Case Title: In re Hawaii Government Employees Association, AFSCME, Local 152, AFL-CIO and Casupang.

Citation: 116 Haw. 73

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER*##

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

000:

 

 

In the Matter of

HAWAI'I GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, AFSCME,
Local 152, AFL-CIO, Complainant-Appellant-Appel lant

and

AMADOR CASUPANG, Labor Relations Specialist,
Department of Transportation, State of Hawai'i;
LISA DAU, Department of Transportation, State of

Hawai'i; BARRY FUKUNAGA,’ Director, Department

of Transportation, State of Hawai'i; and LINDA LINGLE,
Governor, State of Hawai'i (2004-006),

Respondent s~Appellees-Appellees,
and
HAWAI'I LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, JAMES B. NICHOLSON,
EMORY J. SPRINGER, and SARAH R. HIRAKAMT,?
"Agency-Appellees-Appel ii

 

 

No. 27800

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO. 05-2-1373)

NOVEMBER 13, 2007

  

NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.;
WITH LEVINSON, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY,”
AND WITH WHOM MOON, C.J., JOINS

2M2Nd C1 AON La

of Appellate Procedure (HRAP)

 

 

5 Pursuant to Howas"s Rul
Role 43(c) (1}, Harry Fokunaga (Fukunege), the current Darecter of the

tment of Transportation, has been substituted for Rodney Haragey the
Dizector at the tine this cove was decided by the firat eirevit court

 

 

Dep:
* Pursuant to WRAP Rule ¢3(c) (1), James B. Nicholson, Chair of the
Howai'i Labor Relations Board (HERE), and Saran R. Birekani, NLRB member, hove

been eubstituted for Brion K. Nakamura and ¥athleen Racuye-Harkrich,, HLS
iG menber, respectively, at the tine this case nas decied by the firet

 

 

Chai
cies court

omy
WAWAT'T REPORTS. AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

 

s+FOR PUBLICATION IN WES!

 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.
This case is before us by virtue of our acceptance of a
transfer from the Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA),
Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-58 (Supp. 2006),” filed by
Complainant-Appellant-Appellant the Hawai'i Government Employees
Association, AFSCME, Local 182, AFL-CIO (HGEA or Appellant).
Appellant appeals from the February 21, 2006 judgment

of the first circuit court (the court)‘ affirming the June 30,

 

> RS § 602-58 (Supp, 2006) entitled “Application for transfer to
tthe suprene court,” states as follows

(a) The suprene court, in the manner and within the
tine provided by the roles of court, shail grant an
application to transfer any case within the jurisdiction of
the internediste appellate court to the supreme court upon
the grounds that the case involves!

(2) A question of inperat!

Anmportance

(2) Anvappeal. from & decision of any court or agency

when’ Sppeals are allowed by law:

(a) “Thvalideting an onendment to the state
constitution; or

(B) Determining’ state statute, county
ordinance, or agency rule to be invalid on
the grounds that it wes invalidly enacted
for is unconstitutional, on ite face or as
Spplied, under either the constitution of
the State or the United states? of

(3) A sentence of Life inprisonsent without the

possibility of parole.

(o) The suprene court, in'the manner and within the
tine provides by the roles of court, may grant an
application to transfer any case within the jurisdiction of
the internediste appellate court to the suprane court upon
the grounds thet the case involve:

(2) Alguestion of first impression or a novel legal

question; oF

(2) Tesues upon which there 48 an inconsistency in

the decisions of the intermediate appellate
court or of the suprene court

(c)__The grant or denial of an application for
transfer under subsection (b) thall be Siscreticnary and
shall not be subject to furtner review. Denial of an
Spplicetion for transfer under subsection (b) shall not
Prejudice « later application for a writ of certiorert

 

 

 

oF fundamental public

 

  

 

 

 

 

+ the Honorable Sebrine &. NeKenne presided

2

 
 

"FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*
2005 decision and order rendered by the HLRB dismissing a

prohibited practice complaint (Complaint) filed by HGEA pursuant
to HRS §§ 89-13 (Supp. 2006)* and 89-14 (1993)* against
Respondent s~Appellees-Appellees,” employer and supervisors of
affected HGEA members (Respondents or State) and Agency-
Appellees-Appellees HLRB, Brian K. Nakamura, Enory J. Springer,

and Kathleen Racuy:

 

Markrich, then-members of the HLRE
[collectively, HLRB or Board), for removal of election campaign
materials from a State bulletin board assigned for “Union
Notices.”

We hold that the court’s February 13, 2006 judoment
affirming the June 30, 2005 decision and order rendered by the
Board, dismissing HGEA's prohibited practice complaint is

affirmed, because (1) there was no constitutional violation of

+ this section identities "prohibited practices” and is discussed

© Rs § 99-14 states:

Any controversy concernii
subaitted to the board in the
fect ss provides in section 37

prohibited practices may be
sme manner and with the same
provides that the beard

 

 

      

SguLroversy except that nothing herein shall preclude
(2) ‘the institution of appropriste proceedings in circuit
court pursuant to section é9i2(e) oF (2) the Judicial
Feview of cecisions or orders of the board in prohibited
practice controversies in accordance with section 377-9 and
Chapter 91. All references in section 377-8 to claber
organizaticn” shall include employee organizet ion,

 

(Ephasis added.)

> Respondent s-Appellees-Appellees are Anador Cesupang (Cesupeng!,
Labor Relations Specialist, Deportrent of frensportetion (O0Tl,, state of

Howei'i; Lise Deu (bev), DOT, state of Manali; Berry Fukonage, Director, DOT,
‘ate of Hawai'i; and Linda Lingle (Lingle), Governor, State of hawaii,

 

 

 

3
‘*+4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAMAZ'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER**+

the free speech rights of public employees under the First and
Fourteenth Anendnents to the United States Constitution or
article I, section 4 of the Hawai'i State Constitution, (2) the
statutory rights of public employees to engage in “mutual aid or
protection,” HRS § 89-3 (Supp. 2006), were not violated, (3) the
Board did not exceed its jurisdiction by applying the State
Ethics Code, HRS § 84-13, in this case, and (4) the Board did not

misconstrue the preemption clause of HRS § 89-19 (Supp. 2006).

 

‘The initial relevant facts garnered from the Board’s
“Findings of Fact” (findings) in its decision follow.

2. The HGEA is gn enployee organization, as defined in
Rs § 69-2, [") which represents ail white-coller
Ronsupervisory State employees in bargaining unit (80)
03. The Union wae certified by the Board's
predecessor, the Hawsi't Public Employment Relation
Board, as the exclusive representative of BU 03 on
April’ 3, 1972.

2, Einoval is the covernor of the state, and the public
‘gaplever, a9 defined in TRS § 89-2, of State employees
ine 08.0)

 

 

     

teriosd, MRS 8 892 (SuRP. 2006) defines an “employes organization” as

 

[Any ergantzation of any kind in which public employ
participate and which exists fer the primary purpose o!
Sealing with public enployers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, hours, amounts of contributions by’ the
‘State and counties to the Hawaii enmployer-union health
benefits trust fund or a voluntary employees’ beneficiary
essociation trust, and other terns and conditions of
‘employment of public employees.

   

 

 

* RS § €9-2 states that an “employer” or “public employer”

means the governor in the case of the State, the respective
mayors in the co counties, the chief Justice of the
Soprene court in of the judiciary, the boore of
Sducation in the case of the department of educstlon, the

be

   

 

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ }OWAI'T REFORTS ND PACIFIC REFORTER#

 

3. Cesussng, in his capacity as DOT's Labor Relations
Specialist and Personnel Management Specialist TV, Day
inher copacity as DOT's Acting Business Manager, and
(Bukunaga), in his capacity as DOT Director, are
seslorated representatives of the Governor and-are
ened to be public enplovers
HRs 89-2,

5.° "Since on or sbout January 1, 1973, the HGEA and the
State have been parties to successive collective
bargeining agreements (Contract [or CBA]) covering BU
(03 employees:

6. At ali tines relevant, the BU 03 Contract provided for
Onion Representation Aights covered in Article 7, and
states in part as follows:

°.

 

‘osting of usual_and_custonery Union
Roticess Complainants Exnibit (Ex-) 15-5,
Dee.

7, Re all tines relevant, the BU 03 Contract provided for
Personnel Policy Changes in Article 4, which states in
pert as follow

 

 

8.
hey be sade except by mt :
Complainant? Ex. 15-4.

€. pra tines selevant. Arvid’ Younoguist (Youngguist),

2 DOT State employee snc nenber of NGEATS BU 03, in.
hss copseity ae ef GEA hop ste s

eng custonsry union notices" on DOI= bulletin board
Sccated on the fourth floor of its office puilaing
consistent with Article 78 of the 80 03 contract {*]
To keep its nenbership informed and educated, the
Union mails materiale to its nenbere, including
Youngquist, in the form of general membership fliers
and steward bulletins, of distributes information at
steward meeting

9. The Union nailed its nenbere cards and {sere of
Selitica! encorsenente and neusletters seting members
Ke suport Desocrats on Hovenber 2, 2004, " Included in
the mailings was an article entitied ~ ~ “Talking
Story with Mufi Hannemann” whom the GEA endorsed for
nayor in the HGEA Publi Enployee, July 2004, Vol. 39

 

"Cs scontinues)
he recresente one of these emplovers or acts in their
‘interest in dealing with public enployees. in the case of
the josiciery, the sdninistrative Girecter of the courte,
shall be the employer in lieu of the chief justice for
Purposes which the chief justice determines would be prudent
Or necessary to avoid conflict.

(Exphasis added.)

 

Article 7E of the BU 03 contract states, "The Union shall be
provided adequate space cn bulletin Beards for posting of Geusl and customary
Union notes.

 
‘S+4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ 8 HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER®

issue; and 4 2004 legislative score card that not only
showed how U.S. House and Senate voted on issue
important to GEA, but also identified candidates that
the HGEA opposed and supported. The Union's purpose
for there neilings was “to educate. [the] nenbers on
why it is inportant to support certain candidates or a
Certain party for their benefit, whether it be salary,
Fetizement, or health benefits.”

10. Sometine before October 14, 2004, Youngquist nosted on
he DOT's. fourth floor bulletin board the following
‘She bet es toarsh cheok bulletin pears the ee

Select besocrate on November fed", 2) 0a

Hubli Explovee, July 2004 Vol, 39 Newsletter that
nelodes 4 letter fron Aceh Executive Director Rossel)

a eigreiele, snd ABA's earl

 

   

x ial Nalans fono. voluse’

Public Workers {UPW] AFSOME, Local 646, AFL-CIO,
Sctobex 2004, Tesue That includes 2 Reoort of the
State oi 5 and 4) 204

[ecislative score card of key vores by the

Youngquist cotained these naterisis from ACER either
Ehroagh the mall of at the steward or union nenbership
ectinge.

11, Qnor about October 14, 2004, Day sax a picture of

bulletin board for Union notices, “bev sought the
Suvice of Casupang about the oppropristenese of having
Eenpaign litersture posted. Casupang advised Osu that
based on the Hawaii ‘state Ethice Commission's
campaign restrictions flier, the 0OT is not allowed to
have compaign Literature on the bulletin boards and
Casupang reccmnensed that Dau meet with Youngquist
about the materials he posted. Dau and Cosupang net
with Youngguist and his' supervisor, Robert M. Unangst
(Unanget) to ciscvse the materials posted. fay asted

Younoauist to renove the canpaian Literature that
included the Gnion‘s colitical endorsenents en the

 

 

 

 

Hannenan™ nex = zr

snolic net be costed based on hex interpretation of
ing Hauari stave ethics Comissiens fier covering’
i Tentnictlans ander tae eee oe

 

HRS § €4-13 (2993) provides in pertinent part that:

No legislator or gnplovee shell use or attempt to vse

the legisistor's or

smolovee's official oasition to secure
Srcrant unverranted privileaee, exemptions, agvantaoee
‘or treatnent, tor oneseli or others: includine

(I) Seeking other employment or contract for

 

 
 

'FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

 

agreed to, Youngquist's request to get an opinion from
the Hswai's State Ethics Commission about the campaign
materiale that Youngquist had posted. (CRA 360-363)
32, Dau and Casupang relied on a bulletin issued by the
Hawai'i State Ethics Connission entitied “campaign
Sestrictions for State Ofticisle snd Scate Employees
THRS chapter 64)” which reads in part as follow
INTRODUCTION: The following restrictions on
sommaion activities are based on [HRS $1-64-12,

‘State Ethics Code, in ceneral, [HRS $1 84-13

reson! neiden
Exesples of Campaign activities, described
below, ‘that violate or may violate the ethics
code Axe for {llustration only and are not meant
to be all inclusive:
STATE CEFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES ¥HO MUST COMPLY
WITH THE RESTRICTIONS: All state officials,
State employees, state legislators, and state
board snd conmiteion nenbers. State justices
and judges are not subject to the Jurisdiction
Of the State Ethics Conmiseion, but are subject
fo the Commission on Judicial Conduct:
CHPATGN RESTRICTIONS
{THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES BY STATE OFFICIALS ND
STATE GLOVES VIOLATE THE STATE ETHICS CODE!
1. Using state tine, equipment{,) supplies,
of state preaises for campaign activities
OF canpaion Porpo

 

 

 

 

state pri

 

f State
Prenises or facslities that are available to the
Public for use (e.g., for holding meetings or
Eondueting business) may also be used for,
Ssnpaign activities on the same basis as the
facilities are available to the public.

 

 

 

BC... continved)
services for one
of the
position

(2) Recepeing, receiving, or soliciting compensation
of cther consideraticn for the performance of
the legislator's or employee's official duties
or vesponeibilities except ss provided by Lew.

(2) Using state tine, equipnent or ether facilities
for private business purposes:

(4) Solieiting, selling, or otherwise engaging in a
substantial financisi transaction with &
Suberdinate or 2 person or business whom the
legislator or enployee inspects or supervises in
the legislator's or employee's official
capacity

 

oF attenpted use
egislater's or employee's office or

  

 

 

 

 

(Emphases added.)
 

‘*++fOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS A] PACIFIC REPORTER:

 

Campaign activities or campaign purposes
include: (3) selling, purchasing, or
distributing campaign fundraiser tickets,
including complimentary tickets; (b)- conducting
‘campaign meetings; (c) distributina campaign

erature snd materials; (a) soliciting
campaign assistance or support; or (g) oroducing
fanbaign literature or sateriais or storing such
materiale.

ial" By letter dated october 18, 2004, Unangst forwarded
‘the campaign materials to the Hawai state Ethics
Commission, and asked for an opinion as to whether the
Sgtate is within our righte te poll such items off the
board or should we put them back opi")

as. ‘oot nf

shat he sas freeto continue coating any and all NCEA
saterisis on D0f"s Dolletin board that did not _include

‘Sambaidn materiale; Day or Unanost did not review or
‘Soprove Younoauiet"s subsequent postings ef Seual and
‘Sustoman union notices orior to posting. And

re was gone earlier discussicne on oF
24 with Youngguist about Dau or Unangst
Feviewing the postings, that did not occur.

  

 

 

(Emphases added.) (Boldfaced font in original.)
‘The bulletin board was described as “shared” and “one
continuous bulletin board” in the court transcript. However, in
the exhibits it appears that a separate partitioned portion of
the bulletin board is designated for “Union Notices.” It also
appears that adjacent to the Union Notices portion of the
bulletin board, is an employee section which includes such itens

as “minimum wage,” health and safety, and “Job” information.

the Letter stated

Richa! Here are the stens chat were post
Hleor hallway enployee bulletin bosrd.
et me know if the state 1s within our rights te pull such
itens off the boara or should we put then back vp!

   

Please expedite these matters within reason.

 

Ae discussed per our 10/15/04 telephone conversation, 1 do
ot wish te incur any regrettable eituation for the State of
Nowais or our employees

  
4ss+70R PUBLICATION IN WEST" INAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS##

Oo

Appellant's October 22, 2004 Complaint stated in

relevant part as follows:

20. By the aforenenticned and other acts and deeds (to be
edteblished at a hearing before this Boerd)
[Rlesponcents (Casupang], Dau, (Fukunaga], end Lingle
willeuily engaged i
inherently destructive conduct which diminished

and inpaited the HGEA as the exclusive
Bargaining representative of (BU) 3 employees
ane penalized employees in (SU) 3 for their
Guereiae of protected concerted activity sn
Slelation of (HRS §5] 68-3(") and 85
Balen.

b. Unlawful discrimination in regard to terms
fof conditions of enploynent to discourage
enbership in an employee organization 19
violation of [#85 §) #8-23(8) (3)

 

 

 

ertog?, MS £ €9°3 (Sopp. 2006) defines the “Rights of enpteyeee™ ae
foLlowa:

Employees shall have the right of self-organization
and the Fight to fem, Join, or assist any expleyee
Srganisation for the purpose of Dargaining collectively
Chiough Fepresentatives of their own choosing on questions
Of wages, hours, and cther terms and conditions of
Gaployeent, including retiree health benefit contributions,

 

 

ine te snstce in lanful, concerted activities for the
ret free ferend nee or

Kn employee ehsil have the right to refrain from any or ali
OF such sctivities, except for having « payroll deduction
Equivalent to regular dues venitted £0 an exclusive
Fepresentative as provided in section 89-4.

 

 

 

(Bapne

 

8 added.)

MRS § 89-13 (Supp. 2006) enumerates “Prohibited Practices” end
“evidence of bad faith” and provide:

 

(a) 2 shail be a prohibited practice for a public
enployer or its designated representative wilfully to:
Ti)” Interfere, restrain, oF coerce any enployee in
the exercise of any right guarantees under this
chepter:

ia)" Discriminate in regard to hiring, tenure, or any
term or condition of enploynent to encourage oF
Giecovrage senbership in any employee
organizatic

 

 

(7) ” Refuse or fail to comply with any provision of
this ehapter{.)

8
 

NAWAE'T REPORTS AND PACIVIC REPORTER*!

SSS

Appellant requested that the Board adjudge Respondent

 

in violation of HRS chapter 89 and order appropriate relief,
excluding but not limited to: “{(a) dJeclaratory relief in favor
of [Appellant]; [(b) a] cease and desist order prohibiting
[Rlespondent(] from engaging in the prohibited practices:

[(c) mlake whole relief for adversely affected employees; and
((d) o]ther ‘affirmative’ relief to ensure full compliance with
[HRS] chapter @9 and the applicable provisions of the (CBAs].”

In their November 9, 2004 answer to the Complaint,
Respondents argued, in pertinent part, that “Respondents complied
with HRS (c]hapter 84, Standards of Conduct (Campaign
Restrictions for State Officials and state Employees).”

On November 8, 2004, Jeffrey A. Keating (Keating),
Deputy Attorney General, had a telephone conversation with
Virginia M, Chock (Chock), Staff Attorney of the State Ethics
Commission (the Ethics Commission). On November 9, Keating sent
a letter to Chock requesting a “written response as to whether
the HGEA is permitted to post campaign materials on the office
bulletin boards, or whether such conduct is in viclation of HRS
lelhapter 94, Standards of Conduct.”

On December 3, 2004, Keating sent Chock another letter
again requesting the written response, and also that he receive
it prior to December 11, 2004, the date prehearing statements
Were due for the Prehearing Conference and Hearing on the

Complaint.

10
‘+e7OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S IDWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS**

on December 8, 2004, Chock responded to Keating’

 

letters. Her letter stated that the matter would be presented to

 

the Commissior

This is in reply to your letters, dated Novenber %
2004, and Decenber 3, 2004, in which you requested # written
Eesponse af to whether, under the State Ethics Code, (HRS
Ehepeer 84], the AGEA ie permitted to post campaign
aterials on office bulletin boards.

‘This ise conplex inguiry to which we cannot provide
fan snnediate answer. I have been inforned by Daniel J.
Meiiway, Executive Director and General Counsel of (the
Ethice Commission (Nollway or Director)), that, based on the
ature of your quest, this matter will require’ extensive
Pecearch, and further, that st will be necessary to present
thie matter to cur Comission for determination. Mr
bolimay estinetes that this process will take two to three
onthe.

‘ir. Moliwey 4s currently out of town and will contact
you when he returns. Thank you for your patience in this

 

on December 21 and 23, 2004, the Board held hearings
where “both parties were afforded [a] full opportunity to present
evidence and argument before the Board.” Respondents Dau and
Casupang testified, Sanford Chun, an HGEA field officer,
testified for Appellants, as did Unangst. At the hearing,
Mollway testified as to the bulletin the Ethics Commission had
developed pursuant to the Fair Treatment Section of the State
Ethics Code, HRS § 84-13.

Thereafter, on January 3, 2008, Mollay sent Keating @
letter which steted in part that “state officials and employees
are barred by HRS section @4-13 of the State Ethics Code from
placing political campaign materials on state office bulletin
boards.” Additionally, Mollway indicated the matter would not be

submitted to the Ethics Commission:

a
 

'FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#*

Finally, ina letter trom our office to you dated Decenber
8, 2004, T'indicated that this aatter was complex end wood
eed to'be taken to the State Ethics Commission for an
opinion, ‘which I indicated might teke several months to
issue. ‘However, after considering this matter {ron the tine
of Lee inception in October, and in depth after Decenber &,
At is my belief that the above epinion falls within prior
Commission rulings regerding canpeigning and the vee of
state resources, and this I believe this ierter can be
issued at this tine,

    

Nollvay's written opinion was submitted as an exhibit by
Respondents and referenced in the Board's decision.

Respondents filed a Notion to Re-open Record on
January 24, 2005, and Appellant filed a Menorandum in Opposition
to Respondents’ Motion to Reopen Record on January 31, 2005. on
February 2, 2005, the Board denied Respondents’ motion, and on
April 4, 2005, both parties filed post hearing briefs with the
Board.

On dune 30, 2005, the Board dismissed Appellant’ s
Complaint. Relevant to its “Conclusions of Law” (conclusions)
were the following findings:

a3. nai oun en on an

wien Dau aeked Youngauist to renove the cambaien

‘au isa nenber of the sane Union 3
Youngquist and she would have asked # nonunion nenber
{0 renove cenpaign materials if posted on the OO?
bulletin board, Furthernore, Dab did not order
Youngquist to renove specific items. Youngguist
selected the naterials and gave then to his supervisor
to send to the [Ethics Commission)

16. ” {oLivayt opined that 9 state enplovee, like

  

ounaaulst, cannct ca ter ata
‘Titeraretarior aut aoe coeiaesa Beate beged bi
Fe hs ‘Unger

the Hawai state Ethics Code, a State officiel cenot
give preferential trestment by allowing @ non-state
exployes to post canpeign naterisis ons state
bolletin poste. Mollusv defined cenpaion seterials as

 

 

wz
‘FOR PUBLICATION IN NEST'S HAMAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERS**

17, based op Mollvay’s interpretation of HRS § 64-13, end

‘2 review of the conpaign materials received fron the
ot, ‘the anien cannet post canpaign materials on stare
office bulletin beards because to do so involves the
bse of state property, which is paid for by the
taxpayers, and the state property would constitute a
state reecurce that is controlled by a state official,
Therefore, « state official violates the Hawari State
Ethics Code wien he or she allows state resources to
be used for campaign purpos

a8. rity finde th

 

 

 

 

sgnaaulet’s che tine renovi etter
‘nid notices that contained political endorsenents of
fe cistributed te AER's me Sst

fo -edueste and communicate with ite nenberes oF
‘ghinaed_any conditions of work to require cod faith
bargaining.

8 added.)

 

In the relevant conclusions, the Board declared the

following:

 

2, [Appellant] failed to prove by a prependerance of
Evidence thet Respondents unlawfully interfered with
the Fights of public employees to engage in provected
Concerted activity for "mutual aid or protection”
within the meaning of HRS {]§ 89-3 . ... and comnitted
2 prohibited practice under HRS §§ 89°13(2)(1) ane
i.

3. [Appetlant) faiied to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that Respondents engaged in unlawful
Siscrinination to undermine the Union and deter
protected conduct that was “inherently destructive of
Smployee rights,” and conautted a prohibited practice
Gnder § 85-138) (3)

é ses " see

BRS § Be-15, 16 ine S820

PEEP M nt iis eat

 

 

» ans 6 6:
Public Employment (,]”

sha over a1) statute

  

9 dictates thet Chapter 88, “Collective Bargaining in

‘soncexning this subiect natter and shall preempt al

Souttary local crdinances, executive orders, lealsiation, ox
by the state, ¢ county, or any department 4
) snerading the departments of human resources:

Sevelepeent cr of personnel services oF the civii service

 

(continued...)

13
*0FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER‘

 

of “usual and customary union notices,” which 4s an
existing condition of employment negotiated in Article
2B. s State employees, Respondents, aa well as
Youngquist, are duty bound to comply with the campaign
restrictions set forth in the State Ethics Code as ie
Spplies to the posting on State premises of Union
Botices that contain campaign materials. And, the
Respondents cannot be required to negotiate the
conditions set forth in Article 78 that wold allow
them to act contrary to their statutory duty under the
State Ethics Code

 

(Emphasis added.)

Chairman Brian K. Nakamura dissented fron the Board

decision and opined:

By ite decision the majority condones the rights
of managenent to censor on the basis of content onion
enber communications on a matter of Utmost importance

inva forum contractully dedicated to such

‘communication,

RS § 89-3 protects the rights of a union and ste
enbership to engage in "concerted activity for mutwal aid
(or) "protection." The Suprene Court hae held that this,
Fight encenparees the workplace dietribution of & union
newsletter urging nenbers to register to vote and to svete
to defeat cur enenser and elect our friends.”

ZAMIR, 437 Urs. $86 (1976)]. Eastex inveived union
Ccmmunicstions with private employees regarding the somewhat
attenuated political issue of inimon wage legitlation. The
Conmuniestions at issue here were to public employees
Fegarding union endorsements. Elected officsale negotiate,
fond and seninister public workers [CBAs]. they have [the]
Poxer to influence virtually every condition of employment .
fo noid thet communications identifying the workers’ friends
ang enenice rote the right of meaning (sie]- The majority
Ignores the substance and relevance of the communications by
concluding that the enployees rights were net infringed upon
because the newsletters were provebly mailed to ali enion
menbers.. By this reasoning, any right of workplace
Conmunication may be subverted to proof of an adequate
nailing List or rolodex thereby rendering the right ®
virtual nullity.

The rajority also undermines the precedence of
collective Bargaining rights 98 mandated in HRS $ 65-19 and
Ee slecenstrvet the fowai't Guprene Court decisien in (State
rot" Jounel fete 7 es ewe 378,
Sivtpiza see i390) ineretnetter SIRE yo Go sor in erat
decision the {clourt held thet HRS § 66-19 extends only te
statutory provisions of [MRS c)hapter 69 and not to the

 

 

 

 

my

continued)

(Emphases s30ec.)

a4
   

/+POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER'|

specific provisions of the (CBAs) derive(é] therefrom. The
[clourt therefore found the provisions of [HRS c)hapter $2
hot to be preempted by # conflicting provision in the SHOP
{Cia}. In the instant case the provisions of the Ethics
Code ae interpreted by Hr, Mollway stand in direct conflict
hot only with provision of the CBA but with an express
Statutory right of senbership te engage in “concerted
Sctivity for mutual aid [or] protection.” If by its
Opinion, the Bosrd se requiring expreseiy conflicting
TEnguage, ‘then it Le draining HRS § 89-19 of its meaning.
For 2 public worker union, the ability to conmunicate
with sts membership regerding electoral activities goes to
‘olé] the right to engege in "concerted activity
1 aid for) protection.” Like sil citizens, public
ve a right to "vote to defeat our enemies and
i the identification of friends and
to *mutuel ic [or] protection” and such
Comunicstions are protected by [HRS c)hapter 89. However
Neli-intentioned, unilateral management 1imitations on such
Sonsuniestions violate Chapter 69. And however clumsily
Glever, the condoning of such # violation ie wrong.

 

   
 

 

 

 

 

   

 

on July 28, 2005, Appellant appealed the Board's
decision to the court. Appellant raised the same issues thet it
raised in its opening brief to this court. Likewise, the State
responses before the court were substantially the same as the
ones contained in its answering brief to this court. See infra
After orel argunents on January 23, 2006, the court
affirmed the decision of the Board and stated that “the [cJourt

agrees with the Board for reasons stated in that opinion... .

 

Although st does not appear that the First Anendrent issue, sae
intra, wee raised Before the Board, Respondents do not argue that it cannot be
‘Srgued before thie court. It appears that the court ang this court may
Consider the 1ssue Eased on HRS § 1-14(g) (1) (Supp. 2006), which states that
the reviewing court may

   

affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case with
Instructions for further proceedings: or it may reverse or
nodity the decision and order if the substantial rights of
the petiticner may have been prejudiced because the
Sdninistrative findings, conclusions, decisions or orders
are... in Wiclation of constitutional or statutory
previsicns.

 

 

    

(Exphasis added.)

1s
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS#*

 

The decision of the Board is affirmed.” Thus, the court entered
the February 13, 2006 order affirming the Board's decision and
the February 21, 2006 judgment in favor of Respondents and the
Board and against Appellant.
m.
On appeal Appellant contends that the court’s judgment
affirming the decision and order rendered by the Board

(2) violates the constitutional right of free speech of
Public employees under the First and Fourteenth Anendeent (8)
bf the United states Constitution and [a]rticle I,  [s}ection
4 of the Hawai'i State Constitution{;] (2) infringes the
statutory rights of employees to engage in “mutual aid (or)
protection” under [HRS § 5-3) as construed and applied in
(Enskex/] (2) exceeds (the) statutory jurisdiction of MLAB
which has no authority to interpret ox spply the state
Ethics Code(, HRS § 84-13;) and (4) misconstrues the
preemption clause of Section 89-19, HRS-["]

 

   

 

Appellant requests that the court’s order and judgment entered on
February 13, 2006, and the Board’s decision and order dated
June 30, 2005, be reversed.

qin.

As to agency appeals, this court has said:

csReview of 2 decision nade by a court upon its review
of an administrative decision i a secondary sppeal. The
Standard cf review is one in which this court most deteraine
Whether the court onder review was right or wrong in ite
Gecisicn.’* Sederlund v, Aanin, Diz vot the courte, 96
Newai' 114, ile, ze P.3 1214, 1218 (2001) (quoting Farmer

 

 

‘The State responds that (1) CHGEA's First Avendnent challenge to
Fegerei and State restriction on the posting of canpsign nateriel2 wes
rejected by Burrus t, VeaLiante, 33¢ F.3d 6 (26 Csr. 2003)"s.(2) the Easton
decision 52 inepposite because “the Board found the unien ie free to
Gistrisuce cenpsign materials to its mexbers and hes nesled then to sts
Resbers without interference’; (3] "the union's suggestion that the Soard
Gxceeced sts sutherity 19 without erit, snd there se no willfol violation of
ins Chapcer @8r1' and (¢) "the union niaconeteues the preemption provisions of
MRS Section

 

 

     

 

16
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ WAWAI'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER**#

uz Henin, Dir, of the Court, 94 Hawai'i 232, 236, 11 P.3d
G5, ei (20007) Thrackets omitted). It ic well settled
that **[i]n an eppeai from a circuit court's review of an
Sdinistrative decision, the appellate court will, utilize

Gdentieal standards applied by the circuit court./” Price
ve tonieg Bo. of Asoesis, 17 Hawai's 168, 171, 683 P-2a 629,
632 (2994) (queting

Natural Res.) 76 Hawai'i 259, 264, 674 F.2d 1084, 1089

 

(i990)

when # court reviews the decision of an adninistrative
agency, HRS § Si-14(g) (1993) governs. “[Alppeals token
f¥om Findings set forth in decisions of the [agency] are
feviewed under the clesrly erroneous standard.” Thus, (the)
Court considers whether such e finding is clearly erroneous
in view of the reliable, probetive, and substantial evicence
on the whole record.” Eocalhos v, Kapiolani Med. Cir, for
Hosen «Children, $3 Howei't 116, 24, 997 F-2d 42, 30 (APP.
2000) (citations, internal quotation marks, brackets,
ellipses, and enphasis onitted)«

Ge’ the other hang, “conclusions of law... are
freely reviewable to cetermine if the agency's decision was
in'vidiation of constitutional or statutory provisions, in
excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of agency, or
aifected by other ezrer of law.” v

 

   

 

 

 

dL, 67 Howai'i 191, 195, 953 P.2d 563, 573 (1988). “Hence,
Envagency's.statutcry interpretation ie reviewed de nove.”
Heanini ¥, Akiba, 92 Hawai 75, 78, 996 F.26 260, 84 (App.

2000).
Hoopai v, Civil Serv, Comm'n, 106 Hawai'i 205, 214, 103 P.3d 365,
374 (2004) (footnote omitted).

on questions of constitutional law, “[t)his court

reviews questions of constitutional law de novo, under the

 

‘eight/wrong’ stendard and, thus, exercises its own independent
constitutional judgnent based on the facts of the case.” State
ex rel, Anza v. City & County of Honolulu, 99 Hawai'i 508, 515,
57 P.3d 433, 440 (2002) (citing State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai'i 87,
100, 997 P.2d 13, 26 (2000) (citations omitted)). “Whether

speech is protected by the first amenduent to the United states

Constitution, as applied to the states through the due process

clause of the fourteenth amendment, is a question of law which is

vv
‘s+470R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAL'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER***

freely reviewable on appeal.’” Inte Doe, 76 Hawai'i 85, 93, 869

P.2d 1304, 1312 (1994) (citations and brackets omitted). In

 

interpreting and applying article I, section 4 of the Hawa
Constitution, this court considers the case law established under
the first amendment to the United States Constitution. see,
S.c., Janta Enters., Inc, v, City & County of Honolulu, 107
Hawai‘ 314, 323, 113 P.3¢ 190, 199 (2005).

As to HRS chapter 89, Appellant points out that, “(i]n
its interpretations of chapter 89, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has
found U.S. Supreme Court, federal appellate court . . . and labor

board precedent governing private and public sector labor

 

ations ‘instructive.’ (Citing Haw, State Teachers Ass'n ve
Haw. Pub, Employment Relations Bd., 60 Haw. 361, 365, 590 P.2d
993, 996 (1979); Univ, of Haw, Prof’] Assembly v, Tomasu, 79
Hawai'i 154, 189, 900 P.2d 162, 166 (1995).).
wv.
In regard to issue (1), Appellant contends that “{a]
State agency which creates a ‘designated public forum’ or a
‘Limited public forum’ may not enforce a ban based on the content
or viewpoint of its user without violating the First Amendment.”
(Citations omitted.)
a.
Initially, in order to make @ claim under the First
Amendnent, Appellant must show that there has been a state action

that implicates speech because the state “must respect the

18
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST! IDKAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER**#

EE

commands of the First Amendment” and “[i]t is decades of settled
Jurisprudence that require judicial review of state action that

is challenged on First Amendment grounds.” Ark. Educ. Television

 

Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 693 n.17 (1998) (Stevens, J.
dissenting) (citations omitted). Appellant asserts that “the ban
was imposed by public officials acting on behalf of Lingle, an
‘employer’ as defined in [HRS § 89-2 which] constitutes a ‘state
action,’ Abood v, Detroit Bd, of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 226 (1977),
[and that) implicates ‘constitutional interests’ under the First
Amendment, Perry Ed. Ass'n [v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass'n], 460
v.8. [37,) 44 ((1983)]." According to Appellant, “since the ban
proscribed HGEA publications containing” campaign materials

urging union menbers to support candidates who were sympathetic

 

to union views, “it undoubtedly involved ‘speech’ on questions
over which ‘free and open debate is vital to informed decision
making by the electorate,’ Pickering v. Bd, of Educ,, 391 U.S.

563, [571-]72 (1968).” Finally, Appellant urges that thi

 

vas
state action, in that Dao, Cesupang, and Unangst, designated as
State enployers, required the HGEA steward to remove all HGEA
postings concerning “political endorsement” and to stop future
posting pending word from the Ethics Connission.

‘There is no question that there was state action here
and Respondents do not dispute this. There is also “no question

that constitutional interests are implicated” here, as Appellant

19
 

‘S**FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERS#

SSS
contends. As Appellant urges, “[iJt has long been recognized

that the First Amendment has ‘its fullest and most urgent
application’ to speech uttered during political campaigns.
Buckley v, Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976); Metntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S 334, 346-47 (1995).” Manifestly,
advocating for the election of @ particular candidates is
“speech” and, thus, implicates the First Anendnent.
B.

Regarding public fora, the Court in Perxy first
indicated that in traditional public fora, content-based
exclusions are subject to a compelling state interest linitation.

in places which by long tradition or by coverment

 

 

‘Sircumscribed.—At one end of the spectrum are streets and
rks ansch "have fal aie mE

m assent) neat hte

et secu =

Hague ¥. Clo,
307 0.8. 496, £15 (1938). In these quinteasent ral pubis
Forums, ‘the government nay not prohibit all communicative
activity. 3

exclusion if must ahow that its reaulation 1s necessary to,
Serve 2 conseliing state interest at tise ate

‘Gtann to schlave that end, “Garey-v Brews dP De eee
ser (3980)

 

 

460 U.S. at 45 (emphases added).
Next, the Perry Court explained that in the second
category of public property known as limited or designated public
fora, reasonable time, plece, and manner regulations were allowed
and content-based exclusions were subject to a compelling state

interest standard,

20
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERS*#

 

A second category consists of public property which

Spi
rom 2 forum ceneraliy open

Hepublic even if it wae not required to create che torus

inthe first plsce, Wiswarv. Vincent, s5¢ 0-8. 263 (1961)

(urversity meeting facilities); City of Madison Joint

Shoot biay "ve Wg, Pub. bastoiment Relations Commtae «29

Urs. 167 (1876) (school bosra meeting); Southeastern
Conrad, (200.8. 546 (1975) cmonicipal

theater). Eltnough a state is not rea 2

Reasonable tine, place and manner
regulations are permissible, content-based pronibition
hnust be narrowly drawn to effectuate a conpelling state

Midmar vs Vincent, supra, 4540.5, at 269-270,
Ad. at 45-46 (emphases added) .

Sees 2o-it is boond by th

 

   

‘The Court further noted that “{a] public forum may be
created for @ limited purpose such as use by certain groups,” id.
at 46.7 (citing, s.a., Widnar, supra (student groups)) or it
could also be created “for the discussion of certain subjects,”
Ads (citing, e.g., City of Madison Joint School Dist., supra
(school board business).

Finally, the Court recognized a third category of
governnent property, a non-public forum, where the governnent is
entitled to “reserve the forum for its intended purposes” subject
to reasonable regulation.

Public property which is not by tradition or designation @
forun for public communication is governed by different
Stendaras.” Me that the "Fi

does not cuarantee access to proverty sinoly because it is
‘suned or controlled by the ocvernnent." .8. Postal Serv
2a Greenburan Civic Ass'n, 453 U-S, [il4,) 123 {0S80)]- In
Sddition to time, place, nd manner regulations, the state

hay reserve the forun for its intended purposes:

eect stiore to

 

 

 

soenter's view. Id st 131 2.7. Ae we have stated on
Several cccsions, “the State, fo less than # private omer
ef property, har power to preserve the property under ite

 

 

 

2a
‘+470R PUBLICATION IH MEST’ HAWAI'I REFORTS 2X PACIFIC REPORTER*#*

 

control for the
(et) 129; Greer v. scock,
wi Bierida, 305 0-3. 35,

je to which it is lawfully dedicated." Ids
24 U.S. 628, 636 (1876); Adderley
ase}

  

Berry, 460 U.S. at 46 (emphases added).
v.
ES

Appellant appears to argue that the union bulletin
board in this case constituted either a traditional public forum
or @ designated or limited public forum. However, the bulletin
board did not constitute @ traditional public forum. There was
no evidence indicating that union bulletin boards are “places
which by long tradition or public fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate.” Id. at 45. The union bulletin board is
not markedly similar to the “streets or parks which have
inmenorially been held in trust for the use of the public{.]”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus,
union bulletin boards would not fall into the category of public
fora.

As to the contention that the union bulletin board
constitutes a designated public forum, Appellant maintains that
‘the “union bulletin boards axe authorized ae 2 forum for
expressive activity for public employees and their
representatives by statute in [HRS § 89-3), by contract in
Section 78, and by undisputed past practice and custom of the
parties.” Specifically, Appellant asserts that “(t]he agreenent

refers to the union bulletin board as a ‘union representation

22
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPCRTER***
right,’ and it mandates that ‘adequate space’ be provided for

 

‘posting of usual and customary union notices(,J’" “[t]here is
unrebutted testimony in this case that HGEA hes historically used
the union bulletin boards to endorse candidates for public office
and to publish their views on concerns impacting on public
employee wages, benefits, and working conditions for decades{,}”
and thus, “the union bulletin boards are designated forum or
Limited public forum(.]*

Even assuming, arquendo, Appellant’s arguments are all
true, Appellant sets forth no argument indicating how @ union
bulletin board, open only for that union's use, constitutes @
designated public forum. Although Appellant points to the
contract provision allowing the EGBA use of the board and to the
historical practice of HGEA’S use of the board, it does not
identify in the record an indication that the board hes been
designated as a public forum and, although “{a] public forum may
be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups,”
ids at 46 n.7 (citation omitted), Appellant does not cite to any
case law in which a designated public forum was created for use
by one group.

B,

The facts of Berry are instructive. Perry involved a
mailing system which permitted messages to be delivered rapidly
to teachers throughout public school district consisting of

thirteen separate schools. Id. at 39. The primary function of

23
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AKD PACIFIC REPORTERS**

the system was to transmit official messages among teachers and
between teachers and the administration. Id, However, the
teachers also used the system to send personal messages and
individual principals occasionally allowed various private
organizations to use the mail system. Id.

Prior to 1977, two unions had represented teachers in
the district and both unions were given equal access to the
interschool mail system. Id, However, after an election, one
union became certified as the “exclusive representative” as
provided for by Indiana lew. Id. at 40 (citing Ind. Code Ann.

§ 20-7.5-1-2(1)). The exclusive representative union negotiated
2 labor contract which gave it “access to teachers’ mailboxes in
which to insert material” and stipulated that access rights would

not be granted to any other “school employee association.” Id.

 

The second union, that hed formerly represented some of
the teachers, challenged its exclusion from the éystem. It
argued that the school mail system had become a limited public
forum through the periodic use of the system by private non-

‘School connected groups and the union’s own prior access. Id, at

 

47. Despite these arguments, the Court concluded that “[t)he
school mail facilities at issue” fell within the third category
of property defined above as non-public fora. Id, at 46. It
explained that the mail systen was not open for use by the

general public and thus was not @ public forum.

24
/“FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S WANAT'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER**#

Te use of the internal school mail by groups not
affiiiated with the schools is no doubt 2 relevent
Goneideretion, 1 by policy or by practice the Perry School
District hae opened ite mail system for indiscriminate use
by the general pablic, then (the union) could justifiably
Srgue » public forum has been created. This, however, 48
not the case.

 

ie be record ‘nalibe
Gublic. «+. Me can only conclude that the schools do

Sliow cone outside organizations such es the YMCA, Cub
Ecoute, and other civic and church organizations to use the
facilities, This tse of selective access does not,

Id, at 47 (emphases added).
c.

Appellant concedes the instant case involves a “union
bulletin board[]* located on a work site at the DOT. There is no
evidence that the bulletin board at issue had been opened up for
public use in any way. As in Berry, the property at issue is

“public property which is not by tradition or di

 

ignation a forun
for public conmunication{.J" Id, Also similar to Perry, there
is no suggestion in the record that the bulletin board at issue
was “open for use by the general public.” Id, at 47. In fact,
it appears that the portion of the employee bulletin board,
labeled “union Notices” was only used by HGEA and was not open to
use by any other groups. As the Supreme Court has noted, “(t]his
type of selective access does not transform government property
inte a public forum.” Id, Although Appellant insists that “the
State created a limited or designated ‘public forum’ for union
postings on workplace bulletin boards throughout the process of

collective bargaining over @ period of more than 30 years{,)”

25.
‘*4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAI'T REPORTS 24D FACIFIC REFORTERS#

 

(emphasis added) for the reasons noted above, there is no
evidence the nonpublic forum was transformed into a limited or
dedicated public forum.
vr.
Appellant relies on Giebel v, Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1162
(9th Cir. 2001), and Searcey v. Crim, 681 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ga.

1988), two cases where the respective courts determined that

 

certain bulletin boards were designated public fora. Both cas
are distinguishable from the present case. First, in Gicbel, a
professor had removed handbills from university bulletin boards
publicizing a former colleague’s speech at an upcoming university
conference. 244 F.3d at 1185. Giebel stated that there vas
“uncontradicted evidence that the university’s bulletin boards
[were] available for use by the public, including persons not
affiliated with the university, ‘to communicate with students and
others at the university’” and “evidence showled) that the
university ha[d) no policy or practice of regulating content of

” Ide at

 

the materials placed on the university bulletin boards
1188 (emphasis added). Thus, that court concluded “the
university’s bulletin boards [were] designated public [fora).”
Id

Similerly in Searcey, @ school board had created a
policy allowing outside groups to present information on
designated school bulletin boards to assist students in making

career choices. 681 F. Supp. at 28. The Atlanta Peace

26
 

   

WOWAT'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

Alliance, “a coalition of individuals and groups organized for
the purpose of providing high school students in Atlanta with
information on careers and educational opportunities related to
peace as well as information to help them make informed choices
concerning military enlistment[,]” id. at €23, brought suit
challenging the school officials’ denial of their request to
present information about peacemaking and military service on the
bulletin boards. Id, at 822-23. The federal district court
noted that the school bulletin boards had been “generally held
open to those who disseminate specific information regarding job
and post-high educational opportunities.” Id, at 828 (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus,
Scearcy concluded that the “bulletin boards constitute(d) public
[fora) for the limited purpose of presenting information
regarding post-secondary pursuits[,]” id., and held that the
school board could not restrict the peace activists from placing
“educational and career oriented” literature on school bulletin
boards, absent a compelling interest which it had not shown. Id.
at 832.

Plainly, both cases are distinguishable because the
bulletin boards involved had been held open to the public for a
designated use, See Giebel, 244 F.3d at 1188 (explaining that
there was “uncontradicted evidence that the university's bulletin
boards [were] available for use by the public, including persons

not affiliated with the university, ‘to communicate with students

27
‘S*4FOR PUBLICATION If WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTERS

and others at the University’” (emphasis added)); Searcey, 681 F.
Supp. at 828 (concluding that the bulletin board was “generally
held open” for job and post-high school education opportunities) .
As noted above, Appellant plainly hes not presented any evidence
that the union bulletin board was available for any sort of
public use.

vir.

In response to HGEA’s first amendment clains,
Respondents rely on Burrus. As the State maintains, “the factual
background in the Eurrus case is strikingly similar to [the]
facts in the present appeal.” In Burrus, the American Postal
Workers Union (APWU) brought suit after it was prohibited from
displaying political materials on APWU bulletin boards. 336 F.3d
at 84. An agreement between the APWU and the United States
Postal Service provided that “[t]he Employer shall furnish
separate bulletin boards for the exclusive use of the Union party
to this Agreement, subject to the conditions stated herein, if
space is available” and “[oJnly suitable notices and literature
may be posted[.]" Id. According to the APWU, it had “regularly
used these bulletin boards to make political endorsements by
separate postings or through a ‘News Service’ that it regularly
posted] on the bulletin boards.” Id.

During the 2000 presidential election between George W.
Bush and Albert H. Gore, the APHU distributed @ poster comparing

the campaign positions and voting records of both candidates.

28
“S+ePOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS##

Jd. As Burrus noted, “[w}hile the poster purported to present
only factual information, the APWU does not seriously dispute
that it was intended to generate support for Vice President
Gore.” Id, After the posters were displayed, the United States
office of Special Counsel issued an advisory opinion stating that
the posting violated the Hatch Act. Id. The Burrus court
agreed and concluded that the publication fell under prohibited
conduct in the Hatch Act, Id. at 90 (citing 5 U.S.C. $ 7324(a)
(generaily prohibiting federal employees from engaging in
political activity while on duty or on government premises)).
Significantly, Burrus also rejected APWU's first
anendnent claims because “interior work areas of post offices are
nonpublic fora” and “these work areas and bulletin boards are

only open to the union, and then only with respect to ‘suitable

 

the Advisory Opinion referred to in Burrus stated:

te Hatch Act (5 (United states Code (U.8.C.))
$5 7321-7326) generally permite nost federal enployees,
Including Unites States Postal Enployees to actively
participate in partisan political nanagenent and partisan
Political canpeigns. Covered employees, however, are
prohibited fro engaging in political activity while on
Suey, dna government office or building, while wearing an

 

 

   

official uniter or using s governnent vehicle. See 5
U.8.c. § 7324.
political activity hae been defined as activity

directed toward the success or failure of @ political party,
Candidate for # partisan political office or partisan
political group. 5 [Code of Federal Regulations (C.f.R.1)
Bora.icl. therefore, covered enployees are prohibited,
Sncng other things, fom displayang cr posting partisan
political posters cr pertican candidates” position
Stetemente in government offices or BuLidings, including
‘union space and bulletin boards.

 

 

 

 

336 F.26 at 64 n.3 (quoting Letter of 10/26/00 from William E. Revkevf,
Aenociate Special Counsel for Proseestion, to Court Wheeler, Attorney, USPS)

 

 

29
‘S*97OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERC+®

 

notices and literature,’ which by any definition surely excludes
material posted in violation of federal law.” Id. at 90-91
(citations omitted). Similarly, in the instant case, the union
contract provides that “adequate space” be provided for “posting
of usual and customary union notices." There is no mention that
the “interior work area()” of the Department of Transportation
has been transformed from a “nonpublic forlum)” into @ public
forum." Id. at 91. Thus, it appears that the union bulletin

board remains @ non-public forum.

 

% Respondents argue that “[t]he prohibitions set forth in the Hatch
Act are analogous to HRS § E(-13." As noted previously, HRS § 64-13 9

that “{nJo legislator or employes shell use of attempt to Use the legisiater’s
for employee's official position to secure or grant onwarranted privileges,
exemptions, advantages, contracts, of trestnent, for oneself or others:
HRS’ § 86-13 provices examples of the above, none Of which mentions politics,
political activity, or any other siniler term,

Appellant asserts in its reply brief that “Eurrus involved federal
‘qxployees [who] are governed by the Hatch Act which expressly prohibits
‘political activity" on the Jeb and at the work place,” whereas, “there {8 no
etch Act in Haweil" and neither “the GEA or the state and county employees,
Ae Fepresente” are feceral employees. Further, Appellant declares thet [ila
Eke proceedings before the [Beard] the State did not raise se 2 ‘defense’ to
the prohibited practice complaint by HGEA the Hatch Act.*7 Burrus te
Gistinguishable because “undisputed evicence in the present case eetablishes
that the State created a “limited or designated ‘public forum”; "Burrus did
not involve selective renoval of postings based on the viewpoint expressed by
4g union over an issue of public importance to state employees”) and Burrus 12
distinguishable because the statute involved here, BRE S 84-13, Le net
“comparable in any way" to the Hatch Act.

Appellant attempts to istinguleh the State Ethics Code by arguing
thst it relates “solely to the conduct ef 2 ‘legielator’ or ‘employee,’ and
imposes no restrictions on union endorsements.” However, Like the hatch Act
whlch prohibits federe! employees from engaging in political activities, ARS S
86-13 has been interpreted te prohibit state enployees from engaging in
political or campaign activities on state premises. See Finding 12, supca
7 (stating that “[ujeing state time, equipnent ,) supplies, or state prenices
for cenpeign activities of campaign purposes” 1s prohibived)

Honever, even if the Hatch Act is not’ applicable to state
employees, Burrus i¢ relevant, Ag noted above, the fectusl circumstances are
Berkedly tiniler to the situation here, e¢ Burrus slz0 involved ® union
desiring to post canpaign materials on unich Bulletin boards. €36 F.3d at 6
Further, Burrus adarecsed the issue of uhether such e prohibition vicleted the
first amengent ané dig a fcrun analysis. Ja, st $1. Thue, Burrus supports =
Geternination that the prohibition against campsign nateriaie would not
constitute a first anentnent violation in the case wnere the Bulletin board
was @ non-public forum and the restriction Mas “reasonable.” id.

    

 

    

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

30
‘se+7OR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS *®

vant.
aA.

Having concluded that the union bulletin board
constitutes @ non-public forum, the remaining question is what
speech the government can lawfully prohibit within a non-public
forum. Relying on Rosenberger v, Rector & Visitors of the Unive
of Virginia, $15 U.S. 819 (1995), Appellant asserts that the ban
wae unlawfully content-based and constituted viewpoint
discrimination, Rosenberger involved a student organization that
published a newspaper espousing a Christian editorial viewpoint.

Id, at 625-26, The organization was denied monies from a

 

university fund created to cover costs of student publications.
Ida at 622-23, In the portion of the case quoted by Appellant,
Rosenberser explained that the government must refrain fron
regulating speech where it is specifically motivated by the
“opinion or perspective of the speaker{.)”

It 4g axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech
based on its substantive content or the message it conveys.
a yr 408 Ui8y 32, 96 972)
Sther principles fellow from this precept.  In'the realm of
private speech or expression, government regulation may not
Pover one speaker over another. Henbers of city Couned) of
1 466 Urs. 789, 804
Ds Diserininetion against speech because of its

 

tisk
neseage ie presumed to be unconstitutional. See Turner
Broads Sve, Inc. v. FOC, $12 0.8. €22, 641-643 (1996)
These Tales Informed our deternination that the government
offends the First Amencment when it imposes financial
Burdens on certain spesters besed on the content of their

 

 

expression
Grine victine sa: 502 Uns. 105, 115 (1991). When the

rencnert more Distant, See B.A.t =. St Paul,
50S 0.8. 377, 391 (1992). Viewpoint discrimination is the
an egregiour fern of content discrimination. Zhe government

 

31
 

es (Berry),
S00 ss, (at) ae UI

Ids at 826-29 (emphases added).

Applying the above principles, the Court concluded that
the university had created a limited public forum and by not
providing funds to the Christian newspaper, the university vas
committing viewpoint discrimination in violation of the first
amendnent. Id, at 837. Although the principles outlined in
Rosenbercer regarding viewpoint discrimination are applicable to
the instant case, Rosenberger is distinguishable from the present
case in that the University of Virginia had created a limited
public forum, whereas in this case, as noted above, only a non-
public forum exists.

More pertinent here is Cornelius v. NAACP Lega] Def, &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985). In Cornelius, the Court
reiterated that governnent may regulate a non-public forum “as
ong_as_the restrictions are ‘reasonable and are not an effort to
suppress_expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view.’” Id, at 800 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46)
(emphasis added) (brackets omitted); see also Berry v. Deo't of
Soc, Servs, 447 F.3d 642, 654 (Sth Cir. 2006) (holding that a
conference room was a non-public forum and that precluding an
employee from holding bible study in the room did not violate
employee's free speech rights because it wes “reasonablel,)" and

“that is all that is required for a nonpublic forum” (citing

22
 

JpoR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S JJAAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER***

a

Comelius, 473 U.S. at 808)). Cornelius reemphesized that

speaker may be excluded fron a nonpublic forum if he wishes to
address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum,
see Lehman, City of Shaker Heichts, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), oF if

he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial

 

benefit the forum was created, see (Berry, supra]." 473 U.S. at
206. Additionally, “[t]he [government's decision to restrict

access to a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable; it need not
be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation." Id.

at 808. Also, the “reasonableness of the (gJovernment’s

 

triction of access to a nonpublic forum must be assessed in

 

the light of the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding

circumstances.” Id, at 609 (determining that it was reasonable

 

for the President to conclude “that @ dollar directly spent on
providing food or shelter to the needy is more beneficial than
dollar spent on litigation that might or might not result in aid
to the needy").
B.
Apparently, because Appellant is convinced that the

bulletin boards constitute, at the very least, 2 limited public
forum, it does not make arguments as to the reasonableness of the

prohibition.” Respondents however, assert that the prohibition

 

% Contrary to the concurrence, gee concurring opinion at 1, the
reference ins Foctsote of the cpening brief toe "reasonable basis test”
Eited'no discernable ergurent ae to why the prohibition itself, i.e, HRS
Sel Gheeecenasles Rather, Appellant rests on the breach of Article
Sen bles the cencurrence acknowledges wes net reised as © point of
(Gone inved. +)

 

 
   

33
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*
is “reasonable and viewpoint neutral.” First, Respondents argue

that “(t]he Hatch Act (] and Fair Treatment provisions of HRS
§ 84-19 bar the display of all campaign materials on state
property by anyone, and are therefore viewpoint neutral” and the
“fair Treatment provisions have been applied uniformly to all
employees, including the Governor, regardless of party
affiliation.”

It is not necessary to examine the specific provisions
of HRS § 84-13, nor is it particularly relevant whether the
Ethics Conmission determined, as Appellants note, that “[HRS
§ 84-13] does not restrict public employees from engaging in
political activities.” It is only necessary that the prohibition
be “reasonable.” See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808.

As noted above, Respondents maintain that a “DOT
supervisor observed the words ‘vote for Mufi Hannemann’ in a
union newsletter posted on the bulletin board designated for
union postings. ‘The supervisor asked a labor relations
specialist whether such postings were allowed,” and “[bJased on
the State Ethics Commission fliers, the labor relations
specialist indicated that campaign literature or materials could
not be posted on State premises.” Further, as Respondents

indicate, “the State Ethics Conmission was consulted, and

 

(continued)

 

It 4s not evident from Respendents' brief how the Hatch Act

provisions would specifically apply in this

34

 
s+070R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
Se

(Mollway] confirmed the rule in HRS § 84-13 barring campaign
materials on state office bulletin beards.” Thus, “in light of
the purpose of the forun[,]” a bulletin board for union postings,
and “all of the surrounding circunstences{,]” id. at 609,
including the Ethics Conmiesion’s bulletin and the opinion of the
Director that posting campaign materials on the union bulletin
board violated HRS § 84-13, the decision to prohibit campaign
materials appears reasonable.” Further, Appellant does not make
any discernible showing that Respondents could not reasonably
draw the above conclusions.

As previously stated, if it can be shown that the
restriction was “an effort to suppress the expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's view,” id. at 800
(citation omitted), then the restriction in a non-public forum
could be unconstitutional, Here, the prohibition was against all
compaign materials, and not simply materials advocating a
particular viewpoint. Further, the Board apparentiy found that
Respondents were not acting to suppress HGEA’s speech by
restricting campaign postings because it found that there was “no
evidence of Union animus." As noted above, we review findings of
fect under the “clearly erroneous standard.” ocalbos, 93

Hawai'i at 124, 997 P.2d at 50. Appellant has not expressly

 

Hae noted above, none of the parties expressly challenge the
Anterpretetion and epplication of BRS § 4-13 by Mellway or his opinion that
the posting of the campaign materials was prohibited by HRS § 64-13.

 

    

35
 

'SFOR PUBLICATION It WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER**

 

contested this finding and has not presented evidence that
demonstrates that this finding was clearly erroneous.” it
cannot be concluded, then, that the postings were renoved
“merely” because “public officials {may have] oppose{d] the
speaker's view.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (citation omitted).
Thus, the restriction against campaign materials on the union
bulletin board was not in violation of the First Amendment.

Ix,

As to issue (2), Appellant maintains that “the right of
employees to engage in concerted action for ‘mutual aid or
protection’ was violated by the state ban{.]" Appellant argues
specifically that the “ban imposed on (campaign) postings and
Publications . . . directly interferes with the statutory rights
of employees under (HRS § 89-3, constituting} unlawful

discrimination in violation of [HRS $§ 89-13(a) (1) and (3)].”

 

Contrary to the concurrence’s discussion, Appellant never reised

as a point of appeal that “the HERD Inposed an uncenstituticnal condition of
exployment upon’ [Youngquist], as an employee of the DOT." Concurring opini
fet 4 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Gee HRAP Rule 2676) {1
(Points not presented in accordance with this section will be disregarded,
except thet the appellate court, at ite option, may notice ® plein error not
presented."). “Any rennent of this issue is subeuned in the discussion in
these Parts Iv through VII1 addressing Appellant's firet point of error. The
Concurrence concedes that the matter it raises was “fairly subevmed within
Uppelient’s} first point of error.” Conevrring opinion at 6. That Appellent
nay have raised this issue before the HLRB or before the court is of no import
Ae appellant fails to clearly identify the Sesue a= 2 peint of sppes!

 

 

 

   

i Finally, Appellant maintains that there “is no compelling state
interest which has been narrowly crawn.” However, because it is concluded
that the bulletin boards de not constitute traditional public fore ef
desiceted public fore, the strict scrutiny test proposes by Appellant is
inapplicable. In order to withstand constitutional scrutiny in ® non-public
forum, 011 that is neceseary is thet the restriction meet the resscnebieness
ang non-suppressive requirenents noted shove:

 

 

 

 

36
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’
To reiterate, HRS § 89-3 defines the “[rJights of

employees” in public employment and states in pertinent part:

Employees shall have the right . . . to engage in lau
gchcerted activities for the nurnose of collective
[iiceining cr ether aurcal sid-or protection, free fom

interference, restraint. or cosrcian. An enployee shel)
have the right to refrain fvom ony cr all of such
activities, except for having a payroll deduction equivalent
to regular’ dues remitted to an exclusive representativ
provided in section &

 

  

(Emphasis added.)

 

ARS § @9-13(a) provides in pertinent part as follow:

(@)_It shall be a prohibited practice for a
public enployer or ite cesignated representative
suitulay te

a) sor,

‘chapters

Discrininete ip regard to hiring, tenure, or any
term oF condition of employment fo encourage oF
Slecourage menberehip in any enployee
organization|-]

 

 

(Emphasis added.)
hppellant’s contention of @ violation of HRS § 69-
13(a) (3) is not supported by any discernable argunent as to how
there was discrimination “in regard to hiring, tenure, or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
menbership in an employee organization{.]” See State v. Bui, 104
Hawai": 462, 464 0.2, 92 P.3d 471, 473 n.2 (2004) (“Inasmuch as
Defendant ‘presents no discernable argunent in support of this
contention{,) . . . it is our prerogative to disregard this
claim.’” (Quoting State v. Moore, 62 Hawai'i 202, 206, 921 P.2d
122, 126 (1996).)). Thus, Appellant's contention under HRS § 89-

13(a) (3) must be deemed waived.

37
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'E REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

 

In regard to a violation of § 89-13(a) (1), Appellant

 

apparently maintains that HRS § 69-3, which recognizes enployees’
right to “engage in lawful, concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, free
from interference, restraint, or coercion[,]” includes the right
to post all union statements, including canpaign materials, as
was purportedly determined by the Supreme Court in Eastex. Thus,
Appellant's argunent appears to be that by banning union

communications of a political nature from the HGEA’s bulletin

 

board at the DOT, Respondents conmitted a “prohibited practice
by “[iJnterfer[ing], xestrain[ing], or coercling] any employee in
the exercise of any right guaranteed under this chapter(.]” HRS
§ 89-23(a) (2).

Appellant further asserts that “(t]he (Eoard’s}
decision totally ignores the established case precedent (s) which

are dispositive of the issue under (HRS § @9-3].” Appellant

 

argues that Eastex controls this issue because, in that case, the
Court found an unfair labor practice where an employer prohibited
“distribution of union newsletters which encouraged employees to
write their legislators to oppose incorporation of the state
‘right to work statute’ into a revised constitution, varning that
the incorporation would ‘weaken unions and improve the edge

business has at the barcaining teble.” (Quoting Eastex, 437 U.S.

at 569.) (Emphasis added.) Appellant points out that, “[iJn

3e
 

‘s0+FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER!

 

Bastex, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an in-plant distribution
of union newsletters by employees in non-work areas urging
employees, inter alia, to vote against opponents of an increase
in minimum wages had sufficient relationship to employee
interests to come within the ‘mutual aid and protection’ clause
of section 7 of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 157).” (Quoting Eastex, 437
U.S. at 572-73.) Appellant further argues that “[t]he holding in
Eastex has been specifically applied to prohibit an employer from
removing union notices from bulletin boards on working premises
in Union Carbide Corp, v. NLRE, 714 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1983).”
The State responds that “[t]he Union’s argument that

the

 

striction on posting of campaign materials on union
bulletin boards violates the right of the union to engage in
‘mutual aid [or] protection’ is without merit and the Union is
free to distribute campaign materials to its menbers.” The State

had

 

also contends Eastex is inapposite because “(t)he Eastex
nothing to do with the posting of campaign materiels on Union
bulletin boards” but instead involved a private company
prohibiting a union from distributing its union newsletter to
Production employees and “[t]he Court held the Union was
permitted to distribute the newsletter to its menbers, in
nonworking areas in nonworking tine.”

Additionally, the State asserts that Union Carbide is
inapposite because it “invelve(d) nonworking areas and nonworking

hours in private employment locations.” It argues that the

39
‘S*4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS 28D PACIFIC REPORTER!

 

instant case is distinguishable because here, “there was no
prohibition against distribution of campaign materials to Union
members, and in fact, the Union concede[d] that the campaign
materials were distributed to its menbers via the mail.” The
State cites to the Board's statement that it “received no
evidence to show that the Union was not able to conmunicate
directly with its general membership through mailings of
political endorsenent cards, fliers, [or] newsletters” for the
proposition that the “one-time renoval from a single State office
bulletin board, which [Youngguist] selected, posted and removed,
[did not infringe} on the Union's ability to educate and
communicate directly with its menbers for their mutual aid or
protection.” Finally, the State relates the Board’s statement
that “the Union steward was informed he was ‘free to continue
posting any and all HGEA materials that did not include campaign
materials’ and the DOT ‘did not review or spprove (the Union
steward’ s] postings.”

In its reply brief, Appellant counters that Eastex is
applicable to postings on bulletin boards and Respondents’
contention that the decision is not applicable “misconstrues the
Eastex holding and ite applicability.”

xr.
aA
In Eastex, officers of a union, “seeking to strengthen

employee support for the union and perhaps recruit new members in

40
‘*+0FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*##

 

anticipation of upcoming contract negotiations with [the]
petitioner, decided to distribute a union newsletter to the
petitioner’ s production employees." 437 U.S. at 559 (footnote
omitted). As Eastex explained, regarding the newsletter:

[Tt] was divides into four sections. The first and fourth
sections urged employees to support and participate in the
Gnion and, mort ly, extolled the benefits of union
solidarity. 7 ind section encouraged employees to.
write thelr legislators to oppose incorporetion of the state
“right-to-work” statute into s revised state constitution
then under consideration, warning that incorperetion would
“weske(n] Unions ané inprov{e] the edge business hes at the
bargaining table.” The third section noted thet the
President recently ped vetoed a Dill to snerease the federal
minimum wage fron $1.60 £0 $2.00 per hour, compared this,
ction to the increase of prices snd protits in the oil
incostry under saninistration policies, and aduonished: "As
working men and women we must defeat oir enenies and elect
burtriende. If you haven't Fegistered to vote, please Go
fo today.”

     
  

   

 

 

Id, at 559-60 (emphasis added).

Representatives of Eastex refused to permit the
requested distribution and the union filed on unfair labor
practice charge with the Netional Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
maintaining that the refusal interfered with the employees’
rights under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Id.

at 560-61.

 

ction 7, like HRS § 89-3, provides that
“[elmployees shall have the right . . . to engage in. . .
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection[.]" Id, at $63 (footnote
omitted). The NLRB found in favor of the union. Id, at $61. On
certiorari before the Court, Eastex challenged the distribution

of the newsletter as to the second and third sections, admitting

a
 

‘S*4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

that it had no objection to the first and fourth sections of the

newsletter. Id, at 561-62.

 

‘The Court explained that the applicable test for
determining whether a refusal to allow distribution of the
newsletter violated the “mutual aid or protection clause” was
(1) “whether, apart from the location of the activity,
distribution of the newsletter is the kind of concerted activity
that is protected from employer interference by §§ 7 and 8(a) (1)
of the [NLRA],” id. at 563 (citations omitted), and if that
answer was yes then (2) whether “the fact that the activity takes
place on petitioner's property gives rise to a countervailing
interest that outweighs the exercise of § 7 rights in that
location[,]” id, (citations omitted).

As to (1), the Court explained “it has been held that

the ‘mutual aid or protection’ clause protects employees from

 

retaliation by their employers when they seek to improve working
conditions through resort to administrative and judicial foruns
and that employees’ appeals to legislators to protect their

at $65-66 (citations and footnotes omitted). The Court also

interests as employees are within the scope of this cla

 

noted that “i]t is true, of course that some concerted activity
bears a less inmediate relationship to employees’ interest as
employees than other such activity” and “(wle may assume that at

some point the relationship becomes so attenuated that an

a
 

{POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’§ HAMAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER**®

 

activity cannot fairly be deemed to come within the ‘mutual aid

or protection’ claus

 

“Id. at 567-68.
However, in analyzing whether the clause was violated,
it stated that “[£]ew topics are of such immediate concern to
employees as the level of their wages” and that “(t]he union's
call . . . for these employees to back persons who support an
increase in the minimum wage, and to oppose those who oppose it,

fairly is characterized as concerted activity for the ‘mutual aid

 

or protection’ of [Eastex’s] employees and of employees
generally.” Id, at 569-70. Similarly here, Appellant’s
materials advocating for candidates who support the union
interests and opposing those candidates who oppose union
interests are protected under Hawaii's “mutual aid or protection”
clause. See HRS § 89-3.
c
Because Eastex answered (1) in the affirmative, it wa

necesgary to reach the second question of “whether the Board

erred in holding that [Eastex's) emplovees mav distribute the

i working are a Fl
honworkine time.” Id, at 570 (emphasis added). The Court
compared the case to Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLAB, 324 U.S.

793 (1945), which had determined that “an employer may not
prohibit its employees from distributing union organizational
Literature in nonworking areas of its industrial property during

nonworking time[,]" Eastex, 437 U.S. at 570-71 (citing Republic

43
‘*+0FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTES

 

 

Aviation, supra), and held similarly that the same rule applied
because Eastex's “employees [also] sought to distribute
literature in nonworking areas of their employer's industrial
Property during nonworking time[,]" id. at 572.

The instant case does not conflict with Eastex. The
campaign materials at issue were posted on @ specific union
bulletin board located on the fourth floor of the DOT's office

building, apparently at the working place. The bulletin board,

 

although designated for union use, was on State premises for
purposes of HRS § 64-13, and Appellant apparently indicates it
was 2 “workplace bulletin board.” Appellant makes no argument
that the materials were only displayed during nonworking hours,
and, thus, the materials appear to have been posted during both

“working” and “nonworking” hour:

 

xr.
a

Appellant argues that Union Carbide construes Eastex as
prohibiting an employer from removing union notices from bulletin
boards on working premises. Union Carbide involved Union
Carbide’s Oak Ridge facilities ‘which employled) approximately
11,000 salaried workers, none of whom (were) represented by a
union." 714 F.2d at 659. During @ “particularly aggressive
representation campaign directed at the [employees,]” several
unions sought to organize some or all of the workers. Id. A

Union Carbide supervisor persisted in removing one union's “open

4“
ss470R PUBLICATION IN MEST’ S HANAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

house” notices from a particular bulletin board. Id. at 660.
‘The Union Carbide court explained that where a company

makes an enployee bulletin board available for employees to use

freely for any purpose, it must also allow employees to post

union materials.

‘The Labor Menscenent Relations Act doce not afford emplovees
ape ae aces in Stee of an eopleier e balletia
Rev, Container Core, cf Aa., €49 F-20 1213 (etn
Sitesi per cortan) Gee lao Husent Services, inca,
20) wL-a-p. 158 (1974): Nevertheless,
Te secs Pee

aterials. + 374
Pree 1¢7 (6th Cir, 196))-— Gf; MLAB
Supra (enforcing N.L.R.B. decision which held thet elthough
inete was no statutory right to use the bulletin bosrd, once
an enployer permitted eccess to 3 company boerd, it could
hot thereafter renove notices or discrininate against an
Cuployee who ported snies notices). The content of such
Rotices is protected by the Act even if abusive and
Tnealting. neh nestn of
Leiter Carriere, AFL-CIO v, Bustin, 416 0.5. 264, 94 5.ct.
Bios ai Leed-2a 142 (1974); MIRE Y, Container Corp., 643)
F.2e'at 121s. Notwith: gy Fowever, is
the employer's legitinate property intereste and concern for
the maintensnce of order: accordingly, where the bulletin
Eoards threaten to becone a battleground for competing
groups”, ion sf the ale is

Ss Yo hold otherwise would "be unduly
Prejudicial to the company's property and nanagenent
Fights.”

 

 

 

 

    

 

Id. at 660-61 (emphases added) (internal citation omitted).

Union Carbide further expleined thet “[t]he employee
right to discuss self-organization extends to the posting of
notices on conpany bulletin boards where, as here, the company
has weived its right of exclusive control over the medium.” Id.
at 661 (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the
Sinth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that “use of the

bulletin boards to post notices of the campaigning union’s open

45
‘S*4P0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER®:

 

house events did not infringe on any legitimate company
concern[.]" Id.
5.

‘The instant case also does not conflict with Union
Carbide. First, in that case, the company had “permit [ted]
employee access to [the] bulletin boards for eny purpose.” Id.
at 660. The State provided the space to the union “for posting
of usual and customary union notices” pursuant to Article 7B of
the BU 3 contract. HGEA remained “free to continue posting any
and all HGEA materials on DOT’s bulletin board that did not
include campaign materials” and those postings did not have to be
“review(ed] or approve[d].”

However, as Union Carbide indicated, a company could
prohibit certain materials where the materials “infringe[d] on @
“legitimate company concern.” Id, at 661. Here, analogous to
the “legitimate company concern” in Union Carbide, the State, as
an employer, expressed a “legitimate” concern with campaign

Postings, inasmuch as supervisors at the DOT believed them to be

 

in violation of statutory law, HRS § 64-13, and the Ethics
Commission bulletin, and there was no Board finding of “union

animus.“

Again, Appellant does not expressly appeal the Board's application
of BRS § 64-15. “Tnusy st se presumed for purposes of this issue thet
Dppellent’s posting of canpeign materisis vicleted HAS € 64-13.

46

 
 

“FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S WANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*#*

 

 

XII.
Appellant does not state directly how Evanston
fichters Res’ 742 v, Illinois State Lal
Bd., 609 N.E.2d 790 (I11. Ct. App. 1993), relates to the case at
hand, but argues that “[t]he issue of whether government can
restrict the activities of a public employee based on a law which
prohibits the employee from using his or her public ‘office and
title’ to promote @ [political action committee] program of a
union during an election campaign was squarely addressed” in that
case. Evanston Firefichters involved members of a firefighter’s
union who participated in a union-created political action
committee (FIRE-PAC) whose “goal was to meet the need for sound
political education and action among the members of Local 742.”

Ids at 792.

 

fore an election FIRE-PAC members engaged in a door-
to-door and telephone canvassing event on behalf of @ particular
condidate. Id, at 792. Members who perticipated were instructe:
not to identify thenselves as city employees but as members of a
political action committee associated with the Firefighters
Aesociation. Id. During the canvas, the city manager received a
telephone call from a citizen who claimed that an individual
identifying himself as a city employee had come to his door
campaigning for a particular candidate. Id, The city manager

issued @ memorandum reminding employees that using their title or

a
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S KAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER!

 

office during political activity was prohibited. Id.

Evanston Firefichters emphasized that the only issue
before it ‘was whether the memorandum constituted an unfair labor
practice.” Id, at 794. The Illinois statute identifying the
rights of State employees is substantially the same as HRS $$ 89-
3 and 69-13(a) (1) and states, in part, that employees of the
state have the right “to engage in other concerted activities not
otherwise prohibited by law for the purposes of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, free from
interference, restraint or coercion.” Id, at 795 (citing Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 1606(a)).

‘The Illinois appellate court ruled that it could not

“accept the Board's conclusion that the mere fact that a city

 

the menorancum stated in pertinent part as follows:

This week I received a complaint that soneone, uno

identified himself as a city enployee, was calling on
dents in their homes to encourage @ vote for a

‘ticular eldermanic candidate. Thet person, if he is in

fact a city employee, violated the Civil Service Ordinance,

the code of Ethice, and the Personnel Rules of the city of

Evanston by using his official city office and title wile

engaging in political activity sfter work hours.

‘The Civil Service Ordinance and the Personnel Riles

both contain the fellowing provision:

“No employee of the City shell engage in political

activity during working hours or while on City

Brenises in any City-conected function, cr use their

Official city office or title while engaging in

political activities (after) working hours.”

The Coce of Ethice provides that

"No nonselective enplcyee shall use the prestige of

his positicn on behalf of any political party or for

any political purpose."

Each’ enpleyee ef the City Je subject to these

provisicns.

   

 

 

609 W.E.2d at 792-83
48
/+FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER!*#

 

employee identifies his position represents a use of his title or
position to coerce or influence another person” and “[t}here is,
in short, no logical justification for prohibiting city employees
from merely identifying themselves as such.” Id. at 797. Thus,
the court concluded that the memorandum was an unfair labor
practice. Id, at 797-98.

Evanston Firefichters is both distinguishable and
quoted incorrectly. First, the circumstances in that case were
markedly different from the instant case as they involved public
employees “canvassing” an area, making phone calls or going door-
to-door, thus campaigning for a candidate outside of the work
premises and not during work hours. As previously noted, the
instant case concerns @ bulletin board on work premises with
materials displayed during working hours.

Further, Evanston Firefighters did not, as Appellant
argues, held that it was an unfair labor practice to “prohibit (]
the employee from using his or her public ‘office and title’ to
promote a Political Action Conmittee . . . program of a union
@uring an election campaign[.]" Rather, that court held that the
nenorandum was not a correct interpretation of the statute to

which it referred. Id, at 798 (cautéoning that the holding w

 

“a narrow one”). The Illinois court stated that “a blanket
proscription against ell city employees identifying their
positions, regardless of the circumstances, is not supported by

the language of the City’s ordinance.” 1d. (emphasis omitted).
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST! KAMAE REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*1

 

Thus, Evanston Firefichters did not, as Appellant suggests,
determine whether such a statute, if it had existed, would be
lawful. In sum, the removal of campaign materials from the union
bulletin board, under the circumstances of this case, did not
infringe on the “mutual aid or protection” clause of HRS § 89-3.
xiv.
As to issue (3), Appellant argues that (a) “the Board

: acted in excess of its statutory authority by interpreting
and applying [HRS] chapter 84, and deciding questions expressly
reserved for the State Ethics Commission instead of limiting
itself to deciding whether there was a violation of [HRS) chapter
89,” and (b) “{b)y substituting itself as the ethics commission
the [Board] usurped the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission,
and created a statutory defense not afforded in chapter 89 or
under [HRS §] 84-13[.]”"

With respect to Appellant’s argument (3) (a), the
Intermediate Court of Appeals has observed that “[aJn
adninistrative agency can only wield powers expressly or
implicitly granted to it by statute. Implied powers are limited
to those reasonably necessary to make an express power
effective.” TIG Ins, co, v, Kauhane, 101 Hawa:

P.3d 810, €26 (App. 2003) (internal quotation marks, brackets,

 

"4312, 327, 67

and citations omitted). The Board has “exclusive original

Jurisdiction” over *[a]ny controversy concerning prohibited

50
 

{FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERY+#

 

practices[.]"” HRS § 89-14. Thus, the Board has express pover
over “Lalny controversy concerning prohibited practices(,]” id.
(enphasis added), and also those powers which are “reasonably
necessary to make [this] express power effectivel,]” Kauhane, 101
Hawai'i at 327, 67 P.3d at 626 (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted) .

Also, the Board is mandated to “{clonduct proceedings
on complaints of prohibited practices by employers, employee:

 

and employee organizations and take such actions with respect
thereto as it deems necessary and proper[.]” HRS § 89-5(i) (4)
(Supp. 2006) (emphases added). The Board is additionally

authorized to

and for the purpose of such hearangs and
Engoiries, scminister cethe and affirmations, examine
cithesses and cocunents, take testineny and receive
fvigence, compel attendance of witnesses and the
Brouction of docunents by the esuance of subpoena:
Snd delegete such powers to any nember of the board or
any person eppointed by the board for the performance
of its fonctions(.)

  

 

 

 

HRS § 89-5(4) (5) (Supp. 2006) (emphases added). Consequently, in
deciding prohibited practice conplaints, the Board is vested with
the power “reasonsbly necessary,” Kauhane, 101 Hawai'i at 327, 67
P.3d at 826 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations
omitted), to effectuate resolution of such complaints. In that

regard, as stated befor

 

it may take actions “necessary and

proper” in the conduct of the proceedings and make inquiries

 

See sunia note 6.
51
 

‘*9FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

 

“necessary” to decide the controversies. HRS $5 €9-5(4) (4) 6
().
xv.

With respect to its argunent (3) (b), Appellant contends
that the Board should have “Limit[ed) itself to deciding whether
there wes a violation of chapter 69.” According to Appellant,
because “([t]here is no reference in (HRS) chapter €9 to [HRS]
chapter €4(,] the [Board] has no jurisdiction over questions of
ethics arising under (HRS) chapter @4, which are expressly
reserved for the State Ethics Conmission under [HRS $) 84-31

[(Supp. 2006)).~* Appellant thus asserts that, “Ibly

% HRS § 64-31, entitied “outies of commission; complaint, hearing,
Getermination,” states in relevant par

 

(2) The ethics coamieeion shall have the following
powers and duties

ia

 

 

formerly holding auch office or emplcynent ag te
che facts see ef

 

he-code Thin eavisory
opinion is rendered within thirty days after the
Fequest is filed with the comission, it shall
bbe ceened that en advisory opinion was tendered
and that the facts and circumstances of that
particular case do not constitute « violation of
the code of ethics. The opinion rendered oF
deened rendered, until anended cx revoked, shall
be Binding on the commission in sny subsequent
Charges concerning the legislator, employee, oF
Gelegate to the constitutional ccnvention, oF
person formerly holding such office or
Gnployment, ho Sought the opinion and acted in
reliance on it in geod faith, unless materiel

Were cnitted er misstated by euch persons
in the request fer an advisery opinien?

 

 

 

  

 

ie” 1 have juxi 1
dngestisition and taking appropriate action on
flleced vieletions of this chester in

‘cont inves.

 

$2
 

FOR PUBLICATION IM WEST

 

Sn
substituting itself as the ethics comission, the (Board) - . -
usurped the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission, and created
a statutory defense not afforded in [HRS] chepter 89 or under
(HRS §) 84-131.]"

In its complaint, Appellant alleged that in removing
the posted campaign materials, Respondents “unlewful(1y]
interfere[é] with the rights of public employees to engage in
protected concerted action . . . , free of interference,
restraint, or coercion in connection with an ongoing dispute with
[ingle]." However, the State recounts that its “sole motivation
in requesting that the HGEA renove the campaign materials from
the bulletin board was to comply with the Hawai'i State Ethics
code{,]" HRS chapter 84. Because the State expressly based its
actions on the Hewas‘i State Ethics Code, the question of whether
there was a prohibited practice violation under the circunstances

of this case, implicated the Codi

 

Accordingly, in exercising its jurisdiction to decide

the Complaint, the Board wae empowered to make such inquiries “

 

H(,. continued)

ce = wi a
allesed violaticn of this chapter bya
si 2 et

B proceeding shell be ceened
Eoneenced by the filing of # charge with the
Etaaiesien ox by the signing of a cherge by
fhree er nore penbere of the comission.
Nothing nerein shell bar proceedings ageinet a
person uho by fra0d or other device, prevents
Eitcevery ef @ violetion of this chepterl.]

(ixphases added.)

53
   

'FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS!

a

it deem{ed} necessary and proper{,}" HRS § 89-5(i) (4), with
respect to the application of the Ethics Code. Thus, during the
hearing regarding Appellant's Complaint, the Board received the
testimony of Mollway,* pursuant to HRS § 89-5(i)(5). In doing
50, the Board was empowered by its authority “to take such
actions with respect" to the “conduct [of] proceedings on
complaints of practices” as “it deem[ed) necessary and proper.”
Id

It should be noted that Appellant did not contest the
Board's receipt of Mollway’s testimony at the Board, before the
court, or to this court. In such a case Appellant waived any
objection to the receipt of such testimony. See Lee v. Elbaum,
‘77 Hawai'i 446, 453, 87 P.2d €56, 663 (App. 1993) (holding that
because “[p]laintiffs’ counsel did not object to [the witness’ ]
testimony until after [the witness] had been questioned on direct
examination, cross-examination and redirect examination” and “no
motion to strike [the witness's) testimony was made until two

days later, after the defense had already rested its case and the

& sicat indicated supra at note 26, the Ethics Commission has
‘ierladiction for purposes of investigation and taking apprepriete action on
alleged viclations' of [ARS chapter S{) in all proceedings consenced within eix
fof an alleges violation... by ain]. « . employee.” MRSS Bé=
(6), ‘In elation to its ieiue (1), appeliant states thet "the Bsard's
reliance on “flyers” prepared by and testimony offered by Mol iwey a
Anepposite. Jurisdiction to determine alleged violations of {HRS § 84-13) se
vested in the State Ethics Comission (nct Wellwey er the HIRE)” ‘How

to teke issue as to this point in connection with
3 may be noted that the Board wae authorized te
inguiry ae it believed reasonably necersary, Appellant aid not
object to receipt of Mollway's testinony, ano Moliway snéccates @ response
from the Connistion would net be fortncening. fea discussion herein:

54

 

 

 

     

    

 

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION 38 MET! HANAT'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER#*#

court had already determined the instructions to be submitted to
the juryl,] . . . [the p)laintiffs’ objection to [the witness’s]
testimony was untimely and was thus waived for appeal purposes”).
Moreover, to reiterate, it is “a prohibited practice
for @ public employer or its designated representative wilfully
to” engage in an act enumerated in HRS § 89-13. With respect to
HRS chapter @9, this court has said that “wilfully” means
“conscious, knowing, and deliberate intent to violate the
provisions of HRS chapter 89.” Aio v, Hamada, 66 Haw. 401, 410,
664 P.2d 727, 734 (1983). Thus, in assessing a violation of HRS
§ 89-13, the Board was required to determine whether Respondents
acted with the “conscious, knowing, and deliberate intent to
violate the provisions” of HRS chapter 89 when it removed the
campaign materials. Respondents assert that they did not act
wilfully, but acted to comply with the Ethics Code. Hence,
again, in order to fulfill its duty to decide the Complaint, the
Board was required to determine the relevance of the Ethics Code.
It follows then, that in order to determine whether @
prohibited practice occurred, the Board was necessarily required
to decide the application of HRS § 84-13 under the circumstances
posed by Appellant's complaint. See also Fed. Trade Comm'n v.
Raladam Co,, 283 U.S. 643, 649 (1931) (“Official powers cannot be
extended beyond the terms and necessary implications of the
grant.” (Emphasis added.)). Because the determination of such

an application falls within the powers accorded the Ecard, the

8s
 

}POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS#*
Board acted within its jurisdiction in receiving evidence

 

concerning the Code.
xvI.

Although an application of HRS § 84-13 was necessary to
decide Appellant’s Complaint under HRS § 89-13, it cannot be said
that the question arose under HRS chapter @4, as Appellant
contends. Appellant filed the Complaint with the Board pursuant
to HRS § 89-19. The Board has “exclusive original jurisdiction”
to determine prohibited practice complaints. HRS § 89-14.
Therefore, the Ethics Commission would net have had jurisdiction
to make such a determination.

Moreover, as indicated previously, in his written
opinion to the Board dated January 3, 2005, Mollway stated that
the prohibition of posting campaign materials pursvant to HRS
§ €4-13 “falls within prior Commission rulings regarding
cempaigning and the use of state resources," and, thus, the

Commission did not need to decide the issu

Finally, ina letter tron our office to vou dated

2508, a 7

 

f intent ea ake #004 hs

,, after consiGering this matter from the
tine of its inception in October, and in depth after,
Decenber 8, bel 7

As noted before, on Octeber 18, 2004, the DOT sent s letter to the
Exhies Commission asking whether the State’ could “pull” the items thee were

sted on the enpicyee Eulletin board or whether if should “put [the items)
Beck up." and on November 9, 200¢ and Decenber 3, 2004, the Attorney General
Fequested = “written responte” on “whether the... campeign materials en the
office bulletin boards” vas a “violation of HAS (c]hapter ly Seanderce of
Conduct." It is not argued that these letters, sent to the Ethics Ceamission,
constituted requests for advisory opinions. fae HRS $ B61 (a) (2)

96

 

 

 
+s+¥OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER**#

 

athe ission dine os ne ani
Ean be issued at this tine

(Emphases added.) Because Mollway indicated his opinion fell
“within prior Commission rulings,” it does not appear the Ethics
Commission would have taken any further action on the matter. It
should be noted that none of the parties expressly challenge the
interpretation and application of HRS § 84-13 by Mollway or his
opinion that the posting of the campaign materials was prohibited
by HRS § 84-13.
XVII.

Appellant relies on LIV Stee] Co. v. Griffin, 730
N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. 2000). In that case, the Supreme Court of
Indiana held that in dismissing an employer's series of alleged
violations of the Indiana Occupational Safety and Health Act

(10sHA) after deciding that the issuing inspector violated the

% de shovld noted, however, thet in a footnote, Appellant states:

 

Substantively, the State Ethics Comission’ s opinions
ineseste that’ (HRS § never intended to “seprive
the individual state enployees of a basic right to
perticipate in political campaigns.’ ‘The State Ethics
Eomeiseton in Asvisory Opinion No. 2000-1 found no violation
Of THRE $ 64-13] when HGEA and other union menbers were
Pereases to attend "infcrmatson and eavestions) meetings’
hele one dey pricr to the elections of 1998 during which
Gnien officials praised s state candidate for re-election
Guring the two our event, and the candisate informes state
employees in attendence that if re-elected, he would work to
get funding for the negctiated pay reises for public

Norkere.

   
 

 

 

Appellent stated the sone before the court. The court made no findings as to
this specific point end, thus, Ey amplication, rejected it. Nevertheless, it
Mould appear that the posting of conpaign materials on e Bulletin board in a
Public Busleing, even though reserved for Unien notices, differs markedly from
Feleasing expicyees to ettend @ unscn meeting st which election matters were
Siecuesed.

   

 

 

87
‘*47OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S OWAI'T REPORTS 8D PACIFIC REFORTER!®

 

State Ethics Code, the Safety Board exceeded its statutory
jurisdiction. Id, at 1257 (citation omitted). The Indiana court
noted that “[t]he Safety Board resolved [the] case by
adjudicating [the inspector) to have had a ‘financial interest!”
in violation of the code but that the Safety Board was not
authorized to rule on the ethics violation. Id, at 1258. The
Gtiffin court concluded that such an adjudication was “within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Ethics Commission.” Id.

That court observed that there were “[a]t least two
policy reasons for entrusting such determinations exclusively to
the Ethics Conmission[.]” Id, at 1259, First, “[1]£ each state
agency were to issue its own interpretations of what, sey,

constituted an impermissible financial inte:

 

t, the standards
would inevitably vary from agency, to agencyl,)” which “would

make compliance unnecessarily difficult, especially for employees

 

who are reassigned among agencies or who may perform
responsibilities for more than one.” Id, Griffin observed “a
sense of such inconsistency . . . where the Safety Board, the
trial court, and the Court of Appeals each tried their respective

hands at interpreting the meaning of ‘financial interest’ in the

 

Ethics Code with varying results.” Id, The second policy reason
articulated, but not directly implicated by the facts of Griffin,
wes “entrusting such determinations to a single agency assures
consistency in the epplication of due process rights of alleged

violators.” Id. (footnote omitted) .

56
 

“s+e7OR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ WAMAI'Z REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

a

Although the State does not address the relevance of
this case, Griffin is distinguisheble. Unlike the instant case
where the application of HRS § 84-13 was necessary to the
resolution of the Complaint, in Griffin, the inspector's
purported violation of the State Ethics Code was not related to
the employer's alleged 10SHA violation. Thus, an adjudication of
the State Ethics Code violation by the Safety Board was not
directly implicated by the alleged I0SHA violation.

In addition, the policy concerns articulated by the
Griffin court are not present here. In this case, the Board
received and relied heavily on the testimony of Mollway, who, as
noted, was the Executive Director and General Counsel of the
Ethics Commission, as to the applicability of HRS § 84-13. As
stated in Motlway’s January 3, 2005 letter, his opinion as to HRS
§ €4-13's prohibition against the posting of the campaign
materials fe11 “within prior Comission rulings regarding
campaigning and the use of state resources{,]” and, thus, it did
not appear that the Commission would issue any further opinions
Hence, there was no concern of a varied or inconsistent

interpretation of HRS § 84-13 among different agencit

 

and as
observed supra, Appellant does not expressly contest the Board's
interpretetion of HRS § 64-13.

The Griffin court's second policy reason regarding the
application of due process rights was also not impliceted by the

facts of this cese. Here, Appellant was not adjudged to have

89
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S KAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

SSS

violated the Ethics Code by the Ethics Commission and, thus, was

 

not subject to penalties for having violated the Ethics Code.

It should be noted that in addition, the Griffin court
“conclude(d] that even if [the issuing inspector] had been
Properly found by the [e]thics {c]onmission to have had an
impermissible financial interest in (the employer], such a
finding vould not have provided [the employer) with a statutory
basis for dismissal of the safety orders” because there was no
authority that suggested that “a state ethics violation by an
inspector serv(es] as a defense to allegations of serious
workplace safety violations.” Id. (footnote omitted). However,
in this case, the finding of the Ethics Code violation provided a
basis for dismissal of the prohibited practice complaint inasmuch
as it negated the “willfully” mental state which is required
under HRS § 69-13.

Moreover, Appellant's contention that “courts in other
jurisdictions similarly have held that where the legislature gave
one acministrative body authority over a subject matter to the
exclusion of another agency, the other administrative body

Possessed no authority to decide on that matter” is

appellant cites to Dune-ted, Inc.
Sommn, 743 F.26 1323, 1333 (Cal. 1967) Tnoting that Th eectainy sooo
Powers’ of agency, the’ legislative intent to limit the avtnerity of one agency
‘was found in legislation that enpowered one agency te award damages while not
sintlarly espowering encther agency]; Bell v. State fi. ef Tex Cam's, e5%
N-E.2d €16 (Ind. 1998) (tax agency Jackes authority to decide Tf sohee)
Construction project was necessary from edvcationel stancpoint); fit

p County Sclid Waste Most, Diet., 622 N.E.26 248, 258-60 (ind TSP
(stating thet vno edeinistrative agency has the preregative to mate decisions
Properly cemitted to any cther agency"); ang Brancesterst v. Joe stare

Teontsnued...)

   

 

   

 

   

60
‘ss+70R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERS**

unpersuasive under the circumstances. (Citations omitted.) As
discussed supra, the Board necessarily had the power to apply HRS
§ 84-13 in order to decide whether a prohibited practice
violation actually occurred. Therefore, the Board did not exceed
Ats jurisdiction in ruling that 4 prohibited practice violation
did not occur based on the application of HRS § 84-13. CE. Honda
vs Bd. of Trs. of the Emplovees’ Ret. Svs., 108 Hawai'i 338, 346,
120 P.3d 237, 245 (2005) (where the court recently clarified that
it was not requiring the trustees of the employees retirement
system to act ‘outside its statutory mandate’ under HRS chapter
88); Morcan v, Planning Dent,, County of Kauai, 104 Hawai‘ 173,
188, 86 F.3d 982, 997 (2004) (where the legislature empowered the
courts to issue injunctions, the planning commission had no
authority to require property owners to conduct a sand
replenishnent program).

xvItT.

As to Sesue (4), Appellant contends that (a) “the
contractual right to post notices and publications on union
bulletin boards within the state (and county) buildings was
expressly authorized by [HRS § 89-3] as a part of the right of

employees to engage in protected concerted activity for ‘their

mutual aid [or] protection’ and “[t)he Board . . . erred by
*(, continued)
Hichway Conm'n, 202 N.W.26 38, ¢0-82 (Iowa 1972).

 

a
‘S*4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS##
—

considering the contractual provision only, without examining the
statutory basis for that right,” and (b) “the provisions of {HRS
§ 84-13} are in direct conflict with the exercise of statutory
Fights by (Youngquist] (and other public employees) as provided
for in (HRS § 89-3."
A

As to Appellant's argument (a), pursuant to HRS § 89-3,
“{elmployees shall have the right . . . to engage in lawful,
concerted activities{.]” (Emphasis added.) By its plain and

express language, however, HRS § 89-3 only protects those

concerted activities that are “lawful.” See Blaisdell v, Dep't
of Pub, Safety, 113 Hawai'i 315, 318-19, 151 P.3d 796, 799-800

(2007) (stating that “‘where the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and
obvious meaning’ (quoting State v, Kalama, 94 Hawai'i 60, 64, 6
P.3d 1224, 1228 (2000) (other citations omitted))). Because
under the circumstances of this case, the posting is prohibited
by HRS § 84-13, it is not lawful, and is therefore not protected
under the express language of HRS § 89-3. With respect to the
specific language of Article 7B, this court has said that “a
public employer is not free to bargain with respect to a proposal
which would authorize a violation of a statute.” SHOPO, 63
Hawai'i at 405, 927 F.2d at 413. Thus, assuming, arquendo, that
Article 78 allowed for the posting of the campaign materials,

inasmuch as the posting was prohibited by HRS § €4-13, it was not

62
 

s+FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER

Sa

allowable under HRS § 89-3. Therefore, even if the Board

exenined the statutory basis for Article 78, it would be bound by

the fact that the postings were not protected under HRS § 89-3.
B.

As to Appellant’ argument (b), Appellant apparently
alleges that HRS $§ 69-3 and 84-13 are conflicting statutes
concerning the subject matter of HRS chapter 89 and, thus, HRS
§ 89-3 should take precedence over HAS § 84-13. It should be
noted that Appellant does not set forth a basis for this “direct
conflict.” However, it appears that at least for purposes of
this issue, Appellant has accepted the proposition that the
posting of compaign materiale on the DOT bulletin board violeted
HRS § 84-23. For if Appellant argued that HRS § 84-13 allowed
the posting of such materials, there could be no “direct
conflict,” as Appellant asserts, Furthermore, Appellant does not
expressly appeal the Board’s application of HRS § @4-13. Thus,
it As presumed for purposes of this issue that Appellent’s
posting of campaign materials violated HRS § @4-13.

HRS § €9-19 states that HRS chapter 69 “shall take

precedence over ali conflicting statuti

 

concerning this subject

 

matter.” In SHOPO, this court held that

St ds the provisions of HRS chapter 69 itself
of [a) CEA ~~ that are accorded

 

nd not those

 

By Tes cnn iengusge, URS § €5-19 accords preemptive effect
£6 the provisions of HRS chapter 89 and not to the
Sgreenents entered into between parties pursuant to the
authority, procedures, end roles establishes in BRS chepter
es.

 

 

63
 

"FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
SSS
SHOPO, €3 Hawai'i at 403, 927 P.2d at 411 (emphasis added)

(citing HRS § 89-19 (stating that “Jtlhis chapter shall take
Precedence over all conflicting statutes” (emphasis added))); see
also Hoopai, 106 Hawai'i at 223, 103 P.3d at 383 (concluding that
SHOPO Was distinguishable because “the disputed (CBA) provisions
[were] specifically authorized by [provisions in HRS chapter
891”). Assuming, arquendo, that the statutes concern the sane
subject matter, HRS §§ 89-3 end 84-13 cannot be said to conflict,
as Appellant contends. See SHOPO, @3 Hawai'i at 402, 927 P.2d at
410 ("Nothing in HRS Chapter 89 is explicitly contrary to, or
inconsistent with, any of the provisions of HRS Chapter 92F.
Specifically, HRS Chapter 89 does not require the confidentiality
of any information that must be made publicly accessible under
HRS Chapter 92F.") To reiterate, as applied in this case HRS

§ @4-13 prohibits the posting of the campaign materials, and
nothing in BRS Chapter 89 “is explicitly contrary to, or
inconsistent with” that construction. Id, Because there is no
conflict between HRS §§ €9-3 and 84-13, Appellant's argument that
“Iw]here collective bargaining rights conflict with the
Provisions of other statutes courts have recognized that public
sector statutes supercede the conflicting provisions of other

statutes” is inapposite to this case.” (Citations omitted.) In

 

 

% appellant cites | 348 F.2d 951 (Colo. 1960)
municipal ordinances in confiict with lebor peace’ act are without force of
effect); Hesith Pie: 602 N.E.26 591, $93
(111. App. 19921; Ei a a , $83 2a iste
Wash. 1976) (epplying Kevieed Cede of Kechington § 41 -86.908 to find
(continued...)

64
sssP0R PUBLICATION 8 MEST’ S HAKAZ'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

a
Light of the foregoing, Respondents’ argument regarding the
applicability of the federal Hatch Act, and Appellant's argunent
in reply, need not be reached
XIX.
Based on the foregoing, the court's February 13, 2006
judgment is affirmed.

Pests Oo raey ne

Rebecca L. Covert

Covert) for complainant-
appellant-appel lant.

David Fitzpatrick, Deputy
Attorney General (Janes B.
Halvorson Deputy Attorney
General, with him on the
brief) for respondents-
appellees-appellees.

 

 

>. continues)
provisions of collective bargaining sct supersede general monicipal powers
Tletotels end fit, inplemert Relations Cone'nv. Teanstare Local Now 562, 260

ee (wie. 1

 

SY (applying eection prospectivery for state employees

 

6