Case Title: CommCan, Inc. v. Mansfield

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13029

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13029 
 
COMMCAN, INC., & another1  vs.  TOWN OF MANSFIELD. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 3, 2021. - August 30, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Marijuana.  Municipal Corporations, Marijuana, By-laws and 
ordinances.  Zoning, Validity of by-law or ordinance. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on July 
18, 2019. 
 
 
The case was heard by Howard P. Speicher, J., on a motion 
for summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Noemi Kawamoto for the defendant. 
 
Jason R. Talerman for the plaintiffs. 
 
Valerio G. Romano, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
Adam D. Fine & Brandon R. Kurtzman, for Vicente Sederberg 
LLP, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
 
1 Ellen Rosenfeld, as trustee of the Ellen Realty Trust. 
2 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  The recent legalization of the sale of 
marijuana for recreational use has led to predictable disputes 
over the proper application of G. L. c. 94G (act).  Here the 
plaintiffs and the town of Mansfield (town) have differing 
interpretations of G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a) (1) (§ 3 [a] [1]), 
which, with some exceptions, exempts medical marijuana 
dispensaries from zoning ordinances that would prohibit them 
from converting to retail marijuana sales. 
In 2016 Ellen Rosenfeld, in her roles as trustee of the 
Ellen Realty Trust (Rosenfeld) and president of CommCan, Inc. 
(CommCan), had taken all of the necessary steps and received 
authorization from the town to construct a building that would 
house a medical marijuana dispensary on an unimproved lot owned 
by the Ellen Realty Trust.  Before construction began, the act 
legalized the sale of recreational marijuana.  Rosenfeld and 
CommCan (collectively, plaintiffs) thereafter sought a 
determination from the Land Court that, pursuant to § 3 (a) (1), 
the town may not prevent CommCan from converting to a retail 
marijuana establishment.  A judge allowed the plaintiffs' motion 
for summary judgment, and the town appealed.  We affirm.2 
 
Background.  We summarize the pertinent facts, which are 
undisputed and are supported by the record.  The property is a 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Valerio 
Romano and Vicente Sederberg LLP. 
3 
 
parcel of land located in a planned business district zone where 
the dispensing of medical marijuana is allowed by special 
permit. 
In July 2016, CommCan was granted a provisional certificate 
of registration to operate a medical marijuana dispensary at the 
property by the Department of Public Health.  In the following 
months, CommCan and the town executed a host community 
agreement,3 and the town planning board granted Rosenfeld a 
special permit to construct the dispensary.  Before construction 
commenced, an abutting landowner brought a lawsuit challenging 
the grant of the special permit.4  Construction of the dispensary 
was halted pending the outcome of the litigation. 
In November 2016, voters approved the legalization of the 
sale and use of recreational marijuana in the Commonwealth.  See 
Regulation and Taxation of Marijuana Act, St. 2016, c. 334, 
§§ 1-12, codified at G. L. c. 94G, §§ 1 et seq.  The next year, 
 
3 A host community agreement is an agreement between the 
prospective marijuana establishment and the host community 
"setting forth the conditions to have a marijuana establishment 
. . . located within the host community."  G. L. c. 94G, 
§ 3 (d).  Although such agreements were not mandated by the 
State at the time CommCan and the town executed the agreement, 
the Legislature since has altered the statutory framework to 
require that prospective establishments must execute an 
agreement with the host community before applying for licensure 
with the State.  See St. 2017, c. 55, § 25, codified at G. L. 
c. 94G, § (3) (d). 
 
4 See West St. Assocs. LLC v. Planning Bd. of Mansfield, 488 
Mass.    (2021). 
4 
 
amendments to the act went into effect, implementing a procedure 
for the retail sale of marijuana for adult recreational use.  
See St. 2017, c. 55, §§ 20-43 (amending G. L. c. 94G). 
In June 2019, CommCan sent a letter to the town requesting 
a meeting to discuss conversion of the property to a 
recreational marijuana retail establishment.  The town declined 
to meet with CommCan, referencing the fact that the property's 
location was not zoned for retail recreational marijuana sales.  
The plaintiffs thereafter filed a complaint in the Land Court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 240, § 14A, seeking a determination that 
the town's zoning bylaw could not operate to prevent CommCan 
from converting to a retail marijuana establishment.  See G. L. 
c. 94G, § 3 (a) (1).  The motion judge allowed the plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment; the town appealed.  We transferred 
the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  As an initial matter, the town argues that the 
plaintiffs are not authorized to bring a claim under G. L. 
c. 240, § 14A, which allows a landowner to obtain a declaratory 
judgment from the Land Court regarding the validity of a zoning 
ordinance or bylaw as it pertains to the property at issue.5  The 
statute provides: 
 
5 The town frames the issue as one of standing; however, 
whether a party has a cause of action under G. L. c. 240, § 14A, 
is not a question of standing.  See Hansen & Donahue, Inc. v. 
Norwood, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 292, 295 n.8 (2004), citing 
5 
 
"The owner of a freehold estate in possession in land may 
bring a petition in the land court against a city or town 
wherein such land is situated, . . . for determination as 
to the validity of a municipal ordinance, by-law or 
regulation, passed or adopted under the provisions of 
[G. L. c. 40A] or under any special law relating to zoning, 
so called, which purports to restrict or limit the present 
or future use, enjoyment, improvement or development of 
such land, or any part thereof, or of present or future 
structures thereon, including alterations or repairs, or 
for determination of the extent to which any such municipal 
ordinance, by-law or regulation affects a proposed use, 
enjoyment, improvement or development of such land by the 
erection, alteration or repair of structures thereon or 
otherwise as set forth in such petition. . . .  The court 
may make binding determinations of right interpreting such 
ordinances, by-laws or regulations whether any 
consequential judgment or relief is or could be claimed or 
not." 
 
G. L. c. 240, § 14A.  Thus, to bring a claim under G. L. c. 240, 
§ 14A, the party must (1) own the property in question and (2) 
allege that the zoning bylaw or ordinance in question 
"restrict[s] or limit[s] the present or future use, enjoyment, 
improvement or development" of that property. 
It is undisputed that Ellen Realty Trust, of which 
Rosenfeld is the trustee, is the owner of the property.  
Moreover, the fact that the zoning bylaw does not allow for the 
retail sale of marijuana for recreational use in the area where 
the property is located plainly restricts the use of the 
property.  Therefore, G. L. c. 240, § 14A, authorizes Rosenfeld 
 
Bobrowski, Massachusetts Land Use & Planning Law § 3.05[B], at 
111 (2d ed. 2002) ("Standing is something of a misnomer in 
evaluating the right to bring a c. 240, § 14A, petition"). 
6 
 
to pursue the claim.  See Woods v. Newton, 349 Mass. 373, 376 
(1965) ("Owners of freehold estates in possession are expressly 
authorized by G. L. c. 240, § 14A[,] . . . to petition the Land 
Court for a determination of the validity of zoning enactments 
affecting their land or structures thereon").  Moreover, as 
Rosenfeld is the president of CommCan and CommCan has a 
provisional registration to operate a dispensary on the 
property, it is a proper coplaintiff. 
 
Turning to the substance of the appeal, "[o]ur review of a 
motion judge's decision on summary judgment is de novo, because 
we examine the same record and decide the same questions of 
law."  Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 792 (2018), 
quoting Kiribati Seafood Co. v. Dechert LLP, 478 Mass. 111, 116 
(2017).  Here, the single issue raised is the interpretation of 
§ 3 (a) (1). 
 
Section 3 (a) gives municipalities the power to regulate 
the number and location of retail marijuana establishments 
within their borders with certain exceptions.  One such 
exception is that "zoning ordinances or by-laws shall not 
operate to . . . prevent the conversion of a medical marijuana 
treatment center licensed or registered not later than July 1, 
2017[,] engaged in the cultivation, manufacture or sale of 
marijuana or marijuana products to a marijuana [retail 
facility]."  § 3 (a) (1).  The town argues that the plaintiffs 
7 
 
do not qualify for a zoning exemption because they are not 
"engaged in the . . . sale of marijuana or marijuana products" 
(emphasis added). 
 
"Our primary duty is to interpret a statute in accordance 
with the intent of the Legislature."  Pyle v. School Comm. of 
S. Hadley, 423 Mass. 283, 285 (1996).  "[C]onsistent with our 
general practice of statutory interpretation, we look first to 
the language of the statute because it is the 'principal source 
of insight' into the intent of the legislature."  Sisson v. 
Lhowe, 460 Mass. 705, 708 (2011), quoting Bishop v. TES Realty 
Trust, 459 Mass. 9, 12 (2011).  See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 476 
Mass. 768, 777 (2017), citing Commonwealth v. Peterson, 476 
Mass. 163, 167 (2017) ("The plain language of the statute, read 
as a whole, provides the primary insight into that intent"). 
 
Because the statute does not define "engaged," "we give the 
term its 'usual and accepted meaning[],' as long as it is 
'consistent with the statutory purpose.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 372 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Zone 
Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977).  To be "engaged" in 
something is to be "involved in activity; occupied; busy."  
Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 413 (11th ed. 2003).  
See Zone Book, Inc., supra ("We derive the words' usual and 
accepted meaning from sources presumably known to the statute's 
8 
 
enactors, such as their use in other legal contexts and 
dictionary definitions"). 
It is undisputed that the plaintiffs applied for and 
obtained the requisite provisional State license, executed a 
host community agreement with the town, and procured a special 
permit from the town's planning board.  Although construction 
has not begun at the property, the plaintiffs vigorously have 
litigated the abutter's appeal of the special permit authorizing 
the dispensary.6  It hardly can be said that the plaintiffs were 
not "involved in" and "occupied" by the sale of marijuana, even 
though the dispensary is not yet operational.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Sovrensky, 269 Mass. 460, 462 (1929) ("one may 
be engaged in the business of selling although he [or she] has 
made no sale").  Cf. Green v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 
Southborough, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 126, 131-132 (2019) (developer 
"exercised" its use variance by taking necessary legal and 
conceptual steps to prepare property for construction). 
 
The town argues that the phrase "engaged in" means 
"actually being 'engaged in'" an activity (emphasis added).  
Thus, according to the town, to qualify for the zoning 
 
6 The town argues that the judge improperly took judicial 
notice that it is impractical to begin construction when a 
zoning permit is being appealed.  Putting aside whether this was 
a proper use of judicial notice, we will not penalize the 
plaintiffs for waiting to begin construction until the 
permitting issue is resolved. 
9 
 
exemption, the plaintiffs actually must have been distributing 
marijuana from the property in order to be covered by the 
statute.7  To begin, the town's interpretation ignores the plain 
meaning of the term "engaged" and requires the addition of the 
word "actually" into the text of the statute.  See Commonwealth 
v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 435 (2011) ("as a matter of 
statutory construction, we cannot supply words the Legislature 
chose not to include"). 
 
Further, it is plain from the statutory language that the 
purpose of the provision is to make it easier for medical 
marijuana dispensaries to convert to retail marijuana sales.  
See Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 475 Mass. 820, 821 (2016) ("Clear 
and unambiguous language is conclusive as to legislative 
intent").  The only condition of consequence set by § 3 (a) (1) 
 
7 The town argues that revisions made to G. L. c. 94G, § 3, 
in 2017 supports this argument; we disagree.  The original 
version of the statute states that zoning ordinances "shall not 
prohibit placing a marijuana establishment . . . in any area in 
which a medical marijuana treatment center is registered to 
engage in the same type of activity" (emphasis added).  See St. 
2016, c. 334, § 5.  As discussed supra, the current version of 
the statute states that municipalities may not "prevent the 
conversion of a medical marijuana treatment center licensed or 
registered not later than July 1, 2017[,] engaged in the . . . 
sale of marijuana" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 94G, § 3 (a) (1), 
as amended through St. 2017, c. 55, § 23.  Although both 
versions of § 3 (a) (1) bar zoning ordinances from unduly 
restricting the location of retail marijuana establishments, 
only the amended version provides a benefit to medical marijuana 
dispensaries seeking to convert to retail sales.  We see nothing 
to suggest that the Legislature intended also to narrow the 
definition of the verb "to engage" with this change. 
10 
 
is that the medical marijuana dispensary must have been 
"licensed or registered not later than July 1, 2017." 
 
Elsewhere in the act the Legislature calls upon the 
Cannabis Control Commission to "prioritize the review and 
licensing decisions for applicants for retail . . . licenses who 
. . . are registered marijuana dispensaries with a final or a 
provisional certificate of registration in good standing with 
the department of public health . . . that are operational and 
dispensing to qualifying patients" (emphasis added).  St. 2017, 
c. 55, § 56 (a).  Thus, it is obvious that the Legislature knew 
how to narrow the set of dispensaries qualifying for particular 
benefits when it saw fit to do so.  See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 
439 Mass. 826, 833 (2003), quoting 2A N.J. Singer, Statutes and 
Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 194 (6th ed. rev. 2000) 
("[W]here the [L]egislature has carefully employed a term in one 
place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where 
excluded"). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.