Case Title: Borgen v. Wiglesworth

Citation: 189 Kan. 261, 369 P.2d 360

Docket Number: 42,104

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1962-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
189 Kan. 261 (1962)
369 P.2d 360
ROY BORGEN and MARY BORGEN, Appellants,
v.
BILLY WIGLESWORTH and MERLE McCLURE, Appellees.
No. 42,104

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 3, 1962.
George K. Melvin, of Lawrence, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellants.
Eugene C. Riling, of Lawrence, argued the cause, and John J. Riling, of Lawrence, was with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This is an action in which plaintiffs (lessors) seek to enjoin defendants (lessees) from the use made of the leased premises. The district court denied the injunction and plaintiffs have appealed.
On April 1, 1957, the plaintiffs leased to the defendants certain land, then outside the limits of the City of Lawrence, Kansas. The lease provided:
The lease was for a primary term of seven years with the right of the lessees to extend it for two five-year periods "under the same terms herein set out except that parties of the second part (lessees) shall not be required to make any further improvements on the property."
The lease further provided in part as follows:
*263 The lessees were to pay all taxes after the execution of the lease and fifty dollars per month rent commencing April 1, 1959. In the event the lessees surrendered possession, "then all buildings and improvements placed thereon by parties of the second part shall remain and be and become property of parties of the first part."
The lease also provided:
Other facts material to the controversy may be summarized as follows:
A car washing building was constructed on the leased property, and car washing was started on June 8, 1957. The building was sixty-five feet in length and twenty feet in width. It consisted of two concrete block walls running the length of the building, a concrete floor and a partial roof to support the walls. The ends of the building were not enclosed. Because of open structure of the building car washing ceased when the weather got cold in the fall of 1957.
Sometime during the following winter the leased land was taken into the City of Lawrence. In March of 1958 the lessees obtained a permit to convert the building from a car wash to a launderaide business and started to enclose the structure. On April 4, 1958, lessors notified the lessees that if the work continued appropriate legal action would be taken. The notice was ignored and the building was completed for a launderaide.
On April 16, 1958, after most of the additions were completed, plaintiffs brought this action to enjoin the defendants from reconstructing and remodeling the building for any purpose other than that of car washing and car servicing and from using the building for any other purpose. A restraining order or temporary injunction was not requested. The building was completed in its entirety before the case was tried.
Following the trial the district court, in a memorandum decision, stated the issues and concluded as follows:
Judgment was entered in accord with the foregoing conclusions.
After an extended examination of the record and careful consideration of all contentions advanced by counsel for the respective parties we are constrained to agree with the conclusions and judgment of the district court.
The lessors were interested in the construction of a building meeting certain specifications and dimensions. The improvement was part of the consideration for the lease. The lessees were given the unlimited right to make additions to the structure. Lessees were specifically restricted from using the premises to engage in any kind of cafe or restaurant business. There was no other restriction as to use.
It would also appear that enclosing the ends and putting a roof on a structure is an addition. There is no claim here of waste or injury to the reversion. Indeed, the entire controversy centers on the use of the premises.
Neither party is now contending that the provisions of the lease are ambiguous. Under similar circumstances in Smith v. Holmes, 181 Kan. 438, 312 P.2d 228, we said:
The general rule that lease are to be interpreted from "four corners" and that all of the language used anywhere in such an instrument must be considered, construed and harmonized, is well-established. (See Smith v. Russ, 184 Kan. 773, 778, 339 P.2d 286, and cases there cited.)
The instant lease specifically prohibits the use of the premises for a cafe or restaurant business. There would be no justification for the court reading into the lease other restrictions as to use. They should have been stipulated if intended.
It is also the general rule, with certain reasonable exceptions, that where a tenant is not restrained by the terms of the lease the premises may be used for any lawful purpose. (Asling v. McAllister-Fitzgerald Lumber Co., 120 Kan. 455, 244 Pac. 16, 46 A.L.R., 1127.)
The rule just stated is discussed in 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant, §§ 203, 204, pp. 190, 191, where it is said:
See, also, 2 A.L.R.2d p. 1143, and annotated cases pp. 1148 to 1155, incl.
Aside from what has been heretofore stated and held there is an additional reason why the judgment of the district court should not be disturbed in the case at bar. A large amount of discretion is *266 permitted in the exercise of injunctive relief. Moreover, a strictly legal right will not be enforced by injunction contrary to equity and good conscience.
See Babb v. Rose, 156 Kan. 587, 134 P.2d 655, which holds:
See, also, Smith v. City of Kansas City, 167 Kan. 684, 689, 690, 208 P.2d 233.
And see Atchison, T. & S.F. Rly. Co. v. Hamilton, 130 Kan. 685, 288 Pac. 560, a case where the court had under consideration a petition to enjoin the use being made of certain property, where it is stated:
"In 32 C.J. 29 the writer says:
In Harder v. Power Co., 95 Kan. 315, 148 Pac. 603, this court held:
One feature of the Harder case was quite similar to the case now being considered. There  as here  before the case was reached for trial the construction had been completed and no restraining order or temporary injunction had been requested. This court, at page 318 of the opinion, stated:
Under the confronting facts and circumstances we are convinced that equity and good conscience should not require the tearing down and removal of the additions and improvements to the structure on the leased premises; that the record does not disclose that any injury will result to the lessors if the business of a launderaide is conducted in such structure; and that, after giving consideration to the equities between the parties, the trial court did not abuse sound judicial discretion in refusing to grant the plaintiffs injunctive relief.
The judgment is affirmed.