Case Title: Britton v. Bill Anselmi Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Britton v. Bill Anselmi Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc.1990 WY 7786 P.2d 855Case Number: 89-100Decided: 01/26/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming

REX A. BRITTON AND VERONICA K. 
BRITTON,

 APPELLANTS 
(PLAINTIFFS),

v.

BILL 
ANSELMI PONTIAC-BUICK-GMC, INC., 

APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District Court, Sweetwater County, 
Jere Ryckman, J.

James K. Lubing of Goody & Lubing, 
Jackson, for appellants.

Robert J. Pickett of Pickett & McKinney, 
Rock Springs, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, 
URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1]      
This is a lemon car lawsuit where, following numerous unsuccessful 
attempts to have their 1983 Buick Regal repaired, appellants Rex A. and Veronica 
K. Britton (Britton) brought suit against the seller of the vehicle, Bill 
Anselmi Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc. (BAI), and the manufacturer, General Motors 
Corporation (GM). Their complaint sought recovery of the $15,184.84 purchase 
price, incurred costs and attorney fees by allegations of fraud, breach of both 
express and implied warranties, and failure to comply with both the federal 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301-2312 and Wyoming's "Lemon Law", 
W.S. 40-17-101 (1989 Cum. Supp.). GM settled with Britton and the case proceeded 
to a bench trial against BAI. The district court allowed recovery for the 
dealership's breach of warranty, determined the Brittons had failed to establish 
their fraud claim or their claims under either of the two statutory causes of 
action, and only awarded damages of $1,500. The Brittons question contended 
district court errors:

1) * * * in 
ruling that fraud was not proven at trial when:

a) ample evidence of fraud was produced at trial, 
and

b) Appellant 
Veronica Britton was prohibited from testifying as to representations made to 
her by an agent of Appellee because of erroneous application of the hearsay 
doctrine?

2) * * * in not 
applying the Wyoming lemon law when the Appellee represented the car as a new 
car at the time of sale, and the car was covered under a new car 
warranty?

3) * * * in not 
applying the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act which applies to used as well as new 
cars?

[¶2]      
We reverse and remand.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[¶3]      
On December 4, 1984, the Brittons visited the Buick-Pontiac-GMC 
dealership in Rock Springs, Wyoming to purchase a car. Although initially 
intending to buy a new vehicle, they had become curious about BAI's radio 
advertisements trumpeting the arrival of a number of "Brass Hat" specials. Dick 
Boling, company salesman and an acquaintance of the Brittons, informed them the 
advertisements referred to certain low-mileage vehicles which had never been 
privately titled and had only been used as company cars by GM executives. 
Because such cars, with the availability of new car financing and their 12 
months/12,000 miles new car warranty, had been described as comparable to new 
vehicles, the Brittons permitted Boling to show them one of the "Brass Hat" 
specials, a 1983 Buick Regal. When they inquired about a dealer's identification 
sticker on the rear of the car, Boling explained that the vehicle had been used 
solely to transport GM executives to and from the Jackson, Wyoming airport, but 
that GM had permitted Teton Motors, Inc., a local Jackson dealership, to place 
the sticker on the car for advertising purposes. The Brittons bought the car and 
purchased additional warranty protection which extended the basic new car 
warranty to a term of 48 months/48,000 miles.

[¶4]      
The Brittons immediately experienced problems with the vehicle. Between 
the purchase date and June 1985, they repeatedly attempted to have BAI repair 
the following items: a malfunctioning tape deck, an "adjustable" heater that 
would deliver only cold air or air heated to eighty-five degrees, windows that 
would not fully close, a defective alternator, a non-functioning gas gauge, a 
leaking sun roof, broken electric seats, paint that washed off when the car was 
hosed down, a malfunctioning turbocharger, and a leaking and slipping 
transmission. The Brittons claimed that, during those six months, they had the 
car towed a number of times, took the car back for repair fifteen times, and 
lost the use of the vehicle due to repairs for forty-five days. Notwithstanding 
the time and effort presumably put into those repair efforts, the dealership 
managed to fix only the alternator, and that only after three tries. Compounding 
the frustration and inconvenience of these unsuccessful attempts to repair the 
car, one of the dealership's mechanics, harboring an unrelated personal grudge 
against Rex Britton, threatened to make the vehicle the instrument of his 
vengeance.1 
The Brittons, accordingly, engaged the services of an attorney.

[¶5]      
By this time, the parties' business relationship had become nearly as 
irreparable as the "Brass Hat" special. The Brittons resisted suggestions of 
further attempts at repair. BAI's alternative offer to exchange the 1983 Buick 
Regal for another vehicle, because it appeared limited to vehicles of lesser 
value than the Buick and appeared to require further expenditures by the 
Brittons to obtain a car of comparable value, met with similar resistance. 
Negotiations were further discouraged by the Brittons' discovery that their 
"new" vehicle had actually been owned previously by a Jackson man who had 
prevailed in a suit against Teton Motors, Inc. and GM after the dealership 
proved unable to correct a myriad of problems with the car. Many of the defects 
plaguing the prior owner were identical to the problems encountered by the 
Brittons.2 
Meanwhile, the "Brass Hat" special continued to tarnish in various garages and 
repair shops. On April 17, 1986, the Brittons filed the present 
lawsuit.

PROOF OF FRAUD

[¶6]      
At trial, the Brittons attempted to introduce both direct and 
circumstantial evidence that the salesman, Boling, had misrepresented the 
history of the purchased vehicle. The direct evidence consisted largely of the 
uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony by Rex Britton, and Veronica Britton to 
the extent as purchasing owner, she was permitted to testify as to statements 
made by Boling. The circumstantial evidence included newspaper advertisements, 
published a few days after the sale, which corroborated Boling's definition of a 
"Brass Hat" special and which confirmed that BAI was selling the purchased 
vehicle under such a guise. Additionally, the Brittons introduced evidence of 
the dealership's guilty plea to criminal charges that those advertisements, in 
describing the listed vehicles as "Brass Hat" specials, were knowingly false and 
misleading. The district court concluded that such evidence was insufficient to 
establish the Brittons' case for fraudulent misrepresentation.3

[¶7]      
The only rationale given for that conclusion appears in the district 
court's decision letter of February 13, 1989 which stated:

     Several of the 
exhibits go to the wrongdoing of Bill Anselmi, Inc. in the advertising of the 
car as a Brass Hat Special. The company was prosecuted and convicted for 
the fraudulent advertising. The testimony, however, was that the Plaintiffs did 
not go to the dealer for a Brass Hat Special but for a new car. The actual ad in 
evidence which led to the conviction ran in the newspaper three days after the 
Brittons purchased the car. The testimony also indicated that Bill Anselmi, Inc. 
advertised the car the same way G.M.C. advertised it to him.[4]

(Emphasis in original.) This statement 
suggests the district court conceived the Brittons' case for fraud to be based 
solely upon misrepresentations contained in the newspaper advertisements. 
Insofar as that characterization of the case is correct, the district court 
perhaps concluded: (1) the advertisements could not have induced the sale since 
they were not published until after the sale; (2) the advertisements could not 
have induced the Brittons to seek a "Brass Hat" special since they admitted 
that, despite the advertisements, they had gone to BAI to buy a new car; and (3) 
the car seller was not culpable because, having itself relied on the 
representations of GM, it made no knowing misrepresentations to the Brittons. We 
do not believe, however, that such a characterization of the Brittons' fraud 
case comports with the record. Their case rested, not on misrepresentations 
contained in the newspaper advertisements, but rather on the false statements of 
Boling. Because evidence regarding those statements was crucial to the Brittons' 
case, we turn our attention to the propriety of excluding much of that 
evidence.5

[¶8]      
When Veronica Britton was questioned about Boling's pre-sale 
representations, appellee entered a hearsay objection. The district court 
clearly erred in sustaining that objection over the Brittons' argument that 
statements made in Boling's capacity as BAI's agent were not hearsay. W.R.E. 
801(d)(2)(D) states:

(d) Statements 
which are not hearsay. - A statement is not hearsay if:

* * 
* * * *

     (2) Admission 
by Party-Opponent. - The statement is offered against a party and is * * * (D) a 
statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his 
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship.

Boling's statements as a car salesman, 
admittedly employed by the dealership at the time he sold the 1983 Buick Regal 
to the Brittons, were obviously offered against his employer. Any such 
statements made to Veronica Britton, a prospective customer, concerning the 
history of that vehicle were unquestionably "matter[s] within the scope of his 
agency or employment." W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D). Thus, those statements were not 
hearsay and were erroneously excluded. See Kobielusz v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 559, 
562 (Wyo. 1985). This was fundamental evidence of Brittons' case, and 
particularly so since, by the buyer's copy of the sales instrument, she was the 
only buyer. See n. 7 infra.

[¶9]      
BAI, however, asserts on appeal that, because Rex Britton testified 
concerning Boling's statements, any error in excluding Veronica Britton's 
testimony must be harmless. We cannot agree. While the substance of her 
testimony might be apparent from the record, we cannot with any assurance assume 
that its quality or scope would have been identical to that given by her 
husband. Had Veronica Britton's testimony proved more convincing than her 
husband's, or had it been strongly corroborative of his testimony, the district 
court might not have so easily limited its examination of BAI's putative fraud 
to a consideration of the misleading newspaper advertisements. Although the 
district court appears to have given little weight to Rex Britton's testimony 
regarding the seller's pre-sale representations, focusing instead solely on the 
proof of its after-the-fact advertisements, we are unable to conclude that it 
would do so again in the face of additional testimony for it is clear the 
Brittons established a prima facie case of fraudulent misrepresentation.6

[¶10]   To make such 
a case, the Brittons needed to introduce evidence that the BAI salesman 
knowingly made a false representation of a material fact with the intent of 
inducing them to buy the car, and that they were induced to make the purchase, 
to their detriment, by their reasonable reliance upon his statements. See 
Willmschen v. Meeker, 750 P.2d 669, 672 (Wyo. 1988); Garner v. Hickman, 709 P.2d 407, 410 (Wyo. 1985); and Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433, 437 (Wyo. 1985). 
Evidence of any active conduct or words by Boling which tended to produce an 
erroneous impression might sufficiently satisfy that burden if those half truths 
had the effect of lies. Although BAI and its salesman were under no legal duty 
to speak on the matter of the 1983 Buick Regal's ownership history, once they 
chose to speak they were obligated to fully and fairly disclose the truth of the 
matter. Meeker v. Lanham, 604 P.2d 556, 558 (Wyo. 1979); Simpson v. Western 
National Bank of Casper, 497 P.2d 878, 880 (Wyo. 1972); Twing v. Schott, 80 Wyo. 
100, 338 P.2d 839, 841 (1959).

[¶11]   The Brittons 
even met their burden without the challenged testimony of Veronica Britton. Rex 
Britton testified that Boling completely fabricated an account of the 1983 Buick 
Regal's presence in Jackson, thereby embellishing upon the false claim that it 
had only seen use as a GM company car. The company owner testified that no one 
in his organization had any such detailed knowledge of the vehicle's history. It 
is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the history of a vehicle would 
not be material to a prospective purchaser. Since the Brittons had gone to the 
automobile sales company with the intent of purchasing a new vehicle, Boling's 
fabrication appears to have served its obvious purpose of diverting the 
Brittons' plans and inducing them to purchase the used 1983 Buick Regal.7

[¶12]   We recognize 
at bench trial it is the provence of the district court to determine whether 
fraud has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek 
Holding En Financiering, B.V., 762 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Wyo. 1988); Duffy, 708 P.2d  
at 437; Meyer v. Ludvik, 680 P.2d 459, 464-65 (Wyo. 1984). However, it has long 
been the position of this court that testimony favoring a party which is both 
uncontradicted and unimpeached cannot be wholly ignored during the district 
court's deliberations. Crompton v. Bruce, 669 P.2d 930, 933 (Wyo. 1983); Creek 
v. Town of Hulett, 657 P.2d 353, 357 (Wyo. 1983); Twing, 338 P.2d  at 841. Thus, 
we will not ordinarily disturb its decision regarding the existence of fraud 
unless it is unsupported by the evidence or is against the great weight of the 
evidence on record. True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781, 793 (Wyo. 
1989); Walter v. Moore, 700 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Wyo. 1985); Meeker, 604 P.2d  at 
558. Because the Brittons' prima facie case of fraud is both unimpeached and 
uncontradicted, we assume that the district court gave due consideration to the 
evidence of Boling's statements, despite its apparent concentration on BAI's 
post-sale misrepresentations. We cannot intrude on what may have been merely the 
district court's assessment of a witness' credibility. However, we must allow 
for the possibility that, with the addition of Veronica Britton's testimony, the 
district court might find the weight of evidence shifted in the Brittons' favor. 
We, therefore, decline BAI's invitation to hold the erroneous exclusion on 
Veronica Britton's testimony harmless, and accordingly remand for further 
consideration of the Brittons' fraud claim.

APPLICABILITY OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY 
ACT

[¶13]   We also 
remand the Brittons' claim for relief under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty 
Act for reconsideration by the district court. The Act provides, at 15 U.S.C. § 
2310(d) (emphasis added):

(1) Subject to 
subsections (a)(3) and (e), a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a 
supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under 
this title * * *, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service 
contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief 
-

     (A) in any 
court of competent jurisdiction in any State * * *.[8]

The Brittons were clearly "consumers" under 
the Act, and BAI was just as clearly a "supplier."9 
Furthermore, the district court expressly found the Brittons entitled to relief 
under a breach of warranty theory. Although the district court's decision letter 
and the remainder of the record do little to clarify whether the promise the 
district court found breached would best be characterized under the Act as a 
written warranty, an implied warranty, or a service contract, we cannot help but 
to conclude that it must fall under one or a combination of these headings and 
particularly so because an extra $350 was paid for acquisition of the warranty 
as a result of the sales negotiations.10 
We therefore hold the Brittons have established their cause of action under the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and remand for a determination of their entitlement 
to the Act's expanded remedies.11

APPLICABILITY OF WYOMING'S "LEMON LAW"

[¶14]   In its 
decision letter, the district court makes the following comments regarding the 
Brittons' warranty protection: 

Plaintiffs are 
entitled to recover under a cause of action for Breach of Warranty. * * 
*

* * 
* * * *

     * * * The 
warranty was not in effect when Mr. Britton "spun a rod" in December, 1987, 
because mileage on the vehicle exceeded 51,558 which was the limit.

While this statement fails to eliminate the 
possibility that the district court may also have considered the Brittons 
entitled to relief under an implied warranty, and while the record is unclear as 
to whether the document referenced in that statement would more aptly be 
characterized a written warranty or a service contract under the Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act, there is only one document in the record which the district court 
could have had in mind. That is the instrument which allegedly extended the 
Brittons' 12 months/12,000 miles warranty protection to a term of 48 
months/48,000 miles, and which was variously described as an "extended warranty" 
or a "repair agreement."

[¶15]   Regardless of 
the label placed on this document, the district court identified only one 
characteristic of the agreement which excluded the Brittons from the protection 
of Wyoming's "Lemon Law," W.S. 40-17-101 (1989 Cum.Supp.). The district court's 
opinion letter states:

     As mentioned in 
the Summary Judgment Opinion letter, this car was not new as it had 6,558 miles 
on it when purchased by the Brittons. (Even the ad reflected as much.) The 1983 
car was purchased in December, 1984 when new cars were 1985 models. And, 
although there was some conflict in testimony, the contract states "used".[12] 
Therefore, Wyoming's Lemon Law does not apply

That is, the district court found Wyoming's 
"Lemon Law" inapplicable because the warranted vehicle was not "new", as that 
word is usually and commonly employed.

[¶16]   Indeed, 
portions of the definitional and remedial subsections of the statute suggest 
such a conclusion. W.S. 40-17-101(a)(iv), (b) and (c) (emphasis added) 
state:

     (iv) 
"Manufacturers' express warranty or warranty" means the written warranty, so 
labeled, of the manufacturer of a new motor vehicle, including any terms 
or conditions precedent to the enforcement of obligations under 
warranty.

     (b) If a new 
motor vehicle does not conform to all applicable express warranties and the 
consumer reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer, its agent or its 
authorized dealer within one (1) year following the original delivery of the 
motor vehicle to the consumer, the manufacturer, its agent or authorized dealer 
shall make repairs necessary to conform the vehicle to the express warranties. 
The necessary repairs shall be made even if the one (1) year period has 
expired.

     (c) If the 
manufacturer, its agents or authorized dealers are unable to conform the motor 
vehicle to any applicable express warranty by repairing or correcting any defect 
or condition which substantially impairs the use and fair market value of the 
motor vehicle to the consumer after a reasonable number of attempts, the 
manufacturer shall:

     (i) Replace the 
motor vehicle with a new or comparable motor vehicle of the same type and 
similarly equipped; or

     (ii) Accept 
return of the motor vehicle and refund to the consumer and any lienholder as 
their interest may appear the full purchase price including all collateral 
charges less a reasonable allowance for consumer's use.

Because the term "new vehicle" is undefined 
under the statute, one would normally be justified in adopting the position of 
the district court that such a vehicle is one which has had no prior owner and 
one which has seen only the negligible mileage associated with test driving and 
transport between assembly line to showroom. Such is not the case, 
however.

[¶17]   W.S. 
40-17-101(a)(i)(A), (B) and (C) define a "consumer" as any person:

     (A) Who 
purchases a motor vehicle, other than for purposes [purpose] of resale, to which 
an express warranty applies; or

     (B) To whom a 
motor vehicle is transferred during the term of an express warranty applicable 
to the motor vehicle; or

     (C) Entitled by 
the terms of an express warranty applicable to motor vehicle to enforce 
it.

It is clear from subsections (B) and (C) of 
this definition that a consumer need not be the first owner of a "new vehicle" 
to be entitled to the protection of the statute, so long as either the 
manufacturer gave the first owner of that vehicle an "express warranty" which is 
still in effect at the time of transfer to the consumer or the consumer has been 
given such a warranty by the manufacturer. The crucial fact is not that the 
vehicle has been previously owned, nor that the vehicle has been driven a 
substantial number of miles, but rather that the transfer of the vehicle to the 
consumer occurs during the term of a prior warranty or is accompanied by a new 
warranty. To read the definition otherwise would be to ignore the plain language 
of subsections (B) and (C) and to render them superfluous. This definition, 
however, clearly conflicts with the district court's criteria for a "new 
vehicle," lack of prior ownership and substantial mileage, thereby rendering the 
term "new vehicle" ambiguous.

[¶18]   This court 
will abide by the plain language of a statute so long as the meaning of the 
statute is, by such a reading, clear and unambiguous. When ambiguity arises, 
though, we resort to well-settled principles of statutory construction, reading 
all portions of the statute in pari materia under the assumption that the 
legislature intended no part of its enactment to be inoperative or superfluous. 
We construe every word, every clause and every sentence so as to avoid rendering 
the legislature's actions futile or absurd. Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228, 231 
(Wyo. 1988); Deloges v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 
750 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Wyo. 1988); Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139, 1142 
(Wyo. 1985).

[¶19]   The 
legislature expressed, by definition, an intent to extend the benefits of the 
"Lemon Law" to three classes of "consumers": (1) those who were the first 
purchasers of a "new vehicle" under its "manufacturer's express warranty"; (2) 
those who became the subsequent owner of a "new vehicle" prior to the lapse of 
the "manufacturer's express warranty" given to the first purchaser of the 
vehicle; and (3) those subsequent owners of a "new vehicle" who otherwise 
obtained the protection of a "manufacturer's express warranty." The common 
feature of each of these consumer classes is not that they were the first 
purchasers of a current model year vehicle with a blank odometer. Thus, we 
cannot use that feature to define a "new vehicle" without voiding the benefit 
the legislature intended to bestow. The circumstance that binds all these 
consumers is that the manufacturer chose to make an express "new vehicle" 
warranty applicable to their vehicles. Only by including all such vehicles 
within the definition of the term "new vehicle" can the full breadth of 
legislative protection find effect. Only by such means can the ambiguities of 
this statute be resolved to render all parts of the statute 
operative.

[¶20]   In the 
present case, the Brittons' 1983 Buick Regal was at least initially provided a 
"full new car warranty." Such being the case, it was a "new vehicle" for 
purposes of the Lemon Law and the Brittons were entitled to have the vendor 
remedy its defects according to the statutory standard. Since, as the district 
court found, the Brittons were damaged by BAI's failure to conform the vehicle 
to what the district court characterized as an express warranty, the Brittons 
were entitled by W.S. 40-17-101(j) to "bring a civil action to enforce this 
section and * * * recover reasonable attorney's fees from the manufacturer who 
issued the express warranty." Accordingly, they could seek any of the remedies 
of W.S. 40-17-101(b) and (c) set out above. The district court erred in its 
determination that Wyoming's "Lemon Law" was inapplicable under the facts of 
this case.

[¶21]   We reverse 
the decision of the district court which denied the Brittons relief under their 
claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and 
Wyoming's "Lemon Law," and remand for retrial.

CARDINE, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part.

[¶22]   I concur with 
the result reached by the majority in this case and, for the most part, concur 
with the reasoning by which it arrived at that result. However, because the 
majority has deviated from sound and customary principles of statutory 
construction in its treatment of Wyoming's "Lemon Law," I am compelled to take 
issue with that portion of the court's opinion.

[¶23]   W.S. 
40-17-101(a)(i) (June 1989 Cum. Supp.) provides:

"`Consumer' means 
any person:

"(A) Who 
purchases a motor vehicle, other than for purposes [purpose] of resale, to which 
an express warranty applies; or

"(B) To whom a 
motor vehicle is transferred during the term of an express warranty applicable 
to the motor vehicle; or

"(C) Entitled by 
the terms of an express warranty applicable to a motor vehicle to enforce 
it."

While I agree with the court's assertion 
that subsections (A), (B) and (C) of this provision clearly extend statutory 
protections to three distinct classes of consumers, I depart from its reasoning 
in distinguishing those classes.

[¶24]   The court's 
opinion assumes that all consumers protected by this statute share two 
characteristics: they are all "purchasers" of vehicles, and they are all 
entitled to enforce an express warranty. The court reasons that, if the 
statute's application is confined to new vehicles, little remains to 
differentiate between the three consumer classes. It concludes that subsections 
(A), (B) and (C) are redundant under such a reading, thereby rendering the 
statute ambiguous. Accordingly, the court abandons the plain and usual meaning 
of the term "new vehicle" and, instead, defines it as a vehicle carrying a "new 
vehicle warranty." By such means, the majority differentiates between the three 
classes of consumers based on three different circumstances under which they 
have received such warranties: (1) first purchasers of new vehicles which carry 
the customary new car warranty; (2) subsequent purchasers of such vehicles who 
become such prior to the lapse of the original new car warranty; and (3) those 
subsequent purchasers who obtain such vehicles from a dealer after the lapse of 
the original warranty but who receive equivalent warranty 
protection.

[¶25]   Because the 
plain meaning of the statutory language clearly delineates and distinguishes the 
three protected classes of consumers without redundancy or ambiguity, these 
contortions were wholly unnecessary. Contrary to the majority's analysis, I 
perceive these "consumers" to share but a single attribute: they all have some 
interest in a "new vehicle," as that term is commonly understood, which carries 
the customary new car warranty. They are not all "purchasers," as the majority 
suggests. In fact, the ownership interest enjoyed by a purchaser distinguishes 
the "consumer" defined in subsection (A) from the two alternative consumer 
classes defined in subsections (B) and (C). Subsection (B) refers to a 
non-purchasing party to whom some ownership interest in the new vehicle has 
nevertheless been transferred during the term of the original new car warranty. 
Clearly, that subsection describes the circumstances of lenders having a 
security interest in the vehicle. It is equally clear that subsection (C) has 
extended the protections of the statute to those without any such ownership 
interest in the vehicle. That is, the legislature has included among "consumers" 
not only purchasers and non-purchasing transferees of new vehicles but also 
those leasing new vehicles.

[¶26]   Reading the 
definition of "consumer" in this manner achieves a reasonable result from the 
plain meaning of the statutory language and avoids any of the redundancy or 
ambiguity perceived by the majority. The Wyoming "Lemon Law," W.S. 40-17-101, is 
restricted in its application to new cars only, providing in part as 
follows:

"(b) If a new 
motor vehicle does not conform to all applicable express warranties and the 
consumer reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer, its agent or its 
authorized dealer within one (1) year following the original delivery of the 
motor vehicle to the consumer, the manufacturer, its agent or authorized dealer 
shall make repairs necessary to conform the vehicle to the express warranties. 
The necessary repairs shall be made even if the one (1) year period has 
expired.

"(c) If the 
manufacturer, its agents or authorized dealers are unable to conform the motor 
vehicle to any applicable express warranty by repairing or correcting any defect 
or condition which substantially impairs the use and fair market value of the 
motor vehicle to the consumer after a reasonable number of attempts, the 
manufacturer shall:

"(i) Replace the 
motor vehicle with a new or comparable motor vehicle of the same type and 
similarly equipped; or

"(ii) Accept 
return of the motor vehicle * * *." (emphasis added)

A 1983 Buick, having 6700 miles on its 
odometer when purchased in 1985 by its second owner, is not a new car. I, 
therefore, respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion 
holding that appellant is entitled to the protection of Wyoming's "Lemon 
Law."

[¶27]   I concur in 
the resulting remand of this case, nevertheless, because recovery may be had by 
plaintiff under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

FOOTNOTES

1 Britton was a Wyoming Highway Patrolman 
assigned to the Rock Springs division and had previously arrested the mechanic 
"for numerous traffic violations." On a trip to the garage for repair, Britton 
testified:

[T]his gentleman [the BAI mechanic] came up to me and 
says Officer Britton, remember me. I said yes, I do. And he said I just want you 
to remember one thing, the next time you bring your car in here, I'm going to be 
the one that works on it, and I just want you to remember what goes around comes 
around.

Q. 
You didn't take your car in there after that?

A. 
No, sir. I was afraid to.

In fairness, testimony was also 
given on behalf of appellee that this "technician" was fired when the employer 
confirmed the threat had been made to the customer.

2 The condition of the vehicle in first 
ownership by Richard and Linda Martin in Jackson before title was transferred to 
the unsuspecting buyers in Rock Springs is vividly described by the Teton County 
District Judge in an opinion letter in awarding judgment of $20,964.41 
(including attorney fees and nominal punitive damages) to the Martins for their 
problems for possession in the period between May 26, 1983 and when the keys 
were handed back to the vendor on September 24, 1984. The district court, in the 
opinion letter, after relating the initial history of the purchase by the 
Martins, stated:

In 
any event, the 1983 Buick Regal in question (Regal) arrived 2 months 15 days 
after it was ordered. It arrived without the electric seat which had been 
ordered, but which had been placed on the new car sticker on the window of the 
Regal and had been paid for by the consumer and by Teton Motors. In fact, Tom 
Shear, the salesman, stated it was the first time in his experience as a car 
dealer that the manufacturer charged for an item which had not come with the car 
and been placed on the sticker. That, of course, was only one of the problems as 
the Court finds this car was a "lemon" from the outset.

Not 
only was the electric seat not installed, but there was a dent in the hood, 
there was bad painting on the side of the car and the overspray had been sprayed 
on the chrome and the windows, the windows did not seat, there were scratches on 
the paint, the passenger window squeaked and there was a leak in the 
transmission. This was not the only trouble because later, after the car had 
been returned to Teton Motors by the Martins, it was found that there was also 
an engine oil leak in the Regal.

The district court then related 
the history of the period of total frustration from purchase to redelivery of 
the keys, including attempted repair and continued problems. According to the 
district court:

On 
September 24th they returned to Jackson but, when coming up Parley's Canyon from 
Salt Lake City, the car began to smoke and transmission fluid was again leaking. 
They again bought transmission fluid at the top of Parley's Canyon just east of 
Salt Lake City and limped back to Jackson. They called Earl Auge on September 
26th; Mr. Martin explained they had had it and that they had "had all the fun 
they could have with this car." On that date, Mr. Martin took the car to Teton 
Motors where he was to visit with Mr. Auge, but it appears that Mr. Auge was 
busy, so Mr. Martin went to the rear of Teton Motors, left the car outside and 
waited for Mr. Auge. After waiting what he felt a reasonable amount of time, Mr. 
Auge did not appear, he told the service manager he was turning the car back and 
handed they keys over. The plaintiffs have not had possession of the Regal since 
that date.

3 Initially, the Brittons were called to 
inquire at that automobile sales agency by a radio advertisement for the "Brass 
Hat" special. The significance of the newspaper advertisement by contention of 
the Brittons as published three days after purchase was that it was 
demonstrative proof in print confirming the text of the identical statement by 
the salesman which had been the basis of their initial purchase. They admitted 
they did not rely on the newspaper advertisement, but that information was 
identical to the earlier radio advertisement and the sales pitch of the BAI 
employee at demonstration and purchase discussions. The asserted defense of 
appellee that the vehicle was only sold as a normal buy-back vehicle was 
impacted by both the newspaper advertisement and guilty plea which inferred to 
the contrary.

Boling did not testify at 
trial, having both left the dealership employ and moved from the community. The 
record reflects efforts of the Brittons to find him in the Gillette, Wyoming 
area. Whether his former employer knew anything about his whereabouts by trial 
time is undisclosed in this record. Consequently, tie-in relations between what 
he said or did is also undisclosed as, for example, who handled directions for 
typing on the differentiated sales and warranty instruments and who got the car 
title for the buyer from the Sweetwater County Clerk in Green River, Wyoming. 
See n. 5, n. 7 and n. 12, infra.

It is noted that between 
September 24, 1984 and December 4, 1984, the vehicle reappeared in Rock Springs 
on the BAI sales floor. As detailed in n. 5, infra, title had not been 
transferred from the Martins to anyone prior to the delivery in Rock Springs. A 
sticker was found on the back of the car in large letters reflecting "Teton 
Motors, Inc., Jackson Hole, Wyoming." This advertising symbol had been explained 
to the Brittons by salesman statement that the car had been used between Jackson 
and the airport in that community and that, for advertising purposes, the local 
dealer was given the right to install the sticker.

4 We do not understand where this 
conclusion was derived since the record reveals without dispute that the radio 
advertisement for the "Brass Hat" special was an inducement for their initial 
visit to, and inquiry from the seller about the purchase of that kind of 
vehicle.

5 The undisputed testimony of Britton 
denies suggestion that the status of this car as a used Wyoming vehicle was 
unknown to BAI personnel. Britton explained that, in bolting down a child 
restraint seat by removal of the back seat, he discovered a "name badge that 
said Dick Martin on it." He then described:

Q. 
Did you ever find out who this Dick Martin was?

A. I 
found out later on that Mr. Martin was the original purchasing 
owner.

Q. 
How did you find that out?

A. 
In June of '85, we had contacted our private attorney, Mr. Leonard Kaumo, to 
look into the possibility of a Lemon Law suit against Mr. Anselmi. He told me to 
go over and secure a copy of the title, and I went over to the Green River 
Courthouse, downstairs in the building here, and talked to the auto licensing 
people, the Clerk of Court, asked her for a copy of my title. She handed me a 
copy of it and it said used on the title. That's the first time I'd ever seen 
the title. I asked her to see the application for title, she went and got it, 
and on the back of it, it stated that Mr. Martin had been the owner of the 
vehicle previous to me.

Q. 
Did you do any follow-up to find out anymore about the history of that 
car?

A. 
Yes, I did. I called Mr. Martin in Jackson and he told me that the car had been 
involved in a lengthy lawsuit in Teton County and that he eventually went to 
court, the Judge found in favor of the Plaintiff, Mr. Martin, and the car was 
repurchased by General Motors or given back to General Motors.

With this undisputed evidence, 
we have an established record that when BAI received the car, it was accompanied 
by a title issued to a Wyoming resident which, in the nature of things, would 
have been assigned in blank by the Martins when they settled with GM as the 
result of the Teton County litigation. The title the seller received for 
transfer of ownership to the Brittons would have been issued in the name of the 
Jackson resident and the vehicle itself carried the logo for Teton Motors, Inc., 
Jackson Hole, Wyoming. If GM had secured a re-issued title upon settlement with 
the Martins, its name rather than the Martins' would have appeared on the 
application of transfer of title obtained by BAI for Britton in Sweetwater 
County. It is realistic to recognize that GM may have also committed fraud on 
the dealership by delivery of a vehicle without explaining the tale of woe when 
first sold in the adjoining community. At the same time, appellee was provided 
information that the vehicle had been issued in the name of an individual. With 
a mileage of only 6,700, an expert in the automobile sales business could 
conclude that something was, at best, strange in "western Wyoming."

6 The guilty plea to the fraudulent 
newspaper advertisements, which were similar to the radio advertisements and the 
same as the salesman's spiel in a transactional evaluation, provides probative 
strength to evidence addressing contentions of fraud. This record provides not 
the semblance of an indication that the Brittons were told that this vehicle was 
a second-owner, repossession or lemon reject from Jackson, Wyoming.

7 Careful examination of the sales 
documents reveal what is sometimes called double layering sales papers. See 
Wales v. Roll, 769 P.2d 899, 904 (Wyo. 1989), Urbigkit, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part. The printed form used for the retail sales contract was 
the General Motors Acceptance Corporation Z-109WY printed form which obviously 
comes in a set of quadruplicate instruments as a carbonized combination. At 
issue in the case was controversy about the Brittons' knowledge that the car was 
used. Rex Britton testified, as did Veronica Britton, that they had signed one 
copy and then were handed another copy which they signed without examination, 
since each was required to be signed in the original. Present exhibits reveal 
that these two forms, even though part of a carbonized set, were not the same. 
Examination of the lower portion of the form (even from the xerox copies 
presented in evidence) reveals that a one typing process was used for most of 
the insertions on the forms. The two forms were, however, typed separately for 
the information at the top left where the names were different for the purchaser 
with Rex Britton included in one and not on the other and the first form which 
was signed as buyers' copy stating nothing in the space for designation of new 
or used and the car model was stated to be a Buick Englewood, while the second 
form, which was the dealer's copy, was typed in altered form to state in the 
space for new or used, "used," and a different make and model "Buick Regal." 
When the top form, as a part of a carbonized set, comes out typed differently 
from succeeding instruments in the same set, it is sometimes described as double 
layering sales documents.

After purchase on December 4, 
1984, with anticipated acquisition of a new car warranty "just like the 
newspaper advertisement said and the salesman promised," the customer was 
charged a sales amount of $350 for "an extended warranty." The Brittons first 
learned about the unavailability of the promised warranty by a letter from BAI 
dated May 15, 1985 which stated:

Due 
to the age of your vehicle it cannot be covered as a new car under the 
Automobile Mechanical Repair Agreement service contract.

The 
cost of the plan $350.00, has been credited to your account with 
GMAC.

I 
apologize for any inconvenience.

8 Subsection (e) deals with the 
availability of class actions under 15 U.S.C. § 2310 and is inapplicable to the 
present case. Subsection (a)(3) permits warrantors to establish informal dispute 
settlement mechanisms, conforming to the Federal Trade Commission rules, and to 
require consumers to utilize those mechanisms as a prerequisite to suit. Nothing 
in the record suggests that subsection (a)(3) would prevent the maintenance of 
the Brittons' suit. Additionally, research suggests GM discontinued the use of 
such mechanisms prior to the filing of this suit. See 54 Fed.Reg. 21,070 n. 2 
(1989).

9 15 U.S.C. § 2301 defines those terms in 
the following manner:

(3) 
The term "consumer" means a buyer (other than for purposes of resale) of any 
consumer product, any person to whom such product is transferred during the 
duration of an implied or written warranty (or service contract) applicable to 
the product, and any other person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty 
(or service contract) or under applicable State law to enforce against the 
warrantor (or service contractor) the obligations of the warranty (or service 
contract).

(4) 
The term "supplier" means any person engaged in the business of making a 
consumer product directly or indirectly available to consumers.

10 Written warranties, implied warranties 
and service contracts are distinguished by 15 U.S.C. § 2301 in this 
way:

(6) 
The term "written warranty" means -

(A) 
any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the 
sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature 
of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or 
workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a 
specified period of time, or

(B) 
any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a 
consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with 
respect to such product in the event that such product fails to meet the 
specifications set forth in the undertaking,

which 
written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part of the basis of the 
bargain between a supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such 
product.

(7) 
The term "implied warranty" means an implied warranty arising under State law 
(as modified by sections 108 and 104(a)) [15 U.S.C. § 2308 and 2304(a)] in 
connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product.

(8) 
The term "service contract" means a contract in writing to perform, over a fixed 
period of time or for a specified duration, services relating to the maintenance 
or repair (or both) of a consumer product.

11 In addition to the traditional damages 
remedy afforded for warranty breach under W.S. 34-21-293 and 34-21-294, 15 
U.S.C. § 2310(d) permits, in cases concerning the breach of written or implied 
warranties or service contracts, various forms of equitable relief and the award 
of costs and attorney's fees. We note at this point in our discussion that this 
appeal aims primarily to enlarge the remedies available to the Brittons. Should 
they ultimately prevail on their fraud claim, a variety of equitable remedies, 
including rescission and return of a portion of the purchase price, would 
conceivably become available under W.S. 34-21-299.1 and this court's decision in 
Meyer, 680 P.2d 459. Similarly, replacement of the automobile or a return of the 
purchase price would become available should the Brittons establish their right 
to relief under Wyoming's "Lemon Law", discussed below. While the Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act, to some extent, duplicates the remedies afforded by alternative 
theories of recovery, its real value lies in its provision of costs and fees 
with fewer of the restrictions imposed by Wyoming's "Lemon Law", the only other 
source of such relief.

12 The finding failed to reflect that the 
copy of the sales documents given the buyer did not reflect that the vehicle was 
used. It was only the second dealer's copy which contained that notation. See n. 
7, supra.

From the documents furnished, 
we do not know whether this vehicle was a used 1983 Buick Regal or a new Buick 
Englewood. Exhibit 5 (owner's copy), which was the warranty-repair agreement, 
stated that the vehicle was a new 1983 Englewood, one copy of the sales 
agreement conditional sales document provided that it was an Englewood without 
designation, and another that it was a Regal as used. A check of VIN numbers 
throughout the documents and in comparison to the text of the guilty plea for 
false advertising, which then related to work orders, would define the vehicle 
as a Regal, 1983 model. Count I of the Information, Case No. Cr-8810-0048, 
Sweetwater County, stated:

and 
knowingly cause an advertisement to be disseminated on December 7, 1984 in the 
Rock Springs Rocket Miner for a 1983 Buick Regal, VIN 1G4AK4780DH951867 which 
stated that said vehicle was a "Brass Hat" special or a General Motors car 
driven by General Motors executives with the intent to promote the sale of such 
property when it knew that said advertisement was false and misleading; Contrary 
to W.S. Section 6-3-611 - FALSE ADVERTISING.