Case Title: State v. Muhammad

Citation: 2007 VT 36

Docket Number: 2005-475

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Muhammad (2005-475)

2007 VT 36

[Filed 08-May-2007]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2007 VT 36

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2005-475

                             FEBRUARY TERM, 2007


  State of Vermont                     }         APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.                              }         District Court of Vermont,
                                       }         Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
  Joshua J. Muhammad                   }
                                       }         DOCKET NO. 1927-4-04 CnCr

                                                 Trial Judge: Michael S. 
                                                              Kupersmith

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       ¶  1.  Defendant appeals his conviction for sale of cocaine.  He
  asserts that the district court violated his constitutional rights and
  committed reversible error by denying his motion to dismiss based on the
  State's use of warrantless electronic monitoring, and by allowing a
  confidential source to refresh her recollection with the suppressed
  recording prior to testifying.  He further asserts that the court erred by
  permitting the State to introduce evidence of other bad acts.  We affirm.

       ¶  2.   The events underlying defendant's conviction took place on
  March 4, 2004.  A confidential source agreed to cooperate in a controlled
  drug buy with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in exchange for
  consideration on her own federal drug charge.  On the date at issue, she
  contacted Lauren Desautels, the woman defendant was living with, and set up
  a deal to purchase cocaine.  DEA officers then searched the source and her
  car, and equipped her with a wire and money to purchase the drugs. 
  Desautels failed to meet the source at the predetermined location, but the
  source later received a phone call from a man telling her to come to the
  house where defendant and Desautels lived together.  The officers followed
  the source to the residence and watched her enter through the front door. 
  About fifteen minutes later, the source emerged from the home.  She met the
  officers at a prearranged place, and handed over a bag containing cocaine. 
  She then informed the officers that defendant had given her the drugs.  
   
       ¶  3.  In April 2004, defendant was charged with one count of
  selling cocaine. (FN2)  18 V.S.A. § 4231(b)(2).  Prior to trial, defendant
  filed a motion to exclude and dismiss on the grounds that failure to obtain
  a warrant for the electronic monitoring in his home violated his rights
  under the Vermont Constitution.  In response, the State indicated that it
  would not use the illegal recording of the transaction at trial, or
  evidence derived from it, but would call the source to testify.  The court
  ordered that the recording be suppressed, but denied defendant's motion to
  dismiss.   

       ¶  4.  The day before trial, the court held a hearing to resolve
  evidentiary issues raised by the State.  Among these issues was whether the
  State could use the suppressed recording to refresh the source's
  recollection prior to trial, as the State intended to have her listen to
  the recording that afternoon.  The court ruled that the source could
  refresh her recollection with the suppressed recording.  The following
  morning, immediately preceding trial, defendant renewed his opposition to
  the State's use of the recording to refresh the source's recollection.  The
  court, however, determined that the issue was moot because the source had
  already listened to the recording.  At trial, Defendant was convicted of
  selling cocaine in violation of 18 V.S.A.§ 4231(b)(2). 

       ¶  5.  After trial, defendant sought a new trial on the ground that
  the court erroneously admitted evidence of other bad acts through a DEA
  officer's testimony.  See V.R.E. 404(b) (prohibiting evidence of other
  crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove propensity to act in conformity
  therewith).  The court denied the motion, finding that defendant had
  "opened the door to the introduction of the evidence" by cross-examining
  the officer on the theory that there was no evidence linking defendant to
  drug activity and that the officers acted out of racial bias because
  defendant was a black man living with a white woman.  This appeal followed.

       ¶  6.  Defendant now claims that the trial court committed
  reversible error in several respects.  He argues that the court erred by
  (1) denying his motion to dismiss based on the State's violation of his
  constitutional rights, (2) allowing the source to refresh her recollection
  using the suppressed evidence, and (3) permitting the State to introduce
  evidence of other bad acts at trial.
          
       ¶  7.   Defendant's first argument-that illegal wiretapping requires
  the trial court not only to exclude evidence derived from the wire but also
  to dismiss the case outright-fails for lack of support.  We first addressed
  the constitutionality of warrantless electronic monitoring conducted in the
  home in State v. Blow, where we held that such surveillance violates
  Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution.  157 Vt. 513, 520, 602 A.2d 552, 556 (1991); see also State v. Geraw, 173 Vt. 350, 357-58,