Case Title: State v. S.R.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-96-01

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). S.R. pled guilty to two counts of fourth-degree sexual contact involving child victims in 1991. On July 26, 1991, he was sentenced to concurrent probationary terms of three years. When Megan s Law became effective on October 31, 1994, all of the terms and conditions of S.R. s probationary sentence had been met, except for the payment of a $60 VCCB penalty. S.R. was discharged from probation on May 27, 1994, but the probation department was required to collect the VCCB penalty. Because the $60 assessment had not been paid within a year after S.R. s discharge from probation, contempt charges were instituted. The contempt proceedings were adjourned until October 16, 1995, at which time the Morris County Probation Department noted in its records that S.R. was discharged completely and his financial obligations fulfilled. In April 1999, S.R. was indicted for failure to register under Megan s Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b. That statute requires registration by offenders who, among other things, have been convicted of sex offenses or other predatory acts against minors and are serving a sentence of incarceration, probation, parole or other form of community supervision as a result of the offense . . . on the effective date of this act. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b(2). S.R. pled guilty to failing to register. Prior to sentencing, however, S.R. moved to vacate his plea and to dismiss the indictment. S.R. argued that he was not subject to the registration requirement because he had been discharged from probation on May 27, 1994, and, thus, was not serving a sentence on the effective date of Megan s Law. The State, on the other hand, argued that when Megan s Law became effective, S.R. was still under a form of community supervision because he had not paid his VCCB penalty. The trial court denied S.R. s application to withdraw the guilty plea. It sentenced S.R. to a two-year probationary term and imposed the requisite fines and penalties. The Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Appellate Division reasoned that Megan s Law is a remedial statute that should be broadly interpreted to advance the purpose of protecting the community from the dangers of recidivism by sexual offenders. The Appellate Division concluded that the Legislature intended other form of community service to encompass all sentencing provisions beyond incarceration, and that the VCCB penalty was clearly a part of the criminal sentence. The Supreme Court granted S.R. s petition for certification. HELD: S.R. was not subject to the registration provisions of Megan s Law. His failure to pay the VCCB penalty did not mean he was serving some other form of community supervision. The Legislature intended that phrase to mean some kind of critical monitoring by parole or probation authorities beyond merely acting as a collection agency. 1. The pertinent language of Megan s Law identifies four types of adult sentencing dispositions covered by Megan s Law - incarceration, probation, parole, and other form of community supervision. The dispositions covered by the final category are those where the sentence has been suspended and the person is supervised pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2b(5) (community supervision or community-related service with supervision) and 2b(6) (placement in a halfway house or residential facility). Probation places the defendant under the supervision of the County Probation Office and normally carries a requirement to report to that office periodically. Suspension ordinarily does not involve such supervision. Because Megan s Law specifically refers to probation, an authorized sentencing disposition, a probationary sentence ordinarily would not be an other form of community supervision. By operation of law, when S.R. s three-year probationary term ended on May 27, 1994, by order of the court, or on July 25, 1994, at the end of three years, S.R. satisfied his sentence except for the payment of the VCCB penalty. S.R. s probationary sentence ended before Megan s Law became effective on October 31, 1994. (pp.6-10) 2. If a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face and admits of only one interpretation, a court need look no further to determine the Legislature s intent. The court finds that the disputed language of Megan s Law is clear and unambiguous. Since the Legislature did not attach any special meaning to the word supervision, it should be given its ordinary definition - a critical watching and directing. Although the Legislature surely intended the collection of VCCB penalties to be enforced seriously, it does not require the same type of strict supervision associated with the probation or parole of a defendant. Because S.R. failed to pay the VCCB penalty, he was held in contempt of court and ordered to pay. That remedy was completely unrelated to the probation he served for the Megan s Law offense. Moreover, as opposed to a violation of probation or parole, the failure to pay the penalty was no reflection of S.R. s tendency to commit another Megan s Law offense. (pp. 10-13) 3. Other provisions of Megan s Law and the Criminal Code provide further support for the conclusion that the Legislature intended the phrase other form of community supervision to involve a form of critical monitoring by community or probation authorities. Federal law addressing the issue has reached a similar conclusion, also distinguishing supervised release from the payment of a fine. Such critical monitoring also is reflected in the statutes of other states permitting noncustodial supervision. (pp. 13-19) 4. The Court agrees with the trial court and the Appellate Division that Megan s Law should be construed broadly to achieve its goal of protecting the public, but finds that interpreting the language other form of community supervision to include the collection of unpaid VCCB penalties does not further that goal. Under the Appellate Division s decision, a marginal sex offender without the financial resources to pay the VCCB penalty would be required to register, while a more egregious sex offender who had the financial wherewithal to have paid the penalty would not. Such a distinction is intolerable. (pp. 19-20) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division to dismiss the indictment and to remove S.R. s name from the list of Megan s Law registrants. JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and ALBIN join in JUSTICE COLEMAN s opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 96 September Term 2001 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. S.R., Defendant-Appellant. Argued October 22, 2002 Decided December 12, 2002 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Susan Brody, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). William Scharfenberg, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Thomas F. Kelaher, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney; Patricia S. Toreki, Assistant Prosecutor, on the letter in lieu of brief). Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. In this appeal we must decide whether a defendant s failure to pay a $60 Violent Crimes Compensation Board (VCCB) assessment prior to the effective date of Megan s Law, but after he was discharged from probation, constitutes an other form of community supervision requiring that he register as a sex offender pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b(2). To answer that question, we must interpret the meaning of the phrase other form of community supervision as used in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b(2). The Appellate Division concluded that the Legislature intended other form of community supervision to [include] . . . [t]he payment of the VCCB penalty. We disagree and reverse. We hold that the Legislature intended the phrase other form of community supervision to mean some kind of critical monitoring by the parole or probation authorities beyond merely serving as a collection agency to permit a defendant to pay a fine or assessment in installments. . . . . [The Legislature made] Megan s Law, as broad as they could, to reach as far as they could, to get as many Megan s Law type offenders, sex offenders out there under the blanket of the Megan s Law registration, and had he completed satisfactor[ily] his probation and fines and costs, we wouldn t be here today. The trial court sentenced defendant to a two-year probationary term and imposed the requisite fines and penalties. Defendant appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Appellate Division reasoned that Megan s Law is a remedial statute, (citing Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 73 (1995)), that should be broadly interpreted to advance its purpose of protect[ing] the community from the dangers of recidivism by sexual offenders. (quoting In re C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 80 (1996)). The Appellate Division concluded that the Legislature intended other form of community service to encompass all sentencing provisions beyond incarceration, probation, and parole and thereby to extend the reach of the registration provisions to their utmost limits. The payment of the VCCB penalty was clearly a part of the criminal sentence. (citing State v. Kemprowski, 265 N.J. Super. 471, 473 (App. Div. 1993); State v. Joseph, 238 N.J. Super. 219, 222-23 (App. Div. 1990)). We granted defendant s petition for certification, 171 N.J. 445 (2002), and now reverse. [N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b(2) (emphasis added).] Insofar as adult convictions are concerned, the pertinent language in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b(2) refers to convictions entered on or after October 31, 1994, and to those adult sex offenders serving a sentence of incarceration, probation, parole or other form of community supervision as a result of the offense . . . on the effective date of this act. Ibid. That language identifies four types of adult sentencing dispositions established in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (Code), N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 to 2C:104-9. The first category is incarceration. The Code s authorized incarcerations as dispositions are found in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2b(2) (split sentences), -2b(3) (terms of imprisonment), -2b(4) (imprisonment, fine and restitution), and -2b(7) (imprisonment at night or on weekends). The second type of disposition is probation authorized in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2b(2) and -2b(4). The third category refers to persons released from imprisonment and placed on parole pursuant to the Parole Act of 1979, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45 to -123.76. The fourth and final type of adult sentencing disposition covered by Megan s Law is identified as other form of community supervision. The Code s dispositions that cover that category are found in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2b, where imposition of sentence has been suspended and the person is supervised pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1a and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2b(5) (community supervision or community-related service with supervision) and -2b(6) (placement in a halfway house or residential facility in the community ). When a court suspends the imposition of a sentence, it shall attach reasonable conditions authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1b, State v. Rivera, 124 N.J. 122, 125 (1991), which may include probationary supervision. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1b(10). The difference between suspension and probation is that probation places the defendant under the supervision of the County Probation Office and normally carries a requirement to report to that office periodically whereas suspension is ordinarily without such supervision. Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, comment 5 on N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2 (2002). See N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1b(10); State v. Dove, 202 N.J. Super. 540, 542 n.2 (Law Div. 1985). Therefore, because Megan s Law specifically refers to probation, an authorized sentencing disposition, a probationary sentence ordinarily is not an other form of community supervision. Although persons placed into the Pretrial Intervention Program pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 to 22 receive community supervision, such supervision does not fall within the scope of Megan s Law other form of community supervision because there has been no conviction, adjudication of delinquency, or finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, a precondition to Megan s Law registration requirements. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b(2). In other words, Megan s Law registration requirements do not apply to pretrial diversionary programs because they are not sentencing dispositions. In contrast, Megan s Law registration requirements do apply to persons placed in the Intensive Supervision Program, R. 3:21-10(b)(5), -10(e), a post-incarceration program of judicial intervention and diversion back to the community. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-11. See State v. Cannon, 128 N.J. 546, 549 (1992). Arguably, the indictment in this case is irreconcilable with the Code. The Code s authorized disposition that the trial court applied was the original three-year probationary sentence imposed on July 26, 1991. That term of probation was authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2b(2). Once defendant was discharged from probation on May 27, 1994, he was no longer supervised by the probation department. Defendant s only outstanding obligation at that point was to pay his $60 VCCB penalty. As will be seen later, after defendant was discharged from probation on May 27, 1994, the role of the probation department was similar to that of a collection agency. Thus, by operation of law, when the three-year probationary term ended on May 27, 1994, by order of the court, or on July 25, 1994 at the end of three years, defendant was relieved of any obligations imposed by the order of the court and shall have satisfied his sentence, N.J.S.A. 2C:45-2c, except for the payment of the VCCB penalty. See N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3a (requiring an application to extend probation to pay a fine to be made before the probationary term ends); R. 3:21-7(c). When the State indicted defendant for failing to register under Megan s Law, the State s approach to this case seems to have presupposed that the sentencing disposition in 1991 was to release defendant under community supervision pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2b(5) rather than placing him on probation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2b(2). Subsection 2b(5) authorized the court [t]o release [defendant] under supervision in the community or to require the performance of community-related service. Ibid. Because the court clearly sentenced defendant to probation on July 26, 1991 pursuant to subsection 2b(2) and did not make a disposition pursuant to subsection 2b(5), defendant s three-year probationary sentence ended before Megan s Law became effective. Under the above legal and factual analysis, the indictment was improper, as a matter of law. Nonetheless, we will address the State s assertion that nonpayment of the VCCB penalty before October 31, 1994 meant that defendant was still under a form of community supervision when Megan s Law became effective. Like Megan s Law and the Code, the federal act distinguishes supervised release from the payment of a fine. Supervised release requires the critical monitoring of an individual s conduct after he or she has served the custodial aspect of the sentence. That type of critical monitoring also is reflected in the statutes of other states permitting noncustodial supervision. See, e.g., Ala. Code 15-18-112 (providing that individual supervision and placement of an inmate in the community requires intensive supervision [by] a correctional officer in the community ); Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-1202(h) (defining supervision as direct supervision at varying levels of intensity by either probation officers, in the case of sentences to probation with a condition of community punishment, or parole and post prison supervision officers, in the case of offenders eligible for release on parole or offenders transferred to community punishment or community supervision from the Department of Correction ); Fla. Stat. 948.001(7) (defining sex offender community control as a form of intensive supervision, with or without electronic monitoring, which emphasizes treatment and supervision of a sex offender in accordance with an individualized treatment plan administered by an officer who has a restricted caseload and specialized training ); Minn. Stat. 244.13 (indicating that intensive community supervision is a program in which individuals serv[ing] all or part of a sentence on intensive community supervision or all or part of a supervised release or parole term on intensive supervised release are supervised by a probation officer, a corrections agent, or any other qualified person employed in supervising offenders serving a period of intensive community supervision or intensive supervised release ); Miss. Code Ann. 47-7-34(2)-(3) (providing that post-release supervision programs shall be operated through the probation and parole unit and shall be conducted in the same manner as . . . supervised probation, including a requirement that the defendant shall abide by any terms and conditions as the court may establish ); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. 42.12.[781d](2) (defining community supervision as the placement of a defendant by a court under a continuum of programs and sanctions, during which time a fine or other sentence is probated for a specified period); Melissa C. Beauchesne, An Act Relating to Criminal Offenses - Parole, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 836, 836 (1999) (citing R.I. Gen. Laws 13-8-30 (1956)(1994 Reenactment & Supp. 1998)) (providing that Rhode Island s mandatory requirement of community supervision for persons convicted of first- or second-degree child molestation is aimed to protect[] the public from those who have committed a sex offense . . . [and] to serve as a method of rehabilitation for sex offenders ). NO. A-96 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. S.R., Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED December 12, 2002 Justice Coleman PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Coleman CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY