Case Title: In re Morton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2023-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 125,621 
 
In the Matter of TARISHAWN D.D. MORTON, 
Respondent. 
 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Oral argument held September 13, 2023. Opinion filed 
December 1, 2023. Published censure. 
 
Gayle B. Larkin, Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause and was on the brief for the 
petitioner. 
 
Tarishawn D.D. Morton, respondent, argued the cause and was on the brief pro se. 
 
PER CURIAM:  This is an attorney-discipline proceeding against the respondent, 
Tarishawn D.D. Morton, of Colorado Springs, Colorado. Morton received her license to 
practice law in Kansas in July 2016.  
 
On June 16, 2022, the Disciplinary Administrator's office filed a formal complaint 
against Morton alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). 
Morton answered the formal complaint on July 15, 2022.  
 
On August 23, 2022, Morton appeared pro se at the complaint hearing before a 
panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys. After the hearing, the panel 
determined that Morton had violated KRPC 7.1(a) (communication concerning a lawyer's 
services) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 423), KRPC 8.1 (bar admission and disciplinary matters) 
(2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 431), KRPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 433), and KRPC 8.4(g) (conduct that 
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adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 433). 
The panel set forth its factual findings, legal conclusions, and recommended discipline in 
a final hearing report. The relevant portions of that report are set forth below. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
"The hearing panel finds the following facts, by clear and convincing evidence:  
 
"8. 
The respondent is a Colorado resident. She has not passed the Colorado bar 
examination, but scored high enough on the Uniform Bar Examination in Colorado to 
apply for and obtain a Kansas license to practice law under Supreme Court Rule 709A, 
and she was admitted on July 8, 2016. Respondent lives in Colorado and rents an office 
in Overland Park, Kansas, with a mail drop and a conference room for use on those 
occasions when she travels to Kansas. According to respondent's testimony, she has 
never lived in Kansas, and has visited the Kansas office approximately ten times in 
connection with her practice.  
 
"Website 
 
"9. 
In November 2020, Brandan Davies of Roth Davies, LLC, discovered that 
the respondent had copied significant portions of content from his firm's website and 
pasted that content onto her website, www.attorneytmorton.com. In at least one place, the 
respondent included Roth Davies' name and telephone number on her website. 
 
"10. As a result of the respondent's actions, when the term 'Roth Davies' was 
included in an Internet search, the respondent's website appeared in the results. 
 
"11. On November 17, 2020, Mr. Davies sent the respondent a letter by certified 
mail and an email message, asking the respondent to remove the Roth Davies content 
from her website. The initial email provided: 
 
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'It has come to my attention that over 20% of your website 
(https://www.attorneytmorton.com/) is a direct copy or ever-so-slightly 
altered content from our law firm's website. In fact, some of our firm's 
name and telephone number is [sic] currently on your site due to the 
poorly executed copy paste job. We have spent a lot of time and money 
in [sic] developing our site and copying the site has affected our search 
rankings adversely. Kindly remove any [sic] of the duplicate content 
from your site. Our website company will be running a report Friday to 
check your site for duplicate content.'  
 
The respondent did not respond to Mr. Davies' communications. A week later, Mr. 
Davies again demanded that the respondent remove the duplicate content by email 
message. Again, the respondent did not respond to Mr. Davies' communication. 
Respondent asserts that she did not receive Mr. Davies' communications. 
 
"12. On January 11, 2021, Mr. Davies filed a complaint against the respondent 
with the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator, after which respondent deactivated her 
website.  
 
"13. As of July, 2021, it was discovered that the respondent had reactivated her 
former website, though it has now been substantially reduced to address the issues 
discussed below. 
 
"14. The 2020-2021 website contained the following intentional 
misrepresentations by the respondent: 
 
a. The website contained copied substantial portions of the Roth Davies 
website, including a number of references to the firm of Roth Davies, that firm's 
telephone number, areas of expertise, and courts where the firm practices, as well 
as several case law summaries developed by Roth Davies, making it appear that 
the work was the product of respondent's labors and expertise. It is unknown 
what and how many clients (if any) were misled into believing there was some  
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identity between respondent and Roth Davies, and how many clients (if any) 
were deterred from proceeding further after seeing the confusion between the two 
firms;  
 
b. On the website, the respondent identified herself as an experienced 
attorney practicing in the areas of criminal defense, sex crimes, and personal 
injury. However, the respondent had limited experience practicing law. In fact, 
according to the respondent's 2019 Colorado 'on-motion' bar application and 
according to the respondent's supplemental response to the complaint and Kansas 
bar application, the respondent worked full-time for El Pueblo Boys and Girls 
Ranch and practiced law during the evenings and weekends; and 
 
c. On the website, the respondent made it appear that she was a 
member of the Johnson County Bar Association (JCBA), the Kansas Bar 
Association (KBA), and the American Bar Association (ABA). The respondent's 
statements regarding her memberships with bar associations were false.  
 
i. The respondent has not been a member of the JCBA since 
2017.  
 
ii. The respondent was a complimentary member of the KBA 
immediately after her admission in 2016. However, when her free 
membership expired on June 30, 2017, she did not join the KBA.  
 
iii. The respondent has been a member of the ABA, off and on, 
during her six-year career. But, in 2020, when the website was live, the 
respondent was not a member of the ABA. The respondent has not been 
a member of any section of the ABA since 2018. 
 
iv. Contrary to the information the respondent included on her 
website, in response to question 6 on the respondent's 2019 'on-motion' 
Colorado bar application, the respondent stated that she had never been a 
member of a bar association. 
 
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d. On the website, the respondent stated that she received an A/V rating 
from the Martindale-Hubbell attorney-rating service. Respondent has not 
received an A/V rating from Martindale-Hubbell. 
 
e. The website claimed respondent was experienced in criminal cases, 
whereas in her response to the complaint, she admitted she had no criminal cases 
in November, 2020, and had handled only one before that.  
 
"Kansas Bar Application 
 
"15. On March 2, 2016, the respondent applied to take the Kansas bar 
examination. The application form required the respondent to disclose ten years of 
employment history. Because the respondent filed her Kansas bar application on March 
2, 2016, she was required to disclose her employment history from March 2, 2006, 
through March 2, 2016.  
 
"16. The respondent's employment history included on her Kansas bar 
application varied from the employment history reported on the Colorado bar 
applications discussed below. Most importantly, on the respondent's Kansas bar 
application, the respondent failed to disclose her employment with the Boys and Girls 
Club. As a result, when considering the respondent's bar application, the Board of Law 
Examiners in Kansas was unaware, and unable to inquire to determine, that she had been 
terminated from her employment with Boys and Girls Club for misconduct.  
 
"17. The panel concludes that, despite her protestations to the contrary, 
respondent intentionally omitted, in her Kansas bar application, reference to her erstwhile 
employment with the Boys and Girls Club, as she managed to recall and list her 
employment with the temporary agency which placed her at the Boys and Girls Club, 
with its dates immediately prior to her actual employment with the Boys & Girls Club, 
while omitting that later employment. This intentional misrepresentation kept the Kansas 
Board of Law Examiners from checking into that employment, which likely would have 
led to the disclosure of respondent's fraud during that employment, discussed below.  
 
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"18. In addition to failing to disclose her employment with the Boys and Girls 
Club on the Kansas bar application, the respondent also failed to disclose employment 
with Colorado State University-Pueblo and Crystal Specialties, Inc. 
 
"19. In her Kansas bar application, respondent stated 'none' in response to the 
question whether she had ever received any licenses, when in fact, she had been licensed 
as a special education director and as a temporary teacher. 
 
"Boys and Girls Club 
 
"20. Respondent was employed by the Boys and Girls Club of Colorado first as 
an independent contractor through a temporary agency, and then on September 10, 2007 
as a permanent employee. Her position at Boys and Girls Club was Controller, at an 
annual salary of $35,000. 
 
"21. In December, 2007, respondent went to her supervisor at Boys and Girls 
Club, James Sullivan (the Executive Director) and presented him for his signature a Boys 
and Girls Club check for $3,000.00, which respondent had prepared for delivery to Sam's 
Club, a supplier to the Boys and Girls Club. Mr. Sullivan signed the check and returned it 
to respondent. 
 
"22. The respondent then went to Sam's Club and cashed the $3,000 check at 
Sam's Club which was issued as a payment of the Boys and Girls Club's bill with Sam's 
Club. Respondent had Sam's Club apply $2,617.18 to the Boys & Girls Club bill, and 
spent the remaining $382.82 on personal items. Further, the respondent used the Boys 
and Girls Club tax-exempt account information to avoid paying sales tax on the personal 
items she purchased from Sam's Club. To date, respondent has never reimbursed the 
Boys and Girls Club the $382.82 which she spent on personal items. 
 
"23. While a police report was filed in connection with this theft, respondent 
was never charged or convicted.  
 
"24. On three occasions during her employment with the Boys and Girls Club, 
as the Controller, the respondent paid herself her full-time salary as well as wages 
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claimed as hourly employment. She overpaid herself a total of $4,038.35 by this method. 
To date, the respondent has not reimbursed the Boys and Girls Club the $4,038.35 that 
she overpaid herself. Respondent was never charged for nor convicted of this theft. 
 
"25. Respondent was terminated from her employment at Boys & Girls Club on 
December 26, 2007. She took her personnel file with her when she left, and when she 
returned the file upon demand of her former employer, some documents were missing.  
 
"26. Again, had respondent's employment with Boys and Girls Club been 
disclosed on her application for the Kansas bar, these facts may well have been 
discovered, which likely would have had a detrimental effect on the decision of the Board 
of Law Examiners. 
 
"Colorado Bar Applications 
 
"27. In 2014, 2015, and 2019, the respondent filed a total of four bar 
applications with the State of Colorado. On each of the applications, the respondent 
disclosed her prior employment with the Boys and Girls Club (which she failed to 
disclose in her Kansas bar application, showing she was aware and recalled it). While the 
respondent indicated that she was disciplined and left the position involuntarily, she 
inaccurately explained that she left the position voluntarily and was disciplined only after 
she voluntarily resigned. She stated that she was investigated for mishandling money. She 
stated that she 'hired an attorney, out of fear and to protect [her] rights, [and the attorney] 
found out that nothing ever came of [the] matter.' 
 
"28. On her 2019 Colorado 'on-motion' bar application, the respondent listed 
Debbie Uhl, registration clerk for the Kansas Office of Judicial Administration, and the 
Honorable David Hauber, Johnson County District Court Judge, as supervisors of her 
solo practice. While the respondent was never employed by Judge Hauber or the Office 
of Judicial Administration, respondent's exhibit A shows that a Colorado official asked 
the respondent to provide the name and contact information of a third[-]party individual, 
such as a judge or other professional colleague who could confirm her solo practice. The 
respondent provided the names of Judge Hauber and Debbie Uhl in response. 
 
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"29. While her 2019 Colorado 'on-motion' bar application was pending, the 
complaint which gave rise to this case was filed against the respondent. The respondent 
failed to notify the Colorado admissions authorities that the complaint was filed against 
her, as required by the statement of verification portion of the bar application.  
 
"30. On her 2019 Colorado 'on-motion' bar application, the respondent stated 
that she had never been a member of a bar association. However, the respondent was a 
member of the Johnson County Bar Association and the Kansas Bar Association from 
2016 to 2017 and the respondent was also previously a member of the American Bar 
Association.  
 
"31. Finally, on the Kansas bar application, the respondent disclosed that she 
worked as a special education director for El Pueblo Boys and Girls Ranch, a mental 
health and substance abuse treatment facility for adolescents in Pueblo, Colorado; the 
respondent did not disclose that employment on her 2019 Colorado 'on-motion' bar 
application. 
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
"32. Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a matter of 
law that the respondent violated KRPC 7.1, 8.1, and 8.4(c) and (g), as detailed below. 
 
"KRPC 7.1(a) 
 
"33. KRPC 7.1(a) provides:  
 
'A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the 
lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:  
 
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact 
necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially 
misleading.'  
 
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"34. The respondent violated KRPC 7.1 when she published a website 
containing materially false information, including masses of information copied from the 
Roth Davies website (leading searchers to land on her website when actually searching 
for Roth Davies), her bar association memberships, her alleged Martindale-Hubbell A/V 
rating, and her alleged experience, particularly in motorcycle and wrongful death cases. 
This was exacerbated when, having removed the website upon receipt of the complaint in 
this matter, she put the offending website back up within a few months thereafter. As 
such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 7.1(a).  
 
"KRPC 8.1 
 
"35. Rule 8.1 provides: 
 
'An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar 
admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: 
 
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or 
 
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known 
by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a 
lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, 
except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise 
protected by Rule 1.6.' 
 
"36. In the present case, respondent intentionally failed to include her 
employment with the Boys and Girls Club, as well as her employment with Crystal 
Specialties and Colorado State University-Pueblo in her application for admission to the 
Kansas bar. 
 
"37. Additionally, respondent failed to disclose a number of matters, and mis-
stated a number of facts to the Colorado bar authorities in her several applications to that 
bar, including: 
 
 
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a. that she voluntarily quit her employment with Boys & Girls Club; 
 
b. that she had not been a member of any bar associations; and 
 
c. failing to disclose that the complaint had been filed in this matter 
before the Kansas State Board for Discipline of Attorneys. 
 
"38. Therefore, the panel concludes that respondent violated Rule 8.1. 
 
"KRPC 8.4(c) 
 
"39. Rule 8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
'engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' 
 
"40. The panel concludes that the respondent engaged in conduct that involved 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation when she: 
 
a. Failed to disclose in her application to the Kansas bar authorities her 
employment with Boys & Girls Club; 
 
b. Failed to disclose in her application to the Kansas bar authorities her 
defrauding of Boys and Girls Club of $382.82 at Sam's Club; 
 
c. Failed to disclose in her application to the Kansas bar authorities her 
double-payment to herself of $4,038.35 as an employee of Boys and Girls Club, 
claiming both salary and hourly wages; 
 
d. Included false information on her website, and then after receiving 
the complaint and taking it down, re-publishing that website, including 
information taken directly from the Roth Davies website, claiming bar 
association memberships, and claiming a rating of A/V from Martindale-Hubbell; 
respondent's website also falsely claimed that she was an 'experienced' lawyer, 
and could handle motorcycle cases and wrongful death cases, whereas she has  
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handled no such cases. Indeed, the website claimed respondent was experienced 
in criminal cases, whereas in her response to the complaint, she admitted she had 
no criminal cases in November, 2020, and only one before that;  
 
e. Failed to disclose her employment with Crystal Specialties and 
Colorado State University-Pueblo; 
 
f. Claimed to the Colorado bar that she had voluntarily quit her 
employment at Boys and Girls Club; 
 
g. Failed to disclose to the Colorado bar that she had been a member of 
bar associations; 
 
h. Failed to disclose to the Colorado bar that an ethics complaint had 
been filed against her in Kansas; and 
 
i. Failed to disclose to the Colorado bar that she had been employed by 
El Pueblo. 
 
"41. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 
8.4(c).  
 
"KRPC 8.4(g) 
 
"42. Rule 8.4(g) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
'engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice 
law.' 
 
"43. The respondent engaged in conduct that adversely reflects on her fitness to 
practice law when she: 
 
a.  Failed to disclose her employment with Boys & Girls Club in her 
application to the Kansas bar authorities; 
 
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b. Failed to disclose her defrauding of Boys and Girls Club of $382.82 
at Sam's Club in her application to the Kansas bar authorities; 
 
c. Failed to disclose her double-payment of $4,038.35 as an employee 
of Boys and Girls Club, claiming both salary and hourly wages in her application 
to the Kansas bar authorities; 
 
d. Included false information on her website, and then after receiving 
the complaint and taking it down, re-publishing that website, including 
information taken directly from the Roth Davies website, claiming bar 
association memberships, and claiming a rating of A/V from Martindale-Hubbell; 
respondent's website also falsely claimed that she was an 'experienced' lawyer, 
and could handle motorcycle cases and wrongful death cases, whereas she has 
handled no such cases. Indeed, the website claimed respondent was experienced 
in criminal cases, whereas in her answer to the complaint, she admitted she had 
no criminal cases in November, 2020, and only one before that;  
 
e. Failed to disclose her employment with Crystal Specialties and 
Colorado State University-Pueblo; 
 
f. Claimed to the Colorado bar that she had voluntarily quit her 
employment at Boys and Girls Club; 
 
g. Failed to disclose to the Colorado bar that she had been a member of 
bar associations; 
 
h. Failed to disclose to the Colorado bar that an ethics complaint had 
been filed against her in Kansas; and 
 
i. Failed to disclose to the Colorado bar that she had been employed by 
El Pueblo. 
 
"44. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(g).  
 
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"Probation Plan 
 
"45. On August 9, 2022, respondent timely submitted 'Respondent's Rule 227 
Proposed Probation Plan.' The proposed plan does not suggest any supervision by any 
experienced lawyer. The panel finds the proposed plan to be very general and vague, with 
few specific promised corrections and activities.  
 
"46. The panel recognizes that the 'court is generally reluctant to grant probation 
where the misconduct involves fraud or dishonesty because supervision, even the most 
diligent, often cannot effectively guard against dishonest acts.' In re Stockwell, 296 Kan. 
860, 868, 295 P.3d 572 (2013); In re O'Neill, 285 Kan. 474, [481,] 172 P.3d 1179, (2007) 
('["]Dishonest conduct cannot be corrected by probation.["]'). 
 
"47. Additionally, placing the respondent on probation is not in the best 
interests of the legal profession and the citizens of the State of Kansas. In re Mason, 308 
Kan. 1105, 427 P.3d 40 (2018). 
 
"48. Further, applying Rule 227, the panel finds that the respondent's proposed 
plan is not workable, substantial, or detailed, particularly given the remote nature of her 
practice, living in Colorado while maintaining a drop-box office in Overland Park. In re 
Harrington, 296 Kan. 380, 293 P.3d 686 (2013) (probation plan not adopted where it is 
not workable, substantial, and detailed); In re Baker, 296 Kan. 696, 294 P.3d 326 (2013) 
(same). 
 
"49. The panel has found several instances of intentional misrepresentations and 
fraud on the part of the respondent. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that 
probation is not appropriate in this case and the respondent's plan is insufficient in any 
event.  
"Recommended Discipline 
 
"50. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel considered 
the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors to be 
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considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury 
caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.  
 
a. Duty Violated. The respondent violated her duty to the bar and the 
public by all the misconduct enumerated above.  
 
b. Mental State. The respondent intentionally violated her duty. 
 
c. Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent 
caused injury and harm to the justice system and the practice of law in this State. 
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
"51. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
aggravating factors present: 
 
a. Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent committed a number of 
acts of fraud and intentional misrepresentation. Accordingly, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent's misconduct was motivated by dishonesty.  
 
b. Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule 
violations. The respondent violated KRPC 7.1 (advertising); 8.1 (bar 
admissions); 8.4(c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation); and 8.4(g) 
(adversely reflects on lawyer's fitness). Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes 
that the respondent committed multiple offenses.  
 
c. Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Conduct. The 
respondent has refused to acknowledge any wrongdoing of any kind, and 
maintains denials and excuses, even when confronted with proof. Accordingly, 
the hearing panel concludes that the respondent refused to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of her conduct.  
 
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"52. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify 
a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its recommendation for 
discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following mitigating circumstances 
present, though neither the Disciplinary Administrator nor the respondent argued for any. 
 
a. Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The respondent has not 
previously been disciplined.  
 
b. Inexperience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme Court 
admitted the respondent to the practice of law in 2016. Thus, the respondent is 
inexperienced in the practice of law.  
 
"Application of Standards 
 
"53. In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards:  
 
'5.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when: 
 
(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary element 
of which includes intentionally [sic] interference with the 
administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, 
extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution or 
importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of 
another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to 
commit any of these offenses; 
 
(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that serious 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.  
 
'5.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in 
criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Standard 
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5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to 
practice.  
 
'5.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in 
any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to 
practice law.'  
 
"Recommendation of the Parties 
 
"54. The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be 
disbarred. The respondent made no recommendation on discipline, other than to plead for 
the mercy of the panel. 
 
"Discussion 
 
"55. While the panel is concerned about the multiple acts of fraud, deceit and 
misrepresentation, particularly in her application which led to her becoming a member of 
the bar of this court, and some of which could be considered criminal, respondent was 
never charged or convicted.  
 
"56. However, the panel does not find that respondent is guilty of the 'serious 
criminal conduct' required to justify a disbarment. See, e.g. In re Richardson, 268 Kan. 
831, 833, 1 P.3d 328 (2000) (conviction of three felonies for fraud—disbarred); In re 
Minneman, 287 Kan. 477, 196 P.3d 1156 (2008) (federal conviction for income tax 
fraud—disbarred). 
 
"57. Therefore, the panel concludes that indefinite suspension be imposed, with 
the condition that, upon her re-application for reinstatement, respondent submit a 
workable, substantial and detailed plan for returning to the practice with, at least, the 
following provisions: 
 
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a. Supervision by an experienced, specifically-named, senior Kansas 
lawyer, with regular monitoring of practice, advertising, and case handling, and 
regular reporting to the Disciplinary Administrator; 
 
b. A detailed plan of office administration, client intake and 
communication, and regular attendance at the Kansas office of the respondent, to 
ensure that Kansas clients receive adequate communication and representation; 
and 
 
c. Additional five hours of approved continuing legal education per 
year on office administration, law office management, and professional 
responsibility. 
 
"Recommendation of the Hearing Panel 
 
"58. Accordingly, based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the 
Standards listed above, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that the respondent 
be indefinitely suspended with the conditions listed above for readmission to the practice. 
 
"Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by the 
Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
 
Once a disciplinary-hearing panel finds misconduct and recommends any 
discipline besides informal admonition (the least serious form of discipline under our 
rules), the matter proceeds to our court. See Supreme Court Rule 226(b) (2023 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. at 282). At that stage, the respondent and the Disciplinary Administrator may file 
"exceptions," which are formal objections to the hearing panel's factual findings or legal 
conclusions. See Supreme Court Rule 201(h) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 251) (defining 
"exception"). A party must file an exception to a factual finding or a legal conclusion to 
preserve the issue for our review. Supreme Court Rule 228(e)(1) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 
288). If a party files no exceptions, then we consider that party to have admitted the 
factual findings and the legal conclusions in the final hearing report. Rule 228(g).  
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Whether or not the parties file exceptions or briefs, we hold oral argument in 
disciplinary cases. See Rule 228(i). Following several rounds of briefing not relevant to 
the issues here, we agreed to hold argument by videoconference. We did so in September 
2023. Both parties appeared. Morton acknowledged making mistakes, and she expressed 
a desire to continue practicing law in Kansas. The Disciplinary Administrator continued 
to press for disbarment. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
In many of the disciplinary cases we hear, neither the respondent nor the 
Disciplinary Administrator files exceptions. As a result, we often adopt the panel's 
findings of fact and its conclusions of law. See In re Murphy, 312 Kan. 203, 218, 473 
P.3d 886 (2020) ("'When a respondent does not take exception to a finding it is deemed 
admitted.'"). In those cases, our task is to decide the appropriate discipline after 
considering the admitted rule violations, the respondent's state of mind, any resulting 
injury, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. See, e.g., In re Barnds, 317 
Kan. 378, 398, 404, 530 P.3d 711 (2023) (citing ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions).  
 
But this case is more complicated. Morton filed exceptions to most of the panel's 
factual findings and all its legal conclusions. Thus, the panel's findings and conclusions 
are not deemed admitted. In re Hodge, 307 Kan. 170, 209-10, 407 P.3d 613 (2017). And 
we must determine whether attorney misconduct has been established by clear and 
convincing evidence. In re Spiegel, 315 Kan. 143, 147, 504 P.3d 1057 (2022). This 
requires us to examine the panel's findings and applicable professional-conduct rules in 
more detail. 
 
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Across her exceptions, briefing, and oral argument, Morton raises four main 
arguments. First, Morton contends that we lack subject-matter jurisdiction to discipline 
her for conduct related to her 2019 Colorado bar application. Second, Morton argues that 
the Disciplinary Administrator and the hearing panel violated her federal due-process 
rights. Third, Morton maintains that there is no clear and convincing evidence supporting 
the panel's conclusions that she violated KRPC 7.1, 8.1, and 8.4(c) and (g). Finally, 
Morton proposes that the appropriate discipline is probation or published censure if we 
uphold the rule violations.  
 
We address these arguments in turn below. We conclude that our court has 
subject-matter jurisdiction to discipline Morton for conduct related to her 2019 Colorado 
bar application and that Morton inadequately briefed her due-process challenges. But we 
agree with Morton that the facts and law do not support many violations the panel found. 
We also agree with her that the discipline recommended by the Disciplinary 
Administrator (disbarment) and the hearing panel (indefinite suspension) is too severe. 
Giving due consideration to the violations supported by clear and convincing evidence, 
Morton's state of mind, the injury she caused, and the applicable aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, we conclude that the appropriate discipline is a censure to be 
published in the Kansas Reports.  
 
But before explaining our reasoning, we must briefly address the supplemental 
documents Morton filed the evening before oral argument. Those documents included a 
corrected opening brief, letters of support, and a list of continuing-legal-education 
courses that Morton had recently completed. Although we need not discuss the delays 
and motion practice leading up to oral argument, we twice denied Morton's request to file 
a corrected brief during that period. Further, under Rule 228(c), the record in an attorney-
discipline proceeding before our court consists of the record before the hearing panel, the 
hearing transcript, and any exhibits a party offered for admission into evidence at the 
panel hearing. The rule contains no provision allowing a party to supplement the record 
20 
 
 
 
with letters of support or other documents the panel did not consider. See Rule 228(e)(1) 
(2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 288). We do not suggest that supplementing a disciplinary-
proceeding record is never warranted. But it was improper to do so without leave of the 
court and on the eve of oral argument. We decline to consider Morton's corrected brief 
and supplemental documents when resolving the issues before us. 
 
I. 
The Kansas Supreme Court Has Subject-Matter Jurisdiction to Discipline an 
Attorney Licensed in Kansas for Misrepresentations Made While Seeking Bar 
Admission in Another Jurisdiction 
 
Morton first insists that our court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to discipline her 
for statements made on her 2019 Colorado bar application. The hearing panel found that 
Morton misrepresented facts on that application and that she failed to inform Colorado 
admissions authorities of the pending disciplinary case against her in Kansas. The panel 
relied on those facts to conclude that Morton violated KRPC 8.1 and 8.4(c) and (g). But 
Morton contends that only the Colorado Supreme Court has the authority to investigate 
and sanction her for that conduct. 
 
We disagree. Article 3, § 1 of the Kansas Constitution vests the Kansas Supreme 
Court with authority to administer the judicial department of Kansas government and to 
exercise judicial power. This power includes maintaining high standards for the practice 
of law and disciplining those who fail to meet such standards. In re Crandall, 308 Kan. 
1526, 1538, 430 P.3d 902 (2018). Thus, under Supreme Court Rule 202(b), attorneys 
admitted to practice law in Kansas are "subject to the jurisdiction of the Kansas Supreme 
Court and the Board [for Discipline of Attorneys]." (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 253). And 
KRPC 8.5, which provides that a Kansas lawyer "is subject to the disciplinary authority 
of this jurisdiction although engaged in practice elsewhere," specifically contemplates 
subject-matter jurisdiction even if the lawyer is practicing outside Kansas. (2023 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. at 434). Our precedent likewise confirms that subject-matter jurisdiction exists 
even when the misconduct occurs outside Kansas. See In re Crandall, 308 Kan. at 1539-
21 
 
 
 
40 ("[M]isconduct in another jurisdiction 'still reflects on the ability of that lawyer to 
practice' in the licensing jurisdiction.") (quoting Rotunda & Dzienkowski, Legal Ethics:  
The Lawyer's Deskbook on Professional Responsibility § 8.5-1, at 1433 [2017]). Thus, 
we have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider whether Morton's out-of-state conduct—
including statements and omissions in her Colorado bar application—violated Kansas' 
professional-conduct rules. 
 
II. Morton Has Not Established That Her Federal Due-Process Rights Were Violated 
During the Proceedings Before the Hearing Panel 
 
Morton next argues that her federal due-process rights were violated during the 
panel proceedings in five ways. See In re Harrington, 305 Kan. 643, 657, 385 P.3d 905 
(2016) ("[T]he Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution applies to lawyer 
disciplinary proceedings."). We conclude that Morton has not adequately briefed any of 
the issues, so we decline to resolve them on the merits. See In re Bishop, 285 Kan. 1097, 
1106, 179 P.3d 1096 (2008) ("[T]he general rule [is] that an issue not briefed on appeal is 
deemed waived or abandoned."); In re Coggs, 270 Kan. 381, 396, 14 P.3d 1123 (2000) 
("We, therefore, decline to consider the two issues raised but not briefed."). We briefly 
explain why below. 
 
Morton first argues that the panel violated her federal due-process rights when it 
denied her motion to continue the formal hearing. Morton had asked for the continuance 
so she could subpoena records from the Boys & Girls Club and Sam's Club. To establish 
a procedural due-process violation, Morton would need to show that she was denied a 
specific procedural protection to which she was entitled. See In re Landrith, 280 Kan. 
619, 640, 124 P.3d 467 (2005). To decide the procedural protections that must 
accompany the deprivation of a particular property right, we weigh several factors:   
 
"(1) the individual interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest 
through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
22 
 
 
 
procedural safeguards; and (3) the State's interest in the procedures used, including the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would 
entail." 280 Kan. at 640 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 
L. Ed. 2d 18 [1976]). 
 
Moreover, respondents in disciplinary proceedings have the burden to show that they 
were prejudiced by any failure in the proceedings. See Supreme Court Rule 239(b) (2023 
Kan. S. Ct. R. at 312) (deviation from disciplinary procedures not grounds for reversal 
unless it causes prejudice). Morton simply asserts a federal due-process violation without 
addressing any of this applicable framework. See, e.g., 280 Kan. at 640 (applying 
procedural due-process framework to disciplinary-panel proceeding).  
 
Morton next argues that the Disciplinary Administrator violated her due-process 
rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), by 
objecting to a continuance and by failing to request and obtain exculpatory evidence on 
her behalf. Morton does not explain why Brady applies to a disciplinary proceeding 
(Brady is a criminal-law rule), why the Disciplinary Administrator had a duty to obtain 
evidence on Morton's behalf, or why the materials she sought were exculpatory. 
 
Morton then argues that the admission of Boys & Girls Club payroll records and 
a receipt from Sam's Club violated the rules of evidence. See Supreme Court Rule 
222(e)(1) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 277) (disciplinary hearing is governed by the Kansas 
rules of evidence). But Morton did not object to the admission of these exhibits. See 
K.S.A. 60-404; State v. Sharp, 289 Kan. 72, 100, 210 P.3d 590 (2009) ("'As a general 
rule, a party must make a timely and specific objection to the admission of evidence in 
order to preserve the issue for appeal.'"). And she merely asserts, without explaining, that 
the admission of the evidence violated K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-245a(b) (a civil-procedure 
statute governing the subpoena of nonparty business records) and K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-
460(m) (an evidence statute that provides a hearsay exception to business entries). 
23 
 
 
 
 
Morton then argues that the Disciplinary Administrator "failed in her duties to 
investigate." But Morton does not explain the source of these duties. Nor does she 
explain their substance. 
 
Finally, Morton argues that the panel erred by refusing to admit Exhibits I and J 
that she offered at trial. Those exhibits consist of email exchanges between Morton, the 
Disciplinary Administrator, Morton's former Boys & Girls Club supervisor, and the Boys 
& Girls Club's attorney. Morton vaguely asserts that the content of these exchanges 
conflicts with the supervisor's testimony at the panel hearing. But she does not explain 
how her argument implicates due process. Nor does she explain the alleged 
inconsistencies or how the exhibits are material or probative.  
 
These failings preclude meaningful review of Morton's due process claims.  
 
III. Clear and Convincing Evidence Supports Only Some of the KRPC Violations Found 
by the Hearing Panel 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, we consider the evidence, the hearing panel's 
findings, and the parties' arguments to determine whether KRPC violations exist and, if 
they do, what discipline to impose. Attorney misconduct must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence. In re Spiegel, 315 Kan. at 147; see Rule 226(a)(1)(A) (2023 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. at 281). Clear and convincing evidence is "evidence that causes the factfinder to 
believe that 'the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.'" 315 Kan. at 147. "'In 
making this determination, the court does not weigh conflicting evidence, assess witness 
credibility, or redetermine questions of fact. If a disputed finding is supported by clear 
and convincing evidence, it will not be disturbed.'" In re Ayesh, 313 Kan. 441, 464, 485 
P.3d 1155 (2021). 
 
24 
 
 
 
In its final hearing report, the panel determined that Morton had violated KRPC 
7.1(a) (communication concerning a lawyer's services), KRPC 8.1 (bar admission and 
disciplinary matters), KRPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation), and KRPC 8.4(g) (conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law). Morton denies violating any rule. The Disciplinary Administrator 
contends that clear and convincing evidence supports each rule violation. But it concedes 
that the panel erred by applying KRPC 8.4(c) and (g) to conduct occurring before Morton 
was licensed in Kansas. We address each rule in turn. 
 
A. Clear and Convincing Evidence Does Not Support the Panel's Conclusion 
That Morton Violated KRPC 7.1 by Posting Certain Content on Her 
Professional Website 
 
Under KRPC 7.1, a lawyer "shall not make a false or misleading communication 
about the lawyer or the lawyer's services." (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 423). A 
communication is "false or misleading" if it "contains a material misrepresentation of fact 
or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not 
materially misleading." KRPC 7.1(a) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 423). The panel concluded 
that Morton violated KRPC 7.1 by publishing "a website containing materially false 
information, including masses of information copied from the Roth Davies website, . . . 
her bar association memberships, her alleged Martindale-Hubbell A/V rating, and her 
alleged experience, particularly in motorcycle and wrongful death cases." In the panel's 
view, Morton had intentionally represented material facts, and her rule violations were 
exacerbated when, "having removed the website upon receipt of the complaint in this 
matter, she put the offending website back up within a few months." 
 
 
More context is required before evaluating the panel's findings. The record reveals 
that the Disciplinary Administrator first took issue with the November 2020 version of 
Morton's website—Davies had attached screenshots of the page to his complaint, and the  
25 
 
 
 
Disciplinary Administrator introduced them as evidence at the panel hearing. The 
November 2020 website included a logo for a Martindale-Hubbell A/V rating, the Roth 
Davies material, the bar association logos, and statements about Morton's experience and 
practice areas. At that time, the Disciplinary Administrator raised concerns only about the 
Roth Davies' material and the Martindale-Hubbell logo. When Morton received the 
complaint, she promptly deactivated her website. 
 
 
In July 2021, the Disciplinary Administrator conducted a follow-up investigation 
and found that Morton had reactivated her website. It was only then that the office began 
to object to the other aspects of Morton's website. And, importantly, the July 2021 
version had addressed the Administrator's earlier concerns:  Morton had deleted the 
Martindale-Hubbell A/V rating logo and the Roth Davies material (a fact that belies the 
panel's conclusion that Morton "exacerbated" the violations by reactivating her website). 
 
 
Given that context, it is useful to separate our discussion of KRPC 7.1 violations 
into two categories. We first examine the November 2020 website and determine whether 
clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's finding that the website contained 
"intentional misrepresentations" related to the Martindale-Hubbell logo and the Roth 
Davies material and, if so, whether such findings support a KRPC 7.1 violation. Then we 
ask the same questions for the July 2021 website containing Morton's bar membership, 
her experience, and her practice areas. 
 
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence Does Not Support the Panel's Conclusion 
That the Content of Morton's November 2020 Website Violated KRPC 7.1 
 
Clear and convincing evidence does not support the panel's finding that the use of 
the Martindale-Hubbell A/V Preeminent was an "intentional misrepresentation." There is 
no dispute that Morton had not received that rating. But the record shows only that the  
26 
 
 
 
logo was on the website for some time until a complaint was filed, that Morton promptly 
removed it, and that she did not republish it on her July 2021 website. The Disciplinary 
Administrator argues that we should infer that Morton knowingly violated the rule simply 
because she controlled the contents of her website. But we cannot agree. No evidence 
suggests that Morton's use of the logo was intentional, as the panel found, rather than 
inadvertent or negligent. And the Disciplinary Administrator has not argued that lawyers 
are strictly liable for a KRPC 7.1 violation or that a lawyer may violate the rule by way of 
ordinary negligence. We therefore reject the panel's conclusion. 
 
Nor do we agree that Morton's use of the Roth Davies material violated KRPC 7.1. 
That rule prohibits a lawyer only from making "a false or misleading communication 
about the lawyer or the lawyer's services." (Emphasis added.) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 
423). But Morton's inclusion of the Roth Davies material—whether inadvertent or 
intentional—was not a communication about Morton or her services. Instead, it consisted 
of summaries of Kansas and federal caselaw, a question-and-answer section about Kansas 
domestic-violence law, and an explanation of the criminal-trial process. Perhaps Morton's 
use of the materials violates a different rule of professional conduct (a possibility we 
address, in part, below), but KRPC 7.1 is simply inapplicable under these facts. We 
therefore conclude that the November 2020 version of Morton's website fails to support 
any KRPC 7.1 violations. 
 
2. Clear and Convincing Evidence Does Not Support the Panel's Conclusion 
That the Content of Morton's July 2021 Website Violated KRPC 7.1 
 
Morton's July 2021 website is the basis for the remaining violations. Because the 
panel's final hearing report lacks important details, additional context is again needed. 
Under the heading titled, "Associations," Morton included the logo of the Johnson 
County Bar Association, Kansas Bar Association, and American Bar Association. Her  
27 
 
 
 
website also used the word "experienced" several times:  it said that "you need an 
experienced Johnson County, Kansas attorney;" that "Attorney T. Morton has the 
experience necessary to determine if you are being treated fairly;" that "experience 
counts;" and that Morton was "experienced legal counsel you can trust." Finally, Morton 
listed her practice areas as "criminal defense" and "personal injury," and she listed 
several types of cases within those areas:  "sex crimes, child pornography/sexual 
exploitation, Jessica's law" and "auto accident, motorcycle accidents, wrongful death, 
serious injuries." The panel found that these communications were intentional 
misrepresentations about her bar membership, her experience, and her practice. 
 
We disagree with the panel. First, a misrepresentation must be "material" to be 
false or misleading under KRPC 7.1(a). (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 423). Although Morton's 
membership in each of the bar associations had lapsed, she had been affiliated with each 
previously, and her website did not expressly say that she was a current member. So the 
evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that any misrepresentation of fact 
was "material." Second, while an attorney's assertion of "experience" may be a material 
misrepresentation in some cases, that is not the case here. Morton's claims to be 
"experienced legal counsel" and to "ha[ve] the experience necessary to determine if you 
are being treated fairly" are not demonstrably false under the record before us. Finally, it 
is not improper for an attorney to state the areas he or she is willing to practice in or to 
state the types of cases he or she will accept. Indeed, KRPC 7.4(a) specifically allows a 
lawyer to "communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular 
fields of law." (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 429). Nothing in the record shows that Morton 
claimed to be a specialist in a particular field of law, or that she claimed to have 
experience handling particular types of cases. She simply listed types of cases she would 
accept. Thus, clear and convincing evidence does not support the panel's conclusion that 
the July 2021 website violated KRPC 7.1. 
 
28 
 
 
 
B. Clear and Convincing Evidence Supports the Panel's Conclusion That Morton 
Violated KRPC 8.1 by Omitting Material Employment Information on Her 
2016 Kansas and 2019 Colorado Bar Applications and by Failing to Disclose 
to Colorado Attorney-Admissions Authorities That She Was Facing a 
Disciplinary Complaint in Kansas 
 
KRPC 8.1 prohibits "[a]n applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in 
connection with a bar admission application" from "knowingly mak[ing] a false 
statement of material fact" or "fail[ing] to disclose a fact necessary to correct a 
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail[ing] 
to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary 
authority." (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 431). The panel concluded that Morton had violated 
that rule when she (1) "intentionally failed to include her employment with the Boys and 
Girls Club, as well as her employment with Crystal Specialties and Colorado State 
University-Pueblo" in her Kansas bar application; (2) stated in "her several applications" 
to the Colorado bar that she had "voluntarily quit her employment with Boys & Girls 
Club" and "had not been a member of any bar associations"; and (3) had failed to disclose 
this disciplinary case to the Colorado attorney-admissions authorities. We address these 
violations in order, noting that neither the panel nor the parties have addressed how each 
alleged violation fits into each subsection of KRPC 8.1. 
 
First, we mostly agree with the panel's conclusion about Morton's failure to 
disclose prior employment on her Kansas bar application. Question 22 of the Kansas bar 
application required Morton to disclose 10 years of employment history. Morton filed her 
application in March 2016, meaning that she needed to disclose all employment dating 
back to March 2006. Morton was an employee of the Boys & Girls Club in late 2007, so 
she needed to disclose that employment. That omission was material because Morton's 
supervisor testified that she was fired for misconduct, and "employment misconduct" is 
one of the factors considered when establishing character and fitness qualification for the 
Kansas bar. Supreme Court Rule 712(d)(3) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 574). And because 
29 
 
 
 
Morton had listed her Boys & Girls Club employment on her earlier Colorado bar 
applications, it is reasonable to infer that she intentionally omitted it from her Kansas  
application. Even so, we disagree that there is evidence in the record suggesting that 
Morton's failure to disclose her employment with Crystal Specialties or Colorado State 
University-Pueblo was material, so those omissions do not support the violation. 
 
Second, the panel relied on statements from Morton's "several" Colorado bar 
applications, but it should have relied only on Morton's 2019 Colorado bar application. 
KRPC 8.1 applies to a Kansas "lawyer" or "[a]n applicant for admission" to the Kansas 
bar, and Morton was neither before 2016. (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 431). But we agree that 
clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's conclusion that Morton's statement on 
her 2019 Colorado application that she voluntarily quit her Boys & Girls Club position 
was a false statement of material fact. Based on her supervisor's testimony, clear and 
convincing evidence supports the panel's finding that the Boys & Girls Club terminated 
Morton for misconduct, meaning that Morton misrepresented the resolution of her 
employment relationship. And because misconduct in employment is one of the factors 
considered when establishing character and fitness qualification for the Colorado bar, it is 
reasonable to infer that Morton intended to cover up the grounds for her termination. See 
Colorado Court Rules, C.R.C.P. 208.1(6)(c) (2023).  
 
However, we disagree with the panel that Morton's statement about her prior bar 
membership supports a violation of KRPC 8.1. True, although Morton stated on her 2019 
Colorado bar application that she had not been a member of any bar associations, Morton 
had been a member of the Johnson County Bar Association and the Kansas Bar 
Association from 2016 to 2017 and of the American Bar Association from 2013 to 2018. 
But nothing in the record suggests that Morton's statement was material to her bar 
application. And she was not a member of those associations at the time her application 
was submitted to Colorado authorities. 
 
30 
 
 
 
Finally, we agree with the panel that Morton violated KRPC 8.1 by failing to 
disclose her Kansas disciplinary complaint to the Colorado attorney-admissions 
authorities while her 2019 Colorado bar application was pending. That application asked 
if the applicant was the subject of any complaints or disciplinary or grievance actions. 
Morton answered no, which was accurate when she submitted the application in June 
2019. But when she submitted the application, Morton acknowledged that she had a 
continuing obligation to timely update the information on the application until she was 
admitted to practice in Colorado. And she acknowledged that an amendment was 
considered timely when made "no later than 10 days after any occurrence that would 
change, or render incomplete, any answer on" her application. As a result, when Morton 
learned of the pending Kansas complaint against her in February 2021, she needed to 
timely update her Colorado bar application, which was still pending. Her failure to do so 
was a material omission. 
 
C. Clear and Convincing Evidence Supports Some Violations of KRPC 8.4(c) 
and (g), but the Panel's Findings Concerning Conduct Occurring Before 
Morton Was Licensed in Kansas Do Not Support a Violation of KRPC 8.4 
 
KRPC 8.4 defines professional misconduct. Under KRPC 8.4(c), it is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation." (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 433). And under KRPC 8.4(g), it is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in . . . conduct that adversely reflects on 
the lawyer's fitness to practice law." (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 433). The panel concluded 
that Morton had violated these provisions in numerous ways. And it relied on the same 
findings to support violations of both subsections of KRPC 8.4. 
 
But there is a problem with many of the panel's conclusions. KRPC 8.4 expressly 
applies only to "a lawyer," and much of the conduct the panel relied on concerns 
Morton's Kansas bar application, meaning it occurred before Morton was admitted to the 
bar. As the Disciplinary Administrator concedes, KRPC 8.4 does not apply to that 
31 
 
 
 
conduct. Thus, Morton's failure to disclose facts on her Kansas bar application about her 
employment at the Boys & Girls Club, Crystal Specialties, and Colorado State 
University-Pueblo cannot support a violation of KRPC 8.4.  
 
Several of the remaining violations involve the statements or omissions on her 
Colorado bar application that we discussed above. Although the panel did not specify 
whether it found violations based on Morton's earlier Colorado bar applications, KRPC 
8.4 applies only to statements or omissions made on Morton's 2019 Colorado application, 
since she was not a lawyer when she submitted the earlier applications.  
 
We agree with the panel that clear and convincing evidence supports a KRPC 8.4 
violation for Morton's statement that she "voluntarily" quit her employment with the 
Boys & Girls Club. Her supervisor's testimony clearly and convincingly supports the 
panel's finding that Morton was fired for misconduct. Morton's statement involves a 
material misrepresentation and adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law. We also 
agree that clear and convincing evidence supports a KRPC 8.4 violation for Morton's 
failure to disclose her Kansas disciplinary complaint to Colorado attorney-admissions 
authorities while her Colorado bar application remained pending. The record shows that 
Morton acknowledged that she had a continuing obligation to update the information on 
the application until she was admitted to practice in Colorado. Her failure to disclose the 
complaint is a material misrepresentation or deceitful, and it adversely reflects on her 
fitness to practice law. 
 
But we disagree with the panel that other statements and omissions in her 2019 
Colorado bar application support KRPC 8.4 violations. We have already discussed 
Morton's statement that she had not been a member of any bar associations. The record 
contains no evidence suggesting that Morton's statement was material to her bar 
application, so clear and convincing evidence does not support a conclusion that she 
made a material misrepresentation or that her statement adversely reflects on her fitness 
32 
 
 
 
to practice law. Nor do we believe clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's 
conclusion that Morton violated KRPC 8.4(c) and (g) because she "[f]ailed to disclose to 
the Colorado bar that she had been employed by El Pueblo." To the contrary, the first 
item listed in the employment-history section of Morton's 2019 Colorado application was 
her position as principal at El Pueblo.  
 
Finally, the panel relied on the contents of Morton's website to conclude that 
Morton had engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
under KRPC 8.4(c) and in conduct that adversely reflected on her fitness to practice law 
under KRPC 8.4(g). We have already addressed most of the content on Morton's website. 
We determined that there was no clear and convincing evidence showing that Morton's 
use of the Martindale-Hubbell A/V Preeminent was anything other than inadvertent or, at 
most, negligent. We also determined that Morton's use of the three bar-association logos 
was not a material misrepresentation, that her use of "experienced" was not demonstrably 
false, and that listing case types and practice areas was unobjectionable under the facts 
here. Because the record shows that any misrepresentations related to this content were 
either immaterial or (at most) negligent, we do not believe clear and convincing evidence 
shows that Morton engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation under KRPC 8.4(c). See In re Pyle, 283 Kan. 807, 827, 156 P.3d 1231 
(2007) (clear and convincing evidence did not support KRPC 8.4[c] violation when 
incorrect statement reflected "mistake rather than malevolence"); see also Black's Law 
Dictionary 1198 (11th ed. 2019) (defining "misrepresentation" as the "act . . . of making a 
false or misleading assertion about something, usu. with the intent to deceive" [emphasis 
added]). And for that same reason, we also conclude Morton did not engage in conduct 
that adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law under KRPC 8.4(g).  
 
But we have not yet discussed Morton's use of the Roth Davies material because 
we concluded that such content did not represent a communication about Morton or her 
services under KRPC 7.1. KRPC 8.4 contains no such limitation, so we agree with the 
33 
 
 
 
panel that it may sometimes apply when a lawyer misappropriates materials for a 
professional website. But the record before us contains no evidence showing that 
Morton's use of the Roth Davies material was anything more than inadvertent or 
negligent. Thus, we "discern mistake rather than malevolence," and cannot agree that 
clear and convincing evidence establishes that Morton engaged in conduct that involved 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation under KRPC 8.4(c) or that adversely 
reflects on her fitness to practice law under KRPC 8.4(g). In re Pyle, 283 Kan. at 827.  
 
IV. The Appropriate Discipline Is Published Censure 
 
We have evaluated the hearing panel's conclusions on Morton's rule violations. 
We determined that Morton violated KRPC 8.1 by failing to disclose her Boys & Girls 
Club employment on her Kansas bar application, by materially misrepresenting the 
termination of her Boys & Girls Club employment on her 2019 Colorado bar application, 
and by failing to inform the Colorado attorney-admissions authorities of a pending 
Kansas disciplinary complaint. We determined that this same conduct violated KRPC 
8.4(c) and (g). But we rejected many of the rule violations the panel found, including all 
violations of KRPC 7.1 and KRPC 8.4 that arose from the content of Morton's website, 
violations of KRPC 8.1 and KRPC 8.4 that arose from immaterial omissions of 
employment and bar-membership history, and all violations of KRPC 8.4 that arose from 
conduct before Morton had been admitted to the bar.  
 
The remaining question is the appropriate discipline. We generally look to 
the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to aid in 
determining discipline. That framework considers "four factors in determining 
punishment:  (1) the ethical duty violated by the lawyer; (2) the lawyer's mental state; 
(3) the actual or potential injury resulting from the lawyer's misconduct; and (4) the 
existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." In re Hodge, 307 Kan. at 231. 
 
34 
 
 
 
The panel considered these same factors. It determined that Morton had violated 
the KRPC in numerous ways. It found that Morton's violations were intentional and had 
"caused injury and harm to the justice system and the practice of law" in Kansas. The 
panel also found that Morton's misconduct was aggravated by a dishonest or selfish 
motive, by her commission of multiple offenses, and by her refusal to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of her conduct. But it did find that her misconduct was mitigated by a 
lack of prior disciplinary record and by her inexperience in the practice of law. Based on 
these considerations, the panel recommended an indefinite suspension with various 
conditions for reinstatement. The Disciplinary Administrator recommends we disbar 
Morton from the practice of law. Morton recommends either censure or probation. 
 
While we agree with the panel that Morton engaged in intentional rule violations, 
we have concluded that clear and convincing evidence supports only a few of the rule 
violations the panel found. The record also lacks evidence of concrete or specific harm, 
and the Disciplinary Administrator has never alleged that Morton injured a client. And 
we question the weight the panel assigned some of the aggravating factors. We agree that 
Morton at times acted with a dishonest motive. And while we also agree that Morton 
committed multiple violations, that aggravating factor warrants much less weight since 
we determined that most of the violations involving misrepresentations are not supported 
by clear and convincing evidence. Moreover, in our view, the panel's finding that Morton 
had refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct is not supported by clear 
and convincing evidence. The panel failed to identify specific instances of Morton's 
failure to take responsibility, and the finding threatens to punish Morton for exercising 
her rights in an adversarial proceeding. The record shows that Morton promptly 
addressed the Disciplinary Administrator's objections to her website, and at oral 
argument, Morton acknowledged mistakes and evinced a commitment to future 
compliance. On the other hand, we agree with the mitigating circumstances the panel 
found. 
 
35 
 
 
 
"In any given case, this court is not bound by the recommendations from the 
hearing panel or the Disciplinary Administrator. 'Each disciplinary sanction is based on 
the specific facts and circumstances of the violations and the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances presented in the case.' 'Because each case is unique, past sanctions provide 
little guidance.' [Citations omitted.]" In re Hodge, 307 Kan. at 230. Having considered 
the facts here, a majority of this court holds that published censure is the appropriate 
discipline. We base this determination on ABA Standards 5.13 (reprimand generally 
appropriate when lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation that causes injury or potential injury). See In re Spencer, 317 
Kan. 70, 86, 524 P.3d 57 (2023) (published censure appropriate sanction for lawyer who 
committed "a misdemeanor that involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law but did not seriously adversely 
reflect on his fitness to practice law"). A minority of the court would impose more severe 
discipline. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Tarishawn D.D. Morton is disciplined by 
published censure to be published in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 225(a)(5) 
(2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 281) for violating KRPC 8.1, 8.4(c) and (g).  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.