Case Title: Morgan v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 211033

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Goodwyn, C.J., Powell, Kelsey, McCullough, Chafin, and Mann, JJ., and Mims, S.J. 
 
WILLIAM JOSEPH MORGAN, III 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 211033 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
DECEMBER 29, 2022 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
William Joseph Morgan, III (“Morgan”) appeals the decision of the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia affirming his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated in violation 
of Code § 18.2-308.012. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
“On appeal, we review the evidence in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, 
the prevailing party in the trial court.”  Myers v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 671, 674 (2021) 
(quoting Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 236, 781 S.E.2d 920 (2016)).  So viewed, the 
record demonstrates that on March 6, 2019, a white Ford Crown Victoria was seen driving 
“erratically.” A police officer in a marked patrol unit performed a traffic stop of the vehicle. 
During the traffic stop, the driver, later identified as Morgan, informed the officer that a gun was 
next to him in a zipped bag on his front passenger seat.  The officer detained Morgan and then 
located the zipped bag, which contained a holstered handgun. Morgan subsequently provided the 
officer with his concealed weapons permit. After smelling alcohol on Morgan and performing a 
preliminary breath test, the officer placed Morgan under arrest for driving under the influence. 
 
Morgan was charged and convicted in the general district court for carrying a concealed 
weapon while intoxicated, driving under the influence, and impersonating a police officer.  He 
appealed all but the driving under the influence charge to the circuit court. Following a bench 
trial, the circuit court found him guilty of all charges. 
 
2 
 
Morgan appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals arguing, inter alia, that Code 
§ 18.2-308.012 requires a finding that the gun was carried about his person.  He further argued 
that his gun was neither carried on his person nor was it immediately accessible and, therefore, 
his conviction was in error.  The Court of Appeals affirmed Morgan’s convictions.  In a footnote, 
the Court of Appeals stated that “the trial court need not have found that the firearm was about 
appellant’s person because[,] unlike Code § 18.2-308(A), Code § 18.2-308.012 does not contain 
an ‘about the person’ element.”  Morgan v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 512, 535 n.13 (2021). 
 
Morgan appeals. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Morgan takes the position that a conviction under Code § 18.2-308.012 
requires that the firearm be carried about the person and hidden from common observation.  He 
contends that on the facts of the present case the handgun was neither carried nor about his 
person because it was in a zipped bag on the passenger seat of his vehicle.  Conversely, the 
Commonwealth asserts that Code § 18.2-308.012 does not require a finding that the handgun be 
“about the person” because the language is omitted from the statute.  Furthermore, the 
Commonwealth contends that Morgan carried the handgun because the term “carry” within the 
statute should be broadly construed to include transporting and conveying from one place to 
another.1 
 
 
1 On brief, the Commonwealth correctly states that Morgan never explicitly raised the 
argument that his gun was not “carried” in the Court of Appeals.  However, Morgan generally 
argued in the Court of Appeals that “about his person” is a necessary element of carrying a 
concealed weapon while intoxicated.  Moreover, on brief to the Court of Appeals, Morgan also 
contended that the gun was not carried on his person.  The phrase “about his person” as used in 
Code § 18.2-308(A) modifies “carry,” and as will be explained, “carrying” within Code 
§ 18.2-308.012 is a narrower concept that is distinct yet subsumed within the phrase “carry about 
his person.”  Accordingly, Morgan’s argument was sufficient to preserve this issue for our 
consideration. 
 
3 
 
The question before this Court requires interpretation of Code § 18.2-308.012, which we 
review de novo.  Eberhardt v. Fairfax Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. Bd. of Trs., 283 Va. 190, 194 
(2012).  When interpreting statutes, we must “‘ascertain and give effect to the intention’ of the 
General Assembly.”  Farhoumand v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 338, 343 (2014) (citation 
omitted). 
 
Code §§ 18.2-308 and -308.012 are parts of the same statutory scheme involving 
concealed weapons; thus, it is beneficial to our analysis to address the interplay between them to 
glean the underlying legislative intent.  Code § 18.2-308(A) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f 
any person carries about his person, hidden from common observation, (i) any pistol, revolver, or 
other weapon . . . he is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.”  Conversely, Code § 18.2-308.012 
states, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person permitted to carry a concealed handgun who is under 
the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs while carrying such handgun in a public place is guilty 
of a Class 1 misdemeanor.”2 
 
Generally, statutes with a common purpose or in the same general plan are considered as 
in pari materia.  Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 405 (1957).  When considering 
statutes as in pari materia, they should not be analyzed as isolated fragments of law.  Id. Instead, 
the 
statutes are considered as if they constituted but one act, so that 
sections of one act may be considered as though they were parts of 
the other act, as far as this can reasonably be done . . . where 
legislation dealing with a particular subject consists of a system of 
related general provisions indicative of a settled policy, new 
enactments of a fragmentary nature on that subject are to be taken 
as intended to fit into the existing system and to be carried into 
effect conformably to it, and they should be so construed as to 
 
 
2 The Court of Appeals noted that Morgan’s “private” vehicle may not be a public place 
as required by Code § 18.2-308.012.  However, Morgan did not raise this issue at trial or on 
appeal; thus, this Court may not consider it.  See Rule 5:25. 
 
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harmonize the general tenor or purport of the system and make the 
scheme consistent in all its parts and uniform in its operation, 
unless a different purpose is shown plainly or with irresistible 
clearness. 
Id. at 405 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Furthermore, “when the General Assembly has used specific language in one instance but 
omits that language or uses different language when addressing a similar subject elsewhere in the 
Code, [the Court] must presume that the difference in the choice of language was intentional.”  
Zinone v. Lee’s Crossing Homeowners Ass’n, 282 Va. 330, 337 (2011); accord Rives v. 
Commonwealth, 284 Va. 1, 3 (2012).  Courts must rely on this presumption “because under these 
circumstances, it is evident that the General Assembly ‘knows how’ to include such language in 
a statute to achieve an intended objective,” and therefore, omission of such language in another 
statute “represents an unambiguous manifestation of a contrary intention.”  Brown v. 
Commonwealth, 284 Va. 538, 545 (2012) (quoting Halifax Corp. v. Wachovia Bank, 268 Va. 
641, 654 (2004)). 
 
In analyzing the two code sections involved here, we note that the phrase “about his 
person” found in Code § 18.2-308(A) is conspicuously omitted from Code § 18.2-308.012.  The 
omission of this language is telling as it indicates that the General Assembly did not intend for 
the two statutes to mean the same thing.  Thus, Code § 18.2-308.012 must be interpreted to 
require evidence that the firearm was carried by Morgan and not just about his person.  Having 
determined that “carry” is the operative word, it is therefore necessary to determine the meaning 
of “carry” in the context of Code § 18.2-308.012. 
 
We are bound by the plain language of the statute “‘unless the terms are ambiguous or 
applying the plain language would lead to an absurd result.’”  Baker v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 
572, 576 (2012) (citation omitted).  “A statute is considered ambiguous if the text can be 
 
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understood in more than one way or refers to two or more things simultaneously or when the 
language is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness or definiteness.”  Id. 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
In the context of Code § 18.2-308.012, the word “carry” can be interpreted multiple 
ways.  As the Commonwealth argues, the plain meaning of “carry” could include mere 
conveyance or transporting.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 265 (11th ed. 2019) (“carry” means 
“[t]o convey or transport”).  However, consistent with Morgan’s position, the same term could 
reasonably be limited to physically holding an item on one’s person.  See Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 343 (1993) (“carry” means “to hold, wear, or have upon one’s person”). 
As Code § 18.2-308.012 could quite reasonably be interpreted as incorporating either one of 
these definitions, and the application of either interpretation invariably leads us to a drastically 
different outcome, the statute is ambiguous.  See Blake v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 375, 382 
(2014). 
 
In determining which definition of “carry” to apply in this case, we cannot overlook the 
fact that Code § 18.2-308.012 is a penal statute and, therefore, the rule of lenity applies. 
[I]t is an ancient maxim of the law that all such statutes must be 
construed strictly against the state and favorably to the liberty of 
the citizen. The maxim is founded on the tenderness of the law for 
the rights of individuals, and on the plain principle that the power 
of punishment is vested in the Legislature, and not in the judicial 
department. No man incurs a penalty unless the act which subjects 
him to it is clearly within the spirit and letter of the statute which 
imposes such penalty. There can be no constructive offenses, and 
before a man can be punished his case must be plainly and 
unmistakably within the statute. If these principles are violated, the 
fate of the accused is determined by the arbitrary discretion of the 
judges, and not by the express authority of the law. 
Sutherland v. Commonwealth,109 Va. 834, 835 (1909) (citations omitted). The rule of lenity 
does not apply when it “would conflict with the implied or expressed intent of [the legislature],” 
 
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Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 295 Va. 177, 188 n.8 (2018) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted), nor when it would be an overly “restrictive interpretation of 
the statute.”  McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 489, 504 (2018).  Neither of those exceptions 
applies here.  Accordingly, the application of the rule of lenity, in this case, requires us to use the 
narrower definition of the word “carry.” 
It is further worth noting that a narrow definition of “carry” in this context is supported 
by our jurisprudence.  In Sutherland, we construed the phrase carry (a weapon) “about his 
person” and held that it meant “that it is so connected with the person as to be readily accessible 
for use or surprise if desired.”  109 Va. at 835.  With that definition in mind, we held that a pistol 
encased in a scabbard concealed within a saddlebag, which, in turn, was carried by the defendant 
was not “about his person.”  Id. at 836. 
 
Seventy years later in Schaaf v. Commonwealth, we further refined the phrase and held 
that a pistol carried in a handbag was near and about the defendant’s person so as to constitute a 
violation of the statute.  220 Va. 429, 431 (1979).  Although the crux of our analysis in that 
decision focused on whether the handgun was about the defendant’s person, we noted that our 
decision aligned with a majority of other jurisdictions which have concluded that “the carrying of 
a weapon in a handbag or other similar article, held in the hand or placed under the arm, 
constitutes concealment of a weapon on or about the person.” 3  Id. at 432 (emphasis added). 
 
Just last year we decided Myers, in which we stated that since Schaaf, “this Court and the 
Court of Appeals have interpreted Schaaf’s ‘carry about his person’ analysis as applying to any 
hidden firearm within arm’s reach of the person — whether or not the person physically carried 
 
 
3 We also held that Sutherland could be “distinguished from this case on the facts, [but] 
to the extent that there may be a conflict Sutherland is overruled.”  Id. at 575. 
 
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the firearm.”  299 Va. at 677.  Inherent in this analysis is the notion that the phrase “carry about 
his person” is distinct from and broader than “carry” or “carry on” the person.  Thus, the 
inclusion of the language “about his person” serves as an extension principle, which modifies 
“carry” and expands its definitional scope.  By omitting the phrase “about his person” in Code 
§ 18.2-308.012, the General Assembly appears to have intended to narrow the scope of the 
statute to apply only when physically carrying a handgun on one’s person. 
 
This interpretation is consistent with the authority on which we relied in Schaaf, 
highlighting this Court’s accordance with other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., W.M. Moldoff, 
Annotation, Offense of Carrying concealed weapon as affected by manner of carrying and place 
of concealment, 43 A.L.R.2d 492, § 4(c) (1955) (noting that various courts construe carry “to 
imply that the weapon is so placed that it is capable of moving with the person whenever he 
desires to move.”); Avery v. Commonwealth, 3 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Ky. 1928) (holding that 
carrying a weapon requires that “it must be on the person or so connected or annexed to the 
person that the weapon is carried along as the person moves.”); Commonwealth v. Festa, 40 A.2d 
112, 116 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1944) (defining “carry” in the context of carrying concealed weapons as 
“a connection between the weapon and the carrier so ‘that the locomotion of the body would 
carry with it the weapon as concealed.’”). 
 
By enacting Code § 18.2-308.012, the General Assembly specifically targeted persons 
permitted to carry concealed handguns and sought to prevent them from carrying that handgun in 
a public place while intoxicated.  When reading the statute in context with the public place 
aspect, it is evident that the General Assembly did not envision criminalizing the transportation 
of a handgun within a bag located in a vehicle.  Rather, the legislature sought something more 
specific. It intended to deter intoxicated individuals from physically carrying a concealed 
 
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handgun – whether it be in their waistband, pocket, etc. – in and out of public establishments. 
Contrary to the Commonwealth’s argument, allowing a broad interpretation would stretch this 
purpose and punish behavior the legislature never intended to forbid.  Indeed, if “carry” included 
transportation, it would add another charge to an intoxicated individual who attempted to act 
responsibly by placing his holstered weapon in the trunk of his vehicle.  Accordingly, we hold 
that “carry” within the meaning of Code § 18.2-308.012 is limited to physically carrying the 
handgun on one’s person such that it moves when he moves. 
 
Turning to this case, Morgan had a valid concealed weapons permit and provided it to the 
officer during the traffic stop.  Morgan did not physically carry the handgun on his person, but 
rather, the handgun was holstered and contained within a small, zipped backpack on the front 
passenger seat of his vehicle.  Under these facts, Morgan did not “carry” the handgun as 
contemplated by Code § 18.2-308.012, and his conviction was in error. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals’ judgment upholding Morgan’s 
conviction under Code § 18.2-308.012 will be reversed and the charge dismissed. 
Reversed and final judgment.