Case Title: Brody v. Barasch

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-575


Barry Brody                                  Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             Rutland Superior Court
Robert Barasch and the Vermont
Board of Psychological Examiners             May Term, 1990


Arthur J. O'Dea, J.

William A. Hunter, Windsor, for plaintiff-appellant

John H. Chase, Office of the Secretary of State, Montpelier, for defendant-
   appellees


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck and Gibson, JJ.



     GIBSON, J.   Plaintiff appeals from a superior court judgment affirming
a decision of the Appeals Panel denying him a license to practice as a
psychologist in Vermont.  We affirm.
     In the fall of 1984, plaintiff applied to the Board of Psychological
Examiners (Board) for a license under 26 V.S.A. chapter 55 as a psycholo-
gist-doctorate.  The resume he submitted with the application incorrectly
stated that he held a Vermont license as a psychologist-master.  After an
investigation of his background, the Board denied his application on two
grounds: first, that he had failed to represent accurately his competence,
education, training and experience, and second, that he had improperly
attempted to establish a personal relationship with a client.
     Plaintiff took an appeal to the Appeals Panel. (FN1) In April of 1987, the
Panel affirmed the Board's denial on the basis of what it found to be six
misrepresentations in plaintiff's 1984 resume, but it was "unable to find"
that plaintiff had established a personal relationship with a client, and
vacated that portion of the Board's order.
     During the pendency of the appeal before the Panel, plaintiff
instituted the present action, requesting an order that he be seated for
the licensing examination, and seeking damages.  The Board stipulated that
he could sit for the examination pending results of the Panel hearing.
After the Panel's decision, he amended his complaint to include an appeal of
that decision.  The Superior Court affirmed the Panel's decision and granted
summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's other claims for relief.  The
present appeal followed.
     Plaintiff contends first that the evidence before the Appeals Panel did
not warrant denial of his license on grounds that he was "morally unfit" to
practice psychology.  The argument on appeal is essentially identical to
the argument before the trial court -- that the denial may not be based on
Dr. Brody's past behavior, but only his present behavior.  Plaintiff goes on
to contend that in any case there had never been anything false in his
resume, and that when requested by the Board he was quick to "clear up any
confusion there might have been."
     Neither argument withstands analysis.  In its decision, the Superior
Court concluded that the 1984 resume "mischaracterized certain of appel-
lant's past experiences," noting that a majority of the Panel had concluded
that the misrepresentations were material and substantive and "that they
revealed a cavalier attitude about the truth and a serious problem in
judgment."  26 V.S.A. { 3011(2) provides that an applicant for a psychol-
ogist's license must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Board that he
"is not engaged in unprofessional conduct."  Section 3016 defines "[u]npro-
fessional conduct" to include deception in the procurement of a license,
false reporting in the practice of psychology, and advertising that has a
tendency to deceive the public.  { 3016(1), (2) and (3).  In discussing this
statute, the court concluded:
          That the Board and Appeals Panel applied appellant's
          conduct against the moral fitness criterion of the
          statute does not negate the fact that the conduct
          offends against a fairly rooted conception of morality
          as well as the obvious spirit and intent of the statute.
          The state has a legitimate interest in regulating pro-
          fessions in Vermont and there is a rational  relation-
          ship between the profession of psychology and the
          regulation here in issue.

The record amply supports the court's conclusion that there was a sufficient
connection between plaintiff's misrepresentations and his professional fit-
ness for the Appeals Panel to have concluded as it did.  See Board of
Medical Practice v. Perry-Hooker, 143 Vt. 268, 270,