Case Title: State v. Smith

Citation: 2008-Ohio-1260

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Smith, 117 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-1260.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SMITH, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Smith, 117 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-1260.] 
In determining whether an offense is a lesser included offense of another when a 
statute sets forth mutually exclusive ways of committing the greater 
offense, a court is required to apply the second part of the test established 
in State v. Deem to each alternative method of committing the greater 
offense — Theft is a lesser included offense of robbery. 
(No. 2007-0268 — Submitted November 28, 2007 — Decided March 26, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 
No. C-060077, 2006-Ohio-6980. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
In determining whether an offense is a lesser included offense of another 
when a statute sets forth mutually exclusive ways of committing the 
greater offense, a court is required to apply the second part of the test 
established in State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294, 
paragraph three of the syllabus, to each alternative method of committing 
the greater offense. 
 
2. 
Theft, as defined in R.C. 2913.02, is a lesser included offense of robbery, 
as defined in R.C. 2911.02. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The issue presented for consideration in this appeal concerns 
whether the offense of theft is a lesser included offense of the crime of robbery.  
Appellate courts have reached different conclusions on this question, prompting 
us to resolve the issue.  We hold that theft is a lesser included offense of robbery. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 2} The events giving rise to our current consideration arose on April 
7, 2005, when Danielle Smith, Lashay Meadows, and Meadows’s children 
shoplifted merchandise from the Macy’s department store located in the Tri-
County Mall in Hamilton County.  On that day, Rachel Cornett, a Macy’s loss-
prevention supervisor, saw the group with a shopping cart that had empty Macy’s 
bags in it.  Cornett went to the security office to watch Smith and Meadows on the 
security monitors. Cornett watched as Smith and Meadows removed multiple 
items from the clothing racks, took them into the fitting rooms, and then returned 
only some of the items to the clothing rack.  During Smith’s trial, the court 
viewed the store’s tape of what Cornett had seen on the monitors.  The closed-
circuit footage corroborated Cornett’s observations.   
{¶ 3} As the group began to leave the store, Meadows and her children 
pushed the cart past all the sales counters, with Smith following several feet 
behind.  After Meadows and her children left the store with the cart, Roger 
Sauerwein, Macy’s loss-prevention manager, stopped them.  Seeing the 
confrontation, Smith began looking at clothing on a rack, and at that point, 
Sauerwein asked that she accompany him to the security office.  While walking 
toward the office, Smith tipped over a display table and began hitting Sauerwein 
and Cornett with hangers.  When they tried to get hold of Smith, she bit them.  
During this time, Smith told Meadows to take the children and leave. 
{¶ 4} The shopping cart contained more than $1,600 worth of clothing. 
{¶ 5} After further investigation, a grand jury indicted Smith for robbery 
in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(3), alleging that “in committing or attempting to 
commit a theft offense * * * [Smith] used or threatened the immediate use of 
force against” Sauerwein and Cornett.  Smith waived a jury trial, and the case was 
tried to the court.  At the close of evidence, the trial judge found overwhelming 
evidence that Smith had participated in the theft of the clothing.  Specifically, the 
court stated, “Having sat through this trial, I find the testimony of the defendant 
January Term, 2008 
3 
with regard to not knowing that she was involved in a theft offense – I find that to 
be incredible.  I viewed the videotape; there is no question she was acting in 
concert.”  The trial court expressed doubt, however, with respect to the robbery 
charge.  It therefore found Smith guilty of fifth-degree felony theft as a lesser 
included offense of robbery. 
{¶ 6} Smith appealed her conviction to the Hamilton County Court of 
Appeals, arguing that fifth-degree felony theft is not a lesser included offense of 
robbery, because an offender could commit a robbery without committing a theft.  
In addition, she urged that fifth-degree felony theft differs from robbery in that it 
requires the state to prove that “the property or services stolen is five hundred 
dollars or more and is less than five thousand dollars,” R.C. 2913.02(B)(2), while 
robbery has no element regarding the value of stolen property. She therefore 
asserted that petty theft, a first-degree misdemeanor containing no value element, 
was the greatest offense of which she could have been convicted. 
{¶ 7} The appellate court cited State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 
533 N.E.2d 294, in which we modified the test announced in State v. Kidder 
(1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 279, 513 N.E.2d 311, to determine whether an offense was 
a lesser included offense of another.  The court of appeals stated that theft did not 
appear to be a lesser included offense of robbery, because robbery could be 
committed by depriving a victim of property valued at less than $500, while theft 
involved property valued at $500 or more.  Nonetheless, the court felt constrained 
by State v. Davis (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 91, 6 OBR 131, 451 N.E.2d 772, in which 
this court determined that theft by threat is a lesser included offense of robbery, 
and it therefore affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 
{¶ 8} Smith appealed that determination to this court, and we granted 
discretionary review. 
{¶ 9} The three-part test we set forth in Deem provides:  “An offense 
may be a lesser included offense of another if (i) the offense carries a lesser 
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penalty than the other; (ii) the greater offense cannot, as statutorily defined, ever 
be committed without the lesser offense, as statutorily defined, also being 
committed; and (iii) some element of the greater offense is not required to prove 
the commission of the lesser offense.”  Deem, 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 
294, paragraph three of the syllabus.  We have repeatedly stated that “[i]n 
determining whether an offense is a lesser included offense of the charged 
offense, ‘“the evidence presented in a particular case is irrelevant to the 
determination of whether an offense, as statutorily defined, is necessarily included 
in a greater offense.” ’ ”  Shaker Hts. v. Mosely, 113 Ohio St.3d 329, 2007-Ohio-
2072, 865 N.E.2d 859, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Barnes (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 26, 
759 N.E.2d 1240, quoting State v. Kidder (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 279, 282, 513 
N.E.2d 311.  See also State v. Koss (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 218-219, 551 
N.E.2d 970.  Deem was intended to require analysis of the statutory elements 
conducted in the abstract without reference to the specifics of any individual case. 
{¶ 10} Because the offense of robbery carries a greater penalty than the 
offense of theft, and because robbery contains an element that the offense of theft 
does not, Smith’s contention is with respect to only the second element of the 
Deem test. 
{¶ 11} R.C. 2911.02 defines “robbery” and states:   
{¶ 12} “(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense or in 
fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, shall do any of the following:   
{¶ 13} “ * * *  
{¶ 14} “(3) Use or threaten the immediate use of force against another.” 
{¶ 15} R.C. 2913.02 defines “theft” and states:   
{¶ 16} “(A) No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or 
services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or 
services in any of the following ways: 
January Term, 2008 
5 
{¶ 17} “(1) Without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give 
consent; 
{¶ 18} “(2) Beyond the scope of the express or implied consent of the 
owner or person authorized to give consent; 
{¶ 19} “(3) By deception; 
{¶ 20} “(4) By threat; 
{¶ 21} “(5) By intimidation.” 
{¶ 22} The troublesome part of the Deem test is the second part, which 
requires that “the greater offense cannot, as statutorily defined, ever be committed 
without the lesser offense, as statutorily defined, also being committed.” 
(Emphasis added.) Deem, 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294, paragraph three of 
the syllabus.  The problem occurs because as statutorily defined, robbery contains 
one element that may be proved alternatively—as theft or attempted theft.  Since 
the crime is defined as constituting mutually exclusive alternatives, it is possible 
for robbery to be committed without committing theft if the robbery is committed 
by an attempted theft. 
{¶ 23} Based on this problem with the test, Smith argues that theft is not a 
lesser included offense of robbery and cites our decision in State v. Carter (2000), 
89 Ohio St.3d 593, 734 N.E.2d 345, a death-penalty case in which Carter raped 
his adoptive grandmother and killed her by stabbing her 18 times before taking 
$150 in cash from her purse and fleeing.  In that case, Carter argued that the court 
erred by failing to instruct the jury on theft, which he claimed was a lesser 
included offense of aggravated robbery.  Id. at 599-601. 
{¶ 24} In Carter, we applied Deem and concluded that theft was not a 
lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, because the offense of aggravated 
robbery could be committed in the course of an attempted theft, which does not 
require the accused to actually exert control over the property of another, while 
the crime of theft does; hence, according to Deem, the greater offense – 
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aggravated robbery – could be committed without the lesser offense – theft – also 
being committed. 
{¶ 25} Carter, however, conflicted with an earlier decision holding to the 
contrary, State v. Davis (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 91, 95, 6 OBR 131, 451 N.E.2d 772, 
on which the court of appeals in this case relied.  Davis held that theft is a lesser 
included offense of robbery because it is a crime of lesser degree and contains no 
element that is not also an element of robbery.  Id. at 95.  Although Davis was 
decided before Deem, the court asked questions similar to those asked in Deem. 
But rather than determining whether a robbery can be committed without 
committing a theft, as required by part two of the test, the court in Davis 
determined only that theft does not include any element that is not also an element 
of robbery, a different inquiry. 
{¶ 26} We explain the discrepancy between the outcomes in Carter and 
Davis by noting that Deem, upon which Carter relied, did not analyze an offense 
of the type here; that is, an offense that by statutory definition included as one of 
its elements “committing or attempting” to commit another offense.  In fact, the 
court used kidnapping, R.C. 2905.01, as its “pedagogic example.” Deem, 40 Ohio 
St.3d at 209, 533 N.E.2d 294.  Kidnapping differs from robbery in that in order to 
prove kidnapping, the prosecutor is not required to prove as one of the elements 
that the defendant committed or attempted to commit another crime. 
{¶ 27} We therefore modify the analysis required by Deem to address 
statutes like robbery, in which one element of the offense can be satisfied by 
proving either that the defendant actually committed another offense or attempted 
to commit it.  This analysis looks at each alternative separately, similar to the 
method set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Whalen v. United States 
(1980), 445 U.S. 684, 694, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715. See also Pandelli v. 
United States (C.A.6, 1980), 635 F.2d 533, 537 (“The theory behind the [Whalen] 
analysis is that a criminal statute written in the alternative creates a separate 
January Term, 2008 
7 
offense for each alternative and should therefore be treated for double jeopardy 
purposes as separate statutes would”).  We adopted a similar test in State v. Zima, 
102 Ohio St.3d 61, 2004-Ohio-1807, 806 N.E.2d 542, for analyzing when 
successive prosecutions are permissible.  In that case, we held that when looking 
at “a statute containing alternative elements, each statutory alternative should be 
construed as constituting a separate offense and analyzed accordingly.” Id. at ¶ 
40. 
{¶ 28} Accordingly, when applying the second part of the Deem test in 
cases involving statutes phrased in the alternative, such as the robbery statute, a 
court must consider each alternative method of committing the greater offense 
when deciding whether “the greater offense cannot, as statutorily defined, ever be 
committed without the lesser offense, as statutorily defined, also being 
committed.”  Therefore, in determining whether an offense is a lesser included 
offense of another when a statute sets forth mutually exclusive ways of 
committing the greater offense, a court is required to apply the second part of the 
test established in Deem, 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294, paragraph three of 
the syllabus, to each alternative method of committing the greater offense.  
Because robbery may be committed by either committing a theft or attempting to 
commit a theft, there are two possible ways to commit the offense: robbery by 
theft or robbery by attempted theft.  If these two alternatives are essentially 
treated as separate offenses, then fifth-degree felony theft is a lesser included 
offense of robbery as statutorily defined in the alternative of robbery by theft, 
because it would be impossible to ever commit a robbery by theft without also 
committing a theft. 
{¶ 29} Accordingly, theft, as defined in R.C. 2913.02, is a lesser included 
offense of robbery, as defined in R.C. 2911.02. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 30} Thus, based on our holding that theft is a lesser included offense of 
robbery, the trial court properly convicted Smith of the lesser included offense of 
theft. 
{¶ 31} Smith also argues that theft requires proof of the value of the 
property stolen, while robbery has no such element.  But the elements of theft do 
not include value.  Rather, value is a special finding to determine the degree of 
offense, but is not part of the definition of the crime.  Thus, Smith’s position is 
not well taken. 
{¶ 32} Accordingly, we clarify our decision in Deem and affirm the 
judgment of the appellate court. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 33} This case should have been resolved by a simple entry: “Reversed 
on the authority of State v. Carter (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 734 N.E.2d 345.”  
In Carter, this court was asked, for all intents and purposes, the same question 
that it faces today — is theft a lesser included offense of robbery? — and 
answered no:  
{¶ 34} “The issue becomes whether aggravated robbery * * * can ever be 
committed without theft * * * also being committed.  We answer that question in 
the affirmative because aggravated robbery can be committed in the course of an 
‘attempted theft.’ R.C. 2913.02; 2923.02.  Theft requires the accused to actually 
obtain or exert control over the property or services of another; attempted theft 
does not. Since theft is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, the 
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trial court did not err by not providing a lesser-including-offense instruction.” 
Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d at 601, 734 N.E.2d 345. 
{¶ 35} In State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294, this 
court established a tripartite test for determining whether one offense is a lesser 
included offense of another.  Carter is the only case decided by this court on this 
issue since the promulgation of the Deem test.  Carter could not be more clear and 
could not be more clearly applicable to this case.  It was my impression that this 
court accepted jurisdiction in this case because the appellate court simply had 
overlooked this court’s decision in Carter – the case is not even mentioned in the 
appellate court’s decision.  But the majority also ignores this court’s decision in 
Carter.  Does the majority overrule Carter?  No – it is more important to the 
majority to perpetuate the folly of Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 
216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, and its almost-always-inapplicable set of 
factors for overruling precedent than it is to set forth a coherent jurisprudence.  
Thus, the law in Ohio now says that theft is a lesser included offense of robbery 
but that theft is not a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery.  Welcome to 
Wonderland. 
{¶ 36} To get to this point, the majority relies upon a United States 
Supreme Court case, Whalen v. United States (1980), 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 
1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715, that this court has rejected on multiple occasions.  Whalen 
addresses the issue of allied offenses of similar import in federal criminal statutes; 
it does not address how to determine whether one offense is a lesser included 
offense of another.  Although Whalen is not exactly on point, it could be 
considered instructive on the issue of lesser included offenses had it not been 
roundly rejected by this court on multiple occasions, as discussed below. 
{¶ 37} In Whalen, a felony-murder case, the defendant was convicted and 
sentenced consecutively for both rape and felony murder.  Rape was one of the 
six lesser offenses that could become an element of a felony-murder charge.  The 
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government argued in Whalen that since there were six separate crimes that could 
satisfy the underlying felony requirement for felony murder, felony murder did 
not require proof of rape, and a defendant thus could be sentenced for both rape 
and felony murder.  The court, however, held, “In the present case, * * * proof of 
rape is a necessary element of proof of the felony murder, and we are 
unpersuaded that this case should be treated differently from other cases in which 
one criminal offense requires proof of every element of another offense.”  
Whalen, 445 U.S. at 694, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715. 
{¶ 38} This court has repeatedly held the exact opposite regarding Ohio’s 
aggravated-murder statute, holding that defendants can be convicted of and 
sentenced for both the underlying element (rape, kidnapping, arson) as well as for 
aggravated murder.  “This court has repeatedly held that aggravated murder and 
kidnapping are not allied offenses of similar import under R.C. 2941.25.  See 
State v. Coley (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 265, 754 N.E.2d 1129; State v. Keenan 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 154, 689 N.E.2d 929; State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio 
St.3d 22, 32-33, 559 N.E.2d 464.” State v. Elmore, 111 Ohio St.3d 515, 2006-
Ohio-6207, 857 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 51.  See also State v. Richey (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 
353, 369, 595 N.E.2d 915, overruled in part, on other grounds, by State v. 
McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112;  State v. Grant (1993), 67 
Ohio St.3d 465, 474-475, 620 N.E.2d 50; State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 
331-332, 595 N.E.2d 884. 
{¶ 39} Whalen has been specifically repudiated by this court.  In State v. 
Rance (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 636-637, 710 N.E.2d 699, this court adopted 
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Whalen as the law in Ohio.  In State v. Zima, 102 
Ohio St.3d 61, 2004-Ohio-1807, 806 N.E.2d 542, cited by the majority, this court 
recognized the inapplicability of Whalen in Ohio, noting that this “court rejected 
Whalen’s treatment of alternative-element statutes in the context of determining 
whether two crimes constitute ‘allied offenses of similar import’ for purposes of 
January Term, 2008 
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cumulative punishments under R.C. 2941.25.” Zima, 102 Ohio St.3d 61, 2004-
Ohio-1807, 806 N.E.2d 542, ¶ 40, fn. 3.  Zima identified one exception to this 
court’s blanket rejection of Whalen — where a defendant is tried successively for 
the same act. Id.  This court made clear that Whalen is applicable in Ohio only in 
those successive prosecution cases. 
{¶ 40} The majority, by its own admission, essentially creates two new 
crimes in Ohio’s criminal code – robbery by theft and robbery by attempted theft.  
Must prosecutors respond to this court’s decision by indicting defendants for 
either robbery by theft or robbery by attempted theft?  Will they indict for both to 
cover their bases?  If so, that is rather ironic: we would not even be hearing this 
case had the prosecutor in this case simply indicted the defendant for both theft 
and robbery.  To correct that mistake in this inconsequential case, the majority has 
had to ignore this court’s own precedent, rely on other, semi-relevant precedent 
that this court has already rejected, meddle with the Deem test, which has been in 
place for nearly 20 years, and rewrite a criminal statute.  The Queen of Hearts 
would be proud. 
___________________ 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith 
Anton Lapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Michaela M. Stagnaro, for appellant. 
______________________