Case Title: State v. Schmidt

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020AP000616-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 65 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP616-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Anthony M. Schmidt, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON PETITION TO BYPASS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 18, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 8, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
Phillip A. Koss   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined, and in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined with respect to Parts I, II, and III.A.  ROGGENSACK, 
J., filed a concurrence, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., 
joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, and 
dissenting in part, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., 
joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Christopher P. August, assistant state public defender and Office 
of the State Public Defender, Milwaukee. There was an oral argument 
by Christopher P. August. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by Eric 
M. Muellenbach, assistant attorney general; with whom on the brief 
was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument 
by Eric M. Muellenbach.  
 
 
2021 WI 65 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP616-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2018CF636) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Anthony M. Schmidt, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUN 18, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined, and in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined with respect to Parts I, II, and III.A.  ROGGENSACK, J., 
filed a concurrence, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.  
HAGEDORN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, and dissenting 
in part, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court for 
Walworth County, Phillip A. Koss, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This case is before 
the court on bypass pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60 (2019-
20).1  Anthony Schmidt brought this action challenging the Walworth 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
2 
 
County circuit court's2 judgment imposing a child pornography 
surcharge for 14 images of child pornography, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 973.042(2), and order denying Schmidt's postconviction 
motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea or, in the alternative, 
have the circuit court vacate the child pornography surcharges for 
the eight images of child pornography that formed the basis of 
Schmidt's read-in charges of possession of child pornography.   
¶2 
Schmidt was charged with 14 counts of possession of child 
pornography and one count of failing to register for the sex 
offender registry.  As part of a plea agreement, Schmidt pled 
guilty to six counts of possession of child pornography, and the 
State dismissed and read in the remaining charges.  The circuit 
court accepted this plea agreement and convicted Schmidt of the 
six counts of possession of child pornography.  At sentencing, the 
circuit court sentenced Schmidt to 30 years, consisting of 15 years 
of initial confinement and 15 years of extended supervision.  The 
circuit court also imposed a $500 child pornography surcharge, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2), for each of the 14 images of 
child pornography for which Schmidt was charged. 
¶3 
After sentencing, Schmidt filed a postconviction motion 
seeking to have the circuit court (1) allow him to withdraw his 
guilty plea, (2) vacate the child pornography surcharges imposed 
for the eight images of child pornography that formed the basis of 
Schmidt's read-in charges of possession of child pornography, and 
(3) grant a hearing on both issues.  Schmidt argued that he should 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Phillip A. Koss presided. 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
3 
 
be permitted to withdraw his plea because the circuit court failed 
to adequately inform him during the plea colloquy about the child 
pornography surcharge, which he alleged was a punishment attaching 
to his conviction.  In the alternative, he argued that the circuit 
court could not impose a child pornography surcharge for images of 
child pornography that form the basis of read-in charges of 
possession of child pornography.  The circuit court denied 
Schmidt's postconviction motion without a hearing, determining 
that it did not need to inform Schmidt of the child pornography 
surcharge during the plea colloquy, and that it could order the 
child pornography surcharge for the images of child pornography 
that formed the basis of read-in charges of possession of child 
pornography.  We agree.  
¶4 
We conclude that the child pornography surcharge is not 
punitive, so the circuit court did not need to inform Schmidt of 
the child pornography surcharge during the plea colloquy.  
Consequently, the circuit court did not err when it denied 
Schmidt's postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  We 
also conclude that the child pornography surcharge applies to 
images of child pornography that form the basis of read-in charges 
of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child 
pornography, so long as those images of child pornography are 
connected to and brought into relation with the convicted 
individual's offense of sexual exploitation of a child or 
possession of child pornography.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
circuit court's judgment imposing the child pornography surcharge 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
4 
 
for 14 images of child pornography, and the order that denied plea 
withdrawal.   
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶5 
On December 13, 2018, the State filed a criminal 
complaint against Schmidt, alleging five counts——specifically, 
four counts of possession of child pornography and one count of 
failing to comply with requirements of the sex offender registry.3  
The State later filed an information increasing the number of 
counts against Schmidt to 14 counts of possession of child 
pornography and retaining the one count of failing to comply with 
requirements of the sex offender registry.   
¶6 
On April 1, 2019, the circuit court held a plea hearing 
after the State and Schmidt reached a plea agreement.  The plea 
agreement, which was filed with the circuit court, stated that 
"Schmidt will plead guilty to counts 1-6 [each a count of 
possession of child pornography], the State will move to dismiss 
and read-in the remaining charges, a [presentence investigation] 
will be requested by the parties, and both sides will be free to 
argue for the appropriate sentence."  Schmidt also submitted a 
completed Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form.  Included in 
the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form, Schmidt acknowledged 
that he faced "a $500.00 surcharge for each image or each copy of 
                                                 
3 Schmidt was previously convicted of possession of child 
pornography and, as a part of that conviction, was required to 
register as a sex offender.   
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
5 
 
an image [of child pornography]" upon the circuit court accepting 
his guilty plea.   
¶7 
The circuit court engaged in a standard plea colloquy 
with Schmidt before accepting his guilty plea.  At no time did the 
court inform Schmidt that he faced a surcharge for each image of 
child pornography associated with his crimes.  The court accepted 
Schmidt's guilty plea, entered its judgment of conviction, and 
ordered a presentence investigation.   
¶8 
On May 28, 2019, the circuit court held a sentencing 
hearing.  The court sentenced Schmidt to 30 years, consisting of 
15 years of initial confinement and 15 years of extended 
supervision.  The circuit court also imposed a surcharge for 14 
images of child pornography; specifically, the six images of child 
pornography that formed the basis of the six convictions and the 
eight images of child pornography that formed the basis of 
Schmidt's read-in charges of possession of child pornography.   
¶9 
On December 18, 2019, Schmidt filed a motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea or, in the alternative, to have the circuit court 
vacate the child pornography surcharges imposed for the eight 
images of child pornography that formed the basis of his read-in 
counts of possession of child pornography.  He asserted that the 
child pornography surcharge is a punishment that the circuit court 
was required to inform him of during the plea colloquy.  Because 
the circuit court did not do so, Schmidt claims that his plea was 
not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and that therefore he was 
entitled to withdraw his plea.  He also contended, in the 
alternative to plea withdrawal, that the circuit court could not 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
6 
 
impose the child pornography surcharge for the images of child 
pornography that formed the basis of his read-in counts of 
possession of child pornography because the court imposed a 
sentence for only six counts, not 14 counts, of possession of child 
pornography.  Accordingly, Schmidt argued, the circuit court 
should vacate the child pornography surcharge for the eight images 
of child pornography that formed the basis of his read-in charges 
of possession of child pornography.   
¶10 On March 31, 2020, the circuit court issued its order 
denying Schmidt's postconviction motion without a hearing.  
Specifically, the court determined that the child pornography 
surcharge was not punishment, so it did not need to inform Schmidt 
of the surcharge prior to accepting his guilty plea.  The court 
also determined that it had the power to impose the child 
pornography surcharge for the eight images of child pornography 
that formed the basis of the eight read-in charges of possession 
of child pornography and correctly exercised its authority when it 
did so.   
¶11 Schmidt appealed.  On October 16, 2020, while the case 
was still pending before the court of appeals, Schmidt petitioned 
this court to bypass the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.60.  We granted Schmidt's petition to bypass the court 
of appeals and took jurisdiction of this case.   
 
II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 Schmidt asks this court to review the circuit court's 
denial of his postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
7 
 
after he was sentenced.  "We review a circuit court's decision to 
deny a plea withdrawal motion under an erroneous exercise of 
discretion standard."  State v. Savage, 2020 WI 93, ¶24, 395 
Wis. 2d 1, 951 N.W.2d 838 (citing State v. Nash, 2020 WI 85, ¶27, 
394 Wis. 2d 238, 951 N.W.2d 404).  "A defendant seeking to withdraw 
a plea after sentencing must show by clear and convincing evidence 
that 'allowing the withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct 
a manifest injustice.'"  Id. (quoting Nash, 394 Wis. 2d 238, ¶32).  
"A defendant can meet that burden by showing that he or she did 
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter the plea."  
State v. Fugere, 2019 WI 33, ¶16, 386 Wis. 2d 76, 924 N.W.2d 469.   
¶13 "Whether 
a 
guilty 
plea 
was 
entered 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily is a question of constitutional 
fact."  Id., ¶17 (citing State v. Muldrow, 2018 WI 52, ¶24, 381 
Wis. 2d 492, 912 N.W.2d 74).  "This court upholds a circuit court's 
findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, and '[d]etermines 
independently whether those facts demonstrate that the defendant's 
plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.'"  Id. (alteration 
in original) (quoting State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶19, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906).  
¶14 Schmidt also asserts that there were deficiencies in the 
plea colloquy conducted by the circuit court.  "This court 
determines the sufficiency of the plea colloquy and the necessity 
of an evidentiary hearing, questions of law, independently of the 
circuit court and court of appeals but benefiting from their 
analyses."  State v. Hoppe, 2009 WI 41, ¶17, 317 Wis. 2d 161, 765 
N.W.2d 794.   
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
8 
 
¶15 Furthermore, Schmidt argues that the child pornography 
surcharge is punishment, and that the child pornography surcharge 
cannot apply to images of child pornography that form the basis of 
read-in charges of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of 
child pornography.  Both of these arguments require us to interpret 
Wis. Stat. § 973.042, which we do de novo.  Muldrow, 381 
Wis. 2d 492, ¶25.  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶16 We begin our analysis with Schmidt's claim that he is 
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.  We then turn to his 
alternative argument that we should vacate the circuit court's 
imposition of the child pornography surcharge for the images of 
child pornography that formed the basis of his read-in charges of 
possession of child pornography.   
A.  Schmidt Is Not Entitled To Withdraw His Guilty Plea.  
 
1.  Principles of plea withdrawal, plea  
colloquies, and punishment  
¶17 To withdraw a plea after sentencing, as is the case here, 
the defendant "bears the heavy burden to demonstrate by 'clear and 
convincing evidence' that withdrawal is necessary to avoid 
'manifest injustice.'"  Fugere, 386 Wis. 2d 76, ¶24 (quoted source 
omitted).  "A plea is 'manifestly unjust' in violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution if it was not 
entered 'knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.'"  Id. 
(quoting Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 182-83 (2005)).  "A 
plea not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
9 
 
violates fundamental due process, and a defendant therefore may 
withdraw the plea as a matter of right."  State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 
34, ¶25, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482.   
¶18 For a defendant's plea to be knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary, "the circuit court must notify the defendant of any 
direct consequence of his guilty plea."  Muldrow, 381 Wis. 2d 492, 
¶1.  "A direct consequence of a guilty plea, is one that 'has a 
definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range of 
a defendant's punishment.'"  Id. (quoting State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 
6, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199).  While a circuit court 
must inform a defendant of a direct consequence of a guilty plea, 
the circuit court does not need to inform a defendant of 
"collateral consequences" of a defendant's plea for the plea to be 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Fugere, 386 Wis. 2d 76, ¶20.  
"Collateral consequences are indirect and do not flow from the 
conviction."  Id. (quoting State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶61, 237 
Wis. 2d 197, 
614 
N.W.2d 477). 
 
"In 
evaluating 
whether 
a 
consequence of a defendant's plea is direct or collateral, courts 
look to whether the consequence is a punishment."  Id.   
¶19 "The 
legislature 
has 
codified 
this 
prerequisite, 
requiring circuit courts to '[a]ddress the defendant personally 
and determine that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding 
of the nature of the charge and the potential punishment if 
convicted' before the court accepts a guilty plea."  Muldrow, 381 
Wis. 2d 492, ¶2 (alteration in original) (quoting Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(a)).  "A defendant who is not accurately informed of 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
10 
 
the punishment that could result from his guilty plea may be 
entitled to withdraw his plea."  Id.   
¶20 When a defendant has shown that he or she was not 
accurately informed of a punishment, the circuit court does not 
automatically grant the defendant's plea withdrawal request.  See 
Fugere, 386 Wis. 2d 76, ¶24.  Instead, the circuit court may hold 
an evidentiary hearing where the State may prove that, despite the 
failure to inform him of the punishment, the defendant's plea was 
indeed knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Id.    
2.  The child pornography surcharge is not punishment. 
¶21 With these principles in mind, we turn to Schmidt's 
challenge in this case.  Schmidt alleges that he is entitled to 
plea withdrawal, or an evidentiary hearing, because the child 
pornography surcharge is punishment that he was not informed of 
during his plea colloquy.    
¶22 Despite the clear mandate that the circuit court must 
inform the defendant of all punishments, it is not always clear 
whether a particular sanction constitutes punishment.  See, e.g., 
Muldrow, 381 Wis. 2d 492 (determining whether lifetime GPS 
tracking 
constitutes 
punishment); 
Bollig, 
232 
Wis. 2d 561 
(determining whether a sex offender registration requirement 
constitutes punishment); State v. Williams, 2018 WI 59, 381 
Wis. 2d 661, 912 N.W.2d 373 (determining whether a DNA surcharge 
constitutes punishment).  To determine whether a sanction is 
punishment, we adopted the "intent-effects test" from Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-70 (1963).  Muldrow, 381 
Wis. 2d 492, ¶30.   
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
11 
 
¶23 This intent-effects test consists of two independent 
inquiries to determine whether the sanction is punishment.  The 
first inquiry requires courts to "look to the 'statute's primary 
function' to determine the statute's intent," as expressed in the 
plain text of the statute.  Fugere, 386 Wis. 2d 76, ¶38 (quoting 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169); State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. 
Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  If the statute's primary function is to impose 
punishment, we end the inquiry, and the sanction is deemed 
punishment.  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003).  If the 
statute's primary function is not punitive, we then turn to the 
second inquiry, which requires the court to consider "whether the 
effect of the statute was 'penal or regulatory in character.'"  
Muldrow, 381 Wis. 2d 492, ¶31 (quoting Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 
at 168).  If the effect of the statute was penal in character, the 
sanction is deemed punishment.  Thus, if either the statute's 
primary function is punitive or the sanction is in effect punitive 
in character, we must deem the sanction to be punishment.  
¶24 Accordingly, we must determine whether the statute's 
primary function is punitive or the effect of the child pornography 
surcharge is punishment.  Such an inquiry is "a matter of statutory 
construction."  See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 
(1997).  The child pornography surcharge is codified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.042(2), which provides: 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
12 
 
If a court imposes a sentence or places a person on 
probation for a crime under [Wis. Stat. §§] 948.05[4] 
or 948.12[5] and the person was at least 18 years of age 
when the crime was committed, the court shall impose a 
child pornography surcharge of $500 for each image or 
each copy of an image associated with the crime.  The 
court shall determine the number of images or copies of 
images associated with the crime by a preponderance of 
the evidence and without a jury.[6] 
¶25 Having set forth the specific statute at issue, we now 
turn to an analysis of the intent-effects test to determine whether 
the child pornography surcharge is punishment.  
a.  Intent of the child pornography surcharge 
¶26 The first half of the intent-effects test requires us to 
determine whether the primary function of the child pornography 
surcharge statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2), is punitive.  See 
Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶22.  Both parties agree that the 
primary function of the child pornography surcharge is not 
punitive.  We agree.  See State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 
Wis. 2d 312, 891 N.W.2d 786 (holding that the primary function of 
the DNA surcharge statute was not punitive); Williams, 381 
Wis. 2d 661 (same).   
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.05 criminalizes sexual exploitation 
of a child, including the recording and displaying of children 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct and the sale, distribution, 
and promotion of recordings of children engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.   
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.12 criminalizes possession of child 
pornography.     
6 "In this section, 'image' includes a video recording, a 
visual representation, a positive or negative image on exposed 
film, and data representing a visual image."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.042(1).   
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
13 
 
¶27 In Scruggs, we determined that the primary function of 
the DNA surcharge statute was not punitive.  Scruggs, 373 
Wis. 2d 312, ¶3.  We reached this conclusion based on the plain 
text of the statute because "[t]he legislature termed the payment 
a 'surcharge' not a 'fine,' . . . and it linked the surcharge to 
legislation that dramatically increased the number of people 
required to provide DNA samples to be analyzed, stored, and 
maintained in the DNA databank."  Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶22 
(summarizing the Scruggs court's analysis).   
¶28 The child pornography surcharge shares both of these 
characteristics.  Just as with the DNA surcharge, the legislature 
termed the payment a surcharge rather than a fine.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.042(2), (5), (6).  Moreover, the surcharge is linked to 
funding of investigations of sexual exploitation of children and 
possession of child pornography and grants to eligible public 
agencies or nonprofit organizations that provide counseling 
services 
to 
victims 
of 
sexual 
assault. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 20.455(5)(gj).7  Therefore, in light of the plain text of 
§ 973.042, the primary function of the child pornography surcharge 
is not punitive.  
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 20.455(5)(gj) provides that "[a]ll moneys 
received from any child pornography surcharge imposed under 
[§] 973.042 for investigating offenses under [§] 948.05 or 948.12 
and for making grants under [§] 165.93(2)(a)."   
Wisconsin Stat. § 165.93(2)(a) in turn provides that "[t]he 
[Department of Justice] shall provide grants to eligible 
organizations from the appropriations under [§] 20.455(5)(e) and 
(gj) to provide services for sexual assault victims."   
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
14 
 
b.  Effect of the child pornography surcharge 
¶29 The second inquiry of the intent-effects test requires 
us to independently consider the effect of the child pornography 
surcharge.  See Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶30.  Regardless of the 
statute's non-punitive primary function for imposing the child 
pornography surcharge, we must consider whether the child 
pornography surcharge is "so punitive in form and effect as to 
render [it] criminal despite" the statute's primary function to 
the contrary.  Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312, ¶39 (quoting State v. 
Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶42, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762).  "Only 
the 'clearest proof' will 'override [the statute's primary 
function] and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy 
into a criminal penalty.'"  Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶30 (quoting 
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100).   
¶30 Seven factors, referred to as the Mendoza-Martinez 
factors, guide our analysis of whether a sanction is punitive in 
effect.  These factors are:   
(1) does the statute involve an affirmative disability 
or restraint; (2) has the sanction at issue historically 
been regarded as punishment; (3) will the sanction be 
imposed only after a finding of scienter; (4) does the 
statute promote the traditional aims of punishment——
retribution and deterrence; (5) is the behavior to which 
it applies already a crime; (6) is there an alternative 
purpose to which it may be rationally connected; and (7) 
is the sanction excessive in relation to the alternative 
purpose assigned. 
Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶30 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. at 168-69).  The Mendoza-Martinez factors "are 'neither 
exhaustive nor dispositive' but are 'useful guideposts'" in 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
15 
 
ascertaining if the effect of a statute is punitive.  Smith, 538 
U.S. at 97 (citations omitted).  And these factors must be applied 
on the face of the statute, rather than to the facts and 
circumstances of an individual defendant.  Hudson, 522 U.S. at 
100; contra Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶67 (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring) (advocating to answer these questions "on a case-by-
case basis").   
¶31 Accordingly, when we apply the seven Mendoza-Martinez 
factors here, we look to the statutory language that imposes the 
$500 surcharge rather than a potential cumulative effect for a 
particular defendant.  See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169.  We 
conclude, based on our application of the Mendoza-Martinez 
factors, that the child pornography surcharge is not punitive in 
effect.  
 
i.  Is the surcharge an affirmative disability or restraint? 
¶32 Schmidt asserts that the child pornography surcharge 
imposes an affirmative disability or restraint due to the "extreme 
level of financial immiseration entailed by the statute."  Schmidt 
argues that the child pornography surcharge statute imposes a 
disability on defendants because it "is capable of imposing 
millions of dollars of financial liability," which "harshly 
limit[s] the defendant's ability to reintegrate into society upon 
release" and "creates a debt that can never be repaid 
and . . . will in fact impact employment, housing, and travel."  
However, as we discussed above, when analyzing the child 
pornography surcharge statute under the Mendoza-Martinez factors, 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
16 
 
we must look at the statutory language, which imposes a $500 
surcharge per image of child pornography.  As such, Schmidt's 
hypothetical argument that an individual defendant may face 
millions of dollars of surcharges is irrelevant to our analysis.  
¶33 Furthermore, the child pornography surcharge statute 
does 
not 
impose 
an 
affirmative 
disability 
or 
restraint.  
"'[D]isability' and 'restraint' are normally understood to mean 
imprisonment."  Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶32.  The child 
pornography surcharge "imposes no physical restraint, and so does 
not resemble the punishment of imprisonment, which is the 
paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint."  Smith, 538 
U.S. at 100.  Moreover, a $500 surcharge is "less harsh than the 
sanctions of occupational debarment, which [the Court has] held to 
be nonpunitive."  Id.  Such a surcharge "does not restrain 
activities [defendants] may pursue but leaves them free to change 
jobs or residences."  Id.   
¶34 As such, this factor weighs against characterizing the 
child pornography surcharge as punishment.  
 
ii.  Is the surcharge historically viewed as punishment? 
¶35 "[A] surcharge has not been viewed as punishment."  
Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶33.  We have been unable to identify 
"historical evidence supporting [the] characterization of a 
surcharge as punishment.  Although the surcharge might not align 
exactly with the remedial sanction cases from the late 1800s and 
early 1900s[,] a surcharge resembles a non-punitive remedial 
sanction much more than punishment."  Id., ¶34.  Schmidt requests 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
17 
 
that we depart from this conclusion because of his assertion that 
the child pornography surcharge statute authorizes the imposition 
of millions of dollars of financial penalties "in conjunction with 
proof that the offender has committed a morally blameworthy act."  
However, contrary to Schmidt's assertion, the plain language of 
the child pornography surcharge statute imposes a $500 surcharge 
as the sanction.  Accordingly, Schmidt has presented no new 
information that suggests that we should depart from our previous 
determination that "a surcharge has not been viewed as punishment."  
Id., ¶33.  As such, this factor undercuts characterizing the child 
pornography surcharge as punishment.  
iii.  Is a finding of scienter required? 
¶36 Schmidt concedes that no finding of scienter is required 
to impose the surcharge.  The absence of the scienter requirements 
shows that the statute is not punitive in effect.  Id., ¶35 
(quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997)).  As such, 
this factor militates against characterizing the child pornography 
surcharge as punishment. 
 
iv.  Does a surcharge promote retribution and deterrence? 
¶37 The child pornography surcharge does not promote the 
traditional aims of punishment——retribution and deterrence.  The 
child pornography surcharge statute imposes a $500 surcharge, 
which is "relatively small and therefore [does] not promote the 
traditional punitive aims of retribution and deterrence."  Id., 
¶36 (citing Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312, ¶45).  The $500 surcharge 
"is unlikely to deter anyone from engaging in illegal activity.  
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
18 
 
And the corrective impact of a [$500 surcharge] pales in comparison 
to the penal power of a lengthy prison sentence."  Id.  The maximum 
sentence for possession of child pornography is 25 years in prison 
and $100,000 fine, which is far more retributive and deterring 
than the $500 surcharge. As such, this factor undermines 
characterizing the child pornography surcharge as punishment.   
 
v.  Does the surcharge apply to conduct already a crime? 
¶38 Both the State and Schmidt agree that the surcharge 
applies to conduct that was already a crime:  convictions for 
sexual exploitation of a child and possession of child pornography.  
This suggests that "the surcharge has the effect of punishing 
criminal behavior."  Scruggs, 373 Wis. 2d 312, ¶43.  Accordingly, 
this factor weighs in favor of characterizing the surcharge as 
punishment.  However, the factors are only guideposts and no one 
factor is dispositive.  Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.  
 
vi.  Is the surcharge rationally connected to an  
alternative purpose? 
¶39 "The existence of an alternative non-punitive purpose 
for a sanction is considered 'the most significant factor' in 
determining whether the effect of a sanction is punitive."  
Muldrow, 381 Wis. 2d 492, ¶57.  Both the State and Schmidt agree 
that the child pornography surcharge serves two alternative non-
punitive 
purposes:  (1) 
funding 
investigations 
of 
sexual 
exploitation of children and possession of child pornography, and 
(2) providing grants to eligible public agencies or nonprofit 
organizations that provide counseling services to victims of 
sexual assault.  Wis. Stat. § 20.455(5)(gj).  While Schmidt agrees 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
19 
 
that the child pornography surcharge has these alternative 
purposes, he contends that assessing the child pornography 
surcharge based on the number of images of child pornography is 
not rationally related to the alternative purposes because "it 
makes little sense that the costs of a child pornography 
investigation will increase at a rate of $500 per individual 
[image]."   
¶40 Even if Schmidt's assertion were correct——for which he 
provides no support or citation——"[a] statute is not deemed 
punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the 
nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance."  Smith, 538 U.S. at 103.  
Schmidt's alleged imprecision "does not suggest that the [child 
pornography surcharge's] nonpunitive purpose is a 'sham or mere 
pretext.'"  Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)).  "[I]t is altogether rational to assess a fee aimed 
at solving crimes against those who commit them . . . ."  Williams, 
381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶38 (quoted source omitted).  Because the child 
pornography surcharge is used to fund investigations of sexual 
exploitation of children and possession of child pornography, the 
child pornography surcharge is rationally related to its 
alternative purpose of defraying investigation costs.  
¶41 Moreover, Schmidt's assertion ignores the other purpose 
for which the $500 is earmarked——providing grants for counseling 
services to victims of sexual assault.  As distribution of child 
pornography "is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of 
children," United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010), the 
counseling services that the child pornography surcharge funds 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
20 
 
will assist the victims of child pornography.  Thus, the child 
pornography surcharge is also rationally related to this non-
punitive purpose.  
¶42 Accordingly, 
the 
child 
pornography 
surcharge 
is 
rationally connected to alternative non-punitive purposes; namely, 
funding investigations of sexual exploitation of children and 
possession of child pornography and providing grants to eligible 
public agencies or nonprofit organizations that provide counseling 
services to victims of sexual assault.  As such, this factor weighs 
against characterizing the child pornography surcharge as 
punishment. 
 
vii.  Is the surcharge excessive in relation to the  
alternative purpose? 
¶43 "To determine whether the surcharge is excessive in 
relation to its non-punitive purpose, we must compare the amount 
of the surcharge with the overall expenses the State incurs because 
of the charged population's conduct."  Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, 
¶39.  "The surcharge must be 'grossly disproportionate to the 
annual cost' to prove it is excessive."  Id. (quoting Mueller v. 
Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 2014)).  "We examine not 
'whether the legislature has made the best choice possible to 
address the problem it seeks to remedy,' but 'whether the 
regulatory means chosen are reasonable.'"  Id. (quoting Smith, 538 
U.S. at 105).   
¶44 Under this standard, we are not convinced the surcharge 
is excessive in relation to its non-punitive purposes.  Schmidt 
argues that because the impact on an individual defendant may 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
21 
 
exceed millions of dollars of liability, the child pornography 
surcharge is punitive in nature.  However, the child pornography 
surcharge imposes $500 of liability per image.  Schmidt and the 
State agree that the cost that child pornography imposes on society 
and victims is high.  The money generated from the child 
pornography surcharge is specifically earmarked to alleviate those 
costs to society (via investigations) and to the victims (via 
grants for counseling services).  See Wis. Stat. § 20.455(5)(gj).8  
The high cost of counseling for an individual victim can easily 
exceed the $500 amount of the child pornography surcharge.  See, 
e.g., Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 441 (2014) 
(addressing a child pornography victim's claim for $500,000 in 
future treatment and counseling costs for the defendant possessing 
two images depicting the victim).  Similarly, the cost of 
investigating sexual exploitation of a child and possession of 
child pornography is expensive, especially as the technology for 
                                                 
8 The child pornography surcharge generated an estimated 
$215,500 in 2018-19, of which $181,300 went to grants for 
counseling services for victims of sexual assault.  See Legislative 
Fiscal Bureau Informational Paper #59, Crime Victim and Witness 
Services 
10 
(January 
2019), 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lfb/informational_papers/j
anuary_2019/0059_crime_victim_and_witness_services_informational
_paper_59.pdf.   
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
22 
 
sharing and storing child pornography increases in complexity and 
sophistication.9   
¶45 When we consider the high cost of counseling for victims 
and the high cost to investigate child pornography, we are not 
convinced that the $500 child pornography surcharge per image of 
child pornography is excessive in relation to its non-punitive 
purposes.  As such, this factor militates against characterizing 
the child pornography surcharge as punishment. 
3.  Summary 
¶46 In sum, we conclude that the child pornography surcharge 
does not constitute punishment.  Our application of the intent-
effects test demonstrates that the primary function of the child 
pornography surcharge statute is not punitive nor is the child 
pornography surcharge punitive in effect.  The text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.042 does not evidence that the child pornography surcharge 
statute's primary function is punitive, and our review of the 
Mendoza-Martinez factors demonstrates that all but one factor——
application to conduct already a crime——weigh in favor of our 
determination that the child pornography surcharge is not punitive 
in effect.  Because of our conclusion that the child pornography 
surcharge is not punitive, the circuit court did not need to inform 
                                                 
9 See Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force, Priority 
Needs For Our Top Priority: Kids 14-16 (May 3, 2007), 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/2007-news/icac-
report.pdf (approximating costs to investigate internet crimes 
against children and estimating cost to investigate "all known IP 
addresses offering to share child pornography in Wisconsin" to be 
$82,888,395 in 2007).   
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
23 
 
Schmidt of the child pornography surcharge during the plea 
colloquy.  See Fugere, 386 Wis. 2d 76, ¶20.  Consequently, the 
circuit court did not err when it denied Schmidt's postconviction 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
 
B.  The Child Pornography Surcharge Applies to Images  
of Child Pornography that Form the Basis of Read-in Charges. 
¶47 Having determined that Schmidt was not entitled to 
withdraw his guilty plea, we now turn to his alternative argument 
that we should vacate part of the child pornography surcharge that 
the circuit court imposed.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.042 sets forth 
when a circuit court imposes a child pornography surcharge, which 
we repeat for context: 
If a court imposes a sentence or places a person on 
probation for a crime under [§§] 948.05 or 948.12[,] the 
court shall impose a child pornography surcharge of $500 
for each image or each copy of an image associated with 
the crime.  The court shall determine the number of 
images or copies of images associated with the crime by 
a preponderance of the evidence and without a jury. 
§ 973.042(2) (emphasis added).   
¶48 Schmidt argues that the circuit court could impose the 
child pornography surcharge only for the six images that formed 
the basis of his convictions, not for the eight additional images 
that formed the basis of the charges that were read-in at 
sentencing.  To address Schmidt's argument, we interpret the 
language of the child pornography surcharge statute and conclude 
that a circuit court must impose the child pornography surcharge 
for images of child pornography that form the basis of read-in 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
24 
 
charges of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child 
pornography.   
¶49 While the statute imposes mandatory language on the 
circuit court, the circuit court determined that only the 14 images 
that formed the basis of the charges were associated with Schmidt's 
possession of child pornography.  Consequently, we do not need to 
address, and we do not address in this case, whether the circuit 
court must impose the child pornography surcharge for images of 
child pornography that were not charged.   
¶50 "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its full, 
proper, and intended effect."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44.  To do 
so, we begin with the plain language of the statute, stopping our 
inquiry there if the meaning of the statute is clear.  Id., ¶45.  
When interpreting the language of a statute, the words are given 
their "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.  Determining the 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning of a word can be 
"acertain[ed] by reference to the dictionary definition."  Id., 
¶53.   
¶51 Also essential in a plain meaning analysis is the context 
and structure of the statute in which the operative language 
appears.  Id., ¶46.  "[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the 
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
25 
 
results."  Id.  Moreover, "[s]tatutory language is read where 
possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid 
surplusage."  Id.  "If this process of analysis yields a plain, 
clear statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the 
statute is applied according to this ascertainment of its meaning," 
and we do not need to consult extrinsic sources.  Id. (quoted 
source omitted) 
¶52 Turning to the facts of this case, the circuit court 
imposed the child pornography surcharge for the 14 images of child 
pornography charged.  Schmidt concedes that he is liable for the 
surcharge for the six images of child pornography that formed the 
bases for his six convictions of possession of child pornography.  
With respect to the other eight images of child pornography that 
formed the basis of the dismissed and read-in charges, Schmidt and 
the State disagree solely about whether those images were 
"associated with the crime" as that phrase is used in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.042(2).  Thus, we must determine the plain meaning of the 
phrase "associated with the crime" before determining whether the 
circuit court must impose the child pornography surcharge for 
images of child pornography that form the basis of read-in charges 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
26 
 
of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child 
pornography.10  
¶53 As the term is used in Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2), to 
associate is "to connect or bring into relation, as thought, 
feeling, memory, etc."11  Random House Unabridged Dictionary 126 
(2d ed. 1983).  Beyond the definition of associate, we must also 
determine what "the crime" means as used in § 973.042(2).  A 
straightforward reading of § 973.042(2) indicates that "the crime" 
refers to the offenses of conviction previously mentioned in the 
sentence, namely, sexual exploitation of a child and possession of 
child pornography.  See § 973.042(2) (requiring that circuit court 
impose the child pornography surcharge "[i]f a court imposes a 
sentence or places a person on probation for a crime under 
[§§] 948.05 or 948.12"); Paroline, 572 U.S. at 445 (explaining 
                                                 
10 Before imposing a child pornography surcharge, the circuit 
court must "determine the number of images or copies of images 
associated with the crime by a preponderance of the evidence and 
without a jury."  Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2).  After determining by 
a preponderance of the evidence the number of images associated 
with the crime, the circuit court must impose the child pornography 
surcharge for those images of child pornography.  Id.  Here, the 
parties do not dispute that the circuit court found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 14 images of child 
pornography charged were associated with the crime of possession 
of child pornography.  
11 This dictionary's definition is consistent with the 
definition of "Associate" from other dictionaries.  See, e.g., 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 132 (1986) ("to join 
or connect in any of various intangible or unspecified ways"); The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 112 (3d ed. 
1992) ("To connect in the mind or imagination"); Oxford English 
Dictionary, 
https://www.oed.com/ 
view/Entry/11976?rskey=2n1wss&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid 
("Connected in thought, mentally related").   
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
27 
 
that the use of the term "a crime" refers to the "offense of 
conviction").  So a child pornography surcharge must be imposed 
for an image of child pornography if that image is connected or 
brought into relation with the convicted individual's offense of 
sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography.  
¶54 Applying this understanding of "associated with the 
crime," it is clear that a circuit court must impose the child 
pornography surcharge for images of child pornography that form 
the basis of read-in charges of sexual exploitation of a child or 
possession of child pornography.  Those images of child pornography 
are specifically connected to and brought into relation with the 
convicted individual's offense of either sexual exploitation of a 
child or possession of child pornography because those images of 
child pornography that form the basis of read-in charges of sexual 
exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography can be 
considered for restitution or as a factor at sentencing for the 
crime.  See State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶44, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 880 
N.W.2d 659 (explaining effect of read-in charges).  As such, images 
of child pornography that form the basis of read-in charges of 
sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography 
are sufficiently related to the offenses of sexual exploitation of 
a child or possession of child pornography for a circuit court to 
impose the child pornography surcharge for those images of child 
pornography that form the basis of read-in charges of sexual 
exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography.   
¶55 Moreover, the facts of this case demonstrate that the 
images of child pornography that formed the basis of Schmidt's 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
28 
 
read-in charges of possession of child pornography were connected 
to and brought into relation with Schmidt's offense of possession 
of child pornography.  The images that formed the basis of 
Schmidt's read-in charges were collected at the same time and found 
on the same devices as the images that formed the basis of 
Schmidt's conviction of possession of child pornography.  Such a 
connection between the images of child pornography that formed the 
basis of Schmidt's read-in charges of possession of child 
pornography and Schmidt's offense of possession of child 
pornography was sufficient for the circuit court to impose the 
child pornography surcharge for those images of child pornography 
that formed the basis of Schmidt's read-in charges of possession 
of child pornography.   
¶56 Schmidt argues that this reading is incorrect for two 
reasons.  First, he asserts that this reading renders superfluous 
part of the statute——specifically, "if a court imposes a sentence 
or places on probation for a crime under [§§] 948.05 or 948.12"——
so Schmidt contends that the child pornography surcharge must apply 
only to images of child pornography that form the basis of actual 
convictions for the crime (hereinafter "per conviction basis").  
Second, he asserts that the child pornography surcharge statute 
does not include a specific provision for read-in charges, as it 
does in other statutes.  We disagree with both arguments.  
¶57 The plain language of the child pornography surcharge 
statute reveals that it does not apply on a per conviction basis.  
The circuit court must impose the surcharge for each image of child 
pornography "associated with the crime."  Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2).  
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
29 
 
As explained above, "associated with the crime" refers to a 
connection or relation to the convicted individual's offense of 
sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography, 
which is broader than the individual's conviction for either of 
those crimes.  Moreover, several other surcharge statutes use the 
per conviction formulation.  See, e.g., § 973.043(1) (imposing a 
drug offender diversion surcharge "for each conviction"); 
§ 973.045(1) (imposing a crime victim and witness assistance 
surcharge for each count "on which a conviction occurred"); 
§ 973.046(1r) (imposing a DNA analysis surcharge "for each 
conviction").  Despite the common usage of "conviction" as the 
basis for a surcharge, the child pornography surcharge does not 
include that formulation.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2).  Such 
different language shows that the child pornography surcharge was 
not meant to apply on a per conviction basis as Schmidt argues.  
See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (2012) (explaining the 
Presumption of Consistent Usage canon of construction, which in 
part dictates that "a material variation in terms suggests a 
variation in meaning"); Estate of Miller v. Storey, 2017 WI 99, 
¶35 n.14, 378 Wis. 2d 358, 903 N.W.2d 759 (same).    
¶58 Additionally, Schmidt asserts that the child pornography 
statute cannot apply to images of child pornography that form the 
basis of read-in charges of sexual exploitation of a child or 
possession of child pornography because the child pornography 
surcharge statute does not specifically include or refer to read-
in charges.  The restitution statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.20, 
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
30 
 
specifically requires restitution be paid to victims of read-in 
crimes.12  While the language in the restitution statute is similar 
to the language of the child pornography surcharge statute, the 
child pornography statute is not imposed for the crime itself or 
for charges of the crime, as the restitution statute requires; 
rather, the child pornography statute is imposed on a per image 
basis instead of based on the crime itself.  Compare § 973.20 
(requiring restitution for any crime for which the defendant was 
convicted and any read-in crime) and § 973.042(2) (requiring the 
child pornography surcharge for "each image or each copy of an 
image associated with the crime").  Multiple images of child 
pornography may be part of a conviction for a singular count of 
possession of child pornography.  See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 441 
(requiring restitution for a victim of child pornography despite 
the images of child pornography depicting the victim not forming 
the basis of the conviction).   
¶59 Limiting the language of the child pornography surcharge 
statute as strictly as Schmidt proposes would render the surcharge 
                                                 
12 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r), the circuit court 
"shall order [a] defendant to make full or partial restitution 
under this section to any victim of a crime considered at 
sentencing."  A "[c]rime considered at sentencing" includes "any 
read-in crime."  § 973.20(1g)(a).  A "read-in crime" is 
any crime that is uncharged or that is dismissed as part 
of a plea agreement, that the defendant agrees to be 
considered by the court at the time of sentencing and 
that the court considers at the time of sentencing the 
defendant for the crime for which the defendant was 
convicted. 
§ 973.20(1g)(b).  
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
31 
 
effectively a per conviction surcharge, which, as we explained 
above, is an improper reading of the child pornography surcharge 
statute.  Instead, the child pornography surcharge applies for 
every image of child pornography associated with the convicted 
individual's sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child 
pornography regardless of whether those images form the basis of 
either a convicted charge or a read-in charge.   
¶60 Accordingly, we also conclude that the child pornography 
surcharge applies to images of child pornography that 0 basis of 
read-in charges of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of 
child pornography, so long as those images of child pornography 
are connected to and brought into relation with the convicted 
individual's offense of sexual exploitation of a child or 
possession of child pornography.  Here, the circuit court applied 
the child pornography surcharge to images of child pornography 
that were connected to Schmidt's offense of possession of child 
pornography by the nature of those images forming the basis of 
Schmidt's read-in charges of possession of child pornography.  
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's determination and 
imposition of the child pornography surcharge for the images of 
child pornography that formed the basis of Schmidt's read-in 
charges of possession of child pornography.   
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶61 We conclude that the child pornography surcharge is not 
punitive, so the circuit court did not need to inform Schmidt of 
the child pornography surcharge during the plea colloquy.  
No. 
2020AP616-CR   
 
32 
 
Consequently, the circuit court did not err when it denied 
Schmidt's postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  We 
also conclude that the child pornography surcharge applies to 
images of child pornography that form the basis of read-in charges 
of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child 
pornography, so long as those images of child pornography are 
connected to and brought into relation with the convicted 
individual's offense of sexual exploitation of a child or 
possession of child pornography.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
circuit court's judgment imposing the child pornography surcharge 
for 14 images of child pornography, and the order that denied plea 
withdrawal.   
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court are 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2020AP616-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶62 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.  (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion and write in concurrence to emphasize that the 
majority opinion affirms and employs those principles of statutory 
interpretation mandated in Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110, throughout its 
statutory analysis.  That the majority opinion follows Kalal while 
interpreting Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2) and applying a process known 
as the "intent-effects test" to determine whether the statutory 
surcharge is punitive, is important to the scholarship of our 
jurisprudence.   
¶63 For years, we interpreted statutes by attempting to 
determine the intent of the legislature.  Id., ¶38.  At the same 
time, we, and other courts, held that a court must presume that 
statutory meaning is derived through the words that the legislature 
chose.  Id., ¶39.  In Kalal, we settled that conflict by holding, 
"It is the enacted law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding 
on the public.  Therefore, the purpose of statutory interpretation 
is to determine what the statute means."  Id., ¶44.   
¶64 Given our agreed upon focus, we provided a general 
structure for determining statutory meaning.  We began with the 
"language of the statute."  Id., ¶45.  We gave words chosen by the 
legislature their common meaning unless they were technical or 
specially-defined words.  Id.  "If the meaning of the statute [was] 
plain, we ordinarily [stopped] the inquiry."  Id.  We explained 
that "[c]ontext is important to meaning."  Id., ¶46.  Furthermore, 
unless the words chosen by the legislature created an ambiguous 
statute, we concluded our analysis with the plain meaning of the 
No.  2020AP616-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
words chosen.  Id.  However, statutory ambiguity moved us into 
additional aids in determining statutory meaning.  Id., ¶¶47–49.    
¶65 Statutory interpretation in the matter before us creates 
a special challenge that we not slide backwards into interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2) by determining the intent of the 
legislature.  It is especially challenging here because we employ 
a process, which the United States Supreme Court named the "intent-
effects test," to determine whether § 973.042(2) is punitive.1    
¶66 The 
majority 
opinion 
meets 
this 
challenge 
by 
interpreting the "intent" part of the test as requiring us to 
determine the statute's "primary function," "as expressed in the 
plain text of the statute."2  As the majority opinion explains, 
"[i]f the statute's primary function is not punitive," we then 
turn to the "effects" part of the test.3   
¶67 This methodology is faithful to our mandate in Kalal.  I 
would have renamed the intent-effects test for use in Wisconsin as 
the "primary function-effects test" so that future courts faced 
with determining whether a statute is punitive would have immediate 
direction on the manner in which that determination is made.  A 
majority of the court decided not to do so.   
¶68 Therefore, I write in concurrence with the hope that 
this writing will be of assistance in regard to future analyses 
and applications of the intent-effects test.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur.    
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶22.   
2 Id., ¶23.   
3 Id. 
No.  2020AP616-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
¶69 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2020AP616-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
¶70 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).  Anthony M. Schmidt pled guilty to six counts of possession 
of child pornography, each conviction based on one image.  The 
circuit court correctly imposed a $500 child pornography surcharge 
for each of these six images.  However, it also imposed child 
pornography surcharges for eight images associated with eight 
separate counts of possession of child pornography that were 
dismissed as part of the plea and read in at sentencing.  While I 
agree with the majority that the circuit court did not err by 
failing to advise Schmidt of these surcharges when he entered his 
plea,1 the majority erroneously upholds surcharges for images 
beyond those "associated with the crime" for which sentence was 
imposed, which is all that Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2) (2019-20)2 
authorizes.  Because the majority misreads the law, I respectfully 
dissent to this conclusion. 
¶71 We begin, as we should, with the statute's text: 
If a court imposes a sentence or places a person on 
probation for a crime under [Wis. Stat. §§] 948.05 or 
948.12 and the person was at least 18 years of age when 
the crime was committed, the court shall impose a child 
pornography surcharge of $500 for each image or each 
copy of an image associated with the crime.  The court 
shall determine the number of images or copies of images 
associated with the crime by a preponderance of the 
evidence and without a jury. 
                                                 
1 I join Parts I, II, and III.A. of the majority opinion. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version. 
No.  2020AP616-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2).3  This statutory language contains a 
statement establishing two conditions, followed by mandatory 
duties arising from the satisfaction of the conditions. 
¶72 The two conditions triggering a child pornography 
surcharge are:  (1) the court must impose a sentence or place a 
person on probation for committing certain crimes; and (2) the 
person must have been at least 18 years old when the crime was 
committed.  The second condition is not at issue here, but the 
first is.  The crimes for which a surcharge must be assessed 
(provided a sentence or probation is imposed) are those under Wis. 
Stat. §§ 948.05 and 948.12.  Both are located in a chapter that 
defines various crimes against children. 
¶73 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.12 criminalizes possession of 
child pornography.  This can include possessing, accessing, 
exhibiting, or playing recordings of a child engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct.  § 948.12(1m), (2m).  Although each individual 
photograph may be charged as a separate crime,4 nothing in this 
statute requires that each image must be separately charged.  We 
see this in State v. Van Buren, where the defendant was convicted 
of a single charge of possession of child pornography even though 
over 51,000 images were found on his computer and multiple 
photographs were introduced to support the lone charge.  2008 
                                                 
3 "In this section, 'image' includes a video recording, a 
visual representation, a positive or negative image on exposed 
film, and data representing a visual image."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.042(1). 
4 See State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶64, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 643 
N.W.2d 437. 
No.  2020AP616-CR.bh 
 
3 
 
WI App 26, ¶¶1, 4, 14, 307 Wis. 2d 447, 746 N.W.2d 545.  So while 
possession of child pornography may be charged on a one-image, 
one-crime basis as it was here, the law does not require it. 
¶74 The second statute defining crimes that can trigger the 
child pornography surcharge is Wis. Stat. § 948.05, which 
criminalizes sexual exploitation of a child.  This can take the 
form of employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, or 
coercing a "child to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the 
purpose of recording or displaying" the conduct.  § 948.05(1)(a).  
It can also be violated by recording or displaying a child engaging 
in such conduct.  § 948.05(1)(b).  And one can commit a crime under 
this section by producing, performing in, profiting from, 
promoting, 
importing, 
reproducing, 
advertising, 
selling, 
distributing, or possessing with intent to sell or distribute "any 
recording of a child engaging in sexually explicit conduct."  
§ 948.05(1m).  Further, if someone responsible for the child's 
welfare "knowingly permits, allows, or encourages" a child to 
engage in recorded sexual conduct, they too can be charged under 
this section.  § 948.05(2).  This scope of behavior is broad, and 
importantly for our purposes, the crimes are not necessarily one-
image offenses.  For example, a person could be charged and 
convicted of one count of sexual exploitation of a child under 
Wis. Stat. § 948.05(1m) for selling a hard drive containing various 
pictures and videos depicting a child engaging in sexual acts.  
The important takeaway is that one conviction under the various 
crimes itemized in § 948.05 can involve multiple images for a 
single conviction. 
No.  2020AP616-CR.bh 
 
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¶75 When a defendant is over 18 and receives a sentence or 
probation following conviction under Wis. Stat. §§ 948.05 or 
948.12, the conditions are satisfied and "the court shall impose 
a child pornography surcharge of $500 for each image or each copy 
of an image associated with the crime."  Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2).  
This phrase reveals three key principles. 
¶76 First, the surcharge "shall" be imposed; it is 
mandatory.  State v. Cox, 2018 WI 67, ¶11, 382 Wis. 2d 338, 913 
N.W.2d 780 ("The general rule is that the word 'shall' is presumed 
mandatory when it appears in a statute." (quoting another source)).  
The statute leaves the court no room to refuse to impose 
surcharges, or to impose a smaller surcharge if the fine becomes 
onerous.  Each image associated with the crime must result in a 
$500 surcharge without exception. 
¶77 Second, the surcharge is assessed per image, not per 
conviction.  This reflects that a single conviction under the 
relevant 
sections 
can 
involve 
multiple 
images 
of 
child 
pornography.  Since the surcharge must be assessed for every image 
associated with the conviction, the statute provides a mechanism 
to count the number of images.  The final sentence of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.042(2) provides:  "The court shall determine the number of 
images or copies of images associated with the crime by a 
preponderance of the evidence and without a jury."  Consider again 
a one-count conviction under Wis. Stat. § 948.05(1m) for selling 
a hard drive containing various pictures and videos depicting a 
child engaging in sexual acts.  Under the law, the court's job is 
to determine how many individual images were on the hard drive and 
No.  2020AP616-CR.bh 
 
5 
 
impose the surcharge for each image.  If the hard drive contained 
ten images, the surcharge for the lone conviction would be $5,000 
($500 per image).  The court's inquiry is a factual one. 
¶78 Third, the surcharge must be assessed only for images 
"associated with the crime."  Critically, the statute ties the 
images to "the crime"——not a crime that could have been charged 
but wasn't, or a related crime, or a charged but dismissed crime, 
but the crime.  Which one?  The crime mentioned in the beginning 
of the section——the crime for which the court "imposes a sentence 
or places a person on probation."  Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2).  The 
phrase "associated with" is not an invitation to the court to sweep 
in images unrelated to the specific crime for which a sentence or 
probation is imposed under either Wis. Stat. §§ 948.05 or 948.12.  
The legislature, understanding that the crimes triggering a 
surcharge can involve multiple images, used the phrase "associated 
with" to clarify that the surcharge must be assessed per image, 
not per conviction. 
¶79 Related statutes reinforce this plain reading.5  Four 
other 
surcharge 
statutes 
immediately 
following 
the 
child 
pornography surcharge in Chapter 973 begin the same way:  "If a 
court imposes a sentence or places a person on probation."  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.042(2); 973.043(1); 973.045(1); 973.0455(1); 
973.046(1r).  The drug offender diversion surcharge assesses "$10 
                                                 
5 State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶49, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("A statute's purpose or scope 
may be readily apparent from its plain language or its relationship 
to surrounding or closely-related statutes——that is, from its 
context or the structure of the statute as a coherent whole."). 
No.  2020AP616-CR.bh 
 
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for each conviction."  § 973.043(1).  Similarly, the crime 
prevention funding board surcharge is "calculated by adding up, 
for each misdemeanor or felony count on which a conviction 
occurred, $20."  § 973.0455(1).  The crime victim and witness 
assistance surcharge imposes a total surcharge based on adding the 
number of felony counts ($92 per felony) and misdemeanor counts 
($67 
per 
misdemeanor) 
"on 
which 
a 
conviction 
occurred."  
§ 973.045(1).  Finally, the deoxyribonucleic acid analysis 
surcharge is calculated as $250 for "each conviction" of a felony 
and $200 for "each conviction" of a misdemeanor.  § 973.046(1r).  
Unlike the per-conviction surcharges in these neighboring 
statutes, the child pornography surcharge focuses on images 
"associated with the crime." 
¶80 But that's not all.  The restitution statute, also 
located in Chapter 973, provides a vital contextual clue.  When 
ordering restitution, the circuit court does not look merely at 
the crime a defendant was convicted of.  Rather, the statute 
creates a broader technical phrase called the "Crime considered at 
sentencing."  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(a).  This phrase is defined 
to mean "any crime for which the defendant was convicted and any 
read-in crime."  Id.  And read-in crime 
means any crime that is uncharged or that is dismissed 
as part of a plea agreement, that the defendant agrees 
to be considered by the court at the time of sentencing 
and that the court considers at the time of sentencing 
the defendant for the crime for which the defendant was 
convicted. 
§ 973.20(1g)(b). 
No.  2020AP616-CR.bh 
 
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¶81 The legislature expressly incorporated read-in counts 
for restitution, but it made no reference to read-in charges in 
Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2).  If the legislature had meant to include 
images associated with read-in charges here, it surely could have, 
and likely would have, used language similar to the restitution 
statute.6  The restitution statute's direct reference to read-in 
crimes buttresses the conclusion that images associated with read-
in crimes should not be subject to the $500 child pornography 
surcharge. 
¶82 This statutory context demonstrates that the surcharge 
does not apply to images associated only with read-in crimes, nor 
is it assessed on a per-conviction basis.  Faced with this 
evidence, the majority chooses to read "associated with the crime" 
as a vague phrase that could encompass just about any image a judge 
might wish to include, so long as the images have some ill-defined 
connection to a conviction for possession of child pornography or 
sexual exploitation of a child.  It frames its rule as follows:  
"So a child pornography surcharge must be imposed for an image of 
child pornography if that image is connected or brought into 
relation with the convicted individual's offense of sexual 
exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography."  
Majority op., ¶53.  What does this include?  I'm not sure.  The 
majority isn't quite sure either and limits its analysis to the 
facts of this case.  Id., ¶49.  But the majority expands the child 
pornography surcharge's reach to images beyond those connected to 
                                                 
6 The same definition is also found in Wis. Stat. § 973.049, 
which applies to restrictions on contact during sentencing.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 973.049(1)(b). 
No.  2020AP616-CR.bh 
 
8 
 
the crime itself, and nothing in its rule offers discernable 
boundaries separating images that must be included from those that 
must be excluded.  The majority reframes the statute to reach an 
open-ended group of images for which the circuit court must——
again, the surcharge is not optional——count and assess the 
surcharge.  This is not what the law requires. 
¶83 The far more reasonable reading of the law is that the 
legislature chose to assess a surcharge only for those images 
connected with the specific crime under Wis. Stat. §§ 948.05 or 
948.12 for which a sentence or probation is imposed.  That is the 
language the statute uses, and it makes sense.  This does not 
include images related to crimes for which a defendant has not 
been found guilty, whether read-in charges or images discovered 
during the investigation but not associated with the crime of 
conviction itself.  This limits the images to a known and 
discernable set——namely, those associated with the specific crime 
of conviction, evidence a court can readily examine to determine 
how many images were associated with each conviction.7 
                                                 
7 While the text is sufficient to resolve the interpretive 
inquiry on its own, legislative history confirms this reading.  
See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51.  The drafting file for the 
legislation that created Wis. Stat. § 973.042(2) contains an email 
exchange between a Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) drafter and 
a legislative aide preparing the bill.  The correspondence contains 
a discussion about how to count the number of images assessed under 
§ 973.042(2)'s per-image surcharge.  The LRB drafter explained his 
understanding as follows: 
I assume that the surcharge should also apply to crimes 
under [Wis. Stat. §] 948.05 (which covers the creation 
of child pornography——as well as parents who allow 
children to participate in the making of child 
pornography).  In those cases, should I link the 
surcharge to the number of copies that are produced, 
No.  2020AP616-CR.bh 
 
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¶84 In sum, the text and statutory context reveal that the 
surcharge applies to images associated with the crime for which 
sentence or probation is imposed.  The surcharge does not apply to 
images associated only with charges dropped and read in as part of 
a plea, or to images collected in the investigation, or to images 
that might be captured by the majority's nebulous, open-ended 
approach.  Applying these principles here means that the circuit 
court should have assessed the child pornography surcharge for 
only the six images tied to the six counts Schmidt pled guilty to 
and for which the circuit court imposed a sentence.  Schmidt should 
not have been assessed a $500 child pornography surcharge for each 
of the eight images tied to the eight counts read in at sentencing 
                                                 
distributed...?  Obviously a producer or distributor has 
control over the number of copies that are produced and 
distributed.  Counting becomes difficult for cases under 
[§] 948.05(3) (allowing a child to participate) or for 
cases in which the person is charged is an employee of 
a distributor.  One option is to just specify that the 
surcharge is imposed for each copy of the image 
associated with the offense and let the court determine 
whether a particular copy is "associated with" the 
offense in question. 
Drafting File, 2005 A.B. 942, Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wis.  The aide replied that this was what the legislator 
wanted.  Id. 
This drafting confirms the most straightforward reading of 
the text.  The drafters chose their words to assess the per-image 
surcharge solely for the images that form the basis for the crime 
the defendant is convicted of ("the offense in question"), not 
images related to the investigation or to dismissed charges.  And 
the drafting difficulty was in crafting language that would 
encompass some crimes where the number of images connected to a 
specific count would be difficult to determine——particularly those 
under Wis. Stat. § 948.05.  The resolution?  A surcharge for each 
image "associated with the crime," with the court determining this 
factual question. 
No.  2020AP616-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
because these images were not "associated with the crime[s]" for 
which Schmidt was sentenced. 
¶85 While I join the majority's conclusion that the circuit 
court did not err by failing to advise Schmidt of these surcharges 
when he entered his plea, I respectfully dissent from its flawed 
interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. § 973.042. 
¶86 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this concurrence/dissent. 
No.  2020AP616-CR.bh 
 
 
 
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