Case Title: Grams v. Independent School District No. 742

Citation: 176 N.W.2d 536

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1970-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
176 N.W.2d 536 (1970) Joseph S. GRAMS, individually, and Stephen Grams, a minor, by Joseph Grams, his father and natural guardian, Appellants, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 742, Respondent, Don R. Nylund and Phil Rogosheske, Respondents. No. 41919. Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 10, 1970. *537 Hughes, Hughes & Hughes and Thomas J. Murphy, St. Cloud, for appellants. Donohue & Donohue, St. Cloud, for School Dist. 742. Mordaunt, Walstad, Cousineau & McGuire, Minneapolis, for respondents, Nylund & Rogosheske, did not appear or file brief. Heard before KNUTSON, C. J., and NELSON, OTIS, SHERAN and THEODORE B. KNUDSON, JJ. THEODORE B. KNUDSON, Justice.[*] Appeal by plaintiffs from an order granting a motion for summary judgment in *538 favor of defendant Independent School District No. 742, a municipal corporation of Minnesota, and denying a motion for summary judgment made by plaintiffs against said defendant and from the judgment entered pursuant to such order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint as to said defendant. Plaintiff Stephen Grams was injured while wrestling during a physical education class at the Technical High School in St. Cloud on February 19, 1968. He suffered a broken neck and injury to his spinal cord, resulting in apparent total and permanent disability of his limbs. Stephen and his father, Joseph S. Grams (hereinafter referred to as Grams), brought timely suit against defendant school district, alleging that defendants negligently failed to instruct and prepare Stephen for the dangers of wrestling and that defendants failed to provide adequate equipment and supervision. On February 27, 1968, Grams signed a form, hereinafter referred to as a notice, which was prepared by school personnel (apparently in part by codefendants) at the executive offices of the school district, blank spaces therein having been filled in by persons other than Grams, who signed it as parent. The school district was a member of the Minnesota State High School League, which provided very limited coverage for expenses incurred incident to injuries under a group accident benefit plan. In consideration of the payment of some amount by the students and their parents, students incurring injuries were compensated according to a fixed schedule. The school assigned Miss Judy Notsch of the administrative office as benefit plan administrator and took pains to see that the parents of a child injured would be notified of their limited rights under the group policy so that claims could be made within 30 days of the accident. There was no comparable procedure provided by the board of education to process notices and loss claims for injuries resulting from negligence on the part of the school district under Minn.St. c. 466, although the board had provided insurance coverage in case of loss under the provisions of that chapter. Grams signed the form at the school district offices after he had a conversation about the claim for his 15-year-old son's injury with Curtis Mogck, Judy Notsch, and other school personnel. Mogck was one of three administrative officers of the school district and the principal administrative officer on duty and then in charge for the school district. Mogck was director of business services. His duties included, in addition to business operations, the procurement of liability insurance, assistance in the preparation of the board's agenda with Mr. James K. Mitchie, superintendent, and Mr. Kermit L. Eastman, assistant superintendent, which was known as "Superintendent's Report to the Board," and attendance at board meetings. The reports are distributed to board members about 2 days in advance of the monthly board meetings. The school district is a large one with administrative offices centralized in a building adjoining the Technical High School. The board has a clerk but clerical functions are delegated to an administrative employee. In the report for the first meeting of the board after the accident, held on March 21, 1968, the following appeared as an agenda item or report: There was no reference in the board's minutes to any discussion of the incident following the report. The minutes were prepared by the superintendent's secretary who determined for the most part what would be transcribed. On March 4, 1968, the superintendent, who had been out of the city at the time of the accident, requested the principal to investigate fully "because such a file will no doubt be called for if a court case arises from same, and this no doubt will occur." (Italics supplied.) Plaintiffs contend that the form of notice states all the particulars required by the statute although it was prepared by school district employees; that it was signed by Grams in the presence of the highest administrative officer of the school district on duty and in charge at the time, within the time permitted by law, and was left at the administrative offices although no member of the governing board nor the superintendent was there; and that knowledge of the time, place, and circumstances of the accident reached the governing body by way of the superintendent's report and through Mogck and other school personnel within the time required and at the board's next meeting. At the time the notice was signed and presented to the school district in the offices of the superintendent of schools, the injured boy was in the University Hospitals incapable of doing anything to protect his interest. The trial court in its memorandum stated: Although plaintiffs admit that the notice Grams signed[1] was not intended by the *540 personnel in the school district's office as notice of a tort claim for damages, it is equally clear to this court that Grams intended the paper he signed to be a claim based on the negligence of employees of the school district for his son's injury and his own expenses in connection with the boy's treatment.[2] The school district claims that it did not receive a sufficient written notice within 30 days as required by Minn.St. 466.05. L.1963, c. 798, § 16, subd. 1, repealed Minn.St.1961, § 465.09, which enumerated negligence of employees and defects in specific types of municipal property as bases for liability of a city, village, or borough and required that notice of a claim based on such grounds be given within 30 days after the alleged loss or injury. Section 465.09 was replaced by Minn.St. 466.02, which imposes liability for its torts on "every municipality,"[3] and § 466.05, which contains the present notice provisions. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant school district on the basis of noncompliance with the notice provisions of § 466.05. The issues presented by this appeal are as follows: (1) Was the writing referred to as a notice served or presented to the governing body of the school district in compliance with the provisions of Minn.St. 466.05? (2) Was such notice legally sufficient? 1. Minn.St. 466.05, subd. 1, requires that one "who claims damages from any municipality for or on account of any loss or injury within the scope of section 466.02 shall cause to be presented to the governing body of the municipality within 30 days after the alleged loss or injury a written notice stating the time, place and circumstances thereof * * *." (Italics supplied.) This section is applicable to the St. Cloud school district by virtue of Minn.St. 466.12, subd. 3, because the defendant school district obtained insurance. Minn.St. 466.05 does not require formal service as the language "cause to be presented" appears to indicate a legislative purpose to permit bringing the claim to the attention of the board in an informal manner. This court has said that notice is properly "presented" to a village council if addressed to the council and filed with the village clerk or recorder. Doyle v. City of Duluth, 74 Minn. 157, 76 N.W. 1029; Roberts v. Village of St. James, 76 Minn. 456, 79 N.W. 519; Peterson v. Village of Cokato, 84 Minn. 205, 87 N.W. 615; Hebert v. Village of Hibbing, 170 Minn. 211, 212 N.W. 186. In a case involving service upon an officer under a charter provision, this court said, in Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 77 Minn. 76, 79, 79 N.W. 653, 654: The trial court has cited Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 143 N.W.2d 205, and Johnson v. City of Chisholm, 222 Minn. 179, 24 N.W.2d 232, in its memorandum both as to the sufficiency of the service and the necessity of written notice. Defendant also relies on them on both grounds. The Johnson case was decided prior to Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795, and Hirth was decided subsequent to Spanel (because of the date of the accident, Minn. St.1961, § 465.09, was the applicable statute) but both involved a failure to serve a written notice of claim of any description at any time. They clearly are to be distinguished from the present case where there is a written notice. Defendant likewise relies on Olcott v. City of St. Paul, 91 Minn. 207, 97 N.W. 879. In Brittain v. City of Minneapolis, 250 Minn. 376, 384, 84 N.W.2d 646, 652, this court said the following about Olcott: "This case has been distinguished many times and seems at best narrow authority for the proposition it contains." With regard to the method of serving or presenting the notice, this court said, in Roberts v. Village of St. James, 76 Minn. 456, 457, 79 N.W. 519, 520: In Lyons v. City of Red Wing, 76 Minn. 20, 22, 78 N.W. 868, 869, this court considered the question of the service of the notice on a governing body when not in session as follows: An indication of the general liberality with which this court has viewed the notice provision may be found in 13A Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 6739. Sufficiency of service is also discussed therein as follows (p. 219): In the California case of Phillips v. Huntington Beach Elementary School Dist., 8 Cal. 2d 553, 555, 66 P.2d 657, 658, the court stated in a per curiam opinion: See, Annotation, 23 A.L.R.2d 969. The trial judge made the following observation in his memorandum about the question of service on a school board: We think the request for guidelines by the trial judge is both sound and appropriate, particularly in the light of the number of school districts which have come and will come under the provisions of Minn.St. c. 466. Accordingly, we hold that service may be made on the governing board of a school district by leaving a notice with the superintendent of the district, or in his absence with anyone under his supervision then in charge of his office, to be presented to the board at its next meeting. We likewise hold that in this case the notice signed by Grams and left at the administrative office of the school district within the time required by law satisfied the requirements of service. 2. The notice is required to state "the time, place and circumstances [of the alleged loss or injury]." Minn.St. 466.05, subd. 1. Where a claim is made based upon a defect in a sidewalk, street, or other municipal property, the failure to identify the defect, the time, and more particularly the place, understandably would not apprise the municipality sufficiently so it could investigate. Unlike an injury occurring from a physical defect, the injury in this case occurred in a class where there were three instructors present. The purpose of the notice, as we held in Kandelin v. City of Ely, 110 Minn. 55, 58, 124 N.W. 449, 450, is We addressed ourselves to the purpose of the notice also in Brittain v. City of Minneapolis, 250 Minn. 376, 383, 84 N.W.2d 646, 651, where we said: This court in Hebert v. Village of Hibbing, 170 Minn. 211, 213, 212 N.W. 186, said: The Connecticut court's holding in Cassidy v. Town of Southbury, 86 Conn. 45, 84 A. 291, is commented on in Annotation, 63 A.L.R.2d 863, 868, as follows: Most of the cases refer to claims arising out of defects in, or improper maintenance of, streets, sidewalks, etc. In Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 138 Minn. 350, 352, 165 N.W. 134, this court said: The statute requires that the notice set forth the "circumstances" of the "loss or injury." According to Black, Law Dictionary (Rev. 4 ed.) p. 308, the definition *544 of "circumstances" is given as "[a]ttendant facts," or "occurrences or things which * * * attend upon," etc. In 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 569, the words "circumstances" and "facts" are given as synonyms. The trial judge, with commendable candor and courage, made the following observation about the sufficiency of the "facts" received by the school district: The notice, in our judgment, despite its form and exculpatory language, apparently written by school personnel, served the purpose it was designed to accomplish under Minn.St. 466.05 and was sufficient, as we articulated in the Kandelin case (110 Minn. 58, 124 N.W. 450), "to furnish the municipal officers information of the time and place of an accident and the nature of the injuries received, to the end that due investigation may be made to determine the truth and merits of the claims made." The notice in this case was sufficient to enable the school district to determine the facts; and we hold that defendant district received actual notice of the time, place, and circumstances of the accident. Accordingly, the requirements of the statute were met. Reversed. MURPHY and ROGOSHESKE, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [*] Acting as Justice of the Supreme Court by appointment pursuant to Minn.Const. art. 6, § 2, and Minn.St. 2.724, subd. 2. [1] of Student Stephen Grams School Technical High School "Date of Accident February 19, 1968 Time of Accident 9:20 A.M. "Description of Accident "Nature of Injury While wrestling the cervical (neck) area of spine was injured. "Place Injury Occurred Phy. Ed. Wrestling Class. "How Injury Occurred Normal wrestling procedureNothing unusual. "Cause of Injury While wrestling and other than that we do not know. "Teacher Supervisor at time of Injury Don R. Nylund, Phil Rogosheske, Jim Noonanall 3 of us present. "Who is Administering Medical or Dental attention? "Dr. Name Dr. R. Cumming and Dr. Lyle French. "1st date seen by doctor February 19, 1968. "I certify the information furnished is correct and complete, and I have not withheld any information that might disclose this claim to be invalid under the Benefit Plan rules. "Receipt of this notice is acknowledged: 2/27/68 Date Received." [2] In Grams' affidavit, he stated: "* * * [W]hat I intended to do was to make a claim against the school district, and its insurance company if they had one, although I had been led to believe they didn't have insurance; I now understand that the school district does have liability insurance to cover injuries for which it is responsible; I intended the claim form I signed to cover all Stephen's injuries and all my expenses caused by the accident; that is what I understood from the people there, and after my talk with them; I didn't get a copy of the form there; I left it there; * * *." [3] Minn.St. 466.02: "Subject to the limitations of Laws 1963, Chapter 798, every municipality is subject to liability for its torts and those of its officers, employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function." (Italics supplied.)