Case Title: In the Matter of Robert John Wray

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02S00-1511-DI-648

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2018-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 02S00-1511-DI-648 
In the Matter of 
Robert John Wray, 
 Respondent. 
Decided: February 27, 2018 
Attorney Discipline Action 
Hearing Officer Christopher M. Goff 
Per Curiam Opinion 
Chief Justice Rush, Justice David, Justice Massa, and Justice Slaughter concur. 
Justice Goff did not participate. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Feb 27 2018, 2:26 pm
 
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Per Curiam. 
We find that Respondent, Robert John Wray, engaged in attorney 
misconduct arising from his solicitation of clients through a nonlawyer 
intermediary. For this misconduct, we conclude that Respondent should 
be suspended from the practice of law in this state for at least nine months 
without automatic reinstatement.   
This matter is before the Court on the report of the hearing officer 
appointed by this Court to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court 
Disciplinary Commission’s “Amended Verified Complaint for 
Disciplinary Action,” and on the post-hearing briefing by the parties. 
Respondent’s 1980 admission to this state’s bar subjects him to this 
Court’s disciplinary jurisdiction.  See IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4.   
Procedural Background and Facts 
The Commission filed a five-count “Verified Complaint for 
Disciplinary Action” on November 13, 2015, and later amended that 
complaint to add a sixth count. As set forth in more detail below, the 
amended complaint charged Respondent with a wide range of rule 
violations arising out of his professional relationship with Douglas 
Stephan, a nonlawyer. Following a hearing, the hearing officer filed a 64-
page report finding Respondent committed violations as charged.   
Respondent has represented several owners of allegedly defective 
modular or manufactured homes in actions against the homes’ installers, 
builders, or manufacturers. One of those owners was Stephan, who 
purchased a home from Joseph Callaghan, d/b/a Fahl Manufactured 
Homes (“Callaghan”). Respondent and Stephan developed a relationship 
under which Stephan (through his company Stephan Consulting, Inc., 
which Respondent helped Stephan incorporate) would solicit other 
owners to become plaintiffs in Stephan’s action and in other actions 
against Callaghan and other installers, builders, and manufacturers. 
Typically, Stephan would “cold call” the owners, offer to perform home 
inspections for them, and then ask those owners to sign an “Investor 
Agreement” and an “Attorney Agreement,” both of which were drafted 
 
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and/or approved by Respondent and included Respondent’s name 
throughout. The owners, and subsequently Respondent, would sign the 
Attorney Agreements, frequently without any direct communication with 
one another or discussion about the merits of the claim. 
The Investor Agreements included statements falsely representing that 
the owners already had entered into fee agreements with Respondent. The 
Investor Agreements also included several statements that inaccurately 
described how litigation costs would be advanced and how the risks of 
litigation would be assumed. For example, the Investor Agreements stated 
Stephan would advance the costs of litigation in exchange for 50% of the 
client’s net recovery, but aside from the first few cases Stephan did not 
actually advance these costs.1  The Attorney Agreements provided that 
Respondent would receive a contingent fee of between 33% and 50%, and 
some Attorney Agreements also required a nonrefundable $1,000 retainer 
for costs. 
Respondent entered into contracts with about 118 owners through his 
relationship with Stephan. One of these clients was David Lomperski, 
who – in exchange for a reduced contingent fee in his case – agreed to 
work with Stephan to identify other potential clients. Respondent helped 
draft an employment and noncompete agreement between Stephan and 
Lomperski. 
The relationship between Respondent and Stephan eventually soured 
due to a dispute involving the advancement of costs, and Respondent 
proposed to Lomperski that they work together in the same capacity that 
Respondent had been working with Stephan. When they met to discuss 
this, Lomperski secretly recorded the conversation. Respondent also 
briefly entered into a similar relationship with David Blumenherst, who 
solicited at least two new clients using the same “Investor Agreement” 
template Respondent had provided Stephan. 
                                                 
1 The hearing officer credited Stephan’s testimony that he and Respondent eventually reached 
a verbal agreement that Respondent would front the litigation costs because Stephan was 
bringing in so many clients for him. 
 
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In addition to the misleading representations in the Investor 
Agreements regarding the advancement of litigation costs, after cases 
settled Respondent drafted a “Disbursement Authorization and 
Acknowledgement” form for his clients that in some instances 
inaccurately reflected the actual distributions and advancement of costs. 
After the accounting dispute arose between Respondent and Stephan, 
Respondent represented to clients that he had paid Stephan his share and 
instructed them not to pay Stephan, when in fact Respondent merely had 
“allocated” Stephan’s share against the amount Respondent believed 
Stephan owed him. 
The Investor Agreements provided that Stephan “shall take the lead in 
communications with the attorney” and others and purported to grant 
Stephan the authority to advance the client’s claims and to “arrange for 
settlement.” Notwithstanding this language, Respondent did have a 
general practice of writing his clients to notify them of significant events 
in their cases. However, Respondent admitted there often were delays of 
several months between the time that Stephan had clients execute 
Attorney Agreements and the time that Respondent eventually received 
those Agreements, and Respondent admitted further that he never raised 
the issue of these delays with Stephan. These delays could have led to 
claims being time-barred, although there is no evidence this occurred in 
any of the cases. 
Several clients testified about what they felt was a lack of adequate 
communication or explanation from Respondent. Several clients also 
testified that they agreed to settle a claim against one defendant 
(Callaghan) based, at least in part, on Respondent’s representation that 
they could recover additional amounts against another defendant 
(Chilton). However, Chilton would have been among the parties covered 
 
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by the release in the Callaghan settlement.2  The hearing officer found that 
Respondent misrepresented the viability of a potential claim against 
Chilton in order to motivate clients to settle claims against Callaghan. 
During the Commission’s investigation into the events described above, 
Respondent represented to the Commission that “Stephan Consulting did 
not ‘solicit’ clients for my law office. Stephan Consulting provided 
financing and consulting to various homeowners under separate and 
distinct agreements with homeowners.” The hearing officer found this 
statement was false with respect to both solicitation and financing. 
Finally, from 2008 through 2015, Respondent failed to keep adequate 
trust account records and separate ledgers for each client. Respondent also 
kept more than a nominal amount of personal funds in his trust account. 
Discussion 
The Commission alleged, and the hearing officer concluded following 
an evidentiary hearing, that Respondent violated the following Indiana 
Rules of Professional Conduct: 
1.4(a)(2):  Failing to reasonably consult with a client about the 
means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished. 
1.4(a)(3):  Failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the 
status of a matter.  
                                                 
2 Respondent partially disputes this, arguing that he believed at the time there was a potential 
claim against Chilton that would survive the release. To make a long story short, 
Respondent’s theory hinged upon whether the clients’ homes were manufactured or modular. 
This was a fact that was readily ascertainable prior to the settlement with Callaghan; and 
indeed, Respondent advised clients just two weeks after their settlement with Callaghan that 
there was no viable action to be taken against Chilton. 
 
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1.4(a)(4):  Failing to comply promptly with a client’s reasonable 
requests for information. 
1.5(a):  Making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an 
unreasonable fee or amount for expenses. 
1.15(a):  Failing to maintain and preserve complete records of 
client trust account funds. 
5.3(b): Failing to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the 
conduct of a nonlawyer employee over whom the lawyer has 
direct supervisory authority is compatible with the professional 
obligations of the lawyer. 
5.3(c):  Ordering or ratifying the misconduct of nonlawyer 
assistants, or failing to take reasonable remedial action with 
respect to the misconduct of nonlawyer assistants under the 
lawyer’s supervision.    
5.4(a):  Improperly sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer. 
7.3(a):  Improperly soliciting employment in-person, by phone, 
or by real time electronic contact from a person with whom the 
lawyer has no prior relationship when a significant motive is 
the lawyer’s pecuniary gain. 
7.3(e):  Improperly giving something of value for a 
recommendation for employment. 
7.3(f):  Accepting employment when the lawyer knows, or 
reasonably should know, that the person seeking the lawyer’s 
services does so as a result of lawyer conduct prohibited under 
Rule 7.3. 
 
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8.1(a):  Knowingly making a false statement of material fact to 
the Disciplinary Commission in connection with a disciplinary 
matter. 
8.4(a):  Violating the Rules of Professional Conduct through the 
acts of another. 
8.4(c):  Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation. 
The Commission also alleged, and the hearing officer concluded, that 
Respondent violated the following Indiana Admission and Discipline 
Rules:3 
23(29)(a)(2):  Failing to create, maintain, or retain appropriate 
trust account records. 
23(29)(a)(3):  Failing to maintain a ledger with separate records 
for each client with funds deposited in a trust account. 
Respondent has petitioned this Court to review the hearing officer’s 
findings and conclusions. In his petition, Respondent admits the trust 
account violations but disputes the other charges. The Commission carries 
the burden of proof to demonstrate attorney misconduct by clear and 
convincing evidence.  See Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 23(14)(g)(1). 
We review de novo all matters presented to the Court, including review 
not only of the hearing officer’s report but also of the entire record. See 
Matter of Wall, 73 N.E.3d 170, 172 (Ind. 2017). While this Court reserves the 
right to make the ultimate determination, the hearing officer’s findings 
receive emphasis due to the unique opportunity for direct observation of 
witnesses. Id. 
                                                 
3 Admission and Discipline Rule 23 was amended effective January 1, 2017.  The citations 
herein are to the version of Rule 23(29) in effect at the time of Respondent’s misconduct. 
 
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The overarching issue in this case involves the nature of Respondent’s 
relationship with Stephan. Respondent has contended throughout these 
proceedings that Stephan acted independently and that Respondent 
merely accepted referrals from him. The Commission has contended that 
Stephan was acting as Respondent’s agent. The hearing officer 
acknowledged conflicting evidence on this point but ultimately concluded 
the Commission had proven the existence of an agency relationship. Upon 
review of the materials before us, we agree with the hearing officer. 
In his petition for review, Respondent strenuously attacks Stephan’s 
credibility. Indeed, the hearing officer in his report expressly questioned 
the credibility of both Stephan and Respondent, but ultimately found key 
portions of Stephan’s testimony corroborated by independent evidence 
and logical inferences. This type of credibility determination was within 
the hearing officer’s purview to make, and we find ample support for his 
findings in this case. Respondent helped Stephan incorporate Stephan 
Consulting, the business Stephan used to recruit other potential plaintiffs. 
The Investor Agreements and Attorney Agreements used by Stephan (and 
later by Blumenherst) were drafted and/or approved by Respondent and 
contained his name throughout. Stephan performed the client intake and, 
as the Agreements expressly contemplated, served as the primary point of 
contact for the clients. Respondent later drafted an employment and 
noncompete agreement between Stephan and Lomperski, who assisted 
Stephan in identifying potential plaintiffs. When Respondent’s 
relationship with Stephan soured, Respondent attempted to persuade 
Lomperski to take Stephan’s place in the recruitment scheme and 
discussed (in a conversation secretly recorded by Lomperski) the need for 
Lomperski to get out of the noncompete agreement Respondent had 
drafted. In sum, this was not merely a referral system, and Respondent’s 
role in the client recruitment process was anything but passive. We find 
the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes an agency relationship 
between Respondent and Stephan. See Restatement (Third) of Agency §§ 
1.01, 1.03 (2006). 
As the issues have been framed in this case, many of the rule violations 
found by the hearing officer consequently follow from the finding of an 
agency relationship between Respondent and Stephan. See, e.g., Rules 
 
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7.3(a) (barring solicitation by a lawyer or the lawyer’s employee or agent) 
and 8.4(a) (addressing violation of professional conduct rules through the 
acts of another). Respondent’s remaining challenges to the hearing 
officer’s findings and conclusions are not persuasive. With respect to the 
Rule 1.4 charges, Respondent attacks the credibility of those clients who 
testified to a lack of adequate communication or explanation from 
Respondent, and he points to the existence of some written 
correspondence between himself and those clients. Similar to Stephan’s 
testimony though, the hearing officer found the clients’ testimony largely 
corroborated by independent evidence and logical inferences, and we find 
ample support for the hearing officer’s findings and reasoning. 
With respect to the Rule 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) charges, Respondent contends 
he was not dishonest or deceitful with either his clients or with the 
Commission. For example, Respondent asserts there is little material 
difference between Stephan being “paid” and having funds “allocated” 
against Stephan’s alleged debt to Respondent, but under the 
circumstances there plainly was a difference. Stephan disputed the alleged 
debt, and if Respondent did not pay him, Stephan presumably could seek 
payment from the clients (which likely is why the clients were seeking 
clarification and confirmation of payment from Respondent). And while 
Respondent argues that the solicitation component of his statement to the 
Commission was simply a good-faith defense to the matters being 
investigated by the Commission, he makes no argument about the 
financing component of his statement, which was objectively false. 
Notwithstanding the plain language (and asserted purpose) of the 
Investor Agreements, Stephan was not providing financing to the 
homeowners, and Respondent testified he knew Stephan was not 
advancing these funds and that Respondent was paying these costs out of 
his own trust account instead. 
Finally, Respondent advances an alternative argument with respect to 
Rule 7.3. Respondent argues that even if Stephan was soliciting clients as 
Respondent’s agent, and even though Rule 7.3(a) generally prohibits such 
solicitation, Rule 7.3(b)(3) provides a “safe harbor” in this case. 
Respondent is mistaken. Rule 7.3(b)(3) by its express terms addresses 
solicitation that “concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death 
 
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or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster . . . .” Allegedly defective 
workmanship in a manufactured or modular home, standing alone, is not 
the type of injury encompassed by this rule. And while Respondent 
advances a colorable policy argument in favor of expanding the scope of 
permitted solicitation under Rule 7.3, an attorney has the obligation to 
conform his practices to the applicable professional conduct rules as 
written, not whatever alternative rules the attorney believes would be 
better. 
In sum, we find sufficient support for the hearing officer’s findings and 
conclusions with regard to each of the charged rule violations. 
Accordingly, we find Respondent violated Professional Conduct Rules 
1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.5(a), 1.15(a), 5.3(b), 5.3(c), 5.4(a), 7.3(a), 7.3(e), 
7.3(f), 8.1(a), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and Admission and Discipline Rules 23(29)(a)(2) 
and 23(29)(a)(3). We turn now to the question of sanction. 
Respondent’s arrangement with Stephan shares some similarities with 
the type of business model we have confronted in disciplinary cases 
involving attorneys’ association with corporations marketing “foreclosure 
assistance” or “debt relief” services to consumers. See, e.g., Matter of 
Mossler, 86 N.E.3d 387 (Ind. 2017); Matter of Dilk, 2 N.E.3d 1263 (Ind. 2014).  
To be sure, there are important distinctions. Respondent had much more 
substantive involvement in his clients’ cases than did the attorneys in 
cases such as Mossler and Dilk, whose marginal roles in the business 
schemes at issue amounted to little more than creating the illusion of 
meaningful attorney involvement. Further, unlike the largely worthless 
services sold by the debt relief companies to consumers in those cases, 
Respondent’s services provided some value for his clients, many of whom 
obtained recoveries they might not otherwise have obtained. 
Nonetheless, the actual and potential harm resulting from this type of 
arrangement is readily apparent. In this case, Respondent’s delegation of 
client intake responsibilities to Stephan led to impermissible solicitation of 
clients, misrepresentations to clients about financing and costs, and delays 
of several months before Respondent became involved with (or even 
aware of) the clients’ cases. Clients, whose primary point of contact was 
Stephan, encountered difficulty communicating with Respondent and 
 
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remaining sufficiently apprised about their cases. Although many clients 
did obtain some recovery, those recoveries were greatly reduced due to a 
second contingent fee owed to Stephan, a middleman who was not 
actually providing the financing services clients were paying him to 
provide. And when a financial dispute arose between Respondent and 
Stephan, clients were caught in the middle. 
Throughout all of this, Respondent lied. Respondent provided Stephan 
with Investor Agreements for clients to execute that Respondent knew 
were false in several material respects. Respondent falsely told several 
clients at the conclusion of their cases that Respondent already had paid 
Stephan. And when the Commission began investigating Respondent’s 
practices, Respondent falsely told the Commission that Stephan provided 
financing for clients, when Respondent knew Stephan was not doing so. 
Respondent’s pattern of dishonesty elevates his problematic arrangement 
with Stephan into a much more serious offense. See Matter of Ellison, 87 
N.E.3d 460, 462 (Ind. 2017). 
Nor is this Respondent’s first encounter with the disciplinary process. 
Respondent and two other attorneys were publicly reprimanded by this 
Court in 2009 for deceptive advertising and improper use of a trade name. 
Matter of Loomis, Grubbs and Wray, 905 N.E.2d 406 (Ind. 2009). Notably, 
Respondent undertook his unethical arrangement with Stephan around 
the same time he was being disciplined for a prior unethical scheme to 
attract clients. One would have hoped our reprimand would have 
prompted Respondent to consider his ethical obligations and business 
practices more carefully. See Matter of Powell, 76 N.E.3d 130, 135 (Ind. 2017) 
(“[I]n many instances an attorney will be chastened by discipline for a first 
offense, adequately remedy his or her professional shortcomings, and be 
unlikely to recidivate going forward”). Instead, Respondent continued his 
enterprise with Stephan for several years and then sought to pursue 
similar client solicitation arrangements with other middlemen. Under 
these circumstances, Respondent’s prior discipline is a significant 
aggravating factor. 
After careful consideration of this matter, we conclude that Respondent 
should be suspended for a period of at least nine months, after which he 
 
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may be reinstated only after proving by clear and convincing evidence his 
remorse, rehabilitation, and fitness to practice. See Admis. Disc. R. 
23(18)(b). 
Conclusion 
For Respondent’s professional misconduct, the Court suspends 
Respondent from the practice of law in this state for a period of not less 
than nine months, without automatic reinstatement, effective April 9, 
2018. Respondent shall fulfill all the duties of a suspended attorney under 
Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26). At the conclusion of the minimum 
period of suspension, Respondent may petition this Court for 
reinstatement to the practice of law in this state, provided Respondent 
pays the costs of this proceeding, fulfills the duties of a suspended 
attorney, and satisfies the requirements for reinstatement of Admission 
and Discipline Rule 23(18). 
The costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent. The 
hearing officer appointed in this case is discharged. 
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur. 
Goff, J., did not participate. 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT 
James P. Fenton 
Daniel G. McNamara 
Fort Wayne, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR INDIANA SUPREME COURT 
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION 
G. Michael Witte, Executive Director 
Rachel B. Gallagher, Staff Attorney 
Indianapolis, Indiana