Case Title: Willie Seth Crain, Jr. v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC00-661

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2004-10-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida 
____________ 
No. SC00-661 
–––––––––––– 
 
WILLIE SETH CRAIN, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[October 28, 2004] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
This is a direct appeal of convictions of first-degree murder and kidnapping 
and a sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.1  For the reasons that follow, we 
conclude that the State presented legally sufficient evidence of first-degree felony 
murder based on kidnapping with intent to inflict bodily harm, and therefore affirm 
the murder conviction and the sentence of death. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Willie Seth Crain, a then fifty-two-year-old Hillsborough County fisherman 
                                        
1.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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and crabber, was charged with the September 1998 kidnapping and first-degree 
murder of seven-year-old Amanda Brown.  At the time, Amanda was three feet, 
ten inches tall and weighed approximately forty-five pounds. 
The evidence introduced at trial establishes that on September 9, 1998, 
Crain's daughter, Cynthia Gay, introduced Crain to Amanda's mother, Kathryn 
Hartman, at a bar in Hillsborough County.  Crain and Hartman danced and talked 
for four hours, until 1:30 or 2:00 in the morning, then went to Hartman's residence, 
a trailer located in Hillsborough County, where they remained for approximately 
thirty minutes.  Amanda was spending the night with her father and was not 
present.  However, two photographs of Amanda and some of her toys were visible 
in the trailer.  Before Crain left, Hartman made it clear to Crain that she wanted to 
see him again. 
The next afternoon, September 10, 1998, Crain returned to Hartman's trailer.  
Hartman testified that Crain smelled of alcohol and carried a cup with a yellow 
liquid in it.  Amanda was present.  Crain began talking to Amanda about her 
homework.  He pulled some money out and told Amanda that if she got her 
homework right, he would give her a dollar.  He eventually gave her two dollars. 
Crain and Amanda sat at the kitchen table playing games and working on her 
homework.  At some point during the afternoon, Crain became aware that Amanda 
had a loose tooth.  After wiggling the tooth, Crain offered Amanda five dollars to 
 
 
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let him pull the tooth out, but she refused.  Hartman testified that the tooth was not 
ready to be pulled out.  Crain remained at Hartman's residence for approximately 
one hour.  Before he left early in the afternoon, Crain accepted Hartman's 
invitation to return for dinner that evening. 
Crain returned to Hartman's trailer shortly after 7 p.m.  Crain still smelled of 
alcohol and carried the same or a similar plastic cup with a colored liquid.  After 
dinner, Hartman and Crain played more games with Amanda.  At some point, 
Crain mentioned that he had a large videotape collection and invited Hartman and 
Amanda to his trailer to watch a movie.  Amanda asked if he had "Titanic," which 
she stated was her favorite movie.  Crain stated that he did have "Titanic" and 
Amanda pleaded with her mother to allow them to watch the movie.  Hartman was 
initially reluctant because it was a school night, but she finally agreed.  Crain drove 
Hartman and Amanda approximately one mile to his trailer in his white pickup 
truck. 
They began watching the movie in Crain's living room but were interrupted 
by a telephone call from Crain's sister.  Crain said he did not get along with his 
sister and asked Hartman to speak to her.  At the conclusion of a twenty- to twenty-
five-minute phone conversation with Crain's sister, Hartman found the living room 
unoccupied.  Hartman opened a closed door at the rear of the trailer without 
knocking, and found Amanda and Crain sitting on the bed in Crain's bedroom, 
 
 
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watching the movie "Titanic."  Both were dressed and Amanda was sitting between 
Crain's sprawled legs with her back to Crain’s front.  Crain's arms were around 
Amanda and he appeared to Hartman to be showing Amanda how to work the 
remote control.  Hartman testified that although she was not overly concerned 
about what she observed at that time, she nevertheless picked Amanda up and sat 
Amanda beside her on the bed.  Crain, Hartman, and Amanda then watched the 
movie together in Crain's bedroom.  Crain testified at trial that they watched the 
movie in his bedroom because it was the only air-conditioned room in the trailer. 
At some point in the evening, Amanda and Hartman used Crain's bathroom 
together.  While they were in the bathroom, Hartman did not notice Amanda 
bleeding from any location that Hartman could observe.  Hartman did notice a blue 
cover on the back of the toilet seat.  Amanda did not use the bathroom at any other 
time that evening. 
At another point in the evening, Hartman asked Crain if he had any 
medication for pain.  Crain offered her Elavil and Valium.  He also offered her 
some marijuana, which she declined.  Crain told Hartman that the Elavil would 
"really knock the pain out" and would make her sleep for a long time.  Hartman 
elected to take five, five-milligram Valium tablets.2  Crain took one Valium tablet. 
                                        
2.  At the time she took the Valium, Hartman had a twelve-year addiction to 
pain pills.  Crain testified at trial that he was unaware of the addiction. 
 
 
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Eventually, Hartman decided that it was time to leave.  Crain drove Hartman 
and Amanda back to their residence and accompanied them inside.  Amanda took a 
shower.  While checking on Amanda during the shower and helping her dry off 
and get ready for bed, Hartman did not notice any sores or cuts on Amanda's body.  
According to Hartman, Crain suggested that Amanda should not go to sleep with 
wet hair, so Crain blow-dried Amanda's hair in Hartman's bathroom without 
Hartman present.  According to Hartman, when Amanda went to sleep in 
Hartman's bed around 2:15 a.m., the loose tooth was still in place and it was not 
bleeding. 
According to Hartman, she told Crain, who appeared to be intoxicated at that 
time, that he could lie down to sober up but she was going to bed.  The time was 
approximately 2:30 a.m.  Within five minutes of Hartman going to bed, Crain 
entered Hartman's bedroom and lay down on the bed with Hartman and Amanda.  
Hartman testified that she neither invited Crain to lie in her bed nor asked him to 
leave.  Crain was fully clothed and Amanda was wearing a nightgown.  Amanda 
was lying between Hartman and Crain. 
Penny Probst, a neighbor of Hartman, testified that at approximately 12 
midnight on September 10-11, 1998, she saw a white truck parked immediately 
behind Hartman's car in Hartman's driveway.  In the early morning hours of 
September 11, Probst observed the truck parked at the side of Hartman's residence 
 
 
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with the lights on and the engine running.3  Probst heard the truck leave after about 
five minutes. 
Hartman slept soundly through the night.  When she awoke in her bed alone 
the next morning, she discovered that Amanda was missing.  Hartman testified her 
alarm clock read 6:12 a.m. when she awoke.  Hartman immediately called Crain on 
his cell phone.  At that time, he was at the Courtney Campbell boat ramp in 
Hillsborough County loading his boat.  He told Hartman that he did not know 
where Amanda was.  Hartman then called the police and reported Amanda's 
disappearance. 
At trial, the State presented the testimony of fisherman Albert Darlington, 
who witnessed Crain towing his boat into the Courtney Campbell loading area at 
approximately 6:15 a.m. on September 11, 1998.  Darlington testified that Crain 
pulled up to the boat ramp and backed his boat trailer and truck into the water until 
the truck's front tires were halfway submerged.  Crain then got out of his truck and 
boarded his boat wearing what appeared to be a two-tone maroon shirt and dark 
slacks, and carrying what appeared to be a rolled-up item of clothing.  Crain 
unhooked his boat and launched it in an overall "odd" manner.  Darlington further 
                                        
3.  Michelle Rogers, another neighbor of Hartman, testified that she saw a 
light blue truck parked behind Hartman's car at approximately 10:30 p.m. on 
September 10, 1998.  Rogers further testified that she saw a light blue truck 
positioned beside the residence at 10:45 p.m. on September 10, 1998.  Rogers 
stated that she left her residence around 11 p.m. and when she returned at 2:30 
a.m., she observed the truck parked on the side of the residence with the lights on. 
 
 
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testified that in the eighteen months prior to Amanda's disappearance, on two 
occasions Crain told Darlington that Crain had the ability to get rid of a body 
where no one could find it.4 
At around 8:30 a.m. on September 11, Detective Mike Hurley located Crain 
in his boat in Upper Tampa Bay.  Crain was dressed in "slickers" (rubber pants 
fisherman wear over their clothes), a blue t-shirt, and loafers.  Crain and Hurley 
returned to the boat ramp in Crain's boat.  On the ride back, Hurley noticed a small 
scratch on Crain's upper arm.  At the boat ramp, Crain removed his slickers, 
revealing jeans with the zipper down.  Hurley took Crain to the police station for 
questioning.  Crain was cooperative but denied having anything to do with 
Amanda's disappearance. 
At the police station, Detective Al Bracket interviewed Crain.  Crain told 
Bracket that he left Hartman's house alone at about 1:30 in the morning,5 went 
home and accidentally spilled bleach in his own bathroom.  Crain claimed that he 
did not like the smell of bleach, so he spent four hours cleaning his bathroom from 
about 1:30 to 5:30 in the morning.  Later in the same interview, Crain said he 
                                        
4.  It is undisputed that these comments occurred during a discussion 
between Crain and Darlington regarding Crain's disagreements with other crabbers 
about Crain's claims that they had stolen from Crain's crab traps. 
 
5.  Crain testified at trial that he left Hartman's residence between 2:30 and 
3:30 in the morning. 
 
 
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cleaned his bathroom with bleach, as was his custom, then cleaned the rest of the 
house until 5:30 a.m., at which time he left to go crabbing.6 
During the questioning, Bracket noticed multiple scratches on Crain's arms 
and asked Crain how he got them.  Crain claimed that he received the scratches 
while crabbing, but became defensive when Bracket asked him to demonstrate how 
the scratches were inflicted.  Photographs of Crain's body were taken on the 
morning of September 11, 1998.  A forensic pathologist testified at trial that the 
scratches on Crain’s arms probably occurred within a few hours to a day before the 
photos were taken.  Although the pathologist could not identify the source of the 
scratches with certainty, he testified that all but two of the scratches were more 
likely to be caused by the fingernails of a seven-year-old child than by another 
cause.  The pathologist also testified that there was one cluster of small gouges on 
Crain's arm, and it was more likely that these gouges were caused by the small 
grasping hand of a child of about seven years of age than by another cause. 
During a search of Crain's residence, Bracket noticed the strong smell of 
bleach and recovered an empty bleach bottle.  Bracket testified that there were 
obvious signs of grime and dirt around the edges of the bathroom sink.  A blue 
fitted rug that would go around the base of the toilet was found in Crain's dryer.  
Another detective applied Luminol, a chemical that reacts both with blood and 
                                        
6.  Crain testified at trial that he cleaned his bathroom with bleach at around 
3 a.m. and left to go crabbing between 5 a.m. and 6 a.m.   
 
 
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with bleach, to Crain's bathroom.  The detective testified that the floor, the bathtub, 
and the walls "lit up." 
Bracket also recovered two pieces of toilet tissue from the inside rim of 
Crain's toilet and observed what appeared to be a small blood stain on the seat of 
the toilet.  The tissue pieces, the toilet seat, and the boxer shorts that Crain was 
wearing on the morning of September 11, 1998 were collected and analyzed for 
DNA evidence.  A forensic scientist for the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement (FDLE) testified at trial that two blood stains were found on the toilet 
seat, one blood stain was found on one of the pieces of toilet tissue,7 and one blood 
stain was found on the boxer shorts.  The FDLE forensic scientist testified that the 
blood stain on the boxer shorts and one of the stains from the toilet seat contained 
DNA consistent with the DNA extracted from personal items belonging to Amanda 
Brown.  The second stain on the toilet seat and the stain on the tissue contained 
DNA consistent with a mixture of the DNA profiles of Amanda and Crain.  
Testimony established that the probability of finding a random match between the 
DNA profile on the boxer shorts and Amanda's known DNA profile is 
approximately 1 in 388 million for the Caucasian population. 
                                        
7.  The blood stains were very small.  The blood stain on the tissue was not 
visible to the human eye.  When a North Carolina laboratory performed an 
independent analysis on the blood evidence, its expert could not find enough DNA 
on the tissue stain to corroborate the testimony of the FDLE forensic scientist 
identifying Crain and Amanda as the sources of the tissue stain.  
 
 
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Detective Hurley supervised an extensive, two-week search for Amanda in 
Upper Tampa Bay, the land surrounding Upper Tampa Bay (including the 
Courtney Campbell Causeway), and the land area surrounding the Crain and 
Hartman residences.  Amanda's body was never found.  The maroon shirt and dark 
pants that Darlington saw Crain wearing on the morning of September 11, 1998, 
also were never recovered. 
At trial, the State introduced the testimony of Linda Miller, Maryann Lee, 
and Frank Stem.  Miller and Lee, who were neighbors of Crain's daughter, Gay, 
testified about a conversation with Crain that occurred at Gay's home on the first 
Saturday after Amanda's disappearance.  Miller and Lee both testified that Miller 
said to Crain, "Don't worry, you don't have anything to worry about," and "Just 
remember, you didn't do anything, you didn't hurt that little girl."  According to the 
testimony of Miller and Lee, Crain responded, "Yes, I did do it; yes, you're right, I 
didn't hurt her, I didn't do anything."  Gay testified that Crain said, stuttering, "yes, 
I did . . . did . . . didn't do it; yes, you're right, I didn't hurt her." 
Frank Stem, Crain's friend and in-law,8 testified that about one month prior 
to Amanda's disappearance, Stem helped Crain lay crab traps in a "special" 
location.  At that time, Crain told Stem that other crabbers would steal the crab 
traps if they knew of the spot.  After Amanda disappeared and during a 
                                        
8.  Stem's daughter was married to Crain's son. 
 
 
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conversation regarding competing crabbers finding his crab traps, Crain told Stem 
that if Stem revealed the location of the traps "that it could bury him," meaning 
Crain, or that Stem had enough "evidence to bury him." 
At the conclusion of the State's case, Crain moved for judgments of acquittal 
of first-degree murder and kidnapping based on the insufficiency of the evidence.  
The trial court denied Crain's motion.  Crain then testified in his defense and 
denied that he was involved in Amanda's death.  He stated that he last saw Amanda 
while she lay sleeping in her mother's bed in the early morning hours of September 
11, 1998. 
On the first-degree murder charge in count I, the trial court instructed the 
jury on the dual theories of premeditated murder and felony murder based on 
kidnapping "with intent to commit or facilitate the commission of homicide or to 
inflict bodily harm upon the victim."  On the kidnapping charge in count II, the 
court instructed the jury that the State had to prove that Crain acted "with intent to 
commit or facilitate the commission of a homicide."  The jury found Crain guilty 
of first-degree murder on a general verdict form.  The jury also found Crain guilty 
of kidnapping as charged.  In the penalty phase, the jury unanimously 
recommended the death sentence.  The trial court found three aggravators:  (1) 
prior violent felonies (great weight), (2) the murder was committed during the 
course of a kidnapping (great weight), and (3) the victim was under the age of 
 
 
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twelve (great weight).  The court found no statutory mitigators and eight 
nonstatutory mitigators,9 and imposed the death sentence. 
Crain raises five issues on appeal:  (1) the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that the murder of Amanda was premeditated; (2) the evidence was 
insufficient to establish an essential element of kidnapping, that Amanda was 
abducted with the intent to commit or facilitate commission of a homicide; (3) the 
trial court committed fundamental error by giving different jury instructions in the 
felony murder and kidnapping counts as to the elements of kidnapping; (4) the 
kidnapping conviction relied on by the State for an aggravating circumstance was 
not supported by the evidence; and (5) Florida's death penalty scheme is 
unconstitutional. 
We address those issues that are necessary to our resolution of this case.    
Because our analysis regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain Crain's 
conviction is dependent upon our determination of whether the felony murder jury 
instruction constituted fundamental error, we discuss that issue first. 
                                        
9.  The nonstatutory mitigators the trial court found were: (1) nonstatutory 
mental health impairment (some weight); (2) mental problems exacerbated by the 
use of alcohol and drugs, both legal and illegal (some weight); (3) Crain was an 
uncured pedophile (some weight); (4) Crain had a history of abuse and an unstable 
home life (modest weight); (5) Crain was deprived of the educational benefits and 
social learning that one would normally obtain from public education (modest 
weight); (6) Crain had a history of hard, productive work (some weight); (7) Crain 
had a good prison record (modest weight); and (8) Crain had the capacity to form 
loving relationships (modest weight). 
 
 
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II.  FELONY MURDER JURY INSTRUCTION 
The indictment on which Crain was tried and convicted charged him in 
count I with the premeditated murder of Amanda Brown between September 10 
and 11, 1998.  Count II of the indictment charged Crain with kidnapping Amanda 
on the same dates "with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a 
felony, to wit, homicide" in violation of section 787.01(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes 
(1997).  The kidnapping statute found in section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1997), 
defines the offense in pertinent part as follows: 
 
(1)(a) The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by 
threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her 
or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to:
 
 
1. Hold for ransom or reward or as a shield or hostage. 
 
2. Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. 
 
3. Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another 
person. 
 
4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or 
political function. 
 
The trial court instructed the jury on first-degree felony murder in count I as 
follows: 
Before you can find the defendant guilty of First Degree Felony 
Murder, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
One, that Amanda Victoria Brown is dead; two, that the death 
occurred as a consequence of and while Willie Seth Crain was 
engaged in the commission of Kidnapping; three, that Willie Seth 
Crain was the person who actually killed Amanda Victoria Brown. 
 
 
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"Kidnapping" is the forcible or secret confinement, abduction 
or imprisonment of another, against that person's will and without 
lawful authority. 
The Kidnapping must be done with the intent to commit or 
facilitate the commission of homicide or to inflict bodily harm upon 
the victim. 
(Emphasis added.)  On the separate kidnapping charge in count II, the court gave 
the following instruction: 
Before you can find the defendant guilty of Kidnapping, the State 
must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
One, that Willie Seth Crain forcibly, secretly or by threat 
confined, abducted or imprisoned Amanda Victoria Brown, a child 
under the age of 13 years, against her will; two, that Willie Seth Crain 
had no lawful authority; three, that Willie Seth Crain acted with the 
intent to commit or facilitate the commission of homicide. 
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, while the trial court instructed the jury only on the intent 
to commit or facilitate the commission of homicide under section 787.01(1)(a)(2) 
as to the kidnapping charge in count II, the trial court instructed the jury that it 
could find Crain guilty of felony murder based on kidnapping in count I if it found 
that he abducted Amanda with either the intent to commit or facilitate the 
commission of homicide or the intent to inflict bodily harm upon her under section 
787.01(1)(a)(3). 
Crain argues that because kidnapping with intent to commit homicide was 
the kidnapping specifically charged in count II of the indictment, the trial court 
erred in instructing the jury on kidnapping with intent to inflict bodily harm as an 
alternate method of establishing felony murder based on kidnapping.  The State 
 
 
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asserts that the trial court did not commit reversible error in instructing the jury on 
the latter element under an indictment charging premeditated murder.  On the facts 
of this case, we agree. 
Although Crain asserts on appeal that this instruction was in error, his trial 
counsel did not object to the instruction when presented with a packet of corrected 
jury instructions before closing arguments in the guilt phase of the case.  With 
regard to claims of error pertaining to jury instructions, we have held that "[i]ssues 
pertaining to jury instructions are not preserved for appellate review unless a 
specific objection has been voiced at trial."  Overton v. State, 801 So. 2d 877, 901 
(Fla. 2001); see also Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 418 n.8 (Fla. 1998).  Because 
this issue was not preserved by an objection, Crain argues that the felony murder 
instruction constitutes fundamental error.  When constitutional rights are 
implicated, we have considered issues for the first time on appeal as fundamental 
error where the error "goes to the foundation of the case or the merits of the cause 
of action and is equivalent to a denial of due process."  J.B. v. State, 705 So. 2d 
1376, 1378 (Fla. 1998). 
To determine whether the felony murder instruction based on kidnapping 
with intent to inflict bodily harm constitutes fundamental error, we must consider 
two lines of precedent.  First, due process prohibits a defendant from being 
convicted of a crime not charged in the information or indictment.  See Aaron v. 
 
 
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State, 284 So. 2d 673, 677 (Fla. 1973) ("The right of persons accused of serious 
offenses to know, before trial, the specific nature and detail of crimes they are 
charged with committing is a basic right guaranteed by our Federal and State 
Constitutions.");  Long v. State, 92 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. 1957) ("[W]here an 
offense may be committed in various ways, the evidence must establish it to have 
been committed in the manner charged in the indictment."); Lewis v. State, 53 So. 
2d 707, 708 (Fla. 1951) ("No principle of criminal law is better settled than that the 
State must prove the allegations set up in the information or the indictment.").  
Consistent with this principle, the Third District Court of Appeal has held that a 
kidnapping conviction cannot be sustained on evidence of an intent element not 
charged in the indictment.  See Mills v. State, 407 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). 
The significance of the intent element flows from the status of kidnapping as 
a specific intent crime.  See Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285, 290 (Fla. 1993).  
Modern, statutory kidnapping as codified in section 787.01, Florida Statutes, 
differs from its lesser included offense of false imprisonment in its requirement of 
proof by the State of one of the four intent elements set out in the statute.  See Sean 
v. State, 775 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).  As stated in Keith v. State, 163 
So. 136 (Fla. 1935), the "gist of the offense" is the felonious act of a confinement 
or abduction with a specific intent.  Id. at 138-39. 
 
 
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On the other hand, it is well settled that if an indictment charges 
premeditated murder, the State need not charge felony murder or the particular 
underlying felony to receive a felony murder instruction.  See Woodel v. State, 804 
So. 2d 316, 322 (Fla. 2001); Gudinas v. State, 693 So. 2d 953, 964 (Fla. 1997); 
Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677, 682 (Fla. 1995).  We have held that in felony 
murder situations the notice required by due process of law and supplied by the 
charging document as to other offenses is provided instead by our State's reciprocal 
discovery rules and by the enumeration in section 782.04(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes 
(2003), of the felonies on which the State may rely to establish first-degree felony 
murder.  See Kearse, 662 So. 2d at 682; see also O'Callaghan v. State, 429 So. 2d 
691, 695 (Fla. 1983).  As long as the definition of the underlying felony provided 
to the jury is sufficiently definite to assure the defendant a fair trial, "[i]t is not 
necessary . . . to instruct on the elements of the underlying felony with the same 
particularity as would be required if the defendant were charged with the 
underlying felony."  Brumbley v. State, 453 So. 2d 381, 386 (Fla. 1984); see also 
Gudinas, 693 So. 2d at 964 ("We have repeatedly rejected claims that it is error for 
a trial court to allow the State to pursue a felony murder theory when the 
indictment gave no notice of the theory."). 
In this case, the State relied on kidnapping to support the felony murder 
theory of first-degree murder and also charged kidnapping in a separate count of 
 
 
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the indictment.  However, the instruction on the offense of kidnapping relied upon 
for felony murder and the instruction on the separate count of kidnapping do not 
correspond.  In the absence of an objection to these divergent instructions, the 
question becomes whether it was fundamental error for the trial court to give an 
instruction on the kidnapping underlying felony murder in count I different from 
the instruction given on kidnapping as charged in count II.  We resolve this issue 
by examining the rationale behind case law allowing instruction on felony murder 
based on an indictment charging premeditated murder, by looking to the 
instruction given to Crain's jury on the relationship between the two counts, and 
finally by looking for any indications in the record that Crain was surprised or 
prejudiced by the divergent instructions. 
First, as we have previously explained, the State need not charge felony 
murder in a first-degree murder indictment.  Second, separate treatment of felony 
murder and the underlying felony comports with the standard jury instructions 
which were given in this case: 
A separate crime is charged in each count of the indictment and 
while they've been tried together, each crime and the evidence 
applicable to it, must be considered separately and a separate verdict 
returned as to each. 
A verdict of guilty or not guilty as to one crime, must not affect 
your verdict as to the other crime charged. 
The jury did not request clarification of the felony murder or kidnapping 
instructions.  Accordingly, we assume that the jury understood and properly 
 
 
- 19 - 
applied the instructions, and independently assessed Crain's guilt on each count.  
See Burnette v. State, 157 So. 2d 65, 70 (Fla. 1963) (stating that an appellate court 
must assume that a juror, if properly instructed, will comply with the obligations of 
the oath and render a true verdict according to the law and the evidence); see also 
Sutton v. State, 718 So. 2d 215, 216 & 216 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), and cases 
cited therein, ("applying the well-established presumption that juries follow trial 
court instructions"). 
Third, we note that Crain's argument on appeal that the indictment gave him 
constitutionally insufficient notice of felony murder resting on kidnapping with 
intent to inflict bodily harm is not compelling on these facts.  The record contains 
no indication that Crain was surprised or otherwise prejudiced at trial by the felony 
murder instruction.  The proposed jury instructions provided to Crain's attorney 
included the alternative of intent to inflict bodily harm as an element of felony 
murder based on kidnapping.  Not only did defense counsel fail to object or 
otherwise claim surprise, but Crain's attorney specifically referred to the wording 
of the felony murder instruction in his closing argument.10  Moreover, Crain's 
                                        
10.  In discussing the anticipated instruction on felony murder, counsel 
stated: 
 
They still have to prove under the felony murder theory, they have to 
prove that Amanda Victoria Brown is dead and that she died––the 
death occurred as a consequence of and while Willie Seth Crain was 
engaged in the commission of kidnapping. 
 
 
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defense at trial in this case was that he was in no way responsible for the 
disappearance and death of Amanda, not that he lacked the requisite intent. 
On this record, we cannot conclude that there was any unfair surprise, failure 
of notice, or denial of due process as to the felony murder instruction on 
kidnapping. In light of these considerations, we conclude that the trial court did not 
commit fundamental error in instructing the jury on "intent to inflict bodily harm" 
as an alternative to "intent to commit homicide" in defining the underlying felony 
of kidnapping.11  In light of this conclusion, we next determine whether the 
evidence is sufficient to sustain Crain's convictions. 
III.  SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
A.  Applicable Law 
In cases in which the evidence of guilt is wholly circumstantial, it is the trial 
judge's task to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to 
determine the presence of competent evidence from which the jury could infer 
guilt to the exclusion of all other inferences.  See State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187, 
189 (Fla. 1989).  A reviewing court must assess the record evidence for its 
                                                                                                                              
 
. . . .  
 
The instruction further says that the kidnapping must be done 
with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of homicide or 
to inflict bodily harm upon the victim. 
 
11.  We do not address whether the felony murder instruction given in this 
case would have constituted harmful error had Crain preserved the issue with a 
proper objection. 
 
 
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sufficiency only, not its weight.  We explained in Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 
(Fla. 1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31 (1982): 
 
The weight and the sufficiency of evidence are, in theory, two 
distinct concepts most often relevant at the trial court level.  
Sufficiency is a test of adequacy.  Sufficient evidence is "such 
evidence, in character, weight, or amount, as will legally justify the 
judicial or official action demanded."   In criminal law, a finding that 
the evidence is legally insufficient means that the prosecution has 
failed to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Weight, at least in theory, is a somewhat more subjective concept.  
The "weight of the evidence" is the "balance or preponderance of 
evidence."   It is a determination of the trier of fact that a greater 
amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue or cause 
than the other. 
As a general proposition, an appellate court should not retry a 
case or reweigh conflicting evidence submitted to a jury or other trier 
of fact.  Rather, the concern on appeal must be whether, after all 
conflicts in the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom have 
been resolved in favor of the verdict on appeal, there is substantial, 
competent evidence to support the verdict and judgment.  Legal 
sufficiency alone, as opposed to evidentiary weight, is the appropriate 
concern of an appellate tribunal. 
Id. at 1123 (citations and footnotes omitted) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1285, 
1429 (5th ed. 1979)). 
Although the jury is the trier of fact, a conviction of guilt must be reversed 
on appeal if it is not supported by competent, substantial evidence.  See Long v. 
State, 689 So. 2d 1055, 1058 (Fla. 1997).  In this regard, we have explained:
 
A judgment of conviction comes to this Court with a presumption of 
correctness and a defendant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence 
cannot prevail where there is substantial competent evidence to 
support the verdict and judgment. The fact that the evidence is 
contradictory does not warrant a judgment of acquittal since the 
 
 
- 22 - 
weight of the evidence and the witnesses' credibility are questions 
solely for the jury.  It is not this Court's function to retry a case or 
reweigh conflicting evidence submitted to the trier of fact. 
Donaldson v. State, 722 So. 2d 177, 182 (Fla. 1998) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
The State acknowledges that the evidence of intent in this case is entirely 
circumstantial.  In Law, this Court reiterated the standard of review in 
circumstantial evidence cases:  "Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no 
matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be 
sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence."  449 So. 2d at 188 (citing McArthur v. State, 351 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 
1977), and Mayo v. State, 71 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1954)). 
B.  Corpus Delicti 
Crain assumes for the purposes of argument that there is sufficient evidence 
to support the jury conclusion that Amanda is dead and that he killed her.12  
However, in capital cases, this Court independently assesses the sufficiency of the 
evidence to determine if it is legally sufficient.  See Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 
636, 649 (Fla. 2000).  Thus, we must determine whether there was sufficient 
evidence to establish that the alleged victim is dead and that the defendant killed 
her. 
                                        
12.  Crain has not asserted in his appeal that the evidence was insufficient to 
prove either that Amanda is dead or that he killed her. 
 
 
- 23 - 
Despite the inability of authorities to find the victim's body, there is 
competent, substantial evidence, inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence, to establish that Amanda is dead and that Crain killed her, establishing 
two of the three essential elements of first-degree murder.  See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. 
(Crim.) 7.2.  These elements subsume the corpus delicti for murder, which consists 
of the victim's death via the criminal agency of another.  See Meyers v. State, 704 
So. 2d 1368, 1369 (Fla. 1997).  The corpus delicti of murder can be proven 
circumstantially, even without any evidence of the discovery of the victim's body.  
See id.; see also Bassett v. State, 449 So. 2d 803, 807 (Fla. 1984).  In this case, the 
extraordinary unlikelihood that a seven-year-old child would voluntarily disappear 
from her sleeping mother's side in the middle of the night and remain alive but 
never be seen or heard from again is strong circumstantial evidence of her death.  
See Epperly v. Commonwealth, 294 S.E.2d 882 (Va. 1982) (establishing corpus 
delicti based on evidence of eighteen-year-old victim's character, traits, habits, and 
relationships, which negated theories of suicide, natural death, accidental death, 
justifiable, or excusable homicide, or continuing life in absentia). 
In addition to the abrupt and permanent disappearance of a young child 
supporting the inference that Amanda is dead, there is also evidence that Amanda 
was last seen alive in the presence of Crain, that Amanda's blood was found on 
Crain's boxer shorts, and that scratch marks consistent with a young girl's 
 
 
- 24 - 
fingernails were found on Crain’s body.  Finally, although not independently 
determinative, we note that Crain's oddly targeted bleaching of his bathroom in the 
middle of the night along with his unusual behavior the next morning support a 
conclusion that Crain's actions with Amanda the previous evening were unlawful 
and resulted in her death.   Thus, we conclude that the totality of these 
circumstances constitutes substantial, competent evidence from which the jury 
could reasonably have excluded all inferences other than that Amanda is dead and 
that Crain killed her.  Cf. Meyers, 704 So. 2d at 1370 (concluding that the State 
presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of corpus delicti in case involving 
disappearance of fourteen-year-old victim, and evidence of injuries to defendant 
including fingernail scratches).13 
C.  First-Degree Murder 
The jury found Crain guilty of first-degree murder on a general verdict form 
that did not specify whether the verdict was based on premeditated or felony 
murder.  A general guilty verdict rendered by a jury instructed on both first-degree 
murder alternatives may be upheld on appeal where the evidence is sufficient to 
                                        
13.  Justice Wells’ partially dissenting opinion in this case includes the 
assertion that this case is distinguishable from Meyers only in the absence of a 
confession, which Justice Wells deems fatal to Crain's conviction.  However, 
unlike Meyers, in which the defendant's confession was necessary to establish that 
the victim's death was caused by the defendant's criminal act, see 704 So. 2d at 
1370, in this case the circumstantial and physical evidence was such that the jury 
could lawfully have concluded that it was the defendant and no one else who 
committed the killing. 
 
 
- 25 - 
establish either felony murder or premeditation.  See Jones v. State, 748 So. 2d 
1012, 1024 (Fla. 1999); Mungin v. State, 689 So. 2d 1026, 1029-30 (Fla. 1995).  
We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish first-degree felony murder 
based on kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm. 
Crain, a fifty-two-year-old man who met Amanda at her mother's house on 
the day before she disappeared, showed an immediate interest in the child.  Crain 
played games with Amanda and gave her money for her homework, drew with her, 
and told her about his collection of movies.  This initial, apparently benign conduct 
led to several instances of closer contact, including Crain and Amanda 
disappearing into his bedroom to watch "Titanic," Hartman subsequently 
discovering Amanda sitting between Crain's legs, and Crain insisting on blow-
drying Amanda's hair.  Perhaps most significantly, the last time Hartman saw 
Amanda, she was sleeping next to Crain in Hartman's bed.  Although Hartman did 
not prevent any of these close contacts, it is reasonable for the jury to have inferred 
from the evidence of Crain's conduct that Crain had taken steps to ingratiate 
himself to Amanda. 
In addition, the evidence showed that on the night of Amanda's 
disappearance, a witness living near Amanda's trailer saw a vehicle that matched 
the description of Crain's truck with its lights on and engine running for 
approximately five minutes before she heard the truck being driven away.  From 
 
 
- 26 - 
the evidence of Crain's interest in Amanda, the fact that he was present when 
Amanda was last seen asleep in her mother's bed, Hartman's testimony that she 
slept through the night, and the neighbor's observations of Crain's truck, the jury 
could reasonably have inferred to the exclusion of all other hypotheses that Crain 
took Amanda from the trailer without the consent of her mother.  This conduct 
establishes an unlawful confinement under the kidnapping statute.  See § 
787.01(1)(b) ("Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is against her or his will 
within the meaning of [kidnapping] if such confinement is without the consent of 
her or his parent or legal guardian."). 
However, as noted above, in order to establish a kidnapping the State must 
also prove that the unlawful confinement occurred with a specific intent.  In this 
regard we note that the Second District Court of Appeal has affirmed a conviction 
of attempted kidnapping with intent to inflict bodily harm or terrorize the victim in 
reliance on evidence similar to that in this case, specifically that the defendant took 
a young, sleeping child from his bed in the middle of the night.  See Sean, 775 So. 
at 344.  Here, in addition to circumstances similar to Sean, the State also presented 
evidence that blood consistent with Amanda's DNA was found on Crain's boxer 
shorts and taken from the toilet tissue found in Crain’s toilet bowl.  Further, 
multiple scratches and one cluster of gouges were observed and photographed on 
Crain's arms.  All but two of the scratches were more likely to have been caused by 
 
 
- 27 - 
the fingernails of a seven-year-old child than by any other cause.  The cluster of 
small gouges was more likely to have been caused by a small grasping hand 
consistent with that of a seven-year-old child than by another cause. 
Based on this evidence, we conclude that the State presented legally 
sufficient evidence of a kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm.  The 
DNA blood evidence linked to Amanda that was found on Crain's boxer shorts 
tends to establish that Amanda bled while Crain was wearing his boxer shorts.  
Moreover, the DNA evidence indicating a mixture of blood from Crain and 
Amanda found on the toilet seat and tissue in Crain's bathroom establishes that 
Amanda and Crain both bled at some point during the kidnapping.  When 
considered in light of the DNA evidence, the scratch and gouge marks on Crain's 
arms are indicative of a struggle between Crain and Amanda.14  We note that at the 
time of her death Amanda was three feet ten inches tall and weighed approximately 
                                        
14.  Crain asserted at trial and on appeal that he obtained the scratch marks 
while crabbing.  Relying on testimony from the medical examiner that he could not 
determine with any degree of certainty whether the scratches were caused by 
fingernails or crab traps, Justice Lewis states in his separate opinion that "[t]he 
State did not offer definitive evidence that Crain's version of the facts was not true" 
regarding the origin of the scratch marks.  See infra at 56.  However, we note that 
the circumstantial evidence standard requires this Court to take every inference in 
the light most favorable to the State.  See Law, 559 So. 2d at 189.  The State 
offered evidence that Crain's version of the events was untrue––namely the 
medical examiner's testimony that the scratches were more likely to have been 
caused by the fingernails of a seven-year-old girl than by a crab trap.  Applying the 
review standard for circumstantial evidence to this evidence, we conclude that the 
jury could have properly rejected Crain's version that the scratches came from 
crabbing. 
 
 
- 28 - 
forty-five pounds.  Crain was a fifty-two-year-old man of normal height and 
weight,15 engaged in a physically demanding profession.  Combined with the 
disparate height and weight, we conclude that the evidence that a struggle occurred 
between Amanda and Crain which resulted in both parties' blood loss and 
numerous scratches and gouges to Crain's arms is a compelling indication of 
Crain's intent to inflict bodily harm on Amanda. 
Our conclusion in this case is consistent with a Virginia Supreme Court 
decision on analogous facts.  In Epperly, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered 
whether, in the absence of a body and a confession, the evidence was sufficient to 
support a jury verdict of first-degree premeditated murder.  In that case, the 
defendant and the victim met at a bar and went to a lake house that belonged to a 
friend of the defendant.  The victim's sister reported her missing the next evening.  
The police ultimately arrested the defendant for her murder despite the fact that the 
victim's body was never found.  In affirming the defendant's conviction for first-
degree murder the Virginia Supreme Court noted that a "spattering of tiny droplets 
of blood through two rooms, the bloodstained clothing, the broken ankle bracelet, 
the large bloodstain on the carpet, and the disparity of size and strength between 
[the victim] and the defendant are all circumstances from which the jury could 
                                        
15.  The October 1, 1998, arrest report reflects that Crain was six feet tall 
and weighed 150 pounds. 
 
 
- 29 - 
properly infer that she was subjected to a savage beating, resulting in her death."  
Epperly, 299 S.E.2d at 892. 
In this case, we determine that the circumstantial evidence supports a verdict 
of first-degree murder based on felony murder with the underlying felony being 
kidnapping with intent to inflict bodily harm.  The evidence of an abduction, the 
drops of blood, the DNA evidence, the disparity of size and strength, and the 
evidence of a struggle between Amanda and Crain are all circumstances from 
which a jury could properly infer, to the exclusion of any reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence, that Crain abducted and intentionally harmed Amanda before her death.  
The fact that we cannot pinpoint when the actual bodily harm and subsequent 
killing occurred in relation to the time Crain first kidnapped Amanda does not 
undermine this conclusion.  See Van Gotum v. State, 569 So. 2d 773, 776 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1990) (holding that the continuing unlawful confinement and the intent to 
commit grand theft existed simultaneously and involved the same victim and 
established a confinement with the intent to commit theft).  It is sufficient if the 
State establishes that the unlawful confinement and the specific intent at some 
point existed simultaneously and involved the same victim.  See id. 
Accordingly, we find sufficient evidence of a killing in the course of a 
 
 
- 30 - 
kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm.16  On this basis, we affirm the 
first-degree murder conviction. 
D.  Kidnapping 
We next address whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the 
conviction of kidnapping with the intent to commit a homicide as charged in count 
II of the indi
ctment.  Unlike the murder charge, which subsumes all valid felony 
murder theories, the State cannot rely on the unpled alternative of intent to inflict 
bodily harm as to this count. 
The State argues that the luminol evidence demonstrates that a large amount 
of blood was spilled in the bathroom and therefore establishes that the kidnapping 
was committed with an intent to kill.  The State's argument on this point invites 
this Court to stack inferences, which we decline to do.  As we stated in Miller v. 
State, 770 So. 2d 1144, 1149 (Fla. 2000), "the circumstantial evidence test guards 
against basing a conviction on impermissibly stacked inferences." 
                                        
16.  Because we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support a first-
degree felony murder conviction, we decline to directly address Crain's argument 
that the evidence is insufficient to establish first-degree premeditated murder.  Any 
error in instructing the jury on premeditated murder based on insufficient evidence 
of premeditation is necessarily harmless.  See Jones, 748 So. 2d at 1024 ("[E]ven if 
the evidence does not support premeditated murder, any error in charging the jury 
on that theory is harmless where the evidence supports a conviction for felony 
murder, which has also been charged."); Mungin, 689 So. 2d at 1029-30 
(concluding that error in instructing on felony murder was "clearly harmless" 
where evidence supported conviction for felony murder and the jury properly 
convicted defendant of first-degree murder on this theory).   
 
 
- 31 - 
The reaction to luminol in Crain's bathroom may support an inference that 
Crain was attempting to cover something up rather than cleaning his bathroom in 
the middle of the night.  However, there is no evidence from which the jury could 
have inferred that there was ever a substantial quantity of blood indicative of a 
prolonged attack and, therefore, a killing with premeditated intent.  Although the 
DNA blood evidence found on the tissue and the toilet seat in Crain's bathroom 
independently establishes that Amanda's blood was deposited in Crain's bathroom, 
it does not establish how much she bled, what caused her to bleed, or where she 
was killed.  Because of the presence of bleach, it is impossible to tell how much of 
the luminol "glow"––if any––was attributable to blood and how much was 
attributable to bleach. 
To support its theory that the murder was committed with premeditation, the 
State also relies on evidence that Crain left his truck running outside Hartman's 
trailer on the night of Amanda's disappearance, exhibited unusual behavior the next 
morning, and attempted to conceal his crime.  These facts evince a plan to remove 
Amanda from her mother's residence and to eliminate all evidence of her presence 
at his residence, but do not support an inference that Crain's intent at any specific 
point in time was to kill her.  See generally Norton v. State, 709 So. 2d 87, 93 (Fla. 
1997) ("Efforts to conceal evidence of premeditated murder are as likely to be as 
consistent with efforts to avoid prosecution for any unlawful killing."); Hoefert v. 
 
 
- 32 - 
State, 617 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. 1993); see also Smith v. State, 568 So. 2d 965, 
968 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). 
The impossibility of better reconstructing the circumstances of Amanda's 
death leaves us unable to conclude that the State presented legally sufficient 
evidence of a specific intent to kill.  Therefore, we conclude that competent, 
substantial evidence does not exist to support the jury verdict of kidnapping with 
intent to commit homicide.  Accordingly, pursuant to section 924.34, Florida 
Statutes (1997),17 we reverse the judgment of guilt of kidnapping and direct the 
trial court on remand to enter judgment for false imprisonment, and to resentence 
Crain accordingly.18 
                                        
17.  Section 924.34 provides: 
 
 
When the appellate court determines that the evidence does not 
prove the offense for which the defendant was found guilty but does 
establish guilt of a lesser statutory degree of the offense or a lesser 
offense necessarily included in the offense charged, the appellate 
court shall reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to enter 
judgment for the lesser degree of the offense or for the lesser included 
offense. 
18.  False imprisonment does not require specific intent.  See State v. 
Sanborn, 533 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1988) (concluding that the general intent of 
false imprisonment is included in the specific intent of kidnapping).  Section 
787.02, Florida Statutes (1997), provides in pertinent part: 
 
 
(1)(a) The term "false imprisonment" means forcibly, by threat, 
or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another 
person without lawful authority and against her or his will. 
 
 
- 33 - 
IV.  PROPORTIONALITY OF DEATH SENTENCE 
Although Crain does not raise the proportionality of his death sentence as a 
separate issue on appeal, this Court has an independent duty to perform a 
proportionality review of all death sentences.  See Rimmer v. State, 825 So. 2d 
304, 331 (Fla. 2002).  Proportionality review "is not a comparison between the 
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances."  Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 
954, 965 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990)).  
Rather, our proportionality review requires us to consider the totality of the 
circumstances in each case, and to compare these circumstances with other capital 
cases to determine whether death is warranted.  See Rimmer, 825 So. 2d at 331; 
Porter, 564 So. 2d at 1064. 
In this case, Crain's death sentence was supported by three aggravating 
factors found by the trial court:  the murder was committed during the commission 
of a felony (kidnapping), the defendant was convicted of prior violent felonies 
(sexual battery and aggravated child abuse), and the victim was under the age of 
twelve.  The trial court rejected statutory mitigating factors, and the nonstatutory 
mitigation is far from compelling.  First, the trial court's finding of nonstatutory 
                                                                                                                              
 
(b) Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is against her or 
his will within the meaning of this section if such confinement is 
without the consent of her or his parent or legal guardian. 
 
 
 
- 34 - 
mental health impairment was based on the fact that Crain was a pedophile and 
substance abuser.  Second, as noted by the State, the trial court's finding that Crain 
had the capacity to form loving relationships with his children was a "charitable" 
finding as none of Crain's children testified during the penalty phase and the 
defense filed a motion in limine prior to trial to prohibit the State from eliciting 
testimony concerning Crain's sexual abuse of his own children.  The trial court also 
found that Crain had an abusive childhood, was deprived of educational benefits, 
and had a good prison record. 
In his fourth issue, Crain asserts that the trial court erred in relying on the 
aggravator of murder in the course of a felony under section 921.141(5)(d), Florida 
Statutes (1997), because the evidence of the crime of kidnapping is legally 
insufficient.  Assuming without deciding that Crain is correct in light of this 
Court’s reduction of the separate kidnapping conviction to false imprisonment, we 
conclude that any error in finding the "murder in the course of a felony" aggravator 
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  This case is analogous to Geralds v. State, 
674 So. 2d 96, 104 (Fla. 1996), in which this Court concluded that the erroneous 
finding of the "cold, calculated, or premeditated" aggravator was harmless based 
on two valid aggravators––that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and 
that the murder was committed during a robbery/burglary––three mitigators that 
the trial court gave little weight, and a unanimous death recommendation. 
 
 
- 35 - 
Moreover, we conclude that any error in finding the aggravator of murder in 
the course of a felony does not affect our proportionality review based on the 
weight of the two remaining valid aggravators under the circumstances of this case.  
In making this determination, we remain mindful that proportionality review is not 
a simple comparison of aggravators and mitigators, and we look to other capital 
cases involving child victims under twelve in which we have found death 
sentences proportional.  In Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 2000), this 
Court affirmed a death sentence for the murder of a five-month-old child.  We 
determined that the murder was "significantly aggravated by the existence of the 
prior conviction for felony child abuse," in which Lukehart caused a closed-head 
injury to his girlfriend's eight-month-old daughter by shaking her, and concluded 
that the "prior felony aggravator i
s an exceptionally weighty aggravating factor 
under the circumstances of the present case."  Id. at 926.  In Stephens v. State, 787 
So. 2d 747 (Fla. 2001), we found a death sentence proportional for the murder of a 
child aged three years, four months.  We concluded that "like Lukehart, Stephens' 
prior violent felony was given great weight and is similar to the events which led to 
the present murder."  Id. at 760.  This Court further observed that the record 
demonstrated that the defendant "was indifferent to the fate of [the] helpless child" 
and, therefore, concluded that the death penalty was proportional under the 
circumstances.  Id. at 760.   
 
 
- 36 - 
During the penalty phase in this case, the State submitted copies of 
judgments and sentences for five counts of sexual battery and one count of 
aggravated child abuse.  The State also offered the testimony of three child victims 
of Crain's previous sexual assaults.  The three female victims all testified that Crain 
began abusing them when they were between the ages of seven and nine years of 
age.  One of the victims endured Crain's repetitive abuse on a monthly basis for 
five years.  The victims also testified that Crain threatened them with extensive 
bodily harm or death should they reveal his abuse to anyone.  Thus, as we found in 
Lukehart, the prior felony aggravator is an exceptionally weighty aggravating 
factor under the circumstances of the present case, and as we concluded in 
Stephens, Crain's history of victimization of children similar in age to the victim in 
this case increases the magnitude of the prior violent felony aggravator.  
In light of the strength of the aggravating factors, the relatively weak 
mitigation, and our affirmance of death sentences in comparable cases, we 
conclude that the death penalty is a proportional punishment. 
V.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEATH PENALTY 
In a supplemental brief, Crain raises the issue of the constitutionality of 
Florida's death penalty scheme in the wake of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  This Court addressed 
the contention that Florida's capital sentencing scheme violates the United States 
 
 
- 37 - 
Constitution under Apprendi and Ring in postconviction appeals in Bottoson v. 
Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 
2002), and denied relief.  We have also denied relief in direct appeals where, as in 
this case, the trial judge has found the aggravating factor of previous conviction of 
a violent felony.  See Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 49 (Fla. 2003), cert denied, 
124 S. Ct. 2023 (2004); see also Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 963 (Fla.) 
(stating that prior violent felony aggravator based on contemporaneous crimes 
charged by indictment and on which defendant was found guilty by unanimous 
jury "clearly satisfies the mandates of the United States and Florida 
Constitutions"), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2647 (2003).  Additionally, the advisory 
sentence of death in this case was by a unanimous vote.  In Anderson v. State, 863 
So. 2d 169, 189 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 1662 (2004), we pointed to the 
unanimous death recommendation as well as a prior violent felony aggravator in 
rejecting an Apprendi/Ring claim in direct death appeal.  We have also rejected 
Apprendi/Ring claims in other direct death appeals involving unanimous death 
recommendations.  See Conahan v. State, 844 So. 2d 629, 642 n.9 (Fla.), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 240 (2003); Chavez v. State, 832 So. 2d 730, 767 (Fla. 2002), 
cert. denied, 539 U.S. 947 (2003).  Accordingly, we conclude that Crain is also not 
entitled to relief. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
- 38 - 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction of first-degree murder 
and sentence of death in this case, and reduce the conviction of kidnapping to false 
imprisonment. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, C.J., and 
CANTERO, J., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only with an opinion. 
WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
 
QUINCE, specially concurring. 
 
I concur in the majority's decision to affirm the jury's verdict for first-degree 
murder because the evidence demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Amanda Brown is dead and that her death occurred during criminal activity, a 
kidnapping, perpetrated by Willie Seth Crain.  My agreement with the majority is 
based on both the absence of evidence which would suggest some other person is 
responsible for the disappearance and death of Amanda and the circumstances 
surrounding Crain's interaction with this seven-year-old victim.  Thus, the 
 
 
- 39 - 
circumstantial evidence in this case leads to the inescapable conclusion that Crain 
and no one else abducted and murdered Amanda Brown.  See Cox v. State, 555 So. 
2d 352, 353 (Fla. 1989) (holding that the circumstantial evidence must lead "to a 
reasonable and moral certainty that the accused and no one else committed the 
offense charged"). 
The time frames involved in this murder indicate there was only a short 
period of time (at most four hours) between the time that the mother went to sleep 
and when Crain left her residence, and the discovery that Amanda was not at 
home.  From the testimony of Crain, Kathryn Hartman (Amanda's mother), Penny 
Probst, a neighbor, and Michelle Rogers, another neighbor, the earliest Crain could 
have left Hartman's trailer is 2:30 a.m.  The neighbors indicated they observed 
Crain's vehicle on the side of the trailer with the lights on and the engine running at 
2:30 a.m.  When Hartman awoke at 6:12 a.m., Amanda was not in the bed or in the 
house.  Both Hartman and Roy Brown, Amanda's father, testified that Amanda was 
afraid of the dark and never wandered outside alone at night.  Moreover, there was 
no indication that there was any type of forced entry into the trailer.  The back door 
to the trailer was kept locked and was locked on September 9, 10 and 11.  There 
was also no evidence that any of Amanda's clothes or toys were missing.  Hartman 
testified that nothing of value was missing from the trailer. 
 
 
- 40 - 
In addition, the circumstances of this case weave a pattern that leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that Amanda Brown is dead and that Willie Seth Crain 
caused that death.  After meeting Amanda for the first time on the afternoon of 
September 10, Crain showed a pointed interest in this seven-year-old child.  He 
talked to her about her homework and offered her money if she got the homework 
correct.19  He also sat at the kitchen table and played games with her.  At some 
point in the afternoon Crain noticed that Amanda had a loose tooth, and he offered 
her money if she would let him pull it.20 
On the evening of September 10, Crain returned to the Hartman residence 
and again played games with Amanda.  At some point in the evening he told them 
he had a large video collection and invited them to his trailer.  Once at Crain's 
trailer, they began watching a movie in the living room.  However, while the 
mother was on the telephone talking to Crain's sister, Crain took the child into his 
bedroom to watch the movie.  When the mother came in, Amanda was sitting 
between his legs with his arms around her.  Even after Amanda and her mother 
returned home, Crain continued to show a marked interest in the child when he 
offered to and did blow dry her hair after she took a shower.21 
                                        
19.  He eventually gave her $2. 
20.  This time the offer of money was $5. 
21.  Hartman testified there that were no cuts or sores on Amanda's body 
when she helped Amanda dry off and get ready for bed. 
 
 
- 41 - 
After Amanda and her mother were in bed, Crain laid down in his clothing 
on the same bed occupied by the females.  Less than four hours later, when 
Hartman got up, both Amanda and Crain were no longer in the residence.  When 
Crain was called by Hartman to see if Amanda was with him, he simply said she 
was not with him, and he continued to take his boat out.  There was no offer of 
assistance. 
The circumstantial evidence produced by the State indicates that after 
removing Amanda from her home, Crain took her to his trailer and committed acts 
of violence against her.  Blood consistent with Amanda Brown's DNA was found 
on the toilet seat, on a piece of toilet tissue22 from Crain's bathroom, and on Crain's 
boxer shorts.  Hartman indicated that she and Amanda used Crain's bathroom when 
they were there on the evening of the 10th; however, the child was not bleeding 
during that time.  Even more telling is the fact that, after coming home after 2:30 
a.m., Crain spent the rest of the early morning hours scrubbing down his bathroom 
with bleach.  He then went out to the Courtney Campbell Causeway and took out 
his boat. 
Amanda's death occurred only one day after Crain was introduced into her 
life.  Hartman met Crain on the night of September 9, 1998.  Amanda was not at 
home when Crain came to the trailer that night or early morning of the 10th.  
                                        
22.  The blood on the tissue was consistent with a mixture of the DNA 
profiles of Amanda Brown and the defendant. 
 
 
- 42 - 
However, he met Amanda on the afternoon of September 10, and she was killed on 
September 11.  Both the jury and this Court would have to engage in sheer 
speculation to conclude that some other person entered the Hartman dwelling and 
abducted Amanda during this four-hour window of opportunity. 
I believe these facts and circumstances lead to the inescapable conclusion 
that Amanda Brown is dead and Crain murdered her.  Therefore, I concur in the 
majority's decision affirming Crain's conviction for first-degree murder.  See, e.g., 
Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2003).23    
PARIENTE, C.J., and CANTERO, J., concur. 
 
LEWIS, J., concurring in result only. 
Although I concur in result, it is not without considerable concern and 
reservations.  I have concerns with not only the legal theories and applications, but 
also with overstatements of facts.  We review very tragic circumstances here 
involving a child, but I cannot agree with characterizations of much of the 
evidence and inferences upon which others rely for legally sufficient evidence.  In 
my view, the majority and others rely upon strained and improper expanded 
                                        
23.  I also agree with the majority that the jury was properly instructed on 
felony murder with the underlying felony being kidnapping to facilitate great 
bodily harm even though the defendant was not charged with this form of 
kidnapping. 
 
 
- 43 - 
inferences drawn from the actual evidence presented, which ultimately determine 
that Crain’s intent can be ascertained from far less actual evidence.  In my view, it 
is the actual physical evidence (blood and scratches) along with the actual physical 
location of such evidence (boxer shorts and arms) that tips the evidentiary balance 
to support a finding of felony murder based upon kidnapping with the intent to 
commit bodily harm.  Therefore, I cannot fully agree with the majority’s decision 
and discussion of the evidence. 
Prior to addressing the ultimate issue in this case, however, I must also 
initially voice my concern regarding our determination that Crain's death sentence 
may rest upon a conviction of felony murder, where the underlying felony is 
kidnapping with intent to commit bodily harm.  Crain was indicted on two 
counts—premeditated murder and kidnapping with intent to commit a homicide.  
Pursuant to the majority's holding, however, Crain's conviction and sentences are 
being affirmed based only upon convictions for felony murder and false 
imprisonment.  In my view, this result presents serious due process concerns that 
cannot be lightly disregarded.  While I recognize this Court's repeated adherence to 
the rule that the state may pursue a theory of felony murder even when the 
defendant has only been indicted for premeditated murder, I am concerned with 
our application of the rule here, as I believe this case presents a very unique 
 
 
- 44 - 
scenario, and may be clearly distinguishable from those decisions which have 
relied upon and discussed this rule.24 
Our rules do not require that the state charge a defendant with felony 
murder, or even inform the defendant of the specific crimes upon which the state 
intends to rely, when the state elects to pursue a theory of felony murder.  See 
Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677, 682 (Fla. 1995).  This rule is based upon the 
theory that through our reciprocal discovery rules and the felony murder statute, a 
defendant has notice of the charges, the evidence the state will rely upon, and the 
possible underlying felonies the state may use to prove felony murder.  See id.  I 
am not convinced this rationale is always adequate where the state intends to rely 
upon kidnapping as the underlying felony for felony murder and a separately 
charged kidnapping count cannot be sustained by the evidence. 
Kidnapping is a specific intent crime.  Under Florida law, the state is 
required to prove one of the four enumerated intentional acts to support 
kidnapping.  See Van Gotum v. State, 569 So. 2d 773, 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); 
Mills v. State, 407 So. 2d 218, 221 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).  While a charge of first-
                                        
24.  I must note that it is troubling to me that neither the State nor Crain gave 
more than passing consideration to the theory, namely felony murder based upon 
kidnapping with intent to inflict bodily harm, upon which the majority is upholding 
Crain's first-degree murder conviction and sentence of death.  While Crain argued 
that neither premeditation nor kidnapping with intent to commit a homicide was 
supported by the evidence, he never addressed whether kidnapping with intent to 
commit bodily harm was proven.     
 
 
- 45 - 
degree murder may place a defendant on notice of the possibility that the state 
intends to pursue a theory of felony murder, and the felony murder statute itself 
informs the defendant of the possible felonies the state may pursue, these 
provisions do nothing to notify the defendant of the specific intentional conduct the 
state will seek to prove to support a finding of kidnapping, which I suggest is 
foundational in the process of formulating any defensive strategy. 
Here, the charge of premeditated murder did not place Crain on notice of the 
underlying felony upon which the State would ultimately rely to support a 
conviction for felony murder.  Instead, that notice was actually supplied by the 
additional charge of kidnapping with intent to commit a homicide.  Indeed, while 
the State maintains that Crain was on notice regarding intent to inflict bodily harm, 
the State conceded that its theory of prosecution throughout trial in this case was 
that Crain kidnapped the child with the intent to commit homicide.  Clearly, this 
was the alleged conduct Crain was on notice to defend against. 
As noted, the State charged Crain with both premeditated murder and 
kidnapping with intent to commit a homicide, and proceeded throughout the trial 
on only those two theories.  It was not until the end of trial, during closing 
arguments and jury instructions, that the theory of kidnapping with intent to inflict 
bodily harm was first raised and then presented to the jury for the first time.  Also, 
as a result of the use of a general jury verdict form, it is impossible to ascertain 
 
 
- 46 - 
whether the jury found Crain guilty of premeditated murder or felony murder.  
Further, as it is impossible to know if Crain was convicted of felony murder, it is 
not known whether the jury determined that Crain had committed a kidnapping 
with intent to commit a homicide or intent to inflict bodily harm.25 
We have concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of 
premeditated first-degree murder, yet we uphold the conviction based on felony 
murder with the underlying felony being kidnapping, but then proceed to reduce a 
second count of kidnapping with intent to commit a homicide to false 
imprisonment.  A review of the numerous decisions of this Court holding that the 
state may pursue a theory of felony murder even when the defendant has been 
charged with only premeditated murder, seems to reveal no decision where this 
Court has applied this rule in a situation similar to that presented here.  In all cases 
where the rule has been followed, either the finding of premeditation has been 
upheld or the defendant's separate conviction of an underlying felony that would 
support felony murder could be upheld.  Therefore, in those decisions, the 
defendant was clearly not harmed by the fact that the state charged only 
premeditated murder. 
                                        
25.  However, as the State noted in its brief, the jury's erroneous 
determination of guilt as to the charge of kidnapping with intent to commit a 
homicide strongly suggests that if the jury found Crain was guilty of felony 
murder, the underlying felony upon which the jury relied was kidnapping with 
intent to commit a homicide.  
 
 
- 47 - 
Here, the evidence does not support a finding of premeditation and we have 
also reduced the separate charge of kidnapping to false imprisonment, a crime that 
does not support felony murder.  In reviewing Florida law it appears that never 
before has this Court determined that when premeditation is not supported by the 
evidence, and the separately charged felony which provided the defendant with 
notice as to felony murder is also not supported by the evidence, the felony murder 
theory may be upheld as a basis for conviction.  In my view, although our theories 
of law appear to permit this result, this presents serious due process concerns. 
I would agree that here, had the State proven the intent necessary to support 
the separate charge of kidnapping with intent to commit a homicide, Crain's first-
degree murder conviction should clearly be upheld pursuant to the felony murder 
doctrine, as Crain unquestionably was on notice of that charge and defended 
against it.  However, because the State elected to charge the separate kidnapping 
count, but failed to prove that charge by legally sufficient evidence, and because it 
is very likely that the jury relied upon the underlying kidnapping charge to support 
the felony murder count, Crain's right to due process is placed in question.  While I 
recognize the principle that an appellate court must assume that jurors follow 
instructions, here Crain's jury was provided two separate instructions for the same 
crime.  These varying instructions could have easily misled or confused the jury, 
 
 
- 48 - 
placing the jury's verdict in question.  Notably, the State wrote in its brief to this 
Court: 
Under either of the two intents, the evidence is sufficient to find the 
appellant guilty of felony murder with kidnapping as the underlying 
felony.  However, should this Court determine it must speculate as to 
which intent the jury found, the fact the jury returned a verdict of 
guilty on the kidnapping count indicates the jury necessarily found 
that the kidnapping was done with the intent to commit or to facilitate 
the commission of a homicide; the intent charged in the indictment. 
Answer Brief of the Appellee at 75. 
 
The State could have very easily avoided the problem in this case by 
charging Crain with felony murder, thereby placing him on notice by enumerating 
the exact felony upon which it would be relying, or by using a specific jury verdict 
form.  See In re Use By Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal 
Cases, 431 So. 2d 594, 597 (Fla. 1981) (recognizing there could be improvement in 
the manner in which a case is presented to the jury on alternate theories of felony 
murder and premeditated murder and suggesting use of special verdict forms as a 
solution).  The State, for unknown reasons, opted not to indict Crain for felony 
murder, choosing instead to charge him with only first-degree premeditated 
murder.  Further, although not required by law to do so, the State elected to charge 
Crain with a separate felony, namely kidnapping with intent to commit a homicide, 
which, if proven, certainly could have been used to support felony murder.  Again, 
the State was free to charge Crain with kidnapping with intent to commit bodily 
 
 
- 49 - 
harm, but did not choose to do so.  I suggest that when the state elects to charge 
only premeditated murder, and further elects to charge a felony which, if proven, 
would support felony murder, it is that felony or a lesser included felony that 
provides the defendant with notice of the felony the state intends to rely upon 
should it pursue a theory of felony murder.  It is that felony the defendant prepares 
to defend against, and therefore if the underlying felony cannot be proven, felony 
murder cannot be found.  In cases involving the ultimate punishment of death, a 
defendant is entitled to the ultimate level of due process.  The result attained here 
without the aid of complete argument from either party generates concerns as to 
whether Crain received the due process rights to which he is entitled under these 
specific facts. 
Turning to the next issue, the ultimate conclusion affirming Crain's 
conviction and sentence, with regard to whether the evidence is legally sufficient to 
support a finding of kidnapping with intent to inflict bodily harm, in my view, the 
majority's rendition of the facts skews the evidence presented and draws improper 
and expanded inferences.  From the majority's presentation, it is suggested that 
Crain was a predator, who ingratiated himself into the victim's life through her 
mother, only to wait for the perfect opportunity to kidnap and murder the child.  
The majority highlights that Crain visited Hartman's trailer three times in two days, 
and suggests, in speculation at best, that after the first visit Crain must have known 
 
 
- 50 - 
Hartman had a daughter because "two photographs of Amanda and some of her 
toys were visible in the trailer."  Majority op. at 2.  Additionally, by noting that 
Crain assisted Amanda with her homework, gave her money for correct answers, 
played games with her, and offered to pull a loose tooth, see id. at 2-3, the majority 
suggests that Crain took an untoward interest in Amanda during his visits to her 
mother's trailer.  This inference is further developed when the majority notes that 
Hartman, who had been on the telephone, found Amanda sitting on Crain's bed, 
between Crain's legs facing the television, with Crain apparently demonstrating to 
Amanda how to work the remote control, see id. at 4, and that later in the night 
Crain dried Amanda's hair after she had showered.  See id. at 5. 
Even recognizing that in consideration of a motion for a judgment of 
acquittal, the court must examine all the facts and inferences in a light most 
favorable to the state, see McCoy v. State, 853 So. 2d 396, 408 (Fla. 2003), it is my 
view that here, the majority opinion has drawn and relied upon expanded 
inferences contrary to law.  The evidence presented demonstrates that Crain never 
attempted to separate Amanda from her mother, and in fact it was Amanda's 
mother who voluntarily and intentionally introduced Crain into these 
circumstances.  It was Hartman who solicited Crain into her home.  Further, 
Amanda's mother neither voiced an objection nor asked Crain to leave when Crain 
laid down on the bed with Hartman and her daughter. 
 
 
- 51 - 
The majority's characterization of Hartman's testimony is in my view also 
misleading in its suggestiveness.  While it may be true that Crain demonstrated an 
interest in the child by helping her with her homework and rewarding her for 
correct answers, such is not uncommon or abnormal behavior for an adult in the 
normal course of human interaction.  Further, the evidence shows that the bedroom 
in which Amanda and Crain were located while Crain assisted Amanda with the 
operation of the television electronic equipment, was the only room in the trailer 
with air conditioning and a television.  Therefore, it was logical for Crain and 
Amanda to be in that room while Hartman was on the telephone.  When Hartman 
entered the room, apparently nothing had occurred or was occurring to cause the 
mother any particular concern for the child's safety.  Hartman knew the two were 
together and apparently had no reason for fear or concern.  Hartman, the mother on 
the scene, apparently observed no improper or illicit conduct or behavior as she 
freely participated in the various activities from which the majority now attempts 
to infer a predatory stalking of the child by Crain.  The majority seeks to infer 
something that the mother, who was physically present with her child, apparently 
did not observe as being the sinister conduct the majority infers.  Hartman solicited 
Crain's presence within her family circle and apparently she never had a reason to 
ask that he leave or alter his behavior. 
 
 
- 52 - 
Additionally, it is not uncommon that an adult would be positioned behind a 
child while demonstrating how to work an electronic device, such as a remote 
control.  Crain's interactions with the child were not unlike interactions that adults 
have with children every day.  Hartman's testimony provides no support for our 
conclusion that Crain kidnapped Amanda with the intent to cause her bodily harm.  
It must be remembered that it was Hartman who brought Crain into this context 
and Hartman was present at all times.  While in no way suggesting that Hartman is 
at fault or blameworthy for the tragic circumstances that occurred, it must be 
recognized that the majority is drawing inferences that even the mother, who was 
present at the time, clearly did not make. 
During trial, Crain moved for a judgment of acquittal both after the State 
presented its evidence and after the close of all evidence, arguing the State had not 
presented sufficient evidence to support either premeditated or felony murder.  The 
trial judge denied Crain's motion.  This Court has repeatedly held that where a 
conviction is based wholly upon circumstantial evidence, a special standard of 
review applies.  See Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 155 (Fla. 2002); Jaramillo v. 
State, 417 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1982).  As stated in State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 
1989):  
Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how 
strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be 
sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence. . . . 
 
 
- 53 - 
. . . . 
. . .  A motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted in a 
circumstantial evidence case if the state fails to present evidence from 
which the jury can exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of 
guilt.  Consistent with the standard set forth in Lynch [v. State, 293 
So. 2d 44 (Fla.1974)], if the state does not offer evidence which is 
inconsistent with the defendant's hypothesis, "the evidence [would be] 
such that no view which the jury may lawfully take of it favorable to 
the [state] can be sustained under the law."  293 So. 2d at 45.  The 
state's evidence would be as a matter of law "insufficient to warrant a 
conviction."  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.380. 
It is the trial judge's proper task to review the evidence to 
determine the presence or absence of competent evidence from which 
the jury could infer guilt to the exclusion of all other inferences.  That 
view of the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the 
state. 
Id. at 188-89 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
Crain's hypothesis of innocence at trial was simply that he was not guilty—
that he did not kidnap and kill Amanda Brown.  Therefore, it was the trial court's 
obligation to determine whether the State presented substantial, competent 
evidence to refute Crain's theory of innocence.  In my view, the State could meet 
its threshold burden and provide competent evidence from which the jury could 
infer guilt to the exclusion of all other inferences in this case only from the 
physical blood and scratch injury evidence.  Suspicions alone cannot satisfy this 
burden and the expansive inferences are not, in my view, competent.  The majority 
properly concludes that the evidence was insufficient to support premeditated 
murder and felony murder based upon kidnapping with intent to commit a 
homicide.  The majority is correct in concluding that the evidence supports that 
 
 
- 54 - 
Crain committed felony murder, where the underlying felony is kidnapping with 
intent to commit bodily harm, but incorrect in seizing upon expansive improper 
inferences. 
Initially, we should not impute upon Crain an admission that he was in fact 
involved in the murder of Amanda Brown.  In his brief to this Court, Crain does 
assume only for purposes of argument that Amanda is dead and that he killed her, 
but this does not equate to an admission of guilt that should be used against him as 
established fact.  Crain's primary argument to this Court is that the State did not 
prove the required intent necessary to support either premeditated or felony murder 
based on kidnapping with intent to commit homicide.26  The majority improperly 
infers that because Crain does not assert on appeal that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove the fact that Amanda is dead and that he killed her, he has 
thereby conceded that the child died at his hands.  See Majority op. at 22 n.12.  
Such a conclusion would necessarily require that this Court infer guilt in every 
case in which an appellant-defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence necessary to prove that the victim is dead, and that he or she actually 
killed the victim.  To support the ultimate conclusion that Crain had the requisite 
intent to commit bodily harm, the majority opinion begins with the presumption 
that Amanda Brown is dead and that Crain killed her. 
                                        
26.  Crain also asserted in his brief that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion for a judgment of acquittal.   
 
 
- 55 - 
In support of the determination that the evidence was sufficient to support 
felony murder based on the felony of kidnapping with the intent to commit bodily 
harm, the majority posits that:  (1) Crain took a young sleeping child from her 
mother's bed in the middle of the night; (2) the DNA blood evidence linked to 
Amanda Brown found on Crain's boxer shorts and the luminol evidence in the 
bathroom both established that Amanda bled while confined; and (3) the scratch 
and gouge marks on Crain's arms indicate that a struggle occurred between Crain 
and Amanda.  See Majority op. at 28.  The support for the majority decision comes 
from a Second District decision, Sean v. State, 775 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2000). 
The conclusion that Crain's act of removing Amanda from her mother's bed 
in the middle of the night supports an inference of guilt has some limited support in 
the record.  As noted, the majority begins with the presumption that Crain killed 
Amanda, and it simply expands that presumption by maintaining that Crain must 
have taken the child from her mother's bed.  The State presented absolutely no 
evidence that demonstrates that Crain took the child from her mother's bed.  The 
presence of a vehicle without more does not justify the inference the majority 
imposes.  The majority's reliance on Sean is also misplaced.  In Sean, the Second 
District merely noted:  "[U]nder the facts in this case, we have no problem 
affirming Sean's [attempted kidnapping] conviction.  The evidence that Sean took a 
 
 
- 56 - 
young, sleeping child from his own bed in the middle of the night supports the 
verdict of guilt."  Sean, 775 So. 2d at 344.  The district court did not explain what 
evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant had taken the child from his 
own bed.  See id.  While I agree that when there is evidence that an adult has taken 
a child from the child's bed in the middle of the night, that fact may create an 
inference of fact to support a charge of kidnapping with intent to inflict bodily 
harm.  However, in the instant case, there is no direct evidence to support the 
allegation that Crain removed the child from her mother's bed, a fact that cannot be 
merely assumed, which is an assumption drawn by the majority. 
The majority also directs attention to evidence of scratch marks on Crain's 
arms to conclude that a struggle occurred between Amanda and Crain.  Crain, who 
earned his living as a crabber, attributed the scratches and gouges to his work with 
crab traps.  The State did not offer definitive evidence that Crain's version of the 
facts was not true.  In fact, the State's own medical examiner testified that he could 
not determine with certainty whether the scratches were caused by fingernails.  The 
medical examiner did testify that some of the scratches were more likely caused by 
fingernails, a factual basis from which inferences may be drawn.  Although the 
expert conceded that all of the scratches were consistent with having been caused 
by crab traps and wire meshing, such does not negate proper inferences. 
 
 
- 57 - 
The majority further concludes that the luminol evidence presented here 
establishes that Amanda was bleeding while she was confined by Crain.  However, 
Crain testified that he had cleaned his bathroom with bleach, an assertion 
supported by the State's witness, Detective Bracket, who testified that when he 
conducted a search of Crain's trailer, he noticed a very strong odor of bleach in 
Crain's bathroom.  As the State's expert witness testified, luminol reacts with the 
presence of bleach in the same manner in which it reacts when blood is present.  
The State presented no evidence that Crain had used bleach to clean blood from his 
bathroom because no such direct evidence existed.  Therefore, in my view, there is 
no competent evidence inconsistent with the defendant's theory of events 
concerning the luminol evidence. 
The final piece of evidence upon which we rely is the blood found on Crain's 
boxer shorts, which was subsequently linked by DNA to Amanda Brown.  While 
the existence of this blood evidence alone may be enough to support a finding that 
Crain possessed the intent to commit bodily harm required to affirm the felony 
murder conviction, this Court has held even when evidence, such as fingerprints, 
conclusively links a defendant to a crime, the state must still introduce some other 
evidence to support a conviction.  See Long v. State, 689 So. 2d 1055, 1058 (Fla. 
1997).  Similarly, even when evidence, such as a single drop of blood, conclusively 
 
 
- 58 - 
links a victim to a defendant, the state is required to introduce other evidence to 
support a first-degree murder conviction and sentence of death.27 
This Court has held that "[c]ircumstances that create nothing more than a 
strong suspicion that the defendant committed the crime are not sufficient to 
support a conviction."  Cox v. State, 555 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. 1989).  Further, 
"[c]ircumstantial evidence is not sufficient when it requires such pyramiding of 
inferences in order to arrive at a conclusion of guilt."  Weeks v. State, 492 So. 2d 
719, 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).  The parties do not dispute that the State's case was 
based entirely upon circumstantial evidence.  The State provided no direct 
evidence of Amanda's death, that her disappearance was the result of a kidnapping, 
or that Crain was in any way involved in Amanda's disappearance.  The blood and 
scratch evidence is the only substantive material.  The majority begins with the 
presumption that Amanda is dead and that Crain was involved, and then arrives at 
a conclusion of guilt based upon a pyramiding of inferences.  While the evidence 
may suggest such suspicions, the majority's ultimate conclusion—that the evidence 
supports a finding of kidnapping with intent to commit bodily harm—is clearly not 
without problems.  Even if the majority is correct, and we assume Amanda Brown 
                                        
27.  This same rationale applies to the small, almost invisible blood stain 
found on Crain's toilet seat.  That blood establishes only that Amanda was present 
in Crain's bathroom, a bathroom she had used prior to her disappearance, and in no 
way supports a finding that Crain kidnapped Amanda with the intent to commit 
bodily harm. 
 
 
- 59 - 
is dead and that Crain killed her, the record is completely void of any direct 
evidence of his intent to cause Amanda Brown bodily harm.  The evidence does 
not demonstrate how she died, and from the limited evidence presented, it is 
difficult to determine, to any reasonable degree, Crain's mental state that night.  
Just as the evidence does not support a finding of premeditation or kidnapping with 
intent to commit a homicide, it is only circumstantial to prove kidnapping with 
intent to commit bodily harm when the blood and scratch evidence is considered.  
While the evidence presented may support a non-intent based homicide, it is not 
without some good arguments that a conviction for first-degree felony murder and 
a sentence of death does not have sufficient supporting evidence.  Therefore, I 
concur in result only. 
 
 
 
WELLS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I concur that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the kidnapping 
conviction.  I dissent to the affirming of the first-degree murder conviction. 
Based upon the record presented in this case, there are simply too many 
assumptions which have to be made to affirm Crain’s conviction for first-degree 
murder, either premeditated or felony.  Since the child’s body has not been located, 
the initial inference which has to be made is that she is dead.  From that inference, 
 
 
- 60 - 
all others have to be stacked.  I have to recognize what the trial judge concluded in 
her sentencing order:  “There is no way to know exactly what happened to Amanda 
Brown.”  State v. Crain, No. 98-17084, order at 2 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. order filed 
Nov. 19, 1999).  That is the evidence in the record. 
It appears to me that this case is similar to the case this Court had before it in 
Meyers v. State, 704 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1997).  However, the clear distinction was 
that in Meyers, there was a confession to cell mates which overcame the wholly 
circumstantial evidence of a case in which the child’s body was never located. 
In Cox v. State, 555 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. 1990), we said:
 
This Court has long held that 
one accused of a crime is presumed innocent until proved 
guilty beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.  
It is the responsibility of the State to carry this burden.  
When the State relies upon purely circumstantial 
evidence to convict an accused, we have always required 
that such evidence must not only be consistent with the 
defendant’s guilt but it must also be inconsistent with any 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. 
Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1956); McArthur v. State, 351 
So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1977).  Circumstantial evidence must lead “to a 
reasonable and moral certainty that the accused and no one else 
committed the offense charged.”  Hall v. State, 107 So. 2d 246, 247 
(Fla. 1925).  Circumstances that create nothing more than a strong 
suspicion that the defendant committed the crime are not sufficient to 
support a conviction.  Williams v. State, 143 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1962); 
Davis; Mayo v. State, 71 So 2d 899 (Fla. 1954). 
One of this Court’s functions in reviewing capital cases is to see 
if there is competent substantial evidence to support the verdict.  
Williams v. State, 437 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 
 
 
- 61 - 
909 (1984).  After reviewing this record, we find that the state’s 
evidence is not sufficient to support Cox’ conviction. 
See also Long v. State, 689 So. 2d 1055, 1057-58 (Fla. 1997). 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,  
Barbara Fleischer, Judge - Case No. 98-17084 CFAWS 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Paul C. Helm, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee