Case Title: Brown v. Racquetball Centers, Inc.

Citation: 369 Pa. Super. 13, 534 A.2d 842

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1987-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
369 Pa. Superior Ct. 13 (1987) 534 A.2d 842 Leroy F. BROWN, Appellant, v. RACQUETBALL CENTERS, INC., t/d/b/a Lehigh Valley Racquet and Fitness Centers, Appellee. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted October 5, 1987. Filed December 22, 1987. *14 James M. Lillis, Reading, for appellant. Jeffrey R. Dimmich, Allentown, for appellee. Before BROSKY, DEL SOLE and HOFFMAN, JJ. DEL SOLE, Judge: The Plaintiff/Appellant, Leroy Brown, commenced this action by a complaint filed on April 11, 1986, against Defendant/Appellee Racquetball Centers, Inc., t/d/b/a Lehigh Valley Racquet & Fitness Centers. (Racquetball Centers, Inc., owns and operates several facilities, including the Westend Racquetball Club hereinafter designated as the "Club"). When Brown became a member of the Club on September 27, 1984, he was required to complete and sign a two sided application form, which included the following release: On May 9, 1985, as Appellant was exiting the shower facilities at the Club, he slipped on the wet tile floor and fell, striking his head and suffering numerous injuries. Appellant claims that this accident was a direct and proximate result of the Appellee's negligent maintenance of the shower room. In its New Matter, the Club contended that the application form signed by Brown, operated to release the Club from liability for Brown's injuries. The Club filed a motion for Summary Judgment which was granted by Order of May 6, 1987. For the reasons expressed herein we reverse. Princeton Sportswear Corp. v. H & M Associates, 510 Pa. 189, 193, 507 A.2d 339, 341 (1986). In the case sub judice there is no need to address whether the release contravened public policy or satisfied the other criteria, since we find that in no way does this release absolve the releasee of liability for its own acts of negligence. The law requires that before an exculpatory clause will be interpreted and construed to relieve a person of liability for that party's own or its servants' or agents' acts of negligence it must: Id. 510 Pa. at 193, 507 A.2d at 341 (citations omitted). The release in question does not spell out the intention of the parties with the necessary particularity. The language does not set forth in an unambiguous manner that the releasor, in signing the agreement, intends to absolve the releasee of liability for the releasee's own negligence. Instead, the language can more clearly be interpreted to relieve the Club of liability as the result of injuries sustained by a member while participating in certain activities of the Club. Contracts providing for immunity from liability from one's own negligent acts are disfavored by the law and therefore require strict adherence to the above elaborated standards. Employers Liability Assurance Corporation v. Greenville Business Men's Association, 423 Pa. 288, 224 A.2d 620 (1966). The release signed by Appellant Brown does not satisfy these standards. In so holding we reverse the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in the favor of Appellee.