Case Title: State v. John M. Kieffer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP000008-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-0008-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
John M. Kieffer,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  207 Wis. 2d 462, 558 N.W.2d 664 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996-PUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 12, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 8, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael S. Gibbs 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Wilcox, J., dissents (Opinion filed) 
 
 
Steinmetz and Crooks, J.J., join 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Daniel J. O'Brien, assistant attorney general with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, assistant attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
John A. Birdsall, and Gonzalez, Saggio, Birdsall & Harlan, S.C., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by John A. Birdsall. 
 
 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert T. Ruth, 
Madison for the Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers. 
 
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-0008-CR  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
John M. Kieffer, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 12, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.   This review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 presents two questions 
regarding authority to consent to a warrantless police search:  
First, did the defendant's father-in-law have actual authority 
to consent to a search of the loft area above the father-in-
law's garage where the defendant and his wife were living?  
Second, even if the father-in-law lacked actual authority to 
consent, could the police reasonably rely upon his apparent 
authority to consent to a search of the defendant's living 
quarters in the loft?  The circuit court for Walworth County, 
Michael S. Gibbs, presiding, inferentially concluded that the 
father-in-law, 
Robert 
Garlock 
lacked 
actual 
authority 
to 
consent, but expressly concluded that the officers acted 
                     
1 State v. Kieffer, 207 Wis. 2d 462, 558 N.W.2d 664 (Ct. 
App. 1996).  
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
2 
reasonably under the circumstances in believing that the father-
in-law had apparent authority to consent to the search.  The 
circuit court therefore denied the defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence based on the warrantless search.  The court of 
appeals reversed.  We first conclude that the father-in-law 
lacked actual 
authority 
to 
consent 
to a 
search of the 
defendant's living area.  Second, we conclude that the police 
made insufficient inquiry and thus could not reasonably rely 
upon the father-in-law's apparent authority to consent to a 
search of the defendant's living area.  We therefore affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶2 
We first consider those facts known to the arresting 
officers at the time of the search.  Early in the morning of 
April 9, 1995, Whitewater police arrested Scott Garlock for 
possession of psilocybin mushrooms, a controlled substance. See 
Wis. Stat. § 161.41(1m)(g)1.2  Scott Garlock informed the police 
that he had purchased the mushrooms from John Zattera, and that 
Zattera had more mushrooms in his possession.  Scott Garlock 
gave the police an address where Zattera was staying, the 
residence of Scott's father, Robert Garlock.  Without obtaining 
a search warrant, Officer Scott Priebe and Sergeant Thomas 
                     
2 Wis. Stat. § 161.41(1) (1995-96), as part of Chapter 161, 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, was renumbered in part as 
Chapter 961, Uniform Controlled Substances Act, and repealed in 
part by 1995 Act 448, §§ 243-266, effective July 9, 1996.  
Amendments to Wis. Stat. § 161.41(1m)(g)1 pursuant to 1995 Act 
448 do not affect the statutory violations charged in this case.  
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
3 
Bushey of the Whitewater Police Department, and Deputy Timothy 
Otterbacher of the Walworth County Sheriff's Department, went to 
that address to look for Zattera.  When they arrived at 
approximately 
8:45 
a.m., 
they 
spoke 
to 
Robert 
Garlock 
("Garlock"), who identified himself as the owner of the 
property, including the garage and loft area. 
¶3 
The police informed Garlock that his son Scott had 
been arrested on a drug charge.  They also told Garlock of their 
suspicion that there might be drugs in the (Garlock) residence, 
or in the area where Zattera was staying.  Garlock became upset 
and readily consented to let police search anywhere on the 
premises because "he didn't want any drugs on his property."  
Garlock told the officers that his daughter and son-in-law, Dawn 
and John Kieffer, slept in a loft area above Garlock's garage.  
Garlock also reported that Zattera was staying with them.  
¶4 
Before proceeding to the garage loft, the three 
officers asked Garlock about the living arrangements.  Deputy 
Otterbacher asked Garlock what he owned, to which he responded 
the house and the loft or barn.  The officers asked whether the 
Kieffers paid rent.  Garlock replied that the Kieffers sometimes 
helped pay the electric bills but that there was no written 
lease.  The police also learned that there was no plumbing in 
the loft, and no telephone.  Later, at the suppression hearing 
in this case, Officer Bushey testified that he understood this 
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
4 
information to mean that although the Kieffers slept in the 
loft, they used the entire house as their home3: 
 
The way I understood it they used the entire house and 
the loft area.  The loft area is where they slept, but 
they came in the house to take their showers, go to 
the bathroom, use the phone, and I would assume it's 
where they would eat dinner.  The loft area was a 
place that they stayed and slept. 
¶5 
Garlock then led the officers to the detached garage, 
approximately 15 to 20 feet behind the house.  The outside door 
to the garage was unlocked.  Garlock opened the outside garage 
door.  There were no outside steps leading directly to the loft. 
 Deputy Otterbacher asked Garlock how he normally entered the 
loft.  Garlock told police that he usually knocked before 
entering the loft, "out of respect."  With Garlock leading the 
way, the three officers and he then climbed up the interior 
stairs to the Kieffers' living quarters.  At the top of the 
stairs was a door with a lock; it was unlocked at the time.  
¶6 
Additional facts about the use of the loft area as 
living space, but not relayed to the police at the time of the 
search, came out in testimony at the suppression hearing. The 
Kieffers had converted the loft area into a living space with 
                     
3 The dissent has it backwards.  The dissent looks at this 
information known to the officers, and asserts that "it would be 
reasonable for the officers to conclude that the Kieffers would 
have to enter Mr. Garlock's house every time they had to wash 
their hands, use the toilet, take a shower, brush their teeth, 
or even get a drink of tap water."  Dissenting op. at 5.  What 
the officers concluded about the Kieffers' actual or apparent 
authority to use the Garlock residence is not evidence of 
whether or not Garlock had access to the Kieffers' quarters.  
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
5 
their own money.  They did so with Garlock's permission.  The 
Kieffers considered Garlock their landlord, and were living 
there by Garlock's rules.  As part of their agreement, Garlock 
would not go into loft area without asking their permission.  
The Kieffers had the only keys to the loft.  Dawn felt that as 
part of the agreement, she and her husband had the right to 
exclude anyone, including her parents, from the loft area. 
Garlock testified that the Kieffers paid the utilities monthly.4  
¶7 
At this point, the testimony diverges regarding the 
manner of entry and sequence of conversation.  Officer Bushey 
testified that Garlock poked his head in the door, and yelled to 
the Kieffers that the police were there and wanted to talk to 
them.  According to Deputy Otterbacher's testimony, someone said 
in response to Garlock's knock "come in" or words to that 
effect. At the hearing Garlock testified that he didn't knock, 
he simply opened the door and walked into the loft.  Garlock 
entered first.  The officers followed.  When Garlock entered, he 
took hold of the dog that was in the loft.  
¶8 
At the suppression hearing, Garlock testified as to 
his custom in entering the loft, and also the manner in which he 
entered the loft area on the day of the search: 
 
Q: 
(District Attorney Resch) And you have gone into 
that loft for various reasons prior to April 9th of 
1994 (sic) when they were living there, correct? 
 
A: (Robert Garlock) With their permission. 
                     
4 Deputy 
Otterbacher 
testified 
that 
Garlock 
said 
the 
Kieffers helped with the electric bill when they had money.   
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
6 
 
Q: You apparently knocked on the door like you did on 
April 9th? 
 
A: No, I didn't knock on the door.  No. 
 
Q: You didn't knock on the door? 
 
A: No. 
 
Q: Well, how did you – 
 
A: I just walked in.  Like I said, I was very upset 
and I just walked in. 
 
Q: And you're free and comfortable in doing that, 
correct? 
 
A: Yes.  Considering the way I felt, yes. 
 
Q: You did not walk into that apartment because the 
police officers told you to go in; isn't that correct? 
 
A: No.  They didn't tell me.  I just told them that I 
would go up there.  After they told me what it was all 
about, I told them that I would go up there and take 
care of the dog because I didn't want to see anybody 
get hurt with the dog.   
¶9 
Once inside the loft, the officers found Zattera 
sleeping on a couch in the living room area.   The officers also 
found a marijuana pipe and rolling papers on or near the coffee 
table in front of the couch. 
¶10 There was a door from the living room area to a small 
bedroom.  Garlock said "come on out," several times.  Then the 
officers asked Kieffer and Dawn to come out.  The three officers 
stood outside the door until Kieffer and eventually his wife 
walked out of the bedroom.  Dawn Kieffer testified that she 
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
7 
immediately asked whether the officers had a search warrant.5  
Officer Bushey, according to Dawn, told her they did not obtain 
a search warrant but relied on the consent given by her father, 
Robert 
Garlock, 
to 
enter 
and 
search 
the 
loft 
area.  
Consequently, the officers did not ask either John or Dawn 
Kieffer for their consent to search the living quarters. 
¶11 The officers questioned both Zattera and John Kieffer. 
Kieffer initially denied knowing anything about the mushrooms.  
After this initial questioning, Kieffer went back into the 
bedroom.  Officer Priebe followed him.  While in the bedroom, 
Priebe conducted a search and found several bags containing 
psilocybin mushrooms.  Kieffer then admitted having purchased 
the mushrooms from Zattera.  
¶12 Without giving Kieffer Miranda6 warnings, the officers 
continued to question him about his involvement with the 
mushrooms.  Kieffer made several incriminating statements.  The 
officers arrested Kieffer, handcuffed him and transported him to 
the Whitewater police station.  At the station an officer read 
Kieffer his Miranda rights, which Kieffer then waived.  Officer 
Bushey then interrogated Kieffer.  Following that interrogation, 
Kieffer was charged with one count of possession with intent to 
                     
5 When they testified at the suppression hearing, none of 
the three officers recalled Dawn asking them about a warrant.  
6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
8 
deliver 
psilocybin 
mushrooms 
in 
violation 
of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 161.41(1)(g)1.7 
¶13 Kieffer 
filed 
motions 
to 
suppress 
the 
physical 
evidence obtained in the search of the loft and to suppress the 
statements he made when questioned by police at both the loft 
and the police station.  After hearings on these motions in 
June, 1995, the circuit court first denied Kieffer's motion to 
suppress the physical evidence and the motion to suppress his 
post-Miranda statement given at the police station.  The court 
inferentially concluded that Garlock lacked actual authority to 
consent to a search of Kieffer's living area, but expressly held 
that Garlock had apparent authority to consent.  The circuit 
court granted Kieffer's motion to suppress the statement made at 
the loft.  Kieffer pled guilty to one count of possession with 
intent to deliver psilocybin mushrooms.  Kieffer appealed, 
asserting that the circuit court should have suppressed the 
results 
of 
the 
warrantless 
search 
and 
his 
post-Miranda 
statement.  
¶14 The court of appeals reversed in part, and affirmed in 
part.  First, it held that the circuit court erred when it 
                     
7 The complaint initially charged defendant Kieffer with one 
count of possession with intent to deliver psilocybin mushrooms, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 161.41(1m)(g)1, 
violation 
of 
the 
controlled 
substance tax stamp statute, Wis. Stat. § 139.95(2), and 
possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 161.573(1).  As a result of his guilty plea, Kieffer was 
convicted only of the delivery charge. 
All future statutory references in this opinion will be to 
the 1995-96 volume, unless otherwise noted.  
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
9 
denied Kieffer's motion to suppress the physical evidence 
obtained during a warrantless search, concluding that Garlock 
did not have actual authority to consent to a search of the 
loft, and that the officers could not have reasonably relied 
upon Garlock's apparent authority to consent to the search.  See 
207 Wis. 2d at 471.  Second, the court of appeals held that Dawn 
Kieffer's request for a search warrant negated any consent given 
by Garlock.  See id. at 471.  Third, the court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's finding that the statement made 
while in police custody and after Kieffer had received Miranda 
warnings should not have been suppressed.  The statement was not 
the "fruit" of a statement taken in violation of the Miranda 
requirements, nor was it the product of improper promises made 
by the officers to obtain Kieffer's cooperation.  See id. at 
474. 
¶15 The 
State 
petitioned 
for 
review 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment consent issue.  Kieffer opposed the petition, but 
argued in the alternative that the issues surrounding the 
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
10
inculpatory statement given at the police station should also be 
addressed.  We granted review of all issues.8 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 The question of whether a search or seizure is 
reasonable 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
a 
question 
of 
constitutional fact.  Appellate courts decide constitutional 
questions independently, benefiting from the analysis of the 
circuit court.  See State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 140, 569 
N.W.2d 577, 582 (1997); State v. Angelia D.B., 211 Wis. 2d 140, 
146, 564 N.W.2d 682 (1997).  The circuit court made certain 
findings of fact following the suppression hearing.  In 
reviewing an order suppressing evidence, appellate courts will 
uphold findings of evidentiary or historical fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  See Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2); State v. 
Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 250 n.6, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996). 
¶17 Warrantless searches are "per se" unreasonable and are 
subject to only a few limited exceptions.  See Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). One of those exceptions is 
                     
8 In addition to the questions of whether Garlock possessed 
actual or apparent authority to consent to the search, the State 
raises two other issues on this review: If the police were 
lawfully inside the loft area of the garage, was the consent to 
search then vitiated when Kieffer's wife asked to see a search 
warrant even though Kieffer had himself consented to a search of 
the bedroom?  Next, was the defendant's inculpatory statement, 
given to police after Miranda warnings at the police station, 
the tainted fruit of an earlier inculpatory statement given at 
the scene of the search in violation of Miranda procedures?  
Even though the court of appeals reached the former question, we 
need not reach or comment upon either of these other issues 
because we hold that the initial entry and search was unlawful. 
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
11
valid third-party consent.  See  United States v. Matlock, 415 
U.S. 164, 171 (1974); Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 314, 249 
N.W.2d 800 (1977).  The State has the burden to prove that a 
warrantless search was reasonable and in compliance with the 
Fourth Amendment.9  See State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 449, 
340 N.W.2d 516 (1983).  The State bears that burden of proof by 
clear and convincing evidence.  See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 
U.S. 177, 181 (1990); Kelly, 75 Wis. 2d at 316.  "As with other 
factual 
determinations 
bearing 
upon 
search 
and 
seizure, 
determination of consent to enter must be judged against an 
objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at 
the moment . . . warrant a (person) of reasonable caution in the 
belief that the consenting party had authority over the 
premises?" Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
¶18 The United States Supreme Court, in Matlock, described 
the bounds of third-party consent to search: 
 
[T]he 
authority 
which 
justifies 
the 
third-party 
consent does not rest upon the law of property, with 
its 
attendant 
historical 
and 
legal 
refinements, 
(citations omitted) but rests rather on mutual use of 
the property by persons generally having joint access 
                     
9 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.  
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
12
or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable 
to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the 
right to permit the inspection in his own right and 
that the others have assumed the risk that one of 
their number might permit the common area to be 
searched. 
415 U.S. at 171 n.7.  As characterized by the Matlock Court, it 
is the sufficiency of the consenting individual's relationship 
to the premises to be searched, that the State must establish.  
See 415 U.S. at 171.  
¶19 The State first asserts that Robert Garlock had 
actual, shared authority with the defendant, his son-in-law John 
Kieffer, 
to 
consent 
to 
a 
search 
of 
the 
garage 
loft.  
Alternatively, the State contends that the police officers 
reasonably believed that Garlock had apparent authority to 
consent to the search.  
ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO CONSENT 
¶20 For its first assertion, the State points to the fact 
that there was no written lease between Garlock and the 
Kieffers.  The Kieffers made only small payments in exchange for 
use of the loft space, and according to Garlock's testimony at 
the suppression hearing, his daughter and son-in-law stayed in 
the loft "under my rules."  The State contends that this 
arrangement reflects an informal familial living arrangement 
typically held by courts to give parents actual authority to 
consent to a search of the premises. 
¶21 Kieffer disagrees, asserting that there was no "mutual 
use" of the loft property and no "joint access and control for 
most purposes," as directed by the Matlock Court, between the 
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
13
defendant and his wife, and the Garlocks.  Kieffer points to the 
testimony regarding Dawn's and his exclusive possession of the 
loft, and Garlock's testimony that he would not enter the 
Kieffers' home without asking their permission.  
¶22 Kieffer essentially argues that he had a landlord-
tenant relationship with his father-in-law.  He contends that 
the payment of money from the Kieffers to Garlock, as part of 
the rental agreement, was not occasional but mandatory.  Kieffer 
cites Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616 (1961), where 
the Court held that in the absence of the tenant's express 
permission, a landlord could not give valid consent to the 
search of a house that he had rented to another.  
¶23 The State has cited a number of cases from other 
jurisdictions where a relative consented to a search, but each 
of them are distinguishable from the facts here.  In addition, 
sufficiency of the close relative’s relationship to the premises 
is not necessarily established by the relative's familial 
relationship to the defendant, although that connection is a 
factor.  See Mears v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 435, 440-41, 190 N.W.2d 
184 (1971) (mother-son relationship was only a factor supporting 
the finding that the mother had at least equal rights to the use 
and occupancy of the home she shared with her adult son, the 
defendant); see also Kelly, 75 Wis. 2d at 315-16 (no support for 
proposition that nonresident of premises, albeit a relative of 
the property owner, has authority to consent to a search). 
¶24 In one case relied upon by the State, a 19-year old 
son had a room in the basement of the family home.  See State v. 
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
14
Don, 318 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 1982).  Hours after the offense was 
committed, but on that same day, the defendant's father 
consented to a police request to search the basement.  Citing 
Matlock, the Iowa court agreed that the father's "authority to 
consent depends on whether he had common authority over 
defendant's living area."  318 N.W.2d at 804.  The Don court 
concluded that the father had actual authority to consent based 
on the circumstances, including the father's insistence that no 
one could exclude him from any part of the house, the son paid 
no rent, and the trial court finding that the son lived there 
"as an ordinary family member."  Id. 
¶25 In United States v. Duran, 957 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 
1992), another case cited by the State, the court concluded that 
the defendant's wife had actual authority to consent to a search 
of an old farmhouse on the property.  The defendant's wife never 
went into the old farmhouse because she believed it to be her 
husband's personal gym.  She testified, however, that she could 
have gone into the farmhouse if she had wanted to.  See 957 F.2d 
at 505.  The court applied the "joint access or control" 
requirement of Matlock, considered the marital relationship, and 
concluded that the wife "was not denied access to the old 
farmhouse, but (simply) made it a habit not to enter."  Id.10  
                     
10 Interestingly, in comparing the privacy expectations of 
spouses to those of other persons who share living quarters, the 
Duran court noted that the situation of an adult child living at 
home, as a general rule, "involve(s) privacy expectations 
greater than those inherent in a marriage, making it more 
difficult to demonstrate common authority."  United States v. 
Duran, 957 F.2d 499, 505 (1992).  
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
15
¶26 The facts in this case are distinct from those in both 
Don and Duran.11  The defendant, John Kieffer, is not the child 
of Garlock, but is married to Garlock’s daughter.  The door to 
the Kieffers' loft has a lock, for which Kieffer and his wife 
have the only keys.  In return for use of the living space in 
the loft, they pay some form of rent.12  The facts demonstrate 
that Kieffer and his wife have established at least a partial, 
separate household together in the garage loft. 
¶27 In addition, there is not the same quantum of evidence 
of "joint access or control" in this case as there was in Duran 
and Don or as envisioned by the Matlock Court.  Garlock 
testified that he knocked before entering the loft "out of 
respect."  This testimony is indicative of a respect for the 
expectations of privacy held by the defendant and his wife, and 
                     
11 The State also points us to the decision in Adams v. 
State, 645 P.2d 1028 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), a case with facts 
similar to the present case.  There, the sister of the defendant 
owned the property.  Her brother made occasional payments to her 
and also agreed to perform some repairs to the property in 
exchange for living there.  While the Oklahoma court of appeals 
concluded that the sister had actual authority to consent to a 
search of her brother's room, the court reached that conclusion 
with little or no analysis.  The appellate court specifically 
noted that the defendant had provided the court with no case 
support for his argument against actual authority.  See 645 P.2d 
at 1030.  Relying not on substantive law applying the Fourth 
Amendment, but on the Oklahoma courts' procedural rule against 
considering arguments advanced without legal support, the court 
ruled against the defendant. See id.  Lacking Fourth Amendment 
analysis, the Adams case is not persuasive support for a finding 
of actual authority to consent.  
12 It is irrelevant for this analysis whether that money is 
actually used by Garlock to pay off a mortgage on the property 
or to pay to utility bills.  
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
16
not a mere "habit" of the property owner.  In addition, Dawn and 
John Kieffer testified that they considered Garlock their 
landlord, and that they had a right to exclude anyone from the 
loft area.  Therefore, Garlock could not have entered the loft 
"if he wanted to."  The investigating officers did not ask 
Garlock at all about his mutual use,13 if any, of the loft 
property.   
¶28 As directed by Matlock, we conclude that it is not 
reasonable to recognize under these facts that Garlock had the 
right to permit inspection of the Kieffers' living area in the 
garage loft, nor is it reasonable to recognize that the 
defendant had assumed the risk that his father-in-law and 
                     
13 As the parties point out, federal court decisions vary as 
to whether joint access to the premises, without a showing of 
mutual use, is sufficient to establish common authority to 
consent to a search.  Compare United States v. Whitfield, 939 
F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that a mother's 
consent to search her son's bedroom did not support a reasonable 
belief that she had common authority because the government made 
insufficient inquiry to prove that the defendant's mother ever 
used the bedroom even if she had access) with United States v. 
Hall, 979 F.2d 77, 78 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that a homeowner 
had common authority to consent to search of the defendant's 
rental room where the room was never locked and the homeowner 
owned all of the furniture in the room, even though the 
homeowner never entered it when the defendant was not present) 
and United States v. Rith, 954 F. Supp. 1511, 1515-16 (D. Utah 
1997) (holding that parents of an 18-year old had common 
authority to consent to search his room where the son lived in 
the family home, did not pay rent, and the son introduced no 
evidence of an extraordinary expectation of privacy beyond what 
might be reasonably apparent under the circumstances).  In this 
case where the third party consented to a search of living 
quarters used by an adult other than the third party's own 
child, we decline to ignore the element of "mutual use" as 
described by the Matlock Court. 
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
17
landlord might permit the loft area to be searched.  On this 
basis, we conclude, as the circuit court inferentially concluded 
and as the court of appeals held, that Garlock's relationship to 
the loft premises was insufficient to constitute actual common 
authority to consent to a search of the Kieffers' living area. 
APPARENT AUTHORITY TO CONSENT 
¶29 The State's second position is that even if Garlock 
did not possess actual authority to consent to a search of the 
loft area, under the police officers' reasonable belief, Garlock 
had apparent authority to so consent. 
¶30 The circuit court concluded that the police were 
reasonable in their belief that Garlock had apparent authority 
to consent.  Accordingly, the circuit court denied Kieffer's 
motion to suppress.  The circuit court based its determination 
of apparent authority on two facts.  The court was persuaded by 
Garlock's response to the police that Kieffer and his wife did 
not pay rent, but only made some payment toward the electric 
bill.  The circuit court also determined that the officers' 
conduct was reasonable based on Garlock's eagerness to assist in 
ridding the premises of illegal drugs.  In addition, the circuit 
court made a credibility determination, finding the officers' 
testimony of their conversation with Garlock more credible than 
Garlock's own testimony at the suppression hearing.14 
                     
14 The circuit court, in commenting on Garlock's testimony, 
stated that Garlock "apparently had second thoughts since the 
day of the arrest."  
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
18
¶31 The court of appeals, on the other hand, was troubled 
by the minimal inquiry undertaken by the officers before they 
accepted Garlock's authority to consent to a search.  See 
Kieffer, 207 Wis. 2d at 470-71.  The court of appeals pointed 
out that the officers, other than asking whether the Kieffers 
paid rent, made no further inquiries as to their use of the loft 
or whether Garlock ever entered the loft without first receiving 
the Kieffers’ permission.  See id. 
¶32 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
even if a third party lacks actual common authority to consent 
to a search of the defendant’s residence, police may rely upon 
the third party’s apparent common authority to do so, if that 
reliance is reasonable.  See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186-87.  
Whether 
facts 
satisfy 
the 
constitutional 
requirement 
of 
reasonableness is a question of law which appellate courts 
review independently.  See State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 
226, 455 N.W.2d 618 (1990).  The question for the courts is 
whether the information available to the police officers at the 
time of the search would justify a reasonable belief that the 
party consenting to the search had the authority to do so.  
Under Rodriguez, this is an objective test.  See 497 U.S. at 
188-89. 
¶33 The Rodriguez court cautioned that officers may not 
always take third-party consent to a search at face value, but 
must consider the surrounding circumstances.  That consideration 
often demands further inquiry.  “Even when the (consent) is 
accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person lives 
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
19
there, the surrounding circumstances could conceivably be such 
that a reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon 
it without further inquiry.”  497 U.S. at 188.  See also, People 
v. Brooks, 660 N.E.2d 270, 276 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (police 
officers 
may 
not 
"proceed 
without 
inquiry 
in 
ambiguous 
circumstances or always accept at face value the consenting 
party's apparent assumption that he [or she] has authority to 
allow the contemplated search"). 
¶34 We 
will 
uphold 
a 
circuit 
court's 
findings 
of 
historical fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous.  
See Harris, 206 Wis. 2d at 250 n.6.  In this case, the circuit 
court found that defendant and his wife did not pay "rent," even 
though they did make payments toward utility bills.  Based on 
that finding, and based on Garlock's perceived eagerness to rid 
his premises of drugs, the circuit court concluded that the 
State proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 
officers were reasonable in their belief that Garlock had 
apparent authority to consent. 
¶35 We 
review 
the 
ultimate 
constitutional 
findings 
independently.  See Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d at 140; Murdock, 155 
Wis. 2d at 226.  In this case, we share the concern expressed by 
the court of appeals for the insufficient inquiry by the police 
into the surrounding circumstances.  We conclude that the 
information known to the police at the time of the search was 
inadequate to support a reasonable belief that Garlock had 
apparent authority to consent.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the State has not met its burden. 
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
20
¶36 One officer asked whether the Kieffers paid rent.  
Garlock then volunteered that the Kieffers slept in the loft, 
but used the Garlocks’ home for showers and the telephone.  
Beyond this meager information, the officers were unaware of 
Garlock’s ability to gain access to and use the converted loft 
space.  Garlock had no key to the interior loft door.  Although 
there may have been occasions when the Kieffers left the 
interior loft door unlocked, as they did on the day of the 
search, the officers had no information as to whether this was a 
habit, or an uncommon occurrence.  What they did know was that 
before entering the loft, Garlock always knocked.  He said that 
he did so “out of respect.” 
¶37 Furthermore, we find troubling the circuit court’s 
reliance, at least in part, on Garlock’s emotional state at the 
time of the search.  The officers’ observation that Garlock was 
upset and wanted to help "rid his premises of drugs” cannot 
support a reasonable belief that Garlock had common authority to 
consent to a search of the loft area.  This emotional response 
of a property owner sheds no light on whether that person enjoys 
a “mutual use of the property” and whether he or she has “joint 
access or control for most purposes” of that property.  See 
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.  Such a response could have 
reflected a general anti-drug attitude, or a reaction to the 
news that his son Scott had just been arrested for possession of 
a controlled substance.  Under the circumstances of this case, 
Garlock's emotional reaction, by itself, did not support a 
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
21
reasonable belief that he possessed authority to consent to a 
search of the loft. 
¶38 In order to establish a reasonable belief in Garlock's 
authority to consent, the police should have made further 
inquiry into the sufficiency of Garlock's relationship to the 
loft premises.  For example, the officers could have asked 
whether the Kieffers had the right to exclude others from entry 
into the loft area.  The officers could have asked Garlock 
whether it was his normal practice to enter and exit the loft 
area whenever he felt like it.  The officers could have asked 
whether 
Garlock 
considered 
himself 
to 
be 
the 
Kieffers' 
"landlord."  The officers also could have asked whether the loft 
had a lock on the door, and if so, whether Garlock had a key to 
it.  The officers could have asked whether Garlock made personal 
use of the loft area himself.  As the suppression hearing 
testimony 
demonstrates, 
answers 
to 
these 
questions 
were 
"available" to the officers, had they only asked for them. 
¶39 At oral argument, the State focused on evidence not 
shown by the defendant: 
 
One of the officers, I believe Sgt. Bushey, testified 
that he did not believe, based on his observations at 
the scene, he did not believe there was a lock on the 
door.  Furthermore, based on his observations at the 
scene, he observed Mr. Zattera (sic) open the door, 
without even attempting, it was an unlocked door, and 
he just walked right in, which would lead, I would 
suggest, would lead a reasonable police officer to 
believe that Mr. Zattera, Mr. Garlock had fairly free 
access to this place, whether or not there was a lock. 
 And furthermore, Dawn Kieffer, the daughter of Mr. 
Garlock, testified that, when asked "Do you keep it 
locked?" I think her answer was "Sometimes."  So there 
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
22
is also no testimony from anyone that they refused 
access to Mr. Garlock at any time or that they ever 
told Mr. Garlock to keep people out or to keep himself 
out.  There is no indication of any agreement or any 
understanding between Mr. Garlock and the Kieffers 
that Mr. Garlock was to stay away unless allowed in by 
them. Again, Mr. Garlock felt he could come and go but 
he, out of respect, knocked on the door before 
entering. 
Oral argument transcript.  This argument relies more on 
"negative" evidence than on the results of a reasonable inquiry 
conducted by the officers.  The record demonstrates that answers 
to those questions were available to the officers at the time of 
the search, if they had only asked.15  Further, to resolve a 
Fourth Amendment question based on information not known to the 
officers at the time of the search merely because the defendant 
did not volunteer it would effectively shift the burden of 
proof. 
¶40 The State next points to several cases discussing a 
“legal presumption that a child—emancipated or not—who resides 
with his or her parents shares common authority with the parent 
                     
15 The dissent criticizes the majority for taking a "rigid 
approach" to the need for police officers to ask enough 
questions to satisfy a reasonable belief that the third party 
has apparent authority to consent.  There is no magic "litany" 
of questions.  However, had the investigating officers asked 
even one of the two questions posed by the dissent, namely 
whether Garlock "could enter the loft whenever he felt like it" 
or "could the Kieffers exclude Garlock from entering" the loft, 
we might well have concluded that the officers were reasonable 
in believing Garlock had apparent authority.  See dissenting op. 
at 10.  Because they did not ask pointed questions like those 
suggested by the dissent, the information the officers did 
obtain was insufficient to establish reasonable belief of 
consent under the Fourth Amendment.  
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
23
to consent to a search,” despite the fact that defendant Kieffer 
is not Garlock's child.  See, e.g., Brooks, 660 N.E.2d 270; 
State v. Summers, 764 P.2d 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).  Wisconsin 
does not recognize a presumption of common authority to consent 
to a search when a defendant lives with his or her parents or 
close relatives.  We disagree with the rationale in the foreign 
cases which have adopted such a presumption, as cited by the 
State, and decline to adopt such a presumption in a case where 
the defendant does not live with either of his parents. 
¶41 For example, in Brooks, the Illinois court applied the 
presumption to facts presented by the parties' lawyers in 
chambers.  See 660 N.E.2d at 275.  There was no evidentiary 
hearing.  The appellate court affirmed the denial of the 
defendant's suppression motion based not on facts in the record 
obtained through police inquiry and observation, but in essence 
on "negative" evidence:  "The police officers did not know the 
defendant paid rent to his mother.  There was no evidence the 
defendant had exclusive possession of his bedroom.  No one said 
the room was locked in the defendant's absence, or that he had 
given explicit instructions not to allow anyone to enter."  Id. 
at 276.  Most if not all of the "negative" facts were available 
to the police in Brooks, had they inquired. 
¶42 The presumption, as described in the Summers case 
cited by the State, is actually a qualified one.  The Summers 
court relied on Matlock to state that "there is no doubt that a 
parent may authorize a search of areas within the home to which 
all family members have equal access."  764 P.2d at 252.  The 
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
24
question 
left 
open 
by 
that 
statement 
was 
"under 
what 
circumstances a parent may authorize the search of a child's 
room."  Id.  The Summers court distinguished between consent to 
search of a dependent child's room from consent to search an 
emancipated child's room.  "When a child is emancipated but 
occupies a room in the parent's home, pays rent, and otherwise 
manifests his (or her) independence from the parent, that child 
is entitled to the same protection as a tenant."  Id. at 253. 
¶43 The very distinctions made in Summers convince us not 
to adopt a presumption of authority to consent in this case. 
Here, the defendant is not the child of the third party, but is 
an adult married to the third party's adult child.  The marriage 
of two adults is certainly a manifestation of independence from 
a parent.  Further, our decision in Mears confirms that familial 
relationship is but one of many factors to be considered.16 
¶44 In Wisconsin there is no presumption of common 
authority to consent to a search when an adult defendant lives 
with his or her spouse's parents or close relatives.  Because 
the officers in this case only asked questions regarding whether 
there was a written lease and whether the Kieffers paid rent, we 
conclude that they lacked a reasonable basis to believe that 
Garlock possessed apparent authority to consent to a search of 
the defendant's living area. 
                     
16 We recognize the premise that as a "general matter, one 
spouse has the authority to consent to a search of premises 
jointly occupied by both spouses."  United States v. Duran, 957 
F.2d 499, 503-04, (7th Cir. 1992), citing United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).  
No.  96-0008-CR  
 
25
¶45 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Garlock 
lacked actual 
authority 
to 
consent 
to a 
search of the 
defendant's living area.  In addition, we conclude that the 
police made insufficient inquiry and thus could not reasonably 
rely upon Garlock's apparent authority to consent to a search of 
the loft area.  Our conclusions on the Fourth Amendment 
questions render the initial entry and search constitutionally 
invalid, and thus avoid a need to address the other issues 
raised by the defendant. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
96-0008.jpw 
 
1 
¶46 JON P. WILCOX, J. (Dissenting).   Today's decision 
requires this court to strike a delicate balance between two 
opposing 
interests 
that 
are 
inherent 
to 
constitutional 
considerations arising under the Fourth Amendment.  On the one 
hand, we must attempt to avoid rules and procedures that "leave 
law-abiding citizens at the mercy of [police] officers' whim or 
caprice."  Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
 On the other, we must also be concerned with rules and 
technicalities which "unduly hamper law enforcement," id., by 
superseding 
the 
practical, 
day-to-day 
judgment 
of 
police 
officers in the field. 
¶47 Not surprisingly, the accepted method of striking this 
balance turns on principles of "reasonableness."  See, e.g., 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).  The majority 
decision, though built upon this standard of "reasonableness," 
overlooks the fact that warrantless searches based upon the 
apparent common authority of a third party inherently require 
police officers to make on-the-scene, commonsense determinations 
as to the validity of that third party's common authority.  As a 
result, the majority applies the rules governing apparent common 
authority in an unnecessarily rigid and impractical fashion.  
Accordingly, I dissent.17 
                     
17 For purposes of this dissent, I agree with the majority 
that Mr. Garlock did not have actual common authority over the 
garage loft in this case.  Therefore, this dissent addresses 
only the police officers' reliance upon Mr. Garlock's apparent 
common authority to consent to the garage loft search.  
96-0008.jpw 
 
2 
¶48 The United States Supreme Court has held that police 
may rely upon a third party's apparent common authority to 
consent to a search of the defendant's residence, even if that 
third party lacks actual common authority to do so, provided 
that the reliance is "reasonable."  See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 
186-87.  The reasonableness of an officer's reliance in any 
given situation is determined by use of an objective standard.  
See id. at 188-189. 
¶49 Therefore, our duty in this case is to determine 
whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment [of 
the search] warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
that the consenting party had authority over the premises."  Id. 
at 188 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  "If not, then warrantless 
entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority 
actually exists.  But if so, the search is valid."  Id. at 188-
89.   
¶50 This standard of reasonableness is no different from 
that which is ordinarily demanded of police officers in order to 
comply 
with 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution.  See id. at 185-86.  To fully explain this 
principle, it is worth quoting the Rodriguez court at length: 
 
It 
is 
apparent 
that 
in 
order 
to 
satisfy 
the 
"reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 
what is generally demanded of the many factual 
determinations that must regularly be made by agents 
of the government—whether the magistrate issuing a 
warrant, the police officer executing a warrant, or 
the police officer conducting a search or seizure 
96-0008.jpw 
 
3 
under 
one 
of 
the 
exceptions 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement—is not that they always be correct, but 
that they always be reasonable.  As we put it in 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 
1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949): 
 
"Because many situations which confront officers in 
the course of executing their duties are more or less 
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on 
their part.  But the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to 
their conclusions of probability." 
 
We see no reason to depart from this general rule with 
respect to facts bearing upon the authority to consent 
to a search.  Whether the basis for such authority 
exists is the sort of recurring factual question to 
which law enforcement officials must be expected to 
apply their judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment 
requires is that they answer it reasonably. 
Id. at 185-86. 
¶51 As the United States Supreme Court has recently 
emphasized, it is not possible to articulate precisely what the 
Fourth Amendment demands in terms of reasonableness.  See 
Ornelas v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1661 (1996).  At the 
very least, however, it is clear that the reasonableness 
requirement is a "commonsense, nontechnical conception[] that 
deal[s] with the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act."  Id. (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
¶52 Applying these standards of reasonableness to the case 
at bar, I conclude that Officer Priebe, Sergeant Bushey and 
Deputy Otterbacher (the "officers") reasonably relied upon Mr. 
Garlock's apparent common authority over the garage loft in 
96-0008.jpw 
 
4 
order to conduct a warrantless search of the premises.  In order 
to appropriately assess the reasonableness of the officers' 
actions in this case, I examine the extent of their knowledge at 
the time of the warrantless search. 
¶53 Before the officers entered the loft above Mr. 
Garlock's garage, they knew the following: 
1. Mr. Garlock was the owner of the premises in question, 
including the house, garage and loft above the garage. 
2. Mr. Garlock's daughter and her husband, Mr. Kieffer 
("the Kieffers"), slept in Mr. Garlock's loft above the garage. 
 Mr. Zattera was staying with the Kieffers at the time. 
3. Mr. Garlock's garage and loft were located 15-20 feet 
behind his house. 
4. There were no plumbing services connected to Mr. 
Garlock's loft.  The Kieffers had to come into Mr. Garlock's 
home to use the shower and bathroom. 
5. There was no telephone service to Mr. Garlock's loft. 
6. There was no lease or agreement to pay rent between the 
Kieffers and Mr. Garlock. 
7. There was electricity running to Mr. Garlock's loft.  
The Kieffers sometimes helped pay the electric bills for the 
loft. 
8. There was no separate entrance to the loft from the 
outside of the garage.  One had to enter the loft by first 
entering Mr. Garlock's garage through a door which was not 
locked at the time of the search. 
96-0008.jpw 
 
5 
9. Mr. Garlock usually knocked before entering the loft 
"out of respect." 
10. The door to the loft was also unlocked at the time of 
the search. 
¶54 With this knowledge, I conclude that the officers 
reasonably believed that Mr. Garlock had common authority over, 
or sufficient relationship to, the garage loft in order to 
authorize a warrantless search of the premises.  That is, the 
officers acted reasonably under the circumstances in believing 
that Mr. Garlock had "mutual use of the property" through "joint 
access or control for most purposes."18  United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974).  Accordingly, I conclude 
that the Kieffers assumed the risk that Mr. Garlock might permit 
the garage loft to be searched.  See id. 
¶55 Viewed together, the first five facts listed above, 
together with all logical inferences therefrom, would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that the garage loft was not a 
separate, self-sustained living space.  Mr. Garlock's garage was 
situated in close proximity to his actual home, and the Kieffers 
slept in the loft—they had no plumbing or running water to speak 
of.  With this knowledge, it would be reasonable for the 
officers to conclude that the Kieffers would have to enter Mr. 
                     
18 In assessing Mr. Garlock's apparent common authority, it 
is important not to cloud one's reasoning with the accepted 
conclusion that Mr. Garlock did not have actual common authority 
over the garage loft.  In this analysis, we must examine only 
the reasonableness of the officers' belief that Mr. Garlock had 
such authority. 
96-0008.jpw 
 
6 
Garlock's house every time they had to wash their hands, use the 
toilet, take a shower, brush their teeth, or even get a drink of 
tap water. 
¶56 These observations would in turn make it reasonable 
for the officers to conclude that the garage loft was more akin 
to a bedroom of the Garlock house, rather than a separate "home" 
for the Kieffers.19  As the majority recognizes, courts have 
afforded a legal presumption to the validity of a parent's 
common authority over their children's bedrooms, whether or not 
that child is married.  See, e.g., People v. Daniels, 93 Cal. 
Rptr. 628, 631-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); People v. Brooks, 660 
N.E.2d 270, 275 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); State v. Packard, 389 So. 
2d 56, 58 (La. 1980); State v. Kinderman, 136 N.W.2d 577, 580 
                     
19 That the garage loft was located in a building separate 
from the Garlock home is not dispositive in this situation, 
since we are concerned with Mr. Garlock's apparent common 
authority, not his common habitation, of the premises to be 
searched.  See State v. Zimmerman, 529 N.W.2d 171, 175 (N.D. 
1995) ("Common authority is not restricted to a single residence 
or dwelling.  If the third party has control over or joint 
access to any property, common authority exists."). 
The majority seems to think that this dissent references 
the Kieffers' need to use the Garlock home for such everyday 
activities 
as 
brushing 
one's 
teeth 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
determining what the officers concluded about the Kieffers' 
actual or apparent authority to use the Garlock residence.  See 
majority op. at 4 n.3.  Much to the contrary, this information 
is of critical importance to the officers' assessment of whether 
the garage loft served as a separate "home" for the Kieffers, or 
merely as a separate bedroom of the Garlock residence.  The 
officers' conclusions, if any, regarding the Kieffers' actual or 
apparent authority to use the Garlock residence are irrelevant. 
96-0008.jpw 
 
7 
(Minn. 1965); State v. Summers, 764 P.2d 250, 253-54 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1988).20 
¶57 This information provides a background against which 
to assess the remaining five facts known to the officers at the 
time of the search.  Analyzed together, the latter five facts 
listed above would alert the officers to the following: Mr. 
Garlock was not the Kieffers' landlord, nor could the Kieffers 
appropriately be labeled as "tenants."  The Kieffers did not pay 
rent, and there was no written or oral lease—only an undefined 
"agreement" that the Kieffers would help to pay the utility 
                     
20 Interestingly, the only reason given by the majority for 
declining to adopt the legal presumption which other states have 
adopted in these situations is that Mr. Kieffer is not the child 
of Mr. Garlock.  See majority op. at 22-23, 24 ("We disagree 
with the rationale in the foreign cases which have adopted such 
a presumption, as cited by the State, and decline to adopt such 
a presumption in a case where the defendant does not live with 
either of his parents.").  I find this to be an artificial 
distinction, because it ignores the fact that Mr. Garlock's 
daughter lived in the garage loft.  Mr. Garlock's apparent 
common authority to consent to a search of the garage loft 
should not be affected merely because the defendant is not his 
biological son. 
I also note that many courts have upheld searches of a 
defendant's residence when consent for that search was given by 
a relative other than the defendant's parents.  See Timothy E. 
Travers, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence Discovered in 
Search of Defendant's Property or Residence Authorized by 
Defendant's Adult Relative Other Than Spouse—State Cases, 4 
A.L.R. 4th 196, §§ 13-19 (1981) (reviewing cases which have 
upheld third-party consent searches authorized by brothers; 
sisters; 
grandparents; 
fathers-, 
mothers-, 
brothers-, 
and 
sisters-in-law; and cousins).  If the majority declines to adopt 
such a presumption, it should do so based upon the merits of 
that presumption and not upon the artificial distinction which 
it advances today. 
96-0008.jpw 
 
8 
bills from time to time.  Under any reasonable interpretation of 
the Garlock/Kieffer living agreement, this was not an arm's-
length rental arrangement. 
¶58 Moreover, Mr. Garlock manifested his apparent common 
authority by leading police through his house, out the back door 
to the garage, through the unlocked garage door (the sole access 
to the loft), up the loft stairs and through the unlocked loft 
door at 8:45 a.m. because he was "very upset" that "drugs were 
on [his] property." 
¶59 Together, these facts would lead the officers to 
reasonably believe that Mr. Garlock could enter the garage loft 
at will, even if that belief was ultimately a mistaken one.  
Although Mr. Garlock told the officers that he usually knocked 
"out of respect," this fact could lead an officer to reasonably 
conclude that Mr. Garlock was not obligated to knock, but did so 
merely to respect the privacy of his daughter and son-in-law. 
¶60 Looking at all of the facts known to the police at the 
time of the search, then, I conclude that it was reasonable for 
the officers to believe that Mr. Garlock had common authority 
over his garage loft.  In this case, the officers did not simply 
"accept at face value the consenting party's apparent assumption 
that he has authority to allow the contemplated search."  See 
majority op. at 19 (quoting Brooks, 660 N.E.2d at 276).  To the 
contrary, the officers made a commonsense determination, acting 
on facts leading sensibly to their conclusion, that Mr. Garlock 
had common authority over his garage loft. 
96-0008.jpw 
 
9 
¶61 Unfortunately for the police officers of this state, 
the majority concludes that at least 6 more questions should 
have been asked by the officers when they arrived at the Garlock 
home: 
1. Whether the Kieffers had the right to exclude others 
from entry into the loft area. 
2. Whether it was Garlock's normal practice to enter and 
exit the loft area whenever he felt like it. 
3. 
Whether 
Garlock 
considered 
himself 
the 
Kieffers' 
"landlord." 
4. Whether the loft door had a lock on it. 
5. Whether Garlock had a key to the loft door. 
6. Whether Garlock made personal use of the loft area 
himself. 
See majority op. at 21. 
¶62 Not only does the majority emphasize that the police 
officers failed to ask this litany of questions, but it goes to 
great lengths to illustrate that these specific legal questions 
must be asked directly.  See majority op. at 22, 24 ("The record 
demonstrates that answers to those questions were available to 
the officers at the time of the search, if they had only 
asked."); ("Because the officers only asked questions regarding 
whether there was a written lease and whether the Kieffers paid 
rent, we conclude that they lacked a reasonable basis to believe 
that Garlock possessed apparent authority to consent to a search 
of his son-in-law's living area."). 
96-0008.jpw 
 
10
¶63 Such a rigid approach which requires police officers 
to ask all of the "right" questions inappropriately reduces the 
discretion and judgment of police officers in the field.  
Without such discretion, and the ability to draw all logical 
inferences from what they observe at the scene, officers will be 
compelled to act more as "legal technicians" than police 
officers.  Ornelas, 116 S.Ct. at 1661.  Nevertheless, the 
majority frowns upon the use of "negative" evidence to reach a 
reasonable conclusion as to a third party's common authority 
over the premises to be searched.  See majority op. at 22, 23.  
I conclude that "negative" evidence, though not dispositive on 
its own, can often be helpful when coupled with "positive" 
evidence to support an officer's conclusions. 
¶64 In this case, the officers received all of the 
information discussed above, and did not receive any information 
that would contradict their beliefs, such as an indication that 
Mr. Garlock could not enter the loft area whenever he felt like 
it, or that the Kieffers could rightfully exclude Mr. Garlock 
from entry.  Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for 
the officers to conclude that, ultimately, Mr. Garlock could 
enter the loft if he desired to.  I respectfully dissent. 
¶65 I am authorized to state that Justice Donald W. 
Steinmetz and Justice N. Patrick Crooks join this dissent. 
96-0008.jpw 
 
1