Case Title: State v. Jenne

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.



                                No. 89-409


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
William A. Jenne                             Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

                                             October Term, 1990



Frank G. Mahady, J.

William H. Sorrell, Chittenden County State's Attorney, Burlington, and Gary
  S. Kessler and Rosemary Hull, Department of State's Attorneys, Montpelier,
  for plaintiff-appellee

Walter M. Morris, Jr., Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
  Attorney, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant



PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
          Specially Assigned



     GIBSON, J.   Pursuant to V.R.A.P. 5(b), defendant appeals from the
trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to
strike the jury panel.  We conclude that the jury-selection procedures in
Chittenden County do not violate defendant's constitutional or statutory
rights, and, accordingly, answer the question certified by the trial court
     in the negative. (FN1)
                                   I.
     Defendant is charged with causing bodily injury to another with a
deadly weapon, in violation of 13 V.S.A. { 1024(a)(2).  On April 26, 1989,
he filed a pretrial motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to strike the
jury panel on grounds that Chittenden County's jury-selection process
violates his rights under (1) the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, (2) Chapter I, articles 7, 10 and 12, and
Chapter II, {{ 28 and 38 of the Vermont Constitution, and (3) the jury-
selection statutes (4 V.S.A. {{ 952-953) and jury-selection rules 1 and 3.
     Evidentiary hearings were held on April 28, May 10 and 15, 1989.
Based upon the evidence presented, the trial court made the following
findings.  A pool of 237 potential jurors was generated from voter regis-
tration and licensed drivers lists.  Defendant's evidence drew statistical
comparisons between the pool and Chittenden County's population with regard
to age, occupation, marital status, and gender.  Data on the jury pool was
gathered from the returned juror questionnaires.  The general population
figures were derived from the 1980 census, updated where appropriate by
reliable Department of Health estimates.
     With regard to age, the following categories were used: 18 to 24; 25 to
34; 35 to 44; 45 to 54; 55 to 64; and 65 to 69.  The trial court found that
no significant statistical disparities exist for the age groupings between
25 and 64.  Both the top and bottom age categories, however, were found to
have sociologically significant statistical disparities: 3.6% of the
County's population is in the 65-to-69 category, compared to 8.9% of the
pool, an overrepresentation of 5.3%; in contrast, the 18-to-24 age grouping
represents 24.1% of the County population, but only 12.7% of the pool, an
underrepresentation of 11.4%.  Nevertheless, the court concluded that
insufficient evidence existed to warrant classifying any of the age
categories as distinctive groups within the community.
     With regard to occupation, the evidence was incomplete.  Only 131 of
the 237 people in the jury array reported their occupations in a manner use-
ful to defendant's experts and those occupations were organized into very
broad categories.  Significant statistical disparities were nevertheless
found in several categories.  The managerial and administrative category
represents 12.9% of the population, but 21.4% of the pool, an
overrepresentation of 8.5%.  Machine operators, fabricators, and laborers
represent 13.5% of the county population, but 5.3% of the pool, an
underrepresentation of 8.2%.  The court concluded the disparities were of
limited usefulness, however, because of the poor quality of the data and the
very broad nature of the occupational categories.  With respect to
educational attainment, the trial court found no significant statistical
disparities.
     The trial court found statistical disparities with respect to marital
status.  Single people represent 33.9% of the population, but only 22.4% of
the pool, an underrepresentation of 11.5%.  Married people comprise 55.3%
of the county population and 68.8% of the panel, an overrepresentation of
13.5%. (FN2) The trial court concluded, on the evidence presented, that these
disparities would be sociologically significant only in a few "family-core"
types of cases.
     Finally, with regard to gender, 51.2% of the County is female, compared
to 59.1% of the pool, an overrepresentation of 7.9%.  In contrast, 48.8% of
the county population is male, whereas 40.5% of the jury array is male, an
underrepresentation of 8.3%.  The trial court concluded that the statistical
disparities for gender are sociologically significant.
     Based upon these findings, the trial court held that (1) the proposed
categories for age, occupation, and marital status do not constitute
"distinctive groups," (2) gender is a "distinctive group," but the dispar-
ities were not sufficient to preclude a "fair and reasonable" representation
and there was no "systematic exclusion" of males or females from voters or
drivers lists, and (3) 4 V.S.A. { 953(a) was not violated because this was
the first jury chosen from a new jury pool combining both drivers' license
and voter registration lists.  The trial court subsequently granted defend-
ant's motion for permission to file an interlocutory appeal, pursuant to
V.R.A.P. 5(b).
     On appeal, defendant argues (1) that his rights under the Sixth
Amendment and the Vermont Constitution to a jury drawn from a fair cross-
section of the community are violated by the underrepresentation of young
people, blue-collar workers and less-well-educated individuals, single
people, and males; (2) that the evidence establishes a failure to take great
care to avoid jury partiality, in violation of the Vermont Constitution,
Chapter II, { 38; and (3) that the underrepresentation of young people
violates his rights under Vermont's jury-selection statutes. (FN3) We address
defendant's arguments seriatim.  Initially, however, we must address the
propriety of the interlocutory appeal.
                                   II.
     The instant case is one of forty-four that were under appeal
simultaneously.  All of them present the same certified question.  On our
own motion, we dismissed the other forty-three on grounds that a decision
on the question presented would not materially advance termination of the
litigation.  See V.R.A.P. 5(b)(3).  We denied the State's subsequent motion
to dismiss this case, however.  In its brief, the State renews its argument
that interlocutory appeal is inappropriate herein.
          Under Rule 5(b), the defendant must show three elements
          to obtain an interlocutory appeal: (1) the ruling to be
          appealed must involve a controlling question of law; (2)
          there must be a substantial ground for difference of
          opinion on that question of law; and (3) an immediate
          appeal must materially advance the termination of the
          litigation.

State v. Wheel, 148 Vt. 439, 440,