Case Title: STATE EX REL. BOARD OF ED. OF CO. OF KANAWHA v. Dyer

Citation: 179 S.E.2d 577

Docket Number: 

State: west-virginia

Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1971-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
179 S.E.2d 577 (1971) STATE ex rel. the BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the COUNTY OF KANAWHA, a Corp. v. N. H. DYER, State Director of Health and Chairman of the State Committee of Barbers and Beauticians, et al., etc. No. 13040. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. Submitted February 2, 1971. Decided March 9, 1971. *578 Campbell, Love, Woodroe & Kizer, John O. Kizer, Charleston, for relator. Jack L. Miller, Parkersburg, George S. Sharp, Charleston, for respondents. BROWNING, Judge: This is an original proceeding in mandamus instituted in the name of the State of West Virginia at the relation of the Board of Education of the County of Kanawha, a corporation, relator herein, against N. H. Dyer, State Director of Health and Chairman of the State Committee of Barbers and Beauticians, Leonard W. Watson, Joy Lynch, Evaun Hardman, and Dennis Howard, members of the State Committee of Barbers and Beauticians, and E. B. Roush, Director of the Division of Barbers and Beauticians. Sometime prior to November 4, 1969, relator submitted an application to respondents for a license to operate a school of beauty culture in furtherance of its plans to establish such a school at the Carver Career and Technical Center, a vocational school operated by relator. On November 4, 1969, at a meeting of the respondent committee, the following motion was offered, seconded and apparently approved: On December 22, 1969, respondent Roush sent a letter to Clarence E. Burdette, Director of Adult Vocational Education for relator, informing him of the action taken. The letter bore a notation that respondent Dyer had "approved and forwarded" the letter, and it was signed by him as chairman of the Committee. Relator alleges that in reliance upon this, it "expended large sums of money furnishing and equipping" the school totalling approximately $33,000.00, entered into one-year contracts with two teachers, and enrolled *579 forty students for the school term commenced in September, 1970. Thereafter, the Committee met on July 21, 1970, and upon hearing representatives of the West Virginia Beauty Schools Association, which represents private beauty schools, and without notice to relator, "arbitrarily, capriciously and unlawfully rescinded its action of November 4, 1969, and voted to reject the application * * *." Respondent Roush so informed relator of this by letter dated July 29, 1970. This letter was not approved by respondent Dyer, as relator maintains was required by Code, 16-14-3, as amended. On September 15, 1970, relator notified respondents that it intended to open the school on September 26th pursuant to the authorization given it in the aforementioned December 22, 1969, letter, and paid the required $25.00 inspection fee. On September 16, 1970, respondent Roush, in a letter "approved and forwarded" by respondent Dyer, informed relator that he had received the notice, and that: Relator additionally alleges that on November 18, 1970, the Committee met, and the members were advised by respondent Dyer that an inspection of relator's school indicated that there was full compliance with all requirements and that a license should be issued. To this date no such license has been issued. Respondents herein have filed two separate answers, one purporting to be the answer of all the respondents and the other being the answer only of Dyer, Hardman and Roush. In that separate answer, these three respondents also request that their names be stricken from the first answer and from a demurrer filed purportedly on behalf of all the respondents. In the first answer, respondents maintain that relator applied for the license on July 8, 1969, but that the application was defective in that it did not contain all necessary information. In particular, it did not contain "evidence that the Kanawha County Board of Education was professionally competent and financially responsible." Respondents also allege that the persons designated by relator to be instructors were not properly registered with the Committee, nor were they qualified. In addition, respondents state that on January 27, 1970, respondent Dyer sent relator a letter, the partial text of which is as follows: On July 21, 1970, respondent Dyer informed the Committee at a meeting that he had returned relator's application, and that relator had returned it July 1, 1970, with no changes. Respondents maintain that because of this failure to fully comply, they unanimously rejected the application on August 17, 1970, and filed a written decision on the matter. Respondents further maintain that the aforementioned letter of September 16, 1970, from Roush to relator was not authorized by the Committee and is, consequently, null and void. Furthermore, respondents say that the inspection of the school alluded to by relator with respect to the November 18, 1970, meeting was not made by a Committee member or a qualified inspector appointed pursuant to Code, 16-14-3, as amended. In the separate answer filed by respondents Dyer, Hardman and Roush it is admitted, as relator alleges, that the Committee, on July 21, 1970, met without notice to relator and unlawfully rescinded the prior conditional approval. This answer alleges that respondents Watson and Lynch, and a former member, John H. Caudill, voted to rescind, that respondent Hardman was not present at that meeting, and that respondent Dyer did not approve the action taken at that meeting as Code, 16-14-3, as amended, commands he must. In addition, these respondents say that respondent Roush and another, Edwin DeBarr, were directed by Dyer to inspect the school and did, indeed, make such an inspection. Furthermore, it is admitted that relator has fully complied with all requirements and that the license should be issued. In addition to all the aforementioned pleadings and papers, respondents Watson, Lynch and Howard filed a reply to the separate answer of respondents Dyer, Hardman and Roush, in which it is asserted that the latter three respondents "have no right to admit any allegations insofar as it pertains to the State Committee, since they are a minority * * * and cannot act individually for and on behalf of such Committee." They also deny once again that the rescission of July 21, 1970, was unlawful, that Dyer did not approve the action, and that such approval by Dyer was even necessary. It is further denied that Roush and DeBarr had the right to inspect the school since they were not official representatives of the Committee. On December 14, 1970, this Court granted the rule in mandamus returnable on January 13, 1971, and on February 3, 1971, the case was submitted for decision upon all the aforementioned pleadings and exhibits, briefs and oral argument of counsel. The parties hereinafter will be referred to as the Board and the three members constituting the majority of the Committee of Barbers and Beauticians as the Committee, unless it is necessary to further particularize with regard to one or more of the parties. The respondents contend that the writ should be refused for the following reasons: (1) the relator has not shown a clear legal right to the relief sought; (2) there is no duty upon the Committee to issue a license to the Board upon the facts of the case; (3) the Board has another adequate remedy at law by virtue of Chapters 29A and 30 of the Code of West Virginia of 1931, as amended; (4) the Board is guilty of laches; and (5) the State Director of Health, as ex officio Chairman of the Committee, exceeded the powers vested in him by the provisions of Article 14 of Chapter 16 of the Code, as amended. Chapter 16 of the Code is entitled "Public Health" and contains 22 Articles and scores of Sections. Article 14 is entitled *581 "Barbering, Beauty Culture and Manicuring" and although three sections of the Article were amended by Acts of the Legislature, 1967, Regular Session, there has been no amendment to that Article pertinent to the issues raised in this proceeding since it was originally enacted by Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session, 1951. All of the sections hereinafter referred to will be of Article 14 of Chapter 16 of the Code, as amended. Section 1 provides: Section 10 provides: Section 3 provides that the Committee shall consist of a director of health, ex officio, and four other members to be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate. Of the four members thus appointed, one must be *582 an employing barber, one an employee barber, one an employing beautician and one an employee beautician. Prior to the 1967 amendment, the section provided that one of the four so appointed should be of the negro race but that provision was deleted in the amendment of 1967. Section 12 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, etc., to own or operate a school of beauty culture, etc., unless: This provision is contained in Section 3 with regard to inspectors: Section 3 further provides: It will be observed from the above quotations from certain sections of Article 14 that the State Committee of Barbers and Beauticians is unique. It does not have the exact status of other administrative agencies such as the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, the Public Service Commission or the Civil Service Commission, for example, in that it is inextricably affiliated with, even if indirectly, the State Department of Health. The director of health is the ex officio chairman of the Committee, and whoever holds that position is a permanent member of the Committee without appointment of the governor. Furthermore, while Article 14 provides for an inspection of any proposed school of barbering or beauty culture and that no such school shall be licensed "unless in the opinion of the committee it is properly fitted and equipped," as heretofore noted, the Committee is not authorized to appoint any inspectors, that authority being delegated exclusively to the director of health. Whether the provisions of Article 14 did authorize the Committee as a whole to inspect the premises of an applicant for a new school of barbering or beauty culture is not clear, but the record in this case shows that the Committee did not inspect this school but instead relied *583 upon the report of inspection of E. B. Roush who was, at the time, director of the Division of Barbers and Beauticians, and who had formerly served as an inspector. In addition, shortly after the inspection of this school, he was also again given the title of inspector by the director of health. In his inspection, Roush was accompanied by Edwin DeBarr, assistant chief sanitarian of the environmental section of the department of health. The Committee attempted to rescind its previous approval of the Board's application by a vote of three members of the Committee (two, apparently including the ex officio member, abstaining) for the following reasons: It will be noted that the lack of qualification of Roush as an inspector was not given as a reason for the rescission. At the time of the conditional approval of the application none of the reasons given for rescission was raised. Furthermore, it will be noted that Roush was an experienced inspector and at the time he made the inspection at the direction of Dr. Dyer, the director of health, he was head of the division under whom the inspectors and other employees were serving. It is also to be observed the attempted rescission was more than ninety days after the conditional granting of the license. Section 8.03 of the Committee's regulations provides: The Committee did not for approximately eight months question the information contained in the Board's application. The letter to the Board notifying it of the rescission was dated July 29, 1970, although as heretofore noted the conditional license was granted on November 4, 1969. The meeting with the members of the West Virginia Beauty Schools Association by the Committee on July 21, 1970, and the subsequent notice of August 17, 1970, to the Board that it had "unanimously rejected" their application was invalid inasmuch as the Board was not notified of such meeting and was thereby denied due process of law in view of the order of November 4, 1969, granting the Board the license. It is true that the Board thereafter was granted a hearing, but it is the view of this Court that such did not remedy the deficiency of the meeting at which the action of rescission was taken. Depositions were taken in this case on January 29, 1971, and Dr. Dyer, the director of health and ex officio chairman of the Committee was asked if he approved the action of the Committee in rescinding the license granted on November 4, 1969, and replied, "I did not." He was also asked under date of August 17, 1970, and as a result of the meeting of July 21, 1970, if he saw a writing denominated "Decision and Reasons" relating to the Board's application and he *584 stated that he did. He was asked these questions and made these answers: He was asked this further question: Dr. Dyer was asked this further question: and over objection of counsel, he replied: In his deposition taken on the same day, Clarence E. Burdette, Director of Adult and Vocational Education of the Kanawha County Board of Education, testified that the two instructors whose names were placed on the original application were substituted by two other women, the first two having declined to serve, and he testified that the latter two were qualified under the new rules and regulations of the Committee although there is a conflict in the evidence upon that question. (Dr. Dyer was asked if he ever advised Burdette that his instructors were not properly qualified to which Dyer answered in the negative. He was then asked if, in his opinion, they were qualified at the time he wrote to Burdette on January 27, 1970, to which he answered in the affirmative. He was also asked if the letter was "intended to inform Mr. Burdette that his instructors were not qualified," to which he answered, "It was not.") Mr. Burdette further testified that the annual budget of the Board of Education of Kanawha County is "approximately $35,000,000." He was asked these two questions and answered as follows: "Q. Has an item been budgeted for the operation of this school? A. Yes, sir; it has. Q. What sum has been budgeted for the operation of this school? A. This is approximately $23,000." He was asked further if that was an adequate sum to operate the school for a period of one year and answered in the affirmative. Burdette was also asked these questions and gave these answers: It is apparent from the evidence that the Board did all of this without conceding that it was required to pursuant to the alleged changes in the rules by the Committee. It is true as contended by counsel for the Committee that the Board had the authority under the provisions of Code, 30-1-9, as amended, for a review of the decision of the Committee by the circuit court and thereafter by this Court. That brings us to the question of whether mandamus will lie inasmuch as the Board had another remedy. The cases are of course voluminous upon this subject and the older ones indicate that mandamus will lie only "in the absence of another remedy at law." There can be no doubt that the rule long ago laid down in those cases has been modified. In Doran v. Whyte, 75 W.Va. 368, 83 S.E. 1025 (1914), the Court held that a "remedy given by statute, which is as speedy and equally as efficacious as mandamus, excludes the latter remedy." In State ex rel. Simon v. Heatherly, 96 W.Va. 685, 123 S.E. 795 (1924), it was held that the "true test is whether there is another remedy equally convenient, beneficial and effective. If so, mandamus will not lie. Here there is a remedy provided by a socalled appeal; but, while it may be effective, yet it is not as convenient or beneficial." This is the second syllabus point of Stowers v. Blackburn, 141 W.Va. 328, 90 S.E.2d 277 (1955): It is the view of this Court that the circumstances of this case bring it peculiarly within the rule that an appeal to the circuit court and thereafter perhaps an appeal to this Court would not be "equally beneficial, convenient and effective" inasmuch as this school has been completed and is in operation, although in violation of the law if the order of rescission of the Committee was valid. Therefore, we are of the view that mandamus is a proper remedy upon the facts of this case. Upon the question of whether the action of the Committee was arbitrary and capricious such as to warrant the granting of the writ of mandamus to require the issuance of license to the Board, the minutes of the meeting of September 14, 1970, are revealing. One of the members of the Committee, the owner of a beauty parlor, whose vote was necessary to constitute a majority stated: "I can't understand why you can expect anyone to give approval on something that is going to cut their throat. Eventually, this is what that would do to me." Dr. Dyer asked her how she knew it would and she stated: "If I stand and watch someone electrocuted, and if I sit down and become electrocuted, I know this would be dangerous to me." She further stated: "I just couldn't get up and look at myself in the mirror, voting for this." Dr. Dyer stated "We shouldn't allow our bitterness to overcome our judgment." The member that we have heretofore quoted replied, "* * * I am being practical. My *586 practicability is my business." This Court is of the opinion that the reasons advanced by the Committee for the rescission of its previous approval of relator's application should be read in the light of these remarks. We feel they bear heavily on the issue of whether or not the action was arbitrary and capricious. We hold that on the facts of this case the rescission of the prior approval and the Committee's refusal to now approve relator's application and issue a license was and is arbitrary and capricious. Even if it is assumed that licensing is a discretionary function of the respondent Committee, that fact will not bar the awarding of a writ of mandamus where there is evidence of arbitrariness and capriciousness in the exercise of that discretion. See State ex rel. Bronaugh v. Parkersburg, 148 W.Va. 568, 136 S.E.2d 783 (1964); State ex rel. Ellis v. Kelly, 145 W.Va. 70, 112 S.E.2d 641 (1960); Dillon v. Bare & Carter, 60 W.Va. 483, 56 S.E. 390 (1906). Finally, it is the view of this Court that the Board was not guilty of laches. It is true that they did not answer Dr. Dyer's letter informing them that the license had been rescinded for approximately six months, and when they did, they simply returned the application unchanged. However, the Board thereafter requested a hearing which was granted by the Committee and held on September 14, 1970, at which time the Committee refused to issue a permanent license. On November 18, 1970, an inspection of the school at the instance of Dr. Dyer showed that it complied with the necessary requisites for a license and despite the recommendation of Dr. Dyer the Committee again refused and since that time has refused to take any action with regard to issuance of a license. This proceeding in mandamus was instituted in this Court on December 8, 1970, approximately three weeks after the November 18 meeting of the Committee. This is the third syllabus point of Carter v. Carter, 107 W.Va. 394, 148 S.E. 378 (1929): There is no showing in this case that the Board has slept on its rights or that the Committee has in any way been placed at a disadvantage. Furthermore, it is the view of this Court that under the holding of the cases hereinafter cited that in view of those facts even if time began to run against the Board on August 17, 1970, the date of the Committee's written decision attempting to reject the Board's application that the delay was not unreasonable and that the Board is not therefore barred by laches. See Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty Corp., 141 W.Va. 627, 92 S.E.2d 891 (1956); Rhodes v. Board of Education, 95 W.Va. 57, 120 S.E. 183 (1923); DePue v. Miller, 65 W.Va. 120, 64 S.E. 740 (1909). It is the decision of this Court that the Board has shown a clear legal right to the relief sought and that a writ of mandamus will issue against the respondents directing them to issue a license to the Board for the operation of a school of beauty culture and cosmetology at its Carver Career and Technical Center at Malden, Kanawha County. In conclusion, it is the view of this Court that if the operators and owners of private schools of cosmetology and beauty culture are adversely affected by the aforementioned 1967 amendment permitting boards of education to establish vocational schools, their relief lies in the legislature and not in this Court. Writ awarded.