Case Title: Lazlo L. v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12625 & 12660

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12625 
SJC-12660 
 
LAZLO L., a juvenile  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
MILES M., a juvenile  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 4, 2019. - May 16, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Delinquent Child.  Juvenile Court, Delinquent child, 
Jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction, Delinquent child, Juvenile 
Court, Juvenile delinquency proceeding.  Practice, 
Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding.  Statute, 
Retroactive application. 
 
 
 
 
Civil actions commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on September 4 and 21, 2018. 
 
 
The cases were reported by Cypher, J. 
 
 
 
Melissa Allen Celli (Katherine J. Perry-Lorentz, Committee 
for Public Counsel Services, also present) for Miles M. 
 
Eva G. Jellison (Stephanie Stolk Ormsby, Committee for 
Public Counsel Services, also present) for Lazlo L. 
 
Jane A. Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, & David L. 
Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Benjamin L. Falkner, for youth advocacy division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
Mary E. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for District 
Attorney for the Bristol District, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  Before July 12, 2018, "a child between seven 
and [eighteen] who violates any city ordinance or town by-law or 
who commits any offence against a law of the commonwealth" could 
be adjudicated a "delinquent child" in the Juvenile Court.  See 
G. L. c. 119, § 52, as amended through St. 2013, c. 84, § 7; 
G. L. c. 119, § 58.  On and after that date, as a result of the 
enactment of St. 2018, c. 69, entitled "An Act relative to 
criminal justice reform" (act), a child who commits an offense 
before the age of twelve or who commits a civil infraction, 
violates a municipal ordinance or town bylaw, or commits a first 
offense of a misdemeanor "for which the punishment is a fine, 
imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than 
[six] months or both such fine and imprisonment" can no longer 
be adjudicated a "delinquent child."  St. 2018, c. 69, § 72.1  
The cases before us concern two juveniles who allegedly 
committed offenses before July 12, 2018, but whose cases 
remained pending before the Juvenile Court on and after that 
date.  There is no dispute that, if their cases had been 
adjudicated before July 12, each could have been subject to 
                                                          
 
 
1 The Legislature also raised from seven to twelve the 
minimum age at which a complaint could issue against a child.  
See St. 2018, c. 69, § 73, amending G. L. c. 119, § 54. 
3 
 
 
adjudication as a "delinquent child."  There is also no dispute 
that, if they had committed the same offenses on or after July 
12, neither juvenile could be adjudicated a "delinquent child" 
under the amended definition of that term because of age (in the 
case of Lazlo L.2) or because of the nature of the offenses (in 
the case of Miles M.3). 
 
The issue presented on appeal is whether the amended 
definition of "delinquent child" should be applied retroactively 
to cases pending on July 12, 2018.  We conclude that it should, 
and that a child may not be adjudicated a "delinquent child" on 
and after this date if he or she does not fit within the 
definition of that term as amended by the act.  We therefore 
vacate the orders denying the juveniles' motions to dismiss, and 
remand both matters to the Juvenile Court, where an order of 
dismissal for each case shall issue.4 
 
Background.  1.  Lazlo.  At the time of the events at 
issue, Lazlo was eleven years old and living with his mother and 
stepfather.  The complainant, A.M.,5 is the juvenile's 
                                                          
 
 
2 A pseudonym. 
 
 
3 A pseudonym. 
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services 
and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
and by the district attorney for the Bristol district. 
 
 
5 A pseudonym. 
4 
 
 
stepsister.  She lived primarily with her mother, but would 
occasionally spend the night at her father's (Lazlo's 
stepfather's) home.  A.M. alleges that on one such night in 
2017, when she was thirteen, Lazlo entered her bedroom uninvited 
and performed unwanted sexual acts upon her. 
 
On April 10, 2018, a complaint issued charging Lazlo with 
one count of rape and abuse of a child in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 23.  On June 13, Lazlo filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint prior to arraignment, arguing that the act's amended 
definition of "delinquent child" should apply retroactively to 
his case, and that the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction to 
adjudicate him a "delinquent child" because he was eleven years 
old at the time of the alleged offense.  The Commonwealth 
opposed the motion to dismiss, and the motion judge denied it.6  
Lazlo's case was pending when the amended definition of 
"delinquent child" became effective, and remains so. 
 
2.  Miles.  On June 13, 2018, police filed an application 
for a complaint against Miles for trespassing in violation of 
G. L. c. 266, § 120, and disorderly conduct in violation of 
G. L. c. 272, § 53 (b).  The following day, a Juvenile Court 
clerk found that both charges were supported by probable cause.  
                                                          
 
 
6 Lazlo L. has yet to be arraigned, because a Juvenile Court 
judge allowed his motion to stay the proceedings pending this 
interlocutory appeal. 
5 
 
 
A delinquency complaint issued against Miles on June 15.  When 
he appeared for arraignment on July 9, Miles moved to dismiss 
the charges against him prior to arraignment, arguing that 
because he had no prior criminal or delinquency record, neither 
charged offense was a qualifying offense under the amended 
definition of "delinquent child."7 
 
The Juvenile Court judge denied Miles's motion to dismiss, 
as well as his request to postpone the arraignment.  The judge 
asserted that the act did not apply to the juvenile's case 
because he was not charged with a school-based offense or a 
civil infraction.  The judge further reasoned that arraignment 
was proper because "[t]here are no fines that are affixed under 
the juvenile law" and because the Department of Youth Services 
(department) "is not a place of incarceration," but one of 
rehabilitation.  The Juvenile Court judge proceeded to arraign 
Miles, and his case was pending when the amended definition of 
"delinquent child" became effective (and remains pending). 
                                                          
 
 
7 The parties agree that Miles M. had no prior record and 
that both trespass and disorderly conduct are punishable by a 
fine, imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more 
than six months, or both.  See G. L. c. 266, § 120 (trespass 
"punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or by 
imprisonment for not more than thirty days or both such fine and 
imprisonment"); G. L. c. 272, § 53 (b), as appearing in St. 
2018, c. 69, § 160 ("Disorderly persons and disturbers of the 
peace shall, for a first offense, be punished by a fine of not 
more than $150"). 
6 
 
 
 
3.  Petitions pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Both 
juveniles filed interlocutory petitions for extraordinary relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, requesting that a single justice 
of the county court exercise this court's general 
superintendence power to reverse the decisions of the Juvenile 
Court judges in their respective cases.  A single justice of the 
county court reserved and reported both cases for determination 
by the full court. 
 
Discussion.  Because this case turns on a question of 
statutory interpretation, we review the juveniles' motions to 
dismiss de novo.  Commonwealth v. Martin, 476 Mass. 72, 75 
(2016).  The parties agree that neither juvenile could qualify 
as a "delinquent child" under the term's amended definition.8  
                                                          
 
 
8 The Juvenile Court judge who denied Miles's motion to 
dismiss the case and to stay the arraignment held that the 
amendment excluding from the definition of "delinquent child" a 
child who commits a "first offense of a misdemeanor for which 
the punishment is a fine, imprisonment in a jail or house of 
correction for not more than [six] months or both such fine and 
imprisonment," St. 2018, c. 69, § 72, did not apply to Miles's 
case.  The judge reasoned that there are "no fines that are 
affixed under the juvenile law," and that offenses adjudicated 
in the Juvenile Court are not punishable by imprisonment for any 
period of time because the Department of Youth Services is a 
place of rehabilitation, and not of incarceration.  However, in 
determining whether an individual may be adjudicated a 
"delinquent child" under the amended definition, a court must 
focus on the possible sentences under the particular statutes 
criminalizing an offender's conduct, not on the dispositions 
available to the Juvenile Court.  Here, the statutes 
criminalizing trespass and disorderly conduct both provide for 
sentences in the form of a fine, imprisonment for not more than 
six months, or both.  See G. L. c. 266, § 120; G. L. c. 272, 
7 
 
 
The only question, then, is whether this definition should be 
applied retroactively to cases, such as these, that were pending 
at the time that definition became effective. 
 
1.  Statutory presumption of prospective application.  To 
determine whether the amended definition of "delinquent child" 
applies retroactively, we first must determine whether the rule 
of statutory construction described in G. L. c. 4, § 6, Second, 
is applicable here.  General Laws c. 4, § 6, Second, provides in 
relevant part: 
"In construing statutes the following rules shall be 
observed, unless their observance would involve a 
construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the 
law-making body or repugnant to the context of the same 
statute:  . . . Second, The repeal of a statute shall not 
affect any punishment, penalty or forfeiture incurred 
before the repeal takes effect, or any suit, prosecution or 
proceeding pending at the time of the repeal for an offence 
committed . . . under the statute repealed" (emphasis 
added). 
 
Because this particular rule of construction applies only to 
"strictly penal" statutes, Commonwealth v. Dotson, 462 Mass. 96, 
99 (2012), quoting Nassar v. Commonwealth, 341 Mass. 584, 588 
(1961), we must decide whether the repeal accomplished through 
the amended definition of "delinquent child" in St. 2018, c. 69, 
                                                          
 
§ 53 (b).  Miles, therefore, would not qualify as a "delinquent 
child" under the amended definition provided for in § 72. 
 
 
The Commonwealth concedes that the judge also "erred in 
concluding that the amendment applies only to civil infractions 
or school-based offenses." 
8 
 
 
§ 72, affects a penal statute.9  If it does, the new "delinquent 
child" definition is presumptively prospective in its 
application, that is, it would apply only to cases adjudicating 
offenses that were committed on or after July 12, 2018.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 497-498 (2000) ("When the 
conduct triggering the statute's application occurs on or after 
its effective date, the statute's application is deemed 
prospective . . ."). 
 
The juveniles argue that G. L. c. 4, § 6, is not applicable 
here because the Juvenile Court is not a penal institution and 
the department's purpose is rehabilitation, not punishment.  
They contend that a statute articulating the jurisdiction of a 
nonpenal institution cannot qualify as a "strictly penal" 
statute subject to the rule of construction outlined in G. L. 
c. 4, § 6, Second.10  The juveniles are correct that that our 
                                                          
 
 
9 We deem an amendment of a penal statute to constitute an 
implicit repeal where the amendment is inconsistent with the 
statute's earlier provisions.  Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 
Mass. 551, 553 (2013).  Here, however, the Legislature did not 
enact an amendment that was merely "inconsistent" with the 
former definition of "delinquent child."  Instead, it struck the 
definition in its entirety and replaced it with a new one.  We 
therefore consider the repeal of the former definition to be 
explicit. 
 
 
10 The Commonwealth asserts that because Miles did not raise 
arguments concerning the nonpenal nature of Juvenile Court 
proceedings in his motion to dismiss or in his G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, petition, the issue whether to apply G. L. c. 4, § 6, 
Second, is not properly before this court.  Because the 
applicability of G. L. c. 4, § 6, is a threshold issue we must 
9 
 
 
statutes governing the adjudication of children "shall be 
liberally construed so that the care, custody and discipline of 
the children brought before the court shall approximate as 
nearly as possible that which they should receive from their 
parents, and that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated, 
not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement 
and guidance."  G. L. c. 119, § 53.  In accord with that 
statutory principle, we have recognized that the "rehabilitation 
of the child remains front and center" in the Juvenile Court, 
Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 654 (2013), and that 
delinquency is "legally and constitutionally different from 
crime."  Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 Mass. 503, 506 (2015), 
quoting Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 648, 651-652 (1959).  
See G. L. c. 119, § 53 ("Proceedings against children . . . 
shall not be deemed criminal proceedings"). 
 
A statute, however, need not be criminal to be penal.  Any 
"statute designed to enforce the law by punishing offenders, 
rather than simply by enforcing restitution to those damaged, is 
in the nature of a penal statute."  Johnson's Case, 69 Mass. 
App. Ct. 834, 838 (2007), quoting Collatos v. Boston Retirement 
Bd., 396 Mass. 684, 686 (1986).  A child adjudicated delinquent 
in a Juvenile Court may suffer a loss of liberty, including 
                                                          
 
evaluate in order to assess the Commonwealth's and the 
juveniles' claims under this statute, we address it here. 
10 
 
 
commitment to the department.  See G. L. c. 119, § 58.11  Even if 
the purpose of commitment is "primarily rehabilitative," 
Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 461 (2012), a 
deprivation of liberty imposed by the State as a direct 
consequence of being found delinquent for having committed an 
offense necessarily includes an element of punishment.  See 3 
N.J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 59:1 (7th ed. 2008) (statute "dealing with 
juveniles [is] not technically classified as criminal, but 
because it potentially involves the deprivation of liberty 
similar to those which are criminal in nature, it is construed 
no less strictly than statutes imposing criminal sanctions on 
adults").  Where a statute affects whether a child can be 
adjudicated delinquent, and therefore whether that child may be 
subject to a loss of liberty, an amendment to that statute 
necessarily implicates the potential for punishment.  See Watts 
v. Commonwealth, 468 Mass. 49, 53-54 (2014) (statute considered 
penal, not merely procedural, where it "changes both the nature 
of the proceedings against, and dispositional options for" 
                                                          
 
 
11 "If a child is adjudicated a delinquent child on a 
complaint, the court may . . . commit him [or her] to the 
custody of the department of youth services" for no "longer than 
until such child attains the age of eighteen, or nineteen in the 
case of a child whose case is disposed of after he has attained 
his eighteenth birthday or age [twenty] in the case of a child 
whose case is disposed of after he has attained his nineteenth 
birthday."  G. L. c. 119, § 58. 
11 
 
 
juveniles of certain age [footnote omitted]).  We therefore 
conclude that § 72 qualifies as penal for the purposes of G. L. 
c. 4, § 6, Second, and that its application is presumptively 
prospective.12 
 
2.  Exceptions to presumption of prospectivity.  As the 
preamble to G. L. c. 4, § 6, makes clear, the "presumption of 
prospective application . . . is not absolute," and is subject 
to two exceptions explicitly provided for in the preamble.  
Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 553 (2013).  Namely, the 
rules of statutory construction do not apply where "their 
observance would involve a construction inconsistent with the 
manifest intent of the law-making body or repugnant to the 
context of the same statute."  G. L. c. 4, § 6.  We consider 
each exception in turn. 
 
a.  Legislature's manifest intent.  "The presumption of 
prospective application is inconsistent with the manifest intent 
of the law-making body where there is a clearly expressed 
intention of the Legislature that the new statute apply 
retroactively" (quotations and citation omitted).  Bradley, 466 
Mass. at 554.  In order to determine the Legislature's intent, 
"we look to all the statutory words construed by the ordinary 
                                                          
 
 
12 Because we conclude that G. L. c. 4, § 6, Second, is 
applicable here, we need not address the parties' common-law 
arguments. 
12 
 
 
and approved usage of the language, considered in connection 
with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to 
be remedied and the main object to be accomplished to the end 
that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated" (quotation, 
citation, and alteration omitted).  Id.  Because the 
Legislature's intent to apply a statute retroactively must be 
"clearly expressed," we cannot overcome the presumption of 
prospective application under this first exception simply by 
"inferring that the Legislature probably intended retroactive 
application."  Id., quoting Dotson, 462 Mass. at 101.  But the 
presumption may be overcome where the Legislature "clearly 
express[es] its intent through the words used in a statute or 
the inclusion of other retroactive provisions in the statute 
that would make prospective application of the provision at 
issue 'anomalous, if not absurd.'"  Bradley, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Galvin, 466 Mass. 286, 291 (2013). 
 
We conclude that there is inadequate evidence of the 
Legislature's manifest intent to apply § 72 retroactively to 
overcome the presumption of prospective application.  Although 
the Legislature clearly established the effective date of § 72, 
see St. 2018, c. 69, § 232, it did not clearly establish whether 
the definition of "delinquent child," once it became effective, 
would apply retroactively to pending cases.  See Bradley, 466 
Mass. at 555 (effective date does not determine whether 
13 
 
 
Legislature intended retroactive application).  Nor are there 
any other provisions in the act that would make prospective 
application of § 72 "anomalous, if not absurd."  Id. at 554, 
quoting Galvin, 466 Mass. at 291.  In the absence of clear 
indication that the Legislature intended retroactive 
application, the manifest intent exception is not satisfied. 
 
The juveniles' arguments to the contrary are unavailing.  
The juveniles assert that by expressly providing that certain 
sections of the act, not including § 72, shall be applied 
prospectively, the Legislature indicated its manifest intent 
that the amended definition of "delinquent child" be applied 
retroactively.  See St. 2018, c. 69, § 237 ("Sections 45, 46, 
49, 50, 51, 57 and 111 shall apply to offenses committed after 
the effective date of this act").  The principle of statutory 
interpretation that the "statutory expression of one thing is an 
implied exclusion of other things omitted from the statute" 
(citation omitted), Commonwealth v. Perry, 455 Mass. 1010, 1011 
(2009), does not help the juveniles in these cases for two 
reasons.  First, implied exclusion is insufficient to 
demonstrate manifest intent.  See Bradley, 466 Mass. at 
554.  Second, this principle of statutory construction is not a 
rule of law, but rather a mere aid to interpretation, Phillips 
v. Equity Residential Mgt., LLC, 478 Mass. 251, 259 n.19 (2017), 
and should be applied only with great caution, Trustees of 
14 
 
 
Cambridge Point Condominium Trust v. Cambridge Point, LLC, 478 
Mass. 697, 702 (2018).  Reliance on this principle is therefore 
inadequate to satisfy the first exception, which requires a 
clear expression of legislative intent to overcome the 
presumption of prospectivity. 
 
b.  Repugnancy.  Even where prospective application is not 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature, 
retroactive application is appropriate if prospective 
application would be "repugnant to the context" of the statutory 
amendment narrowing the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction.  G. L. 
c. 4, § 6.  The "presumption of prospective application is 
'repugnant to the context of the . . . statute' where it would 
be contrary to the purpose of the statute to delay the 
accomplishment of that purpose."  Bradley, 466 Mass. at 555-556.  
Unlike the manifest intent exception, the repugnancy exception 
"certainly does not require that the intent of the Legislature 
be made 'manifest.'"  Id. at 556.  It does, however, "compel us 
to discern the legislative purpose of the statute at issue and 
determine whether prospective application would be inconsistent 
with that purpose."  Id. 
 
The legislative history of the act indicates that the 
Legislature understood that children who enter the juvenile 
justice system have a higher risk of reoffending for the 
remainder of their lives, and that their risk of recidivism is 
15 
 
 
greater the earlier they enter the system.  See State House News 
Service (House Sess.), Nov. 13, 2017 (statement of Rep. Claire 
D. Cronin, co-chair, Joint Committee on Judiciary) ("the earlier 
a child become[s] involved" in justice system, "the more likely 
that child will remain in the system through his or her life"); 
State House News Service (House Sess.), Apr. 4, 2018 (statement 
of Rep. Kay Khan, co-chair, Joint Committee on Children, 
Families and Persons with Disabilities) (amendment that "raises 
juvenile jurisdiction from [seven] to [twelve]," among other 
amendments, "will give young people a second chance"); State 
House News Service (Senate Sess.), Oct. 26, 2017 (statement of 
Sen. William N. Brownsberger, co-chair, Joint Committee on 
Judiciary) ("decriminalizing childhood behaviors" part of effort 
to "cut the chains that hold people down when they're trying to 
get back up on their feet").13 
                                                          
 
 
13 We think it helpful to look to the statements of 
proponents of legislation in order to discern its purpose.  See 
Bradley, 466 Mass. at 558-559.  But we acknowledge the danger 
that, where there is broad disagreement on a legislative 
subject, a court could paint an incomplete picture of the intent 
behind a particular act by "cherry picking" statements of 
various legislators.  See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (relying on legislators' 
statements can be described as "the equivalent of entering a 
crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests 
for one's friends").  Here, however, we did not cherry pick the 
legislators' remarks -- we focused on the statements of 
legislative leaders, and the parties do not dispute that one of 
the Legislature's aims was to reduce recidivism for juvenile 
offenders. 
16 
 
 
 
It is clear from the text of § 72 that the Legislature 
intended to reduce the number of children who enter the juvenile 
justice system by narrowing the definition of "delinquent child" 
to exclude children below the age of twelve and children who 
commit civil infractions, violate a municipal ordinance or town 
bylaw, or commit a first offense of a minor misdemeanor.  In so 
doing, the Legislature implicitly declared that the juvenile 
justice system is not the appropriate forum to address offenses 
committed by children under twelve, or civil infractions, or 
first offenses of a minor misdemeanor committed by any child, 
and that such matters should not result in a juvenile record 
that may later adversely affect a child and increase his or her 
risk to recidivate.  We see no reason to delay the application 
of an amendment aimed at combatting the negative effects of 
Juvenile Court involvement on children and their communities.  
See Bradley, 466 Mass. at 559 (retroactive application 
appropriate where prospective application affects not only "the 
individuals charged" but also their broader communities).  
Allowing these juveniles to proceed through the Juvenile Court 
system and potentially to be adjudicated as delinquent children 
would be directly contrary to the Legislature's goal of giving 
children in their position a second chance by removing the 
possibility of a Juvenile Court adjudication, with all of its 
attendant consequences. 
17 
 
 
 
The juveniles' cases are distinguishable from Watts, 468 
Mass. at 49-50, where we held that St. 2013, c. 84, which 
expanded the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction to include persons 
who were seventeen years old at the time of an alleged offense, 
did not apply retroactively to criminal cases pending on the 
act's effective date.  Prior to the enactment of this act, 
seventeen year old offenders were treated as adult criminals 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Superior and District Courts.  
Id. at 51.  In Watts, supra at 57, we acknowledged that 
expanding the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court aimed "to 
protect minors, particularly children who are seventeen years of 
age, from certain well-documented harms, including . . . an 
increased risk of recidivism, that arise when children are 
prosecuted as if they were adults," and that this goal was 
"significant and compelling."  Nevertheless, the court concluded 
that prospective application would not be repugnant to the 
context of the act because the Legislature was aware that 
expanding the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court to include 
seventeen year old offenders would require "additional staff and 
services" and result in "unavoidable complexities," which would 
inevitably require time to resolve.  Id. at 60, 62.  "It is no 
help to these children," the court reasoned, "if they are 
transferred to the Juvenile Court system before the system is 
18 
 
 
able to absorb them and able to provide the attending services 
that they need."  Id. at 57. 
 
Such concerns do not exist here.  It takes no additional 
resources for the Juvenile Court to dismiss cases that were 
pending on July 12, 2018, where the juvenile no longer falls 
under the definition of "delinquent child."  On the contrary, 
narrowing the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court to exclude 
certain children will reduce the number of cases before the 
Juvenile Court, conserving its resources as opposed to 
stretching them.  Therefore, unlike in Watts, 468 Mass. at 57, 
there is no practical reason to delay the Legislature's 
"significant and compelling" goal of protecting children under 
the age of twelve, and children who commit civil infractions or 
a first offense of a minor misdemeanor, from the long-lasting 
effects of involvement in the juvenile justice system. 
 
The jurisdictional nature of § 72 reinforces our conclusion 
that retroactive application is appropriate here.  As of July 
12, 2018, the Juvenile Court no longer has jurisdiction to 
adjudicate as a "delinquent child" either of the children who 
are involved in these cases.  See G. L. c. 119, § 52, as amended 
through St. 2018, c. 69, § 72; G. L. c. 119, § 58.  Because 
jurisdiction is a threshold requirement for a court to decide 
any case, it would have been logical for the Legislature to 
expect that Juvenile Court proceedings against children who were 
19 
 
 
removed from the definition of "delinquent child" would cease 
and the cases would be dismissed on the day that § 72 became 
effective.  See Mogelinski, 466 Mass. at 645 ("Juvenile Court is 
a court of limited jurisdiction, which has no authority in the 
absence of a specific statutory authorization" [quotation, 
citation, and alteration omitted]). 
 
Because we conclude that prospective application of St. 
2018, c. 69, § 72, would be repugnant to its context, we hold 
that the amended definition of "delinquent child" applies 
retroactively to cases pending on its effective date of July 12, 
2018.  Therefore, the juveniles in these cases are not subject 
to the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction.14 
 
Conclusion.  We vacate the decisions denying both 
juveniles' motions to dismiss and remand the matters to the 
Juvenile Court for dismissal.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
14 Having concluded that prospective application of St. 
2018, c. 69, § 72, would be repugnant to its context, we need 
not address the juveniles' constitutional arguments. 
 
 
15 In his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, Miles requested that 
the county court vacate his arraignment and expunge the charges 
of trespass and disorderly conduct from his delinquency record.  
Because Miles's arraignment took place on July 9, 2018, prior to 
the effective date of § 72, we decline to vacate it.