Case Title: State ex rel. Heartland Title Services, Inc. v. Honorable Kevin D. Harrell

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC95377

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2016-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. 
 
 
) 
HEARTLAND TITLE SERVICES, INC., 
) 
f/k/a HEARTLAND TITLE COMPANY, INC., ) 
AND JAMES C. DAY, 
 
)
)
Relators, 
) 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC95377 
) 
THE HONORABLE KEVIN D. HARRELL, 
) 
) 
Respondent.  
 
) 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN MANDAMUS 
This action involves an original proceeding for a writ of prohibition or, 
alternatively, a writ of mandamus filed by Heartland Title Services, Inc., and James C. 
Day (collectively, "Heartland") requesting this Court prohibit Respondent from 
dismissing one of Heartland's claims in the circuit court for lack of venue.  This Court 
issued a preliminary writ.  Because this Court holds that venue was proper in any county 
in Missouri, including Jackson County, the preliminary writ is made permanent. 
Factual Background 
In March 2015, Heartland filed a two-count petition in the circuit court of Jackson 
County alleging professional malpractice claims against Paul P. Hasty, Jr., and Hasty and 
Associates, LLC (collectively, "Hasty").  Count II of the petition alleges a claim of 
professional malpractice based on Hasty's provision of legal services in a case in which 
Opinion issued October 18, 2016
 
2 
Heartland sought to become creditors in a former employee's personal bankruptcy case 
filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas.  Hasty filed a 
motion to dismiss Count II for lack of venue, arguing that the tort injury alleged in Count 
II occurred outside Missouri.  Hasty asserted the applicable venue statute, § 508.010.5,1 
limited venue to either the county in Missouri where a corporate defendant's registered 
agent is located or the county in Missouri where an individual defendant's principal place 
of residence is located.  Hasty further asserted that because the individual defendant did 
not have his principal place of residence in Missouri and because the corporate defendant 
did not have a registered agent in Missouri, no county in Missouri constitutes a proper 
venue, including Jackson County.  The circuit court agreed and dismissed Count II for 
lack of venue.2  Heartland seeks relief in this Court. 
Analysis 
 
This Court has the authority to "issue and determine original remedial writs."  Mo. 
Const. art. V, § 4.1.  "It is well-established that this Court accepts the use of an 
extraordinary writ to correct improper venue decisions of the circuit court before trial and 
judgment."  State ex rel. Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. Nixon, 282 S.W.3d 363, 365 (Mo. banc 
2009).  This Court has determined a writ of mandamus is the "appropriate remedy to 
                                              
1 All statutory references are to RSMo NonCum. Supp. 2014, unless otherwise noted. 
2 Hasty's motion to dismiss only raised the affirmative defense of lack of venue.  When . . . the 
circuit court does not specify reason for dismissing a petition, an appellate court presumes that 
the circuit court's judgment is based on the reason stated in the motion to dismiss.  Avery 
Contracting v. Niehaus, 492 S.W.3d 159, 162 (Mo. banc 2016).   
 
 
3 
reinstate a petition erroneously dismissed for improper venue."  State ex rel. Rothermich 
v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Mo. banc 1991). 
Heartland contends that venue is proper in Jackson County for Count II and that 
the circuit court erred in its interpretation of § 508.010.5.  Before addressing the text of 
§ 508.010.5, a brief discussion of the distinction between jurisdiction and venue is in 
order.  Jurisdiction refers to "the power of a court to try a case[.]"  Nixon, 282 S.W.3d at 
365.  Jurisdiction "is based upon constitutional principles."  Id.   
Missouri courts recognize two kinds of jurisdiction: subject matter and personal. 
J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 252 (Mo. banc. 2009).  Subject 
matter jurisdiction refers to a court's authority to render judgment in a particular category 
of cases.  Id. at 253.  The Missouri constitution provides circuit courts with subject matter 
jurisdiction over all civil and criminal cases.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 14.  Personal 
jurisdiction, on the other hand, refers to the power of a court to require a party to respond 
to a legal proceeding affecting the party's rights or interests.  Id. at 253.  The requirement 
that a court have personal jurisdiction flows mostly from the Due Process Clause, either 
in the Fifth or the Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.  Ins. Corp. of 
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).   
While subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived, personal jurisdiction is an 
individual right to which a party can consent.  Id. at 703.  It is not alleged that the circuit 
 
4 
court of Jackson County lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Count II, and the motion to 
dismiss does not allege lack of personal jurisdiction over either defendant.3 
Venue, on the other hand, assumes jurisdiction and only "relates to the locale 
where the trial is to be held."  Nixon, 282 S.W.3d at 365.  Unlike jurisdiction, venue is 
not determined by constitutional principles but by the applicable rule or statute that 
"determines, among many courts with jurisdiction, the appropriate forum for the trial."  
Id. 
In the event a party is injured outside Missouri by allegedly tortious conduct, 
§ 508.010.5 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) If the defendant is a corporation, then venue shall be in 
any county where a defendant corporation's registered 
agent is located or, if the plaintiff's principal place of 
residence was in the state of Missouri on the date the 
plaintiff was first injured, then venue may be in the county 
of the plaintiff's principal place of residence on the date 
the plaintiff was first injured; 
 
(2) If the defendant is an individual, then venue shall be in 
any county of the individual defendant's principal place of 
residence in the state of Missouri or, if the plaintiff's 
principal place of residence was in the state of Missouri 
on the date the plaintiff was first injured, then venue may 
be in the county containing the plaintiff's principal place 
of residence on the date the plaintiff was first injured[.] 
 
The parties agree, and the pleadings confirm, that § 508.010.5 does not prescribe a 
particular venue for the facts alleged in Count II.  Heartland argues that, without an 
express provision in § 508.010.5 prescribing a specific venue, venue is proper in any 
                                              
3 At oral argument, counsel for Hasty conceded that Jackson County had personal jurisdiction 
over both defendants.  
 
5 
Missouri county.  Hasty argues the lack of an express provision in § 508.010.5 
prescribing a specific venue for these parties means that no county in Missouri is a proper 
venue and, therefore, Count II was properly dismissed.4  
This is an issue of first impression for this Court.  The court of appeals, however, 
addressed a similar issue in State ex rel. Neville v. Grate, 443 S.W.3d 688 (Mo. App. 
2014).  In Neville, a plaintiff filed an action in Jackson County for a tort claim related to 
an injury that occurred in Kansas.  Id. at 690–91.  The corporate defendant owned 
property and transacted business in Bates County, Missouri, and plaintiffs alleged that 
some of the tortious actions that caused the injury in Kansas occurred on defendant's 
Missouri property.  Id.  As in the present case, the individual defendant did not have his 
principal place of residence in Missouri and the corporate defendant had no registered 
agent in Missouri.  Id. at 691.  The defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of 
venue or, in the alternative, to transfer the case from Jackson County to Bates County.  
Id.  The circuit court transferred the case to Bates County.  Id.  The court of appeals held 
that venue was proper in Jackson County.  Id. at 695.  The court explained that the 
language of § 508.010.5 "does not reflect an intent to deny Missouri venue in all 
situations not provided for by the statute" and without an express prescription of a 
particular venue, venue was "proper in any Missouri county, including Jackson."  Id. at 
693, 695. 
                                              
4 Each count must pass venue muster.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Jinkerson v. Koehr, 826 S.W.2d 
346, 348 (Mo. banc 1992). 
 
6 
 
Hasty argues that Neville is distinguishable because it is "limited to its facts, which 
involved negligent conduct in Missouri;" "[t]herefore, in the absence of any nexus to 
Missouri, the rule in . . . Neville has no application" to this case.  Hasty's argument, in 
essence, is that § 508.010.5 requires a "nexus" to Missouri that would be akin to a 
minimum contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction.  This argument confuses the 
requirements for venue with the requirements of jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Andra v. Left 
Gate Prop. Holding, 453 S.W.3d 216, 225 (Mo. banc 2015); Nixon, 282 S.W.3d at 365. 
As explained by the court in Neville, such a construction of § 508.010.5(1) and (2) 
is not in accord with the purpose of the venue statutes, which is to "provide a convenient, 
logical and orderly forum for the resolution of disputes, not to limit or control the types 
of parties and actions that can appear before Missouri courts."  443 S.W.3d at 693 
(internal citation omitted); see also State ex rel. McDonald's Corp. v. Midkiff, 226 
S.W.3d 119, 123 (Mo. banc 2007).  Moreover, this Court has held that when venue is 
improper, the circuit court has a "ministerial duty" to transfer the case to a county where 
venue is proper.  See Nixon, 282 S.W.3d at 365; § 476.410, RSMo 2000.  The 
requirement to transfer a case to the proper venue when it is filed in an improper venue 
supports the interpretation that § 508.010.5 is not intended to bar litigation when a circuit 
court in Missouri has jurisdiction.5  To interpret § 508.010's silence as barring venue in 
any Missouri county in which the circuit court's jurisdiction is not contested would lead 
                                              
5 Similarly, the federal analog for venue provides, in relevant part, that "if there is no district in 
which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, [a civil action may be 
brought in] any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal 
jurisdiction with respect to such action."  28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
 
7 
to the absurd result of precluding a forum to a party in which a Missouri court has subject 
matter jurisdiction of the case and personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472, 479 (Mo. banc 2013); 801 Skinker 
Boulevard Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 395 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. banc 2013). 
Hasty argues that interpreting § 508.010.5 to allow venue in any Missouri county 
where the circuit court has jurisdiction will encourage forum shopping, which could 
inundate the circuit courts, particularly those located in larger metropolitan areas, with 
cases from outside Missouri.  First, this argument neglects the reality that both subject 
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are prerequisites to proceeding in Missouri 
courts.  Second, this argument neglects that the General Assembly requires both limited 
liability companies and corporations, whether foreign or domestic, to register an agent in 
Missouri if conducting business in the state, see § 347.030.1(2) (Missouri limited liability 
companies); § 347.0153 (foreign limited liability companies); § 351.370.1(2) (Missouri 
corporations); § 351.586(2) (foreign corporations), and provides venue for those entities.  
See § 347.069.2 (Missouri limited liability companies); § 347.167 (foreign limited 
liability companies); § 508.010 (Missouri and foreign corporations).  It is unreasonable to 
interpret the venue statute in a manner that would encourage limited liability companies 
and corporations to not follow the law and appoint a registered agent.  Third, the General 
Assembly is presumed to know this Court has not abolished the doctrine of interstate6 
forum non conveniens, State ex rel. Howard Elec. Co-op. v. Riney, 490 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Mo. 
                                              
6 Missouri does not recognize intrastate forum non conveniens, which would permit a circuit 
court to transfer venue from one proper county under the venue statute to another proper county 
under the venue statute.  State ex rel. Sharp v. Romines, 984 S.W.2d 500, 500 (Mo. banc 1999). 
 
8 
1973) (noting that the General Assembly is presumed to know the law, including this 
Court's prior decisions, in enacting statutes), which would permit a circuit court to 
dismiss the rare case in which jurisdiction and venue are present but defending in the 
forum would be such a hardship on the defendant that it warrants dismissal and refiling 
the case in another jurisdiction.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Wyeth v. Grady, 262 S.W.3d 216, 
220 (Mo. banc 2008); State ex rel. K-Mart Corp. v. Holliger, 986 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. 
banc 1999).   
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, if personal and subject matter jurisdiction are established, venue is 
proper in any county in Missouri in the absence of an express provision by the General 
Assembly restricting venue.7  The preliminary writ of mandamus is made permanent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
All concur. 
                                              
7 Because venue was proper in Jackson County, this Court need not reach Heartland's 
constitutional challenge to § 508.010.5.  See, e.g., Lang v. Goldsworthy, 470 S.W.3d 748, 751 
(Mo. banc 2015).