Case Title: Commonwealth v. Gravely, S., Aplt. (Dissenting Opinion)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[J-190-2008] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. STEVEN GRAVELY, Appellant : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 9 EAP 2008 Appeal from the Judgment of Superior Court entered on 2/23/07 at No. 2772 EDA 2005 affirming the judgment of sentence entered on 9/1/05 in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-1009691-2004 SUBMITTED: November 21, 2008 DISSENTING OPINION MR. JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: May 27, 2009 The Commonwealth’s lead argument is that this appeal should be dismissed as improvidently granted. The primary reason is that Appellant’s claim arises under a superseded version of Rule 1925(b), and thus, this Court’s present holding would at most apply to a relatively few similarly situated appellants.1 Moreover, the Commonwealth highlights the existing, available procedure for individuals whose appellate rights were forfeited by their counsel on direct appeal through deficient 1 See generally Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund v. Commonwealth, 583 Pa. 275, 301, 877 A.2d 383, 398 (2005) (observing that in all judicial decisions the holding must be read against the underlying facts of the case); Commonwealth v. Singley, 582 Pa. 5, 15, 868 A.2d 403, 409 (2005) (expressing the axiom that “a statement in [a] prior opinion, which clearly was not decisional but merely dicta, ‘is not binding upon us’” (citation omitted)). [J-190-2008] - 2 stewardship, namely, the advancement of a post-conviction petition seeking reinstatement of direct-appeal rights. See Commonwealth v. Halley, 582 Pa. 164, 172, 870 A.2d 795, 801 (2005). Indeed, the Commonwealth essentially concedes such relief is available to Appellant in the post-conviction context. See Brief for Appellee at 17 (“[H]ad defendant simply filed a PCRA petition following the Superior Court’s February 2007 decision, he would most likely already have had merits review of his claim by now.”). Furthermore, the Commonwealth points to the Superior Court’s alternative holding that the single substantive issue Appellant seeks to pursue to challenge his conviction is waived for the independent reason that he failed to ensure transmission of a complete record on appeal. In light of this holding, which Appellant did not challenge in his petition for allowance of appeal and is outside the scope of our review, see Majority Opinion, slip op. at 5 n.3, the Commonwealth explains that no relief is available to Appellant in the present appeal in any event. I agree with the Commonwealth’s arguments on the above points; therefore, I would dismiss the appeal as improvidently granted. Additionally, it is my strong preference that any necessary adjustments to new Rule 1925 should be made through the rulemaking process. In my view, the experience with Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 420, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (1999), favors such an approach (since the effort in Lord and its progeny to announce and maintain an unyielding waiver approach outside the rulemaking process proved unworkable, triggering a substantial outcry from the legal community and culminating in the amendments to Rule 1925). For all of these reasons, I do not support the majority’s utilization of this appeal as a vehicle for imposing another bright-line rule. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 14 (“The failure to file . . . an application within the 21-day time limit set forth in Rule 1925(b)(2) will result in waiver of all issues not raised by that date.”). My concern arises, in particular, since the [J-190-2008] - 3 majority now appears to disavow the limited flexibility which we had just incorporated into the very recent rule amendments. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) (“In extraordinary circumstances, the [common pleas] judge may allow for the filing of a Statement . . . nunc pro tunc.”). Finally, I also differ with the majority’s perception that there is some ambiguity in new Rule 1925 in terms of whether an application should be written. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 12. As the Commonwealth also explains, under the explicit terms of the existing Rules of Appellate Procedure, “[u]nless another form is elsewhere prescribed by these rules, an application for an order or other relief shall be made by filing a written application for such order or relief with proof of service on all other parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 123(a). Since Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b)(2) does not specify any alternative form, I do not see that there is anything unclear about the requirement of a written application to obtain an extension of the time period for filing a statement of matters complained of on appeal. Mr. Chief Justice Castille joins this dissenting opinion.