Case Title: Brittany Frost v. Doreen Whitbeck

Citation: 2002 WI 129

Docket Number: 2001AP000327

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 129 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0327 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Brittany Frost, by her Guardian ad Litem,  
Michael S. Anderson, and Tina Frost,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
Doreen Whitbeck,  
 
Defendant, 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 289 
Reported at:  249 Wis. 2d 206, 638 N.W.2d 325 
(Ct. App. 2001-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 17, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 7, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Callaway   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
CROOKS and SYKES, J.J., join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Virginia L. Newcomb, Paul F. Graves, Patryk Silver, and 
Borgelt, Powell, Peterson & Frauen, S.C., Madison, and oral 
argument by Virginia L. Newcomb. 
 
For plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief by Michael S. 
Anderson and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison, and oral argument by 
Michael S. Anderson. 
 
 
2002 WI 129 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0327  
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 2669) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Brittany Frost, by her Guardian ad Litem,  
Michael S. Anderson, and Tina Frost,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Doreen Whitbeck,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 17, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Frost v. 
Whitbeck, 2001 WI App 289, 249 Wis. 2d 206, 638 N.W.2d 325, 
reversing the judgment and order of the Circuit Court for Dane 
County, Richard J. Callaway, Judge.   
¶2 
The circuit court granted summary judgment to American 
Family Mutual Insurance Co., concluding that Tina Frost and 
Brittany Frost were excluded from coverage for bodily injury 
No. 
01-0327   
 
2 
 
under Doreen Whitbeck's homeowner's policy because Tina Frost is 
a relative of Ms. Whitbeck and was residing in Doreen Whitbeck's 
household at the times her daughter, Brittany Frost, suffered 
bodily injuries. 
¶3 
The court of appeals reversed the judgment and order 
of the circuit court, concluding that the word "relative" in the 
policy exclusion was ambiguous and was to be construed against 
American Family in favor of coverage.  We affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
¶4 
A summary judgment is granted if there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law.1  An appellate court reviews a 
summary judgment applying the same standards and methods used by 
the circuit court.2 
¶5 
At issue in this case is the interpretation of a 
homeowner's 
insurance 
policy. 
 
The 
interpretation 
of 
an 
insurance policy is a question of law when no extrinsic evidence 
is introduced to interpret the wording of the policy.3  This 
court decides questions of law independently of the circuit 
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) 
(1999-2000). 
 
All 
subsequent 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-2000 
version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 
(1980).   
3 Employers Health Ins. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 161 
Wis. 2d 937, 945-46, 469 N.W.2d 172 (1991). 
No. 
01-0327   
 
3 
 
court and court of appeals, benefiting from the analyses of 
those courts.4   
¶6 
The specific question of law presented in this case is 
whether Tina Frost, one of the claimants, is a relative of 
Doreen Whitbeck, the policyholder, within the definition of 
insured so that the claims of Tina Frost and her daughter 
Brittany seeking damages for bodily injury are barred from 
coverage under the policy's intra-insured exclusion, sometimes 
referred to herein as the resident-relative exclusion.5 
¶7 
Applying the oft-repeated, well-accepted rules for 
construing insurance policies leads us to conclude that Tina 
Frost is not a relative of Doreen Whitbeck for the purpose of 
the resident-relative exclusion in Ms. Whitbeck's homeowner's 
                                                 
4 Id. at 946. 
5 American Family argued in its motion for summary judgment 
that both Tina and Brittany Frost were resident relatives of 
Doreen Whitbeck and that, as a result, their claims were 
properly excluded from coverage.  It also asserted that the 
Frosts' claims would be excluded even if only Tina Frost were a 
resident relative, because any claims by Brittany Frost would 
then be excluded as she would be a person under the age of 21 in 
the care of a resident relative.  Because both the circuit court 
and the parties focused on the relationship between Tina Frost 
and Doreen Whitbeck, we shall do so also.  Our conclusions about 
the word "relative" apply with equal force to the relationship 
between Brittany Frost and Doreen Whitbeck. 
To be excluded from coverage a relative must also be a 
"resident" of the policyholder's household at the time of 
injury.  The parties dispute the issue of residency, but because 
we conclude that Tina and Brittany Frost are not relatives of  
Doreen Whitbeck within the policy's definition of "insured," we 
need not address the issue of whether either or both were 
residents of Doreen Whitbeck's household. 
No. 
01-0327   
 
4 
 
insurance policy.  The word "relative" is an indefinite, 
elastic, intrinsically imprecise word in the context of the 
exclusion and accordingly should be construed against American 
Family and in favor of coverage.  A reasonable insured would not 
have understood that Tina Frost, who has a great-great-
grandfather as a common ancestor with the policyholder, is a 
relative within the exclusion.  Construing the word "relative" 
not to include Tina Frost, a third cousin separated by eight 
degrees of kinship, does not render the resident-relative 
exclusion meaningless and does not undermine the purpose of this 
exclusion. 
¶8 
The facts can be stated simply for purposes of this 
review.  Tina Frost and Doreen Whitbeck first met as teenagers.  
At some point, Doreen Whitbeck's mother told the two women that 
they were "shirttail relatives."6  Apparently, Tina Frost and 
Doreen Whitbeck share the same great-great-grandfather.7 Tina 
                                                 
6 At times American Family stresses that the subjective 
awareness of relatedness is relevant to the interpretation of 
the insurance policy.  At other times it asserts that the 
subjective knowledge of a policyholder is irrelevant.  We 
conclude that the proper question in the present case is whether 
a reasonable policyholder would consider a third cousin to be a 
relative under the resident-relative exclusion in a homeowner's 
insurance policy. 
7  The Frosts argue that the relationship between the Frosts 
and Ms. Whitbeck was not conclusively established by admissible 
evidence.  In contrast, American Family urges that the evidence 
of relatedness is competent and undisputed. Because we conclude 
that the relationship upon which American Family relies is not 
sufficient to activate the policy exclusion, we need not and do 
not address the evidentiary issue, and we do not address whether 
a 
genuine 
issue 
of 
material 
fact 
exists 
concerning 
the 
relationship. 
No. 
01-0327   
 
5 
 
Frost's great-grandfather, Barney Van Ert, and Doreen Whitbeck's 
great-grandfather, John Van Ert, were brothers.  Thus Tina Frost 
and Doreen Whitbeck are third cousins separated by eight degrees 
of kinship.8  Tina Frost's daughter, Brittany Frost, and Doreen 
Whitbeck are third cousins once removed and separated by nine 
degrees of kinship. 
                                                                                                                                                             
American Family documents Doreen Whitbeck and Tina Frost's 
family histories to establish their relationship as third 
cousins.  By tracking their respective family trees, American 
Family intends to show that Doreen Whitbeck and Tina Frost share 
a common great-great-grandfather whose exact name is unknown.  
This common great-great-grandfather had sons, Barney Van Ert and 
John Van Ert, who were brothers.  Barney Van Ert was Tina's 
great-grandfather.  The relationship between Tina and Barney Van 
Ert is as follows:  Barney Van Ert’s son, George Van Ert, had a 
daughter, Marie Van Ert (maiden name), who was Tina's mother.  
John Van Ert was Doreen's great-grandfather.  The relationship 
between Doreen and John Van Ert is as follows:  John Van Ert's 
son, Harold Van Ert, Sr., had a daughter, Theresa Van Ert 
(maiden name), who was Doreen's mother.  Thus, because Tina and 
Doreen's great-grandfathers were brothers, they share a common 
great-great-grandfather and are related by eight degrees of 
kinship.  This genealogical exercise simply establishes a single 
point of relatedness for Tina and Doreen as third cousins. 
In its motion for summary judgment, American Family claims 
that Tina and Doreen are both third and fourth cousins.  
American Family claims that they are third cousins because they 
share a common great-great-grandfather.  They are also fourth 
cousins because their mothers were third cousins.  See Record 
34, American Family's Motion for Summary Judgment at 3.  Because 
we conclude that third cousins are not "relatives" as the word 
is used in the policy, we need not address whether Tina Frost 
and Doreen Whitbeck are also fourth cousins.  
8 According to Wis. Stat. § 990.001(16), they are separated 
by eight degrees of kinship.  The circuit court concluded that 
Tina Frost and Doreen Whitbeck were separated by ten degrees of 
kinship. 
No. 
01-0327   
 
6 
 
¶9 
Tina Frost and Brittany (age 6) came from Kentucky to 
stay in Doreen Whitbeck's Wisconsin home in May 1996.  During 
the course of their stay, Brittany was allegedly bitten twice by 
Doreen Whitbeck's dog, once on June 4, 1996, and the second time 
on November 20, 1996.  Brittany suffered injuries on both 
occasions.  Shortly after the second dog bite, both Tina Frost 
and Brittany left Ms. Whitbeck's home and returned to Kentucky.  
Three years later, on November 10, 1999, Tina Frost and Brittany 
filed suit in Wisconsin, naming, as the defendants, Doreen 
Whitbeck and American Family, her homeowner's insurance company.  
¶10 American Family moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that Doreen Whitbeck's homeowner's insurance policy contains an 
express exclusion of coverage for bodily injury of a resident 
relative.  This review therefore relates to insurance coverage, 
not to liability for the injuries. 
¶11 The 
policy 
provides 
several 
types 
of 
coverage.  
Section I of the policy provides coverage for first-party claims 
for property loss with some exclusions.  Section II of the 
policy provides coverage for third-party claims with some 
exclusions.  This case involves a Section II exclusion for a 
claim for bodily injury.  
¶12 Specifically, Section II of Ms. Whitbeck's homeowner's 
insurance 
policy provides 
personal 
liability 
coverage for 
compensatory damages for bodily injury for which an insured is 
legally liable.  It provides: 
We will pay, up to our limit, compensatory damages for 
which any insured is legally liable because of bodily 
No. 
01-0327   
 
7 
 
injury or property damage caused by an occurrence 
covered by this policy. 
This section of the policy explicitly excludes coverage for 
compensatory damages for bodily injury to an insured. The policy 
states: 
11.  Intra-insured Suits.  We will not cover bodily 
injury to any insured. 
The policy defines an insured to include a relative who resides 
in the policyholder's household.  The policy reads: 
5.  Insured 
a. Insured means you and, if residents of your  
household: 
(1) your relatives; and 
(2) any other person under the age of 21 in 
your care or in the care of your 
resident relatives. 
¶13 The question of law presented is whether Tina Frost, 
one of the claimants, is a relative of Doreen Whitbeck, the 
policyholder, within the definition of an insured in the policy 
so that the claims of Tina Frost and her daughter Brittany 
seeking damages for bodily injury are barred from coverage under 
the policy's resident-relative exclusion. 
¶14 The 
court 
has 
set 
forth, 
in 
numerous 
cases, 
overlapping rules for interpreting an insurance policy.  These 
rules of interpretation are as follows: 
No. 
01-0327   
 
8 
 
¶15 Words and phrases in insurance contracts are subject 
to the same rules of construction that apply to contracts 
generally.9 
¶16 The primary objective in interpreting and construing a 
contract is to ascertain and carry out the true intent of the 
parties.10 
¶17 If the language of an insurance policy is unambiguous, 
a court will not rewrite the policy by construction11 and will 
interpret the policy according to its plain and ordinary meaning 
to avoid imposing contract obligations that the parties did not 
undertake.12   
¶18 On the other hand, the language of an insurance policy 
may be ambiguous.  Words and phrases in an insurance policy are 
ambiguous when they are so imprecise and elastic as to lack any 
                                                 
9 Peace v. N.W. Nat'l Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 106, 120, 596 
N.W.2d 435 (1999); Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. Employers Ins., 119 
Wis. 2d 722, 735, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984). 
For commentary on these various rules of construction, see 
2 Lee R. Russ & Thomas S. Segalla, Couch on Insurance ch. 22 (3d 
ed. 1999 & Supp. 2002). 
10 Mau v. N.D. Ins. Reserve Fund, 2001 WI 134, ¶13, 248 
Wis. 2d 1031, 637 N.W.2d 45; Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 120; Kremers-
Urban Co., 119 Wis. 2d at 735. 
11 Smith v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 808, 811, 456 
N.W.2d 597 (1990).  
12 Danbeck v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI 91, ¶10, 245 
Wis. 2d 186, 629 N.W.2d 150. 
No. 
01-0327   
 
9 
 
certain interpretation13 or are susceptible to more than one 
reasonable construction.14  Terms of an insurance policy may be 
inherently ambiguous or may be ambiguous when considered in the 
context of the insurance policy as a whole.15  Whether ambiguity 
exists in an insurance policy is a question of law.16 
¶19 If terms in an insurance policy are ambiguous, they 
should be construed against the insurance company that drafted 
the policy.  Thus, ambiguous terms are to be construed in favor 
of coverage,17 and exclusions are to be narrowly construed 
against an insurer.18 
¶20 Language in an insurance policy is construed as 
understood by a reasonable person in the position of an insured 
rather than as intended by the insurer.19  The reasonable 
expectations of coverage of an insured should be furthered by 
the interpretation given.20 
                                                 
13 Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 121 (ambiguity described as "an  
'intrinsically 
imprecise 
or 
uncertain' 
term" 
(citation 
omitted)). 
14 Danbeck, 245 Wis. 2d 186, ¶10. 
15 Badger Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schmitz, 2002 WI 98, ¶61, 255 
Wis. 2d 61, 647 N.W.2d 223. 
16 Mau, 248 Wis. 2d 1031, ¶13. 
17 Danbeck, 245 Wis. 2d 186, ¶10. 
18 Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 121, 132; Whirlpool v. Ziebert, 197 
Wis. 2d 144, 152, 539 N.W.2d 883 (1995). 
19 Kremers-Urban Co., 119 Wis. 2d at 735. 
20 Id. 
No. 
01-0327   
 
10 
 
¶21 A construction of an insurance policy that gives 
reasonable 
meaning 
to 
every 
provision 
of 
the 
policy 
is 
preferable to one leaving part of the language useless or 
meaningless.21 
¶22 Furthermore, in construing an insurance policy as it 
is understood by a reasonable person in the position of the 
insured, a court may consider the purpose or subject matter of 
the 
insurance, 
the 
situation 
of 
the 
parties, 
and 
the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the contract.22 
¶23 With these rules in mind, we examine the meaning of 
the word "relative" in the intra-insured policy exclusion to 
determine whether Tina Frost is a relative of Ms. Whitbeck so 
that the Frosts' claims are excluded from coverage. 
¶24 American Family urges this court to begin and end its 
inquiry with the rule of construction that when the language of 
an insurance policy is unambiguous, a court will interpret the 
policy according to its plain and ordinary meaning to avoid 
imposing 
contract 
obligations 
that 
the 
parties 
did 
not 
undertake.  American Family argued in the court of appeals and 
in its brief in the present court that the word "relative" is 
unambiguous and that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word 
                                                 
21 Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis. 2d 823, 848-49, 280 
N.W.2d 711 (1979); Inter-Ins. Ex. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 
25 Wis. 2d 100, 106, 130 N.W.2d 185 (1964). 
22 Employers Health Ins. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 161 
Wis. 2d 937, 946, 469 N.W.2d 172 (1991). 
No. 
01-0327   
 
11 
 
is, at minimum, "a person related to another by blood . . . no 
matter how distant or remote the connection."23   
¶25 American 
Family 
contends 
that 
its 
position 
is 
supported by Wisconsin case law, relying on In re Estate of 
Haese, 80 Wis. 2d 285, 259 N.W.2d 54 (1977), and Peabody v. 
American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 220 Wis. 2d 340, 582 
N.W.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1998).  Neither case, however, supports 
American Family's position.  
¶26 The court in Haese decided whether a non-blood nephew 
of the testator's deceased husband was a "relative of the 
testator" as that phrase appeared in the anti-lapse statute.24  
The Haese court concluded that "there is general agreement that 
a relative is one connected by blood or affinity,"25 but that 
"the term [relative] is ambiguous."26  After examining various 
indices of legislative intent, the Haese court concluded that 
                                                 
23 Brief of Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner at 25-26.  At 
oral 
argument 
American 
Family 
recognized 
that 
the 
word 
"relative" in the policy did not necessarily include very remote 
blood kin.  In fact, it conceded that there must be some limit.  
American Family did not, however, describe what degree of 
kinship fell outside the word "relative," although American 
Family also stated that a limit could be determined by asking 
whether a reasonable person in the position of the insured would 
know that he or she was related to the person in question. 
24 In re Estate of Haese, 80 Wis. 2d 285, 288, 259 N.W.2d 54 
(1977). 
25 Id. at 291. 
26 Id.  
No. 
01-0327   
 
12 
 
the word "relative" in the anti-lapse statute was restricted to 
persons bound by blood.27 
¶27 The Haese decision can be read to support American 
Family's argument that the word "relative" can be interpreted in 
the context of the anti-lapse statute to mean persons connected 
by blood.  The Haese case does not, however, support American 
Family's 
position 
that 
the 
word 
"relative" 
plainly 
and 
unambiguously includes any and all persons connected by blood.  
The nephew in question in the Haese decision was not connected 
by blood to the testator, and the court did not have to decide 
the issue presented in this case, namely, how close must blood 
kin be to fall within the meaning of "relative" for purposes of 
this insurance policy. 
¶28 In the Peabody case, the injured party attempted to 
get underinsured motorist coverage as a relative under her 
father's insurance policy.  The policy defined "relative" as a 
"person living in your household, related to you by blood, 
marriage or adoption.  This includes a ward or foster child.  It 
does not include any person who or whose spouse owns a motor 
vehicle."28  As in Haese, the court in Peabody did not have to 
decide whether "relative" plainly and unambiguously includes all 
persons connected by blood.  The Peabody court merely concluded 
that because the daughter owned her own vehicle she was not a 
                                                 
27 Id. at 298. 
28 Peabody v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 220 Wis. 2d 340, 
346, 582 N.W.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1998). 
No. 
01-0327   
 
13 
 
relative as defined by her father's policy and was therefore not 
covered under his policy.  Peabody is inapposite and is not 
relevant to the issue raised in this case. 
¶29 American Family cites cases from other jurisdictions 
in an attempt to support its interpretation of the word 
"relative."  None of the cases cited stands for the broad 
proposition urged by American Family, namely, that the word 
"relative" refers to all persons related by blood no matter how 
distant or remote the connection.  The courts generally 
concluded that "relative" means a person connected by blood, 
marriage, or adoption.  They then determined whether the person 
at issue is or is not a relative, depending on the language of 
the policy, the nature of the relation, and the purpose of the 
policy provision.29  
                                                 
29 See, e.g., Vernatter v. Allstate Ins. Co., 362 F.2d 403 
(4th Cir. 1966)(uncle-in-law); Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. 
Jackson, 297 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1961)(mother-in-law); Ala. Farm 
Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pigott, 393 So. 2d 1379 (Ala. 
1981)(unborn child); Groves v. State Farm Life & Cas. Co., 829 
P.2d 1237 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)(former son-in-law); Aji v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 416 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1982)(brother-in-law); Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 
697 P.2d 40 (Haw. 1985)(son of the policyholder's paramour); 
Hernandez v. Comco Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 1368 (La. Ct. App. 
1978)(son-in-law); Liprie v. Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 143 
So. 2d 597 (La. Ct. App. 1962)(daughter-in-law); Mickelson v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.W.2d 814 (Minn. 1983)(domestic 
partner); Pruitt v. Farmers Ins. Co., 950 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1997)(nephew); Hayes v. Am. Standard Ins. Co., 847 S.W.2d 
150 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (daughter of policyholder's deceased 
paramour); Sjogren v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 703 A.2d 
608, 612 (R.I. 1997)(former step-son). 
No. 
01-0327   
 
14 
 
¶30 Four cases cited by American Family concluded that the 
word "relative" is unambiguous.  One of these cases simply 
concluded that "relative" as defined by the policy clearly and 
unambiguously did not include domestic partners.30  In each of 
the other three cases, the court addressed the issue of whether 
the word "relative" includes relationships by affinity, clearly 
not the issue in our case.  Furthermore, in each of these three 
cases the relationship involved appears much closer than the one 
in the present case.31   
¶31 Contrary to the arguments of American Family we 
conclude that the word "relative" in the policy exclusion is 
ambiguous.  Our rules of construction state that words in an 
insurance policy are ambiguous when they are so imprecise and 
elastic as to lack any certain interpretation.32   Courts have 
described the word "relative" as one of "flexible meaning"33 and 
                                                 
30 Mickelson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.W.2d 814 
(Minn. 1983). 
31 Vernatter v. Allstate Ins. Co., 362 F.2d 403, 404 (4th 
Cir. 1966)(uncle-in-law); Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Jackson, 
297 F.2d 230, 231-32 (4th Cir. 1961)(mother-in-law); Liprie v. 
Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 143 So. 2d 597 (La. Ct. App. 
1962)(daughter-in-law). 
32 Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 121.  According to the dissent, the 
word "relative" is unambiguous.  Nevertheless, the dissent 
defines "relative" by adding the following words to the policy:  
Relative "includes at least those who are related by blood and 
consider themselves to be relatives."  Dissent, ¶59.  None of 
the rules of construction of insurance policies, however, 
support a court’s rewriting a policy (ambiguous or unambiguous) 
in this way. 
 
33 Cooney v. Cooper, 143 F.2d 312, 314 (8th Cir. 1944). 
No. 
01-0327   
 
15 
 
as a word with "inherent ambiguities."34 The word has also been 
described as susceptible to more than one meaning.35  Courts have 
stated that because there is no single, precise definition of 
"relative," the word must be interpreted in the context in which 
it is employed.36   
 ¶32 We agree with American Family that "relative" means, 
at a minimum, a person related to another by blood and that 
numerous cases so state.  We also accept that dictionaries 
define the word "relative" to include a person related by blood.  
But neither a dictionary definition nor case law resolves the 
word's elasticity in the case before us.  A dictionary 
definition alone does not mean that the word is precise, 
definite, and inelastic.  Moreover, the issue before us is not 
whether "relative" means a person related to another by blood 
but rather whether "relative" means, as American Family asserts, 
every person related to another by blood, no matter how distant 
or remote the connection, in the context of this policy.   
                                                 
34 Sjogren, 703 A.2d at 612.  See also Ind. Lumbermens Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Passalacqua, 211 N.Y.S.2d 62, 65-66 (Sup. Ct. Eq. 
1961).  
35 See, 
e.g., 
McGuiness 
v. 
Motor 
Vehicle 
Accident 
Indemnification Corp., 231 N.Y.S.2d 795, 797 (Sup. Ct. 1962); 
Ind. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 211 N.Y.S.2d at 65; Sjogren, 703 
A.2d at 612; Forner v. Butler, 460 S.E.2d 425, 427 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 1995). 
36 Cooney, 143 F.2d at 314 ("relative" must be interpreted 
within the context in which it is employed and with regard to 
the contract within which it appears); Ind. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. 
Co., 211 N.Y.S.2d at 65 (same); Forner, 460 S.E.2d at 427 
(same).   
No. 
01-0327   
 
16 
 
 
¶33 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley asked at oral argument:  How 
far does the policy require us to trace our ancestors to 
determine who our relatives are?  If we accept Adam and Eve, she 
continued, aren't we all relatives under American Family's 
definition?  Counsel for American Family replied, "one has 
certainly to draw the line."  This exchange clearly illustrates 
that the word "relative" is elastic and that some limits need to 
be established in order to give the word meaning.37  American 
Family could have defined the word "relative" in the policy, but 
it did not.   
 
¶34 The dissent agrees that the term "relative" may be 
ambiguous because it does not include all persons related by 
blood no matter how distant or remote the connection.  It simply 
argues that we need not find the outer limits of consanguinity 
in this case because Tina Frost and Doreen Whitbeck "knew of and 
acknowledge their blood connection."  Dissent, ¶48.  According 
to the dissent, "the definition of the term 'relative' as used 
in this policy includes at least those who are related by blood 
and consider themselves to be relatives."  Dissent, ¶59.  None 
                                                 
37 In discussing the potential unlimited nature of the scope 
of the word "relative" and the intra-insured exclusion as 
defined by American Family, the Frosts refer to an ABC News 
segment from April 21, 2000, which reported that all Europeans 
are descended from seven matriarchal groups.  Each of these 
maternal clans, referred to as the Seven Daughters of Eve, has 
sprouted millions of individuals.  In addition, all seven of the 
genetic groups appear to be descended from the "Lara" clan, one 
of three clans that still exist in Africa today.  This research 
tends to support the claim that all humans share a common 
African ancestor.  See R. 37, Brief in Opposition to Defendant 
American Family's Motion for Summary Judgment at 16-17. 
No. 
01-0327   
 
17 
 
of the rules of construction for insurance policies, however, 
permit ambiguity to be written out of an insurance policy by the 
addition of a qualifying term such as "known." 
¶35 The plain meaning rule of construction does not apply 
in the present case because the word "relative" in the context 
of the policy exclusion is so imprecise and elastic as to lack a 
certain interpretation.  The insurance policy leaves open the 
degree of consanguinity required to be included as a relative, 
and therefore the word must be construed by a court. 
¶36 Adhering to the rules of construction for interpreting 
language in a policy leads to the conclusion that the imprecise, 
elastic, indefinite word "relative" should be construed against 
American Family and in favor of the policyholder and coverage.38  
This conclusion about the word "relative" is consistent with 
case law in other jurisdictions.  The word "relative" has been 
viewed as ambiguous and has been narrowly construed when the 
policy excludes a relative and has been broadly construed when 
the policy extends coverage to a relative.39 
¶37 Another rule of construction for interpreting language 
in a policy is that a policy is to be construed as understood by 
a reasonable person in the position of the policyholder.40  As 
noted by the court of appeals, the "degree of consanguinity or 
                                                 
38 Danbeck, 245 Wis. 2d at 193; Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 132. 
39 See, 
e.g., 
McGuiness, 
231 
N.Y.S.2d 
at 
797; 
Ind. 
Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 211 N.Y.S.2d at 66; Forner, 460 S.E.2d 
at 427.  See also ¶19, supra. 
40 Kremers-Urban Co., 119 Wis. 2d at 735. 
No. 
01-0327   
 
18 
 
affinity must be such that a reasonable policyholder would 
understand 
that 
co-habitation 
would 
reduce 
the 
coverage 
available to her if she were held liable for bodily injury to 
that relative."41   
¶38 A reasonable policyholder would not understand the 
word "relative" in this policy exclusion to include any person 
related by blood no matter how remote the relationship.  If 
"relative" embodies all persons having a blood relationship to 
the insured, the effect is to enlarge the exclusion in this 
policy to extend to persons only barely and remotely touching 
the policyholder.  
¶39 Moreover, American Family's combined use of "resident 
of your household" and "relative" to exclude persons from 
coverage increases the likelihood that a reasonable insured 
would interpret the word "relative" to refer only to close 
family members, in terms of degrees of kinship.  We conclude 
that a reasonable person in the position of Doreen Whitbeck 
would not understand the word "relative" to include persons 
separated by eight degrees of kinship.  Thus, a holding that 
Tina Frost is not a relative within the policy exclusion is 
consistent with the understanding of a reasonable person in the 
position of a policyholder and comports with the reasonable 
expectation of the policyholder. 
                                                 
41 Frost v. Whitbeck, 2001 WI App 289, ¶13, 249 Wis. 2d 206, 
638 N.W.2d 325. 
No. 
01-0327   
 
19 
 
¶40 Arguing for the application of a different rule of 
construction, American Family contends that a holding that Tina 
Frost is not a relative does not give reasonable meaning to 
every provision of the policy and leaves the language of the 
exclusion useless and meaningless.  We agree with American 
Family to the extent that it argues that our rules of 
construction of insurance policies require that a court not 
adopt a construction of a policy that entirely neutralizes one 
provision if the contract is susceptible to another construction 
that gives effect to all of its provisions and is consistent 
with the general intent of the parties.42   
¶41 We are not, however, construing "relative" so as to 
render the resident-relative exclusion meaningless.  We are 
simply delineating some boundary to the otherwise limitless 
meaning of "relative."   
¶42 We need not define in the present case what degree of 
consanguinity is required by the word "relative" as used in the 
intra-insured exclusion.  We need determine only whether the 
word "relative" in the context of this policy exclusion extends 
as far as persons having a great-great-grandfather as a common 
ancestor.   
¶43 The 
word 
"relative" 
encompasses 
a 
continuum 
of 
possible 
interpretations, 
a 
continuum 
of 
degrees 
of 
consanguinity.  To hold that "relative," within the context of 
an insurance policy exclusion, does not include third cousins 
                                                 
42 Stanhope, 90 Wis. 2d at 849. 
No. 
01-0327   
 
20 
 
does not strip the resident-relative exclusion of all meaning.  
It simply limits the scope of the exclusion. 
¶44 American Family further urges that in construing the 
word "relative" we should, as the rules of construction teach, 
consider the purpose of the exclusion.  American Family contends 
that the purpose of an exclusion helps inform our interpretation 
of a policy as it is understood by a reasonable person in the 
position of an insured and that the purpose of the exclusion in 
the present policy leads to holding that Tina Frost is a 
relative of Doreen Whitbeck under the policy.   
¶45 We agree with American Family that the purpose of an 
exclusion assists a court in interpreting the policy.  We 
further agree with American Family that the purpose of the 
exclusion in issue here is to exempt an insurance company from 
liability to those persons to whom a policyholder, on account of 
close family ties, would be likely to show partiality in case of 
injury.43  Construing "relative" to exclude blood relations who 
are separated by eight degrees of kinship does not, however, 
defeat this purpose.  Indeed, such a construction of the word 
"relative" is consistent with the goal of excluding only those 
family members who presumptively would be inclined to collude on 
claims. 
                                                 
43 The resident-relative exclusion is designed and intended 
to protect an insurance company from exposure to liability "to 
those persons to whom the insured, on account of close family 
ties, would be apt to be partial in case of injury."  Shannon v. 
Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 456, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989)(quoting A.G. 
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 112 Wis. 2d 18, 20-21, 331 N.W.2d 643 
(Ct. App. 1983)). 
No. 
01-0327   
 
21 
 
¶46 In sum, applying the oft-repeated, well-accepted rules 
for construing insurance policies leads us to conclude that Tina 
Frost is not a relative of Doreen Whitbeck for the purpose of 
the resident-relative exclusion in Ms. Whitbeck's homeowner's 
insurance policy.  The word "relative" is an indefinite, 
elastic, intrinsically imprecise word in the context of the 
exclusion and accordingly should be construed against American 
Family and in favor of coverage.  A reasonable insured would not 
have understood that Tina Frost, who has a great-great-
grandfather as a common ancestor with the policyholder, is a 
relative within the exclusion.  Construing the word "relative" 
not to include Tina Frost, a third cousin separated by eight 
degrees of kinship, does not render the resident-relative 
exclusion meaningless and does not undermine the purpose of this 
exclusion. 
¶47 Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and we remand the cause to the circuit court for 
further proceedings.   
 
By the Court.  The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
¶48 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with the 
majority's 
statement 
of 
the 
methodology 
to 
be 
used 
in 
interpreting the language of an insurance policy.  See majority 
op., ¶¶14-22.  However, I do not agree with the majority's 
application of the rules of interpretation to the facts here, 
nor do I agree with the ultimate decision of the court to affirm 
the court of appeals.  I would find that under the well-
established rules of insurance policy interpretation, the term 
"relative" is unambiguous in this case, where Frost and Whitbeck 
knew of and acknowledged their blood connection.  I would 
further hold that a reasonable person in the position of the 
policyholder would understand the word "relative" in the policy 
exclusion to cover such a blood relation.  Finally, I would hold 
that the record in this case supports the conclusion that, as a 
matter 
of 
law, 
the 
Frosts 
were 
residents 
of 
Whitbeck's 
household.  Thus, I would reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and grant summary judgment in favor of American Family.  
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶49 The majority holds that the word "relative" is 
ambiguous, concluding that it is "an indefinite, elastic, 
intrinsically 
imprecise 
word 
in 
the 
context 
of 
the 
exclusion . . . ."  Majority op., ¶7.  I disagree.  The majority 
states:  "Words and phrases in an insurance policy are ambiguous 
when they are so imprecise and elastic as to lack any certain 
interpretation or are susceptible to more than one reasonable 
construction."  Majority op., ¶18 (citations omitted).  While I 
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
2 
 
concede that there are circumstances where the inclusion of a 
person under the term "relative" might be unreasonable, this is 
not 
such 
a 
case. 
 
The 
term 
"relative" 
has 
a 
certain 
interpretation that should apply in this case. 
¶50 When interpreting an insurance policy, we are to give 
the policy terms their plain and ordinary meaning in order to 
avoid imposing contract obligations upon the parties that they 
did not undertake.  Danbeck v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI 
91, ¶10, 245 Wis. 2d 186, 629 N.W.2d 150 (internal citations 
omitted).  We may discern the plain and ordinary meaning of an 
insurance policy term by "seek[ing] guidance from a recognized 
dictionary."  Smith v. Katz, 218 Wis. 2d 442, 451 n.4, 578 
N.W.2d 202 (1998).  "Relative" is defined in the American 
Heritage Dictionary as, "One related by kinship, common origin, 
or marriage."  American Heritage Dictionary 1523 (3d ed. 1992).  
Similarly, "kinship" is defined as a "[c]onnection by blood, 
marriage, or adoption; family relationship" or a "[r]elationship 
by nature or character; affinity."  Id. at 993.  American Family 
asserts that this dictionary definition supports the argument 
that "relative" is unambiguous, because there is agreement that 
it means, at minimum, "connected by blood."  The majority 
accepts this definition, but finds that the real issue is 
whether the definition extends to all blood relatives "no matter 
how distant or remote the connection."  Majority op., ¶32. 
¶51 I agree with the majority that blood relations cannot 
and should not be interpreted to trace back all the way to the 
beginning of the human race, but this case does not call for 
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
3 
 
such an interpretation.  Here, we have two people that are third 
cousins, related by blood, who know and acknowledge that they 
are related.44  When people are related by blood and recognize 
each other as a "cousin," they are, by definition, relatives.   
¶52 Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that this 
court has to find that the term "'relative' refers to all 
persons related by blood no matter how distant or remote the 
connection," majority op., ¶29, in order to find that Frost and 
Whitbeck are relatives under this policy.  At some point, the 
blood connection becomes too tenuous for parties to even be 
aware they are related.  At such a point, it is unreasonable to 
find a relative relationship.  However, those circumstances do 
not exist in this case.  Here, Frost and Whitbeck were blood 
related and they knew it.  The existence of the blood connection 
under circumstances where those involved are aware of the 
connection and refer to each other as "cousins" is sufficient to 
make them relatives under the plain language of this insurance 
policy, particularly in light of the additional "resident" 
limitation on the exclusion. 
¶53 The majority acknowledges that Tina Frost and Doreen 
Whitbeck are related by blood, repeatedly stating that they are 
third cousins separated by eight degrees of kinship.  See 
majority op., ¶¶7, 8, 39.  Whitbeck and Frost knew they shared a 
great-great-grandfather and that their great-grandfathers were 
                                                 
44 Frost has argued that there is no competent evidence to 
support a finding of relative status.  However, I find that the 
hospital records and testimony by Whitbeck and Frost are 
sufficient and admissible evidence of the relationship. 
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
4 
 
brothers.  Indeed, hospital records from Brittany's June 1996 
emergency room visit indicate that Brittany was "living" with 
her 
"mother's 
cousin," 
having 
"recently 
moved . . . from 
Kentucky."  They held out to the world that they were relatives. 
¶54 One Wisconsin case examined by the majority is In re 
Estate of Haese, 80 Wis. 2d 285, 259 N.W.2d 54 (1977).45  We held 
in Haese that the term "relative" was ambiguous in the context 
of the anti-lapse statute as it pertains to a non-blood 
relative.  The majority asserts that Haese is rendered useless 
to our analysis because it did not hold that the word 
"'relative' plainly and unambiguously includes any and all 
persons connected by blood."  Majority op., ¶27.  While we held 
that the statute required a narrow interpretation limited to 
blood relatives, we noted that "there is general agreement that 
a relative is one connected by blood or affinity."  Haese, 80 
Wis. 2d at 291.  Further, we found that although the term was 
ambiguous in the context of the case, the term in other cases 
was unambiguous and "susceptible to interpretation by common and 
ordinary meaning."  Id. at 296. 
¶55 The majority also suggests that the cases from other 
jurisdictions are of little or no use in the present case 
because, among the cases that hold "relative" to be unambiguous, 
one held that "relative" clearly did not include domestic 
                                                 
45 The other Wisconsin case cited by the majority is Peabody 
v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 220 Wis. 2d 340, 582 N.W.2d 753 
(Ct. App. 1998).  The majority asserts, and I agree, that the 
case is inapposite because the policy in the case specifically 
excluded those persons who owned their own vehicle.  See 
majority op., ¶28. 
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
5 
 
partners, and the others dealt with affinity relationships.  
Majority op., ¶¶29-30. 
¶56 The majority is correct that none of these cases 
involve a blood relationship like the one in this case.  I 
disagree, however, that these cases are of no use to our 
analysis.  These cases show that the word relative can be 
construed broadly and, under the common definition, extend 
unambiguously to a variety of non-blood relatives.  In Liprie, 
for example, a Louisiana court found that the "usual, customary 
and generally accepted interpretation of the word 'relative'" 
included those related by blood or affinity, and a daughter-in-
law of an insured was an insured under the relevant policy.  
Liprie v. Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 143 So.2d 597, 600-01 
(La. Ct. App. 1962).   
¶57 In Mickelson, the Supreme Court of Minnesota found 
that the word "relative" was a "term[] of common usage and 
generally accepted meaning" and means "one connected by blood or 
marriage."  Mickelson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 329 
N.W.2d 814, 816 (Minn. 1983).  That court concluded a domestic 
partner was not a relative under the policy because there was no 
relationship by blood or marriage.  Id.   
¶58 A common thread binds all the cases cited by the 
majority.46  Even where a court has found the term ambiguous 
within the context of a case, the court has acknowledged that 
the definition of a "relative" includes those related by blood.  
                                                 
46 For a full list of these cases, see majority op. ¶29, 
n.29. 
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
6 
 
The majority fails to cite a single case in which a court has 
found that a person related by blood to another is not a 
relative.47  That portion of the definition of "relative" is 
clear and unambiguous.   
¶59 There may be a case where, as in the Haese case, this 
court must find ambiguity, but this is not such a case.  The 
definition of the term "relative" as used in this policy 
includes at least those who are related by blood and consider 
themselves to be relatives.  Any ambiguity with the term 
"relative" would arise when people do not know they are related 
by blood or where there is a non-blood relationship, not under 
facts such as those presented by this case. 
¶60 In Maca, this court called "resident" an "elastic" 
term.  See Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Maca, 26 
Wis. 2d 399, 407-08, 132 N.W.2d 517 (1965).  In another case, 
though, this court found that "resident" was unambiguous as used 
in automobile liability insurance policies and should be 
"construed in light of [its] plain and common meaning."  
Pamperin v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 55 Wis. 2d 27, 37, 197 
N.W.2d 783 (1972).  I am of the opinion that the term "relative" 
should be interpreted in the same manner. 
¶61 I now turn to the issue of whether a reasonable person 
in the position of the policyholder would understand a third 
cousin to be included by use of the term "relative" in a 
homeowner's insurance policy.  The majority holds that a 
                                                 
47 Again, the majority notes Peabody, 220 Wis. 2d 340, but 
finds the case inapposite.   
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
7 
 
reasonable person would not have such an understanding.  I 
disagree.  Frost and Whitbeck were more than just good friends.  
They were blood relatives and they recognized that fact.  As 
such, it would be reasonable for Whitbeck to consider Tina and 
Brittany in dealing with insurance issues.  The majority finds 
that a reasonable person would only consider close kin under the 
policy exclusion.  I see no reason why a person would only 
consider a "close" relative to be included in the exclusion.  
Also, I find the additional "resident" requirement makes this a 
narrow exception, one that applies only to relatives with whom 
the policyholder feels close enough to share a home.  If blood 
relatives are close enough to share a home, they are close 
enough to consider the implications of that arrangement for 
insurance purposes. 
¶62 While few may be in the situation to have a close 
relationship with a third cousin, Frost and Whitbeck were.  It 
may be more common for a person to have a son or daughter, 
parent or sibling living in one's home, but a reasonable person 
would recognize that use of the term "relative" is broader and 
expands beyond those categories of people in absence of specific 
limiting language.  The very use of the term "relative" in the 
policy defies a narrow understanding.  The majority finds that 
excluding third cousins does not defeat the purpose of the 
exclusion.  Again I disagree.  By finding that acknowledged 
cousins do not fit the policy exclusion, the majority draws an 
arbitrary line regarding who might and who might not collude in 
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
8 
 
the face of a definition that unambiguously includes blood 
relatives. 
¶63 The purpose of this policy exclusion is to prevent 
collusion; it is designed to "exempt an insurance company from 
liability to those persons to whom a policyholder, on account of 
close family ties, would be likely to show partiality in case of 
injury."  Majority op., ¶45 (citing Shannon v. Shannon, 150 
Wis. 2d 434, 456, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989)).  Given that Frost and 
Whitbeck were "good friends" and third cousins by blood, there 
is no reason to believe the risk of collusion here is less than 
with other family situations.  This court has noted that the 
probability of collusion in a particular case need not be high 
for exclusion language to apply.  See Whirlpool Corp. v. 
Ziebert, 197 Wis. 2d 144, 151, 539 N.W.2d 883 (1995) (finding 
that although the possibility of collusion in the case seemed 
"quite low, if not nil" the policy still applied).  Although 
Frost and Whitbeck are separated by eight degrees of kinship, 
they are connected by blood.  If Whitbeck felt close enough to 
Frost to allow her to be a resident of her home, there is no 
reason why Whitbeck would not consider her third cousin like 
other relatives in dealing with insurance issues.  
¶64 In Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Jackson, 
297 F.2d 230, 232 (4th Cir. 1961), one of the parties argued 
that interpreting "relative" to include those related to an 
insured by marriage would so "enlarge the exemption as to 
include car owners only barely and remotely touching the insured 
through affinity."  The majority suggests a similar problem 
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
9 
 
arises here.  See majority op., ¶38.  However, the Fourth 
Circuit found that "the latitude of the stipulation is severely 
straitened by the further requirement that the 'relative' be a 
'resident of the same household' as the insured."  Jackson, 297 
F.2d at 232.  As I have suggested, the category of people that 
will be both relatives and residents is very narrow.  If, as I 
assert occurred here, third cousins choose to reside together, 
knowing that they are related, there is no reason why that 
relationship should not be considered for insurance purposes. 
¶65 In Vernatter v. Allstate Insurance Co., 362 F.2d 403 
(4th Cir. 1966), the court found that although an uncle-in-law 
is not as closely related as the mother-in-law in Jackson, for 
purposes of automobile liability insurance, the degree of 
relationship did not matter.  The purpose was to exclude all 
relatives by blood or marriage, "whose car would be readily 
available to the insured by reason of their common residence and 
their familial relationship."  Id. at 406.  The same reasoning 
applies to the homeowner's insurance policy exclusion, where the 
purpose of the exclusion is to avoid liability where collusion 
is likely.  Frost argues that close friends create the same 
risks; however, the argument that the exclusion could be broader 
does not require that the policy limits, as written, should not 
apply. 
¶66 Since I would hold that Frost and Whitbeck are 
relatives, I turn to the "resident" portion of the resident-
relative policy exclusion.  I would find that the Frosts were 
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
10 
 
residents of Whitbeck's household.  Since the majority decided 
only the relative issue, some additional facts are necessary. 
¶67 When Tina divorced, she was given sole custody of her 
six-year-old daughter Brittany.  In May 1996 Tina and Brittany 
Frost came to stay at Doreen Whitbeck's home in Mt. Horeb, 
Wisconsin.  Tina rented a trailer for the trip.  In addition to 
clothes, toys, and Brittany's bike, Tina brought several large 
items with her, including a bed, a clothes dryer, and a 
television.   
¶68 Shortly after moving 
into 
Whitbeck's 
home, 
Tina 
obtained 
full-time 
employment 
as 
a 
nursing 
assistant 
at 
Ingleside Nursing Home.  In July 1996 Tina turned in her 
Kentucky license and obtained a Wisconsin driver's license.  She 
also sold her truck and leased a car that she registered in 
Wisconsin.  Tina received mail at the Whitbeck residence.  She 
used the Mt. Horeb address for her driver's license, car 
insurance, employment application, and various medical records. 
Before moving from Kentucky, Tina closed out her savings account 
in Kentucky.  She opened a bank account and used her Wisconsin 
address for her checkbook.  Tina paid Wisconsin taxes in 1996. 
¶69 Whitbeck paid all of the rent while the Frosts stayed 
with her, but Tina paid other bills, including water and 
utilities.  Tina and Brittany had full use of the home and no 
limitations were placed upon the length of their stay. 
¶70 Tina usually worked from 11:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m.  
Whitbeck worked from 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m.  Brittany stayed 
at home with Whitbeck while her mother was at work.  No 
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
11 
 
babysitters were used.  Tina and Brittany did not often eat with 
Whitbeck; rather, they typically ate fast food. 
¶71 Tina kept in contact with Brittany's father and other 
family members in Kentucky.  She told them she wanted to return 
and would return when she had the money.  She also told Whitbeck 
that she wanted to return to Kentucky.   
¶72 After the first dog bite, Brittany went to stay with 
her father in Kentucky for approximately one month.  She 
returned to Mt. Horeb in time to begin school in August.  After 
the second dog bite in November, Brittany returned to Kentucky 
permanently.  Tina moved back to Kentucky in December 1996. 
¶73 Under Pamperin, 55 Wis. 2d at 33-34, 36-37, this court 
has held that three factors should be considered in determining 
if one is a resident of a household:  1) whether the individuals 
were living under the same roof; 2) in a close, intimate and 
informal relationship and not at arm's length; and 3) where the 
intended 
duration 
is 
substantial, 
consistent 
with 
the 
informality of the relationship, and "'long enough so that it is 
reasonable to expect the parties to take the relationship into 
consideration in contracting about such matters as insurance or 
in their conduct in reliance thereon.'"  Id. at 34.  The court 
in Pamperin went on to note that the intended duration of the 
stay need not have the permanency of a legal domicile, but the 
stay must be more than a "mere temporary sojourn."  Id. at 35.  
No one factor is controlling; rather, "all of the elements must 
combine to a greater or lesser degree in order to establish the 
relationship."  Id. at 37. 
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
12 
 
¶74 Tina argues that there are material issues of fact 
that remain regarding whether she or Brittany were residents of 
Whitbeck's 
household, 
thereby 
making 
summary 
judgment 
inappropriate.  However, I agree with the circuit court's 
finding that the only dispute relates to the location where Tina 
and Brittany slept in the household, and that this issue is 
immaterial to the resident question.  Determining residency is, 
by its nature, a fact specific analysis.  See Ross v. Martini, 
204 Wis. 2d 354, 358, 555 N.W.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1996).  However, 
Wisconsin courts have held that residency can be determined as a 
matter of law.  See Pamperin, 55 Wis. 2d at 38-39; Maca, 26 
Wis. 2d at 408; Ross, 204 Wis. 2d at 360; A.G. v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 112 Wis. 2d 18, 24-25, 331 N.W.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1983). 
¶75 In Pamperin, this court reversed a circuit court 
ruling, finding that a directed verdict was appropriate on the 
issue of residency.  55 Wis. 2d at 39.  There, a niece of the 
insured was involved in an accident.  Id. at 32, 37.  This court 
held that she was not a resident of her uncle's home, because 
she kept only a few clothes there and transferred none of her 
possessions, she did not reside continuously at the home, and 
early termination of the arrangement was likely. Id. at 37-38. 
¶76 In Maca, on the other hand, this court held that an 
adult son was a resident of his parents' home.  Maca, 26 
Wis. 2d at 
406-08. 
 In 
that 
case, 
the son 
brought his 
possessions to his parents' home, lived only on their farm for 
five months, did not pay rent but was paid for work done on the 
farm, used the family car, and sometimes ate at the home.  Even 
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
13 
 
though both he and his father considered the stay temporary, and 
he actively sought work that would require him to move, this 
court found that he was a resident.  Id. at 408. 
¶77 The undisputed facts in the present case support a 
finding that both Brittany and Tina were residents of Whitbeck's 
household.  Although Brittany stayed with her father during the 
summer, both Tina and Brittany stayed at Whitbeck's home for a 
substantial period of time.  Courts have held that people might 
be residents of more than one household at a time.  See, e.g., 
Ross, 204 Wis. 2d at 360.  Also, in Ross, the court of appeals 
noted:  "Generally, residency and custody are inexorably 
linked."  Id. at 359.  Tina had sole custody of Brittany.  
Brittany may have been a resident of both her father's and 
Whitbeck's households, but she was at least a resident of 
Whitbeck's.  Brittany lived there for several months with her 
mother and attended school in Mt. Horeb.  She stayed at the home 
with Whitbeck while her mother was at work.  Her clothes, toys, 
and bike came along to Wisconsin.   
¶78 Tina lived in Whitbeck's household continuously from 
May to December.  She obtained full-time employment, received 
mail at the Mt. Horeb residence, and did her banking in 
Wisconsin.  She obtained a Wisconsin driver's license and leased 
a car in Wisconsin.  Tina brought large items such as a 
television, a bed, and a clothes dryer with her to Whitbeck's 
residence.  Whitbeck paid all the rent, while Tina paid some of 
the other bills.  Although Brittany and Whitbeck apparently did 
not get along, Whitbeck watched the six year old while Tina was 
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
14 
 
at work.  Whether they ate together is of little consequence, 
considering Whitbeck worked a schedule opposite to Tina's.  This 
was clearly not an arm's length arrangement, and the stay 
involved more than a "mere temporary sojourn."   
¶79 Although Brittany and Tina may have desired to return 
to Kentucky, their intent is not wholly determinative of this 
matter.  In Maca, both father and son considered the arrangement 
temporary 
and 
the 
son sought to 
leave, 
but 
this 
court 
nonetheless found that the son was a resident.  26 Wis. 2d at 
407-08.  In Ross, the court of appeals found, citing Pamperin, 
that a child's intent regarding residency is a factor to 
consider, but is not controlling.  See Ross, 204 Wis. 2d at 358-
59.  There, the child ran away from his father's home to live 
with his mother and gained an injunction preventing his father 
from having contact with him for a year.  Id. at 357.  The child 
said he intended to live with his mother permanently, although 
his father had custody of him.  Id. at 356-57.  Despite these 
facts, the court of appeals held:  "Because [the child] could 
not choose his residence, his intention as to where he would 
live is given little weight."  Id. at 359.  Under the present 
facts, I would find that both Brittany and Tina Frost were 
clearly residents of Whitbeck's household when the alleged dog 
bites occurred. 
¶80 Because I conclude that Tina Frost is a relative of 
Whitbeck under this policy and that both Tina and Brittany were 
residents of Whitbeck's household, I would reverse the decision 
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
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of the court of appeals and grant summary judgment in favor of 
American Family. 
¶81 I am authorized to state that Justices N. PATRICK 
CROOKS and DIANE S. SYKES join this opinion. 
 
No.  01-0327.jpw 
 
 
 
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