Case Title: People v. Robinson

Citation: 

Docket Number: S220247

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 5/23/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S220247 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/3 G048155 
LEE HOANG ROBINSON, 
) 
 
) 
Orange County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 11WF0857 
 
____________________________________) 
 
It is a commonly stated rule that if the statutory elements of a crime include 
the elements of another offense, so that the first offense cannot be committed 
without also committing the second, the second is a “lesser offense” that is 
“necessarily included” in the first.  (E.g., People v. Bailey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 740, 
748 (Bailey).)  As this case demonstrates, however, when the same evidence is 
required to support all the elements of both offenses, there is no lesser included 
offense. 
The issue here is whether misdemeanor sexual battery is a lesser included 
offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose.  Penal 
Code section 243.4, subdivision (c) prohibits touching an intimate part of another 
person for a sexual purpose when “the victim is at the time unconscious of the 
nature of the act because the perpetrator fraudulently represented that the touching 
served a professional purpose.”  That offense can be punished as either a felony or 
a misdemeanor.  Section 243.4, subdivision (e)(1) provides that it is a 
2 
misdemeanor to touch an intimate part of another person for a sexual purpose “if 
the touching is against the will of the person touched.”1  We use the term 
“misdemeanor sexual battery” to refer to the section 243.4(e)(1) offense.  
In this case, defendant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual battery 
by misrepresentation of professional purpose.  In the Court of Appeal, the 
Attorney General conceded there was insufficient evidence that two of the four 
victims were deceived by defendant‟s misrepresentations.  The court held that 
misdemeanor sexual battery is a lesser included offense of sexual battery by 
misrepresentation of professional purpose, so that convictions of the greater 
offense could be reduced to the lesser. 
The court erred.  It is true that every defendant who commits sexual battery 
by misrepresentation of professional purpose also commits misdemeanor sexual 
battery:  The victim has been touched for a sexual purpose without consenting.  
However, the victim‟s lack of consent arises from a particular circumstance 
created by the defendant‟s misrepresentation.  If the evidence does not support that 
circumstance, the misdemeanor offense cannot stand on the same factual 
foundation.  Here, the evidence failed to show that two of the victims‟ consent was 
negated by misrepresentation.  That evidence was equally insufficient to establish 
lack of consent for purposes of misdemeanor sexual battery.  Lack of consent may 
be shown in other ways to prove the misdemeanor offense, but the jury did not 
consider alternate grounds.  Moreover, a charge of sexual battery under section 
243.4(c) does not notify the defendant of the need to contest the consent issue on 
any basis other than the alleged fraudulent representation.  Accordingly, 
                                              
1  
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.  Hereafter, we refer to the 
above cited statutes as sections 243.4(c) and 243.4(e)(1).  
3 
misdemeanor sexual battery cannot be deemed a lesser included offense of sexual 
battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The facts are undisputed.  Defendant Lee Hoang Robinson worked in a 
beauty salon.  One day in December 2009 he approached 17-year-old Dianna N., 
who worked nearby, and offered her a free facial if she would come to the salon 
after hours.  He told her she could bring a friend as well.  Dianna and her 18-year-
old sister, Christine, decided to accept his offer.  Their mother drove them to the 
salon and waited while they went with defendant. 
Defendant took them to a back room to change.  They removed their tops 
and bras and donned robes.  Defendant then had them lie on tables, where he 
covered their eyes and applied a facial cream that hardened into a mask.  He said 
he was going to give them a “European massage.”  He began by rubbing their 
upper bodies, but eventually unbuttoned their pants and rubbed their vaginal areas.  
Dianna and Christine were uncomfortable but voiced no objection.  However, 
when defendant tried to insert his finger in Christine‟s vagina, she pushed his hand 
away and pulled up her underwear.  Defendant went back to massaging her arms, 
stomach, and breasts.  After a few more minutes, he left the sisters alone to get 
dressed.  They spoke briefly with each other about what had happened, but did not 
tell their mother until several months later. 
In the meantime, defendant enticed two older victims.  In March 2010, he 
approached 37-year-old Trang T. in a store, telling her he owned a salon.  He 
offered her $40 to be his “model” while he demonstrated facial and massage 
techniques for students later in the evening.  Trang agreed, came to the salon, and 
changed into a gown.  No students were present, but defendant said he was going 
to begin in their absence.  He rubbed lotion on her face, then oiled his hands and 
began massaging her arms, legs, and feet.  Trang said she did not like him 
4 
touching her body, but defendant told her to relax and began rubbing oil on her 
breasts.  Trang did not believe him when he said all his clients loved this 
treatment.  When he tried to slip his hands beneath her underwear, she told him to 
stop.  He did, but then turned her over and massaged her buttocks.  Trang said 
nothing because she did not want to anger defendant.  Eventually, he inserted his 
finger into her vagina.  Trang said she was late for a class and had to leave.  
Defendant began wiping the oil from her body, and in the process digitally 
penetrated her again.  Trang protested, but defendant repeated the act a third time.  
Trang grabbed her clothes, left, and reported the incident to the police.  When the 
police questioned him, defendant denied any wrongdoing. 
Four months later, he promised 24-year-old Odette M. a free facial if she 
came to the salon in the evening.  He took her to a back room, had her change into 
a robe, and put cream on her face.  He then began rubbing oil on her body, though 
he had said nothing about a massage.  Odette objected immediately, but defendant 
told her to relax and slipped his hands beneath her underwear, rubbing her vaginal 
area.  When she objected again, he assured her he provided this service to all his 
clients.  After repeated demands, defendant finally put Odette‟s robe back in place, 
but then began massaging her shoulders and squeezing her breasts.  She protested 
again, and finally defendant stopped.  However, he wiped a towel over her body, 
including her vaginal area and breasts.  He told her to leave the cream on her face 
for 10 minutes.  She did so, out of fear.  Defendant returned, wiped her face, and 
asked for her phone number.  Odette dressed and left, angrily confronting 
defendant when she encountered him in the parking lot.  About a week later, she 
reported the incident to the police. 
Defendant was charged with eight counts of sexual battery by 
misrepresentation of professional purpose, two counts for each victim.  He was 
also charged with digitally penetrating Trang.  A jury convicted him as charged.  
5 
The Court of Appeal upheld the battery convictions related to the two younger 
victims.  However, it accepted the Attorney General‟s concession that the 
evidence was insufficient with respect to Trang and Odette, because they never 
believed defendant‟s touchings served a professional purpose.  The court then 
weighed whether to dismiss the counts involving those victims, or reduce the 
convictions to misdemeanor sexual battery as a lesser included offense.  
Disagreeing with People v. Babaali (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 982 (Babaali), the 
court held that misdemeanor sexual battery is necessarily included in the crime of 
sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose.  It affirmed the 
judgment after modifying it to reflect the lesser offense on the four counts 
involving Trang and Odette. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Under section 1181, subdivision 6, a jury verdict not supported by the 
evidence may be modified if the record establishes the defendant‟s guilt of a lesser 
included offense.2  The requirement that the lesser offense be included in the 
greater “is based upon due process considerations:  A criminal defendant must be 
given fair notice of the charges against him in order that he may have a reasonable 
opportunity properly to prepare a defense and avoid unfair surprise at trial.”  
(People v. Anderson (1975) 15 Cal.3d 806, 809.)  The requirement also preserves 
the jury‟s role as the finder of fact.  The modification permitted by section 1181, 
subdivision 6 “merely brings the jury‟s verdict in line with the evidence presented 
                                              
2  
“When the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence, but . . . the 
evidence shows the defendant to be . . . guilty . . . of a lesser crime included 
therein, the court may modify the verdict, finding or judgment accordingly without 
granting or ordering a new trial, and this power shall extend to any court to which 
the cause may be appealed.”  (§ 1181, subd. 6; see also § 1260, authorizing 
reviewing courts to “reduce the degree of the offense” on appeal.) 
6 
at trial.”  (People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 679.)  The reviewing court 
corrects the verdict “ „not by finding or changing any fact, but by applying the 
established law to the existing facts as found by the jury.‟ ”  (Ibid., italics added, 
quoting People v. Cowan (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 155, 162.) 
To ascertain whether one crime is necessarily included in another, courts 
may look either to the accusatory pleading or the statutory elements of the crimes. 
When, as here, the accusatory pleading incorporates the statutory definition of the 
charged offense without referring to the particular facts, a reviewing court must 
rely on the statutory elements to determine if there is a lesser included offense.  
(People v. Anderson, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 809; see People v. Shockley (2013) 58 
Cal.4th 400, 404 (Shockley).)  “The elements test is satisfied if the statutory 
elements of the greater offense include all of the statutory elements of the lesser 
offense, such that all legal elements of the lesser offense are also elements of the 
greater.  [Citation.]  In other words, „ “[i]f a crime cannot be committed without 
also necessarily committing a lesser offense, the latter is a lesser included offense 
within the former.” ‟ ”  (Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 748.)3  Nevertheless, if the 
same evidence is required to support all elements of both offenses, there is no 
lesser included offense.  (Shockley, at pp. 405-406.)  Each is its own offense, 
based on different statutes that apply to the same conduct; neither can be said to be 
a lesser of the other. 
 
A.  The Lack of Consent Requirement 
Before considering the application of the elements test in this case, we 
resolve the parties‟ dispute over whether the crime of sexual battery by 
                                              
3  
Lesser included offenses are distinguished from lesser related offenses, 
which “merely bear some relationship” to another offense.  (People v. Birks (1998) 
19 Cal.4th 108, 119.) 
7 
misrepresentation of professional purpose requires lack of consent.  The answer to 
this question has ramifications for a number of sex offenses.  Section 243.4(c) 
contemplates a victim who is “unconscious of the nature of the act because the 
perpetrator fraudulently represented that the touching served a professional 
purpose.”  Section 243.4(e)(1) includes the requirement that “the touching is 
against the will of the person touched.”  The Attorney General argues that despite 
the distinctions between these statutory formulations, they amount to the same 
thing:  the victim‟s lack of consent to the touching.  Defendant contends that 
section 243.4(c) simply criminalizes sexual battery in one narrow circumstance, 
without imposing any requirement as to the victim‟s consent. 
Case law and legislative history support the Attorney General‟s position.  In 
the sexual assault context, it is settled that “ „without the victim‟s consent‟ ” has 
the same meaning as “ „against the victim‟s will.‟ ”  (People v. Giardino (2000) 82 
Cal.App.4th 454, 460; see People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 635, fn. 10; 
People v. Ogunmola (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 274, 279 (Ogunmola).)  Here we 
must determine whether a touching is without consent when the victim is 
“unconscious” of its sexual nature under section 243.4(c).  If so, the defendant‟s 
act is also “against the will” of the victim under section 243.4(e)(1).  It is apparent 
from the history of section 243.4(c) that the Legislature indeed intended the statute 
to establish that misrepresentation of professional purpose may negate a victim‟s 
consent. 
When it enacted section 243.4(c), the Legislature also amended four other 
sex crime statutes to add misrepresentation of professional purpose to listed 
circumstances where a victim is “unconscious of the nature of the act.”  (Sen. Bill 
No. 1421 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) (hereafter SB 1421), enacted by Stats. 2002, 
ch. 302, p. 1198 and also amending §§ 261, subd. (a)(4) [rape], 286, subd. (f) 
[sodomy], 288a, subd. (f) [oral copulation], 289, subd. (d) [sexual penetration].)  
8 
One such circumstance was, and is, “fraud in fact.”  (§§ 261, subd. (a)(4)(C), 286, 
subd. (f)(3), 288a, subd. (f)(3), 289, subd. (d)(3).)  The record of SB 1421‟s 
passage includes extensive discussion of the common law distinction between 
fraud in fact, which was deemed to vitiate consent, and fraud in the inducement, 
which was deemed not to do so.  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on SB 1421 
[Apr. 16, 2002] pp. G-K (Senate Committee Report), reviewing Ogunmola, supra, 
193 Cal.App.3d  274; and Boro v. Superior Court (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1224 
(Boro); see Babaali, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 988.) 
At common law, fraud in fact occurs when the defendant obtains the 
victim‟s consent to an act but then engages in a different act.  Fraud in the 
inducement is committed when the defendant uses misrepresentations to gain the 
victim‟s consent to an act, and then performs that same act.  (Babaali, supra, 171 
Cal.App.4th at p. 987.)  In Ogunmola, a gynecologist who raped his victims during 
pelvic examinations was guilty under a fraud in fact theory.  His victims consented 
to pelvic examinations, not sexual intercourse, and did not realize the “nature of 
the act” until it had already occurred.  (Ogunmola, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 281, italics omitted.)  Conversely, in Boro the defendant tricked his victim into 
having intercourse as a treatment for disease.  The victim consented to an act of 
intercourse, accepting Boro‟s representation that it served a medical purpose.  
(Boro, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1226-1227.)  The court held that Boro 
committed only fraud in the inducement, and therefore was not guilty of rape.  (Id. 
at p. 1229.) 
 The Legislature considered these precedents, giving careful attention to the 
question of consent, when it framed the offense of sexual battery by 
misrepresentation of professional purpose.  It understood that under the common 
law, perpetrators of sexual offenses by way of fraud in the inducement escaped 
punishment.  Although an earlier Legislature had responded to the Boro case by 
9 
passing section 266c, that statute requires the defendant‟s fraudulent 
representation to create fear in the victim.  (See Sen. Com. Rep., supra, at p. N.)  
The proponents of SB 1421, motivated by incidents in which patients were 
sexually abused under the guise of medical treatment, wanted to ensure that “sex 
offenses committed by fraudulent inducement involving a purported professional 
purpose can be prosecuted,” even without proof of the victim‟s fear.  (Id. at p. N.) 
When the Legislature acted to criminalize that behavior, it had before it a 
committee report quoting the Boro court‟s comment that “the Legislature well 
[understands] . . . how to specify certain fraud in the inducement as vitiating 
consent.”  (Boro, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 1229; Sen. Com. Rep., supra, at 
p. I.)  The terms of section 243.4(c), and of the other sex crime statutes amended 
to include misrepresentation of professional purpose, reflect the Legislature‟s 
intent that this kind of fraud in the inducement would henceforth be deemed to 
vitiate consent.  Like fraud in fact, a successful misrepresentation of professional 
purpose results in the victim being “unconscious of the nature of the act.”  
(§§ 243.4(c), 261, subd. (a)(4), 286, subd. (f), 288a, subd. (f), 289, subd. (d).)  In 
that circumstance, there is no legal consent.  Section 261.6, which defines 
“ „consent‟ ” for purposes of sections 261, 286, 288a, and 289, specifies that the 
term means “positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free 
will.  The person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature 
of the act or transaction involved.”  (Italics added.)  The term “unconscious of the 
nature of the act,” as used in the statutes addressed by SB 1421, is based on this 
understanding of the consent requirement.  (See Sen. Com. Rep., supra, at p. E, 
quoting § 261.6.)4 
                                              
4  
In Babaali, the majority found no indication in the history of SB 1421 that 
the Legislature meant to include a lack of consent element in any of the statutes 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
10 
Thus, the Legislature has refined the consent requirements for sex crimes to 
include not only the ordinary circumstance where consent is never given, but also 
more complicated circumstances where it is obtained through deceit.  A woman 
who is groped on a crowded bus is plainly subjected to a sexual touching without 
her consent.  That is the sense in which consent is ordinarily understood.  But 
under section 243.4(c), a woman who is tricked into a sexual touching under the 
pretense of a professional purpose is also touched without her legal consent. 
 
B.  Application of the Elements Test 
The parties agree that misdemeanor sexual battery and sexual battery by 
misrepresentation of professional purpose share two elements:  The defendant 
must touch an intimate part of the victim, and do so with a sexual purpose.  Given 
our conclusion that section 243.4(c) requires lack of consent, every defendant who 
violates that statute also satisfies the third element of misdemeanor sexual battery, 
because the victim is sexually touched without consenting. 5  The traditional 
description of the elements test would appear to make misdemeanor sexual battery 
a lesser included offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
criminalizing fraudulent representation of a professional purpose.  (Babaali, supra, 
171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 997-998.)  While we disagree on that point, we reach the 
same result as the Babaali majority:  Misdemeanor sexual battery is not a lesser 
included offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose.  
5  
The parties characterize each of these crimes as encompassing three 
elements, but section 243.4(c) actually sets out four.  As stated in the CALCRIM 
instruction given in this case, they are:  (1) an intimate touching, (2) a sexual 
purpose, (3) a fraudulent representation of a professional purpose, and (4) 
consequent unconsciousness of the sexual nature of the act on the part of the 
victim.  (CALCRIM No. 937.)  Nevertheless, as we have explained, the last two 
elements of section 243.4(c) outline a circumstance where the victim‟s consent is 
lacking, which is equivalent to the third element of misdemeanor sexual battery. 
11 
purpose.  (See Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 748 [if one crime cannot be 
committed without also committing a lesser offense, the latter is an included 
offense].)  However, the traditional description is insufficient in circumstances 
where the same evidence is needed to establish all elements of both offenses.  In 
such a case, if the evidence fails to support the jury‟s finding on any element of 
one offense, the remaining findings are insufficient to support a conviction of the 
other.  The two offenses overlap entirely based on the facts presented and the 
manner in which the case is tried, leaving no room for a lesser included offense. 
An analogous situation was presented in Shockley.  There the defendant 
was charged with lewd conduct with a child.  (§ 288, subd. (a).)  He claimed the 
trial court was required to instruct the jury on battery as a lesser included offense.  
(§ 242; Shockley, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 403.)  His argument was that a touching 
with lewd intent, as required by section 288, subdivision (a), is necessarily a 
“harmful or offensive touching” under section 242.  (Shockley, at p. 405.)  The 
argument failed.  The defendant‟s theory “would mean this form of battery (where 
lewd conduct supplies the required harmful or offensive touching) is not a lesser 
and included offense of lewd conduct but is essentially the identical offense.  If 
guilt of battery is predicated on guilt of lewd conduct — i.e., if a person is guilty 
of battery because that person committed lewd conduct — neither crime would 
have an element not also required of the other.  Substantial evidence could never 
exist that an element of the lewd conduct offense is missing but that the defendant 
is guilty of battery as a lesser included offense.  [Citation.]  A jury could never 
find the defendant not guilty of lewd conduct (perhaps because of the lack of lewd 
intent), but guilty of battery, without finding some other element of battery not 
included within lewd conduct.  Accordingly, even under defendant‟s argument, the 
court would never have to instruct on battery as a lesser included offense of lewd 
conduct.”  (Ibid.) 
12 
In Shockley, if lewd conduct were the only ground on which a touching was 
“offensive” for purposes of battery, then simple battery could be not be a lesser 
included offense.  Here the problem arises in a different context, but the result is 
the same.  The prosecution‟s theory was that defendant‟s misrepresentations 
negated any consent on the part of Trang and Odette.  The theory failed because 
the women were not deceived.  Lack of consent for purposes of misdemeanor 
sexual battery could not be premised on the jury‟s unsupported findings on the 
charges of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose.  In order to 
convict defendant of the misdemeanor offense, the jury would have had to find 
lack of consent on a basis other than fraud.6  As in Shockley, a finding of a 
different form of one element was required, and therefore the lesser offense is not 
included in the greater.  (Shockley, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 405.) 
Bailey is also instructive.  There the defendant was convicted of escaping 
from prison, but the evidence did not show that he ever reached an unauthorized 
location, as required by the escape statute.  We considered whether the conviction 
could be reduced to attempted escape as a lesser included offense.  (Bailey, supra, 
54 Cal.4th at p. 747.)  We decided it could not, because attempted escape has a 
specific intent requirement that is not included in the crime of escape.  (Id. at p. 
749.)  Pertinent to our analysis here, we reasoned that when a reviewing court 
modifies a conviction to reflect a lesser included offense, it is not empowered to 
make additional factual findings.  It may only conform the verdict to the facts as 
found by the jury.  In Bailey, “the case was tried solely as an escape, the trial court 
                                              
6  
Section 243.4(e)(1) is a “ „catchall‟ provision,” encompassing a variety of 
forms of lack of consent.  (People v. Smith (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 199, 207; see 
id. at pp. 208-209 [misdemeanor sexual battery may be committed against a victim 
who is unconscious or too intoxicated to consent].)  
13 
did not instruct on attempt to escape, and the jury was never required to make a 
finding of specific intent to escape . . . .  Because the crime of attempt to escape is 
not necessarily included in the offense of escape under the elements test, the jury, 
by finding defendant guilty of escape, did not impliedly find all the elements of 
the attempt offense.”  (Id. at p. 752.) 
So too here, the jury was not asked to decide whether Trang and Odette 
agreed to defendant‟s acts.  It was only told to consider whether his 
misrepresentations rendered them “unconscious of the nature of the act[s].”  
(§ 243.4(c).)  On the evidence presented, the jury could have found that neither 
woman agreed to defendant‟s touching even though they were not deceived.  But it 
did not consider lack of consent in this ordinary sense.  It is not enough to say the 
jury could have made a finding required to support a conviction, if the record does 
not show that it did make the finding.  To conclude that Trang and Odette were 
aware of the nature of defendant‟s acts but did not consent, the Court of Appeal 
was required to engage in factfinding of its own.  It considered an alternate theory 
of liability, asserted for the first time on appeal.  Section 1181, subdivision 6 does 
not authorize such a judicial undertaking.  (Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 752; 
People v. Navarro, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 679; People v. Cowan, supra, 44 
Cal.App.2d at p. 162.) 
There is a further reason why misdemeanor sexual battery cannot be 
considered a lesser included offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of 
professional purpose.  We touched upon the point in Shockley.  The consent 
element of misdemeanor sexual battery is a general one, whereas sexual battery by 
misrepresentation of professional purpose contemplates a specific circumstance in 
which consent is vitiated.  In Shockley we pointed out the notice problems that can 
arise if a narrower charged offense is deemed to include a broader lesser offense.  
Shockley was charged only with lewd conduct, but a battery might have been 
14 
based on an offensive touching of some other kind.  We observed, “ „[a] criminal 
defendant must be given fair notice of the charges against him in order that he may 
have a reasonable opportunity properly to prepare a defense and avoid unfair 
surprise at trial.‟  (People v. Anderson, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 809.)  Convincing 
the jury there was no lewd intent would be a complete defense to a lewd conduct 
charge.  Charging only lewd conduct would not provide the defendant with notice 
of the need to defend additionally against a battery charge based on an offensive 
touching not included within the elements of lewd conduct.”  (Shockley, supra, 58 
Cal.4th at p. 406; see People v. Lohbauer (1981) 29 Cal.3d 364, 368-371.) 
Similarly here, defendant was not given notice to prepare a defense against 
the charge that he touched his victims without their consent in any way other than 
by tricking them into thinking they were receiving a professional service.  If 
misdemeanor sexual battery had been charged, he would have been on notice of 
the need to defend against that charge.  He may have chosen to argue that, even 
though Trang and Odette were not misled by his promises of a professional 
service, they actually did consent to being touched.  But he was not given that 
notice and the jury was not asked to consider whether the victims consented in the 
ordinary sense.  For all these reasons, misdemeanor sexual battery cannot be 
considered a lesser included offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of 
professional purpose.  The court erred by modifying defendant‟s convictions under 
section 1181, subdivision 6.7 
                                              
7  
The lesser included offense doctrine applies in three areas:  (1) jury 
instructions, which were at issue in Shockley, supra, 58 Cal.4th 400; (2) sentence 
modification under section 1181, subdivision 6, at issue here and in Bailey, supra, 
54 Cal.4th 740; and (3) multiple convictions, which may not be based on 
necessarily included offenses (see People v. Pearson (1986)  42 Cal.3d 351, 355).  
In the multiple conviction context, the doctrine sometimes operates differently.  
(See People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227-1231 [accusatory pleading test 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
15 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.   
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
does not apply].)  We have no occasion here to consider whether our analysis of 
the elements test would apply to a defendant facing multiple convictions. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Robinson 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 227 Cal.App.4th 387 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S220247 
Date Filed: May 23, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: James A. Stotler 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Leonard J. Klaif, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steven T. Oetting, Deputy State Solicitor General, 
Melissa Mandel, Laura A. Glennon, Lise S. Jacobson and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Leonard J. Klaif 
P.O. Box 1657 
Ojai, CA  93024 
(805) 640-9659 
 
Laura Baggett 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-3120