Case Title: Osborn v. Pine Mountain Ranch

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-01-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Osborn v. Pine Mountain Ranch1989 WY 4766 P.2d 1165Case Number: 88-231Decided: 01/05/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
RICHARD B. 
OSBORN, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
PINE 
MOUNTAIN RANCH, A PARTNERSHIP, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Richard B. 
Osborn, appellant, pro 
se.

 
 
William W. 
Harden, Casper, 
for appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Richard B. 
Osborn asks this Court to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to 
support the issuance of a permanent injunction in favor of appellee Pine 
Mountain Ranch. The injunction permitted Pine Mountain Ranch to build a fence 
along the parties' adjoining property line and prohibited Osborn from 
interfering with the building of that fence.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     No transcript was made 
of the proceedings held in the district court. However, the essential facts, as 
gleaned from the pleadings and the briefs, are as follows. The parties' 
predecessors in interest erected a fence in 1936 that, while purporting to 
separate their properties, actually encroached upon the lands now belonging to 
Osborn. Because the fence had fallen into disrepair, Osborn decided to rebuild 
it in 1983. He located the fence along a line that had been determined by a 1970 
power company survey to be the boundary between the parties' properties. In 
September 1986, Pine Mountain Ranch hired Ladd Engineering Co., Inc. to survey 
its land and discovered that the relocated fence encroached upon its property. 
PineMountain Ranch advised 
Osborn of its intent to move the fence so that the fence line would conform to 
the results of the survey made by Ladd Engineering Co., Inc. Osborn indicated 
that he would not peaceably permit relocation of the fence and suggested that 
the matter be resolved by the courts. PineMountain Ranch then sought temporary and 
permanent injunctive relief to prevent Osborn from interfering with the 
relocation of the fence. At a hearing, Pine Mountain Ranch demonstrated its 
ownership of the disputed property and produced the Ladd Engineering Co., Inc. 
survey as being determinative of the proper boundary line. Osborn offered no 
evidence to dispute the results of the survey and relied upon the assertion that 
he had gained title to the disputed portion of Pine Mountain Ranch's property by 
adverse possession. The district court found that Osborn's possession, if any, 
of the disputed property commenced when he rebuilt the fence in 1983 and that 
Osborn had failed to adversely possess it for the requisite ten-year period. 
Accordingly, the district court granted the permanent 
injunction.

 
 

[¶4.]     Osborn's pro se brief 
raises fifteen issues, which we synthesize:

 
 
1. Did the 
district court err in failing to approve the "statement of proceedings" offered 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 4.03?

 
 
2. Is a 
permanent injunction an appropriate remedy to settle a boundary dispute when 
there is also a dispute as to ownership of the lands that are 
involved?

 
 
3. Was 
there sufficient evidence to support the claim of adverse 
possession?

 
 

[¶5.]     We note from the outset 
that our review of this case is severely limited by Osborn's failure to provide 
us with a transcript or other proper record of the proceedings below. It is 
Osborn's responsibility to provide a transcript. W.R.A.P. 4.05; Edwards v. 
Edwards, 732 P.2d 1068 (Wyo. 1987); Nicholls v. 
Nicholls, 721 P.2d 1103 (Wyo. 1986). When there is no transcript, the 
findings of the trial court are accepted as the only basis for deciding issues 
pertaining to evidence. Salt River Enterprises, Inc. v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 518 
(Wyo. 1983). 
In the absence of anything to refute them, we will sustain the findings of the 
trial court, and we assume that the evidence presented was sufficient to support 
those findings. Feaster v. Feaster, 721 P.2d 1095 (Wyo. 1986). Osborn did 
offer a proposed statement of the proceedings in accordance with W.R.A.P. 4.03, 
but that proposal did not meet the requirements of the rule and was properly 
refused by the district court. See Feaster, 721 P.2d  at 
1097.

 
 

[¶6.]     Osborn asserts that 
injunctive relief should not be used to resolve disputes over land. In support 
of this assertion, he cites Alaska Development Co. v. Brannan, 40 Wyo. 106, 275 P. 115 
(1929). Osborn is correct insofar as he goes, but he ignores the language in 
Alaska Development Co. which holds that such injunctive relief is proper when 
matters of title have been settled and when no adequate remedy at law exists. 
Id. at 120-21. 
Assuming, as we must, that the evidence presented below supports the district 
court's determinations that title to the property was in Pine Mountain Ranch and 
that no adequate remedy at law was available, we hold that the district court 
properly issued the injunction.

 
 

[¶7.]     Osborn next argues that 
the district court erroneously decided the issue of his adverse possession of 
the disputed property. A party claiming adverse possession has the burden of 
proving his actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession of the 
property for the statutory period of ten years, and that possession must be 
hostile and under a claim of right. Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d 295 
(Wyo. 1983); Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932 
(Wyo. 1983). 
The district court found that Osborn, by his own admission, did not have 
possession for the requisite ten-year period. Notwithstanding that there 
apparently were many other defects in Osborn's claim of adverse possession, we 
hold that the finding that Osborn did not fulfill the ten-year requirement is 
sufficient to sustain the district court's action. Thus, the order of the 
district court issuing a permanent injunction in favor of Pine Mountain Ranch is 
affirmed in all respects.

 
 

[¶8.]     PineMountain Ranch claims that Osborn's appeal 
is frivolous and asks us to certify that there was no reasonable cause for 
appeal and to award attorney's fees and costs pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05. Osborn 
provided little or no cogent authority to support his claims before this Court, 
and he provided us with no record for review. Where an appellant's arguments are 
specious and frivolous, as they are here, and where an appellant fails to 
present cogent argument and to provide a proper record for review, as in this 
case, we will grant requests pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05 for attorney's fees and 
costs expended in defending an appeal. Edwards, 732 P.2d 1068; Osborn v. Warner, 
694 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1985). Therefore, in accordance with 
W.R.A.P. 10.05, we certify that there was no reasonable cause for appeal, and we 
grant Pine Mountain Ranch's request for attorney's fees and costs. Pursuant to 
the rule, the fees and costs must be reasonable. PineMountain Ranch has attached to its brief 
an affidavit of its appellate counsel delineating costs and legal fees of 
$856.27 incurred in defending this appeal. We find this is a reasonable amount 
to be charged to Osborn and paid to the attorney for Pine Mountain 
Ranch.

 
 

[¶9.]     
AFFIRMED.