Case Title: Hewitt v. L.E. Myers Co.

Citation: 2012-Ohio-5317

Docket Number: 2011-2013

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Hewitt v. L.E. Myers Co., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5317.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5317 
HEWITT, APPELLEE, v. L.E. MYERS COMPANY, APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Hewitt v. L.E. Myers Co., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5317.] 
Workers’ compensation—Immunity of complying employer—Intentional tort by 
employer—R.C. 2745.01—“Equipment safety guard” construed. 
(No. 2011-2013—Submitted September 25, 2012—Decided November 20, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 96138, 2011-Ohio-5413. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
As used in R.C. 2745.01(C), “equipment safety guard” means a device designed 
to shield the operator from exposure to or injury by a dangerous aspect of 
the equipment, and the “deliberate removal” of an equipment safety guard 
occurs when an employer makes a deliberate decision to lift, push aside, 
take off, or otherwise eliminate that guard. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} We are asked to decide whether “equipment safety guard” for 
purposes of R.C. 2745.01(C) includes only those devices on a machine that shield 
an employee from injury by guarding the point of operation of that machine and 
whether the “deliberate removal” of such an “equipment safety guard” occurs 
when an employer makes a deliberate decision to lift, push aside, take off, or 
otherwise eliminate that guard from the machine. 
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we hold that as used in R.C. 
2745.01(C), “equipment safety guard” means a device designed to shield the 
operator from exposure to or injury by a dangerous aspect of the equipment, and 
the “deliberate removal” of an equipment safety guard occurs when an employer 
makes a deliberate decision to lift, push aside, take off, or otherwise eliminate that 
guard. 
{¶ 3} Protective rubber gloves and sleeves are personal items that an 
employee controls and do not constitute “an equipment safety guard” for purposes 
of R.C. 2745.01(C).  An employee’s failure to use them, or an employer’s failure 
to require an employee to use them, does not constitute the deliberate removal by 
an employer of an equipment safety guard.  Consequently, the plaintiff failed to 
establish a rebuttable presumption of intent pursuant to R.C. 2745.01(C), and the 
defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  We reverse the judgment 
of the court of appeals and enter judgment in favor of appellant. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} Appellee, Larry Hewitt, was working as an apprentice lineman for 
appellant, the L.E. Myers Company, an electrical-utility construction contractor.  
Hewitt was a second-step apprentice, meaning that he had completed the first two 
steps in a seven-step program, and he was now working in the field. 
{¶ 5} On June 14, 2006, Hewitt was assigned to an L.E. Myers crew that 
was replacing old electrical power lines along Route 60 near New London, Ohio.  
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The crew met that morning for a short daily job briefing.  Workers who attended 
the briefing signed a daily job-briefing log.  Hewitt claimed that he was late and 
missed the meeting that morning; nevertheless, his signature appeared on the log. 
{¶ 6} Hewitt’s job that day was to tie in the new power line, which was 
de-energized.  Because the crew was short one person, Hewitt had to work by 
himself in an elevated bucket even though he was only an apprentice.  According 
to the daily job-briefing log, workers were required to use protective rubber 
gloves and sleeves that day, which was consistent with L.E. Myers’s policy, in 
case the lines became energized.  Hewitt admitted that gloves were available, but 
he claimed that Dennis Law, a lineman on the job, told him that he shouldn’t need 
the protective rubber gloves and sleeves because the line was de-energized.  Law 
disputed the conversation.  Hewitt did not wear them. 
{¶ 7} Law was directing traffic and supervising Hewitt’s work from the 
ground that day.  At some point, Law yelled to Hewitt from the ground.  When 
Hewitt turned in Law’s direction, the wire in his right hand came in contact with 
an energized line and he received an electric shock, which caused severe burns. 
{¶ 8} Hewitt applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits.  
He also filed a claim alleging a violation of a specific safety requirement, and the 
parties settled that case. 
{¶ 9} Hewitt filed this action against L.E. Myers alleging a workplace 
intentional tort in violation of R.C. 2745.01 and common law.  He alleged that 
L.E. Myers knew with substantial certainty that he would be injured when 
working alone in an elevated lift bucket near energized high-voltage power lines 
without the use of protective rubber gloves and sleeves.  Hewitt alleged that L.E. 
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Myers in effect removed the protective rubber gloves and sleeves that were safety 
guards creating a barrier between him and the electrical current.1   
{¶ 10} The case proceeded to a jury trial.  At the conclusion of the 
plaintiff’s case, L.E. Myers moved for a directed verdict as to liability under R.C. 
2745.01.  The trial court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate a direct intent to harm as required by R.C. 2745.01(A) and (B).  So 
the court limited the plaintiff’s theory of recovery to R.C. 2745.01(C), according 
to which the employer’s deliberate removal of an equipment safety guard creates 
a rebuttable presumption of an intent to injure. 
{¶ 11} The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hewitt.  The court overruled 
L.E. Myers’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
{¶ 12} L.E. Myers appealed the court’s denial of a directed verdict and 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  The court of appeals affirmed.  The court 
reasoned that the protective rubber gloves and sleeves were equipment safety 
guards within the meaning of R.C. 2745.01(C) and that the decision by Hewitt’s 
supervisor to place Hewitt alone in an elevated bucket close to energized wires 
without requiring him to wear protective rubber groves or sleeves amounted to the 
deliberate removal of an equipment safety guard.  Thus, the appellate court 
concluded, this established a rebuttable presumption under R.C. 2745.01(C) of an 
intent to injure Hewitt, and L.E. Myers had presented no evidence to rebut the 
presumption. 
{¶ 13} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal.  131 Ohio St.3d 1456, 2012-Ohio-648, 961 N.E.2d 1135. 
 
 
                                      
1 Hewitt also named as defendants the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation to the extent of its 
subrogation rights and the Ohio attorney general because the complaint asserted a challenge to the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2721.12.  They are not parties in this appeal. 
January Term, 2012 
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Analysis 
{¶ 14} A cause of action for an employer intentional tort is 
governed by R.C. 2745.01, which provides:  
 
(A) In an action brought against an employer by an 
employee * * * for damages resulting from an intentional tort 
committed by the employer during the course of employment, the 
employer shall not be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the 
employer committed the tortious act with the intent to injure 
another or with the belief that the injury was substantially certain 
to occur. 
 
(B) As used in this section, “substantially certain” means 
that an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee 
to suffer an injury, a disease, a condition, or death. 
 
(C) Deliberate removal by an employer of an equipment 
safety guard or deliberate misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous 
substance creates a rebuttable presumption that the removal or 
misrepresentation was committed with intent to injure another if an 
injury or an occupational disease or condition occurs as a direct 
result. 
 
 
{¶ 15} Today, we review the phrase “deliberate removal by an employer 
of an equipment safety guard” in R.C. 2745.01(C).2  L.E. Myers argues that “an 
equipment safety guard” means a safety device attached to a machine that is 
intended to guard an employee from injury and that “deliberate removal” occurs 
                                      
2 The trial court ruled that Hewitt had presented insufficient evidence of a direct intent to injure 
necessary to recover under R.C. 2745.01(A) and (B), and the court limited the plaintiff’s theory to 
the presumption of intent in R.C. 2745.01(C).   The issue of direct intent is not before us.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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when an employer makes a deliberate decision to eliminate that guard from the 
machine. 
{¶ 16} When construing a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and 
give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.  State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio 
St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 11.  We begin with the plain 
language and apply it as written in the statute.  State v. Chappell, 127 Ohio St.3d 
376, 2010-Ohio-5991, 939 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 17.  In doing so, we read words and 
phrases in context and according to the rules of grammar and common usage, and 
they must be given a technical or particular meaning if appropriate.  R.C. 1.42. 
A.  Definition of “An Equipment Safety Guard” 
{¶ 17} R.C. 2745.01(C) does not define these terms, so we look to the 
plain and ordinary meaning of the words.  Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 
36 Ohio St.3d 100, 103, 522 N.E.2d 489 (1988).  The court of appeals used the 
following definitions:  
  
“ ‘Guard’ is defined as ‘a protective or safety device; specif: a 
device for protecting a machine part or the operator of a machine.’  
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary [516 (10th Ed.1996)].  ‘Safety’ 
means ‘the condition of being safe from undergoing or causing hurt, 
injury, or loss.’  [Id. at 1027.]  And ‘equipment’ is defined as ‘the 
implements used in an operation or activity: APPARATUS.’ [Id. at 392.]” 
 
2011-Ohio-5413, ¶ 24, quoting Fickle v. Conversion Technologies, Internatl., 
Inc., 6th Dist., No. WM-10-016, 2011-Ohio-2960, ¶ 38. 
{¶ 18} The word “guard,” a noun, is modified by the adjectives 
“equipment” and “safety.”  Reading the words in context and according to the 
rules of grammar as we must, R.C. 1.42, we determine that the phrase “an 
January Term, 2012 
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equipment safety guard” means a protective device on an implement or apparatus 
to make it safe and to prevent injury or loss. 
{¶ 19} The Sixth District Court of Appeals so interpreted the phrase in 
Fickle v. Conversation Technologies Internatl., Inc., 6th Dist. No. WM-10-016, 
2011-Ohio-2960, modified by Breyer v. Rieter Automotive N. Am., Inc., 6th Dist. 
No. L-11-1110, 2012-Ohio-2807, 973 N.E.2d 318.  In that case, the plaintiff’s 
hand and arm were caught in a roller on an adhesive-coating machine.  She 
alleged that her employer had failed to train her to use a jog switch that would 
stop the roller when not depressed and also had disconnected an emergency stop 
cable.  The Fickle court concluded that these devices were not “equipment safety 
guards,” because they did not prevent the plaintiff’s hands from being exposed to 
the dangerous point of operation of the machinery she had been operating.  Id. at 
¶ 42. Thus, the court concluded that these facts did not demonstrate a “[d]eliberate 
removal by an employer of an equipment safety guard” to establish a presumption 
of intent under R.C. 2745.01(C). 
{¶ 20} Fickle rejected the argument that “equipment safety guard” 
included “ ‘any device designed to prevent injury or to reduce the seriousness of 
injury.’ ” Id. at ¶ 39.  “The General Assembly did not make the presumption 
applicable upon the deliberate removal of any safety-related device, but only of an 
equipment safety guard, and we may not add words to an unambiguous statute 
under the guise of interpretation.”  Id. at ¶ 42.  Thus, Fickle defined “equipment 
safety guard” as a “device that is designed to shield the operator from exposure to 
or injury by a dangerous aspect of the equipment.”  Id. at ¶ 43. 
{¶ 21} Other appellate districts in this state have similarly construed this 
phrase.  See Beary v. Larry Murphy Dump Truck Serv., Inc., 5th Dist. No. 2011-
CA-00048, 2011-Ohio-4977, ¶ 21 (“equipment safety guard” commonly means a 
device designed to shield the operator of equipment from exposure to injury by a 
dangerous aspect of the equipment; a vehicle’s backup alarm does not guard 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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anything);  Barton v. G.E. Baker Constr., 9th Dist. No. 10CA009929, 2011-Ohio-
5704 (a trench box to secure the sides of a trench from collapse is not “an 
equipment safety guard” because it is not a piece of equipment designed to protect 
an operator of equipment);  Roberts v. RMB Ents., Inc., 197 Ohio App.3d 435, 
2011-Ohio-6223, 967 N.E.2d 1263, ¶ 24 (12th Dist.) (a tire bead and bead taper, 
alleged safety features of a wheel-assembly unit, do not constitute “equipment 
safety guards,” because they are not  devices designed to shield the operator from 
exposure to or injury by a dangerous aspect of the equipment). 
{¶ 22} The court below did not agree that the “safety guard” must be 
attached to machinery.  The court reasoned that that interpretation would limit 
recovery for injured employees who did not work with equipment.  2011-Ohio-
5413, ¶ 20.  Likewise, Hewitt advocates that the phrase should apply broadly to 
any safety-related item that may serve as a barrier between the employee and 
danger, citing Beyer v. Rieter Automotive N. Am., Inc., 6th Dist. No. L-11-1110, 
2012-Ohio-2807, 973 N.E.2d 318 (6th Dist.), in support. 
{¶ 23} In Beyer, the Sixth District Court of Appeals agreed with the 
Eighth District’s expanded interpretation in Hewitt and concluded that even 
“personal protection equipment” such as face masks at a manufacturing plant was 
“equipment safety guards” because the masks were used to prevent the 
employee’s exposure to toxic dust.  Beyer modified Fickle and held that 
“equipment safety guard”  as used in R.C. 2745.01(C) may also include free-
standing equipment.  Id. at ¶ 12–13. 
{¶ 24} We do not agree.  To construe “equipment safety guard” to include 
any generic safety-related item ignores not only the meaning of the words used 
but also the General Assembly’s intent to restrict liability for intentional torts.  As 
the Ninth District observed in Barton v. G.E. Baker Constr., 2011-Ohio-5704, 
¶ 11, “[f]rom these common dictionary definitions, it becomes apparent that not 
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all workplace safety devices are ‘equipment safety guards’ as that term is used in 
Section 2745.01.” 
{¶ 25} A broad interpretation of the phrase does not comport with the 
General Assembly’s efforts to restrict liability for intentional tort by authorizing 
recovery “only when an employer acts with specific intent.”  Stetter v. R.J. 
Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C., 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 
N.E.2d 1092, ¶ 26;  Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 
2010-Ohio-1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, ¶ 56.  As we explained in Kaminski, the 
statutory restriction of intentional-tort liability “is supported by the history of 
employer intentional-tort litigation in Ohio and by a comparison of the current 
statute to previous statutory attempts.”  Id., ¶ 57.  It is not our role to second-
guess the policy matters set by the General Assembly.  Stetter at ¶ 35.  
Consequently, we refrain from expanding the scope of the rebuttable presumption 
of intent in R.C. 2745.01(C). 
{¶ 26} Free-standing items that serve as physical barriers between the 
employee and potential exposure to injury, such as rubber gloves and sleeves, are 
not “an equipment safety guard” for purposes of R.C. 2745.01(C).  Instead, rubber 
gloves and sleeves are personal protective items that the employee controls.  We 
adopt the definition in Fickle and hold that as used in R.C. 2745.01(C), 
“equipment safety guard” means “a device that is designed to shield the operator 
from exposure to or injury by a dangerous aspect of the equipment.” Fickle, ¶ 43. 
B.  Definition of “Deliberate Removal” 
{¶ 27} The court of appeals concluded that the employer’s decision to 
place Hewitt close to energized wires without requiring him to wear protective 
rubber gloves or sleeves amounted to the deliberate removal of an equipment 
safety guard.  We disagree. 
{¶ 28} The court below defined the words as follows:  “deliberate” means 
“ ‘characterized by or resulting from careful and thorough consideration—a 
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deliberate decision,’ ” and “remove” means “ ‘to move by lifting, pushing aside, 
or taking away or off’; also ‘to get rid of: ELIMINATE.’ ”  2011-Ohio-5413 at 
¶ 24, quoting Fickle, 2011-Ohio-2960, at ¶ 30–31. 
{¶ 29} Thus, the “deliberate removal” referred to in R.C. 2745.01(C) may 
be described as a careful and thorough decision to get rid of or eliminate an 
equipment safety guard.  Hewitt argues that “removal” is a broad term that 
encompasses more than just a physical removal.  Although “removal” may 
encompass more than physically removing a guard from equipment and making it 
unavailable, such as bypassing or disabling the guard, an employer’s failure to 
train or instruct an employee on a safety procedure does not constitute the 
deliberate removal of an equipment safety guard.  Fickle, 2011-Ohio-2960, at 
¶ 45.  See also Wineberry v. N. Star Painting Co., 7th Dist. No. 11MA103, 2012-
Ohio-4212 (employer’s failure to place guardrails around a perch and scaffolding 
was not a deliberate removal when the guardrails were never in place). 
{¶ 30} Consequently, we hold that the “deliberate removal” of an 
equipment safety guard occurs when an employer makes a deliberate decision to 
lift, push aside, take off, or otherwise eliminate that guard from the machine.  
Here, the employer’s failure to instruct Hewitt to wear protective items such as 
rubber gloves and sleeves and requiring Hewitt to work alone in an elevated 
bucket do not amount to the deliberate removal of an equipment safety guard 
within the meaning of R.C. 2745.01(C) so as to create a rebuttable presumption of 
intent. 
{¶ 31} Finally, Hewitt argues that the meaning of the terms in R.C. 
2745.01(C) is a question for the trier of fact to determine.  According to Hewitt, 
jurors could reasonably conclude that the protective rubber gloves and sleeves 
qualified under R.C. 2745.01(C) as “equipment safety guard[s]” that were 
“effectively eliminated” when Hewitt was told he did not have to wear them.  
Because the interpretation of undefined terms within a statute is a question of law 
January Term, 2012 
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for the court, we reject this argument.  Akron Centre Plaza, L.L.C. v. Summit Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 128 Ohio St.3d 145, 2010-Ohio-5035, 942 N.E.2d 1054. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 32} The protective rubber gloves and sleeves in this case do not, as a 
matter of law, constitute an equipment safety guard within the meaning of R.C. 
2745.01(C).  Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
order judgment in favor of the appellant. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and MCGEE BROWN, J., concur in judgment only. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 33} One of these days a company is going to surprise me and act 
honorably and with compassion.  They are going to acknowledge their complicity 
in the grievous injuries suffered by their employee, they are going to adequately 
compensate their employee for his or her injuries, and they are going to do so 
without resorting to every countervailing stratagem that their high-priced counsel 
can devise.  Today is not that day.  Even though L.E. Myers has implicitly 
acknowledged its complicity by firing every person involved in the incident that 
caused Larry Hewitt’s injuries, even though L.E. Myers knows that, through its 
employees, it acted irresponsibly, L.E. Myers does not have to suffer the 
consequences; only its apprentice does. 
I 
{¶ 34} The majority opinion ultimately concludes that “ ‘an equipment 
safety guard’ means a protective device on an implement or apparatus to make it 
safe and to prevent injury or loss.”  This is a plausible, though not the best, 
conclusion.  For one thing, it reads words into the statute, something courts are 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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not supposed to do.  See Columbus-Suburban Coach Lines, Inc. v. Pub. Util. 
Comm., 20 Ohio St.2d 125, 127, 254 N.E.2d 8 (1969), where we stated that this 
court has a duty “to give effect to the words used [in a statute], not to delete words 
used or to insert words not used.” 
{¶ 35} R.C. 2745.01(C) refers to “[d]eliberate removal by an employer of 
an equipment safety guard.”  The definition that the majority opinion has chosen 
to favor could have easily been written into the statute by changing three words:  
deliberate removal by an employer of a safety guard attached to equipment.  That 
is the definition the majority opinion prefers, but it is not the statute that was 
enacted. 
{¶ 36} Instead of adding words to the statute that the General Assembly 
could have easily added, instead of attempting to divine what the General 
Assembly intended, the better course is to read the statute as enacted and consider 
“equipment safety guard” as a unitary term.  Viewed in that light, “equipment 
safety guard” has a simple meaning: equipment that is used as a safety guard.  
There is no need to add words to the statute.  There is no need to divine intent.  
There is only a conclusion that the majority opinion does not want to 
countenance. 
{¶ 37} The General Assembly chose not to define “equipment safety 
guard.”  In my opinion, that is because they did not want an unduly restrictive 
meaning, one that they surely would have enacted had they chosen to.  There are 
many “equipment safety guards” that absent the majority opinion’s new 
constrictive interpretation would give rise to a rebuttable presumption of intent to 
injure.  Remember, the presumption is rebuttable, whereas the absence of the 
presumption is often, as in this case, dispositive. 
{¶ 38} One example of an “equipment safety guard” the removal of which 
should give rise to a presumption to injure is a kill switch.  Most dangerous 
machines have them.  Hitherto, most reasonable people would have thought that 
January Term, 2012 
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removing a kill switch would give rise to a rebuttable presumption of intent to 
injure.  Not anymore.  Employers are now free to remove kill switches without 
troubling over R.C. 2745.01(C).  Helmets, facemasks, and visors are other 
examples of equipment used as a safety guard, the removal of which will no 
longer lead to a rebuttable presumption of intent to injure.  Governors, which 
prevent certain machines from operating too quickly, may now be removed 
without concern that injuries that result will give rise to a rebuttable presumption 
pursuant to R.C. 2745.01(C).  None of these equipment safety guards fit within 
the majority opinion’s draconian interpretation of R.C. 2745.01(C).  The scope of 
the majority opinion is staggering and dangerous for employees. 
{¶ 39} The short-term consequences of affirming the court of appeals’ 
decision would be de minimis.  True, the employer would have to pay some 
money to its injured apprentice.  But this is an employer whose experienced 
supervisors told an apprentice that he shouldn’t wear gloves and sleeves, 
equipment safety guards designed specifically to prevent the type of injury that 
occurred.  Everyone involved with this case knows that the use of the equipment 
safety guards at issue would have prevented the apprentice’s injuries. 
{¶ 40} For the injured apprentice, the damages are a considerable amount 
of money, but for the employer, the sums involved are not significant.  L.E. 
Myers’s parent company, MYR Group, has a market capitalization of over $450 
million and earned over $18 million in profits in 2011.  The long-term 
consequences of reversing the court of appeals and imposing an unduly restrictive 
interpretation of “equipment safety guard” are potentially calamitous for Ohio’s 
workers because companies will have less incentive to ensure that their 
employees operate as safely as possible. 
II 
{¶ 41} Larry Hewitt sought recovery based on three grounds:  that L.E. 
Myers acted with the specific intent to injure him, R.C. 2745.01(A); that L.E. 
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Myers knew that its actions were substantially certain to injure him, R.C. 
2745.01(A) and (B); and that L.E. Myers was presumed to have intended to injure 
him, R.C. 2745.01(C).  The trial court indicated that it was going to limit the 
claim to the statutory presumption, though the court did not memorialize that 
conclusion in an entry.  In the event, the court instructed the jury as to the 
“specific intent” and “substantially certain” grounds contained in R.C. 2745.01(A) 
and (B).  Furthermore, the interrogatories addressed the concepts of substantially 
certain injury and conscious disregard for worker safety and did not address the 
statutory presumption.  There is no reason to assume that the jury confined itself 
to consideration of the statutory presumption.  To the contrary, there is ample 
reason to conclude that the jury considered the totality of R.C. 2745.01 in 
reaching its conclusion.  The majority opinion does not even mention the jury 
instructions or interrogatories. 
{¶ 42} Even with the majority opinion’s conclusion regarding R.C. 
2745.01(C), the case should not be decided on the motion for a directed verdict.  
Instead, it should be returned to the court of appeals to consider whether the jury’s 
conclusions with respect to R.C. 2745.01 (A) and (B) are sustainable.   
{¶ 43} I dissent. 
________________ 
 
Plevin & Gallucci Co., L.P.A., Frank L. Gallucci III, and Michael D. 
Shroge; and Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, for appellee. 
 
Tucker, Ellis & West, L.L.P., and Benjamin C. Sassé, for appellant. 
The Mismas Law Firm, L.L.C., and John D. Mismas, urging affirmance 
for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice.   
 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., and Brian D. Sullivan, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
 
Roetzel & Andress, Denise M. Hasbrook, and Emily Ciecka Wilcheck, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae FirstEnergy Corporation. 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
 
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, and Michael J. Hickey, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.P.A., and Robert R. Sant, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Ohio Chapter of the National Federation of Independent Business. 
 
Licata & Toerek and Elizabeth A. Crosby, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Council of Smaller Enterprises. 
______________________