Case Title: Commonwealth v. Ramos

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12678

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-11-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12678 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSE RAMOS. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     April 6, 2022. - November 28, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Practice, Criminal, Postconviction 
relief.  Evidence, Scientific test, Relevancy and 
materiality, Self-defense.  Statute, Construction.  
Homicide.  Self-Defense.  Words, "Material." 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 15, 2015. 
 
A postconviction motion for forensic testing, filed on May 
19, 2020, was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J. 
 
 
Michael Tumposky for the defendant. 
Lee Baker, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  The defendant, Jose Ramos, was convicted of 
murder in the first degree for killing Luis Sanchez.  The 
defendant subsequently filed a motion under G. L. c. 278A 
(c. 278A) seeking deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing of 
2 
 
fingernail clippings collected from the victim's body during an 
autopsy to support his contention that the victim was the first 
aggressor and that the defendant acted in self-defense.  After a 
hearing, a judge of the Superior Court denied the motion on the 
grounds that the defendant had failed to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that (1) the requested testing had 
the potential to result in evidence material to his defense and 
(2) a reasonably effective attorney would have sought this 
testing.  See G. L. c. 278A, §§ 3 (b) (5) (iv), 7 (b) (3)-(4).  
Before us is the defendant's appeal from that ruling.  For the 
reasons discussed infra, we reverse. 
Overview of G. L. c. 278A.  Pursuant to c. 278A, an 
individual "whose liberty has been . . . restrained as the 
result of a conviction" of a criminal offense in the courts of 
the Commonwealth, and who "asserts factual innocence of the 
crime for which [he or she] has been convicted," may file a 
motion requesting postconviction testing.  G. L. c. 278A, § 2.  
If the motion meets certain threshold requirements, see G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3 (b) (§ 3 [b]),1 a hearing will be held where the 
 
1 Section 3 (b) requires that the movant provide the 
following information: 
 
"(1) the name and a description of the requested forensic 
or scientific analysis; (2) information demonstrating that 
the requested analysis is admissible as evidence in courts 
of the commonwealth; (3) a description of the evidence or 
biological material that the moving party seeks to have 
3 
 
defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence each 
of the factors set forth in G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (§ 7 [b]),2 
including that the "requested analysis has the potential to 
result in evidence that is material to the moving party's 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime," and that the 
evidence has not been analyzed previously for one of five 
 
analyzed or tested, including its location and chain of 
custody if known; (4) information demonstrating that the 
analysis has the potential to result in evidence that is 
material to the moving party's identification as the 
perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case; and (5) 
information demonstrating that the evidence or biological 
material has not been subjected to the requested analysis 
because [of one of the five reasons enumerated in 
§ 3 (b) (5)]." 
 
2 Section 7 (b) requires the defendant to demonstrate the 
following by a preponderance of the evidence: 
 
"(1) that the evidence or biological material exists; (2) 
that the evidence or biological material has been subject 
to a chain of custody that is sufficient to establish that 
it has not deteriorated, been substituted, tampered with, 
replaced, handled or altered such that the results of the 
requested analysis would lack any probative value; (3) that 
the evidence or biological material has not been subjected 
to the requested analysis for any of the reasons in 
[§ 3 (b) (5) (i)-(v)]; (4) that the requested analysis has 
the potential to result in evidence that is material to the 
moving party's identification as the perpetrator of the 
crime in the underlying case; (5) that the purpose of the 
motion is not the obstruction of justice or delay; and (6) 
that the results of the particular type of analysis being 
requested have been found to be admissible in courts of the 
commonwealth." 
 
4 
 
reasons enumerated in § 3 (b) (5).3  See G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b) (4). 
"If such a showing is made, the court shall allow the 
requested forensic or scientific analysis, the results of which 
may be used to support a motion for a new trial."  Randolph v. 
Commonwealth, 488 Mass. 1, 4 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 481 Mass. 799, 801-802 (2019). 
 
Background.  1.  Evidence at trial.  We summarize the facts 
of the underlying criminal case, reserving certain details for 
later discussion of the issues. 
 
3 The defendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the requested analysis has not been done for one 
of the following reasons: 
 
"(i) the requested analysis had not yet been developed at 
the time of the conviction; (ii) the results of the 
requested analysis were not admissible in the courts of the 
commonwealth at the time of the conviction; (iii) the 
moving party and the moving party's attorney were not aware 
of and did not have reason to be aware of the existence of 
the evidence or biological material at the time of the 
underlying case and conviction; (iv) the moving party's 
attorney in the underlying case was aware at the time of 
the conviction of the existence of the evidence or 
biological material, the results of the requested analysis 
were admissible as evidence in courts of the commonwealth, 
a reasonably effective attorney would have sought the 
analysis and either the moving party's attorney failed to 
seek the analysis or the judge denied the request; or (v) 
the evidence or biological material was otherwise 
unavailable at the time of the conviction." 
 
G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5). 
5 
 
On the evening of March 10, 2015, the defendant and the 
victim were staying at a homeless shelter in Springfield.  At 
approximately 6 P.M., the defendant approached a shelter staff 
member in the intake office and told her that the victim "was 
giving him a lot of attitude" and that "somebody needed to speak 
to [the victim]."  The defendant also said that he believed the 
victim was under the influence of alcohol.  The staff member 
informed the defendant that she would have another staff member 
assess the situation.  Meanwhile, the victim was observing this 
conversation through the intake office's window, which faced the 
hallway, and when the defendant left the office, the victim 
followed him.  Both men walked toward the stairs to the basement 
dormitory where they both lived while at the shelter. 
Shortly thereafter, the defendant and the victim ascended 
the stairwell from the basement and walked along the hallway 
toward the exit to the parking lot.  Another staff member, who 
had been sent to check on them, observed that both the defendant 
and the victim appeared to be hurried and "hostile" as they 
ascended the stairs.  This second staff member went to the 
intake office and told the first staff member that the defendant 
and the victim were going outside and that he thought they were 
going to fight.  Both staff members went outside, along with a 
police officer who was stationed at the shelter.  When they 
arrived outside, they saw the defendant and the victim "coming 
6 
 
apart" from one another and "squared off," and the defendant had 
a knife in his hand.  The officer told the defendant to drop the 
knife, and the defendant did so.  The victim was staggering and 
bleeding from his torso, and he fell down.  The officer and the 
two staff members, however, did not see the defendant stab the 
victim or the events immediately preceding the stabbing. 
Two witnesses who already were outside the shelter at the 
time of the altercation between the defendant and the victim 
gave conflicting testimony.  One witness testified that she saw 
two men arguing and fighting in the parking lot.  She saw the 
defendant make punching gestures toward the victim approximately 
ten to fifteen times as the victim attempted to block the blows.  
She neither saw anything in the victim's hands nor saw him throw 
any punches during the fight.  The victim stumbled and fell, got 
up and removed his jersey, and was bleeding from his chest. 
Another witness, called by the defense, testified that he 
saw the defendant and the victim engaged in "a lot of yelling 
and screaming" and a "pushing match," and "squaring up to 
fight."  They began "fist fighting," although the altercation 
involved "bumping chest[s]" and "pushing off of each other," 
rather than actual "swings."  Next, the victim took off his 
jersey, pulled out a screwdriver, and swung it at the defendant, 
jabbing at him, and the defendant kept backing away to avoid 
being hit.  The defendant pulled out a weapon that looked like a 
7 
 
"sheetrock edger" and "pok[ed]" at the victim two or three times 
with the knife. 
Police subsequently recovered both a knife and screwdriver 
at the scene.  No fingerprints were detected on either item.  
Both the knife and screwdriver tested positive for occult blood.  
The victim's DNA was detected on the blade of the knife, but 
there was not enough blood for the police to conduct further 
analysis of the screwdriver. 
Surveillance cameras, operated by the shelter, captured 
some of the events that occurred inside and outside the shelter.  
Video excerpts and still images from this surveillance footage 
were shown to the jury at trial.  Footage from a camera inside 
the shelter shows the defendant and the victim as they left the 
building.  The defendant was walking ahead of the victim as they 
headed toward the door and, just as they went through the exit 
of the shelter, the defendant stopped and let the victim pass 
him.  Footage from an outside camera depicts the two men as they 
walked through the parking lot; the defendant was following 
several paces behind the victim, until the defendant suddenly 
sped up and contacted the victim from behind with an 
outstretched arm, and they moved beyond the camera's view.  
Subsequent footage shows the two men as they came back into 
view; the victim circled the defendant, took off his jersey, and 
8 
 
fell to the ground, while the defendant walked back toward the 
shelter. 
Defense counsel argued in closing that his client had been 
acting in self-defense when he killed the victim.  The 
prosecutor argued that the defendant acted with premeditation by 
ambushing the victim from behind, and also with extreme atrocity 
and cruelty.  The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in 
the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. 
2.  Procedural posture.  While his direct appeal was 
pending, the defendant filed a c. 278A motion in the Superior 
Court, requesting that the fingernail clippings taken from the 
victim during the autopsy be tested for the defendant's DNA.  As 
the Commonwealth conceded that the defendant had met the 
threshold requirements pursuant to § 3 (b), an evidentiary 
hearing was held, after which the motion judge4 denied the 
motion.  The defendant filed his subsequent appeal from that 
decision in this court because the direct appeal from his 
conviction of murder was pending here already.  See Commonwealth 
v. Moffat, 478 Mass. 292, 293 (2017), S.C., 486 Mass. 193 
(2020); G. L. c. 278A, § 18 (order allowing or denying motion 
under c. 278A is final and appealable).  This court stayed the 
 
4 As the trial judge had retired, the motion was assigned to 
a different judge. 
9 
 
defendant's direct appeal pending the appeal from the denial of 
his c. 278A motion. 
 
Discussion.  At the motion hearing, the Commonwealth argued 
that the defendant failed to meet the requirements of § 7 (b).  
Specifically, according to the Commonwealth, the defendant 
failed to demonstrate that the presence of the defendant's DNA 
under the victim's fingernails would be "material or relevant" 
to the defendant's self-defense claim, see G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b) (4), and that therefore the failure to request such 
testing was not ineffective assistance of counsel, see G. L. 
c. 278A, §§ 3 (b) (5) (iv), 7 (b) (3).  In denying the 
defendant's motion, the motion judge essentially agreed with the 
Commonwealth.  We review the defendant's appeal from that 
decision under a de novo standard.  See Moffat, 478 Mass. at 
298-299, quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 
(1986) ("For second-stage motions under G. L. c. 278A, § 7, 
where the motion judge was not the trial judge, and where the 
record before us is purely documentary, we . . . review claims 
of error under a de novo standard, because 'we regard ourselves 
in as good a position as the motion judge to assess the trial 
record'"). 
1.  G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4).  Whether DNA analysis of 
the victim's fingernail clippings has the "potential to result 
in evidence that is material to [the defendant's] identification 
10 
 
as the perpetrator of the crime" under § 7 (b) (4) depends on 
what the Legislature meant by the term "material." 
a.  Materiality standard in the context of G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b) (4).  As always, "[o]ur primary duty is to interpret a 
statute in accordance with the intent of the Legislature."  Pyle 
v. School Comm. of S. Hadley, 423 Mass. 283, 285 (1996).  See 
Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Boston, 435 Mass. 718, 719-
720 (2002), and cases cited.  The Commonwealth urges us to adopt 
a definition of material evidence drawn from our decisions 
concerning the government's loss or destruction of potentially 
exculpatory evidence:  "Evidence is material if, in considering 
the entire record, it creates a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt that would not otherwise exist."  Commonwealth 
v. Harwood, 432 Mass. 290, 295 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Otsuki, 411 Mass. 218, 231 (1991).  We decline to do so. 
The Legislature enacted c. 278A "to remedy the injustice of 
wrongful convictions of factually innocent persons by allowing 
access to analyses of biological material with newer forensic 
and scientific techniques."  Commonwealth v. Wade, 467 Mass. 
496, 504 (2014), S.C., 475 Mass. 54 (2016), quoting 2011 Senate 
Doc. No. 753 and 2011 House Doc. No. 2165.  Because "defendants 
who sought access to DNA through motions for a new trial under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b)[, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 
(2001),] faced long delays and impediments to access," Wade, 
11 
 
supra at 505, the Legislature created a "process, separate from 
the trial and any subsequent proceedings challenging an 
underlying conviction, that permits forensic and scientific 
analysis of evidence or biological material, the results of 
which could support a motion for a new trial," Commonwealth v. 
Clark, 472 Mass. 120, 121-122 (2015). 
As a broad interpretation of c. 278A aligns with the 
remedial nature of the statute, see Williams, 481 Mass. at 808, 
we generally have "construe[d] the language of G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b), in a manner that is generous to the moving party," 
Randolph, 488 Mass. at 11.  In particular, we have emphasized 
that defendants need not demonstrate that the requested testing 
could result in evidence that would justify a new trial.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Linton, 483 Mass. 227, 242 (2019) ("The 
requirements of G. L. c. 278A are, by design, less stringent 
than a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30"); Wade, 467 Mass. at 509 ("It would thwart the legislative 
purpose to impose on a moving party seeking forensic analysis 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278A an equal or greater burden of proof 
than that which is required of a party seeking discovery under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 [c] [4]").  For example, in Linton we held 
that a defendant who had been convicted of murder in the first 
degree for strangling his wife had met the materiality standard 
for further DNA testing of swabs taken from the victim's neck, 
12 
 
where an expert witness had identified potentially exculpatory 
male DNA at a single locus in data derived from these samples 
using a lower threshold for detection.  See Linton, supra at 
241-242.  In reaching that conclusion, we noted that we were 
"not deciding whether the evidence of a single potential allele 
supports the allowance of a motion for a new trial."  Id. at 
242.5 
With the legislative intent of c. 278A and our prior case 
law in mind, we consider the meaning of "material" within the 
context of § 7 (b).  Because "material" is not defined in 
c. 278A, we turn to "the plain and ordinary meaning of the word" 
as derived from sources such as "other legal contexts and 
dictionary definitions."  Commonwealth v. Tinsley, 487 Mass. 
380, 386-387 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Montarvo, 486 Mass. 
535, 536 (2020).  The definitions in these sources are, by and 
large, variations on the same theme.  Nonlegal dictionaries 
equate "material" to "substantial" or "consequential," or define 
it as "of real importance or great consequence."  See, e.g., 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1392 (2002); 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1083 (5th 
ed. 2011).  Black's Law Dictionary defines "material" as 
 
5 We went on to hold, however, that the defendant's motion 
for postconviction DNA testing was properly denied for other 
reasons.  See Linton, 483 Mass. at 245-246. 
13 
 
"significant" or "having some logical connection to 
consequential facts."  Black's Law Dictionary 1170 (11th ed. 
2019).  A well-known hornbook on evidence explains that "[a] 
fact that is 'of consequence' is material."  1 McCormick on 
Evidence § 185, at 1108 (R.P. Mosteller ed., 8th ed. 2020).  
Synthesizing these various similar formulations, we believe that 
the phrase "evidence that is material" in § 7 (b) (4) means 
evidence that is of significance "to the moving party's 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the underlying 
case."  G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4). 
The Commonwealth's proposed definition of materiality would 
require more:  a defendant would need to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the requested analysis has 
the potential to result in evidence that creates a reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant's guilt that would not otherwise 
exist.  See Harwood, 432 Mass. at 295.  However, c. 278A was 
intended to give defendants easier access to scientific or 
forensic testing than is available through a motion for a new 
trial, without having to prove that the test results will raise 
doubts about their convictions.6  See, e.g., Clark, 472 Mass. at 
 
6 We note that in contrast to c. 278A, similar forensic 
testing statutes in other jurisdictions require a defendant who 
seeks such testing to demonstrate some degree of likelihood that 
he or she is innocent.  See Wade, 467 Mass. at 509 n.16 (citing 
statutes).  See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.692(6)(d) (judge 
shall order DNA testing if it is found that, "[i]n light of all 
14 
 
136, quoting Wade, 467 Mass. at 511 ("the Legislature intended 
to permit access to DNA testing 'regardless of the presence of 
overwhelming guilt in the underlying trial'"). 
 
Thus, we conclude, for purposes of § 7 (b) (4), that a 
defendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the requested analysis has the potential to result in 
evidence that is of significance to the moving party's 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the underlying 
case. 
b.  Application.  Applying the standard articulated supra, 
we conclude that the defendant has demonstrated by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the DNA testing he seeks has 
the potential to result in evidence that would be material -- 
that is, of significance to issues concerning his identification 
as the perpetrator of murder in the first degree. 
The Commonwealth's theory at trial was that the defendant 
ambushed the victim.  The defendant countered that he had been 
acting in self-defense when he stabbed the victim.  As stated in 
the affidavit submitted in support of his c. 278A motion, the 
defendant alleged that the victim first attacked him; they 
 
the evidence, there is a reasonable probability that, had 
exculpatory results been available at the time of the underlying 
prosecution, the person would not have been prosecuted or 
convicted of the offense").  No such language appears in 
c. 278A. 
15 
 
engaged in a fist fight; in the course of the fight, the victim 
pulled out a screwdriver and swung it at him in an attempt to 
stab him; and the defendant used a knife to defend himself.  The 
defendant contends that testing of the victim's fingernail 
clippings has the potential to result in evidence that would be 
material to his self-defense claim because if it revealed the 
defendant's DNA on the victim's fingernails, it would support 
his contention that the victim had attacked the defendant first. 
As we explained supra, the defendant need only show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the results of the DNA 
testing "could be material" to his self-defense claim,7 not that 
it "would have had any effect on the underlying conviction" 
 
7 We previously have held that where a defendant denies 
having committed a crime on the ground that he or she was acting 
in self-defense, evidence that is material to the self-defense 
claim would be "material to the moving party's identification as 
the perpetrator of the crime" under c. 278A.  See Williams, 481 
Mass. at 806-809 (construing G. L. c. 278A, § 3 [b] [4]).  See 
also id. at 806 & n.8 ("factual innocence" requirement of G. L. 
c. 278A, § 2, was met where defendant asserted that he acted in 
self-defense and therefore "no crime occurred"). 
 
In addition to arguing that the testing could result in 
evidence that is material to his self-defense claim, the 
defendant contends that this same evidence could be used to 
argue that he used excessive force in self-defense, or that he 
acted in the heat of passion induced by sudden combat resulting 
in voluntary manslaughter rather than murder in the first 
degree.  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 78-82 (2018).  
We need not consider whether these alternative theories meet the 
materiality requirement in § 7 (b) (4) because we conclude infra 
that the defendant adequately demonstrated that the DNA testing 
he requested has the potential to result in evidence that is 
material to his self-defense claim. 
16 
 
(emphasis in original).  Commonwealth v. Steadman, 489 Mass. 
372, 389 (2022), quoting Wade, 467 Mass. at 508 (discussing 
parallel materiality requirement in § 3 [b] [4]).  Here, the 
defendant has done so. 
The witness called by the defense testified that there was 
a physical altercation between the defendant and the victim 
during which the victim attacked the defendant with a 
screwdriver.  In response, the defendant took out a knife and 
poked at the victim two or three times with it.  If evidence of 
the defendant's DNA were discovered on the victim's fingernail 
clippings, it could further corroborate this testimony and the 
defendant's self-defense theory by tending to prove that the 
victim had grabbed or struck the defendant.  It also could help 
to contradict the Commonwealth's contention that the defendant 
suddenly ambushed the victim from behind and stabbed him in the 
back, without any prior fist fight, and counter the testimony of 
the prosecution witness who said that she did not see the victim 
throw any punches at the defendant.  Moreover, the DNA evidence 
could be particularly significant because the Commonwealth's 
contention that the defendant was the first aggressor was 
premised solely on circumstantial evidence. 
We therefore conclude that the defendant adequately 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that testing of 
the victim's fingernail clippings to determine whether they 
17 
 
contain traces of the defendant's DNA has the potential to 
result in evidence that is material, i.e., of significance to 
the defendant's contention that he acted in self-defense. 
The dissent appears to take the position that for the DNA 
evidence to be material under § 7 (b) (4), it must have the 
potential to support independently and directly one or more 
elements of his self-defense claim, e.g., by demonstrating who 
was the first aggressor, or who initiated the use of deadly 
force, or whether the defendant's use of deadly force was 
justified.  However, we have been consistent in taking a broader 
approach to the application of § 7 (b) (4).  That is, in our 
view, the defendant only needs to show that the DNA evidence, in 
combination with other evidence presented at trial, would tend 
to support the defendant's self-defense claim.  For example, we 
stated in Linton, 483 Mass. at 239 n.5, that under § 7 (b) (4), 
"[i]t is the defendant's burden to prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that testing may result in evidence that, on its 
own, or with other evidence, might be material to the identity 
of the perpetrator" (emphasis added).  Cf. Moffatt, 478 Mass. at 
301 ("We do not suggest that postconviction forensic testing 
under G. L. c. 278A is limited to direct evidence of the 
perpetrator's identity. . . .  [D]epending on the facts of a 
particular case, . . . DNA evidence could be used in conjunction 
with other evidence to establish the identity of a third 
18 
 
party").  As explained supra, the defendant has met that 
standard here by showing that the DNA evidence he seeks might be 
used to bolster the testimony of the lone defense witness and to 
challenge the Commonwealth's account of the sequence of events.8 
2.  G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (3).  As previously discussed, 
§ 7 (b) (3) requires the defendant to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the testing sought had not 
occurred previously due to one of the five reasons specified in 
§ 3 (b) (5).9  Here, the defendant argued that although trial 
counsel was aware, or should have been aware, of the victim's 
fingernail clippings, he failed to have them tested for DNA 
evidence, and "a reasonably effective attorney would have sought 
the analysis" because of the possibility that it could support 
 
 
8 There are, of course, situations where the purported 
connection between the DNA evidence a defendant hopes to recover 
through testing and the other trial evidence is so attenuated 
that a request for testing may be appropriately denied.  For 
example, in Moffatt, 478 Mass. at 300-301, we held that the 
trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying a request 
under c. 278A for DNA testing of cigarette butts that were found 
approximately 200 feet from the murder victim's body, where 
there was no evidence indicating when they might have been 
deposited or that any other alleged participants had been 
smoking.  But the result in that case is explained easily under 
the standard of materiality set forth here.  Because the 
cigarette butts could have been left by any number of people 
before or after the murder, the defendant failed to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that testing of those cigarette 
butts would result in evidence that would be of significance to 
his identification as the perpetrator of the crime. 
 
9 See note 3, supra. 
19 
 
the defendant's self-defense claim.  G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5) 
(iv).  The defendant further argues that there would be little 
downside risk if the testing yielded a negative result, because 
that would not prove the absence of hand-to-hand combat between 
the defendant and the victim, but only that there was no 
resulting DNA evidence. 
Bearing in mind the liberal construction to be given to 
c. 278A, we agree that a reasonably effective attorney would 
have requested the DNA testing in light of the fact that it 
potentially could corroborate the testimony of the lone defense 
witness and contradict the Commonwealth's argument. 
We have held that the "reasonably effective attorney" 
standard under § 3 (b) (5) (iv) is not equivalent to the 
standard for assessing a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in a motion for a new trial.  See Linton, 483 Mass. at 
237; Wade, 467 Mass. at 511.  Consequently, although we have 
held that strategic or tactical decisions by counsel do not 
constitute ineffective assistance unless they are "manifestly 
unreasonable when made," see Wade, supra, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Watson, 455 Mass. 246, 256 (2009), that is not the 
appropriate standard to apply under § 3 (b) (5) (iv).  For 
purposes of assessing trial counsel's decision not to seek 
scientific testing, the defendant needs to show "only that 'a' 
reasonably effective attorney would have sought the requested 
20 
 
analysis, not that every reasonably effective attorney would 
have done so."  Wade, supra.  See Linton, supra at 236-237.  The 
defendant has met that standard. 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the order of the 
Superior Court judge denying the defendant's motion under G. L. 
c. 278A is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
CYPHER, J. (dissenting).  Because I am of the opinion that 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing, regardless of its result, 
would be immaterial to the defendant's identity as the 
perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case, as it could not 
support his claim of factual innocence, I respectfully dissent. 
 
Background.  I include additional facts, as the jury could 
have found them, that were not mentioned by the court but that 
are relevant to my analysis.  On March 10, 2015, the defendant 
killed the victim by stabbing him four times:  twice in his 
chest, once in his back, and once in his left torso.  Two of 
those stab wounds penetrated his heart.  Multiple sharp-force 
injuries were determined to be the victim's cause of death. 
As mentioned by the court, the Commonwealth introduced 
video recordings of the incident from the shelter.1  Video 
footage from inside the shelter's front door showed the 
defendant stepping to the side and letting the victim walk out 
of the shelter in front of him.  The victim was seen walking in 
front of the defendant toward the street.  As they neared the 
street, the defendant sped up and reached out to the victim from 
behind.  After the defendant reached out to the victim, the 
victim fell to the ground out of view of the camera, and the 
 
1 As part of my review, I watched the video recordings of 
the altercation. 
2 
 
defendant briefly stood over him before they both went out of 
view of the camera. 
In addition to the video footage, witnesses testified that 
as the defendant walked away from the victim, his demeanor was 
calm.  While staff members attempted to treat the victim's 
wounds, the defendant sat down and smoked a cigarette.  When 
police approached the defendant, without prompting, he stood up 
"very casually, nonchalant, took a puff of his cigarette," 
turned around, and put his hands behind his back.  As he was 
escorted to a cruiser, passing the victim, the defendant said, 
"[T]hat guy's dangerous.  He always carried knives.  I don't 
feel bad about it." 
Two eyewitnesses to the altercation, Julie Mayers and 
Raymond Perkins, Jr., testified at the trial.  Mayers went to 
the shelter to visit friends and to smoke marijuana.  As she 
watched the two men fighting, she saw the defendant make a 
"punching gesture," and she witnessed the victim stumble and 
fall to the ground.  She watched the defendant repeat the 
"punching" motion about ten to fifteen times.2  She did not see 
anything in the hands of the victim, but she saw him attempt to 
block himself from being hit.  Mayers saw a screwdriver on the 
 
2 She acknowledged that she did not count. 
3 
 
ground next to the victim's jersey after the altercation.  She 
identified the defendant in a showup identification that day. 
Perkins, a resident of the shelter at the time of the 
murder, also was present in the parking lot at the time of the 
altercation.  According to Perkins, the victim struck the 
defendant first with his bare hands.  He maintained that the 
victim took off his jersey before he took out the screwdriver, 
"swinging" and "jabbing" it at the defendant.  At some point, as 
the defendant was backing away, Perkins saw the defendant pull 
out from his jacket a "sheetrock edger" with which he "poked" 
the victim, causing the victim's "insides" to "spill[] out into 
the parking lot."  Perkins testified that the screwdriver and 
the knife recovered by police were not the items with which he 
saw the victim and the defendant fighting during the 
altercation. 
At the scene, officers secured not only the knife with a 
lime green handle and a screwdriver, but also the victim's 
jersey and shirt, both of which had "cuts" throughout.  During 
booking, a lime green sheath for a knife was found in the 
defendant's jacket pocket. 
 
In closing argument, the defense attorney argued that 
during the altercation the victim pulled out a screwdriver and 
4 
 
began to swing it at the defendant.3  In response, the defendant 
then attempted to back away and return to the shelter, but was 
forced to defend himself with the knife by stabbing the victim. 
 
The Commonwealth argued that the victim was "ambushed" from 
behind while he was walking through the parking lot and was 
stabbed in the back.  The Commonwealth asserted that even if the 
jury were to believe the testimony of Perkins that the victim 
took off his jersey before he took out the screwdriver, the 
jersey had several "stab holes" in it consistent with the knife, 
indicating that the defendant used deadly force before the 
victim introduced the screwdriver. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Legislative background and statutory 
framework.  "In 2012, the Legislature enacted G. L. c. 278A" to 
allow access to forensic and scientific evidence on "a motion by 
an individual who has been convicted of a criminal offense, who 
consequently has been incarcerated, and who asserts factual 
innocence."  Commonwealth v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 497 (2014) 
(Wade II), S.C., 475 Mass. 54 (2016). 
Before the enactment of the statute, a defendant seeking to 
obtain scientific testing of evidence through a motion for a new 
 
3 The defense attorney stated, "[T]he credible evidence in 
this case establishes that there's a fistfight that turns into a 
fight involving a deadly weapon, a screwdriver, which then 
allows under the law for [the defendant] to defend himself with 
a deadly weapon, a knife." 
5 
 
trial was required to make "a prima facie showing that the test 
results would warrant a new trial."  Wade II, 467 Mass. at 505, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Evans, 439 Mass. 184, 204-205, cert. 
denied, 540 U.S. 923 and 540 U.S. 973 (2003).  Thus, a defendant 
was in the difficult position of asserting the importance of 
evidence while simultaneously being unaware of its probity.  
Wade II, supra. 
The statute creates a two-step process for requesting DNA 
analysis.  Wade II, 467 Mass. at 501.  The first step, the 
"nonadversarial" portion, is governed by G. L. c. 278A, § 3, 
which enumerates the required information that a moving party 
must include in his or her motion.  Id. at 503-504.  If the 
motion includes the required information, that step is 
satisfied.  The second step involves a hearing.  To ultimately 
prevail on a motion for posttrial forensic testing, a defendant 
must meet six criteria by a preponderance of the evidence.  See 
G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b).4  See also Commonwealth v. Steadman, 489 
 
4 General Laws c. 278A, § 7 (b), requires that the following 
criteria be met:  "(1) that the evidence or biological material 
exists; (2) that the evidence or biological material has been 
subject to a chain of custody that is sufficient to establish 
that it has not deteriorated, been substituted, tampered with, 
replaced, handled or altered such that the results of the 
requested analysis would lack any probative value; (3) that the 
evidence or biological material has not been subjected to the 
requested analysis for any of the reasons in [§ 3 (b) (5) (i)-
(v)], inclusive; (4) that the requested analysis has the 
potential to result in evidence that is material to the moving 
party's identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the 
6 
 
Mass. 372, 392 (2022) ("The more robust evidentiary analysis of 
the defendant's proof is to be faced at the § 7 hearing stage").  
If all the elements articulated in § 7 (b) have been 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence, "the court 
shall allow the requested forensic or scientific analysis, the 
results of which may be used to support a motion for a new 
trial" (emphasis added).  Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 
799, 801-802 (2019). 
2.  Materiality under G. L. c. 278A.  I am mindful that 
"the Legislature enacted G. L. c. 278A as a means to permit 
prompt access to scientific and forensic testing in order to 
remedy wrongful convictions."  Commonwealth v. Linton, 483 Mass. 
227, 234 (2019).  As such, we "generous[ly]" construe the 
language in the statute as favorable "to the moving party."  
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Clark, 472 Mass. 120, 136 (2015).  
The defendant argues that he has demonstrated, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the DNA testing of the 
victim's fingernail clippings would be material to his 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime of which he was 
convicted, murder in the first degree, thus satisfying 
§ 7 (b) (4).  He asserts that the testing would have "strongly 
 
underlying case; (5) that the purpose of the motion is not the 
obstruction of justice or delay; and (6) that the results of the 
particular type of analysis being requested have been found to 
be admissible in courts of the commonwealth." 
7 
 
supported a claim of 1) self-defense or 2) mitigation based on 
excessive use of force in self-defense or from heat of passion 
induced by sudden combat or provocation." 
 
All that the defendant has to prove, however, is that the 
analysis of the fingernail clippings "has the potential to 
result in evidence that is material to the moving party's 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the underlying 
case" (emphasis added).  Clark, 472 Mass. at 135, quoting G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4).  "The Legislature's use of the word 
'potential' in § 7 (b) (4) suggests an awareness of the fact 
that the requested forensic analysis may not produce the desired 
evidence, but such a consequence should not be an impediment to 
analysis in the first instance."  Clark, supra at 135-136. 
Despite this generous construction, the requirement 
prescribed by § 7 (b) (4) is not toothless.  Although our case 
law recognizes the Legislature's intent to make postconviction 
forensic testing more accessible, this does not mean that every 
motion filed under § 7 should be allowed without scrutiny, 
abandoning common sense.  Commonwealth v. Moffat, 478 Mass. 292, 
301 (2017), S.C., 486 Mass. 193 (2020). 
I largely agree with the court's definition of the word 
"material" in the context of postconviction forensic testing.  
Specifically, I agree that the phrase "evidence that is 
material" in § 7 (b) (4) means evidence that is significant "to 
8 
 
the moving party's identification as the perpetrator of the 
crime in the underlying case."5 
Nonetheless, § 7 (b) (4) still requires that the evidence 
have some "potential" to be of consequence particularly in 
relation to the identity of the perpetrator of the crime in the 
underlying case.  Had the Legislature intended for the testing 
of evidence that simply is relevant to any issue in the case, it 
would have said so.  See Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 489 Mass. 
589, 593 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 
676, 679 (2012) (we "presume, as we must, that the Legislature 
intended what the words of the statute say"). 
Based on my reading of the statute as a whole, I diverge 
from the court in my understanding of what it means for testing 
to have the potential to be significant to "the moving party's 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the underlying 
case."  G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4).  General Laws c. 278A, § 1, 
defines "[f]actually innocent" as "a person convicted of a 
criminal offense who did not commit that offense."  In order to 
 
5 I also agree that the Commonwealth's proposed definition, 
appearing in the context of a claim of prejudice for the 
government's loss or destruction of evidence and requiring that 
the requested analysis "create[] a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt that would not otherwise exist," is more 
stringent than what was intended by the Legislature in the 
enactment of this statute.  Commonwealth v. Harwood, 432 Mass. 
290, 295 (2000), citing Commonwealth v. Otsuki, 411 Mass. 218, 
231 (1991). 
9 
 
benefit from G. L. c. 278A, a defendant must "assert[] factual 
innocence of the crime for which [he or she] has been 
convicted."  G. L. c. 278A, § 2.  Pursuant to § 3, the moving 
party must file an affidavit stating, in part, that "the 
requested forensic or scientific analysis will support the claim 
of innocence."  G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (d).  This dovetails with the 
Legislature's purpose in enacting the statute to remedy wrongful 
convictions of factually innocent persons. 
In Williams, we recognized that "factual innocence" as used 
in this statute includes a person asserting that he or she acted 
in lawful self-defense, because such a claim "negates the 
element of 'unlawfulness'" and "is a claim that the homicide was 
justified."  Williams, 481 Mass. at 805-806, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 688 (1976).  We noted 
that "[o]ur jurisprudence has considered self-defense a factual 
issue, as it is directly correlated with the underlying facts of 
the case and whether the defendant acted justifiably under the 
circumstances."  Williams, supra at 805.  Going further, we 
pointed to the language "of the crime for which the person has 
been convicted" to state that "the defendant need not allege 
that he did not" kill the victim, but "need only assert that, 
because he acted in self-defense, he did not commit . . . the 
10 
 
crime of which he was convicted."  Id. at 806, quoting G. L. 
c. 278A, § 2.6 
In light of this precedent, I conclude that the language in 
§ 7 (b) (4) that the analysis has "the potential to result in 
evidence that is material to the moving party's identification 
as the perpetrator in the crime in the underlying case" means 
that it must have the potential to be material to his or her 
factual innocence.  I view the language "identification as the 
perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case" as tending to 
support "factual innocence," which would include evidence with 
the potential to support factual innocence through lawful self-
 
6 The Massachusetts erroneous convictions law, G. L. c. 258D 
(c. 258D), is instructive in defining the term "innocence."  In 
order to be eligible for relief, c. 258D requires a claimant's 
conviction to "have been overturned on 'grounds which tend to 
establish the innocence' of the plaintiff."  Irwin v. 
Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 834, 843 (2013), quoting G. L. c. 258D, 
§ 1 (B) (ii).  The court interpreted the requirement to mandate 
that a conviction be "overturned 'on grounds resting upon facts 
and circumstances probative of the proposition that the claimant 
did not commit the crime.'"  Irwin, supra at 844, quoting Guzman 
v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 354, 359 (2010).  Procedural or 
evidentiary errors or structural deficiencies at trial that may 
be "'consistent' with innocence without any tendency to 
establish it" do not meet the definition in c. 258D.  Irwin, 
supra at 846.  For example, in Irwin, the court held that the 
inclusion of "highly prejudicial" evidence surrounding the 
claimant's prearrest silence that led to reversal did not 
qualify under c. 258D because it was not "probative of the 
proposition that [Irwin] did not commit the crime," and thus did 
not tend to establish his innocence.  Irwin, supra at 855, 
quoting Guzman, supra at 362. 
11 
 
defense.7  G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4).  In the matter at bar, I 
do not think that the analysis of the DNA under the victim's 
fingernails meets this requirement. 
 
Even if we were to assume that, after testing, the 
defendant's DNA was found on the victim's fingernail clippings, 
that fact would not have "the potential to result in evidence 
that is material to the moving party's identification as the 
perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case."  Clark, 472 
Mass. at 135, quoting G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4).  The presence 
of the defendant's DNA on the victim's fingernail clippings 
would not lend any weight to his claim of self-defense because 
it would not show whether the victim was the first aggressor, or 
whether the defendant acted reasonably by using deadly force in 
self-defense.  At most, this evidence could show that the victim 
used physical force against the defendant at some point in time 
before his death.  This would be of no use to the defendant. 
 
7 Although I agree with the court's suggestion, see ante at 
note 6, that our forensic testing statute does not have explicit 
language requiring a defendant seeking testing to demonstrate a 
degree of likelihood that he or she is innocent, I emphasize 
that our statute does require a defendant to assert that he or 
she is "factually innocent."  G. L. c. 278A, § 2.  As explained 
supra, it is my opinion that the requirement of the potential to 
produce evidence material to "identification as the perpetrator 
of the crime," looking at the statute in its entirety, means 
that the analysis has the potential, albeit not to "a degree of 
likelihood," to support the defendant's factual innocence. 
12 
 
Even if the defendant had not initiated the fight, he was 
not necessarily entitled to an instruction on self-defense 
unless there was some evidence warranting a reasonable doubt 
that (1) he had reasonable grounds to believe (and subjectively 
did believe) that he was in imminent danger of death or serious 
bodily harm, from which he could only save himself by using 
deadly force; (2) he availed himself of all the proper means to 
avoid physical combat before resorting to deadly force; and (3) 
he used force not exceeding that which was reasonably necessary 
in all the circumstances of the case.  Commonwealth v. Pring-
Wilson, 448 Mass. 718, 733 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Harrington, 379 Mass. 446, 450 (1980). 
The victim's fingernail clippings could not demonstrate, or 
corroborate, any of these three considerations by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Even if I ignore the video 
evidence -- which strongly suggests that the defendant did not 
use the proper means to avoid deadly force and that he initiated 
the fight -- the defendant's DNA on the victim's fingernails 
could not demonstrate that the victim was the first aggressor, 
or that the victim used force causing the defendant to fear 
serious bodily harm or death at the time of the altercation.8  
 
8 The video footage depicted the defendant stepping to the 
side and allowing the victim to walk out of the shelter in front 
of him.  The defendant then sped up and reached out to the 
victim, and the victim fell to the ground with the defendant 
13 
 
That the victim may have used physical force, even if he 
initiated the encounter, would have no bearing on whether he was 
the first to use deadly force with the screwdriver.  This was 
the defendant's contention at trial.  For this reason, I 
disagree with the court that the DNA evidence could be 
"particularly significant" to refute the Commonwealth's 
contention that the defendant was the first aggressor.  Ante 
at    .  As the defendant cannot use the fingernail clippings to 
bolster his claim of self-defense, he cannot show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that their testing may lead to 
evidence that is material to his identification as the 
perpetrator of the crime. 
Further, even if the presence of the defendant's DNA on the 
victim's fingernail clippings could be interpreted as 
contradicting the Commonwealth's theory at trial,9 that would not 
meet the low standard set out in § 7 (b) (4).  Put differently, 
such evidence would not, as the court suggests, "contradict the 
Commonwealth's contention that the defendant suddenly ambushed 
the victim from behind . . . without any prior fist fight."  
 
standing over him.  After the seconds-long altercation, the 
defendant slowly walked away toward the front of the shelter, 
seemingly ignoring the victim who approached him and circled 
around him. 
 
9 I.e., that there was no physical altercation prior to the 
defendant stabbing the victim. 
14 
 
Ante at    .  The presence of the defendant's DNA could not show 
when the victim contacted the defendant or in what manner he did 
so.  It could not show whether he touched the defendant in self-
defense or, for example, threw a punch in a fist fight.  It 
could not corroborate whether the contact came before, during, 
or after the altercation on the video footage.  For the same 
reason, it could not, as the majority states, "counter the 
testimony of the prosecution witness who said that she did not 
see the victim throw any punches at the defendant."  Id. at    .  
Mayers testified that she saw the victim attempting to block 
himself from being hit, which just as plausibly may have 
resulted in the defendant's DNA underneath the victim's 
fingernails.  In my opinion, the suggestion that the sought-
after DNA could contradict the Commonwealth's theory of the case 
is unpersuasive. 
As discussed supra, the victim's use of nondeadly physical 
force does not speak to the reasonableness of the defendant in 
using deadly force, and the DNA evidence does nothing to 
demonstrate whether the victim used the screwdriver in deadly 
force.  "[F]irst aggressor" refers to "not only the person who 
initiated the confrontation, but also the person who initiated 
the use or threat of deadly force."  Commonwealth v. Camacho, 
472 Mass. 587, 592 (2015).  See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 465 
Mass. 520, 528 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Maguire, 375 
15 
 
Mass. 768, 772 (1978) ("In our common law, a criminal defendant 
who is found to have been the first aggressor loses the right to 
claim self-defense unless he 'withdraws in good faith from the 
conflict and announces his intention to retire'").  The DNA 
testing does not have the potential to result in evidence that 
could corroborate the defendant's contention that the victim was 
the first aggressor.  Regardless of the strength of the 
Commonwealth's case at trial, the fingernail clippings would be 
of no use to the defendant in demonstrating factual innocence 
through self-defense, and thus he cannot show by a preponderance 
of the evidence that they have the potential to result in 
evidence that is material to his innocence of murder in the 
first degree.10 
 
10 See Moffat, 478 Mass. at 300-301 (testing of cigarette 
butts on side of road near victim's body, where there was 
nothing to indicate temporal link with shooting and no 
statements from defendant to police that alleged third-party 
culprits smoked cigarettes at scene, would not result in 
evidence material to identity of perpetrator).  Contrast Clark, 
472 Mass. at 135 (where testimony from victim was that assailant 
used kitchen knife, testing of DNA on handle had potential to 
result in evidence material to defendant's identification as 
perpetrator); Commonwealth v. Lyons, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 485, 486-
487, 495 (2016) (potential for materiality in testing of strands 
of hair found in victim's hands where defendant denied she 
killed victim); Commonwealth v. Coutu, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 686, 
702 (2015) (DNA testing of victim's finger swabs had potential 
to result in material identification evidence where she 
testified that she tried to "peel" and "pull" assailant's 
fingers off her nose and mouth and assailant was stranger to 
victim). 
16 
 
Contrary to the court's assertion, I do not take the 
position that, for the DNA evidence to meet the standard set out 
by the statute, it must have the potential to "'independently' 
and 'directly'" support an element of his self-defense claim.  
Ante at    .  I simply conclude that the evidence must have the 
potential to support his factual innocence through his self-
defense claim.  Where the DNA under the victim's fingernails 
cannot support the defendant's self-defense claim, either 
independently or in conjunction with the other evidence 
presented at trial, it cannot assist him in demonstrating his 
factual innocence, and it does not qualify under the statute. 
 
Assuming, without deciding, that the defendant can rely on 
the alternative theory of voluntary manslaughter in meeting the 
materiality test, the presence of the defendant's DNA under the 
victim's fingernails would not give rise to a claim of 
mitigation from murder to manslaughter based on excessive use of 
force in self-defense or heat of passion induced by sudden 
combat or provocation.11  "A killing 'is voluntary manslaughter, 
 
11 It is unlikely that a defendant asserting mitigating 
circumstances to a lesser included offense could avail him- or 
herself of the testing procedure provided for by G. L. c. 278A.  
Previously, in Williams, we limited our holding to cases "in 
which the defendant alleges that no crime occurred (as compared 
to a case in which a defendant alleged that he or she committed 
a lesser included offense)."  Williams, 481 Mass. at 806 n.8.  
Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder in 
the first degree.  Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 74 
(2018). 
17 
 
not murder, if malice is negated by reasonable provocation[,] 
. . . sudden combat,'" or excessive use of force in self-
defense.  Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 449 (2006), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Boucher, 403 Mass. 659, 663 (1989).  See 
Commonwealth v. Hinds, 457 Mass. 83, 91 (2010).  At most, the 
presence of the defendant's DNA would suggest physical contact, 
such as the victim scratching or touching the defendant at some 
point in time. 
 
Even when a victim initiates physical contact with a 
defendant, the evidence may not be sufficient to warrant a 
manslaughter instruction.  Commonwealth v. Yat Fung Ng, 489 
Mass. 242, 257 (2022).  This is because "reasonable provocation 
also requires an objective showing that the precipitating event 
would have provoked heat of passion in the ordinary person."  
Commonwealth v. Felix, 476 Mass. 750, 757 (2017).  Physical 
contact initiated by the victim may be even less telling "where 
the defendant outweighs and is physically far more powerful than 
the victim, and the defendant uses a weapon or excessive force."  
Id. 
"[S]udden combat is among those circumstances constituting 
reasonable provocation."  Commonwealth v. Howard, 479 Mass. 52, 
58 (2018), quoting Camacho, 472 Mass. at 601 n.19.  "A victim's 
conduct must present a 'threat of serious harm' to be considered 
reasonable provocation."  Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 482 Mass. 823, 
18 
 
827 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 442 Mass. 826, 839 
(2004). 
Here, the victim was five feet, five inches tall and 
weighed approximately 120 pounds.  The defendant, at the time, 
was approximately five feet, nine inches tall and weighed 
approximately 200 pounds.  Touching, scratching, or even 
punching, at some point in time, in the circumstances of this 
case, would not permit an instruction on reasonable provocation 
where the defendant was larger than the victim, led him to the 
outside of the shelter in order to fight, and was armed with a 
knife.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bianchi, 435 Mass. 316, 329 
(2001) ("Bianchi's further testimony that the victim punched him 
in the face during their 'argument' adds little to his claim of 
provocation, where he intentionally precipitated the 
confrontation in violation of the protective order, was a 
weightlifter who outweighed the victim by more than 170 pounds, 
and was armed with a fully loaded weapon").  Thus, the defendant 
cannot show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
fingernail clippings may lead to material evidence demonstrating 
his innocence of murder in the first degree in this respect. 
 
For a defendant to be entitled "[t]o receive an instruction 
on the excessive use of force in self-defense, 'the defendant 
must be entitled to act in self-defense,' Commonwealth v. Berry, 
431 Mass. 326, 335 (2000), but 'used more force than was 
19 
 
reasonably necessary in all the circumstances of the case.'"  
Commonwealth v. Anestal, 463 Mass. 655, 674 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Glacken, 451 Mass. 163, 167 (2008).  To be 
entitled to use deadly force, a defendant "must have 'a 
reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm and a reasonable 
belief that no other means would suffice to prevent such harm.'"  
Anestal, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Houston, 332 Mass. 687, 
690 (1955).  For the reasons indicated supra, because the 
presence of the defendant's DNA under the victim's fingernails 
would not be material to his self-defense argument where he used 
deadly force, it also would not be helpful to his argument of 
excessive force in self-defense. 
That the jury in this case were instructed on voluntary 
manslaughter, with mitigating circumstances of heat of passion 
on reasonable provocation and excessive use of force in self-
defense, is of no matter to the analysis.  I take no position on 
whether the evidence, as it was presented at trial, warranted a 
voluntary manslaughter instruction.  The point, as relevant 
here, is that the addition of the DNA on the victim's fingernail 
clippings would not contribute to an attempt to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of the defendant's actions.  Therefore, the 
defendant is unable to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
20 
 
that the testing could lead to material evidence demonstrating 
the identity of the perpetrator of the crime in this case.12 
Conclusion.  Although "the Legislature intended to permit 
access to DNA testing 'regardless of the presence of 
overwhelming evidence of guilt in the underlying trial,'" and we 
construe the language in the statute as being generous to the 
moving party, that does not mean that the defendant has no 
hurdle to clear within the statute.  Clark, 472 Mass. at 136, 
quoting Wade II, 467 Mass. at 511.  The Legislature did not 
intend to permit access where the DNA testing, regardless of its 
result, would be immaterial to the defendant's identity as the 
perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case.  Because the 
presence of the defendant's DNA under the victim's fingernails 
could not lead to material evidence with respect to the 
defendant's factual innocence where it cannot provide 
information explaining the defendant's use of deadly force, and 
at most could demonstrate that the victim touched the defendant 
at some point in time before his death, I am of the opinion that 
the defendant's motion pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7, properly 
was denied. 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
12 Because the defendant cannot satisfy § 7 (b) (4), I do 
not address whether he satisfies § 7 (b) (3).  See G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (b) (court shall allow analysis if "each of the 
following has been demonstrated by a preponderance").