Case Title: State v. Adrian L. Williams

Citation: 2000 WI 78

Docket Number: 1999AP000752-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 78 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0782-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Adrian L. Williams,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  229 Wis. 2d 737, 600 N.W.2d 56 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 6, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 31, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert C. Crawford 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence. 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Ellen Henak, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2000 WI 78 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0752-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Adrian L. Williams,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case arises on a petition for 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals that 
affirmed the judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Robert C. Crawford, Judge.  The defendant, 
Adrian Williams, asks this court to adopt a new rule of 
procedure, which would require that if a trial judge anticipates 
exceeding the state's sentence recommendation under a plea 
agreement, the trial judge must inform the defendant of that 
fact and allow the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.   
¶2 
We decline Williams' invitation to create a new rule 
and instead adhere to the well-established law of this state.  
In Wisconsin, a trial court is not bound by the state's sentence 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
2 
recommendation under a plea agreement.  Before entering a plea, 
the defendant is informed of and understands that the sentence 
recommendation he or she has bargained for is not binding on the 
court.  Under this procedure, "failure to receive sentence 
concessions contemplated by a plea agreement is [not] a basis 
for withdrawing a guilty plea on the grounds of manifest 
injustice."  Melby v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 368, 385, 234 N.W.2d 634 
(1975) (citing Young v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 361, 367 182 N.W.2d 
262 (1971)).  Because no manifest injustice occurred, Williams 
is not entitled to withdraw his plea.   
I 
¶3 
On January 12, 1998, police arrested seventeen-year-
old Williams at his residence pursuant to a probation violation 
arrest warrant.  During the arrest, police took Williams to his 
bedroom so that he could get dressed.  The police found 
individually wrapped cocaine in Williams' jacket in his bedroom. 
 They also saw a gun in the room.  As a result, Williams was 
charged with two misdemeanors.  The first count, misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(c)(1995-96),1 was punishable by up to one year of 
imprisonment in the county jail.2  The second count, possession 
of a dangerous weapon by a person under the age of 18, contrary 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 volumes unless otherwise indicated.  
2 Section 961.41(3g)(c) provides, "[i]f a person possess 
[sic] or attempts to possess cocaine or cocaine base, . . . the 
person shall be fined not more than $5,000 and may be imprisoned 
for not more than one year in the county jail." 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
3 
to Wis. Stat. § 948.60(2)(a), was punishable by a maximum of 
nine months of imprisonment.3  
¶4 
Williams made a motion to suppress the evidence 
against him, but his motion was denied.4  Williams then entered 
into a plea agreement with the State.  In exchange for Williams' 
plea of guilty to both charges, the State agreed to recommend a 
sentence of four months on the first count and three months on 
the second count, to be served consecutively.   
¶5 
On September 17, 1998, the circuit court conducted 
proceedings during which Williams pled guilty to both charges 
and was sentenced.  During the proceeding, Williams completed a 
guilty plea questionnaire, acknowledging that he understood 
"that the Judge is not bound to follow any plea agreement or 
recommendation made by the District Attorney, my attorney, or 
any presentence report.  I understand that the Judge is free to 
sentence me to the following minimum (if applicable) and maximum 
possible penalties in this case."  The applicable maximum 
penalties were specifically stated on the form.  Williams' 
                     
3 Section 948.60(2)(a) provides, "[a]ny person under 18 
years of age who possesses or goes armed with a dangerous weapon 
is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor."  The penalty for a Class A 
misdemeanor is a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not 
to exceed 9 months or both.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.51(3)(a).  A 
technical amendment to § 939.51(3)(a) took effect on December 
31, 1997, but did not change the applicable penalties.  See 1997 
Wis. Act 35, § 575.   
4 Williams challenged the constitutionality of the officers' 
entry into his residence and the subsequent search and seizure 
that produced the cocaine and the gun.  The trial court denied 
Williams' motion, and Williams did not appeal from that ruling.  
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
4 
attorney signed the acknowledgement at the bottom of the form 
indicating that he had explained the questionnaire to Williams 
and that Williams had acknowledged that he understood each item 
on the questionnaire.   
¶6 
In 
addition, 
in 
accordance 
with 
established 
procedures,5 the trial court questioned Williams personally to 
determine 
whether 
his 
plea 
was 
knowing, 
voluntary, 
and 
intelligent.  During this questioning Williams acknowledged that 
he understood that the court was not bound by the State's 
sentence recommendation and that the court had the duty to 
impose a fair and just sentence.  Williams then pled guilty to 
each charge.  
¶7 
Next, the prosecutor summarized the facts underlying 
the 
charges, 
and 
the 
defendant 
acknowledged 
that 
the 
prosecutor's summary was fair and complete.  Based on this 
summary of the relevant facts, the court determined that the 
prosecutor could prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt at 
trial.  The court further concluded that Williams had waived his 
right to a jury trial on the charges and had knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently entered his guilty pleas.  The 
court then adjudged Williams guilty of the charges. 
                     
5 See Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and Wis JICriminal SM−32 at 1-8, 
12.  Note that effective December 1, 1998, subsection (1)(d) was 
added to § 971.08.  See 1997 Wis. Act 181, § 100.  The new 
subsection requires that before the court may accept the 
defendant's plea, the court must ask the prosecutor whether he 
or she has consulted with the victim or victims of the 
defendant's 
crime. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stats. 
§§ 971.08(1)(d) 
and 
971.095(2) (1997-98). 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
5 
¶8 
The court proceeded to sentencing.  Consistent with 
the plea agreement, the prosecutor recommended a four-month 
sentence on the first count and a three-month sentence on the 
second count, to be served consecutively.  The prosecutor argued 
that this sentence would "send the message to the defendant that 
this kind of activity has to stop now."  The defense responded 
by asking the court to impose the sentences recommended by the 
State, but to make the sentences concurrent rather than 
consecutive.  After hearing these recommendations, the court 
spoke extensively with Mr. Williams about his conduct and 
punishment.   
¶9 
After hearing from the State, the defense, and the 
defendant himself, the court pronounced sentence: 
 
THE COURT: 
 . . . .  Mr. Williams, I conclude 
that the evidence is absolutely overwhelming that you 
were a 17-year-old crack dealer in December 1997 and 
January 1998.  I conclude that your possession of a 
loaded pistol next to your stash of cocaine made you 
dangerous.  Indeed you were dangerous to yourself and 
dangerous to anybody whom you might have been dealing 
crack to. 
 
I think that it's my responsibility to impose 
sentences which will take you off the street for a 
while and give you a chance to grow up and perhaps 
reexamine where you're headed. . . .  
The court sentenced Williams to the maximum penalties on both 
countsone year on the conviction for possession of cocaine and 
nine months on the conviction for possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a person under the age of 18.  Thus, the trial court 
imposed a sentence of a total of 21 months, 14 months longer 
than the sentence recommended by the State. 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
6 
¶10 Williams subsequently filed a post-conviction motion 
seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas.  Williams argued that "the 
current procedure that allows a court to exceed a bargained-for 
state's 
sentencing 
recommendation 
without 
warning 
to 
the 
defendant and without providing an opportunity to withdraw his 
plea is fundamentally unfair."   
¶11 The circuit court denied Williams' motion, explaining 
that under Wisconsin's plea agreement procedure, the defendant 
is 
specifically 
warned 
that 
the 
prosecutor's 
sentence 
recommendation is not binding on the court.  This ensures that 
the defendant's plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  
Sentencing is then conducted separately from the plea, and the 
trial court is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation but 
instead has the duty to pronounce a sentence that protects the 
public interest.  Under this court's holdings in Melby, 70 Wis. 
2d 368, and State v. Betts, 129 Wis. 2d 1, 383 N.W.2d 876 
(1986), no manifest injustice occurs when the trial court 
exceeds the state's recommendation under this procedure.  
¶12 Williams appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
decision of the circuit court, noting that it was unable to 
change the established law of this state.  See Cook v. Cook, 208 
Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997)(holding that the 
court of appeals lacks the authority to overrule, modify, or 
withdraw published opinions).  This court accepted Williams' 
petition for review. 
II 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
7 
¶13 The circuit court's decision whether to permit a 
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is generally a matter of 
discretion.6  State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶ 13, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 
605 N.W.2d 836 (citing State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 
2d 615, 635, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998)).  The circuit court's 
decision will be sustained if it was made upon the facts of the 
record and in reliance on the appropriate and applicable law.  
Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d at 635 (citing State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 
2d 246, 289, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986)). 
¶14 After sentencing, the circuit court may permit a 
defendant to withdraw his or her guilty plea if the defendant 
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that withdrawal of 
the plea is necessary to correct a "'manifest injustice.'"  
Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d at 726 (citations omitted).  This "manifest 
injustice" test was adopted in State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 
386, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967), based on a tentative draft of 
standards for plea withdrawals that had been issued by the 
American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for 
Criminal Justice.  See Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d at ¶ 17 (discussing 
Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d at 385-86).  
                     
6 Although the decision whether to permit withdrawal of a 
plea is ordinarily a matter of discretion, "[w]hen a defendant 
establishes a denial of a relevant constitutional right, 
withdrawal of the plea is a matter of right.  The trial 
court . . . has 
no 
discretion 
in 
the 
matter 
in 
such 
an 
instance."  State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 283, 389 N.W.2d 
12 (1986).  Williams has not asserted that he is entitled to 
withdraw 
his 
plea 
because 
he 
was 
denied 
a 
relevant 
constitutional right. 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
8 
¶15 Williams contends that "manifest injustice" exists 
because he pled guilty to the charges "based solely on the 
state's recommendation for an aggregate sentence of seven 
months," 
and 
the 
trial 
court 
deviated 
from 
the 
state's 
recommended sentence "[w]ithout explicitly warning" Williams. 
Williams believes that "[t]he procedure allowing imposition of 
this sentence was so fundamentally unfair that it created a 
manifest injustice."  (Appellant-Petitioner's Brief at 4.)  He 
asks us to hold that when a trial court anticipates that it will 
exceed the sentence recommendation in the plea agreement, the 
court must inform the defendant that the court probably will not 
follow the State's recommendation and offer the defendant an 
opportunity to withdraw the plea. 
¶16 Williams' proposal is contrary to the well-established 
law of this state.  This court has consistently held that when a 
defendant enters a plea with full knowledge of the fact that the 
trial court was not bound by the state's recommendation in the 
plea agreement, the trial court's decision to exceed the state's 
recommendation does not result in any "manifest injustice" and 
does not justify withdrawal of the plea.  Melby, 70 Wis. 2d at 
385-86; Young, 49 Wis. 2d at 366-67.  See also In re the 
Amendment of Rules of Civil & Criminal Procedure:  Sections 
971.07 & 971.08, Stats., 128 Wis. 2d 422, 383 N.W.2d 496 (1986) 
and Betts, 129 Wis. 2d 1.   
¶17 Williams acknowledges that the circuit court and court 
of appeals' decisions were consistent with the law.  He asks us 
to change this law, in exercise of our superintending and 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
9 
administrative authority over all Wisconsin courts.  See Wis. 
Const. art. VII, § 3(1).   
¶18 This court has the authority to change the law 
governing plea procedures and impose new procedures governing 
the entry of pleas.  See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 267-72 
(imposing mandatory procedures to be followed at the plea 
hearing as a function of this court's superintending and 
administrative authority).   
¶19 In 1986 this court considered and rejected a proposal 
similar to Williams' request.  See In re the Amendment of Rules, 
128 Wis. 2d 422 (rejecting a proposal to amend the Rules of 
Civil and Criminal Procedure pursuant to this court's rule-
making authority in Wis. Stat. § 751.12).7  The Judicial Council 
proposed changing the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure to 
require a trial court to either approve or reject the plea 
agreement between the defendant and the state in its entirety.  
Id. at 423.  Under the Judicial Council's proposal, if the court 
approved the agreement, the sentence or term of probation 
imposed on the defendant could be "no less favorable" than the 
recommended disposition.  Id.  If the court rejected the 
agreement, it would have to inform the defendant of the specific 
terms that the court intended to impose that would exceed the 
                     
7 See also State v. Betts, 129 Wis. 2d 1, 1-2, 383 N.W.2d 
876 (1986) (dismissing a petition for review that advocated a 
similar proposal because, having declined to adopt the rule 
under the rule-making procedure in Wis. Stat. § 751.12, the 
court would also decline to adopt it in the exercise of its 
superintending authority under Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3).    
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
10
recommended disposition.  Id.  The defendant would then have the 
opportunity to withdraw the plea.  Id.   
¶20 This court rejected the Judicial Council's proposal 
for two primary reasons.  First, the court concluded that the 
proposal was not necessary to ensure that the defendant 
understands that the state's recommendation does not bind the 
court: 
 
Insofar as it may be intended to ensure that a 
criminal defendant not be misled into entering a plea 
of guilty or no contest to criminal charges, the 
proposed procedure is unnecessary, as this court has 
set forth on numerous occasions the procedure a trial 
court is to follow prior to accepting a plea.   
Id. at 424.  Second, the court rejected the proposal because it 
was "contrary to what we have consistently held to be the proper 
judicial 
role 
in 
considering 
pleas 
made 
pursuant 
to 
an 
agreement."  Id. at 425.   
¶21 These same considerations weigh against adopting the 
proposal Williams advocates.   
¶22 To begin with, the procedure Williams advocates is not 
necessary to ensure that defendants have fair warning that a 
trial 
court 
may 
exceed 
the 
sentence 
recommended 
by 
the 
prosecutor pursuant to a plea agreement.  A defendant's right to 
understand the consequences of his plea is protected by the 
constitution, because by entering a plea, the defendant waives 
several federal constitutional rights, including the right to a 
jury trial and the privilege against self-incrimination.  Brady 
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).  A trial judge therefore may not 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
11
accept a plea "without an affirmative showing that it was 
intelligent and voluntary."  Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242.  See also 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 257-58 (discussing Boykin and Brady).   
¶23 In Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. § 971.08 ensures that this 
constitutional standard will be met.  It provides in part: 
 
(1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, it shall do all of the following: 
 
 
(a) Address 
the 
defendant 
personally 
and 
determine that the plea is made voluntarily with 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the 
potential punishment if convicted. 
 
 
(b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a)-(b) (emphasis added).  In addition, 
this court has made mandatory certain procedures designed to 
ensure that a defendant understands the nature of the charge 
against him or her and understands that he will be waiving 
particular constitutional rights by entering a guilty plea.  See 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 266-72.  
¶24 The trial court in Williams' case followed all of the 
proper procedures to ensure that Williams' plea was a knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his rights.  The record 
demonstrates 
that 
Williams 
knew 
and 
understood 
that 
the 
prosecutor's recommendation was not binding on the court: 
 
 
THE COURT: 
Mr. Williams, do you understand 
that 
I 
don't 
have 
to 
follow 
the 
prosecutor's 
recommendation about what your punishment should be? 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
12
 
THE COURT: 
Do you understand, Mr. Williams, 
that when you're convicted through your guilty plea 
this afternoon, I have to impose punishments that are 
fair and just? 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
 
THE COURT: 
Do you understand that you might 
be punished with punishments as large as the maximum 
punishment of a $1,000 fine andI'm sorry, a $5,000 
fine and one year in the county jail for possessing 
cocaine? 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT: 
Do you understand that on your 
conviction for possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
person under 18 years of age, you might be punished 
with a maximum punishment of a $10,000 fine plus nine 
months in the county jail? 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
In addition to this personal, oral acknowledgment, Williams and 
his attorney completed the guilty plea questionnaire reiterating 
the same information.  Thus, the record establishes that 
Williams was fully informed of the fact that the court was not 
bound by the State's recommendation but instead had the duty to 
impose a fair and just sentence.  See Young, 49 Wis. 2d at 367 
("[T]he trial court . . . made it crystal clear that the judge 
was 
not 
bound 
by 
and 
could 
not 
be 
controlled 
by 
any 
understanding had by the prosecutor and defendant."). 
¶25 Williams argues that it is inadequate to issue these 
warnings on the plea questionnaire and in open court because 
"[a]ll disclaimers that the court is not bound are often viewed 
as ceremonial incantations."  People v. Killebrew, 330 N.W.2d 
834, 842 (Mich. 1982)(citations omitted).  He argues that the 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
13
rule he proposes would increase fairness, particularly when the 
defendant is an unsophisticated participant in the process or 
when the defendant's attorney does not have sufficient knowledge 
about a particular judge's sentencing practices.  He contends 
that his rule is needed to ensure that defendants are not at a 
disadvantage in plea bargaining with more sophisticated or more 
knowledgeable prosecutors.   
¶26 These same arguments could have been made in support 
of the 1986 proposal.  However, as this court explained when 
rejecting the 1986 proposal, involving the trial court in the 
process of plea agreement negotiations is contrary to the proper 
judicial role.  In re the Amendment of Rules, 128 Wis. 2d at 
424-29.  "'Trial judges should be careful to abstain from 
injecting themselves into plea bargaining or influencing the 
making of a plea.'"  Id. at 425-26 (quoting Rahhal v. State, 52 
Wis. 2d 144, 150, 187 N.W.2d 800 (1971)).  This has been the law 
of this state since State v. Wolfe, in which this court held 
that: 
 
A 
trial 
judge 
should 
not 
participate 
in 
plea 
bargaining.  This is true because (1) the defendant 
can receive the impression from the trial judge's 
participation in the plea discussions that he would 
not receive a fair trial if he went to trial before 
the same judge; (2) if the judge takes part in the 
preplea discussions, he may destroy his objectivity 
when it comes to determining the voluntariness of the 
plea when it is offered; (3) judicial participation to 
the 
extent 
of 
promising 
a 
certain 
sentence 
is 
inconsistent with the theory behind the use of the 
pre-sentence 
investigation 
report, 
and 
(4) the 
defendant may feel that the risk of not going along 
with the disposition which is apparently desired by 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
14
the judge is so great that he will be induced to plead 
guilty even if innocent. 
 
 
The vice of judicial participation in the plea 
bargaining is that it destroys the voluntariness of 
the plea. 
State v. Wolfe, 46 Wis. 2d 478, 487-88, 175 N.W.2d 216 (1970) 
(footnote omitted) (quoted in In re the Amendment of Rules, 128 
Wis. 2d at 426).  Requiring a trial judge to approve or 
disapprove of a particular sentence recommendation prior to 
sentencing would in effect cause the trial court to participate 
in 
plea 
bargaining 
and 
therefore 
would 
undermine 
the 
voluntariness of the plea. 
¶27 Williams next argues that certain changes in the court 
system in Wisconsin since the time of the Judicial Council's 
proposal in 1986 necessitate a change in procedure.  Williams 
first contends that a change in procedure is required because 
the criminal courts have jurisdiction over an increased number 
of juvenile offenders.  Williams notes that in 1986, an "adult" 
was defined as a person "18 years of age or older" for purposes 
of criminal court jurisdiction.  Wis. Stat. § 48.02(1)(1985-86). 
 In contrast, under the current law a person 17 years of age or 
older is an "adult" for purposes of criminal investigation or 
prosecution.  Wis. Stat. §§ 48.02(1d) and 938.02(1)(1997-98).  
Williams 
also 
points 
out 
that 
in 
1986, 
juvenile 
court 
jurisdiction over a violation of state criminal law could not be 
waived unless the defendant allegedly committed the law "on or 
after his or her 16th birthday."  Wis. Stat. § 48.18(1)(1985-
86).  The current law, on the other hand, subjects juveniles as 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
15
young as ten years old to the original jurisdiction of adult 
criminal courts for certain offenses such as homicides.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 938.183 (1997-98).8  Williams argues that the 
developmental traits of younger defendants will make them more 
likely to assume that the judge will follow the state's sentence 
recommendation under the plea agreement.   
¶28 In addition, Williams contends that a change in 
procedure is required because of the increased number of circuit 
courts and judges in Wisconsin since 1986.  He argues that the 
increase in judges makes it more difficult for defense attorneys 
to know whether a particular court is likely to adhere to a 
particular recommendation.  He contends that this change has 
less impact on prosecutors, who work in one county and sometimes 
in one particular court.  
¶29 These factors do not persuade us to change Wisconsin's 
plea procedures, at least not in the context of Williams' case. 
 As already discussed, Wisconsin 
courts follow 
procedures 
designed to ensure that the particular defendant understands the 
nature of the charge, the penalties that can apply, and the 
consequences of entering the plea.  The procedures are flexible 
and should be changed as required to achieve their purposes 
                     
8 See also 1999 Wis. Acts 32, § 358 and 9, § 3130d, amending 
Wis. Stat. § 938.183.  
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
16
under the circumstances of the particular case.9  Williams does 
not argue that due to changes in the court system, he did not 
know or understand that the trial court would not be bound by 
the state's recommendation as to sentence.  Nothing in the 
record in this criminal case persuades us to abandon our well-
established procedures. 
¶30 Williams also emphasizes the difference between the 
proposal he advocates and the proposal rejected in In re the 
Amendment of Rules.10  The 1986 proposal would have required the 
court to give very specific information about what sort of plea 
agreement would be acceptable.  The court would have been 
                     
9 See State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 267-68, 389 N.W.2d 
12 (1986) (explaining that the different methods of ensuring 
that the defendant understands the nature of the charges will be 
appropriate depending on the circumstances including "the level 
of education of the defendant and the complexity of the 
charge.").  See also Wis JI-Criminal SM-32 Comment at 12 ("The 
inquiry suggested here is intended to illustrate a complete plea 
acceptance procedure . . . .  It is expected that individual 
judges will use it only as a general guide, choosing those parts 
that seem helpful and modifying others as appropriate to local 
practice and the case at hand.").    
10 Williams also argues that his proposal is distinguishable 
from the proposal rejected in Melby, because the defendant in 
Melby advocated that a trial court must either accept each and 
every term of a plea agreement or must reject the entire 
agreement.  See Melby v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 368, 384-85, 234 
N.W.2d 634 (1975).  Williams emphasizes that under the rule he 
advocates, the trial court would not remain free to follow or 
deviate from any specific term of the plea agreement, so long as 
the trial court first gives the defendant a general warning that 
the court is likely to deviate in some way from the agreement 
and then gives the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea 
if he desires.  We do not find any distinction between the rule 
advocated by Williams and the rule advocated in Melby that would 
justify a different result. 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
17
required to either accept all of the terms of the plea 
agreement, including the recommended sentence, or to explain 
which specific terms were objectionable and inform the defendant 
of the terms that the judge planned to impose instead.  In re 
the Amendment of Rules, 128 Wis. 2d at 427.  Under Williams' 
proposal, the court would not have to give any such specific 
information.  The court would merely inform the defendant that 
it "probably will not" adhere to the terms of the plea 
agreement.  The court would not be required to tell the 
defendant 
which 
particular 
terms 
of 
the 
agreement 
were 
unacceptable or to state specifically what other terms would be 
acceptable. 
¶31 We do not think that this difference between Williams' 
proposal and the 1986 proposal eliminates the problems inherent 
in involving the trial court in plea negotiations.  Under 
Williams' proposal, the trial court would still be required to 
either 
accept 
or 
reject 
a 
particular 
sentence 
prior 
to 
sentencing.  It seems possible and even likely that in some 
cases, the defendant would withdraw his or her plea, the parties 
would conduct further plea negotiations, and the court would 
then be asked to accept a new proposal.  What should happen if 
the second proposal was also unacceptable to the court?  Would 
the court again be obliged to give a general warning that the 
court would probably deviate from some term of the agreement?  
At oral argument, Williams stated that a single opportunity to 
have the plea agreement accepted or rejected would be better 
than the current procedure.  However, even if only for a single 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
18
round of negotiations, Williams' proposal necessarily involves 
the court in the bargaining that leads to the plea.  Involving 
the court in plea negotiations is unwise, for all of the reasons 
already stated. 
¶32 Finally, 
Williams 
argues 
that 
Wisconsin's 
plea 
procedure places us in a distinct minority.  He urges us to 
adopt his proposal to "bring Wisconsin into line with the 
majority of jurisdictions."  The State contests Williams' count 
of the jurisdictions but acknowledges that a small majority of 
states have adopted the rule advocated by Williams.11 However, 
the State points out that what took place in Williams' case 
would not justify withdrawal of the plea in a significant 
minority of states.12  
¶33 Both parties provided the court with thorough surveys 
of the rules governing withdrawal of pleas in jurisdictions 
throughout the United States.  The most significant disagreement 
between the parties is how to characterize the rule followed in 
the federal courts.  We think it is clear that under the federal 
                     
11 Williams' brief included a thorough survey of the rules 
governing 
withdrawal 
of 
guilty 
pleas 
in 
United 
States 
jurisdictions.  In response, the State contested Williams' 
characterization of a few of these jurisdictions, but the 
State's own research was for the most part consistent with 
Williams'.  For an exhaustive report on the issue, see 
Annotation, Right to Withdraw Guilty Plea in State Criminal 
Proceeding Where Court Refuses to Grant Concession Contemplated 
by Plea Bargain, 66 A.L.R.3d 902 (1975 and Supp. 1999). 
12 See, e.g., cases collected at Annotation, Right to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea in State Criminal Proceeding Where Court 
Refuses to Grant Concession Contemplated by Plea Bargain, 66 
A.L.R.3d 902 § 5d (1975 and Supp. 1999). 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
19
rule, the procedure followed in Williams' case would not justify 
withdrawal.  Under the procedure followed in federal courts, 
when the defendant in federal court has bargained for a 
"recommendation" rather than a particular disposition, the trial 
court's deviation from the recommendation does not give the 
defendant the right to withdraw his or her plea.13  Thus, 
although many states do follow a rule like the one advocated by 
Williams, the federal courts and many states still hold that the 
procedure that was followed in Williams' case does not result in 
any "manifest injustice." 
¶34 We adhere to the prior decisions of this court.  So 
long as the defendant understands before entering his or her 
plea that the trial court will not be bound by the prosecutor's 
sentence recommendation in the plea agreement, the trial court's 
deviation from that recommendation does not result in "manifest 
                     
13 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(B) and 11(e)(2).  Rule 
11(e)(2) provides in part, "[i]f the agreement is of the type 
specified in subdivision (e)(1)(B), the court shall advise the 
defendant that if the court does not accept the recommendation 
or request the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw 
the plea." 
The federal rule also authorizes plea agreements for a 
particular disposition, which the court must either accept or 
reject.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C).  However, the court 
need not accept such agreements, and some federal courts have 
been reluctant to even consider them.  See Shayna M. Sigman, An 
Analysis of Rule 11 Plea Bargain Options, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1317, 1319 and n.9 (1999)(advocating increased use of the 
procedure authorized by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C) but 
discussing the fact that the procedure has been rejected by many 
courts). 
No. 
99-0752-CR 
 
 
20
injustice."  We therefore affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 99-0752.ssa 
 
1 
¶35 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  I 
agree with the defendant that a circuit court should give an 
accused an opportunity to withdraw a guilty plea when the 
circuit court intends to impose a sentence greater than that 
recommended by the state pursuant to a plea agreement.  Thus, I 
express my agreement with those Wisconsin circuit courts that 
presently let an accused know when the circuit court considers 
the recommended sentence unacceptable and affords the accused an 
opportunity to withdraw a guilty plea.  See Wis JICriminal SM-
32 at 18, n.11. 
¶36 I join the mandate in this case, however, because I 
conclude that any such change in our current plea practice 
should be made by this court not in a case but rather through 
its rule-making procedure, Wis. Stat. § 751.12 (1997-98). 
¶37 Under the current procedure endorsed by this court, an 
accused who pleads guilty must give up the valuable right to 
trial, while a prosecutor gives up very little because the 
circuit court makes the ultimate sentencing decision.14  Although 
an accused is told that a prosecutor's sentencing recommendation 
is not binding on the circuit court, many lawyers and accuseds 
believe that the circuit courts will accept the recommendation. 
And, as best we can tell, most circuit courts do, most of the 
time.  
                     
14 The court of appeals recognized "the significant risk 
taken 
by 
a 
criminal 
defendant 
who 
gives 
up 
valuable 
constitutional rights by pleading guilty in exchange for a 
sentencing recommendation that may go completely unheeded."  
State v. Williams, No. 99-0752-CR, unpublished slip op. at 5 
(1999). 
No. 99-0752.ssa 
 
2 
¶38 In my view, fundamental fairness requires that an 
accused not be entrapped into a plea agreement.  State v. 
Thomas, 294 A.2d 57, 61 (N.J. 1972).  A full understanding of 
the consequences of a plea is impossible when accuseds plead 
guilty believing that they have negotiated a specific length of 
sentence only to find that they are bound by an act of self-
conviction, while the circuit court is free to impose any 
sentence within the statutory range.  State v. Killebrew, 330 
N.W.2d 834, 843 (Mich. 1984).  I agree with the Michigan supreme 
court, which analyzed the fairness issue as follows: 
 
Although the prosecutorial "recommendation" would seem 
to inform the defendant of the consequences of his 
pleathat the prosecutor is merely suggesting a 
sentence and that the judge is not bound to follow the 
recommendationthe truth is that most defendants rely 
on the prosecutor's ability to secure the sentence 
when offering a guilty plea.  This is true even when 
the court specifically admonishes the defendant that 
it is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation.  
All disclaimers that the court is not bound are often 
viewed as ceremonial incantations (citations omitted).  
 
 . . .  
 
To most defendants, the distinction between a sentence 
agreement and a sentence recommendation is little more 
than a variation in nomenclature.15 
 
¶39 As the majority opinion acknowledges at ¶ 32, the 
arguments that the defendant in the present case has set forth 
for plea withdrawal have convinced a majority of jurisdictions 
                     
15 State v. Killebrew, 330 N.W.2d 834, 842-43 (Mich. 1984). 
  
No. 99-0752.ssa 
 
3 
to require trial courts to warn an accused when the court is 
going to reject part of a plea agreement and to allow an accused 
to withdraw the guilty plea.  Such a plea practice is consistent 
with the ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure §§ 350.5(4) 
and 350.6 (1975) and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Plea 
of Guilty § 3.3(e) (3d ed. 1999).  However, these jurisdictions, 
the commentators and the defendant in the present case differ on 
the details of the plea withdrawal procedure. 
¶40 This court rejected one variation of a plea withdrawal 
procedure in a 1986 rule proposal.  See In the Matter of the 
Amendment of Rules of Civil & Criminal Procedure: Sections 
971.07 & 971.08, Stats., 128 Wis. 2d 422, 383 N.W.2d 496 (1986) 
(criticizing the proposal as requiring the circuit court to take 
an active part in the plea agreement process).  Other proposals 
address the concerns this court expressed in 1986.  The Michigan 
supreme court recognized the dangers of involving a trial court 
judge in the plea agreement process but nonetheless established 
a required practice akin to that requested by the defendant in 
the present case.  See People v. Killebrew, 330 N.W.2d 834, 841 
(Mich. 1982).  I have not determined which of the various 
proposals I would favor. 
¶41 In 1986 the Wisconsin Department of Justice advised 
the court that the department strongly favored the adoption of 
the proposed rule regarding withdrawal of guilty pleas to assure 
that "the plea agreement process is uniform [across the state], 
No. 99-0752.ssa 
 
4 
fair to all parties and deserving of public confidence."16  For 
the reasons set forth by the Department of Justice, I conclude 
that this court should adopt a rule, either on its own motion or 
on a petition brought to the court and after a public hearing, 
to allow plea withdrawal when a circuit court will not accept a 
prosecutor's 
sentence 
recommendation 
pursuant 
to 
a 
plea 
agreement.  
¶42 For the reasons set forth, I concur in the mandate but 
write separately. 
¶43 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
 
                     
16 See In the Matter of the Amendment of Rules of Civil & 
Criminal Procedure: Sections 971.07 & 971.08, Stats., 128 
Wis. 2d 422, 430, 383 N.W.2d 496 (1986) (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting).