Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V D'ANDRE D CALLOWAY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 122431

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED NOVEMBER 25, 2003 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
Nos. 122430, 122431 
D=ANDRE D. CALLOWAY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
PER CURIAM 
Defendant 
was 
convicted 
after 
a 
jury 
trial 
of 
violating MCL 750.224f (felon in possession of a firearm) 
and MCL 750.227b (possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony).a  He argues that these convictions 
violate the federal and state prohibitions against double 
jeopardy.b  The Court of Appeals rejected defendant=s double 
jeopardy claim, holding that its decision in People v 
a Defendant was also convicted of assault with intent to 
do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84. 
b US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, ' 15. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
Dillard, 246 Mich App 163; 631 NW2d 755 (2001), controlled.c 
Defendant now seeks leave to appeal, arguing that Dillard 
and our decision in People v Mitchell, 456 Mich 693; 575 
NW2d 283 (1998), which the Dillard panel followed, were 
wrongly decided. We disagree. 
I 
A challenge under the double jeopardy clauses of the 
federal and state constitutions presents a question of law 
that this Court reviews de novo. People v Herron, 464 Mich 
593, 599; 628 NW2d 528 (2001). The double jeopardy clauses 
of the United States and Michigan constitutions protect 
against 
governmental 
abuses 
for 
both 
(1) 
multiple 
prosecutions for the same offense after a conviction or 
acquittal and (2) multiple punishments for the same 
offense. 
Ohio v Johnson, 467 US 493, 497; 104 S Ct 2536; 
81 L Ed 2d 425 (1984); Herron, supra. 
The issue presented 
in this case is one of multiple punishments for the same 
offense. 
This Court discussed the constitutional protections 
against multiple punishments in Mitchell, supra at 695, 
which relied on People v Sturgis, 427 Mich 392; 397 NW2d 
c Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued August 30,
2002 (Docket Nos. 232225, 232274). 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
783 (1986). In Sturgis, Justice Boyle, speaking for a 
majority, helpfully discussed the multiple punishment bar 
by contrasting it with the multiple prosecution bar: 
The Court can enforce the constitutional 
prohibition against multiple prosecutions through
judicial 
interpretation 
of 
the 
term 
"same 
offense" as intended by the framers of the 
constitution. 
Judicial examination of the scope
of double jeopardy protection against imposed 
multiple punishment for the "same offense" is
confined 
to 
a 
determination 
of 
legislative
intent. In the latter case, the core double 
jeopardy 
right 
to 
be 
free 
from 
vexatious 
proceedings is simply not present, People v 
Robideau, [419 Mich 458, 485; 355 NW2d 592 
(1984)]. Since the power to define crime and fix
punishment is wholly legislative, the clause is
not a limitation on the Legislature, Whalen v 
United States [445 US 684, 700; 100 S Ct 1435; 63
L Ed 2d 715 (1980)], and the only interest of the
defendant is in not having more punishment
imposed than intended by the Legislature, People 
v Robideau, supra, 485. Thus, "[even] if the
crimes are the same, ... if it is evident that a
state 
legislature 
intended 
to 
authorize 
cumulative punishments, a court's inquiry is at
an end," Ohio v Johnson, 467 US 493, 499 n 8; 104
S Ct 2536; 81 L Ed 2d 425 (1984). [Sturgis, supra
at 400.] 
The question is, then, whether the Astate legislature 
intended to authorize cumulative punishments.@ 
Ohio, supra. 
The felony-firearm statute, as relevant, states: 
A person who carries or has in his or her
possession a firearm when he or she commits or
attempts to commit a felony, except a violation
of section 223, section 227, 227a or 230, is
guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned for 2
years. Upon a second conviction under this 
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section, the person shall be imprisoned for 5
years. Upon a third or subsequent conviction 
under this subsection, the person shall be 
imprisoned for 10 years. [MCL 750.227b(1).] 
The felon in possession statute states, in relevant part: 
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a
person convicted of a felony shall not possess,
use, transport, sell, purchase, carry, ship,
receive, or distribute a firearm in this state
until the expiration of 3 years after all of the
following circumstances exist: 
(a) The person has paid all fines imposed 
for the violation. 
(b) The person has served all terms of 
imprisonment imposed for the violation. 
(c) The person has successfully completed
all conditions of probation or parole imposed for
the violation. [MCL 750.224f.] 
In considering MCL 750.227b in Mitchell, we concluded 
that, with the exception of the four enumerated felonies,d 
it 
was 
the 
Legislature=s 
intent 
Ato 
provide 
for 
an 
additional felony charge and sentence whenever a person 
possessing a firearm committed a felony other than those 
four explicitly enumerated in the felony-firearm statute.@ 
Id. at 698. 
d MCL 750.223 (unlawful sale of a firearm), MCL 750.227
(carrying a concealed weapon), MCL 750.227a (unlawful
possession by licensee), and MCL 750.230 (alteration or
removal of identifying marks). 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We follow, as did the Court of Appeals in Dillard, 
supra, our Mitchell opinion in resolving this matter. 
Because the felon in possession charge is not one of the 
felony exceptions in the statute, it is clear that 
defendant 
could 
constitutionally 
be 
given 
cumulative 
punishments when charged and convicted of both felon in 
possession, MCL 750.224f, and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. 
Because there is no violation of the double jeopardy 
clause, the Court of Appeals properly affirmed defendant=s 
convictions. 
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this point. 
MCR 7.302(F)(1). In all other respects, we deny defendant=s 
delayed application for leave to appeal because we are not 
persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed 
by this Court. Defendant=s motion to remand is also denied. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
5  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
                                                 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
Nos. 122430, 122431 
D’ANDRE D. CALLOWAY,
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
KELLY, J. (concurring in result only). 
Defendant was convicted of an assault, for being a 
felon in possession of a firearm1 and for possessing a 
firearm while committing a felony (felony-firearm).2
 He 
claims that the two latter convictions for the same act, 
possessing a single firearm on a single occasion, violate 
the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and 
Michigan Constitutions. 
While I disagree with the Court’s 
analysis, I concur in the result it reaches. 
I write 
separately to reiterate what I believe to be the proper 
analysis under the controlling precedent of the United 
1MCL 750.224f.  
2MCL 750.227b.  
 
 
 
 
States Supreme Court and this Court. 
The bar against double jeopardy protects against 
multiple punishments for the same offense. 
The United 
States Supreme Court and this Court have interpreted this 
protection as a restraint on the courts and the prosecutor. 
However, if the Legislature expressly desires, it is within 
its power to provide for cumulative punishment of the same 
conduct. 
People v Mitchell, 456 Mich 693, 695; 575 NW2d 
283 (1998), citing Brown v Ohio, 432 US 161, 97 S Ct 2221; 
53 L Ed 2d 187 (1977). 
To do so, it must express this 
intent in clear terms. 
Mitchell, p 696, citing People v 
Robideau, 419 Mich 458, 469; 355 NW2d 592 (1984). The rule 
of lenity requires that the courts presume that the 
Legislature did not intend to punish conduct cumulatively 
unless there is conclusive evidence of a contrary intent. 
Robideau, p 488. 
Legislative intent can be difficult to discern. 
“The 
Legislature rarely reveals its intentions with a specific 
statement.” 
Robideau, pp 486-487. 
Here, the Legislature 
did not explicitly state its intent and, to ascertain it, 
we must employ an analysis that the United States Supreme 
Court and this Court have developed. The analysis has been 
devised to protect substantial liberty interests and 
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tailored for double jeopardy challenges. 
It begins with some general principles whose purpose 
is to examine the subject, language, and history of the 
statutes in question. 
Id., p 486. 
Basic to them is a 
presumption that the Legislature did not intend multiple 
punishments for one act that violates different statutes 
protecting the same social norms. Id., p 487. Conversely, 
a court could infer the intent of multiple punishments 
where the social norms do not overlap. Additional tools of 
statutory construction may be employed as well. 
But a 
court must search for conclusive evidence of an implicit 
intent to provide multiple punishments when the prosecutor 
seeks multiple punishments for a single act. 
In this case, the defendant was a convicted felon who 
had committed a serious assault with a firearm. 
The 
felony-firearm 
and 
assault 
statutes 
protect 
different 
social norms. 
The assault statute and its common-law 
predecessor are meant to preserve order. 
The felony­
firearm 
statute 
is 
intended 
to 
deter 
the 
unlawful 
possession of firearms. 
Mitchell, p 700 (KELLY, J., 
dissenting). 
This 
supports 
the 
inference 
that 
the 
Legislature intended to provide additional punishment of a 
person who commits an assault while in possession of a 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
firearm. 
The rationale was, presumably, that someone 
assaulted by a person having ready access to a deadly 
weapon is at greater risk of injury than someone assaulted 
by an unarmed person. 
It is noteworthy that, in this case, the felony­
firearm charge would have been barred by double jeopardy if 
it had been predicated on the felon-in-possession charge. 
Both involve mere possession, protecting similar norms. 
The felony-firearm statute is intended to deter the 
unlawful possession of firearms by punishing those who 
commit a felony with a firearm in their possession. 
Id. 
Similarly, the felon-in-possession statute is intended to 
deter the possession of firearms by those who have 
previously committed a felony. 
Because the social norms 
underlying the statutes are similar, an inference may be 
drawn that the Legislature intended not to provide multiple 
punishments for a single act that violated both statutes. 
In addition, assault requires proof of more than mere 
possession of the firearm.3 
3Accord People v Sturgis, 427 Mich 392; 397 NW2d 783
(1986) (simultaneous convictions allowed for unlawfully
carrying a concealed weapon [CCW], felonious assault, and
felony-firearm, but the CCW could not serve as the 
predicate felony for the felony-firearm conviction), Wayne
Co Prosecutor v Recorder’s Court Judge, 406 Mich 374; 280 
4  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
This conclusion is consistent with the United States 
Supreme 
Court 
interpretation 
of 
the 
double 
jeopardy 
provision in Ball v United States, 470 US 856; 105 S Ct 
1668; 84 L Ed 2d 740 (1985). 
Ball held that a defendant 
could not be convicted simultaneously of receipt and of 
possession of a stolen firearm, because receipt is implicit 
in possession and no additional act is required. 
The four exceptions listed in the felony-firearm 
statute do not undercut this analysis. 
Unlawful sale of a 
firearm, unlawful possession by a licensee, carrying a 
concealed weapon (CCW), and altering the markings of a 
firearm,4 do not result in a felony-firearm violation. The 
majority determined that this list was exclusive and, 
therefore, that the Michigan Legislature intended any other 
felony with a firearm to be a violation of the felony­
firearm statute. 
However, 
its 
analysis 
avoids 
the 
constitutional 
question and assumes that, by providing a short list of 
exceptions, the Legislature intended cumulative punishments 
NW2d 793 (1979) (simultaneous convictions allowed for 
second-degree murder and felony-firearm), and People v 
Walker, 167 Mich App 377; 422 NW2d 8 (1988) (simultaneous
convictions allowed for assault with intent to do great
bodily harm less than murder and for felony-firearm). 
4MCL 750.223, 750.227a, 750.227, and 750.230. 
5 
 
 
 
 
for all unlisted crimes. 
When one applies the social norm 
analysis, it becomes apparent that the felony-firearm 
statute and its four exceptions protect diverse interests. 
The 
unlawful 
sale 
statute 
and 
the 
markings 
statute 
facilitate the regulation of firearms. 
The licensee’s 
unlawful possession statute and the CCW statute prevent 
deadly weapons from being available in situations where 
they might be used imprudently. 
These interests are 
different from, and more narrowly tailored than, the 
felony-firearm statute, which protects against unlawful 
possession in general. 
Thus, there would be no double jeopardy bar to 
simultaneous prosecutions under one of these statutes and 
under the felony-firearm statute. 
It follows that the 
Legislature intended not to provide cumulative punishments 
for these four exceptions. Moreover, their inclusion 
furnishes no conclusive evidence of an intent with respect 
to other felonies. 
This analysis illustrates the limited applicability of 
the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which the 
majority used in this case and in Mitchell. 
Rather than 
standing as a rule of law, the maxim is merely an aid to 
construction. 
It should not be used summarily to decide 
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constitutional questions. 
In passing over the established social norm analysis 
when deciding this case, the majority failed to apply the 
rule of lenity. 
It should have done so, given that no 
conclusive 
evidence 
of 
legislative 
intent 
exists. 
Moreover, by expressly agreeing with the holding in People 
v Dillard,5 this Court effectively decides the issue 
presented there, although it is not presented in this case. 
Dillard held that felon-in-possession can be the 
underlying felony for felony-firearm. 
This per curiam 
opinion affirms that holding in a case in which an assault 
conviction could provide the underlying felony for the 
felony-firearm conviction. 
There was no need to reach the 
question whether felon-in-possession could be the predicate 
felony. 
This case should not be made a vehicle to resolve the 
Dillard issue, a larger one not before the Court. 
For 
these reasons, I cannot join the majority’s analysis in 
this case or in Mitchell. 
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh 
5 246 Mich App 163; 631 NW2d 755 (2001). 
7