Case Title: State v. Donlay

Citation: 253 Kan. 132, 853 P.2d 680

Docket Number: 68,293

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1993-05-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
253 Kan. 132 (1993)
853 P.2d 680
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant,
v.
ROBERT C. DONLAY, Appellee.
No. 68,293

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 28, 1993.
Kevin C. Fletcher, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellant.
Benjamin C. Wood, special assistant appellate defender, argued the cause, and Jessica R. Kunen, chief appellate defender, was with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ABBOTT, J.:
This is a direct appeal by the State from an order dismissing the complaint (K.S.A. 22-3602[b][1]).
Robert C. Donlay was charged with aggravated false impersonation under K.S.A. 21-3825 (class E felony). Donlay showed another individual's driver's license and signed that person's name *133 to the tickets he received when a state trooper stopped Donlay for speeding and for a seat belt violation. The trial court dismissed the charge, reasoning that Donlay should have been charged with the more specific crime of unlawful use of a driver's license, K.S.A. 8-260(a)(3) (class B misdemeanor).
Based upon the driver's license produced and the signature on the tickets, the trooper believed he had issued tickets to Matthew J. Jacobs. The two tickets were filed in Reno County District Court. Jacobs did not appear on the appearance date, and the trial court entered a plea of not guilty on behalf of Jacobs. Trial was set for a specific time and a notice to appear was sent to Matthew J. Jacobs.
Jacobs contacted the prosecutor, obtained the ticketed car's license number, produced alibi evidence, and told the prosecutor the tickets actually belonged to Donlay. The State dismissed the charges against Jacobs.
The State then filed a complaint against the true driver, Donlay, for aggravated false impersonation, contrary to K.S.A. 21-3825. At the preliminary hearing, the trooper testified Donlay had not represented himself as Jacobs at any time after he handed Donlay the citation.
The trial court ruled it was inappropriate to charge Donlay under K.S.A. 21-3825 because a more specific statute, K.S.A. 8-260, is available that deals with the particular action. The trial court reasoned Donlay should have been charged under K.S.A. 8-260(a)(3), which states in pertinent part:
....
Consequently, the trial court dismissed the aggravated false impersonation charge. Rather than file a misdemeanor charge under K.S.A. 8-260(a)(3), the State appealed.
Two issues are briefed: whether Donlay could be charged with a violation of either or both K.S.A. 21-3825(d) and K.S.A. 8-260(a)(3) and whether K.S.A. 21-3825(d) is applicable under the facts of this case.
The second issue was not considered or raised in the trial court. However, "`[i]nterpretation of statutes is a question of law.'" *134 Todd v. Kelly, 251 Kan. 512, 515, 837 P.2d 381 (1992). "When determining a question of law, this court is not bound by the decision of the district court." Memorial Hospital Ass'n, Inc. v. Knutson, 239 Kan. 663, 668, 722 P.2d 1093 (1986). In addition, "[t]he judgment of a trial court, if correct, is to be upheld, even though the court may have relied upon a wrong ground or assigned an erroneous reason for its decision." State v. Wilburn, 249 Kan. 678, 686, 822 P.2d 609 (1991).
A majority of this court finds the language in K.S.A. 21-3825(d) dispositive of this appeal. That statute provides in pertinent part:
....
The question then becomes when does "in the course of a prosecution" commence? Is it when a crime is committed and an investigation begins, or is it when charges are filed with a court of competent jurisdiction? In this case, an argument can be made that it is somewhere in between, i.e., when the ticket was issued based upon exhibiting someone else's driver's license and upon signing the ticket with the other person's name.
The general rule is that a criminal statute must be strictly construed in favor of the accused, which simply means that words are given their ordinary meaning. Any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected to the criminal statute. State v. Flummerfelt, 235 Kan. 609, 612, 684 P.2d 363 (1984).
K.S.A. 21-3825(d) prohibits "[d]oing any other act in the course of a suit, proceeding or prosecution." (Emphasis added.)
A "suit" is a proceeding in a court for the enforcement of a right. It would not include the investigatory phase in preparing to file a suit. See United States v. Safeway Stores, 140 F.2d 834, 838 (10th Cir.1944); Dobbins et al. v. First Nat. Bank, 112 Ill. 553, 566 (1884); Drake v. Gilmore et al., 52 N.Y. 389, 394-95 (1873).
*135 Additionally, Black's Law Dictionary 1434 (6th ed. 1990) defines "suit" as:
Black's Law Dictionary 1204 (6th ed. 1990) also defines "proceeding":
A "proceeding" is the attempted enforcement of a right or law in a prescribed manner and requires commencement of the action. Matter of Schorer, 154 Misc. 198, 200, 277 N.Y.S. 677 (1935). Mere preparation is not a "proceeding."
The legislature has made the crime of aggravated false impersonation apply to acts in the course of a suit or in the course of a proceeding, which requires that a civil action be filed or a proceeding be commenced. If that is a given, would the legislature intend something different for "in the course of a prosecution"?
Black's Law Dictionary 1221 (6th ed. 1990) defines "prosecution" as:
....
In 1905, this court considered the term "prosecute" and, with approval, set forth:
In the context of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, this court, in State v. Bristor, 236 Kan. 313, 320-22, 691 P.2d 1 (1984), stated:
....
K.S.A. 8-2108, part of the Kansas Uniform Act Regulating Traffic; Arrests, Citations, Penalties, provides:
We see nothing inconsistent between K.S.A. 8-2108 and K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 22-2202(8), which defines a complaint and provides that a notice to appear issued under the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic shall be deemed a valid complaint if it is signed by a law enforcement officer. K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 22-2202(8) does not do away with the specific requirement set forth in 8-2108 that the citation be filed with a court having jurisdiction before it is deemed to be a lawful complaint for the purpose of prosecution. Cf. K.S.A. 12-4201 ("The prosecution for the violation of municipal ordinances shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint with the municipal court."); K.S.A. 22-2301(1) ("Unless otherwise provided by law, a prosecution shall be commenced by filing a complaint with a magistrate."); K.S.A. 22-2303(1) ("In misdemeanor cases and traffic infraction cases a prosecution may be begun by filing an information in the district court").
Giving the words in K.S.A. 21-3825(d) their ordinary meaning, a majority of this court is satisfied the legislature intended, and an ordinary reasonable person reading K.S.A. 21-3825(d) would conclude the statute requires, that the prosecution formally be *138 commenced by a complaint being filed in a court having jurisdiction before "any other act in the course of a prosecution can occur."
Thus, the trial court was correct in dismissing the felony because no act occurred after the complaint was filed that would be a violation of K.S.A. 21-3825(d).
Having so held, the remaining issue is moot.
Affirmed.
SIX, J., dissenting:
At the preliminary hearing, Jacobs testified that he was not familiar with the two traffic tickets in question. Jacobs said that he knew Donlay. He also indicated that the signature at the bottom of the citations was not his and that he never received the tickets. Jacobs stated that he first became aware of the tickets when he received a letter in the mail saying that there was a warrant for his arrest.
Trooper Mayfield testified that he had issued the two citations to an individual he had assumed was Jacobs. He identified Donlay in the courtroom as the person to whom he had actually issued the tickets. Mayfield testified that Donlay admitted he had signed the tickets using Jacobs' name.
The State contends that the basis for the charge was Donlay's act of signing Jacobs' name on the two traffic tickets. According to the State, Donlay falsely represented himself as Jacobs when he gave Mayfield Jacobs' name and driver's license. The State reasons: "In the course of the trooper giving the two (2) tickets to the Defendant, the Defendant committed another act of deception by signing and accepting the two (2) tickets as Matthew J. Jacobs. By the Defendant signing the two (2) tickets, he made Matthew J. Jacobs liable for whatever actions could arise from the prosecution of these traffic offenses. Mr. Jacobs may be liable for the payment of the fine and costs of the traffic tickets, may have his license suspended for not paying the fine and costs, and may be arrested for not appearing in court." The State believes Donlay was trying to avoid both liability for the tickets and being arrested for operating a vehicle while his license was suspended. I agree.
The gist of the offense under K.S.A. 21-3825(d) is the actual or potential harm caused to the person impersonated. See State v. Banks, 14 Kan. App.2d 393, 394, 790 P.2d 962 (1990).
*139 The use of either K.S.A. 8-260(a)(3) or K.S.A. 21-3825(d), as authority for the prosecutor charging Donlay, is at issue in the case at bar. The better view is that the legislature intended a lesser punishment for the simple misuse of a license (K.S.A. 8-260) rather than in the instant situation (where the use produces negative results for a third party as required under the aggravated false impersonation statute, K.S.A. 21-3825[d]). The State acted within its discretion when it charged Donlay under K.S.A. 21-3825(d).
Under K.S.A. 8-2108, a citation is deemed a lawful complaint for the purpose of prosecution when filed. However, K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 22-2202(8) indicates:
K.S.A. 21-3825(d) prohibits: "[d]oing any other act in the course of a suit, proceeding or prosecution." The term "in the course of" used in the context of a criminal charge may be broadly construed to include the event of criminal impersonation giving rise to and connected with a prosecution.
I disagree with the majority's interpretation of K.S.A. 21-3825(d). Reason suggests that the impersonation which placed Jacobs at risk constitutes impersonation in the course of a prosecution. The majority's interpretation of K.S.A. 21-3825(d) has narrowed application of that statute to the point of questionable viability. To what set of circumstances does it now apply? Jacobs, who has been impersonated by Donlay, is summoned to court, not Donlay. What impersonating will Donlay do of Jacobs after the complaint is filed in court? Jacobs is the person the State is looking for. Donlay, in his initial performance as Jacobs, successfully eluded the trooper. Realistically, Donlay playing Jacobs will not seek a return engagement.
I acknowledge the concept of strict construction in favor of the accused; however, the facts in the case at bar fit the criminal *140 misconduct K.S.A. 21-3825(d) was designed to address. The legislature did not intend the result reached by the majority.
LOCKETT and DAVIS, JJ., join the foregoing dissenting opinion.