Case Title: Com. v. Davis

Citation: 440 A.2d 1185, 497 Pa. 335

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1981-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
497 Pa. 335 (1981) 440 A.2d 1185 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. William DAVIS, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted October 28, 1981. Decided December 30, 1981. Reargument Denied February 16, 1982. *336 John W. Packel, Chief, Appeals Div., Elaine DeMasse, Asst. Public Defenders, for appellant. Robert B. Lawler, Chief, Appeals Div., Gaele McLaughlin, Barthold, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee. Before O'BRIEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY, KAUFFMAN and WILKINSON, JJ. NIX, Justice. Appellant, William Davis, was indicted as of June Sessions, 1975 for simple and aggravated assault, and possessing instruments of crime. He was tried and convicted of all charges. Post-verdict motions were filed and following their denial on July 1, 1976, the appellant was sentenced to concurrent and consecutive prison sentences totalling seven and one-half (7½) to fifteen (15) years. Thereafter, appellant *337 filed a direct appeal to the Superior Court which affirmed, without dissent, the judgments of sentence on October 20, 1978. A timely petition for the allowance of appeal was filed with this Court and was granted. The essence of appellant's claim for relief is that the trial judge's conduct exceeded the bounds of propriety, and failed to maintain impartiality, thus depriving him of his right to a fair trial. To support this proposition, he cites a number of objections such as the court's refusal to permit defense counsel to make motions out of the hearing of the jury or to make argument on motions; that the court unnecessarily suggested possible motives for the crime in his charge to the jury; that the court misstated the evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution and highly prejudicial to the defense; that the court impeded cross examination by the defense by repeatedly interrupting at critical points; that the court's manner toward the appellant, his counsel and his witnesses was sarcastic and reflected his (the court's) disbelief of the defense's evidence. We need not consider all of these allegations since one of the cited complaints is sufficient in itself to support the relief appellant now seeks. During the course of the trial, counsel for the defense was adjudicated in contempt by the trial judge. A part of this episode occurred in the presence of the jury. For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the prejudicial effect of this evidence was such that appellant was indeed denied a fair trial. The incident occurred during the defense's cross examination of the victim, Mr. Mack Robinson. From the record it appears that the trial judge on at least three separate occasions interrupted the examination of the witness and interposed questions which were of a nature to rehabilitate that witness. Just prior to the incident in question, defense counsel had attempted to establish that the District Attorney aided the witness in preparation for his testimony, thereby attempting to cast doubt on the witness's testimony. After the jury returned to the courtroom, appellant's counsel requested and was granted a sidebar conference *341 with the court. Thereafter, the court excused the jury for the remainder of the day. The trial resumed the next day. At the outset, it must be made clear that our concern here is not whether the conduct of the attorney justified the adjudication of contempt. We are called upon to determine whether the impact of this incident was prejudicial to appellant's case; and if so, was he denied, as a result, a fair trial. The jury in this case witnessed the attorney for appellant being admonished by the court and being ordered into the custody of the sheriff. The significance of this incident is highlighted because of the unique position the trial judge holds. In this case, we are provided with circumstances that do more than merely give rise to an inference of partiality of the trial judge against defense counsel. To laypersons, inexperienced in the operation of trial procedures, the event in question was undoubtedly a memorable one. It was a situation likely to leave an indelible impression upon the viewers. The severity of the court's responses would suggest to the uninitiated that counsel's conduct represented a grave departure from the conduct expected of one in his *342 position. There was a reasonable probability the incident may have distracted the jury from an objective appraisal of those legitimate issues presented on the question of guilt or innocence. Discord between the trial court and defense counsel is also likely to affect the client's cause. The client's position may be deemed less worthy in the eyes of the jury, by their translating the court's displeasure as an indication of the lack of substance in the client's cause. The fact that counsel is perceived by the jury as having engaged in some serious misbehavior may suggest to the jury that he was forced to resort to such behavior because of the hopelessness of his client's case. The lack of respect for counsel, which may well have been engendered, would necessarily diminish his effectiveness as a persuasive advocate of his client's positions. Where a prejudicial incident occurs during a trial which reflects unfavorably upon the defendant, it then must be determined whether it is of such manner or substance as may reasonably be said to have deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial verdict. See Commonwealth v. Goosby, 450 Pa. 609, 301 A.2d 673 (1973); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 183 Pa.Super. 377, 132 A.2d 733 (1957). This highly provocative event can obviously not be dismissed as being of no significance. Even if counsel's conduct is viewed as justifying the court's action, his client does not deserve to suffer. Since we cannot say that this event did not unfavorably affect appellant's cause and improperly *343 influence an adverse decision in this case, we are constrained to hold that the judgments of sentence must be reversed and a new trial awarded. It is so ordered. LARSEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion. LARSEN, Justice, dissenting. I dissent; a judge's proper efforts to maintain order in the courtroom cannot be a basis for awarding a new trial. I would therefore affirm the judgment of sentence. [1] The following occurred out of the presence of the jury: THE COURT: Sir, you're in contempt of court. The fine is one hundred dollars. MR. SAGEL: May I be heard? THE COURT: No, Sir. You have until tomorrow to pay that fine. MR. SAGEL: May I make a statement Sir? THE COURT: No. MR. SAGEL: May I make a motion? THE COURT: Do you move for a mistrial? MR. SAGEL: Yes. THE COURT: Denied. Anything else? MR. SAGEL: Your Honor, I don't believe I was contemptuous. THE COURT: Sir, you interrupted this court during its effort to postulate the evidence. You were told five times to sit down. You did not. You persisted not withstanding a direction of the court. MR. SAGEL: It is my understanding THE COURT: I am not interested in your understanding, Sir. You're here as an officer of the court. Your function is to obey the court. You acted in contempt by not obeying the court. You have until tomorrow morning to pay your fine. MR. SAGEL: I apologize, if your Honor wishes, in view of your opinion that THE COURT: I am not interested in your apologizing, because of my opinion. If you wish to say so of your own motion, saying you're in contempt, then you may apologize for that. MR. SAGEL: If, in Your Honor's opinion THE COURT: You heard my opinion. You're in contempt. MR. SAGEL: It was not my intention to be in contempt. THE COURT: If you do not know that you were in contempt or did not, that is not my fault. You were in contempt. Bring the jury Back. (The jury returned to the courtroom at 3:35 P.M.) Mack Robinson, resumed: THE COURT: Gentlemen? MR. SAGEL: Before I begin, Your Honor, may I see Your Honor at sidebar? THE COURT: Yes.