Case Title: Moore v. Mount Carmel Health System

Citation: 2020-Ohio-4113

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Moore v. Mt. Carmel Health Sys., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4113.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-4113 
MOORE, CONSERVATOR, APPELLEE, v. MOUNT CARMEL HEALTH SYSTEM 
D.B.A. MOUNT CARMEL ST. ANN’S HOSPITAL ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Moore v. Mt. Carmel Health Sys., Slip Opinion No.  
2020-Ohio-4113.] 
Civil law—Savings statute—R.C. 2305.19(A)—The savings statute may be applied 
only when its terms have been met—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
(Nos. 2018-1233 and 2018-1479―Submitted November 13, 2019―Decided 
August 20, 2020.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 2017APE-10-754, 2018-Ohio-2831. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} This case requires us to examine the interplay between Ohio’s savings 
statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), and the provisions of Civ.R. 3(A) to determine whether 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
an action is barred by the statute of limitations.  The statute of limitations prohibits 
an action unless it is “commenced” prior to the expiration of the statute.  Civ.R. 
3(A) says that an action is “commenced” at the time it is filed if service is obtained 
within one year.  The savings statute provides that when an action is dismissed other 
than on the merits, the plaintiff may refile the action within one year. 
{¶ 2} Here, the plaintiff filed the action just before the expiration of the 
statute of limitations.  The plaintiff did not obtain service within one year, however.  
Nor did he dismiss the action during that period.  The question is whether the 
plaintiff can nevertheless rely upon the savings statute.  We hold that he may not.  
Because the action was not commenced within the statute-of-limitations period, it 
fails.  The savings statute cannot be used to revive the action. 
Moore Files Suit One Day Prior to the Expiration of the Statute of 
Limitations 
{¶ 3} Michael Moore filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice for 
injuries suffered by his son during a medical procedure that was performed on 
January 20, 2014.  Moore sued multiple defendants, including Dr. Eric Humphreys, 
the anesthesiologist who treated his son; Mount Carmel St. Ann’s Hospital (“Mount 
Carmel”), where the procedure was performed; and Central Ohio Anesthesia, Inc., 
the practice group with which Dr. Humphreys worked. 
{¶ 4} The statute of limitations for medical claims is one year.  R.C. 
2305.113(A).  That period may be extended if, before the expiration of the 
limitations period, the plaintiff gives written notice to the defendant that he intends 
to bring a claim.  R.C. 2305.113(B)(1).  In such event, the action may be 
commenced at any time within 180 days after the notice was given.  Moore took 
advantage of this provision, extending his deadline to commence the action to July 
7, 2015.  He filed his complaint one day prior to this deadline, on July 6, 2015.  
Simultaneously, Moore requested service of the complaint and summons on all 
three defendants. 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
{¶ 5} Timely service was obtained on Central Ohio Anesthesia and Mount 
Carmel, but Moore failed to obtain service on Dr. Humphreys during the year 
following the filing of the complaint as required by Civ.R. 3(A).  An attempt to 
serve Dr. Humphreys by certified mail at Mount Carmel was unsuccessful; Dr. 
Humphreys had retired and was no longer seeing patients at Mount Carmel or 
elsewhere. 
{¶ 6} Mount Carmel filed an answer to the complaint and raised a statute-
of-limitations defense and an insufficiency-of-service-of-process defense.  Central 
Ohio Anesthesia and Dr. Humphreys jointly filed an answer and also raised those 
defenses. 
Moore Serves Dr. Humphreys More Than One and a Half Years after Filing 
{¶ 7} In February 2017, Central Ohio Anesthesia, Dr. Humphreys, and 
Mount Carmel all moved for summary judgment.  They argued that Moore’s claim 
against Dr. Humphreys was time-barred because Moore failed to serve him within 
Civ.R. 3(A)’s one-year commencement period.  Mount Carmel and Central Ohio 
Anesthesia further asserted that because the claim against Dr. Humphreys was time-
barred, they could not be vicariously liable.  On March 2, 2017, Moore again issued 
instructions to the clerk to attempt personal service on Dr. Humphreys.  Service 
was finally perfected on Dr. Humphreys at his residence on March 10, 2017. 
{¶ 8} The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all three 
defendants.  The court found that the lawsuit against Dr. Humphreys was barred by 
the statute of limitations.  It noted that under our precedent, Dr. Humphreys’s 
participation in the case did not prevent him from raising the defense of insufficient 
service of process, citing Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists, 114 Ohio St.3d 141, 2007-
Ohio-3762, 870 N.E.2d 714, ¶ 18.  Although Moore had initially filed the lawsuit 
within the limitations period, he neither obtained service on Dr. Humphreys within 
one year as required by Civ.R. 3(A), nor did he dismiss his lawsuit during that time.  
Thus, the claim against Dr. Humphreys was not commenced prior to the expiration 
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4
of the statute of limitations and was barred.  As a consequence, the court ruled, “Dr. 
Humphreys is dismissed with prejudice from this lawsuit because plaintiff’s claims 
against him are barred by the statute of limitations.”  And, concluding that Mount 
Carmel and Central Ohio Anesthesia could only be vicariously liable, the court 
found that any liability of both parties was “extinguished.”  The court thus granted 
summary judgment and entered final judgment in favor of Dr. Humphreys, Central 
Ohio Anesthesia, and Mount Carmel and against Moore “on the merits.” 
{¶ 9} Moore appealed.  The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed and 
held that the savings statute applied to Moore’s claim against Dr. Humphreys.  For 
the savings statute to apply, an action must fail other than on the merits and then 
the plaintiff must commence a new action within one year of that failure.  R.C. 
2305.19(A).  Relying on Goolsby v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 61 Ohio St.3d 549, 
575 N.E.2d 801 (1991), the court of appeals construed Moore’s instructions for 
service of process on March 2, 2017, as a voluntary dismissal of his action and a 
refiling of a new action against Dr. Humphreys by operation of law.  The court 
further concluded that this dismissal by operation of law was a failure “otherwise 
than on the merits,” even though the statute of limitations had expired.  2018-Ohio-
2831, 117 N.E.3d 89, ¶ 2.  Thus, it concluded that the savings statute allowed Moore 
an additional year to perfect service of his complaint, which was accomplished on 
March 10, 2017.  Having determined that the claim against Dr. Humphreys was not 
time-barred, the court of appeals dismissed as moot Moore’s remaining assignment 
of error, which argued that his claim against Central Ohio Anesthesia survived even 
if the claim against Dr. Humphreys was barred by the statute of limitations. 
{¶ 10} The court of appeals acknowledged that several other courts of 
appeals have held Goolsby to be inapplicable in similar situations.  See, e.g., 
Anderson v. Borg-Warner Corp., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 80551 and 80926, 2003-
Ohio-1500; Bentley v. Miller, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25039, 2010-Ohio-2735; 
Gibson v. Summers, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2008-P-0032, 2008-Ohio-6995.  
January Term, 2020 
 
5
Finding its decision to be in conflict with these cases, the court of appeals certified 
the following question to this court: 
 
“Does the Ohio savings statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), apply to an action in 
which a plaintiff attempts, but fails to perfect service on the original 
complaint within one year pursuant to Civ.R. 3(A)?  If so, when a plaintiff 
files instructions for service after the Civ.R. 3(A) one-year period, does the 
request act as a dismissal by operation of law and also act as the refiling of 
an identical cause of action so as to allow the action to continue?”  
 
154 Ohio St.3d 1436, 2018-Ohio-4732, 112 N.E.3d 922. 
{¶ 11} Mount Carmel filed a discretionary appeal to this court, as did Dr. 
Humphreys and Central Ohio Anesthesia.  They raised similar propositions of law, 
essentially asserting that once the applicable statute-of-limitations period expires, 
the savings statute cannot be used to revive a cause of action that was not timely 
commenced under Civ.R. 3(A).  This court accepted both discretionary appeals and 
consolidated them with the certified-conflict case.  154 Ohio St.3d 1437, 2018-
Ohio-4732, 112 N.E.3d 922. 
{¶ 12} Before we begin our analysis, and to make all this easier to follow, 
we restate the pertinent dates below:  
01/20/2014 
Date of alleged injury 
07/06/2015 
Complaint filed 
07/07/2015 
Expiration of the statute of limitations 
07/06/2016 
Date by which service must be obtained to commence action 
under Civ.R. 3(A) 
02/2017 
Summary-judgment motions filed 
03/02/2017 
Instructions for service on Dr. Humphreys 
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03/10/2017 
Service on Dr. Humphreys obtained 
 
 
By Its Plain Terms, the Savings Statute Does Not Save Moore 
{¶ 13} To resolve the question in front of us, we need to examine the statute 
of limitations, the commencement requirement in Civ.R. 3(A), and the savings 
statute, R.C. 2305.19(A). 
{¶ 14} The applicable statute of limitations is R.C. 2305.113, which states 
that “an action upon a medical * * * claim shall be commenced within one year 
after the cause of action accrued.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2305.113(A).  Here, 
because Moore took advantage of the 180-day extension provided for in R.C. 
2305.113(B)(1), he was required to “commence” his action by July 7, 2015. 
{¶ 15} Civ.R. 3(A) determines when an action is commenced:   
 
 
A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the 
court, if service is obtained within one year from such filing upon a 
named defendant, or upon an incorrectly named defendant whose 
name is later corrected pursuant to Civ.R. 15(C), or upon a 
defendant identified by a fictitious name whose name is later 
corrected pursuant to Civ.R. 15(D). 
 
(Emphasis added.)  See also R.C. 2305.17. 
{¶ 16} The upshot of the aforementioned provisions is that to comply with 
the statute of limitations, an action must be “commenced” within the limitations 
period.  Under Civ.R. 3(A), this occurs when the action is filed within the 
limitations period and service is obtained within one year of that filing. 
{¶ 17} That brings us to Ohio’s savings statute.  It provides: 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
In any action that is commenced or attempted to be 
commenced * * *, if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the 
merits, the plaintiff * * * may commence a new action within one 
year after the * * * plaintiff’s failure otherwise than upon the merits 
or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, 
whichever occurs later. 
 
R.C. 2305.19(A). 
{¶ 18} Under the plain language of these three provisions, Moore’s claim is 
barred by the statute of limitations.  Moore filed his action within the limitations 
period but did not obtain service on Dr. Humphreys during the one-year 
commencement period pursuant to Civ.R. 3(A).  Thus, he did not commence his 
action within the statute-of-limitations period.  As a result, as of July 7, 2016, his 
claim was time-barred. 
{¶ 19} By its terms, the savings statute cannot save Moore’s claim.  In order 
for the statute to apply, the claim must have failed “otherwise than upon the merits” 
and then Moore must have filed a new claim within one year thereafter.  Here, when 
Moore issued instructions to the clerk to serve the complaint in March 2017, 
Moore’s claim hadn’t failed other than on the merits.  The case remained on the 
court’s docket—it was subject to dismissal, to be sure, both because Moore had 
failed to accomplish service and because the statute of limitations had run.  But no 
such dismissal had been entered, and if such dismissal had been entered, the 
expiration of the statute of limitations would have made the failure on the merits.  
See LaBarbera v. Batsch, 10 Ohio St.2d 106, 114-115, 227 N.E.2d 55 (1967) (“a 
judgment based upon the statute of limitations is generally regarded as on the merits 
and bars another action for the same cause”).  Further, Moore did not file a “new 
action.”  The only thing he did was ask the clerk to serve the original complaint that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
remained on the court’s docket.  Thus, if the savings statute means what it says, it 
does not apply. 
{¶ 20} This would be a relatively simple case if all we had to grapple with 
was the language of the applicable rule and statutes; under a plain reading, the trial 
court properly found that Moore’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations.  
But the court of appeals concluded that our decision in Goolsby, 61 Ohio St.3d 549, 
575 N.E.2d 801, dictated a different result—a contention that Moore echoes in his 
briefing.  So we take up Goolsby. 
Goolsby Does Not Save Moore, Either 
{¶ 21} Goolsby involved the two-year statute of limitations for personal-
injury claims.  See R.C. 2305.10.  Goolsby filed her complaint less than seven 
months after the date of her automobile accident (more than one year before the 
statute of limitations was set to expire).  Goolsby at 549.  Goolsby did not seek to 
serve her complaint within one year of filing.  Instead, two days before the statute 
of limitations was set to expire, Goolsby instructed the clerk to execute service, 
which was obtained shortly thereafter.  Id.  The defendant argued that because 
Goolsby’s complaint was not served for more than one year after it was filed, she 
had never commenced an action.  Id. at 550.  This court recognized that a “technical 
application” of Civ.R. (3)(A) would lead to the conclusion that Goolsby never 
commenced her action.  Id. at 550.  On the other hand, “had Goolsby dismissed her 
complaint and again filed it at the time instructions for service were given, the 
action would have been commenced according to Civ.R. 3(A).”  Id. at 550-551.  
But the court worried that to require her to do so would lead to delay, unnecessary 
expense, and other impediments to the “expeditious administration of justice.”  Id. 
at 551.  “Under these circumstances,” the court explained, a strict application of 
Civ.R. 3(A) “would not comport with the spirit of the Civil Rules.”  Id.  Thus, the 
court held that “[w]hen service has not been obtained within one year of filing a 
complaint, and the subsequent refiling of an identical complaint within rule would 
January Term, 2020 
 
9
provide an additional year within which to obtain service and commence an action 
under Civ.R. 3(A), an instruction to the clerk to attempt service on the complaint 
will be equivalent to a refiling of the complaint.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 22} The facts of the present case are quite different from the facts in 
Goolsby.  When Goolsby issued her instruction to the clerk to attempt service of 
the complaint, she was still within the limitations period.  Because the limitations 
period had not yet run, she could have simply dismissed her complaint without 
prejudice and refiled it.  In contrast, when Moore issued his instructions to the clerk 
in March 2017, the statute of limitations period had already expired. 
{¶ 23} This court applied Goolsby’s holding in a somewhat different 
context in Sisk & Assocs., Inc. v. Commt. to Elect Timothy Grendell, 123 Ohio St.3d 
447, 2009-Ohio-5591, 917 N.E.2d 271.  There, Sisk filed a complaint for breach of 
contract in September 2004, failed to obtain service within one year, and voluntarily 
dismissed the action.  Id. at ¶ 2.  Sisk refiled the complaint in 2005 but did not 
obtain service within one year of the 2005 complaint; instead, Sisk instructed the 
clerk to serve the defendant in 2007.  Id. Service failed again, so the trial court 
dismissed the refiled action without prejudice.  Id.  The court of appeals affirmed, 
but we reversed.  “To allow Sisk to proceed with its case, after twice failing to 
perfect service within a year,” this court said, “would be a perversion of justice.”  
Id. at ¶ 7.  To avoid this result, the court applied Goolsby, 61 Ohio St.3d 549, 575 
N.E.2d 801, and held that Sisk’s instruction to serve process in 2007 should be 
construed as a dismissal and a refiling.  Sisk at ¶ 8.  Since Sisk had already 
dismissed the original complaint once, the second dismissal was with prejudice 
under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a).  Id. 
{¶ 24} The opinion in Sisk does not detail whether the statute of limitations 
had expired at the time the clerk was instructed to serve process in 2007.  It appears 
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from the record, however, that it had not.1  Thus, Sisk, like Goolsby, is best 
understood as dealing with a situation where the original statute of limitations had 
not expired. 
{¶ 25} The rationale underlying the rule announced in Goolsby (and applied 
in Sisk) is that in the circumstances of that case—where the statute of limitations 
had not run—it was an unnecessary and onerous procedural hurdle to force a 
plaintiff to dismiss and refile an identical complaint.  The key distinction between 
Goolsby and our case is that here, the statute of limitations had run when Moore 
requested that the clerk make a renewed attempt at service.  To apply the savings 
statute to revive the action in our case, despite the plain terms of Civ.R. 3(A), has 
the effect not of avoiding unnecessary procedural hoop jumping, but of extending 
the statute of limitations beyond the term set by the legislature. 
{¶ 26} We have little difficulty in concluding that the rule announced in 
Goolsby, 61 Ohio St.3d 549, 575 N.E.2d 801, does not apply in this case.  But that 
leaves us with the question of the continued viability of our holding in Goolsby.  
Had we simply applied the plain language of the statutory scheme in Goolsby, we 
would have reached a different result.  Our decision in that case, however, was 
driven by an interest in judicial economy and avoiding unnecessary procedural 
hurdles.  As today’s case demonstrates, however, some courts have extended 
Goolsby well beyond the facts of that case, and in so doing, have extended the 
statute of limitations beyond what was ordained by the legislature.  To prevent any 
further confusion, we make clear today that Goolsby is limited to the factual 
circumstance that motivated its holding.  Thus, the rule announced in Goolsby—
that a new instruction to the clerk to serve a complaint that is made after Civ.R. 
                                          
 
1. 
See, 
e.g., 
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Ohio 
Case 
Information, 
case 
No. 
2008-1265, 
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Clerk/ecms/#/caseinfo/2008/1265 (accessed Apr. 2, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/FA9J-GZVY].   
 
January Term, 2020 
 
11 
3(A)’s commencement period has expired may be treated as a dismissal and refiling 
for purposes of the savings statute—applies only when the statute of limitations has 
not yet expired. 
Nor Does the “Attempt to Commence” Language Save Moore 
{¶ 27} Moore also argues that the failure to serve a complaint within Civ.R. 
3(A)’s one-year commencement period is not determinative because the savings 
statute applies to “any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced.”  
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2305.19(A).  His argument goes like this: (1) he attempted 
to commence the action when he filed the complaint and made the initial request 
for service on Dr. Humphreys, (2) his claim failed “otherwise than upon the merits” 
on July 6, 2016, when he failed to obtain service during Civ.R. 3(A)’s one-year 
commencement period, but (3) the savings statute provided him an additional year 
(until July 5, 2017) to commence a new action, (4) which he accomplished when 
he issued instructions to the clerk and obtained service in March 2017. 
{¶ 28} It is true that we have applied the savings statute when an action has 
not been commenced.  In Thomas v. Freeman, 79 Ohio St.3d 221, 680 N.E.2d 997 
(1997), we dealt with an action in which the plaintiff had filed a lawsuit and 
requested service within the statute-of-limitations period.  Id. at 227.  After the 
limitations period had run, but within Civ.R. 3(A)’s commencement period, the 
action was dismissed without prejudice without the plaintiff having obtained 
service.  Id.  Under these facts, we held that the plaintiff could use the savings 
statute to commence a new action within one year of the dismissal without 
prejudice.  Id. at 227-228. 
{¶ 29} Thomas dealt with a situation in which the terms of the savings 
statute had been complied with.  There was an attempt to commence the action (the 
filing of the complaint and a request for service), the action was dismissed other 
than on the merits prior to the running of Civ. R. 3(A)’s commencement period, 
and a new action was filed.  In contrast, here, the requirements of the savings statute 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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have not been met: there was no failure other than on the merits and there has been 
no filing of a new action. 
{¶ 30} Moore would have us ignore these statutory requirements and ordain 
that the requirements of the savings statute were met by operation of law when 
Civ.R. 3(A)’s one-year commencement period passed without service of the 
complaint.  In other words, Moore posits that when a plaintiff does not obtain 
service during the one-year commencement timeframe, the savings statute 
automatically gives him another year to perfect service.  Moore’s argument would 
essentially change Civ.R. 3(A)’s one-year commencement rule to a two-year 
commencement rule.  We decline to adopt such a construction in the face of the 
explicit language of Civ.R. 3(A).  The savings statute does not apply automatically 
to extend the one-year commencement requirement.  It applies only when its terms 
are met: when an action is commenced or attempted to be commenced; when a 
judgment is reversed or an action fails other than on the merits, that is, when there 
is either a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Civ.R. 41(A) or an 
involuntary dismissal without prejudice under Civ.R. 41(B); and when the 
complaint is refiled within one year. 
We Cannot Save Moore by Modifying the Trial Court’s Judgment 
{¶ 31} The dissent agrees that we should not engage in the legal fiction of 
treating Moore’s second request for service as a dismissal and refiling, but it would 
have us do something similar.  It urges that we adopt what it terms the “alternative 
rationale” of the court of appeals and “ ‘modify the [trial court’s] judgment 
[granting summary judgment] so that the dismissal would be without prejudice.’ ”  
Dissenting opinion at ¶ 38, quoting 2018-Ohio-2831, 117 N.E.3d 89, at ¶ 94.  It 
says that upon remand from this court, Moore would have yet another year in which 
he could file his claim against Dr. Humphreys.  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 39.  (And 
then, of course, another year in which to serve the complaint under Civ. R. 3(A).)  
In other words, even though the statute of limitations indisputably expired on July 
January Term, 2020 
 
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7, 2015 (and the deadline to commence on July 6, 2016), the dissent would allow 
Moore until at least late 2022 to “commence” his action against Dr. Humphreys.  
As far as the claims against the other parties, the dissent postulates that these would 
continue in the trial court, despite the fact that the trial court already entered 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 
{¶ 32} But the imaginative fiction engaged in by the dissent fares no better 
than the one employed by the Tenth District.  Remember, Moore filed his action on 
July 6, 2015.  To avoid the running of the statute of limitations, he had to commence 
under Civ.R. 3(A) by obtaining service by July 6, 2016, or voluntarily dismiss his 
action within this time period to obtain the benefit of the savings statute.  He failed 
to do so and thus, his action is time-barred.  Thus, even if the dissent were to have 
its way and the grant of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Humphreys were 
somehow converted to a dismissal without prejudice, it wouldn’t matter.  Moore 
still couldn’t refile because the statute of limitations has expired. 
{¶ 33} For this reason, the dissent’s extensive argument that the trial court 
erred in granting judgment on the merits while Dr. Humphreys was contesting the 
lack of service is an unnecessary tangent.  However the judgment is characterized, 
Moore can’t refile; the statute of limitations has expired.  Nonetheless, to avoid 
reader confusion, it is worth pointing out that the dissent is simply wrong in its 
premise. 
{¶ 34} Nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure prevents a defendant from 
simultaneously asserting a statute-of-limitations defense and a defense of lack of 
service of process.  The service requirement protects the defendant’s right to due 
process.  See Wainscott v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 133, 137, 
351 N.E.2d 466 (1976).  A court may enter judgment against a plaintiff even when 
it has not acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, because in such a case the 
plaintiff has submitted to the court’s jurisdiction by filing the complaint.  Thus, we 
have explained that a party may participate in a case—and thereby assert 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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affirmative defenses—and at the same time continue to maintain the defense of 
insufficiency of process as long as the defense was properly raised in the answer 
and properly preserved.  Gliozzo, 114 Ohio St.3d 141, 2007-Ohio-3762, 870 N.E.2d 
714, at syllabus.  In this vein, in Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 464 N.E.2d 
538 (1984), we affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of an action with prejudice in 
which a defendant had simultaneously asserted both failure-of-service and statute-
of-limitations defenses.  See Maryhew v. Yova, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 3138, 1982 
WL 5690, *1 (Nov. 26, 1982), aff’d, 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984); 
see also Sisk, 123 Ohio St.3d 447, 2009-Ohio-5591, 917 N.E.2d 271 (instructing 
that the plaintiff’s second dismissal was with prejudice, even though the plaintiff 
had never obtained service over the defendant); Cundall v. U.S. Bank, 122 Ohio 
St.3d 188, 2009-Ohio-2523, 909 N.E.2d 1244, ¶ 21, fn. 1 (deciding the case based 
on the defendants’ statute-of-limitations defense without reaching the defense of 
lack of personal jurisdiction). 
{¶ 35} The dissent cites broad statements from a number of federal courts 
dealing with personal jurisdiction generally, and claims these statements support its 
view that a court is powerless to enter a dismissal with prejudice when service has 
not been obtained.  But none of these cases deal with a dismissal for failure of 
service following the expiration of the statute of limitations.  Indeed, even though 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) provides for a dismissal without prejudice for a lack of timely 
service, a federal court may enter a dismissal with prejudice for failure of service 
when the expiration of the statute of limitations would prevent the filing of a new 
complaint.  See, e.g., Cardenas v. Chicago, 646 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir.2011) (dismissal 
with prejudice was appropriate when service requirements were not met properly 
and the statute of limitations had expired); Zapata v. New York City, 502 F.3d 192 
(2d Cir.2007) (upholding dismissal of claim as “time barred” where plaintiff failed 
to obtain service within limitations period); see also 1 Moore, Moore’s Federal 
Practice, Section 4.82[2], 4-150 to 4-151 (3d Ed.1997) (“any dismissal ordered 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
after expiration of the statute of limitations for failure to establish good cause [to 
extend service date] will be, in effect, with prejudice because plaintiff will be 
precluded from commencing a new action”).  But again, this is all largely beside 
the point.  Moore can’t file a new action because the action became time-barred 
when he failed to commence his action within the limitations period. 
{¶ 36} We resolve the certified-conflict question by stating that the savings 
statute may be applied only when its terms have been met.  Thus, when, as here, 
(1) a plaintiff attempts to commence an action but fails to obtain service within 
Civ.R. 3(A)’s one-year commencement period and (2) the action has neither failed 
other than on the merits during that one-year period (i.e., been dismissed without 
prejudice) nor been refiled, (3) the plaintiff cannot use the savings statute to revive 
the action outside the limitations period. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 37} Moore’s instructions for service of process, filed after the statute of 
limitations had expired, cannot be treated as a voluntary dismissal and a refiling of 
his complaint.  Because there was neither a dismissal otherwise than on the merits 
nor the filing of a new action, the savings statute does not apply.  The court of 
appeals erred in concluding otherwise.  We reinstate the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Dr. Humphreys and Mount Carmel.  In the 
proceeding below, the court of appeals did not reach Moore’s final assignment of 
error, which asserted that Central Ohio Anesthesia could be liable even if the claim 
against Dr. Humphreys was barred by the statute of limitations.  In light of our 
decision today, we remand to the court of appeals for consideration of Moore’s final 
assignment of error and for other proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, and FISCHER, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DONNELLY, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
_________________ 
STEWART, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 38} I agree with the majority opinion’s decision to limit Goolsby v. 
Anderson Concrete Corp., 61 Ohio St.3d 549, 575 N.E.2d 801 (1991), to the facts 
of that case and with the majority opinion’s holding that appellee Michael Moore’s 
second request for service did not amount to dismissing and refiling the action 
against appellant Dr. Eric Humphreys.  I would nevertheless affirm the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals’ judgment based on its alternative rationale, which states: 
 
However, even if we concluded that the trial court should have 
dismissed the complaint because service was not obtained within 
one year, we would modify the judgment so that the dismissal would 
be without prejudice.  This is abundantly clear, and if that occurred, 
Moore would be able to refile his complaint under the savings 
statute. 
 
2018-Ohio-2831, 117 N.E.3d 89, ¶ 94. 
{¶ 39} I agree with the appellate court that since Moore’s action against Dr. 
Humphreys was dismissed for lack of service, it should be viewed as a dismissal 
without prejudice and thus a failure otherwise than on the merits.  Moore should 
have an additional year to refile his complaint and serve it on Dr. Humphreys.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the savings 
statute does not apply to save Moore’s claims. 
Commencement of a Civil Action, the Statute of Limitations, 
and the Savings Statute 
{¶ 40} Pursuant to Civ.R. 3(A), a civil action is commenced when a plaintiff 
files a complaint and obtains service on a named defendant within one year of that 
filing.  Although Civ.R. 3(A) dictates how an action is commenced, it does not bar 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
an action from being commenced outside the time period prescribed by a statute of 
limitations. 
{¶ 41} Suppose, for instance, that a plaintiff has a cause of action for an 
injury that occurred on January 1, 2018.  Because the statute of limitations for such 
a claim is two years, see R.C. 2305.10(A), the limitations period for commencing 
the action would be January 1, 2020.  Id.  Suppose further that the plaintiff files suit 
on February 1, 2020—one month after the statute of limitations expired.  The action 
would nevertheless be deemed “commenced,” for purposes of Civ.R. 3(A), so long 
as the named defendant is served with the complaint within one year of filing.  Of 
course, the defendant may raise the statute of limitations as a defense to the action 
by asserting it in the first responsive pleading.  See Mills v. Whitehouse Trucking 
Co., 40 Ohio St.2d 55, 59-60, 320 N.E.2d 668 (1974).  But if the defendant fails to 
assert a statute-of-limitations defense, the defense is waived and the action will 
proceed in the ordinary course.  Id.; see also R.C. 2305.03(A) (providing that when 
“interposed by proper plea by a party to an action * * *, lapse of time shall be a bar 
to the action”); Civ.R. 8(C) (requiring a defendant to timely assert a statute-of-
limitations defense). 
{¶ 42} Civ.R. 3(A) establishes when an action is commenced and therefore 
is naturally an important part of a statute-of-limitations analysis.  Nevertheless, 
Civ.R. 3(A) and the statutory timing provisions for commencement of civil actions 
involve different concepts. 
{¶ 43} R.C. 2305.19, the savings statute, insulates a plaintiff’s claim from 
a statute-of-limitations defense when a complaint is filed, dismissed, and then 
refiled after the statute-of-limitations period has run.  But R.C. 2305.19(A) will not 
save a refiled action unless three prerequisites are met: (1) the plaintiff either 
commences or at least attempts to commence the action, (2) a judgment for the 
plaintiff is reversed or the action fails otherwise than on the merits, and (3) within 
one year of the dismissal or failure, the plaintiff commences a new action against 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
the defendant.  If the plaintiff satisfies these prerequisites, the newly commenced 
action relates back to the date on which the complaint had been filed in the original 
action.  See Frysinger v. Leech, 32 Ohio St.3d 38, 42, 512 N.E.2d 337 (1987).  If 
the complaint in the original action was filed outside the statute-of-limitations 
period, the defendant may assert a statute-of-limitations defense in the event that 
the original action is dismissed and a new one is commenced within one year, just 
as he could have done in the original action.  But if, in the original action, the 
plaintiff filed the complaint within the statutory time limit, the defendant will have 
no viable statute-of-limitations defense if that action is dismissed without prejudice 
and a new one is commenced within one year because of the concept of relation 
back.  See id. 
{¶ 44} The majority seems to take the position that the statute of limitations 
operates as a jurisdictional bar to a lawsuit as a matter of course.  This is not true.  
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense in an action; the defense is 
waived when it is not properly asserted. 
A Dismissal for Failure of Service is Not a Dismissal on the Merits 
{¶ 45} Dr. Humphreys and appellants Mount Carmel Health, d.b.a. Mount 
Carmel St. Ann’s Hospital, and Central Ohio Anesthesia, Inc. (collectively, 
“appellants”) argue that Moore’s action against Dr. Humphreys fails on the merits 
because Dr. Humphreys was not served within one year of Moore’s filing of the 
complaint and therefore the action was never commenced before the statute of 
limitations expired.  Although this argument might appear to be sound on its face, 
it presents a couple of procedural problems that the majority fails to adequately 
address. 
{¶ 46} In Dr. Humphreys’s motion for summary judgment, he asserted an 
insufficiency-of-service defense together with a statute-of-limitations defense as 
part of an overall claim that the action filed against him should be dismissed with 
prejudice because Moore failed to commence the action against Dr. Humphreys 
January Term, 2020 
 
19 
within the statute of limitations.  By pursuing an insufficiency-of-service defense, 
Dr. Humphreys in effect maintains that the trial court never acquired personal 
jurisdiction over him.  See Laneve v. Atlas Recycling, Inc., 119 Ohio St.3d 324, 
2008-Ohio-3921, 894 N.E.2d 25, ¶ 22 (failure to perfect service ultimately affects 
whether a court has personal jurisdiction over defendant); see also Thomas v. 
Freeman, 79 Ohio St.3d 221, 225, 680 N.E.2d 997 (1997) (“where a case is 
dismissed because the court did not have jurisdiction, such as in this case where 
service has not been perfected, the dismissal is always otherwise than on the 
merits”).  Yet, while not submitting to the trial court’s jurisdiction, Dr. Humphreys 
simultaneously asked the trial court to entertain his statute-of-limitations defense 
and enter judgment in his favor on the merits of the claim. 
{¶ 47} Dr. Humphreys wants to have it both ways: he wants to maintain that 
the trial court does not have jurisdiction over him as a defendant while also relying 
on the jurisdictional authority of the court to grant judgment in his favor on a 
substantive and personal defense to an action.  This court should not countenance 
these conflicting arguments.  Sinochem Intl. Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Intl. Shipping 
Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-431, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007) (In the 
federal system, a court “generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first 
determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter 
jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisdiction)”); Lampe v. Xouth, Inc., 952 
F.2d 697, 700 (3d Cir.1991) (“It is an elementary requirement that personal 
jurisdiction must be established in every case before a court has power to render 
any judgment”); Sutton v. Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Group, Ltd., Tenn.App. No. 
E2008-01033-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 499521, *5 (Feb. 27, 2009) (“Generally, a 
court must have both personal and subject matter jurisdiction in order to adjudicate 
a claim on the merits”); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 
584, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) (a defendant must timely assert a 
lack-of-personal-jurisdiction defense “or he may forgo that right, effectively 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
consenting to the court’s exercise of adjudicatory authority”); Norris v. Six Flags 
Theme Parks, Inc., 102 Haw. 203, 74 P.3d 26 (2003) (“trial courts must determine 
the question of jurisdiction before deciding other dispositional matters such as a 
statute of limitations defense”); Brooks v. Bacardi Rum Corp., 943 F.Supp. 559, 
562-563 (E.D.Pa.1996) (after the district court granted the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, the district court declined to 
review the defendant’s statute-of-limitations defense); Nationwide Bi-Weekly 
Admin., Inc. v. Belo Corp., 512 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir.2007), fn. 1 (when a 
defendant asserted a statute-of-limitations defense, it conceded that the court had 
personal jurisdiction). 
{¶ 48} Of course, no rule prevents a defendant from presenting a statute-of-
limitations defense in addition to an insufficiency-of-service defense, but these 
arguments are designed to be offered in the alternative.  After all, the two defenses 
are at odds with each other.  The defense of insufficient service challenges a trial 
court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant and a dismissal on this ground results 
in a dismissal without prejudice.  On the other hand, a statute-of-limitations defense 
is a substantive defense that challenges the merits of a claim; a dismissal on such 
grounds is a dismissal with prejudice.  LaBarbera v. Batsch, 10 Ohio St.2d 106, 
115-116, 227 N.E.2d 55 (1967).  In this case, however, maintaining an 
insufficiency-of-service defense and a statute-of-limitations defense in the 
alternative does nothing to help the defendants’ position.  If Dr. Humphreys 
asserted and prevailed on his insufficiency-of-service defense, then the case against 
him should be dismissed without prejudice.  On the other hand, if Dr. Humphreys 
asked the court to rule on his statute-of-limitations defense, then he would be 
conceding to the trial court’s jurisdiction over him as a defendant and any 
insufficiency-of-service claim would no longer matter.  The problem with doing 
January Term, 2020 
 
21 
this, however, is that if Dr. Humphreys were to concede that the trial court has 
personal jurisdiction over him, then the action would be deemed commenced.2 
{¶ 49} The majority maintains that there is nothing wrong with a trial court 
proceeding to rule on a defendant’s merits defense after determining that personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant does not exist.  As support for this position, the 
majority explains that the service requirement is meant to protect a defendant’s 
right to due process and that a court may enter a judgment against a plaintiff even 
when it has not acquired jurisdiction over the defendant because the plaintiff has 
submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction by filing the complaint.  It further notes 
that in one of our previous cases, Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 464 N.E.2d 
538 (1984), this court affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of an action with prejudice 
when the defendant asserted both a failure-of-service defense and statute-of-
limitations defense.  Lastly, the majority cites certain federal circuit-court decisions 
upholding dismissals with prejudice when service was not perfected within the time 
frame set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) and the statute of limitations had run on the 
claims.  Although at first glance these arguments may seem persuasive, they 
disintegrate under even the mildest scrutiny. 
{¶ 50} In discussing Yova, the majority leaves out the fact that the issue in 
that case had nothing to do with whether the trial court could rule on a defendant’s 
statute-of-limitations defense after determining that service had failed and that it 
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  Rather, the main issue in Yova was 
whether the defendant’s request for additional time to respond to the complaint 
                                          
 
2.  Although Civ.R. 3(A) states that an action “is commenced by filing a complaint with the court, 
if service is obtained within one year from such filing upon a named defendant,” serving the 
defendant should not be viewed as a strict requirement to commencement of an action.  If that were 
the case, a trial court should hold that an action was never commenced when a defendant waives 
service under Civ.R. 4(D).  The same should also be true for any action in which the defendant is 
not served but still makes an appearance and does not raise a failure-of-service defense.  Ultimately, 
Civ.R. 3(A)’s service rule requires that the court obtain personal jurisdiction over any defendant 
within one year of the complaint being filed, otherwise the action may be dismissed for insufficiency 
of service or for failure to commence. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
counted as a waiver of an insufficiency-of-service defense.  We answered that 
question in the negative and affirmed the decision of the appellate court on that 
ground only.  Yova was not concerned with whether a trial court may grant a 
defendant’s statute-of-limitations defense while the defendant is simultaneously 
asserting that the trial court does not have jurisdiction over him.  That issue is 
squarely before us now in this case.  The majority’s argument regarding this issue 
boils down to nothing more than the following: because we never said anything 
about it before in a case we decided over 35 years ago, it must be okay.  I, however, 
am not persuaded by that faulty reasoning. 
{¶ 51} Nor am I persuaded by the federal cases that the majority cites or its 
reference to statements in Moore’s Federal Practice (3d Ed.1997) synthesizing 
those cases.  Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a civil action is 
commenced at the moment a plaintiff files a complaint.  See Fed.R.Civ.P. 3.  
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) states that if the plaintiff fails to serve the defendant within 90 
days after the complaint is filed, then the court must dismiss the action without 
prejudice or order that service be made within a specified time.  The rule also states 
that for good cause shown, the court must extend the time for service for an 
appropriate amount of time.  Id.  A federal court often considers the relative 
hardships a party is facing when exercising its discretion to extend the time or to 
dismiss the action.  See Coleman v. Milwaukee Bd. of School Dirs., 290 F.3d 932, 
933-934 (7th Cir.2002).  Importantly, there is no savings statute similar to R.C. 
2305.19 that applies to save a federal action that has been filed after the statute of 
limitations has run.  See Logan v. Music, C.D.Cal. No. CV 16-6364-SJO(E), 2017 
WL 1369001 (Feb. 17, 2017), aff’d, C.D.Cal. No. CV 16-6364-SJO(E), 2017 WL 
1393029 (Feb. 17, 2017).  
{¶ 52} In Cardenas v. Chicago, 646 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir.2011), and Zapata 
v. New York City, 502 F.3d 192 (2d Cir.2007), the issue before each circuit court 
was whether a district court had abused its discretion when it dismissed the action 
January Term, 2020 
 
23 
with prejudice for failure to serve a defendant within Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m)’s specified 
timeframe.  In each case, the respective circuit court held that the district court had 
not abused its discretion in declining to extend the time for service and dismissing 
the action, because there was no good cause for an extension.  In each case, the 
circuit court upheld the decision to dismiss the action with prejudice when the 
statute of limitations had expired during the pendency of the suit.  But in affirming 
the district courts’ dismissals, the circuit courts made clear that pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m), a dismissal for failure of service is supposed to be without 
prejudice. 
{¶ 53} In Zapata, the Second Circuit noted that the plaintiff had not 
challenged the district court’s decision to dismiss the action with prejudice.  Id. at 
197, fn. 6.  The Second Circuit further stated: 
 
 
Where, as here, good cause is lacking [for an extension], but 
the dismissal without prejudice in combination with the statute of 
limitations would result in a dismissal with prejudice, we will not 
find an abuse of discretion in the procedure used by the district court, 
so long as there are sufficient indications on the record that the 
district court weighed the impact that a dismissal or extension would 
have on the parties. 
 
(Footnote omitted.)  Id. at 197. 
{¶ 54} Similarly, in upholding the district court’s decision in 
Cardenas, the Seventh Circuit stated: 
 
A dismissal pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(5) motion ordinarily should be 
entered without prejudice.  See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m); [United States 
v.] Ligas, 549 F.3d [497,] 501 [7th Cir.2008].  The district court, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
however, dismissed the claims against [the defendant] with 
prejudice based on the fact that the applicable statute of limitations 
had expired while the case was pending.  Cardenas, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15253, 2010 WL 610621, at *5.  The Plaintiffs argued for 
the first time at oral argument that its order was inconsistent with 
Rule 4(m)’s clear “without prejudice” requirement. 
 
Both the district court and the Plaintiffs correctly recognize 
that any refiled suit would be time-barred.  That bar effects a result 
similar to a dismissal with prejudice: “[I]f the statute of limitations 
has meanwhile expired it will be the limitations defense that greets 
[any] new action, which will make the case just as dead as a 
disposition on the merits * * *.”  David Siegel, Practice 
Commentary on Fed.R.Civ.P. 4, C4-38, reprinted at 28 U.S.C.A. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 at 211 (West 2008). 
 
(Fifth and sixth brackets and ellipsis sic.)  Id. at 1007-1008. 
{¶ 55} When citing to Cardenas, 646 F.3d 1001, and Zapata, 502 F.3d 192, 
the majority fails to discuss that before those circuit courts allowed the district 
courts’ decisions to stand, the circuit courts made sure that the procedural 
irregularity would have no actual effect on the plaintiffs’ right to proceed with 
refiling.  Indeed, in Cardenas, the Seventh Circuit noted that when deciding 
whether to extend the time for service, federal courts should consider whether the 
plaintiff would be time-barred by the statute of limitations if the court were to 
dismiss the action and plaintiffs were to refile.  Id. at 1007.  But in each case, the 
circuit courts found that the district courts had considered the plaintiffs’ inability to 
refile the action because the statute of limitations had expired and that the district 
courts had not abused their discretion in finding a lack of good cause shown for an 
extension of the service deadline.  Accordingly, the circuit courts upheld the 
January Term, 2020 
 
25 
dismissals with prejudice.  Since no federal rule or statute would have saved the 
actions from a statute-of-limitations defense, dismissal with prejudice 
accomplished the inescapable outcome. 
{¶ 56} The rationale that the courts used in Cardenas and Zapata does not 
apply here, however, because Ohio has a savings statute.  By allowing the trial court 
to entertain Dr. Humphreys’s merits defense after determining that it did not have 
jurisdiction over Dr. Humphreys, the majority forecloses Moore from refiling his 
claim and taking shelter from a statute-of-limitations defense under the savings 
statute—which applies to actions that are attempted to be commenced and 
dismissed without prejudice.  Accordingly, a plaintiff’s right to due process is at 
stake in situations like this one in which a trial court lacking jurisdiction over a 
defendant improperly entertains that defendant’s merits defense. 
{¶ 57} Another procedural problem in this matter is the fact that Dr. 
Humphreys is asking this court to uphold a merits judgment in his favor in an action 
that he maintains was never even commenced against him.  How the majority 
squares this irregularity is unclear, because it chooses to say nothing about it.  But 
what should be clear to the majority is that by asking for summary judgment in his 
favor, Dr. Humphreys takes a position that is wholly inconsistent with his claim 
that the action fails for lack of commencement; if no action was ever commenced, 
then there is no commenced action under which the court may enter a merits 
judgment.  If Dr. Humphreys wanted to maintain a lack-of-commencement defense, 
he should have raised it in a responsive pleading and then asked the court to strike 
the complaint from the record once a year had passed and he had still not been 
served.  By asking to strike the complaint, Dr. Humphreys would have been asking 
the court to take an action consistent with his theory that the complaint filed against 
him is a nullity.  If the majority is going to uphold the dismissal with prejudice in 
this case, then it might want to take some time to explain why Dr. Humphreys’s 
actions do not amount to a waiver of the lack-of-commencement defense. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
Other Problems with the Majority Opinion 
{¶ 58} Even if this court were to look beyond the procedural problems 
addressed above, the majority’s explanation for why Moore’s action must be 
deemed dismissed on the merits is still unsound.  The majority takes the position 
that to “avoid the running of the statute of limitations, [Moore] had to commence 
under Civ.R. 3(A) by obtaining service by July 6, 2016, or voluntarily dismiss his 
action within this time period to obtain the benefit of the savings statute.”  Majority 
opinion at ¶ 32.  Noticeably, the majority offers no support for the latter half of this 
sentence, whether that be a citation to a civil rule, statute, or even some parsing of 
potentially applicable cases. 
{¶ 59} Although Civ.R. 3(A) provides the requirements for the 
commencement of an action, it does not say what the consequences are when a 
plaintiff fails to meet those requirements.  The action may be dismissed, but 
whether that dismissal should be with or without prejudice is unclear.  Our ruling 
in Goolsby, 61 Ohio St.3d 549, 575 N.E.2d 801, indicates that as long as a case may 
be refiled within the statute-of-limitations period, a dismissal before that period 
expires is a dismissal without prejudice, even if the plaintiff fails to perfect service 
on the defendant within one year of filing.  And our ruling in Thomas, 79 Ohio 
St.3d 221, 680 N.E.2d 997, provides that even when a statute-of-limitations period 
has run and a case has been dismissed, the savings statute may still apply to save 
the action when the dismissal was without prejudice and occurred within the one-
year Civ.R. 3(A) service timeframe.  In this case, the majority opinion takes the 
position that an action must be dismissed with prejudice if it is dismissed on 
insufficiency-of-service grounds following the Civ.R. 3(A) one-year service 
period, and the statute-of-limitations period has expired.  But neither the Civil Rules 
nor the Revised Code requires this outcome. 
{¶ 60} Although Civ.R. 3(A) establishes when an action is commenced, it 
is not a timing provision.  Instead, it is a housekeeping measure.  See 1970 Staff 
January Term, 2020 
 
27 
Note, Civ.R. 3 (“service within [the] one year requirement is retained from 
§2305.17, R.C., as amended in 1965, and is based on the philosophy that dockets 
should be cleared if, within the reasonable time of one year, service has not been 
obtained” [emphasis added]).  Furthermore, Ohio’s savings statute, R.C. 2305.19, 
applies to actions “attempted to be commenced,” R.C. 2305.19(A).  Presently, 
nothing says that an action meets the definition of an “action that is * * * attempted 
to be commenced,” id., only if that action is dismissed within the confines of Civ.R. 
3(A)’s one-year service period.  In situations like this, in which there is no authority 
or reason that warrants a dismissal with prejudice, the court should err in favor of 
preserving the claim for a resolution on its merits.  See Thomas at 226 (“Dismissal 
with prejudice is a very severe and permanent sanction, to be applied with great 
caution”); see also Civ.R. 1(B) (Ohio’s Rules of Civil Procedure “shall be 
construed and applied to effect just results by eliminating delay, unnecessary 
expense and all other impediments to the expeditious administration of justice”). 
Moore Still Has a Viable Cause of Action Against Dr. Humphreys 
{¶ 61} For the reasons discussed above, I would treat the trial court’s 
dismissal of the complaint against Dr. Humphreys as a dismissal without prejudice 
on insufficiency-of-service grounds and hold that Moore may still take advantage 
of the savings statute by commencing a new action against Dr. Humphreys within 
one year of this court’s decision. 
{¶ 62} Although Moore’s legal action against Dr. Humphreys was never 
“commenced” within the meaning of Civ.R. 3(A)—because service was 
unsuccessful within the one-year timeframe following the filing of the complaint—
I find that Moore nevertheless attempted to commence the action against Dr. 
Humphreys by filing the complaint on July 6, 2015, and attempting service within 
one year.  See Thomas, 79 Ohio St.3d at 225, 680 N.E.2d 997; see also Motorists 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huron Rd. Hosp., 73 Ohio St.3d 391, 396, 653 N.E.2d 235 (1995).  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
{¶ 63} The action remained pending on the trial court’s docket as an action 
attempted to be commenced against Dr. Humphreys until Dr. Humphreys sought 
and was granted dismissal for insufficiency of service.  Because a dismissal for 
insufficiency of service should not be treated as a dismissal with prejudice, even if 
the statute-of-limitations period for commencing an action has expired at the time 
of dismissal, I would find that Moore meets the first two prerequisites of the savings 
statute.  Thus, if Moore were to refile his lawsuit against Dr. Humphreys and 
successfully commence the lawsuit by obtaining service within the year, then the 
savings statute should apply to preserve his claim. 
{¶ 64} What this means for the case going forward is that the complaint 
against Dr. Humphreys is dismissed without prejudice, and the trial court’s granting 
of summary judgment in favor of Central Ohio Anesthesia and Mount Carmel is 
reversed, because the basis on which those defendants sought relief—the statute-
of-limitations bar—is not yet ripe for review.  The action remains pending against 
Central Ohio Anesthesia and Mount Carmel because those parties were properly 
served.  If Moore wishes to take advantage of the savings statute by refiling his 
claim against Dr. Humphreys and perfecting service, and if Moore wants to keep 
all three parties as defendants in the same lawsuit, then he could voluntarily dismiss 
his claims against Central Ohio Anesthesia and Mount Carmel on remand under 
Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a).  He could then refile and assert his claims against all parties. 
Practical Effects 
{¶ 65} The majority accuses this dissent and a unanimous panel of the Tenth 
District of engaging in an “imaginative fiction,” majority opinion at ¶ 32, by 
construing the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint against Dr. Humphreys as a 
dismissal without prejudice.  However, the majority might want to take a look at 
the practical effects of its own holding. 
{¶ 66} Moore filed his complaint against Dr. Humphreys, Central Ohio 
Anesthesia, and Mount Carmel on July 6, 2015.  Dr. Humphreys became aware of 
January Term, 2020 
 
29 
Moore’s pending lawsuit on July 14, 2015, when an electronic copy of the summons 
and complaint addressed to Central Ohio Anesthesia was e-mailed to Dr. 
Humphreys from his liability insurer.  The common-pleas case docket indicates that 
service on Dr. Humphreys was complete on July 16, 2015, something Dr. 
Humphreys would first contest in his motion for summary judgment, which was 
filed on February 27, 2017.  Through their attorneys, Dr. Humphreys and Central 
Ohio Anesthesia answered the complaint on July 30, 2015, and participated in the 
litigation for over a year and a half.  Dr. Humphreys did not seek dismissal for 
insufficiency of service under Civ.R. 4(E) after six months.3  And the trial court 
also took no action to dismiss the complaint under Civ.R. 4(E) or 3(A)—perhaps 
because it was relying on Dr. Humphreys to assert that argument if it applied or on 
its own docket as evidence of commencement.  When Dr. Humphreys finally did 
ask the court to dismiss the action, he took the unorthodox step of asking the court 
to rule on his insufficiency-of-service defense and his statute-of-limitations defense 
together. 
{¶ 67} What Dr. Humphreys and the other appellants want from this court, 
and what the majority opinion gives them, is a clear declaration that a defendant 
may maintain an insufficiency-of-service defense simultaneously with a statute-of-
limitations defense in order to secure the dismissal of an action with prejudice on 
insufficiency-of-service grounds, when that dismissal would otherwise normally be 
without prejudice.  This decision prevents a plaintiff from taking shelter under the 
                                          
 
3. Civ.R. 4(E) states:  
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant 
within six months after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf 
such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made 
within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without 
prejudice upon the court’s own initiative with notice to such party or upon motion.   
 
(Emphasis added.) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
savings statute if the plaintiff were to refile and attempt service within one year of 
the dismissal.  In order to craft this outcome, the majority must necessarily overlook 
the fact that a court lacking jurisdiction over the defendant is nevertheless 
adjudicating a merits defense.  Indeed, it must overlook the fact that the defendant 
is asking for an adjudication on the merits of an action that was never commenced.  
And it must also overlook the logical inconsistency that arises from this court’s 
determination that a dismissal within the Civ.R. 3(A) service timeframe is a 
dismissal without prejudice but that a dismissal outside the Civ.R. 3(A) timeframe 
is a dismissal with prejudice, when under both scenarios the dismissal may have 
occurred after the statute of limitations expired. 
{¶ 68} Furthermore, the end result that the majority comes to—that 
dismissal for insufficiency of service is a dismissal with prejudice when Civ.R. 
3(A)’s timeline has passed—contravenes both the Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
savings statute.  The Rules of Civil Procedure are to be applied to “effect just results 
by eliminating delay, unnecessary expense and all other impediments to the 
expeditious administration of justice.”  Civ.R. 1(B).  And R.C. 2305.19, “being a 
remedial statute, should be given a liberal construction to permit the decision of 
cases upon their merits rather than upon mere technicalities of procedure.”  Cero 
Realty Corp. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 82, 85, 167 N.E.2d 774 
(1960); accord Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 73 Ohio St.3d at 396, 653 N.E.2d 235 
(“Savings statutes have been created to afford plaintiffs an opportunity to bring a 
new action after the running of the limitations period when an effort to bring the 
original action in a timely manner fails otherwise than on its merits”).  Here, the 
majority is allowing a defendant, who has had notice of and participated in an action 
from the beginning, to wait a year and a half before seeking a dismissal of the action 
in order to secure a dismissal with prejudice for failure of service under Civ.R. 
3(A)’s one-year service timeframe—a docket-clearing provision—in order to 
prevent the plaintiff from taking shelter under the savings statute, which is a 
January Term, 2020 
 
31 
remedial provision intended to preserve actions “attempted to be commenced.”  If 
it is true that this dissent and the Tenth District’s position amounts to an 
“imaginative fiction,” majority opinion at ¶ 32, then the majority’s position in 
comparison is a fever dream that turns Ohio’s procedural rules and the savings 
statute on their heads. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 69} For these reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion’s conclusion 
that the savings statute does not apply to Moore’s claim.  I would affirm the Tenth 
District’s judgment on the alternative grounds stated in its opinion.  2018-Ohio-
2831, 117 N.E.3d 89, at ¶ 94. 
DONNELLY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
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Colley Shroyer & Abraham Co., L.P.A., and David I. Shroyer, for appellee. 
Arnold Todaro & Welch Co., L.P.A., and Grier D. Schaffer, for appellant 
Mount Carmel Health d.b.a. Mount Carmel St. Ann’s Hospital. 
Carpenter Lipps & Leland, L.L.P., Theodore M. Munsell, Joel E. Sechler, 
Emily M. Vincent, and Michael H. Carpenter, for appellants Eric Humphreys, 
M.D., and Central Ohio Anesthesia, Inc. 
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