Case Title: Mullinax Concrete Serv. v. Zowada

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0213

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
MULLINAX CONCRETE SERVICE, a Wyoming corporation, v. MERLIN AND LORI ZOWADA and THE SHERIDAN COUNTY BORAD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS2012 WY 55Case Number: S-11-0213Decided: 04/11/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
MULLINAX 
CONCRETE SERVICE COMPANY, a Wyoming 
corporation,Petitioner,v.MERLIN AND LORI ZOWADA and THE 
SHERIDAN COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS,Respondents.
 
Original 
Proceeding
Petition 
for Writ of Review
District 
Court of Sheridan County
The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge 
 
Representing 
Petitioner:
Anthony 
T. Wendtland and Debra J. Wendtland of Wendtland & Wendtland, LLP, Sheridan, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Wendtland.
 
Representing 
Respondents Merlin and Lori Zowada:
Harlan 
W. Rasmussen of Attorneys at Law of Wyoming, P.C., Sheridan, 
Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Respondent Sheridan County Board of County Commissioners:
No 
Appearance.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      This case, 
concerning a petition for the establishment of a private road filed by the 
Zowadas, is before us for a second time, this time on a petition for writ of 
review.  In Mullinax Concrete Service Co., Inc., v. 
Zowada (Mullinax I), 2010 WY 146, 243 P.3d 181 (Wyo. 2010), we remanded the 
case to the district court for further remand to the Sheridan County Board of 
County Commissioners (the Commission) to make adequate findings of fact on 
specific issues.1  Id. at ¶ 23, at 192.  While the case was pending before this 
Court, the legislature amended Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (LexisNexis 2005), 
which governs the procedure used when petitioning for the establishment of a 
private road.  On remand, the 
Commission and its hearing officer chose to apply the statute as amended in 2008 
and 2009, although the case had originally proceeded under the statute as it 
existed in 2005.2  Mullinax petitioned this Court to 
determine whether the amended statute applies or whether the statute applies as 
it existed in 2005.  We hold that 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 as it existed in 2005 applies.
 
ISSUES
[¶2]      Whether, on 
remand to the Commission, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 should be applied as it 
existed in 2005 or as it currently exists with the 2008 and 2009 
amendments.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      The facts 
underlying the Zowadas’ petition for establishment of a private road and the 
Commission’s original decision are described in detail in Mullinax I, 2010 WY 146, ¶¶ 4-15, 243 P.3d  at 183-89, and will not be repeated here.  In the first appeal, this Court 
recognized that, although the legislature made significant changes to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 24-9-101 after the petition was filed, the proceedings were always 
guided by the statute as it existed in 2005.  Id. at ¶ 4, at 183.  We remanded the case and ordered the 
Commission to make adequate findings of fact regarding two of the road routes 
originally considered.  Id. at ¶ 23, at 
192.
 
[¶4]      On remand, the 
hearing officer for the Commission requested briefing from both parties and 
found that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101, as amended in 2009, should apply to the 
proceedings going forward.  
Thereafter, instead of retaining jurisdiction and making the findings of 
fact as mandated by this Court, the Commission certified the matter to the 
district court for the remainder of the proceedings, as allowed by the 2008 and 
2009 amendments to the statute.  
Mullinax filed a petition for writ of review with the district court, 
arguing that the 2005 version of the statute should continue to apply to the 
proceedings.  The district court 
denied the petition.  Mullinax then 
filed a petition for writ of review with this Court, which we granted. 

 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶5]      The question of 
whether a statute applies retroactively is a question of law and, “[a]s always, 
we review an agency’s conclusions of law de novo[.]”  Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 
84, ¶ 26, 188 P.3d 554, 561 (Wyo. 2008).  
Therefore, “[w]e will affirm an agency’s legal conclusion only if it is 
in accordance with the law.”  Id. at ¶ 26, at 562 (quoting Diamond B Servs., Inc. v. Rohde, 2005 WY 
130, ¶ 12, 120 P.3d 1031, 1038 (Wyo. 2005)). 
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶6]      Generally, 
“retrospective application of a statute to events occurring before enactment of 
a statute is not favored.”  Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 908, 914 (Wyo. 1977).  With one 
exception, this Court steadfastly applies this rule, and the rule has also 
been adopted by the legislature in a “savings statute.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-107 
(LexisNexis 2011) states:
 
If 
a statute is repealed or amended, the repeal or amendment does not affect 
pending actions, prosecutions or proceedings, civil or criminal.  If the repeal or amendment relates to 
the remedy, it does not affect pending actions, prosecutions or proceedings, 
unless so expressed, nor shall any repeal or amendment affect causes of action, 
prosecutions or proceedings existing at the time of the amendment or repeal, 
unless otherwise expressly provided in the amending or repealing 
act.
 
[¶7]      The plain 
language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-107 means that an amendment to a statute will 
not affect pending actions, unless the legislature specifically states that it 
is to apply retroactively.  See Wyo. Ref. Co. v. Bottjen, 695 P.2d 647, 650 (Wyo. 1985).  The 
legislature did not include language in the current version of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
24-9-101 that would lead anyone to believe that the statute is to be applied 
retroactively.  Additionally, the 
session laws for both the 2008 and 2009 amendments state that the amendments go 
into effect on July 1 of each respective year, and do not give any indication 
that the amendments should apply to pending actions.  2008 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 58, § 1; 2009 
Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 188, § 1.  The 
legislature has not expressed that the amended provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
24-9-101 apply retroactively, and, therefore, under the general rule, the 
statute applies as it existed in 2005.
 
[¶8]      Despite the 
general rule and the savings statute, there is one exception that may be applied 
under the appropriate circumstances.  
We have recognized that, if the amendment relates to procedure, it may be 
applied retroactively.  Aden v. State, 761 P.2d 88, 90 (Wyo. 
1988); see also Johnson, 568 P.2d  at 
915.  In Aden, the court determined that a 
statute may be applied retroactively without legislative direction when to do 
otherwise would “result[] in a manifest injustice.”  761 P.2d  at 90.  The court held that, since the amendment 
to the statute in question was procedural, and the amended statute was more 
objective and rational than the previous form of the statute, the amendment 
should be applied retroactively.  Id.
 
[¶9]      To determine 
whether the Aden exception applies, 
we must first determine whether the amendments to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 are 
substantive or procedural in nature.  
As we have previously recognized, the distinction is not always 
clear.  State ex rel. Frederick v. Dist. Court of the Fifth 
Judicial Dist. in and for Bighorn Cnty., 399 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo. 1965).  However, we have 
explained:
 
“* 
* * The substantive law is that part which creates, defines, and regulates 
rights as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of 
enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion.  * * *”  Mix v. Board of Com’rs of Nez Perce 
County, 18 Idaho 695, 112 P. 215, 220 [(1910)].  “Courts generally agree in defining the 
terms 'substantive’ and 'adjective’ that 'substantive’ law creates, defines, and 
regulates rights as opposed to 'adjective’ or 'procedural’ law which provides 
the method of enforcing and protecting such duties, rights, and obligations as 
are created by substantive law. * * *”  
In re McCombs’ Estate, Ohio Prob., 80 N.E.2d 573, 586 
[(1948)].
 
Id.; 
see also In re Estate of Boyd, 606 P.2d 1243, 1245 (Wyo. 1980).
 
[¶10]   The amendments to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
24-9-101 do not establish a new right.  
The 2005 version of the statute gave an individual the right to request 
the establishment of a private road, and the amended statute provides for that 
same right.  Instead, the amendments 
changed the procedure used to determine the validity of the petition and how the 
remedy is to be determined.  
Therefore, the amendments are procedural in nature, satisfying the first 
consideration of whether an amendment may be applied retroactively.  
 
[¶11]   However, although the amendment is 
procedural, we do not find that application of the Aden exception would be appropriate in 
this case because it would not prevent a “manifest injustice.”  761 P.2d  at 90.  In fact, to apply the amended statute to 
this case on remand would lead to absurd results.  In Mullinax I, we recognized that, while 
the statute had been amended since the filing of the petition, the matter had 
proceeded under the 2005 version of the statute.  Thus, our decision was guided by the 
2005 statute.  Mullinax I, 2010 WY 146, ¶ 4, 243 P.3d  
at 183.  Additionally, the district 
court has already exercised its jurisdiction in this case in one capacity--that 
of an appellate court.  To allow the 
district court to exercise jurisdiction over the same matter, now as the fact 
finding body, would certainly not cure a “manifest injustice” but, instead, may 
promote one.  Finally, we remanded 
the case with specific instructions for the 
Commission:
 
            
We are compelled to conclude that the Commission did not make adequate 
findings of fact, comparing the relative costs and benefits of Routes 1 and 
6.  Therefore, we remand this matter 
to the district court with directions that it modify its order remanding this 
matter to the Commission as 
follows:
 
1.    The 
Commission need only compare the relative merits of Routes 1 and 6 in 
light of the circumstances in which both of the parties will be 
left.
 
2.    If Route 6 is ultimately 
chosen, the Commission must fully consider 
why the greater costs of that road are justified.  It must also obtain a before and after 
appraisal to consider in any award the damages to 
Mullinax.
 
3.    . . . .
 
The 
Commission 
may opt to take additional evidence in order to meet these requirements, but 
should be able to do so without the need to appoint new Viewers and 
Appraisers.
 
Id. 
at ¶ 23, at 192 (emphasis added).  
Therefore, the only body that is capable of carrying out the remand 
requirements ordered by this Court in Mullinax I is the Commission.  We hold that the 2008 and 2009 
amendments to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 do not apply retroactively to this case 
on remand.  The hearing officer 
erred, as a matter of law, when he determined that the 2009 statute 
applied.  Under the 2005 statute, 
the Commission did not have the authority to certify the matter to the district 
court.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶12]   The hearing officer’s decision to 
apply Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 as it existed in 2009 was in error.  While the amendments to the statute are 
procedural in nature, we find that the general rule against retroactive 
application of the amendment applies.  
The Commission did not have the authority to certify the matter to the 
district court.  We reverse the 
district court’s order denying Mullinax’s petition for writ of review and remand 
the case to the district court to order the Commission to comply with the remand 
requirements this Court ordered in Mullinax I, 2010 WY 146, ¶ 23, 243 P.3d  
at 192.
FOOTNOTES
1Since 
this was an appeal of an agency action, this Court was the second appellate 
court to hear the case.  The 
district court served as the appellate court in the first 
instance.
2Under 
the 2005 statute, the board of county commissioners was the only body that could 
act as the fact finder and issue a decision on a petition for a private 
road.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 
(LexisNexis 2005).  However, in 
2008, the legislature amended the statute, allowing the board to “certify the 
application directly to the district court unless the board elects to retain 
jurisdiction.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 24-9-101(m) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).  In 2009, the legislature amended the 
statute again, giving the board thirty days to certify the case to the district 
court.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
24-9-101(h) (LexisNexis 2009).