Case Title: Kevin Thomas v. David H. Schwarz

Citation: 2007 WI 57

Docket Number: 2005AP001487

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 57 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1487 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Kevin Thomas, 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
David H. Schwarz, Administrator, Division of 
Hearings and Appeals and Matthew J. Frank, 
Secretary, Department of Corrections, 
          Respondents-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 296 Wis. 2d 419, 722 N.W.2d 400 
(Ct. App. 2006—Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 22, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 16, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Clare L. Fiorenza 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
respondents-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs and oral argument by Christopher G. Wren, assistant 
attorney 
general, 
with 
whom 
on 
the 
brief 
was 
Peggy 
Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the petitioner-appellant there was a brief by Michael 
D. Kaiser and Kaiser Law Offices, Hartland, and oral argument by 
Michael D. Kaiser. 
 
 
2007 WI 57
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1487  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV5900) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Kevin Thomas, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
David H. Schwarz, Administrator, Division of 
Hearings and Appeals and Matthew J. Frank, 
Secretary, Department of Corrections, 
 
          Respondents-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 22, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 reversing an order 
of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Judge Clare L. Fiorenza 
presiding, which affirmed a decision of the Administrator of the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals (the Division) holding that the 
Division had jurisdiction to revoke both Kevin Thomas' parole 
and extended supervision at the same time. 
                                                 
1 State 
ex 
rel. 
Thomas 
v. 
Schwarz, 
No. 
2004AP1487, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 5, 2006). 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
2 
 
¶2 
In 
the 
petition 
for 
review, 
David 
H. 
Schwarz, 
Administrator of the Division, and Matthew J. Frank, Secretary 
of the Department of Corrections (the DOC) (collectively, 
Schwarz), ask this court to answer the question of whether the 
court of appeals erred in interpreting Wisconsin sentencing 
statutes when it held that the Division lacked jurisdiction 
simultaneously to revoke parole and extended supervision of a 
person 
serving 
consecutive 
indeterminate 
and 
determinate 
sentences.  Schwarz also asks this court to determine whether 
the court of appeals applied the correct standard of deference 
to the interpretation and application of the Truth-in-Sentencing 
(TIS) statutes by the Division. 
¶3 
We hold that the Division acted properly, and within 
its jurisdiction, in revoking Kevin Thomas' parole and extended 
supervision 
simultaneously, 
since 
here 
the 
consecutive 
indeterminate and determinate sentences were properly treated as 
one continuous sentence, with the confinement periods served 
first, followed by continuous nonconfinement periods of parole 
and extended supervision.  We further hold that the issue 
presented in this case is one of first impression, so that no 
deference to the decision of the Division is warranted. 
¶4 
The decision of the court of appeals is, therefore, 
reversed, and the decision of the Division is reinstated. 
I 
¶5 
On June 30, 1999, Kevin Thomas (Thomas), also known as 
Fernando Thomas, pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, two 
counts of forgery in Milwaukee County Circuit Court.  On August 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
3 
 
17, 1999, the court imposed an indeterminate sentence of two 
years of imprisonment on each count of forgery, consecutive to 
each other.  The court stayed the sentence and placed Thomas on 
probation for a five-year period.  On April 6, 2000, Thomas 
pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, one count of burglary 
in Milwaukee County Circuit Court. 
¶6 
Thomas' probation was revoked on April 21, 2000, as a 
result of actions giving rise to the burglary charge.  Thomas 
then began serving the two consecutive two-year sentences for 
the forgery convictions.  On May 8, 2000, Thomas was sentenced 
to a determinate, consecutive eight-year sentence for the 
burglary conviction, consisting of three years of initial 
confinement and five years of extended supervision. 
¶7 
Thomas completed the Challenge Incarceration Program 
while serving his sentence and, consequently, the circuit court, 
Judge Jeffrey A. Conen presiding, amended the judgment of 
conviction and sentence in the burglary case.  The court ordered 
Thomas to serve an eight-year sentence consisting of zero years 
of confinement and eight years of extended supervision. 
¶8 
On August 27, 2001, the DOC released Thomas to parole 
and, it asserts, extended supervision.  On February 2, 2004, 
Thomas was taken into custody for allegedly violating the 
conditions of his parole and extended supervision.  The alleged 
violations included possession and sale of heroin, consumption 
of heroin, possession and consumption of methadone, operating a 
motor vehicle without prior approval from his parole agent and 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
4 
 
without a valid driver's license, and failing to report to his 
parole agent for an office visit. 
¶9 
The DOC sought revocation of both Thomas' parole and 
extended supervision simultaneously.  A revocation hearing took 
place in front of an administrative law judge (ALJ)2 on March 16, 
2004.  Thomas moved to dismiss the proceedings for revocation of 
extended supervision.  Thomas argued that parole and extended 
supervision are two separate sentences, not one continuous 
period of supervision.  He argued that he had not yet commenced 
serving the extended supervision in the burglary case and that, 
therefore, it could not be revoked. 
¶10 The ALJ concluded that changes to the sentencing 
statutes due to TIS3 had not been intended to change the existing 
law that all consecutive sentences are served as one continuous 
sentence.  The ALJ concluded that Thomas had committed all of 
                                                 
2 Mayumi M. Ishii, who presided over Thomas' revocation 
hearing, is an ALJ in the Division of Hearings and Appeals and 
was acting on the Division's behalf. 
3 In June 1998 the legislature enacted Truth-in-Sentencing 
Part I (TIS-I), 1997 Wis. Act 283, which did away with the 
state's indeterminate sentencing system and put a determinate 
sentencing system in place.  See Michael B. Brennan, Thomas J. 
Hammer, and Donald V. Latorraca, Fully Implementing Truth-in-
Sentencing, 75 Wis. Law. 10, 11 (November 2002).  The TIS-I 
legislation applies to felonies committed on and after Dec. 31, 
1999.  Id. 
   
Then, in July 2002 Governor Scott McCallum signed Truth-in-
Sentencing Part II (TIS-II), 2001 Wis. Act 109, into law.  Id. 
at 
12. 
 
The 
TIS-II 
legislation 
included 
new 
crime 
classifications 
and 
other 
substantive 
and 
procedural 
law 
changes.  Id.   
 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
5 
 
the alleged violations and revoked his parole and extended 
supervision.  The ALJ did not order any reincarceration time for 
the parole revocation in the forgery case, but recommended that 
the circuit court impose two years and fifteen days of 
reconfinement in the burglary case. 
¶11 Thomas appealed the ALJ's decision to the Division, 
challenging only the revocation of his extended supervision.  
Schwarz, 
as 
Division 
Administrator, 
sustained 
the 
ALJ's 
decision, 
reasoning 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 302.113(4)(2003-04)4 
plainly indicates the legislature's intent to continue the long-
standing practice of treating consecutive sentences as one 
single, continuous sentence for TIS cases. 
¶12 Thomas appealed the decision of the Division to the 
Milwaukee 
County 
Circuit 
Court, 
Judge 
Clare 
L. 
Fiorenza 
presiding, which affirmed the Division's decision.  Thomas then 
sought review in the court of appeals, which reversed and 
remanded, with Judge Ralph Adam Fine dissenting. 
¶13 The court of appeals noted that Thomas was not 
challenging his parole revocation, but rather, was arguing that 
his extended supervision could not be revoked, because it had 
not yet begun at the time he was on parole.  The court of 
appeals applied a de novo standard of review, holding that this 
case is one of first impression. 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
6 
 
¶14 The court of appeals looked at the relevant case law 
and statutes that were in effect prior to TIS.  The court of 
appeals noted that in Ashford v. Division of Hearings and 
Appeals, 177 Wis. 2d 34, 501 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1993), the 
court had rejected the defendant's argument that parole should 
be viewed as two distinct time periods, with parole on one 
sentence expiring before parole on the other sentence began.  At 
the time Ashford was decided, Wis. Stat. § 302.11 (1991-92) 
provided in relevant part:  
(3) All consecutive sentences shall be computed 
as one continuous sentence. 
. . . . 
(7)(a) The division of hearings and appeals in 
the department of administration, upon proper notice 
and hearing . . . may return a parolee released under 
 . . . [mandatory release] to prison for a period up 
to the remainder of the sentence for a violation of 
the conditions of parole.  The remainder of the 
sentence is the entire sentence, less time served in 
custody prior to parole. . . . 
The court of appeals noted that the legislature eliminated 
the language in Wis. Stat. § 302.11(3) (1991-92) that said, "All 
consecutive sentences shall be computed as one continuous 
sentence" and replaced it with, "All consecutive sentences 
imposed for crimes committed before December 31, 1999, shall be 
computed 
as 
one 
continuous 
sentence." 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 302.11(3). 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
7 
 
¶15 The court of appeals also noted that the legislature 
created Wis. Stat. § 302.113(4) as part of TIS5.  Section 
302.113(4) provides: "All consecutive sentences imposed for 
crimes committed on or after December 31, 1999, shall be 
computed as one continuous sentence.  The person shall serve any 
term of extended supervision after serving all terms of 
confinement in prison."  The court of appeals stated that the 
current version of Wis. Stat. §  302.11(3) indicates that all 
consecutive indeterminate sentences shall be treated as one 
continuous6 sentence, and that § 302.113(4) indicates that all 
consecutive determinate sentences shall be treated as one 
continuous sentence. 
¶16 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
also 
examined 
Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2m)(c) and (d)7, and determined that those 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.113(4)(1997-98), adopted as part of 
TIS-I, provided: "All consecutive sentences shall be computed as 
one continuous sentence.  The person shall serve any term of 
extended supervision after serving all terms of confinement in 
prison."  This provision was later amended to its current 
version as part of TIS-II.  The version amended by TIS-II is the 
applicable version in this case. 
6 The American Heritage Dictionary defines "continuous" as 
"uninterrupted 
in 
time, 
sequence, 
substance, 
or 
extent."  
American Heritage Dictionary 408 (3d ed. 1992). 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.15(2m)(c) and (d) provides:  
(c) 
Determinate 
sentences 
imposed 
to 
run 
concurrent 
with 
or 
consecutive 
to 
indeterminate 
sentences.  1.  If a court provides that a determinate 
sentence is to run concurrent with an indeterminate 
sentence, the person sentenced shall serve the period 
of 
confinement 
in 
prison 
under 
the 
determinate 
sentence concurrent with the period of confinement in 
prison under the indeterminate sentence and the term 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
8 
 
statutory provisions indicate how concurrent sentences are 
handled when the defendant is confined, and when the defendant 
is released on parole and extended supervision.  The court of 
appeals determined that § 973.15(2m)(c) and (d) provides for how 
the confinement portions of consecutive sentences are to be 
served. 
 
The 
court 
noted 
that 
what 
is 
missing 
from 
§ 973.15(2m)(c)2. and (d)2. is language that would mirror the 
parole and extended supervision provisions in § 973.15(2m)(c)1. 
and (d)1.   
                                                                                                                                                             
of extended supervision under the determinate sentence 
concurrent 
with 
the 
parole 
portion 
of 
the 
indeterminate sentence. 
2. If a court provides that a determinate 
sentence is to run consecutive to an indeterminate 
sentence, the person sentenced shall serve the period 
of 
confinement 
in 
prison 
under 
the 
determinate 
sentence consecutive to the period of confinement in 
prison under the indeterminate sentence. 
 
(d) 
Indeterminate 
sentences 
imposed 
to 
run 
concurrent 
with 
or 
consecutive 
to 
determinate 
sentences. 
 1.  If a court provides that an 
indeterminate sentence is to run concurrent with a 
determinate sentence, the person sentenced shall serve 
the 
period 
of 
confinement 
in 
prison 
under 
the 
indeterminate sentence concurrent with the period of 
confinement in prison under the determinate sentence 
and the parole portion of the indeterminate sentence 
concurrent with the term of extended supervision 
required under the determinate sentence. 
 
2. If a court provides that an indeterminate 
sentence is to run consecutive to a determinate 
sentence, the person sentenced shall serve the period 
of confinement in prison under the indeterminate 
sentence consecutive to the period of confinement in 
prison under the determinate sentence.   
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
9 
 
¶17 The court of appeals then stated that the legislative 
history gives insight into the lack of such provisions in 
Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2m)(c)2. and (d)2. that explain how to 
handle consecutive parole and extended supervision.  The court 
noted that the Criminal Penalties Study Committee (the CPSC) was 
established by the legislature to make recommendations and 
proposals 
related 
to 
TIS 
legislation. 
 
One 
of 
the 
recommendations of the CPSC concerned persons subject to both 
pre-TIS (indeterminate) and TIS (determinate) sentences.  The 
CPSC stated: 
The Committee recommends that in either sequence 
(indeterminate 
sentence 
followed 
by 
determinate 
sentence, or determinate followed by indeterminate), 
and regardless of whether the sentences are run 
concurrent with or consecutive to each other, all 
confinement time should be served together, either 
concurrently or consecutively in whatever sequence 
ordered by the courts; and extended supervision should 
always precede any parole time.   
Criminal Penalties Study Comm., Final Report on 1997 Wis. Act 
283, Truth in Sentencing at 102 (August 31, 1999).  The court of 
appeals noted that the CPSC was construing parole and extended 
supervision separately and considered that sequencing important.   
¶18 The court of appeals further noted that 2001 Wis. Act 
109, which created Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2m)(c) and (d), included 
the following language, in relevant part:  
(c) 
Determinate 
sentences 
imposed 
to 
run 
concurrent 
with 
or 
consecutive 
to 
indeterminate 
sentences.  . . .  
2. If a court provides that a determinate 
sentence is to run consecutive to an indeterminate 
sentence, the person sentenced shall serve the period 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
10 
 
of 
confinement 
in 
prison 
under 
the 
determinate 
sentence consecutive to the period of confinement in 
prison under the indeterminate sentence and the parole 
portion of the indeterminate sentence consecutive to 
the term of extended supervision under the determinate 
sentence.  
(d) 
Indeterminate 
sentences 
imposed 
to 
run 
concurrent 
with 
or 
consecutive 
to 
determinate 
sentences.  . . .  
2. If a court provides that an indeterminate 
sentence is to run consecutive to a determinate 
sentence, the person sentenced shall serve the period 
of confinement in prison under the indeterminate 
sentence consecutive to the period of confinement in 
prison under the determinate sentence and the parole 
portion of the indeterminate sentence consecutive to 
the term of extended supervision under the determinate 
sentence. 
See 2001 Wis. Act 109, § 1142 (emphasis added).   
¶19 The court of appeals then noted that Governor Scott 
McCallum 
vetoed 
the 
underlined 
language, 
explaining 
that 
consecutive sentences are currently served in the order they are 
handed down from the court, which means parole is generally 
served 
before 
extended 
supervision. 
 Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau, Wisconsin Briefs 02-2 (Supplement): Executive Vetoes of 
Bills Passed by the 2001 Wisconsin Legislature from May 3, 2002, 
through August 16, 2002, August 2002 at 54.  Adopting the 
proposed language would mean that, when sentences are served 
consecutively, sentences with extended supervision would be 
served first.  Id.  In his veto message, Governor McCallum 
explained: 
If an offender has a sentence with a parole provision 
and receives a consecutive sentence with an extended 
supervision provision, the extended supervision must 
be served first, requiring the shifting of dates for 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
11 
 
serving the first sentence.  The dates for serving all 
other sentences will need to be adjusted, resulting in 
an increased potential for errors and litigation if an 
offender is held longer than the sentence that was 
imposed.  Id. 
¶20 The court of appeals emphasized that the governor's 
veto message did not assume that parole and extended supervision 
would be served as a continuous sentence in cases where the 
sentences were ordered to be served consecutively.  The court of 
appeals also noted that Governor McCallum's veto message states 
that "parole is generally served before extended supervision."  
Id. 
¶21 From the legislative history, the court of appeals 
concluded that the statutes do not mandate that consecutive 
sentences involving parole and extended supervision be served as 
a continuous sentence.  The court of appeals held that Thomas, 
who was serving his determinate sentence consecutive to his 
indeterminate sentence, was serving parole first, and had not 
yet begun to serve extended supervision at the time he committed 
parole violations.  The court therefore reversed the decision of 
the circuit court. 
¶22 Judge Ralph Adam Fine dissented, stating that the 
majority did not explain why the Division lacked jurisdiction to 
revoke Thomas' parole and extended supervision.  Judge Fine 
concluded that simultaneous revocation of parole and extended 
supervision was permitted by statute.  He reasoned that, when 
Thomas was placed on parole in the pre-TIS case (the forgery 
case), Thomas had already completed his initial confinement in 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
12 
 
the TIS case (the burglary case), because of his participation 
in the Challenge Incarceration Program. 
¶23 Judge Fine noted that persons sentenced under TIS are 
subject to Wis. Stat. § 302.113 and (2), which states in 
relevant part that "an inmate subject to this section is 
entitled to release to extended supervision after he or she has 
served the term of confinement in prison portion of the sentence 
imposed under s. 973.01, as modified by the sentencing court 
under . . . s. 302.045(3m)(b)1 . . . if applicable."  Judge Fine 
reasoned that, since Thomas served the "'term of confinement in 
prison portion of the sentence'" in the TIS case, he was 
released to extended supervision and could, at any time, have 
his extended supervision revoked if he violated its terms.    
State ex rel. Thomas v. Schwarz, No. 2004AP1487, unpublished 
slip 
op., 
¶38 
(Wis. 
Ct. 
App. 
July 
5, 
2006)(Fine, 
J., 
dissenting)(quoting Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2)).  
¶24 Schwarz filed a petition for review with this court, 
which we granted. 
II 
¶25 This case involves statutory interpretation, an issue 
of law that this court reviews de novo.  Megal Dev. Corp. v. 
Shadof, 2005 WI 151, ¶8, 286 Wis. 2d 105, 705 N.W.2d 645.  This 
case also involves review of an agency decision.  When reviewing 
an administrative agency's interpretation of statutes, this 
court generally applies one of three standards of review, with 
varying degrees of deference.  DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 
15, ¶15, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 727 N.W.2d 311; Labor Ready, Inc. v. 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
13 
 
LIRC, 2005 WI 153, ¶5, 285 Wis. 2d 506, 702 N.W.2d 27.  The 
agency's determination is entitled to "'great weight'" deference 
if 
the 
agency's 
experience, 
technical 
competence, 
and 
specialized knowledge aid the agency in its interpretation and 
application of the statute.  Labor Ready, 285 Wis. 2d 506, ¶5 
(citation omitted).  If the agency decision is "'very nearly'" 
one of first impression, it is entitled to "'due weight'" 
deference.  Id. (citation omitted).  The de novo standard is 
applied where it is clear from the lack of agency precedent that 
the case is one of first impression for the agency, and the 
agency lacks special expertise and experience in determining 
that issue.  Id.   
¶26 Schwarz argues that this court should apply great 
weight deference8 to the DOC's and the Division's interpretation 
of the sentencing statutes.9  In support of his argument, Schwarz 
                                                 
8 In order for this court to apply great weight deference to 
an agency's interpretation of a statute, four requirements must 
be met: (1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the 
duty of administering the statute; (2) the interpretation of the 
agency is one of long-standing; (3) the agency employed its 
expertise 
or 
specialized 
knowledge 
in 
forming 
the 
interpretation; and (4) the agency's interpretation will provide 
uniformity in the application of the statute.  DaimlerChrysler 
v. LIRC, 2007 WI 15, ¶16, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 727 N.W.2d 311. 
9 The Division is not part of the DOC; rather, it is part of 
the Department of Administration.  George v. Schwarz, 2001 WI 
App 
72, 
¶21, 
242 
Wis. 
2d 
450, 
626 
N.W.2d 
57.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 301.03(3) explains the role of the DOC and the 
Division 
in 
the 
administration 
of 
parole 
and 
extended 
supervision.  Wisconsin Stat. § 301.03(3) states, in relevant 
part, that the DOC shall: 
Administer parole, extended supervision and probation 
matters, except that the decision to grant or deny 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
14 
 
asserts that, at the time of Thomas' revocation hearing in 2004, 
the DOC had had nearly two decades of experience in computing 
sentences subject to parole release, nearly six years of 
experience with extended supervision, and one year of experience 
dealing with consecutive pre-TIS and TIS sentences.  Schwarz 
argues that this court should apply Jicha v. DILHR, 169 Wis. 2d 
284, 485 N.W.2d 256 (1992), in which great weight deference was 
given to the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations' 
interpretation of a relatively new statute, because it had 
experience in administering similar statutes. 
¶27  Thomas argues that this case is subject to de novo 
review because there is no long-standing interpretation of the 
TIS statutes and because there is no evidence that the Division 
used expertise or specialized knowledge to analyze or interpret 
the TIS statutes.  Thomas further argues that Schwarz's reliance 
on Jicha is misplaced, because that case compared two analogous, 
simultaneously existing statutory sections.  Thomas asserts 
that, 
in 
this 
case, 
Schwarz 
is 
relying 
on 
well-settled 
interpretations of the pre-TIS sentencing scheme, and arguing 
that they apply to the new, overhauled sentencing scheme under 
TIS.   
                                                                                                                                                             
parole to inmates shall be made by the parole 
commission and the decision to revoke probation, 
extended supervision or parole in cases in which there 
is no waiver of the right to a hearing shall be made 
by the division of hearings and appeals in the 
department of administration. 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
15 
 
¶28 Under the circumstances of this case, we agree with 
Thomas that reliance on Jicha is misplaced.  This case focuses 
on the interpretation of statutes enacted in 2001 pursuant to 
2001 Wisconsin Act 109, as part of TIS legislation.  Thomas' 
forgery crimes were committed prior to December 31, 1999, the 
date that TIS legislation went into effect.  The sentence 
imposed was, therefore, an indeterminate sentence.  Thomas' 
burglary crime was committed after December 31, 1999, and he 
received a determinate sentence for that conviction. 
¶29 Neither 
party 
cited 
any 
controlling 
authority 
addressing the particular issue of whether the Division lacked 
jurisdiction simultaneously to revoke parole and extended 
supervision of a person serving consecutive indeterminate and 
determinate sentences.  Under the circumstances presented here, 
we are satisfied that this case presents an issue of first 
impression for which no deference is owed to the Division or to 
the DOC.10  Solie v. Employee Trust Funds Bd., 2005 WI 42, ¶25, 
279 Wis. 2d 615, 695 N.W.2d 463. 
III 
¶30 Schwarz argues that the court of appeals' decision 
should be reversed, because it relied on statutory silence and 
ignored unambiguous statutory language that allows the Division 
to 
revoke 
Thomas' 
parole 
and 
extended 
supervision 
                                                 
10 The entity we must focus on, in regard to the issue of 
deference, is the Division since it is the decisionmaker on the 
question of revocation, see Wis. Stat. § 301.03(3), but we 
recognize that Schwarz has argued for deference to the DOC, as 
well as the Division. 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
16 
 
simultaneously.  Schwarz asserts that Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2)11 
unambiguously provides that extended supervision begins when a 
person has completed his or her period of confinement. 
¶31 Schwarz 
also 
asserts 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 302.11(1)12 
implies that parole begins upon a person's mandatory release 
from 
confinement. 
 
Reading 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 302.113(2) 
and 
302.11(1) together, Schwarz argues that, upon release from 
confinement for consecutive pre-TIS and TIS sentences, the 
person begins both his parole and extended supervision at the 
same time.  He argues that the indeterminate and determinate 
sentences merge into a single continuous sentence, with the 
person serving all periods of confinement under all sentences, 
followed by all periods of nonconfinement.  Schwarz asserts 
that, because the language of §§ 302.113(2) and 302.11(1) 
mandates releasing a person to both parole and extended 
supervision upon completion of serving his or her term of 
confinement, the Division had jurisdiction to revoke Thomas' 
parole and extended supervision simultaneously.   
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.113(2) provides in relevant part, 
"[A]n inmate subject to this section is entitled to release to 
extended supervision after he or she has served the term of 
confinement in prison portion of the sentence imposed under s. 
973.01, as modified by the sentencing court under . . . s. 
302.045(3m)(b)1.,  . . .  if applicable."  
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.11(1) provides in relevant part, 
"[E]ach inmate is entitled to mandatory release on parole by the 
department.  The mandatory release date is established at two-
thirds of the sentence."   
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
17 
 
¶32 Schwarz 
further 
argues 
that 
the 
legislature's 
amendment of Wis. Stat. §§ 302.11(3) and 302.113(4)(1999-2000), 
pursuant to 2001 Wis. Act 109, §§ 386 and 393, respectively, did 
not effectuate any structural changes in the treatment of 
consecutive sentences, between the pre-TIS sentencing regime and 
the 
TIS 
sentencing 
regime. 
 
Schwarz 
notes 
that 
§ 302.113(4)(1999-2000) was created in 1998 as part of the first 
phase of TIS legislation.  See 1997 Wis. Act 283, § 207.  At 
that time, § 302.113(4)(1997-98) provided in relevant part, 
"'All consecutive sentences shall be computed as one continuous 
sentence.'"  Schwarz notes that § 302.11(3)(1997-98) contained 
the same language.  He argues that the amendments made to 
§§ 302.11(3) and 302.113(4)(1999-2000)in 2002 arose because the 
legislature enacted TIS in two phases and wanted to make a 
technical clarification that the language regarding computation 
of 
consecutive 
sentences 
applied 
to 
all 
consecutive 
TIS 
sentences, regardless of whether they were imposed during TIS-I 
or TIS-II. 
¶33 Schwarz also argues that Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2m)(c)(2) 
supports his argument that pre-TIS and TIS consecutive sentences 
should be computed the same way in the pre-TIS regime and the 
TIS regime.  He argues that, under both pre-TIS and TIS 
standards, persons serve all confinement time before beginning 
any period of nonconfinement time.  Section 973.15(2m)(c)(2) 
states, "If a court provides that a determinate sentence is to 
run consecutive to an indeterminate sentence, the person 
sentenced shall serve the period of confinement in prison under 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
18 
 
the 
determinate 
sentence 
consecutive 
to 
the 
period 
of 
confinement in prison under the indeterminate sentence."  Under 
this section, Schwarz states, consecutive indeterminate and 
determinate sentences are merged into one continuous sentence, 
with all confinement periods served before the person begins any 
continuous 
nonconfinement 
periods 
of 
parole 
and 
extended 
supervision. 
¶34 Thomas argues that the court of appeals properly 
concluded that Thomas was not yet placed on extended supervision 
at the time of his parole violations, and that the Division, 
therefore, 
had 
no 
jurisdiction 
to 
revoke 
his 
extended 
supervision.  Thomas reads the sentencing statutes so that 
confinement 
periods 
under 
indeterminate 
and 
determinate 
sentences are to be served consecutively and continuously under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2m)(c)2., followed by release to parole 
supervision which, when completed, is to be followed by extended 
supervision. 
¶35 Thomas 
claims 
that 
the 
amendments 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 302.11(3) and 302.113(4), which were signed into 
law in July 2002, were added to conform to recommendations of 
the CPSC.  He points out that the CPSC suggested that extended 
supervision run first and be followed by parole, in cases where 
an indeterminate sentence is followed by a determinate sentence.   
¶36 Thomas argues that Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2) does not 
mandate initiation of extended supervision once the confinement 
is complete.  Rather, he claims that the plain language of 
§ 302.113(2) merely makes a person eligible for extended 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
19 
 
supervision.  According to Thomas, § 302.113(2) does not say 
that the person's term of extended supervision begins as soon as 
the person finishes serving confinement. 
¶37 Thomas argues that the legislative history of the 
sentencing statutes suggests that the legislature intended a 
person to serve consecutive parole and extended supervision as 
two distinct periods, one following the other.  Thomas notes 
that 
the 
original 
proposed 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2)(c)2. 
included 
a 
provision 
that 
"the 
parole portion of the indeterminate sentence [shall be served] 
consecutive[ly] to the term of extended supervision under the 
determinate sentence."  2001 Wis. Act 109, § 1142.  Thomas takes 
the position that Governor McCallum's veto of this language 
shows that there was never any intent for parole and extended 
supervision 
to 
be 
treated 
as 
one 
continuous 
period 
of 
supervision. 
¶38 We are satisfied that the Division acted within its 
jurisdiction when it revoked Thomas' parole and extended 
supervision simultaneously.  As Judge Ralph Adam Fine stated in 
his dissent to the court of appeals' majority opinion in this 
case, simultaneous revocation of parole and extended supervision 
is permitted by the sentencing statutes. 
¶39 It seems clear that the sentencing statutes do not 
answer directly the issue presented as to whether a person who 
is serving consecutive determinate and indeterminate sentences 
may have his or her parole and extended supervision revoked 
simultaneously.  When interpreting a statute, we begin with the 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
20 
 
language of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we need not inquire further.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
¶40 Legislative history and case law do, however, often 
provide some guidance in interpreting the statutes.  While, 
traditionally, we do not resort to legislative history in the 
absence of a finding of ambiguity, this court has recognized 
that on occasion we consult legislative history in order to show 
how that history supports our interpretation of a statute.  
Megal Dev. Corp., 286 Wis. 2d 105, ¶22.  Here, as noted 
previously, the statutes do not squarely answer the issue 
presented, but require a careful analysis of the overall 
statutory scheme. 
¶41 All persons sentenced under the TIS regime are subject 
to a bifurcated sentence under Wis. Stat. § 973.01.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 302.11(1), a person is subject to § 302.11 if he or 
she, like Thomas, is serving a bifurcated sentence under 
§ 973.01.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2), "an inmate 
subject to this section is entitled to release to extended 
supervision after he or she has served the term of confinement 
in prison portion of the sentence imposed under s. 973.01, as 
modified by the sentencing court under . . . s. 302.045(3m)(b)1 
. . . if applicable."   
¶42 When Thomas was placed on parole in the pre-TIS case 
(the forgery case), he already had completed serving his term of 
confinement in the TIS case (the burglary case).  Afterward, 
Thomas was "release[d] to extended supervision," as provided in 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
21 
 
Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2). 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 302.113(8m)(a) 
provides in relevant part, "Every person released to extended 
supervision under this section remains in the legal custody of 
the 
department." 
 
When 
Thomas 
was 
released 
to 
extended 
supervision, clearly he was in the custody of the DOC.  His 
extended supervision could, therefore, be revoked at any time 
under Wis. Stat. § 302.113(9)(am), if he were to violate a 
condition imposed.  Section 302.113(9)(am) provides in relevant 
part, "If a person released to extended supervision under this 
section violates a condition of extended supervision, the 
reviewing authority may revoke the extended supervision of the 
person." 
¶43 Thomas was taken into custody on February 2, 2004, for 
alleged 
violations 
of 
the 
terms 
of 
parole 
and 
extended 
supervision.  The alleged violations included possession and 
sale 
of 
heroin, 
consumption 
of 
heroin, 
possession 
and 
consumption of methadone, operating a motor vehicle without 
prior approval from his parole agent and without a valid 
driver's license, and failing to report to his parole agent for 
an office visit.  A revocation hearing was held on March 16, 
2004, and the ALJ concluded that Thomas had committed all of the 
alleged violations.  The ALJ ordered revocation of Thomas' 
parole and extended supervision pursuant to her authority under 
Wis. Stat. § 302.113(9)(am), and the Division upheld the ALJ's 
decision. 
¶44 We disagree with Thomas' argument that he was required 
to complete serving his parole in the 1999 forgery case, before 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
22 
 
he could begin serving his extended supervision in the 2000 
burglary case.  Rather, we are satisfied that, under the overall 
statutory scheme adopted by the legislature, parole and extended 
supervision are to be served as one continuous period of 
supervision. 
¶45 In Ashford, 177 Wis. 2d at 38, the court of appeals 
held that a person serving consecutive sentences was subject to 
parole revocation for both sentences if he committed a parole 
violation prior to discharge of the first sentence.  Examining 
Wis. Stat. § 302.11 (1991-92), the court concluded that "the 
statutory language unambiguously requires revocation on all 
sentences if a parole violation is committed."  The court in 
Ashford rejected the defendant's argument that parole should be 
viewed as two distinct time periods, with parole on one sentence 
expiring before parole could begin on the other sentence.  Id. 
at 41-42. 
¶46 Thomas points out that the legislature eliminated the 
language in Wis. Stat. § 302.11(3)(1999-2000) that stated "All 
consecutive sentences shall be computed as one continuous 
sentence" and replaced it with "All consecutive sentences 
imposed for crimes committed before December 31, 1999, shall be 
computed 
as 
one 
continuous 
sentence."  
Wis. Stat. § 302.11(3)(2001-02).  We recognize his argument that 
this change indicates the legislature's intent to treat all 
consecutive pre-TIS sentences as one continuous sentence, but 
not to treat consecutive determinate and indeterminate sentences 
as one continuous sentence.  We disagree, however. 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
23 
 
¶47 Both the 1999-2000 version and the current version of 
Wis. Stat. § 302.11(3) use the phrase "one continuous sentence."  
There is no language in the statute requiring that a person 
serve the nonconfinement time on one sentence, before serving 
the 
nonconfinement 
time 
on 
another 
sentence. 
 
Although 
§ 302.11(3) does not specify how consecutive determinate and 
indeterminate sentences are to be treated, it is reasonable to 
conclude, following the reasoning of the court of appeals in  
Ashford, that parole and extended supervision should not be 
viewed as two distinct time periods, with parole expiring before 
extended supervision can begin.  See Ashford, 177 Wis. 2d at 41-
42.  In Ashford, the court of appeals stated: 
If 
consecutive 
sentences 
are 
computed 
as 
one 
continuous sentence, the remainder of the sentence 
referred to in sec. 302.11(7)(a) [(1991-92)] must be 
the 
remainder 
of 
the 
aggregate 
sentence. 
The 
unambiguous language of sec. 302.11[(1991-92)] gives 
the state the authority to revoke Ashford's parole on 
both the theft and the robbery convictions and to 
reincarcerate him for the time remaining on both 
convictions. 
 
	

Although the Ashford court considered pre-TIS sentencing 
statutes, its reasoning remains sound.  We hold that extended 
supervision and parole are to be treated as one continuous 
period, and both may be revoked upon violation of the conditions 
imposed.   
¶48 As we discussed previously, Governor McCallum vetoed 
language in 2001 Wis. Act 109, § 1142 and issued a veto message 
that stated, "I am partially vetoing these provisions because 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
24 
 
they needlessly complicate existing procedures. . . . "13  The 
veto message reflects an intention not to change the practice of 
how consecutive sentences were then being handled.  This court's 
holding in Ashford, 177 Wis. 2d at 38, indicates that, prior to 
TIS, a person serving consecutive sentences was subject to 
parole revocation for both sentences if he committed a parole 
violation. 
¶49 If we were to adopt Thomas' interpretation of the 
sentencing statutes, the significance of revocation as a 
deterrence mechanism would be diminished.  As the State of 
Wisconsin points out in its brief, if we were to treat parole 
and extended supervision as discrete units that could not be 
revoked simultaneously, absurd results might follow.  If a 
person were to commit a serious violation of his or her terms of 
parole or extended supervision, the subsequent revocation of 
only one unit of extended supervision or parole could be 
disproportionately small in comparison to the seriousness of the 
violation.  
¶50 We hold, therefore, based on our analysis of the 
statutory scheme adopted by the legislature and consistent with 
the Ashford decision, that the Division had jurisdiction to 
revoke Thomas' parole and extended supervision simultaneously.  
                                                 
13 Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Wisconsin Briefs 02-2 
(Supplement): Executive Vetoes of Bills Passed by the 2001 
Wisconsin Legislature from May 3, 2002, through August 16, 2002, 
August 2002 at 54. 
 
No. 
2005AP1487   
 
25 
 
We are satisfied that there is nothing in the statutes at issue 
that requires a contrary conclusion. 
IV 
¶51 Schwarz asks this court in his petition for review to 
answer the question of whether the court of appeals erred in 
interpreting Wisconsin sentencing statutes when it held that the 
Division lacks jurisdiction simultaneously to revoke parole and 
extended 
supervision 
of 
a 
person 
serving 
consecutive 
indeterminate and determinate sentences.  Schwarz also asks this 
court to determine whether the court of appeals applied the 
correct 
standard 
of 
deference 
to 
the 
interpretation 
and 
application of the Truth-in-Sentencing statutes by the Division. 
¶52 We hold that the Division acted properly, and within 
its jurisdiction, in revoking Thomas' parole and extended 
supervision 
simultaneously, 
since 
here 
the 
consecutive 
indeterminate and determinate sentences were properly treated as 
one continuous sentence with the confinement periods served 
first, followed by continuous nonconfinement periods of parole 
and extended supervision. 
¶53 We further hold that the issue presented in this case 
is one of first impression, so that no deference is required.  
The decision of the court of appeals is, therefore, reversed, 
and the decision of the Division is reinstated. 
By the Court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.      
 
 
No.  2005AP1487.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶54 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  This case 
highlights a gap in our sentencing structure.  The legislature 
provided that consecutive sentences of parole should be treated 
as 
one 
continuous 
period 
for 
pre-TIS 
cases. 
Wis. Stat. § 302.11(3). It likewise provided that consecutive 
sentences of extended supervision should be treated as one 
continuous 
period 
in 
TIS 
cases. 
Wis. Stat. § 302.113(4).  
However, a gap in the statutory scheme, created by a Governor's 
veto, leaves the statutes silent in regards to the hybrid 
situation presented in this case: how pre-TIS parole and TIS 
extended supervision are to be treated when the sentences are 
consecutive. 
¶55 At first 
blush, the majority's approach appears 
acceptable. After all, what the parties need is to fill the gap. 
They need an answer and the majority has provided just that.  
¶56 I cannot join the majority, however, because the 
statute is silent and the answer that the majority provides (1) 
is clearly contrary to legislative history; (2) may result in 
illegal sentences in excess of the statutory maximum; and (3) 
exposes defendants to serving longer periods behind bars upon 
revocation, contrary to a basic rule of construction for penal 
statutes. 
I 
¶57 The majority recognizes that the statutes are silent 
as to whether consecutive sentences of pre-TIS parole and TIS 
extended supervision are to be served as one continuous period. 
No.  2005AP1487.awb 
 
2 
 
Majority op., ¶39. It also recognizes that the language of 
Wis. Stat. § 302.11(3) changed from the general requirement that 
"[a]ll consecutive sentences shall be computed as one continuous 
sentence" to the narrower requirement that "[a]ll consecutive 
sentences imposed for crimes committed before December 31, 1999, 
shall be computed as one continuous sentence." Majority op., 
¶46. It reasons that the use of the phrase "one continuous 
sentence" in both versions of the statute, together with the 
statutory silence, makes it reasonable to conclude that the 
legislature intended that consecutive sentences of parole and 
extended supervision should be viewed as one continuous period. 
Majority op., ¶47. Further, it reasons that Governor McCallum's 
veto message indicates an intent that supports the majority's 
conclusion Majority op., ¶48.  
II 
¶58 The majority's view ignores the clear legislative 
history indicating that parole and extended supervision were 
intended to be treated as distinct periods. As passed by the 
legislature, 2001 Wis. Act 109 ("Act") did not leave a gap in 
the statutory scheme. Rather, it provided that § 973.15(2m)(c)2. 
would read: 
2. If a court provides that a determinate sentence is 
to run consecutive to an indeterminate sentence, the 
person sentenced shall serve the period of confinement 
in prison under the determinate sentence consecutive 
to the period of confinement in prison under the 
indeterminate sentence and the parole portion of the 
indeterminate sentence consecutive to the term of 
extended supervision under the determinate sentence.  
2001 Wis. Act 109, § 1142 (emphasis added).  
No.  2005AP1487.awb 
 
3 
 
¶59 Further, it provided that § 973.15(2m)(d)2. would 
read:  
2. If a court provides that an indeterminate sentence 
is to run consecutive to a determinate sentence, the 
person sentenced shall serve the period of confinement 
in prison under the indeterminate sentence consecutive 
to the period of confinement in prison under the 
determinate sentence and the parole portion of the 
indeterminate sentence consecutive to the term of 
extended supervision under the determinate sentence.  
Id. (emphasis added). The underlined language, which ultimately 
was not included in § 973.15(2m), indicates that the legislature 
intended that in hybrid cases parole would be served consecutive 
to extended supervision, regardless of which sentence was handed 
down first.  
¶60 The language of 2001 Wis. Act 109, § 1142 reflects the 
recommendations 
of 
the Criminal Penalties Study Committee 
(CPSC), which addressed the treatment of consecutive determinate 
and indeterminate sentences. In its final report, the CPSC 
recommended that regardless of the order in which sentences are 
handed down, all confinement time should be served together, and 
extended supervision should always precede parole. It based this 
recommendation on the ground that extended supervision was 
intended to be stricter than parole. The report provides:  
The committee recommends that in either sequence 
(indeterminate 
sentence 
followed 
by 
determinate 
sentence, or determinate followed by indeterminate), 
and regardless of whether the sentences are run 
concurrent with or consecutive to each other, all 
confinement time should be served together, either 
concurrently or consecutively in whatever sequence 
ordered by the courts; and extended supervision should 
always precede any parole time. This recommendation is 
based in the Committee's conclusion that [extended] 
No.  2005AP1487.awb 
 
4 
 
supervision 
will 
involve 
stricter 
community 
supervision than currently available through parole. 
Criminal Penalties Study Comm., Final Report on 1997 Wis. Act 
283, Truth In Sentencing, at 102 (Aug. 31, 1999).  
¶61 The 
CPSC 
clearly 
viewed 
parole 
and 
extended 
supervision as having important differences, and that it made a 
difference which was to be served first. By following the CPSC's 
recommendation that parole follow extended supervision in hybrid 
cases, 
the 
legislature 
agreed 
that 
parole 
and 
extended 
supervision had important differences. 
¶62 Despite the CPSC's recommendation and the legislation 
reflecting that recommendation, Governor McCallum vetoed the 
language in the Act providing that parole should follow extended 
supervision 
in 
consecutive 
determinate 
and 
indeterminate 
sentences. In his veto message, he notes that the consecutive 
periods of parole and extended supervision are to be served in 
the order that the sentences are imposed. 
I am partially vetoing these provisions because they 
needlessly complicate existing procedures and place an 
administrative burden on the Department of Corrections 
that could lead to increased errors in sentence 
calculation 
and 
offender 
litigation. 
Consecutive 
sentences are currently served in the order they are 
handed down from the court, which means parole is 
generally served before extended supervision. These 
provisions require that when sentences are to be 
served 
consecutively, 
sentences 
with 
extended 
supervision are served first. If an offender has a 
sentence with a parole provision and receives a 
consecutive sentence with an extended supervision 
provision, the extended supervision must be served 
first, requiring the shifting of the dates for serving 
the first sentence. The dates for serving all other 
sentences will need to be adjusted, resulting in an 
increased potential for errors and litigation if an 
No.  2005AP1487.awb 
 
5 
 
offender is held longer than the sentence that was 
imposed. 
Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau, 
Wisconsin 
Briefs 
02-2 
(Supplement): Executive Vetoes of Bills Passed by the 2001 
Wisconsin Legislature from May 3, 2002, through August 16, 2002, 
August 2002, at 54.  
¶63 Nothing in Governor McCallum's veto message can be 
construed as intending that consecutive sentences of parole and 
extended supervision are to be served as a single continuous 
period. 
Rather, 
the 
intention 
is 
clear 
that 
consecutive 
sentences of parole and extended supervision should be served, 
one after the other, in the order that they are handed down. As 
the court of appeals notes, the Governor's veto message 
contemplates that the periods are distinct, such that "parole is 
generally served before extended supervision." 
¶64 Nevertheless, 
the 
majority 
ignores 
the 
clear 
legislative history and determines that this gap, this utter 
silence, somehow makes it reasonable to view consecutive 
sentences of parole and extended supervision as one continuous 
period. Majority op., ¶47.  
¶65 I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority's 
view 
that 
the 
Governor's veto message regarding the order in which consecutive 
periods 
of 
parole 
and 
extended 
supervision 
are 
served 
demonstrates "an intention not to change the practice of how 
consecutive sentences were then being handled." Majority op., 
¶48. It is correct that the message demonstrates an intention 
not to change the practice regarding the order in which 
consecutive sentences are served. However, the Governor's 
No.  2005AP1487.awb 
 
6 
 
statement that parole is generally served before (rather than 
continuous 
with) extended supervision illustrates that he 
understood that the periods are distinct.  
¶66 In sum, the statutes are silent on whether to treat 
parole and extended supervision as distinct or continuous. The 
CPSC viewed consecutive sentences of parole and extended 
supervision as distinct and the legislature passed a bill that 
reflected the CPSC's view that the periods were distinct. 
Additionally, the Governor's veto message supports the view that 
the periods are distinct. Such a record cannot support the 
majority's interpretation that there was any intention that 
parole and extended supervision were to be treated as one 
continuous period in cases such as this.1  
III 
¶67 It is not simply the legislative history that leads me 
to diverge from the majority’s view.  I am particularly 
concerned 
that 
the 
majority’s 
interpretation 
may 
expose 
defendants to illegal sentences.  If a court imposes a sentence 
in excess of the maximum authorized by law, it is an illegal 
sentence.  Wis. Stat. § 973.13.  Although this case does not 
                                                 
1 The majority also relies on the continued vitality of 
Ashford v. Division of Hearings and Appeals, 177 Wis. 2d 34, 501 
N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1993), for its determination. Majority op., 
¶47. I do not dispute the holding of Ashford. Rather, Ashford 
concerned the treatment of consecutive periods of parole that, 
according to the statute, were to be treated as one continuous 
sentence. Id. at 39-40. Here, the statute is silent as to how to 
treat periods of parole served consecutively with periods of 
extended supervision. Thus, Ashford is inapplicable.  
No.  2005AP1487.awb 
 
7 
 
represent an illegal sentence, the majority’s analysis allows 
for illegal sentences in other cases.  Let me explain. 
¶68 Suppose a defendant has a pre-TIS sentence and a TIS 
sentence to be served consecutively (as here).  Further suppose 
that on his pre-TIS case, the defendant was sentenced to three 
years incarceration and five years parole. In his TIS case, he 
is convicted of burglary and is sentenced to a determinate 
sentence of seven years confinement and five years extended 
supervision. Burglary is a Class F felony with a maximum 
imprisonment (confinement plus extended supervision) of 12.5 
years.   
¶69 The 
law 
of 
course 
provides 
that 
periods 
of 
incarceration and confinement, even though they may be imposed 
as consecutive sentences, are to be served as one continuous 
period. Wis. Stat. §§ 973.15(2m)(c)2. and (d)2.   All agree with 
this premise. Where we part ways is that the majority interprets 
the gap in the statutory scheme to allow for pre-TIS parole and 
TIS supervision, even though imposed consecutively, to be served 
as one continuous period.  
¶70 In the majority's view, when a person is released from 
the confinement portion of a determinate sentence served 
consecutively with an indeterminate sentence, he or she is 
automatically on extended supervision. Majority op., ¶42. Thus, 
a person serving consecutive periods of parole and extended 
supervision will be on extended supervision from the moment he 
or she is released from confinement and will finish serving 
No.  2005AP1487.awb 
 
8 
 
extended supervision at the moment he or she completes both 
parole and extended supervision. 
¶71 In other words, in the above hypothetical, the 
continuous period of extended supervision could be up to ten 
years 
(five 
years 
of 
parole 
plus 
five 
years 
extended 
supervision).  Allowing for extended supervision for up to ten 
years, in addition to the period of confinement of seven years, 
would result in a sentence that is far in excess of the 
statutory maximum for a Class F Felony (12.5 years). The net 
result of the majority’s analysis is that in many instances 
treating the period of extended supervision as continuous with 
the period of parole will result in illegal sentences. 
IV 
¶72 Even if the majority opinion is contrary to clear 
legislative history, and may result in illegal sentences, what 
difference does it make whether parole and extended supervision 
are two separate periods or combined into one continuous period 
of supervision?  After all, the total length of combined 
sentences will remain the same. 
¶73 What difference does it make that in August 2001, when 
Thomas was released from prison,2 he was placed solely on parole 
to be followed by a consecutive period of extended supervision 
rather than being placed on both at the same time? 
                                                 
2 Thomas was released after having served in the Challenge 
Incarceration 
Program. 
Neither 
party 
contends 
that 
his 
participation in that program or its effect on his sentence 
bears upon the legal issues presented.  
No.  2005AP1487.awb 
 
9 
 
¶74 The difference in result lies in the fact that if he 
was not placed on extended supervision upon release from prison, 
then his extended supervision could not have been revoked when 
he was taken into custody on February 2, 2004, due to an alleged 
parole violation.  If parole and extended supervision are two 
separate consecutive periods, then his extended supervision had 
not yet commenced. 
¶75 As a consequence, if he were serving only parole at 
the time of revocation, then the period of exposure to being 
placed behind bars is far less than if he were serving one 
continuous period of parole and extended supervision. At oral 
argument, the State made the representation that at the time of 
revocation Thomas had two years, 15 days left to serve on his 
parole.  Thus, the potential exposure for prison time based 
solely on revocation of parole was two years, 15 days. In 
contrast, 
he 
had 
eight 
years 
remaining 
on 
his 
extended 
supervision at the time of the February 2, 2004, revocation.  If 
parole and extended supervision are treated as one continuous 
period, then his potential for prison time upon revocation is 
increased by an additional eight years.  
¶76 The interpretation of the majority, which provides for 
greater potential time served behind bars upon revocation, is 
not only contrary to the clear legislative history but is also 
contrary to a basic rule of construction regarding penal 
statutes. It is fundamental that "[p]enal statutes are generally 
construed strictly to safeguard a defendant's rights unless 
doing so would contravene the legislative purpose of a statute." 
No.  2005AP1487.awb 
 
10 
 
State v. Baye, 191 Wis. 2d 334, 340, 528 N.W.2d 81 (Ct. App. 
1995). Reading the requirement that consecutive sentences of 
parole and extended supervision should be treated as one 
continuous period into a statutory gap violates this precept.  
V 
¶77 In sum, because the majority opinion ignores clear 
legislative history, may often result in sentences in excess of 
the statutory maximum, and subjects defendants to greater 
periods of confinement contrary to a basic rule of construction 
for penal statutes, I cannot join the majority. 
¶78 Rather, I would determine that Thomas, who was serving 
consecutive sentences, was serving parole and had not yet been 
released to extended supervision. He therefore could not have 
had 
his 
extended 
supervision 
revoked 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 302.113(9)(am). 
Accordingly, 
I 
respectfully 
dissent. 
¶79 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2005AP1487.awb 
 
 
 
1