Case Title: Hermreck v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hermreck v. State1998 WY 38956 P.2d 335Case Number: 96-202Decided: 03/24/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Kay 
Lynn HERMRECK, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

 

Sylvia Lee Hackl, Public 
Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Michael Dinnerstein, Director, 
Wyoming Defender Aid Program; and Stacey Best and Cathryn Brodie, Student 
Interns. Argument presented by Ms. Best, for 
Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistant 
Program; and Joseph W. Cole, Student Intern. Argument by Mr. Cole, for 
Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant Kay Lynn Hermreck was convicted of 
aggravated assault and battery as a result of an accident in which, while 
driving under the influence of alcohol, she hit a child on a bicycle. On appeal, 
Hermreck claims that she was denied the right to present her theory of defense, 
that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on a lesser-included 
offense, and that she was deprived of a fair trial because the court allowed the 
prosecution to introduce results of an expert's experiment. We find no error by 
the trial court; therefore, we affirm.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶2] Hermreck presents three 
issues:

 

1. 
Did the trial court deny appellant her right to a fair trial when it precluded a 
defense to an element of the crime?

 

2. 
Did the trial court err when it refused to instruct the jury on the statutory 
lesser offense of assault and battery?

 

3. 
Did the trial court deprive appellant of a fair trial by permitting the 
prosecution to introduce an "experiment" which was materially dissimilar to the 
actual events at issue?

 

The State 
responds:

 

I. 
Did the district court properly exclude evidence relating to the effect upon the 
victim's injuries of his failure to wear a protective 
helmet?

 

II. Under the circumstances of this trial, did the 
district court properly refuse to give lesser included offense instructions 
requested by the Appellant?

 

III. Did the district court properly exercise its 
discretion in admitting the State's expert witness Thomas Alcorn to testify 
regarding an experiment he conducted?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶3] On June 18, 1995, 
Rodney Howard, Jr. (Rodney) and his mother were riding their bicycles through a 
back alley, on their way home. Seven-year-old Rodney was riding ahead of his 
mother when they arrived at the Duff Street viaduct, across the street from the 
alley behind their house. Rodney proceeded to ride his bicycle across the street 
at the same time Hermreck was driving south across the viaduct. Driving a 
friend's 1978 Ford pickup, she was traveling an estimated 32 to 36 miles per 
hour in a 30-mile-per-hour zone. Hermreck struck Rodney near the center line, 
knocking him from his bicycle. Rodney sustained life threatening head injuries 
and suffered permanent brain damage as a 
result of the accident.

 

[¶4] Officer Greg Way 
interviewed Hermreck at the scene of the accident. He noticed alcohol on her 
breath and saw open beer cans in the truck. Hermreck admitted to drinking two or 
three beers at a softball game at the VFW. Officer Way administered field 
sobriety tests, which Hermreck failed. Officer Way then took Hermreck to the 
Cheyenne detention facility where she was twice given a breathalyser test, with 
results of .123 and .113. A blood sample was also drawn, showing a blood alcohol 
content of .1366. Hermreck was then released pending further 
investigation.

 

[¶5] On July 13, 1995, 
Hermreck was charged with one count of aggravated assault and battery and one 
count of driving while under the influence of alcohol. The information was later 
amended to exclude the DWUI charge. At a scheduling conference, issues arose 
regarding Rodney's failure to wear a helmet. The court ordered briefing by the 
parties and, at a pretrial motions hearing on January 17, 1996, determined that 
Rodney had no duty to wear a helmet and his failure to wear one was not a 
defense to the crime charged.  The 
court then ruled that Hermreck would not be permitted to put on evidence as to 
the effect of Rodney's failure to wear a helmet.1

 

[¶6] After a four-day trial, 
the jury found Hermreck guilty of aggravated assault and battery in violation of 
W.S. 6-2-502(a)(i). Hermreck timely appeals the judgment and sentence entered on 
the jury verdict.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

Exclusion of Evidence

 

[¶7] Hermreck argues that 
the trial court violated her right to a fair trial by preventing her from 
presenting the theory of her defense. The aggravated assault and battery statute 
provides, in pertinent part:

 

          
(a) A person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if 
he:

 

(i) Causes serious bodily injury to another 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life[.]

 

W.S. 6-2-502(a)(i) (1997). 
Hermreck's theory of defense was that serious bodily injury would not have 
occurred had Rodney been wearing a helmet. Hermreck did not dispute the fact 
that Rodney was seriously injured, but she contends that Rodney's failure to 
wear a helmet caused his injuries to be serious. She asserts the court erred by 
excluding evidence concerning the effect of Rodney's failure to wear a helmet on 
the severity of his injuries.

 

[¶8] A trial court's 
evidentiary rulings, including rulings on evidence offered to support a 
defendant's theory of the case, will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of 
discretion. Paramo v. State, 896 P.2d 1342, 1345 (Wyo. 1995). In the context of 
evidentiary rulings at trial, this court has long adhered to the doctrine that a 
sufficient offer of proof is necessary so that we are adequately apprised of the 
nature of the excluded testimony. Rudolph v. State, 829 P.2d 269, 274 (Wyo. 
1992); Garcia v. State, 667 P.2d 1148, 1155 (Wyo. 1983). This requirement 
enables the trial court to be fully advised in the exercise of its discretion 
regarding the admission of evidence and 
allows the reviewing court to determine if prejudicial error resulted from the 
exclusion of the proffered testimony. Rudolph, 829 P.2d  at 274; Garcia, 667 P.2d  
at 1155. Assertions and speculation in an appellate brief in no way take the 
place of an explicit offer of proof:

 

We 
suggest there is only one prudent way for an offer of proof to be made a trial. 
The attorney who seeks to offer evidence, which has been refused or to which an 
objection has been upheld, should take the initiative. The offer of proof should 
then take the form of counsel's eliciting the proposed testimony directly from 
the witness, or entering the tangible evidence in the record, all outside of the 
hearing of the jury.

 

Rudolph, 829 P.2d  at 275.

 

[¶9] Hermreck made no offer 
of proof as to what evidence she would present in order to establish that a 
protective helmet would have prevented Rodney's serious bodily injury. In her 
pretrial brief Hermreck stated: "Defendant will attempt to have an expert 
testify that non-use of a helmet is what caused the serious bodily injury." At 
the January 17 motion hearing, the State questioned whether it would be possible 
to determine whether the victim's injuries would have been less serious had he 
been wearing a helmet. Hermreck's counsel stated that he did not have an expert to 
support that conclusion, but that Milo Beaver, a professional engineer, was a 
potential expert. The court responded that unless Mr. Beaver was also a medical 
doctor, he was not competent to testify whether or not a helmet would have made 
a difference in the injuries Rodney suffered. Hermreck made no other attempt to 
offer proof, either before or during trial.

 

[¶10] The lack of an offer 
of proof impacts the district court's ruling and severely impedes appellate 
review. At this point it would be sheer speculation to conclude that Hermreck 
could have presented a competent witness at trial to testify that Rodney would 
have suffered less than serious bodily injury had he been wearing a protective 
helmet. In the absence of a positive showing that such evidence was available, 
Hermreck cannot claim she was prejudiced by the court's ruling or establish that 
it amounted to an abuse of discretion.

 

 Jury 
Instructions

 

[¶11] Hermreck contends that 
the court erred when it refused two proffered jury instructions on proximate 
cause and a lesser-included instruction for the offense of simple battery.2 The proposed instructions were 
based on Hermreck's theory that Rodney's serious bodily injury was proximately 
caused by his failure to wear a helmet at the time of the 
accident.

 

[¶12] A criminal defendant 
is entitled to a theory of the defense instruction if it sufficiently informs 
the jury of the defendant's theory, is supported by competent evidence, is not 
presented by another instruction, and is a defense recognized by statute or 
common law.  Wilkening v. State, 922 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Wyo. 1996). A lesser-included instruction is required when the 
offense is "necessarily included" in the offense charged and the evidence 
presented would support a conviction upon the lesser offense.3 Sindelar v. State, 932 P.2d 730, 
732 (Wyo. 1997). Both types of instructions depend on the existence of 
sufficient evidence to support them.  Wilkening, 922 P.2d  at 1383; Sindelar, 932 P.2d  at 
732. Instructions not based on the evidence can be properly refused.  Chavez-Becerra v. State, 924 P.2d 63, 67 
(Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶13] The record contains no 
evidence that Rodney would have suffered less than serious bodily injury had he 
been wearing a protective helmet. Further, as discussed above, Hermreck made no 
offer of proof, nor did she identify any witness who would testify to that 
effect. Because there was no evidence to support the proffered instructions, the 
court did not err when it refused to submit them to the 
jury.

 

Expert's Experiment

 

[¶14] Hermreck contends that 
the district court committed reversible error when it permitted the State's 
expert, Thomas Alcorn, to testify regarding an experiment he conducted. Mr. 
Alcorn, an accident reconstruction expert, conducted the experiment to determine 
how much time it would take a child riding a bicycle to go from a standing start 
at the side of the road to the place where Hermreck's truck struck Rodney's 
bicycle. Mr. Alcorn testified that a ten-year-old girl on a 20-inch bicycle made 
seven timed runs over the distance, and that her time ranged from a minimum of 
3.6 seconds to a maximum of 7 seconds, with an average around 5 seconds.  
Mr. Alcorn used this information to 
create a chart which demonstrated that if Hermreck had been going the speed 
limit or if she had applied her brakes, Rodney would have passed in front of her 
vehicle and not been hit. The chart included a range of estimated crossing times 
from 3 seconds to 5 seconds. Hermreck contends that the experiment was 
irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial to her because the actual accident involved 
a seven-year-old boy on a 16-inch bicycle.

 

[¶15] The trial court is 
given broad discretion in its evidentiary rulings, and its decisions will not be 
overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 436 (Wyo. 1995). This deference applies to the admission of expert 
testimony, Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 137 (Wyo. 1995), as well as experimental 
evidence, Gilbert v. Cosco, Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1993); People v. 
McCombs, 629 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Colo. App. 1981). Expert testimony is admissible 
if it will assist the trier of fact. W.R.E. 702. Experimental evidence must satisfy the relevancy 
standard of W.R.E. 401, and may be excluded under W.R.E. 403 where its 
helpfulness is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, 
delay or confusion. See 5 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER AND LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 532, at 124 (2nd ed. 1994), McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 202, at 
862 (4th ed. 1992).

 

[¶16] Generally, the 
conditions under which the experiment was conducted must be the same or 
substantially similar to those involved in the commission of the crime. Lampitt 
v. State, 34 Wyo. 247, 270, 242 P. 812, 819 (1926); Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 
627 (Alaska 1969). See also Gilbert, 989 F.2d  at 402. The similarity requirement 
is relative. The requirement is most strictly applied when the experiment seeks 
to replicate the event in question to show that things could or could not have 
happened as alleged.  McCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE, supra, § 202, at 863; see also Love, 457 P.2d  at 627. Substantial 
similarity does not require identity of conditions, but only that degree of 
similarity which will insure that the results of the experiment are probative. 
Lampitt, 34 Wyo. at 269-70, 242 P.  at 819; Love, 457 P.2d  at 627. Minor 
variations go to the weight of the evidence rather than to its 
admissibility.  McCombs, 629 P.2d  at 
1090. Experiments which demonstrate scientific principles used to form an expert 
opinion do not require strict adherence to the conditions of the actual 
accident. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra, § 202, at 865-66; Gilbert, 989 F.2d  at 
402.

 

[¶17] When Mr. Alcorn began 
to testify about the experiments he conducted, Hermreck objected; the court 
excused the jury to determine whether that testimony should be admitted. Mr. 
Alcorn testified to the court that the purpose of the experiments was to 
determine how long it took Rodney to get from the side of the road to the point 
of impact. The court was concerned about the differences between the 
experimental and actual conditions, and that Mr. Alcorn lacked the expertise to 
testify as to the effect of the differences. During voir dire, Mr. Alcorn 
testified that the conclusions he reached about how long it took Rodney to cross 
to the point of impact could be 
calculated based on industry standards for acceleration rates for bicycles (.10 
to .15 feet per second squared), the estimated distance Rodney traveled from the 
side of the road to the point of impact (30 feet), and his estimated speed at 
impact (10 miles per hour). He further testified that the tests he conducted 
with the ten-year-old girl were to confirm that the numbers he arrived at were 
within the realm of possibility. Satisfied that the experiment was offered to 
substantiate Mr. Alcorn's conclusions based on the application of scientific 
principles regarding acceleration and time-distance analysis, the court allowed 
him to testify to the jury about his 
experiment.

 

[¶18] The court properly 
exercised its discretion in allowing Mr. Alcorn to testify about the experiment. 
The similarity requirement is less strict here because the experiment was used 
to demonstrate the scientific principles upon which he based his opinion. The 
differences between the experimental and actual conditions were fully explored 
for the jury during both direct and cross-examination.  Despite the differences, the experiment 
was helpful to the jury because it translated Mr. Alcorn's calculations into 
comprehensible reality. The time 
estimates were relevant to support Mr. Alcorn's ultimate conclusion that 
Hermreck's speed played a major part in the accident and that she was at 
fault.

 

[¶19] Relevant evidence may 
be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. W.R.E. 403. Before this court will conclude that the trial court 
admitted unduly prejudicial evidence in violation of W.R.E. 403, the appellant 
"must demonstrate that the evidence had little or no probative value and that it 
was extremely inflammatory or introduced for the purpose of inflaming the jury." 
DeWitt v. State, 917 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Wyo. 1996). As stated above, the 
experiment had probative value because it validated Mr. Alcorn's calculations 
and ultimate conclusions. Hermreck had ample opportunity to attack the 
credibility of Mr. Alcorn on 
cross-examination and to point out the flaws in his experiment through the 
testimony of her own accident reconstruction expert, Milo Beaver. Although Mr. 
Alcorn and Mr. Beaver differed in their conclusions as to how fast Rodney 
crossed the road, and thus how much time Hermreck had to react, the differences 
are attributable in large part to the fact that the two experts used different 
underlying assumptions. For instance, Mr. Beaver assumed Rodney was traveling at 
a constant speed, while Mr. Alcorn assumed Rodney was stopped at the side of the 
road before he crossed. Mr. Beaver assumed that the impact occurred 23 feet from 
the side of

the road, while Mr. Alcorn 
estimated that Rodney rode 30 feet before he was hit. Mr. Beaver pointed out for 
the jury the differences in the assumptions used by the two and explained the 
bases of his assumptions. He also testified that, assuming Rodney stopped before 
crossing, he would estimate Rodney's crossing time at 3 seconds, a figure 
encompassed in Mr. Alcorn's chart. Under these circumstances, we fail to see how 
evidence of Mr. Alcorn's experiment inflamed the jury or was unfairly 
prejudicial to Hermreck.

 

                                           
CONCLUSION

 

[¶20] Hermreck did not make 
an offer of proof as to what evidence she would present to support her theory 
that Rodney would have suffered less serious injuries had he been wearing a 
helmet. That being the case, we find no abuse of discretion by the district 
court in ruling that such evidence would not be permitted. The court properly 
refused Hermreck's jury instructions on proximate cause and the lesser-included 
offense of simple battery because they were unsupported by the evidence. 
Finally, the court properly exercised its discretion when it allowed evidence of 
the experiment performed by the State's accident reconstruction expert. The 
judgment and sentence is affirmed in all respects.

 

                              

FOOTNOTES

1Hermreck 
was not precluded from questioning witnesses about whether Rodney was wearing a 
helmet at the time of the accident. Rodney's mother testified that he was 
not.

  

2W.S. 
6-2-501(b) (Rpl. 1988) states: "A person is guilty of battery if he unlawfully 
touches another in a rude, insolent or angry manner or intentionally, knowingly 
or recklessly causes bodily injury to another."

  

3Our 
disposition of the jury instructions issue on the basis of insufficient evidence 
leaves for another day the question of whether simple battery is necessarily 
included in the offense of aggravated assault and battery.