Case Title: Givens v. Fowler

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-08-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Givens v. Fowler1999 WY 116984 P.2d 1092Case Number: 98-329Decided: 08/09/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
SUE 
GIVENS, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

EDWARD A. FOWLER, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Fremont County, The Honorable D. Terry Rogers, 
Judge.

Drew A. Perkins 
of Blood & Perkins, P. C., Casper, Wyoming; and Elizabeth Greenwood and 
Robert Bundy, Pinedale, Wyoming, representing 
appellant.

Thomas A. Fasse 
and William L. Miller of Miller & Fasse, P. C., Riverton, Wyoming, 
representing appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C. J.; THOMAS, MACY & HILL, JJ.; and DAN R. SPANGLER, D. J. 
(RET.)

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Sue 
Givens (the daughter) appeals from the summary judgment that the district court 
entered in favor of Appellee Edward Fowler (the son).

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      The daughter 
presents the following statement of the issues:

Did issues of 
material fact exist that precluded summary judgment by the district court on 
each of the following issues[:]

A. Did the 
parties reach a meeting of the minds[?]

B. If there was 
a meeting of the minds, is Appellant entitled to recis[] ion because of her 
unilateral mistake or because of Appellee's 
misrepresentations[?]

C. If there was 
a meeting of the minds, did Appellant's lack [of] authority to bind the estate 
and/or trust of Freeman D. Fowler make the alleged agreement 
void[?]

FACTS

[¶4]      The background 
facts of this case are set out in this Court's decision issued on March 7, 1997, 
and captioned Fowler v. Fowler, 933 P.2d 502 (Wyo. 1997). That case involved a 
dispute between Freeman D. Fowler (the father) and his son, Edward A. Fowler, 
the appellee in this case. 933 P.2d 502. The dispute between the father and the 
son involved whether an oral agreement existed to transfer the Willow Bow Ranch 
from the father to the son. 933 P.2d  at 503. In 1974, the son resigned from his 
position with the Fort Collins, Colorado, police department and moved to Fremont 
County to manage his father's ranch with the understanding that he would inherit 
the ranch upon the death of his parents. Id. In 1992, a dispute arose, and the 
father asked his son to leave the ranch. Id. The son refused, and the father 
filed an ejectment action against him. Id. The son counterclaimed for breach of 
contract, alleging that he and the father had an oral contract which provided in 
part that the son would receive the ranch upon the death of his parents in 
exchange for his efforts in running the ranch. 933 P.2d  at 503, 505. The 
district court found that an oral contract existed and awarded the land, 
livestock, and machinery to the son subject to the father's life estate. 933 P.2d  at 503-04. This Court reversed the district court, holding that an oral 
contract did not exist because the essential terms of the agreement had not been 
adequately defined. 933 P.2d  at 506.

[¶5]      After the trial 
and while the appeal was pending, a conservator and guardian ad litem was 
appointed to represent the father's interests. A settlement was proposed on 
January 17, 1997, by an attorney who was acting for the father's conservator and 
guardian ad litem. The proposed settlement would have effectuated the division 
of the estate into two parts. The son would have received the Willow Bow Ranch, 
and the daughter would have received the balance of the estate. Each of them 
would have held the property in trust for their father and paid an amount toward 
his support. Upon the father's death, the trusts would have terminated, and the 
parties would have kept the property in the respective trusts. On February 23, 
1997, before a settlement could be reached, the father 
died.

[¶6]      Shortly after the 
dispute arose between the father and the son, the father executed a will and 
amended his trust to disinherit the son, making the daughter the sole trustee 
and beneficiary of his estate. After her father's death, the daughter, being the 
sole trustee and beneficiary of her father's estate, hired an attorney to revive 
settlement negotiations with the son. The daughter's attorney contacted the 
son's attorney on March 12, 1997, to reopen settlement negotiations and faxed a 
settlement proposal to him, which was almost identical to the proposal that was 
offered while the father was still alive. That same day, the son's attorney 
faxed an unqualified acceptance of the offer to the daughter's 
attorney.

[¶7]      The next day, 
March 13, 1997, the daughter's attorney called the son's attorney and explained 
that, because the daughter was not a party in the earlier action, neither he nor 
his client was aware of the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Fowler v. Fowler 
at the time she proposed the settlement offer. The daughter's attorney said he 
needed to talk to the daughter and would get back with the son's attorney. When 
the daughter's attorney told the daughter about the predicament, she responded 
"okay." The daughter's attorney then called the son's attorney and said that 
"Sue Givens had said `okay.'" The son interpreted that statement to mean the 
daughter still desired to settle, and he sent a check to the daughter pursuant 
to the settlement agreement, along with the written settlement agreement that he 
had signed. The daughter never signed and returned the settlement agreement nor 
did she ever return or negotiate the check.

[¶8]      The son filed a 
complaint, alleging that a contract had been formed and seeking enforcement of 
that contract. After the daughter answered, the son filed a motion for summary 
judgment. The daughter opposed the motion, asserting essentially the same 
arguments that she makes to this Court on appeal. Finding no genuine issues of 
material fact and that an agreement had been formed, the district court granted 
the son's motion for summary judgment. The daughter appeals to this 
Court.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶9]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the 
prevailing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Wolter v. 
Equitable Resources Energy Company, Western Region, No. 98-299, 1999 WL 301297, 
at *2 (Wyo. May 14, 1999); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). We evaluate the propriety of 
a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same 
materials as were employed and used by the lower court. Kirkwood v. CUNA Mutual 
Insurance Society, 937 P.2d 206, 208 (Wyo. 1997). We review the record from the 
vantage point most beneficial to the nonmoving party, affording that party the 
benefit of all the favorable inferences that may be drawn from the facts. Austin 
v. Kaness, 950 P.2d 561, 563 (Wyo. 1997). Although whether an oral contract was 
formed is normally a question of fact, when a dispute does not exist with regard 
to the material facts, the question presented for our review becomes a question 
of law. Shaw v. Smith, 964 P.2d 428, 435-36 (Wyo. 1998); Enes v. Baker, 58 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1952). We do not accord deference to the district court's 
decisions on matters of law. O'Quinn Enterprises v. Central Wyoming Regional 
Water System Joint Powers Board , 975 P.2d 1062, 1063 (Wyo. 
1999).

DISCUSSION

[¶10]   The daughter argues that a meeting 
of the minds did not exist with respect to the settlement agreement because she 
was unaware of the fact that the Wyoming Supreme Court had issued its decision 
in the underlying case. She asserts that knowledge of that fact was essential to 
the mutual understanding of the terms of the agreement and that, therefore, a 
contract was not formed between her and the son.

[¶11]   The basic elements of a contract 
are offer, acceptance, and consideration. Frost Construction Company v. Lobo, 
Inc., 951 P.2d 390, 394 (Wyo. 1998). "When these elements have been established, 
`courts conclude that there has been a meeting of the minds and an enforceable 
contract exists.'" McCormick v. McCormick, 926 P.2d 360, 362 (Wyo. 1996) 
(quoting Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. Warila, 890 P.2d 39, 41 (Wyo. 1995)). 
"`An agreement to make a written contract where the terms are mutually 
understood and agreed on in all respects is as binding as the written contract 
would be if it had been executed.'" Frost Construction Company, 951 P.2d  at 394 
(quoting Robert W. Anderson Housewrecking and Excavating, Inc. v. Board of 
Trustees, School District No. 25, Fremont County, 681 P.2d 1326, 1331 (Wyo. 
1984)). "`An unconditional, timely acceptance of an offer, properly communicated 
to the offeror, constitutes a meeting of the minds of the parties and 
establishes a contract.'" Id. (quoting Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. Morris, 756 P.2d 774, 775 (Wyo. 1988)).

[¶12]   In Wyoming, we examine the 
objective manifestations of the parties' contractual intent to determine whether 
a contract was formed. McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 990 
(Wyo. 1991). "Under the `objective theory' of contract formation, contractual 
obligation is imposed not on the basis of the subjective intent of the parties, 
but rather upon the outward manifestations of a party's assent sufficient to 
create reasonable reliance by the other party." Id. A party's intention will be 
held to be what a reasonable person in the other party's shoes would conclude 
his manifestations to mean. Shrum v. Zeltwanger, 559 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Wyo. 
1977).

[¶13]   The daughter complains that she 
should not be bound to her offer because she did not know that the underlying 
case had been decided and, without citing any authority, insinuates that it was 
the son's responsibility to divulge this information. We disagree. The daughter 
was fully aware that the appeal was being considered by this Court and that the 
opinion could be issued at any time. It was no one's responsibility but the 
daughter's to stay abreast of the status of the case.

[¶14]   After analyzing the record, we 
conclude that the uncontested material facts demonstrate that an oral agreement 
was formed. The daughter made an offer which was unconditionally accepted by the 
son. When she was told about this Court's decision in Fowler v. Fowler, she said 
"okay" and that response was communicated to the son's attorney. The daughter 
did not withdraw her written offer or respond to the son's attorney's 
correspondence to the effect that an agreement had been reached. Nor did she 
return the check that the son tendered in an attempt to fulfill the agreement. 
Her objective manifestations indicated that she still intended to enter into the 
settlement agreement.

[¶15]   The daughter's attorney attested in 
his affidavit that

9. After I had 
disclosed the foregoing information to Sue Givens, Sue stated to me, in a voice 
that I perceived as being deeply shaken, the sole phrase "okay". I don't . . . 
know whether Sue Givens meant that she was ratifying the agreement or she was 
stating the word okay in acknowledgment of the information that I had just given 
her;

. . 
.

12. I do not 
know what Sue Givens intended when she state[d] the term "okay". I do know that 
it was impossible for Sue Givens to understand what she was negotiating for, 
given the fact that she was never informed of the Wyoming Supreme Court's 
decision which had a direct impact on the size and value of the property at 
issue[.]

The daughter 
averred the following:

8. I was shocked 
by this information. I told [my attorney] "okay," meaning that I understood what 
he said. I did not approve or consent to the settlement agreement in light of 
the new information about the result of the appeal at that time or anytime since 
then.

These statements 
are insufficient to prevent a summary judgment because they relate to what the 
daughter's subjective mind might have been when she said "okay." That the 
daughter might not have subjectively intended to enter into the settlement 
agreement is of no consequence because she made sufficient objective 
manifestations of contractual assent to create a reasonable reliance by the son. 
McDonald, 820 P.2d  at 990.

[¶16]   We hold that the objective 
manifestations of the daughter evidenced her desire to enter into the settlement 
she proposed to the son even after she learned of this Court's decision in the 
underlying case. The son's unqualified acceptance of the offer formed the 
contract and the daughter's later "okay" would be understood by a reasonable 
person in the son's position to mean she still intended to settle the matter in 
accordance with the settlement agreement that she 
proposed.

A. Recision for 
Unilateral Mistake

[¶17]   The daughter claims that, even if 
there was a meeting of the minds, she is still entitled to relief under a 
unilateral mistake theory. She maintains that her lack of knowledge that Fowler 
v. Fowler had been decided was caused by the son and that he should have known 
she would not have assented to the agreement had she known the true 
facts.

[¶18]   A mistake by only one of the 
parties ordinarily does not offer a reason for avoidance of the contract by that 
party unless the mistake was produced by the conduct of the other party. Raymond 
v. Steen, 882 P.2d 852, 855 (Wyo. 1994); Svalina v. Big Horn National Life 
Insurance Company, 466 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Wyo. 1970).

[¶19]   The daughter argues that the son 
deceptively solicited the settlement offer, knowing she was not aware that the 
underlying case had been decided, in hopes of creating exactly this situation. 
We are unmoved by the daughter's repeated complaints that the son solicited the 
offer. It is of no consequence to the determination of this case. Nevertheless, 
it was the daughter's attorney who telephoned the son's attorney to see whether 
a settlement offer by the daughter would be fruitful. Furthermore, the offer 
must have been a reasonable one because it was virtually the same offer that the 
attorney acting on the father's behalf proposed. We find it peculiar that the 
daughter is offended by the son's positive response to her inquiry regarding his 
interest in settling.

[¶20]   Additionally, the daughter is 
charged with the responsibility to use the ordinary means of information 
available to her and to make reasonably diligent inquiries regarding the facts 
surrounding her offer. Schepps v. Howe, 665 P.2d 504, 509 (Wyo. 1983); Schaffer 
v. Standard Timber Company, 79 Wyo. 137, 331 P.2d 611, 615 (1958). She could 
have easily found out about the status of the appeal by making a telephone call 
to the Wyoming Supreme Court Clerk's office. She did not make that inquiry, and 
she proposed a settlement offer to the son. A contract was formed when the son 
unconditionally accepted the daughter's offer.

[¶21]   The daughter's ignorance of this 
Court's decision in the underlying case was caused not by the son but rather by 
her own failure to check the status of the appeal. The daughter, therefore, is 
not entitled to rescind the settlement agreement under a unilateral mistake 
theory.

B. Disclosure of 
Material Fact

[¶22]   The daughter claims that she is 
entitled to relief because the son breached his duty to disclose the material 
fact that the underlying case had been decided against him. In making her 
argument, the daughter apparently encourages this Court to adopt a cause of 
action for negligent nondisclosure. She points out that this Court discussed the 
possibility of Wyoming adopting such a cause of action in Richey v. Patrick, 904 P.2d 798 (Wyo. 1995). In that case, we quoted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
551 (1977), which provides:

"(1) One who 
fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the 
other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the 
same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the 
matter that he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to 
the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in 
question.

"(2) One party 
to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
disclose to the other before the transaction is 
consummated,

(a) matters 
known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other 
similar relation of trust and confidence between them; and

(b) matters 
known to him that he knows to be necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous 
statement of the facts from being misleading; and

(c) subsequently 
acquired information that he knows will make untrue or misleading a previous 
representation that when made was true or believed to be so; 
and

(d) the falsity 
of a representation not made with the expectation that it would be acted upon, 
if he subsequently learns that the other is about to act in reliance upon it in 
a transaction with him; and

(e) facts basic 
to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into it under a 
mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship between 
them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would 
reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts."

904 P.2d  at 
802-03.

[¶23]   In Richey, we stated that we had 
never had a previous opportunity to determine whether § 551 could be the basis 
of a cause of action in this state. 904 P.2d  at 802. We concluded that, even if 
we accepted the Restatement, the Patricks' claim would still fail and, 
therefore, decided not to make that determination at that time. Id. We come to 
the same conclusion in the case at bar. The son denies that any duty or 
fiduciary relationship existed, and the daughter has failed to demonstrate that 
such a relationship or duty did exist to trigger the obligation to disclose the 
information. Furthermore, even after the daughter learned that the opinion had 
been issued, as we discussed earlier, her objective manifestations indicated she 
still desired to enter into the settlement agreement.

C. Authority to 
Bind Estate

[¶24]   The daughter lastly contends that 
she lacked the authority to bind the estate to the settlement agreement because 
the Willow Bow Ranch belonged to the father's trust and because she had not yet 
been appointed personal representative of the estate. The son counters that this 
argument is an attempt to create a subterfuge. We agree with the 
son.

[¶25]   The Willow Bow Ranch was owned by 
the father as trustee of his living trust, which named the daughter as the 
successor trustee upon the father's death or disability. By operation of the 
living trust, the daughter became the trustee and sole beneficiary of the 
father's estate upon his death. She, accordingly, did possess the authority to 
bind the estate to the settlement agreement.

CONCLUSION

[¶26]   After examining the record, we 
conclude that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the facts 
demonstrate a settlement agreement was formed between the parties. The son was 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and the district court properly 
ordered a summary judgment in his favor.

[¶27]   Affirmed.