Case Title: Commonwealth v. Tuma

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2013-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
 
            
OPINION BY 
 v.  Record No. 121177 
         JUSTICE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN 
 
 
             
APRIL 18, 2013 
WILLIAM EDWARD TUMA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
A jury convicted William Edward Tuma (Tuma) of taking 
indecent liberties with a child, aggravated sexual battery, 
and animate object penetration.  On appeal, we consider 
whether the Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963) by suppressing evidence in the form of an audio tape 
recording of an investigative interview with the victim.  
Concluding the Commonwealth committed no Brady violation, as 
the recording was made available to Tuma in sufficient time 
for its use at trial, we will reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Under familiar principles, we review the facts in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party 
at trial.  Bly v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 656, 658, 702 S.E.2d 
120, 121 (2010) (applying the Brady rule). 
The victim, L.S., a seven-year-old girl, indicated to her 
father and stepmother that she had been sexually assaulted by 
Tuma, her stepfather.  L.S. stated that Tuma had been placing 
2 
 
his fingers "inside" of her "private parts," referring to her 
vagina.  When provided with this information, the Dinwiddie 
County Sheriff's Office (DCSO), along with the Dinwiddie 
County Department of Social Services (DSS), conducted a joint 
investigation.  Among other things, DCSO Investigator Dwayne 
Gilliam and Jon Scheid, a child protective services worker 
with DSS, interviewed L.S.  Scheid audio tape recorded the 
interview as required by DSS regulations.  See 22 VAC § 40-
705-80(B)(1)). 
As a result of the investigation, Tuma was indicted on 
charges of committing three sex crimes against L.S. for which 
he was ultimately convicted in a jury trial - taking indecent 
liberties with a child (Code § 18.2-370.1), aggravated sexual 
battery (Code § 18.2-67.3(A)(1)), and animate object 
penetration (Code § 18.2-67.2). 
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth's Attorney for Dinwiddie 
County provided Tuma's counsel with a written summary of the 
investigative interview with L.S., which Gilliam prepared as 
part of his case report.  Tuma's counsel was not provided pre-
trial access to the tape recording of the interview.  However, 
he learned of the tape's probable existence at least a week 
before trial when, according to him, he specifically "asked 
[Gilliam] whether or not there was a tape" and Gilliam said 
"he thought there may have been but he was not sure." 
3 
 
At trial, Gilliam, the Commonwealth's second of six 
witnesses (L.S. was the first), reiterated on cross-
examination that he believed DSS had tape recorded the 
interview.  Scheid, the Commonwealth's third witness, then 
confirmed during cross-examination that she recorded the 
interview and had the audio tape with her in the court room.  
Tuma's counsel immediately moved to admit the tape recording, 
in its entirety, into evidence.  At that time, neither he, the 
prosecutor, nor the trial judge had listened to it.  Under 
those circumstances, the trial judge refused to admit the tape 
into evidence.  As the judge explained, "we'll not just play a 
tape . . . without any sort of thought or notion as to what is 
there." 
In making this evidentiary ruling, the trial judge 
nevertheless made clear to defense counsel that he could 
listen to the tape:  "You can go listen to it if you want to 
on your own time," the judge stated.  "You can take it off and 
listen to it," the judge further clarified.  The judge then 
asked the prosecutor if defense counsel "had access to [the 
tape]," to which the prosecutor replied, "He can listen to it 
if he wants to."  Defense counsel did not ask to listen to the 
tape outside of the jury's presence, either then or at any 
other time during the trial.  Rather, he simply asked the 
4 
 
judge to "[j]ust note [his] exception" to the ruling on his 
request to play the entire tape to the jury. 
Tuma's counsel moved a second time to admit the tape into 
evidence before arguing a motion to strike at the conclusion 
of the Commonwealth's case.  He asserted that the tape was 
"the best evidence of what was said" during the interview, and 
that he "would think that it would be exculpatory in terms of 
where things occurred and [the] number of times they 
occurred," referring to the allegations of sexual assault. 
However, Tuma's counsel admittedly had "not heard [the tape] 
yet."  The trial judge denied the request, explaining to him, 
"I don't think you are entitled just to play something because 
you think it may be exculpatory." 
Tuma's counsel first listened to the tape after the trial 
ended with guilty verdicts on all charges.  Tuma subsequently 
filed motions to strike the evidence as insufficient for 
conviction and, alternatively, to set aside the verdicts and 
grant him a new trial, based on the contention that the 
prosecutor violated Brady by failing to provide pre-trial 
access to the tape.  Had he been given such access, Tuma 
argued, it could have been used to impeach the credibility of 
the Commonwealth's first four witnesses, namely, L.S., 
Gilliam, Scheid, and L.S.'s counselor, Amy Holloman.  
According to Tuma, the tape revealed eight certain "areas of 
5 
 
interest and factual discrepancies" that the defense could 
have used to effectively cross-examine those four witnesses.  
Tuma's counsel conceded at an earlier post-trial hearing, 
however, that he had access to the tape during the trial.  
Counsel specifically admitted that "at the trial [the 
prosecutor] said I could have access to it and things of that 
nature."  He similarly acknowledged that the trial judge "was 
clear at the trial that I would be able to get it and listen 
to it."  Finding no Brady violation, the trial court denied 
Tuma's motions, entered a judgment of conviction and imposed 
the sentences fixed by the jury. 
Tuma appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, 
contending the trial court erred by (i) rejecting his Brady 
challenge to the prosecutor's failure to disclose the audio 
tape prior to trial, and (ii) refusing to admit the tape into 
evidence and allow the jury to hear it.  In a memorandum 
opinion, a three judge panel, with one judge dissenting, 
reversed the convictions on the Brady issue and remanded the 
case for a new trial.  Tuma v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0919-
10-2, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 337 (November 8, 2011).  Given that 
ruling, the panel did not rule on Tuma's second assignment of 
error.  Id. at *12-13.  Granting the Commonwealth's petition 
for rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals reached the same 
6 
 
decision.  Tuma v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 273, 303-04, 726 
S.E.2d 365, 380 (Va. App. 2012). 
We granted the Commonwealth this appeal on two 
assignments of error in which it asserts the Court of Appeals 
erred by (i) finding a Brady violation when the evidence was 
available to Tuma at trial; and (ii) holding that the audio 
tape contained evidence that was material under Brady.  
II. ANALYSIS 
A. 
Under the Brady rule, the prosecution's suppression of 
evidence favorable to the accused and material to either guilt 
or punishment violates due process.  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.   
First, the prosecution's suppression of evidence may be 
established "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of 
the prosecution."  Id.  Second, the evidence must be 
"'favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, 
or because it is impeaching.'"  Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 
___, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1300 (2011) (quoting Strickler v. 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).  Third, the "'evidence 
is "material" within the meaning of Brady when there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.'"  
Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012) 
(quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2009)).  The 
7 
 
accused has the burden of establishing each of these three 
components to prevail on a Brady claim.  Skinner, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1300. 
In this appeal, the Commonwealth does not challenge 
whether the tape recording presented favorable impeachment 
evidence for the defense, as Tuma contends.  The Commonwealth 
instead limits its challenge to Tuma's showing on the 
suppression and materiality prongs of the Brady rule.  Because 
we agree with the Commonwealth that the prosecution did not 
suppress the tape in violation of Brady, we need not address 
the issue of materiality.  See Porter v. Warden of the Sussex 
I State Prison, 283 Va. 326, 332, 722 S.E.2d 534, 542 (2012) 
(explaining that "we do not reach the issue of materiality" 
under Brady "unless we first determine that the evidence was 
not available" to the defense). 
B. 
Brady is "a disclosure rule, not a discovery rule."  
United States v. Higgins, 75 F.3d 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1996).  
Indeed, "[t]here is no general constitutional right to 
discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one."  
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).  The more 
limited purpose of the Brady rule is "'to assure that [the 
defendant] will not be denied access to exculpatory [or 
impeachment] evidence known to the government but unknown to 
8 
 
him.'"  Lugo v. Munoz, 682 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1982) (quoting 
United States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir. 1973)) 
(first emphasis added).  Accordingly, Brady is not violated, 
as a matter of law, when impeachment evidence is made 
"'available to [a] defendant[] during trial'" if the defendant 
has "sufficient time to make use of [it] at trial."  Read v. 
Virginia State Bar, 233 Va. 560, 564-65, 357 S.E.2d 544, 546-
47 (1987) (quoting U.S. v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154, 158 (10th 
Cir. 1982)); see Higgins, 75 F.3d at 335 (Under Brady, 
"[d]isclosure even in mid-trial suffices if time remains for 
the defendant to make effective use of the exculpatory 
material."); United States v. Knight, 867 F.2d 1285, 1289 
(1989) (holding Brady satisfied where "[a]ppellants received 
the information during the trial and have failed to 
demonstrate that the disclosure came so late that it could not 
be effectively used"); see generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Criminal Procedure § 24.3(b) at 365 (3d ed. 2007) (Under 
Brady, "the prosecution should be able to satisfy its 
constitutional obligation by disclosure at trial."). 
This principle applies without regard to when the 
prosecution was or should have been "aware of the 
information."  Read, 233 at 564, 357 S.E.2d at 546, citing 
with approval United States v. Darwin, 757 F.2d 1193 (11th 
Cir. 1985).  In Darwin, the defendant contended that the 
9 
 
prosecution violated Brady because the government failed to 
disclose certain impeachment evidence about a witness until 
after he had testified even though the government had been 
aware of the information several days prior to his testimony.  
Id. at 1201.  Rejecting defendant's Brady claim, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explained: 
The point in the trial when a disclosure is 
made . . .  is not in itself determinative of 
timeliness.  We agree with those circuits 
holding that a defendant must show that the 
failure to earlier disclose prejudiced him 
because it came so late that the information 
disclosed could not be effectively used at 
trial.  Appellant here made no such showing.  
In fact, although Dunn had completed his 
testimony, the trial itself was far from over.  
Appellant could have recalled Dunn for further 
questioning but chose not to. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted), quoted in part by Read, 233 
Va. at 564-65, 357 S.E.2d at 546-47; see also United States v. 
Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding disclosure 
of impeachment material during trial, when witnesses were 
subject to recall, satisfied Brady); United States v. Mangual-
Garcia, 505 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2007) (same); United States 
v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 882 (8th Cir. 1996) (same). 
 
In Read, this Court further relied upon United States v. 
Elmore, 423 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1970), which held that no Brady 
violation occurred when the impeachment information was 
disclosed "well before the end of the trial," particularly 
10 
 
given that defense counsel requested no continuance "for 
whatever further time might have been necessary" to make use 
of the information at trial.  Id. at 779-80.  Similarly 
rejecting a claim for late disclosure of Brady material, the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Higgins reasoned 
that "[i]f counsel needed more time, she had only to ask; yet 
she did not seek a continuance.  Nothing more need be said."  
75 F.3d at 335; see United States v. Crayton, 357 F.3d 560, 
569 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Any disadvantage that a defendant might 
suffer because of the tardiness [in the disclosure] of 
impeachment material can be cured by asking for a recess." 
(citing United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1283-84 (6th 
Cir. 1988)).1  In the analogous context of Rule 3A:11, 
governing discovery in criminal cases, this Court has held 
that a defendant who "failed to move for a continuance or even 
for a recess in order to consider the material" untimely 
disclosed by the prosecution would not "be heard to complain 
that he had insufficient time to prepare for trial."  Frye v. 
Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 384, 345 S.E.2d 267, 277 (1986); 
                         
1 See also United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 311 
(4th Cir. 2005) (holding that the proper response to a late 
Brady disclosure was a motion for continuance, not a motion to 
dismiss); United States v. Sepulvenda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1178 (1st 
Cir. 1993) (generally "a defendant who does not request a 
continuance will not be heard to complain on appeal that he 
suffered prejudice as a result of late arriving" Brady 
material). 
11 
 
see Davis v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 201, 204, 335 S.E.2d 375, 
377 (1985) (holding no prejudice shown under Rule 3A:11 when 
defendant "did not request either a postponement or a 
continuance"). 
Here, Tuma did not have pre-trial access to the audio 
tape recording of the investigative interview with L.S., which 
purportedly contained impeaching material favorable to him.  
His counsel, however, had reason to believe before trial that 
the tape existed based on his conversation with Gilliam.  Then 
early in the trial, the two prosecution witnesses who 
conducted the interview, Gilliam and Scheid, testified that it 
was recorded; and Scheid revealed that the tape was in her 
possession in the courtroom.  Without first seeking to listen 
to the tape outside the jury's presence, Tuma's counsel simply 
moved to admit the tape into evidence and play it for the 
jury, which the trial judge denied as procedurally improper.  
Nevertheless, the judge twice advised defense counsel that he 
could "go listen to it," and the prosecutor concurred, 
stating, "[h]e can listen to it if he wants to." 
On these facts, we conclude Tuma failed, as a matter of 
law, to show he was denied access to the tape recording in 
sufficient time to effectively use it at trial.  Upon learning 
during Scheid's testimony that she had the tape, Tuma's 
counsel could have asked for a recess and listened to it, 
12 
 
proceeded to cross-examine Scheid using any favorable 
impeaching information contained on it, and recalled L.S. and 
Gilliam for the same purpose; but defense counsel chose not to 
do so. 
Despite such access to the tape at trial, Tuma attempts 
to save his Brady claim by pointing to the subsequent exchange 
between the trial judge, his counsel, and the prosecutor 
following the close of the Commonwealth's case.  At that time, 
Tuma's counsel moved for the second time to admit the tape 
into evidence without having listened to it, and without 
having made any request during the trial to do so.  He instead 
asserted that the tape was "the best evidence of what was 
said" during the recorded interview, and that he "would think 
. . . it would be exculpatory in terms of where [the alleged 
sexual assaults] occurred and [the] number of times they 
occurred."  The trial judge again denied the request, 
explaining that Tuma's counsel was not "entitled just to play 
something" because he thought "it may be exculpatory."  When 
Tuma's counsel pursued the issue further, the trial judge 
reiterated his ruling that "[t]he tape will not be played."  
The trial judge committed no error under Brady with this 
ruling.  The trial judge was not denying Tuma access to the 
tape, as Tuma contends, but rather rejecting the method by 
which his counsel sought repeatedly to introduce the tape into 
13 
 
evidence (an issue to be addressed by the Court of Appeals on 
remand, as explained in Part II.C. of this opinion).  We thus 
reject Tuma's argument that the ruling was in error under 
Brady because it was not a Brady ruling. 
Tuma also asserts that the prosecutor violated Brady 
during the same exchange because she represented there was no 
exculpatory information on the tape.  What she actually 
represented was that she had "relied" on information from 
Investigator Gilliam to form her opinion that nothing on the 
tape was exculpatory.  Most significantly, when the trial 
judge asked her at that time whether she had listened to the 
tape and whether she knew if it was exculpatory, she answered 
unequivocally, "[n]o, sir."  Tuma thus cannot credibly contend 
that the prosecutor's representations about the tape somehow 
amounted to its suppression.  Indeed, Tuma's counsel made 
clear each time he moved to introduce the tape into evidence 
that he had formed his own opinion that it contained favorable 
impeachment material based on the testimony of L.S., Gilliam 
and Scheid – yet he did not pursue the opportunity to listen 
to it when it was made available to him early in the trial.  
In short, the tape was not suppressed.  Thus, having had such 
access to the tape, Tuma "cannot miraculously resuscitate 
[his] defense after conviction by invoking Brady."  United 
States v. White, 970 F.2d 328, 337 (7th Cir. 1992). 
14 
 
Finally, we disagree that "the futility of any request 
Tuma might have made at trial for a recess to listen to the 
audio tape is obvious."  Tuma, 60 Va. App. at 303, 726 S.E.2d 
at 380.  As Judge Kelsey states in his dissenting opinion:  
This ipse dixit implies a bold accusation.  The 
majority apparently believes it "obvious" the 
trial judge would have arbitrarily denied a 
brief recess (if one had been requested) for 
Tuma's counsel to listen to the tape - after 
twice suggesting that he do so.  Nothing in the 
record suggests this censorious supposition is 
true, much less obvious.  We will never truly 
know, of course, because Tuma's counsel never 
asked for a brief recess to listen to the tape.  
I do not see how the trial judge can be blamed 
for that.  
 
Id. at 313-14, 726 S.E.2d at 385.2 
                         
 
2 We also note the Court of Appeals devotes much of its 
opinion to criticizing the prosecutor's handling of the tape 
on the basis of essentially ethical considerations.  In Brady, 
however, the United States Supreme Court made clear that the 
"good faith or bad faith of the prosecution" is not 
dispositive in deciding a Brady claim.  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.  
As the Court explained more recently in Strickler, "under 
Brady an inadvertent nondisclosure has the same impact on the 
fairness of the proceedings as deliberate concealment.  'If 
the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, 
it is because of the character of the evidence, not the 
character of the prosecutor.'"  527 U.S. at 288 (quoting 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976)).  In short, 
"Brady is not a canon of prosecutorial ethics . . . .  In 
Brady cases, therefore, an appellate court sits not as a 
disciplinary committee of the state bar – but rather as a 
court of review, ensuring only that the criminal conviction 
satisfies the threshold requirements of due process."  Tuma, 
60 Va. App. at 308-09, 726 S.E.2d at 382-83 (Kelsey, J., 
dissenting).  Because of the availability of the audio tape 
for Tuma's use at trial, those threshold requirements were met 
under Brady in this case. 
 
15 
 
C. 
 
This appeal is limited to the Commonwealth's challenge to 
the Court of Appeals' decision on the Brady issue, which that 
court decided in Tuma's favor pursuant to his first assignment 
of error.   In light of that decision, the Court of Appeals 
was not required to address Tuma's second assignment of error 
in which he challenged the trial court's denial of his request 
to admit the tape into evidence (a separate issue from whether 
the prosecution violated Brady).  That evidentiary ruling is 
thus not before this Court to decide.  Therefore, having now 
decided in the Commonwealth's favor on the Brady issue, we 
will remand this case to the Court of Appeals to decide Tuma's 
second assignment of error. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment appealed 
from and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for a 
decision on Tuma's second assignment of error challenging the 
trial court's ruling on the admissibility of the audio tape of 
the investigative interview with the victim. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reversed and remanded.  
 
JUSTICE LEMONS, concurring. 
 
I agree with the majority's holding that the 
recording was made available to Tuma in sufficient time 
16 
 
for its use at trial, but I write separately to address 
the issue of materiality raised by the dissent. 
 
The United States Supreme Court held in Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that "the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of 
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."  Id. at 
87.  That Court later explained that evidence is only 
material under Brady "if there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different."  
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).  
"Reasonable probability" is defined as "a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  Id. 
We have held that in order to meet the materiality 
prong, "the accused must have been prejudiced."  Workman 
v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 633, 644-45, 636 S.E.2d 368, 374 
(2006).  Essentially, "[t]he question is not whether the 
defendant would more likely than not have received a 
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its 
absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial 
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence."  Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).  "The mere possibility 
17 
 
that an item of undisclosed information might have helped 
the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the 
trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the 
constitutional sense."  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 
97, 109-10 (1976). 
 
The dissent fairly points out the prosecutor's 
failures in this case, and I agree that the prosecutor's 
understanding of her duties under Brady was deficient.  
However, the ultimate issue under Brady is whether the 
defendant has actually been prejudiced, not what a 
prosecutor should or should not have done in a particular 
case.  Under the facts of this case, I do not believe that 
Tuma was prejudiced. 
 
The inconsistencies between L.S.'s statements on the 
tape and her statements at trial involve where the abuse 
occurred and how many times it occurred.  On the tape, 
L.S. stated that the abuse only occurred at the "white 
house," and that it happened more than five times and less 
than ten times.  At trial, L.S. testified that the abuse 
occurred in other locations in addition to the "white 
house,"* and more than ten times.  But the statements on 
the tape never indicate that L.S. was not abused, or that 
                         
* The "white house" is also referred to as the "house 
with horses" and is located in Dinwiddie County.  
18 
 
Tuma was not the person who abused her.  In Smith v. Cain, 
565 U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 627 (2012), the United States 
Supreme Court held that previously undisclosed impeachment 
evidence was material.  However, the evidence in Smith was 
material because it directly contradicted the only 
eyewitness' identification of the defendant.  Id. at 630.  
Because the statements on the tape in no way indicate that 
L.S. was not abused, or that someone else was the abuser, 
the United States Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Cain 
is not implicated. 
L.S. was consistent in her statements on the tape and 
in her trial testimony that Tuma abused her at least 5-10 
times at the "white house."  Tuma was only charged with 
and convicted of three counts: taking indecent liberties 
with a child, aggravated sexual battery, and animate 
object sexual penetration.  Perhaps if Tuma had been 
charged with more than five counts, then the exact number 
of times the abuse occurred would become material. 
 
The jury in this case was also already aware that 
L.S. had made inconsistent statements as to the number of 
times the abuse occurred and the locations where the abuse 
occurred.  The trial testimony of Jon Webster Scheid, the 
social services worker, and Investigator Gilliam, the 
police officer who conducted the taped interview, and 
19 
 
Investigator Gilliam's written summary of that interview, 
already demonstrated that L.S.'s trial testimony differed 
from her initial interview with them regarding the 
frequency and location of the abuse, and her mother's 
presence during the abuse.  The audio tape was merely 
cumulative of other evidence that had already been used to 
impeach L.S. at trial.  Where undisclosed evidence merely 
furnishes an additional basis on which to challenge a 
witness whose credibility has been attacked, the 
undisclosed evidence may be cumulative, and hence not 
material.  See Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 518 (6th 
Cir. 2000); United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 257 
(2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Cuffie, 80 F.3d 514, 518 
(D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 
The impeachment value of the statements on the tape 
would have been minimal, especially in light of the expert 
witness' testimony that it is not uncommon for young 
children to not recall specific dates or instances of 
abuse because they attempt to repress such events.  Any 
impeachment of these issues, taken as a whole, does not 
undermine the confidence in this verdict. 
 
The dissent asserts that the impeachment evidence was 
also material to the punishment Tuma received, noting that 
Tuma received a sentence of 35 years' imprisonment, nearly 
20 
 
three times the upper end of the guidelines.  The mere 
fact that the jury sentenced Tuma above the guidelines 
does not prove materiality.  As discussed above, the jury 
was already aware of L.S.'s inconsistent statements.  
Despite that, the jury believed her testimony and the 
evidence was more than sufficient to prove that Tuma 
sexually molested his seven-year-old stepdaughter.  The 
jury's sentence was within the statutory range and 
arguably supported by the egregious facts of this case, 
including the victim's very young age. 
 
Any Brady claim must be "evaluated in the context of 
the entire record" of the case.  Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112.  
Favorable evidence is material "only if there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  A 'reasonable probability' is 
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome."  Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.  After considering the 
entire record of the case and the statements on the audio 
tape, I believe that the statements on the tape do not 
"put the whole case in such a different light as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict."  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 
435. I also believe that Tuma has failed to establish a 
reasonable probability that his punishment would have been 
21 
 
different if L.S.'s statements on the audio tape had been 
utilized by the defense at trial.  Tuma has failed to 
prove that the statements on the audio tape were material 
to his guilt or punishment. 
 
Accordingly, I join the majority opinion and would 
further hold that the statements at issue were not 
material. 
 
JUSTICE MILLETTE, with whom JUSTICE GOODWYN joins, 
dissenting. 
 
 
The fundamental principle set forth in Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), is that "the suppression 
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 
. . . violates due process where the evidence is material 
either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecution."  To be awarded a 
retrial based on a Brady violation, the defendant must 
make three showings as set forth in Skinner v. Switzer, 
562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011):  "(1) the evidence 
at issue is favorable to the accused, either because it 
was exculpatory, or because it is impeaching (2) the State 
suppressed the evidence, either willfully or inadvertently 
and (3) prejudice . . . ensued."  Id. at 1300 (alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Because 
22 
 
I find that the defendant in this instance made all of the 
above showings, I respectfully dissent. 
1. Undisclosed evidence is favorable to the accused 
because it is impeaching. 
 
As to the first prong, the Commonwealth does not 
contest on appeal that we are considering impeachment 
evidence, and it is clear that we are.  The victim was the 
primary witness against the accused, and the content of 
the tape when compared to the in-court statements of the 
victim raised inconsistencies primarily as to the number 
of times the alleged abuse occurred and the locations 
where she was allegedly abused.  The content of the tape 
would thus have allowed for impeachment through a more 
thorough cross-examination of the witnesses, arguably 
raising doubts in the jurors' minds as to either the 
truthfulness of the victim's statements or the frequency 
or severity of the events that occurred. 
2. Impeachment evidence was suppressed. 
 
The second prong is where the majority finds a 
deficiency in this case.  The majority focuses on the 
availability of the tape at trial, holding that there was 
no suppression because the evidence was made available 
during trial but that the defense attorney declined to 
take advantage of it.  The majority concludes that the 
23 
 
burden fell on the defense attorney to ask for a 
continuance to review the tape, and, finding that the tape 
was made available to him at trial but that he did not 
make such a request, holds that there was no Brady 
violation. 
 
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the 
tape was made available at trial in the form of disclosed 
exculpatory evidence.  A close reading of the trial 
transcript seems to reveal the opposite. 
During trial, L.S., the first witness, testified that 
she was abused in both her stepfather's and her own 
bedroom within the original house where they lived (the 
"house with the horses"), as well as in the trailer park 
and her grandmother's house after they moved out of the 
original house.  She also testified that her stepfather 
touched her "a lot" – more than ten times – and that when 
they moved into the trailer he touched her three times a 
week, every week.  She additionally stated that her 
stepfather made her touch her younger brother while he was 
in the bathtub. 
 
After the detective and the Department of Social 
Services (DSS) worker testified, it first became clear 
that the DSS worker had a tape of the original interview 
with the girl.  Defense counsel moved to play the tape 
24 
 
arguing that it was admissible under the "best evidence" 
rule.  Over defense counsel's objection, the circuit court 
denied the motion as to admissibility as best evidence, 
stating:  "We'll not play it now because you want to play 
it.  It is not admissible unless it contradicts something 
that she has said.  You haven't heard it. . . .  It is not 
going to be played."  When asked by the circuit court 
whether defense counsel had had access to the tape, the 
prosecutor, who previously had not provided the tape to 
defense counsel, had not listened to the tape, and had 
instead produced for the defense a report of the interview 
prepared by the detective, responded that defense counsel 
"can listen to it if he wants to."  There was no 
discussion by the circuit court or admission by the 
prosecutor at that time regarding whether the tape was 
potentially exculpatory. 
It was not until the motion to strike at the close of 
the Commonwealth's evidence that the issue of the 
potential exculpatory nature of the tape was raised, when 
counsel for the defense argued that the tape "would be 
exculpatory in terms of where things occurred and a [sic] 
number of times they occurred."  The following exchange 
continued: 
 
25 
 
The Court [to the  
Commonwealth]: 
Have you listened to the 
tape? 
 
[The Commonwealth]: No, sir. 
 
The Court: 
So you don't know whether it 
is exculpatory or not? 
 
[The Commonwealth]: No, sir. 
 
The Court: 
So therefore you didn't give 
it to him as being 
exculpatory because you 
never listened to it?  You 
don't think it is – he is 
entitled to it because it is 
not exculpatory?  You just 
don't know? 
 
[The Commonwealth]: I relied on my investigator 
 
 
 
 
who had given me his notes 
 
 
 
 
and transformed that into a 
 
 
 
 
typewritten statement that 
 
 
 
 
codified what went on at 
 
 
 
 
that particular interview. 
 
The Court: 
 
So you are satisfied there 
 
 
 
 
is nothing significant or 
 
 
 
 
exculpatory? Are you willing 
 
 
 
 
to stand on that? If it is 
 
 
 
 
you will not have complied 
 
 
 
 
with Brady.  
 
[The Commonwealth]: Yes, sir. 
 
The Court:  
 
You are willing to stand on 
 
 
 
 
that? 
 
[The Commonwealth]: Yes, sir. 
 
. . . . 
 
The Court: 
 
You are saying that you  
 
 
 
 
think it is exculpatory?  
 
[Defense counsel]: Yes, sir. 
26 
 
 
The Court: 
 
In some way? 
 
[Defense counsel]: Yes, I mean I can't get to 
 
 
 
 
the material.  I have asked 
 
 
 
 
the representatives. 
 
The Court: 
 
Well, I don't think you are 
 
 
 
 
entitled just to play  
 
 
 
 
something because you think 
 
 
 
 
it may be exculpatory. . . .  
 
 
 
 
The Court is not going to 
 
 
 
 
admit it.  If at some point 
 
 
 
 
if your client is convicted 
 
 
 
 
that tape shows something 
 
 
 
 
that is significant,  
 
 
 
 
exculpatory, he gets a new 
 
 
 
 
trial.  So that is the way 
 
 
 
 
we are going with it. 
 
. . . . 
 
We will not hear any more 
about that 
over your 
objection.  The tape will 
not be played.  Now you have 
a motion to strike, and I 
will be glad to hear you on 
that. 
 
The above exchange reflects the clear suppression of 
the evidence at trial.  The tape was not made available to 
the defendant when he requested it, and the prosecutor 
conceded her duty to disclose potentially exculpatory 
evidence on the tape and acknowledged that she was not 
doing so at her own peril.  The circuit court stated that 
it would hear no additional argument on the issue.  The 
information was therefore not made available to the 
defendant at a time when it could be used. 
27 
 
According to the majority, this case rises or falls 
on the apparent availability of the tape at trial and the 
failure of defense counsel to immediately request a 
continuance to listen to the tape once it was established 
that the tape was in the courtroom.  The majority, in 
concluding that this failure of defense counsel is 
paramount, ignores the fact that the burden of production 
of exculpatory evidence falls on the prosecution.  The 
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence requires not merely 
a duty to acknowledge the existence of a tape of an 
interview, but rather to disclose the exculpatory or 
impeachment evidence at least during the course of a 
trial, if not earlier.  The Supreme Court of the United 
States has stated that 
[a] rule thus declaring "prosecutor may hide, 
defendant must seek" is not tenable in a system 
constitutionally bound to accord defendants due 
process.  Ordinarily, we presume that public 
officials have properly discharged their 
official duties.  We have several times 
underscored the special role played by the 
American prosecutor in the search for truth in 
criminal trials.  Courts, litigants, and juries 
properly anticipate that obligations [to refrain 
from improper methods to secure a conviction] 
. . . plainly rest[ing] upon the prosecuting 
attorney, will be faithfully observed. 
 
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted) (second, third, and 
fourth alterations in original).  Our courts have long 
28 
 
stated that we hold our prosecutors to a higher standard 
even than other attorneys: 
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of 
an ordinary party to a controversy, but a 
sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation 
to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not 
that it shall win a case, but that justice 
shall be done.  As such, he is in a peculiar 
and very definite sense the servant of the law, 
the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall 
not escape or innocence suffer. 
 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  Thus, 
relying on the declarations by the prosecutor that the 
content of the tape was not exculpatory, the circuit court 
did not order the production of the evidence.  In fact, 
again in reliance on the prosecutor's position, the 
circuit court foreclosed any further inquiry. 
The prosecutor's overly narrow view of exculpatory 
evidence was only revealed during argument on a post-trial 
motion brought by defense counsel more than three months 
after the trial was concluded, when defense counsel was 
still seeking an opportunity to inspect the tape.  Defense 
counsel argued to the circuit court that "in light of what 
has gone on[,] there needs to be some sort of inspection 
of the tape to see if it has Brady material. . . .  I 
don't think it's sufficient for a prosecutor to say, well, 
the police officer told me there was nothing exculpatory 
29 
 
on it."  The prosecutor responded that "[t]he only thing 
that would be exculpatory on that tape is if there was [a] 
child saying he didn't do it, somebody else did it or it 
happened in China or somewhere else." 
Assuming without deciding that the evidence contained 
in the tape only became exculpatory once the victim 
testified, the prosecutor felt no obligation to turn over 
evidence that the Commonwealth does not now contest should 
have been disclosed under Brady.  The prosecutor 
apparently ignored the mandate of Brady to disclose 
evidence favorable to the accused either because it is 
exculpatory or because it is impeaching.  Skinner, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1300. 
Defense counsel, meanwhile, clearly signaled that he 
was seeking impeachment evidence when he claimed during 
trial that he was seeking evidence regarding each witness' 
credibility based upon discrepancies in the number and 
location of occurrences.  In a post-trial motion to set 
aside the verdict, defense counsel was even more specific 
in addressing what he considered to be eight separate 
areas of discrepancies that he believed could have been 
utilized in impeaching witnesses' credibility if he could 
only have had access to the tape. 
3. Defendant suffered material prejudice. 
30 
 
Because of its finding as to the second prong, 
today's majority does not reach the third prong of 
materiality or prejudice.  Under Brady, the prosecution's 
suppression of evidence favorable to an accused "violates 
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt 
or to punishment."  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (emphasis 
added).  This has been more recently phrased as the 
defendant's obligation to prove prejudice by showing a 
"reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different."  Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2009).  
"A reasonable probability does not mean that the defense 
'would more likely than not have received a different 
verdict with the evidence,' only that the likelihood of a 
different result is great enough 'to undermine[] 
confidence in the outcome of the trial.'"  Smith v. Cain, 
565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012) (quoting Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). 
 
Considering the materiality of the impeachment 
evidence, I concur with the majority opinion offered by 
the Court of Appeals of Virginia that, given that the 
Commonwealth's case rested primarily on the victim's 
testimony, impeachment testimony concerning the number of 
instances of abuse and the places where the abuse occurred 
31 
 
could have sufficiently undermined the jury's confidence 
in the victim as a witness to create a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the proceeding, 
potentially as to guilt but at least as to sentencing, 
would have been different.  Witness credibility is of the 
utmost importance in a case like this one in the absence 
of any physical evidence produced by the Commonwealth.  
The accusations in the case at bar were such that they 
relied primarily on the credibility of a single witness, 
one who is young and thus suggestible, on the detective 
and DSS worker's accounts of her prior statements, and on 
her counselor's observations.  See, e.g., Workman v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 633, 650, 636 S.E.2d 368, 378 (2006) 
(noting that the credibility of a key witness testifying 
against a defendant is "a significant issue at trial," and 
that – for Brady purposes – material usable for 
impeachment is "critical . . . evidence" in that context).  
The case at bar required the jury to weigh these 
statements against the testimony of the defendant and the 
victim's mother, who denied the abuse.  Under such 
circumstances, impeachment evidence goes directly to the 
jury's evaluation of which witnesses are being truthful, 
and so bears strongly not only on the issue of guilt, but, 
since a jury in Virginia also imposes the punishment for 
32 
 
felony convictions, likewise bears on the issue of 
punishment. 
At sentencing before the circuit court judge, defense 
counsel argued that the sentencing guidelines for the 
crimes for which the defendant was convicted ranged from a 
total of five years, two months to thirteen years, one 
month.  At trial, the jury had reached a determination 
that the combined sentence for the three convictions 
should be 35 years, nearly three times the upper end of 
the guidelines.  The circuit court refused any reduction 
in the sentence, specifically deferring to that jury 
verdict.  See Code § 19.2-298.01(A) ("In cases tried by a 
jury, the jury shall not be presented any information 
regarding sentencing guidelines.") 
Given the severity of the punishment and the 
potential for impeachment of the witnesses, the likelihood 
of a different result, at least as to sentencing, is 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the 
proceeding.  As explained by Judge Humphreys, writing for 
the majority of the Court of Appeals: 
Had the jury known of L.S.'s recorded interview 
statements, that the abuse occurred only at the 
white house between five and ten times and not 
at the trailer or her grandmother's house, the 
jury very well could have doubted the number of 
times Tuma sexually abused L.S., considering 
that her interview statements contradicted her 
33 
 
trial testimony.  It is reasonable to conclude 
that the evidence of repeated occurrences of 
sexual abuse at three separate locations 
impacted the jury's assessment of a proper 
punishment for Tuma. . . .  Therefore, the 
evidence was also material to Tuma's degree of 
punishment, and suppression of the recorded 
interview constituted a separate Brady violation 
on that basis. 
 
A jury could reasonably have awarded a lengthier sentence 
based on the more frequent abuse testified to at trial.  
In addition, the tape only referred to abuse in Tuma's 
bedroom at one house in which they lived, unlike L.S.'s 
testimony at trial which made references to him coming 
into her bedroom on multiple occasions and continuing to 
abuse her as they moved their residence to multiple 
locations, which a jury could have found more 
reprehensible.  There was also a discrepancy between the 
victim's testimony at trial and on the tape as to her 
mother's involvement in the alleged abuse, which may have 
had a dual impact on the credibility of the mother and the 
jury's determination of the appropriate punishment.  
Finally, the tape contained no references involving Tuma 
demanding she touch her younger brother in the bathtub, as 
testified to at trial, and which could reasonably be 
viewed as more significantly offensive behavior on the 
part of her stepfather.  Thus, even if Tuma would 
ultimately have been found to be guilty of the abuse, due 
34 
 
process entitled him to use these contradictions to 
attempt to mitigate the sentence levied upon him by the 
jury. 
For the aforementioned reasons, I would affirm the en 
banc judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
reversing the conviction and remanding for retrial as to 
both guilt and sentencing.