Case Title: Woolfolk v. Tucker

Citation: 485 So. 2d 1039

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1986-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
485 So. 2d 1039 (1986) Elise WOOLFOLK v. James F. TUCKER. No. 56094. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 5, 1986. *1040 John L. Hatcher, Cleveland, for appellant. William O. Luckett, Jr., Clarksdale, for appellee. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ. ANDERSON, Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Tunica County, wherein the appellant, Elise Woolfolk was found guilty of the malicious prosecution of James F. Tucker. A jury awarded $85,000 in damages to Tucker. From this judgment Woolfolk appeals. In 1981, appellant Elise Woolfolk and her husband moved to Tunica County, Mississippi, from Houston, Texas, and commenced construction of a home. James Tucker, d/b/a Tucker Electric, contracted to do the electrical work. While the house was under construction, the appellant's husband died. Appellee was paid for the contract work, but had done some extra work at the residence and payment for that work was in dispute. The appellee, James F. Tucker, age 52, had been a resident of Tunica for 27 years. He was employed as a service man by Mississippi Power & Light Company and had been an employee of said company since he graduated from high school. He was also sole owner of Tucker Electric Company, a corporation organized on February 5, 1980, which he operated as a sole proprietor prior to that date. On September 25, 1981, while driving a company vehicle, with MP & L insignia, and on company time, the appellee saw a sign advertising appellant's home for sale. He drove the company vehicle onto the property of the appellant to inquire about the payment of her bill with Tucker Electric Company, his privately owned business, since it was apparent that she was planning to move to another location. An intense argument ensued with both parties giving different versions. Appellee Tucker alleges that he approached the appellant in a friendly manner and the following conversation allegedly ensued: The appellant's recollection of this incident was remarkably different. According to appellant the appellee approached her and the following conversation then ensued: The appellant called the sheriff's office and he advised her to contact Justice Court Judge J.W. Thornton. The appellant told the justice court judge what had transpired and he made out an affidavit, had her sign it and issued the warrant for the arrest of the appellee on a charge of disorderly conduct. After Woolfolk left, the Judge called Tucker and advised him of what happened. The judge told Tucker that he would not have to be taken into physical custody and he could simply come by the judge's office at his own convenience to pick up the warrant. Tucker did not have to make bail and was left on his own recognizance and given the time for him to appear at the trial. The only witnesses were the appellant and the appellee, at the hearing which resulted in acquittal of appellee. On February 6, 1982, Tucker filed suit in the Circuit Court of Tunica County charging Woolfolk with malicious prosecution and abuse of process stemming from the September 25, 1981, occurrence, seeking actual damages of $250,000 and punitive damages of $1,000,000. Woolfolk then filed her answer and counter-claim charging plaintiff with trespass and slander seeking the same amount of actual and punitive damages. It should be noted that the complaint filed alleged malicious prosecution and *1042 abuse of process. The clarification of this distinction between the two causes of action, as set out in State for the Use and Benefit of Foster v. Turner, 319 So. 2d 233 (Miss. 1975), would be in order here: This would not be a case of abuse of process, since there is no allegation of abusive or improper use of process after the action was filed. After disposing of that part of the allegation, we address the following assignments of error: A review of the record shows that appellant did not object to instruction P-1 as offered in its original form. Appellant objected to the amended form of P-1 which was denied. Instructions P-2 and D-3 should be examined together. Instruction P-2, which was given, reads: Instruction D-3, which was refused, reads: The elements constituting malicious prosecution were set forth by this Court in Harvill v. Tabor, 240 Miss. 750, 128 So. 2d 863 (1961) as follows: See also, Brown v. Kisner, 192 Miss. 746, 6 So. 2d 611 (1942). It is not disputed that malice and probable cause are essential elements in proving malicious prosecution. Appellant's argument appears to be based on the fact that the terms "malice" and "probable cause" are not specifically stated in the instructions. For purposes of a malicious prosecution action, the term "malice" is used in an artificial and legal sense and simply means the prosecution was instituted "primarily because of a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice." State Life Ins. Co. of Indianapolis, Ind. v. Hardy, 189 Miss. 266, 195 So. 708 (1940). In order to have probable cause for criminal prosecution, the prosecutor must have "(1) an honest belief in the guilt of the person accused, and (2) reasonable grounds for such belief." Harvill v. Tabor, supra, at 865. While the actual words are not used, even the appellant agrees that the definitions of these terms are set out in a clear, specific and accurate manner. While it would probably be error to use the terms without proper definitions for the jury, the converse of that is not necessarily true. The purpose of the instruction is to clearly and accurately instruct the jury and this does not necessarily require the use of any "magic word". The jury instructions must be read as a whole to determine whether the jury was correctly instructed. Jackson v. Griffin, 390 So. 2d 287 (Miss. 1980), Estate of Lawler v. Weston, 451 So. 2d 739 (Miss. 1984). Furthermore, the courts need not grant duplicitous instructions. Allen v. Blanks, 384 So. 2d 63 (Miss. 1980). Under the foregoing rules it would appear that the jury was properly instructed on the elements necessary to establish malicious prosecution. The appellee presented evidence of loss of profits in his private corporation, possible loss of job opportunity, resulting from receipt of the reprimand letter, and mental distress resulting from the embarrassment and loss of reputation. While not assigned as error, the Court notes that damages for loss of profit of Tucker Electric, a separate corporate entity, were claimed by appellee in his individual capacity. However, appellee cannot pierce his own corporate veil at his convenience simply because he is the sole shareholder. An appraisal of the relevant facts show that the behavior of the parties in the initial encounter from which this suit stems is in dispute. Tucker required no medical attention, testimony by appellee's witnesses showed that any doubt or suspicions they entertained were only momentary; the appellee's personal income increased during that period rather than decreased; the letter of reprimand was precipitated by the fact that he did, indeed, stop to conduct private business on company time and was not a result necessarily of the prosecution; and furthermore, Tucker was never arrested or jailed, but picked up the necessary documents at his convenience. There is no evidence to show that appellee suffered any substantial physical, mental or economic damages as a result of the prosecution. While the jury determined that sufficient grounds for liability was established, we are of the opinion that the amount of damages awarded ($85,000) was excessive and contrary to the overwhelming weight of the credible evidence. Therefore, in accord with Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 11-1-55 (1972), we affirm as to liability and reverse and remand for new trial on the issue of damages. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P. JJ., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur.