Case Title: In re Kilburn

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1991-09-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 90-478


In re District Judge Ronald F. Kilburn       Supreme Court

                                             Original Jurisdiction


                                             September Term, 1991


M. Jerome Diamond of Diamond & Associates, P.C., Montpelier, for appellant

Chester S. Ketcham, Middlebury, for appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     PER CURIAM.   Judge Ronald Kilburn appeals a Judicial Conduct Board
conclusion that he failed to dispose promptly of the business of the court,
a violation of Canon 3A(5) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  Because the
board limited its investigation to a single instance of delay, we remand for
further proceedings.
     The board based its conclusion on its investigation of a single
complaint, brought by a litigant in a contested divorce, concerning an
eight-month delay in rendering a final order.  The divorce hearing was
completed on March 24, 1988, and Judge Kilburn stated a decision would be
forthcoming by May 1, 1988.  Later he changed the date to May 31, 1988.
That deadline passed without any action.  Counsel for the parties attempted
without success to contact Judge Kilburn over the summer and ultimately
wrote to Judge Martin, Administrative Judge for Trial Courts, to complain
about the delay.  Judge Martin responded, promising that a decision would be
issued by September 20, 1988.  A copy of that letter was sent to Judge
Kilburn.  Again, no decision was issued.  Finally, on November 29, 1988,
Judge Martin removed Judge Kilburn from the bench, telling him he could not
return until he issued the decision.  On December 1, 1988, a notice of
decision was issued.
     Canon 3A(5) states that "A judge should dispose promptly of the
business of the court."  Appellant asserts this Canon has not been violated
because:  (1) failure to decide cases promptly should be handled by
administrative correction rather than judicial discipline; (2) the board
cannot find judicial misconduct based on a single instance of delay; and (3)
the standard imposed by Canon 3A(5) is so vague that it would be funda-
mentally unfair and violate due process to find judicial misconduct in the
absence of specific time standards for deciding cases.
     Appellant's first argument is based on a recent decision of the New
York Court of Appeals, In re Greenfield, 76 N.Y.2d 293, 557 N.E.2d 1177,
558 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1990).  In Greenfield, a judge had failed to render a
timely decision in eight matters, with delays ranging from seven months to
over nine years.  Id. at 296, 557 N.E.2d  at 1178, 558 N.Y.S.2d  at 882.
Despite finding these delays "inexcusable," the court concluded that no
violation of Canon 3A(5) had been shown:
           In our view a clearer line must be drawn between the
         role of the Commission and court administrators in order
         to avoid confusion and provide adequate notice to mem-
         bers of the judiciary as to when and under what circum-
         stances delays in disposing of pending matters ceases to
         be a purely administrative concern and becomes a matter
         warranting punitive sanctions.  We have concluded that
         generally these matters can and should be resolved in
         the administrative setting and that the more severe
         sanctions available to the Commission should only be
         deemed appropriate and necessary when the Judge has
         defied administrative directives or has attempted to
         subvert the system by, for instance, falsifying,
         concealing or persistently refusing to file records
         indicating delays.

Id. at 298, 557 N.E.2d  at 1179-80, 558 N.Y.S.2d  at 883.  We are unpersuaded
by the Greenfield opinion.  As the dissent in that case points out, the
result is inconsistent with the plain language of the Canon:
         The rule contains no such qualifying conditions and
         nothing should be added to it.  To require delay plus
         some other misconduct, such as falsification of records
         or insubordination, is to proscribe the other conduct,
         not to proscribe delay.

Id. at 305, 557 N.E.2d  at 1184, 558 A.2d  at 888 (Simons, J., dissenting).
Other courts have found violations of Canon 3A(5), or similar disciplinary
rules, on facts similar to those in Greenfield.  See, e.g., In re Jones,