Case Title: In re J.V.

Citation: 2012-Ohio-4961

Docket Number: 2011-0107

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re J.V., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4961.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-4961 
IN RE J.V. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, 
it may be cited as In re J.V., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4961.] 
Juvenile offenders—Invocation of adult portion of blended sentence—R.C. 
2152.14(E)—Judicial fact-finding constitutional—Standard of proof. 
(No. 2011-0107—Submitted December 7, 2011—Decided October 30, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 94820, 2010-Ohio-5490. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 1} In June 2005, pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court found 
juvenile appellant J.V. delinquent and guilty of one count of felonious assault, one 
count of aggravated robbery, and the attendant firearm and serious-youthful-
offender specifications.  The court imposed a blended sentence:  at least two years 
of incarceration at the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“ODYS”) and a 
stayed adult sentence of three years.  Several legal challenges that are immaterial 
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here were filed while J.V. was incarcerated.  Near the end of his sentence at 
ODYS, J.V. was involved in a fight that led the trial court to invoke the 
theretofore stayed adult sentence. 
{¶ 2} On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the invocation of the 
stayed adult sentence.  We accepted J.V.’s discretionary appeal, which presents 
two propositions of law.  The first proposition of law states, “The invocation of an 
adult prison sentence upon a juvenile, pursuant to R.C. 2152.14, violates the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution.”  We conclude to the contrary that 
the invocation of the adult prison sentence was constitutional.  The second 
proposition of law states, “A juvenile court does not have the authority to impose 
criminal punishment (including post-release control) after the delinquent child 
turns 21.”  We agree, and reverse that portion of the court of appeals decision. 
Law and Analysis 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 3} Because both propositions of law involve only questions of law, 
our review is de novo.  In re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-599, 923 
N.E.2d 584, ¶ 13. 
I.  Constitutionality of Invocation Provisions of R.C. Chapter 2152 
{¶ 4} R.C. Chapter 2152 is a relatively recent enactment of the General 
Assembly, which became law on January 1, 2002.  “The overriding purposes for 
dispositions under this chapter are to provide for the care, protection, and mental 
and physical development of children subject to this chapter, protect the public 
interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for the offender’s actions, 
restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender.”  R.C. 2152.01(A).  We have 
addressed R.C. 2152.14, which allows for the invocation of the adult portion of a 
dispositional sentence, three times.  State v. D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-
Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209; In re M.P.; and In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-
January Term, 2012 
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Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729.  But we have not addressed the constitutionality of 
the invocation provisions of R.C. 2152.14 in these cases.  Our summary of R.C. 
2152.14 in D.H. provides background to our analysis in this case: 
    
 
R.C. 2152.14(E) governs under what instances a juvenile 
court may invoke the adult portion of a serious youthful offender’s 
sentence for failure to successfully complete the traditional 
juvenile disposition. The statute requires a finding by clear and 
convincing evidence that the juvenile is “unlikely to be 
rehabilitated during the remaining period of juvenile jurisdiction” 
and that the juvenile has engaged in further bad conduct pursuant 
to R.C. 2512.14(A) or (B) [sic; “2152.14”]. R.C. 2512.14(E) [sic] 
reads: 
“(E)(1) The juvenile court may invoke the adult portion of 
a person’s serious youthful offender dispositional sentence if the 
juvenile court finds all of the following on the record by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
 
“(a) The person is serving the juvenile portion of a serious 
youthful offender dispositional sentence. 
 
“(b) The person is at least fourteen years of age and has 
been admitted to a department of youth services facility, or 
criminal charges are pending against the person. 
 
“(c) The person engaged in the conduct or acts charged 
under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section, and the person’s 
conduct demonstrates that the person is unlikely to be rehabilitated 
during the remaining period of juvenile jurisdiction.” 
 
The conduct that can result in the enforcement of an adult 
sentence includes committing, while in custody or on parole, an act 
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that is a violation of the rules of the institution or the conditions of 
supervision and that could be charged as any felony or as a first-
degree misdemeanor offense of violence if committed by an adult, 
R.C. 2152.14(A)(2)(a) and (B)(1), or engaging in conduct that 
creates a substantial risk to the safety or security of the institution, 
the community, or the victim. R.C. 2152.14(A)(2)(b) and (B)(2). 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 2152.14(D), the court may not invoke the 
adult sentence without another hearing, and the juvenile has the 
right to counsel and to present evidence on his behalf. In fact, the 
right to counsel cannot be waived. Id. Furthermore, the adult 
portion of the sentence invoked as a result of the evidence may be 
more lenient, though not more severe, than the original stayed 
sentence. R.C. 2152.14(E)(2). Since the adult portion of D.H.’s 
sentence has not been invoked, this opinion does not address the 
constitutional ramifications of invoking the adult sentence under 
R.C. 2152.14 in light of Blakely [v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 
S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)] and [State v.] Foster [109 
Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470]. 
 
The statutory scheme establishes that a juvenile subject to 
serious-youthful-offender status, despite the carrot/stick of the 
possible imposition of an adult sentence, remains squarely in the 
juvenile court system. The juvenile cannot be sent directly to an 
adult facility for the acts that led to his serious-youthful-offender 
status. The juvenile court retains jurisdiction. The juvenile would 
have to engage in separate conduct detrimental to his own 
rehabilitation in the juvenile system to be committed to an adult 
facility. The aims of the juvenile system—and its heightened goals 
of rehabilitation and treatment—control his disposition. To get the 
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5 
 
rehabilitative benefit of the juvenile system, the juvenile’s case 
must remain in juvenile court. 
 
D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, ¶ 31–38. 
{¶ 5} With that background, it is clear that the issues before us have not 
been addressed.  In this case, J.V.’s stayed sentence has been invoked, and he has 
challenged the constitutionality of two aspects of the invocation provisions of 
R.C. 2152.14, which were specifically not addressed in D.H.  First, J.V. argues 
that the judicial fact-finding necessary to invoke the stayed adult sentence violates 
J.V.’s right to a trial by jury.  Second, J.V. argues that the burden of proof should 
be the heightened “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of criminal trials rather 
than the lesser “clear and convincing” standard of R.C. 2152.14(E)(1).  Unlike 
D.H., which did not require us to “address the constitutional ramifications of 
invoking the adult sentence under R.C. 2152.14 in light of Blakely and Foster,” 
today we squarely address these constitutional challenges.  D.H. at ¶ 37. 
Judicial Fact-finding 
{¶ 6} J.V. argues that R.C. 2152.14(E) violates his right to a trial by jury 
by allowing the judge to substitute his own judgment as to certain factual findings 
for a jury’s.  J.V. relies on Apprendi v. Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 
147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), which states, “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
{¶ 7} We conclude that the Apprendi line of cases is not even in play, 
because the juvenile court did not increase the penalty that J.V. was subject to.  
Apprendi does not prohibit all judicial fact-finding; it prohibits only that which 
increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum.  Id. at 490.  The “statutory 
maximum” is the maximum sentence “allowed by the jury verdict or by the 
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defendant’s admissions at a plea hearing.”  State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 
2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, at ¶ 7. 
{¶ 8} In this case, based on delinquency admissions, J.V. was sentenced 
to a blended sentence.  The adult portion of the sentence was stayed, “pending the 
successful completion of the traditional juvenile disposition.”  R.C. 
2152.13(D)(1)(c).  When the juvenile court invoked the stayed sentence because 
J.V. did not successfully complete his juvenile disposition, the judge did not 
increase J.V.’s sentence; he merely removed the stay.  The sentence had already 
been imposed. 
{¶ 9} As we have explained, R.C. 2152.14 does not require the stay to be 
lifted, and it allows the juvenile court to impose a lesser sentence than the stayed 
sentence when the adult portion of a stayed disposition is invoked.  In In re C.P., 
we stated:  
 
Once the request is filed, the adult portion of the sentence 
cannot be invoked without a public hearing.  R.C. 2152.14(D). The 
juvenile has a right to counsel that may not be waived and the right 
to present evidence on his own behalf, “including evidence that 
[he] has a mental illness or is a mentally retarded person.”  Id.  If 
the person submits evidence that he has a mental illness or is 
mentally retarded, the court must consider that evidence in 
determining whether to invoke the adult portion of the SYO 
[serious youthful offender] dispositional sentence. 
Further, pursuant to R.C. 2152.14(E)(1), the court must 
find by clear and convincing evidence not only that the person 
serving the juvenile portion of an SYO dispositional sentence 
engaged in the conduct—the additional bad act—he is accused of, 
but also that the conduct “demonstrates that [he] is unlikely to be 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
rehabilitated during the remaining period of juvenile jurisdiction.” 
And under R.C. 2152.14(E)(2), the juvenile court has the 
discretion to “modify the adult sentence the court invokes to 
consist of any lesser prison term that could be imposed for the 
offense.” 
 
Thus, for the bulk of Ohio’s SYO scheme, the juvenile 
court retains discretion to deal individually with juvenile offenders, 
and procedural protections are in place before adult punishment 
can be invoked. Even after additional bad acts by a juvenile, the 
judge has the discretion not to invoke the adult sentence, or to 
lessen the one imposed at the time of the juvenile disposition. 
 
In re. C.P.  131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, at ¶ 80-82. 
{¶ 10} Even if the adult portion of the disposition is “only a potential 
sentence,” the fact remains that J.V. had been sentenced, and the juvenile court 
merely removed the stay of that sentence.  D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-
9, 901 N.E.2d 209, at ¶ 30.  In doing so, the juvenile court followed the procedure 
prescribed in R.C. 2152.14.  And, most important for present purposes, the 
juvenile court did not increase a sentence that had been previously imposed.  
Based on this factual distinction, Apprendi, Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 
U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and State v. Foster, 109 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, are not implicated. 
{¶ 11} Furthermore, juveniles do not enjoy a right to a trial by jury.  In In 
re Agler, 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969), paragraph two of the syllabus, 
we stated: 
 
Delinquency proceedings in Juvenile Court do not require 
indictment or trial by jury under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
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Amendments to the Constitution of the United States or under 
Sections 5 and 10 of Article I of the Constitution of Ohio. 
 
{¶ 12} This is not to say that juries play no role.  In D.H., we stated that 
juries have an “important role in the adjudicative portion of Ohio’s serious-
youthful-offender disposition statutory scheme.”  In re D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 
2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, at ¶ 58.  But juries are not required, and  
 
removing the jury from the dispositional process does not violate 
due process.  The court’s dispositional role is at the heart of the 
remaining differences between juvenile and adult courts.  It is there 
that the expertise of a juvenile judge is necessary. 
 
Id. at ¶ 59. 
{¶ 13} There is no question that the statutory scheme allows, indeed 
requires, juvenile courts to make factual determinations before invoking the 
stayed adult portion of a blended sentence.  We conclude that when an invocation 
hearing is properly conducted pursuant to R.C. 2152.14, as in this case, the 
juvenile’s right to a trial by jury is not even implicated, let alone violated. 
Burden of Proof—Clear and Convincing Evidence 
{¶ 14} As explained above, juveniles are not entitled to full constitutional 
protections during delinquency proceedings.  Nevertheless, the United States 
Supreme Court has stated that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of 
Rights is for adults alone.”  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 
527 (1967).  At a minimum, juveniles are entitled to proceedings that “measure up 
to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.”  Kent v. United States, 383 
U.S. 541, 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
{¶ 15} Because of the state’s “parens patriae interest in preserving and 
promoting the welfare of the child,”  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766, 102 
S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), juvenile proceedings are fundamentally 
different from adult criminal trials.  In re D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 
901 N.E.2d 209, at ¶ 50.  There is, however, no bright line that differentiates 
between the standard required in criminal trials and that required in juvenile 
proceedings.  See id. at ¶ 51 (“The standard as to whether due process 
requirements are met is inexact”).  We now address whether the juvenile court’s 
authority to invoke the stayed adult sentence based on clear and convincing 
evidence, pursuant to  R.C. 2152.14(E)(1), comports with due process. 
{¶ 16} We do not view the invocation proceeding as akin to a delinquency 
proceeding.  Even J.V. states that the invocation proceeding “is not technically a 
separate delinquency proceeding.”  We also don’t view the invocation proceeding 
as similar to a full-blown adult criminal trial.  Clearly, it is not.  We see the 
invocation proceeding as similar to the proceedings incident to a criminal court’s 
imposition of a suspended sentence. 
{¶ 17} In Ohio, courts typically impose two sentences on a criminal 
defendant:  a prison term and a period of postrelease control.  See R.C. 
2967.28(B).  During the period of postrelease control, the defendant is subject to 
conditions.  R.C. 2967.28(D)(1).  Violation of these conditions may result in the 
trial court imposing a prison term.  R.C. 2967.28(F)(3).  This approach has been 
characterized as a carrot-and-stick approach because the carrot of rehabilitation 
without institutional confinement is offered as an inducement to good behavior, 
even as the trial court retains the stick of imposing institutional confinement.  We 
view the blended sentences imposed on serious youthful offenders in much the 
same way.  In re D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, at 
¶ 38.  In the federal criminal court system, defendants are treated similarly.  See 
United States v. Makres, 851 F.2d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir.1988). 
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{¶ 18} In both state and federal systems, the trial court decides on its own 
whether to revoke postrelease control (or probation) and whether to impose an 
additional prison term.  In Ohio, this judicial authority has deep roots. 
   
The power to stay the execution of a sentence, in whole or 
in part, in a criminal case, is inherent in every court having final 
jurisdiction in such cases, unless otherwise provided by statute.  
The suspension being in favor of the prisoner, is for his benefit, 
and is valid, whether consented to by him or not.  When the 
suspension is upon conditions expressed in the judgment, the 
prisoner has the right to rely upon such conditions, and so long as 
he complies therewith the suspension will stand. 
 
Weber v. State, 58 Ohio St. 616, 619, 51 N.E. 116 (1898). 
{¶ 19} The United States Supreme Court has stated that “there is no right 
to a jury trial before probation may be revoked.”  Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 
420, 435, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984), fn. 7.  See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
411 U.S. 778, 781, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), discussing Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).  (“Even though the 
revocation of parole is not a part of the criminal prosecution, we held that the loss 
of liberty entailed is a serious deprivation requiring that the parolee be accorded 
due process”). 
{¶ 20} Because the invocation proceeding is not a criminal proceeding, 
the fact-finding need not be according to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 
required in criminal trials.  The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard allowed 
by R.C. 2152.14(E)(1) is less rigorous, though stronger than a mere 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.  We have stated that clear and 
convincing evidence is that “which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a 
January Term, 2012 
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firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.”  Cross v. 
Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the 
syllabus.  The standard requires the judge to have a firm belief or conviction 
about the facts adduced.  We conclude that there is nothing fundamentally unfair 
about a statutory scheme that authorizes a judge to reach conclusions about facts 
according to a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, as R.C. 2152.14(E)(1) 
does. 
{¶ 21} In this case, J.V. had notice of the invocation hearing, he was 
present at the hearing, he had counsel at the hearing, he had the opportunity to 
present evidence at the hearing, and he had the opportunity to cross-examine the 
witnesses called by the state.  Based on our examination of the record, the court 
complied with the statutory framework laid out in R.C. 2152.14.  We conclude 
that J.V. was not denied due process based on the fact that the trial court reached 
factual conclusions according to a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. 
Jurisdiction of Juvenile Court to Impose a Stayed Sentence after the 
Juvenile Delinquent Reaches the Age of 21 
{¶ 22} J.V. argues that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over 
him when it sentenced him in February 2010.  He relies on R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), 
which states, “The juvenile court has jurisdiction over a person who is adjudicated 
a delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender prior to attaining eighteen years of 
age until the person attains twenty-one years of age.” 
{¶ 23} This language is straightforward.  It states that juvenile courts have 
jurisdiction over adjudicated delinquents until they are 21 years old.  The obvious 
flip side of that statement is that juvenile courts do not have jurisdiction over 
adjudicated delinquents once they are 21 years old.  There is no need to interpret 
the statute; we need only apply the facts of this case to the law.  Bernardini v. 
Conneaut Area City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 58 Ohio St.2d 1, 4, 387 N.E.2d 
1222 (1979). 
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{¶ 24} J.V. turned 21 on March 11, 2009.  Accordingly, the juvenile court 
had no jurisdiction over him after that date.  Nevertheless, in February 2010, it 
held a de novo sentencing hearing to correct the original juvenile disposition, 
which did not mention postrelease control.  At that time, the juvenile court 
imposed the adult sentence and added postrelease control.  Based on the plain 
language of R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over 
J.V.  There can be no doubt that the juvenile court acted outside its jurisdiction 
and therefore that the disposition issued in February 2010 is void.   
Conclusion 
{¶ 25} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur in part and dissent in 
part. 
__________________ 
MCGEE BROWN, J., concurring. 
{¶ 26} I concur in the opinion of the majority but write separately to 
address the jurisdictional theory of the dissent.  The dissent seems to argue that 
our precedent allows us to find jurisdiction where it is not provided by statute.  In 
Ohio, juvenile courts are creatures of statute with limited jurisdiction set by the 
General Assembly.  See In re Agler, 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 72-74, 249 N.E.2d 808 
(1969).  Consequently, only the General Assembly can expand the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court to address the gap in the serious-youthful-offender scheme that 
this case illustrates. 
{¶ 27} It is helpful to understand the long history of this case.  J.V. 
initially was sentenced on June 17, 2005, when he was 17 years old.  He received 
a blended sentence consisting of a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence that 
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allowed him to spend the first portion of his sentence in the Ohio Department of 
Youth Services (“ODYS”).  The juvenile court in imposing this sentence failed to 
correctly notify J.V. of his postrelease-control obligations or to include 
postrelease control in its judgment entry. 
{¶ 28} On May 18, 2006, the Eighth District reversed the juvenile court, 
finding that J.V’s first sentencing entry did not correctly reflect the length of his 
sentence as established at the disposition hearing.  In re J.V., 8th Dist. Nos. 86849 
and 86850, 2006-Ohio-2464, 2006 WL 1351647.  The appellate court remanded 
the case to the juvenile court with instructions to correct the sentence.  The 
juvenile court resentenced J.V. on January 5, 2007.  At this point, J.V. was 18, 
and the juvenile court failed for the second time to correctly impose postrelease 
control. J.V. did not appeal this entry. 
{¶ 29} On February 5, 2009, the juvenile court imposed the adult portion 
of J.V.’s sentence.  J.V. was now 20.  For the third time, the juvenile court did not 
correctly impose postrelease control.  The Eighth District once again reversed and 
on January 14, 2010, remanded the case to the juvenile court for resentencing.  
However, by this date J.V. was 21 years old. 
{¶ 30} With respect to each of these sentencing entries, there is no dispute 
that the juvenile court had jurisdiction under R.C. 2152.02(C)(6) to impose 
postrelease control as required by law.  But the juvenile court did not correctly 
impose postrelease control until February 12, 2010, when J.V. was nearly 22 and 
the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction over the case. 
{¶ 31} Contrary to the argument of the dissent, neither the juvenile court 
nor this court has authority to grant jurisdiction when there is none.  This is the 
province of the legislature. We simply do not have authority to uphold the 
juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction when it was contrary to the express 
language of R.C. 2152.02(C)(6). 
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{¶ 32} This case has revealed a gap in the law that should be addressed by 
the legislature.  This is an unfortunate result that was not intended by the 
legislature. However, the error here is not the juvenile’s exercise of his right of 
appeal. 
{¶ 33} I respectfully concur in the majority opinion. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and CUPP, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 34} In this appeal, we confront two issues: (1) whether R.C. 2152.14 
violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution  and  (2) whether the 
juvenile court is divested of jurisdiction to correct a void sentence after the 
juvenile turns 21 years of age.  Although I concur in the majority’s holding that 
R.C. 2152.14 is constitutional, I respectfully dissent from the determination that 
the juvenile court lacked authority to correct the sentence to impose postrelease 
control after J.V. turned 21. 
Blended Sentencing 
{¶ 35} The General Assembly authorized the imposition of blended 
sentences in order to give juvenile courts more flexibility in handling violent 
juvenile offenders.  Prior to the enactment of 2000 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 179, juvenile 
courts had the choice of two extremes: the court could treat the child as a juvenile, 
committing the child to the Department of Youth Services (“DYS”) for a period 
not to exceed the juvenile’s attainment of 21 years of age, or it could treat the 
child as an adult and transfer the case to the common pleas court, depriving the 
child of a chance at rehabilitation and exposing the child to an adult sentence in 
an adult prison.  See former R.C. 2151.26, 1996 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 124, 146 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 2034, 2054, and former R.C. 2151.355, 2000 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 222, 
148 Ohio Laws, Part V, 10900. 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 36} Against this backdrop, the General Assembly enacted S.B. 179 and 
authorized juvenile courts to impose a blended sentence, which is a traditional 
juvenile disposition coupled with the imposition of a stayed adult sentence. R.C. 
2152.13.  A blended sentence functions as both a carrot and a stick; the adult 
sentence remains stayed so long as the juvenile successfully completes the 
traditional juvenile disposition, and the threat of an adult prison term encourages 
the juvenile to cooperate in his rehabilitation.  R.C. 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(iii); State v. 
D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209.  At the same time, 
blended sentencing provides the juvenile court with a means to supervise the 
rehabilitative process and to ensure that an offender who remains dangerous is not 
released into society solely by virtue of turning 21. 
{¶ 37} J.V. benefited from this flexibility.  The state had charged him with 
attempted murder—in addition to aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and 
firearm specifications—an allegation that would have resulted in mandatory 
transfer to the common pleas court for prosecution of J.V. as an adult.  R.C. 
2152.10.  However, the state entered into a plea agreement with J.V. in order “to 
give this young man one more chance to try to right his ways,” in the words of the 
assistant prosecutor at the dispositional hearing, in the belief that a blended 
sentence would encourage rehabilitation.  The juvenile court accepted J.V.’s 
admissions and on June 22, 2005, imposed the jointly recommended blended 
sentence, committing J.V. to DYS and staying the adult prison term.  J.V. avoided 
prosecution as an adult and gained an opportunity to rehabilitate himself. 
{¶ 38} However, J.V. wasted that opportunity.  While at DYS, he rose in 
the ranks of a gang called the Heartless Felons and committed offenses of 
violence against a juvenile corrections officer and a fellow inmate.  Because J.V. 
failed to reform himself, the juvenile court ordered the adult portion of the 
sentence into execution on February 5, 2009—before J.V. turned 21 years old on 
March 11, 2009.  J.V. appealed, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals vacated 
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the sentence based on the juvenile court’s failure to properly impose postrelease 
control and remanded the matter for resentencing.  In re J.V., 8th Dist. No. 92869, 
2010-Ohio-71, ¶ 23-24.  On remand, the juvenile court resentenced him and 
properly imposed postrelease control. 
{¶ 39} J.V. again appealed, asserting that the juvenile court lacked 
jurisdiction to correct his sentence because he had reached the age of 21.  The 
Eighth District rejected this argument and affirmed, holding that “the 
determination by the juvenile court to invoke the adult portion of the SYO  
sentence on February 5, 2009, was not impacted by the subsequent decision from 
this Court to remand the case for a new hearing to properly incorporate 
postrelease control in J.V.’s dispositional sentence.”  In re J.V., 8th Dist. No. 
94820, 2010-Ohio-5490, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 40} Then, following that judgment and before J.V. appealed to this 
court, we announced State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 
N.E.2d 332, where we recognized that “when a judge fails to impose statutorily 
mandated postrelease control as part of a defendant's sentence, that part of the 
sentence is void and must be set aside.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 26.  The court 
further explained, “Although the doctrine of res judicata does not preclude review 
of a void sentence, res judicata still applies to other aspects of the merits of a 
conviction, including the determination of guilt and the lawful elements of the 
ensuing sentence.”  Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus.  Accordingly, we 
concluded, “The scope of an appeal from a resentencing hearing in which a 
mandatory term of postrelease control is imposed is limited to issues arising at the 
resentencing hearing.”   Id. at paragraph four of the syllabus. 
{¶ 41} In my view, Fischer applies to this case and supports the appellate 
court’s resolution of this matter.  In this case, the trial court invoked the adult 
portion of the blended sentence before J.V. reached the age of 21, and the court’s 
failure to properly impose postrelease control did not affect the lawful part of the 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
sentence imposed on June 22, 2005, which was ordered into execution on 
February 5, 2009, and included a term of imprisonment.  According to our 
holding in Fischer, this appeal from a resentencing to properly impose postrelease 
control is limited to issues arising at the resentencing hearing, and res judicata 
precludes any other challenge to the sentence. 
{¶ 42} Moreover, the juvenile court had authority to correct the void part 
of the sentence in order to properly impose postrelease control, even after J.V. 
reached 21 years of age.  As we have consistently recognized, “[a] trial court's 
jurisdiction over a criminal case is limited after it renders judgment, but it retains 
jurisdiction to correct a void sentence and is authorized to do so.” (Emphasis 
added.)  State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568,  
¶ 23, citing State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-
5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, at ¶ 19, and State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-
Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, at ¶ 23; see also Commonwealth v. S.K., 253 S.W.3d 
486, 489 (Ky.2008) (holding that a juvenile court retains jurisdiction to enforce 
orders of restitution even after the child turns 18 years old). 
{¶ 43} Not only did the juvenile court retain jurisdiction to correct the 
void part of J.V.’s sentence, but also the mandate of the appellate court required it 
to do so.  See State ex rel. Potain v. Mathews, 59 Ohio St.2d 29, 32, 391 N.E.2d 
343 (1979) (“The Constitution does not grant to a court of common pleas 
jurisdiction to review a prior mandate of a court of appeals”); see also R.C. 
2505.39 (“A court that reverses or affirms a final order, judgment, or decree of a 
lower court upon appeal on questions of law, shall not issue execution, but shall 
send a special mandate to the lower court for execution or further proceedings”).  
In my view, then, the juvenile court had inherent authority to correct the adult 
portion of the blended sentence. 
{¶ 44} The effect of today’s decision by the majority is significant in a 
number of respects.  First of all, it will have substantial precedential value in cases 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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where a juvenile appeals a blended sentence and reaches the age of 21 during the 
pendency of the appeal.  Secondly, in this case, J.V. received credit for the time 
served in DYS against the adult sentence and therefore has completed serving the 
term of incarceration; the majority has now removed postrelease-control sanctions 
on him, denying the state the opportunity to supervise his postrelease conduct, 
contrary to the intent of the General Assembly. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 45} The court’s decision today frustrates the intent of the General 
Assembly in authorizing blended sentences and threatens to deprive other children 
of a last opportunity for rehabilitation as had been afforded  J.V.  The practical 
result is that serious youthful offenders now have an incentive to appeal any 
blended sentence imposed in the hopes of delaying the appeal long enough to 
divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction to invoke the adult portion of the blended 
sentence.  As a consequence, a juvenile court choosing between imposing a 
blended sentence that it may not be able to invoke in a proper case and 
transferring the case to common pleas court for prosecution of the child as an 
adult may be more likely to transfer the case and thereby deprive a child of a 
chance for rehabilitation in the juvenile court. 
{¶ 46} Accordingly, because the juvenile court had jurisdiction to invoke 
the adult portion of the blended sentence in this case, I would affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga Country Public Defender, and Cullen 
Sweeney, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant, J.V. 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristen 
L. Sobieski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee, state of Ohio. 
January Term, 2012 
19 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Jill Beeler and Amanda J. 
Powell, Assistant State Public Defenders, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio 
Public Defender. 
 Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, and David M. Lieberman and Elizabeth A. Matune, Assistant Attorneys 
General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General. 
______________________