Case Title: Schiff v. Winchell

Citation: 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 32

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
on

426 Nev., Advance Opinion 22.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

RENATE SCHIFF, TRUSTEE, SCHIFF No. 63168
PROPERTIES,

Appellant, FILED
CALVIN WINCHELL, AN INDIVIDUAL

D/B/A CGL SEAFOOD, INC. AUG 12 2010
Respondent.

 

use
Appeal from a district court amended judgment in an
insurance action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; David
Wall, Judge.

 

Muije & Varricchio and John W. Muije, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Glade L. Hall, Reno,
for Respondent,

 

BEFORE HARDESTY, DOUGLAS and PICKERING, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, DOUGLAS, J.

In this appeal, we consider whether the district court erred
in determining that the date of the original judgment on a jury verdict,
rather than the date of an amended judgment entered on remand, was
the appropriate date for determining the rate of prejudgment interest.

We conclude that the district court did not err and that the appropriate

10 -20%61

 

 
dato for determining prejudgment interest is the date the original
judgment was entered.
FACTS

The initial suit in this case involved a dispute between a
commercial landlord and tenant. Respondent Calvin Winchell sued
appellant Renate Schiff, as trustee of Schiff Properties, for conversion.
‘The matter proceeded to trial and the jury found in Winchell’ favor. On
March 7, 2006, the district court entered a judgment against Schiff,
awarding Winchell monetary damages. The judgment was appealed and
this court issued an opinion on October 9, 2008, affirming in part,
reversing in part, and remanding with instructions to offset Winchell’s
award of damages by the amount he recovered under his insurance
poliey. See Winchell v. Schiff, 124 Nev. 938, 193 P.3d 946 (2008)
Pursuant to our instructions, the district court entered an amended
judgment on December 9, 2008.

During proceedings on remand, the parties presented
arguments regarding which judgment date should be used to determine
the rate of prejudgment interest. Schiff argued that December 9, 2008,
the date the amended judgment on remand was entered, is the
appropriate date for determining the prejudgment interest rate.
Conversely, Winchell argued that March 7, 2006, “[t]he date the
{original] judgment [was] entered[,] should be the date that prejudgment
interest should be set.”

After hearing arguments from both parties, the district court
determined that the proper date for determining the prejudgment
interest rate was March 7, 2006, the date the original judgment was

entered. This appeal followed.

 

 
ome

 

DISCUSSION

Schiff argues that the only appropriate judgment date for
purposes of determining prejudgment interest is December 9, 2008.
Schiff reasons that although the original judgment was entered
pursuant to the jury verdict on March 7, 2006, the only time an accurate
damage amount was conclusively determined was December 9, 2008.
Schiff contends that since the damage amount was not conclusively
determined and liquidated until the entry of the amended judgment
after remand on December 9, 2008, the March 2006 date should not be
the operative date for purposes of fixing the interest rate. Accordingly,
Schiff asserts that this court should reverse the judgment as entered and
direct the district court to enter a corrected judgment with interest set
by the rate effective on the December 9, 2008, amended judgment date.

Winchell counters that Lee v, Ball, 121 Nev. 391, 116 P.3d
64 (2005), clearly states that the appropriate interest rate for

 

prejudgment interest is “the single rate in effect on the date of
judgment.” Id, at 896, 116 P.3d at 67. Winchell argues that public
policy requires the effective interest rate be set on the date judgment is
entered, rather than after an appeal has been settled, because the date
judgment is entered is closer in time to the plaintiff's loss. Further,
Winchell suggests that setting the interest rate after an appeal would
provide an incentive for parties to pursue an appeal in hopes that the
interest rates will decrease over the course of the appeal.

Schiff responds by arguing that the unusual circumstance of
‘a significant modification to a judgment in this case requires that the
operative date for determining prejudgment interest be the date of entry
of the amended judgment after remittitur. Accordingly, Schiff argues
that “the date that a final undisputed, liquidated damage amount is

 
established is the date that should control” the applicable interest rate,
and therefore, December 9, 2008, is the operative date for determining
the prejudgment interest rate in this case.
Standard of review

“We review an award of prejudgment interest for error.”
Kerala Properti v. Familian, 122 Nev. 601, 604, 137 P.8d 1146,
1148 (2006). Pursuant to NRS 17.130(1) prejudgment interest is
awarded on judgments “for any debt, damages, or costs.” Further, NRS
17.130(2) allows for the award of prejudgment interest, and provides
that

When no rate of interest is provided by contract

or otherwise by law, or specified in the

judgment, the judgment draws interest from the

time of service of the summons and complaint

until satisfied, except for any amount

representing future damages, which draws

interest only from the time of the entry of the

judgment until satisfied, at a rate equal to the

prime rate at the largest bank in Nevada as

ascertained by the Commissioner of Financial

Institutions on January 1 or July 1, as the case

may be, immediately preceding the date of

judgment, plus 2 percent. The rate must be

adjusted accordingly on each January 1 and July

1 thereafter until the judgment is satisfied.
This court has said that “until satisfied” in NRS 17.130(2) occurs upon
the entry of the judgment in the district court. Lee, 121 Nev. at 396,
116 P.3d at 67.

tLe states, “[ulnder the plain language of NRS 17.1902), the
istrict court should have calculated prejudgment interest at the single
continued on next page... .

 

 

 
Date of judgment

We first look to statutory authority to determine which
judgment date triggers the applicable interest rate. NRS 17.130(2)
provides, in relevant part, that the interest rate to be applied to any
prejudgment interest is the rate that is established “immediately
preceding the date of judgment.” In this appeal, the district court
entered a judgment on the jury's verdict in March 2006 and the amended
judgment upon remand was entered in December 2008. Under NRS
17.130(2)'s plain language, we have not previously been called upon to
determine what judgment date applies when this court affirms in part,
reverses in part, and remands the matter to the district court with
instructions to offset a plaintiff's award. Thus, we turn to a Nevada rule
governing a similar issue and caselaw from other states for guidance.

RAP 37 establishes the judgment date for purposes of the
accrual of post-judgment interest when an appeal has been decided by
this court. Logically, the judgment date is the same for purposes of
determining the appropriate rate of prejudgment interest. Pursuant to
NRAP 87(a), “{ulnless the law provides otherwise, if a money judgment
in a civil case is affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law is payable
from the date when the district court's judgment was entered.”

Further, NRAP 37(b) states, “lif the court modifies or
reverses a judgment with a direction that a money judgment be entered

continued

rate in effect on the date of judgment.” Lee, 121 Nev. at 396, 116 P.3d at
67.

 

 
in the district court, the mandate must contain instructions about the
allowance of interest.” In our previous opinion, this court did not modify
or reverse the judgment with a direction that a judgment for money be
entered; we affirmed the judgment for money but remanded with
instructions to offset Winchell’s judgment by the amount he recovered
under his insurance policy. Winchell, 124 Nev. at 949-50, 193 P.3d at
953-64. This court has not previously made a determination as to
whether @ modification to the amount of a money judgment constitutes
an affirmation or a reversal of the original judgment, We take the
opportunity to do so now.

In neighboring states, courts have determined that when a
judgment is modified on appeal, the modification is treated as an
affirmation of judgment and interest accrues from the date of entry of
the original judgment. Pearson v, Schmitt, 492 P.2d 269, 270 (Or. 1971)
(The view as now taken by a majority of the states is that where a
money award has been modified on appeal ... then the interest on the
award, as modified, should run from the date of original judgment.”);
L.R. James, Annotation, Date From Which Interest on Judgment Starts
Running, as Affected by Modification of Amount of Judgment on Appeal,
4 ALR. 34 1221 (1965 & Supp. 2010); Stockton Theatres, Inc, v.
Palermo, 360 P.2d 76, 78 (Cal. 1961); Munoz v. City of Union City, 92
Cal. Rptr. 8d 527, 531 (Ct. App. 2009); Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc,, 987
P.2d 476, 478 (Or. 1999); Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d
470, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Fulle v, Boulevard Excavating, Inc.
610 P.24 387, 389 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). Each of these states considers

 

any modification on appeal, whether upward or downward, as an
affirmation of the original judgment. Stockton Theatres, 360 P.2d at 78;

 

 

 
oe

 

Munoz, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 531; Brown, 978 P.2d at 47; Lakin, 987 P.2d
at 478; Fulle, 610 P.2d at 389. We adopt the same rationale for Nevada.

Since this court effectively affirmed the original judgment in
the prior appeal in this case, we conclude that the original date of the
district court judgment should set the prejudgment interest rate as set
forth in NRS 17.130(2). Accordingly, we affirm the amended judgment
of the district court.

 

Douglas
We concur:
[nbn lesbey a
Hardesty
C rl
Pickering
7