Case Title: State v. Thompson

Citation: 2012 WI 90

Docket Number: 2009AP001505-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2012-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 WI 90 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP1505-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Harry Thompson, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 330 Wis. 2d 833, 794 N.W. 2d 926 
(Ct. App 2010 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2012    
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 5, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Wood 
 
JUDGE: 
Edward F. Zappen, Jr. 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs (Opinion filed).  
ROGGENSACK and GABLEMAN, J.J., join concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by J.P. La Chapelle and Brazeau, Wefel, Kryshak and 
Nettesheim, LLP, Wisconsin Rapids, and oral argument by J.P. La 
Chapelle. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Eileen 
W. Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
2012 WI 90
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP1505-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2007CF389) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Harry Thompson, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.    This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Thompson, 
No. 2009AP1505-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 
2010), reversing a circuit court order granting Harry Thompson 
(Thompson) a new trial after a jury found him guilty of one 
count of first-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of 
13. 
¶2 
The predicament presented by this case involves the 
following facts.  Thompson was charged with two counts of first-
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
2 
 
degree sexual assault of a child under the age of thirteen 
without 
great 
bodily 
harm, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.02(1)(b).  The criminal complaint stated that each count 
was "a Class B Felony."  Each count of the complaint cited Wis. 
Stat. § 939.50(3)(b),1 which provided that the penalty "For a 
Class B felony [is] imprisonment not to exceed 60 years."  Each 
count stated that "upon conviction ['the above-named defendant'] 
may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed sixty 
(60) years."   
¶3 
From the filing of the complaint on September 26, 
2007, until shortly before the date scheduled for Thompson's 
sentencing (November 6, 2008), the State (represented by the 
Wood County District Attorney's office),2 Thompson's defense 
attorney,3 the Wood County Circuit Court,4 and the defendant were 
not aware that a violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(b) arguably 
                                                 
1 At issue in this case are statutory changes that occurred 
during the 2005 legislative session.  Thompson was charged with 
crimes that occurred in September 2007.  Thus, the version of 
the law that was in effect when the crimes were committed is 
contained in the 2005-06 version of the statutes.  A detailed 
description of these statutory changes is found infra. 
2 Assistant District Attorney John P. Henkelmann handled the 
case.  Henkelmann was appointed Wood County District Attorney in 
August 2009. 
3 Attorney Gary J. Kryshak represented Thompson through 
trial and post-conviction motions. 
4 Wood County Circuit Judge Gregory J. Potter presided at 
the initial appearance.  Wood County Circuit Judge Edward F. 
Zappen, 
Jr., 
presided 
at 
the 
preliminary 
examination, 
arraignment, and jury trial.  Judge Zappen also handled the 
post-trial proceedings. 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
3 
 
was subject to Wis. Stat. § 939.616(1), which provided a 
mandatory minimum sentence as follows: 
Mandatory minimum sentence for child sex offenses. (1) 
If a person is convicted of a violation of s. 
948.02(1)(b) or (c) or 948.025(1)(a), the court shall 
impose a bifurcated sentence under s. 973.01.  The 
term 
of 
confinement 
in 
prison 
portion 
of 
the 
bifurcated sentence shall be at least 25 years.  
Otherwise the penalties for the crime apply, subject 
to any applicable penalty enhancement.   
(Emphasis added). 
¶4 
Stated differently, all principals in this case were 
unaware at the initial appearance; the preliminary examination; 
the arraignment; the discussions about a plea bargain if there 
were any; and the jury trial at which the defendant testified, 
that the defendant faced a possible mandatory minimum sentence 
of 25 years in prison on each of the two counts. 
¶5 
Thompson had been charged with placing his finger 
inside the vagina of a nine-year-old child on September 6, 2007, 
and doing it again on September 21.  He was found guilty of only 
the first count.  It wasn't until the preparation of a pre-
sentence investigation (PSI) report following his conviction at 
trial that all the principals in the case learned that Thompson 
was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years in 
prison.   
¶6 
The predicament, then, is whether the failure to 
inform 
the 
defendant 
of 
the 
mandatory 
minimum 
sentence 
purportedly 
attached 
to 
a 
conviction 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.02(1)(b) violates some right that the defendant may assert 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
4 
 
and, if so, what remedy, if any, follows from proof of that 
violation. 
¶7 
Thompson presents three issues for review: 
 
1. 
Whether the failure to inform Thompson of 
the applicable mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years 
of incarceration prior to trial violated Thompson's 
constitutional due process rights. 
 
2. 
Whether the complaint in this case was 
defective under Wis. Stat. § 970.02(1)(a) because it 
did 
not 
state 
the 
applicable 
mandatory 
minimum 
sentence, therefore entitling Thompson to a new trial. 
 
3. 
Whether the court of appeals exceeded its 
authority and neglected to adhere to prior precedent 
when it decided issues of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
¶8 
We reach the following conclusions. 
¶9 
First, there are legitimate questions whether a 
mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years applies to Thompson in 
this case.  However, we do not decide this issue because the 
issue has not been briefed and it is better practice not to 
decide issues that have not been fully briefed.  The issue 
should be considered on remand. 
¶10 Second, assuming but not deciding that the mandatory 
minimum sentence applies to Thompson, the failure to inform 
Thompson of the mandatory minimum sentence violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.02(1)(a).  Wisconsin Stat. § 970.02(1)(a) requires the 
judge who presides at an initial appearance to inform the 
defendant of the charge and furnish the defendant with a copy of 
the complaint "which shall contain the possible penalties for 
the offenses set forth therein."  (Emphasis added).  "In the 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
5 
 
case of a felony, the judge shall also inform the defendant of 
the penalties for the felony with which the defendant is 
charged."  Id. (emphasis added).  The court did not furnish the 
defendant with a complaint that contained one of "the possible 
penalties 
for 
the 
offense"——namely, the mandatory minimum 
penalty of 25 years in prison——and it did not adequately inform 
the defendant of the possible penalties.  Assuming that Thompson 
is subject to a mandatory minimum penalty, these violations of 
Wis. Stat. § 970.02(1)(a) by the State and by the circuit court 
were not corrected at any point in the proceedings. 
¶11 We conclude that this case must be remanded to the 
circuit court for a hearing to determine whether Thompson was 
prejudiced by the violations of Wis. Stat. § 970.02(1)(a).  The 
prejudice determination must satisfy the traditional standard 
for overcoming harmless error, that is, there must be a 
reasonable probability that the error contributed to the outcome 
of the action or the proceeding at issue.  
¶12 Third, assuming again but not deciding that the 
mandatory minimum sentence applies to Thompson, the failure of 
Thompson's defense attorney to discover this fact, inform 
Thompson of this fact, and incorporate this fact into his 
defense strategy, is likely to be assessed as deficient 
performance if Thompson should file an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.  However, if Thompson were to make such a claim, 
he also would be required to establish prejudice from the 
deficient performance as the second prong of such a claim.  See 
State 
v. 
Domke, 2011 WI 95, ¶34, 337 Wis. 2d 268, 805 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
6 
 
N.W.2d 364.  We remand this case to the circuit court, so that 
all facets of possible prejudice to the defendant may be 
examined at the same time if an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is made.   
¶13 Consequently, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand this case to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 This case presents constitutional questions regarding 
whether the defendant's due process rights were violated.  We 
review determinations of these questions de novo.  State v. 
McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶26, 328 Wis. 2d 289, 786 N.W.2d 227. 
¶15 Additionally, this case presents several questions of 
statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.  State v. 
Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, ¶28, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 810 N.W.2d 787. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Background 
¶16 When the principals in this case learned from the PSI 
that Thompson was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 
years, the Wood County Circuit Court, Edward F. Zappen, Jr., 
Judge, delayed sentencing. 
¶17 The court briefly examined the statutory history of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.616 (the mandatory minimum penalty statute) and 
expressed concern whether Thompson's conviction was valid, or, 
if it was, what sentence should be applied.  At this hearing, on 
November 6, 2008, the circuit court stated, "If we want to point 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
7 
 
any fingers, it has to be done with the sloppy legislation that 
was done that put this law in effect that went past all of us."   
¶18 On January 15, 2009, Thompson moved for a new trial on 
the basis that he was denied his due process rights when "he was 
not adequately informed of the penalty of said crime prior to 
going to a jury trial."  
¶19 On January 29, 2009, the court held a hearing on that 
motion.  
¶20 At the hearing, the assistant district attorney 
explained that the legislature had passed two bills affecting 
the applicable statutes.  He noted that the bills were signed on 
the same day and that the bills created "mutually inconsistent" 
laws.  As a result, he asked that the defendant be sentenced 
without the mandatory minimum.   
¶21 The circuit court disagreed, stating that "There is a 
mandatory 25 year minimum mandatory on this case, no ands, ifs 
and buts."  "It is patently clear that the 25 year mandatory 
minimum penalty applies to a violation of 948.02(1)(b) as 
defined in 05 Act 437."   
¶22 Based on this holding, the court determined that 
failure by the district attorney to allege the mandatory minimum 
sentence in the complaint, combined with Thompson's attorney's 
failure to inform Thompson of the penalty, was "a very clear 
violation of due process."  The court did not sentence Thompson.  
Instead, it granted him a new trial.  While the court noted that 
due process and ineffective assistance of counsel were both 
issues, the court grounded its new trial ruling on due process.   
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
8 
 
¶23 The court stated: "How can that be any different if a 
defendant 
is . . . deciding . . . to 
make 
an 
intelligent 
decision whether or not to go to trial or whether or not to 
perhaps take some other offer?  And whether there was [an offer] 
here is beside the point.  But without being notified as to what 
he's facing he's not in a position to make a decision whether or 
not to go to trial."   
¶24 In the court's order for a new trial, the court 
included the following findings of fact: 
 
1. 
That the defendant, Harry Thompson, was 
charged in a Criminal Complaint dated September 26, 
2007, with two counts of first degree sexual assault 
of a child under the age of 13 without great bodily 
harm, 
contrary 
to 
Sections 
948.02(1)(b) 
and 
939.50(3)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes.  As a penalty, 
the Criminal Complaint indicated that it was a Class B 
felony, and upon conviction, he may be sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment not to exceed sixty (60) years. 
 
. . . .  
 
3. 
That no party made an objection to the 
penalty 
referred 
to 
in 
the 
Criminal 
Complaint/Information. 
 
4. 
That it was only after the pre-sentence 
investigation was received, that the Court and counsel 
discovered that the correct penalty included a minimal 
initial incarceration of 25 years per Wisconsin 
Statute Section [939.616]. 
 
5. 
That at no time was the defendant informed 
that he faced a [mandatory minimum] prison sentence of 
25 years.   
¶25 The State appealed.  The court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's order for a new trial.  The court of appeals 
relied on cases stating that defendants have no right to plea 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
9 
 
bargain.  Thompson, No. 2009AP1505-CR, unpublished slip op., 
¶¶7-8.  Therefore, the court determined that the lack of 
knowledge regarding a mandatory minimum sentence could not have 
interfered with Thompson's right to plea bargain because he did 
not have such a right.  Id., ¶13.  Likewise, the court 
determined that "any defect in the complaint [under Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.02(1)(a)] was not prejudicial"; therefore, he was not 
entitled to a new trial.  Id., ¶14.  The court also discussed 
ineffective assistance of counsel, determining that the failure 
of Thompson's attorney to inform Thompson of the mandatory 
minimum sentence failed on the same grounds as his due process 
and statutory violation challenges——namely, that Thompson had no 
right to bargain in the first place.  Id., ¶20. 
¶26 Thompson 
moved 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
for 
reconsideration, claiming that the court prematurely decided the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which was not decided 
by the circuit court nor appealed to the court of appeals.  The 
court of appeals noted that the parties had referred to 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the court of appeals briefs 
and that the court decided the claim only insofar as it related 
to the issue of whether Thompson had a right to plea bargain.  
The court stated that Thompson could still bring an ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
claim 
if 
he 
could 
show 
deficient 
performance and prejudice, and the court declined to alter its 
opinion.   
B. Applicability of Mandatory Minimum Sentence 
to This Case 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
10 
 
¶27 This case has been argued on the assumption that 
Thompson is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years.  
This assumption may not be correct.  The legislative history of 
the applicable statutes is so bizarre that it raises legitimate 
questions about whether the mandatory minimum sentence applies 
in this case.   
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1) (2003-04) provided: 
Sexual assault of a child. (1) First degree sexual 
assault.  Whoever has sexual contact or sexual 
intercourse with a person who has not attained the age 
of 13 years is guilty of a Class B felony. 
¶29 "Sexual contact" was defined in Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5) 
and "sexual intercourse" was defined in Wis. Stat. § 948.01(6).  
In 2003-04 there was no Wis. Stat. § 939.616 and no Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.617.  
¶30 The 2005 legislature passed 2005 Assembly Bill 784.  
This bill became 2005 Wisconsin Act 430.  Among its provisions, 
Act 430 made several changes in the sexual assault statutes 
affecting children. 
¶31 Act 430 created § 939.617 (mandatory minimum sentence 
for child sex offenses), which provided in part: 
(1) If a person is convicted of a violation 
of s. 948.02(1)(b) or (c) or 948.025(1)(a), the 
court shall impose a bifurcated sentence under s. 
973.01.  The term of confinement in prison 
portion of the bifurcated sentence shall be at 
least 25 years.  Otherwise the penalties for the 
crime apply, subject to any applicable penalty 
enhancement. 
¶32 Act 430 renumbered § 948.02(1) to § 948.02(1)(b) and 
amended it to read: 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
11 
 
(b) Whoever has sexual intercourse with a 
person who has not attained the age of 12 years 
is guilty of a Class B felony. 
¶33 Act 430 created § 948.02(1)(e) to read: 
(e) Whoever has sexual contact with a person 
who has not attained the age of 13 years is 
guilty of a Class B felony. 
¶34 The effect of Act 430 was to create a section imposing 
a mandatory minimum penalty for sexual intercourse with a person 
who has not attained the age of 12 years.   
¶35 The 2005 legislature also passed 2005 Senate Bill 629.  
This bill became 2005 Wisconsin Act 437.  Act 437 became law 
exactly the same day as Act 430 but its numbering indicates that 
it became law after Act 430.  Act 437 had no mandatory minimum 
provision, but it too renumbered and amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1).  As a result of the Act 437 amendment, § 948.02 
read in part:  
(1) 
Whoever 
has 
sexual 
contact 
or 
sexual 
intercourse with a person who has not attained the age 
of 13 years is guilty of one of the following: 
 
. . . .  
(b) If the sexual contact or sexual intercourse 
did not result in great bodily harm to the person, a 
Class B felony. 
¶36 The effect of Act 437 was to create a different, 
inconsistent Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(b).  This inconsistency was 
clearly identified by the Revisor of Statutes Bureau in the 
2005-06 version of the statutes as follows: 
NOTE: Sub. (1) is affected by 2005 Wis. Acts 430 
and 437.  The 2 treatments are mutually inconsistent.  
Sub. (1) is shown as affected by the last enacted act, 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
12 
 
2005 Wis. Act 437.  As affected by 2005 Wis. Act 430, 
it reads: 
[text of Act 430 provision]. 
¶37 The approval of Act 437, which amended the same 
statutory section that Act 430 had amended, raises the question 
whether both provisions existed——as fraternal twins——at the time 
Thompson was prosecuted.5  Thompson was charged under the 
provision created by Act 437.  An argument has been made in 
                                                 
5 he legislature addressed the confusion created by Acts 
430 and 437 by passing 2007 Wisconsin Act 80.  That Act read in 
part: 
SECTION 12. 948.02 (1) of the statutes, as 
affected by 2005 Wisconsin Acts 430 and 437, is 
repealed and recreated to read: 
948.02 (1) FIRST DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT.  
(am) 
Whoever 
has 
sexual 
contact 
or 
sexual 
intercourse with a person who has not attained the age 
of 13 years and causes great bodily harm to the person 
is guilty of a Class A felony. 
(b) Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person 
who has not attained the age of 12 years is guilty of 
a Class B felony. 
(c) Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person 
who has not attained the age of 16 years by use or 
threat of force or violence is guilty of a Class B 
felony. 
(d) Whoever has sexual contact with a person who 
has not attained the age of 16 years by use or threat 
of force or violence is guilty of a Class B felony if 
the actor is at least 18 years of age when the sexual 
contact occurs. 
(e) Whoever has sexual contact with a person who 
has not attained the age of 13 years is guilty of a 
Class B felony. 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
13 
 
unrelated cases that two versions of § 948.02(1)(b) existed and 
that the mandatory minimum sentence in Wis. Stat. § 939.616(1) 
applied only to a charge under the version created by Act 430, 
not the version created by Act 437. 
¶38 In State v. Comas, No. 2010AP2687-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶5 n.2 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2011), Judge Lundsten noted 
that  
[I]n a recent unpublished decision involving the same 
legislative acts, State v. Thompson, No. 2009AP1505-
CR, unpublished slip Op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 
2010), we explained that the parties agreed, for 
purposes of that appeal, that the mandatory minimum 
confinement provision applied to a charge under a 
different child sexual assault provision, Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1)(b) 
(2005-06). 
 
See 
Thompson, 
No. 
2009AP1505-CR, ¶2 & n.2.  It may be that the defendant 
in Thompson could have raised the same or similar 
arguments that Comas makes in this case. 
¶39 In State v. LaGrew, No. 2010AP1761-CR, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 29, 2011), the State argued in its 
brief to the court of appeals that  
Because 
Act 
430 
created 
both 
§ 939.616(1) 
and 
§ 948.02(1)(b) 
and 
(c), 
it 
is 
clear 
that 
the 
subsection (b) and (c) referred to in § 939.616(1) are 
the subsection (b) and (c) created by  Act 430, not 
the subsection (b) created by Act 437 and the 
subsection (c) not mentioned in Act 437.  See 2005 WI 
Act 430, §§ 1, 3, 4. . . .  If the [Revisor of 
Statutes 
Bureau] 
had 
renumbered 
the 
"reference 
numbers" in 939.616(1) as it was authorized to, any 
confusion on this matter would have been eliminated. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
¶40 Inasmuch as the issue of whether the mandatory minimum 
sentence applies to Thompson, who was charged under the language 
created by Act 437, was not briefed or argued, we do not decide 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
14 
 
the issue here.  We respectfully suggest that the circuit court 
consider the issue on remand, including the fact that the 
Revisor of Statutes Bureau, in preparing the 2005-06 Wisconsin 
Statutes, drafted a NOTE to follow Wis. Stat. § 939.616(1): 
"NOTE: The cites are to s. 948.02(1)(b) or 948.025(1)(a) as 
affected by 2005 Wis. Act 430.  See the notes to ss. 948.02(1) 
and 948.025(1)."  (Emphasis added).6 
C. Due Process 
¶41 Thompson contends that his "due process rights were 
violated" because he was not informed until after his trial that 
he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years in prison if 
he was convicted. 
¶42 The constitutional basis for a due process claim is 
found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and in Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant 
part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law."  U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV.  The Wisconsin Constitution provides in relevant 
part: "No person may be held to answer for a criminal offense 
without due process of law."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 8.   
                                                 
6 We also observe that Act 430 did not create a section 
"939.616."  It created a section "939.617."  Another act, 2005 
Wisconsin Act 433, also created a section "939.617," which was 
completely different from the section created by Act 430.  The 
Revisor of Statutes Bureau renumbered the Act 430 section to 
"939.616."  The Act 433 section "939.617" remained as passed.  
In short, both sections survived. 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
15 
 
¶43 Courts have had difficulty pinpointing the meaning of 
due process.  According to Chief Justice Earl Warren, "'Due 
process' is an elusive concept.  Its exact boundaries are 
undefinable, and its content varies according to specific 
factual contexts."  Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).  
According to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "[D]ue process of 
law depends on circumstances.  It varies with the subject-matter 
and the necessities of the situation."  Moyer v. Peabody, 212 
U.S. 78, 84 (1909).   
¶44 This court offered a broader comment a century ago:  
What is due process of law?  There is nothing very 
technical about it when we view the subject broadly.  
Due process of law means, in brief, the law of the 
land——including the unwritten law.  It is, simply, 
that which must be followed in depriving any one of 
anything which is his to enjoy until he shall have 
been divested thereof by and according to the law of 
his country.   
Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 240, 142 N.W. 595 (1913) 
(emphasis added).   
¶45 As implied by the quotation from this court, "due 
process of law" has the capacity to be interpreted expansively——
in determining what "must be followed"——to achieve a desired 
objective.  Conversely, "due process" may be interpreted 
narrowly to prevent an undesired result. 
¶46 Corpus Juris Secundum took a good stab at defining 
"Procedural due process": 
 
Procedural due process means that persons whose 
rights may be affected are entitled to be heard, and 
in order that they may enjoy that right, they must 
first be notified; correlatively, this right to notice 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
16 
 
and opportunity to be heard must be extended at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.  The 
elements of procedural due process are notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, or to defend or respond, in 
an orderly proceeding, adapted to the nature of the 
case in accord with established rules. 
16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1444, at 188 (2005)(emphasis 
added)(footnotes omitted). 
¶47 Thompson's due process argument is that although he 
was provided notice that, upon conviction, he could face 
imprisonment for up to 60 years on each count, this notice was 
inadequate because it did not inform him of the mandatory 
minimum prison term that was lurking behind every conviction, 
thus depriving him of the ability to assess risks and conduct 
his defense with full knowledge of the stakes. 
¶48 This argument does not rely on statutory law.  It 
relies on principles imported from other cases and applied to 
the facts here by analogy.  For instance, Thompson points to 
State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991), and 
State v. Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d 102, 477 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1991), 
two cases that interpreted Wis. Stat. §§ 973.12(1)7 and 971.298 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12(1) provided in pertinent part:  
973.12 Sentence of a repeater. (1) Whenever a person 
charged with a crime will be a repeater as defined in 
s. 939.62 if convicted, any prior convictions may be 
alleged in the complaint, indictment or information or 
amendments so alleging at any time before or at 
arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea.  The 
court may, upon motion of the district attorney, grant 
a reasonable 
time to investigate possible prior 
convictions before accepting a plea.  If such prior 
convictions are admitted by the defendant or proved by 
the state, he shall be subject to sentence under s. 
939.62 unless he establishes that he was pardoned on 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
17 
 
with respect to adding or amending repeater charges after the 
defendant has entered a plea.  Both cases turned on statutory 
interpretation, even though the statutes appeared to have a due 
process underpinning. 
¶49 The 
Martin 
court 
quoted 
Block 
v. 
State, 
41 
Wis. 2d 205, 210, 163 N.W.2d 196 (1968): 
The allegation of recidivism is put in the information 
in order to meet the due-process requirements of a 
fair trial.  When the defendant is asked to plead, he 
is entitled to know the extent of his punishment of 
the alleged crime, which he cannot know if he is not 
then informed that his prior convictions may be used 
to enhance the punishment. 
Martin, 162 Wis. 2d at 900-01 (emphasis added by Martin court). 
                                                                                                                                                             
grounds of innocence for any crime necessary to 
constitute him a repeater.   
See State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 888 n.1, 470 
N.W.2d 900 (1991). 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.29 provided as it does now:  
971.29 Amending the charge.  (1) A complaint or 
information may be amended at any time prior to 
arraignment without leave of the court.  
(2) At the trial, the court may allow amendment of the 
complaint, indictment or information to conform to the 
proof where such amendment is not prejudicial to the 
defendant.  After verdict the pleading shall be deemed 
amended to conform to the proof if no objection to the 
relevance of the evidence was timely raised upon the 
trial. 
(3) Upon allowing an amendment to the complaint or 
indictment or information, the court may direct other 
amendments thereby rendered necessary and may proceed 
with or postpone the trial.   
See Martin, 162 Wis. 2d at 889 n.3. 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
18 
 
¶50 Wilks explained that the supreme court in Martin 
"declared that the policy behind sec. 973.12(1), Stats., is to 
satisfy due process by assuring that a defendant meaningfully 
understands the extent of potential punishment at the time of 
the plea," Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d at 109, especially "when a 
defendant pleads guilty."  Id.; see also State v. Stynes, 2003 
WI 65, ¶34, 262 Wis. 2d 335, 665 N.W.2d 115. 
¶51 Thompson also cites State v. Mohr, 201 Wis. 2d 693, 
700-01, 549 N.W.2d 497 (Ct. App. 1996), in which the court of 
appeals correctly stated that a plea may be involuntary if the 
defendant does not have a complete understanding of what might 
or could happen to him in his sentence, particularly the 
possibility of a presumptive minimum sentence. 
¶52 These cases are distinguishable from this case because 
Martin, Wilks, and Stynes involved statutory interpretation.  
Additionally, Wilks involved a no contest plea where the State 
attempted to amend the penalty enhancement provision in the 
complaint after the plea was entered; Mohr also involved a no 
contest plea.  Dispositive pleas of guilty or no contest must be 
knowing and intelligent as well as voluntary.  State ex rel. 
Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 635-36, 579 N.W.2d 698 
(1998); State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶35, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 
N.W.2d 906. 
¶53 Thompson's due process argument does not rely on the 
interpretation of a statute, and Thompson did not enter a 
dispositive plea.  Thus, he cannot claim that he was surprised 
by the result of his plea, inasmuch as he went to trial.  
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
19 
 
Rather, he must argue that his lack of information about the 
mandatory 
minimum 
sentence 
prevented 
him 
from 
making 
an 
"informed decision on whether to plea bargain," i.e., what 
concessions he might make——in response to an offer or on his own 
initiative——to avoid going to trial on two offenses carrying 
mandatory minimum penalties.  "The analysis," Thompson explains,  
is largely a cost-benefit analysis.  The defendant 
weighs the probability of prevailing at a trial by 
jury and its inherent risk of more severe penalties if 
losing the jury trial, with a plea bargain.  The 
greater the penalties the defendant faces when losing 
at trial, the more likely a defendant is to accept, or 
at least pursue, a plea bargain. 
¶54 Argument along this line impressed the circuit court, 
but not the court of appeals, which cited Weatherford v. Bursey, 
429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977), for the proposition that "there is no 
constitutional right to plea bargain; the prosecutor need not do 
so if he prefers to go to trial."9  See also State v. Tkacz, 2002 
WI App 281, ¶27, 258 Wis. 2d 611, 654 N.W.2d 37.     
¶55 The court of appeals stated that, "regardless what 
information Thompson possessed, the prosecutor in this case 
could have refused to engage in plea bargaining."  Thompson, No. 
2009AP1505-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶7. 
What remains is Thompson's assertion that he has a due 
process right to be fully informed of the possible 
penalties so that he can make an informed decision 
whether to pursue a plea agreement.  But a comparable 
argument was rejected by the United States Supreme 
                                                 
9 "It is a novel argument that constitutional rights are 
infringed by trying the defendant rather than accepting his plea 
of guilty."  Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
20 
 
Court in Weatherford. . . .  [T]he Weatherford Court 
rejected the proposition that [an undercover agent's] 
"continued duplicity lost Bursey the opportunity to 
plea bargain."  [Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 560]. 
Thompson, No. 2009AP1505-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶8. 
¶56 Earlier this year, the United States Supreme Court 
issued two decisions, Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 
1399 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376 
(2012), that take the constitutional status of plea bargaining 
to a new level.  The two opinions open "a whole new field of 
constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law."  
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
¶57 Both decisions focus on ineffective assistance of 
counsel, but they take on added significance because the Court 
reiterated that "the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical 
phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to 
the effective assistance of counsel."  Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406 
(quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 
(2010))(internal quotation marks omitted). 
¶58 The Court observed that "Ninety-seven percent of 
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions 
are the result of guilty pleas."  Id. at 1407.  Then it added: 
The reality is that plea bargains have become so 
central to the administration of the criminal justice 
system that defense counsel have responsibilities in 
the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must 
be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel 
that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal 
process at critical stages.  Because ours "is for the 
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials," 
it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of 
a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors 
in 
the 
pretrial 
process. 
 
"To 
a 
large 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
21 
 
extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and 
defense counsel] determines who goes to jail and for 
how long.  That is what plea bargaining is.  It is not 
some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the 
criminal justice system."  Scott & Stuntz, Plea 
Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L. J. 1909, 1912 
(1992). 
 
. . . .  
[A] plea agreement can benefit both parties.  In order 
that these benefits can be realized . . . criminal 
defendants 
require 
effective 
counsel 
during 
plea 
negotiations. 
 
"Anything 
less . . . might 
deny 
a 
defendant 'effective representation by counsel at the 
only stage when legal aid and advice would help him.'" 
Id. at 1407-08 (citations omitted). 
¶59 Because these cases focus on the course of legal 
representation by the defendant's attorney, it is unclear 
whether the principles stated in the two cases have any 
application to other key actors in the criminal justice system. 
¶60 Frye and Lafler were argued in the Supreme Court on 
October 31, 2011——more than three weeks after Thompson's case 
was argued in this court.  The cases were decided on March 21, 
2012.  Consequently, the effect of the two cases on Thompson's 
due process argument has not been briefed and should not be 
decided without thorough input from counsel, especially if this 
court can dispose of the case on less impactful grounds.   
D. Violation of Wis. Stat. § 970.02(1)(a) 
¶61 This brings us to Thompson's statutory argument with 
respect to Wis. Stat. § 970.02(1)(a).  The statute reads as 
follows: 
Duty of a judge at the initial appearance.   
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
22 
 
(1) At the initial appearance the judge shall 
inform the defendant: 
 
(a) Of the charge against the defendant and shall 
furnish the defendant with a copy of the complaint 
which shall contain the possible penalties for the 
offenses set forth therein.  In the case of a felony, 
the judge shall also inform the defendant of the 
penalties for the felony with which the defendant is 
charged. 
Wis. Stat. § 970.02(1)(a). 
¶62 The statute imposes several mandatory duties on the 
judge: 
(1) The judge shall inform the defendant of the 
charge against the defendant. 
(2) The judge shall furnish the defendant with a 
copy of the complaint. 
(3) The complaint furnished by the judge shall 
contain "the possible penalties" for the offenses set 
forth in the complaint. 
(4) In the case of a felony, the judge shall 
personally inform the defendant of the penalties for 
the felony or felonies with which the defendant is 
charged. 
¶63 In this case, the circuit judge performed the first 
two duties.  If a mandatory minimum sentence does not apply to 
Thompson, the circuit judge performed all four duties.  However, 
if the mandatory minimum sentence in Wis. Stat. § 939.616(1) 
does apply to the charges against Thompson, the circuit judge 
did not satisfy his third and fourth obligations.  The judge did 
not furnish the defendant with a complaint that contained "the 
possible 
penalties" 
(a 
mandatory 
minimum 
sentence 
upon 
conviction certainly qualifies as a "possible penalty").  The 
circuit judge also did not personally inform the defendant of 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
23 
 
the possible penalty of a mandatory minimum sentence.  In fact, 
he inadvertently misled the defendant into relying on the 
penalty in the complaint.   
¶64 The threshold question, therefore, is whether the 
mandatory minimum sentence applies.  If it does not, the State 
did not err in drafting the complaint, the circuit judge did not 
err in performing his statutory duties, and defense counsel did 
not err when he did not inform Thompson that he was facing the 
possibility of two mandatory minimum terms of 25 years in prison 
and conduct his defense accordingly. 
¶65 On the other hand, if the mandatory minimum penalty 
applies, the prosecutor erred, the court erred, and defense 
counsel erred, and we must explore the consequences. 
¶66 Prior to mid-1973, Wis. Stat. § 970.02(1)(a) provided: 
(1) At the initial appearance the judge shall 
inform the defendant: 
 
(a) Of the charge against him and shall furnish 
the defendant with a copy of the complaint. 
Wis. Stat. § 970.02 (1971-72).  The Wisconsin Statutes Annotated 
carries a comment on Chapter 255, Laws of 1969, which created 
that provision: "The furnishing of a copy of the complaint will 
assist [defense] counsel in the preparation of the case, since 
normally counsel first sees a defendant either in jail or in his 
office and does not have access at that time to court records."10  
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 970.02 at 435 (West 2007). 
                                                 
10 This "comment" is a "NOTE" prepared by a Criminal Rules 
Committee established by the Judicial Council in 1967. 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
24 
 
¶67 In 1973, the legislature approved 1973 Senate Bill 
189, which amended § 970.02(1)(a), requiring the judge to inform 
the defendant: 
 
(a) Of the charge against him and shall furnish 
the defendant with a copy of the complaint which shall 
contain the possible penalties for the offenses set 
forth therein.  In the case of a felony, the judge 
shall also inform the defendant of the penalties for 
the felony with which the defendant is charged. 
Chapter 45, Laws of 1973, § 1 (emphasized language represents 
the new language in the law). 
¶68 The 
bill 
analysis 
prepared 
by 
the 
Legislative 
Reference Bureau states: "The bill also requires the judge 
presiding at the initial appearance to inform those accused of 
felonies of the penalties they face." 
¶69 Significantly, the main authors of Senate Bill 189 
were Senator Roger Murphy and Senator William Bablitch, both of 
whom had been district attorneys and both of whom went on to 
become distinguished judges.  Justice Bablitch, of course, 
served 20 years on this court. 
¶70 The text of the statute is plain.  The inference drawn 
from 
the 
text and the legislative history is that the 
legislature expected the Wisconsin criminal justice system to 
provide defendants and their counsel with fair notice of the 
charges and the possible penalties that accompany those charges, 
including any mandatory minimum penalty. 
¶71 The 
State 
contends 
that 
notwithstanding 
apparent 
errors by nearly everyone involved before sentencing, Thompson 
forfeited his right to challenge the insufficiency of the 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
25 
 
complaint.  The State points to Wis. Stat. § 971.31, which reads 
in part: 
(2) Except as provided in sub. (5), defenses and 
objections based on defects in the institution of the 
proceedings, 
insufficiency 
of 
the 
complaint, 
information or indictment, invalidity in whole or in 
part of the statute on which the prosecution is 
founded, or the use of illegal means to secure 
evidence shall be raised before trial by motion or be 
deemed waived.  The court may, however, entertain such 
motion at the trial, in which case the defendant 
waives any jeopardy that may have attached. 
 
. . . .  
(5)(c) In felony actions, objections based on the 
insufficiency of the complaint shall be made prior to 
the preliminary examination or waiver thereof or be 
deemed waived. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.31(2) and (5)(c). 
¶72 The State's position gives us pause.  There is a 
recognized need for forfeiture in the criminal justice system.  
Nonetheless, forfeiture and waiver "embody very different legal 
concepts," forfeiture being "the failure to make the timely 
assertion 
of 
a 
right," 
waiver 
being 
"the 
intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."  State v. 
Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (quoting 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993))(internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
¶73 In 
Ndina, 
Chief 
Justice 
Abrahamson 
discussed 
forfeiture of rights as follows: 
[S]ome rights are forfeited when they are not claimed 
at trial; a mere failure to object constitutes a 
forfeiture of the right on appellate review.  The 
purpose of the "forfeiture" rule is to enable the 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
26 
 
circuit court to avoid or correct any error with 
minimal 
disruption 
of 
the 
judicial 
process, 
eliminating the need for appeal.  The forfeiture rule 
also gives both parties and the circuit court notice 
of the issue and a fair opportunity to address the 
objection; encourages attorneys to diligently prepare 
for and conduct trials; and prevents attorneys from 
"sandbagging" opposing counsel by failing to object to 
an error for strategic reasons and later claiming that 
the error is grounds for reversal.   
 
In contrast, some rights are not lost by a 
counsel's or a litigant's mere failure to register an 
objection at trial.  These rights are so important to 
a fair trial that courts have stated that the right is 
not lost unless the defendant knowingly relinquishes 
the right.  As the court explained in State v. 
Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶14, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 
N.W.2d 727, 
"a 
criminal 
defendant 
has 
certain 
fundamental constitutional rights that may only be 
waived personally and expressly," including "the right 
to the assistance of counsel, the right to refrain 
from self-incrimination, and the right to have a trial 
by jury. . . .  Such rights cannot be forfeited by 
mere failure to object." 
Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶¶30-31 (footnotes omitted). 
¶74 This helpful discussion raises questions of when a 
defendant may avoid a forfeiture for failure to timely assert a 
right, especially if the right is not deemed to be a fundamental 
constitutional right. 
¶75 Relying on Wis. Stat. § 971.31(2) and (5), the State 
insists that Thompson, who admittedly had no knowledge of a 
mandatory minimum sentence in his case, forfeited his right to 
raise the issue, except in the context of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. 
¶76 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.31(2) and (5) address the timing 
of objections.  There are a few occasions in which the 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
27 
 
forfeiture rule does not apply because the defendant is not in a 
position 
to 
make 
a 
timely 
objection. 
 
See 
Ndina, 
315 
Wis. 2d 653, ¶140 (Prosser, J., concurring) (citing Walton v. 
Briley, 361 F.3d 431 (7th Cir. 2004); State v. Vanness, 2007 WI 
App 195, 304 Wis. 2d 692, 738 N.W.2d 154).  Use of the phrase 
"deemed waived" and the word "waiver" in § 971.31 may imply that 
a defendant should understand, or at least be able to perceive, 
what he is expected to object to. 
¶77 There are also situations in which § 971.31, by its 
terms, may not apply.  For instance, Thompson is really 
complaining about more than the "insufficiency of the complaint" 
or "information," which are specifically addressed in the 
statute.  Thompson also is complaining that the judge failed to 
personally inform him of the mandatory penalties he faced for 
the felonies and that his lack of information was never 
remedied, so that neither he nor the State understood what was 
at stake at trial or before trial. 
¶78 We believe it would be unreasonable to strictly apply 
§ 971.31 to a situation in which the entire courtroom was 
operating under a mistaken understanding of the law.  The 
criminal complaint appeared to be correct on its face.  Its 
defect was latent because the listing of "potential penalties" 
was incomplete.  As a result, the defendant and his counsel were 
given misleading information, which is exactly the opposite of 
Wis. Stat. § 970.02(1)(a)'s intent. 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
28 
 
¶79 The court of appeals did not rely on Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.31 to reverse.  It turned instead to Wis. Stat. § 971.26, 
which provides:  
No indictment, information, complaint or warrant 
shall be invalid, nor shall the trial, judgment or 
other proceedings be affected by reason of any defect 
or imperfection in matters of form which do not 
prejudice the defendant.   
Wis. Stat. § 971.26 (emphasis added). 
¶80 We note at least three other statutes worth discussing 
in this context.  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.18 is entitled "Mistakes 
and omissions; harmless error." 
(1) The court shall, in every stage of an action, 
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or 
proceedings which shall not affect the substantial 
rights of the adverse party. 
(2) No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or 
new trial granted in any action or proceeding on the 
ground of . . . the improper admission of evidence, or 
for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, 
unless in the opinion of the court to which the 
application is made, after an examination of the 
entire action or proceeding, it shall appear that the 
error complained of has affected the substantial 
rights of the party seeking to reverse or set aside 
the judgment, or to secure a new trial. 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18 (emphasis added). 
¶81 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.22 provides: 
Effect of technical irregularities.   
No evidence seized under a search warrant shall 
be suppressed because of technical irregularities not 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant.   
Wis. Stat. § 968.22 (emphasis added). 
¶82 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.29 reads in part: 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
29 
 
(1) A complaint or information may be amended at 
any time prior to arraignment without leave of the 
court. 
(2) At the trial, the court may allow amendment 
of the complaint, indictment or information to conform 
to the proof where such amendment is not prejudicial 
to the defendant.  After verdict the pleading shall be 
deemed amended to conform to the proof if no objection 
to the relevance of the evidence was timely raised 
upon the trial.   
Wis. Stat. § 971.29 (emphasis added). 
¶83 These four statutes——Wis. Stat. §§ 971.26, 805.18, 
968.22, and 971.29——demonstrate that while the legislature does 
not demand perfection in criminal procedure, it is nonetheless 
sensitive 
that 
procedural deficiencies not "prejudice the 
defendant" or affect a defendant's "substantial rights."  
¶84 The court of appeals grasped the complexity of the 
situation when it chose to focus on the "prejudice" element in 
Wis. Stat. § 971.26 instead of applying Wis. Stat. § 971.31.  
However, the court of appeals did not have a complete factual 
record on the various facets of prejudice, and no one claims to 
have anticipated the Supreme Court's decisions in Frye and 
Lafler.   
¶85 Assuming without deciding that the mandatory minimum 
sentence applies to Thompson, we conclude that the failure to 
inform Thompson of the mandatory minimum sentence violated Wis. 
Stat. § 970.02(1)(a) and that the error was never corrected.  We 
conclude that this case must be remanded to the circuit court 
for a hearing to determine whether Thompson was prejudiced by 
the violation.  The prejudice determination must satisfy the 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
30 
 
traditional standard for overcoming harmless error, that is, 
there 
must 
be 
a 
reasonable 
probability 
that 
the 
error 
contributed to the outcome of the action or the proceeding at 
issue.  Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 67, ¶68, __ Wis. 2d __, __ 
N.W.2d __.  We expect the circuit court to make a threshold 
determination whether the mandatory minimum penalty applies to 
Thompson and if it does, whether the Supreme Court's recent 
decisions in Frye and Lafler affect the issue of prejudice. 
E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶86 Because we reverse the court of appeals decision, we 
do not need to determine whether the court exceeded its 
authority and neglected to adhere to prior precedent when it 
decided issues of ineffective assistance of counsel.   
¶87 Ultimately, the court of appeals recognized that a 
potential ineffective assistance of counsel claim is still 
alive.  Assuming but not deciding that the mandatory minimum 
sentence applies to Thompson, the failure of Thompson's defense 
attorney to discover this fact, inform Thompson of this fact, 
and incorporate this fact into his defense strategy, is likely 
to be assessed as deficient performance if Thompson should file 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  However, if 
Thompson were to make such a claim, he would also be required to 
establish prejudice from the deficient performance as the second 
prong of such a claim.  See Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, ¶34.  We 
remand this case to the circuit court, so that all facets of 
possible prejudice to the defendant may be examined at the same 
No. 
  2009AP1505-CR 
 
31 
 
time if an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is made and 
if the mandatory minimum sentence applies. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶88 We reverse the court of appeals decision.  We remand 
the case to the circuit court, which has not yet sentenced the 
defendant.  Upon remand, we expect the circuit court to make a 
threshold determination as to whether the mandatory minimum 
sentence applies to Thompson's conviction.  If the circuit court 
determines that the mandatory minimum sentence does not apply to 
Thompson's conviction, there was no error in failure to provide 
Thompson with notice of a mandatory minimum sentence.  If the 
circuit court determines that the mandatory minimum sentence 
does apply to Thompson, the circuit court should determine 
whether Thompson was prejudiced by the violations of Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.02(1)(a). 
 
Additionally, 
the 
circuit 
court 
should 
reconsider the due process claim in light of Frye and Lafler.  
Should Thompson bring an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, the circuit court should consider that claim in light of 
the discussion in this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2009AP1505-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶89 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority's mandate reversing the decision of the court 
of appeals that reversed the circuit court's order granting 
Harry Thompson's motion for a new trial and remanding the cause 
to the circuit court.  See majority op., ¶13.  However, I do not 
join the majority opinion because unlike the majority, see id., 
¶¶9, 40, I would decide the issue of whether the mandatory 
minimum sentence of 25 years, as set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.616(1) (2005-06),1 applies to Thompson.  In particular, 
because Thompson was charged under the version of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1)(b) that did not carry a mandatory minimum sentence 
of 25 years, I would conclude that the mandatory minimum 
sentence does not apply to Thompson.  I would therefore reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the 
circuit court for sentencing consistent with this concurrence.  
¶90 As explained by the majority, see id., ¶¶27-39, as 
well as the assistant district attorney at the January 29, 2009, 
hearing on Thompson's motion for a new trial, see id., ¶20, the 
legislature simultaneously enacted two acts: 2005 Wis. Act 430, 
which created a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years for those 
persons convicted of a violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(b), 
and 2005 Wis. Act 437, which did not create such a mandatory 
minimum sentence.  In this case, the State charged Thompson 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2009AP1505-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
under the version of § 948.02(1)(b) that did not carry a 
mandatory minimum sentence. 
¶91 Both Act 430 and Act 437 renumbered Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1) (2003-04) as Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(b) and amended 
its language.  See 2005 Wis. Act 430, § 3; 2005 Wis. Act 437, 
§ 1.  The two versions of § 948.02(1), while enacted on the very 
same day, are mutually inconsistent.  See note to § 948.02(1).  
Act 430 renumbered Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (2003-04) as Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02(1)(b) and amended it to read: "Whoever has sexual 
intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 12 
years is guilty of a Class B felony."  2005 Wis. Act 430, § 3 
(emphasis added).  By contrast, Act 437 renumbered Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1) (2003-04) as Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(b) and amended 
it to read: "Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse 
with a person who has not attained the age of 13 years is guilty 
of one of the following: . . . (b) If the sexual contact or 
sexual intercourse did not result in great bodily harm to the 
person, a Class B felony."  2005 Wis. Act 437, § 1 (emphasis 
added). 
¶92 For our purposes today, it is significant that Act 430 
created Wis. Stat. § 939.617, since renumbered to Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.616,2 effecting a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years 
                                                 
2 Because 2005 Wis. Act 433, enacted the very same day as 
both Act 430 and Act 437, created a different statute that was 
also numbered Wis. Stat. § 939.617, see 2005 Wis. Act 433, § 15, 
the Revisor of Statutes Bureau renumbered as Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.616 the Wis. Stat. § 939.617 created by Act 430, pursuant 
to its authority under Wis. Stat. § 13.93(1)(b).  See third note 
to Wis. Stat. § 939.616. 
No.  2009AP1505-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
for those persons convicted of either Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(1)(b) 
or (c) or 948.025(1)(a).  See 2005 Wis. Act 430, § 1.  Act 437, 
however, did not create such a mandatory minimum sentence.  See 
note to Wis. Stat. § 939.616(1) (clarifying that the citations 
in § 939.616(1) to Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(1)(b) and 948.025(1)(a) 
are those "affected by 2005 Wis. Act 430"). 
¶93 As 
the 
majority 
aptly 
notes, 
the 
legislature's 
approval of Act 437, which renumbered and amended the very same 
statute that Act 430 had renumbered and amended but which did 
not create a mandatory minimum sentence applicable to such 
statute, "raises the question whether both provisions existed——
as fraternal twins——at the time Thompson was prosecuted."  
Majority op., ¶37.  In other words, we are left with the 
"legitimate 
question[]" 
of 
whether 
the 
mandatory 
minimum 
sentence of 25 years applies to Thompson in the first instance.  
See id., ¶27. 
¶94 Unlike the majority, see id., ¶¶9, 40, I would 
definitively answer that legitimate question.  To determine 
whether the mandatory minimum sentence applies to Thompson, I 
would begin by assessing the allegations of the complaint and 
information.  Because Thompson was charged under the version of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(b) renumbered and amended by Act 437, the 
act that did not create a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 
years, I would conclude that the mandatory minimum sentence does 
not apply to Thompson. 
¶95 The State charged Thompson with two counts of first-
degree sexual assault of a child contrary to Wis. Stat. 
No.  2009AP1505-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
§ 948.02(1)(b), alleging that on September 6, 2007, and again on 
September 21, 2007, Thompson had "sexual intercourse with a 
child under the age of thirteen, [T.L.G., born June 4, 1998], 
which did not result in great bodily harm to said child."  The 
complaint advised Thompson that a violation of § 948.02(1)(b) is 
a Class B felony which, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(b), 
subjects Thompson to a term of imprisonment not to exceed 60 
years. 
¶96 The State's allegation that Thompson twice violated 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(b) by having sexual intercourse with a 
child under the age of 13 years, which did not result in great 
bodily harm to the child, informs us that the State charged 
Thompson under the version of § 948.02(1)(b) renumbered and 
amended by Act 437, rather than Act 430.  This is so because the 
version of § 948.02(1)(b) renumbered and amended by Act 437 is 
the version that applies to a victim under the age of 13 years 
and that differentiates between sexual intercourse that resulted 
in great bodily harm to the victim and sexual intercourse that 
did not result in great bodily harm to the victim.  See 2005 
Wis. Act 437, § 1. 
¶97 Moreover, it is clear from the record that nobody 
involved in the case was under the impression that the mandatory 
minimum sentence applied to Thompson.  Specifically, the record 
indicates that the district attorney did not intend to charge 
Thompson under the version of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(b) that 
carried a mandatory minimum sentence, defense counsel was 
unaware of the mandatory minimum sentence, the circuit court did 
No.  2009AP1505-CR.akz 
 
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not advise Thompson of the mandatory minimum sentence, and 
Thompson was not otherwise aware of the mandatory minimum 
sentence. 
¶98 Because I would conclude that the mandatory minimum 
sentence of 25 years does not apply to Thompson, I would not 
address the remaining issues of whether the failure to inform 
Thompson of the mandatory minimum sentence violated either his 
right to due process or Wis. Stat. § 970.02(1)(a), and if so, 
whether Thompson was prejudiced by the violation.  I further 
would not address whether defense counsel's failure to discover 
and inform Thompson of the fact of the mandatory minimum 
sentence constituted deficient performance.  Instead, I would 
remand the cause to the circuit court for sentencing consistent 
with this concurrence. 
¶99 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶100 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
No.  2009AP1505-CR.akz 
 
 
 
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