Case Title: State ex rel. Johnson v. Richardson

Citation: 2012-Ohio-57

Docket Number: 2011-1464

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Johnson v. Richardson, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-57.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-57 
THE STATE EX REL. JOHNSON v. RICHARDSON. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Johnson v. Richardson,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-57.] 
Quo warranto—Removal of village-council member—Village council did not 
properly vote for respondent to fill vacancy—Writ granted. 
(No. 2011-1464—Submitted November 15, 2011—Decided January 12, 2012.) 
IN QUO WARRANTO. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action in which relator, Terry Johnson, requests 
a writ of quo warranto to oust respondent Scott Richardson from the office of 
member of the council of the village of Carlisle, Ohio, and to declare relator 
entitled to the office.  Because the pertinent facts are uncontroverted and relator 
has established his entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief, we grant the 
writ. 
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Facts 
{¶ 2} On November 3, 2009, Chad S. Johnson was elected to serve a 
four-year term as an at-large member of the Carlisle Village Council.  On April 
22, 2011, Chad S. Johnson resigned from his office as an at-large council member 
effective June 1, 2011. 
{¶ 3} On June 28, 2011, at a regular meeting of the Carlisle Village 
Council, the remaining six council members voted to fill the vacant council seat.  
Of the six votes cast, respondent Scott Richardson received three votes, relator, 
Terry Johnson, received two votes, and Cheryl Sweezy received one vote.  After 
village-council members disagreed about whether their vote had filled the vacant 
council seat, a council member requested that the village law director render an 
opinion on the matter. 
{¶ 4} On June 30, the law director gave his written opinion concerning 
the June 28 vote to the village council.  On that same date, the law director swore 
Richardson into the office of member of village council.  No further votes to elect 
a successor council member were taken. 
{¶ 5} On July 1, 2011, Carlisle Mayor Timothy Humphries appointed 
relator, Terry Johnson, to the office of Carlisle Village Council member to fill the 
vacancy caused by the resignation of former council member Chad S. Johnson.  
Richardson has assumed the council seat and purported to exercise the rights and 
duties of that office notwithstanding the mayor’s request that he remove himself 
from the council meetings. 
{¶ 6} On August 25, 2011, Terry Johnson filed this action for a writ of 
quo warranto to oust Richardson from the office of member of the Carlisle 
Village Council and to declare Johnson entitled to possession of that office.  
Richardson filed an answer, the village filed a motion to intervene and an answer, 
and Johnson filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to intervene.  
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Twenty-four days after he filed his answer, Richardson filed a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings.  Johnson filed a motion to strike Richardson’s motion. 
{¶ 7} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 
village’s motion to intervene, Johnson’s motion to strike Richardson’s motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, and our S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.5 determination. 
Legal Analysis 
Motion to Intervene 
{¶ 8} The Village of Carlisle seeks to intervene as an additional 
respondent in this case.  The village has an interest in this case because it involves 
the interpretation of the village’s charter procedure to fill a vacancy in the village 
council.  Moreover, the village may not be adequately represented by Richardson 
in this proceeding.  Further, the village has complied with the mandatory 
procedural requirements of Civ.R. 24(C) by filing its answer with its motion to 
intervene. 
{¶ 9} Based on the foregoing as well as our duty to liberally construe 
Civ.R. 24 in favor of intervention, we grant the village’s motion to intervene.  See 
State ex rel. Watkins v. Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 532, 
534, 696 N.E.2d 1079. 
Motion to Strike 
{¶ 10} Johnson moves to strike Richardson’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.  In an original action filed here, the respondent “shall file an answer to 
the complaint or a motion to dismiss within twenty-one days of service of the 
summons and complaint.”  S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.5(A).  Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.5(B), 
“[t]he respondent may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings at the same 
time an answer is filed.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 11} Under the rule, respondents in original actions filed in the Supreme 
Court are authorized to file motions for judgment on the pleadings, but if they do 
so, the motion must be filed “at the same time an answer is filed.”  State ex rel. 
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Van Landingham v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 1509, 764 
N.E.2d 1038; State ex rel. Toledo v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections (2002), 95 Ohio 
St.3d 73, 74, 765 N.E.2d 854.  Because Richardson did not file his motion for 
judgment on the pleadings until 24 days after he filed his answer, we grant 
Johnson’s motion and strike the untimely motion. 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.5 Standard 
{¶ 12} We now determine whether dismissal, an alternative writ, or a 
peremptory writ is appropriate.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.5.  Dismissal, which respondents 
request in their answers, is required if it appears beyond doubt, after presuming 
the truth of all material factual allegations of relator’s complaint and making all 
reasonable inferences in his favor, that relator is not entitled to the requested 
extraordinary relief in quo warranto.  See State ex rel. Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. v. 
Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 41, 2010-Ohio-2450, 930 
N.E.2d 299, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 13} If, however, after so construing the complaint, it appears that 
relator’s quo warranto claim may have merit, we will grant an alternative writ and 
issue a schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefs.  See State ex rel. 
Mason v. Burnside, 117 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007-Ohio-6754, 881 N.E.2d 224, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 14} Finally, if the pertinent facts are uncontroverted and it appears 
beyond doubt that relator is entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in quo 
warranto, a peremptory writ will be granted.  See State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin 
Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, 
¶ 14. 
Quo Warranto Claim 
{¶ 15} “[Q]uo warranto is the exclusive remedy by which one’s right to 
hold a public office may be litigated.”  State ex rel. Battin v. Bush (1988), 40 Ohio 
St.3d 236, 238-239, 533 N.E.2d 301; see also State ex rel. Varnau v. Wenninger, 
128 Ohio St.3d 361, 2011-Ohio-759, 944 N.E.2d 663, ¶ 9.  “To be entitled to the 
January Term, 2012 
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writ of quo warranto, the relator must establish that the office is being unlawfully 
held and exercised by respondent and that relator is entitled to the office.”  State 
ex rel. Zeigler v. Zumbar, 129 Ohio St.3d 240, 2011-Ohio-2939, 951 N.E.2d 405, 
¶ 23. 
{¶ 16} Relator asserts that Richardson’s holding and exercising the office 
of village-council member is unlawful because the village council did not 
properly vote for him to fill the vacancy pursuant to the village charter.  Under 
Section 4.01(a) of the Carlisle Charter, “all powers of the Municipality, including 
its legislative powers, shall be vested in a Council consisting of seven (7) 
members (including the Mayor),” with three of the council’s seven members 
being elected from the village at large.  The office of member of the village 
council became vacant when Chad S. Johnson resigned effective June 1, 2011.  
See Carlisle Charter, Section 4.05(a) (“The office of member of Council shall 
become vacant upon the member of Council’s death, resignation, removal from 
office in any manner authorized by this Charter, or forfeiture of office”). 
{¶ 17} Section 4.05(d) of the village charter governs the procedure to fill 
vacancies in the office of village council: 
{¶ 18} “Filling of Vacancies.  Vacancies in the office of member of 
Council shall be filled within thirty (30) days by vote of a majority of the 
remaining members of Council.  If a vacancy occurs in one (1) or more positions 
among members of Council elect, the Council of the new term shall appoint, by a 
majority vote, an eligible person or persons to fill the vacancy.  If the Council 
fails to fill a vacancy within thirty (30) days following the occurrence of the 
vacancy, the power of Council to fill the vacancy shall lapse and the Mayor shall 
fill the vacancy by appointment immediately following the expiration of the said 
thirty (30) days.  Any appointee under this section shall qualify under the 
provisions of this Charter, shall hold office, and shall serve for the unexpired term 
and until a successor is elected and qualified.”  (Emphasis added.) 
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{¶ 19} Richardson and the village claim that Richardson lawfully holds 
the office of village-council member based on the village council’s June 28, 2011 
vote of three to two to one in which three council members voted for Richardson 
and two council members voted for relator, Terry Johnson.  Relator counters that 
because Richardson received the vote of only three of the six remaining council 
members, he did not receive the requisite “majority vote” to fill the vacancy. 
{¶ 20} Section 4.05(d) of the charter specifies that if a vacancy occurs in 
the village council, the council, within 30 days following the occurrence of the 
vacancy, “shall appoint, by a majority vote, an eligible person * * * to fill the 
vacancy.” The term “majority” is not defined in the charter.  Undefined language 
used in a municipal charter must be construed according to its ordinary and 
common usage.  State ex rel. Commt. for the Proposed Ordinance to Repeal 
Ordinance No. 146-02, W. End Blight Designation v. Lakewood, 100 Ohio St.3d 
252, 2003-Ohio-5771, 798 N.E.2d 362, ¶ 19 (“In construing these charter 
provisions, the court applies general laws regarding statutory interpretation, 
including construing charter language according to its ordinary and common 
usage”).  The ordinary and common meaning of “majority” is “[a] number that is 
more than half of a total; a group more than 50 percent.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 
(9th Ed.2009) 1040.  “A majority always refers to more than half of some defined 
or assumed set.”  Id. 
{¶ 21} Since three is not more than half of six, Richardson did not receive 
enough votes to fill the vacancy on the village council under the plain language of 
Section 4.05(d) of the Carlisle Charter.  We reached a comparable result in State 
ex rel. Smith v. Nazor (1939), 135 Ohio St. 364, 14 O.O. 246, 21 N.E.2d 124, a 
quo warranto case in which we held that a vote of three to two to one by the six 
remaining Ironton City Council members to fill a vacancy was insufficient to 
constitute the required majority vote—“a majority vote of all members present 
was required, but since neither relator nor respondent received such vote, neither 
January Term, 2012 
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was elected to fill the vacancy for which the election was conducted.”  Id. at 368; 
see also State ex rel. Corrigan v. Tudhope (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 57, 70 O.O.2d 
153, 322 N.E.2d 675 (quo warranto granted to oust city council member who had 
not received a majority vote of six remaining council members to fill a vacancy 
when he received three votes); see generally Annotation, What Constitutes 
Requisite Majority of Members of Municipal Council Voting on Issue (1955), 43 
A.L.R.2d 698. 
{¶ 22} Therefore, in accordance with the plain language of Section 
4.05(d) of the Carlisle Charter as well as our precedent, relator has established 
that Richardson is unlawfully holding and exercising the office of village-council 
member. 
{¶ 23} Moreover, relator has also established that he is entitled to the 
office.  The village council failed to fill the vacancy caused by Chad S. Johnson’s 
resignation within 30 days of the June 1 effective date of the resignation.  The 
council’s failure to fill the vacancy within the time specified by the charter 
imposed a duty on the mayor to “fill the vacancy by appointment immediately 
following the expiration of said thirty (30) days.”  Carlisle Charter, Section 
4.05(d).  The mayor satisfied that duty by appointing relator, Terry Johnson, to fill 
the vacancy on July 1, 2011. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 24} Because the pertinent facts are uncontroverted and establish 
relator’s  entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief, we grant a peremptory 
writ of quo warranto to oust respondent Scott Richardson from the office of 
Carlisle Village Council member and to declare relator, Terry Johnson, entitled to 
that office.  No further evidence or briefs is required. 
Writ granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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__________________ 
 
Rion, Rion & Rion, L.P.A., Inc., and Bradley D. Anderson, for relator. 
 
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., Alan G. Starkoff, Jeremy M. 
Grayem, and Asim Z. Haque, for respondents. 
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