Case Title: Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc.

Citation: 2007-Ohio-3762

Docket Number: 20061166

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., 114 Ohio St.3d 141, 2007-Ohio-3762.] 
 
 
 
GLIOZZO, APPELLEE, v. UNIVERSITY UROLOGISTS OF  
CLEVELAND, INC. ET AL., APPELLANTS 
[Cite as Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., 
 114 Ohio St.3d 141, 2007-Ohio-3762.] 
Civil procedure — Service of process — When the affirmative defense of 
insufficiency of service of process is properly raised and properly 
preserved, a party’s active participation in the litigation of a case does not 
constitute waiver of that defense. 
(No. 2006-1166 – Submitted May 24, 2007 – Decided August 8, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 86371, 2006-Ohio-1726. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS 
When the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process is 
properly raised and properly preserved, a party’s active participation in the 
litigation of a case does not constitute waiver of that defense. (First Bank 
of Marietta v. Cline (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 317, 12 OBR 388, 466 N.E.2d 
567, applied.) 
___________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} On November 14, 2003, appellee, Frank Gliozzo, filed a medical 
malpractice action against appellants, University Urologists of Cleveland, Inc. and 
Martin Resnick, M.D., alleging negligence in their performance of a surgical 
procedure on him in June 2002.  Before filing his complaint, Gliozzo had hand-
delivered a 180-day letter to appellants, which extended the statute of limitations 
for his claim.  See R.C. 2305.113(B)(1). 
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{¶ 2} Gliozzo’s deadline was November 14, 2004, one year from the 
date that he filed his complaint, to perfect service. Civ.R. 3(A). Service was 
attempted by certified mail, but failed.  No further attempt was ever made to serve 
appellants. 
{¶ 3} On February 10, 2004, appellants and appellees filed a stipulated 
motion allowing appellants until March 9 to answer Gliozzo’s complaint.  Two 
days later, appellants filed an answer denying the allegations and raising several 
affirmative defenses, including the insufficiency of service of process and the 
statute of limitations.  Trial was scheduled for April 13, 2005, and a dispositive-
motion deadline of January 28, 2005, was set. 
{¶ 4} On April 4, 2005, appellants filed a motion to dismiss because 
service of process was never perfected.  Although the trial court recognized that 
the motion to dismiss might have merit, the court denied the motion as untimely 
because the dispositive-motion deadline had passed.  On April 14, the day of trial, 
appellants orally moved for leave to renew their motion to dismiss.  After hearing 
argument, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that “the case was 
never properly commenced as defendants were not served with the complaint and 
did not waive the affirmative defenses of statute of limitations and insufficient 
service of process.” 
{¶ 5} Gliozzo appealed, contending that because appellants had actively 
participated in the case, they had submitted to the court’s jurisdiction and had 
therefore waived the defense of insufficient service of process.  The Eighth 
District Court of Appeals agreed and, in a two-to-one decision, reversed the 
judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Gliozzo 
v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 86371, 2006-Ohio-
1726. 
{¶ 6} We accepted jurisdiction over this discretionary appeal and now 
hold that parties who assert an affirmative defense of insufficiency of process in 
January Term, 2007 
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their first responsive pleading do not waive that defense by actively participating 
in litigation of the case. 
Analysis 
{¶ 7} The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure address how and when defenses 
and objections must be raised.  Civ.R. 12(B) states, “Every defense, in law or fact, 
to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is 
required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be 
made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) 
insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19 or Rule 19.1. A motion 
making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading 
is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more 
other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion. If a pleading sets 
forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a 
responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that 
claim for relief.”  (Emphasis added.)  If any of the 12(B) defenses are raised, 
whether by motion or pleading, then CivR. 12(D) provides that they “shall be 
heard and determined before trial on application of any party.” 
{¶ 8} In addition to determining how and when defenses must be raised, 
Civ.R. 12 explains how defenses may be waived.  Specifically, Civ.R. 12(H)(1) 
provides: “A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, 
insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived (A) if 
omitted from a motion in the circumstances described in subdivision (G), or (B) if 
it is neither made by motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading 
or an amendment thereof permitted by Rule 15(A) to be made as a matter of 
course.” 
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{¶ 9} Thus, the defense of insufficiency of service of process is waived if 
a motion is made raising other Civ.R. 12(B) defenses and it is not included in that 
motion or, if there is no such motion, if it is not raised by separate motion or 
included in the responsive pleading. 
{¶ 10} This court has previously considered the issue of when a party 
waives a properly asserted defense of insufficiency of service of process. First 
Bank of Marietta v. Cline (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 317, 12 OBR 388, 466 N.E.2d 
567. In Cline, the defense was properly raised in the first responsive pleading, but 
the case proceeded to trial. Only after all evidence had been presented was a 
motion made to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process.  We held that 
failure to request a pretrial hearing on the issue did not constitute a waiver of the 
defense. Id. at 318, 12 OBR 388, 466 N.E.2d 567. 
{¶ 11} Both Civ.R. 12 and our decision in Cline support the conclusion 
that when the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process is properly 
raised and properly preserved, a party’s active participation in litigation of a case 
does not constitute waiver of that defense.  Civ.R. 12(H)(1) does not include a 
party’s participation in the case as a method of waiver.  In our interpretation of the 
rule in Cline, we determined that a properly asserted and preserved defense may 
be raised even after trial has begun. Nothing in the facts here causes us to 
reconsider that conclusion. 
{¶ 12} Appellants did not file a pre-answer motion, but instead properly 
raised the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process by including it 
in their answer, as Civ.R. 12 requires.  Appellants were then free to seek dismissal 
of the case for insufficiency of service, even though they had also mounted a 
vigorous defense upon the merits.  Though the dispositive-motion deadline had 
passed by the time appellants had filed their motion to dismiss, decisions to grant 
such motions past deadline are left to the discretion of the trial court. See 
Brinkman v. Toledo (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 429, 432, 611 N.E.2d 380.  Although 
January Term, 2007 
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Gliozzo suggests that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion, 
his argument is conclusory and fails to demonstrate how the specific facts of this 
case support that position. 
{¶ 13} In some instances, a party who voluntarily submits to the court’s 
jurisdiction may waive available defenses, such as insufficiency of service of 
process or lack of personal jurisdiction.  Maryhew v. Yova (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 
154, 156-157, 11 OBR 471, 464 N.E.2d 538.  The only way in which a party can 
voluntarily submit to a court’s jurisdiction, however, is by failing to raise the 
defense of insufficiency of service of process in a responsive pleading or by filing 
certain motions before any pleading. Id. at 157-158, 11 OBR 471, 464 N.E.2d 
538. Only when a party submits to jurisdiction in one of these manners will the 
submission constitute a waiver of the defense. 
{¶ 14} Gliozzo cites decisions from other states, which, while 
informative, are not controlling. Gliozzo also relies heavily on Justice Brown’s 
dissenting opinion in Maryhew to argue that Cline was wrongly decided, but 
because he has not shown how Cline meets the standards for reversal in Westfield 
Ins. Co. v. Galatis (2003), 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 
1256, paragraph one of the syllabus, we will not revisit Cline’s conclusion. 
{¶ 15} Gliozzo also argues that allowing a party to file a motion to 
dismiss based on insufficient service after that party has defended on the merits 
simply encourages legal gamesmanship and prevents the efficient administration 
of justice.  Gliozzo points out that although appellants were aware of the deficient 
service, they did not move to dismiss the case on that basis until after the time to 
perfect service had expired, denying him an opportunity to remedy the error.  He 
also contends that because the primary objective of the rules relating to service of 
process is to provide notice, a strict application of the rules in this case simply 
elevates form over function. 
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{¶ 16} Regardless of how appellants’ behavior is characterized, the Ohio 
Rules of Civil Procedure govern the conduct of all parties equally, and “we cannot 
disregard [the] rules to assist a party who has failed to abide by them.” Bell v. 
Midwestern Educational Servs., Inc. (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 193, 204, 624 
N.E.2d 196.  The rules clearly declare that an action is commenced when service 
is perfected. Civ.R. 3(A).  Furthermore, we have held, “Inaction upon the part of a 
defendant who is not served with process, even though he might be aware of the 
filing of the action, does not dispense with the necessity of service.”  Maryhew, 
11 Ohio St.3d at 157, 11 OBR 471, 464 N.E.2d 538.  The obligation is upon 
plaintiffs to perfect service of process; defendants have no duty to assist them in 
fulfilling this obligation. Id at 159, 11 OBR 471, 464 N.E.2d 538. 
{¶ 17} Whether appellants’ conduct constituted gamesmanship or good 
litigation strategy, they followed the rules.  If such behavior should not be 
permitted in the future, the proper avenue for redress would be to seek to change 
those rules. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 18} When the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process 
is properly raised and properly preserved, a party’s active participation in the 
litigation of a case does not constitute waiver of that defense. In this case, 
appellants raised the defense appropriately within their answer.  Since this defense 
was properly preserved, the trial court did not err when it later granted appellants’ 
motion to dismiss for lack of sufficient service.  We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and CUPP, 
JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2007 
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PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 19} Civ.R. 1(B) states that the Rules of Civil Procedure “shall be 
construed and applied to effect just results by eliminating delay, unnecessary 
expense and all other impediments to the expeditious administration of justice.”  
We have stated that this rule suggests that “[t]he spirit of the Civil Rules is the 
resolution of cases upon their merits, not upon pleading deficiencies.”  Peterson v. 
Teodosio (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 175, 63 O.O.2d 262, 297 N.E.2d 113.  In 
DeHart v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 189, 192, 23 O.O.3d 210, 431 
N.E.2d 644, this court stated that “it is a fundamental tenet of judicial review in 
Ohio that courts should decide cases on the merits. * * * Judicial discretion must 
be carefully—and cautiously—exercised before this court will uphold an outright 
dismissal of a case on purely procedural grounds.”  In upholding the trial court’s 
dismissal of a case – which was vigorously defended — for lack of sufficient 
service, this court is ignoring, even reversing, the implicit holding of DeHart.  
And it is doing so despite its failure to apply its own talismanic and legalistic 
straitjacket, the Galatis test.  See Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 
216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 20} The whole point of service of process is to put the other party on 
notice that a lawsuit has been filed.  Service of process serves no other purpose.  
University Urologists of Cleveland, Inc. obviously had notice of the suit.  
Otherwise, it would not — could not — have defended itself.  Perfected service of 
process would not have provided University Urologists anything that it did not 
already have.  And when University Urologists defended itself, it effectively told 
Gliozzo that it had notice, that it was defending itself, and that the purposes of 
service of process had been effectuated.  The result in this case is exactly what the 
Civil Rules, Peterson, and DeHart discredited.  In allowing the dismissal of this 
case, the majority is not cautiously exercising judicial discretion, it is elevating 
legalistic rules over substance and subverting justice.  Sadly, we are returning to 
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the days of yore, when the pleadings ruled, and notice was just a salutary goal.  
Before you know it, demurrer will be back.  I dissent. 
__________________ 
Carlin & Carlin, William A. Carlin, and Nicholas A. Papa, for appellee. 
 
Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., William A. Meadows, and Martin T. 
Galvin, for appellants. 
______________________