Case Title: State v. Boskind

Citation: 174 Vt. 184, 807 A.2d 358

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Boskind (98-470 & 99-335); 174 Vt. 184; 807 A.2d 358

[Filed 28-Aug-2002]
[Motion to Reconsider & Clarify Granted 28-Aug-2002]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                  SUPREME COURT DOCKET NOS. 98-470 & 99-335

                              AUGUST TERM, 2002


  State of Vermont 	               }   	 APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
       v.	                       }	District Court of Vermont,
                                       }	Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
  Jethro S. Boskind	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 1351-3-98 Cncr

  State of Vermont	               }
                                       }
      v.	                       }
                                       }
  John S. Boardman	               }	DOCKET NO. 912-2-98 Cncr

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       The State's June 6, 2002 motion to reconsider and clarify the opinions
  in the above appeal issued on May 24, 2002 is granted.  With respect to the
  majority slip opinion, footnote five on page ten and the last five words of
  the third full sentence on page nine, beginning with the word "or," are
  stricken.  With respect to the dissenting slip opinion, the last sentence
  of the full paragraph beginning on page six and extending to page seven, as
  well as footnote two and the citation following the last sentence of the
  paragraph, are also stricken.  In all other respects, the opinions remain
  the same.


                                       BY THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice


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State v. Boskind (98-470) & State v. Boardman (99-335)

[Filed May 24-2002]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                            Nos.  98-470 & 99-335


State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

Jethro S. Boskind	                         March Term, 2000


State of Vermont

     v.

John S. Boardman


Brian L. Burgess, J.  (98-470)
Amy M. Davenport, J.  (99-335)


Jane Woodruff, Department of State's Attorneys, Montpelier (98-470), and 
  Lauren Bowerman, Chittenden County State's Attorney, Burlington (99-335), 
  for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney, 
  Montpelier (98-470), and Paul D. Jarvis of Jarvis and Kaplan, Burlington 
  (99-335), for Defendants-Appellants.


PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.


       AMESTOY, C.J.   In these consolidated cases, defendants appeal their
  enhanced convictions  for driving while intoxicated.  The appeals present
  four significant issues: (1) whether a defendant  can challenge a prior
  conviction used to enhance a sentence when the challenge is based on a
  claim  other than a violation of right to counsel; (2) when a defendant has
  a right to challenge a prior 

 

  conviction the State intends to rely upon for sentence enhancement, whether
  the proper forum for  exercising that right is the sentencing proceeding in
  district court or a post-conviction relief (PCR)  proceeding in superior
  court; (3) when the appropriate remedy for a defendant's challenge to a 
  predicate conviction is governed by the post conviction relief statute (13
  V.S.A. § 7131), whether a  defendant who challenges the prior conviction is
  "in custody under sentence" within the meaning of  § 7131 when the
  defendant is no longer in custody for the conviction being challenged; (4)
  when a  defendant challenges a prior conviction used for enhancement
  purposes on the basis of a failure to  comply with V.R.Cr.P. 11, whether
  the burden of proof to demonstrate compliance shifts to the State  where
  the defendant's evidence raises a substantial question about whether the
  defendant's plea to  the challenged conviction was made in compliance with
  V.R.Cr.P. 11.

       We hold that a defendant's right to challenge a prior conviction that
  the State intends to use  to enhance a sentence is not limited solely to a
  claim that the conviction was obtained in violation of  right to counsel. 
  We further determine that the challenge must take place in superior court
  pursuant  to Vermont's post conviction relief statute and that a defendant
  is "in custody under sentence" for  purposes of invoking the jurisdictional
  requirement of § 7131 where the defendant is challenging his  current
  sentence by attacking the constitutionality of a prior conviction used to
  enhance the  defendant's current sentence.  We also conclude that the
  burden of proof remains on the defendant  where the defendant's challenge
  to the prior conviction is based upon a claim that the trial court did  not
  comply with V.R.Cr.P. 11 in accepting defendant's plea to the challenged
  predicate conviction.

       Accordingly, we affirm the enhanced sentences imposed upon the
  respective defendants and  hold that defendants, should they challenge
  convictions on the basis of a claim that the trial court did 

 

  not comply with V.R.Cr.P. 11, must do so pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7131 where
  they have the burden  to show that the trial court did not substantially
  comply with V.R.Cr.P. 11 in their pleas and that this  noncompliance
  prejudiced them.

       In February 1998, defendants John Boardman and Jethro Boskind were
  each separately  arrested for DUI and charged with violating 23 V.S.A. §
  1201(a)(2) ("A person shall not operate,  attempt to operate, or be in
  actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway . . . when the person 
  is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.").  For each defendant, the
  State sought the enhanced  penalty for a DUI-third offense pursuant to 23
  V.S.A. § 1210(d) ("A person convicted of violating  section 1201 of this
  title who has twice been convicted of violation of that section shall be
  fined not  more than $2,500.00 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
  both.").  The State alleged that  defendant Boardman had been previously
  convicted of DUI in 1991 and 1992, and that defendant  Boskind had been
  previously convicted of DUI in 1988 and 1991.  

       Defendant Boardman moved to dismiss the DUI-third offense enhancement,
  claiming that his  prior DUI convictions, in each of which he was
  represented by counsel and pled guilty, were  products of unconstitutional
  guilty pleas because of failure to comply with V.R.Cr.P. 11.  Defendant 
  Boskind moved to dismiss his enhancement, claiming that the 1991
  conviction, in which he was  represented by counsel, was the product of an
  unconstitutional nolo contendere plea because the  court did not comply
  with V.R.Cr.P. 11. (FN1)

 

       The district court denied defendant Boardman's motion to dismiss his
  prior convictions,  precluding his collateral attack on the sentence
  enhancement, because both of his prior convictions  were counseled and had
  not been appealed, litigated in post-conviction proceedings, or withdrawn.  
  Defendant Boardman pled guilty to the offense pursuant to a conditional
  plea agreement, by which  he was sentenced to 2-to-4 years of supervised
  community service, but reserved the right to appeal  from the denial of his
  motion to dismiss the enhancement allegation.  After the court denied his 
  motion to dismiss his prior conviction, defendant Boskind also pled guilty
  to the offense pursuant to  a conditional plea agreement, by which he was
  sentenced to a term of 1-to-5 years, and similarly  preserved his right to
  appeal.

       Both trial courts relied on Custis v. United States,