Case Title: Townsend v. ChartSwap, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019AP002034

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-11-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 86 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP2034 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Andrea Townsend, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
ChartSwap, LLC, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 395 Wis. 2d 229,952 N.W.2d 831 
PDC No:2021 WI App 79 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 26, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 29, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Paul R. Van Grunsven   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined, and in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined, except for ¶¶17 and 23-26.  DALLET, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Thomas L. Shriner, Jr., Andrew J. Wronski, Philip C. 
Babler, Anne-Louise T. Mittal, and Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee. 
There was an oral argument by Thomas L. Shriner, Jr. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by Robert 
J. Welcenbach and Welcenbach Law Offices, S.C., Milwaukee; with 
whom on the brief was Scott C. Borison  and Legg Law Firm LLC, 
Baltimore, Maryland; with whom on the brief was Jon Craig Jones 
 
 
2 
and Jones & Hill, LLC, Oakdale, Louisiana. There was an oral 
argument by Scott C. Borison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association for Justice by Brett A. Eckstein and Cannon & Dunphy, 
S.C., Brookfield.  
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 86 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2019AP2034 
(L.C. No. 
2018CV9938) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Andrea Townsend, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
ChartSwap, LLC, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
NOV 26, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined, and in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined, except for ¶¶17 and 23-26.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
 
 
REVIEW of the decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review the court of 
appeals' decision1 reversing the circuit court's2 dismissal of 
Andrea Townsend's claim against ChartSwap, LLC ("ChartSwap") for 
                                                 
1 Townsend v. ChartSwap, LLC, 2020 WI App 79, 395 Wis. 2d 229, 
952 N.W.2d 831. 
2 The Honorable Paul R. Van Grunsven of Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court presided.  
No. 
2019AP2034 
 
2 
 
unlawfully overcharging her for copies of her medical records in 
contravention of the fee restrictions set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.83(3f) (2017-18).3  On appeal, ChartSwap urges us to reverse 
the court of appeals, arguing that the statutory fee restrictions 
do not apply to it because it is not a health care provider, which 
is statutorily defined, and because principles of agency law do 
not impose personal liability on it for the fees it charged.   
¶2 
We conclude that, under a plain meaning interpretation 
of Wis. Stat. § 146.81(1), ChartSwap is not a health care provider; 
and, therefore, it is not subject to the fee restrictions in Wis. 
Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b), which regulate health care providers.  
Additionally, we conclude that neither common law principles of 
agency nor the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 990.001(9) supports 
the conclusion that an agent is personally liable for charging 
more for health care records than the statute permits its principal 
to charge.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals.  
                                                 
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-
18 version unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
2019AP2034 
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Factual History4 
¶3 
On August 2, 2016, Andrea Townsend ("Townsend") was 
injured in a car crash.  Townsend retained a law firm for her 
personal injuries, and the firm, with her written consent, sought 
certified health care records and billings from Milwaukee 
Radiologists, which was involved in her care.  
¶4 
Following her attorney's request, ChartSwap replied on 
behalf of Milwaukee Radiologists and provided a one page certified 
health care record to Townsend, for which it charged $35.87.  
Townsend's attorneys paid the bill.  Townsend then asserted claims 
against ChartSwap for negligent or intentional violation of the 
fee structure dictated for health care providers in Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.83(3f)(b) and a claim for unjust enrichment.5  Townsend also 
                                                 
4 This case presents in the context of a motion to dismiss. 
Therefore, facts are drawn from the complaint and taken as true 
and undisputed for purposes of the motion.  Data Key Partners v. 
Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶18, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 
693.  
5 In pleading "UNJUST ENRICHMENT," Townsend incorporated by 
reference all allegations about ChartSwap's charging more for the 
copy of her medical record than Townsend asserts ChartSwap lawfully 
could charge under Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b).  Complaint ¶60.  
Townsend alleged that ChartSwap knew its charges were unlawful, 
and that it appreciated and received a benefit of the illegal 
charges that was inequitable.  Id., ¶¶61-63.  All of her 
allegations require that ChartSwap's charge for medical records 
were controlled by § 146.83(3f)(b), were in excess of the 
statutorily stated charges, and therefore were unlawful.  As we 
explain fully below, her contentions are legally incorrect.   
Before us Townsend asserts, "The Complaint sets forth facts 
and a cause of action in which it alleges that Milwaukee 
Radiologists was not entitled to charge these fees, that 
Chart[S]wap . . . acted as the agent of Milwaukee Radiologists and 
No. 
2019AP2034 
 
4 
 
alleged that ChartSwap had collected fees as the agent for and on 
behalf of Milwaukee Radiologists.  
B.  Procedural History 
¶5 
In the circuit court, ChartSwap moved to dismiss the 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.  ChartSwap alleged that Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b) 
applies only to "health care providers" and that Townsend's 
complaint did not allege that ChartSwap was a health care provider 
within the statutory definition of that term.  Moreover, ChartSwap, 
after initially disputing that it was the agent of Milwaukee 
Radiologists, argued that even if it were its agent, ChartSwap was 
not personally liable under Wisconsin common law principles of 
agency. 
¶6 
The circuit court granted ChartSwap's motion to dismiss.  
It relied on the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b) to 
determine that the fee restrictions applied only to health care 
providers.  Therefore, because the complaint failed to allege that 
ChartSwap was a health care provider, it failed to state a claim 
                                                 
that Chart[S]wap illegally charged and obtained the money knowing 
it was illegal and must return it."  Reply Br., 34.   
Townsend does not allege facts sufficient to support a claim 
for unjust enrichment.  Rather, she simply incorporates her 
statutory violation claim in paragraph 60 and labels it unjust 
enrichment.  However, the type of claim is not determined by the 
label a party gives to a pleading.  Tikalsky v. Friedman, 2019 WI 
56, ¶14, 386 Wis. 2d 757, 928 N.W.2d 502.  It is the facts alleged 
that matter.  See Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 
315, 401 N.W. 816 (1987).  Here, no facts were alleged sufficient 
to support a claim for unjust enrichment.  See Puttkammer v. Minth, 
83 Wis. 2d 686, 688-89, 266 N.W.2d 361 (1978).  
No. 
2019AP2034 
 
5 
 
upon which relief could be granted. Additionally, the circuit court 
held that, regardless of whether ChartSwap was an agent for 
Milwaukee Radiologists, the common law of agency in Wisconsin does 
not impute a principal's liability for failing to comply with 
§ 146.83(3f)(b) to an agent.  The circuit court entered judgment 
dismissing Townsend's complaint, and she appealed. 
¶7 
The court of appeals reversed, holding that, as an agent 
of Milwaukee Radiologists under Wis. Stat. § 990.001(9), ChartSwap 
was subject to the fee restrictions provided by Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.83(3f)(b).  The court of appeals held that, although 
§ 146.83(3f)(b) applied only to health care providers, and 
ChartSwap was not a health care provider as defined by statute, 
the intent of the legislature and purpose of the statute——to 
"protect patients from being charged excessive fees for access to 
information in the custody and control of health care providers"—
—would be undermined if § 146.83(3f)(b) were not applied to 
ChartSwap.  Townsend v. ChartSwap, LLC, 2020 WI App 79, ¶¶8, 9, 
13, 395 Wis. 2d 229, 952 N.W.2d 831. 
¶8 
In so concluding, the court of appeals interpreted Wis. 
Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b) as follows: 
[I]n conjunction with the remedial provision set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 146.84(1)(b), which explicitly imposes 
liability upon 'any person . . . who violates [§] 
146.83,' and Wis. Stat. § 990.001(9), which expressly 
states that when construing legislative requirements 
found in all statutes, the legislature's requirements 
apply with equal force to the acts of agents.  
Id., ¶10.  The court of appeals reasoned that this conjunctive 
interpretation guarded against the "absurd" result of allowing 
No. 
2019AP2034 
 
6 
 
health care providers to charge patients "more than the reasonable 
copying and mailing costs if the providers hire others to perform 
the task of supplying the records."  Id., ¶14. Therefore, the court 
of appeals concluded that § 146.83(3f)(b), when read together with 
§ 146.84(1)(b) and § 990.001(9), required ChartSwap to adhere to 
the fee restrictions in § 146.83(3f)(b). 
¶9 
We granted ChartSwap's petition for review.6  On review, 
we determine:  (1) whether Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b) applies its 
fee restrictions to a person who is not within one of the 
statutorily-defined categories of "health care providers" and 
(2) whether Wis. Stat. § 990.001(9) requires that an agent be held 
liable 
for 
charging 
more 
for 
health 
care 
records 
than 
§ 146.83(3f)(b) directs. 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that, prior to this court's granting the 
petition for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit decided a factually and legally analogous 
case:  Smith v. RecordQuest, LLC, 989 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2021). 
Before ultimately reversing the district court out of deference to 
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision in the case at bar, the 
Seventh Circuit raised some concerns such as the common law of 
agency that binds a principal when its agent acts within the scope 
of its agency and how agency principles fit within Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.001(9).  Id. at 519.  In the court's estimation, those 
concerns required meaningful engagement.  See id.  This decision 
will provide that engagement.   
No. 
2019AP2034 
 
7 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶10 A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the 
complaint.  Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, 
¶26, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35.  Upon a motion to dismiss, we 
accept as true all facts well-pleaded in the complaint and the 
reasonable inferences therefrom.  Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg 
Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶11, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205.  
However, a court cannot add facts in the process of construing a 
complaint.  John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 123, 
¶19, 284 Wis. 2d 307, 700 N.W.2d 180.  Moreover, "legal conclusions 
asserted in a complaint are not accepted, and legal conclusions 
are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss."  Data Key 
Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶18, 356 Wis. 2d 
665, 849 N.W.2d 693.  Therefore, our focus is on factual 
allegations made in the complaint.  Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 
1, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶26.  We determine whether the facts alleged 
state a claim for relief, which is a legal question that we review 
independently.  Id. 
¶11 Additionally, this case involves questions of statutory 
interpretation and application.  Statutory interpretation and 
application present questions of law that we independently review, 
while benefitting from the decisions of the circuit court and the 
court of appeals.  Marder v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. 
Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110. 
No. 
2019AP2034 
 
8 
 
B.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 146.83(3f)(b) and 146.84(1)(b) 
¶12 The "purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine 
what the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, 
and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Statutory 
interpretation begins with the language of the statute.  If the 
meaning of the words are plain and unambiguous, a court's inquiry 
ends and there is no need to consult extrinsic sources of 
interpretation, such as legislative history.  Id., ¶¶45, 46.  
Statutory language is given its "common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning."  Id., ¶45 (citing Bruno v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2003 WI 28, 
¶¶8, 20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656).  
¶13 In addition to the plain words of the text, "[c]ontext 
is important to meaning.  So, too, is the structure of the statute 
in which the operative language appears."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46.  Therefore, "statutory language is interpreted in the context 
in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results . . . [and] read where possible to give reasonable effect 
to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id.  When courts 
interpret a statute, they are not at liberty "to disregard the 
plain, clear words of the statute."  Id.   
¶14 Turning 
to 
the 
statute 
at 
issue, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 146.83(3f)(b), it provides that when fulfilling a request by a 
No. 
2019AP2034 
 
9 
 
person for medical records, a health care provider may charge no 
more than the total of all of the following that apply: 
1.  For paper copies:  $1 per page for the first 25 
pages; 75 cents per page for pages 26 to 50; 50 cents 
per page for pages 51 to 100; and 30 cents per page for 
pages 101 and above. 
2.  For microfiche or microfilm copies, $1.50 per 
page. 
3.  For a print of an X-ray, $10 per image. 
4.  If the requester is not the patient or a person 
authorized by the patient, for certification of copies, 
a single $8 charge. 
5.  If the requester is not the patient or a person 
authorized by the patient, a single retrieval fee of $20 
for all copies requested. 
6.  Actual shipping costs and any applicable taxes. 
§ 146.83(3f)(b).  By the terms of the statute itself, these 
restrictions apply only to health care providers, a term which is 
defined in an adjacent statutory provision.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.81(1).7  Here, neither the parties nor the court of appeals 
contend that ChartSwap is a health care provider, as defined by 
§ 146.81(1).8 
¶15 Instead, in order to hold ChartSwap liable, despite not 
being defined as a health care provider, the court of appeals cited 
a third statutory section, Wis. Stat. § 146.84(1)(b), which 
                                                 
7 See Wis. Stat. § 146.81(1) ("'Health care provider' means 
any of the following:  (a) A nurse licensed under ch. 441.  (b) A 
chiropractor licensed under ch. 446.  (c) A dentist licensed under 
ch. 447. . . . . (s) An emergency medical responder, as defined in 
[§ ] 256.01(4p).").  
8 See Townsend, 395 Wis. 2d 229, ¶8. 
No. 
2019AP2034 
 
10 
 
imposes "liability upon 'any person . . . who violates [Wis. Stat. 
§] 146.83.'"  Townsend, 395 Wis. 2d 229, ¶10.  The court of appeals 
reasoned that, rather than focusing on a definition of "health care 
provider," the context and structure of the statute, as well as 
the legislature's decision to impose liability on "any person," 
should control whether ChartSwap is liable for charging more than 
§ 146.83(3f)(b) permits.  Id.   
¶16 We agree that the context of a statutory scheme is 
important to the plain meaning of the text.  Statutes are to be 
construed and harmonized with one another when possible.  Pruitt 
v. State, 16 Wis. 2d 169, 173, 114 N.W.2d 148 (1962).  Here, there 
are two statutes that speak to providing health care records under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 146.83(3f)(b):  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 146.84(1)(b) 
and 
§ 146.83(3f)(b).  Section 146.84(1)(b) provides that "[a]ny 
person" may be held liable for knowingly and willfully violating 
the provisions of § 146.83.  However, the text of § 146.83(3f)(b) 
regulates only those charges made by health care providers.  
Therefore, if a health care provider charged more than the fees 
permissible under § 146.83(3f)(b), it would fall within the 
parameters of both § 146.84(1)(b) and § 146.83(3f)(b).  Because 
ChartSwap is not a health care provider, its provision of health 
care records does not satisfy both statutes.   
¶17 Stated otherwise, Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b) regulates 
charges that a health care provider may require for health care 
records, and Wis. Stat. § 146.84(1)(b) refers back to § 146.83, 
generally, with a directive to "any person" that damages may follow 
if the provisions of § 146.83 are not followed.  Section 
No. 
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146.83(3f)(b) is the more specific of the two statutes in regard 
to charges for health care records.  However, the court of appeals 
concluded that § 146.84 directed its decision, rather than relying 
on the plain meaning of § 146.83(3f)(b).  Townsend, 395 Wis. 2d 
229, ¶10.  We come to a different conclusion based on the plain 
meaning of § 146.83(3f)(b).  Our conclusion also is supported by 
a canon of statutory interpretation, whose potential application 
is explained more fully below.  
¶18 Furthermore, 
although 
the 
text 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 146.84(1)(b) refers to "any person," it is not an enforcement 
mechanism solely for Wis. Stat. § 146.83.  It also relates to 
violations of other statutes.  For example, § 146.84(1)(b) applies 
to Wis. Stat. § 146.82(1), which provides that "All patient health 
care records shall remain confidential."  Section 146.82(1) is not 
at issue in this matter.  
¶19 In addition, limiting the fee restrictions in Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.83(3f)(b) to statutorily-defined health care providers does 
not create absurd results.  In her brief, Townsend invited this 
court to consider the following scenarios:  under the definitional 
limitation, if a patient were to request health care records from 
a hospital and the hospital supplied the records itself, the 
patient would not be charged extra fees.  However, if the hospital 
outsourced responding to the request for health care records, such 
as occurred with ChartSwap, the patient would be charged an extra 
fee.  Townsend's juxtaposition purports to show the absurdity and 
unfairness of the situation, as well as a potential loophole for 
No. 
2019AP2034 
 
12 
 
health care providers.  However, her scenarios are not persuasive 
for at least two reasons.  
¶20 First, it is not absurd for the legislature to make 
policy decisions regarding the applicability of statutes to 
different constituents.  At some point, there will be a cutoff.  
This is a policy choice that legislatures frequently make, and 
policy choices are left to legislative discretion.  See Milwaukee 
J. Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI 65, ¶37, 341 Wis. 2d 
607, 815 N.W.2d 367 ("Policy decisions are left to the 
legislature."); Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 
1718, 1725 (2017) ("Legislation is, after all, the art of 
compromise, the limitations expressed in statutory terms often the 
price of passage . . . .").  
¶21 Second, the perceived unfairness of Townsend's scenarios 
likely have another remedy, which was raised at oral argument.  In 
this case, Townsend asserted that ChartSwap was the agent of 
Milwaukee Radiologists.9  Milwaukee Radiologists is a health care 
provider under the statutory definition.  Therefore, if Chartswap 
was the agent of Milwaukee Radiologists when it provided Townsend's 
health care records, as has been alleged, Chartswap's actions are 
Milwaukee Radiologists' actions.  See Restatement (Third) of 
                                                 
9 Agency is a common law concept based upon certain factual 
situations.  Cochran v. Allyn, 16 Wis. 2d 20, 23, 113 N.W.2d 538 
(1962).  However, whether the facts fulfill the legal standard for 
agency is a question of law.  Brown v. Sandeen Agency, Inc., 2009 
WI App 11, ¶18, 316 Wis. 2d 253, 762 N.W.2d 850 (citing B.C. 
Ziegler & Co. v. Ehren, 141 Wis. 2d 19, 26, 414 N.W.2d 48 (Ct. 
App. 1987)). 
No. 
2019AP2034 
 
13 
 
Agency § 7.03(1) (2006) (explaining that a principal is subject to 
liability to a third party when its agent acts with authority and 
in contravention of the principal's legal obligation).  However, 
whether 
an 
agency 
relationship 
existed 
between 
Milwaukee 
Radiologists and ChartSwap is not an issue that was presented to 
us for decision as we review ChartSwap's motion to dismiss; and 
accordingly, we do not decide it.   
¶22 Finally, 
it 
bears 
repeating 
that 
statutory 
interpretation begins with the language of the statute.  If the 
meaning of the words are plain and unambiguous, the court's inquiry 
ends, and there is no need to consult extrinsic sources of 
interpretation, such as legislative history.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, ¶¶45, 46.  
¶23 The court of appeals struggled with interpreting two 
statutes that address the same subject matter, charging for health 
care records.  Wisconsin Stat. § 146.84(1)(b) provides a general 
prohibition to "any person" in regard to those charges and Wis. 
Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b) provides a prohibition limited to a "health 
care provider."  The court of appeals' efforts at reconciling the 
two statutes relied heavily on its perception of legislative 
"intent" and the "purpose" of Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b) to 
conclude that § 146.83(3f)(b)'s fee restrictions applied to 
ChartSwap.   
¶24 Even after acknowledging that ChartSwap is not a health 
care provider under Wis. Stat. § 146.81(1)'s definition, see 
Townsend, 395 Wis. 2d 229, ¶8, the court of appeals reasoned that 
the "intent of the legislature was to ensure that patients have 
No. 
2019AP2034 
 
14 
 
access to medical records in the custody and control of health 
care providers without being charged more than the reasonable costs 
of copying and mailing them."  Id., ¶14.  The court of appeals 
reliance on its perception of legislative intent when construing 
a statute is misplaced, as we have explained.  State v. Fitzgerald, 
2019 WI 69, ¶30, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165 ("[R]ather, we 
interpret the words the legislature actually enacted into law.").    
¶25 If 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
had 
employed 
the 
general/specific canon of statutory construction, it could have 
assisted its interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 146.84(1)(b) and Wis. 
Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b).  To explain further, although the 
"general/specific canon is perhaps most frequently applied to 
statutes in which a general permission or prohibition is 
contradicted by a specific prohibition[,]. . . [it] has full 
application as well to statutes such as the one here, in which a 
general authorization and a more limited, specific authorization 
exist side-by-side."  RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated 
Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (emphasis added).  As Justice Scalia 
explained, "There the canon avoids not contradiction but the 
superfluity of a specific provision that is swallowed by the 
general one, 'violating the cardinal rule that, if possible, effect 
shall be given to every clause and part of a statute.'"  Id. 
(citing D. Ginsburg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932) 
(explaining that "[s]pecific terms prevail over the general in the 
same or another statute which otherwise might be controlling.")). 
¶26 Applying the general/specific canon here would have 
assisted the court of appeals in understanding that when the 
No. 
2019AP2034 
 
15 
 
wording of a general statute swallows the application of a specific 
statute, the "terms of the specific authorization[, Wis. Stat. 
§ 146.83(3f)(b),] must be complied with."  RadLAX Gateway Hotel 
LLC, 566 U.S. at 645.  Therefore, once the court of appeals 
acknowledged that ChartSwap was not a statutorily-defined health 
care provider, at which § 146.83(3f)(b) is directed, the court of 
appeals' inquiry in regard to ChartSwap should have stopped.  
Instead, its decision misconstrued § 147.83(3f)(b), whose plain 
meaning applies only to health care providers.  
C.  Wisconsin Stat. § 990.001(9) 
¶27 The court of appeals also concluded that, even if 
ChartSwap was not included in the statutorily-defined list of 
health care providers, ChartSwap was nevertheless personally 
liable to Townsend for extra charges under principles of agency 
law that the court of appeals concluded were codified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.001(9).  Townsend, 395 Wis. 2d 229, ¶¶10-13. 
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 990 provides canons of construction 
that shall be observed when construing or interpreting Wisconsin 
statutes.  See Wis. Stat. § 990.001.  Subsection (9) provides:  
Acts by agents.  If a statute requires an act to be done 
which may legally be done by an agent, such requirement 
includes all such acts when done by an authorized agent.  
§ 990.001(9).  The court of appeals interpreted § 990.001(9) to 
mean that if a statute requires a certain action, the requirement 
to comply with the statute applies "with equal force" to a 
principal's agent.  Townsend, 395 Wis. 2d 229, ¶10. Consequently, 
the court of appeals reasoned that because ChartSwap was fulfilling 
No. 
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16 
 
a request made of Milwaukee Radiologists, the fee restrictions on 
Milwaukee Radiologists applied equally to ChartSwap.   
¶29 The court of appeals' interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.001(9) misperceives Wisconsin common law principles of 
agency.  The court of appeals' interpretation is also in conflict 
with the plain meaning of § 990.001(9).   
¶30 "[A]n agent is one who acts on behalf of and is subject 
to reasonably precise control by the principal for the tasks the 
person performs within the scope of the agency."  Westmas v. 
Creekside Tree Serv., Inc., 2018 WI 12, ¶36, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 
N.W.2d 68.  "Whether an agency relationship exists is a question 
of fact that turns on the understanding between the alleged 
principal and the alleged agent of the relationship."  DOR v. 
Microsoft Corp., 2019 WI App 62, ¶46, 389 Wis. 2d 350, 936 N.W.2d 
160 (citing Noll v. Dimiceli's, Inc., 115 Wis. 2d 641, 643, 340 
N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1983)).   
¶31 Townsend seeks to hold ChartSwap liable because of the 
fees it charged for health care records that were generated by 
Milwaukee Radiologists, a health care provider.  However, an agent 
is subject to "liability to a third party harmed by the agent's 
conduct only when the agent's conduct breaches a duty that the 
agent [itself] owes to the third party."  Restatement (Third) of 
Agency § 7.02.  Stated otherwise, in order for an agent to be held 
liable for a statutory violation committed while acting on behalf 
of a principal, that same conduct also would need to violate the 
statute if done in the agent's personal capacity.  However, no 
breach of an independent duty of ChartSwap to Townsend is alleged 
No. 
2019AP2034 
 
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to have occurred.  Rather, a breach of Milwaukee Radiologists' 
statutory duty to Townsend is alleged.   
¶32 Under a plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 990.001(9), the 
statute simply affirms the common law principle that an agent may 
fulfill a principal's statutory duty because, in the eyes of the 
law, the agent's actions are the principal's actions.  Not only 
did the Seventh Circuit come to a similar conclusion in its recent 
interpretation of § 990.001(9), see Smith v. RecordQuest, LLC, 989 
F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2021), but Wisconsin case law confirms 
this understanding.   
¶33 In Rosecky v. Tomaszewski, 225 Wis. 438, 274 N.W. 259 
(1937), a lender told a debtor to make payments on a mortgage to 
an agent that the principal had authorized.  Id. at 439. 
Subsequently, the lender assigned the mortgage to a third party. 
Id.  However, the debtor was never notified of this change and 
continued to pay the agent, who embezzled the funds.  Id.  
¶34 The assignee sued the debtor and the dispositive issue 
was whether the debtor should be credited with the payments made 
to the agent after the assignment.  Id.  In interpreting the 
predecessor statute to Wis. Stat. § 990.001(9), we held that the 
debtor was due credit for the payments made to the agent because 
the principal established the agency and "the act of an authorized 
agent is the act of the principal."  Id. at 442.  
¶35 Furthermore, a plain meaning interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 990.001(9) provides that if a principal is required by 
statute to do an act and that act may be done legally by an agent, 
the statutory requirement of the principal to act includes all 
No. 
2019AP2034 
 
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acts that were done by the principal's authorized agent.  It says 
not one word about making the agent personally liable for acts 
taken upon authorization of the principal.  It simply states the 
common law of agency that an act done by an authorized agent is 
the act of the principal.   
¶36 Accordingly, 
we conclude that the plain meaning 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 990.001(9) embodies the fundamental 
common law principle that an agent's actions are the principal's 
actions for purposes of fulfilling a principal's statutory duty.  
Subsection 990.001(9) imposes no personal liability on an agent 
for authorized acts taken on behalf of its principal.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶37 We conclude that, under a plain meaning interpretation 
of Wis. Stat. § 146.81(1), ChartSwap is not a health care provider; 
and, therefore, it is not subject to the fee restrictions in Wis. 
Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b), which regulate health care providers.  
Additionally, we conclude that neither common law principles of 
agency nor the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 990.001(9) supports 
the conclusion that an agent is personally liable for charging 
more for health care records than the statute permits its principal 
to charge.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.
No.  2019AP2034.rfd 
1 
 
¶38 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  Although the 
substantive canons of statutory interpretation may sometimes be 
helpful in determining what the legislature meant to say, here 
they only confuse the analysis.  The statutes at issue are 
straightforward, and understanding them requires no outside 
interpretive help.  I agree with the majority opinion that Wis. 
Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b), by its plain meaning, does not apply to 
ChartSwap.  As the majority opinion acknowledges, that should end 
the analysis.  Instead, it muddies the waters by attempting to 
apply an inapposite canon of construction.  I therefore 
respectfully concur.1 
¶39 The general-specific canon applies only to statutes that 
both address the same subject matter and conflict with one another 
such that harmonizing them is impossible.  See Kramer v. City of 
Hayward, 57 Wis. 2d 302, 310-11, 203 N.W.2d 871 (1973); see also 
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 183 (2012) 
(explaining that the general-specific canon may apply only when 
conflicting provisions "simply cannot be reconciled——when the 
attribution 
of 
no 
permissible 
meaning 
can 
eliminate 
the 
conflict").  Neither condition is met here.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§§ 146.83(3f)(b) and 146.84(1)(b) address different subject 
matters and are not in conflict.  The former regulates how much a 
health care provider can charge a patient for a copy of her medical 
records; the latter simply provides the penalty for violating the 
former.  See majority op., ¶18.  Thus, the general-specific canon 
does not apply. 
                                                 
1 I join all parts of the majority opinion except for ¶¶17 
and 23-26. 
No.  2019AP2034.rfd 
2 
 
¶40 This case is prime example of how foisting the canons 
upon an otherwise straightforward, well-reasoned, and convincing 
textual analysis is unnecessary——and ultimately confusing.  Even 
if the majority opinion is correct that the general-specific canon 
applies when a general "authorization" "swallows" a specific 
authorization, see id., ¶¶25-26, the majority opinion fails to 
explain how this is such a situation.  It offers no explanation 
for how §§ 146.83(3f)(b) and 146.84(1)(b) are "authorizations" or 
for how one swallows the other.  Indeed, the majority opinion's 
conclusion that the general-specific canon would have "assisted" 
the court of appeals' analysis is a non sequitur:  How could the 
canon "assist" the court of appeals if it does not even apply?  
All of this confusion could easily be avoided by simply reading 
and applying the statutory text.  Because the majority opinion 
instead shoehorns an inapplicable canon into its analysis, I 
respectfully concur. 
¶41 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this opinion. 
 
No.  2019AP2034.rfd 
1