Case Title: CONDRA v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
CONDRA v. STATE2004 WY 131100 P.3d 386Case Number: 03-158Decided: 11/04/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

RUSSELL 
CONDRA,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Hot Springs County

The 
Honorable Gary Hartman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Ken Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel. 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Daniel M. 
Fetsco, Assistant Attorney General. 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and WALDRIP, 
DJ.

 

 

KITE, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Russell Condra 
sold two snowmobiles and a trailer he was storing for a friend and was convicted 
of larceny by bailee.  Mr. Condra 
appeals his conviction claiming the prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
vouched for his own credibility and the credibility of his witnesses, suggested 
he would not have charged Mr. Condra with a crime unless Mr. Condra had done 
something wrong, relied on facts which were not in evidence, and attempted 
improper impeachment of Mr. Condra through the use of a prior conviction, 
thereby denying Mr. Condra a fair trial.  
We agree and reverse and remand for a new trial.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Both parties 
agree the sole issue for review is whether Mr. Condra was denied a fair trial 
due to prosecutorial misconduct.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      In July of 1999, 
Danny Cifers moved to Arizona and left two snowmobiles and a trailer with Mr. 
Condra, who agreed to store the machines and attempt to sell them.  Over two years later, in September of 
2001, Mr. Condra sold the snowmobiles and trailer for $1,700 to Kelly Donathan, 
but did not tell Mr. Cifers about the sale.  

 

[¶4]      When Mr. Cifers 
arrived in Thermopolis in late November 2001 to pick up his snowmobiles and 
trailer, Mr. Condra told him the snowmobiles were with a prospective buyer and 
would not be back for a couple of days.  
Mr. Cifers became suspicious and contacted the police, who located the 
snowmobiles and trailer at the home of Mr. Donathan.  The State charged Mr. Condra with 
larceny by bailee in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(b) and (c)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2003), and although he claimed he sold the snowmobiles for late 
monthly storage fees, the jury found him guilty as charged on March 14, 
2003.  The court sentenced Mr. 
Condra to a term in the state penitentiary for a period of two to four (2-4) 
years, but suspended that sentence contingent upon his successful completion of 
five (5) years supervised probation.  

 

 

 

[¶5]      Our standard for 
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct is well settled.  As we stated in Simmons v. State, 
2003 WY 84, ¶15, 72 P.3d 803, ¶15 (Wyo. 2003),

 

[p]rosecutorial 
misconduct 
"has always been condemned in this state." Whether such misconduct has been 
reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.A.P. 9.04, 
or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 9.05, this Court 
has focused on whether such error affected the accused's "substantial 
rights."  The accused's right to a 
fair trial is a substantial right. "Before we hold that an error has affected an 
accused's substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a conviction, we must 
conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable possibility exists that, 
in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
accused." 

 

(citations 
omitted). The appellant bears the burden of establishing prosecutorial misconduct. 

 

[¶6]      Mr. Condra claims 
three distinct incidents of prosecutorial misconduct at different stages of the 
trial.  Because Mr. Condra did not 
object at trial to two of the incidents, it is incumbent upon him to demonstrate 
plain error as to those instances of alleged misconduct.  "Plain error exists when 1) the record 
is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was 
denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him."  Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶23, 
63 P.3d 875, ¶23 (Wyo. 2003).  

 

[¶7]      Mr. Condra did 
object at trial to the third instance of alleged misconduct.  We, therefore, review that incident for 
harmless error.  Wyoming Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 9.04 states that "any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the 
reviewing court."  Wyoming Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 52(a) and Wyoming Rule of Evidence 103(a) contain similar 
provisions.  The test for harmless error is as 
follows: 

An 
error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might 
have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred. To 
demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under 
"circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice or conduct which 
offends the public sense of fair play. 

Dysthe, 
¶10 (citation omitted).

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

Vouching 
for Credibility and Ignoring the Burden of Proof 

 

[¶8]      Mr. Condra 
contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing argument 
first by using his position as an officer of the court to boost his own 
credibility, as well as the credibility of the State's witnesses, and second, by 
urging the jury to ignore the presumption of innocence and, thus, the State's 
burden of proof.  The State insists 
the prosecutor did not vouch for the State's witnesses or assert his own 
credibility as a basis for conviction, and actually urged the jury to carefully 
review each witness's credibility.

 

[¶9]      The prosecutor 
argued as follows during his rebuttal closing 
argument:

 

Defense 
counsel told you at the beginning of trial this would be a he said she said 
situation, and it really is.  And 
all I have to sell you today is my credibility and that being an officer of 
this court, the credibility of my witnesses.  Now as an officer of this court it's my 
duty to seek justice.  It's not 
about prosecuting people, it's not about throwing them in jail.  If what Mr. Condra did wasn't wrong, 
then we wouldn't be here today.  

 

[¶10]   Mr. Condra did not object to this 
argument at trial, so our review is confined to plain error.  
The incident alleged as error in this instance is clearly 
set forth in the record and, as such, the first requirement of our plain error 
standard is met.  Thus, our focus 
will be on the second and third elements of plain error.

 

[¶11]   We have often recognized the clear 
and unequivocal rule of law that a prosecuting attorney cannot personally vouch 
for the credibility of the State's witnesses.  Harper v. State, 970 P.2d 400, 
403 (Wyo. 1998).  Furthermore, it is 
well established that a prosecutor cannot assert his or her 
own 
credibility as a basis for conviction of defendants. Browder v. 
State, 639 P.2d 889, 893 (Wyo. 1982).  
As we explained in Barela v. State, 787 P.2d 82, 83-84 (Wyo. 1990) 
(citation omitted), 

 

[w]hen the 
prosecutor asserts his credibility or personal belief, an additional factor is 
injected into the case. This additional factor is that counsel may be perceived 
by the jury as an authority whose opinion carries greater weight than their own 
opinion; that members of the jury might be persuaded not by the evidence, but 
rather by a perception that counsel's opinions are correct because of his 
position as prosecutor, an important state official entrusted with enforcing the 
criminal laws of a sovereign state. While the prosecutor is expected to be an 
advocate, he may not exploit his position to induce a jury to disregard the 
evidence or misapply the law.

 

 

[¶12]   As the State points out, the 
propriety of any comment within a closing argument is measured in the 
context of the entire argument.  
Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo. 2000).  The State contends that, when viewed in 
context, the prosecutor's remarks were a proper response to defense counsel's 
argument and reminded the jury that witness credibility was a key issue.  Defense counsel had argued the 
prosecutor was doing what should have been civil work on the State's dime, and 
was also working to conceal unlawful confiscation of the snowmobiles by law 
enforcement.  The State argues the 
prosecutor merely explained why his witnesses were credible.   

 

[¶13]   While the prosecutor's review of 
the testimony of his witnesses was certainly appropriate, it does not excuse the 
prosecutor's unabashed claim that those witnesses were credible because he was 
credible.  Irrespective of whether 
in response to defense arguments or not, a prosecuting attorney simply cannot 
vouch for the credibility of the State's witnesses.  White v. 
State, 
2003 WY 163, ¶28, 80 P.3d 642, 
¶28 (Wyo. 2003).   Stating that 
all he had to "sell" to the jury was "my credibility and that being an officer 
of this court, and the credibility of my witnesses" crossed the very clearly 
established line for prosecutors.  

 

[¶14]   The prosecutor's transgression in 
this case is similar to that found to be improper in Dysthe, ¶28.  That prosecutor 
argued:

 

These 
witnesses, despite the fact that they are users, were credible. They were very 
credible. They were more credible because of the very fact that they have a 
relationship with this Defendant. More credible because, if you couldn't tell, I 
certainly could; they didn't like me asking them questions. They didn't want to 
be telling me anything.

 

He also 
stated he had worked with investigators on the case and could "guarantee" that 
their investigations were not "arbitrary," and that the witnesses "had no reason 
to lie." Id.  This Court held 
those statements improperly gave the clear impression that the prosecutor 
believed the witnesses and so should the jury.    
  

 

[¶15]   In this instance, the prosecutor's 
comments are even more egregious than in Dysthe.  Even though this prosecutor, at the 
end of his rebuttal closing argument, asked the jury to give "serious 
consideration as to the weight and credibility of every witness who testified," 
we cannot overlook the prosecutor's unequivocal vouching for the credibility of 
"his" witnesses, and then tying their credibility to his own as an "officer of 
this court."  Doing so satisfies the 
second element of plain error.  The 
third element is also satisfied because the prosecutor's comments denied Mr. 
Condra's substantial right to have the jury decide his guilt or innocence based 
on the facts, not on the prosecutor's improper comments.  See Dysthe, ¶31.  

 

[¶16]   Mr. Condra also claims the 
prosecutor improperly urged the jury to ignore the presumption of innocence and 
the proper burden of proof when he stated, "If what Mr. Condra did wasn't wrong, 
we wouldn't be here today."  The 
State asserts this comment was a reasonable response to defense counsel's 
argument that the case was a civil matter that was being improperly prosecuted 
as a crime.  We 
disagree.

 

[¶17]   A basic premise of our criminal law 
system is that the burden of proof rests upon the State and never shifts.  Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1066 
(Wyo. 2000).  A prosecutor is not 
permitted to inhibit the right to a presumption of innocence through closing 
argument.  Stephens v. 
State, 
774 P.2d 60, 75 (Wyo. 1989).  As we did in 
Lafond v. 
State, 2004 WY 51, ¶36, 89 P.3d 324, ¶36 (Wyo. 2004), we note 
"jurors recognize the prosecutor's role as a leader of law enforcement in 
their community; they naturally regard the prosecutor as a symbol of authority; 
that recognition and regard may impress a jury, causing jurors to give 
significant weight to the words of a prosecutor."  By telling the jury, "If what Mr. Condra 
did wasn't wrong, we wouldn't be here today," the prosecutor told the jury to 
disregard the presumption of innocence.  
This is a clear violation of the rule of law that a defendant is presumed 
innocent until the State proves otherwise and denied Mr. Condra his right to a 
fair trial. 

 

[¶18]   The evidence of Mr. Condra's guilt 
presented by the State in this case was not overwhelming and Mr. Condra 
presented a plausible defense to the charges, contending he was entitled to sell 
the snowmobiles and trailer to cover storage costs.  Therefore, we conclude a reasonable 
probability existed that but for the prosecutor's comments, the verdict might 
have been more favorable to Mr. Condra.  
Thus, we hold the prosecutor's improper arguments were plain 
error.

 

 

Arguing 
Facts Not in Evidence

 
[¶19]   Mr. Condra claims prosecutorial 
misconduct also occurred during closing argument when the prosecutor relied on 
evidence that was not admitted at trial.  
Again, we must consider "the prosecutor's argument in its entirety, not 
just the sentences and phrases taken out of context."  Lafond, ¶33.  Also, because Mr. Condra lodged no 
objection, we again apply the plain error standard to this claim. 

 

[¶20]   In his closing argument the 
prosecutor discussed how to register certain trailers in Wyoming and then argued 
Mr. Condra had provided false information to the county clerk to do so.  His comments were as 
follows:

 

Now 
through the course of the trial I made a little bit of a fuss with Mr. Condra 
regarding a trailer registration.  
You might wonder why I did that.  
Well, in Wyoming, to register a trailer under a thousand pounds you don't 
have to show proof of ownership to get it licensed, all you have to do is go 
into the Treasurer's office and purport to them that you own that trailer, and 
that's the little yellow sheet of paper that I had out yesterday.  It got entered into evidence so you will 
be able to take a look at it a little more closely when you go to the jury 
room.

 

But 
on that piece of paper it's got a little box and it says PUR slash ADD 
date.  It's got a little box under 
it.  That box says June 1, 
2000.  When Mr. Condra went in to 
get that snowmobile trailer licensed he reported to the Treasurer's office that 
he bought that snowmobile trailer on that date.  That's how he got it licensed.  He didn't have to show any proof, all he 
did was have to give them his word of how he had bought that snowmobile trailer 
on that date.

 

However, no 
evidence regarding that licensing procedure was ever introduced.  The prosecutor did cross-examine Mr. 
Condra on how he obtained license plates for the trailer and the following 
exchange occurred:

 

[Prosecutor]: 
That's the document you received when you went to get the plates on the trailer; 
is that right?

 

[Mr. 
Condra]: That's correct.

 

[Prosecutor]: 
Okay.  And also on that  hold onto 
your glasses for a second  also under  on that document  would you put your 
glasses back on, please  [it's] a purchase and it says PUR/APP date; is that 
right? It's towards the top.

 

[Mr. 
Condra]: [That] says 6-1-00.

 

[Prosecutor]: 
It says 6-1-00, which is June 1, 2000.  
You didn't provide any proof of ownership when you got the plates for 
that license  or that trailer; is that correct?

 

[Mr. 
Condra]: No, no the date it was issued was 10-10-01.

 

[Prosecutor]: 
Right, but you didn't  at that point in time you didn't have to provide any 
proof of ownership of the trailer to get this license; did 
you?

 

[Mr. 
Condra]: I don't remember, but I went into the Clerk's office and explained 
everything to her.  She said this 
was not a title, this was just plates.

 

[Prosecutor]: 
Right.

 

[Mr. 
Condra]: So that's what she did, she just licensed it for 
me.

 

[Prosecutor]: 
Right.  But the date on there that 
you just read is the purchase date that you conveyed to the Clerk's office to 
get that title; is that right?

 

[Mr. 
Condra]: I didn't convey my purchase, I just brought this  this was issued on 
10-10-01.

 

[Prosecutor]: 
But you had to convey to the Clerk's office that you owned that particular 
trailer to be able to license it; is that right, whether you provided proof of 
ownership or not?

 

[Mr. 
Condra]: No, I explained everything about how the property had been left on my 
property and I said I just need to get plates on it.  She gave me this and she said this is 
not a title, this is just a license to the trailer.

 

[Prosecutor]: 
Right.  But that date you just read 
is June 1, 2000; is that right?

 

[Mr. 
Condra]: Yeah, but I don't understand what that means.

 

[Prosecutor]: 
Okay.

 

[Mr. 
Condra]: I know the date issued was 10-10-01.

 

[¶21]   The 
prosecutor's cross examination of Mr. Condra regarding the purchase date 
recorded on the trailer's registration was clearly intended to reveal he had 
deceived the county clerk.  However, 
Mr. Condra explicitly denied that he claimed ownership in order to get the 
trailer licensed, and no evidence concerning the procedure for licensing the 
trailer was introduced.  Thus, the 
prosecutor's comments were not reasonable inferences  they were new, additional 
facts introduced by way of closing argument.  

 

[¶22]   Wide latitude is allowed in 
discussing inferences to be drawn from the evidence Shaffer 
v. State, 640 P.2d 88, 106 (Wyo. 1982).  However, prosecutors 
must limit their closing arguments to commenting on the evidence.  White, 
¶28.  

 

[¶23]   While we find the prosecutor's 
comments troubling, they are not sufficient by themselves to warrant 
reversal.  However, those comments, 
when combined with the prosecutor's improper vouching for his own credibility 
and his witnesses' credibility, and his statement that if Mr. Condra had not 
done anything wrong, there would have been no prosecution, convince us a 
reasonable probability exists that Mr. Condra's right to a fair trial was 
affected and he should be granted a new trial.  See Simmons v. State, 
2003 
WY 84, 72 P.3d 803 (Wyo. 2003).

 

[¶24]   Mr. Condra draws our attention to 
another statement by the prosecutor, which he claims relies on facts not in 
evidence.  The prosecutor implied 
that Mr. and Mrs. Condra and Mr. Donathan conspired to perjure themselves, 
stating:

 

All that 
we have presented before us today, ladies and gentleman on his behalf, after a 
year and a half of preparing for this case is a letter and an attachment.  We don't even know if they are 
legitimate.  He showed us  but he 
did show us how him and his wife and his friend can all get up on the stand to 
testify as to how the machines were acquired.  They were acquired through some money 
owed for storage, that's why he came into possession of them.  Well, let's use our common sense.  How many times do you think the three of 
them have talked about this case since it's been pending in 
2001?

 

[¶25]   A prosecutor may make a reasonable 
inference that a witness is not truthful if the evidence supports that 
inference.  "In the case where a 
prosecutor is commenting on witness credibility, i.e., calling the defendant a 
liar, we have upheld such comment when the evidence supports a reasonable 
inference that the defendant is a liar."  
McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 754 (Wyo. 1993).  

 

[¶26]   Indeed, Mr. Donathan testified that 
he and Mr. Condra were acquaintances at the time he purchased the snowmobiles, 
but had since become friends.  
Contrary to Mr. Condra's claims, the prosecutor did not suggest the 
witnesses had committed perjury but only that Mr. Donathan and Mr. Condra were 
friends and had probably discussed the matter before trial.  The prosecutor's statement in this 
instance does not rise to the level of prosecutorial 
misconduct.

 

 

[¶27]   Mr. Condra argues the prosecutor 
committed prosecutorial misconduct when he improperly introduced previously 
undisclosed and unsubstantiated character evidence against Mr. Condra in front 
of the jury.  During 
cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:

 

[Prosecutor]: 
And you lived in Texas for a number of years; is that 
right?

 

[Mr. 
Condra]: Thirty-eight years, I guess, something like that.

 

[Prosecutor]: 
While you were living in Texas you were convicted of fraud; is that right, for 
writing some bad checks?

 

[Mr. 
Condra]: No, I wasn't.

 

[Defense 
Counsel]: Objection, I need foundation for this.

 

The 
Court: Counsel, do you have any foundation?

 

[Prosecutor]: 
Other than he was living in Texas and at that point in time he had been 
convicted of fraud.

 

 [Mr. Condra]:  No, I hadn't, Your 
Honor.

 

The 
Court: Just a minute.  Counsel, I 
think we need to take a short recess here.  
Counsel, join me in chambers.  

 

Ladies 
and gentlemen, let's take 10 minutes.

 

In chambers, 
the court and counsel held the following conversation:

The 
Court: We're outside the hearing of the jury panel.  Present are Counsel for the State, 
Counsel for the Defendant.  

 

The 
Court [to prosecutor]:  What kind of 
information do you have about previous convictions of the 
Defendant?

 

[Prosecutor]: 
I have a letter that's been sent from Texas to either law enforcement or our 
office.  All it is, though, Your 
Honor, it is a copy of Texas record, it's not a certified copy.  But it does list that he was convicted 
of fraud for a bad check and I believe it goes towards his truthfulness for 
character, as it is a fraud charge.

 

The 
Court: How recent?

 

[Prosecutor]: 
1984, but I believe that anything that goes towards the truthfulness of 
character can go beyond a 10 year time period.

 

The 
Court: Has [Defense Counsel] seen this?

 

[Prosecutor]: 
I'm not sure if it was given to him in his discovery packet or not, if I can 
find the dang thing.

 

[Defense 
Counsel]: Well, there's several problems with the document.  It's not a certified copy or 
anything.  It isn't a fraud charge 
it says he was convicted of the issuance of a bad check, that's not necessarily 
a fraud charge that's been alleged here.  
I think basically the question would prejudice the jury at this point. 

 

[Prosecutor]: 
Your Honor, I will agree that it is not a certified copy, but writing a bad 
check does constitute fraud, and that's what this  if you would like to look at 
the paperwork.

 

The 
Court: Counsel, I don't need to look at it.  I think you're injecting some things in 
here that number one, first wasn't shown to the Defendant, and number two, while 
you may try to impeach this particular individual you will need something more 
than a mere letter to do that with.  
So I'm not going to allow that.

 

[Prosecutor]: 
Okay.  I'll stop from questioning 
him regarding it.

 

[¶28]   Following the meeting in chambers, 
the court did not address the matter in front of the jury, nor did defense 
counsel request the court give a curative instruction.  After trial, defense counsel filed a 
motion for a new trial based on the prosecutor's improper attempt to impeach Mr. 
Condra with the alleged Texas conviction.  
The court denied the motion for new trial, and found that Mr. Condra had 
not been prejudiced. 

 

[¶29]   The State admits the prosecutor did 
not provide notice to defense counsel of his intent to impeach Mr. Condra in 
contravention of W.R.E. 609(b).1  However, the State contends any error 
was harmless.  An error must be 
"injurious or prejudicial" to warrant reversal, and it is the burden of the 
party appealing to establish the injurious or prejudicial nature of the 
error.  Spilman v. State, 633 P.2d 183 (Wyo. 1981).  We have said 
that for an error to be regarded as harmful, there must be a reasonable 
possibility that in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more 
favorable to the defendant.  
Roderick 
v. State, 858 P.2d 538, 550 (Wyo. 1993): 
White v. State, 2003 WY 163, ¶7, 80 P.3d 642, ¶7 (Wyo. 2003).  In support of its position that any 
error was harmless, the State cites Jones v. State, 735 P.2d 699 (Wyo. 
1987) in which we held that improper questioning of a defendant charged with 
attempted robbery regarding her previous arrest for misdemeanor disturbing the 
peace, was harmless because the reference to the arrest was momentary and not 
the subject of extensive inquiry by the prosecutor, and the evidence 
establishing the defendant's guilt was relatively strong.   

 

[¶30]   The present case is distinguishable 
from Jones.  Although the 
improper character reference here, as in Jones, was momentary, the 
reference was to a conviction, not an arrest.  It is settled law in this jurisdiction 
that mere charges, 
accusations and arrests are consistent with innocence.  Schmunk 
v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 730 (Wyo. 1986). 
Convictions, 
however, are not.  Therefore, a reference to a 
conviction is far more damaging than a reference to an arrest.  Furthermore, 
although the court sustained the objection to the prosecutor's attempt to use 
the conviction, it did so out of the presence of the jury and no curative 
instruction was given.   As a 
result, this Court has no way of knowing whether or not the jury considered the 
alleged Texas conviction in its deliberations.  Because the evidence of Mr. Condra's 
guilt was not overwhelming, we conclude the prosecutor's improper attempt to use 
the alleged Texas conviction could have affected the outcome of the trial, and 
was, therefore not harmless error. 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶31]   The cumulative effect of the 
prosecutor's misconduct in this case affected Mr. Condra's right to a fair trial 
and warrants a reversal.  Looking at 
all of the incidents combined, a reasonable probability exists that, absent the 
prosecutor's misconduct, the verdict might have been more favorable to Mr. 
Condra.  We cannot know whether the 
conviction resulted from the jury's independent evaluation of the evidence 
or from the jury having been swayed by the prosecutor's errors.  See Earl, ¶17, Schmunk, 
714 P.2d  
at 743.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment and remand the case for a new trial.

 

FOOTNOTES

1W.R.E. 609 (b) provides that evidence of a conviction more than ten years 
old is inadmissible unless the proponent gives the adverse party sufficient 
advance notice in writing of the proponent's intent to use such evidence.