Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIM OF JAMES MICHAEL SECKMAN v. WYO-BEN, INC. v. STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-41

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIM OF JAMES MICHAEL SECKMAN v. WYO-BEN, INC. v. STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION 1989 WY 207783 P.2d 161Case Number: 89-41Decided: 11/27/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIM OF JAMES MICHAEL SECKMAN, APPELLANT 
(EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT),

v.

WYO-BEN, 
INC.,

APPELLEE 
(EMPLOYER-RESPONDENT),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLEE (OBJECTOR-DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Big HornCounty, Terrence J. 
O'Brien, J.

Robert T. 
Moxley, Whitehead, Gage & Davidson, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Josephine T. Porter, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee, State of Wyo., ex rel. 
Workers' Compensation Div.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired. 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The primary issue in 
this case focuses upon the statutory requirement for filing a claim for worker's 
compensation benefits within one year of the injury and is concerned with the 
jurisdictional nature of that statutory requirement. James Michael Seckman 
(Seckman) questions whether the trial court, on its own motion, could raise that 
statute as a bar to a claim for benefits for total temporary disability and 
contends that the requirement was waived by the Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division. Another issue is presented concerning the ruling by the district court 
that the loss of use of a prosthetic device, necessitated by the amputation of 
Seckman's left arm just below the elbow, could only lead to an award on the 
basis of a vocational disability because Seckman failed to establish a 
disability that could be rated according to statute. Still another issue 
concerns Seckman's assertion that he is entitled to the replacement of his 
unusable prosthetic arm by an improved model. We discern no error by the trial 
court in this case, and its order denying the several claims is 
affirmed.

[¶2.]     In his brief as 
appellant, Seckman sets forth these issues:

"I. Did the district 
court commit error of law or abuse of discretion, in ruling that statutory 
filing time requirements barred a claim for back payment of temporary total 
disability, when the merits of the claim had been tried to the court by the 
consent of the parties?

"II. Did the district 
court apply an improper rule of law in determining that loss of use of the 
claimant's prosthesis, proximately caused by the injury to the worker, could not 
lead to an `impairment' award, but rather could only be the subject of a 
`vocational disability' award?

"III. Was it an error of 
law for the district court to rule the injured employee not to be entitled to a 
usable, high technology prosthetic device, under circumstances where the injury 
permanently rendered the injured employee unable to use the mechanical 
prosthesis he wore prior to the injury?"

The Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, as the appellee, identifies the issues in this 
way:

"I. Whether the district 
court committed error of law or abuse of discretion in ruling that the statutory 
filing time requirements of § 27-12-503, W.S. 1977, barred a claim for back 
payment of temporary total disability.

"II. Whether the loss of 
the use of the prosthesis was an `injury' and a disability as a matter of 
law."

Seckman's 
employer, Wyo-Ben, Inc., did not appear or file a brief in this 
court.

[¶3.]     In 1966, Seckman's left 
arm was surgically amputated just below the elbow because of injuries suffered 
in an unrelated accident. Since 1967, he used a mechanical prosthesis to 
substitute for his left hand. Other than obvious problems attendant to the loss 
of a hand and forearm, Seckman, as he conceded in statements to a rehabilitation 
counselor, had long since recovered from the effects of that initial injury and 
the resulting surgery.

[¶4.]     Seckman's mechanical 
prosthesis was one that attached by a leather harness and was operated by a 
forward pull exerted through the right shoulder. This type of mechanical hand is 
currently available and still utilized by a large number of people. The primary 
advantages are that it is reliable and relatively inexpensive. At the time of 
this accident, Seckman's artificial arm was still functional although it had 
become quite worn from use over the years. It appears that a repair or 
replacement was in order even prior to the injury of which he now complains. As 
of the time of trial, the device was completely unusable because it no longer 
fit Seckman properly due to his gain in size and weight.

[¶5.]     Up until the accident 
which is the subject matter of this case, Seckman was able to maintain 
employment in a relatively normal fashion, aided by the use of his prosthesis, 
although he generally was restricted to work usually described as "light duty." 
His employment record includes jobs as a machinist, a unit manager, a plant 
foreman, a construction laborer, a sporting goods store owner and operator, and 
a traveling salesman for a local laundry. At the time of his injury, he was 
employed by Wyo-Ben, Inc. where he worked as a mill "clean-up" man. He was 
working in that capacity when he suffered the accident that led to this claim 
and the appeal before this court. He left that job in November of 1981 because 
he was no longer able to endure the pain from his injury as it was aggravated by 
his duties on the job.

[¶6.]     The accident that 
caused the injuries resulting in this claim occurred about July 10, 1981. 
Seckman was carrying a large trash can up a ramp that was elevated approximately 
two feet. While so engaged, he slipped on some grease and fell backwards to the 
concrete floor, landing hard on his tailbone. In the course of the fall, he 
struck a pipe with his neck and right shoulder. He was not wearing his 
prosthesis at the time of the fall.

[¶7.]     Soon after he fell, 
Seckman consulted a general practitioner. It was obvious at the time that he had 
suffered an injury, but the scope and substance of the injury were not fully 
apparent. This created some basis for a dispute over his entitlement to worker's 
compensation benefits. Nevertheless, Seckman was awarded $409.64 in temporary 
total disability payments covering the two weeks extending from July 12 through 
July 25, 1981. This was the total amount that he had requested. Because Seckman 
felt that his condition might be deteriorating, or that it might be more severe 
than indicated by the original diagnosis, he then consulted specialists who were 
able to more accurately ascertain the full extent of his 
injury.

[¶8.]     In March of 1983, 
Seckman filed a claim for major surgery and hospitalization and, on August 5, 
1983, he received further worker's compensation benefits. The court deferred 
action on his request for retroactive benefits for temporary total disability 
until a later date. His award was conditioned by a requirement that a subsequent 
hearing be held, following a disability rating being provided by his treating 
physician, with the purpose of that hearing being to determine Seckman's 
entitlement to any permanent partial disability. He was ordered to reimburse the 
Workers' Compensation Division for any monies expended by it in the interim if 
it were found, at the hearing, that he was not entitled to further benefits. 
This contemplated hearing never was held. Instead, Seckman continued to receive 
temporary total disability benefits until he was awarded the amount of 
$18,091.35 for permanent partial disability. This award was premised upon a 
stipulation of the parties, dated April 30, 1986, that Seckman was entitled to a 
forty-five percent (45%) disability rating applicable to his upper 
extremities.

[¶9.]     During the course of 
the case, a dispute developed as to whether Seckman was entitled to a 
retroactive award of benefits for a temporary total disability from the period 
of September, 1981 to August, 1983. Essentially, this dispute centered upon the 
fact of disability, and the issue was presented for trial on July 14, 1988. 
Seckman claimed that he could not have returned to work during these months and, 
for that reason, he was entitled to the award of temporary total disability. The 
employer's records, however, showed some sporadic work attendance during the 
same period. Further, there is evidence in the record that Seckman may have 
received disability payments from November, 1981 to July, 1982 for an unrelated 
condition involving kidney problems. The issue of entitlement never was 
resolved, however, because the trial court, sua sponte, pointed out Seckman's 
failure to comply with § 27-12-503, W.S. 1977, and it then denied any award of 
back payments on that ground alone. With respect to loss of use of the 
prosthesis, the court acknowledged that a disability award could be sustained 
relating to the loss of use of the prosthetic device under appropriate 
circumstances, but it ruled that Seckman had not carried his burden of showing a 
sufficient vocational disability culminating in a diminution of earning capacity 
so as to justify such an award in this case.

[¶10.]  The court also ruled that even though 
Seckman's prosthesis had to be repaired or replaced at state expense because its 
use had been impaired by the injuries to his right arm and shoulder, the proper 
approach to replacement should be "parsimonious" and that all further claims for 
benefits, including claims for a specific prosthesis, should be considered as 
new claims. If contested, they are to be handled by the office of administrative 
hearings. We note, parenthetically, that, in recent years, numerous innovations 
have been achieved in the prosthetic appliance field of medical science. Various 
new devices have been offered. One of these is an electric apparatus known as a 
"Utah" arm. It 
is less reliable than a mechanical prosthesis and considerably more expensive, 
but it does have the advantage of being controlled through nerve impulses 
instead of through the use of a harness thus avoiding the inherent drawback of 
chafing and irritating as well as certain limitations in the event the 
controlling member is somehow limited in either mobility or strength. For 
potential trial in the future is the question of whether Seckman properly could 
be fitted with another mechanical harness device that would not irritate his 
injured shoulder as Seckman's orthopedic surgeon indicated in his expert 
testimony. This appeal is taken from the trial court rulings denying the 
temporary total disability award, the claim for disability because of the loss 
of use of the prosthetic appliance, and the denial of an order to provide the 
more sophisticated appliance.

[¶11.]  Before resolving the issues in this case, 
we recall that the right to benefits from our state-sponsored worker's 
compensation fund is a right granted solely by virtue of a constitutional 
amendment that has been implemented through legislative enactment. See 
Wyo. Const. 
art. 10, § 4. Matter of Johner, 643 P.2d 932 (Wyo. 1982); Tompkins v. George Rinner Construction 
Company, 196 Kan. 244, 409 P.2d 1001 (1966). No such right 
existed at common law. Indeed, the very existence of the fund is a product of 
legislative action. Unlike most statutes that abrogate common law rights and 
must, for that reason, be strictly construed (State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543 
(Wyo. 1982); Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., 426 P.2d 442 (Wyo. 1967)), the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act (Act), §§ 27-12-101 to 27-12-805, W.S. 1977, 
is to be interpreted in a reasonably liberal fashion so that the legislative 
goals that obviously are intended may be accomplished. Lehman v. State, ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 752 P.2d 422 (Wyo. 1988); Matter of 
Abas, 701 P.2d 1153 (Wyo. 1985); Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 660 P.2d 361 (Wyo. 
1983); Matter of Barnes, 587 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 1978); Lichty v. Lichty Construction 
Company, 69 Wyo. 411, 243 P.2d 151 (1952); In re McConnell, 45 Wyo. 289, 18 P.2d 629 (1933). Whenever possible, the Act should be applied in favor of the workman 
(Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction Company, 668 P.2d 649 (Wyo. 1983); Claim of 
Carey, 74 Wyo. 37, 283 P.2d 1005 (1955)), so that industry, and not the 
individual employee, bears the burden of accident and injury occurring within 
the industrial setting. Lehman; State, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Division v. Malkowski, 741 P.2d 604 (Wyo. 1987); Matter of Shapiro, 703 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1985); Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1984); 
Jim's Water Service v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346 (Wyo. 1979); Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, 
566 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1977); In re Gimlin, 403 P.2d 178 (Wyo. 1965). In order to 
achieve that end, we are afforded, under our precedent, a degree of flexibility 
in interpreting the various provisions of the Act.

[¶12.]  This latitude with respect to 
interpretation does not, however, encompass the freedom to extend the Act, under 
the guise of liberal construction, to injuries and situations that do not fall 
within the language adopted by the legislature. Lehman; Baskin v. State, ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 722 P.2d 151 (Wyo. 1986); Abas; Matter of Van 
Matre, 657 P.2d 815 (Wyo. 1983); Mor. Neither have we been afforded 
the freedom to ignore clear statutory provisions. Olson v. Federal American 
Partners, 567 P.2d 710 (Wyo. 1977). We must exercise restraint and 
adhere strictly to the literal terms of the Act, despite our rule of liberal 
construction in favor of the injured workman, when addressing limitations or 
conditions directly mandated by the legislature even though they have the effect 
of abridging or precluding any worker's entitlement to benefits that otherwise 
would be appropriate.

[¶13.]  This case presents one such situation. 
The district court applied § 27-12-503, W.S. 1977, which was in effect at the 
time of Seckman's injury. It subsequently was replaced by § 27-14-503, W.S. 1977 
(June 1987 Repl.), but the statute in effect at the time of the injury is 
controlling. Cf. Shapiro; Wyoming Refining 
Company v. Bottjen, 695 P.2d 647 (Wyo. 1985). That statute provided, in 
pertinent part:

"(a) No order or award 
for compensation involving an injury which is the result of a single brief 
occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time, shall be 
made unless in addition to the reports of the injury, an application or claim 
for award is filed with the clerk of court in the county in which the injury 
occurred, within one (1) year after the day on which the injury occurred or for 
injuries not readily apparent, within one (1) year after discovery of the injury 
by the employee. The reports of an accident do not constitute a claim for 
compensation." Section 27-12-503, W.S. 1977 (emphasis 
added).

The statute 
requires, in language that is clear and unambiguous, that no worker's 
compensation benefits can be awarded for an injury that is the result of a 
single brief occurrence unless the claimant files his application or claim for 
an award within one year from the time the injury was incurred. See Bauer v. 
State, ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division, 695 P.2d 1048 (Wyo. 1985). We can 
provide no other construction as a matter of law. People v. Platte Pipe Line 
Company, 649 P.2d 208 (Wyo. 1982); Olson. Any adjustment of this 
requirement must be the sole responsibility of the state legislature and is not 
one within our judicial province. Johner, In re Sikora, 57 Wyo. 57, 112 P.2d 557 
(1941). See In re Martini, 38 Wyo. 172, 265 P. 707 
(1928).

[¶14.]  Seckman simply did not meet this one-year 
deadline. The accident which caused his injury occurred in July of 1981, and he 
filed a claim for benefits at that time. That claim was granted in full. Seckman 
suspected that his injuries might be more serious than they were first 
diagnosed, and he sought the advice of specialists, who were able to pinpoint 
the problems resulting from his injury and were able to more accurately estimate 
the impact upon his employment. As he suspected, the extent of the damage was 
more severe than previously determined by his general practitioner. Even though 
he then recognized that the gravity of his injuries had been expanded, the 
expansion did not constitute a new or newly discovered injury because the 
physical damages all resulted from the single occurrence in July of 1981. The 
extent of the injuries did not result from a subsequent deterioration or a 
second event.

[¶15.]  State, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division v. Malkowski, 741 P.2d 604 (Wyo. 1987), is a case 
similar in nature, but it is readily distinguishable from Seckman's claim for 
back payments. In Malkowski, the court upheld an award of temporary total 
disability benefits even though the claim was filed more than four years after 
the last treatment and almost six years after the first compensable injury 
because the claimant's condition, though constantly deteriorating, had not 
deteriorated to the point of requiring additional surgery until just before the 
time of the additional temporary total disability. When the additional surgery 
became necessary, and not before, the deterioration reached a point at which a 
second compensable injury was deemed to have occurred. Recognizing that a single 
industrial accident can give rise to more than one compensable injury (Pacific 
Power and Light Company v. Rupe, 741 P.2d 609 (Wyo. 1987)), we noted that 
Malkowski then had one additional year from the time he was diagnosed as needing 
surgery to make application for an award. Section 27-12-503, W.S. 1977 (June 
1983 Repl.). Malkowski submitted such a claim, and this court held the 
application was timely. Seckman has not submitted any claim for a second injury 
that can be identified. Instead, even though Malkowski provided the district 
court with authority to grant benefits on Seckman's second claim for major 
surgery and hospitalization that he submitted in March of 1983, Seckman's claim 
for retroactive temporary total disability is founded solely on the injury that 
occurred in July of 1981. Seckman should have filed his application within one 
year from that date, but he did not. He waited until March of 1983 to file for 
the temporary total disability benefits, a date approximately twenty months 
after the injury for which he seeks past payments and well beyond the 
twelve-month limit.

[¶16.]  We discern nothing in the record to 
support any suggestion that the running of the statute was tolled on equitable 
grounds because the failure to make the timely filing was due to any wrongful or 
fraudulent conduct of his employer. See Bauer. Therefore, pursuant to 
legislative fiat, we are obliged to apply § 27-12-503, W.S. 1977, and affirm the 
denial by the trial court of Seckman's claim for additional temporary total 
disability benefits. See Lehman; Baskin; Abas; Van Matre; Mor. See also 
Platte; Olson. There is no error on the part of 
the district court in denying this claim for benefits, and its ruling on that 
issue is affirmed.

[¶17.]  Seckman insists that the statute was 
waived and, therefore, inapplicable because the merits of the case were tried to 
the court without objection by the Workers' Compensation Division. He relies 
upon Title Guaranty Company of Wyoming v. Midland Mortgage Company, 451 P.2d 798 
(Wyo. 1969), and Simpson v. Western National Bank of Casper, 497 P.2d 878 (Wyo. 
1972), and buttresses his contention with the assertion that issues will be 
treated as if they had been raised in the pleadings when they are tried with the 
express or implied consent of the parties. We are cognizant of the rule that 
issues which are not raised in the pleadings will be treated as if they had been 
properly raised when they are addressed by evidence and argued at a trial, and 
there is no timely objection by any of the parties. Rule 15(b), W.R.C.P.; 
Simpson. The justification for this rule is that, when parties fail to object to 
evidence and argument that addresses issues which are not pleaded, they have 
given implied consent to the trial of those matters even though there is no 
proper notice. See Macy v. Macy, 714 P.2d 774 (Wyo. 1986). When the rule is 
applicable, a party is deemed to have implicitly consented to trial of the issue 
and is generally regarded as having waived his right to claim any error in that 
regard. The thrust of Seckman's contention is that by failing to raise the 
statute of limitations and proceeding with the trial on the merits, the Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division waived the statute of limitations that might 
otherwise pertain. Seckman's approach indeed is innovative, but the significance 
of the waiver rule articulated in Rule 15(b), W.R.C.P., is not one of loss of 
issues that were not raised in the pleadings if they otherwise are properly 
available; instead, that rule relates to the inclusion within the resolution of 
the dispute of issues not raised in the pleadings that were actually presented 
and resolved by the trial. In this instance, neither party is contending for the 
recognition of the disposition of any issues omitted in the 
pleadings.

[¶18.]  The significant concern is with the 
statute of limitations. We appreciate that the defense of the statute of 
limitations can be, and usually is, asserted as an affirmative defense required 
to be stated in the pleadings. The rule of waiver can apply to that defense if 
it is not so raised. In this instance, however, the thrust of the statute of 
limitations is distinguished from other instances because the filing of the 
claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the assertion of the claim. The 
failure to file the claim results in the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
and that defect is present whether or not the merits of the case have been tried 
to the court. The right to compensation pursuant to the Act is one structured by 
legislation, and the legislature is entitled to limit that right in appropriate 
ways. In this instance, compliance with the mandatory statutory requirement of 
the timely filing of the claim is a condition precedent to the granting of an 
award. See Rogulj v. Alaska Gastineau Mining Company, 288 F. 549 (9th Cir. 
1923); London Guarantee & Accident Company v. Industrial Commission, 83 
Colo. 252, 263 P. 405 (1928). See also Annotation, Workmen's Compensation - Time 
for Claim, 78 A.L.R. 1294 (1931). No claim for relief is available unless the 
statutory conditions are satisfied.

[¶19.]  The net effect of this rule is that the 
district court is without the judicial power, or subject matter jurisdiction, to 
award benefits under the Act in the absence of a statutory entitlement which 
depends upon compliance with the requirements of the statute. We do not perceive 
that there exists any flexibility in this regard with respect to construing the 
statute, and any changes must be the result of legislative intervention. Johner; 
Sikora. The courts in this state are without subject matter jurisdiction to 
award benefits under the Act unless the condition precedent of the timely filing 
of an application is satisfied, and the case presenting any claim for 
retroactive total disability payments in an instance such as this must be 
dismissed.

[¶20.]  Because the condition precedent was not 
fulfilled, the district court simply had no jurisdiction to award the benefits. 
This lack of subject matter jurisdiction, unlike jurisdiction in personam, is 
not subject to waiver by the parties, and neither this court nor the trial court 
has any power to disregard the statute. See Matter of Contempt Order Issued 
Against Anderson, 765 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1988). Furthermore, our rule is that the 
absence of subject matter jurisdiction can be asserted by either party, or by 
the court, at any time in the course of the proceedings. The district court was 
required to dismiss Seckman's claim sua sponte once it became apparent that it 
was without jurisdiction. This action by the district court was entirely 
appropriate, and the court should be commended for its application of the 
pertinent statutes. While Seckman's contentions would be correct and 
appropriately applied under the right circumstances, they do not meet the issues 
in this instance and, consequently, we affirm the dismissal of that 
claim.

[¶21.]  Seckman's second issue relates to the 
finding by the district court that his loss of use of his prosthesis had to be 
addressed under a "vocational impairment" test. The court then ruled that his 
claim "has not been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, as 
Employee-Claimant has shown no diminution of earning capacity as a result of his 
work-related injury." The district court denied Seckman's claim for loss of use 
of his prosthesis for that reason although it did rule that he is entitled to 
the repair of the artificial arm to the extent of putting it back to the usable 
form it was in prior to the accident "including revisions to the harness 
mechanism, and compensation for any prosthetic apparatus that is necessary as a 
result of the work-related injury to the right arm and shoulder." Seckman's 
claim here is that the district court erred in treating the loss of use of his 
prosthesis in the context of a vocational disability, instead of an 
"impairment," since that device now is completely unusable because of the 
injuries to his right arm and shoulder. He urges the proposition that the loss 
of a prosthetic arm is to be treated as equivalent to the loss of a living 
member since, in many cases, the loss of either has much the same result. 
Specifically, he asserts that he is entitled to "schedule" benefits set at 140 
weeks of compensation. He further asserts, with respect to the adequate 
replacement of the prosthesis, that such replacement is a specific added benefit 
to which he is entitled. His position is that the replacement of the artificial 
arm is unrelated to any "impairment" award. The obvious extension of this 
combination of claims is the implication that he need not prove diminution of 
income because he is claiming "impairment" benefits, not vocational 
disability.

[¶22.]  In support of these contentions, Seckman 
cites § 27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. 1977, which provides, in pertinent 
part:

"`Injury' means any 
harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging, and includes 
damage to or loss of a prosthetic appliance * * *."

He also cites § 
27-12-403(a), W.S. 1977, the pertinent provisions of which 
read:

"Permanent partial 
disability means the loss or permanent impairment of a limb or sense, or any 
other injury known to surgery or medicine to constitute permanent impairment of 
a bodily function."

Seckman then 
ties in the statement from a leading text that:

"Under most acts, if an 
injury has left the claimant with a permanent bodily impairment, compensation 
for a specified number of weeks is payable without regard to presence or absence 
of wage loss during that period. For loss (and usually loss of use) of members, 
arbitrary schedules of the number of weeks for which compensation is payable are 
provided; for other permanent impairments, a calculation of percentage of total 
permanent disability is ordinarily made. Although in many jurisdictions the 
schedule award is the exclusive remedy whenever applicable, some courts are 
beginning to treat the loss of specific members as amounting to percentage 
disabilities of larger members, or of the entire body, when this more fairly 
reflects the actual effect of the injury, and to make awards for actual wage 
loss when wage loss in fact persists after the expiration of the schedule 
period. In any event, the schedule is not exclusive if the effects of the injury 
extend to other parts of the body." 2 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation § 58.00, at 10-311 (1989).

[¶23.]  Section 27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. 1977, 
indeed, does include within the definition of injury the loss of use of a 
prosthesis. Certainly, a factual situation could be visualized pursuant to which 
a claimant could receive an award for the loss of use of an existing prosthesis 
because of a work-related injury. The statute goes on to provide, however, that 
any permanent partial disability rating depends upon the fact that the loss or 
impairment of a limb, including that occurring to a prosthesis, must be 
permanent. Section 27-12-403(a), W.S. 1977. As a matter of law, a claim for such 
an award depends upon the demonstration of permanent loss or impairment. See 
Fischer v. State, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 734 P.2d 558 
(Wyo. 1987). See also Matter of Injury to Potter, 715 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 1986). The 
statute is not subject to being construed in any other fashion. See People v. 
Platte Pipe Line Company, 649 P.2d 208 (Wyo. 1982); Olson, 567 P.2d 710. 
Seckman's citation to 2 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 58.00, 
at 10-311, adds support for this construction in the pertinent quotation, 
"[u]nder most acts, if an injury has left the claimant with a permanent bodily 
impairment * * *."

[¶24.]  There exists a presumption that any 
compensable injury is temporary. The burden of proof to overcome this 
presumption is assigned to the claimant. Alco of Wyoming v. Baker, 651 P.2d 266 
(Wyo. 1982); Gifford v. Cook-McCann Concrete, Inc., 526 P.2d 1197 (Wyo. 1974); 
Black Watch Farms v. Baldwin, 474 P.2d 297 (Wyo. 1970); Pease v. Pacific Power 
& Light Company, 453 P.2d 887 (Wyo. 1969).

[¶25.]  The district court found, following the 
hearing, that Seckman's loss of use of his prosthesis had not been shown to be 
permanent. The product of that finding is that he is not entitled to an award 
for impairment. The materials in the record support this decision. Expert 
testimony indicates that Seckman's prosthetic arm might be repairable and, thus, 
fully restored to its prior usefulness. Even if that existing device is not 
repairable, that would not sustain an award for impairment based on loss of use 
of this specific unit. Contrary to the position espoused by Seckman, loss of a 
"medical member," or prosthesis, is not the same as loss of a "living member," 
and we cannot ignore the proposition that interchangeability of different types 
of prosthetic devices is practical. That proposition clearly complies with the 
legislative intent reflected in the Act. Replacement of a prosthesis with 
another unit of equal, or better, utility results in a nonpermanent loss and 
justifies denial of any award for "impairment."

[¶26.]  The only relevant issue in this case is 
whether repair or replacement is possible. Further expert testimony is included 
in the record demonstrating that replacement of Seckman's prosthesis with an 
equivalent, or even improved unit, is likely. Seckman, in effect, confesses that 
proposition by requesting the replacement of his prosthesis with an improved 
device. If his demand is satisfied, there is no permanent impairment in the 
context of the Act. Until any court or executive agency order for the repair or 
replacement is found to be inadequate to restore Seckman to his prior condition, 
his claim for an award for "impairment" is not ripe. We cannot thwart the intent 
of the legislature by granting an award contrary to the language of the Act. 
Lehman; Baskin, 722 P.2d 151; Abas; Matter of Van Matre, 657 P.2d 815 (Wyo. 
1983); Mor. We have no freedom to extend the coverage of the worker's 
compensation statute beyond the legislative mandate. Pacific Power and Light v. 
Parsons, 692 P.2d 226 (Wyo. 1984). We affirm the district court on the second 
issue asserted by Seckman.

[¶27.]  This result specifically refutes 
Seckman's premise that there is no relationship between his statutory right to a 
replacement prosthesis, § 27-12-406, W.S. 1977, and his asserted right to an 
"impairment" award. Those two remedies are intertwined, and there is no 
possibility of sustaining "impairment" benefits in the event that the damaged or 
unusable prosthesis can be repaired or replaced so as to restore the claimant to 
his condition prior to the injury.

[¶28.]  Even so, the district court did determine 
that Seckman could be entitled to worker's compensation for a vocational 
disability if a diminution of income was demonstrated because of this injury. 
Section 27-12-402, W.S. 1977. This determination is premised on our rule that, 
"[i]n worker's compensation law, disability means an impairment of earning 
capacity." McCarty v. Bear Creek Uranium Company, 694 P.2d 93, 94 (Wyo. 1985). 
The burden of establishing the impairment of earning capacity is assigned to 
Seckman. See Alco; Gifford. The district court ruled that he had not satisfied 
this burden, and we find nothing in the record to demonstrate otherwise. The 
determination of the district court that Seckman is not entitled to benefits for 
vocational disability also is affirmed.

[¶29.]  We do not address Seckman's final issue 
because it is not ripe for review. The parties agreed that Seckman would be 
evaluated at some future time to determine what would be required to repair or 
replace his prosthesis pursuant to § 27-12-406, W.S. 1977. They also agreed that 
Seckman's request, whatever it might be, then would be treated as a new claim. 
If contested, that claim will be presented to the Office of Administrative 
Hearings. There has not yet been a determination as to the kind of replacement 
prosthesis Seckman should have, and the situation stands as one in which he has 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Park County Resource Council, 
Inc. v. United States Department of Agriculture, 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987); 
Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Association v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1983); 
People v. Fremont Energy Corporation, 651 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 1982); City of Cheyenne 
v. Sims, 521 P.2d 1347 (Wyo. 1974). Consequently, no review of that issue is 
appropriate until those remedies have been completed.

[¶30.]  The order of the district court in this 
case is affirmed in all respects.