Case Title: Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision

Citation: 2009-Ohio-760

Docket Number: 20080717

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 121 Ohio St.3d 
218, 2009-Ohio-760.] 
 
 
 
COLUMBUS CITY SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE, v. FRANKLIN 
COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES; LEONARD L. GREEN BRICE 
ROAD, L.L.C., APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
121 Ohio St.3d 218, 2009-Ohio-760.] 
Real property taxation — County boards of revision — Vote to vacate certified 
determination of value — R.C. 5715.20(A) — Vacation effective without 
certification. 
(No. 2008-0717 — Submitted February 18, 2009 — Decided February 26, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2007-T-616. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} As it comes before us, this case presents a purely procedural issue.  
When a board of revision has decided, through a majority vote, to vacate a 
determination of value that it had previously certified pursuant to R.C. 5715.20, 
does that vote by its own force vacate the determination when it is recorded in the 
minutes?  Or is that vote not effective until a vacating order has been certified in 
writing to the parties?   
{¶ 2} We hold that the decision to vacate the previous determination of 
value becomes effective when the board votes and the results of that vote are 
entered on the record of the board’s proceedings.  Because the Board of Tax 
Appeals (“BTA”) held the contrary, and because the record shows that the BOR 
did act to vacate, we reverse the order of the BTA and remand for further 
proceedings. 
Facts 
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{¶ 3} On March 24, 2006, the Columbus City Schools Board of 
Education (“school board”) initiated these proceedings by filing a valuation 
complaint.  That complaint asked the BOR to adopt a May 2005 sale price as the 
value of the property at issue for tax year 2005. 
{¶ 4} On September 29, 2006, the BOR held a hearing at which the 
school board presented a conveyance-fee statement and deed to document its 
claim.  On October 18, 2006, the Franklin County Board of Revision (“BOR”) 
issued a decision that adopted a May 2005 sale price of $2,900,000 as the value of 
the property at issue for tax year 2005, and the BOR certified that decision to the 
parties pursuant to R.C. 5715.20.  On November 7, 2006, the BOR voted to vacate 
that decision and reopen proceedings.  Subsequently, on November 20, 2006 – 33 
days after certifying the October 18 determination of value – the BOR reduced its 
decision to vacate to a written order and certified that order to the parties.  The 
30th day after October 18, 2006, was Friday, November 17, 2006; thus, the 
vacating order was certified after expiration of the 30-day appeal period following 
the October 18 determination of value. 
{¶ 5} On June 6, 2007, the BOR held a second hearing, at which the 
owner, Leonard L. Green Brice Road, L.L.C. (“Green LLC”), presented evidence 
in support of its contentions.  First, Green LLC presented testimony that the May 
2005 sale was one between related parties and therefore not at arm’s length.  
Second, Green LLC offered evidence that a later sale in December 2005 for 
$2,665,123 was an arm’s-length sale.  Third, Green LLC submitted that a building 
on the property was still under construction as of January 1, 2005, but was fully 
constructed by December 2005. 
{¶ 6} On the basis of these submissions, the BOR determined that the 
value for tax year 2005 should remain $660,000, while for 2006, the value of the 
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3 
property was $2,665,100, based on the December 2005 sale price.1  The school 
board appealed the determinations to the BTA on July 27, 2007. 
{¶ 7} On January 18, 2008, the BTA issued a show-cause order.  The 
order stated that “the record suggests that the BOR certified its November 20, 
2006 entry more than thirty days after its October 18, 2006 certification.  If so, the 
BOR issued its vacating order after it had lost jurisdiction over the complaint.”  
The BTA ordered the parties to show cause why the matter should not be 
remanded to the BOR so that the October 18, 2006 order could be reinstated. 
{¶ 8} The school board did not respond to the show-cause order, but 
Green LLC did.  Green LLC asserted that the BOR had “set the matter down for 
hearing to be conducted on November 7, 2006, at which time it voided its October 
18 decision.”  Attached to Green LLC’s memorandum was a copy of a faxed 
document purporting to be a record of the “2005 Board of Revision November 7, 
2006 (PM Hearings).”  The case at issue, BOR number 900799, is handwritten 
with a notation “Reopen and Reset.”  At the top of the page a handwritten 
notation says “sent 11/20/06.”  Green LLC attached no affidavit or other 
document explaining the exhibit. 
{¶ 9} On March 18, 2008, the BTA issued its decision.  The BTA 
acknowledged that “the BOR retains jurisdiction to reconsider, modify, or alter its 
decision until such time as thirty days have elapsed or a notice of appeal is filed * 
* *.”  Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (Mar. 
18, 2008), No. 2007-T-616, at 3, citing Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 363, 368, 721 N.E.2d 40.  
But in the present case, the 30-day appeal period expired before the BOR certified 
a vacating order to the parties.  Under these circumstances, the BTA felt 
                                                          
 
1.  Although the original complaint pertained to tax year 2005, R.C. 5715.19(D) provides that a 
complaint “shall be continued by the board [of revision] as a valid complaint for any ensuing year 
until such complaint is finally determined.” 
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“constrained to find that the BOR issued its vacating order after it had lost 
jurisdiction over the complaint” because the “BOR, as a tribunal, is deemed to 
speak exclusively through its journal, i.e., its decision letters.”   Id. at 6, 5. 
{¶ 10} Accordingly, the BTA vacated the later valuation decisions of the 
BOR and remanded the case to the BOR “with orders to reinstate its October 18, 
2006 determination of value.” 
{¶ 11} On April 10, 2008, the BTA received correspondence from the 
BOR dated April 2.  The correspondence referred to “attached information” that 
had been “omitted * * * from the original transcript” forwarded by the BOR to the 
BTA.  The only attachment was a CD that recorded a session of the BOR on 
November 7, 2006.  At that session, the representatives of the auditor and the 
treasurer voted to vacate the October 18 determination of value and reopen the 
present case.  The BTA did not issue any additional orders after receiving the 
supplemental transcript from the BOR. 
{¶ 12} Green LLC has appealed to this court, and we now reverse. 
Analysis 
{¶ 13} Under our cases, “[t]he BTA is responsible for determining factual 
issues and, if the record contains reliable and probative support,” the court will 
affirm.  Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 399, 2006-Ohio-5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, 
¶ 14, quoting Am. Natl. Can Co. v. Tracy (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 150, 152, 648 
N.E.2d 483.  On the other hand, the court “ ‘will not hesitate to reverse a BTA 
decision that is based on an incorrect legal conclusion.’ ”  Id., quoting Gahanna-
Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232, 
754 N.E.2d 789.  This appeal calls into question the legal principles that the BTA 
applied in its decision. 
{¶ 14} As administrative tribunals, boards of revision have “ ‘inherent 
authority to reconsider their own decisions since the power to decide in the first 
instance carries with it the power to reconsider,’ ” but such authority does not 
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5 
extend beyond “the actual institution of an appeal or expiration of the time for 
appeal.”  Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision 
(2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 363, 368, 721 N.E.2d 40, quoting Hal Artz Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 20, 28 OBR 83, 502 
N.E.2d 590, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Accord Natl. Tube Co. v. Ayres 
(1949), 152 Ohio St. 255, 40 O.O. 312, 89 N.E.2d 129, paragraph one of the 
syllabus (“The Board of Tax Appeals has control over its decisions until the 
actual institution of an appeal or the expiration of the time for an appeal”). 
{¶ 15} In this case, the BTA correctly stated that during the 30-day period 
following the certification of the October 18, 2006 determination of value, the 
BOR would have had jurisdiction to vacate that decision.  That means that the 
BOR could have acted at any time through November 17, 2006 (a Friday), to 
vacate or modify its determination of value.  The BTA held that the BOR had not 
acted within the period because a vacating order, in the BTA’s view, does not 
constitute a completed act of the BOR until it is certified as a “decision letter” to 
the parties. 
{¶ 16} In this appeal, Green LLC contends that, contrary to the BTA’s 
holding, the BOR validly vacated the October 18 decision when it voted to do so 
on November 7 and that the results of that vote were noted on the BOR’s minutes.  
After carefully reviewing the statutes, we agree. 
{¶ 17} Under R.C. 5715.02, the boards of revision consist of the county 
treasurer, county auditor, and the president of the county commissioners, or the 
designated representatives of those officials.  The section also states that a 
majority of the board constitutes a quorum to hear and determine any complaint.  
R.C. 5715.09 names the county auditor as secretary of the board of revision and 
charges the auditor with “call[ing] the board together as often as necessary during 
any year” as well as requiring that official to “keep an accurate record of the 
proceedings of the board in a book kept for the purpose.”  R.C. 5715.11 charges 
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the board of revision with “hear[ing] complaints relating to the valuation or 
assessment of real property,” and R.C. 5715.20(A) states that “[w]henever a 
county board of revision renders a decision on a complaint,” the board “shall 
certify its action by certified mail to the person in whose name the property is 
listed or sought to be listed and to the complainant.”   That section also makes 
clear that “[a] person’s time to file an appeal * * * commences with the mailing of 
notice of the decision to that person as provided in this section.” 
{¶ 18} We construe these statutes to establish that the boards of revision 
complete official action when they vote on matters that are properly before them 
and the vote is noted on the record of the board’s proceedings.  Indeed, by 
requiring the certification of certain decisions, R.C. 5715.20 implicitly 
acknowledges that the board of revision officially acts – and initially “renders a 
decision on a complaint” – through its recorded vote.  Only after it has done so 
does R.C. 5715.20 require the additional step of certifying the official act through 
a certified mailing to the parties. 
{¶ 19} As noted, when the official act of a board of revision consists of 
“render[ing] a decision on a complaint,” R.C. 5715.20 requires the certification of 
that act to the parties.  By contrast, neither that section nor any other requires 
certification of the act of vacating a previously certified determination of value.  
Unlike a decision to modify a previously certified determination of value, vacating 
the previous determination does not constitute rendering a decision on a 
complaint – indeed, it constitutes the very opposite:  such an order holds the case 
open so that a decision may be reached later, after additional proceedings have 
been conducted. 
{¶ 20} Moreover, the statutes prescribe the act of certification – the 
issuance of what the BTA referred to as decision letters – only with respect to a 
“decision on a complaint.”  Other actions taken by the boards of revision involve 
not decision letters but other methods of giving notice.  See R.C. 5715.15 (board 
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to report omissions and corrections as to tax list to the auditor) and 5715.16 
(board to revise the assessments and returns for the tax year as presented to it by 
the auditor).  With respect to orders vacating previously certified decisions on 
complaints, the statutes are silent.  We conclude that the language of the statues 
does not require certification of a decision to vacate. 
{¶ 21} Nor do we discern any need to infer such a requirement in order to 
effectuate the intent of the statutes.  The auditor as the secretary of the board will 
know that the board has vacated a determination and will not put a vacated 
determination into effect – indeed, the statutes provide that the auditor acts upon a 
determination of the board of revision when that body has separately certified its 
action to him.  R.C. 5715.14.  Moreover, when the board has vacated a previously 
certified determination of value, the board will likely hold additional hearings (as 
happened in the present case).  That action will require the board to notify the 
parties.  See R.C. 5715.19(C), 5715.12, and 5715.13; Knickerbocker Properties, 
Inc. XLII v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 119 Ohio St.3d 233, 2008-Ohio-3192, 
893 N.E.2d 457, ¶ 18 (board of revision’s order purporting to increase value of 
the property was not effective, because owner had not been properly notified).  
And whether such additional hearings are held or not, any subsequent 
determination of value will itself have to be certified pursuant to R.C. 5715.20. 
{¶ 22} At worst, a party who is dissatisfied with the original 
determination and who is unaware that the determination has been vacated might 
try to appeal a vacated determination to the BTA.  That appeal would likely face a 
motion to dismiss by the county auditor, the board of revision itself, or another 
party.  In any event, requiring the board of revision to certify a vacating order 
would not cure this potential problem, because both the appeal and the 
certification could occur as late as the last day of the appeal period. 
{¶ 23} In holding that the board of revision speaks “exclusively through 
its journal, i.e., its decision letters,” the BTA appears to confuse the board of 
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revision’s enabling statutes with the BTA’s own.  R.C. 5703.02 creates the BTA, 
and division (C) of that section requires the board to “[m]aintain a journal, which 
shall be open to public inspection and in which the secretary shall keep a record 
of all of the proceedings and the vote of each of its members upon every action 
taken by it.”  R.C. 5703.13 states that “[a]ll investigations, inquiries, hearings, and 
decisions of the board, and every order made by a member when approved and 
confirmed by the board and shown on its record of proceedings is deemed the 
order of the board.”  R.C. 5717.03(A) mandates that a “decision of the board of 
tax appeals * * * shall be entered of record on the journal together with the date 
when the order is filed with the secretary for journalization.”  Finally, R.C. 
5717.04 provides for appeals from the BTA’s decisions, and the 30-day appeal 
period commences with “the entry of the decision of the board on the journal of 
its proceedings.” 
{¶ 24} Thus, the BTA statutes plainly call for the BTA to journalize 
entries in order to effectuate its decisions and make them appealable.  By stark 
contrast, the statutes relating to the boards of revision do not speak of 
journalization; it suffices that the board of revision votes and that the auditor as 
secretary makes note of the event on the board of revision’s record.  In the case of 
a “decision on a complaint,” R.C. 5715.20 commences the appeal period with the 
certification of the decision; as for an order vacating such a decision, there is no 
provision for appeal because such orders are interlocutory in nature. 
{¶ 25} Moreover, the BTA’s own statutes demonstrate the difference 
between journalization and certification – two acts that the BTA’s decision in this 
case appears to conflate.  As discussed, the BTA makes its decisions effective by 
journalizing them; separate provisions then require that those decisions be 
certified to specified persons.  R.C. 5717.03(C), (D), and (E). 
{¶ 26} Finally, the BTA relies on decisions from this court that address 
orders rendered by courts of record in this state.  See Bittmann v. Bittmann 
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9 
(1934), 129 Ohio St. 123, 1 O.O. 435, 194 N.E. 8; Schenley v. Kauth (1953), 160 
Ohio St. 109, 51 O.O. 30, 113 N.E.2d 625, paragraph one of the syllabus; In re 
Adoption of Gibson (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 170, 173, 23 OBR 336, 492 N.E.2d 
146, fn. 3.  The proceedings of the tribunals at issue in those cases were controlled 
by rules and statutes that, like the BTA’s enabling statutes but unlike those that 
create the boards of revision, require journalization of entries.  See, e.g., Civ.R. 
58(A) (judgment not effective until entered on the journal); Crim.R. 32(C) (same). 
{¶ 27} We hold that a board of revision succeeds in vacating a previously 
certified decision on a complaint when it votes to do so and the auditor notes the 
fact on the record of its proceedings.  In this case, two pieces of evidence pertain 
to the issue:  the document attached to Green LLC’s brief at the BTA and the CD 
that records the actual vote by the BOR.  On the current record, we hold that the 
BOR vacated the October 18, 2006 order by the action it took on November 7, 
2006.  Because that act occurred within 30 days of the October 18 certification, 
the BOR possessed jurisdiction to effectuate its order, to hold the June 6, 2007 
hearing, and to render its subsequent determinations of value. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 28} For all the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the BTA 
and remand for further proceedings. 
Decision reversed, 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 29} I would affirm the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals.  The real 
issue is whether vacation of a previous decision—determination of value in a 
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property valuation case filed under R.C. 5715.19─must be certified to the 
interested parties before becoming effective.  I believe the statute says yes. 
{¶ 30} R.C. 5715.20(A) states: “Whenever a county board of revision 
renders a decision on a complaint filed under section 5715.19 of the Revised 
Code, it shall certify its action by certified mail to the person in whose name the 
property is listed or sought to be listed and to the complainant if the complainant 
is not the person in whose name the property is listed or sought to be listed. A 
person's time to file an appeal under section 5717.01 of the Revised Code 
commences with the mailing of notice of the decision to that person as provided 
in this section. The tax commissioner's time to file an appeal under section 
5717.01 of the Revised Code commences with the last mailing to a person 
required to be mailed notice of the decision as provided in this division.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 31} The board’s vacation of a previous determination of value appears 
to me to be a “decision on a complaint.”  Although the majority takes great pains 
to distinguish a decision to vacate a determination of value from other decisions, I 
am unconvinced that there is a distinction.  R.C. 5715.20(A) plainly says that the 
county board of revision shall certify “a decision on a complaint” and does not 
say that the board shall certify only a “final decision on a complaint.” 
{¶ 32} Furthermore the majority opinion states at ¶ 21: “Nor do we 
discern any need to infer [the requirement of certification to the parties] to 
effectuate the intent of the statutes.  The auditor as the secretary of the board will 
know that the board has vacated a determination and will not put a vacated 
determination into effect – indeed, the statutes provide that the auditor acts upon a 
determination of the board of revision when that body has separately certified its 
action to him.  R.C. 5715.14.” 
{¶ 33} In fact, R.C. 5715.14 provides no discretion for the auditor to fail 
to act when he or she has knowledge that the board has voted to vacate an earlier 
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determination certified to the auditor.  R.C. 5715.14 states: “The county board of 
revision shall certify its action to the county auditor, who shall correct the tax list 
and duplicate according to the deductions and additions ordered by the board in 
the manner provided by law for making corrections thereof. If the tax duplicate 
has been delivered to the county treasurer, the auditor shall certify such 
corrections to the treasurer, who shall enter such corrections on his tax duplicate.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 34} In holding that “a board of revision succeeds in vacating a 
previously certified decision on a complaint when it votes to do so and the auditor 
notes the fact on the record of its proceedings,” ¶ 27, the majority opinion fails to 
follow a clear statute.  Because R.C. 5715.20(A) provides that “a decision on a 
complaint” shall be certified to the interested parties to be effective, and the 
vacation of a previously certified decision is still a decision on a complaint, I 
would hold that the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals was correct.  A vacating 
order does not constitute a completed act of the board of review until it is certified 
as a “decision letter” to the parties. 
{¶ 35} I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Rich and Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., and Mark H. Gillis, for appellee 
Columbus City Schools Board of Education. 
 
Wayne E. Petkovic, for appellant. 
______________________