Case Title: McGuire v. State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
McGuire v. State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation1991 WY 50809 P.2d 271Case Number: 90-197Decided: 04/17/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
Thomas McGUIRE, Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, DEPARTMENT OF 
REVENUE AND TAXATION, Appellee (Respondent).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Nicholas G. 
Kalokathis, J.

Urbigkit, C.J. and Macy, 
J., 
dissented and filed opinions. 

Ronald G. Pretty, 
Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. 
Gen., Michael L. Hubbard, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., and Milo M. Vukelich, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from an 
order of the district court affirming a Department of Revenue and Taxation's 
(Department) report and decision suspending appellant Thomas McGuire's driver's 
license for one year, pursuant to W.S. 31-5-233 and 31-7-128, because of a 
second driving while under the influence (DWUI) conviction.

[¶2.]     We affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant presents the 
following issues:

I. Whether the Department 
of Revenue and Taxation erred in its interpretation of W.S. 31-7-128 and 
subsequently:

A. Erred in imposing a 
second DWUI penalty rather than a first offense DWUI penalty;

B. Erred in treating the 
second DWUI conviction as a second offense when the district court treated it as 
a first offense; and 

C. Abused its power of 
discretion and therefore acted unconstitutionally.

II. W.S. 31-7-128 is 
unconstitutional.

FACTS

[¶4.]     Appellant Thomas 
McGuire was arrested for DWUI on June 7, 1983, in violation of W.S. 31-5-233. At 
that time, Gooden v. State, 711 P.2d 405 (Wyo. 
1985), was pending before the Wyoming Supreme Court presenting the question 
whether Wyoming's DWUI statute was constitutional. 
Appellant, on September 11, 1983, joined other cases then before the court to 
challenge the constitutionality of W.S. 31-5-233. In the Gooden case, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court held the statute constitutional. Appellant's case came to 
trial on December 19, 1984. He appeared pro se and pled guilty to the DWUI 
charge.

[¶5.]     Appellant was convicted 
again for DWUI on September 11, 1989. Upon receipt of appellant's driver record, 
the Department, pursuant to W.S. 31-5-233 and 31-7-128, notified appellant that 
his driver's license would be suspended for one year.

[¶6.]     Appellant requested an 
administrative hearing to challenge the length of driver's license suspension. 
At the hearing he asserted that the length of time between his first arrest 
(June 7, 1983) and second arrest (July 11, 1989) exceeded the five-year period 
prescribed in W.S. 31-7-128. He contended that the Department must use either 
the date of offense or the date of conviction, not both, to determine when the 
five-year period would begin which would enhance the subsequent DWUI conviction. 
Appellant argued that the date of arrest for his first DWUI conviction should 
have been the controlling date.

[¶7.]     The Department, upon 
review of the hearing record and its interpretation of W.S. 31-7-128, determined 
that the offense and conviction of the second DWUI occurred within five years of 
the first DWUI conviction. Appellant's driver's license was suspended for one 
year - a first offense DWUI penalty would have resulted in a 90-day 
suspension.

DISCUSSION

[¶8.]     Central to this appeal 
is the Department's interpretation of W.S. 31-7-128 (June 1989 pamphlet), which 
states in pertinent part:

"(b) Upon receiving a 
record of a driver's conviction under W.S. 31-5-233 or other law 
prohibiting driving while under the influence, the division shall suspend the 
license * * * for:

"(i) Ninety (90) days for 
the first conviction;

"(ii) One (1) year, if 
the person has been previously convicted once under W.S. 31-5-233 or 
other law prohibiting driving while under the influence within the five (5) year 
period preceding:

"(A) The date of the 
offense upon which the conviction is based; or

"(B) The date of the 
conviction at issue." (emphasis added)

[¶9.]     The standard of 
judicial review for administrative actions is governed by W.R.A.P. 12.09 and 
W.S. 16-3-114(c). Wyoming Statute 16-3-114(c)(ii) states the court shall set 
aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

"(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

"(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

"(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

"(D) Without observance 
of procedure required by law; or

"(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute."

[¶10.]  We have said that when the court reviews 
an agency decision:

"We examine the entire 
record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support an agency's 
findings. If the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we 
cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the agency, and must uphold 
the findings on appeal. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of the agency. It is 
more than a scintilla of evidence." (citation omitted) Trout v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 721 P.2d 1047, 
1050 (Wyo. 
1986). See also Hohnholt v. Basin Electric Power Co-op, 784 P.2d 233, 234 
(Wyo. 
1989).

[¶11.]  We review the decision of an 
administrative agency as if we were a reviewing court of the first instance; 
petitioners have the burden of proving that the agency's actions are arbitrary, 
capricious or an abuse of discretion; the reviewing court must examine whether 
the decision made by an administrative agency has been reached on relevant 
factors and was rational; agency decisions are to be reversed only for errors of 
law; and courts will not substitute their judgment for that of an administrative 
agency. Vandehei Developers v. Public Service Comm'n, 790 P.2d 1282, 1284 
(Wyo. 
1990).

[¶12.]  To determine whether the Department erred 
in treating appellant's September 11, 1989 conviction as a second DWUI offense 
requires us to review the Department's interpretation of W.S. 31-7-128. The 
court always begins the search by focusing on the language of the legislative 
enactment, giving to that language its plain and ordinary meaning. Schultz v. 
State, 751 P.2d 367, 370 (Wyo. 1988). A statute is viewed in terms of 
its objective and purpose. Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130, 1133 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶13.]  The statutory language of W.S. 31-7-128 
is plain and unambiguous. The mandate of this statute is that the 
Department must suspend a driver's license for 90 days upon a conviction 
of DWUI. If within five years from the date of the DWUI conviction the driver is 
convicted of another DWUI charge, the mandate of the statute is that the 
Department must suspend the driver's license for one year. The Department may 
use either the date of occurrence of the second offense that results in 
conviction or the date of conviction of the second offense when determining 
whether it is within the five-year period requiring a one-year suspension under 
W.S. 31-7-128(b).

[¶14.]  The Department's action of suspension in 
this case was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. Wyoming 
Statute 31-7-128 does not allow for an exercise of discretion. Agency action is 
mandated. Appellant was convicted of DWUI on December 19, 1984. He was convicted 
again for DWUI on September 11, 1989. This is more than substantial evidence; it 
is unrefuted evidence of a second conviction within the specified five-year 
period. The court must accept an agency's finding of fact when supported by 
substantial evidence. City of Cheyenne Policemen 
Pension Bd. v. Perreault, 727 P.2d 702, 704 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶15.]  Appellant also contends that the 
suspension of a driver's license is penal in nature and the Department's action 
in treating it as civil in nature is an abuse of discretion and, therefore, 
unconstitutional. No cogent authority is presented to support this argument; 
therefore, it would not ordinarily be considered by this court. E.C. Cates 
Agency, Inc. v. Barbe, 764 P.2d 274, 276 (Wyo. 1988). Nevertheless, we note again that 
driver's license suspensions are civil proceedings that are separate and 
distinct from criminal DWUI prosecutions. Drake v. State ex rel. Dept. of Rev. 
and Tax., 751 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶16.]  Appellant's argument that the hearing 
officer erred in interpreting W.S. 31-7-128 as lengthening the period of 
suspension instead of shortening it is unfounded. The argument as stated by 
appellant is less than clear. It may mean that suspension was for a year rather 
than 90 days - or it may mean something else. Wyoming Statute 31-7-128 has no 
provision allowing lengthening or shortening the period of suspension, and there 
is no evidence that the hearing officer "lengthened" the suspension. We cannot 
accept the argument that it was legislative intent to shorten periods of 
suspension for DWUI. If anything, the opposite is true. We are aware that the 
legislature, responding to the public outcry against drunk drivers, has 
significantly increased the penalties for drunk driving convictions. City of 
Casper v. Cheatham, 739 P.2d 1222, 1224 
(Wyo. 1987). 
The purpose of mandatory suspension of a driver's license for a prescribed 
period of time is to put those who choose to violate Wyoming's DWUI laws on 
notice of the penalties awaiting. These laws have been created to protect the 
public, not the privilege of those who choose to drive drunk. Wyoming Statute 
31-7-128 is written to allow the Department to use either the date of the 
offense of the second DWUI conviction or the date of conviction of that offense 
to determine if a one-year suspension is required. This insures that any delay 
of trial will not forfeit the suspension mandate if the offense date falls 
within the statutory time frame and the date of conviction does not. The 
legislature is obviously aware of the problems the drunk driver creates, and it 
has responded with what can only be described as unmistakable clarity. It has 
given the matter serious attention and has exerted unrelenting pressure on 
drunken drivers. Nowack v. State, 774 P.2d 561, 567 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶17.]  Appellant argues a violation of his 
constitutional right to contest a DWUI charge occurs if the Department can use 
either the date of occurrence or date of conviction of a second DWUI to 
determine if the second DWUI occurred within five years of a previous DWUI. 
Appellant had the opportunity to challenge both of his arrests for DWUI. He pled 
guilty to both of them. Neither of the convictions were appealed, only the 
length of the driver's license suspension. Nowhere in the record is a showing 
made that appellant was not allowed to contest either of the two DWUI charges in 
question. For this court to rule against the Department would have us ignore the 
express language of W.S. 31-7-128; this we will not, we cannot do.

[¶18.]  We find no error committed by the 
Department or the district court and no constitutional violation of appellant's 
rights.

[¶19.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, C.J., and MACY, 
J., each 
filed separate dissenting opinions.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶20.]  I dissent for two reasons - an erroneous 
time computation under the applicable statute is accepted and an improper 
standard of review for an administrative agency is applied.

[¶21.]  Appellant was first arrested on June 7, 
1983. At the time of the arrest, the law regarding W.S. 31-5-233 was unsettled 
and all driving-while-under-the-influence cases in SweetwaterCounty, with the consent of the county 
attorney, were handled as one appeal to the district court. More than a year 
after the initial charge, appellant's case was dismissed for lack of prosecution 
to then be refiled on the same day and set for trial for December 19, 1984. The 
State now seeks an advantage occasioned by the consolidated appeal and the 
prosecutor's delay in prosecuting. Had appellant not appealed, he would not now 
have his license suspended for a year because his second conviction would have 
clearly come at a time more than five years later than any initiating date no 
matter how the statute may have been construed.

[¶22.]  In first consideration, I would discern 
that affirming this decision potentially chills the defendant's right to appeal. 
Simonds v. State, 799 P.2d 1210, 1218 (Wyo. 1990), Macy, J. specially 
concurring; Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 
110 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1990); Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 564, 104 S. Ct. 3217, 3221, 82 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1984). Due process under the Wyoming Constitution 
should prevent the loss of life, liberty, or property that is merely occasioned 
by a defendant's exercise of appellate rights or by a prosecutor's delay, 
although the record in this case certainly does not reveal any ill motives for 
this delay. See Hoo v. United States, 484 U.S. 1035, 108 S. Ct. 742, 98 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1988), White, J., dissenting, prosecutorial pre-indictment delay amounts to 
a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; United States v. 
Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752, reh'g denied 434 U.S. 881, 
98 S. Ct. 242, 54 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1977), due process clause has limited role to play 
in protecting against oppressive delay; and United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S. Ct. 455, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971), the due process clause may provide a 
basis for dismissing an indictment if the defense can show at trial that 
prosecutorial delay in bringing the accusation has prejudiced the right to a 
fair trial.

[¶23.]  It is concluded that the State and this 
majority misconstrue the statute in determining passage of a defined period of 
time. My analysis would lead to a construction in accord with the terminology 
provided which is reliable, determinable and not subject to a capricious result 
from an applied construction. Furthermore, the permission now provided for the 
department to construe the statutory language in one of two or maybe more ways 
allows a potential for arbitrary action by the department which is unnecessary 
and improvident.

[¶24.]  We start in application of the statute 
which, in its clear terms, defines the second event, which is the initial 
period for computation, to be either a) crime commission, or b) crime 
conviction.

     (b) Upon receiving a 
record of a driver's conviction under W.S. 31-5-233 or other law prohibiting 
driving while under the influence, the division shall suspend the license * * * 
for:

     (i) Ninety (90) days 
for the first conviction;

     (ii) One (1) year, if 
the person has been previously convicted once under W.S. 31-5-233 or other law 
prohibiting driving while under the influence within the five (5) year period 
preceding:

     (A) The date of the offense 
upon which the conviction is based; or

     (B) The date of the 
conviction at issue.

W.S. 31-7-128 (June 1989) 
(emphasis added). Recognizing that the five year period precedes the alternative 
later dates, this statutory system could be more adequately conceptualized if we 
were to substitute "tomorrow" for "A" and the "day after tomorrow" for "B". Then 
rephrased, we would know that an event within the period five years from 
tomorrow or the day after tomorrow would justify and require the augmented 
penalty assessment.1

[¶25.]  Having then started with the initiating 
date, we are required to determine whether the event necessary for penal offense 
enhancement has occurred within or after the period of five years.2 The decisional factor here, as it 
would be in any case, is what event must have occurred within that previous five 
years for penal offense enhancement - crime commission or crime conviction. We 
make the determination as a matter of law by statutory interpretation starting 
with the initiating date and then analyzing whether commission or conviction is 
the event which earlier occurred that did or did not precede the second offense 
trigger date by five years.

[¶26.]  I do not find any administrative review 
standards involved and certainly not any questions of arbitrary or capricious 
action. The statute either is or is not misapplied as a matter of law and the 
action taken by the department is consequently valid or invalid. The review by 
this court is plenary. Nielsen v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 806 P.2d 297 
(Wyo. 1991); Union Pacific R. Co. v. 
WyomingState Bd. of Equalization, 802 P.2d 856 (Wyo. 1990). For a plenary 
appellate review status without deference, see the discussion of Justice 
Blackmun in Salve Regina College v. Russell, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 113 L. Ed. 2d 190 (1991). Reading the statute as written, the defined event for the 
previous offense to be computed is the date of the offense and not some future 
time when the conviction occurs, as would be in this case, about one and half 
years later.

[¶27.]  A careful examination of the text of the 
statute reveals that in W.S. 31-7-128(b)(ii) (June 1989) for the prior offense 
the word convicted in the second line defines status and does not 
establish a date. The provision does not provide a date of conviction, a 
noun, but rather a past tense verb, convicted, with the subject thereof 
being a statutory offense defined by W.S. 31-5-233. Consequently the offense 
"under W.S. 31-5-233" establishes the event which is 
driving-while-under-the-influence. The verb relates to the status of the event 
and does not define its date. This section would more simplistically be 
understood in accord with the terms used if the sentence was restructured to 
relate to an offense under the cited statute for which the defendant was 
convicted. Otherwise, to interpret the provision as this majority would do and 
as the department earlier attempted, we restructure to add a different subject; 
namely, date of conviction, as the terminology of the 
interpretation.

[¶28.]  By reading the statutory text to find 
that the initial event was the offense "for which he was convicted" and not the 
date he was convicted, I would find that the department as a matter of law was 
in error and this majority continues the same error as amplified by application 
of the wrong standard of review and acceptance of that erroneous statutory 
interpretation.

[¶29.]  I would reverse.

FOOTNOTES

1 The derivation of the 
statute has an interesting history, but provides no persuasive construction 
authority. In Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 52 (1982), statutory provision W.S. 31-7-127 
provided for a three month suspension for first conviction, one year for the 
second conviction and revocation for the third conviction with a right of 
restoration after five years following revocation. A further provision was upon 
a second or third conviction within any two year period, the registration of the 
vehicle being driven would be suspended for the period of the revocation. Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 41 (1984), statutory provision W.S. 31-7-127 then provided "[f]or 
a subsequent conviction occurring within a five (5) year period from the date of 
a prior conviction * * *" and then provided for three or more convictions 
"within a five (5) year period preceding the date of the most recent offense * * 
*."

     The alternative 
language presently existent was then applied to both subparagraphs (A) and (B) 
of W.S. 31-7-127(a)(ii) by Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 234 (1985). The Digest of House 
Journal of the Forty-Eighth State Legislature of Wyoming 391 (1985) reveals that 
the change was accomplished by the addition of the word "or" in the previous 
clause and the addition of the second clause, "(B) [t]he date of the conviction 
at issue" by a third reading amendment in the Senate as a floor amendment. 
Judging from the comprehensive number of changes included in the one amendment 
and the author who was the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, it is 
likely that the impetus for the change was provided by the governmental agency 
or the attorney general's office. As the amendment was added to the prior clause 
"[t]he date of the offense upon which the conviction is based", it cannot make 
any sense unless it was intended to anticipate the alternative of the later 
since the offense inevitably had to come first. The significant fact is that the 
referenced language to the first offense was not changed in the amendatory 
process. The additional clause was added four times: twice in W.S. 31-7-127 
(mandatory revocation) and twice in W.S. 31-7-128 (mandatory 
suspension).

2 Obviously, the defined 
alternative dates for computation triggered by the second offense does not make 
a whole lot of sense since we assume conviction cannot come before commission 
and we want an earlier date to have more opportunity to place the initial event 
within five years. I can, however, find within the poor draftsmanship of the 
statute some justification for the (A) and (B) clauses of W.S. 31-7-128(b)(ii) 
(June 1989). It would appear that the legislature wanted to make sure the 
defendant could not manipulate the period following second arrest by a 
trial continuance or post-conviction appeal which could extend the intervening 
time. Consequently, the department had their choice of conviction or commission 
for the computation starting point. Undoubtedly, in 99 times out of a 100, it 
would not make any difference which initial date might be used. In practical 
effect, I find the statutory system contemplates a computation parameter of 
offense to offense.

MACY, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶30.]  I dissent. The statute is ambiguous and 
should not allow the Department of Revenue and Taxation to jockey dates around 
to enhance or not enhance a subsequent DWUI conviction. I agree that driver's 
license suspension proceedings are separate and distinct from DWUI prosecutions. 
I am convinced, however, that the suspension of a driver's license for a period 
of one year is penal in nature.