Case Title: Rogers v. P-M Hunter's Ridge

Citation: 407 Md. 712

Docket Number: 76/08

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Joseph Sheppard Rogers, Trustee v. P-M Hunter’s Ridge, et al., No. 76, September Term
2008.
PROPERTY — EASEMENTS
Petitioner Joseph Sheppard Rogers sued P-M Hunter’s Ridge to enforce the terms of an
express easement created between his parents and P-M Hunter’s Ridge’s predecessors in
interest.  Under the terms of the original deed, the servient estate holder purportedly had
an option to provide the dominant estate holder, the Rogers, with a roadway easement
either by providing a private road, traveling directly across its property to Landover Road,
or by providing a public road, connecting to another public road, eventually leading to
Landover Road.  The placement of utility easements pursuant to subsequent declarations
to the original deed were also in question.  For more than 35 years of ownership by P-M
Hunter’s Ridge’s predecessors in interest, the Rogers accessed their property by private
road traveling directly between their property and Landover Road.  In 2004, Hunter’s
Ridge acquired the property, closed the private road and provided the Rogers with a
temporary access road leading to 75th Avenue (a public road) and then to Landover Road,
with plans to create a permanent public road between the Rogers parcel and 75th Avenue. 
The Rogers sued, asking a judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to
declare that the roadway and utility lines could not be moved.  The Circuit Court Judge,
interpreting the plain meaning of the deed and subsequent declarations, held that P-M
Hunter’s Ridge had an option to move the roadway and could freely move the utility
lines.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in both respects.
The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded.  With respect to the roadway, the Court of
Appeals held that the lower courts had failed to consider that the subsequent use of a right
of way, which had been granted in general terms and had been defined, fixed and used in
that location “over a long period of time,” could become “as definitely established as if
the grant or reservation had so located it by metes and bounds.”  Accordingly, the Court
remanded for additional fact finding on this issue.  With respect to the location of the
utility easements, the Court affirmed the lower courts, holding that no issue of subsequent
use arose, because it was undisputed that the Rogers never hooked into the utility
easements.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 76
September Term, 2008
JOSEPH SHEPPARD ROGERS, TRUSTEE
v.
P-M HUNTER’S RIDGE, LLC, et al.
Bell, C.J.
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Barbera
Rodowsky, Lawrence F.
(Retired, specially assigned) 
Thieme, Jr., Raymond G.
(Retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   March 18, 2009
1
A dominant tenant is the owner of “[a]n estate that benefits from an easement”;
a servient tenant is the owner of “[a]n estate burdened by an easement.”  See Blacks Law
Dictionary 589 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “dominant estate” and “servient estate”).
2
Part of the tract called Beall’s Pleasure is registered as a national historic site.
It is named after the original grantee of the property, Col. Niniam Beall, a Scottish
Highlander, who, after being sent into involuntary servitude in Barbados by Oliver
Cromwell, went on to become Commander in Chief of the Provincial Forces of the Maryland
Militia and a member of the Maryland House of Burgesses.
2
The gravamen of this case is whether a servient tenant, who acquiesces in the
placement of a roadway easement established in deeds in which two placement options were
provided, can extinguish that easement in favor of the second option, without the consent of
the dominant tenant.1  Associated with this question are issues related to the placement of
utility easements.  The Circuit Court judge ruled in favor of the servient tenant, and the Court
of Special Appeals affirmed.  We granted certiorari, Rogers v. Hunter’s Ridge, 405 Md. 506,
954 A.2d 467 (2008), and are called upon to address two questions:
1.  Did the Court of Special Appeals err in finding that a
constructed roadway expressly designated as permanent may
nonetheless be destroyed and relocated pursuant to the terms of
a Deed?
2.  Did the Court of Special Appeals err in determining that
Respondent may unilaterally and completely extinguish
perpetual easements created by the parties for the express
benefit of Petitioner?
I.  Facts
The property in question is a rectangular tract of land in Prince George’s County,
Maryland, adjoining the west side of Landover Road.2  In November of 1944, the tract was
3
The trial judge noted from the record that “it was evident . . .that many of the
corporate officers of SDN were also general partners of [Landover Gardens, LP].”
4
The trial judge found that 75th Avenue was dedicated as a public road in 1963.
Landover Road is the only other road bordering the tract.
5
Technically, the rectangular property is oriented in the southeast to northwest
direction, but the deeds and agreements refer to Landover Road as being to the east of the
property, and for the sake of consistency and clarity, we shall retain the simplified
orientations set forth in the deeds and agreements.  
6
In the SDN Deed, the Rogers also reserved an express easement over an
existing road on the west side of the property, referred to by the parties as the “Historic
Road.”  That easement is not involved in the instant case.
3
acquired by Anna and James Rogers, who are the parents of Joseph Sheppard Rogers, the
petitioner herein, and Trustee of the Rogers Estate.  In 1963, portions of the Rogers property
were conveyed in two separate deeds to Landover Gardens Apartments, L.P. (hereinafter
“Landover Gardens”), and SDN Landover Corporation (hereinafter “SDN”);3 Landover
Gardens obtained a 8.9-acre rectangular parcel in the east of the tract, abutting Landover
Road, and SDN obtained 33.9 acres, bordering on the Landover Gardens tract in the east and
75th Avenue in the Southwest.4  The Rogers retained a small six-acre square tract that was
surrounded by SDN’s parcel on three sides and an unrelated property to the north.5 
A. The 1963 Deeds
The Rogers conveyed parcels to Landover Gardens and SDN in two separate deeds,
both of which reserved roadway easements to Landover Road and created easements for
water, sewage and gas (collectively the “utility easements”) in a memorandum attached to
the deeds.  The SDN Deed provided:6
4
[Metes and Bounds description of the land conveyed]
RESERVING, HOWEVER, unto the [Rogers], their heirs and
assigns, an easement over the existing road on the Westerly side
of the property hereby conveyed, which, together with the
easement reserved by the [Rogers] in a deed of even date to
Landover Gardens Apartments, Limited Partnership, is to
provide ingress and egress from Landover Road to the residue
of the property of the [Rogers].  The aforesaid easement will be
extinguished by the [Rogers], their heirs or assigns at any time
after one (1) year if a means of access from said road to the
retained property of at least equal quality is provided.
[SDN], its successors and assigns, agree that as development of
the property herein takes place, there shall be provided within
such development a permanent roadway not less than 22 feet to
be constructed and maintained by [SDN], its successors and
assigns, to the property on the South side of the property herein
described which will connect to the proposed roadway located
within said property to provide a permanent means of access
from said Landover Road to the property retained by the
[Rogers] and to connect to said retained property on the Easterly
side thereof or at such other point as may be mutually agreed to
by the parties hereto or their respective heirs, successors and
assigns; or in lieu of such private roadway, [SDN]  may dedicate
and construct a public roadway across the herein described
property which will provide a means of access to Landover
Road or to an existing public roadway leading to Landover Road
and it is further agreed that in the event [SDN] ha[s] failed to do
so on or before the date said retained property is offered for sale
to [SDN], its successors or assigns, or in any event on or before
five (5) years from date hereof, then and in that event the parties
of the first part shall have the right to construct a roadway not
more than thirty (30) feet wide across the herein described land
to connect to the then existing private roadways constructed by
the [Rogers] it shall be constructed and maintained by said
parties of the second part leading to Landover Road;  any such
roadway to be located approximately as shown on the site plan
entitled “Landover Gardens, Section One, dated July 16, 1963”
or at such other location as the parties hereto or their respective
heirs, successors or assigns may agree and in the event any such
roadway is constructed by the [Rogers] it shall be constructed
5
and maintained by said parties for the exclusive use of [the
Rogers], and their agents, guests, or assigns, unless and until
such time as [SDN] agree[s] to maintain said roadway, at which
time [SDN] shall have the right to use said roadway in common
with the [Rogers];  and [SDN], its successors and assigns, shall
have the right, at its expense, to relocate any portion of said
roadway, any such relocated portion to be of comparable quality
and construction.
(Emphasis added).  In essence, the SDN Deed permitted two alternative right of way
easements for the Rogers parcel for ingress/egress to Landover Road: (1) SDN could create
a private road designed to connect the Rogers property with the property “to the east side,”
(the Landover Gardens property) and then onto Landover Road, or (2) “in lieu of such private
roadway,” SDN could construct a public roadway as a means of access to Landover Road or
to “an existing public roadway leading to Landover Road.”
The Landover Gardens’ Deed also created roadway easements to Landover Road for
the benefit of the Rogers parcel:
[Landover Gardens], its successors and assigns, agree that as
development of the property herein described takes place, there
shall be provided, for the use of the [Rogers], their heirs and
assigns, in common with others, a permanent roadway within
said development to provide ingress and egress from Landover
Road to the property on the North side of the property herein
described [SDN’s property]; said roadway to be located
approximately as shown on the site plan entitled: “Landover
Gardens, Section One, dated 7/16/63” and to be not less than 22
feet wide and to be maintained by [Landover Gardens], its
successors and assigns, unless the same is dedicated to public
use, and it is further agreed that in the event said permanent
roadway has not been so constructed within two years from the
date hereof then and in that event, the [Rogers], their heirs and
assigns, shall have the right to construct a roadway not more that
30 feet wide across the herein described land to be located
6
approximately as shown on the above described site plan or at
other such location as the parties hereto, their heirs, successors
or assigns, may agree;  it being agreed that in the event the
[Rogers] construct said roadway that in such event said roadway
shall be constructed and maintained by said parties and shall be
for the exclusive use of said parties and their agents, guests,
invitees unless and until such time as the [Landover Gardens]
agree[s] to maintain said roadway, at which time [Landover
Gardens] shall have the right to use the roadway in common
with the [Rogers];  and [Landover Gardens], its successors and
assigns, shall have the right, at its expense, to relocate any
portion of said roadway, and such relocated portion to be of
comparable quality and construction.
Landover Gardens, thus, provided the Rogers parcel, the dominant estate, with a right-of-
way from the SDN property to Landover Road, over a specified location identified in a site
plan; it is undisputed, however, that this site plan cannot be found in any records.
Attached to both the Landover Gardens and SDN Deeds were memoranda that
created utility easements for the benefit of the Rogers parcel; the utility easements permitted
the Rogers to connect into sewer, water or gas lines on the Landover Gardens/SDN
properties at the Rogers’ own expense, to be further specified by a subsequent instrument,
should the need arise:
NOW, THEREFORE, it is understood between the parties
hereto that the purchaser, Landover Gardens Apartments
Limited Partnership [or SDN], shall provide for the benefit of
the property retained by the seller, a right to cross the property
described in the aforesaid deed, in one or if necessary fully to
serve the said retained parcel, at two locations, to be designated
by the purchaser, which will not interfere with the purchasers
use of property, for the installation at sellers cost of sewer, water
and gas extensions to serve the retained parcel.  Such right of
access shall be granted in the form of a right of way or other
appropriate instrument and sellers agree to be responsible for the
7
cost of maintenance of any installations therein and for
restoration thereof in the event repairs are necessary.
B. The 1964 Declarations
On August 4, 1964, the Rogers, Landover Gardens and SDN entered into an
“Agreement” reciting that the parties “reserved certain easements, across the land conveyed
to [Landover and SDN] . . . for the purpose of providing ingress and egress to and from
Landover Road,” and that Landover and SDN “also agreed to provide certain roadways, etc.,
all as more particularly set forth in [the] Deeds” (hereinafter the “Driveway Agreement”).
The Agreement was filed among the land records for Prince George’s County and provided,
in pertinent part:
WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to clarify their previous
understanding regarding the means of ingress and egress to the
roadway connecting to Landover Road.
* * *
[Landover and SDN give the Rogers] the right to install two (2)
twenty-two (22) foot wide driveways at a point or points to be
selected by [the Rogers] along [the easterly border of the Rogers
Property] to connect to the roadway to be constructed by
[Landover and SDN] to provide ingress and egress to and from
Landover Road . . . .
* * *
[Landover and SDN] agree to provide [the Rogers] with a
temporary access to connect to the [existing road while the
sewer facilities were being constructed] and do further agree to
restore and maintain said existing road after said sewer facilities
are installed so that it is passable by passenger vehicles at all
times until such time as said roadways is replaced by a
permanent means of ingress and egress to and from Landover
Road and [the Rogers Property].
8
Approximately two weeks later, on August 20, 1964, SDN, the Rogers, and various
trustees representing secured interests, entered into a “Declaration of Easement for the
Purposes of Ingress and Egress and for Water and Sanitary Sewer” (hereinafter the “1964
Declaration”), which provided, in pertinent part:
NOW THEREFORE, [SDN] with the consent of the other
parties hereto does establish and create a perpetual easement and
right of way for ingress and egress for pedestrian and vehicular
traffic over the following described property for the common
use of the owners, lessees and occupants of all improvements
constructed or to be constructed on the aforesaid Parcel “A”: [a
metes and bounds description of the easement].
* * *
[SDN] with the consent of the other parties hereto, does also
hereby establish and create a perpetual easement and right of
way for the installation and maintenance of water and sanitary
sewer lines for the purposes aforesaid within the strips of
property hereinafter described. [A metes and bounds description
of the water line and sanitary sewer easements]
* * *
This agreement is intended to create perpetual easements to run
with the land and shall bind the parties hereto, their successors
and assigns and inure to the benefit of all parties hereto as well
as those claiming by, through, or under them.
It is undisputed that the metes and bounds descriptions in the 1964 Declaration established
three easements for roads, which were connected to Landover Road, but none of which
connected to the Rogers property.  Part A of the metes and bounds descriptions created an
easement for Mathias Road, which travels in a straight line west from Landover Road to a
point near the southeastern corner of the Rogers property; the road passes the southern border
of the Rogers property and was set to lie 200 feet away from the Rogers southern border.
7
Notably, Landover Gardens was not a party to the 1964 Declaration, even
though the 1964 Declaration purports to grant easements over both the Landover Gardens
and SDN tracts.  Although the effect of this omission has been disputed by the parties, the
trial judge concluded that Landover LP should have been a party, and thus “would be
estopped to claim that it was not a formal signatory,” and the Court of Special Appeals
agreed, explaining that, “Landover relinquished any right to claim that the agreement was
invalid and unenforceable.”  Because this question has not been presented to this Court, we
do not address this issue.
9
Part B created Loop Road traveling west from Landover Road and after crossing Landover
Gardens property into SDN property, curving right and to the south to meet Mathias Road.
Part C created a short “Stub Road, “arising in the northwestern side of Loop Road and
traveling west and parallel-to Mathias Road; it stopped well short of the Rogers tract’s
eastern border.  The trial judge found that each of these roads was, in fact, established
according to their metes and bounds description.7
C. The 1968 Declaration
In 1968, SDN and various trustees representing interests of the Rogers executed and
filed a “Declaration of Easements for Purposes of Ingress and Egress for Water and Sanitary
Sewer” (hereinafter “1968 Declaration”), for “the common use of the owners, lessees and
occupants of all improvements constructed or to be constructed on . . . Parcel ‘A’”:
WHEREAS, the aforesaid Parcel “A” has been subdivided into
various parcels on which apartment projects have been built, and
it is contemplated that said parcel may be further subdivided in
the future for the construction of additional apartment projects
and it is desired to hereby establish easements of rights of way
for ingress and egress for owners, lessees and occupants of all
of the improvements erected on said Parcel “A”, which rights of
way are to be used in common and for the benefit of all of the
various owners, lessees and occupants of said land and the
10
improvements thereon erected, their tenants, servants, visitors,
licensees and successors in title; and 
WHEREAS, it is also considered essential to create easements
for the benefit of the owners of the entire Parcel “A” as
aforesesaid, their successors and assigns, for the installation and
maintenance of necessary water and sanitary sewer mains to
serve the apartments intended to be constructed on said
property.
The 1968 Declaration established a roadway easement in two parts.  Part I began at the end
of the Mathias Road easement, established by the 1964 Declaration, and extended Mathias
Road to a point near the southeastern corner of the Rogers’ property:
NOW, THEREFORE, [SDN], with the consent of [the trustees],
does hereby establish and create a perpetual easement and right
of way for ingress and egress for pedestrian and vehicular traffic
over the following described property for the common use of the
owners, lessees and occupants of all improvements constructed
or to be constructed on the aforesaid Parcel “A”:
Being an easement and right of way twenty (20)
feet wide, for ingress and egress for pedestrian
and vehicular traffic, through part of Parcel “A”
per plat of subdivision entitled “Parcel “A”,
Landover Gardens” . . . the centerline of said
easement and right of way being more particularly
described, as follows, in two parts:
Part I: Beginning . . . at the end of . . . Part A of
the centerline of the twenty (20) foot wide ingress
and egress easement and right of way previously
established and created per [1964 Declaration]
and agreement heretofore made by and between
SDN Landover Corp., et al . . . and running thence
for said centerline . . . 
(1) 85.16 feet along the arc of a curve deflecting
to the right, having a radius of 665.19 feet and a
chord bearing and length of North 33º 33' 14"
East 85.10 feet, to a point of tangency; thence
(2) North 37º 13' 18" East 259.82 feet to the end
11
of said centerline
Part II began at the end of this easement, and traveled 35 feet in a path perpendicular to
Mathias Road near the Rogers property:
Part II: Beginning for the same 15.00 feet from the end of the
second line of Part I, hereinabove, and running thence for said
centerline (1) North 52º 46' 42" West 35.00 feet, to the end of
said centerline on the southeast line of [the Rogers Property].
After Mathias, Loop and Stub Roads were constructed  in accordance with their metes
and bounds descriptions, a gap existed between the easements and the Rogers parcel, and in
particular, between Mathias Road and the Rogers’ driveway.  Anne Rogers sued SDN to
enforce her roadway easement to Landover Road, and in 1969, SDN was ordered by a judge
of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to permit Rogers to construct a roadway
across its parcel in order to connect the Rogers parcel with Mathias Road, which, in turn,
provided access to Landover Road:
The Court having found that defendant has not provided a
permanent roadway not less than twenty-two (22) feet as set
forth in the Deed of September 26, 1963 . . . and more than five
years having elapsed from the date thereof, it is by the Court
ordered that the plaintiff has the right to construct a roadway not
more than thirty (30) feet wide across the land of the defendant
to connect through the existing private roadways to Landover
Road, which road shall be constructed from the existing 60-foot
street at a distance of 388.77 feet, along the center line with a
bearing North 37 degrees, 13 minutes, 18 seconds East.
In addition thereto the plaintiff shall be permitted to construct
two 22-foot driveways or one 44-foot driveway from the
aforesaid 30-foot roadway to her property and shall be permitted
to install the necessary drainage from her property under the
said 30-foot roadway to adequately carry off the water from her
property for its present use.  The aforesaid right shall be subject
12
to the defendant’s future right to construct or continue the
existing 60-foot roadway along and over the right-of-way
described for this roadway and driveways, provided that when
the defendant, their successors or assigns, shall make such
improvements they shall tie the aforesaid driveways in to the
said improved street.   
Anne Rogers constructed a 388.77 foot road, connecting her driveway to Mathias Road and
thereby with access to Landover Road.  With respect to the utility easements, the Rogers
have never connected into the utility systems constructed by SDN and Landover Gardens.
D.  Hunter’s Ridge Purchase and Aftermath
Hunter’s Ridge acquired both the Landover Gardens and SDN tracts in March of
2004, with the intention of replacing existing apartment complexes on the tracts with newly
constructed townhome condominiums, and filed an application for approval of a Detailed
Site Plan for the project with the Development Review Division of the Maryland-National
Capital Park and Planning Commission.  That plan, and its successors, demonstrated that
Hunter’s Ridge proposed the destruction of all roads located on both parcels.  Among other
roads, Hunter’s Ridge proposed building two new roadways, Beall’s Pleasure Lane and Beall
Court, to connect the Rogers property with 75th Avenue.  The plan also included destruction
of existing water and sewage lines and reconstruction elsewhere.
On November 7, 2005, Hunter’s Ridge closed the private roads leading to Landover
Road and provided the Rogers with a paved asphalt driveway to travel to 75th Avenue, which
8
On July 28, 2006, Beall Court and Beall’s Pleasure Lane were dedicated as
public roadways.  Beall’s Pleasure Lane runs to the Rogers property.  Beall’s Court connects
Beall’s Pleasure Lane to 75th Avenue.
9
The water drainage issue is not before us.
13
was to be used until the completion of Beall’s Pleasure Lane and Beall Court.8  The next day,
the Rogers filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, asking for Mathias Road to be
reopened.  The judge denied the motion.  Rogers filed an interlocutory appeal, which was
voluntarily dismissed and a motion for injunctive relief pending appeal, which was denied.
II.  Procedural History
The present action was initiated when Hunter’s Ridge filed a complaint in the Circuit
Court for Prince George’s County, seeking declaratory relief, permitting it to provide the
Rogers parcel with access to Landover Road via 75th Avenue in lieu of Mathias, Loop and
Stub Roads.  The Rogers then filed a counterclaim for declaratory relief, regarding the
location of ingress/egress and utility easements, for injunctive relief, concerning water
drainage from the Hunter’s Ridge onto their property,9 and for the entry of an order quieting
title.  Rogers also filed an Amended Counterclaim, incorporating the original claims and
adding Branch Banking and Trust Company and the Ryland Group, Inc., as Third Party
Counter-Defendants. Hunters Ridge also amended its Complaint, to reassert its claim for
declaratory relief, again, regarding the roadway and utility easements.  On January 5, 2006,
Rogers filed a Supplemental and Second Amended Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief to
Retain and Enforce Express Permanent Easements, to Quiet Title to Real Property, and for
14
Injunctive and Other Relief, adding counts of interference with an implied prescriptive
easement as well as a nuisance action.
Hunter’s Ridge then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the language
in the deeds permitted relocation of roadways of access.  The Rogers also filed a motion for
partial summary judgment, asserting that, as a matter of law, the original roadways could not
be relocated.  Both motions were denied.
Hunter’s Ridge, thereafter, filed a Third Amended Complaint, adding another
declaratory judgment count, which, for the first time, asserted that it could extinguish or
destroy the established roadway easements by dedicating a public roadway that traversed a
different location on its property under the terms of the 1963 Deeds.  Rogers, in turn, filed
a Third Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Claim, stating that the Rogers parcel was
the intended third-party beneficiary of declarations and agreements that created roadway and
utility easements on the Hunter’s Ridge parcel.
A bench trial, limited to determining whether the roadways, as well as sewer, gas and
water lines could be relocated or extinguished, occurred in October of 2006.  Hunter’s Ridge
contended that the original deed permitted the roadway easement to be constructed as a road
leading to 75th Avenue, “in lieu of” a private roadway traversing its property.  With respect
to the utilities easements, Hunter’s Ridge contended that they were not created, nor was their
location set, for the benefit of the Rogers parcel.  
Rogers argued that the plain meaning of the 1963 Deed did not permit Hunter’s Ridge
to move the roadway easement unilaterally and that any option to move the existing roadway
10
The judge also ruled against Rogers regarding their prescriptive easement and
adverse possession claims.
15
was no longer valid, because SDN elected to provide a private road years ago, and because
subsequent agreements, locating easements of way, as well as water, sewage and gas lines,
were for the benefit of and ran appurtenant to the Rogers land.  After argument and testimony
of two witnesses on behalf of Hunter’s Ridge, called to offer legal conclusions regarding the
interpretation of the original deeds, the trial judge ordered both parties to submit Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  In an oral opinion issued on February 5, 2007,
followed by two memorandum opinions filed April 17, 2007, the trial judge held that
Hunter’s Ridge could construct a public roadway leading to 75th Avenue and that it could
freely move or extinguish the utility easements, wholly located within the Hunter’s Ridge
tract.10
Rogers appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  Before that court Rogers argued
that the words used to create and establish the easements clearly and unambiguously
demonstrated that the parties intended that the easements not be “unilaterally extinguished,
destroyed, relocated, or altered in any way.”  Rogers also contended that SDN and Landover
exercised an option in response to the 1963 Deed that called for “permanent roadways,”
when SDN and Landover created easements and built roadways over their parcels.  Hunter’s
Ridge countered that the option to establish a public road connecting to 75th Avenue
remained viable since the 1963 Deed and that it could unilaterally relocate the easements. 
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported opinion.  With respect to
16
Hunter’s Ridge’s exercise of the public/private road option in the 1963 Deed, the panel
regarded the Deed’s language as unambiguous and applied a plain meaning analysis, holding
that the servient tenant had the ability to exercise both options unilaterally, without any time
restriction, in order to provide the Rogers parcel access either by a private road or by
connecting the parcel to “an existing public roadway.”  The court interpreted the words of
“permanent roadway” as meaning “lasting or enduring” but not “perpetual.”  The Court of
Special Appeals also  regarded the specific language in the 1963 Deeds as reserving a general
easement and noted that the general reservation manifested an intent by the parties that the
roadway would not remain in a permanent or fixed location: 
If the parties intended that the roadways described would be in
one fixed location without alteration, the deeds would have
described the roadways to be built as a perpetual easement
defined by metes and bounds.  This omission is telling as the
1963 deeds simply provide the Rogers with a reservation of
easement rights for a right-of-way for ingress and egress.
Accordingly, it was not the intention of the parties in drafting
the 1963 deeds that the constructed roadways would remain
permanently fixed in one location.
Before this Court, both parties reassert the same arguments.  Rogers contends that
both roadway and utility easements cannot be moved because they ran appurtenant to the
Rogers parcel, and Hunter’s Ridge counters that the 1963 Deeds created the ability to move
the roadway and utility easements unilaterally, or to exercise an option to move the roadway
easement to a road connecting to 75th Avenue.
III.  Discussion
This case involves the interpretation of a deed and subsequent agreements,
11
In Greenwalt v. McCardell, 178 Md. 132, 138, 12 A.2d 522, 525 (1940), we
explained the principle of an easement by estoppel:  
It has long been a familiar principle that when one stands by and
sees another making expenditures for improvements to property
(continued...)
17
purportedly creating a roadway easement, as well as easements for water, sanitation and gas.
Basically, the issue is whether the servient tenant, Hunter’s Ridge, can unilaterally extinguish
a roadway easement and establish another roadway easement in its stead.
“An easement is broadly defined as a nonpossessory interest in the real property of
another, and arises through express grant or implication.” Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679,
688, 484 A.2d 630, 635 (1984) (citations omitted).  An express easement by reservation often
arises when a property owner conveys a portion of his property to another, which would
otherwise render the retained part inaccessible, so the reservation permits a right-of-way.
Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 377 Md. 335, 349, 833 A.2d 536, 544 (2003), citing Knotts v. Summit
Park Co., 146 Md. 234, 239, 126 A. 280, 281-82 (1924).  An easement by implication, on
the other hand, “may be created in a variety of ways, such as by prescription, necessity, the
filing of plats, estoppel and implied grant or reservation where a quasi-easement has existed
while the two tracts are one.”  Boucher, 301 Md. at 688, 484 A.2d at 635 (citations omitted).
See also Atlantic Constr. Corp. v. Shadburn, 216 Md. 44, 52-53, 139 A.2d 339, 344 (1958)
(filing of plats); Slear v. Jankiewicz, 189 Md. 18, 23-24, 54 A.2d 137, 139 (1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 827, 68 S.Ct. 453, 92 L.Ed. 1112 (1948) (quasi-easement), Greenwalt v.
McCardell, 178 Md. 132, 138, 12 A.2d 522, 525 (1940) (estoppel).11  In Boucher, 301 Md.
11(...continued)
to which he has some claim or title, and does not give any notice
or objection, he cannot afterwards in good conscience assert his
own claim or title against the improver. But mere silence or
acquiescence or failure to object does not operate as an estoppel
against one who permitted the making of the improvements in
ignorance of his own rights in the property, or in favor of the
one making the improvements, when the means of knowledge
of the true state of the title is equally available to both parties.
The doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked against a party who
was not under any obligation to speak, and when any protest on
his part against expenditures for improving the land would have
been an officious interference with the right of the owner to
improve the property as he saw fit.
18
at 688, 484 A.2d at 635, we further noted that “[a]n implied easement is based on the
presumed intention of the parties at the time of the grant or reservation as disclosed from the
surrounding circumstances rather than on the language of the deed” and that “[a]s a result,
courts often refer to extraneous factors to ascertain the intention of the parties.”
“In every instance of a private easement—that is, an easement not enjoyed by the
public—there exists the characteristic feature of two distinct tenements—one dominant and
the other servient.”  Bd. of County Comm’rs of Garrett County v. Bell Atlantic-Md., Inc., 346
Md. 160, 175, 695 A.2d 171, 179 (1997), quoting Consol. Gas. Co. v. Mayor and City
Counsel of Baltimore, 101 Md. 541, 545, 61 A. 532, 534 (1905). “Where a right of way is
established by reservation, the land remains the property of the owner of the servient estate,
and he is entitled to use it for any purpose that does not interfere with the easement.”
Greenwalt, 178 Md. at 136, 12 A.2d at 524 (1940).  The owner of the dominant tenement is
entitled to use the easement in a manner contemplated at the time of the conveyance, while
12
In  Weems v. County Comm’rs of Calvert County, 397 Md. 606, 612, 919 A.2d
77, 81 (2007), for example, we defined a “call” as “[a] landmark designating a property
boundary”:
And, whatever may be the rule elsewhere, it is well settled in
this State that a grant of land by metes and bounds and courses
and distances, with calls for visible boundaries on the side of a
highway; for instance a call for a stone planted in the south side
of the road, and running thence, by the south side of the road to
another stone, these calls and boundaries will be construed as
defining the limits of the property thereby conveyed; and the
grantee under such a grant will not take the fee to the middle of
the road.
Id. (emphasis in original).
19
the servient tenant is entitled the use and enjoyment of his property consistent with the terms
and conditions of the reservation,  Millson v. Laughlin, 217 Md. 576, 585, 142 A.2d 810, 814
(1958), and may not obstruct the use of the easement.  Miller, 377 Md. at 350, 833 A.2d at
544; Maddran v. Mullendore, 206 Md. 291, 297, 111 A.2d 608, 610 (1955) (“[I]t is
axiomatic that the owner of a servient tenement cannot close or obstruct the easement against
those who are entitled to its use in such manner as to prevent or interfere with their
reasonable enjoyment.”).
An easement reserved in a deed is either general or specific.  An easement is reserved
in specific terms when its location is easily discernible, such as from a metes and bounds
description, a plat map, or a call.12  An easement is reserved in general terms, when it is clear
from the intentions of the parties that an easement has been created, but without a precise
location.  If the easement is reserved in specific terms, we look no further than the plain
20
meaning of the language in the deed used to describe location and confine our analysis to the
four corners of the instrument.  Weems v. County Comm’rs of Calvert County, 397 Md. 606,
614, 919 A.2d 77, 82 (2007).  If, on the other hand, the easement is reserved in general terms
only, an ambiguity regarding the location of the easement exists, and we look to the
surrounding circumstances, including subsequent agreements and conduct of parties, which
may evidence the parties’ intent.  Judge Dale R. Cathell recently explicated this principle in
Weems, 397 Md. at 614, 919 A.2d at 82: 
In deeds granting easements, ambiguity only exists when the
particular location point at issue cannot be determined, not in
instances where the location point is clear from the language of
the deed. If there was any ambiguity in respect to language (of
which there is none in this case with respect to the boundary at
issue) then, in such an event, other evidence might be
considered to attempt to locate the right of way. The case sub
judice, however, is distinguishable from cases in which the
Court has found it necessary to look outside the four corners of
a granting document.
Id. (holding that because the terminal point of the easement was located by a call, the
easement was specifically located, and the court’s interpretation of the parties’ intent was
confined to the four corners of the granting instrument).
An easement may be extinguished or abandoned by subsequent written agreement,
see, e.g., Glenn v. Davis, 35 Md. 208, 216 (1872) (holding that an agreement by a lessee for
years to abandon an easement “would not bind the [the lessor] unless he is a party to it, or
it is made with his knowledge and acquiescence”), or by subsequent act.  Chevy Chase Land
Co. v. United States, 355 Md. 110, 733 A.2d 1055 (1999).  In Chevy Chase, we stated with
21
respect to the abandonment or extinguishment of an easement:
It is now very well settled, by authorities of the highest
character, that a party entitled to a right of way or other mere
easement in the land of another may abandon and extinguish
such right by acts in pais, and without deed or other writing. The
act or acts relied on, however, to effect such result, must be of
a decisive character; and while a mere declaration of an
intention to abandon will not alone be sufficient, the question,
whether the act of the party entitled to the easement amounts to
an abandonment or not, depends upon the intention with which
it was done, and that is a subject for the consideration of the
jury. A cesser of the use, coupled with any act clearly indicative
of an intention to abandon the right, would have the same effect
as an express release of the easement, without any reference
whatever to time.
Id. at 159, 733 A.2d at 1081 (internal citations omitted).  In United Finance Corp. v. Royal
Realty Corp., 172 Md. 138, 147, 191 A. 81, 85 (1937), we further stated that a right
associated with an easement may be abandoned or extinguished by acquiescence in a use
inconsistent with that right: 
[O]ne who, having an easement of way, whether public or
private, suffers his right to lie fallow and unused for a long
period of time, and throughout the period suffers the owners of
the servient tenement not only to use it as though no such right
existed, but actually acquiesces in such use by taking taxes or
other charges assessed against it or profits therefrom as though
no such easement existed, or by permitting any uses of the land
inconsistent with the existence of the easement, may be held to
have sufficiently manifested such an intention of abandoning the
right as will estop him from asserting it.
A.  Roadway Easement
The first issue involves the location of the roadway easements, as opposed to the
utility easements.  Rogers argues that a roadway easement over the Hunters Ridge property
22
was created for their benefit by the 1963 Deeds and that subsequent amendments, describing
the roads as “perpetual,” and their use of the roads for more than 35 years, reflect the
intention of the parties to the 1963 Deed to affix the easements on three roads traversing the
Hunter’s Ridge property.  Hunter’s Ridge contends that the plain language of the 1963 Deed
created two options, both of which could be exercised without the consent of Rogers, by
Hunter’s Ridge as successor in interest to SDN and Landover Gardens.
The trial judge and the Court of Special Appeals both applied a plain meaning analysis
to the 1963 Deed and held that the servient tenant unilaterally could move the roadway
easement from direct private roads, leading to Landover Road, to a series of public roads,
leading to 75th Avenue and then to Landover Road.  In so doing, the courts below recognized
that general easements were created in the SDN Deed, but did not acknowledge the
ambiguity of the easements’ location, nor the ambiguity of the location of the easement in
the Landover Gardens Deed, resulting from the unavailable site plan, which was referenced
therein.  
The 1963 SDN Deed reserved an easement in general terms, because it created an
option to set the easement either by private or by public roadway, and did not specify the
easement’s location.  The Court of Special Appeals, in fact, recognized the general nature
of the reservation, when the panel observed that “if the parties intended that the roadways
described would be in one fixed location without alteration, the deeds would have described
the roadways to be built as perpetual easements defined by metes and bounds.”  The
existence of the two options in the 1963 Deed, furthermore, exacerbates the ambiguity.  The
23
Landover Gardens Deed may have been a specific reservation when made, but the location
of the easement became ambiguous by the unavailability of the site plan coupled with the
provision calling for “a permanent roadway within said development to provide ingress and
egress from Landover Road to [SDN] property . . . to be located approximately as shown on
the site plan entitled: ‘Landover Gardens, Section one, dated 7/16/63.’”
As a result, the ambiguity in both Deeds cannot be resolved by plain meaning
analysis, but may be resolved by reference to subsequent declarations and conduct of the
parties, evidencing their intent.
Subsequent Agreements
Three agreements, to which Rogers were a party, were entered into after the 1963
Deed.  The first 1964 Declaration, the Driveway Agreement, recited that  “the parties hereto
desire to clarify their previous understanding regarding the means of ingress and egress to
the roadway connecting to Landover Road,” and then proceeded to permit the Rogers to
construct driveways across SDN property to connect to a road yet to be constructed that
would lead to Landover Road.  The second 1964 Declaration created a roadway easement
for pedestrian and vehicular traffic over SDN property, and, using metes and bounds
descriptions, identified Mathias, Loop and Stub Roads.  The 1968 Declaration extended
Mathias Road to a location closer to the Rogers parcel.  
In interpreting these subsequent agreements, the Court of Special Appeals held that
“the 1964 and 1968 Declarations, which created Mathias, Loop and Stub Roads, did not
expressly nullify or abrogate Hunters Ridge’s right, as expressed in the 1963 deeds, to
24
dedicate a public road from the Rogers Property to an existing road that leads to Landover
Road.”  We agree, because none of the roads created in the Declarations connected to the
Rogers tract of land until the 1969 court order required the connection.
Subsequent Conduct   
Rather, evidence of subsequent conduct of the parties, including the Rogers’ use of
an easement and SDN’s and Landover Gardens’ acquiescence to that use, or the easement’s
extinction, needs to be adduced on remand of this case, in order to interpret the parties’
intent.  Independent of the doctrines of adverse user and way of necessity, Taylor v. Solter,
247 Md. 446, 452, 231 A.2d 697, 701 (1967), when an easement is granted in general terms,
“‘the practical location and use of such a way . . . for a long time by the grantor will operate
to fix the location.’”  Weems, 397 Md. at 615-616, 919 A.2d 77, 83 (2007), quoting  Sibbel
v. Fitch, 182 Md. 323, 327, 34 A.2d 773, 774 (1943).  In Sibbel, Fitch, as the dominant
tenant, sought to establish a right-of-way over land conveyed to Sibbel.  Their 1866 Deed
had conveyed a tract of land containing 91 1/4 Acres, “saving there out the family graveyard
and reserving also a right of way to and from the graveyard.” Id. at 325, 34 A.2d at 773.
From the time of the original deed in 1866 to at least 1918, the right of way to the family
graveyard ran along a course labeled the “old road.”  In 1926, Sibbel completed a new road
located solely within his tract, to be used as a driveway to his house.  The evidence was
uncontradicted that between the years 1926 and 1939, seven Fitch-family funerals took place,
all of which traversed the new road.  In 1939, Sibbel constructed a barrier fence across the
new road, preventing Fitch from using the road to access the graveyard.  Fitch, thereafter,
25
sought to enforce his roadway easement over the new road, claiming that Sibbel’s
acquiescence in his family’s use of the new road altered the location of the easement from
the old road to the new road.
The trial judge agreed with Fitch and awarded an easement over the new road, based
on the general grant and Sibbel’s acquiescence to its use.  Sibbel appealed to this Court and
we reversed, holding that where an easement reserves “a right of way in general terms,
without defining its location by metes and bounds,” the use of the easement for a long time
in a specific location “raises an inference that the owners of the dominant and servient
tenements had agreed upon the metes and bounds,” and the easement’s location “thereby
became fixed as if it had been described in the deed . . . by metes and bounds.”  Id. at 326,
34 A.2d at 774.  In reaching this conclusion, we explained:
[A]fter the location of the right of way which has been granted
in general terms has been defined and fixed by the owners of the
dominant and servient tenements by user in a particular location
over a long period of time, it becomes as definitely established
as if the grant or reservation had so located it by metes and
bounds and the location of the right of way as thus defined can
only be changed by agreement of the owners of the dominant
and servient tenements.
“Where an easement in land, such as a way, is granted in general
terms, without giving definite location and description of it, the
location may be subsequently fixed by an express agreement of
the parties, or by an implied agreement arising out of the use of
a particular way by the grantee and acquiescence on the part of
the grantor, provided the way is located within the boundaries
of the land over which the right is granted. As otherwise
expressed, it is a familiar rule, that, when a right of way is
granted without defined limits, the practical location and use of
such way by the grantee under his deed acquiesced in for a long
26
time by the grantor will operate to fix the location. The location
thus determined will have the same legal effect as though it had
been fully described by the terms of the grant.” 28 C.J.S.,
Easements, Sec. 82.
This principle has been approved in the Maryland case of
Stevens v. Powell, 152 Md. 604, 137 A. 312, 313, where the
court says: “While the deeds providing for the right of way over
an ‘eight-foot alley’ do not describe its exact location in the
area, of greater width, through which it passes, yet the definition
of its course by actual user during the period of its enjoyment by
the dominant, and its recognition by the servient, owners, is a
sufficient identification of the way for the purposes of this
proceeding.”
* * *
When a right of way reserved in general terms has been
definitely located and the owner of the dominant tenement has
acquired vested right in the way as located, the general rule is
that the location of the way can be changed only by agreement
of the owners of the dominant and servient tenements.
“As a general rule, in the absence of contrary statute, the
location of an easement when once established cannot be
changed by either party without the other’s consent except under
the authority of a grant or reservation to this effect.’ 28 C.J.S.,
Easements, Sec. 84.
“A way once located can not be changed by either party without
the consent of the other. When the right of way has once been
exercised in a fixed and definite course, with full acquiescence
and consent of both parties, it can not be changed at the pleasure
of either of them.” Jones, Easements, 1898 Ed., Sec. 352.
“The general rule is that the location of an easement once
selected cannot be changed by either the landowner or the
easement owner without the other’s consent.” 17 Am.Jur.,
Easements, Sec. 87.
Id. at 327-28, 34 A.2d at 774-75 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we concluded that Sibbel
27
was entitled to construct a barrier across the new road, because the easement reserved by  the
1866 Deed was fixed as the old road, as used by the Fitches to access the graveyard for more
than fifty years.  Id. at 329, 34 A.2d at 775.
In Taylor, 247 Md. at 446, 231 A.2d at 697, we revisited our holding in Sibbel, when
determining that subsequent conduct of parties can operate to set the location of an easement
when the deed reserving the easement is either imprecise or, based on the facts and
circumstances, incorrect.  In that case, Taylor’s deed reserved a roadway easement over the
“western” part of his parcel to the Solter tract.  Id. at 448, 231 A.2d at 698.  An earlier deed
between predecessors in interest created a roadway over the eastern part of the Taylor
property.  Taylor argued that he possessed a unilateral ability to extinguish the eastern
roadway easement.  The evidence at trial, however, supported the existence of the eastern
easement, and that no roadway ever existed on the western part of the Taylor property.  Five
people, who had either lived, worked or hunted on nearby parcels testified that the eastern
road existed unchanged from 1921 and 1959, and notably, an oil delivery worker testified
that between 1951 and 1952—after the conveyance reserving the easement, but before the
parties obtained ownership—he had traversed the eastern road on the Taylor parcel to deliver
oil to the Solter parcel.  The trial judge determined, on the basis of the evidence, that the
parties’ intended to grant an easement over the eastern road, and we affirmed.
We reflected that it appeared that the use of the term “west side” in the deed
constituted “obvious inadvertence on the part of the draftsman,” and that subsequent
agreements between the adjacent parcel holders regarding the road, the Talyor’s concession
13
The language of the 1949 Deed at the heart of the controversy provided: 
2. The remaining of the above mentioned parties of the first part
do hereby grant a parcel or strip of ground beginning for the
same at the intersection of the present County road, and the land
of Thomas I. Weems and Clifton Smith, and running in a
westerly direction adjacent to and through the lands of the above
mentioned parties of the first part, and running with the center
of the said present county road, said 30 foot strip lying 15 feet
on each side of the center line thereof, and having for its
westerly terminal the lands of the grantor, Lydia Leitch.”
[Emphasis added.]
(continued...)
28
that the Solters enjoyed some right of access across their property, and the use of the road for
years operated to fix the easement.  Id. at 452, 321 A.2d at 701.  In so holding, we quoted
from Sibbel and determined that the use of the easement operated to fix its location, despite
the fact that the deed failed to accurately describe it: “In our judgment the case at bar falls
comfortably within the familiar rule stated in Sibbel v. Fitch, 182 Md. 323, 326-27, 34 A.2d
773, 774 (1943) . . . .”  Id.  See also Weeks v. Lewis, 189 Md. 424, 427, 56 A.2d 46, 47
(1947) (also relying on the rule in Sibbel to set the location of an easement).
More recently in Weems, 397 Md. at 606, 919 A.2d at 77, we held that Sibbel’s
ambiguity analysis did not apply to the interpretation of a deed reserving an easement by
specific grant—or one explicitly defining the easement’s location.  Weems had sought
declaratory relief to set the terminal point of a public easement of way over Leitch’s Wharf
Road—an easement granted to Calvert County by the land’s former owner, Lydia Leitch, in
a 1949 deed of conveyance.13  The particular language of the deed, reserving a right-of way
13(...continued)
Section 15-201 of the Calvert County Code at that time further stated:
Subtitle 2
Access to Wharves and Landings
§ 15-201. Established. [Code 1981, § 15-101, 1985, ch 715, § 2]
(a) The public shall have an easement or right-of-way over any
roads or ways in Calvert County leading to . . . Leitch’s Wharf
. . . .
(b) The purpose of this easement or right-of-way is solely for
access to the wharves and landings and enjoyment of the wharfs
and landings by the public.
Weems v. County Comm’rs of Calvert County, 397 Md. 606 at 611, 919 A.2d at 80-81.
29
to Leitch’s Wharf for public use, stated that the easement’s westerly terminus was “the lands
of the grantor, Lydia Leitch.”  Id. at 611, 919 A.2d at 80.  Weems argued that the lands of
Lydia Leitch ended at a turnaround point on Leitch’s Wharf Road and that, therefore, Weems
could restrict public access between the turnaround point on the road and the barrier wall at
the end of the road, abutting the Potomac River and the area known as Leitch’s Wharf.
Calvert County, conversely, argued that the grant of the easement was a general one, that the
use of the road all the way to the barrier had fixed the location of the easement over that area,
and also that the Calvert County Code, which stated “that the public shall have an easement
or right-of-way over any roads or ways in Calvert County leading to . . . Leitch’s Wharf,”
precluded Weems from restricting use after the turnaround point.  Id. at 611, 919 A.2d at 81.
In the first trial, the judge determined that the easement extended over the paved
portion of Leitch’s Wharf Road, past the turnabout, to the barricade.  A panel of the Court
of Special Appeals then concluded that the 1949 deed was ambiguous, and remanded for fact
30
finding.
During proceedings on remand, both parties presented additional evidence regarding
Lydia Leitch’s intent when executing the 1949 deed to reserve a right-of-way easement for
the public.  Weems proffered testimony that the deed’s language created a specific terminus
point, the lands of Lydia Lynch, so that westerly terminus of the easement had to be the
turnaround point, because that was the borderline of Lydia Leitch’s land after the 1949
conveyance.  Calvert County’s expert proffered that the easement was intended to extend to
the barrier at the end of Leitch’s Wharf Road.  The trial judge concluded that the easement
was intended to extend all the way to the barrier and that even if it did not, the Calvert
County Code prevented Weems from restricting the public’s access to Leitch’s Wharf over
Leitch’s Wharf Road.
We granted certiorari on our own initiative.  Before us, Weems argued, in part, that
the trial judge erred by “arbitrarily disregarding [his] expert’s opinion,” regarding the plain
meaning of the deed locating the easement, and by thereafter finding “that the westerly
terminal of the easement granted in the 1949 Deed, was located within Appellant Weems’
property” at the barrier wall.  Id. at 610, 919 A.2d at 80.  After we distinguished a general
reservation of an easement from a specific one, we concluded that the language, “having for
its westerly terminal the lands of the grantor, Lydia Leitch,” constituted a “call,” or a
landmark clearly demarcating the location of the public right-of-way easement.  Id. at 612,
919 A.2d at 81.  Because we regarded the call as specific, we looked to the plain meaning
of the deed and agreed with Weems that the easement terminated at the turnaround point:
31
In the case sub judice, it is clear that the western boundary of the
easement ends at the Leitch property, not within the property,
and not at the westerly boundary of the property, but at the very
point where the easement first touches the then property of
Lydia Leitch (extant from the record as marked on the various
photographs and maps as the turnaround). This clearly and
unambiguously demarcates the westerly point of the
right-of-way as described in the deed. There is no dispute as to
the other boundaries of the easement relevant to the instant case.
This case only concerns the western boundary of the public
easement. The County has no rights, under this easement,
beyond that point. On that issue, there is no ambiguity in regard
to the easement. When the Court of Special Appeals first
addressed the issue, that court should not have remanded the
case. It should have found the contested description in the
easement to be unambiguous as we do today.
Id. at 613-14, 919 A.2d at 82. 
In the absence of a specific location or a “call,” as in the present case, subsequent
conduct can elucidate use by the dominant tenant and acquiescence, if any, by the servient
tenant, both with respect to affixing the location of an easement and regarding the
extinguishment or abandonment of an easement or an option to place an easement in one
location in lieu of another.  Evidence of subsequent conduct, on remand, must be adduced,
in order to declare the rights of the parties.
Hunters Ridge, however, also has asserted that the language of the 1963 Deed
conferred upon it a unilateral ability, irrespective of usage and acquiescence, to relocate or
extinguish existing easements.  Specifically, Hunters Ridge relies on the last clause from the
following section of the SDN Deed,
or in lieu of such private roadway, the [SDN] may dedicate and
construct a public roadway across the herein described property
32
which will provide a means of access to Landover Road or to an
existing public roadway leading to Landover Road and it is
further agreed that in the event [SDN] ha[s] failed to do so on or
before the date said retained property is offered for sale to
[SDN], its successors or assigns, or in any event on or before
five (5) years from date hereof, then and in that event the parties
of the first part shall have the right to construct a roadway not
more than thirty (30) feet wide across the herein described land
to connect to the then existing private roadways constructed by
the [Rogers] it shall be constructed and maintained by said
parties of the second part leading to Landover Road;  any such
roadway to be located approximately as shown on the site plan
entitled “Landover Gardens, Section One, dated July 16, 1963”
or at such other location as the parties hereto or their respective
heirs, successors or assigns may agree and in the event any such
roadway is constructed by the [Rogers] it shall be constructed
and maintained by said parties for the exclusive use of [the
Rogers], and their agents, guests, or assigns, unless and until
such time as [SDN] agree[s] to maintain said roadway, at which
time [SDN] shall have the right to use said roadway in common
with the [Rogers];  and [SDN], its successors and assigns, shall
have the right, at its expense, to relocate any portion of said
roadway, any such relocated portion to be of comparable quality
and construction.
and a similar clause in the Landover Gardens Deed,
said roadway to be located approximately as shown on the site
plan entitled: “Landover Gardens, Section One, dated 7/16/63”
and to be not less than 22 feet wide and to be maintained by
[Landover Gardens], its successors and assigns, unless the same
is dedicated to public use, and it is further agreed that in the
event said permanent roadway has not been so constructed
within two years from the date hereof then and in that event, the
[Rogers], their heirs and assigns, shall have the right to construct
a roadway not more that 30 feet wide across the herein described
land to be located approximately as shown on the above
described site plan or at other such location as the parties hereto,
their heirs, successors or assigns, may agree;  it being agreed
that in the event the [Rogers] construct said roadway that in such
event said roadway shall be constructed and maintained by said
33
parties and shall be for the exclusive use of said parties and their
agents, guests, invitees unless and until such time as the
[Landover Gardens] agree[s] to maintain said roadway, at which
time [Landover Gardens] shall have the right to use the roadway
in common with the [Rogers];  and [Landover Gardens], its
successors and assigns, shall have the right, at its expense, to
relocate any portion of said roadway, and such relocated portion
to be of comparable quality and construction.
In essence, Hunter’s Ridge argues that the last sentence permits it to relocate any roadway
at its expense, so long as the relocated portion is of a comparable quality and construction.
Rogers, conversely, argues that the last sentence, permitting relocation, applies only to that
roadway that would have been constructed by Rogers in response to SDN’s or Landover
Gardens’ failure to build a roadway within the time limits provided.  We agree with Rogers
regarding the interpretation of this last sentence, as did the trial judge and the panel of the
Court of Special Appeals.
B.  Utility Easement
We shall only briefly address the utility easements, for we adopt the conclusions of
the trial judge and the Court of Special Appeals in this respect.  Rogers argues that Hunter’s
Ridge cannot relocate or extinguish the utility lines on Hunter’s Ridge property, because the
memorandum appended to the 1963 Deed reserved a right to hook into these lines at the
Rogers’ expense, and the subsequent declarations created easements specifically locating the
utility lines on the SDN and Landover Gardens properties.  In essence, Rogers argues that
the utility easements created in subsequent declarations were for the benefit of their land and
cannot now be moved.  Hunter’s Ridge counters that the easements were created solely for
34
the benefit of the SDN and Landover Gardens apartment buildings, and can be moved
because they are located wholly within Hunter’s Ridge property, and Rogers has no right to
set their location.
The trial judge found, and it is not disputed, that the Rogers never exercised their right
to hook into the SDN or Landover utility lines.  Thus, unlike the roadway easement
previously discussed, issues of subsequent use and acquiescence do not arise to fix the
location of the utility easements.  The trial judge held, with respect to the plain meaning of
the declarations creating the utility easements, that he could not conclude that the “easements
that were put in place on the Landover and SDN property were for anything other than the
connection and construction to the various apartments, which were constructed and might
have been constructed . . . .”  In affirming, the Court of Special Appeals aptly noted that the
1964 Declaration stated that the easements were “to serve the apartments intended to be
constructed on the property,” and that the plain meaning of this language indicates that the
easements were not for the benefit of the Rogers Property, and recognized that the Rogers
were not a party to the 1968 “Declaration of Easements for Purposes of Ingress and Egress
for Water and Sanitary Sewer,” nor could the Rogers property be construed to be a third
party beneficiary of the declaration, as the language, to “serve the apartments to be built
thereon,” clearly stated the Declaration’s purpose.
Because it is undisputed that Rogers never used the utility easement, no issue of
subsequent conduct arises, and we agree with the conclusion that the utility easements were
not placed on Hunter’s Ridge property with the intent to benefit the Rogers parcel.
35
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED, AND
CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS WITH DIRECTION
TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT 
COURT 
FOR 
PRINCE
GEORGE ’S COUNTY AND TO REMAND
THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR THE FILING OF A DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS.