Case Title: State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler

Citation: 2002-Ohio-3605

Docket Number: 20011949

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 96 Ohio St.3d 84, 2002-Ohio-3605.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. HUMMEL ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. SADLER, JUDGE, 
APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 96 Ohio St.3d 84, 2002-Ohio-3605.] 
Mandamus and prohibition sought to compel common pleas court judge from 
exercising any jurisdiction in a noncompetition agreement case, to 
prevent the judge from adopting or enforcing a magistrate’s decision, to 
vacate three of the judge’s previous entries, and to dismiss the case — 
Court of appeals’ dismissal of complaints for writs of prohibition and 
mandamus affirmed, when — Allegation of frivolous conduct — Trial 
court did not patently lack jurisdiction over motion for sanctions under 
Civ.R. 45(E). 
(No. 2001-1949 — Submitted May 7, 2002 — Decided July 31, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 01AP-397. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
In August 1998, Capitol Mortgage Services, Inc. sued three former 
employees, Jon Hummel, Steve Gombosch, and Len Finelli, alleging that they had 
breached the terms of their noncompetition agreements when they left Capitol and 
went to work for Macloud Financial, Inc.  Hummel, Gombosch, and Finelli 
retained attorneys John W. Ferron and Sloan T. Spaulding, both of Ferron & 
Associates, L.P.A., to represent them. 
{¶2} 
In December 1998, Gombosch sent a letter to Ferron stating that he 
felt it was in his (Gombosch’s) best interest to personally discuss a proposed 
settlement with Capitol and that he appreciated Ferron’s representation of him but 
that he wanted to end the process.  Gombosch also requested that Ferron send him 
a bill for attorney fees.  Gombosch thereafter personally entered into settlement 
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negotiations with Capitol, through its attorney, Bridgette C. Roman, as well as 
with Macloud, which was not a party to the litigation, through its attorney, David 
S. Kessler. 
{¶3} 
In February 1999, on behalf of Hummel and Finelli, Ferron moved 
to disqualify Roman and her law firm from further representing Capitol.  He 
claimed that Roman should not have conducted settlement negotiations with 
Ferron’s client, Gombosch, without Ferron’s consent. 
{¶4} 
In April 1999, appellee, Judge Lisa L. Sadler of the Franklin 
County Court of Common Pleas, denied the motion to disqualify.  Judge Sadler 
found that Gombosch had terminated Ferron’s representation before he entered 
into settlement negotiations with Capitol.  Judge Sadler further noted that the 
court would consider a motion for sanctions against Ferron if Capitol filed one. 
{¶5} 
In August 1999, Capitol moved for sanctions under Civ.R. 11 and 
R.C. 2323.51, alleging that Ferron’s motion to disqualify Roman was frivolous.  
Ferron subpoenaed Kessler, Gombosch, and Roman and certain records belonging 
to them for a hearing before a magistrate on the motion.  In January 2000, Judge 
Sadler granted Roman and Kessler’s motions to quash the subpoenas. 
{¶6} 
Thereafter, on January 14, 2000, Kessler moved for an order 
compelling Hummel or his counsel, Ferron, to reimburse Kessler for his expenses 
associated with the subpoenas. 
{¶7} 
On February 8, 2000, the remaining parties to the common pleas 
court case, Capitol and Hummel, stipulated to the withdrawal of all of their 
pending motions and to a Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(b) dismissal of the remaining claims.  
On February 10, 2000, Judge Sadler issued an order for the Clerk of the Franklin 
County Court of Common Pleas to remove certain motions from a “Motions 
Report” because the “motions ha[d] been decided or rendered moot.”  One of 
these motions was Kessler’s January 14, 2000 motion for reimbursement. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
{¶8} 
By entries dated February 16 and 17, 2000, Judge Sadler referred 
Kessler’s motion for reimbursement, i.e., for sanctions under Civ.R. 45, to a 
magistrate to determine whether the subpoenas subjected Kessler and his law firm 
to an undue burden and, if so, the appropriate sanctions to be imposed against 
Hummel or Ferron.  Judge Sadler determined that the stipulation of dismissal filed 
by Capitol and Hummel did not moot Kessler’s pending motion for 
reimbursement because Kessler, “a non-party to this action, was not a signatory to 
that document, and may not be bound by its terms.” 
{¶9} 
In April 2000, Hummel, through Ferron, filed a motion to rescind 
the February 16 and 17, 2000 entries referring Kessler’s motion for 
reimbursement to a magistrate.  In May 2000, Judge Sadler denied the motion to 
rescind.  Judge Sadler concluded that the court retained jurisdiction over Kessler’s 
motion for reimbursement brought under Civ.R. 45 despite the stipulated 
dismissal of the case. 
{¶10} On May 15, 2000, the magistrate for the common pleas court 
issued a decision recommending that the court grant Kessler’s motion and award 
him attorney fees against Ferron in the amount of $4,168.18.  The magistrate 
noted that Judge Sadler’s February 10, 2000 order to the clerk of the court was 
simply a clerical act eliminating motions from a court list but having no 
substantive effect on the motion.  On June 2, 2000, Judge Sadler adopted the 
magistrate’s decision ordering Ferron to pay Kessler $4,168.18. 
{¶11} On appeal, in February 2001, the Court of Appeals for Franklin 
County reversed the June 2, 2000 judgment because the trial court had failed to 
consider Ferron’s objections to the magistrate’s decision.  The court of appeals 
determined that, although Ferron’s objections had been filed after the deadline set 
forth in Civ.R. 53(E)(3)(a), i.e., 14 days after the magistrate’s decision is filed, 
they should have been considered because Ferron had never been properly served 
with the magistrate’s decision.  The court of appeals held, “Because we believe 
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that the trial court should independently rule on the issues as to whether or not the 
subpoena of the Kessler firm was a frivolous action and, if so, what sanctions 
should attach, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for 
further proceedings.” 
{¶12} In March 2001, upon remand, Judge Sadler ordered the clerk to 
serve the May 15, 2000 magistrate’s decision, and a copy of the decision was 
mailed to Ferron. 
{¶13} In April 2001, appellants, Hummel and Ferron, filed a complaint in 
the Court of Appeals for Franklin County for writs of prohibition and mandamus 
to order Judge Sadler to refrain from exercising any jurisdiction in the underlying 
common pleas court case, to prevent her from adopting or enforcing the May 15, 
2000 magistrate’s decision, to vacate her February 16, May 4, and June 2, 2000 
entries, and to dismiss the case.  Judge Sadler filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to 
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
and appellants filed a motion for summary judgment. 
{¶14} In June 2001, a magistrate for the court of appeals issued a 
decision recommending that the court grant Judge Sadler’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 
dismissal motion and deny appellants’ motion for summary judgment.  The 
magistrate concluded that appellants had an adequate remedy at law to raise their 
claims.  In October 2001, the court of appeals overruled appellants’ objections to 
the magistrate’s decision, approved and adopted the decision, and dismissed 
appellants’ complaint for writs of prohibition and mandamus.  This cause is now 
before the court upon appellants’ appeal as of right. 
Use of Civ.R. 12(B)(6) on “Merits” Issues in Writ Cases 
{¶15} Appellants initially assert that the court of appeals erred in granting 
Judge Sadler’s motion to dismiss based upon the availability of an adequate 
remedy at law because this is an adjudication on the merits, which is improper 
January Term, 2002 
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under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).  Appellants cite State ex rel. Birdsall v. Stephenson 
(1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 353, 626 N.E.2d 946, in support of this proposition. 
{¶16} But, as Judge Sadler notes, we subsequently clarified Birdsall and 
resolved its apparent conflict with our previous approval of Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 
dismissals based on “merits” issues: 
{¶17} “We have previously noted that Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motions attack the 
sufficiency of the complaint and may not be used to summarily review the merits 
of a cause of action in mandamus.  State ex rel. Horwitz v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court 
of Common Pleas, Probate Div. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 323, 325, 603 N.E.2d 
1005, 1007; Assn. for the Defense of the Washington Local School Dist. v. Kiger 
(1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 116, 117, 537 N.E.2d 1292, 1293.  We have further stated 
that a claim that a relator possesses an adequate legal remedy precluding a writ of 
mandamus seeks an adjudication on the merits, which is normally improper in a 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) determination.  State ex rel. Birdsall v. Stephenson (1994), 68 
Ohio St.3d 353, 355, 626 N.E.2d 946, 949.  Nevertheless, in other cases, we have 
affirmed dismissals pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) based upon the existence of an 
adequate remedy at law.  State ex rel. Sobczak v. Skow (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 13, 
14, 550 N.E.2d 455, 456; State ex rel. Daggett v. Gessaman (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 
55, 63 O.O.2d 88, 295 N.E.2d 659, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶18} “In reconciling this seeming conflict, we interpret the language of 
Kiger, Horwitz, and Birdsall to be limited to the precept that a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 
dismissal based upon the merits is unusual and should be granted with caution, 
rather than setting forth a new standard.  As always, the applicable standard is 
that set forth in O’Brien [v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc. (1975), 42 
Ohio St.2d 242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 N.E.2d 753, syllabus].  In other words, 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is appropriate in certain cases where ‘merits’ issues are raised.”  
(Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Edwards v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 106, 108-109, 647 N.E.2d 799. 
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{¶19} Following Edwards, in appropriate cases, we have continued to 
affirm dismissals of extraordinary writ actions because of the presence of an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Butler 
Cty. Children Serv. Bd. v. Sage (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 23, 764 N.E.2d 1027 
(mandamus); Brooks v. Gaul (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 202, 729 N.E.2d 752 
(prohibition); State ex rel. Warren v. Boggins (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 264, 719 
N.E.2d 549 (mandamus); see, also, State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio 
Conference v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 699 N.E.2d 64, 
67 (affirmance of Civ.R. 12[B][6] dismissal of mandamus action on those claims 
in which prevailing wage law provided adequate remedy). 
{¶20} Therefore, Edwards thwarts appellants’ reliance on Birdsall.  
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissals may be based on “merits” issues such as the 
availability of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  The applicable 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) standard is whether, after presuming the truth of all material 
factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom in 
relators’ favor, it appears beyond doubt that relators can prove no set of facts 
warranting relief.  Taylor v. London (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 137, 139, 723 N.E.2d 
1089; Edwards, 72 Ohio St.3d at 108, 647 N.E.2d 799. 
Prohibition and Mandamus 
{¶21} Appellants next assert that they have established their entitlement 
to the requested writs of prohibition and mandamus.  Neither prohibition nor 
mandamus will issue if appellants have an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of law.  State ex rel. Kreps v. Christiansen (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 313, 316, 725 
N.E.2d 663.  “In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a 
court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own 
jurisdiction, and a party challenging that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by 
appeal.”  State ex rel. Shimko v. McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 426, 428-429, 
751 N.E.2d 472. 
January Term, 2002 
7 
{¶22} Appellants claim that they do not have an adequate remedy by 
appeal because Judge Sadler patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over 
Kessler’s motion because the underlying case had been dismissed.  It is certainly 
true that, in general, when a trial court unconditionally dismisses a case or a case 
has been voluntarily dismissed under Civ.R. 41(A)(1), the trial court patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed, and a writ of prohibition will issue 
to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction.  Page v. Riley (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 621, 
623, 710 N.E.2d 690. 
{¶23} It is equally true, however, that despite a voluntary dismissal under 
Civ.R. 41(A)(1), a trial court may consider certain collateral issues not related to 
the merits of the action.  See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. (1990), 496 U.S. 
384, 396, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (trial court retains jurisdiction to 
determine Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 sanctions after the principal suit has been terminated); 
State ex rel. Corn v. Russo (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 556, 740 N.E.2d 265 
(“court may consider the collateral issue of criminal contempt even after the 
underlying action is no longer pending”); Grossman v. Mathless & Mathless, 
C.P.A. (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 525, 528, 620 N.E.2d 160 (trial court may 
entertain an R.C. 2323.51 motion to impose sanctions for frivolous conduct even 
though underlying case has been voluntarily dismissed). 
{¶24} Kessler, a nonparty who was subpoenaed by appellants in the 
common pleas court case, filed a motion for sanctions under Civ.R. 45(E).  That 
rule provides that “[t]he court from which a subpoena was issued may impose 
upon a party or attorney in breach of the duty imposed by division (C)(1) of this 
rule an appropriate sanction, which may include, but is not limited to, lost 
earnings and reasonable attorney’s fees.”  Civ.R. 45(C)(1) requires a party or an 
attorney issuing a subpoena to “take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue 
burden or expense on a person subject to that subpoena.” 
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{¶25} The sanctions Kessler sought under Civ.R. 45(E) are comparable 
to those available in the collateral proceedings specified in the foregoing cases in 
which the courts retained jurisdiction over the collateral proceedings despite the 
dismissal of the underlying actions.  Thus, when a case is dismissed, the trial 
court is not divested of jurisdiction to hear a claim for attorney fees simply 
because the basis for the claim is a statute or rule different from Civ.R. 11 or R.C. 
2323.51.  Miami Valley Hosp. v. Payson (Dec. 17, 1999), Montgomery App. No. 
CA 17830, 1999 WL 1207064 (ERISA-based claim for attorney fees). 
{¶26} Therefore, Judge Sadler does not patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction over Kessler’s motion for sanctions under Civ.R. 45(E).  
Consequently, appellants have an adequate remedy at law to raise their 
jurisdictional claims, and extraordinary relief in prohibition and mandamus does 
not lie. 
{¶27} The cases primarily relied upon by appellants do not alter this 
conclusion.  See State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 656 
N.E.2d 1288; Corn, 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 740 N.E.2d 265; Chaffins v. Bill Swad 
Chevrolet, Inc. (June 28, 1983), Franklin App. No. 82AP-1025. 
{¶28} In Fogle at 163-164, 656 N.E.2d 1288, we held that the trial court 
was divested of jurisdiction and thus lacked authority to grant custody of children 
to a nonparty grandmother after the parties had voluntarily dismissed their claims 
in an underlying divorce action, where the grandmother had not been made a 
party to the action before the dismissal.  Unlike the nonparty in Fogle, the 
nonparty here, Kessler, filed his motion for sanctions under Civ.R. 45(E) before 
the parties dismissed the case. 
{¶29} In addition, unlike our decision in Corn, 90 Ohio St.3d at 555, 740 
N.E.2d 265, regarding civil contempt, the Civ.R. 45(E) motion filed by Kessler 
does not involve any finding of contempt. 
January Term, 2002 
9 
{¶30} Furthermore, appellants’ reliance on Chaffins is also misplaced.  In 
Chaffins, the court of appeals held that a voluntary dismissal of an action divests a 
trial court of jurisdiction over a pending motion for discovery sanctions.  But 
Chaffins did not involve a nonparty’s pending claim for discovery sanctions.  Cf. 
Dyson v. Adrenaline Dreams Adventures (2001), 143 Ohio App.3d 69, 72, 757 
N.E.2d 401, where the principal opinion observed that a request for discovery 
sanctions before a voluntary dismissal of the case might survive the dismissal. 
{¶31} Moreover, the order by Judge Sadler to the clerk of the common 
pleas court to strike Kessler’s motion from the court list was merely a clerical act.  
It did not patently and unambiguously divest the court of its jurisdiction to 
consider the merits of Kessler’s Civ.R. 45(E) motion for sanctions. 
{¶32} Based on the foregoing, after construing all material factual 
allegations and reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of appellants, it is 
beyond doubt that they could prove no set of facts entitling them to the requested 
extraordinary relief.  The court of appeals thus properly dismissed appellants’ 
complaint for writs of prohibition and mandamus.  By so holding, we decline to 
expressly decide appellants’ claims that Judge Sadler lacked jurisdiction, because 
our review is restricted to whether Judge Sadler patently and unambiguously 
lacked jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Page, 85 Ohio St.3d at 624, 710 N.E.2d 690.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in judgment. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., not participating. 
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Ferron & Associates, John W. Ferron, Sloan T. Spalding and Dawn M. 
Dunker, for appellants. 
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Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Jane 
Martin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
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