Case Title: Scarborough v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 38, 2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2015-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EDWIN SCARBOROUGH, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 38, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID 1204019450 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 7, 2015 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: July 30, 2015 
 
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 30th day of July 2015, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
filed under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, 
and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
On January 6, 2014, after the Superior Court denied defense 
counsel’s motion to suppress, the defendant-appellant, Edwin Scarborough, 
pled guilty to one count of Drug Dealing.  The Superior Court immediately 
sentenced Scarborough, effective September 20, 2012, to a total period of 
fifteen years at Level V incarceration, with credit for eleven days served, to 
be suspended after serving three years in prison for eight months at Level IV 
2 
 
and eighteen months at Level III probation.  This is Scarborough’s direct 
appeal. 
 
(2) 
Scarborough’s counsel filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
under Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  Counsel asserted that, based upon a 
complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, counsel informed Scarborough of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and gave him a copy of the motion to withdraw and 
the accompanying brief and appendix.  Scarborough also was informed of 
his right to supplement counsel’s presentation.  Scarborough has raised eight 
overlapping issues for inclusion in the Rule 26(c) brief.   
 
(3) 
After the State filed its response to the Rule 26(c) brief, the 
Court stayed further consideration of Scarborough’s appeal pending the 
outcome of another case, Brown v. State, No. 178, 2014.  The Court issued 
its opinion in Brown on January 23, 2015.1  The parties were directed to file 
supplemental memoranda addressing the applicability of Brown to 
Scarborough’s case.  After considering the parties’ supplemental 
memoranda, the Court again directed the parties to file additional 
supplemental memoranda related to Scarborough’s contention that, although 
                                                 
1 Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201 (Del. 2015). 
3 
 
his guilty plea was valid, he had not waived his right to appeal the Superior 
Court’s denial of his suppression motion.    
 
(4) 
The Superior Court record reflects that Scarborough was 
indicted in this case in July 2012 on charges of Drug Dealing, Endangering 
the Welfare of a Child, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.  Defense 
counsel filed eight pre-trial motions including a motion to suppress drug 
evidence.  A suppression hearing was held on September 4, 2013.  The 
Superior Court denied Scarborough’s suppression motion, and trial was 
scheduled for January 6, 2014.   
 
(5) 
On the day of trial, at defense counsel’s request, the Superior 
Court engaged in a colloquy with Scarborough about a plea offer made by 
the State to resolve Scarborough’s current charges in Cr. ID 1204019450,  as 
well as another set of criminal charges pending against him in Cr. ID 
1208002007.  Scarborough told the Superior Court that he was interested in 
resolving both cases but that he did not want to accept the State’s offer 
because he was not happy with the length of the State’s recommended total 
sentence of eight years (even though he was facing the possibility of a life 
sentence because of his prior criminal record).  The judge informed 
Scarborough that he could resolve just his current case by a plea, rather than 
both cases together, or he could choose to go to trial on his current charges if 
4 
 
he believed that “the suppression decision is bad.”2  The Superior Court 
recessed to allow Scarborough to consult with his counsel and to reconsider 
the State’s plea offer in light of the judge’s colloquy. 
 
(6) 
Upon returning from the recess, defense counsel informed the 
judge that he had discussed the State’s plea offer with Scarborough, that 
Scarborough understood all the constitutional rights that he was waiving by 
pleading guilty, and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter a 
guilty plea.  The judge then engaged in a second colloquy with Scarborough 
in open court.  Scarborough informed the judge that he understood the 
charges against him and that he was pleading guilty to Drug Dealing because 
he was, in fact, guilty of that offense.  Scarborough stated that he had 
reviewed the guilty plea agreement and that he understood its meaning.  
Scarborough also told the judge that no one was forcing him to plead guilty, 
that he was not under the influence of any medications, that he had not been 
under the care of a psychologist in the last two years, and that he was 
satisfied with his counsel’s representation.   
 
(7) 
Scarborough 
told 
the 
judge 
that 
he 
understood 
the 
consequences of what he was doing.  When asked if he had any questions, 
Scarborough’s only question was whether the judge would allow him to be 
                                                 
2 Opening Br. App. at A-209. 
5 
 
held at Level III while awaiting space in a Level IV facility.  The Superior 
Court accepted Scarborough’s plea and sentenced him in accordance with 
his plea agreement to fifteen years at Level V incarceration to be suspended 
after serving three years in prison for decreasing levels of supervision.  This 
appeal followed. 
 
(8) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and an 
accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold:  a) the Court must be 
satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious examination of the 
record and the law for claims that could arguably support the appeal; and b) 
the Court must conduct its own review of the record in order to determine 
whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues 
that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.3    
 
(9) 
In response to his counsel’s motion to withdraw, Scarborough 
enumerated eight overlapping issues for the Court’s consideration: (i) the 
Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (ii) the arresting 
officers violated the “knock and announce” rule; (iii) his arrest was 
pretextual; (iv) his counsel was ineffective for failing to file an interlocutory 
appeal from the denial of the suppression motion; (v) his counsel was 
                                                 
3 Penson v Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
6 
 
ineffective for failing to interview a defense witness, who turned out to be 
hostile, before the suppression hearing; (vi) his counsel was ineffective 
because he failed to argue that his arrest was pretextual; (vii) he never 
waived his right to appeal the suppression ruling because he did not check 
“yes” or “no” to the question on his guilty plea agreement indicating that he 
understood he was waiving all of his trial and appeal rights by pleading 
guilty; and (viii) the State did not prove the authenticity of the drug lab 
report and that, in light of the recent scandal at the Office of the Chief 
Medical Examiner, there is a “reasonable chance” that the drug evidence in 
his case had been tampered with. 
 
(10) With the exception of his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, which we decline to consider for the first time in this direct appeal,4 
the disposition of Scarborough’s remaining claims hinges on the Court’s 
determination of whether Scarborough entered his guilty plea knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.5  It is well-settled that a knowing and 
voluntary guilty plea waives a defendant’s right to challenge any errors 
                                                 
4 Sahin v. State, 7 A.3d 450, 451 (Del. 2010). 
5 Lewis v. State, 2010 WL 2163910, at *1 (Del. May 11, 2010). 
7 
 
occurring before the entry of the plea, “even those of constitutional 
dimensions.”6 
 
(11) In the points he filed to be included in his counsel’s Rule 26(c) 
brief, Scarborough states, “[t]he defendant is not challenging the validity of 
the plea because he voluntarily signed it, however he did not knowingly and 
voluntarily waive his rights to appeal and challenge the suppression issues.”7  
Scarborough points to two alleged errors in the record to support his 
contention that he did not waive his right to appeal.  First, he points out that 
he did not check either “Yes” or “No” to the question on the guilty plea 
agreement asking: 
 “Do you understand that because you are pleading guilty you will not 
have a trial, and you therefore waive (give up) your constitutional rights: 
(1) to have a lawyer represent you at trial; (2) to be presumed innocent 
until the State can prove each and every part of the charge(s) against you 
beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) to a speedy and public trial by jury; (4) to 
hear and question the witnesses against you; (5) to present evidence in 
your defense; (6) to testify or not testify yourself; and (7) to appeal, if 
convicted, to the Delaware Supreme Court with assistance of a lawyer?” 
 
Second, Scarborough asserts that when the judge asked him if he understood 
the rights he was giving up, the judge did not wait for Scarborough to reply.8 
                                                 
6 Wilson v. State, 2010 WL 572114, at *2 (Del. Feb. 18, 2010) (quoting Smith v. State, 
2004 WL 120530, at *1 (Del. Jan. 15, 2004)). 
7 Defendant’s Points at 32. 
8 The transcript of the guilty plea hearing reflects the following exchange: 
8 
 
 
(12) We find no merit to this argument.  Scarborough acknowledges 
in this appeal that he is not challenging the validity of his guilty plea. 
Moreover, it is clear from the entire context of the proceedings below that 
the Superior Court informed Scarborough—and Scarborough understood—
that, if he thought the Superior Court had erred in ruling on his suppression 
motion, then Scarborough’s only option was to go to trial and then appeal.   
                                                                                                                                                 
THE COURT: 
In my left hand I also have the Truth in Sentencing Guilty 
Plea Form.  Did you review the questions and provide the 
information shown? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: 
Did you understand the Constitutional Rights and civil 
liberties you would be giving up by entering this plea? 
 
Now, the other two misdemeanors – he’s not pleading to 
those, right? 
[COUNSEL]: 
That’s correct, Your Honor. 
 
Are those on the form? 
THE COURT: 
Yes.  That’s okay; I can mark them off. 
 
And you face from zero to 15 years? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: 
I will just put my initials right here. 
 
Is that your signature? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: 
Do you have any questions for the Court regarding either 
document or any other aspect in this matter? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, one question. 
THE COURT: 
What’s that? 
THE DEFENDANT: The Level 4 time – I mean, I know it’s – you know, it’s not 
the norm, as Ms. Williams told me; but is there any way I can 
be held at Level 3 before I go to Level 4?  I know it might 
now happen, but I just had to ask. 
Appellant’s Opening Brief app. at A218-19.   
9 
 
In his points, Scarborough also acknowledges his understanding that, if he 
had wished to retain his right to appeal the suppression ruling, he could have 
negotiated an agreement with the State to hold a stipulated trial.9  
 
(13)  Scarborough did not have a stipulated trial, however.  Instead, 
the record reflects that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pled 
guilty with a full understanding of the rights he was waiving, including his 
right to appeal the suppression ruling.  His failure to check either the “yes” 
or “no” box to the question asking whether he understood the trial rights he 
was waiving was merely an oversight that did not affect Scarborough’s 
substantial rights.10   
 
(14) Under the circumstances of this case, we find that 
Scarborough’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea waived his 
right to challenge the suppression ruling and the authenticity of the testing of 
the drug evidence.11  We have reviewed the record carefully and conclude 
that Scarborough’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any 
                                                 
9 Defendant’s Points at 7.  See, e.g., Lambert v. State, 110 A.3d 1253, 1255 (Del. 2015) 
(the parties agreed to a trial by stipulation, which allowed the defendant to retain his right 
to appeal the Superior Court’s suppression ruling). 
10 Abdul-Akbar v. State, 1999 WL 507292 (Del. June 1, 1999) (citing Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 11(h) and holding that the defendant’s failure to execute a guilty plea 
waiver of rights form did not affect his substantial rights and render his guilty plea 
invalid). 
11 Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1202 (Del. 2015) (holding that the defendant’s valid 
guilty plea waived any right to challenge the strength of the State’s evidence, including 
the chain of custody of the drug evidence). 
10 
 
arguably appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Scarborough’s counsel 
has made a conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly 
determined that Scarborough could not raise a meritorious claim in this 
appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice