Case Title: Schmidt v. Gibbons

Citation: 101 Ariz. 222, 418 P.2d 378

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1966-09-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
101 Ariz. 222 (1966) 418 P.2d 378 Florence SCHMIDT, surviving spouse of Frank J. Schmidt, deceased, individually and for and on Behalf of Gail Schmidt, surviving daughter of Frank J. Schmidt, deceased, Appellant, v. J.L. GIBBONS and Frances Gibbons, his wife, dba Arizona Cement Transportation Company, and William D. Eisele and Irene Eisele, his wife, Appellees. No. 7181 P.R. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. September 28, 1966. Rehearing Denied October 25, 1966. *223 Belli, Ashe, Gerry & Ellison, San Francisco, Cal., Cordova, Goss & Mariscal, Phoenix, for appellant. Fennemore, Craig, Allen & McClennen, Phoenix, for appellees. American Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae. LOCKWOOD, Justice. This is a wrongful death action brought by the surviving spouse and daughter of Frank J. Schmidt, deceased. The cause of death was an automobile accident in which the decedent crashed into the rear end of a truck owned by the defendant (appellee herein) which was parked on the highway. Judgment was for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in 3 Ariz. App. 147, 412 P.2d 716, and we subsequently granted the petition for review. The issues presented to this Court involve the determination of two questions. The first involves an allegedly erroneous instruction of the law of contributory negligence. The instruction given over plaintiff's objection is as follows: Plaintiff contends that this instruction violates the Arizona Constitution, Art. 18, § 5, A.R.S. which reads as follows: The interpretation of this constitutional provision was considered in Layton v. Rocha, 90 Ariz. 369, 370, 368 P.2d 444, 445 (1962): We further stated therein that a mandatory "must" instruction is in violation of the foregoing constitutional provision. We subsequently condemned instructions which directed the jury that if they found that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory *224 negligence and this negligence was a proximate cause of his injury then: "You are instructed to find in favor of the defendants." Coyner Crop Dusters v. Marsh, 91 Ariz. 371, 374, 372 P.2d 708, 710 (1962). "It is your sworn duty to return a verdict for the defendants." Coyner Crop Dusters v. Marsh, 91 Ariz. 371, 374, 372 P.2d 708, 710 (1962). "[The plaintiff] may not recover from another for injury suffered." Trojanovich v. Marshall, 95 Ariz. 145, 146, 388 P.2d 149, 150 (1963). "The plaintiff cannot recover in this case." Trojanovich v. Marshall, 95 Ariz. 145, 146, 388 P.2d 149, 150 (1963). The instruction given in this case contained the phrase "the plaintiff is not entitled to recover." To entitle, defined by Webster, is "to give a right or legal title to." Webster's New Int'l., 2d ed., at 854. Thus, as the instruction stated that the plaintiff "is not entitled (has no legal right) to recover" upon a finding of contributory negligence, the jury is effectually bound to find for the defendant upon a finding of contributory negligence. Therefore, this instruction suffers from the same defect as those above condemned. The plaintiff also contends that the trial judge erred in allowing Officer Raymond to testify that the plaintiff's decedent was traveling 86 miles per hour just before impact. Officer Raymond based his opinion upon the assumed fact that the plaintiff's decedent was going 60 miles per hour at the time of impact. Officer Raymond testified on behalf of the defendant and was asked the following hypothetical question: The witness, Kinder, who was qualified by the defense as an expert on judging speed of a vehicle at impact from the positions and condition of the vehicles following the collision, testified that the speed of the decedent's automobile at impact could have been forty, fifty, sixty, or seventy miles per hour. Subsequently he stated that "[I]t could have been going less than thirty. Nobody knows how fast it was going." Hypothetical questions are proper so long as they are based on facts in evidence. Gilbert v. Quinet, 91 Ariz. 29, 369 P.2d 267 (1962); Bogard GMC Co. v. Henley, 2 Ariz. App. 223, 407 P.2d 412 (1965). The question here was improper since it failed to include all of the pertinent portions of the expert's testimony regarding speed (anywhere from thirty to seventy miles per hour). The Court of Appeals opinion is hereby vacated and the judgment of the trial court *225 is hereby reversed and remanded for a new trial. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., BERNSTEIN, V.C.J., and McFARLAND, J., concur. NOTE: The Honorable JESSE A. UDALL, Justice, did not participate in the determination of this case.