Case Title: State v. Williams

Citation: 2010-Ohio-147

Docket Number: 20082037

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-147.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-147 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAMS, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-147.] 
Criminal law — Allied offenses of similar import — Attempted murder and 
felonious assault. 
(No. 2008-2037 — Submitted September 16, 2009 — Decided January 27, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 89726, 
2008-Ohio-5286. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
Felonious assault as defined in R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) is an allied offense of 
attempted murder as defined in R.C. 2903.02(B) and 2923.02. 
2. 
Felonious assault as defined in R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) is an allied offense of 
attempted murder as defined in R.C. 2903.02(A) and 2923.02. 
3. 
The state retains the right to elect which allied offense to pursue on 
sentencing on a remand to the trial court after appeal.  State v. Whitfield, 
__ Ohio St.3d __, 2010-Ohio-2, paragraph one of the syllabus, followed. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The state of Ohio appeals a decision of the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals that merged Kevin Williams’s convictions and sentences on two counts 
of felonious assault and two counts of attempted murder into a single count of 
attempted murder.  The charges arise from an incident in which Williams fired 
two shots at LayShawn McKinney, striking him once in the back and paralyzing 
him.  The state contends that Williams may be separately convicted and sentenced 
for both counts of felonious assault and one count of attempted murder. 
{¶ 2} The issue presented on this appeal is whether felonious assault and 
attempted murder are allied offenses of similar import.  We hold that (1) felonious 
assault as defined in R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)  and attempted murder as defined in R.C. 
2903.02(B) and 2923.02 are allied offenses of similar import, and (2) felonious 
assault as defined in R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) and attempted murder as defined in R.C. 
2903.02(A) and  2923.02 are allied offenses of similar import.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals finding that 
Williams could be convicted of only one count of attempted murder in this case 
and, in accordance with our decision in State v. Whitfield, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2010-
Ohio-2, remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} On July 8, 2006, Kevin Williams and his friend Duce drove up to a 
dice game on Gainsboro Avenue in East Cleveland.  Williams joined in the game, 
but began to argue with Bralynn Randall about who owed the other money.  As 
they continued to argue, McKinney and his girlfriend pulled into the driveway of 
her grandmother’s house, noticed the dice game, and overheard the argument.  
Randall told McKinney that the argument was nothing, and McKinney then 
decided to join the game. 
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{¶ 4} Shortly after McKinney arrived, the argument between Williams 
and Randall escalated.  Williams pulled a gun and fired two shots.  As McKinney 
ran, a bullet struck him from behind, fractured his fifth thoracic vertebra, and 
instantly paralyzed him. 
{¶ 5} While recuperating at his home in September 2006, McKinney 
viewed a photo array compiled by the East Cleveland Police Department and 
identified Kevin Williams as the shooter.  As a result, a Cuyahoga County grand 
jury indicted Williams on two counts of felonious assault, two counts of 
attempted murder with firearm specifications, and one count of having a weapon 
while under disability. 
{¶ 6} Following trial, a jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.  The 
court imposed concurrent sentences of six years for each felonious assault, 
consecutive to a three-year term for the gun specifications.  It also imposed 
concurrent sentences of seven years for each attempted murder, consecutive to a 
four-year term on the weapon conviction, for an aggregate sentence of 20 years. 
{¶ 7} On appeal to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, Williams 
contended that his convictions on two counts of felonious assault and two counts 
of attempted murder arose from the same conduct and therefore constituted allied 
offenses of similar import so that he could be convicted of and sentenced for only 
one count of attempted murder. 
{¶ 8} The appellate court ruled that felonious assault as charged in count 
two of the indictment, knowingly causing or attempting to cause physical harm by 
means of a deadly weapon, should have merged with the attempted-murder charge 
in count four of the indictment, attempted murder as a proximate result of 
committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence.  2008-Ohio-5149, ¶ 
37. 
{¶ 9} The state moved for reconsideration, asserting that because 
felonious assault as defined in R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) contains a deadly-weapon 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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element not present in attempted murder, the greater offense of attempted murder 
could be committed without committing the offense of felonious assault.  The 
state urged that felonious assault was not an allied offense of attempted murder as 
defined in R.C. 2903.02(B) and the attempt section, R.C. 2923.02. 
{¶ 10} The appellate court concluded that the specific intent to kill, 
inferred from Williams’s use of a weapon, subsumed his intent to cause serious 
physical harm to McKinney.  2008-Ohio-5286 at ¶ 33.  Therefore, it ruled that 
“the separate counts of felonious assault as conceptually grouped by the state are 
offenses of similar import to the separate charges of attempted murder.”  Id.  The 
court then determined that Williams committed the attempted murders and 
felonious assaults with a single “purpose, intent and motive,” id. at ¶ 38, and it 
ruled that the two felonious-assault counts merged into the two attempted-murder 
counts.  Id.  After comparing the elements of murder as defined by R.C. 
2903.02(A) and (B) and concluding that the elements so aligned that one could 
not commit one form of murder without committing the other, id. at ¶ 40, and 
having determined that the offenses were committed with a single animus and a 
single intent to kill, the court concluded that the two counts of attempted murder 
merged into a single count.  Therefore, the court held that Williams could be 
convicted of only a single count of attempted murder in violation of R.C. 
2903.02(B) and 2923.02.  Id. at ¶ 40-41. 
{¶ 11} The state appealed, and this court agreed to consider whether the 
two counts of felonious assault are allied offenses of the two counts of attempted 
murder.  The state submitted the following proposition of law for our review:  
“R.C. §2923.02/2903.02, Attempted Murder, is not an allied offense of similar 
import with R.C. §2903.11(A)(1), Felonious Assault.  Further, R.C. 
§2923.02/2903.02, Attempted Murder, is not an allied offense of similar import 
with the offense of R.C. §2903.11(A)(2), Felonious Assault.  Therefore, a 
January Term, 2010 
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defendant may be found guilty and sentenced separately for these Felonious 
Assaults in addition to Attempted Murder.” 
{¶ 12} Our analysis of allied offenses originates in the prohibition against 
cumulative punishments embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  
United States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 
487, citing North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 
L.Ed.2d 656.  However, both this court and the Supreme Court of the United 
States have recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not entirely prevent 
sentencing courts from imposing multiple punishments for the same offense but 
rather “ ‘prevent[s] the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than 
the legislature intended.’ ”  State v. Rance (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 635, 710 
N.E.2d 699, quoting Missouri v. Hunter (1983), 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 
74 L.Ed.2d 535, and citing State v. Moss (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 515, 518, 23 
O.O.3d 447, 433 N.E.2d 181.  Thus, in determining whether offenses are allied 
offenses of similar import, a sentencing court determines whether the legislature 
intended to permit the imposition of multiple punishments for conduct that 
constitutes multiple criminal offenses. 
{¶ 13} Ohio’s multiple-count statute, R.C. 2941.25, provides: 
{¶ 14} “(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to 
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or 
information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be 
convicted of only one. 
{¶ 15} “(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more 
offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses 
of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and 
the defendant may be convicted of all of them.” 
{¶ 16} A two-step analysis is required to determine whether two crimes 
are allied offenses of similar import.  E.g. State v. Blankenship (1988), 38 Ohio 
St.3d 116, 117, 526 N.E.2d 816; Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d at 636, 710 N.E.2d 699.  
Recently, in State v. Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625, 886 N.E.2d 
181, we stated:  “In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar 
import under R.C. 2941.25(A), courts are required to compare the elements of 
offenses in the abstract without considering the evidence in the case, but are not 
required to find an exact alignment of the elements.  Instead, if, in comparing the 
elements of the offenses in the abstract, the offenses are so similar that the 
commission of one offense will necessarily result in commission of the other, then 
the offenses are allied offenses of similar import.”  Id. at paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  If the offenses are allied, the court proceeds to the second step and 
considers whether the offenses were committed separately or with a separate 
animus.  Id.  at ¶ 31.  
{¶ 17} The state contends that the appellate court considered the specific 
facts of the case rather than analyzing the elements of the offenses in the abstract.  
A proper application of Cabrales, it argues, would reveal that neither statutory 
definition of felonious assault is an allied offense of attempted murder.  Further, 
the state argues that even if these offenses are allied offenses, they remain 
separately punishable because Williams did not commit them with a single act or 
animus. 
{¶ 18} Williams contends not only that the two felonious assault counts 
merge but also that the two attempted-murder counts merge.  He maintains that he 
can be convicted of only one count of attempted murder in violation of R.C. 
2903.02, because, he asserts, when felonious assault is the felony of violence 
underlying a charge of attempted murder pursuant to R.C. 2903.02(B), the 
January Term, 2010 
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elements of the felonious assault are necessarily part of the attempted murder.  
Therefore, he argues that the attempted murder cannot be committed without 
committing the underlying felonious assault. 
{¶ 19} Alternatively, Williams urges us to reconsider our allied-offense 
analysis, suggesting that if the statutory elements of multiple offenses can be 
satisfied by the same conduct, we should hold that those offenses are allied 
offenses of similar import.  Such an analysis would create an irrebuttable 
presumption that the legislature intended an offender to receive a single 
punishment when a prohibited act constitutes more than one offense.  We do not 
presume that intent, and we reject this position. 
{¶ 20} Our analysis of this case requires us to apply State v. Cabrales.  In 
our application of that test to this case, we recognize that the indictment charged 
Williams with two counts of attempted murder and two counts of felonious 
assault arising out of two separate gunshots he fired at McKinney.  Counts two 
and three correlate to the bullet that did not strike McKinney and charge Williams 
with knowingly attempting to cause physical harm to McKinney and engaging in 
conduct that, if successful, would result in purposely causing the death of another.  
Counts one and four correlate to the bullet that paralyzed McKinney and charge 
Williams with causing physical harm to another by means of a deadly weapon and 
engaging in conduct that, if successful, would result in causing the death of 
another as a proximate result of committing or attempting to commit felonious 
assault. 
{¶ 21} Thus, for each bullet Williams fired at McKinney, he was found 
guilty of one count of felonious assault and one count of attempted murder.  
Accordingly, we consider whether the attempted-murder and felonious-assault 
charges relating to each gunshot are allied offenses of similar import. 
Allied Offenses 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 22} Cabrales requires a comparison of the elements of the offense in 
the abstract, without considering the evidence in the case, but does not require an 
exact alignment of those elements. 
{¶ 23} In order to commit the offense of attempted murder as defined in 
R.C. 2903.02(B), one must purposely or knowingly engage in conduct that, if 
successful, would result in the death of another as a proximate result of 
committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence.  Since felonious 
assault is an offense of violence, R.C. 2901.01(A)(9), the commission of 
attempted murder, as statutorily defined, necessarily results from the commission 
of an offense of violence, here, felonious assault.  Accordingly, felonious assault 
as defined in R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) is an allied offense of attempted murder as 
defined by R.C. 2903.02(B) and 2923.02. 
{¶ 24} The next step in the Cabrales analysis requires a determination of 
whether the offenses were committed separately or with a separate animus.  
Williams knowingly engaged in conduct that, if successful, would have resulted 
in the death of another as a proximate result of committing felonious assault.  He 
did so by knowingly firing a gun at McKinney and paralyzing him with one 
bullet.  Thus, he committed the offenses of attempted murder and felonious 
assault with a single act and animus.  Accordingly, while he may be found guilty 
of both offenses, he may be sentenced for only one.  See State v. Whitfield, ___ 
Ohio St.3d ___, 2010-Ohio-2, at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 25} In order to commit the offense of attempted murder as defined in 
R.C. 2903.02(A), one must engage in conduct that, if successful, would result in 
purposely causing the death of another; and to commit felonious assault as 
defined in R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), one must cause or attempt to cause physical harm 
to another by means of a deadly weapon. 
{¶ 26} Considering these elements in the abstract, although they do not 
align exactly, when Williams attempted to cause harm by means of a deadly 
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weapon, he also engaged in conduct which, if successful, would have resulted in 
the death of the victim.  Here, felonious assault as defined by R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) 
is an allied offense of attempted murder as defined in R.C. 2903.02(A) and 
2923.02. 
{¶ 27} Next we must determine whether Williams committed these 
offenses separately or with a separate animus.  Williams knowingly engaged in 
conduct that, if successful, would have purposely caused the death of another by 
knowingly firing a bullet that missed McKinney; thus these offenses were both 
committed with the same animus.  Therefore, while Williams may be found guilty 
of both offenses, he may be sentenced for only one.  See State v. Whitfield, ___ 
Ohio St.3d ___, 2010-Ohio-2, at ¶ 17. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 28} Based upon the foregoing, felonious assault as defined in R.C. 
2903.11(A)(1) is an allied offense of attempted murder as defined in R.C. 
2903.02(B) and 2923.02; and felonious assault as defined in R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) 
is an allied offense of attempted murder as defined in R.C. 2903.02(A) and 
2923.02.  Pursuant to our holding in State v. Whitfield, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2010-
Ohio-2, at paragraph one of the syllabus, “[t]he state retains the right to elect 
which allied offense to pursue on sentencing on a remand to the trial court after 
appeal.”   Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals finding that Williams could be convicted of only one count of attempted 
murder in this case and, in accordance with our decision in Whitfield, remand this 
cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
CUPP, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 29} This convoluted case is an example of how difficult our 
jurisprudence on allied offenses has become.  Simply stated, the jury heard 
evidence that Williams fired two shots in succession and that one bullet struck 
and paralyzed the victim, LayShawn McKinney.  Williams was found guilty of all 
offenses for which he was indicted: two counts of felonious assault, two counts of 
attempted murder with firearm specifications, and one count of having a weapon 
while under disability.  Williams was sentenced to a total prison term of 20 years. 
{¶ 30} As is explained in the majority opinion, this court agreed to 
consider whether the two counts of felonious assault are allied offenses of the two 
counts of attempted murder.  In other words, are the offenses of attempting to 
purposely cause the death of another pursuant to R.C. 2923.02 and 2903.02(A) 
and of attempted felony murder pursuant to R.C. 2923.02 and 2903.02(B) allied 
offenses of similar import with the two forms of felonious assault pursuant to 
R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) (causing serious physical harm) and (2) (attempting or 
causing physical harm by means of a deadly weapon)?  
{¶ 31} The General Assembly has expressed its intent to permit multiple 
punishments for the same conduct under certain circumstances.  R.C. 2941.25 
provides: 
{¶ 32} “(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to 
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or 
information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be 
convicted of only one.  
{¶ 33}  “(B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more 
offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more 
offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate 
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animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such 
offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 34} In spite of the foregoing language emphasizing the importance of 
the defendant’s conduct, our current cases analyzing allied offenses instruct us to 
jump immediately to the abstract comparison of offenses charged without first 
considering the defendant’s actual conduct as established by the evidence.  See 
State v. Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625, 886 N.E.2d 181; State v. 
Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149; State v. Winn, 121 
Ohio St.3d 413, 2009-Ohio-1059, 905 N.E.2d 154; State v. Harris, 122 Ohio 
St.3d 373, 2009-Ohio-3323, 911 N.E.2d 882. 
{¶ 35} This “abstract comparison” of offenses identifies offenses as allied 
offenses of similar import “if * * * the offenses are so similar that the commission 
of one offense will necessarily result in commission of the other.” Cabrales, at 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  Whether the commission of one offense 
necessarily resulted in commission of the other is best resolved when the actual 
evidence adduced at trial is allowed to be considered.  I realize that in Cabrales 
this court “clarified” the test set forth in State v. Rance (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 
710 N.E.2d 699, but I would go further to frankly reverse Rance.  For omitting 
consideration of the evidence at trial is contrary to the statute, which states that 
the defendant’s conduct must be considered in comparing the offenses: Did the 
commission of the one offense in this case necessarily result in the commission of 
the other?  If so, the offenses are allied and of similar import. 
{¶ 36} A defendant can be convicted and sentenced on more than one 
offense if the evidence shows that the defendant’s conduct satisfies the elements 
of two or more disparate offenses.  But if the conduct satisfies elements of 
offenses of similar import, then a defendant can be convicted and sentenced on 
only one, unless they were committed with separate intent. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 37} Thus, in this case, by shooting a weapon at McKinney twice in 
succession, Williams knowingly caused him serious physical harm, and this 
conduct satisfied both felonious assault sections, R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) (causing 
serious physical harm to another) and (A)(2) (causing or attempting to cause 
physical harm to another by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance).  
When the attempt section, R.C. 2923.02, is added to the murder and felony-
murder statutes, R.C. 2903.02(A) (“purposely cause the death of another”) and 
2903.02(B) (“cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender's 
committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence”), it is apparent that 
Williams’s conduct (shooting twice at McKinney) also necessarily satisfies the 
elements of attempted murder and attempted felony murder.  In other words, 
pursuant to R.C. 2941.25(A), Williams may be convicted of only one of the four 
offenses for which he was indicted, unless the state proved that he committed 
them separately or with separate animus. R.C. 2941.25(B). 
{¶ 38} I would affirm the court of appeals’ holdings that Williams 
committed the attempted murders and felonious assaults with a single “purpose, 
intent and motive,” 2008-Ohio-5286, ¶ 38, and that the two counts of attempted 
murder and two counts of felonious assault should be merged into a single count 
for sentencing.  Furthermore I agree that this case should be remanded to the trial 
court for the state to elect which of the four allied offenses Williams will be 
sentenced on, but I would limit the election to a single crime. 
__________________ 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristen 
L. Sobieski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Robert M. 
Ingersoll, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. 
______________________