Case Title: Peterson v. Sweetwater County School Dist. No. One

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Peterson v. Sweetwater County School Dist. No. One1996 WY 166929 P.2d 525Case Number: 95-298Decided: 12/17/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Karen 
S. PETERSON; Dennis Giere; and Marcia Giere,

 Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

SWEETWATER COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NUMBER ONE; and Don Baumberger, Mary Hay Chant, Grant Christensen, 
Kitty Smith, Kay Marschal, Terry McManus, Robert Ramsey, Norma Stensaas, Each 
Individually and in His/Her Capacity as Superintendent/School Board Members, 
Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, Sweetwater County, John D. Troughton, J.

Karen S. 
Peterson, Salt Lake City, UT, for appellants.

Tracy J. 
Copenhaver of Copenhaver, Kath & Kitchen, Powell, for 
appellees.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

TAYLOR, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants are 
former employees of Sweetwater County School District Number One who applied for 
early retirement benefits during the 1991-1992 school year. In April 1992, 
appellants received notification that their applications were denied. Appellants 
brought an action in district court alleging breach of contract. Appellant Karen 
Peterson later amended her claims to include promissory estoppel, violation of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) as amended by the Older Worker's 
Benefits Protection Act (OWBPA), and denial of procedural due process and equal 
protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1987). The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of appellees on all claims, and this appeal 
followed.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellants 
describe the issues as follows: 

A.                    
The trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment 
because:

a.         It 
failed to consider appellant's civil rights claims, namely, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) as amended, its regulations and 
appellants' constitutional violations

1. Civil 
Rights

i. ADEA and 
OWBPA

ii. 42 U.S.C. § 
1983

b.         
Appellees were required by principals of contract and promissory estoppel 
to grant appellants the benefit of their bargained for 1991-92 negotiations 
agreement ERI plan between the District and its certified employees

c.         
Appellees['] claim of insufficient money to extend ben[e]fits of the ERI 
plan to all eligible candidates is not supported by the facts

B.        The issue 
of appellants[']/appellees['] motions for sanctions remain undecided by summary 
judgment.

[¶4]      Appellees respond 
by presenting two issues:

Issue 1:           
Did the District Court commit error as a matter of law in holding that 
Defendants were entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' claim that the 
Defendants violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and/or regulations 
applicable thereto?

Issue 2:           
Did the District Court commit error as a matter of law in granting 
Defendants' summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract and/or 
promissory estoppel?

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      In 1983, the 
Sweetwater County School District Number One (School District) adopted an Early 
Retirement Plan (Plan) which provided that a teacher or administrator with ten 
years of continuous credited service with the School District, and who was 
between age fifty and sixty-five, may apply for early retirement benefits. The 
Plan's benefits were calculated on a percentage of the applicant's salary, with 
the salary percentage decreasing as the age of the applicant 
increased.

[¶6]      A provision of 
the Plan titled "Request for Early Retirement" provided, in relevant 
part:

A teacher or 
administrator seeking benefits of this plan will notify the Superintendent of 
Schools in writing, before April 15 of the year of intended retirement. * * * 
The board will act and make their decision known to the teacher or administrator 
before May 15.

The board, in its sole 
discretion, maintains the right to accept or deny any request for applicants 
that have not reached age 65.

[¶7]      Each year, the 
School District's Board of Trustees (Board) conducted contract negotiations with 
the Sweetwater Education Association (SEA), the negotiating agent for the 
certified employees in the school district. From 1983 through the 1991-1992 
school year, the Plan was part of each negotiation agreement. During the fall of 
1991, however, the Board's attorney advised the Board that the salary rate 
schedule in the Plan violated the ADEA, which was amended by the OWBPA in 
1990.

[¶8]      Due to the 
concerns of the Board regarding the legality of the Plan's early retirement 
benefit schedule, the Board and the SEA agreed to reopen negotiations in 
November 1991 for the purpose of resolving these concerns. The negotiations 
proceeded with representatives from both the Board and the SEA.

[¶9]      Before the 
deadline for early retirement requests, at a Board meeting on March 9, 1992, the 
Board members expressed their opinions regarding the legality of the early 
retirement benefits. The minutes of the Board meeting record the 
following:

Each member stated that, 
after information received from the school attorney, they felt the present 
System was illegal and in good faith could not approve any of the requests that 
have been submitted at this time. Either new information will have to be 
presented showing that the present policy is legal or a new policy will have to 
be implemented.

 

After this 
meeting, the Board and the SEA continued negotiations and, by April 7, 1992, 
they agreed on modifications which would remove the discriminatory elements from 
the Plan. The only remaining issue was the salary percentage on which to base 
the benefits.

[¶10]   Each year, the Board submitted a 
budget which included funds earmarked for early retirement benefits under the 
Plan. The amount budgeted for early retirement benefits for the 1991-1992 school 
year totaled approximately $330,000.00. As of April 1, 1992, nineteen requests 
for early retirement benefits were submitted to the Board, including those of 
appellants.

[¶11]   Prior to 1992, the School District 
had approved all requests for early retirement benefits. However, all parties to 
the negotiations agreed that the budgeted funds were inadequate to finance all 
early retirement requests at a salary percentage rate equivalent to the old 
schedule. In response to this dilemma, the Board suggested several alternative 
salary percentages. The Board's proposals ranged from a rate of fifty-five 
percent, whereby all applicants could receive benefits, to a rate of ninety 
percent, which would fund two-thirds of the applicants. Rejecting the Board's 
suggestions, the employees requested the percentage rate be 118%, knowing that 
this rate would allow funding for fewer than half of the submitted applications. 
The Board agreed, and on April 13, 1992, the Board and the SEA ratified the 
Revised Retirement Severance Incentive For 1991-92 (Revised Plan).

[¶12]   The Revised Plan did not supply a 
method for determining which applicants would receive benefits, but 
provided:

Participation in this 
Plan is considered a privilege and not a right, and the Board of Trustees is 
entitled to permit or to limit participation and to change or delete all or any 
part of this Plan in its sole discretion, in accordance with the needs and best 
interests of the District and in accordance with applicable law.

[¶13]   After consideration of the number 
of applicants, the limited funds, and the terms of the Revised Plan, the Board 
decided to approve benefits for those applicants with the largest total of years 
in service plus age. On April 27, 1992, the Board approved eight of the nineteen 
applications. Appellants, all fifty years old with between eleven and twelve 
years of credited service, were denied.

[¶14]   Appellant Peterson filed a pro 
se complaint against the school superintendent and the individual Board 
members on December 28, 1993, alleging breach of contract and tortious 
interference with contract. At the hearing on the appellees' motion to dismiss 
on April 28, 1994, appellant Peterson admitted she had not provided notice of 
her claims pursuant to the Governmental Claims Act. The district court dismissed 
the claims without prejudice.

[¶15]   Appellant Peterson subsequently 
refiled her pro se complaint on December 12, 1994, this time naming the 
School District as a defendant as well as the same individuals she had claimed 
against in her original complaint. In June 1995, appellants Dennis and Marcia 
Giere filed a motion to intervene as pro se plaintiffs, which was granted by the 
district court on June 6, 1995.

[¶16]   On June 21, 1995, during argument 
on appellees' motion for summary judgment,1 the district court allowed 
appellant Peterson to add claims for promissory estoppel and civil rights 
violations. After supplemental briefing, the district court entered an order on 
October 13, 1995 granting appellees' motion for summary judgment on all claims. 
From that order, appellants now appeal.2

III. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶17]   Summary judgment is properly 
granted based upon dual findings that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Teton 
Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, Laramie County School Dist. No. 
One, 763 P.2d 843, 847 (Wyo. 1988). We evaluate the propriety of summary 
judgment with the same standards and materials used by the district court, 
affording no deference to the district court's decision on the issues of law. 
Kahrs v. Board of Trustees for Platte County School Dist. No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 
406 (Wyo. 1995). Our examination of the record is from the vantage point most 
favorable to the non-moving party, allowing all reasonable inference which may 
be fairly drawn from the record. Id. Factually unsupported allegations and 
conclusory statements, however, are not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 
Board of County Com'rs of County of Laramie v. Laramie County School Dist. 
Number One, 884 P.2d 946, 956 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Jones Land and Livestock Co. 
v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 733 P.2d 258, 263 (Wyo. 1987)). If the record 
reveals any proper legal theory on which summary judgment may be granted, we 
will affirm the district court. Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Campbell County School 
Dist., 816 P.2d 795, 799 (Wyo. 1991).

IV. 
ANALYSIS

A. CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT AND PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

[¶18]   The dispositive issue on 
appellants' claims based on contract is whether they complied with the notice 
requirements mandated by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 
1-39-103(a)(vii) and 1-39-104(a) (1988 & Cum.Supp. 1996). Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-113(a) (Cum.Supp. 1996) sets forth the mandatory notice requirements which 
are a prerequisite for bringing suit based on tort or contract against a 
governmental entity:

(a) No action shall be 
brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the claim upon which 
the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized statement in 
writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act * * *.

Failure to 
comply with this provision is an absolute bar to appellants' claims. Vigil v. 
Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521, 524 (Wyo. 1994); Duran v. Board of County Com'rs of 
Sweetwater County, 787 P.2d 971, 972 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶19]   Appellants have not met the notice 
requirement. The Board denied appellants' applications for early retirement 
benefits on April 27, 1992. Appellant Peterson admitted to the district court 
she had not complied with the notice requirement on April 28, 1994, over two 
years after the Board had denied her early retirement benefits. It is undisputed 
that the Board did not receive notice of appellant Peterson's claim until May 4, 
1994, and the Gieres' notice was received on May 13, 1994.

[¶20]   Notwithstanding this record, 
appellants state that their notice was timely because their contracts with the 
School District are based on the school year. Appellants contend that their 
claims did not accrue until the contractual period expired in June 1992. We 
disagree.

[¶21]   Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-113(a) expressly 
states that a claim accrues on the date of the alleged act. There is an 
exception, however, when contractual terms creating a condition precedent must 
be exhausted prior to seeking redress with the court. Weston County Hosp. Joint 
Powers Board v. Westates Const. Co., 841 P.2d 841, 848-49 (Wyo. 1992). In 
Weston, we held that a contractual provision which required the parties to 
submit all claims to arbitration created a condition precedent which must be 
exhausted before the claim accrued. Id. at 848-49.

[¶22]   Weston does not save appellants' 
claims in this case. Unlike the situation in Weston, the Board's denial of 
appellants' applications was a final decision which triggered appellants' right 
to claim on the contract. Appellants presented no contractual term which created 
an impediment to their access to the court. Therefore, appellants claim accrued 
on April 27, 1992, the date the Board denied their applications for early 
retirement benefits. Because appellants did not submit a written claim to the 
Board within two years of the Board's alleged act, the district court lacked 
jurisdiction and these claims must be dismissed. 

B. CLAIMS UNDER 
ADEA

[¶23]   Appellant Peterson failed to 
establish a prima facie case on her ADEA claim. It is elementary that in order 
to present a prima facie case of age discrimination under ADEA, plaintiff must 
show that the Board's policy offered a benefit to some employees, but withheld 
the same benefit from older employees based on age. Tusting v. Bay View Federal 
Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 789 F. Supp. 1034, 1037 (N.D.Cal. 1992).

[¶24]   Appellant Peterson ignores this 
requirement, instead arguing that the Board's decision to exercise its 
discretion was a prima facie violation of ADEA. In sole support of this 
contention, appellant Peterson relies on federal regulation 29 C.F.R. § 
1625.10(c) (July 1, 1995), which states in part:

Where a discriminatory 
provision is an optional term of the plan, it permits individual, discretionary 
acts of discrimination, which do not fall within * * * [ADEA's] [§ 623](4)(f)(2) 
exception.

Contrary to 
appellant Peterson's interpretation, nothing in this regulation or in the 
language of ADEA precludes an employer from exercising non-discriminatory 
discretion in the application of early retirement benefits. Neither does the 
regulation allow appellant Peterson to claim under ADEA without showing the 
existence of a discriminatory act.

[¶25]   The Board's March 1992 decision to 
delay its approval of early retirement requests was equally applied to all 
requests which were submitted at that time. Thus, there can be no claim that the 
delay was based on age discrimination. See Tusting, 789 F. Supp.  at 1037 (if a 
plan change had ordered an immediate across the board elimination of benefits, 
irrespective of age or seniority, plaintiffs could not argue the change violated 
ADEA). Likewise, appellant Peterson cannot claim age discrimination when the 
Board determined, under the Revised Plan, to award the benefits to the oldest 
applicants with the greatest number of years in service. "The ADEA has never 
been construed to permit younger persons to claim discrimination against them in 
favor of older persons." Parker v. Wakelin, 882 F. Supp. 1131, 1140 (D.Me. 
1995). Therefore, summary judgment in favor of appellees on this claim is 
appropriate.

C. DUE 
PROCESS

[¶26]   A cause of action is created by 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation, under color of state law, of rights 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution or laws. Teton Plumbing and 
Heating, Inc, 763 P.2d  at 847. The elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
are: "`(1) that the conduct complained of was engaged in under color of state 
law, and (2) that such conduct subjected the plaintiffs to a deprivation of 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.'" Teton Plumbing and Heating, Inc., 763 P.2d  at 847 (quoting 
Schultz v. Palmberg, 317 F. Supp. 659, 661 (D.Wyo. 1970)). The Fourteenth 
Amendment, in pertinent part, states: "nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law * * *." U.S. Const. amend 
XIV, § 1.

[¶27]   Appellants claim that the Board's 
refusal to approve their applications for early retirement benefits in March 
1992 denied them of "a property right without due process of law." This claim 
fails for two reasons. First, as explained above, the record contradicts 
appellant Peterson's allegation that the Board denied her request for early 
retirement benefits in March 1992. Second, appellant Peterson failed to 
establish any protected property right in the early retirement 
benefits.

[¶28]   "`In order to have a property 
interest in a government benefit, * * * the party making the claim must show 
that it has a legitimate claim of entitlement.'" Teton Plumbing and Heating, 
Inc., 763 P.2d  at 849 (quoting American Conveyor Corp. v. Municipality of 
Guanica, 614 F. Supp. 922, 930 (D.C.Puerto Rico 1985)). While legitimate 
retirement expectations may constitute property rights that may not be deprived 
without due process of law, Parker, 882 F. Supp.  at 1138 (quoting Spiller v. 
State, 627 A.2d 513, 517 n. 2 (Me. 1993)), the right to payment of benefits 
before normal retirement age must be found in pertinent employment agreements. 
Sutton v. Weirton Steel Div. of Nat. Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 406, 410 (4th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205, 104 S. Ct. 2387, 81 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1984). 
Therefore, we turn to the provisions of the plan in effect at the time the Board 
made its decision.

[¶29]   In this case, the Board's 
determination to deny appellants' requests for early retirement benefits was 
made on April 27, 1992 under the Revised Plan. Appellant Peterson argues that 
the revisions to the Plan adopted in April 1992 do not apply to her claim 
because the modification took place after she had relied on the provisions of 
the original contract. We need not decide that question, however, because under 
the provisions of the earlier Plan or the Revised Plan, the result is the 
same.

[¶30]   Appellant Peterson admits that both 
versions of the Plan contain provisions which expressly condition the legitimate 
expectation of benefits on the Board's approval of their request. To 
avoid the consequences of these provisions, appellant Peterson contends that the 
Board waived its discretionary power by failing to deny any applications prior 
to 1992. This argument fails for the simple reason that appellant Peterson did 
not explain how the Board's approval of early retirement to previous applicants 
established that the Board did not use its discretion in approving those 
requests. Appellant Peterson presented no evidence that the Board failed to 
consider financial and legal issues in prior years when approving early 
retirement benefits. Therefore, the Board's previous decisions did not waive its 
discretionary powers to refuse to approve all requests for early retirement. See 
Hackett v. Pension Ben. Guaranty Corp., 486 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (D.C.Md. 
1980).

[¶31]   It is undisputed that the written 
terms of the Plan as adopted in 1991 and as revised in 1992 conditioned 
appellant Peterson's property interest on the Board's approval of her request 
for early retirement benefits. Therefore, appellant Peterson had no protected 
property interest at the time the Board denied her request. Consequently, we 
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees on 
this issue.

D. EQUAL 
PROTECTION

[¶32]   Appellants assert that the Board's 
approval of requests for benefits on the basis of age plus years in service 
violated their right to equal protection under the law. We need not address this 
claim, as appellants failed to present this issue with cogent argument or 
pertinent authority. This court has consistently summarily affirmed cases or 
issues in cases that lack these elements. Hamburg v. Heilbrun, 891 P.2d 85, 87 
(Wyo. 1995) (and cases cited thereto).

[¶33]   Moreover, an equal protection claim 
requires the claimant to allege a classification made by the state that treats 
similarly situated people differently. Smith v. Board of County Com'rs of County 
of Sublette, 891 P.2d 88, 91 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Kautza v. City of Cody, 812 P.2d 143, 147 (Wyo. 1991)). Appellants failed to allege any type of 
classification supported by the record.

[¶34]   For these reasons, we hold that 
summary judgment in favor of appellees is appropriate on the equal protection 
claim.

E. MOTIONS FOR 
SANCTIONS

[¶35]   Appellants request that we rule on 
the cross motions for sanctions which were left undecided by the district court. 
We decline to address this issue as it is not properly on appeal. Stone v. 
Stone, 842 P.2d 545, 547 (Wyo. 1992).

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶36]   Appellants failed to comply with 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act's notice requirement, and, therefore, the 
claims based on contract are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm 
summary judgment in favor of appellees on the remainder of appellants' 
claims.

FOOTNOTES

1 Dennis and Marcia Giere 
did not participate in the summary judgment proceedings.

2 Appellant Peterson 
attended law school during the pendency of this litigation and was licensed to 
practice law at the time of filing this appeal. She represents Dennis and Marcia 
Giere on appeal.