Case Title: JASON DEAN BALLINGER, an Individual V. MARC C. THOMPSON, ESQ.; and WEBSTER & THOMPSON, LLC; IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF GLADYS MILDRED BALLINGER, Deceased: JASON DEAN BALLINGER, Personal Representative of the Estate of Gladys Mildred Ballinger V. MARC C. THOMPSON, ESQ.; and WEBSTER & THOMPSON, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-245

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
JASON DEAN BALLINGER, an Individual V. MARC C. THOMPSON, ESQ.; and WEBSTER & THOMPSON, LLC; IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF GLADYS MILDRED BALLINGER, Deceased: JASON DEAN BALLINGER, Personal Representative of the Estate of Gladys Mildred Ballinger V. MARC C. THOMPSON, ESQ.; and WEBSTER & THOMPSON, LLC2005 WY 101118 P.3d 429Case Number: 04-245, 04-246Decided: 08/23/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
JASON 
DEAN BALLINGER, an Individual,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
MARC C. 
THOMPSON, ESQ.; and

WEBSTER 
& THOMPSON, LLC,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 
 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

GLADYS 
MILDRED BALLINGER, Deceased:

 
 
JASON 
DEAN BALLINGER, Personal

Representative 
of the Estate of Gladys Mildred

Ballinger,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
MARC C. 
THOMPSON, ESQ.; and

WEBSTER 
& THOMPSON, LLC,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

 
 
 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Eldon E. 
Silverman of Preeo Silverman Green & Egle, P.C., Denver, Colorado

 
 
 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Marc C. 
Thompson of Webster & Thompson, LLC, Cody, Wyoming

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Jason 
Dean Ballinger appeals the district court's order granting Webster and Thompson, 
LLC, and Marc C. Thompson's (collectively Thompson) motion to dismiss 
Ballinger's legal malpractice suit.  
The district court granted the motion finding Ballinger had failed to 
comply with the statute of limitations.  
We affirm.

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]           
Ballinger 
presents the following issues for review:

 
 

1.                  
Was 
Ballinger under "a legal disability" pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 1-3-107(a)(iii) so 
that his action was timely brought?

 
 

2.                  
Was any 
statute of limitations defense barred under the theory of equitable estoppel for 
purposes of overcoming a motion to dismiss?

 
 

3.                  
Did the 
statute of limitations begin to run only after "discovery" of the claim and was 
that within the two-year period, to overcome a motion to 
dismiss?

 
 

4.                  
Should 
the continuous representation rule be applied to the unique facts of this case 
to toll the statute of limitations?  

 
 
Thompson 
responds with just one issue, "Was the district court correct in ruling that 
appellant's claims are barred by the statute of limitations?"  

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
Ballinger 
hired Thompson to represent him individually and as the personal representative 
and sole beneficiary of the estate of Gladys M. Ballinger. Thompson entered his 
appearance in the probate case on August 7, 1998.  Because Ballinger was incarcerated in 
the Park County Jail during portions of 1998 and 1999, Thompson took on 
additional responsibilities for the estate. One of these additional 
responsibilities was a duty to obtain and maintain insurance for a home in Cody 
owned by the estate in which Ballinger lived.  Unfortunately, the insurance was allowed 
to lapse, and there was a gap in coverage from June 18, 1999, until July 23, 
1999.  In explaining the lapse, 
Thompson claimed he never received a renewal notice.  However, insurance company records 
indicated a renewal notice was sent to Thompson's office address.    

 
 

[¶4]           
On June 
24, 1999, a fight started in the driveway of the Cody home. The fight led to the 
death of seventeen-year-old Scott Tannehill.  Ballinger was at the home at the time of 
the fight and was charged with accessory to second degree murder.  Thompson represented Ballinger in the 
criminal proceeding stemming from this charge. In December 1999, after changing 
his plea to nolo contendere, 
Ballinger was sentenced to a term of incarceration of not less than seven years 
or more than ten years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Ballinger remains 
incarcerated at this time.

 
 

[¶5]           
In 
February of 2000, an attorney representing the estate of Scott Tannehill 
contacted Thompson indicating his intent to pursue a wrongful death suit.  The attorney 
wrote:

 
 
We are 
aware of [Ballinger's] ownership of the property where the incident took 
place.  As with any property, it is 
fair for us to assume that there is a property casualty policy applicable to the 
property. Those policies provide insurance coverage for incidents of this 
nature. I would ask you, on behalf of the survivors of Scott Tannehill to please 
cooperate with us and notify the carrier of our intent to proceed with the 
claim.

 
 
When 
Thompson contacted the insurance company, it was confirmed there was a period of 
time when there was no coverage on the property and this gap included the day of 
the Tannehill incident. A series of letters and explanations then followed; the 
relevant portions can be summarized as follows:  

 
 

·                    
On 
February 15, 2000, Thompson sent Ballinger a copy of a letter addressed to the 
insurance company regarding the insurance lapse. 

 
 

·                    
On 
February 25, 2000, Thompson discussed the insurance lapse with Ballinger on the 
telephone.  

 
 

·                    
On April 
21, 2000, the wrongful death complaint was filed.  It asserted one cause of action, 
negligence. 

 
 

·                    
On April 
21, 2000, Thompson sent Ballinger a copy of letters between Thompson and the 
insurance company discussing the insurance lapse. 

 
 

·                    
Between 
April and September 2000, Thompson continued to tell the attorney for the 
Tannehill estate that he was investigating the matter. 

 
 

·                    
On 
September 8, 2000, Thompson sent Ballinger a copy of a letter addressed to 
Tannehill's attorney concerning the insurance lapse.  In the letter Thompson revealed there 
was not an insurance policy in effect at the time of the accident and claimed 
that "[e]ven if there was a policy in effect, it would not have covered the 
alleged acts under the Complaint."  
He asserted the policy in effect was only a renter's policy, it had 
specific exclusions for acts involving assault, and Tannehill had alleged 
Ballinger committed an intentional act of misconduct.  However, the estate of Tannehill had 
asserted only negligence in its complaint.  
The Tannehill attorney then subpoenaed the insurance records from the 
insurance company.  After reviewing 
the documents the attorney was troubled by Thompson's lack of completeness in 
his initial responses to requests for information concerning insurance on the 
Cody home.  The Tannehill attorney 
contended that review of the documents established Thompson was well aware of 
the lapse in coverage that occurred from June 18, 1999, until July 23, 1999, 
because he was directly involved in procuring the policy and procuring the 
renewal policy.   

 
 

·                    
On 
September 18, 2000, Thompson sent Ballinger proposed discovery responses for the 
wrongful death action which addressed the insurance issues and included the 
policy. 

 
 

·                    
On 
September 20, 2000, Ballinger signed the discovery responses that indicated 
there was no insurance at the time of Tannehill's death. 

 
 

·                    
On 
December 21, 2000, Thompson discussed the insurance lapse with Ballinger on the 
telephone.  Ballinger stated he did 
not think it was an issue or conflict.  
However, Ballinger agreed to consult with another attorney to discuss the 
insurance lapse. 

 
 

·                    
In 
January of 2001, Thompson sent Ballinger a letter from Tannehill's attorney 
dated December 15, 2000, regarding the insurance lapse issue.  That letter contained the following 
statements: "Because of the apparent failure of your office to pay a premium 
upon notice of a premium due, there was a lapse in insurance coverage for the 
Ballinger estate during the time frame Mr. Ballinger was involved with the death 
of Scott Tannehill.  I cannot say 
whether the lapsed policy would have provided coverage for the claims of Mr. 
Tannehill . . . . Because of that conflict, there is no way for [us] on behalf 
of the Tannehill estate, to fairly resolve the claim with Dean Ballinger, 
through you as his attorney.  I am 
duty bound to inform my clients of the potential claims that exist and the 
reason why there is no insurance coverage. . . . Since it is apparent that Dean 
Ballinger may have a claim against you or your firm, I trust you understand the 
nature of our concern and why we must insist that you withdraw."  

 
 

·                    
On 
January 29, 2001, Ballinger consulted with an independent attorney regarding the 
insurance lapse and the wrongful death suit.

 
 
 
 

[¶6]           
Thompson 
withdrew as Ballinger's attorney for the wrongful death case on January 5, 
2001.  Ballinger then hired a 
different attorney to represent him in the wrongful death suit.  Thompson, however, remained the attorney 
for the estate.  Thompson withdrew 
from that representation for the estate December 12, 2002.   

 
 

[¶7]           
On March 
31, 2003, Ballinger, individually and as personal representative of the estate, 
filed suit against Thompson.  Ballinger claimed that had Thompson not 
allowed the insurance to lapse, the wrongful death claim would have been paid by 
insurance, or at least the cost of the defense would have been covered.  Thompson filed a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12 or in the alternative  W.R.C.P. 56 claiming the statute of 
limitations provided by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a) (LexisNexis 2005) had 
expired.  Ballinger responded 
asserting he was under a "legal disability other than minority," namely, 
imprisonment, and therefore the statute was extended under § 1-3-107(a)(iii) to 
one year after the removal of his disability.  Ballinger also asserted equitable 
estoppel applied, the act and damages were not reasonably discoverable until two 
years prior to filing, and the continuous representation rule should apply to 
toll the statute.  

 
 

[¶8]           
The 
district court granted Thompson's motion to dismiss.  The court rejected Ballinger's position 
that he was under a legal disability because he was incarcerated, "since it 
would be bad public policy to give protection and grant a benefit to someone 
convicted of a serious crime."  The 
district court also found equitable estoppel and the continuous representation 
rule did not extend the statute in these circumstances.  Ballinger timely appealed.  

 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶9]           
When 
reviewing W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, we accept the facts stated in 
the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 741-42 
(Wyo. 
1999).  We will sustain such a 
dismissal when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff 
cannot assert any fact which would entitle him to relief.  Id.; see also Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 
1135-36 (Wyo. 2000).  However, a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is converted to a W.R.C.P. 56 motion for summary 
judgment if materials outside the pleadings are considered. Stalkup v. State Dept. of Envtl. 
Quality, 838 P.2d 705, 709 (Wyo. 1992).  In this instance it is clear the 
district court considered materials outside the pleadings. Thus, we apply the 
standard of review for summary judgment.  
Under this standard we examine the record from the vantage point most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of 
all the favorable inferences which may be fairly drawn.  Castleberry v. Phelan, 2004 WY 151, ¶8, 
101 P.3d 460, 462 (Wyo. 2004).  
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Id.   

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Legal 
Disability 

 
 

[¶10]       
Ballinger 
argues that the statute of limitations applicable to professional services 
contains a provision extending the statute for a plaintiff "suffering from a 
legal disability other than minority." Plaintiffs falling into this category 
have one year from the removal of the disability to bring an action.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2005).1  Ballinger claims that imprisonment is a 
"legal disability other than minority," and he therefore has one year from when 
he is no longer incarcerated to bring his action.  

 
 

[¶11]       
In 
making his argument, Ballinger asserts that at common law imprisonment was 
established as a legal disability because felons serving sentences of 
imprisonment were deemed "civiliter 
mortus" or "civilly dead."  
Ballinger claims "civil death" meant a prisoner could not sue or be sued 
and as a result a prisoner had a legal disability.  He likewise maintains that because 
imprisonment created a legal disability many states recognized the statute of 
limitations was tolled while the person was imprisoned.  Ballinger argues that we should 
recognize Wyoming's statute does the same.  He additionally contends courts have a 
duty to carry out the legislative enactments, and the district court failed to 
do so when it simply found that "it would be bad public policy to give 
protection and grant a benefit to someone convicted of a serious crime."   

 
 

[¶12]       
We agree 
with Ballinger that the district court's reasoning for granting the motion to 
dismiss was not based on statutory analysis. The district court based its ruling 
on policy reasoning which is not the proper standard for statutory 
interpretation questions.  Instead, 
when considering the meaning of a statute, courts are obligated to try to 
determine the legislature's intent from the words of the statute.  McNeel v. McNeel, 2005 WY 36, ¶11, 109 P.3d 510, 513 (Wyo. 2005) (citing In Re 
Walsh, 2004 WY 96, ¶¶3-4, 96 P.3d 1, 2 (Wyo. 2004)).  Nevertheless, we determine it was 
correct to grant the motion to dismiss.  
Specifically, after our statutory analysis we do not agree with Ballinger 
that the phrase "legal disability other than minority" includes 
imprisonment.

  

[¶13]       
As with 
all statutory analysis we must start with the plain language of the statute to 
determine its meaning.  McNeel, ¶11, 109 P.3d  at 513.  The question in this instance is what 
does the phrase "legal disability other than minority" mean as it is used in 
this statute?  The statute itself 
does not define the phrase.  
However, the plain language indicates that at the time the statute was 
enacted there were legal disabilities other than minority known in the law.  See Berkin v. Marsh, 44 P. 528, 530 
(Mont. 
1896).  Therefore, we must look to 
the law as it existed at the time this section was enacted to determine if 
imprisonment was recognized as a legal disability.  

 
 

[¶14]       
We begin 
with Ballinger's assertion that at common law a convicted felon was considered 
civilly dead.  The Supreme Court of 
Tennessee explains that nearly every jurisdiction subjects a convicted felon not 
only to criminal punishment but also to other restrictions on civil and 
proprietary rights.  Cole v. Campbell, 968 S.W.2d 274, 275-76 
(Tenn. 1998) 
(citing Walter Matthews Grant, et al., Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal 
Conviction, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 929 (1970) (hereinafter Special Project)).  These restrictions, known as civil 
disabilities, date back to ancient Greece and Rome.  
Cole, at 276.  In those societies, a criminal 
conviction rendered one "infamous" and resulted in the loss of the right to 
vote, hold office, make speeches, and assemble.  Id.  Similar civil disabilities were also 
imposed in early English common law in the form of "attainder."  Id.  A person convicted of treason or a 
felony, i.e., attained, was subject 
not only to criminal punishment but also the loss of property, voting, and other 
civil rights including the right to sue.  
Id.; Mosgrave v. McManus, 173 P. 196, 198 
(N.M. 1918).   

 
 

[¶15]       
Some 
civil disabilities continued to the criminal justice system in the 
United 
States.  
In their role in the United States criminal justice 
system, civil disabilities fall into one of two categories: civil death statutes 
and specific disability statutes.  
Cole, 968 S.W.2d  at 276.  "Civil death statutes are blanket 
provisions that deprive the criminal of [all] rights while he is serving a 
prison sentence for life or less than life."  Id. 
(quoting Special Project, at 950) (alteration in original).  Specific disability statutes, on the 
other hand, designate a particular civil disability that occurs upon conviction 
and remains in effect throughout the defendant's life unless restored by a 
specific statutory procedure.  Cole, at 276 (citing Special Project, at 
951).  A civil disability pursuant 
to a specific disability statute may include the loss of the right to vote, hold 
office, serve as a juror, possess firearms, and the denial of professional or 
occupational licensing.  Cole, at 276. (citing Special Project, 
at 952).  

 
 

[¶16]       
Several 
states enacted civil death statutes.  
See Special Project, at 
950.  These same states often 
provided provisions tolling statutes of limitations for prisoners in order to 
ensure that a citizen who lacks the capacity to sue while imprisoned will not 
lose his cause of action.  
Id. at 1025.  These tolling statutes were designed to 
protect persons who are unable to sue because their imprisonment denied them 
that right.  Id. at 
1026.  

 
 

[¶17]       
However, 
"in the absence of statute, the concept of civil death has generally been denied 
in this country."  Whitson v. Baker, 463 So. 2d 146, 148 
(Ala. 
1985).  "Civil death statutes had 
become too great a burden and there developed a trend away from their strict 
results.  The states then [began] to 
enumerate the disqualifications that attach to a conviction of a felony."  Alan K. Simpson, Indirect Legal Consequences of a Conviction 
for a Felony, 13 Wyo. L. J. 62, 63 (1958). Wyoming was one such 
state.  Indeed, "Wyoming statutory 
development rejected the idea of complete civil death and settled upon the loss 
of three distinct legal privileges under [Wyo. Comp. Stat.] Section 9-104 
[(1945)]: inability to be an elector,' juror,' or hold any office of honor, 
trust, or profit within this state.'"  Id. 
at 64.  Therefore, we must reject 
Ballinger's claim that a convicted felon was civilly dead in Wyoming.  

 
 

[¶18]       
Wyoming's major 
specific disability statute still contains the three distinct privileges noted 
by Simpson.  As it reads today, it 
provides:2 

 
 
(a)  A 
person convicted of a felony is incompetent to be an elector or juror or to hold 
any office of honor, trust, or profit within this state, unless: 

(i)                 
His 
conviction is reversed or annulled; 

(ii)               
He 
receives a pardon; 

(iii)             
His 
rights are restored pursuant to W.S. 7-13-105(a); or 

(iv)              
His 
rights as an elector are restored pursuant to W.S. 7-13-105(b) and (c), in which 
case the person shall remain incompetent to be a juror or to hold any office of 
honor, trust or profit within the state.  

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-10-106 (LexisNexis 2005).  
When tracing this statute back to its enactment, we find that the right 
to sue or be sued has never been included.  
See 1890 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 73, § 4; Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 9-104 
(1945).  Thus, it is clear that in 
1976 when § 1-3-107 was enacted, convicted felons were not denied the right to 
sue by statute.  Additionally, the 
argument that a convict had no standing as a party plaintiff has been generally 
rejected by American courts as a rule of our common law, unless it was provided 
by statute.  Mosgrave, 173 P.  at 197.  

 
 

[¶19]       
Logically 
then we must also reject Ballinger's contention that imprisonment is a legal 
disability as contemplated by this statute.  "Legal disability" is defined as a "want 
of legal capacity to do a thing."  
Id. at 198. "As applied to the statute of 
limitations in civil actions, it would unquestionably mean legal capacity to 
bring the action . . . ."  
Id.  As noted above, in Wyoming a convicted felon 
is not prohibited from instituting a civil action.  Instead, the only civil rights denied 
upon conviction are those set forth by statute.  See id. at 198.  Undoubtedly Ballinger is correct that 
imprisonment increases the burdens of bringing a cause of action and presents a 
unique set of complications for case management.  Nevertheless, the right to sue in fact 
still exists, and we therefore cannot find that it is a legal disability as 
contemplated by § 1-3-107.     

 
 

[¶20]       
Ballinger 
urges us to consider cases from other jurisdictions, particularly 
Georgia and Wisconsin, which find 
imprisonment tolls the statute of limitations.  See Maddox v. HallCounty, 291 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. App. 1982); Ghashiyah v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 
America, 543 N.W.2d 538 (Wis. App. 1995).  The reasoning of these cases is not 
particularly helpful because the applicable statutes in those cases specifically 
identified imprisonment as a condition that tolls the statute of 
limitations.  Ballinger presents no 
case in which a court has recognized imprisonment as tolling the statute of 
limitations where imprisonment is not specifically provided by statute as a toll 
condition, nor did we discover such a case.  Instead, it appears the general rule is 
that imprisonment does not suspend the running of a statute of limitations 
unless expressly provided.  Mosgrave, 173 P.  at 197.  See also Morgan v. People, 158 N.E.2d 24, 26 
(Ill. 1959) ("It is the prevailing view in this country that imprisonment does 
not suspend the running of a statute of limitations unless the statute expressly 
provides."); Special Project, at 1027 ("If the legislature provides that the 
statutes of limitations are tolled for persons under any legal disability,' 
prisoners are not included.").  
Wyoming's statute does not expressly provide 
for imprisonment as a disability.3  Consequently, we find the reasoning of 
jurisdictions that do unpersuasive.     

 
 

[¶21]       
We 
therefore conclude that the phrase "legal disability other than minority" as 
used in this statute does not include imprisonment.  Accordingly, this provision is not 
applicable to toll the statute of limitations in this instance.  Ballinger therefore had two years from 
the discovery of his injury to bring his action.  As discussed later in this opinion, he 
did not do so.  

 
 
 
 
Equitable 
Estoppel

 
 

[¶22]       
Ballinger 
next asserts that equitable estoppel applies in this instance.  He argues he meets the elements of an 
equitable estoppel claim, and therefore Thompson is barred from asserting the 
statute of limitations.  The 
elements of an equitable estoppel claim are 1) a delay in filing an action that 
is induced by the defendant; 2) the defendant misled the plaintiff; and 3) the 
plaintiff must have acted on the misinformation in good faith to the extent that 
he failed to pursue his action in a timely manner.  Archuleta v. City of Rawlins, 942 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo. 1997).  

            

[¶23]       
In this 
instance we conclude equitable estoppel cannot apply to save the action.  While it appears there are factual 
disputes about whether Thompson misled Ballinger when he claimed several times 
that the policy would not have covered the wrongful death claim, it is clear 
there are no facts that could show Ballinger acted on the misinformation in good 
faith to the extent he failed to pursue his action in a timely manner.  Specifically, even accepting Thompson's 
statements were misleading, Ballinger had received the letter from Tannehill's 
attorney discussing a cause of action, and he admits he had all the essential 
facts for his cause of action by January of 2001. Accordingly, he could no 
longer in good faith be relying on Thompson's misleading statements as reason 
not to timely file his action.  
Thus, we can only conclude there is no material question of fact, and 
Thompson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the matter of equitable 
estoppel.  

 
 
 
 
Discovery 
of the Claim

 

[¶24]       
Ballinger 
next argues that he could not have reasonably discovered his claim until two 
years prior to his filing.  
Wyoming 
is a discovery state which means the statute of limitations begins to run when 
the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the existence of a cause of 
action.  Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Followill, 
2004 WY 80, ¶14, 93 P.3d 238, 243 (Wyo. 2004); Murphy v. Housel & Housel, 955 P.2d 880, 883 (Wyo. 
1998).   Ordinarily, the issue 
of when the statute of limitations commences to run would be inappropriate for 
summary judgment.  Murphy, at 883.  
However, if uncontroverted facts exist that demonstrate with 
specificity the time when a reasonable person would have been placed on notice, 
we will resolve the question as a matter of law.  Id.  

 
 

[¶25]       
In this 
instance, Ballinger was alerted to the existence of a cause of action as early 
as February of 2000 when he was first notified of the insurance lapse.  As can be seen from the lengthy list in 
the fact section of this opinion, Ballinger was notified of the lapse on 
numerous occasions.  The lapse was 
specifically addressed in many different ways over the relevant period of time, 
including discovery responses, telephone calls, and correspondence.  Even with Thompson's assurances that the 
insurance policy would not have covered the claim, it is clear Ballinger knew or 
should have known he had a cause of action by at least January of 2001 when he 
received the letter from Tannehill's attorney insisting Thompson withdraw 
because of such a cause of action, and he consulted with an independent attorney 
regarding the insurance lapse.  
Furthermore, as noted above, Ballinger admits he had the relevant 
information in January of 2001. 

 
 

[¶26]       
Therefore, 
we conclude Ballinger knew or should have known he suffered an injury and the 
cause of that injury by at least January of 2001.  At that point, Ballinger had clearly 
"discovered" his claim.  As a 
result, we conclude there was no genuine question of material fact regarding 
this argument, and Thompson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this 
issue as well.   

 
 
 
 

Continuous 
Representation

 
 

[¶27]       
Ballinger 
lastly asserts the continuous representation doctrine should operate in this 
instance to toll the statute of limitations.  The continuous representation doctrine 
is analogous to the continuous treatment doctrine we have applied in medical 
malpractice cases.  However, we have 
consistently stated, "[t]he continuing representation doctrine is absent from 
our legal malpractice statute, and we decline to judicially adopt such a 
provision."  Connell v. Barrett, 949 P.2d 871, 874 
(Wyo. 1997) (quoting Hiltz v. Robert W. Horn, P.C., 910 P.2d 566, 571 (Wyo. 
1996)).  Nevertheless, Ballinger 
argues Wyoming 
has recognized the continuous treatment rule in the context of medical 
malpractice even though there is no statutory enactment of that rule, and we 
therefore should do the same for legal malpractice.  See Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414 
(Wyo. 
1985).  Although Ballinger's 
argument has some merit, we decline to adopt the continuous representation 
doctrine in these circumstances.  

 
 

[¶28]       
Our 
reluctance to adopt the doctrine in this case makes sense in light of the 
reasoning behind the continuous treatment doctrine.  As we explained in Metzger, the rationale for the 
continuous treatment rule is:

 
 
"* * * 
[I]n the treatment of a patient the diagnosis might change from time to time, 
and it is commonly accepted in the medical profession that the diagnosis, in the 
first instance, is not binding on the physician. He should have the right, 
during the course of treatment, to change the diagnosis. * * * 

 
 
"* * * 
The diagnosis referred to was a continuing biweekly one, and each time an 
incorrect diagnosis was made and an incorrect treatment applied, plaintiff's 
injuries were extended. It was not the error in the diagnosis originally made by 
defendant but its adherence thereto and course of treatment that brought about 
the injuries."

 
 

Metzger, 709 P.2d  at 417 (quoting Williams v. 
Elias, 1 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Neb. 1941)).  We further explained in Echols v. Keeler, 735 P.2d 730, 731-32 
(Wyo. 1987) 
(quoting 1 D. Louisell and H. Williams, Medical Malpractice, ¶ 13.08 (1986)): 

 
 
"The 
so-called continuous treatment' rule has been defended on the grounds of 
fairness as well as on the basis of logic. Certainly it would not be equitable 
to bar a plaintiff who, for example, has been subjected to a series of radiation 
treatments in which the radiologist negligently and repeatedly administered an 
overdosage, simply because the plaintiff is unable to identify the one treatment 
that produced his injury. Indeed, in such a situation no single treatment did 
cause the harm; rather it was the result of several treatments, a cumulative 
effect. From the point of view of the physician,  it would seem reasonable 
that if he has made a mistake, a misdiagnosis, for example, he is entitled 
to the opportunity to correct the error before harm ensues. And, as one court 
has put it, It would be absurd to require a wronged patient to interrupt 
corrective efforts by serving a summons on the 
physician.'"

 
 
 
 

[¶29]       
When 
considering the "single act exception" to the continuous treatment doctrine in 
Jauregui v. Memorial Hospital of 
Sweetwater County, 2005 WY 59, 111 P.3d 914, (Wyo. 2005), we further 
explained that where there is a single act of allegedly negligent conduct, the 
statue of limitations begins to run at the time the plaintiff sustains injury 
from the act instead of at the end of the course of treatment.  Id.  at ¶12, 111 P.3d  at 918 (citing Doyle v. Kuch, 611 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 
App. 2000)). Specifically, "when the alleged tort consists of (1) a single act; 
(2) which is complete at a precise time; (3) which no continued course of 
treatment can either cure or relieve; and (4) where the plaintiff is actually 
aware of the facts upon which the claim is based; that is, the plaintiff is 
aware of the malpractice prior to the end of treatment" the cause of action 
begins to run at the time of the negligent act.  Jauregui, at ¶12, 111 P.3d  at 918 
(citing Doyle, at 
31).

 
 

[¶30]       
In this 
instance, although Thompson continued to represent Ballinger for some time after 
the negligent act, i.e., the 
insurance lapse, it appears that a continuous course of malpractice as 
contemplated by Metzger is not 
present.  Specifically, even 
accepting that Ballinger relied on Thompson's representations that the policy 
would not cover the incident and that such representations were incorrect, by 
January of 2001 Thompson had terminated his representation of Ballinger.  Likewise, there is no cumulative effect 
from repeated negligence such that Ballinger is unable to identify the act that 
produced his injury past January of 2001.  
Additionally, there was nothing that Thompson could do to correct the 
error before harm ensued.  Instead, 
these circumstances present something more closely resembling a single negligent 
act as described in Jauregui.  The lapse of the insurance was a single 
act that was complete at a precise time, which could not be cured, and of which 
Ballinger was aware prior to the end of Thompson's representation.  

 
 

[¶31]       
We have 
also explained "[t]he continuous representation doctrine applies only to 
malpractice actions where there is a clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, 
developing and dependent relationship between the client and attorney . . . .'" 
Hiltz, 910 P.2d  at 571.  "Furthermore, the application of this 
doctrine should only be applied where the professional's involvement after the 
alleged malpractice is for the performance of the same or related services and 
is not merely continuity of a general professional relationship.'" Id. In this 
instance, Ballinger consulted numerous other attorneys concerning the insurance 
lapse which indicates his relationship with Thompson was not ongoing, 
continuous, developing and dependant.  
Likewise, Thompson's representation appears to merely be a continuing 
general professional relationship. 

 
 

[¶32]       
We 
therefore conclude that the continuous representation doctrine does not apply in 
this instance to toll the statute of limitations.  Because it does not apply, Ballinger's 
claim began to run when he "discovered" his cause of action.  As we discussed above, the latest the 
discovery occurred was January of 2001. Thus, when Ballinger filed his cause of 
action in March of 2003, his action was not timely.

 
 
 
 

CONCLUSION

            

[¶33]       
For the 
reasons stated above, we affirm.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. 
Ann § 1-3-107(a) (LexisNexis 2005) provides in pertinent part: 

(a)  A cause of action arising from an act, error or omission 
in the rendering of licensed or certified professional or health care services 
shall be brought within the greater of the following 
times:

(i)  Within two (2) years of the date of the 
alleged act, error or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted 
not more than two (2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or 
omission, if the claimant can establish that the alleged act, error or omission 
was:

(A)  Not reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; 
or

(B)  The claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or 
omission within the two (2) year period despite the exercise of due 
diligence.

(ii)  . . . .

(iii)                            
For injury 
to the rights of a plaintiff suffering from a legal disability other than 
minority, within one (1) year of the removal of the 
disability[.]

 
 

2Another civil disability 
today appears to be the right to possess a firearm.  See Dobson v. Stahla, 2003 WY 6N, ¶7, 63 P.3d 209, 211 (Wyo. 2003) (discussing federal regulation), and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-8-102 (LexisNexis 2005), which provides: "Any person who has previously 
pleaded guilty to or been convicted of committing or attempting to commit a 
violent felony or a felony under W.S. 6-5-204(b), and has not been pardoned and 
who uses or knowingly possesses any firearm is guilty of a felony . . . 
."

 
 

3We did turn 
up one instance in Wyoming statutes where additional time was 
provided for a prisoner to comply with a time limitation.  This was in Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 89-4816 
(1931), which provided the time in which one had to file an appeal.  However, this statute was superseded 
when the rules of civil procedure were enacted.  See W.R.C.P. 73 (1957).  Although not necessarily helpful in this 
instance, this statute does indicate that the legislature knew how to provide 
for imprisonment to toll a time limit should it desire to do so.