Case Title: People v. Brownlee

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84739

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 84739-Agenda 6-November 1998.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. LADRESHA F. BROWNLEE, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 17, 1999.
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
In the circuit court of Champaign County, the State charged the defendant, Ladresha F. Brownlee, with the offense of
possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance containing cocaine (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1994)). The
defendant moved to quash her arrest and suppress the evidence against her. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted
the defendant's motion. The State filed a certificate of impairment and appealed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1)
(145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). The appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 293 Ill. App. 3d 315. We
allowed the defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse the appellate court.
The State's Attorney of Cook County filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the State. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.
BACKGROUND
Urbana police officers Carlos Guerrero and Duane Maxey testified regarding the November 7, 1995, events that led to the
defendant's arrest. The officers were on a "special detail" patrol looking for illegal drug activity and illegal weapons.
Around 9:10 p.m., Guerrero observed a white car stop in front of an apartment complex. He drove by the car, turned around,
and then observed the car leaving. The car had been stopped for about one minute.
As the officers drove past, Maxey watched one person exit the vehicle, knock on a residence door, and then leave. Maxey
testified that he did not know whether the door was answered, but he believed that it was not. Nonetheless, this behavior
aroused his suspicion because the area was known for its "crack houses" and because "it's commonplace for a [drug
purchaser] to pull up, run up to a home for just a moment, make a buy and leave." According to Maxey, he and Guerrero
verbally agreed to stop the car if probable cause for a traffic stop arose. Guerrero, however, stated that no conversation
occurred on this subject. Maxey also testified that, while driving by the car, Guerrero informed him that Guerrero
recognized the car's driver from past encounters. In contrast, Guerrero stated that he was not even able to identify the race
or sex of the car's occupants.
The officers followed the car. The car proceeded without violating the law until it stopped at an intersection and turned left.
Guerrero observed that the car failed to activate its turn signal within 100 feet of approaching the intersection and that, at
the intersection, the car stopped two feet beyond the stop sign. Maxey also observed the traffic violations and described the
car as stopping about "one-half a car length" past the stop sign. The officers decided to stop the car for violating the traffic
laws. Guerrero admitted that he wanted "to see if something would come of it." To his recollection, he had never before
issued a traffic citation for either of these violations.
The officers approached the car, Guerrero toward the driver's side and Maxey toward the passenger's side. The driver and
front seat passenger were young-adult males. Two young female passengers, one of whom was the defendant, sat in the
backseat. The officers obtained the identities of all four occupants because identifying everyone in a vehicle was common
departmental practice. Maxey observed that the defendant was holding an unopened bottle of beer, which did not violate the
law. The officers then returned to their car and checked for outstanding warrants. They found none. The officers decided not
to issue any traffic citations, but agreed to ask the driver for permission to search the car.
The officers re-approached the car. Guerrero testified that he returned to the driver his license and insurance card, and
explained that no citations would be issued. He did not advise the driver that he could leave. Rather, Guerrero then "paused
a couple [of] minutes." Following this pause, he asked the driver if he could search the vehicle. When asked what words he
used in this regard, Guerrero explained that he told the driver that "we were concerned that there might be more alcohol in
the car" and that he "just wanted permission to take a look inside the vehicle." The driver asked Guerrero whether he had a
choice in the matter. Guerrero replied that the driver did have a choice and that he was "asking" if he could search the
vehicle. The driver stepped out of the car and said, "Okay, you can search."
The three passengers were ordered out of the car and directed to stand with Maxey. Guerrero found an open beer bottle on
the backseat floor where the defendant's feet had been. He also found two "blunts" lying underneath a man's jacket bundled
up in the center of the front seat. A "blunt" was described as a hollowed-out cigar refilled with marijuana. No one claimed
ownership of the blunts. The officers believed that the blunts were within reach of all the car's occupants because the front
seat was split with a small armrest in the middle. When the four occupants exited the car, all were wearing coats with the
exception of the male passenger.
Maxey testified that the defendant denied having any knowledge of the blunts. The other female passenger told Maxey that
the blunts belonged to the men, but that all four individuals had been smoking them. The officers, however, noted that the
blunts were not burned. Moreover, while searching the car, neither officer had noticed the odor of marijuana.
According to Maxey, the officers determined that they had probable cause to arrest all four individuals in the car because
(1) the blunts were within reach of all four individuals, (2) no one claimed ownership of the blunts, (3) the other female
passenger stated that all four individuals had smoked the blunts, and (4) the defendant stated that she had smoked marijuana
before joining the others. Police searched the defendant incident to her arrest. On her person, police found the controlled
substance that forms the basis of the present charge filed against her.
In the circuit court, the defendant filed a motion to quash her arrest and suppress the evidence against her. The motion
charged, in pertinent part, that "the search of said vehicle violated Defendant's *** constitutional rights in that the
continued detention and search of said vehicle were unrelated to the original *** basis for the stop of said vehicle and any
consent was the product of such unlawful detention." Defense counsel presented oral argument on this issue:
In further support of this position, defense counsel asked the court to consider State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St. 3d 59, 463 N.E.2d 1237 (1984). In Chatton, an officer observed a vehicle without front or rear license plates. The officer effected a
traffic stop and approached the vehicle on foot. Once the officer reached the vehicle's window, the officer observed a
temporary license placard. Despite the officer's observation of the placard, he continued to detain the driver. Ultimately, a
weapon was discovered underneath the driver's seat and the driver was arrested for a weapons violation. The Supreme
Court of Ohio held that the officer lacked the authority to continue to detain the driver after observing the license placard,
because the officer no longer had reasonable suspicion to suspect the driver of a traffic violation. Because the court found
the officer's continued detention of the driver to be unconstitutional, it suppressed the weapon that was found as a result of
that detention. Chatton, 11 Ohio St. 3d at 63, 463 N.E.2d  at 1241.
The circuit court here first ruled that the initial traffic stop was permissible because the officers observed traffic violations.
In doing so, the court rejected the defendant's separate argument that the traffic stop was invalid because the officers had
effected a pretextual stop with the subjective intent to look for illegal drugs and weapons. Nonetheless, the circuit court
quashed the defendant's arrest and suppressed the evidence against her. After referencing the line of cases pointed to by
defense counsel, the court explained the basis for its ruling from the bench:
The circuit court thus held that, after the purpose for the traffic stop was cleared, the officers should not have proceeded
because they lacked reasonable suspicion of any other illegal activity, consent notwithstanding. In rendering this decision,
the court explicitly rejected the State's argument that the controlling fact in the case was that the driver gave consent to
search the car. It also mentioned the Ohio case cited by defense counsel. All of the court's comments, when considered
along with defense counsel's motion and argument, show that the court agreed with the defendant's position that (1) after
the officers determined not to issue any traffic citations, their continued detention of the car's occupants violated the
defendant's constitutional rights, and (2) the driver's consent to search the car was tainted as the product of that unlawful
detention.
The State appealed. The State argued in the appellate court only that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the search
of the car and that the search was valid based on the driver's consent. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court of
the United States issued Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996). In Robinette, the Court
held that the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution does not require a police officer to tell a motorist that the
motorist is free to leave before asking for consent to search the motorist's car. Robinette, 519 U.S.  at 39-40, 136 L. Ed. 2d 
at 355, 117 S. Ct.  at 421. The appellate court determined that Robinette controlled the disposition of this case. People v.
Brownlee, 285 Ill. App. 3d 432 (1996). After stating that Officer Guerrero was not required to inform the driver that he was
free to leave before requesting permission to search the car, the appellate court reversed the circuit court's decision and
remanded for further proceedings. The appellate court never addressed the defendant's argument, made in support of the
circuit court's decision, that the officers' continued detention of the car, after declining to issue any citations, was
unconstitutional. The defendant had maintained that this continued detention violated both the state and federal
constitutions.
The defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal with this court. Her main allegation of error therein was that the appellate
court wrongly reversed the circuit court's decision in her favor without addressing her argument that the officers' continued
detention of the car violated the state constitution. Utilizing our supervisory powers, we vacated the appellate court's
judgment and remanded the cause to the appellate court with directions that it consider the defendant's argument under the
Illinois Constitution of 1970. On remand, the defendant filed a supplemental brief reasserting her argument that the officers'
continued detention of the car violated our state constitution, notwithstanding the driver's consent. The State, in contrast,
filed a supplemental brief on the issue of whether our state constitution imposes an affirmative duty upon officers to inform
a motorist that the motorist is free to leave before requesting permission to search the motorist's car. The appellate court
held that section 6 of article I of our state constitution, like the fourth amendment to the federal constitution, does not
impose a duty upon officers to inform a motorist that the motorist is free to leave before requesting permission to search the
motorist's car. 293 Ill. App. 3d 315. Based on that holding, the appellate court once again reversed the circuit court's
decision and remanded for further proceedings. As before, the appellate court did not address the defendant's argument that
the officers' continued detention of the car was unconstitutional. The defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal from the
appellate court's judgment, which we allowed.
PREFATORY NOTE
In this court, the State filed a motion to strike portions of the defendant's brief. The motion claimed that the defendant
should not be permitted to raise her continued-detention argument because the appellate court never addressed it. We
entered an order denying the State's motion to strike. It is well established that a reviewing court may affirm the circuit
court's decision based on any ground in the record. People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d 195, 205 (1996); People v. Thomas, 164 Ill. 2d 410, 419 (1995). Here, the defendant is not just advancing a ground in the record as a basis for affirming the circuit
court's decision, but is advancing the very rationale that the circuit court gave as the reason for its decision. The defendant
is entitled to raise this argument in this court. Hence, we denied the State's motion to strike. We further directed the State to
brief the continued-detention issue for our consideration. The State has filed its supplemental brief, to which the defendant
has filed a supplemental reply brief.
ANALYSIS
The defendant contends that the appellate court erred in reversing the circuit court's decision to quash her arrest and
suppress the evidence against her. According to the defendant, the circuit court was correct in concluding that, after the
initial purpose for the traffic stop was concluded, the officers' continued detention of the car and its occupants violated her
constitutional rights and thereby invalidated the subsequent consent to search the car and her arrest. She invokes both the
federal and state constitutions in support of her claim. See U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6.
In this argument, the defendant asserts that the traffic stop ended when Officer Guerrero returned to the driver his license
and insurance card, and explained that no citations would be issued. Guerrero did not, at that point, ask the driver for
permission to search the car. Instead, the officer "paused" for "a couple [of] minutes," during which time the driver and all
his passengers were detained without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity. Following this
detention, Guerrero asked the driver for consent to search the car. The defendant also argues that the driver did not
immediately consent. After the driver and Guerrero engaged in conversation about a search, the driver relented and gave his
consent.
The State, in contrast, argues that the issue presented to this court for review is whether, pursuant to Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996), the appellate court properly determined that the circuit court erred in
granting the defendant's motion to quash her arrest and suppress the evidence against her. The State contends that Robinette
applies squarely to the case at bar and requires reversal of the circuit court's decision. The State also contends that article I,
section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 must be interpreted in "lockstep" with Robinette's interpretation of the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution. The amicus brief urges application of the lockstep doctrine as well.
We must first decide whether Robinette requires reversal of the circuit court's decision, as the State claims. In that case, a
deputy sheriff stopped Robinette for speeding. Robinette gave his driver's license to the deputy, who ran a computer check
and found no previous violations. After asking Robinette to step out of his car, the deputy activated a video camera
mounted inside the deputy's car, issued a verbal warning to Robinette, and returned his license. The deputy then asked,
"One question before you get gone: [A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs,
anything like that?" Robinette, 519 U.S.  at 35-36, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 352, 117 S. Ct.  at 419. Robinette responded in the
negative. The deputy then asked Robinette for permission to search his car, and Robinette consented. The deputy found a
small amount of marijuana and one pill.
After being charged with possession of a controlled substance, Robinette sought to suppress the evidence against him. The
trial court ruled against Robinette. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate
court, but adopted a new bright-line rule in the process, as follows:
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari "to review this per se rule." Robinette, 519 U.S.  at 36, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 353, 117 S. Ct.  at 420. The Supreme Court rejected this rule and instead held that a law enforcement officer is not
constitutionally required to tell a motorist that the motorist is free to leave before asking for consent to search the motorist's
car. The Court reaffirmed that a totality-of-the-circumstances test is utilized to determine whether a motorist's consent to
search was voluntarily given. Robinette, 519 U.S.  at 40, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 355, 117 S. Ct.  at 421.
We disagree with the State's assertion that Robinette requires reversal of the circuit court's decision quashing the
defendant's arrest and suppressing the evidence against her. The circuit court here did not grant the defendant's motion on
the ground that the officers' failure to tell the driver that he was free to leave invalidated the driver's consent. Rather, the
court found decisive the issue of whether the officers' continued detention of the car and its occupants violated fourth
amendment principles. The court determined that, after Officers Guerrero and Maxey decided not to issue any traffic
citations, their continued detention of the car and its occupants violated the defendant's constitutional rights. The court
specifically found that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of any illegal activity at the time of this detention. This
continued-detention issue requires consideration independent from Robinette. The circuit court also concluded that the
officers' illegal detention of the car tainted the driver's consent to search, which required suppression of the fruits of that
detention. Robinette, however, does not speak to the issue of taint. Consequently, nothing in Robinette dispenses with the
circuit court's holdings.
The State asserts, in its supplemental brief, that "implicit in Robinette is the fact that a proper traffic stop has been
completed at the time that police request consent to search a vehicle, hence the holding that police need not inform a driver
that he is free to go before they request consent to search." This argument appears to claim that Robinette implicitly
determined that it is always permissible for police to request consent to search a vehicle following the completion of a valid
traffic stop. This claim may be true in the sense that an officer is always free to request permission to search(1);
nonetheless, it does not require reversal of the circuit court's decision. The problem in this case was not that the officers
requested permission to search the car. It was that the officers unconstitutionally detained the car and its occupants before
requesting permission to search the car, and after the conclusion of the traffic stop. Certainly Robinette does not stand for
the proposition that, following the conclusion of a lawful traffic stop, officers may detain a vehicle without reasonable
suspicion of any illegal activity and for any amount of time, so long as they ultimately request and obtain permission to
search the car. We therefore reject this argument by the State.
The State also represents in its brief that the circuit court relied upon the underlying Ohio state court decision in Robinette
in reaching its decision. This is not accurate. The only Ohio case mentioned during the circuit court proceedings was State
v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St. 3d 59, 463 N.E.2d 1237 (1984), and it is not related to Robinette.
Given that Robinette is not dispositive of the case before this court, we cannot decide whether to interpret article I, section
6, of the Illinois Constitution in lockstep with that decision's interpretation of the fourth amendment. We thus express no
opinion on that issue.
We now consider the determinative issue in this appeal. The defendant contends that the circuit court was correct in
concluding that, after the initial purpose for the traffic stop was concluded, the officers' continued detention of the car and
its occupants violated her constitutional rights and thereby invalidated the subsequent consent to search the car and her
arrest. According to the defendant, the traffic stop ended when Officer Guerrero returned to the driver his license and
insurance card, and explained that no citations would be issued. Guerrero did not, at that point, ask the driver for permission
to search the car. Instead, the officer paused for a couple of minutes, during which time the driver and all his passengers
were detained without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity. Following this detention, Guerrero
asked the driver for consent to search the car.
The State counters that there was no unconstitutional detention. The State concedes that the traffic stop had legally come to
an end once the officers informed the driver that no citations would be issued. Nonetheless, the State maintains that the
conclusion of this traffic stop was merely followed by "a consensual conversation between Officer Guerrero and the driver
of the vehicle that resulted in a voluntary consent to search the vehicle." The State argues that a reasonable person in the
driver's position would have believed that he or she was free to leave at the point when the officers informed the driver that
no citations would be issued. Later in its brief the State acknowledges that the officer paused for two minutes at the end of
the traffic stop and before beginning the ensuing conversation. The State claims that this pause did not constitute an illegal
detention because, "arguably, during that couple of minutes, the driver could have driven away." The State does not contest
that, during these two minutes, the officers had no probable cause or reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity. Nor does
the State offer any explanation or justification for the officers' actions.
As a preliminary matter, for our purposes here, we can assume that the initial traffic stop of the car in which the defendant
was riding was permissible based on the officers' observations of the traffic violations. See People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 413 (1998). The discussion that follows does not pertain to that initial traffic stop, which, the State concedes, had
legally come to an end. It pertains to the actions following the lawful conclusion of that stop.
It is well established that the fourth amendment applies to all seizures of a person. People v. Wardlow, 183 Ill. 2d 306, 309
(1998), cert. granted, No. 98-1036 (U.S. May 3, 1999). A person is seized "when, by means of physical force or a show of
authority," that person's "freedom of movement is restrained." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980). In deciding whether a seizure has occurred, a court considers whether "if, in
view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." Mendenhall, 446 U.S.  at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d  at 509, 100 S. Ct.  at 1877; see People v. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 390
(1990) (approving the use of the Mendenhall standard).
As a general rule, all seizures must be reasonable, and the reasonableness of a seizure depends on a balance between the
public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference from law enforcement officers.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 614-15, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2578-79 (1975); see
Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402 (holding that it is reasonable for a law enforcement officer to order a passenger to stay at the
scene of a traffic stop because the public interest in officer safety outweighs the minimal intrusion to that passenger's
liberty interest). Thus, a person may not be seized unless there are reasonable, objective grounds for doing so. Mendenhall,
446 U.S.  at 551-52, 64 L. Ed. 2d  at 507-08, 100 S. Ct.  at 1875-76. Once an illegal seizure has occurred, that illegality may
infect and taint the fruits that subsequently resulted. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963).
It is equally well settled that the fourth amendment applies even to those seizures that involve only a brief detention short of
traditional arrest. Wardlow, 183 Ill. 2d  at 309. The Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), ruled that the public interest in effective law enforcement makes it reasonable for law enforcement officers to
detain and question individuals under certain circumstances where probable cause to arrest is lacking. To protect the rights
of individuals, though, the Court established that such limited investigatory stops are permissible only upon a reasonable
suspicion based upon specific and articulable facts that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Wardlow,
183 Ill. 2d  at 310, citing Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 906, 88 S. Ct.  at 1880. The Illinois General Assembly
engrafted the Terry standard into our criminal code. People v. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d 257, 262 (1997); see 725 ILCS 5/107-14
(West 1994). This "same standard is applied in determining the propriety of an investigatory stop under article I, section 6,
of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6)." Wardlow, 183 Ill. 2d  at 310.
The Court in Terry set forth a dual inquiry for deciding whether an officer's investigative detention is reasonable: (1)
"whether the officer's action was justified at its inception" and (2) "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S.  at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 905, 88 S. Ct.  at
1879. The principles applicable to the second prong of this inquiry were elaborated on in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983) (plurality opinion). There, the Court stated, "This much *** is clear: an investigative
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Royer, 460 U.S.  at
500, 75 L. Ed. 2d  at 238, 103 S. Ct.  at 1325 (plurality opinion). Royer also stated that the State bears the burden of showing
that a seizure based on reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an
investigative seizure. Royer, 460 U.S.  at 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d  at 238, 103 S. Ct.  at 1326 (plurality opinion). Finally, the tainted
fruit doctrine applies in the Terry context as well. Royer specifically held that where an officer's confinement of a person
goes beyond the limited restraint of a Terry investigative stop, a subsequent consent to search may be found to be tainted by
the illegality. Royer, 460 U.S.  at 501, 75 L. Ed. 2d  at 238-39, 103 S. Ct.  at 1326, citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (majority holding).
In the case at bar, the circuit court agreed with the defendant's position that, after the officers determined not to issue any
traffic citations, their continued detention of the car's occupants violated the defendant's constitutional rights. The circuit
court thus necessarily concluded that, following the lawful end of this traffic stop, a reasonable person in the driver's
position would not have felt free to leave in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S.  at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d  at 509, 100 S. Ct.  at 1877. Rather, the officers restrained the movements of the car's occupants by
their show of authority. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S.  at 553, 64 L. Ed. 2d  at 509, 100 S. Ct.  at 1876-77. There is no dispute in
this appeal that the driver had no choice but to submit to the officers' lawful authority while they conducted their traffic
stop and related investigation. This traffic stop concluded when, with Officer Guerrero standing on the driver's side of the
car, and Officer Maxey standing on the passenger side of the car, Guerrero returned to the driver his license and insurance
card, and explained that no citations would be issued. According to Guerrero's own testimony, he then "paused" for "a
couple [of] minutes." The officers apparently did not move from their stations at the car's doors during this two-minute
time period, but rather stood there, saying nothing. Given these circumstances, we can find no fault with the circuit court's
conclusion that the officers' actions constituted a show of authority such that a reasonable person would conclude that he or
she was not free to leave.
A reasonable person in this driver's situation would likely conclude that, if he or she drove away, then the two officers
would soon be in hot pursuit. Indeed, when Officer Guerrero finally engaged the driver in conversation and requested
permission to look inside the vehicle, the driver replied by asking whether he had a choice in the matter. The driver's
question shows that, not only did the driver believe that he was not free to drive away at that point, he was uncertain
whether he was required to submit to Guerrero's request to search his car. Although the test for whether a reasonable person
would have felt free to leave is an objective one, this driver's subjective reaction to the two officers' show of authority
bolsters our conclusion on this matter. A reasonable person in this situation would not have felt free to leave. Accordingly,
the driver and his passengers, including the defendant, were subjected to a seizure.
As noted above, a person cannot be seized unless there are reasonable, objective grounds for doing so. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.  at 556, 64 L. Ed. 2d  at 510-11, 100 S. Ct.  at 1878; see Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402. Likewise, under the Terry line of
cases, the State bears the burden of showing that an investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion was sufficiently
limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of a Terry investigative seizure. Royer, 460 U.S.  at 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 
at 238, 103 S. Ct.  at 1326. In the present case, however, the State makes no attempt to show that the officers' continued
detention of the car was in any way reasonable or objectively justified. Nor does the State attempt to show that the officers'
detention was sufficiently limited in scope or duration to satisfy the conditions of a Terry investigative seizure. The State
has therefore waived the right to challenge the circuit court's holding that the officers' continued detention of the car and its
occupants was unconstitutional because it was not reasonable.
In addition, as earlier stated, the law is settled that, where an illegal detention has occurred, a subsequent consent to search
may be found to have been tainted by the illegality. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407; Royer, 460 U.S.  at 501, 75 L. Ed. 2d  at 238-39, 103 S. Ct.  at 1326, citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407.
Here, the State has failed to argue that the evidence against the defendant should not have been suppressed as the fruit of the
officers' illegal detention. The State has thus waived the right to contest the circuit court's determination that the evidence
against the defendant must be suppressed because the driver's consent to search was tainted as the product of the officers'
illegal detention.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the appellate court's judgment reversing the circuit court's judgment. The circuit
court's judgment is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, specially concurring:
The court holds today that police officers may not detain a vehicle after the initial purpose for a traffic stop is concluded,
and that any evidence seized during such a detention is inadmissible, consent to search notwithstanding. While I agree with
this holding, I write separately because the majority fails to base its decision independently on the Illinois Constitution,
despite defendant's request that we do so.
It is apparent from the majority's analysis that the United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether the
United States Constitution allows police officers to detain a motor vehicle after the initial purpose for a traffic stop is
concluded. Nevertheless the majority opinion, citing both the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution, holds
that such a detention is "illegal." Slip op. at 12, 13, 15.
The United States Supreme Court has warned that, when deciding an issue on which federal law is unsettled, state courts
should clearly delineate whether their decision is based on federal or state grounds. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1214, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983). This directive stems from the Supreme Court's concern that its
"authority as final arbiter of the United States Constitution could be eroded by a lack of clarity in state-court decisions."
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 9, 131 L. Ed. 2d 34, 43, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1190 (1995). Such clarity is particularly important
where the state court opinion refers to both the United States Constitution and the state's constitution. See Pennsylvania v.
Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1031, 116 S. Ct. 2485 (1996) (noting that state court failed to clarify whether its
reference to state constitution was intended as exclusive ground of decision where it also cited cases interpreting federal
constitution); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 571 n.3, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565, 570 n.3, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1978 n.3 (1988)
(same).
In the instant case, the court's opinion discusses both state and federal precedent, ultimately concluding that the challenged
detention was unlawful. The United States Supreme Court, however, has never specifically addressed this question. The
court's opinion thus grants greater protections to criminal defendants under the Illinois Constitution than are currently
recognized under the United States Constitution. In a recent concurrence, Justice Ginsburg offered the following counsel for
state courts rendering decisions in such situations:
In failing to declare explicitly that the Illinois Constitution constitutes an independent ground for its decision, the court's
opinion places the rights of Illinois citizens in the hands of the federal judiciary. If an independent state law basis is not
clearly apparent from a state court's opinion, the United States Supreme Court will treat the decision as if based solely on
federal law. Long, 463 U.S.  at 1040-41, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at 1214, 103 S. Ct.  at 3476. The Supreme Court is therefore free to
reverse this court's judgment if it disagrees with our view of the protections which should be afforded to criminal
defendants, in this as well as in other cases. See, e.g., People v. Wardlow, 183 Ill. 2d 306, 310-11 (1998) (citing both federal
and state constitutions in holding that flight alone is insufficient to justify an investigatory stop), cert. granted, No. 98-1036
(U.S. May 3, 1999).
The responsible approach in this and other similar cases is to preclude federal review of the issue in question by clearly
basing our holding on the Illinois Constitution. If this court truly believes that the right announced today is an essential
component of the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, we should take the simple steps necessary to
prevent its possible curtailment by the United States Supreme Court. By failing to be specific, this court has neglected an
important "opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference." Long, 463 U.S.  at 1041, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at 1214, 103 S. Ct.  at 3476.
For these reasons, I concur only in the court's judgment.
1.      1Of course, Robinette clearly reaffirmed that, in determining whether a motorist's consent to search was voluntarily
given in response to the officer's request, a totality-of-the-circumstances test is utilized. Robinette, 519 U.S.  at 40, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 355, 117 S. Ct.  at 421.