Case Title: Loeffler v. Roe

Citation: 69 So. 2d 331

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1953-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
69 So. 2d 331 (1953)
LOEFFLER et al.
v.
ROE et al.

Supreme Court of Florida. Division B.
December 11, 1953.
Rehearing Denied January 27, 1954.
*332 Ralph Richards, Clearwater, for appellants.
Casler, Douglas & McManus, Clearwater, for appellees.
DREW, Justice.
On October 9, 1952, appellants, O.C. Loeffler and Miralda Loeffler, his wife, hereafter referred to as the vendors, entered into a written agreement with appellees, hereafter referred to as the purchasers, for the sale of a tourist court in the City of Clearwater. The purchase price of the property was $75,000, of which $5,000 was paid when the contract was signed. The balance of the purchase price was to be paid as provided in the contract.
The contract contained a provision whereby the vendors agreed to convey said lands "by good and sufficient warranty deed containing full covenants of warranty of a fee simple marketable title" to the realty "free and clear of all encumbrances whatever." The contract further provided:
Vendors promptly delivered an abstract of title to the purchasers, who, in the interval had employed a surveyor and had the lands surveyed. On October 24th the purchasers advised the vendors and their attorney by letter that they had elected to cancel the contract because the survey of the premises revealed that the buildings on the land described in the contract extended beyond the lot lines. On October 30th the *333 vendors, through their attorneys, wrote the purchasers and their attorneys as follows:
On November 17th a further communication was directed to the purchasers and their attorney by the vendors. This letter is as follows:
Purchasers promptly rejected the proposition contained in the November 17th letter, insisting that they had contracted to purchase an unencumbered title from the vendors and that they would accept nothing short of that.
On November 19th the purchasers instituted this suit to cancel the contract and to secure the return of the $5,000 initial payment on the contract and to have the provision of the contract relating to attorneys' fees construed to apply as well to the purchasers as to the vendors and for an award of reasonable fees for the services of their solicitor in the action. From a decree in favor of the purchasers  except as to attorneys' fees  this appeal has been prosecuted.
The various contentions of the parties are readily ascertainable from an examination of the two letters which we have heretofore quoted. With the exception of the question relating to attorneys' fees on which no appeal was taken, the nub of the law suit and the real question presented here and to the lower court for determination was and is whether, under the terms of the contract the encroachment of the building or parts thereof on the public ways renders the title unmarketable.
Except insofar as it may affect the general equities of the cause we attach no significance to the offer of the vendors to furnish the title insurance. They (the vendors) elected to proceed under the provisions of the contract whereby they agreed to furnish an abstract of title. Under the language employed in the contract both they and the purchasers were then bound by its provisions with respect to an abstract of title rather than title insurance. In other words, having elected to proceed to close the sale on an abstract of title the contract must be construed in the same manner as if title insurance had never been mentioned or referred to therein.
The lower court personally heard the evidence in the cause and personally inspected the buildings. He found from the evidence that the buildings did not encroach on the adjoining private lands. As to the encroachments on the pubic ways at the front and rear of the property he found:
The evidence of various city officials was introduced by both parties concerning similar encroachments of buildings over the public ways in Clearwater and the attitude of the city officials concerning the same. There was no substantial conflict in this evidence and from it the lower court found:
From these facts the Court concluded:
The courts have never been able to establish or agree upon any fixed rule in determining whether encroachments are of such a character as to justify a purchaser in refusing to complete a contract of purchase. This is so because of different facts which necessarily exist in every case. It is so because the situation presented where the encroachment was over a public way is different from that where it is over private property. Still another would be present where the encroachment was on the property being sold. On the subject of encroachment generally it is said in 55 Am. Jur. 706-707, par. 252:
*338 The legal maxim "de minimis non curat lex," simply means that the law does not care for small things. If the encroachments in this case are "small things" within the meaning of that maxim, then it might justly be said that the rejection of the title because of the encroachments was an excuse and not a reason. Threaded throughout the decisions on the subject and in the treatises on the question, is some variation of the above maxim. Some courts have held that an encroachment renders the title unmarketable if it is of "any consequence" or is of "a substantial nature."
An encroachment may be of consequence or of a substantial nature if it is on private property and not if it is on or over public property. So much depends on the policy, laws and customs of the public body having jurisdiction of the public places that the courts have very tersely said that each case must be decided on the facts present in that case.
As to encroachments on public ways we quote from 55 Am.Jur. 708-709, par. 255:
See also the extensive Annotation in Note (1928) 57 A.L.R. 1253, 1451.
In the case of Scheinman v. Bloch, 97 N.J.L. 404, 117 A. 389, 390, affirmed 98 N.J.L. 571, 119 A. 926, the New Jersey Court held:
In the case of Waterman v. Taub, 127 A. 676, 3 N.J. Misc. 216, affirmed 102 N.J.L. 472, 131 A. 924, the New Jersey Court held *339 that a wall along a public sidewalk deviating one-half inch from a direct course and a special encroachment of one to nine inches was not such a substantial encroachment as to authorize a cancellation of a contract to purchase. Again, in Harrington Co. v. Kadrey, 105 N.J. Eq. 389, 148 A. 3, the New Jersey Court made the same holding as to overhanging cornices, decorative pilasters, etc., observing, in reaching the conclusion, that they were all susceptible of removal at slight expense.
The New York Court in Empire Realty Corp. v. Sayre, 107 App.Div. 415, 95 N.Y.S. 371, 373, made the following pertinent observations in disposing of a somewhat similar case in favor of the vendor:
There are many other cases along the same general line digested and discussed in the Annotation above referred to. Out of all these cases and the text authorities seem to come the principle that  so far as encroachments of buildings over public ways are concerned  the encroachment must be of such a substantial nature as to interfere with the normal use of the public way on or over which it encroaches and in addition thereto there must be a strong likelihood that the vendee would be subjected to litigation concerning it or be required to move it. In other words, the facts must reveal a case outside the rule "de minimis non curat lex." Do the facts in this case show that?
We do not put ourselves in the place of the eminent Chancellor who tried this case, nor do we propose to substitute our views of the facts for his. On the other hand, it is our plain duty to set aside his judgment if we conceive that the facts as determined by him fail to support the legal conclusion he reached in construing the facts. When the lower court found the encroachments did exist and then concluded that the purchaser "is not required to take title to land unless all the buildings are on or above the land" (being purchased) "and that any projection of a building * * * prevents a title from being marketable" he reached a conclusion contrary to the well established principles of law which we have discussed and he failed to give effect to the maxim to which we have referred several times.
We are fully aware that the public places of a municipality are held in trust by the authorities for the benefit of the people, but this principle does not prevent the vacation of the streets or portions thereof when done in the interest of the general welfare. The fact that, when abandoned, the title to the street or public place or portions thereof reverts to the adjacent owner is of no consequence if the power to vacate is present and if such power is lawfully exercised. Henry L. Doherty & Co., Inc., v. Joachim, 146 Fla. 50, 200 So. 238. Moreover, the evidence in this case establishes the fact that for many years the custom had been to permit such overhangs over the streets. The lower court so found when it held that "Even though customs of the city *340 in which the property is located permit encroachments and overhangs," etc. It must be assumed from such finding that the general welfare of the city is being served by allowing such inconsequential encroachments to continue to exist. The fact that the subject building was built only recently, evidently pursuant to building permits therefor and under appropriate supervision, places some degree of responsibility on the city officials  especially where, as here, the extent of the encroachment is of an inconsequential nature and not of a character to interfere in any manner whatever with the normal use of the sidewalk or the alley. We make no pretense of prejudging the matter, but it is a fundamental principle of equity that courts will not require the performance of an act where the harm to the person coerced is wholly disproportionate to the benefit to the other party. Johnson v. Killian, 157 Fla. 754, 27 So. 2d 345. It should also be remembered that estoppel can be pleaded against the sovereign as well as against individuals. Only recently we held that where the State levied taxes on public lands, sold the certificates thereon and conveyed, through its agents, title thereto, the State became estopped to deny the validity of the tax and a deed thereafter executed pursuant to the tax. Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Bass, Fla., 67 So. 2d 433.
A careful study of the testimony, exhibits and pleadings in the lower court convinces us that the encroachments in this case, considered in the light of the plain and long standing policy of the city with reference to similar encroachments, are not of such magnitude as to render the title unmarketable. We hold them to be inconsequential and, under the facts before us, within the rule "de minimis non curat lex."
The decree of the lower court is reversed with directions that the lower court proceed further in a manner not inconsistent with the views herein expressed.
ROBERTS, C.J., and THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.