Case Title: GEM of St. Louis, Inc. v. City of Bloomington

Citation: 144 N.W.2d 552

Docket Number: 39745, 39760

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1966-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
144 N.W.2d 552 (1966) G.E.M. OF ST. LOUIS, INC., Respondent, v. CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, Appellant, and Spartan Industries, Inc., Intervenor, Respondent, and Evald A. Jacobsen, dba Ben Franklin Store, Intervenor, Appellant. Nos. 39745, 39760. Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 29, 1966. *553 John G. Pidgeon, City Atty., John J. Waters, Asst. City Atty., Bloomington, for City of Bloomington. Faegre & Benson and Wright W. Brooks, Minneapolis, for Jacobsen, dba Ben Franklin Store. Feinberg, Mirviss, Meyers, Schumacher & Malmon, Minneapolis, for G.E.M. Grannis & Grannis, South St. Paul, for Spartan. SHERAN, Justice. Appeals from a judgment of the district court entered pursuant to an order made in response to a motion for summary judgment in proceedings instituted by G.E.M. of St. Louis, Inc., against the city of Bloomington in an effort to establish the invalidity of an ordinance adopted by the city prohibiting certain business activities on Sunday. The ordinance involved reads as follows: The legal issues before this court are: (1) Is the ordinance invalid because of conflict with Minn.St. 624.01 to 624.03 or as an attempt to regulate business in a field preempted by state law? (2) Is the Bloomington ordinance invalid because of the circumstances of its adoption? 1. Our decision in Mangold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield, 274 Minn. ___, 143 N.W.2d 813, filed July 1, 1966, establishes the absence of invalidating conflict between the statute and such ordinances as the one before us and the lack of preemption of this field by state legislation. We recognize that variances between municipal regulations affecting commercial activity, particularly in a metropolitan area, create serious problems. The absence of preemption by the state legislature may lead in the end to the "uninhibited commercial warfare, * * * disparate degrees of peace, repose and comfort in different communities and, in the metropolitan areas, * * * a checkerboard of conflicting regulations" envisioned by the trial judge. Nevertheless, for the reasons outlined in the Mangold case, we feel that the ordinance, if properly adopted, was within the corporate power of the city of Bloomington. If the Minnesota Legislature determines that local regulation of commercial activity by ordinances of this type is creating economic confusion, the problem can be corrected by a clear expression of the legislative *555 will that regulation of such commercial activity be uniform throughout the state.[1] 2. The circumstances under which the ordinance was adopted involved referendum and initiative procedures of Bloomington's Home Rule Charter and were as follows: On December 18, 1961, Bloomington adopted Ordinance No. 55, its first "Sunday closing ordinance," as a so-called emergency measure. On April 30, 1962, following a challenge of that ordinance, Bloomington repealed it and adopted Ordinance No. 68, a new "Sunday closing ordinance." On May 16 a referendum petition challenging Ordinance No. 68 was filed. On June 4, 1962, the city council, in effect, declared the referendum petition invalid. On June 11, 1962, the council reconsidered the referendum petition, found it valid, and repealed Ordinance No. 68. On October 1, 1963, an initiative petition was filed and at the election subsequently held in response to the initiative petition the present ordinance was adopted. The power of the municipal corporation acting pursuant to its charter to submit the ordinance here involved to the voters in response to an initiative petition was not affected by the council's repeal of the ordinances previously enacted by it. There was no attempt here to nullify provisions of a municipal charter by council action a procedure disparaged by dictum in Megnella v. Meining, 133 Minn. 98, 157 N.W. 991. The vacillation of the city council in adopting and repealing ordinances on a specific subject should not, we feel, foreclose municipal action through the initiative procedures for which provision has been made in the city's charter. Although not directly in point, these decisions give some inferential support to our conclusion: Paetzel v. Clift, 234 Minn. 498, 48 N.W.2d 731; State ex rel. Gabbert v. MacQueen, 82 W.Va. 44, 95 S.E. 666; Russell v. Harwood, 20 Misc.2d 692, 188 N.Y.S.2d 288. It has been established that laws of the type here involved do not violate Federal constitutional inhibitions. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S. Ct. 1144, 6 L. Ed. 2d 563; Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617, 81 S. Ct. 1122, 6 L. Ed. 2d 536; McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393; Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 81 S. Ct. 1135, 6 L. Ed. 2d 551. Reversed. [1] A proposed state statute to provide for a common day of rest may be found in 3 Harv.J. on Legislation 345.