Case Title: Law Finance Group, LLC v. Key

Citation: 

Docket Number: S270798

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SARAH PLOTT KEY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
S270798 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Two 
B305790 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
19STCP04251 
 
 
June 26, 2023 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
 
 
1 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
S270798 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
Law Finance Group, LLC, prevailed in an arbitration 
against Sarah Plott Key and filed a petition to confirm the 
award.  Key filed a response seeking vacatur of the award, but 
she did so outside the 100-day deadline prescribed by Code of 
Civil Procedure section 1288.2.  The primary questions now 
before us are whether, as the Court of Appeal held, this 100-day 
deadline is jurisdictional and, if not, whether the deadline is 
subject to the equitable doctrines of tolling and estoppel.  We 
hold that the section 1288.2 deadline neither is jurisdictional 
nor otherwise precludes equitable tolling or estoppel.  We 
remand for the Court of Appeal to determine in the first instance 
whether Key is entitled to equitable relief from the deadline. 
I. 
The question in this case arises from a dispute within a 
dispute.  After her parents’ death, Sarah Plott Key became 
embroiled in a disagreement with her sister, Elizabeth Plott 
Tyler, over the disposition of the Plott Family Trust (the Trust).  
Under the terms of the Trust, Key’s parents had provided 
equally for their three daughters, so that each would inherit a 
one-third interest in the parents’ estate.  When her mother died, 
Key expected to receive her one-third share.  She soon learned, 
however, that several years before, her mother had executed an 
amendment to the Trust that effectively disinherited Key of 
millions of dollars.  Believing the disinheritance was her sister’s 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
2 
handiwork, Key filed a probate action against Tyler, alleging 
that Tyler had procured the Trust amendment through undue 
influence over their mother.   
Key soon encountered difficulties in litigating the probate 
action.  On the eve of trial, Key had run out of money to pay her 
litigation expenses, and her attorneys threatened to withdraw 
from the case.  To continue financing the litigation, Key turned 
to Law Finance Group, LLC (which, for simplicity’s sake, we will 
refer to as Lender), a California-licensed finance lender.  The 
business relationship between Key and Lender would soon 
result in a second dispute, which gives rise to the issues now 
before us. 
Key and Lender entered a contract (the Agreement) under 
which Lender agreed to loan Key up to $3 million to pay her 
attorneys’ fees, and Key ultimately borrowed $2.4 million for 
that purpose.  Lender charged interest at a rate of 1.53 percent 
per month, compounded monthly, with additional compound 
interest of 0.5 percent accruing monthly in the event of default.  
The Agreement also charged a due diligence fee of up to $10,000, 
an origination fee of $60,000, and a monthly loan-servicing fee 
of 0.25 percent of the outstanding loan principal.  The loan was 
nonrecourse, meaning that Key’s potential liability under the 
loan was limited to her interest in the Trust and that Lender 
would not have recourse to her other assets for repayment.  The 
Agreement also included an arbitration provision. 
Key ultimately prevailed in the probate action against 
Tyler, winning entitlement to one-third of her parents’ estate, 
equivalent to about $20 million.  Upon the successful completion 
of the litigation, Key repaid Lender the $2.4 million loan 
principal.  But she refused to pay any of the interest or fees, 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
3 
claiming they were unlawful under the California Financing 
Law (Fin. Code, § 22000 et seq.), which restricts the interest and 
fees that can be charged on consumer loans (see id., §§ 22306 
[forbidding charges not allowed by statute], 22309 [forbidding 
compound interest]; see also id., § 22001, subd. (b) [making 
these provisions applicable to consumer loans]). 
Lender submitted the dispute to arbitration, seeking 
about $3.5 million in unpaid compound interest and fees.  The 
arbitration panel concluded that the Agreement was generally 
enforceable but that the interest and fee provisions violated the 
California Financing Law.  The panel agreed with Key that 
because the loan was meant to finance a dispute about her 
parental inheritance, the loan should be classified not as a 
“commercial loan” but as a “consumer loan” — that is, a loan 
“the proceeds of which are intended by the borrower for use 
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes” (Fin. 
Code, § 22203) — and that as such, the loan was subject to the 
statute’s restrictions on compound interest and certain other 
fees.  In so concluding, the panel rejected Lender’s argument 
that the loan was exempt from those prohibitions as a loan with 
a bona fide principal amount of $5,000 or more.  (See id., 
§ 22250, subd. (b).) 
The panel disagreed, however, with Key’s further 
argument that, as a consequence of its efforts to charge the 
disputed compound interest and fees, Lender should be barred 
from recovering any amount under the Agreement beyond the 
principal she had already repaid.  Key’s argument relied on 
Financial Code section 22750, subdivision (a), which says that if 
a loan contract “willfully” charges “any amount other than, or in 
excess of, the charges permitted by” the California Financing 
Law, “the contract of loan is void, and no person has any right 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
4 
to collect or receive any principal, charges, or recompense in 
connection with the transaction.”  Rejecting the argument, the 
panel calculated “a fair computation of damages” based on what 
Key would have owed if the Agreement had charged simple, 
rather than compound, interest at the designated monthly rate, 
plus an additional assessment for default interest.  In total, the 
panel awarded Lender about $800,000 in damages, plus 
substantial attorneys’ fees and costs, and it also required Key to 
cover the arbitration forum’s administrative expenses. 
The arbitration panel served the parties with the final 
award on September 19, 2019.  On October 1, Lender filed a 
petition in superior court to confirm the award. 
On October 10, Key’s attorney called Lender’s attorney to 
discuss various procedural matters related to Lender’s petition.  
On that phone call, Key’s attorney informed Lender that Key 
planned to file a petition to vacate the award in addition to her 
response in opposition to Lender’s petition to confirm.  They also 
discussed their mutual understanding that under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 1290.6 (section 1290.6), Key had 10 days from 
the filing of the petition to confirm — that is, until October 11, 
the next day — to file her response to the petition.  The 
attorneys agreed to extend the time for response.  The attorneys 
further agreed to coordinate a hearing date so that the trial 
court could consider both Lender’s petition to confirm and Key’s 
petition to vacate at the same time, and to set a briefing 
schedule for both petitions corresponding to that date.  In 
exchange for Lender’s agreement to extend the October 11 
deadline and adhere to the joint briefing schedule, Key agreed 
to waive personal service of Lender’s petition to confirm and to 
use a peremptory challenge to disqualify the assigned trial 
judge.  Key’s attorney memorialized their agreement in a follow-
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
5 
up e-mail, noting that the parties had “agreed that the 10 day 
time period for filing a Petition to Vacate will not apply” and 
that the parties would “work backwards” from the hearing date 
“to come up with a briefing schedule [that] will include 
oppositions and replies.” 
On December 12 — 84 days after service of the arbitral 
award — Lender’s attorney e-mailed Key’s attorney asking, “Do 
you know when your substantive petition is due?  I know we 
talked conceptually about timelines way back.  I just don’t know 
with the hearing date set . . . whether we need to revisit that or, 
just go according to standard timing.”  Key’s attorney did not 
respond.  On January 21, Key’s attorney e-mailed Lender’s 
attorney, informing him that he was “getting [the] moving 
papers prepared” and stating:  “Looks like the last day to file 
and serve is January 27.”  The attorneys corresponded by phone 
shortly after to finalize the details of filing and serving the 
documents. 
On January 27 — 130 days after service of the arbitral 
award — Key filed her petition to vacate the award.  Then, on 
February 5 — 139 days after service — Key filed her response 
in opposition to Lender’s petition to confirm, in which she also 
argued that the trial court should vacate the award.  Key’s 
primary contention in both filings was that the arbitration panel 
exceeded its authority by enforcing a modified version of the 
Agreement despite concluding that Lender had attempted to 
charge unlawful compound interest and fees.  She argued that, 
rather than reform the contract by requiring Key to pay simple 
interest, the arbitration panel should have declared the loan 
void under Financial Code section 22750, subdivision (a), and 
forbidden Lender from collecting any recompense in connection 
with the transaction.   
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
6 
In response, Lender argued that Key’s request to vacate 
was untimely because neither her petition to vacate nor her 
response to Lender’s confirmation petition was filed within 100 
days after service of the final award, as Code of Civil Procedure 
section 1288 requires for a petition to vacate, and as Code of 
Civil Procedure section 1288.2 also requires for a response 
requesting vacatur. 
The trial court denied Key’s petition to vacate as untimely 
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1288 but deemed her 
response to Lender’s petition to confirm “timely under [section] 
1290.6,” in view of the attorneys’ agreement to a joint briefing 
schedule.  On the merits, the trial court agreed with Key that 
the arbitrators “violate[d] [Key’s] unwaivable statutory rights” 
and “contravene[d] an explicit legislative expression of public 
policy” by refusing to void the contract under Financial Code 
section 22750 and instead limiting Lender’s recovery.  The trial 
court accordingly vacated the award. 
The Court of Appeal reversed.  (Law Finance Group, LLC 
v. Key (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 307, 313, 325.)  Unlike the trial 
court, the appellate court concluded that the response 
requesting vacatur was untimely under Code of Civil Procedure 
section 1288.2, which imposes a 100-day deadline for a response 
to a petition to confirm when the response requests that the 
award be vacated.  (Law Finance Group, at pp. 313, 316–321.)  
The court held that the 100-day deadline was jurisdictional and 
that the parties therefore lacked the power to extend it by 
stipulation.  (Id. at p. 322; see id. at pp. 321–324.)  The court 
also rejected Key’s argument that she could raise her challenges 
to the arbitration award regardless of whether she filed a timely 
request to vacate because the Agreement was an illegal contract 
that courts may not enforce.  (Id. at p. 322, fn. 8.)   
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
7 
We granted review. 
II. 
The California Arbitration Act (Act) (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1280 et seq.) is “ ‘a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating 
private arbitration in this state.’ ”  (Haworth v. Superior Court 
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 380.)  The Act sets out procedures 
governing judicial proceedings related to arbitration, including 
both prearbitration disputes related to the enforceability of 
agreements to arbitrate and postarbitration disputes to settle 
the status of an arbitral award.  (See Code Civ. Proc., pt. 3, tit. 9, 
ch. 5 [“General Provisions Relating to Judicial Proceedings”].)  
Whether the context is pre- or postarbitration, the general 
pleading rules governing the commencement of the proceeding 
are the same.  The proceeding begins with the filing of a petition, 
and any person named as a respondent in that petition may file 
a response.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1290.)  In general, “[a] response 
shall be served and filed within 10 days after service of the 
petition,” unless that time is “extended by an agreement in 
writing between the parties to the court proceeding or, for good 
cause, by order of the court.”  (§ 1290.6.) 
The Act also sets out a more specific set of procedures 
governing postarbitration proceedings, including deadlines by 
which parties seeking to confirm or vacate an arbitral award 
must file those requests with the court.  (See Code Civ. Proc., pt. 
3, tit. 9, ch. 4 [“Enforcement of the Award”].)  A party seeking to 
confirm the arbitral award may file a petition within four years 
of the service of the final award.1  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1288.)  A 
 
1  
Under California law, an arbitration award has the status of 
a contract between the parties.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.6.)  The 
four-year limitations period to file a petition to confirm matches 
the limitations period for an action for breach of contract.  
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
8 
party seeking to vacate the arbitral award, however, has much 
less time.  A request to vacate may be made either in a petition 
to vacate (id., § 1285) or in a response to the petition to confirm 
(id., § 1285.2).  Regardless of the method, the Act imposes the 
same deadline:  “A petition to vacate an award . . . shall be 
served and filed not later than 100 days after the date of the 
service of a signed copy of the award on the petitioner” (id., 
§ 1288), and identically, “[a] response requesting that an award 
be vacated . . . shall be served and filed not later than 100 days 
after the date of service of a signed copy of the award” on the 
respondent (id., § 1288.2). 
In this case, Key filed a petition to vacate the arbitral 
award some 130 days after service of the final award.  Nine days 
later, she filed a response to Lender’s petition to confirm in 
which she likewise requested that the award be vacated.  It is 
undisputed that Key’s first request to vacate was untimely, 
because her petition to vacate was filed outside the 100-day limit 
set by Code of Civil Procedure section 1288 (section 1288).  The 
threshold question we must address is whether Key’s failure to 
meet the 100-day deadline set by Code of Civil Procedure section 
1288.2 (section 1288.2) rendered her second request to vacate 
untimely as well.  Key argues the answer is no, because she filed 
that request within the time period allowed under section 
1290.6 for responding to Lender’s confirmation petition.  Lender 
does not dispute that Key’s response was filed within the time 
limits described in section 1290.6 but argues that the request to 
 
(Recommendation and Study Relating to Arbitration (Dec. 1960) 
3 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1961) p. G-9 (hereafter 
Recommendation); Code Civ. Proc., § 337, subd. (a).) 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
9 
vacate the award was nonetheless untimely under section 
1288.2.  Lender is correct. 
Under the plain terms of sections 1288 and 1288.2, Key 
had 100 days from the service of the final award to request that 
the arbitration award be vacated — whether she chose to do so 
via a standalone petition to vacate or via a response to Lender’s 
petition to confirm the award.  Key’s argument that her 139-day 
filing was nonetheless timely depends on the proposition that 
section 1290.6 — a general statutory provision permitting 
parties to extend the default 10-day period for any responsive 
filing in an arbitration matter — supersedes the specific 100-
day deadline for requesting that an arbitration award be 
vacated, at least when a petition to confirm has been filed within 
100 days of the award’s service.  But under the governing 
statutes, neither deadline supersedes the other.  On the 
contrary, when a filing both (1) responds to a petition to confirm, 
and (2) requests that the arbitration award be vacated, both 
deadlines apply:  (1) Absent a written agreement or court order, 
the response must be filed within 10 days after service of the 
petition to confirm and (2) in any event, no later than 100 days 
after service of the award.2  This rule respects the plain 
language of both provisions without reading an unnecessary 
conflict into the statutory scheme.  (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair 
Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 
[“[S]tatutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject 
 
2  
We need not and do not decide whether a party that fails to 
file a timely response under section 1290.6 may nevertheless 
request vacatur in a petition to vacate filed within the limitations 
period of section 1288.  (See Darby v. Sisyphian, LLC (2023) 87 
Cal.App.5th 1100, 1110, fn. 7.) 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
10 
must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the 
extent possible.”].) 
This understanding of the operation of the 100-day 
deadline is consistent with the Legislature’s evident purpose in 
enacting it.  (See Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 
272 [“Our fundamental task in construing a statute is to 
ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the 
purpose of the statute.”].)  To promote arbitral finality and 
judicial economy, the Legislature deliberately put proceedings 
to vacate on a different timeline than the more leisurely timeline 
for proceedings to confirm an arbitration award.   
In its study recommending the relevant revisions to the 
arbitration statutes, the California Law Revision Commission 
explained that the prevailing party in arbitration should 
normally be able to obtain satisfaction of the award without 
resorting to the courts for confirmation.  If the losing party 
refuses to comply, however, the confirmation procedure provides 
“a method of expeditiously enforcing an arbitration award.”  
(Recommendation (Dec. 1960) 3 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., 
supra, at p. G-9; see Feldman, Arbitration Modernized — The 
New California Arbitration Act (1961) 34 So.Cal. L.Rev. 413, fn. 
1 [noting that the Legislature unanimously enacted the 
California Law Revision Commission’s draft bill without 
changes].)  That mechanism remains available for four years, 
preserving a remedy for the prevailing party even if the refusal 
to comply with the terms of the award occurs long after its 
service.  (3 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., at p. G-9.)   
By contrast, if the losing party wishes to attack the award, 
the statutes make clear that such a challenge must be made 
promptly to promote the timely final resolution of the matters 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
11 
submitted to arbitration.  (See Recommendation (Dec. 1960) 
3 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra, at p. G-58.)  If such a 
challenge is made, the Act requires the court to settle all issues 
relating to the status of the arbitral award in a single 
proceeding, by either confirming the award (as rendered or as 
corrected by the court) or by vacating it.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286 
[“If a petition or response under this chapter is duly served and 
filed, the court shall confirm the award as made . . . unless in 
accordance with this chapter it corrects the award and confirms 
it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the proceeding.”]; 
3 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., at p. G-9 [“When a court 
entertains any proceeding relating to an award, it should finally 
settle the status of the award so that it will be unnecessary for 
the parties to return to the court at a later time for another 
determination of the status of the award.”].)  Reading the 100-
day limitations period as a statutory outer boundary on the 
timeliness of a vacatur request,  even when the request is made 
in response to a petition to confirm, respects the Legislature’s 
evident purpose to promote the efficient final resolution of 
disputes decided in arbitration. 
Key argues that it would do no harm to the Legislature’s 
aims if we were to recognize a modest exception for 
circumstances when the prevailing party files a petition to 
confirm within the first 100 days after the service of the award, 
as Lender did here, rather than later in the four-year limitations 
period.  But the statute contains no exception based on when the 
petition to confirm is filed.  And there is nothing modest about 
recognizing a statutory exception the Legislature did not write.  
Key cites several Court of Appeal cases as support for her 
position.  But as she acknowledges, none of those cases actually 
confronted the situation here, where the party seeking to vacate 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
12 
the award complied with the general  section 1290.6 deadline for 
responses in arbitration matters, but not section 1288.2’s 100-
day deadline for responses requesting vacatur.  In several of 
them, the losing party to the arbitration complied with the 100-
day deadline, so the court had no occasion to consider the 
consequences of a failure to adhere to that deadline.  (Rivera v. 
Shivers (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 82, 93–94; Oaktree Capital 
Management, L.P. v. Bernard (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 60, 64–66 
(Oaktree Capital Management); Coordinated Construction, Inc. 
v. Canoga Big “A,” Inc. (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 313, 316–317.)  In 
every other case, the losing party to the arbitration failed to 
comply with both section 1290.6 and section 1288.2 — meaning 
that those cases also had no reason to determine whether one 
deadline superseded the other.  (Soni v. SimpleLayers, Inc. 
(2019) 
42 
Cal.App.5th 
1071, 1081–1082; 
Douglass 
v. 
Serenivision, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 376, 384–385; Santa 
Monica College Faculty Assn. v. Santa Monica Community 
College Dist. (2015) 243 Cal.Ap.4th 538, 543–545; Eternity 
Investments, Inc. v. Brown (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 739, 742, 745; 
Lovret v. Seyfarth (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 841, 847–849, 856 
(Lovret); DeMello v. Souza (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 79, 83–84 
(DeMello).)  None of the cited cases stand for the rule that Key 
presses here — and, to the contrary, several of the cases plainly 
state that a party seeking to vacate an award must raise that 
challenge within 100 days of the award’s service.  (See, e.g., 
Eternity Investments, at p. 746 [“[T]he Browns did not serve or 
file a petition or response to correct or vacate the award before 
the 100-day period expired. . . .  At that point, it was too late for 
the Browns to seek correction or vacatur.”].)   
To conjure support for her position, Key plucks sentences 
in those decisions from their factual context.  For example, she 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
13 
notes that some cases have characterized section 1290.6 as an 
“exception” to section 1288.2 that applies when the prevailing 
party in arbitration has filed a petition to confirm.  (E.g., Oaktree 
Capital Management, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 66–67; 
DeMello, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d at p. 83; see also, e.g., Lovret, 
supra, 22 Cal.App.3d at p. 856 [stating that when a petition to 
confirm is filed, “the time for filing a response is governed by 
section 1290.6 and not section 1288.2” (fn. omitted)].)  
Considered in their factual context, though, those statements 
mean only that section 1290.6 may shorten the time for filing a 
response requesting vacatur when a confirmation petition has 
been filed.  In other words, a party may not get the full benefit 
of the 100-day deadline for filing a response seeking vacatur if 
section 1290.6 dictates a shorter timeline.  The cases do not hold, 
as Key now urges, that section 1290.6 could extend that time 
beyond section 1288.2’s 100-day limitations period.   
III. 
A. 
Having established that Key’s vacatur requests were filed 
outside the applicable statutory period, we move to the central 
issue before us.  Key argues that her untimely filing should be 
accepted under the doctrines of equitable tolling and equitable 
estoppel.  Lender, for its part, argues that those doctrines do not 
apply because section 1288.2’s deadline is jurisdictional, which 
means the courts have no power to adjust it for equitable 
reasons.  The Court of Appeal agreed with Lender that section 
1288.2 sets out a jurisdictional limitation.  We disagree and hold 
that section 1288.2 is not jurisdictional in the relevant sense.  
As we have often observed, “the term ‘jurisdiction’ has 
‘many different meanings.’ ”  (Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
14 
Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 807 (Quigley), quoting 
Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 287.)  
Lender’s jurisdictional argument in this case concerns what we 
have called the courts’ “fundamental” jurisdiction.  “A lack of 
fundamental jurisdiction is ‘ “ ‘an entire absence of power to 
hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the 
subject matter or the parties.’ ” ’ ”  (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial 
Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 339 (Kabran), quoting People v. 
Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216, 224.)  Because a lack of fundamental 
jurisdiction implicates “the basic power of a court to act,” courts 
must enforce jurisdictional limitations even if considerations of 
waiver, estoppel, consent, or forfeiture might otherwise excuse 
a party’s failure to comply with them.  (Quigley, at p. 807; see 
also Wilkins v. United States (2023) 598 U.S. ___, ___ [143 S.Ct. 
870, 876] (Wilkins); Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue (2022) 596 U.S. ___, ___ [142 S.Ct. 1493, 1497] 
(Boechler).)  In other words, when a party fails to comply with a 
jurisdictional time bar, the court has no choice but to dismiss 
the case for lack of jurisdiction, even if equitable concerns would 
support reaching the merits. 
Because of those harsh consequences, we apply a 
“presumption that statutes do not limit the courts’ fundamental 
jurisdiction absent a clear indication of legislative intent to do 
so.”  (Quigley, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 808, citing, e.g., Kabran, 
supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 342–343; see Wilkins, supra, 598 U.S. at 
p. ___ [143 S.Ct. at p. 876].)  This approach reflects “ ‘a 
preference for the resolution of litigation and the underlying 
conflicts on their merits by the judiciary.’ ”  (Quigley, at p. 808, 
quoting Kabran, at pp. 342–343.)  To be sure, mandatory 
procedural rules — like many statutes of limitations or other 
filing deadlines — serve important policy goals, and courts must 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
15 
enforce them when properly raised.  (See Kabran, at pp. 341–
342.)  But we will not assume that the Legislature intended to 
imbue a time bar with jurisdictional consequences merely 
because the statute speaks in mandatory terms; as we have said, 
“jurisdictional rules are mandatory, but mandatory rules are not 
necessarily jurisdictional.”  (Id. at p. 342; see id. at pp. 340–342.)  
To establish that a particular filing deadline is jurisdictional, 
more is required.  Much as the high court has said of Congress, 
our Legislature “must do something special, beyond setting an 
exception-free deadline, to tag a statute of limitations as 
jurisdictional” in the fundamental sense.  (United States v. Kwai 
Fun Wong (2015) 575 U.S. 402, 410.) 
Here, nothing in section 1288.2’s instructions for the 
timing of responses requesting vacatur clearly indicates the 
Legislature’s intent to remove a class of cases from the court’s 
fundamental jurisdiction.  Section 1288.2 speaks only to 
obligations of the litigants and makes no reference at all to the 
power of the courts — in other words, the section reads as an 
ordinary statute of limitations.  Lender argues, however, that 
the jurisdictional limitation resides in a neighboring section of 
the Act, Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.4 (section 1286.4), 
which admonishes that “[t]he court may not vacate” an award if 
the petition or response requesting vacatur is not “duly served 
and filed.”  (Id., subd. (a).)  A response has not been “duly served 
and filed” (ibid.), in Lender’s view, if it has not been filed in 
accordance with the procedural requirements of the statute, 
including the 100-day time limit set forth in section 1288.2. 
The language of section 1286.4 differs in important 
respects from language we have previously regarded as evidence 
that the Legislature intended to mark a filing deadline as 
jurisdictional.  For example, the Code of Civil Procedure 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
16 
prescribes deadlines for a party seeking a new trial to file a 
notice of intent (id., § 659) and for the court to rule on the motion 
for a new trial (id., § 660).  Under those provisions, the party’s 
time to file the notice “shall not be extended by order or 
stipulation” (id., § 659, subd. (b)), and assuming the moving 
party files timely notice, “the power of the court to rule on a 
motion for a new trial shall expire” after a specified period (id., 
§ 660, subd. (c)).  We have held that those limitations are “clear 
markers of legislative intent that the[] respective deadlines are 
jurisdictional.”  (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 344.)  While the 
language of the statutes governing new trial requests speaks 
directly to the trial court’s power to act on an untimely motion, 
section 1286.4 does not speak directly to the power of the court 
to act on an untimely response.  Instead, it speaks, more 
obliquely, of the power to act on a “duly served and filed” vacatur 
request.  (Id., subd. (a).)  It is not clear from the statutory text 
whether this “duly served and filed” language incorporates 
procedural requirements found in other sections of the Code of 
Civil Procedure and, if so, which ones.  Section 1286.4 does not, 
in short, speak with the clarity necessary to overcome the 
presumption that statutory deadlines do not limit the courts’ 
fundamental jurisdiction. 
In any event, even if we were to accept the premise that 
section 1286.4, subdivision (a)’s reference to a “duly served and 
filed” vacatur request incorporates considerations of timing, 
Lender’s argument would still fail.  The word “duly” means “[i]n 
a proper manner; in accordance with legal requirements.”  
(Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) p. 633, col. 1.)  Far from 
expressing a limitation on the courts’ power to entertain a late-
filed vacatur request, the phrase “duly served and filed” simply 
begs the question whether a vacatur request has been served 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
17 
and filed in a proper manner if a court grants equitable relief 
from the missed deadline.  (Cf., e.g., McDonald v. Antelope 
Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 99 
(McDonald) [equitable tolling will “ ‘suspend or extend a statute 
of limitations as necessary’ ”].)   
To be sure, a court may act in excess of jurisdiction by 
entertaining an untimely response over a proper objection.  “We 
have described courts that violate procedural requirements, 
order relief that is unauthorized by statute or common law, or 
otherwise ‘ “fail[] to conduct [themselves] in the manner 
prescribed” ’ by law as acting ‘ “in excess of jurisdiction.” ’ ”  (See 
Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 339–340.)  Section 1288.2 speaks 
to the parties in mandatory terms, stating that a vacatur 
request “shall be served and filed not later than 100 days” after 
service of the award.  If the trial court were to entertain an 
untimely response over a proper objection invoking this 
mandatory statute of limitations, any judgment for the 
responding party vacating the award might be reversible on 
appeal (assuming equitable considerations like waiver or 
estoppel do not provide grounds to excuse the untimely filing, 
see pt. III.B., post).  (Kabran, at p. 341.)  “But a party’s failure 
to comply with a mandatory requirement ‘does not necessarily 
mean a court loses fundamental jurisdiction resulting in “an 
entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an 
absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties.” ’ ”  
(Ibid., quoting People v. Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91, 101, fn. 5; 
see Quigley, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 813.) 
In short, absent clearer evidence of legislative intent, we 
presume that the Legislature did not intend to limit the 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
18 
fundamental jurisdiction of the courts by enacting the 100-day 
deadline to challenge an arbitral award under section 1288.2.3 
B. 
That is not the end of the analysis, however.  Even if a 
statute of limitations is nonjurisdictional, the Legislature still 
may preclude the court from applying equitable doctrines like 
tolling and estoppel.  (See Saint Francis Memorial Hospital v. 
State Dept. of Public Health (2020) 9 Cal.5th 710, 720 (Saint 
Francis); see also, e.g., Boechler, supra, 596 U.S. at pp. ___–___ 
[142 S.Ct. at pp. 1500–1501].) 
In Saint Francis, we described the framework for 
determining whether a nonjurisdictional statute of limitations 
is subject to equitable tolling.  We explained that the tolling 
doctrine derives from the courts’ inherent equitable powers, not 
from a delegation of authority by the Legislature in a particular 
statute.  (Saint Francis, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 720.)  This 
equitable power forms “ ‘part of the established backdrop of 
American law,’ ” and we assume that the Legislature 
understands this background principle when drafting statutory 
deadlines.  (Id. at p. 721, quoting Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez 
(2014) 572 U.S. 1, 11.)  Accordingly, we presume that a statutory 
limitations period is subject to equitable tolling.  (Saint Francis, 
at p. 720, citing Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs (1990) 
498 U.S. 89, 95–96.)  Much like the presumption that a filing 
deadline is nonjurisdictional, the presumption that a deadline 
permits tolling and other forms of equitable relief is rebuttable:  
 
3 
We disapprove Darby v. Sisyphian, LLC, supra, 87 
Cal.App.5th 1100 to the extent that it characterized section 
1288.2’s 100-day limitations period as “jurisdictional” in the 
fundamental sense. 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
19 
An examination of the “explicit statutory language” or the 
“manifest policy underlying a statute” may demonstrate that 
the Legislature intended to reverse the usual rule.  (Saint 
Francis, at p. 720.)  We have applied a similar presumption in 
assessing whether the Legislature intended to preclude courts 
from applying equitable estoppel.  In that context, we held that 
“ ‘courts should not presume the Legislature intended “to 
overthrow long-established principles of law unless such 
intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration 
or by necessary implication.” ’ ”  (Atwater Elementary School 
Dist. v. California Dept. of General Services (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
227, 233, quoting Juran v. Epstein (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 882, 
896.) 
Here, just as we have discerned no clear legislative intent 
to limit the courts’ fundamental jurisdiction to consider a late-
filed vacatur request, neither do we discern any clear legislative 
intent to preclude courts from providing equitable relief from 
the statutory deadlines under appropriate circumstances.  To 
begin, section 1288.2 does not expressly prohibit courts from 
applying traditional equitable principles to the statutory 
deadline.  If the Legislature had intended to preclude equitable 
tolling or equitable estoppel, it could have done so expressly.  
(See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 366.2, subd. (b) [providing a one-
year statute of limitations for a surviving action against a 
deceased person and stating that the period “shall not be tolled 
or extended for any reason” except as specified in the statute]; 
Atwater Elementary School Dist. v. California Dept. of General 
Services, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 233 [“ ‘The Legislature could 
have easily stated it intended to abrogate long-established 
equitable principles [such as equitable estoppel].  It did not do 
so.’ ”].)  Instead, section 1288.2 reads like other run-of-the-mill 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
20 
statutes of limitations that we have held are subject to equitable 
tolling.  (Compare Code Civ. Proc., § 1288.2 [providing that a 
response “shall be served and filed not later than 100 days after 
the date of service of a signed copy of the award”] with, e.g., 
Saint Francis, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 720 [holding that equitable 
tolling applies to Gov. Code, § 11523, which provides that a 
petition for writ of mandate “shall be filed within 30 days after 
the last day on which reconsideration can be ordered”].) 
Even absent an express prohibition, however, we have 
held that equitable exceptions may be inconsistent with the 
statutory text or the legislative policy reflected in the statutory 
scheme.  (Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 371 
(Lantzy); McDonald, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 105.)  In Lantzy, for 
example, we held that Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15’s 
10-year limitations period for actions based on latent 
construction defects could not be equitably tolled while the 
potential defendant attempted to repair the defects.  (Lantzy, at 
p. 383.)  Although the statute of limitations did not expressly 
forbid equitable tolling, we determined that the “stentorian 
terms” of the statutory language and the legislative purpose 
behind the broader statutory scheme reflected a clear intent to 
preclude a general tolling-for-repairs rule.  (Id. at p. 373; see id. 
at pp. 374–380.)  Specifically, we noted that “a suit to recover for 
a construction defect generally is subject to limitations periods 
of three or four years” depending on the theory of recovery, and 
that “these periods begin to run only when the defect would be 
discoverable by reasonable inspection.”  (Id. at p. 369.)  The 10-
year limitations period supplemented these shorter periods by 
prescribing an absolute outer limit before which an action to 
recover for a latent construction defect must be brought, 
“ ‘regardless of the date of discovery of the defect.’ ”  (Ibid.)  We 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
21 
reasoned that the “extraordinary length” of the 10-year 
limitations period at issue “weigh[ed] strongly against the need 
for such a tolling rule as a matter of fair procedure.”  (Id. at 
p. 367.)   
Turning to the legislative purpose underlying the two-
tiered limitations architecture, we observed that “the statute is 
the result of general legislative concern about the economic 
effects of indefinite ‘long tail’ defect liability on the construction 
industry.”  (Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 374.)  The 10-year 
limitations period arose from the Legislature’s concern that 
participants in the construction industry faced potential 
exposure to liability for defects in their past projects many years 
after those projects were completed.  (Id. at pp. 374–375.)  That 
exposure “was producing a risk for which insurance was 
available only at prohibitive cost, if at all, thus threatening the 
industry’s economic health.”  (Id. at p. 376.)  Application of a 
general 
tolling-for-repairs 
rule 
would, 
we 
concluded, 
“fundamentally compromise” the legislative purpose to curtail 
the effects of that long-tail exposure, “a consideration that 
outweighed any corresponding harm to the plaintiffs arising 
from foreclosure of their claims.”  (McDonald, supra, 45 Cal.4th 
at p. 106, citing Lantzy, at pp. 378–379.) 
This case differs markedly from Lantzy, where the 
complementary limitations periods were part of a deliberately 
constructed statutory design.  Here, by contrast, we discern no 
analogous fundamental statutory policy inconsistent with 
application of traditional equitable doctrines.  Although, as 
noted, the Legislature did enact a strict 100-day limit for 
challenging an arbitration award to ensure prompt finality, we 
have previously held that the Legislature’s choice to enact a 
“relatively brief” limitations period does not, by itself, mean the 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
22 
Legislature intended to foreclose equitable tolling or other forms 
of equitable relief in “unusual situations.”  (Saint Francis, 
supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 720, 721.)  Because equitable tolling is 
not “ ‘a cure-all for an entirely common state of affairs’ ” (id. at 
p. 724, quoting Wallace v. Kato (2007) 549 U.S. 384, 396) but 
instead applies only “in carefully considered situations to 
prevent the unjust technical forfeiture of causes of action” 
(Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 370), tolling of the 100-day 
period for seeking vacatur will be the exception, not the norm.  
Lender has not shown that applying the doctrine to extend the 
100-day deadline in those limited, exceptional circumstances 
would “fundamentally compromise” (McDonald, supra, 45 
Cal.4th at p. 106) the legislative purpose to promote the efficient 
final resolution of arbitral disputes. 
Lender argues that two features of the statutory scheme 
reflect a clear legislative purpose to prohibit a court from 
applying any equitable exceptions.  First, Lender contrasts 
section 1290.6, which includes a mechanism for the parties or 
the court to extend the deadline for filing a response, with 
section 1288.2, which does not.  Lender argues that the omission 
of a comparable extension mechanism in section 1288.2 signals 
the Legislature’s intent to foreclose equitable tolling.  
We are not persuaded.  Section 1290.6 is a general 
provision that applies to any response filed in any arbitration-
related judicial proceeding, including a response filed in a 
proceeding unrelated to the enforcement of an arbitration 
award.  The extension mechanism in that provision permits the 
parties to agree to extend the response deadline for any reason 
at all and permits the court to extend the deadline for good 
cause.  That exception gives the parties and the court wide 
latitude to set a briefing schedule in any arbitration-related 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
23 
proceeding — an exception that would permit modifying the 
response 
deadline 
without 
necessarily 
meeting 
the 
requirements for equitable tolling or estoppel.  Section 1288.2, 
by contrast, is specific to responses to petitions to confirm an 
arbitration award and applies only when the response seeks 
vacatur.  The legislative choice to enact a broad exception to 
section 1290.6’s general response deadline conveys no clear 
intention to insulate section 1288.2’s more specific deadline 
from the application of traditional equitable principles.  (Cf. 
Atwater Elementary School Dist. v. California Dept. of General 
Services, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 234 [“Thus, the Legislature’s 
decision to include or omit such an express legal exception does 
not signal an intent to bar the application of equitable estoppel.  
It simply reflects a legislative disinclination to write a sweeping 
exception into the statutory scheme as a matter of law.”].)4   
Second, Lender again points to the neighboring provision 
of section 1286.4, which says that “[t]he court may not vacate” 
an arbitral award unless a vacatur request is “duly served and 
filed.”  (Id., subd. (a).)  Lender argues that “[i]f the Legislature 
intended courts to have the power to equitably toll the vacatur 
deadlines, it would make no sense for the Legislature to have 
expressly directed that courts ‘may not vacate’ an award absent 
compliance with specific service and filing requirements.”   
 
4 
Even when considering statutes that do, themselves, include 
enumerated grounds for tolling, we have held “that the legislative 
codification of particular tolling bases” does not “establish[] a 
legislative intent to preclude tolling on any other basis.”  
(McDonald, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 107.)  “To the contrary, we have 
implicitly assumed that the Legislature’s authority to declare 
tolling bases . . . and the courts’ ability to do likewise may coexist 
in the absence of an explicit legislative directive that they may 
not.”  (Ibid., citation omitted.)   
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
24 
Once again, we are unpersuaded.  In full, section 1286.4 
states:  “The court may not vacate an award unless:  [¶]  (a) A 
petition or response requesting that the award be vacated has 
been duly served and filed; or [¶]  (b) A petition or response 
requesting that the award be corrected has been duly served and 
filed and:  [¶]  (1) All petitioners and respondents are before the 
court; or [¶]  (2) All petitioners and respondents have been given 
reasonable notice that the court will be requested at the hearing 
to vacate the award or that the court on its own motion has 
determined to vacate the award and all petitioners and 
respondents have been given an opportunity to show why the 
award should not be vacated.”  Read as a whole, the evident 
purpose of this provision is to ensure that all parties to the 
arbitration have adequate notice that the court may vacate an 
award and are provided an opportunity to respond.  The 
provision does not, as Lender argues, also reveal a clear 
legislative purpose to preclude courts from applying equitable 
exceptions to section 1288.2.  On the contrary, as we have 
already explained, the language in section 1286.4 can be read in 
a manner that accounts for the availability of equitable relief in 
appropriate circumstances. 
In sum, we see nothing in the “explicit statutory language” 
nor in the “manifest policy underlying [the] statute” 
demonstrating that the Legislature intended to reverse the 
usual rule and preclude the courts from applying traditional 
principles of equity to section 1288.2’s statutory deadline.  
(Saint Francis, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 720.)  We therefore hold 
that section 1288.2 is subject to both equitable tolling and claims 
of equitable estoppel. 
It is a separate question whether Key has established 
entitlement to equitable relief in this particular case.  The Court 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
25 
of Appeal answered that question in the negative, but its answer 
appears to have been predicated on the court’s belief that section 
1288.2’s 100-day deadline is jurisdictional in the fundamental 
sense.  Specifically, the Court of Appeal observed that Key’s 
arguments for equitable relief “depend upon the assumption 
that the parties could alter the 100-day deadline by agreement” 
and that this assumption was unreasonable, in part because the 
100-day deadline is “jurisdictional.”  (Law Finance Group, LLC 
v. Key, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 321, 322.)  The court’s 
conclusion that Key is not entitled to equitable relief warrants 
reexamination in light of our conclusion that section 1288.2’s 
deadline may be tolled in exceptional circumstances and that a 
party may be estopped from raising the deadline as a defense.  
We express no view on whether Key is entitled to equitable 
relief, which is an issue for the Court of Appeal to address in the 
first instance. 
IV. 
Key raises a final argument.  She contends that regardless 
of the timeliness of her filing, the trial court was obligated to 
reach the merits and vacate the arbitration award because her 
substantive claim goes to the legality of her Agreement with 
Lender and arbitration awards enforcing entirely illegal 
contracts cannot be confirmed.  She argues, in other words, that 
a claim of contract illegality can never be forfeited by failure to 
raise it in a timely response seeking to have an arbitral award 
vacated.  If Key were correct on this point, it would be 
unnecessary to conduct further proceedings to address her 
entitlement to equitable relief from the statutory deadline.  But 
we are unconvinced. 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
26 
Key’s argument that a claim of contract illegality can 
never be forfeited rests on our treatment of a claim of illegality 
as a ground for challenging an arbitral award.  “Generally, 
courts cannot review arbitration awards for errors of fact or law, 
even when those errors appear on the face of the award or cause 
substantial injustice to the parties.”  (Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. 
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 916 (Richey).)  But in Loving & Evans v. 
Blick (1949) 33 Cal.2d 603 (Loving & Evans), we held that “the 
rules which give finality to the arbitrator’s determination of 
ordinary questions of fact or of law are inapplicable where the 
issue of illegality of the entire transaction is raised in a 
proceeding for the enforcement of the arbitrator’s award.”  (Id. 
at p. 609.)  That is so because the arbitration statute permits a 
court to vacate an arbitral award if “ ‘the arbitrators exceeded 
their powers,’ ” and “the power of the arbitrator to determine the 
rights of the parties is dependent upon the existence of a valid 
contract under which such rights might arise.”  (Id. at pp. 609–
610; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (a).) 
Although Loving & Evans predates the 1961 Act, we have 
since reaffirmed that “judicial review may be warranted when a 
party claims that an arbitrator has enforced an entire contract 
or transaction that is illegal.”  (Richey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at 
p. 917, citing Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 32 
(Moncharsh).)  We have also acknowledged that “there may be 
some limited and exceptional circumstances justifying judicial 
review of an arbitrator’s decision when a party claims illegality 
affects only a portion of the underlying contract” — for example, 
where confirming the award “would be inconsistent with the 
protection of a party’s statutory rights.”  (Moncharsh, at p. 32 
[citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon (1987) 482 
U.S. 220, 225–227, for the proposition that claims based on 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
27 
statutes are generally arbitrable unless the legislature 
specifically “ ‘intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies 
for the statutory rights at issue’ ”].) 
Here, Key pitches her illegality challenge as one that 
implicates the entire Agreement — including, presumably, the 
arbitration clause itself.  Curiously, though, Key has never 
argued that the arbitration clause in the Agreement with 
Lender was not enforceable or that the illegality issue is 
nonarbitrable.  Even now, Key does not ask us to disregard the 
arbitral award entirely and review the illegality claim de novo, 
with the benefit of briefing and argument on the merits of that 
issue, even though both parties have raised questions about the 
merits of the arbitrators’ decision.  While Key challenges the 
arbitrators’ choice of remedy for Lender’s alleged violation of the 
California Financing Law, Lender argues the arbitrators were 
wrong to find a violation in the first place; Lender contends that 
the arbitrators erred in classifying the loan as a “consumer loan” 
and that, in any event, the California Financing Law’s 
prohibitions on compound interest and certain fees do not apply 
to “any loan of a bona fide principal amount of five thousand 
dollars . . . or more.”  (Fin. Code, § 22250, subd. (b).)  The 
arbitrators’ conclusions on those issues inure to Key’s benefit, 
and she asks us to accept them as conclusive.  She takes issue 
only with the arbitration panel’s choice of remedy — its decision 
to reform rather than void the contract, a decision that, in Key’s 
view, contravenes her statutory rights. 
In any event,  the important point for our purposes is that 
Key does not seek merely to establish a substantive basis for 
judicial review; rather, she invokes a right to such review 
notwithstanding the applicable statutory deadlines.  But our 
cases establish no such right.  To the contrary, whether we 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
28 
construe Key’s argument as challenging the legality of the entire 
Agreement or only a portion of it, our decision in Moncharsh 
forecloses her contention that a claim of illegality can never be 
forfeited by a failure to raise the claim in a timely manner.  In 
Moncharsh, the plaintiff sought to vacate an arbitral award, 
claiming that the arbitrators had enforced an illegal 
noncompete provision of his employment contract.  (Moncharsh, 
supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 6–8.)  We held that the claim of illegality 
was not the kind that would require a court to intervene on 
public policy grounds.  (Id. at p. 33.)  Critically, however, we did 
so only after considering whether the claim had been forfeited 
through failure to raise it in accordance with prescribed 
procedure.  (See id. at pp. 29–31.)  We explained that both 
challenges asserting that “grounds exist to revoke the entire 
contract” and challenges going “to only a portion of the contract” 
can be forfeited if they are not timely raised.  (Id. at pp. 29, 30; 
cf. Richey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 920, fn. 3 [by not raising the 
issue in the superior court, the plaintiff forfeited on appeal a 
claim that an arbitral award must be vacated because the 
underlying contract violated his statutory rights].)   
Although Moncharsh did not involve section 1288.2’s 100-
day deadline for a response seeking vacatur of an arbitral 
award, the case makes clear that claims of contract illegality are 
not categorically immune from the traditional rules of forfeiture.  
It follows that the court in this case was not obligated to 
entertain an untimely request to vacate the arbitral award 
merely because Key asserted that the award enforces a contract 
made unlawful by statute.5 
 
5 
We disapprove South Bay Radiology Medical Associates v. 
Asher (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1074, 1079, 1080 insofar as it 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
29 
A contrary conclusion would undermine the statutory 
scheme governing challenges to arbitration awards.  The Act 
sets out both the grounds and relevant procedures for seeking 
vacatur.  As we explained in Loving & Evans, judicial review of 
an arbitral award based on a claim of contract illegality is 
authorized by the statutory provision permitting a court to 
vacate an arbitral award if “ ‘the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers,’ ” for arbitrators have no power to determine the rights 
of the parties if the underlying contract is unlawful.  (Loving & 
Evans, supra, 33 Cal.2d at pp. 609–610; see also Sheppard, 
Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. 
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 59, 72, 73 [noting that the excess-of-authority 
exception to the rule of arbitral finality is “specified by statute” 
and that Loving & Evans “held that the excess-of-authority 
exception applies, and an arbitral award must be vacated, when 
a court determines that the arbitration has been undertaken to 
enforce a contract that is ‘illegal and against the public policy of 
the state’ ”].)  But while the Act establishes a basis for seeking 
vacatur on the ground of contract illegality, it also sets a 
deadline for doing so.  In making her argument for vacatur of 
the arbitral award under the Act, Key may not disregard the 
Act’s instructions for when those arguments must be asserted.6   
This conclusion does not undermine the overarching 
lesson of Loving & Evans that “an unlawful transaction cannot 
 
suggests that an “attack on the arbitrator’s decision [that] is based 
on alleged illegality” is a defense that “may be raised at any time.” 
6 
In addressing the timeliness of Key’s claim that certain 
provisions of her Agreement with Lender are inconsistent with 
statutory requirements, we express no views on a court’s discretion 
to reach the merits of a forfeited claim of contract illegality where 
enforcement of the contract raises matters of significant public 
interest and threatens substantial injustice. 
LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC v. KEY 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
30 
be given legal vitality by the arbitration process . . . .”  (Loving 
& Evans, supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 611.)  Just as an appellant may 
forfeit the opportunity to vindicate her statutory rights by 
failing to preserve an issue in the trial court or by failing to file 
a timely notice of appeal, so too, in a postarbitration judicial 
proceeding to enforce an arbitral award, a challenger may forfeit 
the opportunity to raise a claim of contract illegality by failing 
to timely request that the arbitration award be corrected or 
vacated. 
V. 
We hold that section 1288.2’s deadline for seeking vacatur 
of an arbitral award is a nonjurisdictional statute of limitations 
that is subject to equitable tolling and equitable estoppel.  The 
Court of Appeal must determine in the first instance whether 
equitable considerations should excuse Key’s failure to comply 
with the statutory deadline.  We reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Law Finance Group, LLC v. Key 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 67 Cal.App.5th 307 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S270798 
Date Filed:  June 26, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Rafael A. Ongkeko 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Eisner, Weinberg Gonser Frost, Christopher L. Frost, Taylor S. 
Simeone; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Cynthia E. Tobisman, 
Alana H. Rotter and Jeffrey E. Raskin for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Grignon Law Firm, Margaret M. Grignon and Anne M. Grignon for 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Zareh A. Jaltorossian; Mathew H. Fisher; R. Rex Parris; Michael J. 
Jaurigue, Barbara DuVan-Clarke; Joseph A. Kaufman; and Kevin 
Chiang for KP Law, Da Vega Fisher Mechtenberg, LLP, Parris Law 
Firm, JLG Lawyers, Joseph A. Kaufman & Associates, Inc., and Equity 
Legal Group as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
The Office of Michael Tenenbaum and Michael Tenenbaum for Michael 
Tenenbaum and Micha Star Liberty as Amici Curiae.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Alana H. Rotter 
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland LLP 
6420 Wilshire Boulevard, 11th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90048 
(310) 859-7811 
 
Margaret M. Grignon 
Grignon Law Firm LLP 
3780 Kilroy Airport Way, Suite 200 
Long Beach, CA 90806 
(562) 285-3171