Case Title: Commonwealth v. Hallinan

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13301

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-04-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13301 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LINDSEY A. HALLINAN. 
 
 
 
Essex.     December 7, 2022. - April 26, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence.  Supreme Judicial 
Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  Practice, 
Criminal, Admission to sufficient facts to warrant finding, 
Sentence.  Evidence, Breathalyzer test, Scientific test.  
Constitutional Law, Conduct of government agents. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Salem Division of 
the District Court Department on October 9, 2013. 
 
 
A motion to withdraw an admission to sufficient facts, 
filed on July 6, 2021, was heard by Robert A. Brennan, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Murat Erkan (Joseph D. Bernard also present) for the 
defendant. 
David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Ira L. Gant, Nathan Tamulis, Patricia Muse, & Ben 
Leatherman, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & Joshua M. 
Daniels, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, 
amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
Amy Spector, Assistant Attorney General, for Registry of 
Motor Vehicles, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this case we are asked to exercise our 
extraordinary superintendence powers under G. L. c. 211, § 3, in 
light of government misconduct involving the State police office 
of alcohol testing (OAT) and its use of the Draeger 
Alcotest 9510 breathalyzer device.  In November 2013, the 
defendant, Lindsay A. Hallinan, admitted to facts sufficient to 
support a finding of guilty to operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), second 
offense, after her attorney advised that her case was unwinnable 
due to an Alcotest 9510 breath test result showing a blood 
alcohol content (BAC) of 0.23 percent.  The matter was continued 
without a finding for two years, the defendant was placed on 
probation with conditions for alcohol treatment and random 
testing, and her driver's license was suspended for two years.  
The defendant subsequently moved to withdraw her admission to 
sufficient facts.  The motion was denied because she was unable 
to show a nexus between the allegations of governmental 
misconduct involving the Alcotest 9510 device and her own case; 
she was not a member of the consolidated class of defendants who 
were challenging the reliability of the Alcotest 9510 device, 
nor did she request discovery in her own case.  The defendant 
3 
 
 
 
appealed, and we granted her application for direct appellate 
review. 
 
The extensive nature of OAT's misconduct, and the inability 
of the defendants in the consolidated cases challenging the 
reliability of the Alcotest 9510 device, see Commonwealth vs. 
Ananias, Dist. Ct., No. 1248CR1075 (Ananias litigation), to 
receive a fair Daubert-Lanigan hearing, see Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 
419 Mass. 15, 25-26 (1994), have resulted in the violation of 
the right to due process for approximately 27,000 defendants.  
Accordingly, defendants who pleaded guilty or who were convicted 
after trial, and the evidence against whom included breath test 
results from the Alcotest 9510 device from June 1, 2011, through 
April 18, 2019, are entitled to a conclusive presumption of 
egregious government misconduct.  They may proceed in motions to 
withdraw their guilty pleas, and motions for new trials, without 
having to establish egregious government misconduct in each 
case, see Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 346 (2014); 
Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 290 (1st Cir. 2006), and 
their breath test results are excluded from use at any 
subsequent trial. 
4 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, in this case, the judge erred in denying the 
defendant's motion to withdraw her admission to sufficient 
facts,1 and her motion should have been allowed.2 
 
1.  Background.  On the evening of October 5, 2013, police 
were operating a sobriety checkpoint on Route 1A in Beverly.  
State police Trooper Thomas Canning, who was greeting drivers at 
the checkpoint, observed that "[the defendant's] eyes were red 
and glassy, he could smell the odor of an intoxicating liquor 
coming from the vehicle, and her speech was slurred."  Canning 
directed the defendant to a parking lot for further evaluation 
by State police Trooper Carolyn Mansi.  Mansi observed that the 
defendant "seemed dazed," did not appear to notice the trooper, 
and admitted to consuming three drinks at a local sports bar.  
At Mansi's request, the defendant performed a series of field 
sobriety tests; she was unable to complete any of them 
successfully.  The defendant then consented to a breath test, 
which was administered using a Draeger Alcotest 9510 
 
1 Because an admission to sufficient facts to warrant a 
finding of guilty "exposes a defendant to some of the same 
collateral consequences as a guilty plea, we treat the admission 
the same as a guilty plea" for purposes of this discussion, and 
in this opinion we refer to the two interchangeably.  See 
Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 476 Mass. 
298, 319 n.18 (2016). 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services and Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers and the amicus letter submitted by the 
Registry of Motor Vehicles. 
5 
 
 
 
breathalyzer.  The result of the test was a 0.23 percent BAC, 
well above the legal limit of .08 percent.  See G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1). 
 
In November 2013, the defendant admitted to sufficient 
facts on a single count of OUI, second offense.3  The judge 
ordered that the matter be continued without a finding for two 
years, on conditions that the defendant enroll in the fourteen-
day second offender program, abstain from alcohol for six 
months, submit to an evaluation pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24Q, 
attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings at least once a week, 
and submit to random alcohol testing.  The judge also imposed a 
two-year loss of her driver's license.  See G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (c) (2). 
 
The defendant subsequently moved to withdraw her plea on 
the ground that her admission to sufficient facts was not 
knowing and voluntary, because of issues with the Alcotest 9510 
device and the government misconduct that came to light in the 
Ananias litigation.  See Commonwealth vs. Ananias, Dist. Ct., 
No. 1248CR1075 (Feb. 16, 2017) (Ananias I); Commonwealth vs. 
Ananias, Dist. Ct. No. 1248CR1075 (Jan. 9, 2019) (Ananias II).  
In support of her motion, the defendant submitted an affidavit 
averring that her decision to resolve the case largely was due 
 
 
3 The defendant had been convicted of OUI in New York in 
2006. 
6 
 
 
 
to her attorney's advice, based on his assessment that the 
breath test results made the case unwinnable.  After a 
nonevidentiary hearing, the same judge who presided over the 
Ananias litigation denied the defendant's motion.  The defendant 
appealed to the Appeals Court, and we thereafter allowed her 
petition for direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  Before us, the defendant seeks to withdraw 
her guilty plea as a result of newly discovered evidence -- the 
findings after multiple evidentiary hearings in the Ananias 
litigation -- concerning State police management and handling of 
the Alcotest 9510 device that was used to test her blood alcohol 
level after the stop; this new evidence suggests egregious 
misconduct by OAT.  In light of this newly discovered evidence, 
the defendant argues that her admission to sufficient facts was 
induced involuntarily by OAT's misconduct.  See G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1). 
 
Before turning to the defendant's arguments, some 
background understanding of OAT's purpose, structure, and 
organization is necessary.4 
 
 
4 The facts concerning the structure and operation of OAT, 
set forth in the judge's decision on the defendant's motion to 
withdraw, are based on his findings in two memoranda of decision 
in the Ananias litigation as well as the joint stipulations of 
facts in that case, and the proceedings at the hearing on the 
defendant's motion to withdraw.  After remand by this court in 
Commonwealth v. Camblin, 471 Mass. 639, 640 (2015), for 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
a.  Structure and regulation of OAT.  The State police 
crime laboratory (crime lab) is a forensic sciences organization 
that provides scientific analysis and testimony in support of 
police departments and prosecutors' offices across the 
Commonwealth.  OAT, which oversees the breath testing program 
for the Commonwealth, is a unit within the crime lab.  At the 
time of the events underlying this litigation, OAT had one 
supervising scientist, Melissa O'Meara, who supervised three 
other scientists. 
 
To convict a defendant of OUI, the Commonwealth must prove 
that (1) the defendant operated a motor vehicle, (2) on a public 
way or place to which the public had a right of access, and 
(3) while under the influence of alcohol.  See Commonwealth v. 
Zeininger, 459 Mass. 775, 778, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 967 
(2011); Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 420 Mass. 630, 631 (1995); 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).  To establish OUI, the 
Commonwealth may proceed on a theory of impairment (impaired 
ability to operate) or on a theory of a per se violation 
(operating with a BAC of 0.08 percent or greater).  See 
Commonwealth v. Hebb, 477 Mass. 409, 412 (2017); Zeininger, 
 
evidentiary hearings and fact finding, this judge was appointed 
to preside over the consolidated Ananias litigation.  The 
judge's findings in the Ananias litigation, following extensive 
evidentiary hearings involving approximately 600 defendants, are 
set forth in full in Ananias I and Ananias II. 
8 
 
 
 
supra; Commonwealth v. Rumery, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 685, 686 
(2011). 
 
OAT scientists assist prosecutors when they are proceeding 
against defendants on the theory of a per se violation.  The 
scientists provide a report setting forth the results of a 
chemical test of an individual's BAC; although this measurement 
can be obtained through a breathalyzer test or through a blood 
test, see G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e), in practice, the 
breathalyzer test is the most commonly used one.  General Laws 
c. 90, § 24K, provides that, for a breath test to be considered 
valid, it must have been performed by a "certified operator," 
using a certified "infrared breath-testing device."  The statute 
also mandates that the Secretary of Public Safety (secretary) 
"promulgate rules and regulations regarding satisfactory 
methods, techniques and criteria for the conduct of such tests, 
and shall establish a Statewide training and certification 
program for all operators of such devices and a periodic 
certification for such breath testing devices."  See G. L. 
c. 90, § 24K. 
 
In accordance with this mandate, the Executive Office of 
Public Safety and Security (EOPSS) has promulgated regulations 
directing that OAT perform annual certifications of all breath 
testing instruments used in the Commonwealth.  See 501 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 2.06 (2016).  These regulations also provide that 
9 
 
 
 
OAT is responsible for establishing and maintaining a list of 
approved breath test devices; certifying the functionality of 
all breath testing equipment used in the Commonwealth on an 
annual basis; approving and distributing all calibration 
standards used with breath test instruments; establishing 
standards for training and certification for breath testing; and 
creating and maintaining a breath test operator's manual.  See 
501 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 2.04-2.05 (2016). 
 
In accordance with these regulations, OAT creates and 
maintains records of the authorization and testing process used 
in readying breath test instruments for use in the Commonwealth.  
OAT first formally adopted a written certification protocol for 
testing and calibrating its instruments in September 2014, under 
the direction of O'Meara.5  Before the establishment of this 
protocol, OAT had had no formal, written policies to standardize 
testing and calibration procedures to be followed by its 
scientists.  Instead, in performing specific tasks related to 
the proper functioning and certification of the breath test 
instruments, OAT scientists had employed a variety of 
"certification worksheets" with checkboxes.  These worksheets 
 
 
5 Melissa O'Meara became the supervising scientist at OAT in 
June 2011.  In that role, she was responsible for the day-to-day 
operation of the State police crime laboratory (crime lab), as 
well as for establishing policies and procedures for breath test 
administration and training in accordance with the promulgated 
regulations. 
10 
 
 
 
consisted of a list of steps to be completed and acknowledged to 
certify that an instrument was functioning properly. 
 
Before September 2014, if an instrument did not perform 
adequately on the first certification attempt, it was OAT's 
practice to set aside the instrument, place the partially 
completed worksheet6 in the instrument's assigned folder, and 
conduct a second attempt at certification after a period of 
rest.  If the second attempt also failed, the instrument would 
be sent to the manufacturer for repairs.  Eventually, this 
process also was guided by the State police quality assurance 
manual, which contained procedures, instructions, and 
requirements for calibration and certification of all crime lab 
equipment, including the Alcotest 9510 breathalyzer. 
 
OAT maintained records detailing when machines had to be 
sent to the manufacturer for repair, so that it could keep track 
of when the repaired machine was returned; occasionally, a 
description of the work that had been completed by the 
manufacturer was indicated.  Thus, two types of repair records -
- internal documentation by OAT and the manufacturer's 
documentation delineating the repairs -- were stored at OAT.  In 
2011, when the Alcotest 9510 device was introduced for use in 
the Commonwealth, OAT generated authorization reports, which 
 
 
6 These incomplete worksheets were known as "failed 
worksheets." 
11 
 
 
 
indicated that the particular instrument was authorized for use.  
Those reports generally were maintained in the folder for the 
corresponding instrument. 
 
b.  OAT's discovery practices.  At all times relevant here, 
OAT frequently received discovery requests from both prosecutors 
and defense attorneys.7  Prosecutors seeking test results for use 
at trial obtained records from OAT by filling out a request 
form.  This form, created by OAT, contained four check boxes to 
indicate the information the prosecutor was seeking; there was 
no area for the individual to request additional types of 
documents.8 
 
It was OAT's practice to supply only documents specifically 
requested on this form.  If a prosecutor requested documents 
 
 
7 The crime lab maintains a written policy, first 
promulgated on July 24, 2015, regarding discovery requests.  At 
all times relevant here, the policy indicated that all requests, 
whether through court orders, public records requests, or from 
prosecutors' offices, were to be received, reviewed, and 
fulfilled by the crime lab's case management unit (CMU).  The 
CMU employed five full-time staff members who provided 
comprehensive records relating to firearms, deoxyribonucleic 
acid, trace evidence, and other laboratory functions.  The one 
exception to the policy was that OAT handled its own discovery 
responses, without any assistance from the CMU. 
 
 
8 The possible categories of documents that could be 
requested were the "90-24 Record" (breath test data for 
defendant); "Periodic Test Record" (test data from standard 
calibration tests initiated prior to defendant's breath test); 
"Calibration and Verification Records" (OAT testing data); and 
"Certification Summary" (containing OAT certification, 
expiration date, and certifying chemist). 
12 
 
 
 
that fell outside one of the categories indicated on the form, 
OAT would require the prosecutor to obtain a court order before 
responsive documents were produced.  Efforts to respond to these 
more complex requests were coordinated by O'Meara.  It was not 
OAT's practice to request input from the crime lab's legal 
counsel when responding to discovery requests. 
 
Once OAT collected what it deemed to be responsive 
documents, it would mail the package to the appropriate court 
clerk.  The documents sent typically included records relating 
to the certification and periodic testing of a particular 
breathalyzer machine, along with a supporting affidavit by the 
keeper of records.  This affidavit obviated the need for OAT 
personnel to appear to testify in OUI trials; instead, the 
records and affidavits were introduced at trial without 
scientific testimony.9  See Zeininger, 459 Mass. at 786 ("OAT 
certification records are outside the orbit of the 'common 
nucleus' of the various definitions of 'testimonial' set forth 
in Crawford[ v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,] 51-52 [2004]"). 
 
 
9 OAT employees, however, routinely appeared as witnesses in 
specific, more complex cases involving issues of blood serum 
analysis and retrograde extrapolation (a mathematical 
calculation used to estimate a person's BAC at a particular 
point in time by working backward from the time the BAC was 
tested and factoring in rates of absorption and excretion).  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 811 (2007); 
Commonwealth v. Douglas, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 643, 646 (2009).  
These cases are rare and represent only a small fraction of 
prosecutions involving breath testing. 
13 
 
 
 
 
c.  Prior litigation on admissibility of breath test 
results.  The defendant's challenge here is based on extensive 
proceedings in earlier litigation in other, related cases, 
including the Ananias litigation.  To evaluate her arguments, 
familiarity with some of those proceedings is necessary. 
 
Until June 2015, breath test results had been admissible by 
statute, and in practice were admitted without question, in the 
prosecution of OUI cases.  See Zeininger, 459 Mass. at 786-787.  
General Laws c. 90, § 24 (1) (e), provides that, in any OUI 
prosecution, 
"evidence of the percentage, by weight, of alcohol in the 
defendant's blood at the time of the alleged offense, as 
shown by . . . a chemical test or analysis of his breath, 
shall be admissible and deemed relevant to the 
determination of the question of whether such defendant was 
at such time under the influence of intoxicating liquor." 
 
In 2013, a group of defendants involved in then-pending OUI 
prosecutions sought to exclude breath test evidence derived from 
a different breathalyzer, the Alcotest 7110 MK III-C, made by 
the same manufacturer as the Alcotest 9510 device, on the ground 
that the source code used in the device's computer programs, in 
conjunction with other deficiencies, rendered its results 
unreliable.  See Commonwealth v. Camblin, 471 Mass. 639, 640 
(2015).  We concluded that the defendants were entitled to seek 
a Daubert-Lanigan hearing to challenge the reliability of the 
newest breathalyzer technology, because "breath test evidence, 
14 
 
 
 
at its core, is scientific evidence," id., and "where 'evidence 
produced by a scientific theory or process' is at issue, the 
judge plays an important gatekeeper role to evaluate and decide 
on its reliability as a threshold matter of admissibility."  Id. 
at 648, citing Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25-26. 
 
i.  First Ananias decision.  After the Camblin matter was 
remanded to the District Court for such a hearing, the Chief 
Justice of that court issued an order of special assignment 
consolidating 535 cases in which defendants who had been charged 
with OUI similarly had challenged the scientific reliability of 
the Alcotest 9510,10 the device that had been in use throughout 
the Commonwealth at that time.  In November 2015, the Chief 
Justice of the Boston Municipal Court likewise consolidated 
sixty-four cases raising the same issue.  Thousands of other OUI 
cases were stayed pending the outcome of that consolidated 
litigation.  The parties then sought review in the county court 
to challenge the orders of consolidation and a number of rulings 
on discovery issues. 
 
In June 2016, a single justice ordered that both sets of 
consolidated cases be consolidated.  The Chief Justice of the 
 
 
10 As stated, the Camblin defendants challenged the 
technology used in the Alcotest 7110 MK III-C breathalyzer.  See 
Camblin, 471 Mass. at 640.  In Ananias I, the court expanded the 
scope of the reliability challenge permitted in Camblin to 
include the newest device, the Alcotest 9510, which began 
replacing the Alcotest 7110 in June 2011.  See Ananias I, supra. 
15 
 
 
 
Trial Court then assigned the consolidated case to a specific 
District Court judge pursuant to G. L. c. 211B, § 9.  In 
preparation for Daubert-Lanigan hearings in their individual 
cases, many of the defendants had filed discovery motions.  In 
response, multiple judges had ordered OAT to produce 
documentation.  The newly assigned judge issued a comprehensive 
discovery order requiring the Commonwealth to produce, among 
other items, "[d]ocumentation of the [instrument] certification 
process, which provides instructions to the OAT employee 
performing the certification," as well as all certification 
worksheets for Alcotest 9510 devices since 2011. 
 
The crime lab's attorney conveyed the substance of the 
court's order to O'Meara, who coordinated the production of 
responsive documents.  The attorney did not participate in the 
actual review, collection, or production of the documents.  
Ultimately, OAT produced a digital versatile disc (DVD) 
containing more than 2,000 certification worksheets and a few 
failed, incomplete worksheets.  The crime lab attorney submitted 
the DVD to the court and represented that it contained "all of 
the worksheets for certification[,] as the [court] ordered all 
be turned over."  Unbeknownst to the prosecutors and defense 
attorneys, at that time, OAT had not produced all of the 
certification worksheets that had been ordered. 
16 
 
 
 
 
A Daubert-Lanigan hearing commenced on January 18, 2017.  
Over ten days, the judge heard expert testimony concerning the 
reliability of the Alcotest 9510 device.  On February 16, 2017, 
in Ananias I, the judge denied in part, and allowed in part, the 
defendants' motions to exclude their breath test results.  The 
judge found that, despite its ability to produce scientifically 
reliable results, the annual certification methodology used by 
OAT to certify the Alcotest 9510 device, from its initial 
deployment in June 2011, through September 2014, "did not 
produce scientifically reliable BAC results," because of the 
absence of written protocols to be used in calibrating and 
certifying the operation of the device.  More specifically, the 
judge found that the procedures used in preparing the devices 
for deployment in the field were shared only informally through 
"word of mouth around the lab."  Consequently, the judge 
concluded, OAT's methodology produced presumptively unreliable 
breath test results from June 2011,11 through September 15, 2014. 
 
Notwithstanding this finding, the Commonwealth was 
permitted to demonstrate, on a case-by-case basis, that a 
 
11 Ananias I originally stated that the Alcotest 9510 device 
was first used in June 2012, and therefore, the presumption for 
tests began in June 2012.  A subsequent order was issued to 
correct the findings of fact to reflect that the Alcotest 9510 
device was in use beginning in June 2011.  The parties have 
agreed that, consistent with the court's reasoning, the 
presumption applies to tests performed starting in June 2011. 
17 
 
 
 
particular Alcotest 9510 device had been calibrated and 
certified using scientifically reliable methodology and, thus, 
that a particular BAC result was scientifically reliable.  
Results obtained after the promulgation of written protocols by 
OAT on September 15, 2014, were determined to be presumptively 
reliable and admissible in criminal prosecutions.  Accordingly, 
the defendants' motion to exclude results obtained using the 
Alcotest 9510 from devices that had been calibrated and 
certified after September 15, 2014, was denied, but the 
defendants' motion with respect to results produced by any 
Alcotest 9510 device that had been calibrated and certified 
between June 1, 2011, and September 14, 2014, was allowed. 
 
ii.  Second Ananias decision.  Following Ananias I, 
District Court and Boston Municipal Court judges conducted 
numerous hearings on motions in limine where the Commonwealth 
sought to admit BAC results obtained using Alcotest 9510 devices 
that had been calibrated and certified between June 1, 2011, and 
September 14, 2014, despite the finding of presumptive 
unreliability.  At these hearings, prosecutors began to call OAT 
scientists as witnesses in OUI cases that involved results from 
these machines.  On August 2, 2017, during a hearing in the 
District Court on one such case, where an OAT employee had 
testified, the judge determined that OAT had failed to disclose 
exculpatory "failed certification" worksheets demonstrating that 
18 
 
 
 
the particular Alcotest 9510 device at issue had failed certain 
certification tests.  Contemporaneously, the Ananias litigation 
defendants received a response to a Freedom of Information Act  
request; the response contained a significantly larger number of 
the same type of documents that were ordered to be produced in 
the Ananias litigation prior to the Ananias I decision, 
indicating that OAT had failed to produce hundreds of similar 
failed worksheets that were considered to be exculpatory. 
 
On August 19, 2017, the Ananias litigation defendants filed 
a motion to compel and to impose sanctions.  The Commonwealth 
responded that OAT personnel had not made the Commonwealth aware 
of these documents, despite prosecutors' best efforts to obtain 
all required discovery.  On August 31, 2017, the secretary 
directed EOPSS, the administrative body that oversees OAT, to 
investigate OAT's discovery practices. 
 
iii.  EOPSS report.  In an extensive report following a 
six-week investigation, EOPSS identified a history of 
intentional withholding of exculpatory evidence by OAT, blatant 
disregard of court orders, and other misconduct, all underscored 
by "a longstanding and insular institutional culture that was 
reflexively guarded."  The discovery practices that led to the 
withholding of exculpatory evidence predated the Ananias 
litigation. 
19 
 
 
 
 
In one example, the EOPSS report described a case decided 
prior to the Ananias litigation, in which OAT failed to produce 
any of its internal repair records.  A District Court judge 
allowed a discovery motion that requested "[a]ny and all 
maintenance records including but not limited to calibration, 
repairs and certification of the breath testing device 
concerning the test administered to the . . . [d]efendant."  As 
stated, it was OAT policy to produce only the manufacturer's 
repair records, which included the invoice, the manufacturer's 
repair authorization form, and, occasionally, a description of 
the repair that had been completed.  Relying on this policy, OAT 
did not produce its internally generated repair records, in 
violation of the discovery order. 
 
In March 2013, in another case preceding the Ananias 
litigation, a District Court judge allowed a discovery motion 
that requested "[a]ll information, data and documents that 
contain information about testing and repair of the breath test 
device utilized by the . . . [p]olice [d]epartment to test the 
defendant."  OAT did not produce the authorization report 
relating to the device that had been used, even though the 
record was present in the file for that device. 
 
The EOPPS investigation found that the failure to disclose 
documents, specifically in the context of the Ananias 
litigation, arose from a lack of communication between OAT and 
20 
 
 
 
the assistant district attorneys who were assigned to the 
Ananias litigation.  The prosecutors were unfamiliar with 
general OAT discovery policies and, in particular, were unaware 
that it was OAT policy not to produce failed worksheets when an 
instrument failed certification.  Indeed, the EOPPS report 
highlighted that OAT scientists responding to discovery requests 
were instructed not to provide failed worksheets.  If a 
scientist included such a worksheet in the discovery package, 
O'Meara would insist that the failed worksheet be removed, 
because she considered it to be nonresponsive.12  These failures 
left prosecutors in the Ananias I litigation representing to the 
judge, and to defense counsel, that the Commonwealth had 
complied with its discovery obligations, when in fact it had 
not.  Accordingly, the prosecutors were unable adequately to 
carry out their obligation to identify and produce exculpatory 
evidence. 
 
As a result of the EOPSS investigation, in October 2017, 
the secretary directed the State police to undertake a number of 
 
 
12 When O'Meara was interviewed in conjunction with the 
EOPSS investigation, she explained that she considered failed 
certification worksheets to be "data not reported" and, 
therefore, under OAT policy, not subject to discovery.  She also 
commented that, in her view, because no motorist had been 
subjected to breath testing with an instrument that was put in 
the field without having been calibrated successfully, the 
failed calibration attempts had no probative value, and thus 
appropriately were excluded from consideration in the 
certification analysis. 
21 
 
 
 
remedial measures.  The State police were required to expand the 
responsibilities of the case management unit (CMU), which 
followed established protocols that specifically delineated how 
to respond to discovery requests, to include OAT.  The secretary 
also required OAT to eliminate its long-standing policy of 
requiring court orders before complying with "nonstandard" 
discovery requests and, instead, instructed OAT to comply with 
all discovery requests from prosecutors' offices.  OAT also was 
required to enhance and expand its then newly released 
electronic discovery (eDiscovery) portal, to obtain 
accreditation by the ANSI-ASQ13 National Accreditation Board 
(ANAB) within twelve months, and to conduct enhanced training 
for OAT employees, focusing on the identification of, and their 
duties regarding, exculpatory information. 
 
iv.  Joint stipulation.  Over the course of the next year, 
prosecutors turned over tens of thousands of documents that had 
not previously been provided to the consolidated defendants.  On 
August 14, 2018, following extensive negotiations, the parties 
submitted a joint stipulation and a recommended resolution to 
the defendants' motion for sanctions.  The stipulation included 
factual findings from the EOPSS report. 
 
 
13 American National Standards Institute – American Society 
for Quality. 
22 
 
 
 
 
Among other things, the parties stipulated that (1) in 
Ananias I, the judge had ordered OAT to produce copies of all of 
the annual certification and calibration worksheets used to 
conduct the annual calibration of the Alcotest 9510 devices; 
(2) OAT produced 1,976 worksheets and represented that these 
were all the worksheets the judge had ordered produced; (3) of 
the 1,976 worksheets, only eleven were incomplete worksheets 
indicating a failed calibration; (4) OAT intentionally withheld 
an additional 432 worksheets that reported failures in the 
annual calibration process; (5) OAT did not inform the 
prosecutors, the defense attorneys, or the judge that it was 
withholding the 432 worksheets; and (6) the withheld failed 
worksheets were exculpatory. 
 
The parties also agreed on specific remedial measures.  OAT 
committed to applying for national accreditation with ANAB and 
to expanding its existing eDiscovery portal to provide all users 
equal access to breathalyzer-related records and documents.  In 
addition, the parties agreed that the period for which 
Alcotest 9510 test results were deemed to be presumptively 
excluded would be enlarged through a date to be set by the 
judge; the Commonwealth would not seek to establish the 
reliability of OAT's calibration and certification on a case-by-
23 
 
 
 
case basis in cases pending trial;14 and the Commonwealth would 
pay for notices to be sent to the approximately 27,000 
defendants who had received an adverse disposition in a case in 
which the defendant submitted to an Alcotest 9510 test between 
June 1, 2011, and August 31, 2017.  The joint stipulation of 
facts and the recommended resolution were submitted to the judge 
for approval. 
 
After a three-day hearing, in January 2019, the judge 
accepted the joint stipulation of facts and the recommended 
resolution, made additional findings of fact, and issued a 
decision on the date that the presumptive exclusion of 
Alcotest 9510 test results would terminate.  Ananias II, supra.  
The judge found that OAT's misconduct resulted in a deprivation 
of the consolidated defendants' due process rights because they 
had been unable to obtain a full, fair, and complete Daubert-
Lanigan hearing.  The judge concluded that EOPSS's findings 
regarding OAT's approach to producing exculpatory information 
had had a devastating impact on public trust and confidence in 
the fairness of the criminal justice system and the integrity of 
the process. 
 
 
14 The parties agreed that the Commonwealth could seek to do 
so on a case-by-case basis for cases involving motor vehicle 
homicide by OUI, G. L. c. 90, § 24G; OUI causing serious bodily 
injury, G. L. c. 90, § 24L; manslaughter by motor vehicle, G. L. 
c. 265, § 13 1/2; and OUI as a fifth or greater offense, G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1). 
24 
 
 
 
 
As a result of OAT's misconduct, the judge fashioned a 
remedy to restore confidence that OAT's methodology produces 
scientifically reliable breathalyzer results, and that OAT is 
fully disclosing those instances where, for a variety of 
reasons, it is unable to certify the reliability of a 
breathalyzer result.  The judge ordered that the period of 
presumptive exclusion of Alcotest 9510 test results be extended 
until the Commonwealth could demonstrate compliance with seven 
remedial measures. 
 
The remedial measures required the Commonwealth to show 
that OAT not only had filed an application for accreditation 
with ANAB, but also that the application was substantially 
likely to succeed.  In addition, the application and the ANAB 
accreditation requirements manual had to be uploaded to the 
eDiscovery portal so that it publicly was accessible.  The 
Commonwealth also had to demonstrate that OAT had promulgated 
discovery protocols consistent with those employed by the CMU, 
including policies defining exculpatory evidence and an 
explanation of OAT's obligations with respect to such evidence; 
in the alternative, the Commonwealth had to show that the CMU 
would be responsible for processing OAT's discovery requests.  
OAT's discovery protocol had to be made accessible publicly on 
the eDiscovery portal.  Further, the Commonwealth had to show 
that all OAT employees had received training on the meaning of 
25 
 
 
 
exculpatory information and their attendant obligations, and all 
written materials used in this training had to be placed on the 
eDiscovery portal. 
 
In July 2019, the judge issued a final order finding that, 
by April 18, 2019, the Commonwealth had satisfied all these 
remedial measures.  Consequently, the period of presumptive 
exclusion of the results of breath tests extended from June 1, 
2011, through April 18, 2019. 
 
With OAT's history of misconduct in mind, we turn to the 
defendant's claims in this case. 
 
d.  Motion to withdraw.  The defendant maintains that the 
judge erred in denying her motion to withdraw her admission to 
sufficient facts on the ground that her admission was not 
knowing and voluntary because of the later-discovered issues 
with the Alcotest 9510 device and the government misconduct that 
came to light during the Ananias litigation.  In particular, she 
points to statements in her affidavit averring that her decision 
to accept the plea arrangement was based largely on her 
attorney's assessment that the breath test results made her case 
unwinnable.  She maintains that her motion should have been 
allowed because OAT's misconduct was egregious and induced her 
admission to sufficient facts.  Accordingly, her plea was not 
knowing and intelligent, and violated her right to due process. 
26 
 
 
 
 
"Due process requires that a guilty plea be accepted only 
where 'the contemporaneous record contains an affirmative 
showing that the defendant's plea was intelligently and 
voluntarily made.'"  Scott, 467 Mass. at 345, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 Mass. 101, 106 (2009).  "A guilty plea 
is voluntary so long as it is tendered free from coercion, 
duress, or improper inducements."  Commonwealth v. Wentworth, 
482 Mass. 664, 679 (2019), citing Scott, supra. 
 
i.  Standard of review.  A motion for a new trial under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), 
"is the appropriate vehicle to attack the validity of a guilty 
plea or an admission to sufficient facts" (citation omitted).  
Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 476 Mass. 
298, 316 (2017) (Bridgeman II).  A judge may grant a motion for 
a new trial any time it appears that justice may not have been 
done.  See Commonwealth v. Moore, 408 Mass. 117, 125 (1990).  We 
review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of 
discretion or significant error of law.  See Commonwealth v. 
Sherman, 451 Mass. 332, 334 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 817 (1998). 
 
ii.  Voluntariness of admission to sufficient facts.  In 
Scott, 467 Mass. at 346, in light of the so-called drug lab 
scandals, we adopted a two-pronged test to determine when 
government misconduct is so egregious that it renders a guilty 
27 
 
 
 
plea involuntary, and thus in violation of a defendant's rights 
to due process.  See Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 290.  To prevail on a 
claim that government misconduct induced a defendant to admit to 
sufficient facts, "the defendant must show both that 
'egregiously impermissible conduct . . . by government 
agents . . . antedated the entry of his [or her] plea' and that 
'the misconduct influenced his [or her] decision to plead guilty 
or, put another way, that it was material to that choice.'"  
Scott, supra, quoting Ferrara, supra.  Establishing egregious 
government misconduct, in turn, requires the defendant to show 
that (1) the egregious government misconduct preceded the entry 
of his or her guilty plea; (2) the egregious misconduct was 
undertaken by government agents; and (3) the misconduct occurred 
in the defendant's case.  See Scott, supra at 347-351. 
 
The defendant contends that OAT's failure to establish 
written calibration protocols for the Alcotest 9510 
breathalyzer, and OAT's intentional withholding of exculpatory 
evidence beginning at least as early as the deployment of the 
Alcotest 9510 device in June 2011, are sufficient to demonstrate 
egregious government misconduct by OAT in her case. 
 
A.  Egregiously impermissible conduct.  Our decisions 
addressing the misconduct in State police drug laboratories 
involving State police chemists Annie Dookhan and Sonja Farak 
contain extensive discussion of what constitutes egregious 
28 
 
 
 
government misconduct.  See Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. 
Attorney Gen., 480 Mass. 700, 701-702 (2018) (egregious 
misconduct where State police chemist consumed drugs submitted 
to government laboratory for testing and drug standards used in 
testing and manipulated evidence to conceal actions, and 
assistant attorneys general were aware of those actions but 
undertook cover-up); Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 302 (egregiously 
impermissible conduct where State police chemist intentionally 
reported positive results without testing submitted evidence, 
intentionally contaminated drug samples, falsified machine 
reports, and committed breach of laboratory protocols).  In 
addition, "threats, blatant misrepresentations, or untoward 
blandishments by government agents" may constitute conduct that 
could be categorized as egregious.  See Wilkins v. United 
States, 754 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2014), quoting Ferrara, 456 
F.3d at 290. 
 
The scathing EOPSS report highlights OAT's disturbing 
pattern of intentionally withholding exculpatory evidence year 
after year, dating back at least as early as June 2011.  The 
report characterizes OAT's discovery practices as 
"dysfunctional," guided by "serious errors of judgment," and 
"enabled by a longstanding and insular institutional culture 
that was reflexively guarded."  OAT leadership "frequently 
failed to seek out or take advantage of available legal 
29 
 
 
 
resources."  As a result, thousands of documents were not 
produced to defendants in the Ananias litigation and in other 
cases, despite plainly being responsive to discovery orders and 
requests.  These defendants thus did not have the benefit of 
using exculpatory authorization reports, the quality assurance 
manual, failed certification worksheets, and internal repair 
records to challenge the validity of the breath test instrument 
used in their individual cases.  The broad scope and nature of 
these violations of court orders undermined the criminal justice 
system in the Commonwealth, compromised thousands of 
prosecutions for OUI offenses, and potentially resulted in 
inaccurate convictions.  As the specially assigned District 
Court judge observed in his order denying the defendant's 
motion, the conclusion that OAT's behavior was egregiously 
impermissible is "inescapable." 
 
The Commonwealth rightly does not dispute that OAT 
employees are government agents for purposes of a Scott-Ferrara 
analysis.  Notably, as well, OAT assists prosecutors and forms 
part of the prosecution team in OUI cases, given that proof of 
compliance with calibration and certification protocols is an 
essential aspect of any OUI prosecution involving a breathalyzer 
machine.  "[P]rior to the admission of a breathalyzer result, 
the Commonwealth must prove the existence of, and compliance 
with, the requirements of a periodic testing program [for 
30 
 
 
 
breathalyzer machines]."  Commonwealth v. Barbeau, 411 Mass. 
782, 786 (1992). 
 
At the time of the defendant's trial, O'Meara and the three 
other scientists employed at OAT were responsible for responding 
to discovery requests and maintaining records relative to the 
functioning of the breath test instruments.  Defense counsel 
obtained from OAT the standard breath test report form that 
contained certification and calibration information for the 
specific device used to test the defendant's BAC, which had been 
completed by OAT staff.  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 349-350, 
quoting Martin, 427 Mass. at 824 (characterizing State police 
chemist who "ha[d] participated in the investigation [and] 
evaluation of the case and ha[d] reported to the prosecutor's 
office concerning the case" as agent of Commonwealth).  OAT's 
misconduct therefore is attributable to the Commonwealth.  We 
also note that, prosecutors have a duty to "inquire concerning 
the existence of scientific tests, at least those conducted by 
the Commonwealth's own crime laboratory."  Martin, supra at 823-
824. 
 
"[I]n applying the Ferrara analysis to a defendant seeking 
to vacate a guilty plea under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), on the 
ground that government misconduct rendered the plea involuntary, 
the defendant is required to show a nexus between the government 
misconduct and the defendant's own case."  Scott, 467 Mass. 
31 
 
 
 
at 351.  In this case, the motion judge held that, given the 
absence of a specific discovery request by the defendant prior 
to trial, the defendant was unable to establish the necessary 
nexus required by Scott.  Accordingly, the judge determined that 
it was not within his authority to adopt a conclusive 
presumption of egregious misconduct for all cases involving 
Alcotest 9510 breathalyzer results (outside the Ananias 
litigation defendants).  Pointing to the approximately 27,000 
defendants who have been affected by OAT's misconduct, which 
"has cast a shadow over the entire criminal justice system," the 
defendant urges us to adopt a global remedy in this case, 
because we "cannot expect defendants to bear the burden" of the 
Commonwealth's systemic failures.  See Bridgeman v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 465, 476, 487 (2015) 
(Bridgeman I), quoting Scott, supra at 354 n.11. 
 
Pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, we have the extraordinary 
power to superintend "the administration of all courts of 
inferior jurisdiction."  "Allegations of systemic abuses 
affecting the proper administration of justice are particularly 
appropriate for review pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3."  Brantley 
v. Hampden Div. of the Probate & Family Court Dep't, 457 Mass. 
172, 183 (2010). 
 
In Scott, 467 Mass. at 351-352, we concluded that it would 
have been impossible for the defendant to show the requisite 
32 
 
 
 
nexus between the government misconduct and the defendant's 
conviction, because the State police chemist who had falsified 
drug test results was unable to identify the cases in which she 
had fabricated results or committed a breach of protocols and 
those in which she had followed proper procedures.  We therefore 
fashioned a global remedy for those defendants who had been 
affected by the chemist's misconduct; we determined that 
defendants who had been convicted of a drug offense and who 
proffered a drug certificate signed by the chemist were entitled 
to a conclusive presumption that egregious government misconduct 
had occurred.  Id. at 352.  This special evidentiary rule of a 
conclusive presumption was "sui generis," "a remedy dictated by 
the particular circumstances surrounding" the chemist's 
misconduct, that was "intended to apply only to [the] narrow 
class of cases in which a defendant seeks to withdraw his or her 
guilty plea after having learned of" this specific misconduct.  
Id. at 353-354. 
 
Although we recognize that OAT has complied with numerous 
remedial measures that were ordered after the discovery of the 
extent of the misconduct involving the Alcotest 9510 device, and 
some that were adopted voluntarily, these combined measures do 
not go far enough to restore defendants' rights.  The inability 
of the Ananias litigation defendants to receive a fair and 
accurate Daubert-Lanigan hearing, and the years-long practice of 
33 
 
 
 
intentional withholding of exculpatory evidence, "is a lapse of 
systemic magnitude in the criminal justice system" that can be 
cured only by a global remedy.  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 352.  
OAT's cavalier and supercilious attitude toward its discovery 
obligations led to the repeated concealment of evidence that its 
testing process was flawed.  This was compounded by its failure 
to work with available legal counsel and the experts in the CMU 
who handled all other discovery requests to the crime lab and 
who could have assisted in the identification and production of 
this type of exculpatory evidence.  Indeed, the reach of OAT's 
missteps is vast. 
 
The Commonwealth notified approximately 27,000 defendants 
whose OUI convictions were implicated by OAT's misconduct.  
Requiring tens of thousands of defendants to bear the cost of 
proving that OAT's conduct was egregiously impermissible would 
be antithetical to our responsibility to ensure the efficient 
administration of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Camacho, 483 
Mass. 645, 650 (2019), quoting Bridgeman I, 471 Mass. at 476 
(absent global remedy, "defendants wrongly would bear the burden 
of a systemic lapse that . . . is entirely attributable to the 
government").  We must "account for the due process rights of 
defendants, the integrity of the criminal justice system, the 
efficient administration of justice in responding to such 
potentially broad-ranging misconduct, and the myriad public 
34 
 
 
 
interests at stake."  See Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 480 
Mass. at 723, quoting Bridgeman I, supra at 487.  Accordingly, 
in cases in which a defendant seeks to vacate a guilty plea as a 
result of the revelation of OAT's misconduct, and the 
defendant's breath test took place between June 1, 2011, and 
April 18, 2019, the defendant is entitled to a conclusive 
presumption that egregious government misconduct occurred. 
 
At the same time, we do not go as far as some of the amici 
suggest and order the dismissal with prejudice of all OUI cases 
within the relevant time period.  See Committee for Pub. Counsel 
Servs., 480 Mass. at 729 (vacating convictions and dismissing 
cases tainted by drug lab scandal that met certain criteria).  
To begin, OUI prosecutions inherently are different from 
prosecutions for drug offenses.  Convictions of possession or 
distribution of drugs rise and fall on proving that the 
substance involved was, in fact, the illegal substance charged.  
"In a case charging a narcotics offense, the Commonwealth must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt 'that a substance is a 
particular drug' because such proof is an element of the crime 
charged."  Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350, 361 (2010), 
quoting Commonwealth v. McGilvery, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 508, 511 
(2009), and cases cited.  Without the certification that the 
substance at issue was the alleged illegal substance, at least 
as to possession, there is no case for the prosecution to 
35 
 
 
 
pursue.  See G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (a) ("Any person who knowingly 
or intentionally manufactures, distributes, dispenses or 
possesses with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance . . . shall be punished . . .").  That, in 
rare instances, proof that a suspected illegal substance sold by 
a defendant was an illegal drug can be established in other 
ways, such as the testimony and observation of an experienced 
user of the drug, see Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 459 Mass. 148, 
153-154 (2011), does not change this calculus. 
 
Comparatively, the Commonwealth has a number of different 
avenues by which to pursue an OUI prosecution beyond 
establishing the level of alcohol in a defendant's blood.  
"Whoever . . . operates a motor vehicle with a percentage, by 
weight, of alcohol in their blood of eight one-hundredths or 
greater, or while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor . . . shall be punished . . . ."  G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1).  Accordingly, OUI can be shown, for example, 
by field sobriety tests, police observations, blood tests, and 
statements by a defendant.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wood, 261 
Mass. 458, 459 (1927) (circumstantial evidence sufficient for 
OUI conviction); Commonwealth v. Belliveau, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 
830, 835 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Petersen, 67 Mass. App. 
Ct. 49, 52 (2006) ("Proof of operating under the influence on a 
public way may 'rest entirely on circumstantial evidence'").  
36 
 
 
 
Thus, even where an unreliable breath test result is suppressed, 
the Commonwealth may have other ways in which to pursue a 
conviction. 
 
We are satisfied that a conclusive presumption that all 
three elements needed to establish the first prong of the Scott-
Ferrara test have been met "will relieve the trial courts of the 
administrative burden" of making findings in potentially tens of 
thousands of motions for a new trial, see Scott, 467 Mass. 
at 353, that egregious government misconduct indeed occurred.  
It also will assist in "restor[ing] the public's faith in the 
integrity of the courts," without forcing defendants to bear the 
cost of the government's misconduct.  See Bridgeman II, 476 
Mass. at 337 (Hines, J., dissenting). 
 
Because we conclude that the defendant is entitled to a 
presumption that the first prong of the Scott-Ferrara test -- 
the existence of egregious government misconduct that antedated 
her plea -- has been established, see Scott, 467 Mass. at 346, 
we turn to consideration of the second prong of that test. 
 
B.  Reasonable probability defendant would not have pleaded 
guilty.  The second prong of the Scott-Ferrara test requires a 
defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he or she 
would not have pleaded guilty had he or she known of OAT's 
misconduct.  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 354-355, citing United 
States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 469 (4th Cir. 2013), and 
37 
 
 
 
Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 290, 294.  Establishing such a reasonable 
probability requires examining the totality of the 
circumstances, guided by a number of specific factors.  These 
factors include 
"(1) whether evidence of the government misconduct could 
have detracted from the factual basis used to support the 
guilty plea, (2) whether the evidence could have been used 
to impeach a witness whose credibility may have been 
outcome-determinative, (3) whether the evidence is 
cumulative of other evidence already in the defendant's 
possession, (4) whether the evidence would have influenced 
counsel's recommendation as to whether to accept a 
particular plea offer, and (5) whether the value of the 
evidence was outweighed by the benefits of entering into 
the plea agreement." 
 
Scott, supra at 355, citing Ferrara, supra at 294.  The motion 
judge decided that the defendant had made the requisite showing, 
because she had established a reasonable probability that she 
would not have tendered her admission to sufficient facts if she 
had known that the breathalyzer results would be excluded. 
 
The defendant's breath test resulted in a reported BAC of 
0.23 percent.  Aside from the breath test result, the judge 
found that proof of the defendant's impairment was based on a 
fairly brief interaction between the defendant and the troopers 
and her statement that she had had three drinks.  Otherwise put, 
the breathalyzer result was the "crown jewel" -- the most 
inculpatory piece of evidence against the defendant.  In 
conjunction with the defendant's motion to withdraw, her 
attorney submitted an affidavit averring that, given the 
38 
 
 
 
breathalyzer result, he "did not believe it would be cost 
effective or reasonable to take this case to trial."  Had he 
known, however, that the breathalyzer test was not admissible, 
he would have advised the defendant to proceed to trial, as, in 
his experience, juries tend to acquit in similar cases where 
there is no breathalyzer result and no accident.  The defendant 
also submitted an affidavit stating that she had relied on her 
attorney's advice in making the admission, and she would have 
followed his advice to proceed to trial. 
 
The motion judge found, and we agree, that the disposition 
that the defendant received was not so favorable that the 
benefits of the plea outweighed the value of the evidence.  The 
Commonwealth did not offer her a charge concession as part of 
the plea, and the judge ordered a two-year loss of the 
defendant's driver's license, as well as conditions of probation 
mandating attendance at AA meetings once per week, enrollment in 
a fourteen-day second offender program, submission to an 
evaluation pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24Q, and random alcohol 
testing.  While the continuance without a finding was of some 
benefit to the defendant (who averred that it was not essential 
for her to continue in her line of work), we discern no error in 
the judge's determination that the defendant satisfied the 
second prong of the Scott-Ferrara test. 
39 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, the denial of the defendant's motion to 
withdraw her admission to sufficient facts must be reversed.15 
 
iii.  Exposure to harsher sentence.  The defendant argues 
that, should she prevail in her motion for a new trial and 
thereafter be convicted of the same offense, she should not be 
subject to a harsher sentence than that which originally was 
imposed.  If we were to hold otherwise, she argues, it would 
chill OAT defendants' exercise of their postconviction rights. 
 
"[T]his court will not review [a] matter until the entire 
case is ripe for review due to the burdensome nature of 
'piecemeal appellate review.'"  Bridgeman I, 471 Mass. at 474, 
quoting Campana v. Directors of the Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 399 
Mass. 492, 499 n.16 (1987).  Yet, as stated, approximately 
27,000 defendants have been affected by OAT's misconduct.  Thus, 
it is within our broad powers of superintendence under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, to review the defendant's claim. 
 
Although this issue is not ripe, we nonetheless may review 
it "given the significance of this case in light of the 
thousands of defendants who have been affected by [the Ananias 
litigation]."  See Bridgeman I, 471 Mass. at 474.  It is the 
Commonwealth's position that, notwithstanding the egregious 
 
 
15 Because of the result we reach, we need not address the 
defendant's arguments with respect to judicial estoppel and 
waiver. 
40 
 
 
 
government misconduct, we should not depart from our general 
rule that "when a defendant withdraws his [or her guilty] plea 
after sentencing, he [or she] may receive a harsher sentence 
than was originally imposed."  See Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 387 
Mass. 481, 486 (1982). 
 
In Bridgeman I, 471 Mass. at 477, we concluded that 
defendants who sought a new trial because of a particular police 
chemist's misconduct could not be charged with a greater offense 
than the one of which the defendant originally had been 
convicted.  In addition, if convicted at a new trial, the 
defendant could not receive a harsher sentence than the one 
originally imposed.  We decided that anything less would be 
"giving the Commonwealth a second bite at the proverbial apple 
in its efforts to convict the [defendants]."  Id. 
 
So too here.  Our "goal is to fashion a remedy that will, 
as much as possible, place [the defendant] in the position that 
[she] would have been in if the government had not violated 
[her] constitutional right to [d]ue [p]rocess."  See Ferrara v. 
United States, 372 F. Supp. 2d 108, 111 (D. Mass. 2005).  Before 
OAT's misconduct came to light, the Commonwealth and the 
defendant entered into a plea agreement that they both viewed as 
mutually advantageous and fair.  Absent the breath test results, 
the motion judge found that the defendant would not have entered 
into the plea.  Allowing the imposition of a harsher sentence 
41 
 
 
 
after a new trial would vitiate her due process rights to pursue 
a remedy for OAT's extensive and egregious misconduct.  Thus, if 
the defendant is tried and convicted, her sentence must be 
capped at what it was under her original plea arrangement. 
 
In this case, however, capping any subsequent sentence at 
the defendant's initial sentence poses a unique challenge.  As a 
result of her admission, the defendant's case was continued 
without a finding for two years, she was required to complete 
the fourteen-day second offender program, to submit to an 
evaluation as set forth in G. L. c. 90, § 24Q, to attend AA 
meetings at least once a week, and to submit to random alcohol 
testing.  Her driver's license also was suspended for two years.  
In his decision denying the defendant's motion to withdraw her 
admission to sufficient facts, the judge characterized the plea 
judge's decision to continue the defendant's case without a 
finding as "relatively unusual" for an OUI, second offense.  The 
Commonwealth contends that the continuance without a finding for 
a second offense, less than ten years after the defendant's 
first conviction of OUI, constituted an illegal disposition. 
 
An illegal sentence is one that is "in some way contrary to 
the applicable statute."  See Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 Mass. 
502, 505 (2014), quoting Goetzendanner v. Superintendent, Mass. 
Correctional Inst., Norfolk, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 533, 537 (2008).  
42 
 
 
 
General Laws c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1), which governs sentencing 
for a conviction of OUI, second offense, provides: 
"If the defendant has been previously convicted . . . by a 
court of the Commonwealth or any other jurisdiction because 
of a like violation preceding the date of the commission of 
the offense for which [the defendant] has been 
convicted, . . . the defendant shall be punished . . . by 
imprisonment for not less than sixty days . . . [and] the 
sentence imposed . . . shall not be reduced to less than 
thirty days" (emphasis added). 
 
The thirty-day minimum sentence may be served in an approved 
facility dedicated to alcohol treatment rehabilitation "to the 
extent such resources are available."  G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1).  The provision also contains an exception 
providing that "a prosecution [for OUI] shall not be . . . 
continued without a finding except for dispositions under [G. L. 
c. 90, § 24D]" (emphasis added).16  Id.  General Laws c. 90, 
§ 24D, permits certain defendants to "be placed on probation for 
not more than two years."  Those defendants, however, are 
individuals who have never been convicted of a prior OUI offense 
in any jurisdiction, or who have been convicted of a single like 
offense ten or more years previously.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24D.  
The defendant does not fall into either of these two groups. 
 
 
16 The sentencing guidelines also note that a conviction of 
OUI, second offense, in violation of G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1), carries a mandatory minimum sentence of thirty 
days of confinement.  See Massachusetts Sentencing Commission, 
Advisory Sentencing Guidelines 59, 63 (Nov. 2017). 
43 
 
 
 
 
Here, prior to her conviction of OUI for events at the 
sobriety checkpoint in Beverly in 2013, the defendant was 
convicted of a like violation of OUI in New York on May 5, 2006, 
clearly less than ten years previously.  Thus, continuing the 
defendant's case without a finding, without imposing the 
mandatory minimum period of confinement of thirty days, was 
contrary to the sentencing provisions in G. L. c. 90, 
§§ 24 (1) (a) (1), 24D.  A "'sentencing judge currently may not 
impose a sentence that departs from the prescribed mandatory 
minimum' sentence or minimum term."  Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 
489 Mass. 589, 594 n.7 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Laltaprasad, 475 Mass. 692, 693 (2016).  Thus, because her 
original sentence was illegal, if the defendant is tried and 
convicted at any new trial, her new sentence would not be 
limited to the initial disposition. 
 
The Commonwealth concedes that a defendant who successfully 
moves for a new trial, and thereafter is convicted, should be 
credited for so much of his or her period of license suspension 
as already has been served.  Imposing an additional period of 
license suspension for the same criminal conviction implicates 
double jeopardy concerns.  See Commonwealth v. Rollins, 470 
Mass. 66, 70 (2014), citing Marshall v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 
529, 534 (2012).  For similar reasons, a defendant who has 
served a period of incarceration, is convicted again following a 
44 
 
 
 
new trial, and is sentenced to a longer period of incarceration 
must receive credit for the time already served following the 
original trial, and therefore may be required only to serve the 
period of the new sentence that exceeds the original.  Not 
crediting the prior time served clearly would implicate double 
jeopardy concerns.  In addition, a defendant's compliance with 
any previously mandated treatment programs or conditions, such 
as the fourteen-day second offender program, see G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1), evaluation pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24Q, or 
regular attendance at AA meetings, should be taken into account 
when fashioning a new sentence. 
 
We recognize that, in this case, the defendant may have 
been unaware of the illegality of her sentence, which apparently 
was not recognized by her attorney, the prosecutor, or the 
motion judge, who commented only that the sentence was 
"relatively unusual."  Moreover, the defendant successfully 
completed her sentence approximately eight years ago.  We 
recognize as well that G. L. c. 90, § 24, has been amended 
numerous times with respect to penalties and mandatory minimums, 
and indeed, three amendments became effective since the 
defendant's conviction.  See St. 2013, c. 38, § 80, eff. Mar. 1, 
2014; St. 2018, c. 69, §§ 32-33, eff. April 13, 2018; St. 2020, 
c. 227, § 35, eff. July 1, 2021.  Accordingly, in light of the 
egregious government misconduct that gave rise to the 
45 
 
 
 
defendant's motion to withdraw years after she completed serving 
her sentence, on remand, she should be afforded the opportunity 
to withdraw her motion.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 
461 Mass. 256, 261 (2012) ("Where there is a plea agreement, the 
judge is . . . bound to allow a defendant to withdraw his plea 
where the judge imposes a sentence more severe than the 
prosecutor's recommendation"); Commonwealth v. Najjar, 96 Mass. 
App. Ct. 569, 573 (2019) (allowing defendant to withdraw plea 
where "plea judge at the colloquy [failed] to inform the 
defendant of the mandatory minimum sentence on the charges to 
which the defendant was pleading guilty"). 
 
3.  Proceedings in future cases.  In sum, defendants who 
pleaded guilty to an OUI offense, where a breath test had been 
conducted using an Alcotest 9510 breathalyzer from June 1, 2011, 
through April 18, 2019, are entitled to a conclusive presumption 
that the first prong of the Scott-Ferrara test is satisfied, and 
the existence of egregious government misconduct that antedated 
the defendant's plea has been established.  See Scott, 467 Mass. 
at 346.  By extension, any breath test conducted using an 
Alcotest 9510 device during that time period must be excluded in 
any pending or future prosecutions. 
 
Where a defendant successfully moves for a new trial due to 
OAT's misconduct, and thereafter is convicted, so long as the 
defendant's original sentence was legal, the new sentence will 
46 
 
 
 
be capped at no more than the original sentence.  If the 
defendant's original sentence was illegal, the new sentence will 
not be limited to the initial disposition. 
 
4.  Conclusion.  This matter is remanded to the District 
Court, where the defendant shall be allowed to withdraw her 
motion to withdraw her admission to sufficient facts.  If the 
defendant chooses not to withdraw her motion, the decision 
denying her motion to withdraw her admission shall be reversed, 
and the case shall proceed consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.