Case Title: San Leandro Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd.

Citation: 46 Cal. 4th 822

Docket Number: S156961

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 6/18/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
SAN LEANDRO TEACHERS  
) 
ASSOCIATION et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
) 
 
 
) 
S156961 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/1 A114679 & A115686 
GOVERNING BOARD OF THE SAN 
) 
LEANDRO UNIFIED SCHOOL  
) 
DISTRICT et al., 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. RG05235795 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Shortly before an election, an employee organization that represents school 
teachers, and which regularly communicates with its members through school 
mailboxes, sought to distribute literature through these mailboxes that included 
endorsements of certain school board candidates.  The school district 
administration refused to permit such political communication and the employee 
organization sought a writ of mandate to have that policy overturned.  In order to 
resolve whether a writ should properly issue in this case, we must construe the 
meaning of Education Code section 7054, subdivision (a), which prohibits the use 
of ―school district . . . funds, services, supplies or equipment‖ for urging the 
support or defeat of political candidates or ballot propositions.  The trial court 
sided with the employee organization but the Court of Appeal reversed, upholding 
the school district‘s policy as within the scope of section 7054.  It also determined 
 
2 
that the policy did not violate Government Code section 3543.1, subdivision (b), 
which gives school employee organizations the right to use internal mailboxes 
subject to ―reasonable regulation,‖ concluding that the school district‘s policy was 
a reasonable regulation.  The Court of Appeal also held that the policy did not 
violate the United States or California Constitutions. 
We conclude that the Court of Appeal is correct and therefore affirm its 
judgment denying the employee organization‘s request for a writ of mandate. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The essential facts underlying this case are not in dispute.  The San Leandro 
Teachers Association (SLTA) is the exclusive bargaining representative of the San 
Leandro Unified School District‘s (District) certificated employees.  Each 
certificated employee is assigned a mailbox.  The normal intended purpose of the 
school mailboxes is to communicate with teachers and staff regarding school-
related matters.  As a representative employee organization, SLTA is authorized to 
use the mailboxes to communicate with its employee members pursuant to 
Government Code section 3543.1, subdivision (b), a part of  the Educational 
Employment Relations Act (EERA, Gov. Code, § 3540 et seq.) and the collective 
bargaining agreement.  Nonschool organizations do not have direct access to these 
mailboxes and may not access them without the District‘s prior approval.  The 
mailboxes are permanent fixtures at each school, consisting of a wooden or metal 
frame grid that is fixed to the wall in school offices. 
 
On October 11 and 12, 2004, SLTA distributed two employee newsletters 
by placing them in internal faculty mailboxes located at the District‘s schools.  
The first newsletter, entitled ―SLATE,‖ was a two-page memorandum from 
SLTA‘s president.  In addition to discussing health benefits and a recently filed 
unfair labor practice charge regarding unilateral staff reduction, the memorandum 
 
3 
included a paragraph about the upcoming school board election.  The paragraph 
mentioned by name two SLTA-endorsed school board candidates and referred to 
the success of SLTA volunteer efforts and of a ―Meet the Candidate‖ night; it also 
urged more volunteer effort.  Another paragraph in the same memorandum 
described SLTA‘s political efforts in more general terms.   
The second newsletter is a one-page memorandum addressed to SLTA‘s 
members, entitled ―From the Table.‖  In addition to discussing salary and benefits, 
negotiation of procedures for evaluating employees, and other matters, the 
memorandum states: ―Support your Bargaining Team‘s efforts to improve your 
salaries and working conditions.  Please volunteer to phone or walk in support of 
our endorsed School Board Candidates.  Our next bargaining date is October 29.‖  
Both newsletters were produced entirely at SLTA expense and were placed in the 
mailboxes by SLTA volunteers during their nonwork hours.   
On October 15, 2004, Assistant Superintendent Martinez sent a letter to the 
president of SLTA advising him that the union was prohibited by Education Code  
section 7054 from using school district mail facilities to distribute materials that 
contain political endorsements.  Because of that statutory prohibition, ―we will not 
allow the SLTA access to faculty mailboxes if any future distributions contain 
impermissible political endorsements.‖ 
On November 16, 2004, SLTA filed an unfair practice charge with the 
Public Employee Relations Board (PERB), alleging that the District violated 
provisions of the EERA by prohibiting SLTA from using the school mailboxes to 
distribute union newsletters containing its political endorsements.  On June 28, 
2005, PERB adopted an earlier decision of one of its agents, dismissing the unfair 
practice charge.  The agent had determined that ―the plain meaning of [Education 
Code section 7054] prohibited the use of mailboxes as a means of distributing 
 
4 
political information.‖  The agency also relied on one of its own earlier decisions, 
which held that a school‘s internal mail system amounted to ―services‖ or 
―equipment‖ within the meaning of Education Code section 7054.   
On September 30, 2005, SLTA filed a petition for peremptory writ of 
mandate to cause appellants to ―cease and desist from enforcing a policy which 
forbids [respondents] from placing in the school mailboxes any materials 
generated by the [SLTA] which contain references to candidates for public office 
or ballot initiatives.‖  The District demurred to the writ petition, asserting that 
prohibiting the distribution of partisan political material via the mailboxes is both 
constitutional and mandated by Education Code section 7054. 
On May 3, 2006, the trial court granted the writ petition and overruled 
appellants‘ demurrer.  Subsequently, the court awarded respondents their attorney 
fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.  For reasons discussed at 
length below, the Court of Appeal reversed, concluding both that Education Code 
section 7054 compelled the District‘s policy and that the statute and policy were 
not unconstitutional.  We granted review. 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. The Statutory Question 
We begin by examining the statute in dispute.  Education Code section  
70541 is part of the statutory scheme regulating the political activities of school 
districts and employees.  It provides: ―(a) No school district or community college 
district funds, services, supplies, or equipment shall be used for the purpose of 
urging the support or defeat of any ballot measure or candidate, including, but not 
limited to, any candidate for election to the governing board of the district;  [¶]  
                                              
1  
All statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated. 
 
5 
(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the use of any of the public resources 
described in subdivision (a) to provide information to the public about the possible 
effects of any bond issue or other ballot measure if both of the following 
conditions are met:  [¶]  (1) The informational activities are otherwise authorized 
by the Constitution or laws of this state.  [¶]  (2) The information provided 
constitutes a fair and impartial presentation of relevant facts to aid the electorate in 
reaching an informed judgment regarding the bond issue or ballot measure.  [¶]  
(c) A violation of this section shall be a misdemeanor or felony punishable by 
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year or by a fine not exceeding 
one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both, or imprisonment in a state prison for 16 
months, or two or three years.‖ 
 
― ‗When construing a statute, we must ―ascertain the intent of the 
Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.‖ ‘  [Citation.]  ‗In 
determining such intent, a court must look first to the words of the statute 
themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and according 
significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the 
legislative purpose.‘  [Citation.]  At the same time, ‗we do not consider . . . 
statutory language in isolation.‘  [Citation.]  Instead, we ‗examine the entire 
substance of the statute in order to determine the scope and purpose of the 
provision, construing its words in context and harmonizing its various parts.‘  
[Citation.]  Moreover, we ‗ ―read every statute ‗with reference to the entire scheme 
of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain 
effectiveness.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (2004) 
32 Cal.4th 1029, 1043.) 
In construing the statutory language, we first note that section 7054 cannot 
be construed to ban the use of all public resources for political purposes.  
 
6 
Subdivision (a) of section 7054 bans the use of ―funds, services, supplies, or 
equipment‖ for certain political purposes, whereas subdivision (b) states that 
―[n]othing in this section shall prohibit the use of any of the public resources 
described in subdivision (a) to provide information to the public about the possible 
effects of any bond issue or other ballot measure if both of the following 
conditions are met.‖  The italicized language of subdivision (b) therefore makes 
clear that the public resources described in subdivision (a) are a subset of all 
public resources. 
The parties argue about whether a school mailbox constitutes ―services‖ 
within the meaning of section 7054.  The District contends, and the Court of 
Appeal found, that mailboxes provide a service to those who use them, and that 
otherwise SLTA would have to use the more costly United States mail or some 
other means to deliver its message.  SLTA argues in effect that the term ―services‖ 
generally connotes useful activity performed by a human agency, i.e. that while 
distribution of mail is a service, the mailboxes themselves do not constitute a 
service.  Thus, because the literature in question was distributed by SLTA, no 
public ―service‖ was used.  The dictionary definition of ―service‖ does give some 
support to SLTA‘s position.  That word has been most relevantly defined as: ―1 a: 
the occupation or function of serving  b: employment as a 
servant 2 a: the work performed by one that serves  b: HELP, USE, BENEFIT  c: 
contribution to the welfare of others d: disposal for use  . . . . 4: the act of serving: as a: a helpful act  b: useful labor that does not produce a tangible commodity —
usually used in plural .‖  (Webster‘s 9th New 
Collegiate Dict. (1987), 1076.) 
 
7 
Similarly, the parties disagree about whether a school mailbox constitutes 
―equipment.‖  The District, like the Court of Appeal, construes the word broadly, 
and contends in essence that such mailboxes are self-evidently ―equipment.‖  As 
the Court of Appeal stated:  ―We . . . believe that the mailboxes themselves 
constitute school district ‗equipment‘ in that they are tangible, specially 
constructed receptacles that, while not unduly expensive, are created and 
maintained solely by the district.  And unlike tables, which can serve many 
functions, mailboxes are solely dedicated to the task of distributing information to 
individual recipients.‖  SLTA argues the contrary.  In the words of amicus curiae 
California School Board Association: ― ‗[E]quipment‘ connotes an object that is 
handled, used or operated, such as a copying machine or a printer: a mailbox does 
not fit within this category.‖  Moreover, SLTA and its amici argue that unlike a 
copying machine or printer and other common examples of equipment, which 
generate costs in terms of depreciation and the utilization of supplies, the use of 
the mailbox is virtually without cost, and therefore not within the purview of the 
statute primarily concerned with the expenditure of public funds for political 
campaigns.  They further point to the District‘s apparent concession that a table in 
a faculty lounge, for example, on which the union‘s political literature rested, was 
not ―equipment‖ within the meaning of section 7054.2 
                                              
2  
Neither side cites the dictionary definitions of ―equipment,‖ and these are 
not particularly helpful in deciding the question.  The dictionary assigns the word 
several meanings, most pertinently, ―1. a: the set of articles or physical resources 
serving to equip a person or thing: as (1): the implements used in an operation or 
activity: APPARATUS (2): all the fixed assets other than land and buildings of a 
business enterprise . . .  b: a piece of such equipment.‖  (Webster‘s 9th New 
Collegiate Dict., supra, p. 421.)  From the broadest definition above, staff 
mailboxes might be considered ―equipment‖ because they could be considered 
―fixed assets other than land and buildings.‖  On the other hand, ―[f]ixed assets‖ 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
8 
Because neither side makes a compelling case for its construction of section 
7054 based on the language of the statute alone, we may consider various extrinsic 
aids, including legislative history and an examination of the objectives to be 
achieved, in order to discern legislative intent.  (Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 
Cal.4th 268, 272.)  The statute was initially enacted in 1977, and the parties agree 
that it was a legislative response to Stanson v. Mott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 206 
(Stanson), which held that government agencies could not use public funds to 
campaign for ballot propositions or candidates, at least not without explicit 
legislative authorization.  As we stated in Stanson, ―the use of the public treasury 
to mount an election campaign which attempts to influence the resolution of issues 
which our Constitution leave[s] to the ‗free election‘ of the people (see Cal. 
Const., art. II, § 2) . . . present[s] a serious threat to the integrity of the electoral 
process.‖  (Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 218),  
As we further explained in Stanson: ―Underlying this uniform judicial 
reluctance to sanction the use of public funds for election campaigns rests an 
implicit recognition that such expenditures raise potentially serious constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
have been defined as ―[t]he tangible, long-lived assets of the business including 
land, buildings, furniture, fixtures, and equipment.‖  (Pollard et al., Principles of 
Accounting (2007) G-6.)  Thus, defined broadly ―fixed assets‖ other than land and 
buildings include ―furniture‖ and ―fixtures,‖ and therefore under that broad 
definition, ―fixtures‖ and ―furniture‖ would be considered ―equipment.‖  But as 
the above definition of ―fixed assets‖ illustrates, ―furniture‖ and ―fixtures‖ are 
commonly thought of as distinct from ―equipment‖ and therefore the three terms 
are listed in the conjunctive.  It is thus not entirely clear from the statutory 
language of section 7054 whether school mailboxes are ―fixtures‖ rather than 
equipment in the sense that they are attached to a building (see Black‘s Law Dict. 
(5th ed. 1979) p. 574) or whether ―equipment‖ was intended broadly to include 
such fixtures.  
 
9 
questions.  A fundamental precept of this nation‘s democratic electoral process is 
that the government may not ‗take sides‘ in election contests or bestow an unfair 
advantage on one of several competing factions.  A principal danger feared by our 
country‘s founders lay in the possibility that the holders of governmental authority 
would use official power improperly to perpetuate themselves, or their allies, in 
office (see, e.g., Madison, The Federalist Papers, Nos. 52, 53; 10 Richardson, 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents (1899) pp. 98-99 (President Jefferson)); the 
selective use of public funds in election campaigns, of course, raises the specter of 
just such an improper distortion of the democratic electoral process.‖  (Stanson, 
supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 217.) 
As originally enacted in 1977, section 7054 sought to limit the scope of the 
Stanson decision.  It stated: ―Except as provided in Sections 7056, 35174 and 
72632, no school district or community college district funds, services, supplies, 
or equipment shall be used for the purpose of urging the passage or defeat of any 
school measure of the district, including, but not limited to, the candidacy of any 
person for election to the governing board of the district.‖  (Stats. 1977, ch. 36, 
§ 396.5.)  Former section 35174, however, created a large loophole:  It provided in 
pertinent part: ―The governing board of any school district or any member of the 
governing board of a school district may prepare or disseminate information or 
may make public or private appearances or statements for the purpose of urging 
the passage or defeat of any school measure of the district.‖  (Stats. 1976, ch. 
1010, § 2.) 
In 1995 section 7054 was amended in conjunction with the repeal of former 
section 35174, and more expressly incorporated the principles set forth in Stanson.  
Section 1 of the new statute stated in part:  ―(a) The Legislature hereby finds and 
declares that, in a democratic society, the use of public funds in election 
 
10 
campaigns is unjustified and inappropriate.  No public entity should presume to 
use money derived from the whole of taxpayers to support or oppose ballot 
measures or candidates.  [¶]  (b) However, it is not the intent of the Legislature, in 
enacting this act, to restrict the political activities of officers or employees of a 
school district or community college district except as provided in Article 2 
(commencing with Section 7050) of Chapter 1 of Part 5 of the Education Code or 
as may be necessary to meet specified requirements of federal law. . . . The right 
of speech of any member of a governing board of a school district or community 
college district or any employee thereof is in no manner affected by this act.‖  (Id., 
§ 1, p. 6695.) 
Legislative committee analysis made clear the purpose of the amended 
statute: ―Proponents argue that in general, public funds or resources may not be 
used for political  purposes.  Members of the Legislature, for instance, are 
prohibited from using legislative funds, resources or personnel time for political 
purposes, including partisan political activity and advocacy of, or opposition to, 
ballot measures.  Local government officials are bound by similar prohibitions.  
Members of school and community college district governing boards, however, 
have been exempted from this general rule since 1977.  Education Code section 
35174, enacted in 1976, authorizes the use of public resources and employee time 
for the purpose of urging the support or defeat of school board candidates, school 
bond measures and any other school ballot measure.  This constitutes an 
inappropriate use of public funds.  Taxpayers‘ money should not be used for 
political purposes, whether in state, county, city, special district or school district 
elections.  [¶]  Proponents note that members of school and community college 
district governing boards have a legitimate role in addressing the public about 
bond measures and other related issues.  This bill does not in any way abridge 
 
11 
their constitutional right to continue to speak about these issues.  Nor does it 
prevent them from raising money for political purposes or advocating on behalf of 
ballot measures or individual candidates.  The bill does, however, repeal the 
authorization for school board members to use for political purposes district 
telephones, copying machines, equipment, employees, and materials produced 
with taxpayer monies.‖  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis 
of Sen. Bill No. 82 (Reg. Sess. 1995-1996) as amended Aug. 31, 1995, pp. 5-6.) 
Two aspects of the above legislative history are noteworthy.  First, it refers 
to ―materials produced with taxpayer monies,‖ which school mailboxes clearly 
are.  Second, and more significantly, as the legislative history of section 7054 
makes clear, it was designed to avoid the use of public resources to perpetuate an 
incumbent candidate or his or her chosen successor, or to promote self-serving 
ballot initiatives, thereby compromising the integrity of the electoral process.  The 
District contends that permitting employee organizations to use the mailboxes to 
endorse school board candidates will unfairly advantage those organizations and 
the candidates they endorse, because it allows them, but not other candidates and 
organizations, to use the mailboxes to communicate with teachers about these 
endorsements.  We agree that this special access to an internal channel of 
communication to influence elections is a potential abuse that section 7054, and 
the Stanson decision, were designed to guard against.  (See also Vargas v. City of 
Salinas (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1 [reaffirming Stanson‘s basic principles].)  Therefore 
we conclude, consistent with the purpose of section 7054, that the broad term 
―equipment‖ was intended to encompass mailboxes specially constructed at 
taxpayer expense to serve as a school‘s internal communication channel, which 
one group may not use to its exclusive political advantage.  We agree with the 
Court of Appeal that, unlike school furniture, for example, which may be 
 
12 
incidentally used for a host of different purposes, the term ―equipment‖ is 
plausibly applied to fixtures dedicated to a specific use. 
SLTA, in arguing that section 7054 is not implicated, cites an Attorney 
General opinion construing section 7054, found at 84 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 52 
(2001).  There, the Attorney General addressed the question of whether section 
7054 prohibited a school district from making employee payroll deductions for a 
political action committee established by a representative employee organization.  
The Attorney General‘s opinion interpreted section 7054 not to apply when a 
school district merely transfers nonpublic money from employees to a 
nongovernmental organization like a political action committee.  (84 
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 53-54.)  As the District points out, the Attorney 
General‘s opinion has been critiqued by PERB for neglecting the fact that section 
7054 is not only concerned with public funds but also with services, and for failing 
to come to terms with the fact that payroll deductions are a service.  (American 
Federation of Teachers Guild v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2001) 
PERB Dec. No. 1467 [26 PERC ¶33014].)3  In any case, there is no basis in the 
language of section 7054 for concluding it applies to school districts but not 
employee organizations.  Indeed, SLTA appears to concede in its briefing that, had 
it used school copying machines or printers to produce its political literature, or 
used on-duty school personnel to distribute that literature, it would have run afoul 
of that statute. 
                                              
3  
We express no opinion as to whether the Attorney General‘s opinion 
discussed above was correct in its result.  We note that the issue requires not only 
an analysis of the scope of section 7054, but also of those statutes that authorize 
government employee payroll deductions for union dues and other services.  (See, 
e.g., Gov. Code, §§ 1157.1, 1157.3) 
 
13 
Nor is a construction of section 7054 to ban placing candidate 
endorsements in school mailboxes inconsistent with Government Code section 
3543.1, subdivision (b).  That statute states: ―Employee organizations shall have 
the right of access at reasonable times to areas in which employees work, the right 
to use institutional bulletin boards, mailboxes, and other means of communication, 
subject to reasonable regulation, and the right to use institutional facilities at 
reasonable times for the purpose of meetings concerned with the exercise of the 
rights guaranteed by this chapter.‖  (Italics added.) 
The term ―reasonable regulation‖ is not defined.  In reference to an almost 
identically worded provision of the Higher Education Employer-Employee 
Relations Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3560-3599) ― Government Code section 3568 ― 
one court has stated:  ―To assess the reasonableness of a particular regulation, the 
Board must balance, in light of applicable public policies, the benefits conferred 
by the regulation and the burdens it imposes.‖  (Regents of the University of 
California v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 346, 361.)  
Thus, the inquiry into reasonableness is necessarily contextual.  On the one hand, a 
school district is given the discretion to regulate mailbox access so that it does not 
interfere with the district‘s legitimate interests.  On the other hand, since the 
statute speaks of a ―right of access‖ by employee organizations to mailboxes, the 
regulations in question should not unreasonably interfere with such access. 
―When two statutes touch upon a common subject, they are to be construed 
in reference to each other, so as to ‗harmonize the two in such a way that no part 
of either becomes surplusage.‘ [Citations.]  Two codes ‗ ―must be read together 
and so construed as to give effect, when possible, to all the provisions thereof.‖ ‘ ‖  
(DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 778-779.)  In the present case, 
there seems little question that a regulation that bans candidate endorsements 
 
14 
pursuant to section 7054 to preserve the integrity of the electoral process is a 
reasonable regulation pursuing a legitimate statutory objective.  Moreover, such a 
regulation would not unduly limit a union‘s statutory right of access.  Government 
Code section 3543.2 defines the scope of union representation as limited to 
―matters relating to wages, hours of employment and other terms and conditions of 
employment.‖  As we have recognized, school districts are not compelled to 
bargain about, nor are school employees compelled to contribute to, matters or 
activities outside the scope of union representation.  (See Cumero v. Public 
Employment Relations Bd. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 575, 593-594.)  That is not to say that 
public employee unions do not have an important political dimension, given that 
they are governed by and negotiate with government entities.  (See Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education (1977) 431 U.S. 209, 228.)  Here, however,  the SLTA 
still has numerous alternative channels with which to communicate its views to its 
members.  The regulation of school mailboxes to disallow candidate endorsements 
and to counter the advantage that those with special access to those mailboxes may 
possess would not interfere with a teachers‘ union‘s core mission of advocating for 
its members. 
We therefore hold that the District‘s regulation in the present case is lawful.  
We emphasize the narrowness of the holding.  We do not hold that school districts 
are compelled to exclude candidate endorsements from school mailboxes.  Indeed, 
section 7058, part of the same article as section 7054, states: ―Nothing in this 
article shall prohibit the use of a forum under the control of the governing board of 
a school district or community college district if the forum is made available to all 
sides on an equitable basis.‖  (Italics added.)  A school mailbox is a forum of 
communication, albeit, as discussed in the next part of this opinion, a nonpublic 
one, that is within the control of the school district.  Section 7058 makes clear that 
 
15 
section 7054 does not prohibit a school board from opening up mailboxes to 
political endorsement literature, as long as this is done ―on an equitable basis.‖ 
Furthermore, our holding does not extend to union literature in school 
mailboxes that does not ―urg[e] the support or defeat of any . . . candidate‖ within 
the meaning of section 7054, but merely urges members to become involved in 
upcoming elections and informs them how to do so, or engages in public policy 
discussion in more general terms.4  We note that a school district‘s ability to 
control the political communication of its employees is limited by section 7052, 
part of the same article as section 7054, which states: ―Except as otherwise 
provided in this article, or as necessary to meet requirements of federal law as it 
pertains to a particular employee or employees, no restriction shall be placed on 
the political activities of any officer or employee of a local agency.‖5  We hold 
only that a rule prohibiting candidate endorsement literature in school mailboxes is 
a ―reasonable regulation‖ within the meaning of Government Code section 3543.1, 
subdivision (b) because it enforces the directive of section 7054. 
                                              
4  
Nor do we consider literature in mailboxes that endorses ballot propositions 
rather than candidates, an issue not before us.  We note that Education Code 
section 7056, subdivision (b), a part of the same article as section 7054, provides 
in pertinent part: ―Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any 
recognized employee organization or its officers, agents, and representatives from 
soliciting or receiving political funds or contributions from employee members to 
promote the support or defeat of any ballot measure on school district property or 
community college district property during nonworking time.‖  How that statute‘s 
authorization of union campaigning with its members on school property for or 
against ballot propositions is to be read in conjunction with section 7054 is a 
question we need not and do not address. 
5  
Of course, union literature on whatever topic remains subject to reasonable 
regulation pursuant to Government Code section 3543.1, subdivision (b), 
including regulations reasonably limiting the quantity of material that can be 
placed in mailboxes. 
 
16 
B. The Constitutional Question 
The constitutional issue, as framed by SLTA in its petition for review, is as 
follows: ―Does the guarantee of liberty of speech in Article I, section 2 of the 
California Constitution assure that an employee organization may distribute its 
messages to its members concerning electoral politics by school mailboxes free 
from school district censorship?‖  Another way of phrasing the above question is 
this: Does the District‘s regulation prohibiting employee organizations from 
placing candidate endorsement literature in school mailboxes violate the 
California Constitution? 
The above question indicates that SLTA is not relying on the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and implies that SLTA‘s claim 
would fail under First Amendment doctrine as articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court.  That implication indeed appears to be correct.  Below we will 
first discuss how this case would be analyzed under federal First Amendment 
jurisprudence, and then address SLTA‘s arguments that we should adopt a 
different and more favorable analysis under California‘s liberty of speech clause.  
Because the Court of Appeal set forth the proper First Amendment analysis, based 
on public forum doctrine, we incorporate their discussion below.   
1. Analysis Under the First Amendment6 
 
As the scope of permissible regulations of speech varies depending on the 
nature of the forum, it is essential to determine which forum applies to this case.  
As [[we have]] noted, ―For purposes of [a] forum analysis the high court has 
                                              
6  
Except for the final paragraph, the following section of this opinion (Part 
II.B.1.) is quoted from the Court of Appeal opinion, with double brackets 
indicating our additions.  (See Arriaga v. County of Alameda (1995) 9 Cal.4th 
1055, 1059.) 
 
17 
divided all public property into three categories.  The first is the traditional public 
forum—i.e., a place that by long tradition has been used by the public at large for 
the free exchange of ideas.‖  (Clark v. Burleigh (1992) 4 Cal.4th 474, 482.)  Public 
streets and parks are prototypical public forums.  (Id. at p. 482.) 
 
Regulations restricting speech in public forums must satisfy exacting tests 
in order to pass constitutional muster: ―In these quintessential public forums, the 
government may not prohibit all communicative activity.  For the State to enforce 
a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.  
[Citation.]  The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner 
of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication.‖  (Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn. [(1983)] 460 
U.S. 37, 45.) 
 
―The second category of public property is the designated public forum, 
whether of a limited or unlimited character — property that the [[S]]tate has 
opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public.‖7  (International Soc. 
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (1992) 505 U.S. 672, 678.)  ―The 
Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally 
open to the public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place.  
[Citations.]  Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open 
character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as 
apply in a traditional public forum.  Reasonable time, place, and manner 
                                              
7  
[[This court has]] observed, ―there are few examples of designated public 
forums in Supreme Court jurisprudence because the court has rarely . . . placed 
any property in this category.‖  (Clark v. Burleigh, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 483.) 
 
18 
regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly 
drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.‖  (Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Assn., supra, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, fn. omitted.)  Thus, regulations of 
expression in the context of a designated public forum must satisfy the same 
standards as those that apply in the context of a public forum. 
 
― ‗Finally, there is all remaining public property [citation], a category 
usually referred to as the ‗nonpublic forum.‘  ‗Limitations on expressive activity 
conducted on this last category of property must survive only a much more limited 
review.  The challenged regulation need only be reasonable, as long as the 
regulation is not an effort to suppress the speaker‘s activity due to disagreement 
with the speaker‘s view.‘  [Citation.]‖  (Clark v. Burleigh, supra, 4 Cal.4th 474, 
483, fn. omitted.) 
 
As the United States Supreme Court has explained: ―Public property which 
is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication is governed by 
different standards.  We have recognized that the ‗First Amendment does not 
guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the 
government.‘  [Citation.]  In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the 
State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or 
otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to 
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker‘s view.  
[Citation.]  As we have stated on several occasions, ‗ ― ‗[t]he State, no less than a 
private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for 
the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.‘ ‖ ‘  [Citations.]‖  (Perry Ed. Assn. v. 
Perry Local Educators’ Assn., supra, 460 U.S. 37, 46.) 
 
19 
 
[[We have]] observed: ―To apply the public forum doctrine a court 
proceeds in a series of steps.  In step one the court defines the ‗forum‘ by deciding 
whether the forum is the entire property to which access is sought or only a 
portion of that property.  In step two the court decides whether the forum thus 
defined is a traditional ‗public forum,‘ a ‗designated public forum,‘ or a 
‗nonpublic forum.‘  If it is either of the first two kinds of forums, in step three the 
court decides whether the challenged law restricts the content of speech in that 
forum or only its time, place, or manner.  And in step four the court tests the 
challenged law by the standard that governs both the class of forum it has selected 
in step two and, if relevant, the type of speech restriction it has identified in step 
three.‖  (Clark v. Burleigh, supra, 4 Cal.4th 474, 484.)  
 
Proceeding with step one, both sides agree that the forum is the internal 
school district mailboxes.  As to step two, both sides agree that this forum is not a 
―traditional‖ public forum.  They disagree, however, as to whether the forum is a 
―designated/limited public forum‖ or a ―nonpublic forum.‖  Relying on Perry, 
[[the District]] argue[[s]] that the mailboxes are a nonpublic forum.  
 
The issue in Perry was whether it was constitutional for the school district 
to limit access to the school mailboxes to the union that represented district 
employees, thus denying access to a rival union that had previously been allowed 
to use the mailboxes.  (Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., supra, 
460 U.S. 37, 39.)  As the court stated: ―The primary question presented is whether 
the First Amendment, applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, is violated when a union that has been elected by public school 
teachers as their exclusive bargaining representative is granted access to certain 
means of communication, while such access is denied to a rival union.‖  (Perry, 
supra, at p. 44.)  The high court disagreed with the rival union‘s position that ―the 
 
20 
school mail facilities have become a ‗limited public forum‘ from which it may not 
be excluded because of the periodic use of the system by private non-school-
connected groups, and [the union‘s] own unrestricted access to the system prior to 
[the rival union‘s] certification as exclusive representative.‖  (Id. at p. 47.)  The 
court concluded that teacher mailboxes in a school district‘s interschool mail 
system were not a public forum, and that the district could therefore validly 
prevent unions other than the teachers‘ exclusive bargaining representative from 
using the system.  (Id. at p. 46.) 
 
In the present case, the trial court found that the District‘s mailboxes are a 
forum ―that has been opened to SLTA by statute, by the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement,[8] and by the conduct of the District.  Thus as to this 
designated group, any restrictions by the District are subject to strict scrutiny.‖  
The trial court found that Perry did not apply, observing that the court in Perry 
itself had noted that ―The very concept of the labor-management relationship 
requires that the representative union be free to express its independent view on 
matters within the scope of its representational duties.‖  (Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry 
Local Educators’ Assn., supra, 460 U.S. 37, 51, fn. 10.)  The court thus limited 
Perry to its holding that the school district was justified in excluding the rival 
union from using the mailboxes while allowing the representative union such 
access. 
 
We first observe that ― ‗[t]he government does not create a public forum by 
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a 
                                              
8  
The collective bargaining agreement provides, in part: ―The Association 
shall have the right to post notices of Association business.  The Association may 
use teacher mailboxes and communications for lawful communications to 
teachers.  Such postings or items for school mailboxes must contain the date of 
posting or distribution and the identification of the Association.‖  
 
21 
nontraditional forum for public discourse.‘  [Citation.]‖  (Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier [[(1988)]] 484 U.S. 260, 267.)  In the present case, we do not 
believe that the Legislature or the District has created a designated public forum in 
the District‘s mailboxes.  This is not a case where ―by policy or by practice‖ the 
District has ―opened its mail system for indiscriminate use by the general public,‖ 
in which case one could ―justifiably argue a public forum has been created.‖  
(Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., supra, 460 U.S. 37, 47.)  It is 
undisputed that the District only grants selective access to the mailboxes to outside 
interests.  Moreover, the access granted by statute to SLTA is indistinguishable 
from the access accorded to the prevailing union in Perry. 
 
[[SLTA]] reiterates the trial court‘s rationale that Perry involved the issue 
of access to the forum based on speaker identity, rather than the content of the 
speaker‘s message.  However, the court in Perry specifically stated that ―Implicit 
in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access on 
the basis of subject matter and speaker identity.‖  (Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Assn., supra, 460 U.S. 37, 49, italics added.)  [[This court]] relied, in 
part, on Perry in holding that it was constitutional for the Legislature to limit the 
statements of candidates for office that are placed in voter pamphlets to a brief 
factual statement of the candidate‘s own background and qualifications.  (Clark v. 
Burleigh, supra, 4 Cal.4th 474, 494–495.)  Thus, we read Perry to apply to 
restrictions based on content as well as speaker identity.  
[[Thus, under established First Amendment public forum doctrine, school 
mailboxes would be considered nonpublic forums.  Although Government Code 
section 3543.1, subdivision (b) permits limited access by a recognized employee 
organization, as noted ― ‘[t]he government does not create a public forum by 
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a 
 
22 
nontraditional forum for public discourse.‘  [Citation.]‖  (Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier, supra, 484 U.S. at p. 267.)  Here, Government Code section 
3543.1 was not designed to open up school mailboxes to the general public and 
create a public forum, but to allow access by a single group with which the 
school‘s employees were affiliated.  Therefore, the mailboxes are nonpublic 
forums and school districts would be able to impose viewpoint-neutral subject 
matter regulations on the content of what is placed in those mailboxes.  (Clark v. 
Burleigh, supra, 4 Cal.4th 474, 483.)  The prohibition of candidate endorsement 
literature is such a viewpoint-neutral regulation.]] 
2. Analysis Under the State Constitution 
 
The thrust of SLTA‘s position is that under the liberty of speech clause of 
the California Constitution (art. I, § 2, subd. (a)), a different analysis more 
protective of employee organizations‘ right of free expression is required — as 
explained below, either a balancing test or a ―basic incompatibility‖ test.  SLTA‘s 
starting point is the distinctive language of our constitutional provision: ―Every 
person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, 
being responsible for the abuse of this right.  A law may not restrain or abridge 
liberty of speech or press.‖  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (a).)  It is often stated 
that the California liberty of speech clause is broader and more protective than the 
free speech clause of the First Amendment.  (See, e.g., Los Angeles Alliance for 
Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 366-367, and cases cited 
therein.)  The liberty of speech clause has been interpreted more broadly than the 
First Amendment in several areas, including recognizing privately owned 
shopping centers as public forums subject to free speech protections (Fashion 
Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 862-
 
23 
863) and according greater protection to certain types of commercial speech 
(Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Kawamura (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1, 16). 
SLTA first argues that California courts have not employed a public forum 
test when it comes to determining the free speech rights of teachers in the school 
setting, but instead have used a balancing test, citing L.A. Teachers Union  v. L.A. 
City Board of Ed. (1969) 71 Cal.2d 551 (L.A. Teachers Union) and CTA v. San 
Diego Unif. School Dist. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1383 (CTA).  In L.A. Teachers 
Union, the union contested the school district policy that prohibited off-duty 
teachers from circulating in the faculty lunchroom and lounge a petition for the 
improvement of education.  The court, in explaining the proper test under the First 
Amendment, stated: ―we must strike ‗a balance between the interests of the 
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the 
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.‘ ‖  (L.A. Teachers Union, supra, 71 
Cal.2d at p. 558.)  The court, in upholding the teachers‘ right to petition, 
concluded that the teachers‘ interest in political expression was paramount, while 
the district had failed to demonstrate that its concerns with substantial disruption 
of school operations were well founded.  (Id. at pp. 559-563.) 
In CTA, the question was whether teachers could wear buttons in school 
opposing a statewide school voucher initiative.  Employing the balancing test used 
in L.A. Teachers Union, the court concluded that the District‘s strong interest in 
regulating classroom activity justified prohibiting teachers from wearing the 
buttons in the classroom, but that the balance tipped in favor of free expression in 
noninstructional settings.  (CTA, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1388-1392.) 
 
24 
The District argues that we have never recognized and should not recognize 
a balancing test under the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution 
that departs from public forum analysis under the First Amendment.  It points out 
that L.A. Teachers Union predates development of the public forum doctrine.  
Although SLTA cites In re Hoffman (1967) 67 Cal.2d 845 in arguing that this 
court had already adopted something like a public forum analysis by the time L.A. 
Teachers Union had been decided, it appears correct that not until Perry in 1983 
did the United States Supreme Court articulate its three-tiered public forum 
doctrine.  (See Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum 
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication (1984) 70 Va. 
L.Rev. 1219, 1220-1221 (Farber & Nowak).)  Moreover, L.A. Teachers Union 
cannot plausibly be read to signify that this Court considered and rejected public 
forum doctrine in analyzing employee speech in schools under the California 
Constitution — indeed the case was decided under the First Amendment.  (L.A. 
Teachers Union, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 566.) 
In any event, the present case is also distinguishable from L.A. Teachers 
Union.  In the latter case, there was no question that the faculty lounge and 
lunchroom were places in which unrestricted conversations between teachers took 
place, and we found no plausible reason to prevent the circulation of a petition in 
that context.  (L.A. Teachers Union, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 560-563.)  We rejected 
the notion that the government had an interest in preventing controversy, or that its 
interest in preventing disruption of off-duty faculty engaged in work-related 
preparation justified a broad prohibition on circulating petitions.  (Id. at pp. 561-
562.)  In the present case, the school mailboxes are dedicated to school business 
and, by statute, to union communications with employees, but are not places 
where open exchanges of ideas occur.  The District has a legitimate interest in 
 
25 
restricting mailbox communications so as not to permit such mailboxes to become 
venues for the one-sided endorsement of political candidates by those with special 
access. 
SLTA and amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union also advocate an 
alternative type of public forum analysis principally based on U.C. Nuclear 
Weapons Labs Conversion Project v. Lawrence  Livermore Laboratory (1984) 154 
Cal.App.3d 1157 (U.C. Weapons Labs).  In that case, a group protesting nuclear 
weapons research at the University of California‘s Lawrence Livermore 
Laboratory (Livermore Laboratory) sought a preliminary injunction to compel 
access to the laboratory‘s visitor centers, for purposes of distributing and 
displaying its literature to the public and to the auditorium for purposes of 
showing a slideshow or film.  The court departed somewhat from the United States 
Supreme Court‘s rendering of the public forum doctrine, and instead articulated a 
more protective version based on the liberty of speech clause of the California 
Constitution.  (Id. at p. 1169.)  The court rejected an all-or-nothing approach to the 
issue of whether government property is a public forum, viewing the public forum 
question as ―a continuum, with public streets and parks at one end and government 
institutions like hospitals and prisons at the other.‖  (Id. at p. 1164.) 
Instead, adopting the analysis formulated by then Court of Appeal Justice 
Grodin in Prisoners Union v. Department of Corrections (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 
930, 935, the court reasoned that the question was not whether the government 
property in question could be considered a public forum, but rather whether there 
was a ―basic incompatibility‖ between the proposed communicative activity and 
the intended use of the government property.  (U.C. Weapons Labs, supra, 154 
Cal.App.3d at p. 1164; see Prisoners Union v. Department of Corrections, supra, 
135 Cal.App.3d at p. 935.)  The court decided there was no basic incompatibility 
 
26 
between the visitors center‘s functioning as a venue for disseminating information 
to the public, and the display and distribution of literature protesting Livermore 
Laboratory‘s nuclear weapons research.  (U.C. Weapons Labs, at pp. 1168-1169.)  
On the other hand, the court denied that portion of the preliminary injunction that 
sought access to Livermore Laboratory‘s auditorium, which was used primarily 
for technical group meetings and could not be classified even as a ―semi-public 
forum.‖  (Id. at p. 1170.) 
SLTA, joined by its amici curiae, argues that under the basic 
incompatibility test, its position should prevail.  They further point to a number of 
academic articles critical of the United States Supreme Court‘s public forum 
doctrine as lacking intellectual coherence and being insufficiently protective of 
free speech.  (See Farber & Nowak, supra, 70 Va. L.Rev. at p. 1219; Massey, 
Public Fora, Neutral Governments, and the Prism of Property (1999) 50 Hastings 
L.J. 309.)  On the other hand, as the Court of Appeal pointed out below, this basic 
incompatibility test has not been found in California appellate cases since U.C. 
Weapons Labs.  The court also pointed out that the concept of ―basic 
incompatibility‖ is used in First Amendment analysis after it has been decided that 
the government property in question is a public forum, to determine whether a 
given regulation constitutes a reasonable time, place or manner restriction.  (See 
Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 104, 116.) 
In any event, U.C. Weapons Labs is distinguishable from the present case.  
In the former case, the primary purpose of the visitors center was the 
dissemination of information about the laboratory and its work.  (U.C. Weapons 
Labs, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d at p. 1168.)  The court determined that the 
government had no legitimate interest in monopolizing the dissemination of 
information about the laboratory on that site.  (Id. at pp. 1168-1169.)  In the 
 
27 
present case, the District is not attempting to monopolize speech regarding 
political endorsements in mailboxes, but rather has determined, pursuant to 
statutory directive, to disallow use of mailboxes for one-sided political 
endorsements.  As discussed in the previous section of this opinion, this 
prohibition on the use of government resources for political campaigning is a 
means of promoting an important government interest, i.e., maintaining the 
integrity of the electoral process by neutralizing any advantage that those with 
special access to government resources might possess.  (See Stanson, supra, 17 
Cal.3d at pp. 217-218; Vargas v. City of Salinas, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 23-24.) 
Again, we emphasize the narrow reach of our holding.  Political speech is 
― ‗at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.‘ ‖  (Morse v. 
Frederick (2007) __ U.S. __ [127 S.Ct. 2618, 2626].)  Neither the First 
Amendment nor the free speech clause of the California Constitution, nor, as 
discussed, California statutory law, countenances undue restriction on the political 
speech of teachers or their unions.  But we hold the District may constitutionally 
determine pursuant to section 7054 that internal school mailboxes should be kept 
free of literature containing endorsements of political candidates. 
 
28 
III. 
DISPOSITION 
The SLTA sought a writ of mandate to compel the District to reverse its 
policy against candidate endorsement literature in school mailboxes.  Because we 
determine the District‘s policy is lawful, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal reversing the trial court‘s granting of SLTA‘s writ petition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion San Leandro Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of San Leandro Unified School Dist. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 154 Cal.App.4th 866 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S156961 
Date Filed: June 18, 2009 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Winifred Smith 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Littler Mendelson, Garry G. Mathiason, Kimberly L. Owens and Olga Savage for Defendants and 
Appellants. 
 
James S. Burling and Harold E. Johnson for Pacific Legal Foundation and National Tax Limitation 
Committee as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, Bruce A. Barsook, David A. Urban and Didier Y. Reiss for California School 
Boards Association, Association of California School Administrators and School Employers Association of 
California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Ruiz & Sperow, Celia M. Ruiz and David E. Lyon for Association of California School Administrators as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
California Teachers Association, Priscilla S. Winslow, Joseph R. Colton, Beverly Tucker, Ballinger G. 
Kemp and Ramon E. Romero for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
Michael R. Clancy and Christina C. Bleuler for California School Employees Association as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
Rothner, Segall & Greenstone, Glenn Rothner, Lisa C. Demidovich and Jonathan Cohen for American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees and Service Employees International Union Local 
99 as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 2 – S156961 – counsel continued 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Julia Harumi Mass, Alan L. Schlosser; David Blair-Loy; and Peter Elisasberg for American Civil Liberties 
Union of Northern California, American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties and 
American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and 
Respondents. 
 
The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, Robert M. O‘Neil and J. Joshua 
Wheeler as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
Law Offices of Robert J. Bezemek, Robert J. Bezemek, Patricia Lim and David Conway for The California 
Federation of Teachers, The Faculty Association of the California Community Colleges and The California 
Community College Independents Organization as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Garry G., Mathiason 
Littler Mendelson 
650 California Street, 20th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94108-2693 
(415) 433-1940 
 
Priscilla S. Winslow 
California Teachers Association 
1705 Murchison Drive 
Burlingame, CA  94010 
(650) 552-5425