Case Title: Waller v. Am. Transmission Co.

Citation: 2013 WI 77

Docket Number: 2012AP000840

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 77 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP805 & 2012AP840   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Scott N. Waller and Lynnea S. Waller, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
American Transmission Company, LLC, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2013  
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 10, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
James L. Carlson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: GABLEMAN, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs by Katherine 
Stadler, Bryan J. Cahill, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, and 
oral argument by Katherine Stadler.   
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents, there were briefs by Hugh 
R. Braun, Nicholas R. DiUlio, and Godfrey, Braun & Frazier, LLP, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Hugh R. Braun. 
 
There was an amicus curiae brief by Trevor J. Will, Bradley 
D. Jackson, Krista J. Sterken, and Foley & Lardner, LLP, 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Utilities Association.  
   
 
 
2013 WI 77
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840   
(L.C. No. 
2008CV520 & 2010CV691) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Scott N. Waller and Lynnea S. Waller, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
American Transmission Company, LLC, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from final judgments of the Circuit Court for 
Walworth County, James L. Carlson, Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on a petition for bypass of the court of appeals pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.60 (2011–12).1  We are asked to interpret 
the condemnation procedures in Wis. Stat. § 32.06 and determine 
the rights of property owners who claim that a taking of 
property has left them with an "uneconomic remnant." 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
2 
 
¶2 
American Transmission Company, LLC (ATC) condemned a 
pair of easements on the residential property of Scott and 
Lynnea Waller (the Wallers) to facilitate the construction and 
placement of high-voltage transmission lines.  The Wallers 
claimed that the easements diminished the value of their 
property so much that they were left with an uneconomic remnant.  
The Wallers contend that they are entitled to certain rights as 
the owners of property that has substantially impaired economic 
viability as a result of a partial taking.   
¶3 
The Walworth County Circuit Court2 agreed with the 
Wallers, concluding that their property, after the taking of the 
easements, was an uneconomic remnant.  It ordered ATC to acquire 
the entire property.  The circuit court also awarded the Wallers 
litigation costs and relocation expenses as "displaced persons" 
when they moved from the property after the taking. 
¶4 
The specific issues before this court are as follows: 
(1) At what point in a Wis. Stat. § 32.06 
condemnation proceeding must a property owner raise an 
uneconomic remnant claim? 
(2) Were the Wallers left with an uneconomic 
remnant 
after 
ATC 
took 
two 
easements 
on 
their 
property? 
(3) Are 
the 
Wallers 
entitled 
to 
litigation 
expenses? 
(4) Are 
the 
Wallers 
"displaced 
persons," 
entitling them to relocation benefits? 
                                                 
2 Judge James L. Carlson, presiding.   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
3 
 
¶5 
We affirm the circuit court and reach the following 
conclusions. 
¶6 
First, Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5), the "right-to-take" 
provision, sets out the proper and exclusive way for a property 
owner to raise a claim that the owner will be left with an 
uneconomic remnant after a partial taking by the condemnor.  An 
uneconomic remnant claim should be brought under § 32.06(5) 
because the condemnor has failed to include an offer to acquire 
any uneconomic remnant in the condemnor's jurisdictional offer.  
The inclusion of an offer to acquire an uneconomic remnant 
acknowledges the existence of the uneconomic remnant.  The 
exclusion of such an offer indicates that the condemnor disputes 
the existence of an uneconomic remnant.  A right-to-take action 
must be decided promptly by the court and shall not prevent the 
condemnor 
from 
filing 
a 
simultaneous 
valuation 
petition, 
proceeding thereon, and taking any property interest whose 
condemnation is not being directly contested by the owner.  A 
right-to-take action on an uneconomic remnant claim is designed 
to protect an owner's right to fair compensation to avoid 
economic hardship, not to paralyze public interest takings under 
eminent domain. 
¶7 
Second, the Wallers' property, after ATC took two 
easements for transmission lines, is an uneconomic remnant 
because it is of such size, shape, and condition as to be of 
substantially 
impaired 
economic 
viability 
as 
either 
a 
residential or an industrial parcel.  The taking of the two 
easements drastically reduced the portion of the Wallers' 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
4 
 
property not subject to a servitude.  The easements themselves 
not only restricted the Wallers' activity in the easement area 
but 
also 
substantially 
diminished 
the 
desirability, 
practicality, and value of the Wallers' property for either a 
residential or industrial user.   
¶8 
Third, the Wallers prevailed on their uneconomic 
remnant claim brought under Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5)——the right-to-
take 
statute——and, 
therefore, were entitled to litigation 
expenses under Wis. Stat. § 32.28. 
¶9 
Finally, the Wallers were displaced persons under Wis. 
Stat. § 32.19(2)(e)1.a. because they moved "as a direct result" 
of ATC's jurisdictional offer, and the circuit court's findings 
of fact on this issue are not clearly erroneous. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶10 These consolidated cases3 come before the court with a 
long and complicated history; the uneconomic remnant claim alone 
has been the subject of three proceedings before the circuit 
court and two appeals before the court of appeals.  We begin 
with background information on the Waller property, ATC, and the 
negotiations between the two parties before ATC's jurisdictional 
offer to acquire the two easements for its transmission lines.  
Second, we summarize the Wallers' right-to-take action, along 
with ATC's simultaneous petition to determine just compensation 
                                                 
3 This petition for bypass is composed of two cases 
consolidated for purposes of appeal.  The first case, 2008CV520 
(No. 2012AP805) is the Wallers' relocation benefits case.  The 
second case, 2010CV691 (No. 2012AP840) is the Wallers' right-to-
take action.   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
5 
 
for the taking of the easements.  Third, we examine the holding 
and reasoning in the first court of appeals decision, Waller v. 
American 
Transmission 
Co., 
LLC, 
2009 
WI 
App 
172, 
322 
Wis. 2d 255, 776 N.W.2d 612 (Waller I).  Fourth, we explain the 
circuit court proceedings after the first remand from the court 
of appeals.  Fifth, we examine the holding and reasoning in the 
second 
court 
of 
appeals 
decision, 
Waller 
v. 
American 
Transmission Co., LLC, 2011 WI App 91, 334 Wis. 2d 740, 799 
N.W.2d 487 (Waller II).  Sixth, we recount the proceedings in 
the circuit court on the uneconomic remnant issue after the 
second remand.  Finally, we examine the circuit court's findings 
and conclusions on the issues of litigation expenses and 
relocation benefits. 
A. The Waller Property and ATC 
¶11 In 1989 the Wallers purchased a 1.5 acre triangular 
lot in the Town of Delavan in Walworth County.  The property is 
bounded on the east by Interstate 43, on the north by Mound 
Road, and on the west by a vacant lot.  The property——zoned A-1 
Agricultural——includes 
a 
single-family 
residence, 
site 
improvements, landscaping, and outbuildings.  
¶12 The Waller property had several encumbrances burdening 
it before the easements taken by ATC.  First, a transmission 
line with a 20-foot-wide easement burdened the property along 
Mound Road on the north before the Wallers purchased the 
property.  Second, the property was subject to highway setbacks 
along both Mound Road (25 feet) and Interstate 43 (50 feet).   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
6 
 
¶13 For almost 20 years, the rural farmette served as the 
Wallers' home.4  However, in the years since 1989 the character 
of the land surrounding the Wallers' property changed.  By 2008 
nearby land that was once agricultural became an industrial 
park.  
¶14 ATC is a Wisconsin limited liability company and 
public utility regulated by the Public Service Commission of 
Wisconsin 
(the 
PSC)5 
and 
the 
Federal 
Energy 
Regulatory 
Commission.  The legislature authorized the creation of ATC and 
designated it as a "public utility," an electric "transmission 
company," 
and 
a 
"transmission 
utility." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 196.01(5), 196.485(1)(ge), 196.485(1)(i).  See also 1999 Wis. 
Act 9.  Wisconsin Stat. § 32.02(5)(b) vests entities like ATC 
with the power of eminent domain.   
¶15 Public utilities may not undertake work on a project 
like a high-voltage transmission line unless they have obtained 
the requisite approval from the PSC and the Department of 
Natural Resources (the DNR).  See Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3) 
(requiring the PSC to issue a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity before the construction of a "facility" like a 
                                                 
4 The Wallers used their property to raise chickens and 
turkeys and pasture sheep.  The Wallers also had an extensive 
garden on the property.   
5 The Public Service Commission (PSC) "has jurisdiction to 
supervise and regulate every public utility in this state and to 
do all things necessary and convenient to its jurisdiction."  
Wis. Stat. § 196.02(1).  See also Indus. Energy Grp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n, 2012 WI 89, ¶26, 342 Wis. 2d 576, 819 N.W.2d 240.   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
7 
 
high-voltage transmission line).  Thus, when ATC proposed an 
upgrade and expansion of an existing transmission line in and 
around the City of Delavan, the statutes required administrative 
proceedings before the PSC and the DNR.  One of the proceedings 
included a public hearing at the PSC in Madison at which Scott 
Waller testified.  He expressed concern about possible health 
hazards and impairment of property values resulting from the 
placement of high-voltage transmission lines affecting two sides 
of his property.  
¶16 Ultimately, on March 30, 2006, the PSC issued ATC a 
certificate 
of 
public 
convenience 
and 
necessity 
for 
the 
utility's project.  The PSC determined that the upgrade and 
expansion of transmission lines "[would] not have undue adverse 
impacts on . . . public health and welfare."   
¶17 Having received the requisite regulatory approval, ATC 
proceeded to acquire the land and easements needed to advance 
the project.  These acquisitions included the easements on the 
Waller property.   
¶18 As explained previously, the Waller property was 
already burdened by a 20-foot-wide easement from an existing 
transmission line on the north side along Mound Road, highway 
setbacks along Mound Road, and highway setbacks along Interstate 
43.   
¶19 ATC sought to purchase two easements on the Waller 
property.  The first easement would overlay the existing 
transmission line easement on the north side of the property, 
but widen the easement to 45 feet——an extension of 25 feet over 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
8 
 
the existing easement.  The second easement would be 45 feet 
wide and run along the east side of the property——within the 50 
foot highway setback from Interstate 43.  In addition, ATC 
sought to install a large utility pole in the northeast corner 
of the property to support conductor wires and distribution 
lines.6  
¶20 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.06(2)(a),7 ATC retained 
John Rolling (Rolling) of Rolling & Co. to conduct an appraisal 
                                                 
6 The 
easement 
authorized 
ATC 
to 
do 
the 
following: 
"Construct, 
install, 
operate, 
maintain, 
repair, 
replace, 
rebuild, remove, relocate, inspect and patrol a line of 
structures, comprised of wood, concrete, steel or of such 
material as Grantee may select, and wires, including associated 
appurtenances 
for 
the 
transmission 
of 
electric 
current, 
communication facilities and signals appurtenant thereto."   
The easement also granted ATC the associated necessary 
rights to: 
 
(1) Enter upon the easement strip for the 
purposes of exercising the rights conferred by this 
easement.  (2) Construct, install, operate, maintain, 
repair, replace, rebuild, remove, relocate, inspect 
and patrol the above described facilities and other 
appurtenances that the Grantee deems necessary.  (3) 
Trim, cut down and remove any or all brush, trees and 
overhanging branches now or hereafter existing on said 
easement strip.  (4) Cut down and remove such trees 
now or hereafter existing on the property of the 
Landowner located outside of said easement strip which 
by falling might interfere with or endanger said 
line(s), together with the right, permission and 
authority to enter in a reasonable manner upon the 
property of the Landowner adjacent to said easement 
strip for such purpose. 
7 Wis. Stat. § 32.06(2)(a) provides: "The condemnor shall 
cause at least one . . . appraisal to be made of the property 
proposed to be acquired."   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
9 
 
of the property.  Rolling concluded that the property's 
appraised value before the easements was $130,000.8  With regard 
to the  effects of the easements, Rolling wrote: 
 
We believe there will be an immediate negative 
effect on residential appeal.  Over one half of the 
property will be under easement.  The [property] will 
have major transmission lines along two of its three 
sides.  The transmission lines will be within 60 
[feet] of the house.  A substantial part of the 
landscaping will have been lost.  Our before analysis 
suggested a property which was already in transition 
from improved residential use to vacant industrial lot 
use.  We believe the installation of the transmission 
line pole and the lines themselves brings this 
property to the tipping point from residential appeal 
toward light industrial appeal.  It is more likely 
that the next buyer of this property will be an 
industrial developer rather than a residential user.  
We conclude that the residential improvements are 
rendered totally obsolete.  Highest and best use 
changes from improved residential to vacant industrial 
land.   
Consequently, Rolling concluded that the Waller property's 
appraised value after the easements was $55,500——a loss of 
$74,500, or nearly 57 percent loss in value.  Rolling allotted 
an additional $7,500 to demolish the residential improvements.   
¶21 The Wallers retained their own appraisers, Arthur 
Sullivan and Kurt Kielisch of Appraisal Group One (Group One).  
Group One concluded that the before-easement value of the 
property was $132,000, very similar to Rolling's before-easement 
                                                 
8 Of 
the 
$130,000 
before-easement 
appraisal, 
Rolling 
allocated $75,500 to value of the land and $54,500 to value of 
the improvements.   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
10 
 
appraised value.  However, Group One came to a very different 
conclusion on the after-easement value of the Waller property. 
¶22 In determining the after-easement value, Group One 
considered the property use for industrial and residential 
purposes.  In light of the neighboring industrial land uses, 
Group One considered the Waller property to have its highest and 
best use as "vacant for industrial purposes."  However, Group 
One noted that the property's triangular shape and small size 
"negatively impact[ed] its desirability as an industrial site at 
this time."  Thus, Group One concluded that the current 
improvements "contribute significant value to its ongoing use as 
a residential property, despite the changing land use and city 
expansion surrounding it."  In either case, following the 
encumbrance of the property by two 45-foot-wide easements, the 
property's use would be restricted further for either industrial 
or residential purposes.9  Altogether, Group One estimated that 
the easements would cover approximately 0.8 acres of land and 
would produce in that area a 100 percent loss in value.  
Consequently, Group One concluded that:   
 
Granting [the two easements to ATC] reduces the 
property owner's right to enjoy their property and 
utilize it to its fullest use.  Due to the restricted 
use of the property and the giving up of the right to 
control the easement area, it is concluded that the 
                                                 
9 In particular, Group One pointed to restrictions on owner 
usage in the easement area (i.e., inability to build structures, 
store certain wares, plant trees or shrubs).  Furthermore, the 
property's size and shape limitations, while already creating 
development limitations, would be further restricted for either 
industrial or residential users.   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
11 
 
easement area represents a 100% loss of property value 
to the property owner. 
Thus, Group One estimated the after-easement value of the total 
property to be only $15,500——resulting in a loss of $116,500, or 
88 percent of the before easement value.   
 
¶23 Kurt Kielisch later supplemented Group One's initial 
appraisal, 
stating 
his 
opinion 
that 
the 
Waller 
property 
"suffered substantial[ly] impaired economic viability as a 
result of the taking of the transmission line easement."  Mr. 
Kielisch based his opinion, in part, on the following:  ATC's 
jurisdictional offer indicated a value of $30,500 for the 
property, reflecting a loss of value of more than 76 percent; 
the easement area covered more than half of the property; 
"public perceptions of the dangers of electric magnetic fields"; 
the appearance and proximity of the high-voltage transmission 
lines; the highest and best use of the property after the taking 
would be vacant industrial; and the inability of the parcel to 
be utilized for industrial purposes in the absence of municipal 
sewer and water.   
¶24 After the Rolling and Group One appraisals, ATC made 
several offers to the Wallers.  See Wis. Stat. § 32.06(2a) 
(requiring the condemnor, before making a jurisdictional offer, 
to negotiate personally with a property owner).  Initially, on 
October 8, 2007, ATC offered to acquire only the easements for 
$49,000.  The Wallers rejected that offer.  Next, ATC raised its 
offer for only the easements to $84,600, which the Wallers also 
rejected.  Later, on March 14, 2008, after receiving the Group 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
12 
 
One appraisal, ATC again raised its offer for the easements to 
$99,500.  In the alternative, ATC offered to purchase the entire 
Waller property for $132,000, provided the Wallers waived the 
right to any relocation benefits.  The Wallers rejected that 
offer as well.   
¶25 Finally, on March 20, 2008, ATC made a jurisdictional 
offer to the Wallers of $99,500 for only the two easements.  The 
Wallers rejected the jurisdictional offer.   
B. The First Circuit Court Decision: The Wallers'  
Right-to-Take Action and the Just Compensation Proceeding 
Initiated by ATC 
 
¶26 On April 25, 2008, the Wallers filed a right-to-take 
action under Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5).  The Wallers did not 
challenge ATC's right to take the easements.  They argued 
instead that because the proposed easements would cover more 
than half of their property and render their residential 
improvements totally obsolete, they would be left with an 
uneconomic remnant under § 32.06(3m).  In short, the Wallers did 
not argue that the ATC was taking too much, but that ATC was 
trying to get away with taking too little.  The Wallers' 
complaint claimed that "the proposed acquisition by ATC compels 
a total acquisition with a guarantee of attendant relocation 
benefits pursuant to . . . Wis. Stat. § 32.19."  Then, raising 
the stakes, the Wallers asked the circuit court to prohibit the 
proposed acquisition of the easements until ATC agreed to 
acquire the entire property and provide relocation benefits.   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
13 
 
 
¶27 Four days after the Wallers filed their right-to-take 
action, 
ATC 
filed 
a 
verified 
petition 
for 
condemnation 
proceedings, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.06(7).10  ATC asked the 
circuit 
court 
for 
hearings 
before 
the 
Walworth 
County 
Condemnation Commission (the Commission) to determine just 
compensation for the taking of the easements.11  At the same 
time, ATC petitioned the circuit court for immediate possession 
of the easements pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.12(1).  The circuit 
court, 
Robert 
J. 
Kennedy, 
Judge, 
granted 
the 
petitions, 
assigning the case to the Commission and allowing ATC to take 
immediate possession without a hearing.12   
 
¶28 The Commission held a hearing on June 11, 2008, on 
valuation questions to determine an award.  Ultimately, the 
Commission concluded that the fair market value of the Waller 
                                                 
10 2008GF78, Walworth County, Consolidated Court Automated 
Program (CCAP).  Initially, the Wallers' right-to-take action 
was consolidated with the two petitions of ATC on just 
compensation and immediate possession.   
11 ATC's petition for condemnation proceedings and the 
subsequent award of just compensation became the subject of 
appeal by the Wallers.  Ultimately, the Wallers' appeal of the 
Commission's award became 2008CV955, the valuation case.  The 
appeals of the right-to-take action and the relocation benefits 
case implicate the valuation case; however, neither party has 
appealed the jury verdict in the valuation case, where the jury 
determined that the value of the Waller property was $38,000.   
12 Shortly after ATC filed its petition for condemnation 
proceedings and to take immediate possession, the Wallers moved 
the circuit court for an expedited hearing on their right-to-
take action and for a temporary injunction preventing ATC from 
proceeding on their petitions.  The circuit court rejected the 
Wallers' motion, concluding that there was no reason to prevent 
ATC from obtaining immediate possession of the easements.   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
14 
 
property before the taking of the easements was $130,000, that 
the value was reduced to $40,000 after the taking, and that the 
Wallers should be awarded $90,000.  The Wallers ultimately 
accepted this amount from ATC in January 2009 but appealed the 
Commission's award to the circuit court.   
¶29 The circuit court, again presided over by Judge 
Kennedy, dismissed the Wallers' right-to-take action on November 
8, 
2008, 
five 
months 
after 
the 
Commission 
finished 
its 
valuation.  The circuit court concluded that an uneconomic 
remnant claim should be decided in a valuation proceeding, not 
in a right-to-take action.  The Wallers appealed the dismissal 
of their complaint. 
C. Waller I: The First Appeal 
 
¶30 The sole issue before the court of appeals was 
"whether the question of the existence of an uneconomic remnant 
is properly raised in an action under Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5)."  
Waller I, 322 Wis. 2d 255, ¶10.   
 
¶31 The Wallers argued that Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5) provides 
the only opportunity for a property owner to challenge a taking 
on the ground that it was incomplete because it left an 
uneconomic remnant.  Id., ¶13.  The court of appeals found this 
argument persuasive in light of the plain language of § 32.06(5) 
(allowing for challenges for any reason other than just 
compensation), as well as the statutory scheme.  Id., ¶¶13–16.  
Although conceding that "an uneconomic remnant seems to require 
valuation," 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
reasoned 
that 
"before 
compensation can be set, there must be a determination of what 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
15 
 
is being taken."  Id., ¶¶13–14.  The uneconomic remnant 
determination 
in 
§ 32.06(5) 
"permits 
the 
court 
and 
the 
[condemnation] commission to 'devote full attention' to the 
crucial 
issue 
of 
just 
compensation 
'without 
having 
the 
deliberation 
deflected 
into 
consideration 
of 
collateral 
procedural matters.'"  Id., ¶14 (quoting Rademann v. DOT, 2002 
WI App 59, ¶38, 252 Wis. 2d 191, 642 N.W.2d 600).  In other 
words, the property owner must know the "scope of the 
acquisition before the question of compensation is negotiated."  
Id.   
 
¶32 The court of appeals also held that a property owner 
asserting the existence of an uneconomic remnant after a taking 
"must have the right to contest a condemnation that does not 
acknowledge an uneconomic remnant."  Id., ¶15.  The claim of an 
uneconomic remnant, the court of appeals posited, "is not a 
meaningless exercise swallowed up in the compensation process," 
but a property owner's assertion to protect his or her rights.  
Id., ¶16.   
¶33 Therefore, the court of appeals remanded the case to 
the circuit court, directing it to reinstate the Wallers' right-
to-take claim and to determine whether ATC's taking created an 
uneconomic remnant.  "If so," the court of appeals concluded, 
"ATC is required, under [Wis. Stat.] § 32.06(3m), to make a 
concurrent offer for the remnant and to provide relocation 
benefits . . . directed by Wis. Stat. § 32.19."  Id., ¶17.   
D. Post-Waller I: The Valuation Trial and  
Second Decision on the Wallers' Uneconomic Remnant Claim 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
16 
 
 
¶34 After remand, the circuit court, with Judge John R. 
Race presiding over both the right-to-take and valuation cases, 
chose to postpone a hearing on the uneconomic remnant claim 
until after the jury's verdict in the valuation appeal.13   
¶35 The circuit court conducted a three-day jury trial on 
the 
Wallers' 
appeal 
of 
the 
Commission's 
award 
of 
just 
compensation.  The jury concluded the before taking value of the 
property at $132,000 and an after taking value at $38,000.  The 
resulting just compensation award was $94,000, which the Wallers 
did not appeal.   
¶36 After the valuation jury trial, the circuit court 
incorporated both the record and the verdict from the jury trial 
into the recently reinstated right-to-take action by the 
Wallers.  The circuit court found that the Wallers resided in 
their house for approximately one year after ATC took the 
easements; that people could still reside in the Waller house; 
that the property was of sufficient size to allow for meaningful 
use; and that the property and improvements had substantial 
value after the taking.  Therefore, the circuit court ruled 
that, as a matter of law, the property after the taking of the 
easements was not an uneconomic remnant.   
                                                 
13 The Wallers petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of 
mandamus, arguing that the order of determination chosen by the 
circuit court violated the court of appeals mandate in Waller v. 
American 
Transmission 
Co., 
LLC, 
2009 
WI 
App 
172, 
322 
Wis. 2d 255, 776 N.W.2d 612 (Waller I).  The court of appeals 
denied the petition, concluding that the circuit court did not 
violate a plain legal duty mandated in Waller I.   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
17 
 
¶37 The circuit court dismissed the Wallers' complaint and 
the Wallers appealed.  
E. Waller II: The Second Appeal 
¶38 Once again, the court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court.  Waller II, 334 Wis. 2d 740.  The court of appeals held 
that  
when a property owner properly raises the issue of 
whether he or she will be left with an uneconomic 
remnant pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m), a circuit 
court must first hold an evidentiary hearing under 
§ 32.06(5) to determine whether the remaining parcel 
is an uneconomic remnant.  A fact finder may not 
determine just compensation until the circuit court 
has resolved the full scope of the taking. 
Id., ¶2.   
¶39 As it did previously in Waller I, the court of appeals 
acknowledged the difficulty of separating the question of the 
existence of an uneconomic remnant and the question of value of 
the remnant.  Id., ¶14.  However, determining the existence of 
an uneconomic remnant is "not just a question of value——a 
circuit court must also determine whether the property is 'of 
substantially impaired economic viability.'"  Id. (quoting Wis. 
Stat. § 32.06(3m)).  The court of appeals concluded that the 
circuit court failed to address whether the Waller property was 
"substantially impaired" as to its economic viability.  Id.  
Significantly, the court of appeals stated that "the inquiry 
does not end once the dollar value of the remaining property is 
determined——a circuit court is also expected to examine whether 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
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the 
partial taking 
'substantially impaired [the] economic 
viability' of the property."  Id., ¶15 (alteration in original). 
¶40 Thus, the court of appeals reversed and remanded to 
the circuit court for a hearing consistent with its decision.  
Id., ¶17.  Also, the court of appeals ruled that "[i]f the 
circuit court finds that the Wallers' property is an uneconomic 
remnant, the jury's just compensation verdict is vacated."  Id.   
F. Post-Waller II: The Third Decision on the Wallers'  
Uneconomic Remnant Claim and Litigation Costs 
¶41 Following the second remand from the court of appeals, 
the circuit court, Judge James L. Carlson now presiding, held a 
two-day trial in the right-to-take case on whether an uneconomic 
remnant existed.  The trial was held in November 2011.  For the 
most part, the same witnesses who testified in the valuation 
trial testified at the right-to-take trial, and the testimony 
was largely the same.   
¶42 At the conclusion of this trial, Judge Carlson ruled 
that the taking did indeed leave the Wallers with an uneconomic 
remnant.  The circuit court found that the property suffered 
"substantially impaired economic viability" because: (1) the 
jurisdictional offer of $99,500 set damages to the property at 
76 percent of the agreed upon $130,000 pre-taking value; (2) 
both appraisers agreed that the taking made the value of the 
residential improvements obsolete because the highest and best 
use after taking was vacant industrial land; (3) after the 
activation of both transmission line, the Wallers experienced 
regular electronic 
interference that prompted concern for 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
19 
 
themselves, their family, and potential buyers; and (4) the 
removal 
of 
shrubbery 
and 
trees 
within 
the 
easement 
"substantially reduced the attractiveness of the site" and 
eliminated a sound barrier between the home and Interstate 43.   
¶43 The circuit court entered final judgment for the 
Wallers, imposing an additional $47,509.72 on ATC to acquire the 
entire Waller property and ordering the Wallers to quitclaim the 
property to ATC.  ATC appealed the judgment.   
¶44 After an additional two-day hearing, the circuit court 
awarded the Wallers $211,261.74 in litigation expenses.  The 
court found that ATC conditioned the purchase of all the 
Wallers' property on whether the Wallers waived any right to 
relocation expenses.  On the basis of this finding, the court 
determined that ATC failed to negotiate in good faith.  The 
court also ruled that, when a condemnor fails to "resolve the 
issue 
of 
the 
uneconomic 
remnant 
prior 
to 
[making 
the 
jurisdictional offer]," the cost of litigation shifts to the 
condemnor.  The circuit court determined that both scenarios 
applied in this case.  ATC challenges the award of litigation 
costs in this appeal.   
G. The Relocation Benefits Case 
¶45 On December 18, 2008, the Wallers filed a claim with 
ATC for relocation benefits, which ATC denied.  On August 15, 
2009, the Wallers moved to a new permanent residence in the Town 
of 
Sharon 
in 
Walworth 
County——after 
the 
high-voltage 
transmission lines had been installed and fully charged.   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
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¶46 On April 30, 2010, the Wallers filed a complaint with 
the circuit court claiming the right to recover relocation 
costs.  The circuit court, Judge Carlson presiding, held a one-
day trial on the issue on January 25, 2012.   
¶47 During the trial, Scott Waller testified that the 
decision to move resulted from ATC's jurisdictional offer of 
$99,500 and the report of ATC's appraiser, Rolling, that the 
easements destroyed the value of the residential improvements on 
the land.  Waller testified further that he and his wife started 
looking for a new home in February 2008——a month before the 
jurisdictional offer——and made an offer to purchase their Town 
of Sharon property the following November.14   
¶48 Jack Sanderson, a relocation specialist with the 
Wisconsin Department of Commerce, also testified.  Sanderson 
evaluated the Wallers' claim for relocation benefits.  He opined 
that the Wallers were displaced persons because "their home was 
no longer safe, decent or sanitary," and that it had "been 
degraded to an industrial lot."  However, Sanderson admitted 
that he relied on "common sense" and a dictionary definition of 
"decent" and not on any definition in the administrative code.   
¶49 At the conclusion of the trial, the circuit court 
ruled that the Wallers were displaced persons under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.19(2)(e)1.a. and entitled to relocation benefits.  The 
                                                 
14 On cross-examination, Scott Waller testified that he had 
considered moving to a new home even before he learned of the 
transmission line upgrade and expansion, based on a desire for 
larger property and more building space.   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
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court found that the Wallers sustained $26,350 in costs 
associated with the acquisition of relocation property and 
entered judgment in that amount.15   
¶50 ATC appealed the right-to-take and relocation cases 
and petitioned this court to bypass the court of appeals.  The 
court granted the petition on January 14, 2013.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶51 In this case, the court must interpret various 
provisions 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. ch. 32's condemnation procedure.  
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this court 
reviews de novo.  Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 67, ¶41, 341 
Wis. 2d 668, 816 N.W.2d 191 (citations omitted).   
 
¶52 The court also is asked to apply statutory provisions 
on condemnation to certain facts.  The application of a statute 
to the facts of the case is a question of law that we review de 
novo.  Warehouse II, LLC v. DOT, 2006 WI 62, ¶4, 291 Wis. 2d 80, 
715 N.W.2d 213 (citing State v. Reed, 2005 WI 53, ¶13, 280 
Wis. 2d 68, 695 N.W.2d 315). As usual, the court benefits from 
the analyses of the circuit court and court of appeals.  Id. 
(citing State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶12, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 
N.W.2d 700).  "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.19(4)(a) capped relocation benefit 
costs for the Wallers at a maximum of $25,000, but the circuit 
court also permitted an additional $1,350 for the cost of 
moving, pursuant to then-Wis. Admin. Code § COMM 202.54.   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
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opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses."  Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).   
III. DISCUSSION 
 
¶53 Before we address the arguments of counsel, we think 
it is useful to summarize the condemnation process in Wisconsin. 
A. Statutory Overview of the Wis. Stat. ch. 32  
Condemnation Process 
¶54 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. 
amend. V.  The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applied 
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., ___ U.S. ___, 
130 S.Ct. 2592, 2597, 177 L.Ed. 2d 184 (2010); Chi., Burlington 
& Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).  Article I, 
Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides, "The property 
of no person shall be taken for public use without just 
compensation therefor."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 13. 
¶55 A "taking"——or condemnation——of private property for 
public use requires the award of just compensation under both 
the United States and Wisconsin constitutions.  E-L Enters. v. 
Milwaukee Metro. Sewage Dist., 2010 WI 58, ¶21, 326 Wis. 2d 82, 
785 N.W.2d 409 (citing Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 424, 334 
N.W.2d 67 (1983); Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 92 
Wis. 2d 74, 80, 284 N.W.2d 887 (1979)). 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
23 
 
¶56 As a general rule,16 condemnation powers in Wisconsin 
are set out in Wis. Stat. ch. 32, "Eminent Domain."  Condemnors 
are divided into two categories depending on the purpose for 
which they seek to acquire property.  Each category follows a 
separate procedural track, although the two tracks share many 
common procedures.   
¶57 Condemnors use Wis. Stat. § 32.05, known as the 
"quick-take" statute,17 for condemning property related to sewer 
and transportation projects.  Other condemnors utilize Wis. 
Stat. § 32.06, the "slow-take" statute, which is the "catch-all" 
for condemnations not covered by § 32.05.  
¶58 Wisconsin's 
condemnation 
procedures 
underwent 
significant revisions in 1959.  Ch. 639, Laws of 1959; Falkner 
v. N. States Power Co., 75 Wis. 2d 116, 120, 248 N.W.2d 885 
(1977).  Based on the legislative revisions,  
[i]t is apparent that the legislature intended to 
create 
two 
independent 
proceedings 
relating 
to 
["catch-all"] 
condemnation, 
an 
owner's 
action 
in 
circuit court under sec. 32.06(5), Stats., and the 
condemnation proceeding before a judge under sec. 
32.06(7).  From sec. 32.06(5) it is clear that the two 
proceedings may go on simultaneously.   
                                                 
16 Exceptions to the general powers and procedures in Wis. 
Stat. ch. 32 are Wis. Stat. § 157.50 (condemnation powers 
established for municipalities to acquire land for municipal 
cemeteries) and Wis. Stat. ch. 197 (acquisition of public 
utilities by municipal utilities).   
17 "Quick-take proceedings are intended to permit the 
immediate transfer of possession and title to condemnors while 
protecting the rights of landowners."  27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent 
Domain § 687 (2004) (footnote omitted).   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
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Falkner, 75 Wis. 2d at 120.   
1. Who May Condemn, Negotiation Between the Parties,  
and the Jurisdictional Offer 
¶59 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.02 enumerates entities that have 
the power to condemn private property.  The list includes public 
utilities such as ATC.  See Wis. Stat. § 32.02(5)(b).  Utilities 
use the condemnation procedures outlined in Wis. Stat. § 32.06. 
¶60 Most condemnations under Wis. Stat. § 32.06 require a 
determination of the "necessity of taking."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.06(1).  For example, utilities secure a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity, Wis. Stat. § 32.07(1), under 
Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3).  See also Indus. Energy Grp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n, 2012 WI 89, ¶¶26–38, 342 Wis. 2d 576, 819 
N.W.2d 240 (describing the process of obtaining a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity).   
¶61 After making a determination of what it needs to take, 
a condemnor "shall attempt to negotiate personally" with the 
condemnee (the property owner) for purchase of the property 
"sought to be taken."  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(2a).  The condemnor 
must "cause at least one . . . appraisal to be made of the 
property to be acquired" before the negotiations commence, and 
the condemnee may also obtain an appraisal "of all property 
proposed to be acquired."  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(2)(a)–(b).   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
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¶62 If the negotiations are unsuccessful,18 the condemnor 
"shall make and serve" a jurisdictional offer to purchase the 
property sought.  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3).  The contents of a 
jurisdictional offer are set out in Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3).  They 
include a description of the property and "the interest therein 
sought to be taken," the proposed date of occupancy, and "the 
amount of compensation offered," including such additional items 
as relocation benefits.  Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3).   
¶63 Immediately following the provision relating to the 
jurisdictional 
offer 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.06(3) 
is 
the 
definitional provision on "uneconomic remnant."  It reads: 
 
In this section, "uneconomic remnant" means the 
property remaining after a partial taking of property, 
if the property remaining is of such size, shape or 
condition as to be of little value or of substantially 
impaired economic viability.  If acquisition of only 
part of a property would leave its owner with an 
uneconomic remnant, the condemnor shall offer to 
acquire the remnant concurrently and may acquire it by 
purchase or by condemnation if the owner consents.19 
                                                 
18 If the negotiations are successful, the condemnor must 
file two documents: a record of the conveyance itself and the 
certificate of compensation, indicating the identity of persons 
having an interest of record in the property, the property's 
legal description, the nature of the interest acquired and the 
compensation provided.  Kurylo v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 2000 WI 
App 102, ¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 166, 612 N.W.2d 380 (quoting Wis. 
Stat. § 32.06(2a)). 
For a general discussion of negotiations in eminent domain 
proceedings, 
see 
Ross 
F. 
Plaetzer, 
Comment, 
Statutory 
Restrictions on the Exercise of Eminent Domain in Wisconsin: 
Dual 
Requirements 
of 
Prior 
Negotiation 
and 
Provision 
of 
Negotiating Materials, 63 Marq. L. Rev. 489 (1980).   
19 Except for a different title to the subsection, Wis. 
Stat. § 32.05(3m) contains an identical version of this statute. 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
26 
 
Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m).   
¶64 If 
the 
property 
owner 
fails 
to 
accept 
the 
jurisdictional offer within the time specified in the statute, 
the condemnor may petition the circuit court in the county where 
the property is located to have the county condemnation 
commission determine the just compensation for the property 
sought to be taken.  Wis. Stat. §§ 32.06(6)–(7), 32.08(5).  If 
the court finds that the condemnor is entitled to condemn any 
portion of the property, it "immediately shall assign the matter 
to the chairperson of the county condemnation commissioners" to 
hold a hearing to determine just compensation.  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 32.06(7), 32.08(6)(a).   
2. The Just Compensation Proceeding and Appeal 
 
¶65 The county condemnation commission holds a hearing to 
ascertain just compensation for the taking of the condemnee's 
property.  Wis. Stat. §§ 32.06(8), 32.08(5).  Upon determining 
just compensation, the commission files a sworn voucher for the 
compensation with the circuit court; if the court approves the 
voucher, the condemnor pays the just compensation to the 
condemnee.  Wis. Stat. §§ 32.06(8), 32.08(6)(b).  Either party 
may appeal the commission's award to the circuit court within 60 
days of the filing of the commission's award.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.06(10).  Parties may appeal only on issues related to the 
amount of just compensation and questions of title, "and it 
shall have precedence over all actions not then on trial."  Id.  
The appeal proceeds as a jury trial unless both parties agree 
otherwise.  Id.   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
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3. Right-to-Take Proceedings 
 
¶66 The county condemnation commission hearing provides an 
opportunity for the condemnee to be heard on the question of 
just compensation.  However, if after the condemnor makes the 
jurisdictional offer, the condemnee wishes to contest the 
condemnor's right to take the property "for any reason other 
than that the amount of compensation offered is inadequate," the 
condemnee may file a separate right-to-take action with the 
circuit court.  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5).   
¶67 A § 32.06(5) action "shall be the only manner" in 
which a condemnee may raise "any issue other than the amount of 
just compensation" or perfection of title for the property 
described in the jurisdictional offer.  Id.  A right-to-take 
action 
under 
§ 32.06(5) 
proceeds 
independently 
from 
a 
condemnation proceeding under § 32.06(7) and a just compensation 
proceeding under § 32.06(8).  Id.   
¶68 A trial on the issues in a right-to-take action takes 
precedence over all other actions in the court except those 
already on trial.  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5).  Nevertheless, the 
commencement of a right-to-take action does not "limit in any 
respect" the right of a condemnor to commence condemnation 
proceedings under § 32.06(7).  Id.  Both matters may proceed 
simultaneously.  Id.     
¶69 If a court "determines that the condemnor does not 
have the right to condemn part or all of the property described 
in the jurisdictional offer or there is no necessity for its 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
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taking," litigation expenses20 may be awarded to the condemnee.  
Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b).   
B. When Must a Property Owner Raise an  
Uneconomic Remnant Claim? 
 
¶70 The first issue we must consider is when a property 
owner must raise an uneconomic remnant claim in the condemnation 
process.  The Wallers argue that an uneconomic remnant claim 
must be made in a right-to-take proceeding, as expressed in 
Waller I and Waller II.  ATC, on the other hand, asserts that 
there is no action for an uneconomic remnant, but if such an 
action were permitted, the claim should be raised either in a 
valuation proceeding before the county condemnation commission, 
or alternatively, in an inverse condemnation proceeding.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 32.10. 
¶71 Determining 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 32 
allows 
a 
property owner to bring an uneconomic remnant claim——and if so, 
when——requires this court to interpret statutes.  "The purpose 
of statutory interpretation is to determine what the statute 
means so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended 
effect."  Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2012 WI 26, 
¶26, 339 Wis. 2d 125, 810 N.W.2d 465 (internal brackets and 
                                                 
20 "Litigation expenses" in Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) means 
"the sum of costs, disbursements and expenses, including 
reasonable attorney, appraisal and engineering fees necessary to 
prepare for or participate in actual or anticipated proceedings 
before 
the 
county 
condemnation 
commissioners, 
board 
of 
assessment or any court under this chapter."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.28(1).   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
29 
 
citation omitted).  Statutory interpretation "begins with the 
language of the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Courts give statutory 
language its common, ordinary meaning.  Id.  Statutory language 
is interpreted in the context in which it is used, not in 
isolation but as part of a whole.  Id., ¶46.  We must construe 
statutory language reasonably, so as to avoid absurd results.  
Id.  Legislative history may be relevant to confirm a statute's 
plain meaning.  Id., ¶51. 
¶72 Rules of construction for eminent domain statutes also 
guide our interpretation of Wis. Stat. ch. 32.  "Because the 
power 
of 
eminent 
domain 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 32 
is 
extraordinary, 
we 
strictly 
construe 
the 
condemnor's 
power . . . while liberally construing provisions favoring the 
landowner, including available remedies and compensation."  TFJ 
Nominee Trust v. DOT, 2001 WI App 116, ¶10, 244 Wis. 2d 242, 629 
N.W.2d 57 (citing Miesen v. DOT, 226 Wis. 2d 298, 305, 594 
N.W.2d 821 (Ct. App. 1999)); see also City of Janesville v. CC 
Midwest, Inc., 2007 WI 93, ¶101 n.11, 302 Wis. 2d 599, 734 
N.W.2d 428 (Prosser, J., dissenting); Aero Auto Parts, Inc. v. 
DOT, 78 Wis. 2d 235, 241, 253 N.W.2d 896 (1977). 
¶73 The 
uneconomic 
remnant 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.06(3m), became law more than 35 years ago.  § 5, ch. 440, 
Laws of 1977.  The legislation was the product of the 
legislature's Special Committee on Eminent Domain (Special 
Committee), under the auspices of the Wisconsin Legislative 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
30 
 
Council.  Summary of Proceedings, Spec. Comm. on Eminent Domain, 
Wis. Leg. Council, Madison, Wis. (Sept. 9, 1977) [hereinafter 
Spec. Comm. Summary of Proceedings].   
¶74 At the September 9, 1977, proceeding of the Special 
Committee, members considered separate draft legislation on 
various topics that would eventually lead to several bills, 
including 1977 Assembly Bill 1077, enacted as Chapter 440 of the 
Laws of 1977.  See ch. 440, Laws of 1977; Wis. Leg. Council Rep. 
No. 28 to the 1977 Legislature, Legislation Relating to Eminent 
Domain, at 3–4, Wis. Leg. Council, Madison, Wis. (1977) 
[hereinafter Rep. No. 28].  One of the pieces of draft 
legislation discussed at the September 9 proceeding addressed 
"uneconomic 
remnant," 
creating 
the 
current 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.06(3m).  The summary of proceedings indicates that the 
draft 
legislation 
would 
"allow[] 
condemnors 
to 
acquire 
uneconomic remnants" and that the draft was based on Section 208 
of the Uniform Eminent Domain Code.  Spec. Comm. Summary of 
Proceedings at 5.21   
¶75 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws approved the Model Eminent Domain Code in 1974.  
Model Eminent Domain Code, Prefatory Note, 13 U.L.A. 3 (2002).  
Section 208, titled "Offer to Acquire Uneconomic Remnant," reads 
as follows: 
                                                 
21 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws officially changed the Uniform Eminent Domain Code to a 
Model Act in 1984.  Model Eminent Domain Code, 13 U.L.A. 1 
(2002).   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
31 
 
(a) If the acquisition of only part of a 
property would leave its owner with an uneconomic 
remnant, the condemnor shall offer to acquire the 
remnant concurrently and may acquire it by purchase or 
by condemnation if the owner consents. 
(b) "Uneconomic remnant" as used in this section 
means a remainder following a partial taking of 
property, of such size, shape, or condition as to be 
of little value or that gives rise to a substantial 
risk that the condemnor will be required to pay in 
compensation 
for 
the 
part 
taken 
an 
amount 
substantially equivalent to the amount that would be 
required to be paid if it and the remainder were taken 
as a whole. 
Model Eminent Domain Code § 208, 13 U.L.A. 22–23 (2002) 
(emphasis added).  The Special Committee replaced the above 
emphasized language with the more succinct phrase "substantially 
impaired 
economic 
viability." 
 
Spec. 
Comm. 
Summary 
of 
Proceedings at 5. 
¶76 The Comment to subsection (b) of § 208 of the Model 
Eminent Domain Code lists several examples of "physical" or 
"financial" remnants after partial takings that would qualify as 
uneconomic remnants: 
Remnants that are totally "landlocked" so that no 
physical use of the property is practicable; remnants 
reduced below minimum zoning area requirements where 
there is no reasonable possibility of a zoning change; 
remnants in such physical condition as to preclude 
economically 
practicable 
use 
for 
any 
plausible 
application; and remnants that are of significant 
potential value only to one or a few persons (e.g., 
adjoining landowners). 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
32 
 
Model Eminent Domain Code § 208 cmt., 13 U.L.A. 23 (2002) 
(citations omitted).22   
¶77 ATC asserts that this legislative history confirms 
that the decision to acquire an uneconomic remnant should be 
determined by the condemnor, and thus, property owners do not 
have a cause of action for an uneconomic remnant.  In our view, 
the legislative history does not support this theory.  On the 
contrary, the legislative history shows that condemnors were 
given authority to acquire uneconomic remnants, not sole 
authority to determine whether an uneconomic remnant exists.  If 
a condemnor fails to acknowledge the existence of an uneconomic 
remnant by describing it and including an offer for it in the 
jurisdictional offer——concurrent with its offer for a taking of 
other property——the condemnee must have some recourse to assert 
and prove the uneconomic remnant claim.   
                                                 
22 The various examples of uneconomic remnants in the 
Comment to § 208 indicate that landlocked parcels are but one of 
many possible uneconomic remnants.  In their brief, ATC implies 
that landlocked parcels resulting from partial takings were the 
impetus behind the wording substitution "substantially impaired 
economic viability."  We do not agree.   
The Summary of Proceedings for the September 9, 1977, 
meeting of the Special Committee records a single spectator "who 
referred to a remnant of 30 acres to which there was no access."  
Summary of Proceedings, Spec. Comm. on Eminent Domain, at 5, 
Wis. Leg. Council, Madison, Wis. (Sept. 9, 1977).  The spectator 
asserted that this type of property should also be taken.  Id.  
While the Summary of Proceedings then shows the committee 
amended the draft legislation to include the phrase "or of 
substantially impaired economic viability," we do not agree with 
ATC's conclusion that the amendment was in reaction to the 
comments of the spectator in particular, or to landlocked 
remnants in general.    
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
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¶78 A Wisconsin Legislative Council report on the Special 
Committee's work bears this out.  The report states that, with 
regard to the uneconomic remnant proposal, "[the legislation] 
provides landowners with a means of disposing of portions of 
their property which would be substantially reduced in value by 
a condemnation project."  Rep. No. 28 at 4 (emphasis added).23   
¶79 A logical argument can be made that the county 
condemnation commission is the place to consider compensation 
for an uneconomic remnant if the existence of an uneconomic 
remnant has been acknowledged by the condemnor and the condemnor 
has included an offer to acquire the uneconomic remnant as part 
of the jurisdictional offer.  But ATC's position is that the 
condemnor alone decides whether to recognize an uneconomic 
remnant and that the parties simply fight over the amount of 
compensation before the county condemnation commission.  We 
disagree with that analysis.   
¶80 Having recognized a property owner's right to bring an 
uneconomic remnant claim, we turn to the question of when in the 
condemnation process a property owner should bring that claim. 
¶81 We look first to Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m) to see if it 
yields any direction or clues: 
                                                 
23 The Comment to § 208 of the Model Eminent Domain Code 
also provides foundation for the assertion of a claim by the 
owner of an alleged uneconomic remnant: "[I]f the owner is 
prepared to sell, but is not willing to agree to the amount of 
compensation offered, this section authorizes the parties to 
agree to its acquisition by condemnation proceedings, so that 
the compensation may be ascertained by the trier of fact."  13 
U.L.A. 23, § 208 cmt. (2002).   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
34 
 
 
Definition. 
 
In 
this 
section, 
"uneconomic 
remnant" means the property remaining after a partial 
taking of property, if the property remaining is of 
such size, shape or condition as to be of little value 
or of substantially impaired economic viability.  If 
acquisition of only part of a property would leave its 
owner with an uneconomic remnant, the condemnor shall 
offer to acquire the remnant concurrently and may 
acquire it by purchase or by condemnation if the owner 
consents.  
¶82 The key phrase in this subsection is "the condemnor 
shall offer to acquire," and the key word is "concurrently."  If 
the parties have agreed that there is an uneconomic remnant, 
that the condemnor will acquire it, and that the amount of 
compensation offered is acceptable, there is no dispute.  Where 
there is a dispute, the nature of the dispute is exposed in the 
jurisdictional offer.  If the condemnor makes an offer to 
acquire the uneconomic remnant as well as an offer on the 
property sought, the condemnor is conceding that an uneconomic 
remnant exists, and the dispute is confined to the amount of 
compensation.  If the condemnor fails to include an offer to 
acquire the uneconomic remnant in the jurisdictional offer, it 
is disputing that an uneconomic remnant exists, and the property 
owner must have a place to raise the issue. 
¶83 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.06(5), the right-to-take statute, 
reads in part: "When an owner desires to contest the right of 
the 
condemnor 
to 
condemn 
the 
property 
described 
in 
the 
jurisdictional offer for any reason other than that the amount 
of 
compensation 
offered 
is 
inadequate, 
such 
owner 
may . . . commence an action in the circuit court . . . naming 
the condemnor as defendant."  (Emphasis added.)  Subsection (5) 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
35 
 
continues: "Such an action shall be the only manner in which any 
issue other than the amount of just compensation or other than 
proceedings to perfect title . . . may be raised pertaining to 
the condemnation of the property described in the jurisdictional 
offer."  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5) (emphasis added).   
¶84 If subsection (5) contained only the first sentence 
quoted above, there might be reason to resist including an 
uneconomic remnant claim in a right-to-take action.  But the 
second 
sentence 
refers 
to 
"any 
issue," 
and 
when 
the 
jurisdictional offer fails to include an offer to acquire the 
alleged uneconomic remnant, it creates an "issue other than the 
amount of just compensation."24 
¶85 Asking the county condemnation commission to order the 
condemnor to acquire property beyond what the condemnor has 
sought to take in the jurisdictional offer and beyond what the 
circuit court has already approved is asking the commission to 
exceed its statutory authority.  Moreover, if the commission did 
not exceed its statutory authority, the condemnee arguably would 
not be able to appeal the uneconomic remnant issue because of 
the statutory limit on issues that may be appealed.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 32.06(10).   
¶86 The amicus brief filed by the Wisconsin Utilities 
Association remarks that:  
                                                 
24 The "any issue" language quoted above was part of the 
Wisconsin Statutes before the enactment of the "uneconomic 
remnant" provision in 1978.  See Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5) (1975–
76). 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
36 
 
There is simply no reason for issues concerning 
uneconomic remnants to ever be raised in a right-to-
take proceeding.  Even if a landowner brought a 
challenge to a condemnation under § 32.06(5) on the 
grounds that an uneconomic remnant existed because the 
condemnor took a wider right-of-way than needed, the 
inquiry would be how wide an easement was needed for 
utility 
purposes, 
not 
whether 
a 
wider 
easement 
produced an uneconomic remnant.   
The Wisconsin Utilities Association's hypothetical suggests that 
even though the issue of "uneconomic remnant" might well come up 
in a right-to-take hearing, the parties would battle over such 
questions as the necessity of taking so large an easement.  We 
think the existence or non-existence of an "uneconomic remnant" 
would be integral to the discussion.  The present case 
represents the flip side of the hypothetical: the condemnor, 
allegedly, has so failed to account for the full impact of its 
taking of easements on the condemnee's property that the 
condemnee seeks to require the condemnor to acquire more than 
the condemnor would like to take.  If the condemnee succeeds, 
the condemnor also may be required to pay the condemnee 
relocation expenses.  Surely these are "issues." 
 
¶87 ATC's position is that any question about uneconomic 
remnants should be decided by the county condemnation commission 
irrespective of whether the condemnor has acknowledged the 
existence of an uneconomic remnant. 
 
¶88 The Wallers' position is that the condemnor must take 
the uneconomic remnant and pay for it.  Wisconsin Stat. § 32.07 
is entitled "Necessity, determination of."  It reads in part: 
The necessity of the taking shall be determined 
as follows:  
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
37 
 
(1) A certificate of public convenience and 
necessity issued under s. 196.491(3) shall constitute 
the determination of the necessity of the taking for 
any lands or interests described in the certificate. 
. . . . 
(3) In 
all 
other 
cases, 
the 
judge 
shall 
determine the necessity. 
Wis. Stat. § 32.07(1) and (3). 
 
¶89 We think it is unlikely that the PSC would decide on 
the necessity of taking an individual uneconomic remnant when it 
authorizes a major utility project.  Thus, the task of 
determining the existence of an uneconomic remnant will fall to 
the circuit court. 
¶90 ATC argues that an uneconomic remnant claim should be 
brought in a condemnation hearing on valuation, but this 
argument misconstrues the inherent dispute in an uneconomic 
remnant case.  While determining whether an uneconomic remnant 
exists undoubtedly is related to the total amount owed to a 
condemnee, it is fundamentally different from a calculation of 
the 
fair 
market value of an easement under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6g).  As Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m) implies, the question in 
an uneconomic remnant claim is the extent of the property the 
condemnor has the right or obligation to acquire.  Indeed, if a 
court finds that a property would become an uneconomic remnant 
if the condemnor took an easement, the condemnor might not have 
a right to take the easement without offering to purchase the 
entire property.  See Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m).  Thus, an 
uneconomic remnant determination is essential in deciding a 
right to a partial taking like an easement and should, whenever 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
38 
 
reasonably possible, precede valuation questions. See Arrowhead 
Farms, Inc. v. Dodge Cnty., 21 Wis. 2d 647, 651, 124 N.W.2d 631 
(1963) (stating that under Wis. Stat. § 32.05, procedural issues 
must be resolved before the matter of just compensation).   
¶91 While an uneconomic remnant claim may, arguably, be 
brought in some cases in an inverse condemnation action, such a 
process is "unusual."  W. Va. Dep't. of Transp. v. Dodson Mobile 
Homes Sales & Servs., 624 S.E.2d 468, 473 (W. Va. 2005).  
Further, a property owner may bring an inverse condemnation 
action under Wisconsin law only if the property in question "has 
been occupied by a person possessing the power of condemnation 
and if the person has not exercised the power."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.10; Kohlbeck v. Reliance Constr. Co., 2002 WI App 142, ¶22, 
256 Wis. 2d 235, 647 N.W.2d 277.  In this case, an inverse 
condemnation action would be inappropriate because the Wallers 
never claimed that ATC was occupying their entire property; they 
retained ownership interest in the property.  Instead, the 
Wallers argue that ATC's easement substantially impaired the 
economic viability of their property.   
¶92 It is important to stress that the two tracks——the 
right-to-take action and the valuation proceeding before the 
county condemnation commission——can proceed simultaneously, and 
nothing should stop a utility like ATC from getting easements so 
that projects can move forward, so long as the right of 
condemnation is not being directly contested.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 32.06(5) specifically provides that the commencement of an 
action under that section "shall not prevent a condemnor from 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
39 
 
filing the [condemnation] petition provided for in [subsection] 
(7) and proceeding thereon."  Utilities like ATC are entitled to 
an efficient, cost-effective, and timely resolution of their 
proposed takings.  In that vein, a motion for injunctive relief 
to halt a condemnation proceeding, like the one the Wallers 
proposed here, is counterproductive and contrary to the intent 
and spirit of the statutes.   
C. Is the Waller Property an Uneconomic Remnant? 
 
¶93 This brings us to the question of whether ATC's taking 
of the two easements left the Wallers with an uneconomic 
remnant, that is, "property . . . of such size, shape or 
condition as to be of little value or of substantially impaired 
economic viability."  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m).  In our view, the 
circuit court was correct in its determination that the Wallers 
were left with an uneconomic remnant. 
 
¶94 Considerable 
factual 
findings 
support 
the 
trial 
court's conclusion that ATC's easements substantially impaired 
the economic viability of the Waller property.   
¶95 The circuit court described the damage to property 
value that was recognized in both appraisals and in the 
jurisdictional offer.  Rolling's appraisal noted nearly a 57 
percent loss in value, while Group One's appraisal determined 
that the Waller property sustained an 88 percent loss of value.  
The jurisdictional offer acknowledged a 76 percent decrease in 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
40 
 
value from the taking.  These numbers are indicative of 
substantial economic impairment to the Wallers' small property.25   
¶96 Other conclusions in both appraisals create a bleak 
picture.  Rolling's appraisal for ATC noted that the Wallers' 
property will have major transmission lines along two of its 
three sides; that the transmission lines will be within 60 feet 
of the house; and that substantial landscaping will have been 
lost in the easement area.  Rolling's appraisal acknowledged 
that the property was already transitioning from improved 
residential use to vacant industrial use; the installation of 
the transmission line pole and the lines themselves would tip 
the property to light industrial, rendering the residential 
improvements "totally obsolete." 
¶97 The Group One appraisal also considered the Waller 
property to have its highest and best use——after the taking——as 
"vacant for industrial purposes."  Group One also noted that the 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, in its Real Estate 
Manual for contractors and local governments, indicates that 
when a partial taking changes a property's highest and best use, 
the change provides a basis for determining that the property 
has become an uneconomic remnant.   
¶98 However, even for industrial purposes, Group One noted 
that the property's triangular shape and small size "negatively 
                                                 
25 The existence of an uneconomic remnant will not always 
turn on the percentage of land or the percentage of value taken 
by the condemnor.  The existence of an uneconomic remnant almost 
always turns on the economic viability of what is left after the 
taking.   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
41 
 
impact[ed] its desirability as an industrial site at this time."  
Furthermore, the lack of municipal sewer and water on the 
remaining property is a detriment to any potential industrial 
buyer, and as the court of appeals in Waller II noted, it would 
cost approximately $41,000 to install the sewer and water——more 
than the $38,000 in value for the remaining property. 
¶99 In 
either 
case, 
the 
two 
45-foot-wide 
easements 
restrict the property's use for industrial or residential 
purposes.   
¶100 In conjunction, the two appraisals reveal a picture of 
a property so dramatically affected by the easements that it has 
limited residential and industrial use after the taking.  In 
addition, a reduced sound barrier between the residence and 
Interstate 43 and perceived electromagnetic disturbances that 
would likely rattle any potential buyer, further diminish the 
attractiveness and usability of the property.  In other words, 
the size, shape, and condition of the Waller property is of 
substantially 
impaired 
economic 
viability 
as 
either 
a 
residential or a light industrial parcel, and it is therefore an 
uneconomic remnant. 
¶101 These factual findings are not "clearly erroneous."  
See Waller II, 334 Wis. 2d 740, ¶15 ("Whether the remaining 
property after a partial taking has 'little value' or is 'of 
substantially impaired economic viability' is a factual question 
for the circuit court to resolve.").   
 
¶102 ATC claims that the Wallers' property is not an 
uneconomic remnant because the Wallers could still live on the 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
42 
 
property with the addition of the new high-voltage transmission 
lines and that they in fact did live on the property even after 
the transmission lines were fully energized.  However, ATC 
confuses habitability with substantial economic impairment.  
Although it may be objectively possible to remain on the 
property and continue to live with the new transmission lines, 
this does not overcome the fact that the property lost a 
significant amount of its desirability and value and could no 
longer sustain its previous use as a residential property.   
 
¶103 ATC argues that the property is not an uneconomic 
remnant because the existence of a habitable home negates the 
possibility that the property is valueless.  To support this 
proposition, ATC cites Lake Oswego v. Babson, 776 P.2d 870 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1989) and Spotsylvania County v. Mineral Springs 
Homeowners Ass'n, No. CL02-391, 2003 WL 21904116 (Va. Cir. Ct. 
July 18, 2003).  However, these cases are distinguishable from 
the Wallers' situation.  In both cases, the court relied on 
statutes or regulations that defined "uneconomic remnant" as 
land with no practical value or utility.  See Lake Oswego, 776 
P.2d at 872-73; Mineral Springs, 2003 WL 21904116 at *3 
(defining 
uneconomic 
remnant 
as 
"unusable"). 
 
Thus, 
the 
determinative question in these cases was limited to whether a 
property was valueless.  By contrast, Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m) 
designates property as an uneconomic remnant if its economic 
viability has been substantially impaired.  This broader 
definition allows for the conclusion that the Wallers' property 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
43 
 
constitutes an uneconomic remnant even though it is not 
valueless.  
¶104 In addition, Mineral Springs and another case cited by 
ATC, New Mexico ex rel. New Mexico State Highway Department v. 
United States, 665 F.2d 1023 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (per curiam), are 
factually distinct from the present case in that the property 
owners themselves objected to the compelled takings and asserted 
that their remaining properties were not uneconomic remnants.  
These 
distinctions 
are 
material 
because——unlike 
broad 
constructions favoring landowners——courts interpret the power of 
condemnors narrowly, especially when a taking goes beyond what 
is needed for public use.  TFJ Nominee Trust, 244 Wis. 2d 242, 
¶10; Mitton v. DOT, 184 Wis. 2d 738, 748, 516 N.W.2d 709 (1994) 
(quoting Falkner, 75 Wis. 2d at 139) ("[N]o more property can be 
taken than the public use requires."). 
¶105 Based on the factual findings, we conclude that it was 
not clearly erroneous for the circuit court to conclude that 
ATC's 
easements 
have 
substantially 
impaired 
the 
economic 
viability of the Waller property and that it is an uneconomic 
remnant.   
D. Are the Wallers Entitled To Litigation Expenses? 
¶106 Whether 
the 
Wallers 
are 
entitled 
to 
litigation 
expenses turns on an application of Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b), 
which provides, in relevant part, that "litigation expenses 
shall 
be 
awarded 
to 
the 
condemnee 
if . . . [t]he 
court 
determines that the condemnor does not have the right to condemn 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
44 
 
part or all of the property described in the jurisdictional 
offer."   
¶107 By the plain language of the statute, if the court 
determines that the condemnor does not have the right to condemn 
part or all of the property, then litigation expenses shall be 
awarded to the condemnee under Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b).  The 
circuit court concluded that ATC had to acquire the entire 
property if it wanted to condemn the land for the easements.  
The court held that ATC did not have the right to condemn only 
the part of the property "sought to be taken" in the 
jurisdictional offer because that would leave an uneconomic 
remnant.  Given this antecedent determination by the court, it 
was not error for the court to conclude that the Wallers are 
entitled to litigation expenses. 
¶108 This conclusion finds support in Warehouse II.  In 
Warehouse II, this court held that an owner of condemned 
property was entitled to litigation expenses under the "right to 
condemn" language of Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b), where the 
condemnor had not negotiated its jurisdictional offer in good 
faith.  This court found the statutory language ambiguous, and 
"liberally 
construe[d] 
statutory 
provisions 
regarding 
compensation for eminent domain takings to favor the property 
owner whose property is taken against his or her will."  
Warehouse II, 291 Wis. 2d 80, ¶32.  Awarding litigation expenses 
under those circumstances furthered the statutory purposes "to 
provide more specific and concrete opportunities to recover 
litigation expenses for condemnees with legitimate challenges to 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
45 
 
the actions of condemnors" and "to discourage a condemnor from 
making a low-ball offer to save money."  Id., ¶¶33–34.  Here, 
like the plaintiffs in Warehouse II, the Wallers seek to recover 
litigation expenses under Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b) for a 
legitimate challenge to the condemnation actions of ATC.  The 
statute should be liberally construed in the same manner, and 
the Wallers are entitled to litigation expenses. 
¶109 ATC argues that no statutory basis exists to award 
litigation expenses because ATC negotiated in good faith.  Even 
if 
"good 
faith 
negotiation" 
would 
preclude 
an 
award 
of 
litigation expenses——which was not the holding of Warehouse II——
whether ATC negotiated in good faith is a factual issue best 
addressed by the circuit court.  It should be noted, however, 
that although ATC did offer to acquire the Wallers' entire 
property for the full amount of the Wallers' appraisal, that 
offer was conditioned upon the Wallers' waiver of relocation 
benefits, which the Wallers successfully sought in circuit 
court.  Moreover, the offer was not included as part of the 
jurisdictional offer.  These facts weigh against a finding that 
ATC negotiated in good faith. 
¶110 ATC argues also that awarding litigation expenses does 
not advance the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 32.28(3)(b).  ATC 
correctly points out that the purpose of the statute is to make 
the 
landowner 
whole 
and 
to 
discourage 
condemnors 
from 
shortchanging landowners.  ATC claims that the Wallers would 
have been made more than whole by accepting its offer of 
$132,000 for the whole property or the jurisdictional offer for 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
46 
 
the easement for $99,500.  However, this claim ignores the fact 
that ATC's offer for the entire property was conditioned on the 
Wallers' waiver of relocation benefits, to which the circuit 
court held the Wallers are entitled.  Because the Wallers could 
have been made whole only by a jurisdictional offer that 
included relocation benefits, accepting ATC's offer would have 
shortchanged the Wallers, and awarding litigation expenses 
furthers the purposes of the statute.26 
E. Are the Wallers "Displaced Persons" and Entitled 
to Relocation Benefits? 
 
¶111 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.19, titled "Additional items 
payable," provides for payments to persons displaced by public 
projects.  The declaration of purpose in Wis. Stat. § 32.19(1) 
provides, in part, that: 
The legislature declares that it is in the public 
interest that persons displaced by any public project 
be fairly compensated by payment for the property 
acquired and other losses hereinafter described and 
                                                 
26 The dissent professes fidelity to the text of the 
condemnation statute, see Dissent, ¶162, without acknowledging 
the usual disparity in resources between the condemnor and 
condemnee and the broad policy contained in the condemnation 
statute to ameliorate this disparity. 
A condemnee is entitled to just compensation.  A condemnee 
will not be made whole if the condemnee is forced to litigate 
the issue of just compensation at great expense and then 
subtract his or her attorney fees from an award of full value.  
See Standard Theatres, Inc. v. DOT, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 744, 349 
N.W.2d 661 (1984).  A condemnor has no incentive to reach a fair 
settlement with a condemnee if the condemnor is convinced that 
it can prevail by outspending and outlasting the weaker 
adversary.  Wisconsin Stat. § 32.28(3) exists to address this 
imbalance of power between the condemnor and the condemnee.   
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
47 
 
suffered as the result of programs designed for the 
benefit of the public as a whole; and the legislature 
further 
finds 
and 
declares 
that, 
notwithstanding 
subch. II, or any other provision of law, payment of 
such relocation assistance and assistance in the 
acquisition of replacement housing are proper costs of 
the construction of public improvements. 
¶112 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.19(3) provides that a condemnor 
shall make relocation benefit payments to "displaced persons."  
A displaced person is:  
[A]ny person who moves from real property or who moves 
his or her personal property from real property: 
 
a. 
As a direct result of a written notice of 
intent to acquire or the acquisition of the real 
property, in whole or in part or subsequent to the 
issuance 
of 
a 
jurisdictional 
offer 
under 
this 
subchapter, for public purposes; or 
b. 
As a result of rehabilitation, demolition or 
other 
displacing activity, as determined by the 
department of administration, if the person is a 
tenant-occupant 
of a dwelling, business or farm 
operation and the displacement if permanent. 
Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(e)1.  Disputes about relocation benefits 
must be brought in separate actions under Wis. Stat. § 32.20.   
¶113 Because the Wallers did not move as a result of 
"rehabilitation, demolition, or other displacing activity" as 
articulated in subparagraph b., the Wallers are "displaced 
persons" only if they moved "as a direct result" of the 
jurisdictional offer under subd. para. a. 
 
¶114 Determining whether a person moved from real property 
"as a direct result" of a written notice of the acquisition——
i.e., a jurisdictional offer——requires a factual inquiry into 
the 
cause 
of 
the 
person's 
move. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
48 
 
§ 32.19(2)(e)(1)a.  Factual findings will be affirmed unless 
clearly erroneous.  Wis. Stat. § 805.17 (2); Emp'rs Ins. of 
Wausau v. Jackson, 190 Wis. 2d 597, 613, 527 N.W.2d 681 (1995). 
¶115 The Wallers lived on their property for almost 20 
years before ATC made its jurisdictional offer in March 2008.  
Though ATC offered to purchase the Wallers' entire property for 
$132,000——approximately 
the 
full 
amount 
of 
the 
Wallers' 
appraisal——the Wallers refused that offer because it was 
conditioned on a waiver of their relocation benefits.  Although 
the Wallers had listed their house for sale in 2005, there is no 
evidence that the Wallers conducted a search for replacement 
property until Spring 2008, when ATC made its jurisdictional 
offer.  Based on these facts, Judge Carlson's finding that the 
Wallers' move was a "direct result . . . in whole or in part" 
because of ATC's jurisdictional offer is not clearly erroneous. 
¶116 ATC argues that the Wallers are not "displaced 
persons" because they chose to move voluntarily and were not 
"forced" to move.  The Wallers do not dispute that they could 
have continued to live on the property after the installation of 
the transmission line or that they decided to move before they 
received Rolling's 2007 appraisal.  However, the statute 
contains no explicit requirement that a person's move must be 
"forced" 
or 
involuntary 
in 
order 
to 
render 
that 
person 
"displaced." 
¶117 If the legislature intended to provide for relocation 
benefits only for persons who were "forced" to move, it could 
have done so.  Indeed, the second alternative definition of 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
49 
 
"displaced person" in Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(e)(1)b. explicitly 
provides that a "displaced person" is one whose move is prompted 
by "rehabilitation, demolition, or other displacing activity."  
This definition of "displaced person" is an alternative to subd. 
para. a., which contains no reference to the physical condition 
or habitability of the condemned property, and instead defines 
"displaced person" in terms of "direct" causation.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
¶118 We 
conclude 
the 
following. 
 
First, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.06(5), the "right-to-take" provision, sets out the proper 
and exclusive way for a property owner to raise a claim that the 
owner will be left with an uneconomic remnant after a partial 
taking by the condemnor.  An uneconomic remnant claim should be 
brought under § 32.06(5) because the condemnor has failed to 
include an offer to acquire any uneconomic remnant in the 
condemnor's jurisdictional offer.  The inclusion of an offer to 
acquire an uneconomic remnant acknowledges the existence of the 
uneconomic remnant.  The exclusion of such an offer indicates 
that the condemnor disputes the existence of an uneconomic 
remnant.  A right-to-take action must be decided promptly by the 
court and shall not prevent the condemnor from filing a 
simultaneous valuation petition, proceeding thereon, and taking 
any property interest whose condemnation is not being directly 
contested by the owner.  A right-to-take action on an uneconomic 
remnant claim is designed to protect an owner's right to fair 
compensation to avoid economic hardship, not to paralyze public 
interest takings under eminent domain. 
No. 
  2012AP805 & 2012AP840 
 
50 
 
¶119 Second, the Wallers' property, after ATC took two 
easements for transmission lines, is an uneconomic remnant 
because it is of such size, shape, and condition as to be of 
substantially 
impaired 
economic 
viability 
as 
either 
a 
residential or an industrial parcel.  The taking of the two 
easements drastically reduced the portion of the Wallers' 
property not subject to a servitude.  The easements themselves 
not only restricted the Wallers' activity in the easement area 
but 
also 
substantially 
diminished 
the 
desirability, 
practicality, and value of the Wallers' property for either a 
residential or industrial user.   
¶120 Third, the Wallers prevailed on their uneconomic 
remnant claim brought under Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5)——the right-to-
take 
statute——and, 
therefore, were entitled to litigation 
expenses under Wis. Stat. § 32.28. 
¶121 Finally, the Wallers were displaced persons under Wis. 
Stat. § 32.19(2)(e)1.a. because they moved "as a direct result" 
of ATC's jurisdictional offer, and the circuit court's findings 
of fact on this issue are not clearly erroneous. 
 
By the Court.—The judgments of the circuit court are 
affirmed. 
¶122 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶123 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
has transformed what should be a case of minor statewide impact 
involving only a small amount of money into a case with 
significant ramifications and costly consequences for ratepayers 
and taxpayers who end up paying the bills.   
¶124 The ramifications will affect how all condemnors 
throughout the state proceed with the taking of property for 
projects, large and small.1 
¶125 Because 
the 
majority 
rewrites 
and 
broadens 
the 
statutory definition of an uneconomic remnant, condemnors may 
now be required to take an increased amount of property that 
they do not want or need for their projects.  Increased costs to 
ratepayers 
and 
taxpayers will accompany these unnecessary 
takings because now condemnors can be required to pay for the 
                                                 
1 As ATC warned before the circuit court, the ramifications 
of this case extend far beyond this relatively small dispute.  
The importance of this case was described by ATC's attorney on 
the record: 
The value is small in this case.  But the implications 
of it are enormous not just for ATC but for the 
Department of Transportation and every other condemnor 
in the state . . . if there were a finding that this 
small amount of visual and noise w[as] enough to 
render 
this 
an 
uneconomic 
remnant, 
you'll 
have 
uneconomic remnants in all sorts of cases.  You'll 
have to buy the entire property, you'll have to 
provide all the relocation benefits, and we don't 
think 
that's 
anything like what the legislature 
intended. 
In essence, this case has the potential to spawn a cottage 
industry of uneconomic remnants. 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
2 
 
entire property, together with relocation benefits, rather than 
paying for the taking of only an easement.   
¶126 In concluding that the right-to-take proceeding is the 
only way to bring an uneconomic remnant claim, the majority 
rewrites another statute.  Rather than following the clear words 
of the right-to-take statute, the majority creates a process 
with concurrent dual proceedings which has the potential for 
conflicting valuations and procedural quagmires.  The majority's 
process of dual proceedings contravenes the legislative purpose 
of the condemnation statutory scheme, which is to promote 
efficient and cost-effective condemnation procedures. 
¶127 Likewise, 
because the majority rewrites what it 
initially acknowledges as the clear language of a third statute, 
the litigation expense statute, it awards out-of-proportion 
litigation expenses of $211,261.64 for a case involving only a 
few thousand dollars difference in value. 
¶128 Our task when interpreting statutes is to discern the 
statute's meaning, which we presume is expressed in the language 
of the legislature.  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 
52, ¶20, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581.  In applying the words 
of the statutes written by the legislature, I conclude that a 
valuation proceeding under Wis. Stat. § 32.06(7) is the proper 
proceeding to bring an uneconomic remnant claim.  Furthermore, I 
determine that the Wallers' property is not an uneconomic 
remnant as it is defined by Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m) and that the 
Wallers are not entitled to litigation expenses or relocation 
benefits.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
3 
 
I 
  
A. The 
majority 
rewrites 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.06(3m), 
the 
uneconomic remnant statute. 
¶129 The majority rewrites the statutory definition of an 
uneconomic remnant.  It describes the remnant here as "the 
Wallers' property," leaving the impression that the remnant is 
the entire property rather than a remaining piece of the 
property.  Majority op., ¶7.   
¶130 Basing its analysis on a percentage formula (57%, 88%, 
and 76%), the majority opines that the percentage losses in 
value 
illustrate "substantial economic impairment" to the 
property.  Id., ¶95.  In addition to considering the percentage 
losses to the property's value, it states that the Waller 
property 
is 
an 
uneconomic 
remnant 
because 
the 
easements 
"diminished the desirability, practicality, and value of the 
Wallers' property."  Id., ¶7. 
¶131 Such an analysis rewrites the uneconomic remnant 
statute.  The text of Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m), which sets forth a 
definition of an uneconomic remnant, provides in relevant part: 
(3m) Definition. In this section, "uneconomic remnant" 
means the property remaining after a partial taking of 
property, if the property remaining is of such size, 
shape or condition as to be of little value or of 
substantially impaired economic viability.  
¶132 The majority rewrites Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m) in two 
ways.  First, it appears to rewrite the statutory phrase 
"property remaining" to mean an entire property.  Second, it 
rewrites the statutory phrase "substantially impaired economic 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
4 
 
viability" to mean "diminished desirability, practicality, and 
value." 
¶133 In essence, to fit the facts of this case, the 
majority rewrites Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m) as follows: 
(3m) Definition. In this section, "uneconomic remnant" 
means the entire property remaining after a partial 
taking of property, if the property remaining is of 
such size, shape or condition as to be of little value 
or 
of 
substantially 
impaired 
economic 
viability 
diminished desirability, practicality, and value.  
(additions are in bold, deletions have been struck.) 
¶134 The 
majority's 
revision 
not 
only 
changes 
the 
legislature's explicit statutory language defining a remnant, 
but it also flies in the face of common sense——the entire 
property cannot constitute only a remaining part of the 
property.  Throughout its opinion, the majority describes the 
relevant remnant in this case as "the Wallers' property."  See 
majority op., ¶¶7, 102, 103, 119.  If the majority is indeed 
defining an uneconomic remnant as the entire property, it makes 
no sense because a remnant necessarily means something that is 
remaining or left over. 
¶135 The common and ordinary meaning of the word "remnant" 
is "[s]omething left over; a remainder."  The American Heritage 
Dictionary, 1527 (3d ed. 1992).  Likewise, the common and 
ordinary meaning of the statutory word "remaining" contemplates 
that some property will be "left after the removal, loss, 
passage, or destruction of others."  Id. at 1525.  The "remnant" 
or the "property remaining" cannot mean the whole Waller 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
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property——there nothing that is "left over" because the entire 
property is still intact.     
¶136 If the remnant were the entire property, condemnors 
would be put in the absurd position of having to buy entire 
properties when the taking leaves the property wholly intact and 
retaining an economic viability.  It substantially inflates the 
scope of takings required for projects where only easements are 
necessary, such as the installation of power lines, water or gas 
pipelines, and the like.  In setting forth a definition of an 
uneconomic remnant, the legislature cannot have intended that a 
utility company would be forced to buy a whole property in order 
to install power lines on otherwise existing highway and utility 
easements. 
¶137 Arguably 
the 
majority 
embraces 
its 
strained 
"whole=left over part" analysis because under the facts of this 
case it also makes no sense that the remnant is the remaining 
part of the property which is unencumbered by easements.  The 
following illustration, which is not to scale, depicts the 
previously existing highway and utility easements together with 
the ATC easements superimposed on top of them: 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
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The legislature likewise cannot have envisioned that public 
utilities would be forced to take fee simple title to the 
interior part of property as an "uneconomic remnant" while 
leaving the property owner fee simple title subject to easements 
in the borders of the property.2  It would be absurd. 
                                                 
2 The north side of the triangle is abutted by Mound Road.  
It was previously subject to a 20-foot easement and a 25-foot 
highway 
setback. 
 
ATC's 
proposed 
easement 
expanded 
the 
encumbered area by 25 feet, and would create a 45-foot wide 
strip of land along Mound Road.  
The east side of the triangle abuts Interstate 43 and was 
previously subject to a 50-foot highway setback.  ATC's proposed 
easement would create a 45-foot wide strip of encumbered 
property within the existing setback area.   
A 
smaller 
triangle 
of 
land 
remains 
unencumbered 
by 
easements or setback restrictions after the partial taking.  The 
residence is located on the smaller triangle. 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
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¶138 The second way in which the majority rewrites the 
statutory definition of the remnant also leads to absurd 
results.  The statute sets forth the "size, shape and condition" 
test to be applied when determining "substantially impaired 
economic viability."  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m).  Instead of 
focusing on the statutory test, the majority makes up its own.  
It interprets "substantially impaired economic viability" to 
mean "diminished . . . desirability, practicality, and value."  
Majority op., ¶7.  The majority's emphasis on desirability, 
practicality, and value causes it to employ a percentage formula 
in determining whether the Waller property is an uneconomic 
remnant that at first appears compelling, but ultimately the use 
of a percentage formula can lead to absurd results.  Majority 
op., ¶85. 
¶139 The absurdity is illustrated in the taking of an 
easement on a highly valued piece of property.  Take, for 
example, a $6 million parcel of land:   
¶140 If the value of the property after the partial taking 
decreases by 57%, as Rolling's appraisal indicated, then the 
value of the remaining property is $2,580,000.   
¶141 If the jurisdictional offer's estimation of the 
decrease in value is used and the $6 million parcel loses 76% of 
its value, the remaining property is worth $1,440,000.   
¶142 If the Group One appraisal's estimation of the 
decrease in value is used and the $6 million parcel loses 88% of 
its value, the remaining property is worth $1,320,000. 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
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  ¶143 Few would argue that a property with an after-taking 
value of $2,580,000, $1,440,000, or $1,320,000 is an uneconomic 
remnant of "substantially impaired economic viability," except 
perhaps in the extreme circumstance where there are other 
compelling factors present in the facts.  Does the majority 
really mean to employ an analysis that could declare a multi-
million dollar property an uneconomic remnant? 
¶144 Rather than rewrite Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m) to fit the 
Wallers' situation, the majority should stick to applying the 
words chosen by the legislature.  Such a practice would avoid 
the absurd results described above.   
B. The majority rewrites Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5), the right-to-
take statute. 
¶145 The majority tackles the issue of what condemnation 
proceeding should be used to raise an uneconomic remnant claim——
a valuation proceeding3 under Wis. Stat. § 32.06(7)4 or a right-
                                                 
3 The majority refers to the proceeding set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 32.06(7) in various ways.  At times it calls the 
proceeding a "valuation proceeding."  Majority op., ¶¶70, 92.  
Other times, it calls the proceeding a "condemnation hearing on 
valuation."  Id., ¶90.  In yet other places, it refers to the 
proceeding as a "just compensation proceeding."  Id., ¶67.  This 
opinion refers to such a proceeding as a "valuation proceeding." 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.06(7) states as follows, in relevant 
part: 
(7) Petition for condemnation proceedings. If the 
jurisdictional 
offer is not accepted within the 
periods limited in sub. (6) or the owner fails to 
consummate an acceptance as provided in sub. (6), the 
condemnor may present a verified petition to the 
circuit court for the county in which the property to 
be taken is located, for proceedings to determine the 
necessity of taking, where such determination is 
required, and the amount of just compensation. . . . 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
9 
 
to-take proceeding under Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5).  Majority op., 
¶68.  Citing to Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5), the right-to-take 
statute, it concludes that an uneconomic remnant claim can be 
maintained only in a right-to-take proceeding.  Id., ¶92. 
¶146 In reaching this conclusion, however, the majority 
rewrites the right-to-take statute.  As the legislature wrote 
the statute, it provides, in relevant part: 
(5) Court action to contest right of condemnation. 
When an owner desires to contest the right of the 
condemnor to condemn the property described in the 
jurisdictional offer for any reason other than that 
the amount of compensation offered is inadequate, such 
owner may . . . commence an action in the circuit 
court of the county wherein the property is located, 
naming the condemnor as defendant. Such action shall 
be the only manner in which any issue other than the 
amount of just compensation or other than proceedings 
to perfect title under ss. 32.11 and 32.12 may be 
raised pertaining to the condemnation of the property 
described in the jurisdictional offer. 
Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5) (emphasis supplied). 
¶147 The Wallers are not contesting the right of the 
condemnor to condemn——quite the opposite.  They want the 
condmenor to condemn even more property.  In an effort to 
shoehorn 
the 
facts 
of 
this 
case 
into 
the 
right-to-take 
                                                                                                                                                             
If the petitioner is entitled to condemn the property 
or any portion of it, the judge immediately shall 
assign the matter to the chairperson of the county 
condemnation commissioners for hearing under s. 32.08. 
An order by the judge determining that the petitioner 
does not have the right to condemn or refusing to 
assign the matter to the chairperson of the county 
condemnation commissioners may be appealed directly to 
the court of appeals. 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
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proceeding, the majority rewrites the statute by ignoring part 
of the statutory language.   
¶148 The 
majority 
erases 
the 
portion 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.06(5) stating that the proceeding is to be maintained when 
"an owner desires to contest the right of the condemnor to 
condemn 
the 
property 
described 
in 
the 
jurisdictional 
offer . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5).  Despite that clear 
statement of purpose in the statute, the majority directs future 
litigants like the Wallers, who do not in any way contest the 
condemnor's right to take the property described in the 
jurisdictional offer, to bring uneconomic remnant claims under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m) in a right-to-take proceeding.5 
¶149 All of the legislature's words must be accorded 
meaning, and here the legislature has stated that a right-to-
take proceeding is to be maintained when an owner contests the 
right of the condemnor to take the property described in the 
jurisdictional offer.  However, the majority appears to delete 
that language from Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5) in characterizing the 
right-to-take proceeding as a catchall proceeding for uneconomic 
remnant claims. 
                                                 
5 The Wallers' attorney stated on the record that there is 
no challenge to ATC's right to take the property described in 
the jurisdictional offer: 
In this case . . . this is a case in which we are not 
challenging their right to take.  The only reason 
we're in that statute [Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5)] is 
because the statute says the only reason——the only way 
you can enforce (3m) is under this provision.  This is 
really not a challenge action. 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
11 
 
¶150 Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5) is rewritten when 
the majority leaves out other statutory words from its analysis.  
It emphasizes "any issue," but the statute states in full "any 
issue other than the amount of just compensation . . . ."  By 
emphasizing "any issue," the majority implicitly holds that an 
uneconomic remnant claim is not really one of just compensation. 
¶151 However, just compensation is at the heart of the 
uneconomic remnant claim here.  The owners want more money. 
¶152 Misinterpreting an uneconomic remnant claim as an 
issue of the right to take rather than an issue of how much 
compensation 
a 
property 
owner 
should 
receive 
creates 
a 
procedural quagmire.  Because the majority contemplates that a 
right-to-take 
case 
proceeds concurrently with a valuation 
proceeding, see majority op., ¶¶92, what happens when the 
answers reached in each proceeding conflict with each other?  
Both proceedings require a fact finder to determine the before 
and after value of the property at issue.  When they are in 
conflict, which valuation trumps the other? 
¶153 If the valuation in the right-to-take proceeding 
trumps the valuation in the valuation proceeding, how does that 
affect the statutory right to a jury trial in the valuation 
proceeding?  Wisconsin Stat. § 32.06(10) expressly sets forth a 
statutory right to a jury in a valuation proceeding.  It states 
that a valuation proceeding on appeal to the circuit court 
"shall be tried by a jury unless waived by both plaintiff and 
defendant."  Id.  Is such a statutory right now to be subsumed 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
12 
 
in favor a judge's determination of value in a right-to-take 
proceeding? 
¶154 Here, the court of appeals held that the jury's 
verdict in the valuation proceeding must be vacated if the 
circuit court determined——as it did——that the taking resulted in 
an uneconomic remnant.  Waller v. American Transmission Co., 
LLC, 2011 WI App 91, ¶17, 334 Wis. 2d 740, 799 N.W.2d 487.  
Because there is a statutory right to a trial by jury in a 
valuation proceeding and the jury's verdict is now vacated, does 
that mean that the valuation proceeding must be retried?   
¶155 Is the circuit court's determination on the issue of 
value in the right-to-take proceeding subject to a claim of 
issue preclusion in the valuation proceeding?  If so, is the 
denial of the statutory right to a jury trial implicated?   
¶156 The 
condemnation 
statutory 
scheme 
strives 
for 
proceedings 
which 
are 
both 
efficient 
and 
cost-effective.  
Pulvermacher Enterprises, Inc. v. Wisconsin DOT, 166 Wis. 2d 
234, 241, 479 N.W.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1991).  The majority's 
conclusion that an uneconomic remnant claim can be brought only 
in a right-to-take proceeding is contrary to those purposes and 
potentially creates the procedural quagmire described above.   
¶157 This 
case 
provides 
a 
textbook 
example 
of 
the 
inefficiencies likely to result from the majority's procedures.  
Here, the same evidence is so essential to both the question of 
just compensation and the uneconomic remnant determination that 
the circuit court incorporated the record and the jury's verdict 
setting forth before and after values from the valuation 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
13 
 
proceeding into the right-to-take case.  See majority op., ¶36.  
After the court of appeals reversed the circuit court a second 
time, concluding that a hearing was necessary to determine 
whether an uneconomic remnant exists, the same witnesses who 
testified in the valuation trial were called.  They offered 
essentially the same testimony.  See majority op., ¶41. 
¶158 Condemnation proceedings are designed not only to 
provide 
for 
an 
efficient 
resolution 
to 
the 
question 
of 
compensation, but also to provide a cost-effective method of 
taking property.  Pulvermacher Enterprises, Inc., 166 Wis. 2d at 
241.  In Falkner v. Northern States Power Co., 75 Wis. 2d 116, 
248 N.W.2d 885 (1977), even as this court recognized that a 
right-to-take 
proceeding 
is 
independent 
from 
a 
valuation 
proceeding, it also observed that "[d]uplication of effort and 
expense may result if separate trials are held."  Falkner, 75 
Wis. 2d at 135 n.9.  The Falkner court therefore recognized that 
the condemnation statutes are designed to avoid unnecessary 
expense incurred by concurrent proceedings. 
¶159 In 
an 
amicus 
brief, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Utilities 
Association provides examples of the added expense that will 
likely arise due to the condemnation procedures adopted by the 
majority.  It advances that the added expense will ultimately 
appear in Wisconsin residents' utility bills: 
For example, Wisconsin utilities . . . depend on 
efficient condemnation procedures to allow them to 
quickly construct new power lines, gas pipes, and 
water 
pipes to meet Wisconsin's growing utility 
needs. . . .  The financial expenses associated with 
the eminent domain process [] directly impact[s] 
Wisconsin residents, as the costs of doing business as 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
14 
 
a utility are largely passed on to customers through 
rates. 
In rewriting Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5), the majority has left in its 
wake 
inefficient 
condemnation 
proceedings 
that 
are 
more 
expensive to maintain.  The costs of the majority's procedures 
will be passed on to rate-payers and taxpayers alike.6      
C. The 
majority 
rewrites 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.28(2)(b), 
the 
litigation expenses statute. 
¶160 The litigation expenses awarded by the circuit court 
total $211,261.74.  Majority op., ¶44.  In its discussion of 
litigation expenses, the majority does not even mention the 
amount awarded by the circuit court.  It nevertheless, without 
analysis of the amount, affirms the entire award as reasonable.  
Id., ¶¶106-110. 
¶161 The 
error 
of 
the 
majority's 
sub 
silencio 
reasonableness determination is compounded because it has to 
rewrite a statute in order to affirm this award of out-of-
proportion litigation expenses.  Wisconsin Stat. § 32.28(3)(b), 
the litigation expenses statute,  provides in relevant part: 
(3) In lieu of costs under ch. 814, litigation 
expenses shall be awarded to the condemnee if:  
. . . . 
                                                 
6 The Wisconsin Utilities Association further argues that 
the provision of utility services such as electricity, gas, and 
water are "a quintessential public good at stake in the exercise 
of eminent domain."  It advances that "[r]esidents throughout 
Wisconsin depend on" condemnor-utilities for their utility 
services, and observes that this court's decision "not only 
affects the [utilities], it also affects their customers' 
interests in reasonably priced utility services and sufficient 
electric, gas, and water distribution infrastructure to support 
economic development and growth throughout Wisconsin."   
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
15 
 
(b) The court determines that the condemnor does not 
have the right to condemn part or all of the property 
described in the jurisdictional offer or there is no 
necessity for its taking . . . . 
¶162 The majority initially accepts point-blank that the 
"plain language" of the statute does not allow the majority to 
award litigation expenses here.  Majority op., ¶107.  The plain 
language allows litigation expenses only if "the condemnor does 
not have the right to condemn part or all of the property 
described 
in 
the 
jurisdictional 
offer." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(b).  Nevertheless, the majority seemingly ignores the 
plain language and rewrites the statute by awarding litigation 
expenses in a case where all agree that ATC has the right to 
condemn 
part 
or 
all 
of 
the 
property 
described 
in 
the 
jurisdictional offer.  Id.   
¶163  An 
award 
of 
litigation 
expenses 
is 
ordinarily 
authorized by statute and must fit within the relevant statutory 
grant of authority to justify an award in a given case.  
Shifting litigation expenses under Chapter 32 is no different——
it 
"is 
a 
matter 
of 
policy 
to 
be 
determined 
by 
the 
legislature . . . ."  Wieczorek v. City of Franklin, 82 Wis. 2d 
19, 23, 260 N.W.2d 650 (1978).  By applying Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(b) to these facts, the majority is rewriting the 
words of the statute and granting an award of litigation 
expenses that the legislature did not authorize.   
¶164 Ultimately, the ramifications of rewriting Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(b) to fit this fact pattern will be felt by the rate-
paying public.  It is not really ATC that is on the hook for 
paying 
the 
Wallers' 
disproportionately 
large 
litigation 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
16 
 
expenses.  Rather, it is those Wisconsin residents who use 
electricity that will pay the $211,261.74 bill.   
¶165 The amounts in dispute in this case are dwarfed by the 
Wallers' litigation expenses.  Here, ATC offered to purchase the 
easements for $99,500 in a consensual sale.  That offer exceeded 
the awards of both the compensation commission, which awarded 
$90,000 for the easements, and the jury, which awarded $94,000 
for the easements.  In the alternative, ATC conditionally 
offered to buy the Wallers' entire property for $132,000——the 
same valuation that the jury ultimately proffered for the Waller 
property. 
¶166 The Wallers rejected ATC's offers.  Instead, they took 
ATC to court.  They chose to litigate until the case had seen 
three circuit judges, the condemnation commission, two panels at 
the court of appeals, and now the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
¶167 In the end, a jury awarded the Wallers $5,500 less for 
the easements than what ATC offered to pay in a consensual sale.     
¶168 The 
Wallers' 
attorneys 
have 
without 
question 
vigorously and diligently advanced their clients' interests.  
However, a litigation expenses award of $211,261.74 in a matter 
where the just compensation award was less than what was 
initially offered in a consensual sale and where it is 
undisputed that the condemnor has a right to take the easements 
at issue is wholly out of proportion to the scale of the 
dispute. 
¶169 The law requires that an award of litigation expenses 
must be reasonable and necessary.  Standard Theatres, Inc. v. 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
17 
 
Wisconsin DOT, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 741, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984).  In 
evaluating the reasonableness of proposed litigation expenses, 
this court has in past cases utilized SCR 20:1.5 as a useful 
guide.  Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, 
¶24, 275 Wis. 2d 1, 683 N.W.2d 58.  One factor to consider under 
SCR 20:1.5 is "the amount involved and the results obtained." 
 
Such an out-of-proportion award is not reasonable under these 
circumstances, given the "amount involved" and the "results 
obtained." 
¶170 By affirming an award of $211,261.74 in litigation 
expenses here, the majority is sending the wrong message.  
Litigants may have little incentive to avoid dragging out small 
disputes about uneconomic remnants, hoping that future courts 
will likewise shoehorn their circumstance into the words of the 
statute and award out-of-proportion litigation expenses.   
II 
¶171 Our task when interpreting statutes is to discern the 
statute's meaning, which we presume is expressed in the language 
of the legislature.  Richards, 309 Wis. 2d 541, ¶20.  For the 
reasons set forth above, I conclude that the right-to-take 
procedure is ill-fitted for an uneconomic remnant determination.  
It would require rewriting of the statute and results in 
concurrent, costly, and potentially conflicting procedures.   
¶172 The 
uneconomic 
remnant 
determination 
is 
about 
compensation, not the right to condemn.  That is especially 
evident in this case.  The Wallers do not challenge ATC's right 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
18 
 
to condemn.  Rather, they seek additional compensation based on 
the nature of ATC's taking.   
¶173 In applying the words of the statutes as written by 
the legislature, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 32.06(7) sets 
forth the correct procedure because it focuses on valuation and 
compensation.  Wisconsin Stat. § 32.06(7) requires that if the 
condemnor is "entitled to condemn the property or any portion of 
it, the judge immediately shall assign the matter to the 
chairperson of the county condemnation commissioners for hearing 
under s. 32.08."  Such a proceeding may be commenced in the 
circuit court by verified petition "for proceedings to determine 
the necessity of taking, where such determination is required, 
and the amount of just compensation."7  Id.   
 
¶174 Thus, even if an uneconomic remnant claim implicates 
issues related to the necessity of the taking, Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.06(7) allows for the resolution of those uneconomic remnant 
claims.  Under the statute, the circuit court is expressly 
empowered to determine the necessity of the taking before 
referring the matter to the condemnation commission.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.06(7); see also Wis. Stat. § 32.07(3) (allowing the 
necessity of a taking to be determined by the court).  A 
"proceeding to determine the necessity of taking" naturally 
                                                 
7 Upon resolution of questions regarding the necessity of a 
taking, the statute directs the circuit court to refer the 
valuation question to the condemnation commission.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.06(7).  The condemnation commission is authorized by 
statute to "ascertain the compensation to be made for the taking 
of property or rights in property sought to be condemned," but 
is not otherwise empowered to determine the necessity of the 
proposed taking.  Wis. Stat. § 32.08(5). 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
19 
 
encompasses uneconomic remnant arguments that implicate the 
scope of a taking.   
 
¶175 The legislative purpose of the condemnation statutory 
scheme supports my conclusion.  The purpose "is to provide an 
efficient, final resolution to the compensation question."  
Pulvermacher Enterprises, 166 Wis. 2d at 241.   
¶176 Bringing an uneconomic remnant claim in a valuation 
proceeding avoids the procedural quagmire identified above.  It 
will encourage questions such as the ones presented here, where 
the Wallers do not dispute the taking but instead seek 
additional compensation, to be resolved quickly and efficiently 
so that just compensation may be addressed with a measure of 
finality.     
 
¶177 Having determined that a valuation proceeding is the 
correct way to raise an uneconomic remnant claim, I turn to 
address whether the Wallers' remaining property after the taking 
is an uneconomic remnant.  Wisconsin Stat. § 32.06(3m) states 
that a parcel is an uneconomic remnant under two circumstances——
when the remnant is of such size, shape or condition so as to be 
of "little value" or is of "substantially impaired economic 
viability."   
 
¶178 No one argues on review that the Waller property is of 
"little value," and because the Waller property has $38,000 in 
value after the taking, such an argument would be difficult to 
successfully advance under these facts.  Ultimately, the real 
question is whether the Wallers' remaining property is of such 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
20 
 
"size, shape or condition" so as to be of "substantially 
impaired economic viability."  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m). 
¶179 Here, the "size, shape or condition" of the Waller 
property before the taking indicates that it was a property 
subject to substantial restrictions.  It was a small triangle of 
land with a residence subject to substantial easements for power 
lines and setback restrictions, which is situated next to an 
industrial park and a major interstate highway.   
 
¶180 ATC proposed to take only easements, leaving the 
Wallers with a fee simple title to the entire parcel.  The 
easements expand upon already-existing easements, and most of 
the new easements are within an area already subject to setback 
restrictions.   
¶181 Given the nature of the taking in this case and the 
$38,000 in value left over after the taking, the Wallers have 
failed to establish that the size, shape or condition of the 
property remaining after the taking is of "substantially 
impaired economic viability."  Wis. Stat. § 32.06(3m).  Under 
these circumstances, I conclude that after the partial taking, 
there is no uneconomic remnant.   
¶182 Because I determine that there is no uneconomic 
remnant in this case, I further conclude that an award of 
litigation expenses and relocation benefits is not justified 
here.  With regard to litigation expenses, the plain text of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.28(3)(b) 
allows 
an 
award 
only 
when 
the 
"condemnor does not have the right to condemn part or all of the 
property described in the jurisdictional offer or there is no 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
21 
 
necessity for its taking."  That circumstance is not present in 
this case. 
¶183 Likewise, relocation benefits are available only if 
the Wallers meet the statutory definition of a "displaced 
person" under Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(e).8  That statute requires 
the Wallers to show that they moved "as a direct result of a 
written notice of intent to acquire or the acquisition of the 
real 
property . . . subsequent 
to 
the 
issuance 
of 
a 
jurisdictional offer."  See also Wis. Admin. Code § Adm. 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.19(2)(e) provides as follows: 
(e)1. "Displaced person" means, except as provided 
under subd. 2., any person who moves from real 
property or who moves his or her personal property 
from real property: 
a. As a direct result of a written notice of intent to 
acquire or the acquisition of the real property, in 
whole or in part or subsequent to the issuance of a 
jurisdictional offer under this subchapter, for public 
purposes; or 
b. As a result of rehabilitation, demolition or other 
displacing activity, as determined by the department 
of administration, if the person is a tenant-occupant 
of a dwelling, business or farm operation and the 
displacement is permanent. 
2. "Displaced person" does not include: 
a. Any person determined to be unlawfully occupying 
the property or to have occupied the property solely 
for the purpose of obtaining assistance under ss. 
32.19 to 32.27; or 
b. Any person, other than a person who is an occupant 
of the property at the time it is acquired, who 
occupies the property on a rental basis for a short 
term or a period subject to termination when the 
property is needed for the program or project for 
which it is being acquired. 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
22 
 
92.01(14) 
(further 
defining 
"displaced 
person"); 
City 
of 
Milwaukee v. Roadster LLC, 2003 WI App 131, ¶¶13, 18, 265 Wis. 
2d 518, 666 N.W.2d 524 (a lessee was a "displaced person" when 
it was "forced" to give up its leasehold interest and "forced" 
to relocate); C. Coakley Relocation Systems, Inc. v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2008 WI 68, ¶19, 310 Wis. 2d 456, 750 N.W.2d 900 
(describing the language in Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(e) as applying 
to a "person displaced by a condemnation"). 
¶184 The Wallers listed their house for sale in February 
2005, one year before they learned of ATC's transmission-line 
project.  Additionally, they lived in their residence for about 
one year after the upgraded transmission line was installed.  
Ultimately, I conclude that they do not satisfy the statutory 
definition of a "displaced person" under these circumstances 
because they have failed to establish that they moved as a 
"direct result" of a "written notice of intent to acquire," an 
"acquisition," 
or 
a 
"jurisdictional 
offer." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.19(2)(e).  
¶185 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶186 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2012AP805 & 2012AP840.awb 
 
 
 
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