Case Title: MILLER v HERBERT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95-032

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1995-07-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 95-032
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1995

 

ARTHUR D. MILLER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

DAVE HERBERT and SAFECO
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants and Respondents.

 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Third Judicial Dietrict,
In and for the County of Anaconda-Deer Lodge
‘The Honorable Ted L. Mizner, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:

W.M. Hennessey, Hennessey, Joyce, McCarthy & Wing,
Butte, Montana

For Respondent :

P, Keith Keller, Keller, Reynolds, Drake, Johnson &
Gillespie, Helena, Montana

'
FILLED scsnseset on seictes vay 28, 195

JUL 25 1995 Decided: July 25, 1995
rated: | Lf Swi
‘euenk or s/c count

   
 

STATE OF ONTANA
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Third Judicial
District Court, Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, granting summary
judgment in favor of Defendants/Respondents, Dave Herbert and
Safeco Insurance Company. We affirm.

‘The issue on appeal is did the District Court err in granting
summary judgment for the reason that Plaintiff/appellant, Arthur D.
Miller (Miller), failed to establish a material issue of fact?

Defendant Respondent, Safeco Insurance Company (Safeco) moves
this Court to dismiss this appeal.

‘The issue on Safeco’s motion to dismiss is whether Miller's
notice of appeal was timely? We deny Safeco's motion to dismiss

this appeal for untimelines:

 

Facts
Miller was involved in an automobile accident with an
uninsured motorist, defendant Dave Herbert, on December 25, 1989.
Miller was covered by an uninsured motorist insurance policy
through Safeco. Miller received a check from Safeco, dated March
18, 1991, and then endorsed and deposited said check on March 20,
1991. Directly above Miller’s endorsement, the check stated
Your endorsement releases the Safeco Group of Insurance
Companies and their insureds, where applicable, from all
Glains arising out of the referenced occurrence. (The
occurrence referenced on the face of the check is the
December 25, 1989, accident]
On December 21, 1992, Miller filed a claim with the District
Court for additional uninsured motorist insurance proceeds arising

from the December 25, 1989 automobile accident. Safeco answered

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alleging Miller had accepted a check in compromise and complete

accord and satisfaction for his claim, thus, releasing Safeco.

 

Safeco subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment which
motion was granted by the District Court on October 27, 1994.

Miller filed and served a motion for reconsideration on
November 9, 1994; and on the same day the District Court filed its
Judgment dismissing Miller’s complaint on its merits with
prejudice. Notice of entry of the court's judgment was served on
Miller on November 23, 1994. The District Court denied Miller’s
motion for reconsideration on December 12, 1994.

Miller filed a notice that he was appealing the District
Court’s summary judgment on December 29, 1994. On January 30,
1995, Safeco filed a motion with this Court requesting we dismiss
Miller’s appeal as untimely.

Motion to Dismiss Appeal

The issue on Safeco’s Motion to Dismiss is whether Miller's
notice of appeal was timely made?

Rule 5, M.R.App.P., provides time limits for filing notices of
appeal.

Rule 5.

(a) Appeals in civil cases.

(2) In civil cases the notice of appeal required by

(these rules] shall be filed with the clerk of the

district court within 30 days from the date of the entry

of the judgment or order appealed from, except that in

cases where service of notice of entry of judgment is

required by Rule 77(d) of the Montana Rules of Civil

Procedure the time shall be 30 days from the service of

notice of entry of judgment;

“(4) If a timely motion under the Montana Rules of

Civil Procedure is filed in the district court by any

party: (i) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (ii) under Rule

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52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact,
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be
vequired if the motion is granted; (iii) under Rule 59 to
alter or amend the judgment; or (iv) under Rule 59 for a
new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run
from the ‘entry of the order denying a new trial or
granting or denying any other such motion,

 

Miller filed his appeal in the District Court thirty-six days
after he was served with a notice of entry of judgment. Safeco
argues Miller's motion for reconsideration was not a motion which
could extend his time to file under Rule S(a) (4), M.R-App.P.
Safeco asserts the post-judgnent motions referred to in Rule
5(a)(4) apply only to well-defined circumstances, and must be
decided in accordance with specific standards.

Safeco argues Miller failed to present any new facts or
original legal arguments; thus, Miller impermissibly asked the
lower court to revisit the identical issue it already decided.
Safeco concludes, because Miller’s motion for reconsideration
cannot be deemed to be a Rule 50(b), S2(b) oF 59 motion, the last
date upon which a notice of appeal could have been filed was
Decenber 23, 1994. Miller filed hie appeal on Decenber 29, 1994
Therefore, Safeco concludes the appeal was untimely and should be
dismissed by thie Court.

Miller argues, while a motion for reconsideration is not
specifically referred to in Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P., thie Court has
equated it to a motion to alter or amend a judgment under that
rule. Easley v. Burlington Northern Railroad (1968), 234 Mont.
290, 292, 762 P.24 870, 871. Miller concludes that when he filed
his motion for reconsideration he extended his time for filing an

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appeal of the summary judgment under Rule 5(a) (4), M.R.App.P., £0
thirty days after the District Court denied his motion

Miller points to the fact the District Court denied his motion
for reconsideration on December 16, 1994, and he filed his notice
of appeal on December 29, 1994--well within the thirty day time
Limit set forth in Rule 5(a) (4), M.R.App.P. Miller requests that
we deny Safeco's motion to dismiss because his notice of appeal was
timely made under this Court's holding in gasley.

In Easley, we stated:

A motion for reconsideration, while not specifically

referred to in Rule 59(@),M.K,Civ.P", ‘haa been equated

to a motion to alter or amend a judgment
Easley, 762 P.2d at 871. We find no authority to support this
statement in Easley in its broadest interpretation. A motion for
reconsideration will not be equated to a Rule 59(g) motion to alter
or amend unless the substance of the motion constructively requests
that the court alters or amends the judgment. We shall look to the
substance of a motion, not just its title, to identity what motion
has been presented.

On February 28th, 1995, we reserved ruling on Safeco’s motion
to dismiss Miller‘s appeal for further consideration of its merits.
After such consideration, we conclude Safeco’s motion to dismiss
will be denied in this instance because of our holding in Easley.
Tt would be unfair to Miller to dismiss his appeal when he may have
been mislead by the statement in Easley that a motion for
reconsideration has been equated to a motion to alter or amend. We

do conclude that it is necessary to limit the holding in Easley for
future cases.

We hold that the statement in Eagley--that a motion for
reconsideration may be equated to a motion to alter or amend a
judgnent--is limited to motions which contain statements or
allegations demonstrating that such motion is the equivalent to a
motion to amend or a motion to alter a judgment. we further hold
that Miller's notice of appeal was timely and deny Safeco’s motion
to dismiss the appeal

Appeal of Summary Judgment

Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment for
the reason that Miller failed to establish a material issue of
fact?

Miller states, in order for Safeco to prevail on its motion
for summary judgment, it mist prove there is no existence of any
material fact at issue. Miller contends Safeco failed to meet its
burden because Miller's understanding that he released his clains
against Safeco is a genuine issue of material fact

Miller refers to his affidavit, submitted in opposition to
Safeco’s motion for summary judgnent, where he stated he has
suffered from mental and psychological disorders for a number of
years and he was suffering fron such disorders during the time he
allegedly released all clains against Safeco. He further stated he
@id not understand that he was releasing any claims when he
endorsed the check, and he believed he was merely recouping further

medical expense:

 

Miller claimed he did not realize Safeco’s adjuster, Mark
Sannes, was seeking a release of all claims when they discussed the
matter on March 14, 1991, Miller contends his affidavit conflicte
with Mark Sannes’ affidavit which states it was Mr. Sannes’
intention to obtain a full release. Furthermore, Miller argues his
inability to understand such release at that time ie supported by
the affidavit of Dr. Timothy Casey (Dr. Casey) who has been
Miller's psychologist since April of 1991. Miller concludes these
affidavits clearly demonstrate a material issue of fact; therefore,
the District Court's grant of summary judgment wae improper.

Safeco contends, according to Miller’s claims, his appeal
succeeds or fails on the question of his mental capacity and
whether he furnished the District Court with sufficient evidence to
create a material fact issue, Safeco argues Miller‘s claim of not
understanding is insufficient without more to create a fact issue.
Safeco surmises that any release or settlement agreement is
vulnerable to the claim, after the fact, that it was not
understood.

‘The standard we apply in reviewing a District Court's sunmary
judgment is the same as that used by the District Court under Rule
56(c), M.R.Civ-P. -- "{s]ummary judgment is proper only when no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Spain-Morrow Ranch,
Inc. v. West (Mont. 1994), 872 P.2d 330, 331-32, 51 St.Rep. 363,
364 (citing Minnie v. City of Roundup (1993), 257 Mont. 429, 431,
849 P.2d 212, 214)

‘The District Court found that Miller "failed in his burden to
produce evidence of a genuine issue of material fact." The court
also found that Miller “effectively released Defendant Safeco
Insurance Company from all claims and that the parties did reach
complete accord and satisfaction. (Miller‘s] claim that he lackea
capacity to consent at the time he signed the release is not
supported by any competent evidence. Dr. Casey's Affidavit is pure
speculation." These findings are supported by the record; and, in
fact, there is nothing in the record to contradict these findings.

Miller relies on Morrow v. FBS Insurance (1988), 230 Mont.
262, 749 P.24 1073, to argue that it was improper for the District
court to grant summary judgnent where Miller’s credibility was
crucial to the decision of material fact. We agree with the
District Court's conclusion that “this is not a case where
(Willer’s] credibility is essential to a determination of the

In Morrow, 749 P.24 at 1075, we state:

 

. all ‘reasonable inferences that may be drawn from
the offered proof are to be drawn in favor of the party
opposing summary judgment." [citation omitted.]

Morrow asserts that in applying this rule, the lower
court ignored the material fact questions created by the
conflicting affidavits and depositions of the parties.
In support of this argument, Morrow cites § 26-1-301,
NCA, which provides:

‘One witness sufficient to prove a fact. The
direct evidence of one witness who is entitled
to full credit is sufficient for proof of any
fact, except perjury and treason.

We agree with Morrow's argument.

 

 

‘The Court then considered all reasonable inferences in favor of
Morrow's offered proof and concluded that there was not the

appropriate absence of material fact. In that case, the record
contained specific statements of fact contradicted by specific
statements of fact of other witnesses. Moxrow, 749 P.2d at 1073-
76. Here, we have merely the statements on the part of Miller
which the District Court said required more of an expert on the
matter of mental capacity.

‘There was no expert testimony to establish Miller’s incapacity
to understand mentally what he was doing at that time. Dr. Casey
testified that it was ‘possible (Miller’s) judgment may have been
compromised at that time and he may not have understood the import
of what he was doing." We have consistently held that speculation
is not a sufficient basis on which to raise a genuine issue of
material fact. Pauerso v. Maronick Construction (1983), 203 Mont.
106, 661 P.2d 20; General Insurance Company of North America v.
Town Pump, Inc. (1984), 214 Mont. 27, 692 P.2d 427; Brothers v.
General Motors Corporation (1983), 202 Mont. 477, 658 P.2d 1108.
We agree with the District Court's finding that this testimony is
entirely speculative and inaufficient to create an issue of
material fact.

We hold the District Court did not err in granting summary

judgment for the reason that Miller failed to establish a material

issue of fact.

cies

 
Tustices

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Justice Karla M. Gray, specially concurring.

I concur in the Court's opinion on the substantive issue
involving sunmary judgment. 1 specially concur in the Court's
opinion insofar as it relates to the motion to dismiss the appeal,
agreeing with the result but not with the rationale

‘The Court concedes that there is no basis for the statement in
Hagley that a motion for reconsideration has been equated to a
motion to alter or amend a judgment. Indeed, it is clear that the
Montana Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for, or authorize,
a motion to reconsider at all; as a result, no such motion is
encompassed within Rule S(a), M.R.App.P. Under these
circumstances, it is my view that the better course would be to
overrule the entirety of the statement in Easley, rather than to
merely limit it as the Court has done. 1 would hold that any
motion captioned a motion to reconsider is to be entirely
Aieregarded by opposing parties and district courte because no such

motion exists within the purview of the rules of civil procedure.

 

a
Justice W. William Leaphart, dissenting,

I dissent. In opposing Safeco’s motion for summary judgment,

Miller put forth essentially two separate argument:

 

(2) that at
the time of signing the release, he was suffering from mental
problems which effected his capacity to comprehend what he was
doing, and (2) that he did not understand the terminology and scope
of the specific release language. With regard to the question of
his mental capacity, I think that Miller raised a genuine issue of
material fact sufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment.
Miller submitted the affidavit of a psychologist, Timothy casey,
who testified that he had diagnosed Miller as having somatoforn
pain disorder and Axis II diagnosis of paranoid personality
Gisorder; further, that these disturbances may have compromised
Miller’s judgment at the time of signing the release. The District
court rejected Casey's testimony because he was not treating Miller
at the time of the release. However, Miller submitted his own
affidavit which stated that he had suffered from a mental and
psychological disorder for a number of years and "was suffering

from such disorders in March, 1991"--the date of the release.

 

Without commenting upon the strength or weight of this testimony,
I believe that the psychologist’s affidavit combined with Miller’ s
uncontroverted affidavit raises a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Miller was of “unsound mind" under § 26-2-201, MCA, and
thus incapable of executing a valid release, irrespective of the
particular language of the release in question. 1 would reverse

the summary judgment.

 
gustice Terry N. Trieweiler and Justice William B. Hunt, Sr.,
join in the foregoing dissent of Justice W. William Leaphart.

Teatiee

Justice

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