Case Title: Ex parte Helen Kathryn Wheeler and William Newton Phillips, as trustee under the Doris R.H. Phillips Revocable Living Trust Agreement. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Helen Kathryn Wheeler et al. v. Don Siegelman et al.)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1051788

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 5/18/07
REL: 8/17/07 as modified on denial of rehearing
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2007
____________________
1051788
____________________
Ex parte Helen Kathryn Wheeler and William Newton Phillips,
as trustee under the Doris R.H. Phillips Revocable Living
Trust Agreement
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Helen Kathryn Wheeler et al.
v.
Don Siegelman et al.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-04-1434)
On Application for Rehearing
SEE, Justice.
APPLICATION OVERRULED; OPINION OF MAY 18, 2007, MODIFIED
[BY SUBSTITUTION OF PAGES 3, 4, 5, AND 25].
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.
1051788
2
Helen Kathryn Wheeler and William Newton Phillips, as
trustee under the Doris R.H. Phillips Revocable Living Trust
Agreement ("Phillips"), petition this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order
removing Spain & Gillon, LLC, as their counsel in this
litigation.  Because we hold that Spain & Gillon did not
violate Rule 1.10, Ala. R. Prof. Cond., and because we hold
that any violation of Rule 8.4 of those rules resulted in
minimal harm to the defendants, we grant the petition and
issue the writ.
Statement of Facts
During Governor Don Siegelman's term of office, a firm
representing Hyundai Motor Company ("Hyundai") contacted the
Alabama Development Office ("ADO") and requested information
regarding incentives and available locations in Alabama for
building a large industrial facility.  In response to this
inquiry, the City of Montgomery, the Montgomery Industrial
Development 
Board 
("the 
IDB"), 
the Montgomery 
County
Commission, and the Montgomery Area Chamber of Commerce
searched for available sites for such a facility.  They
ultimately acquired land in Montgomery County for an
1051788
Both 
Wheeler 
and 
Phillips 
were 
ultimately 
paid 
$4,500 
per
1
acre for their properties.
[substituted p. 3]
industrial site, including land belonging to Helen Kathryn
Wheeler and Phillips.  
Wheeler and Phillips executed an option agreement with
the IDB for the sale of 800 acres of land for the project
site.  The option agreement provided that Wheeler and Phillips
would sell their land for a minimum of $4,500 per acre.  By
the terms of the most-favored-nations clause in the option
agreement, Wheeler and Phillips would receive an amount equal
to the highest price paid to any other seller whose property
was later purchased for the project.   The IDB subsequently
1
assigned this option to the City of Montgomery and Montgomery
County, which exercised the option and then transferred the
property to Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC, as part
of a project agreement for the construction of the Hyundai
automobile-manufacturing 
plant. 
 
Just 
before 
Hyundai 
announced
its choice of a plant site in the United States, a Hyundai
representative telephoned ADO and spoke to Todd Strange, the
director of ADO.  The representative communicated to Strange
that Hyundai wanted to acquire a certain piece of property
1051788
The landowner received over $12,000 per acre for the
2
property.
[substituted p. 4]
("the Shelton property") that would allow a redesign of the
railroad 
spur 
servicing 
the 
project 
site. 
 
Various
individuals, whom Strange named the "working group," met at
the offices of the Montgomery Chamber of Commerce to discuss
the 
request, 
and 
Strange 
and 
an 
executive 
at 
CSX
Transportation, Inc. 
("CSX"), 
arranged 
 for the 
acquisition 
of
the Shelton property.  Under this arrangement, CSX would
purchase 
the Shelton 
property 
for rail 
access, 
thereby keeping
the Shelton property outside the terms of the option
agreement.  CSX would pay the owner $8,000 per acre for the
Shelton property, and the State would reimburse CSX for the
purchase.   Strange informed the Hyundai representative that
2
the property could be acquired.  Subsequently, Hyundai
announced that Montgomery would be the site of its automobile-
manufacturing site.
Wheeler, Phillips, and other plaintiffs sued several of
the participants in these transactions, including the
president of 
the 
Montgomery Area Chamber 
of 
Commerce, Strange,
the IDB, the City of Montgomery, the Alabama Incentives
1051788
In his position as Governor, Siegelman served as
3
president of the AIFA.  Dr. Henry Mabry, as state finance
director 
during 
Governor 
Siegelman's 
term, 
served 
as 
secretary
of the AIFA.  See Ala. Code 1975, § 41-10-540 et seq.
In an e-mail sent to David Echols, the ADO project
4
manager, confirming this arrangement, David Hemphill, an
assistant 
vice 
president 
of 
industrial 
and 
economic
development for CSX, explained the situation as follows:
"Regarding the extra 93 acres that will need to be
purchased, you asked if [CSX] would be willing to
buy this property for the State and [the City of]
Montgomery at approximately $8,000 an acre. ... The
purpose of doing it this way rather than what you
did in getting control of the other 1800 acres is to
avoid paying the other landowners $8,000 an acre,
which would have a negative impact of $10 million on
the site cost. ... Moreover, the other landowners
will get wind of this ploy and may create negative
community publicity.  We have seen this happen
before and would prefer not to be in the middle, so
if asked, we would respond that the State asked us
[substituted p. 5]
Financing Authority ("AIFA"), former Governor Siegelman,3
former Finance Director Henry Mabry, CSX, and Hyundai.  They
alleged fraud, suppression, breach of contract, rescission,
and conspiracy arising out of the option to purchase their
land. 
 
Specifically, 
they 
allege 
that 
the 
defendants 
conspired
to purchase the Shelton property at a higher price than was
paid for their property and that they did so to avoid
complying with the most-favored-nations clause of the option
agreement.4
1051788
to buy this additional property and to contact them
for further information."
Strange responded by letter, stating:
"As I indicated to you last night, our option
agreements have a 'most favored nation' clause where
we agreed to pay no more for any one parcel than any
of the other parcels. ... We decided the most
appropriate course to follow would be to ask CSX to
obtain the parcel for rail access to keep it outside
of the project agreement."
Both then Governor Siegelman and then Finance Director Mabry
received copies of Strange's letter.
6
A. Lee Miller III served as chief of the legal division
of the Department of Finance from January 1987 to September
2003.  The Code of Alabama defines this position as follows:
"The chief of the legal division shall confer
with and advise the Director of Finance and any and
all of the subordinate officers and employees of the
Department 
of 
Finance 
on 
all 
legal 
matters
pertaining to said department."
§ 41-4-203, Ala. Code 1975.  Miller served as chief of the
legal division during Governor Siegelman's term of office and
while Mabry was finance director.  After resigning from the
Department of Finance in 2003, Miller became "of counsel" to
Jemison, 
Mendelsohn, 
& James, 
P.C. 
("the 
Jemison firm"), which
represented Southdale, LLC, a plaintiff in this litigation. 
1051788
7
Less than a week before this case was set to go to trial,
the defendants moved the trial court to disqualify the Jemison
firm from representing Southdale, LLC, in this litigation.
The defendants asserted that they had "recently learned
through discovery ... that a member of [the Jemison firm], Lee
Miller, ... appears to have provided legal advice regarding
the 93 acre rail yard property ... [during his employment with
the Department of Finance]."  The defendants also moved to
disqualify the firm of Spain & Gillon, LLC, from representing
Wheeler and Phillips.  The defendants based their motion 
"on the ground [that] Spain & Gillon, L.L.C., and
its attorneys are working closely with, and upon
information and belief, have received confidential
information from, Lee Miller of Jemison, Mendelsohn
& James P.C., related to this matter and the 93
acres, which likewise causes these attorneys to have
impermissible conflict of interest in this case."
After holding hearings on the motion to disqualify, the trial
court granted the motion as to both the Jemison firm and Spain
& Gillon.  Wheeler and Phillips petition this Court for the
writ of mandamus, arguing that the trial court erred in
disqualifying Spain & Gillon from representing them in this
litigation.
Analysis
1051788
8
Although the Jemison firm's disqualification from this
litigation has not been challenged, Wheeler and Phillips
petition this Court for the writ of mandamus, arguing that the
trial court erred in disqualifying Spain & Gillon.  The
defendants 
argue 
that 
Spain 
& 
Gillon 
was 
properly 
disqualified
because its representation of Wheeler and Phillips violated
Rules 1.10 and 8.4, Ala. R. Prof. Cond.  Rule 1.10 provides
for the imputed disqualification of a firm based on a conflict
of interest in a case on the part of an attorney associated
with the firm.  Rule 8.4, in part, prohibits attorneys from
knowingly assisting other attorneys in violating, or inducing
other attorneys to violate, the Alabama Rules of Professional
Conduct.  Before determining whether Spain & Gillon violated
these rules, we must decide whether the defendants had
standing to file their joint motion to disqualify counsel.
I.  Standard of Review
In Ex parte Central States Health & Life Co. of Omaha,
594 So. 2d 80, 81 (Ala. 1992), this Court held that "the
correct method for seeking review of a lower court's ruling on
a motion to disqualify an attorney ... is by a petition for
writ of mandamus only."  A writ of mandamus "'is a drastic and
1051788
9
extraordinary writ to be issued only where there is (1) a
clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2)
an 
imperative duty upon 
the 
respondent to perform, accompanied
by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate
remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.'"
Ex parte Terminix Int'l Co., 736 So. 2d 1092, 1093-94 (Ala.
1999) 
(citations omitted). 
 
The 
question 
before us, therefore,
is whether Spain & Gillon has a "clear legal right" to
represent Wheeler and Phillips in this litigation. 
II.  Standing
a.  Based on a Conflict of Interest
In their petition for the writ of mandamus, Wheeler and
Phillips argue that the defendants lacked standing to bring
their motion to disqualify Spain & Gillon.  Wheeler and
Phillips cite our holding in Ex parte Tiffin, 879 So. 2d 1160,
1165 (Ala. 2003), in which we stated that "'a stranger to the
attorney-client relationship lacks standing to assert a
conflict 
of 
interest 
in 
that relationship.'" 
(Quoting 
Jones 
v.
American Employers Ins. Co., 106 Ohio App. 3d 636, 641, 666
N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (1995).)  They argue that neither of
Miller's former clients, the Department of Finance and the
1051788
10
State Board of Adjustment, are parties to this litigation.
Because the defendants were not Miller's clients, Wheeler and
Phillips argue, the defendants lack standing to move the trial
court to disqualify Spain & Gillon from representing Wheeler
and Phillips.
In Tiffin, we held that minority shareholders could not
move to disqualify a corporation's counsel on the basis of a
conflict of interest under Rules 1.7 and 1.9, Ala. R. Prof.
Cond.  Because the case was not a shareholder-derivative suit,
the shareholders were not representing the interests of the
corporation. 
 
Because 
the 
corporation, 
and 
not 
the
shareholders, was counsel's client, the shareholders lacked
standing to challenge the representation based on a conflict
of interest.
Similarly, in Lowe v. Graves, 404 So. 2d 652, 653 (Ala.
1981), we held that "'[t]he principle seems to be fully
established that only a party who sustains the relation of a
client to an attorney, who 
undertakes 
to 
represent conflicting
interests, may be entitled to object to such representation
for that reason alone.'" (Quoting Riley v. Bradley, 252 Ala.
1051788
11
282, 287, 41 So. 2d 641, 644 (1948).)  Furthermore, we have
stated: 
"To allow an unauthorized surrogate to champion
the rights of the former client would allow that
surrogate to use the conflict rules for his own
purposes where a genuine conflict might not really
exist. It would place in the hands of the
unauthorized surrogate powerful presumptions which
are inappropriate in his hands."  
404 So. 2d at 653.  Therefore, we must first determine whether
any of the defendants were Lee Miller's clients during his
employment as legal counsel for the Department of Finance.
Other courts have held that a lawyer employed by a state
agency represents that agency only and does not have a
conflict of interest in cases against the state or another
state agency.  See Gray v. Rhode Island Dep't of Children,
Youth & Families, 937 F. Supp. 153, 158 (D.R.I. 1996) ("The
client clearly includes the attorney's own agency.  On the
other hand, it would not include some other agency under all
circumstances, 
because any 
two 
agencies 
can have 
compatible or
conflicting positions depending on the matter involved.").
The defendants assert standing on various grounds.  The
AIFA and 
former Governor 
Siegelman 
and former Finance Director
Mabry, its president 
and secretary, 
respectively, 
at 
all times
1051788
12
pertinent to this litigation, assert that they were Miller's
clients during his employment with the Department of Finance.
Therefore, they argue, they have standing to challenge his
representation in this case and to impute his alleged conflict
to Spain & Gillon.  They argue that Miller represented the
AIFA and thereby represented then Governor Siegelman in his
role as president of the AIFA and then Finance Director Mabry
in his role as secretary of AIFA.  In his deposition, Miller
agreed that "the AIFA utilized the staff" of the Department of
Finance, including Miller as general counsel, "on some
issues."  Furthermore, Mabry testified that Miller "ran" the
AIFA.  They also argue that Miller was Mabry's "statutorily
designated lawyer."  Presumably, they are referring to § 41-4-
203, Ala. Code 1975, which provides: "The chief of the legal
division [of the Department of Finance] shall confer with and
advise the Director of Finance ... on all legal matters
pertaining to said department." 
Wheeler and Phillips acknowledge that by statute Miller
reported to Mabry as the Director of Finance.  However, they
argue, Mabry was not sued in his capacity as Director of
Finance.  Instead, he was sued individually and as secretary
1051788
13
of the AIFA.  Moreover, they argue, Mabry did not consult
Miller regarding the Hyundai transaction, but instead sought
counsel from attorneys with the law firm of Maynard, Cooper &
Gale, P.C.  They state: "There is certainly no evidence
whatsoever that Mabry or the AIFA ever consulted Miller in any
way as to the 'ploy' used by the defendants to purchase the
Shelton property." 
Although we agree with Wheeler and Phillips that Miller
did not act as then Finance Director Mabry or then Governor
Siegelman's personal attorney during his employment with the
Department of Finance, Miller's testimony shows that through
his position with the Department of Finance he worked for the
AIFA.  Miller's statutory duties extended only to the
Department of Finance and the State Board of Adjustment, but
the AIFA apparently operated largely through the staff of the
Department of Finance and through Miller particularly.  By
using Miller as its general counsel "on some issues," the AIFA
established an attorney-client relationship with Miller.
Therefore, the AIFA had standing to move to disqualify Miller
from representing Southdale, LLC, in its action against the
AIFA.  In the same way, Miller reported to then Governor
1051788
14
Siegelman and then Finance Director Mabry, as president and
secretary, respectively, of the AIFA.  Because we hold that
Miller represented the AIFA 
and 
both former 
Governor 
Siegelman
and former Finance Director Mabry in their capacities with the
AIFA, these defendants had standing to move for Spain &
Gillon's disqualification from this case on the basis of a
conflict of interest.  
b.  Based on Rule 8.4
CSX argues that it has standing to seek disqualification
of Spain & Gillon on the basis of Rule 8.4(a).  CSX states
that it seeks disqualification not on the basis of a conflict
of interest, but because of "counsel's obligation under the
Rules to report a violation of Rule 8.4(a) to the Court."
Rule 8.3, Ala. R. Prof. Cond., imposes on attorneys a duty to
"report" any "unprivileged knowledge of a violation of Rule
8.4 ... to a tribunal or other authority empowered to
investigate or act upon such violation."  The defendants
assert that Spain & Gillon violated the following provision of
Rule 8.4(a): "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
... violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
1051788
15
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another."
CSX cites Ex parte Lammon, 688 So. 2d 836 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996), for the proposition that CSX has standing to seek Spain
& Gillon's disqualification for violating Rule 8.4, Ala. R.
Prof. Cond.  In Lammon, an attorney moved for sanctions,
including the disqualification of counsel, after opposing
counsel violated Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Prof. Cond.  The trial
court disqualified opposing counsel.  The Court of Civil
Appeals held that "[a] trial court has the authority and the
discretion to disqualify counsel for violating the Rules of
Professional Conduct, and a 'common sense' approach should be
used."  688 So. 2d at 838 (citing Roberts v. Hutchins, 572 So.
2d 1231, 1234 (Ala. 1990)).  The Court of Civil Appeals upheld
the sanction, stating that "[c]ommon sense supports the trial
court's disqualification of an attorney who may have violated
the Rules of Professional Conduct, and we find no abuse of the
trial court's discretion." 688 So. 2d at 838.
Rule 8.3 imposes a duty to report unethical behavior "to
a tribunal or other authority" and specifically to report
behavior in violation of Rule 8.4.  CSX and the remaining
1051788
Strange argues several other bases for standing to seek
5
the disqualification of Spain & Gillon; however, it is not
necessary to address these arguments. 
16
defendants 
therefore 
have 
standing 
to 
seek 
the
disqualification of Spain & Gillon on the allegation of
impropriety under Rule 8.4(a).5
III.  Conflict of Interest
In their joint motion to disqualify counsel, the
defendants argue that Miller's conflict in the present case
can be imputed to Spain & Gillon "if confidential information
obtained 
by 
Miller during his 
representation 
of 
the Defendants
AIFA and Mabry was shared with Spain & Gillon, L.L.C."  Rule
1.10, Ala. R. Prof. Cond., provides for such imputed
disqualification:
"(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm,
none of them shall knowingly represent a client when
any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited
from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9, or 2.2.
"(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a
firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a person
in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer
was associated, had previously represented a client
whose interests are materially adverse to that
person and about whom the lawyer had acquired
1051788
17
information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that
is material to the matter."
The comment to Rule 1.10 explains that "[p]aragraph (a)
operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a
firm."  In Ex parte Terminix International, 736 So. 2d at
1094, this Court explained: "Nothing in Rule 1.10(a) or in the
comment to the rule suggests that attorneys employed by
different firms working together in a cocounsel relationship
constitute a 'firm' within the meaning of 1.10(a)."  Paragraph
(a) does not govern imputed disqualification between Miller
and Spain & Gillon because they are not "associated in a firm"
as is required by the rule.
The defendants argue that paragraph (b) applies to this
case because, they say, the language in it is looser than the
language in paragraph (a); instead of applying to lawyers
"associated in a firm," paragraph (b) applies to lawyers
"associated with a firm."  They argue that Miller, while
working with the Jemison firm, was associated with Spain &
Gillon, and, therefore, that Spain & Gillon should be
disqualified from representing Wheeler and Phillips in this
case. 
1051788
18
In Terminix, this Court "require[d] proof of actual
disclosure of confidential information as a prerequisite to
disqualifying counsel" when a lawyer with a conflict was never
cocounsel with the subject law firm.  736 So. 2d at 1095.  The
Court explained that, "[i]f a showing of actual disclosure was
not required, 
then 
disqualification could arguably be based on
a 'double imputation' theory 
(imputing 
information 
from a firm
to a member of that firm and then to a member of another firm
acting as cocounsel), a theory that has been heavily
criticized by other courts."  736 So. 2d at 1095.  In this
case, Miller never acted as cocounsel with Spain & Gillon; in
fact, the Jemison firm was not acting as cocounsel with Spain
& Gillon, because the firms represented different clients in
the litigation.  Although Terminix dealt largely with Rule
1.10(a), the Court held that "requiring proof of actual
disclosure of confidential information is consistent with
paragraphs (b) and (c) of Rule 1.10."  736 So. 2d at 1095.
The Court also noted in Terminix that the comment to Rule 1.10
"state[s] that paragraphs (b) and (c) of Rule 1.10 operate to
disqualify a firm only when the lawyer involved has actual
knowledge 
of 
information 
protected 
by 
the 
Rules 
of
1051788
19
Professional Conduct."  736 So. 2d at 1096.  Therefore, in
order to impute Miller's or the Jemison firm's alleged
conflict to Spain & Gillon, the evidence must show an actual
exchange of confidential information between Miller and Spain
& Gillon or between the Jemison firm and Spain & Gillon.
In their joint motion to disqualify counsel, the
defendants pointed to communications between Gene Stutts, an
attorney with Spain & Gillon, and Lee Miller, after he had
gone to work for the Jemison firm, as evidence of actual
disclosure of confidential information.  To show that Stutts
had communicated with Miller, they relied solely on an e-mail
from Miller to Pat Haigler, the custodian of records for the
AIFA.  The e-mail asks whether the bonds issued by the AIFA to
finance the Hyundai project were taxable and states that "Gene
Stutts, a lawyer from B[irmingham], has asked me to review
some documents relating to the AIFA grant to Hyundai to
purchase the CSX rail site."  In later e-mails to Haigler,
Miller asked for a copy of the project agreement.  Miller
testified that he did not recall whether Stutts or Mays
Jemison, a principal in the Jemison firm, asked him to obtain
the project agreement, but he thought that the purpose of
1051788
20
obtaining the project agreement was to give it to Stutts.
When asked whether he discussed with anyone any of the
documents he obtained from Haigler, Miller stated, "No.  I
would have passed those on to whoever had asked for them when
I got them."  In another e-mail, Miller asked Haigler whether
she knew if the IDB "got any AIFA or 21st Century money to
help it fund the land purchases for the Hyundai project."
Miller testified that he may have also asked her for a copy of
a payment voucher. 
Wheeler and Phillips argue that the project agreement,
which Miller admitted obtaining for Stutts, is a public
document and its disclosure therefore does not amount to an
"actual disclosure of confidential information."  The
defendants do not argue that the project agreement is not a
public document.  Instead, they cite Ex parte Taylor Coal Co.,
401 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 1981), for the proposition that "all
information coming to the attorney from his client, whether it
be from public records or not, is confidential."  However, the
information obtained in Taylor Coal was given to an attorney
by an individual who was a client of the attorney's at the
time of the disclosure; therefore, the information came to the
1051788
21
attorney through the attorney-client relationship and was
entitled to the attorney-client privilege.  By contrast,
Miller sought the project agreement from Haigler after his
attorney-client relationship with both the AIFA and the
Department of Finance had ended.  The information was not
obtained as a result of the attorney-client relationship and
was not entitled to the privilege.  Therefore, the statement
in Taylor Coal does not apply in this instance, and the public
document does not amount to an "actual disclosure of
confidential information" by Miller to Stutts.
In their submission in support of the joint motion to
disqualify counsel and in their briefs to this Court,
defendants Siegelman, Mabry, and the AIFA also cite a couple
of meetings at which both Miller and Stutts were present as
evidence of communications between Stutts and Miller.  Miller
testified that he met with Stutts before the filing of this
action.  The meeting consisted of a general "discussion about
the facts that gave rise to this lawsuit."  Miller also
testified that, sometime after July 2004, Stutts, Mays
Jemison, Miller, and two other attorneys went to lunch and
discussed this case.  Miller testified that "they were talking
1051788
22
about the issues in the case and who might have been involved
in it."  He said that he mostly listened at this lunch, but he
also testified that the other attorneys "probably" asked him
about how public corporations like the AIFA raise their money.
In Terminix, this Court quoted from the report of the
special master who had previously heard the case.  The special
master referred to an opinion of the State Bar, which stated
"'that 
any 
presumption 
of 
shared 
confidence 
between 
members 
of
the same firm does not extend to lawyers in a cocounsel
relationship.'"  736 So. 2d at 1094.  Instead, the Bar stated
that "'the disqualification of a lawyer or firm would only be
appropriate when confidential information has actually been
disclosed between cocounsel.'"  736 So. 2d at 1094.  Although
the meetings involving Stutts and Miller could lead one to
speculate 
that 
confidential 
information 
could 
have 
been 
shared
between Miller and Spain & Gillon, no such presumption exists;
instead, the defendants must show actual disclosure of
confidential information in those meetings.  The defendants
have failed to present evidence of any actual disclosure
between Miller and Stutts and thus have failed to meet their
burden.
1051788
23
IV.  Rule 8.4
The defendants also argue that Spain & Gillon violated
Rule 8.4(a), Ala. R. Prof. Cond., by "knowingly assist[ing] or
induc[ing]" Miller in violating the Alabama Rules of
Professional Conduct.  In their submission in support of the
joint motion to disqualify counsel, the defendants stated: 
"Stutts used Miller to analyze documents received
from the Department of Finance and was present in a
meeting 
with 
Miller 
that 
was 
used 
to 
gain
information related to several of the Defendants in
this case.  Stutts, knowing of Lee Miller's role
with the Finance Department, had a duty to act in
accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct,
just as the Jemison firm. Yet, like the Jemison
firm, Stutts chose to ignore his ethical obligations
in order to receive the benefit of the use of Lee
Miller and his confidential information."
Rule 1.11(a), Ala. R. Prof. Cond., prohibits a former
government attorney from "represent[ing] a private client in
connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially as a public officer or employee,
unless the appropriate government agency consents after
consultation."  Similarly, Rule 1.11(a) prohibits the firm
with which that attorney is associated from representing the
private client, unless the disqualified lawyer is screened
from participating in the representation and 
written 
notice is
1051788
24
given to the government agency.  The defendants assert, and
Wheeler and Phillips do not argue otherwise, that no written
notice was given to the AIFA in this case.  Also, it appears
clear from the record that Miller was not screened from this
case, but was instead involved in the investigation of the
case. 
 
The 
question, 
therefore, 
is 
whether 
Miller
"participated personally and substantially" in the Hyundai
matter while he was employed by the State.  Frank McPhillips,
an attorney with Maynard, Cooper & Gale who represented the
State in the Hyundai transaction, testified that he thought of
Miller as his cocounsel regarding the Hyundai matter.  Also,
Miller approved the funding of the purchase of the Shelton
property through the AIFA while he worked for the Department
of Finance.  There is sufficient evidence, therefore, to show
that Miller worked both "personally and substantially" on the
Hyundai matter during his employment with the State.
Therefore, 
Rule 
1.11 
prohibits 
him 
from 
representing 
a 
private
client in connection with this matter; further, it prohibits
the Jemison firm from representing a private client in the
matter unless Miller is screened from any participation and
written notice is provided to the Department of Finance.  
1051788
[substituted p. 25]
Spain & Gillon knew of Miller's former employment with
the State.  Miller's e-mail to Haigler says that Gene Stutts,
of Spain & Gillon, asked Miller to review documents in
relation to the purchase of the Shelton property for use by
Hyundai.  Furthermore, even though the documents Miller
transmitted to Stutts were public documents and therefore not
privileged, Miller's "representation" of a private client in
this case was prohibited by Rule 1.11.  If Stutts did ask
Miller to obtain and review documents on behalf of a private
client, he may have "induce[d] another" to "violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct," which would have been a violation of
Rule 8.4(a).
V.  Prejudice to the Plaintiffs
Although Stutts may have violated Rule 8.4 by asking
Miller to obtain and review documents for Stutts as he
prepared for this case, we must also consider the prejudicial
effect of the disqualification of Spain & Gillon on Wheeler
and Phillips themselves. The defendants cite Baker v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ohio 
1051788
26
1995), 
in 
support 
of 
their 
argument 
in 
favor 
of
disqualification based on Rule 8.4.  
In Baker, the Ohio court disqualified an attorney and one
of two law firms representing the plaintiffs in a products-
liability action.  The court disqualified one firm because of
frequent contacts between it and the disqualified lawyer,
stating that "[t]he weight of the evidence therefore makes it
more likely than not that on isolated occasions additional
disclosures were made."  893 F. Supp. at 1369.  However, the
court noted that, "[w]ere [the firm] the Bakers' sole
attorney, the Court would be inclined ... to stop short of
disqualification," 893 F. Supp. at 1369, because "the
disclosure case against the [firm] [wa]s weak" and "any
resulting taint [from 
the 
possible 
disclosures] is more 
formal
than real."  893 F. Supp. at 1368-69.  The court did stop
short of disqualifying the second firm, holding that "[t]he
facts strongly suggest that confidential information, if any,
wrongly passed to [the second firm] will have no impact on the
just resolution of this litigation."  893 F. Supp. at 1368.
The court, quoting an expert from an exhibit in the
litigation, stated:
1051788
27
"'To completely disqualify [the second firm] at this
late stage, merely because of the theoretical
possibility that it gained some small advantage by
having had access to the material provided by [the
disqualified lawyer] for a brief period of time,
would not only be an overreaction, but would be
largely symbolic and would do little to protect the
defendant's interests in any event.'"
893 F. Supp. at 1368.  
This Court similarly considers the interests at stake
when deciding whether to disqualify counsel:
"'Disqualification of counsel, like other reaches
for perfection, is tempered by a need to balance a
variety of competing considerations and complex
concepts.  Disqualification in spasm reaction to
every situation capable of appearing improper to the
jaundiced cynic is as goal-defeating as failure to
disqualify in blind disregard of flagrant conflicts
of interest.  Between these ethical extremes lie
less obvious influences on the interest of society
in the orderly administration of justice, on the
interest of clients in candid consultation and
choice of counsel, and on the interest of the legal
profession in its representational soul.'"
Taylor Coal, 401 So. 2d at 7 (quoting Arkansas v. Dean Foods
Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1979)).
In this case, the defendants filed their joint motion to
disqualify counsel one week before the trial date and more
than two years after this litigation had commenced.  The
1051788
28
parties have taken over 29 depositions, and the plaintiffs
have obtained thousands of pages of documents.  According to
the affidavit of Steve R. Burford, an attorney with Spain &
Gillon, the lawyers with Spain & Gillon have spent more than
2,469 hours working on this case.  Unlike the disqualified
firm in Baker, Spain & Gillon is the only firm representing
Wheeler and Phillips.  Wheeler and William Newton Phillips,
both elderly individuals living outside the State of Alabama,
would undoubtedly suffer a great deal of prejudice if Spain &
Gillon was disqualified from representing them in this case.
Moreover, the defendants have not shown any actual
disclosure of confidential information from Miller to Spain &
Gillon.  Although Stutts's request for Miller to obtain
documents from the State and to review those documents was
improper in light of Rule 1.11, Ala. R. Prof. Cond., the
resulting harm to the defendants was minimal.  Miller
testified that he did not analyze the documents or discuss
them with Stutts; he says he merely "passed them on."  The
documents were matters of public record, and Miller's
acquiring 
them 
did 
not 
provide 
Spain 
& 
Gillon 
with
confidential information.  To disqualify Spain & Gillon under
1051788
In their petition, Wheeler and Phillips also argue that
6
the defendants waived their right to file the joint motion to
disqualify by waiting to file it until days before the trial.
However, because we hold in favor of Wheeler and Phillips on
the basis of the prejudicial effect to them of disqualifying
Spain & Gillon, we do not reach this issue.
29
these circumstances, based on the evidence provided by the
defendants, would amount to the "overreaction" the Baker court
sought to avoid.6
Conclusion
The defendants in this case did not provide evidence of
an actual disclosure of confidential information between
Miller and Spain & Gillon, as is required by this Court's
holding in Terminix.  Therefore, no conflict of interest arose
under Rule 1.10.  Although Gene Stutts arguably "induce[d]"
Miller to obtain and review documents from the State in
violation of Rule 1.11, the documents he obtained were public
records, and any harm to the defendants resulting from
Stutts's request appears to be minimal.  Balancing this harm
against the prejudice to Wheeler and Phillips that would be
caused by disqualifying their counsel at this stage in the
litigation, we hold that the trial court erred in granting the
joint motion to disqualify counsel as to Spain & Gillon.
1051788
30
Therefore, we grant the petition and issue the writ of
mandamus, directing the trial court to vacate its order
insofar as it removed Spain & Gillon as Wheeler and Phillips's
counsel in this litigation.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.