Case Title: Satele v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County

Citation: 

Docket Number: S248492

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2019-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
WILLIAM TUPUA SATELE, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 
Respondent;   
 
THE PEOPLE,  
Real Party in Interest. 
 
S248492 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Three 
B288828 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
NA039358 
 
 
July 18, 2019 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
SATELE v. SUPERIOR COURT 
S248492 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
Petitioner, William Tupua Satele, asked the superior court 
to release ballistics evidence for expert testing in preparation for 
filing a habeas corpus petition.  The court denied the request 
under the authority of Penal Code section 1054.9, which governs 
discovery in habeas corpus proceedings involving certain 
judgments, including a sentence of death.  Specifically, the court 
found that Satele had failed to show good cause to believe his 
access to the evidence was reasonably necessary to obtain relief, 
as the statute requires.  The trial court erred.  Section 1054.9’s 
good cause requirement applies only to physical evidence in 
possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities, 
not to evidence held by the court.  Court documents, including 
exhibits, are generally open to public inspection and may be 
released subject to such conditions the court deems necessary to 
safeguard their integrity.  A threshold showing of good cause is 
not required.  We issue a writ of mandate directing the trial 
court to vacate its order and conduct further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.    
I.  BACKGROUND 
Satele was sentenced to death for the first degree murders 
of Renesha Ann Fuller and Edward Robinson, with a special 
SATELE v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
2 
circumstance finding for multiple murders.  (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, 
subd. (a), 189, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(3); People v. Nunez and 
Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1 (Nunez and Satele).)  Briefly, the facts 
are these:  Satele and codefendant Daniel Nunez shot the 
victims from a car while they stood in front of Robinson’s home.  
Robinson was shot three or four times; Fuller was shot twice.  
(Nunez and Satele, at pp. 5–6.)  About an hour later Satele was 
heard to say, “ ‘We were out looking for niggers,’ ” and either he 
or Nunez said, “ ‘I think we hit one of ’em.’ ”  (Id. at p. 6.)  The 
prosecution introduced evidence that Nunez and Satele were 
members of the West Side Wilmas gang and that murdering a 
Black couple with no gang ties, like the victims in this case, 
would enhance their gang status.  (Id. at pp. 6, 9.)  Also 
connecting Satele to the crime was a semiautomatic gun 
recovered from a car he was driving hours after the shooting.  A 
ballistics comparison identified it as the murder weapon.  (Id. at 
pp. 6–7.)   
Satele’s death judgment was affirmed on direct appeal.  
(Nunez and Satele, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 63.)  In January 2017, 
Satele’s habeas counsel informally asked the prosecutor for 
discovery under section 1054.9.  As relevant here, counsel 
requested 
“[a]ll 
materials 
concerning 
the 
testing 
and 
examination of ballistics evidence, including, but not limited to 
reports, bench notes and photographs.”  In October 2017, Satele 
sought an order requiring the prosecutor to produce the evidence 
for testing by an expert, again citing section 1054.9.   
At the hearing on the motion, habeas counsel explained 
that he had been unable to obtain ballistics bench notes or 
                                        
1  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
SATELE v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
3 
photographs from the prosecutor.  Counsel asked the court to 
release various items, including bullets, shell casings, and the 
weapon, for expert testing.  The items were trial exhibits held 
by the court clerk.     
The trial court found Satele had failed to meet the good 
cause requirement of section 1054.9.  It observed that two 
prosecution experts and one defense expert had all agreed that 
the ballistics evidence matched the weapon seized from Satele’s 
car.  According to the court, “sometimes that is just what it is.  
It is just painfully obvious that they’re a match, and it sort of 
sounds like that’s what we have here.  Unless we’re paying for 
yet another person to come in to look at the bullets or look at the 
evidence and say, ‘It’s a match.’ ”  In the court’s view, the 
statute’s good cause requirement was meant to preclude such 
fishing expeditions, which could go on “ad infinitum.”   
Habeas counsel interjected that there may be some 
“confusion here.”  He clarified that, despite his reliance on 
section 1054.9 in his moving papers, “it’s not really a [section] 
1054.9” motion, because the court, not the prosecutor, held the 
evidence.  He explained, “It’s just evidence of the court” and 
“[w]e just want our expert to be able to look at it” with all 
necessary precautions to preserve the chain of custody.  The 
court denied Satele access to the physical evidence under any 
circumstances.  The court explained:  “It finally sort of dawned 
on me why I’m struggling, and it is because of the phrase ‘good 
cause.’  I’m not seeing that there is good cause.  Good cause to 
believe that the access to the physical evidence is reasonably 
necessary for the defendant to get relief.”   
The Court of Appeal summarily denied Satele’s petition 
for writ of mandate.  We denied his petition for review, which 
SATELE v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
4 
framed the issue in terms of whether physical evidence must be 
released for a defense expert’s examination when scientific or 
technological developments have undermined a prosecution’s 
expert’s opinion.  Instead, we granted review on our own motion 
and directed the People to show cause why the relief requested 
should not be granted “on the ground that the superior court 
abused its discretion by applying Penal Code section 1054.9 
[former] subdivision (c) [now subdivision (d)] to a motion for 
access to trial evidence that is in the possession of the superior 
court.”  We treat this review proceeding as one in mandate and 
resolve it under our original jurisdiction.  (People v. Picklesimer 
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340–341; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.)  
II.  DISCUSSION 
The question is whether section 1054.9’s provisions apply 
to evidence held by the court.  The statute partially abrogated 
the general rule that a person seeking habeas corpus relief from 
a judgment of death is not entitled to postconviction discovery 
until a court issues an order to show cause.  (People v. Superior 
Court (Morales) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 523, 528 (Morales); see 
generally People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1255–1261.)  
It authorizes discovery of materials, including physical 
evidence, to facilitate the prosecution of a habeas petition or 
motion to vacate the judgment.  (Morales, at p. 528.)2  It vests 
                                        
2  
The statute in effect at the time Satele filed his motion 
applied only to persons sentenced to death or life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.  (§ 1054.9, former subd. (a), 
added by Stats. 2002, ch. 1105, § 1.)  Effective January 1, 2019, 
section 1054.9 was amended to apply to cases involving a serious 
felony or a violent felony resulting in a sentence of 15 years or 
more.  (§ 1054.9, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 482, 
 
SATELE v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
5 
jurisdiction in the trial court to grant discovery and order the 
preservation of evidence within the statute’s scope.  (Morales, at 
pp. 531, 533.)   
Under section 1054.9, subdivision (a) (section 1054.9(a)), 
upon a showing of good faith but unsuccessful efforts to obtain 
discovery materials from trial counsel, the court shall order that 
the defendant “be provided reasonable access to any of the 
materials described in subdivision (c).”  In essence, “[i]f that 
showing is made, the defendant is entitled to discovery.”  (Catlin 
v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 300, 305.)  Subdivision (c) 
defines “ ‘discovery materials’ ” as “materials in the possession 
of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities to which the 
same defendant would have been entitled at time of trial.”  
(§ 1054.9, 
subd. (c) 
(section 1054.9(c)).) 
 
Reading 
these 
provisions together, we have explained that the discovery 
contemplated under section 1054.9(a) applies only to those 
materials “currently in the possession of the prosecution or law 
enforcement authorities involved in the investigation or 
prosecution of the case.”  (Morales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 534, 
italics added; accord, In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 695, 
697.) 
A defendant’s right to access such discovery materials is 
expressly qualified, however, by subdivision (d), which states:  
“In response to a writ or motion satisfying the conditions in 
subdivision (a), the court may order that the defendant be 
                                        
§ 2.)  The statute’s expansion applies prospectively only.  
(§ 1054.9, subd. (j).)  The amendment also redesignated former 
subdivision (b) as subdivision (c), and former subdivision (c) as 
subdivision (d), without substantive change.  We will refer to the 
subdivisions by their current designations.      
SATELE v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
6 
provided access to physical evidence for the purpose of 
examination, including, but not limited to, any physical 
evidence relating to the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of 
the defendant only upon a showing that there is good cause to 
believe that access to physical evidence is reasonably necessary 
to the defendant’s efforts to obtain relief.”  (§ 1054.9, subd. (d), 
italics added (§ 1054.9(d)); see id., subd. (a) [containing the 
qualifier, “except as provided in subdivision (b) or (d)”].)3  We 
have not yet interpreted whether the good cause requirement 
applies only to evidence possessed by prosecution and law 
enforcement authorities, or whether it also applies to physical 
evidence held by a court clerk.  We now conclude it does not.   
“It is well settled that the proper goal of statutory 
construction ‘is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, 
giving the words of the statute their usual and ordinary 
meaning.  When the statutory language is clear, we need go no 
further.’ ”  (People v. Ramirez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 987.)  We 
consider the language in the context of the entire statute and 
the statutory scheme of which it is a part (Phelps v. Stostad 
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 23, 32), harmonizing provisions relating to the 
same subject matter, to the extent possible (Cooley v. Superior 
Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 248). 
The statutory language provides strong indicators that the 
reference to “physical evidence” in section 1054.9(d) means 
evidence “in the possession of the prosecution and law 
enforcement authorities to which the same defendant would 
have 
been 
entitled 
at 
time 
of 
trial.” 
 
(§ 1054.9(c).)  
                                        
3  
Section 1054.9(d) clarifies that its provisions do not cover 
access for postconviction DNA testing.  Those procedures are 
found in section 1405.   
SATELE v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
7 
Subdivision (d) authorizes an order for access to physical 
evidence “[i]n response to a writ or motion satisfying the 
conditions in subdivision (a).”  As relevant here, those conditions 
are:  “the prosecution of a postconviction writ of habeas corpus 
or a motion to vacate a judgment”; a case in which a sentence of 
death has been imposed; and “a showing that good faith efforts 
to obtain discovery materials from trial counsel were made and 
were unsuccessful.”  (§ 1054.9, subds. (a), (b).)  Thus, the 
conditions in subdivision (a) explicitly incorporate the definition 
of “ ‘discovery materials’ ” in subdivision (c).  This reading 
accords with subdivision (c)’s statement that “ ‘discovery 
materials’ ” are defined “[f]or the purposes of this section” (italics 
added), rather than more narrowly for the purposes of 
subdivision (a).  As noted, that definition applies to “materials 
in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement 
authorities . . . .”  (§ 1054.9(c).) 
“It is elementary that, absent indications to the contrary, 
‘a word or phrase . . . accorded a particular meaning in one part 
or portion of the law, should be accorded the same meaning in 
other parts or portions of the law . . . .’ ”  (County of San 
Bernardino v. City of San Bernardino (1997) 15 Cal.4th 909, 
926.)  The word “discovery” is used consistently throughout 
section 1054.9.  As noted, subdivision (a) refers to good faith 
efforts to obtain “discovery materials,” and subdivision (c) offers 
a definition of that term.  Newly enacted subdivision (b) makes 
clear that the trial court has discretion to entertain successive 
requests for “discovery.”  Newly enacted subdivision (f) provides 
that “[t]his section does not require the retention of any 
discovery materials not otherwise required by law or court 
order.”  Section 1054.9’s drafting is also consistent with related 
provisions of the code that “limit trial discovery to materials the 
SATELE v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
8 
prosecutor possesses or knows ‘to be in the possession of the 
investigating agencies . . . .’ ”  (In re Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 
p. 696, quoting § 1054.1, italics omitted.)  These statutory 
provisions “are the only means for the defendant to compel 
discovery” from prosecutors, investigating law enforcement 
agencies, or others “ ‘employed to assist them in performing 
their duties.’ ”  (In re Steele, at p. 696.)  
Discovery is generally understood to mean an exchange of 
information among the parties to an action.  (See § 1054, 
subd. (c); Cal. Const., art. I, § 30, subd. (c); cf. Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 2017.010.)  The trial court and its clerk are not parties to the 
criminal action.  We have found no published decision applying 
the discovery provisions of section 1054.9 to materials held by 
the court.  On the contrary, all have addressed requests for 
materials possessed by the prosecution or law enforcement 
authorities.  (See, e.g., In re Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 689; 
Davis v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 881, 884–885; 
Hurd v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1107–
1108.)  Moreover, although the issue was not squarely 
presented, we emphasized in Morales that the provisions of 
section 1054.9 “[do] not extend to judicial or other non-law-
enforcement agencies, such as jury commissioners or indigent 
defense programs.”  (Morales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 534, italics 
added.)  
In short, section 1054.9 requires a defendant to show good 
cause to access “discovery materials” (§ 1054.9(a)), i.e., 
“materials in the possession of the prosecution and law 
enforcement authorities . . .” (§ 1054.9(c)).  Based on the 
statute’s plain language, the good cause requirement does not 
apply to evidence possessed by the court clerk.   
SATELE v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
9 
A question remains:  If section 1054.9 does not govern 
here, what standards control access to physical evidence 
retained by the court as a trial exhibit?  Section 1417 provides 
that “[a]ll exhibits which have been introduced or filed in any 
criminal action or proceeding shall be retained by the clerk of 
the court who shall establish a procedure to account for the 
exhibits properly . . . until final determination of the action or 
proceedings . . . .”4  In capital cases, the final determination of 
the action is “30 days after the date of execution of sentence” or 
“one year after the date of the defendant’s death” if the 
defendant 
dies 
while 
awaiting 
execution. 
 
(§ 1417.1, 
subds. (d)(1), (2).)   
Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have 
recognized a “general right” under the common law “to inspect 
and copy public records and documents, including judicial 
records and documents.”  (Nixon v. Warner Communications, 
Inc. (1978) 435 U.S. 589, 597, fn. omitted; accord, Sander v. State 
Bar of California (2013) 58 Cal.4th 300, 313–314, 322–323; 
Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (2014) 231 
Cal.App.4th 471, 483.)  “The right of access ‘serves the important 
functions of ensuring the integrity of judicial proceedings in 
particular and of the law enforcement process more generally.’ ”  
(KNSD Channels 7/39 v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 
1200, 1203; see Sander, at p. 318.)  To this end, rule 2.550(c) of 
the California Rules of Court provides that “[u]nless 
confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to 
be open.”  The rule defines “ ‘record’ ” to include “all or a portion 
                                        
4  
Sections 1417.2 and 1417.3 set forth some exceptions to 
this general rule not applicable here.    
 
SATELE v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
10 
of any document, paper, exhibit, transcript, or other thing filed 
or lodged with the court . . . .”  (Id., rule 2.550(b)(1).)5  The 
definition encompasses trial exhibits. 
The court’s jurisdiction to entertain a request for access to 
court exhibits derives from its inherent supervisory power over 
its own records and files.  (Nixon v. Warner Communications, 
Inc., supra, 435 U.S. at p. 598; cf. People v. Johnson (1992) 3 
Cal.4th 1183, 1258.)  Specifically, the California Rules of Court 
authorize the court to permit an exhibit’s release for 
examination outside of a court facility.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
2.400(c).)  In fashioning such an order, the court retains 
inherent authority to consider such factors as the need for 
testing, the administrative burden attendant to testing, any 
conditions necessary to maintain the integrity of the exhibit and 
chain of custody, as well as other equitable factors. 
Here, the court denied access to the ballistics evidence 
based solely on Satele’s failure to establish “good cause to 
believe that access to physical evidence is reasonably necessary 
to the defendant’s effort to obtain relief.”  (§ 1054.9(d).)  The 
court erred because section 1054.9(d) does not apply to a request 
for access to court exhibits.  While the court has inherent 
authority to fashion an order respecting such access, its strict 
application of a good cause requirement is inconsistent with the 
presumption that such documents are open for inspection.  (See 
KNSD Channels 7/39 v. Superior Court, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th 
at pp. 1203–1204.)  Accordingly, we vacate the order and 
                                        
5  
The California Public Records Act does not apply to 
records of the court.  (See Gov. Code, § 6252, subds. (a), (f)(1).) 
SATELE v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
11 
remand for the trial court to exercise its inherent authority to 
grant access under whatever conditions it deems necessary.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
The petition for writ of mandate is granted.  Let a writ of 
mandate issue directing that the trial court vacate its order 
denying access to exhibits and conduct further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.   
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Satele v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S248492 
Date Filed: July 18, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Laura L. Laesecke 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Sanger Swysen & Dunkle, Robert M. Sanger and Stephen K. Dunkle for Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Jackie Lacey, District Attorney, Phyllis C. Asayama and Scott D. Collins, Deputy District Attorneys, for 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert M. Sanger 
Sanger Swysen & Dunkle 
125 East De La Guerra Street, Suite 102 
Santa Barbara, CA  93101 
(805) 962-4887 
 
Scott D. Collins 
Deputy District Attorney 
320 West Temple Street, Suite 540 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 974-5911