Case Title: In re Rosenfeld

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1991-09-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-513


In re Alan D. Rosenfeld                      Supreme Court

                                             Original Jurisdiction

                                             September Term, 1991


Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Marilyn Skoglund, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for State

William A. Hunter, Ludlow, for respondent

J. Eric Anderson, Manchester Center, for amicus curiae Professional Conduct
  Board


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson and Dooley, JJ.


     PER CURIAM.   The Attorney General brought a nine-count presentment in
this Court against attorney Alan Rosenfeld, alleging that he violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility.  The alleged violations were in
connection with three civil cases in which he represented a party in
litigation, and a case in which he was a pro se plaintiff.  We referred this
matter to a committee for fact-finding, legal conclusions and recommended
action.  See Permanent Rules Governing Establishment of Professional Conduct
Board and its Operation, Administrative Order 9, { 18(d). (FN1) The committee
consisted of Ritchie E. Berger, Esq., chairman, Patricia A. Barr, Esq., and
William J. Donahue, Esq.  Evidence was taken over three days in November
1990, and on December 13, 1990, the committee issued findings and
conclusions.  It concluded that three of the counts had been proven by clear
and convincing evidence.  On one of the counts, a majority of the committee
found that it had not been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and
Chairman Berger dissented.  The Attorney General withdrew one of the counts,
and the committee concluded unanimously that the remainder had not been
proven.  The committee held a separate sanction hearing on December 14,
1990, and on December 20, 1990, filed a recommendation that respondent be
publicly censured, that he be required to complete at least twenty hours of
continuing legal education (ten in ethics, ten in office management) over an
eighteen-month period, and that he be required to take a multistate
professional responsibility examination and remain licensed to practice only
if he passed it.
                                    I.
     The Attorney General appeals the committee's failure to find a breach
of the Code of Professional Responsibility in Count II(A) of the
presentment, the matter on which there was not a unanimous opinion.  The
Attorney General further urges that we not accept the recommended sanction
and instead suspend respondent from the practice of law for an appropriate
period.
     In order to address the sanction issue, we include a complete statement
of the relevant facts bearing on the counts for which the committee found
violations of the Code, as well as the count in dispute.
                                   II.
                            COUNTS II(B) & (C)
     These related counts arise out of respondent's representation of
Katrina Yurenka in Sacks v. Yurenka, a parentage case, in which custody and
visitation were contested.  Respondent was retained in May of 1987 with a
$500 retainer and an agreed rate of compensation of $50 per hour.  Shortly
thereafter, the rate was reduced to $25 per hour because of Ms. Yurenka's
financial difficulties.  There was no discussion of whether the client was
to receive a detailed, itemized bill from respondent, although the committee
found that an attorney practicing in Vermont should "maintain records
adequate so that, upon request, a client may promptly be provided with a
detailed, itemized bill for legal services provided."
     Respondent's record-keeping did not allow him to present an itemized
bill.  On August 7, 1987, respondent billed Ms. Yurenka for legal services
rendered without detailing those services.  She paid him in October.  In
December, Ms. Yurenka hired another lawyer who asked respondent to notify
the court of his withdrawal and send her Ms. Yurenka's file.  Respondent
sought confirmation from Ms. Yurenka that she was discharging him and wanted
him to withdraw, but added that he would withdraw by the end of December if
he did not hear from her.  The client responded without addressing
respondent's inquiry.  She requested an itemized bill of the services he had
rendered.  At the end of January, 1988, respondent withdrew from the court
action.  In February, he wrote the client's new lawyer that he wanted to
resolve any questions over his fee, adding:
         I will be able to prepare a specific accounting for Ms.
         Yurenka of all my work for her.  To my mind, however,
         this will be a substantial change in the agreement that
         we had.  I can assure you that I spent substantially
         more time on the case than I have been paid for, and if
         requested to prepare a complete accounting I will do so
         and then expect payment for whatever balance it turns
         out remains unpaid.  As a rough estimate, I had told Ms.
         Yurenka that the unbilled portion would be about thirty
         three percent extra.

The new lawyer responded that she found respondent's threat to increase his
bill to be inappropriate and again sought Ms. Yurenka's file.  Respondent
began transmitting the file on March 25, 1988.
     The committee found that respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility in two respects in connection with the Yurenka case. (FN2) It
concluded that respondent's threat to increase his bill if he was required
to create an itemized statement was "conduct that adversely reflects on
[respondent's] fitness to practice law" in violation of DR 1-102(A)(7).  It
concluded that the delay in forwarding Ms. Yurenka's file to the new lawyer
was "excessive and unjustified" and was also a violation of DR 1-102(A)(7)
and of DR 2-110(A)(2) (a withdrawing lawyer must take "reasonable steps to
avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of [the] client," including
"delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is
entitled").
                                  III.
                                COUNT II(A)
     This count, on which the committee divided, also arose out of
respondent's representation of Katrina Yurenka.  In June 1987, the
Washington Superior Court issued a temporary order giving temporary custody
of the child to Ms. Yurenka, but awarded the father visitation each weekend
and set the final hearing for July 14, 1987.  On July 7, 1987, Ms. Yurenka
became concerned that the father had sexually abused the child.  She went to
the Washington Superior Court seeking a relief-from-abuse order to prevent
further contact between the child and the father.  By chance, she met
respondent at the court, and he helped her prepare the proper paperwork.
     The relief-from-abuse petition was filed on July 10th, and the
attorney for the father of the child was notified of the filing.  The court
decided to consolidate it with the hearing on permanent custody to be held
on the following Tuesday, July 14, 1987.  On learning that the matter would
not be heard until after the weekend, respondent and Ms. Yurenka conferred
on what to do about the father's right to visitation over the weekend.
     Respondent told Ms. Yurenka that he could not advise her to violate the
outstanding visitation order.  Nevertheless, he told her that he did not
think the judge would hold it against her if she denied visitation.  He
informed her "that it was his guess that . . . [the judge] did not expect
her to permit . . . [the father] to exercise his parent-child contact for
the coming weekend."  To avoid a confrontation, he advised her not to be at
home if she decided to withhold visitation.  Respondent thought that his
client would not allow visitation that weekend, and his expectation proved
correct.
     The majority of the committee found that respondent was properly
sympathetic to his client's concerns and was honest with her.  It noted that
he failed to discourage her from violating the order, adding "his failure .
. . was not blunted by his self-serving disclaimer that he could not
counsel a violation of the order."  The committee concluded that respondent
did not violate DR 7-106(A) (a lawyer shall not advise a client to disregard
a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding, but may take
steps in good faith to challenge the validity of the ruling) because of the
jeopardy his client perceived in granting visitation, the inability to place
the matter before the court prior to the weekend visit, the loss of only one
weekend visit, and the short time prior to the court hearing.  The committee
also concluded that similar situations arose often in family practice and
many attorneys "choose to assure the safety of the child over the sanctity
of the court order."
     The chairman of the committee dissented, concluding that the failure of
respondent to advise Ms. Yurenka that she was legally obligated to comply
with the court order effectively guaranteed that she would violate the
order.  He rejected the application of a different standard for family law
practitioners and concluded the conduct violated DR 7-106(A) as well as DR
1-102(A)(5) & (A)(7).
     The Attorney General argues that the committee's conclusion is
inconsistent with its findings and should be reversed.  Respondent urges
that we uphold the conclusion on the basis that the evidence shows he did
not "advise" his client to disregard the court's order.  See DR 7-106(A).
We first emphasize the proper standard for our review.  The committee was
the trier of fact and "it was for the committee to determine the weight of
the evidence and the persuasive effect of the testimony."  In re Wright, 131
Vt. 473, 490,