Case Title: Jenkins v. Director, Va. Ctr. for Behavior Rehab.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 050374

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
JIM MURROW JENKINS 
 
v.  Record No. 050374 
OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
 
 
                   January 13, 2006 
 
DIRECTOR OF THE VIRGINIA CENTER 
FOR BEHAVIORAL REHABILITATION 
 
UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
I. 
 
 
The primary issue that we consider in this habeas corpus 
proceeding invoking this Court's original jurisdiction is 
whether petitioner, who was committed to an institution 
pursuant to Virginia's Sexually Violent Predators Act, is 
entitled to effective assistance of counsel during the appeal 
of the civil commitment judgment. 
II. 
 
Jim Murrow Jenkins, petitioner, was convicted in the 
Accomack County Circuit Court in 1994 of one count of forcible 
sodomy, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count 
of carnal knowledge.  He received a sentence of 10 years, and 
he was released on parole in October 1999. 
Subsequently, Jenkins was convicted of a sexual offense 
in Maryland and his parole was revoked.  He was returned to 
the custody of the Virginia Department of Corrections. 
 
2
 
On October 9, 2003, the Department of Corrections 
notified the Attorney General that Jenkins qualified for 
consideration under the Virginia Sexually Violent Predators 
Act.  Petitioner, who was scheduled to be released from prison 
on October 31, 2003, had scored a four or five on the Rapid 
Risk Assessment for Sexual Offender Recidivism Test, and he 
had predicate convictions of one count of forcible sodomy and 
two counts of aggravated sexual battery. 
The Attorney General filed a petition seeking commitment 
of Jenkins as a sexually violent predator.  Pursuant to former 
Code § 37.1-70.7 that was in effect at the time of 
petitioner's incarceration, the circuit court was required to 
conduct a hearing to determine whether there was probable 
cause to continue to hold Jenkins in prison beyond his 
scheduled release date, pending the outcome of a trial under 
the Sexually Violent Predators Act.1  A probable cause hearing 
was scheduled for October 28, 2003.  That morning, Jenkins 
obtained a shaving razor and mutilated himself by cutting his 
testicles and flushing them in the toilet. 
 
The Attorney General requested that the circuit court 
detain Jenkins in prison until the date of the rescheduled 
                     
1 Former Code § 37.1-70.7 was repealed, along with all the 
other provisions of title 37.1 of the Code, effective October 
1, 2005.  See 2005 Acts ch. 716.  Code § 37.2-906, effective 
 
3
probable cause hearing.  Jenkins objected, and the court 
refused to do so.  Jenkins was released from custody of the 
Department of Corrections on October 31, 2003.  The circuit 
court scheduled a probable cause hearing for November 17, 
2003, and ordered Jenkins to appear. 
 
Jenkins appeared at the probable cause hearing, and at 
the conclusion of the Attorney General's evidence, the circuit 
court ruled that probable cause existed to believe that 
Jenkins was a sexually violent predator.  The circuit court 
entered an order that placed Jenkins in the custody of the 
Department of Corrections. 
 
At the conclusion of a trial, the circuit court held that 
Jenkins was a sexually violent predator and that no lesser 
restrictive alternative to full commitment existed.  Jenkins 
was placed in the custody of the Commissioner of the 
Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance 
Abuse Services. 
 
On February 12, 2005, Jenkins filed a notice of appeal 
from the circuit court's judgment.  However, his trial counsel 
failed to file timely trial transcripts as required by Rule 
5:11(a).  Consequently, this Court dismissed Jenkins' appeal. 
                                                                
October 1, 2005, addresses the subject matter previously 
covered in former Code § 37.1-70.7. 
 
4
Jenkins filed with the Clerk of this Court a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of the Virginia 
Center for Behavioral Rehabilitation.  We placed this 
proceeding on our privileged docket, and we requested that 
counsel address the question whether petitioner was denied 
effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed 
to perfect his appeal of the civil commitment order.  
Additionally, petitioner challenges whether the circuit court 
had subject matter jurisdiction to commit him as a sexually 
violent predator because he was not incarcerated at the time 
of the probable cause hearing held pursuant to former Code 
§ 37.1-70.7. 
III. 
A. 
 
Former Code § 37.1-103,2 in effect when Jenkins filed his 
petition of habeas corpus, stated: 
 
"Any person held in custody as mentally ill may 
by petition for a writ of habeas corpus have the 
question of the legality of his detention determined 
by a court of competent jurisdiction.  Upon the 
petition, after notice to the authorities of the 
hospital or other institution in which such person 
is confined, the court shall in some courtroom of 
such county or city, or in some other convenient 
public place in such county or city determine 
whether such person is mentally ill and whether he 
should be detained." 
 
                     
2 Former Code § 37.1-103 has been repealed and replaced 
with Code § 37.2-844. 
 
5
 
Former Code § 37.1-104,3 in effect when Jenkins filed his 
petition for writ of habeas corpus, stated: 
 
"If the person mentioned in § 37.1-103 is held 
in custody and actually confined in any hospital or 
other institution, he may file his petition in the 
circuit court of the county or the city in which 
such hospital or other institution is located or in 
the circuit court of the county or the city 
adjoining the county or city in which such hospital 
or other institution is located." 
 
 
Former Code § 37.1-104.1,4 also in effect when Jenkins 
filed his petition for habeas corpus, stated: 
 
"In all cases, other than those provided for in 
§ 37.1-104, the person may file his petition in the 
circuit court of the county or the city in which he 
resides, or in which he was certified to be mentally 
ill, or in which an order was entered authorizing 
his retention for continued hospitalization, 
pursuant to Chapter 2, Art. 1 (§ 37.1-63 et seq.) of 
this title." 
 
 
Code § 8.01-654 states in relevant part: 
"A.  1.  The writ of habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum shall be granted forthwith by the 
Supreme Court or any circuit court, to any person 
who shall apply for the same by petition, showing by 
affidavits or other evidence probable cause to 
believe that he is detained without lawful 
authority. 
"2.  A petition for writ of habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum, other than a petition challenging a 
criminal conviction or sentence, shall be brought 
within one year after the cause of action accrues.  
A habeas corpus petition attacking a criminal 
conviction or sentence, except as provided in 
§ 8.01-654.1 for cases in which a death sentence has 
                     
3 Former Code § 37.1-104 has been repealed and replaced 
with Code § 37.2-845. 
4 Former Code § 37.1-104.1 has been repealed and replaced 
with Code § 37.2-846. 
 
6
been imposed, shall be filed within two years from 
the date of final judgment in the trial court or 
within one year from either final disposition of the 
direct appeal in state court or the time for filing 
such appeal has expired, whichever is later. 
 
. . . . 
 
"[B.]2.  Such petition shall contain all 
allegations the facts of which are known to 
petitioner at the time of filing and such petition 
shall enumerate all previous applications and their 
disposition.  No writ shall be granted on the basis 
of any allegation the facts of which petitioner had 
knowledge at the time of filing any previous 
petition. . . . 
"3.  Such petition may allege detention without 
lawful authority through challenge to a conviction, 
although the sentence imposed for such conviction is 
suspended or is to be served subsequently to the 
sentence currently being served by petitioner." 
 
 
Contrary to the Director's assertions, Jenkins was not 
required to file his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 
circuit court where he was adjudicated as a sexually violent 
predator.  As we have repeatedly stated: 
"While in the construction of statutes the constant 
endeavor of the courts is to ascertain and give effect to 
the intention of the legislature, that intention must be 
gathered from the words used, unless a literal construction 
would involve a manifest absurdity.  Where the legislature 
has used words of a plain and definite import the courts 
cannot put upon them a construction which amounts to holding 
the legislature did not mean what it has actually expressed. 
 
Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 
S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990) (quoting Watkins v. Hall, 161 Va. 924, 
930, 172 S.E. 445, 447 (1934)); accord Davis v. Tazewell Place 
 
7
Associates, 254 Va. 257, 260-61, 492 S.E.2d 162, 164 (1997); 
Abbott v. Willey, 253 Va. 88, 91, 479 S.E.2d 528, 530 (1997).   
 
Applying this basic principle of statutory construction, 
we hold that Jenkins was entitled to file his petition with 
the Clerk of this Court.  There is simply no language in 
former Code § 37.1-104 that required Jenkins to file his 
petition for habeas corpus in the circuit court that 
adjudicated him as a sexually violent predator.  Additionally, 
Code § 8.01-654, which the Director does not discuss in his 
brief, authorizes the petitioner to file his petition for writ 
of habeas corpus in this Court.  Code § 8.01-654 also 
prescribes the statute of limitations and numerous requisites 
that a habeas corpus petitioner, including Jenkins, must 
satisfy. 
B. 
 
Former Code § 37.1-70.7,5 in effect during Jenkins' 
sexually violent predator proceedings, stated: 
"A.  Upon the filing of a petition alleging 
that a person is a sexually violent predator, the 
circuit court shall schedule a hearing within thirty 
days to determine whether probable cause exists to 
believe that the person named in the petition is a 
sexually violent predator.  A copy of the petition 
shall be personally served on the person named in 
the petition, his attorney, and his guardian or 
committee, if applicable.  In addition, a written 
explanation of the sexually violent predator 
                     
5 Former Code § 37.1-70.7 has been repealed and replaced 
with Code § 37.2-906. 
 
8
involuntary commitment process and the statutory 
protections associated with the process shall be 
given to the person at the time the petition is 
served. 
 
"B.  Prior to any hearing under this section, 
the judge shall ascertain if the person whose 
commitment is sought is represented by counsel, and 
if he is not represented by counsel, the judge shall 
appoint an attorney-at-law to represent him.  
However, if such person requests an opportunity to 
employ counsel, the court shall give him a 
reasonable opportunity to employ counsel at his own 
expense. 
 
"C.  At the probable cause hearing, the judge 
shall (i) verify the person's identity and (ii) 
determine whether probable cause exists to believe 
that the person is a sexually violent predator.  In 
the case of a prisoner in the custody of the 
Department of Corrections, if the judge finds that 
there is not probable cause to believe that the 
person is a sexually violent predator, the judge 
shall dismiss the petition and the person shall 
remain in the custody of the Department of 
Corrections until his scheduled date of release from 
prison.  In the case of a defendant, if the judge 
finds that there is not probable cause to believe 
the defendant is a sexually violent predator, the 
judge shall dismiss the petition and order that the 
defendant be released, committed pursuant to § 37.1-
67.3, or certified pursuant to § 37.1-65.1.  If the 
judge finds that probable cause exists to believe 
that the prisoner or defendant is a sexually violent 
predator, the judge shall order that the prisoner 
remain in the secure custody of the Department of 
Corrections or the defendant remain in the secure 
custody of the Department of Mental Health, Mental 
Retardation and Substance Abuse Services until a 
trial is conducted to determine whether he should be 
committed." 
 
 
As we have already stated, petitioner was released from 
the custody of the Department of Corrections on October 31, 
2003, and his probable cause hearing was conducted on November 
17, 2003, eighteen days after he was released.  Petitioner, 
 
9
relying upon Townes v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 234, 609 S.E.2d 1 
(2005), contends that at the time of the probable cause 
hearing, he was neither a prisoner nor a defendant and, thus, 
the circuit court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to 
conduct the civil commitment proceedings.  We disagree with 
petitioner's arguments. 
 
In Townes, we considered whether, pursuant to former Code 
§ 37.1-70.6(A), the Commonwealth could obtain a civil 
commitment of Lorenzo Townes as a sexually violent predator 
even though he had served his entire sentence for the 
necessary predicate "sexually violent offense."  Townes had 
been convicted of statutory rape and sentenced to 18 years in 
prison.  He finished serving this sentence in January 1991, 
but he remained in prison as a result of convictions for other 
crimes that were not sexually violent offenses.  269 Va. at 
237, 609 S.E.2d at 2. 
Townes was released from prison in April 2002 and granted 
parole.  He violated parole, and he returned to prison that 
same month to complete his remaining sentence.  In April 2003, 
the Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections 
notified the Commitment Review Committee that Townes, who was 
scheduled to be released from prison in August 2003, was 
subject to review for civil commitment because he had 
 
10
committed a sexually violent offense, and he had been 
identified through testing as likely to re-offend.  Id. 
 
The circuit court conducted a probable cause hearing as 
required by former Code § 37.1-70.7 and concluded that there 
was probable cause to believe that Townes was a sexually 
violent predator.  At the conclusion of a trial of the 
commitment petition, the circuit court found that Townes was a 
sexually violent predator, and he was committed to the custody 
of the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and 
Substance Abuse Services for appropriate treatment and 
confinement in a secure facility.  269 Va. at 237-39, 609 
S.E.2d at 2-3. 
 
Reversing the judgment of the circuit court, we held that 
Townes could not be subjected to the involuntary civil 
commitment process under the sexually violent predator 
statutes because former Code §§ 37.1-70.4 and -70.5 required 
that a prisoner must have been serving an active sentence for 
a sexually violent offense at the time he was identified as 
being subject to the Sexually Violent Predators Act.  269 Va. 
at 240-41, 609 S.E.2d at 4. 
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, we did not hold in 
Townes that the circuit court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to adjudicate Townes' status as a sexually 
violent predator.  Rather, we held that the circuit court 
 
11
erred by declaring that Townes was a sexually violent predator 
because the Commonwealth failed to establish one of the 
necessary statutory predicates – that Townes was a prisoner 
serving an active sentence for a sexually violent offense when 
he was identified as being subject to the former Sexually 
Violent Predators Act. 
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's power to 
adjudicate a class of cases or controversies, and this power 
must be granted through a constitution or statute.  Nelson v. 
Warden, 262 Va. 276, 281, 552 S.E.2d 73, 75 (2001); Morrison 
v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 169, 387 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1990); 
Humphreys v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 765, 772-73, 43 S.E.2d 890, 
894 (1947); Farant Investment Corp. v. Francis, 138 Va. 417, 
427-28, 122 S.E. 141, 144 (1924).  Subject matter jurisdiction 
cannot be waived or conferred on a court by the litigants and 
the lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any 
time.  Nelson, 262 Va. at 281, 552 S.E.2d at 75; Morrison, 239 
Va. at 169-70, 387 S.E.2d at 755-56.  Additionally, any 
judgment rendered by a court without subject matter 
jurisdiction is void ab initio.  Nelson, 262 Va. at 281, 552 
S.E.2d at 75; Morrison, 239 Va. at 170, 387 S.E.2d at 755-56. 
Clearly, in the present case, the circuit court that 
heard Jenkins' probable cause hearing and adjudicated his 
status as a sexually violent predator had subject matter 
 
12
jurisdiction to make these determinations.  The former 
Sexually Violent Predators Act conferred subject matter 
jurisdiction upon the circuit courts to adjudicate the class 
of cases involving the involuntary commitment of alleged 
sexually violent predators.  Petitioner ignores the numerous 
statutory grants of authority that the former Act conferred 
upon the circuit courts.  For example, the former Act required 
that the Attorney General file all petitions for involuntary 
commitments against alleged sexual predators in the circuit 
court where the prisoner was last convicted of a sexually 
violent offense or where the defendant was deemed unrestorably 
incompetent.  See former Code § 37.1-70.6.  Additionally, the 
former Act prescribed numerous procedures for involuntary 
commitment proceedings in the circuit courts.  
C. 
 
Jenkins argues that pursuant to the due process clauses 
of the federal constitution and the Constitution of Virginia, 
he is entitled to counsel during the involuntary commitment 
process for sexually violent predators.  Jenkins asserts that 
he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because 
trial counsel failed to perfect an appeal from the order of 
involuntary commitment in the manner provided by law.  
Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a belated appeal of 
that order. 
 
13
 
Responding, the Director states that Jenkins does not 
have a constitutional right to an appeal and, hence, he has no 
right to counsel during the appellate phase of a civil case.  
The Director also contends that even if Jenkins has a right to 
effective assistance of counsel, he was not prejudiced because 
of trial counsel's failure to file an appeal in the manner 
prescribed by law.  We disagree with the Director. 
 
We stated in Townes: 
"It cannot be seriously disputed that a person 
subjected to an involuntary civil commitment 
proceeding has a substantial liberty interest in 
avoiding confinement in a mental hospital.  Zinermon 
v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 131 (1990).  'Civil 
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant 
deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
protection.'  Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 
(1979)." 
 
269 Va. at 240, 609 S.E.2d at 4.  Additionally, the United 
States Supreme Court has stated: 
"We have recognized that for the ordinary 
citizen, commitment to a mental hospital produces 'a 
massive curtailment of liberty,' Humphrey v. Cady, 
405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972), and in consequence 
'requires due process protection.' Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); O'Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (BURGER, C. J., 
concurring).”   
 
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980). 
 
The Supreme Court has also held that: 
"There is a substantial liberty interest in avoiding 
confinement in a mental hospital.  See Vitek v. 
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-492 (1980) (commitment to 
mental hospital entails ' "a massive curtailment of 
 
14
liberty," ' and requires due process protection); 
Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. at [584,] 600 [(1979)] 
(there is a 'substantial liberty interest in not 
being confined unnecessarily for medical 
treatment'); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 
(1979) ('Civil commitment for any purpose 
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty 
that requires due process protection')." 
 
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 131 (1990). 
 
We also recognize that an individual who is the subject 
of a proceeding under Virginia's Sexually Violent Predators 
Act has a substantial liberty interest in avoiding 
confinement.  Indeed, the subject of a civil commitment 
proceeding commenced pursuant to this Act may be confined for 
his natural life.  Additionally, a person who is adjudicated 
as a sexually violent predator may be compelled to accept 
medical treatment against his will. 
 
Even though involuntary civil commitment is a significant 
deprivation of liberty to which federal and state procedural 
due process protections apply, persons subject to these 
commitment proceedings do not enjoy the same rights attendant 
to a criminal proceeding.  See e.g., Jones v. United States, 
463 U.S. 354, 367-68 (1983).  However, the Supreme Court in 
Vitek identified certain minimal standards that federal due 
process guarantees to a respondent in an involuntary civil 
commitment proceeding:  a hearing at which evidence is 
presented and the respondent is provided a chance to be heard 
 
15
and to present documentary evidence as well as witnesses; the 
right to confront and to cross-examine government witnesses at 
the hearing except upon a showing of good cause; an 
independent decision maker; a written, reasoned opinion; and 
effective and timely notice of the pendency of the hearing and 
of these rights. 
A plurality of the Supreme Court concluded in Vitek that 
federal due process required that an indigent civil commitment 
respondent have representation by an attorney, Justice Powell 
expressly disagreed, and the remaining Justices did not 
consider the issue because they believed the controversy was 
moot.  We agree with the plurality in Vitek that: 
"A prisoner thought to be suffering from a mental 
disease or defect requiring involuntary treatment 
probably has a [great] need for legal assistance, 
for such a prisoner is more likely to be unable to 
understand or exercise his rights.  In these 
circumstances, it is appropriate that counsel be 
provided to indigent prisoners whom the State seeks 
to treat as mentally ill." 
 
Vitek, 445 U.S. at 496-97. 
We hold that in view of the substantial liberty interest 
at stake in an involuntary civil commitment based upon 
Virginia's Sexually Violent Predators Act, the due process 
protections embodied in the federal and Virginia Constitutions 
mandate that the subject of the involuntary civil commitment 
process has the right to counsel at all significant stages of 
 
16
the judicial proceedings, including the appellate process.  
Accord, Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 976 (2nd 
Cir. 1983); In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370, 1375-76 (D.C. Cir. 
1971); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968); 
Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F.Supp. 278, 292 (D. Md. 1979); Dorsey 
v. Solomon, 435 F.Supp. 725, 733 (D. Md. 1977); Stamus v. 
Leonhardt, 414 F.Supp. 439, 446 (S.D. Iowa 1977); Suzuki v. 
Quisenberry, 411 F.Supp. 1113, 1129 (D. Haw. 1976); Lynch v. 
Baxley, 386 F.Supp. 378, 389 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne 
County General Hospital, 384 F.Supp. 1085, 1093 (E.D. Mich. 
1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.Supp. 1078, 1097-99 (E.D. 
Wis. 1972); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F.Supp. 966, 972 
(M.D.Pa. 1971); Honor v. Yamuchi, 820 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Ark. 
1991); Pullen v. State, 802 So. 2d 1113, 1119 (Fla. 2001); In 
re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 489 (Fla. 1977); In re Simons, 698 
P.2d 850, 851 (Mont. 1985); People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 
217 N.E.2d 636, 636 (N.Y. 1966); Rashid v. J. B., 410 N.W.2d 
530, 532 (N.D. 1987); McDuffie v. Berzzarins, 330 N.E.2d 667, 
669 (Ohio 1975); Ex parte Ullmann, 616 S.W.2d 278, 283 (Tex. 
App. 1981). 
 
We also hold that Jenkins has a constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel during the proceeding in which 
he was adjudicated a sexually violent predator, and on appeal 
from that adjudication.  Thus, Jenkins’ claim of ineffective 
 
17
assistance of counsel must be evaluated under the standard set 
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  See 
Pope v. Alston, 537 So.2d 953, 956-57 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988) 
(subject of an involuntary commitment must show counsel was 
ineffective under Strickland); People v. Rainey, 758 N.E.2d 
492, 502-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (persons adjudicated under 
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act are entitled to 
effective assistance of counsel measured by the Strickland 
test); In re Crane, 704 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Iowa 2005) (claim of 
ineffectiveness of counsel by person involuntary committed 
under Sexually Violent Predator Act is measured by Strickland 
test); In re Alleged Mental Illness of Cordie, 372 N.W.2d 24, 
29 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (involuntarily commitment will not be 
overturned because of counsel’s ineffectiveness unless 
Strickland standard is satisfied); State of Texas for the Best 
Interest and Protection of H.W., 85 S.W.3d 348, 356 (Tex. App. 
2002) (subject of an involuntary commitment proceeding has the 
right to effective assistance of counsel as judged by the 
Strickland two-prong test); In re Smith, 72 P.3d 186, 190 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (person involuntarily committed as a 
sexually violent predator must establish both prongs of 
Strickland in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective 
counsel). 
 
18
Under Strickland, a habeas petitioner must first 
demonstrate that “counsel’s performance was deficient,” i.e., 
“that counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.”  466 U.S. at 687-88.  Second, a 
petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.”  Id. at 694.  These 
requirements are commonly referred to as the “performance” and 
“prejudice” prongs of the Strickland two-part test. 
 
The performance of Jenkins’ attorney was deficient.  By 
failing to perfect an appeal to this Court from Jenkins’ 
adjudication as a sexually violent predator, his counsel’s 
representation “fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.”  Id. at 688. 
The United States Supreme Court has held, and we agree, 
that “when counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance 
deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have 
taken, the defendant has made out a successful ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal.”  Roe 
v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000).  In this 
circumstance, prejudice is generally presumed.  See Miles v. 
Sheriff, 266 Va. 110, 116-17, 581 S.E.2d 191, 195 (2003) 
(“when a defendant . . . timely instructs counsel to file an 
appeal, . . . it would be unfair to find an absence of 
 
19
prejudice solely because the defendant failed to state, in a 
habeas corpus petition, the anticipated grounds of a belated 
appeal”); Hernandez v. United States, 202 F.3d 486, 489 (2nd 
Cir. 2000) (prejudice is presumed “where the alleged 
ineffective assistance lies in counsel’s unexcused failure to 
bring a direct appeal from a criminal conviction upon the 
defendant’s direction to do so”); Romero v. Tansy, 46 F.3d 
1024, 1030 (10th Cir. 1995) (“where a defendant claims that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to perfect an appeal, he 
must only satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test . . . 
prejudice is presumed”); Bonneau v. United States, 961 F.2d 
17, 17 (1st Cir. 1992) (the defendant, who lost his right of 
appeal due to his counsel’s deficient performance, was 
“entitled to a new appeal without first showing that there is 
a meritorious appellate issue”); Thomas v. O’Leary, 856 F.2d 
1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1988) (attorney’s failure to file a brief 
on behalf of a defendant “amounted to a complete denial of 
assistance of counsel during a critical stage” and defendant 
was not required to prove prejudice under the second prong of 
the Strickland test); Williams v. Lockhart, 849 F.2d 1134, 
1137 n.3 (8th Cir. 1988) (“deficient attorney performance in 
perfecting an appeal is prejudicial under” Strickland); 
Langston v. Arkansas, 19 S.W.3d 619, 621 (Ark. 2000) (“a 
presumption of prejudice aris[es] from the failure of counsel 
 
20
to perfect an appeal if counsel’s deficient performance led to 
the forfeiture of the convicted defendant’s right to pursue a 
direct appeal”); Montana v. Rogers, 32 P.3d 724, 729 (Mont. 
2001) (“when, but for counsel’s deficient performance, 
defendant would have appealed, such error is prejudicial”); 
Nebraska v. Trotter, 609 N.W.2d 33, 38 (Neb. 2000) (when 
defendant’s counsel failed to perfect an appeal, prejudice was 
presumed); Pennsylvania v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 801 (Pa. 
2005) (prejudice is presumed when counsel’s failure to file a 
required statement results in a waiver of all claims asserted 
on direct appeal); Washington v. Wicker, 20 P.3d 1007, 1009 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (“an attorney’s failure to file a 
requested notice of appeal is ‘professionally unreasonable’ 
[and t]he defendant need not make any additional showing of 
prejudice”). 
Courts have expressed various reasons for presuming 
prejudice when counsel’s deficient performance deprived a 
defendant of an appeal that the defendant otherwise would have 
pursued.  One explanation previously articulated by this Court 
in the context of post-conviction habeas relief is equally 
valid in this proceeding.  When ruling on a habeas petition 
asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failing to perfect an appeal, it is not an efficient use of 
judicial resources for this Court to examine the merits of a 
 
21
petitioner’s grounds of appeal in order to determine whether 
the petitioner satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland 
test.  It is better to grant a belated appeal and then permit 
the appellate court to consider petitioner’s claims of trial 
error. See Miles, 266 Va. at 117, 581 S.E.2d at 195; see also 
Abels v. Kaiser, 913 F.2d 821, 823 (10th Cir. 1990). 
IV. 
We conclude that Jenkins was entitled to file his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court.  We 
further conclude that Jenkins’ claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel must be measured by the Strickland standard and 
that, under the Strickland two-prong test, Jenkins established 
that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and 
should be granted a belated appeal. 
 
Accordingly, we will grant the writ of habeas corpus, and 
we will award Jenkins a belated appeal.  We note, however, 
that Jenkins will remain confined to a secure facility 
designated by the Commissioner of the Department of Mental 
Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services 
pending his appeal.  Additionally, Jenkins will remain subject 
to any statutory reviews set forth in the Virginia Sexually 
Violent Predators Act, Code § 37.2-900, et seq. 
Petition granted.