Case Title: Town of Evansville Police Dept. v. Porter

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0178

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
TOWN OF EVANSVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT v. LONNIE PORTER2011 WY 86Case Number: No. S-09-0178, S-10-0133Decided: 06/01/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 

TOWN 
OF EVANSVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT,Appellant 
(Defendant),v.LONNIE PORTER,Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

 
 
 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Judith 
A. Studer of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Keith 
R. Nachbar of Keith R. Nachbar, P.C., Casper, Wyoming 

 
 
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In these two 
consolidated appeals, the Town of Evansville Police Department (Department) 
appeals the district court's order of reversal for agency inaction filed July 
23, 2009, in No. S-09-0178 and the district court's order denying motion for 
relief from an order filed April 15, 2010, in No. S-10-0133.  The appeals arise from the Department's 
effort to terminate the employment of Lonnie Porter (Porter), a police officer 
in the Department.  For the reasons 
set forth below, we affirm the district court's orders and remand to that court 
with directions that it issue its order ordering the Department immediately to 
reinstate Porter to his employment as a police officer in the Department 
effective February 12, 2008.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
NO. 
S-09-0178

 
 
[¶2]      The Department 
states its issue in this appeal to be:

 
 
Did 
the District Court lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Petition for 
Review due to the failure of the Petitioner to file a proper and timely Notice 
of Appeal?

 
 
Porter 
offers this statement of the issue:

 
 
Did 
Sgt. Lonnie Porter effectively appeal his termination of employment from the 
Evansville Police Department timely by serving his request for hearing on the 
mayor and the attorney for the Town and the Police Department? 

 
 
[¶3]      The Department 
filed a reply brief, but we shall not consider it because it failed to precisely 
and concisely set forth on the first page those new issues and arguments raised 
by Porter's brief which are addressed in the reply brief.  W.R.A.P. 7.03.

 
 
 
 

NO. 
S-10-0133

 
 
[¶4]      The Department 
states its issues in this appeal to be:

 
 
1.         
Does Rule 60(b)(4) mandate relief as the district court relied on a void 
ordinance in its Order?

 
 
2.         
Did the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion constitute an 
abuse of discretion as the court mistakenly utilized law no longer in effect at 
the time of petitioner's termination, and it would be inequitable to allow the 
Order to stand?

 
 
3.         
Did the district court properly refuse to consider the Rule 60(b) motion 
for the procedural reasons stated by the district court?

 
 
Porter 
states the issue to be:

 
 
Did 
the district court below commit an error of law in denying the Town of 
Evansville's W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) motion in this administrative 
appeal?

 
 
[¶5]      The Department 
filed a reply brief, but we shall not consider it because it too failed to 
precisely and concisely set forth on the first page those new issues and 
arguments raised by Porter's brief which are addressed in the reply brief.  W.R.A.P. 7.03.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶6]      Porter had been 
employed in the law enforcement field for nearly sixteen years.  From approximately July 2, 2001, until 
February 12, 2008, he was employed by the Department.  The Department claims that its police 
chief, Zachery Gentile, hired Porter.  
In approximately September of 2007, Porter was promoted to the rank of 
Sergeant, and he then supervised other police officers on his shift.  On September 9, 1996, the Town of 
Evansville in Ordinance No. 9-96 adopted an employee personnel manual entitled 
"Employee HandbookPersonnel Rules and Regulations" which superseded "all 
previous publications of this handbook and all other Evansville employment laws, 
rules, regulations, and other directives where inconsistent." Several provisions 
of this employee handbook are pertinent to these appeals.  First, Section 2.C. of Chapter XII 
addresses the required pre-termination procedure applicable when the Department 
is considering terminating an employee for cause:

 
 
            
Termination.  An employee's 
employment may be terminated by the appointing authority or his designated agent 
upon recommendation of the employee's department head for an infraction of a 
severe nature or a repeated infraction following earlier disciplinary 
action.  Notice of termination shall be in writing, 
stating the specific details of the infraction(s), earlier disciplinary 
action taken for other, similar infraction(s) (if appropriate), reasons for the termination action, the 
effective date, and notice of the right to request an informal hearing before 
the appointing authority prior to the effective date of termination. Prior to 
termination (except in an emergency when immediate action is required), the 
employee may request an informal hearing before the appointing authority, which 
the employee and department head shall attend, for purposes of determining 
whether there is reasonable cause for termination.  A tape recorded record of the informal 
hearing shall be maintained.  
The reasons for termination shall be documented, and a copy given to the 
employee, who shall initial or sign, and date the documentation to acknowledge 
receipt only.  The documentation 
shall be included in the employee's permanent personnel file.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶7]      Second, Section 3 
of Chapter XII addresses the required post-termination procedure applicable when 
a terminated employee appeals his termination:

 
 

Section 
3:  Appeal 
Procedures.

 
 
            
Permanent full time and part time employees of the Town shall have the 
right to appeal . . . termination actions.  
Notice of the appeal must be 
submitted to the appointing authority within ten (10) calendar days of the 
effective date of the . . . dismissal action.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
Section 
3, as part of Ordinance No. 9-96, which was adopted on September 9, 1996, had 
replaced Article 23 of Chapter 2 of the Town's ordinances which in § 2-23-4(c) 
had entitled an employee dismissed for cause to "a hearing before the Governing 
Body within 30 days after the discharge by requesting the same, in writing, 
within 10 days of the date of discharge."  

 
 
[¶8]      On February 7, 
2008, Police Chief Gentile called Porter into his office and questioned him 
about certain allegations made against him by two rookie officers.  Also at this meeting were Lieutenant 
Thomas Laughrey of the Department and Porter's attorney.  Before this meeting, Police Chief 
Gentile had not delivered to Porter any written notice of termination.  The Police Chief did not tape record 
this meeting.  Porter claims that at 
this meeting the Police Chief did not mention anything about terminating 
Porter's employment. On February 12, 2008, Police Chief Gentile again called 
Porter into his office and handed him a four-page letter of termination which 
stated, among other things, that Porter's termination was effective that date 
and that he could appeal that decision.  

 
 
[¶9]      By letter dated 
February 20, 2008, Porter's attorney and the Town's attorney agreed that Porter 
had a ten-day extension of the time to file a notice of appeal of Porter's 
termination.  By letter dated 
February 27, 2008, addressed to the Town's mayor, with a copy to the Town's 
attorney, Porter's attorney gave notice of Porter's appeal of his 
termination.  Over the following 
months, the Town's attorney and Porter's attorney discussed engaging and then 
agreed to engage a hearing examiner for purposes of Porter's post-termination 
appeal hearing.  Sometime that 
summer, the attorneys engaged a hearing examiner who then held a scheduling 
conference with both attorneys at which deadlines were established, a motion 
hearing was set for September 12, 2008, and a hearing was set for October 6, 
2008.  On August 15, 2008, Porter 
submitted his disclosure statement listing witnesses and exhibits and his motion 
to dismiss or for summary judgment supported by his affidavit and a memorandum 
of law.  Among other points, 
Porter's motion asserted that the Department had violated the provisions of the 
employee handbook governing the pre-termination procedures applicable to a 
termination for cause.  The 
Department did not submit a disclosure statement or a response to Porter's 
motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.  
However, by letter dated August 20, 2008, the Town's attorney informed 
Porter's attorney that he had "concluded the Mayor and Council do not have 
jurisdiction to hear and consider Mr. Porter's attempted appeal."  The Town's attorney stated that the 
employee handbook required Porter's notice of appeal to be served on the 
appointing authority who, by implication, was Police Chief Gentile who had hired 
Porter, and not the Town's mayor.  
He stated because Porter's notice of appeal had been served on the mayor, 
and not the police chief, that notice of appeal was defective, the appeal did 
not exist, and the time for appeal had run.  He concluded that he had "advised the 
Mayor that in my opinion the appeal was not perfected, and therefore the Town 
does not have jurisdiction to hear or consider an appeal from Mr. Porter."  The Town attorney's ipse dixit1 aside, neither the mayor nor 
the Town's governing body notified Porter that they deemed Porter's notice of 
appeal to be defective and they did not have jurisdiction.  They issued no formal decision on the 
matter.

 
 
[¶10]   On September 11, 2008, Porter filed 
his "Petition for Review of Administrative Decision" with the district 
court.  In his petition, Porter 
stated that he sought judicial review of agency inaction, or the denial of 
required action, in the failure to afford him administrative hearings on his 
termination from employment pursuant to the administrative rules adopted by the 
Town of Evansville.  He identified 
the specific issues of law for review to be:

 
 
1.         
Did the Town of Evansville Police Department violate its own 
administrative rules when Petitioner was terminated and was denied his right to 
pre- and post-termination hearings?

2.         
Have the Petitioner's termination hearings been unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed, or is the Town's refusal to grant any termination hearings 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority or limitations, unsupported by substantial evidence, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law? 

 
 
[¶11]   The Department filed a reply to 
Porter's petition for review. The district court entered its order establishing 
a briefing schedule, and the parties filed their briefs. On July 23, 2009, the 
district court issued its "Decision Letter":

 
 
            
Enclosed you will find a certified copy of the Order of Reversal for 
Agency Inaction entered in the referenced case.  As you can see, the Order finds that 
pursuant to the Town of Evansville's Employee Handbook and Chapter 2 of the 
Ordinances of the Town of Evansville, the Petitioner is entitled to an informal 
hearing and a post-termination hearing in connection with the termination of his 
employment with the Town of Evansville Police Department, that the failure and 
refusal of the Town of Evansville Police Department and Town of Evansville to 
follow the required procedures in providing for such hearings constitutes agency 
inaction subject to reversal, and that the matter must be remanded for the 
required hearings to be held.

 
 

Issues

 
 
            
The issues presented for review by Petitioner Lonnie Porter are stated as 
follows:

 
 
Issue 
#1

 
 
Was 
Lonnie Porter entitled to notice of the right to request an informal hearing 
before the appointing authority prior to the effective date of his termination, 
a pre-termination hearing, and a tape recorded record of the pre-termination 
hearing, as required by the administrative rules and Ordinances of the Town of 
Evansville, Wyoming law, and the U.S. Constitution?

 
 
Issue 
#2

 
 
Was 
Lonnie Porter entitled to a post-termination hearing in front of the Evansville 
Town Council or a hearing examiner to determine whether the termination should 
be upheld as required by the administrative rules and Ordinances of the Town of 
Evansville, Wyoming law, and the U.S. Constitution?

 
 
Respondent 
Town of Evansville Police Department delineates the issues somewhat differently, 
and states them to be:

 
 
ISSUE 
ONE  Was a final or appealable judgment or order entered by the Town of 
Evansville from which an appeal could be taken to the District Court by a 
petition for review?

 
 
ISSUE 
TWO  Was a Notice of Appeal properly served on the Appointing Authority, 
thereby entitling Mr. Porter to a review hearing before the Governing Body of 
the Town of Evansville?

 
 
ISSUE 
THREE  Are there proceedings or issues of fact, or a decision, made by the Town 
of Evansville, from which an appeal can be taken to the District Court by a 
petition for review.

 
 

Facts 
and Procedural Background

 
 
            
Petitioner Lonnie Porter (hereinafter "Mr. Porter") was a police officer 
for a total of twenty-six (26) years, and worked for the Police Department of 
the Town of Evansville for seven (7) years.  He held the rank of Sergeant and 
supervised other officers.  Mr. 
Porter asserts that he was the most experienced officer in the Department, that 
he supervised and trained other officers, and that he handled the Department's 
only police dog.

 
 
            
Two of Mr. Porter's fellow officers accused him of wrongdoing on the 
job.  As a result, on February 7, 
2008, a meeting was held at which the Chief of Police conversed with Mr. Porter 
concerning the allegations.  Present 
at the meeting were the Chief of Police, a Lieutenant with the Police 
Department, Mr. Porter, and Mr. Porter's attorney.  There is no recording of the meeting, 
but it is agreed that the parties discussed reports that included that Mr. 
Porter had slept during his entire shift on December 25, 2007, and that he 
allowed a training officer to conduct solo traffic stops.  Also, the parties agree that at the 
meeting Mr. Porter denied any wrongdoing, but did admit to sleeping on his lunch 
break (which he asserts was permissible) and to allowing a training officer to 
perform solo traffic stops because the trainee was fully trained and qualified 
to do so.

 
 
            
On February 12, 2007, Mr. Porter was terminated from his employment.  On that date, he was presented with a 
letter outlining the reasons for his termination.  The letter includes the following 
advisement:

 
 
Effective 
this date your services as a sworn peace officer for the Town of Evansville is 
hereby terminated.  This decision is 
based on recent violations of Departmental Policies and Procedures, to include 
officer safety issues, conduct unbecoming an officer with possible criminal 
implications and dereliction of duty.  
Additionally prior past discipline and performance were considered in 
this decision.  Your recent actions 
do not portray those of an individual with your tenure as a law enforcement 
officer.

 
 
The 
letter also referenced the Town of Evansville's rules and regulations in 
explaining that the termination was a discharge "for cause," and it contained 
the following statement advising Mr. Porter of his right to appeal the 
decision:

 
 
In 
accordance with the Town of Evansville Employee Handbook, you have the right to 
an appeal in matters of suspension without pay and or termination actions.  It is your responsibility to follow the 
appropriate procedures set forth in Section 3: Appeal Procedures of the Town of 
Evansville Handbook.

 
 
            
After a number of communications between legal counsel for the parties, 
Mr. Porter submitted a Notice of Appeal to the Mayor and to the attorney for the 
Town of Evansville.  The Notice of 
Appeal requested a post-termination hearing as provided in the Employee 
Handbook.  The Notice of Appeal was 
dated February 27, 2009, and sent certified mail to Mayor Phil Hinds of the Town 
of Evansville, and copied to the attorney for the Town of Evansville.  The Notice of Appeal included the 
information required under Section 3 of the Employee Handbook of the Town of 
Evansville.  Anticipating that the 
Town of Evansville was in agreement with the holding of a post-termination 
hearing, Mr. Porter's attorney submitted a disclosure statement and other 
filings in advance of any hearing to be held.  However, legal counsel for the Town of 
Evansville advised that the hearing would not be held because it was determined 
that "the Mayor and Council do not have jurisdiction to hear and consider Mr. 
Porter's attempted appeal."  A 
letter from the lawyer for the Town of Evansville dated August 20, 2008, 
contained the following advisements:

 
 
You 
have raised the issue of a requested informal hearing before the appointing 
authority prior to termination.  Mr. 
Porter made the request, was granted the request, and retained you as his 
attorney to attend the informal hearing, before Chief Gentile, held on February 
7, 2008.  Mr. Porter was then 
terminated on February 12, 2008, after the informal hearing and due 
consideration of all the circumstances by Chief Gentile.

 
 
* 
* *

 
 
The 
Town of Evansville Employee Handbook requires the notice of appeal to be served 
on the appointing authority.  The 
appointing authority can be an elected official or department head, by 
definition.  As the title implies, 
the appointing authority is the person appointing or hiring the individual, 
which is the employee.  Mr. Porter 
was hired/appointed by Chief of Police Gentile, not Mayor Hinds.  Mayor Hinds was not the Mayor when Mr. 
Porter was hired.  Mayor Hinds could 
not have been the appointing authority.  
Mr. Porter knew this.

 
 
As 
you know, the law concerning filing appeals is absolutely clear:  if the notice of appeal is defective, 
such as timeliness or service, there [is] not an appeal, the appeal does not 
exist.  Time has run in this matter 
to appeal.  I have advised the Mayor 
that in my opinion the appeal was not perfected, and therefore the Town does not 
have jurisdiction to hear or consider an appeal from Mr. 
Porter.

 
 
It 
is from those determinations that the requested review in this action was timely 
brought.

 
 

Standard 
of Review

 
 
            
The issues presented by the parties for review in this case are questions 
of law to be reviewed de novo.  An agency's conclusions of law are 
to be affirmed if they are in accordance with the law.  Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 
84, ¶ 26, 188 P.3d 554, 562 (Wyo. 2008).  
A reviewing court does not defer to the agency's determination on issues 
of law; instead, it must correct any error made by the agency in either 
interpreting or applying the law.  
Three Sons LLC v. Wyoming 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission, 2007 WY 93, ¶ 11, 160 P.3d 58, 63 
(Wyo. 2007).

 
 

Discussion

 
 
            
At the outset, this judge has struggled with the approach to be 
undertaken in making the requested review of this matter.  Most commonly, there is an agency order 
setting forth the decision or ruling to be reviewed.  Pursuant to Rule 12.06(e) of the Wyoming 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, a copy of the agency decision is to be attached as 
an appendix to the petition for review of an administrative decision.  While the record does contain items of 
correspondence from the legal counsel for the Town of Evansville, there is no 
actual written order or decision identified for review as contemplated by the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.

 
 
            
The above-stated concern is alleviated in the case at hand by the 
provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(a) and Rule 12.01 of the Wyoming Rules 
of Appellate Procedure which expressly authorize judicial review of agency 
inaction.  Painter v. Spurrier, 969 P.2d 548, 549 
(Wyo. 1998).  Wyoming case law holds 
that after a reasonable period of time, agency inaction is deemed a denial of a 
request, so as to authorize judicial review of agency inaction under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.  Whiteman v. Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division, 984 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Wyo. 1999).  That legal principle has application to 
the matter hereunder review where we have agency inaction in the form of the 
denial of a request for a hearing or hearings.  Harris v. Schuetz, 948 P.2d 90[7], 908 
(Wyo. 1997).

 
 
            
Additionally, there is a threshold question of the enforceability of the 
provisions of the Town of Evansville Employee Handbook urged to be the basis of 
one of the claims of agency inaction in this matter.  The definition found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-3-101(b)(i) supports the Petitioner's position that the Town of Evansville 
Police Department is an administrative agency.  Further, it is legally established that 
an administrative agency is without authority to deviate from its adopted 
personnel rules.  Antelope Valley Improvement v. State Board 
of Equalization for the State of Wyoming, 992 P.2d 563, 566 (Wyo. 
1999).  Administrative rules and 
regulations have the force and effect of law, and agencies are, therefore, 
required to comply with their administrative rules.  Goedert ex rel. Wolfe v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 991 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Wyo. 
1999) (citing M B v. Laramie County 
Department of Family Services in the Interest of L B, 933 P.2d 1126, 1130 
(Wyo. 1997), and Fullmer v. Wyoming 
Employment Security Commission, 858 P.2d 1122, 1123-24 (Wyo. 
1993)).

 
 
            
Mr. Porter urges in this appeal that the applicable rules, regulations, 
and ordinances require both a per-termination hearing and post-termination 
hearing in connection with the termination of his employment with the Town of 
Evansville Police Department.  He 
contends that he was given neither.

 
 
            
With respect to the requirement for what is referenced as a 
"pre-termination hearing," the personnel regulations found at Chapter XII, 
Section 2.C of the Employee Handbook require:

 
 
            
Termination.  An employee's 
employment may be terminated by the appointing authority or his designated agent 
upon recommendation of the employee's department head for an infraction of a 
severe nature or a repeated infraction following earlier disciplinary 
action.  Notice of termination shall 
be in writing, stating the specific details of the infraction(s), earlier 
disciplinary action taken for other, similar infraction(s) (if appropriate), 
reasons for the termination action, the effective date, and notice of the right to request an 
informal hearing before the appointing authority prior to the effective date of 
termination.  Prior to termination 
(except in an emergency when immediate action is required), the employee may 
request an informal hearing before the appointing authority, which the employee 
and department head shall attend, for purposes of determining whether there is 
reasonable cause for termination.  A 
tape recorded record of the informal hearing shall be maintained.  The reasons for termination shall be 
documented, and a copy given to the employee, who shall initial or sign, and 
date the documentation to acknowledge receipt only.  The documentation shall be included in 
the employee's permanent personnel file.  
(Emphasis added).

 
 
The 
express provisions of the Employee Handbook require that there be (a) notice of 
termination in writing, (b) notice of the right to request an informal hearing 
before the appointing authority prior to the effective date of termination, (c) 
if requested, an informal hearing to be attended by the employee and department 
head for a determination whether there is reasonable cause of termination, (d) a 
tape recorded record of the informal hearing, and (e) documentation of the 
reasons for termination.

 
 
            
While it may be urged that the February 7, 2008 meeting attended by the 
Chief of Police, a Lieutenant with the Police Department, Mr. Porter, and Mr. 
Porter's attorney, was an informal hearing pursuant to Chapter XII, Section 2.C 
of the Employee Handbook, there was a lack of compliance with several of the 
above-noted requirements.  There was 
no advance written notice of termination, no notice of the right to request an 
informal hearing before the effective date of termination, and no tape recorded 
record as required under the regulations.  
As a result, it is necessary to conclude that an informal hearing was not 
held in accord with the Town of Evansville's adopted procedural 
requirements.  When a procedural 
rule bears on an individual right, "the rule is binding on the agency and may 
not be violated or ignored because the rule is not a mere internal housekeeping 
arrangement."  Cook v. Zoning Board of Adjustment for the 
City of Laramie, 776 P.2d 181, 188 (Wyo. 1998) (Golden, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (citing Brookhaven Housing Coalition v. Kunzig, 
341 F. Supp. 1026, 1027 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)).

 
 
            
Further, it is evident that a post-termination hearing before the 
governing body of the Town of Evansville was not held in this matter pursuant to 
the Town of Evansville's ordinances.  
Chapter 2 of the Ordinances of the Town of Evansville, at Article 23, 
requires the following regarding the discharge of an employee for 
cause:

 
 
(b)       If a Town 
employee is discharged for incompetency, neglect of duty, or other good cause, 
the department head shall deliver to the employee a written notice of 
discharge.  Said notice shall 
contain:

 
 
(i)         
written reasons for discharge; and

 
 
(ii)        a 
notice that the employee has 10 days from the date of said discharge to request 
a hearing before the governing body.

 
 

(c)       Every 
employee who has been discharged for incompetency, neglect of duty, or other 
good cause shall be entitled to a hearing before the Governing Body within 30 
days after the discharge by requesting the same, in writing, within 10 days of 
the date of the discharge.  (Emphasis added).

 
 
            
Since the February 12, 2007 letter to Mr. Porter stated that he was being 
discharged for cause, the quoted Ordinance has application to his 
termination.  As a result, Mr. 
Porter was entitled to a hearing before the governing body within thirty (30) 
days after his discharge by requesting the same in writing within ten (10) days 
of that date.  While there are 
legitimate questions raised concerning the timeliness and sufficiency of service 
of the Notice of Appeal by Mr. Porter upon the Mayor and the attorney for the 
Town of Evansville and Town of Evansville Police Department, it cannot be 
concluded that such was defective so as to preclude the right to the requested 
hearing.  The appeal process in an 
administrative review is not as rigidly construed as appeals from a court; as 
long as all necessary parties are notified of the appellant's desire for an 
appeal, service is effective.  See 
Kittles v. Rocky Mountain Recovery, 
Inc., 1 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Wyo. 2000); and In re Discipline of Cook, 2007 WY 178, ¶ 
18, 170 P.3d 122, 126-27 (Wyo. 2007).  
Considering all the facts of record relative to Mr. Porter's request for 
appeal of the termination of his employment, including the consent of the 
attorney for the Town of Evansville for an extension of the ten (10) day 
deadline to request a hearing, this court would find that the requirements of 
Article 23 of Chapter 2 of the Ordinances of the Town of Evansville were 
sufficiently invoked to require the post-termination hearing.  As a result, the inaction of the Town of 
Evansville Police Department in failing to provide the required hearing before 
the governing body must be reversed, with the matter remanded to afford the 
rights prescribed by the Town of Evansville's own 
ordinance.

 
 

Conclusion

 
 
            
The necessary conclusion is that this matter must be reversed and 
remanded to the Town of Evansville Police Department and Town of Evansville to 
afford Mr. Porter the hearings required under the Town of Evansville's Employee 
Handbook and Chapter 2, Article 23, of the Ordinances of the Town of 
Evansville.  As referenced in this 
Decision Letter, the law mandates strict compliance with the requirements of the 
Employee Handbook and Town Ordinances in the holding of the proceedings provided 
for therein.  

 
 
The 
district court's "Order of Reversal for Agency Inaction" was filed that same 
day.  The Department timely filed 
its notice of appeal.  

 
 
[¶12]   On November 16, 2009, the same day 
the Department e-filed its brief in this Court, the Department e-filed in this 
Court its motion asserting that the district court had erred in its decision 
below by relying on Chapter 2, Article 23 of the Ordinances of the Town of 
Evansville, which had been superseded in September 1996 by Ordinance 9-96, and 
asked this Court to take judicial notice of the latter ordinance, stay the 
appeal or remand the matter to the district court for consideration of the 
Department's motion pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b) which it had recently filed in 
the district court.  On December 8, 
2009, this Court issued its order which denied without prejudice the 
Department's motion to take judicial notice of the applicable ordinance, denied 
the Department's motion for a remand for further proceedings, stayed briefing in 
the appeal until further notice, ordered the Department to keep this Court 
apprised of the status of its W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion in the district court, and 
ordered the Department to provide this Court with a copy of the district court's 
order determining that motion.  In 
the district court, the parties filed pleadings concerning the motion and the 
district court held its hearing.  On 
April 15, 2010, the district court issued its order denying the 
motion:

 
 

ORDER 
DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER

 
 
            
THIS MATTER coming before the Court for hearing on April 8, 2010; and 
Petitioner Lonnie Porter being represented by his attorney, Keith R. Nachbar; 
and Respondent Town of Evansville Police Department being represented by its 
attorneys, Judith A. Studer and Phillip T. Willoughby; and the Court having 
before it for its consideration Respondent's Motion for Relief from Order filed 
November 16, 2009; and the Court having reviewed the Motion for Relief from 
Order, Petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Relief from Order, and 
Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Opposition to Motion for Relief from Order, 
having taken judicial notice of Ordinance No. 9-96 Ordinance Adopting Employee 
Handbook  Personnel Rules and Regulations, pp. 65 and 66 of the Town of 
Evansville Employee Handbook, and Chapter 2 Administration Article 23  
Employment Policies (Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 to the Affidavit of Jannelle 
Underwood), having considered the argument of counsel, and being advised in the 
premises, finds:  (a) that the 
motion is brought pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and that no authority has been cited to support the granting of the 
requested relief in a judicial review/appeal; (b) that the motion was not 
determined within ninety (90) days after filing, and is deemed denied pursuant 
to Rule 6(c)(2) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and Paxton Resources L.L.C. v. Brannaman, 
2004 WY 93, 95 P.3d 796 (Wyo. 2004); (c) even if the motion were to be 
considered under Rule 60(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, no 
sufficient showing has been made of a reason or ground to grant relief from the 
Decision Letter and Order of Reversal for Agency Inaction entered upon full 
review of this matter; (d) that even if the Court's reliance upon Ordinance 9-96 
of the Town of Evansville was in error, the Court's ruling that agency inaction 
on the part of Respondent Town of Evansville Police Department and the Town of 
Evansville in refusing to properly hold an initial hearing and a 
post-termination hearing on the termination of the employment of Petitioner 
pursuant to the Town of Evansville's Employee Handbook would be the same; and 
(e) that accordingly, the Motion for Relief from Order should be denied. 

 
 
[¶13]   The Department timely filed its 
notice of appeal of that order.  
This Court then entered its order consolidating both cases for argument 
and decision.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶14]   The Department is an "agency" as 
that term is defined by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2009) ("agency' means any . . . department . . . of . . . a . . . 
town . . . of the state").  Under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(a) (LexisNexis 2009), "any person aggrieved or 
adversely affected in fact . . . by other agency action or inaction, or any 
person affected in fact by a rule adopted by an agency, is entitled to judicial 
review in the district court for the county in which the administrative action 
or inaction was taken."  The 
provisions of W.R.A.P. 12 and 13 pertain to judicial review of administrative 
action.  Judicial review "shall be 
limited to a determination of the matters specified in Wyo. Stat. 
16-3-114(c)."  W.R.A.P. 12.09.  The matters specified in § 16-3-114(c) 
are:

 
 
(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
            
(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

            
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:

            

            
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

            
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

            
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or 
lacking statutory right;

            
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or

            
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute. 

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2009).  Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-115 
(LexisNexis 2009), an aggrieved party may obtain review of any final judgment of 
the district court under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act by appeal to 
this Court.  We structure our review 
as though the appeal were directly from the agency, giving no special deference 
to the decision of the district court, and we apply the same standard of review 
used by the district court under § 16-3-114(c).  Escarcega v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of 
Transp., 2007 WY 38, ¶ 6, 153 P.3d 264, 267 (Wyo. 2007).  "We do not . . .  defer to an agency's conclusions of 
law.  If the correct rule of law has 
not been correctly applied, the agency's errors are to be corrected."  Pine Bar Ranch, LLC v. Luther, 2007 WY 
35, ¶ 8, 152 P.3d 1062, 1065 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Wagstaff v. Sublette County Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 2002 WY 123, ¶ 7, 53 P.3d 79, 81 (Wyo. 
2002)).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶15]   At the heart of the Department's 
argument in these consolidated appeals is its assertion that Porter's failure to 
submit his notice of appeal dated February 27, 2008, to the police chief, his 
appointing authority, as required by Section 3, Chapter XII, Ordinance 9-96, 
which was adopted September 9, 1996, and superseded Article 23 of Chapter 2 of 
the Town of Evansville Ordinances, deprived the Town's governing body of 
jurisdiction to consider Porter's post-termination appeal of the police chief's 
termination decision set forth in his letter dated February 12, 2008, and, in 
turn, deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider 
Porter's petition for review filed September 11, 2008, and to enter its order 
reversing the Department's (police chief) termination decision and remanding to 
the Department (police chief) to afford Porter the procedural due process to 
which he is entitled under Section 2.C., Chapter XII, Ordinance 
9-96.

 
 
[¶16]   We reject the Department's 
argument.  The pre-termination 
procedural due process requirements of Section 2.C., Chapter XII, Ordinance 
9-96, are quite clear.  There must 
be a written notice of termination delivered to the employee.  That written notice must 
state:

 
 
1.         
the specific details of the infractions;

2.         
earlier disciplinary action taken for other, similar infractions, if 
appropriate;

3.         
reasons for the termination action;

4.         
the effective date of the termination;

5.         
notice of the employee's right to request an informal hearing before the 
appointing authority prior to the effective date of 
termination.

 
 
[¶17]   When the employee receives this 
written notice of termination before the effective date of termination, the 
employee may then request an informal hearing before the appointing authority 
"for purposes of determining whether there is reasonable cause for 
termination."  This informal hearing 
is commonly known as a pre-termination hearing.  Importantly, "[a] tape recorded record 
of the informal hearing shall be maintained." 

 
 
[¶18]   The Department (police chief) 
failed to comply with any of these pre-termination procedural due process 
requirements.  "Administrative rules 
and regulations have the force and effect of law, and agencies are, therefore, 
required to comply with their administrative rules.  MB v. Laramie County Department of Family 
Services in the Interest of LB, 933 P.2d 1126, 1130 (Wyo. 1997); Fullmer v. Wyoming Employment Security 
Commission, 858 P.2d 1122, 1123-24 (Wyo. 1993)."  Goedert ex rel. Wolfe v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 991 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Wyo. 
1999).  We agree with that said in 
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 
540, 79 S. Ct. 968, 973, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (1959), that in proceedings of this 
nature "scrupulous observance of departmental procedural safeguards is clearly 
of particular importance."  The 
guiding principle of procedural due process is that the requisite 
pre-termination hearing be granted "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner."  Armstrong v. Menzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 
85 S. Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1965).  
Here, even the Department's (police chief) oral calling of Porter into 
his office on February 7, 2008, was abrupt and uninformative.  The purpose of the requirements of 
written notice of the specific charges and having the subject employee request a 
pre-termination hearing is to allow that employee to marshal his case against 
the terminating actor.  Absent 
suitable written notice, as required by the departmental procedural safeguards 
in place here, the opportunity for Porter to marshal his case and be 
meaningfully heard before termination was a charade.  Although the briefs tell us that at the 
February 7 meeting called by the police chief, several allegations against 
Porter were identified, it is clear that the police chief's February 12 
termination letter expanded considerably the breadth of reasons for taking 
termination action.  Had the 
Department (police chief) delivered that letter to Porter at the outset so that 
Porter could marshal his response to the contents of that letter and then 
request the pre-termination hearing to which he was entitled, perhaps this case 
would be in a different posture.  
But that was not to be.

 
 
[¶19]   It will not do for the Department 
to assert that Porter could have cured the Department's violation of his 
pre-termination procedural due process rights had he but correctly and timely 
met the requirements of the post-termination procedures prescribed in Section 3, 
Chapter XII, Ordinance 9-96, and submitted his notice of appeal to the police 
chief as the appointing authority.  
We agree with that said in Cotnoir 
v. University of Maine Systems, 35 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 
1994):

 
 
Where 
an employee is fired in violation of his due process rights, the availability of 
post-termination grievance procedures will not ordinarily cure the violation. 
Kercad³-Mel©ndez v. Aponte-Rogue, 829 F.2d 255, 263 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(citing Schultz v. 
Baumgart, 738 F.2d 231, 237 (7th Cir. 1984)), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1044, 108 S. Ct. 2037, 100 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1988). Thus, even where a discharged employee receives a 
post-termination hearing to review adverse personnel action, the 
pre-termination hearing still needs to be extensive enough to guard against 
mistaken decisions, and accordingly, the employee is entitled to notice, an 
explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side 
of the story. See [Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v.] Loudermill, 470 U.S. [532] at 546, 105 S.Ct. [1487] 
at 1495 [(1985)]; Brasslett [v. Cota], 761 F.2d [827] at 836 [(1st 
Cir. 1985)]. If an employee is fired without these pre-termination 
protections, normally the constitutional deprivation is then complete.  Kercad³-Mel©ndez, 829 F.2d  at 263. Thus, 
the post-termination grievance procedures which the individual defendants 
provided to Cotnoir could not compensate for a lack of pre-termination process 
afforded Cotnoir.

 

[¶20]   We hold that the Department's 
termination of Porter's employment as a police officer violated his 
pre-termination procedural due process rights and remand to the district court 
with directions that it issue its order ordering the Department immediately to 
reinstate Porter to that employment effective February 12, 
2008.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 

1"Something asserted but not proved."  Black's Law Dictionary 905 (9th ed. 
2009).