Case Title: Haagensen v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.,

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-133

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Haagensen v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.,1997 WY 130949 P.2d 865Case Number: 96-133Decided: 12/04/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

In the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of 
HOWARD O. HAAGENSEN,  

Appellant (Petitioner/Claimant), 

 

v. 

 

STATE of Wyoming, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, 

Appellee (Respondent/Objector).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Crook County 

The 
Honorable Terrence L. O'Brien, Judge

 

 

Hanscum, D.J., filed dissenting opinion. 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

J. Stan 
Wolfe, Gillette.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. 
Hill, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. 
Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jennifer A. Evans, Assistant 
Attorney General, Cheyenne.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, and LEHMAN, JJ., and HANSCUM, D.J.(Ret.)

TAYLOR, Chief 
Justice. 

[¶1]      The sole issue 
presented is whether the finding of the hearing examiner that Howard O. 
Haagensen sustained injuries "arising out of and in the course of employment" as 
required by Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (Cum.Supp. 1995) is supported by 
substantial evidence. The finding is controverted since Mr. Haagensen fell in 
the parking lot of his employer, Nelson's Oil and Gas, two and one-half to three 
hours after ending his work shift. We agree with the district court's finding 
that Mr. Haagensen's injury did not occur in the course of his employment and, 
therefore, affirm the district court's order reversing and remanding the case to 
the Office of Administrative Hearings.

 

I. 
ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant, Howard 
O. Haagensen (Haagensen), states the issues as follows:

 

A. Was there substantial evidence to support the 
Hearing Examiner's Award of Benefits to the Employee/Claimant for Workers' 
Compensation Benefits?

 

B. Did the District Court err in reversing the 
Hearing Examiner's determination, finding the Appellant was not injured in the 
course of employment, thus denying benefits in this 
matter?

 

[¶3]      Appellee, State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division (Division), states the issue 
as:

 

A.        Whether the 
Office of Administrative Hearings Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law And Order 
awarding workers' compensation benefits for an injury which occurred two and 
one-half to three hours after the end of the injured employee's work shift is 
supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with 
law.

 

II. 
FACTS

 

[¶4]      Haagensen was an 
employee of Nelson's Oil and Gas, a Conoco gas station and convenience store in 
Sundance, Wyoming, where he performed duties as a clerk and cook. On June 29, 
1995, Haagensen's shift began at 2:00 p.m. and ended shortly after midnight when 
he clocked out. Haagensen usually remained on the premises of his employer after 
clocking out for a period of fifteen minutes to one hour to rest his legs, which 
often hurt following a shift, and to visit with a clerk on duty and a co-worker. 
On June 30, 1995, Haagensen remained on the premises for two and one-half to 
three hours, sitting in a booth, drinking coffee and visiting with another 
off-duty co-worker and the night clerk.

 

[¶5]      Between 2:30 a.m. 
and 3:00 a.m., Haagensen left the gas station through the rear door as he 
usually did. Approximately four feet from the back door, he tripped over a stack 
of wood left by construction workers hired by Nelson's Oil and Gas causing him 
to fall to the ground. As a result of the fall, Haagensen sustained a rotator 
cuff injury to his right shoulder for which he seeks worker's compensation 
benefits.

 

[¶6]      The Division 
denied benefits on the basis that Haagensen's injury did not occur in the scope 
of his employment as required by Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102(a)(xi). Following an 
evidentiary hearing on Haagensen's appeal, the hearing examiner found the injury 
"ar[ose] out of and in the course of his employment" and awarded benefits, 
stating:

 

35. Given that the employee here did nothing out of 
the ordinary while resting and visiting at the work place, the hazard did not 
change during his lengthy interlude before leaving, the visiting and drinking 
coffee was helpful to employee morale, the employer never objected to these late 
visits, and the employer had no rule or policy about leaving after shift 
changes, the mere extension of time from that held to be "a reasonable time" in 
other opinions is not enough to rebut the presumption that the employee was 
injured while leaving work on the employer's premises.

 

On the Division's appeal for 
judicial review, the district court found Haagensen was not in the course of his 
employment when the injury occurred and his claim was not compensable. Haagensen 
appeals from the Order Upon Petition for Judicial Review.

 

III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      This court's 
review of administrative action or inaction is confined to the record and is 
limited by W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) to those matters specified in Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-114(c) (1997), which provides the reviewing court 
shall:

 

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

 

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law;

* * * * * *

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 

[¶8]      We do not afford 
deference to the reviewing court's findings, but we do, 
however,

 

afford respect and deference to an administrative 
agency's findings of fact if they are 
supported by substantial evidence. Aanenson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. White, 837 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Wyo. 1992)). "Substantial 
evidence" is a term of art, best described as "relevant evidence that a 
reasonable mind can accept as adequate to support an agency's conclusion." Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 
224 (Wyo. 1995). Further, we consider only that evidence favoring the party 
prevailing below, leaving out of consideration conflicting evidence. Wyoming Steel and Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 
882 P.2d 873, 876 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting 
Matter of Injury to Carpenter, 736 P.2d 311, 312 (Wyo. 1987)). * * * Unlike 
its findings of fact, however, an administrative agency's conclusions of law are 
afforded no special deference, and will be affirmed only if truly in accord with 
the law. Matter of Cordova, 882 P.2d 880, 882 (Wyo. 1994). See also Wyo. 
Stat. § 16-3-114(c).

 

Coleman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div., 915 P.2d 595, 598 
(Wyo. 1996) (emphasis added).

 

IV. 
DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      The Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Act provides compensation for work-related injuries as 
defined in Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102(a)(xi):

 

"Injury" means any harmful change in the human 
organism other than normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any 
artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the course of 
employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred 
while at work in places where the employer's business requires an employee's 
presence and which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business. * * 
*

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶10]   The requirement that the injury 
"aris[e] out of and in the course of employment" is premised upon a 
determination whether the relationship between the injury and the employment is 
sufficient that the injury should be compensable. A causal connection exists 
between the employee's injury and the course of employment when "`there is a 
nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or 
requirement of the employment.'" Stuckey 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1098 
(Wyo. 1995) (quoting Bearden v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 868 P.2d 268, 270 (Wyo. 
1994)).

 

[¶11]   The general rule for an injury 
arising in the course of employment is set out in 1 Arthur Larson, Workers' 
Compensation Law § 14 (1997):

 

An injury is said to arise in the course of the 
employment when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place 
where the employee reasonably may be, and while the employee is fulfilling work 
duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto.

 

Normally, an injury 
sustained outside the hours of employment are not compensable, but Haagensen 
points to our seminal cases where we adopted the premises rule. Archuleta v. Carbon County School Dist. 
No. 1, 787 P.2d 91 (Wyo. 1990); State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Miller, 787 P.2d 89 (Wyo. 
1990). In Archuleta, we defined the 
premises rule and discussed its application to periods immediately before and 
after work:

 

"As to employees having fixed hours and place of 
work, injuries occurring on the premises while they are going to and from work 
before or after working hours or at lunchtime are compensable, * * *." 1 A. 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 15.00 at p. 4-3 (1989). * * 
*

* * * * * *

 

We noted in Corean [Matter of Injury to Corean, 723 P.2d 58 
(Wyo. 1986)] that on-premises accidents are, indeed, most often causally 
connected to employment, thereby suggesting that a presumption created by rule might have 
considerable validity, albeit not the conclusive validity argued for in 
Corean. A trend toward adoption of a 
premises rule, insofar as it creates a rebuttable presumption of causal 
connection, has been foreshadowed by a number of our prior decisions. * * * It 
is a logical progression now to extend that proposition to such necessary 
incidents of the employee's service as punching a time clock or entering and 
leaving the employer's premises during those periods immediately before and after work. Indeed, we have previously 
upheld a worker's compensation claim for an injury arising from a dangerous 
condition on the employer's premises even though the claimant, at the time of 
the injury, had completed his daily shift and had finished filling out his time 
card. Claim of Carey, 74 Wyo. 37, 283 P.2d 1005 (1955). * * *

 

* 
* * Accordingly, we hold that where the elements of the premises rule, as set 
forth above, have been established, a rebuttable presumption arises that the 
employee's injury is causally connected to his employment.

Archuleta, 787 P.2d  at 93-94 (emphasis 
added).

 

[¶12]   2 Arthur Larson, Workers' 
Compensation Law, supra, at § 21.60(a) discusses what constitutes a reasonable 
time interval before and after work and the preparatory and incidental acts that 
occur:

 

The course of employment, for employees having a 
fixed time and place of work, embraces a reasonable interval before and after official working hours while the 
employee is on the premises engaged in preparatory or incidental acts. 
The rule is not confined to activities that are necessary; it is sufficient if 
they can be said to be reasonably incidental to the work. What 
constitutes a reasonable interval depends not only on the length of time 
involved but also on the circumstances occasioning the interval and the nature 
of the employee's activity.

 

(Emphasis added and 
footnotes omitted.)

 

[¶13]   This court addressed the issue of 
reasonable time interval in a situation where the employee had quit his job and 
was returning home in Claims of 
Naylor, 723 P.2d 1237, 1241-42 (Wyo. 1986):

 

"The issue of reasonableness may also turn on the 
question of what the employee was doing during the 
interval before leaving the premises, and whether his activity bore any relation 
to his employment or was purely personal. * * *

 

* * * * * *

 

"On the other hand, it is quite possible for an 
employee, whose employment has ended, to remain at a place of employment such as 
a restaurant, taking on the status of customer or member of the public. * * * 
Moreover, when the employee for a substantial amount of time 
before leaving is engaged in an unmistakably personal pursuit, such as 
picking up pieces of coal for his own use, fooling with an unlicensed 
motorcycle, or playing cards and drinking, the 
interlude is not within the course of employment." 1A Larson, The Law of 
Workmen's Compensation, § 26.10, pp. 5-285 to 5-292 
(1985).

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶14]   Haagensen's injury occurred two and 
one-half to three hours after he had completed his work shift causing it to fall 
outside the realm of "immediately * * * after work" as discussed in Archuleta. The issue becomes whether 
Haagensen's injury occurred within a reasonable time interval after his work 
shift ended so as to qualify as a compensable injury. Our focus shifts to the 
circumstances occasioning this time interval and the activities of Haagensen 
during this interval.

 

[¶15]   Haagensen does not contend nor does 
the record show that his activities were due to the control of his employer, but 
he does assert that he was clearly within the ambit of his duties, that is, 
leaving the premises following the conclusion of his work. Haagensen testified 
that on June 30, 1995, he remained on his employer's premises for approximately 
two and one-half to three hours after clocking out from his work shift. He 
remained to rest his legs, to drink coffee and visit with both a co-worker who 
was also off-duty and the night clerk. He stated that he did not perform duties 
for his employer after clocking out.

 

[¶16]   In the instant case, we are 
satisfied that Haagensen failed to prove the elements of the premises rule and 
did not benefit from a rebuttable presumption that his injury was causally 
connected to his employment. Specifically, Haagensen failed to show he was in 
the course of his employment at the time he sustained the injury. We cannot say 
if the employer benefitted by allowing Haagensen to remain after work for such a 
long time and rest his legs or by improved morale of the employees as he 
contends, but at some point in time soon after he had clocked out, Haagensen's 
remaining on the employer's premises had no connection with his employment or 
the employer's business. His drinking coffee with and talking to another 
off-duty employee on the premises must be characterized as solely pursuing his 
own personal purposes. Any reasonable period involving preparation for leaving 
or any activity reasonably incidental to work had expired long before 
Haagensen's injury took place. No causal link exists between the occurrence of 
the injury and a risk connected with his employment. While Haagensen presents 
numerous cases where benefits were awarded and states these cases are 
controlling, they can be distinguished on their facts.

 

V. 
CONCLUSION

 

[¶17]   We hold that substantial evidence 
does not exist to support the finding of the hearing examiner that Haagensen's 
injury "ar[ose] out of and in the course of his employment," and therefore, its 
decision is not in accordance with the law. We find Haagensen did not suffer a 
compensable injury under the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act. We affirm the 
district court's Order Upon Petition for Judicial Review.

 

HANSCUM, District Judge (Retired), dissenting. 

[¶18]   I must respectfully dissent from 
the majority's reversal of the hearing examiner's award of worker's compensation 
benefits in this case. The hearing examiner's determination comports with the 
traditions and purposes underlying the State of Wyoming's system of "job 
insurance" as that system has evolved over the years while the majority decision 
in this case does not. The majority's current "refinding" of the facts in this 
case and its disinclination to accept the hearing examiner's correct application 
of the "on-premises" presumption disembody Wyoming's "on-the-job" insurance only 
somewhat less than Henry VIII's action against Anne Boleyn. Nary an 
"appellatectomy" of this worker's benefits is indicated much less the 
evisceration of a longstanding rule of worker's compensation law. 

 

[¶19]   I would affirm the hearing 
examiner's award because the facts merit the application of the legal 
presumption that the injury was work-related and thus compensable. Archuleta v. Carbon County School District 
No. 1, 787 P.2d 91 (Wyo. 1990). Alternatively, this Court should affirm the 
hearing examiner's decision by recognizing a derivative presumption whose 
simplicity and logic would compel affirmance of the hearing examiner's award in 
this case and would also be instrumental in the disposition of future like 
appeals.

 

[¶20]   At a fact-finding hearing held in 
Sundance, Howard O. Haagensen was referred to as "Swede." If it please, I shall 
do likewise. At the time of his injury, Swede was a man in his late fifties who 
worked as a clerk and cook at Nelson's Oil and Gas. He was given to stay over on 
the work premises for periods of time following the completion of his 
midnight-ending shift to rest his "weary legs," to share humor, and to generally 
provide camaraderie and support to the graveyard shifters. Whether "on clock" or 
not, Swede was the type of guy who gave old-fashioned, Wyoming-type support to 
his fellows at work. At the hearing, Laraya Royer, one of Swede's co-workers, 
warmly related to the fact finder: "I'm tired after we get off work so Swede 
stays with me and we have coffee and talk until I can get woken up enough to 
drive home." This is proof that it was a common practice for employees to linger 
after work in support of one another - certainly benefitting employment 
purposes.

 

[¶21]   Disaffirming the award, the 
majority opinion relies on isolated comments and vignettes in the testimony 
which emphasize the quantity of the stay - rather than 
also analyzing the character of it and its quality. The "reasonableness" of the 
stay is not merely a matter of marshalling ticks on a clock. We must delve 
deeper. Some of the evidence is subtle, but a careful analysis of the record 
reveals very substantial facts which, together with reasonable inferences, 
establish the existence of the presumption and serve as the factual predicate 
for the hearing examiner to apply it to this case. Accordingly, it is necessary 
to briefly allude to the record evidence which is unelucidated in the majority 
opinion and to highlight certain facts discussed in the majority opinion but 
whose significance went unheeded. Such a review will illuminate the sound 
foundation for an award of benefits and ample cause for affirmance on 
appeal.

 

[¶22]   The importance of Swede extending a 
helping hand to his fellow late shifters and the significance of the unpaid 
services thereby rendered to his employment seem to have escaped the majority's 
attention. Swede's own words bespeak an air of mere chivalry: "Oh, maybe 
sometimes if the lady has to go out and bag pumps or something, we'll watch the 
cash register in case somebody came in." In fact, this testimony proves much 
more; namely, that Swede actually engaged directly in a work 
activity on the premises after he punched out that night. Moreover, if, 
while "watch[ing] the cash register," Swede had been killed in a holdup, he 
would be just as dead a clerk as any paid employee serving in that capacity. 
Indeed, the majority fails to credit Swede with the increased security that his 
very presence adds to the premises and the attendant reassurance which it brings 
to solo-staffing female convenience store clerks and safety-conscious employers 
alike. Doubtless, these tangible, as well as esoteric, factors involving Swede's 
post-shift presence at the store influenced the fact finder who is the best 
equipped to assess their import and reasonableness - similar to a jury assessing 
a personal injury case.

 

[¶23]   The reasonableness of the 
post-shift time on the premises, augmented by specifically found facts and 
circumstances, demonstrates that Swede was there for his employer and 
co-employees. Whether in application of the "on-premises" presumption or in the 
construction of factual findings independent of that evidentiary rule, a 
uniquely fact intensive environment is created such that the weighing of the 
two-sides of the scale properly should be left with the on-site trier of fact. 
Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Wyo. 1995). The job insurance system, 
which was designed to be there for Swede, unfortunately 
dissipates here in the wash of two 
nonfact-finding appellate tribunals. This Court should not mucky pup with the 
fact-finding province in this case.

 

[¶24]   The undisputed facts are: Swede was 
injured while leaving work through a clearly marked employee exit door where a 
defective condition awaited him which had remained unchanged and unremedied from 
the time he punched out until the time he left the premises. He remained on the 
work site continuously during that interval. Ms. Royer, the beneficiary of 
Swede's largess, punched out with Swede and left approximately one-half hour 
before Swede. Query: Would her stay be deemed "reasonable" under the majority 
opinion which finds Swede's stay to be unreasonable? Does one-half hour turn a 
reasonable stay into an unreasonable one? What about fifteen minutes, seventeen 
minutes, or thirty-eight minutes? The point is: Whether reasonableness is 
considered strictly a time construct or a mixed construct of time and activity, 
isn't this all best left for the trier of fact? Instead of conducting an ad hoc 
appellate review of reasonableness, is it not a far better approach to affirm 
this case and augment the premises presumption rule with the following 
renaissance holding: Where an employee, who stays over on the work premises 
following a work shift in continuous and uninterrupted furtherance of the 
employer's interests and with the employer's knowledge, suffers an injury due to 
a defect on the premises which was in existence at the time the employee's 
normal work shift ended and remained unchanged and unremedied during the period 
of staying over, the period of staying over does not affect the compensability 
of the injury. Such a rule would, as worker's compensation intended, focus on 
the condition and safety associated with the premises 
as the object of the "on-the-job" query rather than obsessing on the hour of day 
on the punch clock or analyzing the post-shift motivations of well intended 
workers in carryover service to their employer's 
interests.

 

[¶25]   This is to say nothing of the 
adverse impact of the majority's decision between and among co-employees, inter 
sese. The Wyoming work place should be a fair place. Being "at work" should 
imply being at a place that is safe, and that, when properly there, any worker 
should receive the benefits of the employment relationship which are available 
to all employees on the work premises. Any result which has the effect of 
discriminating between and among on-premises employees whose presence advances 
the employment enterprise constitutes an invidious serendipity which ill-befits 
"The Equality 
State."

 

[¶26]   This case calls to mind the Latin 
maxim, ratio legis est anima legis, "[t]he reason of law is the soul of law." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (5th ed. 1979). Why should a worker be denied the 
benefits of a system designed to promote the safety of the work place when the 
same premises condition would have caused the injury three minutes or three 
hours after the shift ended? Are premises or people paramount under the fabric of 
our job insurance, employee-employer coexistence system in Wyoming? Finally, why 
should this Court arbitrate over ticks of the clock? The reason of the majority 
opinion is lost on me, but the soul of the state-administered pact between 
worker and employer lies housed in a safe work place for workers and the 
preservation of compensation for our injured workers.

 

[¶27]   An appellate dissection of the 
facts which severs this case from the on-premises coverage presumption impales 
this rule of law and deals a disharmonious blow to the symbiotic 
employer-employee relationship. This case cries out for reinstatement of the 
original factual findings as regards Swede and for the benefit of the efficient 
administration of the justice system. The district court's reversal of the award 
of benefits should be overturned, and the benefits properly due Swede should be 
restored.