Case Title: Collins v. Ashurst

Citation: 821 So. 2d 173

Docket Number: 1000890

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
821 So. 2d 173 (2001)
Sara Jean COLLINS
v.
Winston M. ASHURST, M.D., et al.
1000890.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 5, 2001.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing November 30, 2001.
*174 Jeffery C. Duffey, Montgomery, for appellant.
Thomas H. Keene, Frank J. Stakely, and Ben C. Wilson of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, P.A., Montgomery, for Winston M. Ashurst, M.D., and Alabama Physicians for Women.
W. Stancil Starnes and Ashley E. Watkins of Starnes & Atchinson, L.L.P., Birmingham, for amicus curiae Medical Association of the State of Alabama.
HARWOOD, Justice.
Sara Jean Collins appeals the trial court's striking two counts of her complaint in a medical-malpractice action. We reverse and remand.
In March 1998, Collins was examined by Doctor Wallace B. McGahan in Barbour County after experiencing pain in her left side. Dr. McGahan informed Collins that she had a three-centimeter cyst on her left ovary and that her uterus was enlarged; he referred her to Dr. Winston M. Ashurst for further treatment. On April 6, 1998, Dr. Ashurst performed surgery on Collins; that surgery included an abdominal hysterectomy and the removal of Collins's right ovary, which Collins alleged constituted negligence and violated the appropriate standard of care because, she says, her plan of treatment called for the removal of her left ovary.
On March 31, 2000, Collins sued Dr. Ashurst and Alabama Physicians for Women ("the defendants"), and fictitiously named defendants, seeking damages for Dr. Ashurst's removal of the wrong ovary. Collins's complaint contained three counts: Count I, entitled "Medical Malpractice"; Count II, entitled "Assault and/or Battery"; and Count III, entitled "Trespass to Person." On May 1, 2000, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. That motion was pending when this appeal was filed on February 6, 2001. On May 17, 2000, the defendants filed a motion to strike, seeking: (1) to strike Alabama Physicians for Women as a defendant, stating that the correct corporate name of Dr. Ashurst's professional association was "Physicians for Women, P.C."; and (2) to strike Count II ("Assault and/or Battery"), and Count III ("Trespass to Person"), from Collins's complaint, on the ground that the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987, § 6-5-540 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 (the "AMLA"), allowed only the count alleging medical malpractice.
On May 20, 2000, the trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike, but allowed Collins 10 days in which to file an objection. Collins filed an objection to the defendants' motion to strike on May 26, 2000. On December 28, 2000, the trial court entered an order. That order stated:
The issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court correctly determined that the AMLA provides a cause of action for medical malpractice only, precluding all other causes of action, including Collins's claims alleging assault and battery and trespass. By striking Counts II and III of Collins's complaint, the trial court effectively entered a partial summary judgment for the defendants as to those counts, and the trial court certified that partial summary judgment as final for purposes of appeal, pursuant to the requirements of Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. The trial court's certification is sufficient to bring the case before this Court for review. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Tinney, 776 So. 2d 753 (Ala.2000).
Our review of a summary judgment is de novo.
Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So. 2d 341, 344 (Ala.1997).
At the outset, we note that the AMLA recognizes the possibility that more than one type of action may be brought under that act. Specifically, the definitions section, § 6-5-542, which the trial court interpreted to allow only one cause of action, i.e., medical malpractice, states, in pertinent part, that "[t]his definition [for `standard of care'] applies to all actions for injuries or damages or wrongful death whether in contract or tort and whether based on intentional or unintentional conduct." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the AMLA envisions both tort claims and contract claims, based on either intentional or unintentional conduct. This particular section provides the applicable standard of care that governs all actions against the health-care providers specified in the act; it does not contain language that would lead to the conclusion that the only available cause of action, in contract or in tort, is medical malpractice. We note further that other sections of the AMLA also recognize that more than one type of action for medical malpractice may be brought.[1] Moreover, we note that this Court has accepted other causes of action, distinct from medical malpractice, as being governed by the AMLA. In Mock v. Allen, 783 So. 2d 828, 832 (Ala.2000), this Court stated:
Therefore, based upon the clear language of the AMLA, we hold that the trial court erred in determining that the AMLA allows for only one cause of action, and, consequently, in striking Collins's counts for assault and battery and trespass. The trial court's judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MOORE, C.J., and SEE, BROWN, and STUART, JJ., concur.
[1]  Upon a review of the AMLA, we find that the act, as first written in 1975, § 6-5-540 et seq., contemplated the maintenance of more than one type of action by referring to actions "based on contract or tort" in § 6-5-482(a). The 1987 supplemental statutes, in addition to the statute considered by the trial court, continued to recognize more than one cause of action in §§ 6-5-543, -544, -546, -547, -548, -549, -550 (creating an additional cause of action for malicious prosecution), and -551. The AMLA contains no section similar to that found in § 6-5-573, a part of the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act, which creates "only one form and cause of action ... known as the legal services liability action."