Case Title: Stogsdill v. Board of Parole

Citation: 

Docket Number: S53458

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: February 8, 2007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE STOGSDILL,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND 
POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Respondent on Review.
(CA A119694; SC S53458)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Submitted on the record on December 20, 2006.
Irene B. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, filed the
petition for review for petitioner on review.  With her on the
petition for review were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and
Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
No filing contra.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson,** Gillette,
Durham, Balmer, Kistler, and Walters, JJ.***
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of the
Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision are affirmed.
*Judicial Review from the Board of Parole and Post-Prison
Supervision.
204 Or App 779, 132 P3d 62 (2006).
**Carson, J., retired December 31, 2006, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.
***Linder, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
KISTLER, J.
ORS 144.125(3) (1) provides that the Board of Parole
and Post-Prison Supervision (board) may postpone a prisoner's
scheduled release date if the board finds that the prisoner has a
"present severe emotional disturbance such as to constitute a
danger to the health or safety of the community."  In this case,
the board found by a preponderance of the evidence that
petitioner had such a condition, and petitioner sought judicial
review arguing that the Due Process Clause required the board to
apply a higher standard of proof.  The Court of Appeals affirmed
the board's order without opinion.  Stogsdill v. Board of Parole,
204 Or App 779, 132 P3d 62 (2006).  We allowed review and now
affirm the Court of Appeals decision.
In 1986, petitioner shot and killed his estranged
wife's boyfriend, struck his wife with the gun, and then shot
another woman.  As a result of those acts, petitioner pled guilty
to murder, second-degree assault, and fourth-degree assault.  The
trial court sentenced petitioner to life imprisonment with a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence on the murder conviction and two
lesser, concurrent sentences on the assault convictions.
Pursuant to ORS 144.120, the board set an initial
release date for petitioner of February 5, 2000. (2)  In 2000,
the board postponed petitioner's release date, pursuant to ORS
144.125(3), (3) until December 5, 2002.  In 2002, the board
again considered whether to postpone petitioner's release date. 
During an "exit interview," the board asked petitioner about the
crimes that he had committed and his progress within the
institution.  In addition to petitioner's answers, the board had
before it a recent psychological evaluation of petitioner,
evidence from earlier hearings, and testimony from the sister of
the person whom petitioner had killed.  Based on that record, the
board found by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner
"suffers from a present severe emotional disturbance that
constitutes a danger to the health or safety of the community." 
Pursuant to ORS 144.125(3), the board postponed petitioner's
release date for two years.
After exhausting his administrative remedies,
petitioner filed a petition for judicial review of the board's
order postponing his release.  Among other things, petitioner
argued that the Due Process Clause required the board to find the
requisite facts by clear and convincing evidence rather than by a
preponderance of the evidence.  As noted, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the board's order without opinion, and we allowed review
to consider whether due process required the board to find the
facts by clear and convincing evidence. (4)
Before turning to that federal constitutional issue, we
begin with the subsidiary state law question of who bears the
risk of nonpersuasion.  See Davis v. Board of Parole, 341 Or 442,
445-47, 144 P3d 931 (2006) (analyzing subsidiary state law issues
before deciding whether due process required proof by clear and
convincing evidence).  Two statutes bear on that analysis.  ORS
144.120 directs the board to set an initial release date for most
prisoners admitted to the Department of Corrections.  See
Engweiler v. Board of Parole, 340 Or 361, 367-71, 133 P3d 910
(2006) (discussing initial release dates).  Another statute
provides that, having set a release date, the board may postpone
a scheduled release date if it finds that the prisoner has a
"present severe emotional disturbance such as to constitute a
danger to the health or safety of the community."  ORS
144.125(3). (5)
Under those statutes, petitioner is entitled to be
released unless the board is persuaded that he has a present
severe emotional disturbance that constitutes a danger to the
health or safety of the community.  See ORS 144.245 (explaining
effect of a release date).  Under that statutory scheme,
petitioner has an interest in having the board employ a higher
standard of proof.  Compare Davis, 341 Or at 447-48 (holding
that, under a different statutory scheme, the prisoner had no
interest in having the board apply a higher standard of proof). 
That is, if due process requires proof by clear and convincing
evidence, as petitioner argues, then petitioner would be entitled
to be released if the board were persuaded by a preponderance of
the evidence (but not by clear and convincing evidence) that he
had a present severe emotional disturbance that made him a danger
to the community.  We accordingly turn to the question whether
due process required the board to find the facts by clear and
convincing evidence.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."  Procedural
due process claims present two issues.  See Wilkinson v. Austin,
545 US 209, 224, 125 S Ct 2384, 162 L Ed 2d 174 (2005)
(explaining analysis).  The first issue is whether the state has
deprived a person of a liberty or property interest within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause.  Id.  If it has, the second
issue is what process is due.  Id.
In this case, petitioner argues that the state statutes
directing the board to set a release date created a protected
liberty interest, which required the board to provide him with
some process.  As to that issue, we agree with petitioner.  The
United States Supreme Court has long recognized that state law
can give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest. 
See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 US 539, 557, 94 S Ct 2963, 41 L Ed 2d
935 (1974) (recognizing proposition).  In 1995, the Court limited
the types of state laws that would create protected liberty
interests and overruled earlier decisions holding that mandatory
state laws always created protected liberty interests.  See
Sandin v. Conner, 515 US 472, 483-84, 115 S Ct 2293, 132 L Ed 2d
418 (1995) (so holding).  However, in overruling those decisions,
the Court reaffirmed its decision in Wolff that a state law
granting prisoners good time credits (which reduce the length of
a prisoner's sentence) created a constitutionally protected
liberty interest, which the state could not revoke without
providing some process.  See id. at 480, 483 (reaffirming Wolff). 
In this case, the board postponed petitioner's release
date.  The board's order resulted in the denial of petitioner's
early release from prison, much in the same way that the
revocation of good time credits resulted in the denial of early
release in Wolff.  As the Court recognized in Wolff and
reaffirmed in Sandin, a prisoner's state-created interest in
being released early from prison is an interest of "real
substance," which the state may not deny without due process. 
See id.  The question that remains, however, is how much process
is due.  On that question, petitioner focuses solely on the
standard of proof that the board employed. (6)  He argues that
due process required the board to find the facts by clear and
convincing evidence rather than by a preponderance of the
evidence.  We turn to that question.
The United States Supreme Court has employed a three-factor balancing test, first set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
US 319, 96 S Ct 893, 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), to determine the
standard of proof that due process requires.  See Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 US 745, 758, 102 S Ct 1388, 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982)
(applying that test to determine standard of proof required in
parental termination proceedings).  The Court explained that test
in Mathews:
"[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due
process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors:  First, the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail."
424 US at 335.
Regarding the first factor, the private interest at
stake, petitioner has a state-created right to be released on
parole unless the board finds that he suffers from a present
severe emotional disturbance that presents a danger to the health
or safety of the community.  Postponing a scheduled release date
results in a substantial deprivation of liberty.  In evaluating
the significance of that deprivation, we note that the Court has
distinguished among three related but separate deprivations:  a
criminal conviction, the revocation of parole, and the
deprivation of good time credits.  The Court has recognized that,
of those three deprivations, the deprivation of good time credits
is the least significant.
Regarding the revocation of parole, the Court has
explained that parole arises after, and as a consequence of, a
criminal conviction.  Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 US 471, 480, 92 S
Ct 2593, 33 L Ed 2d 484 (1972).  It follows that revocation of
parole "deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional
liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole
restrictions."  Id.  The revocation of parole, while a "grievous
loss," is of less weight in the Mathews balance than the loss of
"absolute liberty" that results from a criminal conviction.  See
id. at 481.
Regarding the deprivation of good time credits, the
Court has explained that, unlike the revocation of parole, "[t]he
deprivation [of good time credits and the resulting denial of
early release], very likely, does not then and there work any
change in the conditions of [the prisoner's] liberty."  Wolff,
418 US at 561.  Rather, revocation of good time credits
"postpone[s] the date of eligibility for parole and extend[s] the
maximum time to be served" unless the prison officials decide to
restore the revoked credits.  Id.  Although the Court cautioned
against "unrealistically discount[ing]" the significance of
revoking good time credits, it concluded that revoking good time
credits is "qualitatively and quantitatively different from the
revocation of parole or probation."  Id.
The private interest at stake in this case falls
somewhere between that implicated by revocation of parole and
deprivation of good time credits.  Although revoking good time
credits may not always result in denying a prisoner early
release, see Wolff, 418 US at 561 (recognizing that proposition),
postponing a release date almost always will affect a prisoner's
actual date of parole.  However, postponing the release date is
similar to revoking good time credits in that it continues the
prisoner's existing status; it does not deprive a prisoner of
either absolute or conditional freedom as do conviction and
revocation of parole.  It follows, we think, that the interest
affected by postponing a release date is closer to the
deprivation of good time credits than it is to the revocation of
parole.
In evaluating the significance of petitioner's
interest, we also note that the stigma associated with a criminal
conviction is far greater than the stigma associated with a
determination that a prisoner is ineligible for early release. 
See In re Winship, 397 US 358, 373-74, 90 S Ct 1068, 25 L Ed 2d
368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing stigma associated
with delinquency determination in concluding that due process
required heightened standard of proof).  The board's
determination that continued confinement is appropriate because
the prisoner has a condition that makes him or her a danger to
the community simply reaffirms, in many respects, the original
determination implicit in the judgment of conviction that
confinement was necessary both for the prisoner's reformation and
the community's safety.
Finally, we note that the board's determination does
not result in a permanent deprivation, as did the actions at
issue in Santosky and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health, 497 US 261, 110 S Ct 2841, 111 L Ed 2d 224 (1990).  This
is not a case in which the state is seeking to terminate parental
rights, as in Santosky, nor is it a case in which clear and
convincing proof that an incompetent person wanted to have life-sustaining medical treatment withdrawn was required, as in
Cruzan.  In both those instances, the Court recognized that an
erroneous determination would not be "susceptible of correction,"
and it focused on that fact in holding that a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard complied with due process.  Cruzan,
497 US at 283; Santosky, 455 US at 759.  In this case, by
contrast, an erroneous decision does not result in a permanent
deprivation.  Rather, the board deferred petitioner's release for
a two-year period, and ORS 144.122 permitted petitioner to ask
the board to "reset [the scheduled release date] to an earlier
date" than that.
The second Mathews factor is "the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of [the private] interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards."  Mathews, 424 US at 335.  In applying
that factor to issue of the standard of proof, the Court has
explained that "the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the
due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the
private and public interests affected, but also a societal
judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed
between the litigants."  Santosky, 455 US at 755.  That is, in
applying the second Mathews factor, the Court has not asked
simply whether a higher standard of proof will reduce the risk of
an erroneous deprivation (it always will); rather, the Court has
looked to a "societal judgment" about how the risk of error
should be distributed between the parties.
In making that determination, the Court has relied on
the reasoning set out in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Winship.
See, e.g., Santosky, 455 US at 754-55.  We follow the same
course.  Justice Harlan reasoned in his concurring opinion:
"[T]he trier of fact will sometimes, despite his best
efforts, be wrong in his factual conclusions.  In a
lawsuit between two parties, a factual error can make a
difference in one of two ways.  First, it can result in
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff when the true
facts warrant a judgment for the defendant.  The
analogue in a criminal case would be the conviction of
an innocent man.  On the other hand, an erroneous
factual determination can result in a judgment for the
defendant when the true facts justify a judgment in
plaintiff's favor.  The criminal analogue would be the
acquittal of a guilty man.
"The standard of proof influences the relative
frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes. 
If, for example, the standard of proof for a criminal
trial were a preponderance of the evidence rather than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there would be a
smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing
guilty persons, but a far greater risk of factual
errors that result in convicting the innocent.  Because
the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency
of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice of
the standard to be applied in a particular kind of
litigation should, in a rational world, reflect an
assessment of the comparative social disutility of
each."
Winship, 397 US at 370-71 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan explained that the standard of proof in
a criminal prosecution -- beyond a reasonable doubt -- reflects
the considered societal judgment that "it is far worse to convict
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."  Id. at 372
(Harlan, J., concurring).  Conversely, the preponderance-of-evidence standard in civil matters reflects a long-held
understanding that it is "no more serious in general for there to
be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there
to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiff's favor."  Id. at 371
(Harlan, J., concurring).
Here, the board applied a preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard; it determined that the risk of error should be
allocated equally between the board and the prisoner.  Petitioner
has not identified any basis for saying that there is a shared
societal judgment that parole boards should employ a higher
standard of proof and thus err on the side of releasing dangerous
offenders early.  He does not identify any other court that has
held, in this context, that due process requires clear and
convincing evidence, nor has he identified any other state that
requires, as a matter of state law, proof by clear and convincing
evidence that an inmate is not fit for early release.  Compare
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 US 348, 360, 116 S Ct 1373, 134 L Ed 2d
498 (1996) (looking to practices in other states in deciding what
standard of proof due process requires); Santosky, 455 US at 749
(same).
The reason for that allocation derives, we think, from
the existence of a conviction -- a proposition that petitioner's
case illustrates.  Petitioner has been convicted of murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment.  Consistently with due process,
the state could confine him for the duration of his sentence,
i.e., the remainder of his life.  See Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 US 1, 7-8, 99 S Ct 2100, 60 L Ed 2d 668 (1979)
(recognizing that proposition).  If the state may confine
petitioner for the duration of his sentence, then it is difficult
to see why the state may not allocate the risk of error equally
in deciding whether he qualifies for early release.  As the Court
has recognized, due process does not require states either to
provide for parole or to structure their parole systems in a
particular way.  See id. at 7-8 (recognizing that proposition).
The third Mathews factor is "the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements
would entail."  424 US at 335.  In evaluating the government's
interest, courts typically have focused on the burdens that
providing additional procedural protections would entail.  For
example, in the prison context, the Court has recognized that,
although the right to call witnesses is a basic tenet of due
process, "[p]rison officials must have the necessary discretion
to keep the hearing within reasonable bounds and to refuse to
call witnesses that may create a risk of reprisal or undermine
authority, as well as to limit access to other inmates to collect
statements or compile other documentary evidence."  Wolff, 418 US
at 566.  In this case, however, the board has not identified
comparable administrative considerations that a higher standard
of proof would impose on either the board or prison officials,
nor are we aware of any.
Considering the three Mathews factors, we note that the
significance of petitioner's private interest is diminished by
the existence of a conviction that permits the state to hold him
for the duration of his sentence and that he has not identified
any basis for saying that the board should err on the side of
releasing dangerous offenders early.  Accordingly, we hold that
due process does not require the board to apply a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof.  Proof by a preponderance
of the evidence is sufficient.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of
the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision are affirmed.
1. Because petitioner committed his crimes in 1986, the
statutory citations in this opinion refer to 1985 version of the
Oregon Revised Statutes.
2. When petitioner committed the underlying offense in
1986, ORS 144.120(1) provided:
"Within six months of the admission of a prisoner
to any state penal or correctional institution, the
board shall conduct a parole hearing to interview the
prisoner and set the initial date of release on parole
pursuant to subsection (2) of this section.  Release
shall be contingent upon satisfaction of the
requirements in ORS 144.125."
Other parts of ORS chapter 144 stated exceptions to that rule. 
See, e.g., ORS 144.120(4) (identifying instances in which the
board "may choose not to set a parole release date"); ORS
144.228(1)(a) (providing that the board will set "a date for a
parole consideration hearing instead of an initial release date"
for persons sentenced as dangerous offenders).  
3. When petitioner committed the underlying offense in
1986, ORS 144.125(3) provided:
"If a psychiatric or psychological diagnosis of
present severe emotional disturbance such as to
constitute a danger to the health or safety of the
community has been made with respect to the prisoner,
the board may order the postponement of the scheduled
parole release until a specified future date."
4. Although petitioner has raised other issues, we limit
our review to the due process issue that he has raised and
subsidiary state law issues.  
5. The board may postpone a prisoner's release date for
other reasons.  See, e.g., ORS 144.125(2) (providing that the
board shall postpone a prisoner's release date if it finds that
he or she engaged in serious misconduct during confinement).
6. Petitioner does not argue that any other aspect of the
board proceeding did not comply with due process, and we limit
our discussion of petitioner's due process claim to the standard
of proof that the board employed.