Case Title: Clermont Cty. ADAMH Bd. v. Hogan

Citation: 1997-Ohio-31

Docket Number: 19952561

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
CLERMONT COUNTY ADAMH BOARD ET AL., APPELLEES and CROSS-APPELLEES, V. 
HOGAN, DIR., ET AL., APPELLANTS; OHIO COALITION OF ADAMH/CMH BOARDS ET 
AL., APPELLEES and CROSS-APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Clermont Cty. ADAMH Bd. v. Hogan (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 358.] 
Public welfare — R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) establishes the total amount of state general 
revenue funds to the Department of Mental Health for allocation and 
distribution to the alcohol, drug, and mental health services boards 
according to the provisions of R.C. 5119.62(B)(1) and other relevant 
statutory provisions. 
R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) establishes the amount of state general revenue funds 
appropriated to the Department of Mental Health for funding state mental 
hospitals that the department must allocate and distribute to the alcohol, drug 
and mental health services boards pursuant to a formula devised by the 
department in its discretion according to R.C. 5119.62(B)(1) and other 
relevant statutory provisions. 
(No. 95-2561 — Submitted March 19, 1997 — Decided August 13, 1997.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clermont County, Nos. 
CA94-09-074, CA94-10-079, CA94-10-080 and CA94-10-082. 
 
Over fifty alcohol, drug abuse, and mental health services boards 
(“ADAMHS boards”) and community mental health boards (“CMH boards”) exist 
throughout Ohio.  They are statutorily charged with the responsibility of planning 
and providing mental health services and alcohol and drug addiction services to 
residents of the districts they serve.  R.C. 340.02, 340.021, 340.03, and 340.033. 
 
This action against the Ohio Department of Mental Health (“department”) and 
its Director was initiated by six county ADAMHS boards and two individuals who 
suffer from mental illness.  Plaintiffs alleged that the department had violated R.C. 
2 
5119.06, 5119.62(B)(1), and 5119.62(B)(2), and had violated the equal protection 
rights of the individual plaintiffs.  As is specifically relevant to this appeal, plaintiffs 
claimed that in fiscal year 1993 the department failed to allocate funds to the state's 
ADAMHS boards in the amounts required by R.C. 5119.62(B)(2), in that “the 
percentage amounts of state mental health hospital appropriations to be allocated by 
defendants to the ADAMHS boards for the development of community based 
services was to increase as follows:  20% in fiscal year 1991; 40% in fiscal year 
1992; 60% in fiscal year 1993; 80% in fiscal year 1994; and 100% in fiscal year 
1995 and thereafter.”  They further alleged that the department did not plan to 
allocate eighty percent of state hospital appropriations for fiscal year 1994 to the 
state's ADAMHS boards as required by R.C. 5119.62(B)(2).  The plaintiffs sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief, but did not seek recovery of funds representing 
monies allegedly due them in the past but not paid by the department. 
 
Subsequently two additional ADAMHS boards, one CMH board, and three 
additional severely mentally disabled or seriously emotionally disturbed individuals 
joined the action as plaintiffs, and ten other county boards of alcohol, drug abuse 
and mental health services or boards of community mental health,1 acting together 
as the Ohio Coalition of ADAMH/CMH Boards (“Ohio Coalition”), were granted 
leave to intervene as additional plaintiffs to present their interests, which they 
deemed to be different from those of the original plaintiff boards.  Ultimately, every 
ADAMHS board and CMH board in the state was joined as a party in the action, 
and given an opportunity to align itself with either the original plaintiff boards, the 
Ohio Coalition boards, the department, or yet another intervening group of 
ADAMHS/CMH boards, the Alliance for Stable Client Care.  In addition, the action 
was certified as a class action in which the class was defined as all residents of 
Brown and Clermont counties who are, or will in the future become, severely 
3 
mentally disabled or seriously emotionally disturbed, and entitled to services from 
agencies funded by an ADAMHS board. 
 
On May 2, 1994 the trial court severed the issues raised in the pleadings and 
proceeded to determine the issue presented in the plaintiffs’ first cause of action 
only, that being whether the department's actions and proposed actions in allocating 
state funds to the local ADAMHS and CMH boards of the state for fiscal years 1993 
and 1994 “violate[d] defendants' mandatory statutory obligations pursuant to Ohio 
Revised Code §5119.62(B)(2).”  The trial court thus deferred consideration of 
plaintiffs' allegation that the defendants had violated R.C. 5119.62(B)(1) in their 
allocation and distribution of funds to the state’s ADAMHS boards.  It further 
deferred consideration of the individual plaintiffs' constitutional claims. 
 
The plaintiffs supplemented their second amended complaint by adding an 
allegation that the department's allocation plan for fiscal year 1995 violated R.C. 
5119.62(B)(2) as had its plans for previous years. 
 
The trial court rendered a decision and entered a declaratory judgment that the 
department had not properly allocated the full amount of state general revenue funds 
required by R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) during the fiscal years in question.  The trial court 
issued a permanent injunction enjoining the department from implementing its fiscal 
year 1995 allocation plan.  It further certified that no just cause existed to delay 
appeal pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B) and stayed its order pending appeal. 
 
The court of appeals affirmed.  It noted that the plaintiffs' contentions of 
impropriety as to distribution of total state ADAMHS/CMH board funds among all 
fifty-three (now fifty-one) state ADAMHS/CMH boards pursuant to R.C. 
5119.62(B)(1) had not been adjudicated by the trial court, stating that “nothing in 
the trial court's order determines the issue of the legality of the allocation formula 
established by [the department] for FY 1994 or 1995.”  The court of appeals 
4 
remanded the cause for adjudication of the issues raised by the pleadings that had 
not yet been determined. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal and cross-appeal. 
___________________ 
 
John Woliver, for appellees and cross-appellees Clermont County ADAMH 
Board et al. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, and 
Simon B. Karas, Deputy Chief Counsel; Crabbe, Brown, Jones, Potts & Schmidt 
and Luis M. Alcalde, Special Counsel, for appellants Michael Hogan, Director, and 
the Department of Mental Health. 
 
Frank J. Wassermann, for appellees and cross-appellees individual plaintiffs. 
 
Martin, Browne, Hull & Harper, David A. Weaver and Regina Watson, for 
appellee and cross-appellant Alliance for Stable Client Care. 
 
Stege, Hickman & Lowder Co., L.P.A., Franklin J. Hickman and Janet L. 
Lowder, for appellee and cross-appellant Ohio Coalition of ADAMH/CMH Boards. 
 
Rittgers & Mengle and John Mengle, for appellee Warren/Clinton County and 
Brown County ADAMH Boards. 
 
Cutright & Cutright and James K. Cutright, for appellee Paint Valley 
ADAMH Board. 
 
Santen & Hughes and Robert S. Kaiser, for Homeless Hotline of Cincinnati. 
 
Herman S. Whitter and Linda K. Fiely, urging reversal for amicus curiae, 
Ohio Civil Service Employees Association, AFSCME Local 11, AFL-CIO. 
___________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  In its present posture this case presents the sole issue whether 
the trial court erred in declaring that the Director of Mental Health failed to comply 
5 
with the requirements of R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) during fiscal years 1993, 1994, and 
1995. 
 
R.C. 5119.62(B) provides in part: 
 
“(1) The director, in consultation with relevant constituencies as required by 
division (A)(11) of section 5119.06 of the Revised Code, shall establish a formula 
for allocating to boards of alcohol, drug addiction, and mental health services 
appropriations from the general revenue fund for the purpose of local management 
of mental health services as this purpose is identified in appropriations to the 
department of mental health in appropriation acts.  The formula shall include as a 
factor the number of severely mentally disabled persons residing in each alcohol, 
drug addiction, and mental health service district and may include other factors, 
including, but not limited to, the historical utilization of public hospitals by persons 
in each service district.  The appropriations shall be allocated to each board in 
accordance with the formula but shall be distributed only to those boards that elect 
the option provided under division (B)(3)(a) of this section. 
 
“(2) The director shall allocate each fiscal year to boards of alcohol, drug 
addiction, and mental health services for services to severely mentally disabled 
persons a percentage of the appropriations to the department from the general 
revenue fund for the purposes of hospital personal services, hospital maintenance, 
and hospital equipment as those purposes are identified in appropriations to the 
department in appropriation acts.  After excluding funds for providing services to 
persons committed to the department pursuant to section 2945.38, 2945.39, 2945.40, 
2945.401, 2945.402, or 5139.08 of the Revised Code, the percentage of those 
appropriations so allocated each year shall equal ten per cent in fiscal year 1990, 
twenty per cent in fiscal year 1991, forty per cent in fiscal year 1992, sixty per cent 
in fiscal year 1993, eighty per cent in fiscal year 1994, and one hundred per cent in 
6 
fiscal year 1995 and thereafter.  The amounts so allocated shall be transferred from 
the appropriations for the purposes of hospital personal services, hospital 
maintenance, and hospital equipment and credited to appropriations for the purpose 
of local management of mental health services.  Appropriations for the purpose of 
local management of mental health services may be used by the department and by 
the boards.” 
 
R.C. 5119.62(B) was enacted as part of the Mental Health Act of 1988 
(“MHA”), 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 800-802, and expressly refers to appropriations to 
the department for specific purposes “as those purposes are identified in 
appropriations to the department in appropriation acts.”  By its terms, the statute 
requires the Director to deduct amounts necessary for the department to provide 
forensic services and then transfer a percentage of the remaining funds “from the 
appropriations for the purposes of hospital personal services, hospital maintenance, 
and hospital equipment” by crediting the specified percentages to a category of 
appropriations identified as being “for the purpose of local management of mental 
health services.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Because this statute refers to appropriations for specific purposes as 
“identified in * * * appropriations acts,” it is appropriate to examine the 
appropriations acts actually in effect preceding adoption of the MHA in 1988. 
 
The appropriations act in effect for fiscal years 1985 and 1986 included 
specific hospital line items corresponding to the terminology used in R.C. 
5119.62(B)(2), i.e., line item 334-100, designated for state mental health hospital 
personal services; line item 334-200, designated for state mental health hospital 
maintenance; and line item 334-300, designated for state mental health hospital 
equipment.  141 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2949-2950.  Appropriations to the 
department to fund support services at the local level were contained in various 
7 
other separate line items, e.g., line items 335-502 (community mental health 
programs), 335-503 (community forensic services), and 335-508 (services for the 
severely mentally disabled). Id.  There was no line item designated “local 
management of mental health services.” 
 
The biennial appropriations act for fiscal years 1987 and 1988, that being the 
act in effect at the time the MHA was enacted, again included separate line items 
334-100, 334-200 and 334-300 designated for state hospital personal services, 
maintenance, and equipment, respectively.  In this appropriations act, however, a 
new line item, 335-408, “line item 408,”2 was added for the first time and bore the 
designation “local management of mental health services.”  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 171, 
142 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2482-2483.  The appropriations act explained the purpose 
of the new line item 408 as follows:  “The foregoing appropriation item 335-408, 
Local Management of Mental Health Services, shall be used by the Department of 
Mental Health for planning and preparation related to a restructuring of the state 
and community mental health systems.”  (Emphasis added.)  142 Ohio Laws at 
2484.  Significantly, it was this appropriations act, including specifically designated 
line items for state hospital “personal services,” state hospital “maintenance,” state 
hospital “equipment” and “local management of mental health services,” that was in 
place when the Mental Health Act of 1988, including R.C. 5119.62(B), was 
adopted. 
 
In view of the existence of appropriations line item designations that 
paralleled exactly the language used in the statute at the time of its enactment, we 
conclude that the meaning of R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) was plain at the time it was 
enacted.  R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) was a mandate to the Director to adjust the 
appropriations amounts that would be contained in future appropriations act line 
items 334-100, 334-200 and 334-300 by (1) deducting funds necessary for forensic 
8 
purposes from the total amount of state hospital funds included in those line items, 
(2) applying the appropriate percentages as specified in R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) for each 
year during the period 1990 to 1995 to the remainder of the state hospital 
appropriations included in those line items, and (3) transferring the resulting amount 
into appropriations identified as being for “local management of mental health 
services,” i.e., the new line item 408 appropriations.  That is, R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) 
was enacted to provide a mechanism to adjust and finally determine the total dollar 
amounts of four specifically identified appropriations act line items, all of which 
were used to provide services to severely mentally disabled people. 
 
The statute contemplated both the continuation of the three state hospital line 
items during the six-year phase-in period and retention by the department of a 
decreasing amount of those funds during that same period.  As funds remaining in 
the three state hospital line items would not be “allocate[d] each fiscal year to 
boards of alcohol, drug addiction, and mental health services for services to severely 
mentally disabled persons,” R.C. 5119.62(B)(2), those funds would not be subject to 
further allocation and distribution pursuant to R.C. 5119.62(B)(1) or subject to the 
planning authority of the state's ADAMHS/CMH boards which exists pursuant to 
R.C. 340.03. 
 
The statute further contemplated that, at the end of the phase-in period in 
1995, the total of the three hospital line item appropriations, excepting only a 
portion representing funds necessary to provide mental health services to forensic 
patients, would be deemed included in the “local management of mental health 
appropriations” line item, as one hundred percent of the three hospital line items 
(minus only funds for forensic services) would then be transferred to the latter 
appropriations line item.  “Spending” of the appropriations in that fund would then 
be accomplished in accordance with plans developed by ADAMHS/CMH boards 
9 
and approved by the department, as set forth in other sections of the MHA.  See, 
e.g., R.C. 5119.61, 5119.62(B)(1), 5119.62(B)(3), 5119.62(B)(4), and 5119.62(D). 
 
It is helpful to consider what R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) does not do.  It does not 
require the Director to allocate or distribute funds to individual boards, and does not 
provide a mechanism to divide the total amount of “local management of mental 
health services” funds between all the ADAMHS boards of the state.  It does not 
establish the amount of “local management of mental health services” 
appropriations any individual ADAMHS board should receive.  Although the final 
sentence of division (B)(2) provides that “[a]ppropriations for the purpose of local 
management of mental health services may be used by the department and by the 
boards,” division (B)(2) is silent as to the issue of determining how “usage” of those 
funds would be made by the department vis-a-vis the ADAMHS boards. 
 
In short, when it was adopted, R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) simply determined the total 
amount of general revenue funds to be included in the new appropriations act line 
item designated as being for “local management of mental health services.”  The 
methodology by which the funds contained in that line item were to be allocated and 
distributed to each of the state's ADAMHS/CMH boards was established by other 
statutory provisions of the Revised Code. 
 
However, beginning with the appropriations act for fiscal years 1989 and 
1990 the General Assembly changed its designations of appropriations for mental 
health purposes.  Thereafter, the appropriations acts failed to include line item 
appropriations specifically designated for state hospital personal services, 
maintenance, and equipment, and no line items equivalent to 334-100, 334-200 and 
334-300 were included.  See Am.Sub.H.B. No. 111, 143 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 
2755-2756; Am.Sub.H.B. No. 298, 144 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4616-4617; 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 152, 145 Ohio Laws, Part III, at 4487-4488.  Nor did subsequent 
10 
appropriations acts include a line item labeled as designated for purposes of “local 
management of mental health services.”  Id.  Instead, line item 408, which 
previously bore the title “local management of mental health services,” was 
redesignated as being for “state and community mental health services.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  The General Assembly explained the purpose of the new appropriations 
line item as being for “state mental health hospital personal services, maintenance, 
and equipment [analogous to prior line items 334-100, 334-200, and 334-300]; 
[and] state-operated community services; and community mental health board 
contracted services.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. 
 
Thus, the General Assembly determined that, for fiscal year 1989-1990, the 
previously separate line items designated for state mental health hospital personal 
services, maintenance, and equipment would be consolidated into the new single 
line item 408.  However, the General Assembly did not amend the language of R.C. 
5119.62 to reflect this consolidation.  Nor did the General Assembly indicate the 
proportion of the consolidated “state and community mental health services” funds, 
line item 408 funds, which were to be considered appropriations for the purpose of 
funding state mental hospitals, prior line items 334-100, 334-200, and 334-300.  Nor 
did the General Assembly advise whether new line item 408 should be deemed 
equivalent in its totality to the prior “local management of mental health services” 
line item, or whether, for purposes of applying R.C. 5119.62, only that portion of 
line item 408 representing appropriations for state-operated community services and 
community mental health board contracted services (which represent expenditures 
indeed local in nature) would be deemed equivalent to the prior “local management” 
line item. 
 
Because appropriations acts subsequent to that for fiscal years 1987-1988 no 
longer included separate line item appropriations specifically designated for state 
11 
hospital personal services, maintenance, and equipment, the Director technically 
could no longer implement the mandate of R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) to “transfer” amounts 
from appropriations specifically designated for those purposes.  Similarly, because 
subsequent appropriations acts no longer included line item appropriations 
designated for the purpose of funding “local management of mental health services” 
the Director could no longer “credit” appropriations from other line items to such a 
line item, as contemplated by the statute.  Accordingly, ambiguity was created as to 
the proportion of the consolidated line item 408 funds to be considered as being 
equivalent to the three prior hospital line items, and thus subject to the percentage 
multipliers set forth in R.C. 5119.62(B)(2). 
 
Thus, at the time the statute was adopted the phrases “appropriations for the 
purposes of hospital personal services, hospital maintenance, and hospital 
equipment” and “appropriations for the purpose of local management of mental 
health services” in R.C. 5119.62(B) had a particularized meaning, that being to 
identify specific appropriation act line items.  Removal of the line items specifically 
referred to in R.C. 5119.02(B)(2) from appropriations acts enacted subsequent to 
fiscal years 1989 and 1990 made literal implementation of R.C. 5119.02(B)(2) 
infeasible, creating ambiguity where none had previously existed.  Elimination of 
the previous line item designations also fostered uncertainty as to the meaning of the 
language of R.C. 5119.62 and created an environment in which the plaintiff boards 
could credibly argue that the language of that statute should be construed in a 
general, rather than particularized, sense. 
 
 The legislative history preceding enactment of the Mental Health Act of 1988 
clearly establishes, and the parties generally agree, that a primary goal of the Mental 
Health Act of 1988 was to eliminate the then-existent dual system of mental health 
care in which mentally ill people were cared for either in state hospitals or in the 
12 
community, but rarely received care which was coordinated between the two 
entities.  Thus, one goal of the MHA was to create an “integrated” mental health 
system in which services to mentally ill Ohioans would be unified and coordinated 
between state and local service providers.  The department acknowledges that the 
legislative intent of the MHA was to encourage the “deinstitutionalization” of 
Ohio's mentally ill patients by reducing average state psychiatric hospital patient 
populations and to develop new community-based (local) mental health programs. 
 
The MHA encouraged local mental health boards to assume a greater degree 
of financial and legal responsibility for managing the mental health needs of the 
individuals residing in its district by providing those boards with the opportunity to 
become primarily responsible for planning and delivering the most clinically 
appropriate and cost-effective services to severely mentally disabled persons 
resident in each locality.  Accordingly, as pointed out by appellees Clermont County 
ADAMH Board et al., local boards must “assume the responsibility of providing 
appropriate treatment to those committed to [their] care.”  See R.C. 5122.15(C)(4) 
and (D).  This goal of the MHA was frequently summarized during the legislative 
process as being the creation and implementation of policies whereby, as explained 
by a witness for the department, mental health services funds would “follow the 
patient” rather than the patient following the funds. 
 
As 
previously 
noted, 
R.C. 
5119.62(B)(1) 
governs 
allocation 
of 
“appropriations from the general revenue fund for the purpose of local management 
of mental health services as this purpose is identified in appropriations to the 
department of mental health in appropriations acts.” (Emphasis added.)  In view of 
this legislative history it would be absurd to believe that the General Assembly 
intended that no funds be transferred to ADAMHS/CMH boards pursuant to R.C. 
5119.62(B)(1) in that no line item appropriations designated “for the purpose of 
13 
local management of mental health services” existed subsequent to the 1989-1990 
appropriations act.  Similarly, it would be unreasonable to believe that the General 
Assembly intended to preclude the transfer of state hospital funds to 
ADAMHS/CMH boards when it deleted line items 100, 200 and 300, and changed 
the name of line item 408 from “local management of mental health services” to 
“state and community mental health services.” 
 
Rather, the legislative history of the MHA clearly indicates that it was the 
intent of the act that determination of where and how nonforensic mentally disabled 
patients would be treated was to be gradually shifted from the department to the 
state's ADAMHS/CMH boards over a six-year period in furtherance of the principle 
that mental health funds should “follow the patient” rather than “the patient follow 
the funds.”  At the end of that six-year period, state hospitals would be funded 
primarily as a result of payments made to the department by ADAMHS and CMH 
boards (although those payments would be made by way of accounting transfers 
rather than actual funds transfers).  See R.C. 5119.62(B)(3)(a), providing that “[t]he 
department shall retain and expend the funds projected to be utilized for state 
hospitals and other state-operated services.”  (Emphasis added.)  The trial court and 
the court of appeals correctly recognized that the intent underlying the MHA was 
that local ADAMHS/CMH boards, not the department, would determine the number 
of patients to be served by the state's mental hospitals. 
 
All parties and the courts below have assumed sub silentio that, during the 
six-year phase-in period beginning in 1989, the total amount of nonforensic funds 
contained in line item 408 was subject to application of the annual percentage 
reallocations contained in R.C. 5119.62(B)(2).  That assumption was not necessarily 
required by R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) during the six-year phase-in period.  Until the 
expiration of that period the statute contemplated the retention by the department of 
14 
a percentage of funds from the three separate hospital appropriations line items only. 
 During the phase-in period, however, the department would not have been entitled 
to retain any percentage of that component of the consolidated line item for “state 
and community mental health services” representing prior appropriations for “local 
management of mental health services.” 
 
Thus, both the department and the ADAMH boards agreed that during the 
phase-in period the entire amount of net line item 408 funds would be deemed 
subject to the percentage formulas set forth in R.C. 5119.62(B)(2).  We find this 
consensus interpretation to be consistent with the intent of the MHA.  Nevertheless, 
the six-year phase-in period has now expired, and the percentage reductions 
contained in R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) no longer serve a significant purpose.  R.C. 
5119.62(B)(2) currently serves the purpose of establishing that all net line item 408 
funds, minus only funds necessary for forensic purposes, are to be allocated and 
distributed to the state's ADAMH/CMH boards pursuant to R.C. 5119.62(B)(1) and 
other relevant statutory provisions. 
 
We conclude that, subsequent to the General Assembly's change of language 
in appropriations acts beginning with the 1989-1990 biennium, R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) 
establishes (1) that the department has the right to deduct an amount appropriate for 
use in funding forensic services from line item 408 (“state and community mental 
health services”), and (2) during the six-year phase-in period between 1990 and 
1995, the department could retain a decreasing percentage of the remaining line item 
408 funds pursuant to its sole discretion, irrespective of the plans submitted by the 
ADAMHS/CMH boards.  We hold that R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) establishes the amount 
of state general revenue funds appropriated to the Department of Mental Health for 
funding state mental hospitals that the department must allocate and distribute to the 
alcohol, drug and mental health services boards pursuant to a formula devised by the 
15 
department in its discretion according to R.C. 5119.62(B)(1) and other relevant 
statutory provisions, for purposes of providing services to severely mentally 
disabled persons. 
 
The parties remain in disagreement as to whether the department failed to 
properly “allocate” and “distribute” those net line item 408 funds.  That issue, 
however, cannot be resolved based on R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) alone.  It requires 
consideration of the Mental Health Act of 1988 as a whole. 
 
The trial court declared that “R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) requires the Department of 
Mental Health to allocate and make available for distribution 100% (80% for FY 
1994) of the non-forensic 408 monies to each ADAMHS Board consistent with a 
formula established under R.C. 5119.62(B)(1).”  The trial court's declaration was 
correct insofar as it recognized that R.C. 5119.62(B)(2) requires the Director to 
allocate and distribute one hundred percent of 1995 nonforensic line item 408 
monies pursuant to R.C. 5119.62(B)(1) and other relevant statutes.  However, R.C. 
5119.62(B)(2) is not relevant to determine what portions of the total nonforensic 
line item 408 monies must actually be distributed to each of the state's 
ADAMHS/CMH boards.  See R.C. 5119.62(B)(1) (“[t]he appropriations shall be 
allocated to each board in accordance with the formula but shall be distributed only 
to those boards that elect the option provided under division [B][3][a] of this 
section.”).  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The trial court further declared that “the amount distributed to each Board 
may be reduced only by the reasonable cost of the Board’s projected state hospital 
utilization and State Operated Services (SOS) utilization.”3  Because R.C. 
5119.62(B)(2) does not govern “distribution,” we do not agree that this conclusion 
is mandated by R.C. 5119.62(B)(2).  However, the interpretation of that statutory 
provision was the sole issue before the trial court subsequent to its bifurcation order. 
16 
 The trial court's conclusion that the state had failed to distribute the required full 
amount of funds to the state's collective ADAMHS/CMH boards may have been 
correct insofar as the state's allocation and distribution formulas implemented 
pursuant to the other portions of the statutory scheme resulted in usurpation of the 
ADAMHS/CMH boards’ discretionary authority as to how much of its allocated 
funds would be spent on state hospital inpatient costs.  However, the trial court erred 
in holding that such a determination could be made based on the language of R.C. 
5119.62(B)(2) in isolation. 
 
Because the department has consistently recognized its obligation to allocate 
and distribute the entire amount of nonforensic line item 408 appropriations 
according to other provisions of the Revised Code, including R.C. 5119.62(B)(1), 
we conclude that the trial court erred in declaring the department to have been in 
violation of R.C. 5119.62(B)(2).  We find moot that part of the trial court's order 
enjoining the department from implementing its allocation plan for fiscal year 1995. 
 
The cause is remanded to the trial court to determine those issues raised in the 
pleadings which have not yet been considered and which still present a case and 
controversy.  On remand, and to the extent that ambiguity exists in those divisions 
of R.C. 5119.62 not before this court in the present appeal, the trial court should 
endeavor to interpret those provisions to effectuate the intent of the General 
Assembly, avoid an unreasonable result, and achieve a just and reasonable outcome. 
 See State ex rel. Cooper v. Savord (1950), 153 Ohio St. 367, 41 O.O. 396, 92 
N.E.2d 390, paragraph one of the syllabus; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Kosydar (1975), 44 
Ohio St. 2d 208, 73 O.O. 2d 507, 339 N.E.2d 820, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 
and cause remanded. 
17 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS and COOK, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
ADAMHS boards were statutorily created in 1989 by the enactment of 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 317.  143 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4193-4194.  Prior to that time, 
mental health services were provided at the local level by community mental health 
boards.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 317 gave counties with a population over 250,000 the 
option of retaining the existing community mental health board and creating a 
separate new board for the purpose of planning and providing for alcohol and drug 
abuse services.  See R.C. 340.021. 
2. 
In subsequent appropriations acts this line item was identified as line item 
334-408 rather than 335-408.  In this opinion the term “line 408” is used to specify 
either line 334-408 or 335-408 as is applicable. 
3. 
“State operated services” refers to services provided by state employees at the 
local level rather than in state mental hospitals.  R.C. 5119.62(B)(3). 
 
 
COOK, J., concurring in judgment only.  Because the trial court’s bifurcation 
order prevents this court from determining whether the Director of Mental Health 
violated any statutory obligation other than that imposed by R.C. 5119.62(B)(2), 
the syllabus language suggesting a degree of “discretion” in the Director’s role 
under R.C. 5119.62(B)(1) is advisory.  While I express no opinion as to the 
accuracy of the majority’s limited interpretation of R.C. 5119.62(B)(1), I believe 
that the interpretation is an invalid exercise of our judicial authority.  Accordingly, 
I concur in judgment only. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.