Case Title: Fanders v. Riverside Resort & Casino

Citation: 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 50

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
one

 

428 Nev. Advance Opinion 5D

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JUANA P. FANDERS, No, 61225
Appellant,

RIVERSIDE RESORT & CASINO,
INC,, A NEVADA CORPORATION;
ANGELA M. GRISSOM, AN
INDIVIDUAL; LOUIS G. MARINO,
AN INDIVIDUAL; DAVID E.
BARNES, AN INDIVIDUAL; DANNY
LUNDSFORD, AN INDIVIDUAL; % hee oerarv'
JOHN C. ENGLAND, AN

INDIVIDUAL; AND ONA ROGERS,

AN INDIVIDUAL,

Respondents.

 

Appeal from a district court summary judgment in a tort
action. Kighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Valerie Adair,
Judge.

Reversed and remanded,

Mills & Mills and Gregory S. Mills and Daniel W. Anderson, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Bell and Young, Ltd., and Richard D, Young, Las Vegas,
for Respondents.

BEFORE HARDESTY, DOUGLAS and PICKERING, JJ.

10-34014

 
OPINION

By the Court, DOUGLAS, J.:

This case arises from an intentional tort and negligence
action filed by appellant Juana Fanders after she allegedly was injured
by security guards on the premises of her former employer, respondent,
Riverside Resort and Casino, Inc. Respondents Angela M. Grissom,
Louis G. Marino, David E, Barnes, Danny Lundsford, John C. England,
land Ona Rogers were the security guards involved in the incident. The
[district court granted summary judgment to respondents on all counts
based on its conclusion that all of Fanders’ claims were precluded by the
lexclusivity provision of the workers’ compensation statutes found in the
Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NIZA).

We conclude that the district court erred when it granted
|summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact as
jto whether Fanders’ injuries arose out of and in the course of her
Jemployment, and thus, whether they were covered by workers’
compensation. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment and
lremand this matter to the district court for further consideration of
Fanders' claims.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Fanders was employed as a guest room attendant at
Riverside, where her job was to clean hotel rooms. One day, while on
the job, Fanders was called to Riverside's human resources office and
confronted with a coworker’s accusation that Fanders had used foul
language directed at the coworker. Believing that Riverside was

{fabricating a reason to fire her, Fanders became angry and quit her job.

 

 
ome

 

According to Fanders, she went to the housekeeping area to
hand over her keys and identification badge and was instructed to sign
termination papers in the human resources office. Fanders asserts that
lonce she arrived in the human resources office, she was approached by
security guards, who apparently told her that they would escort her off
ithe premises. The guards, however, had been instructed by Riverside’s
human resources director Peggy Moma to “86” Fanders from the
property. In order to carry out the 86 procedure, the security guards led
/Fanders to Riverside’s security office where they tried to take her
photograph. Fanders asked the security guards why they were trying
to take her photo, and when they would not tell her, she climbed under
ja table to avoid having it taken. ‘The parties dispute exactly what
happened next, but according to Fanders, one of the guards grabbed her
by her hair, pulled her out from under the table, and called her a
Jderogatory name. ‘The parties agree that Fanders was then handcuffed
jand placed in a holding cell until a police officer arrived and gave
/Fanders a misdemeanor citation for battery against one of the guards.

‘Thereafter, Fanders filed a civil complaint against
Riverside and the security guards in which she raised claims for assault,
and battery, vicarious liability, wrongful imprisonment, negligence, and
Jpunitive damages. Fanders’ pleadings specifically named Riverside,
Jany corporate associates, and each security guard, and the complaint
Jalleged that Riverside employees had the specific intent to injure her
while she was on Riverside’s property.

Respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Ithe NIIA provided Fanders with her exclusive remedy because the acts
that caused her injuries arose out of and in the course of her

 
om

 

lemployment at Riverside. Fanders opposed the motion, Following a
/hearing on the motion, the district court granted summary judgment to
respondents, finding that Fanders’ injuries were covered by the NIA,
land that the compensation statute was her sole remedy. This appeal
followed.
DISCUSSION

‘This court reviews a district court summary judgment de
novo, without deference to the district court's findings. Wood _v.
/Safewav, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Summary
judgment was appropriate in this case if the pleadings and other
levidence presented, viewed in a light most favorable to Fanders,
Jdemonstrated that respondents were entitled to judgment as a matter
lof law and that no genuine issues of fact remain in dispute. Id.
All claims

‘The threshold question presented in this appeal concerns
whether Fanders’ injuries arose out of and in the course of her
Jemployment with Riverside. If not, Fanders was entitled to proceed on
Jall of her common-law claims without regard to the NIIA. Fanders
argues that her injuries did not arise out of her employment, given that.
she was no longer employed at Riverside when she was injured.
Respondents counter that, for purposes of the NILA, the employment
relationship continues for a reasonable amount of time after an
Jemployee quits or is fired, so that Fanders was still considered an
Jemployee when she was injured, and thus, the NIIA applied and was
Fanders’ sole remedy.

‘The NIIA only covers injuries that arise out of and in the
course of the injured claimant's employment. NRS 616C.150(1), An
injury occurs within the course of employment when there is a causal

4

 
oo 9,

 

connection between the injury and the nature of the work or the
workplace. Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel &
Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.24 1048, 1046 (1997)
(recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if
it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace
environment); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 400-01,
116 P.3d 56, 58-59 (2005) (concluding that an injury that occurs when
jan employee is on the employer's premises and is coming or going to
work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment). If
the nature of the work or the workplace contributes to or increases the
risk of injury more than that of the general public, the injury is covered
by the NIIA. Wood, 121 Nev. at 736, 121 P.3d at 1034; see also Rio All
[Suite Hotel & Casino v. Phillips, 126 Nev. _, 240 P.3d 2 (2010)
(adopting the increased-risk test for determining whether a claimant's
injury arose out of employment).

An injury that occurs after the employment relationship
lends, however, is generally not compensable under the NIIA. See Law
Offices of Bary Levinson v. Milko, 124 Nev. 355, 184 P.3d 378 (2008).
JOther courts have recognized exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g.
[Peterson v. Moran, 245 P.2d 540 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) (reversing a tort
Jiudgment for an employee who was assaulted as he left the workplace
immediately after being discharged); Ardoin v. Cleco Power, L.L.C., 38
[So, 3d 264, 266 (La, 2010) (providing that an employee is within the
Jcourse and scope of employment if his “injury occurs during the
reasonable period of time for winding up his affairs"); Zyemuntowicz v,
[American Stool & Wire Co,, 194 N.B, 385, 386-87 (Mass, 1922) (holding
that an assault that occurred immediately after the employee was

 
con ae

 

Jdischarged was in the course of the employment); Anderson v. Hotel
Cataract, 17 N.W.2d 913, 917 (S.D. 1945) (stating that “an employee
Jwho quits remains in the course of his employment until afforded a
reasonable opportunity to leave the employer's premises’). We find
persuasive a Texas appellate court decision, Sanders _v. Texas
Employers Insurance Ass'n, 775 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App. 1989), in which
‘the court discussed post-termination injuries,

In Sanders, the court held that once an employment
relationship has ended, regardless of whether the employee quits or is
fired, an injury that occurs at the job site or while leaving the job site
generally is not sustained in the course of employment. Id, at 763-64
‘The court recognized, however, that even after termination, an injury
still might be sustained in the course of employment if it occurs in a
place where the employee is subject to the inherent hazards arising
from the employment or if the employee is required to remain on the
Jemployer’s premises “to take care of some other duty incidental to the
termination.” Id, at 764. We agree with the reasoning in Sanders that
when an injury is the result of an inherent hazard of the employment or
Joccurs in the course of conducting the termination, workers’
Jcompensation may apply to injuries sustained after the employment
relationship is terminated.

Reviewing the record in the present case raises a number of
factual issues concerning whether Fanders’ injuries occurred in the
lcourse of her employment with Riverside or after her termination,
Specifically, the record does not clearly establish whether the
Jemployment relationship had actually been severed when Fanders wi

 

injured. Fanders insists that she signed termination papers before the

 
am ae

 

injuries occurred. Riverside neither concedes nor denies that Fanders
signed termination papers, but no such papers are included in the
record on appeal. The record also does not show whether Fanders knew
Jabout the 86 policy; additionally, the record also fails to provide what
ithe 86 policy actually entailed as to employees. Moreover, there is a
jquestion of fact as to whether Fanders’ risk of being subjected to the 86
procedure was increased because of the nature of her position or
Jwhether it was a risk faced by the public at large. In particular, it is
not clear from the record whether the 86 procedure was “incidental to
the termination.” See id. Because the record evidence regarding the
Jevents surrounding Fanders’ termination does not establish all of the
material facts necessary to conclude that respondents were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment was not proper in this
jease. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's summary judgment
land remand this matter to the district court for consideration of
whether Fanders’ injuries arose out of and in the course of her
lemployment.

On remand, when resolving the disputed factual questions,
if the district court determines that Fanders’ injuries did arise out of
and in the course of her employment, the court must begin its analysis,
from the proposition that workers’ compensation is Fanders’ exclusive
remedy. ‘The court must, nevertheless, determine whether the claims

fall outside of the workers’ compensation statutes based on applicable

 
Nevada law. If, on the other hand, the court finds that Fanders’
injuries did not arise out of and in the course of her employment, the
Jcourt must then consider the merits of each of Fanders’ common-law
jclaims. In the remainder of this opinion, then, we discuss how Fanders’
[claims should be treated depending on the district court's conclusions as
to whether the injuries arose out of and in the course of her
employment.”
|Intentional tort claims against the security guards

Fanders asserts that her intentional tort claims, based on
assault and battery and wrongful imprisonment, were properly brought
against the security guards because they committed intentional acts
that caused her injuries, She acknowledges that the NIIA is the sole
remedy for accidental workplace injuries, but she argues that her

"Phe district court should consider Fanders’ punitive damages
claims only to the extent that they are based on claims that do not fall
under the NIIA. See NRS 616A.020(1).

2Fanders raised vicarious liability and wrongful imprisonment
claims against Riverside. On appeal, Fanders argues that there is a
question of fact as to whether Riverside may be liable to her because
Riverside, through Peggy Moma, intended to injure her. She did not,
however, raise this argument before the district court, and thus, she is,
precluded from raising it now. See Mason v, Cuisenaire, 122 Nev. 43, 48,
128 P.3d 446, 449 (2006). Also, in her complaint, Fanders alleged that
Riverside was liable on a theory of vicarious liability, but she has not
raised this argument on appeal and we decline to address it. See Edwards

 

 

'v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288
n.38 (2006) (explaining that this court need not consider claims that are
not cogently argued or supported by relevant authority on appeal).
Nevertheless, we note that it would be appropriate for the district court to
/address the vicarious liability argument in the first instance on remand.

 

 
me

 

injuries were caused by intentional acts, not accidental ones.
Respondents counter that the NIIA is the sole remedy for work-related
injuries, including injuries resulting from assaults by coemployees, as
/Nevada only recognizes intentional tort claims against an employer.
‘The NIA, with few exceptions, provides the exclusive
remedy “for an employee on account of an injury by accident sustained
arising out of and in the course of the employment.” NRS 616A.020(1)
(emphasis added). The statute defines an accident as “an unexpected or
junforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without
human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an
injury.” NRS 616A.030. This court has recognized, however, that an
employee may avoid the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy
provisions when an emplover “deliberately and specifically intended to
injure [the employee].” Conway v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc., 116 Nev.
870, 875, 8 P.3d 837, 840 (2000); accord Bariesteh v. Fave's Pub, 106
Nev. 120, 122, 787 P.2d 405, 406 (1990) (holding that an employer who

 

jcommits an intentional tort against his employee cannot claim that the
Jact was accidental, so that workers’ compensation is the employee's
Jexclusive remedy). A viable intentional tort claim, which subjects an
Jemployer to liability outside of the workers’ compensation statute,
requires the employee to plead facts in his or her complaint that
Jestablish “the deliberate intent to bring about the injury.” Conway, 116
Nev. at 875, 8 P.3d 840.

‘This court has not addressed whether an employee can
maintain an action outside of the workers’ compensation statute
Jagainst a coemployee who purportedly commits an intentional tort

Jagainst the employee. We perceive no reason why common-law tort

 
liability should not extend to purported tortious conduct by a
lcoemployee tortfeasor. This is consistent with our decision in Wood v.
‘Safeway, Inc,, 121 Nev. 724, 121 P.3d 1026 (2005). Although the Wood
court found that workers’ compensation applied to the plaintiff's claims
against her employer, the court went on to analyze her claims against
‘the subcontractor that employed her assailant under the vicarious
liability statute, NRS 41.745. Wood, 121 Nev. at 736-41, 121 P.3d at
1034-37. Thus, although not expressly discussed, the Wood decision
implied that the NIZA is not the sole remedy for certain claims against
coemployees. We now make that implication express and hold that
when a plaintiff states a viable intentional tort claim against a
coemployee, that claim is not barred by the NIJA’s exclusivity
provisions.

Fanders’ complaint contains factual allegations relating to
her stated tort claims based on intentional conduct, rather than an
Jaccident, and thus, Fanders is not limited to recovery under the NILA
lon her intentional tort claims against the security guards. The security
guards do not dispute that Fanders stated intentional tort claims
against them in her pleadings. Further, they did not argue in the
district court that they were entitled to summary judgment on any
lbasis other than the NIIA’s exclusivity provision. Thus, even if the

district court concludes that Fanders’ claims arose out of and in the

lcourse of her employment with Riverside, she may still pursue her

 

 
assault and battery and wrongful imprisonment claims against the
security guards.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the district
court's summary judgment and remand this matter to the district court

for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We concur:
hu J
Hardesty
f fi J.
Pickering

SIF the district court concludes that Fanders’ injuries arose out of
and in the course of her employment, she would have to allege specific,
intentional acts in order to bring her claims outside the coverage of the
NIIA. Conway, 116 Nev. at 875, 8 P.3d at 840, Because her negligence
claims alleged negligent conduct, they would be covered by the NIIA,
which would be Fanders’ sole remedy as to those claims. See id.