Case Title: Howard v. DSW

Citation: 163 Vt 109, 655 A.2d 1102

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
HOWARD_V_DSW.93-342; 163 Vt 109; 655 A.2d 1102

[Filed 30-Dec-1994]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                           No. 93-342


Elaine Howard, Clara Parker               Supreme Court
and Carolyn Clark
                                          On Appeal from
     v.                                    Human Services Board

Department of Social Welfare              May Term, 1994



Cornelius Hogan, Secretary

James C. May, South Royalton Legal Clinic, and Ian C. Ridlon, Robert C. Brannan,
 Cynthia E. Frantz, Ronald G. McMallen and Jacob B. Parkinson, Legal Interns,
 South Royalton, for plaintiffs-appellants 

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, Christina M. Byron, Assistant
 Attorney General, and George Collins, Legal Intern, Waterbury, for
 defendant-appellee 

Steven S. Zaleznick, Patricia A. DeMichele and Bruce Vignery, Washington, D.C.,
 for amicus curiae American Association of Retired Persons 

Marilyn Mahusky-Anderson, Rutland, and Judith F. Dickson, Burlington, Vermont
 Developmental Disabilities Law Project, for amicus curiae Vermont Protection 
 and Advocacy, Inc. 


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
          Specially Assigned 



     Gibson, J.      Plaintiffs Elaine Howard, Clara Parker and Carolyn Clark
appeal from a decision of the Secretary of the Agency of Human Services
(Secretary), reversing a decision of the Human Services Board (Board) and
terminating plaintiffs' Aid to Needy Families with Children (ANFC) benefits
when their children reached age eighteen because the children were not
expected to graduate from high school by age nineteen.  Plaintiffs claim that
it is solely due to the children's disabilities that they could not graduate
by age nineteen, and thus, terminating ANFC benefits on this basis violates
(1) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.  794, (2) 

 

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C.  12132, and
(3) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.  We reverse the decision of the Secretary
and reinstate the order of the Board, granting plaintiffs ANFC benefits until
their children reach age nineteen. 

     Plaintiffs are three mothers who were recipients of ANFC benefits.  When
these causes arose, each mother had a child who was attending school
full-time and doing well.  All the children were expected to graduate from
high school at either age nineteen or age twenty.  Each child has repeated at
least one year of early elementary school because of a disability.  The three
children have been diagnosed with specific learning disabilities, and two of
the children also have hearing impairments.  All three have received special
education services.  See 3 Code of Vermont Rules, Department of Education 
2362(1)(a) (1992) (to be eligible for special education, student must have
disability).  The Department of Social Welfare (DSW) does not dispute that,
as a result of these disabilities, these children could not graduate before
turning age nineteen. 

     Prior to the eighteenth birthday of each child, the parent received
notice from DSW that her benefits were to be terminated after the eighteenth
birthday of her child.  ANFC regulations provide: 

          An individual qualifies under the age criterion as a child
          if he or she is under 18.  In addition, an 18 year old child
          is eligible if he or she is a full-time student in a
          secondary school or an equivalent level of
          vocational/technical training and is expected to complete
          high school or the equivalent program before reaching his or
          her nineteenth birthday. 

5 Code of Vermont Rules, Welfare Assistance Manual (WAM)  2301 (1994).
Although DSW provides ANFC benefits for needy children age eighteen who are
full-time students, it does so only for those children expected to graduate
during that year.  Because the children in this case did not meet this test,
they did not meet the ANFC eligibility requirement for needy, eighteen-
year-old students. 

 

     Plaintiffs appealed the decision of DSW to the Human Services Board,
which concluded that plaintiffs' children did not meet the WAM  2301
graduate-by-age-nineteen requirement solely because of their disabilities.
Further, it held that denying ANFC benefits to the parents of these students,
on the basis of disability, denied them the opportunity to participate in the
ANFC program to the same extent as other parents of needy, eighteen-year-old
students.  To comply with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Board decided that DSW was required to
make reasonable modifications to the ANFC program to prevent discrimination
on the basis of disability.  Thus, it held that where the failure to meet the
graduation requirement results solely from the child's disability, the ANFC
recipient is entitled to receive benefits until the child attains age
nineteen. Accordingly, the Board directed DSW to pay plaintiffs ANFC benefits
until these children reached age nineteen. 

     The Secretary of Human Services accepted the findings of the Board but
reversed its decision under the authority granted by 3 V.S.A.  3091(h)(1).
The Secretary determined that the Rehabilitation Act would be the applicable
statute because it prohibits discrimination in state agencies that receive
federal financial assistance.  He noted, however, that the graduation
requirement in WAM  2301 mirrors the eligibility requirement of the federal
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) statute, see 42 U.S.C. 
606(a)(2), that AFDC is a federal- state matching fund program, and that
participating states must comply with federal statutes and regulations to
receive federal funding.  Consequently, the Secretary concluded that DSW was
required to impose the graduation requirement.  This appeal followed. 

                                  I.

     First, we address the jurisdictional issues raised by the parties.  DSW
argues that the Human Services Board exceeded its authority by holding that
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA conflict with federal AFDC eligibility
criteria. According to DSW, the Board does not have authority to determine
which federal law to apply in the event of such a conflict.  We do not decide
this issue because we do not accept DSW's characterization of the Board's
decision. 

 

The Board did not conclude that the federal laws at issue conflicted, nor did
it hold either law invalid.  The Board determined that applying the
graduation requirement in WAM  2301 to plaintiff's children violated both
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.  It concluded, however, that reasonable
modifications to the requirement could be made to avoid discrimination on the
basis of disability and ordered such modifications to be made.  We view this
action as applying both AFDC and federal disability law.  The Board modified
a decision of DSW that was in conflict with federal disability law, action
the Board is explicitly authorized to do.  See 3 V.S.A.  3091(d) (board has
authority to reverse or modify agency decisions based on rules that board
determines to be in conflict with state or federal law); see also Stevens v.
Department of Social Welfare 159 Vt. 408, 417, 620 A.2d 737, 742 (1992)
(Legislature intended Board to hear any case in which individual is aggrieved
by DSW action or policy). 

     Plaintiffs argue that the Secretary erred as a matter of law in
reversing the Board because he failed to comply with 3 V.S.A.  3091(h)(1),
which requires the Secretary to "issue a written decision setting forth the
legal, factual or policy basis for reversing or modifying a board decision or
order." Plaintiffs maintain that the Secretary's decision was incomplete
because he did not address plaintiffs' claims under the ADA or the equal
protection clause; he addressed only the claims under the Rehabilitation Act.
 Generally, we would remand a case to allow the Secretary to consider issues
that he has failed to address.  See 2 C. Koch, Administrative Law and
Practice  9.13C, at 152 (Supp. 1995) (court must remand if agency rationale
inadequate); Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1994)
(remanding to Secretary of Health and Human Services because court should not
infer agency had considered issues unless record so indicates).  An agency
decision should provide a reasonable explanation of its conclusion on each
claim before it to provide an adequate record for review, to preclude
perfunctory decision- making, and to satisfy interested members of the
public.  See 1 C. Koch, supra  6.55, at 276. 

     Although the Secretary's decision is not a model of clarity, we construe
it as concluding that neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act apply to
DSW.  See 2 C. Koch, supra  9.13C, 

 

at 151 (court should try to make sense of explanation of less than ideal
clarity).  He states that "[t]he Rehabilitation Act is the legislation that
would apply to the Department," but then concludes that the AFDC eligibility
requirements adopted in 1981 are what ultimately govern. In the interest of
judicial economy, we do not remand for a decision of plaintiffs' claim under
the Equal Protection Clause because we reverse the Secretary's decisions
under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, and therefore, do not reach the
equal protection issue. 

                                  II.

     Plaintiffs bring this suit under both  504 of the Rehabilitation Act
and Title II of the ADA.  Initially, we note that Title II of the ADA
provides persons with disabilities the same rights and remedies as those
provided by  504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  42 U.S.C.  12133; Coleman v.
Zatechka, 824 F. Supp 1360, 1367 (1993).  The Rehabilitation Act applies only
to programs that receive federal financial assistance, however, while the ADA
applies to all public entities.  See 29 U.S.C.  794(b); 42 U.S.C.  12132.
 In the instant case, both statutes apply. DSW is subject to the
Rehabilitation Act because it receives federal financial assistance, and it
is subject to the ADA because it is a public entity.  See 42 U.S.C. 
12131(1) ("public entity" means any State government and any department or
agency of State government). 

     We analyze plaintiffs' claims under the ADA because the ADA is the most
recent enactment of Congressional intent to prohibit discrimination on the
basis of disability. Nonetheless, we note that Congress intended that Title
II of the ADA be interpreted consistently with prior interpretations of 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  Conner v. Branstad,