Case Title: Hillman v. Raymond

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hillman v. Raymond1987 WY 23733 P.2d 605Case Number: 86-208Decided: 03/04/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
Linda 
Irene HILLMAN, Appellant (Defendant)

 
 
v.

 
 
Roy 
Ellis RAYMOND, Appellee (Plaintiff)

 
 
Hunter 
Patrick and Denice E. Moewes, Student Intern of Patrick & Kitchen, Powell, 
for Appellant.

 
 
Stephen 
L. Simonton and C. Bradley Smith, II of Simonton & Simonton, Cody, for 
Appellee. 

 
 
Before 
Brown, C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ. Brown, C.J., delivered 
the opinion of the court; Cardine, J. filed a dissenting opinion. 

 
 
BROWN, 
Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
the district court's order finding appellee Roy Ellis Raymond not in contempt of 
the terms of a settlement agreement entered into with his former wife, appellant 
Linda Irene Hillman. The trial court found that appellee was no longer obligated 
to provide appellant with a new car each year under the settlement 
agreement.

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues on appeal:

 
 
"A. Can 
[appellee], by his own voluntary actions, cause a condition subsequent to occur, 
thereby discharging his duties under Paragraph 9 of the Property Settlement 
Agreement?

"B. Was 
it error for the Court to construe the condition loosely instead of strictly, 
thereby allowing [appellee] to be released from Paragraph 9 of the Property 
Settlement Agreement?

"C. Was 
it error for the trial judge to put the burden of proof on the 
[appellant]?"

 
 

[¶3.]     We will 
reverse.

 
 

[¶4.]     The parties were 
divorced and a decree entered on October 6, 1976. Incorporated into the divorce 
decree was a settlement agreement entered into by the parties on September 15, 
1976. At issue in this case is Paragraph 9 of the settlement agreement which 
reads:

 
 
"Roy [appellee] agrees to provide Linda [appellant] with 
adequate transportation generally being a new car each year for as long as 
Roy continues in 
the automobile business. * * * *"

 
 

[¶5.]     While married, the 
parties were joint owners of two automobile dealerships, one located in 
Powell, Wyoming, 
and the other located in Cody, Wyoming. 
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, appellee executed a promissory note 
agreeing to pay appellant $900 per month as partial payment of the joint 
interest held by appellant in the dealerships. Additionally, appellee agreed to 
provide appellant with a new car each year "for as long as Roy [appellee] continues 
in the automobile business."

 
 

[¶6.]     The evidence indicated 
that on August 19, 1980, appellee sold the Powell dealership, and on August 21, 
1980, appellee sold the Cody dealership. On September 9, 1980, appellee entered 
into an "Exchange Agreement" with William A. Workman and his wife Melva Workman, 
whereby the Workmans agreed to exchange all stock owned by them in an Idaho 
dealership for a deed to the real property held by appellee in Powell. The 
agreement further provided that the closing of the transfer of stock would take 
place ten days after approval was given by Ford Motor Company. Appellee 
testified he did not actually acquire stock in the Idaho dealership until 
December 4, 1980.

 
 

[¶7.]     The trial court held 
that appellee was not engaged in the automobile business for those three and 
one-half months from the time he sold the Powell dealership on August 21, 1980 
until December 4, 1980, when he actually acquired stock in the Idaho dealership. 
Consequently, the trial court held that appellee's obligation to provide 
appellant with a new car each year under the settlement agreement ceased when 
appellee sold the Wyoming dealerships.

 
 

[¶8.]     We will consider 
appellant's issues together. In her first issue, appellant asks whether appellee 
can voluntarily cause a condition subsequent to occur thereby discharging his 
(appellee's) obligation under the settlement agreement to supply appellant with 
a new car each year. In appellant's second issue, she asks whether the trial 
court erred in construing paragraph 9 loosely instead of strictly, thus allowing 
appellee to be released from his obligation.

 
 
"A 
condition subsequent is any fact the existence or occurrence of which, by 
agreement of the parties, operates to discharge a duty of performance after it 
has become absolute. * * * *" Calamari & Perillo, The Law of Contracts, § 
11-5, p. 385 (1977).

 
 

[¶9.]     In Kindler v. Anderson, Wyo., 
433 P.2d 268, 270-271 (1967), we stated:

 
 
"Conditions 
subsequent are not favored in the law and are to be strictly construed. J. M. Carey & Brother v. City of Casper, 66 Wyo. 437, 213 P.2d 263, 
268 (1950). Of course, conditions, like any other provision of a 
contract, are to be interpreted as the parties must have understood the 
conditions at the time. The true intention of the parties will control and that 
is to be ascertained from the language used in the writing as a whole, looking 
if necessary at the situation of the parties, the subject matter, and the 
purpose to be served. Pacific-Wyoming Oil Co. v. 
Carter Oil Co., 31 Wyo. 314, 226 P. 193, 
197, rehearing denied 31 Wyo. 452, 228 P. 284."

 
 
See 
also, Stockton v. Sowerwine, Wyo., 
690 P.2d 1202 (1984). However, we think a more accurate 
assessment of the issue involved here is simply whether the trial court erred in 
finding appellee was no longer obligated to supply appellant with a new car 
annually since the court found that appellee had not continued in the automobile 
business.

 
 

[¶10.]  The language of the contractual provision 
at issue here was that appellee agreed to provide appellant with a new car each 
year "* * * * for as long as [appellee] continues in the automobile business." 
At the time the agreement was made, appellee had two dealerships in Cody and 
Powell. As noted earlier, appellee sold the dealerships on August 19 and 21, 
1980. Some nineteen days later, on September 9, 1980, appellee entered into the 
exchange agreement to obtain stock in the Idaho dealership. While it is true that 
appellee did not actually obtain any stock in the Idaho dealership until 
December 4, 1980, he entered into the agreement only 19 days after selling the 
Cody dealership.

 
 

[¶11.]  We are unable to see how appellee 
discontinued being in the automobile business for purposes of the settlement 
agreement when he sold the Cody dealership and entered into an agreement to 
obtain another dealership within 19 days. Furthermore, appellee testified that 
before entering into the exchange agreement of September 9, 1980, he and a Ford 
Motor Company representative went to Idaho to look at the dealership in July, 1980. 
Appellee also examined the financial statements before signing the agreement of 
September 9, 1980. It is also noted that appellee looked at other dealerships 
with the prospect of possible purchase in 1978. Therefore, we are unable to 
determine that appellee discontinued his involvement in the automobile business, 
thus entitling him to terminate his obligation to provide appellant with a new 
car each year.

 
 

[¶12.]  If the language of a contract is clear, 
we need look no further than the four corners of the contract to determine the 
intent of the parties. Holst v. Guynn, Wyo., 696 P.2d 632 (1985); and Rouse v. Munroe, Wyo., 
658 P.2d 74 (1983). It seems clear that the parties intended 
that appellee give appellant a new car so long as he continued in the automobile 
business. If the parties had intended to make the contractual provision 
contingent solely upon appellee's continuing in the automobile business in Cody 
and Powell, they could have expressly stated so as they did in other provisions 
of the settlement agreement. We are unable to conclude that appellee 
discontinued his automobile business merely by disposing of one dealership and 
acquiring another.

 
 

[¶13.]  Our holding makes it unnecessary to 
address appellant's last issue regarding burden of proof.

 
 

[¶14.]  Reversed.

 
 
Cardine, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion. 

 
 
CARDINE, 
Justice, dissenting.

 
 

[¶15.]  I dissent.

 
 

[¶16.]  I would have affirmed the district court 
in its decision in the above case. The opinion of the court acknowledges that 
appellee was not in the "automobile business" for 19 days but concludes that, 
although not in business, he did not cease doing business. I cannot help but 
wonder what period of time would be sufficient to hold that he had ceased doing 
business. Would it be six months, a year, or ten years?  At least it is agreed that appellant 
ceased being in the "automobile business" in Cody and Powell, Wyoming, which 
were the automobile businesses within the contemplation of the parties when they 
made their agreement.

 
 

[¶17.]  For me the real question was the intent 
of the parties at the time the agreement was made. The trial court heard the 
testimony, observed the witnesses, evaluated their credibility, and resolved 
this question in favor of appellee. For this reason, I would 
affirm.