Case Title: Shassetz v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Shassetz v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.1996 WY 105920 P.2d 1246Case Number: 95-256Decided: 07/31/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Andrew G. SHASSETZ,

 Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, ex rel. 
WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee 
(Respondent).

Appeal from The District 
Court of Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

George Santini, 
Cheyenne, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. 
Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jennifer A. Evans, Assistant Attorney 
General, Cheyenne, for Appellee.

Before 
THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ., and HARTMAN, District 
Judge.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The issue before 
the court is one of substantial evidence to demonstrate the continuation of a 
worker's temporary total disability. After sustaining an injury while working as 
a carpenter, Andrew G. Shassetz (Shassetz) filed for worker's compensation 
benefits and was granted medical and total temporary disability benefits. At a 
second contested case hearing following a dispute over compensability of 
Shassetz' injury, evidence developed that Shassetz had training and experience 
as a computer operator, and his injury would not prevent him from being employed 
as a computer operator. An order then was entered by the Office of 
Administrative Hearings terminating the temporary total disability benefits 
after March 31, 1995, in accordance with WYO. STAT. § 27-14-404(c)(i) (1991). 
Shassetz sought judicial review. The district court certified the case to this 
court, and we discern sufficient evidence to support the order of the Office of 
Administrative Hearings. That order is affirmed.

[¶2]      In the Brief of 
Appellant Andrew G. Shassetz, the issue is stated as:

Was the decision of the 
Office of Administrative Hearings to deny temporary total disability benefits 
prior to Appellant's reaching maximum medical improvement supported by 
substantial evidence?

In the Brief of 
Appellee, filed for the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division 
(Division), the issue is stated in this way:

Whether the Office of 
Administrative Hearings order denying temporary total disability benefits is 
supported by substantial evidence.

[¶3]      Shassetz suffered 
an injury to his right knee on September 16, 1994 while he was working as a 
carpenter for Reiman Corporation. The following day, he reported the injury to 
his employer, but treated himself instead of seeking medical care. He eventually 
sought treatment from a physician and pursued a claim under the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act. Reiman Corporation and the Division disputed the 
compensability of Shassetz' injury. On January 13, 1995, a contested case 
hearing was held before the Office of Administrative Hearings. On January 31, 
1995, the Office of Administrative Hearings entered an order ruling Shassetz had 
sustained a compensable injury and awarding medical and temporary total 
disability benefits.

[¶4]      A dispute then 
arose about compensability of Shassetz' injury after March 31, 1995. The 
Division issued a final determination denying further benefits as of March 31, 
1995, after concluding the injury was not work related. A second contested case 
hearing followed, and an osteopathic physician specializing in occupational 
medicine reported for the Division that, in his opinion, the primary source of 
the pain Shassetz experienced was due to a preexisting arthritic condition and, 
further, the preexisting arthritic condition had necessitated his knee surgery 
in November 1994. Shassetz' treating physician testified by deposition that, in 
his opinion, the more likely cause of the problem was the September 16, 1994 
injury. Testimony was elicited, from Shassetz, that he had prior experience and 
training as a computer operator and, from his treating physician, that Shassetz 
could have worked as a computer operator. The product of the second hearing was 
an order from the Office of Administrative Hearings ruling Shassetz had suffered 
a compensable injury. The order stated that the question of whether Shassetz' 
ability to work as a computer operator prevented him from receiving temporary 
total disability benefits should have been raised at the first hearing, and the 
first hearing should be conclusive under the doctrine of res judicata or 
collateral estoppel. The Office of Administrative Hearings ruled, however, since 
Shassetz had failed to object, the issue could be considered. Relying upon WYO. 
STAT. § 27-14-404(c)(i), the Office of Administrative Hearings ruled the statute 
provides for termination of payment for temporary disability in certain 
circumstances and, in this case, it precluded the award of temporary total 
disability benefits after March 31, 1995.

[¶5]      The statute upon 
which the Office of Administrative Hearings relies provides, in pertinent part, 
with respect to the award of temporary total disability benefits:

(a) If after a 
compensable injury is sustained and as a result of the injury the employee is 
subject to temporary total disability as defined under W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xviii), 
the injured employee is entitled to receive a temporary total disability award 
for the period of temporary total disability as provided by W.S. 
27-14-403(c).

* * *

(c) Payment under 
subsection (a) of this section shall cease if:

(i) Recovery is complete 
to the extent that the earning power of the employee at a gainful occupation for 
which he is reasonably suited by experience or training is substantially 
restored; or

(ii) The employee has an 
ascertainable loss and qualifies for benefits under W.S. 27-14-405 [permanent 
partial disability] or 27-14-406 [permanent total disability].

WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-404 (1991) (emphasis added).

The definition 
of temporary total disability is found in WYO. STAT. § 27-14-102(a)(xviii) 
(1991):

"Temporary total 
disability" means that period of time an employee is temporarily and totally 
incapacitated from performing employment at any gainful employment or occupation 
for which he is reasonably suited by experience or training. The period of 
temporary total disability terminates at the time the employee completely 
recovers or qualifies for benefits under W.S. 27-14-405 [permanent partial 
disability] or 27-14-406 [permanent total disability] * * *. (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶6]      Judicial review 
of a decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings is provided in WYO. STAT. 
§ 27-14-602(b) (Supp. 1995), and that statute specifies the review will be 
governed by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, WYO. STAT. §§ 16-3-101 to 
-115 (1990 as amended). The scope of judicial review, pursuant to both the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and WYO. R. APP. P. 12.09, permits the 
court to:

(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

* * *

(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

WYO. STAT. § 
16-3-114(c)(ii) (1990).

"Cases certified 
to this court pursuant [sic] W.R.A.P. 12.09 are reviewed according to the 
appellate standards applicable to the court of the first instance." Union Tel. 
Co., Inc. v. Wyoming Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 907 P.2d 340, 341 (Wyo. 1995) (citing 
Hepp v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 881 P.2d 1076, 1077 
(Wyo. 1994)).

[¶7]      Shassetz argues 
that, at the time of the second contested case hearing, he had not completely 
recovered from his work-related injury and had not qualified for a permanent 
partial or total disability award. He contends the hearing examiner erred when 
he ruled Shassetz no longer was eligible for temporary total disability benefits 
because his earning power had been substantially restored as a computer 
operator. Alternatively, he asserts no evidence was presented regarding the 
amount he could earn if he had been hired as a computer operator.

[¶8]      We recently 
revisited the question of the burden of proof in a worker's compensation case 
involving the revocation of worker's compensation benefits, and we 
said:

"The claimant has the 
burden of proving each essential element of [his] claim by a preponderance of 
the evidence." Gilstrap v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 875 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Wyo. 1994) 
(citing Leonard v. McDonalds of Jackson Hole, 746 P.2d 1261, 1263 (Wyo. 1987)). 
"The party who appeals from an administrative determination has the burden of 
proving the lack of substantial evidence to sustain the ruling of the 
agency." Jaqua v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 873 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Wyo. 1994). * * * We review factual issues by applying the 
substantial evidence standard. WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E) 
(1990).

"Our task is to examine 
the entire record to determine if substantial evidence exists to support the 
hearing examiner's findings. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the 
hearing examiner if his decision is supported by substantial evidence. 
Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept 
in support of the agency's conclusions." Romero v. Davy McKee Corporation, 854 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 1993) (citing Farman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 841 P.2d 99, 102 (Wyo. 1992)).

Bearden v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 868 P.2d 268, 269 (Wyo. 1994), quoted in 
Hepp v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 881 P.2d 1076, 
1077-78 (Wyo. 1994).

Padilla v. 
Lovern's, Inc., 883 P.2d 351, 354 (Wyo. 1994) (emphasis added).

"Consistent with 
this general rule, the employee has the burden `to show that he is entitled to a 
continuance of [temporary total disability] benefits.'" Sims v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 872 P.2d 555, 557 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting 
Higgins v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 739 P.2d 129, 131 
(Wyo. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 988, 108 S. Ct. 508, 98 L. Ed. 2d 507 
(1987)).

[¶9]      In accordance 
with these rules, Shassetz was charged with the burden of proof of entitlement 
to the continuation of temporary total disability benefits. He was required to 
establish his entitlement to benefits, and that his right to benefits was not 
foreclosed by restoration of earning power at a gainful occupation for which he 
was reasonably suited. His burden was to establish he did not enjoy earning 
power as a computer operator or that his earning power could not be 
substantially restored by such employment. The record includes this testimony by 
Shassetz:

Q.        By prior 
experience and training you're qualified to operate computers; is that 
correct?

A.        Yes, sir, 
that's correct.

Q.        And what 
type of computers, what type of training have you had in that? You went to 
Laramie County Community College; is that right?

A.        Also Casper 
Community College.

Q.        And what 
type of work are you qualified to do with computers?

A.        Operator 
mainly.

Q.        And what 
does that mean, sir?

A.        Just the 
inputting of the data in to the computer.

Q.        Have you 
looked for any kind of work in computer operations?

A.        Yes, sir, I 
have. I have been back and was seeking work.

Q.        So you feel 
you'd be physically capable of doing that kind of work?

A.        Back in 
computer operations? Yes, sir. I'm also getting involved in computer 
programming. I'm taking a correspondence course through a school in Washington, 
D.C. I have my own PC, and I'm taking some programming right now on 
it.

The treating 
physician testified with respect to Shassetz' ability to return to work as a 
computer operator by stating:

Q.        Are you 
familiar with Mr. Shassetz's work history at all?

A.        
No.

Q.        Well, if 
it's sedentary?

A.        I assume 
we're talking now about after the injury that occurred in November - September 
of '93 [sic]. If a job sitting on a computer had been available to him in that 
period of October, or November, or December of '93 [sic], he could have worked 
at that job.

[¶10]   Shassetz does not assert, and we 
have been unable to find, any evidence presented by him or his treating 
physician demonstrating he was not physically able to work as a computer 
operator or that he was not reasonably suited by experience or training to be a 
computer operator. Substantial evidence is present to support the finding by the 
hearing examiner that Shassetz was reasonably suited by experience or training 
for gainful employment as a computer operator and was capable of earning wages 
in that capacity. The only time earning power was addressed was during closing 
argument by Shassetz' attorney. The attorney stated: "For all we know carpenters 
earn 15 times as much as computer operators. Their [the State's] record in that 
respect, as far as whether or not that earning capacity has been substantially 
restored, is deficient at this point."

[¶11]   The purpose of the award for 
temporary total disability benefits is to provide income to an injured employee 
while he or she recovers from injuries. Pacific Power & Light v. Parsons, 
692 P.2d 226 (Wyo. 1984). The statutory provisions addressing temporary total 
disability benefits, when read together, demonstrate the intention of the 
legislature that workers who are temporarily injured be compensated until their 
earning power is substantially restored. Paravecchio v. Memorial Hosp. of 
Laramie County, 742 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 915, 108 S. Ct. 1088, 99 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1988) (holding we should read statutes relating to the 
same subject matter together to effectuate the legislature's intent). It follows 
that, even though an employee has been injured, if gainful employment permits 
the employee to earn income while recovery from an injury occurs, there is no 
necessity for the temporary disability benefits to substitute for such 
income.

[¶12]   In the record, there is no 
testimony by Shassetz or anyone else demonstrating his earning power would not 
be substantially restored by employment as a computer operator. He argues that, 
in effect, the hearing examiner concluded his earning power would be 
substantially the same as a computer operator as it was as a carpenter. This 
contention incorrectly characterizes the Findings and Conclusions, which state, 
in pertinent part:

10. No objection was made 
to consideration of the issue [whether Shassetz' competence to operate a 
computer should bring about a cessation of benefits] in this proceeding and, in 
the absence of an objection, the Office will consider the issue and will 
conclude that W.S. 27-14-404(c)(i) applies to preclude an award of temporary 
total disability benefits in this case.

It might have 
been more clear for the hearing examiner to state that Shassetz failed to meet 
the burden of proof imposed upon him. That burden was to demonstrate his earning 
power had not been substantially restored and, for that reason, he was entitled 
to a continuation of temporary total benefits. The language chosen does not 
cause the decision of the hearing examiner to be arbitrary, capricious, or not 
in accordance with law. Shassetz failed to meet his burden, and he is not 
entitled to shift that burden to the State. This record encompasses substantial 
evidence to terminate the temporary total disability benefits.

[¶13]   Shassetz contends doing some work 
coupled with earning some money while temporary total disability exists does not 
automatically disqualify a worker from receiving those benefits. He also argues 
he had not, in fact, enjoyed earnings as a computer operator. For his first 
proposition, he relies upon Parsons, 692 P.2d 226, and State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div. v. Ohnstad, 802 P.2d 865 (Wyo. 1990). Those cases do 
hold doing some work coupled with earning some money during the period of 
temporary total disability does not automatically disqualify a worker from 
benefits. The cases are distinguishable here, however, because Parsons and 
Ohnstad presented evidence that their earning power had not been substantially 
restored even though they had earned some money. Similarly, Sims, 872 P.2d 555, 
is distinguishable. There, Sims had earned $2,600 a month prior to his injury 
and earned $8,120 during approximately four months following his injury. Sims 
does not, however, impose a requirement of actual restoration of earnings. 
Shassetz argues that, while there was evidence he had attempted to find work as 
a computer operator, he had not returned to work, and he asserts the hearing 
examiner's ruling was based on speculation. The statute does not require actual 
employment, only that the earning power is substantially restored. Shassetz' 
argument is neither apt nor pertinent. The evidence justifies the finding under 
WYO. STAT. § 27-14-404(c)(i) that his earning power at a gainful occupation for 
which he is reasonably suited by experience or training was substantially 
restored.

[¶14]   Shassetz did not present evidence 
to demonstrate his entitlement to a continuation of temporary total disability 
benefits because his earning power had not been substantially restored. He 
failed to carry a burden assigned to him by the law, and we are satisfied 
substantial evidence supports the conclusion by the hearing examiner that his 
earning power as a computer operator had been substantially restored. The ruling 
of the Office of Administrative Hearings was not arbitrary or capricious, and it 
was made in accordance with law.

[¶15]   The Order Awarding and Denying 
Benefits issued by the Office of Administrative Hearings is 
affirmed.