Case Title: Strawser v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., a Div. of Exxon Corp

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Strawser v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., a Div. of Exxon Corp1992 WY 176843 P.2d 613Case Number: 91-139Decided: 12/14/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
THOMAS J. 
STRAWSER and BARBARA STRAWSER, husband and wife, Petitioners

 
 
v.

 
 
EXXON COMPANY, 
U.S.A. a division of Exxon Corp., a New Jersey corporation, 
Respondent.

 
 
Juline Christofferson, 
Jackson, and 
Joseph E. Darrah, Powell, for petitioners. 

 
 
Marilyn S. Kite and Joe M. Teig of 
Holland & Hart, Cheyenne, and Charles G. Bakaly, Jr. and David M. Fox of 
O'Melveny & Myers, New York, New York, for respondent.  

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, 
CARDINE, URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 
*Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     In granting a petition 
for writ of certiorari in a case of first impression for Wyoming, we must decide 
whether petitioners' counsel is entitled to conduct ex parte interviews with a 
corporation's present and former employees in an action claiming defamation and 
invasion of privacy. In reaching our decision, we are invited to examine Rule 
4.2 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at law and the 
various "tests" adopted in other jurisdictions which govern adverse litigant ex 
parte discovery interviews with present and past corporate employees. 

 
 

[¶2.]     In considering the 
issue of this appeal, which presents a first impression for this court, we will 
not adopt the general standard used by the district court in entry of the 
completely preclusive protective order. We adopt the more limited standard of 
the "alter ego" or "binding admission" test established in Niesig v. Team 
I, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 559 N.Y.S.2d 493, 558 N.E.2d 1030 (1990) and find no 
general preclusion for contact with former employees. In re Environmental 
Ins. Declaratory Judgment Actions, 252 N.J.Super. 510, 600 A.2d 165 (1991). 

 
 
I. 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶3.]     In granting the 
petition for writ of certiorari to review the district court's protective order, 
we identified and the parties have addressed the following issues: 

 
 
1. Whether plaintiffs should be 
prohibited from conducting ex parte interviews with all past or present Exxon 
employees or contacting prospective interviewees unless notice to defendant 
Exxon Corporation is given and a person from the law firm of Holland & Hart 
is present at all times during the interview. 

 
 
2. Whether plaintiffs must produce 
all documents and statements obtained during ex parte interviews previously 
conducted by plaintiffs of Exxon employees and supervisors, such documents and 
statements to include all tapes, transcripts nd notes used to record such 
interviews. 

 
 
3. Whether plaintiffs Thomas 
Strawser and Barbara Strawser should be prohibited from discussing their lawsuit 
with any Exxon employee, past or present. 

 
 
4. Whether irreparable harm will 
result from the lower court's holding. 

 
 
II. FACTS AND 
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

 
 

[¶4.]     Thomas J. Strawser 
(Strawser) went to work for the Exxon Company, U.S.A. (Exxon) 
as a chemical engineer in 1981.  In 
February 1985, Strawser was assigned to Exxon's gas dehydration facility near 
LaBarge in Sublette County, 
Wyoming, where he served in a 
supervisory capacity as a field foreman and senior engineer.  However, in September 1989, following 
Exxon's implementation of a revised drug and alcohol policy which reclassified 
certain employment positions on the basis of safety considerations, Strawser was 
transferred to a similar but "non-designated"1 supervisory position at an Exxon 
facility in Campbell County, Wyoming.

 
 

[¶5.]     On August 21, 1990, 
Strawser and his wife, Barbara, filed a complaint against Exxon, Larry Kennedy 
and Weldon W. Whitaker2 alleging invasion of privacy and 
defamation. In effect, the Strawsers' complaint alleged that Exxon's 1989 
implementation of an "ill-advised" and "reactionary" alcohol and drug policy 
following a oil tanker catastrophe in Alaska 
(the Exxon "Valdez" oil spill incident) as well as the acts 
of various Exxon employees in publicly disclosing Strawser's confidential 
history of alcohol abuse defamed Strawser and violated the Strawsers' rights to 
privacy. 

 
 

[¶6.]     As part of discovery, 
the Strawsers' counsel and a hired investigator began informally interviewing 
various Exxon employees.3 In response, on April 8, 1991, 
Exxon filed a motion for a total protective order under the stated basis of 
W.R.C.P. 26(c) (now W.R.C.P. 26(d)) to prohibit the Strawsers, their counsel and 
the investigator from conducting ex parte interviews with all current and former 
Exxon managers and employees. 

 
 

[¶7.]     Following a hearing,4 the district court generally 
granted the relief Exxon requested in its motion. In its written order, the 
district court stated: 

 
 
Defendant Exxon Corporation's Motion 
for Protective Order prohibiting Plaintiffs from conducting ex parte interviews 
with Exxon managers and employees having come on for hearing before this Court 
on May 3, 1991, and Plaintiffs appearing by their attorneys, Joseph E. Darrah 
and Juline Christofferson, and Defendant Exxon Corporation appearing by one of 
its attorneys, Joe M. Teig, and Defendants Kennedy and Whitaker appearing by 
their attorney, Robert B. Ranck, and the Court having heard the argument of 
counsel and having considered the Briefs and the Court being otherwise fully 
advised in the premises; 

 
 
IT IS ORDERED: 

 
 
1. Defendant Exxon Corporation's 
Motion for Protective Order prohibiting Plaintiffs from conducting ex parte 
interviews with Exxon managers and employees is hereby granted. 

 
 
2. Plaintiffs be and they hereby 
prohibited from conducting further unauthorized ex parte interviews with Exxon 
employees and managers, past or present. 

 
 
3. Any interviews by the Plaintiffs 
of Exxon employees and managers, past or present shall be conducted only after 
notice to Defendant Exxon Corporation and opportunity for a person from the law 
firm of Holland & Hart being present at all times during the interview. 

 
 
4. Plaintiffs shall within thirty 
(30) days from the date of this Order produce all documents and statements 
obtained during ex parte interviews previously conducted by Plaintiff of Exxon 
employees and managers, such documents and statements to include all tapes, 
transcripts and notes used to record such interviews. 

 
 
5. Plaintiffs Thomas Strawser and 
Barbara Strawser are prohibited from discussing their lawsuit with any Exxon 
employees, past or present. 

 
 
6. In the event someone refuses to 
talk with Exxon attorneys present, Plaintiffs are precluded from talking with 
those people. 

 
 
7. Plaintiffs shall not call the 
prospective interviewees first and advise them as to what Plaintiffs are 
interested in asking them and then calling the Exxon attorneys. Such conduct 
will be deemed an ex parte communication in violation of this Order. 

 
 
8. The times and places of the 
interviews will have to be at the mutual convenience of everyone concerned. 

 
 
9. The Court reserves a ruling with 
regard to the admissibility of evidence obtained by Plaintiffs during previous 
ex parte interviews with Exxon employees and managers. 

 
 

[¶8.]     Following issuance of 
the protective order, the Strawsers moved for reconsideration. Following denial 
by the district court, the Strawsers petitioned the Wyoming Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari, which we granted, for review of the district court's 
decision. 

 
 
III. 
DISCUSSION

 
 
A. Standard of Review 

 
 

[¶9.]     In petitioning for a 
writ of certiorari in this case, the Strawsers contend that the district court 
erred by entering an inequitable protective order and seek a remedy of annulment 
or vacation of the district court's order.  
Our normal standard for reviewing protective orders in the discovery 
stage of a legal proceeding is well established In Farrell v. Hursh Agency, 
Inc., 713 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Wyo. 1986), we stated: 

 
 
The rule is that the trial court has 
broad discretion in controlling discovery. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 
Wyo., 641 P.2d 1247 (1982). This broad discretion has been applied in the specific area of 
protective orders.  Penthouse 
International Ltd. v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 663 F.2d 371, 391 (2d Cir. 
1981). 

 
 
In ANR Production Co. v. Wyoming 
Oil and Gas Conservation Com'n, 800 P.2d 492, 496 (Wyo. 1990), we considered 
a district court's exercise of discretion under an "abuse of discretion" 
standard: 

 
 
A discretional decision by a 
district court will only be reversed upon a showing of abuse of discretion. 
"Abuse of discretion has as its anchor point the query of 'whether the court 
could reasonably conclude as it did.'" Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544, 549 
(Wyo. 1990) 
(quoting Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579, 583 Wyo.1986)). 

 
 

[¶10.]  This decision does not present the usual 
discretion review since examination of the standard for corporate employee 
contact in an investigative interview encompasses a legal decision which we 
address without deference to the trial court.  True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil 
Corp., 771 P.2d 781 Wyo. 1989). For this subject, previously 
unaddressed by this court, we discern that the proper ex parte corporation 
employee interview rule is different from the standard the district court 
embraced. Consequently, the appropriate rule is established by this court as a 
question of law.  City of 
Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199 (Wyo. 1991). Accordingly, 
any exercise of discretion by the district court is limited by rules of law 
which are a responsibility of this court for the finite decision.  Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431, 433 
(Wyo. 1987). 

 
 
B. Applicable Rule of Lawyer Conduct 

 
 

[¶11.]  The primary focus of Rule 4.2 of 
Wyoming's Rules of Professional Conduct is to identify limitations for a 
litigant's contact with corporate employees.5

 
 
Rule 4.2. Communication with person 
represented by counsel. 

 
 
In representing a client, a lawyer 
shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be 
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent 
of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶12.]  When a corporation is a "party" in a 
lawsuit, the question arises as to whether current and/or former employees of 
the corporation qualify as represented "parties" under Rule 4.2. Subsection [2] 
of the official comment6 to Rule 4.2 assists in this 
inquiry: 

 
 
[2] In the case of an organization, 
this Rule prohibits communications by a lawyer for one (1) party concerning the 
matter in representation with persons having a managerial responsibility on 
behalf of the organization, and with any other person whose act or omission in 
connection with that matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of 
civil or criminal liability or whose statement may constitute an admission on 
the part of the organization. If an agent or employee of the organization is 
represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel 
to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 
3.4(f). 

 
 

See Action Air Freight, Inc. v. 
Pilot Air Freight Corp.,  769 F. Supp. 899, 902 (E.D.Pa. 
1991).

 
 

[¶13.]  It is obvious from the record that the 
Strawsers, Exxon and the district court discovered a unsettled area of Wyoming 
law (to say nothing of the multifarious split in authority across the country)7 when Exxon moved for the protective 
order which is at issue in this certiorari proceeding.  Although the district court's order 
prohibited informal interviews with both current and former Exxon employees, we 
distinguish between past and present employment status and will consider each 
separately. 

 
 
C. Standard for Current Employees 

 
 

[¶14.]  In support of its motion for a protective 
order, Exxon contended in briefing that counsel for Strawsers breached an 
attorney's ethical limitations pursuant to Rule 4.2 by conducting ex parte 
interviews with at least two Exxon managers and numerous other non-managerial 
Exxon employees. Exxon relied primarily upon a federal magistrate's order 
denying a plaintiff's motion to compel in Johnson v. Celsius Energy Co., 
1989 WL 260153 (D.Wyo. 1989) (No. C88-0227-B, decided 3/13/89). In 
Johnson, the magistrate found "no authority on the point from any court 
in Wyoming, 
and indeed finds little guidance from any other jurisdiction on how to draw the 
line between employees who fall within the protection of Rule 4.2 and those who 
do not." Id., Order on Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Compel, 3. Quoting from Mills Land and Water Co. v. Golden West Refining Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 116, 230 Cal. Rptr. 461, 467-68 
(1986),8 the magistrate noted "'it is best 
to draw a clear and unequivocal line--opposing counsel should not have ex parte 
contacts concerning a subject of controversy with the employees of a corporate 
party to the controversy.'" Order on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel, 3-4. 
Consequently, the magistrate in Johnson concluded that Rule 4.2 
prohibited all ex parte contacts with current and former corporate 
employees. The magistrate's "blanket" order did provide, however, that informal 
interviews of current and former employees could be arranged with the 
participation and cooperation of outside counsel for the opposing party.9

 
 

[¶15.]  The Strawsers countered the Exxon motion 
by arguing that counsel had at all times conducted themselves in accordance with 
the purposes of Rule 4.2. They maintained that the two Exxon employees referred 
to by Exxon as having "managerial responsibility" were, instead, merely 
"supervisors" since the two had not had immediate or direct managerial control 
over Strawser. Within this factual scenario, the Strawsers asserted that the 
district court should adopt the "managerial-speaking test" in Wright by 
Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 192, 691 P.2d 564 (1984) in order 
to identify those Exxon employees that counsel should be entitled to interview 
ex parte See also Fulton v. Lane, 829 P.2d 959 (Okl. 1992). 

 
 

[¶16.]  As is obvious from the recitation of the 
district court's protective order, the court did not cite any legal authority to 
support its conclusion prohibiting ex parte interviews with all present and 
former Exxon employees. The district court also failed to provide supporting 
authority for requiring the Strawsers to produce all documents, statements, 
tapes and notes from previously conducted interviews. It would appear from the 
result that the district court actually embraced Exxon's "bright line" argument 
for a "blanket" prohibition on all ex parte interviews of corporate employees by 
opposing litigants or their counsel. We do not find persuasive justification for 
this court's adoption of that extreme rule, which actually finds little case law 
support. Cf.  Fulton, 829 P.2d  at 
960. 

 
 

[¶17.]  The Strawsers and Exxon essentially adopt 
the same arguments that were made to the district court below and we are favored 
in the present stage of this proceeding with comprehensive briefing and oral 
argument.  The Strawsers contend 
that their ex parte interviews did not breach the ethical duty imposed by Rule 
4.2 since statements made by those employees interviewed do not constitute 
admissions pursuant to W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D). The Strawsers also insist that, 
under Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S. Ct. 677, 66 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1981), attorney-client privilege only protects 
communications--and not 
underlying facts. Thus, they maintain that their interviews did not 
violate Rule 4.2 since the scope of the ethical rule differs significantly from 
that of the privileged communication rule. As before, the Strawsers again 
suggest that the appropriate "test" for Wyoming's Rule 4.2 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct is the "managerial-speaking test" found in Wright by 
Wright, 103 Wash. 2d 192, 691 P.2d 564. 

 
 

[¶18.]  Arguing in support of the district 
court's protective order, Exxon identifies three primary reasons why all ex 
parte interviews should be prohibited in this case: (1) at least two of the 
Strawsers' interviews were with managers in direct violation of Rule 4.2; (2) it 
is likely that some of the Exxon employees interviewed could "bind" Exxon; and 
(3) opposing counsels' "willingness" to probe into privileged matters.  Citing (among other cases) Public 
Services Elec. and Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Services, Ltd. 
(AEGIS), 745 F. Supp. 1037 (D.N.I. 1990),10 Exxon asserts that the district 
court was justified in imposing a complete "blanket" ban on ex parte contacts 
with Exxon's employees.11

 
 

[¶19.]  In addition to the "blanket" and 
"managerial-speaking" tests submitted by the parties for consideration, 
different jurisdictions have adopted several other approaches to assist in 
identifying who is a "party" for Rule 4.2 purposes within the corporate 
context.  For example, several 
federal courts have adopted a case-by-case "balancing" approach to determine 
whether good cause exists for entry of a protective order prohibiting opposing 
counsel from communicating with a corporate party's employees.  Mompoint v. Lotus Development 
Corp., 110 F.R.D. 414 (D.Mass. 1986); see also Morrison v. Brandeis 
University, 125 F.R.D. 14 (D.Mass. 1989). "Courts applying the balancing 
test * * * look to the degree to which ex parte communication is needed to 
unearth relevant information, the danger of generating evidentiary admissions 
against the corporation under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D), and the 
degree to which 'effective representation of counsel' requires that the 
corporation's counsel be present at interviews." Stephen M. Sinaiko, Ex Parte 
Communication and the Corporate Adversary: A New Approach, 66 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 
1456, 1489-90 (1991) (footnotes omitted). 

 
 

[¶20.]  A relatively small number of courts have 
employed a "control group" test. See, e.g., Fair Automotive Repair, Inc. v. 
Car-X Service Systems, Inc., 128 Ill.App.3d 763, 84 Ill.Dec. 25, 471 N.E.2d 554 (1984). The "control group" approach essentially bans ex parte 
communications with only the most highly placed agents in an organization; the 
"control group" is defined as "those top management persons who had the 
responsibility of making final decisions and those employees whose advisory 
roles to top management are such that a decision would not normally be made 
without those persons' advice or opinion or whose opinions in fact form the 
basis of any final decision." Id. at 560. 

 
 

[¶21.]  Finally, other courts have adopted what 
has variously been referred to as the "alter ego" or "binding admission" test 
See Sinaiko, supra, 66 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at 1484-87; Hodson, 
Annotation, supra, 50 A.L.R.4th at 14 (Supp. 1992). In Niesig v. Team 
I, 559 N.Y.S.2d  at 498 (emphasis added), the court 
stated:

 
 
The test that best balances the 
competing interests, and incorporates the most desirable elements of the other 
approaches, is one that defines "party" to include corporate employees whose 
acts or omissions in the matter under inquiry are binding on the corporation (in 
effect, the corporation's "alter egos") or imputed to the corporation for 
purposes of its liability, or employees implementing the advice of counsel. 
All other employees may be interviewed informally. 

 
 

See also Frey v. Department of 
Health and Human Services,  106 F.R.D. 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); and 
State v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 247 N.J.Super. 314, 589 A.2d 180 (1991). 

 
 

[¶22.]  In Niesig, the court applied a 
variation of the "managerial-speaking" test found in Wright by Wright, 
103 Wash. 2d 192, 691 P.2d 564. Niesig, 559 N.Y.S.2d  at 499. Further, the 
Niesig majority disclaimed any reliance on the official commentary to 
Rule 4.2 even though the dispositive result resembles what is suggested by the 
commentary to the rule. Id. at 499 n.6. 

 
 

[¶23.]  Research indicates that application of 
the Niesig "alter ego" or "binding admission" test to answer Rule 4.2 
questions in the corporate setting seems to be gaining support across the 
country. See, e.g., Dent v. Kaufman,  185 W.Va. 171, 406 S.E.2d 68 (1991). In 
Dent, the West Virginia Supreme Court applied the Niesig test and 
found that the protective order issued by the circuit court was "far too broad." 
Id. at 
73 The appellate court concluded that the lower court misapplied Rule 4.2. In 
issuing a writ of prohibition, the appellate court concluded that the lower 
court had a choice of narrowing its order to conform with the 
Niesig/"alter ego" approach or, in the alternative, abandoning its order 
altogether. Id.

 
 

[¶24.]  After a careful review of the record and 
analysis of the various Rule 4.2 "tests," we find the pragmatic legal reasoning 
in the Niesig/"alter ego" or "binding admission" approach to be 
persuasive.  We hold that the 
Strawsers and their counsel are entitled to conduct informal ex parte interviews 
with all present Exxon employees except: (1) those who may legally bind Exxon by 
their having acted or failed to act in the alleged course of defaming Strawser 
or invading the Strawsers' privacy; (2) those whose actual conduct in the 
claimed incidents may be imputed to Exxon; and (3) those employees implementing 
the advice of Exxon's counsel. With this result, we agree with what the West 
Virginia Supreme Court said in Dent, 406 S.E.2d at 72: 

 
 
It is important to remember that 
what we are dealing with here are rules of professional conduct, not rules of 
evidence. As the Supreme Court of Washington has said, "it is not the purpose of 
the rule [DR 7-104(A)(1)] to protect a corporate party from the revelation of 
prejudicial facts." Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 192, 200, 
691 P.2d 564, 569 [1984].  

 
 

Niesig specifies the operational standard: 

 
 
In practical application, the test 
we adopt thus would prohibit direct communication by adversary counsel "with 
those officials, but only those, who have the legal power to bind the 
corporation in the matter or who are responsible for implementing the advice of 
the corporation's lawyer, or any member of the organization whose own interests 
are directly at stake in a representation." * * * 

 
 
This test would permit direct access 
to all other employees, and specifically--as in the present case--it would 
clearly permit direct access to employees who were merely witnesses to an event 
for which the corporate employer is sued. 

 
 
 Niesig, 559 N.Y.S.2d  at 498-99 
(quoting Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 11.6, at 613 (Practitioner's ed. 
1986)).12

 
 

[¶25.]  We hold that the district court applied 
the wrong legal standard when it prohibited all interviews with Exxon's 
employees. We vacate the applicable portion of the protective order and remand 
the remainder of the protective order to the district court for modification in 
light of this opinion. With regard to current Exxon employees who may be 
interviewed ex parte in the future by opposing counsel, the Niesig "alter 
ego" or "binding admission" test will be applied by the litigants and the 
court.  Bouge' v. Smith's 
Management Corp., 132 F.R.D. 560 (D.Utah 1990). 

 
 
D. Standard for Former Employees 

 
 

[¶26.]  Various courts have struggled with the 
question of whether Rule 4.2 applies to former corporate employees. See, 
e.g., Action Air Freight, Inc., 769 F. Supp.  at 903; and Hanntz v. Shiley, 
Inc. A Div. of Pfizer, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 258, 265-69 (D.N.J. 1991). It is 
clear, however, that the overwhelming recent trend has been for courts to find 
that Rule 4.2 does not generally bar ex parte contacts with former employees. As 
noted in Action Air Freight, Inc., 769 F.Supp. at 903: 

 
 
 [Rule 4.2] permits ex parte 
contacts but proscribes inquiry by opposing counsel into matters subject to the 
attorney-client privilege.  The 
qualification on the "contact rule" allows opposing counsel to investigate the 
underlying facts leading up to the disputed matter. At the same time, counsel 
must forego inquiry into attorney-client communications during the contact. 
Accordingly, Hanntz interprets Rule 4.2 to proscribe the type of 
questioning of former employees, not the contact itself. 

 
 

See Valassis v. 
Samelson, 143 F.R.D. 118 (E.D.Mich. 1992); Dubois v. Gradco Systems, Inc., 136 F.R.D. 341 (D.Conn. 1991); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litigation, 141 F.R.D. 556 (N.D.Ga. 1992); Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77 (D.N.J. 1991); Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc. 129 F.R.D. 621 (S.D.N.Y 1990); Shearson Lehman Bros, Inc. v. Wasatch Bank, 139 F.R.D. 412 (D.Utah 1991); Lang v. Superior Court, In and For County of 
Maricopa, 170 Ariz. 602, 826 P.2d 1228 (1992); Neil S. Sullivan 
Associates, Ltd. v. Medco Containment Services, Inc. 257 N.J.Super. 155, 607 A.2d 1386 (1992) (counsel must abide by Rule 4.3 guidelines--must disclose role 
in litigation and can not elicit any privileged information); and In re 
Environmental Ins. Declaratory Judgment Actions, 252 N.J. Super. 510, 600 A.2d 165. 

 
 

[¶27.]  Although the exact status of any former 
Exxon employees who may have been interviewed by the Strawsers or their counsel 
is not particularly clear from the record, we remand to the district court to 
vacate that portion of the protective order prohibiting all ex parte 
interviews with former Exxon employees and managers. 

 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
AND RESOLUTIONS

 
 

[¶28.]  The standards establishing the right to 
interview, or absence thereof, provided by the alter ego/binding admission test, 
should appropriately control the exercise of future discretion by the district 
court regarding requirement of counsel for the Strawsers to produce any or all 
of the documentation included within the May 16, 1991 protective order. The 
challenged protective order is reversed and this litigation is remanded for 
further proceedings in conformity herewith.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Although 
copies of the various Exxon drug and alcohol policies in effect at different 
times during the 1980s were not made part of the record in this certiorari 
proceeding, it appears that Exxon's 1989 policy created "designated" and 
"non-designated" safety status distinctions for certain employee positions. For 
purposes of describing the 1989 policy modification, we note the following from 
the Strawsers' complaint: 

 
 
5. That 
prior to 1981, and prior to his employment with EXXON, THOMAS [Strawser] 
considered himself to have an alcohol abuse problem for which he had at all 
times herein relevant successfully sought therapeutic consultation and 
treatment, and in 1981 through the present has not on any occasion been 
intoxicated by alcoholic beverages.  
That THOMAS communicated in a confidential manner in 1988 to Defendants 
Kennedy and EXXON that he had previously been guilty of alcohol abuse and was 
attending the organization Alcoholics Anonymous. 

 
 
Prior to the 
summer of 1989, EXXON, as was a generally-accepted practice industry-wide, had a 
policy of voluntary, self-identification, wherein the information was completely 
voluntary and representations were made that the responses would not affect the 
informant's employment in any manner. That in January of 1987 EXXON issued a 
policy which recognized alcoholism as a treatable illness, and stated a policy 
that "no employee with alcoholism will have his or her job security or future 
opportunities jeopardized due a request for help or involvement in a 
rehabilitation effort", further adopting a policy in February of 1987 
recognizing alcoholism as a treatable condition and stating "no employee with 
alcohol or drug dependency will be terminated or otherwise disciplined solely 
due to a request for help in overcoming that dependency because of involvement 
in a rehabilitation effort". That THOMAS relied upon such policies and candidly 
informed Defendants Kennedy and EXXON in a confidential manner as aforesaid, 
even though THOMAS had not been guilty of alcohol abuse for many years 
previously. That said confidential information was given to Defendant Kennedy 
with the express assurance and request of EXXON's medical department doctor on 
staff that THOMAS should do so to get a transfer from shift work as EXXON fully 
supported anyone who had already submitted to an alcohol abuse program and such 
information would be strictly confidential. 

 
 
6. That on 
or about July 28, 1989, THOMAS was informed by Defendant Kennedy that EXXON was 
going to implement a new drug and alcohol policy that would affect him in that 
the policy was going to be applicable to certain "designated" positions, one of 
which was THOMAS' job title. The policy provided that no one who had ever 
attended Alcoholics Anonymous or had gone to rehabilitation would be allowed to 
hold the "designated" positions. Said policy was to become effective September 
1, 1989. That while the information given to Defendant Kennedy was given in the 
confidence and assurance that it would not be related except to Kennedy's 
immediate supervisor, Plaintiff THOMAS is informed and believes that such 
information was nonetheless given to many other sources and 
individuals.

 
 

2Co-defendants Kennedy and Whitaker were co-workers of Strawser at Exxon's 
SubletteCounty gas dehydration 
facility.

 
 

3Counsel for 
the Strawsers acknowledge that they conducted informal telephone interviews with 
approximately thirty-five Exxon employees.  
Further, in their Verified Petition for Writ of Certiorari, petitioners 
state: 

 
 
c. None of 
the Exxon employees interviewed hold positions deemed "managerial," although two 
of the employees interviewed hold "supervisory" positions. In fact nearly all of 
the employees held positions inferior to or under the pay status of [Strawser]. 

 
 
d. None of 
the Exxon employees interviewed are or were in a position to bind Exxon in any 
way in this cause of action. 

 
 
e. The 
information solicited from Exxon employees concerned their personal knowledge 
regarding Plaintiff Mr. Strawser's involvement with Alcoholics Anonymous and any 
problems he might have associated with alcohol abuse. It did not concern issues 
involving the scope of the employee's employment or agency. 

 
 
f. All 
interviews were voluntary, but many employees were concerned about retaliation 
from Exxon and wish that their communications be kept confidential. Many of the 
employees came forth in a confidential manner previous to Plaintiffs even hiring 
their attorneys. 

 
 
g. All 
interviews and information were gathered for many months with the knowledge of 
and without the objection of Exxon, pursuant to Rule 4.2, and the overwhelming 
case law supporting the same. 

 
 
h. Exxon 
knew the interviews were taking place and did nothing for many months until the 
interviews had been nearly completed.

 
 
Characterizing the ex parte interviews in a far different light, Exxon 
argues that the Strawsers' counsel conducted interviews with at least two 
employees with "significant managerial responsibilities" and that such 
interviews demonstrate counsel's willingness to "delve into privileged 
communications between Exxon employees and Exxon's counsel." Further, Exxon 
asserts that counsel violated Rule 4.2 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional 
Conduct by interviewing Exxon employees whose acts they intend to impute to 
Exxon as a basis for civil liability.

 
 

4Although the 
district court's May 16, 1991 protective order indicated that a May 3, 1991 
hearing was held, we find nothing in the record to indicate what transpired at 
that hearing. The record does not contain any transcript or other record of that 
court proceeding.

 
 

5Rule 4.2 is 
substantially identical to Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) of the American Bar 
Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., Dent v. 
Kaufman, 185 W.Va. 171, 406 S.E.2d 68, 71 (1991) ("Rule 4.2 
is functionally identical to" DR 7-104(A)(1)) and 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. 
& W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 4.2:101, at 730 (1992) 
(Rule 4.2 "is taken virtually verbatim from DR 7-104(A)(1) of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility"). Prior to the Wyoming Supreme Court's adoption of 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct effective January 12, 1987, Wyoming had followed the 
ABA Model Code. Although several of the cases cited in this analysis involve 
application of Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) rather than Model Rule 4.2, the 
fundamental similarities between the rules and their underlying purposes 
eliminate any need for us to distinguish between the cases interpreting the two 
rules.

 
 

6When 
Wyoming 
adopted the Model Rules, it also adopted the Official Comments to each rule. 
While the Official Comments are "intended as guides to interpretation" and to 
"explain and illustrate the meaning and purpose of the Rule," the "text of each 
Rule is authoritative." Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct "Scope" [P] 
9.

 
 

7See, 
e.g., 
Stephen M. Sinaiko, Ex Parte Communication and the Corporate Adversary: A New 
Approach, 66 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1456 (1991); Samuel R. Miller and Angelo J. 
Calfo, Ex Parte Contact With Employees and Former Employees of a Corporate 
Adversary: Is It Ethical?, 42 Bus. Law. 1053 (1987); Louis A. Stahl, Ex 
Parte Interviews With Enterprise Employees: A 
Post-Upjohn Analysis, 44 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 1181 (1987); John Leubsdorf, Essay, Communicating With Another Lawyer's 
Client: The Lawyer's Veto And The Client's Interests, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 683 
(1979).

 
 

8Mills Land and Water 
Co., 230 
Cal.Rptr.  461 is discussed at 
length in Miller & Calfo, supra n.7, 42 Bus. Law. at 1060-67. 
Actually, the case has no factual relevance in analysis of any particular rule 
since the contact in the case occurred with a corporate director, which 
would within any concept be in violation of the ethical rule. See also Cronin 
v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court In and For County of Clark, 105 Nev. 635, 781 P.2d 1150 (1989).

 
 

9The case 
frequently cited in support of the blanket rule, Hewlett-Packard Co. v. 
Superior Court (Jensen), 205 Cal. App. 3d 43, 252 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1988), was 
ordered not to be officially published by the California Supreme Court, pursuant 
to Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 976. Subsequent support for that approach within 
California 
cases is not demonstrable from citation provided by the litigants or found in 
our independent review. See, e.g., Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc. v. State, 
213 Cal. App. 3d 131, 261 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1989). See also, although 
involving ex-employees, Nalian Truck Lines, Inc. v. Nakano Warehouse & 
Transp. Corp. 6 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467 (1992). It should be 
noted that under California Rules of Court, an opinion that is ordered not 
published shall not, with limited exceptions, be cited or relied upon in that 
jurisdiction as authority. See Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 
977.

 
 

10The 
reasoning and result in Public Service Elec. and Gas Co. has generally 
been disregarded by most other courts--including those within its own district. 
See Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 82 D.N.J. 1991); 
see also Hanntz v. Shiley, Inc. A Div. of Pfizer, Inc.,  766 F. Supp. 258 (D.N.J. 1991); and 
Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. v. Wasatch Bank, 139 F.R.D. 412 (D.Utah 
1991).

 
 

11In arguing 
against the "managerial-speaking test" adopted in Wright by Wright, 103 Wash. 2d 192, 691 P.2d 564, and tendered by the Strawsers, we note that Exxon 
raises an interesting point: 

 
 
The test 
adopted in Wright by Wright is inconsistent with Wyoming substantive law 
and far too narrow to protect the important interests behind Wyoming Rule 
4.2.28

 
 

28Any argument 
at this point in favor of limiting the term "party" in Rule 4.2 to managing 
agents is academic. The issue is whether [the Strawsers] violated the standard 
in place at the time they conducted their interviews, namely Rule 4.2 as 
interpreted by a fair reading of the Official Comment. If, at the time [the 
Strawsers] began their investigation, they were unsure whether they were bound 
by the Comment to Rule 4.2 as opposed to the more narrow "managerial-speaking" 
test, they should have sought guidance from the district court. * * * Their 
argument for adoption of a new interpretation of the Rule comes far too late. 

 
 
We find this 
aspect of Exxon's reasoning unrealistic. First, although there is nothing in the 
language in the district court's protective order--nor, for that matter, 
anywhere else in the record--to indicate that the district court actually 
found a violation of Rule 4.2, Exxon premises its defense of the "blanket" 
prohibition of ex parte contacts on that "finding." We recognize no basis from 
either this record or within the significant body of relevant case law for 
summarily concluding that a "blanket" prohibition of ex parte interviews was 
necessarily imposed because the district concluded the ethics rule had 
been violated.  With the possible 
exception of the protective order requirement that the Strawsers produce all 
documents, statements, tapes and notes, the order might just as easily have been 
imposed prospectively in order to avoid an ethical violation. 

 
 
Second, 
Exxon's suggestion that a "fair reading" of the Official Comment to Rule 4.2 
would have informed the Strawsers and their counsel of their limited options for 
informal discovery belies the substantial body of case law and commentary to the 
contrary. See, e.g., Sinaiko, supra n.7, 66 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1456 
(identifying and critiquing four different "tests" for applying Rule 4.2 or its 
Disciplinary Code counterpart, DR 7-104(A)(1) and, in addition, proposing an 
entirely new and "improved" approach); Jerome N. Krulewitch, Comment, Ex 
Parte Communications with Corporate Parties: The Scope of the Limitations on 
Attorney Communications with One of Adverse Interest, 82 N.W.U.L. Rev. 1274 
(1988) (identifying and critiquing four separate Rule 4.2 approaches in addition 
to the "blanket" approach in be present case); John D. Hodson, Annotation, 
Right of Attorney to Conduct Ex Parte Interviews with Corporate Party's 
Nonmanagement Employees, 50 A.L.R.4th 652 (1986 & Supp. 1992) 
(identifying four separate categories of Rule 4.2 "tests" other than the 
"blanket" ex parte contact prohibition). 

 
 
Finally, 
Exxon's argument that it is "too late" for this court to adopt a "new 
interpretation" of Rule 4.2 is unacceptable. Only the Wyoming Supreme 
Court can adopt the type of interpretive "test" which is needed in this case. 
Since this is a case of first impression in this state and no other Rule 4.2 
"test" has been previously adopted, we will apply our supervisory responsibility 
in de novo review to make that decision and establish the appropriate rule for 
the practice of law by Wyoming lawyers and the trial 
bench.

 
 

12It is 
important to also recognize the cautionary note provided in Niesig, 559 
N.Y.S.2d at 499: 

 
 
Defendant's assertions 
that ex parte interviews should not be permitted because of the dangers of 
overreaching, moreover, impel us to add the cautionary note that, while we have 
not been called upon to consider questions relating to the actual conduct of 
such interviews, it is of course assumed that attorneys would make their 
identity and interest known to interviewees and comport themselves 
ethically.