Case Title: Texas Const. Co. v. H. & PE Local Union No. 101

Citation: 178 Kan. 422, 286 P.2d 160

Docket Number: 39,301

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1955-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
178 Kan. 422 (1955)
286 P.2d 160
TEXAS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Appellee,
v.
HOISTING AND PORTABLE ENGINEERS' LOCAL UNION No. 101, Affiliated with The International Union of Operating Engineers, A.F. of L., an unincorporated Labor Organization or association; JESS HARDY, individually and as Business Agent of said labor organization; and all other members, agents and representatives of said labor organization whose real names are unknown to plaintiff and therefore cannot be given, as individuals and representatives of said labor organization, Appellants.
No. 39,301

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 14, 1955.
Robert L. Kimbrough, of Topeka, argued the cause, and George E. McCullough, of Topeka, and William H. Stowell, of Phillipsburg, were with him on the briefs for the appellants.
E.H. Hatcher, of Topeka, argued the cause, and D.A. Hindman, of Stockton, was with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARVEY, C.J.:
The sole question presented in this appeal is whether the trial court had jurisdiction of the subject matter. Appellants contend it did not.
We summarize or quote portions of the record bearing upon the question presented as follows:
Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation with its home office in Dallas, Texas, and is duly authorized to do business in this state. Its business consists of the construction of dams and various other types of construction work throughout the United States. At the time the action was filed plaintiff was the general contractor for the construction of the Kirwin Dam on the north fork of the Solomon River in Phillips County for the United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation.
*423 Defendant is a voluntary, unincorporated labor association, with headquarters at Kansas City, Missouri, affiliated with the International Union of Operating Engineers, A.F. of L. Jess Hardy was its duly authorized business agent.
In plaintiff's petition it was alleged:
It was further alleged that plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law. The prayer was that defendants be restrained and enjoined from picketing plaintiff's place of business.
Plaintiff's verified petition and verified motion for a restraining order were filed May 4, 1953, in the district court of Phillips County, Kansas. The temporary restraining order was issued on that day and the hearing upon the issuance of a temporary injunction was set for May 8, 1953, and notice was given to defendants. On May 8, 1953, the parties appeared and plaintiff introduced its evidence, and counsel for the respective parties made oral argument. The court took the matter under advisement. Briefs were furnished by counsel, and on May 19, 1953, the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and granted the temporary injunction, requiring plaintiff to give a bond in a stated amount, which was done. The case was set for hearing on June 16, 1953, on its merits.
On May 19, 1953, defendants filed their answer, which reads:
On the same date they filed a motion to dismiss, which reads:
When the court met on June 16, 1953, defendants presented their motion to dismiss. The same was considered by the court and denied. Plaintiff submitted the case to the court on the evidence presented on May 8. Defendants made their opening statement and produced evidence, and plaintiff offered evidence in rebuttal. Counsel for the respective parties argued to the court. Having considered the evidence and arguments, the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law fully set out in Appendix A attached hereto, and found generally in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants in that the temporary injunction heretofore issued should be made permanent. The court also gave the parties 10 days to submit requests for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. Judgment was rendered accordingly.
On June 18, 1953, defendants filed three motions: One for a new trial upon formal statutory grounds; another for the court to modify its decree of injunction, and another to dissolve, which reads:
On July 3, 1953, these motions were presented to the court. Each of them was considered by the court and denied except the court made supplemental findings of fact as follows:
On July 23, 1953, defendants filed their notice of appeal from the following judgments, orders and decisions:
The only specification of error reads:
Counsel for appellants (defendants below) in their briefs state: "... For the purpose of this appeal only, the defendants do not contest having engaged in activities described as unlawful by said Findings of Fact." A similar statement was made elsewhere in the briefs. "The matter, therefore, comes to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas only upon the overruling of the Motion to Dissolve and the Motion to Dismiss for want of jurisdiction of the trial court." This means that appellants have abandoned all points contained in their notice of appeal except Nos. 2 and 4. There is, therefore, no appeal from the final judgment of the court, nor from the order overruling the motion for a new trial. The question here argued could have been presented had the appeal from the final judgment and the order overruling the motion for a new trial been presented here. No such an appeal is presented.
*427 When counsel for appellants speak in their motions of the want of jurisdiction of the trial court we understand them to mean jurisdiction of the subject matter. Defendants filed an answer in this case and participated in the trial so there cannot be any lack of jurisdiction of the person of defendants, and there is no such claim. Counsel for appellants present as the "question involved" here,
We think a less involved statement might be worded thus: Did the trial court lack jurisdiction to enjoin the continuance of acts which violate our state law because an act of Congress described similar acts as being unlawful?
This question has been decided in favor of appellants' contention by recent state cases which have reached the U.S. supreme court. In Garner v. Teamsters' C. & H. Loc. Union 776, 373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d 893, the paragraphs of the syllabus of the state court read:
On certiorari to the U.S. supreme court the opinion is reported in 346 U.S. 485, 74 S. Ct. 161, and 98 L. Ed. 228, where the paragraphs of the headnote of the U.S. supreme court read:
Later in Building Trades Council et al. v. Kinard Construction Co., 74 S. Ct. 373, 346 U.S. 933, 98 L. Ed. 423, the U.S. supreme court reversed the decision of the supreme court of Alabama, 258 Ala. 500, 64 So. 2d 400, without opinion, upon the authority of Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra, and said:
We refer to the decision of the Alabama court for the facts of the case.
Still later (March 28, 1955) in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 75 S. Ct. 480, 348 U.S. 468, the U.S. supreme court reversed the decision of the supreme court of Missouri, 265 S.W.2d 325, which had affirmed a judgment of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis in a labor controversy which should have been presented to the National Labor Relations Board, citing the case of Garner v. Teamsters Union, and others. We refer to the decision of the supreme court of Missouri and the decision of the U.S. supreme court for a fuller statement of facts.
The Garner case and sometimes the Kinard case and the Anheuser-Busch case, or one of them, is cited and followed or distinguished because of the facts, in the following federal and state cases: National Labor Relations Board v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 754; International Union, Etc. v. Hinz, 218 F.2d 664, 665; International *429 Union v. Underwood Corporation, 219 F.2d 100, 101; Lanni v. Wyer, 219 F.2d 701; Irving Subway Grating Co. v. Silverman, 117 F. Supp. 671, 679, 680; United Mineral & Chemical Corp. v. Katz, 118 F. Supp. 433, 434; Isbrandtsen Co. v. Schelero, 118 F. Supp. 579, 582; Your Food Stores of Santa Fe v. Retail Clerks, Etc., 121 F. Supp. 339, 342; Time, Inc. v. T.I.M.E. Inc., 123 F. Supp. 446, 451; Your Food Stores v. Retail Clerks' Local No. 1564, 124 F. Supp. 697, 701; Lock Joint Pipe Company v. Anderson, 127 F. Supp. 692, 694; Johnston v. Colonial Provision Company, 128 F. Supp. 954, 955; Dyer v. International Brotherhood, Etc., 269 P.2d 199, 202, California; Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 273 P.2d 686, 689, California; Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of The Pacific, 275 P.2d 440, 444, Washington; Building Trades Council of Reno v. Bonito, 280 P.2d 295, 296, Nevada; Gulf Shipside Storage Corp. v. Moore, 71 So. 2d 236, 240, Louisiana; Douglas Public Service Corp. v. Gaspard, 74 So. 2d 182, 185, Louisiana; International Ass'n of Mach. v. Goff-McNair Motor Co., 264 S.W.2d 48, 50, Arkansas; Sheet Metal Wkrs. Int. Ass'n v. E.W. Daniels P. & H. Co., 264 S.W.2d 597, 601, 605, Arkansas; Wichita Falls & Southern R. Co. v. Lodge No. 1476, 266 S.W.2d 265, 268, Texas; Coutlakis v. State, 268 S.W.2d 192, 197, 198, Texas; Leiter Mfg. Co. v. International Ladies' Garment W.U., 269 S.W.2d 409, 410, Texas; McAmis v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, 273 S.W.2d 789, 792, Missouri; Grimes & Hauer, Inc. v. Pollock, 119 N.E.2d 889, Ohio; New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. Jenkins, 122 N.E.2d 759, Massachusetts; Benjamin v. Foidl, 109 A.2d 300, Pennsylvania; Wortex Mills v. Textile Workers Union of America, 109 A.2d 815, 817, Pennsylvania; Wilkes Sportswear v. International Ladies' G.W.U., 110 A.2d 418, 421, Pennsylvania; Hammer v. Local No. 211, Etc., 111 A.2d 308, 317, New Jersey; Morgan Millwork Co. v. Highway Truck Drivers, Etc., 112 A.2d 855, 856, Delaware; Sterling v. Local 436, Etc., 113 A.2d 389, 395, Maryland; Cortlandt Co. Dept. Store v. Cohen, 127 N.Y.S.2d 261, 263; S.S. Pennock Co. v. Ferretti, 128 N.Y.S.2d 749, 755; Willoughby Camera Stores v. District No. 15, Etc., 129 N.Y.S.2d 734, 736; General Teleradio v. Manuti, 129 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759; New York State Labor Rel. Bd. v. Wags Transp. Sys., 130 N.Y.S.2d 731, 750; Davis v. Freedman, 133 N.Y.S.2d 793, 795; In re United Steelworkers of America, CIO, 134 N.Y.S.2d 634, 639; Bert Manufacturing Company v. Local 810, Etc., 136 N.Y.S.2d 805, 807; A.E. Nettleton Co. v. United Shoeworkers, Etc., 138 *430 N.Y.S.2d 256, 258; and, People v. Framer, 139 N.Y.S.2d 331, 340. This list may not be complete; the next mail may bring more. A few earlier cases are cited in 32 A.L.R.2d 1026, 1032. Practically every law journal which comes to our law library has an article on the Garner case.
We are not impressed with the incongruous contention of counsel for appellants to the effect that a finding of the court disclosed the court had no jurisdiction for if the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter any finding it made was of no force. However, the record clearly discloses that there was no controversy about this being a case which could properly be handled by the National Labor Relations Board. The leading counsel for plaintiff in the trial court (who does not appear in this court) after stating the fact the matters complained of were in violation of the laws of this state further pointed out they also violated the Act of Congress, and explained his view of how defendants could have had the case transferred to that Board but did not do so. Plaintiff's contract was substantial. It called for the building of a dam 2.4 miles long across the river, which would be 117 feet in height above the bed of the stream and when completed the dam would hold a lake of about 5,000 acres with an average depth of water of 66 feet. The purpose of the dam was twofold; first, to hold the water at times of flood to prevent destruction of the cities and lowlands below the dam; and second, to impound water for irrigation which would be picked up about 3 miles below the dam and extend about 18 miles, and furnish irrigation for several thousand acres in time of drought; irrigation and flood control for thousands of acres of land in northwestern Kansas. While it was not gone into extensively there was testimony that the machinery and much of the equipment for the construction of the dam would have to be brought from a distance. Two of the three trucks stopped by the picket line were from out of the state. Plaintiff was doing interstate work for the government in many states. That was its business.
We think it clear under the ruling of the supreme court in the Garner case and subsequent cases of the federal and state courts that we are compelled to hold that the trial court in this case had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed with directions to set aside the injunction and to dismiss the action.
ROBB, J., not participating.
*431 APPENDIX A
After the hearing on May 8, counsel for the respective parties submitted briefs, and the court, on May 19, 1953, found generally in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, and adopted the following as its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
"FINDINGS OF FACT
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
"4. Temporary injunction should issue.
At the time of final judgment the court made supplemental findings of fact as follows:
In the final judgment after having heard all the evidence and the arguments of counsel the court found generally in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants and adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law previously made, and decreed,