Case Title: Cater v. Cleveland

Citation: 1998-Ohio-421

Docket Number: 19971261

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
CATER ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Cater v. Cleveland (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 24.] 
Municipal corporations — Tort liability — Operation of a municipal swimming 
pool is subject to the exceptions to immunity set forth in former R.C. 
2744.02(B) and to the available defenses enumerated in R.C. 2744.03. 
The operation of a municipal swimming pool, although defined as a governmental 
function in R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(u), is subject to the exceptions to immunity 
set forth in former R.C. 2744.02(B) and to the available defenses 
enumerated in R.C. 2744.03. 
(Nos. 97-1261 and 97-1488 — Submitted May 13, 1998 – Decided August 19, 
1998.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 70674. 
 
On June 14, 1993, twelve-year-old Darrall A. Cater lost consciousness from 
nearly drowning in the city of Cleveland’s Alexander Hamilton indoor swimming 
pool.  As a result of the near drowning, Darrall developed acute bronchial 
pneumonia and was declared brain dead four days later.  He died in the hospital 
after being removed from life support systems.  Darrall’s mother, Valerie Cater, as 
administrator of Darrall’s estate, along with Darrall’s father, Lawrence Cater, 
plaintiffs-appellants, brought this lawsuit against the city of Cleveland, defendant-
appellee, alleging that the city acted negligently and/or recklessly in operating the 
swimming pool and causing Darrall’s death.  The city of Cleveland argued that it 
was immune from liability under R.C. Chapter 2744 and filed two motions for 
summary judgment.  The trial court denied both of these motions, and the case 
proceeded to trial before a visiting judge. 
 
At trial, the evidence established that the near drowning occurred on the first 
day of the summer swim season at the Alexander Hamilton indoor swimming pool.  
 
2
On that day, there were four Red Cross certified lifeguards on duty.  Lisa Hutson, a 
year-round physical director, was the senior guard.  The other lifeguards on duty 
were Willie Hodge, who was also an experienced year-round physical director; 
Mark McDougall, who was hired as a summer lifeguard and had ten years’ 
lifeguarding experience; and Damon Carter, who had recently been certified as a 
lifeguard in May 1993, and was beginning his first day as a lifeguard. 
 
Open swim was scheduled to take place from 1:00 to 4:30 p.m.  From 1:00 
p.m. until about shortly after 3:00 p.m., all four guards patrolled the pool.  Hutson 
walked around the perimeter of the pool deck, while the other three guards were 
stationed at the lifeguard chairs, two of which were located at the deep end and one 
was located at the shallow end.  At around 3:00 p.m., however, Hutson and Hodge 
left their posts, and took an unauthorized lunch break.  Even though it was against 
pool policy to take lunch breaks during open swim periods, Hutson, who was 
nearly nine months pregnant, asked Hodge to buy them lunch. When Hodge 
returned around 3:30 p.m. with sandwiches, he and Hutson ate lunch in the lobby, 
while the other two guards remained at the pool.  Rookie guard Carter sat in the 
high lifeguard chair at the deep end, while McDougall watched the shallow end of 
the pool from his guard chair.  A folding chair that was located at the deep end, and 
which had previously been occupied by one of the other guards, was left empty. 
 
At approximately 3:40 p.m., swimmers notified McDougall and Carter that 
there was a boy at the bottom of the pool.  The boy, later identified as Darrall 
Cater, was found at the bottom of the deep end, in seven feet of water, in an area 
within five to fifteen feet from the previously occupied folding guard chair.  Carter 
explained that he had not seen Darrall in distress because glare interfered with his 
visibility.  The glare was caused by sunlight that reflected off a glass-paneled wall 
that ran along the side of the pool, directly behind the high lifeguard chair where 
Carter sat.  City employees, including the aquatics manager for the city of 
 
3
Cleveland, were aware of the glare problem at the pool and conceded that there 
was no training on how to deal with the glare. 
 
Upon seeing Darrall at the bottom of the pool, McDougall dove in the water, 
pulled Darrall out of the pool and began CPR.  Howard McKeller, the recreation 
center manager for the pool, who was responsible for all pool employees at that 
location, was returning to the facility when he heard the whistle blow.  Upon 
hearing the whistle and seeing commotion, McKeller ran to the pool area and 
assisted McDougall with resuscitation attempts on Darrall. 
 
In the meantime, at least three city employees attempted to dial 911, but 
were unable to get an outside phone line.  Carter said that he tried to dial 911 five 
or six times but could not get through.  Physical director Hutson and a custodian 
made several attempts to dial 911, but they, too, did not know how to use the 
phone system.  These employees were never instructed on the use of 911 and were 
never told that it was necessary first to dial a nine to get an outside line.  When 
asked about the lack of training, center manager McKeller testified that he just 
assumed that the guards had been briefed how to get an outside line to dial 911.  
Eventually, someone was able to make the 911 call.  However, paramedics did not 
arrive at the pool until about 4:10 p.m., nearly thirty minutes after Darrall’s body 
was discovered at the bottom of the pool. 
 
One of Darrall’s treating physicians at the hospital testified that Darrall had 
been deprived of oxygen for at least five minutes before resuscitation attempts 
were underway. According to the coroner, Darrall died as a result of the near 
drowning.  Frank Pia, plaintiff’s aquatics expert, testified that without proper 
oxygenation, irreversible brain damage occurs in a drowning within four to seven 
minutes.  In Pia’s expert opinion, the conduct of the physical directors and the 
failure to have in place an effective rescue plan, including the proper use of 911, 
 
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was reckless.  Pia also testified that the glare spot in the pool created a nuisance; 
however, the trial court excluded that testimony. 
 
Following an internal investigation by the city, physical directors Hutson 
and Hodge, and the center’s manager, McKeller, were found to have violated 
several city policies by failing to ensure that the pool was properly staffed at all 
times; wantonly or willfully neglecting the performance of their assigned duties; 
leaving the job or work area during regular working hours without authorization; 
failing to remain at their posts except in cases of emergency or when properly 
relieved; failing to maintain required standards of performance; and failing to 
observe official safety rules or common safety practices.1  Due to their misconduct, 
Hutson and Hodge were each suspended for forty-five days.  McKeller was 
suspended for three days. 
 
At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, defense counsel moved for a directed 
verdict, again arguing that the city was immune from liability under R.C. Chapter 
2744.  Following oral arguments on this point, the trial court granted the motion 
for directed verdict, noting that the city had hired qualified personnel, had proper 
rules and regulations in place, and did not act in a reckless or wanton manner. 
 
The court of appeals affirmed.  In finding the city immune from liability  
under R.C. 2744.02(A), the court reasoned that the operation of an indoor 
municipal 
swimming 
pool 
is 
a 
governmental 
function 
under 
R.C. 
2744.01(C)(2)(u), and that, therefore, no exceptions to immunity apply.  
Furthermore, the court held that the city did not act in a wanton or reckless manner 
in its discretionary decision making in the operation of the pool.  See R.C. 
2744.03(A)(5). 
 
This court accepted jurisdiction of this case in case No. 97-1261, upon the 
allowance of a discretionary appeal.  The case was then certified to this court as 
being in conflict with Hall v. Ft. Frye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1996), 111 
 
5
Ohio App.3d 690, 676 N.E.2d 1241, and Siebenaler v. Montpelier (1996), 113 
Ohio App.3d 120, 680 N.E.2d 654, in case No. 97-1488, and is now before this 
court upon our determination that a conflict exists. 
__________________ 
 
Linton & Hirshman and Robert F. Linton, Jr.; Klein & Carney Co., L.P.A., 
and Larry S. Klein, for appellants. 
 
Mark W. Ruf, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial 
Lawyers. 
 
Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Mark Landes and Steven G. LaForge, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae, County Commissioners Association of Ohio. 
 
John E. Gotherman and Daniel J. O’Loughlin, urging affirmance for amici 
curiae, Ohio Municipal League and Ohio Municipal Attorneys Association. 
 
R. Todd Hunt, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Cuyahoga County Law 
Directors Association. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  The certified issue is “whether a 
governmental function and the absolute immunity provided it under R.C. 
2744.01(C)(2)(u) [are] still subject to the exceptions to immunity provided in R.C. 
2744.02(B)(3) and (4).”  We find that the operation of an indoor municipal 
swimming pool, although defined as a governmental function under R.C. 
2744.01(C)(2)(u), is still subject to the exception to immunity found in former R.C. 
2744.02(B)(3), but not to the exception contained in former R.C. 2744.02(B)(4). 
 
We also find that a directed verdict was improper in this case, since 
reasonable minds can differ as to whether the city acted in a wanton or reckless 
manner under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), by failing to institute policies or training 
regarding the use of 911.2  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for a new trial. 
 
6
 
The Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, as codified in R.C. Chapter 
2744, sets forth a three-tiered analysis for determining whether a political 
subdivision is immune from liability.  First, R.C. 2744.02(A) sets forth the general 
rule of immunity, that political subdivisions are not liable in damages for the 
personal injuries or death of a person.  R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) provides: 
 
“For purposes of this chapter, the functions of political subdivisions are 
hereby classified as governmental functions and proprietary functions.  Except as 
provided in division (B) of this section, a political subdivision is not liable in 
damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly 
caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the 
political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The immunity afforded a political subdivision in R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) is not 
absolute, but is, by its express terms, subject to the five exceptions to immunity 
listed in former R.C. 2744.02(B).  Hill v. Urbana (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 130, 679 
N.E.2d 1109.  Thus, once immunity is established under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), the 
second tier of analysis is whether any of the five exceptions to immunity in 
subsection (B) apply.  Former R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) through (5).  Finally, under the 
third tier of analysis, immunity can be reinstated if the political subdivision can 
successfully argue that one of the defenses contained in R.C. 2744.03 applies. 
 
Despite the structure of the Act, appellee, city of Cleveland, maintained 
below that it had absolute immunity in this case, and that it was not responsible for 
the negligent acts arising out of the operation of a municipal swimming pool.  
Since the General Assembly has already classified the operation of a municipal 
swimming pool as a governmental function under R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(u), the city 
asserted that no consideration be given to the Act’s exceptions.  The court of 
appeals agreed with appellee and refused to apply the potential exceptions to 
 
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immunity.  The court reasoned that the statutory provisions conflict and that, 
pursuant to R.C. 1.51, the specific provision (R.C. 2744.01[C][2][u]) prevails over 
the general provisions (former R.C. 2744.02[B][3] and [4]), which are exceptions 
to the general grant of immunity. 
 
The court of appeals mistakenly relied on R.C. 1.51 to reach its result. R.C. 
1.51 provides that if there are conflicting statutory provisions, effect should be 
given to both the general provision and special or local provision, if possible.  
Thus, under the cardinal rule of statutory construction, “all statutes which relate to 
the same general subject matter must be read in pari materia.”  Johnson’s Markets, 
Inc. v. New Carlisle Dept. of Health (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 28, 35, 567 N.E.2d 
1018, 1025.  In construing statutes together, this court must give full application to 
both statutes unless they are irreconcilable and in hopeless conflict.  Id., citing 
Couts v. Rose (1950), 152 Ohio St. 458, 40 O.O. 482, 90 N.E.2d 139. 
 
R.C. 1.51 is inapplicable here because there is no conflict between R.C. 
2744.01(C)(2)(u) and former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) or (4).  R.C. 2744.01(C) is 
simply a section of the Act that defines which activities are governmental and 
which are proprietary.  In that context, a municipal swimming pool is included 
within the definition of governmental functions. The operation of a municipal 
swimming pool, although defined as a governmental function in R.C. 
2744.01(C)(2)(u), is subject to the exceptions to immunity set forth in former R.C. 
2744.02(B) and to the available defenses enumerated in R.C. 2744.03.  Thus, the 
city’s assertion that it has absolute immunity runs contrary to the express language 
of the Act.  By structuring the Act in the manner that it did, the General Assembly 
clearly did not intend to immunize political subdivisions for all negligent actions 
that arise out of a governmental function.  Rather than absolve a municipality from 
all responsibility, the General Assembly recognized that political subdivisions 
 
8
must be held accountable for some of their actions.  This case exemplifies one such 
situation. 
 
Therefore, we agree with those appellate decisions certified as being in 
conflict with this case that have held that even if an activity is defined as a 
governmental function, it is still subject to the five exceptions of former R.C. 
2744.02(B)(1) through (5).  See Siebenaler v. Montpelier (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 
120, 680 N.E.2d 654; Hall v. Ft. Frye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1996), 111 
Ohio App.3d 690, 676 N.E.2d 1241.3 
 
In this case, appellants argue that two exceptions to immunity apply, former 
R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) and (B)(4).  Former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) provided: 
 
“Political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or 
property caused by their failure to keep public roads, highways, streets, avenues, 
alleys, sidewalks, bridges, viaducts, or public grounds within the subdivisions 
open, in repair, and free from nuisance * * *.”4 
 
Appellants contend that under former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), a fact issue is 
presented as to whether the glare conditions at the pool constitute a nuisance on 
public grounds.  Pursuant to this exception to immunity, a political subdivision is 
obligated to keep its public grounds free from nuisance.  The phrase “public 
grounds” has been interpreted to include such areas as municipally owned and 
controlled parks that are established and maintained for the general public.  
Cleveland v. Ferrando (1926), 114 Ohio St. 207, 150 N.E. 747.  We find that an 
indoor municipal swimming pool, which is open to the general public, also falls 
within the definition of “public grounds.”  We must next decide whether there was 
sufficient evidence presented of a nuisance to overcome the city’s motion for a 
directed verdict. 
 
The phrase “free from nuisance” in former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) has been 
interpreted most often by this court in the context of an alleged failure by a 
 
9
political subdivision to keep its roads and highways free from physical obstructions 
that interfere with visibility and create an unsafe condition.  Classic examples of 
nuisances include a malfunctioning traffic light, a pothole in the roadway, or an 
overhanging tree limb.  See Franks v. Lopez (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 345, 632 
N.E.2d 502. 
 
In Manufacturer’s Natl. Bank of Detroit v. Erie Cty. Rd. Comm. (1992), 63 
Ohio St.3d 318, 587 N.E.2d 819, we held that a fact issue remained as to whether 
corn growing in the road’s right-of-way was a nuisance, since it obstructed the 
visibility of drivers on the roadway, making the roadway unsafe for travel.  
Although factually distinguishable from the case at hand, we think that it is 
pertinent since, in this case, we are also presented with the issue of an obstruction 
to visibility.  Here, there was evidence presented that glare emanating from the 
wall of glass panels obstructed the lifeguard’s view and prevented him from seeing 
Darrall struggling in the water and ultimately lying at the bottom of the pool.  
Furthermore, had the court allowed appellants’ expert to testify, he would have 
stated that the glare in this case was a nuisance.  This expert testimony is relevant, 
and the trial court improperly excluded it from the jury. 
 
Not only was there testimony that the glare obstructed the lifeguards’ view, 
but there was also evidence that the city was aware that glare was a problem at the 
pool.  Both the aquatics manager for the city of Cleveland and the recreation center 
manager testified that they knew that glare was a problem and conceded that 
lifeguards had not been instructed on how to deal with the glare.  They also 
acknowledged that there were no pool policies addressing this concern.  For 
liability to be imposed on a political subdivision for a nuisance, the political 
subdivision must have had “ ‘either actual or constructive knowledge of the 
nuisance.’ ”  Franks v. Lopez, 69 Ohio St.3d at 349, 632 N.E.2d at 505, quoting 
 
10
Vogel v. Wells (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 91, 97, 566 N.E.2d 154, 160. There was 
sufficient evidence presented to satisfy this notice requirement. 
 
We recognize that glare can exist at all pools (as the aquatics manager 
testified).  Nevertheless, we are not testing the merits of the underlying claim here.  
Instead, we are deciding whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the 
city, which we believe it did.  Consequently, we find that former R.C. 
2744.02(B)(3) is applicable here, and that it is for the trier of fact to determine 
whether the city created an unreasonable risk of harm by maintaining hazardous 
glare conditions in the pool. 
 
Appellants also argue that former R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) is applicable to this 
case.  This exception to immunity provides: 
 
“Political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or 
property that is caused by the negligence of their employees and that occurs within 
or on the grounds of buildings that are used in connection with the performance of 
a governmental function, including, but not limited to, office buildings and 
courthouses, but not including jails, places of juvenile detention, workhouses, or 
any other detention facility, as defined in section 2921.01 of the Revised Code.” 
 
Although former R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) may be applicable to other 
governmental functions not specifically listed in the statute, we believe that it does 
not apply to an indoor swimming pool.  (See, also, Mattox v. Bradner [Mar. 21, 
1997], Wood App. No. WD-96-038, unreported, 1997 WL 133330, which held that 
the exception enumerated in R.C. 2744.02[B][4] is inapplicable to injuries 
sustained in a municipal swimming pool.)  Unlike a courthouse or office building 
where government business is conducted, a city recreation center houses 
recreational activities.  Furthermore, if we applied former R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) to an 
indoor swimming pool, liability could be imposed upon the political subdivision.  
However, there would be no liability if the injury occurred at an outdoor municipal 
 
11
swimming pool, since the injury did not occur in a building.  We do not believe 
that the General Assembly intended to insulate political subdivisions from liability 
based on this distinction.  Therefore, we reject appellants’ contention that former 
R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) applies to an indoor municipal swimming pool. 
 
Appellants further contend that R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) provides an independent 
basis for imposing liability on the city.  We reject this contention.  In Hill v. 
Urbana, supra, 79 Ohio St.3d 130, 679 N.E.2d 1109, a similar argument was 
made.  However, R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) is a defense to liability; it cannot be used to 
establish liability.  Id. at 135, 679 N.E.2d at 1113, fn. 2 (Lundberg Stratton, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 138-139, 679 N.E.2d at 1116 
(Moyer, C.J., dissenting).  Therefore, appellants can only argue that the city is not 
entitled to the defense of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) because the city acted in a reckless or 
wanton manner.  Appellants do, in fact, contend that a jury question arises as to 
whether the city acted recklessly in its use of its facility and equipment, in its 
failure regarding the use of 911 on its emergency phone system.5 
 
R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) provides: 
 
“The political subdivision is immune from liability if the injury [or] death  * 
* * resulted from the exercise of judgment or discretion in determining whether to 
acquire, or how to use, equipment, supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and 
other resources unless the judgment or discretion was exercised with malicious 
purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” 
 
The evidence overwhelmingly established that three city employees were 
unable to contact 911, despite several attempts to do so.  It was further shown that 
these employees were never trained on the use of the phone system.  As a result of 
their failure to contact 911, there was about a thirty-minute delay in Darrall’s 
treatment. 
 
12
 
The fact that the city had no policy in place or training regarding 911 is 
appalling.  The seriousness of these omissions is highlighted by the fact that more 
than one hundred swimmers, mostly children unaccompanied by adults, frequented 
the city pool that day.  However, something as basic and important as dialing 911 
was not within the city employees’ grasp.  Not only did two of the senior 
lifeguards create a dangerous situation by leaving the pool area during an open 
swim session, but the city, in its admitted failure to train its employees on the use 
of 911, left them without the knowledge necessary to handle the emergency as it 
arose.  We are unwilling to grant immunity to the city under this provision, and to 
find, as argued, that the city did nothing wrong on the day Darrall suffered a near 
drowning. 
 
This court has defined the term “reckless” to mean that the conduct was 
committed “ ‘knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a 
reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of 
physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that 
which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.’ ”  Marchetti v. Kalish (1990), 
53 Ohio St.3d 95, 96, 559 N.E.2d 699, 700, fn. 2, quoting 2 Restatement of the 
Law 2d, Torts (1965) 587, Section 500.  The conduct by the city regarding its lack 
of training on the use of 911 presents a question of fact for the jury to consider, 
which was improperly disposed of by granting the city’s motion for directed 
verdict. 
 
The standard for directing a verdict is well established.  Civ.R. 50(A)(4) 
provides: 
 
“When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial 
court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against 
whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable 
minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that 
 
13
conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a 
verdict for the moving party as to that issue.” 
 
In deciding a motion for a directed verdict, neither the weight of the 
evidence nor the credibility of the witnesses is to be considered.  Strother v. 
Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 284, 21 O.O.3d 177, 179, 423 N.E.2d 467, 
469.  Instead, “[w]hen a motion for a directed verdict is entered, what is being 
tested is a question of law; that is, the legal sufficiency of the evidence to take the 
case to the jury.”  Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 66, 68, 23 
O.O.3d 115, 116, 430 N.E.2d 935, 938.  The motion for directed verdict must be 
denied “if there is substantial competent evidence to support the party against 
whom the motion is made, upon which evidence reasonable minds might reach 
different conclusions.”  Hawkins v. Ivy (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 114, 115, 4 O.O.3d 
243, 244, 363 N.E.2d 367, 368. 
 
Since reasonable minds can differ as to whether the city allowed a nuisance 
to exist and as to whether the city acted in a wanton or reckless manner in its use of 
its facilities and equipment under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), by failing to institute 
policies or training regarding the use of the 911 emergency number, we find that 
the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the city. 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand 
the cause to the trial court for a new trial. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs and concurs separately. 
 
MOYER, C.J., HADLEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in syllabus and 
judgment. 
 
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
 
RONALD E. HADLEY, J., of the Third Appellate District, sitting for COOK, J. 
 
14
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
These individuals were cited for the following violations:  leaving the job or 
work area during regular working hours without authorization (Hodge); neglect or 
carelessness in signing in or out (Hodge); recurrent failure to make required reports 
(Hutson); malicious mischief, horseplay, wrestling, or other undesirable conduct 
(Hutson); failing to show reasonable care in the use or operation of city property or 
equipment (Hutson); failing to observe department rules (Hodge, Hutson); 
unsatisfactory work or failure to maintain required standards of performance 
(McKeller, Hutson, Hodge); leaving post of continuous operations position prior to 
being relieved by employee or incoming shift (Hodge); threatening, intimidating, 
coercing, or interfering with supervisors or co-workers (Hutson); disregard or 
carelessness in observance of official safety rules, or disregarding of common 
safety practices (Hodge, Hutson); wanton or willful neglect in the performance of 
assigned duties in the care, use, or custody of any city property or equipment 
(Hodge, Hutson); refusal to work at the scheduled time for the scheduled shift 
(Hutson); failure to remain ready as a lifeguard (Hodge, Hutson); failing to remain 
at post except in cases of emergency or when properly relieved (Hodge, Hutson); 
failing to ensure that the pool is properly staffed at all times (Hodge, Hutson); 
failing to be responsible for and in charge of pool (Hutson); failing to see that all 
policies, rules, and regulations are enforced by staff (Hutson); failing to perform as 
a lifeguard (Hodge, Hutson); failing to establish the working schedule of staff 
(Hutson); failing to be responsible for the actions and work of all personnel 
assigned to facility (Hutson); leaving pool guard chair or pool deck without being 
properly relieved or dismissed (Hodge); failing to keep eyes on swimmers at all 
times (Hodge); and leaving pool unguarded unless in an emergency, and then only 
after clearing the pool (Hodge). 
 
15
2. 
Appellants and amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers also 
challenge the constitutionality of R.C. Chapter 2744.  However, we need not 
address that issue based upon our disposition of the issues raised. 
3. 
The current version of R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), effective June 30, 1997, omits 
any reference to nuisance, and no longer refers to “public grounds.”  The newly 
enacted version of R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) is now applicable only to negligence that 
occurs within or on the grounds of “and is due to physical defects within or on the 
grounds of, buildings used in connection with the performance of a governmental 
function * * *.”  (Emphasis added.) 
4. 
In Siebenaler, a child lost his footing on the ladder of a high diving board 
and fell to the pool deck while taking swimming lessons in a village swimming 
pool.  Although the court of appeals ultimately found that the village of Montpelier 
was immune from suit, due to a lack of evidence regarding the presence of a 
nuisance, the court acknowledged that the nuisance exception of former R.C. 
2744.02(B)(3) was relevant. 
5. 
Appellants also argue that the city was reckless or wanton in the use of its 
lifeguard personnel.  However, any negligence on the part of the lifeguards falls 
under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), not 2744.03(A)(5).  See Fabrey v. McDonald Village 
Police Dept. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 356, 639 N.E.2d 31, 35. Appellants further 
argue that the city was reckless or wanton in its use of its facility, by failing to 
institute a policy concerning the recognition and monitoring of known glare spots.  
However, we find dispositive the issue of the city’s allegedly reckless or wanton 
use of its equipment, in failing to institute a training policy regarding the use of the 
911 emergency phone system. 
__________________ 
 
16
 
Pfeifer, J., concurring.  I concur because of my belief that Ohio’s sovereign 
immunity statute is unconstitutional.  See Garrett v. Sandusky (1994), 68 Ohio 
St.3d 139, 141, 624 N.E.2d 704, 706 (Pfeifer, J., concurring). 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurring in syllabus and judgment.  I believe, as does the 
majority, that the certified issue should be answered in the affirmative, thereby 
establishing the legal principle that “a governmental function and the absolute 
immunity provided it under R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(U) [are] still subject to the 
exceptions to immunity provided in R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) and (4).”  I therefore concur 
in the syllabus. 
 
In applying that syllabus to the case before us, however, I do not believe that 
the facts of this case fall within the scope of the exception in former R.C. 
2744.02(B)(3) for nonliability based on a city’s failure to keep public grounds free 
from nuisance.  I disagree with the majority that the existence of glare on the pool 
water surface establishes a question of fact as to the existence of a nuisance.  As 
acknowledged by the majority, the existence of glare on the water of swimming 
pools, whether operating in direct or indirect sunlight, is a common and nearly 
universal phenomenon.  While failure to provide procedures to accommodate glare 
so as to promote safe swimming might arguably constitute negligent operation of a 
pool, I cannot subscribe to the conclusion that the existence of glare on a swimming 
pool surface can itself constitute a legal nuisance.  To do so would be to effectively 
endorse the proposition that operation of any swimming pool may be equivalent to 
maintaining a nuisance. 
 
Rather, I believe that the city’s potential liability is based in former R.C. 
2744.02(B)(4), which provided at the time of Cater’s drowning:  “Political 
subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by the 
negligence of their employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of buildings 
 
17
that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function * * *.”  
(Emphasis added.)  As the lead opinion acknowledges, operation of a swimming pool 
has been expressly designated a governmental function.  R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(u).  It 
follows that liability potentially exists where death is caused by the negligence of city 
employees on swimming pool property.  Although I acknowledge the existence of 
case law from the courts of appeals to the contrary, in my view both indoor and 
outdoor pools exist “within or on the grounds” of buildings used in connection with 
the performance of the governmental function of operating a pool.  Indoor pools 
clearly are “within” buildings.  Outdoor pools, while not located within buildings 
themselves, invariably are located on land that includes buildings, such as 
bathhouses, shelters, restrooms, storage areas, and offices.  I therefore do not accept 
the conclusion of the majority that application of (B)(4) to this case would result in 
our creation of an artificial distinction between indoor and outdoor pools in applying 
the relevant immunity statutes. 
 
I write separately, as well, to express my disagreement with the majority’s 
analysis of the applicability of the defense provided by R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) to this 
case.  That statute provides immunity to a political subdivision where injury or death 
“result[s] from the exercise of judgment or discretion in determining whether to 
acquire, or how to use, equipment, supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other 
resources unless the judgment or discretion was exercised with malicious purpose, in 
bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”  (Emphasis added.)  It follows that 
where decisions as to these matters are made recklessly, the “judgment or discretion” 
defense is not available to a political subdivision. 
 
The majority concludes that reasonable minds might find recklessness on the 
part of the city based solely on its alleged failure to effectively instruct employees in 
the use of pool telephones to contact emergency services by dialing 911. 
 
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I need not endorse such a conclusion on this record.  Determining the point at 
which behavior rises from the merely negligent to the level of reckless behavior is in 
every instance problematic.  In this case, the plaintiffs produced a litany of facts of 
decisions and acts demonstrating questionable decision-making on the part of city 
employees as to, e.g., understaffing of lifeguards, failure to compensate for the 
existence of glare on the water, and inadequate training in emergency procedures.  
The decision need not be made in this case whether each of these circumstances, 
standing alone, rises to the level of recklessness.  Here a jury viewing all of the facts 
in their totality might well conclude that the city had acted recklessly in exercising 
judgment or discretion in connection with the use of pool equipment, personnel, and 
facilities, thereby precluding application of the defense provided by R.C. 
2744.03(A)(5). 
 
I therefore concur in the syllabus and the judgment only. 
 
HADLEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing concurring 
opinion.