Case Title: Fales v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95-52

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Fales v. State1995 WY 198908 P.2d 404Case Number: 95-52Decided: 12/08/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Lacey Ann FALES, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Sheridan County, John C. Brackley, J.

Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, State Public Defender; Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel; and Donna D. 
Hoffdahl, Assistant Appellate Counsel, for 
Appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Assistant Attorney 
General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director of the Prosecution Assistance Program; and 
Monica Heitzmann, Student Intern for the Prosecution Assistance Program, for 
Appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Lacey 
Fales appeals from the judgment and sentence which was entered after she was 
convicted of one count of accessory before the fact to burglary and one count of 
burglary.

[¶2]      We affirm as 
modified.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents several issues on appeal:

ISSUE 
I

Did the State fail to 
meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant shared 
the same criminal intent as the principals in the accessory before the fact 
charge or that the Appellant entered the Sheridan High School with the intent to 
commit larceny or a felony in the burglary charge? 

ISSUE 
II

Did the Appellant receive 
effective assistance of counsel?

ISSUE 
III

Was Appellant denied a 
fair trial due to the prosecutor's closing remarks?

ISSUE 
IV

Did the jury instructions 
on aiding and abetting fail to correctly state the law regarding shared intent 
to commit a felony and unduly emphasize one aspect of the 
evidence?

ISSUE 
V

Did the trial court 
improperly order restitution for damage done during the commission of a crime 
that Appellant never admitted to, was never charged with, nor convicted of 
committing?

FACTS

[¶4]      Appellant 
attended a party in Sheridan on April 6, 1994, at which alcohol was being 
served. Some of the guests discussed the possibility of breaking into the high 
school. Appellant added that she could recognize the money box which was kept at 
the high school concession stand. Appellant, three boys, and another girl left 
the party, walking toward the high school. One of the boys brought along a 
duffle bag, intending to use it to transport stolen items. As they were walking, 
one of the boys discovered a van which had its keys in it. Another boy stole the 
van, and, instead of going to the high school, he drove past the others and went 
to the junior high school. The others followed.

[¶5]      The three boys 
decided to break into the junior high school. The girls indicated that they did 
not want to go into the school, so one of the boys told them to keep watch while 
the boys were inside. The boys gained entry into the junior high school by 
breaking a window and entering through it. They engaged in various acts of 
vandalism while they were inside the school, causing extensive damage. The boys 
also stole a number of items and handed some of the stolen goods out through a 
window to the girls who were waiting below.

[¶6]      After the boys 
exited the junior high school, two of them began arguing about who would drive 
the van. At that point, the other girl and boy left. When the argument had been 
resolved, the two boys and Appellant proceeded in the van to the high school. 
The boys broke a window, and the three cohorts entered the high school. The boys 
vandalized the high school and stole various items. Appellant took some athletic 
jacket letters and a case of pop.

[¶7]      Appellant was 
arrested for her part in the crime spree. A jury convicted her of one count of 
accessory before the fact to burglary under WYO. STAT. §§ 6-3-301(a) (1985) and 
6-1-201 (1983) for the junior high school incident and of one count of burglary 
under § 6-3-301(a) for the high school incident. She perfected her appeal to 
this Court after the trial court passed sentence against 
her.

DISCUSSION

A. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence

[¶8]      Appellant 
contends that Appellee State of Wyoming did not present sufficient evidence for 
the jury to convict her of either the accessory-before-the-fact charge or the 
burglary charge. She asserts that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that she harbored the requisite intent for her to be found guilty of 
either crime.

[¶9]      Our standard for 
reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims is well established. This Court 
assesses whether all the evidence which was presented is adequate enough to form 
the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be 
drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State. Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo. 1995); Baier v. 
State, 891 P.2d 754, 761 (Wyo. 1995). We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our only duty is to determine 
whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, 
have come to the same result as the jury actually did. Id.

1.         
CONVICTION FOR ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT

[¶10]   Appellant claims that the State did 
not present sufficient evidence at her trial for the jury to convict her of 
accessory before the fact to burglary. She asserts that the evidence did not 
establish that she knowingly acted as a lookout for the boys while they 
burglarized the junior high school or that she knew what the boys were going to 
do while they were inside the building.

[¶11]  Section 6-1-201(a) 
provides:

(a) A person who 
knowingly aids or abets in the commission of a felony, or who counsels, 
encourages, hires, commands or procures a felony to be committed, is an 
accessory before the fact.

Section 6-3-301(a) 
provides:

(a) A person is guilty of 
burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied 
structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with 
intent to commit larceny or a felony therein.

Under Wyoming 
law, one who aids and abets another in the commission of a felony is as culpable 
as the principal is. Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 920-21 (Wyo. 
1984).

To convict a person of 
aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime, the prosecution must prove 
that "the crime in question was committed by someone and that the person charged 
as an aider and abettor associated himself with and participated in the 
accomplishment and success of the criminal venture."

Jones v. State, 
902 P.2d 686, 693 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Virgilio v. State, 834 P.2d 1125, 1127 
(Wyo. 1992)). In order to be convicted, the aider and abettor must share the 
principal's criminal intent, but the prosecution is not required to prove that 
the aider and abettor possessed the identical intent to that possessed by the 
principal. Jahnke, 692 P.2d  at 921. In Haight v. State, 654 P.2d 1232 (Wyo. 
1982), we upheld the defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting because the 
evidence which had been presented at the trial was sufficient for the jury to 
infer that the defendant knew what the principals were doing and that he had 
acted as a lookout for them. 654 P.2d  at 1238.

[¶12]   The evidence presented at the trial 
in this case showed that Appellant was aware of the plan to break into the high 
school. One of the boys testified that he wanted to break into the high school 
so that he could steal money to use in buying drugs. He was the boy who was 
carrying the duffle bag. Appellant contributed to the plan by telling the others 
that she could recognize the money box which was kept at the concession stand. 
Appellant was also aware that one boy had stolen a van on the way to the junior 
high school. From this evidence, the jury certainly could have inferred that 
Appellant knew that the boys possessed an intent to commit larceny when they 
entered the junior high school.

[¶13]   One of the boys stated that he had 
told Appellant and the other girl to act as lookouts while the boys were in the 
junior high school. The evidence also revealed that Appellant remained outside 
the building and responded to the boys' request for her to take some of the 
stolen goods when they handed them out through the window. The jury was 
justified in inferring that Appellant had acted as a lookout for the boys while 
they were burglarizing the junior high school. Sufficient evidence, therefore, 
supported Appellant's conviction for accessory before the fact to the boys' 
burglary of the junior high school.

2. CONVICTION FOR 
BURGLARY

[¶14]   Appellant also asserts that the 
State did not present sufficient evidence for the jury to convict her of 
burglary of the high school because it did not establish that she had the 
requisite intent to commit larceny when she entered the high school. "In order 
for a defendant to be found guilty of burglary, the State must prove that a 
person 1) entered a building without authority, 2) with the intent to commit 
larceny or a felony." Dreiman v. State, 825 P.2d 758, 760 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶15]   The evidence presented at the trial 
established that Appellant accompanied the boys to the high school in the van 
which she knew had been stolen. She was aware of the original plan to steal 
items from the high school, and she assisted in the formation of that plan by 
volunteering the information about the money box which was kept in the 
concession stand. Appellant also knew that the boys had stolen items from inside 
the junior high school. The evidence was, therefore, sufficient for the jury to 
infer that she intended to commit larceny upon entering the high 
school.

B. Effective 
Assistance of Counsel and Closing Argument

[¶16]   Appellant contends that she was 
deprived at her trial of her right to receive effective assistance of counsel. 
Specifically, she asserts that her trial counsel's performance was deficient 
because (1) he failed to present a timely motion to suppress the statements 
which Appellant had made to the police, (2) he failed to request that the jury 
be instructed on the lesser-included offense of criminal entry, and (3) he 
failed to object to the improper comments which the prosecutor had made in his 
closing argument.

[¶17]   The test which we employ to 
determine whether criminal defendants have been deprived of their right to have 
effective assistance of counsel is found in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Jones, 902 P.2d  at 
694.

"First, the defendant 
must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing 
that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, 
it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a 
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable."

Dickeson v. 
State, 843 P.2d 606, 609 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 
S.Ct. at 2064).

1. MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS

[¶18]   Appellant claims that her trial 
counsel was deficient because he did not present a timely motion to suppress the 
statements which she had made to the police. Appellant asserts that a motion to 
suppress was warranted because the times stated on the various police documents 
suggested that Appellant had been interrogated for approximately one hour before 
she was informed of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

[¶19]   Appellant relies on this Court's 
rulings in Dickeson, 843 P.2d 606, and LDO v. State, 858 P.2d 553 (Wyo. 1993), 
as being support for her contention that her counsel's performance was 
deficient. In both of those cases, this Court held that the defendants had been 
deprived of their rights to have effective assistance of counsel because their 
attorneys did not file motions to suppress certain evidence. Dickeson, 843 P.2d 
at 611-12; LDO, 858 P.2d  at 554; see also Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1266 
(Wyo. 1995).

[¶20]   Dickeson and LDO can be 
distinguished from this case. In Dickeson, this Court determined that the 
defendant's counsel should have filed a motion to suppress because he could have 
made a strong argument that an illegal search and seizure had occurred. 843 P.2d  
at 611. The Court went on to conclude that a reasonable probability existed 
that, if the evidence in question had been suppressed, the jury's verdict would 
have been different. 843 P.2d  at 612. In LDO, the counsel failed to interview 
his juvenile client before they appeared at an adjudicatory hearing, and, 
therefore, the counsel was ignorant of a very real ground for filing a pretrial 
motion to suppress the juvenile's confession. 858 P.2d  at 557. We held that the 
counsel's performance had been ineffective because he did not fully investigate 
the facts which would have revealed that the police official failed to give 
Miranda warnings. 858 P.2d  at 559.

[¶21]   In this case, the police report 
stated that Appellant had been interrogated at 3:30 p.m. on April 7, 1994, and 
the consent form indicated that she had not been informed of her Miranda rights 
until 4:25 p.m. on that day. Appellant's trial counsel did not move before trial 
to suppress her statements; instead, he presented a motion at the start of the 
trial to quash her statements. The trial court ruled that the motion to suppress 
was not timely under W.R.Cr.P. 12.

[¶22]   At the trial, the police officer 
explained that the discrepancy between the times in the documents occurred when 
he incorrectly converted military time to standard time. The police officer 
stated that Appellant was arrested at 4:15 p.m. and that, before he began 
interviewing her, he advised her of her Miranda rights and she consented to 
speak with him. Other evidence which was presented at the trial corroborated the 
officer's testimony.

[¶23]   With these facts in mind, we 
conclude that Appellant was not denied her right to be provided with effective 
assistance of counsel when her attorney failed to tender a timely motion to 
suppress. Even had her counsel presented the motion in a timely manner, the 
trial court would have been correct in denying the motion because the evidence 
revealed that Appellant had been properly advised of her Miranda rights before 
she was interrogated. Appellant cannot, therefore, show that she suffered any 
prejudice as a result of her attorney's conduct.

2. LESSER-INCLUDED 
OFFENSE INSTRUCTION

[¶24]   Appellant also argues that she did 
not receive effective assistance of counsel because her attorney failed to 
request that the trial court instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of 
criminal entry for the high school incident. Appellant maintains that a 
lesser-included instruction on the crime of criminal entry should have been 
given because the evidence as to her intent upon entering the high school was 
not clear.

[¶25]   The jury obviously found that 
Appellant harbored the requisite intent to commit a burglary because it 
convicted Appellant of the crime. Earlier in this opinion, we concluded that 
sufficient evidence sustained that verdict. The instructions which were given, 
when they are viewed in their totality, accurately described the legal 
principles which the jury was required to employ in reaching its verdict. Thus, 
we cannot conclude that Appellant's attorney was ineffective and that the result 
of the jury trial is unreliable. See Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 662-64 (Wyo. 
1993).

3. CLOSING 
ARGUMENT

[¶26]   Appellant insists that her 
counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to the comments 
which the prosecutor improperly made in his closing argument. In addressing this 
issue, we will also determine the validity of Appellant's contention that the 
prosecutor's closing argument deprived her of her right to have a fair 
trial.

[¶27]   We have recently summarized our 
standard for reviewing comments made by prosecutors during their closing 
arguments. Vargas-Rocha v. State, 891 P.2d 763, 771 (Wyo. 
1995).

The prosecutor may 
comment on the evidence, and he may make any reasonable inferences that follow 
from that evidence. He may not, however, inflame or mislead the jury. The trial 
court is in the best position to consider the appropriateness of the argument. 
Counsel are allowed wide latitude in the scope of their 
argument.

Taul v. State, 
862 P.2d 649, 659 (Wyo. 1993) (citations omitted).

In the course of our 
review, we consider the entire closing argument and do not take individual 
sentences or phrases out of context. We also consider the closing argument in 
the context of the entire trial record.

Smith v. State, 
880 P.2d 573, 574 (Wyo. 1994) (citations omitted).

[¶28]   The remarks which Appellant 
complains about occurred during the rebuttal portion of the prosecutor's closing 
argument. The prosecutor stated that he believed certain statements which 
Appellant had made to the police and which had been related to the jury during 
the trial. The prosecutor's statements were made in response to a closing 
argument statement made by the defense counsel in which he indicated that he 
believed a particular statement made by Appellant. Defense counsel did not 
object during the closing argument to the prosecutor's remarks. Instead, he 
waited until the jury began to deliberate, and then he moved for a mistrial. The 
trial court denied his motion. 

[¶29]   Appellant contends that her 
attorney should have objected to the prosecutor's comments because they 
improperly relayed the prosecutor's personal beliefs and opinions to the jury. 
She insists that her counsel's failure to object put her in the unenviable 
position of having to show plain error on appeal.

[¶30]   When the prosecutor's comments are 
taken out of context, they can arguably be seen as propounding the prosecutor's 
personal beliefs and opinions. We are always concerned about such comments 
because of the possibility that a jury may give undue weight to the prosecutor's 
personal beliefs. McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 754 (Wyo. 1993). After 
reviewing the prosecutor's comments as a whole and in the context of the entire 
trial, however, we conclude that they were proper because the prosecutor was 
simply emphasizing Appellant's statements and how they had been corroborated by 
the other evidence which had been presented at the trial. Additionally, we note 
that the defense counsel opened the door to this type of argument by making a 
similar statement in his closing argument. Fortner v. State, 835 P.2d 1155, 1158 
(Wyo. 1992). We conclude, therefore, that the prosecutor's comments were proper 
and that the defense counsel's performance was not 
deficient.

C. Aiding and 
Abetting Jury Instructions

[¶31]   Appellant asserts that the trial 
court erred when it gave its instructions to the jury on the law of aiding and 
abetting. She argues that the instructions were erroneous because (1) they 
improperly emphasized the evidence which showed that Appellant had acted as a 
lookout for the boys and (2) they failed to inform the jury that it had to find 
that Appellant shared the boys' criminal intent to commit a felony in order to 
convict her of aiding and abetting.

[¶32]   The trial court is required to 
present instructions to the jury on the law which is applicable to the issues 
which were actually raised by the evidence presented at the trial. Baier, 891 P.2d  at 756. The trial court is "given wide latitude in instructing the jury; 
and as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge to 
the jury adequately covers the issues, reversible error will not be found." 
Id.

"When we examine jury 
instructions, we must look at them in their entirety and read them together." 
Vigil, 859 P.2d  at 663. Before a conviction will be reversed due to an erroneous 
instruction, the defendant must demonstrate that prejudice has occurred. An 
error in one instruction may be cured elsewhere in the jury instructions by 
conveying correct information to the jury "`in a clear and concise manner so 
that it is unlikely that an erroneous impression would remain in the minds of 
the jurors.'" Vigil, 859 P.2d  at 663 (quoting United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 670 (6th Cir. 1977)).

Christian v. 
State, 883 P.2d 376, 379 (Wyo. 1994) (citation omitted).

[¶33]   Appellant objected at the jury 
instruction conference to Instruction No. 11, but the trial court overruled her 
objection and gave the instruction to the jury. Instruction No. 11 
stated:

INSTRUCTION NO. 
11

One who knowingly stands 
guard or keeps watch while a crime is being perpetrated, in order to facilitate 
the escape of the person actually committing the crime, is aiding and abetting 
in the commission of that crime.

[¶34]   In the first section of this 
opinion, we stated that Appellant's conviction for aiding and abetting would 
stand as long as the State proved that a crime had been committed and that 
Appellant had associated herself with and participated in the accomplishment and 
success of the criminal venture. This statement of the law was accurately 
related to the jury through the various instructions which were given to 
it.

INSTRUCTION [NO.] 
7

To be an accessory before 
the fact, a person must intend that his acts or words secure the commission of 
the felony. Merely assenting to or assisting in the commission of the felony 
without knowledge that a crime is going to be committed or that the defendant's 
actions are going to aid in the commission of the felony, is not criminal. 

INSTRUCTION [NO.] 
8

In order to find the 
defendant guilty of being an accessory before the fact to a felony the 
commission of which requires a specific intent, it must be proven by the state 
and found both that:

1.         The 
defendant had the intent necessary for an accessory before the fact; 
and

2.         The 
principal in the crime had the specific intent necessary for the commission of 
the crime.

INSTRUCTION NO. 
8A

To constitute the crime 
charged there must be a union of two essential elements, an act forbidden by law 
and a specific intent.

Specific intent means 
more than the general intent to commit the act. To prove a crime which involves 
specific intent, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt:

(1) That the Defendant 
did the act charged; and

(2) That he did it with 
the specific intent described in the crime charged. The specific intent must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt as any other fact in the 
case.

INSTRUCTION NO. 
9

Pertinent portions of the 
Wyoming Statutes provide as follows:

A person who knowingly 
aids or abets in the commission of a felony, or who counsels, encourages, hires, 
commands or procures a felony to be committed, is an accessory before the 
fact.

An accessory before the 
fact:

(i) May be indicted, 
informed against, tried and convicted as if he were a 
principal;

(ii) May be indicted, 
informed against, tried and convicted either before or after an[d] whether or 
not the principal offender is indicted, informed against, tried or 
convicted.

INSTRUCTION NO. 
10

A person aids and abets 
the commission of a crime if he knowingly and with criminal intent aids, 
promotes, encourages, or instigates the commission by act or 
advice.

[¶35]   Taken as a whole, the jury 
instructions advised the jury that Appellant could be convicted of aiding and 
abetting only if the jury found that she had acted knowingly and with a criminal 
intent. The trial court instructed the jury that, in order to convict Appellant, 
it must find that Appellant intended for her actions to secure the commission of 
the felony. Appellant obviously could not have formed such an intent if she did 
not know what the boys planned to do while they were inside the 
school.

[¶36]   When Instruction No. 11 is read 
together with the other instructions, it does not unduly emphasize the evidence 
which had shown that Appellant acted as a lookout. The trial court properly 
tailored the legal instructions to the evidence which had actually been 
presented at the trial.

D. 
Restitution

[¶37]   Appellant claims that the trial 
court improperly ordered her to pay restitution for the damage done to the van 
when she did not admit to, was not charged with, and was not convicted of any 
crime which was associated with the van.

[¶38]   As a part of her sentence, the 
trial court ordered Appellant to pay $35,367.82 in restitution for the damage 
which occurred during the crime spree. A significant portion of the restitution 
amount - $11,532.04 - represented damages sustained by the stolen van. Appellant 
was not charged with any crime linked to the van, nor did she admit to having 
anything to do with its theft or its destruction.

[¶39]   Criminal defendants may be ordered 
to pay restitution for the damage caused by their crimes under the provisions of 
WYO. STAT. § 7-9-103(a) (1991). Section 7-9-103(a) provides in pertinent 
part:

If restitution is 
ordered, or at the time the defendant is placed on probation, the court shall 
fix a reasonable amount as restitution owed to each victim for actual pecuniary 
damage resulting from the defendant's criminal activity, and shall include its 
determination of the pecuniary damage as a special finding in the judgment of 
conviction. . . .

Appellant 
contends that the damage to the van was not "actual pecuniary damage resulting 
from [her] criminal activity." Criminal activity is defined by WYO. STAT. § 
7-9-101(a)(i) (1991) as being:

(i) "Criminal activity" 
means any crime for which there is a plea of guilty, nolo contendere or verdict 
of guilty upon which a judgment of conviction may be rendered and includes any 
other crime which is admitted by the defendant, whether or not 
prosecuted.

[¶40]  In Dreiman, this Court stated that, in 
order for a criminal defendant to be properly ordered to pay restitution for 
damages, the damages must have been due to the defendant's criminal activity. 
825 P.2d  at 764. We do not believe that a sufficient relationship existed in 
this case between Appellant's crimes and the damage to the stolen van to make 
her accountable for that portion of the restitution amount. The only contact 
which Appellant had with the van was to ride in it. The State did not present 
any evidence which suggested that Appellant had any part in stealing or damaging 
the van. The damage to the van did not, therefore, result from Appellant's 
criminal activity. The portion of the judgment and sentence which required 
Appellant to pay restitution for the damage to the van must be 
vacated.

CONCLUSION

[¶41]   In summary, we hold that sufficient 
evidence supported Appellant's convictions, that Appellant received effective 
assistance of counsel, that the prosecutor's remarks were proper, and that the 
trial court did not err in instructing the jury. We hold, however, that the 
portion of the judgment and sentence which required Appellant to pay restitution 
for the damage to the van was improper and is vacated.

[¶42]   Affirmed as 
modified.