Case Title: RODNEY DEAN BLAKEMAN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-8

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
RODNEY DEAN BLAKEMAN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 13105 P.3d 472Case Number: 04-8Decided: 02/04/2005
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                
  

 
 
RODNEY 
DEAN BLAKEMAN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant) 
,

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff) 
.

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofWestonCounty

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Rodney 
Dean Blakeman, pro se

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Michael D. Allen, Assistant Attorney 
General

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ, and GUTHRIE, 
D.J.

 
 
 
 
            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Rodney 
Dean Blakeman (Blakeman), challenges the order of the district court denying his 
motion to correct his purportedly unconstitutional, and hence illegal, 
sentences.  Blakeman contends that 
the sentences imposed upon him in 2001 violate recently articulated 
constitutional principles and must be vacated.  We will affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Blakeman raises 
this issue:

 
 
Did the 
district court [err] and abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion to 
correct his unconstitutional and therefore illegal 
sentences?

 
 
The 
State phrases the issue thus:

 
 
Did the 
district court err in denying [Blakeman's] W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) motion to correct an 
illegal sentence?

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      On December 19, 
2000, Blakeman was charged with nine counts of sexual assault and one count of 
taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a minor.  The victims of his crimes were his own 
daughters.  At arraignment, Blakeman 
was informed that for some of the sexual assault offenses he faced potential 
life sentences.  Initially, he 
entered pleas of not guilty to all of the charged crimes.  Blakeman later made a decision to change 
his pleas.  In a written plea 
agreement, he acknowledged that the potential sentences for his pleas were six 
life sentences.  Blakeman agreed 
that he would plead guilty to one count of attempted second-degree sexual 
assault, three counts of second-degree sexual assault, and two counts of 
first-degree sexual assault.1  The agreement also provided that the 
remaining counts would be dismissed and no other additional charges would be 
filed against him (although a further investigation had revealed that additional 
charges were possible).  At a change 
of plea hearing, Blakeman again was informed that he could be sentenced to six 
life sentences.  On May 17, 2001, 
sentence was entered imposing six consecutive life sentences.  On appeal, the judgment and sentence of 
the district court were affirmed, as was an order of the district court denying 
Blakeman's motion to correct an illegal sentence.  Blakeman v. State, 2002 WY 177, 
59 P.3d 140 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶4]      On November 3, 
2003, Blakeman filed another motion to correct illegal sentence styled along 
lines similar to the issues raised in this appeal.  By order entered on December 11, 2003, 
the district court denied that motion.

 
 

 
 
[¶5]      Our discussion 
will be brief because we recently resolved the issues raised by Blakeman in a 
case that involved a challenge to virtually identical sentences, on the basis of 
the same legal theories broached here.  
Brown v. State, 2004 WY 119, 99 P.3d 489 (Wyo. 2004).  In his brief, Blakeman added a citation 
to another recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004) (applying 
rule expressed in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000).  In 
Blakely, the Supreme Court held that the rule announced in 
Apprendi applied to Blakely's case because the trial court made a factual 
finding that the defendant acted with "deliberate cruelty."  Based on that finding, the trial court 
imposed an enhanced sentence.  In 
Blakely, the Supreme Court iterated that fact-finding with respect to 
such sentence enhancements must be made by a jury under the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard.  Our decision in 
Brown, as well as our decision today, is in concert with the Supreme 
Court's pronouncements in both Apprendi and Blakely.  In Brown, we expressed our view 
that the existence of a prior conviction and the existence of a contemporaneous 
conviction rest on the same quality of evidence and neither sort of evidence is 
required to be determined by a jury under the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard.  As was the case in 
Brown, here the district court did not err by imposing consecutive life 
sentences on Blakeman.

 
 

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court's order denying Blakeman's motion to correct an illegal sentence is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The crimes were committed at various 
times between 1992 and 1995.