Case Title: Hal Hempel v. City of Baraboo

Citation: 2005 WI 120

Docket Number: 2003AP000500

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 120 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP0500 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Hal Hempel,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
City of Baraboo and City of Baraboo  
Police Department,  
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 254 
Reported at:  268 Wis. 2d 534, 674 N.W.2d 38 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 21, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sauk   
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick Taggart   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and BUTLER, JR., J.J., join the dissent.  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Aaron N. Halstead, Katy Meter Lounsbury and Shneidman, Hawks & 
Ehlke, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Aaron N. Halstead. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by James 
C. Bohl, Baraboo, and oral argument by James C. Bohl. 
 
 
2005 WI 120 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP500   
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 291) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Hal Hempel,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Baraboo and City of Baraboo  
Police Department,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   In this review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals,1 we are required to interpret 
and apply Wisconsin's Open Records Law, Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-
19.39,2 
vis-à-vis 
documents 
generated 
during 
an 
internal 
investigation of alleged sexual harassment by a male Baraboo 
police officer against a female Baraboo police officer, as well 
as other female officers.  Petitioner Hal Hempel (Hempel), the 
                                                 
1 Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 2003 WI App 254, 268 
Wis. 2d 534, 674 N.W.2d 38. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2003AP500 
2 
 
subject of the harassment complaint, seeks review of the 
appellate decision affirming a circuit court order granting 
summary judgment to the City of Baraboo (the City) and the City 
of Baraboo Police Department (the Department) on Hempel's 
challenge to the denial of his open records request.  We must 
determine whether the Sauk County Circuit Court, Patrick J. 
Taggart, Judge, erroneously granted summary judgment.  
¶2 
The 
issues 
presented 
are: 
First, 
does 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am) give a police officer the personal 
right to inspect records compiled by a police department in its 
internal investigation of a sexual harassment complaint against 
the officer?  Second, does Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) give the 
public, including the police officer, a right to inspect a 
police department's records of an internal sexual harassment 
investigation as well as unredacted copies of related documents 
when the department does not bring disciplinary charges against 
the 
officer, 
the 
department 
articulates 
several 
specific 
concerns about the confidentiality and privacy of cooperating 
witnesses 
and 
its 
ability 
to 
conduct 
future 
internal 
investigations, and the department releases redacted records 
that preserve witness confidentiality but expose the nature of 
the harassment complaint? 
¶3 
We conclude, first, that when a person makes an open 
records request for records containing personally identifiable 
information 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am), 
the 
person 
is 
entitled to inspect the records unless the surrounding factual 
No. 2003AP500 
3 
 
circumstances reasonably fall within one or more of the 
statutory exceptions to paragraph (am).   
¶4 
Second, if the person makes a more general open 
records request under § 19.35(1)(a), the records custodian, 
keeping in mind the strong legislative presumption favoring 
disclosure, must determine whether the requested records are 
subject to an exception that may or will prevent disclosure.  
Two general types of exceptions may apply: statutory exceptions 
and common law exceptions.  Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, 
¶10, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 646 N.W.2d 811.  If neither a statute nor 
common law creates a blanket exception, the custodian must 
decide whether the strong presumption favoring access and 
disclosure is overcome by some even stronger public policy 
favoring limited access or nondisclosure.  Id., ¶11 (citing 
Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 192-93, 549 N.W.2d 699 
(1996)).  To determine whether the presumption of openness is 
overcome by another public policy concern, we apply the 
balancing test articulated by the court in Woznicki and 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 
(1979). 
¶5 
Applying these principles to this case, we conclude, 
first, that Hempel was the subject of an investigation "in 
connection with a complaint," an express statutory exception to 
paragraph (am).  As such, Hempel's request falls directly within 
one of the statutory exceptions to disclosure.  Disclosure would 
also expose the names with statements of informants who were 
promised confidentiality for their cooperation in the internal 
No. 2003AP500 
4 
 
investigation.  He therefore had no right to more information 
under paragraph (am) than he received.  Second, in this case, 
the public interest in nondisclosure of police investigative 
records outweighs the public interest in releasing the records 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a).  As a result, the Department had 
the 
authority 
to 
deny 
Hempel's 
open 
records 
request.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶6 
This is a fact-intensive case, but the relevant facts 
are undisputed.  Hal Hempel has been a police officer with the 
Baraboo Police Department for at least 25 years.  On January 20, 
2000, Captain Dennis Kluge (Kluge) of the Department received a 
verbal complaint about Hempel from Officer Kaye Howver (Howver).  
Howver later filed an eight-page written complaint alleging 
gender-based harassment.  In the meantime, Kluge informed 
Baraboo Police Chief Thomas J. Lobe of the complaint, and Lobe, 
in turn, informed Hempel that a complaint had been made.  The 
Chief assigned Kluge the responsibility of conducting an 
investigation. 
¶7 
On February 10, 2000, Captain Kluge delivered a 
memorandum to Hempel.  The memorandum reiterated that a 
complaint had been filed alleging that Hempel had made "gender-
based" statements "degrading to female officers;" advised him 
that a related investigation was being conducted by the Sauk 
County Sheriff's Department; and asked to meet with Hempel to 
obtain his response to the allegations.  Kluge attached Howver's 
full, unredacted complaint to the memorandum.  The complaint 
No. 2003AP500 
5 
 
listed numerous people who allegedly witnessed or had knowledge 
of Hempel's conduct.  On February 18 Hempel met with Kluge and 
provided a recorded response to Kluge's questions. 
¶8 
The Department's investigation apparently continued 
until June 2000.  On June 13 Baraboo City Attorney James C. Bohl 
wrote Hempel's attorney informing him that the Chief had decided 
not to impose any disciplinary measures on Hempel.3  Three days 
later, on June 16, Hempel's attorney, Aaron Halstead, responded, 
expressing concern that Chief Lobe had not contacted all the 
potential witnesses named by Hempel and intimating that the 
failure to get "[Hempel's] side of the story" might affect Chief 
Lobe's perception of Hempel's future performance. 
¶9 
On August 11 Chief Lobe sent a formal memorandum to 
Hempel describing the Department's resolution of the complaint.  
Chief Lobe wrote: 
[The] complaint . . . has been resolved to the mutual 
satisfaction of the parties and the department. . . .  
No further action will be taken on this complaint.  If 
another complaint of a similar nature is received, 
this complaint may be considered at that time.  This 
memo is intended to be documentary only and is not 
disciplinary.  This memo will be retained in Officer 
Hempel's personnel file for a period of three years 
from June 8, 2000. 
The record does not reveal whether the Department found merit in 
the complaint, or whether Hempel agreed to take any action in 
response to the complaint.  In any event, Hempel's attorney 
                                                 
3 City Attorney Bohl's letter of June 13 is not part of the 
record but is referenced in Attorney Halstead's letter of June 
16, 2000. 
No. 2003AP500 
6 
 
objected to the retention of the memorandum in Hempel's 
personnel file.  The Baraboo City Attorney ultimately consented 
to place Attorney Halstead's June 16 letter listing Hempel's 
concerns 
in 
the 
personnel 
file 
with 
Chief 
Lobe's 
final 
memorandum.  In effect, the parties agreed that Hempel's 
concerns would not be addressed at that time, but were not 
waived. 
¶10 On January 24, 2001, Hempel served a written open 
records request on the Department seeking "any and all written 
materials gathered or considered by you in connection with [the] 
complaint against Hal Hempel, including any correspondence or 
statements received by you in connection with that complaint."  
The request cited both "Chapter 19 of the Wisconsin Statutes and 
Sec. 103.13 of the Wisconsin Statutes."   
¶11 On January 31, 2001, Chief Lobe responded to that 
portion 
of 
Hempel's 
request 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 103.13, 
forwarding all documents in Hempel's personnel file related to 
the complaint.  Lobe added:  
Since there was no discipline or other qualifying 
determination made by this Department under Section 
103.13(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes, Officer Hempel is 
not entitled to inspect any additional records under 
Section 103.13, Wis. Stats. and to the extent that 
your request is made under Section 103.13(2) to 
inspect additional documents, it is denied as no such 
additional 
documents 
exist 
in 
Officer 
Hempel's 
personnel file. 
Chief Lobe's letter indicated that he would issue a second 
response to the public records request under Chapter 19. 
No. 2003AP500 
7 
 
 
¶12 Chief Lobe retired on January 31, so that his letter 
to Hempel was one of his last official acts.  He was succeeded 
on February 1 by Kluge, who addressed the Chapter 19 public 
records request in a February 9 letter to Hempel.  Chief Kluge 
wrote that he had been advised by the City Attorney "that 
Attorney Halstead's record request must be treated the same as 
if such a request had been made by the news media."  He added: 
 
After 
reviewing 
the 
documents 
requested 
and 
balancing 
the 
competing 
interests 
implicated 
in 
releasing 
the 
requested 
documents, 
as 
Record 
Custodian, I have determined that certain records, in 
redacted form, are subject to release under the public 
records law.  I have attached to this letter, copies 
of documents I am proposing to release for public 
inspection.  In addition to the attached documents, I 
have provided a similar letter to Officer [ ] with a 
redacted copy of [ ] complaint.  If Officer [ ] does 
not file a court action objecting to the release of [] 
redacted complaint, I will then provide a copy of that 
document to you in order to give you additional time 
to challenge, in Circuit Court, the public release of 
that document.  It is believed that the attached 
documents, as well as the redacted complaint filed by 
Officer [ ] may implicate your privacy interest and/or 
reputational concerns. 
 
. . . .  
 
You should understand that in releasing these 
records to you, it is the same as releasing the 
records to the news media or to other members of the 
public.  Therefore, if the news media makes a request 
to the City for the same records, we will be releasing 
these records without any additional notification to 
you. 
¶13 On February 9 Kluge also implemented this court's 
decision in Woznicki, by separately informing Hempel and 
No. 2003AP500 
8 
 
complainant Howver of their procedural rights in connection with 
the possible release of records related to the investigation. 
¶14 On March 13, 2001, having received no objection from 
Officer Howver, Chief Kluge provided an extensive written 
response to Hempel's open records request.  First, he agreed to 
release several records in redacted form, including: (1) the 
complainant's statement; (2) a Sauk County Sheriff's Office 
report dated February 10, 2000; (3) Chief Lobe's memo of August 
11, 2000; (4) Attorney Halstead's letter of June 16, 2000, 
expressing concern that the complaint might be used against 
Hempel in the future; and (5) Attorney Halstead's letter of 
August 7, 2000, stating his understanding that his letter of 
June 16 would remain in Hempel's personnel file. 
¶15 Chief Kluge also denied Hempel's open records request 
for 
any 
documents 
related 
to 
the 
Department's 
"internal 
investigation" of the complaint.  Chief Kluge provided six 
reasons for the denial: 
1. 
The City harassment policy provides that 
when a complaint is received, such as the one [in this 
case], a "confidential investigation" of the alleged 
activity will be undertaken by the City. . . . 
2. 
[D]isclosure 
of 
[the 
documents 
you 
requested] would interfere with the ability of a law 
enforcement agency to conduct thorough, confidential, 
internal investigations.  [T]he Police Department's 
ability to gather statements from members of the 
Department or other departments would be seriously 
hampered by public disclosure of such investigations.  
Furthermore, disclosure would discourage victims and 
witnesses from providing information to the Department 
regarding personnel investigations. 
No. 2003AP500 
9 
 
3. 
[D]isclosure . . . would interfere with and 
hamper the City of Baraboo's ability to ensure 
employees an opportunity for satisfying careers and 
fair treatment . . . and would impinge upon the City's 
right and opportunity to . . . retain competent law 
enforcement personnel. 
4. 
[N]ondisclosure . . . protect[s] the privacy 
rights 
of 
individuals 
who 
cooperated 
in 
the 
investigation, as well as Officer Hempel and [the 
complainant].  Disclosure of these records might 
subject witnesses, employees, and their families to 
increased risk of harassment or other jeopardy. 
5. 
Nondisclosure . . . is further required in 
order to avoid a loss of morale. . . .  [D]isclosure 
could inhibit the City's ability to hire and retain 
competent personnel. 
6. 
[T]he 
documents 
requested 
may 
contain 
information 
that 
[is] 
mistaken, 
unsubstantiated, 
untrue, or irrelevant, and there is a strong public 
policy in preventing this information from becoming 
public 
thereby 
causing 
[undue] 
personal 
and/or 
economic harm to the individuals involved. . . .  
[Disclosure] . . . would 
constitute 
an 
unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy. . . . 
Chief Kluge concluded:  
[W]hen the public interest in protecting the foregoing 
policies is balanced against the public interest in 
providing 
public 
access 
to 
internal 
personnel 
investigations, the public interest to be served by 
the release of such documents does not out-weigh the 
countervailing interests that would be impacted by 
their release.  Therefore, in my opinion, there is a 
strong public policy interest in non-disclosure.  This 
balancing test is particularly relevant under the 
current facts . . . . 
¶16 The records Chief Kluge released were substantially 
redacted.  However, even the redacted records disclose a lot of 
information.  For example, one of the documents is redacted as 
follows:  "After (redacted) asked if (redacted) was in trouble I 
No. 2003AP500 
10 
 
explained to (redacted) that I received information within the 
last twenty-four hours or so that (redacted) may have suffered 
some harassment by one of the Baraboo Police Department 
Officers."  Later, the document continues: "(Redacted) said that 
(redacted) was talking to (redacted) and made the following 
statements: 'Women are brainless'; 'Women should not be working 
in police work'; and 'Women should not be working at all.'" 
¶17 On March 30, 2001, Hempel filed another open records 
request with the Department, this time asking for "any written 
record that you prepared in conjunction with the interview of 
[complainant] . . . [and] any notes that you prepared during or 
after interviews conducted with other City of Baraboo Police 
Officers during that timeframe regarding Officer Hempel."4  The 
Department denied the new request for the same reasons it denied 
the original request. 
¶18 Unsatisfied with the Department's response, Hempel 
filed an action against the City, the Department, Sauk County, 
and the Sauk County Sheriff's Department in Sauk County Circuit 
Court on June 11, 2001.5  Hempel sought a court order directing 
                                                 
4 The letter of March 30 is not in the record; however, it 
is quoted in the circuit court's decision. 
5 Hempel named Sauk County and the Sauk County Sheriff's 
Department 
because 
he 
sought 
records 
that 
the 
Sheriff's 
Department may have prepared while investigating a related 
complaint against him.  He later dismissed the County and the 
Sheriff's 
Department 
from 
the 
suit 
after 
the 
Sheriff's 
Department provided unredacted copies of the records it had 
prepared. 
No. 2003AP500 
11 
 
the Department to produce its internal investigative records and 
reimburse his attorney fees and costs.6 
¶19 The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.  
The court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed Hempel's 
suit.  In its decision, the circuit court noted that the public 
interest in nondisclosure of the requested records outweighed 
the public interest in disclosure under these circumstances. 
¶20 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
affirmed 
with 
one 
judge 
dissenting.  Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 2003 WI App 254, ¶¶23-
24, 268 Wis. 2d 534, 674 N.W.2d 38.  The majority reasoned that 
the public's right to access records "must give way to the 
important public policy of encouraging victims and witnesses of 
employment 
discrimination 
to 
cooperate 
in 
internal 
investigations of such conduct."  Id., ¶22.  The dissenting 
judge 
believed 
that 
the 
majority's 
decision 
would 
allow 
Wisconsin municipalities to hide evidence of discrimination 
behind the shield of nondisclosure.  Id., ¶31 (Dykman, J., 
dissenting). 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶21 Generally, when we review a grant of summary judgment, 
we construe the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.  Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 2000 
WI 97, ¶7 n.3, 237 Wis. 2d 19, 614 N.W.2d 443.  Here, however, 
the facts are not in dispute, and so our task is simply to apply 
                                                 
6 See Wis. Stat. §§ 19.37(1)(a), 19.37(2). 
No. 2003AP500 
12 
 
the law to the undisputed facts.  Kraemer Bros. Inc. v. Dane 
County, 229 Wis. 2d 86, 92-93, 599 N.W.2d 75 (1999).  The 
application of the Open Records Law to undisputed facts is a 
question of law that we review de novo, benefiting from the 
analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  Osborn 
v. Bd. of Regents, 2002 WI 83, ¶12, 254 Wis. 2d 266, 647 
N.W.2d 158. 
B. 
Wisconsin's Open Records Law 
¶22 The Wisconsin Open Records Law embodies one part of 
the legislature's policy favoring the broadest practical access 
to government.7  The legislature trumpeted its intent when it 
stated: 
[I]t is declared to be the public policy of this state 
that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and 
the official acts of those officers and employees who 
represent them. . . .  To that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 
shall 
be 
construed 
in 
every 
instance 
with 
a 
presumption of complete public access, consistent with 
the conduct of governmental business.  The denial of 
public access generally is contrary to the public 
interest, and only in an exceptional case may access 
be denied. 
Wis. Stat. § 19.31. 
¶23 This 
court 
has 
implemented 
the 
legislature's 
directive. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Linzmeyer, 
254 
Wis. 2d 306, 
¶15; 
Wisconsin Newspress, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Sheboygan Falls, 199 
Wis. 2d 768, 776, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996) (citing cases). 
                                                 
7 See 
also 
Wis. Stat. §§ 19.81-19.98 
(Wisconsin's 
Open 
Meetings Law). 
No. 2003AP500 
13 
 
 
¶24 Two provisions of the Open Records Law are at issue in 
this case.  Hempel claims that he has a right to inspect the 
records under both Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a), which provides that 
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, any requester has a 
right to inspect any record," and Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am), 
which 
provides 
that 
"any 
requester 
who 
is 
an 
individual . . . has a right to inspect any record containing 
personally 
identifiable 
information 
pertaining 
to 
the 
individual," with certain statutory exceptions. 
¶25 A "record" subject to the Open Records Law is "any 
material on which written . . . information is recorded or 
preserved . . . which has been created or is being kept by an 
authority."  Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).  A custodian who denies a 
person's written request for records must respond with a written 
denial specifically stating reasons for denying access to the 
records.  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(b); see also Mayfair Chrysler-
Plymouth, 
Inc. 
v. 
Baldarotta, 
162 
Wis. 2d 142, 
157, 
469 
N.W.2d 638 (1991). 
 
¶26 The Department concedes that the documents Hempel 
requested are "records" within the meaning of the law and that 
the Department is the "authority" with custody of the records.  
See Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1).8  For his part, Hempel concedes that 
the Department's denial of his request was in writing and 
                                                 
8 An "authority" is "any of the following having custody of 
a record: a state or local office, elected official, agency, 
board, commission, committee, council, department or public body 
corporate and politic created by constitution, law, ordinance, 
rule or order . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1). 
No. 2003AP500 
14 
 
sufficiently specific.  Therefore, we proceed directly to our 
analysis of whether the Department must disclose the requested 
records under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) or (am), keeping in mind 
the presumption favoring disclosure. 
¶27 When a person makes an open records request for 
records containing personally identifiable information under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am), the person is entitled to inspect the 
records unless the surrounding factual circumstances reasonably 
fall within one or more of the statutory exceptions to (am).  
These requests are not subject to any balancing test; the 
legislature has done the balancing by enacting statutory 
exceptions to the disclosure requirements.  
¶28 If, on the other hand, the person makes a more general 
open records request under § 19.35(1)(a), the records custodian, 
keeping in mind the strong legislative presumption favoring 
disclosure, must determine whether the requested records are 
subject to an exception that may or will prevent disclosure.  
The presumption favoring disclosure is strong, but is not 
absolute.  Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶11; Milwaukee Teachers' 
Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. Of Sch. Dirs., 227 Wis. 2d 779, 787, 596 
N.W.2d 403 (1999) (citing Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 192-93).  Two 
general types of exceptions may apply:  statutory exceptions and 
common law exceptions.  Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶10.  If 
neither a statute nor common law creates a blanket exception, 
the custodian must decide whether the strong presumption 
favoring access and disclosure is overcome by some even stronger 
public policy favoring limited access or nondisclosure.  Id., 
No. 2003AP500 
15 
 
¶11 (citing Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 192-93).  To determine 
whether the presumption of openness is overcome by another 
public policy concern, we apply the balancing test articulated 
by the court in Woznicki and Newspapers, Inc.  Id., ¶12. 
¶29 In situations in which an individual or his authorized 
representative makes a request under § 19.35(1)(a) or (am) and 
"states that the purpose of the request is to inspect or copy a 
record containing personally identifiable information pertaining 
to 
the 
individual," 
the 
statute 
dictates 
a 
procedure.  
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(c)1. and 3.: 
 
1. 
The authority shall first determine if the 
requester has a right to inspect or copy the record 
under sub. (1)(a). 
 
3. 
If 
the 
authority 
determines 
that 
the 
requester does not have a right to inspect or copy the 
record under sub. (1)(a), the authority shall then 
determine if the requester has a right to inspect or 
copy the record under sub. (1)(am) and shall grant or 
deny this request accordingly. 
¶30 Hempel made a general request for records under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1) and did not stress paragraph (am) or 
"personally 
identifiable 
information 
pertaining 
to 
the 
individual."  The Department complains that Hempel's demand in 
this court for access under paragraph (am) was waived because it 
was not raised with the Department or the circuit court.  
Because the issue was briefed and discussed in oral argument, we 
will address Hempel's request under paragraph (am). 
¶31 As we embark on our analysis of the law, we pause to 
restate which records Hempel is requesting.  Hempel already has 
No. 2003AP500 
16 
 
an unredacted copy of the complaint and several other documents.  
He was given everything on point from his personnel file.  The 
additional records he requests are the Department's internal 
records produced during its investigation of the complaint.  He 
also seeks the information that was redacted from some of the 
documents in his possession——mainly names.   
1. 
Statutory Analysis Including Exceptions 
¶32 We turn first to Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am), as this 
paragraph affords a requester a more potent right of access when 
it applies.  Hempel claims that he is entitled to review records 
under 
§ 19.35(1)(am) 
because 
the 
records 
sought 
contain 
"personally 
identifiable 
information 
pertaining" 
to 
him.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 19.35(1)(am) provides in part: 
In addition to any right under par. (a), any 
requester who is an individual or person authorized by 
the individual, has a right to inspect any record 
containing 
personally 
identifiable 
information 
pertaining to the individual that is maintained by an 
authority and to make or receive a copy of any such 
information.  The right to inspect or copy a record 
under this paragraph does not apply to any of the 
following: 
¶33 The first clause of the introduction indicates that 
the right of inspection under paragraph (am) is in addition to 
any right under paragraph (a).  Conversely, the last sentence of 
the introduction indicates that the right of inspection under 
paragraph (am) does not apply in certain circumstances.  Because 
the right under (am) is the right of an "individual" to request 
records about that individual, it is governed by a different set 
of principles than the right under paragraph (a). 
No. 2003AP500 
17 
 
¶34 An "individual" requester who asks to inspect records 
pertaining 
to 
himself 
is 
substantially 
different 
from 
a 
requester, be it a private citizen or a news reporter, who asks 
to inspect records about any of a wide variety of government 
activities or a wide array of other people.  The right to 
inspect under paragraph (am) is clearly limited to personally 
identifiable information about the requester.  When a request is 
made within that narrow scope, the right is more unqualified 
than a right under paragraph (a), first, because paragraph (am) 
does not recognize common law exceptions and, second, because 
paragraph (am) is not subject to a balancing test.  Paragraph 
(am) recognizes only statutory exceptions.  When these statutory 
exceptions are present, however, paragraph (am) "does not 
apply."9 
¶35 The Department claims that Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am)1. 
defeats the presumption of access in this case.  It reads: 
1. 
Any 
record 
containing 
personally 
identifiable 
information 
that 
is 
collected 
or 
maintained 
in 
connection 
with 
a 
complaint, 
investigation or other circumstance that may lead to 
an 
enforcement 
action, 
administrative 
proceeding, 
arbitration proceeding or court proceeding, or any 
such record that is collected or maintained in 
connection with such an action or proceeding. 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am)1. 
¶36 The Department's invocation of subparagraph 1. is 
weakened by Chief Lobe's August 11, 2000, memorandum to Hempel, 
                                                 
9 Like paragraph (a), paragraph (am) is also subject to 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(em), 
(g), 
(h), 
(j), 
and 
(k), 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36. 
No. 2003AP500 
18 
 
in which the Chief wrote that the Department's investigation 
"has been resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the parties and 
the department . . . .  No further action will be taken on this 
complaint." 
¶37 At the same time, as the Department notes, the Chief's 
memo also stated that the Department could "consider" this 
complaint if someone else brought "another complaint of a 
similar nature" against Hempel within a three-year period.  In 
that event, the second complaint, not this one, would "lead to" 
one of the proceedings the statute describes.  The Department 
could consider the circumstances of the instant complaint at the 
time of the hypothetical second complaint as an additional 
factor in deciding whether to impose discipline.  The instant 
complaint would then be a record "maintained" in connection with 
a pending complaint.  Hence, to some degree, the instant 
"investigation or other circumstance" was still "ongoing" at the 
time of Hempel's open records request.   
¶38 The conditional language in (am)1. makes the intended 
result in these circumstances unclear. 
¶39 The Department also contends that the records sought 
are exempt from disclosure under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am)2.b.  
This provision exempts from disclosure any record that would 
"[i]dentify a confidential informant."  The Department claims 
that it told witnesses that any information they provided would 
No. 2003AP500 
19 
 
remain confidential, and therefore, this exception would apply 
to prevent disclosure.10 
¶40 It is not clear from the language of this provision 
what qualifies a person as a "confidential informant."11   
¶41 Two cases illustrate the problem.  In Mayfair, a 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue field auditor promised an 
"informant" anonymity in exchange for information regarding 
action by the informant's employer.  The information the 
informant provided was relevant to an audit of the employer's 
tax returns.  This court held that "the harm to the public 
interest from the disclosure of portions of records which would 
reveal the identity of a confidential informant who received a 
pledge of confidentiality outweighs the public interest in 
disclosing these records."  Mayfair, 162 Wis. 2d at 149.  This 
decision 
was 
issued 
before 
the 
enactment 
of 
either 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am) or Wis. Stat. § 19.36(8). 
¶42 In Linzmeyer, a more recent case, police investigated 
allegations that a high school teacher made inappropriate 
                                                 
10 An unredacted copy of Officer Howver's complaint was 
provided to Hempel.  Officer Howver was given a Woznicki notice 
and did not object to release of redacted documents.  Officer 
Howver's name appears in the court of appeals opinion and in the 
briefs of both parties.  Consequently, the complainant's name is 
part of the public record. 
11 The 
dissent 
argues 
that 
we 
should 
look 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(8)(a)1. for a definition of "informant."  
Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶111.  That provision is not 
dispositive because § 19.36(8)(a) begins with the language "In 
this 
subsection . . . 'Informant' 
means . . . ." 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Paragraph (8)(b) alludes to Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) 
but not § 19.35(1)(am). 
No. 2003AP500 
20 
 
statements and engaged in inappropriate conduct with students.  
During the investigation, the police interviewed more than 20 
students.  The police may have promised confidentiality, but 
this court stated that "none of the students interviewed was a 
confidential informant."  Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶19.  The 
court allowed that the students "may have some privacy interest 
in protecting their own identities."  Id., ¶40.  The court 
suggested that those interests "could be protected by a 
redaction 
of 
the 
Report 
in 
accordance 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6)."  Id.   
¶43 In 
Linzmeyer, 
the 
subject 
of 
the 
investigation 
attempted to prevent disclosure of the records.  The police 
department was trying to release the records.  Consequently, the 
posture of the case was quite different from the present 
litigation.  To the extent that the teacher in Linzmeyer was 
attempting to use the exceptions in paragraph (am) to prevent 
the police department from releasing his records, he was 
misapplying the statute. 
¶44 Because the scope of the term "confidential informant" 
is not clear, the result intended by the legislature in these 
circumstances is not clear.  We think the ambiguity in both 
subdivisions 1. and 2. permits the court to examine extrinsic 
sources to discern legislative intent. 
¶45 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.35(1)(am) was shoehorned into the 
Open Records Law in the 1991 session of the legislature.  A 
review of its history suggests that it should be applied 
carefully to effect its purpose. 
No. 2003AP500 
21 
 
¶46 Paragraph (am) was adopted in two stages.  The first 
stage was a sweeping amendment to the 1991-93 biennial budget.  
See 1991 Wis. Act 39, § 212qz.  This amendment, authored by 
Representative Marlin Schneider, originated with the Legislative 
Council's 
Special 
Committee 
on 
Privacy 
and 
Information 
Technology.12  It created Subchapter IV of Chapter 19 entitled 
"Personal Information Practices," and included 10 sections.  One 
of these sections was Wis. Stat. § 19.73, entitled "Rights of 
data subject to inspect, copy, challenge, and correct."  The 
governor vetoed the words "and correct" as well as a substantial 
number of other words and phrases in the section.  After the 
vetoes, the section read in part as follows: 
 
19.73 
Rights of data subject to inspect, 
copy, challenge.  (1) In this section, "person 
authorized 
by 
the 
individual" means the 
parent, 
guardian, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 
48.02(8), 
or 
legal 
custodian, as defined in s. 48.02(11), of a child, as 
defined in s. 48.02(2), the guardian, as defined in s. 
880.01(3), of an individual adjudged incompetent, as 
defined in s. 880.01(4), the personal representative 
or spouse of an individual who is deceased or any 
person authorized, in writing, by the individual to 
exercise the rights granted under this section. 
 
(2) Upon 
request, 
any 
individual 
or 
person 
authorized by the individual, may inspect any record 
containing 
personally 
identifiable 
information 
pertaining to the individual that is maintained by an 
authority and make or receive a copy of any such 
information in a form which is comprehensible to the 
individual or person authorized by the individual.  
The authority may impose a fee not to exceed the fees 
                                                 
12 See Legislative Council Information Memorandum 92-13 at 
5. 
No. 2003AP500 
22 
 
under s. 19.35(3) for providing a copy of the 
information. 
 
. . . .  
 
(4) This does not apply to any of the following: 
(a) Records 
transferred 
to 
an 
archival 
depository under s. 16.61(13). 
(b) Personally identifiable information in a 
case or action. 
(c) Any record pertaining to an individual if a 
specific statute prohibits the disclosure of 
the record to the individual. 
 
. . . .  
(e) Personally 
identifiable 
information 
which 
relates 
to 
investigation, 
enforcement 
action, prosecution or other action. 
1991 Wis. Act 39, § 19.73. 
 
¶47 The governor's vetoes concentrated on subsection (3), 
which discussed an authority's duties upon being advised that it 
was holding inaccurate information, and subsection (4), which 
outlined exceptions to the section's coverage.   
¶48 By its plain language, subsection (2) permitted an 
individual 
to 
inspect 
"any 
record 
containing 
personally 
identifiable 
information 
pertaining 
to 
the 
individual" 
maintained by a governmental authority.  Had there not been 
exceptions in subsection (4), subsection (2) would have provided 
access to the records of pending investigations involving the 
"individual" 
requester. 
 
In 
fact, 
however, 
there 
were 
exceptions.  By vetoes, the governor attempted to broaden them.13  
                                                 
13 The effect of the governor's partial vetoes can be seen 
in proposed Section 19.73(4)(b) and (e): 
No. 2003AP500 
23 
 
His vetoes left a very confusing statute that needed prompt 
revision.   
¶49 The purpose of the 1991 amendment was explained in 
Legislative Council Information Memorandum 92-13 entitled "New 
Laws Relating to Personal Information Contained in State and 
Local Government Records."  The Memorandum stated that the 
Special Committee on Privacy and Information Technology had 
reviewed a "Code of Fair Information Practices" issued by the 
United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare.  See 
Legislative Council Information Memorandum 92-13 at 6.  The 
Secretary's Advisory Committee had developed five concepts: 
a. 
There must be no personal data recordkeeping 
system whose very existence is secret. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(4) This subsection does not apply to any of the 
following: 
 
. . . .  
 
(b) Personally identifiable information that is 
at issue in a pending contested case under ch. 227 or 
a pending court action. 
 
. . . .  
 
(e) Personally identifiable 
information 
which 
relates to the investigation, prosecution or other 
enforcement action of possible violations of law 
unless: 
 
1. 
The information has been maintained for a 
period longer than reasonably necessary to conclude 
the investigation, prosecution or other enforcement 
action, and 
 
2. 
Disclosure of the information would not 
reveal confidential investigatory methods, strategies 
or practices. 
No. 2003AP500 
24 
 
b. 
There must be a way for an individual to find out 
what information about the individual is in a 
record and how it is used. 
c. 
There must be a way for an individual to prevent 
information about him or her from being used or 
made available, without his or her consent, for 
purposes other than that for which it was 
obtained. 
d. 
There must be a way for an individual to correct 
or amend a record of identifiable information 
about the individual. 
e. 
Any organization creating, maintaining, using or 
disseminating records of identifiable personal 
data must assure the reliability of the data for 
the 
intended 
use 
and 
must 
take 
reasonable 
precautions to prevent misuse of the data. 
Id. 
¶50 These important goals were quite distinct from the 
traditional principles of the Open Records Law.  As a result, 
the new legislation of necessity required exceptions.  As 
illustrated in ¶48 n.13 herein, the governor attempted to make 
these exceptions broader.   
¶51 The new legislation lasted less than a year.  In a 
second 
stage, 
the 
1991 
legislature 
substantially 
revised 
Subchapter IV and eliminated Wis. Stat. § 19.73.  See 1991 Wis. 
Act 269.  Act 269 created paragraph (am) by splicing together 
old, 
revised, 
and 
new 
text 
and 
inserting 
it 
into 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1).  A clause in the new paragraph opening up 
certain investigative records under § 19.35(1)(am)1. one year 
after "the conclusion of such an action or proceeding . . . or 
the closing of an investigation that does not result in such an 
action or proceeding" was vetoed. 
No. 2003AP500 
25 
 
¶52 The discussion in ¶¶45-51 above shows that paragraph 
(am) does not fit neatly into Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1).  Unlike 
paragraph (a), paragraph (am) is subject to only statutory 
exceptions, not common law rules or a "balancing of interests."  
See Legislative Council Information Memorandum 92-13 at 17.  A 
proper request under (am) is not treated the same as if the 
request had been made by the news media, because the "news 
media" do not make requests under paragraph (am).  They make 
open records requests under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a). 
¶53 The 
very 
existence 
of 
paragraph 
(am) 
may 
have 
facilitated 
legislation 
about 
access 
to 
public 
records 
concerning law enforcement informants.  1993 Assembly Bill 260, 
authored 
by 
Representative 
Rosemary 
Hinkfuss, 
created 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(em) and Wis. Stat. § 19.36(8) relating to 
law enforcement informants.  See 1993 Wis. Act 93.  Her original 
bill carried the following analysis by the Legislative Reference 
Bureau: 
 
Under current law, any person may inspect, copy 
or receive a copy of a public record unless the record 
is specifically exempted from access under state or 
federal law or authorized to be withheld from access 
under state law, or unless the custodian of the record 
determines that the harm done to the public interest 
by providing access to the record outweighs the strong 
public interest in providing access.  Applying this 
test, the Wisconsin supreme court has held that the 
need to maintain the integrity of the government's 
pledges 
of 
confidentiality 
to 
law 
enforcement 
informants may outweigh the public's interest in 
having access to records that could identify a 
confidential informant if a 4-prong test is met: 1) 
there is a clear pledge of confidentiality; 2) the 
pledge was made to obtain information; 3) the pledge 
No. 2003AP500 
26 
 
was necessary to obtain the information; and 4) in the 
particular fact situation, the harm to the public 
interest that would result from permitting access 
outweighs the public interest in providing access.  
Mayfair Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Baldarotta, 162 
Wis. 2d 142, 167-168 (1991). 
 
This bill provides that a law enforcement agency 
shall withhold from access any public record or 
portion of a record containing information that, if 
disclosed, would identify an informant who provided 
information 
to 
that 
agency 
or 
to 
another 
law 
enforcement agency, unless the custodian of the record 
makes a determination, at the time that a request for 
access to the record is made, that the public interest 
in allowing access to the record outweighs the harm 
done to the public interest by providing such access.  
Under the bill, the agency must apply this test 
regardless 
of 
whether 
an 
informant 
requests 
confidentiality and regardless of whether a pledge of 
confidentiality is made. 
Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1993 Wis. Act 93, 
Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau of 1993 Assembly 
Bill 260 (emphasis added). 
¶54 The 
1993 
legislation 
strengthened 
a 
custodian's 
ability to withhold records identifying informants.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 19.36(6) had already authorized redaction.  The 1993 
legislature added Wis. Stat. §§ 19.35(1)(em) and 19.36(8)(b) 
authorizing 
the 
deletion 
of 
parts 
of 
records 
involving 
informants. 
¶55 Against this background, we think that paragraph (am) 
should be interpreted to reflect its original purpose of giving 
an 
individual 
access 
to 
records 
containing 
personally 
identifiable information about the individual, so that he or she 
may determine what information is being maintained and whether 
this information is accurate.  Giving an individual access to 
No. 2003AP500 
27 
 
records of a government investigation that may be used in a 
future proceeding, particularly internal investigative records 
that will identify informants, was never an objective of this 
paragraph.   
¶56 Paragraph (am) is not subject to a balancing of 
interests.  See Legislative Council Information Memorandum 92-13 
at 17.  Therefore, the exceptions to paragraph (am) should not 
be narrowly construed.14  A requester who does not qualify for 
access to records under paragraph (am) will always have the 
right to seek records under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a), as well as 
civil 
and 
criminal 
discovery 
statutes 
in 
appropriate 
circumstances.   
¶57 We conclude that a police officer is not entitled to 
inspect records of an internal investigation pertaining to the 
officer 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am) 
if 
the 
factual 
circumstances reasonably fall within one or more of the 
statutory exceptions to (am).  In this case, Hempel was the 
subject of an investigation "in connection with a complaint."  
The internal investigation records were maintained in connection 
with that complaint and are being held for possible use in 
connection with any future complaint.  Disclosure of the records 
would also expose the names and statements of informants who 
were promised confidentiality for their cooperation in the 
                                                 
14 The dissent asks whether we interpret the exceptions 
"broadly."  See Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶¶98-99.  We 
do not construe the exceptions "broadly."  We simply give effect 
to the statutory language as informed by the legislative 
history. 
No. 2003AP500 
28 
 
internal investigation.  Hempel had no right to more information 
than he received under paragraph (am). 
¶58 This brings us to Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a), which 
provides: 
 
Access to records; fees. (1) Right to Inspection. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, any requester 
has a right to inspect any record.  Substantive common 
law principles construing the right to inspect, copy 
or receive copies of records shall remain in effect.  
The exemptions to the requirement of a governmental 
body to meet in open session under s. 19.85 are 
indicative of public policy, but may be used as 
grounds for denying public access to a record only if 
the authority or legal custodian under s. 19.33 makes 
a specific demonstration that there is a need to 
restrict public access at the time that the request to 
inspect or copy the record is made. 
¶59 Given the clear declaration of policy embodied in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.31, § 19.35(1)(a) must always be interpreted 
with that policy in mind.  This means that even though 
§ 19.35(1)(a) 
recognizes 
both 
statutory 
and 
common 
law 
exceptions and is ultimately subject to a balancing test, the 
section is to be construed "in every instance with a presumption 
of complete public access, consistent with the conduct of 
governmental business."  Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  "[O]nly in an 
exceptional case may access be denied."  Id. 
¶60 The 
statutory 
exceptions 
and 
limitations 
to 
§ 19.35(1)(a) include paragraphs (em), (g), (h), (k), (L), and 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36.  We conclude that none of these provisions 
creates a blanket exception to a request under the facts of this 
case.  Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(8)(b) specifically contemplates a 
balancing of interests. 
No. 2003AP500 
29 
 
2. 
Common Law Exceptions 
¶61 The Department points to common law exceptions that 
would permit it to avoid disclosures beyond those already made.  
It bases its argument on a line of cases from the court of 
appeals, especially Pangman v. Zellmer, 163 Wis. 2d 1070, 473 
N.W.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1991), and Village of Butler v. Cohen, 163 
Wis. 2d 819, 472 N.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1991).  In both Zellmer 
and Cohen, the court of appeals ruled that the custodians of 
police personnel documents were justified in refusing to release 
unredacted copies of those documents when the custodians 
articulated clear policy reasons for nondisclosure.  Zellmer, 
163 Wis. 2d at 1083, 1086-89; Cohen, 163 Wis. 2d at 827.  The 
court cited several valid policy considerations, including the 
protection 
of 
the 
officers' 
privacy 
and 
reputation, 
the 
potential chilling on supervisors' willingness to candidly 
assess officers if the assessments became public, and police 
agencies' 
ability 
to 
attract 
quality 
candidates 
for 
job 
openings.  Zellmer, 163 Wis. 2d at 1083, 1086-89; Cohen, 163 
Wis. 2d at 828-29.  In Zellmer, the court approved nondisclosure 
because it would hamper the department's ability to thoroughly 
investigate wrongful conduct.  163 Wis. 2d at 1082-83. 
¶62 Zellmer and Cohen do not impose a blanket rule 
excepting the disclosure of any "rank-and-file police officer's" 
personnel records.  An open records analysis under paragraph (a) 
is rarely subject to blanket exceptions or bright line rules.  
Each request will lead to a fact-intensive inquiry.  Under this 
statutory structure, the legislature entrusted the records 
No. 2003AP500 
30 
 
custodian with substantial discretion.  The custodian, mindful 
of the strong presumption of openness, must perform the open 
records disclosure analysis on a case-by-case basis.  In 
situations such as this one, in which the requested records do 
not fit within any blanket exception, the records custodian must 
proceed to the final step of the analysis and perform the 
Woznicki balancing test. 
C. 
Balancing Test 
¶63 As the custodian considers an open records request 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a), the custodian must consider "all 
the 
relevant 
factors" 
to 
determine 
"whether 
permitting 
inspection would result in harm to the public interest which 
outweighs the legislative policy recognizing the public interest 
in allowing inspection."  Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 192 (citing 
Newspapers, Inc., 89 Wis. 2d at 427); see also Linzmeyer, 254 
Wis. 2d 306, ¶24.  In other words, the custodian must determine 
whether 
the 
surrounding 
factual 
circumstances 
create 
an 
"exceptional case" not governed by the strong presumption of 
openness.  Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  Although our prior cases have 
not expressly defined "exceptional case," we conclude that an 
"exceptional case" under paragraph (a) exists when the facts are 
such that the public policy interests favoring nondisclosure 
outweigh 
the 
public policy 
interests 
favoring 
disclosure, 
notwithstanding the strong presumption favoring disclosure. 
¶64 Applying 
the 
"exceptional 
case" 
public 
policy 
balancing test to the specific facts before us, we conclude that 
No. 2003AP500 
31 
 
the public's interest in keeping these records confidential 
outweighs the presumptive public interest in disclosure.  
¶65 This is an uncommon case.  Typically, a person subject 
to misconduct allegations attempts to prevent disclosure of the 
investigative records.  In this case, Hempel is the party 
seeking release of the records.  Hempel advises us that he wants 
to review these records so that he may conduct his own 
investigation, 
interviewing 
witnesses 
that 
the 
Department 
interviewed, in case the Department decides to use this 
complaint against him should it receive a similar complaint in 
the future.  We note, however, that Hempel received an 
unredacted copy of Kaye Howver's complaint as well as all the 
material that the Sauk County Sheriff's Department compiled 
during its simultaneous investigation of Hempel pursuant to 
similar allegations.  This disclosure substantially weakens 
Hempel's proffered reason for wanting the documents because 
those unredacted materials contain the names of at least 21 
potential 
witnesses 
with 
whom 
Hempel 
could 
begin 
his 
"investigation," including the complainant herself.  We do not 
know whether the Department actually interviewed all the 
potential witnesses named in the complaint, but Hempel could 
have interviewed any or all of them at his discretion.  With 
such a fertile start for his investigation, it is hard to 
understand why Hempel needs further assistance.   
¶66 Hempel asserts that his actual motivation in seeking 
the documents is irrelevant.  In fact, requesters under the Open 
Records Law need not identify themselves, or state a purpose for 
No. 2003AP500 
32 
 
their request.  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(i).  When performing a 
balancing test, however, a records custodian almost inevitably 
must evaluate context to some degree.   
¶67 The dissenting judge in the court of appeals cast the 
issue in light of the public's right to know of the sexual 
harassment allegations within the Department.  Hempel, 268 
Wis. 2d 534, ¶31 (Dykman, J., dissenting).  Judge Dykman accused 
the Department of "hiding" the evidence of discrimination from 
the public.   
¶68 Evidence of official cover-up would be a very potent 
reason to disclose public records.  The public has a very strong 
interest in being informed about public officials who have been 
derelict in their duty.  In this case, however, we do not sense 
that cover-up constitutes any part of the basis for the 
Department's position.  We think the Department's motive is more 
accurately described in the court of appeals majority opinion, 
see Hempel, 268 Wis. 2d 534, ¶¶20-21, and in the Department's 
stated concern about potential future harassment. 
¶69 The Department provided Hempel with an unredacted copy 
of the complaint and then released a redacted copy.  It told 
Hempel the redacted copy was available to any citizen.  In our 
view, these redacted records do not reveal "little more than 
nothing," as the dissenting court of appeals judge contends.  On 
the 
contrary, 
despite 
redactions, 
the 
records 
provide 
a 
substantial degree of understanding about the alleged problem 
within the Department.  As we have noted, one of the documents 
contained the following text: "After (redacted) asked if 
No. 2003AP500 
33 
 
(redacted) was in trouble I explained to (redacted) that I 
received information within the last twenty-four hours or so 
that (redacted) may have suffered some harassment by one of the 
Baraboo Police Department Officers."  The document continues: 
"(Redacted) said that (redacted) was talking to (redacted) and 
made the following statements, 'Women are brainless'; 'Women 
should not be working in police work'; and 'Women should not be 
working 
at 
all.'" 
 
These 
documents 
provide 
substantial 
information with which a citizen or the news media could pursue 
an inquiry on sexual harassment within the police department.  
The inquiry could start with the known complainant. 
¶70 The 
redaction 
authorized 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6) 
protected the privacy and confidentiality of certain witnesses 
without 
hiding 
alleged 
conduct. 
 
We 
believe 
that 
the 
Department's release of the redacted documents weighs heavily in 
the balancing test. 
¶71 In addition to these factors, other evidence supports 
our conclusion.  As the Department noted in its letter denying 
access 
to 
Hempel, 
disclosure 
would 
violate 
the 
City's 
confidentiality policy.  Hempel strenuously urges us to reject 
this consideration, contending that an authority may not avoid 
the operation of the Open Records Law simply by enacting its own 
policy.  He is of course correct.  The City——indeed, any 
municipality——cannot implement a policy that provides for a 
blanket exception from the Open Records Law.  But the Department 
may proffer the confidentiality concerns of witnesses or a 
No. 2003AP500 
34 
 
complainant as a factor the custodian may consider in the 
balancing test.   
¶72 We agree with the Department that in the future, 
complainants and witnesses will become less likely to make 
candid statements if they know that the accused may access their 
statements through an open records request.  Some officers, 
fearful of being labeled as "whistle blowers," may blanch at the 
thought of offering damaging evidence about a colleague if they 
know that their names and comments will become public record. 
¶73 We believe the Department's concern about witness 
confidentiality carries special weight in cases like this one 
involving sexual harassment.  The City has enacted a sexual 
harassment policy pursuant to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission's (EEOC's) recommendation.15  The Department handled 
the Hempel complaint in accordance with that policy.  The 
Department argues that victims and witnesses might feel an 
increased level of embarrassment if their names were revealed, 
and this might make them less likely to come forward.  The 
Department may argue reasonably that its attempt to avoid such a 
                                                 
15 The EEOC recommends that: 
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of 
sexual harassment.  An employer should take all steps 
necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, 
such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing 
strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, 
informing employees of their right to raise and how to 
raise the issue of harassment under Title VII, and 
developing methods to sensitize all concerned. 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (2004). 
No. 2003AP500 
35 
 
chilling effect on sexual harassment complaints must weigh in 
the balance.  Neither this opinion nor language in the court of 
appeals' opinion should be interpreted to suggest a blanket 
exception to the open records law for EEOC complaints.  Hempel, 
268 Wis. 2d 534, ¶20 n.4.  Rather, as in every other case, the 
records custodian must perform the balancing test to determine 
whether the public interest in nondisclosure in the particular 
case outweighs the public interest in disclosure. 
¶74 We further agree with the Department that release of 
the information could cause a loss of morale within the 
Department if police officers believed that their personnel 
files were readily available to the public.  At oral argument, 
the Department contended that this might even make officers 
reluctant to make arrests out of fear that their personnel 
records would quickly be passed on to defense counsel.  The 
Department did not provide any facts to support this concern.  
Nonetheless, without fully endorsing the Department's argument, 
we agree that a loss of morale is plausible.   
¶75 The Department also contends that it will encounter 
difficulty 
attracting quality 
candidates to 
become 
police 
officers if there is a perception that its employees' personnel 
files are regularly open for public review.  The Department 
presented no evidence to support this view.  Public employees 
are frequently subject to a greater degree of public scrutiny 
than their private counterparts.  This scrutiny comes with the 
territory.  Certainly, prominent public officials must have a 
lower expectation of personal privacy than a regular public 
No. 2003AP500 
36 
 
employee.  Wisconsin Newspress, 199 Wis. 2d at 787.  This case, 
however, involves a rank-and-file police officer.  If the 
scrutiny of rank-and-file officers extends too far, it may 
indeed discourage qualified candidates from entering police 
work.  Accordingly, we conclude that this factor weighs slightly 
in the Department's favor. 
¶76 Finally, the Department voices the concern that some 
of the information that would be released might be factually 
inaccurate and cause damage to the subject's reputation.  This 
would not be a concern if the information were released only to 
the individual requester under paragraph (am), but information 
released under paragraph (a) enters the public domain and is 
available to anyone. 
¶77 Once a secret is out of the box, it can never be put 
back.  In this respect, records dealing with personnel issues 
are slightly different from records concerning, say, public 
finance or highway contracts.  As the court of appeals noted in 
Cohen, disclosure may inhibit candid assessments of employees in 
personnel records.  Cohen, 163 Wis. 2d at 828 n.3.  The court 
also detected a legislative interest in limiting access to 
personnel files of public employees.  Id. at 829.  We cited this 
language with approval in Woznicki.  202 Wis. 2d at 188. 
¶78 The privacy interests in this case are more compelling 
than those at issue in most of our prior cases because we are 
not presented here with an alleged wrongdoer trying to cover up 
evidence.  Rather, the Department, as custodian, is trying to 
protect the complainant and reluctant witnesses involved in its 
No. 2003AP500 
37 
 
investigation.  This factor is not dispositive, but it weighs on 
the Department's side. 
¶79 The court of appeals noted that the Department did not 
provide any hard evidence to support this concern.  Hempel, 268 
Wis. 2d 534, ¶18.  In fact, the Department provided few facts to 
support any of its concerns.  However, the statute does not 
require the records custodian to give facts supporting the 
reasons for its denial.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(b).  It 
merely requires the custodian to provide specific reasons for 
the denial.  Id.  The court reviewing the custodian's decision 
is free to evaluate the strength of the custodian's reasoning in 
the absence of facts.  Id. (custodian's decision subject to 
mandamus 
review 
by 
circuit 
court); 
see 
also 
Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1).  Factual support for the custodian's 
reasoning is likely to strengthen the custodian's case before a 
circuit court. 
¶80 After reviewing all the enumerated considerations,16 we 
conclude that the public policy factors favoring nondisclosure 
                                                 
16 We disagree with the dissent's assertion that any 
custodian proffering the same reasons Baraboo has can avoid 
disclosure, and that we therefore create a de facto blanket 
exception.  Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶128.  Any 
balancing test is necessarily factually intensive, and the facts 
peculiar to a particular case may dictate a different outcome 
even if parties advance the same general justifications for 
disclosure. 
No. 2003AP500 
38 
 
are strong enough to overcome the substantial presumption in 
favor of disclosure.17 
¶81 We reiterate that the outcome here will not be the 
same in every similar case.  The records custodian must evaluate 
the factors on each side of the balance, keeping in mind the 
strong presumption 
favoring 
disclosure, 
and 
evaluate 
each 
request within its own factually specific context.  The facts in 
this case dictate that we affirm the court of appeals. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶82 When a person makes an open records request for 
records containing personally identifiable information under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am), the person is entitled to inspect the 
records unless the surrounding factual circumstances reasonably 
fall within one or more of the statutory exceptions to (am).   
¶83 If the person makes a more general open records 
request under § 19.35(1)(a), the records custodian, keeping in 
mind the strong legislative presumption favoring disclosure, 
must determine whether the requested records are subject to an 
exception that may or will prevent disclosure.  Two general 
types of exceptions may apply: statutory exceptions and common 
law exceptions.  Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶10.  If neither a 
statute nor common law creates a blanket exception, the 
custodian must decide whether the strong presumption favoring 
                                                 
17 The disclosure of public records often has the abstract 
value of promoting accountability by public officers and 
employees.  If disclosure will have the effect of undermining 
accountability by making internal investigation more difficult, 
that consequence may be considered. 
No. 2003AP500 
39 
 
access and disclosure is overcome by some even stronger public 
policy favoring limited access or nondisclosure.  Id., ¶11 
(citing Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 192-93).  To determine whether 
the presumption of openness is overcome by another public policy 
concern, we apply the balancing test articulated by the court in 
Woznicki and Newspapers, Inc. 
¶84 Applying these principles to the facts of this case, 
we conclude, 
first, that 
Hempel 
was 
the 
subject 
of an 
investigation "in connection with a complaint," an express 
statutory exception to paragraph (am).  Disclosure would also 
expose the names with statements of informants who were promised 
confidentiality 
for 
their 
cooperation 
in 
the 
internal 
investigation.  He therefore had no right to more information 
under paragraph (am) than he received.  Second, in this case, 
the public interest in nondisclosure of police investigative 
records outweighs the public interest in releasing the records 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a).  As a result, the Department had 
the authority to deny Hempel's open records request under 
§ 19.35(1)(a).  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶85 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
"The 
denial of public access generally is contrary to the public 
interest, and only in an exceptional case may access be 
denied."18  So sayeth the legislature.  The majority opinion 
candidly admits this is not an "exceptional case," calling it 
only "uncommon."19  Because neither the majority opinion nor the 
City of Baraboo has demonstrated how this case is exceptional or 
even uncommon, I dissent.   
¶86 Faced with trying to craft a standard to cover this 
decidedly unexceptional case, the majority opinion ends up, 
                                                 
18 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.31. 
 
The 
Wisconsin 
Legislature's 
Declaration of Policy as to access to governmental records reads 
as follows: 
In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government is dependent upon an informed electorate, 
it is declared to be the public policy of this state 
that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and 
the official acts of those officers and employees who 
represent them.  Further, providing persons with such 
information is declared to be an essential function of 
a representative government and an integral part of 
the routine duties of officers and employees whose 
responsibility it is to provide such information.  To 
that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in 
every instance with a presumption of complete public 
access, consistent with the conduct of governmental 
business.  The denial of public access generally is 
contrary to the public interest, and only in an 
exceptional case may access be denied. 
Id. 
19 Majority op., ¶65. 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
2 
 
despite its assertions, creating a rule that unfortunately can 
be applied in a broad array of cases to deny access to records.   
¶87 I disagree with the majority opinion on both its 
interpretation of the statutory exceptions to record access 
provided in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am) and its conclusion that 
there is merit in the reasons proffered by the Baraboo Police 
Department 
for 
denying 
disclosure 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(a). 
¶88 Hempel made "a formal request pursuant to Chapter 19" 
and "Sec. 103.13" that the Police Chief produce copies of any 
and all materials gathered or considered by him in connection 
with the complaint against him.20  The majority opinion addresses 
two provisions in chapter 19, discussing first Wis. Stat. 
§19.35(1)(am) and then § 19.35(1)(a).  The majority's order for 
considering 
the 
statutes 
is 
backwards, 
according 
to 
the 
directions set forth in § 19.35(4)(c)1.-3. and the plain 
language of § 19.35(1)(am).   
¶89 The majority opinion recognizes the legislature's 
crystal-clear mandate as to the order in which to consider the 
                                                 
20 Letter from Attorney Aaron N. Halstead to Chief Lobe 
(Jan. 24, 2001), reproduced in Petitioner's Appendix at 135.  
An open records request need not specify the statutory 
provision under which it is being made.  The open records law 
does not require "a request to contain any 'magic words' nor 
[does it] prohibit the use of any words."  ECO, Inc. v. City of 
Elkhorn, 2002 WI App 302, ¶23, 259 Wis. 2d 276, 655 N.W.2d 510 
(Open records request made to city mistakenly cited the federal 
Freedom of Information Act rather than chapter 19; deemed 
sufficient).  The request is sufficient if "'it reasonably 
describes the requested record or the information requested.'"  
Id., ¶23 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(h)). 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
3 
 
two statutes,21 but does not take it seriously.22  The majority's 
order in addressing the statutes demonstrates not only a 
disregard for the legislature's clear instructions, but also 
fosters its mistaken interpretation of the statutes.  
¶90 According 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(4)(c), 
when 
an 
authority receives a request for access to records under either 
§ 19.35(1)(a) or (1)(am), the authority shall first determine 
whether the requester has a right to inspect or copy a record 
under § 19.35(1)(a).  If the authority grants the request for 
access under § 19.35(1)(a), it need go no further.  If the 
authority determines that the requester does not have a right to 
access to the record under § 19.35(1)(a), the authority should 
then turn to § 19.35(1)(am) to determine whether the request 
should be granted or denied.  Section 19.35(1)(am) thus grants 
an 
individual 
requester 
greater 
access 
to 
records 
with 
personally identifiable information than § 19.35(1)(a) grants to 
all other requesters who are not seeking personally identifiable 
information.23 
                                                 
21 Majority op., ¶29. 
22 Majority op., ¶32.  The majority opinion nevertheless 
persists in writing that if Hempel cannot get the record under 
§ 19.35(1)(am) he "will always have the right to seek records 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a)."  Majority op., ¶56. 
23 This order is also set forth in Wisconsin Legislative 
Council Information Memorandum 92-13, New Laws Relating to 
Personal Information Contained in State and Local Government 
Records (1991 Wisconsin Acts 39, 269 and 317) at 17-18 (June 16, 
1992). 
Although the majority opinion relies on this memorandum, it 
relates to laws that were later revised. 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶91 The plain language of § 19.35(1)(am) further resolves 
the issue of the order of addressing the statutes.  Section 
19.35(1)(am) begins by saying, "In addition to any right under 
[§ 19.35(1)] par. (a), any requester who is an individual" may 
have 
access 
to 
personally 
identifiable 
records 
of 
that 
individual.  Because Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am) starts with the 
words "[i]n addition to any right under [§ 19.35(1)(a)]" and 
does not require the government authority to balance interests,24 
§ 19.35(1)(am) 
allows 
greater 
access 
to 
information 
for 
personally identified persons than does § 19.35(1)(a).      
¶92 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.35(1)(am) gives a requester more 
extensive access to information in which the requester is 
personally identifiable than does § 19.35(1)(a) because, as the 
majority opinion recognizes, the purpose of paragraph (am) is to 
enable a person to "determine what information is being 
maintained 
and 
whether 
this 
information 
is 
accurate."25  
Paragraph (am) must therefore be interpreted as an extended 
right of access to requesters seeking personally identifiable 
information to allow these requesters to determine the nature 
and correctness of the information being maintained. 
¶93 Despite the incorrect order in which the majority 
opinion discusses the statutes, for the reader's ease I shall 
follow the order the majority opinion uses. 
¶94 Hempel sought access to records related to allegations 
that he engaged in sexual harassment.  His request made it clear 
                                                 
24 Majority op., ¶56. 
25 Majority op., ¶55. 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
5 
 
that he was seeking personally identifiable information about 
himself.   
I 
¶95 Section 
19.35(1)(am) 
grants 
any 
requester, 
"in 
addition" to any other right of access under § 19.35(1)(a), "the 
right to inspect any record containing personally identifiable 
information pertaining to the individual that is maintained by 
an 
authority . . . ." 
 
The 
statute 
then 
excepts 
certain 
enumerated records from the right to inspect, two of which are 
at issue here. 
¶96 According to the majority opinion, the Baraboo Police 
Department may deny Hempel access to internal investigation 
memoranda pertaining to Hempel on the basis of either of two 
enumerated exceptions to open records set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(am)1. and 2.b.26  Because I conclude that neither of 
these statutory exceptions applies in this case, I would require 
the Baraboo Police Department to release internal investigation 
memoranda with information redacted as necessary.   
¶97 The first exception on which the majority hangs its 
hat is § 19.35(1)(am)1.  Under that provision, the right to 
inspect does not apply to the following records: 
Any 
record 
containing 
personally 
identifiable 
information 
that 
is 
collected 
or 
maintained 
in 
connection with a complaint, investigation or other 
circumstances that may lead to an enforcement action, 
administrative proceeding, arbitration proceeding or 
court proceeding, or any such record that is collected 
or maintained in connection with such an action or 
proceeding. 
                                                 
26 Majority op., ¶57. 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
6 
 
 
Specifically, the majority asserts that Hempel was the "subject 
of an investigation 'in connection with a complaint.'  The 
internal investigation records were maintained in connection 
with that complaint and are being held for possible use in 
connection with any future complaint."27 
 
¶98 The majority opinion declares that the exception is 
ambiguous and turns to legislative history.  The legislative 
history cited lends little if any information about interpreting 
this exception, but the majority opinion nevertheless surmises 
from the legislative history that the exception in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(am)1. should "not be construed narrowly."  If it is 
not to be construed narrowly, is it to be construed broadly?28  
                                                 
27 Majority op., ¶57. 
28 Although an interesting exploration of legislative and 
executive 
wordsmithing, 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
review 
of 
selected excerpts of legislative history offers no conclusive 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am)1. or 2.b. in keeping 
with or contrary to the plain language of the statute. 
The majority opinion seizes on the governor's partial veto 
as indicating that exceptions have to be interpreted broadly 
because the governor's partial veto eliminated some legislative 
language.  Majority op., ¶48 n.13, ¶50.  Governor Thompson's 
full veto message explains the veto as follows: 
Section 26s specifies that records under the Personal 
Information Practices 
Law 
that are collected or 
maintained 
in 
connection 
with 
a 
complaint, 
investigation or circumstances that may lead to an 
enforcement 
action, 
court 
proceeding 
or 
other 
proceeding 
may 
be 
released 
one 
year 
after 
the 
conclusion of the action, proceeding or investigation 
or one year after the filing of a complaint.  I am 
vetoing this 
provision 
because it 
would 
require 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
7 
 
The majority opinion denies that it intends to construe the 
exception broadly.29  I gather that the majority opinion is 
advocating that the exception be construed "just right."   
¶99 Declaring 
that 
the 
exception 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(am)1. 
should 
"not 
be 
construed 
narrowly" 
is 
incongruous.  Section 19.35(1)(am) grants individuals seeking 
personally identifiable information additional rights of access 
as compared to access by the public.  Why should the exception 
to this extensive grant of access be read "not narrowly"?  Such 
a reading of the exception defeats the extensive right of access 
granted.  Furthermore, the general rule for interpreting 
exceptions to the open records law is that they are to be 
construed narrowly.30  I would follow this general rule in 
interpreting § 19.35(1)(am)1.    
¶100 The majority opinion's reasoning is that "[p]aragraph 
(am) 
is 
not 
subject 
to 
a 
balancing 
of 
                                                                                                                                                             
prosecutors 
and 
investigators 
to 
turn 
over 
confidential files only one year after the filing of a 
complaint, 
at 
which 
time 
a 
sensitive 
complaint 
investigation may not be concluded.  Also, I do not 
believe that confidential investigation files should 
be available for inspection by criminal defendants at 
any time.    
Governor Tommy Thompson, Veto Message to Senate Bill 483 
(available at Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, WI). 
29 Majority op., ¶56 n.14. 
30 Hathaway v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, 116 Wis. 2d 388, 397, 
342 N.W.2d 682 (1984). 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
8 
 
interests. . . . Therefore, the exceptions to paragraph (am) 
should not be narrowly construed."31  The conclusion does not 
follow from the premise.  
¶101 Paragraph (am) is not subject to a balancing test 
because the legislature has already done the balancing.  In 
adopting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(am) 
(granting 
access 
to 
personally identifiable information) and § 103.13 (granting 
access to one's own personnel files) the legislature has made 
the policy determination that an individual, above all others, 
has a right to access documents that may personally impact that 
individual, except in circumstances specified in the statutes. 
¶102 So 
when 
the 
majority 
opinion 
says 
that 
under 
§ 19.35(1)(am), "the person is entitled to inspect the records 
unless the surrounding factual circumstances reasonably fall 
within one or more of the statutory exceptions . . . ,"32 I am 
unsure as to what "reasonably fall[s]" means, but the majority 
cannot mean that a balance test is conducted, because we know 
there is no balancing done in evaluating a request under (am).33  
Rather, the majority must simply mean that the person requesting 
the information is entitled to inspect the record unless one of 
                                                 
31 Majority op., ¶56. 
32 Majority op., ¶¶27, 82. 
33 Majority op., ¶27 ("These requests are not subject to any 
balancing test; the legislature has done the balancing by 
enacting statutory exceptions to the disclosure requirements."). 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
9 
 
the statutory exceptions in (am) applies in that particular 
case.  I disagree that an exception in (am) applies in this 
case.  
¶103 The majority opinion concludes that the information 
Hempel requests falls within the exception because there was an 
ongoing investigation when he made his request.34  On what basis 
does the majority opinion reach this conclusion, when the 
Baraboo Police Chief specifically stated that no further action 
would be taken on the sexual harassment complaint?  The majority 
relies on the fact that the Police Chief advised Hempel that if 
another complaint of a similar nature arose in the future, the 
closed complaint could be reexamined.35  Thus, the majority 
opinion states that "[t]he instant complaint would then be a 
record 'maintained' in connection with a pending complaint."36  
¶104 There are two reasons why there was no ongoing 
investigation for the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am)1.  
First, the Police Chief advised Hempel that the documents would 
not be released under Wis. Stat. § 103.13 because no records in 
Hempel's personnel file were used for the purposes specified in 
§ 103.13.  Section 103.13 requires "[e]very employer . . . upon 
the request of an employee . . . [to] permit the employee to 
                                                 
34 Majority op., ¶57. 
35 Majority op., ¶37. 
36 Majority op., ¶37. 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
10 
 
inspect any personnel documents which are used or which have 
been used in determining that employee's qualifications for 
employment, 
promotion, 
transfer, 
additional 
compensation, 
termination or other disciplinary action . . . ."37   
¶105 The Chief's explanation for refusing to release the 
information under Wis. Stat. § 103.13 means that there was no 
                                                 
37 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 103.13(6) 
provides 
the 
following 
exceptions to records open to employees: 
(6)  Exceptions.  The right of the employee or the 
employee's designated representative under sub. (3) to 
inspect his or her personnel records does not apply 
to: 
(a) Records relating to the investigation of possible 
criminal offenses committed by that employee. 
(b) Letters of reference for that employee. 
(c) Any portion of a test document, except that the 
employee may see a cumulative total test score for 
either a section of the test document or for the 
entire test document. 
(d) Materials 
used 
by 
the 
employer 
for 
staff 
management 
planning, 
including 
judgments 
or 
recommendations concerning future salary increases and 
other 
wage 
treatments, 
management 
bonus 
plans, 
promotions and job assignments or other comments or 
ratings used for the employer's planning purposes. 
(e) Information of a personal nature about a person 
other 
than 
the 
employee 
if 
disclosure 
of 
the 
information would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of the other person's privacy. 
(f) An employer who does not maintain personnel 
records. 
(g) Records relevant to any other pending claim 
between the employer and the employee which may be 
discovered in a judicial proceeding. 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
11 
 
ongoing investigation into the employee's conduct.38  I do not 
determine whether the Police Chief was correct in denying the 
request under § 103.13.  That issue is not before us.  Rather I 
make the following point:  It is hard to understand how the 
majority can assert there was an ongoing investigation in light 
of the Police Chief's assurances to the contrary and his refusal 
to release the documents pursuant to § 103.13.  
¶106 Perhaps because of the obstacles to fitting the 
request into the Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am)1. exception, the 
majority opinion has difficulty persuading itself that Hempel is 
the subject of an ongoing investigation for the purposes of 
§ 19.35(1)(am)1. and should be denied access to records.  The 
majority thus hedges its conclusion, stating: "Hence, to some 
degree, the instant 'investigation or other circumstance' was 
still 'ongoing' at the time of Hempel's open records request."39   
¶107 The second reason there is no "ongoing investigation" 
for the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am)1. is that the 
Police Chief's memo advised Hempel that the document describing 
the complaint would be kept for three years starting June 8, 
2000.40  Hempel argues that no investigation proceeded after June 
2003, yet this case (and the ongoing investigation theory) 
persists. 
¶108 As the majority opinion recognizes, the purpose of 
paragraph (am) is to enable a person to "determine what 
                                                 
38 See majority op., ¶11. 
39 Majority op., ¶37 (emphasis added). 
40 Majority op., ¶37. 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
12 
 
information is being maintained and whether this information is 
accurate."41  In keeping with this objective, I conclude that 
Hempel's request does not fall within the exception to access 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am)1.  The information should 
therefore be released to Hempel with appropriate redactions as 
needed.     
¶109 The majority opinion next addresses the exception to 
access 
to 
open 
records 
contained 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(am)2.b., which reads as follows: 
2. 
Any 
record 
containing 
personally 
identifiable 
information that, if disclosed, would do any of the 
following: 
. . . . 
b. Identify a confidential informant. 
¶110 The majority opinion quickly concludes that the phrase 
"confidential informant"42 is ambiguous and ranges widely in 
examining legislative history.  The majority opinion claims that 
that § 19.36(8)(a)1. (relating to confidential informants to law 
enforcement agencies) is part of the background against which 
paragraph (am) should be interpreted43 and that "[t]he very 
existence of paragraph (am) may have facilitated [the adoption 
of § 19.36(8)(a)1.] about access to public records concerning 
law enforcement informants."44 
                                                 
41 Majority op., ¶55. 
42 Majority op., ¶44. 
43 Majority op., ¶55. 
44 Majority op., ¶53. 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶111 However, the majority opinion never examines the 
definition of "informant" in Wis. Stat. § 19.36(8)(a)1., which 
refers 
to 
requests 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35 
(1)(a), 
or 
§ 19.36(8)(b), which authorizes redaction of records identifying 
informants 
and release 
of 
records 
identifying 
informants. 
Section 19.36(8)(a)1. reads as follows: 
"Informant" 
means 
an 
individual 
who 
requests 
confidentiality from a law enforcement agency in 
conjunction with providing information to that agency 
or, pursuant to an express promise of confidentiality 
by a law enforcement agency or under circumstances in 
which a promise of confidentiality would reasonably be 
implied, provides information to a law enforcement 
agency or, is working with a law enforcement agency to 
obtain information . . . . 
¶112 Section 19.36(8)(a)1. requires an express condition of 
confidentiality in exchange for information or circumstances in 
which a promise of confidentiality would be implied.  Section 
19.36(8)(b) allows the authority to release a record after 
redacting information identifying the informant or to release 
the record with identifying information intact if the public 
interest in open records outweighs the harm done the public by 
providing access.   
¶113 After examining legislative history, the majority 
opinion does not define "confidential informant."  The closest 
it comes is the assertion that the Department claims "it told 
witnesses that any information they provided would remain 
confidential 
and 
therefore 
this 
exception 
[Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(am)2.b.] 
would 
apply 
to 
prevent 
disclosure."  
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
14 
 
Majority op. ¶¶39, 57.  The Chief's affidavit, however, does not 
state that such express promises were made.45 
¶114 If 
the 
majority 
is 
saying 
that 
a 
confidential 
informant means any person to whom the Department promised 
confidentiality or any person who gives a statement under a 
policy of confidential investigation, the majority is allowing 
each governmental entity to avoid the operation of the open 
records law by promising confidentiality or instituting a policy 
of confidentiality.  I do not believe the statute allows such a 
result. 
¶115 The 
majority's 
conclusion 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(am)2.b. 
bars 
the 
release 
of 
the 
records 
is 
unsupported by the record before us, the statutes, or case law.  
¶116 The 
record 
shows 
that 
the 
Police 
Department 
successfully redacted personally identifiable information in the 
documents that it did release.  There is no reason it could not 
do the same in any other documents.  The documents can be 
redacted pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6), which provides that 
"the authority having custody of the record shall provide the 
information that is subject to disclosure and delete the 
information that is not subject to disclosure from the record 
before release."  Section 19.36(8) provides for redacting 
information about informants when a request for records is made 
                                                 
45 The Chief's affidavit merely interprets the Harassment 
Policy's stating that a confidential investigation would be 
conducted as a promise of confidentiality.  Hempel's brief in 
this court seems to accept that such promises were made. 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
15 
 
under § 19.35.  In order to protect the names of informants, the 
Police Department can simply redact the names from the record.   
¶117 The majority opinion admits as much in discussing the 
records Hempel did get access to: "The redaction authorized by 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6) protected the privacy and confidentiality 
of certain witnesses without hiding alleged conduct."46 
¶118 Prior case law illustrates that in the past, names 
have 
been 
ordered 
redacted 
when 
necessary 
to 
protect 
individuals.  For example, in Linzmeyer v. Forcey,47 this court 
stated that the students who had provided information regarding 
a high school teacher "'could be protected by a redaction of the 
Report in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6).'"48 
¶119 In Linzmeyer, the court concluded that the names of 
the students should be redacted because they had privacy 
interests, 
but 
that 
the 
students 
were 
not 
"confidential 
informants" because none of the students gave information "in 
exchange for a promise of confidentiality."  Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 
                                                 
46 Majority op., ¶70. 
47 Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 646 
N.W.2d 811. 
48 Majority op., ¶42 (quoting Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 
¶40). 
Consistent with Linzmeyer, this court in an earlier case 
upheld a denial of access to records because "portions of the 
records . . . would reveal the name of a confidential informant 
who had been given a pledge of confidentiality by the Department 
[of Revenue] in exchange for the information [concerning the 
informant's 
employer's 
tax 
returns]." 
 
Mayfair 
Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. v. Baldarotta, 162 Wis. 2d 142, 149, 469 
N.W.2d 638 (1991). 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
16 
 
2d 306, ¶20.  The court went on to say that "[a]lthough it is 
arguable that some of the students may have acted under 
circumstances 
that 
reasonably 
implied 
a 
promise 
of 
confidentiality, this court is not in a position to determine 
whether that was the case."  Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶20. 
¶120 The Baraboo Police Department rests its confidential 
informants argument on its contention that it was conducting a 
"confidential investigation" under the City's Harassment Policy.  
The Harrassment Policy in the record merely states that upon 
receiving a complaint of sexual harassment an official shall 
conduct a confidential investigation.49  The Policy contains no 
promise of confidentiality in exchange for information.   
¶121 If this Policy were read to satisfy the standard for 
"confidential informant" under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am)2.b., 
and applied as the majority opinion applies it here, can't every 
public 
employer 
under 
a 
blanket 
of 
a 
"confidential 
investigation" policy protect documents from release and deny an 
individual access under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(2)b?    
¶122 The record does not show any express grant of 
confidentiality in the present case, and the City's Harassment 
Policy cannot be interpreted as rendering all employees who give 
any information "confidential informants."  In any event, there 
                                                 
49 The relevant portion of the policy prohibiting sexual 
harassment reads as follows: "Upon receiving a complaint of 
harassment prohibited by this policy, the department head, 
supervisor or official to whom the complaint was made should 
promptly report the complaint to the Mayor and the Chairperson 
of the Personnel Committee and also conduct a confidential 
investigation of the alleged harassing activity." 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
17 
 
is no good reason why, like in Linzmeyer, names could not have 
been redacted in the present case from internal investigatory 
documents. 
¶123 Unlike the majority, I would give Hempel documents 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am), redacted as needed.  
II 
¶124 The majority opinion then examines Hempel's request 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) for access to the relevant 
records.  Wisconsin Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) grants a requester the 
right to inspect any record and reads as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, any requester has 
a right to inspect any record.  Substantive common law 
principles construing the right to inspect, copy or 
receive copies of records shall remain in effect.  The 
exemptions to the requirement of a governmental body 
to meet in open session under s. 19.85 are indicative 
of public policy, but may be used as grounds for 
denying public access to a record only if the 
authority or legal custodian under s. 19.33 makes a 
specific demonstration that there is a need to 
restrict public access at the time that the request to 
inspect or copy the record is made. 
¶125 There are statutory and common law exceptions to 
disclosure.  When none applies, Wisconsin law requires a records 
custodian to conduct a balancing test.50  The custodian in the 
instant case concluded that permitting inspection would harm the 
public interest and that this harm trumps the legislatively 
recognized 
public 
interest 
in 
an 
open 
and 
transparent 
government.   
                                                 
50 Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶25 (citing Woznicki v. 
Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 183-84, 549 N.W.2d 699 (1996)); see 
also majority op., ¶28. 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
18 
 
¶126 The majority frames the issue as follows:  "In other 
words, the custodian [of the records] must determine whether the 
surrounding factual circumstances create an 'exceptional case' 
not governed by the strong presumption of openness."51  Both the 
City of Baraboo and Hempel agree that the City must show that 
the harmful effects that might occur in this case outweigh the 
presumption of disclosure.52    
¶127 The Police Department provided six reasons it believes 
make the instant case an exceptional case justifying the denial 
of Hempel's request for records.  As I shall show, however, the 
reasons proffered are applicable to every case in which a 
complaint is filed against a police officer; none is specific to 
the instant request for information.  None demonstrates that 
this case presents exceptional circumstances justifying denial 
of Hempel's request for records.  The Police Chief's reasons 
have been paraded before this and other courts time and again.  
Yet the majority opinion proceeds as if this case is the first 
time the court has seen these reasons.    
¶128 The reasons seem to be just a general expression of a 
reluctance to reveal records.  Government officials (like most 
people) prefer to work outside the public eye.  This uneasiness 
with revealing records runs counter to the legislature's 
unequivocal declaration in Wis. Stat. § 19.31 that government 
records are presumptively open.  By accepting these reasons as 
valid the majority opinion appears, I think, to allow a police 
                                                 
51 Majority op., ¶63. 
52 Brief of City of Baraboo at 5; Brief of Hempel at 20-21. 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
19 
 
department (and other entities) to adopt a blanket exception to 
determine when its records are off limits.   
¶129 I will state and then address each "exceptional 
reason" relating to the instant case in turn. 
¶130 Reason #1.  The City harassment policy provides for a 
confidential investigation.   
¶131 Reason #2.  Disclosure would interfere with the 
ability 
to 
conduct 
thorough, 
confidential, 
internal 
investigations.   
¶132 Reason #3.  "Disclosure . . . would interfere with and 
hamper the City['s] ability to ensure employees an opportunity 
for satisfying 
careers 
and 
fair 
treatment . . . and 
would 
impinge upon the City's right and opportunity to . . . retain 
competent law enforcement personnel."53   
¶133 Reason #4.  Nondisclosure is required to protect the 
privacy 
rights 
of 
individuals 
who 
cooperated 
in 
the 
investigation and to protect them from harassment or other 
jeopardy. 
¶134 Reason #5.  Nondisclosure is required to prevent loss 
of morale; disclosure could cause officers to choose other 
employment and could inhibit the City's ability to hire and 
retain competent personnel.  
¶135 Reason #6.  Documents may contain unsubstantiated or 
untrue information 
and 
disclosure 
might cause 
unwarranted 
personal or economic harm.     
                                                 
53 Majority op., ¶15 (quoting Chief Kluge's reasons for 
denying access to records). 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
20 
 
¶136 Reason #1:  The stamp of confidentiality.  In the same 
way that a prosecutor cannot "shield documents subject to the 
open records law simply by placing them into a 'prosecutorial 
file,'"54 government agencies cannot shield information simply by 
labeling 
an 
investigation 
leading 
to 
the 
information 
as 
confidential.  The majority opinion states that a policy of 
confidentiality is "a factor the custodian may consider in the 
balancing test."55  The Policy in the instant case takes a 
blanket approach to all harassment investigations rather than a 
case-by-case approach.  The City cannot, in my opinion, create 
its own exception to the public records statute.  Indeed the 
Police Chief recognized that Wisconsin law can override the 
confidentiality of the investigation.56 
¶137 If this reason is acceptable for denying access, then 
any governmental entity can institute a confidentiality policy 
and thereby exempt records from Wisconsin's Open Records Law.  
Confidentiality cannot be the end-all and be-all.  Records can 
be redacted to protect privacy.  
¶138 Reason #2:  Inability to conduct thorough, internal 
investigations.  This reason is generic and may be given for any 
investigative record.  In Pangman v. Zellmer, 163 Wis. 2d 1070, 
1077, 473 N.W.2d 538 (1991), the Milwaukee Police Department 
                                                 
54 Nichols v. Bennett, 199 Wis. 2d 268, 274, 544 N.W.2d 428 
(1996). 
55 Majority op., ¶71. 
56 Appendix of Defendants-Respondents, Exhibit 6, A-153, 
Letter to Attorney Aaron Halstead from Chief of Police Dennis 
Kluge, March 13, 2001. 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
21 
 
gave the same reason for denying disciplinary action materials, 
in that instance to the public, using almost precisely the same 
words as used in the present case. 
¶139 Reason #3:  Inhibit ability to hire and retain 
personnel.  Again, this is a stock reason for refusing release 
of an employee record.  In Village of Butler v. Cohen, 163 
Wis. 2d 819, 828, n.3, 472 N.W.2d 579 (1991), the village gave 
substantially this same reason for refusing to release police 
personnel records to the public.       
¶140 Reason #4:  Privacy rights.  Again, a generic 
explanation applicable to all government entities and all 
personnel records.  This reason was also given in Village of 
Butler, 163 Wis. 2d at 828, n.3. As the legislature has 
provided, records can be redacted.   
¶141 Reason #5:  Loss of morale and difficulty hiring and 
retaining officers.  Again, standard reasons in several cases.  
They were given in Zellmer, 163 Wis. 2d at 1083, 1089, and in 
Village of Butler, 163 Wis. 2d 828, n.3.     
¶142 Reason 
#6: 
 
Protecting 
employees 
from 
personal 
(reputation) and economic harm.  This same general reason was 
proffered by the police department in Pangman v. Stigler, 161 
Wis. 2d 828, 833, 468 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1991) and in Zellmer, 
163 Wis. 2d at 1079.  Protecting persons from damage to 
reputation and economic harm is a good reason if it applies to 
the specific case, rather than as a reason for never allowing 
access to any officer's files.  Here the employee is asking for 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
22 
 
information about himself.  The names of other persons may be 
redacted as needed. 
¶143 Thanks to the majority opinion today, we can call 
these reasons the "Exceptional Six," when in reality not one of 
the reasons is uncommon, unique, or "exceptional" to this 
particular case.  Each of these reasons applies to almost every 
file involving some sort of investigation at every governmental 
entity.   
¶144 Indeed, the majority opinion does not even appear to 
be persuaded by these reasons, but sets the bar low enough that 
it nevertheless accepts them.  The majority opinion's analysis 
of the reasons is often noncommittal.  For example, the 
majority, while not "fully endorsing"57 the City's argument, 
finds Reason #5 "plausible."58  The purpose of the balancing test 
is to determine whether an exception can override the strong 
presumption 
of 
records 
disclosure 
that 
is 
vital 
to 
the 
functioning of Wisconsin's government.  A "plausible" reason 
should not be sufficient to defeat the presumption established 
by the legislature.   
¶145 The majority also concedes that the second part of 
Reason #5, namely, the inability of the Police Department to 
hire and retain quality employees because of fear that personnel 
records will be released, is weak: "Public employees are 
frequently subject to a greater degree of public scrutiny than 
their private counterparts.  This scrutiny comes with the 
                                                 
57 Majority op., ¶74. 
58 Majority op., ¶74. 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
23 
 
territory."59  The only argument the majority presents for still 
allowing this reason to "slightly" weigh in the Department's 
favor is that this case deals with rank-and-file officers who 
should expect more personal privacy than a prominent public 
official.60   
¶146 It is unclear from the rest of the majority's hesitant 
language and analysis how the majority concludes the balancing 
test weighs in favor of nondisclosure.  With this weak 
application 
of 
the 
balancing 
test 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(a), the majority opinion renders the undistinguished, 
exceptional. 
¶147 The majority opinion denies it is creating a "blanket 
exception to the open records law . . . "61 when in fact that may 
be exactly what it is doing, provided of course that the next 
police department (or any other governmental entity) that 
receives an open records request repeats the "Exceptional Six" 
for the benefit of the court. 
¶148 For the reasons set forth, I respectfully dissent. 
¶149 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion. 
 
                                                 
59 Majority op., ¶75. 
60 Majority op., ¶75. 
61 Majority op., ¶73. 
No.  2003AP500.ssa 
 
 
 
1