Case Title: Jackson v. Wis. County Mut. Ins. Corp.

Citation: 2014 WI 36

Docket Number: 2012AP001644

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 36 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1644   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Rachelle R. Jackson, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Corp., 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Daniel P. Lynch and Patrick A. Lynch, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 348 Wis. 2d 203, 832 N.W.2d 163 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No: 2013 WI App 65 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 10, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 13, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee  
 
JUDGE: 
William Sosnay 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Lori M. Lubinsky, Timothy M. Barber, and Axley Brynelson, 
LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Lori M. Lubinsky. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was argued by 
Christopher L. Strohbehn, with whom on the brief was D. Michael 
Guerin, Kathryn A. Keppel, and Gimbel, Reilly, Guerin & Brown 
LLP, Milwaukee.  
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Friedman, 
Dustin B. Brown and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, on behalf of 
the Wisconsin Insurance Alliance.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 36
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP1644 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV1407) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Rachelle R. Jackson,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant,   
 
 
v. 
 
Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Corporation,   
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
and 
 
Daniel P. Lynch and Patrick A. Lynch,   
 
 
Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 10, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case concerns Rachelle 
Jackson, a Milwaukee County sheriff's deputy who seeks coverage 
under her employer's underinsured motorist policy.  The policy 
pays sums owed by an underinsured tortfeasor to an insured 
person who is injured while "using an automobile within the 
scope of his or her employment or authority."  The policy 
defines "using" by saying it "has the meaning set forth in Wis. 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
2 
 
Stat. 
§ 632.32.(2)(c)"1 
and 
"includes 
driving, 
operating, 
manipulating, riding in and any other use."  This case turns on 
whether Jackson was "using an automobile" when she was injured.  
¶2 
Jackson was injured while on duty by a driver to whom 
she had just given directions.  The driver hit her as she walked 
in front of the car after she stated that she would "help [the 
driver] get in traffic."  Jackson argues that under the policy's 
definition of "using an automobile" and under case law broadly 
construing the word "using," her actions with regard to the 
vehicle that hit her constituted using the vehicle because she 
was in essence controlling the vehicle.  She testified in her 
deposition that at the time she was hit, she had already "asked" 
the driver to pull into the parking lane to speak with him, had 
spoken with him, and had started to "go in front of the car, 
walk in the walkway"  when the driver pulled forward and hit 
her.  She argues that the accident occurred while she was in the 
process of "manipulating" the car or while she was making some 
"other use" of the car.  There is no assertion that she had 
stopped traffic or was guiding the driver into traffic at the 
time of the accident. 
¶3 
To determine the meaning of the insurance contract, we 
first look at the policy language itself.  We then turn to prior 
Wisconsin cases interpreting the statute and similar policy 
                                                 
1 This statute is now numbered Wis. Stat. § 632.32 (2)(h) 
(2011-12); it states, "'Using' includes driving, operating, 
manipulating, riding in and any other use."  All references to 
the Wisconsin Statutes are to 2011-12 unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
3 
 
language, 
insurance 
treatises, 
and 
cases 
from 
other 
jurisdictions construing the same type of policy language.  We 
conclude that Jackson cannot recover because the actions she 
took with regard to the vehicle that hit her do not constitute 
using 
a 
vehicle 
in 
any 
way 
that 
is 
consistent 
with 
interpretations of "use" in Wisconsin case law or with those of 
cases from other jurisdictions.   
¶4 
Even though Wisconsin courts have given the word 
"using," in the context of insurance policies, quite a broad 
definition, the definition has limits.  See Progressive N. Ins. 
Co. v. Jacobson, 2011 WI App 140, ¶12, 337 Wis. 2d 533, 804 
N.W.2d 838 ("Though 'use' is a broad term and is given a liberal 
construction, it is not without limitation.");  see also Tomlin 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co., 95 Wis. 2d 215, 225, 
290 N.W.2d 285 (1980) (finding "arising out of use of vehicle" 
policy language precluded coverage for state patrolman who was 
injured by driver after a traffic stop).   
¶5 
Other Wisconsin case law construing the phrase "using 
an automobile" or similar phrases in the context of an insurance 
policy applies an understanding of "use" that is consistent with 
an insurance treatise definition: "employment for the purposes 
of the user."2  This broad definition helps to define the limits 
of "use" and further supports our conclusion that Jackson's acts 
with regard to the vehicle that hit her were not done while she 
was employing the car for any purpose.  When we review the types 
                                                 
2 8 Couch on Insurance § 119:37 (3d ed. 2005). 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
4 
 
of purposes for which vehicles have been employed, we find none 
in which the control or use of the vehicle is as attenuated as 
it is here, given that at the time of the accident, Jackson had 
not begun to guide the vehicle into traffic. 
¶6 
However, even though we can draw some general guidance 
from our cases, we recognize that no Wisconsin case directly 
applies because none has addressed use of a vehicle premised on 
the person's guiding of the driver.  Garcia v. Regent Insurance 
Company,3 the case on which the court of appeals relied, held 
that "a driver's gesture and call to invite and assist a 
passenger to enter a vehicle is part of the inherent use of a 
vehicle," but that case is easily distinguishable.  Neither its 
facts (a driver calling and gesturing to a child passenger), nor 
its analysis (whether a driver's "collateral[] involve[ment]" in 
a passenger's getting in and of a car is part of its inherent 
use), nor its conclusion (that inherent use encompasses a 
driver's helping a passenger who is "boarding") bears any 
relation to the question presented in this case concerning a 
person outside a vehicle who purports to be using the vehicle by 
guiding it. 
¶7 
No Wisconsin court has addressed a case involving a 
non-driver who is preparing to guide, but not yet guiding, a 
vehicle driven by another.  Courts from other jurisdictions have 
considered guidance cases.  It is clear that permitting recovery 
                                                 
3 Garcia v. Regent Ins. Co., 167 Wis. 2d 287, 481 N.W.2d 660 
(Ct. App. 1992). 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
5 
 
by Jackson would not be consistent with interpretations of those 
courts.  Treatises recognize that under some circumstances a 
person directing a car from outside the vehicle may be using the 
vehicle within the meaning of insurance policy language.   
¶8 
Holdings from these cases and holdings in Wisconsin 
cases are based on the same principles for construing insurance 
policies, and we find them helpful.  A review of those cases4 is 
helpful because it reveals what a "using by guiding" case 
requires:  "For example, where the driver cannot see where he is 
going and completely trusts the guide to direct his movements, 
the guide can be considered a user because the actual driver is 
essentially an automaton, responding solely to the guide's 
directions."5   
¶9 
By comparison to that scenario, Jackson's testimony 
was that the accident happened before she went to stop the 
traffic: "I looked at [the driver] when I walked——as I was going 
                                                 
4 A representative example from this line of cases is one in 
which a man helped a tractor-trailer driver back a truck up on a 
worksite.  The court's conclusion was based on the following 
reasoning: 
[the] 
hand 
signals 
to 
the 
driver 
effectively 
determined the direction and movement of the tractor-
trailer and were required by the driver for the 
completion of the intended maneuver of the vehicle.  
Accordingly, there was a causal relationship between 
the incident in which [the signaler] was injured and 
the employment of the tractor-trailer as a vehicle 
. . . .   
Slagle v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 S.E.2d 582, 587 (Va. 2004).   
5 8 Couch on Insurance § 111:39 (3d ed. 2005). 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
6 
 
in front of the car, but after that I was looking at the traffic 
to see when it was safe for me to walk out and to stop it so I 
could help him get in [to the lane of moving traffic]."  
Jackson, by her own undisputed testimony, was not controlling 
the car at the time of the accident and had not, in fact, begun 
to guide the vehicle into traffic.   
¶10 We conclude that Jackson was not using the vehicle at 
the time of her injury, and we therefore reverse the court of 
appeals.6  
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶11 Jackson's 
deposition 
testimony 
regarding 
the 
circumstances of the accident can be summarized briefly.  She 
was on duty on a sidewalk at the Milwaukee airport when a lost 
motorist pulled up near her and asked how to get to a specific 
hotel.  She "asked him if he could pull over to the curb," which 
he did; then she bent down to speak into the window, standing 
one or two feet away from the car, and answered his question.  
The driver and passenger said they had gotten lost and ended up 
at the airport after a long drive.  After Jackson gave the 
directions to the hotel, the driver asked, "How am I going to 
get back in traffic?" Jackson said she responded, "I'll go in 
front of your car, and I'll come around and help you get in 
traffic."  As Jackson walked on the pedestrian walkway in front 
of the car, the car "move[d] three or four feet" at about five 
                                                 
6 Jackson v. Wis. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Corp., et al., 2013 WI App 
65, ¶7, 348 Wis. 2d 203, 832 N.W.2d 163. 
 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
7 
 
miles per hour and hit her.  She described the accident as 
follows: 
[A]s soon as I get in front of the car, like, midway, 
I feel a hit or a tap on my leg  . . . .  I'm thinking 
to myself, "Did I just get hit?" And I put my hands on 
the . . . hood of the car, raise up my left leg 
because I'm trying to jump out of the way of the car. 
The right leg hit – as I go on the side of the car – I 
said, "You realize you just hit me. Park the car." 
 
¶12 The accident report states that Jackson "was helping 
[the vehicle] with directions and walked into the crosswalk with 
flashing stop sign to stop traffic when [the vehicle] attempting 
to enter traffic struck the deputy almost knocking her down." 
¶13 Jackson brought this action against several parties, 
including her employer's insurer, Wisconsin County Mutual 
Insurance Corporation (WCMIC), which had issued a public entity 
liability insurance policy that, under an endorsement, provided 
underinsured motorist benefits to Milwaukee County deputies. 
¶14 WCMIC moved for summary judgment on the ground that 
Jackson was not "using an automobile" at the time of the 
accident, as its policy requires for coverage.  The Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court, the Hon. William Sosnay presiding, 
acknowledged that "there is not a lot of case law on this" and 
granted summary judgment to the insurer, holding that "the court 
would be stretching the law to allow for coverage based upon the 
conduct and the facts as they have been presented . . . ." 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
8 
 
¶15 The court of appeals reversed, relying principally on 
language from Garcia.  That case——which involved a driver 
sitting in the driver's seat in his car, motioning to an 
intended passenger, a child, across the street——stated that the 
driver's conduct, consisting of "verbal cues and [a] hand 
gesture," constituted "use" of the vehicle within the meaning of 
the insurance policies, and that "[the driver,] while tending 
the vehicle with engine running, . . . called and gestured to 
[his approaching passenger] to get into the car."  Garcia v. 
Regent Ins. Co., 167 Wis. 2d 287, 296, 300, 481 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. 
App. 1992).  The Garcia court considered "invit[ing] and 
assist[ing] a passenger to enter a vehicle" to be "part of the 
inherent use of a vehicle" because vehicles are used to 
transport 
passengers. 
Id. 
 
Garcia 
also 
reiterated 
prior 
Wisconsin case law holding that an insured does not "have to be 
in direct physical contact with the vehicle to be using it." Id. 
at 296.  
¶16 Citing Garcia's language, along with the general 
principle that coverage clauses are broadly interpreted "to 
afford the greatest protection to the insured," id. at 294, the 
court of appeals concluded that "'manipulating' combined with 
'and any other use' encompasses Jackson helping the underinsured 
driver to safely re-enter traffic." Jackson v. Wis. Cnty. Mut. 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
9 
 
Ins. Corp., et al., 2013 WI App 65, ¶7, 348 Wis. 2d 203, 832 
N.W.2d 163. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION  
¶17 "[W]hether an insurance policy affords coverage . . . 
[is a] question[] of insurance contract interpretation subject 
to de novo review."  1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Grp., Ltd., 
2006 WI 94, ¶23, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 427-28, 716 N.W.2d 822.  "The 
same rules of construction that govern general contracts are 
applied to the language in insurance polices.  An insurance 
policy is construed to give effect to the intent of the parties 
as expressed in the language of the policy."  Folkman v. Quamme, 
2003 WI 116, ¶12, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 857.  Here, we 
focus on a phrase that limits who is an insured for purposes of 
an underinsured motorist endorsement.  We start with the premise 
that the proper interpretation of that phrase has to be one that 
gives it effect and recognizes that it is intended to draw a 
line between who is covered and who is not covered.   
¶18 This case comes to us following a grant of summary 
judgment.   
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, relying 
on the same methodology as the circuit court.  Summary 
judgment is proper where the record demonstrates that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.   
Schinner v. Gundrum, 2013 WI 71, ¶¶35-36, 349 Wis. 2d 529, 833 
N.W.2d 685 (internal citations omitted).   
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
10 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶19 To be an insured under Section II.B. of the UIM 
endorsement, Jackson must meet three requirements.  It is 
undisputed that she meets the first two: that she was an insured 
under the policy and that she was within the scope of her 
employment.  The sole question we address7 is whether Jackson was 
"using 
an 
automobile" 
and, 
therefore, 
met 
all 
three 
requirements.  The contested language we will focus on is found 
in sections II.B. and V.C. of the Underinsured Motorist 
Endorsement to the policy: 
I. 
Insuring agreement 
A. We will pay all sums the insured is legally entitled to 
recover as monetary damages from the owner or driver of 
an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury.  
The bodily injury must be sustained by the insured and 
must be caused by an accident. The owner's or driver's 
liability for the damages must result from the ownership, 
maintenance or use of the underinsured motor vehicle. 
. . .  
II. 
Who is an insured 
. . .  
B. Any person qualifying as an insured under the Who Is an 
Insured provision of the policy while using an automobile 
within the scope of his or her employment or authority.   
. . .  
V. Definitions  
  
. . .  
                                                 
7 WCMIC raises a second argument against coverage: that 
"[t]he clear intent of the UIM endorsement is to provide 
coverage 
to 
someone 
'using' 
a 
vehicle 
other 
than 
the 
underinsured vehicle involved in the accident." Pet'r's Br. at 
35.  Because we resolve this case on the first issue raised, we 
need not address the alternative argument. 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
11 
 
C. Using has the meaning set forth in Wis. Stats. Sec. 
632.32(2)(c) 
and 
includes 
driving, 
operating, 
manipulating, riding in and any other use. 
 
(Emphasis added. Capitalization omitted.) 
¶20 "Using" is defined in the endorsement as including 
"driving, operating, manipulating, riding in and any other use."  
No party asserts that Jackson was driving, operating or riding 
in the vehicle.  In order for Jackson to satisfy the requirement 
of "using an automobile," therefore, her actions at the time the 
accident occurred must be categorized as "manipulating" an 
automobile or as an "other use" of an automobile.8    
 
¶21 Jackson describes the accident in the context of the 
whole encounter with the driver, starting with the direction to 
the driver to pull to the curb and ending with the final order 
to park the car after the accident occurred.  She argues that in 
her series of interactions with the driver of the vehicle, she 
was in the process of manipulating the vehicle, in the sense 
that she was controlling where it went, and she cites to a 
dictionary definition of "manipulate" as meaning "control."  She 
argues that her stepping in front of the vehicle was a part of 
the process that began when she indicated to the driver that he 
                                                 
8 We observe that the definition of "using" employed here 
could be claimed to be open-ended because it states that the 
word "includes" certain activities without expressly limiting 
its meaning to those activities.  Jackson's arguments, however, 
do not turn on this aspect of the definition. 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
12 
 
needed to pull over to the curb and would have lasted through 
the point when she helped him pull back into traffic and drive 
away.   
¶22 In support of her position, she cites the language 
"any other use" as signifying a recognition that there are more 
kinds of uses than those enumerated.  She also points to cases 
that have broadly construed policy language requiring, as a 
condition of coverage, that an injury arise out of the use of a 
vehicle.  For example, in Lawver v. Boling, 71 Wis. 2d 408, 412, 
238 N.W.2d 514 (1976), the plaintiff was injured after a fall 
from a pulley-operated lift that was tied to the defendant's 
pickup truck.  Plaintiff's injury was deemed to be "bodily 
injury . . . arising out of the . . . use of an automobile."  
Id.  This was based on the fact that the court found it 
reasonable to expect that a pickup truck in a farm setting "will 
be put to a variety of uses beyond the ordinary transportation 
of persons and goods from place to place."  Id. at 416.  Jackson 
also points to Garcia, 167 Wis. 2d at 291-92, in which the court 
of appeals considered whether the injuries to a child who had 
been hit by a passing car were injuries "arising out of" the use 
of the insured's vehicle. The driver had gone "to the park to 
find [the child]" and, sitting in the driver's seat of his car, 
beckoned the child to cross the street by "gestur[ing] with his 
hand  . . .  that it was all right for her to come" with her 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
13 
 
mother in the car for a trip to the grocery.  The court 
concluded that the injuries arose from "use" of the vehicle, 
reasoning that the driver's communication to the child was an 
expected part of picking up a passenger, and transporting 
passengers was, in turn, an expected use of a vehicle: 
The jeep in this action is designed to, among other 
things, carry passengers.  Within the reasonable ambit 
of such use are the necessary incidental activities of 
boarding and alighting and the reasonable expectation 
that, in certain instances, the operator may be 
collaterally involved in such activity. 
 
Id. at 297-98.  In language that Jackson cites as relevant to 
this case, the court stated that the driver's "call and gesture 
to [the child] constituted 'use' of the vehicle . . . ." Id.     
¶23 On the other hand, WCMIC characterizes Jackson's 
actions as helping the occupants of the vehicle rather than 
controlling or manipulating the vehicle's movements, and notes 
that at the time of the accident Jackson was simply walking in 
the pedestrian walkway in front of the vehicle, not gesturing or 
waving.  It points out that the cases on which Jackson relies 
construe broader policy language than the language at issue 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
14 
 
here.9  The policy terms in those cases state that the insured is 
covered for damages "arising out of the use of" a vehicle.  That 
language differs in two ways from the relevant language in this 
case: first, it includes the expansive phrase "arising out of,"10 
and, second, it requires "use of" a vehicle without limiting 
whose use it must be.  Unlike that language, the language of the 
endorsement at issue here specifically defines an insured for 
purposes of UIM endorsement coverage as an insured "while using 
an automobile," a formulation that requires the insured to be 
                                                 
9 For example, Garcia involved two policies, one of which 
covered "damages arising out of the . . . use of a car."  Garcia 
167 Wis. 2d at 292.  See also Lawver v. Boling, 71 Wis. 2d 408, 
415, 238 N.W.2d 514 (1976) (policy at issue "provides coverage 
for injuries arising out of the use of an automobile") and 
Tomlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co., 95 Wis. 2d 215, 
218, 290 N.W.2d 285 (1980) (policy would pay damages for 
accident "arising out of the . . . use . . . of the owned motor 
vehicle"). 
10 "As used in a liability insurance policy, the words 
'arising out of' are very broad, general and comprehensive.  
They are commonly understood to mean originating from, growing 
out of, or flowing from, and require only that there be some 
causal relationship between the injury and the risk for which 
coverage is provided." Lawver v. Boling, 71 Wis. 2d at 415. 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
15 
 
the user of the vehicle.11  WCMIC therefore argues that this case 
is distinguishable from the cases Jackson cites because it 
involves narrower policy language.     
¶24 WCMIC also distinguishes this case from cases from 
other jurisdictions where, in the context of insurance coverage 
disputes or sovereign immunity claims, "use" of a police vehicle 
has been found even when law enforcement officers were on foot 
directing traffic, so long as their nearby vehicles were part of 
the traffic management activity.  See, e.g., Maring v. Hartford 
Cas. Ins. Co., 484 S.E.2d 417, 420 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (officer 
standing in intersection directing traffic was using vehicle 
when lights and sirens were activated and police radio was 
turned up so he could communicate from outside the vehicle); 
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Jones, 953 N.E.2d 608, 612, 622 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2011) (placing police vehicle in the lane of highway, 
leaving the engine running, and activating the emergency lights 
on her vehicle to redirect traffic was using vehicle "for one of 
its intended purposes"); Oberkramer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 650 
                                                 
11 As to the difference between the phrases "arising out of 
the use of" and the "while using an automobile," it has been 
explained that the former "describes the accidents for which 
coverage would be afforded an insured under the policy and 
relates to coverage of the event causing injury" and the latter 
"describes who is an insured and relates to coverage of a 
particular person." 34 Am. Jur. 2d Proof of Facts § 585 (1983),  
citing W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Crawford, 635 F.2d 667, 670 n.2 
(8th Cir. 1980).  This case relates to the question of coverage 
of a particular person. 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
16 
 
S.W.2d 300, 302-03 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (officer who was standing 
away from his vehicle while it was parked across road in road 
block with lights activated was using vehicle); Great Am. Ins. 
Co. v. Cassell, 389 S.E.2d 476, 477 (Va. 1990) (similar holding 
regarding fire truck use).  Though Jackson is a law enforcement 
officer, these cases provide no relevant guidance for the 
question presented by this case, because they concern coverage 
based on the use of the law enforcement vehicle.  There is no 
claim here that Jackson was using a sheriff's vehicle in any 
manner, and none of the law enforcement cases cited involved a 
claim that an officer was using a vehicle being driven by 
someone else.     
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
17 
 
¶25 The parties' differing views of the meaning of the 
word "using" in the context of an insurance policy boil down to 
this.  Jackson can cite numerous cases where Wisconsin courts 
have interpreted "using a vehicle," for purposes of insurance 
coverage, to include activities that are not what the ordinary 
person would necessary call using a vehicle. In some of these 
cases, the person who sought to invoke coverage was not driving 
or touching the vehicle.  WCMIC, while it does not seek to 
overturn Garcia or any cases relied on by Jackson, points out 
that on the facts of this case, we are past the outer limits of 
what "using a vehicle" can be understood to mean because no case 
so far has found "use" by a person in Jackson's type of 
circumstances, and to do so would vastly expand coverage. 
¶26 Progressive Northern Insurance Company, 337 Wis. 2d 
533, ¶18, summarizes the "use" cases briefly: 
These activities [deemed to be "use"] can range beyond 
ordinary transportation, but generally involve some 
closely related activity. See Thompson [v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.], 161 Wis. 2d at 458–59[,] [468 
N.W.2d 432 (1991),] (insurer could reasonably expect 
that a truck might be used for hunting, and that a 
hunter might use the truck bed as a platform from 
which to hunt); Lawver [v. Boling], 71 Wis. 2d 411, 
416[,] [238 N.W.2d 514 (1976)] (raising and lowering a 
platform using a truck and pulley constitutes "use" of 
the vehicle); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 
63 Wis. 2d 148, 158, 216 N.W.2d 205 (1974) (reasonable 
and expected "use" of a van includes loading and 
unloading hunting equipment); Trampf [v. Prudential 
Prop. and Cas. Co., 199 Wis. 2d [380] at 389, [544 
N.W.2d 
596 
(Ct. 
App. 
1995)] 
("use" 
includes 
transportation of dogs in the bed of a vehicle); 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
18 
 
Garcia, 167 Wis. 2d at 297–98, 481 N.W.2d 660 
(driver's call and gesture to pedestrian subsequently 
hit while crossing the street a "use" of the vehicle); 
Tasker v. Larson, 149 Wis. 2d 756, 761, 439 N.W.2d 159 
(Ct. App. 1989) (leaving a child in a vehicle during a 
brief 
errand 
reasonably 
consistent 
with 
inherent 
nature of vehicle). 
 
¶27 Jackson relies especially on the Garcia case.  In 
essence, she analogizes the facts in that case to the facts of 
this case: if it is "using a vehicle" for a driver sitting 
inside a vehicle to call and gesture to an intended passenger 
outside the vehicle to direct the passenger to come to the 
vehicle, then it is "using a vehicle" when a person outside the 
vehicle speaks and gestures to the driver.  We note here that 
Jackson's 
deposition 
testimony 
contained 
no 
reference 
to 
gesturing to the driver at any point.  She did state that she 
was planning "to stop traffic," but in fact the accident 
occurred before she did so.   
¶28 We turn to Wisconsin case law that deals with 
construing language similar to the "while using a vehicle" 
phrase in the endorsement.  It is evident that "use" has been 
broadly construed on occasion.  Nevertheless, as we have noted 
previously, the word's meaning "is not without limitation," 
Progressive N. Ins. Co., 337 Wis. 2d 533, ¶12, and the cases "do 
not suggest that the term 'use' must be read so expansively as 
to include a boundless number of activities."  Garcia, 167 Wis. 
2d 287 at 296.   
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
19 
 
¶29 Both the circuit court and the court of appeals 
correctly stated that this case did not have any clear Wisconsin 
precedent.  The circuit court stated, "There is not a lot of 
case law on this."  The court of appeals stated, "No Wisconsin 
published decision has set the parameters of what the word 
'manipulating' . . . and [']any other use' means in the context 
of this case." Jackson, 348 Wis. 2d 203, ¶8. 
¶30 The courts below were correct that this scenario has 
not been addressed in Wisconsin in a "using a vehicle" case.  
Nevertheless, a review of what constitutes "use" in Wisconsin 
case law is a good place to start.  As we will see, these cases 
are consistent with a broad definition of "use" given in an 
insurance treatise:  "The term 'use' is a broad catchall 
designed to include all uses of the vehicle not falling within 
the terms 'ownership' or 'maintenance,' and involves simply 
employment for the purposes of the user."  8 Couch on Insurance, 
§ 119:37 (3d ed. 2005).  
¶31 In Lawver we recognized the "range of reasonable uses" 
to which a vehicle may be put:  "It is reasonably to be expected 
that [the vehicle] will be put to a variety of uses beyond the 
ordinary transportation of persons and goods from place to 
place."  Lawver, 71 Wis. 2d at 416.  The concept of "employment 
for the purposes of the user" is not explicit but is implicit in 
each of the cases.   
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
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¶32 In Lawver, the vehicle was being put to use "as a 
power source in performing necessary farm repairs," or, stated 
more simply, it was used to pull a rope attached to a lift.12  In 
Tasker, the truck was used, "for safety as well as convenience," 
as a place to leave a small child.13  In Thompson, the bed of the 
pickup was used, as a special permit allowed, as a "flat 
elevated surface from which to hunt" for the convenience of 
disabled hunters.14  In Trampf, the vehicle was used to transport 
dogs.15  In Allstate, the vehicle was used to transport "rifles, 
ammunition, and supplies" on a hunting outing.16  In Garcia, the 
vehicle was used to carry passengers, which, the court reasoned, 
meant that it was sometimes used by the operator while calling 
and gesturing to passengers who were "boarding and alighting."17     
¶33 Jackson's actions with regard to the vehicle and 
driver were not employing the vehicle for Jackson's purposes; 
                                                 
12 Lawver v. Boling, 71 Wis. 2d 408, 411, 416, 238 N.W.2d 
514, 516, 518 (1976). 
13 Tasker v. Larson, 149 Wis. 2d 756, 761, 439 N.W.2d 159, 
161 (Ct. App. 1989). 
14 Thompson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 161 Wis. 2d 
450, 459, 468 N.W.2d 432, 435 (1991). 
15 Trampf v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Co., 199 Wis. 2d 380, 
390, 544 N.W.2d 596 (Ct. App. 1995).   
16 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 63 Wis. 2d 148, 
158, 216 N.W.2d 205, 210 (1974).   
17 Garcia, 167 Wis. 2d at 298. 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
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thus, from the outset, this case differs from "the variety of 
uses" that our case law has recognized.  It is reasonable to 
conclude that Jackson was not "using" the vehicle involved here. 
¶34 Garcia does not compel a contrary result.  It simply 
does not follow from the reasoning in that case that a non-
passenger standing outside the vehicle who speaks to the driver 
is using a vehicle in the same way as a driver sitting inside a 
vehicle who calls and gestures to an intended passenger outside 
the vehicle.  Even if it did, to apply Garcia in that fashion to 
this case would ignore the fact that there is no indication 
whatsoever in the record that Jackson gestured to the driver 
here.  The most that can be said is that when the accident 
happened, Jackson had just told the driver she was about to stop 
traffic and "help" the driver "into traffic," but she had not 
yet begun to do so.   
¶35 Whether a person getting ready to direct a driver 
where to go is using the vehicle within the meaning of an 
insurance policy, such as the one at issue here, is a question 
that has not been clearly put to courts in other jurisdictions.  
In Couch on Insurance, Section 111:39, it states, however, that 
"a person may be considered to be 'using' a vehicle for purposes 
of an omnibus clause by guiding or giving signals to the actual 
operator of a vehicle."  8 Couch on Insurance, § 111:39.   
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
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In determining who constitutes a user of a vehicle for 
the purposes of an omnibus clause, it is generally 
required that if one who claims to be a user was not 
actually driving the vehicle, that individual must 
have exercised some form of control over it.  Control 
is therefore the primary factor in determining whether 
signaling directions elevates an individual to the 
status of 'user' under an omnibus clause. . . . 
[W]here the driver cannot see where he is going and 
completely trusts the guide to direct his movements, 
the guide can be considered a user because the actual 
driver is essentially an automaton, responding solely 
to the guide's directions. 
Id. 
¶36 Such a rule is not inconsistent with our holdings in 
prior cases, such as the holding that "[n]either does the 
insured have to be in direct contact with the vehicle to be 
using it."  See Garcia, 167 Wis. 2d at 296 (citing Tasker v. 
Larson, 149 Wis. 2d 756, 761, 439 N.W.2d 159 (Ct. App. 1989)).  
However, cases from other jurisdictions clearly do not support 
the application of such a rule on these facts.  The gap between 
what constitutes "using by guiding" and the facts present here 
becomes 
clear 
as 
one 
reviews 
the 
facts 
of 
the 
other 
jurisdictions' "controlling the vehicle" cases.   
¶37 The courts determining whether a person was "using by 
guiding" have focused on how much control the driver of the 
vehicle was ceding to the person who was acting as a guide.  For 
example, where a man helped a tractor-trailer driver back a 
truck up on a worksite, the court reasoned that  
[the] 
hand 
signals 
to 
the 
driver 
effectively 
determined the direction and movement of the tractor-
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
23 
 
trailer and were required by the driver for the 
completion of the intended maneuver of the vehicle.  
Accordingly, there was a causal relationship between 
the incident in which [the signaler] was injured and 
the employment of the tractor-trailer as a vehicle 
. . . .   
 
Slagle v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 S.E.2d 582, 587 (Va. 2004).  
Where a case similarly involved "active control or guidance of a 
backward movement of a truck," the signaler was deemed to have 
"used" the truck because he had "participate[d] in the operation 
of the truck to such an extent as to be a User of the vehicle."  
Woodrich Const. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 89 N.W.2d 412, 418-
419 (Minn. 1958).  In another case, the court relied on "[t]he 
undisputed fact[] . . . that Hill was placed in the following 
flag car with a radio in order to communicate with the driver of 
Dorwin's truck because the latter could not see the boom's 
position from inside the truck." Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.Royal 
Globe Ins. Co., 631 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).  It 
therefore concluded that the person communicating with and 
guiding the truck was "using" the truck within the meaning of 
the relevant language.  Id.  In reaching that conclusion, the 
court noted that it was indistinguishable from another case, 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Steenberg Construction  
Company, 225 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1955):  
Steenberg was an action by a general contractor 
against a subcontractor's insuror . . . .  The 
subcontractor was supplying mixed concrete for the 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
24 
 
general contractor's use in laying a floor. An 
employee of the general contractor signalled the 
subcontractor's truck driver while backing up, and the 
cement truck struck and injured a third person . . . . 
The [appellate court affirmed the] trial court, 
[which] . . . held that the active directing by the 
general contractor of the backward movement of the 
truck and the following by the subcontractor's driver 
of the signals given to him both activities having 
been performed as incidents to the construction work 
made the participation of the general contractor such 
a part of the actual operation of the truck as to 
constitute 
the 
contractor's 
using 
the 
automobile 
within the meaning of the omnibus clause.  
631 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (emphasis added). 
¶38 As one court noted,  
It is difficult and probably impossible to formulate 
an exact measure of the degree of control which a 
person not owning or driving the particular automobile 
must exercise over it in order to have the type of 
responsibility for its potential to do injury so as to 
be deemed entitled to the protection of automobile 
liability coverage. Obviously the expression 'while 
using' 
is 
intended 
to 
describe 
the 
appropriate 
relationship, but does not readily supply an answer in 
situations of the type now before us.   
Hake v. Eagle Picher Co., 406 F.2d 893, 895, 896 (7th Cir. 1969) 
(citing a case in which a property owner had been deemed to be 
using the automobile within the meaning of an automobile 
liability policy "where by signalling directions to the driver 
the owner of the premises or his employee has exercised 
immediate control over the movement of the automobile"). 
¶39 However, this case does not reach the level of a close 
case because everything relevant to this case happened before 
Jackson began to guide the vehicle.  To revisit Jackson's 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
25 
 
description of what she did with regard to the vehicle that hit 
her, recall that she stated that she "asked [the driver] if he 
could pull over to the curb," then bent down to speak into the 
window, standing one or two feet away from the car, and answered 
his question.  After that, the driver asked, "How am I going to 
get back in traffic?" Jackson said she responded, "I'll go in 
front of your car, and I'll come around and help you get in 
traffic."  As Jackson walked on the pedestrian walkway in front 
of the car, she was hit.  She described the accident as follows: 
[A]s soon as I get in front of the car, like, midway, 
I feel a hit or a tap on my leg  . . . .  I'm thinking 
to myself, "Did I just get hit?" And I put my hands on 
the . . . hood of the car, raise up my left leg 
because I'm trying to jump out of the way of the car. 
The right leg hit – as I go on the side of the car – I 
said, "You realize you just hit me. Park the car." 
Jackson conveyed four points of information to the driver: a 
request to pull to the curb, directions to the hotel he was 
seeking, an offer to help him pull back into traffic, and an 
order to park the car after she was hit.  She touched the 
vehicle as she tried to evade being hit.   
 
¶40 Unlike the cases in which the person guiding or giving 
directions was "controlling" and therefore deemed a user of the 
vehicle, Jackson did not exercise such control over the vehicle 
to the extent that she essentially became the user.  She was not 
communicating with, signaling, or exercising active control over 
the vehicle at the time of the injury. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
26 
 
¶41 To determine the meaning of the insurance contract, we 
first look at the policy language itself.  We then turn to prior 
Wisconsin cases interpreting the statute and similar policy 
language, 
insurance 
treatises, 
and 
cases 
from 
other 
jurisdictions construing the same type of policy language.  We 
conclude that Jackson cannot recover because the actions she 
took with regard to the vehicle that hit her do not constitute 
using 
a 
vehicle 
in 
any 
way 
that 
is 
consistent 
with 
interpretations of "use" in Wisconsin case law or with those of 
cases from other jurisdictions. 
¶42 JUSTICE DAVID T. PROSSER did not participate. 
By the Court.—Reversed.
No. 
2012AP1644   
 
 
 
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