Case Title: VIGIL v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 03-22

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
VIGIL v. STATE2004 WY 11098 P.3d 172Case Number: 03-22Decided: 09/24/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

GEORGE 
VIGIL,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Washakie County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kimberly 
A. Corey of Plains Law Offices, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Donna Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel, State Public Defender's Office, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. Corey. 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, 
and Dana Lent, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Ms. 
Lent.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
George 
Vigil (Vigil) appeals from a judgment and sentence resulting from his conviction 
of aggravated assault and battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(iii).1  On appeal, Vigil contends that his 
constitutional right to be represented by counsel at every critical stage of a 
criminal proceeding was violated when his request for a court appointed attorney 
was denied at his preliminary hearing.  
He also contends that certain hearsay evidence was admitted at his trial 
in violation of his constitutional right to confrontation.  Finding that Vigil's right to 
confrontation was violated, we reverse and remand for a new 
trial.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Vigil 
presents the following issues:

 

I.  Was Appellant denied his right to 
counsel during the preliminary hearing in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Art. 1 § 10 of the Wyoming 
Constitution?

 

A.  Did the Justice of the Peace abuse his 
discretion by denying Appellant his right to counsel at the Preliminary Hearing 
in violation of Appellant's Constitutional Rights?

 

B.  Was Appellant's abrupt waiver of Counsel 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived?

 

II.  Did the trial court abuse its discretion 
by allowing hearsay statements to be made violation [sic] Appellant's 
confrontation clause rights under the Wyoming Constitution and the United States 
Constitution?

 

A.  Did the district court abuse its 
discretion by allowing hearsay statements to be made at trial that were not 
against codefendant's pecuniary interest?

 

B.  Did the trial court abuse its discretion 
by allowing codefendant's statements to be made by an Officer when the indicia 
is unreliable thereby violating Appellant's right to confront the witnesses 
against him?

 

The 
State restructures the issues slightly:

 

I.  Did appellant knowingly and voluntarily 
waive his right to the assistance of counsel at the preliminary hearing and, in 
the alternative, forfeit that right by his conduct when he appeared without 
retained counsel?

 

II.  Did the district court properly admit 
into evidence the statements of unavailable witness Jay Newton under Wyoming 
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
The 
following facts pertinent to this appeal were adduced at trial.  Vigil, Jay Newton (Newton), and a woman 
(hereinafter referred to as Victim) spent the afternoon and evening of April 30, 
2002, drinking and smoking marijuana in an auto body shop where Vigil was 
working.  Ultimately, Newton and 
Victim engaged in sexual relations.  
Victim claims she only engaged in sexual relations with Newton because 
Vigil held a machete type knife to her throat and threatened to kill her if she 
refused.  Newton's defense from the 
beginning was that he only entered the back seat with Victim and at least 
initially only pretended to have sex with her to protect Victim from 
Vigil.

 

[¶4]           
At 
trial, Victim testified that the alleged assault began when Vigil slapped her on 
the buttock with his belt, at which point she turned around and slapped 
him.  The slap made Vigil angry and, 
according to Victim, Vigil then threw her against the back of a car being worked 
on in the shop and held a machete type knife to her throat, threatening to cut 
her up into small pieces and burn the pieces in the stove2 so they would never be found.  Vigil then allegedly cut a small chunk 
of Victim's hair from her head.  
Victim testified that Vigil ordered her to have sex with Newton and that 
Vigil would be next.  

 

[¶5]           
Victim 
testified that after Vigil threatened her with the machete type knife, Victim 
and Newton then entered the back seat of the car.  Victim and Newton proceeded to engage in 
sexual activities in the back seat of the car.  Victim testified that Vigil looked into 
the car a couple of times.  Victim 
and Newton emerged once to smoke a cigarette, at which point Victim testified 
that Vigil was sleeping on a couch in the shop.  Victim and Newton reentered the car and 
continued their sexual activities.  
When they emerged in the early morning hours of May 1, 2002, Vigil was 
still asleep on the couch.  They 
woke Vigil up, and Victim asked him to drive her to her residence.  Vigil complied, and the encounter 
ended.  

 

[¶6]           
Sometime 
around mid-morning on May 1, 2002, Victim telephoned a friend and claimed she 
had been raped.  Ultimately law 
enforcement was contacted, and Sheriff's Deputy Valerie Martin contacted 
Victim.  Deputy Martin convinced 
Victim to go to the hospital where a sexual assault examination was 
conducted.  At Vigil's trial, Deputy 
Martin testified that, when she first encountered Victim on May 1, Victim had 
multiple small bruises and abrasions on her body, although some of these could 
be attributed to a bicycle accident Victim was involved in earlier on April 
30th.  Deputy Martin observed a mark 
on Victim's lower back that Deputy Martin described as looking like a "rub 
area."  Deputy Martin also testified 
that she noticed a small area of hair was missing from Victim's head.  No bruising was found on Victim's 
buttocks during the physical exam at the hospital. 

 

[¶7]           
Deputy 
Martin testified that she interviewed Victim after the physical 
examination.  At that time, Victim 
identified Vigil and Newton as her assailants from respective photo lineups and 
both were subsequently arrested.  
Victim related to Deputy Martin that she had been sexually 
assaulted.  Victim stated that Vigil 
had held a machete type knife to her throat and threatened to kill her if she 
resisted, and then Vigil cut a chunk of hair from her 
head.

 

[¶8]           
Deputy 
Martin, assisted by other law enforcement officers, executed a search warrant on 
the auto body shop.  No machete type 
knife was discovered during the search, although Vigil admitted in an interview 
with a police officer that he owned such a knife and kept it at the shop. A few 
hairs were found on the trunk of the car where the alleged assault occurred. 
These hairs were collected as evidence, but testing on them proved 
inconclusive.

 

[¶9]           
At 
trial, Newton was called by the State as a witness against Vigil.  Newton, as part of a plea bargain, had 
pled guilty and been sentenced regarding the subject events the day prior to 
Vigil's trial.  Newton testified 
only to a few preliminary issues and then invoked his Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination.  The 
trial court accepted the invocation and declared Newton unavailable as a 
witness.  The State then called the 
police officer who initially interviewed Newton upon Newton's arrest.  Over defense objection, the officer 
proceeded to testify as to what Newton said during his interviews with 
Newton.  In the interviews, Newton 
allegedly admitted to the officer that Vigil held a knife to Victim's throat but 
was not sure if he held the blade side or the blunt side of the knife to her 
throat.  Newton also allegedly 
confirmed to the officer that Vigil threatened to cut Victim to pieces and burn 
the pieces in the stove.  According 
to the police officer, Newton also stated that, when Newton and Victim emerged 
from the vehicle the first time to smoke a cigarette, Vigil walked over to them 
and asked if it was his turn yet. 

 

[¶10]      Vigil 
testified at trial.  Vigil generally 
agreed with the version of events presented by Victim but denied ever 
threatening Victim with a knife.  
Vigil admitted that, because Victim was engaged in an activity of which 
he did not approve, and he could not get her attention otherwise, he lightly 
spanked Victim on her buttocks with his belt.  Victim then turned around and slapped 
him, hitting him in the eye.  Vigil 
admitted the slap made him angry and he grabbed Victim and scolded her about 
hitting him.  Vigil denied ever 
having a knife in his hand or threatening her to make her submit to sexual 
activities with Newton or himself. 

 

[¶11]      Vigil 
testified that, after he admonished Victim, basically telling her not to hit him 
again, he then told her to sit in the back of the car because she was too drunk 
to stand.  Vigil testified that he 
worked on another car while Victim and Newton were in the back seat of the 
initial car.  Vigil confirmed that 
he did look into the car on a couple of occasions to see if Newton and Victim 
were still there.  Vigil testified 
that, as far as he could tell, the sexual activity that occurred between Victim 
and Newton was consensual.  Vigil 
testified that eventually he fell asleep on a couch in the shop and was awoken 
by Newton and Victim.  He then gave 
Victim a ride to her residence at her request.  

 

[¶12]      Vigil 
was charged with two counts of being an accessory before the fact to the crime 
of sexual assault and one count of aggravated assault and battery.  Ultimately, the jury acquitted Vigil of 
the accessory before the fact charges related to the alleged sexual assault but 
found Vigil guilty of aggravated assault and battery.  This appeal 
followed.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶13]      This 
Court initially will address Vigil's second issue because we find the issue 
dispositive of this appeal.  Vigil 
contends that his right to confrontation of witnesses against him was denied 
when the police officer was allowed to testify at trial as to what Newton said 
when the officer interviewed Newton.  
Vigil argues the correct standard of review is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in admitting the hearsay testimony into evidence.  The State argues that Vigil did not 
object to the testimony on the grounds that it violated defendant's right to 
confrontation and thus the issue must be reviewed for plain error.  

 

[¶14]      Vigil 
objected to the testimony twice.  
The first objection was on the grounds of hearsay.  A little later in the testimony of the 
police officer, Vigil's attorney again objected, stating: "not only do we not 
have Mr. Newton present to testify, we have leading questions that are being 
asked of him.  We don't have 
anything that shows that he was under oath when he was testifying, and we don't 
know if this interview was recorded or anything else."  Essentially, we interpret this objection 
to challenge the reliability of the hearsay statement.  The trial court seems to have 
interpreted the objection as one of lack of foundation and allowed the police 
officer to proceed with his testimony regarding what Newton had told him during 
his investigation after further facts regarding the interview were 
elicited.  

 

[¶15]      While 
the Confrontation Clause and hearsay may overlap, see generally 
Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 132 (Wyo. 1981) ("we must incorporate 
any additional limits imposed upon the admissibility of hearsay by the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution and its 
Wyoming counterpart, § 10, Art. I, Wyoming Constitution"), they are distinct 
concepts and objections grounded upon these principles incorporate separate 
analyses.  See generally 
Sarr v. State, 2003 WY 42, ¶¶13-30, 65 P.3d 711, ¶¶13-30 (Wyo. 
2003).  Hence, separate objections 
should be made for hearsay violations and confrontation clause violations in 
order to fairly alert the trial court so it can make an informed decision based 
upon the specific legal issues involved.

 

[¶16]      While 
perhaps not as artfully presented as might be advisable, we believe the 
objections presented by Vigil were sufficient to place the trial court on notice 
that Vigil's objections were grounded in the Confrontation Clause.  Vigil's attorney's stated reasons for 
the objection refer to established requirements under the Confrontation Clause 
for the admission of hearsay evidence  the unavailability of the declarant and 
adequate indicia of reliability.  
See generally Sarr, ¶17.  
Importantly, Vigil's attorney specifically referred to the fact that 
Newton was not there to personally testify.  As an objection, this goes to the 
Confrontation Clause.  "When a 
hearsay objection is lodged, as here, on the grounds that the declarant has not 
been made available at trial and, as a result, cannot be subjected to 
cross-examination, the policy of the confrontation clause is invoked equally 
with that of the hearsay rule. We therefore hold that the hearsay objection 
lodged in the instant case adequately preserved the confrontation clause issue 
for review."  Dias v. State, 
601 P.2d 706, 709 (Nev. 1979) (per curiam).

 

[¶17]      Our 
review, therefore, is for evidentiary error.  

 

Evidentiary 
rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 
disturbed absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. Robinson v. 
State, 11 P.3d 361, 367 (Wyo. 2000).  
Moreover, a district court's judgment may be affirmed on any proper 
grounds supported by the record.  
Bird v. Rozier, 948 P.2d 888, 892 (Wyo.1997).  Because the matter at hand involves a 
mixed question of fact and constitutional law, we independently review the 
record as suggested by Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 
144 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1999).

 

Sarr, 
¶12.  Erroneous evidentiary rulings 
will not be disturbed on appeal if the error is harmless.  Warner v. State, 2001 WY 67, ¶29, 
28 P.3d 21, ¶29 (Wyo. 2001).  

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶18]      The 
first issue for our determination is whether the introduction of the hearsay 
statements at issue was error.  This 
issue has been definitively decided by the United States Supreme Court. The 
introduction of any testimonial hearsay evidence violates the Confrontation 
Clause unless the declarant is legally unavailable and the defendant has had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant:

 

[T]he 
Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness 
who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the 
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.  The text of the Sixth Amendment does not 
suggest any open-ended exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be 
developed by the courts.

 

Crawford 
v. Washington, 
124 S. Ct. 1354, 1365, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).  The Crawford Court specifically 
overruled prior precedent that allowed hearsay statements of an unavailable 
declarant to come into evidence if it fit within a "firmly rooted hearsay 
exception" or bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" as initially 
developed in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 
(1980):

 

The 
legacy of Roberts in other courts vindicates the Framers' wisdom in 
rejecting a general reliability exception. The framework is so unpredictable 
that it fails to provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation 
violations.

 

Reliability 
is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept. There are countless 
factors bearing on whether a statement is reliable; the nine-factor balancing 
test applied by the Court of Appeals below is representative. See, e.g., 
People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 406-407 (Colo. 2001) (eight-factor test). 
Whether a statement is deemed reliable depends heavily on which factors the 
judge considers and how much weight he accords each of them. Some courts wind up 
attaching the same significance to opposite facts. For example, the Colorado 
Supreme Court held a statement more reliable because its inculpation of the 
defendant was "detailed," id., at 407, while the Fourth Circuit found a 
statement more reliable because the portion implicating another was "fleeting," 
United States v. Photogrammetric Data Servs., Inc., 259 F.3d 229, 245 
(C.A.4 2001). The Virginia Court of Appeals found a statement more reliable 
because the witness was in custody and charged with a crime (thus making the 
statement more obviously against her penal interest), see Nowlin v. 
Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 327, 335-338, 579 S.E.2d 367, 371-372 (2003), while 
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals found a statement more reliable because the 
witness was not in custody and not a suspect, see State v. 
Bintz, 2002 WI App. 204, ¶13, 257 Wis.2d 177, 187, 650 N.W.2d 913, 918. 
Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court in one case found a statement more reliable 
because it was given "immediately after" the events at issue, Farrell, 
supra, at 407, while that same court, in another case, found a statement 
more reliable because two years had elapsed, Stevens v. People, 29 P.3d 305, 316 (Colo. 2001). 

 

The 
unpardonable vice of the Roberts test, however, is not its 
unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial 
statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude. Despite the 
plurality's speculation in Lilly, 527 U.S., at 137, 119 S. Ct. 1887, that 
it was "highly unlikely" that accomplice confessions implicating the accused 
could survive Roberts, courts continue routinely to admit them. See 
Photogrammetric Data Servs., supra, at 245-246; Farrell, 
supra, at 406-408; Stevens, supra, at 314-318; Taylor v. 
Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 151, 166-168 (Ky. 2001); State v. Hawkins, 
No. 2001-P-0060, 2002 WL 31895118, ¶¶34-37, *6 (Ohio App., Dec. 31, 2002); 
Bintz, supra, ¶¶7-14, 257 Wis. 2d, at 183-188, 650 N.W.2d, at 916-918; 
People v. Lawrence, 55 P.3d 155, 160-161 (Colo. App. 2001); State v. 
Jones, 171 Ore.App. 375, 387-391, 15 P.3d 616, 623-625 (2000); State v. 
Marshall, 136 Ohio App.3d 742, 747-748, 737 N.E.2d 1005, 1009 (2000); 
People v. Schutte, 240 Mich.App. 713, 718-721, 613 N.W.2d 370, 376-377 
(2000); People v. Thomas, 313 Ill. App.3d 998, 1005-1007, 246 Ill.Dec. 
593, 730 N.E.2d 618, 625-626  
(2000); cf. Nowlin, supra, at 335-338, 579 S.E.2d, at 
371-372 (witness confessed to a related crime); People v. Campbell, 309 
Ill. App.3d 423, 431-432, 242 Ill.Dec. 694, 699, 721 N.E.2d 1225, 1230, 
(1999) (same). One recent study found that, after Lilly, appellate courts 
admitted accomplice statements to the authorities in 25 out of 70 cases -- 
more than one-third of the time. Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the 
Confrontation Questions in Lilly v. Virginia, 53 Syracuse L. Rev. 87, 105 
(2003). Courts have invoked Roberts to admit other sorts of plainly 
testimonial statements despite the absence of any opportunity to cross-examine. 
See United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d 1018, 1021-1023 (C.A.9 2002) (plea 
allocution showing existence of a conspiracy); United States v. 
Centracchio, 265 F.3d 518, 527-530 (C.A.7 2001) (same); United States v. 
Dolah, 245 F.3d 98, 104-105 (C.A.2 2001) (same); United States v. 
Petrillo, 237 F.3d 119, 122-123 (C.A.2 2000) (same); United States v. 
Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265, 268-269 (C.A.2 2000) (same); United States v. 
Gallego, 191 F.3d 156, 166-168 (C.A.2 1999) (same); United States v. 
Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 1118-1120 (C.A.8 2000) (grand jury testimony); 
United States v. Thomas, 30 Fed.Appx. 277, 279 (C.A.4 2002) (same); 
Bintz, supra, ¶¶15-22, 257 Wis.2d, at 188-191, 650 N.W.2d, at 
918-920 (prior trial testimony); State v. McNeill, 140 N.C.App. 450, 
457-460, 537 S.E.2d 518, 523-524 (2000) (same).

 

To 
add insult to injury, some of the courts that admit untested testimonial 
statements find reliability in the very factors that make the statements 
testimonial. As noted earlier, one court relied on the fact that the witness's 
statement was made to police while in custody on pending charges -- the theory 
being that this made the statement more clearly against penal interest and thus 
more reliable. Nowlin, supra, at 335-338, 579 S.E.2d, at 371-372. 
Other courts routinely rely on the fact that a prior statement is given under 
oath in judicial proceedings. E.g., Gallego, supra, at 168 (plea 
allocution); Papajohn, supra, at 1120 (grand jury testimony). That 
inculpating statements are given in a testimonial setting is not an antidote to 
the confrontation problem, but rather the trigger that makes the Clause's 
demands most urgent. It is not enough to point out that most of the usual 
safeguards of the adversary process attend the statement, when the single 
safeguard missing is the one the Confrontation Clause 
demands.

 

Crawford, 
124 S. Ct.  at 1371-72.  The 
Crawford Court concluded that "[w]here testimonial statements are at 
issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional 
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation." Id. 
at 1374.3  

 

[¶19]      There 
is no question that the hearsay statements of Newton were presented as 
testimonial evidence.  See 
Crawford at 1364 ("custodial examinations" and "[s]tatements taken by police 
officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial")  There is also no question that Vigil had 
no opportunity to confront Newton about these statements.  Thus, the introduction of such hearsay 
was error.  However, "[r]estrictions 
on the right to confront witnesses are subject to the harmless error 
analysis."  Van Riper v. 
State, 882 P.2d 230, 237 (Wyo. 1994).  
Thus, it remains to be determined if the error was harmless:  

 

Generally, 
an error that violates a constitutional right of the accused is presumed to be 
prejudicial, unless the reviewing court is able to declare its belief that the 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

 

On 
direct appeal, the State has the burden of proving that the constitutional 
errors below were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Gentry v. State, 806 P.2d 1269, 
1272 (Wyo. 1991).  Because the State 
was without benefit of our Asch [2003 WY 18, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo. 2003)] 
opinion, its argument was limited to Daniel's failure to show prejudice; 
however, Harlow held that we have discretion to overlook the government's 
failure to argue harmlessness in an appropriate case.  Harlow, ¶¶44-46.   In deciding whether to exercise 
that discretion, a reviewing court may consider such factors as the length and 
complexity of the record, whether the harmlessness of the error is certain or 
debatable, and whether a reversal would result in protracted, costly, and futile 
proceedings in the trial court.  
Id.

 

Daniel 
v. State, 
2003 WY 132, ¶¶15-16, 78 P.3d 205, ¶¶15-16 (Wyo. 2003).  

 

[¶20]      In 
its brief, the State simply argues that no error occurred and thus offers no 
analysis upon the question of whether any alleged error was harmless.  Because the State has not argued that 
the introduction of the hearsay testimony was harmless, we could simply reverse 
and remand for a new trial.  
See Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 840 (10th Cir. 2003).  However, this Court possesses a 
considerable degree of discretion in deciding sua sponte whether to engage in a 
harmless error analysis.  The record 
in this case is not complex.  This 
appeal involves only one criminal charge, and the trial lasted less than three 
days.  A sua sponte harmless error 
analysis will be relatively simple.  
We will undertake this analysis, but only because neither party had the 
benefit of the United States Supreme Court decision in Crawford when this 
appeal was briefed or argued.4  

 

[¶21]      Our 
harmless error analysis must be set in the context of a violation of a 
constitutional right.  We review 
claims of constitutional error under the standard developed in Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967).  "The Chapman standard requires 
the appellate court to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt no reasonable 
possibility exists that the error contributed to the jury's determination.  Chapman, 386 U.S.  at 23-26, 87 S. Ct.  at 827-29."  Harlow v. 
State, 2003 WY 47, ¶47, 70 P.3d 179, ¶47 (Wyo. 2003).  Thus, upon review, this Court must be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous introduction of the 
hearsay statements of Newton did not contribute to the jury's guilty 
verdict.

 

[¶22]      We 
have already determined that the admission of the hearsay statements of Newton 
violated Vigil's rights under the Confrontation Clause.  

 

The 
Confrontation Clause expresses a preference for face-to-face confrontation. 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.  at 63, 100 S. Ct. 2531. Ohio v. Roberts 
identified the components of a defendant's confrontation right as the interests 
in cross-examining the witness, in requiring the witness to testify under oath, 
in allowing the factfinder to view the witness's demeanor, and in requiring the 
witness to face the defendant as he tells his story. Id. at 63-64 & 
n.6, 100 S. Ct. 2531. If the state is allowed to prove its case using a 
transcript of prior testimony, rather than live testimony, the defendant 
certainly loses the chance to have the factfinder view the witness's demeanor, 
and he may also lose the chance to make the witness face him as the witness 
testifies. 

 

Cook, 
323 F.3d  at 832.  All of these 
interests are implicated in the case sub judice.  

 

[¶23]      From 
the small amount of information Newton offered under oath at Vigil's trial we 
know that, at the time of the alleged assault, Newton was unemployed and living 
out of the back of his van.  Newton 
admitted to possessing marijuana, and he and Victim were looking for a place to 
ingest the marijuana when they came across Vigil's shop.  Newton and Vigil knew each other, and 
Newton said hello to Vigil.  Almost 
all of this testimony was presented in response to leading questions after 
Newton answered "I don't know" or "I don't remember" to general questions.  When asked if Newton and Victim entered 
Vigil's shop, Newton replied "I don't remember" and then invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent. 

 

[¶24]      While 
the jury was given an opportunity to witness Newton's demeanor for this small 
portion of testimony, the members of the jury were not afforded the opportunity 
to hear Newton's version of the critical events from Newton himself.  Vigil was denied the opportunity to 
cross-examine Newton.  Instead, a 
polished police officer of over fifteen years experience presented Newton's 
hearsay statements of the critical events to the jury.  We cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the lack of the opportunity to test Newton's credibility in front of the 
jury did not contribute to the jury's guilty verdict.

 

[¶25]      Without 
Newton's hearsay statements, the only evidence presented against Vigil was the 
testimony of Victim.  Victim 
admitted that she had been drinking and ingesting marijuana on the night in 
question.  The State relied heavily 
on the hearsay statements of Newton to bolster Victim's testimony throughout its 
closing argument.  Indeed, the 
State's theme in its closing argument could fairly be characterized as "two out 
of the three people present in that shop principally agree with what 
happened."  The State repeatedly 
referred to Newton's hearsay statements to support the testimony of Victim.  Again, under the facts of this case, we 
are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the hearsay 
statements did not contribute to the conviction of Vigil for aggravated assault 
and battery.  

 

[¶26]      Because 
of our disposition of this issue, we need not address Vigil's challenge to his 
denial of counsel at his preliminary hearing.  While we have grave concerns about how 
Vigil's request for counsel at his preliminary hearing was handled, this issue 
is rendered moot by our grant of a new trial on other 
grounds.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶27]      The 
introduction at trial of the hearsay statements of Newton violated Vigil's 
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.  Therefore, we reverse and remand for a 
new trial.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1§ 
6-2-502. Aggravated assault and battery; penalty.

(a) 
A person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if 
he:

(i) 
Causes serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 
life;

(ii) Attempts to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily 
injury to another with a deadly weapon;

(iii) Threatens to use a drawn deadly weapon on another unless reasonably 
necessary in defense of his person, property or abode or to prevent serious 
bodily injury to another; or

(iv) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to a 
woman whom he knows is pregnant.

(b) 
Aggravated assault and battery is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than ten (10) years.

 

2There was a large wood-burning stove located in the 
shop.

 

3To 
the extent prior cases of this Court have followed the test enunciated in Ohio 
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 
65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980), to determine admissibility under the Confrontation 
Clause, those cases are overruled in conformance with Crawford.  See, e.g. Robinson v. 
State, 11 P.3d 361, 369-71 (Wyo. 2000); Johnson v. State, 930 P.2d 358 (Wyo. 1996); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 127-37 (Wyo. 
1981).

 

4We 
stress that, when harmless error is not asserted by the State, this Court will 
generally treat such failure as a waiver.