Case Title: State v. Were

Citation: 2008-Ohio-2762

Docket Number: 20061578

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WERE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld. 
(No. 2006-1578 — Submitted February 26, 2008 — Decided June 17, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County,  
No. C-030485, 2006-Ohio-3511. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} In April 1993, inmates rioted at the Southern Ohio Correctional 
Facility (“SOCF”) in Lucasville, Ohio.  During the riot, inmates killed corrections 
officer Robert Vallandingham.  In 1995, James Were, the defendant-appellant, 
was convicted of aggravated murder for his participation in Vallandingham’s 
killing and sentenced to death.  On appeal, this court reversed, holding that Were 
had been deprived of a fair trial because the trial court did not hold a competency 
hearing.  State v. Were (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 173, 176-177, 761 N.E.2d 591. 
{¶ 2} In 2003, a new jury convicted Were of aggravated murder and 
sentenced him to death.  The court of appeals affirmed.  State v. Were, Hamilton 
App. No. C-030485, 2005-Ohio-376.  This cause is now before the court upon an 
appeal as of right. 
{¶ 3} On Sunday afternoon, April 11, 1993, a group of inmates seized 
control of the L-complex (“L-Block”) at SOCF.  The L-Block contained eight 
cellblocks, and each cellblock contained 80 cells.  During the riot, groups of 
inmates overpowered prison guards and held authorities at bay for several days.  
Before control was regained at the prison, several inmates and Vallandingham 
were killed. 
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{¶ 4} The riot was planned and started by a group of Muslim gang 
members imprisoned at SOCF.  Once the riot began, two other prison gangs, the 
Aryan Brotherhood and the Black Gangster Disciples, joined in.  Carlos Sanders, 
Stanley Cummings, and Were - who was also known as “Namir” - were leaders of 
the Muslim gang during the riot.  The Aryan Brotherhood, a white supremacist 
gang, was led by Jason Robb and George Skatzes.  The Black Gangster Disciples 
was headed by Anthony Lavelle. 
{¶ 5} After the riot started, each of the three gangs staked out separate 
territory within L-Block.  The Muslims controlled the L-6 cellblock and stayed 
there for the duration of the riot.  During the riot, Were wore a striped referee’s 
shirt, signifying that he was allowed access to any area controlled by the 
prisoners. 
{¶ 6} As the takeover began, a group of masked inmates entered the L-1 
cellblock where Vallandingham was stationed.  Vallandingham had locked 
himself into the officer’s bathroom near the front of the L-1 cellblock.  Several 
inmates turned over a metal desk and started banging that desk against the 
bathroom door.  Inmate Steve Macko identified Were as one of the inmates near 
the bathroom at this time.  Eventually, Vallandingham was removed from the 
bathroom. 
{¶ 7} Were, Sanders, and Reggie Williams, another Muslim gang 
member, then took Vallandingham down the corridor to the L-6 cellblock.  
Vallandingham was put into the L-6 shower where his hands were cuffed behind 
his back and a sheet was placed over his head.  Vallandingham was later moved to 
a cell in the L-6 cellblock. 
{¶ 8} Organized negotiations between the authorities and the inmates 
began on the second day of the riot.  Additionally, on the second day, the Ohio 
State Highway Patrol (“OSP”) installed listening devices in the large tunnels 
underneath L-Block.  Shortly thereafter, the FBI supplied more sophisticated 
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listening devices, which were placed in crevices at ten locations underneath L-
Block.  Authorities then listened and recorded inmate conversations, referred to as 
the “tunnel tapes,” during the duration of the riot.  A total of 591 “tunnel tapes” 
were created.  Also, on the second day of the riot, the water and power were 
turned off inside L-Block. 
{¶ 9} On April 14, the public information officer for the Department of 
Corrections responded to media questions about inmate threats.  She stated that 
there had been threats and that they were a standard part of the negotiations.  The 
inmates, who were following the news on battery-operated televisions and radios, 
were upset by these comments and felt that the authorities were not taking them 
seriously. 
{¶ 10} During a meeting on April 15 that was recorded on tunnel tape 61, 
Were and other inmate leaders discussed killing one of the hostages to show the 
authorities that they meant business.  Were, who described himself as a hardliner, 
urged others to take a firmer stand during the negotiations.  Were said that the 
water and power must be turned back on.  He continued, “We give [the 
authorities] a certain time * * *.  If it’s not on in a certain time, that’s when a 
body goes out.”  Were also said, “[F]rom this point on we’re turning it over to the 
hardliners.” 
{¶ 11} Before the April 15 meeting concluded, Were and the other inmate 
leaders voted to kill a corrections officer if their demands were not met.  The 
Muslim inmates decided that Vallandingham would be killed because he had seen 
them kill another inmate at the beginning of the riot.  After the meeting, Were 
stated, “I’ll do it, I’ll do it, I’ll take care of it.  The hardliners is taking over.  I’ll 
take care of it.” 
{¶ 12} Around 9:00 a.m. on April 15, Skatzes had a telephone 
conversation with state negotiators.  Skatzes said, “I cannot stress to you * * *.  If 
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you don’t turn it on, it’s a guaranteed murder.  * * *  That’s the end of it.  Do your 
thing at 10:30 or a dead man’s out there.”  The inmates’ demands were not met. 
{¶ 13} During the riot, inmate Thomas Taylor was locked in a cell in the 
L-6 cellblock.  On the morning of April 15, Taylor saw Were and another inmate 
remove Vallandingham from his cell and take him to the end of the L-6 cellblock.  
Around the same time, inmate Sherman Sims walked past the L-6 shower area.  
Were was standing at the shower door and looking into the shower.  Were noticed 
Sims and asked what he was doing there.  While this exchange took place, Sims 
looked into the shower and saw a man with something over his head being 
strangled with a rope by two people.  He also saw one of them “putting a bar to 
[the man’s] throat.” 
{¶ 14} Were told Sims that he would have to help carry the body out of 
the prison.  Were directed the inmates to wrap the body in sheets.  At 11:10 a.m. 
on April 15, Sims and three other masked inmates carried Vallandingham’s body 
from the prison and into the recreation yard. 
{¶ 15} After the body was taken into the yard, Reginald Williams, a 
Muslim inmate, saw Were talking to Cummings while Cummings was on the 
phone with the state’s negotiator.  Were said, “You can come get your boy * * * 
he’s out there, and you didn’t take us serious.  And from this point on, * * * you’ll 
take us serious.” 
{¶ 16} At 12:10 p.m. on April 15, a SWAT team recovered 
Vallandingham’s body from the recreation yard. 
{¶ 17} On April 17, Were and other inmate leaders had a meeting to 
discuss the progress of negotiations.  This meeting was recorded on tunnel tape 
32.  Were argued that the hardliners should control the negotiations.  During the 
meeting, Were said, “If everybody can recall when we first started to see 
improvement in here, when we sent an officer out there, that is when we started to 
get to see some improvement.  * * *  When that officer went out there, that body 
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went out there, that is when they began to see that we is serious, because all along 
they said that we are not serious * * * .” 
{¶ 18} Were continued, “I am putting it just like this * * * if we have to 
throw another body, it will let people know the hardliners will put their foot down 
* * *.  I don’t give a damn you understand if some of the hostages die slow, or die 
at all, if I have to die, or we have to die, so I feel then if I cut off a man’s fingers, I 
will cut the man’s hand off and go out there and say now, I am going to let you 
know we ain’t interested in killing your hostages, they’ll die slow, since you all 
want to play games.  We is for real about what we is about, man.” 
{¶ 19} A short time later, Were said, “[T]hey only respect firmness.  * * *  
I don’t give a damn if it has to be on national TV, for them to see me personally, 
cut one of them dudes hands off and give it to them and spit it out of my mouth 
for them to know how serious I am about what we believe in.  I don’t care nothing 
about no electric chair, I don’t care nothing about no other case * * * we got what 
they want and they got what we want.” 
{¶ 20} The riot ended on April 21, 2003, when the remaining hostages 
were released.  Investigators then began interviewing witnesses and collecting 
evidence from inside the prison.  No useful physical evidence linking any person 
to Vallandingham’s murder was ever recovered. 
{¶ 21} Dr. Patrick Fardal, Franklin County Deputy Coroner, conducted 
the autopsy on Vallandingham.  Vallandingham suffered an injury to his neck that 
was about eight inches in length, and another abrasion about two and one-half 
inches long was above the primary one.  Fardal testified that petechial 
hemorrhages on the victim’s face and eyes showed that considerable force was 
exerted upon Vallandingham’s neck.  An internal exam showed that the hyoid 
bone and the cornu of the thyroid cartilage had been fractured by the force exerted 
upon the victim’s neck.  Vallandingham had also suffered a small chip fracture in 
his anterior cervical spine.  Fardal concluded that Vallandingham died from 
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ligature strangulation.  Fardal did not see anything across the victim’s neck that 
indicated a weight bar had been used to kill him though he could not rule out the 
possibility that such a weapon had been used. 
{¶ 22} At trial, Williams testified that after the riot, he was transferred to a 
prison in Mansfield, Ohio.  On June 23, 1993, Were and Williams were 
transported on a bus from Mansfield to Lucasville.  As they approached 
Lucasville, Were looked very concerned, and Williams asked what was bothering 
him.  Were responded, “I think they know I killed that guard.” 
{¶ 23} Charles Austin testified that he met Were in 2001 when they were 
both in prison in Youngstown, Ohio.  During a conversation, Were said that he 
was Sanders’s lieutenant during the Lucasville riot.  Were then said that “he was 
the one who kidnapped, robbed and killed Officer Vallandingham” by strangling 
him.  Were said that after killing him, Sanders told him to carry Vallandingham’s 
body into the yard and leave it. 
{¶ 24} On September 4, 1995, Were testified as a defense witness at the 
trial of Derrick Cannon, one of the Lucasville rioters.  According to Mark 
Piepmeier, the lead special prosecutor for the Lucasville prison riot cases, Were 
testified that he moved from cellblock L-1 to cellblock L-6 after the riot started 
and remained there for the duration of the riot.  Were also indicated that he was 
present in cellblock L-6 when Vallandingham was murdered. 
{¶ 25} During the defense case-in-chief, Thomas Blackmon, a Muslim 
inmate at SOCF during the riot, testified that Were had not been a leader during 
the riot.  Blackmon said, “Nobody paid that much attention to [Were].  * * * [W]e 
respected him as a Muslim * * * but as far as listening to him * * * no.  * * *  
[H]e is a good brother, but he can’t read or write.  * * *  So he wasn’t taken as 
serious as [Sanders], who was a bookworm and was real intelligent * * *.” 
{¶ 26} After the riot, Blackmon was moved from Lucasville to a 
succession of correctional facilities.  At one correctional facility, Blackmon talked 
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to Sherman Sims.  Sims said that the OSP wanted him to say that Were was 
involved in Vallandingham’s death.  Sims said that if he did not “flip” on Were, 
the OSP “was going to give it to him.” 
{¶ 27} Blackmon also talked to Reginald Williams at Lucasville after the 
riot.  Williams said that the OSP was messing with their food, making death 
threats, and he would do anything to get out of Lucasville.  Williams said that the 
OSP told him to say that Were was involved in Vallandingham’s death. 
{¶ 28} Gregory Durkin, a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, testified that 
he sat next to Skatzes during the April 15 meeting of inmate leaders.  During the 
meeting, Lavelle handed Skatzes a note that said the hardliners were taking over.  
Lavelle told Skatzes to read that message to the negotiators, and Skatzes did so.  
Shortly thereafter, Durkin saw Lavelle enter the L-6 cellblock with four men 
wearing masks and dressed in white food-service uniforms.  Durkin never saw 
Lavelle or the other men exit the L-6 cellblock and did not know what they had 
done. 
{¶ 29} Brian Eskridge, an inmate at SOCF during the riot, testified that he 
talked to Lavelle following the April 14 media comments about inmate threats.  
Lavelle said, “We got to kill this [corrections officer].  We got to show them that 
we serious about * * * our problem, we have to get this 187” (a slang term for 
murder).  Later, Eskridge learned that Vallandingham had been killed.  The next 
day, Lavelle had members of his security force beat Eskridge for not helping him 
“commit this 187.” 
{¶ 30} Aaron Jefferson, a member of the Black Gangster Disciples, 
testified that he attended meetings with Lavelle during the riot.  On April 13 or 
14, Jefferson had a “falling out” with Lavelle because Jefferson refused to follow 
Lavelle’s orders about killing a corrections officer. 
{¶ 31} Finally, the defense played the tape and provided the transcript of 
tunnel tape 60, a recording of an inmate meeting on the morning of April 16.  On 
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the tape, the inmates discussed their grievances with the prison administration and 
their goals for the negotiations. 
{¶ 32} During the meeting, Lavelle stated, “You must understand now 
where George, Robb and I, we have to concern ourselves now, with we’re going 
to wind this thing up with our own safety, and especially with us keeping off that 
death row over there about that guard getting offed[.]  I don’t care about the 
inmates, cause they are going to say we did it, anyway.” 
Trial Result 
{¶ 33} Were was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder.  Count 1 
charged Were with the aggravated murder of Vallandingham with prior 
calculation and design.  Count 2 charged Were with the aggravated murder of 
Vallandingham while committing kidnapping.  Both counts contained death-
penalty specifications for murder committed purposely and with prior calculation 
and design while a prisoner in a detention facility, R.C. 2929.04(A)(4), and 
murder committed purposely and with prior calculation and design while 
committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing after committing kidnapping, R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7). 
{¶ 34} Were had been acquitted of two additional counts at his first trial; 
those charges were not part of his second trial.  Count 5 charged Were with the 
separate offense of kidnapping with a specification of a prior conviction of an 
offense substantially equivalent to an aggravated felony of the first degree. 
{¶ 35} Were pleaded not guilty to all charges.  The jury found Were guilty 
of all charges, and he was sentenced to death.  The cause is now before this court 
upon an appeal as of right. 
{¶ 36} Competency to stand trial.  In propositions of law IX and X, Were 
argues that he was incompetent to stand trial and that the trial court’s ruling that 
he was competent is not supported by the evidence. 
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{¶ 37} The trial court conducted two competency hearings.  Before each 
of these hearings, Were refused to cooperate with psychologists sent to evaluate 
him.  During the first competency hearing, Alan Barr, a correctional-program 
specialist at Lebanon Correctional Institution, testified as a state witness.  Barr 
had numerous contacts with Were in prison.  He testified that Were was always 
responsive and that Were understood the rules and regulations of prison life.  
Marva Allen, the manager of the isolation unit at Lebanon, testified that Were 
presented lucid arguments when talking about his rights and privileges and that he 
had never exhibited any bizarre thought patterns or behavior during their 
discussions. 
{¶ 38} During the first hearing, the defense presented the testimony of 
three inmates: Daniel Coleman, Danny Grant, and John William Harris.  Coleman 
assisted Were with adult education courses he was taking in prison.  All three 
witnesses helped Were with his legal paperwork.  They testified that Were had 
difficulty comprehending information and that explanations had to be repeated to 
him.  Grant and Harris testified that they prepared legal motions for Were, and he 
would then copy them in his own handwriting. 
{¶ 39} The defense also introduced the transcript of the hearing on Were’s 
motion to dismiss counsel at his first trial.  During that hearing, Were asserted a 
breakdown in communications, accused his counsel of trickery, and claimed that 
his counsel would not do what he asked.  According to John Mackey, one of 
Were’s attorneys at his first trial, Were believed that his counsel were in league 
with the state, and he would not talk to them.  Mackey opined that Were suffers 
from paranoia.  The defense also presented a collection of motions, pro se 
motions, and journal entries pertaining to Were’s problems in cooperating with 
his attorneys during his first and second trials. 
{¶ 40} The trial court ruled that Were was competent to stand trial.  The 
trial court found that Were understood the nature and character of the charges 
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against him and that he was capable of assisting counsel in his defense “if he 
wishes to do so.” 
{¶ 41} Less than two months later, the defense filed a new suggestion of 
incompetency.  During the second competency hearing, Jacalyn McCullough, a 
teacher with the Ohio State Penitentiary, testified for the defense.  Were had 
attended classes taught by McCullough for over a year while he was an inmate at 
the Ohio State Penitentiary in Youngstown.  She testified that Were’s reading was 
at a fourth- or fifth-grade level and that his math skills were at a third-grade level.  
Were was unsuccessful in moving to a pre-General Educational Development 
(“GED”) curriculum because he could not perform at a sixth-grade level.  
McCullough believes that if Were were in a normal school setting, he would be 
considered developmentally handicapped. 
{¶ 42} Dr. David Hammer, a clinical psychologist, also testified for the 
defense.  Hammer believed that Were was mildly mentally retarded and was not 
competent to stand trial.  Hammer believed that Were’s intellectual limitations 
would “make it very difficult for him to * * * confer with his counsel for the 
defense.”  Hammer’s competency opinion was based on Were’s cognitive 
limitations and his demonstrated pattern of paranoid thinking.  Hammer’s findings 
on Were’s cognitive limitations were based on Were’s IQ test scores of 69 when 
he was seven and 12 years old and McCullough’s testimony that Were’s reading 
comprehension was at the third-grade level.  Hammer did not personally evaluate 
Were because Were refused to meet with him. 
{¶ 43} The defense also presented Were’s school records.  These records 
show that Were did poorly in school and had an IQ of 69. 
{¶ 44} After the second hearing, the trial court again ruled that Were was 
competent to stand trial.  In reviewing the evidence, the trial court stated that 
McCullough’s testimony dealt with his intelligence level, not his competency.  
The trial court found that Hammer was not believable based on observing his 
January Term, 2008 
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testimony, his background (noting that Hammer failed his test for licensing in 
Ohio the first time), and how he arrived at his conclusions.  The trial court also 
noted that Hammer did not interview Were. 
{¶ 45} The test for determining whether a defendant is competent to stand 
trial is “ ‘whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his 
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether he has a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ”  State 
v. Berry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433, quoting Dusky v. 
United States (1960), 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824.  A 
defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial, and the burden is on the 
defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not competent.  
R.C. 2945.37(G); State v. Jordan, 101 Ohio St.3d 216, 2004-Ohio-783, 804 
N.E.2d 1, ¶ 28. 
{¶ 46} A trial court’s finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial 
will not be disturbed when there is some reliable and credible evidence supporting 
those findings.  State v. Vrabel, 99 Ohio St.3d 184, 2003-Ohio-3193, 790 N.E.2d 
303, ¶ 33; State v. Williams (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 16, 19, 23 OBR 13, 490 N.E.2d 
906.  Deference on these issues should be given “to those who see and hear what 
goes on in the courtroom.”  State v. Cowans (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 84, 717 
N.E.2d 298. 
 
{¶ 47} Were contends that the trial court’s findings are flawed because 
testimony established that he could not understand and cooperate with his lawyers 
because of his paranoid distrust of them.  But Were’s paranoid behavior does not 
undermine the trial court’s findings of his competence to stand trial.  See Vrabel, 
99 Ohio St.3d 184, 2003-Ohio-3193, 790 N.E.2d 303, at ¶ 25-29.  As noted in 
State v. Bock (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 110, 28 OBR 207, 502 N.E.2d 1016, 
“[i]ncompetency must not be equated with mere mental or emotional instability or 
even outright insanity.  A defendant may be emotionally disturbed or even 
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psychotic and still be capable of understanding the charges against him and of 
assisting his counsel.” 
{¶ 48} Were argues that his paranoia was exacerbated because he is also 
mentally retarded.  The trial court, however, made findings during a later portion 
of the trial that Were was not mentally retarded.  Even assuming that these 
findings are incorrect, “[m]entally retarded persons frequently * * * are competent 
to stand trial.”  Atkins v. Virginia (2002), 536 U.S. 304, 318, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 
L.Ed.2d 335.  Thus, we reject this claim. 
{¶ 49} Finally, Were argues that the trial court erred by disregarding 
Hammer’s unrebutted expert testimony that Were was incompetent.  State v. 
Brown (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 133, 5 OBR 266, 449 N.E.2d 449.  In Brown, three 
expert witnesses testified that the defendant met the criteria for legal insanity and 
three lay witnesses recounted the defendant’s bizarre behavior during the relevant 
time period.  Id. at 133-134, 5 OBR 266, 449 N.E.2d 449.  The trial court found 
the defendant sane even though the state offered no rebuttal testimony indicating 
that the defendant was sane.  Id. at 134, 5 OBR 266, 449 N.E.2d 449.  We 
disagreed, holding that the trial court arbitrarily ignored expert testimony that the 
defendant was insane.  Id. at 135, 5 OBR 266, 449 N.E.2d 449.  Unlike Brown, 
the state in this case presented two witnesses testifying to Were’s competency.  
Further, the trial court specifically concluded that Hammer’s conclusions were not 
“believable.”  Brown does not control our conclusion on this issue. 
{¶ 50} We also consider our recent decision in State v. White, 118 Ohio 
St.3d 12, No. 2008-Ohio-1623, 885 N.E.2d 905, in resolving this issue.  In White, 
both the state’s and the defense’s experts concluded that White was mentally 
retarded.  Id. at ¶ 29.  The state also presented testimony from White’s girlfriend, 
who testified that he worked and rented an apartment, and could cook, drive, and 
play games that required coordination.  Id. at ¶ 27.  After considering the 
evidence, the trial court found that White had failed to prove by a preponderance 
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of the evidence that he had significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills or 
“onset before the age of 18.”  Id. at ¶ 33.  Based on these findings, the trial court 
ruled that White had failed to establish that he was mentally retarded.  Id. 
{¶ 51} The trial court in White rejected the experts’ conclusion because it 
questioned the manner in which the experts administered and scored the Scales of 
Independent Behavior – Revised (“SIB-R”), which measures adaptive skills.  Id. 
at ¶ 35.  The trial court also found that the testimony of White’s girlfriend was 
inconsistent with retardation.  Id. at ¶ 39.  We held that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it determined that White had failed to prove the existence of 
significant adaptive-skills limitations.  Id. at ¶ 48.  We concluded that the trial 
court had improperly disregarded expert opinion in reaching its findings and had 
overly relied on the girlfriend’s observations.  Id. at ¶ 71-72.  We also noted that 
the trial court made no findings that the experts lacked either credentials or 
credibility.  Id. at ¶ 73. 
{¶ 52} The trial court in this case found that Dr. Hammer’s expert opinion 
on competency was not credible based on “his education, his experience, and * * 
* how he arrived at his opinions.”  The trial court’s own observations of the 
defendant supported its conclusion that Were was competent to stand trial.  Dr. 
Hammer testified that Were was incompetent because of his inability to cooperate 
with his counsel.  That conclusion is undermined by several in-court statements 
made by Were and by the pro se motions filed by Were before the second 
competency hearing was completed.  We conclude that the trial court could 
properly find that Were was capable of communicating with his lawyers when he 
wanted to do so.  See State v. Filiaggi (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 237, 714 N.E.2d 
867 (trial court’s own observations of defendant and testimony of correctional 
officers showed that competency determination was not arbitrary). 
{¶ 53} We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding 
that Were was competent to stand trial.  The trial court’s findings were based on 
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the state’s two witnesses, consideration of the defense evidence, and its own 
observations of the defendant.  Thus, reliable and credible evidence supports the 
trial court’s decision.  We reject propositions of law IX and X. 
{¶ 54} Disqualification of the trial judge.  In proposition of law XXV, 
Were contends that he was deprived of a fair and impartial judge because the 
judge also presided at the trial of a codefendant, Carlos Sanders.  Because of the 
likelihood of bias, Were argues that the trial judge should have recused himself. 
{¶ 55} During pretrial proceedings, Were addressed the court and asserted 
that the trial judge was prejudiced because he had been the judge at Sanders’s 
trial.  Were said he asked his counsel to file a motion to remove the sitting judge 
from his case.  Trial counsel did not request the judge to recuse himself or file an 
affidavit of disqualification. 
{¶ 56} Under R.C. 2701.03(A), when a party believes that the trial judge 
is biased, the proper avenue for redress is the filing of an affidavit of 
disqualification.  See Section 5(C), Article IV, Ohio Constitution.  “An affidavit 
of disqualification must be filed as soon as possible after the incident giving rise 
to the claim of bias and prejudice occurred or affiant becomes aware of 
circumstances that support disqualification.  A party may be considered to have 
waived its objection to the judge when the objection is not raised in a timely 
fashion and the facts underlying the objection have been known to the party for 
some time.”  In re Disqualification of O’Grady (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 1240, 1241, 
674 N.E.2d 353.  Because Were failed to file an affidavit of disqualification 
against the trial judge, he waived his complaint. 
{¶ 57} Were’s allegations also lack merit.  Were presents no evidence of 
judicial bias other than the trial court’s previous participation as the judge at a 
codefendant’s trial.  A trial judge is not disqualified simply because he acquired 
knowledge of the facts during a prior proceeding.  See State v. D’Ambrosio 
(1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 185, 188, 616 N.E.2d 909.  We reject proposition XXV. 
January Term, 2008 
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{¶ 58} Batson challenges.  In proposition of law XXVIII, Were asserts 
that the prosecutor peremptorily challenged two African-American prospective 
jurors because of their race, in violation of his equal-protection rights under 
Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. 
{¶ 59} Initially, the state argues that this issue is moot because the two 
African-American jurors who were peremptorily challenged were alternate jurors 
who were never called upon to deliberate on the case.  This same argument was 
rejected in United States v. Harris (C.A.6, 1999), 192 F.3d 580, 587-588.  Harris 
held that alternate status is “irrelevant” to a Batson analysis because “the harm 
inherent in a discriminatorily chosen jury inures not only to the defendant, but 
also to the jurors not selected because of their race, and to the integrity of the 
judicial system as a whole.”  Id.  Thus, this argument lacks merit. 
{¶ 60} Moreover, Were did not raise his Batson claim in the court of 
appeals.  He has therefore waived the issue absent a showing of plain error.  State 
v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 80, 656 N.E.2d 643; State v. Williams 
(1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph two of the 
syllabus; see Crim.R. 52(B). 
{¶ 61} “ ‘A court adjudicates a Batson claim in three steps.’  State v. 
Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 528, 747 N.E.2d 765.  First, the opponent of 
the peremptory challenge must make a prima facie case of racial discrimination.  
Second, if the trial court finds this requirement fulfilled, the proponent of the 
challenge must provide a racially neutral explanation for the challenge.  Batson, 
476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.  * * * Finally, the trial court 
must decide based on all the circumstances, whether the opponent has proved 
purposeful racial discrimination.  Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.  See 
also Purkett v. Elem (1995), 514 U.S. 765, 767-768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 
834.  A trial court’s finding of no discriminatory intent will not be reversed on 
appeal unless clearly erroneous.  State v. Hernandez (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 577, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
583, 589 N.E.2d 1310, following Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352, 
111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395.”  State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272, 2004-
Ohio-971, 804 N.E.2d 433, ¶ 106. 
{¶ 62} During the selection of alternate jurors, the prosecutor 
peremptorily challenged two African-American prospective jurors, West and 
Mitchell.  Were’s counsel objected to the state’s peremptory challenge of both 
jurors as a Batson violation. 
{¶ 63} During voir dire, West had stated, “I don’t believe I could” join a 
death verdict.  West continued, “I would feel funny about it.  I just, it is just me.  * 
* *  I don’t want to sentence anybody like that.”  After further questioning, West 
stated, “If I have to do it, I would do it.”  West’s equivocal answers conveyed 
uncertainty about her ability to vote for the death penalty. 
{¶ 64} The prosecutor stated that he peremptorily challenged West 
because she said she had no opinion on the death penalty on her questionnaire.  
He also stated, “When she was [questioned] by the Judge, it became very apparent 
that, in fact, she opposed the death penalty.  Initially, it was almost like she 
couldn’t even pass the Witherspoon [v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 
1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776] test, but the Judge asked her and got her qualified.  But it 
was obvious that she had serious problems with the death penalty.” 
{¶ 65} Uncertainty about how a prospective juror perceives the death 
penalty is a “race-neutral reason” for exercising a peremptory challenge against 
her.  See State v. White (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 437, 709 N.E.2d 140.  The trial 
court concluded that the prosecutor had “asserted a race-neutral reason for [the] 
exercise of the peremptory” challenge and rejected the Batson challenge.  We find 
no plain error. 
{¶ 66} The prosecutor provided the following race-neutral explanation for 
peremptorily challenging prospective juror Mitchell:  
January Term, 2008 
17 
{¶ 67} “First of all, Judge, just to make this short, I’ll adopt everything 
that I said with regard to [West] because the same facts apply here.  There is no 
opinion on the questionnaire, but when questioned by the Judge, it was obvious 
that she had some death penalty feelings. 
{¶ 68} “We think that we’re entitled to a jury that will fairly consider the 
death penalty.  We don’t believe that she’s one.  That’s our reason for excusing 
her.” 
{¶ 69} Trial counsel challenged the state’s explanation and asserted, 
“[T]his is now the third African-American woman being excused from this jury.  
We think that it is a systematic exclusion of African-Americans * * *.”  In reply, 
the prosecutor stated, “This jury contains two black females and one black male.  
We have exercised our peremptories to excuse * * * three white people and three 
black people.  We have done it because we felt that the people couldn’t give us a 
fair jury.”  The trial court rejected the Batson challenge and found that the 
“prosecutor has laid out a race-neutral reason for the excuse of Ms. Mitchell.” 
{¶ 70} We conclude that no plain error was committed.  Mitchell’s 
answers about the death penalty in her questionnaire and during voir dire 
conveyed some uncertainty about her position on the death penalty.  Mitchell’s 
juror questionnaire shows that when asked, “What is your opinion concerning 
Capital Punishment[?]” Mitchell checked the block stating “no opinion.”  During 
voir dire, Mitchell was asked for her views about capital punishment:  
{¶ 71} “Q (trial court):  [I]f the facts * * * would call for [the death 
penalty] and the law that would be given to you would permit it, could you join in 
a verdict with your other jurors knowing that your decision could result in the 
death of Mr. Were, the defendant? 
{¶ 72} “A:  Yes, I think I could. 
{¶ 73} “Q:  You think you could? 
{¶ 74} “A:  Yes.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 75} Other facts also point away from a racial motivation.  The jury 
included two female and one male African-American jurors.  Moreover, the state 
did not use two peremptory challenges that were available before the jury was 
selected.  The presence of African-Americans on a jury certainly does not 
preclude a finding of discrimination, but “ ‘the fact may be taken into account * * 
as one that suggests that the government did not seek to rid the jury of persons [of 
a particular] race.’ ”  White, 85 Ohio St.3d at 438, 709 N.E.2d 140, quoting United 
States v. Young-Bey (C.A.8, 1990), 893 F.2d 178, 180. 
{¶ 76} We conclude that Were has failed to demonstrate that the trial court 
committed plain error by overruling his Batson claim.  We therefore overrule 
proposition of law XXVIII. 
{¶ 77} Restrictions on voir dire.  In proposition of law XXXI, Were 
argues that the trial court improperly restricted defense questioning during voir 
dire examination.  Were did not raise this claim in the court of appeals and 
therefore waived all but plain error.  Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 
364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 78} “The manner in which voir dire is to be conducted lies within the 
sound discretion of the trial judge.”  State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 
418, 613 N.E.2d 212.  “Absent a clear abuse of discretion, prejudicial error cannot 
be assigned to the examination of the venire.”  State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 
53, 2005-Ohio-5981, 836 N.E.2d 1173, ¶ 28. 
{¶ 79} Were asserts that the trial court unduly limited his counsel’s efforts 
to identify prospective jurors who could not reasonably follow the law and 
consider the evidence during both phases of the proceedings.  Were’s claim is not 
supported by the record.  Voir dire took four days and encompasses nearly 800 
pages of the transcript.  Trial counsel were given extensive leeway in examining 
jurors about their willingness to consider the evidence, follow the court’s 
instructions, and impose a life sentence. 
January Term, 2008 
19 
{¶ 80} Were claims that the trial court precluded the defense from asking 
excused juror Lingo and seated juror Copeland about mental retardation.  The trial 
court did not permit Lingo to be questioned about his willingness to consider 
mental retardation as a mitigating factor.  Parties in a capital case are not entitled 
to ask about specific mitigating factors during voir dire.  State v. Jones (2001), 91 
Ohio St.3d 335, 338, 744 N.E.2d 1163.  The trial court precluded Copeland from 
answering a question about the minimum age for imposing the death penalty.  
This question is not relevant to mental retardation. 
{¶ 81} Were also argues that the trial court improperly precluded 
questioning about the burden of proof in the sentencing phase.  During voir dire 
of Lingo, trial counsel stated, “[I]f he was convicted * * * they’re still going to 
have to prove * * * that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating.”  The trial court interrupted counsel and said, “He doesn’t even know 
what an aggravating circumstance is, what is going to outweigh a mitigating 
factor. * * *  You can’t have him answer it.”  The trial court exercised appropriate 
discretion.  Indeed, “weighing aggravating circumstances against mitigating 
factors is a complex process.  * * *  Realistically, jurors cannot be asked to weigh 
specific factors until they have heard all the evidence and been fully instructed on 
the applicable law.”  State v. Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 481, 653 
N.E.2d 304. 
{¶ 82} Next, Were claims that the trial court erred by not permitting trial 
counsel to mention that the defense could not offer plea bargains to inmate 
witnesses, as the prosecution could.  During voir dire of seated juror Erndt, the 
trial court sustained the state’s objection to trial counsel’s statement, “I can tell 
you, by the same token, that the witnesses for the defense are basically going to 
be convicted felons who were inmates at Lucasville at the time of the riot.  * * *  I 
can also promise you that the defense witnesses didn’t get any plea bargains in 
return for their testimony.”  Trial counsel was not asking a question but making a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
statement about witness credibility.  Also, there was no prejudice because counsel 
later asked Erndt if she could judge credibility based upon the witnesses’ bias and 
motive to lie. 
{¶ 83} Were also contends that the trial court erred by not allowing trial 
counsel to ask excused juror Garrett and excused alternate Smith whether they 
would vote for death if Were were found guilty of intentional murder.  During 
Garrett’s voir dire, the trial court did not allow trial counsel to ask, “So what we 
want to know is if you have made that determination, * * * that there was an 
intentional killing * * * in a prison facility, I don’t need to hear any more – death 
penalty?”  Garrett had previously expressed her willingness to consider the facts, 
follow the judge’s instructions, and consider all sentence options.  Thus, the trial 
court could limit repetition of the same type of questions. 
{¶ 84} The trial court curtailed questioning of Smith about imposing the 
death penalty for an intentional killing because “he doesn’t know what an 
intentional killing is. * * * That’s a legal definition.”  No possible prejudice 
resulted because the trial court rephrased the question, and Smith stated that he 
would not automatically vote for the death penalty and would consider life-
sentence options if Were were found guilty as charged. 
{¶ 85} Finally, Were complains that the trial court improperly precluded 
the defense from asking seated jurors Birri and Nie about procedural issues.  The 
trial court did not allow counsel to discuss the differences between grand jury and 
trial procedures with Birri, who had previously served on a grand jury.  The trial 
court also did not allow counsel to inform Nie that the jury would be conducting a 
jury view of the Lucasville prison.  The trial court acted properly in each instance 
because the subject matter of such questioning was outside the scope of voir dire.  
See State v. Durr (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 568 N.E.2d 674. 
January Term, 2008 
21 
{¶ 86} We find that the trial court committed no plain error in restricting 
trial counsel’s questioning during voir dire.  Thus, we overrule proposition of law 
XXXI. 
{¶ 87} Jury view.  In proposition of law XXXII, Were argues that the trial 
court violated his due-process rights by not allowing him to be present at the jury 
view of the crime scene.  Were did not raise this claim in the court of appeals and 
has therefore waived all but plain error.  Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 
98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph two of the syllabus; see Crim.R. 52(B).   In 
a 
pretrial motion, the defense requested that the court grant a jury view of the crime 
scene at the prison.  In ruling on the motion, the following exchange occurred: 
{¶ 88} “The court:  Would your client waive his presence? 
{¶ 89} “The defendant:  Well, I’d like to be present so I can share a 
thought with my attorneys about the situation down there.  They might like — 
{¶ 90} “The court:  I won’t grant that view of the scene if you want to be 
present. 
{¶ 91} “Ms. Agar (defense counsel):  My understanding is if you – if 
that’s the only way we can have the view of the scene, you’re willing to waive 
your presence, is that correct, in order for the jury to be able to see the scene? 
{¶ 92} “The defendant:  Yeah, if that’s the only way. 
{¶ 93} “The court:  That’s the only way, if you waive your presence. 
{¶ 94} “All right.  The record will show the defendant has waived his 
presence at the view of the scene.” 
{¶ 95} R.C. 2945.16 provides:  “When it is proper for the jurors to have a 
view of the place at which a material fact occurred, the trial court may order them 
to be conducted in a body * * * to such place, which shall be shown to them by a 
person designated by the court.  * * *  The accused has the right to attend such 
view by the jury, but may waive such right.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
{¶ 96} Were challenges the validity of his waiver because the trial court 
compelled the waiver as a condition of holding the jury view.  He argues that such 
waiver is improper because his presence was a constitutionally protected right.  
Although Were has a statutory right to be present at the jury view, he does not 
have a constitutional right to be there.  In Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934), 291 
U.S. 97, 122, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674, the Supreme Court held that denial of a 
defendant’s presence at a jury view did not violate due process.  The Snyder court 
recognized that “the presence of a defendant [in a felony prosecution] is a 
condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be 
thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.”  Id. at 107-108, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 
L.Ed. 674. 
{¶ 97} We conclude that the trial court did not commit plain error in 
granting the defense request for a jury view conditioned on Were’s agreement to 
waive his presence.  Were waived his right to attend the jury view in open court 
and in the presence of counsel.  Moreover, trial counsel did not object to Were’s 
waiver of his presence as a condition to the jury view. 
{¶ 98} In addition, Were cannot show that he was materially prejudiced by 
his absence from the jury view.  His counsel were present, and there is no 
indication in the record that anything improper occurred at the jury view.  Were 
told the trial court that he wanted to attend the jury view to tell his attorneys 
“about the situation down there,” but he did not explain how his presence at the 
scene would have provided his attorneys with information that they could not 
have gained by consulting Were before or after the visit.  See State v. Cassano, 96 
Ohio St.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-3751, 772 N.E.2d 81, ¶ 70 (holding that a trial court’s 
refusal to allow the defendant to attend the jury view was not prejudicial).  Based 
on the foregoing, we reject proposition of law XXXII. 
{¶ 99} In proposition of law XXIX, Were argues that he was denied a fair 
trial because the trial judge went on the bus with the jury when they visited the 
January Term, 2008 
23 
prison.  Were did not object at trial to the judge’s decision to ride on the bus and 
thereby waived all but plain error.  State v. Childs (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 56, 43 
O.O.2d 119, 236 N.E.2d 545, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Were also did not 
raise this argument in the court of appeals and waived this claim but for plain 
error.  Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph 
two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 100} No plain error occurred.  On the day before the jury view, the 
trial court discussed the arrangements with the jurors for the two and one-half 
hour bus ride to Lucasville.  Outside the presence of the jury, the judge later 
stated, “I am going to go on the bus and I’ll bring reading material.”  No further 
mention about the bus ride appears in the record. 
{¶ 101} Were asserts that he was denied a fair trial because of the 
likelihood of unauthorized communications between the judge and the jurors 
during the long bus ride.  There is no evidence, however, of any improper 
communications between the judge and jury during the bus ride or the jury view.  
Accordingly, we reject proposition of law XXIX. 
{¶ 102} Stun belt.  In proposition of law XXVI, Were contends that the 
trial court erred by requiring him to wear a stun belt without first conducting a 
hearing to justify the use of this restraint.  In a pretrial motion, Were requested to 
appear at all proceedings without restraints.  The trial court granted the motion to 
appear without restraints but allowed the use of a stun belt.  The record does not 
show that the court heard evidence to justify the use of the stun belt, and the court 
did not state its reasons for allowing its use. 
{¶ 103} A trial court can require the use of stun belts when the 
prosecution justifies their use on the record.  State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio St.3d 
210, 2006-Ohio-6404, 858 N.E.2d 1144, ¶ 242.  The defense did not object to the 
trial court’s ruling permitting a stun belt and did not request a hearing on the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
matter.  Failure to object waived the error, requiring the defendant to show that he 
was prejudiced by wearing the belt.  Id. at ¶ 247. 
{¶ 104} In pro se filings, Were complains that he was required to wear a 
stun belt throughout the trial.  Were does not claim that the device caused him any 
physical discomfort or interfered with his ability to communicate with counsel.  
Moreover, the record contains no indication that the jury knew or could see that 
Were was wearing a stun belt.  Accordingly, we find that defendant was not 
prejudiced, and overrule proposition of law XXVI. 
{¶ 105} Admissibility of tunnel tapes.  In proposition of law XVIII, Were 
argues that the trial court erred by overruling the defense motion to suppress the 
tape recordings of inmate conversations (“tunnel tapes”) that the FBI recorded 
during the riot.  On April 13, 1993, FBI Agent Marc Hopper installed small 
microphones in the tunnels underneath L-Block to monitor and record inmate 
conversations.  Were’s discussions with inmate leaders were recorded on April 15 
and April 17.  No warrant was ever issued for the interception of these 
conversations. 
{¶ 106} Were argues that the state was not allowed to intercept the 
inmates’ conversations without obtaining advance consent from some party to the 
interception or obtaining a warrant as required by former R.C. 2933.51 et seq., 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 222, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 457.  We rejected the same claim in 
State v. Robb (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 65-66, 723 N.E.2d 1019, another case 
stemming from the Lucasville riot. 
{¶ 107} Robb held that federal, not state, law controlled the legality of the 
intercepts.  Id. at 66, 723 N.E.2d 1019.  FBI agents, acting under the authority of 
federal law, installed and monitored the electronic interception and recording 
devices that were used inside the prison.  We explained that “[f]ederal law 
explicitly defines ‘oral communications’ as only those ‘exhibiting an expectation 
that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances 
January Term, 2008 
25 
justifying such expectation.’ ”  Id. at 66-67, 723 N.E.2d 1019, quoting Section 
2510(2), Title 18, U.S.Code.  We explained that the rioting inmates had no 
expectation of privacy in their cells.  Id. at 67, 723 N.E.2d 1019.  Based on Robb, 
we conclude that the conversations of the rioting inmates introduced during 
Were’s trial were not “oral communications” entitled to protection under federal 
law.  Accordingly, proposition of law XVIII is overruled. 
{¶ 108} Admissibility of inaudible tapes, transcripts, and hearsay.  In 
proposition of law XIX, Were argues that the trial court erred by admitting 
inaudible tapes of discussions between Were and inmate leaders and by 
permitting the jury to receive transcripts of those tapes.  He also claims that the 
tapes and transcripts contained inadmissible hearsay.  Were argues that the trial 
court should not have admitted the audiotapes because they were inaudible and 
could not be understood without the transcripts.  Highway Patrol Sergeant 
Howard Hudson described tunnel tape 61, which recorded the April 15 meeting, 
as being of poor quality:  “There’s a lot of clanging and banging in the 
background.  But as far as the voices, most of what is on there can be intelligible.”  
Hudson testified that tunnel tape 32 is “a little clearer * * * [but] these tapes 
contain a lot of background noise that requires a lot of intense listening to make 
out what’s being said.”  Over defense objection, the trial court admitted the tapes. 
{¶ 109} To be admissible, a tape recording must be authentic, accurate, 
and trustworthy.  State v. Rogan (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 140, 148, 640 N.E.2d 
535.  The decision to admit tape recordings that are partly inaudible is a matter 
within the sound discretion of the trial court.  State v. Coleman (1999), 85 Ohio 
St.3d 129, 141, 707 N.E.2d 476.  Snodgrass, who was present at the April 15 
meeting, authenticated tunnel tape 61 and interpreted its contents.  Williams 
authenticated tunnel tape 32.  Were had full opportunity to cross-examine 
Snodgrass and Williams about the conversations on the tapes.  Under these 
circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the tapes 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
despite the background noises and disjointed and multiple conversations.  
Moreover, we held that the same audiotapes were admissible in Robb, 88 Ohio 
St.3d at 72-73, 723 N.E.2d 1019. 
{¶ 110} Were also argues that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to 
use transcripts as an aid in listening to the tunnel tapes.  Hudson testified that 
state’s exhibits 6-A and 8-A are “fair, true and accurate copies of what is being 
said on the tape.”  Hudson testified that investigators and prosecutors listened to 
the tapes and prepared the transcripts.  Inmates Snodgrass, Williams, and David 
Lomache identified the voices on the tapes when the transcripts were prepared.  
The preparation of the transcripts was an ongoing, lengthy process that occurred 
throughout the investigation and the other hearings and trials. 
{¶ 111} Trial counsel objected to the transcripts, state’s exhibits 6-A and 
8-A, and argued that the transcripts did not accurately reflect what was said on the 
tapes.  After the defense objection, the trial court had the court reporter listen to 
the tapes and prepare another transcript of them.  The court reporter spent the 
weekend transcribing the tapes.  On the following Monday, the court reporter 
stated that due to time constraints and equipment problems, she was unable to 
complete an accurate transcription of the tapes. 
{¶ 112} Following his discussion with the court reporter, the trial court 
ruled that state’s exhibits 6-A and 8-A could be used as listening aids.  The trial 
court also stated that the jury would be instructed that the “evidence consists of 
the tapes themselves.  The transcripts are provided to you only for the purpose of 
helping you understand the tapes, if you find they do help you.  If you find there 
is a difference or discrepancy between the transcript and the tapes, you are to rely 
only on the tapes.”  Such instructions were provided to the jury when they were 
presented with the tapes and transcripts. 
{¶ 113} “Where there are no ‘material differences’ between a tape 
admitted into evidence and a transcript given to the jury as a listening aid, there is 
January Term, 2008 
27 
no prejudicial error.”  State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 445, 588 N.E.2d 
819, quoting State v. Holmes (1987), 36 Ohio App.3d 44, 50, 521 N.E.2d 479.  
Moreover, providing a jury with a transcript as a listening aid is permissible when 
the trial court instructs the jury, as it did in this case, that the transcript is not 
evidence.  State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 159, 694 N.E.2d 932. 
{¶ 114} Hudson’s testimony established that the transcripts are fair and 
accurate renditions of the conversations on the tapes.  The trial court repeatedly 
instructed the jury that the tapes were evidence and the transcripts were not.  
Were’s claim that there are material differences between the tapes and transcripts 
is not substantiated.  He contends that there are differences because the transcripts 
have been constantly changed over a ten-year period of time, but he fails to 
identify any of those differences.  We conclude that this claim lacks merit. 
{¶ 115} Finally, Were argues that the trial court erred in admitting the 
two tunnel tapes, state’s exhibits 6 and 8, and a negotiation tape, state’s exhibit 7, 
because the inmate discussion on the tapes was hearsay.  Were did not raise this 
issue in the court of appeals, and therefore waived all but plain error.  Williams, 
51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 116} Under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e), hearsay does not include a 
statement offered against a party that is made “by a co-conspirator of a party 
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy upon independent proof of 
the conspiracy.”  “The statement of a co-conspirator is not admissible pursuant to 
Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e) until the proponent of the statement has made a prima facie 
showing of the existence of the conspiracy by independent proof.”  State v. Carter 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 651 N.E.2d 965, paragraph three of the syllabus.  
Evid.R. 802(D)(2)(e) does not require that explicit findings of the conspiracy be 
made on the record. 
{¶ 117} The prosecution established that the Lucasville takeover involved 
a major conspiracy by inmate gang leaders.  Williams testified about the takeover 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
of L-Block, the kidnapping of Vallandingham, the inmate gangs involved in the 
riot, and the identities of the gang’s leaders, including Were.  Hudson provided an 
in-depth overview of the riot and described how the leaders of three gangs were 
jointly involved during the negotiations.  Thus, Hudson’s and Williams’s 
testimony provided the required preliminary prima facie showing of the 
conspiracy.  Moreover, we held that similar testimony established such a 
conspiracy in Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d at 69, 723 N.E.2d 1019, and in State v. Skatzes, 
104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 102-103.  We reject 
proposition of law XIX. 
{¶ 118} Defense’s excluded evidence.  In proposition of law XX, Were 
argues that the trial court erred by excluding Aaron Jefferson’s testimony that 
Lavelle attempted to recruit Jefferson to kill Vallandingham.  Were also argues 
that the trial court erred by excluding a negotiation tape that contained police 
discussions about Lavelle’s role in the riot. 
{¶ 119} 1. Lavelle’s statements.  During the defense case, Jefferson, a 
member of the Black Gangster Disciples, testified that Lavelle approached him 
about killing a corrections officer during the riot.  The trial court sustained the 
state’s objection when trial counsel asked Jefferson to explain what Lavelle had 
said to him. 
{¶ 120} At the conclusion of the defense case, trial counsel proffered the 
excluded testimony: 
{¶ 121} “Mr. Wenke (defense counsel):  Judge, I have one other proffer 
that I wanted to make * * * and that was in regard to the witness, Aaron Jefferson. 
{¶ 122} “* * * 
{¶ 123} “The statement would have been from Lavelle, that he 
approached Aaron Jefferson and asked him about killing a CO [corrections 
officer] because of the spokesperson.  He wanted him to be the BGD killer, which 
is Black Gangster Disciple.  He refused. 
January Term, 2008 
29 
{¶ 124} “A few hours later, he heard the announcement of the death.  
Lavelle would have been in charge of getting rid of the bloody clothes and 
weapons and giving fresh clothes and that he was going to burn the evidence.” 
{¶ 125} The prosecutor informed the trial court that “Lavelle is up at 
Warren right now.  I could have him down here at 1 o’clock.”  The defense did 
not respond to the prosecutor’s offer, and Lavelle was not called as a witness. 
{¶ 126} Were argues that Jefferson’s excluded testimony was admissible 
as statement against penal interest under Evid.R. 804(B)(3).  In order for a 
declarant’s statement to qualify as an Evid.R. 804(B) exception to the hearsay 
rule, it must first be shown that the declarant is unavailable as a witness.  See 
State v. Issa (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 58, 752 N.E.2d 904; State v. Burke (1995), 
73 Ohio St.3d 399, 403, 653 N.E.2d 242.  Were does not claim, and nothing in the 
record indicates, that Lavelle was unavailable as a witness.  Indeed, the prosecutor 
informed the court that Lavelle could be brought to court that afternoon.  
Accordingly, Jefferson’s testimony about what Lavelle said to him was properly 
excluded. 
{¶ 127} Were also argues that the exclusion of Lavelle’s statement denied 
him the due-process right to present a defense.  This argument has no merit.  At 
most, the excluded testimony showed that Lavelle wanted Jefferson to murder 
Vallandingham, but Jefferson refused to follow Lavelle’s orders.  Thus, the 
excluded testimony provides no evidence that another person might have killed 
Vallandingham. 
{¶ 128} 2. Negotiators’ audiotaped discussions.  Were argues that the trial 
court erred by excluding police discussions about Lavelle’s role that were 
recorded on a negotiation tape.  This issue was not raised in the court of appeals; 
therefore, this claim is waived absent plain error.  Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 
O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
{¶ 129} Inmate Skatzes’s April 15 telephone conversation with police 
negotiators on negotiation tape 6 was presented during the state’s case.  During 
Hudson’s cross-examination, trial counsel sought to play negotiation tape 6 in its 
entirety, including internal discussions among the police about the Muslims and 
Lavelle.  Trial counsel stated that the police comments show that Lavelle was the 
person referred to as the hardliner on the tunnel tapes.  The excluded comments 
include “wonder if that’s just a bunch a blow about the Muslim stuff,” “try to put 
it off on the Muslims,” and “it comes right back to Lavelle again; it sounds just 
like him.”  The state objected to the introduction of taped segments of the police 
negotiators’ internal discussions.  The trial court ruled that the entire version of 
negotiation tape 6 could be played except for the police negotiators’ internal 
discussions. 
{¶ 130} We find that no plain error occurred.  Were has failed to establish 
the relevance of the negotiators’ fragmented and speculative comments about 
Lavelle.  Thus, we reject proposition of law XX. 
{¶ 131} Sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence.  In proposition 
of law XVII, Were argues that his convictions for the aggravated murder and 
kidnapping of Vallandingham were based on insufficient evidence and were 
against the weight of the evidence.  Pursuant to R.C. 2953.02, we can overturn a 
conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence in a capital case 
only when the crime was committed after January 1, 1995.  Skatzes, 104 Ohio 
St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 134.  Because the crimes in this 
case occurred before 1995, we will not address Were’s weight-of-the-evidence 
arguments.  Rather, we will consider these arguments in addressing the 
sufficiency of the evidence. 
{¶ 132} In reviewing a record for sufficiency, “[t]he relevant inquiry is 
whether, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
January Term, 2008 
31 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 
574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia 
(1979), 433 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.  “[T]he weight to be given 
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the 
facts.”  State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 
212, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 133} The state presented extensive evidence showing that Were 
kidnapped Vallandingham.  Macko testified that he observed Were and other 
inmates break down the bathroom door and seize Vallandingham at the start of 
the riot.  Macko and Williams then watched Were and other inmates take 
Vallandingham in handcuffs from the L-1 bathroom to the L-6 block.  There was 
also ample evidence that Were murdered Vallandingham.  During a recorded 
meeting of inmate leaders on April 15, Were described himself as a “hardliner.”  
He told the other inmate leaders, “We give [the authorities] a certain time * * *.  
If [the water and power are] not on in a certain time, that’s when a body goes 
out.”  Snodgrass testified that before the meeting concluded, Were voted to kill a 
corrections officer if inmate demands were not met.  Williams testified that after 
the meeting, Were said, “I’ll do it, I will take care of it.  The hardliners is taking 
over.  I’ll take care of it.” 
{¶ 134} Later on April 15, Taylor saw Were and another inmate remove 
Vallandingham from his cell and walk him to the end of the L-6 block.  Sims 
testified that as he walked past the L-6 shower, he saw Were looking into the 
shower while two other inmates were strangling Vallandingham inside the 
shower.  Were then ordered Sims and other inmates to carry Vallandingham’s 
body into the recreation yard.  Williams testified that several months after the 
murder, Were told him, “I think they know I killed that guard.”  Austin also 
testified that in 2001, Were confided in him that he “kidnapped, robbed and killed 
Officer Vallandingham.”  Finally, Piepmeier testified that during the trial of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
another inmate, Were “indicated that he was present in L-6 when Officer 
Vallandingham was murdered.” 
{¶ 135} Were argues that the testimony is unreliable because all the 
eyewitnesses were inmates who received favorable treatment in exchange for their 
testimony.  He also argues that many of the witnesses lack credibility because 
they were also guilty of aggravated murder.  This contention calls for an 
evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility, which is not proper on review of 
evidentiary sufficiency.  State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, 
854 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 200; State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-2126, 
767 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 79. 
{¶ 136} Were also argues that his “mere presence” in the company of 
others who killed Vallandingham does not establish his guilt.  Were was not an 
innocent bystander when Vallandingham was killed.  He advocated killing a 
corrections officer and voted to do so.  Subsequently, Were orchestrated 
Vallandingham’s murder by removing Vallandingham from his cell, taking him to 
the shower area, and overseeing the inmates who killed him.  Were’s argument is 
without merit. 
{¶ 137} Finally, Were argues that the evidence showed the likelihood that 
Lavelle killed Vallandingham.  Were points out that Eskridge and Jefferson 
testified that Lavelle wanted them to kill Vallandingham.  He also emphasizes 
that Durkin saw Lavelle and four inmates wearing masks and dressed in white 
food-service uniforms enter the L-6 cellblock before Vallandingham was killed.  
Nevertheless, Eskridge and Jefferson refused to murder Vallandingham, and there 
is no evidence that Lavelle and the other inmates entered the L-6 cellblock to kill 
Vallandingham.  Thus, we find that Were’s claim that Lavelle was the killer is 
unsupported by the evidence.  Based on the foregoing, proposition of law XVII is 
rejected. 
January Term, 2008 
33 
{¶ 138} Instructions.  In proposition of law XXII, Were argues that the 
trial court’s instructions on accomplice testimony were deficient.  Were contends 
that the instructions omitted language that more than silence, presence, or 
acquiescence is necessary to make one an aider or abettor. 
{¶ 139} The trial court’s instructions on aiding and abetting include the 
following language: 
{¶ 140} “An individual is an accomplice if he aids, if he supports, if he 
assists, if he encourages, if he cooperates with, if he advises, or if he incites, 
urges, the principal offender in the commission of the crime; and also, if he shares 
the criminal intent of the principal. 
{¶ 141} “However, mere association with the principal or presence at the 
scene of the crime, that is not enough. 
{¶ 142} “Rather, the State must establish that this defendant took some 
affirmative action to assist, encourage, or participate in the crime by some act of 
his, by some word of his, or by some gesture of his. 
{¶ 143} “Participation with a criminal intent may be inferred by you from 
the defendant’s action, by the defendant’s presence, by the defendant’s 
companionship and conduct, either before or after the commission of the 
particular offense involved.” 
{¶ 144} These instructions make it clear that mere association or presence 
is not enough to make one an aider or abettor.  Because these instructions were 
proper, proposition of law XXII is rejected. 
{¶ 145} In proposition of law XXVII, Were argues that the trial court 
erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on venue.  During guilt-phase jury 
instructions, the trial court stated to the jury: 
{¶ 146} “Before we go into the crimes themselves, there are certain 
things that should be established in the case.  One is that whatever happened 
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happened between April 11th and April 21st of 1993, and also that the Southern 
Ohio Correctional Institution is located in Sciot[o] County, Ohio. 
{¶ 147} “For the purposes of this trial, you and I are in Sciot[o] County, 
Ohio.  This case has been transferred from that community to this community 
because, obviously, they could not handle it.  It is a very small county, and also 
that’s where the prison is located and a lot of people work there in the prison who 
live in Sciot[o] County.  So that’s why it was legally transferred from Scioto 
County to here in Hamilton County, but we are to assume that we are in the 
footsteps of Scioto County.” 
{¶ 148} Were argues that this flawed instruction relieved the state of its 
burden of proof as to venue.  Were never objected at trial to these instructions and 
thereby waived all but plain error.  Childs, 14 Ohio St.2d 56, 43 O.O.2d 119, 236 
N.E.2d 545, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Were also did not raise this issue in 
the court of appeals and waived this claim.  Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 
O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 149} “Although it is not a material element of the offense charged, 
venue is a fact which must be proved in criminal prosecutions unless it is waived 
by the defendant.”  State v. Headley (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 477, 6 OBR 526, 
453 N.E.2d 716.  “The standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, although 
venue need not be proved in express terms so long as it is established by all the 
facts and circumstances in the case.”  Id., citing State v. Dickerson (1907), 77 
Ohio St. 34, 82 N.E. 969, syllabus. 
{¶ 150} We find no plain error.  The evidence established that Were’s 
offenses occurred at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility at Lucasville, and 
Hudson testified that the Lucasville prison was located in Scioto County.  Thus, 
venue was proven by the testimony, facts, and circumstances of this case.  
Accordingly, proposition of law XXVII is rejected. 
January Term, 2008 
35 
{¶ 151} Jury question.  In proposition of law XXI, Were argues that 
during deliberations, the trial court incorrectly answered a jury question about 
inferences.  During guilt-phase deliberations, the jury wrote the following note to 
the trial court: 
{¶ 152} “Inference was discussed under the ‘aggravated murder of 
Vallandingham during the kidnapping of Vallandingham,’ under the section that 
explains and discusses purpose.  (It was only under ‘purpose’ that inference was 
discussed.) 
{¶ 153} “Can we infer/use inference for all of the charges and apply 
inference to any charge, or to any definition?  And use inference at any time to 
come to a decision or verdict?” 
{¶ 154} After consulting both parties, the trial court provided the jury 
with the following explanation: 
{¶ 155} “You have my instructions in writing, and if you want to look at 
them, at the beginning of the instructions, I told you that evidence may be of two 
kinds; direct or circumstantial or a combination of the two. 
{¶ 156} “Direct evidence is the testimony of a witness who has actually 
seen or heard those things that he or she tells you about and includes the exhibits. 
{¶ 157} “* * * 
{¶ 158} “Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts by direct evidence 
and from which you may infer or deduce other reasonable or logical conclusions. 
{¶ 159} “So you may reasonably infer, if you care to do so, all of the 
evidence in this trial * * *.  But if you do make that inference, the inference that 
you end up with must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.  But, yes, the 
answer to your question is, can we infer/use inference for all of the charges and 
apply inference to any charge and any definition and use inference at any time to 
come to a decision or verdict? 
{¶ 160} “The answer is yes.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
{¶ 161} Were claims that these instructions permitted the jury to infer that 
he had a purpose to kill because the actual killers had such a purpose and thus 
they attributed to him an intent and purpose harbored by someone else.  We 
conclude that these instructions do not convey that meaning. 
{¶ 162} The trial court’s answer explained the use of inferences in 
considering circumstantial evidence.  The trial court’s further explanation (e.g., 
“you may reasonably infer, if you care to do so, all the evidence in this trial”) 
referred to the jury’s consideration of inferences as to all the charges.  The trial 
court then properly cautioned the jurors that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was 
necessary if they relied on such inferences.  The trial court committed no error in 
answering the jury’s question.  Thus, proposition of law XXI is rejected. 
Penalty-Phase Issues 
{¶ 163} Mental retardation.  In propositions of law IV and V, Were 
argues that the trial court’s finding that he is not mentally retarded is unsupported 
by the evidence.  After the jury found Were guilty of kidnapping and murder, the 
trial court held a hearing to address defense claims that Were was mentally 
retarded and, therefore, not subject to a death sentence.  See Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 
122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335. 
{¶ 164} During the mental-retardation hearing, Were presented the 
transcript from Were’s competency hearings of the previous testimony of inmates 
Coleman, Grant, and Harris.  All three witnesses were in prison with Were at 
various times and locations.  Coleman helped Were with courses he was taking, 
and they all helped Were with his legal paperwork.  All three testified that Were 
had trouble comprehending and remembering information.  Grant and Harris  
drafted legal motions that Were would then copy in his own handwriting. 
{¶ 165} The defense also presented the testimony from the competency 
proceeding of Jacalyn McCullough, a teacher with the Ohio State Penitentiary.  
McCullough had taught Were adult basic education courses while he was a 
January Term, 2008 
37 
prisoner.  Were was described as a hard-working student who had trouble 
comprehending and retaining abstract concepts.  McCullough believed that Were 
would be considered developmentally handicapped in a normal school setting and 
would test below a 70 IQ.  McCullough’s testimony indicates that Were had 
trouble dealing with money and was unable to make change in his head.  In 
McCullough’s opinion, Were was capable of working at a “very low functioning” 
job. 
{¶ 166} In addition, the defense presented Were’s school records, which 
showed that he was a very poor student.  The records show that Were took the 
Stanford-Binet IQ test when he was seven (in 1964) and 12 years old (in 1969) 
and received a score of 69 each time.  The school report that accompanied the 
1964 IQ results described Were as “functioning in the slow learner range of 
mental ability.” 
{¶ 167} Dr. Hammer, a clinical psychologist and mental-retardation 
expert, testified for the defense.  Hammer’s evaluation was based on his review of 
witness testimony and Were’s records because Were refused to meet with him.  
Hammer stated that Were’s IQ score of 69 was within the range of mild mental 
retardation.  Hammer testified that based on McCullough’s testimony, he thought 
that Were had subaverage ability in several adaptive behaviors.  Hammer pointed 
to Were’s deficiencies in functional academic skills, his employment history of 
closely supervised menial jobs, and money-management difficulties as shown by 
Were’s inability to make change for a dollar in his head.  Hammer concluded that 
Were was at the “high end of mild mental retardation.” 
{¶ 168} Dr. Timothy Rheinscheld, a clinical psychologist, testified that 
Were “meets the diagnostic criteria for mental retardation.”  Rheinscheld did not 
personally evaluate Were but reviewed Were’s records and McCullough’s 
testimony.  Rheinscheld testified that Were “received an IQ score of 69, which is 
below the cut off of 70 for mental retardation.”  Rheinscheld found significant 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
limitations in Were’s learning ability resulting from his failure at “different 
opportunities to try to learn and read.”  He also found significant limitations in 
Were’s social skills because “on several occasions he assaulted other people while 
he was in prison.”  Rheinscheld also noted deficiencies in Were’s money-
management skills based on his inability “to really add and subtract very well.” 
{¶ 169} During cross-examination, Hammer and Rheinscheld testified 
that the cutoff score for mental retardation on the widely used Wechsler IQ test 
was 70.  They also testified that the cutoff score for mental retardation was 68 on 
the Stanford-Binet IQ test.  Both experts acknowledged that claims of cultural 
bias had been made against the Stanford-Binet test, which Were took as a child.  
These charges led to the adoption of the adaptive-behavior aspect of the mental-
retardation definition. 
{¶ 170} Dr. W. Michael Nelson, a clinical psychologist, testified as the 
state’s expert.  Were refused to meet with Nelson.  Nelson concluded that Were 
was not mentally retarded after reviewing Were’s records and testimony from his 
competency hearing. 
{¶ 171} Nelson testified that Were’s score of 69 on the Stanford-Binet 
tests does not show that he is mentally retarded.  Nelson stated that a score of 68 
on the Stanford-Binet IQ test equates to a 70 on the Wechsler IQ test.  He 
explained that mental retardation is shown by IQ scores that are two standard 
deviations below the mean.  While the Wechsler and Stanford-Binet tests utilize a 
mean IQ score of 100, the Wechsler scale uses a standard deviation of 15 and the 
Stanford-Binet uses a standard deviation of 16.  Thus, a person reported as being 
two standard deviations below the mean would have different scores on the 
Wechsler and the Stanford-Binet scales. 
{¶ 172} Nelson did not find that Were had significant limitations in 
adaptive functioning.  Nelson testified that evaluations of Were’s employment 
skills needed to consider Were’s prison jobs as well as any jobs he held prior to 
January Term, 2008 
39 
going into prison.  Nelson stated that Were’s employment history before prison 
showed a “somewhat stable work functioning over three years, the longest being 
about a year where he was hauling trash.”  Nelson also testified that Were’s 
membership in the Muslim prison gang provided evidence of his ability to 
“function within groups * * * that would demonstrate * * * some skill in terms of 
* * * daily living skills.”  Further, Nelson testified that notwithstanding the help 
Were received from other inmates, Were “seems to be able to write, to 
comprehend the impact of some of these statements, and to use this as a way of 
trying to influence or explain * * * his present position.”  Nelson also testified 
that Were’s difficulty in making change was an insufficient basis for concluding 
that he had a serious deficiency in family-living skills. 
{¶ 173} At the completion of the hearing, the trial court found that Were 
had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded.  
In reaching this conclusion, the trial court found that Nelson was “the most 
reliable of the three psychologists that were appointed.”  The trial court noted that 
Were “has been uncooperative throughout this entire proceedings.  He’s refused 
to have himself tested [or] examined.”  The trial court stated that there is no way 
to determine Were’s true IQ score because his IQ test was deemed culturally 
biased in the 1960s, and the bias would tend to lower the score.  In his written 
findings, the trial court concluded, “The IQ tests taken by defendant at ages seven 
(1964) and twelve (1969) resulted in a true score of 70, with a five point margin 
of error.” 
{¶ 174} The trial court also found that Were did not have significant 
limitations in two or more adaptive skills.  In reaching this conclusion, the trial 
court noted that Were “rose to leadership positions in prison” and was “articulate 
in court and wrote and presented numerous motions.”  The trial court also found 
that Were’s “ ‘maladaptive behavior’ could [have] easily resulted from a 
sociopathic personality as from an intellectual limitation,” and “[s]ince defendant 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
has spent most of his life in prisons his employment history is limited.”  The trial 
court concluded that Were has “no significant limitations in communication, daily 
living skills and socialization.” 
{¶ 175} In Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335, the 
United States Supreme Court held that executing a mentally retarded person 
violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Atkins did not establish procedures for determining whether an 
individual is mentally retarded.  Rather, the Supreme Court left it to the states to 
develop “ ‘appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] 
execution of sentences.’ ”  Id. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335, quoting 
Ford v. Wainwright (1986), 477 U.S. 399, 416-417, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 
335. 
{¶ 176} In State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 
1011, we set forth the “substantive standards and procedural guidelines” for 
determining mental retardation in Ohio.  Id. at ¶ 11.  Lott adopted clinical 
definitions of mental retardation, cited with approval in Atkins for evaluating an 
individual’s claim of mental retardation.  Id. at ¶ 12.  Lott holds that the defendant 
must raise and prove mental retardation by presenting evidence that he or she (1) 
suffers from “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning,” (2) experienced 
“significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills, such as communication, 
self-care, and self-direction,” and (3) manifested “onset before the age of 18.”  Id. 
{¶ 177} Nelson’s testimony and Were’s school records support the trial 
court’s findings that Were is not mentally retarded.  Nelson testified that Were’s 
score of 69 on the Stanford-Binet IQ test was not indicative of mental retardation.  
Moreover, Were’s school records, completed at the time of his first IQ test stated 
that Were was functioning in the “slow learner” range of mental ability, not that 
he was mentally retarded.  Nelson’s testimony showed that Were failed to prove 
that he suffered significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills.  Nelson 
January Term, 2008 
41 
noted that Were was an active member of the Muslim prison gang, was able to 
comprehend the impact of his statements, and was involved in writing motions to 
the court.  In contrast, defense experts relied primarily on McCullough’s 
anecdotal testimony about Were’s money-management skills and failed to take 
into account all the evidence about Were’s employment history. 
{¶ 178} Were argues that the trial court erred by ignoring defense 
experts.  He also asserts that Nelson’s opinion was discredited during defense 
cross-examination.  The weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the 
expert witnesses are primarily for the trier of the fact.  State v. Nemeth (1998), 82 
Ohio St.3d 202, 211, 694 N.E.2d 1332.  Thus, the trial court could rely on 
Nelson’s testimony and other evidence in finding that Were failed to meet his 
burden of proving that he is mentally retarded. 
{¶ 179} Were also claims that the trial court’s finding that he is not 
mentally retarded must be reversed because his IQ scores were below 70.  Lott 
states that there is a rebuttable presumption that a person is not mentally retarded 
if his or her IQ is above 70.  Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 779 
N.E.2d 1011, at ¶ 12.  Nothing in Lott, however, states that a capital defendant 
must be found mentally retarded if his IQ score was below 70, regardless of the 
testing method used to determine that scores. 
{¶ 180} Were argues that Lott makes no distinction between the Wechsler 
and Stanford-Binet IQ tests in setting 70 as the cut off level for mental 
retardation.  In Lott, we did not direct that a particular test or testing method must 
be used in determining IQ.  On both the Wechsler scale and the Stanford-Binet, 
the diagnosis for mental retardation is approximately two standard deviations 
below the mean, which is an IQ of 70 on the Wechsler scale and an IQ of 68 on 
the Stanford-Binet.  See Bowling v. Commonwealth (Ky.2005), 163 S.W.3d 361, 
374; State v. Williams (La.2002), 831 So.2d 835, 853, fn. 26.  In this case, expert 
testimony established that Were’s IQ score of 69 on the Stanford-Binet test was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
above the cutoff level for mental retardation.  We find that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that Were’s IQ scores on the Stanford-Binet 
test did not indicate that he was mentally retarded. 
{¶ 181} Were also claims that the trial court’s findings that his IQ tests 
were culturally biased and more likely than not resulted in lower scoring is 
erroneous.  This claim lacks merit.  During cross-examination, Hammer stated 
that the Stanford-Binet test that Were took in the 1960s was considered to be 
culturally biased.  Nelson later explained that the test administered to Were was 
considered culturally biased because there were “no minorities in the 
standardization sample.  It was an all-white sample.”  Nelson also testified that 
cultural bias would have the effect of lowering test scores for minorities. 
{¶ 182} Finally, Were argues that the trial court’s findings are flawed 
because the trial court found that Were’s IQ tests “resulted in a true score of 70” 
when he actually scored a 69 on both tests.  It is not clear how the trial court 
arrived at this finding.  Even assuming error, the trial court’s finding makes no 
difference because Were’s IQ score of 69 did not establish that he was mentally 
retarded. 
{¶ 183} Based on the foregoing, we overrule propositions of law IV and 
V. 
{¶ 184} In propositions of law I, II, and III, Were argues that the jury, 
and not the judge, should have determined whether he is mentally retarded.  Lott 
holds that the decision whether or not a defendant is mentally retarded “should be 
decided by the court and do[es] not represent a jury question.  In this regard, a 
trial court’s ruling on mental retardation should be conducted in a manner 
comparable to a ruling on competency (i.e., the judge, not the jury, decides the 
issue).”  Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 1011, at ¶ 18.  
Were invokes Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 
L.Ed.2d 435; Ring v. Arizona (2002), 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 
January Term, 2008 
43 
556; Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 
403; and United States v. Booker (2005), 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 
L.Ed.2d 621, in arguing that a jury must determine whether a capital defendant is 
mentally retarded. 
{¶ 185} In Apprendi, a noncapital case, the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435.  In Ring, a capital case, the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that a trial judge may not make findings of fact on 
the aggravating circumstances necessary to impose the death penalty because such 
a determination is within the province of the jury.  Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 
S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556.  Blakely, a noncapital case, held that the Sixth 
Amendment prohibits a judge from making a finding on a fact that allowed him to 
impose a sentence greater than that allowed by a jury verdict or by the defendant’s 
admissions at a plea hearing.  Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 
L.Ed.2d 403.  In Booker, the Court applied Blakely to make the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines advisory, rather than mandatory.  Booker, 543 U.S. at 243, 
125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621. 
{¶ 186} Based on the Apprendi line of cases, Were claims that the 
determination of whether a capital defendant is mentally retarded was a factor that 
eliminated the possibility of a death sentence, and thus must be decided by the 
jury.  The fact that a capital defendant is not mentally retarded, however, is not an 
aggravating circumstance that increases a defendant’s punishment.  Rather, the 
failure to find mental retardation simply means that the capital defendant remains 
eligible to be sentenced to death.  Such a finding can affect a sentence only by 
mitigating it.  Other jurisdictions that have considered this argument have reached 
similar conclusions.  See State v. Grell (2006), 212 Ariz. 516, 526, 135 P.3d 696 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
44 
(“Ring does not require that a jury find the absence of mental retardation”); State 
v. Laney (2006), 367 S.C. 639, 647-649, 627 S.E.2d 726 (same); Pruitt v. State 
(Ind.2005), 834 N.E.2d 90, 112-113 (same); Howell v. State (Tenn.2004), 151 
S.W.3d 450, 466-467 (mental retardation not required to be proven by the state 
nor found by a jury); Head v. Hill (2003), 277 Ga. 255, 258, 587 S.E.2d 613 (Ring 
and Atkins do not require a jury trial on the issue of mental retardation); Russell v. 
State (Miss.2003), 849 So.2d 95, 148 (Ring has no application to Atkins 
determination).  We conclude that the trial court, not the jury, determines whether 
a capital defendant is mentally retarded.  Nothing in the Apprendi line of cases 
requires otherwise.  We overrule propositions of law I, II, and III. 
{¶ 187} In proposition of law VI, Were contends that the trial court erred 
by failing to instruct the jury that the death penalty was not an option if it found 
that Were was mentally retarded.  We conclude that such instructions are not 
appropriate because the jury does not determine whether a capital defendant is 
mentally retarded.  Thus, proposition of law VI is rejected. 
{¶ 188} In proposition of law VIII, Were invokes Ring and Blakely in 
arguing that the jury should have been instructed that the state must prove that he 
was not mentally retarded by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Were argues that 
the state has this burden of proof because nonretardation is, and should be, treated 
as an aggravating factor. 
{¶ 189} Lott provides that a capital defendant bears the burden of 
establishing that he is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence.  Lott, 
97 Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 1011, at ¶ 21.  Placing the 
burden of proof on Were to establish that he is mentally retarded is constitutional.  
Cf. Medina v. California (1992), 505 U.S. 437, 450-451, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 
L.Ed.2d 353 (state can assign to defendant the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally incompetent to stand trial).  
January Term, 2008 
45 
Moreover, the fact that Were is not mentally retarded does not constitute an 
aggravating circumstance. 
{¶ 190} Several jurisdictions that have considered this issue agree that the 
defendant has the burden to prove entitlement to the Atkins exemption.  Bowling, 
163 S.W.3d at 382; Williams, 831 So.2d at 860; Russell, 849 So.2d at 148; 
Murphy v. State (Okla.Crim.App.2002), 54 P.3d 556, 568; Commonwealth v. 
Mitchell (2003), 576 Pa. 258, 273, 839 A.2d 202, fn. 8.  Thus, we reject 
proposition of law VIII. 
{¶ 191} In proposition of law VII, Were argues that the jury was required 
to return a life sentence because the defense presented unrebutted expert 
testimony during mitigation that he is mentally retarded.  In mitigation, Were 
presented evidence of his mental retardation from Drs. Hammer and Rheinscheld, 
McCullough’s videotaped deposition, and Grant.  At the mental-retardation 
hearing, which did not take place in front of the jury, these witnesses echoed their 
previous testimony.  The state called no expert witnesses concerning Were’s 
mental retardation, but cross-examined each of the defense witnesses. 
{¶ 192} Defense expert testimony about Were’s mental retardation was 
presented to the jury only as a mitigating factor.  The state was not required to 
rebut such testimony because the trial court had previously determined that Were 
was not mentally retarded.  Thus, this claim lacks merit. 
{¶ 193} Were also argues that the death penalty must be vacated because 
the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh the mitigating factors.  He claims 
that he did not personally kill Vallandingham, that his conviction was based on 
inmate testimony, and that he demonstrated that he is mentally retarded during the 
penalty phase.  We shall consider this argument during our independent sentence 
evaluation.  Based on the foregoing, proposition of law VII is overruled. 
{¶ 194} Reintroduction of guilt-phase evidence.  In proposition of law 
XII, Were argues that the trial court erred by introducing irrelevant guilt-phase 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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evidence during the penalty phase.  Trial counsel objected to the reintroduction of 
tunnel tape 32 and the autopsy photographs during the penalty phase.  In 
overruling this objection, the trial court admitted tunnel tape 32 and one upper-
body photograph of Vallandingham that showed he had been strangled. 
{¶ 195} R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) provides that the prosecutor at the penalty 
stage of a capital proceeding may introduce “any evidence raised at trial that is 
relevant to the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of 
committing.”  See State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 528 N.E.2d 542, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  We find that the trial court did not err by admitting 
tunnel tape 32 and the autopsy photograph during the penalty phase because such 
evidence was relevant in showing prior calculation and design. 
{¶ 196} Were also argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury 
to “consider all of the testimony in the first trial, which is relevant to this issue.”  
Were did not object to this instruction and thus waived all but plain error.  Childs, 
14 Ohio St.2d 56, 43 O.O.2d 119, 236 N.E.2d 545, paragraph three of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 197} To the extent that the jury may have interpreted the instructions 
as allowing them to determine relevancy, the trial court erred.  It is “the trial 
court’s responsibility to determine the admissibility of evidence.”  State v. Getsy 
(1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 201, 702 N.E.2d 866.  Nevertheless, much of the guilt-
phase evidence was relevant to the aggravating circumstances.  Further, properly 
admitted evidence supports the jury’s finding that the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh the mitigating factors.  We find that the trial court’s misstatement did 
not result in plain error.  Accordingly, we overrule proposition of law XII. 
{¶ 198} Prosecutorial misconduct.  In proposition of law XI, Were 
argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his penalty-phase closing 
argument.  The test for prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments is 
whether the remarks were improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected 
January Term, 2008 
47 
the accused’s substantial rights.  State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 14 
OBR 317, 470 N.E.2d 883. 
{¶ 199} Were contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct when 
he mentioned Were’s gang involvement during his argument, stating:  
{¶ 200} “But you heard him speak and he wasn’t a scared fourth or fifth 
grader out there in the hallway trying to hide and protect himself and save his life.  
He was one of the leaders of this entire thing. 
{¶ 201} “But for the Muslims, the Black Gangster Disciples, the Aryans, 
Officer Vallandingham would be alive to this day.  They sat and plotted his 
murder and put it into effect.  Nothing in James Were’s background, his past, his 
character, diminished or affected that.  The defense psychologist even told you 
that he knew what he was doing was wrong, that he would have known, that his 
degree of mental state, his degree of learning, that to participate in the death of a 
fellow human being was wrong, and he knew it.” 
{¶ 202} This statement by the prosecutor is a response to defense 
counsel’s comparing Were to a “fourth grader” and suggesting that Were “didn’t 
know what [he was] doing, [and] didn’t realize the consequences.”  The 
prosecutor’s argument pointed out that Were knew what he was doing and that he 
was one of the gang leaders responsible for Vallandingham’s murder.  We 
conclude that the prosecutor’s argument represented fair comment and was not 
improper.  See Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 215, at 
¶ 189 (no misconduct in arguing that defendant “was one of the leaders * * * who 
controlled and ran the riot” and remarking on his membership in the Aryan 
Brotherhood). 
{¶ 203} Were also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
mischaracterizing clinical psychologist Rheinscheld’s testimony during his 
rebuttal argument.  The prosecutor stated that Rheinscheld “didn’t review the two 
tapes that you’ve had to listen to.”  Defense counsel objected and stated, “Dr. 
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48 
Rheinscheld heard the tape.”  The prosecutor explained that “[h]e heard part of it 
in the car on the way down here from Columbus yesterday.  He was already 
coming here to testify.  His opinion was already set.”  Defense counsel objected 
again.  The court overruled the objections. 
{¶ 204} The prosecutor’s rebuttal did not mischaracterize Rheinscheld’s 
testimony.  During mitigation, Rheinscheld testified that he concluded that Were 
was mentally retarded after reviewing “a lot of the records,” McCullough’s 
testimony, and listening to a couple of tapes.  During cross-examination, 
Rheinscheld acknowledged, “I only reviewed one tape and it was one of those 
tunnel tapes that they made.”  He did not recall what Were said on the tape 
because “[t]here were a lot of voices on there.  I was listening to them on my way 
down here this morning.  It was hard for me to discriminate that and negotiate 
traffic at the same time.”  Rheinscheld said he had also listened to a “little bit” of 
the tape before a previous hearing. 
{¶ 205} The prosecutor’s rebuttal argument represented fair comment.  
Moreover, “[p]rosecutors are entitled to latitude as to what the evidence has 
shown and what inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.”  State v. 
Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 111, 684 N.E.2d 668.  This claim lacks merit. 
{¶ 206} Were argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
playing one of the tunnel tapes for the jury during his penalty-phase rebuttal.  The 
defense did not object to the prosecutor’s action and waived all but plain error.  
State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 604, 605 N.E.2d 916. 
{¶ 207} During his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated, “I am going 
to play * * * just part of that tape again, because I think it is important that we all 
hear James Were speak one more time.  Something that his two experts never 
heard.  They never heard James Were speak.  They want to come and tell you and 
convince you of certain things, * * * yet * * * when the experts came to see him, 
to test him, to interview him, * * * he got up and walked out of the room and 
January Term, 2008 
49 
wouldn’t talk to them.”  The prosecutor then played a portion of tunnel tape 32, 
which involved discussions of Were and other inmate leaders after Vallandingham 
was killed. 
{¶ 208} The tape helped rebut defense arguments that Were was mentally 
retarded and had only a minor role in Vallandingham’s death.  Were’s discussions 
on the tape were also relevant because defense experts did not personally evaluate 
Were before testifying that he was mentally retarded.  The prosecutor did not 
commit plain error in playing the tape. 
{¶ 209} Nevertheless, Were contends that by playing the tape, the 
prosecutor violated State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 662 N.E.2d 
311, by focusing the jury’s attention on the nature and circumstances of the 
offense.  Wogenstahl holds that “[it] is improper for prosecutors in the penalty 
phase of a capital trial to make any comment before a jury that the nature and 
circumstances of the offense are ‘aggravating circumstances.’ ”  Id. at paragraph 
two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 210} The prosecutor did not characterize any of the facts of the offense 
as aggravating circumstances.  Furthermore, the prosecutor and the trial court 
correctly identified the statutory aggravating circumstances.  Thus, the prosecutor 
did not violate Wogenstahl by playing the tape. 
{¶ 211} Finally, Were argues that the cumulative effects of the 
prosecutor’s improper arguments prejudiced him.  It is clear from the record, 
however, that prosecutorial misconduct did not permeate the trial or affect its 
fundamental fairness.  See State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 113, 559 
N.E 2d 710.  Based on the foregoing, we reject proposition of law XI. 
{¶ 212} Instructions.  In proposition of law XXX, Were argues that the 
trial court erred by failing to instruct that a lone juror may prevent a death-penalty 
recommendation.  Trial courts are required to instruct juries that a single juror 
“may prevent a death penalty recommendation by finding that the aggravating 
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circumstances in the case do not outweigh the mitigating factors.”  State v. Brooks 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 162, 661 N.E.2d 1030. 
{¶ 213} The record reveals that the trial court did not provide this 
instruction to the jury.  Were did not object or request a lone-juror instruction at 
trial and thus waived all but plain error.  State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354, 
2003-Ohio-1325, 785 N.E.2d 439, ¶ 82.  Were also did not raise this issue to the 
court of appeals and therefore waived this issue.  Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 
O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 214} The instructions were consistent with R.C. 2929.03(D)(2), and 
the trial court’s failure to give a lone-juror instruction is not plain error.  See State 
v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 292, 754 N.E.2d 1150.  Accordingly, we 
reject proposition of law XXX. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
{¶ 215} In proposition of law XXIII, Were argues that his counsel 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel during both phases of his trial.  Were 
did not raise these claims in the court of appeals and therefore waived them, 
absent a showing of plain error.  Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 
N.E.2d 1364, paragraph two of the syllabus.  To establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Were must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial.  
Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two 
of the syllabus.  We conclude that defense counsel were not ineffective. 
{¶ 216} Adequacy of cross-examination.  Were argues that his counsel 
were ineffective by failing to cross-examine several of the state’s witnesses in his 
first trial.  Were complains that his counsel’s cross-examination of Macko was 
ineffective because counsel failed to elicit an alleged inconsistency in Macko’s 
testimony from Were’s first trial.  Were claims that at his first trial, Macko 
January Term, 2008 
51 
testified that in his initial statement to the OSP, he did not identify Were as an 
inmate involved in Vallandingham’s kidnapping.  Were mischaracterizes Macko’s 
testimony.  During Were’s first trial, Macko identified the inmates involved in the 
kidnapping and acknowledged that he had previously stated that “Were was in 
there somewhere too.”  Thus, trial counsel had no basis for pursuing this proposed 
line of cross-examination.  Further, “[t]rial counsel need not cross-examine every 
witness * * *.  The strategic decision not to cross-examine witnesses is firmly 
committed to trial counsel’s judgment * * *.”  State v. Otte (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 
555, 565, 660 N.E.2d 711. 
{¶ 217} Were argues that trial counsel’s cross-examination of Williams 
was ineffective because it did not establish that Williams did not testify that Were 
had confessed to killing Vallandingham at Were’s first trial.  During the first trial, 
Williams testified that Were had stated, “I can’t believe that they are taking me 
back down to Lucasville * * *.  * * *[M]an, they must know.  Somebody told.  I 
believe they think I killed that guard.”  During the second trial, Williams testified 
that Were had stated, “I think they know I killed that guard.” 
{¶ 218} Williams’s testimony at the first trial about Were’s statement, 
which arguably fell short of a confession, established Were’s consciousness of 
guilt and was potentially damaging to the defense case.  Counsel’s decision to 
forgo cross-examination of Williams as to his earlier testimony was a tactical 
decision and did not constitute ineffective assistance.  See State v. Foust, 105 
Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 836, ¶ 125. 
{¶ 219} Were claims that his counsel were ineffective by failing to cross-
examine inmate Sims about his active participation in the riot.  Sims indicated that 
he was not a perpetrator or active participant during the riot.  At Were’s first trial, 
inmates Thomas Taylor and Kenneth Law testified that Sims had actively 
participated in the riot.  Whether questioning Sims about Taylor’s and Law’s 
testimony would have been productive is speculative.  Thus, counsel were not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
52 
ineffective for failing to cross-examine Sims about Taylor’s and Law’s testimony.  
Moreover, Were’s counsel effectively impeached Sims by eliciting an admission 
from Sims that he had withheld information from the prosecutors and that he had 
once retracted his testimony from three previous trials. 
{¶ 220} Finally, Were claims that his counsel failed to develop that 
inmate Austin’s testimony did not match any of the state’s theories of his guilt.  
Austin testified that, while they were in prison together in 2000 or 2001, Were 
told him that “he was the one who kidnapped, robbed and killed Officer 
Vallandingham.”  When Austin asked Were how he did it, Were said that he 
strangled him. 
{¶ 221} Austin’s testimony that Were admitted killing Vallandingham 
conflicted with other evidence showing that Were was an aider and abettor.  
During closing arguments, trial counsel pointed out that the state’s witnesses 
provided conflicting testimony.  Counsel emphasized that “their stories do not 
coincide.  The prosecutor told you that everything has been corroborated * * * but 
it hasn’t.”  Trial counsel used closing arguments, rather than cross-examination, to 
point out inconsistencies in the state’s evidence.  Counsel made a “tactical 
decision” and were not ineffective. 
{¶ 222} Failure to call defense witnesses.  Were argues that his counsel 
were ineffective by failing to call for his second trial several inmates who had 
testified during his first trial.  “Generally, counsel’s decision whether to call a 
witness falls within the rubric of trial strategy and will not be second-guessed by a 
reviewing court.”  State v. Treesh (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 490, 739 N.E.2d 
749.  Moreover, “ ‘[a]ttorneys need not pursue every conceivable avenue; they are 
entitled to be selective.’ ”  State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 542, 747 
N.E.2d 765, quoting United States v. Davenport (C.A.7, 1993), 986 F.2d 1047, 
1049. 
January Term, 2008 
53 
{¶ 223} During Were’s first trial, Eddie Moss testified that he saw 
Lavelle and two masked men enter L-6 on the morning Vallandingham was killed,  
Tyree Parker testified that he saw Lavelle and two masked men exiting L-6 on the 
morning of the murder, and Sterling Barnes testified that he saw Lavelle and two 
masked men enter and exit L-6 that morning.  During the second trial, defense 
witness Gregory Durkin testified that he saw Lavelle and four masked men 
wearing food service uniforms enter the L-6 block on the morning of 
Vallandingham’s murder.  Counsel’s decision not to call the witnesses from the 
first trial was a tactical decision.  By not calling Moss, Parker, and Barnes, the 
defense avoided presenting testimony that conflicted with Durkin’s testimony.  
See State v. Hand, 107 Ohio St.3d 378, 2006-Ohio-18, 840 N.E.2d 151, ¶ 215. 
{¶ 224} During Were’s first trial, Sean Davis and Willie Johnson testified 
that they heard Lavelle discuss killing a correctional officer before 
Vallandingham was murdered.  Their testimony was similar to that of defense 
witness Brian Eskridge.  At the second trial, Eskridge testified that before 
Vallandingham’s murder, Lavelle said, “We got to kill this C.O.  We got to show 
them that we [are] serious * * *, we have to get this 187” (slang for murder).  
Counsel may have decided to forgo calling Davis and Johnson during Were’s 
second trial because their testimony was cumulative.  We conclude that counsel 
made a legitimate tactical decision and were not ineffective. 
{¶ 225} During Were’s first trial, Anthony Byrd testified that on the 
morning of April 15, he saw Were escort three other inmates to the cell in which 
corrections officer Hensley was being held.  Byrd heard Hensley crying and 
begging for his life.  Were told Byrd that “two dudes” wanted Hensley to kill 
another guard.  Byrd then saw Vallandingham taken from his cell and moved to a 
cell with Hensley.  Byrd saw a masked inmate give Hensley a cord.  He also saw 
Were standing in front of the cell.  Shortly thereafter, two inmates removed 
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54 
Vallandingham’s body from his cell.  Byrd then saw a “short guy” put a pole on 
Vallandingham’s neck, stand on the pole, and rock back and forth. 
{¶ 226} Were fails to explain how Byrd’s testimony would have helped 
the defense in the second trial.  Byrd’s testimony placed Were at the murder scene 
when Vallandingham was strangled.  Moreover, contrary to Were’s claims, Byrd 
did not identify Lavelle as the person standing on the bar on Vallandingham’s 
neck.  Counsel were not ineffective by failing to call Byrd. 
{¶ 227} Were mentions three other witnesses who should have been 
called during his second trial.  David Houseman testified during the first trial that 
he did not see Were in the dayroom during negotiations on April 15.  Prentice 
Jackson testified during the first trial that Vallandingham and other hostages were 
brought into the L-3 dayroom on the first day of the prison riot, but he did not see 
Were bring in any of the hostages.  Finally, at Were’s first trial, defense counsel 
proffered testimony by Leroy Elmore that Lavelle said Were had “disrespected 
[him] in front of [his] brothers by hitting [him] for calling the shots.”  Elmore’s 
testimony was not admitted during the first trial. 
{¶ 228} Were fails to explain the relevance of these three witnesses’ 
testimony.  In view of their questionable relevance, we conclude that counsel 
made a legitimate “tactical decision” not to call these witnesses. 
{¶ 229} Based on the record of their testimony at the first trial, we 
conclude that the testimony of these witnesses was not crucial to Were’s defense 
in the second trial.  The decision of counsel not to call these witnesses for the 
second trial was not ineffective assistance. 
{¶ 230} Failure to request a defense expert on tape altering.  Were 
claims that his counsel were ineffective by failing to request a defense expert to 
determine whether the tunnel tapes had been doctored.  There is no evidence in 
the record indicating that the tapes were altered.  Because no such evidence exists, 
January Term, 2008 
55 
trial counsel were not ineffective by failing to request an expert to examine the 
tapes. 
{¶ 231} Failure to make timely objections.  Were also argues that trial 
counsel were ineffective by failing to object to all objectionable guilt-phase 
testimony and exhibits.  Were has not pointed to any specific evidence that was 
improperly admitted because of counsel’s failure to object.  Thus, Were fails to 
establish that his counsel were ineffective. 
{¶ 232} Failure to call lay witnesses at the mental-retardation hearing.  
Were argues that his counsel were ineffective during the mental-retardation 
hearing.  Were claims that trial counsel should have called Grant to testify about 
Were’s mental limitations.  The record at the mental-retardation hearing shows 
that the defense presented a transcript from the competency hearing of the lay 
testimony of Grant, Coleman, and Harris. 
{¶ 233} Were also claims that his counsel were ineffective by failing to 
call Blackmon to testify that Were was not respected in the Muslim community.  
During the guilt phase, Blackmon testified that Muslim inmates paid little 
attention to Were because he was “illiterate.”  Were contends that Blackmon’s 
testimony shows that the trial court’s mental-retardation findings, including the 
finding that Were “rose to leadership positions in prison,” are incorrect.  
Blackmon’s testimony would have made no difference: Were’s leadership role 
during the riot was established by the tunnel tapes and Williams’s testimony.  
Thus, counsel were not ineffective by not calling Blackmon. See Hand, 107 Ohio 
St.3d 378, 2006-Ohio-18, 840 N.E.2d 151, at ¶ 241. 
{¶ 234} Failure to challenge Nelson’s expert qualifications.  Were 
argues that his counsel were ineffective by failing to challenge the expert 
qualifications of Dr. Nelson, who testified during the mental-retardation hearing.  
Were does not, however, explain how Nelson’s qualifications were deficient. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
56 
{¶ 235} Evid.R. 702(B) provides that a witness may qualify as an expert 
by reason of his or her “specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education regarding the subject matter of the testimony.”  Moreover, “[t]he 
individual offered as an expert need not have complete knowledge of the field in 
question, as long as the knowledge he or she possesses will aid the trier of fact in 
performing its fact-finding function.”  Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 285, 754 N.E.2d 
1150.  Nelson has a Ph.D. in clinical psychology and is a professor of psychology 
at Xavier University.  He was a past president of the Cincinnati Psychological 
Association and during the trial was the current president of the American Board 
of Clinical Psychology.  Nelson has also published numerous articles in 
professional journals and made numerous presentations at conventions and other 
professional gatherings. 
{¶ 236} In attacking Nelson’s qualifications, Were asserts that Nelson 
reached his conclusions by assessing the manner in which Were functioned in 
prison rather than his peer group in the general population.  Were fails, however, 
to explain how Nelson’s method for reaching his findings disqualified Nelson as 
an expert witness.  Moreover, Nelson assessed Were’s functioning in prison 
because Were had spent much of his life there.  Accordingly, we hold that counsel 
were not ineffective by failing to challenge Nelson’s expert qualifications.  See 
Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 836, at ¶ 79. 
{¶ 237} Failure to adequately present mitigating evidence.  Were argues 
that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to call more than one 
lay mitigation witness and failing to retain various experts to testify during 
mitigation.  “The decision to forgo the presentation of additional mitigating 
evidence does not itself constitute proof of ineffective assistance of counsel.”  
State v. Keith (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 536, 684 N.E.2d 47. 
{¶ 238} Were argues that lay testimony would have established that he 
relied upon Carlos Sanders, a person of much higher intellect and the leader of the 
January Term, 2008 
57 
Muslims, to make decisions during the riot.  Counsel’s decision not to present lay 
testimony about Were’s subservient role was a legitimate tactical decision 
because other evidence (e.g., the tunnel tapes) showed that Were was a leader 
during the riot. 
{¶ 239} Were also argues that lay testimony should have been presented 
to show that Were protected some inmates from substantial harm during the riot.  
During Were’s first trial, inmate Mike Trocadero had provided such testimony.  
Were fails to indicate how such testimony would have affected the outcome of his 
case. 
{¶ 240} Were also claims that lay testimony should have been presented 
to show that he effectively performed his prison jobs.  During Were’s first trial, 
Mary Tanner, a case manager at SOCF, testified that Were did a very good job as 
a clerk in the prison infirmary.  During Were’s second trial, Hammer testified that 
Were’s employment record showed that he was always working with someone 
else.  Counsel’s decision to forgo further testimony about Were’s employment 
history constituted a tactical decision because such testimony might have undercut 
other defense arguments that Were was mentally retarded. 
{¶ 241} Were contends that his counsel should have retained a prison 
expert, a cultural expert, and a clinical psychologist.  “[T]he presentation of 
mitigating evidence is a matter of trial strategy.”  Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d at 530, 684 
N.E.2d 47.  Moreover, “ ‘strategic choices made after thorough investigation of 
law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable * * * .’ ”  
Wiggins v. Smith (2003), 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, 
quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
{¶ 242} Were argues that his counsel should have called a prison expert 
who could have explained how overcrowding and lack of other facilities at the 
prison led to the riot.  During the guilt phase, the defense played a tunnel tape 
during which inmate leaders discussed their list of grievances at the prison.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
58 
During penalty-phase opening statements, trial counsel reminded the jurors that 
they had heard “about the conditions, the circumstances, [and] what it was like at 
Lucasville * * * prior to and during the course of this riot.”  Thus, the defense 
presented “alternative devices that * * * fulfill[ed] the same functions as the 
expert assistance sought.”  State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 
311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph four of the syllabus. 
{¶ 243} Were argues that his counsel should have called a cultural expert 
to explain his offenses in terms of prison culture, but he does not explain what 
such a witness would have said on his behalf.  Finally, Were argues that counsel 
should have retained a clinical psychologist to explain his social history and 
development.  Drs. Hammer and Rheinscheld, however, were hired by the defense 
and testified during mitigation. 
{¶ 244} The record does not show that defense counsel failed to 
investigate the possibility of presenting additional mitigating testimony.  
Moreover, we cannot infer a defense failure to investigate from a silent record; the 
burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance is on Were.  See Murphy, 91 Ohio 
St.3d at 542, 747 N.E.2d 765.  Based on the foregoing, proposition of law XXIII 
is rejected. 
{¶ 245} In proposition of law XXIV, Were makes several pro se claims 
that his trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance.  We conclude 
that each of these claims is without merit. 
{¶ 246} First, Were alleges that trial counsel paid his appellate counsel to 
cover up his counsel’s and the state’s wrongdoing.  There is nothing in the record 
to support these allegations. 
{¶ 247} Second, Were argues that his counsel failed to challenge his 
indictment.  During pretrial proceedings, Were addressed the court and alleged 
that his indictment was defective because he was being retried with a case number 
that differed from the case number on his indictment.  Defense counsel sent Were 
January Term, 2008 
59 
a letter dated December 17, 2002, that provided an explanation for the 
renumbering of the indictment. 
{¶ 248} Third, Were claims that his counsel refused to challenge the 
court’s ruling that he wear a stun belt.  Trial counsel did not raise this issue at 
trial.  As discussed in proposition of law XXVI, the record contains no indication 
that the jury could see or knew that Were was wearing a stun belt.  No plain error 
occurred. 
{¶ 249} Fourth, Were claims that his counsel refused to raise the issue 
that he was sent to Oakwood Correctional Facility for a competency evaluation 
but was not examined there.  He also states that when he was sent back to the 
Lebanon Correctional Institute, he was placed on suicide watch and left in an 
unclean room because he would not talk to the doctors.  During the competency 
hearing, trial counsel raised Were’s treatment at Oakwood and Lebanon to explain 
his reasons for refusing to be evaluated by other psychologists.  Were fails to 
explain any additional issues regarding these events that his counsel should have 
raised. 
{¶ 250} Fifth, Were argues that his counsel were ineffective by failing to 
call Mackey, his former attorney, and McCullough at the competency hearing.  
The record shows that at the competency hearing, his counsel presented 
McCullough’s testimony as well as statements made by Mackey to the court prior 
to Were’s first trial.  Were also argues that his counsel were deficient by failing to 
call his brother Stanley Nesbitt, his brother-in-law Robert Arrington, and Dorian 
Hall at the competency hearing.  Were fails to explain the substance of their 
testimony. 
{¶ 251} Finally, Were claims that his counsel should have recalled Marva 
Allen, a state witness, to show that she had been untruthful when she testified and 
to question her about the log of Were’s activities while at Lebanon Correctional 
Institute.  He also states that Alice Lynd should have been called to establish that 
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fact.  Even assuming that Allen did not testify truthfully, Were has not established 
that her testimony was prejudicial. 
{¶ 252} Based on the foregoing, proposition of law XXIV is rejected. 
Sentencing Opinion 
{¶ 253} In proposition of law XIV, Were argues that the trial court’s 
sentencing opinion is defective.  Were contends that the sentencing opinion fails 
to explain why the trial court found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh 
the mitigating factors.  But the sentencing opinion did discuss the aggravating 
circumstances and the mitigating factors presented during the penalty phase: 
{¶ 254} “The Court, after receiving the trial jury’s recommendation that 
the sentence of death be imposed, finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the aggravating circumstances the defendant was found guilty of committing 
outweigh any mitigating factor or factors which may be present.  Even though 
defendant was not the principal offender and has some limited intellectual 
abilities, these factors are outweighed by the aggravating circumstances of the 
kidnapping and murder of a prison guard.  The sentence of death is appropriate.” 
{¶ 255} The trial court explained why the aggravating circumstances the 
offender was found guilty of committing were sufficient to outweigh the 
mitigating factors, as required by R.C. 2929.03(F).  No further analysis was 
required.  See Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d at 245, 714 N.E.2d 867.  We conclude that 
this claim lacks merit. 
{¶ 256} Second, Were argues that the opinion improperly treated the 
nature and circumstances of the offense as nonstatutory aggravating 
circumstances.  The trial court accurately identified the two aggravating 
circumstances.  When a court does so correctly, that court is presumed to rely only 
on those circumstances and not on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances.  State 
v. Hill (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 441, 653 N.E.2d 271.  The trial court must also 
examine the nature and circumstances of the offense to determine whether they 
January Term, 2008 
61 
are mitigating.  State v. Brinkley, 105 Ohio St.3d 231, 2005-Ohio-1507, 824 
N.E.2d 959, ¶ 157.  Thus, we overrule proposition of law XIV. 
Independent Review by the Court of Appeals 
{¶ 257} Following a remand from this court, the court of appeals 
conducted its independent review of the death sentence as required by R.C. 
2929.05(A).  See State v. Were , Hamilton App. No. C-030485, 2006-Ohio-3511, 
at ¶ 22-34.  In proposition of law XV, Were argues that the court’s independent 
review of his death sentence was deficient because the court’s conclusion that he 
is not mentally retarded is unsupported by the evidence.  The court, however, 
fully discussed mitigation evidence that Were was mentally retarded.  The court 
then concluded that although “Were’s limited intellectual abilities are entitled to 
some weight in mitigation, the evidence produced in the trial did not establish that 
Were was mentally retarded.”  Id. at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 258} Were makes the same arguments that he made in propositions IV 
and V in challenging the conclusion that he is not mentally retarded.  The 
conclusion reached by the court of appeals in its independent review, however, is 
supported by evidence presented during the mental-retardation hearing.  
Moreover, our independent sentence assessment will cure any deficiency in the 
court of appeals’ opinion.  State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 211, 661 
N.E.2d 1068; State v. Simko (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 483, 493, 644 N.E.2d 345.  
Based on the foregoing, we reject proposition of law XV. 
Settled Issues 
{¶ 259} Proportionality.  In proposition of law XIII, Were disputes the 
constitutionality of Ohio’s death-penalty proportionality review.  We summarily 
reject these arguments.  State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 
N.E.2d 166, ¶ 23; State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 
N.E.2d 383, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
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{¶ 260} Constitutionality.  In proposition of law XVI, Were attacks the 
constitutionality of Ohio’s death-penalty statutes.  We have previously rejected 
similar claims.  State v. Carter (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 607, 734 N.E.2d 345;  
Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, at paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
Cumulative Errors 
{¶ 261} In proposition of law XXXIII, Were argues that cumulative 
errors deprived him of a fair trial and require reversal of his convictions and death 
sentence.  We conclude that Were received a fair trial.  Moreover, “errors cannot 
become prejudicial by sheer weight of numbers.”  Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d at 212, 661 
N.E.2d 1068.  Thus, we reject proposition of law XXXIII. 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE EVALUATION 
{¶ 262} We are required by R.C. 2929.05(A) to independently review 
Were’s death sentence for appropriateness and proportionality.  The evidence at 
trial established beyond a reasonable doubt that Were murdered corrections 
officer Robert Vallandingham purposely and with prior calculation and design 
while Were was a prisoner in a detention facility, R.C. 2929.04(A)(4), and 
purposely and with prior calculation and design while committing or attempting 
to commit kidnapping, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  Against these aggravating 
circumstances, we must weigh the mitigating factors contained in R.C. 
2929.04(B).  Were called four mitigation witnesses.  Were did not present a sworn 
or unsworn statement. 
{¶ 263} Jacalyn McCullough’s videotaped testimony, which was 
presented during Were’s competency and mental retardation hearings, was played 
for the jury.  McCullough, a prison teacher, taught Were adult basic education 
courses for over a year while he was in prison.  She testified that Were’s reading 
level was at the fourth- or fifth-grade level, and his math skills were at the third-
grade level.  Were also did poorly in social studies and did not understand any 
January Term, 2008 
63 
kind of science terminology.  McCullough believed that Were would be 
considered developmentally handicapped in a normal school setting.  Despite his 
intellectual limitations, Were wanted to learn and worked very hard in school. 
{¶ 264} Dr. David Hammer testified that in his opinion, Were is mildly 
mentally retarded.  Hammer testified that Were scored a 69 on the Stanford-Binet 
IQ test in 1964 and 1969.  He testified that Were’s employment history, his 
academic deficits, and his poor money-management skills provided evidence of 
limitations in his adaptive behavior. 
{¶ 265} Dr. Timothy Rheinscheld testified that in his opinion, Were is 
mentally retarded.  Rheinscheld’s opinion was based on Were’s two IQ scores of 
69, and his finding of significant defects in Were’s adaptive behavior, as shown 
by Were’s school and prison records and McCullough’s testimony. 
{¶ 266} Danny Grant’s testimony was presented to bolster the defense 
claim that Were is mentally retarded.  Were and Grant were fellow inmates at the 
Lebanon Correctional Institute from 1999 to 2002.  Grant assisted Were with his 
legal paperwork because “his comprehension level wasn’t up to par of 
understanding what was going on.”  He helped Were spell, pronounce words, and 
comprehend the meaning of legal documents.  Grant had to repeat his 
explanations because Were had trouble remembering what he was told.  On one 
occasion, Grant drafted a motion for Were that Were copied in his own 
handwriting. 
Sentence Evaluation 
{¶ 267} We find nothing in the nature and circumstances of the offense to 
be mitigating.  Were was one of the leaders during the Lucasville prison riot.  He 
helped remove Officer Vallandingham from the bathroom where he was hiding 
and took him to the L-6 cellblock where he was locked up.  On April 15, 1993, 
Were advocated that a prison guard be killed to demonstrate that the inmates’ 
demands should be taken seriously.  Were then supervised the group of inmates 
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64 
who strangled Vallandingham in the L-6 shower.  These facts establish a horrific 
crime without any mitigating factors. 
{¶ 268} Although Were’s character offers nothing in mitigation, we give 
some weight to his history and background.  Were did poorly in school and never 
finished high school.  Nevertheless, McCullough testified that Were wanted to 
learn and tried to do well in taking adult basic education courses in prison. 
{¶ 269} The statutory mitigating factors are generally inapplicable here, 
including R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement); (B)(2) (duress, coercion, or 
strong provocation); (B)(4) (youth of the offender); and (B)(5) (lack of a 
significant criminal record).  Were’s mental deficiencies do not qualify as an R.C. 
2929.04(B)(3) factor because there was no testimony that Were, by reason of a 
mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.  
Nevertheless, Were’s limited intellectual abilities are entitled to some weight in 
mitigation under the catchall provision of R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  See State v. 
Frazier, 115 Ohio St.3d 139, 2007-Ohio-5048, 873 N.E.2d 1263, ¶ 267.  Dr. 
Hammer and Dr. Rheinscheld testified that Were has a low IQ and significant 
defects in his adaptive behavior.  Evidence of Were’s leadership and decision-
making during the riot, however, undercut his claim of limited intellectual 
functioning.  Moreover, the evidence did not establish that Were is mentally 
retarded.  Thus, Were’s execution is not barred by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 
2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335.  The mitigating factor under R.C. 2929.04(B)(6) is 
directly applicable because Were acted as an accomplice and not as the principal 
offender.  Although Were was not the actual killer of Vallandingham, he was one 
of the leaders who decided upon, planned, and supervised the murder.  Thus, this 
mitigating factor is entitled to very little weight.  The evidence does not suggest 
any other mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). 
January Term, 2008 
65 
{¶ 270} We find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  Were murdered Vallandingham 
while he was a hostage during the Lucasville prison riot.  Compared with these 
serious aggravating circumstances, Were’s mitigating evidence has little 
significance. 
{¶ 271} Finally, we hold that the death penalty is both appropriate and 
proportionate to death sentences approved in other Lucasville cases.  See Skatzes, 
104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 246; LaMar, 95 Ohio 
St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 198; State v. Sanders (2001), 92 
Ohio St.3d 245, 281, 750 N.E.2d 90; and Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d at 91, 723 N.E.2d 
1019.  It is also proportionate to death sentences approved for other aggravated 
murders in a detention facility.  See State v. Stojetz (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 452, 
472, 705 N.E.2d 329; State v Zuern (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 66, 512 N.E.2d 
585.  Further, it is proportionate to death sentences approved for other aggravated 
murders during kidnappings.  See State v. McKnight, 107 Ohio St.3d 101, 2005-
Ohio-6046, 837 N.E.2d 315, ¶ 334; State v. Davie (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 334, 
686 N.E.2d 245. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Mark E. Piepmeier, Special Prosecuting Attorney, and William E. Breyer, 
Assistant Special Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
H. Fred Hoefle and Chris McEvilley, for appellant. 
______________________