Case Title: Riley v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 207, 2019

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2019-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAMES W. RILEY, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 207, 2019 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. 00004014504 (K)  
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:   July 5, 2019 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
August 21, 2019 
 
Before VALIHURA, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
 
ORDER 
 
Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to 
affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, James W. Riley, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence.  The State of Delaware 
has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on 
the face of Riley’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
affirm. 
(2) 
In 1982, Riley was convicted of multiple crimes, including first degree 
murder, and was sentenced to death.  This Court affirmed the convictions and 
2 
 
sentence.1  In 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed 
Riley’s convictions and ordered a new trial.2  On retrial, a Superior Court jury found 
Riley guilty of first degree murder, first degree robbery, and possession of a deadly 
weapon during the commission of a felony.  The Superior Court sentenced Riley to 
life imprisonment plus another twenty-five years of incarceration.  On appeal, this 
Court affirmed.3  This Court also affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of Riley’s 
first and second motions for postconviction relief.4 
(3) 
In March 2019, Riley filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence.  He 
argued that the Hurst v. Florida5 and Rauf v. State6 decisions extended to the pretrial 
and trial stages, many judges misused their impermissible final sentencing authority 
to impose the death penalty throughout pretrial and trial proceedings, a life-without-
parole sentence cannot be severed from the capital sentencing provisions in 11 Del. 
C. § 4209, and he should be resentenced for second degree murder.  The Superior 
Court denied the motion, finding the sentence was appropriate for all of the reasons 
stated at sentencing.  This appeal followed.      
                                                 
1 Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985). 
2 Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2001). 
3 Riley v. State, 2004 WL 2850093 (Del. Oct. 20, 2004). 
4 Riley v. State, 2014 WL 98643 (Del. Jan. 9, 2014); Riley v. State, 2012 WL 252405 (Del. Jan. 26, 
2012).  
5 136 S.Ct. 616, 622-24 (2016) (holding Florida’s capital sentencing scheme, which entailed a jury 
making a sentencing recommendation and a judge finding the facts necessary to impose a death 
sentence, violated the Sixth Amendment).  
6 145 A.3d 430, 434 (Del. 2016) (holding the capital sentencing procedures in 11 Del. C. § 4209 
were unconstitutional under federal law). 
3 
 
(4) 
We review the denial of a motion for correction of sentence for abuse 
of discretion.7  To the extent a claim involves a question of law, we review the claim 
de novo.8  A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates double jeopardy, 
is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is 
internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain 
as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.9  
(5) 
The Superior Court did not err in denying Riley’s motion to correct an 
illegal sentence.  After his retrial in 2003, Riley was sentenced to life imprisonment, 
not the death penalty.  The Hurst and Rauf holdings on the constitutionality of death 
penalty statutes have no bearing on Riley’s life sentence.  Riley contends that trial 
judges misused their authority to impose the death penalty in pretrial and trial 
proceedings, but fails to show that any such misuse occurred here.  This Court 
previously rejected Riley’s claim that the trial judge did not fulfill his obligation to 
inquire fully into the reasons for Riley’s disagreement with his counsel.10  As to 
Riley’s severability argument, this Court held in Powell v. State11 and Zebroski v. 
State12 that the life-without-parole alternative in § 4209 is severable from the rest of 
                                                 
7 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 
8 Id. 
9 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
10 Riley, 2004 WL 2850093, at *4 (concluding that the trial judge made the appropriate inquiries 
and properly determined that there was no disqualifying conflict of interest). 
11 153 A.3d 69 (Del. 2016).   
12 179 A.3d 855 (Del. 2018). 
4 
 
the death penalty statute.  Riley has not shown a basis to overturn either of those 
decisions. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice