Case Title: Both v. SUPERIOR CT., IN & FOR CTY. OF MOHAVE

Citation: 121 Ariz. 381, 590 P.2d 920

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1979-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
121 Ariz. 381 (1979) 590 P.2d 920 Robert W. BOTH, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of Arizona, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF MOHAVE, Gary R. Pope, a Judge thereof, and Patricia M. BOTH, Real Party in Interest, Respondents. No. 14010. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. February 1, 1979. *382 Daniel J. Oehler, Bullhead City, for petitioner. CAMERON, Chief Justice. Petitioner in this special action seeks an order from this court directing respondent The Honorable Gary M. Pope, Judge of the Superior Court of Mohave County, to dismiss respondent Patricia M. Both's petition for modification of a foreign dissolution decree granting permanent custody of a minor child to her husband. We took jurisdiction in order to consider the recently enacted Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, A.R.S. §§ 8-401 to 8-424, effective 3 September 1978. We need answer only one question in this special action: Was the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction appropriate under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, A.R.S. §§ 8-401, et seq.? The facts necessary for a resolution of this matter are as follows. Robert V. Both and Patricia M. Both were married in 1971. A daughter was born to them in 1972 while they were living in New Jersey. In September 1976, the Boths separated under a written agreement which gave custody of the daughter to Robert and required Patricia to pay child support. Six months later, Robert moved from New Jersey to the State of Washington with his daughter. The agreement provided that if a divorce was instituted the agreement was to become part of any judgment rendered therein. Some four months later, Patricia moved to Seattle and the Boths attempted to live together as a family. Five months later (in November 1977), Patricia, while Robert was at work, took the child from school and left Seattle. Robert filed for dissolution in Washington and obtained an order for temporary custody of the child on 21 December 1977. In January 1978, Robert discovered that his wife and daughter were living in Mohave County and journeyed to Arizona to obtain physical custody of his daughter pursuant to the Washington custody order. Meanwhile, Patricia filed for separation in the Superior Court of Mohave County on 5 December 1977. Robert was not served until 8 February 1978 when he was in Mohave County to obtain custody of his daughter. Patricia was served with a summons in the Washington dissolution proceedings the same day. Robert appeared before the Arizona court; Patricia did not appear in the Washington proceedings. On 11 May 1978, the Washington court entered default judgment in favor of Robert dissolving the marriage and granting him permanent custody of the daughter under the same conditions as those contained in the New Jersey separation agreement. The Honorable Leonard Langford, Judge of the Mohave County Superior Court, dismissed Patricia's petition for separation on 21 July 1978 in an order which read as follows: That same afternoon, Robert traveled to Arizona to take custody of his daughter but again Patricia refused. Rather, she filed a petition in the Arizona court seeking modification *383 of the Washington decree. The respondent judge granted a temporary restraining order preventing Robert from taking his daughter to Washington, the minute entry of the court reading: Robert petitioned this court for a special action and we accepted jurisdiction. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, A.R.S. §§ 8-401, et seq., was enacted by our legislature in 1978, effective 3 September 1978. § 8-401 reads in relevant part: Although it is not clear from the record, it would appear that the respondent judge ordered the exercise of jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-403(A)(2). That section reads: The Commissioner's Comment to the Uniform Act reads: *384 There is no question that this statute gives the trial court jurisdiction to act when the requisite conditions exist and the best interests of the child are thereby served. This does not mean, however, that the trial court must act in every case in which it is alleged that the best interests of the child warrant the court's attention. We had occasion to consider this problem in McNeal v. Mahoney, 117 Ariz. 543, 574 P.2d 31 (1977), where a father who had been awarded custody of his daughter by the Texas court in a divorce proceeding delivered the child to the child's grandparents in Pinal County, Arizona, pursuant to a stipulation in the decree providing for such temporary custody until the father established a new job and residence in Georgia. He made a subsequent demand for her return which was refused. Five months later the grandparents petitioned the Superior Court of Pinal County to be appointed the child's temporary guardians. The trial judge granted the petition the same day ex parte. We referred to subsection B of A.R.S. § 25-331, which is identical to § 8-403(B), and reads: And we stated: The purpose of the Act, A.R.S. § 8-401, et seq., is to promote cooperation with courts of our sister states and to deter the practice, sadly all too common, of taking the child and fleeing to another jurisdiction. Usually the best interest of the child is served by having a determination in the state where the parties both reside and where the facts concerning the custody of the child are more readily available to the court. To allow the new state in which the child has been wrongfully taken automatically to take jurisdiction, defeats the purpose of the statute and in almost all instances is contrary to the best interest of the child. In the instant case, Robert had custody of the child under the New Jersey separation agreement and he instituted dissolution proceedings in Washington and brought them to fruition (including the formal grant of child custody to him) during the same period of time that the wife was instituting separation proceedings in Arizona. The wife was served in the Washington action and could have appeared in the Washington court. The child's "maximum contacts" were in the State of Washington. The child was taken from Washington and wrongfully retained in face of the Washington decree. Reliance on A.R.S. § 8-403(A)(2) to obtain modification of the Washington decree is misplaced. The court should not have exercised jurisdiction. *385 Relief is granted. The temporary restraining order previously issued by the respondent judge is set aside, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for such further action, consistent with this opinion, as may be proper. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and HAYS, HOLOHAN and GORDON, JJ., concurring.