Case Title: Jeffreys v. Uninsured Employer's Fund

Citation: 

Docket Number: 171467

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2019-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
CHARLIE JEFFREYS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 171467 
 
 
 
                 JUSTICE D. ARTHUR KELSEY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             FEBRUARY 14, 2019 
THE UNINSURED EMPLOYER’S FUND, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Charlie Jeffreys was injured while renovating a historic school building.  The Virginia 
Workers’ Compensation Commission denied his claim for benefits against a church and a 
historical society, which Jeffreys had alleged were his statutory employers.  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed.  On appeal to us, Jeffreys argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming 
the Commission’s decision not to award him benefits.  We disagree. 
I. 
A. 
By statute, determinations of the Commission “shall be conclusive and binding as to all 
questions of fact.”  Code § 65.2-706(A).  Consequently, on appeal, “we do not retry the facts 
before the Commission nor do we review the weight, preponderance of the evidence, or the 
credibility of witnesses.”  Caskey v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 225 Va. 405, 411 (1983).  “If there is 
evidence or reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence to support the 
Commission’s findings, they will not be disturbed by this Court on appeal, even though there is 
evidence in the record to support contrary findings of fact.”  Id.  This deference to the 
Commission’s factfinding necessarily requires that we, as well as the Court of Appeals, construe 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing parties before the Commission.  See 
Rodriguez v. Leesburg Bus. Park, LLC, 287 Va. 187, 193 (2014); R & T Invs., Ltd. v. Johns, 228 
Va. 249, 253-54 (1984). 
2 
B. 
 
The Harvey Colored School (“the School”) is a small building where African-American 
students in Pittsylvania County were educated from approximately the 1880s to the mid-1900s.  
About 15 former students and interested individuals, led by Annie Mosby, formed the Harvey 
School Historical Society (“the Historical Society”)1 “to restore the school to its original 
condition” and to register it as a historical site.  2 J.A. at 804.  The Historical Society operated as 
a non-profit organization.  Its mission was “to purchase, restore, preserve, and maintain the 
Harvey Colored School as a historical site.”  Id. at 801-02.  Mosby lived in California and 
directed the Historical Society’s activities from there. 
 
Seeking tax-exempt status, the Historical Society became an “auxiliary” of the Mount 
Lebanon Missionary Baptist Church (the “Church”) in 2003.  Id. at 800, 811-12, 817-18.  The 
record is unclear regarding the precise nature of this informal relationship.  Practically speaking, 
however, the relationship appears merely to have allowed the Historical Society to meet in the 
Church building.  The Church provided no financial support to the Historical Society, and the 
two entities maintained separate bank accounts.  The Church neither participated in the decisions 
that the Historical Society made nor exercised any control over the Historical Society. 
 
In 2012, Mosby entered into an agreement with William Johnson, an unlicensed 
contractor, to relocate and renovate the school.  Having no construction experience, Mosby relied 
entirely on Johnson to plan and perform the renovation.  While she was briefly present on site at 
the beginning of the project, Mosby lived in California and did not exercise any control over 
Johnson or over any aspect of his working conditions.  Johnson initially worked with one other 
                                                 
1 The Historical Society sometimes refers to itself as the Harvey School Restoration 
Society.  See, e.g., 2 J.A. at 804. 
3 
individual on the job, but he later asked Mosby for permission to hire Jeffreys as well.  Mosby 
agreed.  Johnson was the “boss” on the job, id. at 522, 700, and exclusively managed Jeffreys on 
the worksite.  Johnson kept records of Jeffreys’s work hours and reported them to Mosby for 
payment.  Mosby never met Jeffreys and did not know his name prior to his injury. 
 
While working for Johnson, Jeffreys was badly injured when a beam fell from the roof of 
the school building and struck him on the neck.  He filed a claim for workers’ compensation 
benefits against Mosby, the Church, and the Historical Society — but not against Johnson.  
Because none of the defendants had workers’ compensation insurance, the Uninsured 
Employer’s Fund (“UEF”) was also made a party.  Jeffreys argued that Mosby, the Church, and 
the Historical Society were his direct employers and thus owed him compensation.  In the 
alternative, Jeffreys contended, each defendant was his statutory employer pursuant to Code 
§ 65.2-302 because he had been performing work within their trade, business, or occupation. 
 
A deputy commissioner agreed that Jeffreys was the direct employee of the Historical 
Society as well as Mosby, who was acting as the Historical Society’s “agent,” and that the 
Historical Society was in turn “a part of the Church, making the Church an employer of” Jeffreys 
as well.  2 J.A. at 879-81.  The deputy commissioner entered an award against the Church.  The 
full Commission disagreed in part, holding that Mosby was not Jeffreys’s direct employer 
because she had lacked any meaningful control over his work or over how he performed it.  
However, the Commission affirmed the deputy commissioner’s award against the Church 
because no party had appealed that decision. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s finding that Mosby was not Jeffreys’s 
direct employer, reversed the Commission’s finding that the UEF had waived its argument 
regarding the Church and the Historical Society, and remanded the case for further factfinding.  
4 
See Uninsured Emp’r’s Fund v. Jeffreys, Record No. 1676-15-3, 2016 WL 1637823, at *6 (Va. 
Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2016) (unpublished).  On remand, the Commission held that “there was 
insufficient evidence to conclude the Historical Society and the Church were the claimant’s 
employer.”  2 J.A. at 1034.  Neither had exercised any control over Jeffreys.  Instead, Johnson 
had “recruited” Jeffreys, had told Jeffreys “what to do each day, [had] kept track of his hours and 
[had been] the ‘boss’ on the project.”  Id. at 1035.  Moreover, the Commission added, “Johnson 
was not an employee of Mosby either.”  Id.  Johnson “was free to adopt the methods he needed 
to accomplish the result” and to decide “what materials were needed.”  Id.  Johnson was, at most, 
“an independent contractor,” id. at 1036, and thus, Jeffreys, who worked under Johnson, could 
not have been a direct employee of any of the individual defendants. 
Having held that none of the three individual defendants were Jeffreys’s direct employer, 
the Commission turned to the statutory-employer argument.  “There is no evidence the Church 
and Historical Society were in the construction business,” the Commission stated, “[h]ence there 
is no statutory employer situation at issue here.”  Id.  Jeffreys appealed again to the Court of 
Appeals, which affirmed the Commission’s decision. 
II. 
On appeal to us, Jeffreys contends that the Court of Appeals and the Commission 
erroneously held that the Church and the Historical Society were not his statutory employers.  
We disagree. 
A. 
 
The Workers’ Compensation Act requires an employment relationship of some kind to 
exist between a claimant and the party allegedly liable for compensation.  The usual scenario is a 
true employer-employee relationship in which the employer controls the employee’s jobsite 
5 
conditions, employment tasks, and working hours.  In 1991, however, the General Assembly 
enacted Code § 65.2-302, which created a new category of employment relationship called 
“Statutory employer.”  In relevant part, that section provides: 
A. When any person (referred to in this section as “owner”) 
undertakes to perform or execute any work which is a part of 
his trade, business or occupation and contracts with any other 
person (referred to in this section as “subcontractor”) for the 
execution or performance by or under such subcontractor of the 
whole or any part of the work undertaken by such owner, the 
owner shall be liable to pay to any worker employed in the 
work any compensation under this title which he would have 
been liable to pay if the worker had been immediately 
employed by him. 
B. When any person (referred to in this section as “contractor”) 
contracts to perform or execute any work for another person 
which work or undertaking is not a part of the trade, business 
or occupation of such other person and contracts with any other 
person (referred to in this section as “subcontractor”) for the 
execution or performance by or under the subcontractor of the 
whole or any part of the work undertaken by such contractor, 
then the contractor shall be liable to pay to any worker 
employed in the work any compensation under this title which 
he would have been liable to pay if that worker had been 
immediately employed by him. 
C. When the subcontractor in turn contracts with still another 
person (also referred to as “subcontractor”) for the performance 
or execution by or under such last subcontractor of the whole 
or any part of the work undertaken by the first subcontractor, 
then the liability of the owner or contractor shall be the same as 
the liability imposed by subsections A and B of this section. 
Code § 65.2-302(A)-(C).  See generally Lawrence J. Pascal, Virginia Workers’ Compensation 
Law and Practice, § 2.08[3][a]-[b], at 2-35 to -39 (4th ed. 2011).2 
                                                 
2 The Act similarly protects loaned or borrowed employees.  See, e.g., Metro Mach. 
Corp. v. Mizenko, 244 Va. 78, 82 (1992) (describing the application of the borrowed-servant 
doctrine under both federal and Virginia workers’ compensation statutes); Ideal Steam Laundry 
v. Williams, 153 Va. 176, 179-82 (1929) (concluding that although the Act “is silent with 
reference to the status of a loaned employee,” the common law governing masters and servants 
6 
Subsection A addresses the scenario in which “any person” contracts with an independent 
contractor to perform work within the “trade, business or occupation” of that “any person.”  
Code § 65.2-302(A).  This situation often occurs when a business outsources its own unique 
“trade, business or occupation,” id., to an independent contractor, for example, when a roofing 
company hires an independent contractor to repair a roof.  In these situations, we have applied 
what has become known as the normal-work test, which asks whether the activity in which the 
independent contractor engages is “normally carried on through employees rather than 
independent contractors.”  Shell Oil Co. v. Leftwich, 212 Va. 715, 722 (1972) (emphasis in 
original) (citation omitted).  In this way, subsection A involves a two-tiered scenario:  Party X 
contracts with Party Y to do work within Party X’s trade, business, or occupation.  When this 
takes place, Party X becomes the statutory employer of Party Y’s employees. 
Subsection B involves a three-tiered scenario:  A “person” hires a contractor to perform 
work outside the scope of that person’s “trade, business or occupation.”  Code § 65.2-302(B).  
The contractor then hires a subcontractor to do some or all of that work.  In this scenario, we 
have applied what has become known as the subcontracted-fraction test.  See Cooke v. Skyline 
Swannanoa, Inc., 226 Va. 154, 158-59 (1983).  An example of this scenario would be where a 
banker — whose business is banking rather than construction — enters into a contract with a 
general contractor to build a home, and the general contractor in turn relies on subcontractors 
(e.g., firms employing framers, brick masons, electricians, etc.) to complete the job.3  The 
general contractor, not the banker, becomes the statutory employer of the subcontractors’ 
                                                 
applies to determine whether an individual was acting as an employee of another).  See generally 
5 Arthur Larson et al., Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 67.01, at 67-2 to -3 (2018); 
Pascal, supra, § 2.08[2], at 2-34 to -35 (4th ed. 2011 & Supp. 2018). 
3 Subsection C extends the reach of subsections A and B to cover situations where the 
first covered subcontractor hires his own subcontractors. 
7 
employees.  See, e.g., Cinnamon v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 238 Va. 471, 474-79 
(1989).4 
The Act makes clear, however, that these scenarios are exceptions to the general rule that 
“nothing in [the Act] shall be construed to make the employees of any independent contractor the 
employees of the person or corporation employing or contracting with such independent 
contractor.”  Code § 65.2-101.  Consequently, “the mere fact a business owner engages an 
independent contractor does not make that independent contractor’s employees statutory 
employees of the owner.”  Rodriguez, 287 Va. at 194 (quoting Henderson v. Central Tel. Co. of 
Va., 233 Va. 377, 381 (1987)).5 
B. 
 
Before focusing on the specific provisions governing this case, we must address 
Jeffreys’s overarching assertion that the Workers’ Compensation Act should receive “a liberal 
                                                 
4 Depending upon the circumstances, subsections A and B can overlap each other.  But 
they do not necessarily do so.  When subsection B applies, the contractor becomes the statutory 
employer of the subcontractor’s employee, and “[t]his is true even if that work is not normally a 
part of the []contractor’s normal work, but is a subcontracted fraction of the main contract.”  15 
Virginia Practice Series, Workers’ Compensation § 4:12, at 24 (2018 ed.). 
5 The general rule and its exceptions harmoniously serve the statute’s 
purpose to bring within the operation of the Compensation Act all 
persons engaged in any work that is a part of the trade, business or 
occupation of the original party who undertakes as owner, or 
contracts as contractor, to perform that work, and to make liable to 
every employee engaged in that work every such owner, or 
contractor, and subcontractor, above such employee.  But when the 
employee reaches an employer in the ascending scale, of whose 
trade, business or occupation the work being performed by the 
employee is not a part, then that employer is not liable to that 
employee for compensation.  At that point [Code § 65.2-101] 
intervenes and the employee’s right of action at common law is 
preserved. 
Cinnamon, 238 Va. at 475 n.1 (alterations and citation omitted). 
8 
construction and application of the law in favor of the worker” in order to “accomplish the 
purpose of the Legislature in enacting our Workers’ Compensation statute,” Appellant’s Br. at 7, 
28-29.  We frequently apply this simple principle6 but guard against doing so simplistically.7 
Our caution stems from the unique nature of the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The Act 
reflects a legislative “quid pro quo” that gave workers the right to assert no-fault liability against 
their employers (a right that they had never possessed) and took from them the right to sue their 
employers in tort for negligence (a right that they had possessed under the common law).8  The 
liberal-construction principle, if misapplied, could upset this delicate balance.  A view of the 
Act’s coverage that is too broad would authorize an award of compensation benefits but would 
bar a tort recovery, and a view that is too narrow would authorize a tort recovery but would bar 
an award of compensation benefits. 
Jeffreys contends that he lost his claim for compensation benefits because the Court of 
Appeals and the Commission had failed to interpret Code § 65.2-302 liberally in his favor.  This 
result is illiberal, however, only because Jeffreys has no viable negligence claim against the 
                                                 
6 In certain contexts, this liberal-construction principle has played a measurable role in 
our construction of the Act.  See, e.g., American Original Foods, Inc. v. Ford, 221 Va. 557, 561-
62 (1980); Dowdy v. Giant of Va., Inc., 210 Va. 408, 410 (1969); Byrd v. Stonega Coke & Coal 
Co., 182 Va. 212, 221-22 (1944); Scott Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Carter, 156 Va. 815, 824 (1931); 
Farmers Mfg. Co. v. Warfel, 144 Va. 98, 104-05 (1926); Gobble v. Clinch Valley Lumber Co., 
141 Va. 303, 305-06 (1925). 
7 In other contexts, this principle has played no role at all.  See, e.g., Redifer v. Chester, 
283 Va. 121, 126-27 (2012); Snead v. Harbaugh, 241 Va. 524, 527-29 (1991); American 
Furniture Co. v. Doane, 230 Va. 39, 42 (1985); Rust Eng’g Co. v. Ramsey, 194 Va. 975, 980 
(1953); Kent v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 143 Va. 62, 65-67 (1925); Board of Supervisors v. 
Lucas, 142 Va. 84, 94-95 (1925); Mann v. City of Lynchburg, 129 Va. 453, 459-60 (1921) (per 
curiam). 
8 See Gibbs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 284 Va. 677, 682 (2012); 
Roller v. Basic Constr. Co., 238 Va. 321, 327 (1989); Whalen v. Dean Steel Erection Co., 229 
Va. 164, 170-71, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 802 (1985). 
9 
Church or the Historical Society.  If he had such a claim and had asserted it, the Church and the 
Historical Society — not Jeffreys — would be insisting that Code § 65.2-302 be construed 
broadly.  See Code § 65.2-307(A); Pascal, supra, § 2.08[3][a], at 2-36 (4th ed. 2011).  A 
precedent-setting construction of the Act cannot depend on whether the injured worker is before 
the Commission seeking an expansive application of the Act’s coverage or before a circuit court 
seeking a restrictive application.9  A uniform principle of law, by its nature, cannot fluctuate 
based upon the forum in which it is advocated or the identity of its advocates. 
Rightly applied, the liberal-construction principle means only that an interpretation of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act should take into account the humane, beneficent purposes 
embedded in the legislative quid pro quo.  That interpretative preset does not “permit a liberal 
construction to change the meaning of the statutory language or the purpose of the Act,” 
American Furniture Co. v. Doane, 230 Va. 39, 42 (1985), or “authorize the amendment, 
alteration, or extension of its provisions,” Van Geuder v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 548, 553 
(1951) (citation omitted).  Nor does the principle “go to the extent of requiring that every claim 
asserted should be allowed,” id. (citation omitted),10 or permit the Act to be “converted into a 
form of health insurance,” Doane, 230 Va. at 42.11  Instead, the Act should be liberally 
                                                 
9 The line between coverage and non-coverage under the Act is a matter of great 
significance.  A claimant seeking benefits under the Act, unlike a plaintiff in a tort suit, cannot 
recover damages for pain and suffering or for loss of future earning capacity.  See Clinchfield 
Carbocoal Corp. v. Kiser, 139 Va. 451, 454 (1924); 9 Larson et al., supra note 2, § 100.05[1][d], 
at 100-41 to -42; Pascal, supra, § 1.03, at 1-5.  And compensation benefits, unlike damages 
awarded by juries in tort cases, are calculated based upon statutory schedules that leave the 
decisionmaker, usually a deputy commissioner, with little or no discretion.  See, e.g., Code 
§§ 65.2-500(A), -502(A), -503, -512(A), -518. 
10 See also Conner v. Bragg, 203 Va. 204, 207-08 (1962); Humphries v. Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 183 Va. 466, 479 (1945). 
11 See also Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 584 (1989); Lane Co. v. Saunders, 229 Va. 
196, 199 (1985); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Cogbill, 223 Va. 354, 357 (1982); Vega 
10 
interpreted consistent with its text and its underlying quid-pro-quo purpose to benefit all workers. 
C. 
1. 
 
The contest in this case involves the application of subsection A of Code § 65.2-302.  We 
have applied that provision and its predecessors in various contexts, including those involving 
both private-business employers12 and governmental employers.13  Applying subsection A “is 
not a simple, straightforward exercise.”  Rodriguez, 287 Va. at 193 (citation omitted).  Nor is it 
made easier by the bifurcated nature of appellate review in which we review the legal principles 
de novo but show great deference to the Commission’s direct and inferential factfinding. 
 
The starting point in the analysis is “identifying ‘the nature of the particular owner’” or 
contractor, which often requires us to distinguish between a “governmental entity or public 
utility” on the one hand and “a private entity” on the other.  Id. at 195 (quoting Nichols v. VVKR, 
Inc., 241 Va. 516, 521 (1991)).  A private entity, unlike a governmental entity or a public utility, 
has broad discretion to choose its activities and, thus, to define its own unique nature.  See 
Henderson, 233 Va. at 383.  “Whereas a private business entity is essentially self-defining in 
terms of its trade, business, or occupation, a public utility has duties, obligations, and 
responsibilities imposed upon it by statute, regulation, or other means.”  Id. 
                                                 
Precision Labs., Inc. v. Jwayyed, 218 Va. 1026, 1032 (1978); J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Martin, 
198 Va. 370, 377-78 (1956); Rust Eng’g Co., 194 Va. at 980; Van Geuder, 192 Va. at 552. 
12 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 287 Va. at 194-98; Johnson v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 244 Va. 482, 
485 & n.1 (1992); Nichols v. VVKR, Inc., 241 Va. 516, 521-23 (1991); Cinnamon, 238 Va. at 
474, 478; Carmody v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 234 Va. 198, 203 (1987); Shell Oil Co., 212 Va. at 
719, 724. 
13 See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 218, 221-25 (2004); Roberts v. City of 
Alexandria, 246 Va. 17, 19-20 (1993); Ford v. City of Richmond, 239 Va. 664, 669 (1990); 
Henderson, 233 Va. at 383; Williams v. E.T. Gresham Co., 201 Va. 457, 458, 460-61, 464-65 
(1959); Anderson v. Thorington Constr. Co., 201 Va. 266, 272-74 (1959), appeal dismissed per 
curiam, 363 U.S. 719 (1960). 
11 
 
When addressing private entities, we generally apply the normal-work test to subsection 
A of Code § 65.2-302.  This test asks not 
whether the subcontractor’s activity is useful, necessary, or even 
absolutely indispensable to the statutory employer’s business, 
since, after all, this could be said of practically any repair, 
construction or transportation service.  The test . . . is whether this 
indispensable activity is, in that business, normally carried on 
through employees rather than independent contractors. 
Shell Oil Co., 212 Va. at 722 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).  This test serves as a 
“corollary guide, sometimes useful but not indispensable, in applying the literal language of the 
statutes to the facts in a particular case.”  Rodriguez, 287 Va. at 196 (citation omitted). 
One recurring problem in applying this statute is how to treat a company with no 
employees.  We have stated that a construction company whose trade, business, or occupation is 
obviously construction cannot disclaim statutory-employer status simply by hiring no employees 
and subcontracting all of its construction projects to others.  See id. at 194; Henderson, 233 Va. 
at 381.  But we have also explained that merely because a private entity has no employees and 
relies solely on independent contractors does not mean that everything that the contractors do 
constitutes the trade, business, or occupation of the entity, even though it oversees the 
contractors to ensure that the work is “done properly.”  See Rodriguez, 287 Va. at 197-98. 
In Rodriguez, a developer was engaged in the business of developing an industrial 
warehouse park.  Having no employees of its own, the developer hired a contractor to construct 
the warehouses.  We observed that “[t]he development of the property, including the 
construction of the warehouses, was obviously essential” to the developer’s business plan.  Id. at 
197.  That fact, however, did not necessarily mean that warehouse construction was part of the 
developer’s trade, business, or occupation.  “While many activities may be important or even 
12 
‘indispensable’ to the success of a business, those activities do not necessarily constitute the 
trade, business, or occupation of the owner.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
Put another way, “[t]he test is not whether the owner, by engaging an independent 
contractor to perform some part of his business, thereby engages in the business of the 
independent contractor.  It is whether the independent contractor is performing work that is part 
of the trade, business or occupation of the owner.”  Floyd v. Mitchell, 203 Va. 269, 274 (1962).  
For example, “[e]very manufacturer must have a plant, but this fact alone does not make the 
work of constructing a plant a part of the trade or business of every manufacturer who engages a 
contractor to construct a plant,” Stone v. Door-Man Mfg. Co., 260 Va. 406, 413 (2000) (citation 
omitted); Cinnamon, 238 Va. at 478 (citation omitted), and while selling gasoline is 
“indispensable” to the “business” of every major oil company, that fact alone does not mean that 
the oil company is itself in the business of selling gasoline, see Shell Oil Co., 212 Va. at 722-24. 
2. 
In this case, Jeffreys had the burden of proving his statutory-employer claim for workers’ 
compensation benefits from the Church and the Historical Society.  See Byrd v. Stonega Coke & 
Coal Co., 182 Va. 212, 219 (1944) (“[T]he claimant must carry the burden of proving his 
claim.”).  Acting in its factfinding capacity, the Commission reviewed the history of the 
Historical Society, its informal governance structure, its charitable and nonprofit purposes, its 
fundraising and community-outreach efforts, its lack of any experience or involvement in the 
business of construction or renovation, and Mosby’s role in its activities.  Jeffreys failed to 
persuade the Commission that his reconstruction work on the school building was part of the 
trade, business, or occupation of the Church or the Historical Society.  Discerning no 
misunderstanding of law on the Commission’s part, the Court of Appeals held that a rational 
13 
factfinder could find Jeffreys’s allegations factually unpersuasive.  We agree. 
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by “identifying ‘the nature of the particular 
owner’” or contractor.  Rodriguez, 287 Va. at 195 (citation omitted).  Viewing the factual record 
through the prism of an appeal — which required it to consider the facts in the light most 
favorable to the Church and the Historical Society as the prevailing parties before the 
Commission — the Court of Appeals followed the evidence in detail to its inevitable, rational 
conclusion: 
When we review the characteristics of the Historical Society and 
the activities normally carried out by its members, we conclude that the 
complete reconstruction of the Harvey School was not a part of the 
Historical Society’s “trade, business, or occupation.”  While the ultimate 
goal of the Historical Society was to “restore” the school, the rebuilding 
project at issue was simply beyond its capabilities. 
The Historical Society was not a construction company or a 
commercial property developer.  It was a small, grassroots, nonprofit 
organization with limited resources.  It had approximately fifteen 
members at the height of its success.  None of the evidence presented in 
this case established, or even implied, that the members of the Historical 
Society could undertake the construction project at issue. 
Similarly, the evidence failed to establish that the members of the 
Historical Society engaged in construction-related activities on a regular 
basis.  Rather, the members of the Historical Society engaged in fund-
raising activities and activities designed to encourage community support 
for their project.  Correspondence between Mosby and members of the 
Historical Society established that the Historical Society intended to hire 
contractors to dismantle, move, and rebuild the school, and the evidence 
presented in this case did not imply that members of the Historical 
Society intended to participate in this project. 
We acknowledge that the restoration of the Harvey School 
necessarily involved certain construction-related activities.  The 
complete reconstruction of the school building, however, fell outside of 
any routine restoration work.  While the Historical Society was formed 
to “restore” the school, its “trade, business, or occupation” did not 
include the complete reconstruction of the building. 
For these reasons, we conclude that the reconstruction of the 
Harvey School was not the Historical Society’s “trade, business, or 
14 
occupation.”  The complete reconstruction of the school was beyond the 
restoration project envisioned by the Historical Society, and its members 
were not involved in the reconstruction project or other construction 
activities.  Accordingly, we conclude that the Commission correctly 
determined that the Historical Society and the Church were not engaged 
in the construction business, and we affirm its decision that neither of 
those parties was Jeffreys’s statutory employer. 
Jeffreys v. Uninsured Emp’r’s Fund, Record Nos. 0660-17-3, 0693-17-3, 2017 WL 4363874, at 
*7-8 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2017) (unpublished) (citations omitted).14 
When the legal principles properly frame the question, “[d]etermining whether work is 
part of the trade, business, or occupation of an owner ‘depends upon the facts and circumstances 
of the particular case,’” Rodriguez, 287 Va. at 198 (citation omitted).  As the Court of Appeals 
correctly held, the Commission applied the correct legal standard and acted within its factfinding 
discretion when it concluded that Jeffreys had failed to prove that the Church or its Historical 
Society were his statutory employers.15 
                                                 
14 In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals correctly distinguished Pfeifer v. 
Krauss Construction Co. of Virginia, 262 Va. 262 (2001).  In that case, a developer “had been 
formed solely to build and develop” condominiums on property that the developer owned.  Id. at 
268 (emphasis added).  For purposes of Code § 65.2-302, there was no dispute that the 
developer’s trade, business, or occupation included building the condominiums and developing 
the surrounding property.  Here, the parties disputed the trade-business-occupation issue agreed 
upon in Pfeifer, and the Commission made a factual finding that the Church and the Historical 
Society were not engaged in the construction business.  See, e.g., Cinnamon, 238 Va. at 479 
(finding that an owner/manufacturer’s “trade, business, or occupation” did not include 
“construction work” on the plant that it had “engaged an independent contractor to perform”). 
15 Jeffreys claims that the Court of Appeals made erroneous factual findings and thereby 
violated his due process right to an appeal.  See Appellant’s Br. at 21-25, 37-42; Reply Br. at 14.  
We disagree.  The lengthy quotation above from the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
demonstrates that it did not engage in its own factfinding but instead relied solely on the facts 
established before the Commission.  We find no due process violation. 
Jeffreys also takes issue with several statements of the Court of Appeals and the 
Commission to the effect that the Church and the Historical Society were not engaged in 
construction.  See Appellant’s Br. at 25-27; Reply Br. at 6-7; Oral Argument Audio at 1:18 to 
3:11, 30:50 to 31:25.  To Jeffreys, these statements suggest that the Commission and the Court of 
Appeals misunderstood the proper legal standard.  We find no merit in this assertion because “we 
15 
III. 
We affirm the Court of Appeals, finding no error in its reasoning or in its result. 
Affirmed. 
                                                 
will not fix upon isolated statements of the [Court of Appeals or the Commission] taken out of 
the full context in which they were made, and use them as a predicate for holding the law has 
been misapplied,” Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978 (1977).