Case Title: Pringle v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 346, 2009

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TYRONE PRINGLE, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 346, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0205013378 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: April 1, 2010 
  Decided: June 7, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 7th day of June 2010, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the 
record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Tyrone Pringle, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.  Pringle also has filed 
a motion to remand and/or to expand the record.  After careful consideration of 
the record on appeal, we find it necessary to vacate the judgment of the Superior 
Court and remand this matter for further proceedings. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Pringle pled guilty on January 20, 2005 to 
charges of third degree burglary and possession of a deadly weapon during the 
commission of a felony.  On March 23, 2005, prior to sentencing, Pringle sent a 
 
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pro se letter to the Superior Court indicating that he wished to withdraw his 
guilty plea because he was uncomfortable pleading to a weapon charge when he 
had not been in possession of a weapon.  On April 1, 2005, Pringle appeared 
with his appointed counsel before the Superior Court in order to be sentenced on 
his plea.   
(3) 
The transcript of that hearing reflects the following one-page 
colloquy between the trial court and Pringle: 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Good morning, Your Honor.  I need to find out first if 
Mr. Pringle wants to withdraw his guilty plea.  The State moves the 
sentencing or withdraw [sic] of the plea of Tyrone Pringle. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  This is news to me, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT:  I’ll show you the letter I received, Mr. [Defense Counsel].  
I’ll hand it to the bailiff. 
 
(Pause.) 
 
THE COURT:  Mr. Pringle, the Court has received from you a letter dated 
March 20th in which you asked to withdraw your guilty plea. 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  Do you want to do that? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  Okay.  I’ll allow you to do that.  The matter will be set for 
trial.  The plea is undone.  You’ll go to trial as originally charged. 
 
(4) 
The same day, the trial judge had a notation inserted into the record 
reflecting that Pringle would not be permitted to plead to anything less than the 
 
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indicted charges.  Thereafter, a two-day jury trial was held in August 2005.  The 
jury found Pringle guilty of first degree burglary, possession of a firearm during 
the commission of a felony, theft, criminal impersonation, and resisting arrest.  
The Superior Court sentenced him to a total period of nine and a half years at 
Level V incarceration followed by probation.   
(5) 
On appeal, Pringle discharged his counsel and was permitted to 
proceed pro se.  This Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal.1  
Thereafter, Pringle filed a motion for postconviction relief.  After receiving 
responses from defense counsel and the State, the Superior Court Commissioner 
recommended that Pringle’s motion be denied.  The Superior Court conducted a 
review de novo of the Commissioner’s report and recommendation and denied 
Pringle’s motion.  This appeal followed. 
(6) 
Pringle raises three issues in his opening brief on appeal.  First, he 
contends that he was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
counsel at several critical stages of the trial proceeding.  Second, Pringle asserts 
that his trial counsel’s ineffective representation resulted in a complete 
breakdown of the adversarial process.  Finally, he argues that the Superior 
Court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts without a fact-finding hearing. 
                                                 
1 Pringle v. State, 2007 WL 4374197 (Del. Dec. 17, 2007). 
 
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(7) 
With respect to the first issue, Pringle contends, among other 
things, that he was constructively denied his right to counsel under United States 
v. Cronic2 when his counsel stood mute while the Superior Court granted 
Pringle’s pro se motion to withdraw his plea. He also contends that he was 
constructively denied his right to counsel when his counsel failed to subject the 
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing by failing to investigate and 
test other evidence found near the scene of the crime, including another gun and 
cocaine, which Pringle was not informed of until his counsel filed his affidavit 
in response to Pringle’s motion for postconviction relief.   
(8) 
As the transcript of the plea withdrawal hearing reflects, defense 
counsel had no prior knowledge that Pringle had filed a pro se motion to 
withdraw his plea.  The transcript further reflects that the Superior Court, 
contrary to its own rules,3 granted Pringle’s pro se motion and did not give him 
the opportunity to consult with his counsel before acting on the motion.  This 
Court previously has held that the withdrawal of a plea is a critical stage in the 
                                                 
2 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
3 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 47 (2010) (providing that the Superior Court “will not 
consider pro se applications by defendants who are represented by counsel unless the 
defendant has been granted permission to participate with counsel in the defense.”). 
 
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criminal process at which the constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
counsel attaches.4 
(9) 
As a general rule, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are 
analyzed pursuant to the “cause and prejudice” standard set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington.5  Under Strickland, a defendant must establish that: (i) his 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 
(ii) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result would 
have been different.6  In United States v. Cronic, however, the United States 
Supreme Court articulated three situations in which the prejudice requirement 
under Strickland would be presumed: (i) when the defendant is denied counsel at 
a critical stage; (ii) when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case 
to meaningful adversarial testing; and (iii) when the circumstances are such that 
there is an extremely small likelihood that even a competent attorney could 
provide effective assistance.7 
(10) In this case, Pringle argued he was constructively denied his right 
to counsel at a critical stage in the proceedings, i.e., at the plea withdrawal 
hearing.  The Superior Court Commissioner, however, analyzed Pringle’s claim 
                                                 
4 White v. State, 2000 WL 368313 (Del. Mar. 23, 2000) (citing United States v. 
Sanchez-Barreto, 93 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1996)). 
5 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
6 Id. at 688 
7 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. 
 
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applying the Strickland standard rather than the standard under Cronic.  We find 
this erroneous.  Accordingly, we conclude that the judgment of the Superior 
Court must be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings.  
Because we find that the judgment should be vacated and a fact-finding hearing 
held, we need not reach the other issues raised in Pringle’s briefing in this 
appeal. 
(11) On remand, the Superior Court should appoint counsel to represent 
Pringle, and new counsel should be given the opportunity to re-brief Pringle’s 
postconviction claims, as well as any other claims counsel deems appropriate.  A 
fact-finding hearing should be scheduled upon notice to Pringle and the State. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is VACATED.  This matter is REMANDED for further proceedings 
consistent with this order.  Jurisdiction is not retained.   
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice