Case Title: Virginia Dept. of Corrections v. Estep

Citation: 

Docket Number: 092501

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., 
and Russell and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 
 
 
            OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 092501  
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
                                      April 21, 2011 
TAMMY ESTEP 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
Frederick G. Rockwell, III, Judge  
 
 
This is an appeal from the judgment of a circuit court 
implementing the decision of a hearing officer pursuant to 
Code § 2.2-3006(D), a part of the State Grievance Procedure 
provided for the benefit of employees of the Commonwealth, 
Code § 2.2-3000 et seq. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
The facts will be stated in the light most favorable to 
the grievant, who was the prevailing party before the hearing 
officer and in the circuit court.  Prior to November 2006, 
Tammy Estep (the grievant) was employed by the Virginia 
Department of Corrections (the DOC) as Superintendent of the 
Central Virginia Correctional Unit (CVCU).  Her superiors had 
consistently given her good performance ratings.  On November 
13, 2006, she was involuntarily demoted to a lower position.  
She filed a grievance pursuant to Code § 2.2-3003 that 
ultimately came before a hearing officer. 
 
After hearing 36 witnesses over three days, the hearing 
officer found that the grievant’s demotion was unwarranted.  
He entered an order directing the DOC to  
reinstate the Grievant to a comparable position as 
either a Superintendent or an Assistant Warden, such 
that she will be in the same Pay Band as she was 
when she was involuntarily demoted.  The Hearing 
Officer orders the agency to provide the Grievant 
similar housing as she had in her prior position or 
a supplement to her pay to compensate her for that 
housing. 
 
The order directed the DOC to reimburse the grievant for any 
pay she had lost as a result of the demotion.  The hearing 
officer stated that he was “loathe to disrupt any continuity 
that has been established at the Grievant’s prior location” 
but nevertheless ordered: 
If the Agency is unable to provide an Assistant 
Wardenship, which is in the same Pay Band that the 
Grievant occupied when she was Superintendent, along 
with the appropriate housing or housing allowance, 
the Hearing Officer orders that the Agency return 
the Grievant to her original position with her 
original Pay Band and the housing provided at that 
Unit. 
 
 
Code § 2.2-3006(A) provides for administrative review of 
a hearing officer’s decision at the request of either party to 
a grievance proceeding to ensure that it is “consistent with 
policy.”  Code § 2.2-3006(B) provides for appeal of such a 
decision to the circuit court if either party contends that 
the decision is “contradictory to law.”  Because neither party 
sought administrative or judicial review of the hearing 
 
2
officer’s decision in the present case, the decision became 
“final and binding” pursuant to Code § 2.2-3005.1(C). 
 
Because the grievant’s former position at CVCU had been 
filled, the DOC attempted to comply with the hearing officer’s 
order by transferring the grievant to a newly-created position 
as Deputy Warden at the Powhatan Reception and Classification 
Center (PRCC) at the same rate of pay but with different 
duties, responsibilities and authority.  The grievant 
contended that the position at PRCC was not a “comparable 
position” to that from which she had been involuntarily 
demoted.  She brought the present proceeding by filing a 
petition for implementation of the hearing officer’s order in 
the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County pursuant to Code 
§ 2.2-3006(D), asserting that the DOC had incorrectly and 
inadequately implemented the Hearing Officer’s order. 
 
The court received a stipulation of facts and exhibits 
and heard testimony ore tenus.  The court found that the 
grievant’s new position, while compensated at the same pay 
band, was not comparable to her former position with regard to 
duties, responsibilities, opportunities for professional 
training and advancement, or rank within the career path of 
the DOC.  The court held that the DOC had failed to implement 
the hearing officer’s order.  Because the DOC had failed to 
place the grievant in a comparable position, the court ordered 
 
3
her restored to her original position at CVCU.  The court also 
awarded attorney’s fees to the grievant pursuant to Code 
§ 2.2-3006(E). 
 
The DOC appealed the circuit court’s judgment to the 
Court of Appeals.  By an opinion and order entered 
December 15, 2009, that Court held that it lacked jurisdiction 
over the appeal because it was neither an appeal of the 
decision of a circuit court on appeal from the decision of an 
administrative agency nor an appeal of a grievance hearing 
decision.  The Court held that while those cases are within 
the statutory jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, the 
present case is not.  The Court of Appeals transferred the 
appeal to this Court pursuant to Code § 8.01-677.1.  Virginia 
Dep't of Corr. v. Estep, 55 Va. App. 386, 388-91, 685 S.E.2d 
891, 893-94 (2009). 
Analysis 
 
This appeal involves neither the factual basis nor the 
legal correctness of the hearing officer’s decision.  Our 
consideration is confined to the circuit court’s decision 
implementing the hearing officer’s order.  The appeal presents 
a mixed question of law and fact.  On appellate review, we 
defer to the trial court’s findings of fact if the record 
contains evidence to support them but we review conclusions of 
 
4
law de novo.  Luria v. Board of Dirs., 277 Va. 359, 365, 672 
S.E.2d 837, 840 (2009). 
 
The hearing officer determined that the grievant had been 
involuntarily demoted without just cause and entered an order 
designed to rectify that injustice.  Although the hearing 
officer expressed reluctance to “disrupt any continuity” at 
the grievant’s former workplace if her position had been 
filled by another person since her demotion and transfer, he 
nevertheless ordered DOC to restore her to her original 
position if DOC could not provide her with a comparable 
position elsewhere.  In the circuit court, the grievant 
contended that her new position at PRCC was not comparable to 
her original position and the DOC denied that assertion. 
 
The record before the circuit court included the 
following evidence relevant to that issue:  At CVCU the 
grievant served as head of the unit; managed and directed the 
budget, planning and personnel; was responsible for complex 
administrative duties including developing and directing 
policies and procedures; served as public relations director 
for the facility and was entitled to participate in the Senior 
Management Training Institute.  She attended meetings and 
conferences that provided an advanced level of management 
training.  Her title was “Superintendent, Senior.”  
 
5
 
In her new position at PRCC, her title was “Deputy 
Warden.”  She was not the unit head, did not formulate 
policies, did not handle budget issues, did not plan or 
develop projects and was not permitted to participate in 
senior management training programs.  Her former rank within 
the hierarchy of the DOC had been “Security Manager III” and 
she reported to a “Security Manager IV.”  In her new position, 
her rank was reduced to “Security Manager II” and she reported 
to a “Security Manager III,” the rank she had formerly 
occupied.  
 
We hold that the circuit court’s finding that the two 
positions were not comparable was supported by the evidence.  
“Comparable” is defined as “equivalent, similar.”  Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary 461 (3d ed. 1993).  It is 
apparent from the context of the hearing officer’s decision 
that he used the term in that sense because the purpose of his 
order was to make the grievant whole.  If the DOC could not 
furnish a comparable substitute, the grievant was to be 
restored to her original position.  Because the DOC was unable 
to provide a comparable substitute position, implementation of 
the hearing officer’s order required restoration of the 
grievant to her original position. 
 
In a motion to reconsider the circuit court’s ruling, and 
in an assignment of error here, the DOC argues that the 
 
6
hearing officer had no legal authority to restore the grievant 
to her original position after it had been filled.  The 
circuit court noted in its letter opinion denying the motion 
to reconsider that the parties had agreed that “no part of the 
hearing officer’s decision was contradictory to law.”  
Further, the DOC failed to raise that question by appealing 
the hearing officer’s decision to the circuit court to 
challenge its legal correctness pursuant to Code § 2.2-
3006(B).  Accordingly, we deem that argument waived and do not 
consider it. 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court in all respects, including its award of 
attorney’s fees.  Because the grievant prevailed on appeal as 
well as in the circuit court, she is entitled to an award of 
attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.  Accordingly, we will 
remand the case to the circuit court for ascertainment and 
award of appellate attorney’s fees. 
Affirmed and remanded.  
 
7