Case Title: Commonwealth v. Arzola

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11679

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11679 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MANUEL ARZOLA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 6, 2014. - March 4, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Identification.  Evidence, Identification, Blood sample, Buccal 
swab.  Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Search and Seizure, 
Clothing, Expectation of privacy, Warrant, Blood sample, 
Buccal swab, Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  
Constitutional Law, Privacy, Probable cause, Blood test.  
Privacy. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 11, 2011. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence and to compel the 
provision of a deoxyribonucleic acid sample by means of a buccal 
swab were heard by Thomas A. Connors, J., and the cases were 
tried before Thomas E. Connolly, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Katherine Essington for the defendant. 
 
Donna Jalbert Patalano, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Ian Stone, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
Kirsten V. Mayer, John J. Reynolds III, Sara Perkins Jones, 
Matthew R. Segal, & Jessie J. Rossman, for American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The defendant was convicted by a Superior 
Court jury of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon 
and assault and battery.1  The defendant appealed, and we 
transferred the case here on our own motion.  On appeal, the 
defendant contends that the motion judge erred in denying a 
motion to suppress the victim's out-of-court eyewitness 
identification of the defendant, where the victim had told the 
police that the assailant wore a gray shirt and the defendant 
was the only person shown wearing a gray shirt in the 
photographic array.  The defendant also argues that 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence identifying the victim as 
the source of blood found on the defendant's shirt should have 
been suppressed, because the DNA analysis of the bloodstain 
constituted a search that could only be conducted lawfully with 
a warrant supported by probable cause, and no warrant had been 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant was found not guilty of armed robbery.  He 
was sentenced to from five to seven years in State prison on the 
conviction of assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon, and to from three years of probation on the conviction 
of assault and battery, to commence on his release from State 
prison. 
3 
 
 
obtained.  We find no error and affirm the defendant's 
convictions.2 
 
Background.  In the early morning of August 23, 2010, the 
victim, Mauricio Arevalo, was walking to his home in Chelsea 
when a man seated on a bench asked him for money and cigarettes.  
The victim continued walking for another two or three blocks 
when someone came from behind him and held a knife to his back, 
demanding he give up his possessions.  The victim surrendered 
his wallet and cellular telephone before the assailant shoved 
him to the ground and stabbed him in the neck and shoulder area.  
From the ground, the victim turned his head and observed the 
assailant, whom he recognized as the same person who had asked 
for money and cigarettes.  The victim briefly followed the 
assailant but then stopped at a firehouse for assistance with 
his wounds. 
 
Chelsea police Officer Robert Hammond met the victim at the 
firehouse before he was taken to the hospital.  The victim 
described the assailant as a heavy-set Hispanic male, 
approximately five feet, ten inches to six feet tall, wearing a 
gray shirt, dark-colored jeans, and possibly a hat.  Shortly 
after an ambulance arrived, another officer alerted Officer 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services and by the American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation of Massachusetts. 
4 
 
 
Hammond that a man fitting the victim's description of the 
assailant had been stopped about two blocks away from the crime 
scene.  Officer Hammond went to where the defendant had been 
stopped and observed that he matched the victim's general 
description.3  After learning that the defendant had an 
outstanding warrant, Officer Hammond arrested him on the warrant 
and transported him to the Chelsea police station. 
 
During booking, the defendant was asked to empty his 
pockets and, as he reached into them, Officer Hammond observed 
that the defendant had a stain on the left sleeve of his gray 
shirt.  Believing the stain to be blood, Officer Hammond asked 
the defendant if he had any injuries that might have caused the 
stain.  The defendant responded that he was not injured, and no 
wounds were found on him.  Before placing the defendant in a 
cell, Officer Hammond seized the shirt as evidence of the 
alleged armed robbery and assault of the victim, although the 
defendant was not yet under arrest for those crimes.  Because 
the defendant would have access to a sink and a toilet with 
running water in his cell, Officer Hammond was concerned that 
the defendant might wash away the stain if the shirt were not 
seized. 
                                                          
 
 
3 No showup identification procedure was conducted with the 
victim because he needed to be transported by ambulance to the 
hospital. 
5 
 
 
 
The following day, the victim met with Detective Michael 
Noone and described the assailant as a Hispanic male, about five 
feet, ten inches tall, with a heavy build and short hair, and 
wearing a gray sweatshirt.  Detective Noone created an array of 
eight photographs, including the defendant's booking photograph. 
When choosing fillers for the array, he used a computer program 
that searched a database of photographs that matched the 
defendant's race and ethnicity, gender, height, weight, and age 
group.  Detective Noone then selected people who looked similar 
to the defendant.  Each of the filler photographs depicted a 
Hispanic male in the defendant's age group, with a heavy build 
and a similar complexion to the defendant's.  The photographs 
themselves showed only each person's face and a small portion of 
the upper torso. 
 
Detective Noone asked Officer Jose Torres, Jr., who was not 
involved in the investigation, to conduct the eyewitness 
identification procedure.  Before Officer Torres took the victim 
into a separate room, Detective Noone read the victim the 
Chelsea police department form used to prepare eyewitnesses for 
viewing a photographic array.4  In the separate room, Officer 
                                                          
 
 
4 Among other advisements, the form notifies eyewitnesses 
that the perpetrator may or may not be in the array; that it is 
as important to clear the innocent as to identify the guilty; 
that the Chelsea police would continue to investigate the crime 
 
6 
 
 
Torres began showing each photograph one-by-one for five to ten 
seconds.  When he displayed the fourth photograph, which 
depicted the defendant, the victim stopped him and stated, 
"That’s the man; I’m one hundred percent sure."  The victim 
explained that he identified that person as his assailant based 
on the person's hair and complexion, and added that he could not 
forget the assailant's eyes. 
 
After a grand jury indicted the defendant, the Commonwealth 
moved for an order requiring the defendant to produce a DNA 
sample by means of a buccal swab.  The Commonwealth explained 
that the victim had submitted a DNA sample to compare with the 
DNA from the bloodstain on the defendant's shirt, and that it 
was necessary to obtain a DNA sample from the defendant in order 
to exclude the defendant as the source of the blood.  The motion 
judge (who was not the trial judge) allowed the Commonwealth's 
motion, finding probable cause to believe that the defendant 
committed the crimes of armed robbery and assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon, and that the sample would probably 
provide evidence relevant to the defendant's guilt.  At trial, 
Kara Tremblay, the chemist who analyzed the defendant's shirt, 
testified to her opinion that the DNA profile obtained from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
regardless of whether a suspect were identified; and that if an 
identification is made, the witness should signify the level of 
certainty. 
7 
 
 
bloodstain on the shirt matched the victim and did not match the 
defendant.5 
 
Discussion.  1.  Eyewitness identification procedure.  The 
motion judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's 
motion to suppress eyewitness identification evidence.  In 
denying the motion, the judge found that the computerized 
process by which the filler photographs were selected was 
intended to ensure that no photograph stood out, and that, in 
fact, the seven other photographs showed men of a similar age, 
complexion, build, and hairline.  Regarding the defendant's gray 
shirt, the judge found that (1) the gray shirt was only one of 
several descriptive features mentioned by the victim; (2) the 
photographs themselves showed a very small portion of the 
person's shirt; and (3) the victim explicitly stated that he 
made the identification based on the defendant's facial 
features, hair, complexion, and eyes. 
 
"When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error, but we conduct an independent review of [the] ultimate 
                                                          
 
 
5 Kara Tremblay also testified that the probability of a 
randomly selected unrelated individual having the 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile matching the bloodstain 
profile was approximately 1 in 107.9 quadrillion in the 
Caucasian population, 1 in 262.6 quadrillion in the African-
American population, 1 in 76.98 quadrillion in the Hispanic 
population, and 1 in 104.6 quadrillion in the Asian population. 
8 
 
 
findings and conclusions of law."  Commonwealth v. Perkins, 450 
Mass. 834, 841-842 (2008).  To prevail on a motion to suppress 
an eyewitness identification, "the defendant must show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that, in light of the totality of 
the circumstances, the procedures employed were so unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive to irreparable misidentification as to 
deny the defendant due process of law."  Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 
460 Mass. 617, 632 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Miles, 420 
Mass. 67, 77 (1995).  Here, as the motion judge found and as we 
confirmed from our own review of the photographic array, the men 
depicted were reasonably similar in their features and physical 
characteristics, including their hair length, skin complexion, 
age, and physical build.  See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 
453 Mass. 782, 795 (2009).  Although the defendant was the only 
person shown wearing a gray shirt, the focal point of the 
photograph was the defendant's face, and the gray shirt was not 
distinctive apart from its color.  See Commonwealth v. Montez, 
450 Mass. 736, 755-756 (2008) (although defendant was only 
person shown wearing hooded sweatshirt, which was mentioned in 
witness's description of assailant, defendant's hooded 
sweatshirt was "a generic type" and "defendant's photograph 
[did] not stand out as distinctive in any unnecessarily 
suggestive way"). 
9 
 
 
 
"Although we disapprove of an array of photographs which 
distinguishes one suspect from all the others on the basis of 
some physical characteristic, we have sustained numerous such 
identifications when it is clear that the victim did not select 
the photograph on that basis."  Commonwealth v. Melvin, 399 
Mass. 201, 207 n.10 (1987).  Here, the witness stated that he 
identified the defendant based on his hair, complexion, and 
eyes; the gray shirt was not mentioned as a factor that 
contributed to the identification.  Compare Commonwealth v. 
Mobley, 369 Mass. 892, 896 (1976) (defendant's distinctive 
feature of wearing hat was "neutralized by the witness's 
unequivocal testimony . . . that [in substance] he was not 
looking for a hat when he examined the pictures"), with 
Commonwealth v. Thornley, 406 Mass. 96, 99-100 (1989) 
(identifications suppressed as impermissibly suggestive where 
defendant was only person in array who was wearing eyeglasses 
and eyewitnesses testified that eyeglasses were "significant 
factor" in making identifications).  We conclude that the judge 
did not err in denying the motion to suppress eyewitness 
identification evidence. 
 
2.  DNA profile.  Before trial, the defendant moved to 
suppress the bloodstained shirt and any evidence deriving from 
it as the fruit of an unlawful seizure.  The motion judge denied 
10 
 
 
the motion, concluding that Officer Hammond lawfully seized it 
in plain view, because (1) he had a legal right to be conducting 
the booking process when the stain was discovered; (2) the stain 
was found inadvertently, as the defendant was being booked on an 
unrelated warrant; and (3) the incriminating character of the 
object was immediately apparent where the police already had 
knowledge of the assault of the victim, and the defendant 
matched the assailant's description.6 
 
On appeal, the defendant does not challenge the seizure of 
the shirt, the court-ordered buccal swab for a known sample of 
the defendant's DNA, or the subsequent analysis of the 
defendant's known sample.  Rather, the defendant argues that the 
DNA analysis of the bloodstained shirt was itself a search that 
required a warrant, even where the shirt was lawfully seized in 
plain view.  Because this claim was not raised in the motion to 
suppress, we ordinarily would consider it waived.  See 
Commonwealth v. Silva, 440 Mass. 772, 781-782 (2004).  However, 
we shall exercise our discretion to consider the claim, in order 
to determine whether there was an error that created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth 
                                                          
 
 
6 The motion judge also found that the police "may well have 
had" probable cause to arrest the defendant for the alleged 
robbery and assault, thus enabling them to seize the shirt as a 
search incident to a lawful arrest. 
11 
 
 
v. Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. 537, 550, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942 
(2002), S.C., 456 Mass. 490 (2010); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 46 
Mass. App. Ct. 398, 400 (1999).  The record before us is 
sufficient to resolve the defendant's claim, the matter has been 
fully briefed (including by the amici), and we transferred this 
case from the Appeals Court to address this novel issue.  See 
Commonwealth v. Daniel, 464 Mass. 746, 755 (2013); Commonwealth 
v. Bettencourt, 447 Mass. 631, 633-634 (2006).  Given these 
considerations, we shall proceed to address the claim on the 
merits. 
Before determining whether the DNA analysis of the 
defendant's shirt constituted a search that required a warrant, 
we first clarify the nature and scope of the DNA analysis at 
issue in this case.  Here, the shirt was known to be worn by the 
defendant, but the source of the bloodstain was unknown, meaning 
the bloodstain was treated as an unknown DNA sample.7  Tremblay 
testified that she examined sixteen loci on the unknown DNA 
sample, which were "chosen by the [Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI)] . . . [b]ecause they are highly variable 
                                                          
 
 
7 Tremblay testified that she treated the sample from the 
defendant's shirt as an "unknown" or "question" sample, which 
she defined as evidence taken from a crime scene. 
 
12 
 
 
between individuals" and the "most discriminating."8  After the 
defendant's known sample was provided through the court-ordered 
buccal swab, and the victim voluntarily provided a known sample 
of his DNA, Tremblay compared the DNA profile from the unknown 
sample with the victim's and the defendant's known profiles.  
Based on the record before us, we conclude that this DNA 
analysis was conducted for the sole purpose of identifying the 
source of the unknown sample. 
                                                          
 
8 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) generally 
requires that a minimum of thirteen "Core" loci be tested for 
inclusion in the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).  See FBI, 
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the 
National DNA Index System, available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-
and-ndis-fact-sheet [http://perma.cc/X76V-TXZL] (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2015).  Tremblay tested the thirteen Core loci, 
Amelogenin (a gene used to determine sex), and two additional 
loci, both of which are commonly tested along with the thirteen 
Core loci.  See J.M. Butler & C.R. Hill, Biology and Genetics of 
New Autosomal STR Loci Useful for Forensic DNA Analysis, in 
Forensic DNA Analysis:  Current Practices and Emerging 
Technologies 183 (J.G. Shewale & R.H. Liu eds., 2014).  These 
loci, other than Amelogenin, are generally believed not to 
contain personal genetic information.  See United States v. 
Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 400-401 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012).  See also Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 
1958, 1966-1967 (2013) (loci tested in DNA profiling "useful and 
even dispositive for purposes like identity"); Boroian v. 
Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 65-66 (1st Cir. 2010) (Core loci "not 
associated with any known physical or medical characteristics" 
[citation omitted]).  The resulting DNA profile was essentially 
a set of numbers corresponding to each locus.  See Boroian, 
supra at 66 (DNA profile is "represented as a series of 
digits").  The analysis of Amelogenin only revealed "XY" to 
indicate a male. 
13 
 
 
 
Whether the DNA analysis in this case was a "'search' in 
the constitutional sense . . . depends on whether the 
[Commonwealth's] conduct has intruded on a constitutionally 
protected reasonable expectation of privacy."  Commonwealth v. 
Lopez, 458 Mass. 383, 389 (2010).  We recognize that the DNA 
found in the bloodstain could potentially reveal more 
information than the identity of the source, including the 
source's ancestry and predisposition to medical or psychiatric 
conditions.  See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 
U.S. 602, 617-618 (1989) (chemical analysis of biological 
samples may reveal "a host of private medical facts"); United 
States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 412-413 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012) ("DNA samples may reveal private 
information regarding familial lineage" [citation omitted]).  
See also Raynor v. State, 440 Md. 71, 103 (2014) (Adkins, J., 
dissenting) ("With today's technology, scientists have the power 
to discern [from DNA] genetic traits, behavioral tendencies, 
propensity to suffer disease or defects, other private medical 
information, and possibly more").  But when limited to these 
sixteen loci, DNA analysis "does not show more far-reaching and 
complex characteristics like genetic traits."  Maryland v. King, 
133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966-1967 (2013).  Apart from the source's sex, 
the DNA analysis of the unknown sample taken from the 
14 
 
 
defendant's lawfully seized shirt revealed nothing more than the 
identity of the source, which is what an analysis of latent 
fingerprints would have revealed (albeit with less accuracy) had 
they been found on the clothing.  Therefore, the DNA analysis 
was no more a search than an analysis of latent fingerprints 
would be.  See Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 
2010) (DNA profile provides genetic fingerprint to uniquely 
identify individual but does not provide additional information 
about that person); Raynor, 440 Md. at 96 ("DNA testing of the 
[thirteen] identifying . . . loci within genetic material, not 
obtained by means of a physical intrusion into the person's 
body, is no more a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment 
[of the United States Constitution], than is the testing of 
fingerprints").  See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 
15 (1973), quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 
(1969) (fingerprinting does not involve "probing into an 
individual's private life and thoughts that marks an 
interrogation or search"). 
 
A defendant generally has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the shirt he or she is wearing, but where, as here, 
the shirt is lawfully seized, a defendant has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy that would prevent the analysis of that 
shirt to determine whether blood found on it belonged to the 
15 
 
 
victim or to the defendant.  See Raynor, 440 Md. at 92 
(defendant "does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the identifying characteristics of his DNA").  See also State 
v. Athan, 160 Wash. 2d 354, 374 (2007) ("There is no subjective 
expectation of privacy in discarded genetic material just as 
there is no subjective expectation of privacy in fingerprints or 
footprints left in a public place").  Requiring police to obtain 
a warrant whenever they seek to analyze lawfully seized evidence 
for the sole purpose of identifying the unknown source of a 
genetic fingerprint would "impose[] substantial burdens on law 
enforcement without vindicating any significant values of 
privacy."9  Commonwealth v. Varney, 391 Mass. 34, 39 (1984), 
quoting Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 429 (1981) (Powell, 
J., concurring in the judgment).  See Commonwealth v. Robles, 
                                                          
 
 
9 An amicus notes that DNA analysis of the shirt potentially 
could reveal the identities of persons who have touched the 
defendant's shirt, thereby intruding into his interest in 
keeping his associations private.  We do not address whether our 
analysis would differ if the purpose of the DNA analysis were 
not to investigate the commission of a crime, but instead to 
determine the identity of persons intimately involved with the 
defendant.  We note, however, that DNA analysis of blood found 
on a defendant's lawfully seized clothing, for the sole purpose 
of identifying the unknown source of blood, is unlikely to 
constitute an "undue intrusion" into a defendant's intimate 
relationships.  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 
617-618 (1984).  The mere presence of another person's DNA on a 
defendant's clothing does not reveal a significant amount of 
information or detail about the nature of the relationship 
between the defendant and the source of the DNA. 
16 
 
 
423 Mass. 62, 65 n.8 (1996) (if lawfully seized, police need not 
obtain warrant to conduct chemical analysis of bloodstained 
coat). 
 
Although we recognize that the science of DNA analysis may 
evolve and enable DNA profiling to uncover from these loci 
information more personal than the identity and sex of its 
source, the loci tested in this case "are not at present 
revealing information beyond identification" and sex.  King, 133 
S. Ct. at 1979, quoting Katsanis & Wagner, Characterization of 
the Standard and Recommended CODIS Markers, 58 J. Forensic Sci. 
S169, S171 (2013).  See Boroian, 616 F.3d at 68-69 (government 
use of DNA profile for more than identification "merely [a] 
hypothetical possibilit[y]").  If the Commonwealth were to 
obtain more than identification and sex information from these 
loci, use the DNA profile for any purpose other than identifying 
the unknown source of the sample, or analyze different loci that 
contained more personal genetic information, we would have to 
revisit the question whether such DNA analysis is a search in 
the constitutional sense.  See King, supra ("If in the future 
police analyze samples to determine, for instance, an arrestee's 
predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary 
factors not relevant to identity, that case would present 
additional privacy concerns not present here"); Mitchell, 652 
17 
 
 
F.3d at 408 ("Should technological advancements change the value 
of [loci analyzed in a DNA profile], reconsideration of our 
Fourth Amendment analysis may be appropriate").  Cf. Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490, 2493 (2014) (warrant is 
generally required for search of cellular telephone, even when 
lawfully seized incident to arrest, because "many of the more 
than [ninety per cent] of American adults who own a [cellular 
telephone] keep on their person a digital record of nearly every 
aspect of their lives -- from the mundane to the intimate"). 
 
The defendant's argument rests heavily on United States v. 
Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 250 (4th Cir. 2012), where the court 
concluded that the police conducted an unreasonable search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment when they extracted the 
defendant's DNA profile from his lawfully seized clothing and 
tested it as part of a murder investigation.10  In Davis, the 
defendant's clothing was seized as evidence while he was in the 
hospital as a gunshot victim, and his DNA profile was later 
obtained from the bloodstains on his pants in order to compare 
                                                          
 
 
10 The Fourth Amendment violation, however, did not result 
in the suppression of the DNA evidence because the court 
concluded that the exclusionary rule should not apply in these 
circumstances under the "good faith" exception established in 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-920 (1984).  See United 
States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 251, 257 (4th Cir. 2012). 
18 
 
 
it with an unknown DNA profile from an unrelated homicide.11  Id. 
at 230-231.  After the defendant was excluded as the source of 
the evidentiary sample from that murder, the police retained his 
DNA profile and included it in their local DNA database, where 
it triggered a "cold hit" with another sample from a different 
homicide crime scene.  Id. at 229, 231-232.  The court concluded 
that the defendant's clothing was lawfully seized in plain view.  
Id. at 239.  However, the court held that the defendant had an 
expectation of privacy in his DNA that was implicated once the 
police extracted the DNA from his clothing and obtained his DNA 
profile.  Id. at 246. 
 
In contrast with the instant case, the police in Davis 
treated the DNA sample on the defendant's clothing as the 
defendant's known sample, and created a DNA profile in order to 
compare it with other unknown samples obtained from various 
crime scenes.  Id. at 231-233.  The court's conclusion that the 
defendant "retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
DNA profile" was premised on the finding that the sample from 
his clothing was known to contain the defendant's DNA.  Id. at 
                                                          
 
 
11 Because the parties' briefs and the record were "devoid 
of any factual basis" for concluding that the defendant was 
involved in the murder, Davis, 690 F.3d at 250, the court 
presumed that the police obtained the defendant's DNA profile 
based on suspicions that amounted to less than probable cause.  
Id. at 231 n.6, 250. 
19 
 
 
248.  Even if we were to accept the Davis court's reasoning with 
regard to a DNA sample known to belong to the defendant, a 
defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a 
DNA profile from an unknown sample that was taken from lawfully 
seized evidence.12 
 
Moreover, we doubt that the Fourth Amendment reasoning of 
the Davis court will be adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court.13  The Davis court never fully addressed the limited scope 
of the DNA analysis:  to develop a DNA profile that would serve 
as a genetic fingerprint to be compared with unknown DNA 
profiles.  See id. at 240 n.22 (declining further to discuss 
science of DNA profiling after noting that some courts analogize 
                                                          
 
 
12 We note that where we have concluded that a known DNA 
sample of a defendant was lawfully obtained without a court 
order, we have not required a search warrant to analyze the DNA 
from that sample to compare its profile with the profile from an 
unknown sample in the criminal investigation.  See Commonwealth 
v. Bly, 448 Mass. 473, 489-491 (2007) (no warrantless search or 
seizure occurred where police retrieved cigarette butts and 
water bottle used by defendant during interview in order to 
obtain known DNA sample, because defendant failed "to manifest 
any expectation of privacy in the items whatsoever"); 
Commonwealth v. Ewing, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 539-540 (2006) 
(defendant had no expectation of privacy in cigarette butts that 
he abandoned and that were used to obtain known DNA sample).  We 
also note that the defendants in Bly and Ewing did not claim 
that, if the items were lawfully collected, a search warrant was 
required to conduct a DNA analysis of the known sample. 
 
 
13 The Davis court acknowledged that the "issue of a 
person's reasonable expectation of privacy in his DNA . . . has 
not yet been addressed by the Supreme Court."  Davis, 690 F.3d 
at 240. 
20 
 
 
DNA to fingerprints while others recognize limitations of that 
analogy).  The Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in King, 133 
S. Ct. at 1979, noted that the loci that comprise a DNA profile 
"come from noncoding parts of the DNA that do not reveal . . . 
genetic traits," and that the sole purpose of DNA profiling is 
to generate "a unique identifying number against which future 
samples may be matched."  Although the Court was addressing the 
suspicionless collection of a DNA sample through a buccal swab 
of certain arrestees, rather than the analysis of such a sample, 
we think it is likely that the limited information provided by a 
DNA profile and the limited purpose of identification will lead 
the Supreme Court to reach a conclusion that is different from 
that of the Davis court.  See Raynor, 440 Md. at 90, petition 
for cert. filed, U.S. Supreme Ct., No. 14-885 (Jan. 19, 2015) 
("The Davis Court's conclusion that the DNA testing at issue in 
that case constituted a Fourth Amendment search rested on what 
may now be a faulty premise, given the discussion in King that 
DNA analysis limited to the [thirteen Core] loci within a 
person's DNA discloses only such information as identifies with 
near certainty that person as unique"). 
 
We conclude that where, as here, DNA analysis is limited to 
the creation of a DNA profile from lawfully seized evidence of a 
crime, and where the profile is used only to identify its 
21 
 
 
unknown source, the DNA analysis is not a search in the 
constitutional sense.  Therefore, no search warrant was required 
to conduct the DNA analysis of the bloodstain from the 
defendant's clothing that revealed that the victim was the 
source of the blood. 
 
Conclusion.  Because we find no error, the defendant's 
convictions are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.