Case Title: State ex rel. Jordan v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2004-Ohio-2115

Docket Number: 20031305

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Jordan v. Indus. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 153, 2004-Ohio-2115.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. JORDAN, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Jordan v. Indus. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 153, 2004-Ohio-
2115.] 
Workers’ compensation — Application for wage-loss compensation denied by 
Industrial Commission — Court of appeals’ judgment upholding 
commission’s order reversed — Industrial Commission ordered to 
conduct further proceedings and issue an amended order, when. 
(No. 2003-1305 — Submitted March 30, 2004 — Decided May 12, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 02AP-1110, 2003-
Ohio-2945. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellant-claimant, Jimmie L. Jordan Jr., broke his left wrist at 
work on September 28, 2000.  Appellee-employer Ford Motor Company 
thereafter offered — and claimant accepted — a light-duty job at the same hourly 
wage as before.  Unlike his prior job, however, claimant, for reasons yet to be 
determined, received substantially less overtime, despite an absence of medical 
restrictions limiting the number of hours he could work.  Consequently, 
claimant’s weekly earnings were usually less than those before his injury. 
{¶2} 
Claimant eventually moved for wage-loss compensation pursuant 
to R.C. 4123.56(B).  A district hearing officer (“DHO”) for appellee Industrial 
Commission of Ohio denied the application, finding no causal relationship 
between claimant’s injury and his reduced hours.  Without explaining, the DHO 
said simply that “[a]ny loss of overtime would appear to be related to any number 
of factors.”  A staff hearing officer (“SHO”) also denied the application, but for 
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other reasons.  In an ambiguous order, the SHO suggested the absence of an 
actual wage loss in citing a lack of evidence that others in claimant’s former 
position of employment were still receiving overtime.  She also, however, 
mentioned a lack of evidence that claimant would have accepted overtime if 
offered, implying no causal relationship between wage loss and injury.  Further 
consideration was denied. 
{¶3} 
Claimant petitioned the Court of Appeals for Franklin County for a 
writ of mandamus, claiming that the commission had abused its discretion in 
denying his request for compensation.  The court of appeals, speaking through its 
magistrate, noted that “the record includes no evidence to show why claimant did 
not receive overtime hours.”  Rather than order the commission to reconsider the 
application, however, the court denied the writ, prompting claimant’s appeal to 
this court as of right. 
{¶4} 
Compensation for wage loss demands actual wage loss and a 
causal connection to injury.  State ex rel. Watts v. Schottenstein Stores Corp. 
(1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 118, 623 N.E.2d 1202.  The commission’s denial is 
conflicting, drifting between suggestions of no actual wage loss and no causal 
relationship.  The court of appeals upheld the commission’s order, but clearly on 
the basis of no causal relationship.  For the reasons to follow, we reverse that 
judgment and order the commission to conduct further proceedings and issue an 
amended order. 
{¶5} 
The parties agree that claimant was making approximately $1,300 
per week when injured.  He quickly took light-duty work with the same employer 
at the same $22.23 hourly rate as before.  From these numbers, it follows that if 
the claimant was earning $1,300 weekly, he was working considerable overtime 
to get it. 
{¶6} 
During the disputed period, claimant worked minimal overtime 
with a commensurate decline in earnings, and it is around this that controversy 
January Term, 2004 
3 
revolves.  The commission’s order implied that no wage loss existed, based on the 
absence of evidence that others in claimant’s former classification were still 
receiving overtime during that period.  Claimant assails that reasoning, citing 
State ex rel. Bos v. Navistar Internatl. Transp. Corp. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 314, 
738 N.E.2d 791. 
{¶7} 
Bos involved a claimant whose former associates apparently 
received a raise after injury forced claimant into a lower-paying assignment.  The 
commission refused to compare claimant’s post-injury earnings with those of his 
fellow employees to calculate wage-loss differential, and the court of appeals 
upheld the order.  We did not, however, address this holding, confining our 
analysis instead to the novel wage-averaging proposal raised in Navistar’s sole 
proposition of law. 
{¶8} 
Bos does not, therefore, advance claimant’s argument, but that 
does not detract from his position’s overall viability.  Ohio Adm.Code 4125-1-
01(F) prescribes the claimant’s average weekly wage as the preinjury benchmark 
against which to compare post-injury earnings.  Therefore, any changes to what 
claimant could have been making had he remained at his former position of 
employment — via raises or overtime — are irrelevant.  Bos renders even less 
germane to the question of actual wage loss the earnings of others and the amount 
of their underlying overtime.  The commission thus abused its discretion to the 
extent that it attempted to assess claimant’s wage loss by comparing it to the 
overtime available to those in his former position. 
{¶9} 
Actual wage loss is, of course, inconsequential absent a causal 
relationship to claimant’s allowed conditions.  The DHO specifically found no 
causal relationship between the industrial injury and reduced wages, but the SHO 
adopted completely different reasoning in denying claimant’s wage-loss 
application.  The SHO having found no actual wage loss, the question of causal 
relationship became moot, and the SHO went no further.  She did offhandedly 
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refer to a lack of evidence that “claimant would have accepted such overtime if 
offered,” but that is not entirely accurate.  Claimant’s preinjury pattern of 
routinely performing overtime, at a minimum, suggests his willingness to accept 
overtime. 
{¶10} Acceptance, however, is predicated on overtime being offered, 
and, on this, the commission is silent.  Two key questions thus remain 
unaddressed.  First, was overtime offered?  If it was and was declined, claimant’s 
refusal — unless supported by medical restrictions on the number of hours 
claimant could work — would break the requisite causal connection.  Second, if it 
was not offered, then why not?  If, for example, overtime was rescinded on a 
plantwide basis for economic reasons, then again there would be no causal 
connection.  If, however, the employer singled out claimant because of his injury, 
a causal relationship between injury and wage loss could be present. 
{¶11} For these reasons, further consideration of the question of causal 
relationship is warranted.  The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and 
the cause is returned to the commission for further proceedings and an amended 
order. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
___________________ 
Gallon & Takacs Co., L.P.A., and Theodore A. Bowman, for appellant. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Dennis L. Hufstader, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Bugbee & Conkle, L.L.P., Robert L. Solt and Mark S. Barnes, for appellee 
Ford Motor Company. 
__________________