Case Title: Johnson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 577, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
SCOTT O. JOHNSON,                      
           
Defendant Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
     
 
 
     
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
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   No. 577, 2003 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for New Castle County  
   Cr. A. No. IN02-12-2258  
                      
 
Submitted: May 13, 2004  
   Decided: July 20, 2004    
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 20th day of July 2004, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief filed 
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, and the 
State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Scott O. Johnson, pleaded guilty to one 
count of Possession of a Controlled Substance Within 300 Feet of a Park, 
Recreation Area or Place of Worship.1  He was sentenced to 5 years incarceration 
at Level V, to be suspended following successful completion of the Key Program, 
with the balance of the sentence to be served at Level IV, to be suspended after 6 
months for 2 years at Level III.  This is Johnson’s direct appeal. 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4768 (2003).  
 
 
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(2) 
Johnson’s trial counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 
26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a 
conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably 
support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its own review of the record 
and determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.2 
 
(3) 
Johnson’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By letter, 
Johnson’s counsel informed Johnson of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided 
him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying brief and the 
complete trial transcript.  Johnson was also informed of his right to supplement his 
attorney’s presentation.  Johnson responded with a brief that raises seven issues for 
this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to the position taken by 
Johnson’s counsel as well as the issues raised by Johnson and has moved to affirm 
the Superior Court’s judgment.   
                                                 
2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 
429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
 
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(4) 
Johnson raises several issues for this Court’s consideration, which 
may fairly be summarized as follows:  a) his counsel improperly waived the 
preliminary hearing on his behalf and the Superior Court improperly accepted the 
waiver; b) his constitutional rights were violated by the Probation/Parole officer 
who searched him; c) he was given an illegal sentence; d) the Superior Court 
should have permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea because the State did not 
fulfill its part of the bargain; and e) his counsel provided ineffective assistance. 
 
(5) 
The transcript of Johnson’s June 3, 2003 plea colloquy reflects that, in 
exchange for Johnson’s guilty plea to one count of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance Within 300 Feet of a Park, Recreation Area or Place of Worship, the 
State agreed to dismiss the additional charges of Possession with Intent to Deliver 
Cocaine, Resisting Arrest, Loitering, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.  The 
transcript also reflects that Johnson had reviewed the guilty plea form with his 
counsel and understood its contents, understood he was waiving his right to a trial 
and to present a motion to suppress, understood he could receive a potential 
maximum sentence of 15 years Level V incarceration, admitted he was guilty of 
the crime to which he was pleading guilty, and was satisfied with the 
representation provided by his counsel.  Based upon these representations, the 
 
 
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Superior Court found that Johnson had entered his guilty plea knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily.     
 
(6) 
In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, 
Johnson is bound by the representations he made during the guilty plea colloquy.3  
In addition, Johnson’s voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any alleged 
defects or errors occurring prior to the entry of the plea.4  For these reasons, we 
find Johnson’s first two claims regarding his waiver of the preliminary hearing and 
the search by the Probation/Parole officer to be without merit.   
 
(7) 
Johnson’s third claim of an illegal sentence is based upon his 
argument that the Superior Court imposed a period of probation in excess of the 
statutory maximum permitted under amended Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4333.5  
However, under the savings statute of the Delaware criminal code,6 as interpreted 
by the federal precedents,7 Johnson is not entitled to any benefit conferred by the 
                                                 
3 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
4 Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 311-12 (Del. 1988). 
5 Under amended Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4333(b) (2), the period of probation for an offense set 
forth in Title 16 is limited to 18 months. 
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 211(b) (2001). 
7 Because the savings statute is modeled, in part, on a federal statute, federal caselaw may be 
used to interpret it.  State v. Ismaaeel, Del. Super., Cr. ID No. 0304002130, Stokes, J. (Jan. 13, 
2004), aff’d. Del. Supr., No. 17, 2004, Steele, C.J. (June 25, 2004). 
 
 
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amended statute because its effective date was subsequent to the date of the crime 
to which he pleaded guilty.8  Johnson’s claim is, thus, without merit. 
 
(8) 
Johnson next claims that he should have been permitted to withdraw 
his guilty plea because the State did not fulfill its promise to recommend only a 
probationary sentence in exchange for Johnson’s cooperation in a future drug 
investigation.  The plea agreement itself does not reflect any such promise by the 
State.  In fact, during the plea colloquy, Johnson stated that he understood that he 
could receive as much as a 15-year Level V sentence and that no one had promised 
him what his sentence would be.  It appears that, in a collateral agreement, the 
prosecutor offered to recommend probation if Johnson provided substantial 
assistance in a drug investigation.  It also appears, however, that the prosecutor did 
not believe Johnson provided substantial assistance and, for that reason, did not 
recommend probation for Johnson at the sentencing hearing.  Because Johnson has 
failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor breached any enforceable agreement, this 
claim must fail. 
                                                 
8 Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 661 (1974).  The record reflects that 
the crime was committed in December 2002; however, the amended statute did not become 
effective until May 31, 2003. 
 
 
 
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(9) 
Johnson’s final claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not 
decided on the merits in the Superior Court.  We, therefore, decline to address it 
for the first time in this direct appeal.9 
 
(10) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Johnson’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 
issue.  We also are satisfied that Johnson’s counsel has made a conscientious effort 
to examine the record and the law and has properly determined that Johnson could 
not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to 
withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
9 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994).