Case Title: Marshall Mitchell v. Michael W. Moore

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC95-299

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC95299
____________
MARSHALL MITCHELL,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE,
Respondent.
[April 12, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
Marshall Mitchell petitions this Court for writ of mandamus.  We have
jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.
While we recently struck down the copy requirement portion of section
57.085, Florida Statutes (1999) (hereinafter the Prisoner Indigency Statute), in
Jackson v. Florida Dep’t of Corrections, 26 Fla. L. Weekly S51 (Fla. May 4,
2000), we find it necessary to further address the copy requirement due to the
importance of the constitutional issue raised in this case.
1 Even though the Second Judicial Circuit Court in Leon County treated
petitioner’s petition as one seeking mandamus relief, no compliance with the Prisoner
Indigency Statute was required.  Based on the date of the petition, we would assume
that the reason was that while the statute had gone into effect, the procedures for
implementing the statute had probably not yet been put in place.  Even though the
court treated the petition as one seeking mandamus relief, it would appear that, for
filing fee purposes, petitioner’s petition was still treated by the trial court as one for
habeas corpus (which has no filing fee).  Since the circuit court never asked peititioner
for a filing fee or an affidavit of indigency, no order on indigency was ever issued for
purposes of the original petition.
2
FACTS
On July 24, 1996, petitioner, an inmate in Florida’s prison system, filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Leon County Circuit Court.  The circuit
court treated the petition as one for a writ of mandamus and denied the petition.1 
On September 2, 1997, petitioner filed his notice of appeal in the circuit court and it
was forwarded to the First District Court of Appeal on September 4, 1997.  On
September 10, 1997, the First District issued an order instructing petitioner to pay
the filing fee of $250 or obtain an order determining him indigent (for appellate
purposes) from the lower court within thirty days.  On September 22, 1997,
petitioner filed an affidavit of insolvency in the trial court.  However, before the
circuit court had ruled upon petitioner’s request for indigency, on November 4,
1997, the First District dismissed petitioner’s appeal.  On November 12, 1997, the
circuit court denied petitioner’s request for indigency because he had failed to
3
submit copies of the complaints or other initial pleadings he had filed in the
preceding five years as required by subsection (7) of the Prisoner Indigency
Statute.  It seems clear from petitioner’s numerous motions that petitioner thought
that all the courts wanted was information concerning his lack of funds.  Therefore,
on November 12, 1997, (the same day the circuit court denied his request to
proceed in forma pauperis) petitioner filed a response to the First District’s
dismissal order detailing the cases in which he had been adjudicated indigent,
attaching a number of orders from various courts finding him indigent and asserting
that his financial circumstances had not changed.  He also filed a motion for
rehearing in the circuit court.  The First District denied petitioner’s motion for
rehearing/reinstatement in December 1997 and the trial court denied his motion for
rehearing in February 1998.
At about that time, it seems clear that petitioner began to understand what the
courts had wanted (copies of the initial pleadings and final orders, not the orders on
indigency).  Nevertheless, he also realized that he no longer had copies of the
pleadings from the vast majority of the forty or so lawsuits he had filed in the last
five years.  Petitioner was eventually able to reassemble his old cases and on
February 15, 1999, he filed a second motion for reinstatement in the First District
explaining that he did not have the copies before that time and that he had
2 It took petitioner some six months and a number of orders from this Court
directed to the Department of Corrections before petitioner was able to assemble his
3000 or so pages of prior pleadings so he could comply with this Court’s then-policy
of requiring strict compliance with the copy requirement part of the Prisoner Indigency
Statute.  At that time, in order to receive a thorough briefing, we appointed counsel for
petitioner.
4
mistakenly thought that the courts only wanted prior orders from other courts
finding him indigent.  On March 19, 1999, the First District denied petitioner's
second motion for reinstatement.  On April 8, 1999, petitioner filed his petition for
writ of mandamus in this Court and was granted indigency status.2
Petitioner alleged that the copy requirement of the Prisoner Indigency Statute
violated the constitution under various theories.  We decline to discuss any but the
access to courts theory.
ACCESS TO COURTS
Petitioner argues that the copy requirement of the Prisoner Indigency Statute
is unconstitutional because it results in an insurmountable obstacle to a prisoner’s
right to access the courts. 
Having had several years of experience with the Prisoner Indigency Statute,
we must now agree.  Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed for his failure to provide
copies of voluminous pleadings which were only obtainable through great difficulty,
delay, and public expense.  While the copy requirement  does not always result in a
5
complete inability to gain access to the courts, it produces procedural pitfalls so
difficult and time-consuming that litigation of the merits of a case becomes less
time-consuming and frustrating than being permitted to proceed as an indigent.  We
must conclude that these requirements have become a door to the Court that some
inmates simply cannot open.
There are two sources of the right to access the courts.  Florida’s
constitution specifically guarantees a citizen’s access to courts.  See art. I, § 21,
Fla. Const.  The Constitution of the United States does not, however, contain a
specific clause providing for this right.  The United States Supreme Court,
nevertheless,  has held that there is such a right arising from several constitutional
provisions including the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal
Protection Clause.  See generally Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977)
(holding that prisoners have a fundamental constitutional right to "a reasonably
adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional
rights to the courts"), modified, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343 (1996).  The
Supreme Court described the right of "access to courts" as including, among other
things, the provision of an acceptable law library.  Id. at 828.  In Lewis v. Casey,
518 U. S. at 355, however, the Court made clear that "access to courts" does not
guarantee inmates the right to "transform themselves into litigating engines capable
3 That federal statute provides, in pertinent part:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a
6
of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims." 
States must only provide a reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous
legal claims challenging their convictions or conditions of confinement.  Id.
As pointed out by petitioner’s counsel, one problem with Florida’s Prisoner
Indigency Statute is that the requirement that some inmates comply with the more
rigorous copy requirement does not stem from a determination by any court that
the inmate has ever filed a frivolous or other improper action.  Only inmates who
have twice in the preceding three years been permitted to file actions without
prepayment of filing fees must comply with these more rigorous requirements. 
Having filed only two prior actions in forma pauperis is clearly not, in itself,
inherently improper.  Furthermore, the federal statute upon which the Prisoner
Indigency Statute is purportedly fashioned and upon which the State relies to assert
that the Florida statute does not amount to an access to courts violation does not
contain a copy requirement at all.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (Supp. IV 1999).  Further,
the federal “three strikes” provision to which the State compares Florida’s copy
requirement only applies when an inmate has been found by a court to have filed
three prior in forma pauperis proceedings which were improper.3  Therefore, if
judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or
appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on
the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner
is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (Supp. IV 1999) (emphasis added).
7
application of these requirements either intentionally or incidentally results in a
sanction being imposed on the inmate, there are several constitutional problems. 
First, no “bad act” has been identified as the basis for the “punishment.”  Second,
if the requirements act to prevent the filing of actions which have not yet even been
reviewed to determine whether they are frivolous or otherwise improper, that effect
would result in an access to courts violation under the federal constitution.
The copy requirement of Florida’s Prisoner Indigency Statute is problematic
under an analysis based on Florida’s constitution as well.  Contrary to the federal
constitution, Florida’s constitution contains a specific "Access to Courts"
provision, found in article I, section 21, that provides:
Access to Courts. -- The courts shall be
open to every person for redress of any
injury, and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial or delay.
In Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), this Court set forth a test for
8
determining compliance with the access to courts clause when the Legislature
enacts provisions which appear to restrict the right.  In that case, the Legislature
purported to do away with a person’s ability to sue for an automobile accident
unless the property damages exceeded a certain amount.  This Court found the
statute unconstitutional and established the following test:
[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular
injury has been provided by statutory law predating the adoption of
the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, or
where such right has become a part of the common law of the State
pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 2.01, F. S. A., the Legislature is without power
to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to
protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries,
unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for
the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting
such public necessity can be shown.
Id. at 4.  In Kluger, the Court found that the test was not met and declared the
statute unconstitutional.  On other occasions, however, this Court has concluded
that statutes had passed the test because the right of action at issue had been only
marginally limited.  See, e.g., Chapman v. Dillon, 415 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1982)
(threshold limits of no-fault statute provide a reasonable alternative to tort action
and do not deny access to courts); Purdy v. Gulf Breeze Enterprises, Inc., 403 So.
2d 1325 (Fla. 1981) (statute requiring reimbursement of insurer for PIP benefits
where insured recovers from negligent third party does not deny access to courts);
4    In Hinterkopf, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that
The courts have generally disapproved financial
pre-conditions to bringing claims or asserting defenses in
court aside from court related filing fees.  A payment to the
court clerk to be used in constructing a county law library
as a  condition for bringing a lawsuit has been declared an
undue burden on the right of free access to the courts.
Flood v. State ex rel. Homeland Co., 95 Fla. 1003, 117 So.
385 (1928).  Requiring a defendant in a criminal case to pay
court-appointed counsel fees and certain appellate costs as
a condition for being heard on a motion for supersedeas
bail following conviction has been struck down on the same
ground.  Bell v. State, 281 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
And requiring payment of a sum of money into the registry
of the court unrelated to filing fees as a condition for
defending a lawsuit has long been declared constitutionally
impermissible.  Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 17 S. Ct.
841, 42 L. Ed. 215 (1897). 
Hinterkopf, 343 So. 2d at 901.
9
Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Hospital Corp., 403 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981)
(admissibility of collateral source evidence in medical malpractice actions upheld);
McMillan v. Nelson, 5 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1942).
In this case, however, it is not any asserted right to seek redress from the
court for any particular injury which has been abolished.  Nor is it any asserted right
to indigency itself which is at issue.  See G.B.B. Investments, Inc. v. Hinterkopf,
343 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).4  On the contrary, the right which has been
infringed is the right to seek redress for any type of injury or complaint of any kind
10
in any civil case that requires a filing fee.  This type of abolition is far greater than
the right taken in Kluger, or any of this Court’s previous access to courts cases. 
Further, in order to find that a right has been violated it is not necessary for the
statute to produce a procedural hurdle which is absolutely impossible to surmount,
only one which is significantly difficult.  This is so because the Florida Constitution
provides that “[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury,
and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.” Art. I, § 21, Fla.
Const.  This “openness” and necessity that access be provided “without delay”
clearly indicate that a violation occurs if the statute obstructs or infringes that right
to any significant degree.  We conclude that in petitioner’s case, the right was
significantly obstructed. 
In Kluger, only one type of possible legal action was curtailed.  In this case,
the right to gain access to the courts itself has been infringed.  Under Kluger, the
Legislature may only abolish a right if it has provided a reasonable alternative, it has
shown an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of the right, and there
is no alternative method of remedying the problem.  Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4.  We
find nothing in the act indicating that the Legislature was faced with such an
problem and that there was no alternative method of remedying it.  
The right to access is specifically mentioned in Florida’s constitution.  See
11
art. I, § 21, Fla. Const.  Therefore, it deserves more protection than those rights
found only by implication.  See Lloyd v. Farkash, 476 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1985) (finding duty to protect access to courts guarantee even greater than
when the right is one found by implication from other clauses).  The “no alternative
method of correcting the problem” method of analysis, discussed above, is
reminiscent of the goal-method test used in both substantive due process and equal
protection analysis for cases in which a fundamental right is taken.  See, e.g.,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-34 (1996) (equal protection); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (substantive due process).  In the goal-method
analysis, if the interest which is being taken is a fundamental interest, or if the
classification being challenged is based on a suspect classification (such as race),
then the means or method employed by the statute to remedy the asserted problem
must meet not only the rational basis test, but also the strict scrutiny test.  In the
strict scrutiny test, the method for remedying the asserted malady must be strictly
tailored to remedy the problem in the most effective way and must not restrict a
person’s rights any more than absolutely necessary.  See Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 766 (1997).  Further, in strict scrutiny cases, there must
be a compelling governmental interest which the statute purports to accomplish. 
We believe that this “compelling governmental interest” essentially corresponds to
12
the “overpowering public necessity” language used in Kluger and conclude that
there is no relevant difference between the “compelling governmental interest/strict
scrutiny” test and the “no alternative method of correcting the
problem/overpowering public necessity” test set forth in Kluger.  Therefore,
utilizing the analysis traditionally used in strict scrutiny review, we conclude that the
copy requirement restricts and impedes the filing of many more types of inmate
petitions than the types of inmate petitions which were identified by the Legislature
to be the malady being targeted.  The Legislature specifically identified as the
targeted evil only frivolous or malicious civil actions.  See ch. 96-106, preamble, at
92-93, § 2, Laws of Fla.  The copy requirement has the potential to restrict the filing
of any type of inmate petition requiring a filing fee.  In other words, even assuming
the statute satisfies the “compelling interest/overpowering public necessity” prong,
the legislation is not strictly tailored (i.e., it is overbroad).  Therefore, it does not
meet the strict scrutiny or “no alternative method of correcting the problem” test set
forth in Kluger.
In a number of cases in which legislative acts were challenged on the ground
that a right of recovery had been taken or restricted, this Court held that  since a
commensurate benefit had been provided as an alternative to the preexisting right,
there was no access to courts violation.  For example, in Eller v. Shova, 630 So. 2d
5 See also Bass v. Department of Corrections, 684 So. 2d 834, 835-36 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1996) (striking on an access to courts analysis prison rules which impermissibly
restricted inmates’ ability to file legal actions while in disciplinary confinement).
13
537 (Fla. 1993), this Court found that the system of workers' compensation that
provided no-fault recovery was a reasonable alternative to the right to sue one's
employer for a work-related injury.  Id. at 542-43.  In Lasky v. State Farm
Insurance Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974), the provision of Florida's No-Fault Law
that denied a plaintiff the right to sue unless certain threshold damages existed was
not a violation of access to courts because the right was replaced with the ability to
recover uncontested benefits and an exemption from tort liability.  Id.; see also
Smith v. Department of Insurance, 507 So. 2d 1080, 1088 (Fla. 1987) (further
clarifying the reasoning behind Lasky).  In this case, however, there is no
commensurate benefit or alternative means for judicial access provided in the
statute.  Therefore, we conclude that it does not meet this test either.5  
Statutes which precluded prisoners from filing legal actions like the present
statute have been found unconstitutional before.  See, e.g.,  Holman v. Hilton, 712
F.2d 854 (3rd Cir. 1983) (finding New Jersey’s civil death statute unconstitutional
as due process violation); Thompson v. Bond, 421 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Mo.
1976); Delorme v. Pierce Freightlines Co., 353 F. Supp. 258 (D. Ore. 1973);
McCuiston v. Wanicka, 483 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Collins v. Cote, 490
6  See Wuornos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1994); Wyatt v. State, 641 So.
2d 355 (Fla. 1994); Peterka v. State, 640 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1994); Elam v. State, 636 So.
2d 1312 (Fla. 1994); Taylor v. State, 630 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1993); Jackson v. Dugger,
633 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1993); Valentine v. State, 616 So. 2d 971 (Fla.1993); Koon v.
Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1993); State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1993);
Smith v. State, 598 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (Fla. 1992).
14
So. 2d 164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Lloyd v. Farkash, 476 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA
1985).  Since the procedural hurdles caused by the copy requirement can and in
some cases do rise to the level of a denial of access to courts, we have come to the
conclusion that it is unconstitutional under Florida’s access to courts provision.
Accordingly, we grant the instant petition for writ of mandamus and instruct
the First District Court of Appeal to reinstate petitioner’s appeal. 
APPLICATION OF THIS “NEW RULE”
Whenever a court announces a new rule of law the question arises as to who
is subject to or who may take advantage of the new rule.  A new rule is applied
either prospectively only, prospectively and retrospectively to certain nonfinal
cases, or prospectively and retrospectively to all cases, even final cases on
collateral review.
Normally, a new rule which is not a fundamental change in the law, but
merely an evolutionary refinement is generally applied prospectively to most cases,
retrospectively to certain nonfinal cases (“pipeline” cases), but never to final cases.6 
7 See, e.g., Jones v. State, 528 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 1988) (declined to retroactively
apply  Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987), which held that police failure
to comply with attorney's telephonic request not to question a defendant further until
that attorney could arrive was a violation of due process); State v. Safford, 484 So.
2d 1244 (Fla. 1986) (declined to retroactively apply State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla.
1984), which changed the long-standing rule in Florida that a party could never be
required to explain the reasons for exercising preemptory challenges); State v.
Statewright, 300 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1974) (declined to retroactively apply Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which established that police must warn arrested
15
In order for an advantageous decisional change to be fully retroactive to final cases
on collateral review, it must be of constitutional nature, a “sweeping change of law”
of “fundamental significance” constituting a “jurisprudential upheaval[].”  Witt v.
State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925, 929, 931 (Fla. 1980); see State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d
983 (Fla. 1995).  A mere "evolutionary refinement" will not abridge the finality of
judgments because to do so would "destroy the stability of the law, render
punishments uncertain and therefore ineffectual, and burden the judicial machinery
of our state, fiscally and intellectually, beyond any tolerable limit."  Witt, 387 So. 2d
at 929-30.
This Court has examined at least sixty cases since the Witt decision for
purposes of deciding whether the "new rule" was a fundamental constitutional
change warranting full retrospective application.  In practice, because of the strong
concern for decisional finality, this Court rarely finds a change in decisional law to
require retroactive application.7  At least two decisions of this Court found that
persons of their right to remain silent before questioning). 
16
"new rules" concerning habitual offender sentencing were not fundamental changes. 
In  McCuiston v. State, 534 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1988), for example, this Court
declined to retroactively apply Whitehead v. State, 498 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1986),
which held that finding a defendant to be an habitual offender is not a legally
sufficient reason for departure from the guidelines.  In Glenn v. State, 558 So. 2d 4,
7 (Fla. 1990), this Court further clarified that Winters v. State, 522 So. 2d 816 (Fla.
1988), was merely a refinement of habitual offender caselaw.  In Winters, this Court
had approved the use of the habitual offender statute to exceed the statutory
maximum in accordance with the sentencing guidelines.
 On the other hand, in State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1995), this
Court provided for certain limited retroactive application in a case addressing an
habitual offender issue.  In that case, this Court reexamined its decision in Hale v.
State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993), which held that the imposition of consecutive
habitual offender sentences was improper.  In Callaway, this Court concluded that
its decision in Hale was a "fundamental change" in the law.  It then balanced the
need for decisional finality with the need for fairness and uniformity under the three-
step approach of Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), in which a court must
consider (i) the purpose to be served by the new rule; (ii) the extent of reliance on
17
the old rule, and (iii) the effect that retroactive application of the rule would have on
the administration of justice.  In Callaway, this Court focused particular attention on
the fact that the habitual offender statute had been amended in 1988 to permit
habitual offender sentences to exceed the guidelines.  This Court therefore
concluded that courts and law enforcement could not have assumed and relied on
the belief that defendants could be sentenced consecutively to habitual offender
sentences for very many years.   Accordingly, requiring that the "new rule" be
applied retroactively to provide for a limited two-year window would not unduly
prejudice the administration of justice.
Analyzing the instant case, we must first determine whether our decision
today was based on analysis of provisions of the constitution.  Clearly, our
decision in this case is based on both the Florida Constitution and the Constitution
of the United States of America.  As mentioned above, to determine whether it is of
such a fundamental nature as to warrant full retrospective application, we use the
three-prong test explained in Stovall.  Under Stovall we must consider and balance
the purpose to be served by the new rule in our decision, the extent of reliance on
the old rule, and the effect that retroactive application of the rule would have on the
administration of justice.
The purpose of our decision today in this case is to ensure that the right of
8 The “pipeline” theory is explained in this Court’s decision in Smith v. State,
598 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (Fla. 1992) (citations omitted), wherein this Court stated: 
We are persuaded that the principles of fairness and equal
treatment .  .  .  compel us to adopt a[n] .  .  . evenhanded approach to
the retrospective application of the decisions of this Court with respect
to all nonfinal cases.  Any rule of law that substantially affects the life,
18
access to courts is available to all, a right specifically set forth in our constitution. 
See art. I, § 21, Fla. Const.  Clearly, in order for all to receive this fundamental
right, we must apply it to all.  Further, due to the administrative problems with the
copy requirement, including the lack of the necessary clerical staff to undertake the
additional procedures involved in strictly enforcing the requirement, our experience
leads us to believe that few courts, including this Court, were able to strictly and
consistently enforce it.  Therefore, we cannot say that the extent of reliance factor
in this case can be very large.  Moreover, even assuming strict enforcement of the
requirements since its inception, the statute has only been in effect since 1996 and,
although we expect some disruption to the administration of justice, we believe the
importance  of the right being advanced, that of seeking the aid of the justice
system itself, must outweigh these concerns.
We have also considered whether we should apply our ruling to “pipeline”
cases only.  Under that theory, however, the person seeking application of the new
rule must have objected at trial. 8  Clearly, applying that strict test of “pipeline”
liberty, or property of criminal defendants must be applied in a fair and
evenhanded manner.  “[T]he integrity of judicial review requires that we
apply [rule changes] to all similar cases pending on direct review.”
Griffith[ v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987)].  .  .  .  Thus, we hold
that any decision of this Court announcing a new rule of law, or merely
applying an established rule of law to a new or different factual situation,
must be given retrospective application by the courts of this state in every
case pending on direct review or not yet final.  To benefit from the
change in law, the defendant must have timely objected at trial if an
objection was required to preserve the issue for appellate review.
19
applicability would not work in this mandamus case because the underlying action
here was a writ petition filed by petitioner, not his underlying criminal case. 
Petitioner was not asked to comply with the indigency statute in the underlying
action and it was only when he attempted to appeal his case to the district court that
he encountered the copy requirement.  Therefore, he could not have “objected”
below.  While this Court could attempt to fashion a type of “pipeline” theory where
the person would be able to have his or her case reopened (whether it be an original
action in the circuit court, district court, this Court, or an appeal) if he or she had
objected to the requirements at some point in the case, we think it would be quite
difficult to set a precise definition of “objecting” because there are so many
scenarios possible.  Further, even if we were to attempt to set forth a definition, it
seems to us that the courts would probably spend as much time trying to determine
whether each particular inmate met the definition as it would be for them to just
9 Inmates will have to pay a portion of the filing fee in advance if able and make
installment payments toward the full filing fee if and when any funds are deposited into
their accounts.  See § 57.085(4) - - (5), Fla. Stat. (1999).
20
allow the inmate to refile his or her case and then decide the case on the merits. 
With this consideration in mind, we believe that there will be less “upheaval” to the
court system in the long run to permit all inmates whose cases were dismissed for
failure to comply with the copy  requirement to file a motion seeking reinstatement. 
Further, since this Court has not struck down the payment part of the Prisoner
Indigency Statute, meaning that inmates still will need to pay for their lawsuits,9 we
think some inmates will decide that their lawsuits were not sufficiently important for
them to seek reinstatement.  Therefore, the number of inmates seeking reinstatement
should not be overwhelming.  Accordingly, balancing the important right of access
to courts which underlies our decision in this case with the relative disruption full
retrospective application will cause to the judicial system, we conclude that the
interests of justice require that the courts apply this new rule to all inmates who file
motions seeking to reinstate their cases if they were dismissed for failure to comply
with the copy requirement of the Prisoner Indigency Statute.
However, in order to minimize judicial upheaval, we find it  necessary to set
forth a time frame for the filing of such motions.  As is the case with the analogous
situation presented when claims are filed under rule 3.850(b)(2) (concerning new
10 See, e.g., Dixon v. State, 730 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1999) (3.850 claim permitted
if filed within two years of the decision holding the right to be retroactive).
-21-
rights held to apply retroactively),10 we hold that any motions seeking to reinstate a
closed case under this decision must be filed within two years of the date this
decision becomes final.  
It is so ordered.
SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Writ of Mandamus
Susan L. Kelsey of Holland & Knight LLP, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Douglas T. Squire and Charlie McCoy,
Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent