Case Title: State v. Bell

Citation: 351 Md. 709

Docket Number: 3/98

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1998-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
State of Maryland v. Wilbur Bell
No. 3, September Term, 1998
HEADNOTE:
Under Maryland Rule 4-246, a criminal defendant may waive his or her
jury trial right without being informed specifically in open court of the
requirement that a jury verdict must be unanimous.
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case # CT941753X
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 3
September Term, 1998
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
WILBUR BELL
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Bell, C.J., joins in the result only
Filed:
 The Court of Special Appeals, although vacating the trial court’s judgment for this reason,
1
nonetheless addressed all issues presented to that court by Mr. Bell, finding no merit in Mr. Bell’s
other claims of error.  No cross-petition was filed.
Wilbur Bell, respondent, was convicted in a court trial before the Circuit Court for
Prince George’s County of second degree rape, assault and battery, attempted rape, and
assault with intent to rape.  He was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment on the rape
conviction, with ten years suspended.  The trial court merged the remaining counts for
sentencing purposes.  Respondent appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals.
As relevant to this opinion, that court vacated his convictions and remanded the case
to the circuit court, holding that respondent had been insufficiently advised of his right to a
jury trial because the trial court failed to advise him specifically of the unanimity requirement
that all twelve jurors must agree in order to render a verdict of guilt.1
The State petitioned this Court, presenting one issue for our consideration:
Did the Court of Special Appeals incorrectly hold that Maryland Rule
4-246(b) requires an examination of a defendant on the record and in open
court regarding jury unanimity as a prerequisite for a knowing and voluntary
waiver of a jury trial?
We granted a writ of certiorari to answer this important question.  We shall reverse the Court
of Special Appeals and direct it to affirm the trial court’s judgment.
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL FACTS
On September 2, 1994, respondent was arrested pursuant to a warrant for the above-
charged offenses.  The record indicates that on November 14, 1994, he filed a demand for
a jury trial. When the case ultimately was called for trial, the following exchange occurred:
The Court: Should we bring a jury in?
- 2 - 
Mr. Hale [Defense Counsel]: No, Your Honor.  We are going to waive
a jury trial and go with a Court trial.
The Court: Okay.  Have you advised Mr. Bell of the ramifications of
that?
Mr. Hale: We have talked it over, Your Honor.  We talked it over the
last time we were here, and I haven’t talked it over yet this morning with him.
The Court: Why don’t you do that on the record[?]
Mr. Hale: Mr. Bell, stand up for a second, if you would.  Mr. Bell, how
old are you?
The Defendant: I’m thirty-four.
Mr. Hale: You can read and write the English language, right?
The Defendant: Yes.
    
Mr. Hale: You know what you are charged with, second degree rape,
a very serious charge that can get you thirty years in jail?  
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
Mr. Hale: You and I talked about whether you should have a jury trial
or judge trial, haven’t we?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
Mr. Hale: And we came to the conclusion that we would like Judge
Hotten to decide the case rather than a jury?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
Mr. Hale: Have I forced you to do that?
The Defendant: No, sir.
- 3 - 
Mr. Hale: Are you giving up your right to a jury trial freely and
voluntarily?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
Mr. Hale: Has anyone promised you anything?
The Defendant: No, sir.  
Mr. Hale: Or offered you any inducement?
The Defendant: No, sir.
Mr. Hale: Are you in good health mentally and physically?
The Defendant: No.
The Court: Have you taken any alcohol, medication or drugs?
The Defendant: No, ma’am.
The Court: Do you understand if you were to have a jury trial, which
would consist of twelve people, or whether you choose to have this member
of the bench hear the case, the State would still have the burden to prove the
charges against you beyond a reasonable doubt?
The Defendant: Yes, sir [sic].
The Court: Have you been satisfied with the services of your attorney
up to the present time?
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: Is there anything that’s been said or anything that’s been
going on so far that you don’t understand or have a question about?  
The Defendant: No, ma’am.
The Court: At this time, knowing that you give up the right to a jury
trial and that you are under the influence of no alcohol, medication or drugs,
- 4 - 
and that you are making this decision freely and voluntarily, is it your
intention to give up or waive your right to a jury trial?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Okay.
DISCUSSION
We said in Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444, 455, 408 A.2d 1302, 1307-08 (1979):
 The requirement of § d [of then Rule 735] that the defendant must
“knowingly and voluntarily” waive the right to a jury trial goes no further than
the mandates for a waiver of that right under the constitutions.  If the waiver
is determined by the court to have been an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right, it meets the test of Rule 735d. For the court to
ascertain whether it was a “known right” which was waived, § d prescribes
that the defendant have “full knowledge of his right to a jury trial.”  The
defendant-petitioners urge that “[t]he term ‘full knowledge’ certainly implies
understanding of the most salient features of trial by jury, including, at a
minimum, the composition of the jury, the jury selection process, and the
unanimity requirement.”  This goes far beyond what is necessary for a waiver
of a jury trial to be constitutionally effective; the Supreme Court has certainly
not enunciated such a test.  We do not believe that Rule 735 calls for
knowledge of all the matters which the defendant-petitioners suggest are
essential to a valid election of a court trial.  Such detailed information
regarding a jury is not indicated.  What the Rule contemplates is that the
defendant have a basic understanding of the nature of a jury trial.  We think
that this understanding is generally satisfied when the defendant entitled to a
jury trial knows that he has the right to be tried by a jury of 12 persons or by
the court without a jury; that whether trial is by a jury or by the court, his guilt
must be found to be beyond a reasonable doubt; that in a jury trial all 12 jurors
must agree that he is so guilty but in a court trial the judge may so find.  These
are the matters which the defendant acknowledges he is aware of in the written
form of election set out in § b of the Rule in designating his election of court
trial or jury trial, and normally they should suffice.  We saw no need to go
further when we adopted the Rule, and we see no need to add other matters
now.  Ordinarily if the court duly determines that the defendant understands
those aspects of a jury trial, he has, under the Rule, “full knowledge of his right
to a jury trial.” [Emphasis added.]
- 5 - 
The rule in effect at the time of our decision in Countess, Maryland Rule 735(d),
provided:
If the defendant elects to be tried by the court, the trial of the case on
its merits before the court may not proceed until the court determines, after
inquiry of the defendant on the record, that the defendant has made his
election for a court trial with full knowledge of his right to a jury trial and that
he has knowingly and voluntarily waived the right.  If the court determines
otherwise, it shall give the defendant another election pursuant to this Rule.
[Emphasis added.]  
Additionally, subsection (b) of that rule provided a form criminal defendants were required
to sign to elect a court or jury trial.  That form specified, inter alia, that the defendant knew
he had “a right to be tried by a jury of 12 persons or by the court without a jury,” and that
in a jury trial, “all 12 jurors must find that [the defendant is] guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.”  Relative to this waiver procedure, we noted in Countess, 286 Md. at 453, 408 A.2d
at 1307, that “[t]here are three aspects to this procedure: (1) the election; (2) the inquiry; and
(3) the knowledge necessary for an effective waiver of a trial by jury.” 
After our decision in Countess, this Court revised Rule 735 on November 13, 1981
(effective January 1, 1982), deleting the “full knowledge” requirement.   Additionally,
revised Rule 735 no longer required a written waiver or fixed litany of advice.  8 Md. Reg.
1928, 1929-30 (1981); see also State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 182, 582 A.2d 507, 509 (1990);
Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 132 n.7, 134, 522 A.2d 950, 954 n.7, 955 (1987) (“In
determining whether the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury
trial, the questioner need not recite any fixed incantation.”).  The rule, as modified to its
present form as Maryland Rule 4-246, provides in subsection (b):
 Both the former and the present rule require that a waiver be made knowingly and
2
voluntarily.  
 This Court has addressed the requirement of voluntariness before waiving the jury
3
trial right.  See Stewart v. State, 319 Md. 81, 570 A.2d 1229 (1990); Martinez, 309 Md. at
131-36, 522 A.2d at 953-56.
- 6 - 
(b) Procedure for acceptance of waiver.  A defendant may waive the
right to a trial by jury at any time before the commencement of trial.  The
court may not accept the waiver until it determines, after an examination of the
defendant on the record in open court conducted by the court, the State’s
Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, that the
waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily. [Emphasis added.]
As is evident from the emphasized portions of the respective rules, the requirement
of “full knowledge” contained in the former Rule 735, as it existed at the time of Countess,
has been deleted and a trial court now may accept a waiver if it is satisfied that the waiver
is made “knowingly and voluntarily.”   The current rule no longer requires the trial court to
2
establish that a defendant has “full knowledge” of the right to a jury trial.  We therefore must
address what different standard, if any, was created when the rule was modified to delete the
“full knowledge” requirement in effect at the time of Countess.  
We have not addressed, since the rule was modified in 1981, whether a defendant can
“knowingly” waive his or her right to a jury trial without a specific reference to the
unanimity requirement during the in-court advice given to a defendant about whether to elect
a court or jury trial.   We begin our analysis with the canons of statutory construction that
3
are also generally applicable in respect to rule construction.  See State v. Harrell, 348 Md.
69, 79, 702 A.2d 723, 728 (1997) (“In construing a rule, we apply principles of interpretation
- 7 - 
similar to those used to construe a statute.”); In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94, 646 A.2d 1012,
1016 (1994) (“We have repeatedly stated that the canons and principles we follow in
construing statutes apply equally to an interpretation of our rules.”). 
We have said that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the legislature.”  Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423,
429 (1995).  Legislative intent must be sought first in the actual language of the statute.
Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicles Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444-45, 697
A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346
Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (quoting Tidewater v. Mayor of Havre de Grace,
337 Md. 338, 344, 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995)); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256, 674
A.2d 951, 957 (1996); Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693, 668 A.2d 1, 2 (1995); Oaks, 339
Md. at 35, 660 A.2d at 429; Mauzey v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92, 400 A.2d 1091, 1096
(1979); Board of Supervisors v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 136, 141 A.2d 734, 736 (1958).  Where
the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple
meaning, courts normally do not look beyond the words of the statute to determine legislative
intent.  Marriott Employees, 346 Md. at 445, 697 A.2d at 458; Kaczorowski v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248
Md. 403, 414, 237 A.2d 35, 41 (1968).
In Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992), however, this
Court opined in reference to construing an alimony statute:
- 8 - 
While the language of the statute is the primary source for determining
legislative intention, the plain meaning rule of construction is not absolute;
rather, the statute must be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose,
aim, or policy of the enacting body.  The Court will look at the larger context,
including the legislative purpose, within which statutory language appears.
[Citations omitted.]  
This Court recently stated that “statutory language is not read in isolation, but ‘in light
of the full context in which [it] appear[s], and in light of external manifestations of intent or
general purpose available through other evidence.’”  Stanford v. Maryland Police Training
& Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (alterations in
original) (quoting Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989)).  To
this end, 
[w]hen we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited
to the words of the statute as they are printed . . . .  We may and often must
consider other “external manifestations” or “persuasive evidence,” including
a bill’s title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed
through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation,
and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative
purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the
particular language before us in a given case.
. . . [I]n State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van, 309 Md. 327, 524 A.2d 51
(1987), . . . [a]lthough we did not describe any of the statutes involved in that
case as ambiguous or uncertain, we did search for legislative purpose or
meaning—what Judge Orth, writing for the Court, described as “the legislative
scheme.” [Id. at] 344-45, 524 A.2d at 59.  We identified that scheme or
purpose after an extensive review of the context of Ch. 549, Acts of 1984,
which had effected major changes in Art. 27, § 297.  That context included,
among other things, a bill request form, prior legislation, a legislative
committee report, a bill title, related statutes and amendments to the bill.  See
also Ogrinz v. James, 309 Md. 381, 524 A.2d 77 (1987), in which we
considered legislative history (a committee report) to assist in construing
legislation that we did not identify as ambiguous or of uncertain meaning.
 No separate listing for “knowingly” exists in this source.  It is included, however, in th
4
definition of “knowing.”  Id. 
- 9 - 
Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15, 525 A.2d at 632-33 (some citations omitted). 
In analyzing the plain meaning of the language used in the rule, we note first that THE
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 573 (unabr. ed. 1983), defines
“full” as “2. complete; entire; maximum . . . 3. of the maximum . . . extent, volume.”  As
relevant to the case at bar, it defines “knowledge” as “1. acquaintance with facts, truths, or
principles . . . 3. acquaintance or familiarity gained by sight, experience, or report . . . 5.
awareness, as of a fact or circumstance .”  Id. at 793.  As relevant to our inquiry, that
dictionary defines “knowingly”  as “1. shrewd, sharp, or astute . . .  3. that knows; having
4
knowledge or information; intelligent; wise. 4. conscious; intentional; deliberate.”  Id.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 672 (6  ed. 1990) defines “full” as “[a]bundantly provided,
th
sufficient in quantity or degree, complete, entire, and detailed. . . .  Ample, perfect . . . not
wanting in any essential quality.”  It defines “knowledge” as “[a]cquaintance with fact or
truth.”  Id. at 872.  Finally, “knowingly” is defined as “[w]ith knowledge; consciously;
intelligently; willfully; intentionally.”  Id.  
 Under the former rule construed by Countess, the trial court was required to
determine whether a criminal defendant waived his right to a jury trial “with full knowledge”
of that right.  Given the dictionary and ordinary meanings of “full” and “knowledge,” a
defendant was required to be apprized completely of the jury’s function at trial and his right
to be tried by a jury.  We said in Countess that this meant that a defendant should have a
- 10 - 
“basic understanding of the nature of a jury trial.”  Countess, 286 Md. at 455, 408 A.2d at
1308.  It generally was believed that the record had to reflect that all aspects of the right to
a jury trial were explained to a defendant.  See Countess, 286 Md. at 455, 408 A.2d at 1308
(listing aspects of jury trial the trial court and written waiver must explain for defendant to
have “full knowledge”of his jury trial right).  That “full knowledge” requirement, however,
is no longer expressly imposed by the current rule.  See Md. Rule 4-246.  
It can be argued, therefore, as the State does now, that because full knowledge no
longer is necessary, so long as a defendant knows he is giving up his right to be tried by a
jury, possesses a general knowledge of the nature of a jury trial and waives that right
voluntarily, the dictates of the current rule are met.  The plain meaning of the present rule
supports this contention.  Rule 4-246(b) now provides that a waiver of the jury trial right
must be made “knowingly.”  This word, as relevant here, means “having knowledge or
information.”  It would seem, accordingly, that the alterations in the language of the rule
from Countess to present day would indicate this Court’s intent to replace the more stringent
“full knowledge” requirement with a more flexible “knowingly” made waiver requirement.
The history behind the present rule bears this out.  We shall turn shortly to the legislative
history of Rule 4-246 after we briefly discuss the relevance of amendments in the legislative
and rule-making process in terms of that history.
One form of legislative history useful in determining legislative intent is amendments
proposed but later rejected by the Legislature or, as in this case, rules of procedure proposed
- 11 - 
by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Rules Committee) later
rejected by the Court of Appeals.
Although we have never held that the amendment-rejection theory is a
completely determinative method of ascertaining legislative intent, we have
indicated that such action strengthens the conclusion that the Legislature did
not intend to achieve the results that the amendment would have achieved, if
adopted.  In Bosley v. Dorsey, 191 Md. 229, 240, 60 A.2d 691 (1948), for
example, we indicated that the rejection by the Senate of a bill that would have
authorized the People’s Counsel to appeal decisions of the Public Service
Commission “. . . strengthens the conclusion that the Legislature has not
intended that the [P]eople’s Counsel shall appeal from orders of the
Commission.”
Demory Bros. v. Board of Pub. Works, 273 Md. 320, 326, 329 A.2d 674, 677 (1974).  See
also NCR Corp. v. Comptroller, 313 Md. 118, 125, 544 A.2d 764, 767 (1988) (“While a
committee’s rejection of an amendment is clearly not an infallible indication of legislative
intent, it may help our understanding of overall legislative history.”); Prince George’s
County v. Commission on Human Relations, 40 Md. App. 473, 489, 392 A.2d 105, 115
(1978) (“We may, as we have herein done, consider rejection by the General Assembly of
S.B. 1241, H.B. 1982, and H.B. 1012 as an indication of the legislative will.”), vacated on
other grounds, 285 Md. 205, 401 A.2d 661 (1979).  But see Automobile Trade Ass’n v.
Insurance Comm’r, 292 Md. 15, 24, 437 A.2d 199, 203 (1981) (noting that rejection of a bill
is a “rather weak reed upon which to lean in ascertaining legislative intent.”).
This aid in evaluating legislative intent has been used frequently to interpret criminal
statutes.  For instance, in Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 77-83, 673 A.2d 221, 240-43
(1996), we held that population genetics statistics were admissible when submitted with
- 12 - 
DNA evidence because the Legislature had intended that result even though the statute was
silent on the matter.  We reasoned that, by deleting the words “unique” and “uniquely” from
the proposed Bill to enact the DNA admissibility statute, the Legislature was aware of “some
possibility of random matching,” which could be explained by population genetics statistics.
Id. at 78, 673 A.2d at 240.  
In Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 150-54, 626 A.2d 946, 952-54 (1993), we interpreted
the legislative intent behind the weapons provision contained in the Drug Kingpin Act.  The
Act, as originally drafted, would have criminalized the “use or possession” of a firearm
during or in relation to a drug trafficking offense.  The Conference Committee for the
proposed senate bill, however, deleted the word “possesses” and replaced it with “wears,
carries, or transports.”  We stated that “[b]y deleting ‘possesses,’ and replacing it with
‘wears, carries, or transports,’ terms . . . more active than ‘possesses’, the Legislature clearly
expressed an intention to require, for conviction, something more than the mere possession
of a handgun during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.”  Id. at 152, 626 A.2d at 953.
Likewise, Krauss v. State, 322 Md. 376, 386, 587 A.2d 1102, 1106 (1991), held that
a defendant’s refusal to take a Breathalyzer test could not be admitted in court as evidence
of guilt.  In analyzing the statute specifying when a refusal to take a Breathalyzer test could
be admitted, we first noted that the language of the statute prior to a 1986 amendment
provided that refusing to submit to the test created no presumption of guilt or innocence and
that a refusal to submit was “not admissible in evidence at the trial.”  Id. (quoting Md. Code
(1974, 1989 Repl. Vol.), § 10-309(a) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article).  The
- 13 - 
Legislature amended the section by removing the word “not.”  Research of the legislative
history on the amended statute revealed the Legislature originally intended to omit the “no
inference or presumption” portion of the statute, leaving only the “is admissible in evidence”
clause.  The purpose of the proposed amendment was to provide an additional penalty for
refusal to submit to a Breathalyzer test.
The Legislature’s failure to adopt the amendment as originally intended, we said, was
significant because it demonstrated the Legislature’s  recognition that refusal to submit to the
test was not material or relevant to guilt or innocence, but could be material in other
circumstances.  Id. at 386-87, 587 A.2d at 1107.  Therefore, by declining to adopt the
proposed language of the amending bill, the Legislature clearly did not intend for refusals
to submit to be admissible toward guilt.  See also Gray v. State Rds. Comm’n, 253 Md. 421,
429-30, 252 A.2d 810, 815 (1969) (“[T]he implication is well justified, that prior to the
passage of Chapter 447, the Legislature, by deleting from the Act as originally introduced,
a deduction item based on a Workmen’s Compensation award, specifically intended the
Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund to be open to invasion by subrogation . . . .”); cf. also
Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 462, 456 A.2d 894, 904 (1983)
(noting that Legislature’s repeated rejection of bills adopting comparative negligence
evidences intent to retain contributory negligence).  
Turning now to the history behind the modification of Rule 735, we note that the
Rules Committee originally proposed to the Court of Appeals an entire redraft of Rule 735
as it existed at the time.  Seventy-Fifth Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of
 The certification requirement in proposed subsection (c) was defeated 7-0.  The motion to
5
remove the “unanimity” language from subsection (b) and replace the word “knowingly” was
approved 5-2.  Minutes at 3.
- 14 - 
Practice and Procedure, 2-3 & app. (Oct. 26, 1981).  In subsection (b) of that redraft, the
Rules Committee proposed the following language:
The court may not accept the waiver until it determines, after an examination
of the defendant . . . that the defendant voluntarily waived a jury trial,
understanding that
1.  The defendant has the right to be tried by a jury of 12 persons or by
the judge without a jury; and
2.  Before a finding of guilty in a jury trial, all 12 jurors must agree
that the defendant is guilty.
Id. at app. (emphasis added).  In subsection (c), the committee proposed a certification form
the trial judge would have been required to sign for every waiver of a jury trial, which
reiterated the information listed in subsection (b).  Id. at 3 & app.  
This Court rejected both proposals.  Rules Order, 8 Md. Reg. 1928-30 (1981);
Minutes of Meeting of Court of Appeals, 3 (Nov. 6, 1981) [hereinafter Minutes]. Instead, we
inserted the words “knowingly and” immediately before “voluntarily.”  Rules Order, 8 Md.
Reg. at 1930.  We then deleted the remainder of the proposal enumerating specifically what
the defendant was required to know prior to a waiver,including the deletion of the provision
 
that the trial court specifically had to find that a defendant waived his right “understanding
that . . . all 12 jurors must agree that the defendant is guilty.”  Id.   This Court’s rejection of
5
the Committee’s proposal for the specific language in Rule 735 describing the need for
- 15 - 
twelve unanimous jurors and the certification form, which would have explained that right
in detail to the defendant, implies that we wished to move away from the rigidity of the
former rule 735 and Countess.  See State v. Marsh, 337 Md. 528, 535, 654 A.2d 1318, 1321-
22 (1995) (noting purpose of changes to Rule 735 was “to make the Rule more flexible by
eliminating the prescribed litany”).    In other words, this Court required that the judge be
certain only that the defendant had “knowingly” as well as “voluntarily” waived his jury
rights and nothing more.
  
A review of relevant case law also supports this conclusion.  In Hall, 321 Md. at 182-
83, 582 A.2d at 509, we stated: 
Our cases hold that whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the
jury trial right depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
Stewart, supra, 319 Md. at 90, 570 A.2d at 1234; Martinez, supra, 309 Md.
at 134, 522 A.2d [at 955]; Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, [235,] 428 A.2d
1220[, 1223] (1981).  In determining whether the defendant has knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial under Rule 4-246(b), “the questioner
need not recite any fixed incantation.”  Martinez, supra, 390 Md. at 134, 522
A.2d [at 955].  The court must, however, satisfy itself that the waiver is not a
product of duress or coercion and further that the defendant has some
knowledge of the jury trial right before being allowed to waive it.  Id. at 134,
522 A.2d [at 955]. [Emphasis added.]
There, we refused to overturn the defendant’s conviction even though the trial court failed
to advise him of certain details about his jury trial right:
While the court did not specifically ask Hall whether he understood
what he had been told, or whether his election of a court trial was the result of
any physical or mental duress or coercion, we think that the record before us
demonstrates that the court could fairly be satisfied that Hall had the requisite
knowledge of the jury trial right, that the waiver was voluntary, and that the
requirements of the rule were satisfied.  Moreover, the court was not required
to advise Hall, as he contends, as to the details of the jury selection process.
- 16 - 
321 Md. at 183, 582 A.2d at 510.
This Court used the same “depends upon the facts and circumstances” approach to
hold the waiver deficient in Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28, 590 A.2d 550 (1991):
Considering the totality of the circumstances in the present case, see
Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 235, 428 A.2d 1220[, 1223] (1981), we hold
that the record is woefully deficient to establish that Tibbs knowingly and
voluntarily relinquished his right to a jury trial.  The record fails to disclose
that Tibbs received any information at all concerning the nature of a jury trial,
as required by our cases.  See Hall, supra, 321 Md. at 183, 582 A.2d [at 509];
Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 522 A.2d 950 (1987).  It is not sufficient that
an accused merely respond affirmatively to a naked inquiry, either from his
lawyer or the court, that he understood that he has a right to a jury trial, that
he knows “what a jury trial is,” and waives that right “freely and voluntarily.”
Id. at 31-32, 590 A.2d at 551 (emphasis added).
As relevant to the issue presented in the case sub judice, the waiver exchange that
occurred in Tibbs was as follows:
MR. STILLRICH [Defense Counsel]:  And do you understand what a jury trial
is?  
DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.  
MR. STILLRICH:  And you indicated to me when I spoke with you at the
detention center the other evening that you desired to have the case tried
before this Court alone, is that correct?  
DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do.  
MR. STILLRICH:  And you do specifically waive your right to have the
matter tried before a jury?  
DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do.  
MR. STILLRICH:  Has anyone forced you or threatened you to have you give
up your right to a jury trial?  
- 17 - 
DEFENDANT:  No, they haven’t.  
MR. STILLRICH:  Have you given up your right to a jury trial freely and
voluntarily?  
DEFENDANT:  Yes, I have.
. . . .
MR. STILLRICH:  Your Honor, I would proffer to the Court that a waiver of
a jury trial is freely and voluntarily tendered.
. . . .
THE COURT:  All right.
Id. at 30, 590 A.2d at 551 (alteration in original).  
In contrast to the case sub judice, the defendant in Tibbs was given no explanation of
the nature of a jury trial.  The advice given was limited to questions relating to voluntariness,
i.e., that Tibbs was not coerced or placed under duress in waiving his jury trial right.  The
record in the present case reflects a more extensive litany, notwithstanding that no specific
advisement of the unanimity requirement was given.  The trial judge explained to respondent
the other fundamentals of a jury trial: that a jury “would consist of twelve people” and that,
under either choice, the trier of fact would have to find him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.  Respondent and his trial counsel also had discussed the right to a jury trial prior to
the hearing.  Cf. State v. Kenney, 327 Md. 354, 364, 609 A.2d 337, 342 (1992) (holding
defense counsel’s on-record waiver on client’s behalf of right to twelve-person jury after off-
record discussion with him was valid).  We may presume that respondent’s counsel fully
informed him of his rights during their pre-trial discussion.  Id. at 362, 609 A.2d at 341
- 18 - 
(citing Fowler v. State, 237 Md. 508, 515, 206 A.2d 802, 806 (1965); Stevens v. State, 232
Md. 33, 39, 192 A.2d 73, 77, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 886, 84 S. Ct. 160, 11 L. Ed. 2d 115
(1963)).  See also Ayala v. State, 226 Md. 488, 493, 174 A.2d 160, 163 (1961) (noting
presumption that “an attorney will conduct himself as the law and his duty require him to
do.” (citing Woodell v. State, 223 Md. 89, 95, 162 A.2d 468, 472 (1960)).
The trial court completed the waiver inquiry by asking whether respondent had any
questions or did not understand anything that had transpired, to which he replied: “No,
ma’am.”  The record, therefore, reflects that, under the “totality of the circumstances,” the
defendant had “some knowledge” of his jury trial rights, at least enough to satisfy the trial
court that respondent knowingly waived his jury trial right.  See Tibbs, 323 Md. at 31, 590
A.2d at 551; Hall, 321 Md. at 182-83, 582 A.2d at 509; Martinez, 309 Md. at 134, 522 A.2d
at 955.
A review of this issue in other jurisdictions reveals a variety of approaches.  Some
states agree that defendants can “knowingly and voluntarily” waive their jury trial right
without being informed specifically that a jury’s verdict must be unanimous.  See People v.
Fields, 65 Cal. App. 4th 698, 699, 76 Cal. Rept. 2d 700, 702 (1998) (“In accepting the
waiver of the right to a jury trial, the trial court does not have a duty to sua sponte tell a
defendant who is represented by competent counsel . . . that a jury trial requires [an]
unanimous verdict.” (citing People v. Tijerina, 1 Cal. 3d 41, 45-46, 459 P.2d 680, 682
(1969)); Tucker v. State, 547 So. 2d 270, 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require a defendant to be informed that jury verdict must
- 19 - 
be unanimous before waiver of jury trial); People v. James, 192 Mich. App. 568, 571, 481
N.W.2d 715, 717 (1992) (holding waiver valid because Michigan law does not require that
a defendant be informed of unanimity requirement); People v. Dennis, 210 A.D. 2d 803, 804-
05, 620 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (1994) (upholding waiver made knowingly and voluntarily even
though trial court did not inform defendant of unanimity requirement).  See also United
States ex rel. Wandick v. Chrans, 869 F.2d 1084, 1088 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that states
are not constitutionally required to follow litany guidelines recommended by federal courts
for a knowing and voluntary waiver).
A number of jurisdictions, including several federal circuits, recommend that
defendants be informed of the aspects of a jury trial, including unanimity, before “knowingly
and voluntarily” waiving their right to a jury, but do not so require.  In State v. Redden, 199
W. Va. 660, 667, 487 S.E.2d 318, 325-26 (1997), for example, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia declined “to set forth a specific formulation of the degree or kind
of knowledge about the nature of the right to a jury trial,” but implored the lower courts to
inform defendants about unanimity anyway.  That court backed away from its request in
State ex rel. Ring v. Boober, 200 W. Va. 66, 73, 488 S.E.2d 66, 68, 73 (1997), when it
affirmed a standard written jury trial waiver form that did not mention unanimity.  The court
reiterated that Redden “specifically declined to adopt a specific list of things that a defendant
must know before waiving his right to a jury trial.”  Id.  See also United States v. Duarte-
Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 1997) (declining to impose “a colloquy in every
case” but suggesting court “should inform the defendant that . . . a jury verdict must be
- 20 - 
unanimous.”); United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1432 (10th Cir. 1995) (joining
sister circuit courts that recommend but do not mandate waiver guidelines); Marone v.
United States, 10 F.3d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1993) (suggesting that defendant be informed of
“fundamental attributes” of jury trial, but Constitution does not require litany); United States
v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 852-53 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that trial courts should, but need
not, conduct colloquy which describes unanimity); United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267,
273 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting defendant would be “sufficiently informed” if unanimity
requirement were made known, but “technical knowledge” not required); United States v.
Anderson, 704 F.2d 117, 119 (3d Cir.) (declining to create supervisory rule mandating pre-
waiver colloquy), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S. Ct. 129, 78 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1983);
Ciummei v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504, 509-10, 392 N.E.2d 1186, 1189 (1979) (“We
do not intend to create a rigid pattern but note that . . . the judge might state that the . . .
verdict of the jury must be unanimous . . . .”); State v. Ross, 472 N.W.2d 651, 654 (Minn.
1991) (recommending that defendants be informed of all aspects of jury trial but affirming
conviction of defendant not informed of necessity of unanimous verdict); State v. Ellis, 953
S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (enunciating colloquy that would sufficiently
inform defendant, including unanimity, but noting that procedural rule does not mandate it).
Finally, some jurisdictions require trial courts to inform defendants fully of their jury
trial rights, including that the jury must vote unanimously in order to convict.  See United
States v. Delgado, 635 F.2d 889, 890 (7th Cir. 1981) (advising federal district courts to
explain to defendants that juries must vote unanimously before conviction); Commonwealth
- 21 - 
v. Hughes, 536 Pa. 355, 374, 639 A.2d 763, 772 (1994) (“[T]he trial court must conduct a
colloquy wherein it apprises the defendant . . . that the [jury] verdict must be unanimous .
. . .”); State v. Resio, 148 Wis. 2d 687, 696-97, 436 N.W.2d 603, 607 (1989) (directing lower
courts to “advise the defendant that the court cannot accept a jury verdict that is not agreed
to by each member of the jury.”); cf. Lopez v. United States, 615 A.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C.
1992) (holding defendant’s waiver invalid because, inter alia, she was not informed of
unanimity requirement).  In Vermont, the requirement that the trial judge explain unanimity
to the defendant before a waiver can be valid emanates specifically from a criminal
procedure rule.  State v. West, 164 Vt. 192, 199, 667 A.2d 540, 545 (1995) (noting rule
requires judge to inform defendant pre-waiver that “any verdict of guilty must be
unanimous.”).  Therefore, it appears that a majority of jurisdictions either have no
requirement that a trial court must describe jury unanimity to the defendant or only
recommend that they do so before a defendant can “knowingly and voluntarily” waive his
jury trial right.
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the record reflects that the discussion
between respondent, defense counsel, and the trial court provided respondent with sufficient
information about jury trials and his right to have such a trial.  Respondent possessed
substantial “knowledge” of his jury trial right and, therefore, he “knowingly” waived that
right.  “Knowledge,” in this context means “acquaintance” with the principles of a jury and
“knowingly” means acting consciously or intentionally in waiving the right to a jury.  See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 872; RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, supra, at 793.
 We shall refer the issue of whether a defendant should be expressly advised of the unanimity
6
requirement to the Rules Committee for its consideration and recommendation.
- 22 - 
Because respondent’s knowledge no longer need be “full,” it need not be “complete” or
“entire.”  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 672, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY,
supra, at 573.  The rule no longer requires a specific in-court litany of advice with respect
to the “unanimity” requirement for the trial court to accept and permit the waiver, by a
defendant, of his right to a jury trial.   Accordingly, the trial court did not err in accepting the
6
waiver by respondent.
Chief Judge Bell joins in the result only.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY;
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT 
OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY
RESPONDENT.