Case Title: Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 234076 v. Sex Offender Registry Board

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12762

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12762 
 
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 234076  vs.  SEX 
OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. 
 
 
 
Essex.     January 6, 2020. - May 14, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Evidence, Sex offender, Expert opinion, 
Relevancy and materiality.  Due Process of Law, Sex 
offender, Hearing.  Administrative Law, Evidence, Hearing. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 18, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Salim Rodriguez Tabit, J., on motions 
for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Kate A. Frame for the plaintiff. 
 
Christopher M. Bova for the defendant. 
 
Matthew J. Koes, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The plaintiff, John Doe, challenges his 
classification before the Sex Offender Registry Board (board) as 
2 
 
a level three sex offender.  In this case we decide whether a 
hearing examiner may restrict the scope of an expert's testimony 
at a sex offender classification hearing once the hearing 
examiner has exercised discretion to grant funds for that 
expert.  We conclude that, once the hearing examiner has allowed 
a motion for expert funds to a sex offender seeking a review 
hearing on his classification, whether indigent or otherwise, 
expert testimony in a board hearing is admissible unless it is 
"irrelevant, unreliable, [or] repetitive."  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.18(1) (2016).  Further, testimony in board hearings is 
reliable if it is "the kind of evidence on which reasonable 
persons are accustomed to rely on in the conduct of serious 
affairs."  Id. 
 
1.  Background.  On May 26, 2010, a jury in the Superior 
Court convicted Doe on three indictments charging rape and abuse 
of a child, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23, and on two 
indictments charging indecent assault and battery on a person 
fourteen or over, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13H.1  Doe was 
a former girls' gymnastic coach who owned a training facility in 
                     
 
1 The judge sentenced Doe to from eight to ten years on one 
count of rape and abuse of a child, and to a concurrent sentence 
of from four to five years on two counts of indecent assault and 
battery on a person fourteen or over.  On the other two counts 
of rape and abuse of a child, Doe received five years of 
supervised probation from and after his committed sentence.  The 
jury acquitted Doe on one count of rape. 
 
3 
 
Connecticut and who operated a summer camp for gymnasts, and 
Doe's victims were both his former trainees.  Doe began preying 
on and abusing the first victim when she was thirteen years old 
and the second victim when she was sixteen years old.  The abuse 
occurred repeatedly during the early 1990s in Massachusetts and 
Connecticut. 
In September 2013, during Doe's incarceration, the board 
notified him of his duty to register as a level three sex 
offender pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (c).2  Doe thereafter 
requested his statutory right to a de novo review of his 
classification by one of the board's hearing examiners.  See 
G. L. c. 6, § 178L (2); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.03 (2013). 
 
The hearing examiner presided at a two-day evidentiary 
hearing,3 conducted via video conference, to assess Doe's 
assigned classification based on the board's enumerated risk 
factors, including the victims' ages and whether Doe repeatedly 
offended.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40(2), (3) (2013).  Doe 
and his attorney participated from prison while the board's 
counsel and the hearing examiner were at the board's Salem 
                     
 
2 The board determined that Doe's "risk of reoffense [was] 
high and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public" was 
substantial enough to require "active dissemination" of his 
"registration information."  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (c). 
 
 
3 The hearing commenced on December 3, 2014, and adjourned 
until its second day on April 13, 2015. 
4 
 
office.  Before the hearing, Doe, who was indigent, moved for 
expert funds to hire Dr. Paul D. Zeizel, an expert in forensic 
psychology and assessing sex offenders' risk of reoffense.  See 
G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1) (a).  In his motion, Doe requested 
funding so that Dr. Zeizel could provide expert testimony about 
Doe's risk of reoffense, specifically by focusing on several 
factors not considered by the board's regulations, including age 
and time spent in the community between Doe's last recorded 
incident in the mid-1990s4 and his 2007 arrest ("offense-free 
time prior to incarceration").5 
                     
 
4 Dr. Zeizel testified that Doe's offensive behavior ended 
"roughly" in 1997, but there is no precise end date reflected in 
the record.  Doe claims that he stopped assaulting the victims 
in 1994, and that he maintained a "relationship" with his first 
victim for roughly seven years after he initially assaulted her 
in 1991, when she was fourteen.  Although the first victim was 
of consenting age towards the end of their "relationship," we 
cannot blithely agree with Doe's characterization of his 
behavior as "offense-free" starting sometime around 1994, as 
soon as the first victim reached the legal age of consent.  In 
many instances, the victim of child sexual abuse suffers 
psychological trauma that affects her beyond the legal age of 
consent so that while a "relationship" may be viewed under the 
criminal law as consensual, and thus not constituting an ongoing 
crime of statutory rape or child sexual abuse, it may still be 
coercive and manipulative.  When deciding upon dangerousness, 
the hearing examiner could therefore consider the entirety of 
Doe's sexual conduct towards the victim, including any continued 
grooming, manipulation, and coercion, beyond her reaching the 
legal age of consent. 
 
5 Doe attached research to his motion for expert funds that 
supported the position that his age and the offense-free time 
prior to incarceration reduced his risk of reoffense. 
 
5 
 
During the first hearing day, the hearing examiner orally 
granted the motion.  He "bas[ed his] decision on the age 
[factor]," but stated, "I [am] pretty sure [that the expert is] 
going to do some other inquiries about some other things."  The 
hearing examiner's subsequent written order granting Doe's 
motion did not restrict the subject matter of the expert's 
report or testimony.  Between the first and second hearing date, 
the expert prepared a risk assessment, which considered Doe's 
age, as well as his offense-free time prior to incarceration.  
Upon the board's objection during the second hearing day, the 
hearing examiner limited Dr. Zeizel's testimony to the effects 
of advanced age on reoffense rates generally and as applied to 
Doe.6  Notwithstanding Dr. Zeizel's protestation that he could 
not ethically provide a risk assessment based only on age sealed 
off from other variables, the hearing examiner affirmed Doe's 
level three classification.7 
                     
 
6 Dr. Zeizel testified that "the important aspect [of his 
risk assessment] is how old [the offenders] are and how long 
they've been in the community."  However, the hearing examiner 
restricted Dr. Zeizel's testimony to his opinion based on Doe's 
age and asked him to move on from "elements other than age." 
 
 
7 Between the hearing's completion and the date the hearing 
examiner issued his written decision, we changed the standard by 
which the board must prove its classifications from 
preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence.  
See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 298 (2015).  Doe waived his right 
to a new hearing based on that decision and the new standard, 
and asked that the hearing examiner make his decision on the 
6 
 
 
Doe challenged this classification in the Superior Court.  
The judge affirmed, concluding that the hearing examiner did not 
abuse his discretion either in limiting Dr. Zeizel's testimony 
or in finding the evidence sufficient to classify Doe as a level 
three sex offender.  The judge also determined that the board's 
practice of conducting such hearings over video conference did 
not violate Doe's constitutional rights. 
 
We allowed Doe's application for direct appellate review.  
On appeal, Doe claims that the hearing examiner's decision to 
limit the scope of the expert's testimony (1) violated G. L. 
c. 6, § 178L, and its implementing regulations; (2) violated 
Doe's due process rights; and (3) violated the equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  Doe further contends that conducting the hearings via 
video conference violated his due process rights.  Because we 
hold that the hearing examiner improperly limited the scope of 
Doe's expert's testimony, we remand to the board for a new 
hearing.8  We moreover conclude that the board did not violate 
                     
evidence presented under the clear and convincing standard.  The 
hearing examiner followed the clear and convincing standard in 
his written decision. 
 
 
8 Doe also claimed that the hearing examiner abused his 
discretion in not classifying Doe as a level one sex offender.  
Because we remand for a new hearing, we need not reach that 
issue. 
7 
 
Doe's due process rights by administering the hearing via video 
conference.9 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "A reviewing 
court may set aside or modify [the board's] classification 
decision where it determines that the decision is in excess of 
[the board's] statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates 
constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is 
not supported by substantial evidence.  See G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14 (7) (listing these and other reasons for vacating decision 
of agency).  In reviewing [the board's] decisions, we 'give due 
weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized 
knowledge of the agency.'"  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 
496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 649 (2019), 
quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 602 (2013) (Doe No. 
205614). 
 
b.  Expert funds for indigent sex offenders.  When moving 
for expert funds, indigent sex offenders must "identify and 
articulate the reason or reasons, connected to a condition or 
circumstance special to [them]," and, separately, "general 
motion[s] for funds to retain an expert to provide an opinion on 
                     
 
 
9 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
8 
 
the sex offender's risk of reoffense, without more, would . . . 
be insufficient."  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 89230 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 452 Mass. 764, 775 (2008) (Doe No. 
89230).  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.16(4)(a) (2016).10  The 
hearing examiner accordingly has discretion to deny expert funds 
to indigent sex offenders who offer expert opinion on factors 
that the board's regulations already require the hearing 
examiner to consider.  See Doe No. 89230, supra at 775 n.17. 
 
The record indicates that Doe precisely "identif[ied] and 
articulat[ed]" requested expert funds to present evidence that 
his age, as well as his offense-free time prior to 
incarceration, lowered his risk of reoffense.  Doe No. 89230, 
452 Mass. at 775.  Neither age11 nor time spent in the community 
                     
 
10 The board's 2013 regulations offered two ways for a 
hearing examiner to prohibit expert testimony or to exclude the 
expert report once the hearing examiner decided to grant expert 
funds, neither of which applied to Dr. Zeizel:  (1) if the sex 
offender failed to comply with the discovery obligations to 
provide the expert report to the other side at least ten days 
prior to the hearing; or (2) if the sex offender failed to call 
the expert witness to testify.  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.18(5), 
(6) (2013). 
 
 
11 The board's 2013 regulatory factors did not provide 
guidance for how hearing examiners should consider the 
offender's age at the time of classification, see 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.40 (2013), despite our ruling that the hearing 
examiner must accept expert testimony on that topic.  See Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 620-621 (2010).  Therefore, Doe's motion for 
expert funds on that factor satisfied the necessary 
requirements. 
9 
 
prior to incarceration are included in the board's promulgated 
risk factors.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40 (2013) (factors 
19 and 20 only discuss time in prison community and time in 
community following probation); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33 
(2016) (factor 29 expressly ties offense-free time in community 
to time postconviction or postincarceration).  Doe therefore 
identified and articulated particular issues that would help the 
hearing examiner beyond the enumerated risk factors -- something 
the hearing examiner recognized by granting the motion for 
expert funds and by acknowledging that the expert's testimony 
would address "some other inquiries about some other things" 
beyond age.  In other words, the expert testimony would not have 
been repetitive.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.18 (2016). 
 
c.  Hearing examiners' power to limit scope of expert 
testimony.  We start with the statute.  Where the Legislature's 
intent is evident in a statute's plain language, that meaning 
controls.  See Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 604 (2019).  The board 
argues that the statute provides the hearing examiner with the 
discretion to limit expert testimony, while Doe claims the 
opposite. 
 
General Laws c. 6, § 178L (1) (a), permits sex offenders to 
challenge their classification in a de novo hearing and, if 
indigent, to apply for funds to hire an expert witness for that 
10 
 
hearing.  The hearing examiner "may grant payment of fees for an 
expert witness in any case," but the statute does not expressly 
provide the hearing examiner with the authority to limit the 
scope of an indigent sex offender's expert's testimony once 
granting those expert funds.  Id.  The statute does empower a 
hearing examiner "to consider 'any information useful'" beyond 
the enumerated risk factors.  Doe No. 205614, 466 Mass. at 604, 
quoting G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1).  The regulations in effect at 
the time of the hearing also do not resolve the issue, although 
they grant the hearing examiner broad discretion to rule on 
evidentiary matters.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.09(2), 
1.21(1)(e) (2013); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.19(1)(f) (2016).12  
Specifically, the hearing examiner "may exclude irrelevant, 
unreliable, and repetitive evidence."  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.18(1) (2016).  See 803 Code. Mass. Regs. § 1.19(1) (2013).  
Because, as noted supra, the hearing examiner granted expert 
funds to Doe, implicitly finding the proffered evidence not 
repetitive, we analyze only whether the expert testimony would 
have been irrelevant or unreliable. 
                     
 
12 Between the hearing's completion in 2015 and the date on 
which the hearing examiner issued his written decision in 2016, 
the board promulgated revised regulations.  The hearing examiner 
issued the decision based on the new 2016 regulations.  There is 
no difference relevant to the question presented here. 
11 
 
 
The board's regulations nevertheless speak to the 
importance of relevant and reliable expert testimony.  They 
defined an "expert witness" as a "mental health professional" 
who prepared "testimony and [a] report offering an opinion as to 
a sex offender's risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness" 
for a board hearing.  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.03 (2013).  See 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.03 (2016) (same but adding limitation 
that expert reports "prepared for any other purpose will not 
qualify as Expert Witness opinions").  Sex offenders also "shall 
be permitted to introduce into evidence an Expert Witness's 
written report, including [the witness's] opinion as to the 
offender's risk of reoffense and/or dangerousness."  803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.18(6) (2013).  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.17(5)(c) (2016) (same).  Hearing examiners retain discretion 
"[t]o receive, rule on, exclude, or limit evidence," 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.21(1)(e) (2013), but the "duties of the [hearing 
examiner also] shall include . . . assist[ing] all persons in 
making a full and free statement of the facts in order to bring 
out all the information necessary to decide the issues 
involved," 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.21(1)(b) (2013).  See 803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.19(1)(c), (f) (2016) (same). 
 
This language suggests that the hearing examiner should 
allow the experts to testify because they provide reliable and 
relevant evidence that will assist the hearing examiner to 
12 
 
interpret evidence that lies outside common experience.  This 
standard is consistent with the primary purpose of G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178L:  to classify sex offenders accurately and fairly so as 
to inform and to protect the public.  See Doe No. 205614, 466 
Mass. at 596; Doe No. 89230, 452 Mass. at 772-773.13 
 
The board must rely on available scientific literature, 
admitted through expert testimony or submissions, in determining 
its classifications because "the development of evolving 
research is among the reasons that a hearing examiner is 
empowered to consider 'any information useful' beyond the 
[board's] enumerated risk factors."  Doe No. 205614, 466 Mass. 
at 605, quoting G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1).  In order to satisfy its 
statutory purpose, the board may consider any "growing 
scientific consensus," Doe No. 205614, supra at 608, in the form 
of expert testimony, especially when that expert opinion is not 
"specifically contemplated by the guidelines," id. at 604.  See 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 621, 624 (2010) (new science on 
effects of age on risk of reoffense sufficient for expert 
funds). 
                     
 
13 For a thorough statutory history of G. L. c. 6, § 178L, 
see Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 23656 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 483 Mass. 131, 133-134 (2019); Doe No. 205614, 466 
Mass. at 595-597. 
13 
 
As offense-free time prior to incarceration does not fall 
within the board's promulgated factors, see 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.40 (2013); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (2016), Dr. Zeizel's 
expert testimony was not repetitive, it was clearly relevant to 
the classification determination, and it would have aided the 
hearing examiner in accurately classifying Doe as required by 
G. L. c. 6, § 178L.  See Doe No. 89230, 452 Mass. at 773 
(experts aid board's classification).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 466 (2019).  Moreover, requiring Dr. 
Zeizel to testify as to Doe's risk of reoffense based on one 
factor divorced from other risk factors detracted from the 
usefulness of his opinion to the hearing examiner.  Generally, 
once the hearing examiner determines that a sex offender 
deserved expert funds, the expert's future testimony and 
submissions may be considered reliable, so long as the 
conclusions are not based on rumor or unreliable hearsay.  To 
the extent the hearing examiner does not credit the testimony or 
questions the underlying science or methodology, the expert may 
discount that testimony in rendering the classification 
decision. 
 
Hearing examiners must admit evidence unless it is 
"irrelevant, unreliable, [or] repetitive."  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.18(1) (2016).  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.19(1) (2013) 
(same except not mentioning "unreliable").  Expert evidence is 
14 
 
relevant to a board hearing, and therefore admissible, when it 
would assist the hearing examiner in interpreting evidence that 
lies outside common experience.  Expert evidence is reliable for 
the purposes of admissibility based not on the hearing 
examiner's view of the credibility of a particular expert, but 
on whether it is "the kind of evidence on which reasonable 
persons are accustomed to rely on in the conduct of serious 
affairs."  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.19(1) (2013).  See 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.18(1) (2016) (same).  Because board hearings 
involve no jury and the hearing examiner is the finder of fact, 
the hearing examiner need not be a gatekeeper, because there is 
no reason to protect the fact finder from undue influence due to 
unreliable expert testimony.  Expert testimony for a board 
classification hearing will therefore almost always fall within 
the regulatory definition of reliable.14 
 
Here, Dr. Zeizel's testimony satisfied the standard for the 
admissibility of his more comprehensive opinion as to Doe's risk 
of reoffense because it was relevant, reliable, and not 
repetitive of the promulgated board factors.  The hearing 
examiner therefore abused his discretion in limiting the scope 
                     
 
14 Where the relevancy, reliability, and nonrepetitiveness 
of the evidence is a close call, hearing examiners should err on 
the side of admissibility and then give the evidence the weight 
that they believe it is fairly entitled to receive. 
 
15 
 
of Dr. Zeizel's testimony.  We remand to the hearing examiner 
for a new hearing consistent with our conclusions of law.15 
 
d.  Video conferencing.  Doe argues that the board also 
violated his due process rights by conducting the hearing via 
video conference.  When considering due process challenges to 
the board's procedures, we apply the three-part test articulated 
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  See Noe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 5340 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 480 
Mass. 195, 202 (2018).  We balance (1) the individual's liberty 
or property interest and (2) the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of that liberty or property by the established 
government procedures and the probable value of additional or 
substitute safeguards, against (3) the interest the government 
seeks to achieve in using those procedures.  See id. 
 
First, as we have reiterated on numerous occasions, the 
petitioner in a sex offender classification hearing has a 
"sufficient liberty and privacy interest[] constitutionally 
protected by art. 12" of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, entitling him to receive due process before the board 
requires him to register and before it publishes or disseminates 
                     
 
15 Because we reach our conclusion based on the statutory 
language, and by analogy to the common law, we need not reach 
Doe's constitutional claims.  However, we are hard pressed to 
understand how the rules of admissibility would differ for 
appointed experts and hired experts. 
16 
 
that information online.  Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 
143 (1997).  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 303-308 (2015) 
(describing harsh penalties of registration and resulting 
constraints on one's liberty). 
 
The risk of erroneous deprivation, however, is dampened by 
the presence of other protections the board provided during the 
hearing.  See, e.g., 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.14 (2013) (right 
of representation at classification hearing); 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.15 (2016) (right to subpoena witnesses).  See also 
Gillespie v. Northampton, 460 Mass. 148, 157 (2011) (risk of 
erroneous deprivation lowered by protections of administrative 
hearing).  Doe had counsel present with him who could (and did) 
raise motions, object, introduce evidence, including witnesses 
and expert testimony, make arguments on Doe's behalf, and 
otherwise vigorously advocate for Doe.  See Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 1 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 79 Mass. App. 
Ct. 683, 693 (2011) (Doe No. 1).  See also 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 1.08, 1.09, 1.14, 1.15 (2013).  Moreover, board hearings 
focus mostly on documents and expert testimony, for which 
credibility determinations are not usually the central issue.  
See Doe No. 1, supra at 694.  The potential for prejudice due to 
video conferencing is therefore far less in the board hearings 
than in it may be in other contexts.  See id.  See also Shellman 
17 
 
v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 711, 721-722 (2012).  Despite a few 
technological and communication hitches,16 conducting the hearing 
via video conference sufficiently safeguarded against the risk 
of an erroneous classification. 
 
Third, according to the board, the government's interest in 
holding hearings via video conference is substantial.  See Doe 
No. 1, 79 Mass. App. Ct. at 695; G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (giving 
due weight to expertise of agency during judicial review).  
Unlike when the hearing examiner limited the scope of Dr. 
Zeizel's testimony, there are legitimate government interests 
undergirding the use of video conferencing technology because 
doing so saves significant cost and boosts efficiency, not only 
for the board's matters.17  See Doe No. 1, supra; Shellman, 284 
Va. at 721-722.  The board conducts many hearings with many sex 
offenders in far-flung parts of Massachusetts, with only a few 
hearing examiners.  Doe No. 1, supra.  Video conferencing 
enables the board to conduct more hearings more promptly, by 
                     
 
16 During hearings conducted by video conferencing, as in 
other contexts, it is important that the attorneys not talk over 
each other, if for no other reason than that there be a pristine 
record of the proceedings. 
 
17 Our judicial system routinely relies on video 
conferencing for bail hearings precisely for its cost savings 
and efficiency.  See Mass. Law Weekly, vol. 21, no. 42, at 1, 32 
(July 5, 1993) (video bail program in Superior Court created to 
alleviate overcrowding at pretrial detentions and to reduce 
transportation costs in bringing prisoners back and forth). 
18 
 
liberating time otherwise wasted traveling.  Id.  We therefore 
hold that, in the context of Doe's classification hearing in 
front of the board, conducting the hearing via video conference 
did not violate due process. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, we remand to the 
Superior Court for entry of an order remanding the matter to the 
board to hold another hearing at which Doe's expert may testify 
as to any relevant, reliable, and nonrepetitive evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.