Case Title: ANDERSON HWY. SIGNS & SUPPLY v. CLOSE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
ANDERSON HWY. SIGNS & SUPPLY v. CLOSE2000 WY 1136 P.3d 123Case Number: 98-334Decided: 05/04/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
ANDERSON HIGHWAY SIGNS 
AND SUPPLY, INC., Appellant (Defendant), v.MARION CLOSE and 
ROLLIE CLOSE, Appellees (Plaintiffs).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Carbon County: The Honorable Kenneth E. Stebner, 
Judge.

Representing 
Appellant: Daniel M. Fowler of 
Fowler, Schimberg & Flanagan, P.C., Denver, CO. Argument by Mr. 
Fowler.Representing Appellees: David G. Lewis, Jackson, WY. Argument 
by Mr. Lewis.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1] The only 
question in this case is whether, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 (amended 
1986), a defendant found to be fifty percent at fault is responsible for all or 
only his proportionate share of damages in a case in which the plaintiffs were 
found to be free from negligence. The trial court concluded that, in the absence 
of negligence by the plaintiffs, the defendant was subject to the joint and 
several liability rule. We are satisfied that joint and several liability has 
been abrogated in Wyoming by statute in a simple negligence case, and the trial 
court erred when it refused to reduce the judgment against appellant, Anderson 
Highway Signs and Supply, Inc. (Anderson) and in favor of appellees, Marian 
Close and Rollie Close (the Closes). The judgment entered in the trial court is 
reversed, and the court is instructed to reduce the judgment against Anderson by 
fifty percent as the statute requires.

ISSUES

[¶2] Appellant 
presents the following issue:

Did the trial 
court err as a matter of law under the 1986 version of the comparative fault 
statute, Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109, when it entered judgment against Anderson Highway 
Signs and Supply, Inc. ("Anderson"), for 100% of Plaintiffs' damages, even 
though the jury determined that Anderson was only 50% at fault and that a 
non-party actor, Timothy Velton, was also 50% at fault? Appellees respond with 
this statement of the issue:

Is the defendant 
jointly and severally liable for the injuries it inflicted on the appellees, 
Marian and Rollie Close [?]

FACTS

[¶3] On 
September 2, 1993, the Closes were driving through Carbon County on Interstate 
80. While the Closes were passing through a road construction site, an Anderson 
crew member accidentally dropped an orange traffic cone which rolled in front of 
the Closes' vehicle. Mr. Close swerved and braked suddenly to avoid hitting the 
cone, and the Closes' vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Timothy 
Velton. Both Mr. and Mrs. Close were injured. They filed a complaint against 
Anderson and ultimately proceeded to trial.

[¶4] At trial, 
the Closes argued that, under the 1986 version of the comparative fault statute, 
Anderson would be jointly and severally liable for their total damages even if 
there was a non-party (Velton) also at fault for the accident. Anderson 
responded that joint and several liability had been eliminated and that it 
should only pay damages in proportion to its percentage of fault. The district 
court ruled that, if the jury found Mr. Close free from any negligence, Anderson 
would be liable for the entire amount of the Closes' damages. The issue 
presently before this court was preserved for appeal when the district court 
instructed the jury to determine the relative fault of Mr. Close, Anderson, and 
Velton. Because no evidence pointed to negligence on the part of Mrs. Close, her 
name was not included in this instruction. The jury found Mr. Close 0% at fault 
and apportioned the fault equally between Anderson and Velton. The jury awarded 
the Closes $99,031.51 in damages. On September 10, 1998, the court entered 
judgment against Anderson for the full amount, plus interest and costs. Anderson 
appealed.

DISCUSSION

[¶5] The crux of 
this case is whether the trial court properly interpreted the 1986 statute by 
requiring Anderson to pay 100% of the Closes' damages, even though the jury 
determined Anderson to be only 50% at fault. The question is one of statutory 
interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law; therefore, our 
standard of review is de novo. Cargill v. State, Dep't of Health, Div. of Health 
Care Financing, 967 P.2d 999, 1001 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Parker Land and Cattle 
Co. v. Game and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993)). If the conclusion 
of law is in accordance with the law, we affirm it; if it is not, we correct it. 
Parker Land and Cattle Co., 845 P.2d  at 1042.

[¶6] We first 
determine which version of the comparative fault statute controls this action. 
The 1986 version of the statute applies to all causes of action arising after 
its effective date, June 11, 1986. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 24, §§ 3, 4; 
Halliburton Co. v. McAdams, Roux and Associates, Inc., 773 P.2d 153, 155 (Wyo. 
1989). The 1994 version of the statute applies to causes of action arising after 
its effective date, July 1, 1994. 1994 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 98, §§ 2, 4. Because 
the Closes' accident occurred on September 2, 1993, the 1986 version of statute 
applies, if the comparative negligence statute applies at 
all.

[¶7] The 1986 
version of the comparative negligence statute provides:

§ 1-1-109 
Comparative negligence.

(a) Contributory 
negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his legal 
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury 
to person or property, if the contributory negligence of the said person is not 
more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault. Any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person 
recovering.

(b) The court 
may, and when requested by any party shall:

(i) If a jury 
trial: 

(A) Direct the 
jury to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages 
and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not a party; 
and

(B) Inform the 
jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of 
fault.

(ii) If a trial 
before the court without jury, make special findings of fact, determining the 
total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor 
whether or not a party.

(c) The court 
shall reduce the amount of damages determined under subsection (b) of this 
section in proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the person recovering 
and enter judgment against each defendant in the amount determined under 
subsection (d) of this section.

(d) Each 
defendant is liable only for that portion of the total dollar amount determined 
as damages under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section in the percentage of 
the amount of fault attributed to him under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this 
section.

[¶8] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-1-109 (Michie June 1988 Rpl.) (hereinafter 1986 statute) (emphasis 
added). Clearly, if this version of the statute controls, subsection (d) would 
mandate that the district court was incorrect in making Anderson pay for 100% of 
the damages suffered by the Closes when Anderson was only 50% at fault. However, 
the question remains whether this statute applies.

[¶9] The Closes 
maintain the 1986 version of the comparative negligence statute applies only to 
situations where the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. They also contend 
that, because neither Mr. nor Mrs. Close was found to be contributorily 
negligent, the common law doctrine of joint and several liability allows them to 
recover 100% of their damages from Anderson. They cite to Palmeno v. Cashen, 627 P.2d 163 (Wyo. 1981) and Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949 (Wyo. 1990) 
to support both propositions. Anderson contends those cases are distinguishable 
because both applied the 1977 comparative fault statute.

[¶10] We first 
look at Palmeno, where this court wrote: "[u]nder its own terms, § 1-1-109, 
supra, becomes operative in those cases only where the plaintiff is 
contributorily negligent. Where the plaintiff is found to have been free from 
negligence, the statute does not apply." 627 P.2d  at 166. In that case, the 1977 
statute1 clearly applied, as Anderson 
correctly points out. Id. at 165-66.

[¶11] Unlike 
Palmeno, however, Martinez is not as clear regarding which comparative 
negligence statute applied. In Martinez, 791 P.2d  at 962-63, this court followed 
its ruling in Palmeno, writing:

[¶12] This 
brings us to the two remaining questions with respect to whether reversible 
error was committed by the failure of the district court to include the 
Martinezes on the jury verdict form as actors for purposes of comparative 
negligence and by failing to give the proposed instruction of the State on 
comparative negligence. These two questions relate to the same topic and are 
resolved by the same rationale. The State's first contention is that § 1-1-109, 
W.S. 1977, requires that Mr. and Mrs. Martinez be included on the jury form to 
provide a three-way consideration of comparable negligence among the State, the 
City, and Fleetwood. In pertinent part, § 1-1-109, W.S. 1977, 
provides:

"(b) The court 
may, and when requested by any party, shall:

"(i) If a jury 
trial:

"(A) Direct the 
jury to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages 
and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not a party; 
and. . . ."

The State's 
proposed jury instruction, which was refused, addresses this subject of 
comparative fault on the part of Fleetwood and then encompasses an additional 
instruction mandating no recovery if there is fifty percent or more negligence 
attributable to Fleetwood. This statute is limited to its invocation "in those 
cases only where the plaintiff is contributorily negligent." Palmeno v. Cashen, 
627 P.2d 163, 166 (Wyo. 1981). If the evidence does not disclose negligence on 
the part of the plaintiff, the statute does not apply. Palmeno. The district 
court ruled that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of Fleetwood 
that would justify its inclusion on the verdict form as an actor as to whom 
negligence could be attributed. Our examination of the record results in our 
reaching a similar conclusion and demonstrates that there was no error in the 
failure to give this instruction. Because Mr. and Mrs. Martinez were not 
negligent, the statute does not mandate their inclusion on the verdict form. It 
would have been inappropriate for the district court to give an instruction that 
was not sustained by the evidence. See Hernandez v. Gilveli, 626 P.2d 74 (Wyo. 
1981); Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726 (Wyo. 1980); Edwards v. Harris, 397 P.2d 87 
(Wyo. 1964). The State's attempt to distinguish Palmeno by pointing out that it 
was tried to a judge rather than to a jury is not effective. That distinction 
serves only to trigger separate sections of the statute, see § 1-1-109, W.S. 
1977, but it does not make any difference in the result. The entire statute has 
no application if the evidence fails to disclose any negligence attributable to 
an actor, whether a party or not, that would justify the jury considering 
attributing negligence to that actor.

[¶13] The 
Martinez case arose from an August 1, 1985 flood in Cheyenne. Under Halliburton, 
773 P.2d  at 155, it appears the 1977 statute would control. However, close 
analysis of Martinez reveals this court applied the 1986 statute. First, the 
quoted language in the above excerpt is clearly taken from the 1986 statute; the 
1977 statute did not include a subsection (b)(i)(A). In addition, the opinion 
refers to the 50% contributory negligence provision, a provision not present in 
the 1977 statute, but present in the 1986 statute. Thus, we must conclude the 
Martinez court applied the 1986 statute. The matter of import is that Martinez 
applied the 1986 statute, not whether the application of that statute was 
appropriate under the facts of the case. Regardless, this does not resolve the 
joint and several liability issue presented in this case.

[¶14] The Closes 
contend Martinez supports its argument that the entire comparative negligence 
statute, including the joint and several liability provisions, does not apply 
when a plaintiff is not at fault. However, another careful reading of Martinez, 
as well as an examination of the development of the doctrine of joint and 
several liability, causes us to reject this argument. In Martinez, the jury, in 
response to a question requiring allocation of negligence, concluded the State 
was 100% at fault and the City of Cheyenne 0% at fault. 791 P.2d  at 953. If, as 
Close contends, the entire statute does not apply when a plaintiff is free of 
negligence, the specific allocation of the percentage of negligence would not 
have been necessary in Martinez. Moreover, we emphasized in Martinez that "the 
State is responsible only for the damage that is the proximate result of its 
negligence." 791 P.2d  at 960. Thus, we read Martinez as interpreting the 1986 
comparative negligence statute such that subsections (b), (c), and (d) stand 
alone while at the same time applying the Palmeno rule to the effect that 
subsection (a) applies only if the claimant can be found to be contributorily 
negligent.

[¶15] This 
conclusion finds further support in the development of the law of joint and 
several liability. Under the 1977 comparative negligence scheme, even when the 
plaintiff was not found to be contributorily negligent, a joint tortfeasor could 
sue for contribution against other tortfeasors. The statute was amended in 1986. 
In the preamble to those amendments, it is indicated the statute was eliminating 
the doctrine of joint and several liability among joint tortfeasors; [and] 
providing that each defendant is liable only to the extent of his percentage of 
fault as compared to all other actors whether or not parties to the action. . . 
.

1986 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws, ch. 24. Our discussion in Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 708 (Wyo. 
1993) underscores this point. There, this court, applying the 1986 statute, 
recognized the effect of the legislature's decision to abolish "joint and 
several liability by amending W.S. 1-1-109 to provide that a party at fault be 
required to pay for only his proportionate share of the fault . . ." 866 P.2d  at 
708. We also wrote: "[w]ith the amendment of W.S. 1-1-109(d), W.S. 1-1-110(b) 
providing for contribution was repealed and for good reason, for after joint and 
several liability was abolished, no tortfeasor would ever pay more than his 
proportionate share of a judgment." Id. See also Coryell v. Town of Pinedale, 
745 P.2d 883, 885 (Wyo. 1987) (acknowledging that "the rule of joint and several 
liability was abolished by the legislature in 1986.") Given the abolishment of 
joint and several liability, we do not believe the legislature intended the 
dichotomy reached by the district court: that a non-negligent plaintiff is 
entitled to application of the rule of joint and several liability while a 
plaintiff at fault as little as 1% is not. We conclude that subsection (d) of 
the 1986 statute controls the joint and several liability issue in this 
case.

[¶16] Our 
analysis would be incomplete if it did not address subsequent changes to the 
comparative negligence (now comparative fault) statute. The Closes argue that 
the 1994 amendments to § 1-1-109 clearly indicate that statute applies when the 
claimant is free of contributory negligence.2 Indeed, subsection (c) indicates 
the statute will apply "[w]hether or not the claimant is free of fault." Thus, 
they argue the 1994 amendments must be read as a substantive change to the 1986 
statute and the 1986 statute should, therefore, be read to uphold the district 
court's action. See Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, 589 P.2d 1295, 
1300 (Wyo. 1979). First, not every amendment to a statute must be interpreted as 
a substantive change in the law. Romero v. Hoppal, 855 P.2d 366, 369 (Wyo. 1993) 
("`where, in the enactment of a law, the legislature employs in a subsequent 
clause of the same act or in later legislation on the same subject language 
clarifying a doubtful expression theretofore used, the court should give that 
language the meaning the legislature intended.'" quoting State Bd. of 
Equalization v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 54 Wyo. 521, 540, 94 P.2d 147, 153 
(1939)); Matter of North Laramie Land Co., 605 P.2d 367, 373 (Wyo. 1980). More 
importantly, we have concluded that Martinez interpreted the 1986 statute in a 
manner consistent with the 1994 amendments. Therefore, we interpret the 1994 
amendments as a clarification embodying our interpretation of the 1986 statute 
as found in Martinez.

CONCLUSION

[¶17] Applying 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(d), it is clear the district court erred in assigning 
to Anderson the obligation of paying 100% of the Closes' damages. The plain and 
unambiguous language of the statute dictates that Anderson is only responsible 
for 50% of the damages, in proportion to its percentage of fault. We reverse the 
judgment and remand for entry of judgment in accordance with this 
opinion.

Footnotes

1 The 1977 
statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 (Michie 1977), 
provided:

§ 
1-1-109 Comparative negligence.

(a) 
Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or 
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or 
in injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence was not as great 
as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. Any damages 
allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed 
to the person recovering.

(b) 
The court may, and when requested by any party 
shall:

(i) 
If a jury trial, direct the jury to find separate special 
verdicts;

(ii) If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of 
fact, determining the amount of damages and the percentage of negligence 
attributable to each party. The court shall then reduce the amount of such 
damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person 
recovering;

(iii) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the 
percentage of negligence.

2 The 1994 
version, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 (Lexis 1999), provides in pertinent 
part:

(b) 
Contributory fault shall not bar a recovery in an action by any claimant or the 
claimant's legal representative to recover damages for wrongful death or injury 
to person or property, if the contributory fault of the claimant is not more 
than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault of all actors. Any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the 
claimant.

(c) 
Whether or not the claimant is free of fault, the court 
shall:

(i) 
If a jury trial:

(A) 
Direct the jury to determine the total amount of damages sustained by the 
claimant without regard to the percentage of fault attributed to the claimant, 
and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor; 
and

(B) 
Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of 
fault.

(ii) If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of 
fact, determining the total amount of damages sustained by the claimant without 
regard to the percentage of fault attributed to the claimant, and the percentage 
of fault attributable to each actor.

(d) 
The court shall reduce the amount of damages determined under subsection (c) of 
this section in proportion to the percentage of fault attributed to the claimant 
and enter judgment against each defendant in the amount determined under 
subsection (e) of this section.

(e) 
Each defendant is liable only to the extent of that defendant's proportion of 
the total fault determined under paragraph (c)(i) or (ii) of this 
section.