Case Title: State v. Mink

Citation: 2004-Ohio-1580

Docket Number: 20011429

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1580.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MINK, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1580.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murders — Defendant pled guilty, waived counsel 
and the presentation of mitigating evidence, and requested the death 
penalty — Competency evaluations sufficient, when — Death penalty 
upheld, when. 
(No. 2001-1429 — Submitted January 13, 2004 — Decided April 14, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, No. 2000-CR-
2900. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J. 
{¶1} In this appeal, defendant-appellant, Scott A. Mink, appeals from his 
convictions and death sentence for the aggravated murders of his parents, William 
and Sheila Mink. 
{¶2} The evidence at trial revealed that in September 2000, Scott A. 
Mink, then 36 years old, resided with his parents, 79-year-old William and 72-
year-old Sheila Mink, in their second-floor duplex apartment in Union, Ohio.  
Mink used illegal drugs while living with his parents.  As his drug use increased, 
his parents set curfew limits and restrictions on the use of his truck. 
{¶3} In early to mid-September 2000, Mink’s parents informed Mink 
that he would not be allowed to join them in their move to a smaller apartment.  
On September 18, William G. Mink, Mink’s brother, asked Mink about his 
moving plans, and he replied, “kind of nasty like, * * * don’t worry about it, I’ve 
got a plan.” 
{¶4} Around 9:00 p.m. on September 19, 2000, Mink and Bryan 
Werling were drinking and smoking crack cocaine at Werling’s apartment in 
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West Milton.  Around 9:30 p.m., Mink’s parents called Mink at Werling’s 
apartment and told Mink to return home.  Mink then departed and told Werling 
that “he had to get home or he wasn’t going to have a place to stay.” 
{¶5} At approximately 10:00 p.m., Mink arrived home.  After his 
parents went to bed, Mink looked for his truck keys so that he could leave the 
apartment and get more drugs.  Mink was unable to find the keys, and after 
realizing that his parents had hidden them, he had a “fit of uncontrollable rage.” 
{¶6} According to his subsequent confession, Mink went into his 
parents’ bedroom sometime after 11:20 p.m.  They were sleeping on adjacent twin 
beds, and he repeatedly hit them with a ball-peen hammer.  The hammer broke 
while he was striking them.  Mink left his parents’ bedroom and returned with 
two kitchen knives and an extension cord.  Mink then stabbed each of them 
several times.  One knife broke during the attack, and Mink left the other knife in 
his mother’s chest.  Mink also strangled his mother with the extension cord.  
Finally, Mink repeatedly struck both parents with two cutting boards that he had 
taken from the kitchen.  After one cutting board broke, Mink reassembled it and 
put it back on the kitchen counter. 
{¶7} Following the attack, Mink washed up and put on fresh clothes.  
Mink then took $7 and a British Petroleum (“BP”) credit card from his father’s 
wallet and took his mother’s Bank One card.  After finding his truck keys, Mink 
left the apartment, went to a Bank One automatic teller machine (“ATM”), and 
withdrew $10 from his parents’ account.  Mink then purchased what he thought 
was crack for $20.  Around 1:30 or 2:30 a.m. on September 20, Mink returned 
home and discovered that the crack was not real.  Mink then took five or six of his 
mother’s tranquilizers and went to sleep. 
{¶8} Mink woke up in the late afternoon of September 20.  Mink then 
moved his father’s body off his bed and laid him on top of his mother’s body, 
which was lying between the twin beds.  He covered the bodies with blankets to 
January Term, 2004 
3 
keep them out of view.  Later that evening, Mink traded his father’s Ford Escort 
to a drug dealer for $50 to $100 worth of rock cocaine. 
{¶9} Around 5:00 a.m. on September 21, Mink phoned James Ornduff to 
ask whether he knew anyone interested in buying a television.  Mink said that his 
“parents [were] out of town and he was trying to get * * * some money up for 
groceries.”  Mink then drove to East Dayton, where he exchanged his parents’ 
television for $30 worth of crack.  Mink also used his father’s BP credit card to 
purchase cigarettes, beer, and a gallon of milk. 
{¶10} Later on the same morning, Mink called Ornduff again and 
requested his help in selling a recliner, a microwave, a couple of pictures, a clock, 
and a watch.  Mink said that his parents were on vacation and that they wanted 
him to clean out the garage.  Mink loaded the property in his truck and transported 
it to Ornduff.  Mink returned home around noon. 
{¶11} Mink’s three sisters and his brother lived in the Dayton area and 
frequently visited and talked with their parents on the phone.  The sisters became 
concerned about their parents after they were unable to contact them on 
September 20.  Around noon on September 21, the sisters drove to their parents’ 
apartment to check on their well-being. 
{¶12} When the sisters pulled into the driveway, they saw Mink entering 
their parents’ apartment.  The sisters then pounded on the front door and shouted 
for Mink to come out.  When Mink answered the door, he would not let his sisters 
inside the apartment and said that he did not know the whereabouts of their 
parents.  The sisters left to notify the police.  As they arrived at the police 
department, which was a short distance behind their parents’ apartment, the sisters 
saw Mink walking to his truck.  The sisters confronted Mink in the parking lot 
and asked for the keys to the apartment.  One of them asked, “Scott, did you hurt 
Mom and Dad?  And he said no.”  Mink then gave them the keys and drove away. 
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{¶13} The sisters entered the front door of the apartment, which opened 
into their parents’ darkened bedroom.  They did not recognize that their parents’ 
bodies were under blankets between the beds.  However, the sisters knew that 
something was wrong because their father’s glasses and billfold were on the 
dresser even though the car was gone.  The sisters left the apartment and called 
the police. 
{¶14} At 12:41 p.m. on September 21, Officer Darrin Goudy, a Union 
police officer, was dispatched to the Mink apartment to check on the welfare of 
the residents.  After talking to the three sisters outside, Officer Goudy entered the 
apartment and found the bodies of William and Sheila lying between the beds.  
Police secured the crime scene, obtained a search warrant, and began collecting 
evidence. 
{¶15} William’s body was found lying on top of Sheila’s body, and their 
clothing and the surrounding floor were covered in blood.  A kitchen knife was 
sticking out of Sheila’s chest, and a cord was wrapped around her neck.  The head 
of a broken hammer, a knife blade, and a wooden cutting board were on the floor 
near the bodies.  The hammer handle and the knife handle were under the blankets 
and sheets on a bed.  Blood spatters were found on a roll of carpet padding 
underneath the bed, suggesting that the victims were also attacked while on the 
floor. 
{¶16} Police found a bloody wood-cutting board on the kitchen counter 
that had been broken into three pieces and reassembled.  An empty microwave 
stand in the kitchen and an open space near a loose TV cable in the living room 
suggested that property had been taken from the apartment.  The police also found 
a pair of bloody sneakers and a bloody tee-shirt in Mink’s separate bedroom. 
{¶17} On September 22, police contacted Ornduff after phone records 
showed that Mink had talked with him a number of times after the murders.  
Police then seized the television, recliner, microwave, two pictures, and a wall 
January Term, 2004 
5 
clock that Mink had transferred to Ornduff.  Additionally, police learned that 
Mink had used or attempted to use his father’s BP card seven or eight times after 
the murders.  The police also located and seized William Mink’s Ford Escort, 
which Mink had exchanged for drugs.  Subsequent laboratory testing confirmed 
the presence of blood on the driver’s-side seat belt and the driver’s-side door. 
{¶18} After leaving his sisters at the apartment on September 21, Mink 
stayed on a farm near Tipp City.  Around 8:00 p.m. on September 24, Mink 
turned himself in at the Tipp City Police Department.  Mink stated that he had 
“done something awful and had woke up in a field somewhere west of Tipp City.”  
Mink was then arrested and taken into police custody. 
{¶19} Around 11:00 p.m. on September 24, Detective Rick Bergman and 
Detective Thomas Peed interviewed Mink about William’s and Sheila’s murders.  
Mink was advised of his Miranda rights, which he waived.  Mink provided 
detailed oral and written accounts of the murders that reflect the facts already 
described.  Mink also gave a videotaped interview admitting his guilt. 
{¶20} Dr. Kent Harshbarger, Deputy Coroner for Montgomery County, 
performed autopsies on both victims.  William was stabbed 13 times, suffered at 
least 13 blunt-force impacts to the head, and endured four blunt-force impacts on 
the rest of his body.  Other injuries on William’s hand, wrist, and lower leg were 
defensive injuries and showed that William had been alive and defended against 
the attacks.  William died from “multiple trauma, which consisted of blunt force 
trauma and multiple stab wounds.” 
{¶21} Sheila suffered nine blunt-force impacts to the head, four stab 
wounds to her chest and back, and 33 superficial stab wounds.  The knife 
protruding into her chest extended four to four-and-one-half inches into her right 
lung.  Sheila’s blunt-force injuries were consistent with blows caused by the 
cutting board and hammer found at the scene.  Sheila also suffered fractured 
bones in her neck due to strangulation and “was alive when all those injuries were 
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inflicted.”  Dr. Harshbarger concluded that Sheila died from “multiple traumatic 
injuries, which include blunt force injuries, stab wounds and strangulation.” 
{¶22} Mink was subsequently indicted on four counts of aggravated 
murder for the deaths of his parents.  Count 3 charged Mink with the aggravated 
murder of William with prior calculation and design, and Count 4 charged Mink 
with the aggravated murder of William during commission of a robbery.  Count 5 
charged Mink with the aggravated murder of Sheila with prior calculation and 
design, and Count 6 charged Mink with the aggravated murder of Sheila during 
commission of a robbery.  Additionally, Mink was charged with aggravated 
robbery of William in Count 1 and aggravated robbery of Sheila in Count 2. 
{¶23} The four counts of aggravated murder each contained three 
identical death penalty specifications:  murder to escape detection or 
apprehension, R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), murder while committing or attempting to 
commit aggravated robbery, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), and murder as a “course of 
conduct” involving killing two or more people, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5). 
{¶24} At trial, Mink waived counsel and pled guilty.  After reviewing 
court-ordered competency evaluations and questioning Mink about his decisions, 
the court ruled that Mink was competent to stand trial, competent to waive 
counsel and represent himself, and competent to waive a jury trial.  His counsel 
were ordered to remain as his legal advisors. 
{¶25} Before the three-judge panel, Mink entered pleas of guilty, and the 
state presented evidence of his guilt.  The panel found Mink guilty of Counts 1 
through 6 and Specifications 2 and 3 of Counts 3 through 6.  The panel found 
Mink not guilty of Specification 1 of Counts 3 through 6. 
{¶26} During the penalty phase, Mink waived the presentation of 
mitigating evidence and requested the death penalty.  After finding that Mink was 
competent to waive mitigation, the court sentenced Mink to death for the murders 
and to prison terms for the remaining offenses. 
January Term, 2004 
7 
{¶27} Mink now appeals to this court as a matter of right. 
{¶28} Mink raises 18 propositions of law for our consideration, which we 
have considered fully.  In addition, we have considered the death penalty for 
appropriateness and proportionality, and we have independently weighed the 
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating evidence.  For the reasons that 
follow, we affirm Mink’s convictions and uphold the sentence of death imposed. 
{¶29} Competency evaluations.  In propositions of law I, II, III, and V, 
Mink challenges the sufficiency of his competency evaluations.  However, Mink 
did not object to any aspect of his competency evaluations at trial and thus waived 
all but plain error.  See State v. Childs (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 56, 43 O.O.2d 119, 
236 N.E.2d 545, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶30} In proposition of law I, Mink claims that the two psychologists 
who examined him were not qualified to evaluate his competency because he was 
receiving 150 milligrams of Effexor, an antidepressant, at the time of his 
evaluation.  Mink argues that only a psychiatrist licensed to prescribe medication 
was qualified to render an opinion on his competence. 
{¶31} Near the beginning of trial, Mink informed the court that he wished 
to plead guilty, waive counsel, and request the death penalty.  The trial court then 
appointed Dr. Thomas Martin and Dr. Kim Stookey, two clinical psychologists, to 
conduct separate competency evaluations to ensure that Mink’s decision was 
“voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly made.”  The trial court ordered these 
evaluations even though the defense counsel disclosed that an independent 
psychologist had examined Mink and had found that he was competent.  The trial 
court offered the defense the opportunity to “nominate” a psychiatrist or 
psychologist to conduct the evaluation, but the defense declined. 
{¶32} During May 2001, Dr. Martin and Dr. Stookey conducted their 
competency evaluations of Mink.  Both Dr. Martin and Dr. Stookey completed 
written reports finding that Mink was competent.  At a hearing, Mink stipulated to 
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the “qualifications of the psychologists and also their findings in the reports.”  
The trial court found that “both the examiners are qualified to evaluate the 
defendant and draw the conclusions and opinions that they draw.”  Thereafter, the 
trial court found that Mink was competent. 
{¶33} R.C. 2945.371(A) provides that a competency examination shall be 
conducted by an “examiner,” defined by R.C. 2945.37(A)(2) as either a 
“psychiatrist or a licensed clinical psychologist.”  The appointment of Dr. Martin 
and Dr. Stookey, licensed clinical psychologists, to conduct Mink’s competency 
evaluations met that criterion.  Moreover, Mink’s stipulation to each 
psychologist’s qualifications and findings now forecloses Mink’s argument that 
their findings were flawed. 
{¶34} There was also no plain error.  Dr. Martin and Dr. Stookey were 
fully qualified to determine whether Mink’s prescription medication would have 
affected his competency.  See, generally, Annotation, Qualification of 
Nonmedical Psychologist to Testify as to Mental Condition or Competency 
(1999), 72 A.L.R.5th 529.  Moreover, review of the competency evaluations 
reveals that Dr. Martin and Dr. Stookey were aware that Mink was taking or had 
taken antidepressant medication and considered its effect before reaching the 
conclusion that Mink was competent. 
{¶35} Dr. Martin’s evaluation mentions that Mink was taking 150 mg of 
Effexor-XR each morning.  Dr. Martin reported that while Mink was depressed, 
Mink indicated that “without the medication (i.e., Effexor-XR), [he’d] be moody 
and reclusive, but with it [he’s] okay.”  Dr. Martin evaluated Mink’s state of 
depression by administering the Beck Depression Inventory (“BDI”).  Mink 
obtained a “raw score of 9 on the BDI, which failed to indicate the presence of a 
depressive disorder.”  Thus, Dr. Martin was aware that Mink was taking Effexor-
XR, discussed the effects of the drug with Mink, and conducted further testing 
that showed that Mink was not suffering from a depressive disorder. 
January Term, 2004 
9 
{¶36} Dr. Stookey’s evaluation did not mention that Mink was taking 
Effexor-XR or other antidepressant medications at the time of the competency 
evaluation.  However, Dr. Stookey reported that Mink was treated for depression 
in early 1999 and was prescribed antidepressant medications.  She also mentioned 
that Mink started heavily to use alcohol and crack cocaine during the fall of 1999.  
Dr. Stookey concluded that Mink’s history of depression was related to his 
“chemical dependency.” 
{¶37} After receiving Dr. Martin’s and Dr. Stookey’s competency 
evaluations, the trial court questioned Mink about taking prescription medications 
before accepting his request to waive counsel and represent himself at trial.  The 
trial court asked Mink, “Are you under the influence of any drugs, alcohol, or any 
other medication that in any way would affect your ability to understand what 
we’re doing here today or what I’m saying to you and to which you are 
responding?”  Mink replied that he was not.  Similarly, prior to accepting Mink’s 
guilty plea, the trial court asked Mink whether he was under the influence of any 
“medication that in any way would affect your ability to understand what we are 
doing here today?”  Again, Mink testified that he was not.  Thus, the trial court 
not only relied upon the written competency evaluations but received Mink’s own 
assurances that his ability to understand the proceedings was not adversely 
affected by any prescription medication that he was taking. 
{¶38} Moreover, Mink’s taking of antidepressant medications would not 
have affected the trial court’s findings on Mink’s competency.  R.C. 2945.37(F) 
provides that a “court shall not find a defendant incompetent to stand trial solely 
because the defendant is * * * receiving or has received psychotropic drugs or 
other medication.”  See, also, United States v. Grimes (C.A.7, 1999), 173 F.3d 
634, 635-636 (evidentiary hearing on defendant’s competence not required after 
defense counsel asserted no more than that defendant was seeing a psychiatrist 
and taking antidepressant medication, was “paranoid” about his lawyers, and had 
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trouble concentrating); Hunter v. Bowersox (C.A.8, 1999), 172 F.3d 1016, 1022 
(findings of competency upheld despite contention that the defendant suffered 
from clinical depression and cocaine withdrawal); State v. Borchers (1995), 101 
Ohio App.3d 157, 160, 655 N.E.2d 225 (defendant cannot be found incompetent 
solely because he is receiving medication to treat depression).  Indeed, a 
defendant may be emotionally disturbed or even mentally ill and yet competent to 
stand trial.  State v. Bock (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 110, 28 OBR 207, 502 
N.E.2d 1016. 
{¶39} Based on the foregoing, we reject proposition I. 
{¶40} In proposition of law II, Mink contends that the trial court’s 
findings that he was competent were flawed because the two psychologists failed 
to examine Mink’s medical and mental health treatment records prior to 
concluding that he was competent. 
{¶41} Dr. Martin requested, but did not receive, Mink’s medical and 
mental health records prior to completing his competency evaluation.  These 
records included Mink’s visit to the Crisis Care Facility in 2000, his three-day 
hospitalization at Miami Valley Hospital in April or May 2000, and his 28-day 
residential drug and later outpatient treatment program at Dayton’s Center for 
Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Services (“CADAS”) facilities in 1999.  
Similarly, Dr. Stookey reported that Mink’s psychiatric treatment records were 
requested but not received prior to her evaluation. 
{¶42} After Dr. Martin and Dr. Stookey submitted their reports, Mink did 
not object that the examiners had failed to review his medical and psychiatric 
records.  Rather, Mink stipulated to the “qualifications of the psychologists and 
also their findings in the reports.”  Therefore, Mink’s stipulation and failure to 
object forecloses his argument that his competency evaluation was flawed. 
{¶43} Moreover, there was no plain error.  R.C. 2945.371(G) requires the 
examiner to file a written report with the court that shall include  (1) the 
January Term, 2004 
11 
examiner’s findings; (2) the facts in reasonable detail on which the findings are 
based; and (3) the findings or recommendations applicable to the issue of the 
defendant’s competency to stand trial.  Dr. Martin and Dr. Stookey’s competency 
evaluations met these criteria. 
{¶44} Dr. Martin’s and Dr. Stookey’s competency evaluations were 
thorough and complete.  Dr. Martin clinically interviewed Mink for five hours 
over a three-day period.  Through these interviews, Mink provided Dr. Martin 
with detailed information about Mink’s family background, his education and 
work record, and the history of his medical and psychological problems.  Dr. 
Martin learned that Mink was treated for depression in January 1999, attended a 
28-day drug treatment program during July and August 1999, was hospitalized for 
alcohol and drug treatment for three days in April or May 2000, and received 
psychiatric treatment after an overdose of Alka-Seltzer Nite-Time medication in 
July or August 2000.  Further, Dr. Martin learned that just a few days before the 
murders, Mink’s family brought him to the Good Samaritan Hospital’s Crisis 
Care facility.  Mink also disclosed that he “never followed through with any 
treatment recommendations” from the hospital or crisis care center.  Thus, Dr. 
Martin had a wealth of information about Mink’s medical and psychiatric history.  
Additionally, Dr. Martin reviewed police reports, witness statements, and lab 
reports from the murder investigation. 
{¶45} Dr. Martin also conducted psychological testing of Mink before 
rendering his opinion on Mink’s competency.  Testing included the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale-3d Edition (“WAIS-III”), the BDI, and the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (“MMPI-2”). 
{¶46} Dr. 
Martin’s 
behavioral 
observations 
and 
mental-status 
examination of Mink resulted in detailed findings.  Dr. Martin’s exam revealed 
that Mink “was oriented to person, place, and time, and manifested no lapses in 
his level of consciousness.”  Mink reported that he did not experience phobias, 
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panic attacks, bouts of unmanageable anxiety, or tactile hallucinations.  However, 
Mink disclosed a history of alcohol and marijuana abuse and mentioned that he 
had smoked crack “at least 3 times a week for 5 or 6 years” and had spent $150 to 
$250 a week to support his “crack habit.” 
{¶47} Dr. Stookey’s competency evaluation was similarly complete.  Dr. 
Stookey interviewed Mink for four hours over a two-day period.  During these 
interviews, Dr. Stookey received a detailed history about Mink’s family 
background, his education, and his employment.  Dr. Stookey learned about 
Mink’s long history of alcohol and drug abuse.  Mink explained that he had 
entered a substance abuse treatment program and had done “fine.”  In June 1999, 
Mink was treated for depression and continued on his medications and 
counseling.  However, in the fall of 1999, Mink started “heavy use” of alcohol 
and crack cocaine.  Additionally, Dr. Stookey reviewed police reports, witness 
statements, and Mink’s videotaped statement to the police. 
{¶48} Dr. Stookey administered the MMPI-2 and the Georgia Court 
Competency Test.  Based on her testing, interviews, and behavioral observations 
of Mink, Dr. Stookey concluded that “there are no symptoms of disordered 
thinking, other forms of psychosis, or mental retardation which would interfere 
with his ability to participate in all decisions relevant to the charges * * *, his 
ability to understand the nature and objective of the proceedings against him and 
ability to assist in his defense.” 
{¶49} Admittedly, review of Mink’s medical and mental health records 
would have resulted in an even more complete evaluation.  However, Dr. Martin 
and Dr. Stookey both conducted thorough and complete examinations of Mink 
before concluding that Mink was competent.  Moreover, Mink does not contend 
that the results of his competency evaluations would have been different if the 
psychologists had reviewed his medical and mental health records before reaching 
their conclusion.  Thus, any error is purely speculative. 
January Term, 2004 
13 
{¶50} Further, the record shows that Mink acted sensibly throughout the 
trial, answered the trial court’s questions in a straightforward fashion, and 
exhibited no irrational behavior.  Under these circumstances, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding Mink competent, since “reliable, credible 
evidence” supported such findings.  See State v. Vrabel, 99 Ohio St.3d 184, 2003-
Ohio-3193, 790 N.E.2d 303, ¶ 33.  Moreover, deference on these issues should be 
given to those “who see and hear what goes on in the courtroom.”  State v. 
Cowans (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 84, 717 N.E.2d 298.  Therefore, we find that 
proposition II lacks merit. 
{¶51} In proposition of law III, Mink argues that the trial court’s findings 
of competency were flawed because his history of depression, his suicide 
attempts, and his hospitalization were not adequately addressed. 
{¶52} Dr. Martin and Dr. Stookey provided the trial court with expert 
advice on Mink’s depression before concluding that Mink was competent.  Dr. 
Martin reported that Mink suffered from depression and was being treated with 
the antidepressant medication, Effexor-XR.  Moreover, Dr. Martin informed the 
court that “BDI [testing] failed to indicate the presence of a disabling depressive 
disorder.”  Although Dr. Stookey reported that Mink suffered from depression, 
she concluded that his history of depression appeared to be related to “chemical 
dependency.”  Nevertheless, despite Mink’s history of depression, Dr. Martin and 
Dr. Stookey concluded that Mink was competent to stand trial. 
{¶53} Dr. Martin and Dr. Stookey also addressed Mink’s history of 
suicide attempts.  Dr. Martin reported that Mink had contemplated suicide during 
the Christmas of 1997, but Mink did not actually attempt to kill himself.  Dr. 
Martin also reported that Mink “claimed that he had not been preoccupied with 
thoughts of killing himself during his confinement in the Montgomery County 
Jail, adding that he had not made any overt suicidal threats or gestures while in 
the Jail.”  Moreover, Dr. Martin stated that BDI test results showed that Mink 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“was not preoccupied with suicidal thoughts.”  Dr. Stookey stated that “Mink 
expressed no spontaneous suicidal or homicide ideation and he denied the 
presence of such when asked directly.  Mr. Mink reported he believes suicide is a 
sin and it is the one sin that cannot be forgiven.” 
{¶54} As discussed in proposition II, the psychologists’ evaluations 
included references to Mink’s earlier hospitalizations relayed by Mink himself.  
Thus, the trial court was also aware of this information before concluding that 
Mink was competent. 
{¶55} There was no plain error.  The defense stipulated to the 
“qualifications of the psychologists and also their findings in the reports” that 
Mink was competent and did not object to any aspect of either competency 
evaluation.  Nor does Mink claim that his medical or mental health records, which 
were not reviewed, included information that would have changed his 
competency determination.  Thus, any claims that Mink’s competency evaluation 
was flawed because it did not include additional information about his depression, 
suicide attempts, or prior hospitalizations are purely speculative.  Accordingly, we 
reject proposition III. 
{¶56} In proposition of law V, Mink argues that greater scrutiny was 
required in determining his competency because he waived counsel and actively 
sought the death penalty.  However, Mink has failed to identify the level of 
scrutiny he seeks. 
{¶57} In Dusky v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 
L.Ed.2d 824, the Supreme Court explained the test for competency: a trial court 
must determine whether the defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and 
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him.”  (Internal quotations omitted.)  The competency standard for 
standing trial is the same as the standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right 
January Term, 2004 
15 
to counsel.  See Godinez v. Moran (1993), 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 
L.Ed.2d 321.  In relation to Mink’s arguments, Godinez holds that “while States 
are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky 
formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose * * * additional 
requirements.”  Id. at 402, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321. 
{¶58} R.C. 2945.37 and R.C. 2945.371 provide procedures for a trial 
court to follow in conducting competency evaluations and determinations.  We set 
forth the test to determine whether a defendant is mentally competent to forgo the 
presentation of mitigating evidence in a capital case in State v. Ashworth (1999), 
85 Ohio St.3d 56, 706 N.E.2d 1231.  Ashworth provides that a “defendant is 
mentally competent to forgo the presentation of mitigating evidence in the penalty 
phase of a capital case if he has the mental capacity to understand the choice 
between life and death and to make a knowing and intelligent decision not to 
pursue the presentation of evidence.”  Id., paragraph two of the syllabus.  
Moreover, Ashworth requires a trial court to conduct an inquiry of the defendant 
on the record to determine whether the waiver is knowing and voluntary before 
deciding “whether the defendant is competent and whether the defendant 
understands his or her rights both in the plea process and in the sentencing 
proceedings.”  Id. at 62, 706 N.E.2d 1231. 
{¶59} The trial court went to great lengths before finding Mink 
competent.  On its own motion, the trial court ordered that Mink undergo two 
competency evaluations.  The trial court ordered these evaluations even though 
defense counsel disclosed that an independent psychologist had already found 
Mink competent.  Thereafter, Dr. Martin and Dr. Stookey evaluated Mink, and 
Mink stipulated to their findings that he was competent. 
{¶60} The trial court also conducted a comprehensive inquiry of Mink 
before finding that he was competent to waive counsel and represent himself and 
competent to waive his right to a jury trial.  Moreover, prior to the penalty phase, 
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the three-judge panel thoroughly questioned Mink before finding that he was 
competent to waive the presentation of mitigating evidence. 
{¶61} We find that the trial court fully protected Mink’s constitutional 
rights in determining his competency.  Greater scrutiny was not required.  Thus, 
we find that proposition V lacks merit. 
{¶62} Guilty plea.  In proposition of law IV, Mink argues that he did not 
enter a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty.  However, these claims have no 
merit. 
{¶63} First, Mink contends that the trial court failed to inquire about any 
medication that he was taking at the time of the plea or determine whether the 
medication had any effect on his willingness to plead guilty.  Mink’s assertions 
are incorrect. 
{¶64} Before accepting Mink’s pleas, the three-judge panel reviewed Dr. 
Martin’s and Dr. Stookey’s competency evaluations.  Dr. Martin’s report stated 
that Mink “was receiving a prescription for an antidepressant agent, Effexor-XR 
(150 mg, each morning).”  Further, Dr. Martin had reported Mink’s statement that 
“without the medication, [he’d] be moody and reclusive, but with it [he’s] okay.”  
Moreover, prior to accepting Mink’s pleas, the court asked him, “Are you under 
the influence of any drug, alcohol or other medication that in any way would 
affect your ability to understand what we’re doing here today?”  Mink replied, 
“No, your Honor.” 
{¶65} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) provides that a trial court “shall not accept a plea 
of guilty * * * without first addressing the defendant personally and * * * (a) 
Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding 
of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved.” 
{¶66} Additional inquiry is necessary into a defendant’s mental state 
once a defendant seeking to enter a guilty plea has stated that he is under the 
influence of drugs or medication.  See United States v. Damon (C.A.4, 1999), 191 
January Term, 2004 
17 
F.3d 561, 565; United States v. Cole (C.A.3, 1987), 813 F.2d 43, 47; United 
States v. Parra-Ibanez (C.A.1, 1991), 936 F.2d 588, 595; cf. United States v. 
Dalman (C.A.8, 1993), 994 F.2d 537, 539 (concluding that district court had no 
duty to make further inquiries about the nature of defendant’s medication and its 
effects when he was questioned adequately about his medications and nothing in 
the record suggested that defendant was not “fully in possession of his faculties”). 
{¶67} During the guilty-plea inquiry in Damon, the defendant informed 
the trial court that, following a suicide attempt, he was taking an antidepressant 
medication.  Damon, 191 F.3d at 563.  However, the court did not ask any 
followup questions about whether the medication had any actual effect on 
Damon’s ability to enter a competent and voluntary plea, and it ultimately 
accepted the defendant’s guilty pleas.  Damon found that the trial court erred 
when “it failed to inquire about what effect, if any, Damon’s medication had on 
his ability to make a voluntary plea and to understand the consequences.”  Id. at 
565. 
{¶68} Unlike in Damon, before the trial court accepted Mink’s pleas, it 
was aware that Mink was taking an antidepressant medication but had been found 
competent. Here, the trial court could reasonably assume that Effexor-XR did not 
affect Mink’s competency, or Dr. Martin and Dr. Stookey would have said so in 
their evaluations.  Moreover, the trial court obtained assurance from Mink, who 
was then acting as his own attorney, that the medication had no effect on his 
ability to understand the court’s proceedings.  Under these circumstances, the trial 
court could properly find that Mink entered a voluntary plea. 
{¶69} Second, Mink claims that his plea of guilty was not knowing and 
voluntary because the trial court misadvised him about the legal concept of 
mitigation. 
{¶70} During the trial court’s guilty plea inquiry, the trial court advised 
Mink of its sentencing responsibilities, and the following questioning ensued: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
{¶71} “Judge Sunderland:  Now, in the event that in any of these 
aggravated murder charges you are found guilty of the primary offense and you 
are found guilty of any one of the specifications to that particular charge, * * * the 
Court, the three-judge panel in this particular case, would then deliberate and 
decide * * * what penalty should be imposed. 
{¶72} “And we’ve been over this with you before, but we’ll go over it 
again, that the burden is on the State of Ohio to show ultimately * * * in the 
penalty phase that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors.  
And if they do that, then the death penalty will be imposed.  Do you understand 
that? 
{¶73} “The Defendant:  I understand, your Honor. 
{¶74} “Judge Sunderland:  Do you understand what mitigating factors or 
what mitigation is? 
{¶75} “The Defendant.  Yeah, I do, Your Honor.  It’s items brought up in 
my defense to possibly offset any aggravating circumstances of the crime. 
{¶76} “Judge Sunderland:  I’m not sure it’s quite in your defense, but it’s 
as an excuse. 
{¶77} “The Defendant:  Right, it’s an excuse, exactly. 
{¶78} “Judge Sunderland:  The defense would be brought up in the trial 
phase, and the excuse would be brought in the mitigation phase. 
{¶79} “The Defendant:  Yes. 
{¶80} “Judge Sunderland:  Let me read you a definition here:  ‘Mitigating 
factors are factors that, while they do not justify or excuse the crime, nevertheless 
in fairness and mercy, may be considered … as they call for a penalty less than 
death, or lessen the appropriateness of a sentence of death.’  Do you understand 
that? 
{¶81} “The Defendant:  I understand that, sir.”  (Ellipsis sic.) 
January Term, 2004 
19 
{¶82} In State v. Holloway (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 527 N.E.2d 831, 
paragraph one of the syllabus, we stated that “[m]itigating factors under R.C. 
2929.04(B) are not necessarily related to a defendant’s culpability but, rather, are 
those factors that are relevant to the issue of whether an offender convicted under 
R.C. 2903.01 should be sentenced to death.”  Thus, the trial court’s shorthand 
definition of mitigation as an excuse for the crime strayed from the proper 
definition of mitigating evidence.  See State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 
201, 702 N.E.2d 866.  However, when reviewed in its entirety, the trial court’s 
inquiry adequately advised Mink about mitigating evidence and did not mislead 
him. 
{¶83} Further, questioning Mink about mitigating evidence was 
unnecessary during the Crim.R. 11(C) guilty-plea inquiry.  Those questions were 
properly addressed later during the penalty phase of the trial.  Before finding that 
Mink was competent to waive mitigation and allowing him to waive the 
presentation of mitigating evidence, the trial court fully questioned Mink about 
mitigation during the Ashworth hearing.  See Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d at 61, 67, 
706 N.E.2d 1231. 
{¶84} Finally, Mink argues that the trial court’s failure to question him 
about the existence of possible mitigating factors, a failure that led Mink to 
conclude that he did not have much mitigation, resulted in a defective guilty plea.  
This claim also lacks merit. 
{¶85} Crim.R. 11(C) does not require a trial court to question a defendant 
about the underlying facts of his mitigation before accepting his guilty plea.  The 
Ashworth hearing was the appropriate forum to address defense mitigation, and 
the trial court questioned Mink about the strength of his mitigation during that 
hearing.  Moreover, Mink does not challenge the adequacy of the trial court’s 
inquiry during the Ashworth hearing. 
{¶86} Based on the foregoing, we reject proposition IV. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
{¶87} Ineffective assistance of counsel.  In proposition of law VII, Mink 
recasts objections to his competency evaluations as claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
{¶88} Reversal of convictions for ineffective assistance of counsel 
requires that the defendant show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient 
and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  Strickland v. 
Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Accord 
State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of 
the syllabus. 
{¶89} First, Mink complains that his counsel were deficient by failing to 
object to the appointment of clinical psychologists to perform his competency 
evaluation, since he was under a physician’s care and was being treated with 
antidepressant medication.  However, this claim has no merit. 
{¶90} Nothing in the record suggests that either Dr. Martin or Dr. 
Stookey was incapable of fully evaluating the effects of antidepressants on 
Mink’s competency.  Moreover, an independent expert also examined Mink and 
informed defense counsel that Mink was competent.  Thus, trial counsel were not 
deficient by relying on their expert’s opinion that Mink was competent, 
particularly since the defense would have shouldered the burden of proving that 
Mink was incompetent.  See State v. Tibbetts (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 164-165, 
749 N.E.2d 226; State v. Seiber (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 12, 564 N.E.2d 408. 
{¶91} Second, Mink argues that his counsel were deficient by not 
objecting to his competency evaluation because the two psychologists had failed 
to examine Mink’s medical and mental health records before concluding that he 
was competent.  We also reject this claim. 
{¶92} As discussed in proposition II, review of Dr. Martin’s and Dr. 
Stookey’s competency evaluations confirms that they were thorough and 
complete.  Both examiners conducted lengthy clinical interviews, obtained 
January Term, 2004 
21 
Mink’s social and medical history, and administered a battery of psychological 
tests.  Contrary to Mink’s assertions, Dr. Martin addressed Mink’s suicidal 
behavior and conducted further testing that showed that Mink was not 
preoccupied with suicidal thoughts.  Dr. Stookey also interviewed Mink about 
suicide, but Mink denied the presence of spontaneous suicidal ideation.  Dr. 
Martin also reported that Mink was taking 150 mg. of Effexor-XR.  Although Dr. 
Martin did not specifically testify as to any possible effects of Effexor-XR on 
Mink’s competency, defense counsel could reasonably presume that Dr. Martin 
would have discussed the effects of antidepressant medication on Mink’s 
competency if they were a concern. 
{¶93} Defense counsel also had the benefit of another independent 
psychologist’s examination that found that Mink was competent.  Under these 
circumstances, defense counsel were not deficient in failing to object to the 
adequacy of Dr. Martin’s and Dr. Stookey’s competency evaluations. 
{¶94} Moreover, there was no prejudice.  Mink has failed to make any 
claim that his medical or mental health records included any information that 
would have changed the results of his competency evaluations.  Thus, it is purely 
speculative whether the psychologists’ review of Mink’s medical or mental health 
records would have made any difference in the outcome of his competency 
evaluations. 
{¶95} Finally, Mink argues that his counsel were deficient by failing to 
assert his rights under international law.  As discussed in proposition IX, Mink’s 
rights under international law were not violated by imposition of the death 
penalty.  Thus, his counsel were not deficient by failing to assert these rights at 
trial. 
{¶96} Based on the foregoing, we overrule proposition VII. 
{¶97} Weighing and determination of the death penalty.  In proposition 
of law VI, Mink argues that the death penalty must be vacated because the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
aggravating circumstances do not outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  We will address this argument during our independent sentence 
evaluation. 
{¶98} Sentencing opinion.  In proposition of law VIII, Mink argues that 
the trial court’s sentencing opinion failed to consider his psychological problems 
as a mitigating factor under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), the catchall factor. 
{¶99} The trial court’s sentencing opinion evaluated Mink’s history of 
ongoing depression as a mental disease or defect under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3).  The 
three-judge panel mentioned that Mink had been treated in psychiatric units of 
local hospitals on two occasions, completed a 28-day residential drug treatment 
program, and was taking antidepressant medication.  However, it concluded that 
neither Mink’s depression nor his substance abuse established that Mink lacked 
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3). 
{¶100} The panel’s sentencing opinion attributed “some weight” to 
Mink’s “ongoing substance abuse” as an R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) factor.  However, 
the trial court failed to mention whether Mink’s psychological problems had any 
mitigating weight as a possible (B)(7) factor.  This was error.  State v. Fears 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 345, 715 N.E.2d 136.  However, during our 
independent review, we will correct this error.  State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio 
St.3d 107, 124, 559 N.E.2d 710.  Thus, proposition VIII is overruled. 
{¶101} In propositions of law IX through XVIII, Mink raises various 
constitutional and treaty-related challenges against Ohio’s death penalty statutes.  
However, Mink failed to raise these claims at trial and thereby waived them.  See 
State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 22 OBR 199, 489 N.E.2d 277, syllabus.  
Also, as discussed below, these challenges lack merit. 
{¶102} In proposition of law IX, Mink claims that his execution will 
violate international law and treaties to which the United States is a party.  
January Term, 2004 
23 
However, these arguments lack merit.  State v. Issa (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 69, 
752 N.E.2d 904; State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 502, 709 N.E.2d 484; 
State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 103-104, 656 N.E.2d 643. 
{¶103} In proposition of law X, Mink argues that Ohio’s death penalty 
statutory scheme violates the United States and Ohio constitutional prohibitions 
against arbitrary and unequal punishment.  These claims are without merit.  First, 
prosecutors have indictment discretion.  State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 
164, 169, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264.  Second, Ohio’s statutory scheme is not 
racially discriminatory.  State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 124-125, 31 
OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383.  Moreover, Mink asserts nothing to show that he has 
been racially discriminated against.  Finally, we have previously rejected claims 
that the death penalty is unconstitutional because it is neither the least restrictive 
punishment nor an effective deterrent.  Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 168, 15 OBR 
311, 473 N.E.2d 264. 
{¶104} In proposition of law XI, Mink claims that Ohio’s death penalty 
statutes are unconstitutional because of unreliable sentencing procedures.  
However, we have rejected these arguments on many previous occasions.  See 
State v. Esparza (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 8, 12-13, 529 N.E.2d 192; State v. Stumpf 
(1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 104, 512 N.E.2d 598; and Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 
172-173, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264. 
{¶105} In proposition of law XII, Mink argues that Ohio’s death penalty 
statutes unconstitutionally fail to provide individualized sentencing because they 
require proof of aggravating circumstances in the guilt phase.  This argument also 
lacks merit.  See Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988), 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 
L.Ed.2d 568; State v. Henderson (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 24, 28-29, 528 N.E.2d 
1237; Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 178, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264. 
{¶106} In proposition of law XIII, Mink asserts that Ohio’s death penalty 
scheme imposes an impermissible risk of the death penalty when a defendant 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
exercises a right to a jury trial.  We also find that this claim has no merit.  See 
State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 138, 22 OBR 203, 489 N.E.2d 795, 
citing State v. Nabozny (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 195, 8 O.O.3d 181, 375 N.E.2d 784, 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶107} In proposition of law XIV, Mink challenges Ohio’s death penalty 
statutes because R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) requires submission of defense-requested 
presentence investigations (“PSI”) and mental evaluations to the judge or jury.  
However, Mink declined a PSI and a mental-health evaluation prior to sentencing.  
Moreover, we have previously rejected these arguments.  See Buell, 22 Ohio St.3d 
at 138, 22 OBR 203, 489 N.E.2d 795. 
{¶108} In proposition of law XV, Mink disputes the constitutionality of 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), the felony-murder aggravating circumstance, because it 
repeats the definition of felony murder set forth in R.C. 2903.01(B).  However, 
we rejected similar arguments in Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 178, 15 OBR 311, 473 
N.E.2d 264; see, also, Henderson, 39 Ohio St.3d at 28-29, 528 N.E.2d 1237; Coe 
v. Bell (C.A.6, 1998), 161 F.3d 320, 349-350. 
{¶109} In proposition of law XVI, Mink argues that language in R.C. 
2929.03(D)(1) is unconstitutionally vague because it gives the sentencer 
unfettered discretion to weigh a statutory mitigating factor (see R.C. 2929.04[B]: 
“the nature and circumstances of the offense”) as an aggravator.  We have also 
previously overruled this claim.  See State v. McNeill (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 
453, 700 N.E.2d 596, citing Tuilaepa v. California (1994), 512 U.S. 967, 973-
980, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750. 
{¶110} We summarily reject Mink’s challenge in proposition of law XVII 
to Ohio’s death penalty proportionality review.  See State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio 
St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 23; State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 
111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
January Term, 2004 
25 
{¶111} In proposition of law XVIII, Mink challenges his death sentence 
because the trial court did not consider all of the evidence of mitigation in his 
case.  However, Mink was found competent to waive mitigation, and thus 
Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d at 63, 706 N.E.2d 1231, applies.  Also, the trial court, 
sua sponte, searched the record for mitigating evidence and considered such 
mitigation before imposing the death sentence.  Thus, we also reject this claim. 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE EVALUATION 
{¶112} 
Having considered Mink’s propositions of law as required by 
R.C. 2929.05(A), we now independently review Mink’s death sentences for 
appropriateness and proportionality.  The evidence established that Mink was 
properly convicted of the death penalty specifications for aggravated murder, 
namely murder while committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery 
under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) and a “course of conduct” in killing two or more people 
under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5). 
{¶113} 
We now weigh the aggravating circumstances against the 
mitigating factors contained in R.C. 2929.04(B).  Mink made an unsworn 
statement but presented no other mitigating evidence during the penalty phase.  
However, the trial court reviewed Dr. Martin’s and Dr. Stookey’s competency 
evaluations and scoured the record for mitigating evidence before sentencing 
Mink to death. 
{¶114} 
In his unsworn statement, Mink told the court, “[i]t has been my 
intention all along * * * to enter guilty pleas on all counts.”  Mink expressed his 
appreciation to the court for accepting his guilty pleas and said, “I do ask for the 
death penalty, to be handed a sentence of death.  And that would be all.” 
{¶115} 
Other evidence that the court considered for mitigation showed 
that Mink was raised in the Dayton area and was the youngest of five children.  
Mink told Dr. Stookey that his mother was a “very forthright person” who “wore 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
the pants in the family.”  She was reportedly a “strict disciplinarian” who was “at 
the same time, fair.” 
{¶116} 
Mink attended Dayton area public schools and graduated from 
Colonel White High School in 1982.  He also completed one year of coursework 
at Sinclair Community College.  Mink never married and lived at home with his 
parents “most of [his] life.” 
{¶117} 
Mink was steadily employed with jobs at Kroger’s for six years 
and Dayton newspapers for six years.  He also worked for a gas company for four 
years until the summer of 2000.  Mink claimed that he quit work because he was 
“using alcohol and drugs pretty heavily.”  Mink also mentioned that he had been 
arrested for driving under the influence in 1997 and for public intoxication about 
eight months later. 
{¶118} 
Mink started using marijuana at the age of 15 and started 
drinking alcohol and using cocaine when he was 25.  Mink said his “addiction 
built over time” until he was using crack cocaine and alcohol on a daily basis.  
Mink also suffered from ongoing depression, which appeared to be related to his 
chemical dependency. 
{¶119} 
Mink was treated for depression in early 1999 at Good 
Samaritan Hospital’s Crisis Care facility and was prescribed the antidepressant, 
Effexor-XR.  During the summer of 1999, Mink completed a 28-day residential 
drug treatment program.  In April or May 2000, Mink was admitted for three days 
to the psychiatric treatment unit of Miami Valley Hospital because of his alcohol 
and drug use.  He was briefly hospitalized in July or August 2000 because of an 
overdose of Alka-Seltzer Nite-Time medication and a couple of Ativans. 
{¶120} 
Psychological testing showed that Mink was in the average to 
high average range of intelligence.  Mink’s verbal IQ was 98 on the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale-3d Edition (“WAIS-III”).  Moreover, Mink did not 
January Term, 2004 
27 
exhibit symptoms usually associated with either mental illness or mental 
retardation. 
{¶121} 
We find that the statutory mitigating factors are generally 
inapplicable here, including R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement); (B)(2) 
(duress, coercion, or strong provocation); (B)(4) (youth of the offender; Mink was 
37 at the time of the offenses); and (B)(6) (accomplice only). 
{¶122} 
We give some weight to the R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) factor, since 
Mink has no “significant history of prior criminal convictions and delinquency 
adjudications.”  However, Mink acknowledged that he had been arrested for 
driving under the influence in 1997 and public intoxication about eight months 
later.  See State v. D’Ambrosio (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 141, 145, 652 N.E.2d 710 
(lack of significant prior criminal record entitled to some weight despite two 
previous DUIs); cf. State v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 306, 754 N.E.2d 
1150 (lack of significant criminal background entitled to little weight, since 
defendant had five previous DUIs). 
{¶123} 
Mink’s history of depression does not qualify as an R.C. 
2929.04(B)(3) factor because there was no evidence that Mink’s condition caused 
him to lack “substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of [his] conduct.”  
See Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d at 508, 709 N.E.2d 484 (defendant’s long-term depression 
did not establish the [B][3] mitigating factor). 
{¶124} 
However, under the catchall provision, R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), we 
give weight to Mink’s history of ongoing depression, his alcohol and crack 
cocaine dependency, and his attempts to address his drug and alcohol abuse 
problems through psychiatric and drug treatment programs.  See State v. Smith 
(2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 424, 447, 721 N.E.2d 93. 
{¶125} 
We also give some weight under (B)(7) to Mink’s cooperation 
with the police and his guilty pleas.  His “willingness to step forward and take 
responsibility for his actions, without any offer of leniency by the state, indicate a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
person who is remorseful for the crimes he has committed.”  Ashworth, 85 Ohio 
St.3d at 72, 706 N.E.2d 1231. 
{¶126} 
However, Mink did not express any remorse for killing his 
parents during his unsworn statement.  Moreover, Dr. Martin reported, “Mink 
informed me * * * that he was not preoccupied with any feelings of guilt or 
remorse about his actions at the time of the alleged offense.”  Mink argues that his 
actions speak much louder than his words in demonstrating remorse.  However, 
Mink’s actions fail to demonstrate remorse.  After killing his parents, Mink stole 
money from them and sold his parents’ personal belongings to purchase more 
crack cocaine and to support himself until he surrendered to the police.  
Nonetheless, Mink appears to recognize that he committed unspeakable crimes by 
pleading guilty, waiving mitigation, and requesting that he receive the death 
penalty. 
{¶127} 
We find that Mink’s history, character, and background provide 
modest mitigating value.  Mink graduated from high school, attended community 
college for about a year, and was gainfully employed for most of his adult life.  
Otherwise, his character offers no redeeming features. 
{¶128} 
Furthermore, we find nothing in the nature and circumstances of 
these murders to mitigate Mink’s offenses.  In order to obtain funds to buy crack 
cocaine, Mink murdered both of his parents while they were asleep by repeatedly 
hitting them with a hammer, stabbing them, and strangling his mother with an 
electric cord.  Mink then stole $7 from his father’s wallet and used his mother’s 
ATM card to obtain $10 to purchase crack cocaine.  Over the next couple of days, 
Mink sold his parents’ furniture and other personal belongings to obtain more 
drugs. 
{¶129} 
Upon weighing the aggravating circumstances against the 
mitigating factors, we find that the aggravating circumstances as to each 
aggravated murder outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  
January Term, 2004 
29 
Mink’s course of conduct and the robbery-murder of his elderly parents are grave 
circumstances.  Moreover, the mitigating evidence pales in comparison to the 
aggravating circumstances of these murders.  Mink’s history and background and 
his lack of a significant criminal record, as well as the other mitigation, are easily 
outweighed by these serious aggravating circumstances. 
{¶130} 
We find that the death penalty imposed in this case is both 
appropriate and proportionate when compared with other “course of conduct” 
murders.  See State v. Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St.3d 365, 2003-Ohio-4121, 792 
N.E.2d 1081, ¶ 145; State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354, 2003-Ohio-1325, 785 
N.E.2d 439, ¶ 162; and State v. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 174, 749 N.E.2d 226.  
It is also appropriate and proportionate when compared with the sentence in other 
robbery-murder cases.  See State v. Group, 98 Ohio St.3d 248, 2002-Ohio-7247, 
781 N.E.2d 980, ¶ 173; State v. Thomas, 97 Ohio St.3d 309, 2002-Ohio-6624, 779 
N.E.2d 1017, ¶ 124; and State v. Hill (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 448, 653 N.E.2d 
271. 
{¶131} 
Accordingly, we affirm Mink’s convictions and sentence of 
death. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________ 
 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, Cheryl 
A. Ross and Johnna M. Shia, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
Gary W. Crim and Frank A. Malocu, for appellant. 
__________