Case Title: Andersen v. Highland House Co.

Citation: 2001-Ohio-1607

Docket Number: 20001214

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Andersen v. Highland House Co. , 93 Ohio St.3d 547, 2001-Ohio-1607] 
 
 
ANDERSEN, ADMR., v. HIGHLAND HOUSE COMPANY ET AL., APPELLANTS; 
INDIANA INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Andersen v. Highland House Co. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 547.] 
Insurance — Carbon monoxide emitted from a residential heater is not a 
“pollutant” under the pollution exclusion of a commercial general 
liability insurance policy unless specifically enumerated as such. 
(No. 00-1214 — Submitted May 15, 2001 — Decided November 14, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 75769. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Carbon monoxide emitted from a residential heater is not a “pollutant” under the 
pollution exclusion of a commercial general liability insurance policy 
unless specifically enumerated as such. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  On March 7, 1997, Lisa Andersen died and 
Daniel Wojtala was injured after inhaling carbon monoxide fumes from a faulty 
heating unit inside the Highland House Apartments, a multiunit complex owned 
by appellant Highland House Company (“Highland House”) and managed by 
appellant Renaissance Management, Inc. (“RMI”).  At the time of the accident, 
Highland House and RMI were covered by commercial insurance policies issued 
by appellee Indiana Insurance Company (“Indiana Insurance”).  All of the policies 
contained pollution exclusions. 
 
As a result of Andersen’s death, three lawsuits were filed.  In the first 
action, Andersen’s estate sued Highland House and RMI for wrongful death.  In 
the second action, Highland House and RMI sought a declaratory judgment that 
Indiana Insurance had a duty to defend and indemnify them in the wrongful death 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
action.  In the third action, Indiana Insurance sought a declaratory judgment that it 
did not have a duty to defend and indemnify Highland House and RMI.  All three 
cases were consolidated and the underlying tort claims were settled.  Thereafter, 
the trial court focused on the scope of policy coverage relative to the pollution 
exclusions. 
 
Highland House and RMI moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 
pollution exclusion language was ambiguous and should only be construed as 
pertaining to environmental pollution.  Conversely, Indiana Insurance contended 
that the policy language was unambiguous and clearly excluded claims for death 
and injuries related to residential carbon monoxide poisoning.  The trial court 
ruled in favor of Highland House and RMI, and Indiana Insurance appealed.  The 
Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the policies precluded 
coverage.  The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
 
The issue before us is whether the pollution exclusion language in the 
present case precludes coverage for death and injuries stemming from residential 
carbon monoxide poisoning.  We hold today that Indiana Insurance does have a 
duty to defend and indemnify the insureds because the policy language in 
question does not clearly, specifically, and unambiguously state that coverage for 
residential carbon monoxide poisoning is excluded. We, therefore, reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed under a de novo standard.  Doe 
v. Shaffer (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 390, 738 N.E.2d 1243, 1245.  In order to 
resolve the coverage question, we must first review the pollution exclusion policy 
language.  In pertinent part, the exclusion states: 
 
“2.  Exclusions. 
 
“This insurance does not apply to: 
 
“* * * 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
“f.  Pollution 
 
“(1) ‘Bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ arising out of the actual, alleged 
or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of 
pollutants: 
 
“(a) At or from any premises, site or location which is or was at any time 
owned or occupied by, or rented or loaned to, any insured; 
 
“* * * 
 
“Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or 
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and 
waste.” 
 
In Dealers Dairy Products Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. (1960), 170 Ohio St. 336, 
10 O.O.2d 424, 164 N.E.2d 745, paragraph one of the syllabus, the court 
established that “[a] policy of insurance is a contract and like any other contract is 
to be given a reasonable construction in conformity with the intention of the 
parties as gathered from the ordinary and commonly understood meaning of the 
language employed.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Indiana Insurance argues that carbon monoxide qualifies as a “pollutant” 
in the instant case because it is a “gaseous * * * irritant or contaminant” and that 
by definition, it is “a colorless odorless very toxic gas * * * formed as a product 
of the incomplete combustion of carbon * * *.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary (1986) 336.  Indiana Insurance further contends that 
Highland House and RMI should have known that deaths and injuries caused by 
carbon monoxide poisoning would not be covered based on the general definition 
of “pollutants” provided in the policy.  However, in Home Indemn. Co. of New 
York v. Plymouth (1945), 146 Ohio St. 96, 32 O.O. 30, 64 N.E.2d 248, paragraph 
two of the syllabus, this court stated that “[w]here exceptions * * * are introduced 
into an insurance contract, a general presumption arises to the effect that that 
which is not clearly excluded from the operation of such contract is included in 
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the operation thereof.”  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, Plymouth reasons that if a 
policy does not plainly exclude a claim from coverage, then an insured may infer 
that the claim will be covered. 
 
In the case at bar, the policy in question never clearly excludes claims for 
deaths or injuries caused by residential carbon monoxide poisoning.  It is not the 
responsibility of the insured to guess whether certain occurrences will or will not 
be covered based on nonspecific and generic words or phrases that could be 
construed in a variety of ways. Thus, in order to defeat coverage, “the insurer 
must establish not merely that the policy is capable of the construction it favors, 
but rather that such an interpretation is the only one that can fairly be placed on 
the language in question.”  Reiter, Strasser & Pohlman, The Pollution Exclusion 
Under Ohio Law: Staying The Course (1991), 59 U.Cin.L.Rev. 1165, 1179.  See 
Lane v. Grange Mut. Cos. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 63, 65, 543 N.E.2d 488, 490 
(“Where provisions of a contract of insurance are reasonably susceptible of more 
than one interpretation, they will be construed strictly against the insurer and 
liberally in favor of the insured”). 
 
Furthermore, the genesis of the pollution exclusion does not support the 
notion that it was created to preclude the kind of claim involved in this case.  In 
June 1970, the insurance industry “went on record as being ‘against’ intentional 
polluters and promulgated the qualified pollution exclusion for insertion in all 
comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance policies.”  (Footnotes omitted.)  
Reiter, Strasser & Pohlman, supra, 59 U.Cin.L.Rev. at 1168.  The insurance 
industry explained that “[a]ccidental pollution continued to be insured under a 
CGL policy, but deliberate polluters would remain uncovered, unable to use 
insurance to avoid the financial consequences of their acts.  On the basis of these 
representations, nearly every state, including Ohio, allowed the introduction of 
this new, qualified pollution exclusion.”  (Footnotes omitted.)  Id. 
January Term, 2001 
5 
 
The exclusion disputed in the case at bar, the absolute pollution exclusion, 
“was drafted during the early 1980s and was incorporated into the standard form 
CGL [policies] in 1986.”  Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing 
the “Absolute” Exclusion in Context and in Accord With Its Purpose and Party 
Expectations (1998), 34 Tort & Ins.L.J. 1, 5.  The purpose of the new exclusion 
was “to replace the 1973 ‘sudden and accidental’ exclusion because insurers were 
distressed by judicial decisions holding that the 1973 exclusion did not preclude 
coverage for gradual but unintentional pollution.”  Id.  Further, “[t]he absolute 
exclusion was designed to bar coverage for gradual environmental degradation of 
any type and to preclude coverage responsibility for government-mandated 
cleanup[s].”  Id. 
 
Based on the history and original purposes for the pollution exclusion, it 
was reasonable for Highland House and RMI to believe that the policies 
purchased for their multiunit complex would not exclude claims for injuries due 
to carbon monoxide leaks.  Thus, since insurance policies are interpreted strictly 
against the insurer, “[i]t will not suffice for [Indiana Insurance] to demonstrate 
that its interpretation is more reasonable than the policyholder’s.”  Reiter, Strasser 
& Pohlman, supra, 59 U.Cin.L.Rev. at 1179.  See Am. Fin. Corp. v. Fireman’s 
Fund Ins. Co. (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 171, 174, 44 O.O.2d 147, 148, 239 N.E.2d 
33, 35 (“[T]he insurer, being the one who selects the language, must be specific in 
its use, and an exclusion from liability must be clear and exact in order to be 
given effect”). 
 
The legal effect of the reasonable belief on the part of Highland House and 
RMI is comparable to the effect of the reasonable-expectations doctrine. 
 
The Restatement of the Law 2d, Contracts (1981), Section 211, Comment 
f, discusses the ambit of the reasonable-expectations doctrine: 
 
“Terms excluded. * * * Although customers typically adhere to 
standardized agreements and are bound by them without even appearing to know 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
the standard terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are 
beyond the range of reasonable expectation.  * * * Similarly, a party who adheres 
to the other party’s standard terms does not assent to a term if the other party has 
reason to believe that the adhering party would not have accepted the agreement if 
he had known that the agreement contained the particular term.  * * * Reason to 
believe may be inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or oppressive, from 
the fact that it eviscerates the non-standard terms explicitly agreed to, or from the 
fact that it eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction.” 
 
While we make no determination on the merits of the reasonable-
expectations doctrine, this rationale could apply to the case at bar.  Highland 
House and RMI are both involved in the rental property business.  A major 
concern of these two entities, and many owners and managers of commercial and 
residential property, is deaths or injuries caused by carbon monoxide poisoning.  
To protect themselves from any potential claims based on that hazard, the two 
companies were covered by insurance policies.  None of the policies identified 
carbon monoxide poisoning as a hazard excluded from coverage.  Based on the 
information given in the policies, Highland and RMI reasonably believed that 
Indiana Insurance would defend and indemnify them against claims related to 
potential premises hazards and did not anticipate that such claims would be 
denied based on the pollution exclusion. 
 
Other jurisdictions also recognize the importance of interpreting 
ambiguities in insurance contracts in favor of the insured.  In Davis v. M.L.G. 
Corp. (Colo.1986), 712 P.2d 985, 989, the court, quoting Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. 
v. Quigley (1977), 118 R.I. 321, 325-326, 373 A.2d 810, 812, stated: “ ‘If there 
remains any doubt, the terms should be read in the sense which the insurer had 
reason to believe they would be interpreted by the ordinary reader and purchaser.  
The test to be applied is not what the insurer intended by his words, but what the 
ordinary reader and purchaser would have understood them to mean.’ ”  
January Term, 2001 
7 
(Emphasis added.)  In Regional Bank of Colorado, N.A. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co. (C.A.10, 1994), 35 F.3d 494, 498, the court said that “[w]hile a 
reasonable person of ordinary intelligence might well understand [that] carbon 
monoxide is a pollutant when it is emitted in an industrial or environmental 
setting, an ordinary policyholder would not reasonably characterize carbon 
monoxide emitted from a residential heater which malfunctioned as ‘pollution.’ ”  
Although these cases are not controlling, they do provide persuasive support for 
the underlying notion that this particular policy language is ambiguous and 
therefore should be interpreted in favor of the insured.  As the final authority on 
Ohio law, we must take the opportunity to prevent an absurd and unreasonable 
result—one that was never clearly intended by Highland House or RMI and one 
that was never clearly communicated by Indiana Insurance.  The court in Am. 
States Ins. Co. v. Koloms (1997), 177 Ill.2d 473, 492-493, 227 Ill.Dec. 149, 158, 
687 N.E.2d 72, 81, best described the real purpose of the pollution exclusion 
when it wrote: “Our review of the history of the pollution exclusion amply 
demonstrates that the predominate motivation in drafting an exclusion for 
pollution-related injuries was the avoidance of the ‘enormous expense and 
exposure resulting from the “explosion” of environmental litigation.’  (Emphasis 
added.)  Weaver [v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. (1996)], 140 N.H. [780] at 783, 674 
A.2d [975] at 977, quoting Vantage Development Corp. v. American Environment 
Technologies Corp., 251 N.J.Super. 516, 525, 598 A.2d 948, 953 (1991).  * * *  
We would be remiss * * * if we were to simply look to the bare words of the 
exclusion, ignore its raison d’etre, and apply it to situations which do not 
remotely resemble traditional environmental contamination.”  Based on this sound 
logic, and on other principles stated herein, we hold that carbon monoxide emitted 
from a malfunctioning residential heater is not a pollutant under the pollution 
exclusion of a comprehensive general liability policy unless specifically 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
enumerated as such.  We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur 
separately. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring.  I concur in the syllabus, judgment, and 
opinion of the majority.  I write further only to bring attention to evidence in the 
record that I believe shows that Indiana Insurance intended these policies to 
provide coverage for accidents involving carbon monoxide exposure.  This 
evidence is in the form of an “Apartment Evaluation Supplement” questionnaire 
completed by an underwriter for Indiana Insurance in determining whether to 
issue insurance policies to Highland House and RMI.  The questionnaire was to 
be “used by the underwriter to review * * * all the major underwriting standards 
important in the determination if a risk qualifies for [insurance]” and was “meant 
to alert the underwriter to the more common elements of underwriting this class 
of business.”  Under the heading “Premises Liability” the questionnaire asks 
whether carbon monoxide detectors are provided in the apartments.  (The word 
“some” was written next to this inquiry on the questionnaire.)  If, as Indiana 
Insurance asserts, the standard commercial general liability insurance policy 
denies coverage for carbon monoxide exposure, then why would the standard 
apartment evaluation supplement question whether carbon monoxide detectors are 
provided in the apartments and why would the underwriter feel compelled to 
answer the question?  If carbon monoxide exposure were not covered, then why 
would this information be “important in the determination if a risk qualifies for 
[insurance]”?  I believe that this questionnaire clearly shows that Indiana 
January Term, 2001 
9 
Insurance intended its commercial general liability policies of insurance to 
provide coverage for carbon monoxide exposure notwithstanding its pollution 
exclusion.  At a minimum, the underwriter’s request for this information from a 
potential insured supports the potential insured’s reasonable belief that liability 
for such accidents would be covered by the policy. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing 
concurring opinion. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting. Today’s majority relies upon questionable 
analytical foundations in a strained attempt to find coverage where none exists.  I 
therefore respectfully dissent for the reasons that follow. 
Interpretation of the Pollution Exclusion 
 
Each of the policy exclusions at bar states, with minor variations in 
wording irrelevant to this court’s inquiry, that coverage does not extend to “ 
‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ arising out of the actual, alleged or 
threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of 
pollutants.”  A “pollutant” is defined as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal 
irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, 
chemicals and waste.” 
 
Construing this language, the trial court held that the exclusion applied 
“only to environmental discharge of traditionally environmental pollutants and 
not to cases involving exposure to carbon monoxide produced by a defective 
heating unit inside of a residential apartment unit.”  The court of appeals rejected 
this conclusion, holding that “the pollution exclusion in the insurance contract 
issued to the insureds clearly and unambiguously precluded coverage for the 
claims asserted by the injured parties.” 
 
I agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the court of appeals.  It is 
well settled that  “insurance contracts must be construed in accordance with the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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same rules as other written contracts.”  Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. 
Co., Ltd.  (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 657, 665, 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1102.  Therefore, “if 
the language of the policy’s provisions is clear and unambiguous, this court may 
not ‘resort to construction of that language.’ ”  Id., quoting Karabin v. State Auto. 
Mut. Ins. Co. (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 163, 167, 10 OBR 497, 499, 462 N.E.2d 403, 
406.  Rather, courts must give the words and phrases used in an insurance policy “ 
‘their natural and commonly accepted meaning, where they in fact possess such 
meaning, to the end that a reasonable interpretation of the insurance contract 
consistent with the apparent object and plain intent of the parties may be 
determined.’ ”  Id., quoting Tomlinson v. Skolnik (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 11, 12, 
540 N.E.2d 716, 717-718. 
 
Whether the carbon monoxide incident that occurred in this case fits 
within the pollution exclusion therefore depends upon the meaning of the 
exclusion language.  The majority finds that the exclusions contain “nonspecific 
and generic words or phrases that could be construed in a variety of ways.”  This 
conclusion, however, both devalues any suggestion that, absent contrary intent, 
some words carry fixed meanings and favors conjuring ambiguity over 
objectivity. 
 
The exclusions’ heading is “pollution.”  Two natural and commonly 
accepted meanings of pollution are “1: the action of polluting [especially] by 
environmental contamination with man-made waste; also: the condition of being 
polluted  2: POLLUTANT.” (First emphasis added.)  Merriam-Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary (10 Ed.1999) 902.  The dictionary definition of a 
“pollutant” is simply “something that pollutes.”  Id.  As noted, the exclusions 
provide a more detailed definition of “pollutants.” 
 
Carbon monoxide fits into both definitions of a pollutant, as its commonly 
accepted meaning is “a colorless odorless very toxic gas CO that burns to carbon 
dioxide with a blue flame and is formed as a product of the incomplete 
January Term, 2001 
11 
combustion of carbon.”  (Emphasis added.)  Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary, supra, at 171.  This definition falls within the exclusion’s definition of 
pollution as “any * * * gaseous * * * irritant or contaminant, including * * * 
vapor, * * * fumes, * * * [and] chemicals.”  One commonly accepted meaning of 
“vapor” is “a substance in the gaseous state as distinguished from the liquid or 
solid state.” (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 1306.  Similarly, a “fume” is “a smoke, 
vapor, or gas [especially] when irritating or offensive” or “an often noxious 
suspension of particles in a gas (as air).”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 472.  These 
are not technical definitions describing environmental terms of art.  The words are 
neither “nonspecific” nor “generic.”  Rather, these are common words bearing 
commonly accepted meanings available to any layperson.  Therefore, I conclude 
both that carbon monoxide falls within the foregoing definition of a “pollutant” 
and that the policies clearly exclude coverage. 
 
Courts construing Ohio law have reached similar conclusions regarding 
pollution exclusions.  See Zell v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co. (1996), 114 Ohio 
App.3d 677, 683 N.E.2d 1154 (pollution exclusion precluded coverage for fumes 
from weatherproofing materials); Air Prods. & Chems. v. Indiana Ins. Co. (Dec. 
23, 1999), Hamilton App. Nos. C-980947 and C-990009, unreported, 2000 WL 
955600, at *6 (pollution exclusion precluded coverage for methane gas leak); 
Owners Ins. Co. v. Singh (Sept. 21, 1999), Richland App. No. 98-CA-108, 
unreported, 1999 WL 976249, at *3 (pollution exclusion was clear and 
unambiguous so as to preclude coverage for carbon monoxide from a 
malfunctioning furnace).  See, also, Longaberger Co. v. United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co. (S.D.Ohio 1998), 31 F.Supp.2d 595, affirmed (C.A.6, 1999), 201 F.3d 
441 (unpublished disposition), opinion at 1999 WL 1252874 (both holding that 
under Ohio law a similar pollution exclusion was not ambiguous and precluded 
coverage for carbon monoxide released into a home by a furnace). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion regarding 
the scope of such pollution exclusions.  See, e.g., Deni Assoc. of Florida, Inc. v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. (Fla.1998), 711 So.2d 1135, 1138, quoting Am. 
States Ins. Co. v. F.H.S., Inc. (S.D.Miss.1991), 843 F.Supp. 187, 190 (“The court 
reiterates that it is not free to rewrite the terms of the insurance contract where 
that contract is not ambiguous”); W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Band & Desenberg 
(M.D.Fla.1996), 925 F.Supp. 758, 761 (“The majority of courts that have 
reviewed these absolute [pollution] exclusions have found them to be 
unambiguous and have enforced then in accordance with their plain language”).  
See, also, 9 Russ & Segalla, Couch on Insurance (3 Ed.1997) 127-36 to 127-37, 
Section 127:14, fn. 30 (collecting cases that have found “absolute” pollution 
exclusions unambiguous), and 127-39, Section 127:15 (noting that the majority 
view regards such exclusions as unambiguous).  Accordingly, I would hold that 
the pollution exclusions at issue herein clearly and unambiguously preclude 
coverage. 
Historical Context of the Exclusion 
 
The majority relies upon “the genesis of the pollution exclusion” to 
conclude that “[b]ased on the history and original purposes for the pollution 
exclusion, it was reasonable for Highland House and RMI to believe that the 
policies purchased for their multiunit complex would not exclude claims for 
injuries due to carbon monoxide leaks.”  Without citing a basis for doing so, the 
majority apparently credits Highland House and RMI as having had knowledge of 
the historical development of absolute pollution exclusions at the time they 
purchased the relevant policies and accepts this as informing the relevant policy 
language.  But Indiana Insurance argues that Highland House and RMI failed to 
produce summary judgment evidence in the record supporting this “historical 
context” argument. 
January Term, 2001 
13 
 
By focusing on supposed after-the-fact knowledge of the insureds, the 
majority narrows the meaning of the pollution exclusions beyond that conveyed 
by the common understanding of the words.  The policy language itself, however, 
offers no reason to eschew the dictionary uses of these common words in favor of 
discerning the meaning from the historical development of pollution exclusions.  
The text of the policy exclusions guides judicial interpretation.  Nothing in the 
text of the policies limits application of the exclusions to environmental-type 
pollution. 
 
Instead, as noted, the exclusions contain ordinary words that on their face 
bear the broad application understood by the court of appeals here.  To collapse 
the exclusions’ broad meaning in the way the majority does contradicts axiomatic 
contract principles.  See Hybud Equip. Corp., 64 Ohio St.3d at 665, 597 N.E.2d at 
1102 (court cannot engage in construction of policy language when language is 
clear and unambiguous).  See, also, Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. 
Co. (1996), 451 Pa.Super. 136, 144, 678 A.2d 802, 806 (declining to divine the 
public policy behind an exclusion where “the policy language is clear and 
unambiguous” and where such an exercise would “ ‘convolute the plain meaning 
of a writing merely to find an ambiguity,’ ” quoting O’Brien Energy Sys., Inc. v. 
Am. Employers’ Ins. Co. [1993], 427 Pa.Super. 456, 462, 629 A.2d 957, 960). 
Reasonable-Expectations Doctrine 
 
Despite the foregoing substantive deficiencies, the majority nonetheless 
finds the effect of Highland House’s and RMI’s alleged history-based belief 
“comparable to the effect of the reasonable-expectations doctrine.”  While then 
professing to “make no determination on the merits of the reasonable-expectations 
doctrine,” the majority proceeds in the following pages to find that the doctrine’s 
rationale could apply to the case at bar.  Such dicta serve only to confuse the state 
of insurance law in Ohio. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
In its earliest formation, the reasonable-expectations doctrine arose from 
two principles: that “an insurer will be denied any unconscionable advantage in an 
insurance transaction,” and that “the reasonable expectations of applicants and 
intended beneficiaries [of an insurance policy] will be honored.”  Keeton, 
Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions (Part One) (1970), 83 
Harv.L.Rev. 961.  See, also, Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With 
Policy Provisions (Part Two) (1970), 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1281.  Courts have 
disagreed over the scope and operation of this doctrine.  See, generally, Swisher, 
A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable 
Expectations (2000), 35 Tort & Ins.L.J. 729; Henderson, The Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades (1990), 51 Ohio 
St.L.J. 823; Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine (1989), 56 
U.Chi.L.Rev. 1461. 
 
Some courts, for example, adhere to the belief that the doctrine operates in 
instances of ambiguity, permitting a court to grant coverage “if ‘the policyholder, 
upon reading the contract language is led to a reasonable expectation of 
coverage.’ ”  Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kellman (C.A.6, 1999), 197 F.3d 1178, 
1183, quoting Fire Ins. Exchange v. Diehl (1996), 450 Mich. 678, 687, 545 
N.W.2d 602, 606; Max True Plastering Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. 
(Okla.1996), 912 P.2d 861, 868-869.  See, also, Ware, 56 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 1467-
1468, fn. 32 (collecting cases using this approach).  Other courts have adopted a 
more expansive understanding of the doctrine in which “even an unambiguous 
policy may be ‘interpreted according to the reasonable expectations of the 
insured.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  Nelson v. Becton (C.A.8, 1991), 929 F.2d 1287, 
quoting Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Natl. Mut. Ins. Co. (Minn.1985), 366 
N.W.2d 271, 277.  See, also, Ware, 56 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 1469-1472, fn. 40 
(collecting cases adopting a “fine-print” approach in which terms buried in a 
policy will not be enforced when they conflict with an insured’s reasonable 
January Term, 2001 
15 
expectations) and 1472-1475, fn. 54 (collecting cases adopting a “whole-
transaction” approach in which courts will also consider insurers’ marketing 
patterns and general practices in deciding whether policy terms should be 
enforced). This court has mentioned the doctrine recently in Davidson v. 
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 262, 269-270, 744 N.E.2d 713, 719. 
 
Setting aside the curious technique of devoting several pages of an opinion 
to a doctrine that the opinion expressly declines to rely upon, it is unclear what 
form of the rejected doctrine the majority finds potentially applicable to this case.  
The majority cites both Highland House’s and RMI’s alleged belief of coverage 
(without record evidence) and “the importance of interpreting ambiguities in 
insurance contracts in favor of the insured.”  If the majority were confident in its 
decision that the exclusions are indeed ambiguous, it is equally unclear why the 
majority would resort to discussing parties’ beliefs when Ohio already recognizes 
that courts shall construe ambiguous insurance contract language in favor of the 
insured and strictly against the insurer.  See, e.g., Faruque v. Provident Life & 
Acc. Ins. Co. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 34, 31 OBR 83, 508 N.E.2d 949, syllabus. 
 
In any event, I would not reach the questions of the applicability and the 
scope of the reasonable-expectations doctrine here because the facts of this case 
would not support it.  That is, even if Highland House and RMI subjectively 
believed that coverage would extend to a carbon monoxide leak, such an 
expectation must nonetheless have been objectively reasonable under the 
doctrine.  And given that the language employed in the pollution exclusion on its 
face is not limited to environmental-type pollution, I would conclude that this 
subjective expectation of coverage is not objectively reasonable under the terms 
of the policies. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the pollution exclusions in the 
insurance policies preclude coverage.  Because Indiana Insurance was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, LLP, David W. Mellot and Mark 
D. Tucker, for appellants. 
 
Green & Green and Thomas M. Green, for appellee. 
 
Robert P. Rutter, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of 
Trial Lawyers. 
 
Davis & Young and David J. Fagnilli, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Insurance Environmental Litigation Association. 
 
Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews and James P. Hanratty, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
__________________