Case Title: In re Crist

Citation: 

Docket Number: S30840

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1998-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed: October 29, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re Complaint as to the
Conduct of

RICHARD F. CRIST,

	Accused.

(OSB 97-18; SC S30840)

	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.

	Submitted on the record April 15, 1998.

	Jane E. Angus, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.

	No appearance contra.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Kulongoski, and Leeson, Justices.

	PER CURIAM

	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of five years, commencing sixty days from the date of the
filing of this decision.

		PER CURIAM

		The Oregon State Bar (the Bar) charged the accused by
formal complaint with violating Code of Professional
Responsibility Disciplinary Rules (DR) 6-101(B) (neglecting a
legal matter),(1) DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice),(2) and DR 1-103(C) (failing to
cooperate during disciplinary investigation).(3)  The accused was
served personally with a copy of the complaint and notice to
answer.  He failed to file an answer or to make any appearance
throughout these proceedings.

		A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board entered an
order finding the accused in default.  Rule of Procedure (BR)
5.8(a).(4)  Thereafter, the trial panel deemed the allegations in
the formal complaint to be true.  BR 5.8(a).

		The trial panel held a hearing solely on the issue of
sanction.  BR 5.8(a).  A majority of the trial panel suspended
the accused from the practice of law for a period of three years. 
One panel member dissented, concluding that disbarment is the
appropriate sanction. 

		Under ORS 9.536(2) and (3) and BR 10.1, this court is
required to review the trial panel's decision.  We review de
novo.  ORS 9.536(3); BR 10.6.  The accused did not file a brief
or make any appearance in this court.  We granted the Bar's
motion to submit the matter on the record without oral argument. 
ORAP 11.25(3)(b).  The Bar has the burden of establishing
misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.  BR 5.2.  For the
purposes of review, because the accused defaulted, we deem the
allegations contained in the Bar's complaint to be true.  See In
re Sousa, 323 Or 137, 140, 915 P2d 408 (1996) (so holding in
similar circumstances).

		The Bar's formal complaint against the accused alleged
in part:

"3.

		"On or about September 8, 1995, the Accused was
selected as an arbitrator in the Multnomah County
Circuit Court case entitled West Slope Services, Inc.
v. Jacobs, Case No. 95C 842214.  A hearing was
conducted on November 24, 1995.  Pursuant to UTCR
13.220, the Accused was required to file an award
within 14 days or request a continuance.  The Accused
failed to file the award or request a continuance.

"4. 

		"On or about December 20, 1995, the court filed a
notice of dismissal.  The Accused assured the parties
that the decision would be mailed the following week.
The Accused failed to file the award and counsel for
one of the parties filed a motion to continue the
matter to avoid the dismissal.  The court granted the
motion and continued the case until January 31, 1996. 
Thereafter, the Accused failed to respond to counsel's
inquiries concerning the matter.

"5.

		"On or about February 1, 1996, the Accused filed
the arbitrator's award in favor of the defendant plus
costs and attorney's fees.  The amount of costs and
attorney fees were to be determined by the Accused.  On
February 13, 1996, defendant's counsel filed a
Statement of Costs and Disbursements, and on February
23, 1996, plaintiff's counsel submitted an Objection to
Defendant's Cost Bill re:  Attorney Fees.  The Accused
failed to rule or file an Amended Arbitration Award
concerning the cost and attorney fees.

"6.

		"Between April 18, 1996, and early November 1996,
counsel and the court attempted to communicate with the
Accused on several occasions to determine the status of
the Accused's ruling.  The Accused did not respond.

"7.

		"On June 27, 1996, the court requested that the
Accused file his supplemental award by July 3, 1996. 
The Accused did not respond.

"8.

		"On November 13, 1996, the court issued an Order
to Show Cause to Arbitrator, requiring that the Accused
appear on November 25, 1996 and show cause why he had
not complied with the court's directive of June 27,
1996.  On November 23, 1996, the Accused filed an
Amended Arbitration Award.

"9.

		"On December 6, 1996, the Hon. Kristena LaMar
filed a complaint with the Oregon State Bar concerning
the Accused's conduct.  On December 16, 1996,
Disciplinary Counsel's Office forwarded a copy of the
complaint to the Accused and requested his response on
or before January 6, 1997.  The Accused did not
respond.  On January 10, 1997, Disciplinary Counsel's
Office again requested the Accused's response to the
complaint on or before January 17, 1997.  The Accused
did not respond.

"10.

		"Thereafter, the complaint was referred to the
Clackamas/Linn/Marion County Local Professional
Responsibility Committee (hereinafter, 'LPRC') for
further investigation.  The Accused did not respond to
the LPRC's telephone messages and written
communications.

"11.

		"While the subject of a disciplinary
investigation, the Accused failed to respond to the
inquiries of the Disciplinary Counsel's Office and the
LPRC, which are empowered to investigate or act upon
the conduct of lawyers."

		On the basis of the Bar's formal complaint and the
accused's default, we agree with the trial panel that the accused
is guilty of violating DR 6-101(B), DR 1-102(A)(4), and DR 1-103(C) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  We next
determine the appropriate sanction.

		The purpose of a sanction is not to penalize the
accused, but to protect the public and the integrity of the
profession.  In re Stauffer, 327 Or 44, 66, 956 P2d 967 (1998). 
In considering the appropriate sanction for the violations found,
this court refers to the American Bar Association's Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards)
and Oregon case law.  Stauffer, 327 Or at 66.  The court
considers four factors:  the duty violated, the accused's mental
state, the actual or potential injury caused by the accused's
misconduct, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  ABA
Standard 3.0. 

1.	Ethical duties violated.

		The most fundamental duty that a lawyer owes to the
public is to maintain the standards of personal integrity on
which the community relies.  ABA Standard 5.0.  The accused
violated his duties to the legal system and to the profession. 
See ABA Standards 6.2 (setting out sanctions for abuse of the
legal process), 7.0 (setting out sanctions for violations of
duties owed to the profession).  Lawyers are officers of the
court, and the public expects lawyers to abide by the legal rules
of substance and procedure which affect the administration of
justice.  ABA Standard 6.0.  The accused violated his duty to the
court by failing to obey his obligations under Uniform Trial
Court Rule (UTCR) 13.210 (requiring the arbitrator to send the
award to the parties and to establish procedures for determining
attorney fees and costs within seven days after the conclusion of
an arbitration hearing) and UTCR 13.220 (establishing deadlines
for filing awards).  After violating UTCR 13.210 by failing to
timely file an award, the accused violated UTCR 13.220 by failing
to request a extension of time to file the award.  

		The accused also disregarded the court's directives,
ABA Standard 6.2, and his duty of diligence to the parties to the
arbitration process.  His duty to the parties in the arbitration
may be likened to the duty of diligence a lawyer owes to a
client.  ABA Standard 4.4.  See In re Bourcier, 325 Or 429, 434,
939 P2d 604 (1997) (Bourcier II)(lawyer's duty of diligence
requires that lawyer communicate with and keep client informed of
status, progress, and disposition of a legal matter).  The
parties selected the accused to serve as the arbitrator to decide
their case.  He failed to discharge his required duty.  

		Finally, the accused's failure to respond to the
inquiries of the Bar and the LPRC violated his duty to the
profession and to the public by delaying the Bar's investigation
and, consequently, by delaying the resolution of the complaints
against him.  ABA Standard 7.0.  See Bourcier II, 325 Or at 434
(lawyer's duty to the profession includes an obligation to
respond to inquiries concerning allegations of professional
misconduct); In re Miles, 324 Or 218, 222, 923 P2d 1219 (1996)
(applying ABA Standard 7.0 in similar circumstances).  This court
considers the complete failure to cooperate with a disciplinary
investigation to be a serious ethical violation.  Bourcier II,
325 Or at 434, citing Miles, 324 Or at 222.

2.	Mental state.

		The ABA Standards recognize three mental states:
intent, knowledge, and negligence.  ABA Standards at 7.  The
principal issue in this case is whether the accused acted with
intent or with knowledge.  "Intent" exists when a lawyer acts
with the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a
particular result.  Ibid.  "Knowledge" is defined as the
conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of
the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result.  Ibid.  With regard to the
violations of DR 6-101(B) and DR 1-102(A)(4), we agree with the
trial panel that the accused acted with knowledge.  

		With regard to the violation of DR 1-103(C), we
disagree with the trial panel's conclusion that the accused's
conduct was intentional.  The Bar and its representatives sent
the accused five letters and left one telephone message on his
answering machine.  The accused signed receipts acknowledging
receipt of three of those letters.  He failed to respond.  We
find that the accused acted with knowledge when he failed to do
so.  See Bourcier II, 325 Or at 434 (finding that accused lawyer
acted knowingly when the Bar sent letters advising him of its
disciplinary investigation and he failed to respond); Miles, 324
Or at 221-22 (accused lawyer's receipt of certified letters from
Bar supported finding of knowledge).

3.	Extent of injury.

		Because the purpose of professional discipline is to
protect the public, an injury need not be actual, but only
potential, to support the imposition of a sanction.  In re
Williams, 314 Or 530, 547, 840 P2d 1280 (1992).  The facts of
this case show both potential and actual injury.

		The accused's violation of DR 6-101(B) caused actual
injury to the parties, because they were required to coax an
award from him.  The accused was selected as an arbitrator in
September 1995.  A hearing was held in November 1995.  The
accused failed to file the award in a timely manner or to request
a continuance.  In December 1995, the court filed a notice of
dismissal.  The accused assured the parties that he would mail a
decision the following week.  He failed to do so, forcing counsel
for one of the parties to file a motion with the court to
continue the matter to avoid dismissal.  The court continued the
matter until January 1996.  The plaintiff's counsel left
telephone messages with the accused, but received no direct
response.  On January 29, 1996, the accused mailed the
arbitrator's award, which found in favor of the defendant, and
awarded costs and attorney fees.  In February 1996, plaintiff's
counsel submitted an objection to defendant's cost bill regarding
attorney fees.  The accused failed to rule or file an amended
award concerning defendant's cost bill.  In June 1996, the court
requested that the accused filed his supplemental award by July
3, 1996.  The accused did not respond.  On November 13, 1996, the
court issued an order to show cause requiring the accused to
appear on November 25, 1996, and to show cause why he had not
complied with the court's June 1996 directive.  On November 23,
1996, the accused filed an amended award.  

		Actual injury occurred to the defendant because, by the
time the accused ruled and awarded attorney fees and costs, the
plaintiff no longer was in business and the defendant was unable
to recover on his judgment.  The potential for injury also
existed, because the arbitration case was at risk of being
dismissed.

  		The accused's violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) caused actual
injury to the legal system, because it caused unnecessary
congestion of the court's docket, inordinate delay in the dispute
resolution process, and a wasteful expenditure of judicial
resources.  See Stauffer, 327 Or at 59-61 (lawyer's delay in
closing probate of estate violated DR 1-102(A)(4)).

		Finally, the accused's violation of DR 1-103(C) caused
actual injury to the profession and the public, because it
delayed the Bar's investigation.  See Miles, 324 Or at 222
(reaching the same conclusion in similar circumstances).  	

4.	Aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

		After misconduct has been established, aggravating and
mitigating circumstances may be considered in deciding what
sanction to impose.  ABA Standard 9.1.  An aggravating
circumstance in this case is the accused's prior disciplinary
offenses.   ABA Standard 9.22(a).  In 1971, this court placed the
accused on two years' probation for neglecting to file bankruptcy
petitions and for misrepresentation.  In re Richard E. Crist, 258
Or 88, 481 P2d 74 (1971).  In 1984, the accused was suspended for
six months, with four months stayed pending completion of a
three-year probation.  In re Crist, 297 Or 334, 683 P2d 85
(1984).  The accused was suspended because he was not competent
to handle a probate matter, his incompetency caused inordinate
delay and tax penalties to be assessed on the probate, he
misinformed his client, and he engaged in conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice.  Id. at 336.

		In In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 200, 951 P2d 149 (1997),
this court stated:

	"* * * [T]he following considerations * * * are an
important part of our analysis [when applying the prior
offenses aggravating factor]: (1) the relative
seriousness of the prior offense and resulting
sanction; (2) the similarity of the prior offense to
the offense in the case at bar; (3) the number of prior
offenses; (4) the relative recency of the prior
offense; and (5) the timing of the current offense in
relation to the prior offense and resulting sanction,
specifically, whether the accused lawyer had been
sanctioned for the prior offense before engaging in the
offense in the case at bar.  Those considerations are
important, because they can serve to heighten or
diminish the significance of earlier misconduct."

Applying those considerations to this case, it is significant
that the accused was disciplined twice for earlier misconduct
before he engaged in the misconduct at issue here, which
demonstrates that he had "both warning and knowledge of the
disciplinary process."  Ibid. (citing In re Hereford, 306 Or 69,
75, 756 P2d 30 (1988)).  Also, the accused has been disciplined
for misconduct almost identical to that at issue here, viz.,
neglect and failure to cooperate. 

		Other aggravating circumstances present in this case
are a pattern of misconduct, ABA Standard 9.22(c), and
substantial experience in the practice of law, ABA Standard
9.22(i).  

		There are no mitigating circumstances in this case.

		In Miles, the court concluded that

	"suspension generally is an appropriate sanction for a
knowing violation of DR 1-103(C).  In determining the
length of such a suspension, we must consider two
important factors: (1) the extent of noncooperation by
the accused; and (2) whether multiple violations of the
rule occurred.  In most cases, either a single,
significant failure to cooperate with a disciplinary
investigation or lesser, multiple failures to cooperate
warrant a lengthy suspension from the practice of law." 
324 Or at 223 (emphasis in original).  

We view the accused's failure to cooperate here to be
significant.  See id. at 223-24 (reaching that conclusion in
similar circumstances).

		Generally, the ABA Standards provide that a suspension
is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates multiple
disciplinary rules such as those involved here.  ABA Standards
4.42 and 7.2.  Consonant with the standards, we conclude that a
lengthy suspension is appropriate here.

		The remaining consideration is this court's case law. 
We have found no Oregon case directly on point.  However, some
cases are instructive.  For example, in In re Chandler, 306 Or
422, 760 P2d 243 (1988), this court imposed a two-year suspension
when the lawyer had neglected legal matters, failed to promptly
return a client's property, and failed to cooperate with the Bar
and the State Lawyers Assistance Committee.  In In re Schaffner,
323 Or 472, 918 P2d 803 (1996) (Schaffner I), this court found
that the lawyer had violated DR 6-101(B) and DR 1-103(C) and
imposed a 120-day suspension from the practice of law. 
Subsequently, the court imposed a two-year suspension when the
same lawyer engaged in similar misconduct.  In re Schaffner, 325
Or 421, 939 P2d 39 (1997) (Schaffner II).  Additionally, in In re
Bourcier, 322 Or 561, 909 P2d 1234 (1996) (Bourcier I), the court
suspended a lawyer, who had a disciplinary record, for three
years for violating DR 6-101(B), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 1-103(C), and
other rules.  The following year, the court disbarred the same
lawyer for violating DR 6-101(B) and DR 1-103(C).  The court
emphasized the extent of the lawyer's failure to cooperate in the
disciplinary investigation and his pattern of misconduct. 
Bourcier II, 325 Or at 437.

		Because of the seriousness of the accused's misconduct,
and the existence of several aggravating circumstances,
particulary the accused's disciplinary record and his complete
failure to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation, we
conclude that a five-year suspension is appropriate.

		The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of five years, commencing sixty days from the date of
filing of this decision.

1. 	DR 6-101(B) provides:

		"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to the lawyer." 

2. 	DR 1-102(A)(4) provides:

		"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

		"* * * * *

		"Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice[.]" 

3. 	DR 1-103(C) provides:

		"A lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary
investigation shall respond fully and truthfully to
inquiries from and comply with reasonable requests of a
tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or
act upon the conduct of lawyers, subject only to the
exercise of any applicable right or privilege."

4. 	BR 5.8(a) provides in part:

		"If an accused lawyer fails to resign or file an
answer to a formal complaint within the time allowed by
these rules, or if an accused lawyer fails to appear at
a hearing set pursuant to BR 2.4(h), the trial panel
may enter an order in the record finding the accused in
default under this rule.  The trial panel may
thereafter deem the allegations in the formal complaint
to be true.  The trial panel shall thereafter proceed
to render its written opinion based on the formal
complaint, or at the discretion of the trial panel,
after considering evidence or legal authority limited
to the issue of sanction."