Case Title: Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility v. Reesa Evans

Citation: 2000 WI 124

Docket Number: 1999AP001011-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 124 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1011-D 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Reesa Evans, Attorney at Law. 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional  
Responsibility,  
 
Complainant-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Reesa Evans,  
 
Respondent-Appellant.  
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVANS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
November 17, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
October 5, 2000 
Oral Argument: 
      
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by 
Hal Harlowe and Hal Harlowe and Associates, S.C., Madison. 
 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief 
by Robert G. Krohn and Roethe, Krohn, Pope, McCarthy & Haas, LLP, 
Edgerton. 
 
2000 WI 124 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1011-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Reesa Evans, Attorney at Law. 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional  
Responsibility,  
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Reesa Evans,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant.  
 
FILED 
 
NOV 17, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.  
¶1 
PER CURIAM   Attorney Reesa Evans appealed from a 
single finding of the referee, that she fabricated a letter to a 
client dated March 24, 1997.  Attorney Evans also appealed from 
the referee's recommendation that her license to practice law be 
suspended for two years.   
¶2 
We determine that the referee's finding of fact that 
Attorney 
Evans 
fabricated 
the 
letter 
is 
supported 
by 
satisfactory and convincing evidence.  We determine further that 
the 
egregiousness 
of 
that 
misconduct, 
combined 
with 
the 
referee's other findings of misconduct which Attorney Evans does 
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
2 
not dispute, warrants the suspension of her license to practice 
law for two years. 
¶3 
Attorney Evans was admitted to the practice of law in 
Wisconsin in 1979 and practices in Madison.  She has been 
disciplined for professional 
misconduct 
on 
three previous 
occasions.  In 1994 she agreed to a private reprimand for 
failing to hold property of a client in trust, separate from her 
own property, and for failing to promptly deliver to a client 
funds or other property that the client was entitled to receive. 
In 1995 she agreed to a private reprimand for engaging in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation.  According to the summary of facts in the 
letter of reprimand, she altered an expiration date on a 
document.   
¶4 
In 1997 Attorney Evans agreed to a public reprimand 
for conduct in two separate matters involving failing to act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
client, failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the 
status of a matter and failing to comply with reasonable 
requests for information, and failing to explain the matter to 
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make an 
informed decision regarding representation.  
¶5 
The referee, Attorney John Schweitzer, made findings 
of fact based on testimony and documentary evidence presented at 
a disciplinary hearing concerning Attorney Evans' representation 
of a number of clients.  The referee found that in the course of 
representing 
these 
clients 
Attorney 
Evans 
engaged 
in 
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
3 
inappropriate activity with respect to the handling of her 
client trust account.1  The referee found that by depositing 
personal funds into her trust account and writing checks for 
personal expenses out of her trust account, Attorney Evans 
failed to hold in trust, separate from her own property, the 
property of clients or third persons that was in her possession 
in connection with a representation, contrary to SCR 20:1.15(a).2 
  
                     
1 During the course of this proceeding, the Board filed a 
motion seeking the temporary suspension of Attorney Evans' 
license, asserting that in view of her mishandling of her client 
trust account, her continued practice of law posed a threat to 
the interests of the public and the administration of justice.  
By order dated June 29, 1999, this court denied the Board's 
motion but imposed a number of conditions on Attorney Evans' 
continued practice to ensure that her trust account was operated 
in full compliance with the applicable professional conduct 
rules. 
 
2 Effective 
October 
1, 
2000, 
Wisconsin's 
attorney 
disciplinary process underwent a substantial restructuring.  The 
name of the body responsible for investigating and prosecuting 
cases involving attorney misconduct was changed to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation and the Supreme Court rules applicable to the 
lawyer regulation system were also revised.  Since the conduct 
underlying this case arose prior to October 1, 2000, the body 
will be referred to as "The Board" and all references to Supreme 
Court Rules will be to those in effect prior to October 1, 2000. 
  
SCR 20:1.15(a) provides: 
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
4 
¶6 The referee also found that by writing trust account 
checks to herself that were designated on the face of the checks 
as being attributable to the client but were not recorded on the 
ledger Attorney Evans allegedly kept for the client and by 
failing to keep any trust account records that would identify 
the purpose of sums she withdrew from funds belonging to her 
clients, Attorney Evans failed to keep complete and accurate 
records of transactions in her trust account, contrary to SCR 
                                                                  
(a) A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and third 
persons that is in the lawyer's possession in connection with a 
representation or when acting in a fiduciary capacity.  Funds 
held in connection with a representation or in a fiduciary 
capacity include funds held as trustee, agent, guardian, 
personal representative of an estate, or otherwise.  All funds 
of clients and third persons paid to a lawyer or law firm shall 
be deposited in one or more identifiable trust accounts as 
provided in paragraph (c).  The trust account shall be 
maintained in a bank, savings bank, trust company, credit union, 
savings and loan association or other investment institution 
authorized to do business and located in Wisconsin.  The trust 
account shall be clearly designated as "Client's Account" or 
"Trust Account" or words of similar import.  No funds belonging 
to the lawyer or law firm, except funds reasonably sufficient to 
pay or avoid imposition of account service charges, may be 
deposited in such an account.  Unless the client otherwise 
directs in writing, securities in bearer form shall be kept by 
the attorney in a safe deposit box in a bank, savings bank, 
trust company, credit union, savings and loan association or 
other investment institution authorized to do business and 
located in Wisconsin.  The safe deposit box shall be clearly 
designated as "Client's Account" or "Trust Account" or words of 
similar import.  Other property of a client or third person 
shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded.  If a 
lawyer also licensed in another state is entrusted with funds or 
property in connection with an out-of-state representation, this 
provision shall not supersede the trust account rules of the 
other state. 
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
5 
20:1.15(e).3  The referee also found that Attorney Evans failed 
to promptly deliver to a client funds that the client was 
entitled to receive and failed to render a full and accurate 
accounting regarding trust property, contrary to SCR 20:1.15(b).4 
                     
3 SCR 20:1.15(e) provides: 
(e) Complete records of trust account funds and other trust 
property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for 
a period of at least six years after termination of the 
representation.  Complete records shall include: (i) a cash 
receipts journal, listing the sources and date of each receipt, 
(ii) a disbursements journal, listing the date and payee of each 
disbursement, with all disbursements being paid by check, (iii) 
a subsidiary ledger containing a separate page for each person 
or company for whom funds have been received in trust, showing 
the date and amount of each receipt, the date and amount of each 
disbursement, and any unexpended balance, (iv) a monthly 
schedule of the subsidiary ledger, indicating the balance of 
each client's account at the end of each month, (v) a 
determination of the cash balance (checkbook balance) at the end 
of 
each 
month, 
taken 
from 
the 
cash 
receipts 
and 
cash 
disbursement journals and a reconciliation of the cash balance 
(checkbook balance) with the balance indicated in the bank 
statement, and (vi) monthly statements, including canceled 
checks, vouchers or share drafts, and duplicate deposit slips.  
A record of all property other than cash which is held in trust 
for clients or third persons, as required by paragraph (a) 
hereof, shall also be maintained.  All trust account records 
shall be deemed to have public aspects as related to the 
lawyer's fitness to practice.  
4 SCR 20:1.15(b) provides: 
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly 
notify the client or third person in writing.  Except as stated 
in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with 
the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or 
third person any funds or other property that the client or 
third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the 
client or third person, shall render a full accounting regarding 
such property. 
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
6 
 Further, the referee found that by representing to her clients 
that she was unable to pay them the balance owed because another 
check deposited to her account was returned when, in fact, there 
were insufficient funds in the trust account because of personal 
withdrawals she had made against the clients' money and by 
representing that checks written on her trust account were 
returned because a check a client had written to her bounced, 
Attorney Evans engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).5   
¶7 The referee also found that by failing to respond to 
inquiries of clients or to meet with them regarding the status 
of their case, Attorney Evans failed to keep a client reasonably 
informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information, contrary to SCR 20:1.4(a).6 
 The referee also found that Attorney Evans failed to explain a 
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client 
to 
make 
informed 
decisions 
regarding 
the 
representation, 
contrary to SCR 20:1.4(b).7  Attorney Evans did not appeal from 
                     
5 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:  
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation.  
6 SCR 20:1.4(a) provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about 
the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information.  
7 SCR 20:1.4(b) provides: 
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
7 
any of these findings of fact or conclusions of law by the 
referee. 
¶8 
The subject of this appeal involves Attorney Evans' 
representation of a client who was convicted of armed robbery 
and first-degree intentional homicide by a jury in Kenosha 
county in 1987.  His conviction was affirmed on appeal.  
Attorney Evans consulted with the client regarding the need to 
proceed in state court on a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (1993-94) motion 
raising the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  
On September 28, 1994, the client's father retained Attorney 
Evans by paying her a $3000 retainer fee.  The retainer 
agreement 
included 
provisions 
requiring 
Attorney 
Evans to 
consult with the client's father prior to hiring any experts, 
consultants or investigators and it gave the client's father the 
right to discharge Attorney Evans at any time.  The retainer 
agreement did not establish the client's father as a co-client 
with 
his 
son, 
nor 
did 
it 
establish 
an 
attorney-client 
relationship between the client's father and Attorney Evans.   
¶9 
On February 5, 1995, the client sent a letter to 
Attorney 
Evans 
outlining 
his 
concern 
about 
the 
lack 
of 
communication from her.  As a result of the letter, Attorney 
Evans met with the client and the two agreed that Attorney Evans 
would continue to represent the client and would review 
transcripts and research appellate issues.   
                                                                  
(b) A 
lawyer 
shall 
explain 
a 
matter 
to 
the 
extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation.  
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
8 
¶10 Attorney 
Evans 
was 
unexpectedly 
hospitalized 
on 
December 6, 1995.  A letter was prepared on December 26, 1995, 
to be sent to her clients informing them of the hospitalization 
but neither the client nor his father received the letter.  By 
letter of May 14, 1996, Attorney Evans informed the client that 
she had been hospitalized and would be returning to work for a 
few hours a week.  She said that during her illness she had 
written to authorities in Arizona in an attempt to obtain 
records relevant to his case.  
¶11 On July 16, 1996, the client received a letter from 
Attorney Evans' receptionist indicating that Attorney Evans 
would visit the client 
on 
July 
26 
at the 
correctional 
institution where he was incarcerated.  Attorney Evans did not 
appear at the correctional institution on that date.  In the 
fall of 1996, the client's father wrote to Attorney Evans 
requesting the opportunity to meet with her.  Attorney Evans did 
not respond, nor did she meet with the client's father. 
¶12 In December of 1996, the Wisconsin division of the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sent information to all 
inmates in the Wisconsin prison system notifying them about a 
recent court decision and a federal act that put time limits on 
federal habeas corpus actions.  The Anti-terrorism Act of 1996 
established a one-year time limit for filing federal habeas 
corpus petitions.  Existing federal case law interpreted the Act 
as requiring filing within a reasonable time in those cases that 
had been decided before the enactment of the Act.  A reasonable 
time period was interpreted to mean one year.  The federal 
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
9 
decision indicated that, as to cases predating the Anti-
terrorism Act, any federal habeas corpus petition filed on or 
before April 23, 1997, would be timely. 
¶13 When they learned of these new time limits, both the 
client and his father believed the only way to toll such time 
limits would be to commence a collateral proceeding under Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 (1993-94) in Wisconsin state court before April 
23, 1997.  In December of 1996, the client's father wrote to 
Attorney Evans outlining his and his son's concern about the 
deadline and whether it affected his son's case.  Attorney Evans 
wrote to the client on February 2, 1997, but made no mention of 
the Anti-terrorism Act.   
¶14 From December 1996 through April of 1997, the client's 
father continued to call and write Attorney Evans with increased 
anxiety and concern.  The last letter was written on April 23, 
1997.  At that time the client's father indicated he was waiting 
for a telephone response from Attorney Evans.  He did not hear 
from her.  On that same day, the client filed a pro se Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 (1993-94) motion in the trial court.  That court 
denied a hearing and the client appealed.  On August 19, 1998, 
the court of appeals reversed and ordered the trial court to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue raised in the 
motion. 
¶15 The client's father filed a grievance against Attorney 
Evans for a failure to communicate with him and his son.  On 
September 16, 1998, Attorney Evans sent a letter to the client 
saying she had had a conversation with an investigator in the 
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
10
public 
defender's 
office 
regarding 
the 
client's 
father's 
complaint.  She attached a copy of a letter written on her 
letterhead, dated March 24, 1997, and stated, "It appears that 
you never received the enclosed letter which I wrote to you back 
in March, 1997."  The March 24, 1997, letter indicated it was 
Attorney Evans' opinion that the recently enacted federal law 
and deadlines did not apply to the client's case.  
¶16 The March 24, 1997, letter contained a reference to 
the "federal public defender training program."  Although the 
correct name of the program was the "federal public defender 
training group," no version of that name came into existence 
until May of 1998.  The referee made findings of fact that the 
letter dated March 24, 1997, signed by Attorney Evans and 
described by her as having been written in March of 1997 was in 
fact not written at that time and that Attorney Evans' statement 
to Board investigators that she wrote to her client on March 24, 
1997, was untrue.   
¶17 The referee found that by drafting the letter dated 
March 24, 1997, after the fact and backdating it so that it 
would appear it was sent to the client on March 24, 1997, 
Attorney Evans engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).  The 
referee also concluded that by falsely representing to Board 
investigators that the letter dated March 24, 1997, was sent to 
the client on that date, Attorney Evans made a misrepresentation 
in a disclosure to the Board and failed to cooperate with the 
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
11
Board in such investigation, contrary to SCR 21.03(4)8 and SCR 
22.07(2).9   
¶18 Attorney Evans disputes the referee's finding that she 
fabricated the letter dated March 24, 1997.  She testified at 
the hearing that after her client posed the question regarding 
federal habeas corpus law, with which she was unfamiliar, she 
read the relevant statute and applicable case law.  She 
testified when she was still not confident with the results of 
her research, she called the federal public defender in Chicago. 
 She said that office was unable to assist her, so she called 
the federal public defender's office in San Diego.  That office 
was also not able to help her, but the person she spoke to gave 
                     
8 Former SCR 21.03(4) provided: 
(4) Every attorney shall cooperate with the board and the 
administrator in the investigation, prosecution and disposition 
of grievances and complaints filed with or by the board or 
administrator. 
9 Former SCR 22.07(2) provided: 
(2) During 
the 
course 
of 
an 
investigation, 
the 
administrator or a committee may notify the respondent of the 
subject being investigated.  The respondent shall fully and 
fairly disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct or medical incapacity within 20 days of being 
served by ordinary mail a request for response to a grievance. 
The administrator in his or her discretion may allow additional 
time 
to 
respond. 
 
Failure 
to 
provide 
information 
or 
misrepresentation 
in 
a 
disclosure 
is 
misconduct. 
 
The 
administrator or committee may make a further investigation 
before making a recommendation to the board.  
 
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
12
her an 800 number in Washington, D.C. and she said she called 
that number. 
¶19 Attorney Evans testified she did not know how the 
phone in the Washington, D.C. office was answered but as far as 
she knew she was calling the federal public defender.  She told 
the person who answered that she was calling about a habeas 
corpus question and she was transferred to someone else.  She 
testified she did not recall if she talked to a man or a woman, 
but whoever she talked to confirmed her research was correct.  
She testified at that point she wrote the March 24, 1997, letter 
to her client.  
¶20 Attorney Evans notes that Thomas Hutchison, who works 
with the federal public defender for the District of Columbia as 
part of the "federal defender training group," also testified at 
the hearing.  The "federal defender training group" is the name 
the organization has used since May of 1998.  Prior to that time 
it was known as the sentencing guidelines group.  Mr. Hutchison 
testified that in March of 1997 his group was physically located 
in the office of the federal public defender for the District of 
Columbia but the group's phones rang on a separate system from 
the rest of the public defender's phones and he could not rule 
out the possibility that someone walking by the phones did not 
pick up the phone and answer "public defender's office."  He 
said that would have been an unusual occurrence, however. 
¶21 Attorney Evans states that the evidence presented to 
the Board indicates there were four attorneys working in the 
sentencing guidelines group in March of 1997.  One of those 
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
13
attorneys was Fran Pratt.  Ms. Pratt maintained a record of the 
names of people who had called, and her computer records reflect 
that she spoke to Attorney Evans but the records do not identify 
the date of the call or the subject matter. 
¶22 Attorney Evans does not dispute her client's claim 
that he never received the March 24, 1997, letter but she 
insists she did author and send it on that date.  She argues 
that the referee's conclusion that she fabricated the letter was 
based almost entirely on the inference the referee drew from her 
use of the term "federal public defender training program."  The 
referee concluded that since the office was first called the 
"federal public defender training group" in 1998, the March 24, 
1997, letter using that name must be a fabrication.  Attorney 
Evans argues that the referee's analysis ignores the fact that 
her description of the group in the letter was generically 
correct because the office she called in Washington, D.C. was in 
fact an office of the federal public defender and was what she 
reasonably believed to be part of its training program.  
¶23 We conclude that the referee's finding that Attorney 
Evans fabricated the March 24, 1997, letter is supported by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
 
¶24 The record shows that Attorney Evans' client wrote to 
her on February 27, 1997, asking her opinion on the effect of 
the Anti-terrorism Act.  He wrote again on April 13, 1997, 
saying, 
 
 I have not heard from you since your February 2nd 
correspondence, and I have written to you twice since 
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
14
then.  . . .  I am confused and uncertain and would 
simply like to know whether you are still handling my 
case, and if so, whether the April 23rd deadline will 
affect my case in terms of filing in federal court 
down the line. 
¶25 The client's father testified at a deposition given in 
this proceeding that between December 1996 and April 1997 he 
made 30 to 50 phone calls to Attorney Evans but was never able 
to reach her.  He said on most occasions he left a message on 
her answering machine but on at least one occasion he spoke to 
someone in her office and left a message asking Attorney Evans 
to call him back.  She never responded.   
¶26 The client's father wrote letters to Attorney Evans on 
April 6, April 21 and April 23, 1997, imploring Attorney Evans 
to get in touch with them.  Again, she never replied.  It is 
clear from the letters sent by the client and his father in 
April of 1997 that the client never received the March 24, 1997, 
letter.  Although Attorney Evans continues to insist that she 
did send the letter on March 24, 1997, expressing her opinion 
that the Anti-terrorism Act did not affect her client's case, 
she fails to explain why she did not respond to any of the 
increasingly desperate requests for her opinion on that very 
subject made by both her client and his father throughout April 
of 1997.   
¶27 While it is possible that Attorney Evans did contact 
the sentencing guidelines group in Washington, D.C. in March of 
1997, it does not automatically follow that she wrote a letter 
to her client at that time. If, as she claims, the letter was 
sent on March 24, 1997, the flurry of communications from her 
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
15
client and his father in the weeks leading up to April 23, 1997, 
should have alerted Attorney Evans to the fact that the letter 
was never received.  This, in turn, should have caused her to 
get in touch with her client and/or his father and furnish them 
with another copy of the letter.  The only reasonable inference 
that can be drawn from the record is the one drawn by the 
referee: the letter was not written in March of 1997 but was 
drafted much later, probably around the time the Board commenced 
its investigation.  The referee's findings in this regard have 
not been shown to be clearly erroneous.  Consequently, we adopt 
them.  
¶28 Attorney 
Evans 
also 
appeals 
from 
the 
referee's 
recommendation that her license to practice law be suspended for 
two years.  She notes that the recommended two-year suspension 
stems largely from the referee's finding that she fabricated the 
March 24, 1997, letter.  She says if this court disagrees with 
the 
referee's 
findings 
concerning 
the 
letter, 
then 
the 
discipline imposed should be dramatically reduced.  In the 
alternative, she asserts that even if the referee's disputed 
factual finding about the March 24, 1997, letter should be 
adopted, a reduction in the recommended sanction is still 
appropriate.   
¶29 Attorney Evans asserts that a two-year suspension is 
overly harsh.  She points out that throughout her career she has 
worked for the most needy criminal defendants and her practice 
has involved helping people who are often otherwise poorly 
represented.  She says her contribution to the legal profession 
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
16
and her character is attested to by the various character 
witnesses who testified on her behalf at the hearing, including 
clients, fellow attorneys, judges and district attorneys.   
¶30 The Board takes the position that the trust account 
violations demonstrate a proven pattern of conduct that goes 
beyond the serious problem of putting client funds to her own 
personal use.  The Board notes that Attorney Evans used her 
client trust account as a personal account and failed to keep 
records that would enable her to distinguish client funds from 
her own funds.  She then wrote checks on an account when there 
were clearly insufficient funds to cover them and she lied to 
her clients about the reasons she was unable to pay them the 
sums they were due.   
¶31 The Board also asserts that the creation of a backdated 
letter as a means of responding to allegations of misconduct is 
disturbing and the March 24, 1997, letter represents an act of 
deception and dishonesty toward both her client and the Board.  
The Board contends that no number of character witnesses can 
rehabilitate Attorney Evans since her professional misconduct is 
no less serious in the face of accolades offered by her 
professional peers.  
¶32 Having 
considered 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
Attorney Evans' professional misconduct, including the misuse of 
her client trust account, her failure to keep her clients 
reasonably informed about the status of their cases and promptly 
comply with reasonable requests for information, and her 
fabrication of the March 24, 1997, letter, we determine that a 
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
17
two-year license suspension is appropriate.  That determination 
takes into account the mitigating factors of Attorney Evans' 
representation 
of 
people 
who 
are 
often 
otherwise 
poorly 
represented and her character as attested to by various 
witnesses.   
¶33 By her mishandling of her client trust account and the 
fabrication of a letter, Attorney Evans has shown a willingness 
to place her own financial interest above the welfare of her 
clients and has also established a pattern of deception to keep 
her 
professional 
misconduct 
from 
being 
discovered. 
 
The 
suspension we impose is intended not only to impress upon 
Attorney Evans the gravity of her professional misconduct but 
also to put other attorneys on notice of the degree of 
seriousness with which this court views conduct of this nature. 
¶34 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Reesa Evans to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of two 
years, effective December 22, 2000. 
¶35 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Reesa Evans pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, provided that if the 
costs are not paid within the time specified and absent a 
showing to this court of her inability to pay the costs within 
that time, the license of Reesa Evans to practice law in 
Wisconsin shall remain suspended until further order of the 
court.  
No. 
99-1011-D 
 
18
¶36 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Reesa Evans comply with the 
provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose 
license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.  
¶37 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Board's second motion 
for temporary suspension of Attorney Evans' license to practice 
law in Wisconsin and Attorney Evans' motion to modify this 
court's June 29, 1999, order regarding the maintenance of her 
client trust account are both dismissed as moot.  
  
 
 
1