Case Title: State v. Long

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80284-0

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 11–0197 
 
Filed June 8, 2012 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
PETER KELLY LONG, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Kurt L. 
Wilke, Judge. 
 
 
The State seeks further review from a court of appeals decision 
which vacated the defendant’s enhanced sentence of life in prison 
without parole for a second conviction of sexual abuse or lascivious acts 
with a child under Iowa Code section 902.14.  DECISION OF COURT OF 
APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel L. Mullins, Assistant 
Attorney General, and Ricki L. Osborn, County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, Emily Zerkel, Student 
Legal Intern, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for 
appellant. 
 
 
 
 
2 
ZAGER, Justice. 
 
Peter Kelly Long was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse in 
violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1(3) and 709.4(2)(b) (2009).  Based on 
two 1996 convictions for lascivious acts with a child, the district court 
found that Long had committed a class “A” felony under section 902.14 
and sentenced Long to life in prison without the possibility of parole.  
Long appealed, claiming the district court abused its discretion when it 
allowed the State to reopen the record after the State had rested and 
after the defense had made a motion for judgment of acquittal during the 
enhancement trial.  We transferred the case to the court of appeals.  The 
court of appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the 
district court to render a verdict on the enhancement based solely on the 
evidence introduced prior to the reopening of the record.  The State 
sought further review, which we granted.  We conclude the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in reopening the record under the 
circumstances of this case.  Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the 
court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court. 
I.  Background Facts and Procedural History. 
In February of 2010, A.M., who was twelve years of age, spent the 
weekend at the home of Peter and Tanya Long.  A.M. was going to 
babysit the Longs’ children while the couple did some work around their 
house.  After A.M. had gone to bed, Long entered her bedroom and 
sexually assaulted her.  A.M. called her mother who came to the house, 
picked A.M. up, and drove her to the hospital where police were informed 
of the assault. 
On July 15, Long was charged by trial information with third-
degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1(3) and 
709.4(2)(b).  The trial information also notified Long of the potential 
 
 
 
3 
enhancement of his sentence under section 902.14 based on Long’s prior 
convictions for lascivious acts with a child.  Long pled not guilty, and 
trial commenced on November 30.  On December 1, the jury found Long 
guilty of third-degree sexual abuse. 
Long waived his right to a jury trial on the sentencing 
enhancement under section 902.14 based on his prior convictions, and 
the issue was tried to the district court.  In support of the enhancement, 
the State offered certified copies of Long’s two convictions from December 
30 and 31, 1996.  Both of these convictions were for lascivious acts with 
a child in violation of Iowa Code section 709.8 (1995), a class “D” felony.  
The particular subsection was not indicated on the sentencing orders.  
The State also called three witnesses in support of the enhancement: 
Jason Bahr, a detective with the Webster County Sheriff’s Office who 
investigated the incident involving A.M.; Barbara Ann Krug, a 
probation/parole officer with the Department of Correctional Services 
who supervised Long at a residential work facility; and Russell Goebel, 
another probation/parole officer.  All three identified Long as the person 
who had previously been convicted of committing lascivious acts with a 
child.  Additionally, through Bahr, the State offered a videotaped 
interview of Long from 2010 where he discussed his past offenses.  The 
State then rested. 
Long immediately moved for a judgment of acquittal, claiming the 
State had not met its burden regarding the enhancement.  Specifically, 
Long pointed out that Iowa Code section 902.14 (2009) only applies to a 
lascivious acts conviction under subsections 709.8(1) or (2), whereas 
convictions for violations of sections 709.8(3) or (4) do not lead to an 
enhanced sentence.  Since the evidence provided by the State only 
established Long violated section 709.8, but not the particular 
 
 
 
4 
subsection of the statute that was violated, Long argued the State had 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Long was guilty of the 
applicable subsections subjecting him to the enhanced sentence.  
Therefore, the enhancement should be denied.  The State responded by 
arguing that the only issue at the enhancement trial was the defendant’s 
identity and not which subsection he violated.  The district court took the 
motion for judgment of acquittal under advisement. 
The next morning, on December 2, the State moved to reopen the 
record, and an expedited hearing on this motion was conducted later 
that day.  The State sought to reopen the record to call the court reporter 
from the 1996 guilty plea proceedings.  This person could lay the 
foundation for the transcripts from the guilty plea proceeding where Long 
admitted touching the genitals of two children, which would violate 
subsection 709.8(1), and would satisfy the enhancement requirements of 
section 902.14.  The State pointed out that Iowa Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 2.19(9), which governs the trial of questions involving prior 
convictions, only requires the State to prove the identity of the defendant 
is the same as the person named in the prior conviction and that the 
defendant was represented by counsel at the time of the prior conviction.  
The rule also requires that if the defendant has any other objections to 
the prior conviction evidence, he must assert those objections prior to 
trial.  Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(9).  The State argued that by not asserting 
the issue of which subsection of 709.8 was violated in 1996, Long waived 
his right to bring the objection. 
Long claimed that his defense strategy was based on the minutes 
of testimony the State provided at the beginning of the case.  Long 
claimed that he knew the minutes did not include any documents that 
would indicate which subsection of 709.8 he violated, or any witness who 
 
 
 
5 
had knowledge of which subsection of 709.8 he violated.  There was no 
mention in the minutes of testimony of transcripts of his guilty plea 
proceedings.  Long argued this would result in unfair surprise and he 
would be unfairly prejudiced if this information were allowed to be 
introduced at this late stage.  Long’s attorney claimed the State “just 
blew it.  They want a second bite at the apple.” 
On December 6, the district court granted the State’s motion to 
reopen the record.  In its order, the district court quoted from State v. 
Kukowski, 704 N.W. 2d 687, 693 (Iowa 2005), and found that under rule 
2.19(9), Long had not waived his right to object.  However, after 
balancing the seven factors this court set forth in State v. Teeters, 487 
N.W.2d 346, 348 (Iowa 1992), the court felt it was appropriate to reopen 
the record.  The court noted that the evidence the State sought to admit 
was not introduced based on a mere oversight.  The court also concluded 
that Long would not be prejudiced by this information since the 
enhancement had been an issue since the trial information had been 
filed.  The court also noted that this was a bench trial, so there was no 
danger that a jury might accord undue weight to the newly admitted 
evidence.  Also, the evidence was admissible and material.  Finally, the 
court noted that the State made its motion only one day after the bench 
trial commenced, and the court had not yet made a ruling on the 
enhancement issue.  Accordingly, reopening the record would not 
inconvenience the court or the parties.  The court concluded by noting 
“the significance of the evidence compels an order to reopen the record.” 
On December 16, the State filed a motion to amend trial 
information and minutes of testimony.  The supplemental minutes of 
testimony included listing an additional witness, Tom Kierski, a court 
reporter who could lay the foundation to introduce the transcripts of 
 
 
 
6 
Long’s prior guilty pleas and sentencing.  On December 20, over Long’s 
objection, the court accepted Kierski’s testimony and admitted the 
shorthand notes and transcripts from Long’s 1996 guilty pleas and 
sentencing.  In the transcript of the guilty pleas, Long admits to touching 
the genitals of two girls under the age of twelve.  This would constitute a 
violation of section 709.8(1), one of the offenses which makes Long 
subject to an enhanced sentence under section 902.14.  Following the 
reopened enhancement trial, the court found the enhancement was 
applicable, and Long was guilty of the class “A” felony under section 
902.14(1)(c).  Long was sentenced to life in prison without parole on 
February 3, 2011. 
Long filed his appeal on February 4, and we transferred the case to 
the court of appeals.  The court of appeals noted that rule 2.19(2) 
requires the State to give the defendant the minutes of a witness’s 
testimony ten days before trial.  The State provided Long the amended 
trial information and minutes for Kierski’s testimony four days prior to 
the reopened trial on the enhancement.  The court of appeals noted that 
if the State had notified Long that it intended to call Kierski, Long would 
have realized the State could prove the enhancement.  The court of 
appeals concluded that Long lost the opportunity to attempt to plea 
bargain and “it is the lost opportunity that creates the undue prejudice 
in reopening the record and allowing an additional witness.”  According 
to the court of appeals, by reopening the record after Long had been 
convicted of the instant offense, Long lost a viable trial strategy.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that “allowing Kierski’s testimony 
violated rule 2.19(2), thereby resulting in surprise and unfair prejudice to 
Long, [and therefore] we find the district court abused its discretion in 
reopening the record.”  The court remanded the case to the district court 
 
 
 
7 
for a determination of whether the evidence offered prior to reopening the 
record was sufficient to support the enhancement.  The State sought 
further review which we granted. 
II.  Standard of Review. 
A district court has broad discretion to reopen the record to allow 
the State to introduce further evidence.  State v. Mason, 203 N.W.2d 292, 
295–96 (Iowa 1972) (“We have allowed wide leeway in reviewing 
discretion of trial court in permitting a case to be reopened.”); see also 
Teeters, 487 N.W.2d at 348 (finding the court’s refusal to reopen the 
record to allow the defendant to present new evidence is also 
discretionary).  A court abuses its discretion when its “discretion was 
exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent 
clearly unreasonable.”  Teeters, 487 N.W.2d at 349 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
We have also noted that the discretion afforded in these situations 
“must necessarily be especially broad.”  Id.  In describing the scope of 
this broad discretion, we have stated that  
a trial court . . . may allow reopening of the case at any stage 
of the trial, including after argument has commenced, if it 
appears “necessary to the due administration of justice.”  
Such a decision will ordinarily not be interfered with by a 
reviewing court. 
. . . [T]he decision whether to reopen the case [is] a 
matter of discretion with the district court which [is] in the 
best position to determine what [is] “necessary and 
appropriate to achieve substantial justice.” 
Bangs v. Maple Hills, Ltd., 585 N.W.2d 262, 267 (Iowa 1998) (citations 
omitted).  With these principles in mind, we now review the district 
court’s decision to reopen the record in this case. 
 
 
 
8 
III.  Discussion. 
Long claims the district court abused its discretion when it 
reopened the record of the trial on the enhancement in order to receive 
new evidence.  In order to properly ground his claim, we will begin by 
describing the nature of the trial that was reopened to allow for 
additional evidence. 
A.  Statutory Framework.  Section 902.14 enhances the penalty 
of anyone who violates sections 709.3, 709.4 or section 709.8(1) or (2) a 
second or subsequent time.  Iowa Code § 902.14(1).  “When a defendant 
faces a charge that imposes an enhanced penalty for prior convictions, 
our law, in turn, imposes a two-stage trial.”  Kukowski, 704 N.W.2d at 
691.  The first stage of the trial requires the State to prove the defendant 
is guilty of the current offense.  Id.  In this case, Long was found guilty of 
third-degree sexual abuse, a violation of section 709.4, and he has not 
appealed this conviction. 
Following this first conviction, the trial moves to its second phase: 
If found guilty of the current offense, the defendant is then 
entitled to a second trial on the prior convictions.  The prior 
convictions must be proven by the State at the second trial 
beyond a reasonable doubt, just as the current offense must 
be established at the first trial.  Generally, the State must 
prove the prior convictions at the second trial by introducing 
certified records of the convictions, along with evidence that 
the defendant is the same person named in the convictions.  
The State must also establish that the defendant was either 
represented by counsel when previously convicted or 
knowingly waived counsel. 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  This second trial is 
governed by rule 2.19(9), which reads, 
Trial of questions involving prior convictions.  After conviction 
of 
the 
primary 
or 
current 
offense, 
but 
prior 
to 
pronouncement of sentence, if the indictment or information 
alleges one or more prior convictions which by the Code 
subjects the offender to an increased sentence, the offender 
 
 
 
9 
shall have the opportunity in open court to affirm or deny 
that the offender is the person previously convicted, or that 
the offender was not represented by counsel and did not 
waive counsel.  If the offender denies being the person 
previously convicted, sentence shall be postponed for such 
time as to permit a trial before a jury on the issue of the 
offender’s identity with the person previously convicted.  
Other objections shall be heard and determined by the court, 
and these other objections shall be asserted prior to trial of the 
substantive offense in the manner presented in rule 2.11.  On 
the issue of identity, the court may in its discretion 
reconvene the jury which heard the current offense or 
dismiss that jury and submit the issue to another jury to be 
later impaneled.  If the offender is found by the jury to be the 
person previously convicted, or if the offender acknowledged 
being such person, the offender shall be sentenced as 
prescribed in the Code. 
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(9) (emphasis added). 
B.  The Decision to Reopen the Record.  In this case, Long 
asserted his right to a trial on the question of his prior convictions, 
though he waived his right to a jury trial.  Prior to resting its case, the 
State submitted certified copies of two 1996 convictions for lascivious 
acts with a child in violation of Iowa Code section 709.8.  The State 
presented evidence that Long was the same person as the one who had 
been convicted in 1996 and also offered a videotaped interview of Long in 
2010 where he told Detective Bahr that one of his 1996 convictions arose 
out of an incident where he touched a girl who was riding behind him on 
a motorcycle.  At that point the State rested and Long moved for a 
judgment of acquittal on the enhancement, claiming that the State had 
not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Long had been previously 
convicted of a violation of subsection 709.8(1) or (2), as opposed to (3) or 
(4).  The next day, the State moved to reopen the record.  After a hearing, 
the court granted the motion.  Long has asked us to review this decision. 
It is well settled that a district court is given broad discretion to 
allow a party to reopen the record and introduce evidence that was 
 
 
 
10 
previously omitted.  See State v. Jefferson, 545 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa 
1996); Teeters, 487 N.W.2d at 348–49; Mason, 203 N.W.2d at 295–96.  A 
rule that unequivocally prohibited the district court from reopening the 
record after the State has rested is inconsistent with our rule that a 
court has discretion over such matters because a hard and fast rule 
would preclude the district court from exercising any discretion over 
such an issue.  See, e.g., State v. Hager, 630 N.W.2d 828, 836 (Iowa 
2001) (noting that “a fixed plea deadline is the very antithesis of 
discretionary decision-making [because i]t precludes the exercise of 
discretion”  (citation omitted)).  Stripping the district court of the 
discretion to allow the State to reopen the record in a criminal trial 
would, therefore, be contrary to our precedent.  See Mason, 203 N.W.2d 
at 295–96; State v. Moreland, 201 N.W.2d 713, 714–15 (Iowa 1972).  
However, there are issues of justice and fairness to the defendant which 
are implicated any time the court is asked by the State to reopen the 
record.  Allowing the State to reopen the record in a criminal case, after 
the defendant has moved for a judgment of acquittal, poses a particular 
concern for us.  We are mindful that we must  
balance two competing concerns in reviews of this type: the 
defendant’s interest in fairness and the court’s search for 
truth.  This means negotiating two potentially poor 
outcomes: on the one hand, permitting the state to reopen 
its case after the defendant has identified a deficiency 
rewards the state for its laxity and in practical effect makes 
the defendant a prosecutorial arm of the state; on the other 
hand, excessive procedural rigidity risks reducing the trial to 
“a game of technicalities.” 
State v. Freeman, 33 A.3d 256, 261 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (citations 
omitted). 
Even though a district court is given the discretion to reopen the 
record in a criminal prosecution, courts have held that reopening the 
 
 
 
11 
record is more likely to be an abuse of discretion if the State is 
attempting to “fill a gap in its proof of a prima facie case.”  75 Am. Jur. 
2d Trial § 303, at 539 (2007) (citing cases).  However, if “the proof 
presented before resting was sufficient to sustain the charge,” then 
courts are less likely to find the district court abused its discretion by 
allowing the State to reopen the record.  Id.; see also Moreland, 201 
N.W.2d at 714–15 (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in reopening the record to admit the actual drugs the defendant was 
accused of selling, but stating “we do not intimate that the State [ha]d to 
introduce the hashish in order to make a prima facie case”). 
We have identified seven factors that the district court should 
consider before exercising its discretion and reopening the record: 
(1) the reason for the failure to introduce the evidence; 
(2) the surprise or unfair prejudice inuring to the opponent 
that might be caused by introducing the evidence; (3) the 
diligence used by the proponent to secure the evidence in a 
timely fashion; (4) the admissibility and materiality of the 
evidence; (5) the stage of the trial when the motion is made; 
(6) the time and effort expended upon the trial; and (7) the 
inconvenience reopening the case would cause to the 
proceeding. 
Teeters, 487 N.W.2d at 348 (citing 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 382 (1991), now 
found at 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 298, at 532–33).  These factors were 
explicitly enumerated for the first time in Teeters.  The district court’s 
written ruling on the motion to reopen the record identified and analyzed 
how each of the factors listed in Teeters applied to the facts of this case.  
This clear and explicit ruling assists in our appellate review.  On 
appellate review, we will consider the same factors analyzed by the 
district court and determine whether the district court’s “ ‘discretion was 
exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent 
 
 
 
12 
clearly unreasonable.’ ”  Teeters, 487 N.W.2d at 349 (quoting State v. 
Morrison, 323 N.W.2d 254, 256 (Iowa 1982)). 
 
The first factor we will examine in determining whether the district 
court abused its discretion by reopening the record is whether the State 
introduced evidence that Long was convicted of a violation of subsection 
709.8(1) or (2), as opposed to (3) or (4), prior to reopening the record.  If 
the State needed to reopen the record to make its prima facie case, then 
an abuse of discretion becomes more likely.  State v. McKay, 723 N.W.2d 
644, 648 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006) (“Also important [to the finding of an 
abuse of discretion] was the underlying conclusion that the evidence 
adduced by the State prior to resting was, in fact, insufficient.”).  For 
example, the Connecticut Supreme Court overturned one defendant’s 
conviction after the district court judge allowed the prosecution to reopen 
the record in response to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.  State v. Allen, 
533 A.2d 559, 566 (Conn. 1987).  The court held 
that when the state has failed to make out a prima facie 
case because insufficient evidence has been introduced 
concerning an essential element of a crime and the 
defendant has specifically identified this evidentiary gap in a 
motion for judgment of acquittal, it is an abuse of the trial 
court’s discretion to permit a reopening of the case to 
supply the missing evidence. 
Id.  We now turn to the evidence offered by the State in this case, prior to 
its motion to reopen the record, to determine whether it had provided 
sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case. 
The State introduced evidence that Long had been convicted of a 
violation of section 709.8.  The four subsections of Iowa Code section 
709.8 (1995) describe substantially the same conduct as the subsections 
listed in the 2009 Code.1  Compare Iowa Code § 709.8 (1995), with Iowa 
                                                 
1In 1996, the legislature amended section 709.8(3) by adding language 
prohibiting a person from “solicit[ing] a person to arrange a sex act with a child.”  1996 
 
 
 
13 
Code 709.8 (2009).  The subsections in both Code sections state that a 
person commits the crime of lascivious acts with a child when, among 
other things, the person does any of the following: 
1.  Fondle or touch the pubes or genitals of a child. 
2.  Permit or cause a child to fondle or touch the person’s 
genitals or pubes. 
3.  Solicit a child to engage in a sex act. 
4.  Inflict pain or discomfort upon a child or permit a child to 
inflict pain or discomfort on the person. 
Iowa Code § 709.8 (1995); see also Iowa Code 709.8 (2009).  In order for 
Long’s previous offense to qualify for section 902.14’s enhanced 
sentencing provisions, the State would have to show that Long violated 
subsections 709.8(1) or 709.8(2), as opposed to subsections 709.(3) or 
709.(4).  Iowa Code § 902.14(1)(c) (2009).  The certified copies of Long’s 
convictions do not indicate what subsection he was convicted under. 
In addition to the certified copies of the convictions, the State 
played a videotape where Long discussed his previous convictions with 
Detective Bahr.  The videotape was introduced prior to the State resting.  
Long stated that he was convicted in 1996 for an incident that occurred 
involving a young girl who “was riding on a motorcycle and I reached 
back and was touching her and things like that.”  The conduct Long 
admits to in the videotape would only fall under subsection 709.8(1), 
fondling the pubes or genitals of a child.  Iowa Code § 709.8(1) (1995).  It 
does not describe any of the other conduct listed in subsections 709.8(2) 
through (4).  Id. § 709.8(2)–(4).  In response to Long’s motion for a 
judgment of acquittal, the district court noted that based on Long’s 
____________________________ 
Iowa Acts ch. 1062, § 1.  In 2005, the legislature lowered the minimum age of the 
offender from eighteen to sixteen.  2005 Iowa Acts ch. 158, § 535.  Neither of these 
changes has any bearing on the outcome of this case. 
 
 
 
14 
comments on the videotape, and the certified copies of the convictions 
that had been submitted to the court, the State had probably met its 
burden of proof.  Since the State had provided some evidence that Long’s 
1996 conviction for lascivious acts with a child fell under 709.8(1) prior 
to reopening the record, it may not have been necessary for the State to 
introduce the evidence in order to make a prima facie case that Long 
violated section 709.8(1).  See Moreland, 201 N.W.2d at 715.  The fact 
that there was some evidence submitted as to which subsection Long 
violated weighs against finding an abuse of discretion by reopening the 
record, especially in a case such as this one where the court reopened 
the record to confirm what it already suspected. 
1.  The reason for the State’s failure to introduce the transcripts of 
Long’s guilty pleas.  When determining whether it is appropriate to 
reopen the record, we also note “the reason for the failure to introduce 
the evidence,” just as the district court did.  See Teeters, 487 N.W.2d at 
348.  In this case, the State believed that because the defendant had not 
raised other issues prior to trial, the State would only be required to 
prove the defendant’s identity and the fact that he was represented by 
counsel when he was convicted in 1996.  When a defendant asserts his 
right to a trial on an enhancement, rule 2.19(9) explicitly requires the 
State to prove identity and representation.  Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(9).  
However, the rule goes on to state that “[o]ther objections shall be heard 
and determined by the court, and these other objections shall be 
asserted prior to trial of the substantive offense in the manner presented 
in rule 2.11.”  Id.  When addressing habitual offender statutes in the 
past, we have held “that a defendant who asserts the habitual offender 
statute is not applicable must interpose his objections prior to the trial of 
the underlying charge.  If he does not do so, the objections are waived.”  
 
 
 
15 
State v. Spoonmore, 323 N.W.2d 202, 203 (Iowa 1982).  Rather than 
objecting through a rule 2.11 motion, Long did not raise the subsection 
issue until after the State had rested.  However, the district court found 
that Long had not “waived” the issue, and the State has not appealed 
this ruling.  Accordingly, we will not review that issue in this opinion. 
Even though Long did not waive the right to raise the subsection 
issue at the enhancement stage of his trial, it still bears on the reason 
the evidence was not offered.  In State v. Talbert, we noted that  
when the judgment entry does not designate the offense in 
the prior judgment, the State must supplement the judgment 
entry in that respect by introducing other parts of the record 
that do show the crime which was charged and for which the 
defendant was convicted and sentenced. 
622 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Iowa 2001).  We also suggested that when the 
record of a conviction is uncertain, a transcript of the criminal 
proceeding might establish exactly what law the defendant previously 
violated.  Id. 
While there may have been sufficient evidence to find that Long 
violated section 709.8(1), the district court felt that it was best to reopen 
the record to allow the State to introduce a transcript of the plea.  
Omission of evidence by accident or inadvertence is a proper reason to 
reopen the record.  See Moreland, 201 N.W.2d at 715 (Iowa 1972); see 
also In re J.E.F., 409 A.2d 1165, 1166 (Pa. 1979) (“This Court has 
previously found it proper to reopen a case to allow the introduction of 
additional evidence where the evidence has been omitted by accident, 
inadvertence, or even because of mistake as to its necessity but not 
where the omission was intentional.”  (citations omitted)); 75 Am. Jur. 2d 
Trial § 298, at 532. 
 
 
 
16 
There is no indication that the State intentionally omitted the 
evidence that was admitted when the case was reopened or that the 
evidence was not found based on the State’s lack of diligence.  The 
reason the State did not offer the evidence that it sought to offer once the 
record was reopened was that Long had not raised any other objections 
under rule 2.19(9), which led the State to believe there were no other 
issues to be tried at the enhancement phase of the proceeding.  Criminal 
trials are a search for truth and should not be turned into “a game of 
technicalities.”  Freeman, 33 A.3d at 261 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The reason for reopening the record does not support 
the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion. 
2.  Surprise and unfair prejudice as a result of reopening the record.  
The district court considered the surprise or unfair prejudice that Long 
might suffer if the State were allowed to reopen the record.  Surprise and 
unfair prejudice are legitimate and important considerations when 
deciding a motion to reopen the record.  See Teeters, 487 N.W.2d at 348.  
In Long’s brief, he claims that he was unfairly prejudiced when the 
district court reopened the record and then “erroneously allowed [the 
State] to amend the minutes of testimony in violation of rule 2.19(2).”  
Rule 2.19(2) requires the State to provide the defense with minutes of 
testimony ten days before trial.  Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(2). 
If the prosecuting attorney does not give notice to the 
defendant of all prosecution witnesses (except rebuttal 
witnesses) at least ten days before trial, the court may order 
the state to permit the discovery of such witnesses, grant a 
continuance, or enter such other order as it deems just 
under the circumstances. 
Id. r. 2.19(3).  If “no less severe remedy is adequate to protect the 
defendant from undue prejudice,” the court may exclude the witness.  Id. 
 
 
 
17 
In its December 6 order, the district court granted the motion to 
reopen the record and later allowed the State to amend the trial 
information and minutes of testimony.  The continued trial on the 
enhancement was scheduled for December 20.  The State filed the 
minutes of Kierski’s testimony, including the transcripts of Long’s guilty 
plea, on December 16.  At the hearing on December 20, Long objected to 
Kierski’s testimony, noting that the State had only provided four days’ 
notice.  In response, the State pointed out that there were remedies other 
than exclusion, such as a continuance.  The district court took the 
motion under advisement and heard the testimony.  Ultimately, the court 
accepted the evidence, and based on the transcripts submitted that day, 
the court concluded Long’s 1996 conviction fell under subsection 
709.8(1) and therefore satisfied the requirements of section 902.14.  In a 
subsequent motion for a new trial, Long again claimed that the State 
should not have been allowed to call Kierski based on inadequate notice.  
This motion was denied.  On appeal, Long argues that reopening the 
record to receive the new evidence “was a surprise and unfairly 
prejudicial” and it meant that Long did not have “fair notice of the 
evidence to be used against him.” 
There can be no doubt that Long was prejudiced by the admission 
of Kierski’s testimony and the transcripts of Long’s guilty pleas.  The 
question is whether that prejudice was unfair.  See Teeters, 487 N.W.2d 
at 348.  To make this determination, we will review the context in which 
the district court made the decision to reopen the record and accept the 
new evidence.  On July 15, 2010, nearly five months before the trial, the 
State filed a trial information indicating that the State would be seeking 
the class “A” felony enhancement under section 902.14 based on Long’s 
prior convictions for lascivious acts with a child.  A notice of additional 
 
 
 
18 
minutes was filed on October 14.  This notice indicated that Detective 
Bahr would testify regarding his investigation and the interview he 
conducted of Long and that he would lay a foundation to introduce a 
videotape of Long’s interview.  It also included the copies of Long’s 1996 
convictions.  A second notice of additional minutes of testimony was filed 
October 28.  This notice indicated that Barb Krug and Russ Goebel 
would both be called to testify regarding their interactions with Long 
through their employment with the Department of Correctional Services 
in Fort Dodge.  The minutes of their testimony indicated they would 
discuss the defendant’s 1996 convictions for lascivious acts with a child 
and would “lay a foundation for any record of conviction, including 
records within the possession of the probation/parole office and copies of 
the original conviction.” 
If Long’s strategy was to wait until the State rested in the 
enhancement phase of the proceeding and then move for a judgment of 
acquittal, the variables at play in this case made that strategy risky at 
best.  The district court noted that Long had been apprised of the fact 
that his prior sex offenses would be the basis for enhancing his sentence 
since the trial information was first filed.  Based on the October 14 
minutes, Long knew that Detective Bahr, who he had described his prior 
offense to, would be called as a witness.  Bahr’s testimony authenticated 
a videotape of Long discussing his prior conviction where he admitted 
touching a girl who was riding on a motorcycle behind him.  Based on 
the October 28 minutes, Long also knew that his probation officers 
would be called to testify and that their records might be entered into 
evidence.  In short, it was possible that far more than just copies of his 
convictions would be entered into evidence. 
 
 
 
19 
There were other potential pitfalls to Long’s strategy of relying 
solely on the subsection issue.  There was the risk that the district court 
would reopen the record and allow the State to present more detailed 
evidence.  Additionally, the district court judge who heard the trial in the 
instant prosecution was the same judge who conducted the guilty plea 
proceedings and sentenced Long for his prior offenses in 1996.  Since the 
prior convictions were entered by the same court, the district court 
considered taking judicial notice of the entire court file of Long’s 1996 
convictions.  As discussed above, it was also possible that the district 
court could have found any arguments other than identity and 
representation had been waived because Long did not raise the 
subsection issue prior to trial.  See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(9).  Since the 
district court did not take judicial notice of the court files from Long’s 
prior convictions, or deem the subsection issue waived, we will not 
comment on whether choosing either of these options would have been 
proper.  We mention these alternate outcomes merely to point out the 
uncertainty that accompanied Long’s decision to proceed as he did. 
We also take this opportunity to note that even though Long claims 
the decision to reopen the record and allow the State to amend the 
minutes of testimony unfairly prejudiced him, he does not say what he 
would have done differently if Kierski’s name would have been given to 
him ten days prior to trial, or a continuance granted.  The court of 
appeals stated 
Long contends he was banking on the State’s inability to 
prove the enhancement with the witnesses listed in the 
original minutes, and if the State had provided notice of the 
stronger enhancement evidence before the trial on the 
substantive offense, he would have had the option of 
pursuing a plea agreement with the State. 
 
 
 
20 
The court of appeals went on to note “it is the lost opportunity [to plea 
bargain] that creates the undue prejudice in reopening the record and 
allowing an additional witness.”  The State’s application for further 
review correctly points out that this argument “is conjecture.  There is no 
record to show either [Long] would have made such an overture under 
any circumstances, or that the State would have entertained it.” 
We agree with the State for two reasons.  First, despite the court of 
appeals opinion, we do not see where Long has argued that it was the 
lost opportunity to plea bargain that resulted in unfair prejudice.  This 
argument is not made in any of the pleadings or briefs submitted before 
the court of appeals.  Since Long did not make this argument, he did not 
produce or point to any evidence that would support the idea that he 
would have sought a plea bargain had he known the Kierski would 
testify.  Second, even if Long had offered evidence that he would have 
sought a plea bargain, the State is under no obligation to engage in plea 
bargaining “because a defendant has no right to be offered a plea.”  
Missouri v. Frye, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410, 182 L. Ed. 2d 
379, 392 (2012).  Since Long had no right to be offered a plea, we do not 
see how the denial of the opportunity to plea bargain caused Long to 
suffer undue prejudice in this case. 
In summary, we do not feel Long was unfairly prejudiced by the 
district court’s decision to reopen the record and hear Kierski’s 
testimony.  The evidence listed in the October 14 and 28 minutes of 
testimony may have been sufficient to find Long’s prior conviction was a 
violation of subsections 709.8(1) or 709.8(2) and therefore qualified him 
for enhancement under section 902.14.  Once Long made his objection, 
there were a number of possible courses of action the district court might 
have taken.  One possible course, the one taken by the district court, 
 
 
 
21 
was reopening the record to verify what the district court already 
suspected.  Long has not shown how reopening the record and allowing 
the State to call Kierski impacted Long’s trial strategy in any significant 
way.  Accordingly, we do not believe that reopening the record and 
allowing Kierski to testify unfairly prejudiced Long. 
3.  Other factors.  Another factor the district court properly 
considered in this case was the timing of the request to reopen the 
record.  Teeters, 487 N.W.2d at 348.  One reason that courts consider 
the timing of the request to reopen the record “is that a jury may accord 
undue weight to evidence which is admitted close to the time 
deliberations begin.”  People v. Rodriguez, 199 Cal. Rptr. 433, 436 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1984).  However, in this case, the enhancement trial was before 
a judge, and it was a very short proceeding.  Therefore, there is little 
worry that the timing of the evidence would lead to misuse of the 
information.  Also, since there was no jury, there were no jury 
instructions that had been submitted to the jury that might have needed 
to be modified.  See Teeters, 487 N.W.2d at 349. 
Timing considerations can also take into account the stage of the 
trial when the motion was made, the prompt disposition of the case, and 
any inconvenience to the court.  See Teeters, 487 N.W.2d at 348; see also 
75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 298, at 533.  In this case, the jury trial on the 
current offense had just ended and Long had been convicted.  Long had 
waived his right to a jury trial on the issue of the enhancement, so any 
determinations concerning the evidence presented or enhancements 
would be made by the court.  The district court judge had just heard 
from three witnesses, seen copies of Long’s convictions and seen a 
videotape of him briefly describing what conduct led to his prior 
conviction.  Long moved for a judgment of acquittal, and the motion was 
 
 
 
22 
taken under advisement.  The next morning, the State moved to reopen 
the record. 
The judge in this case was in the best position to assess any 
potential inconvenience or difficulties reopening the record would pose.  
As the district court noted, however, the enhancement issue had not yet 
been 
decided, 
and 
therefore, 
reopening 
the 
record 
would 
not 
inconvenience the proceeding.  This is not a situation where there was 
concern that the trial would be unduly prolonged or where reopening the 
case threatened “the orderly trial process[] fundamental to our 
jurisprudence.”  People v. Olsen, 313 N.E.2d 782, 784 (N.Y. 1974).  The 
timing of the ruling does not favor an abuse of discretion. 
Finally, we must consider the evidence that was admitted when the 
court allowed the record to be reopened.  See Teeters, 487 N.W.2d at 348 
(noting that the court should consider the admissibility and materiality of 
the evidence); see also Rodriguez, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 436 (noting that 
admitted “evidence was decisive on the issue”).  The State wanted to call 
a court reporter to lay the foundation to admit transcripts of Long’s guilty 
pleas to lascivious acts with a child.  The evidence was clearly 
admissible.  As part of Long’s pleas, he admitted touching the genitals of 
two girls under the age of twelve.  This is undisputed evidence that 
Long’s conviction fell under section 709.8(1) and would therefore qualify 
him for sentencing enhancement under section 902.14.  The evidence 
was consistent with, but much more definitive than, Long’s statements to 
Detective Bahr.  This clearly admissible evidence confirmed what the 
court had already heard from Long on the videotape and clearly “aided 
the court in its search for truth.”  Freeman, 33 A.3d at 261.  This factor 
also favors upholding the court’s decision to reopen the record. 
 
 
 
23 
Long exercised his right to require the State to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he was subject to sentencing enhancement based 
on his prior convictions.  Long was also allowed to exercise his right to 
remain mute and require the State meet its burden of proof.  The rule 
governing these trials requires the State to prove that Long was the same 
individual convicted in the prior proceeding and that he was represented 
by counsel at the prior proceeding.  If Long had other issues regarding 
his prior convictions, he needed to raise them before trial or they could 
be waived.  He failed to do so.  In response, the State prepared a case 
that addressed only identity and representation by counsel.  When Long 
belatedly raised another issue, the district court did not rule the issue 
was waived, or decide to take judicial notice of the court files in Long’s 
previous cases, but instead reopened the record in response to Long’s 
motion for a judgment of acquittal.  This decision was not made in haste, 
as evidenced by the district court’s well reasoned, written ruling on the 
matter.  It was made only after careful consideration by the district court 
of the briefs submitted by counsel and after hearing the arguments of 
counsel.  This careful consideration allowed the district court to fully and 
fairly “balance two competing concerns . . . : the defendant’s interest in 
fairness and the court’s search for truth.”  Id.  The ruling to reopen the 
record under the facts of this case was not an abuse of discretion. 
IV.  Disposition. 
The district court was faced with a variety of competing interests 
and alternative courses of action.  The court might have deemed the 
issue waived, or acquitted or convicted the defendant based solely on the 
record before the court at that time.  Instead, the district court chose to 
reopen the record and receive the transcripts of the defendant’s pleas to 
the prior offenses.  Given the specific facts of this case, reopening the 
 
 
 
24 
record was not an abuse of discretion.  Because Long has not claimed 
any other errors, we affirm the judgment of the district court and vacate 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 
COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
All justices concur except Wiggins, J., who takes no part.