Case Title: FINNELL v. JEBCO SEISMIC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97342

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
FINNELL v. JEBCO SEISMIC  FINNELL v. JEBCO SEISMIC 2003 OK 35 67 P.3d 339 Case Number: 97342 Decided: 04/01/2003 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA BILL FINNELL and SANDRA FINNELL, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. JEBCO SEISMIC and JEBCO SEISMIC L.P., Defendants/Appellants, and PGS ONSHORE, INC., Third-Party Defendant/Appellant. ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION II ¶0 Plaintiffs brought this action against Jebco Seismic and Jebco Seismic L.P. in the District Court, Beckham County, Doug Haught, trial judge, to recover monetary damages for injury to real property. Defendants filed a third-party petition against PGS Onshore, Inc., alleging that the third-party defendant was liable for any damages suffered by plaintiffs. Defendants and the third-party defendant admitted liability prior to trial and the issue of damages alone was tried to a jury. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs in the amount of $26,000.00. Plaintiffs then moved to recover their attorney's fee and costs. The trial court granted a fee in the amount of $17,005.00. Defendants appealed from that order. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, reversed. Upon plaintiffs' petition for certiorari, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE TRIAL COURT'S COUNSEL-FEE AWARD IS AFFIRMED; UPON REMAND THE TRIAL COURT IS AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF PLAINTIFFS' REASONABLE APPEAL- AND CERTIORARI- RELATED ATTORNEY'S FEE. Jack W. Ivester and Thomas S. Ivester, IVESTER, IVESTER & IVESTER, Sayre, Oklahoma, for Appellees. Mitchell A. Hallren, Fairview, Oklahoma, for Appellants. OPALA, V.C.J. ¶1 The dispositive issues tendered on certiorari are (1) do the terms of 12 O. S. 2001, §940 entitle plaintiffs/appellees to a counsel-fee award? and if so, (2) is the fee that was awarded reasonable? We answer both questions in the affirmative. I ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 Jebco Seismic, Inc. (Jebco) entered into an agreement in late 1997 or early 1998 with Bill Finnell (Finnell) which granted permission to Jebco and/or its assigns to conduct a 3-D seismic survey on Finnell's property. ¶3 The survey was conducted (at least in part) by Jebco's assignee, PGS Onshore, Inc. (PGS). When Finnell discovered that the survey had caused injury to his property beyond that covered by the agreed compensation, he demanded that Jebco pay for the damages. Jebco refused. Finnell then brought suit against Jebco in the District Court, Beckham County, seeking monetary damages in the amount of $74,000.00. ¶4 Before Jebco filed its answer, the parties stipulated to an amendment to the petition to add Jebco Seismic L.P. as a defendant (Jebco and Jebco Seismic L.P. will together be referred to as Jebco). Jebco denied Finnell's claim and filed a third-party petition against PGS, ¶5 Prior to trial Jebco and PGS admitted liability, ¶6 Plaintiffs timely applied for an attorney's fee award pursuant to the provisions of 12 O.S. 2001, §940 (§940). II STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶7 Two issues are presented on certiorari. The first is whether plaintiffs' claim entitles them to an attorney's fee award under the provisions of §940. This issue presents a question of law which we review de novo. The court has plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to reexamine a trial court's legal rulings. ¶8 The second issue, which need be decided only if plaintiffs are entitled to the statutory award in the first instance, is whether the fee awarded is reasonable. The amount to be awarded as a fee for the services of a legal practitioner is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. III PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A COUNSEL-FEE AWARD UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ¶9 The provisions of §940 state in pertinent part: "A. In any civil action to recover damages for the negligent or willful injury to property and any other incidental costs related to such action, the prevailing party shall be allowed reasonable attorney's fees, court costs and interest to be set by the court and to be taxed and collected as other costs of the action." (emphasis added) ¶10 As the prevailing party in this action, plaintiffs applied for an attorney's fee award in reliance on this section, characterizing their claim to be for a money judgment for the physical injury to property. ¶11 This court remains committed to the American Rule in assessing litigation expenses against a vanquished opponent. ¶12 With the adoption of the Oklahoma Pleading Code in 1984, Oklahoma became a notice pleading state. ¶13 Oklahoma law has long recognized that an action for breach of contract and an action in tort may arise from the same set of facts. ¶14 Defendants also point to the jury instructions in support of their argument that the case was tried as a breach of contract action only, but we see nothing in the trial court's instructions to the jury that calls for this conclusion. The jury instructions indicate that the defendants at some point prior to trial admitted liability for the damage to plaintiffs' property. ¶15 Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be liberally construed so as to effect legislative intent. IV THE ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDED TO PLAINTIFFS IS REASONABLE ¶16 We now turn to review the question of the reasonableness of the attorney's fee awarded by the trial court. ¶17 An attorney's fee must in every instance be reasonable. ¶18 The record shows that the trial court followed these guidelines in assessing the amount of the award. The baseline amount was arrived at from the detailed time records submitted with the application by multiplying the hours expended by an hourly rate just under $100.00 per hour. A hearing was conducted at which two experienced local practitioners familiar with civil litigation testified that the minimum hourly rate in the local legal community is $100.00 per hour. Each also testified that he had reviewed the time records submitted with the fee application and had concluded that the hours expended were reasonable. Defendants called a third local attorney to testify, who opined that an hourly rate of $90.00 per hour would be more reasonable given the experience level of plaintiffs' primary attorney. He also testified that an experienced attorney would probably have spent only one hundred hours, rather than one-hundred sixty nine hours, on the case. The trial judge accepted the testimony of the two attorneys who found the baseline amount to be reasonable and awarded a fee in that amount with a relatively negligible enhancement of $350.00. ¶19 Defendants contend that an award which amounts to sixty-five percent (65%) of the amount recovered is excessive on its face. We disagree. While we are committed to the rule that a fee for legal services must bear some reasonable relationship to the judgment, ¶20 Defendants urge us to consider the fact that there is a contingency fee arrangement extant between plaintiffs and their attorneys under which plaintiffs' attorneys are entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the award on appeal. Defendants contend that plaintiffs' attorneys will garner a windfall by collecting both the contingency fee ($13,000.00) and the statutory fee ($17,005.00). Our pronouncement in State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Weeks, ¶21 We hold that the trial court's counsel-fee award to plaintiffs of $17,005.00 rests on competent evidence. The reasonableness of an attorneys' fee request is a question of fact for the trier. The trial court is in a far better position to judge the demands of the case than are we. Upon the record submitted, we cannot say that the award is clearly erroneous or that it is unsupported by reason and evidence. ¶22 Plaintiffs have timely applied to this court for an appeal-related attorney's fee. An appeal-related counsel fee may be awarded in cases where there is statutory authority to award a fee for legal services rendered in the trial of a cause. V SUMMARY ¶23 The two issues presented for certiorari review are resolved in a manner to be stated: We hold that plaintiffs pressed a claim "to recover for damages for the negligent or willful injury to property" within the meaning of §940 and are hence entitled to an attorney's fee under that statute. We also hold that the amount of the fee awarded was arrived at by a process consistent with the pronouncements of this court and that the amount awarded does not exhibit an abuse of the discretion given the trial court to set a fee award. ¶24 THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE TRIAL COURT'S COUNSEL-FEE AWARD IS AFFIRMED; UPON REMAND THE TRIAL COURT IS AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF PLAINTIFFS' REASONABLE APPEAL- AND CERTIORARI- RELATED ATTORNEY'S FEE. ¶25 WATT, C.J., OPALA, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, KAUGER and WINCHESTER, JJ. CONCUR. ¶26 SUMMERS, J., CONCURS IN PARTS I and II, CONCURS IN RESULT IN PART III and DISSENTS FROM PART IV. ¶27 BOUDREAU, J., CONCURS IN RESULT. ¶28 HARGRAVE, J., DISSENTS. FOOT