Case Title: State v. Wine

Citation: 2014-Ohio-3948

Docket Number: 2012-1611

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-09-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Wine, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3948.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-3948 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WINE, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Wine, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3948.] 
Criminal Law—All-or-nothing defense—Defendant cannot prevent trial court 
from instructing jury on lesser included offenses when instructions are 
warranted by evidence presented. 
(No. 2012-1611—Submitted November 6, 2013—Decided September 25, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Auglaize County, 
No. 2-12-01, 2012-Ohio-2837. 
____________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} The issue we address in this case is whether a defendant who 
presents an “all or nothing” defense in a criminal trial has the right to prevent a 
trial court from giving lesser-included-offense jury instructions.  We hold that a 
criminal defendant does not have the right to prevent a trial court from giving 
lesser-included-offense jury instructions; whether to include such jury instructions 
lies within the discretion of the trial court and depends on whether the evidence 
presented could reasonably support a jury finding of guilt on a particular charge. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} On February 4, 2011, the grand jury in Auglaize County indicted 
appellant, Douglas Wine, on one count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2).  
The charge was based on the allegation made by Wine’s mother-in-law that Wine 
had inserted his finger into her vagina while she was sleeping with one of Wine’s 
children in the child’s bed in Wine’s home. 
{¶ 3} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on October 25, 2011.  The 
alleged victim, Wine’s mother-in-law, testified that she had fallen asleep with one 
of the children after getting in bed with him to tell him a story.  She testified that 
she awoke to her own yelling and saw Wine kneeling down at the side of the bed 
with his face very close to hers.  She realized that one of Wine’s fingers was in 
her vagina while his right hand was on her chest under her pajamas.  She testified 
that she yelled her husband’s name twice, loud enough that she thought that her 
daughter, Wine’s wife, would have heard her, but that her husband, her daughter, 
and the child next to her did not hear her yelling.  She stated that when she yelled, 
Wine removed his finger from her vagina and his hand from her chest, but kept 
his hands under the blankets.  She testified that Wine asked her who was in bed 
with her and that when she responded, Wine removed his hands from under the 
blankets, stood up, and left the room. 
{¶ 4} The state also introduced portions of two videotaped interviews of 
Wine that occurred before he was indicted.  The first interview was by Brad 
Kelly, a private investigator who had been retained by Wine and his wife.  In that 
interview, Wine stated that he remembered being in bed with his mother-in-law.  
He stated, “I sort of remember having my hand down there but I don’t remember 
any of the specifics that she’s talking about.”  He told the interviewer that he may 
have touched his mother-in-law’s vagina.  He also stated, “I may have touched 
her, I mean I almost think I did.  But the truth is I thought it was my wife.”  Wine 
also told the investigator that his wife did not like him to put his fingers in her 
January Term, 2014 
3 
 
vagina and that if he had been in bed with his wife he would generally not have 
done that. 
{¶ 5} The second interview was by Detective Sergeant Jerry Sawmiller 
of the Auglaize County Sheriff’s Office.  In that interview, Wine said that he 
remembered waking up in bed with his mother-in-law.  He said that it was 
possible that something had happened, but that he had no memory of it and no 
memory of ever touching his mother-in-law inappropriately. 
{¶ 6} Wine testified in his own behalf at trial.  He testified that he was 
never in the room that the alleged victim was in on the night in question and that 
he did not lay his hands on her in any way.  In closing argument, Wine’s counsel 
stated, “There isn’t any evidence whatsoever that Doug went into the room that 
night.”  The defense was thus unequivocal—Wine was never in the room on the 
night in question and there could be no gradations on what might have occurred. 
{¶ 7} Prior to presenting the case to the jury, the trial court discussed 
proposed jury instructions with counsel out of the jury’s presence.  Wine objected 
to the trial court’s proposed instructions—neither party had requested them—on 
the lesser included offenses of sexual battery under R.C. 2907.03(A)(1) and gross 
sexual imposition under R.C. 2907.05(A)(1).  A conviction for rape under R.C. 
2907.02(A)(2), a first-degree felony and the crime alleged in the indictment, 
requires proof of sexual conduct compelled by force or threat of force.  A 
conviction for sexual battery under R.C. 2907.03(A)(1), a third-degree felony 
when the victim is age 13 or over, requires proof of sexual conduct in which “the 
offender knowingly coerce[d] the other person to submit by any means that would 
prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution.”  A person commits gross 
sexual imposition, a fourth-degree felony unless an exception applies, under R.C. 
2907.05(A)(1) by compelling another person “to submit by force or threat of 
force” to sexual contact.  Rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and sexual battery under 
R.C. 2907.03(A)(1) both involve “sexual conduct,” a requirement of which is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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penetration.  R.C. 2907.01(A).  Gross sexual imposition, on the other hand, 
involves “sexual contact,” which requires “touching of an erogenous zone of 
another * * * for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.”  
R.C. 2907.01(B). 
{¶ 8} Wine’s counsel objected to the instructions on the lesser included 
offenses because he had prepared his defense based upon the offense charged in 
the original indictment, rape.  He argued that the state could have included the 
other offenses in the indictment but did not.  He also argued that “[t]he only 
testimony with respect to the incident came from the victim and she was explicit 
that she believed there was penetration.”  He contended that the instruction as to 
gross sexual imposition, which does not involve penetration, was thus 
unwarranted. 
{¶ 9} The state did not object to the instructions.  The prosecutor 
commented that although the victim had testified that she had been penetrated, if 
the jury did not believe that penetration occurred, deliberation on sexual contact 
would be appropriate. 
{¶ 10} The trial court overruled Wine’s objections and concluded that it 
would instruct the jury on both lesser included offenses.  As for sexual battery, the 
court explained that a jury could conclude that Wine had not purposely compelled 
the sexual conduct, but could still conclude that he had coerced the victim to 
engage in sexual conduct.  As for gross sexual imposition, the court explained that 
based on Wine’s videotaped statements to investigators, including Wine’s 
statements “about his acts and his hands and what he did with [his wife] and so 
forth, that [the jury] could find that he had perpetrated sexual contact without 
actual sexual conduct.”  Further, the alleged victim had testified that because of 
the dryness of her vagina, it would have been difficult for Wine to have put his 
finger inside her vagina.  The court concluded that the alleged victim’s cross-
examination testimony that she didn’t know whether Wine had used lubricant was 
January Term, 2014 
5 
 
more testimony “bringing into question whether there had, in fact, been possibly 
the actual penetration.” 
{¶ 11} The jury found Wine not guilty of rape and not guilty of sexual 
battery but guilty of the lesser included offense of gross sexual imposition.  The 
court sentenced Wine to 15 months in prison, fined him $5,000, and classified 
him as a Tier I sexual offender. 
{¶ 12} Wine appealed to the Third District Court of Appeals, raising 
numerous assignments of error.  With regard to the issue of the jury instructions 
on lesser included offenses, the appellate court concluded that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on gross sexual imposition; it did 
not address the sexual-battery jury instruction since the jury found Wine not 
guilty of that offense.  The court held that a rational juror could have concluded, 
based upon the evidence admitted at trial, “that penetration, required for a rape 
conviction, did not occur but ‘sexual contact’ did occur sufficient for a gross 
sexual imposition conviction.”  3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-12-01, 2012-Ohio-2837, 
¶ 18. 
{¶ 13} The court rejected Wine’s contention that because he was entitled 
as a matter of trial strategy to waive the jury instructions on lesser included 
offenses, the trial court should not have instructed the jury on those offenses over 
his objection: “That trial counsel may decide not to request lesser-included 
instructions as a matter of trial strategy does not mean the trial court lacks 
discretion to instruct where the evidence, in fact, merits such an instruction.”  Id. 
at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 14} In resolving a separate assignment of error, the court held that 
there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for gross sexual imposition 
because the state had failed to prove the element of force.  However, the court 
found that the evidence presented was sufficient to prove the lesser included 
offense of sexual imposition, and it remanded the case to the trial court “to enter a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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finding of guilt for the lesser-included offense of sexual imposition in violation of 
R.C. 2907.06(A)(1) and to sentence Wine for that offense.”  Id. at ¶ 52. 
{¶ 15} Wine sought a stay of the appellate court’s judgment pending his 
appeal to this court, but we denied his motion for a stay.  Upon remand, the trial 
court conducted a hearing, found that Wine was guilty of sexual imposition under 
R.C. 2907.06(A)(1), a third-degree misdemeanor, sentenced him to time served, 
fined him $500, and classified him as a Tier I sexual offender. 
{¶ 16} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal on the following proposition of law:  “A Defendant in a 
criminal trial, as a matter of trial strategy, has a right to present an ‘all or nothing 
defense’ and refuse any lesser-included offenses instructions.”  134 Ohio St.3d 
1448, 2013-Ohio-347, 982 N.E.2d 727. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 17} Wine argues that a defendant has the right to control whether a jury 
receives instructions on lesser included offenses.  We conclude that a defendant 
does not have that right. 
{¶ 18} In Ohio, the law regarding lesser included offenses is the product 
of statute, rule, and the common law.  R.C. 2945.74—in language very similar to 
Crim.R. 31(C)—provides that a jury may find a defendant guilty of a lesser 
included offense: 
 
When the indictment or information charges an offense, including 
different degrees, or if other offenses are included within the 
offense charged, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the 
degree charged but guilty of an inferior degree thereof or lesser 
included offense. 
 
January Term, 2014 
7 
 
{¶ 19} R.C. 2945.74 and Crim.R. 31(C) have their roots in longstanding 
common law:  “At common law the jury was permitted to find the defendant 
guilty of any lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged.”  
(Footnote omitted.)  Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 
L.Ed.2d 392 (1980).  In any given case, the rule can advantage either the 
prosecution or the defense—a defendant does not have sole claim to its benefits: 
 
This rule originally developed as an aid to the prosecution in cases 
in which the proof failed to establish some element of the crime 
charged.  See 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 515, 
n. 54 (1969).  But it has long been recognized that it can also be 
beneficial to the defendant because it affords the jury a less drastic 
alternative than the choice between conviction of the offense 
charged and acquittal. 
 
Id. 
{¶ 20} Regardless of who reaps the benefit of the rule, this court has held 
that a charge on a lesser included offense is required when the facts warrant it and 
improper when the facts do not warrant such a charge: 
 
If the trier of fact could reasonably find against the state 
and for the accused upon one or more of the elements of the crime 
charged and for the state on the remaining elements, which by 
themselves would sustain a conviction on a lesser-included 
offense, then a charge on the lesser-included offense is required. 
Conversely, if the jury could not reasonably find against the 
state on an element of the crime, then a charge on a lesser-included 
offense is not only not required, but is also improper. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
 
(Emphasis sic; citation omitted.)  State v. Kilby, 50 Ohio St.2d 21, 24-25, 361 
N.E.2d 1336 (1977). 
{¶ 21} The law, the evidence presented, and the discretion of the trial 
judge play a role in whether lesser-included-offense instructions are appropriate.  
But the evidence is crucial: 
 
Even though an offense may be statutorily defined as a 
lesser included offense of another, a charge on such lesser included 
offense is required only where the evidence presented at trial 
would reasonably support both an acquittal on the crime charged 
and a conviction upon the lesser included offense. 
 
State v. Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286 (1988), paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  In determining whether lesser-included-offense instructions are 
appropriate, “the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the defendant.”  State v. Monroe, 105 Ohio St.3d 384, 2005-Ohio-2282, 827 
N.E.2d 285, ¶ 37. 
{¶ 22} This court has recognized the potential perils of pervasive lesser-
included-offense jury instructions for defendants in cases in which the facts do not 
support the lesser charge: 
 
 
The mere fact that an offense can be a lesser included 
offense of another offense does not mean that a court must instruct 
on both offenses where the greater offense is charged.  This court 
made it clear in State v. Nolton (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 133, [249 
N.E.2d 797,] that juries were not to be presented with compromise 
offenses which could not possibly be sustained by the adduced 
January Term, 2014 
9 
 
facts.  Such unreasonable compromises are detrimental to both the 
state and the defendant.  These compromises can allow juries to 
lessen punishment at their unlimited discretion, even when they 
find the defendant guilty of the greater offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Further, they can allow juries to convict a 
defendant of a crime of which he is not guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt with a clearer conscience than if only the greater offense 
were charged. 
 
State v. Wilkins, 64 Ohio St.2d 382, 387, 415 N.E.2d 303 (1980).  Or, as the court 
bluntly stated in State v. Loudermill, 2 Ohio St.2d 79, 81, 206 N.E.2d 198 (1965), 
a defendant’s “liberty should not be dickered away by a compromised verdict 
upon another crime.” 
{¶ 23} Further, this court has recognized that a compromise verdict could 
be more likely in cases in which the defendant presents an all-or-nothing defense.  
“There is great potential for unreasonable compromises where the evidence 
adduced by a defendant constitutes a complete defense to the substantive elements 
of the crime charged.”  State v. Solomon, 66 Ohio St.2d 214, 220, 421 N.E.2d 139 
(1981).  In an attempt to address that concern, this court, in State v. Nolton, 19 
Ohio St.2d 133, 249 N.E.2d 797 (1969), announced a “new rule” to be employed 
in cases in which the defendant offers a complete defense to the crime charged: 
 
If the evidence adduced on behalf of the defense is such 
that if accepted by the trier it would constitute a complete defense 
to all substantive elements of the crime charged, the trier will not 
be permitted to consider a lesser included offense for the reason 
that an unreasonable compromise would be invited on the state’s 
evidence. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10
 
(Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 135. 
{¶ 24} But the court then stated in Nolton that if the trier of fact could 
reasonably find that the state failed to prove an element of its case, but that the 
state proved remaining elements that would support a conviction on a lesser 
included offense, then a lesser-included-offense instruction is warranted: 
 
On the contrary, if the trier could reasonably find against the state 
and for the accused upon one or more of the elements of the crime 
charged and for the state and against the accused on the remaining 
elements, which by themselves would sustain a conviction upon a 
lesser included offense, then a charge on the lesser included 
offense is both warranted and required, not only for the benefit of 
the state but for the benefit of the accused. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  Id. 
{¶ 25} In Wilkins, this court clarified Nolton.  This court observed that 
Nolton had been misinterpreted as creating a rigid rule that when a defendant 
offered a complete defense, no lesser included offense should be submitted to the 
trier of fact.  Wilkins, 64 Ohio St.2d at 387, 415 N.E.2d 303.  Instead, this court 
explained in Wilkins, even when a complete defense is offered by the defendant, if 
the state’s evidence could be interpreted as supporting only a lesser included 
offense, a lesser-included-offense charge to the jury is appropriate: 
 
To clarify, we are restating the rule as follows: 
If the evidence adduced on behalf of the defense is such 
that if accepted by the trier of fact it would constitute a complete 
defense to all substantive elements of the crime charged, the trier 
January Term, 2014 
11 
 
of fact will not be permitted to consider a lesser included offense 
unless the trier of fact could reasonably find against the state and 
for the accused upon one or more of the elements of the crime 
charged, and for the state and against the accused on the remaining 
elements, which, by themselves, would sustain a conviction upon a 
lesser included offense. 
 
Id. at 388. 
{¶ 26} This court has therefore left no doubt that it is the quality of the 
evidence offered, not the strategy of the defendant, that determines whether a 
lesser-included-offense charge should be given to a jury.  But Wine nevertheless 
maintains that a defendant has the right to prevent a trial court from giving the 
jury lesser-included-offense instructions, and he bases that contention on a 
statement in a footnote in State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 402 N.E.2d 1189 
(1980), in which this court referred to a defendant’s right to waive a lesser-
included-offense jury instruction.  The context of the court’s statement is crucial.  
In Clayton, the defendant’s counsel had successfully persuaded the trial court to 
not give lesser-included-offense jury instructions, so the trial court had instructed 
on attempted murder only and on self-defense.  The trial court had noted on the 
record:  “Let the record show that in a discussion with counsel in chambers as to 
the charge of the court, as to crime involved in this, that at the request of the 
defense the court is charging on attempted * * * murder and no lesser included 
offense.”  Id. at 45, fn. 1. 
{¶ 27} The issues this court faced were whether the trial court had 
committed plain error in failing to include lesser-included-offense jury 
instructions and whether Clayton’s counsel’s argument to the court to omit those 
instructions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 46.  Thus, Clayton 
was a much different case from the case before us: in Clayton, the defendant 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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claimed that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on lesser included 
offenses, whereas here Wine argues that the court erred in giving lesser-included-
offense instructions. 
{¶ 28} Wine narrows Clayton to a statement this court made in footnote 
two, which reads: 
 
One of appellee’s major arguments was that there should have 
been an instruction on the lesser-included offense of attempted 
voluntary manslaughter.  Even if the defendant did elicit some 
evidence of mitigating circumstances (fit of anger), he still had the 
right to intentionally waive a jury instruction on the lesser-included 
offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter.  Having elicited 
some evidence in mitigation of attempted murder, the court had the 
duty to instruct on the lesser-included offense, but this in no way 
affected defendant’s concomitant right, through his counsel, to 
waive the instruction. 
 
Id. at 47, fn. 2. 
{¶ 29} In the sentence preceded by this footnote, this court in Clayton 
stated that the reasoning of State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d 316, 348 N.E.2d 351 
(1976), applied to the case before it.  In Wolery, defense counsel had not objected 
to the introduction of certain evidence as a matter of trial strategy.  On appeal, the 
defendant-appellant claimed that the admission of that same evidence was plain 
error.  Noting that the decision not to object to the admission of the evidence was 
tactical, the court wrote that “[a]ppellant cannot now claim the protection of 
CrimR. 52(B) to negate the effect of this tactical decision.”  Wolery at 327. 
{¶ 30} In Clayton, this court held that defendant’s counsel’s decision not 
to request an instruction on lesser included offenses—seeking acquittal rather than 
January Term, 2014 
13 
 
inviting conviction on a lesser offense—was a matter of trial strategy.  Id.  This 
court essentially said in Clayton’s second footnote that although the trial court 
erred in not including the lesser-included-offense charge, the defendant waived 
that error in furtherance of his counsel’s trial strategy.  Once the defendant made 
his tactical gambit, like the defendant in Wolery, he could not then successfully 
claim plain error upon appeal.  This court thus concluded that the trial court’s 
failure to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses and the defendant’s 
subsequent conviction “[did] not amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice and 
[was] not plain error.”  Id. at 47-48.  This court further concluded that although 
his strategy was questionable, Clayton’s counsel did not provide ineffective 
assistance.  Id. at 49. 
{¶ 31} Clayton establishes the consequences that follow a defendant’s 
decision to waive a jury instruction that may have inured to his benefit.  But 
Clayton does not say that a defendant may prevent the trial court from instructing 
the jury as to a lesser included offense that is warranted by the evidence produced 
at trial. 
{¶ 32} A defendant’s choice to pursue an all-or-nothing defense does not 
require a trial judge to impose upon the state an all-or-nothing prosecution of the 
crime charged if the evidence would support a conviction on a lesser included 
offense:  “If under any reasonable view of the evidence it is possible for the trier 
of fact to find the defendant not guilty of the greater offense and guilty of the 
lesser offense, the instruction on the lesser included offense must be given.”  
Wilkins, 64 Ohio St.2d at 388, 415 N.E.2d 303. 
{¶ 33} Whether or not a defendant raises a complete defense to the 
charged crime, the state has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of 
the elements of the crime charged.  The fact that the evidence could be interpreted 
by the jury as questionable on a single element does not mean that the defendant 
committed no crime.  Simply put, a jury can both reject an all-or-nothing 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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defense—e.g., alibi, mistaken identity, or self-defense—and find that the state has 
failed to meet its evidentiary burden on an element of the charged crime.  In such 
a case, “if due to some ambiguity in the state’s version of the events involved in a 
case the jury could have a reasonable doubt regarding the presence of an element 
required to prove the greater but not the lesser offense, an instruction on the lesser 
included offense is ordinarily warranted.”  Solomon, 66 Ohio St.2d at 221, 421 
N.E.2d 139. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 34} The sole issue before us is whether a criminal defendant has the 
right to prevent a trial court from instructing a jury on lesser included offenses.  
We hold that a defendant does not have that power.  The trial court, after 
reviewing the evidence, determines whether an instruction on lesser included 
offenses is appropriate.  The trial court must give an instruction on a lesser 
included offense if under any reasonable view of the evidence it is possible for the 
trier of fact to find the defendant not guilty of the greater offense and guilty of the 
lesser offense. 
{¶ 35} Since the defendant in this case did not have the right to prevent 
the trial court from instructing the jury on lesser included offenses, we affirm the 
judgment of the appellate court. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
Edwin A. Pierce, Auglaize County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Lorin J. Zaner, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, Stephen P. Carney, Deputy 
January Term, 2014 
15 
 
Solicitor, and Matthew T. Green, Assistant Attorney General, urging affirmance 
for amicus curiae state of Ohio. 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Barbara A. 
Farnbacher, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney Ron O’Brien. 
Carol Hamilton O’Brien, Delaware County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Douglas N. Dumolt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
_________________________