Case Title: FGA, Inc. v. Giglio

Citation: 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 26

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
128 Nev., Advance Opinion 2(a
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

FGA, INC., D/B/A INSTANT REPLAY | No, 54187,
SPORTS PUB & GRILL AND |
CARMINE’ LITTLE ITALY; MELINO,
LTD., D/B/A CARMINE’S LITTLE | FILE D
ITALY; CARMINE & ANN M. VENTO
REVOCABLE TRUST, CARMINE JUN 14 2012
VENTO AND ANN VENTO, n cats
‘TRUSTEES; AND CARMINE VENTO, as As
INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A CARMINE. Cs PUTT —
& ANN M. VENTO REVOCABLE
FAMILY TRUST,
Appellants,

v8,
DEBBIE GIGLIO,
Respondent.

 

Appeal from a district court judgment in a tort action. Kighth
Judicial District Court, Clark County; Timothy C. Williams, Judge.
Reversed and remanded,
Lewis and Roca LLP and Joel D, Henriod and Daniel F. Polsenberg, Las

Vegas; Watson Rounds, P.C., and Kelly G. Watson, Las Vegas,
for Appellants.

Mainor Eglet and David . Wall, Robert T. Bglet, and Robert M. Adams,
Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

 

BEFORE DOUGLAS, HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ,

13/8638)

 

 
 

OPINION
By the Court, DOUGLAS, J.

In this appeal, we consider whether the “mode of operation”
approach to premises liability, under which the plaintiff does not have to
prove the defendant's knowledge of a particular hazardous condition if the

plaintiff can prove that the nature of the defendant's business tends to

 

create a substantial risk of the type of harm the plaintiff suffered, extends
beyond the self-service context. Because the mode of operation approach
is premised on the idea that business owners should be held responsible
for the risks that their choice to have customers serve themselves creates,
we conclude that it does not extend to “sit-down” restaurants. Therefore,
the district court abused its discretion by giving a mode of operation
instruction in this case. We further conclude that the district court abused
its discretion by excluding certain evidence. Therefore, we reverse and
remand.
FACTS

‘This case involves respondent Debbie Giglio's June 2004 fall at
Carmine's Little Italy, a “sit-down” restaurant, where servers attended to
the needs of patrons, operated by appellant FGA, Inc. FGA is owned by
appellant the Carmine and Ann M. Vento Revocable Trust (the Trust).
The Trust is also FGA's landlord. Appellant Carmine Vento is the sole
officer of FGA and a trustee of the Trust. Carmine's son, Frank Vento, is
the president of FGA and the general manager of Carmine's Little Italy.

On the day of the fall, Giglio was on a date with her future
husband, Raymond Schrefel. The two were at the restaurant for 45
minutes to an hour before the fall, during which time they consumed four
beers and two glasses of wine. Schrefel later indicated that he thought
that he and Giglio consumed two beers each and that he had consumed

2

 
ame a

 

the two glasses of wine. Giglio was on her way to the restroom when she
fell. She claimed to have slipped on a greasy or oily substance. Schrefel
did not see the fall but corroborated the fact that there was an oily
substance on the floor. However, the managers who assisted Giglio after
she fell stated that the floor was clean and that she fell without slipping.
Although the restaurant had video surveillance cameras, no video footage

of the fall was available because the camera 9}

 

stem was inoperable on the
night in question.

After the fall, Giglio had an intervertebral disc removed in her
neck and two discs removed in her lower back. Giglio required pain
medications and extensive physical therapy, resulting in medical damages
of over $400,000, Giglio's pain was not alleviated by her surgeries, and
she claims that in the future, she will need a spinal stimulator and
injections for pain management.

Giglio filed suit in district court against FGA and the Trust
(collectively, FGA) alleging negligence and requesting over $3.3 million in
damages.

Giglio filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of her prior
and subsequent accidents and injuries because they were not causally
related to the injuries sustained in the accident, which the district court
granted. During the 11 years prior to her fall, Giglio had seen several
doctors about moderate to severe back pain. Giglio had been taking
prescription pain medications consistently from 1997 through 2004, when
her fall occurred. ‘These medications were for pain in her upper back
However, Giglio had also been treated for pain in her lower back.

Giglio filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of her
alcohol consumption on the night of the fall, arguing that there was no

 
ee

 

basis to infer that she was intoxicated when she fell. ‘The district court
granted the motion, During trial, FGA attempted to question Schrefel
about his alcohol consumption on the night of Giglio’s fall. Giglio objected,
and the district court sustained the objection.

When the fact that there was no surveillance video of Giglio’s

fall became an it

 

at trial, Giglio requested that the district court take
judicial notice of Nevada Gaming Regulation 6.160, which requires
nonrestricted gaming licensees to maintain operable video surveillance
equipment.! However, FGA had a restricted gaming license, so this

 

regulation did not apply to it. The district court took judicial notice of the
regulation but did not allow FGA to present certain evidence to clarify
that the regulation did not apply to it.

After the close of Giglio's evidence, FGA moved for judgment
ag a matter of law under NRCP 50(a), arguing that the Trust, as a mere
landlord, cannot be held liable for physical harm caused by a dangerous
condition on the premises. ‘The motion was denied, and the trial
proceeded.

‘The jury was instructed on alternative theories of negligence.
‘The instructions stated that FGA was negligent if Giglio's slip and fall was
caused by a foreign substance on the floor that FGA or one of its
employees (1) caused to be on the floor, or (2) had actual or constructive
notice of and failed to remedy. The jury was additionally instructed on the
“mode of operation” approach to premises liability, in which notice (i.e,, of
a “food hazard”) is established by proof that an injury resulted from a

‘Frank Vento incorrectly testified that FGA had a nonrestricted
gaming license,

 
reasonably foreseeable dangerous condition related to the nature of the
owner's business, or mode of operation, such as self-service? Sheehan v.
Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Ine., 863 N.E.2d 1276, 1283 (Mass. 2007).
Over FGA's objection, the district court allowed the instruction.»

‘The jury found that FGA was 51 percent negligent and Giglio
was 49 percent at fault. No interrogatories were given to the jury for it to
indicate under which theory of liability it found FGA to be negligent. The
jury awarded damages of $5,561,435, which the court reduced by 49
percent. The court entered a $3,526,545.19 judgment against FGA, which

 

“Jury instruction 33 read:

Plaintiff does not have to establish
Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge
of the food hazard and Defendants are negligent
for Plaintiffs injuries and harms if:

1. Food, butter or oils are commonly found in
Defendants’ restaurant;

2, It is continuous or easily foreseeable that food,
butter or oil spilled in the area of the restaurant,
where the Plaintiff fell;

3. Plaintiff slipped and fell on food, butter or oil;
and

4. Defendants could have inspected and cleaned
the area of the restaurant in a more frequent and
competent manner.

"The district court previously excluded FGA’s proffered testimony
regarding absence of prior falls and the restaurant's cleaning standards
and procedures, which would have been relevant to whether FGA could
have “inspected and cleaned the area of the restaurant in a more frequent
and competent manner.”

 

 
included costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest, FGA timely filed
this appeal
DISCUSSION

On appeal, FGA argues that (1) the district court abused its
discretion by giving a “mode of operation” instruction in a case involving a
fall in a sit-down restaurant; (2) the district court abused its discretion by
excluding evidence of Giglio's preexisting injuries, evidence of alcohol
consumption, and evidence to clarify the applicability of a gaming
regulation; and (3) the district court erred by denying the motion for
judgment as a matter of law.

We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
giving the mode of operation instruction and by excluding evidence of
‘Schrefel’s alcohol consumption and evidence to clarify the applicability of
the gaming regulation. However, we find no error in the district court's
evidentiary rulings regarding preexisting injuries or Giglio's alcohol
consumption. We further conclude that the basis for its denial of the
motion for judgment as a matter of law no longer exists. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand,

M jon jury instruc

FGA argues that the district court abused its discretion by
giving a “mode of operation” jury instruction. Giglio counters that the
instruction was proper. In examining these arguments, we will first
address whether they are rendered moot by the general verdict rule.
Concluding that they are not, we then consider the applicability of mode of

operation liability.

 

 
‘The general verdict rule

Giglio asserts FGA's mode of operation argument is moot
because the mode of operation instruction provided merely an alternative
basis for liability. Giglio contends that she alternatively argued that the
spillage was caused by an employee and that FGA is liable for the
negligent acts of its agents; therefore, the mode of operation argument is
rendered superfluous by the general verdict rule, which would require this
court to presume that the jury found every is

 

jue in Giglio’s favor. FGA
urges this court to follow the lead of Connecticut courts, which have held
that the general verdict rule does not apply where a party raises
overlapping factual theories in support of one single claim.

This court has a duty “to decide actual controversies by a
judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon
moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles of law
which cannot affect the matter in issue before it.” University Sv. v.
Nevadans for Sound Gov't, 120 Nev. 712, 720, 100 P.3d 179, 186 (2004)
(quoting NCAA v, University of Nevada, 97 Nev. 56, 57, 624 P.2d 10, 10
(1981). Here, if the judgment may be upheld under the general verdict
rule, this court need not consider FGA’s arguments relating to the mode of

operation approach because they will have been rendered moot.

ARGA alternately argues that, even if the general verdict rule
applies, there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that an
employee spilled the substance upon which Giglio alleges she slipped and
fell. While Giglio failed to properly cite to the record in support of this
claim, see NRAP 28(¢)(1), the record does contain some evidence that the
jury could have considered to reach a conclusion that FGA’s employees
caused any spillage.

 

 
nen

 

‘The “general verdict rule provides that, if a jury renders a
general verdict for one party, and no party requests interrogatories, an

appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the

prevailing party.” Curry v, Burns, 626 A.2d 719, 721 (Conn. 1993). In
Skender v, Brunsonbuilt Construction & Development Co., this court

recognized this rule, citing to cases from Connecticut, which have dealt
with the general verdict rule in depth and outlined the situations in which
the general verdict rule applies, 122 Nev. 1430, 1438, 148 P.3d 710, 716
(2006).

Connecticut courts have further held that the general verdict
rule is inapplicable where a jury renders a verdict on a single negligence
claim that is premised on multiple factual theories. See Curry, 626 A.2d
at 721; Green v, H.N.S. Management Co, Inc,, 881 A.2d 1072, 1076-77
(Conn. App. Ct. 2005). ‘These courts have reasoned that “various grounds
of negligence alleged are often so interlocked as to make it difficult to
consider them separately, and formulating interrogatories to obtain
separate findings on the various claims would complicate the work of
court, jury and counsel,” and that it is “sounder policy to permit an
appellant to take advantage upon appeal of errors affecting one
specification of negligence only, even though no interrogatories have been
submitted.” Green, 881 A.2d at 1076-77 (quoting Ziman v. Whitley, 147
A. 370, 373 (Conn. 1929).

We now adopt the sound reasoning of the Connecticut courts
and clarify that the general verdict rule is inapplicable in cases where
overlapping factual theories support a single theory of recovery. Here,
although Giglio alleged alternate factual theories of negligent conduct, she
raised only one theory of recovery—negligence—and the general verdict

 
om

rule is not properly applied in situations where a jury renders a verdict on
a single negligence claim that is premised on multiple factual theories.
‘This takes into account the fact that, where a general verdict is rendered
without interrogatories, there is no way to know on which factual theory
the jury based its verdict, We therefore address FGA’s mode of operation
argument.

‘The ode of operation’ i

 

FGA argues that the district court abused its discretion by
instructing the jury on mode of operation liability because it applies only
in the context of a self-service establishment. Giglio argues that mode of
operation liability extends beyond the self-service context.

‘This court reviews a district court's decision to give a jury
instruction for an abuse of discretion or judicial error. Skender, 122 Nev.
at 1485, 148 P.3d at 714.

“[A] business owes its patrons a duty to keep the premis
reasonably safe condition for use.” Sprague v, Lucky Stores, Inc,, 109 Nev.
247, 250, 849 P.2d 320, 322 (1993). Where a foreign substance causing a

 

 

ip and fall is made to be on the floor by the business owner or one of its
agents, then “liability will lie, as a foreign substance on the floor is usually
not consistent with the standard of ordinary care.” Id. Traditionally,
where a foreign substance causing a slip and fall results from “the actions
of persons other than the business or its employees, liability will lie only if
the business had actual or constructive notice of the condition and failed to

remedy it.” [d, at 250, 849 P.2d at 822-23. However, there is a modern

 

trend toward modifying this traditional approach to premises liability to
accommodate newer merchandising techniques, such as the shift that
grocery stores have made from clerk-assisted to self-service operations.
Sheehan, 863 N.U.2d at 1281-82.

 

 
‘One such variation is the “mode of operation” approach. Id. at
1282. This approach focuses on the nature of the business at issue. Id, at
1282-83,

(Where an owner's chosen mode of operation
makes it reasonably foreseeable that a dangerous
condition will occur, a store owner could be held
iable for injuries to an invitee if the plaintiff
proves that the store owner failed to take all
reasonable precautions necessary to protect
invitees from these foreseeable dangerous
conditions.

 

Id, at 1283. ‘The rationale underlying the mode of operation approach is
that an owner of a self-service establishment has, as a cost-saving
measure, chosen to have his customers perform tasks that were
traditionally performed by employees. Ciminski v. Finn Corporation, Inc.,
537 P.2d 850, 853 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975). If a customer who is performing
such a task negligently creates a hazardous condition, the owner is
“charged with the creation of this condition just as he would be charged
with the responsibility for negligent acts of his employees” because it was
the owner's choice of mode of operation that created the risk. Id,

Under the mode of operation approach, “the plaintiff's burden
to prove notice is not eliminated. Instead, the plaintiff satisfies the notice
requirement if he establishes that an injury was attributable to a
reasonably foreseeable dangerous condition on the owner's premises that
is related to the owner's self-service mode of operation.” Sheehan, 863
N.E.2d at 1283. There is a strong modern trend toward recognizing some

form of a mode of operation rule, although most jurisdictions have applied
it narrowly. See Fisher v. Big ¥ Foods, Inc., 3 A.3d 919, 928 n.21 (Conn,
2010) (noting that 22 jurisdictions have adopted some variation of the

 

 
er

mode of operation rule, and that the majority of the jurisdictions adopting
it have applied it narrowly).

In Sprague v, Lucky Stores, Inc, this court implicitly adopted
the mode of operation approach? in reversing an order granting summary
judgment in favor of Lucky. 109 Nev. at 251, 849 P.2d at $23. There, the

 

plaintiff slipped and fell on a smashed grape left on the floor of the
produce department in a Lucky grocery store. Id, at 249, 849 P.2d at 322.
‘The plaintiff offered no evidence indicating that Lucky was responsible for
the grape's presence on the floor or that it had actual knowledge of the
grape’s presence on the floor; therefore, under the traditional approach to
premises liability, the plaintiff was required to prove that Lucky had

constructive notice of the grape’s presence on the floor in its produce

"Some jurisdictions have declined to adopt the mode of operation
approach, suggesting that it imposes strict liability on business owners,
making them “absolute insurers’ for the safety of their customers.
Sheehan, 863 N.E.2d at 1285. They instead apply the “recurrent risk”
approach, where “fiJf the owner of the premises has taken precautions
reasonably necessary to protect its customers, then the owner is not liable
to customers injured on the premises.” Dumont v. Shaw's Supermarkets,
Inc,, 664 A.2d 846, 849 n.1 (Me. 1995).

Nevada has not explicitly adopted either approach. Based on
Sprague, some categorize it among the states that apply the recurrent risk
approach, while others treat it as a mode of operation jurisdiction. See
Sheehan, 863 N.E.2d at 1285; Kelly v, Stop and Shop, Inc,, 918 A.2d 249,
258-59 (Conn. 2007). However, while they may have different labels, both
the “recurrent risk” and “mode of operation” approaches involve
essentially the same analysis: to determine whether owners are liable to
injured patrons by analyzing whether there was a “recurrent” or
“continuous” risk on the premises associated with a chosen mode of
operation. Sheehan, 863 N.E.2d at 1285.

rt

 

 
department. Id, at 260, 849 P.2d at 323. This court stated that even in
the absence of constructive notice, “a jury could conclude that Lucky
should have recognized the impossibility of keeping the produce section
clean by sweeping” alone, Id, at 261, 849 P.2d at 323. Further, this court

ated that sufficient evidence was presented “to justify a reasonable jury
in concluding that Lucky was negligent in not taking further precautions,
besides sweeping, to diminish the chronic hazard posed by the produce
department floor.” Id. However, Sprague dealt with a self-service produce
section in a supermarket; therefore, the court did not address whether
such an analysis would extend beyond the self-service context.

Keeping the rationale underlying the mode of operation
approach in mind, we hold that mode of operation liability does not
generally extend to a sit-down restaurant such as Carmino’s Little Italy.
Respondent failed to show that the handling of food in a particular area by

employees of Carmine's Little Italy gave rise to a foreseeable risk of a

 

regularly occurring hazardous condition for its customers similar to the
condition that caused the injury. We find no reason to extend mode of
operation liability to such establishments absent such a showing as their
owners have not created the increased risk of a potentially hazardous
condition by having their customers perform tasks that are traditionally
carried out by employees, Accordingly, we conclude that the district court

abused its discretion by giving a mode of operation instruction.®

“The parties make further arguments regarding the proper
application of mode of operation liability; however, because we conclude
that mode of operation liability does not apply here, we need not address
these arguments.

 

 
 

Evidentiary rulings

FGA argues that the district court erred by excluding evidence
of Giglio's preexisting injuries, evidence of Giglio's alcohol consumption,
and the potential applicability of gaming regulations to FGA, The district
court did not abuse its discretion with respect to Giglio's preexisting
injuries and alcohol consumption, but we agree with FGA as to the
evidence clarifying the applicability of the gaming regulations.

We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion, M.C. Multi-Family Dev, v, Crestdale Assocs,, 124 Nev. 901,
913, 193 P.3d 536, 544 (2008). All relevant evidence is admissible at trial
unless otherwise excluded by law or the rules of evidence. NRS 48.025.
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence,” NRS 48,015, Relevant
evidence may be excluded if, among other things, its “probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of
the issues or of misleading the jury.” NRS 48.036(1).

Preexisting back condition

FGA argues that the district court abused its discretion in
excluding evidence of Giglio's preexisting back condition. It claims that
this evidence was relevant to its arguments regarding causation and
damages. Specifically, FGA contends that it may attack Giglio's theory of
causation without affirmatively proving an alternative. Giglio counters
that the district court properly excluded evidence of her preexisting back
condition because FGA's experts did mot meet Nevada's certainty
requirement for expert opinion testimony.

A prior injury or preexisting condition may be relevant to the

issues of causation and damages in a personal injury action. Voykin v,

13.

  

 
nee

 

Estate of DeBoer, 733 N.E.2d 1275, 1279-80 (Ill. 2000); see also Prichard
v. Veterans Cab Company, 408 P.2d 860, 864 (Cal. 1965),

In order for evidence of a prior injury or preexisting condition
to be admissible, a defendant must present by competent evidence a
causal connection between the prior injury and the injury at issue.
McCormack v. Andres, 185 P.3d 973, 977 (Mont, 2008) (“The party seeking
to introduce alternate causation evidence must demonstrate a causal
connection between the present symptoms complained of and a prior
accident."); Vovkin, 733 N.E.2d at 1279-80 (‘[FJor a prior injury to be
relevant to causation, the injury must make it less likely that the
defendant's actions caused any of the plaintiffs injuries or an identifiable
portion thereof.”); Allendorf v, Kaisorman Enterprises, 630 A.2d 402, 407

(NJ, 1993) (“A party secking to present evidence of a prior injury or

 

condition relating to an issue of medical causation must show that the
evidence has some ‘logical relationship to the issue in the case.”)
Moreover, unless it is readily apparent to a layperson, a defendant seeking
to introduce evidence of @ prior injury generally must produce expert
testimony demonstrating the relationship between the prior injury and
the injury complained of, and why it is relevant to a fact of consequence.
Voykin, 733 N.E.2d at 1280,

‘The test for competency of medical expert testimony depends
‘on the purpose for which the testimony is offered. Williams v, Dist. Ct..
127 Nev. _, _, 262 P.8d 360, 368 (2011). If medical expert testimony is
offered to establish causation, it “must be stated to a reasonable degree of
medical probability.” Id, However, if expert testimony is offered to
contradict the party opponent's expert testimony, the offered testimony

must only be “competent and supported by relevant evidence or research.”

4

 
ome

 

Id, However, for defense expert testimony to constitute a contradiction of
the party opponent's expert testimony, the defense expert must include
the plaintiff's causation theory in his analysis. Id.

If the defense expert does not consider the
plaintiffs theory of causation at all, then the
defense expert must state any independent
alternative causes to a reasonable degree of
medical probability because he or she then bears
the burden of establishing the causative fact for
the trier of fact. Otherwise, the testimony would
be “incompetent not only because it lacks the
degree of probability necessary for admissibility
but also because it does nothing to controvert the
evidence of appellants.”

Id. (quoting Stinson v, England, 633 N.E.24 532, 638 (Ohio 1994))..

Here, the district court excluded all references to Giglio's
preexisting back condition because it concluded that Giglio's prior injuries
were “remote in time” and/or involved body parts that were “unrelated” to
the injuries at issue. A review of the record shows that FGA proffered
expert testimony that indicated that some or all of the treatment Giglio
received after her fall could be attributed to her preexisting condition;
however, none of the experts were able to testify to a reasonable degree of
medical probability that her preexisting condition caused the injuries at
hand. Because this testimony was proffered to establish causation, it
failed to meet the appropriate standard. Accordingly, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Giglio's
prior back condition.

Alcohol consumption

FGA argues that the district court erred by excluding evidence
that Giglio and Schrefel consumed alcohol prior to Giglio’s fall. Giglio
contends that the district court properly excluded the evidence because of

15

 
lack of foundation, danger of confusion, misleading the jury, and the
interjection of collateral issues.

Evidence of a party's possible intoxication may be probative of
the issues of causation and comparative negligence. See VanHercke v.
Eastvold, 405 N.W.2d 902, 906 (Minn. App. 1987). Evidence of
intoxication, however, should not be admitted if there is no support for
finding a causal link between the alleged impairment and the injury.
Holderer_v. Aetna Cas. and Sur, Co,, 114 Nev. 845, 852-53, 963 P.2d 459,
464 (1998). In addition to causation, evidence of intoxication is also
relevant to a person's ability to perceive and, thus, may be “admissible to
attack a witness on (his or] her ability to perceive and remember.” See
State v, Orantes, 902 P.2d 824, 828 (Ariz. 1995).

In this case, the parties offered conflicting testimony
whether Giglio's fall could have been caused by intoxication, FGA offered
testimony that one witness who interacted with Giglio observed that he
smelled alcohol on her breath and that she had slurred speech, Schrefel,
Giglio’s key witness, testified that Giglio had two beers within 45 minutes

to

 

of the fall. However, there is no indication that Giglio showed any signs of
intoxication in the accident report filled out at the time of the accident or
in the medical records from when Giglio was taken to the hospital after
the fall,

‘The transcript of the motion in limine hearing shows that the
district court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to show that
Giglio was intoxicated. In particular, the court noted that if there was an
issue of intoxication, it would have been reported by the emergency

medical team that responded. We detect no abuse of discretion in the

 

 
nee

 

istrict court's decision to exclude evidence of Giglio’s alcohol
consumption,

However, we conclude that the district court abused ite
discretion by excluding evidence that Giglio's key witness, Schrefel,
‘consumed alcohol. Evidence regarding Schrefel’s alcohol consumption is
relevant to his ability to perceive whether there was a foreign substance
‘on the floor. Additionally, we can see no prejudice that would result from
allowing evidence that a man of legal drinking age had consumed alcohol,
Accordingly, evidence of Schrofel’s alcohol consumption should be
admitted at any now trial to assist the jury in determining whether
Schrofel was a reliable eyewitness.

‘Nevada Gaming Regulation 5.160

FGA argues that the district court erred by taking judicial
notice of Nevada Gaming Regulation 5.160, which requires those
establishments with a nonrestricted gaming license to have operational
surveillance cameras. FGA further argues that the district court abused
its discretion by permitting Giglio to present evidence of the regulation
while not permitting FGA to present rebuttal evidence that the regulation
did not apply to it because it only held a restricted gaming license, Giglio
contends that FGA failed to object on the grounds it now asserts on appeal
and that FGA was permitted to testify that it held a restricted license and
was not subject to the regulation and, therefore, any error was harmless,

The nature and extent that a party may present evidence to
correct or change testimony rests largely in the discretion of the district
court. See Turtenwald v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co,, 201 N.W.2d 1, 8
Wis. 1972). However, the legal system has an interest in secking the
truth and encourages the correction of erroneous statements on the part of

7

 
a witness, See Ex parte Keizo Shibata, 35 F.2d 636, 687-38 (th Cir.
1929).

Here, Giglio requested that the district court take judicial
notice of Nevada Gaming Regulation 5.160, which requires nonrestrieted

gaming licensees to maintain operable video surveillance. Prior to Giglio's

 

request, Frank Vento, testifying as the person most knowledgeable for
FGA, stated that FGA held a nonrestricted gaming license. ‘The district,
court properly took judicial notice of Nevada Gaming Regulation 5.160.
See NRS 47.140; NRS 47.150. However, after the district court took
judicial notice of the gaming regulation, FGA informed the court that
Frank Vento's testimony regarding whether FGA held a restricted or
nonrestricted gaming license was incorrect. FGA offered both the
testimony of the attorney who represented FGA before the Gaming

Control Board and a fax from the Gaming Control Board indicating that

 

the license in question was a restricted gaming license. ‘The district court
excluded the evidence and only allowed Carmine Vento, one of the holders
of the license, to testify that the license was a restricted license. The court
then permitted Giglio to argue that FGA’s witnesses lacked credibility
because they contradicted each other and that there was no way to know

what type of license FGA possesses because it was never produced.?

 

"Giglio's counsel argued:

Remember I asked, [Frank Vento], well are you as
certain of that as you are of your testimony ... a
few days ago when you said he asked you three
times does your company have a non-restricted
gaming license or a restricted gaming license?

continued on next page .

 

 
In light of the incorrect statements that FGA had a
nonrestricted license, the fact that a nonrestricted licensee is required to
have a functioning video surveillance system on the premises, and the
subsequent arguments made by Giglio, we conclude that the district court
abused its discretion in excluding this evidence. See NRS 48.025

snial of motion for ju: matter of law ‘armine
Vento Bi

FGA argues that the district court erred by denying its motion
for judgment as a matter of law as to the Trust because a mere landlord
cannot be held liable for physical harm caused by a dangerous condition on
the premises. Giglio counters that the district court properly denied the
Trust's motion for a judgment as a matter of law because its trustee,
Carmine Vento, was also an operator of the restaurant and involved in

deciding how the operation was set up, and mode of operation was one

continued

“A. That is a non-restricted proper gaming
license

“Q. Non-restricted property?

“Yeah, non-restricted license.

“Q. This is « non-restricted license?

“Yes.”

Not once, not twice, three times he testifies
that way,

And then Carmine, just like with everything
else, comes in and testifies inconsistently. Oh, no
it’s a restricted license

How do we know what it is? We don't know
what it is. Nobody produced the license.

 

 
ome ae

 

basis for liability. Giglio further argues that the Trust acted as more than
a mere landlord. Giglio points out that Vento testified that the ‘Trust held
the gaming license for Carmine's Little Italy to permit the Trust to
continue operating the business if something happened to him and that all
of the income from the restaurant went to the Trust.

FGA replies that the mode of operation theory cannot support
liability for the ‘Trust and the only support in the record for Giglio's
argument that the Trust is more than a landlord is the trial testimony
that the Trust's name was also listed on Carmine's gaming license.

This court reviews a district court's denial of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law de novo, Nelson v, Heer, 123 Nev. 217, 223,
163 P.3d 420, 424-25 (2007). A motion for judgment as a matter of law

 

may be granted if the opposing party “failed to prove a sufficient issue for
the jury,’ so that [the] claim cannot be maintained under the controlling
law.” Td, at 222, 163 P.3d at 424 (quoting NRCP 50(a)(1)). ‘The court must
view all evidence and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id,

A landlord is not liable for injury caused by the negligent
actions of its tenant. Wright v, Schum, 105 Nev. 611, 612-13, 781 P.2d
1142, 1142-43 (1989), However, a landlord is still subject to the duty of all
persons to “exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an
unreasonable risk of harm.” Id, at 614, 781 P.2d at 1143 (quotations
omitted).

In Wright, the plaintiff was mauled by a pit bull and sued the
landlord and owner of the premises from which the dog had escaped. Id,
at 612, 781 P.2d at 1142. The landlord had previously received complaints
from neighbors about the dog’s aggressiveness and had assured them that
he would take care of the problem by asking his tenants to get rid of the

 
one

 

dog or move out of the house. Id. at 614-15, 781 P.2d at 1143-44,
However, he allowed the tenants to stay and keep the dog because they
promised to keep the dog in the house or chained in the yard. Id, at 615,
781 P.2d at 1144. This court held that while the landlord was not liable
because of his status as a landlord, there was a material issue of fact as to
whether he was liable as an individual because he voluntarily undertook
to discharge part of the dog owner's duty to the general public to prevent
the dog from leaving the leased premises and harming others. Id, at 613-
18, 781 P.2d at 1143-46. Here, like the landlord in Wright, the Trust is

potentially liable not based on its status as a landlord, but rather based on

 

its own actions,

In denying FGA’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law,
the district court stated that it was the jury's “decision to make a
determination as to whether or not the way [the restaurant] was set up
from the mode of operation standpoint resulted in a potentially hazardous
condition that the property owner and the business owner or the FGA is
responsible for.” Because we now hold that the mode of operation
approach does not apply in the sit-down restaurant context, any jury will
not be instructed on this approach. ‘Thus, the basis for the district court's
ruling is no longer present in this case. Therefore, the district court must
determine whether Giglio presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find
the Trust liable based on its own conduct.

"We note that although the Trust is potentially liable based on its
‘own actions, it may still benefit from the argument raised by FGA that it
was not allowed to provide evidence of the lack of prior slip and falls. This
evidence is relevant to the issue of whether the Trust voluntarily
undertook to discharge part of FGA’s duty to maintain safe premises,

21

 
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order denying
judgment as a matter of law and reverse the district court’s judgment. We

remand this matter to the district court for a new decision on the motion

 

for judgment as a matter of law and for further proceedings in light of this

 

opinion?
D>) 4 aS a
Douglas
We concur:
Hardesty
4,
Parraguirre

°FGA argues that on remand, the matter should be assigned to a
different judge because it appears that the district court judge prejudged
the issues in the case. However, in light of FGA’s failure to cite to any
specific instances of judicial misconduct, we conclude that reassignment is,
not warranted. See Inre AMERCO Derivative Litigation, 127 Nev. __,
1.13, 252 P.3d 681, 704 n.13 (2011) (denying a similar unsubstantiated
request that a matter be assigned to a different judge upon remand
because the district court “prejudged” the case).

Additionally, because we conclude that there was reversible error,
we need not address FGA’s cumulative-error argument.