Case Title: Sandoval v. Qualcomm Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S252796

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2021-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
JOSE M. SANDOVAL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S252796 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division One 
D070431 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
37-2014-00012901-CU-PO-CTL 
 
 
September 9, 2021 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, Jenkins, and Feuer concurred. 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Seven, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
S252796 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
An electrical parts specialist sustained third degree burns 
to over one third of the surface area of his body after he triggered 
an arc flash from a circuit he did not realize was “live” with 
flowing electricity.  The contractor for whom he’d been working 
had removed the protective cover on that live circuit while work 
was underway.  A jury concluded that the contractor acted 
negligently and was liable for the injuries.  What this case is 
about is whether further liability arises for the company that 
hired the contractor, owned the premises, and operated the 
electrical equipment.  The answer here is no.   
Strong public policy considerations readily acknowledged 
in our past decisions generally support a straightforward 
presumption about the responsibilities of hirers and contractors 
for worker injuries in situations like this:  A person or entity 
hiring an independent contractor (a “hirer”) ordinarily delegates 
to that independent contractor all responsibility for the safety of 
the contractor’s workers.  (SeaBright Ins. Co. v. US Airways, 
Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 590, 597, 600, 602 (SeaBright).)  This 
presumption is rooted in hirers’ reasons for employing 
contractors in the first place, and society’s need for clear rules 
about who’s responsible for avoiding harms to workers when 
contractors are hired.  We have therefore generally avoided 
subjecting hirers to tort liability for those workers’ injuries.  (See 
id. at pp. 598–599.)  But that presumption gives way to two 
recognized exceptions:  where the hirer either withholds critical 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
information regarding a concealed hazard (Kinsman v. Unocal 
Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 664 (Kinsman)); or retains control 
over the contractor’s work and actually exercises that control in 
a way that affirmatively contributes to the worker’s injury 
(Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 
202 (Hooker)).  The parties dispute how this presumption of 
delegation and its two exceptions apply here.  The Court of 
Appeal affirmed a jury verdict finding the hirer liable under a 
retained control theory of liability.   
What 
we 
conclude 
is 
that 
defendant 
Qualcomm 
Incorporated, the hirer in this case, owed no tort duty to plaintiff 
Martin Sandoval, the parts specialist working for Qualcomm’s 
contractor, at the time of Sandoval’s injuries.  Although 
Qualcomm performed the partial power-down process that 
preceded the contractor’s work and resulted in the presence of 
the live electrical circuit, we conclude on the record here that 
Qualcomm neither failed to sufficiently disclose that hazard 
under Kinsman nor affirmatively contributed to the injury 
under Hooker.  We also conclude that the pattern jury 
instruction used in this case — CACI No. 1009B — does not 
adequately capture the elements of a Hooker claim.  So we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand this 
case.  The appellate court is instructed to remand this case to 
the trial court, so it can enter judgment for Qualcomm 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
I. 
A. 
Qualcomm powers its San Diego campus from two sources 
of electricity:  the local electric utility and Qualcomm’s onsite 
turbine generators — both of which feed into an electrical 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
switchgear.1  The switchgear consists largely of busbars, which 
are large metal bars that conduct electricity much like power 
cables, and medium-voltage circuit breakers, which are 900-
pound machines that automatically interrupt faulty current 
flow much like their tiny cousins in a house’s fuse box.  Each 
circuit breaker and its incoming and outgoing busbars reside 
within a particular cubicle in a long row of tall metal cabinets.  
Each cubicle allows access from the front side and from the back 
side by removing a bolted-on protective cover.  The cubicles all 
look very similar, particularly on the back side.   
Qualcomm planned to upgrade its onsite turbine 
generators in 2013.  In order to accommodate this upgrade, 
Qualcomm hired TransPower Testing, Inc., an electrical 
engineering service company, to inspect and verify the 
amperage 
capacity 
of 
Qualcomm’s 
existing 
switchgear 
equipment.  Frank Sharghi, TransPower’s president, is a 
licensed electrical engineer and had worked on that switchgear 
at least monthly for nearly 20 years, since before Qualcomm 
acquired the campus.  After Sharghi was unable to locate some 
of the busbars in the “main cogen” circuit during one inspection, 
Sharghi hired Sandoval — an electrical parts supply and repair 
specialist with ROS Electrical Supply & Equipment — to 
accompany him at a second inspection.  For this second 
inspection, Qualcomm approved a scope of work authorizing 
TransPower to inspect the main cogen circuit from the front and 
 
1  
Because this case comes to us on appeal of the denial of 
Qualcomm’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
we summarize the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Sandoval.  (See Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 
Cal.4th 167, 192 (Webb).) 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
back.  Qualcomm did not authorize TransPower to inspect (or 
expose) any other circuits at this time. 
On the morning of the second inspection, Sharghi 
gathered with his workers — Sandoval, TransPower employee 
George Guadana, and Sharghi’s son, Omid — at the Qualcomm 
power plant.  They attended a safety briefing led by Qualcomm 
plant operator Mark Beckelman.  In the course of discussing 
several matters pertinent to the job, Beckelman reminded 
Sharghi and his team that some circuits in the switchgear would 
remain live.  Both Qualcomm’s employees and TransPower’s 
workers then proceeded to the switchgear room.   
Qualcomm’s employees — Beckelman and two others — 
then performed what we will refer to as the power-down process:  
a process of multiple steps designed to ensure there would be no 
live electricity flowing through the main cogen cubicle during 
the inspection.  Qualcomm’s employees wore arc flash protection 
suits for this process.  Beckelman directed the TransPower 
team — who, except Guadana, were not wearing arc flash 
suits — to stand at a safe distance.  Having shut off all turbine 
and emergency diesel generators, the Qualcomm employees 
disconnected (“racked out”) the corresponding generator 
breakers in the switchgear as well as the “sync-tie” breaker 
connecting the main cogen circuit to utility power.  This cut off 
every source of power that could possibly flow to the main cogen 
cubicle.  They performed a “lockout/tagout” on each of these 
breakers, a procedure which physically prevents anyone from 
inadvertently reconnecting them.  As for the main cogen 
breaker, they not only racked it out and performed a 
lockout/tagout, but they also opened the front panel covering its 
cubicle, physically removed the 900-pound breaker, and placed 
the breaker on the floor in front of the switchgear cabinets.  They 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
now had access to the main cogen busbars deep inside the 
cubicle, and they used a voltmeter to confirm that those busbars 
were dead.  Sharghi observed the power-down process carefully 
“to make sure they [didn’t] miss anything.”  All other circuits in 
the switchgear room remained live with utility power.   
Qualcomm’s employees soon exited the switchgear room.  
But before they did, Beckelman confirmed with Sharghi that 
Sharghi was satisfied with Qualcomm’s power-down of the main 
cogen circuit, and that Sharghi understood which circuits were 
now dead (the “safe zone”) and which were still live (the “no-safe 
zone”).  Sandoval did not hear this exchange between 
Beckelman and Sharghi.   
At approximately this point, Guadana — wearing his arc 
flash protection — performed a grounding process on the back 
side of the main cogen cubicle.  He removed the cubicle’s back 
panels, confirmed with TransPower’s own voltmeters that the 
main cogen circuit was indeed dead, bled any residual energy, 
and attached grounding cables as an additional safety 
precaution.  The record is inconsistent regarding whether 
Guadana performed this grounding process before or after 
Qualcomm’s employees left the room, and with or without 
Qualcomm’s employees’ assistance and/or supervision.   
After Qualcomm’s employees left the switchgear room, 
Sharghi instructed Guadana — still wearing his arc flash 
protection — to also remove the bolted-on back protective panel 
from the immediately adjacent GF-5 cubicle.  As Sharghi well 
knew, the GF-5 circuit was still live with electricity from utility 
power.  Sharghi would later testify that his reason for 
instructing Guadana to remove the GF-5 cubicle’s back panel 
was that he wanted to take photographs for purposes of an 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
unrelated previous inspection.  Sharghi told no one that he was 
exposing a live circuit.   
Either while Guadana was removing the back GF-5 panel 
or immediately afterward, the TransPower team began their 
inspection of the main cogen busbars from the front side of the 
switchgear cabinets.   
At some point during this inspection, Sandoval walked 
away from the rest of the TransPower team.  Sharghi would 
later testify that he thought Sandoval was going to get paper 
and pen.  Sandoval would later recall that he was having trouble 
judging the size of some of the main cogen busbars from the front 
side of the cabinet, and he thought he might be able to get a 
better view from the back.  Sandoval called out to Guadana to 
join him.  Sandoval asked Guadana to hold a flashlight as they 
both approached the back side of the cabinets.  Guadana was 
still wearing his arc flash protection.  Sandoval was holding a 
metal tape measure.   
The metal tape measure triggered an arc flash from the 
live, exposed GF-5 circuit.  As best as Qualcomm could later 
reconstruct the incident from the physical evidence, Sandoval 
had inadvertently tried to measure the GF-5 busbars instead of 
the main cogen busbars.  Sandoval recalls everything going blue, 
and screaming.  The 4,160-volt arc flash — thousands of degrees 
in temperature — had set him aflame.  Sharghi and Omid heard 
the “bang” as the arc flash tripped the breaker.  Guadana and 
Omid managed to smother the fire.  Beckelman heard the bang 
from the control room downstairs.  When Beckelman reached 
the switchgear room, he found Sandoval lying facedown and 
screaming, “Why was it live?  It shouldn’t be live.”     
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
Sandoval spent over a month in the hospital.  He 
sustained third degree burns — burns so deep the whole body is 
compromised, requiring multiple skin graft procedures — to 
about one third of his body surface, including his face, neck, 
torso, and arms.  He also experienced additional second degree 
burns, pneumonia, multiple infections, lasting discomfort, and 
loss of full use of his left arm.   
B. 
Sandoval filed suit against Qualcomm, TransPower, and 
ROS Electrical Supply, asserting claims for negligence and 
premises liability.  Qualcomm moved for summary judgment on 
the basis that the presumption of delegation should shield it 
from liability here.  Denying the motion, the trial court found a 
triable issue as to whether Qualcomm affirmatively contributed 
to Sandoval’s injury.  Before trial began, Qualcomm objected to 
the use of CACI No. 1009B — the pattern jury instruction 
setting out the elements of a Hooker claim — on the ground that 
it didn’t adequately convey the element of affirmative 
contribution.  The trial court denied the objection.  At the same 
time, the trial court noted its intention to instruct the jury that 
Kinsman — the case pertaining to a hirer’s duty to disclose 
concealed hazards on the hirer’s premises — did not require 
Qualcomm to disclose the live circuits to Sandoval personally.  
As a result, Sandoval withdrew his premises liability claim 
against Qualcomm. 
Following trial, the jury returned a special verdict 
imposing liability on Qualcomm for Sandoval’s injuries.  
Applying CACI No. 1009B, the jury found that Qualcomm 
retained control over the safety conditions of the worksite, that 
Qualcomm negligently exercised that control, and that 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
Qualcomm’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing 
Sandoval’s injuries.  The jury awarded Sandoval over $1 million 
in past and future medical expenses and $6 million in 
noneconomic damages.  It apportioned the fault 46 percent to 
Qualcomm, 45 percent to TransPower, and 9 percent to 
Sandoval.   
Qualcomm moved for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and for a new trial.  The trial court rejected Qualcomm’s 
argument that it was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict for lack of any triable issue on affirmative contribution.  
The court granted Qualcomm’s motion for a new trial, however, 
on the ground that the jury had improperly apportioned 
liability.   
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  It, too, rejected both of 
Qualcomm’s arguments:  that CACI No. 1009B was an 
inaccurate statement of the law as it relates to hirer liability, 
and that Qualcomm wasn’t liable to Sandoval because it did not 
affirmatively contribute to his injuries.  (Sandoval v. Qualcomm 
Inc. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 381, 417–420 (Sandoval).)   
We granted review to resolve whether a hirer of an 
independent contractor may be liable to a contractor’s employee 
based only on the hirer’s failure to undertake certain safety 
measures to protect the contractor’s employees, and whether 
CACI No. 1009B accurately states the relevant law.    
II. 
A. 
When a person or organization hires an independent 
contractor, the hirer presumptively delegates to the contractor 
the responsibility to do the work safely.  (SeaBright, supra, 52 
Cal.4th at pp. 597, 600, 602; Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th 659, 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
671.)  This presumption is grounded in two major principles:  
first, that independent contractors by definition ordinarily 
control the manner of their own work; and second, that hirers 
typically hire independent contractors precisely for their greater 
ability to perform the contracted work safely and successfully.  
(Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 693 (Privette).)  
Because this actual transfer of control tends to be desirable for 
both private parties and society, the long-standing common law 
rule was that a hirer bore no liability for injuries caused by the 
negligence of the contractor.  (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 693; 
see Snyder v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 793, 
799; Green v. Soule (1904) 145 Cal. 96, 99–100; Frassi v. 
McDonald (1898) 122 Cal. 400, 402; Callan v. Bull (1896) 113 
Cal. 593, 598.) 
But ability to prevent an injury is not the only important 
consideration in the formulation of tort doctrines.  Courts have 
now diluted the original, plain vanilla common law rule in 
various ways depending on the identity of the injured party.  
Where an injury befalls a hapless third party, the paramount 
concerns have been about ensuring victim compensation.  Lest 
the victim be limited to suing an insolvent contractor, courts 
have extended various theories of direct and vicarious liability 
so the injured third party can recover from the hirer.  (Privette, 
supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 694–695.)  As between an unrelated third 
party and a hirer, courts have preferred to let the loss lie with 
the party for whose benefit the contracted work was 
undertaken.  (Id. at p. 694.)   
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
Conversely, where the injury falls on a “contract worker,”2 
concerns about the distribution of tort burdens as between the 
hirer and contractor have become paramount:  Given that the 
Workers’ Compensation Act protects the contractor — but not 
the hirer3 — from tort liability, and already ensures 
compensation for contract worker injuries, we have concluded 
that it is ordinarily unfair to let a contract worker recover from 
the hirer for the contractor’s negligence.  (See Toland v. Sunland 
Housing Group, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 253, 270 (Toland).)  The 
hirer is typically less knowledgeable and more poorly positioned 
to prevent injury to the contract workers than the contractor is.  
(Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 693, 700.)  Typically, the hirer 
indirectly pays for workers’ compensation insurance in the 
contract price.  (Id. at p. 699.)  And the contractor’s insurance 
premiums and, often, personal relationship with its workers 
already give the contractor compelling incentives to ensure a 
safe workplace.  (See id. at pp. 693, 700.)  We refer to this 
principle that a hirer is ordinarily not liable to the contract 
 
2  
We use the term “contract worker” herein as a shorthand 
for the independent contractor personally, the independent 
contractor’s 
employees, 
the 
independent 
contractor’s 
subcontractors personally, the subcontractors’ employees, and 
so on.  (See, e.g., Padilla v. Pomona College (2008) 166 
Cal.App.4th 661, 668–671, 676 (Padilla) [applying Privette 
doctrine to subcontractor's employee]; accord, Khosh v. Staples 
Construction Co., Inc. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 712, 718–719, 721 
(Khosh) [same].) 
3  
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Industrial Accident 
Commission (1919) 180 Cal. 497, we held unconstitutional the 
award of workers’ compensation against a person other than the 
immediate employer.  (See id. at p. 503.)   
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
workers as the Privette doctrine, for the first case in which we 
announced it.     
Over time, we’ve recast our primary rationale for the 
Privette doctrine in terms of delegation rather than workers’ 
compensation.  Because we typically expect contractors to 
perform the contracted work more safely than hirers, we have 
endorsed a “strong policy” of presuming that a hirer delegates 
all control over the contracted work, and with it all concomitant 
tort duties, by entrusting work to a contractor.  (SeaBright, 
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 596.)  In light of this presumption, we 
have refused to extend liability to hirers even on theories of 
nominally “direct” liability, such as negligent failure to require 
precautions or negligent hiring of an incompetent contractor.  
(Toland, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 265; Camargo v. Tjaarda 
Dairy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1235, 1241 (Camargo).)  We reasoned 
that liability for a hirer’s failure to ensure the contractor takes 
reasonable care is “in essence ‘vicarious’ or ‘derivative,’ ” and 
thus impermissible under the Privette doctrine.  (Toland, at p. 
265; see Camargo, at p. 1241.)  Likewise, even where workers’ 
compensation is not available, we have refused to let an 
independent contractor personally sue a hirer under a vicarious 
liability theory, reasoning that society can readily expect a 
competent contractor to have both good reason and knowledge 
to exercise responsibility over the contractor’s own personal 
safety.  (Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 
518, 521 (Tverberg I).) 
But the Privette doctrine has its limits.  Sometimes a hirer 
intends to delegate its responsibilities to the contractor in 
principle but, by withholding critical safety information, fails to 
effectively delegate its responsibilities in practice; or a hirer 
delegates its responsibilities only partially by retaining control 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
of certain activities directly related to the contracted work.  
When such situations arise, the Privette doctrine gives way to 
exceptions.  In Kinsman, we articulated the rule that a 
landowner-hirer owes a duty to a contract worker if the hirer 
fails to disclose to the contractor a concealed premises hazard.  
(Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 664.)  And in Hooker, we 
articulated the rule that a hirer owes a duty to a contract worker 
if the hirer retains control over any part of the work and actually 
exercises that control so as to affirmatively contribute to the 
worker’s injury.  (Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 202.)   
B. 
Bearing these principles in mind, we begin by considering 
whether this case implicates our presumption of delegation, 
and, if so, whether the concealed hazards exception applies here.  
The answers are yes and no, respectively. 
1. 
A presumptive delegation of tort duties occurs when the 
hirer turns over control of the worksite to the contractor so that 
the contractor can perform the contracted work.  Our premise is 
ordinarily that when the hirer delegates control, the hirer 
simultaneously delegates all tort duties the hirer might 
otherwise owe the contract workers.  (Tverberg I, supra, 49 
Cal.4th at p. 528; Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 671.)  
Whatever reasonable care would otherwise have demanded of 
the hirer, that demand lies now only with the contractor.  If a 
contract worker becomes injured after that delegation takes 
place, we presume that the contractor alone — and not the 
hirer — was responsible for any failure to take reasonable 
precautions.    
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
That said, this presumption gives way to the two 
recognized exceptions that apply where delegation is either 
ineffective or incomplete.  We briefly consider the exception for 
the former situation — the concealed hazards exception. 
In Kinsman we recognized that a landowner-hirer cannot 
effectively delegate its duties respecting a concealed hazard 
without disclosing that hazard to the contractor.  (See Kinsman, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 674.)  In this context, a “concealed” 
hazard means something specific:  a hazard that the hirer either 
knows or reasonably should know exists, and that the contractor 
does not know exists and could not reasonably discover without 
the hirer’s disclosure.  (Id. at p. 675.)  We draw no distinction 
between a hazard whose very existence is concealed and a 
hazard which is in some way apparent but whose dangerousness 
is concealed.  (Id. at p. 678.)  The sufficiency of the hirer’s 
disclosure is “measured by a negligence standard,” that is, a 
standard of reasonable care.  (Id. at p. 680.)  If the hirer does not 
sufficiently disclose the concealed hazard, the hirer retains its 
tort duties owed to the contract workers respecting that hazard.  
A contrary conclusion would cut against the rationale justifying 
Privette’s presumption of delegation.  A contractor is not best 
situated to perform work safely when the contractor lacks 
critical information about relevant hazards.  (Kinsman, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 679; see Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 213.)  
Nor is there any unfairness in holding the hirer liable where 
only the hirer possessed that critical knowledge.  (See Toland, 
supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 267.)    
2. 
The record evidence leaves no question that Qualcomm 
both turned over control of the worksite and sufficiently 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
disclosed all relevant concealed hazards before Sandoval’s 
injury occurred.  We therefore presume that Qualcomm owed 
Sandoval no tort duty respecting his injury, subject only to the 
retained control exception which we discuss in the subsequent 
section. 
There is no dispute that Qualcomm turned over control of 
the worksite to TransPower before the injury.  Although the 
record contains some ambiguity regarding when exactly the 
Qualcomm employees left the switchgear room, and when 
exactly TransPower began performing its inspection of the main 
cogen breaker, it is undisputed that both of these things 
occurred before Sandoval’s injury.  We need not resolve whether 
the turning over of control occurred before or after Guadana 
performed the grounding process.  Even if Qualcomm did not 
turn over control until after the grounding process, Sandoval’s 
injury occurred at least several minutes later still — well into 
TransPower’s inspection of the main cogen circuit.  The evidence 
therefore triggers a presumption that Qualcomm had delegated 
to TransPower all duties Qualcomm otherwise would have owed 
to Sandoval by the time of Sandoval’s injury. 
There is likewise no dispute that Qualcomm sufficiently 
disclosed to TransPower any relevant concealed hazards before 
Sandoval’s injury.  The relevant hazard was the presence of live 
circuits in the switchgear room.  Sharghi — TransPower’s 
president — admitted that he was well aware which circuits 
were live and which were not.  Sharghi’s knowledge might 
indicate that the live condition of the circuits was obvious or 
reasonably ascertainable for TransPower, in which case that 
condition was not actually “concealed.”  Or it might indicate that 
Beckelman accurately described the partially live condition of 
the equipment when he communicated with Sharghi before 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
leaving the switchgear room, in which case Qualcomm’s 
disclosure was sufficient.  Either way, the evidence establishes 
that Qualcomm effectively delegated to TransPower any tort 
duties Qualcomm otherwise would have owed Sandoval 
respecting these live circuits under Kinsman.4  
What Sandoval posits is that because the power-down 
process was entirely Qualcomm’s doing, Qualcomm bore 
responsibility for all power-related hazards.  In other words, 
since Qualcomm didn’t delegate to TransPower the performance 
of the power-down process, it couldn’t have delegated its tort 
duties respecting the power-down process.  If Sandoval had been 
injured during Qualcomm’s performance of the power-down 
process, we might agree that no transfer of control or tort duties 
from Qualcomm to the contractor had yet occurred.  (See 
Tverberg I, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 528 [the hirer delegates 
responsibility for performing the work safely “when” the hirer 
delegates control].)  But timing matters, and Sandoval’s injury 
occurred later.  Once Qualcomm turned over control of the 
worksite, any tort duties Qualcomm had with respect to the 
safety of that site presumptively became TransPower’s duties.  
(See Horne v. Ahern Rentals, Inc. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 192, 203 
[where hirer performed noncontract work of driving and parking 
 
4  
By dismissing his premises liability claim, Sandoval in 
fact waived any claim he might have had based on Qualcomm’s 
failure to effectively delegate any landowner duties respecting 
the live circuits.  We discuss such duties to provide guidance in 
future cases.  Because there was no failure here to disclose 
critical information respecting a concealed hazard, we need not 
resolve 
whether 
Qualcomm’s 
ability 
to 
delegate 
its 
nonlandowner duties respecting that hazard (Sandoval posits 
theories of undertaking and of past practice creating a risk of 
harm) may have also required a Kinsman-type disclosure. 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
forklift and then turned over control, hirer delegated to 
contractor responsibility for determining whether that location 
and positioning of the forklift was safe for conducting the 
contracted work of replacing the forklift’s tires].)   
Qualcomm’s performance of the power-down process 
remains relevant only to the extent it implicates our two 
exceptions to this presumption.  As to the first, to the extent that 
Qualcomm’s performance of the power-down process resulted in 
the presence of a preexisting hazard (the live circuits), 
Qualcomm effectively delegated its duties respecting that 
hazard either because it was not concealed or because 
Qualcomm’s disclosure was sufficient.  As to the second, we 
consider in the following section whether Qualcomm owed 
Sandoval a duty on account of incomplete delegation, whether 
by virtue of Qualcomm’s performance of the power-down process 
or otherwise.   
C. 
We now consider whether substantial evidence supports 
the jury’s conclusion that Qualcomm owed Sandoval a duty 
under the retained control exception to the ordinary limitations 
on hirer liability for injuries sustained by contract workers.  (See 
Webb, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 192 [stating standard of review].)  
We conclude that the answer is no. 
1. 
In Hooker, we recognized that hirers do not always fully 
delegate control to their contractors.  We concluded that in some 
such “retained control” situations, notwithstanding Privette’s 
presumption to the contrary, the hirer must owe a duty of care 
to the contract workers.  (Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 211–
212; see SeaBright, supra, 52 Cal.4th 590 at pp. 599–600.) 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
The plaintiff in such cases must establish not only that the 
hirer retained control over the contracted work, but also that the 
hirer actually exercised that retained control in a manner that 
affirmatively contributed to the contract worker’s injury.  
(Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 202.)  Because Hooker’s 
application has produced significant confusion, we dwell at some 
length here on the meaning of Hooker’s three key concepts:  
retained control, actual exercise, and affirmative contribution.   
A hirer “retains control” where it retains a sufficient 
degree of authority over the manner of performance of the work 
entrusted to the contractor.  This concept simply incorporates 
the Restatements’ theory of retained control:  Against a 
backdrop of no hirer duty respecting the manner of performance 
of work entrusted to a contractor, the Restatements provide that 
a hirer who retains control over any part of that work owes 
others a duty of reasonable care respecting the hirer’s exercise 
of that retained control.  (See Rest.2d Torts, § 414; Hooker, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 201–202 [incorporating Rest.2d Torts, 
§ 414]; Rest.3d Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm, § 56 [modern version of Rest.2d Torts, § 414].)  So 
“retained control” refers specifically to a hirer’s authority over 
work entrusted to the contractor, i.e., work the contractor has 
agreed to perform.  For simplicity we will often call this the 
“contracted work” — irrespective of whether it’s set out in a 
written contract or arises from an informal agreement.  A hirer’s 
authority over noncontract work — although potentially giving 
rise to other tort duties — thus does not give rise to a retained 
control duty unless it has the effect of creating authority over 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
the contracted work.5  (See Rest.3d Torts, supra, § 56, com. b, 
pp. 390–392.)  Furthermore, a hirer’s authority over the 
contracted work amounts to retained control only if the hirer’s 
exercise of that authority would sufficiently limit the 
contractor’s freedom to perform the contracted work in the 
contractor’s own manner.  (Id., com. c, p. 392; see, e.g., Grahn v. 
Tosco Corp. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1395 [“the ‘control’ 
necessary to give rise to a duty of care under Restatement 
[Second of Torts] section 414” is “not simply general control over 
the premises,” but control “over the methods of the work or the 
manner in which the contractor’s employees perform the 
operative details of their tasks”], disapproved on other grounds 
in Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 214 and Camargo, supra, 25 
Cal.4th at p. 1245; McDonald v. Shell Oil Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 
785, 790 [“the [hirer] may retain a broad general power of 
supervision and control as to the results of the work so as to 
insure satisfactory performance of the independent contract — 
 
5  
Some line-drawing questions will of course arise when it 
comes to how generally or specifically to understand the scope 
of the contracted work.  Consistent with the Privette 
presumption that the hirer delegates the responsibility to 
perform the contracted work safely, we presume that scope 
encompasses at minimum the taking of reasonable precautions 
during the performance of the work.   
 
We also acknowledge that it will not always be easy to 
distinguish between (a) contracted work over which the hirer 
retained control, and (b) noncontract work in which the 
contractor had some involvement but which the hirer controlled 
to such a great extent that we would not say it was entrusted to 
the contractor.  For instance, it might be difficult to say whether 
the hirer in Regalado v. Callaghan (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 582 
(Regalado) was performing the noncontract work of obtaining 
permits, or retaining control over the permitting aspect of the 
contracted work.  (See id. at pp. 587–588.)   
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
including the right to inspect [citation], the right to stop the 
work 
[citation], 
the 
right 
to 
make 
suggestions 
or 
recommendations as to details of the work [citation], the right 
to prescribe alterations or deviations in the work [citation] — 
without” incurring a retained control duty].) 
The parties dispute whether Qualcomm retained control 
“over safety conditions at the worksite,” a phrase we used in 
Hooker.  (Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 202, 215.)  But the 
pivotal question here is whether the hirer retained a sufficient 
degree of control over the manner of performing the contracted 
work.  Hooker itself gave us no reason to draw a meaningful 
distinction between control over the manner of performing the 
contracted work and control “over safety conditions at the 
worksite,” because the hirer was alleged to have retained control 
over the manner of performing the contracted work by retaining 
the right to take corrective safety measures during the 
contractor’s performance of the work entrusted to it.  (Id. at p. 
202.)  And in any event, one might question whether it’s even 
possible to retain control over safety conditions without also 
retaining some control over the manner of performing the 
contracted work.  To the extent that “control over safety 
conditions” (ibid.) might be taken to mean control over the 
presence of preexisting hazards, though, as Sandoval argues by 
implication, the phrase is unhelpful here.  A hirer might be 
responsible for the presence of a hazard and even convey an 
expectation that the contractor perform its work without 
eliminating that hazard altogether, and yet leave the contractor 
ample freedom to accommodate that hazard effectively in 
whatever manner the contractor sees fit.  (See, e.g., Padilla, 
supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 671 [hirer did not retain control by 
expecting contractor to work in presence of pressurized water 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
pipe where hirer disclosed the pipe’s condition and contractor 
had ample freedom to perform its work in its own 
manner without contacting the pressurized pipe].)  In such 
instance, the hirer does not necessarily retain a sufficient degree 
of control over the contractor’s manner of performing the 
contracted work to constitute “retained control.”  
What we decided in Hooker was that, even if hirers may 
owe unrelated third parties a retained control duty based on 
retained control alone, hirers owe the contract workers a 
retained control duty only with something more.  Contract 
workers must prove that the hirer both retained control and 
actually exercised that retained control in such a way as to 
affirmatively contribute to the injury.  (Hooker, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 202.)   
A hirer “actually exercise[s]” its retained control over the 
contracted work when it involves itself in the contracted work 
“such that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in 
the contractor’s own manner.”  (Rest.3d Torts, supra, § 56, com. 
c, p. 392; see Thompson v. Jess (Utah 1999) 979 P.2d 322, 327; 
Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 209 [endorsing an approach 
similar to Thompson’s].)  In other words, the hirer must exert 
some influence over the manner in which the contracted work is 
performed.  Unlike “retained control,” which is satisfied where 
the hirer retains merely the right to become so involved, “actual 
exercise” requires that the hirer in fact involve itself, such as 
through direction, participation, or induced reliance.6  (See, e.g., 
 
6  
Although “active participation” may be one way of exerting 
influence over the manner of performance (Tverberg v. Fillner 
Construction, Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1446 (Tverberg 
 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
Kinney v. CSB Construction, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 28, 39 
(Kinney) [a hirer’s “mere failure to exercise a power to compel 
the [contractor] to adopt safer procedures does not, without 
more, violate any duty owed to the [contract worker]”]; Hooker, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 209 [quoting and agreeing with this 
passage in Kinney].) 
“Affirmative contribution” means that the hirer’s exercise 
of retained control contributes to the injury in a way that isn’t 
merely derivative of the contractor’s contribution to the injury.  
(See Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 212 [hirer liability based on 
affirmative contribution does not merely “ ‘ “derive[] from the 
‘act or omission’ of the hired contractor” ’ ”].)  Where the 
contractor’s conduct is the immediate cause of injury, the 
affirmative contribution requirement can be satisfied only if the 
hirer in some respect induced — not just failed to prevent — the 
contractor’s injury-causing conduct.  (See, e.g., Kinney, supra, 87 
Cal.App.4th at p. 36 [requiring that the hirer “induc[e] [the 
contractor’s] injurious action or inaction through actual 
direction, reliance on the hirer, or otherwise”]; Hooker, at p. 211 
[quoting and agreeing with this passage in Kinney]; McKown v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 219, 225 [finding 
affirmative contribution where hirer “requested” that contractor 
use faulty equipment, thus at least in part inducing the 
 
II); see Khosh, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 718; Alvarez v. Seaside 
Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 641), it 
is not necessarily the only way.  (See, e.g., Ray v. Silverado 
Constructors (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1133–1134 (Ray) 
[finding Hooker test satisfied where hirer had contractually 
prohibited contractor from unilaterally undertaking a crucial 
safety measure but was not actively participating in the 
contracted work at the time of the injury].) 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
contractor’s decision to use it].)  It is not enough for the hirer’s 
exercise of control to incidentally give the hirer the opportunity 
to prevent the contractor’s injury-causing conduct.  (See Hooker, 
at p. 214 [finding no affirmative contribution where the onsite 
hirer had the authority and opportunity to stop the contractor 
from allowing traffic across the overpass, but did not induce the 
contractor to allow such traffic — the hirer merely “permitted” 
the traffic].)   
A 
hirer’s 
conduct 
also 
satisfies 
the 
affirmative 
contribution requirement where the hirer’s exercise of retained 
control contributes to the injury independently of the 
contractor’s contribution (if any) to the injury.  (See, e.g., Hooker, 
at p. 212, fn. 3 [observing that hirer liability would be 
appropriate where “the hirer promises to undertake a particular 
safety measure, then . . . negligent[ly] fail[s] to do so”]; Ray, 
supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1133–1134 [finding Hooker liability 
where hirer prohibited contractor from erecting road barricade 
that might have prevented injury].)   
The critical factor here is the relationship between the 
hirer’s conduct and the contractor’s conduct, not whether the 
hirer’s conduct, assessed in isolation, can be described as 
“affirmative conduct.”  (Madden v. Summit View, Inc. (2008) 165 
Cal.App.4th 1267, 1276.)  Importantly, neither “actual exercise” 
nor “affirmative contribution” requires that the hirer’s 
negligence (if any) consist of an affirmative act.  The hirer’s 
negligence may take the form of any act, course of conduct, or 
failure to take a reasonable precaution that is within the scope 
of its duty under Hooker.  (See Rest.3d Torts, supra, § 3, com. c, 
pp. 29–30; Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 212, fn. 3 [noting that 
a hirer may be liable based on failing to undertake a promised 
safety measure]; Ray, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1133–1134 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
[finding triable issue on affirmative contribution where hirer 
retained exclusive authority over road barricades and failed to 
erect barricade around fallen debris that contractor was trying 
to clear when injury occurred].) 
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s reasoning (Sandoval, 
supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 417; see also Regalado, supra, 3 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 594–595), affirmative contribution is a 
different sort of inquiry than substantial factor causation.  For 
instance, a fact finder might reasonably conclude that a hirer’s 
negligent hiring of the contractor was a substantial factor in 
bringing about a contract worker’s injury, and yet negligent 
hiring is not affirmative contribution because the hirer’s 
liability is essentially derivative of the contractor’s conduct.  
(See Camargo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1238 [applying the 
Privette doctrine to reject negligent hiring as a theory under 
which contract workers may sue hirers]; Hooker, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at pp. 211–212 [contrasting affirmative contribution 
with Camargo].)  Conversely, affirmative contribution does not 
itself require that the hirer’s contribution to the injury be 
substantial. 
If a plaintiff proves that the hirer actually exercised 
retained control in a way that affirmatively contributed to the 
contract worker’s injury, the plaintiff establishes that the hirer 
owed the contract worker a duty of reasonable care as to that 
exercise of control.  (Cf. Rest.3d Torts, supra, § 56, subd. (b).)7  
 
7  
We emphasize that the test we articulated in Hooker 
establishes only whether the hirer owed a duty to the contract 
worker.  (See Kinney, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 39.)  The 
Hooker test does not establish, for instance, whether the hirer’s 
 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
The Privette doctrine does not bar liability.  (See Hooker, supra, 
27 Cal.4th at pp. 211–212.) 
Imposing this duty on the hirer where Hooker’s test is 
satisfied is consistent with the strong policy of delegation that 
undergirds the Privette doctrine.  (See SeaBright, supra, 52 
Cal.4th at p. 596.)  A hirer’s mere authority to prevent or correct 
a contractor’s unsafe practices (retained control) does not, 
without more, limit the contractor’s delegated control over the 
work.  But to the extent that the hirer exerts influence over the 
contracted work such that the contractor is not entirely free to 
perform the work in the contractor’s own manner (actual 
exercise), the hirer does limit the contractor’s delegated control.  
Still, we impose a duty only where that limitation itself 
contributed to the worker’s injury (affirmative contribution), 
rather than where that limitation incidentally created an 
opportunity for the hirer to prevent the contractor’s injury-
causing conduct.  (See Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 211–212; 
Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 671–672 [explaining the 
holdings in Ray, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 1120 and Austin v. 
Riverside Portland Cement Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 225 in terms of 
limited delegation].) 
Imposing a duty on the hirer under these limited 
circumstances also furthers at least three of the major tort law 
goals underlying the policy of delegation we detailed in our past 
cases applying Privette.  First, Hooker’s rule should tend to 
 
conduct was negligent, whether the hirer’s negligence was a 
substantial factor in causing the injury, or what the comparative 
level of fault may have been between the hirer and the 
contractor.  (Contra, Padilla, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 670.)   
 
 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
improve worksite safety, because it generally discourages hirer 
involvement in contracted work.  This is preferable because we 
presume the contractor is best situated to prevent contract 
worker injury given its relative proximity to the work, superior 
expertise and resources, ability to internalize costs, and 
relationship with the workers.  (See Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th 
at p. 213; Rest.3d Torts, supra, § 57, com. c, p. 392.)  At the same 
time, the rule incentivizes the hirer to use reasonable care when 
the hirer does get involved.  (See Hooker, at p. 213.)  Second, the 
rule distributes liability equitably as between the hirer and the 
contractor.  Where the hirer’s contribution to an injury is merely 
derivative of the contractor’s, it seems unfair to subject the hirer 
to tort liability while workers’ compensation shields the 
contractor — not so where the hirer induces or independently 
contributes to the injury.  (See Hooker, at pp. 204, 210–214; 
Toland, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 267; Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 
p. 701; see also Rest.3d Torts, § 57, com. c, p. 392.)  Finally, 
Hooker’s rule tends to strike an appropriate balance between 
victim compensation and socially undesirable hirer burdens, 
avoiding a tort scheme that might lead hirers to impose 
inappropriate safety requirements (see Rest.3d Torts, § 56, com. 
b, pp. 390–392) or avoid assigning dangerous jobs to those with 
the necessary expertise (see Privette, at p. 700).   
2. 
In this case, substantial evidence does not support the 
conclusion that Qualcomm both retained control over some part 
of TransPower’s work and actually exercised that control in a 
manner that affirmatively contributed to Sandoval’s injury.  
Sandoval’s arguments implicate four distinct theories regarding 
how the evidence establishes these elements.  Two of these 
theories fall short of establishing retained control.  The third 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
26 
fails for lack of an actual exercise of retained control.  And the 
fourth lacks any showing of affirmative contribution.  We 
address each in turn. 
Contrary to Sandoval’s primary argument, Qualcomm did 
not owe him a retained control duty respecting the power-down 
process itself.  Qualcomm’s control over the power-down process 
was not “retained control” over contracted work, because the 
power-down process was not within the scope of work Qualcomm 
had entrusted to TransPower.  True:  Qualcomm directed 
TransPower to observe the power-down process.  And it asked 
TransPower to confirm that TransPower was satisfied with 
Qualcomm’s 
performance 
of 
the 
power-down 
process.  
Qualcomm nonetheless stopped short of offering — and 
TransPower 
never 
agreed — 
that 
TransPower 
take 
responsibility for actually performing the power-down process.  
Nor is it enough here that the power-down process was a 
necessary precondition for TransPower’s work, or that both the 
power-down process and TransPower’s work were essential 
components of a single larger job.  Instead, Qualcomm’s 
performance of the power-down process implicates a retained 
control duty only to the extent that performance actually 
resulted in retained control over the work Qualcomm did 
entrust to TransPower:  the inspection of the main cogen 
circuit.8 
 
8  
As we determined above, Qualcomm ceased performing 
the power-down process and turned over control of the worksite 
well before Sandoval’s injury.  This case does not present, and 
thus we do not address, the issue of a hirer performing 
noncontract work and the contractor performing contracted 
work at the same time.  (See, e.g., Tverberg II, supra, 202 
 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
27 
Although Qualcomm’s performance of the power-down 
process arguably limited TransPower’s own freedom to power 
down additional circuits during its inspection, Sandoval’s 
Hooker claim on this basis still fails to establish that Qualcomm 
retained control.  To wit:  On the evidence here, Qualcomm did 
not retain control over the inspection of the main cogen circuit 
merely by keeping certain other circuits live.  Qualcomm’s 
creation of this condition at the worksite imposed too little a 
degree of control over TransPower’s manner of performing the 
inspection.  Even if Qualcomm could be said to have conveyed 
an expectation that TransPower perform its work in the 
presence of live circuits, TransPower was aware of and had 
ample freedom within the scope of its entrusted work to 
accommodate the presence of the live circuits effectively in its 
own manner, particularly since they were safely covered by 
bolted-on protective panels and not relevant to TransPower’s 
inspection.  Qualcomm did not retain control over the inspection 
merely by declining to shut down these circuits or to give 
TransPower the authority to do so.  (See Padilla, supra, 166 
Cal.App.4th at p. 671 [finding that hirer did not retain control 
by expecting contractor to work in presence of pressurized water 
pipe where hirer disclosed the pipe’s condition and contractor 
had ample freedom to perform its work in its own 
manner without contacting the pressurized pipe].)  It is not 
enough to say that the presence of live circuits pertained to 
“safety conditions at the worksite.”  Under the circumstances 
here, Qualcomm’s control over what was and what was not 
 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1442–1443 [hirer (through another 
subcontractor) performing bollard hole work at same time 
plaintiff contractor performed canopy construction work].) 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
28 
powered down did not constitute retained control over the 
contracted work.   
Qualcomm may have had authority — by virtue of 
performing the power-down process or otherwise — to require 
specific precautions during the inspection, but even if so, 
Qualcomm did not “actually exercise” that authority.  Even 
assuming that Qualcomm retained control9 by retaining the 
authority to require or provide such precautions — e.g., 
supervision, a personal warning for Sandoval, arc flash 
protection 
suits, 
barricades, 
and/or 
additional 
warning 
signage — TransPower remained entirely free to implement (or 
not) any of these precautions in its own manner, issues over 
which Qualcomm exerted no influence.  Although Sandoval 
argues that Qualcomm’s performance of the power-down process 
gave rise to a “duty” on Qualcomm’s part to take these 
precautions, he does not argue — nor is there any indication in 
the evidence — that Qualcomm’s performance of the power-
down process induced TransPower’s failure to take any of these 
precautions itself.  Likewise, that Qualcomm may have 
previously supervised TransPower’s work does not establish, in 
this case, that Qualcomm induced TransPower’s reliance on 
Qualcomm supervision.  Sharghi’s uncontradicted testimony 
established that the reason TransPower did not request or wait 
for Qualcomm’s supervision was that Sharghi felt “in charge,” 
“knew what [he was] doing,” and didn’t “need” a monitor.  That 
Qualcomm’s employees may have been trained to provide 
 
9  
Given this assumption, we decline to resolve whether the 
doctrines of waiver or invited error preclude Qualcomm from 
contesting that it retained control over at least some parts of the 
inspection. 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
29 
personal warnings to everyone in the room, or that Qualcomm’s 
managers and experts may have considered such warnings 
“critical,” 
does 
not 
establish 
that 
Qualcomm 
induced 
TransPower’s reliance on Qualcomm to provide them.  
(Sandoval, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 418.)  Substantial 
evidence does not support the conclusion that Qualcomm 
actually exercised its retained control with regard to any of 
these precautions. 
Qualcomm did take one critical precaution, though 
Sandoval contends it was insufficient:  Qualcomm left the 
bolted-on protective covers over all of the live circuits.  But even 
if Qualcomm could be said to have retained and actually 
exercised control over the inspection by implementing this 
precaution, there is no evidence that Qualcomm thereby 
“affirmatively contributed” to Sandoval’s injury.  Qualcomm’s 
decision to leave bolted-on protective covers in place certainly 
did not induce TransPower’s decision to open them.  Nor does 
the evidence suggest that Qualcomm otherwise induced that 
decision by, for instance, misrepresenting to TransPower the 
live condition of the GF-5 circuit.  Qualcomm merely failed to 
prevent TransPower from opening the back GF-5 panel.  
Substantial evidence thus does not support the conclusion that 
Qualcomm affirmatively contributed to Sandoval’s injury 
through any exercise of control over the bolted-on protective 
panels. 
In this situation, Qualcomm owed Sandoval no injury-
prevention tort duty.  By turning over control of the worksite, 
Qualcomm presumptively delegated to TransPower any 
preexisting duties Qualcomm otherwise owed Sandoval.  As 
noted above, this case does not fall within the concealed hazards 
exception to Privette’s general bar to hirer liability.  Nor does 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
30 
any substantial evidence support application of the retained 
control exception.  Qualcomm is therefore entitled to judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
D. 
Complex tort law concepts like the retained control 
exception to the Privette doctrine ultimately get explained to 
juries by way of standardized pattern jury instructions.  This 
case raised the question of whether the CACI No. 1009B pattern 
jury instruction adequately instructs juries on the necessary 
elements of a Hooker claim.  It does not. 
The pattern version of CACI No. 1009B provides: “[Name 
of plaintiff] claims that [he/she/nonbinary pronoun] was harmed 
by an unsafe condition while employed by [name of plaintiff’s 
employer] and working on [name of defendant]’s property.  To 
establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the 
following:  [¶] 1. That [name of defendant] [owned/leased/
occupied/controlled] the property; [¶] 2. That [name of 
defendant] retained control over safety conditions at the 
worksite; [¶] 3. That [name of defendant] negligently exercised 
[his/her/nonbinary pronoun/its] retained control over safety 
conditions by [specify alleged negligent acts or omissions]; [¶] 4. 
That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and [¶] 5. That [name of 
defendant]’s negligent exercise of [his/her/nonbinary pronoun/
its] retained control over safety conditions was a substantial 
factor in causing [name of plaintiff]’s harm.”10   
 
10  
The trial court in this case gave a modified version of the 
CACI No. 1009B instruction as follows:  “Martin Sandoval 
claims that he was harmed by an unsafe condition while 
employed by ROS Electrical and working on Qualcomm’s 
 
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
31 
We observe at the outset that the pattern instruction 
improperly mixes the Privette exceptions we recognized in 
Kinsman and Hooker.  It does so by including as an element of 
the Hooker theory that the defendant owned or controlled the 
property on which the incident occurred.  Although the 
concealed hazards exception we elucidated in Kinsman applied 
only to landowner-hirers, no such limit governs the retained 
control exception we recognized in Hooker.   
To establish a duty under Hooker, a plaintiff must 
establish (1) that the hirer retained control over the manner of 
performance of some part of the work entrusted to the 
contractor; and (2) that the hirer actually exercised its retained 
control over that work in a way that affirmatively contributed 
to the plaintiff’s injury.  The CACI instruction need not replicate 
these exact words, but its instructions must be consistent with 
the meaning of these terms as we have clarified them in this 
opinion.  Whether the hirer “retained control over safety 
conditions at the worksite” (CACI No. 1009B) does not properly 
capture whether the hirer retained control over the manner of 
performance of some part of the work entrusted to the 
contractor.  Whether the hirer “negligently exercised [its] 
retained control over safety conditions” (ibid.) does not properly 
capture whether the hirer actually exercised its retained 
 
property.  To establish this claim, Martin Sandoval must prove 
all of the following:  [¶] 1. That Qualcomm owned the property; 
[¶] 2. That Qualcomm retained control over safety conditions at 
the worksite; [¶] 3. That Qualcomm negligently exercised its 
retained control over safety conditions concerning the main co-
gen cabinet inspection; [¶] 4. That Martin Sandoval was 
harmed; and [¶] 5. That Qualcomm’s negligent exercise of its 
retained control over safety conditions was a substantial factor 
in causing Martin Sandoval’s harm.”   
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
32 
control.  And whether the hirer’s “negligent exercise of [its] 
retained control over safety conditions was a substantial factor 
in causing [plaintiff]’s harm” (ibid.) does not properly capture 
whether the hirer’s exercise of retained control affirmatively 
contributed to the plaintiff’s injury.11  The Judicial Council and 
its Advisory Committee on Civil Jury Instructions should 
update this instruction with suitable language consistent with 
this opinion. 
III. 
The plaintiff sustained atrocious injuries that could have 
been prevented.  But a rule subjecting Qualcomm to tort liability 
merely for failing to prevent those injuries could easily lead to 
more, rather than fewer, injuries in future cases.  For instance, 
making the hirer liable under the circumstances presented here 
might incentivize hirers to impose and enforce requirements on 
their contractors that — owing to the hirer’s more limited 
expertise and experience — actually impede the contractor’s 
ability to do the job safely.  Or it might discourage hirers from 
engaging more expert contractors at all.   
We retain here the balance struck in our past decisions 
recognizing a rule that hirers who fully and effectively delegate 
work to a contractor owe no tort duty to that contractor’s 
workers.  The same rule also provides that hirers may be liable 
for a failure to use reasonable care when they withhold critical 
information or actually exercise retained control in a way that 
affirmatively contributes to the injury.  Applying this rule here, 
 
11  
We leave it to the Judicial Council to determine how to 
convey the distinct negligence and causation elements of the 
cause of action, once it has revised the duty element in 
accordance with this opinion.  
SANDOVAL v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
33 
we conclude that Qualcomm owed Sandoval no tort duty.  We 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand with 
instructions to remand to the trial court to enter judgment for 
Qualcomm notwithstanding the verdict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
FEUER, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Seven, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Sandoval v. Qualcomm Incorporated 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 28 Cal.App.5th 381 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S252796 
Date Filed: September 9, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior     
County:  San Diego    
Judge:  Joan Marie Lewis    
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Counsel: 
 
Thon Beck Vanni Callahan & Powell, Daniel P. Powell, Michael P. 
O’Connor; Esner, Chang & Boyer and Stuart B. Esner for Plaintiff and 
Appellant.  
 
Alan Charles Dell’Ario for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus 
Curaie on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Horvitz & Levy, Stephen E. Norris, Jason R. Litt, Joshua C. McDaniel; 
Wingert Grebing Brubaker & Juskie, Alan K. Brubaker and Colin H. 
Walshok for Defendant and Appellant.    
 
California Appellate Law Group, Katy Graham, Greg Wolff; U.S. 
Chamber Litigation Center and Janet Galeria for the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States, the American Property Casualty 
Insurance Association and the Civil Justice Association of California as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Lann G. McIntyre and Andrew D. 
Bluth for Western States Petroleum Association as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
June Babiracki Barlow and Neil Kalin for California Association of 
Realtors as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Joshua C. McDaniel 
Horvitz & Levy LLP 
3601 W. Olive Ave., 8th Floor 
Burbank, CA 91505 
(818) 995-0800 
 
Stuart B. Esner 
Esner, Chang & Boyer  
234 E. Colorado Blvd., Suite 975 
Pasadena, CA 91101 
(626) 535-9860 
 
Daniel P. Powell 
Thon Beck Vanni Callahan & Powell 
1100 E. Green St. 
Pasadena, CA 91106 
(626) 795-8333