Case Title: State v. Valadez

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP000680, 2014AP000679, 2014AP000678

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2016-01-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
2016 WI 4 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP678, 2014AP279 & 2014AP680 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Melisa Valadez, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(No Cites) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 28, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 6, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
David M. Reddy 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
Ziegler, J. joined by Gableman, J. 
 
DISSENTED: 
Prosser, J. joined by Roggensack, C.J. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: R. Bradley, J.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs by David 
Ziemer, Glendale, and Marc E. Christopher and Christopher Law 
Office, LLC, Milwaukee and oral argument by Marc E. Christopher. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Nancy 
A. Noet, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 4
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680 
(L.C. No. 
2005CF83, 2005CM257 & 2004CM245) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Melisa Valadez, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 28, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Walworth 
County, David M. Reddy, Judge.  Reversed and remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This case involves the 
intersection of Wisconsin criminal law and federal immigration 
law.1 
                                                 
1 For general primers on various aspects of the intersection 
of criminal law and immigration law, see Margaret Colgate Love, 
Jenny Roberts & Cecelia Klingele, Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions:  Law, Policy and Practice §§ 2:46-:60 
(2013 ed.); Dan Kesselbrenner, Lory D. Rosenberg & Maria 
Baldini-Potermin, Immigration Law & Crimes (2015 ed.). 
(continued) 
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
2 
 
¶2 
This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court 
for Walworth County, David M. Reddy, Judge.  The circuit court 
denied the motion of the defendant, Melisa Valadez, to withdraw 
her guilty pleas.   
¶3 
Ms. Valadez's motion to withdraw her guilty pleas is 
based on Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) (2011-12).2  Before we examine 
§ 971.08(2), 
we 
examine 
§ 971.08(1)(c). 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(c) requires that before a circuit court accepts a 
plea 
of 
guilty 
or 
no 
contest, 
the 
circuit 
court 
"shall . . . [a]ddress the defendant personally and advise the 
defendant as follows:  'If you are not a citizen of the United 
States of America, you are advised that a plea of guilty or no 
contest for the offense with which you are charged may result in 
deportation, the exclusion from admission to this country or the 
denial of naturalization, under federal law.'"   
¶4 
The circuit court's colloquies with Ms. Valadez did 
not adhere to this statute.  Judge John R. Race and Judge Robert 
J. Kennedy presided over the criminal proceedings in which Ms. 
Valadez entered guilty pleas.  Neither of the circuit courts 
                                                                                                                                                             
For information supplied by the federal agency responsible 
for naturalization, see U.S. Customs & Immig. Serv., Citizenship 
Through 
Naturalization, 
http://www.uscis.gov/us-
citizenship/citizenship-through-naturalization.  For information 
regarding prosecutorial discretion in deportation cases, see 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Immigration Action, 
https://www.ice.gov/immigrationAction.  
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011—12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
3 
 
advised Ms. Valadez of the immigration consequences of a guilty 
plea as required by Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).     
¶5 
If a circuit court fails to advise a defendant of the 
immigration 
consequences 
(as 
required 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(c)) and if the defendant shows that the plea is 
"likely" to result in the defendant's deportation,3 exclusion 
from admission to this country, or denial of naturalization, the 
circuit court must ("shall") permit withdrawal of the plea and 
permit the defendant to enter another plea.      
¶6 
Section 971.08(2) provides as follows: 
(2) If a court fails to advise a defendant as required 
by sub. (1)(c) and a defendant later shows that the 
plea 
is 
likely 
to 
result 
in 
the 
defendant's 
deportation, exclusion from admission to this country 
or 
denial 
of 
naturalization, 
the 
court 
on 
the 
defendant's 
motion 
shall 
vacate 
any 
applicable 
judgment 
against 
the 
defendant 
and 
permit 
the 
defendant to withdraw the plea and enter another plea.  
This subsection does not limit the ability to withdraw 
a plea of guilty or no contest on any other grounds. 
¶7 
The court of appeals certified the instant case to 
this court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61. 
¶8 
The appeal presents two questions: 
1. 
Did Melisa Valadez's motion to withdraw her pleas of 
guilty satisfy the "likely" statutory criterion in 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) for mandatory vacation of the 
judgments of conviction, that is, did she show that 
                                                 
3 Federal statutes refer to deportation as "removal."  See 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 n.6 (2010).  We use the 
terms "removal" and "deportation" interchangeably. 
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
4 
 
her guilty pleas were "likely" to result in her 
exclusion from admission to this country?4   
2. 
Is there a time limit for a defendant to file a 
motion to withdraw a plea based on Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2)?5 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
further 
inquired: "How would such a time limit fit in with 
the possible need to await actual deportation 
proceedings before moving to withdraw the plea?" 
                                                 
4 The court of appeals framed the issue as follows: "How 
definite or imminent must deportation be in order for it to be 
'likely' such that a defendant may withdraw a guilty or no 
contest plea on the basis that he or she was not informed of the 
immigration consequences at the plea colloquy?"  
The 
circuit 
court 
and 
court 
of 
appeals 
focused 
predominantly 
on 
deportation, 
although 
they 
occasionally 
referred to the other two immigration consequences——exclusion 
from admission to this country and denial of naturalization.  
We restate the issue to reflect the key arguments of the 
parties in this court.  Both parties briefed the immigration 
consequence 
of 
deportation, 
and 
Ms. 
Valadez 
briefed 
the 
consequence of denial of naturalization.  However, especially in 
oral argument, the parties focused on Ms. Valadez's likely 
exclusion from admission as the ground for withdrawing her 
pleas, not deportation or denial of naturalization.  This court 
does not have to reach the issues of either deportation or 
denial of naturalization because Ms. Valadez has met the burden 
of proving that exclusion from admission is likely.   
Deportation has been addressed by this court in State v. 
Negrete, 2012 WI 92, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749; State v. 
Shata, 2015 WI 74, 364 Wis. 2d 63, 868 N.W.2d 93; and State v. 
Ortiz-Mondragon, 2015 WI 73, 364 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 717. 
5 See State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, ¶67 n.14, 360 
Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668.  
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
5 
 
¶9 
In response to the first question, for the reasons set 
forth, we conclude that Ms. Valadez has demonstrated that the 
circuit court did not comply with Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) and 
that her guilty pleas are "likely" to result in her exclusion 
from admission to this country.  Because Ms. Valadez has shown 
that her guilty pleas are "likely" to result in her exclusion 
from admission to this country, we need not reach the question 
of whether her pleas are also "likely" to result in deportation 
or denial of naturalization.  Accordingly, we reverse the order 
of the circuit court and remand the cause to the circuit court 
to vacate the judgments of conviction and to permit Ms. Valadez 
to withdraw her guilty pleas and enter new pleas.  
¶10 The court of appeals raised the second question 
because although the majority opinion in State v. Romero-
Georgana, 2014 WI 83, ¶67 n.14, 360 Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668, 
did not adopt a time limit on a Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) motion, 
it strongly suggested that (at least in certain circumstances) 
there should be a time limit.6   
¶11 We do not respond to the second question.  Although 
both parties discussed the time limit issue in their briefs, 
neither party argued in this court for a time limit for plea 
withdrawal under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), and both parties agreed 
that even if the court were to adopt a time limit, Ms. Valadez's 
motion is timely.  At oral argument, the State conceded it was 
                                                 
6 The motion in Romero-Georgana was not a Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) motion; it was a § 974.06 motion. 
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
6 
 
not arguing for a time limit on motions under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2), and even if the court were to adopt a time limit, 
Ms. Valadez's motion was timely.7   
¶12 In Romero-Georgana, the court noted that four months 
before the defendant's postconviction motion under Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 was filed, the federal government had started an 
                                                 
7 The following exchange between Justice Ann Walsh Bradley 
and the assistant attorney general representing the State is 
informative: 
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley:  I have a question . . . .  
As I read on page 13 of your brief going on to page 14 
it says, "like many similar defendants, Valadez did 
not pursue additional post-conviction relief beyond 
the motions underlying this consolidated appeal."  
Next sentence.  "Even if she had, however, her [Wis. 
Stat. §] 971.08(2) claims should not be barred later 
because they are not yet viable."  I saw that with 
some dissonance to footnote 14 in our Romero-Georgana 
case.  I mean——I don't think you're embracing the time 
limit suggested for a 971.08(2). 
Assistant Attorney General:  No, I'm not, and I don't—
—I certainly don't think it's operable here.  As the 
court pointed out earlier, the defendant in Romero-
Georgana had filed several post-conviction motions 
already on notice, because he had been served with a 
detainer from Homeland Security that he was subject to 
immigration proceedings.  So with knowledge of a ripe 
claim he sat on it.  And that's what I think Romero-
Georgana in that footnote speaks to and that's 
certainly not what's going on here.   
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley:  And you are not advocating 
that there be a time limit.  Is it correct you are not 
advocating that there be a time limit imposed on 
971.08(2) claims?  Is that correct? 
Assistant Attorney General:  Yes.   
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
7 
 
investigation into the defendant's deportability.8  Nevertheless, 
the defendant in Romero-Georgana pressed forward with his Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 motion, without bringing a Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) 
motion, and without asking the court to construe the Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 motion as a Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) motion.9   
¶13 Under those circumstances, the Romero-Georgana court 
expressed concern about judicial efficiency, stating that 
"[w]hen a defendant has notice that he is likely to be deported 
and subsequently brings postconviction claims unrelated to Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(2), we think it would be unwise to allow him to 
bring his claim as a § 971.08(2) motion at a later time, 
although he may be able to bring his claim as a Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 motion if he has a sufficient reason for the delay."10    
¶14 The circumstances that concerned the court in Romero-
Georgana are not at issue here.  Ms. Valadez has not brought 
other postconviction motions.  Ms. Valadez has not, with notice 
of a ripe claim, sat on her rights.  Moreover, neither Ms. 
Valadez's counsel nor the State argued for a time limit on Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(2) motions, and the State conceded that Ms. 
Valadez's motion would be timely even under the time limit 
suggested in Romero-Georgana.   
                                                 
8 Romero-Georgana, 360 Wis. 2d 522, ¶67 n.14.   
9 Id.   
10 Id.   
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
8 
 
¶15 Because 
the 
parties 
agree 
and 
do 
not 
present 
adversarial positions, we do not address the second question.11  
I 
 
¶16 The facts are not in dispute for purposes of this 
appeal.   
¶17 The defendant, Melisa Valadez, is not a citizen of the 
United States.  She became a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) in 
2001, when she was 15 years old.  Her three children were born 
in the United States. 
¶18 Ms. Valadez was convicted in 2004 and 2005 (when she 
was 19 years old) of possession of cocaine, possession of THC, 
and possession of drug paraphernalia in three separate cases on 
pleas of guilty.12  To the extent it may be relevant under 
federal immigration law,13 the offenses underlying the first two 
cases——possession of cocaine, two counts of possession of THC, 
and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia——occurred 
when Ms. Valadez was 18 years old.  The offense underlying the 
                                                 
11 See State v. Denk, 2008 WI 130, ¶32 n.5, 315 Wis. 2d 5, 
758 N.W.2d 775 (stating that while the court of appeals' 
certification included several additional questions, "[t]hese 
questions are tangential to our inquiry . . . ."); State v. 
Popanz, 
112 
Wis. 2d 166, 
168 
n.3, 
332 
N.W.2d 750 
(1983) 
(refusing to answer a second certified question because the case 
was resolved on other grounds) 
12 On 
Ms. 
Valadez's 
motion, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
consolidated 
the 
three 
cases 
to 
facilitate 
briefing 
and 
disposition. 
13 See, 
e.g., 
8 
U.S.C. 
§§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I), 
1227(a)(2)(A)(i).   
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
9 
 
third case, possession of THC as a repeater, occurred when she 
was 19 years old.   
¶19 The transcripts of the plea hearings clearly show that 
the circuit court failed to warn Ms. Valadez, as required by 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c), that her pleas and subsequent 
convictions may have immigration consequences.  
¶20 As a result of these convictions, Ms. Valadez served 
jail time and was placed on probation.  She was ordered to pay 
fines, have an AODA assessment, and get alcohol counseling.  She 
has fulfilled all the conditions imposed by the circuit courts 
and has had no subsequent convictions in the decade since these 
2004-2005 convictions.    
 
¶21 In 2013, Ms. Valadez filed a motion under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) to withdraw her guilty pleas, arguing that as a 
result of the convictions she is unable to renew her LPR card; 
she is subject to deportation; she likely would be excluded from 
admission to the United States if she left the country; and she 
likely would be denied naturalization if she applied to become a 
naturalized American citizen. 
 
¶22 At the initial hearing on Ms. Valadez's motion to 
withdraw her plea, the circuit court granted her additional time 
to attempt to acquire an affidavit or some narrative of verbal 
communications with a federal agent in order to meet the 
requirements of this court's decision in State v. Negrete, 2012 
WI 92, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749.   
¶23 To supplement Ms. Valadez's initial brief, defense 
counsel submitted e-mail communications between counsel and an 
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
10 
 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Special Agent.  The e-
mails were introduced apparently to confirm a telephone call 
between defense counsel and the ICE Special Agent regarding 
immigration law and enforcement practices.  The e-mails did not 
confirm or challenge defense counsel's views of immigration law.   
 
¶24 Citing Negrete (especially footnote 8), the circuit 
court denied Ms. Valadez's motion to withdraw her pleas.  
Footnote 8 in Negrete states as follows:  
More specifically, if a defendant chooses to establish 
that the crime to which the defendant pleaded is one 
for which the defendant would have been subject to 
potentially adverse immigration consequences under 
controlling federal law, the defendant should cite the 
federal law upon which reliance is placed.  For 
example, under federal law, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006) 
delineates numerous categories of aliens who are 
potentially deportable.  Relevant to motions under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) 
is 
the 
federal 
statute 
providing that "[a]ny alien who is convicted of an 
aggravated felony at any time after admission is 
deportable."  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  See 
State v. Baeza, 174 Wis. 2d 118, 127, 496 N.W.2d 233 
(Ct. App. 1993). 
In addition, in such a motion, a defendant should 
allege that the federal government has conveyed its 
intent to impose one of the enumerated immigration 
consequences set out in Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).  This 
required nexus between the crime to which a plea was 
made and adverse immigration consequences can be 
demonstrated by alleging facts that show that, because 
of his plea, the defendant has become subject to 
deportation 
proceedings, 
has 
been 
excluded 
from 
admission 
to 
the 
country, 
or 
has 
been 
denied 
naturalization. 
Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶27 n.8.   
¶25 Relying on footnote 8 in Negrete, the circuit court 
reasoned that Ms. Valadez had not met the statutory standard of 
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
11 
 
"likely" to suffer the enumerated immigration consequences, 
because she is not presently the object of a proceeding for 
deportation, 
exclusion 
from 
admission, 
or 
denial 
of 
naturalization.  The circuit court concluded the hearing 
stating:  "Gratuitously, I will say that I think that this area 
is ripe for some clarification from the appellate court." 
 
¶26 The court of appeals certified the instant case to 
this court.  The court of appeals wrote that the "degree of 
certainty necessary to show, for purposes of plea withdrawal 
under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), that a defendant is likely to 
suffer immigration consequences as a result of a guilty plea is 
not clear under existing case law." 
II 
¶27 This case requires us to interpret and apply Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(2) to the undisputed facts.  The interpretation 
and application of a statute to undisputed facts are ordinarily 
questions of law which this court determines independently of 
the circuit court and court of appeals, but benefiting from 
their analyses.14  We begin with the text of the statute and 
examine case law interpreting and applying the statute. 
III 
¶28 In order to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), the statute requires a defendant to 
                                                 
14 State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, ¶15, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 
N.W.2d 749; State v. Bobby G., 2007 WI 77, ¶42, 301 Wis. 2d 531, 
734 N.W.2d 81. 
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
12 
 
allege:  (1) that the circuit court "fail[ed] to advise [the] 
defendant as required by [Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c)]"; and (2) 
that the defendant's plea "is 
likely to result in the 
defendant's deportation, exclusion from admission to this 
country, or denial of naturalization . . . ."15   
¶29 No one disputes that Ms. Valadez has met the first 
requirement.  Transcripts of the plea colloquies are available; 
the circuit courts did not provide the immigration warning 
required 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(c). 
 
As 
case 
law 
demonstrates, it is of utmost importance that circuit courts 
adhere to § 971.08(1)(c) in plea colloquies.  
¶30 At issue is whether Ms. Valadez showed that her guilty 
pleas are "likely" to result in one of the enumerated 
immigration consequences.  If Ms. Valadez makes this showing, 
she may withdraw her pleas and enter new ones, irrespective of 
whether she was otherwise aware of such consequences.  State v. 
Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, ¶¶22-25, 42, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 
N.W.2d 1. 
¶31 Ms. Valadez was convicted more than 10 years ago for 
violations of laws relating to controlled substances.  She does 
not allege she is the subject of a deportation proceeding.  
According to the record, the federal government has not taken 
any steps to deport her and has not manifested any intent to 
deport her.   
                                                 
15 Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) (emphasis added).  See also State 
v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, ¶23, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749. 
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
13 
 
¶32 Ms. Valadez's case was not presented in this court, 
however, as solely a deportation case.  Ms. Valadez argues that 
unlike many who seek to vacate guilty pleas by merely claiming 
they are "likely" to be deportable, she is claiming that she is 
"likely" to be excluded from admission.     
¶33 Ms. Valadez claims that even though she is a Lawful 
Permanent Resident, if she were to leave the United States and 
seek to return, she would be excluded from admission as a result 
of her convictions.  She cites 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) to 
support her claim.16   
                                                 
16 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012), providing: 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, aliens 
who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs 
are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be 
admitted to the United States: 
 
 . . . . 
 
(2) Criminal and related grounds 
 
 
(A) Conviction of certain crimes 
 
 
 
(i) In general 
Except as provided in clause (ii), 
any alien convicted of, or who 
admits having committed, or who 
admits 
committing 
acts 
which 
constitute the essential elements 
of- 
 
 . . . . 
(II) 
a 
violation 
of 
(or 
a 
conspiracy or attempt to violate) 
any law or regulation of a State, 
the United States, or a foreign 
(continued) 
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
14 
 
¶34 The State argues that Ms. Valadez's reliance on the 
federal statutes that render her excluded from admission is 
misplaced.  According to the State, what would happen if Ms. 
Valadez left the country and was excluded from admission does 
not prove that she is likely to be excluded from admission.   
¶35 Quoting extensively from the Negrete decision, the 
State contends that Ms. Valadez has not met the burden set forth 
in Negrete:  She has failed, according to the State, to allege 
facts showing that she is "likely" to be excluded from 
admission.  
¶36 Because Negrete interpreted Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), we 
examine Negrete.  Negrete is distinguishable and does not govern 
the instant case.  The Negrete case governs a non-citizen's 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) 
based on "likely" deportation.  Although Negrete refers to the 
other 
immigration 
consequences 
enumerated 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(2)——"likely" exclusion from admission to this country 
or "likely" denial of naturalization17——Negrete was a deportation 
                                                                                                                                                             
country relating to a controlled 
substance (as defined in section 
802 of Title 21),  
is inadmissible. 
17 Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶5 n.5.  
In two other cases, the court has addressed deportation.  
The 
cases 
address 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel.  
Ineffective assistance of counsel is not involved in the instant 
case. 
(continued) 
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
15 
 
case, and the standard it sets forth governs deportation; it 
does not govern "likely" exclusion from admission.   
¶37 In Negrete, the defendant pleaded guilty in 1992 to 
one count of second-degree sexual assault of a person under the 
age of 16, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) (1991-92).18  
No transcript of the plea colloquy was available.19   
¶38 Negrete sought to withdraw his guilty plea in 2010, 
citing Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).  Negrete alleged in his motion to 
                                                                                                                                                             
In State v. Shata, 2015 WI 74, ¶¶59-61, 364 Wis. 2d 83, 868 
N.W.2d 93, 
a 
case 
involving 
deportation 
and 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel, this court noted that although a person 
convicted of a violation of laws relating to controlled 
substances 
is 
deportable, 
"such 
a 
conviction 
will 
not 
necessarily result in deportation."  The court concluded that 
defense counsel did not render defective performance in advising 
the defendant that his plea carried a strong chance of 
deportation.  Shata, 364 Wis. 2d 83, ¶79.   
In State v. Ortiz-Mondragon, 2015 WI 73, 364 Wis. 2d 1, 866 
N.W.2d 717, 
a 
case 
involving 
deportation 
and 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel, Ortiz-Mondragon pleaded no contest to 
felony battery.  He failed to show that defense counsel rendered 
deficient service when defense counsel conveyed the information 
regarding 
immigration 
consequences 
contained 
in 
the 
plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form.   
18 Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶5. 
19 Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶1.  In Negrete, because no 
transcript was available, the court turned to State v. Bentley, 
201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996), and concluded that 
Negrete failed to sufficiently allege that the plea-accepting 
court did not tell him of the potential immigration consequences 
of his plea.  In the present case, the transcripts of the plea 
colloquies are available and clearly show the circuit court 
failed to give the required warnings.  As a result, the 
"Bentley-type" analysis conducted in Negrete is unnecessary 
here.  Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶33.   
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
16 
 
withdraw his plea that the circuit court did not inform him of 
the potential immigration consequences of his plea.  In 
contrast, Negrete's affidavit stated that he "'d[id] not recall' 
whether he received the necessary warning."20     
¶39 Based on the equivocal assertions in the defendant's 
motion and affidavit, the Negrete court concluded that Negrete 
had not sufficiently alleged that the circuit court failed to 
advise him of the potential immigration consequences of his 
plea.21  Despite this ground for denying Negrete's motion, the 
Negrete court moved on to discuss the "likely" prong of Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(2).  
¶40 Negrete's motion alleged that he was "now the subject 
of deportation proceedings."22  Negrete's affidavit alleged that 
he was "now subject to deportation proceedings."23  The Negrete 
court concluded that Negrete's "[b]are allegations of possible 
deportation" were insufficient to show his plea was "likely" to 
result in deportation.24   
¶41 In deportation proceedings, immigration officials seek 
out those who are deportable.  Given the role of immigration 
officials in seeking out those who are deportable, the Negrete 
                                                 
20 Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶35.   
21 Id., ¶25.   
22 Id., ¶¶15, 36 (emphasis added). 
23 Id., ¶2 (emphasis added). 
24 Id., ¶¶26, 36.   
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
17 
 
court held that Negrete's equivocal assertion that he was 
"subject to" or "subject of" deportation was not sufficient to 
show he was actually "likely" to be deported or that deportation 
would be the result of the criminal offense.25  Negrete had to 
allege facts demonstrating a causal nexus between the entry of 
the guilty plea and the federal government's likely institution 
of 
deportation 
proceedings.26 
 
Bare 
allegations 
were 
not 
sufficient.   
¶42 In contrast to deportation, a non-citizen would have 
to take affirmative steps in order to induce the federal 
government to exclude the non-citizen from admission to the 
United States.  The federal government does not seek out 
individuals who may be excluded from admission or otherwise 
inform non-citizens that they may be excluded from admission to 
this country based on convictions for violating laws relating to 
controlled substances.   
¶43 Instead, the federal government, through the statutes 
governing admission to this country, excludes only non-citizens 
with convictions for violating laws relating to controlled 
substances who affirmatively seek admission to the country.  
                                                 
25 Compare 
Negrete, 
343 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶¶5, 
36 
(quoting 
Negrete's motion, which stated that he was "now 'the subject of 
deportation proceedings'") (emphasis added), with Negrete, 343 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶2 (stating that "Negrete's affidavit also states 
that he is now subject to deportation proceedings.") (emphasis 
added). 
26 Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶26. 
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
18 
 
Short of Ms. Valadez taking the affirmative step of leaving the 
United States and actually being excluded from admission, Ms. 
Valadez has no way aside from the immigration and naturalization 
statutes to demonstrate that she is "likely" to be excluded from 
admission. 
¶44 Ms. Valadez's convictions are, as stated previously, 
explicitly listed in federal statutes as grounds for exclusion 
from admission.  Based on the federal statutes, if Ms. Valadez 
leaves the United States and attempts to gain readmission to 
this country, the federal government will "likely" exclude her 
from admission because of her convictions. 
¶45 The circuit court mistakenly required Ms. Valadez to 
show that the federal government has taken steps to exclude her 
from admission.  Section 971.08(2) does not require such a 
showing.  The statute requires only that a defendant show that 
such a consequence is "likely."  Here the text of the federal 
statute and the necessity that a defendant take affirmative 
steps to leave the country in order to actually be excluded from 
admission satisfy the "likely" test.  In other words, the 
immigration 
and 
naturalization 
statutes 
demonstrate 
the 
likelihood that Ms. Valadez will be excluded from admission.  
¶46 Requiring Ms. Valadez to leave the country and seek 
readmission to demonstrate that she is "likely" to be excluded 
from admission is the equivalent of asking her to demonstrate 
exclusion from admission to 100% certainty.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) requires an immigration consequence be "likely," not 
"certain."   
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
19 
 
¶47 When questioned at oral argument about exclusion from 
admission, the State conceded that "given her convictions, [Ms. 
Valadez] is inadmissible," but attempted to distinguish between 
her being inadmissible under the law and her actually being 
excluded from admission.  
¶48 We are not persuaded by this distinction.  Ms. Valadez 
has demonstrated that she will, as a matter of federal law, be 
excluded from admission should she take the affirmative step of 
leaving the country.  She has thus shown she is likely to be 
excluded from admission.  
¶49 The 
Wisconsin 
legislature 
afforded 
relief 
to 
a 
defendant "likely" to be excluded from admission.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 978.02 does not require a defendant to show that he or 
she actually has been excluded from admission or that the 
federal government has manifested its intent to exclude the 
defendant from admission other than through the federal law 
providing for exclusion from admission.   
¶50 To hold that Ms. Valadez cannot withdraw her guilty 
pleas because the federal government has not excluded her from 
admission is, as a matter of practicality, unworkable and 
effectively expunges an enumerated consequence——exclusion from 
admission——from Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).27    
                                                 
27 "[S]tatutes are interpreted to avoid surplusage, giving 
effect to each word."  State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, ¶13, 359 
Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811.  
Nos. 2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680   
 
20 
 
¶51 We are convinced that if Ms. Valadez left the United 
States she would, as a matter of law, be excluded from 
admission.  As a result, we are persuaded that it is "likely" 
that her guilty pleas will "result in [her] . . . exclusion from 
admission."  To deny Ms. Valadez the opportunity to withdraw her 
pleas would render relief under the statutes illusory. 
¶52 Because Ms. Valadez has met her burden of showing her 
guilty pleas are "likely" to result in her exclusion from 
admission to this country, we need not reach the question of 
whether her pleas are also "likely" to result in deportation or 
denial of naturalization. 
¶53 In sum, Ms. Valadez has fulfilled the statutory 
requirements for withdrawing her pleas.  The circuit court 
failed to give the warning required by Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) 
and Ms. Valadez's guilty pleas are "likely" to result in her 
exclusion from admission.  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).   
¶54 Accordingly, we reverse the order of the circuit court 
denying Ms. Valadez's motion to withdraw her guilty pleas.  We 
remand the matter to the circuit court with directions to vacate 
the judgments of conviction and permit Ms. Valadez to withdraw 
her guilty pleas and enter other pleas. 
¶55 By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
¶56 REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
Nos.  2014AP678, 2014AP679, & 2014AP680.akz 
 
1 
 
¶57 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  I join the opinion of the court and its 
conclusion to reverse the order of the circuit court.  I agree 
that under the specific facts of this case, and based on the 
arguments raised, Valadez has established that her pleas are 
likely to result in her exclusion from admission to this 
country.  
¶58 I do not join the decision to "remand the cause to the 
circuit court to vacate the judgments of conviction and to 
permit Ms. Valadez to withdraw her guilty pleas and enter new 
pleas," majority op., ¶9, because there may be other impediments 
to the withdrawal of Valadez's pleas.  Instead, I would remand 
for further proceedings, which may indeed result in withdrawal 
of Valadez's guilty pleas or perhaps, could result in a 
determination of how to proceed if the State has somehow 
preserved the issues raised by Justice Prosser.  If so, the 
circuit court could be called upon to decide on remand whether 
Valadez's motion to withdraw her guilty pleas is time-barred. 
See, e.g., Stern v. WERC, 2006 WI App 193, ¶38, 296 Wis. 2d 306, 
722 N.W.2d 594 (remanding to allow agency to decide whether 
party had waived timeliness issue); Jungels v. Pierce, 825 F.2d 
1127, 1132 (7th Cir. 1987) ("These are issues to be explored on 
remand, unless waived."). 
¶59 To be clear, even if not deemed to be properly raised 
in 
the 
case 
at 
issue, 
however, 
arguments 
regarding 
the 
application of time limits to a motion premised on Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) remain viable for a future case because we do not 
Nos.  2014AP678, 2014AP679, & 2014AP680.akz 
 
2 
 
decide that issue today.  The present opinion of this court does 
not resolve the question of how long is too long to wait to 
bring a challenge based upon the failure of a court to give the 
warning required under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).  Our opinion 
certainly does not conclude that the amount of time that Valadez 
waited to file her motion for plea withdrawal was reasonable or 
that Valadez's claim was otherwise timely.  The issue of 
timeliness was not pursued in the case at issue; thus, it 
remains undecided.  
¶60 Despite 
the 
logic 
of 
Justice 
Prosser's 
dissent 
regarding the time period within which a motion for plea 
withdrawal based on Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) should be filed, I do 
not join the dissent because I would prefer to reach a 
conclusion on that issue after meaningful briefing and argument.  
Here, given the posture of the case and the State's concessions, 
this was not done.  See Swatek v. Cnty. of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 
52 n.1, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995) (citation omitted) ("[T]here are 
real problems with addressing unmade claims and developing the 
arguments for one side to a dispute.").  Moreover, we often 
benefit from the analysis of the courts below; there was no 
analysis in this case of the issues raised by the dissent.  
Therefore, I conclude that this court could benefit from these 
issues being fully vetted on remand or in a future case. 
¶61 Importantly, as stated, the court does not decide 
today whether there are any time constraints on the assertion of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) claims or whether Valadez timely raised 
her claim.  Indeed, I emphasize that I do not join the opinion 
Nos.  2014AP678, 2014AP679, & 2014AP680.akz 
 
3 
 
of the court if it is read to resolve this issue.1  Justice 
Prosser's dissent seemingly fears that the opinion of the court 
could be construed as foreclosing the possibility of a time 
limit on § 971.08(2) claims.  See Dissent, ¶108.  I write to 
dispel that notion, as the court does not reach that conclusion. 
¶62 On the contrary, the opinion of the court leaves the 
issue alive and well.  The opinion of the court is clear on this 
point; although the opinion addressed the first question that 
was certified to this court, it did not address the second.  See 
Majority 
op., 
¶¶8-11 
("The 
appeal 
presents 
two 
questions: . . . 2. Is there a time limit for a defendant to 
file a motion to withdraw a plea based on Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2)? . . . We do not respond to the second question.").2  
                                                 
1 If the opinion of the court is read to resolve this issue, 
then it is in fact only a lead opinion, since it would have 
failed to garner a majority of votes.  
2 Given the way the second certified question was framed to 
this court by the court of appeals, the State's concessions may 
be understandable.  The discussion by the court of appeals of 
time limits on Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) claims was tethered to 
specific language in State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, 360 
Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668.  See Valadez, Nos. 2014AP678, 
2014AP679, 2014AP680, slip op., *5-6 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 
2015).  The parties agree that the discussion at issue in 
Romero-Georgana, which pertains to defendants who knowingly fail 
to assert ripe § 971.08(2) claims while pursuing unrelated 
postconviction claims, does not apply to Valadez's case.  See 
Romero-Georgana, 360 Wis. 2d 522, ¶67 n.14.  The State conceded 
that "Valadez did not pursue additional postconviction relief 
beyond the motions underlying this consolidated appeal."  Thus 
the concerns raised by the dissent, while reasonable, were not 
briefed or argued. 
(continued) 
Nos.  2014AP678, 2014AP679, & 2014AP680.akz 
 
4 
 
Moreover, while the question posed in the second certified 
question could be interpreted in the manner in which Justice 
Prosser interprets it, it could also be interpreted much more 
narrowly.  It is far from clear that the second issue, as raised 
by Justice Prosser, is in fact before the court. What we know is 
that the issues raised by Justice Prosser were not meaningfully 
briefed, argued, or otherwise vetted.  
¶63 In 
other 
words, 
then, 
the 
analysis 
in 
Justice 
Prosser's dissent could become the law of the state, but I 
conclude that it is more prudent to have the issue clearly 
presented, fully briefed, and argued before reaching such a 
conclusion.  In fact, there may be other bases upon which claims 
of those in Valadez's position are time-barred but that should 
be determined only after meaningful briefing and argument. 
¶64 I also concur to clarify that this case should not be 
read as modifying our prior case law on deportation, including 
                                                                                                                                                             
It also bears mentioning that the court of appeals 
formulated the second certified question largely in terms of the 
interplay between potential time limits and the need to await 
the institution of deportation proceedings.  The court of 
appeals asked, "If, in order to withdraw the plea, the defendant 
must show that deportation proceedings are underway, how does 
this standard fit in with the time limits for a motion to 
withdraw the plea?" Valadez, slip op., *1-2 (emphases added).  
Yet the court disposes of today's case based on Valadez's 
ability to demonstrate the likelihood that she will be excluded 
from admission to this country, not a likelihood that she will 
be deported.  Majority op., ¶9.  Obviously, then, Valadez does 
not need to wait for deportation proceedings to begin, which 
renders the question quoted above irrelevant.  This is yet 
another reason not to attempt to decide the issue discussed by 
the dissent without briefing and argument. 
Nos.  2014AP678, 2014AP679, & 2014AP680.akz 
 
5 
 
State v. Shata, 2015 WI 74, 364 Wis. 2d 63, 868 N.W.2d 93,3 State 
v. Ortiz-Mondragon, 2015 WI 73, 364 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 717,4 
                                                 
3 In Shata we concluded in part: 
Shata is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea 
because he did not receive ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
Specifically, 
Shata's 
attorney 
did 
not 
perform deficiently. Shata's attorney was required to 
"give correct advice" to Shata about the possible 
immigration consequences of his conviction. Shata's 
attorney 
satisfied 
that 
requirement 
by 
correctly 
advising Shata that his guilty plea carried a "strong 
chance" of deportation. Shata's attorney was not 
required to tell him that his guilty plea would 
absolutely result in deportation. In fact, Shata's 
deportation was not an absolute certainty. Executive 
action, including the United States Department of 
Homeland 
Security's 
exercise 
of 
prosecutorial 
discretion, can block the deportation of deportable 
aliens.  
State v. Shata, 2015 WI 74, ¶79, 364 Wis. 2d 63, 868 N.W.2d 93 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
4 In Ortiz-Mondragon, we concluded in part:  
Ortiz–Mondragon is not entitled to withdraw his no-
contest plea to substantial battery because he did not 
receive 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel. 
Specifically, his trial counsel did not perform 
deficiently.  Because federal immigration law is not 
"succinct, clear, and explicit" in providing that 
Ortiz–Mondragon's substantial battery constituted a 
crime 
involving 
moral 
turpitude, 
his 
attorney 
"need[ed] [to] do no more than advise [him] that 
pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse 
immigration consequences."  Ortiz–Mondragon's trial 
attorney satisfied that requirement by conveying the 
information contained in the plea questionnaire and 
waiver of rights form—namely, that Ortiz–Mondragon's 
"plea could result in deportation, the exclusion of 
admission 
to 
this 
country, 
or 
the 
denial 
of 
naturalization under federal law."  Counsel's advice 
was correct, not deficient, and was consistent with 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).  In addition, Ortiz–
Mondragon's trial attorney did not perform deficiently 
(continued) 
Nos.  2014AP678, 2014AP679, & 2014AP680.akz 
 
6 
 
and State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749.  
Fundamentally, this court's opinion, unlike the court's previous 
opinions, is about the single adverse immigration consequence of 
exclusion from admission to this country.  Importantly, however, 
this case again highlights the need for circuit courts to take 
the time to properly administer the warning mandated by Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).  
¶65 In short, I join the opinion of the court and its 
conclusion that Valadez has shown that her pleas are likely to 
result in her exclusion from admission to this country.  I would 
remand for further proceedings, which may indeed result in 
withdrawal of Valadez's guilty pleas or perhaps, could result in 
a determination of how to proceed if the State has somehow 
preserved the issues raised by Justice Prosser.  If so, the 
circuit court could be called upon to decide on remand whether 
Valadez's motion to withdraw her guilty pleas is time-barred.  
Regardless, the opinion of this court should not be viewed as 
resolving the question of how long is too long to wait to bring 
a challenge based upon the failure of a court to give the 
warning required under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).  Similarly, 
the opinion certainly does not conclude that the amount of time 
that Valadez waited to file her motion for plea withdrawal was 
reasonable, or that Valadez's claim was otherwise timely.  I 
                                                                                                                                                             
by 
failing 
to 
further 
research 
the 
immigration 
consequences of the plea agreement. 
State v. Ortiz-Mondragon, 2015 WI 73, ¶70, 364 Wis. 2d 1, 866 
N.W.2d 717 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
Nos.  2014AP678, 2014AP679, & 2014AP680.akz 
 
7 
 
decline to join Justice Prosser's dissent, because I conclude 
that this court could benefit from a thorough vetting of the 
issue having had the issue fully briefed and argued.  Finally, 
today's opinion does not alter our deportation case law.  
¶66 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part.  
¶67 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶68 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  In May 2004 the 
defendant, Melisa Valadez, was charged with possession of 
cocaine, 
possession 
of 
THC, 
and 
possession 
of 
drug 
paraphernalia.  She pled guilty to the first two misdemeanors; 
the third was dismissed but read in.  In June 2004 Ms. Valadez 
was charged with possession of THC and possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  She pled guilty to the latter; the former charge 
was dismissed and read in.  In February 2005 she was charged 
again with possession of THC, a second or subsequent offense, 
which constituted a felony.  She pled guilty on April 29, 2005. 
¶69 In the plea colloquies for these offenses, the 
Walworth County Circuit Court failed to provide Ms. Valadez with 
the immigration warnings required by Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).  
This fact is not in dispute. 
¶70 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) (2005-06) reads: 
 
(1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or 
no contest, it shall do all of the following: 
 
. . . .  
 
 
(c) Address the defendant personally and 
advise the defendant as follows: "If you are not a 
citizen of the United States of America, you are 
advised that a plea of guilty or no contest for the 
offense with which you are charged may result in 
deportation, the exclusion from admission to this 
country or the denial of naturalization, under federal 
law." 
¶71 Subsection (2) then reads: 
 
(2) If a court fails to advise a defendant as 
required by sub. (1)(c) and a defendant later shows 
that the plea is likely to result in the defendant's 
deportation, exclusion from admission to this country 
or 
denial 
of 
naturalization, 
the 
court 
on 
the 
defendant's 
motion 
shall 
vacate 
any 
applicable 
No.  2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680.dtp 
 
2 
 
judgment 
against 
the 
defendant 
and 
permit 
the 
defendant to withdraw the plea and enter another plea.  
This subsection does not limit the ability to withdraw 
a plea of guilty or no contest on any other grounds. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2). 
¶72 On October 3, 2013, Ms. Valadez moved to withdraw her 
2004 and 2005 pleas.  Her motion came approximately eight and 
one-half years after she entered her plea in April 2005 to the 
felony.  Her motion was filed after she had completed her 
sentence. 
¶73 The lengthy delay between her 2005 sentence and her 
2013 plea withdrawal motion inevitably raises the question posed 
by the majority opinion: "Is there a time limit for a defendant 
to file a motion to withdraw a plea based on Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2)?"  The certification from the court of appeals was 
more nuanced: "If, in order to withdraw the plea, the defendant 
must show that deportation proceedings are underway, how does 
this standard fit in with the time limits for a motion to 
withdraw the plea?" 
I 
¶74 There are long-established principles governing plea 
withdrawal.  See State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, ¶24, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 
816 N.W.2d 177.  Before sentencing, the circuit court should 
freely allow withdrawal of a plea if the defendant supplies any 
"fair and just reason" unless withdrawal would substantially 
prejudice the prosecution.  State v. Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, ¶2, 
303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24.  After sentencing, however, the 
defendant must show that withdrawal is necessary to correct a 
"manifest injustice."  Cain, 342 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24. 
No.  2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶75 Our court adopted the "manifest injustice" test in 
State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 386, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967).  
However, over the past half century, the court has shifted its 
focus from the broad "manifest injustice" test to tailored rules 
for particular fact situations that amount to a manifest 
injustice. 
¶76 A defective plea colloquy may constitute a manifest 
injustice that warrants plea withdrawal either before or after a 
defendant's sentence.  The statutory basis for this rule is Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08, but § 971.08 does not embody all Wisconsin law 
on defective plea colloquies.  There are many court decisions.  
The key decisions addressing the constitutional importance of 
plea colloquies in establishing knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary pleas are State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986), and State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906.  Brown restated and supplemented 
the Bangert plea colloquy by adding the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(c) as well as additional court-mandated duties.  
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶35. 
¶77 The Brown court then explained the procedure on a plea 
withdrawal motion: 
 
After sentencing, in cases that involve an 
alleged deficiency in the plea colloquy, an attempt to 
withdraw a guilty plea proceeds as follows.  The 
defendant must file a postconviction motion under Wis. 
Stat. § 809.30 or other appropriate statute.  The 
motion must (1) make a prima facie showing of a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other court-
mandated duties by pointing to passages or gaps in the 
plea hearing transcript; and (2) allege that the 
defendant did not know or understand the information 
No.  2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680.dtp 
 
4 
 
that should have been provided at the plea hearing.  
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274. 
 
When a Bangert motion is filed, it is reviewed by 
the court.  If the motion establishes a prima facie 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or other court-
mandated duties and makes the requisite allegations, 
the court must hold a postconviction evidentiary 
hearing at which the state is given an opportunity to 
show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's 
plea 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary despite the identified inadequacy of the 
plea colloquy.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  When the 
defendant has met his two burdens, the burden of 
producing 
persuasive 
evidence 
at 
the 
evidentiary 
hearing shifts to the state.  Id. at 275.  In meeting 
its burden, the state may rely "on the totality of the 
evidence, much of which will be found outside the plea 
hearing record."  Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶47.  For 
example, the state may present the testimony of the 
defendant 
and 
defense 
counsel 
to 
establish 
the 
defendant's understanding.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
275. 
 
The 
state 
may 
also 
utilize 
the 
plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form, documentary 
evidence, recorded statements, and transcripts of 
prior hearings to satisfy its burden. 
 
If the state is able to meet its burden, the 
hearing should be over.  In a theoretical sense, the 
burden will have shifted back to the defendant, but 
there is nothing for the defendant to prove because 
the defendant is not entitled to turn a Bangert 
hearing into a fishing expedition on other issues that 
were not pleaded in the defendant's original motion. 
Id., ¶¶39-41 (footnotes omitted). 
¶78 The Bangert case (1986) was important for numerous 
reasons.  One reason is especially pertinent to this discussion.  
In State v. Cecchini, 124 Wis. 2d 200, 368 N.W.2d 830 (1985), 
this court held unanimously that prior to acceptance of a plea, 
a trial court "must ascertain that the defendant understands the 
nature of the charge, and that this must be done on the record 
at the plea hearing."  Cecchini, 124 Wis. 2d at 201 (emphasis 
No.  2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680.dtp 
 
5 
 
added).  The court then held: "Because the trial court failed to 
do so . . . , the plea was involuntary and unknowing and in 
violation of the defendant's right to due process."  Id.  As we 
later explained in Brown, "[U]nder Cecchini, a deficient plea 
colloquy was per se a violation of due process and required 
withdrawal of the defendant's plea."  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 
¶26.   
¶79 Bangert 
excised the language from 
Cecchini that 
required such a result and created the Bangert hearing. 
¶80 What is at stake in the interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) is that one reading of the statute produces an 
absolute right to plea withdrawal, no matter when that right is 
asserted, if the court failed to properly warn the defendant.  
This reading would resurrect the Cecchini per se plea withdrawal 
rule but only for persons subject to "deportation, exclusion 
from admission to this country or denial of naturalization," not 
ordinary citizens. 
¶81 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) 
does 
not 
appear 
to 
implicate any requirement for a Bangert-type hearing in which 
the state is permitted to show by clear and convincing evidence 
that 
the 
defendant's 
plea 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary despite the court's failure to give the immigration 
warning.  Thus, an "alien" (non-citizen) defendant will always 
appear to have a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal before 
sentencing and will not need to establish a manifest injustice 
for plea withdrawal after sentencing. 
No.  2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680.dtp 
 
6 
 
¶82 This strict interpretation of the statute does not 
appear to be unfair to the government if it is cabined by a 
reasonable time limit.  However, if the statute is not cabined 
by a reasonable time limit, it will not matter that an alien 
defendant fully understood the risk of adverse immigration 
consequences at the time of his plea.  He will never have to 
establish a manifest injustice for plea withdrawal.  It will not 
matter that an alien's untimely plea withdrawal will effectively 
prevent 
retrial 
or 
otherwise 
substantially 
prejudice 
the 
government.  It will not matter that an alien will have 
dramatically different plea-withdrawal rights from a citizen and 
may be able to obtain opportunities, such as gun ownership, that 
a citizen convicted of the same crime or crimes could not obtain 
under the law. 
¶83 If the statute is not cabined by a reasonable time 
limit, the best thing that can happen to most alien defendants 
is for a court to forget to give the statutory warning.  In 
these circumstances, it would border on malfeasance for a 
defense attorney to interrupt a plea colloquy to ask for the 
warning. 
¶84 The bizarre consequences of a limitless right to plea 
withdrawal for non-citizens who did not receive a proper 
immigration warning from the court compels an inquiry whether 
these results are what the legislature intended. 
II 
¶85 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.30(1)(c) 
defines 
"postconviction relief": 
No.  2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680.dtp 
 
7 
 
"Postconviction relief" means an appeal or a motion 
for postconviction relief in a criminal case, other 
than 
an 
appeal, 
motion, 
or 
petition 
under 
ss. 302.113(7m)  302.113(9g), 973.19, 973.195, 974.06, 
or 974.07(2).  In a ch. 980 case, the term means an 
appeal or a motion for postcommitment relief under 
s. 980.038(4). 
(Emphasis added.)  Unsurprisingly, this definition does not 
exclude a postconviction motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.02. 
¶86 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.02 is entitled "Appeals and 
postconviction relief in criminal cases."  It reads in part: 
 
(1) A motion for postconviction relief other 
than under s. 974.06 or 974.07(2) by the defendant in 
a criminal case shall be made in the time and manner 
provided in s. 809.30.  An appeal by the defendant in 
a criminal case from a judgment of conviction or from 
an order denying a postconviction motion or from both 
shall be taken in the time and manner provided in 
ss. 808.04(3) and 809.30. . . .  
 (Emphasis added.) 
¶87 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(a) reads in part: 
A person seeking postconviction relief in a criminal 
case . . . shall comply with this section.  Counsel 
representing the person at sentencing or at the time 
of 
the 
final 
adjudication 
shall 
continue 
representation by filing a notice under par. (b) if 
the 
person 
desires 
to 
pursue 
postconviction 
or 
postdisposition relief unless counsel is discharged by 
the person or allowed to withdraw by the circuit court 
before the notice must be filed. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶88 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(b) reads in part: 
"Notice of intent to pursue postconviction or postdisposition 
relief.  Within 20 days after the date of sentencing or final 
adjudication, the person shall file in circuit court and serve 
on the prosecutor and any other party a notice of intent to 
pursue postconviction or postdisposition relief." 
No.  2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680.dtp 
 
8 
 
¶89 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.30 
contains 
multiple 
other statutory deadlines.  Then, subsection (2)(h) provides, 
"The person shall file in circuit court and serve on the 
prosecutor and any other party a notice of appeal or motion 
seeking postconviction . . . relief within 60 days after the 
later of the service of the transcript or circuit court case 
record."  (Emphasis Added.) 
¶90 The statutory section being interpreted——Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2)——clearly ties the right of plea withdrawal to a 
motion from the defendant: 
 
(2) If a court fails to advise a defendant as 
required by sub. (1)(c) and a defendant later shows 
that the plea is likely to result in the defendant's 
deportation, exclusion from admission to this country 
or 
denial 
of 
naturalization, 
the 
court 
on 
the 
defendant's 
motion 
shall 
vacate 
any 
applicable 
judgment 
against 
the 
defendant 
and 
permit 
the 
defendant to withdraw the plea and enter another plea.  
This subsection does not limit the ability to withdraw 
a plea of guilty or no contest on any other grounds. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶91 It is not evident from the text of the quoted statutes 
why the right of plea withdrawal in Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) is 
not governed by the time limits in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30, 
including a motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.06. 
¶92 In 
State 
v. 
Romero-Georgana, 
2014 
WI 
83, 
360 
Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668, the court discussed the fact that 
the 1981-82 version of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) contained a time 
limit that stated: "The court shall not permit the withdrawal of 
a plea of guilty or no contest later than 120 days after 
conviction."  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) (1981-82).  The 120-day 
No.  2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680.dtp 
 
9 
 
time limit was repealed in 1983 Wis. Act 219, § 43.1  A Judicial 
Council note explained: 
Section 971.08(2), stats., providing a 120-day time 
limit for withdrawing a guilty plea or a plea of no 
contest after conviction, is repealed as unnecessary.  
Withdrawal of a guilty plea or a plea of no contest 
may 
be 
sought 
by 
postconviction 
motion 
under 
s. 809.30(1)(f), stats., or under s. 974.06, stats. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶93 The court in Romero-Georgana observed that "[t]he 
Judicial Council Note suggests that, in general, the proper 
method for raising § 971.08 plea withdrawal claims after 
conviction is through a motion under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30, 
Wis. Stat. § 974.02, or Wis. Stat. § 974.06."  Romero-Georgana, 
360 Wis. 2d 522, ¶67 n.14. 
¶94 We also observed: 
When a defendant has notice that he is likely to be 
deported and subsequently brings postconviction claims 
unrelated to Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2), we think it would 
be unwise to allow him to bring his claims as a 
§971.08(2) motion at a later time, although he may be 
able to bring his claims as a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
motion if he has a sufficient reason for the delay.  
Removing 
all 
time 
constraints 
on 
a 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(2) motion would frustrate judicial efficiency 
by encouraging defendants to delay bringing those 
motions.  In the absence of a time limit, if a 
defendant were indifferent to deportation or wanted to 
                                                 
1 The legislature adopted the 120-day time limit in § 63, 
ch. 255, Laws of 1969.  The Judicial Council legislation reduced 
"from one year to 120 days the time limit for withdrawing a 
'guilty' plea."  Laws of 1969 at 641.  The one-year period had 
been established in Pulaski v. State, 23 Wis. 2d 138, 126 
N.W.2d 625 (1964).  The Pulaski court had observed that 
"normally for a trial court to entertain a motion made beyond a 
year would seem to be an abuse of discretion."  Id. at 144. 
No.  2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680.dtp 
 
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be deported, the defendant would have incentive to 
keep a § 971.08(2) motion in his back pocket while 
pursuing relief on other grounds. 
Id. 
¶95 This brings us to Wis. Stat. § 974.06, which reads in 
pertinent part: 
 
(1) After the time for appeal or postconviction 
remedy provided in s. 974.02 has expired, a prisoner 
in custody under sentence of a court or a person 
convicted and placed with a volunteers in probation 
program under s. 973.11 claiming the right to be 
released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed 
in 
violation 
of 
the 
U.S. 
constitution 
or 
the 
constitution or laws of this state, that the court was 
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that 
the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized 
by law or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, 
may move the court which imposed the sentence to 
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 
 
. . . . 
 
(4) All grounds for relief available to a person 
under this section must be raised in his or her 
original, supplemental or amended motion.  Any ground 
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding 
that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any 
other proceeding the person has taken to secure relief 
may not be the basis for a subsequent motion, unless 
the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in the original, supplemental or amended 
motion. 
¶96 There is no time limit for a motion under Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06.  Moreover, this court has ruled that the "sufficient 
reason" requirement in subsection (4) does not apply in cases in 
which the defendant did not file a motion under Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.02 or file an appeal.  Romero-Georgana, 360 Wis. 2d 522, 
No.  2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680.dtp 
 
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¶35 (citing State v. Lo, 2003 WI 107, ¶44 n.11, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 
665 N.W.2d 756). 
¶97 There are, however, other problems for plea withdrawal 
under Wis. Stat. § 974.06. 
¶98 First, a person who files a § 974.06 motion must be in 
custody.  Wis. Stat. § 974.06(1).  Unlike Romero-Georgana, Ms. 
Valadez is not a prisoner in custody.  She is not in custody, 
and her sentence has been served. 
¶99 Second, it is doubtful that the court's failure to 
give the immigration warnings under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) means 
that Ms. Valadez's sentence was imposed in violation of the 
United States or Wisconsin Constitutions.  Ms. Valadez would 
have to claim that her plea was not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary and/or that she was prejudiced by the ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and that her pleas should be withdrawn on 
those constitutional grounds. 
III 
¶100 The impediment to the above-mentioned analysis has 
long been the perceived unfairness of having a time limit 
attached to a statute that requires a defendant to prove that 
her conviction "is likely to result in . . . deportation."  Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(2).  In State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, 343 
Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749, the court said: 
[T]o satisfy Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2)'s "likelihood" of 
immigration consequences requirement, a defendant may 
allege that: (1) the defendant pleaded guilty or no 
contest to a crime for which immigration consequences 
are provided under federal law; and (2) because of his 
plea, the federal government has manifested its intent 
to institute one of the immigration consequences 
No.  2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680.dtp 
 
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listed in § 971.08(2), as to the defendant.  As 
alternatives, a defendant may submit some written 
notification that the defendant has received from a 
federal 
agent 
that 
imports 
adverse 
immigration 
consequence because of the plea that was entered; or, 
a defendant may narrate verbal communications that the 
defendant has had with a federal agent advising that 
adverse immigration consequences were likely and that 
such consequences were tied to the crime for which the 
plea was entered. 
Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶27 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
¶101 In 
the 
absence 
of 
some 
notice 
from 
federal 
authorities, a defendant may have serious difficulty in proving 
that he is "likely" to be deported under the Negrete test.  This 
is why the court of appeals asked: "If, in order to withdraw [a] 
plea, the defendant must show that deportation proceedings are 
underway, how does this standard fit in with the time limits for 
a motion to withdraw the plea?" 
¶102 The majority opinion supplies an answer by explaining 
that Ms. Valadez, unlike many who seek to vacate guilty pleas 
"by merely claiming they are 'likely' to be deportable, [claims] 
that she is 'likely' to be excluded from admission."  Majority 
op., ¶32.  She claims that even though she is a Lawful Permanent 
Resident, "if she were to leave the United States and seek to 
return, she would be excluded from admission as a result of her 
convictions," citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).  Majority 
op., ¶33. 
¶103 The majority reasons as follows: 
 
In contrast to deportation, a non-citizen would 
have to take affirmative steps in order to induce the 
federal government to exclude the non-citizen from 
admission 
to 
the 
United 
States. 
 
The 
federal 
government does not seek out individuals who may be 
excluded from admission or otherwise inform non-
No.  2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680.dtp 
 
13 
 
citizens that they may be excluded from admission to 
this country based on convictions for violating laws 
relating to controlled substances. 
 
Instead, the federal government, through the 
statutes governing admission to this country, excludes 
only non-citizens with convictions for violating laws 
relating to controlled substances who affirmatively 
seek admission to the country.  Short of Ms. Valadez 
taking the affirmative step of leaving the United 
States and actually being excluded from admission, Ms. 
Valadez has no way aside from the immigration and 
naturalization statutes to demonstrate that she is 
"likely" to be excluded from admission. 
 
Ms. 
Valadez's 
convictions 
are, 
as 
stated 
previously, explicitly listed in federal statutes as 
grounds for exclusion from admission.  Based on the 
federal statutes, if Ms. Valadez leaves the United 
States and attempts to gain readmission to this 
country, the federal government will "likely" exclude 
her from admission because of her convictions. 
Majority op., ¶¶42-44. 
¶104 The majority concludes that Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) 
does not require a showing that the federal government has taken 
steps to exclude Ms. Valadez from admission.  "The statute 
requires only that a defendant show that such a consequence is 
'likely.'"  Majority op., ¶45.  "In sum, Ms. Valadez has 
fulfilled the statutory requirements for withdrawing her pleas."  
Id., ¶53. 
¶105 Under the majority's analysis, "any alien" who is 
"convicted of, or admits having committed, or who admits 
committing 
acts 
which 
constitute 
the 
essential 
elements 
of . . . a violation of (or conspiracy or attempt to violate) 
any 
laws 
or 
regulations . . . relating 
to 
a 
controlled 
substance," 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), is immediately upon 
conviction able to establish grounds for plea withdrawal.  
No.  2014AP678, 2014AP679 & 2014AP680.dtp 
 
14 
 
Consequently, these alien drug offenders do not need time for 
the government to act against them; they can satisfy the second 
ground for plea withdrawal immediately upon conviction, and a 
time limit on plea withdrawal will not disadvantage them. 
¶106 The same statute relied upon by the majority applies 
to persons convicted of "a crime involving moral turpitude."  8 
U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 
It 
applies 
to 
any 
alien 
"convicted of 2 or more offenses (other than purely political 
offenses), regardless of whether . . . the offenses involved 
moral 
turpitude, 
for 
which 
the 
aggregate 
sentences 
to 
confinement were 5 years of more."  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B).  
It applies to many more. 
¶107 In short, almost "any alien" defendant who seeks plea 
withdrawal on grounds that he did not receive the warnings under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) will be able to make his case under a 
Wis. Stat. § 974.02 motion without raising the prospect of 
deportation. 
¶108 The argument that fair play demands that an alien's 
right under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) have no time limit is 
unpersuasive.  Permitting non-citizens to withdraw their pleas 
to serious crimes whenever they want to and regardless of the 
circumstances simply because they did not receive the statutory 
warning is too incongruous and unreasonable to be accepted. 
¶109 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶110 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this dissent. 
 
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