Case Title: Matter of Adoption of GSD

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-85-3

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Adoption of GSD1986 WY 83716 P.2d 984Case Number: C-85-3Decided: 04/01/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
In 
the Matter of the ADOPTION OF: GSD, a Minor Child.

 
 
In 
the Matter of the TERMINATION OF the RIGHTS OF: JWR.

 
 
JWR, 
Appellant (Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
RG, 
Appellee (Petitioner)

 
 
Vincent 
A. Ross of Ross & Ross, Cheyenne, for Appellant.

 
 
Bert 
T. Ahlstrom, Jr. and Kay Snider Coffman, Cheyenne, for Appellee; argument by Mr. 
Ahlstrom.  

 
 
Before 
Thomas, C.J., and Brown, Cardine, Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ.  

 
 
Cardine, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal by a 
child's natural father from a district court's decree of adoption in favor of 
the child's stepfather. The decree terminated the natural father's parental 
rights. We affirm.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶2.]     On August 19, 1981, TG 
gave birth to a baby boy, GSD. Appellant was the child's natural father who, 
until two months prior to the child's birth, lived with TG out of wedlock. TG 
and appellant never married and never resumed their 
cohabitation.

 
 

[¶3.]     Although appellant 
never wanted TG to have the baby and suggested an abortion three months into 
TG's pregnancy, he visited the hospital immediately after his son's birth. He 
brought some baby toys and clothes as a gift but never offered to pay the 
expenses of the difficult cesarean birth. He refused to acknowledge his 
parenthood by signing the birth certificate at the hospital and never tried to 
establish paternity through any other legal process.

 
 

[¶4.]     From August 1981 until 
February 1983 appellant visited his son and TG about once or twice a month for 
one or two hours at a time. TG was living at her parent's house during this 
period. Although appellant had a moderate income from a steady job, he provided 
no financial support for the child. TG testified at trial that appellant never 
offered any support, but he said that he made numerous offers which TG 
refused.

 
 

[¶5.]     In September of 1982, 
TG met RG; and, after a nine-month courtship, they were married. TG and her 
child moved into RG's home, and he supported them by working both a full-time 
and part-time job. Appellant's visits with the child ended in February of 1983 
when it became apparent that TG and RG would marry. TG testified that 
appellant's visits stopped because he did not want to see his son, but appellant 
said that she prevented his visits by refusing his phone calls. In any event, 
between February of 1983 and January of 1985, when the adoption hearing took 
place, appellant never visited his son.

 
 

[¶6.]     RG filed a petition for 
adoption and termination of parental rights on October 24, 1984, a little over a 
year after he married TG and began supporting her and the child. Appellant filed 
an answer contesting the petition, and RG moved to strike that answer on grounds 
that appellant lacked standing because he had never legally established his 
paternity. The district court denied the motion and the case was 
tried.

 
 

[¶7.]     RG explained at trial 
that he wanted to adopt GSD because he had "been pretty much the father of the 
child since [he had] known [TG]," and because he loved the child very deeply. TG 
and her mother testified in favor of the adoption, while appellant, several of 
his friends, and family members testified on his behalf.

 
 

[¶8.]     In a carefully drafted 
letter opinion, the district court held that appellant had standing to object to 
the child's adoption but, on the merits, the court held that RG's petition for 
adoption should be granted and appellant's parental rights terminated. The court 
based its holding on § 1-22-108(c), W.S. 1977, which 
states:

 

"If 
the putative father files and serves his objections to the petition to adopt as 
provided in subsection (b) of this section, and appears at the hearing to 
acknowledge his paternity of the child, the court shall hear the evidence in 
support of the petition to adopt and in support of the objection to the petition 
and shall then determine whether:

 
 
"(i) 
The putative father's claim to paternity of the child is 
established;

"(ii) 
The putative father having knowledge of the birth or pending birth of the child 
has evidenced an interest in and responsibility for the child within thirty (30) 
days after receiving notice of the pending birth or birth of the 
child;

"(iii) 
The putative father's objections to the petition to adopt are valid; 
and

"(iv) 
The best interests and welfare of the child will be served by granting the 
putative father's claim to paternity or by allowing the petition to 
adopt."

 
 

[¶9.]     Specifically, the court 
found that appellant's paternity was established for the purposes of subsection 
(i) that he had evidence an interest in and a responsibility for the child 
within 30 days of his birth as required by subsection (ii). But the court also 
found that appellant "deliberately and willfully abandoned [GSD] by his actions 
and [had] taken no substantial action for a period in excess of twenty months * 
* * * to be a parent to the child in question." Additionally, "no evidence was 
produced by [appellant] that the quality of the relationship between [RG] and 
the minor child was anything but satisfactory." Therefore, according to the 
court, appellant did not demonstrate a valid objection to the adoption as 
demanded by subsection (iii). Finally, the court held that the best interests of 
the child would be served by permitting the adoption by RG who had already 
assumed the role of father. Because there were no valid objections to the 
adoption and because the adoption was in the best interests of the child, the 
court granted the petition and terminated any surviving parental rights held by 
appellant.

 
 
APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF

 
 

[¶10.]  Rule 5.05, W.R.A.P., states in pertinent 
part:

 

"Except 
by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 printed pages 
by letter press or 70 pages by other process of duplicating or copying, 
exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations, and 
any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, 
etc."

 

Appellant's 
brief is 77 pages long, seven pages over the limit. Pages 19 through 57 consist 
solely of quotations of the transcript rearranged to suit appellant. Many of the 
quotations simply repeat appellant's statement of facts which already contain 
record references.

 
 

[¶11.]  This court is perfectly capable of 
reading the original transcript, taking special note of the portions cited in 
the briefs. And, even discounting the 38 pages of repetitious facts, it is hard 
to see why it took appellant 39 additional pages to present his arguments. The 
issues were simple enough to allow RG to make his point in 16 pages. These 
documents are called briefs for a reason.

 
 

[¶12.]  We will not overlook appellant's 
violation of both Rule 5.05 and common sense. We have deliberately ignored pages 
71 through 77 of appellant's brief which deal with the abandonment issue and the 
best interests of the child. This sanction is specifically mentioned in Rule 
1.02, W.R.A. P., which states in part:

 

"The 
failure to comply with any other of these rules or any order of court does not 
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the 
reviewing court deems appropriate, including but not limited to * * * * refusal 
to consider the offending party's contentions * * * *."

 

THE 
PROPER ISSUE

 
 

[¶13.]  Appellant has misunderstood the basis of 
the district court's decision. Of the six issues he identifies for our review, 
five involve the willful abandonment of the child. Apparently he believes that 
the district court relied upon § 1-22-110, W.S.1977, which states in 
part:

 

"In 
addition to the exceptions contained in W.S. 1-22-108, 
the adoption of a child may be ordered without the written consent of the 
parents or putative father * * * * if the court finds that the nonconsenting 
parent or putative father has:

* 
* * *

"(iii) 
Willfully abandoned or deserted the child." (Emphasis 
added.)

 

But 
the district court never relied upon § 1-22-110 in its letter opinion or order. 
The court only discussed appellant's willful abandonment because it tended to 
show that his objections to the adoption were not valid. The validity of 
appellant's objections was, in turn, only one factor in the court's analysis 
under § 1-22-108(c), W.S.1977.

 
 

[¶14.]  The district court properly treated § 
1-22-108(c), W.S.1977, as a complete and independent adoption statute. Three 
facets of the statutory scheme show that the legislature intended the statute to 
apply in some contested adoptions, regardless of whether § 1-22-110, W.S.1977, 
might also apply. First, § 1-22-110, W.S.1977, treats § 1-22-108 as an 
independent basis for an adoption. Section 1-22-110 begins with the following 
proviso:

 

"In 
addition to the exceptions contained in W.S. 1-22-108, W.S.1977, 
the adoption of a child may be ordered without the written consent of the 
parents or putative father if * * * *." (Emphasis added.)

 

Second, 
§ 1-22-108 contains substantive law which provides an alternative procedure for 
contested adoptions. At the hearing, the district court is to take evidence on 
each of the four factors identified in subsections (i) through (iv) of § 
1-22-108(c), supra. Once the district court has heard the evidence, subsection 
(e) of § 1-22-108 permits it to base its discretion on the manner in which the 
factors balance. Subsection (e) states:

 
 
"Based 
upon its determination and findings after a hearing, the court may enter its 
order or decree in accordance with W.S. 1-22-111."1 

 
 

 [¶15.] Finally, an important distinction between these 
two statutes is that § 1-22-110 provides grounds for an adoption when either 
the child's parents or his putative father fails to consent but § 1-22-108 
applied only when the nonconsenting party is a putative father. The 
scheme makes perfect sense. Section 1-22-110 provides a set of circumstances, 
such as the nonconsenting party's abuse, abandonment or failure to support the 
child, under which an adoption is justified no matter who the nonconsenting 
party is. But the more liberal adoption test of § 1-22-108 applies to only those 
adoptions contested by putative fathers who have already shown their lack of 
concern for the children by failing to establish legal paternity. This scheme 
functions as the legislature intended when we recognize § 1-22-108 as a ground 
for adoption fully independent of § 1-22-110.

 
 

[¶16.]  In summary, the district court applied § 
1-22-108 as the legislature intended-without regard to the requirements of § 
1-22-110. Appellant's willful abandonment was just one factor the court 
considered when trying to decide whether appellant's objections were valid. We 
will review the willful abandonment finding, as well as the court's other 
findings, as part of the four-part test of § 1-22-108(c).

 
 
SECTION 
1-22-108, W.S.1977

 
 

[¶17.]  Although § 1-22-108, W.S.1977, was first 
enacted in 1977, this is the first case in which we must review its application 
by a district court. See, 1977 Wyoming Session Laws, ch. 187, § 1 (first 
codified as § 1-726.8, W.S.1957). In most contested adoptions, the adopting 
parties rely on § 1-22-110. See, e.g., Matter of Adoption of CCT, Wyo., 
640 P.2d 73 (1982).

 
 

[¶18.]  Several principles which we have applied 
to contested adoptions under § 1-22-110 should apply equally under § 1-22-108. 
First,

 

"'Adoption 
statutes are strictly construed when the proceeding is against a nonconsenting 
parent and every reasonable intendment is made in favor of that parent's 
claims.'

 

"Such 
strict construction is mandated by the fact that parental rights are fundamental 
rights." (Citations omitted.) Matter of Adoption of CCT, supra, at 74-75, 
quoting Matter of Adoption of Voss, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481, 485 
(1976).

 

[¶19.]  Second, a district court's factual 
determinations in a contested adoption can be reversed only if the court has 
abused its discretion.

 

"'A 
court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been 
an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an 
error of law committed by the court under the circumstances.'" Matter of 
Adoption of CCT, supra, at 76, quoting Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980).

 

[¶20.]  Our review of both the record and the 
district court's letter opinion reveals that the court strictly construed § 
1-22-108 in favor of appellant, the natural father. It is also clear that the 
district court wisely exercised its discretion under the four-part 
test.

 
 
SUBSECTION 
(i)--STANDING

 
 

[¶21.]  The first part of the four-past test, 
subsection (i) of § 1-22-108(c), is really a standing requirement. It compels 
the district court to determine whether "the putative father's claim to 
paternity of the child is established." A putative father is defined for 
purposes of an adoption proceeding as

 

"the 
alleged or reputed father of a child born out of wedlock, whether or not the 
paternity rights and obligations of the father have been judicially determined." 
Section 1-22-101(a) (iv), W.S.1977.

 

The 
district court correctly held that appellant was a putative father under this 
definition.

[¶22.]  Next, § 1-22-108(d) tells us when the 
putative father's claim to paternity is established for purposes of a contest. 
It states:

 

"The 
putative father has no right to assert paternity in adoption, dependency or 
terminations of parental rights proceedings unless he is known and identified by 
the mother or agency, or unless he has lived with or married the mother after 
the birth of the child and prior to the filing of the petition to adopt, and 
unless prior to the interlocutory hearing of the adoption proceedings, he has 
acknowledged the child as his own by affirmatively asserting paternity as 
provided in W.S. 1-22-108."

 

[¶23.]  Although TG never lived with appellant 
after the birth of her child, she identified him as the natural father at trial. 
In addition, appellant acknowledged the child as his own when he filed a timely 
answer in which he affirmatively asserted his paternity. The district court 
correctly held that appellant had a right to claim paternity under § 1-22-108(d) 
and that his claim to paternity was therefore established for purposes of § 
1-22-108(c)(i).

 
 

[¶24.]  RG argues that appellant had no standing 
to contest the adoption because he failed to establish his paternity within 
three years of GSD's birth as required by § 14-2-105, W.S.1977. We agree with 
the district court, however, that the explicit standing requirement of § 
1-22-108 must control in the adoption context. "General legislation must yield 
to special legislation on the same subject whether provisions are found in the 
same statute or in different statutes." Department of Revenue and Taxation v. 
Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295, 1299 (1979). Moreover, when the legislature 
defined putative father to include alleged father "whether or not the paternity 
rights and obligations of the father "whether or not the paternity rights and 
obligations of the father have been judicially determined," § 1-22-101(a)(iv), 
W.S.1977, supra, it clearly indicated that an official declaration of paternity 
was not relevant to contested adoption cases. Finally, the rule of strict 
construction in favor of the contesting parent supports our reliance on the 
liberal standing provision of § 1-22-108(d). In summary, we hold that the 
district court correctly found that appellant had standing to contest the 
adoption and had established a claim to paternity as required by § 
1-22-108(c)(i).

 
 
SUBSECTION 
(ii)--PUTATIVE FATHER'S INTEREST AND RESPONSIBILITY

 
 

[¶25.]  The second factor the district court must 
consider is whether the putative father "has evidenced an interest in and 
responsibility for the child within thirty (30) days after receiving notice of 
the pending birth." Section 1-22-108(c)(ii), W.S.1977. There is no dispute that 
the district court correctly held that appellant expressed an interest in the 
child within the 30-day period. Appellant visited the child immediately after 
birth. RG claims, however, that appellant did not evidence responsibility 
because he never offered to pay the birth or to support the child. There was 
some evidence, however, that appellant offered his support immediately after the 
birth, and it is undisputed that he brought substantial gifts for the child, 
including clothing, at the initial visit. Appellant's failure to assert 
responsibility at a later date is not relevant to subsection (ii). That 
subsection only requires that he show some responsibility during the 30 days 
after birth. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion when it 
held that appellant asserted both interest and responsibility within 30 days 
after GSD's birth.

 
 
SUBSECTION 
(iii)--VALIDITY OF THE OBJECTIONS

 
 

[¶26.]  The next factor which the district court 
must consider under § 1-22-108(c) is the validity of the contesting father's 
objections. In this case, the district court found that appellant's objections 
were invalid, and we agree. First, the court pointed out that appellant's stance 
was essentially defensive because he was trying to prevent the adoption. Yet, 
appellant produced no evidence "that the quality of the relationship between 
[RG] and the minor child was anything but satisfactory."

 
 

[¶27.]  Second, the district court found that 
appellant had willfully abandoned the child by failing to visit him for 20 
months prior to the trial. The finding of abandonment was an important factor in 
determining the validity of appellant's objections and would have independently 
supported the court's decree if the court had chosen to apply § 
1-22-110(a)(iii), W.S.1977.

 
 

[¶28.]  Appellant argues that the court was 
required to find that the abandonment was willful by clear and convincing 
evidence before it could grant the adoption. This argument misses the mark, 
primarily because willful abandonment was just a factor in the court's analysis 
under § 1-22-108(c)(iii). The abandonment finding did not make or break RG's 
case for the adoption. Also, appellant has cited no applicable authority 
requiring the clear-and-convincing-cited no applicable authority requiring the 
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. He refers us to DS v. Department of 
Public Assistance and Social Services, Wyo., 607 P.2d 911 (1980), a case in 
which the State sought to break up a natural family under the termination of 
parental rights statutes, §§ 14-2-308 through 14-2-319, W.S.1977 
(Cum.Supp.1985). That case does not apply here where the putative father has 
never been in the same household with the child; where the termination will 
cement an ongoing family relationship between the child and its natural mother; 
and where the termination occurs through the adoption statutes rather than the 
termination of parental rights statutes.

 
 

[¶29.]  Finally, the 
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard would not have affected the result in 
this case even if it applied. The evidence was overwhelming that appellant 
willfully abandoned the child. In abandonment cases

 

"willfully 
means intentionally, knowingly, purposely, voluntarily, consciously, 
deliberately, and without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from carelessly, 
inadvertently, accidentally, negligently, heedlessly or thoughtlessly." 
Matter of Adoption of CCT, supra, 640 P.2d  at 76.

 

Appellant 
did not visit his child for 20 months prior to the trial although he knew the 
location of the child at all times. He never tried to establish his paternity 
through legal process and never attempted to be a father to the child in any 
substantial way.

 
 

[¶30.]  In summary, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it found a good relationship between the child and the 
adopting stepfather and when it found that appellant had willfully abandoned the 
child and was, therefore, in a poor position to object to the adoption. The 
court correctly held that appellant had no valid objections to the 
objection.

 
 
SUBSECTION 
(iv)--BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

 
 

[¶31.]  We will not fully address appellant's 
argument that the adoption was against the best interests of the child because 
that argument begins on page 73 of his brief. The district court carefully 
analyzed the child's best interests in its letter opinion; and, having reviewed 
the record, we agree completely with the court's conclusions. The adoption was 
in the best interests of the child.

 
 

[¶32.]  Although appellant established his 
paternity for purposes of subsection (i) of § 1-22-108(c), and demonstrated his 
initial interest and responsibility for the child under subsection (ii), he 
failed to present valid objections as required by subsection (iii), he failed to 
rebut RG's strong evidence that the adoption was in the best interests of the 
child under subsection (iv). The district court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting this adoption.

 
 
COSTS

 
 

[¶33.]  Appellee RG argues in his brief that the 
appeal was so frivolous that he is entitled to costs and damages. He cites Rule 
10.05, W.R.A.P., which states in pertinent part:

 

"When, 
in a civil case, the judgment or final order is affirmed, appellee shall recover 
the cost for typewriting and reproducing his brief, such cost to be computed at 
the rate allowed by law for making the transcript of the evidence. Unless the 
court certifies that there was reasonable cause for the appeal, there shall also 
be taxed as part of the costs in the case, a reasonable fee, to be fixed by the 
court, not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than five hundred 
dollars ($500.00), to the counsel of the appellee, and to the appellee damages 
in such sum as may be reasonable, not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) 
* * * *."

 

[¶34.]  An award of damages and costs under this 
rule is inappropriate

 

"where 
a discretionary ruling of the trial court is the subject of the appeal, because 
'the standards for review of discretionary exercise cannot readily be reduced to 
black-letter principles.'" James S. Jackson Company, Inc. v. Meyer, Wyo., 
677 P.2d 835, 838 (1984) quoting Bacon v. Carey Company, Wyo., 669 P.2d 533, 536 (1983).

 

The 
district court's decision in this case was reviewable under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard. We must certify that appellant had reasonable 
cause for this appeal and, therefore, deny appellee's request for damages and 
costs other than the cost of reproducing and typewriting his 
brief.

 
 

[¶35.]  Affirmed.

  

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 
1-22-111, W.S. 1977, sets forth the court's options ranging from a decree of 
adoption to complete denial of the petition.