Case Title: SHERITA WHITE V TAYLOR DISTRIBUTING CO INC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 134751

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 23, 2008  
SHERITA WHITE and DERRICK WHITE,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v 
No. 134751 
TAYLOR DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC, 
PENSKE TRUCK LEASING COMPANY, 
LP, and JAMES J. BIRKENHEUER, 
 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MEMORANDUM OPINION. 
At issue is whether the trial court properly granted summary disposition to 
defendant on the basis of his claim that he experienced a sudden emergency. 
Defendant,1 James Birkenheuer, rear-ended plaintiff, Sherita White, while she was 
stopped for a red light. By statute, the driver of a vehicle that strikes another from 
1 Defendant Taylor Distributing Company is defendant’s employer. 
Defendant Penske Truck Leasing Company, L.P., was the owner of the tractor­
trailer defendant was driving. Because the liability of these two defendants arises 
from Birkenheuer’s conduct, the term “defendant” will be used to refer to 
Birkenheuer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
behind is presumed negligent.2  But defendant claims that, as a matter of law, the 
statutory presumption should not apply to him because he experienced a sudden 
emergency when he blacked out seconds before the collision.  We disagree. We 
conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding defendant’s claim 
of a sudden emergency. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals reversal of 
the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant. 
On March 15, 2004, defendant was driving from Cincinnati, Ohio, to Novi, 
Michigan. He stated that he stopped at a rest area in Canton, Michigan, because 
he experienced an urgent onset of severe diarrhea.  After the diarrhea episode, 
defendant stated that he waited about 20 minutes at the rest area to see how he felt. 
Not experiencing further illness, he continued his trip. 
Defendant stated that as he took the Novi Road exit ramp some 30 minutes 
later, he began to feel dizzy and broke into a sweat.  He recalled seeing plaintiff’s 
car about 250 to 300 yards in front of him, stopped at a red light at the end of the 
ramp. Defendant applied his brakes, began gearing down, and then blacked out. 
2 MCL 257.402(a) states: 
In any action, in any court in this state when it is shown by 
competent evidence, that a vehicle traveling in a certain direction, 
overtook and struck the rear end of another vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction, or lawfully standing upon any highway within this 
state, the driver or operator of such first mentioned vehicle shall be 
deemed prima facie guilty of negligence.  This section shall apply, in 
appropriate cases, to the owner of such first mentioned vehicle and 
to the employer of its driver or operator. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                              
 
He has no recollection of events that occurred before the impact with plaintiff’s 
vehicle jarred him to consciousness.  After the collision, he applied his emergency 
brake, set his emergency flashers, and got out of his truck, but blacked out again in 
the road. He was assisted by other motorists and then treated by emergency 
medical personnel at the scene. 
Defendant was taken to a hospital by ambulance.  He was diagnosed as 
having experienced a “syncopal episode,” meaning that he blacked out.  While at 
the hospital, he described the accident to a police officer and was ticketed for 
violating MCL 257.627(1)—failure to maintain an assured clear distance ahead. 
The next day, defendant visited his family doctor, who diagnosed defendant as 
having experienced “viral enteritis with syncopal spell secondary to hypovolemia” 
(intestinal inflammation with secondary blackout). 
Plaintiff filed a suit alleging that defendant was presumed negligent under 
MCL 257.402(a) because he had struck plaintiff’s vehicle from the rear.3 
Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), asserting 
that he was not negligent under the circumstances because his illness created a 
sudden emergency.  Defendant submitted his deposition testimony, the accident 
report, and related medical reports in support of his motion.  Plaintiff argued that 
questions of fact existed regarding whether defendant had actually blacked out 
3 Plaintiff also alleged a violation of MCL 257.627(1), which requires a 
motorist to maintain an “assured, clear distance ahead.”  Because the analysis of 
(continued…) 
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before the accident and whether defendant knew or should have known that he 
was not in a condition to drive when he left the rest area after experiencing severe 
diarrhea. The trial court granted defendant’s motion.  Plaintiff appealed. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that summary 
disposition was not appropriate because the key evidence was within defendant’s 
exclusive knowledge. White v Taylor Distributing Co, Inc, 275 Mich App 615, 
630; 739 NW2d 132 (2007).  We granted defendant’s application for leave to 
appeal. 480 Mich 961 (2007). 
“We review de novo decisions on summary disposition motions.” AFSCME 
v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 398; 662 NW2d 695 (2003) (quotation omitted).  A court 
reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “must consider the pleadings, 
affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other evidence in favor of the party 
opposing the motion, and grant the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the opposing 
party.” Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993).  The 
statutory presumption of negligence under MCL 257.402(a) may be rebutted by 
showing the existence of a sudden emergency.  Vander Laan v Miedema, 385 
Mich 226, 231; 188 NW2d 564 (1971).  The sudden-emergency doctrine applies 
“when a collision is shown to have occurred as the result of a sudden emergency 
(…continued)  
§ 627(1) is virtually identical, we examine plaintiff’s claim under § 402(a) only.  
Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117, 134; 243 NW2d 270 (1976).   
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
not of the defendants’ own making.”  Id., citing McKinney v Anderson, 373 Mich 
414, 419; 129 NW2d 851 (1964). 
Defendant asserts that he experienced a sudden emergency when he became 
dizzy and blacked out on the exit ramp seconds before he collided with plaintiff’s 
vehicle; thus, the statutory presumption should not apply.  We agree that a sudden, 
unexpected blackout could present a sudden emergency sufficient to rebut the 
statutory presumption.4  But a sudden emergency sufficient to remove the statutory 
presumption must be “totally unexpected.”  Vander Laan, supra at 232.  There is 
evidence that defendant may have known or should have known that he was not 
feeling well when he continued driving after his urgent stop at the Canton rest 
area. This creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant’s 
emergency was totally unexpected.5 
4  In  Soule v Grimshaw, 266 Mich 117, 119; 253 NW 237 (1934), we 
recognized that a sudden loss of consciousness while driving could present a 
sudden emergency sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence. 
5  We note that there is also a question of fact regarding whether defendant 
blacked out while driving or whether he only blacked out after the accident. 
Defendant was driving alone and no one witnessed his condition immediately 
before the collision. The evidence reveals inconsistencies between defendant’s 
condition immediately following his alleged precollision blackout and his 
condition immediately following the undisputed blackout after the collision.  For 
instance, defendant experienced incontinence following the undisputed blackout 
(after the collision), but not following the disputed blackout (before the collision). 
Further, although defendant experienced a lowered level of consciousness 
following the postaccident blackout, there is evidence that he did not experience a 
lowered level of consciousness following the alleged preaccident blackout; 
specifically, his testimony that when he was jarred awake from the latter he 
(continued…) 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
Defendant testified that after experiencing a severe episode of diarrhea at 
the rest area, “I hung around a while, walked around to make sure I was finished 
and felt fine so I continued on to where I had to go because it wasn’t far away.” 
This emphasized statement could imply that defendant was aware he was not 
feeling well, but chose to continue driving his tractor-trailer because he felt he 
could make the short trip despite his condition. 
Defendant states that he “felt great” while driving some 30 minutes 
between the Canton rest area and the Novi Road exit.  But this statement is called 
into question by the medical records and deposition testimony submitted to the 
trial court. The emergency room (ER) physician who treated defendant stated that 
“[a] couple of episodes of diarrhea would not typically cause a syncopal episode. 
Pain, abdominal cramping or severe cramping or any kind of pain can cause 
someone to have a syncopal episode, but a couple of episodes of diarrhea would 
not cause him to pass out.” 
Defendant’s family physician diagnosed defendant with viral enteritis 
severe enough to cause a blackout. Viral enteritis is an inflammation of the 
intestines with symptoms including nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, cramps, and 
abdominal pain. 
So, the independent opinions of the two doctors treating 
defendant within 24 hours of the accident agree that defendant’s condition would 
(…continued)  
immediately activated his emergency flashers, applied his emergency brake, and  
got out of his cab to check on plaintiff’s condition.  
6  
 
 
 
 
have caused ongoing symptoms such as cramps and pain.  Further, the officer who 
responded to the accident noted that defendant “states he ‘blacked out,’ possibly 
from being ill.” It is unclear from this statement whether defendant was referring 
to his diarrhea at the rest area or to illness at some time more immediately before 
the accident. If defendant experienced ongoing symptoms or felt ill after his first 
onset of urgent illness at the rest stop, then any subsequent emergency was not 
totally unexpected and, thus, not sudden. 
The ER physician also testified regarding how quickly defendant’s 
syncopal episode may have developed:  “In my opinion, I would say that happened 
over, you know, several seconds, a couple of minutes, that’s pretty sudden.”  If 
defendant felt dizzy “a couple of minutes” before blacking out, then perhaps his 
subsequent emergency was not clearly sudden under the circumstances.  Further, 
for the sudden emergency doctrine to apply, the emergency must not be of 
defendant’s own making. Vander Laan, supra at 231. If defendant was aware that 
he was not feeling well when he left the rest area but continued driving anyway 
because he “did not have far to go,” or if defendant felt ill while driving from the 
rest area to the Novi Road exit, or if defendant felt ill even a few minutes before 
he collided with plaintiff, then the emergency may well have been of his own 
making. 
Additionally, defendant’s statements regarding the cause of his condition 
are inconsistent. The notes from defendant’s visit to his family doctor the day 
after the accident state that defendant “blacked out while driving . . . feels like it 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
was from eating a hardboiled egg 1 hour prior.”  This information was not given to 
the ER physician. When asked at deposition about what he had to eat or drink 
before the accident, defendant did not mention the hardboiled egg.  We think that 
information about the cause of defendant’s condition could have better established 
how defendant was feeling before the accident.  Defendant’s inconsistent 
statements about the cause of his illness create issues of material fact precluding 
summary disposition. 
We do not assess defendant’s credibility.  But, under the legal and factual 
circumstances, “[w]e do not ignore the inconsistencies in defendant’s 
statements . . . .” Bridwell v Segel, 362 Mich 102, 106; 106 NW2d 386 (1960). 
The questions regarding whether defendant experienced a sudden emergency and 
whether defendant was negligent in driving under the facts presented in this case 
are proper questions for the jury.  Soule v Grimshaw, 266 Mich 117, 120; 253 NW 
237 (1934). 
We affirm the Court of Appeals decision to reverse and remand this case to 
the trial court for further proceedings. Under the facts of this case, the trial court 
improperly granted summary disposition to defendant. 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
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