Case Title: P. v. Bunn

Citation: 

Docket Number: S086128

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 1/10/02 (This opinion should precede the companion case of P. v. King, also filed 1/10/02.)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
)
)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
)
)
S086128
v.
)
)
Ct.App. 1/3 A084466
RONALD STACY BUNN,
)
)
Lake County
Defendant and Respondent.
)
Super. Ct. No. CR4643
__________________________________ )
In 1994 and thereafter, the Legislature established and amended a special
supplementary statute of limitations for certain sex crimes against minors.  (Pen.
Code, § 803, subd. (g) (section 803(g)).)1  Under specified circumstances, the
1994 law, as more recently refined, revives the limitations period for such offenses
after the usual statute of limitations has expired, even if both the crime, and
expiration of the usual limitations period, occurred before 1994.  We found that
these retroactive features did not offend either ex post facto or due process
principles in People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737 (Frazer) (cert. den. sub nom.
Frazer v. California (2000) 529 U.S. 1108, rehg. den. (2000) 530 U.S. 1284).
                                                
1 
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
We granted review in this case and its companion, People v. King (Jan. 10,
2002, S085942) __ Cal.4th __ (King), to consider an additional narrow issue
presented by this legislation.  In 1996 and 1997, section 803(g) was amended to
authorize, in certain circumstances, the filing of a molestation charge even where
an accusatory pleading involving the same offense was previously dismissed as
time-barred by the courts.  The question is whether, and to what extent, the
separation of powers clause of the California Constitution (art. III, § 3) precludes
application of such a refiling provision.2
Following Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211 (Plaut),
which we find both consistent with California law and persuasive for state
separation of powers purposes, we conclude that refiling legislation cannot be
applied retroactively to reopen court cases that had already been dismissed, if the
dismissals had become final judgments, under the law of finality which then
pertained, before the refiling provision became effective.  In this sense, and for
separation of powers purposes, such prior judgments are sacrosanct.  On the other
hand, as Plaut itself explained, any dismissal that was already subject to a
particular refiling law at the time the dismissal was entered or finally upheld
cannot, to that extent, be deemed a final judgment immune from legislative
interference.  Hence, the refiling provision, as it existed at the time the dismissal
was entered or finally upheld, may constitutionally permit reopening of the case.
As demonstrated here and in King, supra, __ Cal.4th __, the relevant
statutory provisions survive separation of powers scrutiny depending upon the
                                                
2 
Article III, section 3 of the California Constitution states:  “The powers of
state government are legislative, executive, and judicial.  Persons charged with the
exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by
this Constitution.”
3
particular circumstances of the case.  In the present matter, the reinstituted
complaint satisfied the requirements of the 1996 refiling provision that was
already in effect when the Court of Appeal finally upheld the prior dismissal.
Hence, prosecution of the instant case under the refiled complaint is not barred by
the separation of powers clause.  We reach the opposite conclusion, however, and
do find a constitutional violation in King.  There, the complaint was refiled under
conditions that complied only with the 1997 version of section 803(g) not yet in
effect when the prior judgment dismissing the same counts became final.
I.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case tracks the history of section 803(g), which we described in
Frazer, supra 21 Cal.4th 737, 743-749, 751-753, and distill as necessary here.
Before 1994, felony sex crimes against children were governed solely by
the statutes of limitation in section 799 et seq.  These provisions require such
prosecutions to commence within either three years (§ 801), or six years (§ 800),
after commission of the crime.  (See §§ 804, subds. (a) & (b) [providing that
prosecution commences when the accusatory pleading is filed], 805, subd. (a)
[basing the applicable limitations period on the maximum statutory punishment].)
In first enacting section 803(g) (Stats. 1993, ch. 390, § 1, p. 2226), the
Legislature found that the limitation periods in sections 800 and 801 were
inadequate in child molestation cases.  Reliable accusations purportedly went
unpunished “because the victim — who may ‘now [be] an adult’ — had waited to
report the crime until after the existing statute of limitations had expired.”
(Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th 737, 763, fn. 24.)  Lawmakers cited the difficulty
children have in recalling and recounting sexual abuse, and their vulnerability to
adults in positions of authority and trust.  (Id. at pp. 744, 763, fn. 24, 773.)
Effective January 1, 1994, section 803(g) (the 1994 version or law) allowed
a criminal complaint to be filed “within one year of the date of a report to a law
4
enforcement agency by a person of any age alleging that he or she, while under the
age of 18 years, was the victim of” one or more specified serious sex offenses.
The 1994 law applied only where:  (1) the limitation period specified in section
800 or 801 had expired, (2) the crime involved substantial sexual conduct, and (3)
independent evidence clearly and convincingly corroborated the victim’s
allegation.3  Because the statute of limitations in section 800 or 801 must first
expire, the one-year period “serves to prolong, rather than shorten,” the time for
prosecuting enumerated crimes.  (Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th 737, 752.)
In a complaint filed January 25, 1995, and amended March 3, 1995 (the
1995 complaint), Ronald Stacy Bunn (defendant) was charged in Lake County
Municipal Court with five counts of forcible rape of a person under age 18 (§ 261,
subd. (a)(2)), and one count of oral copulation with a person under age 18 (§ 288a,
subd. (b)(1)).  Attached to the 1995 complaint and incorporated therein were
investigative materials compiled by the local sheriff’s department stating that the
                                                
3 
The 1994 version of section 803(g) provided as follows:
“Notwithstanding any other limitation of time described in this section, a
criminal complaint may be filed within one year of the date of a report to a law
enforcement agency by a person of any age alleging that he or she, while under the
age of 18 years, was the victim of a crime described in Section 261 [rape], 286
[sodomy], 288 [lewd conduct], 288a [oral copulation], 288.5 [continuous sexual
abuse], 289 [sexual penetration by foreign object], or 289.5 [fleeing sex offender].
This subdivision shall apply only if both of the following occur:
“(1)  The limitation period specified in Section 800 or 801 has expired.
“(2)  The crime involved substantial sexual conduct, as described in
subdivision (b) of Section 1203.066, excluding masturbation which is not mutual,
and there is independent evidence that clearly and convincingly corroborates the
victim’s allegation.  No evidence may be used to corroborate the victim’s
allegation which would otherwise be inadmissible during trial.  Independent
evidence shall not include the opinions of mental health professionals.”
5
victim reported the crime on December 14, 1994.  The charging documents also
indicated that the crimes occurred between February and August 1981, that the
victim was defendant’s daughter, that she was 15 and 16 years old at the time of
the crimes, and that relatives and friends could corroborate her account in certain
respects.  Based on this information, the 1995 complaint alleged that it satisfied
the requirements of section 803(g) as originally constituted in 1994.
Defendant demurred on the ground any postcrime increase in the maximum
six-year period applying under section 800 when the crimes allegedly occurred
violated the federal and state Constitutions, including ex post facto guarantees.
(See U.S. Const., art. I, § 10; Cal. Const., art. I, § 9.)  The magistrate accepted the
ex post facto claim, sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the case.  The superior
court denied the People’s motion to reinstate the 1995 complaint.
The People appealed and lost.  The Court of Appeal held that “at the time
of its enactment,” there was “no clear expression of legislative intent that section
803(g) would apply to revive charges — such as the ones in this case — as to
which the statute of limitations expired before January 1, 1994.”  (People v. Bunn
(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 227, 230-231 (Bunn I).)  The court further opined that even
assuming section 803(g) applied retroactively under a 1996 amendment that took
effect while the appeal was pending (see post, fn. 7), defendant’s prosecution was
barred on ex post facto grounds.  This conclusion was based on Collins v.
Youngblood (1990) 497 U.S. 37, 42 (Collins), limiting postcrime withdrawal of a
“ ‘defense available . . . when the act was committed,’ ” and on Falter v. United
States (2d Cir. 1928) 23 F.2d 420, 425-426 (Falter), condemning postcrime
“reviv[als of] a prosecution already dead.”  Thus, on February 28, 1997, the Court
of Appeal affirmed the order denying reinstatement of the 1995 complaint.
(Bunn I, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 239.)  We denied review on May 21, 1997.
(Ibid.)
6
The 1997 decision in Bunn I was not the first of its kind.  Several Court of
Appeal opinions filed in 1995 and 19964 — only one of which now appears in the
California Official Reports5 — refused to apply the 1994 version of section 803(g)
where the prosecution was already time-barred under existing laws on January 1,
1994, when section 803(g) became effective.  Much like Bunn I, supra, 53
Cal.App.4th 227, these decisions stressed the lack of express “retroactivity” and
“revival” language in the 1994 law (see Pen. Code, § 3), and claimed a contrary
construction would violate the ban on ex post facto legislation.  However, at least
one Court of Appeal opinion originally published around the same time rejected
these conclusions on both statutory and constitutional grounds.6
In response to the 1995 and 1996 appellate decisions declining to give the
1994 version of section 803(g) retroactive effect, the Legislature decided to revise
the statute so that it could be used regardless of when the molestation occurred, or
whether the limitations period in section 800 or 801 had run before 1994.  (Frazer,
supra, 21 Cal.4th 737, 752-753.)  Because the Courts of Appeal were divided on
                                                
4 
E.g., People v. King (Cal.App.), review granted December 11, 1996,
S056411, on April 24, 1997, review dismissed in light of intervening amendments
to section 803(g); People v. Sowers (Cal.App.), review granted March 14, 1996,
S051278, on April 24, 1997, review dismissed in light of intervening amendments
to section 803(g); People v. Regules (Cal.App.), review granted November 16,
1995, S048880, on April 24, 1997, review dismissed in light of intervening
amendments to section 803(g); People v. Richard G. (Cal.App.), review granted
September 14, 1995, S047826, on April 24, 1997, review dismissed in light of
intervening amendments to section 803(g).
5 
Lynch v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1223 (Lynch I).
6 
People v. Maloy (Cal.App.), review granted November 22, 1995, S049313,
on April 24, 1997, review dismissed in light of intervening amendments to section
803(g).
7
the point, lawmakers found no clear ex post facto bar against making such a
change.  (Ibid.)
Hence, a 1996 amendment to section 803(g) took effect January 1, 1997.
(Stats. 1996, ch. 130, § 1 (the 1996 version or law).)7  Another amendment
occurred on an urgency basis six months later, giving rise to the statute in its
                                                
7 
The 1996 version of section 803(g) provided as follows:
“(1)  Notwithstanding any other limitation of time described in this chapter,
a criminal complaint may be filed within one year of the date of a report to a law
enforcement agency by a person of any age alleging that he or she, while under the
age of 18 years, was the victim of a crime described in Section 261, 286, 288,
288a, 288.5, 289, or 289.5.
“(2)  This subdivision applies only if both of the following occur:
“(A)  The limitation period specified in Section 800 or 801 has expired.
“(B)  The crime involved substantial sexual conduct, as described in
subdivision (b) of Section 1203.066, excluding masturbation that is not mutual,
and there is independent evidence that clearly and convincingly corroborates the
victim’s allegation.  No evidence may be used to corroborate the victim’s
allegation that otherwise would be inadmissible during trial.  Independent
evidence does not include the opinions of mental health professionals.
“(3)(A)  Effective July 1, 1997, this subdivision applies to a cause of action
arising before, on, or after January 1, 1994, the effective date of this subdivision,
and if the complaint is filed within the time period specified in this subdivision, it
shall revive any cause of action barred by Section 800 or 801.
“(B) Effective January 1, 1997, through June 30, 1997, this subdivision
applies to a cause of action arising before, on, or after January 1, 1994, the
effective date of this subdivision, and it shall revive any cause of action barred by
Section 800 or 801 if either of the following occurs:
“(i)  The complaint is filed within the time period specified in this
subdivision.
“(ii)  The victim made the report required by this subdivision to a law
enforcement agency between January 1, 1994, and January 1, 1997, and a
complaint was not filed within the time period specified in this subdivision or was
filed within the time period but was dismissed, but a complaint is filed or refiled
on or before June 30, 1997.”
8
current form.  (Stats. 1997, ch. 29, §§ 1, 2, eff. June 30, 1997 (the 1997 version or
law).)8  We summarize the statute after each set of changes was made.
                                                
8 
The 1997 version of section 803(g) provides as follows:
“(1)  Notwithstanding any other limitation of time described in this chapter,
a criminal complaint may be filed within one year of the date of a report to a
California law enforcement agency by a person of any age alleging that he or she,
while under the age of 18 years, was the victim of a crime described in Section
261, 286, 288, 288a, 288.5, 289, or 289.5.
“(2)  This subdivision applies only if both of the following occur:
“(A)  The limitation period specified in Section 800 or 801 has expired.
“(B)  The crime involved substantial sexual conduct, as described in
subdivision (b) of Section 1203.066, excluding masturbation that is not mutual,
and there is independent evidence that clearly and convincingly corroborates the
victim’s allegation.  No evidence may be used to corroborate the victim’s
allegation that otherwise would be inadmissible during trial.  Independent
evidence does not include the opinions of mental health professionals.
“(3)(A)  This subdivision applies to a cause of action arising before, on, or
after January 1, 1994, the effective date of this subdivision, and it shall revive any
cause of action barred by Section 800 or 801 if any of the following occurred or
occurs:
“(i)  The complaint or indictment was filed on or before January 1, 1997,
and it was filed within the time period specified in this subdivision.
“(ii)  The complaint or indictment is or was filed subsequent to January 1,
1997, and it is or was filed within the time period specified within this subdivision.
“(iii)  The victim made the report required by this subdivision to a law
enforcement agency after January 1, 1994, and a complaint or indictment was not
filed within the time period specified in this subdivision, but a complaint or
indictment is filed no later than 180 days after the date on which either a published
opinion of the California Supreme Court, deciding the question of whether
retroactive application of this subdivision is constitutional, becomes final or the
United States Supreme Court files an opinion deciding the question of whether
retroactive application of this subdivision is constitutional, whichever occurs first.
“(iv)  The victim made the report required by this subdivision to a law
enforcement agency after January 1, 1994, and a complaint or indictment was filed
within the time period specified in this subdivision, but the indictment, complaint,
(footnote continued on next page)
9
First, like both the prior and subsequent versions, the 1996 law authorized
the filing of a criminal complaint within one year of a report to a law enforcement
agency by a person of any age claiming to be the victim of an enumerated sex
crime while under the age of 18.  (Former § 803(g)(1) (1996 version).)  The 1996
law was no different from any other version insofar as it conditioned application
of the one-year period on, among other things, expiration of the statute of
limitations in section 800 or 801.  (Former § 803(g)(2)(A) & (B) (1996 version).)
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
or subsequently filed information was dismissed, but a new complaint or
indictment is filed no later than 180 days after the date on which either a published
opinion of the California Supreme Court, deciding the question of whether
retroactive application of this subdivision is constitutional, becomes final or the
United States Supreme Court files an opinion deciding the question of whether
retroactive application of this subdivision is constitutional, whichever occurs first.
“(B)(i)  If the victim made the report required by this subdivision to a law
enforcement agency after January 1, 1994, and a complaint or indictment was filed
within the time period specified in this subdivision, but the indictment, complaint,
or subsequently filed information was dismissed, a new complaint or indictment
may be filed notwithstanding any other provision of law, including, but not limited
to, subdivision (c) of Section 871.5 and subdivision (b) of Section 1238.
“(ii)  An order dismissing an action filed under this subdivision, which is
entered or becomes effective at any time prior to 180 days after the date on which
either a published opinion of the California Supreme Court, deciding the question
of whether retroactive application of this section is constitutional, becomes final or
the United States Supreme Court files an opinion deciding the question of whether
retroactive application of this subdivision is constitutional, whichever occurs first,
shall not be considered an order terminating an action within the meaning of
Section 1387.
“(iii)  Any ruling regarding the retroactivity of this subdivision or its
constitutionality made in the course of the previous proceeding, by any trial court
or any intermediate appellate court, shall not be binding upon refiling.”
10
Second, the 1996 law added language that remains in the statute today, and
that “revive[s]” the state’s ability to prosecute enumerated crimes which occurred
“before, on, or after January 1, 1994,” including “any” crime “barred by Section
800 or 801.”  (Former § 803(g)(3)(A) & (B)(i) (1996 version).)  In other words,
both the 1996 and present versions of section 803(g) allow an accusatory pleading
to be filed within one year of a qualifying report even where the defendant
acquired a statute of limitations defense before 1994.  As noted, this change
addressed the 1995 and 1996 Court of Appeal decisions declining to give the 1994
law retroactive effect.
The third and final feature of the 1996 law was its unique “savings” clause.
(Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th 737, 747, fn. 11.)  Under former section
803(g)(3)(B)(ii) (1996 version), the provisions of section 803(g) applied, and an
otherwise time-barred action was “revived,” where three conditions were met:
(1) “[t]he victim made the report required by this subdivision to a law enforcement
agency between January 1, 1994, and January 1, 1997,” (2) “a complaint was not
filed within the [one-year] time period specified in this subdivision or was filed
within the time period but was dismissed,” and (3) “a complaint is filed or refiled
on or before June 30, 1997.”  (Italics added.)
Thus, as pertinent here, former section 803(g)(3)(B)(ii) (1996 version) —
hereafter, the 1996 refiling provision — gave prosecutors an additional six-month
period from January 1, 1997, when the 1996 law took effect, through June 30,
1997, when such period expired by its own terms, to refile complaints that were
dismissed under section 803(g) before it contained express retroactivity and
revival language.  (See former § 803(g)(3)(B) (1996 version) [confirming that the
1996 refiling provision was “[e]ffective January 1, 1997, through June 30,
1997”].)  The apparent purpose was to prevent the affected group from escaping
prosecution, or from receiving more favorable statute of limitations treatment than
11
other molestation defendants whose cases were never prosecuted under the 1994
version of section 803(g), or, if so prosecuted, were not dismissed by virtue of any
ambiguity in the 1994 law.
In fact, the 1996 and 1997 laws differ only insofar as the latter version
expanded and replaced features that otherwise expired on June 30, 1997.  As a
threshold matter, the new provisions of the 1997 law took effect when such
expiration was imminent.9  The 1997 provisions concern cases in which the victim
made the requisite report “after January 1, 1994,” and in which an accusatory
pleading either “was not filed” within the one-year limitations period
(§ 803(g)(3)(A)(iii)), or “was filed within the time period . . . but . . . was
dismissed.”  (§ 803(g)(3)(A)(iv), italics added.)
Where the foregoing circumstances exist, the 1997 law provides that
section 803(g) applies, and an otherwise time-barred action is “revived,” where a
complaint or indictment is filed, or refiled, “no later than 180 days after the date
on which either a published opinion of the California Supreme Court, deciding the
question of whether retroactive application of this subdivision is constitutional,
becomes final or the United States Supreme Court files an opinion deciding [such]
                                                
9 
As an urgency measure, the 1997 law expressly provided that it became
effective “immediately” upon enactment.  (Stats. 1997, ch. 29, § 2; see Cal. Const.
art. IV, § 8, subd. (c), par. (3); Gov. Code, § 9600, subd. (b).)  Such enactment
occurred on June 30, 1997, when the bill (Assem. Bill No. 700 (1997-1998 Reg.
Sess.)), which had previously been passed by the Legislature, was first approved
by the Governor and then filed with the Secretary of State.  (See Gov. Code,
§ 9510; In re Thierry S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 727, 738-739.)  The legislative history
does not reveal the precise time of day at which the latter events took place.  (Cf.
People v. Cargill (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1554-1555 [holding that because
new urgency penal legislation was filed with the Secretary of State at 2:45 p.m. on
the date of enactment, it was in effect and governed the defendant’s crime, which
occurred at 10:15 p.m. the same day].)
12
question . . . , whichever occurs first.”  (§ 803(g)(3)(A)(iii) & (iv), italics added.)
For “new” accusatory pleadings submitted after a prior “dismiss[al]” under section
803(g)(3)(A)(iv) — hereafter, the 1997 refiling provision — related language
clarifies that the new 180-day period may be invoked notwithstanding any other
statutory bar to refiling (§ 803(g)(3)(B)(i) & (ii)), and notwithstanding any ruling
made in the prior proceeding concerning the retroactivity or constitutionality of
the statute.  (§ 803(g)(3)(B)(iii).)  According to the legislative history, the 1997
law made these “technical, procedural” changes (Sen. Com. on Public Safety,
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 700 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 3, 1997,
p. 6) in an ongoing effort to cover “all cases” involving the enumerated crimes,
including those previously charged under the 1994 law and dismissed (id. at p. 5).
In August 1999, Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th 737, upheld use of section
803(g)’s one-year limitations period in actions time-barred before 1994, and thus
decided that “retroactive application” of the statute “is constitutional,” as
anticipated in the 1997 law.  (§ 803(g)(3)(A)(iii) & (iv).)  In Frazer, supra, at
pages 757-765, we held that the statute of limitations is not a defense entitled to ex
post facto protection under Collins, supra, 497 U.S. 37, and declined to follow
contrary dictum in Falter, supra, 23 F.2d 420, 425-426.  In the process, the
decisions in Bunn I, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 227, and Lynch I, supra, 33
Cal.App.4th 1223 (see ante, fn. 5), were disapproved.  (Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th
at pp. 760, fn. 22, 765.)  Frazer also rejected various due process challenges to the
one-year provision that had not been considered in either Bunn I, supra, 53
Cal.App.4th 227, or Lynch I, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th 1223.10
                                                
10 
Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th 737, 765-772, held that section 803(g) deprives
defendants who acquired a statute of limitations defense before January 1, 1994, of
no “fundamental” constitutional interest, and that such a defense therefore can be
(footnote continued on next page)
13
Meanwhile, before we decided Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th 737, the People
invoked the 1996 refiling provision against defendant.  On June 30, 1997 — the
last day of the six-month period in former section 803(g)(3)(B)(ii) (1996 version)
— a complaint was filed in Lake County Municipal Court alleging five counts of
forcible rape and one count of oral copulation against defendant’s daughter, a
minor, in 1981 (the 1997 or refiled complaint).  The allegations mirrored those
previously made in 1995 and dismissed in Bunn I, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 227.  A
few weeks later, on July 17, the 1997 complaint was amended to also allege
compliance with the 1997 refiling provision, which had since taken effect.11
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
retroactively withdrawn consistent with federal and state substantive due process
guarantees.  Frazer relied heavily upon Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson
(1945) 325 U.S. 304 (Chase), which reached a similar conclusion with respect to
civil statutes of limitation.  Nor, according to Frazer, is section 803(g) “arbitrary”
or “capricious” insofar as it retroactively revives time-barred claims to permit
prosecutions based on delayed reporting by the victims of child sexual abuse.
(Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 773.)  Frazer also declined to invalidate section
803(g) on the ground it facially offends procedural due process rights under either
the federal or state Constitutions.  To the extent the defendant in Frazer claimed
his ability to refute the charges had been impaired by the passage of time, this fact-
based claim was deemed not “ ‘ripe for adjudication.’ ”  (Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th
at p. 775, quoting United States v. Lovasco (1977) 431 U.S. 783, 789.)
11 
As amended, the 1997 complaint alleged, among other things, that the
victim’s accusations were independently corroborated by “the statement of the
defendant wherein he admits to committing these acts.”  This allegation evidently
refers to police reports, attached for the first time to the 1997 complaint, disclosing
that defendant voluntarily told arresting officers in 1995 that he and his daughter
had sexual intercourse about 30 times when she was age 15, and that they engaged
in oral copulation on two occasions.  The same materials also report that defendant
denied using force against his daughter and claimed she always consented to sex.
14
A preliminary hearing was held in July 1998.  Afterwards, the magistrate
found “more than sufficient” evidence to hold defendant to answer on all six
counts reinstituted by the 1997 complaint as originally filed to satisfy the 1996
law, and as subsequently amended to satisfy the 1997 law.  The magistrate reached
the same conclusion with respect to evidence, adduced at the hearing, of one
additional act of oral copulation that had not previously been charged, and that
reportedly occurred during one of the 1981 incidents otherwise covered by the
1997 complaint.  On August 10, 1998, the People filed an information in superior
court charging defendant with all seven of the foregoing crimes.
In September 1998, defendant moved to dismiss the information.  He
claimed, among other things, that section 803(g) violated ex post facto guarantees,
and that collateral estoppel principles compelled adherence to Bunn I, supra, 53
Cal.App.4th 227, in this regard.  The superior court reluctantly agreed.  While the
preliminary hearing evidence suggested that defendant had sexually assaulted his
daughter as charged, the court felt powerless to “reverse” Bunn I’s determination
that section 803(g) could not be used to prosecute crimes time-barred before 1994.
On September 18, 1998, the superior court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss
the information.
The People appealed, and the dismissal entered by the superior court was
reversed.  The Court of Appeal found no ex post facto violation under Frazer,
supra, 21 Cal.4th 737, which issued while the present appeal was pending, and
which disapproved Bunn I, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 227.  In finding no other bar to
use of section 803(g) against defendant, the Court of Appeal rejected his claim that
the state separation of powers doctrine precluded the refiling of previously
dismissed counts.  The court’s opinion focused on the most recent version of the
statute, apparently finding it constitutional per se.  Nothing in the 1997 law
suggested to the court that the Legislature intended to review the merits of final
15
judgments, or to direct courts to adjudicate refiled counts in a particular manner.
While the Court of Appeal relied solely on California case law, it disagreed with
People v. Lynch (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 313 (Lynch II), which declined, on
separation of powers grounds, to apply the 1997 refiling provision.
Defendant’s petition for review was granted.  We limited briefing and
argument to the constitutionality of section 803(g)’s refiling provisions under the
separation of powers doctrine in article III, section 3 of the state Constitution.
II.  DISCUSSION
The California Constitution establishes a system of state government in
which power is divided among three coequal branches (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1
[legislative power]; Cal. Const., art. V, § 1 [executive power]; Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 1 [judicial power]), and further states that those charged with the exercise of one
power may not exercise any other (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3).  Notwithstanding
these principles, it is well understood that the branches share common boundaries
(Hustedt v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 329, 338), and no sharp
line between their operations exists.  (Superior Court v. County of Mendocino
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 52 (Mendocino); see Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46
Cal.3d 64, 76 (Davis) [“ ‘From the beginning, each branch has exercised all three
kinds of powers’ ”].)
Indeed, the “sensitive balance” underlying the tripartite system of
government assumes a certain degree of mutual oversight and influence.  (Harbor
v. Deukmejian (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 1086; see Mendocino, supra, 13 Cal.4th 45,
53 [“the judiciary passes upon the constitutional validity of legislative and
executive actions, the Legislature enacts statutes that govern the procedures and
evidentiary rules applicable in judicial and executive proceedings, and the
Governor appoints judges and participates in the legislative process through the
veto power”].)
16
Despite this interdependence, the Constitution does vest each branch with
certain “core” (Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (2001)
25 Cal.4th 287, 297 (Carmel)) or “essential” (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4
Cal.4th 668, 700, fn. 26) functions that may not be usurped by another branch.
We focus here on the constitutional roles of the Legislature and the judiciary,
particularly with respect to criminal statutes of limitation and judgments of
dismissal obtained thereunder.
The Legislature is charged, among other things, with “mak[ing] law . . . by
statute.”  (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (b).)  This essential function embraces the
far-reaching power to weigh competing interests and determine social policy.
(Carmel, supra, 25 Cal.4th 287, 299; Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 807, 814; see Nougues v. Douglass (1857) 7 Cal. 65, 70
[describing the legislative power as the “creative element” of government].)
Such nuanced determinations underlie the existence and nature of any
statutory time bar in criminal cases.  (See Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th 737, 758 & fn.
19 [noting that criminal statutes of limitation are “an optional form of ‘legislative
grace,’ ” and that they are not constitutionally compelled]; id. at p. 770 [indicating
that such laws carefully balance society’s interest in repose against the need to
prosecute crime].)  No less the product of competing policy choices is the decision
to make any statute retroactive (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d
1188, 1206), and the enactment of rules regulating the dismissal and refiling of
criminal counts.  (E.g., §§ 999 [permitting reprosecution of an offense following
an order setting aside an indictment or information as defined in the statute], 1010
[contemplating orders directing the filing of a new information after a demurrer is
sustained and the action is dismissed as defined in the statute], 1387, subd. (a)
[permitting reprosecution of a felony following one prior order terminating the
17
action as defined in the statute], 1387.1, subd. (a) [allowing the refiling of a
violent felony charge following two prior dismissals as defined in the statute].)
Quite distinct from the broad power to pass laws is the essential power of
the judiciary to resolve “specific controversies” between parties.  (Mandel v.
Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531, 547 (Mandel).)  In such proceedings, existing laws,
like criminal statutes of limitation, are interpreted and applied.  (See California
Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th
627, 632-633 (California Teachers) [describing the judicial role of construing
statutes consistent with their plain meaning and other indicia of legislative intent];
Marin Water etc. Co. v. Railroad Com. (1916) 171 Cal. 706, 712 [noting that
judicial controversies are resolved under “ ‘laws supposed already to exist’ ”].)
The courts also decide on an appropriate case-by-case basis whether
constitutional, jurisdictional, or tactical concerns bar enforcement of criminal
statutes of limitation.  (See, e.g., Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th 737, 754-775 [rejecting
ex post facto and due process challenges to § 803(g)]; People v. Williams (1999)
21 Cal.4th 335, 341-346 [limiting the circumstances under which criminal statutes
of limitation may be forfeited]; Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367,
373-374 [holding that such statutes do not implicate fundamental subject matter
jurisdiction].)  In general, the “power to dispose” of criminal charges belongs to
the judiciary.  (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 136, italics omitted; see
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 512.)
The separation of powers doctrine protects each branch’s core
constitutional functions from lateral attack by another branch.  As noted, however,
this does not mean that the activities of one branch are entirely immune from
regulation or oversight by another.  We have regularly approved legislation
affecting matters over which the judiciary has inherent power and control.  (See,
e.g., Obrien v. Jones (2000) 23 Cal.4th 40, 47-57 [statute changing the Supreme
18
Court’s authority to appoint State Bar Court judges]; Mendocino, supra, 13
Cal.4th 45, 58-66 [statute designating unpaid furlough days on which trial courts
shall not be in session]; Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 191-204
[statute allowing trial judges to be peremptorily disqualified by litigants]; In re
McKinney (1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 10-13 [statute fixing the punishment for witnesses
found in contempt of court].)  As long as such enactments do not “ ‘defeat or
materially impair’ ” the constitutional functions of the courts, a “ ‘reasonable’ ”
degree of regulation is allowed.  (Mendocino, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 58.)
Nevertheless, the separation of powers doctrine prohibits the Legislature
“from arrogating to itself core functions of the executive or judicial branch.”
(Carmel, supra, 25 Cal.4th 287, 298.)  No branch of government can exercise
“ ‘the complete power constitutionally vested in another.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting
Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 117; original italics.)  The
Constitution thereby seeks to avoid both the “concentration of power in a single
branch of government,” and the “overreaching” by one branch against the others.
(Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 495; see Davis, supra, 46 Cal.3d 64, 76
[noting that the doctrine prevents “ ‘the combination in the hands of a single
person or group of the basic or fundamental powers of government’ ”].)
Regarding the core functions discussed above, separation of powers
principles compel courts to effectuate the purpose of enactments (California
Teachers, supra, 14 Cal.4th 627, 632), and limit judicial efforts to rewrite statutes
even where drafting or constitutional problems may appear.  (People v. Garcia
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 14; Kopp v. Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 607,
660-661.)  The judiciary may be asked to decide whether a statute is arbitrary or
unreasonable for constitutional purposes (e.g., Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th 737, 773),
but no inquiry into the “wisdom” of underlying policy choices is made.  (Lockard
v. City of Los Angeles (1949) 33 Cal.2d 453, 461.)
19
By the same token, direct legislative influence over the outcome of judicial
proceedings is constitutionally constrained.  Thus, it has been said that the
Legislature cannot “interpret[ ]” a statute or otherwise bind the courts with a post
hoc “declaration” of legislative intent.  (Hunt v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th
984, 1007 (Hunt).)  Separation of powers principles do not preclude the
Legislature from amending a statute and applying the change to both pending and
future cases, though any such law cannot “readjudicat[e]” or otherwise “disregard”
judgments that are already “final.”  (Mandel, supra, 29 Cal.3d 531, 547; see id. at
pp. 545-551 [rejecting legislative attempt, as part of state budget process, to
review the merits of an attorney fee award previously entered against the state and
affirmed on appeal]; Hunt, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1008 [indicating that judgments
do not become final for separation of powers purposes until both the trial and
appellate process is complete, and the case is no longer pending in the courts].)
Here, as below, defendant claims section 803(g) thwarts final judgments
insofar as it allows the People to timely refile, as part of the 1997 complaint, six
molestation counts that were previously included in the 1995 complaint and
dismissed under Bunn I, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 227.  Defendant observes that
similar concerns were addressed for federal separation of powers purposes in
Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, and suggests the latter decision should guide our
resolution of his analogous state law claim.  For reasons explained below, we
agree that Plaut’s analytical framework applies here.  However, contrary to what
defendant assumes, careful examination of Plaut reveals that the instant
prosecution is not constitutionally flawed.
Plaut concerned a civil action filed in federal district court in 1987 alleging
the fraudulent sale of securities in 1983 and 1984 in violation of substantive
federal law.  (See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the SEC Act), § 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (section 10(b) of the SEC Act).)  From the time the alleged fraud
20
occurred through the time the Plaut suit was filed, federal courts were required to
“borrow” the analogous state statute of limitations in the jurisdiction in which such
actions were pending.  The defendant in Plaut moved to dismiss the complaint
because it was filed more than three years after the alleged fraud occurred, and
because it was allegedly untimely under applicable state law.  The plaintiffs
countered that the three-year state law period had not expired because it ran from
the time the alleged fraud was, or should have been, discovered.  (Plaut, supra,
514 U.S. 211, 213; see id. at pp. 249-250 (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).)
On June 20, 1991, before the district court resolved the timeliness issue
argued by the parties in Plaut, the United States Supreme Court changed the
controlling law and decided Lampf v. Gilbertson (1991) 501 U.S. 350 (Lampf).  In
Lampf, the court adopted a uniform federal limitations rule requiring actions under
section 10(b) of the SEC Act to commence within one year of the time the
violation was discovered, and within three years of the time the violation occurred.
Moreover, this new rule applied in Lampf itself, and in all cases then pending
under section 10(b) of the SEC Act.  The effect was to retroactively shorten the
statute of limitations in actions which, like Plaut, were not necessarily time-barred
under pre-Lampf law.  Based on Lampf, the district court determined that the
complaint in Plaut was untimely, and the case was dismissed on August 13, 1991.
The decision became final on September 12, 1991.  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211,
214; see id. at pp. 250-251 (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).)
Congress promptly responded to Lampf, supra, 501 U.S. 350, by passing
section 27A of the SEC Act, which became effective December 19, 1991.  (15
U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (section 27A).)  This provision did not affect Lampf insofar as it
established a uniform federal limitations period in actions filed under section 10(b)
of the SEC Act after Lampf.  However, through section 27A, Congress repudiated
the high court’s decision to apply Lampf retroactively, and restored the pre-Lampf
21
limitations rule in two kinds of actions commenced before June 20, 1991, when
Lampf was filed:  (1) cases which were still pending on December 19, 1991, when
section 27A took effect, and (2) cases which were dismissed as time-barred
between June 20 and December 19, 1991, and which were timely when filed.  By
its terms, section 27A allowed plaintiffs to seek reinstatement of dismissed actions
no more than 60 days after the statute took effect.  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211,
214-215; see id. at p. 251 (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).)
Complying with all statutory requirements, the plaintiffs in Plaut moved to
reinstate their lawsuit under section 27A of the SEC Act.  The district court denied
the request on the ground the statute violated separation of powers principles
insofar as it contemplated the reinstatement of actions that had been dismissed as
time-barred under Lampf.  The ruling was upheld on appeal.  The United States
Supreme Court affirmed.  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, 215, 240.)  According to
Plaut at pages 217-218, Congress “exceeded its authority by requiring the federal
courts to exercise ‘[t]he judicial Power of the United States,’ U.S. Const., Art. III,
§ 1, in a manner repugnant to the text, structure, and traditions of Article III.”
The high court started from the premise that, under the United States
Constitution’s tripartite system of government, there exists a judicial branch
separate and independent from the legislative branch.  (Plaut, supra, 515 U.S. 211,
221.)  The court noted that while the legislature makes and prescribes the law (id.
at p. 222), the essential function of the judiciary is to interpret statutes (id. at p.
222), and to decide individual cases and controversies arising thereunder (id. at pp.
218-219).
Plaut also observed that the balance created by this constitutional division
between the legislative and judicial departments serves in large part to prevent
“interference with the final judgments of courts.”  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211,
223; see id. at pp. 221, 222.)  In an extensive historical discussion, the high court
22
emphasized the Framers’ interest in eliminating the colonial practice by which
assemblies and legislatures either functioned as equitable courts of last resort,
hearing original actions and providing appellate review of judicial decisions, or
enacted special bills to vacate judgments and order new trials or appeals.  (Id. at
pp. 219-225.)
Against this backdrop, Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, declared, in almost
talismanic form, that Congress lacks the power to “reopen” (id. at pp. 219, 234,
240), “correct” (id. at p. 219), “ ‘reverse’ ” (id. at pp. 220, 222, 225), “revise” (id.
at pp. 226, 233), “vacate” (id. at p. 224), or “annul” (ibid.) final court judgments.
The controlling separation of powers principle was stated as follows:  “Having
achieved finality, . . . a judicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial
department with regard to a particular case or controversy, and Congress may not
declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very case was
something other than what the courts said it was.”  (Id. at p. 227, original italics.)
In Plaut, both the plaintiffs and the court minority raised various arguments
in an attempt to exempt section 27A of the SEC Act from the foregoing rule.  All
were unsuccessful.  For example, the Plaut majority rejected any suggestion that
judgments of dismissal enforcing a statute of limitations are “uniquely subject to
congressional nullification.”  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, 228.)  The court
observed that whether an action was dismissed on statute of limitation grounds or
for some other reason — such as failure to state a claim, to prove substantive
liability, or to prosecute — it has, for separation of powers purposes, the same
conclusive effect under procedural rules governing actions filed in federal court.
Plaut saw no reason to depart from such “statutory and judge made” rules of
finality for constitutional purposes, or to otherwise forgo separation of powers
23
protection for judgments that “rested on the bar of a statute of limitations.”
(Ibid.)12
In a related vein, Plaut determined that the judgments covered by section
27A of the SEC Act were not vulnerable to legislative attack simply because the
actions had previously been dismissed under a limitations period created by the
court itself in Lampf, supra, 501 U.S. 350, rather than by Congress.  Indeed, Plaut
admonished, the operative separation of powers rule was neither triggered nor
affected by congressional disagreement with the substantive reasoning of Lampf.
According to Plaut, the constitutionality of section 27(A) concerned, “not the
validity or even the source of the legal rule that produced the Article III
judgments, but rather the immunity from legislative abrogation of those judgments
themselves.  The separation-of-powers question before us has nothing to do with
Lampf . . . .”  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, 230; see id. at p. 228 [noting that the
separation of powers doctrine is violated “when an individual final judgment is
                                                
12 
In the course of this discussion, the high court acknowledged that both the
existence and length of any statute of limitations is “entirely subject to
congressional control.”  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, 228.)  The court also
reaffirmed its earlier holding in Chase, supra, 325 U.S. 304, that a statute of
limitations defense can be withdrawn after it is acquired consistent with due
process guarantees.  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 229.)  Plaut made clear,
however, that Congress’s retroactive alteration of a limitations period cannot have
the effect of reinstating an action reduced to final judgment on that ground before
the law changed.  In particular, Plaut declined to reach a contrary conclusion
based on the general malleability of statutes of limitation, noting that Congress
could otherwise authorize the “massive” undoing of final judgments by
retroactively changing any rule subject to its control, and could thereby
“substantially subvert” the separation of powers doctrine.  (Id. at p. 229.)  Thus,
under Plaut, “[t]o distinguish statutes of limitations on the ground that they are
mere creatures of Congress is to distinguish them not at all.”  (Ibid.)
24
legislatively rescinded for even the very best of reasons, such as the legislature’s
genuine conviction . . . that the judgment was wrong”], original italics.)
Moreover, notwithstanding the constitutional protection afforded final
judgments on an individual basis, section 27A of the SEC Act did not somehow
escape separation of powers scrutiny merely because the reopening provision
affected “a whole class of cases.”  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, 227.)  The court
reiterated that a separation of powers violation occurs when postjudgment
legislation deprives court decisions “of the conclusive effect that they had when
they were announced.”  (Id. at p. 228.)  Thus, whether a statute targets particular
suits or parties, or whether it purports to apply more generally like section 27A,
the critical factor for separation of powers purposes is whether such impermissible
legislative interference with final judgments has occurred.  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S.
at p. 228; see id. at p. 238 [confirming that a separation of powers violation does
not require any “ ‘singling out’ ” of individual court cases].)
Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, the circumstances under which a
judgment achieves finality and is therefore immune from legislative interference
are clearly limited under Plaut.  First, the high court included in the
constitutionally protected category only those decisions that represent “the final
word of the [judicial] department as a whole,” as expressed by “the last court in
the hierarchy that rules on the case.”  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, 227, italics
added.)  Plaut explained that because the judicial branch consists of both inferior
and reviewing courts, a judgment has no conclusive effect until — under
procedural statutes and rules then in existence — either the time for appealing an
inferior court decision has expired, or such an appeal has been pursued and the
review process is complete.  (Ibid.)  For this reason, Plaut observed, separation of
powers principles are not implicated, and an inferior court decision has not been
impermissibly revised, where a reviewing court applies a new retroactive statute to
25
cases “still [pending] on appeal.”  (Id. at p. 226; see id. at p. 233, fn. 7.)  Under
such circumstances, no final judgment was obtained for federal constitutional
purposes before the substantive law changed.
Second, Plaut established that statutory limitations on the conclusive effect
of judgments are not impermissibly retroactive and can constitutionally be applied
as long as they were already in existence when the judiciary gave its “last word” in
the particular case.  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, 227.)  Stated differently, the high
court found nothing to prevent Congress from authorizing or requiring the
reinstatement of a dismissed action where the prior judgment otherwise becomes
final for separation of powers purposes after the law’s effective date.  (Id. at
p. 234.)
Plaut’s reasoning on this core point was clear:  “The relevant retroactivity,
of course, consists not of the requirement that there be set aside a judgment that
has been rendered prior to its being set[ ] aside — for example, a statute passed
today which says that all default judgments rendered in the future may be
reopened within 90 days after their entry.  In that sense, all requirements to reopen
are ‘retroactive,’ and the designation is superfluous.  Nothing we say today
precludes a law such as that.  The finality that a court can pronounce is no more
than what the law in existence at the time of judgment will permit it to pronounce.
If the law then applicable says that the judgment may be reopened for certain
reasons, that limitation is built into the judgment itself, and its finality is so
conditioned.”  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, 234, original italics omitted and new
italics added.)
In Plaut itself, the challenged provision could not constitutionally be
applied because it was not “built into” the judgment of dismissal for which
reopening was sought.  Specifically, the high court invalidated section 27A of the
SEC Act insofar as it contemplated the reinstatement of actions which had been
26
dismissed as time-barred and reduced to final judgment before the statute’s
effective date.  Under Plaut’s separation of powers analysis, Congress was without
power to subject judgments of dismissal to a retroactive reopening provision not in
existence when those judgments achieved conclusive effect.  (Plaut, supra, 514
U.S. 211, 225, 227, 234, 240.)13
We find Plaut persuasive for purposes of interpreting California’s
separation of powers clause.  (See Mendocino, supra, 13 Cal.4th 45, 53 [citing
Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, as support for the state separation of powers
prohibition against statutes that “readjudicate” cases already resolved by “final”
judgment].)  Consistent with the California principles and authorities discussed
above, Plaut properly preserves and balances the respective “core functions” of
the two branches.  (Carmel, supra, 25 Cal.4th 287, 298.)  On the one hand, Plaut
recognizes the core judicial power to resolve “specific controversies” (Mandel,
supra, 29 Cal.3d 531, 547) between parties by judgments that are “final” under
laws then extant (ibid.), and holds such final dispositions inviolate from legislative
“disregard” (ibid.).  On the other hand, Plaut acknowledges the paramount
                                                
13 
Plaut found “no [other] instance in which Congress has attempted to set
aside the final judgment of an Article III court by retroactive legislation.”  (Plaut,
supra, 514 U.S. 211, 230; see id. at pp. 234, 240.)  The high court also rejected
any suggestion that its holding departed from existing law.  Thus, Plaut
distinguished United States v. Sioux Nation (1980) 448 U.S. 371 (Sioux Nation),
which upheld, on separation of powers grounds, a statute directing the federal
Court of Claims to decide whether the government owed just compensation for
taking tribal land 200 years earlier, notwithstanding any res judicata defense and
even though the same court had previously rejected the same claim.
Congressional waiver in Sioux Nation of the res judicata benefit of a decision
acquired by the government in prior litigation was not — according to Plaut,
supra, 514 U.S. at pages 230-231 — a direct attack on the underlying
independence and power of the judiciary.
27
legislative power to “make” law by statute (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (b)), to
apply new laws to all cases still pending at either the trial or the appellate level
(Hunt, supra, 21 Cal.4th 984, 1008), and to regulate, within reasonable limits, the
practices and procedures by which judicial matters are to be resolved.
(Mendocino, supra, 13 Cal.4th 45, 58.)  When the finality of a judicial
determination is limited or conditioned by the terms of a general statute already in
effect when the determination is made, application of the statute according to its
terms is but a “ ‘reasonable,’ ” and therefore permissible, legislative restriction
upon the constitutional function of the judiciary; it does not “ ‘defeat or materially
impair’ ” that function.  (Ibid.)  Because we therefore conclude that Plaut, supra,
514 U.S. 211, is in clear conformity with California law, we follow it here.14
We note that Plaut’s constitutional analysis has similarly been adopted by
the high courts of other states.  All such courts addressing the issue have found,
under authority of Plaut, that separation of powers principles are offended if, but
                                                
14 
We reject, for instance, the People’s attempt to distinguish the federal
statute in Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, from section 803(g).  The People observe
that Plaut condemned section 27A of the SEC Act insofar as it embodied a
retroactive reopening “require[ment]” (514 U.S. at pp. 213, 217, 240), or
“command[ ]” (id. at pp. 216, fn. 2, 219).  The high court’s terminology reflected
the language of section 27A itself, which stated that actions dismissed before the
statute’s effective date “ ‘shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff.’ ”  (Id. at
p. 215, italics added.)  The People suggest that section 803(g)’s refiling provisions
do not fall within Plaut’s constitutional analysis because they merely “permit,”
rather than mandate, the reinstatement of previously dismissed actions.  However,
as our discussion of the state statutory scheme makes clear, there is no functional
difference between the Plaut statute, which explicitly requires reinstatement upon
the plaintiff’s motion, and section 803(g), which implicitly requires reinstatement
upon a qualified refiling by the People.  In both cases, the final judgment must be
reopened upon appropriate statutory action taken by the party against whom the
prior action was dismissed.  Plaut held that retroactive application of such a statute
violates separation of powers principles at the federal level, and we reach a similar
conclusion under the state Constitution.
28
only to the extent that, a statute permits the reopening of a case which was not
subject to such reopening under the law in effect when the highest court to
consider the matter finally determined it.  (E.g., Ex Parte Jenkins (Ala. 1998) 723
So.2d 649, 653-660 (lead opn. of See, J.) (Jenkins) [authorizing the reopening of a
12-year-old paternity judgment consistent with the requirements of a statute in
effect when finality occurred]; Quinton v. General Motors Corp. (Mich. 1996) 551
N.W.2d 677, 689 (lead opn. of Levin, J.) [applying statutory amendment
retroactively affecting the amount of workers’ compensation benefits awarded in
court where the award was subject to change both by its inherent nature and
express terms]; Savannah R-III v. Pub. School Ret. Sys. (Mo. 1997) 950 S.W.2d
854, 858-859 [applying statutory amendment abrogating an intermediate appellate
decision previously entered in the same public pension dispute where the case was
pending on remand in the trial court when the law changed].)
Of particular interest is Jenkins, supra, 723 So.2d 649, which demonstrates
that a case can be refiled and relitigated to the extent such statutory conditions are
“built into the judgment itself.”  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, 234.)  In Jenkins, a
mother obtained a 1986 judgment identifying her ex-husband as the biological
father of her child and ordering him to pay child support.  When the mother sought
increased child support in 1995, the ex-husband moved to relitigate and reverse
the prior judgment based on DNA evidence excluding him as the biological father,
and on information concerning the mother’s sexual relationship with another man
at the time of conception.  The ex-husband invoked:  (1) a statute in effect in 1986
permitting the reopening of such cases within a reasonable time after a doubt as to
paternity arose (the 1986 statute), and (2) a 1994 statute requiring the reopening of
a paternity case whenever the previously adjudicated father thereafter presents
exculpatory scientific evidence (the 1994 statute).  In a ruling affirmed on appeal,
29
the trial court used the 1994 statute to grant the requested relief.  (Jenkins, supra,
723 So.2d at pp. 651-652 (lead opn. of See, J.).)
Following Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, the Alabama Supreme Court found a
state separation of powers violation only insofar as the lower courts readjudicated
paternity under a statute not in effect when the prior final judgment was obtained.
A majority of the court in Jenkins, supra, 723 So.2d 649, held that the more liberal
terms of the 1994 statute could not be applied “retroactively to change the
reopening provisions incorporated into paternity judgments that became final
before that section was enacted.”  (Jenkins, at p. 656 (lead opn. of See, J.); see id.
at p. 664 (conc. & dis. opn. of Almon, J.); id. at p. 665 (conc. & dis. opn. of
Kennedy, J.).)  However, the court rejected any suggestion that the Legislature
lacked power to change “the law of finality” prospectively (id. at p. 658 (lead opn.
of See, J.)), by subjecting judgments to a reopening provision in existence when
they otherwise achieved conclusive effect.  (Id. at pp. 658-660 (lead opn. of See,
J.); see id. at pp. 661-664 (conc. & dis. opn. of Maddox, J.); id. at pp. 669-678
(conc. & dis. opn. of Cook, J.).)  The Alabama Supreme Court ultimately reversed
and remanded the matter to determine whether the ex-husband was entitled to
relitigate paternity under the 1986 statute, as incorporated into the prior judgment,
including the “reasonable time” restriction contained only in that law.
We therefore hold that a refiling provision like section 803(g) cannot be
retroactively applied to subvert judgments that became final before the provision
took effect, and before the law of finality changed.  This ban applies even where
lawmakers have acted for “the very best of reasons” (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211,
228, italics omitted), and whether or not legislative disagreement with the “legal
rule” underlying the judgment has been expressed (id. at p. 230).  By the same
token, a judgment is not final for separation of powers purposes, and reopening of
the case can occur, under the specific terms of refiling legislation already in effect
30
when the judicial branch completed its review and ultimately decided the case.
Such nonretroactive limitations on judgment finality are constitutionally
allowed.15
                                                
15
Defendant suggests that no statute, regardless of when it was enacted and
whether it affects past or only future judgments, may allow the refiling of
dismissed actions where the Legislature seeks to review, control, or disapprove the
“outcome” reached by the courts in resolving “the merits” of specific disputes.  To
the extent such a distinct separation of powers theory finds support in California
law, we decline to apply it here.  (Cf. Mandel, supra, 29 Cal.3d 531, 545-551.)
Nothing in the 1996 or 1997 versions of section 803(g) suggests that refiling is
permitted because courts misinterpreted or misapplied the law as it then existed
when prior dismissals occurred.  Nor do the 1996 and 1997 laws purport to dictate
the manner in which courts should dispose of refiled counts.  Both the 1996 and
1997 laws simply allow prosecution under current law of previously dismissed
cases on exactly the same terms as cases that were never previously prosecuted.
(Compare former § 803(g)(3)(B)(ii) (1996 version) with § 803(g)(3)(A)(iii) &
(iv).)  Thus, as indicated above, the purpose and effect of the 1996 and 1997
refiling provisions were merely to ensure that defendants who were diligently
prosecuted under earlier versions of the statute, but who won dismissals in those
cases, are not thereafter uniquely exempt from prosecution under more recent law,
and do not receive more favorable statute of limitations treatment than other
similarly situated defendants against whom no previous prosecutions had been
attempted.  (See Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 700
(1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 3, 1997, p. 5 [noting that the 1997
refiling provision helps extend section 803(g) to “all cases” charging the
enumerated crimes].)  Viewed in this manner, section 803(g) is no different, for
separation of powers purposes, from the many other statutes that authorize the
refiling of previously dismissed criminal counts, and that have long been part of
California law.  (E.g., §§ 999 [enacted in 1872], 1010 [same], 1387, subd. (a)
[same], 1387.1, subd. (a) [added by Stats. 1987, ch. 1211, § 47.5].)  To
characterize section 803(g)’s refiling provisions as an impermissible attempt to
readjudicate the “merits” of prior dismissals, or to otherwise conclude that such
provisions impermissibly impair the “finality” of even future judgments, would
raise a serious question as to the constitutionality of all criminal refiling statutes.
Of course, Plaut itself casts doubt on whether the effect of a refiling statute on the
“merits” of judicial determinations is a critical, or even relevant, separation of
powers concern.  Plaut seems to establish a bright-line rule that considers only
whether statutory limitations on finality were, or were not, in existence when the
(footnote continued on next page)
31
We have seen that since it was first amended in 1996, section 803(g) has
continuously offered the People a new opportunity to prosecute child sex crimes
that were previously charged under prior versions of the statute but dismissed by
the courts.  Both the 1996 and 1997 laws authorize the “refiling” and “revival” of
otherwise time-barred counts.  However, the precise conditions under which
prosecutors may refile depend upon which version of section 803(g) is involved.
For example, the 1996 law required, among other things, the refiling of complaints
“on or before June 30, 1997.”  (Former § 803(g)(3)(B)(ii) (1996 version).)  The
1997 law — in addition to other changes and conditions — extends the refiling
period to a point “no later than 180 days after” finality of an authoritative high
court decision upholding retroactive application of the statute, namely, Frazer,
supra, 21 Cal.4th 737.  (§ 803(g)(3)(A)(iv).)
To the extent neither the 1996 nor the 1997 refiling provision was in effect
when a prior judgment of dismissal under section 803(g) became final within the
meaning of Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, 227, 234, the state separation of powers
doctrine bars reliance on either provision to recharge a molestation defendant with
the same crimes.  Such a scenario is indistinguishable from the circumstances that
gave rise to a separation of powers violation in Plaut itself.
Constitutional problems also arise where the prior dismissal was entered or
finally upheld when one version of section 803(g) was in effect (e.g., the 1996
refiling provision), but the reinstituted complaint complies only with a later
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
judgment otherwise achieved conclusive effect.  (Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 228
[prohibiting retroactive reopening statutes regardless of their underlying
“reasons”], 230 [indicating that judgments are entitled to constitutional protection
regardless of the underlying “legal rule”].)
32
version (e.g., the 1997 refiling provision) which became effective after the prior
dismissal was entered or finally upheld.  In that circumstance, use of the later law
constitutes an impermissible retroactive attack on a judgment constitutionally
subject to reopening only under the earlier law.  (Cf. Jenkins, supra, 723 So.2d
649, 655-658 (lead opn. of See, J.).)  It is on this basis that we disallow
reprosecution of the defendant in the companion case of King, supra, __ Cal.4th
__.
In the present case, the pertinent facts are materially distinct from those in
King, and we therefore reach the opposite result.  Dismissal of the 1995 complaint
against defendant Bunn did not become final for constitutional purposes until
judicial review in Bunn I, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 227, was complete.  Both in
February 1997, when the decision in Bunn I was filed, and in May 1997, when
review in Bunn I was denied, the 1996 version of section 803(g) was in effect,
including the refiling provision contained in former section 803(g)(3)(B)(ii) (1996
version).
The 1997 complaint now challenged by defendant satisfies all requirements
of former section 803(g)(3)(B)(ii) (1996 version), as follows:  (1) the victim
reported the crimes to law enforcement officials “between January 1, 1994, and
January 1, 1997,” (2) the 1995 complaint was filed within one year of the report
“but was dismissed,” and (3) the same crimes were recharged as part of the 1997
complaint “on . . . June 30, 1997.”  (Ibid.)  Because the 1996 law permits refiling
under these statutory conditions, and because these conditions were incorporated
into the judgment when it otherwise became final in Bunn I, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th
227, prosecutorial use of the 1996 refiling provision does not retroactively reopen
33
the case or violate the constitutional rules we have discussed.  (Plaut, supra, 514
U.S. 211, 234; cf. Jenkins, supra, 723 So.2d 649, 658-660 (lead opn. of See, J.).)16
Accordingly, the correct result was reached on appeal in the present case.
On the one hand, the Court of Appeal failed to consider either the concept of
judgment finality in Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, or the effect of the 1996 refiling
provision on defendant’s separation of powers claim.  On the other hand, the Court
of Appeal properly allowed reinstatement of the six molestation counts dismissed
in Bunn I, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 227, and properly declined to uphold the superior
court’s dismissal of the information on separation of powers grounds.17
                                                
16 
It is clear that defendant’s prosecution complies with the 1996 refiling
provision in effect when the judgment in Bunn I, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 227,
became final for constitutional purposes under Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, 227,
234.  (See former § 803(g)(3)(B)(ii) (1996 version).)  However, as a
hypertechnical matter of state statutory law, we cannot eliminate the possibility
that, at the precise moment the complaint was refiled on June 30, 1997 (a fact not
disclosed by the record), the 1996 version of section 803(g) had been supplanted
— seconds, minutes, or hours short of its originally devised expiration — by the
1997 version (a fact not disclosed by the legislative history).  Of course, as
reflected in the amended complaint filed on July 17, 1997, the instant prosecution
satisfies the more generous terms of the 1997 refiling provision as well.  (See
§ 803(g)(3)(A)(iv).)  In any event, this hypothetical anomaly is irrelevant to our
separation of powers analysis.  Insofar as the refiled complaint satisfies all
statutory limitations on finality of the judgment in Bunn I, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th
227, which were in effect when finality occurred, the instant refiled prosecution is
not the result of any retroactive statutory assault upon the judgment in Bunn I.
17 
We do reject any suggestion by the instant Court of Appeal that Lynch II,
supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 313, was wrongly decided under its own facts.  On appeal
in Lynch I, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1228-1229, the defendant obtained the
dismissal of charges brought under the 1994 version of section 803(g).  This court
denied review in Lynch I on May 25, 1995, while the 1994 law was still in effect.
(Lynch I, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1229.)  On July 1, 1997, the day after
enactment of the 1997 law, a complaint was filed in Lynch II, supra, 69
Cal.App.4th 313, 317, reinstating the dismissed counts.  In upholding the trial
(footnote continued on next page)
34
III.  DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
court’s dismissal of the refiled complaint, the Court of Appeal held in Lynch II
that use of the 1997 refiling provision would constitute an impermissible
legislative effort “to readjudicate a controversy that has been litigated in our courts
and resolved by a final judicial judgment.”  (Id. at p. 315.)  While the court’s
reasoning does not strictly conform to the analysis we adopt here today, including
our reliance on Plaut, supra, 514 U.S. 211, the result in Lynch II is correct.
Neither the 1996 nor the 1997 refiling provision existed when the judgment in
Lynch I, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th 1223, became final.  Hence, no version of section
803(g) could constitutionally be applied to reinstate the complaint in Lynch II,
supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 313.
1
CONCURRING OPINION BY BROWN, J.
I concur in the judgment under compulsion of People v. Frazer (1999) 21
Cal.4th 737 (see id. at pp. 782-784 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.)) and Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farms, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211.
BROWN, J.
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Bunn
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 1/18/00 – 1st Dist., Div. 3
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S086128
Date Filed: January 10, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Lake
Judge: David Herrick
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson,
Assistant Attorney General, W. Scott Thorpe and Janet Gaard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
Peter Dodd, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Respondent.
2
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Janet Gaard
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 125
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550
(916) 324-5284
Peter Dodd
P.O. Box 380
Hornbrook, CA  96044
(541) 857-2784