Case Title: Groveport Madison Local Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision

Citation: 2013-Ohio-4627

Docket Number: 2012-1476

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Groveport Madison Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion 
No. 2013-Ohio-4627.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-4627 
GROVEPORT MADISON LOCAL SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE, v. 
FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION, ET AL., 
APPELLEES; PUBLIC STORAGE/PUBLIC STORAGE BUSINESS TRUST, APPELLANT 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Groveport Madison Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4627.] 
Taxation—Real property valuation—Subject-matter jurisdiction—Identification of 
legal owner of property in the complaint—Standing. 
(No. 2012-1476—Submitted June 5, 2013—Decided October 24, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2010-A-1290. 
______________________ 
 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} This case concerns the 2008 tax-year valuation of real property in 
Franklin County, Ohio.  The Franklin County Board of Revision (“BOR”) 
reduced the auditor’s valuation of the property in response to a valuation 
complaint, but on appeal, the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) remanded with 
instructions that the BOR dismiss the valuation complaint for lack of jurisdiction 
because the complaint misidentified the owner of the subject property.  A 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
successor owner of the property now argues that the BTA erred in concluding that 
the BOR lacked jurisdiction.  We agree.  Therefore, we reverse and remand this 
matter to the BTA. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} On March 31, 2009, the John W. Messmore Living Trust filed a 
valuation complaint, seeking a reduction of the Franklin County auditor’s 
valuation of a 3.781-acre self-storage facility in southeast Columbus for tax-year 
2008.  The valuation complaint consists of a preprinted form prescribed by the 
Tax Commissioner.  See R.C. 5715.30.  Attorney James Hunter, who is identified 
as the complainant’s agent and the owner’s attorney, signed the complaint on the 
trust’s behalf.  The complaint identifies the trust as the “[o]wner of property” and 
does not identify anyone as “[c]omplainant if not owner.”  The line of the 
complaint labeled “Complainant’s relationship to property if not owner” is blank. 
{¶ 3} In response to the trust’s complaint, the Groveport Madison Local 
Schools Board of Education (“BOE”) filed a countercomplaint, requesting 
retention of the auditor’s valuation of $2,167,100. 
{¶ 4} At a hearing before the BOR, the trust submitted an appraisal, 
which valued the property at $1,600,000 as of January 1, 2008.  Contrary to the 
trust’s identification of itself as the owner of the subject property, the appraisal 
and the auditor’s property record, which was also submitted to the BOR, identify 
the owner of the property as Hamilton-33 Partnership.  The cover letter to the 
appraisal is addressed to John Messmore, Hamilton-33 Partnership.  Both the 
appraisal and the property record list the property owner’s address as 3540 
LaRochelle Drive in Columbus, the same address listed for the trust on the 
valuation complaint.  Despite these inconsistencies regarding the identity of the 
property owner, the BOE did not contest the trust’s standing or the BOR’s 
jurisdiction to hear the valuation complaint.  On May 27, 2010, the BOR ordered 
a reduction of the property value to $1,600,000, as requested by the trust. 
January Term, 2013 
 
3
{¶ 5} The BOE appealed the BOR’s order to the BTA.  The BOE’s 
notice of appeal identifies the trust as the complainant and Hamilton-33 
Partnership as the owner of the subject property.  On May 29, 2012, Hunter 
notified the BTA that the subject property had been sold at sheriff’s sale and that 
the new property owner was Public Storage of Glendale, California. 
{¶ 6} On July 29, 2012, the BOE moved the BTA to remand this matter 
to the BOR with instructions to dismiss the trust’s complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction.  The BOE argued that “the Complaint fails to meet a core procedural 
requirement and must be dismissed,” because it did not identify Hamilton-33 
Partnership as the owner of the property.  Public Storage opposed the BOE’s 
motion.  It conceded that the trust did not hold legal title to the property when the 
complaint was filed, but argued that the trust had standing to file the valuation 
complaint under R.C. 5715.19(A), as the owner of other property in Franklin 
County.  Public Storage submitted screen shots from the Franklin County 
auditor’s website, purporting to show the trust’s ownership of three other 
properties in Franklin County as of the date of the valuation complaint.  The 
screen shots identify the owner of those properties as “Messmore John W Tr.”  
Public Storage also argued that the trust was a party affected by the valuation, as 
required by R.C. 5715.13(A), because it held an ownership interest in Hamilton-
33 Partnership.  The BOE did not expressly contest the trust’s standing, but 
instead focused on the BOR’s subject-matter jurisdiction.  It argued that “[t]he 
sole jurisdictional issue raised in this matter centers around the fact that the face 
of the Complaint as filed fails to identify the legal title holder of record for the 
Subject Property at issue.” 
{¶ 7} The BTA granted the motion to remand for dismissal, holding that 
the BOR lacked jurisdiction over the trust’s complaint because the complaint did 
not correctly identify the legal owner of the subject property.  The BTA refused to 
address Public Storage’s arguments regarding the trust’s standing.  It stated that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
those arguments “have no bearing on whether the property owner, as listed on line 
1 of the complaint, was proper.”  BTA No. 2010-A-1290, 2012 WL 3279121, at 
*2 (July 31, 2012).  Public Storage appealed to this court pursuant to R.C. 
5717.04. 
Analysis 
{¶ 8} This case presents an issue regarding the jurisdictional sufficiency 
of the trust’s valuation complaint.  We review that issue of law de novo.  Akron 
Centre Plaza, L.L.C. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 128 Ohio St.3d 145, 2010-
Ohio-5035, 942 N.E.2d 1054, ¶ 10, citing Toledo Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn. v. 
Lucas Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 490, 2010-Ohio-253, 924 N.E.2d 345, 
¶ 14, fn. 2, and State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-4163, 871 
N.E.2d 1167, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 9} A county board of revision’s jurisdiction to hear and rule on 
complaints is defined by statute.  Elkem Metals Co., Ltd. Partnership v. 
Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 81 Ohio St.3d 683, 686, 693 N.E.2d 276 (1998), 
citing R.C. 5715.01 and 5715.11.  R.C. 5715.01(B) requires each county to have a 
board of revision, “which shall hear complaints and revise assessments of real 
property for taxation.”  R.C. 5715.11 provides that the boards of revision “shall 
hear complaints relating to the valuation or assessment of real property * * * and 
may increase or decrease any such valuation or correct any assessment 
complained of, or * * * order a reassessment by the original assessing officer.” 
{¶ 10} In hearing and ruling on complaints, a board of revision must first 
examine the complaint to determine whether it meets the jurisdictional 
requirements set forth in R.C. 5715.13 and 5715.19.  Elkem at 686.  The board 
must dismiss any complaint that does not meet those requirements.  Id. 
{¶ 11} R.C. 5715.19(A) “establishes the jurisdictional gateway to 
obtaining review by the boards of revision.”  Toledo Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn. at 
¶ 10.  Although a complaint for a decrease in valuation is most frequently filed by 
January Term, 2013 
 
5
the owner of the subject property, R.C. 5715.19(A) provides that “[a]ny person 
owning taxable real property in the county * * * may file such a complaint 
regarding any such determination [including valuation] affecting any real property 
in the county.”  R.C. 5715.13(A) directs that “the county board of revision shall 
not decrease any valuation unless a party affected thereby or who is authorized to 
file a complaint under section 5715.19 of the Revised Code makes and files with 
the board a written application therefor, verified by oath and signature, showing 
the facts upon which it is claimed such decrease should be made.” 
{¶ 12} This court has generally treated full compliance with R.C. 5715.19 
as an indispensible prerequisite to a board of revision’s exercise of jurisdiction.  
Worthington City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio 
St.3d 27, 2009-Ohio-5932, 918 N.E.2d 972, ¶ 17, citing Stanjim Co. v. Mahoning 
Cty. Bd. of Revision, 38 Ohio St.2d 233, 235, 313 N.E.2d 14 (1974) (“full 
compliance with R.C. 5715.19 and 5715.13 is necessary before a county board of 
revision is empowered to act on the merits of a claim”), and Cardinal Fed. S. & L. 
Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 44 Ohio St.2d 13, 336 N.E.2d 433 (1975), 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  But see Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Lake 
Cty. Bd. of Revision, 80 Ohio St.3d 591, 593, 687 N.E.2d 723 (1998) (reversing 
BTA’s dismissal when the appellants substantially complied with R.C. 5715.13 
and 5715.19); Shinkle v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Revision, 135 Ohio St.3d 227, 
2013-Ohio-397, 985 N.E.2d 1243, ¶ 17 (considering whether a requirement in 
R.C. 5715.19 to state a dollar amount for the reduction in value was mandatory 
and thus jurisdictional). 
{¶ 13} In Stanjim, we found that a prior version of the complaint form 
used here was “clearly designed to elicit information required by R.C. 5715.19 
and 5715.13” and that it constituted a “lawful interpretation of the minimal, data 
requirements” of those statutes.  Stanjim at 236.  There, we affirmed a dismissal 
for lack of jurisdiction when the complainant did not complete a portion of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
complaint form entitled “pertinent facts,” despite the statutory requirement that a 
complaint include facts supporting a decrease in valuation.  R.C. 5715.13. 
{¶ 14} The board of revision’s jurisdiction, however, does not hinge on 
complete, technical compliance with the complaint form, and errors in completing 
the complaint form do not necessarily bar the board of revision from exercising 
jurisdiction.  Toledo Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn., 124 Ohio St.3d 490, 2010-Ohio-
253, 924 N.E.2d 345, at ¶ 15.  Notably, failure to provide information requested 
by the complaint form is not a jurisdictional defect when the requested 
information does not fulfill a specific statutory or constitutional requirement.  
Knickerbocker Properties, Inc. XLII v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 119 Ohio 
St.3d 233, 2008-Ohio-3192, 893 N.E.2d 457; Nucorp, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 64 Ohio St.2d 20, 21, 412 N.E.2d 947 (1980).  “While this court 
has never encouraged or condoned disregard of procedural schemes logically 
attendant to the pursuit of a substantive legal right, it has also been unwilling to 
find or enforce jurisdictional barriers not clearly statutorily or constitutionally 
mandated, which tend to deprive a supplicant of a fair review of his complaint on 
the merits.”  (Emphasis added.)  Nucorp at 22. 
{¶ 15} Knickerbocker is particularly relevant to this case.  There, the BTA 
rejected the property owner’s argument that the board of education had failed to 
invoke the board of revision’s jurisdiction because the complaint listed an 
incorrect address for the property owner.  We acknowledged that “[w]hen a 
statute specifically requires a litigant to perform certain acts in order to invoke the 
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal (or the jurisdiction of a court to review 
an administrative decision), the performance of such acts usually constitutes a 
prerequisite to the tribunal's jurisdiction.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Knickerbocker at ¶ 10.  
R.C. Chapter 5715, however, contains no requirement that a valuation complaint 
include the property owner’s correct address. 
January Term, 2013 
 
7
{¶ 16} R.C. Chapter 5715 does place statutory obligations on the board of 
revision to notify a property owner in certain circumstances.  For example, R.C. 
5715.12 requires the board of revision to notify the property owner of a hearing 
before increasing the valuation of the owner’s property.  In Knickerbocker, 
however, we did not equate those obligations with a statutory requirement that the 
complainant furnish the property owner’s correct address.  Rather, we emphasized 
that the responsibility for providing notice lies with the board of revision, not with 
the complainant.  We also noted that “the BOR, through its statutory secretary, the 
auditor, has direct access to the information concerning where to send the notice.”  
Id. at ¶ 13.  Because there was no statutory requirement that a complaint set forth 
a correct, current address for the property owner, we concluded that a 
complainant’s failure to use an appropriate address did not deprive the board of 
revision of jurisdiction.1 
{¶ 17} The BOE has not identified a statutory requirement that a 
complainant correctly identify the legal owner of the subject property in its 
valuation complaint, and we find no such requirement in R.C. Chapter 5715.  
Consistent with Knickerbocker, we reject the contention that the BOR’s statutory 
duty to notify the property owner creates a jurisdictional requirement that the 
complainant correctly identify the owner on the face of the complaint. 
{¶ 18} Here, as in Knickerbocker, the BOR has direct access to the 
identity of the property owner.  Under R.C. 5715.09, the county auditor is the 
secretary of the BOR, and in conjunction with the requirement of R.C. 5301.25 
                                                          
 
1 Knickerbocker did not leave the property owner unprotected.  Despite finding no jurisdictional 
impediment, we held that the board of revision lacked authority to increase the value of the subject 
property without first complying with its statutory obligation to notify the owner and to do so in a 
manner, and at an address, reasonably calculated to reach him, consistent with due process.  
Because the board of revision failed to comply with the statutes requiring it to notify the property 
owner when it sent notice to an incorrect address, we held that the board of revision’s order 
increasing the value of the property was invalid.  Accordingly, we reversed and remanded the 
matter for a new hearing to determine the value of the property after appropriate notice to the 
property owner. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
that deeds and conveyances be recorded, the auditor processes conveyance-fee 
statements submitted by grantees and furnishes indorsements that permit the 
recording of conveyances.  R.C. 317.22; R.C. 319.202.  The auditor is also 
responsible for adopting and using property-record cards pursuant to R.C. 
5713.03.  Indeed, the property record in this case, which correctly identified 
Hamilton-33 Partnership as the owner of the property, was part of the record 
before the BOR.  The BOR’s knowledge of the correct owner is further evident 
from its certification of the transcript of proceedings to the BTA, which identified 
Hamilton-33 Partnership as the property owner.  Moreover, the BOE itself 
correctly identified Hamilton-33 Partnership as the owner in its notice of appeal to 
the BTA.  Inasmuch as the BOR could be expected to utilize the information at its 
disposal to determine where to send notice, it can likewise be expected to consult 
the relevant property-record card and any other information at its disposal to 
determine whether notice is required. 
{¶ 19} The BOE argues that identification of the property owner in the 
complaint is necessary to invoke the BOR’s jurisdiction because it “ ‘runs to the 
core of procedural efficiency.’ ”  This court first discussed the “core of procedural 
efficiency” in Akron Std. Div. of Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Lindley, 11 Ohio 
St.3d 10, 12, 462 N.E.2d 419 (1984), to distinguish between jurisdictional and 
nonjurisdictional statutory filing requirements.  We have subsequently applied a 
core-of-procedural-efficiency test in the context of tax-valuation proceedings.  
See, e.g., 2200 Carnegie, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 135 Ohio St.3d 
284, 2012-Ohio-5691, 986 N.E.2d 919, ¶ 24 (notification requirement in R.C. 
5715.19(B) is jurisdictional because it runs to the core of procedural efficiency); 
Princeton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 94 Ohio St.3d 66, 74, 760 
N.E.2d 375 (2002) (information not required by statute does not run to the core of 
procedural efficiency); Austin Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 46 Ohio 
St.3d 192, 194, 546 N.E.2d 404 (1989) (appellants’ failure to comply with the 
January Term, 2013 
 
9
statutory requirement to file a notice of appeal with both the BTA and the board 
of revision “runs to the core of procedural efficiency and is essential to the 
proceeding”); Salem Med. Arts & Dev. Corp. v. Columbiana Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
80 Ohio St.3d 621, 623, 687 N.E.2d 746 (1998) (filing one notice of appeal with 
the board of revision runs to the core of procedural efficiency). 
{¶ 20} This court recently addressed the jurisdictional requirements for 
contesting a property valuation.  See Shinkle, 135 Ohio St.3d 227, 2013-Ohio-397, 
985 N.E.2d 1243.  We cited the general rule that the exercise of a right to appeal 
conferred by statute “ ‘is conditioned upon compliance with the accompanying 
mandatory requirements.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 17, quoting Zier v. Bur. of Unemp. Comp., 
151 Ohio St. 123, 84 N.E.2d 746 (1949), paragraph one of the syllabus.  We went 
on to state that Zier’s reference to “mandatory requirements” points to the 
importance of distinguishing a mandatory statutory requirement from a directory 
statutory requirement.  Id.  To draw that distinction, courts ask whether the 
statutory requirement runs to the core of procedural efficiency.  Id.  If a statutory 
requirement runs to the core of procedural efficiency, then compliance is 
mandatory and is a jurisdictional prerequisite to pursuing the administrative case. 
{¶ 21} In Shinkle, the complaint did not state the reduction in value 
sought, as required by R.C. 5715.19(D).  Compliance with R.C. 5715.19(D) 
permits the auditor to determine whether it is required to send notice of the 
complaint to interested persons pursuant to R.C. 5715.19(B).2  Notice from the 
auditor, in turn, affords interested persons the right to file a countercomplaint.  
We concluded that the statutory requirement of stating the amount of value on 
which the complaint is based runs to the core of procedural efficiency and is, 
                                                          
 
2 R.C. 5715.19(B) provides, in part, as follows:  [T]he auditor shall give notice of each complaint 
in which the stated amount of overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal 
valuation, or incorrect determination is at least seventeen thousand five hundred dollars to each 
property owner whose property is the subject of the complaint, if the complaint was not filed by 
the owner or the owner’s spouse, and to each board of education whose school district may be 
affected by the complaint. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
therefore, a jurisdictional requirement.  Unlike the statutes we examined in 
Knickerbocker, which placed obligations upon the board of revision and the 
auditor, R.C. 5715.19(D) “explicitly requires the complainant to state the amount 
of value he is putting at issue—and only the complainant can supply that 
information.”  Shinkle at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 22} The cases in which this court has applied a core-of-procedural-
efficiency test to conclude that a requirement is jurisdictional have one factor in 
common: they involve a failure to comply with a requirement imposed by statute.  
The distinction between statutory and nonstatutory requirements is evident in 
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 591, 687 N.E.2d 723, in which 
we addressed jurisdictional challenges based on the manner in which the 
complainants answered questions on the complaint form.  The relevant questions 
involved the increase or decrease in taxable value sought (question seven) and the 
complainants’ justification for the requested increase or decrease (question eight).  
We held that question eight did not elicit factual information required by R.C. 
5715.13, but instead sought an argument in support of a change in taxable value.  
Accordingly, we did not consider whether question eight ran to the core of 
procedural efficiency.  Id. at 595 (summarily stating that “R.C. 5715.13 does not 
require a response to Question 8”).  Question seven, on the other hand, sought 
statutorily required information because R.C. 5715.19(D) requires complaints to 
state the amount of overvaluation or undervaluation claimed.  Therefore, we went 
on to consider whether the complainants’ “somewhat vague” responses to that 
question affected procedural efficiency.  Id. 
{¶ 23} Because there is no statutory requirement that a complainant 
correctly name the property owner in a valuation complaint, we need not 
determine whether the failure to correctly name the property owner runs to the 
core of procedural efficiency.  The procedural importance of particular 
information cannot make the provision of that information a jurisdictional barrier 
January Term, 2013 
 
11
absent a statutory or constitutional requirement.  See Nucorp, 64 Ohio St.2d at 22, 
412 N.E.2d 947.  Thus, the trust’s failure to identify Hamilton-33 Partnership as 
the property owner does not constitute a jurisdictional defect that precludes the 
BOR from reviewing the trust’s complaint. 
{¶ 24} Although we conclude that it is not a jurisdictional requirement to 
correctly name the owner of the subject property in a valuation complaint, our de 
novo review mandates that we also consider whether the trust otherwise invoked 
the BOR’s jurisdiction, when the only basis for standing asserted on the face of 
the complaint is the trust’s erroneous identification of itself as the titled owner of 
the subject property. 
{¶ 25} The BOE argues that the issue of the trust’s standing is separate 
and distinct from the BOR’s subject-matter jurisdiction and that standing is not at 
issue here because the BTA addressed only subject-matter jurisdiction.  Subject-
matter jurisdiction refers to the statutory or constitutional authority to adjudicate a 
case.  Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, 
¶ 11.  Lack of standing, on the other hand, challenges a party’s capacity to bring 
an action, not the subject-matter jurisdiction of the tribunal.  State ex rel. Tubbs 
Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 77, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998).  But, the General 
Assembly has incorporated the requirement for standing into the jurisdictional 
requirements for filing a valuation complaint, as set forth in R.C. 5715.13 and 
5715.19.  “A complaint filed by a person who is not identified by [R.C. 
5715.19(A)] as one who may file a complaint does not vest jurisdiction in the 
board of revision to review the auditor’s valuation.”  Toledo Pub. Schools Bd. of 
Edn., 124 Ohio St.3d 490, 2010-Ohio-253, 924 N.E.2d 345, at ¶ 10.  See also 
Victoria Plaza Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 86 Ohio St.3d 
181, 183, 712 N.E.2d 751 (1999), quoting State ex rel. Tubbs Jones at 77, fn. 4 
(“Standing is jurisdictional in administrative appeals ‘where parties must meet 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
strict standing requirements in order to satisfy the threshold requirement for the 
administrative tribunal to obtain jurisdiction’ ”). 
{¶ 26} Standing is determined as of the commencement of the action.  
Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-
5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 24.  The parties do not dispute that the trust was 
required to have had standing when it filed its complaint in order to invoke the 
BOR’s jurisdiction.  To establish standing as a property owner under R.C. 
5715.19(A), the complainant must own taxable real property in the county at the 
time the complaint is filed.  Soc. Natl. Bank v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Revision, 81 Ohio 
St.3d 401, 403, 692 N.E.2d 148 (1998).  The question here is whether a 
complainant’s failure to accurately assert the basis for its standing on the face of 
its complaint subjects the complaint to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.  We hold 
that it does not.  If the complainant’s standing is challenged, the complainant may 
prove its standing without being bound by what it asserted on the face of its 
valuation complaint. 
{¶ 27} Public Storage argues that the trust had standing to file a valuation 
complaint even though it did not hold legal title to the subject property.  It 
contends that the trust had standing, pursuant to R.C. 5715.19(A), as the owner of 
other real property in Franklin County, and it submitted documentation to the 
BTA in support of that contention. 
{¶ 28} In Soc. Natl. Bank, this court addressed the relationship between 
standing and the board of revision’s jurisdiction.  Society National Bank filed a 
complaint on January 12, 1996, seeking a reduction in the assessed value of 
property for tax-year 1995.  Society owned the subject property from at least 
January 1, 1995, through December 29, 1995.  Thus, Society owned the property 
on the tax-lien date but not when it filed its complaint.  Society’s complaint 
identified the owner of the property as “Society National Bank f.n.a. Toledo Trust 
Company [Owner as of 1-1-95].”  Id. at 401.  In response to the request on the 
January Term, 2013 
 
13
complaint to identify the complainant,  “if other than owner,” Society responded, 
“N/A.”  Id. 
{¶ 29} When a person files a complaint against the property of another, 
the burden to establish standing lies with the complainant.  Soc. Natl. Bank, 81 
Ohio St.3d at 403, 692 N.E.2d 148.  Although a complainant’s assertion of 
standing in its complaint may constitute a prima facie showing of standing, the 
BTA challenged Society’s standing based on Society’s admission in its complaint 
that it had sold the property in question.  The BTA held that Society lost standing 
to file a valuation complaint once it no longer held title to the property.  Id. at 402.  
Looking to R.C. 5715.19(A), we determined that the only classification under 
which Society might have standing was as “ ‘[a]ny person owning taxable real 
property in the county.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 403.  Because Society did not 
own the subject property when it filed its valuation complaint, “it became 
Society’s burden to prove that it owned other taxable real property in the county 
at the time it filed its complaint.”  Id. at 404.  Society’s complaint did not indicate 
that it owned any other real property, but we did not hold that Society’s failure to 
establish standing on the face of its complaint was determinative.  Had Society’s 
failure to correctly identify the property owner and to establish its ownership of 
other property in the county at the time it filed the complaint been fatal, we would 
have affirmed the dismissal of Society’s complaint with no further analysis and 
looked no further than the face of Society’s complaint.  Instead, we looked to all 
the evidence in the record to determine whether Society met its burden of 
establishing standing.  Ultimately, we concluded that “Society did not offer any 
evidence at the BOR hearing or before the BTA to prove that at the time it filed its 
complaint it owned other taxable real property in the county.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Id.  Because Society never presented evidence that it met the threshold standing 
requirement of R.C. 5715.19(A), it failed to invoke the board of revision’s 
jurisdiction.  Id. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
{¶ 30} Soc. Natl. Bank refutes the notion that a failure to accurately 
identify the basis of the complainant’s standing on the face of a valuation 
complaint precludes the board of revision’s exercise of jurisdiction.  Like the trust 
in this case, Society alleged standing as the owner of the subject property but was 
not the owner when it filed its complaint.  In light of the challenge to its standing, 
Society’s subsequent failure to offer evidence at the board of revision hearing or 
before the BTA led us to conclude that Society failed to meet its burden of 
proving standing.  See also Village Condominiums Owners Assn. v. Montgomery 
Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 223, 2005-Ohio-4631, 833 N.E.2d 1230, ¶ 9 
(reviewing the auditor’s property records, a declaration of condominium 
ownership, R.C. Chapter 5311, and statements of counsel while considering 
whether the complainant owned taxable real property in the county for purposes 
of standing). 
{¶ 31} As in Soc. Natl. Bank, a challenge to the trust’s standing required 
that evidence be submitted to establish the trust’s right to maintain the valuation 
complaint.  To that end, Public Storage submitted documentation to the BTA to 
demonstrate that the trust owned three properties in Franklin County when it filed 
its complaint.3  Unlike in Soc. Natl. Bank, the record contains evidence that the 
trust qualified as an entity entitled to file a valuation complaint pursuant to R.C. 
5715.19(A).  Whether the submitted evidence is sufficient to establish the trust’s 
standing is a question to be determined, in the first instance, by the BTA.  At oral 
argument before this court, the BOE’s counsel questioned the sufficiency of the 
                                                          
 
3 Public Storage has also consistently argued that the trust held an ownership interest in Hamilton-
33 Partnership.  R.C. 5715.19(A) provides that in addition to “[a]ny person owning taxable real 
property in the county,” a partner of a partnership owning taxable real property in the county has 
standing to maintain a valuation complaint.  Public Storage has not expressly argued that the 
trust’s interest in the partnership establishes its standing, instead relying on that interest to 
establish that the trust was affected by the valuation of the subject property, as required by R.C. 
5715.13.  Nevertheless, were the evidence to establish that the trust was a partner in the Hamilton-
33 Partnership, that evidence would also establish the trust’s standing to maintain the valuation 
complaint.  
 
January Term, 2013 
 
15
evidence, but the BTA did not consider the parties’ arguments in that regard, and 
Public Storage was not given the opportunity to clarify or present additional 
evidence to eliminate any ambiguity in the evidence because the BTA erroneously 
concluded that the trust’s failure to accurately identify the titleholder of the 
subject property in its complaint was an insurmountable jurisdictional defect.  In 
any event, the complaint’s mischaracterization of the basis of the trust’s standing 
is not a jurisdictional defect, and Public Storage must be afforded the opportunity 
to establish the trust’s standing as of the date that the trust filed its complaint. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 32} Because there is no statutory requirement that a valuation 
complaint accurately identify the legal owner of the subject property, 
identification of the owner is not a jurisdictional prerequisite.  Accordingly, the 
BTA erred in concluding that the complaint’s misidentification of the property 
owner divested the BOR of jurisdiction.  Moreover, once Public Storage 
submitted evidence that the trust owned other real property in Franklin County 
when it filed its complaint, the BTA should have determined whether the trust had 
standing to file its complaint.  We therefore reverse the BTA’s decision, and we 
remand this matter to the BTA to determine whether the trust had standing, 
pursuant to R.C. 5715.19(A), and, if so, to determine the BOE’s appeal on the 
merits. 
Decision reversed  
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, 
JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Sleggs, Danzinger & Gill Co., L.P.A., Todd W. Sleggs, and Robert K. 
Danzinger, for appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
 
Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., Mark H. Gillis, Karol C. Fox, Jeffrey A. 
Rich, and Allison J. Crites, for appellee Groveport Madison Local Schools Board 
of Education. 
__________________