Case Title: Keller v. LTV Steel Co.

Citation: 1996-Ohio-51

Docket Number: 19950388

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Keller, Appellee, v. LTV Steel Company, Appellant. 
[Cite as Keller v. LTV Steel Co. (1996), ___  Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Workers’ compensation -- R.C. 4123.512 -- Dismissal pursuant to 
Civ.R. 41(A) -- Appellate procedure -- Judgment affirmed when 
order not appealable. 
 
(No. 95-388 -- Submitted April 16, 1996 -- Decided July 10, 1996.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 94 CA 0275. 
 
Brian & Brian and Steven J. Brian, for appellee. 
 
Baughman & Associates Co., L.P.A., R. Patrick Baughman and Steven L. 
Sterner, for Appellant. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Robert A. Minor and Robin R. Obetz, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Self-Insurers Association. 
 
COOK, J.   The judgment of the court of appeals finding no appealable 
order is hereby affirmed,  see N. Canton v. Hutchinson (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 
112, 661 N.E.2d 1000, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings, including consideration of any pending motions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
STRATTON, J., dissents. 
STRATTON, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to 
remand this case on the basis that there is no final appealable order.  The court 
bases its decision on the fact that a Civ. R. 41(A) dismissal terminates the case 
and leaves no final appealable order for this court even to consider.  The 
majority remands this matter to the trial court to consider the motions filed on 
August 29, 1994 by LTV Steel Company, so that there can be a final appealable 
order. 
 
I dissent from the court’s decision to remand because Rule 41(A) was 
improperly used and because the situation has a high likelihood of recurrence 
without resolution.  Under that posture, I would accept jurisdiction and rule on 
the merits.  The claimant presents himself as a “plaintiff” and asserts that he 
therefore has the right to dismiss under Civ. R. 41(A).  However, Civ. R. 41(A) 
applies only to those who commence the action and the claimant was not the 
one who commenced this action.  In this case, under R.C. 4123.512, Keller is 
 
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simply the claimant who is required to file a petition in response to a notice of 
appeal filed by the employer.  To permit a claimant to unilaterally dismiss the 
employer’s appeal under Civ. R. 41(A) to delay or thwart the rights of an 
employer who is contesting the findings of the Industrial Commission defeats 
the purpose of the appeals process and is an abuse of  Civ. R. 41(A).  
 
Regretfully, the Tenth District Court of Appeals in Rhynehardt v. Sears 
Logistics Services (1995), 103 App.3d 327, 659 N.E.2d 375, did not file its 
order certifying a conflict to this court, leaving us to consider only Keller v. 
LTV Steel Co.   
 
Remanding this case in order to cross procedural hurdles when the rule 
was improperly used in the first place only creates further delay in the appeal of 
a claimant’s award.  I respectfully dissent from the majority and would consider 
this matter on the merits.