Case Title: State v. Pennell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 371PA13

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2014-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. COA12-1362 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 2 July 2013 
 
 
IN RE: 
 
S.D.W. 
 
Mecklenburg County 
No. 10-SP-8507 
 
Appeal by appellant-father from Orders entered 17 February 
2012 by Judge Elizabeth T. Trosch in District Court, Mecklenburg 
County.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 May 2013. 
 
Thurman, Wilson, Boutwell & Galvin, P.A. by W. David 
Thurman, for petitioner-appellee. 
 
Jonathan McGirt, for appellant-father Gregory Johns. 
 
 
STROUD, Judge. 
 
 
 
Gregory Johns (“father”) appeals from orders entered 17 
February 2012 denying his motion to intervene in the adoption 
proceedings concerning his biological son, denying his motion to 
dismiss the adoption petition, and granting the adoptive 
parents’ (“petitioners”) motion for summary judgment on the 
issue of whether father’s consent was required for the adoption.   
 
For the following reasons, we hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
48-2-601 may be unconstitutional as applied to father if he can 
show that he promptly attempted to grasp the opportunity of 
fatherhood once he discovered his son’s existence, but the 
-2- 
 
 
statute foreclosed that opportunity.  We therefore reverse the 
trial court’s orders granting petitioners’ motion for summary 
judgment and denying his motion to intervene.  Because there are 
factual issues that this Court cannot resolve, we remand this 
case to the trial court with instructions to conduct a hearing 
on that issue and enter an order with appropriate findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. 
I. 
Background and Procedural History 
 
Father dated the mother (“mother”) of his biological son 
from approximately May 2009 to February 2010.  During that time, 
they engaged in sexual intercourse. They broke up around 
February 2010, but continued engaging in sexual intercourse for 
several weeks.  After about March 2010, mother and father 
stopped communicating with each other until around 26 November 
2010. There is no evidence that either mother or father 
attempted to communicate with each other during this time 
period.  After they stopped dating, father continued to live and 
work at the same place at which he had previously lived and 
worked and his contact information, including his phone number, 
remained the same. 
-3- 
 
 
Mother gave birth to a baby boy (“Sean”)1 on 10 October 2010 
in New Hanover County.  Mother relinquished custody of Sean to 
Christian Adoption Services (CAS), an adoption agency in 
Mecklenburg County.  The adoption agency interviewed mother and 
inquired about Sean’s biological father. Mother told the agency 
that she did not know the address or phone number of father and 
had no way to contact him. She misidentified Sean’s father as 
“Gregory Thomas James,” rather than “Johns.” The agency searched 
for “Gregory James,” but did not find him. 
CAS found a married Mecklenburg County couple interested in 
adopting Sean. They filed a petition to adopt Sean on 2 November 
2010.  Along with the adoption petition, the adoptive parents 
filed an Affidavit of Parentage, which again stated the 
biological father’s name as Gregory James.  Because the true 
identity of Sean’s biological father was unknown to CAS and 
because they could not find “Gregory James,” the agency filed a 
petition to terminate the father’s rights on 16 November 2010 
and stayed the adoption proceeding. 
Around 
20 
April 
2011, 
father 
learned 
through 
an 
acquaintance that mother may have been pregnant and had a baby 
that she placed for adoption. Father called mother around 25 
                     
1 To protect the identity of the minor child and for ease of 
reading we will refer to him by pseudonym.  
-4- 
 
 
April 2011 to ask her whether she had been pregnant.  After 
initially denying the pregnancy, mother admitted that she had 
given birth to a baby and placed him for adoption. Mother gave 
father the information with which to contact CAS. 
After mother called CAS to inform them of father’s true 
identity and father got in contact with CAS, petitioners 
voluntarily dismissed the petition to terminate the parental 
rights of “Gregory James” on 2 May 2011 and removed the stay 
from the adoption proceeding on 5 May. 
On 11 May 2011, notice of the adoption proceedings was 
served on Kyle Johns, Gregory Johns’ brother. On 24 May 2011, 
father, pro se, responded to the notice and sent letters to the 
Mecklenburg County Clerk of Superior Court and to counsel for 
petitioners inquiring what he had to do to acquire custody, 
requesting a DNA test to prove that Sean was his biological son, 
and asking that once the DNA test showed him to be the 
biological father the adoption proceeding be terminated. 
On 9 June 2011, counsel for petitioners noted their intent 
to take father’s deposition. On 23 June 2011, father, still pro 
se, was deposed by counsel for petitioners.  In his deposition, 
father described his educational and employment background, his 
relationship with mother, and how he came to discover Sean’s 
-5- 
 
 
existence. On 24 June 2011, counsel for petitioners sent father 
the results of his DNA test, which showed that there was a 
99.99% probability that he was Sean’s biological father. 
On 15 August 2011, father, now represented by counsel, 
moved to intervene, moved for disclosure of the adoption file, 
moved to dismiss the petition for adoption, petitioned to 
legitimate the child, and moved for custody. 
Petitioners responded to father’s motions and moved for 
summary judgment on the issue of whether his consent was 
required for the adoption to proceed.  The District Court held a 
hearing on 24 October 2011 where it considered father’s motion 
to intervene and motion for disclosure of the adoption file. On 
10 November 2011, the trial court entered an order denying 
father’s motion to intervene and allowing his motion for 
disclosure of the adoption file, with some limitations.2 
The District Court then held a hearing on the remaining 
motions on 6 January 2012.3  At the hearing, the court heard 
                     
2 Father voluntarily dismissed his petition to legitimate Sean on 
10 October 2011. 
3 The trial court did not consider father’s motion for custody—it 
had not been noticed for hearing and the court had already 
denied father’s motion to intervene.  We also note that on 4 
January 2012, father commenced an action for custody of Sean 
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-3.1 (2011) and requested an 
injunction against petitioners in this case preventing them from 
proceeding with the adoption. On 10 January 2012, petitioners 
-6- 
 
 
argument from father and petitioners on the motion for summary 
judgment, granted the motion, and then heard testimony from 
father relating to his motion to dismiss. The trial court also 
denied father’s motion to dismiss the adoption petition. On 17 
February 2012, the trial court entered one order amending its 10 
November order and a second order making findings of fact and 
conclusions of law about the motions considered at the January 
hearing. In those orders, the court denied father’s motion to 
intervene and granted petitioner’s motion for summary judgment 
on the basis that father’s consent was not required for the 
adoption to proceed. Father filed timely written notice of 
appeal from these orders on 14 March 2012.  
II. 
Appellate Jurisdiction 
 
As father acknowledges, this appeal is from an order that 
is not a final judgment since it does “not dispose of the case, 
but instead leave[s] it for further action by the trial court in 
order to settle and determine the entire controversy.” Turner v. 
Hammocks Beach Corp., 363 N.C. 555, 558, 681 S.E.2d 770, 773 
                                                                  
herein moved to dismiss the Chapter 50 custody action for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, 
Rule 12(b)(1) (2011), and failure to state a claim under Rule 
12(b)(6), due to the prior pending adoption proceeding.  We have 
addressed the Chapter 50 custody proceeding in Johns v. Welker, 
___ N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2013) (2 July 2013) (No. 
COA12-1154). 
-7- 
 
 
(2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, it is 
interlocutory. Id. Normally, interlocutory orders are not 
immediately appealable. Id. Nonetheless, an interlocutory order 
may be immediately appealed if it affects a substantial right. 
Id.  “Essentially a two-part test has developed [to determine 
whether an interlocutory order affects a substantial right]—the 
right itself must be substantial and the deprivation of that 
substantial 
right 
must 
potentially 
work 
injury 
to 
[the 
appellant] if not corrected before appeal from final judgment.” 
Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 726, 392 S.E.2d 
735, 736 (1990) (citation omitted). 
As will be described below, the order deprives father of 
the right to participate in the adoption proceeding concerning 
his biological child by concluding that his consent is not 
required for the adoption to proceed. 
Such a right is 
substantial. If the adoption proceeds to a final decree of 
adoption, any parental rights that father may have had would be 
terminated.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-1-106(c) (2011). Moreover, the 
adoption statute severely limits the avenues for challenging a 
final decree of adoption through appeal. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-2-
607 (2011).  Therefore, deprivation of the right to consent in 
this context could work irreparable damage to father’s rights. 
-8- 
 
 
Indeed, petitioners do not contest this issue. We conclude that 
the order at issue here affects a substantial right and is 
immediately appealable. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to 
consider the present appeal. 
III. Standard of Review 
 
Father appeals from orders denying a motion to dismiss, 
denying a motion to intervene, and granting a motion for summary 
judgment. The issue on appeal as to all of the motions is 
whether the trial court properly concluded that father’s consent 
was not required under the adoption statutes and under the state 
or federal constitutions and whether the trial court properly 
interpreted the statutes at issue. Thus, the appeal from each 
order presents solely a question of law, which we review de 
novo. City of Wilmington v. Hill, 189 N.C. App. 173, 176, 657 
S.E.2d 670, 672 (2008). 
IV. 
Intervention 
 
Adoption is a special proceeding before the clerk of 
superior court.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-2-100(a) (2011). Special 
proceedings are governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure “except 
as otherwise provided.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-393 (2011). Thus, 
where the adoption statutes provide a procedure different than 
that set out in the Rules of Civil Procedure, the adoption 
-9- 
 
 
statutes govern. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 1 (2011) 
(stating that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply “except when a 
differing procedure is prescribed by statute.”). 
Intervention of right under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 
24, is permitted  
(1) When a statute confers an unconditional 
right 
to 
intervene; 
or 
(2) 
When 
the 
applicant claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject 
of the action and he is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical 
matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect 
that 
interest, 
unless 
the 
applicant’s 
interest 
is 
adequately 
represented by existing parties. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 24(a) (2011). Once an intervenor 
becomes a party, he is entitled to participate as fully as any 
other party. Harrington v. Overcash, 61 N.C. App. 742, 744, 301 
S.E.2d 528, 529 (1983). 
The adoption statutes, however, define specifically who a 
party is and how non-parties are entitled to participate. A 
party to an adoption proceeding is defined as “a petitioner, 
adoptee, or any person whose consent to an adoption is necessary 
under this Chapter but has not been obtained.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 48-1-101(11)(2011). Some people not included as a party are 
nonetheless entitled to notice.  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-2-401 
(2011). “Except as provided in G.S. 48-2-206(c), 48-2-206(d), 
-10- 
 
 
and 48-2-207(d), a person entitled to notice whose consent is 
not required may appear and present evidence only as to whether 
the adoption is in the best interest of the adoptee.” N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 48-2-405 (2011). 
Section 48-2-207(d), in turn, provides, “If the court 
determines that the consent of any individual described in G.S. 
48-2-401(c)(3) is not required, such individual shall not be 
entitled to receive notice of, or participate in, further 
proceedings in the adoption.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-2-207(d) 
(2011).  Thus, a person whose consent is not required is not a 
party, and if that person is described in section 48-2-
401(c)(3), he is not entitled to appear and present best 
interest evidence, even if he was entitled to notice. 
Section 48-2-401(c)(3) requires the petitioner to give 
notice to 
[a] man who to the actual knowledge of the 
petitioner claims to be or is named as the 
biological or possible biological father of 
the minor, and any biological or possible 
biological fathers who are unknown or whose 
whereabouts are unknown, but notice need not 
be served upon a man who has executed a 
consent, a relinquishment, or a notarized 
statement denying paternity or disclaiming 
any interest in the minor, a man whose 
parental rights have been legally terminated 
or who has been judicially determined not to 
be the minor’s parent, or, provided the 
petition is filed within three months of the 
-11- 
 
 
birth of the minor, a man whose consent to 
the adoption has been determined not to be 
required under G.S. 48-2-206. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-2-401(c)(3)(2011). 
Reading these statutes together, it becomes clear that a 
putative father whose consent is not required for the adoption 
is neither a party nor entitled to appear and present best 
interest evidence. By contrast, if a putative father’s consent 
is required, he is a party and entitled to fully participate in 
the adoption proceeding. To determine whether a putative father 
who has been served notice and timely responded or who has 
intervened in the adoption proceeding is entitled to consent, 
the trial court must hold a hearing under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-
2-207 (2011). 
Thus, a putative father in Mr. Johns’ position is entitled 
to have the trial court determine whether his consent is 
required and present evidence concerning that question. If the 
trial court determines that his consent is not required, he is 
not entitled to intervene or participate in any further capacity 
in the adoption proceeding.  Therefore, although the language of 
the 10 November order was slightly confusing in that it could be 
read to deny father the right to have the issue of consent 
determined, the trial court correctly concluded that “[t]he 
-12- 
 
 
father is entitled to intervene in this action as a party only 
if he establishes that his consent is necessary for this 
adoption to proceed” and held a hearing to determine whether his 
consent was, in fact, required. 
V. 
Necessity of Father’s Consent 
Father 
first 
argues 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
erred 
in 
concluding that his consent was not required under N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 48-3-601. We hold that the trial court correctly 
interpreted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 in concluding that his 
consent was not required.  
In North Carolina, all necessary consents must have been 
obtained in order for a trial court to grant an adoption 
petition. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-2-603(4) (2011). The consent of a 
man “who may or may not be the biological father of the minor” 
is required if he 
1. Is or was married to the mother of the 
minor if the minor was born during the 
marriage or within 280 days after the 
marriage is terminated or the parties 
have separated pursuant to a written 
separation agreement or an order of 
separation entered under Chapters 50 or 
50B of the General Statutes or a similar 
order of separation entered by a court 
in another jurisdiction; 
2. Attempted to marry the mother of the 
minor before the minor’s birth, by a 
marriage 
solemnized 
in 
apparent 
compliance 
with 
law, 
although 
the 
-13- 
 
 
attempted 
marriage 
is 
or 
could 
be 
declared invalid, and the minor is born 
during the attempted marriage, or within 
280 days after the attempted marriage is 
terminated by annulment, declaration of 
invalidity, divorce, or, in the absence 
of 
a 
judicial 
proceeding, 
by 
the 
cessation of cohabitation; 
3. Before the filing of the petition, has 
legitimated the minor under the law of 
any state; 
4. Before the earlier of the filing of the 
petition or the date of a hearing under 
G.S. 
48-2-206, 
has 
acknowledged 
his 
paternity of the minor and 
 
I. 
Is obligated to support the 
minor under written agreement 
or by court order; 
 
II. 
Has 
provided, 
in 
accordance 
with 
his 
financial 
means, 
reasonable 
and 
consistent 
payments for the support of the 
biological 
mother 
during 
or 
after the term of pregnancy, or 
the support of the minor, or 
both, which may include the 
payment of medical expenses, 
living 
expenses, 
or 
other 
tangible means of support, and 
has 
regularly 
visited 
or 
communicated, or attempted to 
visit or communicate with the 
biological 
mother 
during 
or 
after the term of pregnancy, or 
with the minor, or with both; 
or 
 
III. After the minor’s birth but 
before the minor’s placement 
for adoption or the mother’s 
relinquishment, has married or 
attempted to marry the mother 
-14- 
 
 
of the minor by a marriage 
solemnized 
in 
apparent 
compliance with law, although 
the attempted marriage is or 
could be declared invalid; or  
 
5. 
Before the filing of the petition, has 
received the minor into his home and openly 
held out the minor as his biological child; 
or 
 
6. 
Is the adoptive father of the minor . . 
. . 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
Mr. Johns argues that § 48-3-601 does not apply to him 
because § 48-3-603 is contrary to § 48-3-601 and more specific. 
We disagree. 
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-603, “[c]onsent to an adoption 
of a minor is not required of a person or entity whose consent 
is not required under G.S. 48-3-601” or if one of eight 
categories applies. Reading these statutes together, it is clear 
that consent is only required of a person or entity listed in § 
48-3-601.  Even if a person or entity qualifies under § 48-3-
601, however, his consent is not required if one of the § 48-3-
603 categories applies. None of those categories applies here. 
Therefore, the only question is whether Mr. Johns’ consent is 
required under § 48-3-601(2)(b). 
-15- 
 
 
 
The record shows, and the trial court found, that there was 
no genuine issue about the fact that Mr. Johns does not fit into 
any of the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601. He has 
never married or attempted to marry the mother and had not 
supported mother or the minor child before the filing of the 
petition. Indeed, he did not become aware of the child’s 
existence until after the petition had already been filed.  
Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that his consent 
is not required under the statute. 
VI. 
Due Process Claim 
 
Mr. Johns argues that applying N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 
to him under the facts disclosed in the present record violates 
his due process rights under the 14th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the North 
Carolina Constitution.  We agree that the application of the 
statute to Mr. Johns would violate his constitutional rights if 
the facts are as he alleges them. We cannot, however, find facts 
ourselves and must remand to the trial court for findings 
relevant to this issue. 
The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
forbids 
“any 
state 
[from] 
depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”  U.S. Const., amend. XIV. Similarly, 
-16- 
 
 
Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution states 
that “No person shall be . . . in any manner deprived of his 
life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.”  N.C. 
Const. art. I, § 19.  “The ‘law of the land’ clause has the same 
meaning as ‘due process of law’ under the Federal Constitution.” 
Summey Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. County of Henderson, 96 N.C. 
App. 533, 541, 386 S.E.2d 439, 444 (1989), disc. rev. denied, 
326 N.C. 486, 392 S.E.2d 101 (1990). 
“In general, substantive due process protects the public 
from government action that unreasonably deprives them of a 
liberty or property interest.  If that liberty or property 
interest is a fundamental right under the Constitution, the 
government action may be subjected to strict scrutiny.” Toomer 
v. Garrett, 155 N.C. App. 462, 469, 574 S.E.2d 76, 84 (2002) 
(citations omitted), app. dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 357 
N.C. 66, 579 S.E.2d 576 (2003).  “Substantive due process 
protection prevents the government from engaging in conduct that 
. . . interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.” State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 491, 508 S.E.2d 277, 
282 (1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “Applying 
the Due Process Clause is . . . an uncertain enterprise which 
must discover what ‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a 
-17- 
 
 
particular 
situation 
by 
first 
considering 
any 
relevant 
precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are 
at stake.”  Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham 
County, N. C., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25, 68 L.Ed. 2d 640, 648 (1981). 
“The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is 
perhaps 
the 
oldest 
of 
the 
fundamental 
liberty 
interests 
recognized by” the United States Supreme Court.  Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 147 L.Ed. 2d 49, 56 (2000); see 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 71 L.Ed. 2d 599, 610 
(1982) (“[A] natural parent’s desire for and right to the 
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her 
children is an interest far more precious than any property 
right.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).  The question 
in this case is whether that right applies to Mr. Johns under 
the facts of this case.  Stated otherwise, has he acted 
inconsistently with the protected rights of a natural parent?  
See Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 83-84, 484 S.E.2d 528, 537 
(1997). 
The United States Supreme Court and the courts of this 
State have wrestled with the question of whether an unmarried 
-18- 
 
 
biological father has a protected constitutional interest in the 
care and custody of his child. 
In Lehr v. Robertson, the United States Supreme Court 
considered “whether New York has sufficiently protected an 
unmarried father’s inchoate relationship with a child whom he 
has never supported and rarely seen in the two years since her 
birth.”  Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 249-50, 77 L.Ed. 2d 
614, 619 (1983).  The biological father in that case “had lived 
with [the mother] prior to Jessica’s birth and visited her in 
the hospital when Jessica was born, but his name [did] not 
appear on Jessica’s birth certificate.”  Id. at 252, 77 L.Ed. 2d 
at 620. Despite being aware of Jessica’s birth, the biological 
father “did not live with [the mother] or Jessica after 
Jessica’s birth, he has never provided them with any financial 
support, and he has never offered to marry [Jessica’s mother].” 
Id. at 252, 77 L.Ed. 2d at 621. 
The Court “noted that the rights of the parents are a 
counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.”  Id. at 
257, 77 L.Ed. 2d at 624. On that ground, the Court distinguished 
“between 
a 
mere 
biological 
relationship 
and 
an 
actual 
relationship of parental responsibility.”  Id. at 259-60, 77 
L.Ed. 2d at 625.  Further, the Court expressly approved of 
-19- 
 
 
Justice Stewart’s observation that “[p]arental rights do not 
spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent 
and child. They require relationships more enduring.” Id. at 
260, 77 L.Ed. 2d at 626 (citation, quotation marks, and emphasis 
omitted). 
The Court went on to state, 
When an unwed father demonstrates a full 
commitment 
to 
the 
responsibilities 
of 
parenthood by coming forward to participate 
in the rearing of his child, his interest in 
personal contact with his child acquires 
substantial protection under the due process 
clause. At that point it may be said that he 
acts as a father toward his children. But 
the mere existence of a biological link does 
not 
merit 
equivalent 
constitutional 
protection. The actions of judges neither 
create 
nor 
sever 
genetic 
bonds. 
The 
importance of the familial relationship, to 
the individuals involved and to the society, 
stems from the emotional attachments that 
derive 
from 
the 
intimacy 
of 
daily 
association, and from the role it plays in 
promoting 
a 
way 
of 
life 
through 
the 
instruction of children as well as from the 
fact of blood relationship. 
 
. . . . 
 
The 
significance 
of 
the 
biological 
connection is that it offers the natural 
father an opportunity that no other male 
possesses to develop a relationship with his 
offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and 
accepts some measure of responsibility for 
the 
child’s 
future, 
he 
may 
enjoy 
the 
blessings of the parent-child relationship 
and make uniquely valuable contributions to 
-20- 
 
 
the child’s development. If he fails to do 
so, 
the 
Federal 
Constitution 
will 
not 
automatically compel a state to listen to 
his opinion of where the child’s best 
interests lie. 
 
Id. at 261-62, 77 L.Ed. 2d at 626-27 (citations, quotation 
marks, ellipses, and footnote omitted).  The Court concluded 
that the New York statutes “adequately protected [his] inchoate 
interest in establishing a relationship with Jessica.” Id. at 
265, 77 L.Ed. 2d at 629. 
The decision in Lehr hinged on the failure of the 
biological father to grasp the opportunity to develop a 
relationship with his daughter. The Supreme Court recognized 
that 
even 
if 
a 
biological 
father 
has 
not 
developed 
a 
relationship with his child so as to warrant “full-blown” 
parental rights, an unwed biological father has an interest in 
the opportunity to develop such a relationship—an “inchoate 
interest.” See id. at 262, 265, 77 L.Ed. 2d at 627, 629. 
Further, the Court noted that “[t]here [was] no suggestion in 
the record that [the mother-petitioner and her husband] engaged 
in fraudulent practices that led [the biological father] not to 
protect his rights.”  Id. at 265, 77 L.Ed. 2d at 629 n.23. 
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the United States Supreme Court 
reflected on its opinion in Lehr and noted that it had “observed 
-21- 
 
 
that the significance of the biological connection is that it 
offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male 
possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring and we 
assumed that the Constitution might require some protection of 
that opportunity.” 491 U.S. 110, 128-29, 105 L.Ed. 2d 91, 109 
(1989) (emphasis added). Yet, the Supreme Court has never 
defined the “inchoate interest” a biological father has in the 
opportunity to develop a relationship with his child. 
The courts of this State have also not directly addressed 
this issue. Although father relies heavily on our Supreme 
Court’s decision in Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 
901 (1994), Price made clear that the presumption referred to in 
Petersen 
is 
not 
applicable 
if 
a 
parent’s 
“conduct 
is 
inconsistent with this presumption or if he or she fails to 
shoulder the responsibilities that are attendant to rearing a 
child.” Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534. 
In Price, an unmarried mother had been sued for custody of 
her minor child by a man whom she had led to believe was the 
natural father of the child and who had acted as such, but who 
was not in fact the child’s natural father.  Id. at 71-72, 484 
S.E.2d at 529-30.  The trial court had awarded custody to the 
defendant-mother because of her paramount status as a natural 
-22- 
 
 
parent, though it found that it was in the child’s best interest 
for custody to be placed with the plaintiff.  Id. at 72, 484 
S.E.2d at 530.  The Court, citing Lehr, held that “[a] parent 
may no longer enjoy a paramount status if his or her conduct is 
inconsistent with this presumption or if he or she fails to 
shoulder the responsibilities that are attendant to rearing a 
child.”  Id. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534.  Thus, our Supreme Court 
in Price placed the father’s failure to grasp the opportunity to 
develop a relationship with his child in Lehr as one of those 
ways in which a natural parent may act inconsistently with his 
otherwise constitutionally protected status and thereby lose his 
parental rights.  See id. 
This Court has also considered similar issues.  In In re 
Adoption of Baby Girl Dockery, we considered an equal protection 
and due process challenge to former N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48–6(a)(3) 
(1984), which only required the consent of an unmarried 
biological father to adoption if paternity had been judicially 
established, if he had acknowledged the child, or if he had 
financially supported and cared for the child and the mother. 
128 N.C. App. 631, 633-34, 495 S.E.2d 417, 419 (1986).  After a 
very brief analysis of the substantive due process issue, we 
concluded that the biological father had not established a 
-23- 
 
 
protected relationship with his child.  Id. at 635-36, 495 
S.E.2d at 420.  As appellees have highlighted, in considering 
the equal protection argument, we discounted the fact that the 
father was unaware of the child’s existence. Id. at 634, 495 
S.E.2d at 419.  There was, however, no discussion in Dockery of 
what interest a biological father has in the opportunity to 
develop a relationship with his child. 
Dockery is distinguishable from the present case. In 
Dockery, the biological father learned of the child’s existence 
when the adoption agency contacted him and asked for his 
consent, approximately one month prior to the adoption petition 
being filed. Id. at 632, 495 S.E.2d at 418.  Thus, under the 
facts of that case, the biological father had an opportunity, 
albeit a limited one, to develop a protected relationship with 
his child by pursuing one of the methods outlined in the consent 
statute before the filing of the petition.  He simply failed to 
grasp the opportunity in time. 
The other North Carolina cases relied on by the parties are 
either no longer good law, e.g., In re Adoption of Clark, 95 
N.C. App. 1, 381 S.E.2d 835 (1989), rev’d, 327 N.C. 61, 393 
S.E.2d 791 (1990), or address issues of statutory interpretation 
without reaching the constitutional issue under consideration 
-24- 
 
 
here, e.g., In re Adoption of Byrd, 354 N.C. 188, 194-98, 552 
S.E.2d 142, 147-49 (2001) (considering whether a biological 
father’s consent was required under the statute), A Child’s 
Hope, LLC v. Doe, 178 N.C. App. 96, 105-06, 630 S.E.2d 673, 678-
79 (2006) (deciding that a father’s parental rights could be 
terminated under the statute even though the mother lied to him 
about the existence of the child), and In re T.L.B., 167 N.C. 
App. 298, 303, 605 S.E.2d 249, 252-53 (2004) (affirming the 
trial court’s decision to terminate a biological father’s 
parental rights under the statute even though he only failed to 
protect his rights because he did not know of the child’s 
existence). 
 
No 
North 
Carolina 
case 
has 
addressed 
the 
constitutional question presented here under similar facts.  
Some of our sister states have, however, confronted similar 
constitutional issues.  
In In re Adoption of A.A.T., 196 P.3d 1180 (Kan. 2008), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 173 L.Ed. 2d 1088 (2009), the Kansas 
Supreme Court considered an adoption case in which the mother 
had lied to the child’s biological father about her pregnancy 
and to the court about the biological father’s identity. In that 
case, the father knew that the mother had become pregnant, but 
the mother then “took extraordinary measures to prevent [the 
-25- 
 
 
biological father] from knowing about the birth of his child,” 
including lying to him about having had an abortion, and 
submitted an affidavit in which she lied about the last name of 
the child’s putative father.  Id. at 1185, 1188.  Because the 
putative father could not be found (using the false last name), 
the adoption agency published newspaper notice to the father 
under the false name.  Id. at 1186.  When no father appeared in 
response to the notice, the court terminated the father’s rights 
and finalized the adoption.  Id.  After six months, the mother 
told the biological father the truth and within six weeks he 
retained counsel and moved to set aside the adoption decree.  
Id. 
In its review of cases from other states, the Kansas court 
noted that 
the cases conclude that as long as the 
state’s statutes provide a process whereby 
most 
responsible 
putative 
fathers 
can 
qualify 
for 
notice 
in 
an 
adoption 
proceeding, the interests of the State in 
the 
finality 
of 
adoption 
decrees, 
as 
discussed 
in 
Lehr—providing 
a 
child 
stability 
and 
security 
early 
in 
life, 
encouraging 
adoptions, 
protecting 
the 
adoption 
process 
from 
unnecessary 
controversy and complication, and protecting 
other 
parties’ 
privacy 
and 
liberty 
interests—justify a rule that a putative 
father’s opportunity to develop a parenting 
relationship ends with the finalization of a 
newborn child’s adoption even if the reason 
-26- 
 
 
the father did not grasp his opportunity was 
because of the mother’s fraud. 
 
Id. at 1196 (emphasis added). 
 
After lengthy analysis of the underlying constitutional 
principles, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded, over three 
dissents, that the father did not have a protected liberty 
interest because he failed to take any steps to protect his 
rights, such as filing a notice with the putative father 
registry immediately upon learning that the mother was pregnant, 
before she lied to him about having an abortion.  Id. at 1195-
96, 1203.  The court reasoned that “the opportunity to assert 
his interest in parenting slipped away without any involvement 
of the State.  The interests of the State and the adoptive 
family justify a conclusion that [the father’s] opportunity to 
demonstrate 
his 
commitment 
to 
parenting 
passed 
without 
developing into a liberty interest.”  Id. at 1203. 
New 
York 
appellate 
courts 
have 
considered 
several 
comparable cases.  In Robert O. v. Russell K., the New York 
Court of Appeals—that state’s highest court—concluded that a 
biological father could not have a final order of adoption 
vacated because he did not have a constitutionally protected 
interest in his child when he failed to develop a relationship 
with that child, even though he failed to do so only because he 
-27- 
 
 
was unaware of the child’s existence.  604 N.E.2d 99, 103-04 
(N.Y. 1992).  The court noted, however, that in a prior case it 
had held that 
a father who has promptly taken every 
available avenue to demonstrate that he is 
willing and able to enter into the fullest 
possible relationship with his under-six-
month-old child should have an equally fully 
protected interest in preventing termination 
of the relationship by strangers, even if he 
has not as yet actually been able to form 
that relationship. 
 
Id. at 103 (quoting In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 425 
(N.Y. 1990)).  The New York courts have limited the period in 
which a biological father may grasp the opportunity to develop a 
relationship with his child to the six months prior to the 
child’s placement for adoption, even in cases of newborn 
adoption. Id. 
Other courts that have looked at the issue of the 
biological father’s opportunity interest have also decided that 
it is not a due process violation when that opportunity has been 
extinguished by the actions of a private party, usually the 
birth mother. See, e.g., Petition of Steve B.D., 730 P.2d 942, 
945-46 (Idaho 1986) (holding that there was no violation of the 
father’s due process rights where the mother, not a state actor, 
hid the adoption proceedings from the father). 
-28- 
 
 
 
The South Carolina Supreme Court, by contrast, has held 
that where a biological father has “demonstrated sufficient 
prompt and good faith efforts to assume parental responsibility” 
his failure to literally comply with the adoption statutes may 
be excused. Doe v. Queen, 552 S.E.2d 761, 764 (S.C. 2001). In 
Doe, the biological father, Queen, had been living with the 
mother when she became pregnant.  Id. at 762. The mother told 
Queen that she wanted an abortion and moved out.  Id. She did 
not end up terminating the pregnancy and instead carried the 
child to term. Id. During the rest of her pregnancy, Queen had 
no contact with the mother. Id.  Indeed, after she signed a 
warrant for assault, a trial court issued an order forbidding 
contact.  Id. 
After the child was born, she placed him for adoption. Id.  
Although she did not tell the adoptive parents the father’s 
address, their attorney managed to track him down approximately 
two months later and asked him to consent to the adoption. Id. 
Queen refused to consent and filed pleadings at a hearing on the 
adoption eight months after he was informed of the child’s 
birth. Id. In the interim, Queen prepared a nursery, opened a 
savings account in the child’s name, and bought medical 
insurance for the child.  Id.  The trial court determined that 
-29- 
 
 
the father’s consent was required.  Id.  Under those facts, the 
South Carolina Supreme Court held that Queen had “demonstrated 
sufficient prompt and good faith efforts to assume parental 
responsibility” and that therefore his consent was required for 
the adoption, even though he did not qualify under the statute. 
Id. at 764. 
Here, the trial court placed a great deal of responsibility 
on father to keep close tabs on his child’s mother and appellees 
urge us to do the same. Appellees cite no binding case 
establishing such a duty.4 Father cannot be faulted for declining 
to constantly call and follow his ex-girlfriend or consistently 
inquire about a potential pregnancy. Indeed, a mother may well 
consider any such inquiries or observation to constitute 
harassment or stalking, if she has asked the father to stop 
                     
4 This Court has noted that “it is certainly not unreasonable to 
charge putative fathers with the responsibility to discover the 
birth of their illegitimate children.”  In re Adoption of Clark, 
95 N.C. App. at 9, 381 S.E.2d at 840. Our opinion in Clark, 
however, was reversed by the Supreme Court.  In re Adoption of 
Clark, 327 N.C. 61, 393 S.E.2d 791 (1990).  This duty has 
nonetheless been mentioned by this Court in In re Baby Boy 
Dixon, 112 N.C. App. 248, 251, 435 S.E.2d 352, 354 (1993), and 
in In re T.L.B., 167 N.C. App. at 303, 605 S.E.2d at 252.  
Neither case, however, reached the constitutional question of 
whether the imposition of such a duty would be consistent with a 
biological father’s constitutionally protected interest in the 
opportunity to develop a relationship with his child where the 
biological father has actually come forward to attempt to 
establish such a relationship. 
-30- 
 
 
communicating with her.  He cannot force her to maintain a 
romantic relationship or even to accept his inquiries. Under 
appellees’ argument, any efforts a father may make to inquire 
about the mother’s pregnancy would be worthless if the mother 
rebuffs them. She, as much as he, is responsible for having sex 
outside of marriage and the associated consequences. Were we to 
hold as appellees urge, a mother could unilaterally terminate a 
father’s rights by lying to him about her pregnancy, lying to 
the adoption agency about him, and lying to the court about her 
knowledge of the father with complete impunity. Under our 
statutes, there would be no remedy for the father and no way for 
him to assert his rights once the petition is filed, even if the 
petition is based upon outright fraud by the mother. 
The 
circumstances 
of 
this 
case 
eliminated 
father’s 
“inchoate interest” in developing a fully protected relationship 
with Sean before the petition was filed and cut off that 
interest immediately, despite the father’s prompt actions to try 
to protect it. Under the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-
3-601, once the petition was filed, any opportunity he had to 
protect his rights was gone solely as a result of the mother’s 
decision not to inform him of her pregnancy and to provide an 
inaccurate name for the father to the adoption agency. 
-31- 
 
 
Our Supreme Court recognized in Byrd that giving the 
biological mother such unilateral power is inconsistent with 
fundamental fairness: 
We 
recognize 
the 
legislature’s 
apparent 
desire for fatherhood to be acknowledged 
definitively regardless of biological link. 
We also recognize the importance of fixing 
parental responsibility as early as possible 
for 
the 
benefit 
of 
the 
child. 
 
Yet, 
fundamental fairness dictates that a man 
should not be held to a standard that 
produces unreasonable or illogical results. 
We also believe that the General Assembly 
did not intend to place the mother in total 
control of the adoption to the exclusion of 
any 
inherent 
rights 
of 
the 
biological 
father. 
 
In re Byrd, 354 N.C. at 194, 552 S.E.2d at 146. 
The adoption statutes as applied here have exactly the 
effect of placing “the mother in total control of the adoption 
to the exclusion of any inherent right of the” father. Id.  The 
State’s interest in establishing a permanent home for the minor 
child is undoubtedly a valid and important one. Yet, the State’s 
interest in permanence is not fully established in this case 
where the adoption proceeding is still pending. This case is not 
one where the biological father is attempting to assert his 
rights after the adoption decree has been issued and a new 
family created.  Additionally, this is not a case where the 
biological father seeks only to block the adoption without 
-32- 
 
 
asserting his intention and plans to take full responsibility 
for the child.  Instead, if the facts are as father has alleged 
them to be, he has demonstrated an interest and willingness “to 
shoulder the responsibilities that are attendant to rearing a 
child.”  Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534. 
We hold that where a biological father, who prior to filing 
of the adoption petition was unaware that the mother was 
pregnant and had no reason to know of the pregnancy5, promptly 
takes steps to assume parental responsibility upon discovering 
the existence of the child has developed a constitutionally 
protected interest sufficient to require his consent where the 
adoption proceeding is still pending. This holding does not 
prevent the termination of the parental rights of an unknown 
father who has failed to respond to notice of the imminent 
termination of his rights.  Cf.  In re Baby Boy Dixon, 112 N.C. 
App. at 251-52, 435 S.E.2d at 353-54 (holding that due process 
was not offended by terminating the parental rights of an 
unknown father who was given notice, but failed to respond). 
                     
5 We do not consider the basic biological fact that any act of 
sexual intercourse may result in pregnancy to be the same as 
“reason to know” that a particular woman may actually be 
pregnant.  The father need not have actual knowledge, but he 
must have some knowledge that would lead a reasonable person to 
believe that the woman is pregnant. 
-33- 
 
 
The adoption petition here had been pending for only 
fourteen days prior to the filing of a petition to terminate 
parental rights on 16 November 2010. The adoption proceeding was 
stayed for the pendency of the termination proceeding. It was in 
the middle of that proceeding that Mr. Johns discovered the 
existence of Sean. Mr. Johns called Ms. Welker on 25 April 2011 
after hearing from an acquaintance that Ms. Welker might have 
had a child. She confirmed that she had given birth to a child 
and told him the name of the adoptive parents and the adoption 
agency. 
After Mr. Johns appeared in the termination proceeding and 
indicated that he would not consent to an adoption, the agency 
dismissed its termination petition on 2 May 2011. The stay on 
the adoption proceeding was lifted on 5 May 2011. On 11 May 
2011, petitioners served notice on Mr. Johns’ brother that the 
stay had been lifted. On 24 May 2011, Mr. Johns sent a letter to 
the Clerk of Superior Court and to counsel for the adoption 
agency stating that “I, Gregory Joseph Johns, am requesting a 
DNA test to prove that I am the biological father of [Sean]. 
Once the DNA test proves me to be the father of [Sean], I am 
requesting that the adoption be terminated and I take [Sean] 
into custody.”  On 15 August 2011, Mr. Johns filed a motion to 
-34- 
 
 
intervene, motion for disclosure of file, motion to dismiss 
petition for adoption, petition to legitimate child, and motion 
for child custody. In response, petitioners filed a motion for 
summary judgment. 
The trial court held a hearing concerning the motions to 
dismiss and for summary judgment. The trial court refused to 
take live testimony at the hearing on the summary judgment 
motion, but allowed Mr. Johns to testify in support of his 
motion to dismiss under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-2-102. 
At the hearing, Mr. Johns claimed that since learning of 
his son’s existence, he sent the child letters and presents, 
scheduled an appointment with a pediatrician, and set up a 
nursery in his home. He also testified that he attempted to 
contact the adoptive parents and set up a way to visit his son, 
but that these efforts were rebuffed.  Nevertheless, we cannot 
make findings about the credibility of Mr. Johns’ assertions. 
See Godfrey v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Union County, 317 
N.C. 51, 63, 344 S.E.2d 272, 279 (1986) (“Fact finding is not a 
function of our appellate courts.”).  We must remand this case 
to the trial court to make appropriate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
-35- 
 
 
Because the trial court only analyzed the facts under the 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601, which would require father to take 
some action before the adoption petition was filed—in this case 
a practical impossibility—it concluded that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact and granted summary judgment. Having held 
that a biological father is entitled to the opportunity to 
develop a relationship with his child, we must remand to the 
trial court for a full hearing concerning the issue of whether 
Mr. Johns grasped the opportunity to act as a parent when that 
opportunity appeared. In other words, the trial court should 
determine what actions Mr. Johns took after learning of the 
existence of his son. If the trial court finds that Mr. Johns in 
fact made reasonable and consistent efforts to “shoulder the 
responsibilities that are attendant to rearing a child,” Price, 
346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534, after discovering Sean’s 
existence, considering the fact that father had no legal means 
to have actual contact with the child due to the adoption 
petition, then he has developed a constitutionally protected 
interest and his consent is required for the adoption to be 
finalized. See, e.g., In re Adoption of K.A.R., 205 N.C. App. 
611, 617, 696 S.E.2d 757, 761-62 (2010) (“Here, Alvarez did what 
the trial court found to be reasonable given his means and 
-36- 
 
 
financial resources; he obtained items—a baby car seat, a baby 
crib mattress, and baby clothing—that could be used only for the 
support of the minor child.”), disc. rev. denied, ___ N.C. ___, 
706 S.E.2d 236 (2011). 
VII. Conclusion 
 
We hold that where a biological father, who prior to the 
filing of the petition was unaware that the mother was pregnant 
and had no reason to know, promptly takes steps to assume 
parental responsibility upon discovering the existence of the 
child has developed a constitutionally protected interest 
sufficient to require his consent where the adoption proceeding 
is still pending. In this case, the trial court did not have the 
opportunity to develop a complete record and make findings on 
that issue.  Therefore, we must reverse the order granting 
petitioners’ motion for summary judgment and denying father’s 
motion to intervene. We remand for an evidentiary hearing and 
entry of a revised order. 
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
 
Judges HUNTER, Robert C. and ERVIN concur.