Case Title: Wilton v. State. ICA s.d.o., filed 03/21/2007 [pdf], 113 Haw. 470. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 08/07/2007 [pdf].

Citation: 116 Haw. 106

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW LIBRARY

‘seefon PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS##

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

==-000-

 

FREEDUS W. WILTON, IZ,
Pet itioner/Pet itioner-Appellant

H21Kd C1 ow eaee
a2

STATE OF HAWAI'I, 5
Respondent/Respondent-Appellee

No. 27129

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(3.P.P. NO. 01-1-0006; CR. NO. 97-0050)

NOVEMBER 13, 2007

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

QPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA,

Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant Freedus W, Wilton, IT
(Petitioner) filed a petition for writ of certiorari on June 29,
2007. Certiorari was accepted on August 7, 2007, and oral.
argument was held on October 17, 2007.!

Petitioner seeks review of the judgment of the

Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA) filed on April 12, 2007,

equed for Petitioner. Peter Hanano argued for
Ppellee State of Hawai'i (Respondent)

   
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pursuant to its March 21, 2007 Summary Disposition Order (S00),?
affirming the December 1, 2004 “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
law, and Order Denying Petition to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct
Judgnent or to Release Petitioner from Custody,” filed by the
Circuit Court of the Second Circuit? (the court). Respondent did
not file a memorandum in opposition.

We respectfully vacate the April 12, 2007 ICA judgment
and the court’s December 1, 2004 findings and conclusions and
order, and remand for an evidentiary hearing under Hawai'i Rules

of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 (2007)* for the reasons stated

 

2 ‘the $00 was issued by Chief Judge Janes S. Burns and Associate
Yudges Daniel R, Foley and Alexa .M, Fujise.

>The Honorable Joel &. August presided.

+ waee Rule 40, entitled Post-Conviction Proceeding, provides in
pertinent part:

(a) Proceedings and Grounde. The post-conviction
proceeding established by this rule shall encompass all
fonmon law and statutory procedures for the same purpos
Including habeas corpus and coram nobis Said
proceeding shail be applicable to judgeents of conviction
and to custody based on Judgments of conviction, as folloy

(0) Exon dudament,” AE any tine bat not prior te fir
judgment, any person nay seek relief under the procedure
forth in’ this rule from the judgment of conviction on ehe
following grounds:

 

 

    

 
 

iwi any around which is a basis for collateral attack
(e) “Haazings.
st ‘only tothe

ere ciain t
‘and is without trace of support ether in the
Fecord oF from other evidence submitted by the petitioner

 
 

HAAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

herein.

 

The following matters, some verbatim, are from the
record and the submissions of the parties. The pertinent
incident facts taken from the application, state in relevant

part:

(o]n January 27, 1997, @ skicmask-wearing intruder wielding
insta broke into the condominius of Mary Paulsen (Mary)
Gnd her sons, Jon and Jeff. Mary was stabbed and cut
Suleipie tines(.] + ; (Meither Marv, Jon or Jatt saw the
Sneraser" described fi rs
not-bellv, welanina approxinately 220 pounds, "The
Perpetrator ran from the unit and was pursued by security
Guard Christ Hoerser (loerner).  doarner pursued the:
ait
ene tore isn as

Tretitioner’s} actual physical sppearance differed
significantly from the description of the perpatrator given
by'the wienesses. [Petitioner] aa about $10" tall and

Sv. Wnen the police arrived at the scene, they
recovered 2 ch ed 338 3l ibe

bandaun, “the aun wae registered £0 (eetiziener| and sone
sitnesses testified that thay had seen his wesrine a similar

*(.-seontinued)

The petits widentiars
bearing of the petition, The court shail receive all
Evidence that 1 selevant and necessary to determine the
petition, including affidavits, depositions, oral testimony,
Eertificate of any Judge who presided at any hearing during
the course of the proceedings which led to the judgm
custody which Ls the subject of the petition, and rel

 

 

 

 

 

 

The petitioner shall have a right to be
present st any evidentiary heating at which o material
Guestion of fact is litigated.

there the petition sileaes

shall serve written

“a stance is silessd to have
been inatfective and said counsel shall have an opportunity
obs heard.

(Boldtaced font in original.) (Baphases added.)

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{but not necessarily identical) cap. Some hair samples were
found in the cap, but (Respondent's) expert witnesses could
only testify chat the hairs weould" have originated trom
{Petitioner} and chat the ONA was “potentially” his. Ia
fact, extensive testing for finserprin un
in her shysical evidens
the eriee ag at th
person or iteas in his apartment.

 

 

‘scene oF on his

 

not_present any evidence to counter [Respondent's
sitcunatantial evidence supposedly identifving (petitioner)
‘athe perpetrate;

(Emphases added.)

After a four-day jury trial, Petitioner was convicted
of (1) burglary in the first degree, (2) robbery in the first
degree, (3) attempted murder in the first degree, (4) place to
keep firearms, (5) carrying or use of a firearm in the commission
of @ separate felony, and (6) use of a deadly or dangerous weapon
in the commission of a crime. The court? sentenced Petitioner to
concurrent terms of (1) life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole for the attempted murder conviction, (2) twenty years
each for the robbery and carrying or use of firearm convictions,
(3) ten years each for the burglary and place to keep firearms
convictions, and (4) five years for the use of a deadly or
dangerous weapon conviction. Additionally, the court imposed
restitution in the amount of $15,800.

Subsequently,

(4)n his (March 20, 2001) HREP Rule 40 petition...

APatitionerl raised the {esue of ineffective assistance of
rial counsel for ¢ailing to present evidence thar would
bye excluded hin as the cerpetrator.... (Petitioner)
Boted that Koerner... seated that the perpetrator hed

 

+ the Honorable Artemio C. Baxa presided.
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outrun him for a significant distance and at one point had
fallen, rolled and chen gotten back to his feet and
continued to run. However,

 

 

with evidence ea roe
skills 3 raakit

impossible for him to nave run In the manner
hoerner. The... . materials provided to trial coun:
prior to trial by (Petitioner) included copies of his
Eitety. a orivate iavestigstor acquaintance, ana a colerace
Bhvsicians (Petitioner) aiso included =a
Sexorsadt celal forming Bim
disability

A Sou “on the Petition!
bearis = restate ad facili

on the “return day” the court* expressed its

Amelination to deny Petitioner’s HRPP Rule 40 petition because it

had difficulty “even get [ting] to a point where there’s sort of a

colorable

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel{,]” noting

that the record contained

(Emphases

 

sone declarations of affidavits by (Petitioner’s} counsel at
tthe time and by [Petitioner] that they [had] reviewed this
matter thoroughly, they had very, you know, intense
discussions, that’ counsel signed’ a declaration, that

Shel, Vicky Russell (Russell), Petitioner’ s appellate
Counsel, ] had spoken to trial’ counsel (Sereno) about his
Situation and whe was a very experienced, even then,
Geiminal defense attorney and had spoken to the investigator
favolved.

 

  

 

 

 

‘So there area number of things said underoath
odicaring that not only with regard tothe allegations of

rE erish, bat
ith regard to having spent tise with (Petitioner)
Siscussing the benefice o Lack thereof of an sspeal versi
2 nee) “Rule 40 petition, when you have statenents unger
Oath by [Petitioner] and by his counsel.

 
 

added.)

on the return day, the court heard argument regarding

Petitioner's allegations that his appellate counsel rendered

 

The Honorable Joel £. August presided.

5
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ineffective assistance, but there was no argument regarding his

claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The court
ruled inmediately on the HREP Rule 40 petition without receiving
any further evidence. The court's oral ruling declared that it
appeared

that whatever decisions were sade were based on strateay as

‘TL think there nav have been very qood reasons why
serteln matters were not provaht before the tury,
farticularly with regard to the underlying disease which
{arstloner] was claiming had’ signitleane efzect on his
ability to move. «=

nd 1"
fon between the court

   

<7 the Tachibana colloquy that went
sad’ [Petitioner], and it's quite clear

 

(Emphases added.)
on Decenber 1, 2004, the court filed its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Petition to Vacate,
Set Aside, or Correct Judgment or to Release Petitioner fron
custody.
m1.

‘The ICA affirmed. The ICA decided Petitioner “hi

not

 

met his burden of establishing ineffective assistance of coun:

 

by showing ‘specific errors or omissions,’* $00 at 8 (quoting
State v. Wakisaka, 102 Hawai'i $04, 514, 78 P.34 317, 327
(2003)), and “tailed to show that the alleged specific errors or
omissions of his trial counsel resulted in the possible

impairment of a potentially meritorious defense,” id.
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ur.
‘The question presented by Petitioner is “{wJhether the
ICA gravely erred in holding that the (court) did not err in
denying (Petitioner’s] HRPP Rule 40 petition where his trial
counsel's failure to present exculpatory evidence in his defense
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel[.]” Petitioner
argues the “court's decision was erroneous for two reasons, first
because the [court] utilized an incorrect standard in ruling on
the merits of [the] Rule 40 petition and second because the
[court's] findings of fact [(findings)] and conclusions of law
[(conelusions)] upon which its ruling was based were in error.””
Petitioner correctly maintains that the applicable standard
imposes the burden of establishing ineffective assistance of

counsel on the defendant, requiring him to prove

 

) the following established standards apply. “A finding of fact is

clearly erroneous when (1) the Fecord lacks substantial evidence to support
the finding, oF (2) despite substantial evidence in support of the finding,
the appellate court is nonetheless Left with « definite and firm conviction
that aimistake has been made."” Fog, State, 106 Hawat's 102, 112, 102 B.34
346,386 (2004) (quoting State vw. Okumura, 78 Hawai'i 383, 392, 894'P.24 80,
a3 {a395)).

“substantial evidence” means “‘oredible evidence which is of
sufficent quality and probative value to enable person, of reasonable

 

   
 
   

 

Gaution to reach a conclusion.'" state v. Bui, 10¢ Hawat's 462, 467, 92 P.3d
G71, (76 (2008) (quoting state v, Silva, 75 Naw. 419, 432, 864 P.24s83, 590

(2983) (ellipses, brackets, and citations onitted)).’ furthermore, “appellate
courts will give due deference to the right of the trier ‘eo determine
Eredipility, weigh the evidence, and draw rt

evidence adduced." In re Dog, 107 Hawai'i 12, 19, 108 P.3d 966, 973 (2005)
(auoting Skakeres junenay 77 Hawal't 425, 432,"986' 0.23 766, 709" top. 1990
(citation omitted) «

 

 

 

othe circuit court's conclusions of lew are reviewed under the
xight/wrong standard.” State v, Diaz, 100 Hawai'i 210, 216, 58 P.3d 1257,
3263 (2002) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

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1) that there were specific errors or omissions
reflecting counsel's lack of skill, Judgment, oF
Giligence; and 2) that such errors’ of omissions
Eosulted in either che withdrawal or substantia!
aca, 74 Haw. [5%,] 66-67, 837 P-2d(1298,]
1308 T9927
nt] nead Snly show a -posiible impairment of a

 

impalement of actual preludice. State v. chrletian,
36 Hawai'i (407,] 415, 967 B.2d (239,] 251 [(1998)]
Wakisaka, 102 Hawai's'ae 516-17, 76 P.34 a 329-30.

 

(Emphasis in original and emphases added.)
1.
‘The court's findings relevant to the facts adduced at
trial and unchallenged by the application except for 9 and 22 are
8 follows:

1. On January 27, 1997, @ burglar broke into Unit
118 of ‘the Mau! Sunset’ located on South Kine! Road, Rines
Maul, Hawai't ag about 3:00 ag, through @ lanai screen
Sor!

2.4

 

ahs awoke, the buralar attach
Fepeatediy stabbing her with 2 xnife.
Se Mare”

Mori's to gona, Jeft, age 23, and Jon, ace 26,
were atieco in the bedroom and sare avakened by Wary's
‘thetassaTlank, wno stabbed Jon in the right forears.

t

to his chin and

 

An the hallway, and received injuri
forearm from the assailant’s knife
. a from
Oait s1is, and whi
‘Sut the Zrone door,
. fosener ch

 

‘toward South Kihei Road. The aagailant
the eae asteing sositl
z Tato a seall housing ares, throwing or

Gropping an underwater casera and scuba dive computer as he

7, Across South Kinel Road, Paula Behnken wae

her-wall, heat net the-shea
in her yard, and heard the poinckana pods in her yard being
crunched as’ though someone was walking on then.

3. s nexe = “
‘The panting left when the sounds of sirens

 

  
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+ Istel and Hose the
TOs ropeed a aus pull
Ti. The gun found in Unit Bile was registered to
Petitioner
12. Before the ner _ouned a
fulls cab identical to the one found in S113.
TS? “when contact eto:

which he said he received
‘dion he bumped into a wall,
T¢, Petitioner had fo alibi except that he clained to

igo "tna searen of nie residence by police,

 

Té. Petitioner clained not to know when he had lost
the Bulls cap:

[it “petitioner had a jury trial from Apri 6, 1998,
to April’ 13, 1998, and was represented by counsel, (Sereno].

1. At teia1, Jonathan Good, 2 coworker of"

ELE to the date of the offenses.

 

19, "At trial, Maul Police Department Detective Brian
kaya testified that’ petitioner Lived within tuo miles of the
20. The evidence at trial established that Betitioner

an Scuba

Gove in dive tour[s) conductea By his employer.
21. ‘The evidence at trial also established that
patie se eran

23. Rt trial, nee” # Pan

notes of martial arts exercises, was _aduitced inte evidence,
Ee waa the testimony of Aarlense Brown, whe testified shar’
Petitioner asked her for $5,000.00 so he could go to Japan

23, Haat Police Departsent Lieutenant Glenn Cusso
testified at trial the Petitioner told Cuomo that he was a
pla bunter

24. Also aduitted into evidence at trial were nine
pages of detailed handwritten nates that police recovered
fron Petitioner and that related to events that occurred

25. On April 6, and April 13, 1998, during trial, the

79 Hawa 226, 231, 900 P-2d 1233, 1258
(1995), “af bis tight te testitv, and Petitioner advised the
court inst he understood his Tight to testity and responded
Syes" when the court askac hin if the decision not t.
Teatify waa nis decision.

26. Petitioner did not testify at his trie

27. petitioner's trial counsel did not call any
witnesses of snter other evidence for the defense during the
Era
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28. On April 13, 1998, che jury found Petitios
guilty of the offenses of Burgiary in the First Degree
{count One}, Aobbery in the First Degree (Count Two),
Attempted Murder in the First Degree (Count Thres), Place to
Keep Firearm (Count Four), Carrying or Use of Firearm in the
Commission of a Separate Felony (Count Five), and Use of
Deadly oF Dangerous Weapon in the Commission of a Crime
(Count Six)

 

 

 

(Emphases added.)

Relevant procedural and post conviction matters as
found by the court and unchallenged by the application are as
follows:

30. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced for the
foregoing offenses on July 30, 1998.
a

 

   

[Russell] represented Petitioner at his
30,1990, and for portions of both of Petitioner's post=
conviction proceedings.

, through Ms.

“Ih the present matter, eetitiones,
nussetl, lean Verified Petition to Yacete, Set Rade, Or
Correct’ Judgnent Or To fel Eitioner From custody on

 

March 20, 2001, alleging that Zetitionee’ I
betitioner hes IMS| and therefore wag unable to-run. as dig
it'trial (3) did nor call [Kraul as 2 witness to fast
[ngt_be advised Petitioner to seep the handeritten ootes

sSduce any evidence a part of 2 defense Cesewin-chi

“38. On October 19, 2001, Petitioner moved to amend
hhis petition, and on October 28, 2002, Petitioner’ s Hotton
‘To Reinstate HRDP Rule {0 Petition With Pro Se Addendum, Ia-
Forma Pauperis And Request For Appointaent Of Counsel
Notions was filed.

39. On Hay 28, 2004, the Court filed it (acl Order
Directing office Of the Public Defender To File Anended Rule
40 Petition On Petitioner's Behalf And Olrecting State To,
File Response To Said Petition.

(Bmphases added.)

v,
Apparently, as noted by the court, the fact that
Petitioner had MS was not presented at trial. Among the items

attached to Petitioner's petition were five pertinent items.

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First, Petitioner's February 5, 2001 affidavit

 

 

1 stated to (Sereno) both in writing in that letter
digo stated directly to (Sereno), verbally, that I have
permanant damage to the motor mov kiius of ay lett
Yegy and ay left leg is incapacit ‘result of my
having had [MS] for many years.

  

Petitioner indicated that “[t]he disability afflicting ay left
leg was diagnosed as [MS] in 1989; T have been unable to run due
to that disability [for] some time prior to the diagnosis in
1989," his medical records “show my history of [MS] and the
effect of the disease on my gait, such that any competent medical
expert could have described the meaning of . . . those
records(,]” and “I informed my trial attorney, [Sereno] of ny
WS} induced disability, and on more than one occasion attempted
to provide trial attorney [Sereno] copies of my medical records
showing the [MS] disability so that [Sereno] would be able to
review and use that information defensively at trial.”

As to his desire to testify, Petitioner averred that

“although 1 re

 

atedly stated my wish to testify to [Sereno], and

in particular, with regard to my disability and inability to run

and my keeping notes on the recommendation of Mr. Krau, T was

repeatedly dissuaded from my wish by my attorney.”
8.

Second, an apparent undated pretrial letter from

Petitioner to Sereno indicated Petitioner advised Sereno he could

a
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do a jog for a short distance but not run because of MS, and that

he believed it was “important to speak to the jury.”*

c.
‘Third, a November 1, 2000 affidavit of Ira Chang, M.D.,
indicated the doctor examined medical records from Colorado which

showed Petitioner vas “first seen in 1989 for the following

+ petitioner attached a copy of this undated redacted letter from

Petitioner to his attorney prior to trial to his original Rule 40 petition.
Eitioner also attached an affidavit in which he attested to the content
the letter.” Im his letter, Petitioner explained that he "put together (a
List of information, ideas and questions for {counsel's} perusal” and stal
that he would appesciate 1t'1f counsel “would look then over and give, [nis] an
answer to the questions and [an] opinion on the ideas and information”

Contained therein. the leeter states in pertinent par

 

 

 

of

      

   

oe
re that 1 cannot walk. i-ride my bicyele as a
form of therapy and exercise. Secause T have toe clips on
the pedals T can se my Fight leg to assist my Left leg when
Se'gets fatigued and still get a lot out of the exercise for
ny eee leg.

Wy" Sado abL1sties have been drastically changed, I can no
longer nove with the agility and speed chat T once had.
However with ny experience and upper-body strength (although
greatly diminished) I can still workout and hold ay own witn
Rost Judo players

 

 

 

 

  
 

[Redacted text)

I have read in sone of the material(s} T have gone
through in the Law Library about
‘Siossrexanined. Ie this something that canbe done in

fy coald that bes possibility? t haven't been able to
find where T ead it, don’t know if it is 2 currently
allowed rule or if maybe I read it in a paperback book about
2 trial, I do get confused and forgetful at tine ((¥S))-
But no_matter where [read it 1 think it is important to

‘speak to the Jury in one wavi,]-shapeT, I or fore.

Tam going to mail this to you today as T want you to have
an opportunity to go over it before we talk again.

 

(Emphases added.)
12
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symptoms: a) recurrence of double vision; b) left-sided
clumsiness; c) difficulty with walking due to difficulty with
[sic] use of right leg,” an “examination showed that
[Petitioner's] left leg exhibited an upper motor neuron pattern
of weakness; [Petitioner's] gait was such that he had a tendency
to fall to the left on tandem walking and to have somewhat poor
ankle dorsiflexion on heel walking,” and upon further testing,
Petitioner was “ultimately diagnosed with the disease of (NS].”
>.

Fourth, a State of Hawai‘i Department of Public Safety
consultation Record of February 10, 2000, indicated Petitioner
has a “history of symptoms of [MS] that began in 1989. . . and
presents records that seem to support the diagnosis of (MS from]
the Rocky Mountain Multiple Sclerosis Center in Colorado.” The
consultation record examiner stated that, “although [Petitioner]
has records documenting that neurologists have said that he has
[MS], 1 do not have records documenting the exact imaging or
laboratory testing that supported this diagnosis.” The examiner
noted that “(t]he patient previously had episodes of weakness in
the lower extremities and diplopia.” The examiner also noted
that Petitioner had an “eight or nine month history of mild
increased fatigue, occasional double vision, and occasional
increase in stiffness, primarily in the lover extremities on the

left.”

13
 

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z.

Fifth, also attached to Petitioner's Rule 40 petition
vas a January 25, 2001 affidavit of Krau, a licensed private
investigator and neighbor of Petitioner. Krau’s affidavit may be
considered in two respects.

Kraus affidavit declared he has known Petitioner “for
some years, including a significant period of time prior to his
arrest on the charges at issue herein.” According to Krau, he
was Petitioner's neighbor in Kihei, Maui, and had “numerous
opportunities to observe him walk, attempt to jog and ride nis

bicycle.” Krau noted that “when walking, [Petitioner] hi

 

distinct gait which cause(s] him to limp due to weakness in the
left side of his body.” “When jogging,” Krau explained, “it is

impossible for [Petitioner] to do so for any distance.”

 

Additionally, “when attempting to exercise by Jogging,
(Petitioner's) gait is slow, labored{,) and hampered by a heavy
Limp due to the weakness in the left side of his body.”

Krau also stated in his affidavit that he was aware
that Petitioner “traveled by bicycle and I am familiar with the
toe clips on [his] bicycle.” As Krau explained, “the toe clips

were in place, not as racing clips, but in order for him to use

his right leg to pull up on the clip in order to compensate for

 

the weakness in his left leg... .” Finally, Krau stated that

he was “aware of the distance the perpetrator in this case ran in

u
‘+40 PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER!*#

 

order to elude pursuit by the Maui Sunset condominium security
guard at full chase,” and “would estimate that distance to be not
i

8 than 500 feet.”

 

As to the second aspect, Krau stated in his affidavit
that “{sJhortly after (Petitioner] had engaged in his first
discussion with the police, he contacted me and I instructed him
to take notes and to write down everything he could remenber
about the victims, any contact he may have had with them, and any
other information which may be of value in order to help the

police during their investigation.” Krau further stated that

 

“()e was at my instruction that these notes ve

 

made after the
fact of the crime in order to facilitate the police
investigation.” However, as indicated infra, it does not appear
the application focuses on this aspect of Krau’s affidavit.
vt.
The court's findings (apparently inferred from the

matters in the

 

cord) that reject Rule 40 relief are as follows,
findings 41, 42, 44 and 45 being specifically highlighted by
Petitioner for challenge:

41. from the record it appears that Petitioner's
briga potmeri' fablute be sideee gridienas of Exeiianas’s,
Feflecting @ lack of skill, Jodgnent, OF
GiTigence, and it didnot result in the withdrawal oF
substantial impairnent of 2 potentially-neritorious defense.
42. The affidavite attached to Fetitioner’s petition
do not ectablisn that Petitioner uae Gnsble to run st the

43. in Light of the fact that Petitioner's registered

gun and & chicago Bulls cap identical to Petitioner's were
found in vale Bi18,

15
 

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‘al_that fetitioner’s (Msi prevented him from running. the

 

the eeidense thy geil wile in
Eke Maul Sundet parking lot and that loud eanting wag chen
heaed outside che badraom windows 2 (eehaken] and tEnns]s
Girectly across the Wasi Sunset.
aon se have deen a

defense of being unable to run due to (MS| to be
consistent vith sbjective evidence of the range of various

ical an Eies that Si

Prior to the offense,
45. From the record, and in Light of [Respondent’s]
idence as a whole bearing upon Petitioner's guilt,
Petitioner's trial counsel”s decision not to call (krau) to
testify that he told... Petitioner to make notes of his
activities surrounding the tise of the offense was nat an
error or onission reflecting a lack of skill, judgrent, oF
Giligence, nor did it roguit in the withdrawal or
Substantial ispalraent of a potentially-meritorious defense,

 

 

 

 

nee tha a leven A
n havi to avoid penal
Tiabitity rather than having been s documentation of actual,

events.
is. In addition, Keau's testimony might have impaired
Petitioner’ s"derense by focusing more ateention on
Petitioners’ notes, which stated that Detective Koya told
Petitioner about a crine dnvolving a lady and nar’ two\ sons,
a" fact which Detective Kays denied
Ai. Petitioner's tfial counsel’ s decision not to calt
Petitioner aS a witness was not an seror or omission
reflecting a lack of skill, Gare, and diligence, and it did
hot Fesule in the withdrawal or Substantial ingaitneat of @
fontially-neritorious defer
Potene{a. vie appears from the ecord involving Petitioner's
Tachibana colloquy by the [eloure on April 13, 1996, thet

destity, aad that the leloast told Petitioner That one

45~ “ven if, as Petitioner clains, his counsel
repeatadiy told him not to testify at trial, that is not an
error of oaisaion.

50. It is one of defense counsel's responsibilities
at trial to advise Ais client snether or not {tol testify,

51. tn light of the record respecting Petitioner's
April 13, 1998 colloquy with the (cloure on his right. to
testity, Petitioner's waiver of his constitutional right to
testify’ in his own defense was both knowing and voluntary.

52." In Light of the substantial evidence implicating
Petitioner at trial, Petitioner has not show how trial
counsels decision not to put on a defense cage-in-chiet was
an error or omission reflecting a lack of skill, juagect,
Or diligence, and that the decision resulted in the
‘withdrawal of substantial impairment of a potentially-
Reritorious defense.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Emphases added.)

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‘+4f0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS*#

 

vir.
Petitioner asserts that as to the first “reason” in his
application, the court’s application of the relevant standard was

incorrect.

   

= requiring that (Petitioner] establish he
Sposaible impairment, rather than the probable impalement,
of a potentially meritorious defense,” Wakisake, supra, the
(court) effectively utilized a standard akin to the more
ateingent federal standard rejected by the Hawal'l Supreme
Court in Briones v. State, 74 Haw. 442, 462 n.12, B48 F.2d
966, 976-77 n.12 1993}, which would require {Petitioner} to
prove chat it was peobsble (versus possible) that trial
Counsel's errors affected the results of the proceedings.

 

 

(Emphasis in original.) Applying this first “reason” in
connection with the second “reason,” Petitioner challenges

several findings that are discussed herein, in seriatim.

 

A

As to finding 9, Petitioner maintains that “(t}his
+. wholly omitted the fact that the witnesses had also
provided estimates of the height, weight and hair color of the
perpetrator that were markedly inconsistent with (Petitioner's)
actual physical appearance.” In its answering brief, Respondent
argues that

‘there was substantial evidence in the record to support the

 

 

      

 

 

finding = =

1)" (Mary) “testified that the man wore dark colored
clothing, dark gloves, and a dark ratty looking ski

2) [Weed] cestisied that the attacker was a “fairly good
sized man in a ski mask holding a knife all dressed in
Bleck(;]" wearing long sleeves and glove:

3) (Gon) testified that the attacker was “all dressed in

dark clothing{,1* with "Long sleeves and something
that covered his whole upper torsol,” gloves, and a
oki mask.

   

a
   

"FOR PUBLICATION TN WEST’ S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER!
4) [Woerner) testified that the attacker wore a black ski

snask, black gloves, black pants, and camouflage. long
Sleeved shire

 

on review of the transcripts, the testimony as stated above is
correct, and indicates that there was substantial evidence to
support the finding. As Petitioner maintains, however, the
finding omits evidence of the inconsistency in the descriptions
of the perpetrator as compared to Petitioner's actual person.
But so far as the finding goes, it was not clearly erroneous.
8

As to finding 22, Petitioner argues that “the court's
recollection of Brown's testimony as stating that [Petitioner]
went to Japan to study martial arts was simply incorrect. In
fact, Brown testified that [Petitioner] had stated that he was
going to Japan to teach English and that she had only assumed
that he wanted to also study (klarate.” fut in its answering

brief, Respondent states that

 

1d that[] [Petitsoner’ s]
because "he wanted to go to San

Francisco and take english as # second language 30 he could
teach in vapan”; and that [Petitioner] wanted to go to Japan
“fblecause of his incerest. in karate.” “The fact that it wag.

 

 

Brown” say Fea ar as to

(Emphasis added.) According to the relevant transcript, the

following was asked of Brow

 

Q. And why did he want to go to Japan?
A. believe because of his interest in (k)azate.
id you know of his interest in (k) arate?
ter of conversation in the group, he
had a ftiend with him who had taught him karate T suppos

 

 

 

18
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‘The responses garnered from Brown tend to support Petitioner's
position that the interest in karate came from Brown's
supposition and not from Petitioner’s stated intent. Thus the
finding vas partially erroneous, insofar as it definitively
indicated Petitioner was going to Japan to study martial arts.
virr.
a

‘The following findings require extended discussion.

As to finding 42, Petitioner contends that it
erroneously states that the “evidence did not establish . . . he

was unable to run at the time of the offen:

 

 

TncluaTing] a physician's report chat
“Showed that the left leg exhibited an upper motor neuron
pattern of weakness,” and that he had a tendency to fall to
Ene left on tandes walking and to have somewhat poor ankle
Gorsifiexion on heal walking.”

 

(Emphasis added.) In respon!

 

in its answering brief,
Respondent contends that

‘the “consultation Record” from the Department of Public
Satety 12 inconclusive. The “evaluation” was apparently
done on February 10, 2000(,] .... over three years after
the January 27, 1997 . . . attack’ on the Paulsens. In

     

neurologic complaints
in stitiness,
‘on the left:

except
primarily 4a the lower extremiti

 

 

(Emphasis in original.) Further, Respondent argued:

Neither (Petitioner's nor Krau’s] affidavit denonstrate()
'S physically incapable of running at the

of the offenses. |... « [Petitioner's] own affidavit

that (Petitioner) could run, albeit at a slow

     

    

a9
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(t)he aftidavit of Tra chang, 4.0., merely says...
he reviewed (Petitioner’ s] medical cacotda from 1989 which
Indicated [Petitioner] had Sone left-sided clumsiness,
weakness and alleged difficulty walking, and that
[Petitioner] had Been dlagnosed with (MS, but [here is no
spinion or conclusion that [Petitioner] would have been
Physically unable to run at all

 

  

(Emphases in original.)
8
i.

As to findings 41 and 43, Petitioner apparently argues
that it is a “recitation of the correct standard, {but} the
[court's] application of the standard was erroneous” because
“none of (Respondent’s] witnesses could directly identity
[Petitioner] as the perpetrator{,]” “the physical descriptions
provided by the witnesses differed significantly from
(Petitioner’s} actual physical appearance(,]”" and “the only other
evidence... was. . . that a cap similar to one worn by
(Petitioner) contain{ed] DNA that was ‘potentially’ his and a gun

+ + was registered to him (both of which [Petitioner] would
have explained had been stolen from his apartment).”
2.

With respect to finding 43, Petitioner repeats that
“the [court] had taken it upon itself to go beyond evaluating the
possible effects of the omitted evidence and instead based its
decision on its speculation as to what would have been the
piobable effects of the evidence on the jury's decision-
making(.]” (Emphases in original.)

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Similarly, as to finding 44, Petitioner contends “[ilts
supposition . . . of what the jury ‘could’ have done . . .
indicates that the [court] had usurped the role of the jury at
trial, instead of assuming its . . . role as a court ruling ona
motion alleging ineffective assistance[.]”

c

Petitioner’s application did not present any argument
as to the “notes” referred to in finding 45,% except to state
that the court should not have decided that the jury could have
Gisregarded the notes as manufactured, but “should have strictly
Limited itself . . . to the possibility that . . . [Petitioner’s]

MS impaired his ability to run.”

 

1@ “notes” aspect of finding

45 thus is not discussed further.

 

+ with respect to finding 45, Respondent asserts (1) “any such
testimony by Keau would have enphasized the falsehoods contained in the notes
relating to statenents allegediy made by the police to Petitioner!” becaus
[Petitioner] knew that the crime involved a lady and
| Detective Kays never disclosed any of chose facts as
notes claimed{,|” (2) "if Krau testified that he advised
[Petitioner] to make notes of his activities in order to ‘facilitate the
police investigation{,]’" this *woald have further exacerbated [Petitioner’s)
Eredipility problens because [Petitioner] never offerea those notes or the
information Contained therein to the police to ‘assist’... thelr
investigation(,]" inasaueh as “ehe notes were recovered through the execution
of a search warrant of the backpack [Petitioner] wore at the tine of his
Srrest(,] . «+ days after police initially contacted (Petitioner, |”
(3) “since the nine handueitten notes contained material which alleged
Improper police tactics, Keau’s proposed teatinony that the notes were created
“to help the police during their investigation’ and ‘to facilitate the police
investigation’ would have been laughable,” (4) *Krau’s testinony would have
-v'Tenpnasized that there were corrections to [Petitior
{indtes] which were more consistent with having been mans!
having been @ documented actual event (1.”

an

 

 

          

   

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAMAI‘E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

 

.
In its answering brief, Respondent responds with
respect to the foregoing findings 41, 42, and 44, that (1) “none
of [Respondent's] witnesses could directly identify [Petitioner]
as the perpetrator. Recognizing this, [Sereno] apparently
decided, as a matter of sound trial strategy, not to put forth
any evidence[,] . . . [but] simply to argue ‘reasonable doubt’";
(2) “according to the ‘undated redacted’ pretrial letter to
[Sereno], [Petitioner] apparently informed [Sereno] of his
physical disability and the effect it’ had on his alleged
inability to run[,]” and [Petitioner] stated, '(I]£ the trial is
going well and you don't want me to testify could that be a

possibility?/” and “(blased on this statement, it is cl

 

ie that
[Sereno] advised [Petitioner] to evaluate the strength of

[Respondent’s} ca

 

in-chief before deciding whether or not to
testify"; (2) (a) “evidence that (Petitioner's MS] restricted oF
prevented him from running would only have strengthened and/or
corroborated [Respondent's] case against [Petitioner]” because
“Islecurity guard Hoerner testified that the assailant fell,
‘rolled’ into a sitting position -- not unlike a martial arts
move ~~ and then ran across the street into a small housing
area[,]” (b) “Behnken and Enns testified to being awakened by the
sound of a man, loudly panting and out of breath,

consistent with a person with a physical disability such as

22
‘*¥+0R PUBLICATION IM WEST’ S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REDORTERS®#

 

[MS1"; and (4) “evidence that (Petitioner) was unable to run
- would . . . contradict the . . . undisputed evidence” “that
[Petitioner]: [(a)] regularly rode a bicycle; [(b)] was an avid
scuba diver; ((c)] was an admitted pig hunter; [(d)] was trained
in the martial arts; and {(e)] worked out at the gym.”
IK.

In his application, Petitioner does not

 

cifically

pinpoint any conclusion for challenge but maintains generally

 

that the “{conclusion: + upon which [the court’s} ruling vas

based were in error.”

Conclusion 1, that

the burden of establishing ineffective
counsel, and must meet the following two-part
1) that there were specific errors or omission:

3 Tack of skill, judgment, or diligence;
rors or omissions resulted in either the
wtendra sneial inpairment of a povent Lally.
hneritorious defenses, State v. sith, 62 Hew. 204, 309, 712
P.24 496, 500 (1986); State ve Morishioa, 65 Haw.” 354, 369,
S52 12d" 1119, (1130 (1302) State's Antone, 62 aw. 348,
348-49, 615 P.2d 101, 104 (2980) (,]

     

 

  
 

 

 

 

is not entirely right. Conclusion 1 contains only a portion of
the applicable standard. As discussed infra, this court has

elaborated on the second prong of this &

 

it) explaining that a
determination of “whether a defense is ‘potentially meritorious’

requir

 

an evaluation of the possible, rather than the probable,
affect of the defense on the decision maker.” Briones, 74 Haw.

at 464, 848 P.2d 996, 977 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) .

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8,

Conclusion 2, in part states that “{s]pecific actions
or omissions alleged to be error but which had an obvious
tactical basis for benefitting the defendant’s case will not be
subject to further scrutiny.” (Citing Briones, 74 Haw. at 462-
63, 848 P.2d at 976. (Citation omitted.)). In arriving at the
decision that “it was tactically advantageous for Petitioner's
trial counsel not to assert Petitioner's [MS] as a defense,” the
court stated:

The affidavits that Petitioner submitted . . . do not
bLish that Petitioner could not run at the tine of the
offense. Moreover, there was substantial evidence of record

in the tial that fetitioner waa capable af a range ol

‘Alternately, the
fant’ Falling white being pursued and the loud panting

1ed by Behnken and Enns outside thelr windows were not
Inconsistent with someone with a physical disability,

 

 

 

 

(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, also as set forth in conclusion 2
regarding “trial counsel's decision not to adduce evidence that
Petitioner was unable to run due to (MS,]” the court declared

“Petitioner has not met his burden” of showing “ineffective

 

stance of counsel{,]” apparently based on an evaluation of
Respondent's evidence against Petitioner as “substantial.”
c.
With respect to Petitioner’s failure to testify, the
court ruled in conclusion 3 that “Petitioner told the (court)

that he knew it wi

 

his decision, not that of his counsel,

whether or not to testify, and then Petitioner did not testify.”

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Relatedly, in conclusion 4, the court ruled that Petitioner had
not demonstrated how Sereno’s advice that Petitioner not testify
on his own behalf amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel
because “(i]t is one of defense counsel's responsibilities .

to advise the defendant on the question of whether or not he or
she should testify." (Internal quotation marks, citations, and

brackets omitted) (ellipses in original.)

 

In conclusion 5, the court stated that Petitioner had
not met his “burden of establishing that” the decision not to put

on a defense ca

 

An-chief “reflected a lack of skill, judgment,
or diligence(] . . . that resulted in the withdrawal or
substantial impairment of a potentially-meritorious {sic]
defense.” Thus, the court concluded that Petitioner was not
entitled to relief under HRPP Rule 40 on this basis.”

x,

 

We observe that the correct standard to apply in a HREP
Rule 40 proceeding, as noted by Petitioner in his opening brief,
is that

Lin any claim of ineffective assistance of tris:
‘Gounsel, the burden ie upon the defendant to.
‘Ganonsefate that, in light of all the circumstances,
5 not objectively reasonable -
f competence demanded of
"Tn [Botonel, we set

 

   

25,
 

FOR PUBLICATION TM WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERSS®

 

cspecitic ercore or omissions reflecting

har “thew ineither the
withdrawal or substantial impairment of potentially.
beritorious dafenans

BrionesiL, 14 Haw. (at] 462, 848 P.24 [at] 976. .

Cinternal citations omitted) [(ellipaes and brackets in

original) )

 

® = sn evaluation of the
Gacision gales. Appellate courts defer to the Judge
Of jury as fact finder unless no substantial evidence
ekisted for their finding because the fact finder 13,
Gniquely qualified to evaluste the credibility of
witnesses and to weigh the evidence

# actual” prejudice {s requir

 

 

inelfective assistance of counsel.
lida) at 464, 840 P.2a at 577 (Footnote and citations
onitees) .

(Emphases added.) As Briones indicated, the court, in
determining a “potentially meritorious” defense, evaluates “the
possible” (as opposed to probable) “effect . . . on the decision
maker,” at least with respect to whether “a defense is
potentially meritorious.” 74 Haw. at 464, 848 P.2d at 977.
Again, Petitioner maintains that, in applying the standard, the
court rather than “evaluating the possible effects of the omitted
evidence . . . , instead engaged in a prediction of the
credibility, weight, and effect that the evidence would have
probably had on the jury's verdict.” (Emphases in original.)

Tt would appear that a court should not determine
credibility or weight of the evidence in a HRPP Rule 40
Proceeding. See Briones, 74 Haw. at 464, 848 P.2d at 977

("Appellate courts defer to the judge or jury as fact finder

26
 

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unless no substantial evidence existed for their finding because
the fact finder is uniquely qualified to evaluate the credibility
of witnesses and to weigh the evidence.” (Footnote and citations
omitted.)); Aplaca, 74 Haw. at 72, 837 P.2d at 1308 (stating that
“we, as an appellate court, cannot predict the exact effect these
prospective witnesses would have had on the trial court's
assessment of [the complainant's] and (the defendants}
credibility”).

Based on the record at present, evidence at trial, as
stated in findings 43 and 44 regarding identity, must be
counterpoised with evidence attached to Petitioner's Rule 40
petition: (1) “the ‘Consultation Record’ from the Department of
Public Safety dated February 11, 2000, states that due to his MS,
[Petitioner] had ‘episodes of weakness in the lower extremities

and diplopia(,]/" (2) Petitioner's “affidavit states that he has

 

‘permanent damage to the motor movement skills of {his} left leg,
and {his} left leg ig incapacitated as a result of [his] having
(Ms] for many years{,]‘" (3) “the affidavit of (Krau] states that
[Petitioner], when walking, ‘has a distinct gait which cause(s]
him to limp due to weakness in the left side of his body . .

[and w)hen jogging it is almost impossible for him to do so for
any distance[,]” (4) “the affidavit of Ira Chang, M.D., states
that, ‘[e]xamination showed that the left leg exhibited an upper

motor neuron pattern of weakness,’ and that [Petitioner] ‘had a

20
‘09OR PUBLICATION IM WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS+®

 

tendency to fall to the left on tandem walking and to have
somewhat poor ankle dorsiflexion on heel walking.’”

Hence finding 42 (stating the affidavits do not
establish that Petitioner was unable to run) arguably engages in
a weighing of the evidence, inasmuch as the import of the
affidavits was whether Petitioner could run as the perpetrator
had. The weight to be given the evidence in the affidavits, if
presented at trial, would be one for the jury, and not for a
judge at the HRPP Rule 40 stage. The omission of such evidence
may possibly impair the defense of mistaken identification. see
Hakisaka, 102 Hawai'i at 516, 78 P.3d at 329 (citation omitted).

Likewis

 

in deciding in finding 43 that the “Jury
could reasonably view" evidence of Petitioner's MS as
“consistent” with the assailant falling and panting loudly
involves a weighing of the evidence and is akin to a review for
substantial evidence, not for the evaluation of whether the
omitted evidence possibly impaired a potentially meritorious
defense.

Also, finding 44, that “the jury could also have
dened” MS Limitations “to be inconsistent” with evidence of
Petitioner's physical activities, again involves a weighing of
evidence in the manner in which the substantial evidence rule
would be applied, rather than whether the failure to adduce such

evidence would have possibly impaired a meritorious defense

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‘s**F0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'L REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER®

 

 

(here, obviously, the requirement that identification must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt). See id.

Petitioner points out in his opening brief that, in
Aplaca, this court said:

Although we, as an aspellate court, cannot predict the

soapact ive witnesses would hav
Gefendant’s| cresibility, ve fimmly believe thst such
festinony could have had a direct Dearing on the uitinate
putcons of the case. We therefore disagree With the ICA's
Conclusion that the unproferred testimony would not have
East any Light on the sole defense in ehis case, that 3,
the lack of criminal intent. The materials and affidavits
ara punitestly adverse to the ToArs finding.

 

74 Haw. at 73, 837 P.2d at 1308 (emphases added). Tt would
appear that evidence regarding restrictions on Petitioner's
ability to run, as attached to his HRPP Rule 40 petition, “could
have had a direct bearing on the ultimate outcome of the case,”
Ada, because it bore on whether Petitioner could run in the same
nanner as the perpetrator had and, thus, on whether Respondent
had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the
perpetrator.

xr.

Respondent's response in its answering brief was to
cite the “obvious tactical basis” exception to the impairment
rule:

soecitic acto Leaed to be error but uh

‘had_on obvious tactical basis for benefitting the
sefendant's case will not be sublect to further scrutiny,
benefitting the defendant's case and it tented ip the

sithdrsws! or supstanrial
Reritorious defense, ‘chen it will be evaluated as

29
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information that an ordinary competent criminal attorney
should have had.

State v, De Guair, 108 Hawai'i 179, 187, 118 2.34 662, 670 (2005)

 

(sone emphases in original and emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks, brackets, ellipses, and citation omitted). In
this regard the ICA noted that “(t]he (court) denied
(Petitioner's) claims against . . . Sexeno, stating{,]” as noted
before, that “there may have been very good reasons why certain
matters were not brought before the jury, particularly with
regard to the underlying disease which [Petitioner] was claiming
had a significant effect on his ability to move.” S00 at 7.
Respondent argues that because the perpetrator wore a ski mask
and there were discrepancies among the witnesses as to the
description of the perpetrator, as Petitioner points out, a
seemingly obvious tactical basis would be to “argue ‘reasonable
doubt’ regarding Respondent’ s case.
xrr.
First, as to Petitioner's own request to testify

(findings 47-51), the ICA observed that the court sai

 

(Oln the Tachibana colloquy . . . it’s quite clear
there was an adequate colloquy.

50 Af. : « (Petitioner) wanted to indicate to the
(clout. : it’was Bis decision and not his attorney's
EME he santed to testify, he certainly could have
indicated ss =

 

800 at 7 (emphasis added). Relatedly, in Jones v. state, 79
Hawai'i 330, 331, 902 P.2d 965, 966 (1995), the defendant argued

fon appeal from the circuit court’s denial of his HREP Rule 40

30
 

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petition that “the circuit court erred in concluding that his
trial counsel had provided effective assistance of counsel with
respect to [the defendant's] failure to testify in his own
defense.” At the HREP Rule 40 hearing, the defendant “testified
that his trial attorney had not told him that the decision to
testify was his decision to make or that he could change his mind
‘about testifying even after signing the written waiver.” Id. at
333, 902 P.2d at 968.

on the other hand, the defendant’s trial attorney
“testified that he did not recall ever discussing (the
defendant’ s] decision not to testify after the written waiver had
been signed, but was sure that he had stressed to (the defendant]
that the decision whether not to testify was his decision to

make.” Id, After conducting the hearing, the circuit court

 

found that “the [d]efendant was properly advised of his right to

t

 

tify and of his subsequent waiver, and that he knew of that
right and knowingly and intelligently waive(d) that right.” Id.
at 333-34, 902 P.2d at 969-69,

The Jones court recognized that under Tachibana, “‘in
order to protect the right to testify under the Hawai"
Constitution, trial courts must advise criminal defendants of
their right to testify and must obtain an on-the-record waiver of

that right in every case in which the defendant does not

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testify.” Id. at 333, 902 P.2d at 968 (quoting Tachibana, 79
Hawai'i at 236, 900 P.2d at 1303 (footnotes onitted)).

But the Jones court concluded, “based on [its] review
of the record, [and) particularly the testimony presented by (the
defendant's} trial counsel, . . . that the circuit court's
findings that (the defendant] was properly advised of his right
to testify and that he knowingly and intelligently waived that
right were not clearly erroneous.” Id. at 334, 902 P.2d at 969.
Accordingly, this court held that “to the extent that (the

defendant's HRPP Rule 40] petition was b

 

don an alleged
violation of his right to testify, . . . the circuit court did

not err in denying the petition.” Id, Thus, on similar fact:

 

Petitioner cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel as to
his not testifying at trial.
xur.

As to evidence other than Petitioner’s own testimony,
Respondent argued, as indicated supra, that there were “obvious
tactical bas[e]s” for not producing such evidence. Respondent
contended that the omitted evidence (1) would have “strengthened
and/or corroborated the. [Respondent's] case” because of evidence
that the assailant fell, rolled into a sitting position, and
apparenty exhibited “loud panting and heavy breathing,” and
(2) would have “contradict{ed] . . . evidence of {Petitioner's}

physical activities.”

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However, it is questionable that there was an “obvious
tactical basis” for suppressing countervailing evidence as
presented in the Consultation report, Dr. Chang’s affidavit, and
Krau's affidavit, age supra, which would contradict or mitigate
the effect of Respondent’s evidence. Such evidence, at the
least, presented a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Hutch v, State, 107 Hawai'i 411, 414, 114 P.34 917, 920
‘Eing should be held on a Rule 40

 

 

(2005) (noting that “a ni
petition for post-conviction relief where the petition states a
colorable claim(,]” and that “{t]o establish a colorable claim,
the allegations of the petition must show that if taken as true
the facts alleged would change the verdict” (quoting Dan vs
State, 76 Hawai'l 423, 427, 879 P.2d 528, 532 (1994) (quoting
State v. Allen, 7 Haw. App. 89, 92-93, 744 P.2d 789, 792-93
(1987))) (emphasis omitted) .

Apparently the jury was not informed of the fact that
Petitioner had MS and that there was evidence contradicting
whether Petitioner could run the distance involved or in the
manner described while being chased. Rather than
“strengthen[ing] or corroborat {ing]” Respondent’s case, such
evidence could cast doubt on its identity evidence. As to
“contradicting” evidence of Petitioner's physical activities,
such information would seemingly qualify such activities. Thus,

according to Petitioner, the ICA gravely erred because in this

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context “trial counsel’s failure to present evidence that would
have further excluded [Petitioner] as the perpetrator (i.e.
evidence that would have shown that he could not have run as the
perpetrator did . . . ) would have at least possibly affected the
jury's verdict” and “did in fact result in the ‘possible
impairment, rather than a probable impairment, of a potentially

meritorious defens

 

+" (Quoting Wakisaka, 102 Hawai'i at $14, 78
P.3d at 327.) (Citation omitted.)

xIv.

A.

As stated previously, HRPP Rule 40(a) (1) entitles
Petitioners to relief from judgment if there is “any ground which
is a basis for collateral attack on the judgment.” HRPP Rule
40(c) (1) requires petitioners to set forth in their petitions

all the grounds for relief which are available to the
Petitioner and of which the petitioner has or by the
Sxercise of reasonable diligence should have knowledge and
Shall set forth in summary fora the facts supporting each of
the grounds thus specified. [t hall also state the relief
requested.

 

HRP Rule 40(f) dictates that “[i]f a petition alleges facts that

Af proven would entitle the petitioner to relief, the court shall

 

grant a hearing. . .
As an exception to this general rule, HRPP Rule 40(f)
further provides that “the court may deny a(n evidentiary]

hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous... .”

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(Emphasis added.) despite its statement regarding “get [ting] to
2 point . . . of a colorable claim,” the court did not find or
conclude that Petitioner’s claim was “patently frivolous.”
Rather, it entered numerous findings concerning the evidence at
trial and concluded that that trial counsel’s “decision not to
call (Krau] or produce other evidence in a defense case-in-chief
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel and does
not support relief pursuant to Rule 40{.)”

‘Thus, the court apparently found that Petitioner's Rule

40 petition raised at least a colorable claim of ineffective

 

assistance of counsel inasmuch as (1) it did not rule that the
petition was “patently frivolous” and (2) it resolved the merits
of the arguments raised in the petition. Furthermore, we note

that on their faces, the affidavits present a colorable claim of

 

ineffective assistance of counsel because if the facts therein

 

were taken as true, they could change the verdict. See Barnett
waState, 91 Hawai'l 20, 26, 979 P.24 1046, 1052 (1991) (noting
that a petition raises a colorable claim if the allegations
therein, “if taken as true(,]” “would change the verdict”
(citation omitted)). Specifically, Petitioner could have been
able to establish that he could not run in the same manner as the
Perpetrator, coupled with the inability of Respondent's witnesses

to unequivocally identify Petitioner as the perpetrator.

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‘**47OR PUBLICATION IM WEST’ HAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTE

 

If a Rule 40 petition raises a colorable claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, the court must hold an
evidentiary hearing. HRPP Rule 40(f) ("If a petition alleges
facts, that if proven would entitle the petitioner to relief, the
court shall grant a hearing which may extend only to the issues
raised in the petition or answer.") Accordingly, a full and fair
evidentiary hearing is required on Petitioner’s clains. Hutch,
107 Hawai'i at 414, 114 P.3d at 920 (holding that “a hearing on a
Rule 40 petition is required whenever the allegations in a
petition, if taken as true, (1) would change the verdict rendered
oF (2) would establish the illegality of custody following a
Judgment{]" (citing HREP Rules 40(a) and (€); Turner, 93 Hawai'i
at 310, 1 P.3d at 780))7 gee also HRPP Rule 40(f) (“The

Petitioner shall have a full and fair evidentiary hearing on the

 

petition, The court shall receive all evidence that is relevant
and necessary to determine the petition... ."). The
evidentiary hearing should also include an opportunity for Sereno
to explain his trial strategy. See id. (“here the petition
alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground upon which
the requested relief should be granted, the petitioner shall
serve written notice of the hearing upon the counsel whose
assistance is alleged to have been ineffective and said counsel

shall have an opportunity to be heard.”); see also State

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HAAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Moses, 107 Hawai'i 282, 293, 112 P.3d 768, 779 (App. 2005)
(noting that “counsel should [be] given every opportunity to
explain the reasons for” the challenged conduct (citing Matsuo v.
State, 70 Haw. 573, $78, 778 P.2d 332, 335 (1989); State v.
Smith, 106 Hawai'i 365, 378, 105 P.3d 242, 255 (App. 2004)
(stating that the decision not to call witnesses is “normally a
matter within the judgment of counsel and will rarely be
second-guessed” by the courts (citing State v. Richie, 88 Hawai'i
19, 39, 40, 960 P.24 1227, 1248 (1998))).

‘The court acted conscientiously in the disposition of
Petitioner’s Rule 40 petition. However, in light of the issues
raised on certiorari, a full and fair evidentiary hearing on
Petitioner’s claims related to his MS evidence, other than
Petitioner’s own trial testimony, must be held. Therefore, the
ICA's April 12, 2007 judgment and the court’s December 1, 2004
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Petition
to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Judgment or to Release
Petitioner From Custody are vacated, and Petitioner's HRPP Rule

40 petition is remanded for such a hearing.

Jon N. Ikenaga, Deputy
Public Defender, for

Petitioner/Defendant~ Qc Aplane—
Appellant.

Peter A. Hanano, Deputy Peete Cae arer

Prosecuting Attorney,

County of Haul, for OO

Respondent /Plaintiff-

Appellee. oor 6 att Oe
2