Case Title: Matter of Workers' Compensation Claim of Fansler

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Workers' Compensation Claim of Fansler1996 WY 54914 P.2d 156Case Number: 95-179Decided: 04/10/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Matter of the WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIM of FONDA FANSLER, an Employee of 
Unicover Corporation.

 

FONDA FANSLER, 
Appellant (Claimant/Petitioner), 

 

v. 

 

UNICOVER CORPORATION, and STATE OF WYOMING, 

ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division,  

Appellees (Respondents).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County 

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant

 

 

Bert T. Ahlstrom, Jr., Cheyenne, for 
appellant. 

Gregory C. Dyekman and Brandin Hay of Dray, Madison 
& Thomson, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee Unicover 
Corporation. 

William U. Hill, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, 
Deputy Attorney General, Jennifer A. Evans, Assistant Attorney General, 
Cheyenne, for appellee State of Wyoming.

 

Before THOMAS, MACY, 
TAYLOR, and LEHMAN, JJ., and PRICE, District Judge.

PRICE, District 
Judge. 

[¶1]      Appellant Fonda 
Fansler sought review in the district court of the hearing examiner's order 
which denied her worker's compensation benefits from and after November 30, 
1993, for treatment or disability alleged to have resulted from her injury of 
September 1993. The District Court, First Judicial District, certified the case 
to this Court for review. Finding the hearing examiner's decision is supported 
by substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law, we 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant states 
the single issue in the case:

 

Whether the hearing examiner erred in failing to 
follow existing law as to the benefit of doubt to be accorded an injured worker 
in such case, and in denying benefits to appellant, 
accordingly.

 

[¶3]      The Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division states the issue:

 

Whether the record contains substantial evidence to 
support the hearing examiner's determination that Claimant's injury did not 
arise out and the course of her employment [sic].

 

[¶4]      The employer 
states that the issue is:

 

The hearing examiner's decision denying Fonda Fansler 
workers' compensation benefits after she received a full medical release to 
return to work was supported by substantial evidence.

 

FACTS

 

[¶5]      Appellant was 
employed in the mail room of Unicover Corporation (employer) in September, 1993. 
Beginning on Monday, September 13, 1993 through Thursday, September 16, 1993, 
appellant worked on a 300,000 piece mailing. The pieces of mail had to be 
bundled by hand and then wrapped lengthwise and crosswise with large thick 
rubber bands which the employee was required to pre-stretch. Appellant reported 
no problems until the middle of the night Wednesday when she had a burning pain 
in her mid back. She awoke Thursday morning with a slightly swollen right hand 
that was stiff. She claimed that she worked it and it loosened up, took a hot 
shower and then went to work. Her back ached all day Thursday although she 
worked all day. She awoke Thursday night with the burning pain in her mid back. 
Friday was a day off from work and although she was sore, she did not have any 
major problems on Friday. After arising on Saturday morning she took a hot 
shower and after getting out of the shower she collapsed in pain. The employer 
was notified on the following Monday. On Wednesday, September 22, 1993, 
appellant saw Victoria M. Vernon, M.D., who diagnosed: "Cervical strain and 
shoulder girdle strain. Neck pain." The appellant saw Dr. Vernon on September 
27, October 4, October 8, October 15, November 16, and November 30, 1993. Dr. 
Vernon's most complete assessment was: "Neck pain, cervical strain, scapular 
strain, bicepital tendinitis, lateral epicondylitis, all felt secondary to 
cumulative trauma disorder improving with conservative therapy." Appellant was 
released to work regular and full duty on November 16, 1993. After the last 
appointment with Dr. Vernon, Dr. Vernon reported: "Fonda is to continue to work 
full duty, no restrictions. I do not anticipate any further symptoms or injuries 
as a result of her initial industrial accident for which I saw 
her."

 

[¶6]      Appellant next 
saw Carol A. Fischer, M.D., for complaints of dizziness or vertigo type 
sensation with nausea. Appellant also saw Edward M. Clark, D.D.S., for problems 
associated with and apparent diagnosis of temporal mandibular joint disorder 
(TMJ). An independent medical examination was performed by Jeffrey Donner, M.D., 
on September 15, 1994, and at that time appellant had continuing claims of pain 
and dizziness. Dr. Donner's impression was: "Continued neck pain, dizziness and 
right shoulder rotator cuff tendinitis symptoms following a work-related injury 
in 9/93."

 

[¶7]      The Workers' 
Compensation Division and the employer objected to benefits after November 30, 
1993. Based upon the objections, a hearing was held on April 20, 1995 before an 
administrative hearing examiner. In addition to the reports from the doctors and 
a testimonial affidavit of the employee, allowed by the hearing examiner, 
testimony was presented from Dr. Claude Grizzle, an expert witness called by the 
State of Wyoming. Based upon this evidence, the hearing examiner entered an 
Order Denying Benefits to the employee from and after November 30, 
1993.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      Cases certified 
to this Court pursuant to WYO.R.APP.P. 12.09(b) are reviewed applying the 
appellate standards which are applicable to the reviewing court of the first 
instances. Pinther v. Dep't of 
Administration and Information, 866 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Wyo. 1994). The burden 
is on the employee in this case to prove that the benefits sought are the result 
of an injury at work and this Court reviews the decision by the hearing examiner 
to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the decision. Stuckey v. State, ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1098-1099 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

Our task is to examine the entire record to determine 
if substantial evidence exists to support the hearing examiner's findings. We 
will not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing examiner if his 
decision is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.

 

Romero v. Davy McKee Corporation, 854 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 1993) (citing Farman v. State, ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation Div., 841 P.2d 99, 102 (Wyo. 1992). Where the findings of fact 
are supported by substantial evidence, the ruling of the hearing examiner will 
be affirmed absent any errors of law. Taylor v. State, ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation Div., 890 P.2d 559, 561 (Wyo. 1995).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      Initially, 
appellant contends that any doubt as to a worker's right to compensation in a 
particular case is to be resolved in the worker's favor. Appellant claims that 
laws and evidence are to be liberally 
construed in favor of an injured worker. Appellant cites Columbus Plumbing and Heating Co. v. 
Hardison, 429 P.2d 320 (Wyo. 1967). However, appellant misconstrues this 
case. The Columbus case involved a claim for hernia and the court said that the 
law relating to hernia, like the other general provisions, are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the worker. "Nevertheless, the courts are not free under 
the guise of construction to extend the beneficent purpose of the law to 
injuries that do not reasonably fall within the reach of the language used. 
Furthermore, the rule is not to be related to the evidence offered, Jennings v. C.M. & W. Drilling 
Company, 77 Wyo. 69, 307 P.2d 122, 126, and does not relieve a claimant of 
his burden to `clearly prove' each of the elements that entitle him to 
compensation." Columbus, 429 P.2d  at 
322.

 

[¶10]   Appellant also claims that where 
the evidence is conflicting, the trier of fact must adopt the most reasonable 
inference and that when the inferences are more or less equally probable, the 
decision must be in favor of the worker. Appellant cites Bocek v. City of Sheridan, 432 P.2d 893, 
895 (Wyo. 1967). Appellant misstates the holding in that case. In that case the 
court stated:

 

It is the rule "that where the evidence justified 
either of two reasonable inferences, one favorable to the party having the 
burden of proof and the other favorable to his opponent, the trier of the facts 
should be allowed to determine which, if either, of the two inferences is more 
reasonable or probable, and make his finding accordingly. If the finding is in 
favor of the party having the burden of proof, this court on appeal will not 
hold that it was made by guess or conjecture, unless we can say, as a matter of 
law, that the inference in favor of the other party was more, or at least 
equally, probable." White v. Maverick 
Production Co., 63 Wyo. 452, 182 P.2d 818, 822 [1947].

 

Bocek, 
432 P.2d  at 895. In the Bocek case 
the court affirmed the district court decision denying worker's compensation 
benefits.

 

[¶11]   The obligation of the trier of fact 
to sort through differences in testimony, including that of experts, is not a 
new proposition in the law. It is a necessary function to which this Court gives 
great deference. The weighing of the evidence is a function of the trier of fact 
and this has always included expert testimony. Latimer v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 
902 P.2d 706, 711 (Wyo. 1995); Padilla v. 
Lovern's, Inc. 883 P.2d 351, 355 (Wyo. 1994); Claim of Vondra, 448 P.2d 313, 318 (Wyo. 
1968); Wyoming State Treasurer, ex rel. 
Workmens' Compensation Dep't v. Boston, 445 P.2d 548, 550 (Wyo. 1968); Miracle v. Barker, 59 Wyo. 92, 107-08, 
136 P.2d 678, 684 (1943).

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶12]   Although the law should be 
construed liberally when considering a worker's compensation case, this does not 
does not mean that the evidence should be liberally construed. The hearing 
examiner's decision to deny appellant's request for worker's compensation 
benefits after November 30, 1993, the date she was completely released by her 
physician, was supported by substantial evidence.

 

[¶13]   Affirmed.