Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Holly Lynn Fulkerson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP002529-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 42 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP2529-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Holly Lynn Fulkerson, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Holly Lynn Fulkerson, f/k/a Holly Lynn Strop, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST FULKERSON 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 20, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
      
 
 
2018 WI 42
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP2529-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Holly Lynn Fulkerson, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Holly Lynn Fulkerson, f/k/a Holly 
Lynn Strop, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 20, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review a stipulation pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.12 between the Office of Lawyer 
No. 
2017AP2529-D   
 
2 
 
Regulation (OLR) and Attorney Holly Lynn Fulkerson.1  The 
stipulation provides that Attorney Fulkerson committed six 
counts 
of 
professional 
misconduct 
arising 
out 
of 
the 
representation of a single client and jointly requests that the 
court publicly reprimand Attorney Fulkerson for her professional 
misconduct.   
¶2 
After carefully reviewing the matter, we accept the 
stipulation and impose the requested public reprimand.  We do 
not require Attorney Fulkerson to pay any restitution, as none 
was requested by the OLR.  Although there was a prior submission 
of a proposed consensual public reprimand to a referee, this 
disciplinary proceeding has been resolved by a stipulation under 
SCR 22.12 without the appointment of a referee.  Thus, we do not 
impose any costs on Attorney Fulkerson. 
¶3 
Attorney Fulkerson was admitted to the practice of law 
in this state in June 2001.  According to the information 
provided to the State Bar, Attorney Fulkerson has most recently 
engaged in the private practice of law in Blue Mounds, 
Wisconsin. 
                                                 
1 This case was originally filed under the caption Office of 
Lawyer Regulation v. Holly Lynn Strop.  We have recently been 
informed, however, that the Board of Bar Examiners has approved 
the change of the name under which the respondent may practice 
law in this state from Holly Lynn Strop to Holly Lynn Fulkerson.  
See SCRs 10.03(2) and 40.14(3).  Consequently, we have changed 
the caption of this matter to list the respondent's name as 
Holly Lynn Fulkerson and we refer to the respondent throughout 
the text of this opinion as Holly Lynn Fulkerson so that this 
disciplinary opinion corresponds with the name under which the 
respondent is currently practicing law. 
No. 
2017AP2529-D   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Attorney 
Fulkerson 
has 
been 
the 
subject 
of 
professional discipline on one prior occasion.  In 2015 she 
consented to the imposition of a private reprimand for failing 
to act with reasonable diligence, failing to protect a client's 
interests, failing to keep a client reasonably informed, making 
a frivolous discovery request or failing to make reasonably 
diligent efforts to comply with a discovery request, and 
knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a 
tribunal.  Private Reprimand No. 2015-28 (electronic copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/ 
002845.html). 
¶5 
This matter was initially submitted to a referee as a 
proposed consensual public reprimand under SCR 22.09.  At that 
time 
the 
OLR 
was 
alleging 
seven 
counts 
of 
professional 
misconduct, which Attorney Fulkerson conceded.  After reviewing 
the submission, the referee declined to approve the consensual 
reprimand.  He pointed to the presence of seven counts of 
misconduct and the existence of the previous private reprimand.  
He stated that he was particularly concerned with the fact that 
Attorney Fulkerson had agreed to represent the clients even 
though she did not have prior experience handling medical 
malpractice matters and that she appeared not to have adequately 
sought guidance from other experienced attorneys or educated 
herself. 
¶6 
Following the refusal of the consensual reprimand, 
Attorney Fulkerson sent a lengthy letter to the OLR providing 
additional, highly personal mitigating information.  In its 
No. 
2017AP2529-D   
 
4 
 
memorandum in support of the current SCR 22.12 stipulation, the 
OLR asserts that Attorney Fulkerson has been "forthright and 
cooperative" throughout the OLR's investigation and that her 
letter did not attempt to avoid responsibility for or minimize 
her conduct.  To the contrary, the OLR states that her letter 
demonstrated that she had understood her misconduct and was 
making changes in her life that will result in her being a 
better, more diligent lawyer.  The OLR then submitted the matter 
to the Preliminary Review Committee, which found cause to 
proceed on six of the seven original counts.  The OLR then 
reconsidered the sanction question, but ultimately determined 
that, especially in light of the mitigating information provided 
by Attorney Fulkerson and the totality of the information in the 
OLR's file, a public reprimand was still the most appropriate 
level of discipline to seek.  The OLR then concluded that rather 
than submit a second consensual reprimand to a referee under SCR 
22.09, it would pursue a SCR 22.12 stipulation with Attorney 
Fulkerson that would be submitted to this court for a decision. 
¶7 
In 
the 
resulting 
stipulation, 
Attorney 
Fulkerson 
represents that she understands the misconduct allegations 
against her and her right to contest them, that she admits them, 
and that she agrees with the OLR's recommended level of 
discipline. 
 
Attorney 
Fulkerson 
further 
states 
that 
she 
understands her right to consult with another attorney regarding 
these matters, that she understands the ramifications of the 
stipulated level of discipline, and that she is entering into 
No. 
2017AP2529-D   
 
5 
 
the stipulation knowingly and voluntarily.  The stipulation also 
states that it was not the product of plea-bargaining. 
¶8 
The counts of misconduct to which Attorney Fulkerson 
is stipulating arise from her representation of La.G. and Li.G. 
(collectively, "the G.s").  Li.G's illness and subsequent 
complications had caused her to spend nearly a year in various 
hospitals and nursing care facilities.  The G.s' health 
insurance carrier had also denied coverage for approximately 
$27,000 in Li.G.'s medical expenses on the ground that certain 
services had been medically unnecessary.  The G.s retained 
Attorney Fulkerson to pursue coverage for the unpaid medical 
expenses and to address a potential malpractice claim against 
certain health-care providers. 
¶9 
Attorney Fulkerson initially sent a letter to the 
health insurance carrier appealing the denial of coverage for 
the certain medical expenses.  The insurer denied the appeal. 
¶10 The 
G.s 
and 
Attorney 
Fulkerson 
then 
discussed 
proceeding with a lawsuit.  Attorney Fulkerson agreed to 
represent the G.s on a contingent fee basis, but she failed to 
draft 
a 
written 
fee 
agreement 
memorializing 
that 
fee 
arrangement. 
¶11 In November 2012 the G.s gave a check in the amount of 
$270 to Attorney Fulkerson to cover the filing fee for the 
anticipated civil action.  Attorney Fulkerson (or someone on her 
behalf) negotiated that check on December 6, 2012, depositing 
the funds into Attorney Fulkerson's personal account.  Attorney 
No. 
2017AP2529-D   
 
6 
 
Fulkerson has acknowledged to the OLR that the funds should have 
been held in trust. 
¶12 At the time she began her representation of the G.s, 
Attorney 
Fulkerson 
had 
no 
experience 
litigating 
medical 
malpractice cases.  Early in the representation Attorney 
Fulkerson informed the G.s of her lack of experience in such 
cases, but told them that she believed that she was familiar 
with the standards of care required in medical facilities, as 
she had worked in the health-care field for 15 years.  Prior to 
initiating the civil action, which contained medical malpractice 
claims, Attorney Fulkerson did not seek guidance concerning the 
specifics of litigating medical malpractice claims.  During the 
course of the representation, Attorney Fulkerson did consult 
with several attorneys about general information concerning 
litigation procedures and tactics.   
¶13 Attorney Fulkerson prepared a draft complaint, which 
she sent to the G.s for their review in October 2013.  The G.s 
reviewed the complaint and returned it to Attorney Fulkerson 
within a month. 
¶14 On June 2, 2014, Attorney Fulkerson filed a civil 
action in the Dane County circuit court on Li.G.'s behalf 
against 
the 
health 
insurer 
and 
a 
number 
of 
health-care 
providers.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 655.445(1), because the 
complaint alleged claims for bodily injury resulting from the 
provision of professional services or the failure to provide 
professional 
services 
by 
health-care 
providers, 
Attorney 
Fulkerson should have filed a request for mediation with the 
No. 
2017AP2529-D   
 
7 
 
director of state courts, but she failed to do so.  It should 
also be noted that under Wis. Stat. § 655.445(3), where 
mediation must be requested, no discovery requests may be 
propounded and no scheduling or pretrial court conferences may 
occur until after the mediation period has expired. 
¶15 In July 2014 Attorney Fulkerson sent a letter to the 
circuit court advising that she would be out of town from August 
10 to October 1, 2014, and asking the court to hold any 
conference after that date.  Attorney Fulkerson did acknowledge 
that she could be available by telephone if the court wished to 
meet with the parties before that time.  Attorney Fulkerson did 
not send a copy of the letter to her clients or otherwise relay 
this information to them.    
¶16 In August 2014 Attorney Fulkerson sustained an injury, 
making her unable to work full-time until February 2015. 
¶17 The circuit court did conduct a scheduling conference 
on 
September 
24, 
2014. 
 
Attorney 
Fulkerson 
appeared 
by 
telephone.  During the conference opposing counsel again 
reminded her of the need to file a request for mediation.   
¶18 Attorney Fulkerson ultimately did file the mediation 
request, and a mediation session was scheduled for February 10, 
2015.  Attorney Fulkerson, however, was not adequately prepared 
for the mediation, which prevented the parties and the mediator 
from having a meaningful exchange and resulted in the mediation 
being terminated.  Consequently, no written report was prepared. 
¶19 In 
mid-February 
2015 
Attorney 
Fulkerson 
accepted 
employment with a large health insurance company.  She began 
No. 
2017AP2529-D   
 
8 
 
that position during the first week of March 2015.  Attorney 
Fulkerson, however, did not inform the G.s of her new position 
and her inability to continue to represent them until May 7, 
2015, approximately two months later.  After having been 
informed of the situation, the G.s chose to have Attorney 
Fulkerson seek a dismissal of the pending complaint without 
prejudice.  Attorney Fulkerson filed a motion to withdraw as 
counsel.  During a subsequent telephone scheduling conference, 
Attorney Fulkerson moved to dismiss the complaint without 
prejudice, which the circuit court granted.   
¶20 Attorney Fulkerson told the G.s that she would provide 
them with the names of other attorneys they could contact about 
taking over the representation.  Attorney Fulkerson, however, 
failed to ever provide any such names, despite an email message 
from the G.s asking for that information. 
¶21 The 
G.s 
did 
eventually 
meet 
with 
three 
other 
attorneys, but all three declined to accept the representation.  
One of those attorneys informed the G.s that they had until 
September 13, 2015, to re-file a complaint before the expiration 
of the statute of limitations.  Attorney Fulkerson had failed to 
advise the G.s of this deadline.  The G.s never re-filed Li.G.'s 
complaint, and any claims she might have had became time-barred. 
¶22 On the basis of these stipulated facts, Attorney 
Fulkerson has admitted the following six counts of professional 
misconduct.  First, by agreeing to represent the G.s on a 
contingent fee basis but failing to enter into a written fee 
agreement signed by the clients, Attorney Fulkerson violated 
No. 
2017AP2529-D   
 
9 
 
SCR 20:1.5(c).2  Second, Attorney Fulkerson violated former 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4)3 when she deposited the $270 check from the G.s 
into her personal account rather than into a client trust 
account.  Third, by failing to acquire the legal knowledge 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.5(c) provides: 
A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the 
matter for which the service is rendered, except in a 
matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by par. 
(d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be 
in a writing signed by the client, and shall state the 
method by which the fee is to be determined, including 
the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the 
lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; 
litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the 
recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted 
before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The 
agreement must clearly notify the client of any 
expenses for which the client will be liable whether 
or not the client is the prevailing party. Upon 
conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer 
shall provide the client with a written statement 
stating the outcome of the matter and if there is a 
recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the 
method of its determination.   
3 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule." See S. Ct. 
Order 14-07, (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016). Because 
the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 2016, 
unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme court 
rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016. 
Former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) provided: 
Except as provided in par. (4m) unearned fees and 
advanced payments of fees shall be held in trust until 
earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant to sub. 
(g).  Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for 
payment of costs shall be held in trust until the 
costs are incurred.  
No. 
2017AP2529-D   
 
10 
 
needed to represent Li.G. in a medical malpractice action, 
including knowledge regarding the requirement of mediation in 
medical malpractice cases, Attorney Fulkerson violated SCR 
20:1.1.4  Fourth, Attorney Fulkerson failed to pursue Li.G.'s 
claims with reasonable diligence, in violation of SCR 20:1.3.5  
Fifth, Attorney Fulkerson's failure to inform the G.s that if 
the initial lawsuit on Li.G.'s behalf was dismissed without 
prejudice, they would have until September 13, 2015 to re-file 
the action constituted a violation of SCR 20:1.4(b).6  Finally, 
Attorney Fulkerson violated SCR 20:1.16(d)7 in multiple ways, 
including by failing to inform the G.s in a timely manner that 
she needed to withdraw from representing them due to her new 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:1.1 provides: "A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.  Competent representation requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation." 
5 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client."  
6 SCR 20:1.4(b) provides: "A lawyer shall explain a matter 
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation." 
7 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides:  
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred.  The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
No. 
2017AP2529-D   
 
11 
 
employment; by failing to withdraw from the representation until 
two months after she had begun her new position; by failing to 
provide the names of possible successor counsel, as she had 
promised; and by failing to inform the G.'s of the date by which 
they would need to re-file the lawsuit to avoid the claims 
becoming time-barred. 
¶23 Attorney Fulkerson agrees with the OLR's position that 
the appropriate level of discipline for the misconduct described 
above would be a public reprimand.  In its memorandum in support 
of the stipulation, the OLR compares and contrasts a number of 
disciplinary matters with similar types of misconduct that 
resulted in public reprimands or 60-day suspensions.  Compare 
Public Reprimand of Colleen J. Locke, No. 2013-3 (electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/ 
raw/002551.html), Public Reprimand of Sarah Clemment, No. 2011-6 
(electronic copy available at https://compendium.wicourts.gov/ 
app/raw/002365.html), and Public Reprimand of Daniel F. Snyder, 
No. 
2016-5 
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/002864.html) with In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Moldenhauer, 2016 WI 43, 369 
Wis. 2d 1, 879 N.W.2d 605 (imposing 60-day suspension), and In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle, 2015 WI 110, 365 Wis. 
2d 649, 872 N.W.2d 637 (imposing 60-day suspension). 
¶24 In the end we agree with the OLR that a public 
reprimand is the appropriate level of discipline in this case.  
Attorney Fulkerson has been admitted to the practice of law in 
this state for approximately 17 years and has previously 
No. 
2017AP2529-D   
 
12 
 
received only a private reprimand.  While her misconduct here 
was serious, it did not involve intentional misconduct or 
dishonesty.  It was limited to a single client representation, 
where Attorney Fulkerson unfortunately agreed to handle a matter 
in an area of the law where she lacked experience and 
competence.  We also note the mitigating factors referenced by 
the OLR.   
¶25 We believe that Attorney Fulkerson's misconduct is 
similar in nature and severity to the misconduct committed by 
Attorney Locke.  Public Reprimand of Colleen J. Locke, No. 2013-
3.  Attorney Locke had received one prior public reprimand, 
while Attorney Fulkerson has a previous private reprimand.  Like 
Attorney Fulkerson, Attorney Locke agreed to represent a client 
in an area of the law in which she had little experience (a 
bankruptcy proceeding).  She repeatedly failed to file correct 
forms and schedules in the bankruptcy proceeding, which caused 
delays, a motion to dismiss from the bankruptcy trustee, and her 
termination from the representation.  Attorney Locke admitted 
that she had violated SCRs 20:1.1 (lack of competence), 20:1.3 
(lack of diligence), and 20:1.5(b) and (c) (failure to enter 
into written fee agreement and failure to properly explain basis 
and rate of the fee).  In addition, unlike Attorney Fulkerson, 
in a separate matter Attorney Locke also admitted that she had 
violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by falsely testifying under oath that she 
had represented herself in a prior divorce proceeding.  While 
Attorney Fulkerson has admitted to a couple more counts of 
misconduct than did Attorney Locke, the primary thrust of both 
No. 
2017AP2529-D   
 
13 
 
matters is that the lawyers demonstrated a lack of competence 
and a lack of diligence, as well as failed to enter into proper 
written fee agreements.  Given Attorney Locke's additional false 
testimony under oath, we cannot say that Attorney Fulkerson 
deserves a more severe level of discipline. 
¶26 In its memorandum, the OLR states that it is not 
seeking restitution.  It notes that the only money Attorney 
Fulkerson received from the G.s was the $270.  While Attorney 
Fulkerson failed to maintain that amount in trust, she did 
ultimately use it to pay filing fees on behalf of the G.s.  
Thus, there are no funds belonging to the G.s that Attorney 
Fulkerson has wrongfully retained. 
¶27 After carefully reviewing this matter, we accept the 
stipulation and impose the requested public reprimand.  For the 
reasons given by the OLR, we do not impose any restitution 
obligation on Attorney Fulkerson.  Finally, although a referee 
did review and refuse a prior proposed consensual reprimand, 
this disciplinary proceeding has been resolved at its outset 
through a stipulation without the need for the appointment of a 
referee or the incurring of legal fees by the OLR.  Accordingly, 
we do not impose costs on Attorney Fulkerson. 
¶28 IT IS ORDERED that Holly Lynn Fulkerson is publicly 
reprimanded for her professional misconduct.   
 
No. 
2017AP2529-D   
 
 
 
1