Case Title: In re Child of Christine M.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018 ME 133

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 133  
Docket: 
Sag-18-121 
Submitted 
On Briefs: September 26, 2018 
Decided: 
October 4, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF CHRISTINE M. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Christine M. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (West 
Bath, Mathews, J.) terminating her parental rights to her child.1  She argues that 
the record fails to support the court’s findings that she is an unfit parent and 
that termination is in the best interest of the child.  She also asserts that the 
Department of Health and Human Services failed to make reasonable efforts to 
reunify the family.  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  In March of 2017, just ten days after this child—the mother’s 
fourth2—was born, the Department filed a child protection petition and a 
request for a preliminary protection order, alleging that the mother had a 
                                         
1  The child’s biological father is, at this time, unknown.   
2  The mother has three older children; she agreed to orders giving custody of two children to their 
respective fathers and consented to a termination of parental rights regarding the other child.  
 
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history of substance abuse and mental health issues, and that she failed to 
access adequate prenatal care.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4032, 4034(1) (2017).  The 
District Court (Dobson, J.) entered a preliminary protection order, placing the 
child in the Department’s custody.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4034(2) (2017).  The mother 
waived her right to a summary preliminary hearing.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4034(3), (4) (2017).   
[¶3]  In June of 2017, the District Court entered a jeopardy order with the 
mother’s agreement, finding jeopardy to the child based on her history of 
substance abuse and mental illness, her failure to seek adequate prenatal care, 
and her past history with the Department.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4035, 4036(1) 
(2017).  In November of 2017, the Department filed a petition for termination 
of parental rights, alleging that the mother stopped attending her mental health 
counseling, failed to participate in drug testing, and stopped visiting with her 
child—requirements of the dispositional agreement in the jeopardy order.  See 
22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2017).  After a testimonial hearing, the court (Mathews, J.), by 
order entered March 12, made the following findings of fact, which are 
supported by competent record evidence.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4054 (2017).    
1. [The mother] ceased all counseling in July of 2017 and 
thereafter failed to involve herself in any counseling for the 
issues identified in the Jeopardy Order.    
 
 
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. . . .  
 
2.  [The mother] last visited [the child] on August 3, 2017.  She has 
not seen this soon to be one-year old child for seven months.   
 
3. [The mother] has missed all her drug screen tests since the 
Jeopardy Order was entered.    
 
 
. . . .  
 
4. [The mother] has failed to engage with the Department in 
accomplishing any of the goals of reunification since the 
Jeopardy Order was entered.   
 
5. [The mother] explains her lack of visitation and the failure to 
attend counseling as a failure of the Department to provide 
transportation.  The Court does not find her explanation 
believable. 
 
6. [The mother] explains her failure to take the drug screen tests 
as the Department’s scheduling the dates when she had her 
other children in care.  The Court does not find her explanation 
believable. 
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
. . . The child was placed with the foster care parents when he 
was ten days old.  As a result, little bonding between mother and 
child has occurred.  Mother was provided a telephone number by 
the foster care mother and encouraged to call and arrange 
visitation.  She has not contacted the foster care mother in the last 
seven months.  Mother has failed completely to engage with the 
Department and perform any of the required acts anticipated by 
the Jeopardy Order and Reunification Plan.  She is not at this time 
in any different position [than] at the time of the June 2017 
Jeopardy Order. 
 
 
. . . .  
 
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. . . [The child] needs a permanent home and waiting for [the 
mother] to address her issues and create a bonded relationship 
after she has failed to do anything in the last seven months is not in 
his best interest.  
 
 
 
[¶4]  Based on these findings, the court determined that the mother is 
unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy within a time that is 
reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, that she is unwilling or unable 
to take responsibility for the child within a time that is reasonably calculated to 
meet the child’s needs, and that she failed to make a good faith effort to 
rehabilitate and reunify with the child.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), 
(iv) (2017).  The court also concluded that termination of the mother’s parental 
rights was in the child’s best interest and thus terminated the mother’s parental 
rights.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1) (2017).  The mother timely appealed.  See 
22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2017); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶5]  The mother argues on appeal that the record fails to support the 
court’s findings that she is an unfit parent and that termination of her parental 
rights is in the child’s best interest.  She also asserts that the Department failed 
to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family.   
 
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[¶6]  To terminate parental rights, a trial court must first find one of the 
four statutory bases of parental unfitness in 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b), and 
then it must consider the best interest of the child.  In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, 
¶¶ 19-21, 775 A.2d 1144.  We have said that “[w]here the court finds multiple 
bases for unfitness, we will affirm if any one of the alternative bases is 
supported by clear and convincing evidence.”  In re M.B., 2013 ME 46, ¶ 37, 
65 A.3d 1260.  Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence from which the 
court “could reasonably have been persuaded that the required factual findings 
were proved to be highly probable.”  In re David G., 659 A.2d 859, 861 
(Me. 1995) (quotation marks omitted).  We review the court’s factual findings 
of parental unfitness and of a child’s best interest for clear error while 
reviewing its ultimate conclusion on best interest for an abuse of discretion.  
In re Mathew H., 2017 ME 151, ¶ 2, 167 A.3d 561.  
 
[¶7]  The District Court’s factual findings—that the mother stopped drug 
screenings, mental health counseling, and visits to her child—are supported by 
competent evidence in the record.  See In re David G., 659 A.2d at 861 (“If there 
is rational or competent support in the record for the trial court’s findings, this 
Court must sustain them.”).  We further conclude that the court did not abuse 
its discretion in finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in 
 
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the child’s best interest.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a); In re Mathew H., 
2017 ME 151, ¶ 2, 167 A.3d 561.  Finally, the record supports the court’s finding 
that the Department made a good faith effort to reunify the mother and child 
and that the mother repeatedly failed to follow the reunification plan.  See In re 
Sara K., 611 A.2d 71, 75 (Me. 1992) (explaining that although the Department 
and the parent have a shared responsibility to make good faith efforts to reunify 
the family, “the Department is not charged with the duty of persisting in efforts 
that can only be destined for failure”).    
[¶8]  Because competent evidence exists to support the court’s finding of 
parental unfitness and the finding that termination of parental rights is in the 
child’s best interest, and because the court did not abuse its discretion in its 
best-interest determination, we affirm the judgment terminating the mother’s 
parental rights.  
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jennifer A. Davis, Esq., Law Office of Jennifer A. Davis, Topsham, for appellant 
Mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
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West Bath District Court docket number PC-2017-3 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY