Case Title: HUFF v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
HUFF v. STATE2003 WY 6369 P.3d 400Case Number: 02-157Decided: 05/22/2003
April Term, A.D. 2003

MIKE 
HUFF,

Appellant(Defendant) ,

 
 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff) .

 
 

The Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 
 
    

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; and Donna D. 
Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.

 
 
          

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia 
L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; and Kerry Gaines, Student Intern.

 
 
          
          
         
     

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

 LEHMAN, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the order of the district court revoking and then reinstating, with 
modified conditions, the probation of appellant Mike Huff.  We affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 

[¶2]      Huff sets forth the 
issue on appeal as:

 
   
    

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. 
Huff's probation for violating a condition of probation when Mr. Huff could not 
physically comply with the condition because of his paralysis? 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On November 16, 
2001, Rush Locke, a probation and parole agent in Johnson County, sent Huff a 
letter requesting that Huff, as an individual on probation, come in for an 
office visit.  Huff complied, 
appearing in Locke's office on November 26, 2001, at 10:00 a.m.  During this visit, Locke requested that 
Huff submit to a urine analysis.  
Huff informed Locke that he was unable to comply because he was unable to 
urinate on demand due to his physical condition, paralysis.  Specifically, Huff stated that "he goes 
without urinating any­where from three days to two weeks." Locke then 
requested, as specified under Wyoming Department of Corrections policy, that 
Huff return to the office in two hours to produce the sample and indicated that 
if Huff had difficulty in urinating he should provide a note from his 
doctor.  Huff told Locke that he had 
not seen a doctor for thirty years and expressed his unhappiness with being 
asked to return, saying that it cost him $8.00 for gas and oil to make the visit 
and that he was going to bill the State for that sum.  

 

[¶4]      At 11:55 a.m. 
that same day, Huff telephoned Locke to inform him that he would not be able to 
produce a sample at 12:30 p.m.  He 
also told Locke that he should "proceed with the court papers and stated he 
would request a trial and bring in a doctor's testimony." Accordingly, Locke 
requested that Huff come in the next morning at 9:00 a.m. to produce a urine 
sample.  

 

[¶5]      Huff did return 
the following day at 9:00 a.m.  
Nevertheless, he advised Locke that he had just previously urinated at 
Hardee's Restaurant before the visit.  
Huff indicated that he therefore could not then give a sample and 
requested that Locke provide him with a sample bottle to take with him so he 
could provide a sample within the next few weeks.  Locke advised Huff that the Department 
of Corrections did not allow for this manner of urinary collection because 
proper monitoring procedures could not be followed.  Further, Locke told Huff that Department 
of Corrections policy stated that failure to submit to a chemical analy­sis 
of one's person within two hours of the request is considered a refusal.  

 

[¶6]      A petition for 
probation revocation was then filed by the State.  At the probation revoca­tion 
hearing, Locke testified that he was not aware of alternative testing procedures 
other than urinalysis for drug use screening and that blood tests were not 
administered to per­sons on probation.  
Huff testified that he did not submit to urinalysis because he was 
para­lyzed on his left side due to a stroke he suffered at age fourteen and 
could not, therefore, urinate on demand.  
Huff also testified that he had seen Dr. Holst, a urologist, who 
confirmed that he had a voiding dysfunction.  Huff further testified that he would 
submit to a blood test, if asked, and had done so in the past.  A memorandum was further submitted from 
Dr. Holst that stated that Huff had a voiding dysfunction which was most likely 
related to his neu­rologic condition.  
In addition, this memorandum indicated that 
Huff stated that he urinates two times per day.

 
           
    

[¶7]      Ultimately, the 
district court found that Huff had violated his probation conditions.  The district court, therefore, entered 
an order revoking Huff's probation and reinstating his probation with the 
condition that chemical testing analysis allow for submission of a blood 
sample.  The term of Huff's 
probation remained unchanged.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
  

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 
 
 

[¶8]      "The imposition 
as well as the revocation of probation lies within the sound discretion of the 
district court, and we will not reverse the actions of the district court unless 
that dis­cretion is abused."  
Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 56, ¶6, 44 P.3d 943, ¶6 (Wyo. 
2002).  We have 
a well-established standard for analyzing claims for abuse of 
discretion:

 
    
       

Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means exercis­ing sound judgment with regard to what 
is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  [Griswold v. 
State, 2001 WY 14, ¶7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001)].  "In the absence of an abuse of 
discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination."  Id.  The burden is on the defendant to 
establish such abuse.  
Trujillo [v. State], 2 P.3d 
[567] at 571 [(Wyo. 2000)].

 
       

Skinner 
v. State, 
2001 WY 102, ¶25, 33 P.3d 758 ¶25 (Wyo. 2001); see also Gleason v. 
State, 2002 WY 161, ¶29, 57 P.3d 332, ¶29 (Wyo. 2002).  

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      Huff asserts that 
the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and then 
immediately reinstated his probation with additional conditions because the 
record indicated that Huff did not violate the terms of his probation.  Huff argues that the record only showed 
that he was physically unable to urinate, making it impossible for him to comply 
with chemical testing as a specified condition of his probation.  We strongly disagree.

 
  

[¶10]   Our review of the record indicates 
that evidence was presented to allow the district court to conclude Huff 
violated the terms of his probation.  
Specifically, Huff testified that he did urinate at Hardee's just prior 
to his appointment with Locke.  
Further, Huff's statements to Locke that he did not urinate "from three 
days to two weeks" is refuted by those state­ments recorded by Dr. Holst 
that Huff told him that he urinated two times a day.  Further, the transcript of the 
revocation hearing indicates that after the district court had already made its 
decision, Huff stated:

 
     
     

I 
am paralyzed totally, my left side.  
That includes the urinary tract part of my body.  I have no mechanism to turn it off and 
turn it on.  When it runs, it runs; 
I dive into Hardee's.  I do it on a 
run on the way to Rush Locke's office.  
I have 
no choice.

 
    

[¶11]   Moreover, the record is patently 
clear that Huff was evasive, uncooperative, and hos­tile regarding Locke's 
efforts to secure a urine sample from him.  
Initially, when Huff was asked to confirm his condition, he told Locke 
that he had not seen a doctor for thirty years.  In addition, when advised that he would 
need to return in two hours, Huff expressed his unhappiness with being asked to 
return, saying that it had cost him $8.00 for gas and oil to make the visit and 
threatening that he was going to bill the State for that amount.  Thereafter, before even attempting to 
give a urine sample two hours later, Huff telephoned to say that he would not be 
able to produce a sample at 12:30 p.m. and advised Locke to simply proceed with 
the court papers.  Huff further 
indicated that when Locke filed these pleadings with the court that he would 
request a trial and bring in doctor's testimony.  Unarguably, Huff 
knew at that time that this approach was transparently elusive, would cause 
Locke additional time and effort, and would unnecessarily involve the court 
system.

 
       
           
       

[¶12]   In order to give Huff the benefit 
of the doubt, Locke, with an abundance of patience, asked Huff to return the 
next day to give a urine sample.  
This favorable offer by Locke was met by Huff indicating that he had just 
minutes earlier urinated at Hardee's making it impos­sible for him to comply 
with Locke's request.  Huff followed 
up this statement by making the request that Locke provide him with a sample 
bottle to take with him so he could provide a sample within the next few 
weeks which did not allow for 
proper monitoring procedures to be followed.

 
           

[¶13]   Finally, although Huff indicated at 
the hearing that he would be willing to give a blood sample, he did not 
volunteer this information to Locke.  
Indeed, Huff testified at hear­ing that when these same issues arose 
with his previous probation officer, Huff had submitted a blood sample for 
testing.  Nevertheless, Huff did not 
advise Locke of these facts.  Hence, 
we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking 
and 
then rein­stating, with modified conditions, Huff's probation.  To the contrary, the decision of the 
district court was based on sufficient evidence.  

 

[¶14]   The additional conditions do not 
prejudice Huff since he admitted that he would volun­tarily submit to blood 
testing, and Huff had the implicit obligation to cooperate with probationary 
officials as a part of his probationary term in any event.  In addition, submission to drug testing 
was always a condition imposed as a part of Huff's probation.  Therefore, the district court merely changed the method of drug testing 
resulting in no prejudice or harm to Huff.

 
     
             

[¶15]   Probation officers are required to 
ensure that the terms of probation are followed by those placed on probation by 
the court.  Similarly, those placed 
on probation are required to strictly comply with the terms of probation 
specified by the court or risk the sure conse­quence that such probationary 
terms will be modified or that probation will be revoked outright.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶16]   For the foregoing reasons, the 
order of the district court revoking and then reinstating Huff's probation, with 
modifications, is affirmed.