Case Title: Oregon v. Sholedice

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
146	
December 13, 2018	
No. 65
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
NATHAN RUSSELL SHOLEDICE,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 141765) (CA A158781) (SC S064787 (Control))
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
MICHELLE RAE SMITH,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 141766) (CA A158794) (SC S064806)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted October 17, 2017, at Baker City 
High School, Baker City, Oregon.
David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. 
Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
George W. Kelly, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the 
brief for respondent on review Sholedice.
Matthew Blythe, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public 
Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the 
brief for respondent on review Smith. Also on the brief was 
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender.
Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Balmer, Kistler, 
Nakamoto, Flynn, and Nelson, Justices.**
______________
	
**  On review from Lincoln County Circuit Court, Sheryl Bachart, Judge. 283 
Or App 346, 386 P3d 701 (2017). 283 Or App 422, 387 P3d 499 (2017).
	
**  Landau, J., retired December 31, 2017, and did not participate in the deci­
sion of this case. Duncan, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of 
this case. 
Cite as 364 Or 146 (2018)	
147
KISTLER, J.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals are reversed. The 
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Case Summary: Defendant Sholedice sent a package to defendant Smith 
through the mail. A postal inspector removed the package from a mail hamper 
and put it in a package lineup for a trained drug dog to sniff. After the dog alerted, 
another postal inspector took the package to Smith but asked for consent before 
tendering it to her. Defendants moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result 
of the postal inspectors’ actions, arguing that the postal inspectors seized the 
package in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution both when 
they removed it from the hamper and put it in the package lineup and also when 
they asked for consent to search it before tendering it to Smith. The Court of 
Appeals reversed. Held: (1) The United States Postal Service lawfully possessed 
the package as a bailee, and the first postal inspector acted consistently with the 
terms of the bailment when she removed the package from the hamper and put it 
in the package lineup. As a result, her actions did not constitute an impermissible 
seizure; and (2) the second postal inspector did seize the package by asking for 
consent before delivering it but that seizure was constitutionally reasonable. At 
the point that he seized the package, he had probable cause to believe it contained 
either drugs or proceeds of a drug sale.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals are reversed. The judgment of the cir­
cuit court is affirmed.
148	
State v. Sholedice/Smith
	
KISTLER, J.
	
This case presents two questions. The first is 
whether a United States Postal Service (USPS) inspector 
seized a package in violation of the Oregon Constitution 
when she took the package out of a mail hamper and put it 
on the floor so that a drug-detection dog could sniff it. The 
second is whether another postal inspector seized the pack­
age when, after the dog had alerted to the package, he took 
it to the addressee’s house and asked for consent to search 
it. Focusing on the first issue, the trial court ruled that no 
seizure had occurred because defendants had no constitu­
tionally protected possessory interest in the package while 
it was in the mail. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning 
that defendants had a constitutionally protected property 
interest in the package, which the first postal inspector sig­
nificantly interfered with when she took the package out of 
the mail hamper. State v. Sholedice, 283 Or App 346, 386 
P3d 701 (2017) (per curiam); State v. Smith, 282 Or App 208, 
384 P3d 701 (per curiam), on recons, 283 Or App 422, 387 
P3d 499 (2017) (per curiam). We allowed the state’s petitions 
for review and now reverse the Court of Appeals decisions 
and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
	
These consolidated cases involve two defendants, 
Sholedice and Smith. On May 27, 2014, Sholedice mailed a 
package from Las Cruces, New Mexico, to Smith in Lincoln 
City, Oregon. He paid the USPS approximately $63 to mail 
the package by express mail with a guaranteed delivery date 
of May 29, 2014. The label on the package was handwritten, 
addressed to “M. Smith” in Lincoln City, and contained a 
signature waiver, which meant that the package could be 
left at the address without the addressee signing for it.
	
Craig is a federal postal inspector who works at a 
mail processing facility near the Portland airport. Hampers 
full of mail come into the processing facility each day, filled 
with packages destined for various locations throughout 
Oregon. Pursuant to federal policies, Craig sorts through 
the hampers looking for prohibited mail—i.e., mail that 
contains poison, controlled substances, suspicious powders, 
bombs, and “injurious objects,” such as knives, guns, poi­
sonous insects, and snakes. As she explained and the trial 
Cite as 364 Or 146 (2018)	
149
court found, she looks for packages containing prohibited 
mail “to keep our—our carriers safe.”1
	
The USPS has established protocols for determin­
ing which packages may contain prohibited materials, and 
Craig sorted packages based on those protocols. On the 
morning of May 28, Craig came across Sholedice’s package. 
She noticed that four indicators set out in the USPS proto­
cols were present. First, Sholedice’s use of express mail was 
unusual. Express mail is ordinarily used by businesses; it 
is not typically used for mailing packages from one person 
to another. Second, Sholedice paid more than was necessary 
to send the package. He paid approximately $63 to mail the 
package from New Mexico to Oregon by express mail when 
first-class or priority mail could have gotten the package to 
Oregon in the same amount of time at a fraction of the cost.2 
Third, the label included a signature waiver. Craig testified 
that most senders use express mail to ensure that the letter 
or package has been received by having the addressee sign 
for it. She explained that a sender may waive the signature 
requirement either because “they don’t want [the mail car­
rier] to have a face to face with [the addressee]” or because 
they do not want the addressee to know that the package 
has arrived.3 Finally, Craig testified that senders who use 
express mail ordinarily use the addressee’s full name rather 
than an initial and last name, such as “M. Smith.”
	
Not only did Sholedice’s package stand out for those 
reasons, but Craig also knew that Oregon is a source state 
for exporting marijuana and a destination state for receipt 
of drug proceeds. For those reasons, she took the pack­
age out of the hamper and put it on the floor of the sorting 
	
1  The safety issues for postal employees resulting from packages containing 
explosives, poisons, and “injurious objects” are self-evident. Additionally, Craig 
testified that packages containing drugs and drug proceeds can present safety 
issues for postal employees. She explained that “our carriers become victims of 
robbery because people know that there’s drugs or drug proceeds going through 
the mail.”
	
2  Craig testified that it would take two days for an express mail package to 
go from New Mexico to Oregon while priority mail would take two to three days 
to get to Oregon at one-third or one-fourth the cost.
	
3  To illustrate the latter point, Craig testified that, if an explosive device 
were sent through the mail, the sender may want the device to be left unnoticed 
at the address.
150	
State v. Sholedice/Smith
facility along with six other similarly-sized packages, which 
Craig also took out of the mail, so that Nikko, a trained 
drug-detection dog, could sniff them. Nikko and his han­
dler did not take part in sorting the packages or in selecting 
which packages would be put in the “package lineup,” nor 
were they aware of which package had aroused Craig’s sus­
picions. Their role was limited to determining if any pack­
ages contained drugs. As the handler testified, the USPS 
does not have “K-9s, and so they ask mostly local agencies to 
provide that tool for them to screen mail.”4
	
Nikko sniffed the seven packages and alerted on 
the package that Sholedice had sent Smith. At the suppres­
sion hearing, Nikko’s handler explained that Nikko has 
been certified every six months to detect four drugs: meth­
amphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. He testified 
that, during 4,000 training and certification searches, Nikko 
has alerted incorrectly only eight times. After Nikko alerted 
on defendants’ package, a person checked the address in 
Lincoln City and found that it was listed on a registry for 
medical marijuana grows.
	
Later, at the suppression hearing, Craig was asked a 
hypothetical question. She was asked on cross-examination 
what she would have done if Nikko had not alerted on the 
package. She testified that the package would not have 
continued “in the normal course of the mail.” Rather, she 
“would have done a further investigation on it.” When asked 
on redirect what she meant by “further investigation,” Craig 
explained that “we would try to—try to get ahold of M. Smith 
or Nathan * 
* 
* Sholedice” and “talk to them a little bit about 
the parcel to get some more information.”
	
Craig was not able to take the package to Lincoln 
City. She accordingly asked another federal postal inspec­
tor, Helton, to deliver the package. Helton testified that, 
although he does not ordinarily deliver mail, he is autho­
rized, as a postal inspector, to do so. On the way to Lincoln 
	
4  Nikko and his handler were part of a state drug-detection unit. As noted 
above, however, their only role was to test the packages that Craig selected for 
the odor of one of the four drugs that Nikko was trained to detect. When asked on 
direct examination whether he was responsible for “generat[ing] a[n] investiga­
tion,” the handler answered, “No.”
Cite as 364 Or 146 (2018)	
151
City, Helton contacted a Lincoln City detective to serve as 
a backup. When Helton delivered the package, both he and 
the detective were wearing plain clothes. Neither displayed 
a weapon. No patrol car was parked in view of the house. 
When they arrived at the address in Lincoln City, Helton 
walked up to the front door. As he did so, he noticed “the 
distinct and pungent smell” of marijuana.
	
When he knocked, Michelle Smith came to the door 
and stepped outside the house. Helton spoke with her briefly. 
He told her that he was a federal postal inspector and that 
his job was to investigate illegal activity with the United 
States Postal Service. He asked her if she were expecting an 
express mail package, and she said that she was. He then 
asked “if Nathan [Sholedice] was at home,” and she said 
that he was.5 He told her that he was going to be “upfront” 
with her, that he believed that the parcel contained either 
controlled substances or money, and he “asked for her per­
mission to open the parcel and to examine the contents of 
the parcel.” She replied, “Yeah.” Helton asked if there was 
money in the parcel, and Smith “nodded her head affirma­
tively, yes.”
	
Helton then asked to speak with Sholedice. Smith 
asked Sholedice to come out of the house, and Helton spoke 
with him separately. Helton told Sholedice that he was a fed­
eral postal inspector and that he believed that the package 
contained contraband or money. He then asked Sholedice for 
his consent to open the package. Sholedice replied, “Yeah, 
you can open it if you need to.” When Sholedice said that, 
Helton told Sholedice that he “was asking for his permis­
sion to open the parcel and search the contents and that I 
would not open the parcel if he told me that I could not open 
it.” Sholedice responded, “You’re going to open it up eventu­
ally anyway. Go ahead.” Given that response, Helton opened 
the package, where he found $15,240 vacuum wrapped in 
	
5  Before he arrived, Helton checked a database and learned that Michelle 
Smith lived at the Lincoln City address, leading him to conclude that she was 
the “M. Smith” to whom the package was addressed. The record does not reveal 
why Helton asked Smith if “Nathan” was at home; that is, the record does not 
disclose whether the database Helton checked revealed that the person listed on 
the package as the sender, Nathan Sholedice, also lived at the same address in 
Lincoln City.
152	
State v. Sholedice/Smith
plastic, which in turn was wrapped with duct tape. The 
money was further wrapped inside clothing.
	
Helton explained that, throughout their conver­
sation, Smith and Sholedice were pleasant. He described 
them as “calm, * 
* 
* not particularly upset or angry,” and 
he thanked them for being reasonable under the circum­
stances. Based on what he found in the parcel and defen­
dants’ answers concerning their medical marijuana grow, 
Helton asked Smith and Sholedice for consent to search 
their house. Both Smith and Sholedice said “no,” and Helton 
responded that he “totally understood, [and] that [he] 
respected their decision to deny consent.” At that point, the 
Lincoln City detective left to apply for a state warrant to 
search the home.
	
Later, at the suppression hearing, defendants also 
asked Helton a hypothetical question: If Sholedice had 
asked Helton to return the package to him when they first 
spoke—namely, after Helton knew that Nikko had alerted 
to the package and that the address in Lincoln City was reg­
istered as a medical marijuana grow but before Smith had 
consented to a search—would Helton have done so? Helton 
answered “no.” He provided a similar answer when asked 
whether he would have delivered the package to Smith with­
out further investigation. He added that, “[i]f the contents of 
the parcel would have been found to be innocuous and there 
was a reasonable explanation for the contents of the parcel, 
[he] would’ve delivered the parcel to Ms. Smith, as [he] ha[s] 
done on other occasions.” However, Helton testified that he 
had reason to believe that the package contained either ille­
gal drugs or drug proceeds before speaking with Smith and 
Sholedice and for that reason would not have delivered the 
package unopened.
	
Following the search of the package, the state 
charged Sholedice and Smith with unlawfully delivering 
marijuana for consideration in violation of former ORS 
475.860(2) (2013), repealed by Or Laws 2017, ch 21, § 126. 
Before trial, both defendants filed motions to suppress the 
evidence that Helton had discovered as a result of the search 
of the package. They argued that Craig unlawfully seized 
the package when she took it from the hamper and put it 
Cite as 364 Or 146 (2018)	
153
in the package lineup for Nikko to sniff, and they sought 
to suppress the evidence resulting from that seizure. The 
trial court disagreed, explaining that neither Sholedice nor 
Smith had a protected possessory interest in the package 
with which Craig or Helton interfered.
	
In analyzing that issue, the trial court focused ini­
tially on Craig’s actions in taking the package out of the 
mail hamper and putting it in the package lineup. The trial 
court reasoned that, once Sholedice put the package in the 
mail, neither Sholedice nor Smith had “a possessory interest 
in the package as long as it’s still within the [guaranteed 
delivery time].” The court reasoned:
	
“[T]here was testimony during this proceeding by both 
employees of the post office, that the mailing of contraband 
does put postal deliveries or postal employees at risk.
	
“They have a—there’s a reason, if you will, that they 
engage in this screening—screening of packages for 
contraband.
	
“And what they have developed is what the Court would 
describe as a minimal intrusion on the packages that are 
going through the transit facility, subjecting them to a—a 
sniff.
	
“I agree that the postal inspectors both identified or tes­
tified that this package, once it was identified as suspicious, 
was not going to be returned to the normal stream of mail.
	
“That if the dog had not alerted or no alert, there would 
have been further investigation. The dog—however, the 
dog, in fact, did alert. What happened at that point is rather 
than obtain a warrant, the—and the package was not fur­
ther opened or inspected—the package was just then given 
to law enforcement who drove it down to Lincoln City.”6
	
As we read the trial court’s factual findings, the 
court found, consistently with Craig’s testimony, that Craig 
removed the package from the mail hamper because she 
	
6  The court’s last statement is not completely consistent with the record, 
which the trial court appears to have noted when it added, “[c]ontacted Lincoln 
City Police Department. What the record shows is that Craig gave the package to 
another federal postal inspector, Helton, who drove the package to Lincoln City 
and took it to Smith’s house. On the way, Helton contacted a local police officer for 
backup. 
154	
State v. Sholedice/Smith
suspected that it contained “nonmailable” material, and her 
“reason” for looking for packages containing contraband and 
other nonmailable material was to keep from putting postal 
employees at risk.7 The trial court also found that, once 
Craig identified the package as suspicious, the package “was 
not going to be returned to the normal stream of mail” and 
that, “if the dog had not alerted * 
* 
* there would have been 
further investigation.” As the trial court observed, however, 
“the dog, in fact, did alert” and, as a result, Craig gave the 
package to Helton to deliver to Lincoln City.
	
Because the trial court found that defendants 
had no constitutionally protected possessory interest in 
the package, the court recognized that it did not need to 
decide whether Nikko’s alert established probable cause or 
whether a federal warrant could have been obtained before 
the guaranteed delivery time. The court, however, accepted 
the dog handler’s testimony that Nikko’s training and expe­
rience met the “standards as they’re set forth in—[State v.] 
Foster,” 350 Or 161, 252 P3d 292 (2011), for determining 
when a trained drug dog’s alert establishes probable cause. 
Finally, the trial court noted, with apparent agreement, 
that “the State pointed out in their argument that had the 
State gone through the efforts to obtain a [federal] war­
rant [to search the United States mail], since a telephonic 
[warrant] is not available [in federal court], that it actually 
would have resulted in a more significant intrusion [than 
having Helton ask for consent] because the package would 
not have been delivered on time.”8 Having made those find­
ings, the trial court denied defendants’ motions to suppress. 
Afterwards, both defendants entered conditional guilty 

pleas.
	
7  Helton testified at the suppression hearing (and Craig testified similarly) 
that “the proceeds * * 
* of the illegal sale of controlled substances that are shipped 
through the United States mail service * 
* 
* represent an inherent danger to our 
employees.” Helton explained that, “[i]n other states, we have had cases where 
employees, letter carriers, have been robbed because criminals knew they were 
carrying the proceeds of controlled substances transactions. And they were 
robbed for those parcels, specifically.”
	
8  Additionally, the court concluded that, even if Craig had unconstitution­
ally seized the package, Helton did not exploit any information that Craig had 
obtained when he asked for and received consent first from Smith and then from 
Sholedice.
Cite as 364 Or 146 (2018)	
155
	
Each defendant appealed separately, and the Court 
of Appeals reversed in both cases. Smith, 283 Or App at 423; 
Sholedice, 283 Or App at 346. Following its decision in State 
v. Barnthouse, 271 Or App 312, 350 P3d 536 (2015), aff’d on 
other grounds, 360 Or 403, 380 P3d 952 (2016), the Court of 
Appeals held “that, for the purposes of Article I, section 9, 
of the Oregon Constitution, law enforcement illegally seized 
[the] package by removing it from the stream of mail and 
submitting it to a dog sniff.” Smith, 283 Or App at 423 (sum­
marizing the Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Barnthouse); see 
Sholedice, 283 Or App at 346 (same). We allowed the state’s 
petitions for review in these cases to consider whether either 
Craig or Helton seized defendants’ package in violation of 
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.9
	
Article  I, section  9, protects citizens from unrea­
sonable “searches” and “seizures” by government officials. 
Barnthouse, 360 Or at 413. A search occurs when the gov­
ernment invades a protected privacy interest while a seizure 
occurs when the government significantly interferes with a 
person’s possessory or ownership interests in property. Id.; 
State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 206-07, 729 P2d 524 (1986). In 
this case, defendants do not argue that Nikko’s sniff of the 
package constituted a “search” for the purposes of Article I, 
section  9. Rather, they argue that Craig seized the pack­
age when she took it out of the mail hamper and put on the 
floor for Nikko to sniff. Additionally, they argue that Helton 
seized the package when he asked Smith and then Sholedice 
for consent to search the package.
	
We begin with the question whether Craig seized 
the package when she put it on the floor for Nikko to sniff. 
On that question, defendants identify two ways in which 
Craig’s actions significantly interfered with their posses­
sory interest in the package and thus constituted a seizure. 
They argue initially that taking the package out of the 
hamper and placing it in the package lineup was sufficient, 
	
9  At first blush, it might seem odd asking whether federal postal inspectors 
acted in violation of defendants’ state constitutional rights. However, this court 
has held that evidence obtained in violation of Article I, section 9, is not admis­
sible in Oregon courts to prove a criminal charge, even when the government 
official who obtained the evidence was from another jurisdiction. State v. Davis, 
313 Or 246, 254, 834 P2d 1008 (1992).
156	
State v. Sholedice/Smith
standing alone, to significantly interfere with their posses­
sory interests in the package. Alternatively, they contend 
that, because Craig intended to conduct a “further investi­
gation” of the package when she removed it from the mail 
hamper, regardless of whether Nikko alerted, Craig did not 
intend to deliver the package unopened by the guaranteed 
delivery date and thus significantly interfered with their 
possessory interests in the package.
	
Before determining whether Craig’s actions signifi­
cantly interfered with defendants’ ownership or possessory 
interests, we first identify what those interests were. See 
Owens, 302 Or at 207. Ordinarily, the question whether a 
person has an ownership or possessory interest in an object 
is straightforward. Typically, the two interests are united. 
However, those interests can be separated when, for exam­
ple, a property owner leases property to another person or 
when a property owner gives the property to a bailee to store 
or transport. In the latter instance, the bailor retains an 
ownership interest in the property, but the bailee has a right 
to possess the property consistently with the terms of the 
bailment. See Samuel Williston, 9 A Treatise on the Law of 
Contracts § 1030 at 879 (3d ed 1967) (“The rights, duties, 
and liabilities of the bailor and the bailee must be deter­
mined from the terms of the contract between the parties, 
whether express or implied.”).
	
In this case, we assume that either Sholedice or 
Smith owned the contents of the package while it was in 
transit.10 Sholedice, however, gave the USPS the package 
to deliver it to Smith. As a bailee or a common carrier, the 
USPS had the right to possess the package while it was in 
transit, and the USPS’s and defendants’ possessory rights 
in the package were defined by the USPS’s agreement with 
Sholedice, which is found in the Domestic Mail Manual 
(DMM). See Barnthouse, 360 Or at 415 (relying on the DMM 
	
10  In a commercial context, when a seller uses a common carrier to deliver 
goods to a purchaser, the seller retains title to the goods until the point of deliv­
ery, although the parties can agree otherwise. See Powerex Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 
357 Or 40, 47-48, 346 P3d 476 (2015). At the suppression hearing, the relation­
ship between Sholedice and Smith was undefined, and it is not clear who, as 
between them, owned the property that Sholedice sent Smith. We assume, how­
ever, that one or the other of them owned it.
Cite as 364 Or 146 (2018)	
157
to determine the defendant’s contractual right as a third-
party beneficiary of the agreement between the sender and 
the USPS to have the express mail parcel delivered by the 
guaranteed delivery date). 11
	
In arguing that Craig’s actions constituted a sei­
zure, defendants have focused on Craig’s interference with 
their possessory interests in the package while it was in 
transit, not on any interference with their ownership inter­
ests in the package.12 Specifically, they have argued that, 
under the DMM, the USPS’s authority to possess the pack­
age did not permit the sort of inspection that Craig under­
took. Alternatively, they argue that the DMM gave them 
affirmative rights to redirect the delivery or the return of 
the package while it was in transit. For those reasons, defen­
dants contend, Craig’s actions significantly interfered with 
their possessory interests in the package.
	
We reach a different conclusion. We first explain 
why Craig’s actions in screening the package were consis­
tent with the terms of the bailment, as defined by the DMM. 
We then explain why Craig’s actions did not interfere with 
any affirmative rights or possessory interests that the DMM 
gave defendants while the package was in transit. Finally, 
	
11  Smith cites the USPS Administrative Support Manual (ASM), which she 
notes can be found on a postal employee website, to define the terms of the bail­
ment. However, as we read the ASM, it does not define the terms of the agree­
ment between the USPS and its postal customers. Rather, it defines the employ­
ment agreement between the USPS and its employees. For example, after stating 
that the postal service must protect the security of the mail from “unauthorized 
opening, inspection, or reading of contents * 
* 
*; tampering; delay; or other unau­
thorized acts,” the ASM provides “[a]ny postal employee committing or allowing 
any of these unauthorized acts is subject to administrative discipline * * 
*.” ASM 
274.1 (2013). As we recognized in Barnthouse, the relevant agreement between 
the USPS and its customers is set out in the DMM.
	
12  An example may suggest the reason for defendants’ focus on possessory 
rather than ownership interests. Suppose Hertz leases a car to a person, and the 
police briefly detain the leased car. The detention interferes with the possessory 
interests of the person who leased the car, but it does not necessarily interfere 
with Hertz’s ownership interest in the car. In this case, Helton would have inter­
fered with defendants’ ownership interest in the package if he refused to deliver 
the package to them by the guaranteed delivery date. However, that refusal also 
would interfere with defendants’ right to a timely delivery under the DMM. See 
Barnthouse, 360 Or at 415. Perhaps because of that overlap, defendants have not 
argued that Craig’s or Helton’s actions interfered with their ownership interest 
in the package separately from any interference with their possessory interests 
in it.
158	
State v. Sholedice/Smith
we note that defendants have not argued that, even if Craig 
complied with the terms of the bailment, Article I, section 9, 
imposed additional limitations on her actions.
	
Defendants argue that, under the DMM, the 
USPS’s authority to possess the package for the purpose of 
delivering it to Smith did not extend to detaining it so that 
Nikko could sniff it. Apparently relying on DMM 113.2.2, 
Sholedice argues that “postal service rules indicat[e] that 
express mail will not be inspected.” He thus finds in the 
DMM an “implied commitment by the postal service that it 
will do only what is needed to achieve delivery of a package.” 
Smith, for her part, recognizes that the USPS may engage 
in some “screening” of packages but argues that “the inspec­
tors’ actions in this case went far beyond the ‘screening’ that 
USPS customers would reasonably expect.”
	
We begin with Sholedice’s argument, which appears 
to be based on DMM 113.2.2.13 That section of the DMM 
provides:
“Matter closed against postal inspection includes First-
Class Mail, Priority Mail, or Express Mail. The USPS may 
open mail other than First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, or 
Express Mail.”
As the words of DMM 113.2.2 make clear, that section of 
the DMM reflects long-standing Fourth Amendment cases 
explaining which classes of mail the USPS may open without 
a warrant. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 US 249, 
250-51, 90 S Ct 1029, 25 L Ed 2d 282 (1970) (describing federal 
cases). As the Court recognized in Van Leeuwen, the USPS 
may not open and inspect first-class mail except with a war­
rant or an exception to the warrant requirement; however, 
lesser classes of mail may be opened and inspected without 
a warrant. Id.14 In this case, Craig did not open defendants’ 
package, and defendants do not argue that Nikko’s sniff con­
stituted a search of the package. As a result, DMM 113.2.2 
	
13  We say appears because Sholedice never ties his argument directly to 
DMM 113.2.2, which he cited and described earlier in his brief. However, it is the 
only arguably applicable provision of the DMM that he cites.
	
14  When the Court decided Van Leeuwen, priority mail and express mail did 
not exist. However, as DMM 113.2.2 makes clear, the rule for first-class mail 
applies equally to priority and express mail.
Cite as 364 Or 146 (2018)	
159
has no application to Craig’s actions, and Sholedice does not 
identify any other provision of the DMM that limited Craig’s 
ability to take defendants’ package out of the hamper and 
put it on the floor so Nikko could sniff it.
	
Smith’s argument is closer to the mark. As noted, 
she recognizes that the USPS can engage in some screening 
of the mail it processes, but she argues that Craig’s actions 
went beyond what the DMM permits. We read the DMM 
differently. Chapter 601 of the DMM defines harmful and 
hazardous materials that either cannot be mailed at all or 
only under specific conditions. DMM 601.8.1. Among other 
things, a person cannot mail poisons, controlled substances, 
poisonous insects and reptiles, live scorpions except when 
used for medical research, explosives, acids, highly flam­
mable liquids, gases that are likely to ignite during trans­
port, radioactive material, and alligators over 20 inches in 
length. DMM 601.8.5 (defining harmful matter that is not 
mailable); DMM 601.8.6 (defining hazardous matter that is 
not mailable); see DMM 601.9.3.3 (authorizing shipment of 
baby alligators under 20 inches); DMM 601.9.3.9 (authoriz­
ing shipment of live scorpions for use in medical research 
but only when appropriately packaged).
	
In addition to defining what may not be mailed, 
the DMM provides that “[a] postmaster may take any step 
reasonable and necessary to protect USPS employees and 
equipment from potentially dangerous or injurious materi­
als or substances found in the mail.” DMM 601.8.13. That 
regulation gives the USPS the right to take reasonable and 
necessary steps to ensure that packages placed in the mail 
do not contain prohibited substances. In that respect, it 
merely codifies the common law. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 
US 765, 769 n 1, 103 S Ct 3319, 77 L Ed 2d 1003 (1983) (rec­
ognizing that “[c]ommon carriers have a common-law right 
to inspect packages they accept for shipment, based on their 
duty to refrain from carrying contraband”). Although the 
DMM does not define what constitutes “reasonable and nec­
essary” steps, the Court’s Fourth Amendment cases define 
the steps the USPS reasonably can take to ensure that the 
mail is not misused. We look to those federal decisions to 
determine what steps will be “reasonable and necessary” for 
the purposes of the federal rule.
160	
State v. Sholedice/Smith
	
The Court’s decision in Van Leeuwen provides the 
most relevant guidance. In that case, the defendant mailed 
two 12-pound packages by registered mail from a town in 
Washington near the Canadian border. He listed the con­
tents of the packages as “coins,” used “a vacant housing area 
of a nearby junior college” as the return address, and drove a 
car with British Columbia plates. Id. at 249-50. Those facts 
caused the postal official to suspect something was amiss, 
and the official detained the packages initially for an hour 
and a half while customs officials checked the addressee 
of one of the packages. Id. at 250. They learned that that 
addressee was under investigation for trafficking in illegal 
coins, and the postal official held the other package until the 
next day when he confirmed that the other addressee was 
under investigation for the same crime. Id. At that point, a 
customs official sought a search warrant to open both pack­
ages. Id.
	
In considering whether the postal official had vio­
lated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by detain­
ing his packages while he investigated them, Justice 
Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that, 
although the postal service could not open and search first-
class mail without a warrant or a warrant exception, “even 
first-class mail is not beyond the reach of all inspection.” 

Id. at 252. The Court reasoned that “[t]he nature and weight 
of the packages, the fictitious return address, and the British 
Columbia license plates of respondent who made the mail­
ings in this border town certainly justified detention [for an 
hour and a half], without a warrant, while an investigation 
was made.” Id. As the Court explained, even if
“[t]heoretically—and it is theory only that respondent has 
on his side—detention of mail could at some point become 
an unreasonable seizure of ‘papers’ or ‘effects’ within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Detention for 1½ 
hours—from 1:30 p.m. to 3 p.m.—for an investigation cer­
tainly was not excessive; and at the end of that time proba­
ble cause existed for believing that the [first] package was 
part of an illicit project.”
Id. at 252.
	
In this case, the trial court reasonably could have 
found that Craig moved defendants’ package only a few feet 
Cite as 364 Or 146 (2018)	
161
from the mail hamper to the floor of the processing facil­
ity when she put it and other similarly sized packages in a 
package lineup. Similarly, the trial court could have found 
that the time that it took for Nikko to sniff the packages 
in the package lineup was minimal. That is, the trial court 
reasonably could have found that the minimal detention of 
defendants’ package was reasonable and necessary in light 
of the facts that caused Craig to take defendants’ package 
out of the mail hamper in the first place. We accordingly 
disagree with defendants’ argument that, in briefly placing 
the package in a package lineup for Nikko to sniff, Craig’s 
actions went beyond what the DMM authorized.
	
Defendants also argue, however, that Craig’s actions 
interfered with their affirmative right to redirect the pack­
age during transit either by having it held for pickup, by hav­
ing it sent to a different address, or by having it returned to 
Sholedice. On that issue, we note that, ordinarily, a package 
will be delivered to the address listed on the package. DMM 
508.1.1.1. However, the addressee can alter when and where 
an express mail package will be delivered. An addressee can 
ask that express mail be held at the post office for three 
to 30 days for later delivery or pickup, or ask that express 
mail be forwarded to a temporary address or a new perma­
nent address. DMM 507.2.1.2-3. Additionally, a sender may 
mail a package using a “hold for pickup” label, which means 
that the package will be sent to a designated post office and 
held for a limited period of time until the addressee picks it 
up. DMM 508.7.2.1-2. Finally, noncommercial customers or 
their authorized representatives “may request to have their 
package intercepted and redirected to [the] sender.” DMM 
507.5.5.15
	
Defendants infer from the ability to request either 
a change in the time and place of delivery or that a package 
be intercepted and returned to the sender that they had a 
constitutionally protected possessory interest in the pack­
age while it was in transit. The state responds that, under 
	
15  Commercial customers have a broader range of options. They “may request 
to have their package redirected to sender, to a new postal delivery address, or 
to a Post Office as Hold for Pickup.” DMM 507.5.5. Because Sholedice was not a 
commercial customer, the more limited provisions of the DMM governing retail 
customers define his rights.
162	
State v. Sholedice/Smith
the DMM, defendants only had a right to ask that mail be 
redirected; they did not have an absolute right to have it be 
redirected.
	
We need not resolve that dispute to decide the point 
that defendants raise. Even if we assume that defendants 
had a right to have the package be redirected or returned to 
the sender and that those rights created a constitutionally 
protected possessory interest, it is difficult to see how taking 
defendants’ package from the hamper and placing it on the 
floor for Nikko to sniff significantly interfered with those pos­
sessory interests. Defendants do not argue that they sought 
to redirect the delivery of the package or to request that it 
be returned to the sender, nor do they explain how Craig’s 
actions actually interfered with the exercise of rights they 
never sought to exercise. Moreover, even if they had sought 
to exercise those rights, it is difficult to see how moving the 
package a minimal distance for a minimal time would have 
interfered with, much less significantly interfered with, the 
possessory interests that they identify. That is particularly 
true when the terms of the bailment expressly permitted 
Craig to take the “reasonable and necessary” steps that she 
did to check whether the mail contained contraband, poi­
sons, or hazardous material.
	
We accordingly conclude that Craig acted consis­
tently with the terms on which the USPS took possession 
of defendants’ package when she took their package out of 
the mail hamper and put it in a package lineup for Nikko to 
sniff. Not only did the DMM 601.8.13 affirmatively autho­
rize Craig, as a USPS postal inspector, to take “reasonable 
and necessary” steps to protect postal employees from “any 
potentially dangerous or injurious materials or substances 
found in the mail,” but her actions did not significantly 
interfere with defendants’ rights to redirect the mail or 
have it returned to the sender. Because Craig acted consis­
tently with the terms of the bailment, we hold that taking 
the package out of the hamper and putting it on the floor 
for Nikko to sniff did not significantly interfere with defen­
dants’ possessory interests in the package.
	
We note three qualifications to that holding. 
First, our holding is limited to the situation that this case 
Cite as 364 Or 146 (2018)	
163
presents—a situation in which the government actor (the 
USPS) possessed the package as a bailee and acted pursu­
ant to the terms of the bailment. The second qualification is 
related to the first. This is not a case in which a government 
agency that was not the bailee (an outside police agency, for 
example) sought to interfere with property entrusted to a 
bailee. In that situation, the police would not be authorized 
as the bailee to take the actions that Craig took here, and 
we express no opinion on whether those actions—if taken by 
a government official other than the bailee—would consti­
tute a seizure. Finally, the trial court reasonably could find 
on this record that Craig was not acting at the behest of an 
outside police agency when she took the package out of the 
hamper and put it in the package lineup. The trial court 
implicitly made that finding when it expressly found that 
the “reason” Craig took the package out of the hamper for 
Nikko to sniff was to protect federal postal employees. This 
case accordingly does not require us to consider the issue 
that the Court of Appeals addressed in Barnthouse.16
	
One other point warrants mention. In analyzing the 
parties’ contract rights under the DMM, we do not mean to 
suggest that defendants’ constitutional possessory interests 
are necessarily coextensive with the terms of the bailment. 
However, we explained in Barnthouse that “[t]he concept of 
a possessory interest, as it is pertinent to Article I, section 9, 
is grounded in property law.” 360 Or at 415; see also id. 
(explaining that “Article I, section 9, emphasizes property 
law concepts in determining what qualifies as a protected 
possessory interest”). Without some explanation as to why 
defendants’ constitutionally protected possessory interests 
were greater than the possessory interests created by the 
bailment, we are not persuaded that Craig’s act of taking 
the package out of the hamper and putting it on the floor for 
Nikko to sniff significantly interfered with defendants’ con­
stitutionally protected possessory interests. Other courts 
have reached a similar conclusion. See Wayne R. LaFave, 
	
16  In Barnthouse, the record permitted the trial court to find that the federal 
postal inspectors were working at the behest of the state police in interdicting 
drugs. Because the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant in Barnthouse, 
the Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that, in that case, the federal postal 
inspectors were not acting independently pursuant to the terms of the bailment, 
as the trial court implicitly found in this case. 
164	
State v. Sholedice/Smith
4 Search and Seizure § 9.8(e) 1011-12 n 173 (5th ed 2012) 
(listing cases holding that a minimal detention of a package 
by both private and public mail services so that a trained 
dog could sniff it did not meaningfully interfere with the 
defendant’s possessory interests and thus did not constitute 
a seizure).
	
Defendants advance an alternative argument based 
on Craig’s answer to a hypothetical question. As noted above, 
at the suppression hearing, defendants asked Craig what 
she would have done if Nikko had not alerted to the package, 
and Craig answered that she would not have returned it to 
the ordinary stream of mail. Rather, she would have done a 
further investigation, which she described as “try[ing] to get 
ahold of M. Smith or Nathan * 
* 
* Sholedice” and “talk[ing] 
to them a little bit about the parcel to get some more infor­
mation.” Defendants infer from Craig’s answer that, even if 
Nikko had not alerted, Craig would not have delivered the 
package to Smith unopened by the guaranteed delivery date 
of May 29. It follows, they contend, that, when Craig took the 
package out of the mail hamper and put it on the floor, she 
significantly interfered with defendants’ possessory interest 
in having the package delivered by the guaranteed delivery 
date.
	
We note, as an initial matter, that Craig did not say 
that she would not have delivered the package unopened 
to Smith by the guaranteed delivery date if Nikko had not 
alerted; she said only that she would have processed the 
package separately while engaging in further investigation, 
which she testified meant trying to talk with defendants “a 
little bit about the parcel to get some more information.”17 
Beyond that, the more difficult problem for defendants is 
that their argument is based on a hypothetical set of facts 
that never occurred. Specifically, defendants argue that, if 
Nikko had not alerted, Craig would have asked for consent 
before delivering the package and, in so doing, would have 
seized it.
	
17  As noted above, the trial court found that, “if the dog had not alerted or no 
alert, there would have been further investigation.” Although the trial court did 
not explicitly say what the “further investigation” would have entailed, the trial 
court’s harmless error conclusion suggests that “further investigation” would 
have included asking for consent before tendering the package to Smith.
Cite as 364 Or 146 (2018)	
165
	
Nikko, however, did alert. Accordingly, the question 
is not whether Craig would have taken additional steps that 
would have amounted to a seizure if Nikko had not alerted. 
Rather, the question is whether the steps that Craig in fact 
took before Nikko alerted amounted to a seizure. If they 
did not, and they did not for the reasons explained above, 
then the only question that remains is whether, once Nikko 
alerted, Craig and Helton’s actions amounted to an unrea­
sonable seizure; that is, after Nikko alerted, did having a 
postal inspector take the package to Smith’s house in Lincoln 
City and ask for consent to search constitute an unreason­
able seizure? We turn to that issue.
	
In considering whether Helton’s actions constituted 
a seizure, defendants argue that this case is not materially 
different from our decision in Barnthouse. In considering 
that argument, we first describe our decision in Barnthouse. 
We then explain how this case differs from Barnthouse. In 
Barnthouse, a suspicious package arrived at the USPS mail 
sorting facility near the Portland International Airport. 360 
Or at 405. A drug-detection dog alerted in response to the 
package, and two Portland police officers, accompanied by 
a postal inspector, delivered the package to the addressee 
approximately two and a half hours before the guaranteed 
delivery time. Id. at 406. The addressee (the defendant in 
Barnthouse) was not home, but one of the police officers 
spoke with him on the phone. Id. at 407. The officer identi­
fied himself as a Portland police officer, told the defendant 
he was investigating a suspicious package addressed to the 
defendant, and asked the defendant for consent to open the 
package. Id. The officer “explained that [the] defendant 
could refuse consent, but that, if he refused, the officers 
would apply for a search warrant.” Id.
	
After consenting to the search, the defendant 
moved to suppress the evidence derived from the search. 
Id. at 408. He contended that the police officer had seized 
the package in violation of Article  I, section  9, before he 
consented to the search. Id. The trial court granted the 
defendant’s motion, and we upheld the trial court’s ruling. 
Id. at 421. Our decision began from the proposition that 
the addressee (the defendant) was the third-party benefi­
ciary of the agreement between the sender and the USPS 
166	
State v. Sholedice/Smith
and, as such, had a property-based right to have the pack­
age delivered to him by its guaranteed delivery time. Id. at 
415. We then held that the trial court reasonably could have 

found
“that, if [the] defendant had chosen not to consent to the 
search and instead required the officers to apply for a war­
rant, the officers would not have delivered the unopened 
package to [the] defendant while they sought a warrant, 
nor would they have permitted anyone else to deliver it to 
him, irrespective of its guaranteed delivery time. See [State 
v.] Juarez-Godinez, 326 [Or 1, 7, 942 P2d 772 (1997)] (appel­
late court is bound by trial court’s factual findings in sup­
pression hearing, as long as those findings are supported 
by evidence in record). Under those circumstances—that 
is, where, having physical control of the package, the offi­
cers curtailed its guaranteed delivery to [the] defendant—
the trial court did not err in concluding that the officers 
significantly interfered with [the] defendant’s possessory 
interest in the package and, therefore, seized it. See id. at 
8 (describing seizure effected by curtailment of [the] defen­
dant’s possessory interest).”
Id. at 419.
	
Having concluded that the trial court could have 
found that the officer’s statement effected a seizure, we 
explained that that finding did not end the inquiry “because 
* 
* 
* only seizures that are ‘unreasonable’ violate Article I, 
section 9.” Id. at 420. The state, however, had not preserved 
its argument that the officers in Barnthouse reasonably sus­
pected that the package was associated with criminal activ­
ity, and we did not decide whether the seizure was reason­
able and thus constitutionally permissible. Id.
	
This case differs from Barnthouse in three respects, 
the last of which is material. In this case, Helton did not 
tell defendants, as the police officer did in Barnthouse, 
that, if defendants did not consent, Helton would apply 
for a warrant. Helton thus did not explicitly state that he 
would retain the package if defendants declined consent. 
Additionally, the trial court did not rule in defendants’ favor, 
as the trial court did in Barnthouse. Because of that proce­
dural difference, we do not draw all reasonable inferences in 
defendants’ favor as we did in Barnthouse. Despite those two 
Cite as 364 Or 146 (2018)	
167
differences, we still conclude that Helton seized the package 
at least temporarily.
	
It is undisputed that, when Helton came to Smith’s 
house, he did not immediately give her the package as a 
mail carrier ordinarily would. Rather, he withheld deliver­
ing the package, told her that he was a federal inspector 
charged with investigating the misuse of the mail, said that 
he believed the package contained either drugs or the pro­
ceeds of drug sales, and asked her for consent to search it. 
Those acts constituted a sufficient show of authority that 
Helton seized the package. See Juarez-Godinez, 326 Or at 6 
(explaining that a seizure of property may be accomplished 
either by physical force or by a show of authority). More spe­
cifically, a reasonable person would have understood from 
those acts that Helton was going to retain the package for 
a longer period of time than the USPS was authorized to do 
under the terms of the bailment. We do not mean to suggest 
that every request for consent constitutes a seizure. However, 
by retaining the package and asking for consent instead of 
immediately tendering the package to Smith, Helton seized 
the package at least temporarily. In that respect, this case 
is similar to Barnthouse.
	
This case, however, differs from Barnthouse in one 
way that is material. In Barnthouse, the state did not pre­
serve its argument that any seizure was reasonable. 360 Or 
at 420. In this case, it did.18 On that issue, Smith acknowl­
edges that, after Nikko alerted to the package, Craig and 
Helton may have had probable cause to believe that the 
package contained contraband. Although Sholedice does 
not concede the point, he does not dispute it. More specif­
ically, Sholedice never explains why, in light of the trial 
	
18  Smith argues that the state failed to make a timely argument in her case 
in the Court of Appeals that any seizure on Helton’s part was reasonable. Because 
the state lost in the Court of Appeals, Smith argues that the state is barred from 
raising that issue on review in her case. As we read the Court of Appeals decision 
in Smith, it declined to allow the state to file the same supplemental brief that it 
had filed in Sholedice (arguing that Helton’s actions, even if a seizure, were con­
stitutionally reasonable) because the supplemental brief was not relevant to the 
ground on which the Court of Appeals decided Sholedice and followed in Smith. 
See Smith, 283 Or App at 423. The Court of Appeals did not decline to allow the 
state to file the supplemental brief because it was untimely. Had that been the 
ground of its decision, it presumably would not have allowed the state’s petition 
for reconsideration. See id.
168	
State v. Sholedice/Smith
court’s finding that Nikko’s training and experience qual­
ified under Foster, Nikko was not sufficiently reliable that 
his alert alone established probable cause. See Foster, 350 
Or at 177-78 (explaining the degree of reliability necessary 
to establish that a dog’s alert, standing alone, establishes 
probable cause).
	
Moreover, when Nikko’s alert is considered together 
with the factors that Craig identified that made her sus­
picious about the package, Craig’s understanding that the 
package was being sent from an out-of-state address to 
an Oregon address listed as a medical marijuana grow, 
and Helton’s detection of the odor of marijuana when he 
approached Smith’s front door, we conclude that Helton had 
probable cause to believe that the package contained either 
drugs prohibited by federal law or the proceeds from illegal 
drug sales. Additionally, because the package was coming 
from out-of-state, Helton had probable cause to believe that 
defendants were in violation of state criminal law—i.e., that 
the applicable 2014 exemption from state criminal laws for 
the possession and distribution of medical marijuana did not 
apply to the interstate sale or transportation of marijuana. 
See former ORS 475.309(1) (2013) (providing limited excep­
tions to state criminal laws prohibiting the possession and 
delivery of marijuana); former ORS 475.316 (2013) (same); 
former ORS 475.320 (2013) (same).19
	
Defendants argue that, even if Helton had probable 
cause to believe that the package contained contraband, he 
needed a warrant to seize it. We note, as an initial mat­
ter, that Helton seized the package only long enough to ask 
for consent. If we apply the same standards to seizures of 
property that we apply to seizures of people, as Juarez-
Godinez teaches, it is difficult to see why Helton’s seizure 
was not equivalent to a permissible Terry stop for the pur­
poses of asking for consent. See Juarez-Godinez, 326 Or at 
	
19  Sholedice mailed the package on May 27, 2014, before the law permitting 
the recreational use of marijuana became effective on December 4, 2014. See Or 
Laws 2015, ch 1, § 84 (identifying the effective date of the new marijuana law). 
Accordingly, the only applicable exceptions from the state criminal laws are found 
in the 2013 medical marijuana statutes. In any event, after in-state possession 
and delivery of marijuana were decriminalized, Oregon has continued to make 
the interstate transportation of “marijuana items” criminal. ORS 475B.227(2) 
(2017), amended by Or Laws 2018, ch 103, § 21.
Cite as 364 Or 146 (2018)	
169
6 (explaining that cases addressing the seizures of persons 
are instructive in deciding when property has been seized 
unconstitutionally). Beyond that, this court has long rec­
ognized an exception to the warrant requirement in these 
circumstances. This court explained in Owens that, “[w]hen 
an officer has probable cause to believe that an object he 
has lawfully discovered is contraband and, therefore, that a 
crime is being committed in his presence, he has the right 
to seize it.” Owens, 302 Or at 202-03; see State v. Elkins, 245 
Or 279, 284, 422 P2d 250 (1966).20 In Owens, for example, 
the court upheld the warrantless seizure of the defendant’s 
purse because the officer had probable cause to believe it 
contained heroin. 302 Or at 202-03 (alternative holding). 
Under Owens, the warrantless seizure in this case was con­
stitutionally permissible.
	
Finally, defendants do not dispute that a federal 
warrant was necessary to search the package while it was 
in the postal service’s possession and that it have would 
have taken 24 to 48 hours to obtain a warrant from a fed­
eral judge. Because Craig did not come across the package 
until the morning of May 28, 2014, and the guaranteed 
delivery time was 3:00  p.m. the next day, she reasonably 
could have concluded that a federal warrant could not have 
been obtained in time to deliver the package to Lincoln 
City. See State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 224, 94 P3d 872 (2004) 
(determining that an exigency existed based on the officer’s 
reasonable understanding). Indeed, the trial court’s factual 
findings appear to accept that proposition. Faced with the 
likelihood that Smith would dispose of the contents of the 
package once it was delivered, Helton reasonably retained 
the package while asking for Smith’s and Sholedice’s con­
sent to search.
	
As Justice Linde explained in State v. Brown, 301 
Or 268, 721 P2d 1357 (1986), when officers have probable 
cause to believe that a stopped car contains contraband, they 
	
20  The exception that the court reaffirmed in Owens for warrantless seizures 
of property mirrors the exception for warrantless arrests of persons when the 
person is either committing a crime in the officer’s presence or the officer has 
probable cause to believe the person has committed a felony. See United States v. 
Watson, 423 US 411, 417-22, 96 S Ct 820, 46 L Ed 2d 598 (1976) (stating that rule 
under the Fourth Amendment, which reflects the common-law rule).
170	
State v. Sholedice/Smith
can “offer the person [in possession of the car] an informed 
choice between consenting to an immediate search or hav­
ing the automobile held for the time necessary to obtain a 
warrant.” Id. at 295 (dissenting opinion). In Justice Linde’s 
view, no exigency justified a warrantless search of the car 
because the government could seize the car long enough to 
ask for consent or obtain a warrant. Id. The seizure was 
justified, in Brown and this case, on the ground that, if 
the officer did not retain control of the car or package long 
enough either to ask for consent or apply for a warrant, the 
defendant could dispose of the contraband contained in the 
car or package. In light of that reasoning, Helton’s request 
for consent to search the package, which he retained only 
briefly, did not run afoul of Article I, section 9. To the extent 
that Helton’s request for consent effected a seizure, his brief 
seizure of the package was reasonable. See Barnthouse, 360 
Or at 420 (“only seizures that are ‘unreasonable’ violate 
Article I, section 9”).
	
We accordingly conclude that Craig did not seize the 
package when she put it in a package lineup for Nikko to 
sniff and that the seizure effectuated by Helton’s request for 
consent was reasonable. Because both federal officials acted 
consistently with Article I, section 9, the trial court correctly 
denied defendants’ motions to suppress.
	
The decisions of the Court of Appeals are reversed. 
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.