Case Title: State v. Lhasawa

Citation: 

Docket Number: S46749

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-09-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  September 19, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Respondent on Review,
	v.
PHUNTSOK NGAWANG LHASAWA,
	Petitioner on Review.
(CC 9702-41629; CA A97609; SC S46749)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted September 11, 2000.
	Samuel C. Kauffman, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioner on review.
	Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for respondent on review.  With him on the brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds.
Solicitor General.
	Chin See Ming, of Perkins Coie LLP, Portland, filed the
brief for amicus curiae ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
	GILLETTE, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Multnomah County District Court, Julie E. Frantz, Judge. 159 Or App 667, 979 P2d 774 (1999).
    **Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J. resigned
on June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision of this
case; De Muniz and Balmer, JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
		GILLETTE, J.
		The City of Portland (the City) has adopted several
"civil exclusion" ordinances, under which the City temporarily
excludes from designated areas of the city persons who the police
have arrested for certain crimes.  In the present case, we are
asked to decide whether exclusion under one of those ordinances
is "jeopardy" for purposes of the former jeopardy provision of
the Oregon Constitution or the double jeopardy prohibition in the
United States Constitution.  If it is "jeopardy," then the person
on whom the City has imposed such an exclusion cannot later be
prosecuted criminally for the underlying crime.  For the reasons
that follow, we conclude that exclusion under the ordinance does
not create jeopardy.  We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals'
decision to that same effect.
		The following facts are undisputed.  In February 1997,
defendant was arrested for prostitution, ORS 167.007, a Class A
misdemeanor, in an area that the City had designated as a
"prostitution-free zone" (PFZ).  At the time of the arrest,
police issued to defendant a "notice of exclusion" under Portland
City Code (PCC) section 14.150.030. (1)  The notice stated that,
effective six days from the date of the arrest and for a period
of 90 days thereafter, defendant was prohibited from entering or
remaining in any area of the city that had been designated as a
prostitution-free zone.  Prostitution-free zones are areas that
have been designated as such by the Portland City Council based
on the high number of prostitution-related crimes in those areas. 
PCC § 14.150.010.  At the time of defendant's exclusion, the City
Council had designated three PFZs that extended along several of
the City's major thoroughfares and made up approximately three
percent of the City's area.
		Although defendant was entitled to request a hearing on
the validity of his exclusion, he did not to do so. (2)  However,
when the state later proceeded criminally against defendant on
the underlying prostitution charge, he moved to dismiss, arguing
that the 90-day exclusion was criminal punishment and that any
further attempt to prosecute or punish him for prostitution would
constitute former or double jeopardy.
		The trial court allowed defendant's motion, holding
that criminal prosecution under the circumstances would violate
state and federal double jeopardy principles. (3)

  In reaching that
decision, the court employed the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy
analysis described and applied by the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Halper, 490 US 435, 109 S Ct 1892, 104 L Ed
2d 487 (1989), which since has been disavowed.  See Hudson v.
United States, 522 US 93, 118 S Ct 488, 139 L Ed 2d 450 (1997)
(disavowing in large part the method of analysis used in Halper). 
The trial court did not analyze separately defendant's jeopardy
challenge under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon
Constitution, but instead assumed that the state constitutional
analysis would be the same.  
		On the state's appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. 
In a brief per curiam opinion, the court cited its own opinion in
State v. James, 159 Or App 502, 978 P2d 415 (1999), to the effect
that criminal prosecution for a drug crime that previously had
triggered civil exclusion under a Portland "drug-free zone"
ordinance did not implicate double jeopardy concerns. (4)  After
noting that the ordinance at issue in the present case was
"virtually identical" to the drug-free zone ordinance at issue in
James, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred
in dismissing the indictment against defendant on double jeopardy
grounds.  State v. Lhasawa, 159 Or App 667, 668, 979 P2d 774
(1999).
		Defendant petitioned for review.  We allowed his
petition to decide whether criminal prosecution on prostitution
charges of a person who already has been excluded from a PFZ
under Portland's civil exclusion ordinance subjects that person
to former or double jeopardy.  Consistent with our usual
practice, we first consider that question under the former
jeopardy provision in the Oregon Constitution.  See State v.
Kennedy, 295 Or 262, 262, 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (Supreme Court
addresses all issues of state laws before turning to federal
constitution).
I. FORMER JEOPARDY UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF THE OREGON CONSTITUTION 

A.	Multiple Punishments versus Multiple Prosecutions 
		Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution
provides that "[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the
same offence."  In the present case, the parties agree that
indicting and proceeding against defendant criminally will put
him "in jeopardy" within the meaning of Article I, section 12. 
However, they differ as to whether civil exclusion under the
Portland PFZ ordinance already had placed defendant "in
jeopardy."  Initially, the parties couched their differences in
that regard in terms of whether Article I, section 12, prohibits
"multiple punishments" in addition to "multiple prosecutions." 
In the Court of Appeals, the state argued that Article I, section
12, pertains only to multiple criminal prosecutions and that
defendant had no double jeopardy claim, because he could not show
that he already had been subjected to a criminal prosecution. (5) 
The state appears to have retreated from that view to some
degree, and now argues that "jeopardy" may arise out of a
criminal punishment, i.e., a punishment that lawfully may be
imposed only after a criminal prosecution with all of the
constitutional protections required in such proceedings.  The
state also argues, however, that defendant's exclusion under
Portland's prostitution-free zone ordinance is not a criminal
punishment.
		The foregoing focus on whether Article I, section 12,
applies to cases of multiple punishment is an unnecessary detour,
in our view.  Although it may be that multiple punishments that
arise out of a single proceeding do not create a double jeopardy
issue, (6) that proposition does not describe the circumstances of
this case.  Here, although there is or will be only on formal
criminal proceeding, the "punishment" of exclusion has no real
connection to that proceeding.  Instead, the exclusion arises out
of a separate process, which is initiated by an individual police
officer's decision to arrest a suspected offender on prostitution
charges and which may, if the offender desires, involve a hearing
in court before the exclusion takes effect.  See PCC § 14.150.160
(providing for appeal of exclusion notice).
		In this case, then, the question is not whether the
former jeopardy prohibition of Article I, section 12, is
implicated when lawmakers attach "multiple punishments" to the
same conduct in, or by means of, a single criminal prosecution. 
Rather, it is whether the former jeopardy prohibition applies
when, in addition to the ordinary criminal consequences of
particular forbidden conduct, a second sanction or consequence is
meted out in a separate proceeding that is not, at least in name,
a criminal prosecution.  So understood, that question really is
no different than the question that this court recently addressed
in State v. Selness, ___ Or ___, ___ P3d ___  (decided this
date), viz., was a nominally "civil" proceeding under Oregon Laws
1989, chapter 791, that resulted in forfeiture of a home on the
ground that the home was used in illegal manufacture of
marijuana, "jeopardy" for purposes of Article I, section 12?  We
turn to that opinion to aid us in resolving the present case.
B.	Selness and Former Jeopardy under Article I, section 12
		In Selness, this court set out the following test for
determining whether a proceeding, although nominally "civil,"
amounts to jeopardy for purposes of Article I, section 12. 
First, we determine whether the legislature (or other governing
body) intended the proceeding in question to be civil.  If we
conclude that the legislature did manifest such an intent, then
we look for evidence that, despite the civil designation or
intention, the proceeding is "so far criminal in its nature" that
it is "jeopardy" within the meaning of Article I, section 12. 
The latter inquiry focuses on four factors or "indicia":  (1) the
use of procedures that are strongly associated with the criminal
law, such as indictment, arrest, and detention; (2) the potential
for imposition of a penalty that is traditionally criminal or
"infamous," or that cannot be explained fully in terms of the
penalty's supposed civil purpose; (3) the potential for a
judgment or penalty that carries public stigma on the individual;
and (4) the existence of collateral consequences that amount to
criminal penalties, either by themselves or in combination with
the direct consequences of the underlying acts.  If we conclude,
on the basis of our examination of those factors, that the
proceeding is criminal in nature, then we will hold that the
proceeding is "jeopardy" for purposes of Article I, section 12,
and that further criminal prosecution of the matter is
prohibited.  See Selness, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 29-30)
(setting out that test).
C.	Application of Former Jeopardy under Article I, section 12,
to the PFZ Ordinance 
		We will not belabor the issue of legislative intent. 
It is clear that the Portland City Council intended to create a
civil process and sanction when it adopted the PFZ ordinance. 
The question is whether, in spite of the council's intent, the
proceeding that results in exclusion under the ordinance is
criminal in nature.  We answer that question by examining the
exclusion procedure in light of the four factors identified in
Selness.
	1.	Use of Procedures Associated with Criminal Prosecution 
		The use of arrest, detention, or other similar police
procedures that ordinarily are associated with criminal law
enforcement may suggest that a nominally civil proceeding in fact
is criminal in nature.  Selness, __ Or at __ (slip op at 23);
Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct., 280 Or 95, 108, 570 P2d 52
(1977).  One amicus suggests that the criminal nature of the PFZ
exclusion process is demonstrated by the fact that, under the PFZ
ordinance, arrest for one of the specified prostitution crimes is
an essential precondition for issuance of an exclusion order. 
PCC § 14.150.030.  However, although arrest is a necessary
precondition to the exclusion process, that process is not part
of the criminal prosecution that may follow from the arrest, but
arises out of a separate source of law.  Indeed, the police have
no authority under the PFZ ordinance itself to arrest individuals
for committing prostitution-related crimes. (7)  Thus, the fact that
individuals may be excluded from PFZs only after being arrested
for a prostitution crime does not demonstrate that the PFZ
exclusion process is criminal, rather than civil. 
	2.	Nature of the Potential Penalty	
		Under this second factor, we look to see if the actual
or potential sanction is "infamous" or one that traditionally has
been regarded as criminal punishment.  Selness, __ Or at __ (slip
op at 29).  Defendant suggests that this factor is definitive --
that exclusion under the PFZ ordinance is equivalent to
banishment, a sanction that has been employed for centuries as
criminal punishment.  Defendant notes, in that regard, that
"banishment" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 183 (Rev 4th ed
1968) as "a punishment inflicted upon criminals, by compelling
them to quit a city, place or country for a specified period of
time, or for life."  Defendant also notes that the United States
Supreme Court has referred to banishment as a "harsh punishment,"
even in the eyes of those who were "accustomed to brutality in
the administration of criminal justice."  Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168 n 23, 83 S Ct 554, 9 L Ed 2d 644 (1963)
(quoting David W. Moxey, Loss of Nationality:  Individual Choice
or Government Fiat?  26 Albany L Rev 151, 164 (1962)).
		Defendant's attempted analogy between banishment and
exclusion under the PFZ ordinance is not apt.  As the state
points out, banishment traditionally meant exclusion from a
sovereign's entire territory for life or a significant period of
time.  The exclusion at issue here, in contrast, pertains for a
limited period of time to a limited part of the city's area.  In
that sense, PFZ exclusions are more like certain restraining
orders and injunctions, which are imposed to maintain order
within a designated geographical area or to protect specific
persons from harassment or physical harm.  See, e.g., ORS 163.738
(providing for issuance of stalking protective order by court);
ORS 107.718(1)(c) (providing for order, on petition by victim of
domestic abuse, restraining abuser from entering "a reasonable
area surrounding the petitioner's * * * residence"); see also
Portland Fem. Women's H. Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 859
F2d 681 (9th Cir 1988) (approving order enjoining right-to-life
advocates from entering "free zone" extending along sidewalk to
the right and left of abortion clinic's front door).  We have
found nothing in the case law surrounding those kinds of orders
that suggests that they are considered, or historically have been
considered, to be criminal punishments.         
		The analogy to banishment that defendant proposes
becomes even more tenuous when one considers that the exclusion
ordinance expressly provides for variances to protect the health,
welfare, and well-being of the targeted individuals, and even
mandates the granting of variances for such persons who reside or
work in a PFZ.  PCC § 14.150.160(2(b)). (8)  By contrast, the
historical punishment of banishment stripped offenders of home,
citizenship, and livelihood.  Because the exclusion ordinance
allows offenders to avoid those consequences, we do not deem it
comparable. (9) 
		Defendant suggests that, the analogy to banishment
aside, the deprivation of any civil right because of past conduct
historically has been viewed as punishment for constitutional
purposes.  He points to the following statement in Cummings v.
The State of Missouri, 71 US (4 Wall) 277, 321-22, 18 L Ed 356
(1866):
"The theory upon which our political institutions rest
is, that all men have certain inalienable rights --
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness; and that in the pursuit of happiness all
avocations, all honors, all positions, are alike open
to everyone, and that in the protection of these rights
all are equal before the law.  Any deprivation or
suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is
punishment, and can be in no otherwise defined."
		The foregoing passage extols the sacred virtue of
opportunity; it clearly does not speak to the far more practical
question that is at issue here, viz., whether the particular
deprivation that is at issue historically has been viewed as a
criminal punishment.  We are satisfied that it has not.
		We also consider under that Selness factor whether the
sanction in question is such that it cannot be explained in terms
of the civil purpose that it supposedly serves.  Selness, __ Or
at ___ (slip op at 29).  Defendant invokes that factor when he
argues that exclusions under the PFZ ordinance far exceed what is
necessary, both in terms of geography and affected activities, to
achieve the city's legitimate, remedial goals.  With regard to
geography, defendant points to the trial court's finding that the
PFZs follow a number of important thoroughfares and that "it
would be extremely difficult to move through substantial portions
of the city without at least crossing one of these lineal zones." 
With regard to activities, defendant argues that exclusion under
the ordinance unreasonably and unnecessarily makes legitimate,
everyday activities, like commuting to work and driving to the
airport, more difficult.  Defendant suggests that the PFZs could
have been designed to minimize those impacts by, for example,
permitting excluded individuals to travel on interstate freeways
and major arterial streets.
		Defendant also argues that the PFZ scheme is excessive
because it is unnecessary, given the legal mechanisms already in
place.  Defendant notes that the City already prohibits many
prostitution-related activities, such as repeatedly circling an
area in a motor vehicle and beckoning to pedestrians and drivers,
and that those activity-based prohibitions are appropriate and
sufficient.  Defendant also suggests that the city could achieve
its goals by imposing narrowly tailored exclusions in criminal
proceedings against individual defendants who are charged with
prostitution crimes, as a condition of release.
		Defendant is laboring under a misapprehension with
regard to the nature of our inquiry.  We never have suggested
that a sanction must be "narrowly tailored" to the remedial goals
that it serves if it is to avoid classification as criminal
punishment.  The test that we have proposed is less exacting:  It
asks only whether the sanction is so excessive that it cannot be
justified in terms of the civil purpose that it ostensibly
serves.  Selness, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 29). 
		The exclusion ordinance passes that test.  Despite
defendant's argument to the contrary, it is evident that the
geographical designs of the PFZs are linked closely to the
remedial purpose of inhibiting prostitution in areas that have
become centers of prostitution activity.  Exhibits in the record
show that the areas designated as PFZs at the time of defendant's
exclusion under the ordinance in fact were experiencing a
significantly higher level of prostitution arrests than other
parts of the city. (10)    
		As noted, defendant suggests that the configuration of
the PFZs makes exclusion unnecessarily burdensome, in that
excluded persons are prohibited from driving on or even crossing
through parts of Portland's most important arterial streets. 
However, given that those major arterials are the prostitution
centers, and that prostitutes and their clients generally find
one another by driving along or through those streets, we cannot
say that the City was overreaching when it designed the PFZs in
the way that it did.  
		With respect to defendant's suggestion that the City
has other mechanisms in place for preventing prostitution
activities in the targeted areas, that argument says nothing
about whether exclusion under the PFZ ordinance is excessive.  We
reject that argument without further discussion.
		Finally, we note that defendant's claims of
excessiveness are diminished by the fact and nature of the
variances that the ordinance provides.  To be sure, exclusion
from a portion of the city can be burdensome, depending on the
excluded person's individual circumstances.  However, if affected
individuals are entitled to a variance because they live or work
in an exclusion zone and may, at the discretion of designated
officials and agencies, obtain additional variances for reasons
of health, welfare, or well-being, PCC § 14.150.160(2)(b), then
the burdens that accompany exclusion are considerably less than
they might be.  Although defendant takes great pains to point out
that the granting of variances is in part discretionary, we
cannot assume that city officials will deny legitimate requests
for variances, particularly when the individual who makes the
request can show that an exclusion is particularly burdensome.
		For the foregoing reasons, we reject defendant's
contention that the punitive effects of exclusion under the PFZ
ordinance are so excessive, in relation to the remedial purpose
that exclusion serves, that exclusion should be deemed a criminal
sanction and the exclusion process a criminal prosecution for
purposes of Article I, section 12.    
	3.	Stigmatizing Significance 
		Some level of public stigma may attach to an exclusion
under Portland's PFZ ordinance.  We must determine, however,
whether that public stigma is stigma of the individual, and not
simply public disapproval of the behavior.  See Selness, __ Or at
__ (slip op at 26) (setting the standard).
		We are persuaded that the stigma associated with
exclusion under the PFZ ordinance is no more stigmatizing of the
individual involved than domestic abuse restraining orders, ORS
107.718(1)(c), and other similar civil orders aimed at preventing
violence and disorder, rather than at punishing past crimes. 
See, e.g., Portland Fem. Women's H. Ctr., 859 F2d at 681-85
(approving order enjoining right-to-life advocates from entering
area around abortion clinic's front door).
	4.	Collateral Consequences  
		The last of the four factors we have identified as
relevant in this context -- whether any collateral consequences
that attach to the proceeding have attributes of a criminal
sanction -- does not appear to be relevant in this case. 
Defendant has not argued that any collateral consequences attach
and none otherwise have come to our attention.
D.	Conclusion     
		We have considered the exclusion ordinance in light of
the four factors identified in Selness.  We have found nothing in
the course of that analysis that conflicts with the Portland City
Council's clear intent to create a civil, remedial process and
sanction.  Consequently, we hold that exclusion under PCC section
14.150.030 is not a criminal sanction or process and, therefore,
does not constitute former jeopardy under Article I, section 12,
of the Oregon Constitution. 
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 

A.	The Federal Double Jeopardy Analysis
		We next consider whether exclusion under the ordinance
is jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. (11)  The federal double jeopardy analysis is similar,
but not identical, to the one that we have applied for purposes
of Oregon's former jeopardy prohibition.  Under the federal
analysis, the reviewing court first asks whether the legislating
body, in enacting the statutory scheme, indicated an intent to
create either a civil or criminal sanction.  See United States v.
Hudson, 522 US at 99 (so stating).  Then, if that inquiry reveals
that the legislating body intended to create a civil sanction,
the reviewing court considers whether the scheme is "so punitive
either in purpose or effect * * * as to transform what was
clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."  Id.
(citations omitted).  In making that latter determination, courts
have been instructed to consider the following seven factors:  
"(1) '[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint'; (2) 'whether it has
historically been regarded as punishment'; (3) 'whether
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter'; (4)
'whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment -- retribution and deterrence'; (5)
'whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime'; (6) 'whether an alternative purpose to which it
may rationally be connected is assignable for it'; and
(7) 'whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned.'"
Hudson, 522 US at 99-100 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 US at 168-69.  Reviewing courts are reminded, moreover, that
"only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative
intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy
into a criminal penalty."  Hudson, 522 US at.  See also United
States v. Ursery, 518 US 267, 290, 135 L Ed 2d 549, 116 S Ct 2135
(1996) (stating "clearest proof" standard).
B.	Applying the Federal Double Jeopardy Analysis
		We already have identified a clear intent on the part
of the body that adopted the PFZ scheme to create a civil, rather
than a criminal, sanction.  We thus turn to the seven factors
that the federal cases identify as relevant.
	1.	Affirmative Disability or Restraint
		The exact boundaries of the first factor in the federal
analysis -- whether the sanction involves an "affirmative
disability or restraint" -- never have been clarified.  Although
more recent United States Supreme Court decisions appear to
suggest that nothing short of imprisonment would qualify as an
affirmative disability or restraint, (12) earlier authorities
suggest that the term encompasses a broader range of restraints,
including permanent exclusion from a vocation, but not denial of
a noncontractual government benefit.  See, e.g., Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US at 168 n 22 (suggesting that deportation of, and
denial of passports to, draft evaders amount to "affirmative
restraints", and citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 US 603, 80 S Ct
1367, 4 L Ed 2d 1435 (1960) (termination of social security
benefits), United States v. Lovett, 328 US 303, 66 S Ct 1073, 90
L Ed 1252 (1946) (statute prohibiting payment of salary or
compensation to named government employees), and Ex parte
Garland, 71 US (4 Wall) 333, 18 L Ed 366 (1867) (exclusion from
practice of law)).  At the very least, the factor appears to
refer to some kind of serious impingement on personal liberty.
		Although exclusion from a part of a city is some
restraint on personal liberty, we are persuaded that exclusions
under the ordinance are not serious enough to qualify as
"affirmative restraints."  We reach that conclusion for a number
of reasons.  First, the exclusions are temporary -- 90 days in
duration.  Second, they are geographically limited, i.e., they
pertain to a relatively small portion of the city.  Finally, they
are open to variance:  Under the ordinance, the City must grant a
variance request to a person who works or lives within a PFZ and
may grant a variance for other reasons relating to the health,
welfare, or well-being of the excluded person.  PCC §
14.150.160(2)(b).  We hold that exclusion under Portland's PFZ
ordinance is not an "affirmative restraint," as that concept is
used in the federal cases.    
	2.	Historical View of Sanction
		As noted above, defendant argues that exclusion under
the PFZ ordinance is the equivalent of banishment, a sanction
that, by long tradition, is criminal punishment.  We have
responded to that argument at length in our analysis of
defendant's former jeopardy claim under Article I, section 12, of
the Oregon Constitution.  We reject the argument here for the
same reasons that we rejected it in that context.
	3.	Scienter 
		The third of the seven factors asks whether imposition
of the sanction at issue is dependent on a finding of scienter. 
It seems clear that, with respect to exclusion under the PFZ
ordinance, the answer is "yes":  Under that ordinance, if a
person challenges an exclusion notice, the exclusion will be
sustained only if the state proves, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the person committed one of the prostitution-related crimes listed in PCC section 14.150.030, all of which
require some proof of intent.  PCC § 14.150.160(1)(c).
		The question remains whether that fact alone marks the
PFZ scheme as a criminal proceeding.  Ultimately, we are
persuaded that it does not.  Although it is true that some level
of intent is required before an actor may be held criminally
liable, a scienter requirement is not necessarily inconsistent
with liability under some civil, remedial scheme.  Here, the
scienter requirement is part of a larger requirement that the
exclusions be directed at persons who have committed the
specified criminal acts.  But exclusion is not imposed to punish
those crimes.  Rather, it seeks to prevent further crime by
keeping persons who have been identified either as probable
prostitutes or their customers away from their customary
marketplaces.  In that respect, the ordinance is remedial and,
unless there is some prohibition against applying both civil and
criminal consequences to the same act (and the United States
Supreme Court has indicated that there is not, Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 US 391, 399, 82 L Ed 917, 58 S Ct 630 (1938)), we
cannot accept the mere fact that the ordinance contains a
scienter requirement as a clear indication that the scheme is
criminal in nature. 
	4.	Is the Behavior Targeted by the Proceeding Already a
Crime?
		Despite its persistent inclusion in the list of factors
to be considered at the second stage of the analysis, it is clear
that the United States Supreme Court considers the fact that the
targeted conduct already is a crime to be all but irrelevant. 
See Ursery, 518 US at 292 (fact that forfeiture statutes are tied
to criminal activity insufficient to render statutes punitive);
see also Helvering, 303 US at 399 ("Congress may impose both a
criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or
omission").  We give that factor little weight.
  	5.	Does the Sanction Serve a Punitive Purpose? 
		Defendant argues that the PFZ exclusion ordinance
serves a punitive purpose, because it seeks to incapacitate
individuals from committing future crimes.  Defendant also argues
that the PFZ ordinance serves the punitive goal of retribution,
"because it goes far beyond what is necessary for any remedial
purpose."  Finally, defendant argues that the ordinance is
intended to be a deterrent to further criminal conduct and is
therefore punitive in that respect.
		Even if defendant were correct that exclusion serves as
a deterrent, that fact is of little value to our analysis.
Deterrence is a legitimate remedial purpose and its presence is
perfectly compatible with a conclusion that a proceeding and
sanction is civil.  See Hudson, 522 US at 105 (stating that
deterrence may serve both civil and criminal goals).  The same
can be said of defendant's contention that exclusion under the
ordinance serves to incapacitate persons from committing further
crimes.  Incapacitation, in that sense, is a remedial goal.
		Defendant does not suggest that that PFZ ordinance
states a retributive purpose, and does not offer evidence --
assuming such evidence would be pertinent -- that the City
Council had a hidden retributive agenda when it enacted the
ordinance.  As to defendant's contention that exclusion is
retributive because it "goes far beyond what is necessary for any
remedial purpose," that argument properly belongs under the
seventh factor in the federal test, i.e., whether the sanction is
"excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned," and
we shall consider it under that topic.  In summary, we do not
find that the PFZ ordinance is punitive, as opposed to remedial.  
	6.	Does the Sanction Serve a Civil Purpose?
		Defendant concedes that exclusion under PCC section
14.150.030 serves the remedial purpose of improving quality of
life in areas that have become notorious for their high level of
prostitution activity.  In addition to that conceded purpose, it
is clear from the record that the exclusion serves an even more
basic remedial purpose -- that of preventing prostitution
activity by keeping prostitutes and their customers out of areas
that have evolved into marketplaces for such activities.
	7.	Is the Sanction Excessive?
		We already have considered, and rejected, defendant's
argument that exclusion under the PFZ ordinance is excessive in
relation to its remedial purposes, in the context of our analysis
under the state constitution's former jeopardy provision.
C.	Conclusion
		We have applied all the factors that are mentioned in
the federal double jeopardy cases to Portland's PFZ ordinance. 
Our analysis of those factors does not persuade us by the
required "clearest proof" standard that the Portland City Council
failed in its effort to create a remedial process and sanction. 
Exclusion under the PFZ ordinance is neither criminal punishment
nor jeopardy for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.




1. 	PCC section 14.150.030 provides, in part:
	"A person is subject to exclusion for a period of
ninety (90) days from the public streets, sidewalks and
other public ways in all prostitution-free zones
designated in Code Chapter 14.150 if that person has
been arrested or otherwise taken into custody within
any prostitution-free zone for any prostitution related
activities including [list of prostitution-related
crimes].
	"* * * * *
	"If a person excluded from a prostitution-free
zone is found therein during the exclusion period, that
person is subject to immediate arrest for criminal
trespass in the second degree pursuant to ORS 164.245." 

2. 	Under the ordinance, an appeal must be filed in writing
within five days of the issuance of the notice.  During the
pendency of the appeal, the exclusion does not take effect.  If
an affected person does appeal, then a hearing is held.  At the
hearing, the City has the burden of showing by a preponderance of
the evidence that the exclusion is based on conduct that
constitutes a targeted prostitution-related crime.  PCC §
14.150.160(1).  

3. 	Defendant's motion to dismiss was combined for purposes
of briefing and argument with similar challenges by other
criminal defendants who had been subjected to exclusion under the
prostitution-free zone ordinance and a similar drug-free zone
ordinance.  The Multnomah County District Court dismissed all the
indictments (including defendant's) in a single order.  Only
defendant's case is before us on review.
4. 	In James, the Court of Appeals applied the Fifth
Amendment double jeopardy analysis most recently employed by the
United States Supreme Court in Hudson.  Based on that analysis,
the Court of Appeals concluded that exclusion orders under the
Portland ordinances do not raise double jeopardy concerns under
the United States Constitution.  James, 159 Or App at 507-13. 
The court then considered the parties' arguments vis-;aga-vis the
former jeopardy clause in Article I, section 12, of the Oregon
Constitution, which centered on the applicability of the analysis
set out in Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct., 280 Or 95, 570
P2d 52 (1977).  The Court of Appeals concluded that the Brown
analysis was not relevant and that an historical investigation
like that used in this court's decision in State ex rel Juv.
Dept. v. Reynolds, 317 Or 560, 857 P2d 842 (1993), would be more
appropriate.  After noting that the defendant had not offered an
argument of that kind, the court concluded that criminal
prosecution of an individual who has been subjected to temporary
exclusion under the Portland drug-free zone ordinance does not
violate the former jeopardy clause of Article I, section 12. 
James, 159 Or App at 513-16. 

5. 	In so arguing, the state adopted the position advanced
by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Department of Revenue of
Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 US 767, 128 L Ed 2d 767, 114 S Ct
1937 (1994), that the notion of double jeopardy applying to
multiple punishments is a relatively recent construct and does
not take into account the fact that, at the time of the drafting
of the Fifth Amendment, legislation providing two sanctions for
the same misconduct was quite common.

6. 	See State v. Welch, 264 Or 388, 505 P2d 910 (1973)
(holding that cumulation of penalties is not a double jeopardy
problem and that double jeopardy does not arise unless a person
is "tried" twice).

7. 	The ordinance does provide for arrest of individuals
who trespass into the PFZ in violation of an exclusion order. 
PCC § 14.150.030.  However, that part of the ordinance is not at
issue in this case.  

8. 	PCC section 14.150.160(2)(b) provides:  
	"Variances f[ro]m an exclusion may be granted at
any time during the exclusion period by either the
Chief of Police or designate or by a social service
agency which provides services within the prostitution-free zones for which the variance is granted, only for
reasons relating to the health, welfare, or well-being
of the person excluded, or for prostitution-related
counseling services.  Only those service agencies which
have written rules and regulations prohibiting
prostitution-related activities by their clients and
which have entered into a written agreement with the
Bureau of Police concerning the applicability and
enforceability of those rules are eligible to grant
variances.  The Chief of Police shall grant a variance
to any person who can establish that he or she:
	"i.  Was a bona fide resident of the
prostitution-free zone, other than transient
occupancy in a hotel or motel, prior to
receipt of the exclusion notice; or
	"ii.  Was a bona fide owner, principal or
employee of a place of lawful employment
located in one of the designated
prostitution-free zones.
	"iii.  All variances shall be in writing, for
a specific period and only to accommodate a
specific purpose, all of which shall be
stated on the variance.  The person shall
keep the variance on his or her person at all
times the person is within the prostitution-free zone.  In the event a person having a
variance is found to be outside the scope of
the terms of the variance, the variance shall
immediately become void and that person is
thereupon subject to arrest for trespass."   

9. 	Defendant attempts to downplay the significance of the
variances by noting that the granting of a "health, welfare or
well-being" variance is wholly at the discretion of the Chief of
Police or specified social service providers.  However, the
variances for residence and employment are not discretionary, and
the fact that those residence and employment variances are part
of the PFZ ordinance is sufficient, in itself, to distinguish
Portland's PFZ scheme from the historical punishment of
banishment.

10. 	Under the express terms of the ordinance, PFZs are
areas of the city "where the number of arrests for [prostitution
crimes] is significantly higher than for other similarly
situated/sized areas of the City."  PCC § 14.150.010. 

11. 	The relevant wording of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides:  "[N]or shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb."

12. 	In Hudson, for example, the United States Supreme Court
held that being barred from the banking profession 
	"do[es] not involve an 'affirmative disability or
restraint,' as that term is normally understood.  While
petitioners have been prohibited from further
participating in the banking industry, this is
'certainly nothing approaching the "infamous
punishment" of imprisonment.'" 
 522 US at 104 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 US 603, 617, 4 L
Ed 2d 1435, 80 S Ct 1367 (1960).