Case Title: State ex rel. Conkle v. Sadler

Citation: 2003-Ohio-4124

Docket Number: 20022190

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Conkle v. Sadler, 99 Ohio St.3d 402, 2003-Ohio-4124.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CONKLE ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. SADLER, JUDGE, ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Conkle v. Sadler, 99 Ohio St.3d 402, 2003-Ohio-4124.] 
Prohibition — Writ prohibiting common pleas court judge and common pleas 
court magistrate from proceeding on a contempt motion involving a case 
that was dismissed — Court of appeals’ dismissal of complaint affirmed. 
(No. 2002-2190 — Submitted May 13, 2003 — Decided August 20, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 02AP-438, 2002-
Ohio-6104. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
In July 2001, Applied Performance Technologies, Inc. (“APT”) 
filed a complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.  APT claimed 
that appellant Eric Conkle, a former employee, had breached a noncompetition 
agreement.  APT sought damages and injunctive relief against Conkle.  Conkle 
retained the law firm of Ferron & Associates, L.P.A., and appellant attorney John 
W. Ferron to represent him in the APT lawsuit.  Appellee Judge Lisa L. Sadler, 
then with the common pleas court,1 was assigned to preside over the case. 
{¶2} 
On July 30, 2001, upon agreement of the parties in the APT case, 
Judge Sadler entered a protective order.  In this agreed protective order, Judge 
Sadler directed that “[a]ll documents containing or reflecting confidential material 
which are produced in discovery by any party or nonparty in this action in 
accordance with this Protective Order shall be used solely in connection with this 
judicial proceeding and shall not be used for any other purposes except as 
                                                 
1 Judge Sadler was subsequently elected to the Court of Appeals for Franklin County. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
otherwise ordered by this Court.”  Judge Sadler further ordered that “[w]ithin 
sixty (60) days of the entry of the final order concluding this judicial proceeding, 
all confidential documents; any copies, summaries, and abstracts thereof, or notes 
relating thereto, shall be returned to the producing party or non-party, except as 
otherwise ordered by the Court.”  Parties retained their rights to seek modification 
of the protective order and to object to discovery believed to be improper.  
Pursuant to this agreed protective order, APT designated certain discovery 
depositions to be confidential. 
{¶3} 
On August 15, 2001, in accordance with Civ.R. 41(A), APT 
voluntarily dismissed its case against Conkle. 
{¶4} 
In October 2001, APT moved for a common pleas court order for 
Conkle and Ferron to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of the 
July 30, 2001 agreed protective order.  APT claimed that Conkle had violated the 
protective order in September 2001 by sending an electronic-mail message 
containing quotes from two of the confidential discovery depositions.  APT 
further contended that Ferron had violated the protective order in that same month 
by quoting excerpts from the depositions in a memorandum in federal district 
court.  Conkle and Ferron opposed APT’s contempt motion by arguing that 
because APT had voluntarily dismissed its case, the common pleas court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the postdismissal motion.  Conkle and Ferron then moved 
to dismiss further proceedings in the case based on their jurisdictional claim. 
{¶5} 
In March 2002, Judge Sadler overruled the motion to dismiss.  
Judge Sadler reasoned that despite the voluntary dismissal of the case, the 
common pleas court retained jurisdiction to determine whether Conkle and Ferron 
were guilty of criminal contempt for violating the agreed protective order.  Judge 
Sadler ordered that appellee Magistrate Harold Paddock of the common pleas 
court conduct a hearing on APT’s contempt motion. 
January Term, 2003 
3 
{¶6} 
Shortly thereafter, Conkle and Ferron filed a complaint in the 
Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  They requested writs of prohibition and 
mandamus to prevent Judge Sadler and Magistrate Paddock from proceeding on 
APT’s contempt motion in the underlying case.  Judge Sadler and Magistrate 
Paddock moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. 
{¶7} 
In November 2002, the court of appeals granted appellees’ motion 
and dismissed appellants’ complaint for writs of prohibition and mandamus.  This 
cause is now before the court upon Conkle’s and Ferron’s appeal as of right. 
{¶8} 
Conkle and Ferron assert that the court of appeals erred in 
dismissing their prohibition2 claim.  The Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal of appellants’ 
prohibition complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
was justified if, after presuming the truth of all factual allegations of the 
complaint and making all reasonable inferences in appellants’ favor, it appeared 
beyond doubt that appellants could prove no set of facts entitling them to the 
requested extraordinary writ of prohibition.  State ex rel.  Ragozine v. Shaker,  96 
Ohio St.3d 201, 2002-Ohio-3992, 772 N.E.2d 1192, ¶ 7.  “In the absence of a 
patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject matter 
jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging that 
jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.”  State ex rel. Shimko v. 
McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 426, 428-429, 751 N.E.2d 472. 
{¶9} 
Conkle and Ferron assert that they are entitled to the writ because 
Judge Sadler and Magistrate Paddock patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction over APT’s postdismissal contempt motion.  For the following 
reasons, appellants’ assertion lacks merit. 
                                                 
2 In their brief to this court, Conkle and Ferron limit their argument to their prohibition claim and 
do not address the court’s dismissal of their mandamus claim.  Therefore, dismissal of their 
mandamus claim is not before this court. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶10} Courts may consider collateral issues like criminal contempt even 
after the case in which the contempt arose has been terminated.  Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp. (1990), 496 U.S. 384, 396, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359; 
State ex rel. Corn v. Russo (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 556, 740 N.E.2d 265. 
{¶11} Moreover, a protective order that on its face survives the 
underlying litigation continues to be effective even after the underlying case has 
been dismissed.  See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co. (C.A.10, 
1990), 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (“As long as a protective order remains in effect, the 
court that entered the order retains the power to modify it, even if the underlying 
suit has been dismissed”); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc. (C.A.1, 1988), 
858 F.2d 775, 781-782.  In rejecting appellants’ claim in a federal suit that Judge 
Sadler’s protective order expired with the dismissal of APT’s underlying case, 
Judge Holschuh observed: 
{¶12} “In this case, on its face, the protective order at issue survives the 
termination of the underlying litigation.  Not only did it specifically state that 
confidential documents were not to be used for any purpose other than that 
judicial proceeding, but it also stated that all confidential material was to be 
returned to the producing party within sixty days after entry of a final order in that 
case.  This language clearly imposes obligations meant to survive the termination 
of the action.  If the parties were free to disclose confidential information upon 
dismissal of a case, protective orders would cease to fulfill their intended purpose 
which is to encourage full disclosure of all relevant information.  The Franklin 
County Court of Common Pleas retained jurisdiction to modify the protective 
order and, if Plaintiffs wished to use deposition testimony subject to that order in 
support of their memorandum in opposition, they should have sought 
modification of that order from the issuing court.”  Yates v. Applied Performance 
Technologies, Inc.  (S.D.Ohio 2002), 205 F.R.D. 497, 501. 
January Term, 2003 
5 
{¶13} Finally, the mere fact that APT’s contempt motion was filed after 
the dismissal does not necessitate finding that the trial court patently and 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over it.  The court and the parties agreed that 
the court would retain jurisdiction over the order’s enforcement, given the specific 
language used.  See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. (1990), 496 U.S. 384, 393-
395, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (holding that a district court retains 
jurisdiction to impose sanctions even after a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the 
action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41[a],). 
{¶14} Based on the foregoing, it appears beyond doubt that Judge Sadler 
and Magistrate Paddock did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction 
over APT’s contempt motion.  Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of 
appellants’ prohibition claim.  By so holding, we need not decide the 
jurisdictional claim, because our review is limited to whether Judge Sadler and 
Magistrate Paddock patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction.  State ex rel. 
Hummel v. Sadler, 96 Ohio St.3d 84, 2002-Ohio-3605, 771 N.E.2d 853, ¶ 32. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Ferron & Associates, L.P.A., John W. Ferron and Elizabeth M. Strautz, for 
appellants. 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Jane 
Martin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
__________________