Case Title: People v. Moses

Citation: 

Docket Number: S258143

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ANTONIO CHAVEZ MOSES III, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S258143 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three 
G055621 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
16NF1413 
 
 
December 28, 2020 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, Groban, and Hoch* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
S258143
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
Penal Code section 236.1, subdivision (c)1 prohibits the 
human trafficking of a minor.  It includes an attempt to commit 
trafficking as part of the definition of the substantive offense.  
Here we consider the attempt aspect of the definition.  
Defendant Antonio Chavez Moses III was convicted of 
attempting to recruit “Bella” as a prostitute.  Bella had 
identified herself to Moses as a 17-year-old girl, but was, in fact, 
an undercover detective.  The question here is whether, in light 
of the statutory language, he can be convicted of an attempt 
under the trafficking statute.  We conclude that he can, based 
on this state’s long-standing application of attempt law.     
I.  BACKGROUND 
As part of an undercover investigation to identify potential 
pimps, Detective Luis Barragan of the Santa Ana Police 
Department created a fictitious user profile for “Bella B.” on a 
social network site used by pimps to recruit women and children 
 
1  
Hereafter section 236.1(c).  The provision reads, in 
relevant part:  “A person who causes, induces, or persuades, or 
attempts to cause, induce, or persuade, a person who is a minor 
at the time of commission of the offense to engage in a 
commercial sex act, with the intent to effect or maintain a 
violation of [certain enumerated crimes] is guilty of human 
trafficking.”  (Ibid.) 
All further undesignated statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
for prostitution.  He identified Bella as a 21-year-old female 
from Santa Ana and attached a photo he took from the Internet. 
On April 16, 2016, Bella received a message from “FM Da 
Prince,” saying “Good morning, Gorgeous.”  “Prince’s” profile 
contained a picture of Moses and a meme composed of a photo of 
one hundred dollar bills with the words, “Everybody wants love.  
I just want money and someone to get it with.”   
Moses asked Bella where she was posting from.  Barragan 
responded as Bella, saying she was in Vallejo “chasing the 
paper,” a phrase used by prostitutes to mean she was engaging 
in sex for money.  Moses replied, “You need to find your way to 
Daddy, your prince.  I will make your life a whole lot easier, bet 
that.”  In Barragan’s experience, the word “daddy” referred to a 
pimp.  After Bella complained that business was slow, Moses 
responded, “Just get here, Boo.  We can take it from there.  Come 
as is.  I’m a real one, not hard up for cash.  I need loyalty, trust, 
and understanding [followed by a dollar sign emoji].  Going to 
come.  I got enough game in this brain to make us all rich.”  
Barragan considered this text to mark the beginning of a 
relationship between pimp and prostitute.  Moses also wrote, 
“I’m not a gorilla [a pimp who is violent toward his prostitutes], 
nor am I what they call a pimp nowadays.  I’m a true gentlemen 
[sic], baby, best believe and known all over the universe, real 
international.”  
Moses gave his phone number and urged Bella to call.  He 
also sent her a text inviting her to “fuck with me,” meaning to 
work for him, and to “come today.”  Bella responded that she 
would be in Southern California the following Monday and was 
“looking for a new start with someone who’s smart.”  Moses 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
replied that she should “get to Daddy,” and he would “step [her] 
game up” to “at least $1,000 a night.” 
The next day Moses messaged Bella promising to show her 
how to increase her income by soliciting customers at bars and 
casinos.  He explained, “See, it’s not all on a bitch.  It’s on me to 
guide you, show you, and protect you, but also lead you to the 
money in a manner that we get the most for our labor.”  The 
following day Bella responded that she could not work in bars 
and casinos because she was only 17 years old.  She said:  “I 
want to keep it 100 with you.  I feel a strong connection, good 
vibe from you.  I’m struggling bad at this game maybe because 
I’m a youngster, too.  Daddy, just know that I’m 17.  Don’t want 
to lie to you because you have been 100 with me from the get.”  
Moses commented, “Damn, Boo, Damn,” and asked when Bella’s 
birthday was.  Bella responded that her birthday was in 
November.  Moses replied, “I never fucked around like that.  You 
not the police[?]  This Internet shit got niggas knocked off.  I’m 
not trying to go out like a sucka.  When’s your birthday?”  When 
Bella said her birthday was November 27, 1998, Moses replied, 
“Oh, you about to be 18.  Cool, SMH [shake my head].”  Bella 
said, “I don’t expect you to stick around.  I get it, but just had to 
be true.”  Moses replied, “I got you as long as you keep it 100 
always.”  Bella said she was on a train to Anaheim, but Moses 
invited her to get off in Los Angeles.  She did not respond to this 
message.  Over the course of the next several days, both Bella 
and Moses confirmed they were not giving up on each other.  
Moses repeated his urging that Bella call and talk to him.  
On April 27, Moses called Detective Sonia Rojo, who was 
posing as Bella. He again asked when her birthday was, and 
Rojo responded, “in November.”  Moses suggested that Bella 
come work for him after she turned 18, and said he was “scared 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
as shit” because he knew a “homie in jail right now fighting life 
for that shit.”  Rojo responded that she needed someone to be 
there for her.  Moses replied, “Yeah but I’m saying Bella, you got 
7 months before you grown.  Why don’t we just wait like that?”  
Moses asked Bella to send him some pictures and commented 
that he might come to get her.   
Moses and Rojo exchanged 13 text messages over the next 
week, and Moses again asked her to come to Los Angeles.  
Moses and Rojo spoke on May 5th.  Moses mentioned 
coming to get Bella, but complained that the traffic was bad and 
suggested she come to Los Angeles by train.  He asked again 
when Bella’s birthday was, and Rojo responded that it was in 
November.  Moses commented, “Yup.  I’m just making sure you 
ain’t telling me no lies, bitch.  This is a risk.”  He mused that 
Bella might be working with the “po-po.”  Moses urged Bella to 
stay with her pimp until her birthday, but Rojo responded she 
was “done” with him.  Moses said, “Yeah but baby I don’t wanna 
[sic] do the minor thing.  That shit scares the fuck out of me,” 
referencing his “homeboy” who had been “knocked at for the 
same shit.”  He commented, “I want to come get you bad as a 
mother fucker, but if I do, I’m going to have to take you to my 
momma[’]s house until your birthday.”  Moses offered to drive 
over to get Bella, but Rojo said that she had to go and would call 
him later.  In all, Bella and Moses communicated by text and 
telephone for just over three weeks, often several times a day.   
On May 10, Moses and Rojo spoke on the phone.  Rojo told 
him that she was in Orange County and asked if Moses would 
pick her up.  They agreed to meet at a McDonald’s restaurant in 
Anaheim.  When he drove into the parking lot, vice officers were 
waiting, and Moses spotted them.  He texted Bella, “I see you 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
not real.  That’s fucked up,” and “You’re the police, LMAO 
[laughing my ass off].”  Moses drove away but was detained 
nearby with a cell phone in his car.  When Rojo sent a text to the 
number she had been using for Moses, the phone vibrated.  
Detective Barragan then called the phone number Moses had 
given Bella during their text exchanges and the seized phone 
displayed Barragan’s phone number. 
At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of text 
messages Moses had sent to other users on the networking site.  
In these messages, Moses identified himself as a pimp and 
advertised his services, claiming an ability to increase earnings.  
He sought to recruit others to his “team,” which he claimed 
numbered five women. 
The defense presented an expert on human trafficking.  
He reviewed the exchanges between Moses and Bella and saw 
no evidence that Moses was trying to target a minor.  He opined 
that Moses’s interactions with Bella did not rise to the level of 
human trafficking.  Moses did not ask Bella for sex or money, 
and did not attempt to manipulate, isolate, or control her.  He 
acknowledged, however, that Moses was in the very early 
recruitment phase of the relationship.   
A jury convicted Moses of human trafficking of a minor, 
attempted pimping of a minor, and pandering.2  The court 
separately found that Moses had suffered a prior strike 
 
2  
Sections 236.1(c)(1), 266h, subdivision (b)(1), 664, 266i, 
subdivision (a)(2). 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
conviction for manslaughter with the personal use of a firearm, 
and imposed a sentence of 24 years in prison.3 
The Court of Appeal reversed Moses’s human trafficking 
conviction.  The majority held that he could not be convicted 
under that provision, but only under the general law of attempt.  
(People v. Moses (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 757, 764, 766–767 
(Moses).)  We ordered review on our own motion following an 
invitation from the Orange County District Attorney’s Office to 
do so.  Subsequently, another panel of the same Court of Appeal 
upheld a human trafficking conviction based on that defendant’s 
conduct toward a fictitious minor, creating a conflict in the 
appellate courts on this issue.  (People v. Clark (2019) 43 
Cal.App.5th 270, 274, review granted Mar. 11, 2020, S260202 
(Clark).)    
II.  DISCUSSION 
The general law governing attempt is found in section 21a, 
which states, “An attempt to commit a crime consists of two 
elements:  a specific intent to commit the crime, and a direct but 
ineffectual act done toward its commission.”  Section 664, which 
sets out the punishment for an attempt, was enacted in 1872 as 
part of California’s original Penal Code.  The substantive law of 
attempt was found in the common law.  (See People v. Miller 
(1935) 2 Cal.2d 527, 530, and cases cited therein, including 
People v. Mize (1889) 80 Cal. 41, 43 and People v. Murray (1859) 
14 Cal. 159; see generally 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law 
(3d ed. 2018) § 11.2(a), pp. 285–288.)  In 1986, Section 21a was 
 
3  
Sections 667, subdivisions (b)–(i), 1170.12.  The court 
imposed the upper term for human trafficking, doubled based 
on the prior strike.  Punishment for the other offenses was 
imposed but stayed under section 654. 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
added to codify the well-established definition of attempt.  
(Stats. 1986, ch. 519, § 1, p. 1859; People v. Williams (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 779, 789 (Williams)). 
As we noted in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 453 
(Dillon):  “ ‘One of the purposes of the criminal law is to protect 
society from those who intend to injure it.  When it is established 
that the defendant intended to commit a specific crime and that 
in carrying out this intention he committed an act that caused 
harm or sufficient danger of harm, it is immaterial that for some 
collateral reason he could not complete the intended crime.’  
[Citation.]  Accordingly, the requisite overt act ‘need not be the 
last proximate or ultimate step towards commission of the 
substantive crime . . . .  [¶]  Applying criminal culpability to acts 
directly moving toward commission of crime . . . is an obvious 
safeguard to society because it makes it unnecessary for police 
to wait before intervening until the actor has done the 
substantive evil sought to be prevented.  It allows such criminal 
conduct to be stopped or intercepted when it becomes clear what 
the actor’s intention is and when the acts done show that the 
perpetrator is actually putting his plan into action.’  [Citations.]”  
Liability for an attempt does not require that any element 
of the underlying offense actually be accomplished.  (People v. 
Chandler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 508, 517 (Chandler).)  “[A] person 
may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime he never could 
have completed under the circumstances.”  (Ibid; accord, People 
v. Peppars (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 677, 688.) 
As a result, factual impossibility is not a defense to the 
crime of attempt.  The defendant’s “ ‘ “guilt or innocence is 
determined as if the facts were as he perceived them.” ’ ”  (People 
v. Reed (1996) 53 Cal.App.4th 389, 396 (Reed); accord, People v. 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 87.)  For example, a person who 
intends to kill and shoots at the victim can be guilty of 
attempted murder, even if it is later discovered that the gun 
contained only blank rounds.  The shooter’s effort to kill, coupled 
with the requisite intent, completes the crime of attempted 
murder, even if the means employed turn out to be ineffectual.  
A thief who intends to steal a valuable vase from a museum and 
takes the vase from a display can be convicted of attempted 
grand theft, even if the museum had placed an inexpensive 
duplicate in the showcase.  The thief’s act of taking the object, 
with the intent to steal the more valuable original, completes 
the crime of attempted grand theft, even if the aim is unachieved 
because the copy had been substituted.  (See Chandler, supra, 
60 Cal.4th at p. 517; id. at p. 528 (conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, 
J.) [citing examples]; People v. Hickman (1939) 31 Cal.App.2d 4, 
12; see generally 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th 
ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 65–70, pp. 356–363.)     
In Reed, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 389, the defendant was 
convicted of attempted molestation of a child under the age of 
fourteen.  (§§ 288, subd. (a), 664.)  He had written to an 
undercover detective who was posing as a woman named 
“Helen,” the mother of two young girls.  (Reed, at p. 393.)  Reed 
said he would give Helen’s daughters a sexual education and it 
was agreed he would meet the children at a motel.  He was 
arrested when he arrived at the location having brought along 
sex toys and lubricating jelly.  (Id. at pp. 394–395.)  He argued 
on appeal that the attempt to molest an imaginary child was not 
a crime.  Rejecting that assertion the court explained:  Those 
“charged with attempting to commit a crime cannot escape 
liability because the criminal act they attempted was not 
completed due to an impossibility which they did not foresee 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
. . . .”  (Id. at p. 396.)  The nonexistence of an essential object, 
such as a defined victim, is not a defense to the crime of attempt.  
(Id. at p. 397.)  “[I]f the circumstances had been as defendant 
believed them to be, he would have found in the room he entered 
two girls under fourteen available for him to engage in lewd and 
lascivious conduct with them.  Defendant’s failure to foresee 
that there would be no children waiting does not excuse him 
from the attempt to molest.”  (Ibid.)   
The law of attempt is replete with such examples.  People 
v. Rojas (1961) 55 Cal.2d 252 upheld a conviction for attempting 
to receive stolen property when the defendants took possession 
of items they believed to be stolen, but which had already been 
recovered by police.  (Id. at pp. 254, 256–258.)  In re Ryan N. 
(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359 upheld a conviction for attempting 
to assist a suicide after the defendant encouraged the victim to 
take pills which were not, in fact, lethal.  (Id. at pp. 1380–1384.)  
In People v. Thompson (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 195 the defendant 
was held properly convicted of attempted rape when, 
unbeknownst to him, the victim had expired before the act of 
intercourse.  (Id. at pp. 201–203; see also People v. Meyer (1985) 
169 Cal.App.3d 496, 503–506 [attempt to furnish material for 
the manufacture of a controlled substance]; People v. Parker 
(1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 422, 426–428 [attempted receipt of stolen 
property]; People v. Siu (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 41, 43–44 
[attempted possession of narcotics].)  The overarching principle 
is that, when a person intends to commit a crime and takes a 
direct but unsuccessful step towards achieving that end, he has 
committed an attempt.  He cannot find safe harbor in his own 
ineptitude.     
Another aspect of the law of attempt involves its 
punishment.  Section 664 sets out different penalties depending 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
on the nature of the crime attempted.  Subdivisions (a) and (b) 
generally provide that the punishment for an attempted crime 
is one half the term imposed for the completed offense.4  The 
penalties listed in section 664 apply when “no [other] provision 
is made by law for the punishment of those attempts.”  The 
general punishment statute, then, explicitly contemplates that 
other statutes may impose a different punishment for an 
attempt to commit them.  A few statutes, like the one at issue 
here, punish attempts as stringently as the completed crime.  
(See discussion, post, at pp. 13–15.)  Notably, section 664 is 
solely a sentencing provision.  It does not change the definition 
of attempt set out in section 21a.  The question of how Moses’s 
conduct can be punished lies at the heart of this dispute.       
The human trafficking statute (§ 236.1) was modified in 
2012 by Proposition 35, the Californians Against Sexual 
Exploitation Act (CASE Act).  (Prop. 35, § 6, as approved by 
voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012), eff. Nov. 7, 2012.)  The measure 
added subdivision (c), which provides:  A person “who causes, 
induces, or persuades, or attempts to cause, induce, or persuade, 
a person who is a minor at the time of commission of the offense 
to engage in a commercial sex act, with the intent to effect or 
maintain a violation of [certain enumerated crimes5] is guilty of 
 
4  
Other portions of section 664 address attempts to commit 
murder. 
5  
The enumerated statutes are sections 266, 266h, 266i, 
266j, 267, 311.1, 311.2, 311.3, 311.4, 311.5, 311.6, and 518.  They 
define various crimes including pimping; pandering; procuring 
a minor for prostitution or lewd acts; abduction of a minor for 
prostitution; sale, distribution, or advertising of obscene matter; 
exploiting or employing a minor to produce obscene matter; 
obscene live conduct in public; and extortion.   
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
human trafficking.”  (§ 236.1(c), italics added.)  For brevity, we 
will use the verb “induce” to encompass the phrase “causes, 
induces, or persuades.”       
The parties agree that attempting to induce a police decoy 
posing as a minor to commit a commercial sex act is a 
punishable offense.  They disagree whether the crime falls 
under the provisions of section 236.1(c), or the traditional 
attempt statutes, sections 21a and 664.  The competing positions 
reflect squarely on punishment.  If defendant’s crime falls under 
section 236.1(c)(1), the penalty is five, eight, or 12 years in state 
prison.6  By contrast, the penalty for attempt under section 664 
would be one half the term imposed for the completed offense, 
with limited exceptions not applicable here.  (§ 664, subd. (a).) 
As noted, the general rule is that factual impossibility is 
not a defense to attempt.  Therefore, Moses’s argument hinges 
on whether section 236.1(c) defines attempted trafficking of a 
minor in a way that abrogates the general impossibility rule.   
A.  Statutory Language 
The parties initially debate the meaning of the statutory 
language.  Section 236.1(c) is violated in two circumstances:  
when a person, acting with the requisite intent, (1) induces a 
minor to engage in a commercial sex act; or (2) attempts to 
induce a minor to engage in such an act.  The statute codifies 
the crime of attempted human trafficking of a minor and 
 
6  
The statute provides a penalty of 15 years to life if the 
offense involves force, fear, fraud, or other enumerated 
circumstances.  (§ 236.1(c)(2).)  None of those circumstances 
were alleged here. 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
punishes actual inducement and attempted inducement in the 
same way.   
Moses argues that the word “attempts” modifies only the 
language “to cause, induce, or persuade.”  (§ 236.1(c).)  He urges 
the next phrase, “a person who is a minor,” (ibid.) creates a 
distinct statutory element that must be proved whether the 
crime is completed or merely attempted.  He cites People v. 
Shields (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1242 (Shields) for the proposition 
that the attempt provision of subdivision (c) “is distinct from the 
separate crime of attempt [defined under section 21a] because a 
completed violation of the statute requires a person under the 
age of 18 while an attempt to violate the statute does not.”  
(Shields, at p. 1257.)   
On the other hand, the People urge that the word 
“attempts” modifies all elements of section 236.1(c), including 
the requirement of “a person who is a minor.”  Because the 
longstanding law of attempt does not require completion of any 
other element, aside from specific intent, they urge the targeted 
victim need not, in fact, be a minor.  Stated another way, factual 
impossibility is not a defense to section 236.1(c), just as it is not 
a defense under the general law of attempt.  This is the position 
taken by the majority in Clark, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at pages 
274, 279–285, review granted.   
As the divergent views of the Courts of Appeal reflect, read 
in the abstract the language of the statute is susceptible to 
differing interpretations.  However, the electorate’s decision to 
include “attempts” in the definition of human trafficking is 
significant because of another statutory provision.  Section 7 
defines words and phrases.  It notes that the “following words 
have in this code the signification attached to them in this 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
section, unless otherwise apparent from the context.”  (Ibid.)  
Subdivision (16), the substance of which has appeared in the 
statute since its enactment as subdivision (25) in 1872, now 
reads:  “Words and phrases must be construed according to the 
context and approved usage of the language; but technical words 
and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar 
and appropriate meaning in law, must be construed according 
to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.”  (§ 7, subd. (16).)  
“ ‘ “[A]fter the courts have construed the meaning of any 
particular 
word, 
or 
expression, 
and 
the 
[electorate] 
subsequently undertakes to use these exact words in the same 
connection, the presumption is almost irresistible that it used 
them in the precise and technical sense which had been placed 
upon them by the courts.” ’ ”  (People v. Lopez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 
1002, 1007 (Lopez); accord, People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 
219, 231 [principle applies to legislation adopted through 
initiative].)  Because the term “attempt” has acquired a 
“peculiar and appropriate meaning in law,” it “must be 
construed” according to that meaning.  (§ 7, subd. (16); accord, 
Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4, 19.) 
Previous cases have consistently looked to section 21a to 
define the elements of an attempt that has been incorporated 
into a statute defining the substantive crime.  For example, 
section 288.3, subdivision (a) provides that “[e]very person who 
contacts or communicates with a minor, or attempts to contact 
or communicate with a minor, who knows or reasonably should 
know that the person is a minor, with intent to commit [certain 
enumerated sex offenses] involving the minor shall be punished 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
by imprisonment . . . .”7  In People v. Korwin (2019) 36 
Cal.App.5th 682 (Korwin) the Court of Appeal rejected the 
defendant’s argument that section 288.3 required an actual 
minor victim.  Korwin urged, as Moses does here, that at most, 
he could be convicted and sentenced under sections 21a and 664.  
The court held instead that “section 288.3, subdivision (a), 
incorporates attempt into the crime itself,” (Korwin, at p. 688), 
and that “lack of an actual minor is not a defense to an attempt 
to commit a sex offense against a minor” (id. at p. 689). 
Other cases have rejected arguments when the People 
have sought to evade the application of section 21a for statutes 
that incorporate an attempt into the definition of a substantive 
offense.  People v. Bailey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 740 (Bailey) involved 
section 4530, subdivision (a) which provides: “Every prisoner 
confined in a state prison who, by force or violence, escapes or 
attempts to escape therefrom” is punishable by imprisonment in 
the state prison for a term of two, four, or six years.  The People 
acknowledged that section 21a requires a specific intent to 
commit the crime attempted.  However, they argued, “because 
section 4530 codifies the offense of escape in a different 
provision, section 21a is inapplicable,” and only a general intent 
was required.  (Bailey, at p. 750.)  We rejected that argument 
and looked to section 21a to define the required elements for the 
attempt provision.  (Bailey, at p. 749.) 
Similarly, People v. Gallegos (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 512 
(Gallegos) dealt with a separate statute embodying an attempt.  
 
7  
Punishment for both the completed offense and the 
attempted offense is identical: “imprisonment . . . for the term 
prescribed for an attempt to commit the intended offense.”  
(§ 288.3, subd. (a).) 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
Section 4532, subdivision (b)(1) prohibits escape “or attempts to 
escape” from a county jail.8  Trial evidence showed that Gallegos 
walked beyond a county jail perimeter.  The question was 
whether the People were required to show that, when he did so, 
he had the specific intent to escape, or whether a general intent 
to do an act which would have effected his escape was sufficient.  
In arguing for general intent the People urged that, because 
attempted escape was included in section 4532, the specific 
intent element of section 21a did not apply.  (Gallegos, at pp. 
515–516.)  The People’s argument was rejected:  “Although an 
attempt to escape is made punishable under Penal Code section 
4532 and not under Penal Code section 664 [citations], . . . the 
essential elements of an attempt to commit a crime, so as to 
make the attempt itself punishable, are present in an attempt 
to escape as well as in those attempts made punishable under 
Penal Code section 664.  [¶]  The argument is unsound that 
because the punishment for attempted escape is specifically 
provided for in section 4532, the crime is moved out of the class 
of attempts of which a specific intent is an element, to the status 
of a substantive crime that requires only a general intent to 
commit the act . . . .  The argument, in opening the possibility 
that there is such a crime as an attempt to attempt to escape, 
leads onto a logical merry-go-round.”  (Id. at p. 516.) 
 
8  
The statute provides in part that a prisoner arrested for, 
charged with, or convicted of a felony, who “escapes or attempts 
to escape” from the county jail or other places of custody or 
confinement without the use of force or violence, is subject to 
imprisonment for 16 months, two years, or three years, or to a 
county jail sentence not to exceed one year.  (§ 4532, subd. 
(b)(1).) 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
The above statutes all differ in some respects from the 
language of section 236.1(c).  Korwin, for example, emphasized 
the language in section 288.3, subdivision (a), requiring that the 
defendant “knows or reasonably should know that the person is 
a minor,” and distinguished section 236.1(c) and Shields, supra, 
23 Cal.App.5th 1242, on that basis.  (Korwin, supra, 36 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 688–689.)  Bailey and Gallegos looked to 
section 21a to define the requisite specific intent for attempt 
under sections 4530, subdivision (a) and 4532, subdivision (b)(1).  
(Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 749–750; Gallegos, supra, 39 
Cal.App.3d at p. 516.)  But neither escape statute includes 
language raising an issue of factual impossibility similar to 
section 236.1(c)’s mention of a minor victim.  Nonetheless, there 
is a consistent theme in this precedent:  Courts have looked to 
section 21a to define the elements of attempt where that offense 
is incorporated into the substantive crime, at least in the 
absence of a more specific definition in the statute itself.  Section 
236.1, subdivision (h) does define several key terms, but it 
contains no alternative definition of “attempts” to replace the 
general definition given in section 21a.   
Here the Court of Appeal majority concluded the attempt 
language in the statutory definition of this crime functions 
differently from the general law of attempt:  “An attempt under 
section 21a does not require a victim.  Instead such an attempt 
requires two inchoate elements:  (1) criminal intent; and (2) an 
ineffectual act toward committing the crime.  In contrast, the 
specific language of section 236.1(c) requires an additional 
element:  the necessity that the victim be a minor.  The ‘context’ 
of the two statutes is therefore different because the language of 
each is different:  section 236.1(c) includes an element that 
section 21a does not.”  (Moses, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 763.)  
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
Because defendant did not direct his efforts at a person who was 
actually a minor, the majority reversed his conviction.  (Id. at 
pp. 759, 761, 767.)  In doing so the majority embraced the 
holding of Shields, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pages 1255–1257, 
which also reversed a section 236.1(c) conviction under similar 
circumstances.  (Moses, at pp. 761–762, 766.)   
The dissenting justice would have held that section 
236.1(c) “penalizes both completed human trafficking acts and 
attempts to commit the proscribed human trafficking acts.  
Because ‘factual impossibility is not a defense to a charge of 
attempt’ [citation], the jury legally could convict Moses of 
human trafficking under [the statute] despite the absence of an 
actual minor victim.”  (Moses, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 767 
(conc. & dis. opn. of Aronson, Acting P. J.).)  The dissent 
reasoned that the purpose of the statute was to strengthen the 
laws against human traffickers and online predators who would 
sexually exploit women and children.  (Id. at p. 768; see 
discussion, post, at pp. 24–27.)  Basic tenets of statutory 
interpretation presume that the electorate intended to 
incorporate the traditional definition of attempt into the human 
trafficking statute.  (Moses, at pp. 769–770 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Aronson, Acting P. J.).)  A counter interpretation, the dissent 
noted, would create “an attempt to commit an attempt.”  (Id. at 
p. 769.)  The dissent reasoned that the law recognizes no such 
creature.   
The majority’s analysis missed the mark for two reasons.  
First, it discerned the creation of a new element, untethered to 
the settled understanding of attempt law.  Second it concluded 
that the language of section 21a and section 236.1(c) is 
significantly different.  In fact, the operative language 
employing the technical word “attempt” is the same.  Section 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
236.1(c) is not different because it creates an altered 
understanding of attempt.  It is different because, unlike some 
other attempt provisions, it expresses the electorate’s intent to 
punish both the trafficking of a minor and the attempt to do so 
in the same way.  The ability to make this sentencing choice is 
explicitly recognized in section 664. 
The Court of Appeal majority cited People v. Colantuono 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 206 for the proposition that the “ ‘meaning of 
“attempt” can vary with the criminal context.’ ”  (Moses, supra, 
38 Cal.App.5th at p. 763, quoting Colantuono, at p. 216.)  Its 
reliance was misplaced.  That case dealt with a specific and 
historical understanding of the offense of assault, which had 
been defined in the common law.  In examining the statutory 
definition of assault, which codified the common law 
understanding (see People v. Yslas (1865) 27 Cal. 630, 632; 
Hinkley, 
Assault-Related 
Conduct 
under 
the 
Proposed 
California Criminal Code (1974) 25 Hastings L.J. 657, 658), we 
observed that an assault is defined as “ ‘an unlawful attempt, 
coupled with the present ability, to commit a violent injury on 
the person of another.’ ”  (Colantuono, at p. 214.)  We then held 
that, unlike other attempted crimes, an assault is a general 
intent offense.  (Id. at pp. 216–217.)  In reaching this conclusion, 
we specifically noted that the crime of assault was statutorily 
defined by the Legislature of 1872 and the reference to attempt 
was used “only in its ordinary sense, not as the term of art we 
currently conceptualize.”  (Id. at p. 216.)  We also observed that 
“ ‘[t]he original concept of criminal assault developed at an 
earlier day than the doctrine of criminal attempt in general 
. . . .’ ”  (Ibid.)  Accordingly, we concluded that assault “is not 
simply an adjunct of some underlying offense [like criminal 
attempt], but an independent crime statutorily delineated in 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
terms of certain unlawful conduct immediately antecedent to 
battery.”  (Ibid.)  “[O]ur criminal code has long recognized this 
fundamental distinction between criminal attempt and assault 
by treating these offenses as separate and independent crimes.  
(Compare § 240 with §§ 663, 664.)”  (Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th 
at p. 786.)  The majority’s reliance on this fundamentally 
distinct provision led it astray. 
As the court in Clark has pointed out, section 236.1(c) is 
distinguishable from the provision defining assault.  Unlike 
assault, the crime of human trafficking of a minor is not “a 
historical anomaly ‘developed at an earlier day than the doctrine 
of criminal attempt in general.’ ”  (Clark, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 282, review granted.)  Instead, the language of section 
236.1(c) defining human trafficking was “chosen by the 
electorate in 2012, some 26 years after the enactment of the 
statutory definition of ‘attempt’ (Stats. 1986, ch. 519, § 1, p. 
1859), and the even earlier adoption of similar language at 
common law.”  (Clark, at p. 282.)  Accordingly, “ ‘ “the 
presumption is almost irresistible” ’ ” that the word “attempt” in 
section 236.1(c) is used in the “ ‘ “precise and technical sense” ’ ” 
provided by section 21a.  (Lopez, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1007.)  
The authorities summarized above demonstrate that, aside from 
the requisite intent, no other element of the completed offense is 
required to prove human trafficking of a minor under the 
attempt provision of the statute.   
Moses relies on the grammatical structure of section 
236.1(c).  In his view, the word “attempts” modifies the operative 
verbs “cause, induce, or persuade,” making the age of the 
inducee a distinct statutory element.  The People counter that 
the word “attempts” is a transitive verb that modifies the entire 
phrase “to cause, induce, or persuade, a person who is a minor.”  
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
The phrase “a person who is a minor” cannot be artificially 
isolated from the transitive verb to create a separate element of 
the offense.  The People’s reading of the statute appears the 
more logical.  The entire phrase “a person who is a minor at the 
time of the commission of the offense to engage in a commercial 
sex act, with the intent to effect or maintain a violation of 
[certain enumerated crimes]” (ibid.) applies both to the 
completed act and an attempt to complete that act.  However, 
repeating the entire phrase with respect to both prongs would 
be overly cumbersome.  It is reasonable to conclude that the 
drafting goal was to achieve word economy, not to set out “a 
person who is a minor” as a stand-alone element.  Under this 
view, the word “attempts” operates to modify all of the elements 
of the statute, making it unnecessary to prove that the 
defendant targeted an actual minor victim.  Moses’s contrary 
argument results in an artificial parsing of the sentence’s 
structure.    
Subdivision (c) must be understood in the context of the 
human trafficking statute of which it is a part.  The first two 
subdivisions of section 236.1 define human trafficking as 
“depriv[ing] or violat[ing] the personal liberty of another with 
the intent to obtain forced labor or services,” (id., subd. (a)), or 
with “the intent to effect or maintain . . . violation[s] of” various 
laws 
regulating 
prostitution, 
pimping 
and 
pandering, 
pornography, and extortion (id., subd. (b)).  Subdivision (c) does 
not speak of violating a victim’s personal liberty.  Instead it 
defines human trafficking another way:  the inducement of a 
minor to engage in commercial sex acts.  Subsequent provisions 
make clear that neither a minor’s consent (id., subd. (e)), nor a 
mistake of fact as to a victim’s age (id., subd. (f)), is a defense.  
Subdivision (c) specifically targets trafficking minors.  A 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
completed violation of subdivision (c) will, obviously, involve the 
inducement of a particular person, and that person must be a 
minor.  By contrast, to violate subdivision (c) as an attempt, the 
defendant must intend to induce a minor, but the target of that 
inducement need not be an actual minor.  This understanding of 
the statute supports a conclusion that, as long as the defendant 
has attempted to induce a person and intends that the object of 
his inducement be a minor, the elements of the attempt 
provision are satisfied.  This understanding honors the general 
law of attempt that punishes a criminal intent coupled with an 
ineffectual act done towards its commission.9   
The sentence structure of section 236.1(c) does not reflect 
an intent by voters to deviate from the established law of 
attempt.  Instead it conveys the voters’ intent that human 
trafficking of a minor, whether successfully completed or merely 
attempted, is to be punished in a uniform way.  As the court 
observed in Clark, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th 270, review granted, 
“[t]he only difference between Reed and cases like it [involving 
prosecutions under section 664], and the instant case is that 
here the crime of attempt is made part of section 236.1(c), 
making the attempted act equally blameworthy to the 
completed act and making equal the punishment for both the 
attempted act and the completed act.  The difference does not lie 
in a ‘plain reading’ of the statute.  It lies instead in the 
electorate’s choice to punish both the attempted act and the 
completed act equally.”  (Id. at p. 284.)      
 
9  
For an analysis of when the planning or preparation of a 
crime ripens into an attempt, see generally People v. Johnson 
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 250, 258 & fn. 4 and People v. Watkins (2012) 
55 Cal.4th 999, 1021. 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
 The Court of Appeal majority reasoned that punishing an 
attempt under section 236.1(c) without an actual minor victim 
is inconsistent with the provisions of subdivision (f) of the 
statute.  (Moses, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 762, 764.)  That 
subdivision provides:  “Mistake of fact as to the age of a victim 
of human trafficking who is a minor at the time of the 
commission of the offense is not a defense to a criminal 
prosecution under this section.”  (§ 236.1, subd. (f), italics 
added.)  The Court of Appeal reasoned that “[u]nder subdivision 
(f), it is no defense that a defendant may have believed a victim 
was 18 or older and therefore did not actually intend to traffic a 
minor; even absent such intent, the conduct constitutes a 
violation of section 236.1(c).”  (Moses, at p. 762.)  The defendant 
“bears the risk, regardless of whether he believed the minor was 
of age or not, that his trafficking target is a minor.”  (Id. at p. 
764.)  The majority acknowledged that if “ ‘there is no actual 
victim and therefore it is factually impossible to complete the 
crime,’ ” traditional attempt principles would hold the defendant 
liable only if he or she actually intended to traffic a minor.  (Id. 
at p. 762, quoting Shields, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1257.)  
Because subdivision (f) precludes a mistake of fact as to the 
victim’s age, the majority concluded that the attempt provision 
of the statute necessarily must require an actual minor in order 
to harmonize the two subdivisions.  (Moses, at pp. 762, 764.)     
The logical flaw here is the assumption that subdivision 
(f) applies when there is no actual minor victim.  By its terms it 
does not.  The statute eliminates a mistake of age defense if the 
defendant successfully induces a minor, even if acting under a 
mistake of fact.  It does not speak to the converse situation, 
when the defendant attempts to induce a person the defendant 
actually believes to be a minor but who is in fact an adult.  Under 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
the provisions of subdivision (c) and the law of attempt, such 
conduct is punishable as human trafficking so long as the 
defendant intended to induce a minor to engage in such conduct.  
There is no inconsistency between disallowing a mistake of age 
defense when the victim is an actual minor and requiring a 
specific intent to induce a minor when the defendant unwittingly 
targets a police decoy.  Nothing in subdivision (f) speaks to the 
latter intent requirement.10 
 Moses observes that the drafters of the initiative could 
have expressly prohibited acts “ ‘directed towards a minor, or a 
person who the defendant subjectively believes is a minor.’ ”  
(Quoting Clark, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 300 (dis. opn. of 
O’Leary, P. J.), review granted.)  It is often possible to craft more 
explicit language after the fact, but there is no question that the 
voters incorporated attempts into the substantive definition of 
section 236.1(c).  We apply the settled rule of statutory 
construction that the electorate used the word “attempts” in the 
“ ‘ “precise and technical sense” ’ ” ascribed to it by statute and 
case law.  (Lopez, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1007; accord, § 7, 
subd. (16).)  The well-established law at the time of the 
initiative’s passage was that “the commission of an attempt does 
not require proof of any particular element of the completed 
crime” other than intent (Chandler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 517, 
and cases cited), nor did it allow for a defense of factual 
impossibility.   
 
10  
We are not called upon here to determine the interplay 
between subdivision (f) and the specific intent required for the 
attempt prong of section 236.1(c) when the defendant attempts, 
but fails, to induce an actual minor to engage in a commercial 
sex act.  We offer no view on whether a mistake of fact as to the 
victim’s age would be a defense in that situation. 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
B. Ballot Materials and Statutory Aim 
Although the statutory language discussed above suggests 
an intent to incorporate traditional attempt principles into 
section 236.1(c), the specific textual formulation alone does not 
definitively answer the question.  Accordingly, we consider the 
ballot materials and the aims to be achieved by the enactment.  
(Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 901.)  That 
exercise reveals that voters did not intend the result defendant 
urges.   
The ballot materials make clear that a primary goal of 
Proposition 35 was to stop the exploitation of children by online 
predators.  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) 
argument in favor of Prop. 35, p. 46 (hereafter Voter Information 
Guide).)  The findings and declarations adopted by the 
electorate in support of the law provide:  (1) “Protecting every 
person in our state, particularly our children, from all forms of 
sexual exploitation is of paramount importance”; (2) “[T]he 
predatory use of [internet] technology by human traffickers and 
sex offenders has allowed such exploiters a new means to entice 
and prey on vulnerable individuals in our state”; and (3) “We 
need stronger laws to combat the threats posed by human 
traffickers and online predators seeking to exploit women and 
children for sexual purposes.”  (Voter Information Guide, supra, 
text of Prop. 35, § 2, p. 101.)  The stated purpose of the law was 
to “ensure just and effective punishment of people who promote 
or engage in the crime of human trafficking.”  (Id., § 3, p. 101.)  
To that end, the measure increased the punishment for human 
trafficking of minors from four, six, or eight years in prison 
(former § 236.1(c), added by Stats. 2005, ch. 240, § 7, p. 2507), to 
five, eight, or 12 years for nonforcible trafficking, and 15 years 
to life when the offense involves force, fear, fraud, or other 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
enumerated factors.  (§ 236.1(c)(1) & (2), as amended by Prop. 
35, § 6, Gen Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012).)11     
The measure’s reference to identifying and punishing 
online child predators is relevant here.  Sting operations are a 
common and effective method of identifying such offenders 
before they victimize an actual child.  (See Korwin, supra, 36 
Cal.App.5th at p. 690; U.S. v. Meek (9th Cir. 2004) 366 F.3d 705, 
719.)  But Moses’s interpretation of section 236.1(c) forces law 
enforcement to choose between traditional sting operations and 
maximum punishment for criminal offenders.  As the defense 
acknowledged at oral argument, its reading of the statute means 
a predator could be convicted under the attempt prong only if an 
actual minor was used in the sting operation, something officers 
would obviously be reluctant to do.  (See U.S. v. Gagliardi (2d 
Cir. 2007) 506 F.3d 140, 146–147.)  Use of an undercover officer 
posing as a minor would result in lesser punishment under the 
provisions of section 664.  By contrast, interpreting the attempt 
provision of section 236.1(c) so as not to require an actual minor 
victim furthers Proposition 35’s stated purposes.  It enhances 
law enforcement investigatory efforts while at the same time 
furthering the measure’s objective to “increase[] the current 
criminal penalties for human trafficking under state law.”  
(Voter Information Guide, supra, analysis of Prop. 35 by Legis. 
Analyst, at p. 43.) 
Again, this approach is consistent with the long-held 
foundation for criminalizing attempts.  “ ‘Applying criminal 
 
11  
Former section 236.1(c) was purely an enhanced 
sentencing provision related to trafficking based on a violation 
of personal liberty.  It was removed and replaced with the new 
subdivision (c) by the initiative’s enactment. 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
culpability to acts directly moving toward commission of crime 
. . . is an obvious safeguard to society because it makes it 
unnecessary for police to wait before intervening until the actor 
has done the substantive evil sought to be prevented.  It allows 
such criminal conduct to be stopped or intercepted when it 
becomes clear what the actor's intention is and when the acts 
done show that the perpetrator is actually putting his plan into 
action.’  [Citations.]”  (Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 453.)   
In resisting this conclusion, the Court of Appeal noted that 
generally attempts may be considered “ ‘ “less serious” ’ than 
crimes carried through to completion.”  (Moses, supra, 38 
Cal.App.5th at p. 765, quoting In re Nuñez (2009) 173 
Cal.App.4th 709, 736.)  It is often true that attempt offenses are 
considered less serious and statutes may reflect that policy 
choice.  However, it is also true that legislators and the 
electorate may consider the harm occasioned by some attempts 
to be on a par with a completed crime.  It is their prerogative to 
enact statutes that reflect that determination.  (People v. Flores 
(1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 74, 84–89, cited with approval in People 
v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838, 840.)12   
 
12  
We note that the Court of Appeal’s reliance on In re Nuñez, 
supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at page 736, and the case it quoted, 
Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277, 293, is somewhat strained.  
Both cases involved a cruel and unusual punishment challenge, 
and neither involved an attempt.  Nuñez was convicted of 
kidnapping for ransom (Nuñez, at p. 714) and Helm for uttering 
a “ ‘no account’ ” check for $100 (Solem, at p. 281).  Those cases 
quoted 
the 
general 
observation 
from 
Blackstone’s 
Commentaries as part of their analysis of the magnitude of 
harm the defendant caused in evaluating a constitutionally 
acceptable punishment. 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
The electorate’s intent to ensure just and effective 
punishment of child predators is demonstrated by section 236.1, 
subdivision (f), which holds the defendant liable for targeting an 
actual minor victim even if the defendant believes the victim is 
an adult.  There is no reason to conclude from the ballot 
materials that the electorate intended to impose lesser 
punishment on a defendant who intentionally targets a minor 
but fails in the attempt because the target is actually an adult.  
Given the initiative’s stated purpose, it is more reasonable to 
conclude that section 236.1(c) operates as a one-way ratchet to 
increase punishment for both such offenders. 
In an argument reminiscent of that in Bailey and Gallegos, 
the People urge that a defendant need not intend to induce a 
minor to commit an attempt under section 236.1(c).  Rather, 
they contend the necessary specific intent is only the intent to 
violate one of the criminal statutes listed in that subdivision.  
They rely on People v. Branch (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 516.  That 
case involved a conviction for attempted pimping of a minor 
under the age of 16 (§§ 266h, subd. (b)(2), 664) against J.V., a 
15-year-old victim.  The court refused the defense request to 
instruct the jury that his good faith, reasonable belief J.V. was 
18 was a defense to the attempt crime.  Instead, the court 
instructed that to convict, the jury must find J.V. was under the 
age of 16 at the time of the charged crimes.  (Branch, at p. 520.)  
On appeal, the court found no instructional error.  It reasoned:  
“[T]he criminal intent for the crimes of attempted pimping and 
pandering of a minor is the attempt to pimp and pander; the age 
of the victim only affects the severity of the sentence, not the 
criminality of the conduct.  Regardless of his belief as to J.V.’s 
age, defendant acted with criminal intent.”  (Id. at p. 522.)   
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
Assuming without deciding that Branch’s interpretation 
of section 266h is correct, the case is distinguishable because it 
did not involve an issue of factual impossibility.  The victim in 
that case was 15 years old and the jury was instructed that it 
must find the victim was under the age of 16 in order to convict.  
Moses, on the other hand, could not be convicted of human 
trafficking under the completed prong of the statute because the 
target of his conduct was not a minor.  Rather, his guilt or 
innocence must be determined “   “as if the facts were as he 
perceived them.” ’ ” (Reed, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 396.)  It 
follows that an attempt under section 236.1(c) does require as 
an element that the defendant intend to target a minor, at least 
where the victim is not in fact a minor.  The People would have 
us reject factual impossibility as a defense to the crime of 
attempt under section 236.1(c) while simultaneously refusing to 
apply another established requirement of that doctrine.  We 
reject the People’s argument that Moses could be convicted not 
only in the absence of an actual minor victim, but also without 
intent to induce a minor victim.  
In sum, section 236.1(c) operates as follows.  To be 
convicted of the completed crime of inducing a minor to engage 
in a commercial sex act, the person induced must be a minor.  To 
commit the crime of attempting to induce a minor, the defendant 
must act with the “ ‘specific intent to commit the [completed] 
crime’ ” (Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 786), i.e., the intent to 
cause, induce, or persuade a minor to engage in a commercial 
sex act, at least when no actual minor victim is involved (see fn. 
10, ante).  The defendant must act with the additional intent to 
effect or maintain a violation of one of the offenses enumerated 
in the statute.  If these elements are met, the fact that the 
particular target of his efforts is not actually a minor is not a 
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
defense.  Under both theories the defendant is guilty of “human 
trafficking” (§ 236.1(c)) and subject to the same punishment.13 
C.  Remand Is Required 
In the Court of Appeal, Moses argued that the instructions 
did not require the jury to find that he specifically intended to 
traffic a minor.  Because the court reversed for lack of sufficient 
evidence of an actual minor victim, it did not reach this claim.  
The court did discuss the adequacy of the instructions in 
deciding that it could not reduce the offense from a violation of 
section 236.1(c) to an attempted violation of section 236.1(c), 
664:  “[T]he instructions provided by the trial court as to count 
1 did not require the jury to determine whether Moses 
specifically intended to target a minor, as would be required if a 
violation of section 21a were a lesser included offense of section 
236.1(c).  Without assurance from the instructions given that 
the jury determined Moses specifically harbored the required 
intent for a violation of section 21a, we cannot reduce the section 
236.1(c) conviction to that lesser attempt conviction.”  (Moses, 
supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 767.)   
The court’s comments on the jury instructions were made 
in the context of its power to reduce the offense under sections 
1181, subdivision 6 and 1260 upon a finding of evidentiary 
insufficiency.  The court can only reduce an offense to a lesser 
offense that was necessarily found by the trier of fact.  (Bailey, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 752.)  Moses’s claim of instructional error 
is governed by different standards.  Specifically, the Court of 
Appeal did not address several counterarguments advanced by 
 
13  
We disapprove People v. Shields, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th 
1242, to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion.   
PEOPLE v. MOSES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
the People, including that (1) Moses forfeited his challenge to 
the instruction by failing to object below; (2) the instructions, 
viewed as a whole and in light of the trial record, were not 
reasonably likely to mislead the jury about the required specific 
intent; and (3) any error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt given the evidence and the jury’s other findings.  
Accordingly, we remand the case to the Court of Appeal to 
address Moses’s instructional challenge in the first instance.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
HOCH, J.* 
 
 
_______________________ 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Moses 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion  
Original Appeal   
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted  XXX 38 Cal.App.5th 757 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S258143 
Date Filed:  December 28, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Orange 
Judge:  Julian W. Bailey   
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Mark Alan Hart, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys  
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve T. Oetting and Michael Pulos, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mark Alan Hart 
Attorney at Law 
9420 Reseda Blvd. 
Northridge, CA 91324 
(818) 363-0419 
 
Steve Oetting 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9207