Case Title: Jones v. Trice

Citation: 360 S.W.2d 48

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1962-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
360 S.W.2d 48 (1962) R.C. JONES v. Helen Corinne Scales TRICE. Supreme Court of Tennessee. September 7, 1962. *49 Wade & Forrester, Pulaski, for plaintiff. Fyke Farmer, Nashville, for defendant. WHITE, Judge. This is an action for damages for libel. To the declaration the defendant filed a demurrer, which was sustained by the trial judge, resulting in the appeal now before us. In general terms the allegations of the declaration are that the plaintiff, R.C. Jones, was present as a visitor in the courtroom during the trial of another case against the defendant as executrix of an estate. Jones was interested in the proceedings, according to the declaration, because he had a similar claim against the estate which was to be tried at a later date. The jury returned a verdict against Mrs. Trice in that case and thereafter she moved for a new trial. One ground of her motion for a new trial was alleged improper influence upon the jury by the plaintiff herein. The motion contained the following statement: It was further alleged in the declaration that these statements, contained in the motion of Mrs. Trice for a new trial, were false, were known to be false when made and were made with wilful intent to injure the character of the plaintiff. An amendment was filed to the declaration alleging that all of the above ground for a new trial was abandoned and withdrawn by the defendant at the hearing on the motion for a new trial. The demurrer filed in the instant case pled absolute privilege. The basis for this pleading is that the allegedly libelous statements were made in the course of a judicial proceeding and as such they could not give a cause on which to predicate civil liability. In his Brief, the plaintiff, Jones, concedes the nature and purpose of the privilege in judicial proceedings. He contends however that it cannot apply in this case. The argument is that the statements were made against a third party about an issue which was not pertinent to the occasion. He says further that the statements were not pertinent and as evidence thereof they were withdrawn at the hearing. Therefore, they were not privileged. Finally the plaintiff argues that naming him specifically in the affidavit for a new trial was also wholly irrelevant and unnecessary and thus without privilege. The defendant contends that the statements were absolutely privileged, that they were pertinent to the occasion, and that the fact that the statements were withdrawn from the motion did not destroy the privilege. Therefore the question presented on this appeal is whether or not the allegedly defamatory statements are absolutely privileged. The general rule is that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings which are relevant and pertinent to the issues are absolutely privileged, and therefore cannot be used as a basis for a libel action for damages. This rule holds true even though such statements are false, known to be false or even malicious. Hayslip v. Wellford, 195 Tenn. 621, 263 S.W.2d 136, 42 A.L.R.2d 820, and cases cited therein. The English rule is stated by Gatley in his work on Libel and Slander at page 186, Third Edition, (1938), in this manner: *51 In 33 Am.Jur. at page 123, the following statements of the rule are found: The same rule was announced early in the State of Tennessee in the leading case of Lea v. White, 36 Tenn. 111 at page 113 (1856), wherein this Court said: This statement in Lea v. White has been cited with approval in the cases of Cooley v. Galyon, 109 Tenn. 1, 70 S.W. 607, 60 L.R.A. 139; Crockett v. McClanahan, 109 Tenn. 517, 72 S.W. 950, 61 L.R.A. 914; Wells v. Carter, 164 Tenn. 400, 50 S.W.2d 228; Dyer v. Dyer, 178 Tenn. 234, 156 S.W.2d 445, and was referred to in the most recent case of Logan's Super Market v. McCalla, 208 Tenn. 68, 343 S.W.2d 892. In the Restatement of Torts, Section 587, it is stated: Underlying this general doctrine of absolute immunity from liability in libel and slander for statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding is a policy decision by the courts that access to the judicial process, freedom to institute an action, or defend, or participate therein without fear of the burden of being sued for defamation is so vital and necessary to the integrity of our judicial system that it must be made paramount to the right of an individual to a legal remedy where he has been wronged thereby. In the case of Crockett v. McClanahan, supra 109 Tenn. at 530, 72 S.W. at 593, it was stated: Again in the case of Lea v. White, supra 36 Tenn. at 114, the Court said: From the above authorities in general and from the Tennessee cases cited, it can be seen that a statement by a judge, witness, counsel, or party, to be absolutely privileged, must meet two conditions, viz: (1) It must be in the course of a judicial proceeding, and (2) it must be pertinent or relevant to the issue involved in said judicial proceeding. Considering the first condition, it cannot be doubted in the case at Bar that the motion for a new trial and the affidavit of the defendant contained therein about the conduct of the plaintiff were "in the course of a judicial proceeding." However, we have been unable to find any prior case in Tennessee dealing with allegedly defamatory matter in a motion for a new trial. In the work of Gatley, supra at page 188, the author states: And at page 199 the author states further: Newell, supra, cites a case directly in point at page 408 as follows: Citing Keeley v. Great Northern Railway Co., 156 Wis. 181, 145 N.W. 664; L.R.A. 1915C, 986. In the case of Schmitt v. Mann, 291 Ky. 80, 163 S.W.2d 281, a case in which libelous matter was contained in an affidavit in support of a petition for a new trial, the Court said: One case in Tennessee has dealt with defamatory matter in an affidavit. It was an action seeking damages for false imprisonment and libel for allegedly false and malicious statements made in affidavits which led to the commitment of the plaintiff to a state hospital for the insane. The Court upheld the defense of absolute privilege, finding the affidavits were relevant *53 and in the course of an insanity proceeding which was held to be a judicial proceeding. Dyer v. Dyer, supra. We do not believe that any distinction in the general rule has been made or should be made in the cases where the defamatory matter is within an affidavit in support of a motion for a new trial, and it is immaterial whether the affidavit is a separate writing or is incorporated into the motion. The plaintiff questions whether or not the above general rule applies where the defamatory matter concerns a third party or stranger to the judicial proceedings. In 33 Am.Jur. at page 177, Section 185, the prevailing rule is stated in this manner: Tennessee is with the weight of authority in holding that it makes no difference that the alleged libel concerns a third party. We believe that the question has been settled by the Court in Crockett v. McClanahan, supra, as follows: Turning now to the second condition, that of pertinency or relevancy, we come to the major question presented by the case. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the alleged defamatory statements were irrelevant and therefore are not absolutely privileged. We quote again from Newell's work on Libel and Slander: And in 33 Am.Jur. Page 146, Section 150, the writer states that: The pertinency of the matter to the occasion is that which is meant by probable cause. Then the question presented in this case is, was there probable cause or in other words could the defendant have reasonably supposed it necessary to her defense to use the alleged libelous matter. The plaintiff in his brief argues that the statements made by the defendant against him were not relevant and pertinent because they concern a third party and were about an "issue not pertinent to the occasion." He says they were not pertinent to the occasion because the defendant abandoned the accusations when time for argument on the motion came on to be heard. The general rule set out above implies that it makes no difference that the contention supported by the alleged libelous statement was abandoned. It is clear from the authorities that the words "pertinent or relevant" do not mean relevant within the technical rules of evidence. Thus where alleged defamatory matter was contained in an answer but was stricken by a judge as technically irrelevant, it was held that this was not determinative of whether the matter was privileged. Johnston v. Schlarb, 7 Wash. 2d 528, 110 P.2d 190, 134 A.L.R. 474 (1941). This however is not the precise question involved in the case at bar, for here the matter was voluntarily withdrawn by the defendant. The question before the Court was the motion for a new trial and one ground of that motion was the alleged improper influence on the jury by the plaintiff, Jones. That the affidavit in support of that ground was relevant, seems sufficiently clear. It purports to give the specific nature of the alleged improper influence and named the person allegedly instrumental in such improper influence. Should the fact that this ground of the motion was withdrawn make any difference? We do not think so. In none of our cases has any such limitation or exception to the privilege been held to exist. Our Tennessee cases have held that relevance in libel cases means reasonably relevant to the judicial proceedings. The very purpose and intent of the motion for a new trial was to have the court set aside the verdict of the jury. It was the duty of counsel for the defendant therein to prosecute with vigor such motion and to bring to the attention of the court any and all revelant and material matters and things necessary to accomplish that end. This instant suit for libel was brought after the motion for a new trial was filed and before it was formally heard. It could be argued that the withdrawal may have indicated knowledge of falsity of the affidavit, but this is immaterial if the statements contained therein were relevant and pertinent, and we hold that they were. It could be argued with equal force that the affidavit was withdrawn because of the bringing of the instant lawsuit, but we believe that the withdrawal of the affidavit is immaterial to the proper decision in this case. We believe a fair statement of the rule in Tennessee to be that statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding, if pertinent or relevant, are absolutely privileged, and this is true regardless of whether they are malicious, false, known to be false, or against a stranger to the proceeding. We believe the overwhelming weight of authority in this country supports the conclusions reached herein. Our opinion is consistent with the free and unrestricted use of all reasonably pertinent and relevant information available to litigants in presenting *55 their causes before the courts of this State. Therefore the action of the Trial Court in sustaining the demurrer is approved and the errors assigned to such action are overruled.