Case Title: Commonwealth v. Walters

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12364

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12364 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL WALTERS. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     December 4, 2017. - April 12, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Sentence.  Moot Question. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 28, 2011. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 472 Mass. 680 (2015), a 
resentencing hearing was had before E. Susan Garsh, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Ethan C. Stiles for the defendant. 
 
Roger L. Michel, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, Michael J. Walters, was 
convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of stalking, 
harassment, two counts of restraining order violations, and two 
counts of perjury.  While he was serving his State prison 
sentence for stalking, that conviction was vacated by this court 
2 
 
 
because the evidence was insufficient.  Commonwealth v. Walters, 
472 Mass. 680 (2015) (Walters I).  As a result, the defendant 
was resentenced on the remaining convictions.  At resentencing, 
the defendant requested that his perjury sentence be deemed 
"time served" because it was the only other sentence that could 
have been considered a State prison sentence.  Rather than 
granting the defendant's request, however, the trial judge 
vacated the stalking sentence, consistent with our opinion in 
Walters I, and imposed the remaining sentences nunc pro tunc to 
the date of his original sentence.  Consequently, the defendant 
served his sentences for criminal harassment and a restraining 
order violation -- crimes that normally carry a sentence to a 
house of correction -- in State prison.  The defendant appealed 
from his resentencing on the ground that the structure of his 
resentencing scheme was illegal.  Following the Appeals Court's 
dismissal of the defendant's case as moot, we granted further 
appellate review.  We affirm the decision of the resentencing 
judge. 
 
Background.  1.  First trial and sentences.  On June 12, 
2012, the defendant was convicted of stalking, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 43 (a); criminal harassment, G. L. c. 265, § 43A (a); two 
counts of restraining order violations, G. L. c. 209A, § 7; and 
two counts of perjury, G. L. c. 268, § 1.  The trial judge 
sentenced the defendant to the following:  on the charge of 
3 
 
 
stalking, from three to four years in a State prison; on the 
charge of criminal harassment, two and one-half years in a house 
of correction, concurrent with the stalking sentence; on the 
charge of a restraining order violation (first count), two and 
one-half years in a house of correction, concurrent with the 
stalking sentence; on the charge of perjury (first count), from 
two to three years in a State prison on and after the stalking 
sentence; on the charge of a restraining order violation (second 
count), two and one-half years in a house of correction, 
suspended for five years with probation on and after all 
incarceration; and on the charge of perjury (second count), five 
years' probation on and after all incarceration.  That day, the 
defendant's bail was revoked and he was transferred to a State 
prison, the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Cedar 
Junction, where he began serving his stalking sentence, before 
being transferred to the Bay State Correctional Center1 at 
Norfolk.  In April, 2015, he was transferred to the North 
                     
 
1 The Bay State Correctional Center at Norfolk was a small, 
general population, medium security State prison that stood on 
the grounds of the original dormitory buildings of the 
Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk.  It was 
closed in December, 2015.  A medium security facility holds 
inmates who may still pose a risk to security; however, they 
have demonstrated a willingness to comply with institutional 
rules and regulations.  There are increased job and program 
opportunities at this level of security. 
4 
 
 
Central Correctional Institution at Gardner,2 where he remained 
through resentencing and until he was released to begin 
probation. 
 
2.  Resentencing.  On December 11, 2015, the stalking 
charge was vacated and dismissed, and the defendant was 
resentenced by the trial judge to the following:  on the charge 
of criminal harassment, two and one-half years in a house of 
correction, nunc pro tunc to June 12, 2012; on the charge of a 
restraining order violation (first count), two and one-half 
years in a house of correction, nunc pro tunc to June 12, 2012, 
concurrent with the sentence for criminal harassment; on the 
charge of perjury (first count), from two to three years in a 
State prison on and after the criminal harassment sentence; on 
the charge of a restraining order violation (second count), two 
and one-half years in a house of correction, suspended for five 
years with probation on and after all incarceration; and on the 
charge of perjury (second count), five years' probation on and 
after all incarceration. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Mootness.  The Commonwealth argues that 
the defendant's place of confinement is a moot issue because the 
defendant has already been released from prison.  The defendant 
argues that the structure of his resentencing scheme ultimately 
                     
 
2 The North Central Correctional Institution at Gardner is a 
medium security State prison that houses over 1,000 inmates. 
5 
 
 
determines when his probation will end.  Therefore, had the 
resentencing judge granted his request -- that his perjury 
sentence be deemed time served with the criminal harassment and 
G. L. c. 209A violation sentences having run concurrently -- he 
would have been released from State prison on the date of his 
resentencing, December 11, 2015, after serving more than the 
maximum of his three-year sentence for perjury.3  Had the 
defendant been released on this date, his five-year probation 
period would end on December 11, 2020.4  However, because the 
resentencing judge denied the defendant's request and instead 
ordered that the entire sentencing scheme (minus the stalking 
sentence) be dated nunc pro tunc to June 12, 2012, the defendant 
was not released from prison until December 7, 2016.5  As a 
                     
 
3 The defendant had served three years, five months, and 
twenty-nine days at the date of his resentencing. 
 
 
4 The defendant also argues that this time difference may be 
even greater based on "good time" earned.  We need not address 
the accuracy of his calculations in light of the result we reach 
because it is clear that his probation date would be affected 
regardless of any time earned. 
 
 
5 By the date of his resentencing, the defendant had been in 
State prison for more than three years.  Because the entire 
sentence was dated nunc pro tunc to June 12, 2012, the perjury 
sentence of from two to three years in State prison began 
approximately in December, 2014, after the two and one-half year 
sentences for criminal harassment and the restraining order 
violation (first count) had been served.  As a result, the 
defendant remained in State prison until December 7, 2016, when 
he was released to begin his probation.  He served a total of 
four years, five months, and twenty-five days in State prison. 
6 
 
 
result, the defendant's probation will not end until December 7, 
2021. 
 
An issue only becomes moot once a defendant would no longer 
be personally affected by the resulting decision.  See, e.g., 
Blake v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 703 (1976) 
("Ordinarily, litigation is considered moot when the party who 
claimed to be aggrieved ceases to have a personal stake in its 
outcome").  Because the defendant is currently serving the 
probation portion of his sentence, and the resentencing 
structure ultimately determines whether the defendant's 
probation ends in 2020 or 2021, the defendant has a stake in 
this court's decision.  Therefore, the issue is not moot. 
 
2.  Resentencing.  The defendant argues that his sentence 
was excessive and incongruous with the applicable statutes 
because he was forced to serve State prison sentences for crimes 
that only carried house of correction sentences.  He also argues 
that his sentence was illegal because the resentencing judge did 
not properly apply our holding in Brown v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 336 Mass. 718 (1958), that, upon resentencing, all 
"from and after" sentences be dated nunc pro tunc to the 
original sentence. 
 
Our review of criminal sentences is limited.  Commonwealth 
v. Coleman, 390 Mass. 797, 804 (1984).  This court will review a 
sentence only to determine if it is illegal or unconstitutional.  
7 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Molino, 411 Mass. 149, 155 (1991).  See 
Commonwealth v. White, 436 Mass. 340, 345 (2002) (applying test 
of illegality to determine whether resentencing scheme should be 
vacated). 
 
"An 'illegal sentence' is one that is in excess of the 
punishment prescribed by the relevant statutory provision or in 
some way contrary to the applicable statute," Commonwealth v. 
Layne, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 17, 19 (1985), or is "premised on a 
major misunderstanding by the sentencing judge as to the legal 
bounds of his authority," Commonwealth v. McGuinness, 421 Mass. 
472, 475 (1995).  See Goetzendanner v. Superintendent, Mass. 
Correctional Inst., Norfolk, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 533, 537 (2008) 
(defendant's sentences were within scope of permissible 
sentences under applicable statutes and were therefore not 
illegal). 
 
A sentence is "in excess" of the prescribed punishment if 
the defendant is sentenced to any length of time beyond the 
maximum permitted by the violated statute.  See Commonwealth v. 
McGhee, 472 Mass. 405, 427 (2015) (sentence of up to five years 
and one day was illegal because it exceeded maximum sentence of 
five years allowed by applicable statute).  A sentence that 
contradicts the statutory provision in question, even where 
those contradictions favor the defendant, is also illegal.  See 
Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 Mass. 502, 505 (2014) (sentence 
8 
 
 
illegal where sentencing judge failed to impose global 
positioning system monitoring on defendant as required by 
statute); Commonwealth v. Cowan, 422 Mass. 546, 548 (1996) 
(defendant's sentence was illegal because statute did not permit 
house arrest with electronic monitoring device to be substituted 
for incarceration in facility). 
 
The defendant argues that his sentence was excessive 
because, after resentencing, he served his sentence for a 
misdemeanor in a State prison.  He argues that a State prison is 
a place of more serious punishment than a house of correction, 
and he was therefore confined with more serious offenders.  
Similarly, the defendant asserts that his sentence is contrary 
to G. L. c. 265, § 43A (criminal harassment statute), because 
the statute mandates that the defendant be sentenced to a house 
of correction -- in addition to or in lieu of a fine.  However, 
serving the entirety of his house of correction sentence in a 
State prison was not illegal because it did not exceed the 
punishment prescribed by nor was it contrary to the violated 
statue.  See McGuinness, 421 Mass. at 475 (sentence permitted by 
statutory law for offense committed not illegal). 
 
The second reason an imposed sentence can be deemed illegal 
is if the resentencing judge premises that sentence on an error 
or misunderstanding of law.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Azar, 
444 Mass 72, 78-79 (2005) ("split sentence" was legal because 
9 
 
 
law making it illegal did not take effect until after murder 
conviction); Commonwealth v. White, 436 Mass 340, 345 (2002) 
(sentence was illegal because judge mistakenly believed she 
lacked authority to consider good conduct information offered). 
 
The defendant argues that his sentence was illegal because 
the resentencing judge did not properly apply this court's 
holding in Brown, 336 Mass. 718.  In Brown, the defendant was 
convicted on three indictments in Middlesex County and five 
indictments in Suffolk County.  Id. at 719.  The sentences for 
the Suffolk convictions were to commence "from and after" the 
sentences for the Middlesex convictions.  Id.  All Middlesex 
convictions were subsequently set aside.  Id.  The Commissioner 
of Correction argued that because the Middlesex judgments were 
"voidable" and not "void," they were in "full force and effect" 
until they were reversed, and the defendant's Suffolk sentences 
should begin on the date of the reversal.  Id. at 720.  We held 
that regardless of whether the Middlesex convictions were "void 
or voidable," the Suffolk sentences should be moved forward and 
made to run from the date of the imposition of the reversed 
convictions and not from the date of reversal.  Id. at 723.  
There, the defendant would have served "dead time"6 if his 
                     
 
6 "Dead time" in this context is "time served under an 
invalid sentence for which no credit is given."  Gardner v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 31, 34 n.5 (2002). 
10 
 
 
remaining sentences had not been determined to be nunc pro tunc 
to the original sentencing date.  Id. at 721. 
 
The defendant argues that, according to our holding in 
Brown, all sentences deemed to commence "from and after" an 
earlier invalid sentence must be held to commence when both 
sentences were originally imposed.  However, the defendant's 
reading of Brown is too broad.  Our holding in Brown is limited 
to cases in which the defendant would have served dead time.  
Gardner v. Commissioner of Correction, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 31, 34-
35 (2002) (Brown and Manning v. Superintendent, Mass. 
Correctional Inst., Norfolk, 372 Mass. 387 [1977], did not 
"establish a bright-line rule" that could be applied to all 
"from and after" sentences that lose their anchor sentence).  
See Wolcott, petitioner, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 473, 477 (1992) ("the 
rationale of [Brown and Manning] is that a prisoner should not 
serve 'dead time' but should receive credit as matter of right 
for time served under an erroneous conviction").  In Brown, we 
emphasized that the avoidance of dead time was crucial to the 
decision, saying, "We think this is the better and more humane 
view, for only in this way can a prisoner receive credit, not as 
a matter of grace, but as of right, for time served under an 
erroneous conviction."  Brown, 336 Mass. at 721.  See Manning, 
supra at 396-397 ("A prisoner should not be penalized or 
burdened by denial of a credit simply because he had 
11 
 
 
successfully appealed [from] a criminal conviction. . . .  The 
result we reach neutralizes the effect of the erroneous . . . 
sentences on the valid . . . sentence, and causes the plaintiff 
to serve no more and no less than he should pursuant to the 
[valid] sentence"). 
 
Here, the defendant does not face the potential for dead 
time because only one of his original convictions was vacated.  
He was therefore serving the concurrent sentences on two 
standing convictions until the "from and after" sentence for 
perjury began.  Similar to the defendant in Gardner, the 
defendant here was credited for all the time he had served, and 
Brown is not controlling in this instance. 
A dependent relationship exists between the different 
components of a sentencing scheme.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Parrillo, 468 Mass. 318, 321 (2014) (defendant's community 
parole supervision for life [CPSL] sentence may have played part 
in judge's over-all concept of sentencing); Commonwealth v. 
Cumming, 466 Mass. 467, 472 (2013) ("It would not be possible to 
sever the CPSL requirement without fundamentally altering that 
judge's original intent"); Commonwealth v. Leggett, 82 Mass. 
App. Ct. 730, 735 (2012), citing Commonwealth v. LeBeau, 451 
Mass. 244, 245, 263 (2008) ("The components of the scheme work 
in combination, not isolation. . . . The subtraction of one or 
more of the scheme's interdependent elements may disrupt its 
12 
 
 
intended proportions and purposes, and warrant its entire 
reconstruction within statutory limits by the sentencing judge 
or a successor"). 
Although an anchor sentence may have been vacated and 
therefore no longer functions as a punishment for the defendant, 
the anchor sentence still provides insight regarding the 
original sentencing judge's intent when punishing multiple 
crimes.  Wolcott, petitioner, 32 Mass. App. Ct. at 477, quoting 
Watson v. United States, 174 F.2d 253, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1948) 
("so-called 'anchor sentences' if reversed are not effective as 
an agency of punishment," and "they may be considered 'to 
evidence the intention of the court in respect of connected 
sentences'").  In cases where a sentencing scheme is truncated 
by a decision to vacate a conviction, "the literal language of 
the trial judge is less significant than the entire sentencing 
structure as a whole."  Wolcott, petitioner, supra at 478. 
 
In the instant case, we have the benefit of analyzing both 
the anchor sentence and the intention of the judge.  The 
sentencing structure distinguished between the crimes that are 
victim-centered and the two convictions of perjury; the victim-
centered sentences ran concurrently, and once they were served, 
the perjury sentences were to begin "from and after."  Further, 
the judge voiced her intention of differentiating between the 
victim-centered crimes of stalking, harassment, and G. L. 
13 
 
 
c. 209A violations and the perjury crimes.7  Once the stalking 
conviction was overturned, the judge simply sought to maintain 
this distinction by denying the defendant's request to deem the 
perjury sentence as time served.  The judge carefully considered 
the impact of the sentencing scheme when she chose to impose the 
entire sentence nunc pro tunc as if it had been imposed on June 
12, 2012, and it was within her discretion to do so. 
 
The judge had discretion to determine the resentencing 
structure as long as she did not add additional time to the 
original, lawfully imposed sentence.  See Cumming, 466 Mass. at 
473-474 (judge may not restructure sentence in way that 
increases aggregate punishment imposed under original sentence).  
Under the defendant's original sentencing scheme, he would have 
served from five to seven years of incarceration and five years 
of probation after all incarceration.  After resentencing, the 
                     
 
7 During the resentencing hearing, the judge said:  "The 
[c]ourt in doing its sentencing structure grouped, in effect, 
stalking, harassment, and [G. L. c.] 209A because they related 
to acts committed with domestic abuse, and the [c]ourt imposed 
sentences on those that were concurrent.  The [c]ourt 
intentionally did not impose a perjury sentence that was 
concurrent because the [c]ourt deems that to be a crime 
different in nature and requiring independent punishment, and 
therefore, imposed an on and after sentence on that." 
 
14 
 
 
defendant served approximately four and one-half years of 
incarceration.8 
 
The defendant's resentencing scheme is neither illegal nor 
unconstitutional; therefore, the decision of the Superior Court 
judge is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
8 The defendant is currently serving five years of 
probation.