Case Title: Commonwealth v. Gumkowski

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12670

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12670 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MATTHEW GUMKOWSKI. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     January 4, 2021. - May 4, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Cellular Telephone.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to 
suppress, Instructions to jury, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 18, 2011. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Frances 
A. McIntyre, J., and the case was tried before Robert J. Kane, 
J. 
 
 
 
Michael J. Fellows for the defendant. 
 
Stephen C. Nadeau, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The defendant, Matthew Gumkowski, was convicted 
by a jury of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty for the killing of Joseph Kilroy.1  The 
 
 
1 The defendant had also been indicted on related charges, 
but at trial the Commonwealth proceeded only on the murder 
indictment, under theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty, 
2 
 
Commonwealth presented evidence that the defendant robbed the 
victim, and then beat, strangled, and stabbed him to death.  The 
verdict came in the defendant's second trial, after the first 
trial ended in a mistrial because the jury were unable to reach 
a verdict. 
 
In this direct appeal, the defendant argues first that his 
cell site location information (CSLI)2 and any "fruits" derived 
from it should have been suppressed, and second that seven 
aspects of the jury instructions were erroneous.  Discerning no 
reversible error, we affirm, and we decline to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the evidence at trial, 
reserving certain details for our analysis of the issues. 
 
The victim was found dead at his Attleboro apartment on 
July 10, 2011.  Sometime between 8:30 P.M. and 9 P.M., the 
victim's downstairs neighbors heard noises that sounded like 
furniture being moved about.  Shortly after 9 P.M., the smoke 
alarms sounded.  When firefighters arrived minutes later, they 
 
felony-murder, and deliberate premeditation.  The jury did not 
convict the defendant on the felony-murder or deliberate 
premeditation theories. 
 
2 "Cell[] site location information (CSLI) refers to a 
cellular telephone service record or records that contain 
information identifying the base station towers and sectors that 
receive transmissions from a [cellular] telephone."  (quotations 
and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 
852, 853 n.2 (2015). 
3 
 
found the victim's body lying on the floor at the foot of the 
bed.  The fire that had started on the victim's bed was no 
longer active, the sprinklers were on, and the contents of the 
room were soaked.  The victim had been beaten, strangled, and 
stabbed.  A medical examiner testified that, based on the 
bleeding, the victim was likely alive when he suffered the blunt 
force injuries, but was already dead or near death when he was 
stabbed. 
 
Police photographed the room to document its state at the 
time the body was discovered.  They tested for fingerprints at 
the scene, and they recovered various objects from inside the 
apartment for testing, but no usable fingerprints were found, 
likely because of the sprinklers. 
 
The defendant knew the victim and had bought drugs from him 
in the past.  In July 2011, the defendant was using 
approximately a gram of heroin per day.  On the morning of July 
10, the defendant visited the victim's apartment, hoping to sell 
him a ring.  The victim knocked on the door of his neighbor 
across the hall -- a former jeweler -- and asked him to look at 
the ring.  When the neighbor looked at the ring, he expressed 
skepticism about its value.  The neighbor saw another man 
standing in the victim's apartment; the neighbor described the 
man as white, with a medium build and blonde hair.  The neighbor 
later identified the defendant as the man who had been in the 
4 
 
victim's apartment that morning from a photograph shown to him 
by police. 
 
The defendant's girlfriend testified that in the early 
evening of July 10, she had been with the defendant in a park in 
Attleboro, where she had fallen asleep.  When she awoke around 8 
P.M., the defendant was gone.  She called the defendant several 
times between 8:15 P.M. and 9:09 P.M., including on cell phones 
borrowed from two strangers.  Initially, she did not get an 
answer, but she eventually spoke to the defendant.  She then met 
up with the defendant shortly after the 9:09 P.M. cell phone 
call.  State police Trooper Daniel Giossi testified that the 
defendant's cell phone records showed calls taking place from 
the defendant's cell phone between around 8 P.M. and 9:15 P.M., 
and the location data showed that the cell phone was in the 
Attleboro area at the time of the calls.3 
 
The defendant was arrested on July 12, 2011, at his 
girlfriend's mother's house.4  The defendant became a suspect 
 
 
3 The parties stipulated that the defendant's cell phone 
records showed he was within a three-mile radius of the center 
of downtown Attleboro between 8:13 P.M. and 8:45 P.M. on July 
10. 
 
 
4 The Commonwealth also introduced evidence showing the 
defendant's activities between the night of July 10 and his 
arrest.  On July 10 after meeting up at the park, the defendant 
and his girlfriend traveled to Pawtucket, Rhode Island, where 
they stayed in a hotel.  The next morning, they went to a pawn 
shop.  The defendant went inside while his girlfriend waited 
outside; when he returned, he had money.  The couple then 
5 
 
after law enforcement examined both the victim's and the 
defendant's cell phone records, as discussed infra.  Before he 
was taken into custody, police patted him down and found a 
hypodermic needle in his pocket; testing later revealed traces 
of heroin.  While the defendant was being booked, an officer 
noticed spots of blood on the defendant's shoes.  
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing revealed that the blood 
matched that of the victim.  Two additional spots of blood found 
on a T-shirt and pack of cigarettes from the defendants' 
backpack also matched that of the victim. 
 
After his arrest, the defendant waived his Miranda rights 
and was interviewed by police.  That interview was recorded, and 
the recording was entered in evidence.  The defendant initially 
denied involvement, but he eventually said that he had gone to 
the victim's apartment on the evening of July 10 to buy heroin.  
He told police that two other men were present while he was 
there.  The first man arrived to sell the victim cigarettes and 
stayed ten to fifteen minutes.  The defendant described the 
second man but could not identify him, and said that the second 
 
returned to Attleboro, where the girlfriend picked up a check, 
and the two traveled to Providence, where she cashed the check 
and gave a portion to the defendant.  That evening, they had 
dinner with a man they met in Providence and spent the night at 
the man's home in North Attleboro.  The next morning, all three 
went to the beach, before traveling back to the girlfriend's 
mother's home. 
6 
 
man was still at the apartment when the defendant left.  The 
defendant stated that he left the apartment after purchasing 
drugs.  He explained that he had initially lied about visiting 
the victim because he had been there to purchase drugs, and 
because he later heard about the fire and homicide from the 
news. 
 
At trial, the defendant testified and provided a somewhat 
different account of his time at the victim's apartment.  He 
identified the cigarette seller as a man named Brian Singer.  He 
stated that after Singer had left and while the second, 
unidentified, man was in the apartment, the victim brandished a 
knife and provoked a fight with the defendant over money that 
the defendant owed him.  The defendant said he struck the victim 
several times in the face, and the victim dropped the knife.  He 
then grabbed his backpack and left.  The defendant stated that 
in his initial interview after being arrested, he had lied about 
getting in a fight because he had seen the news and had heard 
that there had been a fire and a homicide there. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Motion to suppress.  "When reviewing 
the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's 
findings of fact and will not disturb them absent clear error."  
Commonwealth v. Watson, 455 Mass. 246, 250 (2009).  However, we 
undertake "an independent determination as to the correctness of 
7 
 
the judge's application of constitutional principles to the 
facts as found."  Id. 
 
The defendant's cell phone records in this case included 
subscriber information, call logs, and CSLI.5  The subscriber 
information and the call logs are not subject to the warrant 
requirement under Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 251 
(2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015).  Thus, 
only the defendant's CSLI is at issue.  The defendant seeks to 
 
 
5 The motion judge made her decision before we issued our 
decision in Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 (2014), 
S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015).  Consequently, the 
terminology she used to describe the various categories of 
location data differs from our subsequent decisions defining 
CSLI, "repoll numbers," and "pings."  See Commonwealth v. 
Almonor, 482 Mass. 35, 36 n.1 (2019) (pings); Commonwealth v. 
Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 269 (2014) (repoll numbers); Augustine, 
supra at 231 n.1 (CSLI).  Thus, we look to the record, and not 
to the judge's terminology. 
 
 
The location information included "repoll numbers" as well 
as "first cell" and "last cell" data.  Trooper Giossi testified 
that the combination of these three numbers indicates the 
location of the tower to which a cell phone was connected when 
it made a call, which shows the cell phone was likely within a 
three-mile radius of that tower. 
 
 
In its brief, the Commonwealth initially argued that this 
information was not CSLI, but merely "repoll numbers," as the 
motion judge found.  An hour before oral argument, though, the 
Commonwealth sent an e-mail message to the defense attorney, 
conceding that this information was actually CSLI.  See Collins, 
470 Mass. at 269-270 (repoll numbers only provide location 
within area of approximately one hundred miles and thus are not 
comparable to CSLI).  In its postargument brief, the 
Commonwealth again conceded that the relevant location data was 
CSLI. 
8 
 
suppress both the CSLI itself, as well as any fruits derived 
therefrom. 
 
i.  Investigation leading to defendant's arrest.  We recite 
the facts the motion judge found following an evidentiary 
hearing, supplemented with undisputed facts from the record.  
Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015). 
 
When officers discovered the victim's body at his 
residence, they also found the victim's cell phone.  However, 
police were unable to extract any information from it because it 
was soaked.  A neighbor provided the victim's cell phone number, 
and using that, Trooper Giossi obtained the victim's call logs 
and other information from his service provider, Sprint.  In the 
call logs, Giossi focused on incoming and outgoing calls 
occurring shortly before 9 P.M., when witnesses reported hearing 
commotion coming from the victim's apartment.  Giossi then made 
a second request to Sprint for information pertaining to two of 
those numbers pursuant to the exigent circumstances provision of 
the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4).6 
 
 
6 Specifically, Giossi requested subscriber information and 
call detail records with cell site information for the past 
twenty-four hours.  To make the request, he called Sprint and 
requested that someone send him an "exigent circumstance 
request."  He filled out the request and sent it back to Sprint. 
 
 
The motion judge noted that the information was obtained 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703, but that is inaccurate.  Giossi 
repeatedly referred to making an "exigent circumstance request," 
which would be under § 2702(c)(4). 
9 
 
 
One of the numbers was registered to "Matthew Shady" and 
listed a West Warwick, Rhode Island, address.7  In addition to 
that subscriber information, the records showed the dates, 
times, and durations of incoming and outgoing calls, as well as 
CSLI.  Troopers called the local police department and learned 
that the West Warwick address was valid and that the resident 
was the defendant.  Local police had previously interacted with 
the defendant and sent Giossi a photograph of the defendant, as 
well as incident reports of some of his previous arrests.  From 
these documents, Giossi learned that the defendant was blonde 
and muscular, and that he matched the description of the man 
that Singer, a friend of the victim, had seen talking to the 
victim on the morning of July 10.  Giossi examined the 
defendant's CSLI and determined that it placed his cell phone in 
the Attleboro area on the evening of July 10. 
 
On July 11, Giossi interviewed Singer, who had gone to the 
victim's apartment at around 8 P.M. on the day of the murder to 
sell the victim two packs of cigarettes, and who had stayed for 
about twenty minutes.  While Singer was there, the victim 
introduced him to a man named "Matt."  The man was muscular, 
with a crew cut, blonde hair, blue eyes, and tattoos.  Based on 
 
 
 
7 Troopers did not receive any information pertaining to the 
second number. 
10 
 
this information, law enforcement prepared a photographic array, 
including the photograph of the defendant that the West Warwick 
police had sent.  From the array, Singer identified the 
defendant as the blonde man he had seen in the victim's 
apartment.8 
 
Troopers then attempted to locate the defendant.  On the 
defendant's call log, they noticed recent calls to a land line 
telephone number, and subsequently ascertained the address 
associated with it.  On July 12, Giossi visited that address and 
spoke with the occupant, Nita Rose.  Rose stated that her 
daughter was dating the defendant, and that the defendant had 
left some of his property there and likely would return to 
retrieve it. 
 
Later that day, Rose called the State police to say that 
she had just heard from her daughter, and that she expected her 
daughter and the defendant to return to the house shortly.  
Troopers returned to Rose's address and waited for the defendant 
to arrive.  As soon as he did, officers placed him under arrest.9 
 
 
8 Singer did not testify at trial because officers were 
unable to locate him.  He was last seen in Ohio, but authorities 
there were unable to locate him.  His friends and family 
indicated that as of the day he went missing, there had been no 
activity on his bank accounts. 
 
 
9 Before apprehending the defendant, investigators also 
contacted the defendant's cell phone provider, which then 
initiated a "ping" to ascertain the defendant's location in real 
time.  The motion judge found that that "ping" did not lead to 
11 
 
 
ii.  CSLI.  Individuals have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their CSLI, and thus the government needs a warrant 
before searching more than six hours of CSLI data.  See 
Augustine, 467 Mass. at 255 & n.37.  See also Carpenter v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
 
Even though the defendant's motion was decided before 
Augustine, the rule nonetheless applies.  In Augustine, 467 
Mass. at 257, we specified that the new rule requiring a warrant 
for CSLI data applied to "cases in which a defendant's 
conviction is not final, that is, to cases pending on direct 
review in which the issue concerning the warrant requirement was 
raised."  Here, the defendant raised the issue in a motion to 
suppress before his first trial, and Augustine was decided 
before his conviction was final.  Thus, the new rule applies 
retroactively to his case, and a warrant was required for his 
CSLI data. 
 
Despite this, the Commonwealth argues that a warrant was 
not required for the defendant's CSLI because the information 
was turned over pursuant to the voluntary disclosure provision 
of the SCA (18 U.S.C. § 2702), rather than the mandatory 
 
the defendant's arrest; instead, officers located the defendant 
thanks to their communication with Rose.  The Commonwealth also 
stipulated that it would not introduce the "ping" evidence at 
trial.  See Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 35, 36 n.1 (2019) 
(defining "ping" evidence). 
12 
 
provision analyzed in both Augustine and Carpenter (18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703).10  See Augustine, 467 Mass. at 231; Carpenter, 138 S. 
Ct. at 2212.  This is wrong. 
 
Both art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution apply 
only to State action.11  Commonwealth v. Leone, 386 Mass. 329, 
333 (1982).  "Evidence discovered and seized by private parties 
is admissible without regard to the methods used, unless State 
officials have instigated or participated in the search" 
 
 
10 The Stored Communications Act aims to "protect the 
privacy of users of electronic communications during government 
investigations" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Chamberlain, 473 Mass. 653, 658 (2016).  "Service providers 
are permitted and indeed required to disclose customer records 
to a 'governmental entity' when that entity has complied with 
one of the limited number of formal processes for making a 
demand, such as a warrant, a court order, or an administrative 
subpoena, as set forth in the act."  Id. at 658-659, citing 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(c). 
 
 
Another section of the statute permits providers to 
disclose records to the government voluntarily in limited 
circumstances.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c).  "One such circumstance 
is when 'the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency 
involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any 
person requires disclosure without delay of information relating 
to the emergency.'"  Chamberlin, 473 Mass. at 659, citing 18 
U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4). 
 
 
11 The Commonwealth does not frame its argument in terms of 
State action, but that is the constitutional question underlying 
its contention.  The Commonwealth instead based its argument on 
Chamberlain, 473 Mass. at 658-659, which is inapposite because 
that case dealt only with statutory rights. 
13 
 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Brandwein, 435 Mass. 623, 
632 (2002). 
 
Here, law enforcement instigated the search when Giossi 
contacted Sprint and requested the defendant's cell phone 
records.  That he did so using a voluntary disclosure provision 
of the SCA, rather than a mandatory disclosure provision, does 
not require a different conclusion.  In either instance, if law 
enforcement instigates the search by contacting the cell phone 
company to request information, there is State action.12  That 
Sprint could have refused to provide records in response to 
Giossi's request does not change the fact that he instigated the 
search.  See Brandwein, 435 Mass. at 632. 
 
Because law enforcement infringed upon the defendant's 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his CSLI without a warrant, 
the CSLI should have been suppressed. 
 
iii.  Harmless error.  Next, we determine whether the 
admission of defendant's CSLI data was harmless.13  Because the 
 
 
12 In Augustine, 467 Mass. at 240-241, we noted that one 
factor showing State action was that the search was compelled by 
the Commonwealth's subpoena.  Yet this did not change our test 
for State action from Brandwein, 435 Mass. at 632.  Further, 
although decided under the Fourth Amendment, Carpenter 138 S. 
Ct. at 2213-2214, implicitly held that there was State action, 
and the fact that police officers there used a mandatory 
subpoena did not factor into the United States Supreme Court's 
analysis. 
 
 
13 The Commonwealth did not argue harmless error in its 
original brief; instead, it raised the issue for the first time 
14 
 
defendant moved to suppress this evidence before trial, we 
review the admission of the CSLI to determine whether it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Commonwealth v. Tavares, 
482 Mass. 694, 709 (2019). 
 
Our review under this standard considers a number of 
factors, including 
"[1] the importance of the evidence in the prosecution's 
case; [2] the relationship between the evidence and the 
premise of the defense; [3] who introduced the issue at 
trial; [4] the frequency of the reference; [5] whether the 
erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of 
properly admitted evidence; [6] the availability or effect 
of curative instructions; and [7] the weight or quantum of 
evidence of guilt." 
 
Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 Mass. 463, 467-468 (2018), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 447 Mass. 546, 553 (2006).  We then 
must decide, based "on the totality of the record before us, 
weighing the properly admitted and the improperly admitted 
evidence together, [whether] we are satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the tainted evidence did not have an 
effect on the jury and did not contribute to the jury's 
verdicts."  Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 701 (2010). 
 
at oral argument, and then submitted a postargument letter.  The 
defendant argues that it is the Commonwealth's burden to prove 
harmlessness and that the Commonwealth waived the issue by not 
arguing it in its brief.  Recognizing the unusual nature of the 
situation -- where the Commonwealth conceded that the data was 
CSLI the morning of oral argument -- we ordered postargument 
briefing on the issue of harmless error.  Because the defendant 
has now had an opportunity to respond, we consider the issue. 
15 
 
 
We hold that the introduction of the defendant's CSLI data 
was harmless.  First, it was cumulative of other evidence.  The 
Commonwealth introduced the CSLI in the form of a stipulation, 
stating that the defendant's cell phone was located within a 
three-mile radius of downtown Attleboro between 8:13 P.M. and 
8:45 P.M. on July 10.  This was cumulative of the defendant's 
videotaped police station interview, where he stated that he 
went to the victim's Attleboro home on the evening of July 10.  
Moreover, the defendant's girlfriend testified that she was with 
the defendant in Attleboro before and after the time of the 
murder.  Thus, the CSLI only corroborated other undisputed 
evidence that the defendant was in Attleboro at around the time 
of the murder.  See Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 478 Mass. 443, 446 
(2017) ("The CSLI evidence corroborated the Commonwealth's 
other, very strong evidence of guilt by confirming . . . that 
the defendant was in fact in the area of the crime at the time 
of the shooting"). 
 
Second, the prosecutor did not mention the CSLI with any 
frequency.  In closing argument, the prosecutor stated that the 
defendant's cell phone records showed he was in the victim's 
room at the time of the murder, but it appears he was referring 
to the call logs, not the CSLI, because he proceeded to 
reference the girlfriend's calls to the defendant, and the 
defendant's statement that he had been at the victim's apartment 
16 
 
when he received one of them.  The CSLI itself was never 
referred to in closing. 
 
Finally, the other evidence of guilt was substantial.  The 
defendant admitted to being in the victim's room on the night of 
the murder.  When he was arrested two days later, police found 
blood with DNA matching the victim's on his shoe as well as 
items in his backpack.  Thus, we are convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the CSLI data "did not have an effect on 
the jury and did not contribute to the jury's verdicts."  Tyree, 
455 Mass. at 701.14 
 
iv.  Fruits.  Next, the defendant argues that not only 
should the CSLI have been suppressed, but so should any fruits 
derived from it.  He argues that both the call logs and the 
evidence seized during his arrest are tainted by the unlawfully 
obtained CSLI data, thus constituting fruits of the poisonous 
tree.  See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).  
Because neither of these categories of evidence was derived from 
the CSLI, they are not fruits. 
 
 
14 The Commonwealth also argued at oral argument -- despite 
not having briefed the issue -- that the CSLI should not be 
suppressed because we should apply the "good faith" exception to 
the exclusionary rule, which we have not recognized in the 
Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Fredericq, 482 Mass. 70, 84 
(2019).  Because we find the error was harmless, we need not 
address that argument. 
17 
 
 
"Under what has become known as the 'fruit of the poisonous 
tree' doctrine, the exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence 
derived from an unconstitutional search or seizure."  Tavares, 
482 Mass. at 706, quoting Commonwealth v. Fredericq, 482 Mass. 
70, 78 (2019).  "In determining whether the evidence is 
considered a fruit of the poisonous tree, we consider 'whether 
. . . the evidence . . . has been come at by exploitation of 
[that] illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'"  Tavares, 
supra, quoting Fredericq, supra. 
 
First, the call logs were not fruits of the CSLI.15  The 
Commonwealth received the call logs and the CSLI as a result of 
the same request.16  The mere fact that the call logs were 
requested contemporaneously and were produced on the same sheet 
of paper as the CSLI does not render them a fruit; the logs were 
not derived from the CSLI or obtained as a result of a CSLI 
request.  See Tavares, 482 Mass. at 706.17 
 
 
15 The call logs included incoming and outgoing calls, the 
times and dates of those calls, and the duration of each call.  
As discussed supra, the call logs are not subject to the warrant 
requirement under Augustine, 467 Mass at 251. 
 
 
16 At the suppression hearing, Giossi testified that he 
asked for the subscriber information and call detail records 
with CSLI in the same request.  Call detail records include both 
call logs and CSLI. 
 
 
17 The defendant argues that this reasoning renders the 
exclusionary rule toothless because it does not disincentivize 
18 
 
 
Second, the defendant's arrest -- and the clothing seized 
from him postarrest -- are also not fruits of the CSLI.  The 
defendant became a suspect not as a result of his CSLI, but 
through information garnered from his call logs and subscriber 
information.  Police began investigating the defendant because 
his cell phone number was one of two numbers that had been in 
contact with the victim's cell phone shortly before the victim's 
death.  Police then requested the defendant's cell phone records 
from Sprint.  The defendant's subscriber information showed his 
cell phone was registered to an address in West Warwick, Rhode 
Island.  The investigators then called the West Warwick police 
department and learned that the defendant was blonde with blue 
eyes and a muscular build -- matching the description of both 
the man whom the victim's neighbor saw discussing a ring that 
morning and the man whom Singer saw in the victim's apartment 
around 8 P.M. on the night of the murder.  Police used a 
photograph of the defendant sent by West Warwick police to 
conduct a photographic array with Singer, who identified the 
 
police from securing and using CSLI without a warrant.  On the 
contrary, if police unlawfully obtain CSLI, any fruits derived 
therefrom must be suppressed unless the Commonwealth proves that 
the evidence is untainted.  See Commonwealth v. Blevines, 438 
Mass. 604, 610-611 (2003).  The fact that the call logs were not 
derived from the CSLI, and thus are not a fruit, does not gut 
the exclusionary rule.  Rather, that is simply how the rule 
works. 
 
19 
 
defendant as the blonde male he had seen talking to the victim 
shortly before his death.18 
 
Police did also look at the defendant's CSLI.  It showed 
that he had been within three miles of Attleboro around the time 
of the murder.  Yet the CSLI was merely "cumulative and 
corroborative" of other evidence, and thus did not lead to the 
defendant becoming a suspect.  Vazquez, 478 Mass. at 446. 
 
Finally, the defendant was located and arrested through, as 
the motion judge put it, "traditional investigative techniques," 
not through the CSLI.  To locate the defendant, police started 
by contacting the telephone numbers on the victim's call log.  
They noticed a land line telephone number, figured out its 
location, and visited it.  There they found Rose, the 
defendant's girlfriend's mother.  Rose stated that the defendant 
had left some of his belongings in her home, and that she 
expected him to return.  Later that day, Rose called one of the 
officers, stating that her daughter and the defendant had just 
called and that they would be returning to the house soon.  
Police went to Rose's house.  When the defendant arrived, they 
placed him under arrest.19  Thus, the apprehension and arrest of 
 
 
18 The neighbor also identified the defendant from a 
photographic array, although that evidence was not introduced at 
the suppression hearing. 
19 Other officers who did not testify at the suppression 
hearing contacted Sprint to request a "ping" of the defendant's 
cell phone to attempt to locate him prior to his arrest.  But, 
20 
 
the defendant was also not a fruit of any unlawfully obtained 
evidence, and therefore evidence obtained as a result should not 
be suppressed. 
 
b.  Jury instructions.  Next, the defendant argues that his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to seven portions 
of the jury instructions, and that the failure to object created 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  We 
disagree. 
 
"Because the defendant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree, rather than evaluating claims of ineffective assistance 
under the traditional standard of Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 
Mass. 89, 96 (1974), we apply instead the more favorable 
standard of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine whether there was 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice" (footnote 
omitted).  Seino, 479 Mass. at 472 , citing Commonwealth v. 
Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681–682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 
(2014).  "That is, we determine whether defense counsel erred in 
the course of the trial and, if so, 'whether that error was 
likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion.'"  Seino, supra 
at 472-473, quoting Wright, supra at 682. 
 
as the motion judge found, the pings were "not material in his 
arrest in that he was apprehended through traditional 
investigative measures." 
21 
 
 
"When evaluating jury instructions, we consider the charge 
in its entirety, to determine the probable impact, appraised 
realistically . . . upon the jury's factfinding function" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Walker, 466 
Mass. 268, 284 (2013).  "Jury instructions must be construed as 
a whole to prevent isolated misstatements or omissions from 
constituting reversible error."  Id., citing Commonwealth v. 
Owens, 414 Mass. 595, 607 (1993).  We examine each portion of 
the jury instructions in turn. 
 
i.  Factual questions.  First, the defendant argues that 
the following instruction asked the jury to find facts that were 
immaterial to any element of the crime and placed a burden on 
the defendant to prove that someone else had killed the victim: 
"Now, I say this to you.  You're charged with finding the 
facts.  It's your job.  I have nothing to do with it.  To 
find the facts.  In this case, you are being asked to 
determine what happened at Apartment 9 located at 49 Dunham 
Street in Attleboro during the evening hours of July the 
10th, 2011.  That inquiry by this jury presents, among 
others, the following examinations.  One, who was there 
that night?  Two, when did each party arrive?  Three, what 
was each party's purpose in going to that apartment that 
night?  Four, what did each party do?  And five, what was 
the sequence of events?  And I'm going to repeat those.  
Who was there that night?  When did each party arrive?  
What was each party's purpose in going to Room No. 9 at 49 
Dunham Street?  What did each party do inside that room? 
What was the sequence of events?" 
 
 
The defendant likens this instruction to the one reviewed 
in Bihn v. United States, 328 U.S. 633 (1946).  There, multiple 
defendants were tried for conspiracy, and a crucial issue for 
22 
 
one of the defendants was whether she stole ration coupons from 
a bank.  Id. at 634-635.  The judge instructed the jury: 
"Who would have a motive to steal them?  Did she take these 
stamps?  You have a right to consider that.  She is not 
charged with stealing, but with conspiracy to do all these 
things, and you have a right to consider whether she did 
steal them, on the question of intent.  Did she steal them?  
Who did if she didn't?  You are to decide that." 
 
Id. at 636-637.  The United States Supreme Court held that with 
respect to the defendant in question, the charge was prejudicial 
error, because it essentially shifted the burden of proof to the 
defendant by "putting on [the defendant] the burden proving her 
innocence by proving the identity of some other person as the 
thief" (citation omitted).  Id. at 637. 
 
Although the judge's instruction here was ill advised, 
trial counsel's failure to object did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Looking at the 
instructions as a whole, we do not believe it would have 
substantially affected the jury's function as the sole finder of 
the facts.  See Walker, 466 Mass. at 284.  First, the judge 
began the instruction by reiterating that he had no role in 
finding the facts; that was the sole province of the jury.  This 
harkened back to one of his initial instructions, where he 
stated, "I'm going to bring up suggestions.  Not requirements."  
Further, while the instruction posed factual questions to the 
jury that were tangential to finding the elements of the crime, 
23 
 
unlike in Bihn, the judge did not require the jury to find these 
tangential facts. 
 
ii.  Bias.  Second, the defendant argues that the judge 
undermined the defendant's credibility by instructing the jury 
that he "has a bias."  The comment came at the end of the 
judge's general instructions regarding credibility: 
"Credibility, jurors.  What do we mean by that?  You know 
about it.  Sure, you do.  You use it in your everyday 
affairs.  Think about this.  Do people come up to you and 
tell you to believe something?  Ask you to say yes?  And 
it's something that you want to think about.  What do you 
do?  What's the first thing?  Well, you're watching the 
person.  Sure, you are.  You want to figure out from your 
common sense whether or not this person is believable.  So 
you're watching demeanor.  You're also listening carefully 
to the words and asking yourself he just said that, but 
then he said this, and those two don't make sense.  If he 
said this, then that doesn't follow.  You're listening to 
him to see whether this is double talk, or sales talk, or 
this is the genuine article.  Three, you're thinking what's 
in it for him or her.  Is there bias?  Is there self 
interest?  All of that comes into play.  So you are in a 
sense evaluating all the time in your lives believability.  
And I say to you that you're going to use essentially those 
same tools when you go into that jury room, and you use 
your common sense and life's experiences to decide this. 
 
"You're going to be asking about consistency.  You're going 
to ask yourself about coherency.  Does it appeal to common 
sense and logic?  And you're going to ask yourself about 
how it was presented, and you will also ask yourself about 
bias or interest.  And bear this in mind.  The defendant 
has a bias.  He has an interest.  So do the police.  So do 
the police.  Anyone who works for an agency that's involved 
in the case has a bias.  So don't think the only person 
with a bias is the defendant, because that's not so." 
 
 
"It is appropriate for a judge to mention that interest in 
the case is a criterion, along with others which the judge 
24 
 
detailed, for assessing the credibility of witnesses."  
Commonwealth v. Ramos, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 362, 368 (1991), citing 
Commonwealth v. Perez, 390 Mass. 308, 320 (1983).  In Perez, 
supra at 314 n.3, the judge instructed the jury, "You are 
entitled to weigh this evidence, this testimony of the 
defendant, and you are entitled, of course, in weighing the 
testimony of the defendant, to consider, if you see fit, the 
interest of the defendant in the outcome of the case which is 
before you."  We held that "[w]hile it is not a model charge, we 
conclude that the judge did not impose on the jury his opinion 
of the witness's credibility."  Id. at 321. 
 
The same is true here.  While the judge should not have 
stated "the defendant has a bias," taken in context the comment 
did not communicate to the jury the judge's own opinion 
regarding the defendant's credibility.  See Perez, 390 Mass. at 
321.  Rather, it was immediately followed with the reminder, 
stated and then repeated, that the police, too, have a bias, as 
does anyone who works for an agency involved in the case.  Thus, 
even though the defendant's potential bias should not have 
specifically been mentioned, this is not a case where his bias 
was "singled out for special comment."  United States v. 
Rollins, 784 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 1986).  Thus, trial counsel's 
failure to object did not amount to a substantial likelihood of 
25 
 
a miscarriage of justice.20  We emphasize, however, that the 
utmost care is required when instructing the jury about a 
defendant's testimony or failure to testify.  Even an unintended 
suggestion by the judge that the defendant's testimony is 
subject to greater scrutiny risks error. 
 
iii.  Contradiction between an exhibit and a witness.  
Third, the defendant argues that the judge invaded the fact-
finding province of the jury by instructing them that if an 
exhibit contradicted a witness, the jury should use the exhibit 
as "[a] reason not to believe a witness."  The instruction was 
as follows: 
"Now, there's another way to look at credibility.  Say to 
yourself, you know, I believe something in those exhibits.  
And you know what?  What's in those exhibits backs up this 
witness.  That's called corroboration.  If, on the other 
hand, the exhibit contradicts the witness, what do you use 
that for?  A reason not to believe a witness.  And go back 
to this, jurors.  If someone's being sincere with you, you 
move onto reliability.  If someone's insincere and is 
winking at the oath, how can you believe that person?  So 
 
 
20 The defendant also argues that the judge did not inform 
the jury to what extent the defendant's potential bias may have 
influenced his credibility.  See United States v. Gleason, 616 
F.2d 2, 15 (2nd Cir. 1979) ("Where the court points out that 
testimony of certain types of witnesses may be suspect . . . it 
must also direct the jury's attention to the fact that it may 
well find these witnesses to be truthful").  While again it 
would have been preferable for the judge to state as much 
explicitly, he did, in his illustration about how one evaluates 
credibility in one's everyday life, state, "you're thinking 
what's in it for him or her.  Is there bias?  Is there self 
interest?  All of that comes into play."  This comment showed 
that bias is but one of many factors to be evaluated in 
determining credibility, in addition to, among others, the 
person's demeanor and word choice. 
26 
 
that is what I would say as to your consideration of 
credibility." 
 
The defendant argues that this instruction "improperly informed 
the jury precisely what effect certain evidence should have on 
their deliberations" and was particularly prejudicial because 
the Commonwealth had argued in closing that the jury should not 
believe the defendant's testimony, and look instead to 
statements the defendant made in his recorded interview.  Thus, 
the defendant argues the instruction mirrored the Commonwealth's 
theory of the case. 
 
We disagree.  The judge did not state that exhibits should 
be believed over witness testimony, but rather any 
contradictions could be considered when assessing witness 
credibility.  Moreover, the judge had previously instructed the 
jury that they had "full authority over the evidence," including 
whether to believe or disbelieve some or all of a witness's 
testimony.  Thus, in the context of the instructions as a whole, 
counsel's failure to object to this instruction did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
iv.  Jurors should be "controlled" by the video recording 
of the defendant's statement to police.  Fourth, the defendant 
argues that the judge again invaded the fact-finding province of 
the jury when he instructed: 
"You've got a video, jurors.  You've got a video of what 
the interview consisted of at the Attleboro police station.  
27 
 
That's going to be given to you.  You're going to have the 
ability to play it.  Indeed, you should be controlled by 
it.  What he said on the video, you're going to see.  
You're going to see it.  If it conflicts with what the 
lawyers said he said, you're going to follow the video." 
 
The defendant argues that this instruction, like the previous 
one, communicated to jurors that they should give greater weight 
to the defendant's recorded statements to police than to his 
testimony at trial.  The defendant acknowledges that the last 
sentence asks jurors to contrast the video recording with 
statements by lawyers -- which are not evidence -- and states 
that the video evidence should control over what lawyers said 
about the recording.  The defendant nonetheless argues that 
jurors could understand the instruction to mean instead that the 
recording should control "over other evidence and testimony and 
over any misstatements made by the lawyers." 
 
We disagree.  The instruction clearly refers only to 
comparing the recording to the lawyer's statements, not to 
comparing the recording to other evidence.  While it would have 
been prudent for the judge to say that all the evidence -- not 
just the video recording -- controls over statements by the 
attorneys, the instruction was not error.  In the context of the 
instructions as a whole, a reasonable juror would have 
understood this instruction as referring back to an instruction 
the judge had given before closing arguments:  that lawyers are 
not witnesses and cannot provide information that is not found 
28 
 
directly or inferentially in the evidence.  Thus, the 
instruction was not error, and consequently trial counsel was 
not ineffective for failing to object. 
 
v.  Direct and circumstantial evidence.  Fifth, the 
defendant argues that the judge's instruction on the difference 
between direct and circumstantial evidence essentially 
diminished the Commonwealth's burden of proof.  Specifically, 
the judge illustrated the concepts of direct and circumstantial 
evidence by giving two hypothetical examples.  In the first -- 
which illustrated direct evidence -- the judge described a 
defendant who was charged with leaving the scene of an accident.  
In the example, a victim felt something strike her car, which 
caused her to hit a tree.  Two days later, a witness told police 
that on the night in question he had been a passenger in a car 
when the driver started to text, struck a car that struck a 
tree, and then drove off.  The witness identified the victim's 
car as the one that had been struck by the defendant's vehicle.  
The judge described the witness's testimony as direct evidence. 
 
In the second example, which illustrated circumstantial 
evidence, the judge used the same hypothetical, but instead of a 
witness who saw the accident, the evidence came from various 
other sources.  A neighbor who heard the crash stated she saw a 
dark Ford Taurus with a license plate starting with "1-0" leave 
the scene.  The police then searched Registry of Motor Vehicle 
29 
 
records to identify owners of dark Ford Tauruses with license 
plates starting with 1-0, and found the defendant.  The location 
of the car crash was consistent with the most efficient route of 
travel to the defendant's home.  When police visited the 
defendant's home, they found a Taurus with damage consistent 
with the accident.  Paint chips on the Taurus were consistent 
with the paint from the victim's car.  The defendant admitted to 
driving his Taurus the night of the accident, but denied 
striking a car. 
 
The defendant first argues that the charge was unbalanced 
because it only illustrated how to infer guilt and not how to 
infer innocence.  See United States v. Dove, 916 F.2d 41, 46 
(2nd Cir. 1990) (to explain difference between direct and 
circumstantial evidence, trial judge used unbalanced 
hypothetical that "merely instructed how to look for evidence of 
. . . guilt").  We recently analyzed a similar hypothetical by 
the same trial judge in Commonwealth v. Silva, 482 Mass. 275, 
286-290 (2019).  There, although we did not explicitly address 
the unbalanced nature of the charge, we held that, taken as a 
whole, the instructions were not error; however, we 
"underscore[d] that, moving forward, . . . it is better practice 
to avoid examples in which hypothetical individuals commit 
crimes."  Id. at 290.  We hold the same here.  See United States 
v. Hensley, 982 F.3d 1147, 1161 (8th Cir. 2020) (unbalanced 
30 
 
hypothetical was not error but "discourag[ing] the use of such 
one-sided jury instructions"); United States v. Salameh, 152 
F.3d 88, 142-143 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1028 
(1999) (noting unbalanced hypotheticals are "disfavored" but did 
not constitute prejudicial error in circumstances, because most 
circumstantial evidence in case pointed towards guilt). 
 
Next, the defendant argues that the hypothetical describes 
a situation similar to the facts at trial and thus acted as a 
roadmap showing how to find the defendant guilty.  This argument 
was not raised in Silva because the facts from the hypothetical 
used there did not mirror those of the case.  Here, we are 
troubled that the hypothetical too closely tracks the facts of 
the defendant's case. 
 
To illustrate this, we compare the two.  The neighbor who 
witnessed a Ford Taurus leaving the scene is akin to the 
neighbor who saw Gumkowski21 in Kilroy's apartment the day of the 
murder.  Investigators visiting the home and finding the 
defendant is akin to investigators arresting Gumkowski at Rose's 
home.  The paint chip on the Taurus consistent with paint from 
the victim's car is akin to the blood on Gumkowski's shoe that 
was consistent with Kilroy's DNA.  The defendant admitting to 
driving the Taurus on the night of the accident but denying 
 
 
21 Here we refer to Gumkowski by name to distinguish him 
from the defendant in the judge's hypothetical. 
31 
 
striking the car is akin to Gumkowski admitting to going to 
Kilrow's apartment on the night of the murder but denying 
committing it. 
 
The hypothetical used in this case is far more similar to 
the facts of the defendant's case than instructions that have 
been objected to on similar grounds.  Compare Commonwealth v. 
Shea, 398 Mass. 264, 270 & n.3 (1986) (rejecting defendant's 
argument that hypothetical about missing piece of chocolate cake 
too closely paralleled facts of his case); Commonwealth v. Gil, 
393 Mass. 204, 222 (1984) ("We do not think that the 
coincidental similarity between the well-known 'footprints in 
the snow' example and the evidence of footprints on the floor at 
the scene of the crime would make the jury reasonably believe 
that the judge was expressing his belief in the Commonwealth's 
theory of the case or was favoring a particular inference 
propounded by the prosecutor"); Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 32 Mass. 
App. Ct. 435, 443 (1992) ("Although we do not think the judge 
committed reversible error, the similarity of the analogy to the 
Commonwealth's evidence makes use of that particular analogy 
ill-advised in the instant circumstances of this case" [citation 
omitted]); Hensley, 982 F.3d at 1161 (very short hypothetical 
illustrating concept of substantial step "track[ed] closely with 
the facts of [the] defendant's case"); Dove, 916 F.2d at 46 
32 
 
(hypothetical about "whether Jack shot Mary" was "not analogous 
to the facts of this case"). 
 
In those cases, the illustrations were less in depth than 
the hypothetical used here.  Here, the hypothetical closely 
mirrored the circumstances of the defendant's case and arguably 
served to emphasize the prosecution's theory of the case, 
illustrating to the jurors how they could find the defendant 
guilty.  Thus, the instruction was erroneous.  Consequently, 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. 
 
Looking at the instructions as a whole, however, the error 
did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  First, as in Silva, 482 Mass. at 289, the judge made 
clear that the jury could not premise a verdict on speculative 
inferences.22  Second, the judge stated that jurors should not 
take anything he had said to demonstrate his view on the case, 
and that if he had done so unintentionally, they should 
disregard it.23  See Hensley, 982 F.3d at 1160-1161 (judge's use 
 
 
22 Specifically, the judge stated:  "One, you can only draw 
a reasonable inference from evidence that you believe.  Two, 
that inference has to be reasonable.  In other words, it can't 
be a guess." 
 
 
23 The judge instructed:  "Jurors, I am neutral in this 
case.  I have no role in the facts.  And if I ever suggested to 
you that I have a view of this case, that's arrogant on my part.  
That is not something I want to convey.  I respect you; and if I 
did that unconsciously, you disregard it." 
 
33 
 
of hypothetical similar to facts case not reversible error 
because judge also instructed that jury "should not take 
anything I have said or done during the trial as indicating what 
I think of the evidence or what I think your verdict should 
be").  Third, the hypothetical did not infringe on the 
instructions on reasonable doubt.  Compare Silva, supra (judge's 
hypothetical to explain circumstantial evidence entirely 
separate from "unambiguous and adequate instruction on 
reasonable doubt"), with Commonwealth v. Pomerleau, 10 Mass. 
App. Ct. 208, 214 (1980) (use of examples to explain reasonable 
doubt was reversible error).  Fourth, it is clear from a review 
of the entire record that the judge was scrupulously focused on 
the defendant receiving a fair trial.  And finally, the 
Commonwealth's case against the defendant was strong, and thus 
any error was likely not to have influenced the jury's verdict.  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Garcia, 379 Mass. 422, 442 (1980) (error in 
jury instructions was harmless where "case involve[d] 
overwhelming evidence of guilt").24  In sum, although the 
 
 
24 In Silva, 482 Mass. at 288, an additional mitigating 
factor was that the jury did not convict on a theory of 
deliberate premeditation, which showed "they understood the high 
degree of certainty required to find the defendant guilty."  
While here, similarly, the jury did not convict on either 
deliberate premeditation or felony murder, we do not believe 
this fact mitigates the error in the jury instructions.  The 
erroneous hypothetical did not speak to the hypothetical 
defendant's intent or any underlying felony, so there is no 
34 
 
instruction -- and counsel's subsequent failure to object -- 
were error, those errors did not create a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
vi.  Reasonable inferences.  Sixth, the defendant argues 
that at the close of the hypothetical illustrating 
circumstantial evidence, the judge insinuated an inference of 
guilt would be reasonable.  At the close of the hypothetical, 
the judge stated:  "And in this instance, you could be asked do 
you draw a reasonable inference that the defendant [in the 
hypothetical] did this.  And in looking at that question, you 
certainly can apply your common sense, your powers of logic." 
 
The defendant argues that a juror would likely understand 
this instruction as implying that any inference they might draw 
of the defendant's guilt would be a reasonable one.  Although we 
have made our concerns with the hypothetical clear, we do not 
think this closing element created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  While the words may have subtly implied 
that such an inference would be reasonable, a reasonable jury 
would not have interpreted them as "a conclusive direction by 
[the judge] to find murder in the first degree once the jury 
were convinced of the [underlying] facts."  Commonwealth v. 
Skinner, 408 Mass. 88, 95 (1990).  Compare id. at 94-95 
 
reason it would have affected the jury's fact finding concerning 
the elements of deliberate premeditation or felony-murder. 
35 
 
(reversible error where judge instructed "not only that [the 
jury] could infer premeditation from certain subsidiary facts 
and malice, but that the finding of those facts and malice 
'would constitute first-degree murder'"). 
 
vii.  Drawing of inferences.  Seventh, the defendant argues 
that the judge's instructions on inferences implied that intent 
had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but the other 
elements of the crime did not.  The judge instructed: 
"And here are the rules that apply to drawing a reasonable 
inference.  One, you can only draw a reasonable inference 
from evidence that you believe.  Two, that inference has to 
be reasonable.  In other words, it can't be a guess.  
Three, that where the inference constitutes an element of 
the crime -- intent.  Intent, which I told you can well be 
the subject of circumstantial evidence -- it has to be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 
 
Looking at the jury instructions as a whole, it is clear that 
the judge properly instructed the fact that proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is necessary for every element of the offense.  
As the judge outlined the elements of each charged crime, he 
repeatedly emphasized that the Commonwealth had the burden to 
prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.  Thus, a 
reasonable juror would have understood the challenged 
instruction to show that intent is one example of an element 
that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, not that it was 
the only one.  There was no error. 
36 
 
 
c.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
reviewed the record in accordance with our statutory duty under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and we identify no basis upon which to 
order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.