Case Title: Wilcutt v. State

Citation: 123 So. 2d 203

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1960-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
123 So. 2d 203 (1960)
Herbert Eugene WILCUTT.
v.
STATE of Alabama.
6 Div. 599.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 15, 1960.
Rogers, Howard & Redden, Birmingham, for petitioner.
MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen., and Jas. W. Webb, Asst. Atty. Gen., opposed.
GOODWYN, Justice.
Petition of Herbert Eugene Wilcutt for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review and revise the judgment and decision of that court in the case of Wilcutt v. State, 123 So. 2d 193. Our conclusion is that the writ is due to be denied. However, we think one of the thirteen grounds of the petition calls for discussion.
After the trial court's oral charge, the jury retired to the jury room for deliberation. After deliberating for some time, the jury returned to the courtroom, where the following occurred:
"The Court: Gentlemen, do you have some requests to make?
"A Juror: Yes, sir.
"The Court: All right, sir.
"The Juror: Yes, sir.
"A Juror: Could you read us the law, or anything, on probation?
*204 "Is that any help to you?
"A Juror: Yes, sir.
"A Juror: Would it be considered?
"A Juror: Could it be considered?
"The Court: I am afraid I couldn't answer that.
"The Court: Yes, sir.
"A Juror: Ask for that particular statement?
"All right, gentlemen, you may return to the jury room.
"Mr. Rogers: All right.
"The Court: Overrule.
"Mr. Mills: We except."
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner's exception to the court's instruction came too late, since it was not taken before the jury again retired. Petitioner, while conceding that the general rule requires an exception to the court's oral charge to be taken in the presence of the jury, contends that, in this instance, the exception was properly taken after the jury again retired. In support of this contention, petitioner places principal reliance on Meadows v. State, 182 Ala. 51, 62 So. 737, 739, Ann.Cas.1915D, 663. It seems to us that that case and the instant case are clearly distinguishable. In Meadows the exception was not taken to any part of the trial court's oral instruction to the jury but to a reprimand directed to the jury. As there stated, the court's "language did not constitute an instruction on the law of the case, but constituted a reprimand to the jury." We think the case before us is controlled by the following from Meadows:
Writ denied.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON and COLEMAN, JJ., concur.