Case Title: Frette v. City of Springdale

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Paul FRETTE v. CITY OF SPRINGDALE

CR 97-712                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered January 15, 1998


1.   Criminal procedure -- conditional plea of guilty -- general rule and
     exception on appeal. -- As a general rule, one is not allowed to
     appeal from a conviction resulting from a guilty plea, aside
     from jurisdictional defects; however, Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b)
     presents an exception to the rule, but only for the purpose of
     determining on appeal whether an appellant should be allowed
     to withdraw her plea if it is concluded that evidence should
     have been, but was not, suppressed.

2.   Criminal procedure -- conditional plea of guilty -- supreme court declined
     to consider merits of appellant's challenge to sufficiency of evidence and
     factual basis of plea. -- The supreme court has strictly construed
     the permissible scope of an appeal under Ark. R. Crim. P.
     24.3(b); the supreme court therefore declined to reach the
     merits of appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the
     evidence and the factual basis for his plea.  

3.   Motions -- denial of motion to suppress -- factors on review. -- In
     reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the supreme
     court makes an independent examination based on the totality
     of the circumstances; the evidence is viewed in the light most
     favorable to the State as appellee, and the supreme court will
     reverse only if the trial court's ruling was clearly against
     the preponderance of the evidence.

4.   Criminal procedure -- police-citizen encounters -- three categories. --
     Police-citizen encounters have been divided into three
     categories: the first and least intrusive encounter, when an
     officer merely approaches an individual on a street and asks
     if he is willing to answer some questions, occurs in a public
     place and is consensual and thus does not constitute a
     "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; the
     second, initially consensual police encounter, which occurs
     when the officer may justifiably restrain an individual for a
     short period of time if he or she has an articulable suspicion
     that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime,
     is transformed into a seizure when, considering all the
     circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that he is
     not free to leave; the final category is the full-scale
     arrest, which must be based on probable cause.

5.   Criminal procedure -- police-citizen encounters -- officer's actions in
     ordering appellant out of truck constituted "seizure." -- The police
     officer's actions in ordering appellant out of his parked
     truck to investigate a DWI tip fell into the second category
     of police-citizen encounters, a "seizure" under the Fourth
     Amendment requiring the police officer to be able to point to
     specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
     rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the
     intrusion; the supreme court has held that an officer with
     reasonable suspicion under Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1 to suspect
     that the occupant of a parked vehicle was about to commit a
     DWI could ask the occupant to exit his car.    

6.   Criminal procedure -- investigatory stop -- justification for. -- The
     justification for an investigative stop depends upon whether,
     under the totality of the circumstances, the police have
     specific, particularized and articulable reasons indicating
     the person or vehicle may be involved in criminal activity. 

7.   Criminal procedure -- informant was not anonymous. -- Where the
     informant in this case provided the police with his name,
     address, and occupation, it was clear that he was more than an
     anonymous informant; courts quite frequently find that
     information is presumed reliable when it comes from an
     identified person.

8.   Criminal procedure -- different considerations present where citizen or
     witness provides information. -- The supreme court rejected the
     argument that the information provided by an informant is per
     se unreliable simply because the information was provided over
     the telephone and the police had no prior dealings with the
     informant; different considerations are present where
     information has been provided by a citizen or a witness to a
     crime, as opposed to informants who are typically unnamed
     police contacts and who are usually themselves criminals. 

9.   Criminal procedure -- citizen-informant's report -- indicia of reliability
     -- three factors. -- When reasonable suspicion is based solely on
     a citizen-informant's report, the report must contain some
     indicia of reliability; three factors in determining indicia
     of reliability are: (1) whether the informant was exposed to
     possible criminal or civil prosecution if the report is false;
     (2) whether the report is based on the personal observations
     of the informant; and (3) whether the officer's personal
     observations corroborated the informant's observations.  

10.  Criminal procedure -- citizen-informant's report -- indicia of reliability
     -- satisfaction of. -- Regarding the indicia of reliability for
     a citizen-informant's report, the first factor is satisfied
     whenever a person gives his or her name to authorities or if
     the person gives the information to the authorities in person;
     with regard to the second factor, an officer may infer that
     the information is based on the informant's personal
     observation if the information contains sufficient detail that
     it is apparent that the informant had not been fabricating the
     report out of whole cloth and that the report is of the sort
     that in common experience may be recognized as having been
     obtained in a reliable way; the third and final element may be
     satisfied if the officer observes the illegal activity or
     finds the person, the vehicle, and the location as
     substantially described by the informant.

11.  Criminal procedure -- State's interest in eliminating drunk driving --
     balance tipped in favor of public safety. -- The supreme court has
     previously recognized the magnitude of the State's interest in
     eliminating drunk driving in comparison to relatively minimal
     intrusions on motorists; the totality of circumstances tips
     the balance in favor of public safety and lessens the
     requirements of reliability and corroboration.

12.  Criminal procedure -- citizen-informant's report -- tip carried sufficient
     indicia of reliability to justify stop under Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1. --
     trial court did not err in denying motion to suppress. -- Where a
     citizen-informant identified himself by name, address, and
     occupation, exposing himself to potential prosecution for
     making a false report, the tip ranked high on the reliability
     scale, more than an anonymous caller or a confidential
     informant from the criminal milieu; where it was undisputed
     that the citizen-informant personally observed the alleged
     criminal activity, providing a basis of knowledge for the tip;
     and where the police officer's own observations substantially
     corroborated the citizen-informant's report, the supreme court
     concluded that under the totality of the circumstances, the
     citizen-informant's tip carried with it sufficient indicia of
     reliability to justify an investigatory stop under Ark. R.
     Crim. P. Rule 3.1; the trial court did not clearly err in
     denying appellant's motion to suppress.


     Appeal from Washington Circuit Court; William Storey, Judge;
affirmed; Court of Appeals reversed.
     Kenneth Osborne, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  J. Brent Standridge, Asst.
Att'y Gen., for appellee.

     Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.
     The primary issue in this case is whether a police officer
acted lawfully in ordering appellant, Paul Frette, the occupant
of a parked tractor-trailer, out of his vehicle.  The officer,
who suspected that Frette was intoxicated, acted solely on the
basis of a tip phoned in by an identified citizen informant.  We
conclude that the tip carried with it sufficient indicia of
reliability to give the officer reasonable suspicion to justify
an investigatory stop.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
denial of appellant's motion to suppress.  
     While there was no testimony taken in the case, the parties
stipulated to the following facts.  At 6:51 p.m. on June 15,
1995, Jerry Smith, a truck driver from Jonesboro, Georgia, phoned
in a tip to the Springdale Police Department.  Smith provided the
radio dispatcher with his name, address, and occupation.  He
stated that he had observed an elderly male in a red Volvo
tractor-trailer drinking beer in the cab of his vehicle in the
commercial truck parking lot behind the McDonald's restaurant
located on West Sunset in Springdale.  The lot had nine spaces
designated for commercial vehicles.  The police department had no
prior dealings with Smith.  At 7:02 p.m., an Officer Kwano
responded to the dispatch and discovered that Frette was behind
the wheel inside a red tractor-trailer parked immediately behind
McDonald's in the designated parking area.  
     Officer Kwano approached the vehicle and ordered Frette to
step out of the vehicle.  When Frette exited, Officer Kwano
noticed the strong smell of intoxicants on Frette, who swayed as
he spoke.  Frette failed various field-sobriety tests and was
arrested at 7:49 p.m.  A test performed at the police station
revealed that Frette had a .08% blood-alcohol content.  
     Frette was found guilty in municipal court of driving while
intoxicated as a holder of a commercial driver's license.  On
appeal to circuit court, Frette filed a motion to suppress his
"statements. . .blood alcohol analysis, physical description [of
Frette], statements of an informant, descriptions of field
sobriety tests, and a physical [of Frette]" on the ground that
this evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal seizure. 
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and accepted
Frette's conditional guilty plea to one count of driving while
intoxicated while holding a commercial driver's license. 
Pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b), Frette's plea was
conditioned on an appeal of the trial court's adverse ruling on
his pretrial motion to suppress.
     The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the
trial court erroneously denied the motion to suppress.  Frette v.
State, 58 Ark. App. 81, 947 S.W.2d 15 (1997).  We granted the
State's petition for review, and now review the case as though it
was originally filed with this court.  McElhanon v. State, 329
Ark. 261, 948 S.W.2d 89 (1997); Brunson v. State, 327 Ark. 567,
940 S.W.2d 440 (1997).  
                               1.
     We first consider Frette's challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence and the factual basis for his plea.  Frette entered
a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b),
which provides:
With the approval of the court and the consent of the
prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a
conditional plea of guilty. . . reserving in writing
the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review of an
adverse determination of a pretrial motion to suppress
evidence.  If the defendant prevails on appeal, he
shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.

As a general rule, one is not allowed to appeal from a conviction
resulting from a guilty plea, aside from jurisdictional defects. 
Ark. R. App. P. -- Crim. 1(a).  However, "Rule 24.3(b) presents
an exception to the rule but only for the purpose of determining
on appeal whether an appellant should be allowed to withdraw her
plea if it is concluded that evidence should have been, but was
not, suppressed."  Wofford v. State, 330 Ark. 8, 952 S.W.2d 646
(1997).  This court has strictly construed the permissible scope
of an appeal under Rule 24.3(b).  In Wofford the appellant
entered a conditional guilty plea under Rule 24.3(b) and we
declined to address an upward departure from the sentencing
guidelines and an alleged violation concerning cameras in the
courtroom because these points did not concern "suppression of
evidence."  Id.  See also Jenkins v. State, 301 Ark. 586, 786 S.W.2d 566 (1990) (declining to reach the merits of a speedy-
trial argument when the appellant entered a Rule 24.3(b)
conditional plea of nolo contendere on the charge).  Likewise, we
decline to reach the merits of Frette's challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence and the factual basis for his plea.  
                               2.
     We next consider the trial court's adverse determination of
Frette's pretrial motion to suppress evidence.  In reviewing the
denial of a motion to suppress, this court makes an independent
examination based on the totality of the circumstances.  Mullinax
v. State, 327 Ark. 41, 938 S.W.2d 801 (1997), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2411 (1997); Norman v. State, 326 Ark. 210, 931 S.W.2d 96
(1996).  The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to
the State as appellee, and this court will reverse only if the
trial court's ruling was clearly against the preponderance of the
evidence.  Id.  
     This court has previously categorized police-citizen
encounters into three categories:
The first and least intrusive category is when an
officer merely approaches an individual on a street and
asks if he is willing to answer some questions. 
Because the encounter is in a public place and is
consensual, it does not constitute a "seizure" within
the meaning of the fourth amendment.  Id. The second
police encounter is when the officer may justifiably
restrain an individual for a short period of time if
they have an "articulable suspicion" that the person
has committed or is about to commit a crime.  Id.  The
initially consensual encounter is transformed into a
seizure when, considering all the circumstances, a
reasonable person would believe that he is not free to
leave.  The final category is the full-scale arrest,
which must be based on probable cause.  Id.

Thompson v. State, 303 Ark. 407,