Case Title: FRONTIER REFINING, INC. v. PAYNE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
FRONTIER REFINING, INC. v. PAYNE2001 WY 4923 P.3d 38Case Number: 00-227Decided: 05/17/2001
 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                            

 

FRONTIER 
REFINING, INC.

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

VIRGIL 
L. PAYNE,

 Appellee(Respondent) 
.

 

 

W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certification from the District Court of Laramie 
County

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Alexander 
K. Davison and Wendy J. Curtis of Patton & Davison, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Peter K. 
Michael, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

  

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 [¶1]           
Appellant 
Frontier Refinery, Inc. (Frontier) challenges a hearing examiner's award of 
worker compensation benefits to its employee, Virgil L. Payne (Payne), claiming 
that the evidence did not satisfy the proper burden of proof.  We affirm the order granting 
benefits.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Frontier 
presents these issues for our review:

 

1.  Is the Office's decision that appellee's 
injury is compensable in accordance with Wyoming law governing pre-existing 
conditions.

 

2.  Is there substantial evidence in the 
record to support the Office's finding that appellee met the burden of proof 
required for pre-existing conditions?

 

 

Appellee 
Payne believes that the sole issue is:

 

Whether 
substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's decision that Mr. Payne's 
work caused him to suffer a material aggravation of his carpal tunnel syndrome 
that led to surgery and temporary total disability.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
The 
parties agree that Payne suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) in his right 
wrist and that this condition arose over a long period of time.  Payne was diagnosed with this condition 
on November 24, 1995, by Reed Shafer, M.D., a Cheyenne neurologist.  Payne reported the diagnosis as a 
work-related injury to his employer, Frontier, and, after surgery, applied for 
temporary total disability.  The 
Division granted benefits; however, Frontier objected and, after a hearing, 
benefits were denied for failure to timely file an injury report.  This Court reversed that denial and 
remanded for a hearing.  Payne v. 
Frontier Refining, Inc., 993 P.2d 313 (Wyo. 1999).

 

[¶4]           
At the 
hearing, Payne presented evidence pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a) 
(Lexis 1999) that his CTS was a compensable injury occurring over a substantial 
period of time. Alternatively, he claimed that if his CTS was not caused by his 
employment, it was compensable because his work aggravates the pre-existing 
condition.  Payne presented expert 
testimony from his surgeon and an orthopedic specialist.  Frontier provided expert testimony by an 
osteopathic physician, who specializes in the area of occupational 
medicine.  The hearing examiner 
determined that Payne's CTS is not work-related and is a pre-existing condition 
that his work aggravated, accelerated, or combined with his CTS to produce a 
compensable injury.  Benefits were 
granted to cover surgery, medical treatment, and temporary total 
disability.  Frontier appealed, and 
the district court certified the case to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09.  

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶5]           
Judicial 
review of agency action is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (Lexis 
1999):

 

            
(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 

* * 
*

 

(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 

* * 
*

 

                        
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence . . . .

 

See also 
W.R.A.P. 
12.09(a).  

 

[¶6]           
When 
reviewing an agency's findings of fact, this Court applies the substantial 
evidence standard.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E) (Lexis 1999).  

 

We 
review an administrative agency's findings of fact by applying the substantial 
evidence standard.  Our task is to 
examine the entire record to determine whether substantial evidence supported 
the hearing examiner's findings.  We 
will not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing examiner when 
substantial evidence supports his decision.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.

 

Leavitt 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 980 P.2d 332, 334 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting DeWall v. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. 
Div., 960 P.2d 502, 503 (Wyo. 1998)).  
Accordingly, "we examine only the evidence which favors the prevailing 
party, allowing every favorable inference, while omitting consideration of any 
conflicting evidence."   
Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 876 (Wyo. 
1994) (citing Matter of Injury to Carpenter, 736 P.2d 311, 312 (Wyo. 
1987)).   

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]           
Frontier 
challenges the hearing examiner's conclusion that Payne's CTS was a pre-existing 
condition that his work aggravated, accelerated, or combined with his CTS to 
produce a compensable injury.  

 

            
(xi) "Injury" means any harmful change in the human organism other than 
normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and 
death, arising out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about 
the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at 
work in places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence and 
which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the 
business.  "Injury" does not 
include:

 

* * 
*

 

            
(F) Any injury or condition preexisting at the time of employment with 
the employer against whom a claim is made[.]

 

Wyo.  Stat. Ann.  § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(F) (Lexis 
1999).

            

[¶8]           
A 
preexisting condition may present a compensable claim "if the employment 
aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce 
the * * * disability for which compensation is sought."  Haynes v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Comp. Div., 962 P.2d 876, 878 (Wyo. 1998).  The claimant seeking damages for 
aggravation of a preexisting injury must prove that the "work effort contributed 
to a material degree to the precipitation, aggravation or acceleration of the 
existing condition of the employee."  
Id.; Lindbloom v. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 684 P.2d 1388, 
1389-90 (Wyo. 1984).

 

[¶9]           
Frontier 
contends that we recently decided that a claimant must prove three additional 
elements to demonstrate material aggravation and Payne failed to meet this 
burden.  This assertion relies upon 
Frazier v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 997 P.2d 487 (Wyo. 2000).  Frazier did 
not establish a three-part material aggravation test.  It applied the Lindbloom standard 
and, additionally, examined whether the hearing examiner's decision that an 
injury did not occur at work was supported by the record.  In doing so, this Court did focus on the 
particular facts of the case to determine whether a specific injury occurred on 
a specific date, but that analysis has no application to the facts of this case 
where no specific incident is alleged to have caused Payne's 
CTS.

 

[¶10]       
Because 
Payne claimed that his CTS occurred over a substantial period of time, the 
hearing examiner applied Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a)(i) through (v) (Lexis 
1999):

 

Burden 
of proof; required proof of circumstances; coronary conditions; 
hernia.

 

            
(a) The burden of proof in contested cases involving injuries which occur 
over a substantial period of time is on the employee to prove by competent 
medical authority that his claim arose out of and in the course of his 
employment and to prove by a preponderance of evidence 
that:

            
(i) There is a direct causal connection between the condition or 
circumstances under which the work is performed and the 
injury;

            
(ii) The injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the 
work as a result of the employment;

            
(iii) The injury can fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate 
cause;

            
(iv) The injury does not come from a hazard to which employees would have 
been equally exposed outside of the employment; and

            
(v) The injury is incidental to the character of the business and not 
independent of the relation of employer and employee.

 

[¶11]       
In the 
findings of fact, the hearing examiner determined that Drs. Hall and Lovejoy 
agree that Payne's work at the refinery aggravated his pre-existing, non-work 
related, CTS.  Dr. Hall 
stated:

 

And if I 
might reiterate, what I said was, his work activities either caused his symptoms 
to occur, given the fact that he has carpal tunnel syndrome, in other words, an 
increased pressure within the carpal tunnel or increased incidence of symptoms 
by virtue of the necessity to move the wrist away from this neutral 
position.  So I want to make it 
clear that his work is not a cause of  as far as I know, it is not a cause of 
carpal tunnel syndrome.  It's just 
that his symptomatology as a result of that condition was increased as a result 
of his work activities.

 

* * 
*

His 
symptoms were either provoked by his work endeavors or increased as a result of 
his work endeavors.  

 

The 
hearing examiner concluded:

 

6.  Where the condition for which 
compensation is sought involves complex medical issues, the technical knowledge 
and testimony of medical experts may be both highly persuasive and relevant to 
the resolution of questions concerning causation.

 

* * 
*

8.  Payne has proven that his pre-existing 
CTS condition is aggravated by his employment and has met the additional burdens 
established in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a) (Michie 1995) for an injury 
occurring over a substantial period of time.

 

[¶12]       
Examining 
the entire record, the hearing examiner found for Payne because the expert 
testimony established evidence supporting a decision that Payne's CTS was a 
preexisting condition materially aggravated by work.  Expert medical testimony was presented 
by both sides, and we agree with the hearing examiner's determination that both 
Frontier's expert and Payne's expert supported its decision.  Frontier's contention that other factors 
aggravated the CTS cannot be addressed under our standard as this Court cannot 
re-evaluate the evidence and make an independent determination on the issue or 
assess witness credibility.  Rather, 
this Court simply searches the record to determine if substantial evidence was 
presented supporting the hearing examiner's decision.  Such a review of the present record 
discloses expert medical testimony, notes in several doctors' records, medical 
testing and reports that support the hearing examiner's decision, and we defer 
to the hearing examiner's findings as to these factual matters.  

 

[¶13]       
The 
order granting benefits is affirmed.