Case Title: Abate v. Fremont Inv. & Loan

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11638

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11638 
 
THOMAS C. ABATE  vs.  FREMONT INVESTMENT & LOAN & others.1  
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 4, 2014. - March 9, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Real Property, Record title, Mortgage.  Mortgage, Assignment, 
Foreclosure.  Jurisdiction, Land Court.  Land Court, 
Jurisdiction.  Practice, Civil, Parties, Standing, 
Dismissal. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on May 
25, 2012. 
 
 
Motions to dismiss were heard by Robert B. Foster, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Thomas B. Vawter for the petitioner. 
 
James L. Rogal for Deutsche Bank National Trust Company & 
another. 
                     
 
1 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS); 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee for Carrington 
Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-FRE1, Asset Backed Pass-Through 
Certificates (Deutsche Bank); and Carrington Mortgage Services, 
LLC (Carrington). 
2 
 
 
Robert M. Brochin for Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. 
 
James P. Long, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In this appeal, we determine whether a 
respondent in a try title action brought pursuant to G. L. 
c. 240, §§ 1-5, may test the substantive merits of a 
petitioner's claims in the "first step" of such an action.  The 
issue arises because the try title statute, in keeping with its 
purpose to allow a person holding record title to compel an 
adverse claimant to prove the merits of the adverse claimant's 
interest in the property, contemplates a two-step procedure in 
which the substantive merits of the parties' claims are 
determined at a trial.  Under our interpretation of the statute, 
the "first step" requires that the petitioner must satisfy the 
jurisdictional elements2 of the statute and, if satisfied, the 
"second step" requires the adverse claimant either to bring an 
action to assert the claim to title, or to disclaim an interest 
in the property.  Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 460 Mass. 762, 766 
(2011), citing G. L. c. 240, § 1.  Recognizing the potential 
                     
 
2 The petitioner must satisfy these three jurisdictional 
elements:  (1) that he holds "record title" to the property; (2) 
that he is a person "in possession"; and (3) the existence of an 
actual or possible "adverse claim" clouding his record title. 
Blanchard v. Lowell, 177 Mass. 501, 504-505 (1901).  Standing 
encompasses the first two elements: "record title" and 
"possession."  Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 460 Mass. 762, 766-767 & 
n.5 (2011). 
3 
 
conflict between jurisdictional determinations and a 
petitioner's right under the statute to compel an adverse 
claimant to bring his or her own action to assert that claim, we 
transferred the petitioner's appeal to this court on our own 
motion.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the Land 
Court judgment dismissing his petition. 
 
Background.  1.  Procedural history.  The petitioner, 
Thomas C. Abate, brought this action in the Land Court asserting 
that a purported assignment of a mortgage was invalid and, 
thereby, indirectly challenging a foreclosure by Deutsche Bank 
National Trust Company, as trustee for Carrington Mortgage Loan 
Trust, Series 2005-FRE1, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates 
(Deutsche Bank).  At the time of filing, Deutsche Bank as the 
assignee of the mortgage already had foreclosed on Abate's 
mortgage.  The respondents filed motions to dismiss under Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), for failure to 
state a claim on which relief could be granted.3  A Land Court 
judge dismissed the petition after concluding that, as a matter 
of law, none of the alleged grounds for invalidity of the 
                     
 
3 Fremont Investment & Loan (Fremont) did not file a motion 
to dismiss; the claims against Fremont were dismissed without 
prejudice by stipulation of the parties on January 9, 2013.  For 
purposes of this decision, reference to the respondents only 
includes MERS, Deutsche Bank, and Carrington unless otherwise 
noted. 
4 
 
assignment could be sustained and that the foreclosure left 
Abate without record title.4 
 
2.  Facts.  The following facts are taken from undisputed 
facts in the record.5  On June 17, 2005, Abate granted a mortgage 
to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as 
nominee for Fremont Investment & Loan (Fremont).  On that same 
date, Abate took title to the property at 14 Owatonna Street, 
Newton, through a quitclaim deed.  The mortgage and quitclaim 
deed were recorded in the Middlesex County registry of deeds.  
An assignment of the mortgage, recorded on December 3, 2010, 
purported to assign Abate's mortgage from MERS to Deutsche Bank 
on November 16, 2010. 
 
Abate has been in possession of the property since 2005.  
He filed bankruptcy on October 29, 2010, and represented during 
                     
 
4 Although the respondents filed their motions to dismiss 
under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), as 
explained below, the argument advanced in the motion was in 
essence a challenge to Thomas C. Abate's standing, a requirement 
of subject matter jurisdiction which may be considered under 
either rule 12 (b) (1) or 12 (b) (6). 
 
 
5 The record before the judge included the petition and 
other materials from court filings and the Middlesex County 
registry of deeds.  Although the judge did not explicitly cite 
rule 12 (b) (1), we consider his disposition of this case to be 
a better fit under rule 12 (b) (1) than under rule 12 (b) (6).  
The judge was properly allowed to review materials outside of 
the petition in deciding subject matter jurisdiction.  "A judge, 
and logically a reviewing court, may consider documents and 
other materials outside the pleadings when ruling on a rule 12 
(b) (1) motion."  Audoire v. Clients' Sec. Bd., 450 Mass. 388, 
390 n.4 (2008). 
5 
 
bankruptcy proceedings that he intended to surrender the 
property.6  On December 9, 2010, the bankruptcy court ordered 
that Deutsche Bank be released from an automatic stay so that it 
could exercise its rights pursuant to the mortgage.  On March 
28, 2012, Deutsche Bank conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure 
auction in accordance with the statutory power of sale provision 
in the mortgage and the nonjudicial foreclosure process set 
forth in G. L. c. 244, §§ 11-17C.7   The foreclosure deed 
conveying title from Deutsche Bank to itself was recorded on 
October 5, 2012.8 
 
In May, 2012, Abate filed a petition to try title, pursuant 
to G. L. c. 240, §§ 1-5, in the Land Court, claiming to hold 
record title and to be in possession of the property.  The 
petition named four possible adverse claimants:  (1) Fremont; 
(2) MERS; (3) Deutsche Bank; and (4) Carrington Mortgage 
                     
 
6 Abate's Chapter 7 individual debtor's statement of 
intention showed the creditor for the property as Carrington and 
that Abate intended to surrender the property. 
 
 
7 Deutsche Bank recorded a certificate of entry on October 
5, 2012, pursuant to the statute governing foreclosure by entry 
and possession, G. L. c. 244, §§ 1-2, asserting that Deutsche 
Bank, through its agent, had made an open, peaceable, and 
unopposed entry on the property on March 28, 2012. 
 
 
8 At a September, 2012, hearing on the motion to dismiss 
filed by Deutsche Bank and Carrington, Deutsche Bank explained 
that the foreclosure deed had not been previously recorded 
because the high bidder at the auction, a third party, did not 
proceed when the contract expired because of this try title 
action. 
6 
 
Services, LLC (Carrington).  Abate claimed to have record title 
"by virtue of a quitclaim deed dated June 17, 2005."  Abate 
asserted that he had granted a mortgage to Fremont, as the 
lender, and MERS, as the mortgagee, and that MERS had purported 
to assign the mortgage to Deutsche Bank.  Abate asserted that 
the defendants were potentially adverse claimants because the 
assignment from MERS to Deutsche Bank was "fraudulent, invalid, 
void and/or legally inoperative" for a variety of reasons.  
Abate did not acknowledge in his petition that Deutsche Bank had 
already foreclosed on the mortgage. 
 
On July 31, 2012, Deutsche Bank and Carrington filed a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12 (b) (6).  The motion 
asserted that the try title petition did not demonstrate a 
plausible entitlement to the relief sought because Abate failed 
to allege facts sufficient to prove that the assignment was 
invalid.9  Abate contested the filing on procedural grounds, 
arguing that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is 
not a proper response to a try title action and that once he 
satisfied the threshold jurisdictional requirements for 
                     
 
9 In a supplemental memorandum in support of their motion to 
dismiss, Deutsche Bank and Carrington also argued that Abate is 
judicially estopped from proceeding with the try title action 
because of the "contrary" assertion made in Abate's bankruptcy 
case, where Abate indicated that he intended to surrender the 
property.  Like the Land Court judge, we decline to resolve this 
claim because the petition against the defendants was properly 
dismissed on other grounds. 
7 
 
maintaining the action, the judge should have compelled Deutsche 
Bank and Carrington either to disclaim their interests in the 
property or to bring an action to try title.  Abate did not 
offer a rebuttal to the substantive merits of the defendants' 
motion to dismiss. 
 
After a hearing, and with the benefit of additional 
briefing, the judge allowed the motion on December 10, 2012 
(Deutsche Bank/Carrington Order), agreeing with the argument of 
Deutsche Bank and Carrington that Abate failed to state a claim 
on which relief can be granted.  Addressing separately each of 
the claimed defects in the assignment, the judge ruled that 
Abate's petition failed to sufficiently allege effective record 
title because none of the allegations established any ground on 
which the assignment could be found void or invalid. 
 
Subsequently, on January 16, 2013, MERS filed a motion to 
dismiss the petition pursuant to rule 12 (b) (6), arguing that 
the Deutsche Bank/Carrington Order rendered Abate's petition 
moot and further asserting that MERS does not have a present 
interest in the property because it validly assigned the 
mortgage to Deutsche Bank.  Abate filed an opposition to MERS's 
motion and a motion for reconsideration of the Deutsche 
Bank/Carrington Order.  The judge allowed MERS's motion to 
dismiss on the ground that the reasons supporting dismissal 
against Deutsche Bank and Carrington also apply to MERS and that 
8 
 
MERS no longer claims any title interest in the property.  The 
judge denied Abate's motion for reconsideration. 
 
A judgment entered dismissing the petition against Deutsche 
Bank, Carrington, and MERS with prejudice.10  Abate timely 
appealed the judgment of dismissal. 
 
While the appeal was pending, Abate filed a motion for 
relief from judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (1), 
(5), and (6), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), arguing that the judge erred 
in allowing the motions to dismiss and that a subsequent Land 
Court decision, which denied a motion to dismiss and held that a 
try title action properly may lie before a foreclosure, rendered 
the judgment inequitable.11  The judge denied Abate's motion, 
reasoning that the subsequent decision was not binding precedent 
and the ruling allowing a try title action to be brought before 
a mortgage foreclosure had no bearing on the issues before him.  
It was undisputed that Abate's try title action was brought 
                     
 
10 Earlier in the litigation, MERS and Deutsche Bank were 
defaulted pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 55 (a), 365 Mass. 828 
(1974).  The judge did not abuse his "sound discretion" in 
removing the defaults.  Burger Chef Sys., Inc. v. Servfast of 
Brockton, Inc., 393 Mass. 287, 289 (1984), quoting Silkey v. New 
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 816, 816 (1980). 
 
 
11 Unlike the respondents in this case, the respondents in 
Varian vs. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, Mass. Land Court, No. 12-MISC-
462971 (Aug. 23, 2013), did not attack the merits of the 
petitioners' arguments claiming that the assignment of their 
mortgage was invalid and thus the judge in that case did not 
consider the motion to dismiss on that ground. 
9 
 
after foreclosure, and in any event, the decision would not have 
changed the outcome in Abate's case where the complaint was 
dismissed for failure to state a claim, a ground independent of 
the timing of the foreclosure. 
 
Discussion.  In this appeal, Abate argues that in allowing 
the respondents to bring a motion to dismiss under rule 12 (b) 
(6), the judge vitiated his right under the statute to compel 
the respondents to "disclaim all right and title adverse to the 
petitioner" or "show cause why they should not bring an action 
to try such claim."  G. L. c. 240, §§ 1, 3.  In particular, 
Abate argues that in considering and allowing the motions, the 
judge erroneously obliterated the distinction between 
jurisdiction and the merits of a try title action.  We disagree.  
The judge properly considered the substantive merits of Abate's 
claim that the assignment was invalid because the issue was 
determinative of Abate's standing to bring a try title action 
and ultimately the Land Court's subject matter jurisdiction.  
Therefore, we affirm the decision of the Land Court allowing the 
motions to dismiss.  In doing so, we also resolve a conflict in 
Land Court decisions by concluding that a petitioner claiming a 
defect in the legal title of a purported mortgagee may only meet 
10 
 
the jurisdictional element of "adverse claim" after that 
mortgagee has foreclosed.12 
 
1.  Statutory background.  A try title action is one of 
several judicial avenues available to a property owner who seeks 
to challenge a claimed adverse property interest.13  See e.g., 
G. L. c. 231A, §§ 1-9 (declaratory judgment); G. L. c. 240, 
§§ 1-5 (try title action); G. L. c. 240, §§ 6-10 (action to 
                     
 
12 Compare Varian vs. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, Mass. Land Court, 
No. 12-MISC-462971 (Aug. 23, 2013) ("uncertainty as to the 
holder of a mortgage" provides required adversity for mortgagor 
to bring try title action prior to foreclosure), with Abate vs. 
Freemont Inv. & Loan, Mass. Land Court, No. 12-MISC-464855 (Dec. 
10, 2012) ("try title act may be used to challenge a party's 
claim to hold a mortgage only after that party has foreclosed, 
because it is only after foreclosure that the mortgagee has a 
claim of superior title").  See Mitchell vs. United States Bank 
Nat'l Ass'n, Mass. Land Court, No. 12-MISC-473427 (Mar. 21, 
2014) (following Abate decision analysis); Stephens-Martin vs. 
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A., Mass. Land Court, No. 12-
MISC-465277 (Oct. 1, 2013) (following Abate decision analysis).  
Federal court decisions addressing the try title statute have 
noted the disparity in our Land Court decisions.  See, e.g., 
Lemelson v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 721 F.3d 18, 23-24 (1st Cir. 
2013) (citing Abate decision favorably, "efforts to foreclose" 
prior to foreclosure not "adverse claim" sufficient to 
demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction over try title action); 
Jepson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 969 F. Supp. 2d 202, 
207 (D. Mass. 2013) (dismissing preforeclosure try title action 
in accordance with Lemelson, while noting as persuasive 
conflicting conclusion reached in Varian decision). 
 
 
13 As noted in Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 766 n.3, the "try 
title statute may now be something of an anachronism" when 
considered in light of modern statutes that allow a landowner to 
bring various actions to determine title.  The statute is still 
in effect, however, and we therefore analyze the contours of a 
try title action in light of the subsequently enacted 
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. 
11 
 
quiet title).  A try title action is an action at law14 brought 
by a person in possession of property and who claims to hold 
"record title" clouded by an actual or possible adverse claim.15  
Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 766, 767 n.5.  The Land Court has 
exclusive original jurisdiction over try title actions, which, 
as we have noted, involve two steps.  G. L. c. 185, § 1 (d).  A 
petitioner must establish three jurisdictional elements in the 
"first step" of a try title action:  (1) that he holds "record 
title" to the property; (2) that he is a person "in possession"; 
and (3) the existence of an actual or possible "adverse claim" 
                     
 
14 In comparison, an action to quiet title, G. L. c. 240, 
§ 10, is an in rem action brought under the court's equity 
jurisdiction.  See Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 767 n.5, citing 
G. L. c. 185, § 1 (k).  See also First Baptist Church of Sharon 
v. Harper, 191 Mass. 196, 209 (1906).  The try title action, in 
contrast, is based in law instead of equity and allows a 
petitioner to defeat a potentially adverse claim through default 
or by showing title that is merely superior to that of the 
respondent.  Bevilacqua, supra.  A try title action, where the 
petitioner sets forth a sufficient petition, places the burden 
on the respondent either to bring an action to try title or to 
disclaim his interest in the property.  G. L. c. 240, § 3. 
 
 
15 The relevant portion of G. L. c. 240, § 1, is as follows: 
 
"If the record title of land is clouded by an adverse 
claim, or by the possibility thereof, a person in 
possession of such land claiming an estate of freehold 
therein or an unexpired term of not less than ten years, 
and a person who by force of the covenants in a deed or 
otherwise may be liable in damages, if such claim should be 
sustained, may file a petition in the land court stating 
his interest, describing the land, the claims and the 
possible adverse claimants so far as known to him, and 
praying that such claimants may be summoned to show cause 
why they should not bring an action to try such claim." 
12 
 
clouding the plaintiff's record title.16  Blanchard v. Lowell, 
177 Mass. 501, 504 (1901) (jurisdictional facts are "[the 
petitioner's] interest, a description of the premises, the 
claims and the possible adverse claimants, so far as known").  
The failure to satisfy all of the elements of G. L. c. 240, 
§§ 1-5, nullifies the court's subject matter jurisdiction.  
Bevilacqua, supra at 766, citing Riverbank Improvement Co. v. 
Chapman, 224 Mass. 424, 425 (1916).  Standing is based on the 
first two jurisdictional elements.  See Bevilacqua, supra.  If 
these requirements are satisfied, the "second step" requires the 
adverse claimant either to "disclaim the relevant interest in 
the property or to bring an action to assert the claim in 
question."  Id., citing G. L. c. 240, § 1. 
 
2.  Motions to dismiss in try title actions.  Abate's main 
contention in this appeal flows from our prior case law 
explaining the two steps of a try title action and noting that 
the question who "has a better title . . . does not arise, and 
is not to be determined in [the first step], but in the actions 
which the respondents may be ordered to bring."  Blanchard, 177 
Mass. at 504-505.  The rule that "better title" is to be 
                     
 
16 Abate's argument that only the first two elements are 
required for jurisdiction is unavailing in light of the language 
of the try title statute and our prior case law that also 
requires an "adverse claim."  See G. L. c. 240, § 1 (action may 
be brought "[i]f the record title of land is clouded by an 
adverse claim"); Blanchard, 177 Mass. at 504-505. 
13 
 
determined in the second step, however, does not preclude 
consideration of the issue presented in the defendants' motions 
to dismiss.  At issue in the defendants' motions to dismiss was 
the threshold question of jurisdiction, or more specifically 
Abate's standing to bring the try title action.  Where, as here, 
the determination of standing, and ultimately jurisdiction, 
necessarily reaches and effectively negates the merits of a 
petitioner's claim, the two-step procedure is not abrogated.  
Indeed, dismissal of a try title petition for lack of standing 
on a motion to dismiss is a procedural disposition we expressly 
approved in Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 763-764.17  Standing may be 
considered under either rule 12 (b) (1) or rule 12 (b) (6).  
Ginther v. Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 322 (1998).  As 
a component of subject matter jurisdiction, a party may 
challenge, or a judge may consider, sua sponte, standing under 
rule 12 (b) (1) at any time.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (h) (3), 
                     
 
17 To the extent that Abate argues that the rules of civil 
procedure do not apply to a try title action, we decline to 
adopt that view.  A try title action, like any other civil 
action, is subject to the rules of civil procedure.  See Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 1, as amended, 450 Mass. 1403 (2008) (rules of civil 
procedure apply to proceedings in Land Court); Mass. R. Civ. P. 
81 (a) (1), as amended, 450 Mass. 1405 (2008) (rules applicable 
to all proceedings not specifically excluded).  See also G. L. 
c. 185M, § 1 (d) (granting exclusive jurisdiction of try title 
actions to Land Court).  Although the try title action predates 
the rules of civil procedure, we have never recognized an 
exception for try title actions.  Nor have we encountered a case 
where a party claims such an exception. 
14 
 
365 Mass. 754 (1974); Maxwell v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 460 
Mass. 91, 99-100 (2011). 
 
In Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 764, the judge was compelled to 
act where he correctly perceived legal impediments to subject 
matter jurisdiction and the respondent had not appeared to 
challenge the issue.  Here, because standing is a requirement of 
subject matter jurisdiction, that issue was properly considered 
by the Land Court judge even though not expressly cited by the 
respondents in their motions to dismiss.  As we indicated in 
Bevilacqua, to the extent that subject matter jurisdiction 
generally, or standing in particular, is raised by a respondent, 
the judge may consider the issue by way of a motion to dismiss 
under either rule 12 (b) (1) or rule 12 (b) (6). 
 
a.  Standard of review of a motion to dismiss in the "first 
step" of a try title action.  In a typical case, a plaintiff is 
required to prove jurisdictional facts if those facts are 
challenged by an opposing party through evidence accompanying a 
motion to dismiss.  Callahan v. First Congregational Church of 
Haverhill, 441 Mass. 699, 710-711 (2004) ("factual challenge" to 
subject matter jurisdiction, made through presentation of 
extrapleadings material, "gives no presumptive weight to the 
averments in the plaintiff's complaint, and requires the court 
to address the merits of the jurisdictional claim by resolving 
the factual disputes between the plaintiff and the defendants").  
15 
 
In Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 764 n.2, we recognized some of the 
difficulties of applying the procedure and standards of rule 12 
(b) (1) or rule 12 (b) (6) to try title actions.  We noted, for 
example, that it may be appropriate in try title actions to 
place the burden on the petitioner to prove jurisdictional facts 
even where the potentially adverse party does not challenge 
jurisdictional facts because a property owner who has not 
received notice of the action may "be forever barred from having 
or enforcing any such [title] claim" after a default.  Id., 
quoting G. L. c. 240, § 2.  We recognized, on the other hand, 
that requiring the petitioner to prove all jurisdictional facts 
by a preponderance of the evidence standard might result in the 
two steps of a try title petition being collapsed into one.18  
Id.  We then observed that "it may be necessary to adopt a 
unique standard of review in future try title actions."  Id. 
 
We now set forth the standard applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to dismiss brought in the first step 
of a try title action.  As previously discussed, a petitioner 
                     
 
18 The preponderance of the evidence standard is used in 
other jurisdictional challenges.  See Miller v. Miller, 448 
Mass. 320, 328 (2007) ("in deciding motion to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction, court has discretion to determine 
personal jurisdiction by preponderance of evidence without 
waiting for trial on merits").  See also McNutt v. General 
Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936) (preponderance 
of evidence standard appropriate for contested facts in subject 
matter jurisdiction). 
16 
 
must allege three jurisdictional elements in the first step of a 
try title claim:  (1) record title, (2) possession, and (3) an 
actual or possible adverse claim.  The jurisdictional facts 
required for standing -- record title and possession -- are 
subject to challenge through the introduction of other evidence 
negating the petitioner's claim.  If the jurisdictional facts 
required for standing are factually challenged by an adverse 
party or by the court, the petitioner bears the burden to prove 
those facts by a preponderance of the evidence.  Conversely, 
allegations regarding the third jurisdictional fact, adverse 
claim, are entitled to a presumption of truth regardless of a 
factual challenge because determining the merits of an adverse 
claim in the first step would compress the two-step structure of 
the try title statute.  In this way, we harmonize the two-step 
try title procedure with the traditional use of the rules of 
civil procedure as a device for raising jurisdictional issues 
before a court. 
 
This approach is also consistent with that taken in try 
title actions before the rules of civil procedure were adopted.  
This court has historically reviewed the factual accuracy of a 
petitioner's claimed jurisdictional facts required for standing, 
i.e., record title and possession -- but not necessarily the 
third nonstanding jurisdictional fact, i.e., adverse claim, in 
the first step of a try title action.  See Arnold v. Reed, 162 
17 
 
Mass. 438, 440 (1894) (determining record title in first step of 
try title action based on "examination of the records of the 
Probate Court"), cited with approval in Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 
769 n.6.  See also Blanchard, 177 Mass. at 505 (determining 
possession in first step of try title action after review of 
petitioner's testimony and respondents' competing arguments). 
 
In addition, our case law requires the plaintiff to bear 
the burden of establishing sufficient facts on which 
jurisdiction can be found.  See Droukas v. Divers Training 
Academy, Inc., 375 Mass. 149, 151 (1978) (personal 
jurisdiction).  See also Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 
436 Mass. 574, 577 n.2 (2002) (subject matter jurisdiction).  In 
Cepeda v. Kass, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 732, 736-738 (2004), the 
Appeals Court held that a reviewing court shall accept as true 
all prima facie evidence of personal jurisdiction unless 
contradictory evidence is introduced, in which case the 
plaintiff must "establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the 
evidence at an evidentiary hearing or at trial."  As with 
personal jurisdiction, a judge has discretion to hold a hearing 
prior to trial to determine subject matter jurisdiction.  Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 12 (d), as amended, 451 Mass. 1401 (2008).  
Similarly, there is no impediment to a judge holding a hearing 
to determine the accuracy of alleged jurisdictional facts in the 
first step of a try title action.  If a judge holds a hearing to 
18 
 
determine the facts necessary for the petitioner to establish 
record title and possession in the first step of a try title 
action, the petitioner is required to establish those elements 
by a preponderance of the evidence standard.19   
 
Although the judge's decision ostensibly resolved the 
respondents' claim that the petition failed to state a claim 
under rule 12 (b) (6), the issue before the judge was 
essentially a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction or, more 
specifically, Abate's standing.  The respondents' challenge to 
Abate's record title, based on their argument that the 
assignment was indeed valid, was in effect a challenge to 
Abate's standing.  We now address the judge's disposition of the 
matter insofar as it rested on a determination that Abate failed 
to demonstrate record title, which in turn resulted in a lack of 
standing. 
 
b.  Abate's standing.20  Abate asserted that he held record 
title and acknowledged his grant of a mortgage to MERS and the 
                     
 
19 Requiring the petitioner to establish record title and 
possession by a preponderance of the evidence satisfies the 
"Brooklyn Bridge" problem identified in Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 
770-771. 
 
 
20 The respondents do not dispute that Abate is in fact in 
possession of the property.  There is therefore no dispute that 
he satisfies the second requirement of standing to maintain a 
try title action, i.e., that he be a "person in possession."  
G. L. c. 240, § 1. 
 
19 
 
purported assignment of that mortgage to Deutsche Bank.  Without 
acknowledging in his petition that Deutsche Bank had already 
foreclosed on the mortgage, Abate merely claimed that the 
assignment was invalid.  Deutsche Bank responded in its motion 
to dismiss that it had foreclosed on Abate's equity of 
redemption under the mortgage, thus challenging Abate's claim of 
record title.  Abate did not dispute that Deutsche Bank 
purported to foreclose on Abate's equity of redemption prior to 
Abate filing his try title action.21  The judge concluded that 
Abate lacked record title based on the absence of any viable 
claim that the mortgage assignment, and by extension the 
subsequent foreclosure, was invalid. 
 
Although it is correct that "better title" is typically 
determined in the second step of a try title action if the 
petitioner sufficiently alleges all jurisdictional facts, a try 
title action brought by a mortgagor against a foreclosing 
mortgagee may sometimes require a determination of better title 
                     
 
21 Although the foreclosure deed was not recorded before 
Abate filed his try title action, it was recorded before the 
judge issued the order dismissing Abate's complaint.  The 
foreclosure deed was not produced as part of the record, but we 
may take judicial notice of the deed where Abate did not contest 
the occurrence of the foreclosure auction.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 201(b)(2) (2014).  Judicial notice may be taken by a trial 
court or an appellate court.  Commonwealth v. Grinkley, 44 Mass. 
App. Ct. 62, 69 n.9 (1997).  The foreclosure deed was not a 
necessary requirement to finding the absence of record title, 
but its presence on record prior to disposition of this case 
further supports the conclusion that Abate lacked record title. 
20 
 
in the first step.  In circumstances such as this, where the 
mortgagor's claim of record title is predicated on a 
determination that a foreclosure auction held by a mortgagee was 
void because of a flaw in the mortgagee's chain of title, the 
petitioner must demonstrate "better title" than the mortgagee in 
order to show that the foreclosure was invalid and, thus, that 
the mortgagor retained title after the foreclosure auction 
occurred.  If a valid foreclosure did not occur, the mortgagor 
and mortgagee have complementary claims to title; however, a 
valid foreclosure terminates a mortgagor's claim of title.22  
Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 775 ("a mortgage, by its nature, 
necessarily implies the simultaneous existence of two separate 
but complementary claims to the property that do not survive the 
mortgage or each other").  See Blanchard, 177 Mass. at 504-505.  
Under Massachusetts law, which subscribes to the "title theory" 
for mortgages, the title interests are split between the 
mortgagor and mortgagee.  The legal "'title' to the mortgaged 
real estate remains in the mortgagee until the mortgage is 
satisfied or foreclosed."  Faneuil Investors Group, Ltd. 
Partnership v. Selectmen of Dennis, 458 Mass. 1, 6 (2010), 
                     
 
22 A petitioner may hold record title without having good 
title or may have good title without record title.  See Arnold 
v. Reed, 162 Mass. 438, 440 (1894) (noting that forged deed 
creates record title but not good title and that adverse 
possession and deed executed through unrecorded power of 
attorney create good title, but not record title). 
21 
 
quoting Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 4.1 
comment a (1997).  Equitable title remains in the mortgagor.  
Bevilacqua, supra at 774.  See Eaton v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. 
Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 575-576 (2012) (collecting cases and 
discussing common-law roots of separation of legal and equitable 
title between mortgagor and mortgagee); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. 
Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 649 (2011). 
 
Because Abate asserted that he granted a mortgage to MERS 
and did not dispute that Deutsche Bank, MERS's purported 
assignee, foreclosed Abate's equitable title under the mortgage, 
the judge was required to determine whether the assignment, and 
thus the foreclosure auction, was valid in order to determine 
whether Abate had the record title necessary to survive the 
first step of a try title action.  In so doing, the judge 
reviewed the merits of each legal argument alleged by Abate to 
support his claim that the assignment to Deutsche Bank was 
invalid or void.23  As previously mentioned, Abate had the burden 
                     
 
23 Abate pleaded the following allegations in support of his 
claim that the assignment was void or invalid:  (1) the 
assignment "fails to identify the principal that MERS was 
purportedly acting for"; (2) MERS had no lawful authority from 
Fremont to assign the mortgage; (3) lack of consideration; (4) 
noncompliance with G. L. c. 183, § 6D, because the mortgage 
broker and originator were not listed; (5) lack of MERS's 
corporate seal; (6) the assignment violated the terms of the 
Carrington trust; (7) the assignment was not lawfully executed 
because the signatory allegedly did not sign in the presence of 
the notary; (8) the signatory was not "duly authorized" to 
 
22 
 
to prove record title after that jurisdictional fact was 
challenged, and Abate failed to demonstrate that the assignment 
was invalid for any of the reasons asserted in his petition.  
Consequently, the judge determined that Abate failed to 
demonstrate the record title required to maintain the action 
because none of the alleged defects in the assignment could 
withstand review under rule 12 (b) (1) and negate the validity 
of the foreclosure.  The judge, therefore, dismissed the 
petition against Deutsche Bank, Carrington, and MERS. 
 
Apart from his contention that the judge could not test the 
sufficiency of his claims under rule 12 (b) (6), Abate does not 
argue error in the judge's rulings on the merits of the 
respondents' claims.  Abate's failure to address this issue on 
appeal waives his right to appellate review of the judge's 
ruling on the merits of the motions.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) 
(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975).  See also Galiastro v. 
Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 467 Mass. 160, 174 (2014) 
(claim waived where appellant made no appellate argument 
concerning improper dismissal under rule 12 [b] [6]).  
Accordingly, we need not, and therefore do not, decide whether 
the judge properly concluded that none of the claimed 
                                                                  
execute the assignment; (9) the signatory was an employee of 
Carrington, not MERS; and (10) the assignment fraudulently 
attempts to conceal the actual date of securitization. 
23 
 
infirmities in the assignment plausibly sets forth any basis on 
which the assignment could be found to be void or invalid. 
 
c.  The adverse claim element of jurisdiction.  Where we 
have characterized the judge's decision as being premised on 
Abate's lack of standing based on the lack of record title, the 
remaining jurisdictional fact, adverse claim, has no bearing on 
the outcome of this appeal.  It is undisputed that Abate filed 
his try title petition after the foreclosure occurred, which 
conclusively establishes the existence of an adverse claim. 
Nonetheless, because the issue may arise in future try title 
actions between a mortgagor and a mortgagee, we take this 
opportunity to resolve the conflict in the Land Court try title 
decisions on the adverse claim element of subject matter 
jurisdiction.24  We conclude that where a mortgagor challenges 
the right of the mortgagee to foreclose, the "adverse claim" 
element of a try title action is sufficiently alleged only if 
the foreclosure already has occurred. 
 
Our view that an adverse claim arises only after 
foreclosure is dictated by application of well-settled mortgage 
law principles to the jurisdictional requirement of an adverse 
claim.  In this regard, the analysis in Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 
776, where we held that "a necessary element of [a] try title 
                     
 
24 See note 12, supra. 
24 
 
action [is] the existence of an adverse claim" is instructive.  
As between a mortgagor and a mortgagee, the title interests are 
not, as a matter of law, adverse.  Because a mortgagor and 
mortgagee hold complementary claims of title, the law fashions a 
relationship that is in equipoise, which stands until either the 
mortgagor satisfies the debt or the mortgagee forecloses.  See 
Bevilacqua, supra at 775, citing Negron v. Gordon, 373 Mass. 
199, 205 n.4 (1977).  Following the logic of Bevilacqua, neither 
is superior or inferior to the other.25 
 
Our conclusion that the requisite adverse claim does not 
exist where a mortgagor challenges an impending foreclosure does 
not, however, preclude a try title action in circumstances where 
the very existence of a mortgage is called into question.  In 
this regard, we recognize the continuing vitality of our holding 
in Brewster v. Seeger, 173 Mass. 281, 282 (1899), where we 
recognized the petitioner's right, under the try title statute, 
to challenge an imminent foreclosure.  The petitioner alleged 
record title, possession, and an adverse claim by the respondent 
having entered to foreclose.  Id.  We reviewed the merits of the 
                     
 
25 Although the judge insisted that Abate demonstrate "a 
claim of superior title," we do not interpret the statute to 
require such a showing.  A property owner need only show record 
title to establish standing under the try title statute.  As 
discussed supra, however, in certain actions between a mortgagor 
and purported mortgagee, a showing of record title may require a 
determination of superior title. 
25 
 
case and determined that the respondent had no legal right to 
enter to foreclose.  Id. at 282-283.  Our holding in Brewster, 
however, does not govern this case.  The result in Brewster is 
explained by the fact that the petitioner's claim did not arise 
from the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship.  To the contrary, the 
petitioner claimed that the mortgage had been discharged and 
that, therefore, it no longer existed.  Thus, the adverse claim 
element alleged in Brewster rested on a completely different and 
legally sustainable footing.  The rules regarding separate but 
complementary title interests did not in that case preclude the 
necessary showing of an adverse claim.  Where a try title action 
is, as in Brewster, based on facts consistent with an adverse 
claim as we have defined it here, or otherwise recognized in our 
law, we leave it to the judge to determine the sufficiency of 
the adverse claim allegation.26 
 
Fidelity to the requirement of an adverse claim does not 
place unreasonable or unnecessary limits on the remedies 
available to a property owner seeking to prevent the obvious 
harm that may result when a foreclosure proceeds without 
challenge.  We are mindful that in Massachusetts, a nonjudicial 
foreclosure State, a mortgagee may foreclose without prior 
                     
 
26 We do not think that the facts in the Varian case, see 
note 12, supra, meet this test inasmuch as the existence of the 
mortgage was not in dispute.  The petitioners argued only that 
the respondents did not hold the mortgage. 
26 
 
judicial intervention.  As we have noted, however, a property 
owner has other, and perhaps more suitable, remedies available 
to him or her.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 231A, §§ 1-9 (declaratory 
judgment); G. L. c. 240, §§ 6-10 (action to quiet title); Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 65, 365 Mass. 832 (1974) (injunction as remedy).  In 
addition, a property owner in a foreclosure is protected by our 
requirement of strict adherence to the law in each of the 
nonjudicial foreclosure procedures available to a mortgagee.  
See, e.g., Eaton, 462 Mass. at 571 (foreclosure sale conducted 
pursuant to power of sale must comply with all applicable 
statutory provisions); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 458 Mass. at 646-
647 (failure to comply strictly with power of sale renders 
foreclosure sale void).  We discern no prejudice to a party's 
rights under this interpretation of the try title statute.27 
 
3.  Dismissal with prejudice.  The Land Court judge 
dismissed Abate's complaint against Deutsche Bank, Carrington, 
and MERS with prejudice.  As noted supra, the judge's dismissal 
was essentially based on Abate's failure to meet one of three 
threshold jurisdictional requirements for a try title action, 
namely, the standing requirement of record title.  Mass. R. Civ. 
                     
 
27 We are cognizant of the concerns expressed by the court 
in Jepson, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 207.  However, as we have already 
said, a petitioner challenging a mortgage foreclosure may seek 
the available and adequate remedies available in other 
procedures. 
27 
 
P. 12 (h) (3).  Dismissals for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction are ordinarily without prejudice because dismissal 
for lack of jurisdiction is typically not an adjudication on the 
merits.  See Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 780, citing Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 41 (b) (3), as amended, 454 Mass. 1403 (2009).  In this case, 
however, as we have explained, the judge correctly considered 
the merits of Abate's claims as a necessary step in determining 
the absence of his record title.  Accordingly, dismissal with 
prejudice was proper. 
 
Conclusion.  The judgment dismissing Abate's petition 
against Deutsche Bank, Carrington, and MERS with prejudice is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.