Case Title: State v. Matavale. Concurring Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf]. Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakayama, with whom J. Duffy joins [pdf]. ICA s.d.o., filed 08/15/2006 [pdf], 111 Haw. 204. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 12/21/2006 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 09/14/2007 [pdf].

Citation: 115 Haw. 149

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAMAT'E

 

000

 

STATE OF HAWAT'T, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,

ve.
3)

TIBVA MATAVALE, Petitioner /Defendant -Appellant ga)
Cross-Appellee. Be!

| ony con

 

No. 27476

=
y
s

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(FC-CR. NO, 5-1-1397)

AUGUST 14, 2007

CONCURRING;

MOON, C.J., and LEVINSON, J.; ACOBA, J.,
JOINS

NAKAYAMA, J., DISSENTING, WITH WHOM'DUFFY, J.,

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.
On December 21, 2006, we accepted petitioner/defendant-

appellee Ijeva Matavale’s (Mother) timely

 

appellant /cro:
application for writ of certiorari (application), filed on

November 27, 2006, requesting that this court review the August

29, 2006 judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA),

entered pursuant to the August 25, 2006 summary disposition

 

2 Te should be noted that, although the dissent chai

opinion as “the plurality,” the concurring opinion clearly ag

iyi regarding the first iseue discussed herein.
Been decided by a vnajerity.~

 

  

 

 

aan
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order. Therein, the ICA affirmed the Family Court of the First
Cixcuit’s? August 5, 2005 judgment, convicting Mother of and

ntencing her for the offense of abuse of family or household

 

members, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 709-906

 

(supp. 2005).”
In her application, Mother argues that the ICA gravely

 

erred in affirming her conviction inasmich as: (1) insufficient
evidence was adduced to rebut her parental justification defense

under HRS § 703-309(1) (1993), quoted infra; and (2) the trial

 

court erred in instructing the jury to continue deliberations and
directing the jury to a previously-promulgated instruction on how
to go about in ite deliberations, after the jury had indicated
that it was deadlocked. Respondent /plaintift-appellee/crose-
appellant State of Hawai'i (the prosecution) did not file a
response to Mother’s application.

For the reasons discussed below, we vacate the ICA's
August 29, 2006 judgment and reverse the trial court’s August 5,

2005 judgment of conviction and sentence.

 

‘The Honorable Patrick M. Border presided over the underlying
proceedings
+ MRS § 709-806 provides in relevant part that *[iJ¢ shall be unlawful

for any person, singly or in concert, to physically abuse @ family or
housenoid wember [|

 

 

 
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1. BACKGROUND
AL The Tria:

on April 25, 2005, Mother was charged by way of
complaint with one count of abuse of family or household menbers,
in violation of HRS § 709-906, for “intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly [causing] physical (] abuse" to her fourteen-year-old
daughter (hereinafter, Daughter]. A jury trial commenced on
August 2, 2005 and lasted three days, until August 4, 2005. ‘The
following evidence was adduced at trial.

Daughter testified that, at the time of the incident on
April 15, 2005, she was fourteen years old and living with
Mother, her step-father, and five eiblings. Daughter was
attending Castle High School and was in the fourth and final
quarter of her freshman year. In the first two quarters of
Daughter’s freshman year, she was receiving low grades, including
two Fe. As a result, Daughter and Mother discussed what was
causing the low grades and how Daughter was going to improve
them, to which Daughter “suggested [that she) should go to
tutoring,” and Mother agreed. Daughter began attending the

tutoring cla

 

6 three times a week at the end of January.

However, by February, Daughter was only attending the class once

 

a week and started to “hang out” with her friends at the mall.
By March, Daughter attended tutoring classes “{nJot as much" and

“only when [she] needed help with a specific item.” Daughter was

 
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not keeping up with her homework and continued to “hang out" with
her friends at the mall.

Nonetheless, Daughter led Mother to believe that she
was attending tutoring classes through February and March
specifically, Daughter testified that:

@. (By Defense Counsel:) During thie period of tine
when youl #eopped going eo tutoring, Uie., the nonth of

Bebrasey,| you"told your non that jou were still going eo
fakorig?
er

Ay [By Deughte
G. okay... . And during thie tie in Mazch you were
seit. Ee1liag your som that you were going to tuoring?

  

 

 

(emphasie added.) The third quarter ended after spring break in
March. At the beginning of April, Mother began to question
Daughter as to when she would be getting her report card for the
third quarter, to which Daughter responded that she was unsure as
to the date. Mother testified that:
1X reminded her from Monday{, ies, April 22, 2008/1

Spon‘ forget your report card.” You know I'm looking

forward to see[ing] these grades cone Up."

3 was looking forward because of her request to go to

tutoring. As a mom, Tvant to see chose grades (go) up for
her(-]

 

on Friday, April 15, 2005 (the date of the incident),
Daughter received her report card and found that she “didn’t do
too well.* Daughter, thus, “purposely left (her report card] in
school" even though she knew that Mother was waiting for her
grades. That afternoon, Mother picked Daughter up from school,
along with her brothers and sisters who were talking about their

report cards, in the family van. Mother Grove to Kaneohe
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Elementary School, where she and Daughter waited in the parking
lot while the other children attended Kunon (L.e., tutoring)
classes. Mother remained seated in the driver's seat, and
Daughter sat diagonally behind her in the second row seat of the
van. While waiting in the van, Mother asked to see Daughter’ a
report card, and Daughter answered that she forgot it at school.
Mother testified that, at that monent,

(ile sy mind|, Twas thinking) how could youl, Le,
Daughter,] forget ail along. T've asked [her], you know.
resinded [her] on Monday. i reminded her again on
Wednesday, and Friday came.

 

iim gitting in the driver's seat. I'm thinking, “How
could this be? How could you forget the report card?"

S0\then 1 ask{ed] her again, “How could you forget
your report card, (Daughter)?~ You know I'm looking forward
to seeing you ~- your grades."

ibaughter] didn’t respond right away. I say, “So tell
ne vhere if your Feport card?" "AE school." “where at
School?” "in my social studies textbook.”

init “chat monent (,) 1 tried to put two and two
together. S0'I'm saying -- 50, I. - - asked her = =
purpoely left it there?” And’ the

      

Signe say’

So r'eald her, “Piet
co touch base with ne[-l"

Je tell me the truth, I want you

 

Mother stated that Daughter eventually told her the truth, and,
at Mother's request, Daughter wrote her grades down on a piece of
paper, indicating that she received “four C's, one D and one 1,
iue., an incomplete. Mother testified that she was ‘very
worried" because she “didn’t know if [Daughter] was going to pass
(her classes] or not.”

Nother began questioning Daughter as to why there had

been no improvement of her low grades. Daughter refused to

 
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anawer. Daughter's testimony reveals why she refused to answer

 

Mother's quest ion:

©. Igy Defense Counsel:] okay. And at first you on’e
answer her{,] right?

‘a. [By Daughters) Wo.

O: okay. "On, mom {8 asking you for answers and you're
pot answering ber?

ae tes.

@ Okay. Un, seems ike nom's getting a little bit
frustrates?

Re Dahan. Yes.

. Okay. Um, and Le Se aie

A. Yeah,

0. Sovnon is asking you now, um, because you're
stalling, ‘are you lying to me?"

ctu not to anewer

 

 

Q! ckay. and were you in fact lying to her?

x. ves.

0. Okay. So mom asks you, “what about the tutoring?"
Right?

@! Okay. and -- and you told her that you were etill)
going £0 tuearingl.) right?

 

 

 

° You weren't answering her immediately
every Eine he asked you a question(,] right?

Bo hor

0: Okay. You were kind of stalling?

B! Yes

Q. Okay. Um, stalling for a long period of tine?

BI vee

Q: Okay. Because you didn’t want to answer her?

R! Yes

@! okay. Um, and that’s when mom disciplines youl.)
right?

A. Yes.

According to Daughter, because Daughter was sitting diagonally
behind Mother in the van, Mother could not reach Daughter easily
and used a plastic backpack (belonging to Mother’s younger
daughter), which was about sixteen inches by twelve inches in
size and contained a school folder and a jacket, to hit Daughter.
Daughter, however, used her left arm to block the backpack.

Mother testified that she was trying to hit Daughter’s leg in

 
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order to get her attention: “I'm aiming to her to respond to me.

‘come on. You're not - you're not, um, touching base with me.’*
Mother continued to denand to know whether Daughter had

been attending the tutoring classes, to which Daughter finally

answered “no.” Mother then demanded to know where Daughter had

 

been going inetead. Daughter refused to answer, and, thus,
Nother tried to hit her with a plastic hanger, aiming at
Daughter's thigh. Mother testified that she began hitting
Daughter with the hanger because Daughter “wasn’t responding" to
her questions. Each tine, Daughter blocked the hanger with her
left arm. Daughter estimated that she was hit approximately five
times on the left forearm and upper arm.

Daughter finally told Mother that she had been hanging
out with her friends at the mall instead of going to the tutoring
classes. At this point, Mother “got more frustrated," “thought
that [Daughter] was dishonest," and “felt deceived.” Mother
picked up a “small car brush,” which was about four or five
inches long, and hit Daughter once on the top of her left hand
with the flat eide of the brush. Mother then hit Daughter once
on the knuckles with “the plastic handle" of an unspecified tool.
Mother indicated that she believed she had “to teach [her]
daughter @ lesson, to get back on the right track." Mother

testified that:

 
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E didn’t know it vas -- it was wrong, but 1 di¢ it for =
purpose, “I just wanted the best for my daughter. 7 tele
That she was’ going off the wrong track. Um, 1 felt that she
heedea to get back on the right path, Un, i don't kaow her
whereabouts to where che say, I don’t know who she made
contact with. I felt that she vas taking the risk of, um,
Complacence.

 

cli "em a 26/7 som, 1 support -- 1 support my kids a
Jhundred percent. Un, I just wanted the best for [Daughter]
spd =" because, ‘un, this school year was coming close to an

Us, 1 juct wanted her -- and hopefully that she would
tai grad

        

 

   

Daughter testified that, on the date of the incident,
her left “arm was red and. . . had. . . a few markings from the
hanger." Daughter further described the markinge ae “just lines"

and ‘small . . . like the size of a pencil (1ine}* with “tiny

 

epote of purplish-greenish." then asked whether Daughter “could
«tell from the way that (MJother was hitting [her] how hard
she wae hitting{,]* Daughter responded “not that hard, but it did
cause me pain.* With respect to the level of pain experienced
upon being hit with the various implements, Daughter specifically

teatified:

@. [By the Prosecutor!) Okay. Uh, 80 let’s talk about
fixat when [Mother] vas hitting you with the backpack. Dia
that hare?

7. (By Daughter:) Unban. When it hit ay arm, it
tinged, but after, no,

(. Okay. On'a scale from one to ten, uh, one being
@idn’t really feel it, ten being very painful, ‘how paints
would you say that waa?

Kote backpack?

©. the backpack,

K. mmm, Evo, three.

9: okay. Moving on to the plastic hanger, uh, did --
when Mother] "hit you with She plastic hanger, you said four
itive tines?

“id that hurt?

A. ua, at that point, yes.

0: And, “uh, on & scale from one to ten, how painful
was thse?

A. Mme, Sour, five.

 

 
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9. Okay. Un, che car brush. You said -- you
testified (ehat Mother) mit you on the band with that. Did
chat hore?

Be Now,

0) Teaiga’t nure?

he

@: Okay. And what about the, uh, the tool?

A. tm, “not really.

(Euphases added.) Daughter also stated that ehe was (at the tine
of trial on August 2, 2005) 5/4" or 5/5" and weighed about 150 or
184 pounds. When asked whether Mother vas taller, heavier, and
stronger than she, Daughter responded affirmatively.

As previously indicated, the incident occurred on a
Friday afternoon. That night, Daughter perforred her normal
household chores, i.e., helping to cook dinner and washing the
dishes. on Saturday, Daughter went to a family lv'au; on sunday,
she went to a family gathering/dinner at her grandmother's house
on Monday, Daughter asked Mother whether she was going to school,
to which Mother indicated in the negative after looking at
Daughter's left arm. On Tuesday and Wednesday, Mother let
Daughter decide whether she was going to attend school, and
Daughter decided to stay hone.

on Thursday, April 21, 2005 (six days after the
incident), Daughter decided to return to school. Apparently, a
teacher or counselor spoke with Daughter, which led to the police
being called to the echool. Honolulu Police Department (HPD)
officer Darryl Lee responded to the call from the school. He
testified that he “net with [2 Castle High School] staff| menber,

who] took (him to see Daughter] and. . . instructed [him] that

 
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[Daughter] had visible injuries and . . . that she was abused by
her mother." Officer Lee related that, upon meeting Daughter, he
waked her if she had any injuries. she said that she had

bruises on her forearms -- on her left forearm. And so I looked

 

at the injuries and asked her how she got it, and she said it was
from her mother." He then proceeded to take two photographs of
Daughter's left arm, which photographs were admitted into

state:

   

evidence ai Exhibits 1 (picture of Daughter’s left arm)

 

em). Officer

and 2 (a close-up picture of Daughter’s left fore

 

Lee identified state's Exhibits 1 and 2

   

accurately
representing the injuries he observed on April 21, 2005. When
asked by the prosecution whether he noticed anything in the
state’s Sxhibit 2, Officer Lee responded “[t]he bruise on her,
un, left shoulder area.* On cross-examination, however, Officer
Lee testified to the following:

@. [By Defense Counsel:] . . . (Ylou didn’ actually
see any, uh, yelling, screaming, any kind of incident?
‘Rhy Oeficer Leet] No. T'- 1 didn't witness the

 

 

“Q. okay. Um, and -- let's see. You took photos of
‘chat you did eee?

 

And you didn’t see any other injuries?

   

 

 

"Wo scratches
he.

Okay. No fractures?

Ko.

 

; Okay. Um, and, um, when you met with (Daughter! ,
wasn’t crying?
oe St the tine.
Okay. Un, she wasn’t angry?
Ua, ho.

ror¥orororopoper

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@. Okay. She wasn’t hyaterical?
Ri xe:
9. Chay. Um, and you offi
Q: She ‘retueea?

 

ed to get her medical

With regard to the two photographs taken by Officer
Lee, the prosecution questioned Daughter as follows:

Q. [By the Prosecutors] Looking at State's Exhibit 2,
(Daughter], ‘what are ve looking at here?

"h.  (ay Daughters] Un, my upper are.

@: okay. And, um, at about right in the center of --
alot the center of State's Exnibie 2, there seems to be
Sone redness and discoloration. What are we looking at
there?

A. Us, right here?

9. Yes.

Us, a small brulee.
@! And Below chat, to the lower portion of state's
mxbibit 2, there seens to be another eimilar marking. what

 

 

‘a. The fame
Q: "The sane" meaning another email bruise?

B. veah

@: (ooking at pictures -- uh, the markings on

your am in State's Sxhibite 1 and 2, vou said that they

(Bnphases added.) In addition, Neil Nishikawa, a social worker
employed at Child Protective Services (CPS), who was assigned to
investigate the circumstances surrounding the incident, testified
that:

(Basically, [Mother] said that, uh, she -- she, um, was
Eaiking with [Deughter] about school, that, um, she waa ~
Chat the nature I guess of the conversation crcated = lot of
stress, and she just lost it fore moment and she hit the
Girl. ‘Us, she has since apologized. she hat since, un =
Gnd ivve talked to the girl, and the girl also felt safe at
hone, bo we didn't puree the case at that point~

 

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Further, when asked by defense counsel whether his decision not

 

to remove Daughter from Nother’s home was based upon his finding

 

that the home was safe and that Daughter wi

 

fe being with
Mother, Nishikawa answered in the affirmative.

Mother was also asked about her meeting with Nishikawa.
Specifically, Mother testified:

©. [By the Progecutor:] You admitted co. [tiahtkawa)
that you felt sorry for what you did on the isth; dent that.
Fight?

A. (By Mother:] I -- r admittedly, um, told him that
what T dig, it —- it hurts me co do that to my daughter

(Q. Now aia you have any bruises ~~

X! Excuse me.

Q. =" From that day?

A. No. “IE hurte me, sy feelinge, not physically.

Q. okay. And you felt sorry; Fight?

A. Te hurt me that I'had to take that route to teach
say daughter s lesson.

(@- You had to take that rout

A. Dhave tried other options. Didn't work. I don't.
enink fe asa:

 

 

And Mr. Nishikawa testified that you told hin
‘a gtressfu2 situation which you admitted you
ed; correct?
Re Twas frustrated.

0. Okay. And then you lost control a Little bit.
‘That’e what you told Mr. Nishikawa, tent it?

‘A. Uh, T iost_a little control. T'-~ yet

  

   

At the close of the defense’s case on August 3, 2005,
the trial court gave the jury general instructions, including the
instruction contained on page 16 of the jury instructions, which
reads:

A verdict must represent the considered judgnent of
each juror, and in order to return s verdict, it is
Recestary that each juror agree thereto. In other worde,
your verdict must be unanimous.

Bach of you mist decide the case for yourself, but it
4s your duty to consult with one another and to deliberate
vith a view to reaching an agreenent, if you can do #0
Without violating your individual judgnent, in the cours

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of your deliberations, do not hesitate to re-examine your
Own views and change your opinion if convinced it is
erroneous. But do not surrender your honest belief ae to
the weight or effect of evidence for the mere purpose of
returning a verdict.

‘he trial court further instructed the jury on the elements of

the offense of abuse of family or household menbers, as contained

 

in HRS § 709-906, and the parental justification defense in HRS
§ 703-309(1).

on the eae day, after closing argunents, the jury
deliberated for two hours before being excused for the day.
After less than three hours of deliberation on the next day,
August 4, 2005, the jury sent “Communication No. 1,* stating:
vWe are in @ deadlock decision. What next?* The trial court’s
proposed response -- “Continue your deliberations. see page 16
of the instructions" -- was objected to by the prosecution. The
prosecution, relying on State v. Fajardo, 67 Haw. 593, 699 P.2d
20 (1985), believed that the more proper response was “Would more
time assist you in. . . reaching a unanimous verdict?" Defense
counsel, on the other hand, objected to any response, contending
that the jury had indicated a final position that they were
deadlocked. Nevertheless, the trial court instructed the jury as
proposed, i.#., “Continue your deliberations. see page 16 of the
jury instructions.” Approximately two hours later, the jury
indicated that it had reached a verdict, finding Mother guilty as

charged.

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On August 5, 2005, before sentencing, Mother renewed
her motion for judgment of acquittal,‘ which was denied. Mother
then moved for a mistrial, arguing that:

Your Wonor, this is in response to the communication
umber one from the Jury which indicated that, un, hey were
Ena deadlock decision. Defense objects to the court's
Snetruceions because it anounced to sa Allen
instruction *) which gave the jury an impre

deadlock was not an appropriate cutcome to
believed that no further response was necessary.

     

  

‘The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial and imposed
sentence of two years probation with two days’ imprisonment. The
judgment of conviction and sentence was entered that same day,
August 5, 2005. On Septenber 1, 2005, Mother timely filed a
notice of appeal.©

c. Appeal Before the Ick

on appeal, Mother raised two points of error, to wi

 

(2) the trial court erred in convicting her becauee the
prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Mothers discipline of Daughter was not inminized by the parental

 

justification defense codified in HRS § 703-309(1); and (2) it

+ At the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief, Mother had orally
noved for 2 judgeent of acquittal, whics motion wae denied.

 

© An Allen instruction is traditionally understood a8 an instruction
to work towards unanimity by considering the views of othere when a jury hat
Yeached an impasse in sts deliberations." fodrique: y. Marshall. 128 P38

739, 750 (9th Cir, 1997) (citation omitted) »

 

 

, Payton v. Woodtord, 299 7.34 615 (Sth Cir, 2002)> The case that
Gives the instruction ite nane is , 164 U.S. 452 (1896).

‘Allen v. United states,
nie court specifically rejected the use Of the Align inetruction in Palards
7 Haw. at 601, 699 P.24 ae 25

 

“on September 13, 2005, the prosecution filed its notice of cross-
appeal, challenging the trial courts order pertaining to bail pending appeal.
However, the issue is not before this court.

 

we
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was reversible error for the trial court to instruct the jury to
continue with its deliberations after it had declared it could
not reach @ unanimous verdict. On August 15, 2006, the ICA
iwaued ite summary disposition order, affirming the trial court's
Auguet 5, 2005 judgment and sentence. Specifically, the ICA

resolved Mother's points of error as follows:

 

2, (Mother] contends the {prosecution} adduced
insufficient evidence et trial to lsprove her parental
(justification) defence. Tala point lacks serit, There ae
substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. State

; 81 Hawar't 132, 135, 139, 913 P.2a 5, 61, 65

 

(ise).

For her other point of error on appeal, [Mother]
contends the (erlal) court comitted ‘reversible error” by
Instructing the Jury te continue deliberstions and directing
the jury te a previcusly-promilgsted instruction on how £0
Go about ies deliberations, after the jury had indicated it
as ung. He disagree

Pitee, a plain reading does not reasonably raise the
inference that the instruction "directes the jury to matters
Gutside the evidence presented,- [Mother's] opening Brief at
32, or “inplicitly led the jury to believe it'was held
hostage by the coure until a verdict was agreed on." Id. at
ie. oe, State v. Villesa, 72 Maw. 327, 335, 617 P.24 1054,
30Se (a9s1) ("it was error for che trial court co instruct
the Jury that Le must unanimously decide that Le wae unable
ko reach @ verdict:

‘Second, the instruction cannot be reasonably
Anterpreted a2\"a subtle form of the Allan eharge(-]*
Opening Brief at 23. Ck, Sate 1. Faiarda, 67 Haw. 99,
Gbo-01, 699 P.24 20, 26-25" (1965) [error to give the Jury an
Allen charge -- that a deadlock means the case sust be
Fetries, and that minority jurors should reconsider in Light
of their status as such).

Finally, the {trial} court’s response to the jury's
report of deadlock was consonant with the relevant case lav.
"Hed the trial court simply repeated an instruction given
earlier to the jury on how to go about ite deliberations, we
feel that no prejudicial effect vould have befallen
Imother].*" 1d, at 601, 699 P.2d at 28 (footnote omitted)
See also Villeza, 72 Haw, at 335, 637 P.zd at 1058-59 (when
the jury advised the court chat it vas unable to reach a
verdict, the trial court properly exercised its discretion
Tn determining chat the jury might not be “deadlocked” and
by providing ehe Jury with a complete set of the Jury
instructions")

   

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

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othe instructions, when considered as a whole, were
not prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, oF
misleading,” id, at 353, 617 P.2d at 1057. (citations
oaitted), and thus the (trial) court properly fulfitied te
Sobligation to exexeise ite broad discretion to obtain
verdict from the jury." Id. at 333, 817 P.ld at 1086
(Gitation omitted)

 

(original brackets omitted.) Subsequently, on August 29, 2006,
the ICA entered its judgment on appeal. Mother timely filed her
application on November 27, 2006, which this court granted on
Decenber 21, 2006.” Oral argument was held on April 24, 2007
um. sm REVIEW

AL Wed of Certiorar:

This court reviews the decision of the ICA for
(2) grave errors of law or of fact or (2) obvious inconsistencies
in the decision of the ICA with that of the suprene court,

federal decisions, or its own decisions. HRS § 602-59(b) (Supp.

2006) .
B. Sufficiency of Evidence

ie have long held that evidence adduced in the trial
court mist be considered in the strongest light for the
prosecution when the appellate coure passes on the lege)
Bufeiciency of such evs ‘conviction; the
jane standard applies whether the case was before a judge oF
a-jury.. The test on appeal is not whether guilt ie
Zablished beyond s reasonable doubt, but shether there was
tential evidence to support the conclusion of the trier
din a bench trial

 

  

 

 

of fact. indeed, even if ie could be
Chat the conviction ie against the weisnt of the evidence.
‘a5 long as there ie substantial evidence te support the
Hequisite findings for conviction, the trial court will be
affirmed

 

1 We pernitted the parties to file supplenental briefs on the sole
issue “whether the [trial ‘clourt comitted reversible error uhen it instructed
the jury to continue deliberations and directed the jury to a previcusly-
promulgates instruction after the jury had indicated that it vas deadlocked.~
Nother filed a supplenental brief, which expanded on the argument expressed in
her application, on February 20, 2007. The prosecution did not file =
supplenentel brief

 

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yeubecantial evidences as to every material element of
the offense charged is credible evidence which is of
sufficient quality and probative value to enable (a person]
of reasonable caution to support a conclusion, And ss trier
of fact, the trial judge is free to make all reasonable and
Fational inferences under the facts in evidence, sncludieg
cizcunstantial evidence.

   

 

 

State v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 248-49, 631 P.2d 924, 931 (1992)
(citations omitted)
ar. SION
As previously stated, Mother maintains that the ICA
gravely erred in affirming the judgment of conviction and

sentence wher

 

(2) there was insufficient evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mother's conduct was not justified
as parental discipline; and (2) the trial court issued what
amounted to an Allen instruction after receiving a communication
from the jury that it wae deadlocked.
A, Sufficiency of Evidence and the Parental Justification
Defense

Mother does not dispute that she used physical force
upon Daughter. However, Mother contends that the evidence
proffered by the prosecution was legally insufficient to disprove
her defense of parental discipline. As such, Mother believes
that her conviction for abuse of family or household members was
not supported by sufficient evidence. We agree with Mother.

Preliminarily, we recognize that “an appellate court
will not overturn a conviction by a jury if ‘viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the [prosecution], there is

substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of

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fact.‘” State v, Moniz, 92 Hawai'i 472, 992 P.2d 741 (App.
1999), cert, denied, 92 Hawai'i 472, 992 P.2d 741 (2002) (qucting
State v. Matias, 74 Haw, 197, 207, 640 P.24 374, 379 (1992).

However, this court has, on numerous occasions,

 

‘sa:, Gtare 2 Basanga, 93 zee, 2
+ 230 (2000) ; State v. Bautista, 86 Havel"! 207,
8'p.2d 1048, oss (1987); stake Z, Malufau, 60

326, 133, 906 P.2d 612, 619, vacated in parton
other crouids, 60 Hawai'i 126, 906 ?.2¢ 612 (1995)) Skate v.
Eucke, 56 aw. 129, 152, 531 P.24 ess, ase (2975).

State v. Jones, 96 Hawai's 162, 180, 29 P.3d 351, 370 (2001)

   

 

(emphasis added)
We begin our analyeie with the well-established
principle that "parental rights are of constitutional dimension."
Inxe Doe, 99 Hawai'i 522, 522, 57 P.3d 447, 457 (2002). A
parent's right to direct hie or her child’s upbringing has found

protection in both the federal and Hawai'i constitutions. See

Ad. at 932-33, 57 P.3d at 457-58; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 213-18 (1972); Bierce v, Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy
Names of Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); but

see Sveaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1365, 1391 (sth Cir.
1997) (although a parent has a privilege to use reasonable oF
moderate physical force to control behavior, there is no absolute
constitutional right to strike a child). The state, however, in
the interest of protecting the child's welfare, has a right to
Limit parental freedom in raising their children. Prince v
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-67 (1944). To this end, our

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ee

legislature has carved out a law, i.e., HRS § 703-309(1),
recognizing a parent's privilege to exercise physical control
over a child go long as it does not result in harm to the child

As originally enacted, HRS § 703-309(1) (1985) provided that:

‘me use of force upon or toward the person of anc!
ip justifiable under the following circumstances:
(2) the actor is the parent or guardian or other
Person similarly Pesponeible for the general
Care and supervision of @ minor, or a person
scting at the request of such parent, guardian,
Of other responeibie person, and:
a) ree ie purr
fatequarding or promotina the welfare of
She einer, ineiuding the prevention or
Sstleiment of his misconduct, and
(») ‘The force aed is not_desianed to cause or
news £o-creste 2 substantial righ of

Sausing death. serious bodily iniuny.
Sistiauresent= exttene pain or mental
‘Sistrese. or arose deavacation.

 

 

(Gmphases added.) The commentary to HRS § 703-309(1) indicated
that the statute “sete a fairly simple and unexceptionable
standard; the right of parents to use force to discipline their
children is recognized, subject to clear requirements not to
cause permanent injury." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, HRS

5 703-309(2) (1985) is derived from and is identical to section

§ 3.08(2) of the Model Penal Code. Compaxe HRS § 703-309(1) with
Model Penal Code § 3.08(1) (1965); see genexally Conf. Comm. Rep.
No. 1, in 1972 House Journal, at 1035, and in 1972 Senate
Journal, at 734. Specifically, the drafters of the Model Penal

code set forth the following comments regarding section 3.08(1):

‘The formation ja in some reapects less_atringent than that
in'Gection i47 of the Reptatement of Torts, which ebeaks of

be Sressonabl Bes =

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E 2 -
To require belief in necessity to avoid criminal conviction
was thought to be too extrene, Parente my defensibiy us
force less on the basis of « judgnent of neceseity than
simply with the belief that it is an appropriate preventive
Or cofrective measure. ‘Hence,

 

 

exercising parental authority aces for the mipose of

sees sof oF put uct
stantial ox ries

™ ation ale from ent in

believed that eo long asa parent Uses moderate force for
permissible purposes, the criminal law should not provice
for review of the reasonableness of the parent's. Suagnest.
of course, even ifs statute includes language about
necessity ‘or Feasonableness or both, it would be
extraordinary for a parent using moderate force for 2
Permissible purpose to be prosecuted because of alejudgnent.

 

 

 

Tous ,] the less stringent language of the Model Code is
unlikely to make a great practical difference, but it does
suore accurately refiect the latitude that is actually given
to judgeente of parente in disciplining their children

State v. Kaimimoky, 9 Haw. App. 345, 351-52, 841 P.2d 1076, 2079-
80 (1992) (quoting Model Penal Code § 3.08, Comment (1979)

 

(format altered) (some emphases added) (some emphases omitted) .
In other words, the original HRS § 703-309(1) granted “to parents
considerable autonomy to discipline their children, and[,] as

long as parents use moderate force for permissible purposes in

 

* Restatement (Second) of Torte § 147 (1965) provides that:

(2) & parent is privileged to apply such reasonable force or
£0 impose such reasonable confinement upon his child ae he
reasonably believes to be necessary for ite proper control,
training, ‘or education.
(2) One other than « parent who has been given by law or hae
voluntarily assuned in waole or in part the function of
controlling, ‘training, or educating « child, ie privileged
to apply such reasonable force or to inpose such reasonsble
confinenent as he reasonably believes to be necessary for
Ste proper control, training, or education, except in to far
the parent has restricted the privilege of one whon he
‘entrusted the child.

 

 

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disciplining their children and do not create a substantial risk
of the excessive injuries specified in subsection (1) (b), they
wi11 not be criminally liable.” Id. at 352, 841 P.2d at 1080.

In Kaimimoku, the trial court found the defendant -
father's use of force against his seventeen-year-old daughter
unjustified under HRS § 703-309(1) (1985) and convicted the
father of abuse of a family or household member. 9 Haw. App. at
348, 841 P.2d at 1078. In that case, the father slapped his
daughter on the face and punched her shoulder, leaving a scratch
and a bruise, and causing some pain of unknown duration. Id. at
347-48, 641 P.2d at 1077. The father testified that he used
force on his daughter to punish her for yelling profanities at
him, disobeying him, and being disrespectful. Id. at 352, e842
P.2d at 1080. The daughter admitted that she yelled profanities
at her father and did not obey him when he told her not to do so.
Id.

In reversing the father’s conviction, the ICA
determined that the elements of the parental justification
defense contained in HRS § 703-309(1) (1985) had been met, to
wit: (1) the father was undisputedly the parent of the daughter;
(2) “{t}here [was] no evidence on the record that [the fJather
struck (his dlaughter for any purpose other than for punishment’;
and (3) the force used was “not designed to cause or known to
create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily

injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distres

 

or gros:

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degradation.” Id, at 32, 642 P.2d at 1080 (internal quotation
marke and citation omitted). In reaching ite concluaicn that the
force used was within the bounds afforded to the father aa a
parent, the ICA relied upon state v. Deleon, 72 Haw. 242, 813
P.2d 1362 (1991).

In Deleon, the defendant-father waa convicted of abuse
of family or household menbers upon the trial court’s finding
that he was guilty of causing ‘extrene pain," a prohibited result
under HRS § 703-309(1) (b) (1985), when he struck his fourteen
year-old daughter with a folded belt. Id. at 242, 013 P.2d at

1383. The undisputed facts revealed that:

The daughter testified that her father cold her every day
not to have her friends to the house. even so, (the
Gaughter’s) friends were usually there when [the father)
cane hone fror work.” (The father] had told [the daughter]
that if she Violated the house rules, he would spank her
with @ belt.” Nevertheless, according to her testimony, she
Getiberately brought her friends hone every day

‘on the day in question, [the father] heard [the
Gaughter] and her friends inthe houre and a gifl was
crying. three friends were with (the daughter] in her room.
(The Father] callea (the daughter] ‘out of her room and asked
what happened to [her friend who was crying] "Ke got no
Satistactory answer. He told. (the cauguter's] friende to go
hhome bot they refused. At thie point,
Sauahter] tr crisscross

on her stretch nants, above the knees. wish a 36-inch long
Bele. fale ras

wide. (The daushter] testified that she felt a little cain,
Ehat tie apanking atune her. and that the pain lasted an

hour -and es
cried for halt athour...

‘The police officer testified that{,] at 6:00 p.m., he
checked (the daughter's) lege and parts of her body Zor
injuries. He found a

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

The raised skin area
‘sae about three to three anda half inches wide and about
four and a half to five inches long.

ait sere fussing fiom

‘rey or Blas.

 

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eee

Id. at 242-43, 613 P.2d at 1363 (emphases added). We reversed

 

the father’s conviction, concluding that the pain inflicted upon
the daughter by her father did not “come, in degree, anywhere
near death, eerioue bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme mental
distress or groee degradation." Id, at 244, 613 P.2d at 1364.
In so concluding, we employed "the ancient canon of
construction,” noscitur a sociis, i.e., that “the meaning of
words or phrases in a atatute may be determined by reference to
the meaning of words or phrases associated with it,” State
Crouser, 81 Hawai'i 5, 13 n.6, 912 P.2d 725, 733 n.6 (2996), to
interpret the phrase “extreme pain” by examining the other
statutorily prohibited reeulte under HRS § 703-309(1) (b) .

In 1992, the legislature, in considering an amendment
to HRS § 703-309(2) (1985), expressly recognized -- through the
adoption of a standing committee report by the Senate Judiciary

Committee -- that

 

‘the line between physical abuse and appropriate parental
Glecipiine is a very subjective one. what one parent
Considers discipline may seem abusive to another. Your

 

eet 0 en rents (and)
Sosrdiane |. when determining guilt in a criminal trial.
ed zis iiseipls

Tea naserity of the comunity would find the extent of che
puniahsent inappropriate.

sen. Stand. Comm, Rep. No. 2493, in 1992 Senate Journal, at 1122
(emphases added). In its attempt to best “draw the line,” the
legislature amended HRS § 703-309(1) (1985) to include the

following underscored new language in subsections (1) (a) and

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(2) (®) and to remove the terns “death” and “gross degradation”

from subsection (1) (b) +
‘The use of force upon or toward the person of ancther
is justifiable under the folloving circumstances
(2) The actor is the parent or guardian or
other person similarly responsible for the
general care and supervision of a minor,
Sr a person acting at the request of the
parent, guardian, or other responsible
Person, and:
(a) The force {s emploves with due
regard for the ace and size of

 

 

  

 

‘She sinor and is reasonably

elated £5 tbe purpose of

feguareing or promoting the

Welfare of the minor,

Sncluding the prevention or
puniehnese of he minor's
Bigconduct; aad.

(») Fhe force used 4 not designed to
Cause of known to create a risk of
causing gubstantial bodily injury,
Sietigurenent, extrene pain or

mental distress, or neursloaical,
amass

 

(onphases added.) See 1992 Haw. Sees. L. Act 210, § 1 at 554
The legislature indicated that the purpose of the
aforementioned amendments was ‘to limit the amount of force that
parents and guardians can legally use in disciplining their
children to that which ie reasonable or moderate.“ Sen. stand.
comm. Rep. No. 2208, in 1992 Senate Journal, at 1022 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphases added); Conf. Comm. Rep. No
103, in 192 House Journal, at 843. The amendments also brought
the eubject statute "much closer to the formulation found in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 147[, see supra note é,] and that
used by a substantial majority of other jurisdictions.” state v.
Growser, 61 Hawai'i 5, 12, 911 P.2d 725, 732 (1996) (citation

omitted). As the conference committee report regarding the

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amendments makes clear, the amendment to subparagraph (a) of
subsection (1) was

intended to further clarify the Jevel_of force one may use
upon minore(.]. In determining whether or not the Level of
force ie permitted under law, @ court must consicer the age
and size of the recipient and vhether « reasonable
Eelationship existe between the force Used and 2 legitimate
Purpose ae specified in the statute

 

Conf. Comm, Rep. No. 103, in 1992 Senate Journal, at 783
(emphases added). Also, according to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, the amendment to subparagraph (b) of subsection (2)
was intended to lower the standard of harm

by lowering the level of risk, and
i which’ ip less than “eubstantial” a6
Gefined In section 707-700 of the Hawai'i Penai coge.()
While the permissible level of injury may still eppear high,
it is clearly @ lover and nore appropriate threshoié.

By using terms in the Hawaii Penal Code, your
committee believer that the standard Je clearer “Zor both the
Rolice and the public tc underesand and foliow

Sen. Stand. Conm. Rep. No. 2208, in 1992 Senate Journal, at 1022-

 

 

 

    

23 (emphases added). The legislature, nevertheless, opined that
“the terms retained from the prior law. . . mist be
reinterpreted by the courts, since the changes affect the
application of the rule of construction applied in [Deleon].
Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2493, in 1992 Senate Journal, at 2123.

However, the legislature expri

 

ly indicated that “the changes

 

> ssubetantial bodily injury’ ie defined as bodily injury which caus

 

(2) A major avulsion, laceration, or penetration of the
akin;

{2) A burn of at least second degree severity:

(3) 2 bone fracture

(a) A serious concussion; or

(5) A tearing, rupture, or corrosive damage to the
Gsophagus, viscera, oF other internal orgai

 

ns § 707-700 (Supp. 2006).

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[were] not intended to create a standard under which the result
in Deleon would have been different. The force used by the
father in Deleon, as described in the decision, did not exceed

 

Tn 1996, this court, in Crouser, wi

 

called upon to
apply the amended statute for the first time, In affirming the
defendant's conviction, we concluded, inter alia, that the force
used exceeded the permissible level of discipline under the

statute. Crouser, 81 Hawai'i at 12-23, 911 P.24 at 732-33. The

 

undisputed facts revealed that the fourteen-year-old complainant,
who was a special education student, lived with her mother and

her mother’s boyfriend (the defendant). Id, at @, 911 P.2d at

mm an attempt to istinguish Deleon and Kaiminoku from the instant
case, the dissent asserts that,

 

waite the corporal punishments in Deleon { (hitting Daughter
lbove the knees aix to ten times with a folded belt)) and

 

" sgurenent,
fextrene pain or mental distress, or gross degraaation,” HRS
§ 703-3052) (b) (1985), neither thie court Sm Deleon, nor the
ICA in Raiminoks, comented se to whether such punishments
complieg with the greater linitations imposed on parental
Giseipline by [the 1992 amendment, i.e.,] HRS

§ 703"309%2) (b) (3993).

 

Dissenting op. at 21-12 (bold emphasis added). we rote, hovever, that pelecs
was decided in 1991 -- obviously, before the i992 anenduent was even
Considered by the legislature, ‘it is, therefore, inconceivable that thie
Court could or would comment on an anendnent that had not yet been paseed.
Noreover, although Kainineku was decides by the ICR six nonthe after the
effective date of the 1992 anenanent, the 1985 version of the parental
Justification defense controlled inasmuch ae the incident giving rise to the
affense charged in that case occurred on Pebruary 13, 421, 9 Raw. App. at’
346, e¢1 F.2d at 1077. Consequently, any comment by che ICA ae to the
inapplicable anendnent would have bean dicts,

 

   

   

 

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728. The complainant was required by her mother and the

defendant to bring hone a daily progress report signed by her
teachers. Id, However, on the day of the incident, the
complainant forgot to pick up the report from her counselor for
her teachers to sign. Id. She apparently used an old report and
changed some of the grades and her attendance record. Id. Upon
learning of the conplainant’s action, the defendant went to the
complainant's bedroom and

called her @ lar and hit her across both sides of her face,
Jnocking her to the floor. Ae she wae trying to get up,

[the defendant) grabbed hor and threw ber face down on the
bed. Recording to the (complainant's) testimony, [the
Gefendant] put his knee on [the complainant's] back, pulled
her panté end underwear Gow to her knees, and started
Nthacking" ner bare buttocks. Moen (the defendant] left the
room, (ehe complainant] pulled up her underwear and pants
bot (the defendant] returned with s plastic bet and closed
the door. Ke again pulled down (herl pante and underwear
and struck her with the bat on the suttocks, arm, thighs,
find torso until the bat broke. (The complainant} could sot
fCnenber the number of times chat she had been struck, but
testified that che incident lasted approximately thirty
minutes

 

 

 

Id. The complainant t

 

eified that she had a hard tine sitting
and felt dizzy for an hour or 90, and her bottom hurt for a
couple of weeks after the incident. Id. She further stated that
she could not sit on a hard student chair at school and stood in
some of her classes. Id, The school counselor and the health
aide both testified that the complainant's buttocks were bruised
and colored a deep reddish-purple. Id. at 8, 911 P.24 at 729.

We initially declared that, to invoke the parental
justification defense under the anended HRS § 703-309(2), the

defendant

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wae required to make @ showing that the record contained
Evidence eupporting the following elemente: (2) he [or she]
was a parent, guardian, or other person at described in ERS
$ 703-3013); (2) he [or shel used force against a winor for
‘whose care and supervision he [or she] vas responsible; (3)
Bis [or her] use of force was with due regard to the age and
size of the recipient and Feagonably relates to the purpose
Of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the mincr,
Incluaing the prevention or punishrent of misconduct; and
(4) the force used wae not designes £0 cauee, or known £0
create a risk of causing, substantial bodily injury,
Gistigurenent, extreme pain or nental Gistrese, oF
neurological danage.

 

 

 

 

 

dy at 10-12, 911 P.2d at 730-31 (citations and footnote

omitted). We also stated that:

Although we have found no other statute employing the
identical language (Contained in the current Version of IRS
§ 703-309(2) (a)], st scene clear that to be “reasonably
Felated" to the purpose of punishing misconduct, use of

force must be both reasonably nroportional <0 the misconduct
‘being puniahed and reasonably believed neceuaary to protect

ghe welfare of the recipient. subsection (b) of HRS § 703"

309{7) defines the maximum degree of force that ie

justifiable under ehe evatute. Subsection (a), as amended,
yr that physical discipline may be 40 excessive

'g no longer Featonably related to safeguarding the

welfare of the minor, even if it does not exceed the bounds

et in subsection tb).

 

 

 

      

Id, at 12, 911 P.2d at 732 (emphasis added).
Upon considering, inter alia, (1) the age and size of

 

the complainant, (2) testimony that the force wi

 

caused the complainant to be unable to sit in her clai
(3) the nature of the injuries, we held that the force used by
the defendant was not reasonably related to protecting the

complainant's welfare. Id. at 12, 911 P.24 at 732. we further

 

held that the force inflicted upon the complainant exceeded the
permissible level of discipline. Id. at 12-13, 911 P.2d at 732-

33. As we explained,

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[iJnterpreting *extrene pain’ noacitur @ gociie vith
substantial bodily injury, las defined tn" fia # 707-700
Eupia note $,] we believeld the complainant's) pain was,
Comparable in degree to the other statutorily forbidden

fSults, such as 2 laceration of the skin or a burn of

 

 

 

 
 

was that. vextrene pain for aay

unable £0 sit without pain for weeks.

Id. at 13, $21 P.2d at 733 (enphasie added). Moreover, we
rejected the defendant’s assertion that HRS § 703-209(1) is void
for vagueness because the subject statute “describes, with

sufficient clarity, the level of force that may justifiably be

 

used in the discipline of a minor,” stating that

Society recognizes the primary role of parents in
preparing chiléren to sssune the obligations and
Pesponsibilities of adulthood, and it is well-established
that parents have a privilege to subject children to
Fesscnable corporal punishment. On the other hand, child
abuse ie @ serious and widespread problen, and the state nae
2 powerful interest in preventing and devarring ene
battering of children. ‘section 703-309 (2) represente the
Balance struck by the legislature between these competing

 

 

at 14, 911 P.2d at 734 (citation omitted) .

In State v. Stocker, 90 Hawai'i 85, 976 P.2d 399

(1999), we revisited the Crouser court’s interpretation of the

 

phrase "reasonably related" and declined to overrule Crouser.
Id, at 94, 976 P.2d at 408. In Stocker, the defendant-father was
convicted of harassvent for slapping hie eleven-year-old son
across the face when the son refused to obey the father’s
repeated instruction to cone to him. Id, at 88, 976 P.2d at 402.
In reviewing the evidence in stacker, namely, the son's testimony
that (1) his father slapped hin as a result of his failure to

come to him after several commands and (2) the fact that the slap

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was (a) ‘with an open hand," (b) “didn’t hurt . . . only hurt a
little bit," and (c) left no mark or bruise, thie court concluded

that a "single, mild slap to the face" wi

 

reasonably
proportional to the son’s misconduct. Id, at 96, 976 P.2d at 420
(ellipsis in original) (brackets and internal quotation marks

omitted). We, thus, reversed the father’s conviction, concluding

that the prosecution failed, as a matter of law, to negate the

 

father’s parental justification defense. Id, at 95-96, 976 P.2d
at 409-10. We further indicated that, although “the
eoiplature’s 1992 amendments to HRS § 703-309(1) accorded the
courts greater leeway to determine the parameters of permissible

parental discipline, they did not eradicate a parent's
1d fores ens

misconduct.* Id. at 96, 976 P.24 at 410 (emphases added).

In contvast, the ICA in State v. Tanielu, 82 Hawai'i
373, 922 P.2d 986 (App. 1996), agreed with the trial court that
the “viciousness of the attack [the] defendant was involved in
severed any relationship between the use of force and the welfare
of [the d]aughter which might be considered ‘reasonable.’" Id.
at 381, 922 P.2d at 994 (some internal quotation marks omitted) .
In that case, the defendant kicked his fourteen-year-old daughter
in the shin, slapped her six to seven tines, punched her in the
face five to ten times, stomped on her face, and pulled her ears
after discovering that she, inter alia, viclated his orders not
to see her verbally and physically abusive eighteen-year-old

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boyfriend. Id, at 276-77, 922 P.2d at 989-90, The ICA held
that, based on the nunber and nature of the slaps, punches, and
kicks inflicted upon the daughter and the police officer's
observation of the daughter's lacerations and contusions, the
fanily court did not err in rejecting the parental justification
defense. Id.; see aleo State v. Miller, 105 Hawai'i 394, 98 7.34
265 (App. 2004) (holding that the punching in the face and the
multiple kicking in the ribe of an eleven-year-old complainant,
as well as evidence of bleeding on the head and scratches to the
facial area and ears, were clearly not reasonably related to the
purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the
complainant)

In the present case, the critical inquiry is whether
the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to negate Mother’s
defense of parental discipline. we believe the prosecution has
not done 80.

When @ question of parental discipline is raised, the

prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

 

4 the digsent believes that Croueer, Miller, and Zanielu “provide
Little assistance in determining whether the corporal punishment delivered by
Nother is insufficient to constitute abuse as a matter of law’ because thove
Cases “do not establish the minimum degree of punishment that will constituce
Shuse(.1* Dissenting Op. at 7, Although, as stated infra, each c

[ivelving the alleged abuse of 2 child must be reviewed on # case-by-case
daria, the aforenentioned cases not only provide guidance in understanding the
evelution and interpretation of HRS §'703"309(2), but also serve to illustrate
the kind of conduct that clearly falle outeide the paraneters of parental
Giscipline. On the other hand, Stocker -~ a case decided after the 1952
anendhent -- gesonstrates the cther side of

Conduct that fella within the parameters of
more fully infra, the facts of this case, in our view, Gictate that the force
Used by Méther wae not #0 excessive as to exceed the boundaries of parental
Siscipline

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

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here, Mother's -- conduct did not cone within the

 

parent's

cope of parental discipline

 

prescribed in HRS § 703-309(1).
See Crouser, 81 Hawai'i at 11, 921 P.2d at 731 ("the progecution
had the burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt the
justification evidence that was adduced, or proving beyond a
reasonable doubt facts negativing the justification defense")
(citation omitted)). As previously discussed, the legislature,
in creating the parental justification defense law, recognized
the right of parents to discipline their children; that right,
however, is not absolute. In other words, parente may be
justified in physically disciplining their children, but such
discipline mst be with due regard as to the anount of force
utilized and must be directed to promote the welfare of the
child. qhe force used must (1) reasonably be proportional to the
misconduct being punished and (2) reasonably be believed
necessary to protect the welfare of the recipient. See id. at
10-12, 911 P.2¢ at 730-32. The means used to effect the
discipline must also be reasonable, In determining whether force
is reasonable, the fact finder must consider the child’s age, the
child’s stature, and the nature of the injuries inflicted, i.e.,
whether the force used was designed to cause or known to create a
risk of causing substantial bodily injury, disfigurement, extrene
pain or mental distress, or neurological damage given the child’s
age and size. These required factors are cbviously general in
nature and, by their very terms, place a large amount of

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discretion with the courts to determine whether the actions of a

 

parent fall within the parameters of parental discipline, as set

forth in HRS § 703-309(1). Clearly, there is no bright line that

 

dictates what, under all circumstances, is unreasonable or

excessive corporal punishment. Rather, the permissible dearee of
force will vary according to the child's physique and age, the

misconduct of the child, the nature of the discipline, and all
the surrounding circumstances. It necessarily follows that the
question of reasonableness or excessiveness of physical
punishnent given a child by a parent is determined on a case-by-
case basis and is dependent upon the particular circumstances of
the case.

Here, the uncontroverted evidence denonstrates that
Daughter had been lying to Mother for about two and a half
months, telling Mother she was attending her tutoring classes
when, in fact, she was hanging out at the mall with her friends
without supervision. Daughter lied to Mother about forgetting
her report card at school when, in fact, she "purposely" left her
report card at school because of her low grades. Daughter
repeatedly refused to answer Mother’s questions concerning her
report card, the reasons for the grades not improving, and
whether she was attending her tutoring classes. Given these

circumstances, it would not be unreasonable for a parent in

 

Mother's position to conclude that Daughter needed disciplining
for lying to, misleading, and disrespecting her mother. indeed,

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as Mother testified, she was “frustrated” and “felt deceived" by

 

Giehonesty and believed she had “to teach [her]

 

Daughter
daughter a lesson, to get back on the right track.’

With regard to the child's age and size, the evidence
reveals that, at the tine of the incident, on April 15, 2005 (a
Friday), Daughter was fourteen years old; her height and weight
were unknown. At the time of trial, which comenced on August 2,
2005 -- less than four months later, Daughter was 5/4" or 5/5"
and weighed approximately 150 or 154 pounds. Daughter testified
at trial that Nother was taller, heavier, and stronger than she.

With regard to the type and amount of force used by
Mother and the nature of Daughter's injury, the record reveals
that: (1) Mother used a plastic backpack to hit Daughter because
Daughter refused to answer Mother's questions concerning
Daughter's report card; (2) Mother tried to hit Daughter on the
thigh with a plastic hanger, but instead hit Daughter's left arm
about five times, when Daughter refused to answer Mother's
questions as to her whereabouts during the time she was
supposedly at her tutoring classes; and, (3) upon learning of
Daughter's activities, Mother hit Daughter once in the hand with
the flat side of a “small car brush" and once in the knuckles
with “the plastic handle” of a tool. According to Daughter,
Nother was not hitting her hard, testifying that, on a scale of
one to ten with ten being “very painful," being hit by (1) the
backpack was a two or three, (2) the plastic hanger was a four or

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five, (3) the flat aide of the car brush did not hurt, and (4)
the plastic handle of the tool also did ‘not really" hurt.
consequently, Daughter's left arm was ‘red and... had... a
few markings from the hanger[,]* which markings were "just lines*
<- ‘emall . . . like the size of a pencil (Line]* with “tiny
spots of purplish-greenish." Officer Lee observed *[t]he bruise
on her . . . left shoulder areal,]" but did not notice any
abrasions, welts, of scratches on Daughter.” Daughter herself
testified that the two photographs of her left arm (state's
Exhibits 1 and 2) showed only “small bruises,” and that, on the
date of the incident, her injuries were exactly as shown in the
photographs, except with “a little color, but you could barely
see it.

Considering the totality of the facts and
circunstances, we believe that the force employed by Mother was
reasonably proportionate to the Daughter’s defiant behavior

towards her mother and ws

 

reasonably believed to be necessary to
discipline Daughter and that the force used was “not designed to
cause or known to create “substantial bodily injury,

disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress, or neurological

 

damage.” HRS § 703-309(1) (b). As stated above, Daughter

testified that, although she experienced sone pain at the tine of

 

2 indeed, had Officer Lee suspected that any of Daughter's injurie:
night dnciude “fractures (which, obviously, are undetectable without an x-
Seyi, he surely would not have acquiesced when she declined medical treatnent.

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the incident, Nother was not hitting her hard. In fact, Daughter
indicated that, out of the four implements used by Mother, two of
them (the flat side of the car brush and the plastic handle of
the tool) did not hurt or did “not really" hurt and the other two
(the backpack and the plastic hanger) only hurt between levels
two to five (on a scale of one to ten with ten being “very
painful"). In addition, unlike Crouser, in which the minor was
unable to sit at school for days as a result of a severe beating
to the buttocks area, or Tanielu, in which the minor received
numerous punches, kicks, and slaps to the face and shin area,

resulting in lacerations, or Miller, in which the minor received

 

multiples kicks and punches to the face and ribs, resulting in
scratches and bleeding, Daughter's injuries in thie case
consisted of a few eal bruises that were visible for about a
week. No evidence was adduced that the bruises required medical
attention. In fact, Officer Lee offered to get Daughter medical
attention, but Daughter refused medical help. Likewise, there is
no evidence to indicate any detriment to Daughter's overall well-
being or physical, emotional or psychological state. See HRS

§ 703-209(1) (B). The evidence indicated that Daughter was able
to tend to her normal household chores on the night of the
incident, as well as attend a fanily lv'au on Saturday (the day

after the incident) and a family gathering/dinner on Sunday

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bel_upset with, or concerned about, their children's
Behavior. Nor do parents elvave act pursuant tos clearly
Sefined cizcunstance of discipline or control. A reaction
Often occurs fron behavior s parent deena inappropriate that
frritates or angers the parent, causing s resctive,
demonstrative act. Heat of the soment sist not reault sn
Stmodevate physical force and mst be managed, however, an

 

een part ahd parcel of the Teal Site
‘hich prosecutors and courte should not interfere. what
Parent anong Us can say he OF she has not been angered to
Some degree from a child's Gefiant, impudent, or insolent
Conduct, suftiesent co call for spontaneous, stern, and
hesningtel discipline?

State v, Lefevre, 117 P.3d 980, 984-85 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005)
(emphases added) (holding that the father’s “demonstrative act,
even if an angry touching, result [ing] in only a temporary, dime-
sized bruise on [the d]aughter’s hand and transient pain" fell
within the parental privilege). Courts have also recognized
that, although corporal discipline may be considered excessive
when it results in significant bruises or welts, “bruises are not
necessarily indicative of excessive corporal discipline.” T.G.
Dep't of Children & Families, 927 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a bruise, without any evidence that
euch bruis
constitute abuse); gee also Sl. v. Dep't of Children & Families,

787 So. 24 973, 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (*Most corporal

required medical attention, was not sufficient to

 

 

punishment, even that which is not excessive, produces temporary
marks of some kind."). Moreover, as observed by another court,

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[if] the mare application of parent's hand to a child's
backside that results in even sinimal bruising vould, ae 8
matter of law, require a finding of physical abuse (,_i5)
easonable seat caus Even nore
Auarning ie that this interpretation Fequires « finding of
physical abuse when a parent attempts to save a child from
hharm but, in Going so, bruises or injures the child.

lovan C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 860 A.2d 1283, 1289

(conn. App. Ct. 2004) (emphasis added). Indeed, this court and

 

 

the ICA have reversed convictions in cases where the parental
force employed was more severe than in this case, holding that
the discipline used was within the protection afforded by HRS
§709-309(1). See Deleon, 72 Haw. at 242-44, 613 P.2d at 1283-94
(involving fourteen-year-old complainant who was hit with a
folded belt six to ten times); Kaiminoku, 9 Haw. App. at 253, 642
P.2d at 1080 (involving seventeen-year-old complainant who was
slapped in the face and punched in the shoulder).

Nevertheless, the dissent takes issue with our holding,
contending that ‘the record, viewed in the Light most favorable
to the prosecution, contains substantial evidence to support the
jury verdict." Dissenting op. at 1. In advancing its position,

the dissent explains tha

 

 

tm Connecticut, section 528-18 of the General statutes provides that
tthe use of physical force upon ancther person which vould
Otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not

criminal under any of the following cizcunstances: (1) A
parent, guardian Or other person entrusted with the ca

supervision of @ minor... may use reasonable physical

ae ch te be necess

‘and

 

ros)

1a, at 1286 (orphasis added) (original brackets omitted) (ellipses in
original) .

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‘Throughout the conversation Mother graw increasing incensed
(Over Daughter's poor performance ang deception, snd (1)
feruck Daughter with a plastic backpack approximately.
sixteen inches by twelve inches in size, (2) struck Daughter
approximately five tines on her left forearm with a plastic
hanger, (3) struck Daughter on the top of her left hand with
the hard, flat side of (carl brush, and (4) struck
Daughter on the knuckles with the plastic handle of
Fisted, metal tool. Daughter testified that Mother was
taller, heavier, and stronger. Mother admitted that she
lost control, and

 

 

 

Wewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
‘the record establishes that Nother, 2 parent of supersor
size and strength, lost control and
Daughter, snong other things, with the plunt Randle cf @
fitted neta! tool, Such a biow carried with st an attendant
Fisk of causing “substantial bodily injury(."

 

(Citation and footnote omitted.) (Emphases added.) Dissenting
op. at 15-16 (citations to the record omitted) .

‘The dissent faile to account for the circumstances that
gave rise to the disciplining and the resulting bruises on
Daughter's left forearm. The dissent attempts to portray Nother
as an out-of-control parent who repeatedly used various
implenents to discipline Daughter for her poor performance in
school. See Dissenting Op. at 15-17. However, as discussed
above, the evidence reveals that Mother disciplined Daughter for
her continuously defiant behavior in refusing to answer Mother's
questions and in lying to her. Specifically, Mother hit Daughter
with a plastic backpack because Daughter refused to respond to
Mother's questions regarding Daughter’s report card. Mother hit
Daughter with a plastic hanger because Daughter again refused to

answer Mother questions

 

this time -- regarding her whereabouts
during the time she was supposed to be attending her tutoring

classes. And, only upon learning of Daughter's activities, ie.,

 

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skipping tutoring classes and hanging out with her friends at the
mall, did Mother hit Daughter once with the flat side of a small
car brush and once with a plastic handle of a tool, both of which
Daughter testified did not hurt.

Although we recognize Mother's admission that she lost
va Little control" is a factor to be considered, such admission
alone is not indicative of child abuse. As discussed above, the
parental justification defense statute requires this court to
take into consideration numerous factors in determining whether
abuse has occurred. Of great significance is the degree of force
employed, which the dissent appears to disregard. Rather, the
Gissent places strong emphasis upon the fact that this case
involved the use of multiple implements. For instance, the
Gissent admits that, although the “the case at bar bears some
factual resemblance to Deleon to the extent that the minors in
both cases suffered bruises lasting approximately one week{,]*
but states that *[t]he distinction, however, lies in the
modus operandi.” Dissenting op. at 12, According to the
Gissent, there is a “considerable difference between striking a
child with a belt{, as in Deleon,] and striking a child with
various hard. blunt implenents[ inasmich as) the latter method
presents a greater potential for substantial bodily injury --
Aue., major avulsions, lacerations, penetrations of the skin, and
bone fractures." Id, at 12 (emphases added). We, however,
perceive some major flawa in the diasent’s interpretation.

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First, the dissent predicates the offense of child abuse
exclusively upon the use of multiple implements (as opposed to
ingle inplenent, e.g, a belt). Second, the dissent effectively
alters the standard set by the legislature and contravenes the
purpose of the statute in recognizing a parent’s right "to ust

force to discipline their children . . . , subject to cl

 

requirement not to cause permanent injury." HRS § 703-309(2)
cmt. (emphasis added). We can see no support from the letter and
spirit of the subject statute to render a parent's use of
multiple implemente upon a minor ae child abuse per ge. As one
court stated,

the use of an object . . . should not blind a court to the

any other factors which should and must be considered when

(weighing the evidence to determine the "reasonableness” of

the discipline. We must take care not to create a legal

fandara from our personal notions of how best to discipline
Senile.

Inxe Z.P., 692 N.E.24 338, 346 (I11. App. ct. 1998).

 

 

‘The basic conception of the parental justification
defense is to allow a person responsible for a child's welfare to
use reasonable force to discipline that child. to determine
whether the force falls within the limitation of parental
discipline, the factors set forth in HRS § 703-309(1) must be
considered. Thus, the implements, if and when used in
Gisciplining a child, do not automatically render the parental
justification defense inapplicable; rather, the applicability of
the defense essentially depends upon the manner in which the

implenents were used, i.e, the degree of force exerted. The use

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of physical force exceeds acceptable norms when such force has
the potential “to cause or known to create risk of causing
substantial bodily injury . . .[, or] extreme pain(.]* ERS

§ 703-309(1) (b). Contrary to the dissent’s contention, we cannot
perceive how the force employed by Mother, which, according to
Daughter, was not hard and only caused her temporary pain, could
somehow have the potential of creating “substantial bodily
injury," such as, “najor avulsiona, lacerations, penetrations of
the ekin,* “bone fracture," and “serious concussion." HRS

§ 707-700. Were that the case, even the use of mild force, which

 

this court held a permissible under HRS § 703-309(1),
nee Stocker, 90 Hawai'i at 96, 976 P.2d at 410, would now be
considered as capable of causing substantial bodily injury and
necessarily constitute child abuse.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that mother’s conduct
fell within the parameters of the justified parental discipline
statute and that, as a matter of law, the evidence in this case
was insufficient to support a determination of guilt on the

charge of abuse of a family or household menber beyond @

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reasonable doubt.'*. However, this court has previously stated --

that

 

and we believe it is worthy of reiteration at this point

our opinion today should not in any way be construed at
expression of approval of the parental conduct that
precipitated the prosecution of the satter before us.
Neither should oor opinion be viewed as an endorsenest, of
fany ind, of the use by parente of corporal punishment of
their chiieren.” It is conmon knowleage that the uesiity ~~
fot tovnention the sinple humanity -- of corporal punietnent
asa parental tool is the subject of considerable
Controversy within Anerican society. Nevertheless, it is
equally cbvious that the permissibliicy of corporal
Punianment reflects @ societal judgnent chat falls well
Within the paraseters of legitimate and constitutional

je policy-making. In this regard, the legislature
eed it jodgnent, for better or worse, through the
parental discipline defense, as enacted in ike § 703-309(1)
What, in ite wiedom, the legislature hae codified, it ic
free’ to amend of repeal: But ae long ae Wee § 703-309(3)
Fensine the law of thie state, we are bound to congtrue and
enforce it.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Stocker, 90 Hawai'i at 96, 976 P.2d at 410. We, therefore, hold
that the ICA gravely erred in affirming Mother's conviction and
sentence.

The Allen-Like instruction

 

Mother finally contends that the trial court, in
responding to the jury's communication, improperly issued what

amounted to an Allen instruction, which led the jurors to believe

 

Me do not see how cur holding today “narrow{s] the gat
restrict (e] the reain reserved for the trier of fact” as the ai
Dissenting Op. at 14. Ae stated earlier, although ve do nct lightly set aside
a jury's verdict, we will not hesitate to do so when such verdict, as here, is
fot supported by the evidence. Nor do ve believe that the result of this Case
Bends s message that "henceforth, where a parent losses (sic) control over a
Child's repeated and prolonged deception about failing to attend tutoring
Session which contributed to poor performance in school, that parent is
permitted, asa matter of law, co respond in the fashion Mother did here.”
Ea at 1 (enphasie in origingn) “again, we review child abuse cases on a
Basis, and, based upon all of the evidence in this c
Pit use of force falls within the Sounde of parental discipline

and thereby
ent contends.

 

   

   

 

 

 

     

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that their “deadlocked” position was unacceptable. However, our

last contention moot .**

 

holding today renders Mother’
Iv. ONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we vacate the ICA's August 29,
2006 judgment and reverse the trial court’s August 5, 2005

judgment of conviction and sentence

Katie L, Lambert and
Deborah L. Kim, Zip

Deputy Public befenders,

for petitioner-appellant, :

on the application LEPPBrimpr

Stephen K. Teushina,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
attorney of record for
respondent -appellee,

no response filed

% waving concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support
wocnervs convictlon, the Giesent wae required to address Wotter', next
Contention that the trial court erred in its re

Communication that it was Geadlockes, which response, according to Mother,
amounted to an improper Allen instruction. However, as discussed above, we
heed not entertain the emue in light of Our holding. ‘would violate
sone of the prudential rules of judicial self-governance’ that “courte are to

    

 

 

avold advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.* ole
‘Trails Group v. Lyman, 69 Haw 61, 67, 734 7.20 261, 165. (987) (internal

quotation sarks, citation, and original brackete omitted). As this court hae
eaves:

tribunal, as

he duty of thie court, as of every other judicial
aa to decide actual controversies by a iudanent

which ca be carried into effect. and not to give opinions
‘apon Woot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
Principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in
[eeu in the case before it~

Sours will not _conaune tine deciding abetcact
propositions of law or soot cases, and have no jurisdiction
odo 50.

sf Regente, univ. ii. 62 Hav. 392, 396-95, 616 P.2d 202,
20 (i900) (citations omitted) (emphases added). Moreover, we note that the
Allen instruction issue is clearly not cne waich faile within the exception to
he moctness doctrine, i.e, that the issue is “capable of repetition, yet
evading review.” 1d. at 396, 616 P.24 at 208 (citation omitted) -

 

 

 

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