Case Title: State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2000-Ohio-485

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm., 87 Ohio St.3d 561, 2000-Ohio-485.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. BAKER, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET 
AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm. (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 561.] 
Workers’ compensation — Denial of application for temporary total disability 
compensation by Industrial Commission not an abuse of discretion, when 
— Claimant who chooses to leave former position of employment for 
reasons unrelated to the industrial injury forfeits temporary total disability 
compensation eligibility. 
(No. 98-556 – Submitted November 2, 1999 — Decided January 26, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 96APD10-1283. 
 
On July 27, 1989, claimant-appellant, Paul W. Baker, injured his left knee 
while employed as a laborer for respondent-appellee Stahl-Wooster Division, A 
Scott Fetzer Company (“S-W”).  The record indicates that claimant missed work 
for the first half of 1990 due to two arthroscopic knee surgeries.  He alleges that 
during the recovery period, he encountered the plant manager, who made 
comments that, to claimant, implied that claimant’s job was in jeopardy. 
 
The record further indicates that claimant was released to return to light duty 
work on July 15, 1990.  However, the following day, claimant signed a termination 
notice with S-W, stating that the “reason” for the termination was that he had 
 
 
2
“accepted other employment.”  Subsequently, he began employment with Truck 
Stops of America (“TSA”).  According to claimant, the new job at TSA had 
approximately the same physical demands as his light duty job at S-W.  Claimant 
left TSA on September 24, 1990, allegedly due to his industrial injury. 
 
Following the allowance of his claim, claimant moved respondent-appellee 
Industrial Commission of Ohio for temporary total disability compensation 
(“TTC”), starting September 24, 1990.  The commission eventually denied that 
compensation, stating: 
 
“Temporary total compensation for the period 9-24-90 through 4-14-91, 
inclusive, is specifically denied.  The Hearing Officers find that the claimant 
voluntarily abandoned his position of employment with the instant employer and 
returned to work for a different employer.  The claimant describes this second 
position of employment as requiring about the same physical activities as his 
former position of employment. 
 
“The Hearing Officers note that the claimant was on Living Maintenance 
[compensation] during the period 4-15-91 through 11-14-91, inclusive.” 
 
In 1996, claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in denying his 
TTC request.  The court of appeals disagreed and denied the writ. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
 
3
__________________ 
 
M. Blake Stone, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and C. Bradley Howenstein, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.P., Richard A. Hernandez and 
Brett L. Miller, for appellee Stahl-Wooster Division, A Scott Fetzer Company. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  In State ex rel. McGraw v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 56 Ohio 
St.3d 137, 564 N.E.2d 695, we held that a claimant who chooses to leave his or her 
former position of employment for reasons unrelated to the industrial injury 
forfeits TTC eligibility.  In McGraw, the court quoted with approval from State ex 
rel. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1985), 29 Ohio App.3d 145, 
29 OBR 162, 504 N.E.2d 451, syllabus: 
 
“ ‘[W]here the employee has taken action that would preclude his returning 
to his former position of employment, even if he were able to do so, he is not 
entitled to continued temporary total disability benefits since it is his own action, 
rather than the industrial injury, which prevents his returning to such former 
position of employment.  Such action would include such situations as the 
acceptance of another position, as well as voluntary retirement.’ ”  McGraw, 56 
Ohio St.3d at 138, 564 N.E.2d at 697. 
 
 
4
 
In this case, claimant’s injury forced him from his former position of 
employment into lighter duty work with another employer.  However, when 
claimant quit S-W, his actions effectively precluded a return to any position with 
that company, invoking the principles of McGraw and Jones & Laughlin. 
 
Claimant asks us to overrule McGraw, and, in so doing, many of the 
decisions that underlie it.  This we refuse to do.  He alternatively asks us to find 
that his departure from S-W was injury-induced.  We again decline. 
 
Claimant left S-W for another job.  The latter employment, by claimant’s 
own admission, had the same physical demands as the job at which he was hurt.  
This finding undermines his assertion that he quit S-W because he could not do the 
work and provides “some evidence” supporting the commission’s determination 
that claimant’s departure was not injury-induced. 
 
Contrary to claimant’s suggestion, the commission was not required to 
accept claimant’s uncorroborated statement that a S-W employee implied that his 
job was in jeopardy.  Only the commission can evaluate evidentiary credibility 
and, in this instance, it did not find for claimant.  Accordingly, the commission’s 
conclusion as to the “voluntariness” of claimant’s departure is upheld. 
 
On a final note, claimant asserts that the receipt of living maintenance 
compensation for the period in which he was involved in the commission’s 
rehabilitation program compels payment of TTC for the period that preceded it, 
 
 
5
September 24, 1990 through April 14, 1991.  Finding no legal support for this 
assertion, we remain unpersuaded. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.