Case Title: State v. Russell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 78098-6

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 2006-09-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 16–0807 
 
Filed June 23, 2017 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
ANDREW LEE RUSSELL, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buena Vista County, 
Carl J. Petersen, Judge. 
 
 
The defendant appeals a district court order granting the State’s 
motion to regulate discovery that prevents the defendant from issuing ex 
parte investigatory subpoenas duces tecum.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Angela Campbell of Dickey & Campbell Law Firm, PLC, Des 
Moines, and John Sandy of Sandy Law Firm, P.C., Spirit Lake, for 
appellant. 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins and Andrew B. 
Prosser, Assistant Attorneys General, David Patton, County Attorney, 
and Ashley Bennett, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Alan R. Ostergren, Muscatine, for amicus curiae Iowa County 
Attorneys Association. 
 
 
 
2 
ZAGER, Justice. 
 
In this interlocutory appeal, Andrew Russell asserts the right to 
serve ex parte subpoenas duces tecum1 upon third parties under the 
rules of criminal and civil procedure without providing notice to the 
State.  Additionally, Russell asserts that denying him the right to issue 
ex parte subpoenas duces tecum denies him the constitutional rights to 
the effective assistance of counsel, compulsory process, and due process 
under the United States and Iowa Constitutions.  The State filed a 
motion to regulate discovery that would prevent the defendant from 
issuing an investigatory subpoena duces tecum except in three 
circumstances: (1) by express agreement of the parties, (2) to a witness 
for a deposition with notice to all parties, or (3) to a witness for a trial or 
court hearing.  After a hearing, the district court found there was no 
statutory or constitutional authority to support Russell’s position that he 
had a right to issue ex parte subpoenas duces tecum.  The district court 
also ordered counsel for the defendant to provide notice to the State 
before serving any subpoenas duces tecum on third parties.  Russell 
sought interlocutory review and a stay, which we granted and retained.  
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the district court. 
I.  Background Facts and Proceedings. 
Because this case comes before us on a motion for interlocutory 
review on a discovery dispute, only the procedural history is relevant. 
On December 4, 2015, the State charged defendant Andrew 
Russell with one count of child endangerment in violation of Iowa Code 
section 726.6A (2015).  On March 15, 2016, the State filed a motion to 
1A subpoena duces tecum is a “subpoena ordering the witness to appear in 
court and to bring specified documents, records, or things.”  Subpoena Duces Tecum, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
                                                 
 
 
 
3 
regulate discovery and requested that the district court enter an order 
prohibiting Russell from issuing ex parte subpoenas duces tecum.  In the 
motion, the State requested that the district court order defense counsel 
not to “serve or deliver any subpoena upon any person or entity” except 
in three situations: (1) the express agreement of the parties, (2) to a 
witness for a deposition with notice to all parties, or (3) to a witness for 
trial or hearing. 
Russell resisted the motion and requested a hearing.  At the 
hearing, Russell argued that under the Iowa rules of criminal and civil 
procedure, he had the right to issue subpoenas without the necessity of 
subpoenaing a witness to a hearing or trial, and without notice to the 
State.  Russell further argued that granting the State’s motion would 
violate his right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of 
the Iowa Constitution; his right to compulsory process; and his due 
process rights under the United States Constitution and article I, section 
9 of the Iowa Constitution. 
The district court set the matter for hearing on April 11.  After the 
hearing, the district court granted the State’s motion and issued a 
protective order stating that Russell’s counsel was 
prohibited from issuing any subpoena except to secure the 
attendance of a witness listed as a witness by the State at a 
deposition on notice to all parties pursuant to Iowa Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 2.13(1); to secure the attendance of a 
witness not listed by the State by order of the Court 
pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.13(2); to 
secure the attendance of a witness at trial or other court 
proceedings pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 
2.13(2).  The Defendant may also attach a request for 
documents, subpoena duces tecum, pursuant to Iowa Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 2.15(2), provided the subpoena also 
requests the witness’s attendance in the above-prescribed 
manner. 
 
 
 
4 
The district court found that there was no authority to support Russell’s 
position whether statutory, rule-based, or in caselaw.  The district court 
noted that its decision did not prevent Russell from obtaining 
information to support an investigation, nor did it require him to show 
his hand prematurely.  Russell applied for interlocutory review which we 
granted and retained. 
II.  Standing. 
Russell argues the State does not have standing to object because 
it is not “injuriously affected” by the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum 
to a third party as part of a defendant’s investigation to build a defense.  
Because the third party possesses the records and not the State, the 
State is not injured by the subpoena.  The State responds it does have 
standing to object because the third party’s refusal to produce 
documents or the third party’s deliverance of documents may impact the 
State’s ability to bring the defendant to trial within the limits of speedy 
trial requirements.  
Our general rule for a party to have standing to object is whether 
the party was “prejudiced by the claimed error.”  Mundy v. Warren, 268 
N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 1978).  Other courts have described the test for 
standing to quash a subpoena.  “A party has standing to move to quash 
a subpoena addressed to another if the subpoena infringes upon the 
movant’s legitimate interests.”  United States v. Raineri, 670 F.2d 702, 
712 (7th Cir. 1982).  In such a situation, “[t]he prosecution’s standing 
rest[s] upon its interest in preventing undue lengthening of the trial [and] 
undue harassment of its witness . . . .”  Id.; see also Schreibvogel v. State, 
228 P.3d 874, 880 (Wyo. 2010). 
Other courts have decided whether the State has standing to 
challenge the issuance of subpoena duces tecum.  The majority approach 
 
 
 
5 
for courts interpreting Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c)2 or their 
own similar rules is to find the State does have standing.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Lam, 827 N.E.2d 209, 213 (Mass. 2005). 
In Lam, the State objected to the defendant’s issuance of 
subpoenas duces tecum and the defendant argued the State lacked 
standing.  827 N.E.2d at 213.  The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts noted it would follow the majority approach and found 
[t]he Commonwealth, charged with prosecuting the case, will 
often be able to assist a judge in determining whether a 
motion under rule 17(a)(2) involves an improper “fishing 
expedition.”  The Commonwealth, of course, also has an 
interest 
in 
preventing 
unnecessary 
harassment 
of 
a 
complainant and other Commonwealth witnesses caused by 
burdensome, frivolous, or otherwise improper discovery 
requests.  A complainant or witness should be forced neither 
to retain counsel nor to appear before a court in order to 
challenge, on the basis of a partial view of the case, 
potentially impermissible examination of her personal effects 
and the records of her personal interactions. 
Id. at 213–14 (citation omitted). 
In State v. DeCaro, the Connecticut Supreme Court held the State 
had standing to move to quash a defendant’s subpoena duces tecum.  
745 A.2d 800, 816 (Conn. 2000).  Although the subpoena duces tecum 
was served on a key witness, the court’s reasoning for concluding the 
State had standing to object rested upon the State’s “interest in 
preventing undue lengthening of the trial [and] undue harassment of its 
2The rule provides,  
A subpoena may order the witness to produce any books, papers, 
documents, data, or other objects the subpoena designates.  The court 
may direct the witness to produce the designated items in court before 
trial or before they are to be offered in evidence.  When the items arrive, 
the court may permit the parties and their attorneys to inspect all or part 
of them. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(1). 
                                                 
 
 
 
6 
witness.”  Id. at 816 (alteration in original) (quoting Raineri, 670 F.2d at 
712). 
In People v. Spykstra, the Colorado Supreme Court likewise held 
the State had standing to move to quash a third-party subpoena duces 
tecum.  234 P.3d 662, 666 (Colo. 2010).  As the prosecuting party, the 
State has standing to object because it has an “interest in ensuring the 
propriety of the subpoenas,” managing the case, and preventing “witness 
harassment through improper discovery requests.”  Id. 
California has also recognized that the government generally has 
the right to file a motion to quash “so that evidentiary privileges are not 
sacrificed just because the subpoena recipient lacks sufficient self- 
interest to object.”  Kling v. Super. Ct., 239 P.3d 670, 677 (Cal. 2010) 
(quoting M.B. v. Super. Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 454, 461 (Ct. App. 2002)); see 
2 Charles Alan Wright & Peter J. Henning, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 275, at 262 (4th ed. 2009) (noting the rationale for requiring 
notice to the victim in Rule 17(c)(3) is that third parties “do not have the 
same incentive to challenge” a subpoena and a “victim may be unaware 
of the subpoena for his personal or confidential information”). 
While we acknowledge that a small minority of jurisdictions would 
find that the government has no standing to challenge the court’s 
issuance of an ex parte subpoena duces tecum, we conclude the State 
clearly has a specific interest in the outcome of this litigation as the party 
prosecuting the criminal case.  As the prosecuting party, the State’s 
interest in the outcome of the case is separate and distinct from that of 
the general population.  The State has an interest in managing the 
progression of the case, in preventing the lengthening of a trial when 
able, and in preventing undue witness pressure or harassment.  The 
injury to the State is also concrete rather than hypothetical.  The State 
 
 
 
7 
has the burden of bringing Russell to trial, and as such, has an interest 
in the documents produced.  We find that the State has standing in this 
case. 
III.  Standard of Review. 
“We review questions of statutory interpretation for correction of 
errors at law.”  State v. Dahl, 874 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Iowa 2016).  To the 
extent the violation of a constitutional right is alleged, our review is de 
novo.  Spitz v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 881 N.W.2d 456, 464 (Iowa 2016). 
IV.  Analysis. 
The district court granted the State’s motion to regulate discovery.  
In its order, the district court ruled that if Russell wished to issue a 
subpoena duces tecum, he could do so for purposes of a deposition, 
hearing, or trial, but was also required to provide notice to the State.  On 
appeal, Russell argues he has the right to issue an ex parte subpoena 
duces tecum under the rules of criminal and civil procedure.  He further 
argues the district court order violates his right to the effective assistance 
of counsel, his right to compulsory process, and his right to due process 
under the United States and Iowa Constitutions. 
A subpoena duces tecum is a “subpoena ordering the witness to 
appear in court and to bring specified documents, records, or things.”  
Subpoena Duces Tecum, Black’s Law Dictionary.  Russell seeks to use a 
subpoena duces tecum to produce documents from a third party only to 
his defense counsel for purposes of investigation.  He argues that he may 
do so without notice to the State and absent any concurrent deposition, 
hearing, or trial.  The State argues that this would violate the rules of 
criminal and civil procedure and that there is no basis for it under Iowa 
statute or caselaw.  The State also requests notice. 
 
 
 
8 
A.  Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure. 
1.  Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Rule 2.15 outlines the 
process for securing subpoenas for witnesses and for the production of 
documents from witnesses.  Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.15(1)–(2).  It provides, 
2.15(1) For witnesses.  A magistrate in a criminal 
action before the magistrate, and the clerk of court in any 
criminal action pending therein, shall issue blank subpoenas 
for witnesses, signed by the magistrate or clerk, with the seal 
of the court if by the clerk, and deliver as many of them as 
requested to the defendant or the defendant’s attorney or the 
attorney for the state. 
2.15(2) For production of documents—duces tecum.  A 
subpoena may contain a clause directing the witness to 
bring with the witness any book, writing, or other thing 
under the witness’s control which the witness is bound by 
law to produce as evidence.  The court on motion may 
dismiss or modify the subpoena if compliance would be 
unreasonable or oppressive. 
Id. 
 
The State also has the power to issue subpoenas and subpoenas 
duces tecum for witnesses prior to indictment.  See id. r. 2.5(6).  During 
its investigation into whether there is sufficient evidence that a crime 
occurred, the State has the authority to issue such subpoenas.  Id.  
However, once a criminal charge is filed, the State must disclose to the 
defendant the witnesses that were subpoenaed.  Id.  Further, the 
defendant has the right to be present and to cross-examine any 
witnesses subpoenaed.  Id. r. 2.14(1). 
 
The rules also provide the procedure by which a defendant may 
depose and seek documents from witnesses.  Id. r. 2.13.  A defendant 
has the right to depose any witness the State lists on the indictment or 
trial information.  Id. r. 2.13(1).  Upon notice to the court and the 
opposing party, a witness who will be deposed may also be ordered to 
produce “any designated book, paper, document, record, recording, or 
 
 
 
9 
other material, not privileged” at the time and place of the deposition.  Id. 
r. 2.13(2). 
 
The rules provide detailed provisions regarding discovery and 
disclosure of documents during discovery.  Id. r. 2.14.  There are 
provisions 
regarding 
mandatory 
and 
discretionary 
disclosure 
of 
documents and evidence.  Id.  Discovery is subject to regulation by the 
district court, and the district court has the power to order that 
“discovery or inspection be denied, restricted or deferred.”  Id. r. 
2.14(6)(a). 
2.  Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure.  While our rules of civil procedure 
do not apply to criminal matters, they can still be instructive in this 
situation.  See State v. Halstead, 791 N.W.2d 805, 813 (Iowa 2010).  
Russell argues that, with regard to ex parte subpoenas duces tecum, we 
should rely on the procedures outlined in the rules of civil procedure.  
However, it is important to highlight the significant differences between 
the rules. 
The rules of civil procedure are lengthier and more detailed than 
the rules of criminal procedure with regard to the issuance of civil 
subpoenas.  The rules of civil procedure provide for subpoenas duces 
tecum to persons, not just witnesses.  Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1701(4)(b).  In 
contrast, the rules of criminal procedure are for securing subpoenas for 
witnesses.  Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.15(1) (“A magistrate in a criminal action 
. . . shall issue blank subpoenas for witnesses . . . .” (Emphasis added.)); 
id. r. 2.15(2) (“A subpoena may contain a clause directing the witness to 
bring with the witness any book, writing, or other thing under the 
witness’s control which the witness is bound by law to produce as 
evidence.” (Emphasis added.)).  Additionally, the rules of civil procedure 
specifically provide that those persons subpoenaed may be “commanded 
 
 
 
10 
to produce documents, electronically stored information, or tangible 
things, or to permit the inspection of premises” without being required to 
attend a deposition, hearing, or trial.  Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.701(4)(b)(1).  No 
such language is contained in the rules of criminal procedure. 
There are, however, also important similarities between the rules of 
civil procedure and the rules of criminal procedure.  Significantly, the 
rules of civil procedure require notice to the opposing party.  Id. r. 
1.1701(3)(a).  Like the rules of criminal procedure, the subpoena is 
subject to the discretion of the district court and the district court may 
quash or modify a subpoena if required.  Id. r. 1.1701(4)(d)(1).  Both the 
rules of criminal procedure and the rules of civil procedure refer to the 
issuance of subpoenas duces tecum as the command to produce 
documents.  Compare id. r. 1.1701(1)(d) (“A command in a subpoena to 
produce documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things 
requires the responding party to permit inspection, copying, testing or 
sampling of the materials.” (Emphasis added.)), with Iowa R. Crim. P. 
2.15(2) (“A subpoena may contain a clause directing the witness to bring 
with the witness any book, writing, or other thing under the witness’s 
control which the witness is bound by law to produce as evidence.” 
(Emphasis added.)).  The use of the term “produce” contemplates 
production not just to one party in secret, but to both parties. 
Although Russell seeks to expand the use of subpoenas duces 
tecum by comparison to the more detailed terms contained in the rules of 
civil procedure, the rules of civil procedure still require notice and 
production.  However, the rules of criminal procedure also provide that 
the court “may dismiss or modify the subpoena if compliance would be 
unreasonable or oppressive.”  Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.15(2).  Absent any other 
 
 
 
11 
protocol, this is the proper procedure for Russell and other criminal 
defendants to utilize.   
3.  Approach of other states and the federal courts.  The majority of 
courts that have considered whether subpoenas duces tecum may be 
issued ex parte have concluded that, absent some sort of protocol, ex 
parte issuance is improper.  See, e.g., State v. DiPrete, 698 A.2d 223, 227 
(R.I. 1997). 
In DiPrete, the defendant issued an ex parte subpoena duces 
tecum pursuant to rule 17(c) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.3  Id. at 223–24.  The State filed a motion to compel 
the disclosure of the materials obtained through the pretrial subpoenas 
duces tecum, which the district court denied.  Id. at 224.  The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court ultimately concluded that three parts of the rule 
led to the conclusion “that litigation concerning issuance of and 
compliance with subpoenas duces tecum be conducted upon notice, and 
not in secret.”  Id. at 226–27 (quoting United States v. Urlacher, 136 
F.R.D. 550, 555–56 (W.D.N.Y. 1991)).  In order to ensure the rule would 
not be used as a discovery device, the court concluded that the “rule 
contemplates an adversarial process in which an opposing party is 
3Rule 17(c) provides, 
A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to 
produce the books, papers, documents, or tangible things designated 
therein.  The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the 
subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.  The court 
may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the 
subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior 
to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their 
production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions 
thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys. 
R.I. Super. R. Crim. P. 17(c).  This rule is “essentially identical to the Federal rule.”  
DiPrete, 698 A.2d at 224. 
                                                 
 
 
 
12 
afforded notice and an opportunity to challenge a motion for issuance of 
a pretrial subpoena duces tecum.”  Id. at 227. 
Rule 17 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure differs from 
the federal rule.4  People v. Baltazar, 241 P.3d 941, 943 (Colo. 2010) (en 
banc).  In pertinent part, it provides that “[t]he subpoenaing party shall 
forthwith provide a copy of the subpoena to opposing counsel (or directly 
to the defendant if unrepresented) upon issuance.”  Colo. R. Crim. P. 
17(c).  Because of this difference, the rule precludes the ex parte 
issuance of subpoenas duces tecum, even in the case of extraordinary 
circumstances.  Baltazar, 241 P.3d at 943. 
Even courts that allow the issuance of ex parte subpoenas duces 
tecum require some showing of exceptional or difficult circumstances.  
Perhaps the most liberal application of rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure can be found in United States v. Beckford, 964 F. 
Supp. 1010, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1997).  In Beckford, the court held that 
subpoenas duces tecum could not be issued ex parte absent exceptional 
circumstances.  Id.  The text of rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure does not provide either party the right to an ex parte subpoena 
4The rule provides, 
A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to 
produce the books, papers, documents, photographs, or other objects 
designated therein.  The subpoenaing party shall forthwith provide a 
copy of the subpoena to opposing counsel (or directly to the defendant if 
unrepresented) upon issuance.  The court on motion made promptly may 
quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or 
oppressive.  The court may direct that books, papers, documents, 
photographs, or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before 
the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to 
be offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the books, 
papers, documents, photographs, or objects or portions thereof to be 
inspected by the parties and their attorneys. 
Colo. R. Crim. P. 17(c). 
                                                 
 
 
 
13 
duces tecum.  Id.  Therefore, the court found that the rule itself “suggests 
an adversarial process wherein the opposing party will be provided notice 
and an opportunity to challenge” the issuance of a subpoena duces 
tecum.  Id.  However, the court also held that the rule did not foreclose 
the use of an ex parte subpoena duces tecum in every situation.  Id.  Ex 
parte issuance is appropriate “in the rare instance in which a defendant 
would be required to disclose trial strategy, witness identities or attorney 
work-product 
to 
the 
Government 
in 
his 
[or 
her] pre-issuance 
application.”  Id. at 1027.  Examples of these rare instances include 
when the defendant seeks records of his or her own mental or physical 
health when such is at issue in the case, when the defendant seeks 
information about his or her own military service, or when requested 
documents are obviously linked to a specific theory of defense.  Id. at 
1030.  Ordinarily, however, ex parte issuance of subpoenas duces tecum 
“will be unnecessary and thus inappropriate.”  Id. 
In contrast, other federal courts have placed more limitations upon 
the issuance of ex parte subpoenas duces tecum.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Finn, 919 F. Supp. 1305, 1329 (D. Minn. 1995).  These courts have 
followed a test formulated in United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 338 
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) that applies more broadly to the production of any 
documents prior to trial.  Finn, 919 F. Supp. at 1329. 
Under this test, in order to require production prior to trial, 
the moving party must show: (1) that the documents are 
evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise 
procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due 
diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial 
without such production and inspection in advance of trial 
and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend 
unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application is 
made in good faith and is not intended as a general “fishing 
expedition.” 
 
 
 
14 
Id. (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699–700, 94 S. Ct. 
3090, 3103 (1974)).  Accordingly, to meet this burden, the defendant 
must be able to demonstrate that an ex parte subpoena duces tecum is 
relevant, admissible, and specific.  Id. 
 
In Finn, the defendant sought to issue an ex parte subpoena duces 
tecum without notice to the government.  Id. at 1330.  While the court 
did not go so far as to hold that every subpoena duces tecum requires 
disclosure to the opposing party, it did hold that the defendant’s motion 
to issue an ex parte subpoena duces tecum, without a particularized 
showing to the court and without notice to the government, should be 
denied.  Id. 
 
Still other federal courts have gone one step further and found that 
the ex parte issuance of subpoenas duces tecum under Rule 17(c) is 
never permitted.  See, e.g., United States v. Hart, 826 F. Supp. 380, 382 
(D. Colo. 1993); Urlacher, 136 F.R.D. at 555–56.  These courts have 
found that the plain language of Rule 17(c) “negates any assumption that 
production should be on an ex parte basis.”  Hart, 826 F. Supp. at 382.  
Because the text of the rule states that “the court may permit the parties 
and their attorneys to inspect all or part of” the documents subpoenaed, 
these courts have held that there can be no right to the ex parte 
procurement of subpoenaed documents.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(1); see 
also Hart, 826 F. Supp. at 382. 
In Commonwealth v. Mitchell, the court cited to Beckford but 
tempered its findings with its own state rules.  831 N.E.2d 890, 898 
(Mass. 2005).  The court began by noting that the purpose of its rule of 
criminal procedure is to expedite trial and avoid delays.  Id. at 897–98.  If 
a party seeks to file an ex parte subpoena, the party first needs to file a 
motion with the court explaining in detail why it is necessary for it to 
 
 
 
15 
proceed ex parte.  Id. at 898.  The court should only issue an ex parte 
subpoena duces tecum when the defendant has demonstrated (1) a 
reasonable likelihood the prosecution would receive incriminating 
evidence it would otherwise not be entitled to receive or (2) a reasonable 
likelihood that giving notice to a third party would result in the 
destruction or alteration of the documents.  Id.  The court also noted that 
a defendant may not make an ex parte motion solely on the basis that 
notice to the State would reveal trial strategy, work product, or client 
confidences.  Id.  Allowing these bases for the ex parte issuance of a 
subpoena duces tecum “would create a loophole that could not be 
contained, because matters of trial strategy, work product, and client 
communications are involved in almost every case where a rule 17(a)(2)[5] 
motion might be filed.”  Id. 
4.  Application.  Nothing in the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure or 
in the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant in a criminal case 
to issue an ex parte subpoena duces tecum to a witness or party without 
notice to opposing counsel and oversight by the district court.  In this 
case, Russell seeks the authority to obtain evidence, irrespective of the 
circumstances, without notice to the State and without any involvement 
5Rule 17(a)(2) provides, 
A summons may also command the person to whom it is directed to 
produce the books, papers, documents, or other objects designated 
therein.  The court on motion may quash or modify the summons if 
compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive or if the summons is 
being used to subvert the provisions of Rule 14.  The court may direct 
that books, papers, documents, or objects designated in the summons be 
produced before the court within a reasonable time prior to the trial or 
prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon 
their production permit the books, papers, documents, objects, or 
portions thereof to be inspected and copied by the parties and their 
attorneys if authorized by law. 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2). 
                                                 
 
 
 
16 
of the district court.  Russell argues he should not be required to make 
any showing of exceptional circumstances.  Indeed, in this case, there is 
not yet any ex parte subpoena duces tecum to quash.  The State filed the 
motion to regulate discovery and prevent ex parte subpoenas duces 
tecum before any motion by the defendant.  There is nothing in the 
record to demonstrate what evidence Russell may seek through the 
issuance of such a subpoena, nor is there any showing that the evidence 
sought would actually raise to the level of an exceptional circumstance.  
Likewise, the State has been unable to demonstrate whether any 
information Russell would seek through an ex parte subpoena duces 
tecum would impact its ability to bring Russell to trial under speedy trial 
restraints or whether it would constitute a fishing expedition, 
harassment of a witness, or some other improper form of discovery. 
We conclude that there is no authority, either in a statutory 
provision or our rules of procedure that would allow Russell to issue an 
ex parte subpoena duces tecum to a third party without notice to the 
State.  While impliedly conceding that no such authority exists, Russell 
alternatively requests that we fashion a protocol for “ex parte subpoenas 
to be filed under seal so as to not . . . reveal his trial strategy.”  See Iowa 
Const. art. V, § 4; Dahl, 874 N.W.2d at 353 (permitting defense counsel 
in certain circumstances to make an ex parte submission to the court to 
justify an application for public funds to retain a private investigator).  
We decline to do so. 
While Russell advocates for us to adopt a protocol, he does not 
present a specific protocol for our consideration in cases involving ex 
parte subpoenas duces tecum.  We recognize that there are a number of 
different protocols adopted by other courts.  Some courts, utilizing their 
own rules of criminal procedure, have concluded that subpoenas duces 
 
 
 
17 
tecum may never be issued ex parte.  See, e.g., DiPrete, 698 A.2d at 227; 
Baltazar, 241 P.3d at 943.  Others allow the issuance of ex parte 
subpoenas duces tecum on a sliding scale of exceptional circumstances.  
The most liberal standard is that found in Beckford, which allows a 
defendant to issue ex parte subpoenas duces tecum “in the rare instance 
in which a defendant would be required to disclose trial strategy, witness 
identities or attorney work-product to the Government in his [or her] pre-
issuance application.”  Beckford, 964 F. Supp. at 1027.  Other federal 
courts have tempered the Beckford test with more stringent exceptional-
circumstances rules, such as those found in Finn, 919 F. Supp. at 1329–
30.  One of the most stringent exceptional-circumstances tests requires 
the defendant to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood the prosecutor 
would receive incriminating evidence or that the third party would 
destroy or alter the requested documents before allowing the issuance of 
an ex parte subpoena duces tecum. Mitchell, 831 N.E.2d at 898.  This 
test was adopted to preclude the creation of a “loophole” that would allow 
all defendants to claim that trial strategy, work product, or client 
communication were at risk.  Id.  
We do not foreclose the possibility that there may be exceptional 
circumstances which warrant the issuance of an ex parte subpoena 
duces tecum.  However, there seems to be an emerging trend whereby 
the State immediately and routinely files a pleading to regulate discovery 
even though, as here, no such request has been made by defense 
counsel.  Having determined that defense counsel has no authority, 
either in a statutory provision or our rules of procedure, to unilaterally 
issue an ex parte subpoena duces tecum, such preemptory filings are 
clearly unnecessary.  If defense counsel feels an ex parte subpoena duces 
 
 
 
18 
tecum is necessary, counsel should file a motion with the district court 
setting forth the basis for the request. 
B.  Effective Assistance of Counsel.  Russell argues that denying 
him the ability to utilize an ex parte subpoena duces tecum for a third 
party violates his right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Criminal defendants are entitled to effective counsel under both 
the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution.  U.S. Const. 
amend. VI; Iowa Const. art. I, § 10.  The test to determine whether 
counsel was ineffective is two-pronged.  Nguyen v. State, 878 N.W.2d 
744, 752 (Iowa 2016); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).  First, “[w]e ask if trial counsel 
breached an essential duty.”  Nguyen, 878 N.W.2d at 752.  Second, we 
“ask whether prejudice resulted from [the] breach” of that duty.  Id.  The 
defendant has the burden of demonstrating he or she received ineffective 
assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id.  Both 
prongs must be met in order to find counsel was ineffective.  Id.  As 
such, if one prong is not met, the other need not be addressed.  Id.6 
To establish the first prong of the test, the defendant must be able 
to demonstrate that counsel performed “below the standard demanded of 
6Although Russell raised both the Iowa Constitution and the United States 
Constitution, he did not offer an argument for why we should depart from established 
precedent under the United States Constitution in interpreting our own constitution.  
Therefore, we treat the claims under both constitutions as a single claim.  See, e.g., 
King v. State, 797 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Iowa 2011). 
When there are parallel constitutional provisions in the federal and state 
constitutions and a party does not indicate the specific constitutional 
basis, we regard both federal and state constitutional claims as 
preserved, but consider the substantive standards under the Iowa 
Constitution to be the same as those developed by the United States 
Supreme Court under the Federal Constitution. 
Id. 
                                                 
 
 
 
19 
a reasonably competent attorney.”  Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 
142 (Iowa 2001).  This is measured against “prevailing professional 
norms.”  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065).  
Because of this, “we begin with the presumption that [an] attorney 
performed competently.”  Id.  We evaluate a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on the totality of the circumstances.  Id. 
A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel can arise at any stage 
of a case and can center on a defense attorney’s failure to adequately 
investigate.  Id.  To provide effective assistance of counsel during the 
investigatory stage, counsel is required to conduct a reasonable 
investigation and to make reasonable decisions regarding discovery.  Id. 
at 145; see also Baltazar, 241 P.3d at 944 (“[T]he Sixth Amendment right 
to the effective assistance of counsel includes an entitlement to no more 
than a thorough investigation, limited by reasonable professional 
judgments.”).  Under the reasonableness prong, we are more likely to find 
the defendant has established counsel was ineffective if the alleged 
actions or inactions are attributed to counsel’s lack of diligence rather 
than counsel’s exercise of judgment.  Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142. 
The question we must address, then, is whether providing notice to 
the State for a subpoena duces tecum to a third party prevents defense 
counsel from conducting a reasonable pretrial investigation.  We do not 
believe it does.  Counsel would not breach an essential duty by providing 
notice, nor would notice fall “below the standard demanded of a 
reasonably competent attorney.”  Id. 
Under our current rules of criminal procedure, subpoenas duces 
tecum are subject to the discretion of the trial court and may be 
dismissed or modified “if compliance would be unreasonable or 
oppressive.”  Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.15(2).  Even in jurisdictions where 
 
 
 
20 
defense counsel may serve ex parte subpoenas duces tecum, counsel is 
still required to demonstrate hardship or concern for disclosure of trial 
strategy.  See, e.g., Finn, 919 F. Supp. at 1329. 
Defense counsel certainly has a duty to conduct a reasonable 
pretrial investigation, which may extend to the duty to subpoena certain 
records and documents.  This duty, however, does not extend to seeking 
the ex parte issuance of subpoenas duces tecum without notice to the 
State, absent any showing of exceptional circumstances.  Counsel’s 
hands are not tied from seeking information or conducting a reasonable 
investigation.  Counsel still has the option to seek leave from the court to 
demonstrate that offering notice to the State “would be unreasonable or 
oppressive.”  See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.15(2).  Defense counsel is not 
precluded from seeking pertinent information to build a defense even 
when, as here, we decline to adopt a specific rule finding that ex parte 
subpoenas duces tecum are appropriate in every case.  Rather, any such 
rule would require notice, court involvement, and a burden of proof on 
the defendant.  Requiring defense counsel to provide notice to the State 
before the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to a third party, without 
a showing of hardship, exceptional circumstances, or impact upon trial 
strategy, and without court involvement does not mean a defendant was 
deprived of effective assistance of counsel.  Defense counsel providing 
notice to the State for the investigation of third-party documents is 
reasonable under the circumstances and does not deprive a defendant of 
effective assistance of counsel. 
C.  Compulsory Process.  The United States Constitution 
recognizes that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  Likewise, the Iowa Constitution 
 
 
 
21 
recognizes the right “to have compulsory process for his witnesses.”  Iowa 
Const. art. I, § 10. 
The right to compulsory process includes the right to compel a 
witness’s presence in the courtroom and the right to offer testimony of 
witnesses.  State v. Weaver, 608 N.W.2d 797, 802 (Iowa 2000).  The 
Supreme Court has described the right to compulsory process as follows: 
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel 
their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to 
present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s 
version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so 
it may decide where the truth lies.  Just as an accused has 
the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the 
purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to 
present his own witnesses to establish a defense.  This right 
is a fundamental element of due process of law. 
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S. Ct. 646, 653 (1988) (quoting 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1967)). 
However, the Supreme Court has “never squarely held that the 
Compulsory Process Clause guarantees the right to discover[y].”  
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56, 107 S. Ct. 989, 1000–01 (1987); 
see also Weaver, 608 N.W.2d at 802.  Instead, the right to compulsory 
process is more appropriately described as a trial right and not a 
“constitutionally compelled rule of pre-trial discovery.”  Baltazar, 241 
P.3d at 944; see also Washington, 388 U.S. at 19, 87 S. Ct. at 1923 
(stating that the right to compulsory process is “the right to present a 
defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well 
as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies” 
emphasis added)); State v. Schaefer, 746 N.W.2d 457, 475 (Wis. 2008) 
(“The Compulsory Process Clause naturally suggests some constitutional 
entitlement to trial evidence.” (quoting 5 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal 
Procedure § 24.3(a), at 469 (2d ed. 1999) (emphasis added))).  Similarly, 
 
 
 
22 
we have found that the right to compulsory process under article I, 
section 10 of the Iowa Constitution “make[s] sense only in the context of 
a formal legal proceeding leading to a trial.”  State v. Senn, 882 N.W.2d 1, 
8–9 (Iowa 2016). 
The leading Supreme Court case on the issue of subpoenas is 
Ritchie, 480 U.S 39, 107 S. Ct. 989.  In Ritchie, the defendant sought to 
subpoena confidential records from the Children and Youth Services of 
Pennsylvania.  Id. at 43, 107 S. Ct. at 994.  While analyzing the 
application of the Compulsory Process Clause, the Court acknowledged 
that it “has had little occasion to discuss the contours” of the Clause.  Id. 
at 55, 107 S. Ct. at 1000.  It noted that the  
cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants 
have the right to the government’s assistance in compelling 
the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to 
put before a jury evidence that might influence the 
determination of guilt. 
Id. at 55–56, 107 S. Ct. at 1000.  The Court declined, however, to decide 
the case under the Compulsory Process Clause.  Id. at 56, 107 S. Ct. at 
1001.  The Court “conclude[d] that compulsory process provides no 
greater protections . . . than those afforded by due process” and therefore 
analyzed the facts of the case under due process.  Id. 
Because of this, the Supreme Court ordinarily evaluates 
compulsory process issues under the broader scope of the Due Process 
Clause, as have we.  Weaver, 608 N.W.2d at 802.  Since Russell also 
raises a due process challenge, we choose not to resolve his claim under 
the compulsory process provision and instead analyze it under broader 
scope of the Due Process Clause.  See id. 
D.  Due Process.  The right to present a defense is a fundamental 
right that is essential to a fair trial.  State v. Clark, 814 N.W.2d 551, 561 
 
 
 
23 
(Iowa 2012).  The United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution 
protect a criminal defendant’s right to substantive and procedural due 
process.  U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9.7  The Due 
Process Clauses include two separate but related concepts—substantive 
due process and procedural due process.  State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 
655, 662 (Iowa 2005).  Substantive due process “prevents the 
government from interfering with ‘rights implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty’ ” while procedural due process “act[s] as a constraint on 
government action that infringes upon an individual’s liberty interest, 
such as the freedom from physical restraint.”  Id. (quoting State v. 
Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 237, 240 (Iowa 2002)). 
Substantive due process claims have two stages of inquiry.  Id.  
First, we must determine the “nature of the individual right involved.”  
Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d at 238.  If the right implicated is 
fundamental, we apply strict scrutiny.  Id.  Strict scrutiny analysis 
requires us to determine “whether the government action infringing the 
fundamental right is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest.”  Id.  If the right implicated is not fundamental, we only apply 
rational basis review.  Id.  Rational basis analysis requires us to 
determine whether there is “a reasonable fit between the government 
interest and the means utilized to advance that interest.”  Id.  
The first step in a procedural due process analysis is to determine 
“whether a protected liberty or property interest is involved.”  Seering, 
701 N.W.2d at 665 (quoting Bowers v. Polk Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 638 
7Russell also did not present an argument for why we should depart from 
established precedent in our interpretation of the Iowa Constitution’s due process 
clause.  We therefore treat both claims as the same.  See, e.g., King, 797 N.W.2d at 571. 
                                                 
 
 
 
24 
N.W.2d 682, 691 (Iowa 2002)).  If we find such a protected interest is 
involved, we balance three factors: 
“First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement[s] would entail.” 
Bowers, 638 N.W.2d at 691 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 (1976)). 
In a criminal proceeding, a defendant has no general due process 
right to discovery.  Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S. Ct. 
837, 846 (1977). 
There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a 
criminal case, and Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 
S. Ct. 1194 (1963)] did not create one; as the Court wrote 
recently, “the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding 
the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded 
. . . .” 
Id.  We likewise recognized in 2000 that a criminal defendant does not 
have a due process right to pretrial discovery, which we have continued 
to uphold.  Clark, 814 N.W.2d at 561; Jones v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 620 N.W.2d 
242, 243 (Iowa 2000); Weaver, 608 N.W.2d at 803. 
 
Pretrial discovery in criminal cases is generally controlled by either 
statute or court rule unless otherwise grounded in the constitution.8  
State v. Tuttle, 472 N.W.2d 712, 717 (Neb. 1991); see also United States 
v. Olivares, 843 F.3d 752, 757 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Orders governing 
8For example, the government is required to turn over any statement made by a 
witness that relates to his or her testimony under the Jenks Act and to produce all 
exculpatory evidence under Brady.  See United States v. Llanez-Garcia, 735 F.3d 483, 
493 (6th Cir. 2013). 
                                                 
 
 
 
25 
discovery are ‘committed to the sound discretion of the district court and 
an error in administering the discovery rules is reversible only on a 
showing that the error was prejudicial to the substantial rights of the 
defendant.’ ” (quoting United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701, 707 (8th Cir. 
1978)).  Federal Rule of Evidence 16 is therefore the “primary means of 
discovery in criminal cases.”  United States v. Llanez-Garcia, 735 F.3d 
483, 493 (6th Cir. 2013). 
Further, at least one court has gone so far as to find that the ex 
parte issuance of third-party subpoenas duces tecum violates due 
process to the extent it deprives the State of notice and participation.  
See, e.g., Kling, 239 P.3d at 677 (“[D]isclosure of the identity of the 
subpoenaed party and the nature of the records sought may, in many 
circumstances, effectuate the People’s right to due process under the 
California Constitution.”).  The California Supreme Court found that 
there are a number of reasons the State has an interest in notice and 
participation involving a subpoena duces tecum—the third party may 
refuse to produce documents, ex parte proceedings may result in delays 
that interfere with the right to a speedy trial, and the State may have the 
right to file a motion to quash the subpoena.  Id.  Because of these 
affected rights, the court held that “[i]t is difficult to see how the People 
can have a meaningful opportunity to be heard if they are categorically 
barred from learning the identity of the subpoenaed party or the nature 
of the documents requested.”  Id. 
We cannot conclude that Russell has demonstrated that 
substantive due process requires the ability to issue ex parte subpoenas 
duces tecum or that there would be a violation of his procedural due 
process rights utilizing the current mechanism for resolving discovery 
disputes involving subpoenas.  See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.15.  We find that 
 
 
 
26 
Russell was not deprived of any due process right by his inability to issue 
an ex parte subpoena duces tecum on a third party. 
V.  Conclusion. 
We do not foreclose the possibility that exceptional circumstances 
may exist for the district court to allow for the issuance of an ex parte 
subpoena duces tecum.  However, we find the proper procedure for 
Russell to utilize if he seeks to issue an ex parte subpoena duces tecum 
is to file a motion setting forth the basis for the request.  We also find 
there is no corresponding constitutional violation under the United 
States or Iowa Constitutions.  We affirm the district court grant of the 
motion to regulate discovery. 
AFFIRMED.