Case Title: Manley v. Nelson

Citation: 443 P.2d 155

Docket Number: 4668

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 1968-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
443 P.2d 155 (1968) Ronald Keith MANLEY, a minor, by Blaine Manley, his Guardian Ad Litem v. Dorothy K. NELSON. Joseph Nick MANGANARO and Martha Elizabeth Canouse Manganaro v. Wayne L. SOSZKA. Nos. 4667, 4668. Supreme Court of Hawaii. June 27, 1968. Rehearing Denied September 16, 1968. *156 Leslie T. Bennett, Honolulu (Skinner, Bennett & Ornelles, Honolulu, of counsel), for defendants-appellants. Raymond J. Tam, Honolulu (Ikenaga & Tam, Honolulu, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee Ronald Keith Manley, a minor, by Blaine Manley, his Guardian Ad Litem. Richard B.W. Ing, Honolulu (V. Thomas Rice, Honolulu, on the brief, Rice & Lee, Honolulu, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees Joseph Nick Manganaro and Martha Elizabeth Canouse Manganaro. Before RICHARDSON, C.J., MIZUHA, MARUMOTO and ABE, JJ. and FAIRBANKS, Circuit Judge, in place of LEVINSON, J., disqualified. ABE, Justice. These two cases involve services of process on nonresident motorists in two civil actions brought by citizens of Hawaii for *157 injuries suffered in automobile collisions which occurred in the State of Hawaii. In the case of Manley v. Nelson (No. 4667) after purported service on the Director of Regulatory Agencies as provided by § 230-33, R.L.H. 1955, as amended, an attempt was made to personally serve defendant at 87-153 D Makona Street, Waianae, Oahu, Hawaii, her last known address; however service could not be made upon defendant as she had left the State of Hawaii. Then plaintiff sent a registered mail, return receipt requested, to defendant at the same address, knowing that the mail would be returned unclaimed. Thereafter, service of summons was made by publication, setting the hearing on March 13, 1967, at 9:00 o'clock a.m. On March 13, 1967, defendant made a special appearance challenging the jurisdiction of the court through an attorney. In the case of Manganaro v. Soszka (No. 4668), after the purported service on the defendant by service on the Director of Regulatory Agencies, a certified copy of the Complaint and Summons by certified mail, return receipt requested and postage prepaid, was sent on June 28 and September 26, 1966, addressed to defendant Wayne L. Soszka, 5935 Mission Street, San Francisco, California. Both letters were returned with notations "No such number" and "Moved, left no address." A notice of service by publication, setting the hearing at 9:00 o'clock a.m. on March 21, 1967, was published. A default judgment was entered at 9:00 o'clock a.m. on March 21, 1967. The attorney for defendant upon being notified that the case was being heard that morning appeared one minute after 9:00 o'clock and made a special appearance, and the court rescinded the default. The attorney for defendants in both cases moved to quash the process of service. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and allowed both defendants an interlocutory appeal. The issue before this court is whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over defendants in the two cases. Section 230-33, R.L.H. 1955, as amended, provides for service of process and notice on a nonresident motorist, or a resident motorist who subsequent to a collision leaves the State of Hawaii, in suits or actions against him growing out of any accident or collision involving a motor vehicle operated by him in the State of Hawaii. This section provides that the Director of Regulatory Agencies shall be deemed to have been appointed by such person as his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served the summons. This section also requires that after the certified copy is filed with the Director of Regulatory Agencies of the State of Hawaii or his deputy, a certified copy of the summons be "served upon the defendant personally by any person authorized to serve process in the place in which he may be found or sent by registered mail, postage prepaid, with return receipt requested, by the plaintiff or his attorney to the defendant. The plaintiff or his attorney shall file an affidavit showing that such notice and such copy of summons were served as aforesaid or sent by registered mail as aforesaid, and in the latter case the return receipt shall be filed with such affidavit." (Emphasis added.) The first paragraph of § 230-33 is not only similar but was based on the Massachusetts statute which was upheld in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).[1] However, plaintiffs in both cases contend that as our statute requires the filing of "return receipt" and the Massachusetts statute requires the filing of "defendant's return receipt" there is a difference between the two statutes, and that the provisions of the first paragraph of § *158 230-33 is fulfilled when it is shown that the registered mail was not delivered to the defendants by reason of their having moved without leaving forwarding addresses. Their contention is that the term "return receipt shall be filed" means the filing of a card provided by the post office entitled "return receipt" without the signature of the addressee or any evidence showing that the addressee had received the same. In upholding the Massachusetts statute, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hess v. Pawloski, supra, at page 356, 47 S.Ct. at page 633, said: The House Committee Report shows that when the legislature enacted Act 167 in 1953, the legislators were cognizant of both the Massachusetts statute and the case of Hess v. Pawloski, supra, which had upheld the Massachusetts statute, and the legislators must have intended to meet the requirement stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in that case that defendant shall actually receive and receipt for notice of service and copy of the process.[2] The word "receipt" is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, as "[a] writing acknowledging the taking or receiving of goods or money delivered or paid." The second paragraph of § 230-33, R.L.H. 1955, as amended by Act 86 enacted by the legislature in 1965 provided for service "by publication of summons in some newspaper suitable for the advertisement of notice of judicial proceedings for such length of time as he may deem reasonable, not less than once each week in four successive weeks, the last publication to be not less than twenty-one days prior to the date set for the trial of the action * * *" when a defendant had left the State of Hawaii and he could not be found to be served by registered mail. House Standing Committee Report No. 617 in connection with the enactment of the 1965 amendment states in part: Let us also review the other statutes providing for service by mail. Section 1-36, R.L.H. 1955, as amended, (Act 48, S.L.H. 1961) under which provision service was attempted in Case No. 4668 provides: Section 230-32, R.L.H. 1955, pertaining to personal service on nonresidents provides: As we have stated in State of Hawaii By its Attorney General v. Heirs of Kapahi, 50 Haw. 237, 437 P.2d 321 (1968), "[s]tatutes having reference to the same subject matter are in pari materia and are to be construed with reference to each other." See also Territory of Hawaii v. Akase, 43 Haw. 84 (1958). We hold that the term "return receipt shall be filed" used in the first paragraph of § 230-33, R.L.H. 1955, as amended, requires the filing of an instrument containing the signature of a nonresident defendant acknowledging receipt of a registered or certified mail. Also, this is the interpretation courts in other jurisdictions have given to similar statutes. Syracuse Trust Co. v. Keller, 5 W.W.Harr. 304, 35 Del. 304, 165 A. 327 (1932); Spearman v. Stover, 170 So. 259 (La. App. 1936). We hold that in both cases, plaintiffs did not fulfill or meet the requirements of the first paragraph of § 230-33. The other issue is whether the trial court may proceed with the trial of the cases and render judgment against defendants after publication of notice of proceedings under the second paragraph of § 230-33, R.L.H. 1955 (1965 Supplement) enacted by Act 86, S.L.H. 1965, hereinafter called Act 86. The United States Supreme Court in Kane v. State of New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37 S. Ct. 30, 61 L.Ed 222 (1916) held that the state may, without violating the Constitution of the United States, forbid a nonresident to operate an automobile within the state unless he has authorized the state official to receive service of process in action brought against him arising out of the operation of the automobile within the state. The court said at page 167, at page 32 of 37 S.Ct.: Then, as a state may constitutionally forbid a nonresident to operate an automobile within the state, unless he has expressly authorized a state official to receive service of process in action brought against him arising out of the operation of the automobile within the state, may a state subject him to the jurisdiction of the courts in the state in such action although he has not expressly consented to the exercise of the jurisdiction? The United States Supreme Court in Hess v. Pawloski, supra, answered this question in the positive. The State of Hawaii has power to forbid any nonresident to drive or operate any vehicle within the State unless he first consents to the exercise of jurisdiction over him by the courts of the State as to the causes of action arising out of these acts. In the exercise of its duty and responsibility to protect its citizens, the Legislature *160 of the State of Hawaii enacted Act 86 and there is no question that it is a legitimate exercise of its police power, as a state in the interest of the public, may regulate the use of its highways by its residents as well as nonresidents. Kane v. New Jersey, supra, Hess v. Pawloski, supra. Defendants' contention is that Act 86 violates the provisions of the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Hawaii as notice by publication does not meet the requirement of due process. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950) the court upheld the constitutionality of published notice as to beneficiaries whose interests or addresses were unknown to the trustee and at page 317, at page 658 of 70 S.Ct. stated: Further, we believe that under the provisions of Act 86, the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"[3] are fully met as the statute requires a plaintiff to give a defendant notice of the pendency of an action by service of a certified copy of the summons "upon the defendant personally by any person authorized to serve process in the place in which he may be found or sent by registered mail, postage prepaid, with return receipt requested * * *." Then, only when he is unable to do so the act provides: If a nonresident operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident or collision sincerely desires to be informed when suit is commenced, it is a simple matter for him to leave with a person injured or suffering damages or involved in the collision or with a police officer investigating the accident his permanent address and if and when he changes his address to so notify the person or persons of the change. By the term "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" we are not only concerned about a defendant, we must also consider the rights and interests of a plaintiff. Under § 230-33, as amended, before resorting to giving of notice by publication, a plaintiff is required to find out the address of a nonresident defendant so that service of notice may be made upon him either by a person authorized to serve process or by *161 registered or certified mail. Publication of notice is the last resort when there is no other method of notifying a nonresident defendant. Thus, we hold that Act 86 is valid and does not violate the due process clause of the United States Constitution or the Constitution of the State of Hawaii. Defendants, by operating automobiles within this State, subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of our courts as to causes of action arising out of the operation of automobilies in this State; and under the facts of the cases, we hold that notice by publication was sufficient notice and the trial court may proceed with the trial of the two cases. Affirmed. FAIRBANKS, Judge (dissenting in part). I concur with the majority on the constitutionality of § 230-33, R.L.H. 1955, as amended by Act 86, Session Laws of 1965. I dissent in Manley v. Nelson on the ground that plaintiff did not make adequate investigation into the whereabouts of the defendant Nelson to justify publication of notice. [1] House Standing Committee Report No. 165, on H.B. 10, House Journal 1953, p. 567, reads in part to-wit: "Service of process on non-residents is often difficult or impossible. The validity and constitutionality of similar statutes notably that of Massachusetts, have been upheld by the courts. Hess v. Pawloski, [274 U.S. 352] 47 Sup.Ct. 632 [71 L. Ed. 109]." [2] See footnote 1. [3] Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 339, 343, 85 L. Ed. 278; International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95.