Case Title: City of Indianapolis v. SCHMID

Citation: 240 N.E.2d 66, 251 Ind. 147

Docket Number: 31,152

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1968-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
251 Ind. 147 (1968)
240 N.E.2d 66
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS
v.
SCHMID ET AL.
No. 31,152.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed September 16, 1968.
*148 Harold H. Kohlmeyer, Jr., Corporation counsel, Gary R. Landau, City Attorney and David A. Steckbeck, Attorney for Board of Flood Control, all for appellant.
Willis A. Kunz and William A. Waddick, of Indianapolis, for appellees.
HUNTER, J.
This is an appeal from a condemnation award made by the Board of Flood Control Commissioners of the *149 Flood Control District of Indianapolis for land for the development of Eagle Creek Reservoir. This Board is a departmental unit of the City of Indianapolis by virtue of Ind. Anno. Stat. § 48-4727, et seq. The Board commenced eminent domain proceedings by the adoption of a resolution and thereafter adopted a damage roll awarding damages to appellees for the fee simple and flowage easement taken on parcels 38 and 39A in conjunction with the Eagle Creek Dam and Reservoir project. The Board did not assess any benefits. Appellees appealed the award of damages to the Marion County Circuit Court under the authority of Ind. Anno. Stat. § 48-2112 and § 48-4501, et seq. From the trial court's judgment appellant appealed to this Court.
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal by virtue of Ind. Stat. Anno. § 4-214 (1946 Repl.) since this is an eminent domain proceeding for the appropriation of lands for public use.
On the 8th of February, 1967, the trial court without intervention of a jury, after a trial de novo on the issue of damages, entered judgment awarding damages in the sum of $19,840 on Parcel 38 to the appellees Jacob C. Schmid and Mary C. Schmid together with 6% interest on said sum from January 14, 1966, until paid, and damages on Parcel 39A to the appellee Jacob C. Schmid in the sum of $9,200 together with interest on said sum from January 14, 1966, until paid. The appellant filed a petition for a rehearing on February 3, 1967, which was overruled on March 15, 1967. On March 10, 1967, appellant filed a motion for a new trial which motion was overruled on March 23, 1967.
The appellant here contends that the award of damages made by the trial court was excessive, and that it was denied its constitutional right to a jury trial.
The proceedings to condemn real estate under the Eminent Domain Act for First Class Cities, Ind. Anno. Stat. § 48-2101 *150 et seq. are statutory proceedings before a statutory board and must be strictly followed. Elliot v. City of Indianapolis (1959), 237 Ind. 287, 142 N.E.2d 911; Hamilton v. City of Indianapolis (1946), 116 Ind. App. 342, 64 N.E.2d 303.
Statutes of eminent domain are in derogation of common law rights of property and must be strictly followed, both as to the extent of the power and as to the manner of its exercise. Cemetery Co. v. Warren School Tp. of Marion County (1957), 236 Ind. 171, 139 N.E.2d 538. In City of Richmond v. Test (1897), 18 Ind. App. 482, 48 N.E. 610, the court stated:
Appellant elected to institute its eminent domain action under the Eminent Domain Act for First Class Cities, Ind. Anno. Stat. § 48-2101, et seq. One provision of that act, being Ind. Anno. Stat. § 48-2112, relating to appeals to the Circuit or Superior Court, provides:
The statute relating to appeals from boards of public works, as well as other municipal bodies and agencies is Ind. Anno. Stat. § 48-4501, et seq. In that act, § 48-4506 provides, in part, as follows:
In passing, we are compelled to note that under Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co. (1940), 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399, the clause in § 48-4506 which purports to limit the scope of the Court's appellate jurisdiction in these cases to a determination of the trial court's jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties is clearly unconstitutional.
As this court said, in the Warren case:
Notwithstanding the unconstitutional flaw in § 48-4506, supra, which attempts to limit the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, the remainder of the statute need not be affected thereby in so far as it provides for the taking of an appeal to this court after filing the petition for rehearing.
The Indiana code of civil procedure applies in this eminent domain case only if it is not inconsistent with the specific *152 provisions of the governing eminent domain statutes. Joint County Park Board, etc. v. Stegemoller (1949), 228 Ind. 103, 88 N.E.2d 686.
Under the eminent domain statute here involved, and under Ind. Anno. Stat. § 48-4506, supra, which is incorporated therein, a petition for rehearing takes the place of a motion for new trial. Thus, in this appeal, we are free to consider only those errors raised by the petition for rehearing which appellant filed in the court below. That petition, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
By this petition for rehearing the City of Indianapolis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the award of damages made by the trial court.
In an appeal from an award of damages in an eminent domain proceeding, this court will affirm the award of damages when the amount awarded is within the bounds of the probative evidence adduced at trial. Public Service Company of Indiana v. Levenstein Bros. Realty Co. *153 (1965), 246 Ind. 520, 207 N.E.2d 202; State v. Monninger (1962), 243 Ind. 174, 182 N.E.2d 426; Atherton v. State (1959), 239 Ind. 245, 154 N.E.2d 887.
There is ample evidence in the testimony of appellee's expert, Mr. William MacConnell, to support the award of the trial court in all respects. He testified that the appellee's total damages as a result of the taking in this case amounted to $31,589.00 in connection with parcel 38 and $12,940 in connection with parcel 39A. Therefore, appellant's claim of insufficient evidence is without merit.
Appellant claims that it was denied its constitutional right to jury trial. The statute relating to appeals from boards of public works and other municipal boards, Ind. Anno. Stat. § 48-4501, et seq., is again applicable. Section 48-4504 provides:
This same provision was long ago held to be constitutional when it was included in a former version of the law. City of Crown Point v. Newcomer (1933), 204 Ind. 589, 185 N.E. 440.
Since Ind. Anno. Stat. § 48-4504 is a re-enactment of a statute which has previously been judicially construed, such re-enactment is deemed to be a legislative adoption of such construction. Department of Treasury v. City of Linton (1945), 223 Ind. 363, 60 N.E.2d 948, 950; Huntington v. Hamilton (1957), 118 Ind. App. 88, 73 N.E.2d 352, 357.
Article I, § 20 of the Constitution of Indiana has been held to guarantee the right to trial by jury only in those actions which were triable by jury at common law. Dean v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 25, 116 N.E.2d 503; State v. Lake Circuit Court (1945), 223 Ind. 375, 61 N.E.2d 168; Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., supra.
*154 Ind. Stat. Anno. § 2-1204 (Repl. 1968) provides:
Ind. Anno. Stat. § 48-4506 (1963) which relates to appeals from municipal boards and bodies, and part of which was discussed above, reads as follows in its concluding sentence:
Furthermore, this Court has consistently held that proceedings to condemn property by the exercise of eminent domain, strictly, are not civil actions but are actions of a special character based wholly upon the statute by which they are authorized. Indianapolis Water Co. v. Lux (1946), 224 Ind. 125, 64 N.E.2d 790; City of Lebanon v. Public Service Co. of Indiana (1938), 214 Ind. 295, 14 N.E.2d 719; Toledo & I. Traction Co. v. Indiana & C. Interurban Ry. Co. (1908), 171 Ind. 213, 86 N.E. 54.
The Board of Flood Control Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis, being a department of the city, functions as a *155 creature of the Legislature. Perry Tp., Marion County v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. (1946), 224 Ind. 59, 64 N.E.2d 296. As such, the Board of Flood Control Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis, Indiana, has no vested rights which cannot be taken away by the Legislature, and is not protected by the reservation of rights under Article I, Section 20 of the Constitution of Indiana.
We hold that the provision precluding trial by jury in appeals from the Board of Flood Control as against a municipal corporation demand for trial by jury is constitutional.
For all the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Marion County Circuit Court should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Lewis, C.J., Arterburn and Jackson, JJ. concur. Mote, J. not participating.
NOTE.  Reported in 240 N.E.2d 66.