Case Title: State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Honorable David Dolan

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC95619

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE ex rel.  
) 
CHARLES ZIMMERMAN, 
) 
) 
Relator, 
) 
) 
vs. 
 
) 
No. SC95619 
) 
THE HONORABLE DAVID DOLAN, 
) 
) 
Respondent. 
) 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION 
Charles Zimmerman (hereinafter, “Zimmerman”) seeks a writ of prohibition to 
prevent the circuit court from taking any further action in his probation revocation 
proceeding, other than to dismiss it with prejudice, contending the circuit court lacks the 
authority to act under section 559.036.8, RSMo Supp. 2013.1  This Court holds the circuit 
court abused its discretion and exceeded its authority in holding Zimmerman’s probation 
revocation hearing because it failed to make every reasonable effort to conduct a hearing 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2013 unless otherwise indicated.  While 
section 559.036 has been amended multiple times since Zimmerman was placed on 
probation, the relevant statutory language regarding revocation has not changed.  Before 
the amendments, the relevant statutory language was contained in section 559.036.6.  See 
section 559.036.6, RSMo 2000.  It is now in section 559.036.8.  For ease of reference, this 
Court cites section 559.036.8.  
Opinion issued April 4, 2017
2 
 
prior to the expiration of the probationary period.  The preliminary writ in prohibition is 
made permanent, and the circuit court is directed to discharge Zimmerman from probation. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
In November 1996, Zimmerman was charged with first-degree robbery and armed 
criminal action for offenses that occurred in Mississippi County, Missouri.  Zimmerman 
pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery and was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment.  
The circuit court suspended the execution of Zimmerman’s sentence and placed him on 
probation for a period of five years, commencing September 11, 1997. 
 
Zimmerman violated the terms of his probation while residing in Indiana.  In 
January 2000, the circuit court issued a capias warrant for Zimmerman’s arrest.  
Zimmerman waived extradition and was transported from Indiana to Mississippi County 
for a probation revocation proceeding.  On May 9, 2000, the circuit court revoked 
Zimmerman’s probation, retained jurisdiction pursuant to section 559.115, and ordered 
him to serve 120 days of shock incarceration.  After completing shock incarceration, the 
circuit court placed Zimmerman on a second term of five years’ probation.  The circuit 
court permitted Zimmerman to return to Indiana after receiving reporting instructions and 
upon signing “an agreement to the terms of an Order of Extradition” in favor of Missouri.  
Zimmerman’s second term of probation commenced September 8, 2000.   
 
In mid-September 2000, Zimmerman was charged in Indiana with armed robbery 
that resulted in the victim’s death under a theory of accomplice liability.  On January 16, 
2003, a probation violation report was filed with the Mississippi County circuit court and 
recommended “delayed action.”  Zimmerman later pleaded guilty in Indiana to first-degree 
3 
 
robbery and received a twenty-six year sentence.  Zimmerman began serving the Indiana 
sentence in September 2003. 
 
 
On June 4, 2003, a supplemental probation violation report was filed with the 
Mississippi County circuit court.  The docket entry contained the notation:  “Capias 
revocation.”  The circuit court issued a capias warrant for Zimmerman’s arrest for a 
probation violation resulting from the Indiana conviction.   
 
The docket entries next reflect that a probation violation hearing was scheduled for, 
and subsequently continued on, December 30, 2004.  In January 2005, a probation violation 
hearing was scheduled and continued again with the notation:  “(Need Writ).”  On March 
8, 2005, the cause was continued again, with the docket entry reflecting, “Cause passed for 
Writ.”  On March 9, 2005, the Mississippi County circuit clerk sent the circuit court an e-
mail asking if Zimmerman’s probation should be suspended because the term was set to 
expire September 7, 2005.  The circuit court replied, “Yes.”  That same day, the circuit 
court issued an order suspending Zimmerman’s probation. 
 
On May 24, 2005, Zimmerman filed a pro se demand for a trial on his probation 
violation case.  Zimmerman invoked the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, section 
217.490, RSMo 2000 (hereinafter, “IAD”), and requested that the circuit court set the cause 
for a hearing.  Zimmerman named the correctional facility where he was incarcerated in 
Indiana and the sentence he was serving.  Zimmerman then requested a final disposition of 
the charges pending against him in Mississippi County and agreed to waive extradition.  
Zimmerman also requested counsel be appointed to assist him in resolving this matter.  The 
circuit court took no action on any of Zimmerman’s requests and did not appoint counsel. 
4 
 
 
In December 2005, Zimmerman filed a second pro se motion requesting the charges 
and detainer be dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with the IAD.  Zimmerman 
repeated his allegations from the May 24, 2005 filing.  The circuit court took no action on 
this motion.  Zimmerman also sent a request for information regarding the active 
Mississippi County warrant to his caseworker in Indiana.  The caseworker told Zimmerman 
she received a fax from the Mississippi County sheriff’s department stating, “[Zimmerman] 
does have active warrant, however per [Jail Administrator], we will not extradite.”   
 
On November 28, 2006, Zimmerman sent another pro se letter to the circuit court.  
Zimmerman informed the circuit court where he was incarcerated in Indiana and the 
sentence he was serving.  Zimmerman noted the active warrant on his case.  Zimmerman 
alleged he contacted the Mississippi County circuit clerk’s office and the prosecutor in an 
attempt to resolve the warrant.  Zimmerman claimed the Indiana department of corrections 
tried to release him temporarily from custody to resolve this matter but was unsuccessful.  
Zimmerman once again invoked the IAD and requested that the proper paperwork be 
completed to extradite him to Missouri.  Zimmerman again requested counsel be appointed 
to help him resolve this issue.  Zimmerman attached all of his IAD paperwork from Indiana 
to the letter.  The circuit court took no action on any of Zimmerman’s requests and did not 
appoint counsel. 
 
In April 2008, Zimmerman received communication from an Indiana department of 
corrections reentry specialist regarding the Mississippi County warrant.  The reentry 
specialist told him, “I spoke to dispatch and was informed that the warrant is still active, 
5 
 
but they will not extradite.”  This information was reaffirmed in May 2008, when a warrant 
status report indicated, “Per Sheriff’s Department, still active but will not extradite.”   
 
The docket entries contain no further filings until March 1, 2011, when Zimmerman 
filed another pro se motion to dismiss the charges and remove the detainer due to 
Missouri’s repeated failure to comply with the IAD.  Zimmerman again listed where he 
was incarcerated in Indiana and the sentence he was serving.  Zimmerman reviewed his 
prior filings with the circuit court.  Zimmerman averred that Indiana department of 
corrections classification and reentry specialists contacted the prosecutor’s office 
repeatedly about the Mississippi County warrant.  Zimmerman contended the prosecutor’s 
office indicated it would not extradite Zimmerman, but the warrant remained active.   
On April 5, 2011, ostensibly in response to Zimmerman’s motion, the circuit court 
ordered:  “Prosecuting Attorney to prepare Writ for Sheriff’s Department to pick up in 
Indiana.  Sheriff’s Office ordered to remove ‘will not extradite’ per notation.”  Despite the 
explicit circuit court order, the prosecuting attorney did not prepare a writ and the sheriff’s 
department did not remove the “will not extradite” notation from its records.   
 
Zimmerman remained in Indiana until he was released on parole for his Indiana 
conviction in January 2016, after serving thirteen years’ imprisonment.  On January 21, 
2016, the public defender’s office entered its appearance on Zimmerman’s behalf in the 
probation revocation cause.  On January 25, 2016, the Mississippi County sheriff’s 
department served Zimmerman with the June 2003 capias warrant.  Zimmerman then was 
brought back to Mississippi County.  On February 8, 2016, a probation violation report 
6 
 
was filed, outlining the Indiana conviction that trigged the probation violation.  The circuit 
court scheduled a probation violation hearing for March 8, 2016.   
On March 7, 2016, Zimmerman filed a petition for writ of prohibition with the court 
of appeals to prevent the circuit court from holding the revocation hearing, which was 
denied.  Zimmerman then filed a writ petition with this Court.   
While this writ was pending, the circuit court held Zimmerman’s probation 
revocation hearing because no stay was issued preventing the hearing.  At the hearing, 
Mississippi County sheriff’s department employees denied having placed the “will not 
extradite” notation in Zimmerman’s records, claimed to have no knowledge of how it 
originated there and stated they were unaware of the circuit court’s order to remove the 
notation.  An Indiana extradition coordinator stated that, although Zimmerman’s claim was 
not proper under the IAD, he regularly received “flat out writs” and released offenders into 
temporary custody with the requesting state to resolve these issues.  The extradition 
coordinator testified that, in this case, he “would have probably scheduled a hearing to 
grant the writ, and have specifics placed on it where [Zimmerman] was housed ….  [O]nce 
proceedings were done he would be returned to us.”  Zimmerman’s probation officer 
recommended his probation be revoked due to the Indiana conviction.  At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the circuit court held Zimmerman violated the terms of his probation and 
set sentencing for June 14, 2016.   
On May 24, 2016, this Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition, pursuant to 
its authority under article V, section 4 of the Missouri Constitution.  This Court’s 
preliminary writ of prohibition commanded the circuit court to take no further action in 
7 
 
this matter, other than to show cause as to the reasons this writ should not issue, until 
ordered to do so by this Court. 
Standard of Review 
This Court has jurisdiction to issue original remedial writs.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 
4.   “A writ of prohibition is appropriate:  (1) to prevent the usurpation of judicial power 
when a lower court lacks authority or jurisdiction; (2) to remedy an excess of authority, 
jurisdiction or abuse of discretion where the lower court lacks the power to act as intended; 
or (3) where a party may suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted.”  State ex rel. 
Strauser v. Martinez, 416 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Mo. banc 2014).  Writ relief lies when the 
circuit court ‘“lacks the authority to conduct a probation revocation hearing after the term 
of probation has expired.’”  State ex rel. Amorine v. Parker, 490 S.W.3d 372, 374 (Mo. 
banc 2016) (quoting State ex rel. Dotson v. Holden, 416 S.W.3d 821, 823 (Mo. App. S.D. 
2013)). 
Probation Revocation Proceedings 
Zimmerman argues a writ is appropriate because the circuit court exceeded its 
authority under section 559.036.8 in setting his case for a probation revocation hearing and 
finding he violated the terms of his probation.  Zimmerman maintains the circuit court no 
longer had authority over him under section 559.036.8 because his probation terminated 
by operation of law years before the 2016 hearing.  Zimmerman contends there was a 
known and readily available means to procure his presence for a hearing, the circuit court 
should have procured him, and a hearing should have been held within the time allowed by 
8 
 
law.  The state counters the circuit court acted appropriately in waiting to conduct the 
probation revocation hearing until after Zimmerman completed his Indiana sentence. 
Intent to Revoke 
Section 559.036 “governs the duration of probation terms and the power of a court 
to revoke a defendant’s probation.”  Strauser, 416 S.W.3d at 801.  “A term of probation 
commences on the day it is imposed.”  Section 559.036.1.  Throughout the duration of a 
defendant’s probationary term, the circuit court has the authority to revoke a term of 
probation if a defendant violates it.  Sections 559.036.3; 559.036.5; and 559.036.8.  Section 
559.036.8 empowers the circuit court to revoke probation during the term of probation.  
However, the circuit court’s authority to revoke probation ends when the probationary 
period expires.  Dotson, 416 S.W.3d at 824.  Once the probationary term expires, the circuit 
court retains no authority over a probationer, ‘“for any purpose, whether to cite him [or 
her] for probation violations, revoke probation, or order execution of the sentence 
previously imposed.’”  State ex rel. Stimel v. White, 373 S.W.3d 481, 485 (Mo. App. S.D. 
2012) (quoting Starry v. State, 318 S.W.3d 780, 782 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010)). 
Section 559.036.8 recognizes that not all probation revocation-related matters can 
be resolved during the probationary period.  Hence, this section provides for the extension 
of the circuit court’s authority over a probationer “for any further period which is 
reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before [the probationary 
period’s] expiration.”  Id.  However, the circuit court must show “some affirmative 
manifestation of an intent to conduct a revocation hearing … prior to the expiration of the 
9 
 
period and that every reasonable effort is made to notify the probationer and to conduct the 
hearing prior to the expiration of the period.”  Id.   
 
Zimmerman’s probation expired September 7, 2005.  The circuit court issued a 
capias warrant for the probation revocation on June 3, 2003, and suspended Zimmerman’s 
probation on March 9, 2005.  The issuance of a capias warrant and suspension of the 
probationary term are affirmative manifestations of the circuit court’s intent to conduct a 
probation revocation hearing.  Dotson, 416 S.W.3d at 824.  Zimmerman does not dispute 
this finding.  Zimmerman instead challenges whether the circuit court made every 
reasonable effort to conduct the probation revocation hearing prior to the expiration of the 
probationary period.   
Every Reasonable Effort 
Zimmerman bears the burden of demonstrating the circuit court failed to make every 
reasonable effort to conduct the probation revocation hearing prior to the expiration of the 
probationary period.  State v. Roark, 877 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994).  
However, Zimmerman need not prove he suffered prejudice or an inordinate delay to be 
afforded relief.  See Strauser, 416 S.W.3d at 803, n.4 (stating section 559.036.8 does not 
require a defendant to demonstrate prejudice); Timberlake v. State, 419 S.W.3d 224, 230 
n.9 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (stating the length of the delay between the expiration of the 
probationary period and the actual hearing is not an issue).  The state argues Williams v. 
State, 927 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996), and Stelljes v. State, 72 S.W.3d 196 (Mo. 
App. W.D. 2002), control this Court’s analysis of Zimmerman’s claim.  This Court 
disagrees. 
10 
 
In Williams, the probationer absconded three months into his term of probation.  The 
circuit court suspended his probation and issued a capias warrant during the probationary 
period.  The probationer was apprehended approximately seven years later, and a probation 
revocation hearing was held two months after he was apprehended.  The circuit court 
revoked his probation, and the probationer appealed, arguing the circuit court lacked 
authority to do so.  Williams, 927 S.W.2d at 904-05.  The appellate court affirmed, finding 
the circuit court met both statutory requirements.  With respect to whether the circuit court 
made every reasonable effort to hold the hearing, the appeals court stated it was impossible 
to hold a hearing until the probationer was apprehended, and the circuit court did all it 
could do by issuing the capias warrant.  Id. at 906-07.  Williams is distinguishable from the 
instant case in that Zimmerman was not an absconder who needed to be located before the 
revocation hearing could occur.  Zimmerman made his whereabouts known early and often 
throughout this proceeding in an effort to be brought back to Mississippi County to resolve 
the probation violation. 
In Stelljes, the probationer violated his probation approximately two years into his 
five-year term.  The circuit court issued a capias warrant and suspended his probation.  The 
probationer could not be served with the warrant because he absconded to Washington and 
was incarcerated after committing a criminal offense there.  After the probationer was 
released from prison in Washington, he waived extradition and was returned to Missouri 
for a hearing that was held beyond the probationary period.  The circuit court revoked his 
probation, and the probationer appealed arguing, inter alia, the circuit court lacked 
authority to revoke his probation.  Stelljes, 72 S.W.3d at 198-99.  Relevant to this case, the 
11 
 
appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment on this claim, finding the circuit court 
made every reasonable effort to hold the probation revocation hearing.  The court explained 
the probationer failed to meet his burden because: 
[The probationer’s] incarceration in Washington required [him] to 
demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to have him transferred to Missouri 
to hold a revocation hearing prior to the expiration date of his probation was 
the failure to make every reasonable effort.  [The probationer] did not argue 
to the trial court or present evidence of the nature of the process necessary to 
have him returned to Missouri while he was serving a Washington sentence.  
Contrary to his argument on appeal that the court could have held a hearing 
before his release from the Washington prison, [the probationer] testified at 
the revocation hearing that if he had not waived extradition, the State could 
not have had him transferred to Missouri for the probation revocation 
proceedings ….  Since [the probationer] did not address the issue of the 
availability of a procedure to transfer a Washington state prisoner to Missouri 
for a probation violation proceeding, and it was not briefed by either party in 
the trial court or on appeal, this court will not undertake a sua sponte analysis 
of the issue.  It is [the probationer’s] burden to prove the trial court’s lack of 
every reasonable effort to hold a hearing, and by failing to address the 
reasonableness of the procedure to return him to Missouri for a hearing, he 
fails to meet his burden. 
 
 
Id. at 203.  The court stated that, even assuming, arguendo, a procedure existed to transfer 
the probationer from Washington to Missouri, the probationer did not demonstrate that 
waiting until he was released from custody in Washington was unreasonable.  Id.  
 
Although Stelljes addresses a probationer who was incarcerated in another state and 
had to wait until his out-of-state sentence was completed to dispose of his Missouri 
probation violation, this is where the similarities end.  Zimmerman did not abscond while 
on probation.  Zimmerman contacted the prosecuting attorney, the sheriff’s department, 
and the circuit court repeatedly throughout the duration of his Indiana sentence to resolve 
this issue.  There is no indication the probationer in Stelljes sought disposition of his 
12 
 
Missouri charges while incarcerated in Washington.  Further, unlike Stelljes, Zimmerman 
placed ample evidence in the record that it was not onerous for the circuit court to transport 
him back to Missouri for the revocation hearing.  Zimmerman presented testimony from 
an Indiana extradition specialist who said he regularly received these types of writs and 
would release custody temporarily to get them resolved.  Finally, it is undisputed that the 
circuit court extradited Zimmerman from Indiana for his first probation revocation hearing 
in 2000.   
The state argues this Court should adopt Stelljes’ holding that, if a probation violator 
is serving an out-of-state sentence, it is reasonable for the circuit court to wait until the out-
of-state sentence is complete and the probationer is returned to Missouri for a revocation 
hearing.  In Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 89, 97 S. Ct. 274, 279-80, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 
(1976), the United States Supreme Court discussed the reasonableness of waiting for a term 
of incarceration to be completed before making a determination about parole revocation in 
another jurisdiction: 
[I]n cases such as this, in which the parolee admits or has been convicted of 
any offense plainly constituting a parole violation, the only remaining inquiry 
is whether continued release is justified notwithstanding the violation.  This 
is uniquely a ‘prediction as to the ability of the individual to live in society 
without committing antisocial acts.’ In making this prophecy, a parolee’s 
institutional record can be perhaps one of the most significant factors.  
Forcing decision immediately after imprisonment would not only deprive the 
parole authority of this vital information, but since the other most salient 
factor would be the parolee’s most recent convictions, … a decision to revoke 
parole would often be foreordained.  Given the predictive nature of the 
hearing, it is appropriate that such hearing be held at the time at which 
prediction is both most relevant and most accurate at the expiration of the 
parolee’s intervening sentence.   
 
13 
 
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 733, 105 S. Ct. 
3401, 3410, 87 L.Ed.2d 526 (1985) (applying this same rule to probation revocation cases).   
While Moody and Carchman state it may be appropriate to hold a revocation hearing 
after the completion of the out-of-state sentence, it does not mandate this procedure.  
Further, given the record before us, it is clear the circuit court was not merely waiting for 
Zimmerman to complete his Indiana sentence.  Initially, this Court notes the circuit court 
was willing and able to extradite Zimmerman from Indiana to attend a probation revocation 
hearing, which occurred during Zimmerman’s first revocation proceeding in 2000.  As 
early as January 2005, the record demonstrates that the circuit court intended to hold a 
probation revocation before the end of Zimmerman’s Indiana sentence, but a writ needed 
to be issued to bring him back to Missouri.  The January 2005 docket entry states the 
probation revocation hearing was continued with the notation, “(Need Writ).”  In March 
2005, the docket entry states, “Cause passed for Writ.”  In April 2011, the circuit court 
again ordered that a writ be prepared to pick up Zimmerman in Indiana and that the “will 
not extradite” notation be removed.  Each of these orders demonstrate the circuit court did 
not intend to wait until Zimmerman completed his Indiana sentence prior to holding a 
probation revocation hearing.  This Court will not now excuse an eleven-year delay in 
holding a probation revocation hearing on a speculative justification not borne out by the 
record. 
Finally, the state next argues the circuit court did all it reasonably could do in this 
case because it issued the capias warrant, directed the prosecuting attorney to prepare a 
writ, and ordered the sheriff’s department to remove the “will not extradite” notation.  The 
14 
 
state argues it is unreasonable to expect the circuit court to arrange personally for the return 
of out-of-state probation violators and that such a task is a matter for the executive branch.   
 
Although not labeled as such in the docket sheets, the “writ” that the circuit court 
directed the prosecuting attorney to prepare is a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.  
In Missouri, writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum have long been a traditional means 
of securing the presence of prisoners located in another jurisdiction for the purposes of 
prosecuting the prisoner for some other offense.  State v. State v. Branstetter, 107 S.W.3d 
465, 471 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003); State ex rel. White v. Davis, 174 S.W.3d 543, 550 n.2 
(Mo. App. W.D. 2005).  While typically this writ is prepared or drafted by the prosecuting 
attorney, it is issued by the circuit court.  Branstetter, 107 S.W.3d at 474. 
 
The circuit court’s inherent authority to issue writs of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum was affirmed in State ex rel. Billings v. Rudolph, 17 S.W.2d 932 (Mo. banc 
1929).  In Billings, this Court explained, “If a circuit court issued such a writ … it is 
equivalent to a warrant for an arrest.  It should be executed as warrants are executed.  Our 
courts have [the] power to issue all warrants which may be necessary in the exercise of 
their respective jurisdictions.”  Id. at 933.  This holding was codified in section 476.070, 
RSMo 1939, and remains today.  Section 476.060, RSMo Supp. 2008, provides:  “All 
courts shall have power to issue all writs which may be necessary in the exercise of their 
respective jurisdictions, according to the principles and usages of law.”  See also State v. 
Robinson, 325 S.W.2d 465, 469 (Mo. 1959) (relying on Billings and section 476.070 to 
hold the circuit court properly issued the writ to transfer the defendant from St. Louis city 
to St. Louis County); State v. Savage, 461 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Mo. banc 1971) (holding the 
15 
 
magistrate court had authority under section 476.070 to issue an appropriate writ to secure 
the attendance of the accused at a preliminary hearing). 
In Dotson, the Southern District issued a permanent writ of prohibition to prevent 
the circuit court from holding a probation revocation hearing because the circuit court 
failed to make every reasonable effort to hold a hearing in that case.  Dotson, 416 S.W.3d 
at 824.  Central to the Southern District’s holding was the finding that the circuit court and 
the state had knowledge of where the probationer was incarcerated and, therefore, the 
circuit court “could have set a probation revocation hearing in this matter and, by means of 
a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum or ad prosequendum, could have secured [the 
probationer’s] presence for such a hearing.”  Id. at 825.  Hence, Dotson found the circuit 
court had the power to issue either a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum or ad 
prosequendum to secure the probationer’s presence for a hearing.  See also Timberlake, 
419 S.W.3d at 226 (stating the circuit court issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum 
and sent it to the sheriff’s office for service to the probationer who was incarcerated). 
Although the circuit court could have exercised its inherent authority to issue a writ 
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum pursuant to section 476.070, the circuit court failed to 
articulate any reason on the record why it failed to rule on any of Zimmerman’s requests 
16 
 
for counsel,2 his requests for prompt disposition of his claims under the IAD,3 or why it 
failed to enforce its order directing the prosecuting attorney to prepare the writ and the 
sheriff’s department to remove the “will not expedite” language.  Even when Zimmerman 
argued immediately before the revocation hearing that the circuit court lacked authority to 
proceed, the circuit court merely asked if there was a stay issued due to the writ filing 
pending in this Court.  When the circuit court was informed there was no stay, it proceeded.  
At no point in these proceedings has the circuit court ever set forth a single reason or 
                                                 
2 Zimmerman maintains that, had the circuit court sustained any of his requests to appoint 
counsel, appointed counsel would have resolved this issue quickly.  The state correctly 
argues that appointment of counsel is not required under the statute.  Section 559.036.6 
provides that if a probationer requests counsel to represent him or her during a revocation 
proceeding, “the judge shall determine whether counsel is necessary to protect the 
probationer’s due process rights.  If the judge determines counsel is not necessary, the 
judge shall state the grounds for the decision in the record.”  See also Abel v. Wyrick, 574 
S.W.2d 411, 420 (Mo. banc 1978).  The record clearly shows Zimmerman requested 
counsel in his May 24, 2005, and November 28, 2006, filings and arguably a third time in 
the December 2005 filing that repeated the May 24, 2005, requests.  The circuit court made 
no rulings on these requests.  Even assuming, arguendo, those requests were overruled, the 
circuit court failed to state the grounds for that decision on the record as required under 
section 559.036.6.  Notably, the public defender entered an appearance on Zimmerman’s 
behalf in January 2016, immediately prior to his extradition to Mississippi County, thus 
evidencing the circuit court’s belief that counsel was necessary to protect Zimmerman’s 
rights in these proceedings.   
3 The state argues the IAD does not entitle Zimmerman to relief.  This Court agrees.  
Zimmerman worked tirelessly from Indiana in an effort to have his probation detainer 
resolved, invoking the IAD in making his request for disposition of the detainer lodged in 
Mississippi County.  Yet Zimmerman now concedes the IAD does not apply to detainers 
based on probation violation charges.  Carchman, 473 U.S. at 734; Stelljes, 72 S.W.3d at 
203.  Nevertheless, these filings served to give the circuit court notice of Zimmerman’s 
whereabouts and his desire to resolve the probation violation promptly.  Although the IAD 
could not afford Zimmerman relief, in Carchman, the Supreme Court recognized a 
“prisoner may have a legitimate interest in obtaining prompt disposition of a probation-
violation charge underlying a detainer,” which includes “hope for the imposition of a 
concurrent sentence.”  Carchman, 473 U.S. at 733-34. 
 
17 
 
explanation as to why it had authority to hold the hearing despite the almost eleven-year 
delay between the expiration of Zimmerman’s probationary period and his revocation 
hearing.   
Conclusion 
 
The facts and circumstances in this case demonstrate unequivocally that this Court 
should exercise its discretion to issue a writ of prohibition to remedy an excess of authority.  
The circuit court abused its discretion in overruling Zimmerman’s motion to dismiss his 
probation revocation proceeding and holding a hearing because the circuit court failed to 
make every reasonable effort to conduct a hearing prior to the expiration of the 
probationary period.  Therefore, the preliminary writ of prohibition is made permanent, 
and the circuit court is directed to discharge Zimmerman from probation. 
 
______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, JUDGE 
 
Breckenridge, C.J., Stith and Russell, JJ., concur; Wilson, J., concurs in separate opinion 
filed; Fischer, J., concurs in opinion of Wilson, J. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE ex rel.  
 
 
 
 
) 
CHARLES ZIMMERMAN, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Relator, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC95619 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
THE HONORABLE DAVID DOLAN,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
) 
 
CONCURRING OPINION 
 
The majority opinion holds that Respondent failed to make every reasonable effort 
to conduct a hearing prior to the expiration of the probationary period.  I concur but write 
separately to emphasize the unique set of facts on which this holding is based. 
The majority opinion’s analysis turns on section 559.036.8, RSMo Supp. 2013,1 
which provides: 
The power of the court to revoke probation shall extend for the duration of 
the term of probation designated by the court and for any further period 
which is reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before 
its expiration, provided that some affirmative manifestation of an intent to 
conduct a revocation hearing occurs prior to the expiration of the period 
and that every reasonable effort is made to notify the probationer and to 
conduct the hearing prior to the expiration of the period. 
 
                                                 
1   As noted in the margin of the majority opinion, this identical provision was previously found 
at section 559.036.6, RSMo.  All subsequent citations will be to RSMo Supp. 2013. 
2 
 
§ 559.036.8 (emphasis added). 
 
As the language of this subsection makes clear, the touchstone of the analysis is 
reasonableness.  To retain authority to revoke probation beyond the probationary term, 
the trial court is not required to take all conceivable steps to secure the defendant’s 
presence, only reasonable steps.  In particular, the trial court is not required to issue a writ 
of habeas corpus ad testificandum to a sheriff or other custodian located in another state 
in the mere hope that the official will comply and tender the defendant for transport to 
Missouri.  Cf. Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 621 (1961) (noting that the similar 
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, though not strictly enforceable by the issuing 
court, is recognized as a matter of “comity ... necessary between sovereignties in the 
administration of criminal justice”). 
 
Here, however, the facts demonstrated the issuance of such a writ was reasonably 
likely to produce the defendant’s presence.  By all accounts, Indiana officials were ready 
and willing to temporarily release Mr. Zimmerman to the custody of the Missouri trial 
court for purposes of resolving his probation violation.  Despite the Missouri sheriff’s 
reticence to travel to Indiana to transport Mr. Zimmerman back for this purpose (a not 
inconsiderable burden but one that it had performed before and that was at least a 
possible result of giving the defendant permission to relocate to Indiana), the trial court 
recognized that it had authority to order the sheriff to do so.  As a result, the issue in this 
case is not whether it was reasonable to issue the writ to Mr. Zimmerman’s Indiana 
custodian but whether – having already decided to do so – it was reasonable for the trial 
3 
 
court to fail to issue the writ merely because the prosecuting attorney never completed the 
paperwork.   
The majority opinion holds it was not, and I concur.  This case should not, 
however, be read as imposing a requirement that trial courts must issue a writ in every 
case in which a probationer is in out-of-state custody or lose authority to conduct a 
revocation hearing after the probation term expires.  Such a requirement would be 
unreasonable in many, if not most, cases and cannot be inferred from section 559.036.8. 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul C. Wilson, Judge