Case Title: 118th Street Kenosha, LLC v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp.

Citation: 2014 WI 125

Docket Number: 2012AP002784

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 125 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2784 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
118th Street Kenosha, LLC, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 352 Wis. 2d 183, 841 N.W.2d 568) 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2013 WI App 147 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 10, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 10, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Bruce E. Schroeder 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Abigail C.S. Potts, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief by Charles 
P. Graupner, Susan M. Sager, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, 
Milwaukee, with oral argument by Charles P. Graupner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 125
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP2784 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV212) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
118th Street Kenosha, LLC, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 10, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals,1 which reversed the 
order of the Kenosha County Circuit Court2 that granted the 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation's ("DOT") motion in 
limine to exclude evidence of diminution in value of commercial 
property owned by 118th Street Kenosha, LLC ("the LLC").  We 
                                                 
1 118th St. Kenosha, LLC v. DOT, 2013 WI App 147, 352 
Wis. 2d 183, 841 N.W.2d 568. 
2 The Honorable Bruce E. Schroeder presided. 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
2 
 
reverse the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court to 
dismiss the action. 
¶2 
The LLC owns commercial property consisting of a four-
store shopping center in the City of Kenosha.  Before 2010 the 
commercial property had direct access to 118th Avenue by a 
driveway onto 118th Avenue and indirect access to 118th Avenue 
by a driveway onto 74th Place, a private road that intersected 
with 118th Avenue.  In 2010 the DOT performed three acts 
relevant to this case: the DOT (1) relocated 118th Avenue to the 
east one block, thereby eliminating the commercial property's 
direct access to 118th Avenue; (2) acquired a temporary limited 
easement3 that authorized the DOT to construct a new double-
throated driveway connecting the commercial property to 74th 
Place; and (3) constructed that new driveway onto 74th Place.  
After the DOT finished these three acts, the commercial property 
had two driveways to 74th Place, indirect access to 118th Avenue 
via 74th Place, and no direct access to 118th Avenue.  The DOT 
paid the LLC $21,000 for the temporary limited easement.  The 
LLC 
and 
the 
DOT 
stipulated 
that 
$21,000 
was 
adequate 
compensation for the temporary limited easement itself. An 
appraiser determined that the commercial property's value 
                                                 
3 "An easement provides a nonpossessory right to enter and 
use land in the possession of another that obligates the 
landowner not to interfere with the uses authorized by the 
easement."  Savage v. Am. Transmission Co., 2013 WI App 20, ¶1, 
346 Wis. 2d 130, 828 N.W.2d 244 (citing Restatement (Third) of 
Prop.: Servitudes § 1.2 (2000)). 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
3 
 
declined by $400,000 because the relocation of 118th Avenue 
caused the commercial property to lose direct access and 
proximity to 118th Avenue.   
¶3 
The LLC now seeks to recover damages under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6g) (2011-12)4 for the commercial property's diminution 
in value caused by the relocation of 118th Avenue. Subsection 
32.09(6g) provides compensation for diminution in value caused 
by "the taking of an easement."  Because the temporary limited 
easement and the relocation of 118th Avenue were both part of 
the same greater highway reconstruction project, the LLC argues 
its award for the temporary limited easement under § 32.09(6g) 
should include damages for the commercial property's decline in 
value caused by the relocation of 118th Avenue.  
¶4 
This case presents the following three issues: 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.  Subsection (6g) 
was created by § 7, ch. 440, Laws of 1977, and it provides:  
In the case of the taking of an easement, the 
compensation to be paid by the condemnor shall be 
determined by deducting from the fair market value of 
the whole property immediately before the date of 
evaluation, the fair market value of the remainder 
immediately after the date of evaluation, assuming the 
completion of the public improvement and giving 
effect, without allowance of offset for general 
benefits, 
and 
without 
restriction 
because 
of 
enumeration but without duplication, to the items of 
loss or damage to the property enumerated in sub. 
(6)(a) to (g) where shown to exist. 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
4 
 
(1)  Is a temporary limited easement compensable under Wis. 
Stat. § 32.09(6g)?5 
(2)  Assuming 
that 
a 
temporary 
limited 
easement 
is 
compensable under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g), did the circuit court 
appropriately exercise its discretion when it excluded evidence 
of the commercial property's diminution in value from lost 
direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue because the 
temporary limited easement did not cause the loss? 
(3)  Is the LLC barred from recovering compensation for the 
commercial property's loss of direct access and proximity to 
118th Avenue because the relocation of 118th Avenue was a proper 
exercise of the DOT's police power? 
¶5 
The crux of the issue before this court is whether 
damages under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) for the temporary limited 
easement include the commercial property's diminution in value 
caused by its loss of direct access and proximity to 118th 
Avenue due to that road's relocation, although the temporary 
limited easement did not cause that loss of direct access and 
proximity. 
¶6 
For purposes of our analysis, we assume, without 
deciding, that a temporary limited easement is compensable under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g). 
                                                 
5 The LLC's claim for compensation for loss of direct access 
and proximity to 118th Avenue is based solely on Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6g).  The LLC does not ask us to, and we do not, 
determine whether the LLC could be entitled to compensation for 
that loss under any other claim. 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
5 
 
¶7 
We conclude that the LLC is precluded from seeking 
damages 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(6g) 
for 
the 
commercial 
property's diminution in value which resulted from its loss of 
direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue due to the 118th 
Avenue relocation.  The temporary limited easement did not cause 
the commercial property to lose direct access and proximity to 
118th Avenue, so damages under § 32.09(6g) for the temporary 
limited easement cannot include damages for the loss of direct 
access and proximity to 118th Avenue.  Because the LLC seeks 
damages for its loss of direct access and proximity to 118th 
Avenue, the circuit court did not err by excluding evidence of 
those damages in the § 32.09(6g) claim for taking an easement.  
Thus, the LLC improperly seeks compensation under § 32.09(6g) 
for the commercial property's diminution in value based on its 
lost direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue when 118th 
Avenue was relocated.  Because our resolution of the narrow 
issue presented disposes of the LLC's claim, we need not address 
the other issues presented.  See Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v. 
Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15.   
¶8 
We affirm the circuit court's grant of the DOT's 
motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of damages caused 
by the LLC's loss of direct access and proximity to 118th 
Avenue. We reverse the court of appeals and remand to the 
circuit court to dismiss the action. 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶9 
The LLC owns 1.83 acres or 79,715 square feet of land 
("commercial property") that consists of a one-story strip mall 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
6 
 
with four stores and restaurants.  The commercial property is 
located at 7300 118th Avenue in the City of Kenosha, just 
northeast of the intersection of Interstate 94 and State Trunk 
Highway 50.  Before 2010 the eastern side of the commercial 
property abutted 118th Avenue and the southern side abutted 74th 
Place, a private road.  A driveway on the northeastern side of 
the commercial property provided direct access to 118th Avenue. 
An existing single-lane driveway on the southern side of the 
commercial property provided direct access to 74th Place.  The 
commercial property had indirect access to 118th Avenue via 74th 
Place, which intersected with the western side of 118th Avenue.  
¶10 On January 4, 2010, the DOT acquired a temporary 
limited easement of .262 acres of the commercial property for 
the purpose of constructing a new double-throated driveway 
connecting the commercial property to 74th Place.  Sometime in 
2010, the DOT built the new driveway.6  The DOT awarded the LLC 
$21,000 in damages for the temporary limited easement.7  This new 
driveway was located on the southern side of the commercial 
property, near the commercial property's existing single-lane 
driveway to 74th Place.  Therefore, the double-throated driveway 
provided the commercial property with two points of direct 
                                                 
6 The record indicates that the new driveway was constructed 
in 2010 without providing a more specific date.  
7 The record suggests the $21,000 was for the rental value 
of the property encumbered by the temporary limited easement and 
for the loss of landscaping that resulted from the temporary 
limited easement. 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
7 
 
access to 74th Place instead of one.  The DOT acquired this 
temporary limited easement as part of a greater highway 
reconstruction project ("Highway Reconstruction Project").8 
¶11 Also sometime in 2010, as part of the greater Highway 
Reconstruction Project, the DOT vacated and relocated to the 
east one block the portion of 118th Avenue that abutted the 
LLC's commercial property.  After 118th Avenue was relocated, 
the commercial property no longer abutted the Avenue; thus, it 
lost direct access to 118th Avenue.  The DOT did not alter 74th 
Place or the fact that it connected to 118th Avenue.   
¶12 On January 24, 2011, the LLC appealed to the circuit 
court the DOT's award and sought additional compensation under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) for the commercial property's decline in 
value caused by the loss of direct access and proximity to 118th 
Avenue when the Avenue was relocated.  Specifically, the LLC's 
expert appraiser determined that the commercial property's "loss 
of direct access to [118th Avenue], and the loss of proximity to 
[118th Avenue]" caused the commercial property's value to 
decline by $400,000.  The LLC did not allege that $21,000 was 
inadequate compensation for the temporary limited easement 
itself.  The damages at issue in this appeal instead relate to 
the property's diminution in value because it lost direct access 
                                                 
8 This project involved the taking of more than 50 temporary 
limited easements and more than one dozen permanent easements 
from various landowners. 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
8 
 
and proximity to 118th Avenue due to the Highway Reconstruction 
Project.  
II. 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶13 On December 27, 2011, the DOT filed a motion in limine 
with the circuit court, requesting the court to exclude evidence 
of damages caused by the LLC's loss of direct access and 
proximity to 118th Avenue.  On November 5, 2012, the circuit 
court granted the DOT's motion in limine. 
¶14 The circuit court reasoned that Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) 
allows only damages that result from an easement.  The circuit 
court stated that § 32.09(6g) "merely identifies the damages 
which are allowed if, and only if, caused by a taking by the 
state." (Emphasis in original.)  According to the circuit court, 
the LLC's loss of direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue 
"was caused by the vacation of the street [118th Avenue], not by 
the taking of any property from the plaintiff.  Damages are 
allowed under § 32.09(6g), Stats., only for loss which was a 
consequence of the particular taking."  
¶15 On November 9, 2012, the DOT and the LLC entered into 
a stipulated judgment that preserved each party's right to 
appeal the circuit court's ruling on the DOT's motion in limine.  
The parties agreed that $21,000 was the fair value of the 
temporary limited easement itself.  The DOT already paid the LLC 
that amount in damages. 
¶16 On November 20, 2013, the court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court's decision granting the DOT's motion in 
limine.  118th St. Kenosha, LLC v. DOT, 2013 WI App 147, ¶1, 352 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
9 
 
Wis. 2d 183, 841 N.W.2d 568.  The court of appeals reasoned that 
"the temporary easement was integrally connected with the 
property's loss of direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue."  
Id., ¶9.  The court noted that Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) requires 
that compensation for an easement be determined while "assuming 
the completion of the public improvement."  Id., ¶10.  Based on 
the "integral connection" between the temporary limited easement 
and the relocation of 118th Avenue, the court of appeals held 
that the "public improvement" mentioned in § 32.09(6g) refers to 
the relocation of 118th Avenue.  Id.  Thus, the court of appeals 
held that the LLC's damages for the temporary limited easement 
may include damages under § 32.09(6g) for the LLC's loss of 
direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue.  Id., ¶11. 
¶17 The DOT petitioned this court for review, and we 
granted the petition. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 We must determine whether the circuit court properly 
excluded evidence that the LLC's compensation for the temporary 
limited easement should include damages under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6g) for the LLC's loss of direct access and proximity to 
118th Avenue. "This court will not disturb a circuit court's 
decision to admit or exclude evidence unless the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion."  Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 
67, ¶41, 341 Wis. 2d 668, 816 N.W.2d 191 (citing State v. 
Ringer, 2010 WI 69, ¶24, 326 Wis. 2d 351, 785 N.W.2d 448).  "A 
circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if it applies 
an improper legal standard or makes a decision not reasonably 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
10 
 
supported by the facts of record."  260 N. 12th St., LLC v. DOT, 
2011 WI 103, ¶38, 338 Wis. 2d 34, 808 N.W.2d 372 (citing Ringer, 
326 Wis. 2d 351, ¶24). 
¶19 To determine whether evidence was admissible under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g), we must interpret and apply that 
statute. 
 
See 
id., 
¶39. 
 
"Statutory 
interpretation 
and 
application present questions of law that we review de novo 
while benefiting from the analyses of the court of appeals and 
circuit court."  Id. (citing E–L Enters., Inc. v. Milwaukee 
Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2010 WI 58, ¶20, 326 Wis. 2d 82, 785 
N.W.2d 409). 
¶20 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (citations omitted).  We give statutory language "its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Id. (citing Bruno v. Milwaukee 
Cnty., 2003 WI 28, ¶¶8, 20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656; 
Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1)).  We interpret statutory language in the 
context of the statute in which it is used and in relation to 
closely-related statutes.  Id., ¶46 (citations omitted).  We do 
not consult extrinsic sources of interpretation, such as 
legislative history, if the statutory language is unambiguous.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
11 
 
A. The DOT's Arguments 
¶21 The DOT argues that the LLC cannot recover damages 
under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) for the LLC's loss of direct access 
and proximity to 118th Avenue.  First, the DOT argues that 
damages for a temporary limited easement are not compensable 
under § 32.09(6g), which the DOT argues is "ineffective and 
unsuitable" for calculating damages for a temporary limited 
easement.  According to the DOT, a temporary limited easement 
often does not affect the value of the subject property, so 
damages under § 32.09(6g) would unconstitutionally result in no 
compensation for the property owner in many cases.  The DOT 
urges this court to hold that rental-value damages for a 
temporary limited easement are available under the Wisconsin 
Constitution's takings clause9 or § 32.09(6).10 
                                                 
9 Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides that "[t]he property of no person shall be taken for 
public use without just compensation therefor." 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(6) (intro.) provides: 
In the case of a partial taking of property other 
than an easement, the compensation to be paid by the 
condemnor shall be the greater of either the fair 
market value of the property taken as of the date of 
evaluation or the sum determined by deducting from the 
fair market value of the whole property immediately 
before the date of evaluation, the fair market value 
of the remainder immediately after the date of 
evaluation, assuming the completion of the public 
improvement and giving effect, without allowance of 
offset for general benefits, and without restriction 
because of enumeration but without duplication, to the 
following items of loss or damage to the property 
where shown to exist . . . . 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
12 
 
¶22 If this court holds or assumes without deciding that 
damages for a temporary limited easement are compensable under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g), the DOT argues that the LLC may not 
recover damages under § 32.09(6g) for its loss of direct access 
and proximity to 118th Avenue, for two reasons.  First, the DOT 
argues that, under the facts of this case, the LLC's damages 
under § 32.09(6g) for the temporary limited easement may not 
include damages for the LLC's loss of direct access and 
proximity to 118th Avenue because the temporary limited easement 
did not cause the LLC to lose direct access and proximity to 
118th Avenue.  Instead, according to the DOT, the relocation of 
118th Avenue caused the LLC to lose direct access and proximity 
to 118th Avenue.  The DOT relies on Jantz v. State, 63 
Wis. 2d 404, 217 N.W.2d 266 (1974), and More-Way North Corp. v. 
State Highway Commission, 44 Wis. 2d 165, 170 N.W.2d 749 (1969), 
for the proposition that damages for a temporary limited 
easement may not include damages which were not caused by the 
temporary limited easement. 
¶23 Second, the DOT argues that the LLC's damages for the 
temporary limited easement may not include damages under Wis. 
Stat. § 32.09(6g) for the LLC's loss of direct access and 
proximity to 118th Avenue because the DOT used its police power 
to limit the LLC's direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue.11 
                                                 
11 At oral argument, the DOT argued that Wis. Stat. § 84.29 
gives it a police power to relocate a public road, including 
118th Avenue.  
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
13 
 
Relying on Stefan Auto Body v. State Highway Commission, 21 
Wis. 2d 363, 124 N.W.2d 319 (1963), and Chicago & Northwestern 
Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 178 Wis. 485, 
188 N.W. 86 (1922), the DOT argues that relocating a public road 
is an exercise of the police power.  The DOT relies on Surety 
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Department of Transportation, 54 
Wis. 2d 438, 195 N.W.2d 464 (1972), to argue that a landowner 
may not recover damages for loss of direct access to a public 
road if the State eliminated that direct access under its police 
power and if the landowner retained other access to the public 
road.  Because the LLC retained indirect access to 118th Avenue 
via 74th Place after 118th Avenue was relocated, the DOT argues, 
the LLC's damages for the temporary limited easement may not 
include damages under § 32.09(6g) for the LLC's loss of direct 
access to 118th Avenue.  
B. The LLC's Arguments 
¶24 The LLC argues that its damages for the temporary 
limited easement should include damages under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6g) for the LLC's loss of direct access and proximity to 
118th Avenue.  The LLC notes that § 32.09 (intro.) states:  "In 
all matters involving the determination of just compensation in 
eminent domain proceedings, the following rules shall be 
followed . . . ."  The LLC relies on the language of § 32.09(6g) 
to argue that § 32.09(6g) provides the proper method of 
calculating 
the 
LLC's 
damages 
for 
the 
temporary 
limited 
easement.  Subsection 32.09(6g) states that its method for 
determining damages applies "[i]n the case of the taking of an 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
14 
 
easement . . . ."  The LLC argues that this statutory language 
does not distinguish between temporary and permanent easements.  
According to the LLC, the DOT is asking this court to improperly 
insert 
the 
word 
"permanent" 
immediately 
before 
the 
word 
"easement."  
¶25 The LLC further argues that, according to the language 
of Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g), the LLC's damages for the temporary 
limited easement may include damages for the LLC's loss of 
direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue.  The LLC notes that 
§ 32.09(6g) states, by reference to § 32.09(6), that damages for 
loss of access and proximity are compensable under § 32.09(6)(b) 
and (6)(e) "where shown to exist."  The LLC argues that 
§ 32.09(6g)'s command to "assum[e] the completion of the public 
improvement" when calculating damages for an easement refers to 
the relocation of 118th Avenue, not the construction of the 
double-throated driveway.  Specifically, § 32.09(6g) provides 
compensation "determined by deducting from the fair market value 
of the whole property immediately before the date of evaluation, 
the fair market value of the remainder immediately after the 
date of evaluation, assuming the completion of the public 
improvement . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g). 
¶26 Additionally, the LLC argues that it lost direct 
access to 118th Avenue when 118th Avenue was relocated, and that 
a landowner is entitled to compensation for loss of direct 
access to a public road abutting the landowner's property.  The 
LLC quotes our prior cases that have stated a right to access a 
public road abutting one's property "is a property right, the 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
15 
 
taking of which requires compensation," Narloch v. DOT, 115 
Wis. 2d 419, 430, 340 N.W.2d 542 (1983) (citation omitted), and 
"the deprivation or restriction of an existing right of access 
is compensable under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)."  Nat'l Auto 
Truckstops, Inc. v. DOT, 2003 WI 95, ¶18, 263 Wis. 2d 649, 665 
N.W.2d 198.  
¶27 The LLC disagrees with the DOT's argument that the 
LLC's loss of direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue is 
separate and distinct from the temporary limited easement.  The 
LLC argues that the temporary limited easement was an "integral" 
part of the Highway Reconstruction Project, which caused 118th 
Avenue to be relocated.  According to the LLC, 118th Avenue 
would not have been relocated if the DOT did not acquire a 
temporary limited easement to build the double-throated driveway 
that connected the commercial property to 74th Place.  The LLC 
reasons that its appraiser stated in an affidavit that the 
commercial property would have had legally insufficient access 
for emergency vehicles if its only access point were the 
preexisting 
single-lane 
driveway 
connecting 
the 
commercial 
property to 74th Place.  The LLC argues that Jantz and More-Way 
North are distinguishable because each of those cases involved a 
landowner's attempt to receive damages for a public road's 
change of grade, whereas the LLC is not seeking damages for 
change of grade. 
¶28 The LLC also disagrees with the DOT's argument that 
the DOT exercised its police power when it relocated 118th 
Avenue.  The LLC argues that the DOT used its eminent domain 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
16 
 
powers under Wis. Stat. ch. 32 to acquire the temporary limited 
easement and used its eminent domain power under Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.09 to relocate 118th Avenue.  The LLC argues that in 
National Auto Truckstops, 263 Wis. 2d 649, Crown Zellerbach 
Corp. v. Department of City Development of Milwaukee, 47 
Wis. 2d 142, 177 N.W.2d 94 (1970), and Hastings Realty Corp. v. 
Texas Co., 28 Wis. 2d 305, 137 N.W.2d 79 (1965), we rejected the 
State's attempt to characterize its use of its eminent domain 
power as an exercise of its police power.  
¶29 Finally, the LLC rejects the DOT's assertion that the 
LLC dedicated to the State its legal right to access 118th 
Avenue.  The LLC argues that the DOT abandoned this assertion 
before the circuit court. 
 
C. General Legal Principles 
¶30 Because we decide this case on one narrow ground, we 
need not decide the broader issues today.  Maryland Arms, 326 
Wis. 2d 300, ¶48.  We do, however, briefly depart to discuss 
pertinent general legal principles.  "'The right of access to 
and from a public highway is one of the incidents of the 
ownership or occupancy of land abutting thereon.'"  Hastings 
Realty, 28 Wis. 2d at 310 (quoting Royal Transit, Inc. v. 
Village of West Milwaukee, 266 Wis. 271, 277, 63 N.W.2d 62 
(1954)). "'[H]ighway access rights are but one of a bundle of 
rights which appertain to a parcel of real estate.'"  Id. at 311 
(quoting Nick v. State Highway Comm'n, 13 Wis. 2d 511, 517-18, 
109 N.W.2d 71 (1961) (Currie, J., concurring)). 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
17 
 
¶31 However, when the government relocates a road, it is 
not always required to compensate all who are adversely affected 
by the relocation.  Surety Savings & Loan, 54 Wis. 2d at 444.  
The State may exercise its police power to authorize the 
relocation of a highway.  Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 178 Wis. at 
491 ("The state has ample power, in the exercise of the police 
power, to authorize the relocation of the highway in order to 
protect the public . . . .") (citations omitted).  "Where access 
to a highway is controlled under the exercise of the police 
power 
and 
reasonable 
access 
remains, 
no 
compensation 
is 
required."  Schneider v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 458, 462, 187 
N.W.2d 172 (1971) (citing Nick, 13 Wis. 2d 511). Eminent domain 
can occur contemporaneously with the exercise of police power.  
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(4).  
¶32 In Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Commission, 92 
Wis. 2d 74, 80, 284 N.W.2d 887 (1979), we stated, "there must be 
a taking before there can be a claim for just compensation."  In 
More-Way North we stated, "[M]ere consequential damage to 
property resulting from governmental action is not a taking 
thereof. 
 
Sec. 
13, 
art. 
I, 
Wis. 
Const., . . . does 
not 
undertake, . . . to socialize all losses, but only those which 
result from a taking of property."  More-Way N. Corp., 44 
Wis. 2d at 170 (quoting Wis. Power & Light Co. v. Columbia 
Cnty., 3 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 87 N.W.2d 279 (1958)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
¶33 Distinct projects are frequently undertaken during a 
highway construction project, but that does not necessarily 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
18 
 
merge each project into one single compensable act.  We 
explained in Jantz that the fact "[t]hat both undertakings are 
related to a single overall highway improvement purpose does not 
merge the actions into a single act . . . ."  Jantz, 63 
Wis. 2d at 411.  Further, even if a highway construction project 
results in damages that are compensable under a particular 
statute, those damages cannot be recovered in a claim brought 
under the wrong statute.  See id. at 411-12. 
¶34 This discussion begs the question: had the DOT not 
undertaken the temporary limited easement project to create the 
additional driveway with access to 74th Place, would the LLC 
otherwise have a viable claim for the damages it seeks?  Cf. 
DeBruin v. Green Cnty., 72 Wis. 2d 464, 471, 241 N.W.2d 167 
(1976).  We need not endeavor to answer this question today. 
 
D. Damages Available for an Easement  
under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) 
¶35 The LLC seeks damages under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) for 
the commercial property's diminution in value caused by its loss 
of direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue.  The LLC's loss 
of direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue was caused by the 
relocation of 118th Avenue.  We begin our analysis with a plain 
reading of the statute.  Subsection 32.09(6g) provides: 
In the case of the taking of an easement, the 
compensation to be paid by the condemnor shall be 
determined by deducting from the fair market value of 
the whole property immediately before the date of 
evaluation, the fair market value of the remainder 
immediately after the date of evaluation, assuming the 
completion of the public improvement and giving 
effect, without allowance of offset for general 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
19 
 
benefits, 
and 
without 
restriction 
because 
of 
enumeration but without duplication, to the items of 
loss or damage to the property enumerated in sub. 
(6)(a) to (g) where shown to exist.  
¶36 It is true that Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) allows for 
recovery of damages enumerated in § 32.09(6)(a) to (6)(g), but 
compensation is due for "the taking of an easement."  The LLC 
argues that, because its commercial property was subject to a 
temporary limited easement, § 32.09(6g) allows the LLC to 
recover damages for its loss of direct access and proximity to 
118th Avenue under § 32.09(6)(b) and (6)(e), respectively.  
However, the LLC falls short of adequately explaining how the 
"taking of the easement" caused these damages.  Here, the 
temporary limited easement provided the LLC with additional 
access to 74th Place, but the easement did not cause the LLC to 
lose direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue.12  
                                                 
12 We note that the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) 
also causes us to pause when considering whether that statutory 
subsection is designed to apply to temporary limited easements 
in the first instance.  See also More-Way N. Corp. v. State 
Highway Comm'n, 44 Wis. 2d 165, 173-75, 170 N.W.2d 749 (1969) 
(holding that a temporary limited easement did not effect an 
actual permanent taking). First, the plain language of the 
statute references easements, not temporary limited easements.  
Second, the before and after valuation approach arguably creates 
confusion in temporary limited easement cases because it does 
not consider the temporary nature of the easement.  Third, this 
statutory subsection may not apply to a temporary limited 
easement because a temporary limited easement often will 
terminate upon completion of the project.  Thus, a benefit, 
rather than a detriment, may accrue to the property.  Thus, the 
before and after valuation leaves no room for compensation for 
many temporary easements.  As a result, Wisconsin Constitution, 
Article I, Section 13, and W.H. Pugh Coal Co. v. State, 157 
Wis. 2d 620, 631, 460 N.W.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1990), instruct that 
rental value may be the appropriate measure, rather than 
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
20 
 
¶37 Subsection 32.09(6g) states that compensation for an 
easement is calculated by considering the fair market value of 
the whole property immediately before and after the "date of 
evaluation,"13 which other statutory provisions explain is the 
date on which the easement is acquired.  Wis. Stat. §§ 32.09(1), 
32.06(7).14  Thus, the plain purpose of considering the "date of 
evaluation" is to determine the damages to the property caused 
by the taking of an easement.  See Hoekstra v. Guardian 
Pipeline, LLC, 2006 WI App 245, ¶13, 298 Wis. 2d 165, 726 
N.W.2d 648 (holding that § 32.09(6g) provides compensation for 
damages that occurred "'because of'" an easement) (quoting 
Arents v. ANR Pipeline Co., 2005 WI App 61, ¶14, 281 
Wis. 2d 173, 696 N.W.2d 194).  We conclude that § 32.09(6g) 
plainly allows compensation for damages caused by the taking of 
an easement.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45. 
¶38 As we assume, without deciding, that a temporary 
limited easement is compensable under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g), we 
                                                                                                                                                             
§ 32.09(6g), when a temporary easement occurs.  The $21,000 
awarded in this case seems to compensate for the temporary 
limited 
easement's 
rental 
value 
and 
resulting 
loss 
of 
landscaping. 
13 The "date of evaluation" generally is the date on which 
the easement is acquired.  Wis. Stat. §§ 32.09(1), 32.06(7); see 
also 260 N. 12th St., LLC v. DOT, 2011 WI 103, ¶45, 338 
Wis. 2d 34, 808 N.W.2d 372; Fields v. Am. Transmission Co., 2010 
WI App 59, ¶13, 324 Wis. 2d 417, 782 N.W.2d 729.  
14 We may consider closely related statutory provisions.  
See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 
58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
21 
 
proceed to the crux of the issue at hand, which distills into 
whether under these facts, damages are properly awarded under 
§ 32.09(6g) for the commercial property's diminution in value 
caused by the loss of direct access and proximity to 118th 
Avenue.   
¶39 In so doing, we first turn to case law which has 
analyzed how damages for an easement are determined under Wis. 
Stat. § 32.09(6g).  Recognizing that More-Way North determined 
that a temporary limited easement did not effect an actual 
permanent taking, we nonetheless endeavor to further discuss 
§ 32.09(6g) damages for easements.  See More-Way N. Corp., 44 
Wis. 2d at 176. 
¶40 For example, in Hoekstra, Guardian Pipeline obtained 
an easement to install a natural gas transmission pipeline on 
the Hoekstras' property.  Hoekstra, 298 Wis. 2d 165, ¶1.  At 
trial, the circuit court excluded evidence that prospective 
buyers' fear of gas pipelines reduced the value of the 
Hoekstras' property.  Id., ¶15.  The court of appeals reversed 
because the property's alleged diminution in value was caused by 
the easement.  See id., ¶¶17-23.  
¶41 Similarly, in Savage v. American Transmission Co., 
2013 WI App 20, 346 Wis. 2d 130, 828 N.W.2d 244, American 
Transmission acquired a new easement to add more wires to an 
electricity transmission line that was already on Savage's 
property.  Savage, 346 Wis. 2d 130, ¶4.  At trial, the circuit 
court excluded evidence that the easement precluded Savage from 
using the easement property as he could have before.  Id., ¶6.  
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
22 
 
The court of appeals reversed and concluded that because the new 
easement precluded Savage from using the property as he could 
have before, Savage could introduce evidence of damages caused 
by the new easement's restrictions.  Id., ¶¶15-16. 
¶42 Fields v. American Transmission Co., 2010 WI App 59, 
324 Wis. 2d 417, 782 N.W.2d 729, further demonstrates that a 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) claim for damages is not as sweeping as 
the LLC suggests.  American Transmission acquired a new easement 
to replace the electricity transmission poles on the Fields' 
property.  Fields, 324 Wis. 2d 417, ¶¶5, 6, 11.  Poles were 
previously located on the Fields' property under an existing 
easement from 1948.  Id., ¶¶1, 4.  The Fields sought 
compensation for the new easement.  Id., ¶1.  In proving their 
claim under § 32.09(6g), the Fields were entitled only to 
damages caused by the new easement, not for the 1948 easement.  
Id. 
¶43 These three court of appeals cases demonstrate that, 
even where a more permanent easement taking occurs, damages 
under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) are limited to those caused by the 
easement at issue.  Because the temporary limited easement did 
not cause the diminution in value of the LLC's commercial 
property, no published Wisconsin case interpreting § 32.09(6g) 
allows the LLC to recover damages for its commercial property's 
diminution in value as part of the LLC's damages for the 
temporary limited easement.   
 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
23 
 
E. May the LLC's Damages under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) Include 
the Commercial Property's Diminution in Value Caused by the 
Relocation of 118th Avenue? 
¶44 Our analysis of whether damages are compensable under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) for the commercial property's diminution 
in value caused by the relocation of 118th Avenue is further 
guided by precedent which has considered what damages are due 
when a taking occurs in a highway relocation project.  In the 
case at issue, it is not disputed that no property was taken 
from the LLC and the property's size and boundaries remained 
unchanged.  However, the LLC lost the commercial property's 
proximity and direct access to 118th Avenue when that road was 
relocated.  The following cases, while not § 32.09(6g) easement 
cases, inform our analysis. 
¶45 For example, in Carazalla v. State, 269 Wis. 593, 70 
N.W.2d 208 (1955) ("Carazalla I"), the Carazallas' farm abutted 
United States Highway 51 in Marathon County.  Carazalla I, 269 
Wis. at 595.  The county used eminent domain to acquire 13.05 
acres of the Carazallas' farm property, but the property taken 
did not include an access point to the highway.  See id. at 595, 
597.  Highway 51 was then constructed on the acquired land.  Id. 
at 595-97.  At trial over compensation due for the taking, the 
circuit court allowed evidence that the relocation of Highway 51 
caused the Carazallas' property to become less valuable.  Id. at 
597-98.  Initially, in Carazalla I, Justice Currie's unanimous 
opinion held that the circuit court did not err by allowing that 
evidence.  Id. at 606-08. 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
24 
 
¶46 On rehearing in Carazalla v. State, 269 Wis. 593, 71 
N.W.2d 276 (1955) ("Carazalla II"), however, we made clear that 
the court erred in admitting such evidence.  Justice Currie's 
unanimous 
opinion 
thus 
concluded 
that 
in 
calculating 
compensation due for the partial taking of land, the circuit 
court indeed erred when it allowed the jury to consider the 
diminution in value caused by the relocation of the highway.  
Carazalla II, 269 Wis. at 608c.  We clarified that Carazalla I 
was incorrect to conclude that the partial taking of land and 
relocation of the highway "were so interwoven that" the two acts 
were "an inseparable whole," because the two acts really were 
"separate and distinct."  Id.  In other words, we clarified in 
Carazalla II that compensation for a taking cannot include 
damages for a lost point of access to a highway if the point of 
access was lost because of an act separate from the taking, such 
as the highway's relocation. 
¶47 Similarly, in Jantz, Jantz sought damages for a 
partial 
taking 
of 
land 
that 
occurred 
during 
a 
highway 
relocation.  Jantz owned a bar and grill that abutted United 
States Highway 41-45 and Maple Road in Washington County.  
Jantz, 63 Wis. 2d at 406.  Jantz's property had access to 
Highway 41-45 only via Maple Road.  See id.  The DOT used 
eminent domain to acquire .38 acres of Jantz's land adjacent to 
Highway 41-45.  Id.  The property taken did not include Jantz's 
point of access to the highway.  See id.  The DOT built 
additional highway lanes on the strip of land acquired from 
Jantz.  Id.  The DOT also relocated Maple Road.  Id.  Jantz's 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
25 
 
property maintained access to Highway 41-45 via Maple Road.  Id.  
Jantz argued, however, that the value of her bar and grill 
declined because the roadway relocation left her with circuitous 
access to the highway.15  Id. at 406-07.  At trial, the circuit 
court excluded evidence that the circuity of access or change in 
grade reduced the value of Jantz's property.  Id. at 407. 
¶48 On appeal, we upheld the circuit court's exclusion of 
that evidence.  Id. at 412.  We reasoned that the relocation of 
Maple Road was separate from the partial taking of land.  Id. at 
411.  In other words, damages for the circuitous access to the 
relocated highway were not included in the compensation for the 
partial taking because those damages were not "a consequence of 
the taking of .38 acre of land . . . ."  Id. at 412.  Even if 
the relocation of Maple Road and the partial taking of Jantz's 
land 
were 
somehow 
"related 
to 
a 
single 
overall 
highway 
improvement purpose," that fact would not transform the partial 
                                                 
15 Jantz also argued that her property's value declined 
because of the change of grade of the highway, the right-of-way 
due to the change of grade, the loss of view to and from the 
property, and loss of income of the bar and grill.  Jantz v. 
State, 63 Wis. 2d 404, 406-07, 217 N.W.2d 266 (1974).  The LLC 
is incorrect in concluding that Jantz involved only a change in 
grade. 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
26 
 
taking claim into a valid claim for damages based on the highway 
project's negative effect on Jantz's business.  Id. at 411.16  
¶49 Likewise, Schneider v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 458, 187 
N.W.2d 172 (1971), like Carazalla II and Jantz, stands for the 
proposition that even in a compensation claim for a partial 
taking of land, the damages due are for the taking rather than 
for a relocated highway's impacts on the property.  In 
Schneider, Schneider owned land abutting State Highway 151 and 
Thompson Road in Dane County.  Schneider, 51 Wis. 2d at 460.  In 
1956 the State of Wisconsin designated State Highway 151 as a 
controlled-access highway.  Id.  Schneider maintained direct 
access to the highway with a private permit and indirect access 
to the highway via Thompson Road.  Id.  In 1968 the State used 
eminent domain to acquire 3.29 acres of Schneider's land to 
build a frontage road on the acquired land.  Id.  The land taken 
did not include Schneider's access point to the highway.  See 
id.  Rather, Schneider's access to the highway was reduced 
because the State revoked Schneider's private permit to directly 
access the highway and closed the Highway 151-Thompson Road 
intersection that Schneider used to access the highway.  Id.  
                                                 
16 We noted that Jantz perhaps may have been entitled to 
recover damages under Wis. Stat. § 32.18 for harm to her 
property caused by Maple Road's change in grade. Jantz, 63 
Wis. 2d at 411.  However, those damages were unavailable in 
Jantz's lawsuit because Jantz brought suit under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6) to recover compensation for the partial taking, and 
the partial taking did not cause the change in grade.  Id. at 
411-12. 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
27 
 
The new frontage road became Schneider's only access to the 
highway.  Id. at 463.  At the trial on the amount of 
compensation owed to Schneider, the jury's award for the partial 
taking of land included damages for the property's diminution in 
value caused by the property's loss of access to the highway.  
See id. at 460-61, 464.  The circuit court later concluded that 
it was incorrect to allow evidence of diminution in value that 
resulted from loss of access to the highway.  Id. at 464. 
¶50 On appeal we affirmed the circuit court's conclusion 
that damages for the partial taking of land could not include 
damages for the diminution in value of Schneider's land that 
resulted from the closing of Thompson Road and the designation 
of Highway 151 as a controlled-access highway.  Id. at 465-66.  
We reasoned that the partial taking of Schneider's land was 
"separate and distinct" from Schneider's loss of access to 
Highway 151 and the resulting diminution in value of Schneider's 
land.  Id. at 463 (citing Carazalla II, 269 Wis. at 608c). 
¶51 Not surprisingly, the LLC attempts to distinguish the 
above cases and instead primarily relies on National Auto 
Truckstops, 
263 
Wis. 2d 649, 
for 
the 
proposition 
that 
compensation under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) for the temporary 
limited easement should include damages for the commercial 
property's diminution in value caused by the relocation of 118th 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
28 
 
Avenue.17  Notably, National Auto Truckstops neither overruled 
nor modified Carazalla II, Jantz, or Schneider.  As a result, we 
examine whether these cases can coexist in our jurisprudence.   
¶52 In National Auto Truckstops the truckstop's strip of 
land, which contained the only points of direct access to the 
highway, was taken.  Nat'l Auto Truckstops, 263 Wis. 2d 649, 
¶¶4-5.  National Auto owned a truckstop near the intersection of 
United States Highway 12 and Interstate 94 in St. Croix County.  
Id., ¶4.  The DOT used eminent domain to acquire .27 acres from 
the truckstop to build a frontage road on the land taken and to 
                                                 
17 Relying on National Auto Truckstops, Inc. v. Department 
of Transportation, 2003 WI 95, 263 Wis. 2d 649, 665 N.W.2d 198, 
Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Department of City Development of 
Milwaukee, 47 Wis. 2d 142, 177 N.W.2d 94 (1970), and Hastings 
Realty Corp. v. Texas Co., 28 Wis. 2d 305, 137 N.W.2d 79 (1965), 
the LLC argues that the relocation of 118th Avenue was an 
exercise of the DOT's eminent domain power rather than police 
power and, therefore, the LLC's damages for the temporary 
limited easement should include damages that resulted from the 
relocation of 118th Avenue.  
However, even if the LLC correctly characterizes the 
holdings of these cases, they are distinguishable.  In these 
three cases, whether the taking or easement caused the loss of 
access to a road was not at issue.  In the present case, by 
contrast, the fact that the temporary limited easement did not 
cause the LLC's loss of direct access and proximity to 118th 
Avenue is fatal to the LLC's Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) claim.  
Hastings is further distinguishable because the court in that 
case did not determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to 
compensation for a taking.  Instead, the court determined 
whether the plaintiff's lease was terminable under a provision 
that allowed for termination of the lease if the State took a 
portion of the leased property under eminent domain.  Hastings, 
28 Wis. 2d at 308-09.  We do not consider whether the relocation 
of 118th Avenue was an exercise of the police power under these 
three cases. 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
29 
 
widen the highway to four lanes.  Id.  Because the truckstop's 
only two points of direct access to the highway were actually 
located on the portion of land taken, the partial taking 
resulted in the truckstop losing its only points of direct 
access to the highway.  Id., ¶¶4-5.  National Auto's new access 
to the highway was via the new frontage road.  Id., ¶5.  At 
trial over compensation due for the partial taking of land, the 
circuit court excluded evidence that the truckstop declined in 
value because of its loss of two points of direct access to the 
highway.  Id., ¶7.  
¶53 On appeal, we held the circuit court erred by 
excluding that evidence because at issue was whether the changed 
access was reasonable access.  Id., ¶2.  We held that, in order 
to award damages to a landowner for loss of access to a road, a 
jury must determine that the landowner was left without 
reasonable access to the road.  Id.  Thus, we held that if a 
jury determined that the changed access was not reasonable, then 
just compensation is due for the "deprivation or restriction of 
[National Auto's] right of access."  Id.  The evidence which 
related to National Auto's loss of access due to the taking was 
admissible insofar that the jury found that the changed access 
was unreasonable.  Central to the court's determination that the 
evidence was admissible, was the fact that the property taken 
contained the access points.  See id., ¶¶17-18.  National Auto 
Truckstops does not stand for the proposition that compensation 
for an easement includes damages for a commercial property's 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
30 
 
diminution in value caused by a highway relocation project when 
no property was taken. 
¶54 National 
Auto 
Truckstops 
is 
fundamentally 
distinguishable from the present case.  In National Auto 
Truckstops the parcel of land taken contained the landowner's 
only two points of access to a public road.  In the case at 
issue, none of the LLC's land was taken.  In National Auto 
Truckstops a permanent taking of land occurred which caused the 
size and boundaries of National Auto's property to change.  In 
the present case, the boundaries and size of the LLC's 
commercial property are unchanged.  
¶55 Unlike the taking in National Auto Truckstops, the 
temporary limited easement at issue did not cause the LLC to 
lose direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue.  In the 
present case, not only was no land taken, but by providing the 
LLC with a permanent additional driveway pursuant to the 
temporary limited easement, the LLC gained more, not less, 
access to 74th Place. The temporary limited easement at issue 
did not cause the relocation of 118th Avenue nor did the LLC 
lose direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue because of the 
easement.  Therefore, compensation due for this temporary 
limited easement does not properly include damages for the 
commercial property's diminution in value based on its lost 
direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue, which resulted from 
the relocation of 118th Avenue. 
¶56 Hence, Carazalla II, Jantz, Schneider, and National 
Auto Truckstops all comport with the plain language of Wis. 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
31 
 
Stat. § 32.09(6), which allows "compensation" for damages caused 
by "a partial taking of property."  See Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6).  
In each case, the allowable damages were caused by the claimed 
taking.  These cases, however, do not stand for the proposition 
that the LLC may recover the damages sought here when no 
property was taken from the LLC, its property's boundaries 
remained intact, and its claim is for "the taking of an 
easement."  At its core, this commercial property's diminution 
in value resulted from its loss of direct access and proximity 
to a relocated road, not because of the temporary limited 
easement.  No case supports the notion that the LLC's claim 
under § 32.09(6g) for a temporary limited easement would include 
the near half million dollar diminution in value which resulted 
from 118th Avenue being relocated.  
¶57 We conclude that Carazalla II, Jantz, Schneider, and 
National Auto Truckstops can be reconciled in the present case, 
and in fact, produce consistent analyses.  Carazalla II, Jantz, 
and Schneider stand for the principle that damages for a partial 
taking cannot include damages for the impact caused by loss of 
access to a highway if the loss of access resulted from the 
relocation of the highway, rather than from the taking.  
National Auto Truckstops recognized that there are circumstances 
under which damages for loss of direct access to a highway could 
be recoverable.  However, those circumstances are glaringly 
absent in the case at issue.  Thus, we conclude that Carazalla 
II, Jantz, and Schneider are more compelling.  We agree with the 
circuit court that the LLC's loss of direct access and proximity 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
32 
 
to 118th Avenue "was caused by the vacation of the street [118th 
Avenue], not by the taking of any property from the plaintiff. 
Damages are allowed under § 32.09(6g), Stats., only for loss 
which was a consequence of the particular taking."  The circuit 
court's analysis is consistent with the case law.  See Jantz, 63 
Wis. 2d at 412 (holding that the circuit court correctly limited 
damages in a partial taking claim to "damages sustained as a 
consequence of the taking").  Contrary to the LLC's suggestion, 
an award for a temporary limited easement, such as the one at 
issue, cannot serve to bootstrap damages that emanate from this 
road relocation, especially when, as here, no land has been 
taken and the property's boundaries are unchanged.  See 
Carazalla II, 269 Wis. at 608c (holding that compensation for a 
partial taking cannot include damages for "interwoven" loss of 
point of access to a road because the taking did not cause the 
loss of the access point).  
¶58 Whether the LLC may recover damages for its loss of 
direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue under a different 
theory is reserved for another day.  According to the DOT, "No 
one disputes that loss of access can be compensable.  It is just 
not compensable here."  We agree.  We conclude that the subject 
loss is not recoverable under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) because 
this temporary limited easement did not cause those damages.  
Cf. Jantz, 63 Wis. 2d at 411-12.  Simply stated, under these 
facts, the temporary limited easement did not cause the LLC to 
lose direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue; therefore, the 
LLC's damages for the commercial property's diminution in value 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
33 
 
are not recoverable in its § 32.09(6g) temporary limited 
easement claim. 
¶59 Accordingly, we hold that the LLC's claim under Wis. 
Stat. § 32.09(6g) for the temporary limited easement may not 
include evidence of damages for the commercial property's 
diminution in value caused by the relocation of 118th Avenue. 
The circuit court did not err by excluding that evidence. 
Because our holding is dispositive, we decline to address the 
other issues presented.  
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶60 For purposes of our analysis, we assume, without 
deciding, that a temporary limited easement is compensable under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g). 
¶61 We conclude that the LLC is precluded from seeking 
damages 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(6g) 
for 
the 
commercial 
property's diminution in value which resulted from its loss of 
direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue due to the 118th 
Avenue relocation.  The temporary limited easement did not cause 
the commercial property to lose direct access and proximity to 
118th Avenue, so damages under § 32.09(6g) for the temporary 
limited easement cannot include damages for the loss of direct 
access and proximity to 118th Avenue.  Because the LLC seeks 
damages for its loss of direct access and proximity to 118th 
Avenue, the circuit court did not err by excluding evidence of 
those damages in the § 32.09(6g) claim for taking an easement.  
Thus, the LLC improperly seeks compensation under § 32.09(6g) 
for the commercial property's diminution in value based on its 
No. 
2012AP2784   
 
34 
 
lost direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue when 118th 
Avenue was relocated.  Because our resolution of the narrow 
issue presented disposes of the LLC's claim, we need not address 
the other issues presented.  See Maryland Arms, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 
¶48.   
¶62 We affirm the circuit court's grant of the DOT's 
motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of damages caused 
by the LLC's loss of direct access and proximity to 118th 
Avenue. We reverse the court of appeals and remand to the 
circuit court to dismiss the action. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and remanded. 
 
 
No.  2012AP2784.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶63 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority opinion that the circuit court did not err in 
granting the Department of Transportation's motion to exclude 
evidence of the property's alleged diminution in value resulting 
from the relocation of 118th Avenue. 
¶64 I further agree with the majority opinion that this 
case does not present, and the court does not decide, the 
following questions:  whether the LLC suffered a diminution in 
property value from the relocation of 118th Avenue, whether the 
LLC's loss of direct access to 118th Avenue is compensable in 
some action unrelated to the damages award at issue in the 
present case, and whether the LLC's remaining access to 118th 
Avenue is reasonable as a matter of fact or law. 
¶65 The majority opinion assumes without deciding that 
temporary limited easements (TLEs) fall within Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6g).  The majority opinion does not resolve the issue 
even though the Department is certain to frequently confront the 
question 
whether 
TLEs 
are 
compensable 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(6g) and what the proper compensation is for the taking 
of a TLE.1 
                                                 
1 Wis. Department of Transportation, Facilities Dev. Manual, 
Temporary Limited Easements, ch. 12 § 1-15.5, available at 
http://roadwaystandards.dot.wi.gov/standards/fdm/12-01.pdf#fd12-
1 (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).  See also majority op., ¶10 n.8 
("This project involved the taking of more than 50 temporary 
limited 
easements 
and 
more 
than 
one 
dozen 
permanent 
easements . . . ."). 
No.  2012AP2784.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶66 The majority opinion recites the tools for statutory 
interpretation but does not apply them to decide whether TLEs 
are compensable under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g).  It merely assumes 
that § 32.09(6g) applies. 
¶67 This court is developing the bad habit of assuming 
applicable legal principles without deciding the legal issues 
that are presented and briefed.2  This habit "has the unfortunate 
effect of ducking [] vital issue[s] that should be decided,"3 
"fails to provide adequate guidance to litigants, the circuit 
courts, and the court of appeals,"4 and flouts this court's 
"ultimate responsibility for development of the law."5       
                                                 
2 See, e.g., State v. Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶¶59-60, 357 
Wis. 2d 172, 
849 
N.W.2d 798 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting) 
("This court owes it to law enforcement, lawyers, litigants, 
circuit courts, the court of appeals, and the public at large to 
provide clarity about when a search has occurred . . . . Rather 
than dance around the issue of whether government access to cell 
phone location data in the instant cases is a search within the 
meaning of the Constitutions, I propose that the court address 
it head-on."); State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 2014 WI 87, ¶159, 357 
Wis. 2d 41, 
849 
N.W.2d 748 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting) 
("Neither the Tate majority opinion nor Justice Prosser's lead 
opinion in Subdiaz–Osorio decides whether the government access 
in question constituted a search within the meaning of the 
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  Both opinions assume 
that a search occurred."); State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, ¶¶63-64, 
355 Wis. 2d 722, 849 N.W.2d 317 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) 
("The majority opinion assumes that the circuit court erred when 
it refused to allow the defendant to tell her side of the 
story. . . . I would hold that the circuit court erred."). 
3 State v. Rocha-Mayo, 2014 WI 57, ¶100, 355 Wis. 2d 85, 848 
N.W.2d 832 (Prosser, J., dissenting). 
4 State v. Magett, 2014 WI 67, ¶96, 355 Wis. 2d 617, 850 
N.W.2d 42 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
5 State ex rel. Swan v. Elections Bd., 133 Wis. 2d 87, 108, 
394 N.W.2d 732 (1986). 
No.  2012AP2784.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶68 I turn to the text of Wis. Stat. § 32.09.   
¶69 This section sets forth rules for the determination of 
just 
compensation. 
 
Various 
subsections 
describe 
just 
compensation in terms of fair market value, which is calculated 
differently under varying circumstances.  Subsection (6g) of 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09 explicitly governs just compensation for "the 
taking of an easement."  It provides as follows: 
In the case of the taking of an easement, the 
compensation to be paid by the condemnor shall be 
determined by deducting from the fair market value of 
the whole property immediately before the date of 
evaluation, the fair market value of the remainder 
immediately after the date of evaluation, assuming the 
completion of the public improvement and giving 
effect, without allowance of offset for general 
benefits, 
and 
without 
restriction 
because 
of 
enumeration but without duplication, to the items of 
loss or damage to the property enumerated in sub. 
(6)(a) to (g) where shown to exist.  
(Emphasis added). 
¶70 A temporary limited easement (TLE) is, of course, an 
easement.6  The text of § 32.09(6g) does not distinguish between 
permanent and temporary easements. 
¶71 That Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) governs TLEs is supported 
not only by the statutory text but also by the broader statutory 
context.  No other statute governs just compensation for the 
taking of a TLE or any other particular kind of easement.  On 
the 
contrary, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09 
appears 
to 
govern 
the 
determination of just compensation for all takings by eminent 
                                                 
6 See generally 9 Nichols on Eminent Domain ch. G32 (3d ed. 
2014). 
No.  2012AP2784.ssa 
 
4 
 
domain.7  It explicitly covers the determination of just 
compensation for "total" takings (Wis. Stat. § 32.09(5)), 
"partial" takings (Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)), and, of course, 
takings of an easement (Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g)).  Thus, the 
plain reading of § 32.09(6g) is that it applies to TLEs. 
¶72 Although the majority opinion assumes without deciding 
that Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) applies in the present case 
involving the taking of a TLE, it expresses qualms.  Lengthy 
footnote 12 of the majority opinion explains why the text of 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) "causes us [the majority] to pause when 
considering whether that statutory subsection is designed to 
apply to temporary limited easements in the first instance." 
¶73 Footnote 12 of the majority opinion offers various 
reasons why Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) might not apply to TLEs.  
Most importantly, the "before and after" fair market value rule 
for calculating damages for the taking of an easement does not 
fit valuation of a TLE.    
¶74 The 
"before 
and 
after" 
fair 
market 
value 
rule 
determines "compensation . . . by deducting from the fair market 
value of the whole property immediately before the date of 
evaluation, the fair market value of the remainder immediately 
after the date of evaluation . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g).  
Generally, valuing a permanent easement using this calculation 
makes sense, but the calculation does not necessarily make sense 
when the taking is of a TLE. 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 32.09 
is 
titled 
"Rules 
governing 
determination of just compensation." 
No.  2012AP2784.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶75 TLEs present significant valuation problems for just 
compensation.8  Fair market value is ordinarily established by 
comparable sales.  Yet there is generally no market for TLEs.9  
In addition, TLEs are partial interests in terms of both space 
and duration.10  According to a leading text, the valuation of a 
TLE "depends on the nature of the taking."11 
¶76 Few jurisdictions employ the "before and after" fair 
market value calculation to determine just compensation for TLEs 
because its application would produce unreasonable results.  An 
important tool of statutory interpretation is that "[w]ords are 
given meaning to avoid absurd, unreasonable, or implausible 
results . . . ."12  Thus, the text of Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) 
should 
be 
interpreted 
reasonably, 
to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable results.13 
¶77 The leading text on eminent domain sets forth the 
following methods used to determine just compensation for the 
taking of TLEs: 
                                                 
8 W.H. Pugh Coal Co. v. State, 157 Wis. 2d 620, 631, 460 
N.W.2d 787 (1990). 
9 9 Nichols on Eminent Domain, ch. G32, § G32.08[1][a] (3d 
ed. 2014). 
10 Id., § G32.08[7]. 
11 Id., § G32.08[1][a]. 
12 Force ex rel. Welcenbach v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
2014 WI 82, ¶30, 356 Wis. 2d 582, 850 N.W.2d 886. 
13 See id., ¶30. 
No.  2012AP2784.ssa 
 
6 
 
• Fair and reasonable rental value of the land subject 
to the easement; 
• Loss of use; 
• Diminution of the rental value of the property 
adjacent to the temporary easement; 
• Diminution of the rental value of the property as a 
whole;  
• Diminution of the fair market value of the property 
during the period of the taking; and 
• Fair rate of return.14 
¶78 "The most widely accepted measure of compensation for 
the taking of a temporary easement appears to be the rental 
value of the property taken."15  "Overall, the opinions of the 
United States Supreme Court support compensation for temporary 
takings based on the fair market rental value."16  The rental 
value is the measure of compensation that was used in the 
instant case.  I conclude a reasonable reading of Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6g) permits this method of valuation when the taking is 
of a TLE. 
¶79 The majority opinion's assumption that the statute 
applies, 
alongside 
its 
assertion 
that 
the 
statute 
seems 
inapplicable to TLEs, engenders confusion.  I would prefer this 
                                                 
14 9 Nichols on Eminent Domain, ch. G32, § G32.08[1][e] (3d 
ed. 2014). 
15 Id., § G32.08[2][a]. 
16 Id., § G32.03[7].  See also W. H. Pugh Coal Co., 157 
Wis. 2d at 631 ("With a temporary taking, 'the proper measure of 
compensation is the rental [value] that probably could have been 
obtained,' in other words, 'the reasonable value of the 
property's use.'"  (Citations omitted.)). 
No.  2012AP2784.ssa 
 
7 
 
court address head-on the question of whether and how Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6g) applies to TLEs. 
¶80 Another point of confusion raised by the majority 
opinion is the refrain that "no property was taken" (majority 
op., ¶¶44, 53, 56).  The instant case does, in my opinion (and 
apparently in most of the court's opinion), involve a taking, 
the cornerstone of condemnation proceedings giving rise to a 
claim for compensation.17  Thus, if Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) does 
not 
apply, 
the 
property 
owner 
must 
still 
receive 
just 
compensation for the taking under the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions.18  In determining just compensation for 
the taking of TLEs, I wonder whether it makes any difference 
whether Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) or constitutional principles of 
just compensation apply. 
¶81 In sum, footnote 12 supports the conclusion that Wis. 
Stat. § 32.09(6g) does not apply to TLEs in a decision that 
contradictorily assumes (without deciding) that the statute does 
apply.  This inconsistency in the opinion engenders unnecessary 
confusion. 
¶82 The damages the parties agreed upon subject to review 
in this court reflect the rental value of the TLE.  The result 
of the majority opinion is that the rental value is upheld as 
                                                 
17 More-Way 
N. 
Corp. 
v. 
State 
Highway 
Comm'n, 
44 
Wis. 2d 165, 169, 170 N.W.2d 749 (1969). 
18 U.S. Const. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation."); Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 13 ("The property of no person shall be taken for 
public use without just compensation therefor."). 
No.  2012AP2784.ssa 
 
8 
 
just compensation in the present case.  I agree with that 
result.   
¶83 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
 
No.  2012AP2784.ssa 
 
 
 
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