Case Title: Gentry v. Craycraft

Citation: 2004-Ohio-379

Docket Number: 20022095

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Gentry v. Craycraft, 101 Ohio St.3d 141, 2004-Ohio-379.] 
 
 
GENTRY ET AL., APPELLEES, v. CRAYCRAFT ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Gentry v. Craycraft, 101 Ohio St.3d 141, 2004-Ohio-379.] 
Torts — Personal injury action brought for injuries sustained while individual is 
a participant in or spectator at a sport or recreational activity — Age of 
participant or spectator and whether he or she was capable of 
appreciating the inherent risks is immaterial — Recovery dependent 
upon whether defendant’s conduct was either reckless or intentional. 
(No. 2002-2095 — Submitted October 22, 2003, at the Clinton County Session — 
Decided February 11, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 19262, 2002-
Ohio-5822. 
__________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
In a personal injury action brought for injuries sustained while an individual is a 
participant in or a spectator at a sport or recreational activity, the age of 
the participant or spectator and whether he or she was capable of 
appreciating the inherent risks is immaterial.  Instead, recovery is 
dependent upon whether the defendant’s conduct was either reckless or 
intentional.  (Marchetti v. Kalish [1990], 53 Ohio St.3d 95, 559 N.E.2d 
699; and Thompson v. McNeill [1990], 53 Ohio St.3d 102, 559 N.E.2d 
705, followed and explained.) 
__________________ 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J. 
{¶1} 
On the evening of June 17, 1999, eleven-year-old Christopher 
Craycraft and nine-year-old Levi Gentry were building a chair in Craycraft’s 
backyard.  Levi’s younger brother, Lucas Gentry, age four, watched from a 
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distance of about two to three feet away, as the older boys took turns hammering 
nails into the chair.  As Christopher began hammering the final nail, he placed the 
nail on the wood, and held it as he tapped twice.  When the nail stood on its own, 
Christopher let the nail go and hammered a third time, a little harder than he had 
previously.  The nail flew out of the chair and hit Lucas in the eye, causing him to 
sustain serious injuries. 
{¶2} 
Lucas, by and through his parents, Bonnie and Mike Gentry, 
plaintiffs-appellees, filed suit against Christopher and his parents, Terry and 
Nancy Craycraft, defendants-appellants.  The complaint alleged that Christopher 
negligently, intentionally, and/or recklessly hammered the nail into the chair, 
causing Lucas to sustain injuries.1 
{¶3} 
The Craycrafts filed a motion for summary judgment, which the 
trial court granted.  Based upon our decision in Marchetti v. Kalish (1990), 53 
Ohio St.3d 95, 559 N.E.2d 699, the court found that neither Christopher nor his 
parents could be held liable for Lucas’s injuries, since the children had been 
involved in a recreational activity at the time of the accident and because there 
was no showing that Christopher had acted intentionally or recklessly.  The court 
of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded the cause for further 
proceedings.  The court agreed that the boys were involved in a recreational 
activity, and found that Christopher did not act intentionally or recklessly.  
Nevertheless, the court concluded that Lucas could pursue a negligence action.  It 
reasoned that Lucas was too young to have assumed the risk of injury and 
consequently could not be deemed a spectator to a recreational activity. 
{¶4} 
The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
                                                 
1  The complaint further alleged causes of action for negligent supervision against Christopher’s 
parents and for loss of consortium. 
 
January Term, 2004 
3 
{¶5} 
This appeal concerns the standard of care owed to a young child 
injured in a recreational or sporting activity. 
{¶6} 
In Marchetti v. Kalish, 53 Ohio St.3d 95, 559 N.E.2d 699, 
syllabus, we delineated the following standard:  “Where individuals engage in 
recreational or sports activities, they assume the ordinary risks of the activity and 
cannot recover for any injury unless it can be shown that the other participant’s 
actions were either ‘reckless’ or ‘intentional’ as defined in Sections 500 and 8A of 
the Restatement of Torts 2d.”  Id. at syllabus.  In the companion case of 
Thompson v. McNeill (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 102, 559 N.E.2d 705, paragraphs one 
and two of the syllabus, we reiterated our holding in Marchetti and stated that 
where injuries are sustained in a sporting event, there is no liability for injuries 
caused by negligent conduct.2  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  In Thompson, 
we included spectators within the scope of the rule.  Id. at 104, 559 N.E.2d 705. 
{¶7} 
At the time Lucas was injured, the children were involved in 
typical backyard play, which falls within the definition of a recreational activity.  
The parties further concede that Christopher did not act intentionally or recklessly 
in hammering the nail into the chair.  Nevertheless, the parties disagree over 
whether the recreational or sports-activity exception to liability for negligence 
applies.  Appellants contend that Lucas was a spectator to a recreational activity 
and that pursuant to our holdings in Marchetti and Thompson, appellants were 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Appellees, however, argue that these 
decisions apply only to active participants or to those spectators who are old 
enough to voluntarily agree to watch and accept the risks associated with the sport 
                                                 
2  The underlying facts of Marchetti v. Kalish (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 95, 559 N.E.2d 699, involved 
a thirteen-year-old girl who was injured while playing a game called “kick the can” with 
neighborhood children in her yard.  Since there was no showing of recklessness or intentional 
conduct on the part of the defendant, we upheld the granting of summary judgment in defendant’s 
favor.  In Thompson, the plaintiff was a golfer injured by a shanked golf ball.  In upholding 
summary judgment for the defendant, we held that that the injury was foreseeable and that there 
was no duty owed to the plaintiff. 
 
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or activity.  Since Lucas was too young to have appreciated the inherent dangers 
in the activity, appellees maintain that he cannot be deemed a spectator.  Thus, 
appellees argue that the recreational or sports-activity exception to liability for 
negligence does not govern this case.  Instead, they urge us to impose a simple 
negligence standard of liability. 
{¶8} 
Contrary to appellees’ position, we did not intend to limit 
Marchetti and Thompson to active participants or to spectators old enough to 
appreciate the risks inherent with the sport or activity.  In fact, we made it clear 
that the opposite was true when we stated that the reckless/intentional standard of 
liability applies regardless of whether the activity was engaged in by children or 
adults, or was unorganized, supervised, or unsupervised.  We recognized that 
“[t]o hold otherwise would open the floodgates to a myriad of lawsuits involving 
the backyard games of children.”  Marchetti, 53 Ohio St.3d at 98, 559 N.E.2d 
699. 
{¶9} 
Moreover, our focus in these decisions was on the conduct or 
actions of the defendant, not on whether the plaintiff was too young to have 
assumed the risk of injury.  Id. at 99, 559 N.E.2d 699.  In fact, in Marchetti, we 
refused to consider the plaintiff’s scope of consent because we were fearful that 
“requiring courts to delve into the minds of children to determine whether they 
understand the rules of the recreational or sports activity they are engaging in 
could lead to anomalous results.”  Id.  If we were to accept appellees’ position, 
this is precisely what we would be doing.  We would be measuring a defendant’s 
liability based upon the subjective understanding of the young plaintiff.  We are 
unwilling to do this, since the determinative factor in a defendant’s liability in 
sports and recreational activity cases is the conduct of the defendant himself, not 
the participant’s or spectator’s ability or inability to appreciate the inherent 
dangers of the activity.  See, e.g., Ramos v. Countryside (1985), 137 Ill.App.3d 
1028, 1031-1032, 485 N.E.2d 418. 
January Term, 2004 
5 
{¶10} Furthermore, in Marchetti, we stressed that the underlying policy 
behind our holding was to “strike a balance between encouraging vigorous and 
free participation in recreational or sports activities, while ensuring the safety of 
the players.”  Id., 53 Ohio St.3d at 99, 559 N.E.2d 699.  In finding no liability in 
these types of cases, we reasoned that spectators as well as participants “must 
accept from a participant conduct associated with that sport” or activity and that 
where injuries stem from “conduct that is a foreseeable, customary part” of the 
activity, the defendant “cannot be held liable for negligence because no duty is 
owed to protect the victim from that conduct.”  Thompson, 53 Ohio St.3d at 104, 
559 N.E.2d 705. 
{¶11} Obviously, without our stating so, in Marchetti and Thompson we 
applied “primary” assumption-of-risk principles in limiting the defendant’s 
liability.  Primary assumption of the risk is essentially a principle of no duty, or 
no negligence.  Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts (5th Ed.1984) 496, Section 
68.  It differs from secondary assumption of the risk, which appellees urge us to 
apply, in that secondary (or implied) assumption of the risk requires a showing 
that the plaintiff has consented to or acquiesced in an appreciated or known risk.  
2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 496C, Comment b. 
{¶12} In limiting a defendant’s liability in sports and recreational 
activities, courts have relied upon primary assumption of the risk and have 
reasoned that “those entirely ignorant of the risks of a sport, still assume the risk 
(in this ‘primary’ sense) by participating in a sport or simply by attending the 
game.  The law simply deems certain risks as accepted by plaintiff regardless of 
actual knowledge or consent.”  (Footnotes omitted.)  Susan M. Gilles, From 
Baseball Parks to the Public Arena:  Assumption of the Risk in Tort Law and 
Constitutional Libel Law (2002), 75 Temple L.Rev. 231, 236. 
{¶13} This is precisely how we approached our prior decisions.  We 
concluded that the plaintiff had assumed the risk by voluntarily participating in 
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the activity or sport and focused on the conduct of the defendant to determine 
whether he or she had been reckless or had acted intentionally.  We continue to 
adhere to this position today.  We hold that in a personal injury action brought for 
injuries sustained while an individual is a participant in or a spectator at a sport or 
recreational activity, the age of the participant or spectator and whether he or she 
was capable of appreciating the inherent risks is immaterial.  Instead, recovery is 
dependent upon whether the defendant’s conduct was either reckless or 
intentional. 
{¶14} In applying this holding to the case at hand, we find that the 
children were engaged in typical backyard play, which the lower courts correctly 
determined to be a recreational activity.  The evidence further demonstrates that 
Christopher acted neither intentionally nor recklessly when the nail he was 
striking flew out of the wood and hit Lucas in his eye.  We also find that Lucas, 
who stood a few feet away from the defendant and watched as he and the other 
boys took turns hammering the nails into the chair, was a spectator to a 
recreational activity.  The fact that Lucas was only four years old and may not 
have understood the inherent risks involved is immaterial.  Instead, we find that 
the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Christopher and his 
parents, since there was no showing that Lucas’s injuries were caused by 
intentional or reckless conduct. 
{¶15} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
RESNICK, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR 
and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
January Term, 2004 
7 
{¶16} Dodge ball.  Capture the Flag.  Red Rover.  Freeze Tag.  Today the 
majority makes a strange addition to the list of fondly remembered childhood 
games: nail hammering.  What’s next on the list of spectator sports — mowing 
the lawn, draining the septic tank, or digging a ditch?  The simple fact that a child 
is engaged in something does not necessarily make that activity a sport or a 
recreational activity.  The majority stretches much too far to include the activity 
of the children in this case within the coverage of Marchetti v. Kalish (1990), 53 
Ohio St.3d 95, 559 N.E.2d 699; and Thompson v. McNeill (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 
102, 559 N.E.2d 705. 
{¶17} This is not to say that Christopher Craycraft should be found liable 
for negligence.  Tort law already offers protection for children from being found 
negligent for doing the things kids do.  This court has held: 
{¶18} "Children are not chargeable with the same care as persons of 
mature years. Although children are required to exercise ordinary care to avoid 
the injuries of which they complain, such care, as applied to them, is that degree 
of care which children of the same age, education, and experience, of ordinary 
care and prudence, are accustomed to exercise under similar circumstances." 
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Grambo (1921), 103 Ohio 
St. 471, 134 N.E. 648, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶19} The protection is even greater for younger children.  This court has 
also held that “[a] child under seven years of age is, as a matter of law, incapable 
of negligence.” DeLuca v. Bowden (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 392, 71 O.O.2d 375, 
329 N.E.2d 109, 71 O.O.2d 375, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶20} Tort law provides enough protection to children without 
shoehorning every activity involving children within the protections accorded to 
participants in sporting activities.  Moreover, the majority does not limit its nail-
hammering defense to children.  Would or should the majority have been so quick 
to recognize nail hammering as a recreational activity had one of Craycraft’s 
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parents been doing the hammering?  An expanded definition of what constitutes a 
recreational activity is expansive for everyone, not just children. 
__________________ 
Dyer, Garofalo, Mann & Schultz, John A. Smalley and Devon A. Stanley, 
for appellees. 
Young & Alexander Co., L.P.A., and Mark R. Chilson, for appellants. 
__________________