Case Title: Sellers v. Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sellers v. Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming1988 WY 105760 P.2d 394Case Number: 88-35Decided: 08/25/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming

GARY SELLERS, APPELLANT 
(PETITIONER),

v.

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
COMMISSION OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(RESPONDENT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

David A. Drell, 
Casper, for appellant.

William G. 
Hibbler, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ. 

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellee Employment 
Security Commission of Wyoming (ESC) denied the application of appellant Gary 
Sellers for unemployment benefits. Appellant's subsequent petition for review in 
the district court was dismissed as being untimely filed, and this appeal 
followed. Resolution of the issue presented in this case requires that we 
examine the applicable statutes and rules to determine the proper method of 
computing time limits on filing a notice of appeal from an administrative 
decision where notice of the decision is provided to the parties by 
mail.

[¶2.]     We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3.]     Appellant describes the 
issue in this manner:

WHETHER THE APPELLANT 
TIMELY FILED HIS PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT TO PROPERLY INVOKE THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
COURT.

[¶4.]     An ESC deputy, by 
initial determination and a redetermination, concluded that appellant was 
disqualified from receiving benefits because he had voluntarily left his most 
recent employment without good cause attributable to that employment. Appellant 
filed an administrative appeal and, after a hearing, an ESC hearing examiner 
affirmed the deputy's decision. Appellant further pursued his administrative 
remedy by appealing to the commissioners of the ESC. The commissioners affirmed 
the examiner's decision at a meeting held on October 26, 1987. On October 30, 
1987, the decision of the commissioners was mailed to appellant by certified 
mail. Appellant received the certified letter of notice on November 2, 
1987.

[¶5.]     On December 2, 1987, 
appellant filed a petition for review with the district court. By order entered 
December 18, 1987, the district court dismissed the petition, stating as grounds 
therefor:

THE COURT FINDS THAT the 
petition was mailed on October 30, 1987, that the time allowed by the Wyoming 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 12.04, for filing a petition for review 
expired on November 30, 1987, as the time for filing a petition begins to run on 
the date that the notice is mailed, and that the Court is therefore without 
jurisdiction to consider the petition.

[¶6.]     The right to judicial 
review of administrative decisions is entirely statutory, and agency actions are 
not reviewable absent statutory authority. Holding's Little America v. Board of 
County Commissioners of Laramie County, 670 P.2d 699 (Wyo. 1983); Keslar v. 
Police Civil Service Commission, City of Rock Springs, 665 P.2d 937 (Wyo. 1983). 
In addition, timely filing of a petition for review is jurisdictional. Wolfley 
v. Crook, 695 P.2d 159 (Wyo. 1985); Department 
of Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, 589 P.2d 1295 
(Wyo. 
1979).

[¶7.]     Statutory authority for 
judicial review of ESC decisions is found in W.S. 27-3-407(a), which provides in 
pertinent part:

Any person aggrieved or 
adversely affected by a final decision under this act may obtain judicial review 
by filing a petition for review with the district court of jurisdiction. Review 
by the court shall be as provided by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act 
[§§ 16-3-101 through 16-3-115] * * *.

[¶8.]     In addition, W.S. 
16-3-114(a) of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act establishes, in general, 
the right to review of agency decisions or actions. That section 
states:

Subject to the 
requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted and in the absence of any 
statutory or common-law provision precluding or limiting judicial review, any 
person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency 
in a contested case, or by other agency action or inaction, or any person 
affected in fact by a rule adopted by an agency, is entitled to judicial review 
in the district court for the county in which the administrative action or 
inaction was taken, or in which any real property affected by the administrative 
action or inaction is located, or if no real property is involved, in the 
district court for the county in which the party aggrieved or adversely affected 
by the administrative action or inaction resides or has its principal place of 
business. The procedure to be followed in 
the proceeding before the district court shall be in accordance with rules 
heretofore or hereinafter adopted by the Wyoming supreme 
court.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶9.]     W.R.A.P. 12 governs the 
procedural aspects of review of administrative decisions. Board of 
CountyCommissioners of TetonCounty 
v. Teton County Youth Services, Inc., 652 P.2d 400 (Wyo. 1982); W.R.A.P. 
12.03. W.R.A.P. 12.01 provides:

To the extent that 
judicial review of administrative action by a district court is available, any 
person who is aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an 
agency in a contested case, or who is aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by 
any other agency action or inaction, or who is adversely affected in fact by a 
rule adopted by [an] agency, may obtain such review as provided in this 
rule.

W.R.A.P. 12.04 
establishes the time for filing a petition for review, providing in relevant 
part:

In a contested case, or 
in a noncontested case where a statute places a time limit on appeal, the 
petition for review shall be filed within thirty (30) days after written, certified notice to all 
parties of the final decision of the agency * * *.

(Emphasis 
added.) Finally, W.S. 16-3-110 of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act 
prescribes the procedure for giving notice of a final agency decision in a 
contested case. In pertinent part, that section provides:

Parties shall be notified 
either personally or by mail of any 
decision or order. A copy of the decision and order shall be delivered or mailed 
forthwith to each party or to his attorney of record.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶10.]  Thus, pursuant to the above statutes and 
rules, appellant had thirty days after certified notice of the agency decision 
in which to file his petition for review. Our initial inquiry, therefore, is 
whether the appeal period runs from the date the notice is sent by mail as 
opposed to the date it is received. Both parties seem to agree that the period 
is measured from the time the notice was mailed. We agree that, pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 12.04, the appeal period is triggered by the sending of certified 
notice through the mail. The general rule is found in 1 M. Merrill, Notice § 633 
at 715-16 (1952), wherein it is stated:

Whether the authority 
springs from common law or custom, from contract or from direction by the 
notice, from rule of court or of administrative tribunal, or from the sovereign 
will of the legislature, it is not necessary that a notification authorized to 
be made by mail be received. Its effectiveness dates from the time of 
mailing.

(Emphasis 
added.) In Call v. Alexander Coal Company, 8 Ohio App.3d 344, 457 N.E.2d 356, 
357 (1983), the court said, "Where a statute specifies that a person shall be 
notified by a particular means, such as certified or registered mail, notice is 
effective when deposited in the mails." See also Crow v. United States, 
203 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1953); Elliott v. Board of Equalization and Adjustment of 
Jefferson County, 469 So. 2d 602 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Caldwell v. Geldreich, 
137 Cal. App. 2d 78, 289 P.2d 832 (1955); Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b); and 58 Am.Jur.2d, 
Notice § 27 (1971).

[¶11.]  Having determined that the time period 
for filing an appeal pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.04 is measured from the date of 
mailing rather than the date of receipt, we next look to W.R.A.P. 14.02,1 which prescribes the method for 
computing time.2 W.R.A.P. 14.02, as amended in 1987, 
provides in relevant part:

In computing any period 
of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, or by order of court, the day of 
the act, event or default from which the designated period of time begins to run 
shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included, 
unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, or, when the act to be 
done is the filing of a paper, a day on which weather or other conditions have 
made the office of clerk of the court inaccessible, in which event the period 
runs until the end of the next day which is not one of the aforementioned days. 
When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than eleven (11) days, 
intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the 
computation.

On the basis of 
the foregoing, the appeal period in this case was initiated by the mailing of 
the decision notice on October 30, 1987. Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 14.02, that date 
is not included. The first day of the count, therefore, is October 31, with the 
thirtieth day falling on November 29. November 29, 1987, was a Sunday, so, 
accordingly, the thirty-day period expired on Monday, November 30. This was the 
finding of the district court, and it was correct as far as it 
went.

[¶12.]  The district court, however, failed to 
consider the operation of W.R.A.P. 14.03, which, in certain circumstances, 
enlarges the prescribed time to do an act after service of notice when the 
notice is sent by mail. W.R.A.P. 14.03 states:

Whenever a party has the 
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed 
period from or after the service of a brief, notice or other paper upon him, and 
the brief, notice or other paper is served upon him by mail or by delivery to 
the clerk, three (3) days shall be added to the prescribed 
period.

W.R.A.P. 14.03 
has similar counterparts in W.R.C.P. 6(e); W.R.Cr.P. 43(d); Fed.R.Civ. P. 6(e); 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 45(e); and Fed.R.App.P. 26(c). In 4A C. Wright & A. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1171 at 514-15 (1987), the authors, 
in reference to Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e), describe the rationale for the three-day 
extension:

[T]he rule clearly is 
intended to protect parties who are served notice by mail from suffering a 
systematic diminution of their time to respond through the application of Rule 
5(b), which provides that service is complete upon mailing, not receipt; the 
additional three days provided by Rule 6(e) to the party being served represent 
a reasonable transmission time, and a fair compromise between the harshness of 
measuring strictly from the date of mailing and the indefiniteness of attempting 
to measure from the date of receipt, which in many cases would be 
unverifiable.[3]

[¶13.]  Appellant clearly was entitled to the 
three-day extension in this case. Our analysis, however, does not end here. We 
must additionally determine whether the extra three days are to be added to the 
original period or whether they are to be treated as a separate period. Although 
not dispositive here, the importance of this distinction can readily be seen. 
If, for example, the thirtieth day should fall on a Saturday, the final day for 
filing a notice of appeal by the computation rules, would fall on the following 
Monday. W.R.A.P. 14.02. Under these circumstances, if the extra three days are 
added to the original period, the thirty-third day would fall on Tuesday, 
resulting in a net gain of one day if the notice is provided by mail. If, 
however, the extra three days are treated as a separate period and computed 
separately, the initial period would expire on Monday, and the addition of three 
days would extend the time until Thursday.

[¶14.]  This question becomes further complicated 
when considered in relation to time periods of less than eleven days, in which 
case all intervening Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded from 
the count. W.R.A.P. 14.02. As an example, if the original time period is ten 
days and if the extra three days are added to this period, the period then would 
exceed ten days, and the intervening weekends and holidays would be included in 
the count. An inconsistency thus arises. When the original period is ten days 
and the notice is served personally, the recipient benefits from at least four 
additional days because of the exclusion of weekends, giving him a total of at 
least fourteen days. If, however, the notice is given by mail and if the extra 
three days are added to the original period, the weekends are not excluded, and 
the recipient may have only thirteen days from the date of mailing in which to 
respond. This is obviously inconsistent with the purpose of the mailing 
extension. Wright and Miller advocate treating the two situations differently; 
i.e., where the original period is less than eleven days, compute the extra mail 
days separately; and where the original period is eleven days or more, compute 
the extra days as part of the original period. 4A C. Wright & A. Miller, 
supra, at 516-21. We view such diverse treatment as only adding further 
confusion, however, and we therefore hold that the three-day mailing extension 
should be computed separately from the original period, regardless of the length 
of the original time period involved. See Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation 
v. National Labor Relations Board, 669 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 
1982).

[¶15.]  Having examined the rules and 
interpretive authorities, we return to the facts of this case and apply the 
rules as ascertained. We have previously determined that appellant's original 
thirty days in which to file an appeal expired on Monday, November 30, 1987. 
Appellant was entitled to the extra three days provided by W.R.A.P. 14.03, 
however, and, pursuant to our holding supra, this period is computed separately 
from the original period. Consequently, appellant had until Thursday, December 
3, 1987, to file his petition for review.4 Appellant filed his petition on 
December 2, 1987, and therefore his notice of appeal was timely. It was error 
for the district court to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was not 
timely filed.

[¶16.]  REVERSED AND 
REMANDED.

THOMAS, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 The Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure in their entirety, including W.R.A.P. 14.02, are applicable 
to appeals from administrative agencies by virtue of W.R.A.P. 1.01, which 
provides:

All appeals to the 
district court and Supreme Court shall be governed by these 
rules.

2 The method specified for 
computing time under W.R.A.P. 14.02 is virtually identical to that provided by 
W.R.C.P. 6(a), and W.R.Cr.P. 43(a).

3 It is clear that, in the 
federal courts, as in Wyoming, the three-day mail extension applies 
only where the time period for doing an act runs from the time of service of 
notice. The three-day extension is inapplicable to a direct appeal from the 
district court where the time is calculated from the date of entry of the 
judgment, regardless of whether the parties are notified of the decision by 
mail. Savage v. CacheValley Dairy Association, 737 F.2d 887 
(10th Cir. 1984); Lashley v. Ford Motor Company, 518 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 
1975).

In addition, under the 
federal system, the time period for review of agency decisions is generally 
controlled by the enabling legislation of the various agencies. Thus, in 4A C. 
Wright & A. Miller, supra, at 522, it is said:

As a general rule, the 
service-by-mail extension provided in Rule 6(e) applies only to civil actions. 
Thus, the rule has been held not to extend the time permitted for obtaining 
review of administrative decisions when the decision has been mailed, on the 
theory that the statutory time elements for review are mandatory and 
jurisdictional.

See also Carr v. 
Veterans Administration, 522 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1975); Whipp v. Weinberger, 505 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1974); and Lauzon v. Strachan Shipping Company, 602 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.Tex.), aff'd by 782 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1985). In the instant case, 
however, the time period for an appeal is set by court rule (W.R.A.P. 12.04) 
rather than statute, so the application of the W.R.A.P. 14.03 mail extension 
does not operate to extend or limit any statutorily prescribed jurisdiction of 
the district court. See W.R.C.P. 82. Thus, the general rule applied by the 
federal courts is inapplicable to the instant case. See Lincoln v. Board of Commissioners of TippecanoeCounty, 510 N.E.2d 716 (Ind. App. 
1987).

4 In this case, even if 
the additional three days were computed as part of the original time period, 
appellant's appeal would have been timely. Using this method, the thirty-third 
day would have fallen on Wednesday, December 2, the day appellant filed his 
petition for review.

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶17.]  I agree with the result in this case 
because, under any rule of computation, Sellers' notice of appeal was timely 
filed. In my judgment, this means that the discussion by the majority of whether 
the three-day period is to be added to the original period or be treated as a 
separate period is dictum. It is dictum in which I cannot join, however. I 
believe that, when there is a thirty-day period involved, the three days simply 
should be added to the original period, making a total of thirty-three days. 
Conversely, if the period of time involved is ten days or less, I would follow 
the rule espoused in 4A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil 2d § 1171 at 516-521 (1987). So long as attorneys know what the 
rule is, I do not perceive this as structuring undue complexity.