Case Title: Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A. v. Flynn

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015 ME 134

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2015-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2015 ME 134 
Docket: 
Cum-14-333 
Argued: 
September 17, 2015 
Decided: 
October 20, 2015 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
DANIEL G. LILLEY LAW OFFICE, P.A. et al. 
 
v. 
 
JOHN P. FLYNN III 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  John P. Flynn III appeals, and Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A. (LLO) 
and Daniel G. Lilley cross-appeal,1 from an amended civil judgment entered in the 
Superior Court (Cumberland County, Cole, J.) following a jury trial.  In 
accordance with the jury’s verdict, the judgment awarded Flynn unpaid salary from 
his tenure at LLO and apportioned attorney fees between the parties in cases that 
Flynn brought to LLO from his former law firm. 
[¶2]  Flynn contends that the court erred by (1) amending its judgment, 
(2) submitting certain questions concerning the parties’ employment agreement to 
the jury, and (3) declining his request to order LLO to turn over financial records 
in discovery.  He also asserts that the jury’s findings concerning fee division and 
                                         
1  Daniel G. Lilley, Esq., is the principal of Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A (LLO).  Where an action 
discussed is attributable to one or the other, this opinion does so.  If it is unclear whether an act is 
attributable to Lilley, LLO, or both, the terms “Lilley” and “LLO” may be considered one and the same.  
 
2 
the question of which party breached the employment agreement were unsupported 
by the evidence.  LLO contends that the court was required as a matter of law to 
rule in its favor on Flynn’s claim for unpaid salary, and that in one of the disputed 
cases Flynn accepted $50,000 as an accord and satisfaction and was therefore 
entitled to no more. 
[¶3]  We conclude that the court (Wheeler, J.) abused its discretion in 
declining to consolidate this case with the closely-related cases at issue in Tucker 
v. Lilley, 2015 ME 36, 114 A.3d 201, as both parties urged it to do.  For that 
reason, we vacate the amended judgment and remand with instructions to grant 
LLO’s motion to consolidate. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶4]  The facts are not disputed.  As the Superior Court noted in its order on 
the parties’ motions for summary judgment, “[b]roadly speaking, this case arises 
from an employment relationship that went entirely awry.” 
 
[¶5]  Flynn and Lilley are both practicing Maine attorneys.  Tucker, 
2015 ME 36, ¶ 2, 114 A.3d 201.  In February 2009, Flynn left the law firm of 
Troubh Heisler (Troubh) to join LLO.  Id. ¶ 4.  Flynn and Lilley entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning the terms of Flynn’s 
employment at LLO.  Nineteen days later, Flynn, LLO, and Troubh entered into a 
 
3 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) concerning referral fees due Troubh on cases 
that went to LLO with Flynn.  Id. ¶ 7. 
 
[¶6]  While at LLO, Flynn obtained favorable verdicts in, inter alia, Paige v. 
MMC and Braley v. EMMC, two cases listed in the MOA.  In 2010, the Paige 
verdict resulted in approximately $173,000 in attorney fees; following a heated 
dispute over the amount due Flynn, LLO issued, and Flynn cashed, a check for 
$50,000 bearing a notation on the memo line “Paige Compensation in full.”  More 
than a year later, the Braley verdict resulted in $1,240,000 in attorney fees that 
were placed in escrow until disputes among Flynn, LLO, Troubh, and 
Attorney Richard Tucker could be resolved.  Id. ¶¶ 4-5.  Flynn left LLO in 
July 2011 to open his own practice.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 
[¶7]  In September 2011, LLO and Lilley filed a seven-count complaint 
against Flynn, primarily seeking (1) a judicial declaration that any contingency 
fees earned in cases that Flynn brought to LLO, as well as in cases that Flynn 
worked on that originated at LLO, were the property of LLO to be distributed at 
Lilley’s sole discretion; and (2) the return of such fees that Flynn had already 
received.  Flynn filed an answer and a counterclaim.  In October 2012, the court 
denied LLO’s motion to consolidate this case with the cases at issue in Tucker.  
See id. ¶¶ 6, 9. 
 
4 
 
[¶8]  LLO moved for summary judgment on all counts of Flynn’s 
counterclaim and Flynn cross-moved for partial summary judgment on his claim 
that the section of the MOU concerning the cases that Flynn brought to LLO from 
Troubh was an enforceable contract.  The court granted LLO partial summary 
judgment, allowing Flynn’s claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and 
unjust enrichment to proceed to trial, and denied Flynn’s motion altogether. 
 
[¶9]  The case was tried to a jury on May 12-16 and May 19-20, 2014.  In its 
responses on a special verdict form, the jury: 
• Awarded Flynn $23,653.72 in unpaid salary 
• Found that Flynn was entitled to a bonus from LLO, but awarded $0 
• Found that the MOA modified the MOU, and that both parties had 
breached the MOU as modified 
• Split the Braley fee 25% to Flynn and 75% to “Attorney Lilley/Daniel G. 
Lilley, Esq. Law Offices” 
• Split the Paige fee 90% to Flynn and 10% to “Attorney Lilley/Daniel G. 
Lilley, Esq. Law Offices” 
• Split the fee on remaining Flynn/Troubh cases 25% to Flynn and 75% to 
“Attorney Lilley/Daniel G. Lilley, Esq. Law Offices” 
 
 
[¶10]  In July 2014, the court entered judgment after hearing and then 
denying several post-trial motions, including LLO’s request for an equitable 
accounting and Flynn’s motion for a new trial.  Flynn moved to alter or amend the 
judgment, and then filed a notice of appeal.  LLO cross-appealed. 
 
5 
 
[¶11]  On February 6, 2015, the court issued an amended judgment that, in 
part, listed by name the Flynn/Troubh cases subject to a 25% Flynn, 75% LLO 
split; namely, all of the cases listed in the MOA except Braley and Paige.2 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Consolidation 
 
[¶12]  LLO’s motion to consolidate in this case, filed on May 14, 2012, and 
denied by the trial court on October 29, 2012, is the same motion—involving the 
same cases—that was filed in Tucker, where we said that 
[b]y rule, when actions involving a common question of law or fact 
are pending before the court . . . it may order all the actions 
consolidated . . . . M.R. Civ. P. 42(a).  The power to order 
consolidation is within the court’s discretion.  Although this standard 
of review is deferential, it does not give a trial court unfettered 
discretion to separate cases, or parts of cases, when closely-related 
claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims among the parties directly 
affect what any particular party may eventually be awarded and which 
party will be required to pay those awards. 
 
Here, in its summary judgment order, the court adjudicated several of 
the interrelated contract claims, yet several important claims and 
issues in the two cases remain unresolved.  They include . . . whether 
Flynn’s claim that Troubh breached the [separation agreement 
between Troubh and Flynn] and thereby nullified its entitlement to a 
fee under the MOA [between Flynn, Troubh, and LLO] will be 
successful, with the potential result that Troubh is owed nothing; and 
[] whatever the fees due Tucker and Troubh may prove to be, which 
                                         
2  Flynn’s earlier notice of appeal did not bar the court’s action because M.R. App. P. 3(b) allows a 
trial court to act following the docketing of an appeal in the Law Court “in civil cases . . . as is [] 
necessary . . . to dispose of any timely motion made pursuant to one of the rules enumerated in 
Rule 2(b)(2) & (3).”  One of the motions listed in Rule 2(b)(3) is “a motion under M.R. Civ. P. 59 to alter 
or amend the judgment.”  M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3). 
 
6 
party has to pay them as between Flynn and LLO.  We conclude that, 
with the exception of Tucker’s claim against Flynn, these disputes 
must be resolved in one consolidated action before a single 
fact-finder, and therefore it was an abuse of discretion for the court to 
decide some claims, but not others, in piecemeal fashion. . . .  Lilley’s 
motions to consolidate should have been granted.  To that end, we 
vacate the remaining judgments and dispositions in these two cases. 
 
Id. ¶¶ 16-17 (alteration, footnotes, and quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶13]  We noted in Tucker that “[b]ecause they are not before us, we do not 
decide whether other cases listed in Lilley’s motion not involving the Braley 
matter should also be consolidated.”  Id. ¶ 17 n.2.  The question of whether one of 
those other cases—the case at bar—should have been consolidated as well, 
although not raised by the parties, is squarely presented in this appeal.  Our view 
has not changed since Tucker was decided.  Because this case is an integral 
member of the set of cases that “must be resolved in one consolidated action before 
a single fact-finder,” id. ¶ 17, the trial court’s failure to do so was an abuse of 
discretion requiring that the judgment be vacated. 
 
[¶14]  As support for this conclusion, beyond what we said in Tucker, we 
need do no more than agree with both parties’ arguments to the trial court in 
support of consolidation.  LLO asserted that 
[i]f this [c]ourt was to allow all of these separate actions to proceed in 
their own ways before different judges and at different times then the 
only guarantee is that there will be confusion and near certain chaos.  
There is just no simple way to litigate any one case, as much as 
everyone would like it to be so, to the exclusion of the others without 
 
7 
unintended consequences. . . . [T]here is no practical way of 
addressing these cases in the abstract, separately.  The appropriate . . . 
way is to have all of the cases consolidated together, before one 
judge[.] 
 
Flynn replied that 
[a]lthough Flynn basically disagrees with Lilley on virtually all fronts, 
he agrees with Lilley with respect to the Motion to Consolidate all 
matters into one matter before a single Justice.  Flynn agrees that the 
issue of apportionment of attorney[] fees between the [various parties] 
involves interrelated factual and legal issues.  Flynn further agrees 
that there is no practical way of addressing these cases in the abstract, 
separately. . . . [T]here are countless . . . questions concerning the 
interrelation between the parties and their claims that will be raised 
during the course of the litigation. 
 
 
[¶15]  On the authority of Tucker, LLO and Flynn are correct—this case 
must be consolidated with the others and then resolved “before a single 
fact-finder,” not “in piecemeal fashion.”  Id. 
B. 
Interrelationship of the MOU and MOA  
 
[¶16]  Because we vacate the judgment on other grounds, it is unnecessary 
for us to reach the parties’ numerous substantive arguments.  However, in keeping 
with our occasional practice to address significant issues that are likely to recur 
“for the guidance of the court and counsel in the event of a new trial,”3 we discuss 
one issue emphasized by the parties that we find to be straightforward, namely 
Flynn’s assertion that the trial court erred in asking the jury to decide whether the 
                                         
3  State v. Palmer, 624 A.2d 469, 471 (Me. 1993) (quotation marks omitted); see State v. Almurshidy, 
1999 ME 97, ¶ 26, 732 A.2d 280. 
 
8 
MOA modified the earlier MOU.  Because, as a matter of law, the unambiguous 
language of the MOA did not modify the MOU, it was an abuse of discretion to 
submit that question to the jury.  See Williams v. Inverness Corp., 664 A.2d 1244, 
1247 (Me. 1995) (stating that a trial court has “broad discretion in framing the 
interrogatories submitted to a jury in a special verdict form”); but see Whitehouse 
v. Bolster, 95 Me. 458, 461 (1901) (“If there were any warrantable inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence, tending to support the contention of the claimant, the 
question should have been submitted to the jury.” (emphasis added)). 
 
[¶17]  The “[i]nterpretation of an unambiguous [contract] provision is a 
matter of law, and the provision is given its plain, ordinary, and generally accepted 
meaning.”  Reliance Nat’l Indem. v. Knowles Indus. Servs., Corp., 2005 ME 29, 
¶ 24, 868 A.2d 220 (quotation marks omitted).  The MOA makes no reference to 
the MOU whatsoever.  It first recites that it is an agreement among Troubh, Flynn, 
and LLO, and that it is entered into “in contemplation of Flynn’s departure from 
[Troubh] to work at Lilley.”  It then goes on to say, in substantive part: 
 
For those clients whose cases are listed on the attached page 
who choose to have their cases transferred to Lilley with Flynn, it is 
the parties’ intention that Flynn and Lilley will pay a referral fee to 
[Troubh] if and when any legal fees are paid to Flynn and/or Lilley. 
 
 
For each such case, the referral fee paid to [Troubh] will be 
equal to a percentage of the total fees received by Flynn and or Lilley 
on that case.  The percentage referral fee for each case is listed in the 
right-hand column of the attached page. 
 
9 
 
 
[¶18]  The language of the MOA is simple and unambiguous.  Its purpose 
and effect is to obligate Flynn and LLO to pay Troubh an agreed-upon referral fee 
in listed cases when either Flynn or LLO receives any legal fees in those cases.  It 
is silent concerning how Flynn and LLO are to divide attorney fees between 
themselves in those cases after Troubh’s referral fee is paid.  Construing the MOA 
according to its plain language, it does not, and does not purport to, modify the 
MOU.  Accordingly, the court erred in submitting the question of whether it did to 
the jury. 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded with instructions to 
grant Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A.’s motion 
to consolidate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Mark V. Franco, Esq., and Jason P. Donovan, Esq., Thompson 
& Bowie, LLP, Portland, for appellant John P. Flynn III 
 
Walter F. McKee, Esq., and Matthew D. Morgan, Esq., McKee 
Billings, P.A., Augusta, for cross-appellant Daniel G. Lilley 
Law Office, P.A., et al. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
At oral argument: 
 
Mark V. Franco, Esq., for appellant John P. Flynn III 
 
Walter F. McKee, Esq., for cross-appellant Daniel G. Lilley 
Law Office, P.A., et al. 
 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2011-403 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY