Case Title: Pham v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC08-2355

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-2355 
____________ 
 
TAI A. PHAM,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[June 16, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from a judgment of conviction of 
first-degree murder and a sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the following reasons, we affirm Pham‘s conviction and 
sentence. 
Overview 
 
On March 7, 2008, Tai Pham (Pham) was convicted in Seminole County for 
the first-degree murder of his estranged wife Phi Pham (Phi), the attempted first-
degree murder of her boyfriend Christopher Higgins (Higgins), the armed 
kidnapping of his stepdaughter Lana Pham (Lana), and armed burglary.  Pham 
 
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entered Phi‘s apartment where her oldest daughter, his stepdaughter Lana, was 
alone and awaiting Phi‘s return.  After binding Lana, Pham hid in her bedroom for 
an hour, then stabbed Phi at least six times as she entered the room.  Prior to 
returning to the apartment, Phi and Higgins were together at a party and returned in 
different vehicles.  Phi‘s stabbing occurred while Higgins secured his motorcycle 
outside.  Once Higgins entered the apartment, he struggled with Pham.  During the 
struggle, Lana was able to get free and call the police.  Higgins was severely 
injured during the struggle, but was able to subdue Pham until the police arrived.  
Both Lana and Higgins testified at trial.  Pham was the sole witness for the 
defense.  On May 22, 2008, the jury, by a vote of ten to two, recommended the 
death penalty after the penalty phase.  After the Spencer1 hearing held on 
November 14, 2008, the trial court found the aggravators2 outweighed the 
mitigation3 and entered a sentence of death.  This is Pham‘s direct appeal.   
                                         
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
2.  In aggravation, the court found the following: (1) Pham was previously 
convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of 
violence to the person—great weight; (2) the capital felony was committed while 
the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice in the commission of or attempt 
to commit or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery; sexual 
battery; aggravated child abuse; abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult 
resulting in great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; 
arson; burglary; kidnapping; aircraft piracy; or unlawful throwing, placing, or 
discharging of a destructive device or bomb—moderate weight; (3) the capital 
felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel—great weight; (4) the capital 
felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated 
 
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On appeal, Pham raises seven issues:  (1) that the prosecutor‘s improper 
statements during closing arguments entitle him to a new trial, (2) that juror 
misconduct entitles him to a new penalty phase, (3) that the trial court erred in 
finding the prior violent felony aggravator, (4) that his death sentence is 
unconstitutional because the aggravating circumstances were not alleged in the 
charging document, (5) that the trial court erred in finding the murder was heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (HAC), (6) that the trial court erred in finding the murder cold, 
calculated, and premeditated (CCP), and (7) that his death sentence is not 
proportionate.  Additionally, we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
Pham‘s conviction.   
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification—no evidence of any 
moral or legal justification was presented and argued. 
 
3.  The following statutory or nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were 
considered: (1) the capital felony was committed while the Defendant was under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; the court did not find 
―extreme‖ mental or emotional disturbance—moderate weight as a non-statutory 
mitigator; (2) capacity of the Defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct 
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired—
moderate weight as a non-statutory mitigator; (3) existence of any other factor in 
the Defendant‘s background—great weight; (4) Defendant had stable employment 
history—some weight; (5) Defendant was a good father and caring husband—not 
established; (6) Defendant cared for his sister‘s children for two weeks while their 
parents recuperated from a car accident—not a mitigating circumstance.     
 
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Discussion 
 
Pham raises seven issues on appeal.  In addition, although the issue is not 
raised by Pham, we are required to review the sufficiency of the evidence to 
uphold Pham‘s conviction.  Because we find them to be without merit, we deny 
each of Pham‘s claims on appeal.  Additionally, we find that the evidence 
presented below is sufficient to support Pham‘s conviction. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
 Pham alleges that the State made two improper arguments that entitle him to 
a new trial.  Contemporaneous objections were made to both statements, and, 
accordingly, they have been properly preserved for review.  Because the 
prosecutor‘s comments were a reasonable summary of the evidence presented at 
trial, we deny relief on this claim. 
 
The first portion of the argument to which Pham objects states: 
MR. STONE: But I just do want to quickly address the Defendant's 
testimony.  
 
And, you know, in a nutshell, the way that you can describe the 
Defendant's testimony is a desperate man telling a desperate story.  
That's exactly what it is. 
 
I won't spend more than a few moments on the Defendant's 
testimony because that's all it deserves, if that much, but there are a 
few points that I do want to make.  And some of the things that he 
said are just nonsensical, that just don't make sense. 
 
 
The second portion of the argument to which Pham objects states: 
 
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MR. STONE:  You know, Mr. Pham testified, the Defense chose to 
present a case in this case, they chose to present evidence, and still 
they have not provided an explanation as— 
The law is well-settled that ―[w]ide latitude is permitted in arguing to a jury.‖  
Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1982).  Logical inferences may be drawn, 
and counsel is allowed to advance all legitimate arguments.  Thomas v. State, 748 
So. 2d 970, 984 (Fla. 1999).   ―It is within the judge‘s discretion to control the 
comments made to a jury, and [this Court] will not interfere unless an abuse of 
discretion is shown.‖  Moore v. State, 701 So. 2d 545, 551 (Fla. 1997).   
 
The State asserts that the prosecution‘s comments were a fair and accurate 
description of the evidence presented to the jury.  We agree.  Pham‘s testimony 
regarding Phi‘s death was that he was not sure how she‘d been stabbed but that he 
never stabbed her.  Further, Pham testified that his teenaged step-daughter 
consented to being tied and bound even after arguing with him over his dismissal 
of her friends who had attempted to visit.  Accordingly, we deny relief on this 
claim. 
Juror Misconduct 
 
Next, Pham alleges that the jurors prejudged him and began deliberations 
prior to receiving instructions.  The crux of Pham‘s claim is that his Vietnamese 
nationality figured prominently in the penalty phase and that the jury was 
prematurely disinclined to accept Pham‘s nationality and upbringing as mitigation.  
 
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Because it is not apparent on the record that the comments affected the verdict or 
sentence recommendation in any way, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Pham‘s motion for a new penalty phase and we deny Pham‘s claim. 
 
An alternate juror, Valenti,4 brought these allegations to the trial court‘s 
attention.  Valenti wrote a letter stating that he had overheard jurors making 
inappropriate statements.  Based on the information contained in the letter, the trial 
court interviewed Valenti and two other jurors.   
 
Juror Kristen Appleman stated that she heard a comment in passing:  ―I think 
just the comment of, you know yes, everyone had a rough life in some case, but 
you are—this is the law, this is—there is right and wrong, and, you know, if you 
wanted to come to America, you have to live by American standards, American 
Law.‖  Appleman stated that the comment was made in passing and not directed at 
anyone—it was not a conversation.  She further stated that she did not ―get the 
sense that anyone ha[d] their mind made up or would not listen to a certain piece of 
information and take it in consideration.‖    
 
Juror Peter Perkins stated that he heard idle chitchat about people having 
tough luck, but that he did not know who said it.   Perkins stated that the comments 
were made walking down the hallways, but not in the jury room.   
                                         
 
4.  In an apparent oversight, this juror is referred to only as ―Mr. Valenti‖ in 
the record and briefs. 
 
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The trial court reserved ruling on the defense‘s motion for mistrial, but 
reminded the jury not to form any definite or fixed opinion on the merits of the 
case until all evidence had been presented.  The court ultimately denied the motion.  
While we strongly discourage jurors from this sort of behavior, indeed any 
discussion of the case or parties at all prior to deliberations, we do not find that 
these comments rise to the level of ethnic bias. 
The Court has addressed the issue of juror misconduct and a court‘s 
power to discharge the jury and declare a mistrial: 
―It has been long established and continuously adhered to 
that the power to declare a mistrial and discharge the jury 
should be exercised with great care and caution and 
should be done only in cases of absolute necessity.‖ 
Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 980 (Fla. 1999) (citing 
Salvatore v. State, 366 So. 2d 745, 750 (Fla. 1978)). 
Moreover, addressing allegations of juror misconduct is 
left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.  Doyle v. 
State, 460 So. 2d 353, 357 (Fla. 1984). 
England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 402 (Fla. 2006).  Specifically, with 
respect to a motion for mistrial, the Court has noted: 
A motion for a mistrial should only be granted when an 
error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial. Snipes 
v. State, 733 So. 2d 1000, 1005 (Fla. 1999).  A trial 
court‘s ruling on a motion for mistrial is subject to an 
abuse of discretion standard of review.  Perez v. State, 
919 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1182, 
126 S.Ct. 2359, 165 L.Ed.2d 285 (2006). 
England, 940 So. 2d at 401-02. 
Seibert v. State, 35 Fla. L. Weekly S437 (Fla. July 8, 2010).   
 
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Any inquiry into juror misconduct must be limited to objective 
demonstration of overt acts committed by or in the presence of the 
jury or jurors which reasonably could have affected the verdict. 
Powell [v. Allstate Ins. Co.], 652 So. 2d [354,] 356 [(Fla. 1995)]; 
[Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v.] Maler, 579 So. 2d [97,] 101 [(Fla. 
1991)]; State v. Hamilton, 574 So. 2d 124, 128-29 (Fla. 1991).   
Wilding v. State, 674 So. 2d 114, 117-118 (Fla. 1996), receded from in part by 
Devoney v. State, 717 So. 2d 501, 505 (Fla. 1998) (―We recede from that portion 
of Wilding which says that, while the jurors‘ subjective beliefs inhere in the 
verdict, any discussion of them can become an overt act of misconduct.‖). 
If the [misconduct is] such that [it] would probably influence the jury, 
and the evidence in the cause is conflicting, the onus is not on the 
accused to show he was prejudiced for the law presumes he was. But 
it should be clearly understood that not all [misconduct] will vitiate a 
verdict, even though such conduct may be improper. It is necessary 
either to show that prejudice resulted or that the [misconduct was] of 
such character as to raise a presumption of prejudice. 
Amazon v. State, 487 So. 2d 8, 11 (Fla. 1986) (alterations in original) (quoting 
Russ v. State, 95 So. 2d 594, 600-01 (Fla.1957)). 
 
Pham‘s argument here is basically one of ethnic bias—that some jurors were 
not willing to accept his mitigation based on his upbringing and societal 
differences in Vietnam.  While we continue to condemn ethnic bias in jurors, the 
comments here did not rise to the level of ethnic bias.  As determined by the trial 
court, the statements made were not open appeals to the bias in others.  Therefore, 
the trial court correctly denied Pham‘s request for a new penalty phase. 
Accordingly, we deny Pham‘s claim. 
 
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Prior Violent Felony 
 
Pham alleges that it was error to permit the State to present testimony of the 
alleged victim of the battery on a law enforcement officer over objection at the 
Spencer hearing.  Pham does not argue that the finding of the prior violent felony 
aggravator is improper because his conviction for aggravated battery on a law 
enforcement officer did not precede the penalty phase below.  Instead, it appears 
that Pham is arguing that the application of this aggravator violates Apprendi5 and 
Ring6 because the crime has to be one involving the use of threat or violence and 
that this Court has held that battery on a law enforcement officer is not a ―forcible 
felony‖ that can be used to enhance a subsequent felony.  State v. Kearns, 961 So. 
2d 211 (Fla. 2007).  Thus, Pham argues his mere conviction was not enough to find 
this aggravator because the trial court had to consider extrinsic evidence that was 
not presented to the jury.  As stated in the sentencing order, the evidence to support 
this aggravator that was considered by the trial court was as follows: 
 
On March 7, 2008, [Pham] was found guilty by the jury of the 
Attempted First Degree Murder of Christopher Higgins.  This 
conviction was contemporaneous to his conviction for the First 
Degree Murder of Phi Pham in this case.   
 
At the Spencer hearing, the State introduced additional 
evidence in support of this aggravator by way of the [Pham‘s] 
conviction on August 12, 2008, for Battery on a Law Enforcement 
                                         
 
5.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 
6.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 
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Officer in Seminole County, Florida in Case No. 06-4879-CFA.  
Testimony of retired deputy Oleander Csisko, the victim, was also 
presented as to the events of October 12, 2006, which resulted in that 
conviction.  Csisko testified that as [Pham] was being removed from 
the courtroom during a hearing in juvenile court, he stopped suddenly, 
and then became aggressive and combative.  While Mr. Pham was 
hitting and kicking another deputy, Csisko grabbed his belly chains in 
an effort to regain control and escort him from the courtroom.  She 
testified that [Pham] bent her fingers all the way back which resulted 
in pain and swelling.  Subsequent medical examinations revealed a 
fracture to her arm. 
 
The Judgment and Sentence, in Case No. 06-4879-CFA, paired 
with the testimony of the victim, proves [that Pham] has one prior 
conviction[n.2] for a crime involving the use of violence and one 
contemporaneous conviction, for the attempted first degree murder of 
Christopher Higgins. 
 
This aggravating factor has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt and is given great weight. 
[N.2] Although the offense occurred after the capital 
felony in this case it can be considered as an aggravating 
circumstance because the conviction was entered prior to 
sentencing for the capital felony.  Brown v. State, 473 
So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1985) and Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 
998 (Fla. 1977). 
The trial court did not err in finding this aggravator.   
During a penalty phase proceeding, the trial court has the discretion to 
admit evidence with regard to the details of a defendant‘s previous 
conviction for a felony involving the use or threat of violence.  See 
§ 921.141(1), (5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006); Rhodes v. State, 547 So. 2d 
1201, 1204 (Fla. 1989); Tompkins v. State, 502 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 
1986). This Court reviews the admission or exclusion of evidence for 
an abuse of discretion. See San Martin v. State, 717 So. 2d 462, 470-
71 (Fla. 1998).   
 
. . .This Court has repeatedly held that the State is not restricted 
to the bare admission of a conviction when presenting evidence in 
support of the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance. See 
Rhodes, 547 So. 2d at 1204; Delap v. State, 440 So. 2d 1242, 1255-56 
 
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(Fla. 1983); Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1001-02 (Fla. 1977). 
Rather, the State may adduce any testimony that the trial court deems 
relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant. 
See § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (2006); Delap, 440 So. 2d at 1255. 
―Whether a crime constitutes a prior violent felony is determined by 
the surrounding facts and circumstances of the prior crime.‖ Anderson 
v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407 (Fla. 2003) (holding that trial court did 
not err in admitting testimony that demonstrated the defendant‘s 
conviction for attempted sexual battery was actually a completed 
sexual battery). 
Miller v. State, 42 So. 3d 204, 225 (Fla. 2010). 
 
Florida law is well settled that contemporaneous convictions, like the 
conviction for the attempted murder of Christopher Higgins, establish the prior 
violent felony aggravator.  See LeCroy v. State, 533 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1988); King 
v. State, 390 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1980).  Because that is the law (and because Pham 
has not challenged this aspect of Florida law), this claim is without merit.  The 
prior violent felony aggravator is established by virtue of the attempted murder 
conviction irrespective of the battery on a law enforcement officer conviction. 
Pham has not challenged the Higgins conviction and has waived any challenge to 
its application in aggravation.  Accordingly, Pham has not provided a basis for 
relief on this claim. 
Constitutionality 
 
In this claim, Pham alleges that his death sentence is invalid because the trial 
court exceeded its authority in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 
(2004).  Specifically, Pham contends that first-degree murder is not punishable by 
 
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death because imposition of capital punishment requires that additional findings of 
fact be made after a defendant is convicted of premeditated murder, which is in 
violation of Ring and Apprendi.   
 
This Court has repeatedly held that where a death sentence is supported by 
the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance, Florida's capital sentencing 
scheme does not violate Ring or Apprendi.  See, e.g., Frances v. State, 970 So. 2d 
806, 822 (Fla. 2007) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490); Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 
611, 619 (Fla. 2003).  A Florida jury unanimously found Pham guilty of three 
violent felonies.  Therefore, the trial court found that the death sentence was 
supported by the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance, which satisfies 
express exceptions to Apprendi that were unaltered by Ring. 
 
Additionally, this Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that 
aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the indictment.  See, e.g., Coday v. 
State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1006 (Fla. 2006) (rejecting the defendant‘s argument that 
the failure to allege the aggravating circumstances in the indictment renders a 
sentence unconstitutional under Ring); Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 473 (Fla. 
2006) (noting that the defendant‘s claim that the indictment was defective because 
it did not provide notice of the aggravators had been addressed adversely to the 
defendant); Blackwelder v. State, 851 So. 2d 650, 654 (Fla. 2003) (observing that 
this Court had rejected the argument that aggravating circumstances must be 
 
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alleged in the indictment); Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41, 54 (Fla. 2003) 
(explaining that Ring does not require notice of the aggravating factors that the 
State will present); see also Rogers v. State, 957 So. 2d 538, 554 (Fla. 2007) 
(noting that this Court has consistently held that neither Apprendi nor Ring 
requires that aggravating circumstances be alleged in the indictment).   
―[W]e have rejected claims that Ring requires the aggravating 
circumstances to be alleged in the indictment.‖  Ferrell v. State, 918 
So. 2d 163, 180 (Fla. 2005).  A defendant is not entitled to notice of 
every aggravator in the indictment because the aggravators are clearly 
listed in the statutes.  Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 378 (Fla. 2003) 
(citing Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 928 (Fla. 1994)). . . . [O]ne of 
the aggravators in this case is the prior violent felony aggravator, 
which both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have 
recognized as an exception to the requirement that the jury must make 
all the findings necessary to enhance a defendant‘s sentence.  Ring, 
536 U.S. at 597 n.4, 122 S.Ct. 2428; see also Patton v. State, 878 So. 
2d 368, 377 (Fla. 2004) (―The existence of this prior violent felony 
aggravator satisfies the mandates of the United States and Florida 
constitutions. . . .‖); Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41, 54 n.3 (Fla. 
2003) (finding the prior violent felony aggravator through 
contemporaneous charges of robbery, sexual assault, and battery 
included in the indictment and affirmed by the jury satisfies Ring‘s 
requirements). 
England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 407 (Fla. 2006). 
 
We have not receded from these cases.  Thus, we reject Pham‘s argument.   
HAC Aggravator 
 
Pham contends that because there was no intentional torture of the victim, 
the trial court erred in finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel.  The State argues that there is no legal basis for Pham‘s claim because this 
 
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Court has rejected the addition of an intent element to the aggravator.  Because 
there is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court‘s finding, we 
deny this claim. 
 
―In reviewing an aggravating factor challenged on appeal, this Court‘s task 
‗is to review the record to determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of 
law for each aggravating circumstance, and, if so, whether competent substantial 
evidence supports its finding.‘ ‖  Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1260-61 (Fla. 
2004) (quoting Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997)).   
 
We have explained the meaning of the HAC aggravator as follows: 
It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or 
shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; 
and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with 
utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others.  
What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the 
actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such 
additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital 
felonies—the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily 
torturous to the victim. 
State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973); see also Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 
1155, 1159 (Fla. 1998) (―The HAC aggravator applies only in torturous murders—
those that evince extreme and outrageous depravity as exemplified either by the 
desire to inflict a high degree of pain or utter indifference to or enjoyment of the 
suffering of another.‖).  We have also stated that ―[u]nlike the cold, calculated and 
premeditated aggravator, which pertains specifically to the state of mind, intent and 
 
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motivation of the defendant, the HAC aggravator focuses on the means and manner 
in which death is inflicted and the immediate circumstances surrounding the 
death.‖  Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998) (citing Stano v. State, 460 
So. 2d 890, 893 (Fla. 1984)).   
 
Furthermore, we have held that ―[i]n determining whether the HAC factor 
was present, the focus should be upon the victim‘s perceptions of the 
circumstances as opposed to those of the perpetrator.‖  Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 
362, 369 (Fla. 2003).  The victim‘s mental state may be evaluated in accordance 
with common-sense inferences from the circumstances.  Swafford v. State, 533 So. 
2d 270, 277 (Fla. 1988).  We have also held that to support this aggravating 
circumstance, the evidence must show that the victim was conscious and aware of 
impending death.  Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1261 (Fla. 2004).  However, 
we have also explained that the actual length of the victim‘s consciousness is not 
the only factor relevant to this aggravator.  Beasley v. State, 774 So. 2d 649, 669 
(Fla. 2000).  ―[F]ear, emotional strain, and terror of the victim during the events 
leading up to the murder may make an otherwise quick death especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel.‖  James v. State, 695 So. 2d 1229, 1235 (Fla. 1997); see also 
Swafford, 533 So. 2d at 277.  We have further held that the actions of the 
defendant preceding the actual killing are also relevant.  Gore v. State, 706 So. 2d 
1328, 1335 (Fla. 1997).  
 
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In Cox v. State, 819 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 2002), we noted, ―Obviously, a 
victim‘s suffering and awareness of his or her impending death certainly supports 
the finding of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance where 
there is a merciless attack . . . as occurred here.‖  Id. at 720.  Here, Phi was 
conscious during at least part of her attack.  She was stabbed at least six times, and 
the medical examiner testified that the nature of her wounds would have caused her 
a high degree of pain.  Further, her attack was unprovoked and witnessed by her 
daughter.  The evidence established that Phi motioned for her daughter to leave the 
apartment and that one of her wounds was consistent with her having grabbed the 
blade of the knife.  Accordingly, there is competent, substantial evidence to 
support the trial court‘s finding of the HAC aggravator. 
CCP Aggravator 
 
Pham contends that the trial court erred in finding that the murder was cold, 
calculated, and premeditated.  Because there is competent, substantial evidence to 
support the trial court‘s finding, we deny this claim. 
 
In deciding whether a lower court erred in its finding of an aggravator, this 
Court does not reweigh the evidence to determine whether an aggravator was 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt but instead ―review[s] the record to determine 
whether the trial court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating 
circumstance and, if so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its 
 
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finding.‖  Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 98 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Willacy, 696 
So. 2d at 695).  In order to find CCP as an aggravating factor: 
[T]he jury must determine that the killing was a product of cool and 
calm reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or 
a fit of rage (cold); and that the defendant had a careful plan or 
prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident 
(calculated); and that the defendant exhibited heightened 
premeditation (premeditated); and that the defendant had no pretense 
of moral or legal justification.   
Anderson v. State, 863 So. 2d 169, 176-77 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Jackson v. State, 
648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994)).  CCP can be established by evidence of ―advance 
procurement of a weapon, lack of resistance or provocation, and the appearance of 
a killing carried out as a matter of course.‖  Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465, 479 
(Fla. 2003). 
 
It is the State‘s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder 
was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an act of emotional frenzy or 
panic or a fit of rage.  Walker v. State, 957 So. 2d 560, 581 (Fla. 2007).  ―[T]he 
facts supporting CCP must focus on the manner in which the crime was executed, 
e.g., advance procurement of weapon, lack of provocation, killing carried out as a 
matter of course.‖  Id. (quoting Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 372 (Fla. 2003)).  
Premeditation for CCP may be indicated by circumstances showing taking a 
murder weapon to the scene, lack of victim resistance, and ―the appearance of 
 
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killing as a matter of course‖ such as in an ―execution style‖ killing.  Franklin, 965 
So. 2d at 98.   
 
A determination of whether CCP is present is properly based on a 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances.  Wike v. State, 698 So. 2d 817, 
823 (Fla. 1997); see also Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 372; Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 
29, 46 (Fla. 2000); Occhicone v. State, 570 So. 2d 902, 905 (Fla. 1990).  The scope 
of review is limited ―to ensuring that the trial court applied the correct rule of law 
and, if so, that there is competent, substantial evidence to support its findings.‖ 
Caballero v. State, 851 So. 2d 655, 661 (Fla. 2003) (citing Willacy v. State, 696 
So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997)).  ―Competent substantial evidence is tantamount to 
legally sufficient evidence, and [this Court] assess[es] the record evidence for its 
sufficiency only, not its weight.‖ McCoy v. State, 853 So. 2d 396, 407 (Fla. 2003) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Almeida v. State, 748 So. 2d 922, 932 (Fla. 
1999)). 
 
We have also found the heightened premeditation required to support CCP 
where a defendant has a lengthy period of reflection and the opportunity to 
abandon the plan but, instead, commits the murder.  Alston v. State, 723 So.2d 
148, 162 (Fla. 1998).  We explained in Alston that where the defendant had ample 
opportunity to release the victim but instead, after substantial reflection, ―acted out 
the plan [he] had conceived during the extended period in which [the] events 
 
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occurred,‖ heightened premeditation was proven.  Id.  (alterations in original) 
(quoting Jackson v. State, 704 So. 2d 500, 505 (Fla. 1997)); see also Looney v. 
State, 803 So. 2d 656, 679 (Fla. 2001).  Legally sufficient evidence also exists to 
support CCP where the defendant procures a murder weapon in advance, receives 
absolutely no resistance or provocation on the part of the victim, and carries out the 
killing as a matter of course.  McCoy, 853 So. 2d at 407.   
 
In Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 368 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Way v. State, 
760 So. 2d 903, 918 (Fla. 2000)), we explained the standard of review of a trial 
court‘s finding of an aggravating factor: 
[I]t is not this Court‘s function to reweigh the evidence to determine 
whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt . . . .  Rather, our task on appeal is to review the 
record to determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of 
law for each aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether competent 
substantial evidence supports its finding. 
Within the confines of this deferential standard of review, we closely scrutinize the 
evidence to ensure that the CCP finding is supported.  See, e.g., Santos v. State, 
591 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. 1992) (―[T]he record discloses that the State failed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the present murder was cold, calculated, and 
premeditated.‖);  Mahn v. State, 714 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1998) (finding trial court 
abused its discretion in finding CCP because ―to satisfy the burden of proof, the 
circumstantial evidence must be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis which 
might negate the aggravating factor‖) (quoting Geralds v. State, 601 So. 2d 1157, 
 
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1163 (Fla. 1992)).  Moreover, we have explained that heightened premeditation 
exists ―where a defendant has the opportunity to leave the crime scene and not 
commit the murder but, instead, commits the murder.‖  Owen v. State, 862 So.2d 
687, 701 (Fla. 2003). 
 
 
 
Here, Pham arrived with two knives.  He bound Lana to prevent her escape.  
He hid her phone to prevent her from calling for help.  He waited for 
approximately one hour before Phi returned home and then attacked her 
immediately.  Pham set up the murder scene by hiding the knives under Lana‘s 
mattress while waiting for Phi to return home and hiding behind Lana‘s closet door 
once she arrived.  Accordingly, there is competent, substantial evidence to support 
the trial court‘s finding of the CCP aggravator. 
Proportionality 
 
As explained by this Court in Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1991): 
The requirement that death be administered proportionately has a 
variety of sources in Florida law, including the Florida Constitution‘s 
express prohibition against unusual punishments.  Art. I, § 17, Fla. 
Const.  It clearly is ―unusual‖ to impose death based on facts similar 
to those in cases in which death previously was deemed improper.  Id.  
Moreover, proportionality review in death cases rests at least in part 
on the recognition that death is a uniquely irrevocable penalty, 
requiring a more intensive level of judicial scrutiny or process than 
would lesser penalties.  Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const.  
 
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Id. at 169 (footnote omitted).  The purpose of this Court‘s proportionality review is 
to ―foster uniformity in death-penalty law.‖  Id.  In performing this review, this 
Court ―must never lose sight of the fact that the death penalty has long been 
reserved for only the most aggravated and least mitigated of first-degree murders.‖  
Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998).  Furthermore, proportionality 
review is a consideration of the totality of the circumstances in a case in 
comparison with other capital cases.  Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 
1990).  It entails a ―qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis for 
each aggravator and mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.‖  Urbin, 714 So. 
2d at 416. 
 
Proportionality review ―is not a comparison between the 
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.‖  Porter v. State, 
564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990).  Instead, the Court looks at the 
totality of the circumstances to determine if death is warranted in 
comparison to other cases where the sentence of death has been 
upheld.  Id.  This Court has made clear that HAC is one of the ―most 
serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme.‖  
Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999). 
England, 940 So. 2d at 408. 
 
 
 ―Because death is a unique punishment, it is necessary in each case to 
engage in a thoughtful, deliberate proportionality review to consider the totality of 
circumstances in a case, and to compare it with other capital cases.  It is not a 
comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.‖  
Tillman, 591 So. 2d at 169 (quoting Porter, 564 So. 2d at 1064).  This Court‘s 
 
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function is not to re-weigh the aggravators and mitigators, but to accept the jury's 
recommendation and the judge's weighing of the evidence.  Bates v. State, 750 So. 
2d 6 (Fla. 1999). 
 
This Court reviews and considers all the circumstances in a case relative to 
other capital cases when deciding whether death is a proportionate penalty and to 
ensure uniformity.  See Johnson v. State, 720 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1998); Urbin v. 
State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416-17 (Fla. 1998).  The death penalty is reserved only for 
those cases where the most aggravating and least mitigating circumstances exist.  
See Kramer v. State, 619 So. 2d 274, 278 (Fla. 1993).   
 
Under the totality of the circumstances, Pham's sentence is proportional in 
relation to other death sentences that this Court has upheld.  See, e.g., Banks v. 
State, 46 So. 3d 989 (Fla. 2010) (death sentence proportionate in a stabbing murder 
where the jury recommended death ten-to-two and the trial court found three 
aggravators: prior violent felony, HAC, and CCP; and five mitigating 
circumstances: low IQ, brain deficit, antisocial personality traits, not the only 
participant, and difficult youth); Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2007) 
(death sentence proportionate for stabbing murder where trial court found prior 
violent felony and HAC aggravators, statutory age mitigator, and several 
nonstatutory mitigators, including a difficult family background, alcohol use the 
night of the murder, and a capacity to form positive relationships); Singleton v. 
 
- 23 - 
State, 783 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 2001) (death sentence proportionate for stabbing 
murder where trial court found prior violent felony and HAC aggravators as well 
as substantial mitigation, including extreme mental or emotional disturbance, 
impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct or to conform conduct to 
requirements of law, and that defendant was under influence of alcohol and 
possibly medication at time of offense); Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 
2000) (death sentence proportionate for strangulation murder where trial court 
found HAC aggravator, one statutory mitigator, and eight nonstatutory mitigators). 
 
The jury voted ten-to-two to recommend death.  The trial court found in 
aggravation: (1) Pham was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a 
felony involving the use of threat of violence to the person; (2) the capital felony 
was committed while Pham was engaged in the commission of a burglary and 
kidnapping; (3) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and 
(4) the capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.  As 
mitigation, the trial court found: (1) the capital felony was committed while Pham 
was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance; (2) Pham‘s capability 
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform to the requirements of law 
was impaired, although not substantially; (3) Pham‘s traumatic childhood had a 
negative impact on his emotional and mental development; and (4) Pham had a 
 
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stable employment history and was considered a hardworking employee.  We find 
that this case meets the criteria of being aggravated with little mitigation.  Thus, 
the death sentence is proportionate. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Although Pham does not raise the issue of sufficiency of the evidence on 
appeal, this Court has an independent obligation to review the record to determine 
whether sufficient evidence exists to support Pham‘s conviction.  See Bevel v. 
State, 983 So. 2d 505, 516 (Fla. 2008); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(6) (―In 
death penalty cases, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence or proportionality 
is an issue presented for review, the court shall review these issues and, if 
necessary, remand for the appropriate relief.‖). 
―In appeals where the death penalty has been imposed, this Court 
independently reviews the record to confirm that the jury's verdict is 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.‖  Davis v. State, 2 So. 
3d 952, 966-67 (Fla. 2008) (citing Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(6)).  ―In 
determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is whether, 
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a 
rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 
1100, 1111 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 
(Fla. 2001)).  Although Caraballo did not expressly challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence as to each of his convictions, we conclude 
that sufficient evidence was presented at trial for the jury to find 
Caraballo guilty of all seven felonies. 
Caraballo v. State, 39 So. 3d 1234, 1243-44 (Fla. 2010). 
 
- 25 - 
 
―This Court reviews ‗the record of a death penalty case to determine whether 
the evidence is sufficient to support the murder conviction.‘ Winkles v. State, 894 
So. 2d 842, 847 (Fla. 2005); see also Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465, 480 (Fla. 
2003).‖   Banks, 46 So. 3d at 999. 
[T]his Court has a mandatory obligation to independently review the 
sufficiency of the evidence in every case in which a sentence of death 
has been imposed.  See Blake v. State, 972 So. 2d 839, 850 (Fla. 
2007); Fla. R.App. P. 9.142(a)(6).  ―In determining the sufficiency of 
the evidence, the question is whether, after viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have 
found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.‖  Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001) (citing 
Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065, 1068 n.5 (Fla. 1999)). 
Miller, 42 So. 3d at 227. 
 
Pham was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-
degree premeditated murder, armed kidnapping, and armed burglary of a dwelling.  
The jury was instructed on both premeditated and felony first-degree murder, and 
found Pham guilty of first-degree murder.  Because the jury was instructed on both 
theories of first-degree murder and found Pham guilty on a general verdict form, 
the evidence must support either premeditated or felony murder.  See Dessaure v. 
State, 891 So. 2d 455, 472 (Fla. 2004).  There is competent sufficient evidence to 
support both theories as well as attempted first-degree murder, armed kidnapping, 
and armed burglary of a dwelling. 
 
- 26 - 
 
First, there is competent, substantial evidence to support Pham‘s conviction 
of first-degree murder under a theory of premeditated murder.  
See § 782.04(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2005) (―The unlawful killing of a human being . . . 
when perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person 
killed or any human being . . . is murder in the first degree and constitutes a capital 
felony . . . .‖).  We have defined premeditation as follows: 
Premeditation is defined as more than a mere intent to kill; it is a fully 
formed conscious purpose to kill.  This purpose may be formed a 
moment before the act but must exist for a sufficient length of time to 
permit reflection as to the nature of the act to be committed and the 
probable result of that act. 
Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Woods v. State, 733 So. 
2d 980, 985 (Fla. 1999)); see also Buckner v. State, 714 So. 2d 384, 387 (Fla. 
1998) (―Premeditation need only exist for such time as will allow the accused to be 
conscious of the nature of the act the accused is about to commit and the probable 
result of the act.‖).  In this case, there is both direct and circumstantial evidence 
that Pham killed the victim in a premeditated manner.   
 
Lana Pham testified that Pham entered the apartment she shared with her 
mother and sisters without her permission.  She further testified that he tied her up 
while they awaited her mother‘s return.  The picture evidence presented at trial 
supports that Lana had been tied.  Further, Pham admitted to binding her, stating 
that she consented to it but that it was a mistake.  After Phi returned to the 
 
- 27 - 
apartment, Lana testified that she observed Pham strike her mother with one of the 
knives he had brought with him.  Although Higgins did not enter the apartment 
until after Phi had been stabbed, his testimony supports Lana‘s version of events. 
He testified that he heard screaming as he approached the apartment and that when 
he entered he saw Lana standing over her mother.  Further, Higgins testified that 
Pham lunged at him with a knife and that Higgins used his motorcycle helmet to 
fend off Pham‘s attack.  The 911 tape played at trial established that Pham and 
Higgins were fighting while Phi was dying, despite Pham‘s testimony that the 
attack began when Higgins struck him and that he never stabbed Phi.  Also 
captured on the tape is Lana‘s distress and the struggle between Higgins and Pham. 
When officers arrived on the scene, Pham and Higgins were still involved in a 
struggle; Phi was dead; and Lana had possession of one of the knives.   
 
Based on the direct and circumstantial evidence, there is competent, 
substantial evidence to support Pham‘s conviction for first-degree murder under 
the theory of premeditated murder.  The facts reveal that there was sufficient time 
before the killing for Pham to have formed a conscious intent to kill. 
 
Second, there is competent, substantial evidence to support Pham‘s 
conviction of first-degree murder under the theory of felony murder.  See 
§ 782.04(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2005) (―The unlawful killing of a human being . . . 
When committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to 
 
- 28 - 
perpetrate, any . . . Burglary . . . [or] Kidnapping . . . is murder in the first degree 
and constitutes a capital felony . . . .‖).  Likewise, it appears that there is 
competent, substantial evidence to support Pham‘s convictions of attempted first-
degree murder,7 armed kidnapping,8 and armed burglary of a dwelling.9   
 
In this case, there is competent, substantial evidence that Pham committed 
the murder while in the commission of an armed burglary and kidnapping.  Lana 
testified that she did not open the door for Pham and was unaware of his presence 
until she was being dragged by her hair to her bedroom; that she looked up and 
saw her stepfather holding two knives; and that once in her room her wrists and 
ankles were tied to prevent her from leaving while her phone and the knives were 
placed under her mattress.  Pham confessed at trial that he had bound Lana‘s hands 
and feet. 
 
Further, there is competent, substantial evidence to support Pham‘s 
conviction of first-degree murder under the felony murder as well as the 
underlying felonies of attempted first-degree murder, armed kidnapping, and 
armed burglary of a dwelling.  The facts reveal that Pham entered Phi‘s apartment 
without permission intending to kill his ex-wife.  As previously noted, the facts 
                                         
 
7.  § 777.04(1), 782.04(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). 
 
8.  § 787.01(1)(a)2, § 775.087(1), § 775.087(2)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2005). 
 
9.  § 810.02(1)(b), § 810.02(2)(b), § 810.07, Fla. Stat. (2005). 
 
- 29 - 
reveal that once inside, Pham dragged Lana by her hair into her bedroom and 
bound her to keep her from escaping or warning her mother.  He then waited for 
approximately one hour for Phi to return home and stabbed her repeatedly without 
provocation.  Finally, when Higgins attempted to stop him, he struck Higgins‘ head 
with a meat cleaver. 
 
In conclusion, upon review of the record, competent, substantial evidence 
exists to support Pham‘s murder conviction on either theory of first-degree murder 
as well as his convictions of attempted first-degree murder, armed kidnapping, and 
armed burglary of a dwelling. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Pham‘s convictions and sentences. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and 
PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Seminole County,  
Marlene M. Alva, Judge – Case No. 2005CF4717A 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Michael S. Becker, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Meredith Charbula and 
Kenneth Sloan Nunnelley, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee