Case Title: Barfield v. Damon

Citation: 245 P.2d 1032, 56 N.M. 515

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1952-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
245 P.2d 1032 (1952) 56 N.M. 515 BARFIELD v. DAMON. No. 5492. Supreme Court of New Mexico. June 24, 1952. Rehearing Denied July 29, 1952. *1033 Lynell G. Skards, Clovis, for appellant. Smith & Smith, Clovis, for appellee. COMPTON, Justice. This is an action for damages for breach of lease covenants. The complaint alleges that on December 21, 1949, appellant leased 2,300 acres of grazing land to appellee for a period of two years commencing January 1, 1950, and ending December 31, 1951, at an annual rental of $1,500 of which $750 was paid upon delivery of the lease, and that appellent failed to deliver possession on January 1, 1950, as provided thereby. Judgment for the return of the initial payment of $750 and damages of $15,000 for the loss of profits by reason of the breach, are prayed for. The answer denies all material allegations and affirmatively pleads delivery of legal possession. Waiver and estoppel are also pleaded as a defense. A trial to a jury resulted in a verdict for appellee, from which appellant prosecutes this appeal. It is agreed that on January 1, 1950, the date the lease began, B.R. Christmas, a former tenant, was in possession of the ranch and that he refused to vacate it. Appellant contends, however, that under the terms of the lease he was required only to give appellee the right of possession and that it was the duty of appellee to enforce such right. Conversely, appellee contends that covenants of entry and quiet possession were implied and that it became the duty of the landlord to put the tenant in actual possession at the commencement of the term. Section (1) of the lease provides "that first party leases and lets to second party the following described premises located in Roosevelt County, New Mexico, to-wit: (here follows description of land) for a term of two (2) years, to have and to hold, from the 1st day of January, 1950, to the 31st day of December, 1951." (Emphasis ours) The disputed question is whether the lessor was required to deliver actual possession or the mere right of possession. At 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 310, relating to the landlord's duty, we find the following rule: While the courts are divided we are in accord with the rule announced. We *1034 think it was the duty of the landlord to put the tenant in actual possession when right of possession accrued. The arguments presented in favor of this conclusion impress us as being more in accord with reason and justice. The weight of authority, at least the better reasoning, lies with the cases supporting the rule. This is the conclusion of such eminent authorities as Tiffany, Trickett, Taylor, and McAdams. We quote from the texts as follows: Numerous authorities support the texts. Coe v. Clay, 5 Bing. 440, 130 Eng.Reprint 1131; Carroll v. Peake, 1 Pet. 18, 26 U.S. 18, 7 L. Ed. 34; Herpolsheimer v. Christopher, 76 Neb. 352, 107 N.W. 382, 111 N.W. 359, 9 L.R.A.,N.S., 1127; King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229, 42 Am.Rep. 107; Obermeier v. Mortgage Co. Holland-America, 111 Or. 14, 224 P. 1089; Shelton v. Clinard, 187 N.C. 664, 122 S.E. 477; Miller v. Ready, 59 Ind. App. 195, 108 N.E. 605; Morrison v. Weinstein, 151 Ark. 255, 236 S.W. 585; Gregory v. Pribbeno, 143 Neb. 379, 9 N.W.2d 485. The courts of Arizona, California, Kansas, Connecticut, Michigan, Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin also follow the rule. The facts in the case of Stewart v. Murphy, 95 Kan. 421, 148 P. 609, are so similar to those under consideration we quote with approval therefrom: It is next contended that the evidence fails to show an eviction. There is no merit to the contention. In order to constitute an eviction it is not necessary that there should be an actual physical expulsion. Turning to the facts, it appears that on or about the 5th day of January, 1950, appellee went to the premises to ascertain if there were sufficient water for the cattle before placing them on the ranch. It was there he met Christmas for the first time. He was then informed by Christmas that he had a five year lease upon the premises and expected to retain it. Christmas told him to leave the ranch and not molest his cattle. On the same day he talked with appellant and related to him what Christmas had said. Appellant, nevertheless, told appellee to bring his cattle to the ranch and that he would see that the Christmas cattle were put off and kept off the ranch. On or about the 7th of January, appellee moved 69 cows, two bulls, and 60 calves to the ranch. Shortly thereafter, additional cattle, consisting of 31 cows and 31 calves were brought to the ranch by appellant. When appellant saw that the Christmas cattle were still on the ranch he placed his cattle in feed pens on the ranch and constructed a small pasture where they could be cared for properly until possession was delivered. Appellant insisted that Christmas was a trespasser and assured appellee from time to time that he would evict him and deliver the ranch, but he failed to do so. In a suit by appellant against Christmas to repossess the premises, the court held that Christmas was a tenant from year to year and his lease was terminated as of September 1, 1950, the expiration of his tenancy. The author, at 21 C.J.S., Covenants, § 108, says: At 3 Thompson, On Real Property, (Perm.Ed.), Section 1296, the rule is stated thusly: To the same effect, Brown v. International Land Co., 29 Okl. 341, 116 P. 799; McAlester v. Landers, 70 Cal. 79, 11 P. 505; Keating v. Springer, 146 Ill. 481, 34 N.E. 805, 22 L.R.A. 544; Econopouly v. Hamerman, Mun.Ct., 185 N.Y.S. 291. In McAlester v. Landers, supra, 70 Cal. 79, 11 P. 507, the court said: In Econopouly v. Hamerman, supra, it was held: Appellant seeks to invoke the doctrine of waiver and estoppel, and the refusal of the court to give the following instructions requested by him, is charged as error. The tendered instructions read: It is claimed that appellee waived the right to full possession by accepting a portion of the premises, such as feeding pens, corrals, etc., and that he is now estopped from demanding full possession. In this respect, appellant continuously, and as late as March 28, 1950, assured appellee that full possession was forthcoming, however, as previously stated, possession was never delivered. Meanwhile, appellee kept his cattle in feed pens or a small pasture or trap, resulting in heavy expense. On the latter date when it became obvious that possession could not be delivered, in order to minimize his damages, he declared a forfeiture of the lease, so advised appellant and moved his cattle. Such conduct cannot be regarded as waiver of right of full possession. See, Douglass v. Guardian Holding Corporation, 132 Cal. App. 585, 23 P.2d 80; Matyasovich v. Petricciani, 60 Nev. 366, 110 P.2d 206. Moreover, waiver and estoppel cannot be relied on. It was immaterial whether appellee had notice of the claims of prior tenant or that he may have used a portion of the premises after having learned of such adverse claims. Under the terms of the lease, appellant was required to put appellee in actual possession at the time specified. In a somewhat similar case, Morrison v. Weinstein, supra, the court disposed of a like contention as follows: Another objection concerns the measure of damages. Appellant strongly argues that anticipated profits are speculative and too remote. In this respect the following instruction, given by the court, is assigned as error: Ordinarily, for breach of covenant, the tenant is entitled to the difference between the actual value of the unexpired term and the agreed rental, and where there are no other elements of damages, if the value of the term is no greater than the value of the rent reserved, nominal damages only may be recovered. See, 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant, Section 285. But special damages which are within the contemplation of the parties and resulting directly and proximately from the breach, are recoverable if they can be established with reasonable certainty. The parties are shown to be experienced in the cattle business. They knew range conditions, carrying capacity, and the purpose for which the premises were to be used. With this knowledge it would seem that the question of profit was clearly within the contemplation of the parties when the lease was made. 3 Thompson, On Real Property, Section 1300, says: Cf. Smith v. Hicks, 14 N.M. 560, 98 P. 138, 19 L.R.A.,N.S., 938; C.W. Kettering Mercantile Company v. Sheppard, 19 N.M. 330, 142 P. 1128; Price v. Van Lint, 46 N.M. 58, 120 P.2d 611; J.R. Watkins Co. v. Eaker, 56 N.M. 385, 244 P.2d 540. During appellee's direct examination, the record discloses the following: Standing alone the testimony obviously is objectionable but appellant was not satisfied to let the record rest. On cross-examination *1038 he went into detail and fully developed facts from which the jury could readily determine for itself the loss of profits sustained as a natural and proximate result of the breach. Appellee testified that he had been in the cattle business all his life, ranching in West Texas and New Mexico; that he had about 195 head of cattle on the ranch when he was evicted. He further testified that appellant had told him at the time he was dealing for the ranch that it would carry 200 head of cows and calves, or 400 yearlings. He detailed the kind and cost of his cattle, the expenses of production, market conditions, and other data from which he estimated his loss. Having established these essential facts, appellant is in no position to complain. The former tenant, Christmas, an adjacent land owner, testified that he knew appellee's cattle, range conditions, the cost of production the market, etc., and he estimated appellee's loss at $10,000. The witness, Clyde Rayl, likewise engaged in the live stock business, after detailing similar data upon which he based his opinion, estimated appellee's loss from $12,000 to $16,000. We find no fault with the measure of damages. The final contention is that the court committed error in permitting appellee's counsel, over objection, to argue to the jury the law respecting the tenancy of Christmas, the former tenant. Of course, it is the prerogative of the court to instruct the jury and the parties may not instruct the jury through arguments of counsel on a subject which should be covered by an instruction of the court. But the tenancy of Christmas was not a proper subject to be covered by the court's instruction. His tenancy was not an issue. It made no difference whether Christmas was rightfully in possession, a holdover, tenant from year to year, or a mere trespasser. Under the doctrine announced it was appellant's duty to deliver possession at the time specified in the lease regardless of the Christmas claims. Consequently, appellant was not prejudiced by the argument of counsel. The judgment will be affirmed and the cause remanded to the trial court to reinstate the case upon its docket and enter judgment against appellant and the sureties upon his supersedeas bond and it is so ordered. LUJAN, C.J., and SADLER, McGHEE and COORS, JJ., concur.