Case Title: State ex rel. Shotts v. Austin Powder Co.

Citation: 1999-Ohio-474

Docket Number: 19962342

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. SHOTTS, APPELLANT, v. AUSTIN POWDER COMPANY ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Shotts v. Austin Powder Co. (1999), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission’s order denying impaired 
earning capacity compensation justified, when. 
(No. 96-2342 — Submitted January 13, 1999 — Decided February 10, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 95APD12-1643. 
 
On March 12, 1981, appellant-claimant, David L. Shotts, sustained a lumbar 
strain/sprain in the course of and arising from his employment with appellee 
Austin Powder Company.  He was thirty-nine years old and never worked again 
after June 25, 1981. 
 
In 1993, he applied for permanent partial disability compensation.  Appellee 
Industrial Commission of Ohio assessed claimant’s permanent partial disability at 
twenty-seven percent.  Claimant asked to receive his award in the form of 
impaired earning capacity (“IEC”) compensation under former R.C. 4123.57(A).  
A district hearing officer denied that motion “due to failure to provide [proof of] 
pre and post-injury earning capacity; and clear proof of present level of earning 
capacity in light of all factors of record.  In summary, the requirements of the 
‘Eaton II [State ex rel. Eaton Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 180, 
610 N.E.2d 992]’ case have not been met, at this time, which is the claimant’s 
burden.” 
 
A staff hearing officer denied claimant’s appeal, writing: 
 
“In addition to the findings noted by the District Hearing Officer, the Staff 
Hearing Officer specifically finds the claimant is 53 years old and has an 8th grade 
education.  His work history involved masonry work, which is considered medium 
to heavy labor.  However, as noted in the prior IC order, which denied permanent 
  
 
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total disability benefits, claimant’s young age (now 53) is considered a significant 
vocational asset in that over the next 15 years before claimant reaches retirement 
age[,] he can be vocationally retrained for employment [compatible] with the 
functional limitations outlined by Dr. [Timothy J.] Fallon in his report dated 
4/10/91 and Dr. [Paul F.] Gatens [Jr.] in his IC Specialist report, dated 3/1/88. 
 
“Accordingly, the vocational opinion dated 7/15/95, by Molly Williams, 
was not relied upon relative to the issue of establishing a post injury earning 
capacity relative to the issue of impairment of earning capacity.  Moreover, 
claimant testified that he has not sought medical treatment since 1/15/94.  He has 
not worked since 6/25/81.  He receives Social Security benefits.  At hearing he 
testified that he is being treated for a non[-]industrial emotional condition.  
Claimant has not sought vocational rehabilitation.  Finally, claimant has not 
looked for work with[in] the restrictions noted herein, since 1981.  Hence, lack of 
motivation and/or disability due to non[-]allowed conditions is not a basis to find 
that claimant ‘retains no post injury earning capacity.’  Hence, the Staff Hearing 
Officer finds that claimant has not shown that his lack of earnings is causally 
related to his 3/12/81 injury.” 
 
Further administrative review was denied. 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County.  The court denied the writ, after finding that the claimant had not 
satisfied his burden of proof in establishing IEC. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Michael J. Muldoon, for appellant. 
 
Duvin, Cahn & Hutton and Christine C. Covey, for appellee Austin Powder 
Company. 
  
 
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Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Craigg E. Gould, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Claimant asserts that he can do no work and offers the 
difference between pre-injury and post-injury earnings as proof of IEC.  The 
commission was unpersuaded by claimant’s position, as are we. 
 
The commission’s order contains several reasons for denying IEC 
compensation, any of which alone could sustain its decision.  Evidence of 
decreased wages, for example, does not establish an impaired earning capacity, 
which “connotes not what claimant did earn, but what he or she could have 
earned.” (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Eaton Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1993), 66 
Ohio St.3d 180, 183-184, 610 N.E.2d 992, 995; State ex rel. Johnson v. Indus. 
Comm. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 384, 387, 533 N.E.2d 775, 778. 
 
The commission also supported with “some evidence” its determination that 
there was no causal relationship between claimant’s allowed condition and his 
alleged IEC.  It observed that claimant’s allowed condition consisted solely of 
what was then a fourteen-year-old strain/sprain for which he no longer received 
treatment.  It accordingly rejected claimant’s assertion of an injury-related 
inability to work, relying on the reports of Drs. Fallon and Gatens, which 
established a physical capacity for both rehabilitation and reemployment. 
 
Finally, in speculating as to the true reason for claimant’s unemployment, 
the commission issued two findings that, in and of themselves, additionally 
support a denial of IEC compensation.  First, the commission noted that the sole 
condition for which claimant was being treated was a nonallowed psychiatric 
ailment.  Compensation, however, cannot be based in whole or part on nonallowed 
conditions.  State ex rel. Waddle v. Indus. Comm. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 452, 619 
  
 
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N.E.2d 1018.  The commission also found that claimant was receiving Social 
Security benefits and simply had no interest in working — an assertion that 
claimant does not vigorously dispute.  Because a claimant cannot successfully 
assert an IEC absent a desire to work, the commission’s finding presents an 
additional justification for denying IEC compensation.  See State ex rel. Pauley v. 
Indus. Comm. (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 263, 559 N.E.2d 1333. 
 
For these reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.