Case Title: State v. Joseph. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakayama, with whom J. Levinson, joins [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 02/17/2006 [pdf], 109 Haw. 578.

Citation: 109 Haw. 482

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW LIBRARY

#** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'Z

 

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oe

 

STATE OF HAWAT'T, Plaintiff-Appellant
vs |
. He §
ROONEY JOSEPH, OR., Defendent-Appeliee SHE
me oF
and iE m
ge =F 9
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ETHAN MOTTA and KEVIN GONSALVES, Defendant:

No. 27001

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CR. NO. 04-1-0077)
JANUARY 31, 2006

c.3., ACOBA, JJ., AND INTERMEDIATE COURT OF

Moon,
APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUDGE WATANABE, IN PLACE OF DUFFY, J.,
RECUSED; WITH NAKAYAMA, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY AND

‘DISSENTING, WITH’ WHOM LEVINSON, J., JOINS

{ION OF THE
We hold in this appeal by Plaintiff-Appellant State of

Hawai'i (the prosecution) that (1) the statement obtained from
befendant-Appellee Rodney Joseph, Jr. (Joseph) was obtained in
violation of Joseph’s right to remain silent, and (2) the
statenent made after Joseph had been given his Miranda rights and

any evidence resulting from such statements are inadmissible as
the fruit of the first statement. Therefore, the November 4,

2004 Order Granting [Joseph's] Motion to Suppress Statement and
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

Evidence (the order) issued by the circuit court of the first
circuit? (the court) is affirmed.

1

aA.

This case arises from a shooting which occurred during
the early afternoon of January 7, 2004 at the Pali Golf Course
when two men were killed and a third man was injured. Joseph
learned that the police were looking for him in connection with
the shooting incident. Attorney Christopher Evans (defense
counsel) represented Joseph. On the advice of his mother and
defense counsel, Joseph voluntarily surrendered to police at
approximately 5:45 P.M. that same evening. He was arrested and
detained at the Beretania Street Station of the Honolulu Police
Department (the police station). That evening, at approximately
9:00 or 10:00 P.M., Joseph and defense counsel met at the police
station while Joseph was in custody.

B,

on January 8, 2004, defense counsel telephoned
Detective Kathleen Osmond (Detective Osmond) of the Honolulu
Police Department and told her that Joseph wished to make a
statement. During these events, defense counsel was suffering
from a broken left wrist. He had broken his wrist either on New
Year's eve or day. His wrist was in a cast and he was taking
either Vicodin or Tylenol Extra-Strength for pain. That evening,

' the Honorable Michael A. Town presided.

2
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a
defense counsel arrived at the police station and Joseph was
brought up from his cell by Detective Larry Tamashiro (Detective
Tamashiro). Defense counsel and Joseph had a private meeting in
a police interrogation room that lasted approximately twenty to
twenty-five minutes. The prosecution asserts that, during this
meeting, defense counsel and Joseph discussed the facts of the
case. although not specifically disputing the prosecution’ s
position, Joseph notes that no testimony was taken as to what was
discussed during this meeting. Shortly after that meeting,
defense counsel told Detectives Osmond and Tamashiro that Joseph
was ready to give his statement.

Detectives Osmond and Tamashiro then entered the room
where Joseph and defense counsel had been speaking privately and
the parties “entered into a pre-interview discussion” (the pre~
interview). Prior to entering the room, Detective Osmond turned
on video recording equipment to record the interview. the

transcript of the pre-interview is as follows:

 

{DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . and Lf you want, Af you want
to stast with asking the questions, please do so, or if you
Went. [Joseph] to start to tell you what the situation was, in
terns of how this thing came about, we can do that. What's
your preference?

‘DETECTIVE OSMOND: Ah, T don't

(DEFENSE COUNSEL]: “Or I can do an offer of proof.
Here’s the offer of proof, okey? Yeah, it's a gambling
Situation, right, he was in charge of the houses, okay end
fepu (spelled phonetically) felt that his toes were being
Stepped’ on. So, Lapa got his boys together and started
potting the word out they're gonne get ‘en. That was a
Pouple of days before the thing at ehe Pali, right?

‘and se when hes when ne went to the Pali, got the
biack Ford Explorer, I can give you the vehicle if you want
Teebut Just Let me’ know that whoever brings it down cen
Grop st off and leave.

DETECTIVE OSMOND: Ua, unm.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He hada gun, a 38. No, a3, 3-60

 

 

   

 

 

 
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WR. JOSEPH: 3-80 (indiscernible).
[DEFENSE COUNSEL}: 3-60, okay. He was the driver.
He was weaged between the, what you call, the door and the
Seat’ facing the bluff on the upper parking lot. Malu was on
the other aide, had a gin, and he heard a pop. He
indiscernible} down, got’ down on the side of the V, reached
into his seat, got the gun, pulled the gun up and started
shooting up towards the BIuEF where he thought the guys

 

 

MR, JOSEPH: ‘Towards the hous
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The bluff or the clubhouse?

whe thiee
(DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Blabt, richt. vou shooting up the
WR. JOSEPH: Noy I'm 1 vebicle.
DETECTIVE oswOND: fo, he's leaning with his back
uote
WR. SOBER:

Yeah. veoh.

(DEFENSE COUNSEL]! Okay. And then what direction do
you shoot when you shoot?

MR, JOSEPH: Tonards down the hous

(DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The clubhouse.

MR. JOSEPH: Towards that way, ye

(DEFENSE COUNSEL]: “Okay. And then you fixe, shoot
few rounds, you stayed by the truck.

MR. JOSEPH: T'stayea by the car, yeah

(DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And then you heard Malu, shots
from his side?

‘UR. JOSEPH: I heard the shet first

(OEFENSE. COUNSEL] Okay.

UR. JOSEPH: AR first, 1 was sitting in the door like
this and they surround the car like that, so had couple guys
cn this side and Iwas watching these quys on this sid
Bnd, then Like they was going sake one move to me, so T back
into the door Like this and then 1 went pow on this side.
So, I'had drop down on the ground like this in the miadle of
the V and that’s when I wen grab the gun and wen blank out,
and I Just startea shooting up like this, Like that.

And when I kine’a wen focus (indiscernible) you know,
I wen kine'a phase-out, thet’ s wen neva hed nobody,
ererypody was gone from the area ova dea. I neva see
oboay, and then I heard Malu, cuz, coz, I said what
happened, what happened, Malu, you okey? Then I started
looking if T had, you know, T'got shot or what, and I got in
the car (indiscernible) dropped hin off at, back at the
funeral

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The gun he got from somebody, he's
trying to recollect the name, okay, that he bought the gun.

WK, JOSEPH: (indiscernible) long tise ago.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL}: Got the gun?

WR, JOSEPH: Yeah

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. He destroyed it after the
shooting and he can tell you who he went to to destroy ity
Burned it, you know, torched it, right? That's what we got.
Tmesn, so, you know ==

‘DEFECTIVE TAMASHTRO: Okay, well anyway, what we're
gonna do 1s we're just gonna

MR. JOSEPH: indiscernible)

DETECTIVE TAMASHIRO:  RAghE:

 

 

 

 

 

 
‘*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

(DEFENSE COUNSEL): It’s background, I mean all this
stuff is just backgrouns
DerBerive TMASHINO: Noy ve pealize that, but she

DETECTIVE OsWOWO: Olav, Yeah. wat i'm conna dois ~

(DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yeah, okay. You're
(indiscernible) they wenna get’ something on the record.
DETECTIVE OSMOND:
DETECTIVE TAMASHIAO: Without, without being ---—
(DEFENSE. COUNSEL]! The Feanch why T wanted you to get

a Little bit of this now.
DETECTIVE OSMOND? Um, Gna.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL} ‘okay, is that hopefully if

you have information that would suggest that there might be
BGkething cther, something else there, you could tell us
Fight now. Say, Rodney, you kow, give ne 3 break, but,
well ~

 

DETECTIVE OSMOND: Mell, I, T

(DEFENSE COUNSEL]: “Now, see, the upper parking lot,
see, I'know the Pali Golf Course pretty well. ‘The upper
Parking Let down to the clushouse, they got one skinny,
Nooden staircase right in the middle of that, that alot
thing, yoo know ({ndiscernisle), and you miss that
Staircase, you don’t go down the seairease, you gotta go all
the way afound the ross, 1 mean, you kno, to get to the
Elubheuse, right, Sa, you know, when the clubhouse pro. shop
owner says that oh, yesh, be seen a guy chasing a guy er
Mhatevers to the front of the clubhouse and then shooting
Undiscernibie), Oh, whatevers, okay.

WR, JOSEPH: (indiscernible)

{DEFENSE COUNSEL)! Hoh?

NR. JOSEPH: “That, you know, that I can work with you
guys (Sndiscernible).

[DETECTIVE TANASHIRO: Well, I‘11 tell you what, the
botton line is your attorney's here, you decide. only you
ean decide whether you wanna talk to (indiscernible). i'm
Sore he's - well, he's talked to you for a while. It's up
fo you whether you wanna talk tous or not

‘WR. JOSEPH: T wanna. cooperate.

TOEFENSE COUNSEL]! Good, and I would recommend you do
that

DETECTIVE TAWASHIRO: But, vou knows Like Kathy said.
we gotta hav

TOEFENSE COUNSEL] See, what they're gonna have to
do, they'Fe gonna have to get’ something on the record at
Sone point in tine cause the first thing the prosecutor's
‘gonna ask them,

DETECTIVE OSwOND: Ch, yeah, cause nothing that anes,

DETECTIVE TAWAGHIRO: Deesn’t mean anything, That's

VR, SOSEPH: Okay. Leen (indlecerniblel ast any

  

 

 

 

‘DETECTIVE TANASHIRO: eve, ue
hrouah the He oftice. 2
what PL work with.
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

{DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There's 2 possibility there ts, 1
wouldn't be here telling you there was if there wasn't, but
there 1s, okay, and it wold include the whole range of
things. Like I tesa, custody if that is required for you
‘nd your family.” Fethaps bail consideration’ s down the road
GPchse's not a concern. Possible sentencing agreenents,
‘okay, but there's @ whole host of things that they can look
at, Rodney

DETECTIVE OSMOND: But we, Tamashixo and myself are

 

 

DETECTIVE TAYASHIRO: And I wouldn't bullshit you
(indiscernible) T promise you that

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, ‘see, what the prosecutor is
gonna ask these two fine individuals ts what do you think
(indiscernible) cooperate (indiscernible)

DETECTIVE TAYASHIRO: | And the thing ts, you know,
whatever deal they make, it’s gonna be = formal

‘DETECTIVE OSHOND:' Yea, it won't Just be a shake
hands:

DETECTIVE TAMASHIRO: No, it will be formal with your
attorney.

SESCTIVE osvoND: 12 wit] be in writing, and

fesze a for vou the other parties named in the indictment were Ethan Motta, aleo
ynown a5 Malu, and Kevin Gonsalves.
‘++ FOR PUBLICATION ***
a

Wolff is the Federal Public Defender for the District of Hawai'i
and testified as an expert in criminal defense Litigation. Wolff
opined that defense counsel had not provided Joseph with
effective assistance of counsel. On November 4, 2004, the court
entered the order. The order in its entirety stated:

Defendant RODNEY JOSEPH, JR. having filed a Motion to
Suppress Statement and Evidence on August 27, 2004, and said
motion having come for hearing before the Honorable Nichae!
Ro Town on september #, 16, 17, and 30, 2004, with the state
Dopresented by Depsty Prosccuting Attorney Lucianne Khalaf,
Gna Defengents Joseph and Kevin Gonsalvez present and
Fepresented by Reginald P. Minn and clifford Hunt,
Fespect ively, and with Todé Edaine appearing on behalf of
Defendent Ethan Hotta, whose presence was waived, and the
Court having received the evidence relsting to said motion
Gnd having considered the szgurents of counsel, hereby

ers tne following findings of fact, conclusions of 1a,

 

 

 

 

 

 

snd order:
FINDINGS OF #2
1. gp January 7, 2004, Defendant Rodney Josephs
ere of the Hanoi ars Pd
prseed Stbaases in connection with the shootings thet had
Seturred earlier that cay st the Pali Golf Course.
sn bess at ee 2c set
3. the of Senuery 1 and 9a
Sor ae zs 2
inrersiey rote within the criminal Investicstion Division of
the Henoivie Police Departwent, and immediately thereafter,
Asetense counsel] stepped out of the interview roce ald
ery i here: Z
i, tht the time (defense counsel) told th

 

detectives that Joseph was prepared to provide a statenent,
[defense counsel]:

 

 

ty had not reviewed any police reports
Fegarding the shootings;

bj had not discusses the police investigation
with’ the detectives:

c) fad not contactes any deputy within the
Office of the Prosecuting Attorney:

¢) had not visited the scene of the shooting,

 

‘though (defense counsel] was familiar

ith the Pals Golf Course having golfed at
that facility:

fe) had aequized some information regarding

 

9
‘*#* FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

the incident from Joseph and media
Sccountes and

£) Rad not conducted any further independent
Investigation of the incident
5. At the time (defense counsel] informed the

detectives that Joseph was prepared to provide @ statenent,
{defense counsel] was suffering from» broken left,
arn/wrist, which had been injured on Decenber 31, 2003, and
which was’ causing him pain and discomfort.

Gr Arter suffering the latter injury, [defense
counsel] had teen taking Vicodin and Extre-strength Tylenol
te alleviate the pain, but he testifies thet by January 3
2004, he had siscontinved the ose of the Vicodin

1, “ager informing the detectives that Joseph ws
prepared to make a statement, [defense counsel) returned to
the interview room where Joseph was waiting, and the
detectives entered the interview room behind (defense
counsel] after Osnond turned on a video caners which was
positioned behind « one-way mirror on the interview room
well.

8, (Defense counsel) did not snguire as to whether
the interview would be Videotaped, and the detectives did
Pot tell (defense counsel] there would be a video recording
Tr addition to an audiotape of the session by way of
Osmond’ s hand-hele sudioesssette recerser, which was placed
fon the interview foom table in front of ail” four partion

 

 

   

 

 

 

oo one id at -approu
fetter ee ote to the faces
TO; (Defense counsel] commenced his proffer without

 

a firm grasp of Joseph's version of the facts:
a)” [Defense counsel) described victim Lepo
Ute Tallese, whom Joseph referred to as
“Lepo", a8 “Lap”

b) [Defense counsel] ‘described Joseph as
being "in charge of the [gambling]
houses”, ‘although Joseph would Later
explain’ that he was merely 2 supervisor of
the doorsen/security at illegal gambling
establishments)

©) {Defense counsel) described Joseph
operating a Ford Explorer SUV on January
37) 2004, when Joseph had been driving a
Ford Taurus at the golf courses

d) [Defense counsel] was not clear as to
whether Joseph possessed a .38-caliber oF
2"Tss0-caliber firearas

€) [Defense counsel) indicated that Joseph
had positioned himself behing his opened
‘car door and discharged a firearm over the
front of the vehicle towards the
sountaineide which was situated directly
Un front of the vehicl

11. Because the latter description of Joseph's
discharging the firearm was contrary to the facts which
Soseph would be asserting, Joe

a ‘and explained that he, Joseph,
was backea into the space inside his open car door and
Hiring towards the back of hit vehicle, ausy from the
mountainside “Bluff” end toward the gsif course clubhouse,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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a

12. At thig point in the colloguy, Osmond repeated
back and asked » clarifying question of (defense counsel)
Pegarding Seseph’s description of his positioning and Joseph
Fesponded "yeah, yeah’

TS. Neither detective provided Josenh with sicanda
warn nv enterin Sterview 1008 a! ee
‘Sosnsel) interned then that Josenh would beoroviding-a
Statement, sor atthe ‘shere ire

Sat Ghia actarney proffering facts to the police
would notnelly conduct such activity outside the presence of
Nis clients [defense counsel] chose to proffer information
Uh’ sosegh’s presence such that Joseph would be likely oF
then conpelled to intersect and correct any misstatements,
thereby providing evidence which could be Used against him

 

[n'dersgation of the purpose behing an attorney proffer.
{er “fs the col leauy proceeded, defense counsel
ge Jogaoh where there was

AGHEEESiruting doneph'a stacement (say, Rodney, you
inow, give ne 2 break"), and (defense counsel] commented on
the prospect of unfavorable media coverage.

ier puring the. 2 su z

 

hy sureenent of "oeal™ ha sehr
see eettition, and that only the Office of the Prosecuting
Recorney could make auch a "deal".

Sy.°°" [Defense counsel) suggested that Joseph
cooperate with the police, implying that he would receive
Seehftance from the State with Bail and sentencing
Ggnaideretions, protection for hinself and his family, less
Sioparaging publicity in the media, and further, that
Sosuph'a cratenent would be confidential for “quite some
Tider even though the statement could become publicly
Svailapie nithin s few days through the preliminary hearing

 

 

 

 

 

process and, {defense counsel) did so in a manner which Max

Jeied Joseph to believe ace ich a

H aa a eau

a a and seked
Seung caterelininery Deckground questions. Osmond then
Seseph of his conesies one: a
2 ravi ist tes

GENSErices the entire interview ~ pre-Mizanda and post-
Mizanda - was videotaped.

fo. “Given the context in which the waiver occurred

land what had transpired during the prt Sprotter™
ther taneciately preceded it, Joseph's waiver of his right
Lorrenain silent wag not made knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily.
20.” The post-Mixanda interview of Josenh immediately
x L rs
SEES Eiomation provices curina ene pre-tirance

St. nt one point during the course of the post~
Mizenea portion, [defense counsel] left the interview room
Mithout ndicering where he Wes going or when he would
return, end B e
Interruption, although there was no particularly

 

 

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‘*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

incriminating information provided by Joseph during (defense
counsel"s] absence.

22, “In the course of his statement, Joseph admitted
to possessing and firing a gun during the Pali colt course
incident, and to destroying multiple firearms with the
absistance of George Cenbra, Jr. (hereinefter “Canbra”)

23. “Rt a September 7, 2004 hearing on the instant
motion to suppress, Tamashiro testified that apart. from
Soseph’ s January €, 2004 statenent to police, the police do
hot have any other evidence oF any significant eyenitness
that provided 2 statenent to the police to the effect that
Goseph possessed a firearm and discharged it on Janvary 9,
2004" at’ the Pali Golf Course

24, On January 3, 2004, after learning from Joseph
that Canbra had assisted’ hin in the destruction of the
Eitearne, Tanashire contacted canbra, interviews the
Latter, snd recovered anmunition with Canbra’ s assistance

28." On January 3, 2004, in conformance with Joseph's
fagreonent with the detectives during the Jenvery 6, 2008
Interview, a Ford Taurus belonging to Joseph's sister as
Provided to the police

26... Expert witness attorney Peter Kolff testified
chat [defense counsel’ s] assistance to Joseph was below the
hninimum standard for a competent defense counsel under the
cicunstances, and the Court is persuaded by this testinony
and finds that [defense cosnsel’s] legal. assistance to
Sosepn was not within the range of competence demanded of
Bttorneye ins criminal case for the following reasons:

'a) [Defense counsel] allowed Joseph to
provide the statement without independent
Sr adequate investigation, oF any attempt
to learn facts about the case other than
Redia accounts:

b) Toefense counsel) allowed Joseph to
provide s stetenent, apparently without
Thoroughly interviewing his client and
Snderstanding the information that his
client would provide in the statenent?

c) [Defense counsel] failed co cbtain fron
the police and/or the Office of the
Prosecuting Attorney any agreement that
would limit the use of Joseph's statenent
Should there be ne agreement reached
Between Joseph end the government:

4} (Defense counsel] proffered facts of
Joseph's prospective statement without a
thorough Understanding of the facts his
client would provide, and dig so in the
presence of his clien

¢) [oefense counsel) sought favorable
treatment sna assistance from the
government, where it was clear that no
“deal” could be agreed to by the
Getectives who were present, and where
[defense counsel] nad made no effort to
contact 2 deputy from the Office of the
Prosecuting Attorney despite the
availability of 2 depoty prosecutor on
2e-hour bans

f) [Defense counsel} sought favorable
treatment and assistance from the

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

2
 

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a

government in exchange for Joseph's
latenent, in a manner which may have
isled Joseph to believe that such
Tovorable treatment and assistance would
be granted in exchange for his statement

4g) [Defense counsel] Informes Joseph that the
Etatenent would be confidential for
fubstantial period of time; and

hn) (Defense counsel) failed to, object or
theruise protest Tenashize’ assertion
Chat a auccessfol polygraph examination
would be s prerequisite to any agreenent
Eetveen the government ana Joseph, even
though (defense counsel} believed that the
polygraph inetrunent. was not completely
Eccurste and that truthful subject coulé
Re found deceptive by a polygraph

 

 

 

examination.
‘CONCLUSIONS OF Lat
2. The sta sv ech ot " ni
beiteieeshiranga Sorofter’ and the sostowirands
knowin st zs era?
UISETS accordance with the above, Findings of Fact

and pursuent co State w. Bowe, 17 Maw(ar'i] 51, 661 P.26 536
{issh) and the other authorities cited in Joseph's nemorands
Ln'igpport of his motion to Suppress Statement and Evidence,
Eonsisering the totality of the circumstances the Court
Finds Joseph's statement was involuntary and therefore
Gbtained in violation of his right against self
Ghetimination under Hawai"! Constitution Article 1, § 10.

sat tCRecouse it was involuntary, the Court ‘farther
concludes that admission of the statement would violate
Soceph’s right to due process pursuant co Hawai's
Constivotion Article 7, § 5.

ye ee STD further independent basis for suppression,
the coast alse finds that Joseph's statement is inadnissibie
Because Joseph received Ineffective assistance of counsel
‘from [aefense counsel). Pursuant to Hawai's Consteut:
Article 1, $§ 5 ana 10 and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Anendnents £0 the United states Constitution, Joseph had the
Fight to effective assistance of counsel during both the
predirends and the pest-Miranda portions of the January 6
Custodial interrogstsi

Se Viewed aa a whole, [defense counsel's)
representation of Joseph in regard to the interrogation and

 

 

 

 

 

 

Jebeph's resulting statenent fell short of the minimum
Standard of cospetence senanded of attorneys in criminal
6. (Defense counsel's) conduct reflected « lack of

 

skill, judgment and diligence and resulted in unlawtully
‘Obtained samissions by Joseph
Se nT addition to being insdnissible for the
reasons stated above, the post-Miranda portion of the
fenent is also iidevendently inedsieeible pursuant to
7 se .

 

 

i

 

B
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Mixanda portion of the statement, the ore-Mirands statement
Decause, Be deacribed above, it
Fesulted from [defense counsel's) ineffective assistance of
Eounsel. With no attenuation between the pre-Hiranda and
post"Mizanda sessions, the interim adninistration of Micands
warnings cid not dissipate the taint. Accordingly, the
Snitial sliegality war exploited end perpetuated, tainting
the entire seatenent
3. Because Joseph's statenent was not voluntarily
made, but rather resulted fron (defense counsel” s]
Eneffective assistance of counsel, the Court also makes an
affirmative finding that
H26.('] This finding of ihacmssibslity pursuant to
$-621-26 2 independent of and in addition to the Court’ s
Conclusions that admission of the statement would 3180
late Joseph's rights to due process and effective
stance of counsel and his privilege against self
9. Because the statement is inadmisaible in its
entirety for each of the reasons stated above, the Court
Siso concludes thet any witnesses or evidence identified or
Seized ass result of infornetion provided during any
portion of the statenent is likewise inadmissible. Such
Witnesses and evidence are tainted by and are the
Jnadniseible poisonous fruits of the excluded statement.

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

ORDER
1 4a therefore ORDERED ADJUOGED AND DECREED:
1." Ghat no portion of Joseph's vansary 8, 2004
statenent may be referenced or Used at trial fer any
Purpos

 

2. That 12 audio and video recordings and aii
written’ transcriptions of all portions of the statement are
hereby suppressed

ar PP that. no witnesses or evidence obtained as «
result Of Joseph's statenent nay be used by the government
in preparing for or conducting the trial of this ct

 

 

(Emphases added.) On appeal, the prosecution concedes that
“[tIne trial court’s Findings of Fact . . . 1-9, 11-13, 16, 18,
20 and 22-25 fairly represent the state of the evidence in this
case.” On December 14, 2004, the prosecution filed a notice of

appeal from the order.

 

RS § €21-26 (2993) states as follows

Confessions when adaisaibie, No confession shall be
received in evidence unless it 1s first made to appear to
the judge before whom the case ie being tried that the
Confession was in fact voluntarily made.

 

 

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ee

qr.
‘The prosecution's solitary argument on appeal is that

[tlhe trial court erred in suppressing defendant’ s statement
Ejlthe police on the ground thet the sane was involuntarily
Race on’ account of the conduct of defenaant's attorney
Goring the pre-interview, where a review of the totelity of
the Clecunetances surrounding the statement illustrates that
Sefendent provided the same xnowingly, intelligently, and
Voluntarily.

 

 

In conjunction with its axgunent, the prosecution asserts that
(2) findings of fact 10, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20,5 21, and 26 are
“clearly erroneous because they inaccurately reflect the evidence
adduced,” and (2) conclusions of law 1-9 are wrong. In support

of its argument, the prosecution argues that (1) Joseph

 

right
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
constitution had not yet attached at the time of the interview on
January 6, 2004, (2) Pebria is inapposite to the inatant case,
(3) defense counse? was not ineffective and the trial record does
not show “the withdrawal or substantial impairment of
potentially meritorious defense,” (4) Hove 1s inapposite to the
instant case, and (5) Joseph was a high school graduate who could
read and write English and was not under the influence of drugs
or alcohol.

In response, Joseph contends that the order should be
affirmed in its entirety. In support of his contention, Joseph

argues that (1) “the State should not be permitted to challenge

2 we note that the prosecution contends that finding of fact 20

rly representis) the state of the evidence in this case” but maintains it
js clearly erroneous “[eJo the extent [it] forms the besis for the court's
[Sonciusien of law] 7." We read this 0 be essentially the prosecution's
Gisagreenent to the application of Bebria to this case

    

 

 

1s
+++ FOR PUBLICATION ***

portions of the Order that are consistent with the State's oun
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which were
submitted prior to entry of the Order,” (2) “the State failed to
demonstrate that Joseph's statement was voluntarily made as
required by HRS § 621-26, or that his waiver of the right to
silence under Article I, Section 10 was knowing, intelligent and
voluntary,” (3) “Joseph's right to counsel was violated where his
attorney failed to provide effective assistance,” and (4) “the
Circuit Court properly found that the post-Mixanda statenent was
the inadnissible poisonous fruit of the pre-Miranda adnissions.”
Defense counsel submitted a “Brief on Behalf of
(Defense Counsel]” (brief 1) and a “Reply Brief on Behalf of
(Defense Counsel]” (brief 2). In brief 1, defense counsel argues
that (1) “the Court erred in allowing Joseph to assert his
attorney-client privilege while at the same time allowing Joseph
to claim that [dJefense counsel provided Joseph ineffective
assistance of counsel,” (2) the court erred in making findings of
fact 8, 10, and 26 that defense counsel was ineffective in his
representation of Joseph, and (3) the court erred in making

conclusions of law 4, 5, 6, 7, and @ that defense counsel was

 

ineffective in his representation of Joseph. in brief 2, defense
counsel argues that he is a party in interest and hie
intervention does not create a conflict of interest.

The prosecution did not submit a reply brief. The

prosecution requests that this court reverse the order and remand
‘+++ FOR PUBLICATION ***

a

the case for trial.
Ww.
‘We review the circuit court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress de novo and must look to the entize record on appeal to

 

determine whether the ruling was right or wrong.” State v
Guntapay, 104 Hawai'i 109, 113, 85 P.3d 634, 638 (2004) (internal
quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). “A trial
court's conclusions of law are reviewed under the right/wrong
standard.” State v. Keliiheleua, 105 Hawai'i 174, 178, 95 P.3d
605, 609 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) -
*A conclusion of law is not binding upon an appellate court and
Ae freely reviewable for its correctness.” Id. at 178-79, 95
P.3d at 609-10 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation
omitted). “This ‘court examines the facts and answers the
question without being required to give any weight to the trial

court's answer to it./” Id, at 179, 95 P.3d at 610 (brackets

 

omitted) (quoting Island Ins. Co, vs Perry, 94 Hawai'i 498, 501,
17 P.3d 847, 850 (App. 2000).

ve

 

lie conclude that on the record, Joseph should have b
warned of his right to remain ailent prior to the pre-interview.*
Because he was not provided such warnings, ali statenents
obtained from him must be suppressed, along with the fruits of

«Accordingly, we do not decide the prosecution's chellenges of

findings of fect 10, 14, 18,17, 23, and 26, Shasmuch es such findings
Givectiy implicated in our disposition.

 

 

”
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

the pre-interview statements. Pebria, 85 Hawai'i at 174-75, 938
P.2d at 1193-94. We note, as mentioned previously, that the
Prosecution concedes that findings of fact 1, 12, 13, and 20, all
regarding the questioning of Joseph and the timing of the Miranda
warnings, “fairly represent the state of the evidence in this

vr.

We emphasize that our decision is based on provisions
of the Hawai'i Constitution and not on the interpretation of the
United States Constitution by the United States Supreme Court.

In State v, Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 265-66, 492 P.2d 657, 664
(1971), this court determined that the protections enumerated in
Miranda v, Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), were also independently
grounded in the privilege against self-incrimination contained in
the Hawai'i Constitution:”

(T)nis court is the final arbiter of the meaning of the

provisions of the fawal'i Constitution. We hold today
that

snunerated in Miranda have an independent

ie hold thatthe provision requives that before reference 1s

 

 

trial to Statenents made by the accused during
Custodial interrogation, the prosecutor must first
Genonstrate that certain safeguards were taken before the

Article I, Section 10 of the Hawai's Constitution states:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentuent or indictment of 3
grang jury or upon 8 finding of probable cause after a
Brelininary hearing hela as provided by law, except in cases
Srising in the armed forces when in actual service in time
Of war or public danger; nor shell any person be subject for
tthe sane cifense to be twice put in Seoparey; nor shall any

  

fasins® onesel?
(Exphasie added.)

18
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

accused was questioned. Unless other equally effective
Protections are developed, the prosecutor musk ahi shat
bach accused was w a rian te

 

ee ie said beuned aaainae hin that

fe -had'a right to the presence of an attorney, and that if

he could net) afford an attorney ne would be appointed for
ide fold that unless these protective measures are

ian, statements made by the accused may not be used either

direct evidence in the prosecutor’ s case in chief or to

Impeach the defendant's credibility during rebuttal oF
examination.

 

   

 

2 grasr to protect that fr a
Relisys that every accused, aust be informed of che tact
fiat he hes certate fiones under the Gavel Comeeitarion

Tn order to-encourege the police to inform persons accused
Of crimes of thelr rights, and in exder to preserve the
incegrity of the judicial process, we Believe that where the
accused Le not informed of his rights, any ednissions OF
Confessions mist be entirely excluded from his trial.

 

 

(Emphases added.) As to the importance of the right to remain

silent, this court has sai

 

Although we have previcusly stated that “(t]he touchstone of
Gue process is protection of the ingividval aginst
arbitrery action of the government,” we nave also stated
That the due process clause serves to "protect the right of
the accused in a criminal case toa fundamentally fair
trial,” implicit in a "fundamentally fair trial” is a right
to make a seaningfel choice between confessing and remaining
sient

 

Bowe, 77 Hawai'i at 59, 681 P.2d at S46. See also State ve
Kamanac, 103 Hawai'i 315, 320, 82 P.3d 401, 406 (2003)
(explaining that “[t]he right to remain silent, otherwise
referred to as the privilege against self-incrimination provides
us some of our most treasured protections - - preservation of our
autonomy, privacy, and dignity against the threat of state
action” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

We believe the most efficacious way to inform a person
of his right to remain silent would be to provide him or her with

the Mixanda warning. Cf, State v. chow, 77 Hawai'i 241, 247, 863

19
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
P.2d 663, 669 (1994) (discussing a defendant's right to be heard

before his or her sentence is imposed and noting that “Iwle know
of no effective or adequate manner in which 2 defendant's right
of presentence allocution may be constitutionally realized than
to affirmatively require that the trial court make direct inquiry
of the defendant’s wish to address the court before sentence is

imposed”). ‘The central premise of Miranda is the protection of

 

the privilege against self-incrimination, which embodies the

right to remain silent.

[t]ne constitutional foundation underlying the privilege
[against self-incrimination] is the respect a government ~
S:Ste°Sr Federal ~ most accord to che dignity snd intesrity
cf its citizens, To maintain a fair staterindividsal
Eslance, to require the government to shoulder the entire
Toad, to Feepect the inviolability of the hunen personality,
car accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the
‘government seeking to punish an individual produce the
ildence against im by its oun independent lebors, rather
Shan by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from
his own mouths 1a 8

Decchockes to apeak in the unfettered exerciae of nis oun
“ie

384 U.S. at 460 (emphasis added) (internal quotation

 

 

 

 

 

marks and citations omitted).

vit.

 

Regarding Miranda protections, this court has stated

that

the requirenent of Mixands warnings is triggered by [t]wo
criteria: (1) the defendant mst be under interrogati
and (2) ‘the defendant must be in custogy. = = To.
Setermine whether interrogation 1s custodial, je look to the
totality of the circumstances, focusing on the place and
Eine of the interrogation, the length of the interrogation,
the nature of the questions asked, the conduct of the
police, and [any] other relevant circsnstences(]

State v. Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i 207, 210, 10 P.3d 728, 731 (2000)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The test to

 

 

 

 

20
 

FOR PUBLICATION ***
oe
determine if a custodial interrogation had taken place is whether

the investigating officer should have known that his or her words
or conduct were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating
response.” State v. Roman, 70 Hew. 351, 367, 772 P.2d 113, 116
(1989) (citing State v. Tkaika, 67 Haw. 963, 698 P.2d 281 (1985)
(citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)1).

Interrogation involves any practice reasonably likely
to invoke an incriminating response without regard to objective
evidence of the intent of the police:

‘mat the matron may not have subjectively intended the
question to yield a confession or an incriminating statenent
NEEtlevank. After the defendant was taken into custody,
AESERE eibcnees to police interrogation were Snadaissible
ahiess ana until the Mizance warnings were proven by the
prosecution.
[n)he wizanda safeguards cone into play whenever
a porsgn in castedy is subjected to either express
AubeEiShing or its functionsl equivalent. That is to
ye the Care interrogation” under Mizanda refers not
ERY. CoSaxpress questioning, but also to eny words oF
Edens sovthe pert of the police (other than those
ZStmalily attendant to arrest and custody) that the
pertee Ynsuie know are reasonebly likely to elicit an
ERerininacing response from the suspect. The latter
ABSEISA'GE this Gofinition focuses primarily upon the
Belceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of
pereepices “This focus reflects the fact that the
Miranda safeguards wer neq to vest 2 suspect in

Seereiv ractiess, without reser ve

 

 

© ing, 1 Haw. App. 430, 437-38, 620 P.2d 263, 269
(2980) (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01) (emphasis added).
an “incriminating response” refers to both inculpatory and
exculpatory responses. See State v. Wallace, 105 Hawai't 132,
137, 94 P.3d 1275, 1261 (2008) (stating that “[1]t is @
fundamental tenet of criminal law that ‘the prosecution may not

2
** FOR PUBLICATION *#*

 

use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination’” (quoting State v. Naititi,
104 Hawai'i 224, 235, 87 P.3d 893, 904 (2004) (quoting Miranda,
384 U.S. at 444))).
viii.
AL

Applying the foregoing propositions to the instant
case, it is evident that Miranda warnings, as independently
grounded in the Hawai'i Constitution, were required prior to the
pre-interview, Under the first criterion, see Ah Loc, supra, and
according to the definition in Roman, the pre-interview
constituted interrogation. Interrogation is “express questioning
or its functional equivalent.” Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10
P.3d at 731. Detectives Osmond and Tamashiro met with Joseph and
defense counsel in an interview room at the police station for
the purpose of interviewing Joseph and obtaining his statement.
Detective Tamashiro specifically testified that he understood
when defense counsel informed him that Joseph was ready to give
his statement to mean that Joseph was “ready to be interviewed.”

Detectives Osmond and Tamashiro met with Joseph and
defense counsel for approximately twenty-two minutes without
providing him with Miranda rights. On cross-examination,

Detective Tamashiro testified as follows:
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
SO
0: Okay. And de dt standard in these kind of - -

that kind of situation £0 Mirsndize people or not to
Mirandize people?

A: | To Mirandize people.
: Youdidnne syand
OM Weraneii we obtained ened
(Emphases added.) Detectives Osmond and Tamashiro participated

in defense counsel's proffer and Detective Osmond’ s remark
concerning Joseph’s position at the time of the shooting was
Likely to elicit an incriminating response from Joseph. Finding
of fact 12 refers to the following exchange which occurred during
the pre-interview:

MR. SOSEFH: The car was into the bluff like this, and
tthe door was open like this.
PDEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right, right, you shooting up the

 

ives or
SR, JOSEPH: No, I'm leaning ay back into the vehicle
DETECTIVE OswOND: a
Jet

 

TR, SOSEPH: Yeah, vesh
(Emphases added.) We agree with Joseph’s assertion that
Detective Osmond’s statement sought confirmation of Joseph's
previous statement and was intended to illicit a response. This
‘exchange forms the basis of finding of fact 12, which is not
disputed by the prosecution. At no point does the transcript of
the pre-interview suggest that either Detective Osmond or
‘Tamashiro attempted to give Joseph his Mixanda rights. Finding
of fact 13, which is not disputed by the prosecution, as stated
supra, states that neither detective provided Joseph with Miranda
rights at this point. The transcript indicates that the “words
or conduct” on the part of the police were such that the police
should have known they were reasonably likely to elicit an

incriminating response. oman, 70 Haw. at 357, 772 P.2d at 116.

B
‘*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

Additionally, despite their declarations that they did
not have the authority to make any deals with Joseph, the
detectives encouraged Joseph to speak by indicating that a
“deal,” if forthcoming, would be “formal” and assured Joseph that
anything he told them would be discussed only with the
prosecutor's office. As stated in Jenkins, the subjective intent
of the officers is not dispositive,

5

As to the second criterion, Joseph was clearly in
custody as he had been arrested and was being detained at the
police station. Finding of fact 1 states that Joseph was in
custody and is not disputed by the prosecution. The two criteria
of the test being met, Mixanda warnings should have been given
prior to the pre-interview having been conducted.

1.

As concluded supra, in the instant case, Joseph's right
to remain silent was violated. The Miranda warnings include the
Hight to have an attorney present. We conclude that a defendant
must be advised of his or her right to remain silent even if
there is an attorney present.

In State v. Deleese, $82 S.B.24 786, 790 (W. Va, 2003),
the defendant in a felony murder case, who was in custody, was
given a polygreph examination wherein he admitted striking the
victim. The defendant had been given his Miranda rights at the

time of his arrest, seven days prior. Id. The statements were

ery
4" FOR PUBLICATION ***

a
introduced into evidence and the defendant objected, contending
that the statements should have been suppressed because he was
not given Mizanda warnings before the examination began. Id. at
794. The prosecution argued, inter alia, that the failure to
give warnings was not fatal because defendant’s counsel was
present during the examination. Id, at 795. The trial court
rejected defendant's contentions and defendant was subsequently
convicted. Id, at 790. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia reversed. Id, at 789. Construing Miranda, that
court emphasized the need for providing Miranda warnings despite
the presence of counsel as follows:

onder Miranda, the mere presence of defense counsel_at

errogstion does i he neces previa

= otha warning, 8=
Shewaruine aieiiiranda decision, is an absolute
Etereguisite to interrogation, indeed, we Rave found no

BeeiSion wherein « court has ruled that a defendant forfeits
sectteee ROSteone fe be informed of the privilege against
Belelinceimination merely because he (or] she has exercised
the right to have counsel present at an interrogation, in
these circunstances, we find it intolerable that one

[Ghaestational right should have to be surrendered beca
Sf the assertion of another.

 

  

 

 

 

‘Id. at 795-96 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks,
brackets and citations omitted).

We agree with the proposition advanced by the court in
Delieese that the mere presence of counsel does not obviate the
need for providing a warning. The right to the presence of
counsel is separate and distinct from the right to remain silent.
Mixanda, 384 U.S. at 474; Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104
n.10 (1975). To relieve the duty of law enforcement officers to

inform a defendant of those rights prior to custodial

2s
* FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

interrogation would defeat the very purpose of Miranda warnings.
Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) ("In these
circumstances, ve find it intolerable that one constitutional
right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.")
Hence, the presence of Joseph's counsel did not obviate the need
to warn Joseph that he had the right to remain silent.

We have held that a defendant may waive the rights
articulated in the Miranda warnings. See, gigs, ab Loo, 94
Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731 (stating that “[a]bsent Miranda
warnings and a valid waiver of them, statements obtained from a
person subjected to uncounseled custodial interrogation are
inadmissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding brought against
that person”); State v, Hoey, 77 Hawai'i 17, 661 P.2d 504 (1994)
(holding that a valid waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently made); State v. Amorin, 61 Haw. 356, 358, 604 P.2d

 

45, 47 (1979) (explaining that, “[a]fter being so informed (of

 

his or her Miranda rights}, the defendant may waive these rights

provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligentiy”). However, the language by the Court in Miranda
does not support the proposition that the reading of warnings
itself is waivable:

Exlor to any questioning the person gust be warned that he
has aright to renain silent, that any statement he does
Rake may be Used as evidence against his, and that he hi
[ont of the presence cf an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant nay waive effectuation of thei

rignts, provided the waiver 1s nade voluntarily, knowingly,
‘and_intellicently.

 

 

Mixanda, 385 U.S. at 444-45 (emphases added). Hence, Miranda

26
** FOR PUBLICATION ***

a
recognizes a waiver of rights only if those rights are known to
the defendant. “Nothing but mischief would flow from a rule that
would permit a defendant to waive the right to be informed of the
rights embodied in the Mixanda warnings.” DeWeese, 562 $.B.2d at
798.

In the instant case, Joseph had counsel. Even if an
attorney is present, the thrust of the Miranda protections is
that it is a personal right against self-incrimination. The
court in Mixanda explained the need for giving a warning as

follows:

 

Woreover, this
intellect tiite to mate the individvel more acutely eva}
That he is faced with a phase of the adversary systen--that
Re'iatSot in the presence ef persons acting solely in his
interest

 

 

inthis warning is an sbsolute prerequisite to
intezrogations No emount of circumstantial evidence that the
person Say have been auare of this Fight will suffice te
Stand in its stead

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-72 (emphasis added). Since the right to

 

 

 

renain silent is personal, it cannot be deemed waived simply
because an attorney is present during interrogation. See Moran
vs Burbine, 475 0.5. 412, 433 n.4 (1986) (stating that “[t]he
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is a personal
right that can only be invoked by the individual whose testimony
4s being compelled” (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted)); United States v, Nobles, 422 U.S, 225, 233 (1975)

n
‘*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

(opining that “[t]he Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination is an intimate and personal one, which
protects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and
thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract
self-condemnation” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); Eeople v. Avila, 75 Cal. App. 4th 416, 419-20 (1999)
(noting that “a person's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent
is a personal one; it cannot be vicariously asserted by counsel”
(internal citations omitted)). The presence of an attorney does
not constitute an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.
Defense counsel’s presence thus was not germane to the personal
waiver envisioned under article I, section 10 of the Hawai'i
Constitution. Accordingly, the police had an obligation to
advise Joseph that he had the right to remain silent.
x

Absent a valid waiver of the right to remain silent,
statements obtained from a person subjected to custodial
interrogation are inadmissible in a subsequent criminal
Proceeding brought against that person. Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at

210, 10 P.3d at 731. See, e.a., State v. Pahio, S@ Haw. 323,

 

324, $68 P.24 1200, 1202 (1977) (“Unless and until the warnings
and waiver required by Miranda aze demonstrated by the
prosecution at trial, under Miranda the prosecution may not use
evidence obtained from the defendant against him if such evidence

resulted from custodial interrogation.”). The facts of this case

 
‘++ FOR PUBLICATION ***

a

demonstrate that Joseph was questioned first, given the warnings,
‘and then interrogated again. As he should have been given the
Mixanda warnings prior to the pre-interview and as we will
demonstrate infra, his waiver of them before the post-Mirands
interview is not effective
XI.

inasmuch as the pre-interview statement was obtained in
violation of Joseph’s right to remain silent, any post-Miranda
statement and evidence obtained as a result of the pre-interview
and post-Miranda statements are excluded under the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine. in State vs Fukusaku, 85 Hawai'i 462,
475, 946 B.24 32, 45 (1997), this court explained that, “[als for
the suppression of derivative evidence, the ‘fruit of the
poisonous tree’ doctrine ‘prohibits the use of evidence at trial
which comes to light as a result of the exploitation of a
previous illegal act of the police.’” (Quoting State v.
Medeiros, 4 Haw. App. 248, 251 n.4, 665 P.2d 181, 184 n.4 (1983).
(citing Silverthorne Lumber Co, v. United States, 251 0.5. 385,
40 $.ct. 182, 64 L.Bd. 319 (1920).)).

‘he Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) applied similar

rationale in Pebria and we adopt its reasoning insofar as it

 

relates to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Pebria
involved statements made by Samson Pebria, Jr. (Samson) while he
was apparently detained at the Queen's Medical Center related to

fan assault. 85 Hawai'i at 173, 938 P.2d at 1192. Two security
+** FOR PUBLICATION *#*

 

guards were standing with Samson. Id. A female was also in the
lobby area speaking to Officer Steven Froeschele (Officer
Froeschele). Id. Officer Samuel Rodriguez (Officer Rodriguez)

approached Samson and asked him if he knew why he was being

 

detained. Samson replied, “I went grab the girl.” Id. After
further investigation by another officer, Officer Rodriguez
informed Sanson “that he was now a suspect in 2 kidnapping case.
Id. Samson then responded, “I like rape her.” Id. The
following day another officer informed Samson of his Miranda
rights and Samson made essentially the same incriminating
statements. Id.

The ICA determined that each of Samson’s statements
were made during custodial interrogation. Id, at 174-75, 938
P.2d at 1193-94, That court opined that the question, “Do you
know why you’ re being detained?” was tantamount to, “Do you know
that you are being detained because the wonan talking to Officer
Froeschele is accusing you of assaulting her?” Jd. at 174-75,
938 P.2d at 1193-94. Tt was concluded that this question
amounted to interrogation because Officer Rodriguez “should have
known that it was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response” from Pebria. Id. at 175, 936 P.2d at 1194. The second
statement made by Pebria, “I like rape her,” was also held to be
made in the course of custodial interrogation. Id.

‘The ICA affizmed the circuit court's determinations

that the post-Miranda statement was the fruit of the pre-Miranda

30
** FOR PUBLICATION ***

oo

statenent and, thus, was inadmissible because the latter resulted
from the “exploitation” of the former:

he applied to confessions, the “fruit of the poisonous tr
BeceFine holds that where one confession or admission is
$iegaliy ebvained and subsequently the defendant makes =

Anes Othe second confession is inednissible in
sarees ao a eruit of ene poisonous tree” if it results
TreeeaS eipiaivecion of the pricr illegality. However,
sem ae orPhage subsequent to an inadmissible one is not
sores Sisiy inednissible, Where e confession has been
SWGGaliycetained, the government will not be allowed to
SLSMEIRE Sto evidence 2 subsequent confession unless st
sre eSekonstrates, that the Latter was not obtained by
fires eemen the initial ‘ilegelity or that any connection
EEE The thc had become so attenuated that the taint was
Siesipsted.

 

 

 

 

Id. (quoting Medeiros, 4 Haw. App. at 252, 665 P.2d at 164), The
TcA upheld the circuit court's finding that both statements
should be suppressed. Id. at 177, 938 P.2d at 1196.

As stated supra, the statement obtained fron Joseph in
the pre-interview was obtained in violation of his right to
renain silent. The pre-interview statements were exploited in
that Joseph was subsequently questioned on the sane matter in
order that he would repeat his earlier statement. As Detective
Tamashiro related, “[WJe gotta have [the statement) on record.”
The circumstances also do not suggest that “any connection
between the two [interviews] had become so attenuated that the
taint was dissipated.” 1d, at 175, 938 P.2d at 1196. ‘The post
interview was conducted by the same two detectives in the same
interrogation room with no lapse in time between it and the pre-

interview. This lack of attenuation is discussed in finding of

3
‘*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

fact 20, which the prosecution apparently does not dispute.*

Accordingly, we reject the prosecution’s contention
that conclusion of law 9 is wrong as a matter of law. The
‘entizety of the prosecution’s argument supporting this contention
As “[bJecause Defendant’s statement was provided voluntarily, and
not illegally obtained, the statement and any evidence therefrom
is not inadmissible as the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ and the
trial court's [conclusion of law] 9 and Order to that effect are
wrong as a matter of law.” As we have held supza, the pre~
Interview statement was tainted as it was obtained in violation
of Joseph's right to remain silent. Because we have adopted the
ICA's rationale in Pebria related to the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine, as stated supra, Joseph's statenent made after
Mixanda warnings were given, and any witnesses or evidence
resulting therefrom, are inadnissible as fruit of the poisonous
tree

xin.

We need not decide the prosecution’s arguments that
(2) Joseph’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution had not yet attached at the time of
the interview on January &, 2004, (2) defense counsel was not
ineffective and the trial record does not show “the withdrawal or
substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense,” and

(3) Joseph was a high school graduate who could read and write

 

See supza note 5,
32
 

FOR PUBLICATION ***

a

English and was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In
Light of our disposition, we need not reach Joseph's other
argunents or defense counsel's arguments.
xrit.
Based on the foregoing, the court’s November 4, 2004
order Granting [Joseph's] Motion to Suppress Statement and

Evidence is affirmed.

on the briefs: You
Janes M. Anderson, Deputy

Prosecuting Attorney, Po
City's County of Honolulu,

for plaintiff-appeliant. Ourme KQ. Watanabe

Reginald P. Minn for
defendant-appellee.

 

Samuel P. King, Jr. for
Party-in-Interest.
Christopher Evans.

33