Case Title: Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sperry

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98075

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 98075-Agenda 22-November 2004.
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, Appellant, v. THOMAS B. 							
SPERRY, d/b/a Thomas B. Sperry, Inc., Appellee.
Opinion filed March 24, 2005.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	The circuit court of Kane County entered an order declaring void
a previous order of that court awarding attorney fees to plaintiff, Ford
Motor Credit Company (Ford Credit). The circuit court held that
because the law firm representing Ford Credit had failed to register
with this court, pursuant to our Rule 721(c) (166 Ill. 2d R. 721(c)),
the firm's practice of law was unauthorized, and, accordingly, there
was no valid basis upon which the court could award legal fees. A
majority of the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit
court. 344 Ill. App. 3d 1068. For the reasons that follow, we reverse
the judgment of the appellate court and vacate the order of the circuit
court.

BACKGROUND
	In June 1993, defendant, Thomas B. Sperry, leased an automobile
from Sycamore Auto Center, Inc. (Sycamore). Thereafter, Sycamore
assigned the lease to Ford Credit. In December 1994, Ford Credit
filed suit against defendant, alleging that defendant had breached the
terms of the motor vehicle lease. As a remedy for defendant's breach,
Ford Credit sought the return of the vehicle and monetary damages.
	In response to the lawsuit lodged against him by Ford Credit,
defendant filed a counterclaim against Ford Credit and a third-party
action against Sycamore. Defendant alleged that Ford Credit and
Sycamore had engaged in various fraudulent activities with respect to
the vehicle lease. Only defendant's counterclaim against Ford Credit
is at issue in this appeal. In August 1999, Ford Credit's lawsuit against
defendant, as well as defendant's counterclaim against Ford Credit,
went to trial. Following defendant's presentation of his case, Ford
Credit moved for a directed verdict on several counts of defendant's
counterclaim, including count V. In count V, defendant alleged that
Ford Credit had violated provisions of the Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West
2000)). After hearing the evidence, the circuit court granted Ford
Credit a directed verdict against defendant on this consumer fraud
count.
	Thereafter, on November 15, 1999, Ford Credit petitioned the
circuit court for statutory attorney fees available to it as the prevailing
party in the consumer fraud action (see 815 ILCS 505/10a(c) (West
2000)). The evidence adduced with respect to this claim showed that,
during the entire course of these proceedings, Ford Credit was
represented by attorney Mary K. Schulz. At the time Ford Credit's
complaint was filed, Schulz practiced with the professional service
corporation law firm of Vigil, Berkley, Schulz and Gordon, P.C. After
that firm dissolved, Schulz continued to represent Ford Credit in these
proceedings as the principal in her own newly created professional
service corporation law firm, Schulz & Associates, P.C.
	On May 8, 2000, the circuit court awarded Ford Credit-as the
prevailing party in the consumer fraud action-statutory attorney fees
in the amount of $31,717.25. Defendant neither filed a motion with
the circuit court to reconsider this award, nor filed an appeal of this
judgment with the appellate court. In May 2001-one year after the
judgment for attorney fees was entered-Ford Credit commenced
collection proceedings against defendant on the attorney fees award. 	On February 5, 2002-21 months after the circuit court entered
the original judgment against defendant for attorney fees-defendant,
pro se, filed in the circuit court a pleading entitled "First Amended
Motion to Vacate the Void Orders of This Court." In this pleading,
brought pursuant to section 2-1401(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West 2000)), defendant requested that the
circuit court vacate the May 8, 2000, order awarding statutory
attorney fees to Ford Credit. Defendant asserted that when the
professional service corporation of Vigil, Berkley, Schulz and Gordon,
P.C., initiated the lawsuit against him in 1994, that firm lacked a
certificate of registration with this court, as required pursuant to our
Rule 721(c) (166 Ill. 2d R. 721(c)). Defendant also alleged that when
that same law firm petitioned the circuit court for attorney fees in
1999, it remained unregistered under Rule 721(c). Based upon the
firm's lack of registration with this court, defendant asserted that Ford
Credit was "not represented by any entities authorized by the Illinois
Supreme Court to practice law in the State of Illinois," and that the
law firm was thereby "prohibited from opening or maintaining an
office for that purpose." Accordingly, defendant argued, the filing of
the lawsuit against him "did not confer jurisdiction" upon the circuit
court. Thus, defendant concluded, because the law firm was
"prohibited *** from practicing law in the State of Illinois" as a result
of its failure to register pursuant to Rule 721(c), the attorney fees
award was null and void ab initio.
	 A hearing on defendant's motion was held on March 7, 2002. At
that time, defendant had retained counsel and was no longer appearing
pro se. Counsel for defendant argued that pursuant to the Corporation
Practice of Law Prohibition Act (705 ILCS 220/0.01 et seq. (West
2000)), a corporation is prohibited from practicing law, unless that
entity falls within the ambit of the Professional Service Corporation
Act (805 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (West 2000)). In turn, counsel argued, the
Professional Service Corporation Act specifies that it is this court
which shall determine how professional corporations shall be
organized to practice law, and it is through the provisions of Rule 721
that this court allows professional corporations to practice law.
	Counsel further argued that because the professional service
corporation law firms representing Ford Credit were not registered
with this court pursuant to Rule 721(c), those firms were engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law. Accordingly, counsel stated, the
order granting those law firms attorney fees was therefore void. In
addition, counsel further asserted that because the motion to vacate
the judgment granting Ford Credit attorney fees was brought pursuant
to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-1401(f) (West 2000)), the motion was not untimely, as section
2-1401 provides that a void order can be set aside at any time.
	At the hearing on defendant's motion, Ford Credit was again
represented by attorney Mary K. Schulz. In response to defendant's
arguments, Ford Credit's counsel first noted that there was no dispute
that, during these proceedings, she was a duly licensed attorney in
good standing with this court. Counsel then stressed that the licensing
requirements imposed by this court upon attorneys is distinguishable
from the registration requirements for professional service corporation
law firms contained within Rule 721(c). Counsel argued that Rule 721
is an administrative rule which allows this court to identify the
individuals who are involved in a professional service corporation and
to assure that these persons are licensed to practice law in this state.
The administrative provisions of Rule 721, counsel asserted, are in
contrast to the licensing and regulation provisions in our rules.
Counsel emphasized that licenses to practice law are not given to law
firms; rather, they are awarded to individuals. Further, counsel stated,
the law firms for which licensed attorneys practice are not,
themselves, licensed to practice law.
	During the course of the hearing, counsel also advised the court
that the firm with which she practiced at the time Ford Credit's
complaint was filed, Vigil, Berkley, Schulz and Gordon, P.C., had
since dissolved in May 2000, and she believed that firm had not been
registered with this court pursuant to Rule 721. Counsel further stated
that she then set up her own professional service corporation law firm,
Schulz & Associates, P.C., which was, at the time of the hearing, in
the process of Rule 721 registration with this court. Counsel
concluded her argument by reiterating her position that registration
under Rule 721 is purely administrative and is not analogous to the
grant of a license to practice law.
	On April 9, 2002, the circuit court granted defendant's motion to
vacate the judgment order of May 8, 2000, which had awarded Ford
Credit statutory attorney fees. As an initial matter, the court found
that it was uncontroverted that Ford Credit's attorney throughout
these proceedings, Mary K. Schulz, was duly licensed to practice law
in this state. In addition, the circuit court acknowledged that, at the
time of its ruling, the law firm of Schulz & Associates, P.C., had
registered with this court pursuant to Rule 721(c).
	However, the circuit court also found that it was uncontroverted
that the law firms with which Schulz practiced during this litigation
had not registered under Rule 721(c). The circuit court held that the
"most pertinent" case was Kaplan v. Tabb Associates, Inc., 276 Ill.
App. 3d 320 (1995), because it presented "striking similarities" to the
cause before it. The circuit court explained that in Kaplan, the plaintiff
and the defendant architectural firm signed a contract for architectural
services. When a monetary dispute arose between the plaintiff and the
defendant firm, that firm sought to invoke the contract's arbitration
provision. The plaintiff sought to have the contract declared void due
to the failure of the defendant firm to be licensed under the Illinois
Architecture Practice Act of 1989 (225 ILCS 305/21 (West 1992)).
The circuit court in the instant cause emphasized that the Kaplan
court held that, even though the sole owner of the defendant firm was
a duly licensed architect, the contract was nevertheless void due to the
failure of the defendant firm to become licensed under the
Architecture Practice Act.
	The circuit court acknowledged that there were factual
differences between the Kaplan case and the matter before it.
Nevertheless, the circuit court followed Kaplan and held that, in the
instant cause, the law firms representing Ford Credit were in violation
of the registration requirement of Rule 721(c) at the time of trial and
also when the attorney fees award was made in May 2000. The circuit
court reasoned:
		"The Kaplan case is essentially controlling here ***. The
mere fact that the attorneys here were licensed is immaterial
to the court's determination. *** Since the corporations were
not registered *** they cannot now claim the benefit of
statutory fees when the lack of registration of these
corporations precluded them from holding themselves out as
organizations for the practice of law in the state of Illinois."
As a result, the circuit court held that the order for award of attorney
fees was void ab initio, and the court therefore vacated that order.
	Ford Credit appealed. A majority of the appellate court affirmed.
344 Ill. App. 3d 1068. The appellate majority equated a law firm's
failure to register pursuant to Rule 721(c) with the unauthorized
practice of law. In support of this determination, the appellate
majority principally relied on Remole Soil Service, Inc. v. Benson, 68
Ill. App. 2d 234 (1966), which held that legal proceedings prosecuted
by those without authority are null, and that the judgments resulting
from such proceedings are void. Thus, the appellate majority
concluded that because the law firms representing Ford Credit during
the instant litigation performed legal services without authorization
and in violation of the law, the circuit court correctly determined that
the order awarding Ford Credit statutory attorney fees was void ab
initio.
	Justice Kapala dissented. First, the dissenting justice asserted that
the circuit court erred in allowing defendant's motion to vacate the
judgment granting Ford Credit attorney fees because that motion was
an improper collateral attack on a final order. Second, Justice Kapala
believed that even if defendant had properly appealed the award of
attorney fees within the applicable time to appeal that order, the
appellate court's prior decision in Joseph P. Storto, P.C. v. Becker,
341 Ill. App. 3d 337 (2003), controlled and defeated defendant's
claim. Justice Kapala explained that in Storto, the court held that Rule
721(c) was not enacted for the protection of public safety and,
therefore, contractual obligations owed to a law firm not properly
registered under Rule 721(c) could not be voided absent a showing of
prejudice resulting from a failure to register. Thus, based upon the
holding in Storto, the dissenting justice concluded that the circuit
court erred in voiding the judgment order awarding statutory attorney
fees to Ford Credit.
	We granted Ford Credit leave to appeal to this court. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS
	In the instant cause, the circuit court, pursuant to section
2-1401(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f)
(West 2000)), vacated a prior judgment order entered on May 8,
2000, reasoning that the May 8 order awarding statutory attorney fees
to Ford Credit was void ab initio because the law firms representing
Ford Credit lacked Rule 721(c) registration with this court. At issue
in this appeal is whether a law firm's failure to register as a
professional service corporation with this court, pursuant to the
requirement set forth in our Rule 721(c), renders the legal services
provided by that law firm the unauthorized practice of law, nullifies
the proceedings in which the firm participated, and causes the
resulting judgments of such proceedings to be void. Our review of this
issue is de novo. People v. Johnson, 206 Ill. 2d 348, 359 (2002).
	Petitions for relief from judgments filed pursuant to section
2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West
2000)) "invoke[ ] the equitable powers of the circuit court, which
should prevent enforcement of a *** judgment when it would be
unfair, unjust, or unconscionable." Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209, 225 (1986). At issue in the instant cause is subsection (f) of
section 2-1401, which provides: "Nothing contained in this Section
affects any existing right to relief from a void order or judgment, or to
employ any existing method to procure that relief." 735 ILCS
5/2-1401(f) (West 2000). Section 2-1401(f) codifies a common law
rule allowing litigants to attack a void judgment at any time. See
Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 104-05
(1992). In a petition to vacate a void judgment brought pursuant to
subsection (f) of section 2-1401, the general rules pertaining to
petitions filed under section 2-1401-that they must be brought within
two years of the order of judgment, that the petitioner must allege a
meritorious defense to the original action, and that the petitioner must
show that the petition was brought with due diligence-do not apply.
Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d  at 104. Rather, "[t]he allegation that the
judgment or order is void substitutes for and negates the need to
allege a meritorious defense and due diligence." Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d 
at 104.
	A void order or judgment is, generally, one entered by a court
without jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties, or by a court
that lacks the inherent power to make or enter the order involved. In
re Estate of Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1994); People v. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1, 5 (1987). A void judgment is from its inception a complete
nullity and without legal effect. In re Application of the Cook County
Collector for Judgment & Sale Against Lands & Lots Returned
Delinquent for Nonpayment of General Taxes for the Year 1985, 228
Ill. App. 3d 719, 731 (1991); In re Marriage of Allcock, 107 Ill. App.
3d 150, 153 (1982). We have cautioned, however, that in declaring a
prior order to be void, the court must be mindful that it is setting aside
a final judgment based upon a collateral attack. Accordingly, we have
recently held that " '[b]ecause of the disastrous consequences which
follow when orders and judgments are allowed to be collaterally
attacked, orders should be characterized as void only when no other
alternative is possible.' " Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 341 (2002), quoting In re
Marriage of Vernon, 253 Ill. App. 3d 783, 788 (1993).
	In its submission to this court, Ford Credit contends that the
lower courts erred in holding that the judgment order awarding Ford
Credit statutory attorney fees was void ab initio. According to Ford
Credit, the appellate court majority improperly equated a law firm's
failure to register with this court pursuant to Rule 721(c) with the
unauthorized practice of law. Ford Credit notes that the sole claim
raised by defendant in the circuit court to support his argument that
the attorney fees award is void and should be vacated is that the law
firms hired by Ford Credit did not register with this court under Rule
721. The circuit court held, and the appellate majority agreed, that this
defect alone was sufficient to void the previously entered judgment
order.
	Ford Credit argues that there are several points upon which the
appellate court should be reversed. First, Ford Credit notes that in
arriving at its ruling, the appellate majority improperly relied upon
Remole Soil Service, Inc. v. Benson, 68 Ill. App. 2d 234 (1966), a
case which Ford Credit asserts is factually inapposite to the matter at
bar. Ford Credit additionally contends that, by relying upon Remole,
the appellate majority failed to follow its own factually relevant
precedent. Ford Credit notes that only a few months prior to filing its
ruling in the instant cause, the appellate court decided Joseph P.
Storto, P.C. v. Becker, 341 Ill. App. 3d 337 (2003), wherein the court
ruled that a law firm's failure to register pursuant to our Rule 721(c)
did not result in the voiding of a contract for attorney fees.
	Second, Ford Credit observes that the appellate majority failed to
consider that the judgment award for statutory attorney fees was in its
own favor as the prevailing party in the consumer fraud action, and
was not awarded to its law firms. Third, Ford Credit notes that, at all
times during this litigation, it was represented by attorneys who were
duly licensed to practice law in this state. As such, Ford Credit
contends, there was no unauthorized practice of law by any lawyer
involved in this case. In addition, Ford Credit asserts that the lower
courts failed to consider the fact that the law firm of Schulz &
Associates, P.C., was properly registered with this court on April 9,
2002, the date on which the circuit court entered its decision to void
the attorney fees judgment order. Finally, Ford Credit contends that
the judgment order awarding statutory attorney fees was not "void,"
because there was no claim that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction
over either the subject matter or the parties. As such, Ford Credit
concludes, defendant's motion to vacate the judgment order awarding
attorney fees was an improper collateral attack.
	In response, defendant asserts that the circuit court properly
granted his motion to vacate the judgment order awarding Ford Credit
statutory attorney fees, and that the action of the circuit court was
properly affirmed by the appellate majority. In his submission to this
court, defendant contends that by failing to advise the circuit court
that their law firms lacked registration with this court pursuant to Rule
721(c), "Ford's attorneys had committed a fraud on the court."
Defendant contends that all work performed on behalf of Ford Credit
and itemized in the fee petition occurred while the law firms lacked
the required registration, and that "Illinois statutes and Rule 721
prohibit the collection of legal fees by a corporation that has failed to
obtain a certificate of registration." As a result, defendant contends,
the judgment order awarding attorney fees to Ford Credit is void
against public policy.
	In his brief to this court, defendant further urges this court to
hold that the "fee award to Ford was void because it exceeded the trial
court's inherent power and authority by infringing on the exclusive
authority of the Illinois Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law
in Illinois by professional service corporation law firms." Defendant
concludes by arguing that because Ford Credit had no right to recover
attorney fees paid to professional service corporations which "were
not authorized to practice," the circuit court "did not acquire subject
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate such a claim for fees nor to enter
judgment thereon in favor of Ford." We reject each of defendant's
arguments.
 	This court has the inherent power to define and regulate the
practice of law in this state. In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill. 2d 471, 475 (1954);
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 349-50
(1937). More specifically, "the power to prescribe rules governing
attorney conduct, and to discipline attorneys for violating those rules,
rests solely in this court." People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley, 119 Ill. 2d 485, 494 (1988).
	To this end, our court has promulgated rules which set forth
detailed regulations for the study of law and which govern the
admission of applicants to our state bar. See 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 701
through 720. This court has also created a comprehensive scheme to
regulate attorneys and discipline them for misconduct. As part of this
regulatory scheme, we have promulgated rules of professional conduct
for state-licensed attorneys (See 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 1.1 through 8.5), and
have constituted an Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission (ARDC) (134 Ill. 2d R. 751), and created the office of an
Administrator (134 Ill. 2d R. 752) to supervise "[t]he registration of,
and disciplinary proceedings affecting, members of the Illinois bar."
134 Ill. 2d R. 751(a). In addition, this court has promulgated detailed
rules which prescribe the appropriate discipline when the Rules of
Professional Conduct are violated. See 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 751 through
775; 137 Ill. 2d Rs. 776, 777; 188 Ill. 2d R. 778; 155 Ill. 2d R. 780.
This court has also created a procedural framework within which the
ARDC performs its duties to investigate complaints of misconduct
against licensed attorneys, hold hearings on those complaints, and
provide review of the findings with respect to those complaints. 166
Ill. 2d R. 753.
	The above-described regulatory rules which govern the admission
of lawyers to our state bar, regulate the practice of law and the
conduct of lawyers, and prescribe discipline for lawyer misconduct are
intended to safeguard the public and assure the integrity of our legal
system. These regulatory provisions assure that only those individuals
who are fit and qualified to practice law will be licensed in this state,
that those individuals will practice law ethically and with competence,
and that any infractions of the Rules of Professional Conduct will be
investigated and discipline will be imposed if appropriate.
	In contrast to the regulatory rules discussed above, the provisions
contained in our Rule 721 do not have as their primary purpose the
protection of the public safety. Rather, Rule 721 is designed to permit
duly licensed lawyers the business option of organizing in professional
service corporations as a means of providing them with limited liability
protection.
	Under the Corporation Practice of Law Prohibition Act (705
ILCS 220/0.01 et seq. (West 2000)), a corporation is prevented from
practicing law. However, with the passage of the Professional Service
Corporation Act (805 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (West 2000)), licensed
professionals were afforded the choice of organizing their practices in
a corporate form. By enacting the Professional Service Corporation
Act, the legislature intended to
		 "provide for the incorporation of an individual or group of
individuals to render the same professional service or related
professional services to the public for which such individuals
are required by law to be licensed *** while preserving the
established professional aspects of the personal relationship
between the professional person and those he serves
professionally." 805 ILCS 10/2 (West 2000).
Section 7 of the Professional Service Corporation Act requires that
the corporations organized and incorporated under this Act must
render professional services only through "its officers, employees and
agents who are duly licensed *** to render such professional services
within this State." 805 ILCS 10/7 (West 2000). Section 16 of the
Professional Service Corporation Act specifically applies to attorneys
at law and provides:
		"[T]he provisions of this Act shall be applicable to attorneys
at law only to the extent and under such terms and conditions
as the Supreme Court of Illinois shall determine to be
necessary and appropriate." 805 ILCS 10/16 (West 2000).
	It is through Rule 721 that this court allows duly licensed lawyers
the option to organize their law firms under one of several statutory
vehicles providing limited liability, including professional service
corporations. Paragraph (a) of Rule 721 requires that each corporate
shareholder and any employee engaged in the practice of law must be
licensed to practice law, and that the entity "shall do nothing which,
if done by an individual attorney, would violate the standards of
professional conduct applicable to attorneys licensed by this court."
166 Ill. 2d R. 721(a)(3).(1) Paragraph (b) of this rule requires that the
corporation, and the attorneys practicing through this entity, must
abide by the standards of professional conduct applicable to attorneys
licensed by this court. 166 Ill. 2d R. 721(b). Paragraph (c) requires
each corporation or association that seeks to practice law to register
with this court. See 166 Ill. 2d R. 721(c). Specifically, Rule 721(c)
provides:
			"(c) No corporation or association or limited liability
company shall engage in the practice of law in Illinois, or
open or maintain an establishment for that purpose in Illinois,
without a certificate of registration issued by this court."
The initial registration application requires a fee of $50 (166 Ill. 2d R.
721(e)), and annual renewals must be accompanied by a $40 fee (166
Ill. 2d R. 721(f)). Finally, any violation of this rule by the entity "is a
ground for the court to terminate or suspend the right of the [entity]
to practice law or otherwise to discipline it." 166 Ill. 2d R. 721(b).
	In the matter before us, defendant's sole claim in the circuit court
to support his argument that the judgment order awarding attorney
fees to Ford Credit is void and must be vacated is that the law firms
representing Ford Credit throughout the litigation were not registered
with this court pursuant to Rule 721(c). The circuit court held, and the
appellate majority agreed, that this defect alone rendered the
previously entered judgment order void, as the law firm's failure to
register under Rule 721(c) equated with the unauthorized practice of
law. We reject this analysis. We hold that a correct interpretation of
the scope and purpose of our Rule 721(c) was set forth in Joseph P.
Storto, P.C. v. Becker, 341 Ill. App. 3d 337 (2003), a decision which
the appellate court below acknowledged but refused to follow.
	The Storto case also involved the question of a law firm's failure
to register with this court pursuant to Rule 721(c). That case arose
from an attorney fees dispute between the plaintiff law firm and its
former client. After the parties ended their attorney-client relationship,
the firm filed suit against the client seeking unpaid fees. The defendant
client moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the firm
was not properly registered with this court pursuant to Rule 721(c),
the contract for legal fees was void as a matter of public policy, and
she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court
granted the motion, holding that because the law firm was not
properly registered under Rule 721(c), it was without authority to
provide legal services and the contract it had entered into with the
client was invalid. On appeal, the appellate court reversed.
	The Storto court observed that although Rule 721(c) requires that
professional service corporations register with this court, the rule also
lacks civil or criminal penalties for noncompliance. "[C]riminal or civil
penalties would indicate that the licensing requirements were enacted
because they have a significant impact on public health or safety."
Storto, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 344. Because Rule 721(c) fails to include
civil or criminal liability for the failure to register, the Storto court held
that this indicated that the registration requirement was not
promulgated for the protection of the public safety. Storto, 341 Ill.
App. 3d at 344. In addition, the Storto court reasoned that this
conclusion was supported by the fact that a law firm "generally does
not incorporate to benefit its clients or to advance the public welfare.
[Citation]. Rather, a law firm incorporates to enjoy certain tax benefits
and to reduce its potential civil liability." Storto, 341 Ill. App. 3d at
344.
	Accordingly, the Storto court determined that, because Rule
721(c) was not enacted for the protection of the public, the
contractual obligations owed to a professional service corporation law
firm which lacked registration under Rule 721(c) could not be voided
absent a showing of prejudice resulting from the failure to register.
Storto, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 342-44. Under the circumstances presented
in that case, the court concluded that allowing the client to escape her
contractual obligations would be disproportionate to the wrong
committed by the law firm. Storto, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 343.
	We adopt the analysis of Rule 721 set forth by the court in the
Storto decision. We hold that a violation of the registration
requirement contained in Rule 721(c) does not lead to the conclusion
that the lawyers of the unregistered firm lacked either the authority or
the competence to practice law. We emphasize that there is a
fundamental difference between an unlicensed individual representing
a party in legal proceedings or performing activities traditionally
considered to be the 'practice of law' and duly licensed attorneys who
happen to belong to a law firm that has not filed its registration and
paid its fees pursuant to Rule 721(c). The material inquiry in assessing
whether there has been an unauthorized practice of law is whether the
individual who acts on behalf of a client is duly licensed by this court,
as it is only individuals-and not corporations-who are granted the
privilege to practice law.
	When unlicensed individuals engage in the practice of law, the
public is at risk of harm. In contrast, when a law firm fails to comply
with the registration requirement in our Rule 721(c), it is the
noncomplying firm that is harmed, not the public. By failing to
register, the law firm loses its right to invoke the corporate
protections of limited liability that are set forth in Rule 721. This
reality further underscores that the registration requirement in Rule
721(c) was not enacted to safeguard the public welfare, but to benefit
those law firms seeking the tax and limited liability advantages of
incorporation. Therefore, duly licensed attorneys who belong to a firm
that lacks Rule 721(c) registration do not, by virtue of the
unregistered nature of the firm, engage in the unauthorized practice of
law. Cf. People v. Brigham, 151 Ill. 2d 58 (1992) (defendant was not
automatically deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel
because his attorney had failed to pay his annual registration dues with
this court; counsel's oversight of nonpayment did not diminish his
competency as an attorney).
	Accordingly, the appellate court erred in applying the nullity rule
set forth in Remole Soil Service, Inc. v. Benson, 68 Ill. App. 2d 234
(1966), to a violation of the registration requirement of Rule 721(c).
In affirming the circuit court's holding that the judgment order
awarding Ford Credit attorney fees was null and void, the appellate
court principally relied on Remole. We hold that Remole is factually
inapposite to the cause before us.
	In Remole, an Illinois corporation initiated a lawsuit in small
claims court against the defendant. The suit was filed and tried to
judgment by the corporation's office manger, who was an unlicensed
attorney. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion with the court to
find the corporation and its office manager in contempt for practicing
law without a license. The circuit court denied the motion. On appeal,
the appellate court reversed.
	The Remole court cited the rule that, generally, corporations are
prohibited from the practice of law, and determined that the
corporation in that case violated that rule when its office manager filed
and tried the corporation's lawsuit. "It is clear that the office manager
was engaged in the practice of law. We find nothing in the statutes,
case law, or Supreme Court Rules which directly or by reasonable
implication permits a business corporation to prosecute or defend its
own suits in our courts, on any level except through a licensed
attorney. It necessarily follows that the plaintiff and its sales manager
are in technical contempt of court." Remole, 68 Ill. App. 2d at 239.
The Remole court then held that " '[p]roceedings in a suit by a person
not entitled to practice are a nullity, and the suit may be dismissed. If
the cause has proceeded to judgement, the judgment is void and will
be reversed.' " Remole, 68 Ill. App. 2d at 239, quoting 7 C.J.S.
Attorney & Client §16b. Applying the nullity rule to the facts before
it, the Remole court held that because the legal proceedings in that
case were instituted without authority, they violated the law.
Therefore, the court concluded, the judgment resulting from such
proceedings was void. Accordingly, the appellate court in Remole
instructed the circuit court to vacate the judgment against the
defendant and to the dismiss the suit at the corporation's cost.
	Although the nullity rule set forth by the court in Remole remains
valid law, its application to the facts in the instant cause by the
appellate court is misplaced. We note that the nullity-or voidness-rule
is well established in our courts. See, e.g., Pratt-Holdampf v. Trinity
Medical Center, 338 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 1083 (2003); Ratcliffe v.
Apantaku, 318 Ill. App. 3d 621, 626 (2000); Berg v. Mid-America
Industrial, Inc., 293 Ill. App. 3d 731, 737 (1997); City of Chicago v.
Witvoet, 12 Ill. App. 3d 654, 655-56 (1973). This rule is grounded in
the fact that there are risks to individual clients and to the integrity of
the legal system inherent in representation by an unlicensed person:
The purpose of the nullity "rule is *** to protect litigants against the
mistakes of the ignorant and the schemes of the unscrupulous and to
protect the court itself in the administration of its proceedings from
those lacking requisite skills." Janiczek v. Dover Management Co.,
134 Ill. App. 3d 543, 546 (1985), citing City of Chicago v. Witvoet,
12 Ill. App. 3d 654, 655-66. Accordingly, it is well settled that the
"effect of a person's unauthorized practice on behalf of a party is to
require dismissal of the cause or to treat the particular actions taken
by the representative as a nullity." Pratt-Holdampf, 338 Ill. App. 3d
at 1083; see also People v. Dunson, 316 Ill. App. 3d 760, 764 (2000);
Blue v. People, 223 Ill. App. 3d 594, 596 (1992).
	In the instant cause, the appellate court erroneously held that the
circumstances at bar were similar to the facts presented in Remole,
and, therefore the nullity rule likewise applied in this matter. The
appellate majority reasoned as follows:
			"[T]he firm was not properly registered with the supreme
court when it obtained the attorney fees award. Like the
plaintiff in Remole, it performed legal services without
authorization and in violation of the law. The general rule of
dismissal applies under such circumstances. Accordingly, we
agree with the trial court's declaration that the order was
void ab initio." 344 Ill. App. 3d at 1072.
We reiterate our holding that duly licensed attorneys who practice
with a law firm that lacks Rule 721(c) registration do not, by virtue of
the unregistered nature of the law firm, engage in the unauthorized
practice of law. In the instant matter, there is no dispute that the
attorney representing Ford Credit throughout these proceedings was
duly licensed to practice law and in good standing with this court.
Therefore, it was error for the lower courts to hold that the nullity rule
applied to void the award of attorney fees to Ford Credit for the legal
services rendered by this attorney.(2) The goals of protecting the public
and ensuring the integrity of the court system which underpin the
invocation of the nullity rule were not implicated by the facts in the
instant cause.
	In sum, we hold that the appellate court erred in affirming the
judgment of the circuit court that the failure of the law firms
representing Ford Credit in this litigation to register as professional
service corporation law firms with this court pursuant to Rule 721(c)
rendered the legal services provided by the firms' attorneys the
unauthorized practice of law. As stated, there is a fundamental
difference between an unlicensed individual engaging in the practice
of law and a duly licensed lawyer who practices with an unregistered
firm. A duly licensed attorney who belongs to a firm that lacks Rule
721(c) registration does not, by virtue of the unregistered nature of
the firm, engage in the unauthorized practice of law. Because Ford
Credit was at all times represented by a duly licensed attorney in good
standing with this court, the judgment award granting Ford Credit
statutory attorney fees should not have been vacated as void.

CONCLUSION
	For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is
reversed and the order of the circuit court, voiding its previous order
awarding attorney fees to the plaintiff, is vacated.

Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court order vacated.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring:
	I respectfully submit this separate writing to clarify two points.
First, I generally agree that the rationale in Storto, adopted as
controlling by the majority (slip op. at 13), is sound. I believe,
however, that Storto and the majority fall short of a complete
explanation of the application of Rule 721. Second, I question the
majority's statement that "it is only individuals-and not
corporations-who are granted the privilege to practice law." Slip op.
at 13. Taking this second point first, the majority's statement is belied
by the plain language of Rule 721(c), providing as follows:
			"No corporation or association or limited liability company
shall engage in the practice of law in Illinois, or open or
maintain an establishment for that purpose in Illinois, without
a certificate of registration issued by this court." (Emphasis
added.) 166 Ill. 2d R. 721(c).
	There is no doubt that only qualified individual attorneys may be
licensed and "granted the privilege to practice law" (slip op. at 13).
188 Ill. 2d R. 701. In fact, the registration of various corporate
entities under Rule 721 is based upon the license of individual
shareholders, officers, directors, members, or partners. 166 Ill. 2d R.
721(a). Rule 721 is, thus, merely a registration vehicle to permit
licensed attorneys to engage in the practice of law through a
registered corporate entity.
	Upon qualification, this court issues a certificate of registration
entitling a registered entity to "engage in the practice of law in
Illinois." 166 Ill. 2d R. 721(a). A plain reading of Rule 721 establishes
that a registered corporate entity may engage in the practice of law.
I acknowledge, however, that in a practical sense, the registered
corporate entity does not and cannot practice law on its own. Rule
721 may need to be amended to clarify its precise intent.
	Despite the registration requirements of Rule 721, that rule
carries no civil or criminal penalties for noncompliance (see Storto,
341 Ill. App. 3d at 337), nor does it provide a remedy for private
parties. Nevertheless, an entity's noncompliance with Rule 721 can be
the basis for discipline by this court, including termination or
suspension of the entity's right to practice law or some other
discipline. Rule 721(b) provides in pertinent part:
		"Any violation of this rule by the corporation or association
or limited liability company is a ground for the court to
terminate or suspend the right of the corporation or
association or limited liability company to practice law or
otherwise to discipline it." (Emphases added.) 166 Ill. 2d R.
721(b).
	In the event of a violation, Rule 721(b) further provides for the
potential termination or suspension of the entity's registration rights
or other discipline by this court. This court's imposition of discipline
does not follow automatically from noncompliance with Rule 721, and
may be inappropriate in some cases. In my opinion, this is such a case.
	Even if some discipline were appropriate, Rule 721 should not be
interpreted to void a judgment under the circumstances presented in
this record. A Rule 721 violation does not include any retroactive or
collateral relief. The only consequence of a Rule 721 violation is the
potential for discipline by this court.
	Furthermore, the majority correctly determined that the public
was not subjected to risk of harm from the entity's unregistered
practice of law in this case. Slip op. at 16. Simply stated, the
defendant cannot complain of any prejudice. Moreover, Rule 721
provides no legal basis for the relief sought by defendant. I therefore
agree with the majority that the lower courts erred in applying the
nullity rule to void the judgment.
1. This court has recently amended Rule 721, effective July 1, 
2003. However, these amendments occurred subsequent to the events in the instant 
cause and are not germane to the issue presented.
2. We 
also observe that, on the date which the circuit court entered its decision to 
void the attorney fee order, April 9, 2002, the law firm of Schulz & Associates, 
P.C., was properly registered with this court.