Case Title: Stutzman v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Elections

Citation: 2001-Ohio-1624

Docket Number: 20011669

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Stutzman v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Elections, 93 Ohio St.3d 
511, 2001-Ohio-1624] 
 
 
STUTZMAN v. MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Cite as Stutzman v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 511.] 
Elections — Prohibition — Writ sought to prevent Madison County Board of 
Elections and its members from submitting Ordinance No. 06-01 to the 
Plain City electors at the November 6, 2001 general election — Writ 
denied, when. 
(No. 01-1669 — Submitted October 2, 2001 — Decided October 11, 2001.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
Lundberg Stratton, J.  On April 23, 2001, the Council of the Village of 
Plain City, Ohio, enacted Ordinance No. 06-01, which rezones approximately 
89.425 acres of land owned by relator, Henry J. Stutzman, to RS3 Single Family 
Residential District.  The title of Ordinance No. 06-01 is: 
 
“AN ORDINANCE AMENDING THE ZONING MAP OF THE 
VILLAGE OF PLAIN CITY, OHIO, AT THE APPLICATION OF 
DOMINION HOMES, AS TO APPROXIMATELY 89.425 ACRES OF 
LAND LOCATED WEST OF U.S. ROUTE 42 AND SOUTH OF 
PROPERTY OWNED BY HOMEWOOD HOMES, INC.”  (Boldface sic.) 
 
On May 10, 2001, a referendum petition on Ordinance No. 06-01 was 
filed with the Plain City Clerk-Treasurer.  The petitioners requested that 
Ordinance No. 06-01 be submitted to the village electors for their approval or 
rejection at the November 6, 2001 general election.  The referendum petition 
specified: 
 
“The following is a full and correct copy of the title and number of the 
Ordinance: 
“Ordinance No. 06-01 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2 
 
“AN ORDINANCE AMENDING THE ZONING MAP OF THE 
VILLAGE OF PLAIN CITY, OHIO, AT THE APPLICATION OF 
DOMINION HOMES, AS TO APPROXIMATELY 89.45 ACRES OF LAND 
LOCATED WEST OF U.S. ROUTE 42 AND SOUTH OF PROPERTY 
OWNED BY HOMEWOOD HOMES INC.”  (Boldface sic.) 
 
The referendum petition, printed on a form prescribed by the Secretary of 
State of Ohio in November 1996, also contained the following statement: 
 
“THE 
PENALTY 
FOR 
ELECTION 
FALSIFICATION 
IS 
IMPRISONMENT FOR NOT MORE THAN SIX MONTHS OR A FINE 
OF NOT MORE THAN $1,000, OR BOTH.”  (Boldface sic.) 
 
After respondent Madison County Board of Elections (“board”) verified 
that the referendum petition contained sufficient valid signatures, the Plain City 
Clerk-Treasurer certified the petition to the board for placement of the referendum 
on Ordinance No. 06-01 on the November 6, 2001 general election ballot. 
 
On August 30, 2001, Stutzman filed a written protest with the board 
challenging the referendum petition on Ordinance No. 06-01.  Stutzman 
contended that the petition was defective because it failed to state the correct title 
of the ordinance in that the acreage listed on the petition (89.45) differed from the 
acreage in the ordinance (89.425) and the petition did not include a comma in the 
name of the owner of property to the north of the rezoned property (“Homewood 
Homes, Inc.”).  Stutzman further claimed that the referendum petition failed to 
contain the mandatory election falsification language set forth in R.C. 3599.36. 
 
On September 12, 2001, the board held a hearing on Stutzman’s protest 
and then took the matter under advisement.  On September 13, the board issued a 
decision denying Stutzman’s protest.  The board concluded that the misstatements 
of the acreage and omission of the comma in Homewood Homes, Inc. were not 
defects requiring rejection of the petition because there was no evidence that the 
petition conveyed a confusing or mistaken impression about the substance of the 
January Term, 2001 
 
3 
zoning ordinance that was the subject of the referendum petition.  The board 
further concluded that the referendum petition contained the election falsification 
language required by law and that the “new election falsification language 
referred to by [the] protest took effect on August 28, 2001.” 
 
On September 14, 2001, i.e., only one day after the board’s decision, 
Stutzman filed this expedited election action for a writ of prohibition to prevent 
respondents, the board and its members, from submitting to the Plain City 
electorate the referendum on Ordinance No. 06-01.  Respondents filed a motion to 
dismiss,1 and after Stutzman filed evidence and a merit brief, respondents failed to 
file a merit brief, which was due on Friday, September 28, 2001.  See S.Ct.Prac.R. 
X(9). 
 
This cause is now before the court for a consideration of the merits. 
 
Stutzman requests a writ of prohibition to prevent the submission of 
Ordinance No. 06-01 to the Plain City electors at the November 6, 2001 general 
election.  In order to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Stutzman must establish 
that (1) the board is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the 
exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denial of the writ will cause 
injury for which no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law exists.  
State ex rel. Baldzicki v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 
238, 241, 736 N.E.2d 893, 896.  It is uncontroverted that Stutzman has satisfied 
the first and third of these requirements, so the dispositive issue is whether 
Stutzman established that the board’s exercise of quasi-judicial authority in 
denying the protest was unauthorized by law. 
 
In determining if Stutzman established this requirement, the applicable 
standard is whether the board engaged in fraud or corruption, abused its 
                                          
 
1. 
We note that respondents’ motion to dismiss is inappropriate in expedited election cases, 
see State ex rel. Ryant Commt. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 107, 111, 712 
N.E.2d 696, 700, and we will therefore proceed to consider the merits of this cause. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4 
discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions in denying 
Stutzman’s protest.  State ex rel. Crossman Communities of Ohio, Inc. v. Greene 
Cty. Bd. of Elections (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 132, 135-136, 717 N.E.2d 1091, 1095.  
Stutzman asserts that the board abused its discretion and acted in clear disregard 
of applicable legal provisions in denying the protest.  For the reasons that follow, 
we hold that the board neither abused its discretion nor clearly disregarded 
applicable law in denying Stutzman’s protest and deny Stutzman’s request for 
extraordinary relief in prohibition. 
R.C. 731.31; Full and Correct Copy of Title of the Ordinance 
 
Stutzman initially contends that the board abused its discretion and acted 
in clear disregard of R.C. 731.31 by upholding the validity of the referendum 
petition although it did not include “a full and correct copy of the title of the 
ordinance or other measure sought to be referred.” 
 
R.C. 731.31 provides that “each part of any referendum petition shall 
contain * * * a full and correct copy of the title of the ordinance or other measure 
sought to be referred.”  Stutzman claims that R.C. 731.31 requires strict 
compliance and that the petition did not strictly comply with R.C. 731.31 because 
it misstated the acreage involved in the title of the ordinance as 89.45 acres 
instead of the 89.425 acres actually listed in the title of the ordinance. 
 
In general, election statutes in Ohio are mandatory and require strict 
compliance unless the statute specifically permits substantial compliance.  State 
ex rel. Wilson v. Hisrich (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 13, 16, 630 N.E.2d 319, 322; State 
ex rel. Citizens for Responsible Taxation v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections (1992), 65 
Ohio St.3d 167, 169, 602 N.E.2d 615, 617.  In accordance with this general rule, 
because R.C. 731.31 does not expressly allow substantial compliance, we 
normally require strict compliance with it, Crossman Communities, 87 Ohio St.3d 
at 137, 717 N.E.2d at 1096, including the requirement that the petition contain a 
January Term, 2001 
 
5 
full and correct copy of the title of the ordinance.  State ex rel. Esch v. Lake Cty. 
Bd. of Elections (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 595, 597, 575 N.E.2d 835, 836-837. 
 
Nevertheless, we have also at times held that courts must avoid unduly 
technical interpretations that impede public policy in election cases.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Ruehlmann v. Luken (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 598 N.E.2d 1149, 
1151.  The policy involved here is the preeminent constitutional right of 
referendum “reserved to the people of each municipality on all questions which 
such municipalities may now or hereafter be authorized by law to control by 
legislative action.”  Section 1f, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  We must 
liberally construe provisions for municipal referendum so as to permit the 
exercise of the power and to promote rather than prevent or obstruct the object 
sought to be attained.  See State ex rel. Rose v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 229, 230-231, 736 N.E.2d 886, 888; State ex rel. Oster v. 
Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 480, 756 N.E.2d 649. 
 
In applying these competing considerations to the R.C. 731.31 
requirement that referendum petitions contain a “full and correct copy of the title 
of the ordinance,” we are guided by the precept that our paramount concern in 
construing any statutory requirement is the legislative intent in enacting the 
statute.  In re Election Contest of Democratic Primary Held May 4, 1999 for 
Clerk, Youngstown Mun. Court (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 258, 265, 725 N.E.2d 271, 
277.  In construing the comparable R.C. 731.31 requirement that initiative 
petitions contain a “full and correct copy of the title and text of the proposed 
ordinance,” we have held that the purpose of this requirement is to fairly and 
substantially present the issue to electors in order to avoid misleading them.  
Christy v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 35, 38, 671 N.E.2d 
1, 4 (“Omitting the title and/or text of a proposed ordinance is a fatal defect 
because it interferes with a petition’s ability to fairly and substantially present the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6 
issue and might mislead electors”); State ex rel. Hazel v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 165, 167, 685 N.E.2d 224, 226. 
 
Rejecting the petition here because of a slight misstatement in the acreage 
listed in the ordinance does not further the legislative purposes of fairly presenting 
the ordinance to electors and preventing them from being misled.  In this regard, 
the title of the ordinance states that the property involved is approximately 89.425 
acres, and the referendum petition specifies the title of the ordinance as involving 
property that is approximately 89.45 acres.  There is no evidence nor is there any 
reasonable argument that this de minimis error could have misled electors to sign 
a petition that they would not have signed had the correct acreage been listed.  
The same conclusion is warranted for Stutzman’s other contention concerning the 
lack of a comma in the corporate name of Homewood Homes, Inc. 
 
As we have previously held in an election case in which a petitioner had 
failed to comply with a technical election requirement, “ ‘[a]bsolute compliance 
with every technicality should not be required * * * unless such complete and 
absolute conformance to each technical requirement * * * serves a public interest 
and a public purpose.’ ” (Ellipses sic.)  State ex rel. Fite v. Saddler (1991), 62 
Ohio St.3d 170, 173, 580 N.E.2d 1065, 1067, quoting Stern v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. 
of Elections (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 175, 180, 43 O.O.2d 286, 289, 237 N.E.2d 
313, 317.  Invalidating the referendum petition here based on the hypertechnical 
grounds suggested by Stutzman serves no public interest or public purpose, 
including the legislative purpose of the R.C. 731.31 requirement of a “full and 
correct copy of the title of the ordinance.” 
 
Moreover, Stutzman’s reliance on Esch and State ex rel. Burech v. 
Belmont Cty. Bd. of Elections (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 154, 19 OBR 437, 484 
N.E.2d 153, to claim that the referendum petition is fatally defective is misplaced.  
Esch involved an initiative petition that contained no title of the proposed 
ordinance, and Burech addressed a referendum petition that contained neither the 
January Term, 2001 
 
7 
title nor the text of the resolution, as required by R.C. 305.32.  The title is not 
completely missing from the petition here.  And both of these cases emphasized 
the potential for misleading petition signers, which is nonexistent here. 
 
Therefore, the board neither abused its discretion nor clearly disregarded 
R.C. 731.31 in denying Stutzman’s protest. 
R.C. 3599.36; Election Falsification Statement 
 
Stutzman next contends that the board abused its discretion and acted in 
clear disregard of R.C. 3599.36 by upholding the validity of the referendum 
petition even though the petition failed to include the election falsification 
statement required by that statute.  We hold that the board neither abused its 
discretion nor clearly disregarded R.C. 3599.36, albeit for different reasons than 
those expressed by the board. 
 
The referendum petition included the language specified in former R.C. 
3501.38(J), which provided prior to August 28, 2001: 
 
“All declarations of candidacy, nominating petitions, or other petitions 
under this section shall be accompanied by the following statement in boldface 
capital letters:  THE PENALTY FOR ELECTION FALSIFICATION IS 
IMPRISONMENT FOR NOT MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, OR A FINE 
OF NOT MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS, OR BOTH.”  
(Boldface sic.)  143 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1940, 1941. 
 
Before December 9, 1997, R.C. 3599.36 similarly provided that election 
falsification was a misdemeanor of the first degree and that “[e]very paper, card, 
or other document relating to any election matter which calls for a statement to be 
made under penalty of election falsification shall be accompanied by the 
following statement in boldface capital letters:  ‘The penalty for election 
falsification is imprisonment for not more than six months, or a fine of not more 
than one thousand dollars, or both.’ ”  138 Ohio Laws, Part II, 4570, 4748. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8 
 
Effective December 9, 1997, however, the General Assembly enacted 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 116, which amended R.C. 3599.36 to provide: 
 
“Whoever violates this section is guilty of election falsification, a felony 
of the fifth degree. 
 
“Every paper, card, or other document relating to any election matter that 
calls for a statement to be made under penalty of election falsification shall be 
accompanied by the following statement in bold face capital letters:  ‘Whoever 
commits election falsification is guilty of a felony of the fifth degree.’ ”  147 Ohio 
Laws, Part IV, 7608, 7667. 
 
The referendum petition here, which required circulators’ statements to be 
made under penalty of election falsification, see R.C. 3501.38(E), contained the 
language in former R.C. 3501.38(J) instead of the language required by R.C. 
3599.36.  Under R.C. 1.52(A), “If statutes enacted at the same or different 
sessions of the legislature are irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of enactment 
prevails.”  See, also, State v. Rush (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 53, 58, 697 N.E.2d 634, 
638.  Former R.C. 3501.38(J) is irreconcilable with R.C. 3599.36.  Unlike the 
current version, which became effective on August 28, 2001, former R.C. 
3501.38(J) retained the penalties for a first-degree misdemeanor even though 
effective December 9, 1997, the General Assembly amended R.C. 3599.36 to 
make election falsification a fifth-degree felony, which carries harsher penalties 
than those specified in former R.C. 3501.38(J).  See, e.g., R.C. 2929.14(A)(5) and 
2929.18(A)(3)(e). 
 
Therefore, under R.C. 1.52(A), R.C. 3599.36, the statute later in date of 
enactment, prevails over former R.C. 3501.38(J). 
 
The board was consequently mistaken in determining that the petition 
contained the appropriate election falsification language. 
 
Nevertheless, as we noted in our previous discussion analyzing R.C. 
731.31, in construing the applicable election falsification petition requirement, our 
January Term, 2001 
 
9 
paramount concern is the legislative intent. In re Election Contest, 88 Ohio St.3d 
at 265, 725 N.E.2d at 277. 
 
In State ex rel. Griffin v. Krumholtz (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 125, 24 O.O.3d 
234, 435 N.E.2d 1110, we held that the absence of the statutorily mandated 
election falsification statement in a referendum petition rendered the petition 
defective.  In that case, we specified that the purpose of the election falsification 
statement is “to insure not only that the signers and circulators of the petition be 
made aware of the fact that election falsification is a crime but also that 
significant sanctions are imposed for violations of the election laws.”  Id. at 127, 
24 O.O.3d at 235, 435 N.E.2d at 1111. 
 
This purpose is sufficiently advanced here by the inclusion of the language 
used by the petitioners, which was on the form supplied by the office of the 
Secretary of State and was consistent with the language of former R.C. 
3501.38(J), which the General Assembly had failed to amend at the same time it 
amended R.C. 3599.36.  In other words, the language, though technically 
incorrect because of the amendment to R.C. 3599.36, ensured that petition signers 
and circulators were aware that election falsification is a crime and that it carries 
significant sanctions.  While the actual statutory penalty was erroneous, the 
petition satisfied the purposes of the statutory requirement. 
 
We note that in the period from December 9, 1997 until August 28, 2001, 
when there were confusing, conflicting “mandatory” statutory requirements for 
the appropriate election falsification statement, petitioners seeking to exercise 
their important constitutional right of referendum reasonably relied on former 
R.C. 3501.38(J) and used a form prescribed by the Secretary of State.  There is no 
evidence or even a contention by Stutzman that the persons who either signed or 
circulated the petition appreciated the distinction between “imprisonment for not 
more than six months or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both” and “a felony of 
the fifth degree.”  Nor is there evidence or any argument that persons would not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
have signed or circulated the petition if the petition instead contained the language 
required by R.C. 3599.36. 
 
We note, however, that with the August 28, 2001 amendment to R.C. 
3501.38(J), both it and R.C. 3599.36 now require the same language, and that 
petitioners should follow this requirement in the future in order to avoid any 
invalidation of their petition.  But under the limited circumstances evident here, 
where the different statutes provided mixed signals from the General Assembly, 
the petitioners’ constitutional right of referendum should not be thwarted by their 
technical violation of R.C. 3599.36.  The board neither abused its discretion nor 
clearly disregarded applicable law by refusing to invalidate the referendum 
petition on this basis. 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing, Stutzman has failed to establish his entitlement to 
the writ.  The board acted properly by denying his protest and submitting the 
referendum issue to the electorate.  The board specifically found that there was no 
evidence that the petition conveyed a confusing or mistaken impression about the 
substance of the zoning ordinance that was the subject of the referendum petition. 
The petition included the notification of the potential for criminal prosecution and 
sanctions for election falsification.  There was also no evidence or any contention 
by Stutzman of any willful or knowing misrepresentation in order to persuade 
persons to sign the petition. 
 
Accordingly, we deny the requested writ of prohibition and permit the 
board and its members to proceed with submitting the referendum on Ordinance 
No. 06-01 to the Plain City electorate.  Under the unique circumstances of this 
case, a contrary holding would constitute an unreasonable restriction on the 
constitutional right of referendum reserved to the people of each municipality.  
See State ex rel. Commt. for the Referendum of Ordinance No. 3543-00 v. White 
January Term, 2001 
 
11 
(2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 212, 218, 736 N.E.2d 873, 878 (court’s duty to avoid 
unreasonable or absurd results). 
Writ denied. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  In concurring with the dissent authored by 
Justice Cook I write to express my concern that a majority opinion would so 
easily disregard the clear direction of the General Assembly in its amendment of 
R.C. 3599.36.  The majority attempts to confine its holding to the confusion 
created by the “mixed signals from the General Assembly.”  One can only hope 
that it will be so confined.  But, as is true in so many issues decided by a Supreme 
Court, the majority opinion produces implications far beyond the facts of this 
case. 
 
As observed in Justice Cook’s dissent, boards of elections and others 
responsible for efficient and fair elections will not know when “substantial” 
compliance with a clear statutory mandate is sufficient or whether actual 
compliance is required.  With one opinion, we have obfuscated a rule of statutory 
construction and principles upon which an important body of election law has 
been developed. 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent.  As the majority notes, the 
dispositive issue in this case is whether the board of elections abused its discretion 
or clearly disregarded applicable law by denying Stutzman’s protest.  Because the 
board clearly disregarded the election falsification language requirement of R.C. 
3599.36, Stutzman is entitled to the requested writ of prohibition. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
 
As the majority recognizes, R.C. 3599.36, the statute later in date of 
enactment, prevails over former R.C. 3501.38(J).  See R.C. 1.52(A) (“If statutes 
enacted at the same or different sessions of the legislature are irreconcilable, the 
statute latest in date of enactment prevails”).  “[T]he settled rule is that election 
laws are mandatory and require strict compliance,” and that “[s]ubstantial 
compliance is acceptable only when an election statute expressly permits it.”  
(Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Thurn v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of  Elections (1995), 
72 Ohio St.3d 289, 294, 649 N.E.2d 1205, 1209-1210; State ex rel. Citizens for 
Responsible Taxation v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 167, 
169, 602 N.E.2d 615, 617.  We have held that the election falsification language 
requirement at issue here is mandatory and requires strict compliance.  See State 
ex rel. Griffin v. Krumholtz (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 125, 127, 24 O.O.3d 234, 235, 
435 N.E.2d 1110, 1111-1112. 
 
The majority erroneously rules on the supposed intent of the General 
Assembly to support its departure from the statutory language.  “In order to 
determine legislative intent it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a 
court must first look to the language of the statute itself.”  (Emphasis added.)  
State v. Jordan (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 488, 492, 733 N.E.2d 601, 605.  R.C. 
3599.36 is unambiguous and must be applied as written, without resort to 
interpretative rules that would apply only if the statutes were ambiguous.  State ex 
rel. Wolfe v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 182, 186, 724 
N.E.2d 771, 774; Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 
38, 39-40, 741 N.E.2d 121, 123. 
 
R.C. 3599.36 provides that “[e]very paper, card, or other document 
relating to any election matter that calls for a statement to be made under penalty 
of election falsification shall be accompanied by the following statement in bold 
face capital letters:  ‘Whoever commits election falsification is guilty of a felony 
of the fifth degree.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  This statute sets forth a patent and 
January Term, 2001 
 
13 
unambiguous requirement that the majority concedes was not satisfied here.  The 
majority simply holds that these errors are “technical” and hence not fatal to the 
petition.  But there is nothing in the statutory language that distinguishes between 
“technical” and “nontechnical” statutory violations.  In making this distinction, 
the majority has inserted words that are not included in these statutes.  See Bailey, 
91 Ohio St.3d at 39-40, 741 N.E.2d at 123 (“In considering statutory language, it 
is the duty of the court to give effect to the words used in a statute, not to delete 
words used or to insert words not used”). Although we have a duty to liberally 
construe statutes in favor of the constitutional right to referendum, requiring the 
falsification statement in R.C. 3599.36 does not contravene this duty; it merely 
applies the plain language of the applicable statutes.  E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Wood 
Cty. Bd. of Elections (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 298, 302, 699 N.E.2d 916, 919. 
 
Furthermore, the majority’s reliance on authorities such as Stern v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 175, 43 O.O.2d 286, 237 
N.E.2d 313, is misplaced.  That case’s dictum—stating that absolute technical 
compliance with statutory election petition requirements is not always 
necessary—is limited to cases “where the statute requires only substantial 
compliance,” which is not the case with the statute involved here.  (Emphasis sic.) 
Id. at 184, 43 O.O.2d at 291, 237 N.E.2d at 319; see, also, State ex rel. Esch v. 
Lake Cty. Bd. of Elections (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 595, 597, 575 N.E.2d 835, 837 
(“The court of appeals properly distinguished Stern * * * because the statutes in 
[that case] expressly allowed substantial compliance, and R.C. 731.31 does not”); 
but, cf., State ex rel. Fite v. Saddler (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 170, 580 N.E.2d 1065. 
 
The board of elections here did not even reach the analysis engaged in by 
the majority concerning the lack of an R.C. 3599.36 election falsification 
statement because it wrongly concluded that this requirement did not become 
effective until August 28, 2001.  As the majority points out, this portion of R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
3599.36 was in effect as of December 9, 1997, and during the time the 
referendum petition was circulated and signed. 
 
The Legislative Service Commission noted that the Am.Sub.H.B. No. 5 
amendment to R.C. 3501.38(J), effective August 28, 2001, merely changed that 
section to comport with the continuing viable and controlling law set forth in R.C. 
3599.36: 
 
“Continuing law makes election falsification a felony of the fifth degree 
(sec. 3599.36—not in the act).  But, under former law, various forms in the 
Election Law, and in other parts of the Revised Code, that had to be signed under 
‘penalty of election falsification’ incorrectly identified the penalty for the offense 
as imprisonment for not more than six months, a fine of not more than $1,000, or 
both; these sanctions pertain to the time when the offense was a misdemeanor of 
the first degree.  The act changes these incorrect references to match continuing 
law’s ‘felony of the fifth degree’ status of election falsification.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Legislative Service Commission, Final Bill Analysis of Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 5, at 11. 
 
The board’s reliance on the fact that the petition was on a form prescribed 
by the Secretary of State is also misplaced because the form was prescribed in 
November 1996, which predates the December 9, 1997 amendment to R.C. 
3599.36 that is dispositive here.  In fact, in State ex rel. Ascani v. Stark Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 490, 700 N.E.2d 1234, the Secretary of State 
denied a protest to a local option petition that included the R.C. 3599.36 election 
falsification statement instead of the former R.C. 3501.38(J) language. One could 
reasonably infer from Ascani that the Secretary of State viewed R.C. 3599.36 to 
set forth the required election falsification statement, not former R.C. 3501.38(J).  
See State ex rel. Stevens v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 
223, 227, 736 N.E.2d 882, 885, quoting State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 581, 586, 651 N.E.2d 995, 999 (“ ‘[W]hen an election 
January Term, 2001 
 
15 
statute is subject to two different, but equally reasonable, interpretations, the 
interpretation of the Secretary of State, the state’s chief election officer, is entitled 
to more weight’ ”). 
 
Finally, I would note that in Griffin, 70 Ohio St.2d at 127, 24 O.O.3d at 
235, 435 N.E.2d at 1111-1112, we rejected an argument comparable to the ones 
espoused by the majority and the board by holding: 
 
“Relator’s argument that his statement more accurately described what 
election falsification entailed is without merit.  To adopt relator’s argument 
would necessarily require this court to find that relator, and not the General 
Assembly, is in the best position to determine the appropriate language to be 
included in referendum petitions.  This we decline to do.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Similarly, we should not substitute our judgment as to what is or is not 
required for election petitions in contravention of the plain language provided by 
the General Assembly in its statutes.  The General Assembly is in the best 
position to determine the applicable requirements for election petitions and it has 
done so here by enacting R.C. 3599.36.  By amending R.C. 3599.36 in 1997, the 
General Assembly’s uncontroverted intent was that petition signers and 
circulators be aware that election falsification is a felony of the fifth degree.  The 
majority’s interpretation does not comport with this intent.  This decision can only 
add confusion to the election process as to whether other statutory requirements 
need to be followed or can be ignored on the basis that they are only “technical” 
requirements. 
 
As even the majority recognizes, the board clearly disregarded the specific 
requirements of R.C. 3599.36.  Therefore, based on the applicable standard, 
Stutzman is entitled to the requested writ of prohibition. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Donald J. McTigue, for relator. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
 
Stephen J. Pronai, Madison County Prosecuting Attorney, for 
respondents. 
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