Case Title: State v. Myers

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2021-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 122,046 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
JESSICA LYNN MYERS, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
In Kansas, the right to appeal arises from statute, and an appellate court has 
jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeals by the State only if they are taken within 
the time limitations and in the manner prescribed by statute.  
 
2. 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3603 permits the State to file an interlocutory appeal from 
a district court order suppressing or excluding evidence that substantially impairs the 
State's ability to prosecute its case. 
 
3.  
When sentencing defendants as repeat offenders under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567, 
driving under the influence (DUI), the Legislature intended courts to count as prior 
convictions those out-of-state offenses comparable to Kansas' DUI statute in title, 
elements, and prohibited conduct, even if the elements of the out-of-state crime are 
broader.  
 
 
 
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4.  
The Missouri driving while intoxicated (DWI) statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 577.010, is 
comparable to K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567, and a conviction under Missouri's DWI statute 
constitutes a prior conviction under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(i)(3)(B). 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 58 Kan. App. 2d 903, 475 P.3d 1256 (2020). 
Appeal from Johnson District Court; SARA WELCH, judge. Opinion filed December 3, 2021. Judgment of 
the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is reversed, and 
the case is remanded with directions.  
 
Jacob M. Gontesky, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Stephen M. Howe, district 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellant. 
 
Adam D. Stolte, of Stolte Law, LLC, of Overland Park, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellee.  
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by  
 
WALL, J.:  Jessica Lynn Myers was arrested on suspicion of operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in Johnson County, Kansas, on 
February 14, 2019. Given her two prior Missouri driving while intoxicated (DWI) 
convictions, the State charged Myers with felony DUI as a third-time offender.  
 
Before trial, Myers filed a motion to strike her two prior Missouri DWI 
convictions, under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 577.010, from the proceedings. The district court 
granted the motion to strike, reasoning that Myers' prior Missouri DWI offenses were not 
"comparable" to those in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 8-1567, for purposes of determining whether 
Myers was a repeat DUI offender, because the elements of the Missouri DWI statute 
were not identical to, or narrower than, the elements of the Kansas offense. 
 
 
 
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Without the prior Missouri DWI convictions, the State could not prosecute Myers 
for felony DUI, and the State filed an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals held 
that K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3603 authorized the State's appeal. But the panel majority 
concluded that Sixth Amendment considerations articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), require the courts to apply the 
"identical-to-or-narrower-than" elements test in State v. Wetrich, 307 Kan. 552, 412 P.3d 
984 (2018), when determining whether an out-of-state DUI conviction is "comparable" to 
K.S.A. 8-1567 and may be included as a prior conviction. State v. Myers, 58 Kan. App. 
2d 903, 913, 919, 475 P.3d 1256 (2020). The panel majority affirmed the district court's 
ruling because the elements of the Missouri DWI statute are broader than the elements of 
the Kansas offense.  
 
In dissent, Judge Buser rejected this holding and adopted the rationale in State v. 
Patton, 58 Kan. App. 2d 669, 475 P.3d 14 (2020), and State v. Mejia, 58 Kan. App. 2d 
229, 466 P.3d 1217 (2020). See Myers, 58 Kan. App. 2d at 919 (Buser, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). In Patton and Mejia, the Court of Appeals held that prior 
DWI convictions from Missouri are "comparable" to K.S.A. 8-1567, even though the 
elements of the out-of-state offense are broader than Kansas' DUI statute. Patton, 58 Kan. 
App. 2d at 682; Mejia, 58 Kan. App. 2d at 240, 249.  
 
This appeal requires us to resolve two legal issues. First, we must interpret K.S.A. 
2020 Supp. 22-3603 to determine whether it vests the appellate courts with subject matter 
jurisdiction over the State's interlocutory appeal. Second, assuming jurisdiction is proper, 
we must construe K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567 to determine whether a Missouri DWI 
conviction is an offense "comparable" to Kansas' DUI statute. In turn, our holding will 
resolve the split of opinion that has emerged between various panels of the Court of 
Appeals on this issue.  
 
 
 
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After careful consideration of the record and thorough review of the legal 
arguments, we hold that K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3603 authorizes the State's interlocutory 
appeal and vests the appellate courts with subject matter jurisdiction. The statute permits 
the State to appeal from a district court's pretrial order suppressing evidence. For decades, 
we have interpreted this provision to authorize an interlocutory appeal from a district 
court's order excluding evidence, provided the ruling substantially impairs the State's 
ability to prosecute the case. Here, the district court's ruling substantially impaired the 
State's ability to prosecute Myers for felony DUI. 
 
As to the merits, we conclude that the meaning of the phrase "an offense that is 
comparable to" Kansas' DUI statute, as used within K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(i)(3)(B), 
is ambiguous. However, the legislative history makes clear the Legislature intended 
convictions from a nonexclusive list of jurisdictions, including Missouri, to be 
"comparable" offenses that qualify as a prior DUI offense under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-
1567, even if the elements of the out-of-state offense are broader. Therefore, the district 
court should have considered Myers' prior Missouri DWI convictions to determine if she 
had committed a first, second, third, or fourth or subsequent DUI.  
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The parties' arguments primarily raise questions of law requiring us to construe 
various statutory provisions. As such, most of the underlying facts are not relevant to our 
analysis. We briefly set forth those facts necessary to frame the legal issues raised on 
appeal.  
 
The State charged Myers with a felony DUI under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-
1567(b)(1)(D). That provision makes a third DUI offense a felony if one of the prior 
DUIs occurred in the last 10 years. Myers committed one of her Missouri DWIs in 2002 
 
 
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and committed the other one in 2010, well within the 10-year lookback period 
contemplated by statute.  
 
A few weeks later, Myers moved the court to "strike any prior out of state 
convictions from the Court's consideration." She argued that under K.S.A. 2020 Supp.   
8-1567(i)(3)(B), a court could consider out-of-state convictions only if they were 
"comparable" to a Kansas DUI offense and that under Wetrich, 307 Kan. at 562, 
convictions were "comparable" only if the elements of the out-of-state crime were 
identical to, or narrower than, the elements of the Kansas crime. The elements of the 
Missouri DWI statute were instead broader, Myers said, precluding the court from 
considering her two convictions from that state. The district court agreed and granted her 
motion. The State then timely filed this interlocutory appeal.  
 
On appeal, Myers challenged the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. She claimed 
that K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3603 did not authorize the State's appeal from the district 
court's order to strike. The Court of Appeals panel disagreed and held that it had 
jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal because the lower court's order had substantially 
impaired the State's ability to prosecute Myers as a third-time, felony DUI offender. 
Myers, 58 Kan. App. 2d at 906-09. 
 
But a majority of the panel agreed with Myers on the merits and held that Myers' 
prior Missouri DWI convictions could not be used to prosecute her as a third-time 
offender. 58 Kan. App. 2d at 919. As explained in more detail below, when deciding 
whether an out-of-state DUI offense is "comparable" to a Kansas offense, K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 8-1567(j)(3) directs courts to consider "the name" and "elements" of the out-of-
state offense and whether that offense "prohibits similar conduct." The majority believed 
these statutory factors invited sentencing courts to engage in judicial fact-finding 
prohibited by Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (holding that Sixth Amendment prohibits a 
 
 
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sentencing court from engaging in judicial fact-finding, other than prior convictions, to 
enhance the defendant's sentence). Myers, 58 Kan. App. 2d at 911-12. To avoid this 
result, the majority construed the statute to require a sentencing court to employ Wetrich's 
identical-to-or-narrower-than rule when determining whether an out-of-state conviction is 
"comparable." The majority reasoned that this construction would standardize the 
classification of out-of-state convictions and resolve any constitutional concerns under 
Apprendi. Myers, 28 Kan. App. 2d at 913-14. 
 
Both parties sought review of the panel's decision. Myers argued that the panel 
incorrectly held that it had jurisdiction over the State's interlocutory appeal. The State 
argued that the panel's interpretation of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567 was erroneous. We 
granted review of both petitions. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
To resolve this appeal, we must answer two questions. First, does K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 22-3603 vest this court with jurisdiction over the State's interlocutory appeal? 
Second, if it does, do Missouri DWI convictions count as prior convictions under K.S.A. 
2018 Supp. 8-1567(i) and (j) for purposes of sentencing a defendant as a repeat DUI 
offender? Answering each question requires us to engage in statutory interpretation, so 
we begin by outlining the applicable standard of review and legal framework.  
 
I. 
Standard of Review and Legal Framework 
 
As we have often said, the most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that 
we follow the Legislature's intent when we can establish it. We begin that search by 
looking at the statutory language. If that language is clear and unambiguous, we stop 
there. But if the language is unclear or ambiguous, then we must ascertain the 
 
 
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Legislature's intent by consulting legislative history and employing traditional canons of 
statutory construction. State v. LaPointe, 309 Kan. 299, 314, 434 P.3d 850 (2019). 
 
District courts and the Court of Appeals use the same approach. But statutory 
interpretation presents a question of law, so our review of the lower courts' conclusions is 
unlimited. State v. Alvarez, 309 Kan. 203, 205, 432 P.3d 1015 (2019). And we need not 
defer to their interpretation of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3603 (the jurisdiction statute) or 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567 (the DUI statute). 
 
II. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3603 Vests the Appellate Courts with Jurisdiction Over the 
State's Interlocutory Appeal 
 
 
The State filed an interlocutory appeal of the district court's order striking Myers' 
two Missouri DWI convictions. In Kansas, the right to appeal arises from statute, and we 
have jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeals by the State only if they are taken 
within the time limitations and in the manner prescribed by statute. State v. Sales, 290 
Kan. 130, 134, 224 P.3d 546 (2010). Here, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3603 defines the 
interlocutory appeal rights of the State. It permits the State to appeal when the district 
court has quashed a warrant or suppressed evidence, confessions, or admissions:  
 
"When a judge of the district court, prior to the commencement of trial of a criminal 
action, makes an order quashing a warrant or a search warrant, suppressing evidence or 
suppressing a confession or admission an appeal may be taken by the prosecution from 
such order if notice of appeal is filed within 14 days after entry of the order. Further 
proceedings in the trial court shall be stayed pending determination of the appeal." K.S.A. 
2020 Supp. 22-3603. 
 
The State's appeal was timely under that statute, so the controlling question is 
whether the district court's order to strike Myers' prior Missouri convictions falls within 
the scope of the statute. Myers argues that it does not and we lack jurisdiction to consider 
 
 
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the appeal. The State argues the district court's order falls within the scope of the statute 
because it is an order "suppressing evidence."  
 
Initially, Kansas appellate courts narrowly construed the term "suppressing 
evidence" in K.S.A. 22-3603 to mean the suppression of evidence unconstitutionally 
obtained by the government. See State v. Boling, 5 Kan. App. 2d 371, Syl. ¶ 5, 617 P.2d 
102 (1980). But in State v. Newman, 235 Kan. 29, 35, 680 P.2d 257 (1984), this court 
rejected that narrow reading. Drawing from the legislative history of K.S.A. 22-3603, 
Newman held that an order "suppressing evidence" includes "rulings of a trial court 
which exclude state's evidence so as to substantially impair the state's ability to prosecute 
the case." 235 Kan. at 34.  
 
The State can demonstrate substantial impairment of the prosecution even when 
the district court's evidentiary ruling does not technically foreclose the State from 
prosecuting the defendant or prevent it from proving the elements of the charged crime. 
See State v. Huninghake, 238 Kan. 155, 157, 708 P.2d 529 (1985). Moreover, we have 
held that a district court's order to exclude aggravating circumstances evidence at 
sentencing substantially impaired the State's ability to prosecute its sentencing case, 
thereby authorizing the State's appeal pursuant to K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3603. See State 
v. Kleypas, 282 Kan. 560, 564-65, 147 P.3d 1058 (2006). Thus, an order excluding 
evidence need not completely prevent the State from obtaining a conviction to 
substantially impair its ability to prosecute.  
 
While appellate courts "should not take jurisdiction of the prosecution's 
interlocutory appeal from every run-of-the-mill pretrial evidentiary ruling of a district 
court," jurisdiction is proper under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3603 where the prosecution 
"make[s] a showing to the appellate court that the pretrial order of the district court 
 
 
9 
 
appealed from substantially impairs the state's ability to prosecute the case." Newman, 
235 Kan. at 35.  
 
We conclude that the State has made that showing here. To explain why, it is 
first helpful to understand how the Legislature chose to address repeat DUI offenders 
under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567. That statute establishes progressively enhanced 
penalties for repeat offenders. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(b)(1)(A)-(E). A first 
conviction is a misdemeanor. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(b)(1)(A). A second conviction 
is a misdemeanor with increased jail time and fines. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(b)(1)(B). 
A third conviction is either a misdemeanor with even more severe penalties or a felony if 
the person has a prior DUI within the last 10 years. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(b)(1)(C), 
(D). And a fourth or subsequent conviction is always a felony. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-
1567(b)(1)(E).  
 
Here, the State charged Myers with a third-time, felony DUI offense. The State 
based the felony charge on Myers' two prior Missouri DWI convictions, one of which 
occurred within the preceding 10 years. But the district court granted Myers' motion to 
strike, precluding the court from considering those two convictions for any purpose in the 
proceedings. The district court could have dismissed the felony charge at that juncture. 
Had it done so, the dismissal would have triggered the State's statutory right to appeal 
pursuant to K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3602(b)(1). Instead, the district court's ruling merely 
suppressed evidence of the prior Missouri DWI convictions without dismissing the 
complaint. Without these convictions, the State could prosecute Myers only for a first-
time, misdemeanor DUI offense, rather than the felony count as charged. We are 
convinced that the district court's ruling "substantially impaired" the State's ability to 
prosecute Myers for felony DUI. Therefore, jurisdiction to consider the State's 
interlocutory appeal is proper under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3603.  
 
 
 
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III. The District Court Erred by Suppressing Evidence of the Defendant's Prior Missouri 
DWI Convictions Under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(i)(3)(B) and (j) 
 
As noted, K.S.A. 2020 Supp 8-1567 provides progressively enhanced penalties for 
repeat offenders. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(b)(1)(A)-(E). The Legislature has 
specified which prior convictions the court should consider when determining whether to 
sentence a defendant as a first-time, second-time, third-time, or fourth-or-subsequent-
time offender. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(i)(1)-(6).  
 
Where, as here, the defendant has an out-of-state conviction, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-
1567(i)(3)(B) provides that courts should count convictions "of a violation of . . . any law 
of another jurisdiction that would constitute an offense that is comparable" to the offenses 
described in the Kansas DUI statute. Myers argues that an out-of-state DUI conviction 
may constitute a prior offense only if the elements of that out-of-state offense are 
identical to, or narrower than, the elements of the Kansas DUI law. The district court and 
Court of Appeals majority adopted this interpretation of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567. 
However, the State argues the Legislature intended out-of-state DUI convictions to count 
if they are merely similar to the Kansas DUI law, even if the elements of the out-of-state 
offense are broader than the elements of the Kansas DUI law. We must employ 
traditional rules of statutory construction to ascertain the intent of the Legislature under 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(i)(3)(B) and determine whether the lower courts properly 
excluded Myers' Missouri convictions.  
 
A. The Meaning of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(i)(3)(B) and (j) Remains 
Ambiguous 
 
We conducted an analogous statutory analysis in Wetrich. There, we interpreted 
K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6811(e)(3), a provision that guides the courts in deciding whether 
prior out-of-state offenses are classified as person or nonperson crimes for criminal 
history purposes under the revised Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA). That 
 
 
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statute directed the State to compare the out-of-state offense to "comparable offenses" 
under the Kansas Criminal Code:   
 
"(3) The state of Kansas shall classify the crime as person or nonperson. In designating a 
crime as person or nonperson, comparable offenses under the Kansas criminal code in 
effect on the date the current crime of conviction was committed shall be referred to. If 
the state of Kansas does not have a comparable offense in effect on the date the current 
crime of conviction was committed, the out-of-state conviction shall be classified as a 
nonperson crime." (Emphases added.) K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6811(e)(3). 
 
In Wetrich, we had to determine whether the Legislature intended "comparable offenses" 
to be limited by defendant's proposed "identical-to-or-narrower-than" elements test or, 
instead, the State's broader interpretation of the statute.  
 
As always, we started with the text of the statute. Wetrich first consulted 
dictionaries and thesauruses to determine the common meaning of "comparable." The 
exercise revealed two common meanings:  (1) akin, alike, or approximate (which 
supported the State's position); and (2) identical, interchangeable, or equivalent (which 
supported the defendant's position). 307 Kan. at 559-60. Based on that ambiguity, we 
turned to the statute's legislative history and concluded that the "identical-to-or-narrower-
than" elements approach to classifying out-of-state offenses as person or nonperson 
crimes more closely tracked the purposes and objectives of the KSGA. 307 Kan. at 561-
62. 
 
While we find Wetrich's analytical model instructive, this case requires us to 
interpret different statutory provisions. Like the statute at issue in Wetrich, K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 8-1567(i)(3)(B) directs courts to consider whether out-of-state offenses are 
"comparable" to a Kansas offense. But the DUI statute identifies additional factors 
 
 
12 
 
relevant to the comparability analysis, including "the name" and "elements" of the out-of-
state offense and whether that offense "prohibits similar conduct":   
 
"(j) For the purposes of determining whether an offense is comparable, the following 
shall be considered:   
 
(1) The name of the out-of-jurisdiction offense; 
(2) the elements of the out-of-jurisdiction offense; and 
(3) whether the out-of-jurisdiction offense prohibits similar conduct to the  
conduct prohibited by the closest approximate Kansas offense." K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 8-1567(j)(1)-(3). 
 
 
While these factors provide additional guidance, they do not resolve the ambiguity 
in the meaning of a "comparable" out-of-state DUI conviction. The amended statute 
identifies factors that sentencing courts "shall" consider when conducting a comparability 
analysis, but it is unclear precisely how a district court should consider them. Is one 
factor enough? Should the court consider the totality of the circumstances? Are the 
factors weighted evenly? And how similar must an offense (or the prohibited conduct) be 
to deem it comparable to a Kansas DUI? The text of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567 alone 
does not resolve these open questions. 
 
Based on that ambiguity, we turn to the legislative history to determine what the 
Legislature intended when it defined a "conviction" to include "a violation of . . . any law 
of another jurisdiction that would constitute an offense that is comparable" to the offenses 
described in the Kansas DUI statute. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(i)(3)(B). See State v. 
Coman, 294 Kan. 84, 93, 273 P.3d 701 (2012) (When faced with statutory ambiguity, the 
canons of statutory construction must be applied and legislative history consulted for 
indications of legislative intent.). 
 
 
 
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B. The Legislature's 2018 Amendments to K.S.A. 8-1567 Responded to Stanley 
 
In 2018, the Legislature amended the DUI statute by defining a "conviction" to 
include a "conviction of a violation of . . . any law of another jurisdiction that would 
constitute an offense that is comparable to the offense described in subsection (i)(1) or 
(i)(2)." See L. 2018, ch. 106, § 13. The Legislature also created the three "comparability" 
factors referenced above in subsection (j). See L. 2018, ch. 106, § 13. Before those 
amendments, an out-of-state conviction counted as a prior conviction if the other state's 
DUI law would "constitute a crime described" in the Kansas DUI law. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 
8-1567 (i)(1), (3).  
 
A panel of the Court of Appeals interpreted the prior version of the statute in State 
v. Stanley, 53 Kan. App. 2d 698, 390 P.3d 40 (2016). It construed the statute narrowly to 
include as a prior offense only those out-of-state offenses whose elements were identical 
to, or narrower than, the elements of K.S.A. 8-1567. 53 Kan. App. 2d at 700-01. The 
panel determined that the elements of Missouri's DWI statute were broader than those of 
the Kansas DUI statute. Therefore, it held K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 8-1567 precluded the 
district court from counting a Missouri conviction as a prior DUI conviction. 53 Kan. 
App. 2d at 701.  
 
Two years later, the Kansas County and District Attorneys Association lobbied the 
Legislature to overhaul the Kansas DUI statute. Representatives of that organization 
testified that Stanley, along with other precedent, had made the enforcement of Kansas' 
DUI statute confusing and ineffective. See, e.g., Hearing on S.B. 374 Before the Kansas 
Senate Judiciary Committee (February 12, 2018) (testimony of Aaron Breitenbach).  
 
The organization's proposed statutory amendments were reflected in S.B. 374, 
which was introduced in the Senate on February 5, 2018. Sen. Journal, p. 1538 (February 
 
 
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5, 2018). New section 1 proposed to count prior DUI convictions from any other state or 
territory as an offense comparable to Kansas' DUI statute. Specifically, the proposed 
language provided that "convictions for a violation of any of the following laws, and 
amendments thereto" would be deemed comparable offenses, and then the bill listed the 
DUI statutes for all 49 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. S.B. 374 (2018), 
as introduced, pp. 2-3.  
 
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, S.B. 374 supporters testified that the 
proposed amendment was a direct response to the panel's holding in Stanley. The chair of 
the Kansas County and District Attorneys Association's DUI Legislative Group noted that 
the proposal was a "comprehensive response" to Stanley and other cases. Testimony of 
Breitenbach on S.B. 374.  
 
A Johnson County assistant district attorney also complained that Stanley had 
forced the county's probation office to regularly amend what should have been felony 
DUIs to misdemeanor DUIs:   
 
"In Johnson County the ramifications of the State v. Stanley decision cannot be taken 
lightly. From 2016 to 2017 we have seen a 9% decrease in the number of felony DUI's 
supervised by our probation office. On a weekly basis, our office must amend felony 
DUI's to misdemeanor DUI's because of the inability to use out of state convictions, in 
particular Missouri convictions, in light of Stanley. Repeat offenders are not being held 
accountable at the level the legislature intended them to be because the Court of Appeals 
ruled the Kansas statute was more stringent. In other words, because Missouri law says 
you are Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) if you are in an intoxicated or drugged 
condition and Kansas law says it is to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle, the court held the degree of intoxication could be different and 
therefore a conviction under this MO statute cannot be used as prior conviction in 
Kansas." Hearing on S.B. 374 Before the Kansas Senate Judiciary Committee (February 
12, 2018) (testimony of R. Ann Henderson). 
 
 
15 
 
 
The McPherson County Attorney raised similar concerns:   
 
"Kansas courts have severely limited out-of-state DUI convictions that count towards a 
prior DUI conviction in Kansas. While our sister states may define a DUI in different 
words, a DUI conviction in one state should be a DUI conviction in our state. Section 1 
of this proposal addresses this issue to make certain that drivers with prior DUI 
convictions in another state are treated similarly to drivers with prior Kansas DUI 
convictions." Hearing on S.B. 374 Before the Kansas Senate Judiciary Committee 
(February 12, 2018) (testimony of Gregory Benefiel). 
 
But the Senate ultimately passed an amended bill that did not contain the original 
language of section 1 (which characterized all DUI statutes in other states, the District of 
Columbia, and Puerto Rico as offenses comparable to DUI in Kansas). S.B. 374 (2018), 
as amended by Senate Committee, pp. 1-3. According to a supplemental note prepared 
by the Legislative Research Department, the Kansas County and District Attorneys 
Association offered an amendment that removed this language at the request of the 
Judiciary Committee. Supplemental Note on Senate Bill No. 374 (2018), p. 8-374. The 
record does not explain why the Committee sought that amendment. 
 
The Senate's amended version of S.B. 374 was introduced in the House of 
Representatives and referred to the House Judiciary Committee. House Journal, p. 2447 
(February 28, 2018); House Journal, p. 2452 (March 1, 2018). Several interested parties 
requested the House Judiciary Committee reinstate the original language from section 1. 
The witnesses testified that without the original language from section 1, sentencing 
courts would still be required to apply the "identical-to-or-narrower-than" elements test to 
define "comparable" offenses, which would exclude many out-of-state DUI convictions 
from being counted as prior offenses. See Hearing on S.B. 374 Before the Kansas House 
Judiciary Committee (March 13, 2018) (testimony of Karen Wittman); Hearing on S.B. 
 
 
16 
 
374 Before the Kansas House Judiciary Committee (March 13, 2018) (testimony of Kim 
Parker); Hearing on S.B. 374 Before the Kansas House Judiciary Committee (March 13, 
2018) (testimony of Amanda Stanley).  
 
The House responded to these concerns by adopting a substitute version of S.B. 
374. This substitute bill added the "comparability" provisions found in the current version 
of the statute at K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(i)(3)(B) and (j)(1)-(3). See H. Sub. for S.B. 
374, pp. 17-18.  
 
After the House passed the substitute version, S.B. 374 returned to the Senate. The 
Senate did not concur with the House's substitute bill and requested a conference 
committee. House Journal, p. 2729 (April 2, 2018). However, the version of the bill that 
emerged from conference retained the comparability provisions added to the substitute 
version. The conference committee also added a preamble to the bill, which is an 
"introductory statement in a constitution, statute, or other document explaining the 
document's basis and objective." Black's Law Dictionary 1423 (11th ed. 2019). The first 
section of the preamble explained that the Legislature intended courts to count an out-of-
state DUI conviction as a prior offense, even if the out-of-state statute is broader than the 
Kansas DUI statute:   
 
"WHEREAS, The Legislature intends that the provisions of this act related to 
comparability of an out-of-jurisdiction offense to a Kansas offense shall be liberally 
construed to allow comparable offenses, regardless of whether the elements are identical 
to or narrower than the corresponding Kansas offense, to be included in a person's 
criminal history." House Journal, p. 3078 (May 2, 2018).  
 
 
The second section of the preamble explained that the Legislature intended 
convictions from a nonexclusive list of jurisdictions, including Missouri, to be 
comparable offenses that qualify as a prior DUI offense under K.S.A. 8-1567:   
 
 
17 
 
 
"WHEREAS, The Legislature intends to promote the inclusion of convictions for 
such offenses in a person's criminal history, including, but not limited to, any violation 
of:  Wichita municipal ordinance section 11.38.150; Missouri, V.A.M.S. § 577.010 or 
V.A.M.S. § 577.012; Oklahoma, 47 Okl. St. Ann. § 11-902; Colorado, C.R.S.A. § 42-4-
1301(1); and Nebraska, Neb. Rev. St. § 60-6,196." House Journal, p. 3078 (May 2, 
2018). 
 
The House and Senate both adopted the version of the bill that came out of the 
conference committee. House Journal, p. 3097 (May 2, 2018); House Journal, p. 3117 
(May 3, 2018). The Governor signed the bill, and it went into effect on July 1, 2018. Sen. 
Journal, p. 2475 (May 4, 2018); L. 2018, ch. 106, § 13. 
 
C. The Legislature Intended to Eliminate the Identical-to-or-Narrower-than Test 
for Comparability of Out-of-State DUI Offenses and to Include Missouri DWI 
Convictions as Comparable Offenses Under K.S.A. 8-1567 
 
The legislative history of S.B. 374 evidences the Legislature's intent to reject the 
identical-to-or-narrower-than approach as the controlling definition of a "comparable" 
offense. Instead, the Legislature intended to include out-of-state statutes similar to the 
Kansas DUI statute, even if the elements are broader than the DUI offense in Kansas.  
 
The preamble tells us as much. First, the Legislature explicitly rejects the 
identical-to-or-narrower-than approach to determining whether an out-of-state DUI 
conviction qualifies as a prior offense. The first section of the preamble states that the 
Legislature intends for "comparable offenses" to be included in a person's criminal 
history "regardless of whether the elements are identical to or narrower than the 
corresponding Kansas offense." L. 2018, ch. 106, Preamble.  
 
 
 
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Second, the preamble states that provisions related to the "comparability of an out-
of-jurisdiction" offense should be "liberally construed." When the directive to liberally 
construe "applies to interpretation of only the statute in which it is contained"—as it does 
here—the directive may reflect the "legislature's clarification of the statute's meaning." 
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 244 (2012). That 
appears to be the case here. A fair reading of the preamble establishes that the Legislature 
intended courts to interpret the statute "with a thumb on the side of the scales that 
produces expansive application of the statute." Scalia, at 245. 
 
We of course recognize that a legislative preamble is not part of the enacted 
statute. But, when faced with statutory ambiguity, "[a] preamble, purpose clause, or 
recital is a permissible indicator of meaning." Scalia, at 217. Such prefatory clauses set 
forth "the assumed facts and the purposes that the majority of the enacting legislature . . . 
had in mind, and these can shed light on the meaning of the operative provisions that 
follow." Scalia, at 218.  
 
The legislative testimony is also instructive. The prosecutors who lobbied the 
Legislature to overhaul the Kansas DUI law and drafted S.B. 374, as introduced, testified 
that the amendments were necessary to change the law in the wake of Stanley's adoption 
of the "identical-to-or-narrower-than" elements approach to defining "comparable" out-
of-state offenses for sentencing purposes. After the Senate passed a version of S.B. 374 
that eliminated those amendments in section 1, the prosecutors lobbied the House 
Judiciary Committee to reinsert the language so that courts could count a broader range 
of out-of-state convictions when sentencing defendants as repeat DUI offenders. The 
final version of the bill did not reinsert section 1 as originally drafted, but it did respond 
to the proponents' concern by adding the comparability provisions found in the current 
version of the statute. Likewise, the Legislature added the preamble language clarifying 
that convictions for out-of-state DUI offenses similar to Kansas' DUI statute, including 
 
 
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Missouri DWI convictions, are comparable offenses that should be considered when 
sentencing a defendant as a repeat DUI offender.  
 
 
In short, the Legislature intended the 2018 amendments to K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-
1567 to require sentencing courts to count out-of-state convictions under laws similar to, 
though perhaps broader than, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567. As noted previously, Myers has 
two prior Missouri convictions under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 577.010. Because one of those 
convictions happened within 10 years of her arrest here, the State charged Myers with 
felony DUI, as a third-time offender. We must now decide whether those Missouri 
convictions count as comparable out-of-state convictions under our construction of 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(i)(3)(B). We conclude that they do.  
 
Stanley determined that the elements of a Missouri DWI under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 
577.010 are broader than the elements of Kansas DUI under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 8-
1567(a). 53 Kan. App. 2d at 701. A different panel of the Court of Appeals reached the 
same conclusion in State v. Mejia, 58 Kan. App. 2d 229, 241-42, 466 P.3d 1217, rev. 
denied 312 Kan. 898 (2020). And neither the State nor Myers disputes that the Missouri 
statute is broader, so we presume that it is. 
 
Even so, the Legislature plainly intended courts to count convictions under Mo. 
Rev. Stat. § 577.010 as comparable out-of-state convictions for determining whether a 
defendant is a first-, second-, third-, or fourth-or-subsequent-time DUI offender. The 
prior version of the statute directed courts to count a "conviction of a violation of . . . any 
law of another state which would constitute a crime" under the Kansas DUI statute. 
(Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 8-1567(i)(1), (3). Our appellate courts interpreted 
that language to require the "identical-to-or-narrower-than" test. The Legislature then 
amended the statute and directed courts to count a "conviction of a violation of . . . any 
law of another jurisdiction that would constitute an offense that is comparable to the 
 
 
20 
 
offense described" in the Kansas DUI statute. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-
1567(i)(3)(B). The modified statutory language clearly reflects the Legislature's intent to 
broaden the meaning of comparable out-of-state-offenses.  
 
Further, the preamble and legislative testimony confirm that those 2018 
amendments to K.S.A. 8-1567 were designed to dispose of the "identical-to-or-narrower-
than" elements test as the controlling definition of a "comparable" out-of-state offense. In 
its place, the Legislature intended to define "comparable" out-of-state offenses to include 
those that are similar to Kansas' DUI statute in title, elements, and prohibited conduct, 
including Missouri's DWI statute specifically, even if the elements of the out-of-state 
crime are broader.  
 
We do not mean to suggest that a conviction under the DUI law of any state 
should count as a prior conviction in a DUI prosecution. After all, the DUI laws of some 
states may be far broader than K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567. And the variance may preclude 
a finding that the out-of-state offense is one that is "comparable to the offense described" 
in Kansas' DUI statute. But we need not define the outer boundaries or contours of 
"comparable" out-of-state convictions under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(i)(3)(B) to 
resolve this appeal. Here, Myers' prior convictions were in Missouri only. And the record 
makes clear that when sentencing a defendant as a repeat DUI offender, the Legislature 
intended a prior Missouri DWI conviction to be a "comparable" offense.  
 
We also disagree with the majority of the panel below that the comparability 
factors in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(j) invite judicial fact-finding in contravention of 
Apprendi. Subsections (j)(1) and (j)(2) clearly direct sentencing courts to look to the out-
of-state offense's title and elements to determine if the offense is comparable for purposes 
of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(i)(3). No judicial fact-finding is required under those 
subsections. Nor does subsection (j)(3) invite fact-finding. That subsection directs courts 
 
 
21 
 
to consider whether the out-of-state offense prohibits "similar conduct" to that of the 
"closest approximate Kansas offense." See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1567(j)(3). That 
subsection requires the district court to evaluate the statutory language of the out-of-state 
offense, not the facts underlying the conviction, to determine what conduct is prohibited. 
Further, the determination of whether an out-of-state offense is "similar enough" to a 
Kansas offense is a legal determination, not a factual one. See James v. United States, 
550 U.S. 192, 214 & 214 n.8, 127 S. Ct. 1586, 167 L. Ed. 2d 532 (2007) (judicial inquiry 
into whether prior conviction "involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another" requires "statutory interpretation, not judicial factfinding" and 
thus does not implicate Apprendi), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. United 
States, 576 U.S. 591, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 192 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2015). Therefore, K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 8-1567 does not implicate any of the Sixth Amendment considerations articulated 
in Apprendi.  
 
 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the district court's ruling to strike Myers' prior 
Missouri DWI convictions and reverse the Court of Appeals holding that prior Missouri 
DWI convictions are not "comparable" to Kansas' DUI offense, based on the identical-to-
or-narrower-than" elements test, for purposes of sentencing a defendant as a repeat DUI 
offender. We remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.