Case Title: Levis v. Konitzky

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016 ME 167

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2016-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 167 
Docket: 
Lin-15-274 
Argued: 
March 3, 2016 
Decided: 
November 17, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
JAMES N. LEVIS 
 
v. 
 
GUSTAV KONITZKY et al. 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  James N. Levis appeals from a summary judgment entered in the 
District Court (Wiscasset, Billings, J.) in favor of Gustav Konitzky in this 
adverse possession and quiet title action.  Levis asserts several errors and 
abuses of discretion by the trial court over the course of the six years that this 
litigation was pending, including, inter alia, that the court abused its 
discretion in vacating a default judgment entered against unknown 
defendants1 and erred in granting summary judgment to Konitzky.2  We 
conclude that none of the court’s rulings constitutes abuse of discretion or 
legal error.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. 
                                         
1  Alleged heirs of the deceased owner of record of the property in question were identified as 
the litigation progressed. 
 
2  Konitzky was first named a party in interest but became a defendant after heirs of the 
deceased owner of record conveyed their interest in the property to him. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  On April 27, 2009, James Levis filed a complaint for declaratory 
judgment and quiet title in the District Court (Wiscasset), claiming title to an 
approximately 125-foot by 100-foot section of mudflat on the southern side of 
McCaffrey’s Brook in Bristol by adverse possession and by deed from his 
ex-wife.3  Levis named “J. Henry Cartland, his heirs and assigns” (the Cartland 
heirs) as defendants and Gustav Konitzky, an abutting neighbor and 
boat-builder, as a party in interest.4   
 
[¶3]  Cartland, who acquired title to the mudflat and an adjoining lot on 
January 1, 1890, was the last known owner of record.  The Cartland heirs were 
served by publication, and, on October 16, 2009, Levis filed a motion for a 
default and default judgment as to the Cartland heirs because none had 
appeared in the case.  The court (Worth, J.) entered a default judgment against 
                                         
3  In 2008, Levis’s ex-wife, Sheila Howard, pursuant to their divorce, gave Levis a quitclaim deed 
conveying any interest she had in the shores and flats of McCaffrey’s Creek, as they were described 
in the deed to J. Henry Cartland, who had acquired title to the mudflat in the late 1800s. Levis 
admits, however, that there were no record conveyances of the mudflat from J. Henry Cartland to 
Howard or to anyone else.   
 
4  Levis named Konitzky as a party in interest because Konitzky had been granted permission to 
repair and reactivate a marine railway by order of the Department of Environmental Protection in 
1983, which, Levis noted in his complaint, may or may not affect the disputed parcel of land.  Levis’s 
primary motivation for filing the action appears to be his desire to prevent Konitzky from using the 
portion of the mudflat in front of Levis’s summer residence.  
 
3 
the heirs on October 28, 2009.  The order specifically stated that it did not 
affect Konitzky’s rights. 
 
[¶4]  For the next several years, Levis and Konitzky engaged in a 
procedural entanglement of dueling motions, with Levis attempting to 
establish that Konitzky had no cognizable interest in the mudflat and Konitzky 
attempting to defeat Levis’s quiet title and adverse possession claims.  
Relevant to this appeal, in December 2010, Konitzky filed a motion to set aside 
the default judgment against the Cartland heirs, alleging that he had located a 
Cartland heir who had transferred her interest in the property to Konitzky.  In 
February 2011, the court (Tucker, J.) held a hearing and denied the motion 
because it was not filed within the one-year deadline specified in M.R. 
Civ. P. 60(b)(2) and because Konitzky had “not presented evidence of reasons 
that Rule 60(b)(6) should apply.”   
 
[¶5]  Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 59(e), Konitzky filed a motion for 
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to set aside the default judgment, 
contending that he had not received notice of the hearing and that because the 
default judgment was not final—it had not settled the matter as to him—the 
court’s application of M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) was in error. 
 
4 
 
[¶6]  The court granted Konitzky’s motion and, in June 2011, held an 
evidentiary hearing at which Konitzky presented a 2010 release deed from 
Margaret Sue Tennant Jones, an alleged heir of Cartland, conveying any 
interest she had in the property to him.  The court entered an order vacating 
the default judgment, opining that Konitzky’s discovery of an heir and the 
subsequent assignment could make him an assignee, not just a party in 
interest.  The court concluded that the default judgment was not a final 
judgment because the entire case had not been resolved, see M.R. 
Civ. P. 54(b)(1); thus, Rule 60(b)(2) and its one-year deadline for newly 
discovered evidence did not apply.  See M.R. Civ. P. 55(c).   
 
[¶7]  Citing the quiet title statute, 14 M.R.S. §§ 6651-6663 (2015), Levis 
filed a motion to modify the order vacating the default judgment.  The court 
denied the motion but noted that none of the Cartland heirs had filed an 
answer or otherwise appeared in the action, and Konitzky had not entered an 
appearance pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 6653 as an assignee of a named defendant, 
and it extended the time for formally answering the original complaint until 
September 2, 2011.  See 14 M.R.S. §§ 6654, 6656.  By a subsequent order dated 
August 31, 2011, the court extended the deadline “for a thirty-day period.” 
 
5 
 
[¶8]  On September 29, 2011, Konitzky entered an appearance, 
pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 6653, as a defendant to the original action based on 
the conveyance from Tennant as well as conveyances from additional alleged 
heirs.  In November 2011, Levis filed several motions, including a motion for 
default against Konitzky as a party in interest and defendant, contending that 
Konitzky failed to comply with several rules of civil procedure and abide by 
court timelines.  The court held a hearing on Levis’s motions and denied them 
all. 
 
[¶9]  Discovery continued between the parties, and in December 2013, 
Konitzky filed a request for leave to file a motion for summary judgment 
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(b).  The court (Billings, J.) granted the request three 
days later.  Levis filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that (1) Konitzky 
had waived any right to argue that summary judgment in his favor was 
warranted, (2) the court had granted Konitzky’s request four days before 
Levis had received a copy of it, and (3) a motion for summary judgment would 
delay trial.  The court did not address Levis’s motion.  Two weeks later, 
Konitzky filed a motion for summary judgment, which Levis opposed with 
both argument and opposing statements of material fact.  After considering all 
of the filings on the motion for summary judgment, the court determined that 
 
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none of the facts disputed by the parties was material to the legal issue 
presented by Levis’s complaint and granted the motion in an order entered on 
March 12, 2014.   
 
[¶10]  Levis both appealed to us and filed motions for findings of fact 
and for reconsideration in the trial court.  We dismissed the appeal as 
interlocutory, concluding that the order was not a final judgment, see M.R. 
Civ. P. 54(b)(1), because it did not adjudicate Levis’s pending claim against the 
Cartland heirs.  On January 22, 2015, Levis filed, among other things, his third 
motion for default judgment against all heirs, assigns, or grantees of Cartland 
“who have failed to file an appearance and Answer in this action,” contending 
that, other than Konitzky identifying himself as a defendant, no other heir or 
assign had ever filed an answer or entered an appearance. 
 
[¶11]  In May 2015, the court denied Levis’s motion, stating that 
because the Cartland heirs “did appear and defend in the case through 
Konitzky” as an assignee of Cartland’s interest, default judgment was not 
warranted; and because all claims had been adjudicated, the summary 
judgment was a final judgment.  The court also stated that the summary 
judgment in Konitzky’s favor did not establish title to the mudflat—it simply 
established that, in light of uncontroverted facts relating to Konitzky’s regular 
 
7 
use of the mudflat, Levis could not meet the prima facie elements of his 
adverse possession or quiet title actions.  Levis timely appealed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶12]  Levis presents five issues for our review.  He contends that the 
court erred or abused its discretion by (1) setting aside the default judgment 
entered against the Cartland heirs in October 2009; (2) denying his November 
2011 motion for default against Konitzky after Konitzky allegedly failed to 
comply with a court order and the rules of civil procedure; (3) granting leave 
for Konitzky to file a motion for summary judgment in December 2013; 
(4) granting summary judgment in favor of Konitzky in March 2014; and 
(5) denying his motion for default in May 2015.  Finding no abuse of 
discretion in the court’s actions in setting aside the default judgment or 
denying Levis’s motion for default, we do not discuss those issues further.  We 
address in turn the court’s actions in allowing Konitzky to file a motion for 
summary judgment in December 2013, granting summary judgment in favor 
of Konitzky in March 2014, and denying Levis’s motion for default in 
May 2015. 
 
8 
A. 
Leave to File Motion for Summary Judgment 
 
[¶13]  Levis argues that the court abused its discretion when it granted 
Koniztky leave to file a motion for summary judgment, where Konitzky’s 
request was made years after the deadline stated in the initial scheduling 
order and where the court granted the request before Levis had an 
opportunity to respond.  He argues that pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 6(b), the court 
could not grant Konitzky’s request absent a showing of excusable neglect.  
Because the trial court was “best positioned to evaluate the circumstances of 
the case,” Johnson v. Carleton, 2001 ME 12, ¶ 10, 765 A.2d 571, we review its 
decision to allow Konitzky to file his summary judgment motion for an abuse 
of discretion, id.; see Dalton v. Quinn, 2010 ME 120, ¶ 6, 8 A.3d 670. 
 
[¶14]  Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) provides, in pertinent part: 
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order 
of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its 
discretion . . . (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act 
was the result of excusable neglect . . . . 
 
We have applied Rule 6(b)’s “excusable neglect” standard in a number of cases 
in which we examined a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a party’s 
request to file a motion or pleading after the deadline for such filing had 
 
9 
passed.  None of these cases involved a motion for leave to file a dispositive 
motion such as a motion for summary judgment.5 
                                         
5  Several involved untimely expert witness designations.  See, e.g., Hutz v. Alden, 2011 ME 27, 
¶¶ 19-22, 12 A.3d 1174 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a 
motion to enlarge the time to designate an expert witness after the deadline had passed, because 
the moving party had not demonstrated excusable neglect pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 6(b)); Dalton v. 
Quinn, 2010 ME 120, ¶¶ 6-8, 8 A.3d 670 (same); Johnson v. Carleton, 2001 ME 12, ¶¶ 7-10, 765 A.2d 
571 (same); but see Estate of O’Brien-Hamel, 2014 ME 75, ¶¶ 22-24, 93 A.3d 689 (holding that even 
absent a showing of excusable neglect, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a 
late-designated expert witness to testify where the opposing party was not “unfairly surprised” by 
the expert’s testimony (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
 
In other cases, a party moved for leave to file a late answer or counterclaim.  See Dyer 
Goodall & Federle, LLC v. Proctor, 2007 ME 145, ¶¶ 17-22, 935 A.2d 1123 (holding that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a motion to enlarge the time to answer a 
complaint after the deadline had passed, because the moving party had not shown excusable 
neglect pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 6(b)); Solomon’s Rock Trust v. Davis, 675 A.2d 506, 508-09 
(Me. 1996) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a motion for 
enlargement of time to file an answer and noting that “M.R. Civ. P. 6(b) should be liberally applied 
to work substantial justice”); Rodriguez v. Tomes, 610 A.2d 262, 264-65 (Me. 1992) (same); but see 
Estate of Leavitt, 1999 ME 102, ¶¶ 3-7, 733 A.2d 348 (vacating the trial court’s grant of a motion for 
extended time to file an answer and counterclaim because the counterclaim was time-barred 
pursuant to the Probate Code). 
 
 
We have also applied the standard to motions to file various other late nondispositive 
filings, including pleadings filed in opposition to motions for summary judgment.  See, e.g., Gregory 
v. City of Calais, 2001 ME 82, ¶¶ 5-11, 771 A.2d 383 (motion for leave to file late motion for award 
of attorney fees); Mancini v. Scott, 2000 ME 19, ¶¶ 7-8, 744 A.2d 1057 (motion for leave to file a late 
motion to substitute parties); Sevigny v. City of Biddeford, 344 A.2d 34, 38 (Me. 1975) (motion for 
enlargement of time within which to file a Rule 80B complaint).  In Camden National Bank v. 
Peterson, the trial court granted a late-filed motion to enlarge time to oppose a motion for summary 
judgment.  2008 ME 85, ¶¶ 15, 17, 948 A.2d 1251.  The moving party gave no reason for its delay, 
the court did not make findings regarding excusable neglect, and the nonmoving party did not ask 
for such findings.  Id. ¶ 18.  We noted that Rule 6(b)’s excusable neglect standard applied, that the 
delay caused by the motion was brief, and that the court had already granted several motions for 
enlargements by the nonmoving party.  Id. ¶¶ 16, 18.  We concluded that “[i]n the absence of a 
record demonstrating any other facts that formed the basis of the court’s ruling, we assume that the 
court acted within its discretion in granting the motion to enlarge.”  Id. ¶ 19. 
 
 
Several federal courts, on the other hand, have applied the excusable neglect standard to 
late-filed summary judgment motions.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[w]hen 
an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the 
time . . . on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable 
neglect.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b).  According to the United States Supreme Court, Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) 
 
10 
 
[¶15]  The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure “shall be construed to secure 
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”  M.R. Civ. P. 1; 
see Merrifield v. Hadlock, 2009 ME 1, ¶ 6, 961 A.2d 1107 (“[T]he overall 
purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure . . . is to ensure the speedy and 
inexpensive resolution of a case.”).  Consistent with these purposes, the 
summary judgment process is a procedural mechanism for determining 
                                                                                                                                   
authorizes a trial court to exercise its discretion to permit a late-filed motion “only 
where[, inter alia,] the failure to meet the deadline was the result of excusable neglect.”  Lujan v. 
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 895-97 (1990) (quotation marks omitted).  In Lujan, the Supreme 
Court upheld the trial court’s decision to reject affidavits supporting an opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment where the affidavits were filed after the court held the hearing on the motion 
for summary judgment.  Id. at 894-95. 
 
 
Since Lujan was decided, federal trial and appellate courts have expressly applied Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 6(b)’s excusable neglect standard to requests to file late motions for summary judgment.  
See Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 784-85 (3d Cir. 2010) (considering an untimely motion for 
summary judgment, made orally on the eve of trial eight months after the court’s deadline for 
summary judgment motions had passed, and holding, based on Lujan and Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), that 
“the district court must make a finding of excusable neglect . . . before permitting an untimely 
motion”); Yeoman v. Ikea U.S.A. W., Inc., No. 11cv701-WQH (BGS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37749 , at 
*8-22 (S.D. Ca. Mar. 20, 2014) (denying a late motion to amend the court’s scheduling order in order 
to file a motion for summary judgment, on the ground that the movant did not meet 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)’s excusable neglect standard); Walker v. Durham, No. 5:12-CT-3186-BO, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133484, at *10-11 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 22, 2014) (allowing a late-filed motion for 
summary judgment on the ground that the movant had met Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)’s excusable neglect 
standard); Sewell v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Co., No. 11 Civ. 4236 (ALC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40538, 
at *3-8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2013) (upholding a magistrate judge’s decision to allow a late-filed motion 
for summary judgment on the ground that the movant had met Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)’s excusable 
neglect standard). 
 
 
These decisions, however, are grounded in the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b): “Unless a 
different time is set by local rule or the court orders otherwise, a party may file a motion for summary 
judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery.”  (Emphasis added.)  By issuing a 
scheduling order, the court has “order[ed] otherwise,” and so Fed R. Civ. P. 6(b)’s requirements—
including the excusable neglect requirement, see Lujan, 497 U.S. at 896—apply when a party has 
missed the deadline stated in the scheduling order.  Maine’s Rule 56 does not contain the same 
language.  Rather, it provides: “A party against whom a claim . . . is asserted . . . may, at any time, but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part thereof.”  M.R. Civ. P. 56(b) (emphasis added). 
 
11 
whether a trial is needed, and can obviate the need for the parties and the 
court to proceed to trial.  See M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, 
¶ 7, 784 A.2d 18; Rancourt v. Waterville Osteopathic Hosp., 526 A.2d 1385, 
1387-88 (Me. 1987); see also Guardianship of Jo Ann L., 2004 ME 68, ¶ 11, 
847 A.2d 415 (“Summary judgment procedure is an appropriate practice 
encouraged in most litigated cases in order to effectuate policies of judicial 
economy.”). 
 
[¶16]  Although Rule 6(b) provides the general rule for nondispositive 
pleadings and motions, the rule specific to summary judgment itself provides 
as follows: 
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor 
as to all or any part thereof. 
 
M.R. Civ. P. 56(b) (emphasis added).  “The primary purpose of [Rule 56’s] 
outermost time limit is to prevent delaying tactics.”  3 Harvey & Merritt, Maine 
Civil Practice § 56:4 at 231 (3d ed. 2015-2016).  Where a scheduling order 
imposes a deadline, “better practice suggests filing a motion for leave to file a 
late motion for summary judgment if new grounds develop late in the case 
justifying the motion.”  Maine State Bar Association, The Maine Rules of Civil 
 
12 
Procedure with Advisory Committee Notes and Practice Commentary 
§ 56 (2008).  A trial court’s decision on whether to grant leave to file a late 
motion, i.e., whether to grant a motion for an enlargement of time, “is entitled 
to considerable deference because of [the court’s] superior position to 
evaluate the credibility and good faith of the parties before it.”  Dalton, 
2010 ME 120, ¶ 6, 8 A.3d 670 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶17]  We now clarify that, contrary to Levis’s contention, the trial court 
has discretion to allow a late-filed motion for summary judgment, even absent 
a showing of excusable neglect, if the request is made “within such time as not 
to delay the trial,” M.R. Civ. P. 56(b).  See Carter v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 
598 A.2d 739, 741 (Me. 1991); Rancourt, 526 A.2d at 1387-88.  The trial court 
should consider whether the motion is interposed for the purpose of delay, 
and whether granting leave to file the motion will promote effective case 
management or result in undue costs to the parties or prejudice to the 
nonmoving party. 
 
[¶18]  In this case, the initial scheduling order, generated in 
October 2009, provided for a discovery deadline of mid-January 2010 and a 
deadline for summary judgment motions of mid-February 2010.  Konitzky 
filed his motion for leave to file a summary judgment motion in late 
 
13 
December 2013.  During the years in between, both parties engaged in a 
convoluted procedural entanglement involving, inter alia, the following: in 
February 2011—after the deadline for filing motions had passed—Levis filed 
a motion for summary judgment, which was later denied; in August 2011, the 
court extended the deadline for defendants to answer the original complaint 
until September 2011, and then again extended that deadline for thirty more 
days; in September 2011, Konitzky entered a first appearance as a defendant 
in the case; in November 2011, Levis filed a motion for default against 
Konitzky; and in 2012, the parties finally engaged in discovery in earnest, 
designating expert witnesses and serving interrogatories.  When Konitzky 
filed his request for leave to file a motion for summary judgment in 
December 2013, the case had been placed on a trailing trial list for 
January 16, 2014, but it was not reached on that date and was rescheduled for 
April 11, 2014.  The court granted Konitzky’s motion for summary judgment 
by order entered March 12, 2014.  
 
[¶19]  This much is clear: throughout the proceedings, neither the 
parties nor the court adhered to the scheduling order.  Levis himself filed a 
motion for summary judgment after the motion deadline.  Although it would 
have been better practice for the court to issue a new scheduling order 
 
14 
reflecting the actual progress of the action, and to grant Levis an opportunity 
to respond to Konitzky’s request, on this record, the court’s actions did not 
exceed the bounds of its discretion.  With discovery extending two years past 
the original deadline, the potential for late-filed dispositive motions was 
obvious.  Had the court determined that the timing of Konitzky’s motion for 
summary judgment would delay trial, add unnecessary costs, or prejudice 
Levis in some way, it had the discretion to deny the motion.  However, the 
summary judgment process did not delay trial, and Levis does not 
demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the court’s decision to allow the 
motion.  To the contrary, the record reflects that the court had before it Levis’s 
timely-filed opposition to Konitzky’s motion for summary judgment when, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Levis as required, see 
Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 30, 41 A.3d 551, it determined 
that Konitzky was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Under these 
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the court exceeded the bounds of its 
discretion when it decided, in December 2013, to allow Konitzky to file his 
motion for summary judgment.  
 
15 
B. 
Grant of Summary Judgment to Konitzky 
 
[¶20]  Levis next argues that the court erred when it entered a summary 
judgment in favor of Konitzky on Levis’s claim of title to the disputed area of 
the mudflat.  “We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de 
novo, and consider both the evidence and any reasonable inferences that the 
evidence produces in the light most favorable to the party against whom the 
summary judgment has been granted in order to determine if there is a 
genuine issue of material fact.”  Budge v. Town of Millinocket, 2012 ME 122, 
¶ 12, 55 A.3d 484 (quotation marks omitted).  “When the defendant is the 
moving party, he must establish that there is no genuine dispute of fact and 
that the undisputed facts would entitle him to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Estate of Cabatit v. Canders, 2014 ME 133, ¶ 8, 105 A.3d 439.  “It then becomes 
the plaintiff’s burden to make out the prima facie case and demonstrate that 
there are disputed facts” regarding issues material to the applicable law.  Id.; 
see also Corey v. Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, 1999 ME 196, ¶ 9, 742 A.2d 933. 
 
1. 
Adverse Possession 
 
[¶21]  On Konitzky’s motion for summary judgment, Levis had the 
burden to make out a prima facie case for adverse possession.  To establish 
title through adverse possession, a party must prove by a preponderance of 
 
16 
the evidence that the party’s use and possession of the subject property was 
(1) actual, (2) open, (3) visible, (4) notorious, (5) hostile, (6) under claim of 
right, (7) continuous, (8) exclusive, and (9) of a duration of at least twenty 
years.  Dombkowski v. Ferland, 2006 ME 24, ¶ 10, 893 A.2d 599.   
 
[¶22]  At the outset, we recognize the long-standing doctrine in Maine 
that the intertidal zone, or wet sand area, is subject to a public easement for 
fishing, fowling, and navigation.  See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 173 
(Me. 1989).  Despite this recognized public easement, Levis nonetheless 
argues that, by “using” the mudflats in front of his upland property for 
clamming and tying boats, he has acquired title through adverse possession to 
the intertidal zone.  As a matter of law, this use—even if it had not been 
interrupted by Konizky’s use of the same area for clamming and boating—is 
not sufficient to establish title through adverse possession. 
 
2. 
Claim of Title Under Deed 
 
[¶23]  Levis also claims that he acquired title to the mudflat through a 
2008 quitclaim deed from his ex-wife.  Although the ex-wife’s quitclaim deed 
purports to convey the mudflat by listing its metes and bounds, Levis admits 
that there were no record conveyances to his ex-wife from the last owner of 
record, Cartland.  Levis asserts that his ex-wife acquired title by adverse 
 
17 
possession herself; however, he did not provide sufficient documentation or 
evidence, or any specific allegations, to support this contention, such as a 
record title in the registry of deeds or some indicia that she sought to quiet 
title through the courts.  In addition, his ex-wife’s theoretical claim of adverse 
possession suffers from the same infirmity as his: the asserted use of the 
intertidal zone is insufficient to meet the necessary elements for adverse 
possession.  Therefore, Levis did not set forth specific facts establishing a 
genuine issue for trial that he is the owner of the mudflat by virtue of deed.  Cf. 
Dionne v. LeClerc, 2006 ME 34, ¶ 11, 896 A.2d 923 (concluding that a break in 
chain of title, which had been transferred to the town by operation of law due 
to unpaid taxes, was cured by a subsequent quitclaim deed from the town to 
the plaintiff).   
 
3. 
Quiet Title 
 
[¶24]  Levis also contends that the court erred by entering a summary 
judgment in Konitzky’s favor on his quiet title action because he has alleged a 
prima facie claim of title to the disputed mudflat against the true owners.  The 
quiet title statue provides that a person may bring a quiet title action if he or 
she has been in uninterrupted, i.e. continuous and exclusive, possession for 
the four years preceding the commencement of the action.  14 M.R.S. § 6651; 
 
18 
see Chickering v. Yates, 420 A.2d 1219, 1223 (Me. 1980).  Levis filed his 
complaint in 2009.  He admitted in his statement of material facts that 
Konitzky had made use of the mudflat since 2002.  Because Levis admitted 
that his possession was not exclusive for more than four years preceding the 
action, he did not make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to quiet title 
relief.  To be clear, relief pursuant to the quiet title statute is only available if 
the plaintiff in such an action provides the legal basis for that title.  The statute 
does not provide an independent basis for a claim of title.  
 
[¶25]  Viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to Levis, the record establishes that he cannot succeed in his claims 
of adverse possession or title under deed or in his quiet title action.  We 
therefore conclude that the District Court did not err when it entered 
summary judgments in Konitzky’s favor on those claims. 
C. 
2015 Order Denying Levis’s Third Motion for Default Judgment 
[¶26]  Finally, Levis argues that the court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion for a default judgment in May 2015.  He contends that 
(1) the court could not declare Konitzky an assignee of J. Henry Cartland 
because Konitzky had not made a timely appearance to make an affirmative 
claim to the land, and (2) the court incorrectly declared that all of Levis’s 
 
19 
claims against all parties had been adjudicated.  We review the denial of a 
motion for a default judgment for an abuse of discretion.  See Millett v. Dumais, 
365 A.2d 1038, 1040 (Me. 1976).   
 
[¶27]  Title 14 M.R.S. § 6653 provides that “[t]he grantee of any 
defendant named or described in the complaint, or any person claiming under 
such grantee, may voluntarily appear and become a party [to a quiet title 
action]. . . . If any person who becomes such grantee by conveyance recorded 
after the filing of the [court clerk’s] certificate [in the registry of deeds] does 
not voluntarily appear, no such conveyance by the defendant shall be given in 
evidence . . . and the issue shall be determined as though no such conveyance 
were made.”  Levis contends that because Konitzky failed to file his answer by 
the deadline set by the court of September 2, 2011, the conveyance to him 
should not be recognized.  Contrary to his contention, however, based on the 
court’s subsequent order extending scheduling deadlines for thirty days, 
Konitzky’s “voluntary appearance” was timely.  The court accepted Konitzky’s 
status as a defendant in an order dated January 25, 2012, and stated in its 
May 2015 order that “Konitzky, as assignee of Cartland’s interest, was the only 
defendant to appear and defend in the case.”  Also, as the court made clear in 
its order denying Levis’s motion for a default judgment, its entry of a 
 
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summary judgment in Konitzky’s favor did not signify that Konitzky, or 
anyone else, had title to the disputed mudflat; it decided only that Levis had 
not proved his claim of title. 
 
[¶28]  Levis’s argument that the court erred in determining that all 
claims against all parties had been adjudicated because Cartland’s unknown 
heirs and assigns had not appeared is also unavailing.  Through his quiet title 
action, Levis sought a declaration that he has title to the mudflat.  The court 
entered a summary judgment in Konitzky’s favor because Levis was unable, as 
a matter of law, to make out that claim.  See McGrath v. Hills, 662 A.2d 215, 217 
(Me. 1995) (“Showing no title in themselves, the plaintiffs cannot prevail even 
if it turned out that the defendants had no title.” (quotation marks omitted)).  
As the court stated, “What is fully resolved is that Levis does not have title to 
the disputed mudflats by virtue of adverse possession and Levis is not entitled 
to quiet title relief.”  Entry of a default judgment against the Cartland heirs 
would be inconsistent with the court’s adjudication of Levis’s claim of title to 
the same property.  The court therefore did not exceed the bounds of its 
discretion in declining to enter a default judgment against the Cartland heirs.   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
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On the briefs: 
 
Jason Dionne, Esq., and Juliana McKittrick, Esq., Isaacson & 
Raymond, P.A., Lewiston, for appellant James N. Levis 
 
Thomas B. Federle, Esq., Federle Law, LLC, Augusta, for 
appellee Gustav Konitzky 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Jason Dionne, Esq., for appellant James N. Levis 
 
Thomas B. Federle, Esq., for appellee Gustav Konitzky 
 
 
 
Wiscasset District Court docket number RE-2009-59 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY