Case Title: Bhatia v. Mehak Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 002414

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, 
JJ., and Whiting, S.J. 
 
NAKUL BHATIA, ET AL. 
         OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
v.  Record No. 002414 
   September 14, 2001 
 
MEHAK, INC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Marcus D. Williams, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal of consolidated personal injury actions, we 
consider whether a restaurant business and its "co-owners" are 
entitled to the protection of a religious organization's 
charitable immunity when donating restaurant catering services 
at one of the charity's religious ceremonies. 
 
Nakul Bhatia and Natasha Bhatia, then four and nine years 
old respectively, went with their parents to a religious 
ceremony conducted by a Hindu religious organization known as 
Rajdhani Mandir (Mandir).  While in a room adjacent to that in 
which the ceremony was being conducted, both children were 
scalded by hot tea, being served with food and other 
refreshments, that spilled from an overturned urn used by 
employees of Mehak, Inc. (Mehak), the caterer.  Mandir's 
minister testified that these refreshments were an essential 
part of the extended religious service which involved 
considerable physical exertion. 
 
2
 
Praveendra Dhingra, a devotee of Mandir and one of the two 
self-described "co-owners" of Mehak, an Indian restaurant in the 
area, had agreed to the request of Mandir's minister that 
Dhingra arrange for the provision, preparation, and service of 
the necessary food and refreshments as a donation to Mandir.  
Dhingra thus had Mehak and its employees cater the event without 
compensation from Mandir, an organization that all parties agree 
is a charitable one. 
 
Both children, by their father and next friend, Sanjeev 
Bhatia, brought actions seeking compensation for their injuries 
against Mehak and its "co-owners" Dhingra and Kashmira Singh.  
In their motions for judgment, the plaintiffs charged that Mehak 
was acting "through its agents, employees, and/or owners" and 
that they "negligently caused scalding hot tea to be served." 
 
The three defendants filed pleas in bar asserting the 
defense of charitable immunity.  On motion of the plaintiffs, 
the cases were consolidated.  After briefs were filed on the 
issue of charitable immunity and evidence was heard, the court 
found that all defendants were engaged in the work of the 
charity without compensation at the time the tea urn overturned.  
Therefore, the court sustained the pleas and entered final 
judgment for the defendants.  The plaintiffs appeal. 
 
3
 
The doctrine of charitable immunity in Virginia 
"precludes a charity's beneficiaries from recovering 
damages from the charity for the negligent acts of its 
servants or agents if due care was exercised in the hiring 
and retention of those servants."  Moore v. Warren, 250 Va. 
421, 422-23, 463 S.E.2d 459, 459 (1995) (citing Straley v. 
Urbanna Chamber of Commerce, 243 Va. 32, 35, 413 S.E.2d 47, 
49 (1992)).  Additionally, "a volunteer of a charity is 
immune from liability to the charity's beneficiaries for 
negligence while the volunteer was engaged in the charity's 
work."  Moore, 250 Va. at 425, 463 S.E.2d at 461 (unpaid 
volunteer driver entitled to charitable immunity from 
damages for alleged negligence while driving beneficiary of 
American Red Cross's services to medical facility for 
treatment).  However, an agent or servant of a charity only 
shares the charity's immunity from liability if the agent 
or servant is acting directly for the benefit of the 
charity.  See Mooring v. Virginia Wesleyan College, 257 Va. 
509, 512, 514 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1999). 
 
In Mooring, a college professor who taught a 
recreational and leisure studies class, volunteered the 
assistance of his students at a program of a local Boys and 
Girls Club.  While observing one of his volunteer-students 
 
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conducting a class, the professor responded to her request 
that he close a door to keep other children out of the 
class.  While closing the door, the professor injured one 
of those children.  Even though the professor incidentally 
benefited the charity by acting as "doorkeeper" to enable 
his students to properly conduct the class, we concluded 
that he was not entitled to the charity's immunity. 
 
In Mooring, we noted that "Moore requires an 
individual seeking the cloak of a charity's immunity to 
establish [1] that he was an agent or servant of the 
charity at the time of the alleged negligence and [2] that 
the alleged negligence for which he seeks immunity occurred 
while he was actually doing the charity's work."  Id. at 
512, 514 S.E.2d at 621.  We denied charitable immunity in 
Mooring on the second ground that the professor was "not 
there to directly perform any of the Club's work; rather he 
was carrying out his duties as a professor."  Id.  Implicit 
in our holding was the fact that the professor was acting 
as the agent of the college, not of the charity. 
 
Here, Mehak, its "co-owners," and its employees were 
neither acting as agents or servants of the charity in 
preparing and serving the food and beverages, nor were they 
directly performing the work of the charity.  Instead, they 
 
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were acting directly for Mehak in preparing and delivering 
its charitable donation.  In this respect, they were like 
the college professor in Mooring who was acting as the 
college's agent in promoting the college's interest, and 
unlike the volunteer driver in Moore who was acting solely 
as the charity's agent in promoting the charity's interest. 
 
Applying the rationale of Mooring and Moore, we 
conclude that none of the defendants was acting as Mandir's 
agents and servants at the time the children were injured.  
Even though the facts are considered in the light most 
favorable to the defendants who prevailed in the trial 
court, we conclude that the court erred in sustaining the 
defendants' pleas of charitable immunity. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.