Case Title: Klein v. U.S.

Citation: 50 Cal. 4th 68

Docket Number: S165549

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 7/26/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
 
ALAN RICHARD KLEIN et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
)  
S165549 
 
 
) 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al., 
) 
9th Cir. No. 06-55510 
 
 
) 
C.D. Cal. No.  
 
Defendants and Respondents. )  
CV-05-05526-PA 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
Plaintiff Alan Richard Klein was riding a bicycle for recreation on a two-
lane paved road in Angeles National Forest in Southern California when he was 
struck head-on by an automobile driven by a part-time volunteer working for the 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service.  Having been seriously injured in the 
collision, plaintiff sued the United States government (the owner of the national 
forest land) and its volunteer worker. 
At issue here is the scope and applicability of California‟s Civil Code 
section 846, which provides, as relevant here, that a landowner “owes no duty of 
care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational 
purpose.”  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has asked this court to decide 
whether this provision applies to “acts of vehicular negligence committed by the  
 
 
 
2 
landowner‟s employee in the course and scope of his employment that cause 
personal injury to a recreational user of that land.”1 
We conclude that Civil Code section 846‟s liability shield does not extend 
to acts of vehicular negligence by a landowner or by the landowner‟s employee 
while acting within the course of the employment.  We base this conclusion on 
section 846‟s plain language.  The statutory phrase “keep the premises safe” is an 
apt description of the property-based duties underlying premises liability, a 
liability category that does not include vehicular negligence.  Furthermore, a broad 
construction of that statutory phrase would render superfluous another provision of 
section 846 shielding landowners from liability for failure to warn recreational 
users about hazardous conditions or activities on the land.  
I 
The facts are taken from the Ninth Circuit‟s order in Klein v. United States 
(9th Cir. 2008) 537 F.3d 1027 requesting that this court decide a question of 
California law. 
On August 29, 2004, plaintiff Alan Richard Klein was riding his bicycle for 
recreation on Bear Divide Road in Angeles National Forest in California.  Bear 
Divide Road is a two-lane paved road that is open to the public and that is owned 
and maintained by defendant United States government.  As plaintiff2 was cycling 
northbound, he was struck head-on by an automobile driven by defendant David 
Anderberg, a part-time volunteer for the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 
                                              
1  
Rule 8.548(a) of the California Rules of Court provides:  “On request of the 
United States Supreme Court, a United States Court of Appeals, or the court of last 
resort of any state, territory, or commonwealth, the [California] Supreme Court 
may decide a question of California law if:  [¶] (1) The decision could determine 
the outcome of a matter pending in the requesting court; and [¶] (2) There is no 
controlling precedent.” 
2  
Although both Alan Klein and his wife Sheryll Klein are plaintiffs in this 
lawsuit, for convenience we use “plaintiff” in the singular to refer to Alan Klein. 
3 
who later told a California Highway Patrol officer that at the time of the collision 
he had been on his way to observe birds. 
The injuries plaintiff sustained in the collision were severe, including a 
partially severed ear, broken ribs, a collapsed lung, a brain injury affecting 
memory and speech, and a brachial plexis injury3 that permanently deprived him 
of the use of his left arm.  In addition to these physical injuries, the collision 
resulted in a substantial loss of income, and thus serious financial hardship, to 
plaintiff and his wife, coplaintiff Sheryll Klein.  This occurred because plaintiff 
was forced to take a medical retirement from his federal government job as an air 
traffic controller, while his wife, so that she could provide care for plaintiff, took 
an early retirement from her job as an elementary school principal. 
After exhausting their administrative remedies, plaintiffs brought suit 
against the United States and Anderberg in federal district court in the Central 
District of California.  The action against the United States was brought under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, which provides for liability “where the United States, if a 
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the 
place where the act or omission occurred.”  (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).)  Against the 
United States, plaintiffs alleged two negligence theories:  (1) the United States 
negligently maintained Bear Divide Road in an unsafe condition, and (2) the 
United States was vicariously liable for the vehicular negligence4 of its volunteer 
employee, David Anderberg.  Only the latter negligence theory is at issue here. 
                                              
3  
The brachial plexus is a network of nerves running from the neck to each 
arm and controlling the movement of certain chest and arm muscles.  (See 
Mosby‟s Medical Dict. (5th ed. 1998) p. 218.) 
4  
As we use it here, the term “vehicular negligence” means negligence in 
driving a motor vehicle, as opposed to other forms of negligence involving a 
vehicle, such as leaving the vehicle parked in an unsafe location or in an unsafe 
condition. 
4 
In its answer to plaintiffs‟ complaint, the United States defended on the 
ground that Civil Code section 846 shielded it, as owner of the United States 
Forest Service land on which the accident had occurred, from any negligence 
liability to a person, such as plaintiff, who was injured while using that land for 
recreation.  The United States also disputed plaintiffs‟ allegation that, at the time 
of the accident, Anderberg was acting in the course and scope of his employment 
as a Forest Service volunteer. 
The United States filed a summary judgment motion, which the district 
court granted.  Regarding plaintiffs‟ negligence theory that the United States was 
vicariously liable for Anderberg‟s vehicular negligence, the district court assumed 
for purposes of ruling on the motion that at the time of the accident Anderberg was 
a United States employee acting within the course and scope of his employment.  
The district court concluded, nonetheless, that California‟s Civil Code section 846 
immunized the United States, as a landowner, from liability for any injuries to 
plaintiffs resulting from negligent driving by Anderberg. 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Recognizing the 
important issue of California law presented by this case, the Ninth Circuit 
requested that we decide this question:  Does section 846 immunize a landowner 
from liability for acts of vehicular negligence committed by the landowner‟s 
employee in the course and scope of his employment that cause personal injury to 
a recreational user of that land? 
II 
In its order requesting that this court decide a question of California law, 
the Ninth Circuit explained why it had concluded that the question had not been 
authoritatively resolved under existing precedents.  The Ninth Circuit‟s 
explanation provides a useful background for resolving the legal question at issue. 
5 
The Ninth Circuit observed, preliminarily, that although the landowner in 
this case happens to be the United States, under the Federal Tort Claims Act the 
federal government is liable only if a private person would be liable in the same 
circumstances under state law.  Accordingly, the question to be decided is whether 
Civil Code section 846‟s immunity would protect a private landowner from 
liability for damages resulting from physical harm to a person who has entered the 
landowner‟s property to engage in a recreational activity, when that harm was 
caused by the vehicular negligence of the landowner or the landowner‟s employee.  
(Klein v. United States, supra, 537 F.3d 1027, 1030.) 
Regarding that question, the Ninth Circuit concluded that there was “ „no 
clear controlling California precedent‟ squarely” addressing the issue.  (Klein v. 
United States, supra, 537 F.3d 1027, 1030.)  The court recognized that an 
intermediate state appellate court — Division Six of the Second Appellate District 
Court of Appeal — had held, in Shipman v. Boething Treeland Farms, Inc. (2000) 
77 Cal.App.4th 1424, that Civil Code section 846‟s landowner immunity does 
extend to vehicular negligence.  In Shipman, the plaintiff, a 16-year-old boy, was 
driving an all-terrain vehicle along a dirt road on the defendants‟ private property 
when his vehicle collided with a station wagon driven by the defendants‟ 
employee.  The plaintiff sued the defendants, seeking damages for personal injury 
suffered in the collision, basing the action in part on the theory that the defendants 
were vicariously liable for negligent driving by their employee.  The trial court 
granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed.  The 
Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that Civil Code section 846 shielded the 
defendants from negligence liability for an injury to an uninvited recreational user 
of their land, even an injury caused by vehicular negligence.  (Shipman, supra, 77 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1428, 1432.) 
6 
The Ninth Circuit recognized that Shipman is squarely on point, and it 
acknowledged that it generally accepts state intermediate appellate court decisions 
in the absence of relevant precedent from a state‟s highest court.  (Klein v. United 
States, supra, 537 F.3d 1027, 1031-1032.)  But the Ninth Circuit said that in this 
particular instance it had found what it termed “convincing evidence” that this 
court likely would disagree with the Court of Appeal‟s decision in Shipman.  
(Klein, at p. 1032.)  The Ninth Circuit explained that it had found nothing in Civil 
Code section 846‟s language, or in the circumstances surrounding its enactment, to 
indicate that it was intended to provide immunity for negligent driving or, 
otherwise stated, that it was “anything more than a premises liability exemption 
statute.”  (Klein v. United States, supra, 537 F.3d 1027, 1032.) 
Its doubts about Shipman‟s validity were also based, the Ninth Circuit 
explained, on certain statements in this court‟s opinions in Ornelas v. Randolph 
(1993) 4 Cal.4th 1095 (Ornelas) and Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist. 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 148 (Avila).  (Klein v. United States, supra, 537 F.3d 1027, 
1032-1034.) 
In Ornelas, this court held that Civil Code section 846 immunized a 
property owner from liability for personal injuries that eight-year-old Jose Ornelas 
had sustained on the owner‟s property.  The injuries occurred when other children 
playing on top of old farm machinery that was stored on the defendant‟s property 
dislodged a metal pipe that fell on the Ornelas child.  (Ornelas, supra, 4 Cal.4th 
1095, 1098.)  This court rejected the argument, supported by earlier Court of 
Appeal decisions, that Civil Code section 846 does not apply if the property on 
which the injury occurred was, at the time of the injury, unsuitable for recreational 
use.  (Ornelas, supra, at p. 1108.)  The Ninth Circuit found significance in this 
court‟s explanation in Ornelas of the rationale for section 846 immunity:  “One 
who avails oneself of the opportunity to enjoy access to the land of another for one 
7 
of the recreational activities within the statute may not be heard to complain that 
the property was inappropriate for the purpose.”  (Ornelas, supra, at p. 1108.)  
This description, the Ninth Circuit stated, “invokes the concept of premises 
liability.”  (Klein v. United States, supra, 537 F.3d 1027, 1033.) 
Avila, the other decision of this court mentioned by the Ninth Circuit, did 
not directly involve Civil Code section 846.  Rather, it concerned the scope of 
California‟s Government Code section 831.7, which immunizes public entities 
from liability for injuries sustained during a “hazardous recreational activity.”5  
But in Avila this court recognized that section 831.7‟s legislative history revealed 
that it had been “designed to mirror Civil Code section 846‟s circumscription of 
property-based duties.”  (Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th 148, 157.)  For that reason, this 
court in Avila gave some consideration to the scope of the immunity conferred by 
section 846.  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that what this court said in Avila about 
section 846, although not binding as precedent, was relevant in determining how 
this court would likely decide the question of California law regarding the scope 
of section 846.  (Klein v. United States, supra, 537 F.3d 1027, 1032-1033.) 
In Avila, the plaintiff was a college student who had been struck in the head 
by a pitched ball while at bat during an intercollegiate baseball game at a 
community college.  (Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th 148, 152.)  The plaintiff sued the 
college, seeking damages for unspecified personal injuries caused by being hit by 
                                              
5  
Government Code section 831.7, subdivision (a), provides:  “Neither a 
public entity nor a public employee is liable to any person who participates in a 
hazardous recreational activity, including any person who assists the participant, 
or to any spectator who knew or reasonably should have known that the hazardous 
recreational activity created a substantial risk of injury to himself or herself and 
was voluntarily in the place of risk, or having the ability to do so failed to leave, 
for any damage or injury to property or persons arising out of that hazardous 
recreational activity.” 
8 
the baseball.  (Id. at pp. 152-153.)  He alleged that the pitcher had hit him 
intentionally and that the college was negligent in failing to supervise and control 
the pitcher.  (Id. at p. 153.)  In a demurrer to the plaintiff‟s complaint, the 
defendant community college relied on Government Code section 831.7.  The trial 
court sustained the demurrer, but on the plaintiff‟s appeal, the Court of Appeal 
reversed, concluding that section 831.7 did not apply under these circumstances.  
(Avila, supra, at p. 153.)  This court granted review. 
Finding Government Code section 831.7‟s relevant language somewhat 
ambiguous, this court reviewed the statute‟s legislative history to determine the 
legislative intent underlying its enactment.  This court stated its conclusion about 
that legislative intent in these words, which the Ninth Circuit considered 
particularly significant:  “Thus, Government Code section 831.7 was adopted as a 
premises liability measure, modeled on Civil Code section 846, and designed to 
limit liability based on a public entity‟s failure either to maintain public property 
or to warn of dangerous conditions on public property.  Nothing in the history of 
the measure indicates the statute was intended to limit a public entity‟s liability 
arising from other duties, such as any duty owed to supervise participation in 
particular activities.”  (Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th 148, 157-158.) 
Ultimately, however, this court found it unnecessary to decide “whether the 
immunity created by [Government Code] section 831.7 extends only to premises 
liability claims.”  (Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th 148, 159.)  Instead, this court reached 
the narrower conclusion that “school-sponsored and supervised sports activities 
are not „recreational‟ in the sense intended by the statute, and thus section 831.7 
does not apply to immunize public educational entities from liability to students 
for injuries sustained during participation in such activities.”  (Ibid.) 
Finally, to explain its request that this court decide whether Civil Code 
section 846‟s immunity extends to vehicular negligence claims, the Ninth Circuit 
9 
stressed the potential impact the resolution of that issue would have, in these 
words:  “[I]t is of no small moment that the federal government owns millions of 
acres of National Park and National Forest land within the state of California.  
Shielding the United States from liability for the negligent driving, and possibly 
for other negligent acts, of its employees on all of these lands may have substantial 
and negative consequences for the many residents of and visitors to California 
who make use of federal lands for recreational purposes.”  (Klein v. United States, 
supra, 537 F.3d 1027, 1033.) 
III 
In construing statutes, we aim “to ascertain the intent of the enacting 
legislative body so that we may adopt the construction that best effectuates the 
purpose of the law.”  (Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 709, 715; accord, Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 
986; Coachella Valley Mosquito etc. District v. Cal. Public Employee Relations 
Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1087.)  We look first to the words of the statute, 
“because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of 
legislative intent.”  (Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital, supra, at p. 715; 
accord, Chavez v. City of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 986; People v. Toney (2004) 32 
Cal.4th 228, 232.) 
When the statutory text is ambiguous, or it otherwise fails to resolve the 
question of its intended meaning, courts look to the statute‟s legislative history and 
the historical circumstances behind its enactment.  (Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 657, 663.)  Finally, the court may consider the likely effects of a proposed 
interpretation because “ „[w]here uncertainty exists consideration should be given 
to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation.‟ ”  (Ibid., 
quoting Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 
1379, 1387.) 
10 
We turn now to the text of Civil Code section 846 to determine its plain 
meaning with regard to the statute‟s purpose. 
A.  Statutory Language 
Civil Code section 846, in its first paragraph, defines the scope of the 
immunity granted to California landowners, in these words: “An owner of any 
estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory, 
owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any 
recreational purpose or to give any warning of hazardous conditions, uses of, 
structures, or activities on such premises to persons entering for such purpose, 
except as provided in this section.”  In its second paragraph, section 846 defines 
“recreational purpose” by reference to a list of activities that qualify as 
“recreational,” including among them all types of “vehicular riding.”  In its third 
paragraph, section 846 states that by allowing another to enter or use property for 
recreation the property‟s owner does not “(a) extend any assurance that the 
premises are safe for such purpose, or (b) constitute the person to whom 
permission has been granted the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a 
duty of care is owed, or (c) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any 
injury to person or property caused by any act of such person to whom permission 
has been granted except as provided in this section.”  Finally, in its fourth 
paragraph, section 846 provides three limitations on, or exceptions to, the 
landowner immunity it has granted, stating that the immunity does not apply to 
“willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, 
structure or activity,” nor does it apply when permission to enter is granted for a 
consideration, nor when persons are expressly invited rather than merely permitted 
to enter the land. 
11 
Preliminarily, we observe that although Civil Code section 846 is 
commonly referred to as an immunity provision, and although for convenience we 
refer to it that way here, it is does not confer an immunity in the strictest sense of 
that term, which is “a complete defense . . . [that] does not negate the tort.”  
(Black‟s Law Dict. (1996 pocket ed.) p. 298; see Myers v. Philip Morris 
Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 832, fn. 2.)  Section 846 does not merely 
eliminate a damage remedy for certain types of negligent conduct by a landowner.  
The wording of section 846‟s first paragraph, providing that a landowner “owes no 
duty of care” to persons using the land for recreation, either to maintain safe 
premises or to warn of hazards, does indeed “negate the tort,” because the 
existence of a duty owed to the injured person is an essential element of the 
negligence tort.  (See Paz v. State of California (2000) 22 Cal.4th 550, 559.) 
By the plain meaning of the language in its first paragraph, Civil Code 
section 846 absolves California landowners of two separate and distinct duties:  
the duty to “keep the premises safe” for recreational users, and the duty to warn 
such users of “hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities” on the 
premises.  (Civ. Code, § 846, 1st par.)  Section 846‟s third paragraph adds an 
additional immunity, stating that by granting permission to enter for recreational 
use a property owner does not extend any assurance that the premises are safe for 
recreational use, confer on the recreational user the legal status of an invitee or 
licensee, or assume responsibility for any injury that a recreational user may cause 
to another person.  This latter provision shields the landowner from liability for 
injuries caused by (rather than to) recreational users. 
Here, we are concerned only with the scope of the first of these immunities, 
which absolves property owners of any duty to “keep the premises safe” for 
recreational use.  The allegations of plaintiffs‟ complaint do not implicate the 
other forms of immunity afforded by Civil Code section 846.  Plaintiffs have not 
12 
sued under a failure-to-warn theory, they have not alleged that plaintiff Alan Klein 
relied on any assurance that the property was safe, they have not alleged that 
plaintiff Alan Klein was an invitee or licensee, and they have not alleged that 
another recreational user caused plaintiff Alan Klein‟s injuries.  These other forms 
of section 846 immunity are relevant here only insofar as they assist us in 
construing the scope of the safe-premises immunity. 
For three reasons, we conclude that the plain language of Civil Code 
section 846‟s first paragraph, absolving landowners of the safe-premises duty, 
supports the conclusion that section 846 does not relieve landowners of the duty to 
avoid vehicular negligence.  First, the phrase “keep the premises safe” is an apt 
description of the property-based duties underlying premises liability, a liability 
category that does not include vehicular negligence.  Second, differences in the 
statutory descriptions of the safe-premises immunity and the hazard-warning 
immunity suggest that the former is considerably narrower in scope and does not 
apply to activities like motor vehicle driving.  Third, the expansive construction of 
the safe-premises clause urged by the United States would render the hazard-
warning clause superfluous.  We elaborate on these reasons. 
As we have noted, Civil Code section 846, in its first paragraph, absolves 
landowners of the duty “to keep the premises safe.”  The United States urges us to 
construe this provision as absolving landowners from any duty of care to refrain 
from negligence in the conduct of activities, such as driving motor vehicles, on 
their land.  In other words, the United States would have us construe the duty “to 
keep the premises safe” as being coextensive with the duty to use due care to 
avoid injury to recreational users of their land, subject only to the three immunity 
exceptions — willful or malicious conduct, entry granted for a consideration, and 
express invitation — that are set forth in section 846‟s fourth paragraph.  We 
disagree. 
13 
First, it is unlikely that California‟s Legislature intended Civil Code section 
846‟s premises-based language to be interpreted so broadly as to include any and 
all factors that might create a personal injury risk on one‟s property.  Had the 
Legislature intended such a broad immunity, it would have been a simple matter to 
provide in section 846 that landowners owe no duty of care to avoid personal 
injury to persons using their land for recreation.  By providing instead that a 
landowner owes no duty to “keep the premises safe,” the Legislature has selected 
language implying a narrower immunity, focused on premises liability claims 
arising from property-based duties.  As one Court of Appeal has explained, 
“[b]roadly speaking, premises liability alleges a defendant property owner allowed 
a dangerous condition on its property or failed to take reasonable steps to secure 
its property against criminal acts by third parties.”  (Delgado v. American Multi-
Cinema, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1406, fn. 1; see also Alcarez v. Vece 
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1156 [premises liability is based on the duty “to maintain 
land in one‟s possession in a reasonably safe condition”].)  The duty to drive a 
motor vehicle safely, by contrast, does not arise from ownership or possession of 
land. 
The second reason is based on a comparison of the statutory language 
describing the safe-premises and hazard-warning immunities.  It is a general rule 
of statutory construction that “[w]hen one part of a statute contains a term or 
provision, the omission of that term or provision from another part of the statute 
indicates the Legislature intended to convey a different meaning.”  (Cornette v. 
Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 73; accord, Wasatch Property 
Management v. Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1111, 1118; People v. Gardeley (1996) 
14 Cal.4th 605, 621-622.)  In Civil Code section 846‟s first paragraph, the 
statutory description of the hazard-warning immunity expressly refers to 
hazardous “uses of” and “activities on” as well as “conditions” of the owner‟s 
14 
land.  By contrast, the statutory description of the safe-premises immunity makes 
no reference to uses or activities.  It does not, for example, absolve a landowner of 
a duty to “keep activities on the premises safe,” but only from the duty to keep 
“the premises” themselves safe.  Had the Legislature intended to extend the 
liability shield to negligently conducted activities, such as dangerous driving, it 
could simply have provided, in the first paragraph, that a landowner owes no duty 
of care to avoid, prevent, remedy, or give any warning of hazardous conditions, 
uses, structures, or activities, on the land.  The Legislature did not do so.  Instead, 
it selected language carrying a strong implication that the safe-premises immunity 
is narrower than the hazard-warning immunity, and does not extend to unsafe 
activities such as negligent driving of a vehicle. 
The third reason relies on another statutory construction principle, that 
courts must strive to give meaning to every word in a statute and to avoid 
constructions that render words, phrases, or clauses superfluous.  (People v. 
Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 245-246; People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 
1002, 1010.)  The broad construction of the safe-premises immunity provision that 
the United States urges us to adopt would violate this rule.  The duty to “keep the 
premises safe,” as the United States views it, encompasses not only the duty to 
prevent or remedy hazardous conditions on the property, and possibly also to 
guard against criminal activity by third parties, but also the duty to use due care in 
the conduct of any activity on the property.  In other words, the United States 
would have us construe the language in Civil Code section 846‟s first paragraph 
absolving landowners of the duty “to keep the premises safe” as absolving 
landowners of any duty of care to avoid personal injury to recreational users of 
their land.  But such a broad reading of the safe-premises immunity would 
encompass tort claims based on a failure to warn of potentially dangerous 
activities because, as to such activities, a landowner can “keep the premises safe” 
15 
either by conducting the activities in a safe manner or by warning others of the 
risks posed by those activities.  Therefore, it is not reasonable to construe the 
phrase “keep the premises safe” as encompassing one of those alternative safety 
approaches but not the other.  Unless the phrase “keep the premises safe” is 
construed narrowly to mean preventing or remedying dangerous physical 
conditions on the property, the alternative expansive construction renders 
superfluous the separate liability shield for failures to warn of hazardous activities.  
To give independent meaning and purpose to Civil Code section 846‟s hazard-
warning clause, we construe Civil Code section 846‟s safe-premises clause more 
narrowly to encompass only premises liability claims arising from alleged 
breaches of property-based duties. 
For these three reasons that are based on the plain language of Civil Code 
section 846‟s first paragraph, we conclude that section 846 does not bar a 
recreational user‟s vehicular negligence claim against a landowner.6  Although 
section 846 is broad in many respects, it is not all-encompassing, and it does not 
release landowners or their employees from their basic duty to use due care while 
engaged in potentially hazardous activities such as driving a motor vehicle. 
Our conclusion is not altered by consideration of the language of Civil 
Code section 846‟s fourth paragraph stating that the section “does not limit the 
liability which otherwise exists . . . for willful or malicious failure to guard or 
warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity.”  This provision 
establishes a limitation on, or exception to, the various section 846 immunities.  
The reference to a “willful or malicious failure to . . . warn against a dangerous 
                                              
6  
Insofar as it is inconsistent with this conclusion, the state Court of Appeal‟s 
decision in Shipman v. Boething Treeland Farms, Inc., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 
1424, is disapproved. 
16 
condition, use, structure or activity” (italics added) limits the hazard-warning 
immunity provided by section 846‟s first paragraph.  The reference to a “willful or 
malicious failure to guard . . . against a dangerous condition, use, structure or 
activity” limits both the safe-premises immunity granted by the first paragraph (as 
to dangerous conditions and structures) and the third paragraph‟s immunity from 
liability for injuries caused by recreational users (as to dangerous uses and 
activities).  The words “guard against a dangerous . . . activity” aptly describe a 
duty relating to the dangerous activity of a third party, such as a recreational user, 
and would be an odd choice of words to describe a duty relating to the 
landowner‟s own activities.  Thus, section 846‟s fourth paragraph does not 
establish a limitation or exception for the landowner‟s own willful or malicious 
conduct.  We may infer that the Legislature perceived no need for such a 
limitation inasmuch as it had not provided a corresponding immunity for activities, 
such as vehicle driving, conducted by the landowner or the landowner‟s employee.  
B.  Legislative History 
Having concluded, based on the plain meaning of its language, that Civil 
Code section 846 does not bar vehicular negligence claims against landowners, it 
is not necessary to consider the statute‟s legislative history.  Our review of that 
legislative history reveals, however, that it is consistent with our conclusion. 
As this court observed in Ornelas, the legislative history for Civil Code 
section 846 is sparse and, at least on some points, inconclusive.  (Ornelas, supra, 4 
Cal.4th 1095, 1105, fn. 8.)  “A letter from the bill‟s Senate sponsor to the 
Governor urging favorable consideration suggests that it would encourage owners 
who might otherwise fear liability to grant access to their property.”  (Ibid.)  As 
this court has noted, however, in crafting legislation that would prevent the closure 
of private lands to recreational users because of landowners‟ liability concerns, the 
17 
California Legislature sought to strike a fair balance between the interests of 
private landowners and those of recreational users.  (Id. at p. 1108.)  Our 
conclusion here, that section 846 encompasses premises liability claims but not 
vehicular negligence claims, furthers this legislative objective of balancing the 
respective interests of landowners and persons using their lands for recreation.  
Construing section 846 to confer an immunity from liability for injuries caused by 
the negligent conduct of the landowner or the landowner‟s employees might well 
discourage recreational use of the land, thereby defeating the underlying statutory 
purpose.  Moreover, the Legislature might well have concluded that it is fair to 
hold both landowners and recreational users to essentially the same standard of 
care.  Thus, if the landowner and a recreational user are engaged in the same 
activity on the land at the same time — whether hunting, bicycle riding, or driving 
a vehicle — each should owe the same duty of care to the other and each should 
be subject to the same liability if a breach of that duty results in personal injury to 
the other.  At the same time, the landowner is relieved of liability for recreational 
user injuries when the theory of liability depends on a duty that the law otherwise 
imposes specifically and uniquely on landowners.  
The summary prepared by the Legislative Counsel for the original 1963 bill 
states that the bill “provides that an owner of an estate in real property is not liable 
for injuries to people who enter upon his land for various recreational purposes” 
(Legis. Counsel, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 639 (1963 Reg. Sess.) July 5, 1963) and 
this wording is repeated in some other legislative history documents relating to 
that bill.  These statements might be read as suggesting that Civil Code section 
846 confers a blanket immunity.  But if the Legislature had actually intended such 
a broad and unqualified immunity, it could have used the Legislative Counsel‟s 
broad and unqualified wording.  That it chose rather different wording suggests 
18 
that it intended a narrower and more focused immunity, and the language of the 
statute itself is the most reliable guide to legislative intent. 
We note also that legislative history materials from the 1980 amendment 
that extended Civil Code section 846‟s protections to owners holding 
nonpossessory interests in land consistently summarize the section as providing 
“that an owner of any estate in real property owes no duty of care to keep the 
premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose.”  (Sen. Com. 
on Judiciary, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1966 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended Feb. 11, 1980, p. 1, italics added.)  Likewise, the debate surrounding the 
1980 amendment to section 846 focused on whether nonpossessory landowners 
should be given an incentive to “protect the public from dangerous conditions on 
the land.”  (See, e.g., Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1966 
(1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 11, 1980, p. 3, italics added.)  These 
statements support our construction of section 846 as barring only premises 
liability claims arising from property-related duties. 
C.  Public Policy Considerations 
Although our construction of Civil Code section 846 is not based on public 
policy considerations, we review those considerations briefly to ensure that the 
construction we adopt will not produce manifestly adverse effects that the 
Legislature could not have intended when it enacted that law.  The state has a 
strong interest in promoting the safe driving of motor vehicles and in preventing or 
minimizing personal injuries resulting from motor vehicle accidents.  Our 
construction furthers these interests by encouraging property owners and their 
employees to drive safely on their lands so as to reduce collisions with, and 
injuries to, persons engaged in recreational activities on those lands. 
19 
Regarding activities other than motor vehicle driving, our construction, as 
previously mentioned, has the effect of holding landowners and those who enter 
their property for recreational purposes to essentially the same standard of care.  
The landowner‟s status as landowner does not result in the imposition of 
additional duties or a higher standard of care, but neither does it relieve the 
landowner from the general duty imposed on all, landowner and recreational user 
of land alike, to exercise due care while performing activities that could result in 
injuries to others.   
Attempting to demonstrate the “artificiality of the distinction” (post, p. 7 
(dis. opn. of Baxter, J.)) that we draw here between negligence consisting of a 
failure to remedy a dangerous physicial condition and negligence in the 
performance of an activity, the dissent relies heavily on a series of hypothetical 
scenarios.  In constructing these examples, the dissent avoids mention of any 
factual detail that would establish the landowner‟s actual negligence, thereby 
creating a false impression that if Civil Code section 846‟s liability shield is not 
extended to cover these situations, landowners may be held liable for conduct that 
is entirely blameless.  Moreover, the dissent nowhere acknowledges the arbitrary 
distinctions that would determine liability under the construction of section 846 
that it proposes. 
An example illustrates the latter point.  A landowner is visited by his 
brother, who lives in another state, and the two travel in the same car to a tavern 
where they spend the afternoon talking and consuming alcoholic beverages.  On 
their return to the landowner‟s property, the car goes out of control, as a result of 
excessive speed and the driver‟s inebriation, while making the turn from the public 
highway onto the landowner‟s property.  The car strikes a recreational hiker, who 
is seriously injured.  Under the dissent‟s proposed interpretation of Civil Code 
section 846, if the negligent driver is the landowner, he is liable for the hiker‟s 
20 
injuries if the hiker happens to be standing beside the public road, off of the 
landowner‟s property, but section 846 shields the owner from liability if the hiker 
is standing just a few feet away on the landowner‟s property.  And if the negligent 
driver happens to be the landowner‟s brother, rather than the landowner, the 
brother is liable for the hiker‟s injuries regardless of where the hiker happens to be 
standing when struck, because Civil Code section 846‟s liability shield applies 
only to persons having an interest in the land.  Under the construction we adopt 
here, of course, the identity of the driver and the hiker‟s exact location at the time 
of injury are not relevant in making the liability determination.  
IV 
Having concluded that Civil Code section 846‟s safe-premises immunity 
clause does not encompass vehicular negligence claims, we consider and reject the 
arguments that defendant United States offers against this statutory construction. 
To support its position that Civil Code section 846 precludes recovery 
against a landowner for an injury caused by vehicular negligence, defendant 
United States seizes on language in this court‟s decision in Ornelas characterizing 
section 846 as “extremely broad” (Ornelas, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1095, 1105).  But 
Ornelas dealt with an injury caused by farm equipment being stored on the 
premises, a hazardous condition of the property.  Nowhere in this court‟s 
discussion of the scope of section 846 did this court consider unsafe activities 
undertaken by landowners or their employees.  More specifically, at no point did 
this court in Ornelas, or in any other case before this one, address whether section 
846 immunity would extend to cover affirmative acts of negligence on the part of 
landowners or their employees.  
Viewed in context, the “extremely broad” language in Ornelas refers to the 
type of interest held by the landowner (possessory or nonpossessory), the nature of 
the property (developed or undeveloped, urban or rural, natural or altered), and the 
21 
sorts of activities considered “recreational” (including even the spontaneous, 
unsupervised play of young children).  (Ornelas, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1095, 1100-
1102, 1105-1108.)  Civil Code section 846 is indeed broad in each of those 
respects.  Ornelas made this point to explain why the statute applies to protect 
landowners from liability even if the land at issue is not well suited to recreational 
pursuits.  (Ornelas, supra, at p. 1105.)  This court stated that, “assuming the 
requisite „interest‟ in land, the plain language of the statute admits of no 
exceptions, either for property „unsuitable‟ for recreational use or otherwise.”  (Id. 
at p. 1105.)   
Defendant United States relies also on this language in Ornelas:  “The 
landowner‟s duty to the nonpaying, uninvited recreational user is, in essence, that 
owed a trespasser under the common law as it existed prior to Rowland v. 
Christian [(1968)] 69 Cal.2d 108; i.e., absent willful or malicious misconduct the 
landowner is immune from liability for ordinary negligence.”  (Ornelas, supra, 4 
Cal.4th 1095, 1100.)  Because this language was unnecessary to the decision in 
Ornelas, it was dictum, and thus lacking in precedential force (City of Hope 
National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 390), 
particularly in light of the facts of Ornelas, which involved a premises liability 
claim based on the allegedly hazardous condition of the property (see Brown v. 
Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 734-735 [stating that a decision‟s 
positive authority is limited by the facts presented by the case]).  Indeed, until now 
every Civil Code section 846 case this court has decided has involved an injury 
arising out of the condition of privately owned property, rather than an injury 
arising out of an allegedly unsafe activity being conducted on the property.  (See 
Prince v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1151 [child injured while 
attempting to dislodge a kite from a power line on defendant‟s property]; Lewis v. 
Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232 [plaintiff injured when horse he was riding 
22 
stepped into a rut on defendant‟s private road]; Hubbard v. Brown (1990) 50 
Cal.3d 189 [plaintiff injured when he ran his motorcycle into a fence on 
defendant‟s property]; Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 
Cal.3d 699 [two teenage girls drowned in canal owned by defendant].)   
Furthermore, it appears that the quoted Ornelas language on which 
defendant United States relies is an inaccurate or at least incomplete description of 
a landowner‟s duty to a trespasser under the common law as it existed in 
California before Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108.  As described by 
this court in Rowland, the general rule under the common law was that trespassers 
are “obliged to take the premises as they find them insofar as any alleged defective 
condition thereon may exist, and that the possessor of the land owe[d] them only 
the duty of refraining from wanton or willful injury.”  (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d 
at p. 114, italics added.)  Twelve years earlier, this court had given this somewhat 
more nuanced description of existing California law:  “[I]n cases involving active 
conduct, as distinguished from condition of the premises, the landowner or 
possessor may be liable for failure to exercise ordinary care toward a licensee 
whose presence on the land is known or should reasonably be known to the owner 
or possessor.”  (Oettinger v. Stewart (1944) 24 Cal.2d 133, 138.) 
Although Oettinger involved a licensee or “business visitor” rather than a 
trespasser, the court implied that, at least under some circumstances, a landowner, 
while engaged in “active conduct,” was obliged to exercise reasonable care toward 
a trespasser if the landowner knew that the trespasser was present, or had reason to 
anticipate that the trespasser would be present, in the area where the injury 
occurred.  (Oettinger, supra, 24 Cal.2d at pp. 138-139.)  Among the cases this 
court cited as having recognized the above described landowner duty was 
Hamakawa v. Crescent Wharf & W. Co. (1935) 4 Cal.2d 499, a case involving a 
trespasser.  There, this court had held that the defendant, who was in control of the 
23 
premises that the plaintiff had entered without permission, owed a duty “to 
conduct its activities with reasonable care for [the plaintiff‟s] safety” if, but only 
if, the defendant “knew or from facts within its knowledge should have known of 
the plaintiff‟s presence.”  (Hamakawa, supra, at pp. 501-502.)  This description of 
the duty that a landowner owes to a trespasser at common law is consistent with 
section 336 of the Restatement Second of Torts, which states:  “A possessor of 
land who knows or has reason to know of the presence of another who is 
trespassing on the land is subject to liability for physical harm thereafter caused to 
the trespasser by the possessor‟s failure to carry on his activities upon the land 
with reasonable care for the trespasser‟s safety.”   
Of course, Civil Code section 846 makes a plaintiff‟s common law status, 
whether invitee or trespasser, irrelevant to the question of the defendant 
landowner‟s liability.  What we decide today is whether section 846 shields a 
landowner from liability for a recreational user‟s injury caused by the negligent 
driving of the landowner‟s employee.  The dictum in this court‟s Ornelas decision 
regarding a landowner‟s duty to a trespasser under earlier common law (Ornelas, 
supra, 4 Cal.4th 1095, 1100) offers little instruction on that issue.  This court had 
no need in Ornelas to consider negligence unrelated to the upkeep of the premises, 
as Ornelas involved the sort of injury typically arising under section 846 — an 
injury resulting from the condition of the land. 
V 
In response to the Ninth Circuit‟s request for clarification of California law, 
we conclude that Civil Code section 846 does not shield a landowner from liability  
24 
 
to a recreational user for personal injury resulting from the negligent driving of the 
landowner‟s employee acting within the course and scope of employment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY BAXTER, J. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  It is clear to me that under Civil Code section 846,1 
the so-called recreational use immunity statute, the owner of an estate in real 
property is not liable for any injury suffered, as the result of the owner‟s mere 
ordinary negligence, by one who is on the property, without payment or invitation, 
for recreational purposes.  The owner‟s statutory immunity for ordinary 
negligence under such circumstances applies not only to injuries caused by 
physical conditions on the property, but also to those caused by the owner‟s uses 
of, and activities on, the property, such as the negligent driving at issue here.  As 
I shall explain, this result is compelled by a fair reading of the statutory language 
and by the policies underlying the immunity, as we have previously described 
them. 
At the outset, I share a natural sympathy for the injured plaintiff in this 
case.  It certainly seems that a bicyclist injured in a traffic accident on a public 
highway should be able to recover from the employer of a negligent driver who 
struck him while engaged in the course and scope of the employment.  
Unfortunately, however, the accident at issue here involved a federal employee 
driving on federal land.  For better or worse, Congress has cloaked the federal 
                                              
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Civil Code. 
2 
government in California with any tort immunity a private person, including a 
private landowner, would have under state law, such as the recreational use 
immunity conferred by section 846.  (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).)  Moreover, though 
the government actively promotes the free public recreational use of its national 
forest lands and roads, case law has consistently held that it does not thereby 
“expressly invite[ ]” members of the public onto its property, so as to come within 
an express statutory exception to immunity.  (§ 846, 4th par.)2  These anomalous, 
and perhaps counterintuitive, circumstances should not influence our resolution of 
the issue the Ninth Circuit has asked us to decide here.  We should resist the 
temptation to make bad law from bad facts. 
Instead, we must focus on how section 846 properly applies to the millions 
of individual California property owners — agricultural, industrial, commercial, 
and residential — who face exposure to tort liability when persons who have 
entered private land for recreational purposes, often without the owners‟ 
permission, come into contact with the owners‟ normal activities on their property.  
For multiple reasons, the majority reaches the wrong interpretation of section 846 
as applied to these owners. 
                                              
2  
See, e.g., Mattice v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 818, 820-821 (section 
846 applied to paved secondary access road in national park); Termini v. U.S. 
(9th Cir. 1992) 963 F.2d 1264, 1265-1266 (§ 846 applied to Forest Service road in 
Angeles National Forest); Phillips v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1979) 590 F.2d 297, 299-300 
(Forest Service promotional literature was not “express invitation” to enter 
national forest); see also Ravell v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1994) 22 F.3d 960, 962-963 
(invitation to general public to attend air show on military base was not “express[ ] 
invit[ation]” to injured spectator); Johnson v. Unocal Corp. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 
310, 317 (exemption from § 846 immunity requires “direct, personal invitation” to 
injured person). 
 
3 
The Legislature‟s primary purpose in adopting section 846 was to 
encourage the owners of real property to allow recreational use of the property by 
others without fear that if an owner‟s mere negligence on the premises injured 
such a user, the owner would face tort liability.  As discussed below, nothing in 
the legislative history of section 846, or in our case law directly interpreting this 
statute, manifests an intent to immunize only static physical “conditions” on the 
property, while leaving the owner fully exposed if his or her normal activities on 
the property injure a person who has entered, without payment or invitation, for 
recreational purposes.  Though the majority insists otherwise, there is no readily 
apparent reason why the Legislature would make such a distinction.  Landowners 
do not simply maintain their property, they use it.  If the law seeks to encourage 
such owners to allow nonpaying, uninvited strangers to enter and use their land for 
recreational purposes without fear of personal injury liability, both “conditions” 
and “use” immunity are equally justified. 
Of course, as this court has indicated, the statute also reflects a policy that it 
is unfair to subject a landowner to tort liability when nonpaying, uninvited 
strangers enter against the landowner’s will for recreational purposes.  This was a 
primary ground for our holding that section 846 applies even to land that is 
unsuitable for recreation, and even where the landowner seeks to prevent 
recreational entry and use by others.  In reaching this conclusion, we stressed that 
section 846 sets forth only two requirements for immunity:  “(1)  the defendant 
must be the owner of an „estate or any other interest in real property, whether 
possessory or nonpossessory‟; and (2) the plaintiff’s injury must result from the 
„entry or use [of the “premises”] for any recreational purpose.‟  (§ 846.)”  
(Ornelas v. Randolph (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1095, 1100, italics added (Ornelas).) 
As we explained in Ornelas, the Legislature “could reasonably determine 
that a landowner — any landowner — should not in fairness be held liable for 
4 
injuries sustained by a trespasser from the recreational use of the owner‟s 
property.”  (Ornelas, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1105, italics added.)  Indeed, we noted, 
the Legislature could recognize the “evident” injustice of subjecting a landowner 
who seeks to prevent recreational entry to greater liability than one who permits 
such entry.  (Id., at p. 1107.)  In sum, we indicated, the statute‟s purpose is to 
ensure that “[t]he landowner‟s duty to the nonpaying, uninvited recreational user 
is, in essence, that owed a trespasser under the common law as it existed prior to 
Rowland v. Christian [(1968)] 69 Cal.2d 108 [(Rowland)]; i.e., absent willful or 
malicious misconduct the landowner is immune from liability [to a recreational 
user] for ordinary negligence.  [Citations.]”  (Id., at p. 1100, italics added; see also 
Rest.2d Torts, § 333 [under traditional common law rule, possessor of land is not 
liable to trespassers for failure to exercise due care either to put the land in a 
reasonably safe condition or “to carry on his activities so as not to endanger them” 
(italics added)].)3 
Land may be unsuitable for recreation, and the owner may attempt to 
prevent recreational trespassing, not only because of dangerous physical 
conditions of the land itself, but because the activities the owner is conducting on 
the property — whether industrial, agricultural, commercial, residential, or even 
recreational — simply make it incompatible with recreational use by outsiders.  
                                              
3  
The majority insists that, in expressing this principle, our Ornelas opinion 
provided an “inaccurate or at least incomplete” description of pre-Rowland 
California law.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.)  This law, the majority asserts, had 
developed nuances that acknowledged a landowner‟s duty to exercise due care in 
“active conduct” toward a trespasser whose presence was, or reasonably should 
have been, known.  (Ibid; see also Rest.2d Torts, supra, § 336.)  The point is of 
little moment.  The simple fact is that, in Ornelas, we discerned a legislative 
intent, by the adoption of section 846, to absolve a landowner of any duty to avoid 
negligent “conduct” toward a recreational trespasser. 
5 
No reason appears why those activities, if not willful or malicious, should 
nonetheless expose the owner to tort liability when a trespasser who enters the 
land for recreational purposes is injured. 
Despite all this, the majority concludes that section 846‟s basic immunity 
extends only to the physical condition of the land itself, not to uses or activities on 
the land by the owner, such as the operation of a motor vehicle by the owner (or 
the owner‟s employee).  To support its conclusion, the majority first points to 
features of the statutory language.  However, I respectfully submit that the 
majority‟s parsing of the statute does not withstand scrutiny.  To put my views in 
context, I briefly review the statutory terms. 
For our purposes, the significant portions of section 846 are contained in 
the first, third, and fourth paragraphs.  The first paragraph provides in pertinent 
part that one with a possessory interest in real property “owes no duty of care to 
keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose,” or 
to “give any warning [to such recreational entrants or users] of hazardous 
conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on such premises.”  (§ 846, italics 
added.) 
The third paragraph says that a landowner who gives permission to another 
for recreational entry and use does not thereby (a) warrant “that the premises are 
safe for such purpose,” (b) accord the permitted person “the legal status of an 
invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed, or (c) assume responsibility for 
or incur liability for any injury . . . caused by any act of such person . . . .”  (§ 846, 
italics added.) 
Finally, the fourth paragraph states, inter alia, that section 846 “does not 
limit the liability which otherwise exists (a) for willful or malicious failure to 
guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity.”  (§ 846, 
italics added.) 
6 
When all is said and done, the majority relies almost exclusively on two 
aspects of the first paragraph.  First, the majority focuses upon the phrase “keep 
the premises safe.”  The majority insists this phrase conjures up the notion of 
“premises liability,” a term of art generally associated with a landowner‟s 
“property-based” duty to maintain the land and buildings themselves in a 
reasonably safe condition.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12, italics added.)  The 
Legislature, the majority assumes, must have so understood when it chose the 
statutory language.  This phrase, the majority insists, does not extend to the 
owner‟s negligent day-to-day activity unrelated to property maintenance, such as 
careless operation of a vehicle, even though the negligent conduct occurs on his or 
her own property and causes injury to a recreational user. 
I am not persuaded.  In the first place, there is no hard-and-fast rule that 
“premises liability” — the liability exposure of a possessor of land to persons 
injured thereon — is limited to what the majority deems the “property-based 
duties” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 13) of physical care, maintenance, and repair.  
Generally, “ „[t]he proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land 
. . . is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man 
in view of the probability of injury to others . . . .‟ ”  (Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 
14 Cal.4th 1149, 1156, quoting Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108, 119.)  Nothing in 
that formulation necessarily distinguishes between dangers arising from mere 
negligent property maintenance by the possessor, on the one hand, and dangers 
arising from activities the possessor or others are conducting on the property, on 
the other.  (See, e.g., Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 
666, 674 [duty of landlord to tenant or patron to protect against foreseeable 
criminal activity on the property]; Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co. (1955) 
44 Cal.2d 225, 233 [possessor‟s duty to warn contractor‟s employees of danger 
posed by operation of crane near live power lines].) 
7 
In any event, the Legislature did not use the term of art “premises liability,” 
as it might easily have done.  Instead, the statute employs the broader phrase “keep 
the premises safe.”  This phrase reasonably encompasses all failures to exercise 
due care that render the “premises” unsafe for recreational use by uninvited, 
nonpaying outsiders.  Such failures may as easily and commonly involve the 
owner‟s active conduct on the property, and the day-to-day use the owner makes 
of it, as they do static physical conditions on the land.  As indicated above, no 
logical reason appears why the phrase “keep the premises safe” should provide 
immunity only for one, and not for the others. 
The following examples illustrate the artificiality of the distinction the 
majority proposes:   
A salvage yard, surrounded by a fence posted with “customers only” and 
“no children” signs, is strewn with carelessly heaped piles of parts and scrap metal 
recovered from junked vehicles.  Attracted by the piles, two neighborhood 
teenagers, X and Y, enter for purposes of amusing themselves.  X scrambles onto 
one of the piles.  His weight causes it to shift, and he is partially buried in debris, 
causing him injury.  Meanwhile, Y‟s attention is diverted to an auto crushing 
machine, which is operating nearby.  Y accidentally places his hand in the path of 
the crushing mechanism.  The operator fails to shut off the machine in time, and 
Y‟s arm is seriously mangled.  Under the majority‟s proposed holding, the salvage 
yard owner is immune from liability to X, but is liable for the negligent injury 
caused to Y. 
Similarly, a wheat farmer has fenced his fields and posted them with “no 
trespassing” signs.  During the harvest season, three bored adolescents who live 
nearby come onto the property to see what recreational opportunities might 
present themselves.  One of the adolescents, C, enters a rarely used barn, which 
the farmer has allowed to fall into disrepair.  C climbs up into the hayloft and falls 
8 
through the rotten structure, injuring himself.  Meanwhile, C‟s companions, D and 
E, play a form of “tag” in the farmer‟s wheat fields, using the tall, ripe summer 
wheat as cover.  While D is hiding, the farmer, harvesting his wheat with a 
combine, accidentally runs over D‟s leg, causing serious injury.  Under the 
majority‟s analysis, the farmer is not liable to C, but is fully exposed to liability to 
D. 
Finally, a landowner, A, has a rural home with substantial acreage.  On a 
remote portion of his property, he has constructed, for his own recreational use, a 
dirt bike course that includes moguls, blind curves, and water hazards.  The owner 
 has fenced off his land to discourage entry by strangers.  He is familiar with the 
challenges the course presents, and, because of his efforts to deter outsiders, he 
assumes he will encounter no other riders.  Hence, to maximize his fun, A rides at 
the highest speed the course will accommodate.  While he is doing so, two other 
dirt bikers, B and C, negotiate the fence, enter the property with their vehicles, and 
begin riding on the course.  B rounds a blind curve, unaware of the hidden water 
hazard just beyond.  He crashes into the water, and is injured.  Moments later, C 
speeds through the same curve, only to see A bearing down on him.  The bikes 
ridden by A and C collide, injuring C.  Under the majority‟s narrow construction 
of “keep the premises safe,” A is immune from liability for B‟s injury, but is fully 
exposed to liability for the injury caused to C. 
Section 846‟s immunity for failure to “keep the premises safe” does not, by 
its terms, admit of such arbitrary distinctions.  Nor are they justified in light of the 
clear public policy implemented by the statute.4 
                                              
4 The majority provides its own hypothetical example in an attempt to show 
that section 846 might operate arbitrarily in certain circumstances if interpreted to 
absolve a landowner of due care toward a nonpaying, uninvited recreational user 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
9 
The majority next observes that the first paragraph of section 846 also 
states an immunity for failure “to give any warning of hazardous conditions, uses 
of, structures, or activities on such premises.”  (Italics added.)  Confronted with 
the fact that this phrase specifically refers to active conduct as well as physical 
conditions, the majority reasons that the  immunity for failure to warn is simply 
broader than the “premises safe” immunity.  Because a broad construction of the 
“premises safe” immunity to include uses and activities would encompass failure-
to-warn theories, the majority asserts, such a construction would render the 
separate immunity for failure to warn unnecessary and superfluous.  Hence, the 
majority concludes, the “premises safe” immunity must apply only to physical 
conditions, while the broader failure-to-warn immunity extends to activities and 
uses as well. 
For several reasons, this analysis is not convincing.  In the first place, no 
reason appears why the Legislature would wish to immunize landowners, as 
against recreational users, for failing to warn about hazardous activities and uses, 
while holding them fully liable for the activities and uses themselves.  A more 
logical approach would be just the opposite — immunity for hazardous activities 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
with respect to the owner‟s uses and activities on the property as well as physical 
conditions thereon.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 19-20.)  Of course, any statutory 
policy choice may produce arbitrary results in isolated instances.  But the majority 
fails to persuade that the policies reflected in section 846 — to encourage the 
availability of suitable private land for recreation while protecting the owners of 
unsuitable land from liability for mere negligence to recreational trespassers — are 
best served by its pinched construction of the statute. 
 
10 
and uses, so long as the landowner provided adequate warning to persons entering 
the land for recreational purposes. 
Consider the following example:  As all agree, the statute would immunize 
a farmer from negligence liability for failing to warn nonpaying, uninvited 
recreational entrants that he is about to spray his crops with toxic pesticides.  
Nonetheless, he does post prominent notices of the imminent spraying at 
numerous locations on the fence around his land.  Notwithstanding these 
warnings, trespassers climb through the fence and enter the property to hunt 
pheasant.  Satisfied that the warnings he provided would deter recreational 
entrants, the farmer negligently fails to notice the hunters‟ presence, and he 
proceeds with the spraying operation.  Several of the hunters suffer injurious 
reactions.  Under the majority‟s interpretation of section 846, the farmer‟s act of 
spraying exposes him to liability, even though he provided clear warnings, and 
even though he would have been immune from liability for his negligent failure to 
do so.  It is difficult to conclude, as a matter of common sense, that the Legislature 
intended such a result. 
Moreover, contrary to the majority‟s assertion, it is simply not true that if 
the “premises safe” immunity applies to uses and activities as well as physical 
conditions, the failure-to-warn immunity becomes superfluous.  On the contrary, 
separate treatment of the two immunities, as applied to both static physical 
conditions and active conduct, is rational and logical, because the duties to which 
these immunities relate are themselves often separate.  Situations may arise where 
due care could be satisfied either by directly reducing, avoiding, or eliminating 
dangers arising from conditions or activities on one‟s property — i.e., “keep[ing] 
the premises safe” — or by giving adequate warning of the dangers.  In some 
cases, where due care cannot make conditions or activities on the premises safe — 
such as those arising from inherently or unavoidably dangerous agricultural or 
11 
industrial operations — due care, where such a duty is owed, may still require the 
landowner to warn potential entrants of these dangers. 
Ample reason thus exists to absolve a landowner of negligence liability to 
an injured recreational user whether a duty would otherwise arise to eliminate 
dangerous conditions and activities, or simply to warn of them.  In my view, 
section 846 does just that. 
If there were any doubt on this point, the fourth paragraph of section 846 
resolves it.  As indicated above, this paragraph declares in pertinent part that the 
statute “does not limit the liability which otherwise exists . . . for [a landowner‟s] 
willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, 
structure or activity . . . .”  (Italics added.)  Two aspects of this provision 
unambiguously refute the majority‟s construction of the statutory immunity. 
First, the paragraph evidences the Legislature‟s intent to deal separately and 
equally with the respective duties to “warn against,” and to “guard . . . against,” 
dangers on the property, whether those dangers arise from “condition[s]” and 
“structure[s],” or from “activit[ies]” and “use[s].”  (§ 846, 4th par.)  Insofar as the 
paragraph withdraws or withholds immunity for landowners‟ “willful or 
malicious” acts or omissions that injure recreational users, it does so across the 
board, for failures both to “guard . . . against,” and to “warn against,” injury-
causing dangers, stemming either from physical conditions, or from the owners‟ 
uses or activities. 
As so worded, the fourth paragraph thus clarifies the scope and extent of 
the first paragraph‟s immunity.  The fourth paragraph makes clear that there is no 
immunity if the failure to “guard . . . against,” or to “warn against,” dangerous 
“condition[s], use[s], structure[s] or activit[ies]” was “willful or malicious.”  But 
the statute‟s need to specify the broad range of circumstances in which immunity 
is not provided obviously arises because the statute does otherwise provide 
12 
immunity under the same circumstances for merely negligent acts or omissions.  
The paragraph clearly implies that its exception from immunity for “willful or 
malicious” conduct is coextensive with the immunity for conduct that is merely 
negligent.  Since the exception applies to a failure to “guard . . . against” 
dangerous “use[s]” and “activit[ies]” as well as hazardous physical conditions, so 
must the immunity.  (§ 846, 4th par.) 
Thus, the most natural way to read the statute is that, under the first 
paragraph, the immunity extends to conditions, activities, and uses, except, under 
the fourth paragraph, those that are “willful or malicious.”  Under this 
construction, the first paragraph‟s phrase “keep the premises safe” is simply an 
analog of the fourth paragraph‟s phrase “guard . . . against a dangerous condition, 
use, structure or activity.” 
The majority suggests the fourth paragraph‟s withdrawal of immunity for 
“willful or malicious” failure to “guard . . . against” “use[s]” and “activit[ies]” 
may properly be read as referring only to the third paragraph, which specifies that 
a landowner who gives permission to another person to enter for recreational 
purposes does not thereby “assume responsibility for or incur liability for any 
injury . . . caused by any act of such person.”  (§ 846, 3d par., italics added.)  
Because the only express immunity set forth in section 846 for “act[s]” is the 
third-paragraph immunity for the “act[s]” of a permitted user, this line of 
reasoning goes, the fourth paragraph must simply mean that if the landowner has 
acted in a “willful or malicious” fashion, his or her immunity for the “act” of a 
permitted recreational user will not apply. 
But this unduly narrow construction of the fourth paragraph‟s references to 
“use[s]” and “activit[ies]” finds no support in the statutory language.  By its terms, 
the fourth paragraph‟s withdrawal of immunity for “willful or malicious” conduct 
by the landowner broadly extends to all failures to “guard or warn against a 
13 
dangerous condition, use, structure or activity.”  (§ 846, 4th par.)  Nothing in this 
phrase suggests it is limited to those particular “act[s]” of a third person to whom 
the landowner has given permission for recreational entry and use, though such a 
qualification could easily have been expressed.  And, as indicated above, the broad 
phrasing of the fourth paragraph‟s exception to immunity clearly implies that the 
immunity itself also extends not only to “condition[s]” of the land, but to “use[s]” 
and “activit[ies]” thereon — including those of the landowner. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the scenario to which the majority 
confines the fourth paragraph‟s withdrawal of immunity would ever occur.  If 
I understand the majority‟s position correctly, the withdrawal of immunity for 
“willful or malicious” failure to “guard . . . against” “use[s]” or “activit[ies]” on 
the land that injured a recreational user would apply only in the almost 
inconceivable case where the landowner “willful[ly] or malicious[ly]” failed to 
prevent a recreational user, whom the landowner had permitted to enter, from 
injuring another person on the land.  Such a circumstance is so unlikely in real life 
that it stretches credulity to believe the Legislature was focused on it. 
Moreover, contrary to the majority‟s analysis, the third paragraph of section 
846 supports, rather than undermines, my reading of the statute.  The third 
paragraph states, inter alia, that merely by giving permission to enter and use the 
property for recreational purposes, the landowner does not thereby grant “the 
person to whom permission has been granted the legal status of an invitee or 
licensee to whom a duty of care is owed . . . .”  (§ 846, 3d par., italics added.)  The 
obvious purpose of this provision is to equate the statutory immunity against a 
permissive recreational user, who might otherwise be entitled to greater common 
law protection as “an invitee or licensee,” with that afforded in the case of a 
recreational trespasser.  By using the broad, unqualified term “a duty of care” 
(ibid., italics added) to describe the extent of this immunity, the statutory language 
14 
strongly suggests that a landowner simply owes no duty of care (other than to 
refrain from “willful or malicious” conduct) to prevent injury to uninvited, 
nonpaying persons, whether trespassers or “permittee[s],” who enter and use the 
land for recreational purposes (id., 4th par.). 
The majority concedes that the legislative history of section 846 is sparse, 
and further acknowledges that the Legislative Counsel‟s summary of the original 
1963 bill (bill “provides that an owner of an estate in real property is not liable for 
injuries to people who enter upon his land for various recreational purposes”) 
(Legis. Counsel, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 639 (1963 Reg. Sess.) July 5, 1963) 
suggests an intent to create a blanket immunity for injuries arising from a 
landowner‟s negligence.  Nonetheless, the majority insists its narrower view of the 
intended immunity finds support in the legislative history of the 1980 amendment 
to section 846. 
I do not agree.  One example cited by the majority simply parrots the 
statutory phrase “keep the premises safe.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 1966 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 11, 1980, p. 1.)  As 
I have indicated above, this language does not necessarily track the narrower term 
of art “premises liability.”  Moreover, at least some of the 1980 legislative 
documents, while reciting the statutory language, state interchangeably that the 
statute “exempts an owner of any estate in real property from liability to 
recreational users of his premises.”  (E.g., Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Bill Digest, 
Assem. Bill No. 1966 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 11, 1980, p.  2.)  
This broader language suggests a blanket immunity for all injuries negligently 
caused by a landowner to a nonpaying, uninvited person on the property for 
recreational purposes. 
The majority suggests that if the Legislature meant to immunize a 
landowner against all injuries sustained by a nonpaying, uninvited recreational 
15 
user of the property as the result of the landowner‟s negligence, it could simply 
have stated that rule in so many words.  But given the ample indicia that the 
Legislature did intend to immunize both conditions and activities, if not “willful or 
malicious,” its failure to set forth the rule with the grammatical exactitude the 
majority proposes cannot be dispositive. 
The majority also speculates that by applying the immunity only to physical 
conditions, and not to “use[s]” and “activit[ies],” the Legislature sought to strike a 
reasonable balance between landowners and recreational users of land.  The 
premise of this theory is that if the statute absolved landowners of liability for their 
negligent conduct toward those on the property for recreational purposes, persons 
would be discouraged from using private lands for recreation, contrary to the 
purpose of section 846. 
But there are two responses to this line of reasoning.  First, as the 
Legislature must have understood, the greater a landowner‟s potential exposure to 
liability for injuries to nonpaying, uninvited recreational users, the greater is his or 
her incentive to discourage or prohibit such use.  Second, as this court has 
previously made clear, section 846 also justly applies to landowners who do 
discourage recreational entry and use of their unsuitable property.  As indicated, 
that unsuitability may arise as much from the owner‟s activities on the property 
that are incompatible with recreation, as from physical conditions thereon. 
The majority also posits that the Legislature may have sought to place a 
landowner and a recreational user of the land on an equal footing, such that each 
owes a similar duty of care to refrain from injurious conduct when they are jointly 
engaged in activities on the property.  The majority offers no evidence for this 
equal-footing theory.  Moreover, as previously indicated, it flies in the face of the 
policies we have said underlie section 846.  First, the statute seeks to encourage a 
landowner to permit outsiders to enter and use the land for recreational purposes, 
16 
even though (1) the recreational users have no right to enter for this purpose, and 
(2) the owner has the absolute right to exclude them.  Second, the statute seeks to 
protect a landowner who does exercise his or her absolute right to discourage 
recreational entry — perhaps because the owner‟s own use of the land is 
incompatible with safe recreation by outsiders — from unjust exposure to tort 
liability when an outsider nonetheless enters for purposes of recreation and is 
injured while on the property. 
Neither of these objectives is served by placing a landowner, and a 
recreational user who enters the land without right or permission, on an equal 
footing with respect to their respective activities on the land.  Instead, as the 
Legislature undoubtedly concluded, the landowner is entitled to protection for his 
or her own uses and activities when, as a result of the owner‟s mere negligence, a  
17 
 
nonpaying, uninvited person who has entered the property for recreational 
purposes suffers injury. 
For all these reasons, I am strongly persuaded that section 846 provides 
immunity both for negligent property maintenance by a landowner, and for 
negligent active conduct by the owner on the property, when a resulting danger 
causes injury to a nonpaying, uninvited person who is present for recreational 
purposes.  I believe the majority‟s contrary holding seriously misconceives the 
legislative purpose and undermines the public policy reflected in section 846. 
Accordingly, I would respond to the Ninth Circuit‟s request for clarification 
of California law by concluding that Civil Code section 846 does shield a 
landowner from liability to a nonpaying, uninvited recreational user for personal 
injury resulting from the negligent driving of the landowner‟s employee acting in 
the course and scope of employment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
CONCUR: 
 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Klein v. United States of America 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX (on certification pursuant to rule 8.548, Cal. Rules of Court) 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S165549 
Date Filed: July 26, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Santiago Rodnunsky & Jones, David G. Jones and Tamara S. Fong for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Thomas P. O‟Brien, United States Attorney, Leon W. Weidman, Julie Zatz, Jonathan K. Klinck and Anoiel 
Khorshid, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold and Frederick D. Baker for Pacific Gas & Electric Company, Southern 
California Edison Company, Southern California Gas Company and San Diego Gas & Electric Company as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Randolph Cregger & Chalfant and Joseph P. Mascovich for Union Pacific Railroad Company as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
David G. Jones 
Santiago Rodnunsky & Jones 
5959 Topanga Canyon Boulevard, Suite 220 
Woodland Hills, CA  91367 
(818) 884-3400 
 
Julie Zatz 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Federal Building, Suite 7516 
300 North Los Angeles Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 894-7349