Case Title: Carbajal v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC10-466

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2011-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-466 
____________ 
 
DAVID CARBAJAL, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
 
[November 3, 2011] 
 
 
CANADY, C.J. 
 
In this case, we consider the timeliness of a claim raised under Florida Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 3.850 that the Office of the Statewide Prosecutor (OSP) 
lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the defendant.  We have for review Carbajal v. 
State, 28 So. 3d 187 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), in which the Second District Court of 
Appeal rejected Carbajal’s argument that the time limitations of rule 3.850 were 
not applicable to his claim that the OSP’s lack of jurisdiction to prosecute him 
divested the circuit court of jurisdiction to enter judgment against him.  The 
Second District held that Carbajal’s claim that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction 
 
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to enter judgment or sentence was barred by the time limits of rule 3.850.  The 
Second District certified that its decision on this issue expressly and directly 
conflicts with the following decisions: Gunn v. State, 947 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2006); Brown v. State, 917 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Harris v. State, 
854 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); and Harrell v. State, 721 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 1998).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
Although the Second District’s ruling was based on its holding that the rule 
3.850 time limits apply to claims asserting that a judgment was void because it was 
entered by a court without jurisdiction, the Second District also observed that any 
lack of jurisdiction by the OSP would not divest the circuit court of jurisdiction.  
The Second District noted that its view on this point was in disagreement with the 
decisions in Luger v. State, 983 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and Winter v. 
State, 781 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). 
Because we conclude that any lack of jurisdiction by the OSP did not divest 
the circuit court of jurisdiction, we decline to address the certified conflict issue.  
Instead, as further explained below, we resolve this case on the ground that 
Carbajal’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the OSP was barred by the time 
limitations of rule 3.850.  Accordingly, we approve the Second District’s 
affirmance of the trial court’s denial of Carbajal’s motion.  We disapprove Luger 
and Winter.  To the extent that they hold that an error regarding the jurisdiction of 
 
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the OSP renders a conviction void ab initio, we likewise disapprove Small v. State, 
56 So. 3d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Brown; and Zanger v. State, 548 So. 2d 746 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1989). 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In December 2001, the OSP filed a ten-count information charging David 
Carbajal with a variety of drug offenses.  In January 2002, Carbajal entered a nolo 
contendere plea to the charges and was sentenced to 155 months in prison.  He did 
not appeal his judgment or sentence.  Carbajal, 28 So. 3d at 187. 
In February 2007, Carbajal filed a successive motion for postconviction 
relief pursuant to rule 3.850, in which he asserted that because “ALL the crimes 
alleged, and ALL the actions pertinent to those crimes, occurred in the same 
county and circuit,” the OSP did not have jurisdiction to prosecute in his case and 
therefore the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to enter his conviction and 
sentence.  Carbajal further asserted that his challenge to the jurisdiction of the 
circuit court was an issue that could be raised at any time and that his 
postconviction motion therefore should not be denied as untimely.  The circuit 
court agreed that Carbajal’s motion was timely but denied relief on the merits.  
Carbajal, 28 So. 3d at 188. 
On appeal, the Second District affirmed the denial of relief on the basis that 
the motion was untimely.  Id.  The Second District explained that while rule 3.850 
 
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envisages claims asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the 
defendant’s conviction or sentence, pursuant to the plain language of the rule, in a 
noncapital case any motion for postconviction relief must be filed no later than two 
years after the judgment and sentence become final.  The Second District listed the 
three exceptions to the two-year limit: (1) claims predicated on facts which were 
previously unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have 
been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; (2) claims predicated on a 
fundamental constitutional right that was not established within the two-year 
period and has been held to apply retroactively; or (3) situations where retained 
counsel failed to timely file the motion.  The Second District concluded that 
because Carbajal’s allegations did not fit any of these exceptions, his motion was 
untimely.  Id. at 189.  On this point, the Second District certified conflict with 
Gunn, Brown, Harris, and Harrell, which determined that the two-year limitation in 
rule 3.850(b) was inapplicable to a motion demonstrating that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to enter the defendant’s conviction or sentence.  See Carbajal, 28 So. 
3d at 190. 
The Second District also observed that any lack of jurisdiction by the OSP 
would not divest the circuit court of jurisdiction.  The Second District reasoned 
that “even if the Statewide Prosecutor did not have jurisdiction to prosecute the 
case, the circuit court still had jurisdiction over these felonies,” and thus, 
 
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Carbajal’s conviction and sentence were valid.  Id. at 188 n.1.  The Second District 
recognized that its view that lack of OSP jurisdiction did not affect the circuit 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction was inconsistent with Luger, 983 So. 2d at 50 
(explaining that the issue of the OSP’s jurisdiction “is one of the trial court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction which can be raised following a plea of guilty”); and 
Winter, 781 So. 2d at 1115 (concluding that allegations regarding whether the 
OSP’s jurisdiction was proper “raise[d] the jurisdiction of the trial court”).  See 
also Small, 56 So. 3d at 53 (concluding that the information was sufficient but 
noting that if “an information fails to allege the necessary jurisdictional allegations 
to support OSP jurisdiction, the information is fatally defective, and a resulting 
conviction is void”); Brown, 917 So. 2d at 273 (“If the Office of the Statewide 
Prosecutor files an information but lacks jurisdiction to prosecute a case, then the 
trial court’s jurisdiction is not properly invoked.”); Zanger, 548 So. 2d at 748 
(concluding that where the OSP files the information, allegations of criminal 
activity in more than one circuit are essential to the invocation of the jurisdiction of 
the circuit court). 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
In the analysis that follows, we approve the Second District’s affirmance of 
the circuit court’s denial of Carbajal’s postconviction motion.  Carbajal’s claim 
that the circuit court which entered the judgment and sentence lacked jurisdiction 
 
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is without merit, and his claim that the OSP lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him is 
untimely under rule 3.850. 
Article IV of the Florida Constitution establishes the OSP as a prosecuting 
officer of the State of Florida.  Article IV, section 4(b), provides in pertinent part: 
There is created in the office of the attorney general the position of 
statewide prosecutor.  The statewide prosecutor shall have concurrent 
jurisdiction with the state attorneys to prosecute violations of criminal 
laws occurring or having occurred, in two or more judicial circuits as 
part of a related transaction, or when any such offense is affecting or 
has affected two or more judicial circuits as provided by general law. 
The role of the OSP is further defined by section 16.56, Florida Statutes.  At the 
time Carbajal was charged by information, section 16.56(1)(a), Florida Statutes 
(2001), authorized the OSP to investigate and prosecute “[a]ny crime involving 
narcotic or other dangerous drugs” or “any attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to 
commit” any crime involving narcotic or other dangerous drugs but “only when 
any such offense is occurring, or has occurred, in two or more judicial circuits as 
part of a related transaction, or when any such offense is connected with an 
organized criminal conspiracy affecting two or more judicial circuits.”  Thus, 
Carbajal is correct that if his criminal activity in Florida actually occurred in only 
Lee County, Florida, the OSP was not authorized to prosecute charges arising from 
that conduct. 
 
We agree with the Second District, however, that even assuming that the 
OSP in fact lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Carbajal, such a defect in the 
 
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information would not divest the circuit court of jurisdiction over the felony 
offenses charged against Carbajal.  The issue of whether an information is filed by 
the OSP or a state attorney has no effect on the circuit court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is the “[p]ower of a particular court to hear the 
type of case that is then before it” or “jurisdiction over the nature of the cause of 
action and relief sought.”  Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 530 So. 2d 286, 288 (Fla. 1988) 
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 767 (5th ed. 1979)).  Pursuant to section 
26.012(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2001), at the time Carbajal was charged, the circuit 
courts had—as they continue to have—subject matter jurisdiction over “all 
felonies.”  See also McLean v. State, 2 So. 5, 5 (Fla. 1887) (“In criminal cases the 
jurisdiction is determined by the charge made.”).  Because the information filed in 
this case charged Carbajal with multiple felonies, the circuit court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over Carbajal’s case. 
Carbajal’s situation is not analogous to cases where a conviction was void 
because the information filed in the circuit court failed to allege that the defendant 
had committed a felony.  See, e.g., Ex parte Reed, 135 So. 302, 303 (Fla. 1931) 
(concluding that judgment of conviction by circuit court was void where 
indictment failed to show that the defendant was charged with a felony); Waters v. 
State, 354 So. 2d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (“Since the circuit court does not 
 
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have jurisdiction when only a misdemeanor is charged, the trial court did not have 
jurisdiction in this case.”); Pope v. State, 268 So. 2d 173, 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972) 
(explaining that an allegation of a felony “is essential to the invocation of the 
jurisdiction of a felony court over the charge since the allegata of the accusatory 
writ are precisely the basis in the first instance upon which the court’s jurisdiction 
over the subject matter thereof is predicated”). 
Carbajal contends that despite the fact that the information filed in his case 
otherwise properly alleged a felony, the information failed to invoke the circuit 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction because it was signed by the incorrect 
prosecuting attorney.  This argument is without merit. 
This Court has explained that “jurisdiction to try an accused does not exist 
under article I, section 15 of the Florida Constitution unless there is an extant 
information, indictment, or presentment filed by the state.”  State v. Anderson, 537 
So. 2d 1373, 1374 (Fla. 1989).  We have also explained, however, that while a 
charging instrument is essential to invoke the circuit court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction, “defects in charging documents are not always fundamental where the 
omitted matter is not essential, where the actual notice provided is sufficient, and 
where all the elements of the crime in question are proved at trial.”  State v. Gray, 
435 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. 1983).  In other words, while an information or 
indictment is “an essential requisite of jurisdiction which cannot be waived,” 
 
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Sadler v. State, 949 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (quoting Caves v. State, 
303 So. 2d 658, 659 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)), defects in the charging instrument do 
not necessarily render void a conviction based on the defective information.  These 
principles are codified in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140, which 
provides in part: 
No indictment or information, or any count thereof, shall be 
dismissed or judgment arrested, or new trial granted on account of any 
defect in the form of the indictment or information or of misjoinder of 
offenses or for any cause whatsoever, unless the court shall be of the 
opinion that the indictment or information is so vague, indistinct, and 
indefinite as to mislead the accused and embarrass him or her in the 
preparation of a defense or expose the accused after conviction or 
acquittal to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the same 
offense. 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140(o). 
In the instant case, a prosecuting officer representing the State filed an 
information in the circuit court.  That information provided Carbajal with actual 
notice of the charges against him.  Carbajal does not allege that as a result of the 
information being filed by the OSP rather than the local state attorney, he was 
misled, prejudiced in the preparation of his defense, or exposed to the danger of 
additional prosecution.  Carbajal knew the charges against him and that he was to 
be tried by the circuit court for Lee County. 
In fact, had the information charging Carbajal been unsigned rather than 
signed by the OSP, any challenge on that basis would have been barred by rule 
 
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3.140(g), which provides that “[n]o objection to an information on the ground that 
it was not signed or verified, as herein provided, shall be entertained after the 
defendant pleads to the merits.”  It would make no sense to conclude that an 
unauthorized signature on an information strips the circuit court of subject matter 
jurisdiction and renders a conviction based on the information void, when a 
complete lack of signature may be waived by the defendant. 
We conclude that Carbajal’s case is analogous to Gerlaugh v. Florida Parole 
Commission, 139 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1962), and Young v. State, 121 So. 468 (Fla. 
1929), in which this Court upheld the defendants’ convictions despite the fact that 
the informations were signed by assistant prosecuting attorneys who at the time 
were not authorized by the Florida Constitution to sign charging informations. 
In Gerlaugh, the defendant pleaded guilty to the charges against him.  Later, 
he challenged his confinement in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis 
that the information in his case was signed by an assistant state attorney instead of 
a state attorney.  After noting that in a similar case this Court had described an 
information signed by an unauthorized attorney as being “null, void, and of no 
effect,” this Court clarified that quoted language from that prior decision “must be 
related to the factual situation presented by the record” in that case and “must be 
considered as holding only that upon timely objections to an information on the 
ground that it was not signed by the State’s Attorney such an information is null, 
 
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void and of no effect.”  Id. at 889-90.  In short, this Court determined that a claim 
that an unauthorized prosecuting attorney signed the information was a not defect 
that would lead to a void conviction.   
Similarly, in Young, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus alleging that he was convicted and sentenced upon an information signed, 
sworn to, and filed by the assistant county solicitor pursuant to an unconstitutional 
statute, instead of by the county solicitor as required by the Florida Constitution.  
This Court denied Young’s motion for rehearing of his petition, explaining: 
It does not appear that at the trial the defendant by motion to quash, 
motion in arrest of judgment, or otherwise during the same term of the 
court made any objection or exception to the manner in which the 
information was signed or sworn to.  The court had jurisdiction of the 
offense and of the defendant, and it is not alleged that the information 
did not charge an offense under the laws of this state . . . .  The statute 
purporting to authorize the assistant county solicitor to file 
information under his own oath may be invalid in that respect, but this 
does not make void a judgment of conviction on such an information, 
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the 
subject-matter, and when a defendant does not duly object to the 
manner in which the information is signed and sworn to, at the proper 
time and in the proper way, he thereby waives his right to do so, and 
cannot invoke habeas corpus to obtain a discharge from custody. 
121 So. at 468 (emphasis added). 
We see no difference between Carbajal’s situation and the errors addressed 
in Gerlaugh and Young.  We continue to hold that a conviction resulting from an 
information signed by a state officer lacking authority is not void ab initio but is, at 
most, voidable upon timely challenge. 
 
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Here, Carbajal effectively concedes that his postconviction motion is barred 
as untimely under rule 3.850 unless the judgment entered against him is void.  And 
he has failed to show that the judgment is void.  He has failed to establish either 
that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment or that the OSP’s 
lack of jurisdiction rendered the judgment void.  Carbajal’s claim concerning the 
OSP’s jurisdiction is a claim that he should have raised long ago.  The claim was 
untimely under rule 3.850 when Carbajal’s motion was filed and is accordingly 
barred. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We therefore approve the Second District’s affirmance of the circuit court’s 
denial of Carbajal’s motion and disapprove Luger and Winter.  Likewise, we 
disapprove Small, Brown, and Zanger, to the extent that those decisions hold that a 
defect regarding the jurisdiction of the OSP renders a conviction void ab initio. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D07-5894 
 
 
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(Lee County) 
 
Sarah Lahlou-Amine of Fowler, White and Boggs, P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Robert J. Krauss, Bureau 
Chief, Elba C. Martin-Schomaker, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant 
Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent