Case Title: CHRISTIAN v. La Forge

Citation: 194 Or. 450, 242 P.2d 797

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1952-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Affirmed April 2, 1952.
*452 John D. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, of Portland, and Leonard D. Alley, of Portland, argued the cause for appellants. With them on the brief was George Neuner, Attorney General, of Salem.
No appearance for respondent.
AFFIRMED.
TOOZE, J.
This is a suit for an injunction, brought by Sherman Christian, Clarence Townsend, and Clyde C. Haase, as members of and constituting the Oregon State Board of Barber Examiners, as plaintiffs, against Earl La Forge, as defendant. The trial court sustained defendant's general demurrer to the complaint, and a decree was entered dismissing the suit. Plaintiffs appeal.
Omitting formal parts, the complaint alleges:
Defendant's demurrer reads as follows:
Insofar as material to the discussion that is to follow, ch 198, Oregon Laws 1945, provides as follows:
*459 The first act in this state that sought to vest the State Board of Barber Examiners with power to adopt a scale of minimum prices for barber services was adopted by the legislative assembly in 1943: ch 330, Oregon Laws 1943. The 1943 act came before this court for consideration on an appeal in a declaratory judgment proceeding, wherein the trial court had decreed the law to be constitutional. This court reversed the decree, holding the act to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. La Forge v. Ellis, 175 Or 545, 154 P2d 844. It was the evident purpose of the legislature in adopting the act of 1945 to meet the objections sustained against the prior law. In passing, it should be noted that the plaintiff in the former appeal is the same person as the defendant in the instant case.
In La Forge v. Ellis, supra, the same attack was made upon the 1943 act as is now being made by defendant respecting the present law. However, this court did not pass upon the objection that the law violated the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution, confining its consideration to the claim that the act was invalid as an attempt unlawfully to delegate legislative authority. Yet, Mr. Justice LUSK, in writing the opinion of the court, recognized the importance of the contention respecting the Fourteenth Amendment, for at page 547 he said:
*460 Upon this appeal, however, we are of the opinion that the question is squarely presented whether the legislation in question violates the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and, therefore, we shall direct our attention to that phase of the problem.
Obviously, the adoption of this law can be justified only upon the theory that it is in the interests of the public order, health, safety, and welfare; that it is a reasonable and proper exercise of the inherent police power residing in the state.
1, 2. We are not concerned with the policy of the law, its wisdom, or expediency, but only with the power of the legislature to enact it. The presumption is that it did have such power, and the court will not hold otherwise, unless it clearly appears that constitutional provisions have been violated.
The police power is very broad and far-reaching, and it is difficult, if not impossible, definitely to fix its bounds. It is better to decide as each case arises whether the police power extends thereto, as the power is coextensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguards of the public interest. In Union Fishermen's Co. v. Shoemaker, 98 Or 659, 673, 193 P 476, 194 P 854, this court said:
Also see Camas Stage Co., Inc. v. Kozer, 104 Or 600, 612, 209 P 95; 16 CJS, Constitutional Law, 539, § 175.
In 16 CJS, Constitutional Law, 543, § 175b, it is stated:
3. However, it is a well-established rule that when courts are called upon to apply the judicial test of reasonableness to an act adopted by the legislature, they will accord to the lawmaking body a large discretion in determining not only what the interests of the public require, but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. As was said in Union Fishermen's Co. v. Shoemaker, supra, at page 675:
*462 4. In applying the test of reasonableness to a statute adopted by the legislature, the courts give due consideration to a declaration therein that the act is in the interests of the public health, safety, and general welfare. This declaration by the legislature is entitled to great weight, but it is not conclusive.
5. In all cases it is the duty of the courts to enforce the state's police regulations enacted by the legislature in good faith and with reasonable and appropriate regard for the protection which the state owes to the life, health, and property of its citizens. Yet, it is not only within the power, but it also is the duty, of the courts, when called upon, to decide what constitutes a proper exercise of the police power, whether legislation purporting to be enacted in the exercise of the police power is really such, and whether regulations prescribed by the legislature are reasonable, or are otherwise unconstitutional.
6. In the instant case, defendant challenges the validity of the act in question on the ground that it deprives him of a property right without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In considering this matter, we must keep in mind that the most important purpose of the written constitution is the protection of the individual right, rather than the collective social right. It is only when the interests and welfare of the public in general are clearly threatened by the unrestricted exercise of the individual right, that the individual right must give way to reasonable limitation and regulation for the public good. The courts must ever be watchful to protect the personal rights guaranteed by state and federal constitutions, and to prevent encroachments thereon by legislative fiat, unless actually essential to the protection of the public welfare.
*463 The Fourteenth Amendment in part provides:
7. The right to pursue a lawful calling is protected against adverse state legislation by this constitutional provision. In 16 CJS, Constitutional Law, 625, § 212, the rule is stated:
Though one has the inalienable right to carry on his business free from all unlawful interference, nevertheless, such right is subject to reasonable regulation in the public interests. Qualification tests for individuals proposing to enter into the practice of certain trades and professions are instances of reasonable regulations adopted for the public good. So also are sanitary regulations applying to certain trades and businesses; the barber trade, for example: title 49, OCLA, Patton v. Bellingham, 179 Wash 566, 38 P2d 364, 98 ALR 1076, and note, 1088.
In Ex parte Northrup, 41 Or 489, 492, 69 P 445, a case involving a Sunday closing law applying to barbers, the late Mr. Justice WOLVERTON said:
The sole question for determination here is whether an act fixing the minimum prices to be charged for personal services performed in the barber trade is in truth an act adopted to protect the public order, health, safety, and welfare. Does it bear some reasonable and substantial relation to the object sought to be accomplished, or is it an unreasonable and arbitrary interference with the right to contract, and, in particular, with the right of one to conduct a lawful business, trade, or calling without unnecessary and improper restrictions?
8. Obviously, the right to labor and the right to enjoy the rewards thereof may not be unreasonably interfered with by legislation. A state may not, under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with private businesses or lawful occupations, and any regulation must be reasonable in its nature, directed to the prevention of the evils, and adapted to the accomplishment of the avowed purposes.
In 16 CJS, Constitutional Law, 562, § 195, it is stated:
In Patton v. Bellingham, supra, the Supreme Court of Washington had before it for consideration a municipal ordinance providing for the inspection of barber shops, and also making it unlawful for such shops to open earlier than 8 a.m., or to close later than 6 p.m. on week days other than Saturday or later than 7 p.m. on Saturdays or days preceding holidays. The court held the inspection provisions of the ordinance to be a valid exercise of the city's police power, but decided that the opening and closing requirements were unreasonable and invalid. At page 573 the court said:
In by-gone days when government was deemed to be a responsibility of the people, rather than the people being a responsibility of government, as is unfortunately too much the case today, all legislation of the character now under consideration was deemed an unreasonable interference with the right of the individual to contract and to own and enjoy private property. Laws attempting to fix minimum wages or prices were uniformly held invalid as being in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in recent years conditions have changed; and as those changes, chiefly economic, have been developing, the law itself has not remained static, but has arisen to meet the new problems of the day, and, in most respects, justly so. As is so well stated in the case of In re Kazas, 22 Cal App2d 161, 166, 70 P2d 962:
This progress of constitutional law to meet changing conditions is well illustrated by the decisions in two cases coming before the United States Supreme Court. In Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 US 525, 43 S Ct 394, 67 L ed 785, 24 ALR 1238, decided in 1923, there was involved an act of congress fixing minimum wages for women and children in the district of Columbia. The court held the law unconstitutional as being an unreasonable restriction upon the liberty of women to contract. Prior thereto, the Supreme Court had upheld the validity of an Oregon statute which prohibited the employment of women in certain industries more than ten hours during any one day. Muller v. Oregon, 208 US 412, 52 L ed 551, 28 S Ct 324, 13 Ann *468 Cas 957. The court in the Adkins case pointed out the distinctions to be drawn between the two situations.
In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 US 379, 57 S Ct 578, 81 L ed 703, 108 ALR 1330, decided in 1937, the Supreme Court of the United States had before it for consideration a statute of the state of Washington providing for the establishment of minimum wages for women. The court overruled the Adkins case and upheld the Washington statute. It is interesting to note that both decisions were by a divided court, the latter being a five-to-four decision. In the West Coast Hotel Co. case the court emphasized the special interest the state has in the protection of women. In speaking of the decision in the Muller case, supra, at page 394, the court said:
See also U.S. v. Darby, 312 US 100, 85 L ed 609, 61 S Ct 451, 132 ALR 1430, wherein the Fair Labor Standards Act was held constitutional.
The decision most relied upon in support of legislation such as that now before this court; i.e., legislation authorizing the fixing of minimum prices, is Nebbia v. New York, 291 US 502, 54 S Ct 505, 78 L ed 940, 89 ALR 1469, decided in 1934. In that case the Supreme Court of the United States considered a statute of New York establishing a milk control board with power to fix the minimum and maximum retail prices of milk. The court upheld the validity of the act. In its discussion *469 the Supreme Court of the United States, at page 523, stated the general rule as follows:
The grounds for the decision in the Nebbia case are well summarized in Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 16 F Supp 575, 580, as follows:
However, the court, in the Nebbia case, made it very plain that the rule established as respects the *470 milk industry did not necessarily apply to all businesses, trades, and occupations, and indicated quite clearly that each case is dependent upon its own circumstances. At page 536 the court said:
In 1933 the legislature of this state adopted a milk control act similar to the New York law. Ch 72, Oregon Laws 1933, 2d special session. This act, as amended in 1935 (ch 67 and ch 69, Oregon Laws 1935, special session) came before this court for consideration. Savage v. Martin, 161 Or 660, 91 P2d 273. In that case Mr. Justice LUSK, in writing the opinion of the court, very thoroughly and capably discussed the constitutional questions involved. We upheld the validity of the act. As justification for the legislation, the court pointed out the very vital part which milk plays in the everyday lives and health of the people. At page 679, Mr. Justice LUSK said:
At page 676 it is further stated:
9. It is a matter of common knowledge that most of these price-fixing laws were adopted in the midst of a severe economic depression. They formed a part of much groping about to find a solution to the very serious economic problems confronted in every walk of life. Where the business affected by such laws was found to be one intimately associated with the public health and welfare, such as the milk industry, the statutes were upheld as a reasonable exercise of the police power. However, with an end to the depression, the justification for many of these laws ceased to exist. What was deemed a reasonable exercise of the police power yesterday might not be so considered today.
*472 The control of wages and prices, as a national problem, continues to agitate the nation. This control is demanded as one of the answers to the problem of inflation. On the other hand, such control is resisted as an unreasonable interference with the constitutional right of contract and of property. As a war emergency power, there may be justification for its existence, as there is for innumerable other powers necessary in war, but most obnoxious in times of peace.
Under our constitutional theory of government, emergencies never create power; they only justify the exercise of a power always held, but which may have lain dormant. The basic principles of our constitution are the true principles in the science of government. They never change. Changed conditions may and do warrant their broader application, but no conditions could ever justify their subversion or abandonment.
In the instant case we are not concerned with legislation having a well-recognized and direct bearing upon the health, happiness, and well-being of the public as a whole. We are concerned with a price fixing statute of primary interest to the barber trade itself. It is a statute that seeks to accomplish by legislative fiat what apparently the barbers are unable to do by agreement among themselves. Sanitary regulations are necessary and proper, as applied to the barbering business, in the interests of the public health and welfare, but it is clear that the prices barbers charge for their personal services have no direct or indirect bearing upon the welfare of the people as a whole. Legislative declaration cannot make that true which is untrue.
If the legislature, in the exercise of the police power, may fix minimum prices to be charged by barbers, it *473 may, by the same token, fix maximum prices. Fixed maximum prices might in truth benefit the public, but at the expense of the barber. It is manifest that the barber would not want that type of legislation. Yet it is clear that what today is considered by a particular trade as a shield may tomorrow become a sword in the hands of the public. Moreover, if the legislature has the constitutional power to fix prices for barbers, it also has the power to fix prices for personal services rendered in other trades, occupations, and professions. Every trade, occupation, and profession caters to and serves the public, and ordinarily the public has no more interest in the economic welfare of any one over the other. There is nothing peculiar about the barber business, as distinguished from many other businesses and professions involving the rendition of personal services. Both the medical and dental professions, for example, render personal services to the public, services which have a direct bearing upon the public health. Are the prices charged for such services subject to legislative dictation? We think not. To some extent, the same situation applies to the legal profession.
In the legal profession a schedule of minimum fees has been adopted by the Oregon State Bar, but that is the result of voluntary action on the part of the members of the Bar, not by reason of legislative act.
In the present day it is clear that barbers, like all other men and women engaged in trades and occupations, need an assured income to meet the high cost of living, and that minimum prices for services performed may be proper. But this is a matter exclusively for agreement among themselves. It does not come within the field of justifiable legislative action. The law by which the barbers must regulate their prices is *474 not one enacted by the legislature, but is the economic law of supply and demand.
10. The general rule as applied to legislation fixing minimum prices for the rendition of personal services is well stated in the note in 111 ALR, at page 354:
A number of the states have adopted statutes similar to the Oregon statute respecting the fixing of minimum prices to be charged by barbers. We have examined the statutes of Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Oklahoma. In most of the statutes of the several states mentioned, we find much the same phraseology as is used in the act now before this court.
We recognize the fact that, in some states, statutes of this character have been held constitutional; while in others they have been rejected as being invalid. We are of the unanimous opinion that those decisions holding the act to be unconstitutional are based upon much sounder reasoning, and that the courts have shown more solicitude for the constitutional rights of the individual, than do those taking the opposite view.
Perhaps the best discussion of the subject is to be found in In re Kazas, supra. In that California decision the court held an act providing for price fixing for barbers unconstitutional and void. Also see State *475 Board of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc., et al., (Cal 1951) 234 P2d 220.
In Mobile v. Rouse, 233 Ala 622, 173 So 266, 111 ALR 349, a similar law was held to be unconstitutional.
At page 623, the court said:
At page 625 the court further stated:
In Noble v. Davis, 204 Ark 156, 161 SW2d 189, the court also held as invalid an act fixing minimum prices for services performed by barbers. In the Arkansas act, as in § 1 of the Oregon law, there is stated the purpose thereof. Respecting that statement, the Arkansas court, at page 159, said:
To the same effect, see State Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind 552, 44 NE2d 972; Duncan v. City of Des Moines, 222 Iowa 218, 268 NW 547; State v. Greeson et al., 174 Tenn 178, 124 SW2d 253.
In State Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, supra, the Indiana court fully discussed the question now before this court. As a part of the discussion, at page 568, it said:
As above stated, there are decisions in which Acts similar to that now before this court were held constitutional. *477 McRae v. Robbins, 151 Fla 109, 9 So2d 284; Board of Barber Examiners of Louisiana v. Parker, 190 La 214, 182 So 485; State v. McMasters, 204 Minn 438, 283 NW 767; Herrin et al. v. Arnold, 183 Okla 392, 82 P2d 977, 119 ALR 1471; Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners et al., 45 N Mex 57, 109 P2d 779.
11. However, we are of the opinion that preservation of the individual's constitutional right of contract and of property without unnecessary and unreasonable interference is of utmost importance to the public welfare in general. The act under consideration in this case unreasonably and unnecessarily interferes with and restricts defendant's constitutional right to carry on his business and to render his services at prices suitable to himself, and is, therefore, unconstitutional and void. The able trial judge correctly sustained the demurrer to the complaint.
Decree affirmed.