Case Title: Eckstein v. Estate of Dunn

Citation: 174 Vt. 575, 816 A.2d 494

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Eckstein v. Estate of Dunn (2001-514); 174 Vt. 575; 816 A.2d 494

[Filed 04-Nov-2002]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2001-514

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 2002


  George Eckstein, Oma Jane Lidell      }	APPEALED FROM:
  Smith, and George H. Lidell, Jr.	}
                                        }
       v.	                        }	Bennington Superior Court
                                        }	
                                        }
  Estate of Mildred Lidell Dunn	        }	DOCKET NO. 80-3-01 Bncv

                                                Trial Judge: John P. Wesley
  	
             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       George Eckstein, Oma L. Smith, and George L. Lidell, Jr., testator's
  heirs at law, appeal from a superior court decision to admit into probate
  the will of their aunt Mildred L. Dunn, in which Joan Teaford Gunterman,
  the testator's grand-niece, was named the sole beneficiary.  They raise two
  issues for our review: first, whether alterations made to the text of the
  will are so ambiguous as to render the will facially invalid, and second,
  whether the superior court erred in failing to find "suspicious
  circumstances," so as to shift the burden of proof on the issue of undue
  influence to the proponent of the will.  Because we find that the will was
  facially valid and that the superior court acted within its discretion in
  deciding that the will was not made under suspicious circumstances, we
  affirm.

       Mildred Dunn died on August 25, 2000, while a resident at the Equinox
  Terrace Home in Manchester, Vermont.  Dunn was ninety-six and a widow at
  the time of her death, leaving an estate estimated to be worth two million
  dollars.    

       Dating from the 1980s, Dunn sought legal advice from Thomas P. Whalen,
  Esq. of Manchester.  On December 19, 1988, Dunn executed a Last Will &
  Testament prepared by Whalen.  Subsequently, Dunn executed a First Codicil
  to her will on March 1, 1989, and a Second Codicil on July 16, 1997. 
  According to the estate plan established by the will and the two codicils,
  Dunn designated a large charitable gift to the Salvation Army and directed
  that the remainder of her estate be divided among two nieces and two
  nephews, three of whom are appellants in this action.
     
       In early August 1997, Whalen prepared a "draft" will, at Dunn's
  request, which incorporated the 1988 will and the two subsequent codicils
  into one document.  He met with Dunn, who requested that he leave the
  document with her.  Whalen then wrote "Draft Copy" at the top, blackened
  out the date, and left it with Dunn.  Whalen again met with Dunn on August
  27, at which time he discussed the contents of the "draft" will with her. 
  He concluded that Dunn was of sound mind and memory and able to recognize
  the objects of her bounty.  Dunn stated that she desired more time to
  review 

 

  the document before signing it.  An appointment for the execution of the
  will was scheduled for the following week on September 4, 1997.  In the
  meantime, Joan Teaford Gunterman ("Teaford"), Dunn's grand-niece, visited
  her grand-aunt at the Equinox Terrace sometime during that Labor Day
  weekend.
    
       Testimony at trial established that Teaford enjoyed a close
  relationship with Dunn from the time she was six-months old.  Their
  activities together included family holidays and frequent visits during
  summer vacations.  In the summer of 1980, Dunn and Teaford went on a trip
  to Sweden to explore their family heritage. The trip included visits to the
  family farm and meetings with relatives living there.  After her graduation
  from college, Teaford lived with Dunn for several months.  In 1987, Dunn
  decided to move from New York City to Dorset, Vermont, and Teaford assisted
  Dunn with packing and agreed to care for numerous items of personal
  property for storage and safekeeping.  Dunn and Teaford continued to
  maintain a close relationship, as Dunn frequently visited Teaford in New
  York.  When Teaford got married, Dunn was the matron of honor.  This close
  relationship continued throughout the remainder of Dunn's life.  

       On September 4, Whalen met with Dunn to execute the will.  Phyllis
  Binkley, who assisted Dunn with her financial affairs, and Teaford were
  present, although Whalen did not request their attendance at the meeting. 
  Teaford initiated discussion relating Dunn's concerns regarding a bequest
  of land to the Salvation Army and a bequest of spring rights to Dunn's
  nephew, George Eckstein.  Whalen then requested to meet privately with
  Dunn.  In this private meeting, Dunn stated her desire to make Teaford the
  sole beneficiary of her will.  Despite his opinion of a week earlier that
  she was of sound mind and memory, Whalen maintained that he became
  concerned about Dunn's competency.  His concern also arose because Dunn
  appeared rehearsed.  As a result, he was unwilling to prepare a revised
  will to fulfill Dunn's request and concluded the meeting by advising Dunn
  to give additional thought to the will.  Whalen acknowledged that some of
  the changes discussed at this meeting were consistent with the
  modifications which were made to the "draft" will.  He also recalled that
  Dunn had a red pen in her hand during his meeting with her, but that they
  did not make any changes to the "draft" will at that time.    
   
       Dunn retained possession of the "draft" will after the September 4
  meeting, and Whalen did not see her again until August 27, 1998, at which
  time he assisted her in deeding her house in Dorset, and its contents, to
  Teaford.  In the interim, Ann White, Dunn's care-giver, recalled trying to
  contact Whalen at Dunn's request, for the purpose of getting him to amend
  the will.  Whalen, however, did not recall those attempts.  At the August
  1998 meeting, according to Whalen, Dunn was alert and decisive in her
  actions.  While they discussed the effect of the deed transfer on her
  estate plan, they did not review the provisions of the "draft" will. 
  Following the execution of the deed from Dunn to Teaford, Whalen had no
  further contact with Dunn. 
          
       In February 2000, Dunn executed the "draft" will in the presence of
  three witnesses.  Between the time she deeded her house to Teaford in
  August 1998 and the time she executed her will, Dunn expressed her desire
  that Teaford, a tennis instructor, be left with sufficient means to
  maintain the home.  Teaford was not present when the will was executed nor
  did she visit Dunn on that day.  Two witnesses at trial testified that
  during this interim period Dunn frequently reviewed the "draft" will with a
  red inked pen nearby.  With the exception of two annotations made in
  pencil, all the revisions 

 

  were in red ink.  Mary Ellen Csizmesia, one of the witnesses to the
  execution of the will, testified that she saw Dunn make numerous changes to
  the "draft" will prior to its execution and that its text was altered in
  red ink.  At Dunn's instruction, Teaford later delivered the will to a
  lawyer, Orland Campbell.   

                       I. Facial Validity of the Will

       The first issue raised on appeal is whether the will is invalid on its
  face.  Because the will is undated and includes numerous handwritten
  alterations, the immediate heirs allege it to be so riddled with
  ambiguities as to render interpretation unworkable.  Consequently, based on
  the alterations and alleged ambiguities, they maintain that the will is
  invalid.

       This Court views the factual findings of a trial court in the light
  most favorable to the prevailing party and will refrain from setting them
  aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  See V.R.C.P. 52(a)(2);  Jarvis v.
  Gillespie, 155 Vt. 633, 637, 587 A.2d 981, 984 (1991).  According to
  statute, a will does not need to be dated or satisfy any particular form;
  the law requires that it be in writing, that it be signed by the testator,
  and that it be attested to by three or more witnesses.  14 V.S.A. § 5.  In
  this case, the record indicates that the will was clearly signed by the
  testator and properly witnessed by three competent, non-beneficiary
  witnesses.  The heirs argue that Dunn could not have intended such an
  informal document to be her will.  However, the superior court noted in its
  decision that Dunn worked on the alterations over a long period of time,
  under the continued expectation that her attorney would ultimately
  formalize the draft.  The superior court also noted that despite the
  uncertainty as to whether Ann White attempted to contact Whalen on Dunn's
  behalf in the period between the September 1997 meeting and the August 1998
  meeting, Dunn's desire to change her estate plan was unequivocally
  expressed, both to Ann White during that interim period and to Whalen at
  the conclusion of their September meeting.  Further, Mary Ellen Csizmesia,
  one of the three witnesses to the execution of the will, testified that she
  saw Dunn make numerous changes to the will prior to its execution and that
  the text of the will was altered by red ink.  A handwriting expert
  testified that the red-ink writing on the will was consistent with Dunn's
  handwriting.  Whalen also testified that a number of the alterations were
  in Dunn's handwriting.  Furthermore, he acknowledged that the some of the
  changes discussed at the September 4 meeting were consistent with the
  modifications which were made to the will. 
        
       The court's primary objective in a case such as this is to discern the
  testator's intent.  See Tuttle v. Tuttle, 112 Vt. 271, 278, 23 A.2d 523,
  525 (1942).  "To determine such intention, the court is to take the
  instrument by its four corners, consider it in all its parts, and give
  effect to its language read in the light of the relation of the parties
  concerned and the circumstances attending its execution."  In re Trust
  Estate of Harris, 120 Vt. 399, 404-05,