Case Title: State v. Jackson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 183A14

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. COA13-710 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 21 January 2014 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Mecklenburg County 
No. 10CRS246707-09 
GREGORY ELDER, 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 18 December 2012 by 
Judge Linwood O. Foust in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 November 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney 
General Michael E. Bulleri, for the State. 
 
Michele Goldman, for defendant-appellant. 
 
 
STROUD, Judge. 
 
 
Defendant appeals judgment entered upon his guilty plea after 
the denial of his motion to suppress.  For the following reasons, 
we vacate the judgment and remand. 
I. 
Background 
On 23 September 2010, based upon an action brought under North 
Carolina General Statute Chapter 50B by defendant’s wife, Stacy 
Elder, the district court entered an ex parte domestic violence 
order of protection (“ex parte DVPO”) against defendant.  In the 
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ex parte DVPO, the district court found that on 22 September 2010, 
defendant had placed his wife in “fear of imminent serious bodily 
injury” and had threatened to “torch their son’s preschool,” among 
other threats of violence.  The district court did not make any 
findings under finding 3 of the “ADDITIONAL FINDINGS”1 portion of 
the ex parte DVPO on page 2, which would be a finding listing any 
“firearms, ammunition, and gun permits” to which defendant was “in 
possession of, owns or ha[d] access.” The district court ordered 
several of the enumerated forms of relief under North Carolina 
General Statute § 50B-3, including the following provisions which 
are relevant for purposes of this case: 
 
It is ORDERED that: 
 
. . . . 
12. the 
defendant 
is 
prohibited 
from 
possessing, owning or receiving[,] purchasing  
a firearm for the effective period of this 
Order[,] and the defendant’s concealed handgun 
permit is suspended for the effective period 
of this Order. . . .  
 
13. the defendant surrender to the Sheriff 
serving this order the firearms, ammunition, 
and gun permits described in Number 3 of the 
Findings on Page 2 of this Order and any other 
firearms and ammunition in the defendant’s 
care, 
custody, 
possession, 
ownership 
or 
                     
1  “ADDITIONAL FINDINGS” are optional findings on the form for the 
ex parte DVPO, AOC-CV-304 Rev. 8/09. 
 
-3- 
 
 
control.2 . . .  
 
. . . .  
 
15. Other: (specify) . . . 
Any Law Enforcement officer serving this Order 
shall search the Defendant’s person, vehicle 
and residence and seize any and all weapons 
found.  
 
 See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3 (2009). 
 
This case arises from defendant’s motion to suppress evidence 
found in his home when the officers served defendant with the ex 
parte DVPO, and the evidence seized as a result of the search 
pursuant to the ex parte DVPO led to the criminal charges for which 
defendant was convicted.   The relevant events as found by the 
trial court are that between 23 September and 26 September officers 
had attempted several times, without success, to serve defendant 
with the ex parte DVPO.  On 26 September 2010, a deputy sheriff 
“received a call from the dispatcher indicating that the defendant 
was at the residence[,]” and so “several deputies” went to the 
residence.  The deputies knocked on the door “for a period of time” 
with no answer, and “[a]fter about 15 minutes, the defendant came 
to answer the door, and the defendant opened the door and slid out 
of the door, closing the door behind him.”  Defendant then locked 
                     
2  As we have already noted, nothing was “described in Number 3 of 
the Findings on Page 2 of this Order[.]” 
-4- 
 
 
the deadbolt on the door.  One of the deputies took defendant’s 
“keys from the defendant’s pocket and unlocked the door” and the 
officers entered the home to search the house in accord with 
“paragraph 15 of the domestic violence order.”  “[U]pon entry into 
the residence, a pungent odor of marijuana was smelled by the 
officers[,]” and ultimately they went downstairs and found 
marijuana. 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the officers’ 
testimonies are not consistent on many facts regarding the search 
of defendant’s home, but they all seem to agree that they went to 
defendant’s home not only to serve the ex parte DVPO but also to 
arrest defendant upon a valid arrest warrant for communicating 
threats, and defendant was indeed arrested upon this warrant. Yet 
we also note that the findings do not mention the existence of an 
arrest warrant for defendant, do not indicate that the officers 
arrested defendant based upon the arrest warrant, and do not state 
that any “firearms, ammunition, [or] gun permits” were seized.  
But the trial court’s findings of fact are uncontested by either 
party, so they are the facts upon which we rely.3 
                     
3 The State has not argued any alternative basis in law for the 
trial court’s ruling, such as the arrest warrant, under North 
Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 10(c). 
-5- 
 
 
As a result of the items seized during this search, defendant 
was indicted for possession of drug paraphernalia, maintaining a 
place to keep controlled substances, and manufacturing a 
controlled substance.  On 8 October 2012, defendant made a motion 
to suppress “any and all physical evidence and any statements 
attributed to the defendant by the police as such evidence was 
obtained as the result of an illegal and unconstitutional search 
and seizure of the Defendant and his home” because 
the police had neither reasonable suspicion 
nor probable cause to search his home and no 
exceptions to the fourth amendment existed.  
Instead, the search was performed pursuant to 
an Ex Parte 50B order signed and dated 
9/23/2012 by Judge Hoover in the Mecklenburg 
County District Court.  The search authorized 
in the Ex Parte 50 B Order exceeded the 
statutory provisions in GS 50B-3.1 and has no 
other constitutional grounds constituting an 
exception to the 4th am[]e[n]dment. 
 
Defendant’s motion to suppress was denied, and on 18 December 2012, 
the trial court entered judgment upon defendant’s guilty plea of 
all the charges; the trial court suspended defendant’s sentence.  
Defendant appeals. 
II. Standard of Review 
It is well established that the standard 
of review in evaluating a trial court’s ruling 
on a motion to suppress is that the trial 
court’s findings of fact are conclusive on 
appeal if supported by competent evidence, 
even if the evidence is conflicting.  In 
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addition, findings of fact to which defendant 
failed to assign error are binding on appeal. 
Once this Court concludes that the trial 
court’s findings of fact are supported by the 
evidence, then this Court’s next task is to 
determine 
whether 
the 
trial 
court’s 
conclusions of law are supported by the 
findings.  The trial court’s conclusions of 
law are reviewed de novo and must be legally 
correct. 
 
State v. Johnson, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 737 S.E.2d 442, 445 
(2013) (citation omitted). 
III. Motion to Suppress  
Defendant contends that his motion to suppress should have 
been allowed because “[t]he North Carolina [a]nd United States 
Constitutions [b]oth [r]equired [o]fficers [t]o [o]btain [a] 
[v]alid [w]arrant [b]efore [e]ntering Mr. Elder’s [h]ome.” 
Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s factual findings 
regarding this search but only its legal conclusion that 
“defendant’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment have 
not been violated and that the officers acted pursuant to a valid 
Court order, valid at the time the officers followed the order as 
designated to them[;]” defendant raises this challenge pursuant to 
both the federal and state constitutions. 
The State contends that defendant failed to argue violation 
of the North Carolina Constitution before the trial court such 
that his state constitutional challenge is not properly preserved 
-7- 
 
 
before this Court.  We disagree, as we conclude that the State’s 
argument is hyper-technical regarding the portions of the North 
Carolina Constitution defendant cited; it is clear that defendant 
argued 
before 
the 
trial 
court 
that 
his 
North 
Carolina 
constitutional rights were violated when law enforcement officers 
searched his home without a warrant or exigent circumstances.  
Accordingly, 
we 
will 
address 
defendant’s 
North 
Carolina 
constitutional claim.     
The State relies upon the ex parte DVPO as providing 
sufficient legal authority for this search, since the officers 
were simply carrying out the directive of the district court’s ex 
parte DVPO, which directed that “[a]ny Law Enforcement officer 
serving this Order shall search the Defendant’s person, vehicle 
and residence and seize any and all weapons found.”  The State 
contends that North Carolina General Statute § 50B-3(a)(13) 
“provided authority for the district court judge to issue the 
search provision in question.”  In the alternative, the State 
argues that if the ex parte DVPO did not properly authorize the 
search or if it is not sufficient to serve as a de facto “search 
warrant,” the officers executed the ex parte DVPO under exigent 
circumstances and in good faith, and thus the exclusionary rule 
should not apply to exclude the items seized in the search.   
-8- 
 
 
 
The district court order in question is a civil ex parte 
domestic violence order of protection issued in an action 
completely unrelated to the current criminal action before us 
regarding the drug-related charges brought against defendant.  The 
State was not a party to the ex parte DVPO, and no issues regarding 
that order are before us on appeal.  Accordingly, we consider the 
ex parte DVPO as a valid district court order which was issued in 
an unrelated civil action. 
Defendant contends that the law does not provide an avenue 
for converting the ex parte DVPO into a search warrant and despite 
the State’s arguments, North Carolina General Statute § 50B-
3(a)(13) does not provide authority for the district court to order 
a general search of a defendant’s home without probable cause and 
without complying with “the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-
241 through -259.” 
 
North Carolina General Statute § 50B-3(a) sets out the relief 
which the district court may grant under Chapter 50B: 
(a) If the court, including magistrates 
as authorized under G.S. 50B-2(c1), finds that 
an act of domestic violence has occurred, the 
court 
shall 
grant 
a 
protective 
order 
restraining the defendant from further acts of 
domestic violence. A protective order may 
include any of the following types of relief: 
 
(1) Direct a party to refrain from such 
acts. 
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(2) Grant to a party possession of the 
residence or household of the parties and 
exclude 
the 
other 
party 
from 
the 
residence or household. 
 
(3) Require a party to provide a spouse 
and 
his 
or 
her 
children 
suitable 
alternate housing. 
 
(4) Award temporary custody of minor 
children 
and 
establish 
temporary 
visitation rights pursuant to G.S. 50B-2 
if the order is granted ex parte, and 
pursuant to subsection (a1) of this 
section if the order is granted after 
notice or service of process. 
 
(5) Order the eviction of a party from 
the residence or household and assistance 
to the victim in returning to it. 
 
(6) Order either party to make payments 
for the support of a minor child as 
required by law. 
 
(7) Order either party to make payments 
for the support of a spouse as required 
by law. 
 
(8) Provide for possession of personal 
property of the parties, including the 
care, custody, and control of any animal 
owned, possessed, kept, or held as a pet 
by either party or minor child residing 
in the household. 
 
(9) Order a party to refrain from doing 
any or all of the following: 
a. 
Threatening, 
abusing, 
or 
following the other party. 
b. 
Harassing the other party, 
including by telephone, visiting 
the home or workplace, or other 
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means. 
b1. Cruelly treating or abusing an 
animal owned, possessed, kept, or 
held as a pet by either party or 
minor 
child 
residing 
in 
the 
household. 
c. 
Otherwise interfering with the 
other party. 
 
(10) Award attorney’s fees to either 
party. 
 
(11) Prohibit a party from purchasing a 
firearm for a time fixed in the order. 
 
(12) Order any party the court finds is 
responsible for acts of domestic violence 
to 
attend 
and 
complete 
an 
abuser 
treatment program if the program is 
approved 
by 
the 
Domestic 
Violence 
Commission. 
 
(13) Include any additional prohibitions 
or requirements the court deems necessary 
to protect any party or any minor child. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3. 
North Carolina General Statute § 50B-3.1, entitled “Surrender 
and 
disposal 
of 
firearms; 
violations; 
exemptions[],” 
has 
additional provisions which are relevant for our purpose of 
determining the extent of the district court’s authority to order 
a general search of defendant, his vehicle, and his residence for 
weapons.  
(a) Required Surrender of Firearms. -- 
Upon issuance of an emergency or ex parte 
order pursuant to this Chapter, the court 
shall order the defendant to surrender to the 
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sheriff 
all 
firearms, 
machine 
guns, 
ammunition, permits to purchase firearms, and 
permits to carry concealed firearms that are 
in the care, custody, possession, ownership, 
or control of the defendant if the court finds 
any of the following factors: 
 
(1) The use or threatened use of a 
deadly weapon by the defendant or a 
pattern of prior conduct involving the 
use or threatened use of violence with a 
firearm against persons. 
 
(2) Threats to seriously injure or kill 
the aggrieved party or minor child by the 
defendant. 
 
(3) Threats to commit suicide by the 
defendant. 
 
(4) Serious injuries inflicted upon the 
aggrieved party or minor child by the 
defendant. 
 
(b) Ex Parte or Emergency Hearing. -- 
The court shall inquire of the plaintiff, at 
the ex parte or emergency hearing, the 
presence of, ownership of, or otherwise access 
to firearms by the defendant, as well as 
ammunition, permits to purchase firearms, and 
permits to carry concealed firearms, and 
include, 
whenever 
possible, 
identifying 
information 
regarding 
the 
description, 
number, and location of firearms, ammunition, 
and permits in the order. 
 
. . . .  
 
(d) Surrender.--Upon service of the 
order, 
the 
defendant 
shall 
immediately 
surrender to the sheriff possession of all 
firearms, machine guns, ammunition, permits to 
purchase firearms, and permits to carry 
concealed firearms that are in the care, 
-12- 
 
 
custody, possession, ownership, or control of 
the defendant.  In the event that weapons 
cannot be surrendered at the time the order is 
served, the defendant shall surrender the 
firearms, ammunitions, and permits to the 
sheriff within 24 hours of service at a time 
and place specified by the sheriff. The 
sheriff shall store the firearms or contract 
with a licensed firearms dealer to provide 
storage. 
 
(1) If the court orders the defendant to 
surrender 
firearms, 
ammunition, 
and 
permits, the court shall inform the 
plaintiff and the defendant of the terms 
of the protective order and include these 
terms on the face of the order, including 
that the defendant is prohibited from 
owning, 
possessing, 
purchasing, 
or 
receiving or attempting to own, possess, 
purchase, or receive a firearm for so 
long as the protective order or any 
successive protective order is in effect. 
The terms of the order shall include 
instructions as to how the defendant may 
request 
retrieval 
of 
any 
firearms, 
ammunition, and permits surrendered to 
the sheriff when the protective order is 
no longer in effect.  The terms shall 
also include notice of the penalty for 
violation of G.S. 14-269.8. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3.1 (2009). 
 
While North Carolina General Statute § 50B-3(a)(13) provides 
that the district court may “[i]nclude any additional prohibitions 
or requirements the court deems necessary to  protect any party or 
any minor child” we cannot read “any” as broadly as the State 
suggests.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(a)(13).  We first note that 
-13- 
 
 
North Carolina General Statute § 50B-3(a)(13) must be read in pari 
materia with the rest of the relevant statutory provisions.  See 
Redevelopment Commission v. Bank, 252 N.C. 595, 610, 114 S.E.2d 
688, 698 (1960) (“It is a fundamental rule of statutory 
construction that sections and acts in pari materia, and all parts 
thereof, should be construed together and compared with each 
other.”)  North Carolina General Statute § 50B-3.1 contains very 
detailed provisions specifically addressing the authority of the 
district court as to the surrender, retrieval, return, and  
disposal of “all firearms, machine guns, ammunition, permits to 
purchase firearms, and permits to carry concealed firearms[.]”  
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3.1(a).  North Carolina General Statute § 
3.1 repeatedly uses the word “surrender” to describe what a 
defendant must do.  “Surrender” is defined  “to yield to the power, 
control, or possession of another upon compulsion or demand[.]”  
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1258 (11th ed. 2003).  
Thus, a defendant is required “[u]pon service of the order” to 
“immediately” yield to the law enforcement officer “all firearms, 
machine guns, ammunition, permits to purchase firearms, and 
permits to carry concealed firearms[.]”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-
3.1(d).   North Carolina General Statute § 50B-3.1 simply does not 
provide any basis for the district court to order a general search 
-14- 
 
 
of a defendant’s person, vehicle, and residence for unspecified 
“weapons[.]”  See id.  If a defendant specifically refused a law 
enforcement officer’s direct request, in accord with a court order, 
to surrender a weapon, this may present another issue, but here no 
such request was made.  The district court exceeded its statutory 
authority by ordering a general search of defendant’s person, 
vehicle, and residence for unspecified “weapons” as a provision of 
the ex parte DVPO under North Carolina General Statute § 50B-
3(a)(13). 
In addition, the State’s argument implies that even if the 
district court lacked statutory authority pursuant to North 
Carolina General Statute § 50B-3(a)(13) to order the search, the 
ex parte DVPO could still serve as a valid search warrant.  “[T]he 
power of the State to conduct searches and seizures is in 
derogation of . . . Article One, Section 20 of the North Carolina 
Constitution[.]”  Brooks, Comr. Of Labor v. Enterprises, Inc., 298 
N.C. 759, 761-62, 260 S.E.2d 419, 421 (1979). 
Our Supreme Court has held that a governmental 
search 
and 
seizure 
of 
private 
property 
unaccompanied by prior judicial approval in 
the form of a warrant is per se unreasonable 
unless the search falls within a well-
delineated 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement involving exigent circumstances.  
The 
North 
Carolina 
Constitution 
forbids 
general warrants whereby any officer or other 
person may be commanded to search suspected 
-15- 
 
 
places without evidence of the act committed, 
or to seize any person or persons not named, 
whose offense is not particularly described 
and supported by evidence.  The North Carolina 
Constitution 
requires 
that 
evidence 
discovered pursuant to an unreasonable search 
or seizure be excluded. 
 
State v. Cline, 205 N.C. App. 676, 679, 696 S.E.2d 554, 556-57 
(2010) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). 
It is fundamental that a search warrant 
is not issued except upon a finding of 
probable cause.  Probable cause means that 
there must exist a reasonable ground to 
believe that the proposed search will reveal 
the presence upon the premises to be searched 
of the objects sought and that those objects 
will aid in the apprehension or conviction of 
the offender. 
 
State v. Lindsey, 58 N.C. App. 564, 565, 293 S.E.2d 833, 834 (1982) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).   
The district court did not make any findings of fact or 
conclusions of law in the ex parte DVPO regarding probable cause 
to believe that the search “will reveal the presence upon the 
premises to be searched of the objects sought and that those 
objects will aid in the apprehension or conviction of the 
offender.”  Id.  The district court did not mention “probable 
cause” because the ex parte DVPO was entered in a civil proceeding, 
not a criminal matter, and the concept of “probable cause” is 
simply not applicable to this situation, between two private 
-16- 
 
 
parties.  Although there may be many other reasons that an ex parte 
DVPO is not a de facto search warrant, one reason is that the 
district court made no determination regarding probable cause for 
the search. Id.  Furthermore, without a proper search warrant, 
unless exigent circumstances existed, the objects seized during 
the search must be suppressed.  Cline, 205 N.C. App. at 679, 696 
S.E.2d at 556-57. 
The State next contends that exigent circumstances existed 
because the officers needed to perform a “protective sweep” of the 
home.  The State cites State v. Stover, 200 N.C. App. 506, 685 
S.E.2d 127 (2009) in support of its argument.  In Stover, officers 
went to do a “’knock and talk’” at a house identified by an 
informant as the place she had purchased marijuana.  200 N.C. App. 
at 507, 685 S.E.2d at 129.  The officers had no warrant to search 
the house, but when they approached the house, they smelled “a 
‘strong odor of marijuana’” and saw the defendant, “whose entire 
upper torso was out of a window.”  Id.  This Court stated: 
In addition to probable cause, the 
situation 
must 
have 
presented 
exigent 
circumstances 
in 
order 
to 
justify 
the 
officers’ entrance into defendant’s house. 
When Officers Crisp and Brown arrived at the 
residence and after they smelled marijuana, 
Officer Crisp heard a noise from the back of 
the house and saw defendant, whose upper torso 
was partially out a window.  
Although 
defendant states that he simply had responded 
-17- 
 
 
to a call from his neighbor, Officer Crisp 
could reasonably believe that defendant was 
attempting to flee the scene. The officers 
also stated that they were concerned about 
possible destruction of evidence, due to the 
smell of marijuana and defendant’s possible 
attempted flight. These facts sufficiently 
support 
a 
conclusion 
that 
exigent 
circumstances existed at the time the officers 
gained entrance into defendant’s house. We 
hold, therefore, that both probable cause and 
exigent circumstances existed when officers 
entered defendant’s residence and conducted a 
protective sweep.  Because the officers 
legally entered defendant’s house and saw the 
evidence seized in plain view during their 
protective sweep, the trial court did not err 
in admitting that evidence. 
 
Id. at 513, 685 S.E.2d 132-33 (emphasis added). 
There are some factual similarities between Stover and this 
case:  officers approached a house in which they found marijuana, 
and at some point they smelled the marijuana, see id. at 507, 685 
S.E.2d at 129, but the similarities end there. The State overlooks 
a crucial point in Stover:  this Court first determined that “the 
officers had probable cause to enter defendant's house” before 
there was a need for a protective sweep.  Id. at 513, 685 S.E.2d 
at 132.  Here, the State does not contend, nor did the trial court 
conclude, that the officers had probable cause to suspect any 
particular criminal activity when they approached defendant’s 
-18- 
 
 
home.4  In addition, the trial court made no findings as to any 
exigent circumstances or the need for a protective sweep. 
At last, the State also contends that even if the ex parte 
DVPO did not properly authorize the search, and if there were no 
exigent circumstances to justify it, the “good faith exception” 
applies. There is no doubt that the officers acted entirely in 
“good faith” as they served the ex parte DVPO and fulfilled the 
directives of the district court, which included a general search 
of the defendant’s person, residence, and vehicle.  While we agree 
that the good faith exception might have applied if defendant 
challenged this search only under the United States Constitution, 
defendant also challenges this search based upon the North Carolina 
Constitution, and there is a no good faith exception to the 
                     
4 We note that while the testimony before the trial court indicates 
that officers arrested defendant at his home based upon a valid 
arrest warrant for communicating threats, the trial court did not 
address this issue at all in its findings of fact and the State 
makes absolutely no argument that the search of defendant’s home 
was in any way related to his arrest or any other actual or 
suspected criminal activity.  Although it appears from the 
testimony at the hearing that the officers arrested defendant based 
upon a valid arrest warrant the State makes no argument that the 
search the officers conducted was incident to the arrest. We again 
note that the testimonies of the officers as to the details of the 
search were not consistent, but we must rely upon the facts as 
found by the trial court, which do not mention any arrest warrant. 
Furthermore, we again note, the State has not argued any 
alternative basis in law for the search.  The only arguments before 
this Court in support of the search are based upon the ex parte 
DVPO. 
-19- 
 
 
exclusionary rule applied as to violations of the North Carolina 
Constitution.  See State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 710-24, 370 
S.E.2d 553, 554-62 (“We hold that there is no good faith exception 
to the requirements of article I, section 20 as applied to the 
facts of this case . . . . [I]t must be remembered that it is not 
only the rights of this criminal defendant that are at issue, but 
the rights of all persons under our state constitution.  The 
clearly mandated public policy of our state is to exclude evidence 
obtained in violation of our constitution.  This policy has existed 
since 1937. If a good faith exception is to be applied to this 
public policy, let it be done by the legislature, the body politic 
responsible for the formation and expression of matters of public 
policy.  We are not persuaded on the facts before us that we should 
engraft a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under our 
state constitution.” (citation omitted)).  In the Editor’s Note of 
North Carolina General Statute § 15A-974, our legislature 
responded:  “Session Laws 2011-6, s. 2, provides ‘The General 
Assembly respectfully requests that the North Carolina Supreme 
Court reconsider, and overrule, its holding in State v. Carter 
that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule which exists 
under federal law does not apply under North Carolina State law.’”  
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-974, Editor’s Note (2011).  The legislature 
-20- 
 
 
specifically adopted a good faith exception in certain situations 
regarding statutory violations, but did not address constitutional 
violations, instead deferring to the Supreme Court in its session 
laws.  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-974(a)(2). At this time, our 
Supreme Court has not overruled Carter, and “[w]e are bound by 
precedent of our Supreme Court[.]”  State v. Pennell, ___ N.C. 
App. ___, ___, 746 S.E.2d 431, 441 (2013).  We realize that the 
legislature recently adopted the session law requesting that the 
Supreme Court overrule Carter in 2011, and it is possible that the 
Court has not yet had an appropriate opportunity to address this 
issue. This case could potentially present such an opportunity, 
should the State petition for discretionary review of this ruling, 
but we are not permitted to anticipate or predict what the Supreme 
Court might do; we are bound by the existing precedent of Carter.  
See id.  Accordingly, there is no good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule as to violations of the North Carolina State 
Constitution.5  See Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 710-24, 370 S.E.2d 553, 
                     
5 We note that this Court has stated that it is unclear whether 
there is a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for 
violations of the North Carolina Constitution; however, we believe 
the language of Carter is clear that such an exception does not 
currently exist.  See State v. Banner, 207 N.C. App. 729, 732-33 
n. 7, 701 S.E.2d 355, 358 n.7 (2010) (“This is known as the good-
faith exception. The Leon Court explained that suppression of  
evidence is only required when doing so will further the goal of 
the exclusionary rule--deterrence. There is disagreement over 
-21- 
 
 
554-62. 
As defendant’s premises were searched without a search 
warrant and without exigent circumstances, and as the good faith 
exception does not apply to evidence obtained in violation of the 
North Carolina Constitution, we conclude that the wrongfully 
seized evidence should have been excluded; see Cline, 205 N.C. 
App. at 679, 696 S.E.2d at 556-57, accordingly, defendant’s motion 
to suppress should have been allowed.   
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment 
entered upon defendant’s guilty plea and remand this case for entry 
of an order allowing defendant’s motion to suppress. 
VACATED and REMANDED. 
Judge MCGEE concurs. 
Judge BRYANT dissents in a separate opinion. 
                     
whether there is such an exception to the North Carolina 
Constitution. Thus, it is possible that evidence not excluded by 
the federal constitution might be excluded by the North Carolina 
Constitution.”  (Citation and quotation marks omitted.)  Footnote 
seven goes on to provide, “Compare Carter, 322 N.C. at 722-24, 370 
S.E.2d at 561-62 (refusing to allow a good-faith exception to the 
North Carolina Constitution with respect to non-testimonial 
identification orders), with State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 506-
08, 417 S.E.2d 502, 510-11 (1992) (rejecting the notion that 
Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution provides 
more protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution while approving the use of the inevitable discovery 
rule (Citation omitted.)).” 
 
NO. COA13-710 
 
 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Filed:  21 January 2014 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
Mecklenburg County  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 10CRS246707-09 
GREGORY ELDER, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
BRYANT, Judge, dissenting. 
 
In vacating the trial court’s judgment entered upon 
defendant’s guilty plea and directing entry of an order allowing 
defendant’s motion to suppress, the majority states that in issuing 
the 22 September 2010 DVPO order, the district court “exceeded its 
statutory authority by ordering a general search of the defendant’s 
person, vehicle, and residence for unspecified ‘weapons’ as a 
provision of the ex parte DVPO under . . . . ' 50B-3(a)(13).”  
Because I believe the district court acted within its statutory 
authority, I respectfully dissent. 
Pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 50B-3, 
(a) If the court . . . finds that an act of 
domestic violence has occurred, the court 
shall grant a protective order . . . .  A 
protective order may include any of the 
following types of relief: . . . (13) Include 
any additional prohibitions or requirements 
the court deems necessary to protect any party 
or any minor child. 
 
2 
 
 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. ' 50B-3(a)(13) (2013). 
 
In its 22 September 2010 DVPO, the Mecklenburg County District 
Court ordered law enforcement officers to “search the Defendant’s 
person, vehicle and residence and seize any and all weapons found.”  
The majority goes to great length to explain why it deems the 
general authority authorized by section 50B-3(a)(13) not broad 
enough to support the order.  Specifically, the majority relies 
upon section 50B-3.1(a) as providing a limitation to the authority 
conferred to the court in section 50B-3(a)(13) by statutory 
construction rule to read statutory provisions in pari materia.  
However, the authority conferred in General Statutes section 50B-
3(a)(13) is broader than that of section 50B-3.1.  Where section 
50B-3.1 provides a procedure for initially determining the likely 
existence of firearms and the surrender and disposal of firearms, 
section 50B-3(a)(13) authorizes a trial court to include in its 
protective orders “any . . . prohibitions or requirements the court 
deems necessary to protect any party or any minor child.”  N.C.G.S. 
' 50B-3(a)(13). 
In addressing whether the 22 September 2010 DVPO order was 
proper, the trial court made the following findings of fact: 
The domestic violence [protective] order was 
issued based on a finding by that Court that 
the defendant had threatened the plaintiff and 
that the defendant had threatened to get some 
3 
 
 
 
gasoline and torch their son's preschool, her 
house, the plaintiff, and her sister's house 
and also stated that I'm going to get all of 
you and that "You won't f**king stop me, the 
police won't f**king stop me." 
 
The findings of fact also include the finding 
that the defendant had a history of substance 
abuse and mental illness and that the 
defendant 
also 
made 
threats 
to 
anyone 
attempting to go into the marital residence. 
 
 
As noted, there was certainly probable cause to search 
incident to the lawful arrest for communicating threats, which was 
not considered by the trial court as a basis for the denial of the 
motion to suppress; likewise, the State did not argue that the 
search incident to service of the arrest warrant provided an 
additional basis.  So, I will not further address it. 
 
However, because the district court had authority to order 
the search of defendant’s residence in its 22 September 2010 DVPO 
pursuant to section 50B-3(a)(13), the law enforcement officers 
acted properly in response to that authority such that the 
resulting search and seizure of contraband was proper.  For this 
reason, I would affirm the order of the trial court denying 
defendant’s motion to suppress the seizure of contraband from 
defendant’s residence due to said search and leave undisturbed the 
trial court’s judgment entered pursuant to defendant’s plea of 
4 
 
 
 
guilty to the charges of manufacturing marijuana and possession of 
drug paraphernalia.