Case Title: Contreras v. Industrial Commission

Citation: 403 P.2d 535, 98 Ariz. 221

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1965-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
98 Ariz. 221 (1965) 403 P.2d 535 Frank CONTRERAS, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona and Eric Lundeen, Inc., and Klaas Bros., Inc., Respondents. No. 8053. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. June 23, 1965. *222 Hirsch, Van Slyke, Richter & Ollason, Tucson, for petitioner. Chris T. Johnston, Phoenix, for respondent The Industrial Commission of Arizona, Richard J. Daniels, Frank E. Murphy, Jr., Robert A. Slonaker and Edgar M. Delaney, Phoenix, of counsel. LOCKWOOD, Chief Justice. On October 10, 1962, the Industrial Commission entered its findings to the effect that the above applicant was able to return to his usual occupation on August 15, 1962, and terminated any temporary disability payment from that date. Petitioner filed a notice of protest and a petition for rehearing. On March 11, 1963, after rehearing held on February 11, 1963, the Commission entered an order affirming the Commission's action of October 10, 1962. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-951 the Commission's order of March 11, 1963, stated that any party aggrieved by the order might, within thirty (30) days after the rendition of the order *223 "apply to the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona for a Writ of Certiorari to review the lawfulness of said order * * *." Section A of A.R.S. § 23-951 states: On May 31, 1963 the petitioner filed a Petition and Application for Readjustment or Reopening of the Claim. On July 16, 1963 the Commission denied the reopening of the petitioner's claim. On July 25, 1963 petitioner filed a Notice of Protest and Petition and Application for a Rehearing. On August 9, 1963 the Commission issued an "Order Denying Rehearing and Affirming Previous Findings and Award." Petitioner filed his petition for writ of certiorari on August 29, 1963. The Commission argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner's application for a writ of certiorari because the petitioner failed to file a petition for such writ within thirty days after the Commission's order of March 11, 1963, pursuant to the rehearing. We have repeatedly held that the thirty days limitation in A.R.S. § 23-951 for making application for a writ of certiorari is jurisdictional, and the petitioner's right to review in this Court is lost by failure to file within that time. Villanueva v. Phelps Dodge Corporation, 82 Ariz. 248, 311 P.2d 843; Harambasic v. Barrett & Hilp & Macco Corp., 58 Ariz. 319, 119 P.2d 932; Di Paolo v. Calumet & Arizona Mining Co., 36 Ariz. 347, 285 P. 680. Petitioner's reply brief acknowledges that the decision upon rehearing by the Commission was dated March 11, 1963 and that that decision allowed thirty days from March 11, 1963 for an aggrieved party to apply to this Court for a writ of certiorari pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-951. However the petitioner claims that the Commission is estopped from asserting the procedural bar created by A.R.S. § 23-951 against the petitioner because of a series of correspondence in 1963, initiated by the petitioner three days after the order of March 11, 1963. On March 14th petitioner's attorney wrote to the Commission, acknowledging receipt of the decision on rehearing, and stating: On April 8th the Commission by its Claims Compensation Supervisor responded to the letter of March 14th as follows: At no time between the period of March 11th when the order was handed down, and April 8th did the petitioner file a petition for writ of certiorari to this court. On April 10th petitioner's attorney answered the Commission's letter of April 8th. This was on the thirtieth day after the Commission's order on rehearing, by which time, pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-951 the petition for writ of certiorari should have been filed with this court. This letter to the Commission stated: *225 Seven days later, on April 17th the Commission responded to the petitioner as follows: Again, on May 6th the Commission wrote to the petitioner's attorney stating: On May 8th the petitioner's attorney sent the following letter to the Commission: On May 10th the Commission responded as follows: On May 14th the plaintiff's attorney replied as follows: As long ago as 1935 in Lilly White v. Coleman, 46 Ariz. 523, 52 P.2d 1157 this court stated the elements of equitable estoppel as follows: See also Knight v. Rice, 83 Ariz. 379, 321 P.2d 1037; Valley National Bank v. Battles, 62 Ariz. 204, 156 P.2d 244; and City of Glendale v. Coquat, 46 Ariz. 478, 52 P.2d 1178, 102 A.L.R. 837. In this case since the petition for writ of certiorari was filed more than five months after the March 11th order, and since there was no false representation or concealment of material facts by the Commission in any of the letters sent to the petitioner in response to the petitioner's original letter of March 14, 1963, in which the petitioner said that the whole matter seemed "like such a small amount to make a Supreme Court case out of * * *", and since the petitioner cannot claim lack of knowledge of A.R.S. § 23-951 nor lack of knowledge that the order of March 11, 1963, contained the thirty day clause, the petitioner cannot assert the claim that all of the essentials of estoppel were present. The petitioner may not create an estoppel of the effect of the statute by his own delay in compliance therewith. For the above reasons we hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for writ of certiorari. Order quashing writ of certiorari. UDALL and McFARLAND, JJ., concur.