Case Title: Ferguson v. State

Citation: 2017-Ohio-7844

Docket Number: 2015-1975

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2017-09-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Ferguson v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-7844.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-7844 
FERGUSON, APPELLEE, v. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Ferguson v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-7844.] 
Workers’ compensation—Appeals—R.C. 4123.512—Consent provision of R.C. 
4123.512(D) does not violate Article IV, Section 5(B) of Ohio Constitution 
because workers’ compensation appeals under R.C. 4123.512 are special 
statutory proceedings and consent provision renders Civ.R. 41(A) clearly 
inapplicable—Consent provision does not violate Equal Protection Clauses 
of Ohio and federal Constitutions because distinct classification of 
claimants in employer-initiated workers’ compensation appeals is 
rationally related to legitimate purposes of limiting improper payments 
made during pendency of appeals and avoiding unnecessary delay in appeal 
process—Consent provision does not violate due-process guarantees of 
Ohio and federal Constitutions because provision is rationally related to 
legitimate purposes of avoiding needless extension of appeal process 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
designed to run quickly, financial effects on system as whole, and waste of 
judicial resources—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed. 
(No. 2015-1975—Submitted February 28, 2017—Decided September 28, 2017.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 102553, 2015-Ohio-4499. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} Under Ohio law, an employer may appeal a determination by the 
Industrial Commission that an employee has the right to participate in the workers’ 
compensation fund.  Although it is the employer who files the appeal in the 
common pleas court, the employee is the plaintiff.  In 2006, the legislature enacted 
a provision allowing an employee to dismiss an employer-initiated appeal only with 
the consent of the employer.  2006 Am.Sub. S.B. No. 7 (amending R.C. 
4123.512(D)).  The question we confront today is whether that provision—the so-
called “consent provision”—is constitutional. 
{¶ 2} The court of appeals determined that the consent provision violates 
the separation-of-powers doctrine embodied in the Ohio Constitution, the Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Ohio and federal Constitutions, and the Due Course of 
Law and Due Process Clauses of the Ohio and federal Constitutions.  We disagree 
and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} In the proceeding below, the Eighth District Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s judgment declaring the consent provision of R.C. 
4123.512(D) unconstitutional.  The declaratory-judgment action was filed by 
appellee, Shannon Ferguson, an injured worker.  To fully understand the 
declaratory-judgment action, some background relating to Ferguson’s workers’ 
compensation claims is necessary. 
January Term, 2017 
 
3
{¶ 4} Ferguson brought two separate workers’ compensation claims 
alleging that he had suffered injuries while working at Ford Motor Company.  The 
Industrial Commission awarded benefits for both claims, and Ford appealed the 
determinations to the common pleas court. 
{¶ 5} Once Ford appealed, Ferguson was required to file the equivalent of 
a complaint alleging his entitlement to participate in the workers’ compensation 
fund.  See R.C. 4123.512(D).  He did so for both claims, and the court consolidated 
the cases. 
{¶ 6} Prior to the scheduled trial date, Ferguson sought to dismiss the 
claims.  Ford refused to consent to the dismissal as required by R.C. 4123.512(D).  
Absent agreement by Ford, Ferguson moved the court to dismiss his complaint 
without prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(2) or, alternatively, for leave to file a 
motion for a declaratory judgment declaring the consent provision unconstitutional.  
The trial court denied both motions.  Ferguson attempted to appeal, but the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 
R.C. 2505.02. 
{¶ 7} After his appeal was dismissed, Ferguson again sought leave to amend 
his complaint to add a declaratory-judgment claim challenging the consent 
provision.  When the trial court denied this motion, Ferguson filed a declaratory-
judgment action against the state in a separate proceeding.  It is that declaratory-
judgment action that we consider today.  The trial court has stayed the original 
consolidated case pending a resolution of this case. 
{¶ 8} In his declaratory-judgment action, Ferguson argued that the consent 
provision in R.C. 4123.512(D) is unconstitutional for three reasons.  First, he 
claimed that it conflicts with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and thus violates 
the separation-of-powers doctrine by improperly intruding on this court’s power to 
govern trial procedure under Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution.  
Second, Ferguson argued that the consent provision violates the Equal Protection 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
Clause contained in Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution because it “treats 
similarly situated plaintiff-claimants unequally based solely on whether the 
plaintiff-claimant or the employer initiated the appeal” and it lacks a legitimate 
rational purpose.  Finally, Ferguson claimed that the consent provision violates the 
Due Course of Law Clause of Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution because 
it prevents claimants from adequately presenting their cases. 
{¶ 9} The trial court held that the consent provision is unconstitutional “on 
the grounds of due process and equal protection, and violates the doctrine of 
separation of powers.”  As for the due-process and equal-protection arguments, the 
trial court gave Ferguson more than he sought, concluding that the consent 
provision violates both the Ohio Constitution—which Ferguson had alleged—and 
the United States Constitution—which he had not.  On appeal by the state, the court 
of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in all respects. 
{¶ 10} The cause is now before this court upon our acceptance of the state’s 
discretionary appeal.  145 Ohio St.3d 1421, 2016-Ohio-1173, 47 N.E.3d 165. 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
{¶ 11} R.C. 4123.512 governs appeals from orders of the Industrial 
Commission in injury or occupational-disease cases other than cases involving the 
extent of a disability.  Both claimants and employers can appeal the commission’s 
decision to the common pleas court.  Id.  But “ ‘the action in the common pleas 
court * * * is not a traditional error proceeding.’ ”  Robinson v. B.O.C. Group, Gen. 
Motors Corp., 81 Ohio St.3d 361, 368, 691 N.E.2d 667 (1998), quoting Marcum v. 
Barry, 76 Ohio App.3d 536, 539, 602 N.E.2d 419 (10th Dist.1991).  Although 
labeled an appeal, the trial court makes its determination after a trial de novo.  Id. 
{¶ 12} The appeal begins with the filing of a notice of appeal.  R.C. 
4123.512(A).  Within 30 days thereafter, the claimant must “file a petition 
containing a statement of facts in ordinary and concise language showing a cause 
of action to participate or to continue to participate in the fund and setting forth the 
January Term, 2017 
 
5
basis for the jurisdiction of the court over the action.”  R.C. 4123.512(D).  The 
petition is for all intents and purposes a complaint.  Robinson at 364.  Regardless 
of who files the appeal, it is the claimant’s burden to prove his or her case before 
the trial court.  Id. at 366, citing Zuljevic v. Midland-Ross Corp., Unitcast Div., 62 
Ohio St.2d 116, 118, 403 N.E.2d 986 (1980). 
{¶ 13} But it is not all-burden-no-benefit for claimants.  As the appeal 
progresses, the commission’s award to the claimant and related payments continue.  
R.C. 4123.512(H)(1).  Further, claimants who successfully establish their right to 
participate in the compensation fund—on their own appeal or the employer’s—are 
entitled to an award of attorney fees up to $4,200.  R.C. 4123.512(F). 
{¶ 14} There is also some protection for the employer.  If the court 
ultimately finds that compensation or benefits should not have been paid, then the 
amounts already paid are charged to the state’s surplus account.  R.C. 
4123.512(H)(1).  This court has held that R.C. 4123.512(H) must be interpreted as 
requiring reimbursement from the surplus fund to self-insured employers for 
compensation paid pursuant to overturned awards.  State ex rel. Sysco Food Serv. 
of Cleveland, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 89 Ohio St.3d 612, 613, 734 N.E.2d 361 (2000).  
State-risk employers’ accounts are adjusted so that the amounts are not charged to 
their experience.  R.C. 4123.512(H)(1). 
{¶ 15} This case concerns the interplay between the workers’ compensation 
appellate process and Civ.R. 41(A), which governs voluntary dismissals.  The 
consent provision was enacted by the legislature in 2006.  2006 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 
7.  In a series of cases decided before its enactment, this court had held that 
claimants could employ Civ.R. 41(A) to voluntarily dismiss their complaints in 
employer-initiated workers’ compensation appeals.  In Robinson, we concluded 
that although a claimant is technically an appellee in an R.C. 4123.512 appeal 
initiated by the employer, “for purposes of Civ.R. 41, the claimant in an employer-
initiated R.C. 4123.512 appeal is the plaintiff.”  81 Ohio St.3d at 368, 691 N.E.2d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
667.  We therefore allowed a court of common pleas to grant a claimant’s motion 
to dismiss his complaint without prejudice under Civ.R. 41(A)(2), even though the 
employer had initiated the appeal.  Id. at 371. 
{¶ 16} We expanded this holding in Kaiser v. Ameritemps, Inc., 84 Ohio 
St.3d 411, 415, 704 N.E.2d 1212 (1999), concluding that a claimant’s ability to 
voluntarily dismiss was not limited to instances in which the trial court approved 
the dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(2) but also extended to a voluntary dismissal 
without court approval under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a).  We reasoned that “[i]t would be 
inconsistent to imply that a workers’ compensation claimant is a plaintiff for 
purposes of Civ.R. 41(A)(2) but not a plaintiff under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a).”  Kaiser 
at 415. 
{¶ 17} In Fowee v. Wesley Hall, Inc., 108 Ohio St.3d 533, 2006-Ohio-1712, 
844 N.E.2d 1193, ¶ 19, we made clear that the saving statute, R.C. 2305.19, applies 
to R.C. 4123.512 appeals and limits a claimant to a one-year period for refiling a 
dismissed petition.  Finally, in Thorton v. Montville Plastics & Rubber, Inc., 121 
Ohio St.3d 124, 2009-Ohio-360, 902 N.E.2d 482, we considered the 2006 
amendment and held that it had prospective application only.  In doing so, we noted 
that our prior holdings in this area had “sometimes led to frustration for employers 
who were forced to wait for the employee-claimant to refile her claim” but 
explained that rather than “legislating from the bench” in Fowee and overruling 
Robinson and Kaiser, we had “followed our established precedent.”  Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 18} Shortly after the Fowee decision, the legislature amended R.C. 
4123.512(D) and enacted the consent provision “to address employers’ concerns.”  
Thorton at ¶ 13.  Today, we consider whether that legislative response is 
constitutional.  We address separately the bases upon which the court of appeals 
held the consent provision unconstitutional and conclude that the consent provision 
is not unconstitutional. 
 
 
January Term, 2017 
 
7
Separation of Powers 
{¶ 19} Can the General Assembly, which established the process in R.C. 
4123.512 for appealing a right-to-participate determination, control certain aspects 
of how those appeals progress procedurally?  The court of appeals said no, holding 
that the consent provision in R.C. 4123.512(D) conflicts with Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) 
and thus infringes upon this court’s constitutionally granted power under Article 
IV, Section 5(B) to set procedural rules for claims brought in Ohio. 
{¶ 20} Article IV, Section 5(B) provides: “The supreme court shall 
prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of the state, which 
rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. * * * All laws in 
conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have 
taken effect.”  This constitutional provision recognizes that “where conflicts arise 
between the Civil Rules and the statutory law, the rule will control the statute on 
matters of procedure and the statute will control the rule on matters of substantive 
law.”  Boyer v. Boyer, 46 Ohio St.2d 83, 86, 346 N.E.2d 286 (1976). 
{¶ 21} Civ.R. 1(C), however, limits the preemptive reach of the Civil Rules: 
 
These rules, to the extent that they would by their nature be 
clearly inapplicable, shall not apply to procedure * * * in all other 
special statutory proceedings; provided, that where any statute 
provides for procedure by a general or specific reference to all the 
statutes governing procedure in civil actions such procedure shall be 
in accordance with these rules. 
 
Civ.R. 1(C) thus acknowledges that the General Assembly may create procedural 
rules for special statutory proceedings that would make a civil rule “clearly 
inapplicable.”  There are two considerations in determining whether the Civil Rules 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
do not apply: whether the procedural statute governs a special statutory proceeding 
and whether that statute renders the civil rule at issue “clearly inapplicable.” 
{¶ 22} The court of appeals concluded that a workers’ compensation case 
was not a special statutory proceeding within the meaning of Civ.R. 1(C).  2015-
Ohio-4499, 42 N.E.3d 804, ¶ 17.  In doing so, the court misinterpreted our decisions 
in Kaiser and Robinson.  The lower court’s confusion stems from a misstatement 
we made in dicta in Kaiser.  There we said that we had held in Robinson that a 
workers’ compensation appeal was not a special proceeding.  Kaiser, 84 Ohio St.3d 
at 414, 704 N.E.2d 1212.  But we made no such holding in Robinson.  Indeed, we 
stated just the opposite: “R.C. 4123.512 is a special statutory proceeding * * *.”  
Robinson, 81 Ohio St.3d at 366, 691 N.E.2d 667.  And then we focused our 
attention on the second consideration—whether Civ.R. 41(A)(2) was “clearly 
inapplicable” to workers’ compensation appeals.  Robinson at 370. 
{¶ 23} Plainly, what we said in Robinson was correct: the workers’ 
compensation appeal provided for in R.C. 4123.512 is a special statutory 
proceeding.  Workers’ compensation did not exist at common law or in equity but 
was established by special legislation.  Myers v. Toledo, 110 Ohio St.3d 218, 2006-
Ohio-4353, 852 N.E.2d 1176, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 24} Having clarified that an R.C. 4123.512 appeal constitutes a special 
statutory proceeding, we turn to the question whether Civ.R. 41(A) is clearly 
inapplicable.  A civil rule is clearly inapplicable “ ‘only when [its] use will alter the 
basic statutory purpose for which the specific procedure was originally provided in 
the special statutory action.’ ”  Price v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 70 Ohio St.2d 
131, 133, 435 N.E.2d 1114 (1982), quoting State ex rel. Millington v. Weir, 60 Ohio 
App.2d 348, 349, 397 N.E.2d 770 (10th Dist.1978). 
{¶ 25} In Robinson, we addressed whether Civ.R. 41(A)(2), which allows a 
claimant to dismiss an appeal with the approval of the trial court, “alter[ed] the 
basic statutory purpose” of R.C. 4123.512.  81 Ohio St.3d at 370, 691 N.E.2d 667.  
January Term, 2017 
 
9
The employer argued that the rule was contrary to the statute’s purpose of 
promoting “a speedy and inexpensive remedy.”  Id.  We were not persuaded by the 
argument—we concluded that requiring court approval before dismissal would 
operate as a check on undue delay and expense.  Id.  We later extended Robinson’s 
holding to voluntary dismissals under Civ.R. 41(A)(1) without revisiting the 
question whether the rule altered the purpose of R.C. 4123.512.  Kaiser, 84 Ohio 
St.3d at 415, 704 N.E.2d 1212. 
{¶ 26} R.C. 4123.512(D) has changed.  A claimant’s ability to voluntarily 
dismiss an employer’s appeal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) and (A)(2) “has * * * 
been superseded by statute.”  Bennett v. Admr., Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 134 Ohio 
St.3d 329, 2012-Ohio-5639, 982 N.E.2d 666, ¶ 19, fn. 3.  The purpose of the 
consent provision is obvious: to thwart the ability of claimants to voluntarily 
dismiss an employer’s appeal without the employer’s consent.  Application of 
Civ.R. 41(A) would “alter the basic statutory purpose” for which the consent 
provision was enacted.  Price at 133.  That renders the rule clearly inapplicable. 
{¶ 27} There is no conflict between a statute and the Civil Rules—and thus 
no separation-of-powers concern—in an instance when the Civil Rules by their own 
terms defer to statutory law.  The Civil Rules allow the General Assembly to 
implement procedural rules in special statutory proceedings and recognize that such 
statutes take precedence when they render the Civil Rules inapplicable.  An R.C. 
4123.512 appeal is a special statutory proceeding.  The consent provision renders 
Civ.R. 41(A) clearly inapplicable because the consent provision does not allow 
dismissals of employer-initiated appeals without the consent of the employer.  
Therefore, the consent provision does not violate Article IV, Section 5(B) of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
Equal Protection 
{¶ 28} The court of appeals also concluded that the consent provision is 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clauses of both the Ohio and federal 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
Constitutions because it creates a distinction between claimants in employer-
initiated appeals in workers’ compensation cases and plaintiffs in other types of 
civil cases with respect to their ability to voluntarily dismiss their complaints.  In 
addition, Ferguson argues that the consent provision violates the Equal Protection 
Clauses because it treats injured workers unequally based on whether the injured 
worker or the employer initiated the appeal. 
{¶ 29} Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution provides: “All political 
power is inherent in the people.  Government is instituted for their equal protection 
and benefit * * *.”  The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
declares that “[n]o State shall * * * deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”  We have considered the two guarantees to be 
“functionally equivalent” and employ the same analysis under both provisions.  
State v. Aalim, ___Ohio St.3d ____, 2017-Ohio-2956, ___N.E.3d ___, ¶ 29. 
{¶ 30} Although citizens are entitled to equal protection under the law, 
governments are “free to draw distinctions in how they treat certain citizens.  ‘The 
Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications.  It simply keeps 
governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all 
relevant respects alike.’ ”  Park Corp. v. Brook Park, 102 Ohio St.3d 166, 2004-
Ohio-2237, 807 N.E.2d 913, ¶ 19, quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 
S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). 
{¶ 31} The first step in analyzing a statute on equal-protection grounds is 
determining the appropriate standard of review.  Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 
Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 64.  Where, as here, the 
classification does not involve a fundamental right or a suspect class, we will 
uphold the classification if it is rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest.  Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 289, 595 N.E.2d 862 (1992).  Under 
rational-basis review, we grant “substantial deference” to the General Assembly’s 
January Term, 2017 
 
11 
predictive judgment.  State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 531, 728 N.E.2d 342 
(2000). 
{¶ 32} Rational-basis review is easily satisfied in this case.  In enacting the 
consent provision, the legislature addressed the anomalous circumstance created by 
the workers’ compensation system: that the appellee (the employee) was able to 
dismiss the appellant’s (the employer’s) appeal.  Thus, while on the one hand, the 
consent provision causes workers’ compensation claimants to be treated differently 
from plaintiffs in other types of cases, on the other hand, it corrected the situation 
so that workers’ compensation appellants are now treated the same as other 
appellants. 
{¶ 33} In enacting the consent provision, the legislature advanced 
legitimate state interests in limiting improper payments made during the pendency 
of appeals and in avoiding unnecessary delay in the appeal process.  Indeed, in 
Thorton, 121 Ohio St.3d 124, 2009-Ohio-360, 902 N.E.2d 482, at ¶ 13, this court 
recognized that “the General Assembly amended R.C. 4123.512(D) through 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 7 to address employers’ concerns” about claimants prolonging 
employers’ appeals. 
{¶ 34} Because the payment of awarded compensation or medical benefits 
continues during an appeal, R.C. 4123.512(H)(1), there was an incentive for 
claimants to voluntarily dismiss a case and refile up to a year later.  Claimants could 
partially insulate themselves from a potential reversal by extending the appeal and, 
along with it, the period during which they received benefits.  This is a distinction 
without parallel in other civil litigation. 
{¶ 35} The ability of claimants to use Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) in employer-
initiated appeals had consequences that the state had a legitimate interest in 
addressing.  First, if on appeal the court determines that payments should not have 
been made, these amounts are reimbursed to the employer from the state’s surplus 
fund.  R.C. 4123.34(H)(1).  There is no dollar-for-dollar clawback from a claimant 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
of payments made pursuant to a commission award that is later reversed in the trial 
court, and no reimbursement at all for allowed claims reversed—for reasons other 
than fraud—by the court of appeals or this court.  See R.C. 4123.511(K).  The 
longer the delay before the reversal of an award, the greater the expense to the state.  
As this court has recognized, the financial health of the workers’ compensation 
fund is a legitimate state interest.  McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 
272, 2005-Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 34. 
{¶ 36} Another consideration is the financial effect on employers.  Self-
insuring employers make outlays that may take years to be refunded.  State-risk 
employers suffer the detriment of having awards charged to their experience until 
their accounts are adjusted for overturned awards.  See R.C. 4123.511(J) and 
4123.512(H). 
{¶ 37} Finally, the state has a legitimate interest in avoiding unnecessary 
delays in the appeal process.  The General Assembly in R.C. 4123.512(I) made 
workers’ compensation appeals a priority for reviewing courts:  “All actions and 
proceedings under this section which are the subject of an appeal to the court of 
common pleas or the court of appeals shall be preferred over all other civil actions 
except election causes, irrespective of position on the calendar.”  And under the 
time guidelines that we have established, the common pleas courts should dispose 
of workers’ compensation cases in half the time allotted for most other civil cases.  
See Sup.R. 39 and Appendix A (“SRF Form A”).  But the ideal of a prompt 
resolution of workers’ compensation cases was compromised when a claimant with 
an award in hand was given control of the pace of a workers’ compensation appeal.  
For a claimant in an employer’s appeal, delay for delay’s sake was a rational 
strategy given the lay of the land legally—payments continued at least as long as 
the appeal.  Justice delayed paid. 
{¶ 38} The classification of claimants in employer-initiated workers’ 
compensation appeals as distinct from plaintiffs in other types of civil cases and 
January Term, 2017 
 
13 
from claimants in claimant-initiated workers’ compensation appeals is rationally 
related to the purpose of the consent provision in R.C. 4123.512(D).  Only 
claimants in employer-initiated appeals had the incentive of continued payments to 
encourage the voluntary dismissal of a complaint.  The unique position of those 
claimants produced the effects the General Assembly sought to address. 
{¶ 39} The classification vis-à-vis other civil plaintiffs is especially 
reasonable given the differences between the workers’ compensation system and 
the civil-justice system.  “[W]orkers’ compensation laws are the result of a unique 
compromise between employees and employers.”  Stetter v. R.J. Corman 
Derailment Servs., L.L.C., 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092, 
¶ 54.  “[T]he Ohio Constitution itself draws the classification between persons who, 
as employees, are injured on the job and those persons who are injured other than 
in the workplace.”  Id. at ¶ 83. 
{¶ 40} “We will set aside legislative classifications only if they are ‘based 
solely on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of the State’s goals and only if no 
grounds can be conceived to justify them.’ ”  Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church 
of Delaware, Ohio, 149 Ohio St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118, 75 N.E.3d 122, ¶ 48 (lead 
opinion), quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 
L.Ed.2d 508 (1982).  Because the classification made by the consent provision 
serves a legitimate state interest, it does not violate the equal-protection guarantees 
of the Ohio and federal Constitutions. 
Due Process and Due Course of Law 
{¶ 41} We turn to the question whether the consent provision violates the 
federal Constitution’s Due Process Clause and the Ohio Constitution’s Due Course 
of Law Clause.  The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
declares that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”  Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution states that “every 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law.” 
{¶ 42} The court of appeals was not clear whether it was providing a 
procedural-due-process analysis or a substantive-due-process analysis.  A 
procedural-due-process challenge concerns the adequacy of the procedures 
employed in a government action that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.  
The court of appeals determined that Ferguson had a property interest in his “cause 
of action.”  2015-Ohio-4499, 42 N.E.3d 804, at ¶ 34-35.  But the court took it no 
further.  “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be 
heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ”  Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), quoting Armstrong v. 
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965).  Accord United 
Tel. Credit Union v. Roberts, 115 Ohio St.3d 464, 2007-Ohio-5247, 875 N.E.2d 
927, ¶ 13.  The court below did not conclude, and Ferguson does not argue here, 
that Ferguson lacked the opportunity to have his case heard in a meaningful time 
or manner. 
{¶ 43} Rather than concluding that Ferguson was denied a property right 
due to a failure of procedure, the court held that the legislative enactment itself 
restricts the right of an injured employee to dismiss his complaint without the 
consent of the employer.  2015-Ohio-4499, 42 N.E.3d 804, at ¶ 34.  Because this is 
a challenge to a generalized legislative determination, it is best characterized as a 
substantive-due-process claim.  Our analysis of the equal-protection claim gives 
away the ending.  Under both state and federal due-process analysis, laws like this 
one that do not infringe upon fundamental rights will be upheld if they are rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest.  See Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-
6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 48-49.  This is the same analysis we applied in our 
equal-protection review. 
January Term, 2017 
 
15 
{¶ 44} The General Assembly saw what it viewed as an area of concern—
that a claimant in an employer-initiated workers’ compensation appeal could 
unilaterally prolong the appeal process for the sole purpose of guaranteeing the 
continued receipt of benefits for at least an additional year.  This resulted in a 
needless extension of a process designed to run quickly, financial effects on the 
system as a whole, and a waste of judicial resources.  And so, the General Assembly 
changed the law.  Because the amendment to R.C. 4123.512(D) was rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest, it does not run afoul of the due-process and 
due-course-of-law protections. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 45} The consent provision of R.C. 4123.512(D) does not improperly 
conflict with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.  Nor does it violate the equal-
protection or due-process guarantees of the state and federal Constitutions.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
KENNEDY, FRENCH, O’NEILL, and FISCHER, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, J., concur in judgment only. 
_________________ 
 
Seaman & Associates, David L. Meyerson, and Shaun H. Kedir, for 
appellee. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, and 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, for appellant. 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Philip J. Fulton, and Chelsea Fulton Rubin, 
urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Association for Justice and Ohio 
Association of Claimants’ Counsel. 
LoPresti, Marcovy & Marotta, L.L.P., Thomas P. Marotta, and Michael S. 
Lewis, urging reversal for amicus curiae Automation Tool & Die, Inc. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
 
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, and Michael J. Hickey, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Sue A. Wetzel, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae National Federation of Independent Business/Ohio. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Robert A. Minor, urging 
reversal for amici curiae Ohio Self-Insurers Association and Ohio Council of Retail 
Merchants. 
 
Chad A. Endsley, Leah Curtis, and Amy Milam, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Ohio Farm Bureau Federation. 
 
_________________