Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Gisriel

Citation: 409 Md. 331

Docket Number: 3ag/08

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Michael U. Gisriel 
Misc. Docket AG No. 3, September Term 2008.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS – MISAPPROPRIATION OF
CLIENTS’ FUNDS; IMPROPER USE OF ATTORNEY TRUST FUNDS
The respondent, Michael Gisriel, having been found in violation of the Maryland Rules
of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 3.1, and 8.4, was disbarred.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 3
September Term, 2008
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
MICHAEL U. GISRIEL
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,
Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Bell, C.J., and Eldridge, J., Dissent.
Filed: June 18, 2009
1
Rule 16-751(a) provides:
(a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action.
(1) Upon approval of the Commission. Upon approval or
direction of the [Attorney Grievance] Commission, Bar Counsel
shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the
Court of Appeals.
2
Rule 1.1 provides:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.
3
Rule 1.3 provides:
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.
4
Rule 1.4 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any
decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s
informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is required by these
Rules; (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status
of the matter; (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information; and (4) consult with the client about any relevant
limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that
the client expects assistance not permitted by the Maryland
Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
(continued...)
Michael Gisriel, (“Gisriel” or “Respondent”), was admitted to the Bar of this Court
on December 29, 1976.  On March 19, 2008, the Attorney Grievance Commission
(“Petitioner” or “Bar Counsel”), acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751(a),1 filed a petition
for disciplinary action against Gisriel, charging numerous violations of the Maryland Rules
of Professional Conduct (“MRPC” or “Rule”), including Rule 1.1 (Competence),2 Rule 1.3
(Diligence),3 Rule 1.4 (Communication),4 Rule 1.15 (Safekeeping Property),5
4(...continued)
regarding the representation.
5
Rule 1.15 at the time of the acts in issue, provided:
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that
is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation
separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in
a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600
of the Maryland Rules. Other property shall be identified as such
and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such
account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer
and shall be preserved for a period of five years after
termination of the representation.
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or
third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the
client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise
permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall
promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other
property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and,
upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render
a full accounting regarding such property.
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in
possession of property in which both the lawyer and another
person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the
lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their
interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests,
the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until
the dispute is resolved.
Rule 1.15 was amended on March 12, 2007, effective January
1, 2008 to state:
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that
is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation
separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in
a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600
of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be created and
maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. Other
property shall be identified specifically as such and
appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and
distribution shall be created and maintained. Complete records
(continued...)
2
5(...continued)
of the account funds and of other property shall be kept by the
lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of at least five years
after the date the record was created.
(b) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer’s own funds in a client
trust account only as permitted by Rule 16-607 b.
(c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in
writing, to a different arrangement, a lawyer shall deposit legal
fees and expenses that have been paid in advance into a client
trust account and may withdraw those funds for the lawyer’s
own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.
(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or
third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the
client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise
permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall
deliver promptly to the client or third person any funds or other
property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and,
upon request by the client or third person, shall render promptly
a full accounting regarding such property.
(e) When a lawyer in the course of representing a client is in
possession of property in which two or more persons (one of
whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be
kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The
lawyer shall distribute promptly all portions of the property as
to which the interests are not in dispute.
6
Rule 3.1 provides:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so
that is not frivolous, which includes, for example, a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law. A lawyer may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to
require that every element of the moving party’s case be
established.
7
Rule 8.1 provides:
(continued...)
3
Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions),6 Rule 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary
Matters),7 and Rule 8.4 (Misconduct).8  The charges involved Gisriel’s representation of
7(...continued)
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a
lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in
connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) knowingly
make a false statement of material fact; or (b) fail to disclose a
fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the
person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond
to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or
disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require
disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
8
Rule 8.4 provides:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do
so, or do so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice;
(e) knowingly manifest by words or conduct when acting in a
professional capacity bias or prejudice based upon race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status when such action is prejudicial to the
administration of justice, provided, however, that legitimate
advocacy is not a violation of this paragraph;
(f) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a
government agency or official or to achieve results by means
that violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law; or
(g) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is
a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.
4
Kenneth J. Barnhart and his wife, Marcia.  This Court referred the matter to Judge Timothy
J. Martin of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for a hearing to determine findings of
9
Rule 16-757 provides:
(a) Generally. The hearing of a disciplinary or remedial action
is governed by the rules of evidence and procedure applicable to
a court trial in a civil action tried in a circuit court. Unless
extended by the Court of Appeals, the hearing shall be
completed within 120 days after service on the respondent of the
order designating a judge. Before the conclusion of the hearing,
the judge may permit any complainant to testify, subject to
cross-examination, regarding the effect of the alleged
misconduct. A respondent attorney may offer, or the judge may
inquire regarding, evidence otherwise admissible of any
remedial action undertaken relevant to the allegations. Bar
Counsel may respond to any evidence of remedial action.
(b) Burdens of proof. The petitioner has the burden of proving
the averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.
A respondent who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of
mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense
or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.
(c) Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file
or dictate into the record a statement of the judge's findings of
fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial
action, and conclusions of law. If dictated into the record, the
statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless the time is
extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record
no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The
clerk shall mail a copy of the statement to each party.
(d) Transcript. The petitioner shall cause a transcript of the
hearing to be prepared and included in the record.
(e) Transmittal of record. Unless a different time is ordered by
the Court of Appeals, the clerk shall transmit the record to the
Court of Appeals within 15 days after the statement of findings
and conclusions is filed.
5
fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-757.9
On November 19, 2008, Judge Martin held an evidentiary hearing, during which
Gisriel represented himself.  By order dated December 18, 2008, we granted an extension for
6
filing the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law until February 4, 2009.  On January 23,
2009, Judge Martin issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (“Findings”), in which
he found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Gisriel’s acts and omissions constituted
violations of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 3.1, 8.1, and 8.4:
Findings of Fact
To the extent these findings of fact are based upon
Petitioner’s evidence, they are found by clear and convincing
evidence. To the extent they are based upon Respondent’s
evidence, they are found by a preponderance of evidence. The
facts found are as follows:
1. Michael Gisriel (Respondent) was admitted to the Bar of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland in December 1976.
2. Thereafter Respondent practiced primarily in real estate law,
deeds, land use, and real estate settlements.
3. Respondent has some limited experience in commercial
litigation.
4. During times relevant to this matter, Respondent maintained
an office for the practice of law in Towson, Baltimore County,
Maryland. He operated with other attorneys in a law firm known
as the Law Offices of Foard, Gisriel, O’Brien & Ward, L.L.C.
5. For approximately six years Respondent hosted a real estate
radio show, and for three years wrote a question and answer
column on real estate matters for the Baltimore Sun. As a result,
the Respondent received numerous requests for pro bono service
and provided same from time to time.
6. On February 16, 2002, Kenneth J. Barnhart and his wife,
Marcia Barnhart, (Barnharts) signed a Residential Contract of
Sale for the purchase of real property in Frederick County,
Maryland. The contract was submitted through the Barnharts’
agent, Len Moyer/Remax Columbia (Moyer/Remax), to Leonard
Martin of Gold Key Real Estate (Martin & Gold Key), agent for
the seller, John Dunenfeld (Dunenfeld).
7. The Barnharts made a $5,000 deposit by check which was
10
Respondent filed an exception to the finding that the “Barnharts made a $5,000
deposit by check which was held by Moyer.”  Respondent argued that the check was made
payable to “Re/Max Columbia” and the “Residential Contract of Sale explicitly stated that
Re/Max would hold the deposit in escrow.”  Petitioner concedes that the hearing court’s
finding may be “technically incorrect.”  Both parties agree that this finding is in error, and
we sustain Respondent’s exception and note that Finding Number 7 should read the check
was held by Re/Max.  The change in the finding has no effect on our decision, however.
7
held by Moyer.[10]
8. The contract signed by the Barnharts contained a mediation
provision which mandated that neither party could initiate any
legal action without first submitting any claim arising out of the
contract to mediation.
9. For various financial reasons, the Barnharts could not
consummate the transaction with Dunenfeld and sought to
terminate the contract.
10. On March 9, 2002 the Barnharts tendered an agreement to
terminate the contract to Dunenfeld.
11. Dunenfeld refused their tendered agreement to terminate the
contract.
12. A third party referred the Barnharts to the Respondent for
legal assistance in this matter.
13. On March 18, 2002, K. Barnhart met with the Respondent
for the first time. After a brief discussion with the Respondent,
K. Barnhart retained the Respondent to assist him and his wife
in terminating the contract and recovering the $5,000 deposit.
14. During this meeting with K. Barnhart, Respondent was privy
to the original contract of sale and all other relevant documents.
Neither K. Barnhart nor the Respondent could remember if the
Respondent read this contract during the initial meeting.
15. K. Barnhart paid the Respondent $500 to accomplish the
desired result with no agreement as to future expenses of
Respondent and without any written retainer agreement.
16. On the same day (March 18, 2002), the Respondent faxed
and mailed a letter to Martin (Gold Key) regarding the
termination of the contract. The Respondent alluded to three
reasons for the termination and indicated: “therefore, there has
been no true meeting of the minds and the contract is a nullity
and is hereby terminated.”  By this letter, Respondent requested
the return of the deposit check.
8
17. The Respondent received no response to this letter.
18. At some point subsequent to the initial meeting of the
Respondent with K. Barnhart, K. Barnhart asked his wife, M.
Barnhart, to handle this matter and be the primary contact by
and between the Respondent and the Barnharts.  The majority of
the communications between the Barnharts and the Respondent
thereafter was made by M. Barnhart, who is now deceased.
19. In June or July of 2002, as a result of the Respondent’s
efforts, Respondent determined that Dunenfeld had sold the
property to a third person in June of 2002.  Neither he nor the
Barnharts were notified of this fact by Moyer, Martin, or
Dunenfeld.
20. At no time prior to the Respondent learning of the sale of the
Dunenfeld property had Dunenfeld invoked the mediation
provision contained in the contract of sale.  No mention of it had
been made by either side.
21. Between March 18 and July 9, 2002 the Respondent made
occasional telephone calls to Martin regarding this matter.
22. Respondent received no meaningful or satisfactory response
to these inquiries.
23. On July 9, 2002, the Respondent wrote Martin indicating his
knowledge of the sale of the subject property and making yet
another demand for the return of the deposit.  In that letter he
indicated that absent resolution, suit would have to filed.
24. Respondent received no real response to the July 9 letter.
Both he and the Barnharts were frustrated at the lack of response
and failed resolution of this matter.
25. At no time between July 9 and August 15, 2002 did Martin
or Dunenfeld suggest or invoke mediation to resolve this
dispute.
26. Respondent discussed the filing of a lawsuit with K.
Barnhart against Moyer, Martin, and Dunenfeld sometime in the
latter part of July and early part of August, 2002.
27. The Barnharts had no legal training and were completely
dependent on the Respondent as to the advisability of filing said
litigation.
28. The Respondent believed that the only way to get the
attention of Dunenfeld or Martin was to initiate litigation.  The
Respondent believed that the contract had been terminated by
the lack of any response, Dunenfeld’s sale of the property, and
believed that the contract was a nullity.
9
29. Prior to initiating the litigation, the Respondent discussed
this matter with Phil Foard, a litigator in his office.  The
Respondent believed that seeking punitive damages would get
the other party to negotiate this matter.
30. Respondent never discussed mediation with the Barnharts as
an alternative to a resolution of his dispute.
31. Having received no response from Dunenfeld or Martin,
Respondent filed a complaint against Moyer (and Remax),
Martin (and Gold Key), and Dunenfeld in the Circuit Court for
Frederick County on or about August 15, 2002.  He sought a
return of the $5,000 deposit and punitive damages from all
parties.
32. The complaint alleged no facts which could possibly have
represented a cause of action against Moyer/Remax.  The
complaint failed to state any facts suggesting malice, bad faith,
evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud on the part of
Martin, Gold Key, or Dunenfeld.  No deliberate wrongdoing
was alleged.  The Respondent simply represented certain facts
in a declaratory way and demanded punitive damages.
33. The Respondent brought the action not because he actually
believed that punitive damages would lie but to get the attention
of the parties.  This he admitted to the court.
34. The Respondent re-sent the July 9, 2002 letter to Martin on
September 16, 2008.
35. Respondent again received no response from Martin or
Dunenfeld.
36. The litigation was initiated two and a half to three months
after the house had been sold to a third party and six months
after the Barnharts had signed the contract.
37. The Respondent did not serve the suit upon the Defendants
until late October, 2002 in the hope and anticipation that he
would receive a response from Martin or Dunenfeld.  None was
forthcoming.
38. Sometime after the litigation was instituted, the Respondent
discussed the status of fees with the Barnharts and requested
additional monies to continue to represent them.
39. In early February, 2003 the Respondent sent the Barnharts
a bill for $1,350 for services already rendered.
40. K. Barnhart understood that, as the matter escalated, there
would be more fees involved.
41. Sometime in early February, 2003, K. Barnhart indicated to
10
the Respondent that he could not or would not pay additional
fees. He wanted to put a stop to the Respondent’s representation.
42. Prior to any court appearance, the Barnharts decided to take
over their own case and advised the Respondent that he was out,
i.e. no longer representing them.
43. The Barnharts and the Respondent agreed to the
Respondent’s withdrawal from the case as their attorney and the
Respondent, in exchange for his withdrawal and their
agreement, waived any fees previously owed by them.
44. On November 25, 2002 Martin (& Gold Key) moved to
dismiss the complaint and filed a counter-complaint for
attorney’s fees per Rule 1-341.
45. In December, 2002 Moyer (& Remax) answered the
complaint and filed a cross-claim for Interpleader (seeking $500
against the $5,000 for costs incurred).
46. On January 30, 2003 Dunenfeld moved to dismiss and for
attorney’s fees.
47. A hearing was scheduled for February 19, 2003 to address
the open motions in the litigation.
48. On February 6, 2003, the Respondent requested a
postponement of the motions hearing.
49. On February 13, the Circuit Court denied the Respondent’s
request for postponement.
50. On February 19, a snow storm prevented the Respondent
from attending the motions hearing and he filed a motion for
continuance and an affidavit to that effect.
51. By order of March 14, 2003 the Circuit Court continued the
motions hearing to May 21, 2003.
52. After the conversation with the Barnharts with respect to
further representation, the Respondent filed a motion for leave
to strike his appearance along with an affidavit.  This motion
was filed on May 2, 2003.
53. The Respondent filed no written response to the motions of
Moyer (& Remax), Martin (& Gold Key), or Dunenfeld.
54. A motions hearing took place on May 21, 2003.  The
Respondent did not attend.  M. Barnhart appeared alone.
55. At this hearing, the judge denied the Respondent’s written
motion to strike his appearance but granted the oral motion to
strike of M. Barnhart.  At that point, the Plaintiffs (Barnharts)
were pro se.  (This court’s emphasis).
56. At this motions hearing, the court granted Moyer/Remax’s
11
cross-claim for Interpleader, ordered that the clerk accept $4,500
into the registry of the court, ordered $500 to Remax for costs
incurred, and dismissed the Barnhart’s complaint against
Moyer/Remax and Dunenfeld with prejudice.
57. The court reserved ruling on all claims for attorney’s fees at
the May 21, 200[3] hearing.
58. On or about May 28, 2003 Martin (Gold Key) filed a
supplemental motion for attorney’s fees attaching certain fee
worksheets.
59. On or about June 4, 2003 Dunenfeld filed a Rule 1-341
motion for attorney’s fees against the Respondent, his law firm,
or, in the alternative, against the Barnharts.  James Stuart was
counsel for Dunenfeld.  Attached to the motion was Mr. Stuart’s
invoice and third person affidavit as to the reasonableness and
fairness of his bill.
60. On or about June 11, 2003 Respondent, on his behalf and on
his firm’s behalf filed an opposition to Martin’s and Dunenfeld’s
Rule 1-341 motion for fees.
61. On June 25, 2003 Dunenfeld responded to the Respondent’s
opposition and again requested attorney’s fees in the amount of
$2,397.50 against either the Respondent and his firm or against
the Barnharts.
62. A hearing on the extant motions was scheduled for Tuesday,
September 23, 2003.  The Respondent requested a postponement
thereof by request filed on August 11, 2003.
63. On August 2, 2003, the Respondent filed a counter-motion
for attorney’s fees pursuant to Rule 1-341.  This was brought
against Martin (Gold Key), R. Mercer Jr. Esq., their attorney, as
well as Dunenfeld and J. Stuart, his attorney.  Attached to this
motion was an affidavit by a Philip O. Foard, Esq. as to the
fairness and reasonableness of the Respondent’s fees.
64. Martin and Gold Key filed its opposition to the
Respondent’s counter-motion for the Barnharts on August 21,
2003.
65. After the court granted the Barnharts’ oral motion to strike
the Respondent’s appearance, the Respondent was representing
himself and his firm with respect to the fee dispute.
66. On August 18, 2003 Martin and Gold Key filed an
opposition to the postponement request of the Respondent.
67. On September 4, 2003 the court denied the Respondent’s
request for a postponement of the September 23, 2003 hearing.
12
68. On September 23, 2003, the hearing took place before Judge
Stepler on the issue of fees.  Counsel for Moyer, Dunenfeld, and
Martin (Gold Key) appeared as well as the Respondent.  The
Barnharts were not present.  The Respondent made arguments
on behalf of himself, his firm, and the Barnharts notwithstanding
that his appearance had been previously stricken.  (court’s
emphasis).  The court heard arguments and awarded $2,642.50
to Dunenfeld against the Respondent and his firm; $2,733.57 to
Meier, counsel for Martin (Gold Key) against the Respondent
and his firm, and $1,963.57 to Meier (Martin & Gold Key)
against the Barnharts.
69. Judgments were entered reflecting the above.
70. The Respondent paid and satisfied the judgments entered
against him, his firm, and the Barnharts.  The Barnharts
contributed no funds towards the satisfaction of these
obligations, nor were they requested to do so by the Respondent.
71. The Barnharts had no knowledge of the entry of the
judgment against them or the judgments against the Respondent
and the Respondent did not advise them of the result of the
September hearing. K. Barnhart discovered this fact while going
through some papers in late 2005 and early 2006.
72. The Barnharts had no communications with the Respondent
as to the hearing or as to his satisfaction of the judgments.
73. In June of 2004, the Barnharts, pro se, went to mediation
with Dunenfeld and agreed to an ultimate distribution of the
$4,500 held in the court registry.  The mediation agreement was
unknown to the Respondent.
74. On June 29, 2004 the Barnharts and Dunenfeld filed a joint
motion to release the funds.  On July 8, 2004 the court ordered
the release of the funds, $3,500 to Dunenfeld and $1,000 to the
Barnharts.  This was unknown to the Respondent.
75. On July 19, 2004 a check in the amount of $1,000 was
drawn by the clerk of the circuit court and made payable to the
Barnharts alone.
76. On or around that date, the clerk of the court erroneously
mailed the check made payable to the Barnharts to the
Respondent’s address in Towson, Maryland.
77. The Respondent did not know the purpose or reasons for the
issuance of the $1,000 check.
78. The Respondent signed the names of the payees, K. and M.
Barnhart and wrote, “pay to the order of Michael Gisriel” on the
13
check.
79. The Respondent believed that he was entitled to these funds
as he had paid the judgment of the Barnharts.
80. The Respondent deposited the check in his operating, not
escrow, account and used the funds for business and personal
purposes.
81. The Respondent did not notify the Barnharts of the receipt
of the check.
82. The Respondent had no authority, express or implied, to
endorse the Barnharts’ names and had no authority to negotiate
the check and keep the funds as his property.
83. After a month or so, and having not received the anticipated
check, the Barnharts inquired about the check to the clerk’s
office in the Circuit Court for Frederick County.
84. The Barnharts eventually received a copy of the check and
realized the Respondent had signed their names and deposited
the check in his firm account.  The Barnharts were offended and
upset.
85. The Barnharts called the Respondent to inquire but received
no phone call(s) in return from the Respondent.
86. K. Barnhart contacted the State’s Attorney’s Office for
Frederick County but no action was taken.
87. On or around April 19, 2007, M. Barnhart filed a grievance
against the Respondent with respect to the facts and the
circumstances of this matter and sought to recoup the $1,000.
88. On April 23, 2007 Bar Counsel sent correspondence to the
Respondent attaching M. Barnhart’s complaint seeking
Respondent’s response to same.
89. The Respondent answered Bar Counsel’s inquiry with a
letter dated May 1, 2007.  In that correspondence, the
Respondent explained the circumstances as he saw them,
admitted to the receipt of the $1,000, but stated that he had
contacted the Barnharts and explained the situation.
Furthermore, the Respondent indicated that the Barnharts had
agreed, at that time, that he should keep the $1,000 in partial
payment for the $3,313.37 which was still owed to him.
(Court’s emphasis).
90. This court is unpersuaded that the Respondent ever
communicated with the Barnharts about receiving the $1,000
and certainly does not accept the Respondent’s assertions that
the Barnharts agreed that the Respondent could keep the funds.
14
91. Furthermore, the Respondent’s contention that he sent a
letter dated October 5, 2004 to the Barnharts explaining all that
had occurred is not accepted by this court.  The Barnharts (K.
Barnhart) denied the receipt of this letter and this court finds that
the Barnhart’s never received such letter and never
communicated with the Respondent in 2004 about the $1,000
check.
92. M. Barnhart died in August, 2007.
93. After the grievance process started, K. Barnhart made
affidavit averring that he had received the disputed $1,000 in the
fall of 2007 from the Respondent and also his acceptance of the
Respondent’s apology and withdrew his complaint against the
Respondent, indicating his complaint had been satisfied and
released.  The Respondent had returned the $1,000 to K.
Barnhart on or about November 5, 2007 following a Peer
Review Panel Hearing.
94. A cover letter directed to the Court of Appeals was signed
by K. Barnhart indicating that he has no desire to see sanctions
against the Respondent which would deprive him of the ability
to practice in his chosen profession and thereby provide for his
family.
In assessing these facts, Judge Martin made the following conclusions of law:
Conclusions of Law
This court is persuaded by clear and convincing evidence
that the following Rules of Professional Conduct have been
violated:
I) 1.1 Competence:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.
This court considered the relevant factors with respect to
the issue of legal knowledge and skill to be employed.  The
court has considered the relative complexity and specialized
nature of the matter, the Respondent’s general experience,
especially in the field in question, the preparation and study the
Respondent was able to give the matter, whether he should have
referred the matter to or associated or consulted with a lawyer
15
of established competence.  See comments to Rule 1.1.  In this
case Petitioner argues that there was a failure of the Respondent
to inform the Barnharts of the terms of the contract.  This court
does not find necessarily that this is so.  The Respondent
certainly did not specifically discuss mediation or counsel fees,
but there must have been enough discussion about the facts and
circumstances for him to tender the March 18, 2002 letter and
give the three reasons for terminating the contract and his
position that the contract was a nullity.  Petitioner urges this
court to look at the result and focus retrospectively.  This court
rather feels it is appropriate to start at the beginning and look
prospectively.  The Respondent had substantial experience in
dealing with real estate matters, but little with litigation.  He
took the position that the contract was a nullity and maintained
it for a long time.  When Dunenfeld sold the property, without
advising the Respondent or the Barnharts, he was even more
convinced that the contract was a nullity, as of then incapable of
performance.  He would not have been thinking of mediation or
counsel fees.  He simply wanted contact and negotiation.
Perhaps he was careless or even negligent and his erroneous
conclusion that the contract was a nullity certainly was fatal to
the case, but this court does not find by clear and convincing
evidence a failure of competence relating to discussions or
information to the client.  See AGC v. Kemp, 335 Md. 1 (1994).
However and unfortunately, the Defendants filed motions
to dismiss directed at his clients and he failed to timely respond.
In truth he did nothing.  He was still attorney of record but took
no position for the Barnharts.  These were the motions filed in
November, 2002 and January, 2003.  His failure is inexplicable
to this court and certainly evidences a failure to demonstrate the
requisite knowledge and skill required of him.  This does indeed
represent incompetence and this court so finds.
Furthermore, notwithstanding an agreement with the
Barnharts that they would “take it from here” the Respondent’s
failure to appear at the May 21, 2003 hearing is again
inexplicable and quite telling.  The Respondent had no right to
assume that his appearance had been stricken and certainly no
right to simply not attend the hearing.  This court must infer that
Judge Stepler was most aggravated by his absence, which
indeed did not bode well for the further conduct of the case.
The Respondent’s argument that they do things differently in
16
Frederick County (as opposed to Baltimore County) cannot and
does not represent an acceptable excuse.  As continuing counsel,
he was duty bound to appear at the hearing and be prepared to
represent the Barnharts.  He did not attend and M. Barnhart
appeared alone, a layperson facing several lawyers across the
table.  Certainly this was a fact not unnoticed by Judge Stepler.
To this court this represented a failure of representation and a
failure to provide the skill, legal knowledge, thoroughness, and
preparation required of him.  Unfortunately, it was a complete
lack of representation.  See AGC v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56
(2000); AGC v. Tinsky, 377 Md. 646 (2003).
II) 1.3 Diligence:
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.
As the comments indicate, a lawyer should pursue a
matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction, or
personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever
lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s
cause or endeavor.  Certainly the Respondent knew upon
receiving the motions to dismiss that mediation was an issue as
well as counsel fees.  Inexplicably, as indicated above, he did
not respond to the motions nor discuss with the Barnharts what
the end result could be.  The conduct as described in Paragraph
I certainly provides clear and convincing evidence that the
Respondent did not act with reasonable diligence and
promptness.  See AGC v. Zdravkovich, 362 Md. 1 (2000); AGC
v. Brugh, 353 Md. 475 (1999).  This court so finds.
III) 1.4 Communication:
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the
status of the matter and promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.
Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the
client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the
representation.  See Comment 1 (this court’s emphasis).  The
client should have sufficient information to participate
intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the
representation and the means by which they are to be pursued,
to the extent the client is willing and able to do so.  Adequacy of
17
communication depends in part on the kind of advice or
assistance that is involved.  In litigation, a lawyer should explain
the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily
should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in
significant expense or to injure or coerce others.  See Comment
5 to this Rule.  As the court indicated in paragraph I, this court
does not find that the Respondent did not reasonably keep his
clients informed regarding the status of this case until the
ultimate decision was made to initiate litigation against all the
parties.  However, at that point, the Respondent did not meet the
requirement that he reasonably inform the Barnharts by
explaining the matter to them in a manner reasonably necessary
to permit them to make informed decisions.  In this, the
Respondent was utterly lacking.  The Barnharts knew nothing
about the mediation requirement, knew nothing of the fact that
mediation was required before filing litigation, and certainly
knew nothing about possible sanctions, i.e. fees, etc., which
could befall them in this regard.  The Respondent’s failure to
communicate with the Barnharts was compounded when he
failed to advise them of the result of the attorney fees hearing.
Even though he was not officially their counsel of record, he
admitted arguing their position at the September 23, 2003
hearing.  The results certainly affected them and the situation
was made worse by his failing to advise them of the judgment
against them.  He failed to advise them of his satisfaction of the
judgments and exacerbated his failures to communicate upon his
receipt of the check, his actions thereafter, and his utter failure
to keep them advised of these circumstances.  His explanations
of his attempts to do so were completely unpersuasive to this
court.  The court finds a failure to communicate by the
Respondent and a violation of Rule 1.4 (a) and (b).  See Taylor
vs. Feissner, 103 Md.App 366 (1995); AGC vs. Harris, 371 Md.
510 (2002); See Mooney, 359 Md. 56 (2000).
IV) 1.15 Safekeeping Property:
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that
is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation
separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in
a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter
600 of the Maryland Rules. Other property shall be identified as
such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such
account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer
18
and shall be preserved for a period of five years after
termination of the representation.
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or
third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the
client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise
permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall
promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other
property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and,
upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render
a full accounting regarding such property.
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in
possession of property in which both the lawyer and another
person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the
lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their
interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective
interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the
lawyer until the dispute is resolved.
All property of clients or third persons, including
prospective clients, must be kept separate from the lawyer’s
business and personal property and, if money, in one or more
trust accounts.
Normally, it is impermissible to commingle the lawyer’s
own funds with client funds.  See Comments to Rule 1.15.
Respondent’s position that he kept the one thousand
dollar check, made payable solely to the Barnharts, as payment
for funds he had expended in satisfying the judgment against the
Barnharts is wholly unacceptable to this court.  He was clearly
duty bound to deposit the check in a separate account and he
admittedly failed to do so.  Without authority or consent, he
deposited the check in his operating account and used the funds
for personal or business purposes.  As indicated, he failed
completely to notify the Barnharts of his receipt of the check
and certainly rendered no accounting to them which would have
indicated his position and reasons for keeping the funds.
The obvious question this court addresses is how could
the Barnharts even take a position regarding the check when
they knew nothing about it?  They had no clue of any of the
circumstances and anticipated the check which, unfortunately,
was directed to the Respondent.  The Respondent obviously
commingled their funds with his funds.  These actions constitute
multiple violations of Rule 1.15, specifically 1.15(a)(b)(c).
19
V) 3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so
that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for
an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer
may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that
every element of the moving party’s case has been established.
The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the
fullest benefit of the client’s cause but also a duty not to abuse
legal procedure.  What is required of lawyers is that they inform
themselves about the facts of their clients’ cases and the
applicable law and determine that they can make good faith
arguments in support of their clients’ positions.  See Comments
1 & 2.
This court is perplexed as to what exactly the Respondent
was thinking when he filed the lawsuit against all the parties.
He had never invoked the mediation provision, notwithstanding
the mandate of the contract, and simply sued everyone claiming
punitive damages and a return of the deposit.  To this court, the
lawsuit had no merit.  There was no basis for doing so that was
not frivolous.  There was no basis for punitive damages and
none was alleged.  There was no basis whatsoever to sue
Moyer/Remax who were no more than stakeholders.  The
contract clearly provided steps to be taken by Moyer in the event
of a dispute.  The respondent never gave them the ability to do
so and completely ignored this provision.
There was no basis to sue Martin or Gold Key.  The
Respondent knew that they were not holding the deposit, he
alleged no basis for punitive damages against them.  See Darcar
Motors of Silver Spring, Inc. vs. Borzym, 379 Md. 249 (2004).
He simply included Martin/Gold Key in his shotgun approach
to get everyone’s “attention.”  These actions were clearly
violations of Rule 3.1.
There were no allegations of knowing or deliberate
wrongdoing by Dunenfeld.  Id.  All the defendants were
required to seek counsel, all incurred expenses, all filed
responsive hearings, and none of this was necessary but for the
actions of the Respondent.  Although not evidence of a violation
of this rule as such, it is certainly clear to this court in the
conclusions of the trial judge in granting the fees and sanctions
against the Respondent and Barnharts that she believed the
20
Respondent’s lawsuit had no merit.  See AGC vs. Brown, 353
Md. 271 (1999).  The Respondent’s supplemental counter
complaint for attorney’s fees was without merit.  It appeared to
be, for the most part, a mere recitation of the very reasons given
by the defendants in their motions against the Respondent and
Barnharts.  The Respondent’s actions in filing the lawsuit and
the supplemental counter complaint for fees were without merit
and had no basis not frivolous in nature.  The legal process
should never be used as the Respondent did here, i.e., merely a
device to apply pressure to the other parties to secure the return
of the deposit, actions which completely backfired.  These
actions represent violations of Rule 3.1.
VI) 8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters:
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a
lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in
connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: 
(a) knowingly make a false statement of fact; or 
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension
known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly
fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an
admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does
not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6.
Regrettably, the Respondent was untruthful to Bar
Counsel in his response to its inquiry (See Respondent’s letter
of 5/1/07).  Although this court does not necessarily find untruth
or falsity in his description of the trial judge’s ruling which
could merely represent his subjective feelings and viewpoint, the
Respondent knowingly made false statements by indicating that
he had contacted the Barnharts, explained the situation to them,
and that they agreed, at that time, that he could keep the one
thousand dollars. (court’s emphasis).  These statements are
anything but the truth.  Additionally, this court does not accept
his response that he sent a letter dated October [5], 2004 to the
Barnharts.  The Respondent’s position, to this court, is a
fabrication made after the fact and unacceptable.  His actions
made much worse the already bad situation he had found
himself in.  These acts clearly and convincingly persuade this
court that he violated Rule 8.1 (a).
VII) 8.4 Misconduct:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
21
(a) violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional
conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another; . . .
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice; . . . .
This court has found a violation by the Respondent of
Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 3.1, and 8.1.  As such, these violations
are professional misconduct in violation of Rule 8.4 (a) and this
court so finds.
Honesty is of paramount importance in the practice of
law.  See AGC vs. Elison, 384 Md. 688 (2005).  Candor and
truthfulness are two of the most important moral character traits
of a lawyer.  See AGC vs. Meyers, 333 Md. 440 (1994).  This
court concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, that from the
point in time whereupon the Respondent received the one
thousand dollar check, he engaged in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.  He never told
the Barnharts of any obligation he felt they owed him.  They
knew of none.  He never told them of the receipt of the check.
He never had authority or consent to endorse their names.  He
forged their names.  He kept their funds without their consent.
His actions, his forgery, violated the Rules and Criminal Law
Article Section 8-602.  See AGC vs. James, 333 Md. 174
(1993).  Even if the Respondent’s tortured explanation of why
he did what he did could somehow be accepted, he was not
entitled to simply use self help by keeping their funds.  See
AGC vs. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1 (1999).  Unfortunately, this court
is of a mind that the Respondent believed the Barnharts did not
know of this check and they would never be the wiser.  This is
clearly dishonesty.  His commingling of their funds with his
funds involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
See Bar Association of Baltimore City vs. Carruth, 271 Md. 720
(1974).
The totality of the Respondent’s actions represented
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by his acting
in such a manner which would seriously impair public
confidence in the legal profession.  See AGC vs. Robertson, 400
Md. 618 (2007).  His forgery and misappropriation of the
Barnharts’ funds is likely to impair the public confidence in the
22
legal profession.  This court by clear and convincing evidence
finds a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (c) & (d).
This court feels compelled to make further remarks.  The
court recognizes that the sum of money involved is perhaps not
huge.  This court recognizes that the Respondent eventually
returned the money to the Barnharts (although rather late in the
disciplinary proceedings this court might add).  This court
recognizes that the Respondent paid the judgment against the
Barnharts and they had been made whole.  This court is aware
of Mr. Barnhart’s magnanimous expression of forgiveness and
support for the Respondent.  However, this court is disheartened
by the Respondent’s rather cavalier attitude towards the facts,
circumstances, and these proceedings.  His apology to the
Barnharts was late coming and appeared to be conditioned upon
their forgiveness of him.  He complains bitterly of Petitioner’s
actions as virtually a witch-hunt (this court’s words) and did not
truly express any contrition or self-awareness of what had
occurred in this matter.  These observations are as disheartening
as the Respondent’s actions in the matter under scrutiny.
Following the issuance of the judge’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
Gisriel obtained counsel and moved to re-open the record and have additional hearings based
upon a proffer of newly-discovered evidence that showed he did not fabricate an October 5,
2004, letter to his clients, alluded to in Paragraph 91 of Judge Martin’s findings, which
figured in the hearing judge’s conclusion that Rule 8.1 was violated.  On March 3, 2009, we
granted Respondent’s motion and remanded the matter to Judge Martin for the limited
purpose of conducting a supplementary evidentiary hearing on or before March 27, 2009, and
filing any supplementary findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Judge Martin conducted a supplementary hearing and filed Supplementary/Amended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (“Amended Findings”), in which he found, by clear
and convincing evidence, that Gisriel’s acts and omissions constituted violations of Rules
11
Bar Counsel excepted to the finding of September 20, 2004, rather than the
correct date of September 30, 2004.  We sustain Petitioner’s exception and note that
Amended Finding Number 81 should read September 30, 2004.
23
1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 3.1, and 8.4, but not of Rule 8.1:
FACTS
* * *
The following finding of facts are amended or supplemented;
Number 71 is amended to read: Until September 30,
2004, when Respondent and M. Barnhart discussed this matter
by telephone, the Barnharts had no knowledge of the entry of
the judgment against them or the judgments against the
Respondent, did not know of the results of the September, 2003
hearing, nor the fact that the Respondent had paid the
judgments.
Number 72 is amended to read: Until September 30,
2004, the Barnharts had no communication with the Respondent
as to the September, 2003 hearing or as to his satisfaction of the
judgments.
Number 81 is amended to read: Until September 20,
2004,[11] the Respondent did not notify the Barnharts of his
receipt of the check.
Number 85 is amended to read: The Barnharts called the
Respondent to inquire about the check and the Respondent made
efforts to call the Barnharts but they had no communication until
the September 30, 2004 telephone conversation.
Number 90 is amended to read: Until September 30,
2004, approximately two months after the Respondent received
the check, Respondent did not communicate with the Barnharts
about receiving the $1,000.  The Respondent and M. Barnhart
discussed the $1,000 check on September 30, 2004 and
Respondent explained his position to M. Barnhart.  The
Respondent’s letter of October 5, 2004 confirmed their
discussion and requested that the Barnharts let Respondent
know if they still believed Respondent owed them the money.
No communication between the Respondent and Barnharts
occurred after the September 30, 2004 conversation until after
the grievance process was initiated a few years later.
Number 91 is amended to read: Respondent’s contention
24
that he sent a letter dated October 5, 2004 is accepted by this
court.  The Respondent mailed the letter to the Barnharts but this
court is unclear as to whether the Barnharts actually received the
letter.  The first actual communication between the Barnharts
and Respondent occurred September 30, 2004, more than one
year after the attorneys’ fees hearing.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This court’s conclusions of law that Respondent violated
Rule 1.1, Competence, 1.3, Diligence, and 3.1, Meritorious
Claims and Contentions are unaffected by this court’s
supplemental/amended findings of fact and remain unchanged.
Rule 1.4 Communication:
As this court stated previously, the court was not
persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent did
not reasonably keep the Barnharts informed regarding the status
of their case so that they could participate intelligently in the
decisions regarding their objectives up to and at the point of
initiating litigation.  However, with respect to the advisability of
this litigation, the determination to seek punitive damages, and
the possible sanctions which could befall them, none were ever
explained to the Barnharts by Respondent.  The attorneys’ fees
hearing took place on September of 2003.  Respondent failed to
advise them of the results of this hearing until, at best,
September of 2004, more than one year later. (court’s emphasis).
The results of the hearing certainly affected them and
Respondent was completely silent.  He failed to advise them of
the judgment against him, them, and his satisfaction of all the
judgments until a year later.  He failed to advise them of his
receipt of the $1,000 check until, at best, two months after his
receipt of same.  All of these facts persuade the court by clear
and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to reasonably
communicate with them as required by this rule.  The court adds
that Respondent’s conversation with M. Barnhart (finally) and
his follow-up with the October 5, 2004 letter do mitigate, to a
large extent, the severity of his violation(s) of this rule.  They do
not, however, alter this court’s fundamental conclusions.
Rule 1.15 Safekeeping Property:
This court’s prior conclusions as to Respondent’s
violations of sections (a) and (c) of this rule are in no way
affected by these supplemental/amended findings of fact.  It is
undisputed that Respondent failed to keep these funds separate
25
and apart from his operating and/or personal funds.  With
respect to (b), Respondent repeatedly states that upon receipt of
the check he did not know what these funds represented and
simply believed he was entitled to keep them.  He takes this
position notwithstanding the undisputed fact that the sole payees
on the check were the Barnharts.  Under the circumstances, the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent
received funds in which the Barnharts clearly had an interest.
He was duty bound to promptly deliver to the Barnharts the
funds they were entitled to receive.  This he failed to do until
some three years later.  Alternatively, if Respondent was unsure,
he should have segregated these funds and kept them separate
until any dispute was resolved.  This he also failed to do.
Although this court now finds that Respondent did in fact
promptly (albeit two months later) notify the Barnharts, the
other circumstances lead this court, by clear and convincing
evidence, to conclude that Respondent has violated (b) of this
rule.
Rule 8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters:
This court has made supplemental/amended findings that
Respondent did in fact have the conversation with M. Barnhart
on September 30, 2004. This court has made
supplemental/amended findings that they discussed the fact of
his receipt of the check and the circumstances thereupon.
Additionally, this court’s supplemental/amended findings that
Respondent created and mailed the letter of October 5, 2004
putting forth his position have, in the aggregate, compelled a
different conclusion by this court as it relates to this rule.  This
court, having found contact between Respondent and Barnharts,
his written explanation to them (notwithstanding their receipt
vel non of the October 5, 2004 letter), and his believe that their
silence and the passage of time represented the Barnharts’
acquiescence that he could keep the money, result in this court
not being persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that
Respondent intentionally falsified facts or information to the
Petitioner and this court does not find a violation of this Rule.
Rule 8.4 Misconduct:
This court has found a violation by the Respondent of
Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, and 3.1.  As such, these violations are
Professional Misconduct in violation of (a) of this rule and the
court so finds.
26
With respect to (c) of this rule, this court has found that
the Respondent did, as of September 30, 2004, advise the
Barnharts of the obligation he felt they owed to him.  At that
time, he also admitted to the Barnharts his receipt of the $1,000
check.  By the conversation of September 30, 2004, and his
subsequent letter of October 5, 2004, he did in fact state his
position regarding the funds.  These amended facts do not alter
the fact(s) that when he received the check in July or August of
2004 he did not make immediate contact with the Barnharts.  He
forged their names to the back of the check made payable solely
to them without their knowledge or prior consent.  He had no
authority to do so at the time of this forgery.  He used their
funds for his personal or business use at that time without the
Barnharts’ knowledge or consent.  Even if the court accepts his
explanation that the passage of time somehow justified his
keeping the funds, his actions at the precise moment of
negotiating the check clearly represented a violation of Section
8-602 of the Criminal Law Article.  This is a violation of (c) and
the court so finds by clear and convincing evidence.  As
previously stated, his use of self-help in the summer of 2004 is
not persuasive to this court as to justify or defend his actions.
His commingling of their funds with his funds represented
dishonesty, fraud, and/or deceit and the court so finds by clear
and convincing evidence.
With respect to (d) of this rule, the totality of the
Respondent’s actions represented conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice by his acting in such a manner which
would seriously impair public confidence in the legal profession.
His forgery and misappropriation of their funds in July/August
of 2004 persuade this court by clear and convincing evidence
that Respondent has violated (d).
This court has now had two evidentiary hearings and has
had the opportunity on various occasions to observe the
Respondent.  To this court, Respondent has finally arrived at a
realization of the significance and import of his actions.  This
court no longer observes what the court initially felt represented
a cavalier attitude.  This court is certainly no longer disheartened
by the present actions of the Respondent.
I. Standard of Review
12
Rule 16-759(b)(1) provides:
(b) Review by Court of Appeals.
(1) Conclusions of Law. The Court of Appeals shall review de
novo the circuit court judge’s conclusions of law.
13
Rule 16-759(b)(2) provides:
(2) Findings of Fact.
(A) If no exceptions are filed. If no exceptions are filed, the
Court may treat the findings of fact as established for the
purpose of determining appropriate sanctions, if any.
(B) If exceptions are filed. If exceptions are filed, the Court of
Appeals shall determine whether the findings of fact have been
proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule
16-757(b). The Court may confine its review to the findings of
fact challenged by the exceptions. The Court shall give due
(continued...)
27
In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction
and conducts an independent review of the record.  Attorney Grievance v. McClain, 406 Md.
1, 17, 956 A.2d 135, 144 (2008); Attorney Grievance v. Whitehead, 405 Md. 240, 253, 950
A.2d 798, 806 (2008); Attorney Grievance v. Zuckerman, 403 Md. 695, 709, 944 A.2d 525,
534 (2008); Attorney Grievance v. Nussbaum, 401 Md. 612, 632, 934 A.2d 1, 12 (2007);
Attorney Grievance v. Lawson, 401 Md. 536, 571-72, 933 A.2d 842, 863 (2007).  We review
the hearing judge’s conclusions of law de novo.  Md. Rule 16-759(b)(1);12 McClain, 406 Md.
at 17, 956 A.2d at 144; Whitehead, 405 Md. at 253, 950 A.2d at 806; Attorney Grievance
v. Kreamer, 404 Md. 282, 292, 946 A.2d 500, 506 (2008); Attorney Grievance v. Parsons,
404 Md. 175, 184, 946 A.2d 437, 443 (2008).  In our review of the record, the hearing
judge’s findings of fact generally will be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous.  Md.
Rule 16-579(b)(2);13 Whitehead, 405 Md. at 253, 950 A.2d at 806; Attorney Grievance v.
13(...continued)
regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the
credibility of witnesses.
28
Harris, 403 Md. 142, 155-56, 939 A.2d 732, 740 (2008); Nussbaum, 401 Md. at 632, 934
A.2d at 12; Attorney Grievance v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54, 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007);
Attorney Grievance v. Mininsohn, 380 Md. 536, 564, 846 A.2d 353, 370 (2004).
II. Discussion
Petitioner took no exceptions to Judge Martin’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, but took a technical exception to one Finding in the Amended Findings, which we have
sustained.  
Respondent took numerous exceptions to Judge Martin’s Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in both the original and Amended Findings.  With the exception of the
Rule 8.1 violation to which Gisriel excepted in the original exceptions, which was rendered
moot by Judge Martin’s reversal of that finding in his Amended Findings, and exception to
Finding Number 7 in the original exceptions regarding the escrow for the $5,000 check,
which we sustain, we overrule all other exceptions filed by the Respondent and conclude that
there exists clear and convincing evidence to support Judge Martin’s Findings and
Conclusions in the original Findings, and the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.
Respondent’s Exceptions 
A. Rule 1.1
14
Rule 2-311(b) provides:
Response. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a party
against whom a motion is directed shall file any response within
15 days after being served with the motion, or within the time
allowed for a party’s original pleading pursuant to Rule 2-321
(a), whichever is later. Unless the court orders otherwise, no
response need be filed to a motion filed pursuant to Rule 1-204,
2-532, 2-533, or 2-534. If a party fails to file a response required
by this section, the court may proceed to rule on the motion.
29
Rule 1.1 requires a lawyer to “provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.”  The hearing judge concluded that Respondent
was not incompetent when he failed to discuss the existence of the mediation clause in the
contract with the Barnharts.  Although Respondent “certainly did not specifically discuss
mediation” and he might have been “careless or even negligent” with his “erroneous
conclusion that the contract was a nullity,” the court did not find by clear and convincing
evidence that Gisriel’s behavior exhibited a “failure of competence relating to discussions
or information to the client.”
Nevertheless, Judge Martin concluded that Respondent did not provide “competent
representation” when he “did nothing” to respond to defendants’ motions to dismiss the
Barnharts’ complaint.  The judge found Respondent’s failure to respond “inexplicable” and
evidence of a “failure to demonstrate the requisite knowledge and skill required of him.”
Respondent concedes that he failed to file an “opposition” to the Motion to Dismiss as
required by Rule 2-311(b),14 but excepts to the finding that he violated Rule 1.1 and contends
30
that he was competent because he “notified his clients about the motion and communicated
with opposing counsel.”  We disagree.  By failing to respond to pleadings, Respondent failed
to provide the Barnharts with any representation, much less competent representation. See,
e.g., Attorney Grievance v. Wallace, 368 Md. 277, 293, 793 A.2d 535, 540 (2002) (ordering
disbarment, in part, for failing to communicate with clients and neglecting them).
The hearing judge also concluded that Respondent violated Rule 1.1 when he failed
to appear at the May 21, 2003, hearing regarding motions to dismiss and attorneys’ fees.  The
judge found that Respondent “was duty bound to appear at the hearing and be prepared to
represent the Barnharts.  He did not attend and M. Barnhart appeared alone, a layperson
facing several lawyers across the table.”  Respondent concedes that he “had an obligation to
appear until his appearance was stricken,” but claims that his actions were acceptable
because this was “not a case where the client was abandoned” and “they do things differently
in Frederick County” (as opposed to Baltimore County).  He cites to the judge’s finding that,
“[p]rior to any court appearance, the Barnharts decided to take over their own case and
advised the Respondent that he was out, i.e. no longer representing them.”  In support of his
point, Respondent cites Attorney Grievance v. Maignan, 402 Md. 39, 46, 935 A.2d 409, 413
(2007), and argues that Maignan held that an attorney could rely upon his clients’ statement
that he would handle his appeal pro se.  
In Maignan, the clients retained the attorney to represent them in a lawsuit pending
in a circuit court matter.  After the action was dismissed, Maignan filed a notice of appeal.
When Maignan informed his clients that the retainer agreement did not include the appeal
31
and that he required more money, the clients informed him they would handle the appeal pro
se, but neither Maignan nor the clients filed an Information Report with the Court of Special
Appeals, and the matter was dismissed.  Id. at 43, 935 A.2d at 411.
Nearly a year later, the clients retained Maignan to prepare the appellate brief after
all, and informed him that the appeal was ongoing and that the time for filing the brief had
been extended.  The clients paid Maignan $3,000, of which $1,000 was allocated to
preparation of the brief.  Maignan prepared the brief, printed it, and sent it to the client, and
at some point noticed there was no case number.  Maignan called the Clerk of the Court of
Special Appeals to get the case number and learned that the appeal had been dismissed.  The
attorney relayed that information to his client who denied the appeal had been dismissed,
after which Maignan did no further work.  The clients then complained to Bar Counsel that
Maignan had inappropriately charged them for work on an appeal that had already been
dismissed and that Maignan refused to refund the money paid by them.  We sustained the
hearing judge’s failure to find any violation, because Maignan had never actually represented
the clients during the appeal, based upon the judge’s explicit finding that,
An attorney has a duty to keep himself informed as to the status
of a case, but in the instant case Respondent did not represent
the Thomases on the appeal of the Mercedes Benz matter since
they initially elected to pursue the appeal in proper person. The
Respondent reasonably relied upon the representations of the
Thomases that they were actively pursuing the appeal because
he thought he was preparing an appellate brief due initially on
September 1, 2003 and extended until December 2003. The
Respondent believed he could rely upon the representations
made by the Thomases since they were active litigators with a
history of pro se filings. 
32
Id. at 45-46, 935 A.2d at 413.  The hearing judge found that for the present case, Gisriel had
not been relieved by the court of his obligation, after filing his case, to represent the
Barnharts nor could Gisriel rely on the Barnharts’ lack of legal experience to relieve him of
his obligation.
This case is more in accord with Attorney Grievance v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 753
A.2d 17 (2000).  In Mooney, the lawyer faced four complaints alleging numerous violations
of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  In one of the four complaints, a defendant facing
criminal charges retained Mooney and met with him to discuss the facts of her case.  Mooney
entered his appearance, but on the day of trial, failed to show up in court.  We held that it was
a violation of Rule 1.1 for a lawyer to fail to appear when scheduled, absent sufficient
explanation.  Id. at 75, 753 A.2d at 27.  Mooney argued that because he typically assigned
his Prince George’s County cases to his associate, and because he could not find the client’s
file, he assumed that he had assigned the case to his associate, but conceded that he may have
neglected to assign the case.  Finding Mooney’s explanation for his failure to appear in court
woefully insufficient, we found him in violation of Rule 1.1:
We have held that it is unacceptable for an attorney to appear in
court for a trial or other proceeding unprepared, and that such
practice may constitute a violation of MRPC 1.1.  See Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Ficker, 349 Md. 13, 39–40, 706 A.2d
1045, 1057–58 (1998) (Ficker II). An attorney who does not
even show up for the court appearance violates the same rule,
absent sufficient explanation.  As we said in Ficker II, 349 Md.
at 39–40, 706 A.2d at 1057–58:
 
The Comment to Rule 1.1 explains, in that regard:
“Competent handling of a particular matter
includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual
33
and legal elements of the problem, and use of
methods and procedures meeting the standards of
competent practitioners. It also includes adequate
preparation. The required attention and
preparation are determined in part by what is at
stake . . . .”
Mooney, 359 Md. at 74, 753 A.2d at 26.  In the case sub judice, Respondent did not
adequately represent Mrs. Barnhart because he failed to respond to motions to dismiss and
to appear at the hearing.  His argument that “they do things differently in Frederick County”
(as opposed to Baltimore County) is a specious attempt to minimize his failure to respond to
the motion and failure to appear in court for the hearing and represents less than competent
representation.  We overrule Respondent’s exception.
B. Rule 1.3
Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client.”  Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent
was not diligent, in violation of Rule 1.3.  The bases for the conclusion that Respondent
violated Rule 1.3 were the same factual findings underlining the violations of Rule 1.1, i.e.,
that Respondent failed to respond to motions, failed to attend a hearing, and failed to counsel
the Barnharts regarding the implications of litigation.  Respondent concedes to “specific
instances involving a lack of diligence,” but he alleges that, overall, he “acted with diligence
and promptness” on behalf of the Barnharts.  Respondent argues that the instances involving
a lack of diligence are outweighed by “numerous instances in which Respondent acted
diligently.”  He alleges that he “faxed a letter to Martin/Gold Key regarding the termination
34
of the contract,” “made phone calls to Martin,” “discussed the option of filing a lawsuit with
the Barnharts,” and “filed suit,” all of which, he claims, do not reflect “abandonment” or a
“complete lack of diligence.”  Petitioner notes that the hearing judge made clear that the
conduct, or lack thereof, that violated Rule 1.3 occurred after he had, in fact, filed the suit,
after which, he dropped the ball regarding the motions to dismiss; Judge Martin did find:
Certainly the Respondent knew upon receiving the motions to
dismiss that mediation was an issue as well as counsel fees.
Inexplicably . . . he did not respond to the motions nor discuss
with the Barnharts what the end result could be.  The conduct as
described [above under MRPC 1.1] certainly provides clear and
convincing evidence that the Respondent did not act with
reasonable diligence and promptness.
In Attorney Grievance v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 516, 823 A.2d 651, 658 (2003), we
determined that a lawyer violated Rule 1.3 after “failing to file a timely motion and/or appeal
on behalf of his client.”   In Attorney Grievance v. Zdravkovich, 362 Md. 1, 762 A.2d 950
(2000), we disciplined a lawyer who repeatedly failed to return phone calls, respond to
letters, or provide accounting for earned fees; in finding that the lawyer violated Rule 1.3,
we stated, “this Court has consistently regarded neglect and inattentiveness to a client’s
interests to be [an ethical violation] warranting the imposition of some disciplinary sanction.”
Id. at 26, 762 A.2d at 963, quoting Mooney, 359 Md. at 76, 753 A.2d at 27, in turn quoting
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Montgomery, 296 Md. 113, 120, 460 A.2d 597, 600 (1983)
(alterations in original).  In the instant case, Respondent failed to respond to motions to
dismiss and attend a court hearing.  Respondent’s inattentiveness to the Barnharts’ interests
rose to a level of neglect unacceptable in the legal profession, thereby violating Rule 1.3.
15
The exception to the hearing court’s finding that Gisriel did not communicate
with the Barnharts regarding the receipt of their $1,000 check will be discussed infra,
because the hearing judge amended this finding of fact and addressed this exception.  The
exception to the finding that the Barnharts lacked knowledge of the entry of judgment against
them will also be discussed infra.  
With respect to the latter, Respondent argues that the court’s reliance on testimony
from Mr. Barnhart that he “had no knowledge of whether they were notified or not” about
the judgment was not enough to prove a lack of knowledge.  Respondent argues that
“Petitioner did not carry its burden to prove that the Barnharts had no knowledge of the entry
of judgment against them” because “a negative inference may not lead to a shift in the burden
of persuasion to the Respondent.”
35
C. Rule 1.4
1) Rule 1.4 Original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Rule 1.4(a) provides “[a] lawyer shall . . . (2) keep the client reasonably informed
about the status of the matter; (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information
. . . . (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”  The hearing judge
concluded that Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a) and (b) because he was “utterly lacking” in
the manner in which he explained the matter to his clients, because Gisriel, as Judge Martin
found, did not explain to his clients, in a reasonable manner: the matter so as to make
informed decisions; the mediation requirement; the possibility of sanctions; the results of the
attorney fees hearing on September 23, 2003; Respondent’s arguing the Barnharts’ position
at the September 23, 2003, hearing; the judgment against them; Respondent’s satisfaction of
the judgments; and Respondent’s receipt of the $1,000 check.15
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s determination that he failed to explain the
36
mediation requirement and the possibility of sanctions.  Contained in the Record as Exhibit
1 is the contract signed by the Barnharts which contains a mediation provision mandating
that neither party could initiate any legal action without first submitting any claim arising out
of the contract to mediation.  The contract also included sanctions for nonadherence, in the
guise of attorneys’ fees incurred:
IN THE EVENT BUYER AND/OR SELLER SHALL
INITIATE OR COMMENCE ANY ACTION IN ANY COURT
OR BEFORE ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
WITHOUT FIRST SUBMITTING THE DISPUTE OR CLAIM
TO MEDIATION AS HEREIN PROVIDED, THE PARTY
INITIATING OR COMMENCING SUCH ACTION AGREES
TO PAY ALL COSTS AND EXPENSES, INCLUDING
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES, INCURRED TO
ENFORCE THE OBLIGATION AS PROVIDED HEREIN TO
FIRST MEDIATE THE DISPUTE OR CLAIM . . . .
Respondent testified that he had not spoken to the Barnharts about mediation because “[t]hey
didn’t bring it up to me,” although he clearly was the lawyer entrusted with the duty to
interpret the contract.  The hearing judge found under Rule 1.1 that Gisriel’s failure to
discuss the mediation clause with the Barnharts was not incompetent, but found, as well, that
the same conduct was violative of Rule 1.4.  Gisriel asserts that these are inherently
contradictory findings.  We disagree.  The standard for counseling set forth in Rule 1.4
differs from the standard of care for competence.  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance v. Harris,
371 Md. 510, 810 A.2d 457 (2002) (holding Rule 1.1 is violated when a lawyer, who may
possess legal knowledge and skill, lacks the thoroughness and preparation necessary for a
particular case, and Rule 1.4 is violated when a lawyer fails to explain a matter and the
37
effects of orders to the extent reasonably necessary for the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation).  Duty of care is different from duty to inform.
Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he was arguing the
Barnharts’ position at the September 23, 2003, hearing, because the results of which
“certainly affected them and the situation was made worse by his failing to advise them of
the judgment against them,” notwithstanding that Gisriel’s appearance previously had been
stricken.  This finding was based upon Respondent’s testimony at the November 19, 2008,
hearing:
[GISRIEL:] . . . So we have the hearing [regarding attorneys’
fees] or whatever and you know.  So [Judge Stepler] came out
with the judgments against myself and against the Barnharts . .
. .  It was like 2,642.50 against me, 1,963.57 against the
Barnharts.  I paid it.  And by the way, at the hearing I
maintained they got – should have gotten the deposit back, and
we had a vigorous argument about that.
* * * 
I maintained at the hearing in September that we should get the
money back, that the case was a nullity.  We should get the
deposit back . . . .
(emphasis added).  Respondent, nevertheless, states that all of his arguments “regarding the
various Motions for Attorneys’ Fees centered on his representation of the Barnharts in their
suit . . . [t]herefore, any and all arguments that he made were somewhat focused on his
actions in the course of his representation” and that they were “so interwoven with the same
arguments and positions that could have been taken by the Barnharts, that it seems extremely
difficult to separate the two” and it “was clear to those present that Respondent did not
38
represent the Barnharts.”  While it might have been necessary for Gisriel to refer to the
underlying suit initiated by the Barnharts at the September 2003 hearing in order to defend
himself, he still chose to “vigorously” argue the “we” and the “they” of an attorney who is
representing clients.  We overrule his exception and find by clear and convincing evidence
that he was representing the Barnharts at the September 2003 hearing.
2) Rule 1.4 Amended/Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
In his Amended Findings, Judge Martin found that until September 30, 2004, when
Respondent and Marcia Barnhart discussed matters on the telephone, the Barnharts did not
know about the entry of the judgment against them or the judgments against the Respondent,
did not know about the results of the September 2003 hearing, nor the fact that the
Respondent had paid the judgments.  In addition, the judge found Respondent did not
communicate with the Barnharts about receiving the $1,000 check made payable solely to
the Barnharts until the September 2004 phone call, approximately two months after Gisriel
received the check.
The judge was persuaded that the Respondent and Barnharts exchanged telephone
calls without actually conversing for a period of time before September 30, 2004, and that
the “Barnharts called the Respondent to inquire about the check and the Respondent made
efforts to call the Barnharts but they had no communication until the September 30, 2004
telephone conversation.”  Judge Martin’s findings of fact, based upon Respondent’s
testimony at the March 27, 2009, hearing and the contents of the October 5, 2004, letter, are
not clearly erroneous.  Maryland Rule 16-759(b), governing the review of a hearing judge’s
39
findings in an attorney disciplinary case, specifically provides in relevant part that the Court
of Appeals “shall give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the
credibility of witnesses.”  See Attorney Grievance v. Harris, 403 Md. 142, 158, 939 A.2d
732, 742 (2008) (“Consistent with the standard of review for factual findings in attorney
discipline cases, we have iterated that the judge may elect to pick and choose which evidence
to rely upon”) (internal quotations omitted); Attorney Grievance v. Mba-Jonas, 402 Md. 334,
344, 936 A.2d 839, 844 (2007) (“We accept [the hearing judge’s] finding and [resulting]
legal conclusion as she had the opportunity to weigh the credibility of the witnesses.  In our
review of such disciplinary hearings, we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact . . . unless
shown to be clearly erroneous.”); Attorney Grievance v. Robertson, 400 Md. 618, 630, 929
A.2d 576, 583 (2007) (“Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflict in
the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder,”) (internal quotations omitted).  Judge
Martin also amended his findings to note that Respondent’s conversation with M. Barnhart
in September 2004, and his October 5, 2004, letter mitigated the severity of his violation, but
they did not alter the judge’s fundamental conclusions.  
In his Amended Exceptions, Respondent argues that the judge’s amended findings
support, by clear and convincing evidence, that there was not a failure to reasonably
communicate.  Respondent alleges that his attempts to contact the Barnharts about the $1,000
check before September 30, 2004, was reasonable communication, and that Judge Martin
wrongly infers that two months is too long of a time period to reasonably communicate, even
after assuming Gisriel attempted to contact the Barnharts.  We hold that there was clear and
40
convincing evidence to support Judge Martin’s findings that Respondent failed to
communicate with the Barnharts until September 30, 2004, at least two months after
receiving the check.  See Attorney Grievance v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, 543, 810 A.2d 457, 477
(2002) (noting it is well settled that a hearing judge “may elect to pick and choose which
evidence . . . to rely upon . . . assess the credibility of the witnesses . . . [and that his findings
in that regard are entitled to] appropriate deference”) (internal quotations omitted)
(alterations in original).  The hearing judge accepted evidence that Gisriel’s first contact with
the Barnharts occurred on September 30, 2004, more than two months after Gisriel
negotiated the $1,000 check.  Based on the foregoing reasons, we hold that there is clear and
convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 1.4, and we overrule Respondent’s
exceptions.
D. Rule 1.15
1) Rule 1.15 Original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Rule 1.15 requires a lawyer to keep client property separate from a lawyer’s own
property, i.e., no commingling of funds, promptly notifying a client upon receiving client
property, and keeping client property separate from the lawyer’s property when both parties
claim an interest, until there is an accounting and severance of their interests.  In Judge
Martin’s original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, he found Respondent’s actions
constituted multiple violations of Rule 1.15:
Respondent’s position that he kept the one thousand
dollar check, made payable solely to the Barnharts, as payment
for funds he had expended in satisfying the judgment against the
16
Respondent excepted to the hearing court’s finding that he did not
communicate with the Barnharts regarding the receipt of their $1,000 check.  The hearing
court amended this finding of fact so that we address this exception, infra.
41
Barnharts is wholly unacceptable to this court.  He was clearly
duty bound to deposit the check in a separate account and he
admittedly failed to do so.  Without authority or consent, he
deposited the check in his operating account and used the funds
for personal or business purposes.  As indicated, he failed
completely to notify the Barnharts of his receipt of the check
and certainly rendered no accounting to them which would have
indicated his position and reasons for keeping the funds.
The obvious question this court addresses is how could
the Barnharts even take a position regarding the check when
they knew nothing about it?  They had no clue of any of the
circumstances and anticipated the check which, unfortunately,
was directed to the Respondent.  The Respondent obviously
commingled their funds with his funds.  These actions constitute
multiple violations of Rule 1.15, specifically 1.15(a)(b)(c).
The facts are clear, and Respondent does not dispute, that he deposited the check
made payable solely to the Barnharts into his operating account.16  This is clear commingling
of funds in violation of Rule 1.15(a) and (c).  See Attorney Grievance v. Blum, 373 Md. 275,
299, 818 A.2d 219, 233 (2003) (holding that a lawyer who deposited funds from clients into
operating and personal accounts prior to “earning” the funds, and consequently used those
funds for a “purpose other than the purpose for which” they were entrusted to the lawyer,
violated Rule 1.15).
2) Rule 1.15 Amended/Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
In his Amended Findings, Judge Martin reaffirmed his conclusion that Respondent
violated Rule 1.15:
42
This court’s prior conclusions as to Respondent’s
violations of sections (a) and (c) of this rule are in no way
affected by these supplemental/amended findings of fact.  It is
undisputed that Respondent failed to keep these funds separate
and apart from his operating and/or personal funds.  With
respect to (b), Respondent repeatedly states that upon receipt of
the check he did not know what these funds represented and
simply believed he was entitled to keep them.  He takes this
position notwithstanding the undisputed fact that the sole payees
on the check were the Barnharts.  Under the circumstances, the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent
received funds in which the Barnharts clearly had an interest.
He was duty bound to promptly deliver to the Barnharts the
funds they were entitled to receive.  This he failed to do until
some three years later.  Alternatively, if Respondent was unsure,
he should have segregated these funds and kept them separate
until any dispute was resolved.  This he also failed to do.
Although this court now finds that Respondent did in fact
promptly (albeit two months later) notify the Barnharts, the
other circumstances lead this court, by clear and convincing
evidence, to conclude that Respondent has violated (b) of this
rule.
Judge Martin made the finding that the clerk of the Circuit Court erroneously mailed the
check made payable solely to the Barnharts to Gisriel in July 2004.  Respondent testified that
he received the check in early August 2004, did not immediately know what it was for, and
deposited the check in his operating account until he could deal with it following a long
vacation.  Respondent contends he exchanged phone calls with M. Barnhart in which he
discussed his belief that he was entitled to the funds.  He claims he did not violate Rule 1.15
based upon his belief that the conversation with his client on the phone in September 2004
and the letter sent in October 2004, which stated, “Call me if [sic] still think that I owe you
more money or if you have questions and we will amicably discuss the matter,” were enough
43
to satisfy his obligations.  Respondent argues that he had a right to keep the money because
he never heard from the Barnharts after sending the letter until two and a half years later
when he received the grievance.  Respondent also argues that his return of the money three
years later after the Peer Review Hearing satisfied Rule 1.15.
Under Rule 1.15, a lawyer, with few exceptions, should not commingle client funds
with the lawyer’s funds.  A reasonable lawyer could see that he was not listed on the check
and that the Barnharts, as sole payees, had the sole interest in the $1,000.  Respondent signed
the names of the payees, K. and M. Barnhart on the back of the check, and wrote “Pay to the
order of Michael Gisriel,” without the Barnharts’ consent.  He then deposited the check in
his operating, not escrow, account and used the funds for business and personal purposes.
These intentional actions were in flagrant disregard of his clients’ financial affairs and his
obligations under Rule 1.15.  See Attorney Grievance v. Daskalopoulos, 383 Md. 375, 382,
859 A.2d 653, 657 (2004) (holding Rule 1.15 was violated when “the respondent placed [the
client’s] funds in a personal account, rather than in his attorney trust account; did not
promptly forward those funds to the third party to whom they were due; and failed to account
for $38,448.61 of those funds”).
E. Rule 3.1
Under Rule 3.1, “[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which
includes, for example, a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
44
existing law.  A lawyer may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every
element of the moving party’s case be established.”
Judge Martin found, “[t]here was no basis . . . that was not frivolous” when Gisriel,
in obvious disregard of the contractual mediation mandate, filed suit to recover the Barharts’
deposit:
. . . the lawsuit had no merit.  There was no basis for doing so
that was not frivolous.  There was no basis for punitive damages
and none was alleged.  There was no basis whatsoever to sue
Moyer/Remax who were no more than stakeholders.  The
contract clearly provided steps to be taken by Moyer in the event
of a dispute.  The respondent never gave them the ability to do
so and completely ignored this provision.
There was no basis to sue Martin or Gold Key.  The
Respondent knew that they were not holding the deposit, he
alleged no basis for punitive damages against them. . . .  He
simply included Martin/Gold Key in his shotgun approach to get
everyone’s “attention.”  These actions were clearly violations of
Rule 3.1.
* * *
The legal process should never be used as the Respondent
did here, i.e., merely a device to apply pressure to the other
parties to secure the return of the deposit, actions which
completely backfired.
Respondent excepts to the judge’s conclusion, arguing that it was his belief that “the contract
was a nullity and that there were reasons to believe that initiating litigation was the
appropriate action.” Respondent argues his actions were justified because the Barnharts had
a cognizable cause of action and the seller lacked capacity to convey the property while he
was in bankruptcy.  Respondent also cites to the fact that “Marcia Barnhart’s father passed
45
away in that time period and the Barnharts were unable to afford the property.”  He further
contends that although he should have known about the mediation provision in the Barnharts’
contract, “none of the defendants filed a motion to compel mediation or took other
affirmative steps to initiate mediation themselves.”  Although Gisriel admits that there was
no basis to seek punitive damages and that he only filed the complaint to get the defendants’
attention, he concludes that his actions were warranted.  
We overrule Gisriel’s exception, because a reading of the contract reveals that the
Barnharts were bound to mediate any dispute; that Gisriel formed an unreasonable belief that
the contract was a nullity; and that Gisriel initiated suit to misuse the judicial process.  This
is violative of Rule 3.1.  See Attorney Grievance v. Davis, 375 Md. 131, 163, 825 A.2d 438,
449 (2003) (“Rule 3.1 is violated when the lawyer is unable . . . to make a good faith
argument on the merits of the action taken.”) (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in
original). 
F. Rule 8.1
Respondent excepted to the hearing court’s original finding that he knowingly made
false statements to Bar Counsel and that he had not sent the October 2004 letter to the
Barnharts.  The hearing judge amended these findings of fact, and was persuaded by clear
and convincing evidence that Respondent did not intentionally falsify facts or information
to Bar Counsel and also found that Respondent did in fact have a conversation with M.
Barnhart on September 30, 2004, and did send a letter dated October 5, 2004, to the
46
Barnharts.  Therefore, Respondent’s exceptions to Judge Martin’s original findings are
rendered moot, and we need not further address Rule 8.1.
G. Rule 8.4
Rule 8.4 provides, in pertinent part:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do
so, or do so through the acts of another;
* * *
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice
In his original findings, Judge Martin concluded that Respondent engaged in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(c):
He never told the Barnharts of any obligation he felt they owed
him.  They knew of none.  He never told them of the receipt of
the check.  He never had authority or consent to endorse their
names.  He forged their names.  He kept their funds without
their consent.  His actions, his forgery, violated the Rules and
Criminal Law Article Section 8-602.  See AGC vs. James, 333
Md. 174 (1993).  Even if the Respondent’s tortured explanation
of why he did what he did could somehow be accepted, he was
not entitled to simply use self help by keeping their funds.  See
AGC vs. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1 (1999).  Unfortunately, this court
is of a mind that the Respondent believed the Barnharts did not
know of this check and they would never be the wiser.  This is
clearly dishonesty.  His commingling of their funds with his
funds involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
See Bar Association of Baltimore City vs. Carruth, 271 Md. 720
47
(1974).
Respondent excepted to these findings by claiming that his commingling of funds was
unintentional and that “he believed in good faith” that he could deposit the check in his
operating account to “satisfy the monies he had expended to pay the judgment against the
Barnharts . . . .”  Respondent concedes that he should not have endorsed his clients’ names
on the check, but asserts that his actions were not an intent to misappropriate and that he
“honestly believed he was equitably entitled to the funds.”
After Judge Martin amended his findings, he did not alter his conclusions of law
regarding Gisriel’s violation of Rule 8.4(c).  Even though the judge amended his finding that
the Respondent did, as of September 30, 2004, “advise the Barnharts of the obligation he felt
they owed to him,” the amendment did not alter the fact that upon receipt of the $1,000
check, Respondent “did not make immediate contact with the Barnharts . . . [and he] forged
their names to the back of the check made payable solely to them without their knowledge
or prior consent.”  The hearing judge noted:
Even if the court accepts his explanation that the passage of time
somehow justified his keeping the funds, his actions at the
precise moment of negotiating the check clearly represented a
violation of Section 8-602 of the Criminal Law Article.  This is
a violation of (c) and the court so finds by clear and convincing
evidence.  As previously stated, his use of self-help in the
summer of 2004 is not persuasive to this court as to justify or
defend his actions.  His commingling of their funds with his
funds represented dishonesty, fraud, and/or deceit and the court
so finds by clear and convincing evidence.
48
We overrule Gisriel’s exceptions to the Rule 8.4(c) findings and conclusions.  Judge Martin
found, based upon his review of the $1,000 check and the testimony of Gisriel and Mr.
Barnhart, that Gisriel did not have the Barnharts’ consent when he forged their names on the
check, the only payees, and then signed it, making it payable to himself.  The fact that Gisriel
has argued that he did not give his act more than “five seconds of thought” belies the notion
that he deliberated, after receiving the check, and determined that he was its equitable owner.
His exception fails by omission—the omission of information that he could have solicited
from the maker of the check—the Clerk of the Circuit Court and the sole payees, the
Barnharts.
We overrule Respondent’s exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he
violated Rule 8.4(c) by commingling the Barnharts’ funds with his funds, an act representing
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  In Attorney Grievance v. Kapoor, 391 Md.
505, 528, 530, 894 A.2d 502, 516-17 (2006), we held that the lawyer’s conduct in forging
his client’s signature was dishonest, deceitful, and criminal in violation of Rules 8.4(a)–(d),
as here.  In Whitehead, 405 Md. at 258, 950 A.2d at 810, the respondent argued that he did
not engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation when he removed $600,000
from a conservatorship, his act was not an “intentional” misappropriation because he took
out the money to “maximize the assets of the estate,” and he did not act with specific intent
to misappropriate; we noted that “specific intent is not a necessary ingredient of dishonesty
or misrepresentation.”  Id., quoting Siskind, 401 Md. at 69, 930 A.2d at 344 (emphasis in
49
original) (internal quotations omitted).  Dishonest acts, in and of themselves are violative of
Rule 8.4(c).  Id.  Although Respondent argues his behavior was “unintentional,” his
deliberate forgery of the Barnharts’ signatures without any solicitation of information, let
alone confirmation, was dishonest.
Judge Martin also found that the totality of Respondent’s actions, his forgery, and his
misappropriation of the Barnharts’ funds, represented conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice by his acting in such a manner which would seriously impair public
confidence in the legal profession.  We have determined misappropriation of client or third
party funds to be “prejudicial to the administration of justice” in violation of Rule 8.4(d).  See
Whitehead, 405 Md. at 260, 950 A.2d at 810; Attorney Grievance v. Zuckerman, 386 Md.
341, 374-75, 872 A.2d 693, 713 (2005); Attorney Grievance v. Brown, 380 Md. 661, 666-69,
846 A.2d 428, 431-32 (2004);  Attorney Grievance v. Somerville, 379 Md. 586, 592, 842
A.2d 811, 814-15 (2004); Attorney Grievance v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 713, 810 A.2d
996, 1020 (2002); Attorney Grievance v. Santos, 370 Md. 77, 83, 803 A.2d 505, 508-09
(2002); Attorney Grievance v. Powell, 369 Md. 462, 474, 800 A.2d 782, 789 (2002);
Attorney Grievance v. McCoy, 369 Md. 226, 235, 798 A.2d 1132, 1137 (2002); Attorney
Grievance v. Snyder, 368 Md. 242, 260, 793 A.2d 515, 525-26 (2002).  We have recognized
that public confidence in the legal profession is a critical facet to the proper administration
of justice, and conduct that negatively impacts on the public’s perception of the courts or the
legal profession violates Rule 8.4(d).  Whitehead, 405 Md. at 260, 950 A.2d at 810, Attorney
50
Grievance v. Sheinbein, 372 Md. 224, 252-53 & n.16, 812 A.2d 981, 996-97 & n.16 (2002);
Attorney Grievance v. Richardson, 350 Md. 354, 368, 712 A.2d 525, 532 (1998).
Respondent’s self-dealing was harmful to the legal profession because his behavior
undermines public confidence that an attorney will maintain entrusted funds as a fiduciary
and as required by law.  As such, and consistent with this Court’s well-established precedent,
we hold that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d) by engaging in behavior that was prejudicial
to the administration of justice.
Finally, Respondent’s violations of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, and 3.1 also constitute
violations of Rule 8.4(a).  See Attorney Grievance v. Webster, 402 Md. 448, 468,  937 A.2d
161 172 (2007) (“Because we have concluded that Respondent has violated various Rules
of Professional Conduct, we overrule Respondent’s exception that he violated MRPC 8.4(a),
which finds professional misconduct where a lawyer ‘violates or attempts to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct.’”), quoting Attorney Grievance v. Cherry-Mahoi, 388 Md. 124,
159, 879 A.2d 58, 80 (2005); Attorney Grievance v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 710-11, 810
A.2d 996, 1018 (2002) (“As we have held that respondent has violated several Rules of
Professional Conduct, he necessarily violated MRPC 8.4(a) as well, which finds professional
misconduct where a lawyer ‘violate[s] or attempt[s] to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct.’”) (alterations in original).
III. Sanction
We now must consider the appropriate sanction for Gisriel’s violations of Rules 1.1,
51
1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 3.1, and 8.4(a), (c), and (d).  Bar Counsel recommends disbarment, while
Gisriel suggests a reprimand, or in the alternative, a short suspension, arguing that his acts,
though “grossly negligent,” do not represent “a disbarment case.”
We evaluate every attorney grievance matter on its own merits, taking into account
the facts and circumstances involved.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md.
276, 300, 614 A.2d 102, 114 (1992); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kemp, 303 Md. 664,
680, 496 A.2d 672, 680 (1985).  The goal of attorney discipline is protection of the public,
rather than the punishment of the erring attorney.  Attorney Grievance v. Goff, 399 Md. 1,
30-31, 922 A.2d 554, 571 (2006); Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. at 703, 919 A.2d at 677; Attorney
Grievance v. Rees, 396 Md. 248, 254, 913 A.2d 68, 72 (2006); Attorney Grievance v.
Kreamer, 387 Md. 503, 534, 876 A.2d 79, 97-98 (2005).  Imposing sanctions that are
commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they
were committed is consistent with, and in fact furthers, that purpose, Goff, 399 Md. at 30-31,
922 A.2d at 571; Attorney Grievance v. Stein, 373 Md. 531, 533, 819 A.2d 372, 375 (2003),
in that such sanctions promote general and specific deterrence, Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Sliffman, 330 Md. 515, 529, 625 A.2d 314, 321 (1993); protect the integrity of the legal
profession, Attorney Grievance v. Cassidy, 362 Md. 689, 698, 766 A.2d 632, 637 (2001);
further the public’s confidence in the legal profession, Attorney Grievance v. Christopher,
383 Md. 624, 639, 861 A.2d 692, 701 (2004); Stein, 373 Md. at 537, 819 A.2d at 375;
Powell, 369 Md. at 474, 800 A.2d at 789; and take account of the facts and circumstances
52
of each particular case, including any mitigating factors.  See Attorney Grievance v. Atkinson,
357 Md. 646, 656, 745 A.2d 1086, 1092 (2000); Attorney Grievance v. Gavin, 350 Md. 176,
197-98, 711 A.2d 193, 204 (1998).  
The severity of the sanction to be applied is measured by the egregiousness of the
misconduct under the particular facts and circumstances of the case.  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Montgomery, 318 Md. 154, 165, 567 A.2d 112, 117 (1989) (“the extent of the
discipline to be applied is generally dependent upon the severity of the misconduct and the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding it.”).  See Attorney Grievance v. Briscoe, 357
Md. 554, 568, 745 A.2d 1037, 1044 (2000), quoting Milliken, 348 Md. at 519, 704 A.2d at
1241 (“[t]he gravity of misconduct is not measured solely by the number of rules broken but
is determined largely by the lawyer’s conduct.”).  Given the importance we place on
maintaining the public’s confidence, “the attorney’s prior grievance history[,] . . . the
attorney’s remorse for the misconduct, and the likelihood of the conduct being repeated” are
relevant considerations, as well.  Attorney Grievance v. Post, 379 Md. 60, 71, 839 A.2d 718,
724-25 (2003).  Regarding whether there is likelihood of repetition, we have recognized one
instance of misconduct can be so egregious as to warrant the imposition of a significant
sanction.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Franz, 355 Md. 752, 762, 736 A.2d 339, 344
(1999), citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Protokowicz, 329 Md. 252, 263, 619 A.2d 100,
105 (1993) (stating that the attorney, by assisting a client in breaking into the home of the ex-
wife of the client, ransacking it, clogging the toilet, stealing personal property, and killing
53
the family kitten, acted in an egregious manner).
Theft and misappropriation of funds constitute egregious misconduct on the part of
an attorney.  Attorney Grievance v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531, 552 886 A.2d 606, 618 (2005).  In
Attorney Grievance v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-15, 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001), we
articulated that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for intentionally dishonest conduct in
the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances.  We explained:
Unlike matters relating to competency, diligence and the like,
intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most
important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make
intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse.
Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in an attorney’s
character. Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for
intentional dishonest conduct.
Id. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488.  Since Vanderlinde, we have consistently disbarred attorneys for
stealing clients’ funds, whether or not the behavior was singular or even if the funds were
returned, because of our determination that “the misappropriation of entrusted funds ‘is an
act infected with deceit and dishonesty,’ and, in the absence of compelling extenuating
circumstances justifying a lesser sanction, will result in disbarment.”  Whitehead, 405 Md.
at 262, 950 A.2d at 811, quoting Nussbaum, 401 Md. at 644, 934 A.2d at 19, in turn quoting
Cherry-Mahoi, 388 Md. at 161, 879 A.2d at 81.  Accord Attorney Grievance v. Prichard, 386
Md. 238, 248, 872 A.2d 81, 86 (2005); Attorney Grievance v. James, 385 Md. 637, 666, 870
A.2d 229, 246 (2005); Daskalopoulos, 383 Md. at 384, 859 A.2d at 658; Attorney Grievance
v. Sperling, 380 Md. 180, 191, 844 A.2d 397, 404 (2004); Somerville, 379 Md. at 593, 842
17
In those rare cases in which mishandling client funds was involved, but a Rule
8.4(c) violation was neither charged nor proven, disbarment may not have been the sanction
imposed, unlike in Vanderlinde, in which a Rule 8.4(c) violation was charged and proven.
See Attorney Grievance v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 992 A.2d 554 (2006) (8.4(c) not violated;
indefinite suspension); Attorney Grievance v. Rees, 396 Md. 248, 913 A.2d 68 (2006) (8.4(c)
not charged; 30 day suspension); Attorney Grievance v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 379, 872
A.2d 693, 716 (2005) (8.4(c) not charged; indefinite suspension) Attorney Grievance v.
DiCicco, 369 Md. 662, 802 A.2d 1014 (2002) (8.4(c) not violated; indefinite suspension);
Attorney Grievance v. Hayes, 367 Md. 504, 789 A.2d 119 (2002) (8.4(c) not charged;
indefinite suspension).
54
A.2d at 815; Attorney Grievance v. Spery, 371 Md. 560, 568, 810 A.2d 487, 491-92 (2002);
Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 406, 773 A.2d at 480.17
In Vanderlinde, we held that extenuating circumstances to lessen the sanction of
disbarment were only those of the most serious variety.  Id. at 413-14, 773 A.2d at 485.
Mindful of the Vanderlinde admonition, a review of Gisriel’s purported mitigation falls far
short of that which constitutes “compelling extenuating circumstances.”  Gisriel offered that
he has been a member of the Bar of this State since 1976, has no prior disciplinary record,
and has provided “significant pro bono services over his thirty-two year career.”  Respondent
also argues that he informed the Barnharts of the receipt of the $1,000 check and offered to
return the money if they disagreed with his position that he was entitled to the money and
asserts that he had no dishonest or selfish motive.  He points also to his remorse that the
hearing judge found in his amended findings.  This proffered mitigation does not rise to the
level of amelioration envisioned in Vanderlinde with respect to intentional misappropriation.
With respect to Gisriel’s assertion that he was negligent rather than willful, it is true
that we have differentiated between negligence and willfulness in a misappropriation context
55
and have determined that disbarment may not be an appropriate sanction for the former.  In
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 463, 491, 671 A.2d 463, 470, 484
(1996), we stated that in a misappropriation situation, an indefinite suspension was
appropriate for a lawyer who was “grossly negligent in failing to establish proper accounting
procedures” when he “failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the bookkeepers’s
actual practices [were] compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer”.  Unlike
the attorney in Glenn, however, Gisriel’s conduct, as found by Judge Martin, was infected
with willfulness, because he took a check made solely payable to the Barnharts, made it
payable to himself, signed his name, and deposited it in his operating account—deliberate
acts solely by his own hand.
Gisriel also argues that his conduct, in and of itself, does not warrant disbarment, by
comparing his acts to those of the attorneys in Attorney Grievance v. Mitchell, 386 Md. 386,
872 A.2d 720 (2005) and Attorney Grievance v. Watson, 382 Md. 465, 855 A.2d 1213
(2004).  In Mitchell, we disbarred an attorney after sustaining the hearing court’s
determination of a violation of Rule 8.4(c), when Mitchell or someone acting at his direction
endorsed and deposited a client’s settlement check in the firm’s operating account, closed the
firm’s location without notice or indication of where he could be found, and took the client’s
money for his own use to buy a car.  Id. at 399, 872 A.2d at 727-28.  Gisriel argues he is
distinguishable from Mitchell because he honestly believed he was entitled to the Barnharts’
check.  Judge Martin found that Gisriel did what he did because he “believed the Barnharts
56
did not know of this check and they would never be the wiser,” a finding not unlike in
Mitchell.
Gisriel also attempts to distinguish himself from the lawyer in Watson, in which we
disbarred the attorney, found to have violated Rule 8.4(c), after he intentionally
misappropriated client funds, as a result of receiving eight settlement checks, forging his
clients’ signatures, and appropriating the money for his personal use and benefit.  382 Md.
at 470-72, 855 A.2d at 1216-17.  Although Gisriel argues that he did not engage in a pattern
of impermissible endorsements as in Watson, so that he should not be sanctioned as severely,
we have held that a single act of misappropriation may be sufficient to warrant disbarment.
In Attorney Grievance v. Roberts, 394 Md. 137, 146, 166-67, 904 A.2d 557, 562, 576-77
(2006), we disbarred an attorney who received a settlement check for $7,500 made payable
to both himself and his client, and after his client endorsed the check, transferred the entire
amount of the check to his operating account for personal use.  Id. at 146, 166-67, 904 A.2d
at 562, 576-77.  Similar to the attorney in Roberts, Gisriel used his client’s funds for business
and personal use, but he also egregiously forged his clients’ names and deposited the check
into his operating account, all the while presuming his clients would never be the wiser.
In the case at bar, the Respondent forged his clients’ names on a check payable solely
to them and made the check payable to himself, without consultation with the clients about
the propriety of his acts nor having secured their consent and then deposited the check in his
operating account.  The fact that Gisriel did not give his receipt of the check, made payable
57
solely to others, more than “five seconds of thought” is not mitigation—it is aggravation;
clients must be given more solicitude than that which was given by Gisriel in the present
case, for their protection.  Gisriel’s conduct, which constituted violations of many of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, exacerbated by his hubris in the handling of the $1,000
check, warrants disbarment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.  RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
THE 
CLERK 
OF 
THIS 
COURT,
INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-761 FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST
MICHAEL GISRIEL.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 3
September Term, 2008
_________________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
MICHAEL U. GISRIEL
_________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
      
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,
Specially  Assigned),  JJ.
_________________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Eldridge, J.,
           which Bell, C.J., Joins.
_________________________________________
Filed: June 18, 2009
Eldridge, J., dissenting.
In light of Judge Martin’s supplementary findings of fact, and the Respondent’s
membership in the Maryland Bar since 1976 without any prior disciplinary record, I
would impose a suspension rather than a disbarment.
Chief Judge Bell has authorized me to state that he joins in the views expressed
in this dissenting opinion.