Case Title: Britt v. State

Citation: 363 N.C. 546

Docket Number: 488A07

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
BARNEY BRITT v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 488A07  
FILED: 28 AUGUST 2009
Firearms and Other Weapons–-possession by convicted felon--N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 as
amended in 2004--unreasonable regulation as applied to plaintiff
The Court of Appeals erred to the extent that it determined N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1
as amended in 2004, that makes it “unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a felony
to purchase, own, possess, or have in his custody, care, or control any firearm,” can be
constitutionally applied to plaintiff whose right to possess firearms was restored in 1987 by
operation of law after he completed his sentence for possession with intent to sell and deliver a
controlled substance without incident in 1982, and this case is remanded to the Court of Appeals
for further remand to the superior court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion,
because: (1) no evidence was presented that would indicate plaintiff was dangerous or has ever
misused firearms, either before his crime or in the seventeen years between restoration of his
rights and adoption of N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1’s complete ban on any possession of a firearm by
him; (2) plaintiff sought out advice from his local sheriff following the amendment of N.C.G.S. §
14-415.1 and willingly gave up his weapons when informed that possession would presumably
violate the statute; (3) plaintiff, through his uncontested lifelong nonviolence toward other
citizens, his thirty years of law-abiding conduct since his crime, his seventeen years of
responsible, lawful firearm possession between 1987 and 2004, and his compliance with the
2004 amendment affirmatively demonstrated that he is not among the class of citizens who pose
a threat to public peace and safety; and (4) based on the facts of plaintiff’s crime, his long post-
conviction history of respect for the law, the absence of any evidence of violence by plaintiff, and
the lack of any exception or possible relief from the statute’s operation as applied to plaintiff, the
2004 version of N.C.G.S. § 14-451.1 is an unreasonable regulation not fairly related to the
preservation of public peace and safety.  N.C. Const. art. I, § 30.
Justice HUDSON concurs in result only.
Chief Justice PARKER dissenting.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON dissenting.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 185 N.C.
App. 610, 649 S.E.2d 402 (2007), affirming an order granting
summary judgment for defendant and denying summary judgment for
plaintiff entered 31 March 2006 by Judge Michael R. Morgan in
Superior Court, Wake County.  Heard in the Supreme Court 5 May
2008.
Dan L. Hardway Law Office, by Dan L. Hardway, for
plaintiff-appellant.
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Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by John J. Aldridge, III,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for defendant-
appellee. 
BRADY, Justice.
This case presents an as-applied challenge to the
constitutionality of the 2004 amendment to N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1
that makes it “unlawful for any person who has been convicted of
a felony to purchase, own, possess, or have in his custody, care,
or control any firearm.”  We determine that N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1
is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff and reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1979 plaintiff Barney Britt pleaded guilty to felony
possession with intent to sell and deliver the controlled
substance methaqualone.  Plaintiff’s crime was nonviolent and did
not involve the use of a firearm.  Plaintiff was sentenced to two
years in the North Carolina Department of Correction, with four
months active imprisonment and the remainder suspended for two
years, during which plaintiff was on supervised probation.  He
completed his probation in 1982, and in 1987 his civil rights
were fully restored by operation of law, including his right to
possess a firearm.  At that time, N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 only
prohibited the possession of “any handgun or other firearm with a
barrel length of less than 18 inches or an overall length of less
than 26 inches” by persons convicted of certain felonies, mostly
-3-
 This statute was later amended in 2006 to exempt “antique
1
firearm[s],” as defined in N.C.G.S. § 14-409.11, from its
provisions.  N.C.G.S. § 14-409.11 provides:
(a) The term “antique firearm” means any of the
following:
(1) Any firearm (including any firearm with
a matchlock, flintlock, percussion cap,
or similar type of ignition system)
manufactured on or before 1898.
(2) Any replica of any firearm described in
subdivision (1) of this subsection if
the replica is not designed or
of a violent or rebellious nature, “within five years from the
date of such conviction, or unconditional discharge from a
correctional institution, or termination of a suspended sentence,
probation, or parole upon such conviction, whichever is later.” 
Act of June 26, 1975, ch. 870, sec. 1, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1273.
Subsequently, in 1995 the General Assembly amended
N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 to prohibit the possession of such firearms
by all persons convicted of any felony, without regard to the
date of conviction or the completion of the defendant’s sentence. 
Act of July 26, 1995, ch. 487, sec. 3, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1414,
1417.  The 1995 amendment did not change the previous provision
in N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 stating that “nothing [therein] would
prohibit the right of any person to have possession of a firearm
within his own house or on his lawful place of business.” 
However, in 2004 the General Assembly amended N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1
to extend the prohibition on possession to all firearms by any
person convicted of any felony, even within the convicted felon’s
own home and place of business.  Act of July 15, 2004, ch. 186,
sec. 14.1, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 716, 737.  
1
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redesigned for using rimfire or
conventional centerfire fixed
ammunition.
(3) Any muzzle loading rifle, muzzle loading
shotgun, or muzzle loading pistol, which
is designed to use black powder
substitute, and which cannot use fixed
ammunition.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term
“antique firearm” shall not include any weapon which:
(1) Incorporates a firearm frame or
receiver.
(2) Is converted into a muzzle loading
weapon.
(3) Is a muzzle loading weapon that can be
readily converted to fire fixed
ammunition by replacing the barrel,
bolt, breechblock, or any combination
thereof. 
The 2006 amendment to N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 is not before the
Court.
Following passage of this amendment, plaintiff had a
discussion with the Sheriff of Wake County, who concluded that
possession of a firearm by plaintiff would violate the statute as
amended in 2004.  Plaintiff thereafter divested himself of all
firearms, including his sporting rifles and shotguns that he used
for game hunting on his own land.  In the thirty years since
plaintiff’s conviction of a nonviolent crime he has not been
charged with any other crime nor is there any evidence that he
has misused a firearm in any way.  Furthermore, no determination
has been made by any agency or court that plaintiff is violent,
potentially dangerous, or is more likely than the general public
to commit a crime involving a firearm.
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On 20 September 2005, plaintiff initiated a civil
action against the State of North Carolina, alleging that
N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 as amended violates multiple rights he holds
under the United States and North Carolina Constitutions.  On 31
March 2006, the trial court granted the State’s motion for
summary judgment, holding that the amended statute is rationally
related to a legitimate government interest and is not an
unconstitutional ex post facto law or bill of attainder. 
Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, and a majority of
that court agreed with the trial court that plaintiff’s rights
had not been violated.  The dissent at the Court of Appeals would
have held that the 2004 amendment amounted to an ex post facto
law and violated plaintiff’s rights to due process under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.  On
24 March 2009, this Court retained plaintiff’s notice of appeal
based upon a substantial constitutional question as to the
following issue only:  “Whether the application of the 2004
amendment to N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 to plaintiff violates his rights
under N.C. Const. art. I, § 30.”  Because we agree with plaintiff
that the application of N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 to him violates
Article I, Section 30 of the North Carolina Constitution, it is
unnecessary for us to address any of plaintiff’s remaining
arguments, and we express no opinion on their merit.
ANALYSIS
Article I, Section 30 of the North Carolina
Constitution provides, in pertinent part:  “A well regulated
-6-
 Because we hold that application of N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 to
2
plaintiff is not a reasonable regulation, we need not address
plaintiff’s argument that the right to keep and bear arms is a
fundamental right entitled to a higher level of scrutiny.
militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed.”  This Court has held that regulation of the right to
bear arms is a proper exercise of the General Assembly’s police
power, but that any regulation must be at least “reasonable and
not prohibitive, and must bear a fair relation to the
preservation of the public peace and safety.”  State v. Dawson,
272 N.C. 535, 547, 159 S.E.2d 1, 10 (1968) (quoting with approval
State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 579, 107 S.E. 222, 226 (1921)
(Allen, J., concurring)).  Accordingly, this Court must determine
whether, as applied to plaintiff, N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 is a
reasonable regulation.   
2
Plaintiff pleaded guilty to one felony count of
possession with intent to sell and deliver a controlled substance
in 1979.  The State does not argue that any aspect of plaintiff’s
crime involved violence or the threat of violence.  Plaintiff
completed his sentence without incident in 1982.  Plaintiff’s
right to possess firearms was restored in 1987.  No evidence has
been presented which would indicate that plaintiff is dangerous
or has ever misused firearms, either before his crime or in the
seventeen years between restoration of his rights and adoption of
N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1’s complete ban on any possession of a firearm
by him.  Plaintiff sought out advice from his local Sheriff
following the amendment of N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 and willingly gave
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up his weapons when informed that possession would presumably
violate the statute.  Plaintiff, through his uncontested lifelong
nonviolence towards other citizens, his thirty years of law-
abiding conduct since his crime, his seventeen years of
responsible, lawful firearm possession between 1987 and 2004, and
his assiduous and proactive compliance with the 2004 amendment,
has affirmatively demonstrated that he is not among the class of
citizens who pose a threat to public peace and safety.  Moreover,
the nature of the 2004 amendment is relevant.  The statute
functioned as a total and permanent prohibition on possession of
any type of firearm in any location.  See N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1
(2004).  
Based on the facts of plaintiff’s crime, his long post-
conviction history of respect for the law, the absence of any
evidence of violence by plaintiff, and the lack of any exception
or possible relief from the statute’s operation, as applied to
plaintiff, the 2004 version of N.C.G.S. § 14-451.1 is an
unreasonable regulation, not fairly related to the preservation
of public peace and safety.  In particular, it is unreasonable to
assert that a nonviolent citizen who has responsibly, safely, and
legally owned and used firearms for seventeen years is in reality
so dangerous that any possession at all of a firearm would pose a
significant threat to public safety.
We conclude that N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 is an
unconstitutional violation of Article I, Section 30 of the North
Carolina Constitution as applied to this plaintiff.  As discussed
above, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1, the State unreasonably
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divested plaintiff of his right to own a firearm.  Such action
violates plaintiff’s right to keep and bear arms under Article I,
Section 30 of the North Carolina Constitution.  For that reason,
we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals to the extent
that court determined N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 can be constitutionally
applied to plaintiff.  This case is remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further remand to the Superior Court, Wake County,
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
Justice HUDSON concurs in the result only.
Chief Justice PARKER dissenting.
In my view N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 as applied to plaintiff
does not violate Article I, Section 30 of the North Carolina
Constitution.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Because the majority has crafted an individualized
exception for a sympathetic plaintiff, thereby placing North
Carolina in the unique position of being the first jurisdiction,
either federal or state, to hold that the inherent police power
of the State must yield to a convicted felon’s right to own a
firearm, I respectfully dissent.  Plaintiff’s right to possess a
firearm is not absolute, but subject to regulation.  The Felony
Firearms Act at issue is a reasonable regulation of the right to
bear arms, both facially and as applied to plaintiff.
I note initially that “there is a strong presumption
that enactments of the General Assembly are constitutional.” 
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Town of Spruce Pine v. Avery Cty., 346 N.C. 787, 792, 488 S.E.2d
144, 147 (1997) (citing Wayne Cty. Citizens Ass’n for Better Tax
Control v. Wayne Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 328 N.C. 24, 399 S.E.2d 311
(1991).  Moreover, it is well settled that “‘[a]cting for the
public good, the state, in the exercise of its police power, may
impose reasonable restrictions upon the natural and
constitutional rights of its citizens.’”  In re Moore, 289 N.C.
95, 103, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312 (1976) (quoting In re Cavitt, 182
Neb. 712, 715, 157 N.W.2d 171, 175 (1968)).  Indeed, this Court
recently noted that the State may properly exercise its police
power to enact laws protecting or promoting the safety and
general welfare of society.  Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 362
N.C. 328, 333, 661 S.E.2d 728, 731 (2008).  With regard to the
right to bear arms, this Court has “consistently pointed out that
the right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is
subject to regulation.”  State v. Dawson, 272 N.C. 535, 546, 159
S.E.2d 1, 9 (1968).  To pass constitutional muster, the
regulation must be (1) reasonable; and (2) related to preserving
public peace and safety.  See id. at 546-47, 159 S.E.2d at 9-10
(citing State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 579, 107 S.E. 222, 226
(1921) (Allen, J., concurring), for the proposition that the
right to bear arms is subject to regulation by the General
Assembly in the exercise of its inherent police power, but the
regulation must be reasonable and related to the preservation of
public peace and safety). 
In addition to regulating the place and manner in which
an individual may exercise his right to bear arms, the General
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 Plaintiff has not brought an equal protection challenge,
3
nor has the majority addressed any equal protection concerns with
the Felony Firearms Act.  I therefore do not comment upon this
issue.  
Assembly may also properly regulate--to the point of absolute
restriction--certain classes of persons reasonably deemed by the
legislature to pose a threat to public peace and safety.   See
3
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. __, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637,
678 (2008) (affirming that the “longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill” survive
Second Amendment scrutiny); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d
203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that “it is clear that felons,
infants, and those of unsound mind may be prohibited from
possessing firearms”), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907, 153 L. Ed. 2d
184 (2002); cf. In re Moore, 289 N.C. at 102-03, 221 S.E.2d at
311-12 (stating that, although the right to procreate is a
fundamental right, the state may limit a class of citizens in
this right).  Thus, in addition to convicted felons, our statutes
unequivocally prohibit incompetents, persons acquitted by reason
of insanity of any crime (whether violent or non-violent), and
persons subject to domestic violence orders from purchasing,
owning, or possessing firearms.  See N.C.G.S. §§ 14-269.8, 415.3
(2007).  The majority’s reasoning casts serious doubts upon the
constitutionality of these statutes and invites individual
challenges to not only the Felony Firearms Act, but these other
statutory provisions as well. 
The General Assembly’s prohibition of firearm use by
convicted felons is both reasonable and related to preserving
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public peace and safety.  Felonies constitute our most serious
offenses.  One who has committed a felony has displayed a degree
of lawlessness that makes it entirely reasonable for the
legislature, concerned for the safety of the public it
represents, to want to keep firearms out of the hands of such a
person.  As this Court stated in State v. Jackson, 353 N.C. 495,
546 S.E.2d 570 (2001):
Just as there is heightened risk
and public concern associated with
firearms on educational property,
which the legislature addressed
through N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2, there
is also heightened risk and public
concern associated with convicted
felons possessing firearms, which
the legislature addressed through
N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1.  Both are
exceptional situations, which have
been addressed through dedicated
statutory law.
Id. at 501, 546 S.E.2d at 573-74 (emphasis added); see also
Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112 n.6, 74 L.
Ed. 2d 845, 854 n.6 (1983) (stating that Congress’s intent in
enacting 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which prohibits firearm possession by
convicted felons, was to “keep firearms out of the hands of
presumptively risky people”), superseded on other grounds by
statute, Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100
Stat. 449, as recognized in Logan v. United States, __ U.S.__,
__, 169 L. Ed. 2d 432, 438 (2007).  The Felony Firearms Act is
moreover limited in scope: the prohibition on firearm possession
does not apply to all persons convicted of crimes--only those
convicted of our most serious offenses, felonies.  And convicted
felons are not barred from possessing all weapons--only firearms.
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The General Assembly, acting upon its compelling
interest in the public welfare and safety, determined that, like
the mentally insane, those convicted of felonies pose an
unacceptable risk with regard to firearm possession.  In so
doing, the legislature has properly fulfilled its duty to
reasonably regulate firearms:  “‘The preservation of the public
peace, and the protection of the people against violence, are
constitutional duties of the legislature, and the guarantee of
the right to keep and bear arms is to be understood and construed
in connection and in harmony, with these constitutional duties.’” 
Dawson, 272 N.C. at 548, 159 S.E.2d at 11 (quoting Hill v. State,
53 Ga. 472, 477 (1874)).  Thus, because I conclude that N.C.G.S.
§ 14-415.1 is reasonable and related to preserving public peace
and safety, both in general and to Mr. Britt in particular as a
convicted drug offender, the Felony Firearms Act is
constitutional on its face and as applied to Mr. Britt.
This case is difficult and poses a temptation for the
Court to depart from established case law in order to accommodate
Mr. Britt.  However, as the Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court recently articulated:
Extreme cases often test the
bounds of established legal
principles.  There is a cost to
yielding to the desire to correct
the extreme case, rather than
adhering to the legal principle. 
That cost has been demonstrated so
often that it is captured in a
legal aphorism: “Hard cases make
bad law.” 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. __, __, 173 L.
Ed. 2d 1208, 1232 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  Although
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Mr. Britt may be a sympathetic plaintiff, in that he made a huge
mistake early in his life, he is nevertheless a convicted drug
offender and a felon and as such, belongs to a class of persons
deemed by the General Assembly and recognized by this Court to
pose “heightened risk and public concern” with regard to firearm
possession.  Other state supreme courts have avoided the
temptation to craft individualized exceptions for particular
plaintiffs.  See State v. Smith, 132 N.H. 756, 758, 571 A.2d 279,
281 (1990) (holding that the state’s felon-in-possession statute
narrowly served a significant governmental interest in protecting
the general public and was therefore constitutional under the New
Hampshire Constitution, even though the New Hampshire Supreme
Court recognized that some felons falling within the statute’s
reach were not potentially dangerous).  Today’s decision opens
the floodgates wide before an inevitable wave of individual
challenges to not only the Felony Firearms Act, but to our
statutory provisions prohibiting firearm possession by
incompetents and the mentally insane.  The majority has not cited
any direct authority from this Court or any other jurisdiction in
support of its position that the legislature may not prohibit
convicted felons like Mr. Britt from possessing firearms. 
Plaintiff does not cite any such case, and I have found none, all
authority being to the contrary. 
Although the majority stands up for Mr. Britt and other
convicted felons who will now undoubtedly seek judicial exemption
from N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1, this is a policy matter and
determination best left to the executive or legislative branches. 
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Mr. Britt may seek relief from the General Assembly through
contact with individual legislators or from the Governor by way
of a conditional or unconditional pardon.  See N.C. Const. art.
III, § 5, cl. 6; N.C.G.S. §§ 13-1 to 13-4. (2007).  The majority
resists judicial restraint in an effort to fashion an individual
exception for Mr. Britt.  I believe this Court should properly
resist such temptation and affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals.