Case Title: Johnson v. Woodard

Citation: 

Docket Number: 092323

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Kinser C.J., Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, JJ., and 
Carrico and Koontz, S.JJ.* 
 
GARR N. JOHNSON, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 092323 
 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
       March 4, 2011 
GREGORY WOODARD, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY 
Westbrook J. Parker, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in imposing sanctions against forty Gloucester citizens 
(the petitioners) who submitted petitions in the circuit court 
seeking the removal of four members (the supervisors) of 
Gloucester County’s seven member Board of Supervisors pursuant 
to Code §§ 24.2-233 and 24.2-235.  Although the petitioners 
raise a number of issues, we address only two issues that are 
dispositive of this appeal.  First, whether the circuit court 
retained jurisdiction beyond 21 days to consider a motion for 
sanctions after entry of a nonsuit order which stated that the 
court was retaining jurisdiction and that it was not a final 
order for purposes of Rule 1:1.  Second, whether the 
petitioners were parties to the removal action such that they 
may be subject to sanctions pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1.  We 
hold that the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the 
                                                 
* Justice Koontz presided and participated in the hearing 
and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on February 1, 2011; Justice Kinser was sworn in as 
Chief Justice on February 1, 2011. 
motion for sanctions, but erred in imposing sanctions against 
the petitioners because they were not parties to the removal 
action. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
The petitioners submitted petitions pursuant to Code 
§§ 24.2-233 and 24.2-235 seeking to remove the supervisors from 
office.1  The petitions were signed by the petitioners and also 
were signed by ten percent of the registered voters who voted 
in the last election for the Gloucester County Board of 
Supervisors.  The petitions alleged that the supervisors 
engaged in conduct that amounted to a “neglect of duty, misuse 
of office, or incompetence in the performance of duties.”  At 
the time the petitions were submitted in the circuit court, the 
                                                 
1 Code § 24.2-233, entitled “Removal of elected and certain 
appointed officers by courts,” provides in pertinent part: 
 
Upon petition, a circuit court may remove from 
office any elected officer or officer who has been 
appointed to fill an elective office, residing within 
the jurisdiction of the court: 
 
1. 
For neglect of duty, misuse of office, or 
incompetence in the performance of duties 
when that neglect of duty, misuse of 
office, or incompetence in the performance 
of duties has a material adverse effect 
upon the conduct of the office. 
 
 
Code § 24.2-235, entitled “Procedure,” establishes the 
procedure for initiating a removal action, and provides that 
once a petition is filed in the circuit court, “the court shall 
issue a rule requiring the officer to show cause why he should 
not be removed from office.” 
 
2
supervisors were under criminal indictments for, among other 
things, violating the Virginia Freedom of Information Act.  The 
petitions cited the allegations made in the indictments as a 
basis for removal pursuant to Code § 24.2-233. 
After the petitions were filed, the circuit court issued 
rules to show cause against the supervisors as required by Code 
§ 24.2-235.  The circuit court appointed a special prosecutor 
to litigate the removal action, and to prosecute the 
supervisors on the criminal charges alleged in the indictments.  
The criminal charges against the supervisors were later 
dismissed upon a motion to dismiss filed by the special 
prosecutor. 
The special prosecutor then moved to nonsuit the removal 
action.  During a hearing on the motion to nonsuit, the special 
prosecutor first stated that the motion was made strictly on 
procedural grounds, that the signatures of the petitioners were 
not executed under penalty of perjury, and that the grounds for 
removal were not stated with reasonable accuracy and detail.  
However, the special prosecutor added that witnesses who were 
initially cooperative were no longer cooperative.  Based upon 
the information that he had from the witnesses, the special 
prosecutor stated that while there were “bad decisions” made, 
there were “no criminal acts” committed by the supervisors, and 
that he believed the case would not withstand a motion to 
 
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strike.  The circuit court granted the motion and entered an 
order entitled “ORDER OF NONSUIT” (the nonsuit order).  The 
nonsuit order stated, in part: 
[It is] ORDERED that, for purposes of Rule 1:1, 
this is not a final order, in that this Court shall 
retain jurisdiction of this matter to consider any 
application for attorney’s fees and costs and such 
other relief as may be sought. 
 
After entry of the nonsuit order, the supervisors filed an 
application for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Code 
§ 24.2-238, and a motion for sanctions against the petitioners 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1.  During a hearing on these 
motions, the circuit court stated that he had “never seen more 
of a misuse of the judicial system” in his 23 years as a judge.  
The circuit court awarded the supervisors attorney’s fees and 
costs pursuant to Code § 24.2-238.2  The court also ordered that 
each petitioner pay $2,000 as a sanction for violating Code 
                                                 
2 In 2009, after the resolution of this case in the circuit 
court, the General Assembly amended Code § 24.2-238.  The 
amendment prohibits the imposition of attorney’s fees, costs, 
and sanctions on persons who sign removal petitions.  The 
amendment states: 
 
No person who signs a petition for the removal 
of an official pursuant to § 24.2-233 or who 
circulates such a petition (i) shall be liable for 
any costs associated with removal proceedings 
conducted pursuant to the petition, including 
attorney fees incurred by any other party or court 
costs, or (ii) shall have sanctions imposed against 
him pursuant to § 8.01-271.1. 
 
2009 Acts chs. 868, 876. 
 
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§ 8.01-271.1.  The June 2, 2009 order awarding attorney’s fees 
and costs and imposing sanctions was entered well more than 21 
days after the November 19, 2008 nonsuit order.  We granted the 
petitioners this appeal. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Jurisdiction 
The petitioners argue that the nonsuit order was a final 
order for purposes of Rule 1:1, and thus the circuit court lost 
jurisdiction over the case 21 days after its entry.  
Accordingly, the petitioners contend that the circuit court did 
not have jurisdiction to award the supervisors attorney’s fees 
and costs or to impose sanctions against the petitioners 
because the circuit court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and 
costs and imposing sanctions was entered more than 21 days 
after entry of the nonsuit order.  We disagree. 
Under Rule 1:1, “[a]ll final judgments, orders, and 
decrees . . . shall remain under the control of the trial court 
and subject to be modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-
one days after the date of entry, and no longer.”  In 
Williamsburg Peking Corp. v. Kong, 270 Va. 350, 619 S.E.2d 100 
(2005), we discussed Rule 1:1 and a circuit court’s 
jurisdiction in a case in which a plaintiff moved for a nonsuit 
when confronted with a motion for sanctions. 
 
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In Williamsburg Peking, the circuit court granted the 
plaintiff’s motion for a nonsuit, but refused to consider the 
defendant’s pending motion for sanctions, concluding that it no 
longer had jurisdiction after granting the plaintiff’s motion 
for a nonsuit.  Id. at 352, 619 S.E.2d at 101.  In reversing 
the judgment of the circuit court, we stated that “an order 
granting a nonsuit should be subject to the provisions of Rule 
1:1,” and, as such, “like all final judgments, [the nonsuit 
order] remained under the control and jurisdiction of the trial 
court for 21 days after the date of entry.”  Id. at 354, 619 
S.E.2d at 102 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Recognizing that a motion for sanctions “has no bearing on the 
facts giving rise to a right to seek judicial remedy,” we 
concluded that “the entry of a nonsuit order does not conclude 
a case as to any pending motion for sanctions.”  Id.  
Accordingly, we stated that under the facts of the case, the 
circuit court was “empowered to consider the sanctions motion 
either before the entry of the nonsuit order or within 21 days 
after the entry of the nonsuit order.”  Id. at 355, 619 S.E.2d 
at 102-03. 
Thus, our decision in Williamsburg Peking holds that a 
circuit court retains jurisdiction to consider a party’s motion 
for sanctions for 21 days after entry of a nonsuit order.  
However, in this case, unlike in Williamsburg Peking, the 
 
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nonsuit order explicitly stated the circuit court’s intent to 
retain jurisdiction to consider the motion for sanctions beyond 
the 21-day period in Rule 1:1.  The supervisors argue that this 
language in the nonsuit order was sufficient to retain 
jurisdiction beyond the 21-day period in Rule 1:1.  We agree. 
In Super Fresh Food Markets of Virginia, Inc. v. Ruffin, 
263 Va. 555, 558, 561 S.E.2d 734, 735 (2002), we addressed “the 
requirements of Rule 1:1 to extend the time within which a 
final judgment remains under the control of the trial court.”  
In Super Fresh, we stated: 
Rule 1:1 facially contemplates the existence of 
a final judgment that a court subsequently seeks to 
modify, vacate, or suspend.  The rule is not 
applicable prior to the entry of a final judgment, 
and the twenty-one day time period contained in the 
rule does not delay the finality of a judgment.  
Thus, when a trial court enters an order, or decree, 
in which a judgment is rendered for a party, unless 
that order expressly provides that the court retains 
jurisdiction to reconsider the judgment or to address 
other matters still pending in the action before it, 
the order renders a final judgment and the twenty-one 
day time period prescribed by Rule 1:1 begins to run. 
 
Id. at 561, 561 S.E.2d at 737. 
Thus, Super Fresh holds that a circuit court may avoid the 
application of the 21 day time period in Rule 1:1 by including 
specific language stating that the court is retaining 
jurisdiction to address matters still pending before the court.  
In the present case, the nonsuit order explicitly stated the 
court’s intent to retain jurisdiction over the case:  “this 
 
7
Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter to consider any 
application for attorney’s fees and costs.”  The nonsuit order 
also stated that “for [the] purposes of Rule 1:1, this is not a 
final order.”  Under our holding in Super Fresh, the nonsuit 
order was not a final order under Rule 1:1 because the language 
was sufficient for the court to retain jurisdiction to consider 
the motions for attorney’s fees and costs and sanctions.  We 
therefore hold that the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter 
the order awarding attorney’s fees and costs and imposing 
sanctions against the petitioners. 
B. 
Parties to the Removal Action 
The petitioners next contend that the circuit court erred 
in sanctioning them pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1 because they 
were not parties to the removal action.  The petitioners assert 
that the only parties to the removal action are the 
Commonwealth, as the moving party, and the supervisors, as the 
responding parties.  Therefore, the petitioners conclude that 
the circuit court erred in imposing sanctions against them.3  We 
agree with the petitioners on this issue. 
Pursuant to Code § 24.2-233, a removal action commences 
“[u]pon petition” that “must be signed by a number of 
                                                 
3 As we stated in footnote 2, supra, the General Assembly 
amended Code § 24.2-238 while this case was on appeal.  Under 
current Code § 24.2-238(B), no person who signs a removal 
petition shall have sanctions imposed against him pursuant to 
Code § 8.01-271.1. 
 
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registered voters who reside within the jurisdiction of the 
officer equal to ten percent of the total number of votes cast 
at the last election for the office that the officer holds.”  
After the petition is filed in the circuit court, “the court 
shall issue a rule requiring the officer to show cause why he 
should not be removed from office.”  Code § 24.2-235 (emphasis 
added).  Thus, petitioners initiate a removal action by 
submitting petitions that, once filed in the circuit court, 
require the court to issue rules to show cause against the 
officers.  While petitioners in a removal action initiate the 
action by filing a petition, the Code does not state that they 
are parties to the removal action. 
Although the Code does not explicitly state who is the 
moving party in a removal action, Code § 24.2-237 provides 
guidance.  This Code section, titled “Who to represent 
Commonwealth; trial by jury; appeal,” provides that the 
“attorney for the Commonwealth shall represent the Commonwealth 
in any trial under this article.”  The section goes on to state 
that “[t]he Commonwealth and the defendant shall each have the 
right to apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of error.”  Code 
§ 24.2-237.  This language presupposes that the Commonwealth is 
the moving party in a removal action.  This view is also 
supported by our case law.  In reviewing a removal action under 
a predecessor statute, we stated it is “one which is primarily 
 
9
public in its nature, which although not a criminal case is one 
highly penal in its nature, and one in which the Commonwealth 
is the party plaintiff.”  Warren v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 573, 
594, 118 S.E. 125, 131 (1923). 
Nothing in the Code or our jurisprudence supports the 
supervisors’ argument that the petitioners are parties to the 
removal action.  The supervisors correctly note that the 
caption of this case in the circuit court – and the caption of 
the case in this Court – lists the petitioners as the moving 
parties.  The supervisors also cite the fact that the circuit 
court purported to assign a special prosecutor to represent the 
interests of the petitioners.  But, neither putting a non-
party’s name in the caption of a case nor assigning counsel to 
represent a non-party makes such person a party to a case. 
A petitioner in a removal action is analogous to a victim 
in a criminal proceeding.  In both cases, while the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney may be advancing the interests of the 
petitioner or victim, the real party in interest is the 
Commonwealth.  Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 
263-64, 355 S.E.2d 579, 580-81 (1987).  Additionally, in both 
cases, the Commonwealth’s Attorney does not owe the petitioner 
or victim a professional duty.  See Rule 1.2(a) of the Virginia 
Rules of Professional Conduct; Restatement (3rd) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 14 (2000) (creation of lawyer-client 
 
10
relationship requires manifestation of an “intent that the 
lawyer provide legal services for the person” and that “the 
lawyer manifests to the person [the lawyer’s] consent to do 
so”).  The Commonwealth’s Attorney’s duty is to further the 
best interests of the Commonwealth, not the interests of the 
respective petitioners.  Counsel for the supervisors 
acknowledged that the special prosecutor represented the 
Commonwealth and not the petitioners when, in arguing against 
the entry of a nonsuit, he stated: 
The posture in which this case is in front of you is 
in the form of the Commonwealth versus public 
officials.  The petitioners have no role in the sense 
that it is the Commonwealth that determines how to 
proceed, if to proceed.  The petitions are really 
what initiates or brings to the forefront the demand, 
if you will, on the Commonwealth if it should 
proceed.  So Mr. Randall [the special prosecutor] is 
truly representing the Commonwealth and not the 
citizens [the petitioners]. 
 
Having concluded that the petitioners were not parties to 
the removal proceeding, we now address whether the petitioners 
– as non-parties – were subject to sanctions under Code § 8.01-
271.1.  For the reasons stated below, we hold that Code § 8.01-
271.1 applies only to parties and their attorneys, and does not 
permit the imposition of sanctions against the petitioners 
because they were not “parties” to the removal action. 
 
Code § 8.01-271.1 provides, in part, that the 
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certificate by him that (i) he has read the pleading, 
 
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motion, or other paper, (ii) to the best of his 
knowledge, information and belief, formed after 
reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, and (iii) it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
This Code section also places a similar duty upon “an 
attorney or party” making an oral motion.  Id.  The last 
paragraph in Code § 8.01-271.1 gives circuit courts the 
authority to impose sanctions for a violation of these duties: 
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed 
or made in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon 
the person who signed the paper or made the motion, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, 
which may include an order to pay to the other party 
or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, 
motion, or other paper or making of the motion, 
including a reasonable attorney’s fee. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
The supervisors argue that the court had the authority to 
sanction the petitioners because the statute states that the 
court may sanction a “person who sign[s]” a paper in violation 
of the statute.  According to the supervisors, the term 
“person” is broader than “attorney or party,” and as such, it 
includes non-parties – such as the petitioners - who submit 
 
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papers with the court because they are “person[s] who signed” 
papers.  We disagree. 
The first paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1 provides that 
“[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper” must be 
signed by either an attorney who represents a party or a party 
who is not represented by an attorney.  As stated above, the 
second paragraph imposes a duty upon “an attorney or party” who 
signs a paper that is filed with the court.  The fourth 
paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1 provides the penalty for 
violation of the duties imposed by the statute.  That paragraph 
provides that an appropriate sanction may be imposed upon “the 
person who signed the paper or made the motion, a represented 
party, or both.”  Code § 8.01-271.1.  This paragraph is 
referring to a violation of the duties that are imposed upon 
“attorney[s] or part[ies]” in the second and third paragraphs 
of the statute.  As such, the term “person” refers only to an 
“attorney or party” that has a duty under Code § 8.01-271.1.  
See Andrews v. Ring, 266 Va. 311, 319, 585 S.E.2d 780, 784 
(2003) (“When general words and specific words are grouped 
together, the general words are limited and qualified by the 
specific words and will be construed to embrace only objects 
similar in nature to those objects identified by the specific 
words.”).  Thus, under Code § 8.01-271.1, a court may only 
sanction an “attorney or party” who violates the duties imposed 
 
13
by the statute.  Having concluded that the petitioners were not 
subject to sanctions under Code § 8.01-271.1, we hold that the 
circuit court erred in imposing sanctions against the 
petitioners because they were not parties in the removal 
action. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the judgment 
of the circuit court imposing sanctions against the 
petitioners.  Because of our decision on the two issues 
discussed, the remaining issues raised by the petitioners are 
rendered moot. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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