Case Title: Anthony Floyd Wainwright v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC07-2005

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2008-11-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Supreme Court of Florida  
No. SC07-2005 
ANTHONY FLOYD WAINWRIGHT, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
[November 26, 2008] 
PER CURIAM. 
This case is before the Court on appeal from an order under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.851 denying a successive motion to vacate a judgment of 
conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of death.  Because the order 
concerns postconviction relief from a capital conviction for which a sentence of 
death was imposed, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, 
section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm 
the trial court’s order denying relief. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Anthony Floyd Wainwright was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, 
kidnapping, and sexual battery in relation to the murder of Carmen Gayheart.  
After a unanimous jury recommendation, the trial court sentenced Wainwright to 
death. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Wainwright’s convictions and death 
sentence and set out in detail the factual background and procedural history of the 
case.  Wainwright v. State, 704 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 1997).  After his conviction and 
sentence of death were final, Wainwright filed an initial motion for postconviction 
relief and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, each raising several issues.  This 
Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the initial postconviction motion and 
denied the habeas petition.  Wainwright v. State, 896 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 2004). 
On July 16, 2007, Wainwright filed a successive motion for postconviction 
relief, raising a newly discovered evidence claim.1 Wainwright alleged that in a 
written statement his codefendant Richard Hamilton asserted that “Wainwright was 
1. To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant 
must meet two requirements:  First, the evidence must not have been known by the 
trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the 
defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence.  
Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would 
probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  See Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 
(Fla. 1998) (Jones II). Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the 
Jones II test if it “weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a 
reasonable doubt as to his culpability.” Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 526 (quoting Jones 
v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)).  If the defendant is seeking to vacate a 
sentence, the second prong requires that the newly discovered evidence would 
probably yield a less severe sentence.  See Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 
1991) (Jones I). 
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not involved in any manner of [sic] the sexual assault committed upon the victim 
in this case.”  In his statement, Hamilton explained that he came forward because 
“I do not feel comfortable with [Wainwright] being convicted with this felony 
when [I] was the sole perpetrator, nor do [I] feel justice is served by allowing this 
felony to exist against him when it is false.” 
The postconviction trial court summarily denied Wainwright’s newly 
discovered evidence claim.  The trial court found that Wainwright failed to state a 
legally sufficient claim because his motion failed to set forth any explanation as to 
why Hamilton’s admission could not have been raised in a prior proceeding.  State 
v. Wainwright, No. 94-150-CF-2 (Fla. 3d Cir. order filed Sept. 20, 2007) 
(Postconviction Order) at 4. The trial court also rejected Wainwright’s claim on 
the merits.  The trial court found that, accepting Hamilton’s statement as true, there 
was no reasonable probability of an acquittal or life sentence on retrial because the 
evidence in the record overwhelmingly supported Wainwright’s convictions and 
the aggravating factors.  Id. at 11, 14.  Wainwright challenges this summary denial 
on appeal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
This Court reviews a summary denial on the pleadings de novo and “must 
accept all allegations in the motion as true to the extent they are not conclusively 
rebutted by the record.”  Rutherford v. State, 926 So. 2d 1100, 1108 (Fla. 2006) 
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(quoting Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 355 (Fla. 2004)); see also Van Poyck v. 
State, 961 So. 2d 220, 224 (Fla. 2007).  In determining whether the evidence 
compels a new trial, the trial court must “consider all newly discovered evidence 
which would be admissible” and must “evaluate the weight of both the newly 
discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial.” Jones v. 
State, 591 So. 2d 911, 916 (Fla. 1991) (Jones I). 
We agree with the trial court that given the totality of the evidence in this 
case, the allegedly newly discovered statement does not “give rise to a reasonable 
doubt as to [Wainwright’s] culpability,” Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 526 (Fla. 
1998) (Jones II) (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)), and that 
it would not probably yield a less severe sentence on retrial, Jones I, 591 So. 2d at 
915.  We therefore hold that the trial court correctly determined that Wainwright is 
not entitled to relief. 
First, we agree with the trial court that assuming Hamilton would testify 
consistently with his written statement on retrial, his statement and testimony 
would not probably result in a jury acquitting Wainwright of sexual battery or first-
degree murder.  At trial, Hamilton County Sheriff James Harrell Reid testified that 
Wainwright confessed that he raped the victim. Reid testified that Wainwright 
“stated that after they had gotten off the interstate and found this wooded area, the 
area which he described as the murder scene . . . that he made Ms. Gayheart get 
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into the very back of the Bronco, and that back there he raped her and had sex with 
her.” In addition, Gary Gunter, a prisoner housed with Wainwright in the Taylor 
County Jail testified that Wainwright told him “they took her down a dirt road and 
both of them had sex with her.”  The State also admitted DNA evidence consistent 
with Wainwright having sexually battered the victim.  Specifically, DNA testing 
determined that a semen stain found on the rear seat cover of the victim’s Bronco 
matched Wainwright, and the stain included an epithelial (skin cell) fraction 
consistent with the victim.  Given Wainwright’s admissions and the DNA 
evidence, Hamilton’s statement would not probably produce an acquittal of sexual 
battery on retrial.2 
Hamilton’s statement likewise does not raise reasonable doubt about 
Wainwright’s culpability for first-degree murder under either a felony murder or a 
2. We also agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Wainwright would be 
convicted of sexual battery as a principal were the jury to believe that Wainwright 
did not personally sexually batter Gayheart.  § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (1993) 
(“Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state . . . or aids, abets, 
counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such 
offense is committed or is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first 
degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such . . . .”).  Lieutenant 
Mallory Daniels, an investigator with the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office, 
testified that Wainwright gave a statement to law enforcement officers admitting 
that he drove the victim’s vehicle while Hamilton raped her.  Wainwright’s actions 
facilitating Hamilton’s sexual assault establish that Wainwright is guilty as a 
principal of sexual battery.  See State v. Williams, 637 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1994) (affirming defendant’s conviction as principal for sexual battery with deadly 
weapon where he drove while codefendant holding gun forced victim to perform 
oral sex and raped her). 
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premeditated murder theory.  The conviction for first-degree murder under the 
felony murder theory is supported by not only the conviction for sexual battery but 
also Wainwright’s convictions for armed robbery and armed kidnapping.  Both are 
qualifying felonies under the felony murder statute.  § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(d), 
(1)(a)(2)(f), Fla. Stat. (1993).  Furthermore, Hamilton’s recent assertion that 
Wainwright did not rape Gayheart does not weaken the more than sufficient 
evidence of premeditation present in this case.  For example, Sheriff Reid testified 
that Wainwright told Reid that he and Hamilton threw the victim’s jewelry out of 
the vehicle prior to the murder because they “had already planned to kill her, and 
[they] didn’t want any articles of jewelry to be found on her body.”  Robert Allen 
Murphy, a fellow Taylor County prisoner, testified that Wainwright told him that 
he tried to strangle the victim, but she would not die, so he shot her in the back of 
the head twice.  Finally, we note that in finding the cold, calculated, and 
premeditated aggravating factor (CCP), which requires proof of heightened 
premeditation, the sentencing court did not rely on the sexual battery to support its 
finding.  For all of these reasons, the trial court properly found that Hamilton’s 
statement would not probably produce an acquittal of first-degree murder on 
retrial. 
Second, we agree with the trial court that on this record, Hamilton’s 
statement does not undermine or invalidate the committed in the course of a felony 
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and heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravating factors.  The sentencing court 
found the committed in the course of a felony aggravating factor applicable based 
on Wainwright’s convictions of armed robbery, armed kidnapping, and armed 
sexual battery.  Thus, regardless of whether Wainwright would be convicted of 
sexual battery in a retrial, this aggravator would still be supported by the two other 
felony convictions.  In finding the HAC aggravating factor applicable, the 
sentencing court considered that both defendants raped the victim.  However, as 
the postconviction trial court found in rejecting Wainwright’s claim, it also 
considered numerous other factors:  (1) the victim pondered her fate for one and 
one-quarter to one and one-half hours; (2) Hamilton sexually battered the victim 
while Wainwright drove; (3) the victim cried and asked to be released; (4) 
Wainwright strangled the victim, taking at least thirty seconds to render her 
unconscious; (5) the victim resisted her death, causing Wainwright to describe her 
as “like a puppy” hit in the head; and (6) the victim endured thirty minutes of terror 
at the murder site before her murder.  Postconviction Order at 12.  The trial court 
did not err in concluding that evidence of strangulation alone may be sufficient to 
support the HAC aggravator.  “[T]his Court has consistently upheld the HAC 
aggravator in cases where a conscious victim was strangled.” Bowles v. State, 804 
So. 2d 1173, 1178 (Fla. 2001).  Given that Gayheart was strangled and shot after 
an extended period of terrorization, Hamilton’s statement that Wainwright did not 
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rape Gayheart is not likely to invalidate the HAC aggravating factor or yield a less 
severe sentence on retrial. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, given the totality of the evidence, Hamilton’s statement 
would not raise reasonable doubt about the convictions or undermine any of the six 
aggravators found in this case.  While Hamilton’s statement asserts that 
Wainwright did not personally participate in the sexual battery, the evidence as a 
whole demonstrates that Wainwright was a full and willing participant in the 
remainder of the criminal events leading to Gayheart’s murder.  Therefore, there is 
no probability that Hamilton’s statement would produce an acquittal or life 
sentence on retrial.  See Van Poyck, 961 So. 2d at 226 (affirming summary denial 
of newly discovered evidence claim where testimony would not have created 
reasonable probability of a lesser sentence); Rutherford v. State, 940 So. 2d 1112, 
1121 (Fla. 2006) (affirming summary denial of newly discovered evidence claim 
where there was no probability that evidence would result in life sentence on 
retrial).  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order summarily denying 
Wainwright’s successive motion for postconviction relief. 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and CANADY, 
JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., did not participate. 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hamilton County, 
E. Vernon Douglas, Judge – Case No. 94-150-CF-2 
Joseph T. Hobson of Hobson Law Firm, P.A., Clearwater, Florida, 
for Appellant 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Meredith Charbula, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
for Appellee 
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