Case Title: MBS-Certified Pub. Accountants, LLC v. Wis. Bell Inc.

Citation: 2002 WI 108, 2012 WI 15

Docket Number: 2008AP001830

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 WI 15 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1830 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC and Thomas 
H. Schmitt, CPA, d/b/a Metropolitan Business 
Services, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross  
Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Bell Inc., d/b/a AT & T Wisconsin, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
ILD Telecommunications, Inc., d/b/a ILD 
Teleservices, Local Biz USA, Inc. and Americatel 
Corporation, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross-                    
Appellants, 
US Connect, LLC, 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 329 Wis. 2d 709, 790 N.W.2d 542 
(Ct. App. 2010-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 24, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 16, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
CIRCUIT   
 
COUNTY: 
MILWAUKEE 
 
JUDGE: 
RICHARD J. SANKOVITZ 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs in part and dissents in 
part (Opinion filed).  
GABLEMAN, J., joins concurrence/dissent.     
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, C. J., did not participate. 
   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-cross-respondents-
petitioners, there briefs filed by Douglas P. Dehler and O’Neil 
Cannon, Hollman, DeJong & Laing, S.C., Milwaukee, James E. 
Miller, pro hac vice, James C. Shah, pro hac vice, and Shepherd, 
 
 
2
Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLC, Media, PA, and oral argument by 
Douglas P. Dehler.   
 
For the defendant-respondent there were briefs filed by 
Paul F. Linn, Ted A. Wisnefski, and Michael, Best & Friedrich, 
LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Paul F. Linn.  
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross-appellant there were 
briefs filed by Robert H. Friebert, Christopher M. Meuler and 
Friebert, Finerty & St. John, S.C. of Milwaukee, and Gregory F. 
Harley, pro hac vice, and Burr & Forman, LLP, and oral argument 
by Gregory F. Harley.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John S. Greene, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was J. B. Van 
Hollen, attorney general, on behalf of the State of Wisconsin.   
 
 
2012 WI 15
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2008AP1830 
(L.C. No. 
2006CV8092) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC and 
Thomas H. Schmitt, CPA, d/b/a Metropolitan 
Business Services, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Bell Inc., d/b/a AT & T Wisconsin, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
ILD Telecommunications, Inc., d/b/a ILD 
Teleservices, Local Biz USA, Inc. and 
Americatel Corporation, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants, 
 
US Connect, LLC, 
 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 24, 2012 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded to the court of appeals.   
 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
2 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  The petitioners, Thomas H. 
Schmitt and MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC (collectively, 
MBS), seek review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals affirming a circuit court order dismissing their claims 
for monetary relief.1  The circuit court determined that the 
common law voluntary payment doctrine barred MBS's claims 
against Wisconsin Bell, Inc. and ILD Telecommunications, Inc. 
for damages under Wis. Stat. § 100.207 and other statutes.2 
¶2 
The defendant telecommunications companies assert that 
Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Southeastern Wisconsin, 2002 WI 
108, 255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626, is squarely on point and 
forecloses the argument advanced by MBS.  Additionally, they 
contend 
that 
under 
the 
rule 
of 
Fuchsgruber 
v. 
Custom 
Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 81, 244 Wis. 2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833, 
the legislature was required to make explicit reference to the 
voluntary payment doctrine in the text of Wis. Stat. § 100.207 
if it intended the doctrine to be inapplicable to claims under 
that statute.    
¶3 
We conclude that no Wisconsin court has addressed 
whether the legislature intended the voluntary payment doctrine 
to be a viable defense against any cause of action created by a 
statute.  In Putnam, the question of whether the voluntary 
                                                 
1 See MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC & Schmitt v. 
Wisconsin Bell, No. 2008AP1830, unpublished slip. op. (Wis. Ct. 
App., Aug. 10, 2010), affirming orders of the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County, Richard J. Sankovitz, Judge, presiding.   
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
3 
 
payment doctrine was a viable defense to a claim under Wis. 
Stat. § 100.18(1) may have lurked in the record, but it was 
neither brought to the attention of the court nor was it 
specifically addressed.  Accordingly, it was not decided by this 
court.  
¶4 
We further determine that the defendants misinterpret 
Fuchsgruber.  Application of the common law voluntary payment 
doctrine would undermine the manifest purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.207.  Under these circumstances, the conflict between the 
statute's manifest purpose and the common law defense leaves no 
doubt that the legislature intended that the common law defense 
should not be applied to bar claims under the statute.  
¶5 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the court of 
appeals to address ILD's cross-appeal and, if appropriate, any 
previously unresolved appellate issues regarding Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18(1) and the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act.     
I 
¶6 
The allegations at issue in this case relate to an 
illegal 
telecommunications 
practice 
called 
"cramming."  
According to MBS, cramming is a deceptive billing scheme in 
which telecommunications companies insert relatively small, 
unauthorized charges into customers' telephone bills with the 
expectation 
that 
the 
customers 
will 
unwittingly 
pay 
the 
unauthorized charges.     
¶7 
The facts set forth below are taken primarily from 
MBS's complaint.  Because we are reviewing the circuit court's 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
4 
 
grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we 
must assume that these facts are true.   
¶8 
Thomas Schmitt is an accountant who owns and operates 
MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC (MBS).  Wisconsin Bell is 
the local exchange carrier that provides MBS's telephone 
service.3  At some point, Schmitt discovered that Wisconsin 
Bell's telephone bills contained unauthorized charges.  Schmitt 
and MBS filed suit.4      
¶9 
According to the allegations in the complaint, the 
unauthorized charges, which ranged from $2 to $40 per month, 
were generated by three service providers, Local Biz USA, U.S. 
Connect, and AmericaTel.  These service providers are in the 
business of providing internet and web hosting services, 
directory assistance services, and international calling plans, 
respectively.  MBS asserted: "Because consumers would be more 
likely to question unauthorized charges if they were contained 
in bills sent to them directly by the Service Provider 
Defendants . . . , those Service Provider Defendants enlist the 
                                                 
3 Although MBS's complaint named AT&T, Inc., the parties 
agree that Wisconsin Bell d/b/a AT&T Wisconsin is the correct 
name of the intended defendant.  The parties stipulated to the 
dismissal of AT&T and the substitution of Wisconsin Bell.     
4 Schmitt and MBS filed suit "on behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated."  The complaint was dismissed 
before the circuit court had the occasion to determine whether 
it was appropriate to certify the lawsuit as a class action.  
Accordingly, at this point the only plaintiffs in this lawsuit 
are Schmitt and MBS. 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
5 
 
aid of third-party billing companies, . . . which agree to take 
part in the deceptive business practices in exchange for a fee."     
¶10 According 
to MBS, the unauthorized charges were 
forwarded to ILD Communications (ILD), a billing clearinghouse.  
ILD aggregated the unauthorized charges and then forwarded them 
on to Wisconsin Bell, where they were incorporated into MBS's 
telephone bills under the heading "Miscellaneous Charges and 
Credits."  The complaint alleges that Schmitt did not notice the 
unauthorized charges and unwittingly paid them.     
¶11 The defendants named in MBS's complaint fall into 
three categories: service providers (Local Biz USA, U.S. 
Connect, and AmericaTel); billing clearinghouses (ILD); and 
local exchange carriers (Wisconsin Bell).  At this point, 
however, only two defendants, ILD and Wisconsin Bell, remain as 
parties to this appeal.5    
¶12 In relevant part, the complaint alleged violations of 
Wis. Stat. § 100.207(2) and (3)(a), violations of Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18(1), and violations of the Wisconsin Organized Crime 
Control Act, Wis. Stat. § 946.80, et seq. (hereinafter, the 
Crime Control Act).6  The telecommunications company defendants 
                                                 
5 U.S. Connect never appeared in the action before the 
circuit court and was defaulted.  Further, while this case was 
pending at the court of appeals, AmericaTel was dismissed to 
accommodate a settlement agreement, and Local Biz filed for 
bankruptcy and was later dismissed under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.18.       
6 Additionally, the complaint alleged violations of Wis. 
Stat. § 100.20(5) and unjust enrichment.  MBS did not appeal the 
circuit court's dismissal of either of these claims.  Therefore, 
they are not before this court.    
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
6 
 
filed motions to dismiss, alleging various defenses including 
the voluntary payment doctrine.  Under that doctrine, a party 
cannot bring an action "to recover payments that [were] paid 
voluntarily, with full knowledge of the material facts, and 
absent fraud or wrongful conduct inducing payment."  Putnam, 255 
Wis. 2d 447, ¶13.   
¶13 At a hearing on the defendants' motions, the circuit 
court dismissed all claims for monetary relief against ILD and 
Wisconsin Bell with one exception.7  The circuit court's analysis 
focused primarily on the language of 100.207(2) and (3)(a).  It 
determined 
that 
although 
the 
complaint 
properly 
alleged 
violations of Wis. Stat. § 100.207, the voluntary payment 
doctrine would bar any entitlement to monetary relief.    
¶14 Taking the allegations in the complaint as true, the 
court 
concluded 
that 
each 
of 
the 
defendants 
made 
false 
statements with regard to the provision of telecommunications 
service in violation of § 100.207(2).8  It explained: "Stating on 
                                                 
7 The circuit court refrained from dismissing claims for 
money damages arising out of one charge generated by U.S. 
Connect.  See infra, ¶19 n.10.  Additionally, the court's order 
left intact MBS's claims for injunctive relief.  Ultimately, the 
parties stipulated to dismiss the claims for injunctive relief 
with prejudice.     
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 100.207(2) provides:  
A person may not make in any manner any statement or 
representation 
with 
regard 
to 
the 
provision 
of 
telecommunications 
services, 
including 
the 
rates, 
terms or conditions for telecommunications service, 
which is false, misleading or deceptive, or which 
omits to state material information with respect to 
the provision of telecommunications service that is 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
7 
 
a phone bill that a customer owes money for services the 
customer did not authorize is false. . . . And that seems to be 
the only element that must be shown to demonstrate a violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 100.207(2)."       
¶15 The court also concluded that all of the defendants 
except ILD violated § 100.207(3)(a).9  The court excepted ILD 
because it was "satisfied that ILD did not bill the plaintiffs.  
ILD collected, packaged, and communicated billing information to 
Wisconsin Bell, but that conduct cannot fairly be described as 
'billing'[.]"       
¶16 Nevertheless, the court went on to conclude that "the 
complaint also establishes a possible defense to the damage 
claim."  Relying on MBS's allegation that Schmitt "did not 
notice the charges and unwittingly paid them," it asserted: 
"[T]he complaint implies that the plaintiffs voluntarily paid 
the unlawful charges."     
                                                                                                                                                             
necessary to make the statements not false, misleading 
or deceptive. 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 100.207(3)(a) provides:  
A person may not engage in negative option billing or 
negative enrollment of telecommunications services, 
including unbundled telecommunications services.  A 
person 
may 
not 
bill 
a 
customer 
for 
any 
telecommunications service that the customer did not 
affirmatively order unless that service is required to 
be 
provided 
by 
law, 
the 
federal 
communications 
commission or the public service commission.  A 
customer's failure to refuse a person's proposal to 
provide 
a 
telecommunications 
service 
is 
not 
an 
affirmative 
request 
for 
that 
telecommunications 
service. 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
8 
 
¶17 The 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
voluntary 
payment 
doctrine was a viable defense to MBS's claims for damages under 
Wis. Stat. § 100.207 because the legislature did not insert any 
language in the statute that expressly abrogated the common law 
doctrine:  
I reach this juncture in my reasoning by following the 
maxim that a court cannot read a statute to override 
the common law unless the legislative purpose to do so 
is clearly expressed in the language of the statute.   
A 
good 
example 
of 
this 
principle 
at 
work 
is 
Fuchsgruber 
v. 
Custom 
Accessories, 
Inc., 
[244 
Wis. 2d 758] . . . . 
Likewise, in the case before me, I find a lack of any 
explicit reference to voluntary payment in section 
100.207, and that lack of any explicit reference to 
the possibility of voluntary payment leads me to 
conclude that the Legislature did not intend for this 
statute to override this common law doctrine.   
I simply do not find any words suggesting that you can 
claim 
damages 
under 
the 
statute 
even 
if 
you 
voluntarily paid.     
The court asserted that it was required to "presume the 
Legislature knew about the doctrine and knew this would be 
raised as a defense, [and] if they didn't want it raised as a 
defense, they would have said so."    
¶18 Additionally, the circuit court found support in 
Putnam: "I'm also influenced by the fact that the Putnam court 
upheld the application of the common law voluntary payment 
doctrine against not only common law damage claims, but also a 
statutory claim."         
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
9 
 
¶19 Wisconsin case law recognizes three exceptions to the 
voluntary payment doctrine: fraud, duress, and mistake of fact.  
See Putnam, 255 Wis. 2d 447, ¶13.  Turning to those exceptions, 
the circuit court determined that MBS had alleged fraud but had 
failed to "satisfy the court" that the charges were sufficiently 
deceptive to fulfill the elements of common law fraud: "[T]he 
charges were stated with sufficient particularity that a 
reasonable customer would be startled to find such a charge on 
the bill."10           
¶20 As explained above, the circuit court's analysis was 
focused on the language of Wis. Stat. § 100.207.  It did not 
specifically examine Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) or the Crime Control 
Act to determine whether the voluntary payment doctrine was 
applicable to claims under those statutes.  Nevertheless, by 
dismissing all of MBS's claims for monetary relief, it appears 
that the court implicitly concluded that the doctrine was a 
viable defense to claims under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) and the 
Crime Control Act as well.    
¶21 Additionally, 
the 
court 
provided 
an 
alternative 
rationale 
for 
dismissing 
the 
claims 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 100.18(1).  It concluded that that statute applied to 
representations that are made in advertisements and sales 
                                                 
10 The court made one exception for the charge for "MONTHLY 
SVCS" generated by U.S. Connect.  It explained: "[t]he words, 
'monthly service fee' are generic and ambiguous enough that even 
a dedicated bean counter might look at that and say, okay I can 
see why I have to pay a monthly fee, and would be easily 
hoodwinked."      
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
10 
 
promotions, and that the telephone bills did not constitute 
advertisements or sales promotions.11  At a hearing on MBS's 
motion for reconsideration, the court stood by its previous 
decision to dismiss the claims.12       
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 100.18(1) provides:  
No person, firm, corporation or association, or agent 
or employee thereof, with intent to sell, distribute, 
increase the consumption of or in any wise dispose of 
any real estate, merchandise, securities, employment, 
service, or anything offered by such person, firm, 
corporation or association, or agent or employee 
thereof, directly or indirectly, to the public for 
sale, hire, use or other distribution, or with intent 
to induce the public in any manner to enter into any 
contract or obligation relating to the purchase, sale, 
hire, use or lease of any real estate, merchandise, 
securities, 
employment 
or 
service, 
shall 
make, 
publish, disseminate, circulate, or place before the 
public, or cause, directly or indirectly, to be made, 
published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before 
the public, in this state, in a newspaper, magazine or 
other publication, or in the form of a book, notice, 
handbill, poster, bill, circular, pamphlet, letter, 
sign, placard, card, label, or over any radio or 
television station, or in any other way similar or 
dissimilar 
to 
the 
foregoing, 
an 
advertisement, 
announcement, statement or representation of any kind 
to the public relating to such purchase, sale, hire, 
use or lease of such real estate, merchandise, 
securities, service or employment or to the terms or 
conditions thereof, which advertisement, announcement, 
statement or representation contains any assertion, 
representation or statement of fact which is untrue, 
deceptive or misleading. 
12 The 
court 
further 
elucidated 
upon 
its 
alternative 
rationale for dismissing the Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) claim.  It 
explained that the representations in the telephone bills did 
not constitute advertisements or sales promotions because they 
were not made to the public for the purpose of inducing a future 
sale.  
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
11 
 
¶22 MBS appealed the dismissal of its claims for relief 
under Wis. Stat. § 100.207, Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), and the 
Crime Control Act.  The primary focus of its brief to the court 
of appeals was the applicability of the voluntary payment 
doctrine.  In addition, MBS appealed the circuit court's 
alternative rationale for dismissing the § 100.18(1) claims and 
the 
court's 
determination 
that 
MBS 
failed 
to 
state 
a 
§ 100.207(3)(a) claim against ILD because ILD did not "bill" 
MBS.    
¶23 ILD cross-appealed.  It argued that in addition to the 
voluntary payment doctrine, the dismissal of the Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.207 claims against it should be affirmed on other 
grounds.13        
¶24 Relying primarily on Fuchsgruber and Putnam, the court 
of appeals concluded that the voluntary payment doctrine applied 
to bar MBS's claims for monetary relief.  MBS-Certified Public 
Accountants, LLC & Schmitt v. Wisconsin Bell, No. 2008AP1830, 
unpublished slip. op. (Wis. Ct. App., Aug. 10, 2010).  Because 
of this determination, the court of appeals declined to address 
                                                 
13 In its cross-appeal, ILD argued that the Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.207(2) claim against it was unavailing because (1) the 
statute prohibits false, misleading, or deceptive statements and 
representations, 
and 
ILD 
did 
not 
make 
any 
statement 
or 
representation to MBS; (2) the statute applies to statements 
made in the context of advertising or sales promotions, and the 
bills were not advertising or sales promotions; and (3) MBS 
lacks standing to file suit under Wis. Stat. § 100.207 because 
MBS is not a "consumer" as that term has been defined by the 
Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection.     
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
12 
 
the additional arguments presented by MBS and declined to 
address ILD's cross-appeal.  Id., ¶1.   
II 
¶25 Upon review, we must determine whether the circuit 
court properly granted the defendants' motions to dismiss.  We 
review a grant or denial of a motion to dismiss independently of 
the determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court 
of appeals.  Pool v. City of Sheboygan, 2007 WI 38, ¶9, 300 
Wis. 2d 74, 729 N.W.2d 415.  Like the circuit court and the 
court of appeals, we must assume that the allegations in the 
complaint are true.  Putnam, 255 Wis. 2d 447, ¶11.  
¶26 This case presents the issue of whether the voluntary 
payment doctrine is a viable defense to claims under several 
statutes. 
 
Ultimately, 
this 
is 
a 
matter 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.  It must be decided whether the legislature 
intended the common law defense to be applied to bar monetary 
relief under these statutes.  Statutory interpretation is a 
question of law, which we also review independently of the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of 
appeals.  Pool, 300 Wis. 2d 74, ¶9.   
¶27 We begin by addressing the defendants' contention that 
the issue in this case was already decided in Putnam, 255 
Wis. 2d 447, a recent decision of this court.  Then, we turn to 
interpreting the statute and addressing the defendants' argument 
that Fuchsgruber, 244 Wis. 2d 758, resolves the matter of 
statutory interpretation that is presented by this case.    
III 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
13 
 
¶28 MBS asserts that the voluntary payment doctrine is not 
a viable defense to its statutory claims for damages because the 
doctrine conflicts with the purposes of the statutes.  The 
defendant telecommunications companies counter that we need look 
no further than a recent decision of this court to resolve the 
issue.  They contend that Putnam demonstrates that the voluntary 
payment doctrine is a viable defense to all statutory claims.  
Therefore, they argue that Putnam forecloses the argument 
advanced by MBS.     
¶29 In 
Putnam, 
the 
dispute 
revolved 
around 
the 
enforceability of a clause in Time Warner's standard cable 
contract.  The clause imposed a late-payment fee on customers 
who failed to timely pay their bills.  255 Wis. 2d 447, ¶4.  A 
class of customers who paid the fees subsequently filed suit to 
recover their payments, alleging that the fees were not 
reasonably related to Time Warner's actual costs.  Id.  The 
customers averred that the fees constituted unlawful liquidated 
damages.  Id., ¶10.  
¶30 The complaint set forth eight separate causes of 
action for monetary damages, including a claim for damages under 
"Wisconsin's Trade Practices Act."14  Id., ¶4 n.2.  We explained 
in a footnote that each of these claims for damages was 
"premised on a theory of liability that Time Warner imposed an 
                                                 
14 The Putnam opinion does not cite a specific statute.  It 
is necessary to turn to the appendix that was filed in that case 
to determine that the damages were claimed under Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18(1).   
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
14 
 
unlawful liquidated damages clause" in its contract: "Each count 
alleges, in some manner, that Time Warner received payments from 
the late fees 'which are not reasonably related to its actual 
costs.'"  Id., ¶36 n.12.    
¶31 We described the nature and purpose of the voluntary 
payment doctrine as follows: "[M]oney paid voluntarily, with 
knowledge of all the facts, and without fraud or duress, cannot 
be recovered merely on account of ignorance or mistake of the 
law."  Id., ¶13.  The voluntary payment doctrine "allows 
entities that receive payment for services to rely upon these 
funds and to use them unfettered in future activities" and 
"operates as a means to settle disputes without litigation by 
requiring the party contesting the payment to notify the payee 
of its concerns."  Id., ¶16.    
¶32 Ultimately, we determined that the voluntary payment 
doctrine barred the customers "from recovering monetary damages 
for their payment of allegedly unlawful fees without objection 
or protest."  Id., ¶3.  We concluded that the customers had paid 
the fees without objection or protest, and that their payments 
were not made as a result of fraud, duress, or mistake of fact.  
Id., ¶3.   
¶33 We neither cited to nor individually addressed the 
customers' claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1).  Rather, we 
grouped together all of the remaining claims and collectively 
disposed of them in a footnote: "[B]ecause the customers are 
precluded under the voluntary payment doctrine from seeking 
repayment 
of 
allegedly 
unlawful 
liquidated 
damages, 
the 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
15 
 
additional claims [for money damages] are encapsulated in the 
overall [unlawful liquidated damages] theory and are properly 
subject to the voluntary payment doctrine."  Id., ¶36 n.12.    
¶34 The 
Putnam court's application of the voluntary 
payment doctrine lends superficial support to the defendants' 
contention that the doctrine is a defense to all statutory 
claims and can likewise be applied to the statutes implicated in 
this case.  Nevertheless, "questions which merely lurk in the 
record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled 
upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to 
constitute precedents."  Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 
(1925).15   
¶35 The 
Putnam 
court 
did 
not 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 100.18(1), and it did not rule upon whether the legislature 
intended the common law doctrine to be a viable defense to that 
statutory claim.  Further, a review of the briefs filed in this 
                                                 
15 See also Colby v. Columbia Cnty., 192 Wis. 2d 397, 405, 
531 N.W.2d 404 (Ct. App. 1995) aff'd, 202 Wis. 2d 342, 550 
N.W.2d 124 (1996) ("[W]e did not consider, and were not asked to 
consider [in a previous case], the impact of section 893.13(2), 
Stats.  Our statement, although superficially supporting the 
City's position here, is thus not precedent."); Fulton Found. v. 
Wisconsin Dep't Taxation, 13 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 108 N.W.2d 312 
(1961) ("Because the right of the department to raise the issue 
of constitutionality was not therein challenged, such case has 
no efficacy as a precedent with respect to such question."); 
State ex rel. City of Sheboygan v. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 194 
Wis. 456, 459, 216 N.W. 144 (1928) ("The relators cannot rely 
upon the fact that similar actions have been maintained in which 
the right of the municipality to prosecute such actions was not 
questioned, because the question now under consideration was 
neither raised nor considered in those cases.  Such decisions 
are not authority either way upon this question."). 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
16 
 
court in Putnam reveals that the customers never advanced that 
the statutory claim should be treated any differently than the 
common law unlawful liquidated damages claim.  They did not 
argue the issue we consider today.   
¶36 In fact, the customers did not make any such argument 
in any court.  During the hearing before the circuit court on 
Time Warner's motion to dismiss, the customers' attorney did not 
discuss or even mention Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1).  Similarly, the 
circuit court did not mention the statutory claim when the court 
dismissed "all counts in this complaint."   
¶37 Likewise, the customers did not make any such argument 
in the court of appeals.  The opinion of the court of appeals 
listed the claims made, including one for "violation of 
Wisconsin's trade practice statutes."  Putnam v. Time Warner 
Cable of Se. Wisconsin, 2001 WI App 196, ¶3 n.1, 247 Wis. 2d 41, 
633 N.W.2d 254.  However, it noted that the customers made no 
separate argument regarding any statutory claim: "The customers 
present separate arguments challenging the circuit court's 
dismissal of both the claim for unlawful liquidated damages and 
the claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.  However, they 
present a unified argument challenging the dismissal of all 
their other claims."  Id.   
¶38 The customers' opening brief to this court did not 
cite to Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) or any other trade practices 
statutes.  The only statute cited was the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgment Act, Wis. Stat. § 806.04.  In their reply brief, the 
customers did not cite any statutes at all.   
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
17 
 
¶39 Rather, the customers' briefs focus on only one claim 
for damages——the common law unlawful liquidated damages claim.  
Under these circumstances, where no distinction between the 
common law and statutory claims was brought to any court's 
attention, it is unsurprising that this court grouped the claims 
for damages together and collectively affirmed their dismissal.   
¶40 In Putnam, the question of whether the voluntary 
payment doctrine was a viable defense to a claim under Wis. 
Stat. § 100.18(1) may have lurked in the record, but it was 
neither brought to the attention of the court nor did the court 
specifically rule upon it.  Accordingly, it has not been 
previously decided.16  
      
                                                 
16 No Wisconsin court has taken up and decided whether the 
legislature intended the voluntary payment doctrine to be a 
viable defense against any cause of action created by a statute.  
Although the court of appeals in this case cited to Butcher v. 
Ameritech Corp., 2007 WI App 5, 298 Wis. 2d 468, 727 N.W.2d 546 
(Ct. App. 2006), the court misconstrued that case. 
In Butcher, it was alleged that Ameritech had collected 
taxes for services that were not properly subject to taxation.  
Id., ¶1.  Wisconsin's tax code provides a statutory procedure 
for recovering payments.  In certain circumstances, taxpayers 
can file a claim for a refund with the Department of Revenue 
(DOR) under Wis. Stat. § 77.59(4)(a).  The remedial scheme in 
Wis. Stat. § 77.59(4)(a) does not require taxpayers to protest 
the payment of unlawful taxes prior to seeking a remedy from the 
DOR.    
The Butcher plaintiffs did not seek the remedy from the DOR 
as provided in Wis. Stat. § 77.59(4)(a).  Rather, they filed 
suit in the circuit court directly against Ameritech. 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
18 
 
IV 
¶41 Having determined that no Wisconsin case squarely 
addresses the question before us, we turn to the relevant 
statutes.  In its petition for review, MBS argued that the 
circuit court erroneously dismissed its claims for monetary 
relief under three statutes: Wis. Stat. § 100.207, Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18(1), and the Crime Control Act.  However, the primary 
focus of the parties' arguments is on just one of these 
statutes, Wis. Stat. § 100.207.  Accordingly, we likewise focus 
our discussion on that statute.  
A 
¶42 When interpreting a statute, this court strives to 
give effect to the language chosen by the legislature.  In so 
doing, we consider the statute's scope, context, and purpose.  
State ex. rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 
                                                                                                                                                             
The plaintiffs argued that application of the voluntary 
payment doctrine to bar their claims would violate the public 
policy as expressed in Wis. Stat. § 77.59.  The Butcher court 
disagreed, holding that the voluntary payment doctrine was a 
viable defense against the claims filed against Ameritech in 
circuit court, even if the doctrine would not apply to claims 
made under Wis. Stat. § 77.59(4)(a).  The court of appeals 
explained: "Section 77.59(4)(a) expresses the legislature's 
intent that a taxpayer need not protest the tax when paying it 
in order to recover a refund [from the DOR] under the procedure 
established in § 77.59(4)(a).  The statute expresses no intent 
and no policy judgment on whether the common law voluntary 
payment doctrine should apply in a court action outside the 
statutory scheme."  Id., ¶31 (emphasis added).   
Because there was no Wis. Stat. § 77.59(4)(a) claim at 
issue in Butcher, the Butcher court had no occasion to evaluate 
the applicability of the voluntary payment doctrine to a cause 
of action created by statute.    
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
19 
 
58, ¶48, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("[S]cope, context, and 
purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation 
of an unambiguous statute as long as the scope, context, and 
purpose are ascertainable from the text and structure of the 
statute itself[.]").  "We begin by looking to the language of 
the statute because we assume that the legislature's intent is 
expressed in the statutory language."  Bosco v. Labor & Indus. 
Review Comm'n, 2004 WI 77, ¶23, 272 Wis. 2d 586, 681 N.W.2d 157.   
¶43 As 
always, 
a 
court 
should 
avoid 
adopting 
an 
interpretation that is contrary to a "textually or contextually 
manifest statutory purpose."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49.  
"[W]e will liberally construe remedial statutes to suppress the 
mischief and advance the remedy that the legislature intended to 
afford."  Garcia v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 2004 WI 93, 
¶8, 273 Wis. 2d 612, 682 N.W.2d 365.     
¶44 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 100.207 
is 
entitled 
"telecommunications services."  It prohibits false, misleading, 
or deceptive statements "with respect to the provision of 
telecommunications service," and it prohibits "bill[ing] a 
customer for any telecommunications service that the customer 
did not affirmatively order."  Wis. Stat. §§ 100.207(2); 
100.207(3)(a).   
¶45 Subsection (2) provides:  
A person may not make in any manner any statement or 
representation 
with 
regard 
to 
the 
provision 
of 
telecommunications service, including the rates, terms 
or conditions for telecommunications service, which is 
false, misleading or deceptive, or which omits to 
state 
material 
information 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
20 
 
provision 
of 
telecommunications 
service 
that 
is 
necessary to make the statements not false, misleading 
or deceptive. 
Wis. Stat. § 100.207(2). 
¶46 Subsection (3)(a) provides:  
A person may not engage in negative option billing or 
negative enrollment of telecommunications services, 
including unbundled telecommunications services.  A 
person 
may 
not 
bill 
a 
customer 
for 
any 
telecommunications service that the customer did not 
affirmatively order unless that service is required to 
be 
provided 
by 
law, 
the 
federal 
communications 
commission or the public service commission.  A 
customer's failure to refuse a person's proposal to 
provide 
a 
telecommunications 
service 
is 
not 
an 
affirmative 
request 
for 
that 
telecommunications 
service. 
Wis. Stat. § 100.207(3)(a) (emphasis added). 
¶47 Finally, 
subsection (6) sets forth two distinct 
remedies for violations of Wis. Stat. § 100.207.17  First, a 
                                                 
17 In relevant part, Wis. Stat. § 100.207(6) provides: 
(a) 1. If a person fails to comply with this section, 
any person or class of persons adversely affected by 
the failure to comply has a claim for appropriate 
relief, including damages, injunctive or declaratory 
relief, specific performance and recission. 
2. A person or class of persons entitled to relief 
under subd. 1. is also entitled to recover costs and 
disbursements. 
(b) 1. The department of justice . . . or any district 
attorney, may commence an action in circuit court in 
the name of the state to restrain by temporary or 
permanent injunction any violation of this section.  
Injunctive relief may include an order directing 
telecommunications 
providers . . . to 
discontinue 
telecommunications 
service 
provided 
to 
a 
person 
violating this section or ch. 196 [which regulates 
public utilities].  Before entry of final judgment, 
the court may make such orders or judgments as may be 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
21 
 
person (or class of persons) who is adversely affected by the 
violation may file a lawsuit for appropriate relief including 
damages.  Wis. Stat. § 100.207(6)(a).  Second, the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) or a district attorney may commence a lawsuit in 
the name of the State to enjoin violations.  In such an action, 
the court may also order the defendant to "restore to any person 
any pecuniary loss."  Wis. Stat. § 100.207(6)(b). 
¶48 The State of Wisconsin, which filed an amicus brief in 
this case, explained that cramming is one of a number of 
deceptive billing practices to emerge in the 1990s.  See United 
States General Accounting Office, Overview of the Cramming 
Problem: Statement of Stanley J. Czerwinski (1999).  The State 
asserts that by enacting Wis. Stat. § 100.207 in 1994, the 
Wisconsin legislature specifically acted with the intent to 
provide the means to seek relief in the courts for deceptive and 
unauthorized billing. 
¶49 The telecommunications company defendants imply that 
the real purpose and import of the statute is found in sub. 
(6)(b) and sub. (6)(c), the portions of the statute that permit 
                                                                                                                                                             
necessary to restore to any person any pecuniary loss 
suffered because of the acts or practices involved in 
the action if proof of these acts or practices is 
submitted to the satisfaction of the court. 
 . . .  
(c) Any person who violates subs. (2) to (4) shall be 
required to forfeit not less than $25 nor more than 
$5,000 for each offense.  Forfeitures under this 
paragraph shall be enforced by the department of 
justice . . . .    
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
22 
 
the State to file actions and seek forfeitures against crammers.  
They indicate that the legislative intent was to give the State 
a "very heavy hammer," and that the private right of action in 
sub. (6)(a) is largely inconsequential because it is duplicative 
of preexisting common law claims.  
¶50 The defendants' assertion of legislative purpose fails 
to square with the statute's plain language.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 100.207 is a remedial statute that provides two remedial 
paths, not one.  In addition to the enforcement mechanisms 
provided to the State in subs. (6)(b) and (6)(c), "any person or 
class of persons adversely affected by the failure to comply" 
with the statute may bring an independent cause of action.18   
¶51 In another context involving remedial statutes with a 
dual enforcement mechanism, we have explained that "private 
tenants actions provide a necessary backup to the state's 
enforcement powers."  Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 Wis. 2d 352, 
358-59, 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983).  Because "the sheer number of 
violations prevent [the State] from proceeding against all 
violators," private actions "constitute an enforcement mechanism 
reinforcing that of the justice department."  Id.; see also 
Benkoski v. Flood, 2001 WI App 84, ¶17, 242 Wis. 2d 652, 626 
N.W.2d 851 ("[P]rivate actions augment enforcement of the [law] 
                                                 
18 By contrast, see Indiana's anti-cramming statutes and 
regulations, which do not provide a private right of action.  
Lady Di's, Inc. v. Enhanced Services Billing, Inc., 654 F.3d 728 
(7th Cir. 2011) (citing Ind. Code § 8-1-29-5(2) and 170 Ind. 
Admin. Code § 7-1.1-19(p)).    
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
23 
 
by the department of justice, which has insufficient resources 
to prosecute all violations."). 
 ¶52 Courts interpret statutes to avoid surplusage.  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  If the legislature had intended nothing 
more in sub. (6)(a) than to duplicate preexisting common law 
claims, there would have been no need to enact sub. (6)(a) at 
all. 
¶53 We must construe this statute "with a view towards the 
social problem which the legislature was addressing when 
enacting the law."  Garcia, 273 Wis. 2d 612, ¶8.  Based on the 
plain language of the statute, the manifest purposes of Wis. 
Stat. § 100.207 are to provide remedies for those who are 
adversely affected by cramming, and to deter that practice.19   
¶54 If the voluntary payment doctrine were a viable 
defense to a person's cause of action under sub. (6)(a), 
however, both of these legislative purposes would be severely 
undermined.   The application of the voluntary payment doctrine 
would significantly limit the circumstances under which a person 
                                                 
19 Wisconsin Stat. § 100.207 was adopted by 1993 Wis. Act 
496, which made numerous changes related to the regulation of 
telecommunications 
utilities.  There is scant legislative 
history that focuses specifically upon the purpose of Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.207.  Information Memorandum 94-27, published by the 
Wisconsin Legislative Council, merely provides: "The Act creates 
new 
consumer 
protections, 
including . . . [p]rohibiting 
deceptive 
advertising 
of 
telecommunications 
services 
and 
limiting telecommunications services sales and bill collection 
practices[.]"  The absence of legislative history does not 
impede our ability to interpret the statute, given that the 
legislative purposes of Wis. Stat. § 100.207 are manifest in the 
text of the statute.     
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
24 
 
would be entitled to a remedy under Wis. Stat. § 100.207.  A 
person could maintain a claim under only two circumstances: if 
the person noticed the charges and protested before paying; or 
if the person could satisfy one of the common law exceptions to 
the voluntary payment doctrine.20  Frequently, the person would 
be required to overcome the high hurdle of proving all of the 
elements of common law fraud.21    
¶55 The plain text of Wis. Stat. § 100.207 sets forth a 
broad remedy available to persons who are adversely affected by 
cramming.  Under the statute, a plaintiff need not protest an 
unauthorized charge to seek a remedy.  Nevertheless, if the 
voluntary 
payment 
doctrine 
were 
a 
viable 
defense, 
then 
plaintiffs would either have to protest or satisfy all of the 
elements of fraud, duress, or mistake of fact.  The broad 
                                                 
20 At oral argument, counsel for ILD appeared to agree that 
the application of the common law doctrine would limit the 
remedy to these two circumstances.  He stated: "There is not an 
element in the statute that says that a protest is required.  
But if the common law defense of the voluntary payment doctrine 
applies and you have this rare customer . . . his payment was 
not the result of fraud, duress, or mistake of fact, then to get 
around the voluntary payment doctrine, that customer would have 
to protest."  
21 For example, in this case, the circuit court concluded 
that the voluntary payment doctrine was a viable defense to the 
claims for damages and then explained: "For the plaintiffs to 
claim that the voluntary payment doctrine does not apply on 
account of fraud, they must satisfy the court of three elements: 
First that there was a knowingly false representation of fact; 
Second, that it was made with intent to defraud and for the 
purpose of inducing another to act upon it; and Third, the 
recipient must have relied on the representation and must have 
been induced to rely on it which act caused the claimed damage."  
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
25 
 
statutory remedy set forth by the legislature would be severely 
circumscribed.   
¶56 Application of the voluntary payment doctrine would 
likewise undermine the legislature's purpose to deter cramming 
by limiting the circumstances under which a customer would be 
entitled to relief.  The defendant telecommunications companies 
explain that whenever a customer notices an unauthorized charge 
and complains, the unauthorized charges are cancelled.  As a 
result of the customer's protest, no claim for damages would 
arise.  If the voluntary payment doctrine were a viable defense, 
one could conceive of very few situations in which a private 
action would produce an actionable claim for damages.     
¶57 The statute is meant to deter the practice of cramming 
by holding crammers responsible for the illegal practice in 
court.  However, application of the common law defense would 
reduce the likelihood that crammers would face any consequence 
at all for violating the statute.  Rather than being deterred by 
the statute's remedial scheme, telecommunications companies 
might be encouraged to produce more unauthorized charges, 
knowing that customers who do not initially notice deceptive 
charges will face high hurdles to recovering those payments in a 
court action.  Applying the voluntary payment doctrine to bar 
many private rights of action could encourage cramming, the 
mischief the legislature sought to suppress, by eliminating "a 
necessary backup to the state's enforcement powers."  See 
Shands, 115 Wis. 2d at 358-59.         
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
26 
 
¶58 A court's interpretation of a statute should not 
"contravene a textually or contextually manifest statutory 
purpose."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49.  Remedial statutes 
should be liberally construed to "suppress the mischief and 
advance the remedy that the legislature intended to afford."  
Garcia, 273 Wis. 2d 612, ¶8.  Here, application of the common 
law voluntary payment doctrine would encourage the mischief 
identified by the legislature and circumscribe the remedy it 
provided.  That is, application of the common law defense would 
undermine both textually manifest purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.207. 
B 
¶59 Despite the damage that application of the voluntary 
payment doctrine would do the manifest purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.207, the defendants assert that such a result is compelled 
by Fuchsgruber, 244 Wis. 2d 758.  They contend that under the 
rule of Fuchsgruber, the common law voluntary payment doctrine 
applies to all new causes of action created by the legislature 
unless the legislature uses express language to the contrary.  
If the legislature intended to make the voluntary payment 
doctrine inapplicable to claims under Wis. Stat. § 100.207, the 
defendants assert that it was required to make explicit 
reference to the doctrine in the text of that statute.  They 
contend that the absence of such a reference forecloses MBS's 
argument that the common law defense is inapplicable because it 
is inconsistent with the purposes of the statute.      
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
27 
 
¶60 At this point, we pause to make an observation 
regarding 
the 
scope 
and 
consequences 
of 
the 
defendants' 
argument.  The defendants' interpretation of Fuchsgruber would 
appear to apply equally to all common law doctrines and rules.  
Thus, if the defendants correctly interpret Fuchsgruber, the 
legislature would be required to identify and evaluate each and 
every potentially relevant common law doctrine and rule, whether 
well known or obscure, and enumerate every one that is 
inapplicable whenever it creates a new statutory cause of 
action.22   
¶61 Overlaying all new statutory causes of action with the 
myriad of common law doctrines and rules would accomplish a 
sweeping change in the law of the state.  This sweeping change 
is not mandated by Fuchsgruber.   
¶62 In Fuchsgruber, after being injured by a product, the 
plaintiff filed a strict product liability claim against the 
product's distributor.  244 Wis. 2d 758, ¶¶4-5.  In a strict 
product liability claim, the defendant's liability is based not 
upon fault, but rather, upon the defective condition of the 
product.  Id., ¶22.    
¶63 Around the same time that the plaintiff was injured, 
the legislature amended the comparative negligence statute.  
Under the amended statute, a plaintiff's negligence would be 
                                                 
22 For instance, it appears that under the defendants' 
interpretation of Fuchsgruber, the legislature would be required 
to routinely add language listing common law doctrines such as 
laches, estoppel, unclean hands, voluntary payment, privity, 
economic loss, etc.   
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
28 
 
compared against the negligence of each individual defendant for 
purposes of determining liability in an action for negligence.  
Id., ¶13.  The amended statute also modified the rules for joint 
and several liability, so that only those defendants found to be 
at least 51 percent negligent could be jointly and severally 
liable for a plaintiff's damages.  Id.    
¶64 Relying on the new statutory language that expressly 
modified the rules for negligence actions, the distributor 
argued that the legislature intended to modify the rules for 
strict product liability actions as well.  It argued that the 
statute, 
as 
applied 
to 
strict 
product 
liability 
claims, 
"operates to protect from liability a defendant who is merely an 
innocent member of the chain of distribution, who did nothing to 
cause or contribute to the defective condition of the product."  
Id., ¶11.    
¶65 This court disagreed.  We explained that "strict 
product liability is not negligence," that negligence and strict 
product liability were separate torts with distinct common law 
rules, and that "[t]he comparative negligence statute has never 
fully applied to strict product liability actions in the first 
place[.]"  Id., ¶27.  We examined the text of the amended 
comparative negligence statute and concluded that it did not 
"explicitly or even implicitly suggest a legislative purpose to 
change the common law of strict product liability."  Id., ¶26.   
¶66 As illustrated by this explanation, the focus of our 
analysis was discerning the legislature's intent.  We explained 
further: "While the 1995 amendment clearly ushered in a 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
29 
 
significant development in negligence law, there is nothing in 
the language of the new statute that even hints at a legislative 
purpose to accomplish such a sweeping change in the common law 
of strict product liability in this state."  Id., ¶29.  
Accordingly, we concluded that the amendment to the comparative 
negligence statute, "which is silent on the subject, does not 
abrogate or alter the common law of strict product liability."  
Id., ¶27. 
¶67 It is in this context that we made the following 
statements, upon which the defendants rely:  
It is axiomatic that a statute does not abrogate a 
rule of common law unless the abrogation is clearly 
expressed and leaves no doubt of the legislature's 
intent.  Statutes in derogation of the common law are 
strictly construed.  A statute does not change the 
common law unless the legislative purpose to do so is 
clearly expressed in the language of the statute.  To 
accomplish a change in the common law, the language of 
the 
statute 
must 
be 
clear, 
unambiguous, 
and 
peremptory.   
Id., ¶25. 
¶68 The defendants' argument takes this language out of 
context.  Fuchsgruber does not stand for the proposition that 
every time the legislature creates a new cause of action, it 
must enumerate each and every potentially relevant common law 
doctrine or rule that is inapplicable to that cause of action.  
Such a proposition would place a weighty and unrealistic burden 
on the legislature when drafting new statutes.     
¶69 In 
addition 
to 
burdening 
the 
legislature, 
the 
defendants' interpretation of Fuchsgruber would needlessly tie 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
30 
 
the court's hands.  In Fuchsgruber, there was no inconsistency 
between the legislature's purpose to modify the rules applicable 
to negligence actions and the common law rules that pertain to 
strict liability claims.  Here, by contrast, the voluntary 
payment doctrine is incompatible with the manifest purposes of 
Wis. Stat. § 100.207.  In a case like this, the defendant's 
interpretation of Fuchsgruber would force the court to interpret 
a statute contrary to the clear legislative intent.  Such a 
proposition would turn on its head the established canon of 
construction that a statute should not be interpreted to 
contravene its manifest purpose.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49.  
¶70 The reasoning underlying Fuchsgruber remains sound.  
If the legislature wanted to abrogate the voluntary payment 
doctrine, certainly it would be required to do so using express 
language.23  However, MBS makes no suggestion that by enacting 
Wis. Stat. § 100.207, the legislature intended to fully abrogate 
the common law doctrine.  Rather, the argument is only that the 
legislature did not intend the doctrine to be a viable defense 
to an action under Wis. Stat. § 100.207. 
¶71 Whenever the application of a common law doctrine or 
rule would undermine the manifest purposes of a statutory cause 
of action, the conflict between the statute's manifest purpose 
                                                 
23 See State v. Hobson, 218 Wis. 2d 350, 577 N.W.2d 825 
(1998) (abrogating the common law right to forcibly resist an 
unlawful arrest).  The Hobson court cited Black's Law Dictionary 
for that proposition that "abrogate" means "[t]o annul, cancel, 
revoke, repeal, or destroy."  Id., ¶1 n.1 (citing Black's Law 
Dictionary 8 (6th ed. 1990)).  
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
31 
 
and the common law defense "leaves no doubt of the legislature's 
intent."  Fuchsgruber, 244 Wis. 2d 758, ¶25.  In a case of such 
apparent incompatibility, the legislature necessarily intended 
that the common law defense would not be applied to bar claims 
under the statute.     
¶72 We find support in a case that postdates both 
Fuchsgruber and the circuit court's grant of the motion to 
dismiss in this case.  In Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, 
2008 WI 22, 308 Wis. 2d 103, 746 N.W.2d 762, we concluded that 
the legislature did not intend the common law economic loss 
doctrine to be a viable defense against the Home Improvement 
Protection Act (HIPA)24 because it would defeat the purpose of 
the statutory cause of action.  Id., ¶35 ("[T]o apply the 
[economic loss doctrine] to the HIPA claims would defeat the 
public policies underpinning the HIPA and the remedies it 
provides."); id., ¶33 ("We are satisfied that the [economic loss 
doctrine] cannot apply to statutory claims, including those 
under HIPA, because of such public policies.").  
¶73 We 
also 
find 
support 
in 
case 
law 
from 
other 
jurisdictions.  Other courts have concluded that the voluntary 
payment doctrine was not a viable defense to claims for damages 
caused by illegal cramming.  For example, in Huch v. Charter 
Communications, Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721 (Mo. 2009), a state 
administrative regulation prohibited the practice of billing for 
                                                 
24 See Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 110 (Oct. 2004) and Wis. 
Stat. § 100.20(5). 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
32 
 
unsolicited merchandise.  In a statutory action for violation of 
the regulation, the Missouri supreme court concluded that the 
voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable as a defense because 
the doctrine "would nullify the protections of the act and be 
contrary to the intent of the legislature."  Id. at 727.  See 
also Indoor Billboard/Washington, Inc. v. Integra Telecom of 
Washington, Inc., 170 P.3d 10 (Wash. 2007) (concluding that the 
voluntary payment doctrine was not a defense in a cramming case 
where the court construed the statute liberally in favor of 
plaintiffs); Sobel v. Hertz Corp., 698 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Nev. 
2010) (concluding that the voluntary payment doctrine did not 
bar a claim for damages arising out of the practice of cramming 
because it would undermine the legislature's intent).25  
¶74 Given the conflict between the manifest purposes of 
Wis. Stat. § 100.207 and the voluntary payment doctrine, we 
conclude that the doctrine is inapplicable to a claim under that 
statute.26  Accordingly, the circuit court erred when it 
dismissed MBS's claims for money damages under Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.207.   
                                                 
25 For a contrary position, see Lady Di's, Inc. v. Enhanced 
Services Billing, Inc., slip copy, No. 1:09-CV-340-SEB-DML (S.D. 
Ind., Nov. 16, 2010), aff'd on other grounds by Lady Di's, Inc. 
v. Enhanced Services Billing, Inc., 654 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 
2011).  
26 Wisconsin Const. art. XIV § 13 provides: "Such parts of 
the common law as are now in force in the territory of 
Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this constitution, shall be and 
continue part of the law of this state until altered or 
suspended by the legislature."  The parties do not argue that 
this constitutional provision is implicated in this case.      
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
33 
 
¶75 As ILD notes, however, its cross-appeal asserted 
various alternative reasons to affirm the circuit court's 
dismissal of MBS's Wis. Stat. § 100.207 claims.  See supra, ¶23 
n.13. 
 The court 
of appeals declined to address these 
alternative arguments because it concluded that the voluntary 
payment doctrine was dispositive.  Given our decision that the 
voluntarily payment doctrine is inapplicable, we remand to the 
court of appeals to address these alternative arguments.   
C 
¶76 As explained above, we have focused our analysis on 
Wis. Stat. § 100.207 because the parties primarily focused on 
that statute.  Before concluding, however, we pause to briefly 
address MBS's claims under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) and the Crime 
Control Act.  
¶77 We emphasize that the voluntary payment doctrine 
remains alive and well in Wisconsin.  The determination of 
whether the doctrine bars a cause of action is a statute-
specific inquiry.  
¶78 At this point, we do not decide whether the voluntary 
payment doctrine is a viable defense to a claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18(1). 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
provided 
an 
alternative 
rationale for dismissing MBS's § 100.18(1) claims.  See supra, 
¶21.  Although MBS appealed the alternative rationale in its 
brief to the court of appeals, it did not include this argument 
in its petition for review in this court.  Under these 
circumstances, we need not now interpret Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1).  
Rather, we remand to the court of appeals to address the 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
34 
 
alternative rationale that the claim presented herein does not 
come within Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) and, if appropriate, whether 
the voluntary payment doctrine applies to claims made under that 
statute.  See State v. Achterberg, 201 Wis. 2d 291, 300 n.5, 548 
N.W.2d 515 (1996).   
¶79 We likewise do not decide whether the voluntary 
payment doctrine is a viable defense to a cause of action under 
the Crime Control Act.  As shown above, the applicability of the 
common law doctrine to a statutory cause of action is a statute-
specific analysis.  Neither the circuit court nor the court of 
appeals specifically addressed the provisions of the Crime 
Control Act.  Although MBS asserts that "the legislative purpose 
behind [the Crime Control Act] would be undermined if the 
voluntary payment doctrine could be used as a defense," it fails 
to examine or even set forth the text of that statute.  Given 
the scant briefing regarding this statute, we decline to 
interpret it here.  See Grube v. Daun, 213 Wis. 2d 533, 544, 570 
N.W.2d 851 (1997). 
¶80 However, nothing set forth in this opinion should be 
construed to restrict the court of appeals from taking up these 
arguments 
on 
remand, 
if 
it 
determines 
that 
they 
were 
sufficiently preserved.  If the court of appeals concludes that 
MBS stated a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), then it will 
need to address whether the voluntary payment doctrine is a 
viable defense to a claim under that statute.  Further, the 
court of appeals may be required to determine whether the common 
No. 
2008AP1830   
 
35 
 
law doctrine is a viable defense to a claim under the Crime 
Control Act.       
V 
¶81 In sum, we conclude that no Wisconsin court has 
addressed whether the legislature intended the voluntary payment 
doctrine to be a viable defense against any cause of action 
created by a statute.  In Putnam, the question of whether the 
voluntary payment doctrine was a viable defense to a claim under 
Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) may have lurked in the record, but it was 
neither brought to the attention of the court nor was it 
specifically addressed.  Accordingly, it was not decided by this 
court.  
¶82 We further determine that the defendants misinterpret 
Fuchsgruber.  Application of the common law voluntary payment 
doctrine would undermine the manifest purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.207.  Under these circumstances, the conflict between the 
statute's purpose and the common law defense leaves no doubt 
that the legislature intended that the common law defense should 
not be applied to bar claims under the statute.  
¶83 Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the court of 
appeals to address ILD's cross-appeal and, if appropriate, any 
previously unresolved appellate issues regarding Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.18(1) and the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act.     
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals. 
¶84 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate.      
 
No. 2008AP1830.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶85 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  The voluntary payment of money by one person to 
another upon a demand of payment, with knowledge of the facts 
and without fraud or duress, generally bars the payor from 
recovering the money from the payee in subsequent litigation.  
This is the essence of the voluntary payment doctrine.  See 
Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., 2002 WI 108, ¶¶13-15, 
255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626.   
¶86 The voluntary payment doctrine is described in 66 Am. 
Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 92 (2011) as 
follows: 
Unjust enrichment contemplates an involuntary or 
nonconsensual transfer, unjustly enriching one party.  
A defendant is not unjustly enriched and therefore not 
required to make restitution where the benefit was 
conferred by a volunteer.  Thus, a person cannot use 
the 
courts 
to 
recover 
money 
voluntarily 
or 
consensually paid with full knowledge of all of the 
facts and without fraud, duress, or extortion in some 
form.  This doctrine is often referred to as the 
"voluntary payment doctrine" or the "volunteer rule" 
and is considered an exception to the principle of 
restitution.  Thus, it is universally recognized that 
money voluntarily paid [by a person] under a claim of 
right to payment and with knowledge of the facts by 
the person [seeking to recover] cannot be recovered on 
the ground that the claim was illegal, or that there 
was no liability to pay in the first instance. 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
No. 2008AP1830.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶87 The voluntary payment doctrine,1 which is heavily fact-
dependent, has deep roots in Wisconsin law.  The doctrine is 
discussed repeatedly in cases involving payments, especially tax 
payments, to governments.2  G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. City of La 
Crosse, 105 Wis. 2d 152, 312 N.W.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1981); 
Interstate Dep't Stores v. Henry, 224 Wis. 394, 272 N.W. 451 
(1937); Schlesinger v. State, 198 Wis. 381, 223 N.W. 856 (1929); 
Rutledge v. Price Cnty., 66 Wis. 35, 27 N.W. 819 (1886); see 
Simmons Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 209 Wis. 232, 244 N.W. 610 (1932); 
Fox Valley Canning Co. v. Vill. of Hortonville, 207 Wis. 502, 
                                                 
1 The term "voluntary payment doctrine" appears to be of 
relatively recent origin.  Past cases referred to the "voluntary 
payment rule," G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. City of La Crosse, 105 
Wis. 2d 152, 162, 312 N.W.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1981), "the doctrine 
of voluntary payment," Frederick v. Douglas Cnty., 96 Wis. 411, 
423, 71 N.W. 798 (1897) (Winslow, J. concurring), or just 
"voluntary payment," Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. 137, 153 
(1836).  Regardless of the name, the concept permeates the law.  
2 For a background of the voluntary payment doctrine in the 
Wisconsin state income tax context, see generally Maurice M. 
Weinstein, Income Tax Refunds in Wisconsin, 16 Marq. L. Rev. 25, 
30-32 (1931).  The article discusses the voluntary payment 
doctrine in substantially its modern form.  Id. at 30.   
While the voluntary payment doctrine is often discussed in 
the context of payments to governments, the same rules do not 
necessarily apply in the context of payments from government 
agents.  See Joshua E. Dodge, How To Sue the Government, 8 Marq. 
L. Rev. 267, 285 (1924) ("When . . . a public officer . . . pays 
out 
to 
an 
individual 
money 
which 
the 
law 
did 
not 
authorize . . . the Government may recover [it] back, unhampered 
by any of the rules of voluntary payment . . . applicable as 
between individuals."); but see Frederick, 96 Wis. at 423 
(Winslow, J. concurring) (suggesting that the opinion of the 
court applied the doctrine of voluntary payment to payments made 
by public officials).  Joshua Dodge was a member of this court 
from 1898-1910.  Portraits of Justice 28 (Trina E. Gray et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 2003). 
No. 2008AP1830.dtp 
 
3 
 
242 N.W. 142 (1932); Roehl v. City of Milwaukee, 141 Wis. 341, 
124 N.W. 400 (1910); Parcher v. Marathon Cnty., 52 Wis. 388, 9 
N.W. 23 (1881); Harrison v. City of Milwaukee, 49 Wis. 247, 5 
N.W. 326 (1880).  However, the court also has applied the 
doctrine outside the tax context.  E.g., Putnam, 255 Wis. 2d 447 
(liquidated damages in a cable television contract); Burgess v. 
Commercial Nat'l Bank of Appleton, 144 Wis. 59, 128 N.W. 436 
(1910) (excess interest paid on bonds); Raipe v. Gorrell, 105 
Wis. 636, 81 N.W. 1009 (1900) (payment of wages during an 
employee's absence); Custin v. City of Viroqua, 67 Wis. 314, 30 
N.W. 515 (1886) (excess payment for liquor license). 
¶88 The voluntary payment doctrine is neither unique to 
Wisconsin nor something new.  To illustrate, in 1836 the United 
States Supreme Court discussed the application of the doctrine 
to an overcharge of a duty by a collector at the Port of New 
York.  The Court determined that when a voluntary payment has 
been made, "no action will lie to recover back the money."  
Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. 137, 153 (1836).  The Court 
acknowledged, however, that if a payor gives notice to the payee 
that the demand for payment may be illegal——that is, if the 
payor protests the payment——then the voluntary payment doctrine 
does not bar recovery by the payor.  Id. 
¶89 In reaching this decision, the Court relied on several 
English cases——dating back two centuries.  One case, Brisbane v. 
Dacres, (1813) 128 Eng. Rep. 641 (C.P.) 645; 5 Taunt. 143, 152-
53 (opinion of Gibbs, J.), describes the doctrine as follows: 
We must take this payment to have been made under a 
demand of right, and I think that where a man demands 
No. 2008AP1830.dtp 
 
4 
 
money of another as a matter of right, and that other, 
with a full knowledge of the facts upon which the 
demand is founded, has paid a sum, he never can 
recover back the sum he has so voluntarily paid.  It 
may be, that upon a further view he may form a 
different opinion of the law, and it may be, his 
subsequent opinion may be the correct one.  If we were 
to hold otherwise, I think many inconveniences may 
arise; there are many doubtful questions of law: when 
they arise, the Defendant has an option, either to 
litigate the question, or to submit to the demand, and 
pay the money.  I think, that by submitting to the 
demand, he that pays the money gives it to the person 
to whom he pays it, and makes it his, and closes the 
transaction between them.  He who receives it has a 
right to consider it as his without dispute: he spends 
it in confidence that it is his; and it would be most 
mischievous and unjust, if he who has acquiesced in 
the right by such voluntary payment, should be at 
liberty, 
at 
any 
time 
within 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations, to rip up the matter, and recover back 
the money.  He who received it is not in the same 
condition: he has spent it in the confidence it was 
his, and perhaps has no means of repayment. 
¶90 Thus, in 1813, an English court eloquently described 
the rationale underlying the doctrine of voluntary payment: to 
promote finality in commercial transactions and to protect 
payees who in good faith spend the money they receive. 
¶91 Any suggestion that the voluntary payment doctrine is 
so old that it is now a dead letter is belied by a decision of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 
2010.  Spivey v. Adaptive Marketing LLC, 622 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 
2010).  In that decision the court, in an opinion written by 
Retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, sitting by designation, 
explained that "[t]he voluntary payment doctrine has long been 
recognized in common law" and cited Illinois cases as recent as 
2005, to determine that the voluntary payment doctrine barred 
the plaintiff's claims.  Id. at 822-24. 
No. 2008AP1830.dtp 
 
5 
 
¶92 Having established both the lineage and vitality of 
the voluntary payment doctrine, I freely concede that this 
common law doctrine may be abrogated by legislation.  As far 
back as 1929, Corpus Juris explained that:  
Payment 
1X. Recovery of Payments 
A. Voluntary Payments——1. Recoverability in General 
§ 280 
Except where otherwise provided by statute it is 
a well settled general rule that a person cannot, 
either by way of set-off or counterclaim, or by direct 
action, recover back money which he has voluntarily 
paid with a full knowledge of all the facts, and 
without any fraud, duress, or extortion, although no 
obligation to make such payment existed. 
48 C.J. § 280 (1929) (footnotes omitted). 
Notably, the only statute cited to support the exception was 
from Louisiana, a code state not operating under common law. 
¶93 Nonetheless, the common law may be abrogated.  This 
fundamental principle is reflected in Article XIV, Section 13 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution which reads: "Such parts of the 
common law as are now in force in the territory of Wisconsin, 
not inconsistent with this constitution, shall be and continue 
part of the law of this state until altered or suspended by the 
legislature."  Wis. Const. art. XIV, § 13 (emphasis added). 
¶94 The question inevitably arises when we interpret this 
section: How do we know when the legislature has "altered or 
suspended" some feature of the common law?  This question was 
addressed in Kranzush v. Badger State Mutual Casualty Co., 103 
Wis. 2d 56, 74, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981).  The court said: 
No. 2008AP1830.dtp 
 
6 
 
"It is an accepted axiom of law in Wisconsin that: 
 
"'Statutes are not to be construed as changing 
the common law unless the purpose to effect such 
change is clearly expressed therein.  To have such 
effect "the language [of the statute] must be clear, 
unambiguous and peremptory."'  Wis. Bridge & Iron Co. 
v. Indus. Comm'n, 233 Wis. 467, 474, 290 N.W. 199 
(1940)." 
Maxey 
v. 
Redevelopment 
Auth. 
of 
Racine, 
94 
Wis. 2d 375, 
399, 
288 
N.W.2d 794 
(1980). 
 
The 
legislative intent to change the common law must be 
expressed "beyond any reasonable doubt."  Grube v. 
Moths, 56 Wis. 2d 424, 437, 202 N.W.2d 261 (1972); 
Burke v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 39 
Wis. 2d 682, 690, 159 N.W.2d 700 (1968). 
Id.; see also Meek v. Pierce, 19 Wis. 318 (*300), 322 (*303) 
(1865) ("[T]he rules of the common law are not to be changed by 
doubtful implication.  To give such effect to the statute, the 
language must be clear, unambiguous and peremptory."); NBZ, Inc. 
v. Pilarski, 185 Wis. 2d 827, 836, 520 N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1994) 
("A statute in derogation of the common law must be strictly 
construed so as to have minimal effect on the common law 
rule."). 
¶95 Ten years ago this court applied these principles in 
the context of a comparative negligence statute and strict 
product liability.  Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 
2001 WI 81, 244 Wis. 2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833.  The court 
determined that an amendment to that statute did not apply to 
strict product liability claims.  Id., ¶30.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court stated: 
It is axiomatic that a statute does not abrogate a 
rule of common law unless the abrogation is clearly 
expressed and leaves no doubt of the legislature's 
intent.  Statutes in derogation of the common law are 
No. 2008AP1830.dtp 
 
7 
 
strictly construed.  A statute does not change the 
common law unless the legislative purpose to do so is 
clearly expressed in the language of the statute.  To 
accomplish a change in the common law, the language of 
the 
statute 
must 
be 
clear, 
unambiguous, 
and 
peremptory.   
Id., ¶25 (citations omitted). 
¶96 I am satisfied that Wis. Stat. § 100.207(3)(a) is so 
clearly designed to protect telecommunications consumers from 
particular unfair practices in billing that it would be 
unreasonable to permit the voluntary payment doctrine to nullify 
the effect of the statute.  Subsection (3)(a) reads as follows: 
 
(3) SALES PRACTICES. (a) A person may not engage 
in negative option billing or negative enrollment of 
telecommunications 
services, 
including 
unbundled 
telecommunications services.  A person may not bill a 
customer for any telecommunications service that the 
customer did not affirmatively order unless that 
service is required to be provided by law . . . .  A 
customer's failure to refuse a person's proposal to 
provide 
a 
telecommunications 
service 
is 
not 
an 
affirmative 
request 
for 
that 
telecommunications 
service. 
Wis. Stat. § 100.207(3)(a).  The evils prohibited by subsection 
(3)(a) are not ambiguous, and the private remedies created to 
attack these evils are plainly identified in subsection (6)(a) 
of the section.  Among the evils prohibited is cramming, an 
attempt to get customers to "unwittingly pay the unauthorized 
charges" 
that 
appear 
on 
their 
telecommunications 
bills.  
Majority op., ¶6.  Even if these payments are not obtained by 
fraud, their voluntariness is certainly questionable.  Cramming 
charges 
are 
prohibited 
under 
subsection 
(3)(a) 
and 
the 
legislature provided a specific remedy in subsection (6)(a) of a 
right to recover these payments when the payments have been 
No. 2008AP1830.dtp 
 
8 
 
made. 
 In sum, 
subsection (3)(a) targets demands for 
unauthorized charges and subsection (6)(a) provides for recovery 
of those charges when paid.  Quasi-voluntary payment of the 
charges does not bar recovery. 
¶97 The application of Wis. Stat. § 100.207(2) to the 
alleged facts is not so clear because subsection (2), which is 
labeled "ADVERTISING AND SALES REPRESENTATIONS," is different 
from subsection (3), which is labeled "SALES PRACTICES."  
Applying the sales language of subsection (2) to the billing 
practices of "cramming" and "slamming"3 is probably stretching 
the subsection beyond what it was intended to cover.   
¶98 The bottom line, however, is that the voluntary 
payment doctrine does not require the dismissal at this time of 
the claims in this case under this anti-cramming/anti-slamming 
statute.  We need not answer whether the voluntary payment 
doctrine could ever apply to a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.207. 
¶99 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 100.18 
requires 
a 
different 
analysis.  This sweeping statute can be traced back to Chapter 
510, Laws of 1913, which created section 1747k of the statutes.  
Section 1747k read: 
Any person, firm, corporation or association who, 
with intent to sell or in any wise dispose of 
merchandise, securities, service, or anything offered 
by such person, firm, corporation or association, 
directly or indirectly, to the public for sale or 
distribution, 
or 
with 
intent 
to 
increase 
the 
                                                 
3 "'Slamming' is the illegal practice of switching a 
consumer's traditional wireline telephone company for local, 
local toll, or long distance service without permission."  FCC 
Encyclopedia, 
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/slamming 
(last 
visited Feb. 17, 2012).  
No. 2008AP1830.dtp 
 
9 
 
consumption thereof, or to induce the public in any 
manner to enter into any obligation relating thereto, 
or to acquire title thereto, or an interest therein, 
for the purpose of defrauding the public, makes, 
publishes, disseminates, circulates, or places before 
the public, or causes, directly or indirectly, to be 
made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed 
before the public, in this state, in a newspaper or 
other publication, or in the form of a book, notice, 
handbill, poster, bill, circular, pamphlet, or letter, 
or in any other way, an advertisement of any sort 
regarding 
merchandise, 
securities, 
service, 
or 
anything so offered to the public, which advertisement 
contains any assertion, representation or statement of 
fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading, shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall upon conviction 
thereof be punished by a fine of not less than ten 
dollars nor more than two hundred dollars, or by 
imprisonment in the county jail not less than ten days 
nor more than ninety days, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment; providing that nothing herein shall 
apply to any proprietor or publisher of any newspaper 
or magazine who publishes, disseminates or circulates 
any 
such 
advertisement without knowledge of the 
unlawful or untruthful nature of such advertisement. 
§ 1747k, ch. 510, Laws of 1913.  This one-paragraph provision 
has been amended at least 45 times over the past century and has 
evolved into a lengthy (nearly 2600 words), very complex statute 
that is difficult to cabin and difficult to analyze.   
¶100 To 
suggest 
in 
the 
majority 
opinion 
that 
the 
legislature abrogated the voluntary payment doctrine when it 
adopted Wis. Stat. § 100.18 is both unnecessary and unfounded. 
¶101 Because the majority opinion cannot support such a 
proposition either analytically or historically, it simply 
concludes that:  
Whenever the application of a common law doctrine 
or rule would undermine the manifest purposes of a 
statutory cause of action, the conflict between the 
statute's manifest purpose and the common law defense 
"leave[s] no doubt of the legislature's intent."  
No. 2008AP1830.dtp 
 
10 
 
Fuchsgruber, 244 Wis. 2d 758, ¶25.  In a case of such 
apparent incompatibility, the legislature necessarily 
intended that the common law defense would not be 
applied to bar claims under the statute. 
Majority op., ¶71.  With this conclusion, the majority opinion 
apparently abandons this court's longstanding methodology in 
evaluating when the legislature has abrogated the common law.  
The methodology that the majority applies——that is, to search 
for some conflict with a statutory purpose——weakens all common 
law doctrines.  This methodology leaves the viability of all 
common law defenses in doubt. 
¶102 The majority opinion casts a cloud of uncertainty over 
commercial transactions in this state.  Its assurance that "the 
voluntary payment doctrine remains alive and well in Wisconsin," 
majority op., ¶77, will prove hollow if its discussion of the 
doctrine in relation to Wis. Stat. § 100.18 is maintained.   
¶103 The majority opinion invites consideration of the 
proposition that Wis. Stat. § 100.18 abrogated the voluntary 
payment doctrine by asserting that the relationship between the 
voluntary payment doctrine and § 100.18 was never "brought to 
the attention of the [Putnam] court [in 2002] nor did the court 
specifically 
rule 
upon 
it. 
 
Accordingly, 
it 
[w]as 
not . . . decided" by the court in Putnam.  Majority op., ¶40.  
I disagree. 
¶104 Putnam discussed the first amended complaint that was 
dismissed with prejudice by the circuit court.  Putnam, 255 
Wis. 2d 447, ¶¶1, 4 n.2.  The opinion cites the multiple 
theories in the amended complaint, including unlawful liquidated 
damages, 
unjust enrichment, restitution, and violation of 
No. 2008AP1830.dtp 
 
11 
 
Wisconsin's Trade Practices Act.  Id., ¶4 n.2.  All are affected 
by the voluntary payment doctrine.  The Wisconsin Trade 
Practices Act is identified as Wis. Stat. § 100.18 in Count VII 
of the amended complaint cited in Putnam's brief.  It was 
discussed by the circuit court, and it was referred to in the 
published court of appeals decision, Putnam v. Time Warner Cable 
of Se. Wis., 2001 WI App 196, ¶3 n.1, 247 Wis. 2d 41, 633 
N.W.2d 254, which affirmed the circuit court.  The Putnam 
majority, in turn, affirmed the circuit court and the court of 
appeals in relation to the voluntary payment doctrine. 
¶105 In doing so, the Putnam court said:  "In analyzing 
this case, we . . . take as true all allegations made in the 
customers' amended complaint and draw all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the customers."  Putnam, 255 Wis. 2d 447, ¶11 
(emphasis added).  The court also cited 66 Am. Jur. 2d 
Restitution and Implied Contracts § 108 (2001), a precursor to 
§ 92 of the 2011 edition cited above.  Unjust enrichment and 
restitution are part of the 2001 Am Jur analysis.  Putnam, 255 
Wis. 2d 447, ¶13. 
¶106 In the present case the majority opinion takes the 
fact that the Putnam court "collectively disposed of" the stated 
claims, majority op., ¶33, as support for the proposition that 
there ought to be a difference between statutory and common law 
claims.  Curiously, the majority opinion takes our past 
identical treatment of statutory and common law claims as 
support for the proposition that the claims ought to be treated 
differently.  Likewise, the opinion's analysis ignores that we 
No. 2008AP1830.dtp 
 
12 
 
determined that the voluntary payment doctrine applied to all 
claims in Putnam——statutory and common law alike.  Putnam, 255 
Wis. 2d 447, ¶36 n.12. 
¶107 The Putnam court addressed the possibility that the 
legislature could act to supersede the voluntary payment 
doctrine in a paragraph strongly affirming the doctrine: 
 
Adoption 
of 
the 
customers' 
argument 
would 
effectively destroy the voluntary payment doctrine.  
The doctrine presupposes mistaken or wrongful conduct 
by the payee.  To allow someone who made voluntary 
payment without objection to claim restitution, based 
only on an allegation that some wrongful conduct by 
the payee caused the payment of a fee, would nullify 
the doctrine in Wisconsin.  We conclude that the merit 
of a claim and the underlying wrongdoing of the 
defendant do not undercut the applicability of the 
doctrine, absent fraud, duress, or mistake of fact.  
The legislature has the power to create additional 
exceptions 
to 
the voluntary payment doctrine in 
particular circumstances. 
Putnam, 255 Wis. 2d 447, ¶35 (emphasis added). 
 
¶108 It is unlikely that the court would have acknowledged 
the legislature's power "to create additional exceptions to the 
voluntary payment doctrine" if the court thought that the 
legislature had already done so in adopting Wis. Stat. § 100.18. 
¶109 I believe this case may go forward under Wis. Stat. 
§ 100.207(3)(a) because the statute prohibits specific billing 
practices 
in 
telecommunications 
and 
actually 
addresses 
a 
person's "failure to refuse" an unauthorized charge.  This 
alters the voluntary payment doctrine so that claims under the 
statute are not required to be dismissed in this case at this 
stage in the proceedings.  The legislature provided a clear 
remedy for overpayment of certain charges.  The legislature was 
No. 2008AP1830.dtp 
 
13 
 
clear, unambiguous, and peremptory in this paragraph; the court 
need not go further and alter the law of abrogation of the 
common law. 
¶110 I concur with the court's decision that the dismissal 
of the claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.207 must be reversed.  
However, I disagree with the court's statement of the law and 
its decision regarding the other claims.  Therefore, I cannot 
join the court's opinion.   
¶111 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part. 
¶112 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this concurrence/dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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