Case Title: DOUGLAS PETER SZYMANSKI V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
DOUGLAS PETER SZYMANSKI V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 139166 P.3d 879Case Number: 06-106Decided: 08/29/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
DOUGLAS 
PETER SZYMANSKI,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

D. Terry 
Rogers, Interim State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel; Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Public Defender.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Daniel M. Fetsco, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Armitage.                       

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  A jury convicted Douglas Peter Szymanski 
of one count of first degree arson for intentionally setting fire to his 
neighbor's apartment.  Mr. Szymanski 
appeals his conviction claiming the trial court erred in allowing the State's 
fire expert to testify concerning hearsay statements made to him by a deceased 
witness during his investigation of the fire's cause.  He also claims the prosecutor committed 
misconduct during witness questioning and closing argument.  We affirm. 

            
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Szymanski 
presents the issues as follows:

 
 
I.          
Was hearsay testimony of a deceased witness improperly admitted, and then 
argued for the truth of the matter asserted?

 
 
II.         
Did prosecutorial misconduct occur in questioning of witnesses and in 
closing argument?

 
 
The 
State reframes the issues as:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted the pretrial 
statements of the victim?

 
 
II.         
Did the prosecution commit misconduct?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  At approximately 8:30 p.m. on April 1, 
2005, Tammy Johnson, a tenant in an apartment complex owned by the Casper 
Housing Authority located at 243 
East K Street in Casper, Wyoming, was returning home.  As she approached her apartment, she 
noticed Mr. Szymanski, who also lived in the apartment complex and with whom she 
had an "on again-off again" relationship, coming toward her.  He was acting strangely and was wearing 
the type of latex gloves worn by volunteer firefighters.    

 
 
[¶4]  As Mr. Szymanski approached Ms. Johnson, 
he said, "Guess what?  Electricity 
is out.  Ha ha ha."  She asked what was going on and he did 
not respond.  Ms. Johnson entered 
her apartment, walked toward the kitchen window and saw that the apartment next 
to hers, in which Sharon Jones lived, was on fire.  Ms. Johnson attempted to call 911 but 
discovered her phone was not working.  
She ran to the apartment of another tenant who called 911.  

 
 
[¶5]  Worried about the fire reaching her own 
apartment, Ms. Johnson went back to try to retrieve some of her 
possessions.  Mr. Szymanski followed 
her into her apartment.  He told her 
she needed to get out and grabbed her arm.  
He became angry and hit her with the gloves he had been wearing.  He said, "I'm just going to burn 
you.  You're going to die, you 
f---ing, ----."  He left and she 
heard a rapping noise on her bedroom window.  She heard Mr. Szymanski outside the 
window saying, "Bitch, come on, bitch, you're going to die."    

 
 
[¶6] At 
approximately 8:40 p.m., the CasperPublicSafetyCommunicationsCenter / 911 received the report of the 
fire.  Police officers and 
firefighters responded.  When they 
arrived at the scene, they determined that the fire was located in unit 241 of 
the apartment complex.  They 
observed Mr. Szymanski outside the burning apartment.  He appeared anxious to enter the 
apartment and had to be asked twice to move out of the way.  One of the firefighters noticed Mr. 
Szymanski had a hammer sticking out of the back of his pants. 

 
 
[¶7]  As firefighters worked to extinguish the 
fire, Ms. Johnson reported Mr. Szymanski's behavior to police at the scene.  When the police spoke with him, he 
appeared to be intoxicated.  They 
asked him to return to his apartment and he refused, becoming increasingly 
belligerent and uncooperative.  
Consequently, police arrested him for public intoxication.  A struggle ensued and the officers had 
to use physical force in order to handcuff him and get him into the patrol 
car.  

 
 
[¶8] At 
the detention center, one of the officers removed a hammer from the back of Mr. 
Szymanski's pants and a jar of onion powder from the front of his pants.  Mr. Szymanski had soot marks on his face 
and his clothes smelled of smoke.  
Small shards of glass were found on the hammer and Mr. Szymanski's 
clothes and shoes. 

 
 
[¶9]  Fire Inspector Mike Magee and 
Police Detective Brian 
Street were called to investigate the cause and 
origin of the fire.  They found a 
disposable lighter in the parking lot of the apartment complex next to Mr. 
Szymanski's car which Ms. Johnson identified as one she had seen him use to 
light his cigarettes.  They also 
found a steak knife inside the doorjamb of the burned apartment which witnesses 
identified as identical to knives found in Mr. Szymanski's apartment.  They concluded someone had broken the 
electrical meter outside the apartment, forcibly entered and ransacked Ms. 
Jones' apartment, leaving piles of clothing, bags, spice containers, food boxes 
and other combustible items strewn about on the floor and breaking several 
windows and a bathroom mirror, and then intentionally set fire to the piles of 
debris dumped in the kitchen.       

 
 
[¶10]  Mr. Szymanski was charged with first 
degree arson in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a) and (b) (LexisNexis 
2007).  After a six day trial, the 
jury found him guilty.  The district 
court sentenced him to 16 to 20 years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
1.         
Hearsay Testimony of Deceased Witness

 
 
[¶11]  Prior to trial, Ms. Jones, the tenant of 
the apartment in which the fire was set, died of causes unrelated to the 
fire.  During trial, the prosecution 
sought to present testimony from Inspector Magee concerning his interview of Ms. 
Jones on the night of the fire.  The 
purpose of the interview was to determine the condition of her apartment prior 
to the fire.  Ms. Jones' statements 
were important to the investigation because of the unusual amount of combustible 
material found piled on the floor throughout her apartment.  During the interview, Ms. Jones told 
Inspector Magee that her apartment was clean and orderly and locked and secure 
when she left it before the fire.  
She also told him the bathroom mirror "should not have been broken."   

 
 
[¶12]  Defense counsel objected to the 
testimony on the grounds that it constituted hearsay and violated Mr. 
Szymanski's constitutional right to confront the witness against him, Ms. 
Jones.  The district court allowed 
the testimony, concluding it fell within an exception to the hearsay rule, was 
not testimonial and did not violate the confrontation clause.  After the State presented the disputed 
testimony, defense counsel requested and the district court gave an instruction 
telling the jury the testimony was not admitted for the truth of the matters 
asserted (i.e. to prove Ms. Jones' apartment was clean when she left it) but 
only for the purpose of showing what Inspector Magee did in the course of 
investigating the fire.         

 
 
[¶13]  Mr. Szymanski claims the trial court 
erred in allowing Inspector Magee to testify concerning Ms. Jones' statements 
because admission of the testimony violated his right to confront the witnesses 
against him guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  Mr. Szymanski relies primarily on Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004) to support his claim.   

 
 
[¶14]  The State responds that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by allowing the testimony.  It argues the trial court correctly 
distinguished the statements at issue here from those in Crawford, which involved statements of 
the defendant's wife implicating him in the charged offense.  The State further asserts, even if the 
trial court incorrectly admitted the statements, the error was harmless because 
Ms. Jones did not identify Mr. Szymanski as the arsonist.

 
 
[¶15]  We review claimed error concerning the 
improper admission of evidence for abuse of discretion and will not reverse the 
trial court's decision absent a clear abuse.  Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d 1202, 1206-07 (Wyo. 2007).  A 
trial court abuses its discretion when it could not have reasonably concluded as 
it did.  Id.  In this context, "reasonably" means 
sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without being arbitrary or capricious.  
Id.  Because the claimed error involves a 
mixed question of fact and constitutional law, we independently review the 
record.  Vigil v. State, 2004 WY 110, ¶ 17, 98 P.3d 172, 177 (Wyo. 2004). 

 
 
[¶16]  The Sixth Amendment protects the right 
of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.  In Crawford, the United States Supreme 
Court held that this provision bars the admission of testimonial statements made 
by a witness who does not appear at trial unless he or she is unavailable to 
testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness.  The Court identified 
various types of statements qualifying as "testimonial," including affidavits, 
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to 
cross-examine or similar pretrial statements that a witness would reasonably 
expect to be used at a later trial.  
Crawford, 541 U.S.  at 51-52.  The Court specifically mentioned police 
interrogations, using the term in its colloquial rather than technical sense, 
and said such interrogations are testimonial even under a narrow standard.  The Court concluded the statements at 
issue in Crawford, i.e. tape-recorded 
statements of the defendant's wife made by police during an interrogation on the 
night of the offense, qualified as testimonial "under any conceivable 
definition" because they were "knowingly given in response to structured police 
questioning."  Id. at 53.  The court held that admission of the 
statements, when the wife was not available to testify at trial and the defense 
had no prior opportunity to cross-examine her, violated the defendant's 
confrontation rights.  

 
 
[¶17]  Following Crawford, this Court held in Vigil, ¶ 16, 98 P.3d  at 177, that a 
police officer's testimony concerning statements made to him by a witness who 
was unavailable to testify at trial and whom the defense had not had an 
opportunity to cross-examine violated the Confrontation Clause.  In Vigil, two men, Mr. Vigil and Mr. 
Newton, were involved in an assault that led to the filing of charges against 
each of them.  As part of a plea 
agreement, Mr. Newton pled guilty and was sentenced.  Id., ¶ 9, 98 P.3d  at 176.  Subsequently, he was 
called to testify in Mr. Vigil's trial and, after answering a few preliminary 
questions, invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  Id.  As a consequence, the trial court 
declared Mr. Newton unavailable as a witness.  The State then called the officer who 
interviewed Mr. Newton after his arrest to testify concerning statements Mr. 
Newton made about Mr. Vigil's involvement in the crime.  Concluding the statements were 
testimonial, we held that their admission violated Mr. Vigil's Sixth Amendment 
right to confront the witnesses against him.  Id., ¶ 19, 98 P.3d  at 179.  We further held the 
admission was not harmless because we could not say beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the testimony did not contribute to the jury's verdict.  Id., ¶ 21, 98 P.3d  at 180.       

 
 
[¶18] 
Subsequently, in Davis v. 
Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d. 224 (2006), the United 
States Supreme Court revisited Crawford and the Sixth Amendment right 
of confrontation in the context of two cases, Davis and Hammon.  For purposes of deciding those cases, 
the Court went beyond what it said in Crawford and further defined the term 
"testimonial statements" as follows:  

 
 
[S]tatements 
are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.

 
 

Id. at 
2273-74.  Applying this definition, 
the Court held in Davis that the 
admission of a domestic disturbance victim's recorded statements during her call 
to a 911 emergency operator did not violate the confrontation clause.  The Court said:  

 
 
[the 
victim] was speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than 
describing past events.  * * * [She] 
was facing an ongoing emergency.  * 
* * [Her] call was plainly a call for help against a bona fide physical 
threat.  * * * [Her] frantic answers 
were provided over the phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or even * 
* * safe.

 
 
We 
conclude from all this that the circumstances of [the victim's] interrogation 
objectively indicate its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet 
an ongoing emergency.    

 
 

Id. at 
2276-77. 

 
 
[¶19]  In contrast, the Court held that the 
admission in Hammon of a victim's 
statements to police officers who responded to a domestic disturbance call did 
violate the confrontation clause where:

 
 
[T]he 
interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct . 
. . . There was no emergency in progress; the interrogating officer testified 
that he had heard no arguments or crashing and saw no one throw or break 
anything.  When the officers first 
arrived, [the victim] told them that things were fine and there was no immediate 
threat to her person.  When the 
officer questioned [the victim] for the second time, and elicited the challenged 
statements, he was not seeking to determine (as in Davis) "what is 
happening," but rather "what happened."  
Objectively viewed, the primary, if not the sole, purpose of the 
interrogation was to investigate a possible crime . . . .            
       

 
 

Davis, 126 S. Ct.  at 2278.

 
 
[¶20]  Applying these standards would seem to 
compel the conclusion that the statements Mr. Szymanski challenges were 
testimonial and violated his right to confrontation because Ms. Jones was 
unavailable at trial and he did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine 
her.  Unlike the statements in 
Davis, Ms. Jones 
was not speaking about events as they were actually happening, but was 
describing past events.  She was not 
facing an emergency and had not called for help.  The interview was part of Inspector 
Magee's investigation into the cause of the fire that had already been 
extinguished by firefighters.  He 
was not seeking to determine what was happening but rather what had 
happened.  From all of the 
circumstances, it is clear the primary purpose of the interview was not to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  Rather, the purpose was to investigate a 
possible crime.

 
 
[¶21]  Despite the result Crawford and Davis seem to dictate, the district 
court admitted the statements.  It 
did so based upon Allen v. State, 
2002 WY 48, 43 P.3d 551 (Wyo. 2002), an aggravated vehicular homicide case in 
which the Court upheld the admission of a police officer's expert opinion 
testimony, including his testimony concerning eyewitness statements he reviewed 
in the course of investigating the accident.  In finding the testimony admissible, the 

Allen Court 
relied on W.R.E. 703, which provides:

 
 
            
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made know to him at or before 
the hearing.  If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence.

 
 
Citing 
the rule, the Court concluded in Allen that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing the police officer to testify concerning the 
eyewitness statements.  The Court 
said:  "The statements clearly 
formed the basis for, and were relevant to, [the officer's] opinion * * * 
regarding the complete picture or precisely how the collision occurred."  Allen, ¶ 71, 43 P.3d  at 574-75.  

 
 
[¶22] In 
this case, the district court relied on Allen in ruling that Inspector Magee's 
testimony concerning the statements Ms. Jones made to him during his 
investigation would be admitted to show the basis for his opinion under W.R.E. 
703.  To ensure the non-hearsay 
purpose1 for which it admitted the 
testimony, the district court instructed the jury immediately after Inspector 
Magee testified about Ms. Jones' statements that the testimony was not being 
allowed for the truth of the matter asserted but only to show what the inspector 
did and what information he relied upon in forming the opinion that the fire was 
intentionally set by human hand.  

 
 
[¶23]  Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 8.27, 
212-13 (3d ed. 2007) contains a 
helpful discussion of the interplay between the confrontation clause and F.R.E. 
703.  Among the categories of 
statements the authors list as admissible under Crawford are those having non-hearsay 
uses.  Id.   

 
 

Crawford does 
not block the nonhearsay use of statements offered against the accused * * * 
*  Thus, statements may be admitted 
to provide context for other statements without offending the Crawford doctrine.  The same applies to statements offered 
as background to explain the acts of law enforcement officers during 
investigations, which are often admitted as nonhearsay  analytically, as 
showing what information the officers had.  
These, too, do not violate Crawford.   

 
 

Id. 

 
 
[¶24]  Edwards v. State, 200 S.W.3d 500 
(Mo. banc 
2006) illustrates this point.  Mr. 
Edwards was charged with first degree murder in the shooting death of his former 
wife.  The evidence presented at 
trial showed that he agreed to pay another man, Mr. Wilson, to kill her.  Mr. Wilson was also charged with and 
convicted of first degree murder for her death and was not available at 
trial.  The trial court allowed 
police officers to testify concerning their investigation, including an 
interview of Mr. Wilson in which he told them where he hid the murder 
weapon.  

 
 
[¶25]  On direct appeal before Crawford and Davis were decided, the Missouri Supreme 
Court held the trial court correctly ruled that testimony about Mr. Wilson's 
statements to the police could not be admitted for its truth, but was admissible 
for the limited purpose of explaining the officers' subsequent 
investigation.  State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 532-22 
(Mo. 
2003).  The Court noted that the 
trial court had carefully restricted testimony concerning Mr. Wilson's 
statements so that the jury did not hear improper statements implicating Mr. 
Edwards.  Id. at 533.  In his post-conviction appeal, decided 
after Crawford and Davis, the Court affirmed its prior 
ruling, stating:

 
 
The 
record shows, as this Court concluded on direct appeal, that all of the evidence 
was admitted for the limited - and proper - purpose of explaining subsequent 
police actions. The judge carefully controlled the evidence so that no witnesses 
were allowed to testify improperly about what Wilson had told them. Because none of Wilson's statements 
implicating Edwards was admitted for its truth, there was no testimonial 
evidence involved, and the Confrontation 
Clause was not implicated. Because the Confrontation Clause was not implicated, the 
subsequent decisions of Crawford and 
Davis do not change the conclusion of 
this Court on direct appeal that no improper hearsay was admitted.     

 
 

Edwards, 
200 S.W.3d  at 512.  

 
 
[¶26]  We find the court's reasoning in Edwards persuasive.  As in that case, Inspector Magee's 
testimony concerning Ms. Jones' statements was admitted not to establish the 
truth of the statements but for the limited purpose of describing his 
investigation.  The statements did 
not identify or even implicate Mr. Szymanski as the arsonist.  Because the statements were not admitted 
for their truth, and did not implicate Mr. Szymanski, their admission did not 
violate the confrontation clause.  
We hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
testimony.2

   

2.         
Prosecutorial Misconduct

 
 
[¶27]  Mr. Szymanski claims the prosecutor 
committed misconduct in several instances during witness questioning and closing 
argument.  The State responds that 
no prosecutorial misconduct occurred.  
We review allegations of prosecutorial misconduct by reference to the 
entire record to determine whether a defendant's case has been so prejudiced as 
to deny him a fair trial.  Talley v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2007).  The 
propriety of any comment made during closing argument is measured in the context 
of the entire argument.  Id.  
Reversal is not warranted unless a reasonable probability exists that 
absent the error the appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict.  Id.  

 
 
[¶28] 
Mr. Szymanski has the burden of demonstrating plain error because defense 
counsel did not object at trial to either the prosecutor's questioning or to the 
closing argument.  Plain error 
exists when:  1) the record is clear 
about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was denied a 
substantial right which materially prejudiced him.  Id.  Mr. Szymanski claims prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred in five instances, which we address 
individually.

 
 

a.                  
Improper 
Comment on Witness Credibility

 
 
[¶29]  Mr. Szymanski's first claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct arises from the prosecutor's questioning of Inspector 
Magee on re-direct examination concerning an interview of Mr. Szymanski which 
defense counsel asked about during cross-examination.  In response to the prosecutor's 
questions, Inspector Magee testified that he did not find Mr. Szymanski's 
statements during the interview to be sufficiently reliable to include them in 
his conclusions. Mr. Szymanski claims this testimony and the prosecutor's use of 
it during closing argument amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because they 
constituted improper comments on his credibility.

 
 
[¶30]  The credibility of witnesses and the 
guilt of the accused are questions for the jury to resolve.  Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 47, 142 P.3d 1134, 1146 (Wyo. 2006).  No 
witness should be permitted to testify that another witness is or is not telling 
the truth.  Id.  However, testimony that assists the jury 
in understanding some aspect of the testimony of another witness that does not 
comment directly on that witness' credibility or veracity, does not invade the 
role of the jury.  Id., ¶ 48, 142 P.3d  at 1146.  Although such 
testimony may have the collateral or incidental effect of supporting or 
undermining a witness' credibility, it is not a direct comment on his 
credibility or veracity and cannot be said to constitute error.  Id.  

 
 
[¶31]  Moreover, when the defendant initiates a 
line of questioning, the prosecutor is entitled to follow up with further 
questioning as long as such questioning is not excessive.  Cazier v. State, 2006 WY 153, ¶ 21, 148 P.3d 23, 34 (Wyo. 2006).  Defense 
counsel cross-examined Inspector Magee in relevant part as 
follows:

 
 
Q.       
Investigator Magee, you would agree with me that the final opinion that a 
fire investigator reaches in a case is only as good or accurate as the quality 
and completeness of the data that he considers in formulating his opinion, would 
you agree with that?

A.        Not 
all the data needs to be collected to formulate an 
opinion.

Q.       I 
understand that. But if you don't  if you have incomplete data, it's less 
likely that you'll have an accurate conclusion; is that 
right?

A.        
There's a possibility of that.

Q.       And, in 
fact, the more incomplete your data is, the more likelihood there is that your 
conclusion might not be accurate?

A.        That 
is a possibility.

           
* * *

Q.       You would agree with me 
that witness interviews are an important way for a fire investigator to collect 
information about the cause and origin of a fire?

A.        Collectively, it's very 
important, yes.

Q.       And you rely upon 
and consider all of the data that you collect through witness 
interviews?

A.        Yes, 
sir.

Q.       In this 
case, you took [part] in an interview of Mr. Szymanski, didn't 
you?

A.        I 
took part in it, yes.

 
 
[¶32]  The State objected to further 
questioning about the interview as going beyond the scope of direct examination 
and calling for inadmissible hearsay.  
The district court allowed defense counsel to inquire about the interview 
to the extent that it related to information Inspector Magee collected in 
investigating the fire's cause and Mr. Szymanski's comments about who might have 
started it.  Thereafter, defense 
counsel elicited testimony from Inspector Magee to the effect that Mr. Szymanski 
said during the interview that he thought maybe a man who came to the apartment 
looking for Ms. Jones a day or two before started the fire.  Inspector Magee testified that Mr. 
Szymanski also said that the man told him to tell Ms. Jones that "I want my 
money."    

 
 
[¶33]  On re-direct, the prosecutor proceeded 
as follows:

 
 

Q.                
Now, you 
were asked about an interview where you were present with Mr. Szymanski and you 
were also asked about motives, is that correct, by [defense 
counsel]?

A.                
Yes.

Q.                
And you 
stated earlier that some interviews you consider sufficiently reliable to 
include in your process; is that true?

A.        
That's true.

Q.                
Did you 
find Mr. Szymanski's information crediting statements to some other person 
reliable enough to include in your conclusions?

A.        No. 

 
 
During 
closing argument, the prosecutor made the statement that no credible evidence of 
other suspects was presented.   

 
 
[¶34]  It is apparent from the course of the 
testimony that the challenged testimony arose when the prosecutor attempted to 
rehabilitate Inspector Magee after defense counsel questioned him concerning the 
importance of interviews generally and Mr. Szymanski's interview 
specifically.  Once the defense 
opened that door, the prosecutor was entitled to make reasonable inquiry 
concerning why the witness did not include the interview in his 
conclusions.  Under the 
circumstances, we conclude the prosecutor's questions were permissible and not 
excessive.  The State simply 
responded to defense counsel's efforts to cast doubt on the thoroughness of the 
inspector's investigation.  Neither 
the testimony nor the comment in closing argument directly commented on Mr. 
Szymanski's credibility but instead assisted the jury in understanding the 
information Inspector Magee relied upon in determining the cause of the 
fire.  Accordingly, we reject Mr. 
Szymanski's claim that prosecutorial misconduct resulted from presentation of 
the testimony and argument.  

 

            
b.         
Improper Character Evidence

 

[¶35]  Mr. Szymanski argues next that plain 
error occurred because the State presented improper character evidence against 
him.  He cites the following 
testimony elicited by the prosecutor on re-direct examination of Inspector 
Magee:

 
 

Q.                
In fact, 
when we talk about motives, is blame shifting by suspects 
unusual?

A.                
That's 
not unusual at all.

Q.                
In fact, 
it's quite common?

A.                
Yes, it 
is.

Q.                
And you 
were asked about covering up crimes as a motive?

A.                
Yes.

Q.                
You're 
trained in other motives as well; is that true?

A.                
That's 
right.

Q.                
First, 
crimes could also include vandalism?

A.                
Yes, 
sir. 

Q.                
Crimes 
could include theft?

A.                
Yes.

Q.                
In 
addition, is there another motive called attention 
seeking?

A.                
Yes, 
there is.

Q.                
Is this 
also referred to as the hero fire setter?

A.                
The hero 
fire setter.

Q.                
What's 
the goal of a hero fire setter according to your training?

A.                
The goal 
of a hero fire setter is to seek as much attention as they can by committing an 
arson and then getting credit for either discovering it or extinguishing the 
fire or rescuing someone.

Q.                
And they 
get attention from people they want attention from?

A.                
That's 
right.

Q.                
In 
addition to that, is there revenge, spite fire sets?

A.                
Yes, 
there is.

Q.                
What is 
a revenge spite fire set?

A.                
That is 
common here in Casper, and that is an arson where someone gets 
back at someone, usually involves boyfriend/girlfriend, husband/wife, 
significant other. And the way they get back at them is they intentionally burn 
their property.

 
 
[¶36] 
W.R.E. 404 provides in relevant part:

 
 
            
(a)       
Character evidence 
generally.Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is 
not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith 
on a particular occasion.                   
   

 
 
Mr. 
Szymanski argues that admission of Inspector Magee's testimony concerning the 
common motives of arsonists was plain error because the State presented the 
testimony to prove he was an arsonist who acted in conformity with those motives 
on the night of the fire.  

 
 
[¶37]  In support of his claim, he cites Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, 33 P.3d 758 (Wyo. 2001), in which this Court held that testimony concerning the general 
characteristics and conduct of batterers was inadmissible to show the defendant 
acted in conformity with those characteristics.  We said:

 
 
Although 
battered-woman-syndrome testimony is admissible and helpful to the jury, it must 
not run afoul of W.R.E. 404(a) . . . .  
When battered-woman-syndrome testimony is raised by the state in its 
case-in-chief and relates to a defendant, as it did in the instant case, the 
"testimony draws close to commenting directly on what likely happened' and 
looks like character evidence after all.'" Ryan, 988 P.2d  at 55 (quoting 
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 3 Federal Evidence § 637 (2d 
ed.1994)).  Evidence concerning a 
defendant's involvement demands close scrutiny under the character evidence 
rules.  Id. "This is so 
even if reference to the defendant may only be inferred from the 
testimony."  Id.

 
 

Skinner, ¶ 27, 
33 P.3d  at 767.

 
 
[¶38]  Arguably, the expert testimony 
concerning the patterns of arsonists is "profile testimony" in the same sense as 
the challenged testimony in Skinner.  We need not decide that issue, however, 
because unlike the situation in Skinner where the challenged testimony 
was raised by the state in its case-in-chief, in the present case the defense 
opened the door to the testimony on cross-examination.  During defense counsel's 
cross-examination of Inspector Magee, the following exchange 
occurred:

 
 

Q.                
Now, in 
your training as a fire investigator, did you learn various reasons  different 
categories of reasons why people might start fires?

A.                 
Yes.

Q.                
Okay.  One of the well-known reasons for an 
arson fire is to cover up a burglary; isn't that right?

A.                 
Yes, it 
is.

Q.                
Can you 
explain that for us?

A.                 
What the 
perpetrator attempts to do is to take the attention off of one crime by  by 
arson, by putting the attention onto the arson rather than the crime.  It occurs with not only burglary but 
with a host of crimes, murder.

 
 
[¶39]  With this cross-examination, defense 
counsel opened the door to questions by the State on re-direct concerning other 
reasons that people set fires.  Once 
the defense opened that door, the prosecutor was entitled to make reasonable 
inquiry concerning other motives for arson.  We do not find the prosecutor's 
questions in that regard to be excessive.  
Accordingly, we reject Mr. Szymanski's claim that prosecutorial 
misconduct resulted from presentation of this testimony. 

 
 
[¶40]  In closing argument, the prosecutor made 
the following comments concerning the motive evidence:

 
 
When we 
look at motive, remember Mr. Magee's testimony.  He was asked this actually by [defense 
counsel], Well, can't that be to cover up a crime? Sure. But there's nothing 
taken for a burglary.  It might be 
to cover up vandalism. But more importantly, he talked about a couple of other 
motivations seen in arson cases.  
One is a spite/revenge. That is I'm mad at somebody, I get revenge upon 
them by burning their property. The second is the attention getting fire setter, 
the one that wants to be a hero.  
And these motives, of course, can exist at the same time.  They don't have to be 
separate.

            
Isn't it interesting Tammy Johnson comes home, and the first thing Mr. 
Szymanski, the man that's been upset for weeks, according to Mr. Copple, that 
she isn't treating him right, isn't paying attention, and he concentrates on 
her.  And she said playing the hero 
is what he was trying to do.

 
 
Given 
that defense counsel opened the door to Inspector Magee's testimony concerning 
motive, we likewise reject Mr. Szymanski's argument that these comments 
constituted prosecutorial misconduct.

 
 
c.         
Violation of ABA Criminal Justice Standard for Courtroom 
Professionalism

 
 
[¶41]  Mr. Szymanski claims next that 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the redirect examination of the State's 
forensic firearms and tool mark examiner, Mr. Dwight Van Horn.  Mr. Van Horn was contacted by the 
Wyoming State Crime Lab and asked to provide an opinion as to whether marks 
appearing on the window and door frames of Ms. Jones' apartment matched the 
hammer taken from Mr. Szymanski on the night of the fire.  On direct examination, he testified that 
the marks appeared to have been made by some type of striking instrument such as 
a hammer and the hammer found on Mr. Szymanski could have been the 
instrument.  During 
cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to minimize the significance of Mr. 
Van Horn's opinion by showing that he could not identify the hammer taken from 
Mr. Szymanski as the striking 
instrument that made the marks and that the marks could have been made by one of 
numerous striking tools.  Defense 
counsel also attempted to determine the parameters of Mr. Van Horn's expertise 
by asking questions about other fields related to tool mark analysis such as the 
examination of paint transfers.  
After the cross-examination of Mr. Van Horn, the prosecutor began his 
redirect examination as follows:

 
 

Q.                
Do you 
perform autopsies in your lab too?

A.                 
No, 
sir.

Q.                
We've 
covered everything else.  I thought 
I'd ask you about that.

 
 
Defense 
counsel objected to "the sarcastic comment" and asked that it be stricken.  The district court sustained the 
objection and ordered the comment stricken. On appeal, Mr. Szymanski claims the 
comment violated the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards, 
Prosecution Function 3-5.2, Courtroom Professionalism, subpart (a) which 
states:

 
 
As an 
officer of the court, the prosecutor should support the authority of the court 
and the dignity of the trial courtroom by strict adherence to codes of 
professionalism and by manifesting a professional attitude toward the judge, 
opposing counsel, witnesses, defendants, jurors and others in the courtroom. 

 
 
[¶42] 
Considering this standard in the context of a prosecutor's statement that 
defense counsel was counting on the jurors not following the law and knew the 
defendant's case was not meritorious, a Colorado court of appeals found no plain 
error.  People v. Darbe, 62 P.3d 1006, 1013 
(Colo. App. 
2002).  The court stated, "Unless a 
prosecutor's comment is flagrant, or glaringly or tremendously improper, it is 
not plain error."  Id.  Similarly, the court in People v. Saiz, 923 P.2d 197, 207 (Colo. 
App. 1995), found no reversible error in a prosecutor's comments, including his 
clearly inappropriate statement comparing defense counsel to "an overwrought 
circus barker."  Our review of the 
cases citing the Criminal Justice Standard as well as the record before us leads 
us to conclude that while the prosecutor's comment may have been unnecessary, it 
did not constitute plain error.   

 
 
            
d.         
Misstating the Evidence in Closing Argument            

     

[¶43]  Mr. Szymanski also claims prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred when the prosecutor misstated the evidence in closing 
argument by saying that another tenant in the apartment complex testified Mr. 
Szymanski had been upset "for weeks" because Ms. Johnson had not been treating 
him right or paying attention to him.  
Mr. Szymanski asserts the evidence was not that he had been upset for 
weeks but that he had complained frequently about Ms. Johnson's lack of 
attention.  We conclude this 
distinction does not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct or plain 
error. The prosecutor's comment was not an unreasonable inference from the 
evidence presented. 

 
 
            
f.          
Arguing Ms. Jones' Statements for the Truth of the Matter Asserted           

 
 
[¶44]  Mr. Szymanski's final claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct is based on the following comment by the prosecutor in 
closing argument:  "We know the 
condition of the apartment because Patrick Kernan was there the day before, and 
Sharon Jones had talked about the state of the apartment."  He contends this constitutes 
prosecutorial misconduct because Ms. Jones' statements concerning the condition 
of her apartment were not admitted for their truth but for the limited purpose 
of describing Inspector Magee's investigation.

 
 
[¶45]  We consider the challenged statement in 
the context of the entire closing argument and in the context of the entire 
trial.  Phillips v. State, 2007 WY 25, ¶ 9, 151 P.3d 1131, 1134 (Wyo. 2007).  As we 
discussed in Mr. Szymanski's first issue, Ms. Jones' statements were admitted 
for the limited purpose of describing Inspector Magee's investigation. After his 
testimony, the jury was instructed the statements were not admitted for their 
truth.  Therefore, it was improper 
for the prosecutor to suggest to the jury during closing argument that Ms. 
Jones' statements proved the condition of her apartment before the fire.  However, in the context of the entire 
trial we do not find that Mr. Szymanski was prejudiced by the improper 
argument.  

 
 
[¶46]  As the prosecutor told the jury, Patrick 
Kernan, the director of operations for the Casper Housing Authority, also 
testified concerning the condition of the apartment, which he had inspected the 
day before the fire.  He testified 
that he did not recall piles of clothes or other items on the floor of the 
apartment and that nothing obstructed his ability to walk around the 
apartment.  He testified the 
apartment was not cluttered and there were no piles of debris in the kitchen 
when he inspected it the day before the fire.  Given Mr. Kernan's testimony, there was 
evidence, other than Ms. Jones' statements, from which the prosecutor could 
properly argue the condition of the apartment prior to the fire.  In the context of the entire argument 
and the record, the fact that the prosecutor also mentioned Ms. Jones' 
statements as proving that the apartment was debris-free did not result in 
material prejudice.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶47]  Addressing Mr. Szymanski's claim that he 
was denied his right of confrontation, we conclude the statements Ms. Jones made 
during the investigative interview were not admitted for their truth, and did 
not implicate Mr. Szymanski.  
Therefore, their admission did not violate the confrontation clause and 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.  With regard to Mr. Szymanski's claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct, we hold that no such misconduct occurred except that 
the State improperly argued Ms. Jones' statements for their truth contrary to 
the limited purpose for which they were admitted. However, the improper argument 
did not result in material prejudice because other evidence supported the 
State's argument. 

    

[¶48]  Mr. Szymanski's conviction is 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
district court characterized the testimony as falling within an exception to the 
hearsay rule.  More accurately, the 
testimony was non-hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted.

    

2In 
reaching this result, we are cognizant of the concern that "overuse and misuse 
of source material . . . [by expert witnesses] raises confrontation concerns, 
and both the expert testimony provisions and the confrontation clause reinforce 
the message that experts are not to be used as conduits in criminal cases for 
out-of-court statements that incriminate defendants."  Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, at 215.  However, it is central to our holding in 
this case that the out-of-court statement did not incriminate Mr. 
Szymanski.