Case Title: Martin G. Wenke v. Gehl Company

Citation: 2004 WI 103

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 103 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2649 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Martin G. Wenke and Dakota M. Wenke, a  
minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, Lynn R. 
Laufenberg,  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Gehl Company, a Wisconsin corporation,  
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 189 
Reported at:  267 Wis. 2d 221, 669 N.W.2d 789 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 27, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick J. Faragher   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Lynn R. Laufenberg and Laufenberg & Hoefle, S.C., Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Lynn R. Laufenberg. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Francis 
H. LoCoco, Daniel J. LaFave and Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Daniel J. LaFave. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Colleen D. Ball, 
Wauwatosa, on behalf of Deere & Company. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark S. Olson and 
Oppenheimer Wolff & Donnelly LLP, Minneapolis, MN, on behalf of 
Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ralph A. Weber, Beth 
Ermatinger Hanan and Gass Weber Mullins LLC, Milwaukee, on 
behalf of Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ralph A. Weber, Beth 
Ermatinger Hanan and Gass Weber Mullins LLC, Milwaukee, on 
behalf of Case LLC. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, 
III and Law Offices of William Gleisner, Milwaukee; David M. 
Skoglind and Aiken & Scoptur, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
2004 WI 103 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2649   
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 0431) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Martin G. Wenke and Dakota M. Wenke, a  
minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, Lynn R.  
Laufenberg,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Gehl Company, a Wisconsin corporation,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals.1  The issue presented is 
whether Landis v. Physicians Insurance Co., 2001 WI 86, 245 
Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893, functionally overrules that part of 
the holding in Leverence v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty, 
158 
Wis. 2d 64, 
462 
N.W.2d 218 
(Ct. 
App. 
1990), 
that 
distinguishes statutes of limitation from statutes of repose in 
the 
application 
of 
Wisconsin's 
"borrowing 
statute," 
                                                 
1 Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2003 WI App 189, 267 Wis. 2d 221, 669 
N.W.2d 789.   
No. 01-2649   
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 893.07.2  This question requires us to consider 
whether 
§ 893.07 
applies 
equally 
to 
foreign 
statutes 
of 
limitation and foreign statutes of repose. 
¶2 
Plaintiff Martin Wenke was severely injured in Iowa in 
September 1997 while using a baler manufactured by the Gehl 
Company, a Wisconsin corporation.  Gehl sold the baler to 
another Iowa resident in 1981, and it was subsequently acquired 
by Wenke.  An Iowa statute limiting product liability actions 
from being commenced more than 15 years after a product "was 
first purchased"3 precluded Wenke from bringing an action in Iowa 
to recover on his injuries.  Hence, in August 1999 Wenke brought 
an action in Wisconsin.  Gehl asserted that the statute barring 
the 
action 
in 
Iowa 
must 
be 
borrowed 
and 
applied 
under § 893.07(1) to bar the action in Wisconsin. 
¶3 
The Wisconsin borrowing statute provides that, "If an 
action is brought in this state on a foreign cause of action and 
the foreign period of limitation which applies has expired, no 
action 
may 
be 
maintained 
in 
this 
state."  
Wis. Stat. § 893.07(1).  In light of our analysis in Landis, we 
conclude that the phrase "period of limitation" in § 893.07 is 
ambiguous and not susceptible to a plain language application.  
Therefore, when the court of appeals decided in Leverence that 
                                                 
2 All references herein to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
1999-2000 version unless otherwise noted. 
3 See Iowa Code Ann. § 614.1(2A)(West 1999).  All references 
herein to the Iowa Code Annotated are to the 1999 version unless 
otherwise noted. 
No. 01-2649   
 
3 
 
the phrase "period of limitation" was unambiguous and that it 
absolutely excluded a foreign statute of repose, the court's 
decision was objectively wrong.   
¶4 
After engaging in the required exercise in statutory 
interpretation, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
phrase 
"period 
of 
limitation" in § 893.07 pertains equally to foreign statutes of 
limitation and foreign statutes of repose.  The legislature did 
not distinguish between these different types of limitation 
periods when enacting § 893.07.  Our interpretation comports 
with the clear purpose and context of § 893.07, along with a 
proper understanding of the Judicial Council Committee Note to 
§ 893.07.  Accordingly, Wenke's action to recover damages for 
injuries sustained in Iowa is barred in Wisconsin and was 
properly dismissed by the circuit court. 
I 
¶5 
The facts in this case are not in dispute.  On 
September 12, 1997, Martin Wenke's right arm was severely 
injured while he was attempting to remove hay from the front end 
of a Gehl Model RB1450 baler.  The injury occurred in Iowa, 
where Wenke was a resident.  The baler was designed and 
manufactured by the Gehl Company, whose principal business 
operations are in West Bend, Wisconsin.  The baler was first 
sold by Gehl to another Iowa resident in May 1981.  Wenke and 
his minor son4 commenced this products liability and negligence 
                                                 
4 Both Martin Wenke and his son, Dakota Wenke, are named 
plaintiffs in this action.  For the sake of clarity we will 
refer to the plaintiffs jointly as "Wenke," unless otherwise 
specified. 
No. 01-2649   
 
4 
 
action in the Circuit Court for Washington County on August 18, 
1999, seeking damages related to Martin Wenke's injuries. 
¶6 
On January 28, 2000, Gehl moved for summary judgment 
on grounds that Iowa's statute of repose prohibited Wenke's 
claim.  Gehl argued that Iowa's statute of repose provides that 
no products liability action may be commenced more than 15 years 
after the product at issue was purchased.5  Gehl argued that 
Leverence, which previously held that Wisconsin's borrowing 
statute has no application to a foreign state's statute of 
repose, was erroneously decided.  The circuit court, Richard 
Becker, Judge, denied Gehl's summary judgment motion, concluding 
that 
Leverence 
controlled. 
 
Gehl 
unsuccessfully 
sought 
interlocutory review of that decision. 
¶7 
On 
June 
8, 
2001, 
Gehl 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
reconsideration based upon this court's decision in Aicher v. 
Wisconsin 
Patients 
Compensation 
Fund, 
2000 
WI 
98, 
237 
Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849.  Aicher upheld the constitutionality 
of two Wisconsin statutes of repose, and Gehl argued that the 
Aicher holding undercut the Leverence decision.  Judge Patrick 
J. Faragher, who had been assigned to the case in April 2000, 
denied the motion.  Judge Faragher opted to defer to Judge 
                                                 
5 If we assume that the applicable Iowa statute of repose on 
products liability actions does not apply (Iowa Code Ann. 
§ 614.1(2A)), Wenke's action was commenced within the two-year 
limitation period for personal injury actions set forth in Iowa.  
See Iowa Code Ann. § 614.1(2).  Wisconsin's general period of 
limitation for personal injury actions is three years.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 893.54.  Wisconsin does not presently impose a 
statute of repose for products liability claims. 
No. 01-2649   
 
5 
 
Becker's determination, noting that Leverence did not rely 
solely on the constitutional concerns expressed in Beard v. J.I. 
Case Co., 823 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1987), and resolved in Aicher, 
but rather was based on a plain language interpretation that 
§ 893.07 applies only to statutes of limitation. 
¶8 
On July 17, 2001, Gehl renewed its motion for 
reconsideration of the summary judgment decision based upon this 
court's July 3, 2001, decision in Landis.  Gehl argued that the 
Landis decision equated statutes of limitation with statutes of 
repose for some purposes, nullifying the "plain language" 
analysis of Leverence.  After a hearing on August 6, 2001, the 
circuit court concluded that it must follow the holding of 
Landis where it conflicts with Leverence.  Thereafter, the 
circuit court dismissed the action and Wenke appealed.   
¶9 
After submission of the parties' briefs, the court of 
appeals certified the action to this court.  The issue certified 
was whether Landis functionally overruled the holding of 
Leverence.  Sitting with six justices, this court was divided 
equally on whether to affirm or reverse the circuit court's 
judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated the order granting 
certification and remanded the case to the court of appeals. 
¶10 On remand, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's decision to dismiss the action.  It determined that 
Landis eliminated the distinction between statutes of limitation 
and statutes of repose that had been perceived in Leverence and, 
accordingly, concluded that Landis had functionally overruled 
Leverence.  Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2003 WI App 189, ¶23, 267 
No. 01-2649   
 
6 
 
Wis. 2d 221, 669 N.W.2d 789.  The court of appeals concluded 
that Landis, a decision of this court, superseded Leverence, a 
decision of the court of appeals, and therefore it was bound to 
follow Landis to the extent that it conflicted with Leverence.  
Id., ¶24. 
¶11 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
decision 
noted 
that 
the 
legislature did not distinguish between statutes of limitation 
and statutes of repose.  Id., ¶20.  Therefore, the reference to 
a "foreign period of limitation" in § 893.07 included both 
statutes of limitation and statutes of repose.  Wenke, 267 
Wis. 2d 221, ¶20.  The court of appeals held that the circuit 
court was correct in concluding that it must borrow Iowa's 
fifteen-year period of repose, which barred Wenke's claim.  
Wenke, 267 Wis. 2d 221, ¶20.6   
¶12 Wenke then petitioned this court for review.  We 
affirm. 
                                                 
6 As further support for its conclusion, the court cited 
Merner v. Deere & Co., 176 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Wis. 2001).  
The court of appeals pointed out that Merner presented facts 
nearly identical to this case.  Wenke, 267 Wis. 2d 221, ¶21.  
The plaintiffs in Merner resided in Iowa and were injured in two 
incidents in Iowa by tractors manufactured in Wisconsin.  Id.  
At issue was whether to apply Iowa's fifteen-year statute of 
repose.  Id.  The District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin held that Landis v. Physicians Insurance Co., 2001 WI 
86, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 89, decided by the highest court 
in Wisconsin, required that it borrow the Iowa statute.  Id., 
¶22.  We understand that an appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals has been stayed pending the resolution of this case.   
No. 01-2649   
 
7 
 
 
II 
¶13 By 
enacting 
Wis. Stat. § 893.07, 
the 
Wisconsin 
legislature limited the time within which foreign causes of 
action may be brought in Wisconsin courts.  Section 893.07 is 
relatively straightforward: 
Application of foreign statutes of limitation.  
(1) If an action is brought in this state on a foreign 
cause of action and the foreign period of limitation 
which applies has expired, no action may be maintained 
in this state. 
(2) If an action is brought in this state on a foreign 
cause of action and the foreign period of limitation 
which applies to that action has not expired, but the 
applicable Wisconsin period of limitation has expired, 
no action may be maintained in this state. 
¶14 Section 893.07 operates as a legislative choice of 
law, directing Wisconsin courts to apply either the limitations 
law of the state where the cause of action arose or Wisconsin's 
limitations law, whichever is shorter.  Guertin v. Harbour 
Assurance Co. of Bermuda, 141 Wis. 2d 622, 631, 415 N.W.2d 831 
(1987); see also Scott v. First State Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 608, 
613, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990).  In the context of tort claims, the 
term "foreign cause of action" refers to claims that are 
premised on injuries sustained outside of Wisconsin.  See Faigin 
v. Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, Inc., 98 F.3d 268, 269 (7th Cir. 
1996) (applying Wisconsin law); Guertin, 141 Wis. 2d at 630. 
¶15 The issue we must address is whether § 893.07 operates 
differently when the applicable foreign limitation period is one 
of repose rather than limitation.  Specifically, are foreign 
No. 01-2649   
 
8 
 
statutes of repose excluded from application under § 893.07, 
even if the foreign repose period precludes the action from ever 
being commenced in the foreign jurisdiction?  Answering this 
question requires us to determine the proper construction 
of § 893.07, which is a question of law that we review de novo.  
See Landis, 245 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶12-13. 
¶16 We do not begin this exercise with a blank slate.  In 
Leverence, decided in 1990, the court of appeals answered the 
precise question now raised.7  The court of appeals distinguished 
between statutes of limitation and statutes of repose for 
purposes of applying § 893.07: 
A period of limitation bars an action if the plaintiff 
does not file suit within a set period of time from 
the date on which the cause of action accrued.  In 
contrast, a period of repose bars a suit a fixed 
number of years after an action by the defendant (such 
as manufacturing a product), even if this period ends 
before the plaintiff suffers any injury. 
Leverence, 158 Wis. 2d at 92 (quoting Beard v. J.I. Case Co., 
823 F.2d at 1097 n.1).  It declared that, "[I]n Wisconsin, 
limitations are not treated as statutes of repose."  Id. at 91 
(quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 390, 393, 14 
N.W.2d 177 (1944)).  The court of appeals then expressly 
                                                 
7 Leverence v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty, 158 
Wis. 2d 64, 462 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1990), was a complex case 
involving numerous issues and numerous named defendants, many of 
whom filed briefs in the court of appeals.  The central issues 
to the case were not related to the question of applying 
Wis. Stat. § 893.07, as evinced by the fact that neither the 
petition nor cross-petition for review asked this court to 
review the court of appeals' application of § 893.07.  We 
ultimately denied both petitions for review. 
No. 01-2649   
 
9 
 
rejected the defendants' argument that statutes of repose and 
statutes of limitation are without distinction in the context of 
§ 893.07's reference to "period of limitation," and it concluded 
"that the plain language of sec. 893.07, Stats., refers to a 
period of limitation, not a period of repose . . . ."  Id. at 
93. 
¶17 As the court of appeals noted when it first certified 
the issue to this court, our ruling in Landis appears to 
contradict the analysis in Leverence.8  In Landis we held that 
the tolling provision of Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4)9 applies to both 
periods of limitation and periods of repose for medical 
malpractice claims.  Landis, 245 Wis. 2d 1, ¶5.  We reached this 
decision after concluding that the phrase "any applicable 
statute of limitations" in § 655.44(4) was ambiguous as to 
whether it included statutes of repose.  Id., ¶36.  We discussed 
                                                 
8 The only other time the issue of Wis. Stat. § 893.07's 
applicability to foreign statutes of repose was raised before 
this court was in Sharp v. Case Corp., 227 Wis. 2d 1, 595 
N.W.2d 380 (1999).  However, we disposed of that case without 
reaching the question of whether Leverence correctly decided 
this issue, as we concluded that the foreign jurisdiction's 
statute of repose was not applicable to the post-sale warning 
claim at issue in the case.  Id. at 13 n.5. 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 655.44(4) provides: 
(4) Statute of limitations.  Any applicable statute of 
limitations is tolled on the date the director of 
state courts receives the request for mediation if 
delivered in person or on the date of mailing if sent 
by registered mail.  The statute remains tolled until 
30 days after the last day of the mediation period 
under s. 655.465(7). 
No. 01-2649   
 
10 
 
historical definitions of statutes of repose and statutes of 
limitation, 
id., 
¶¶25-36, 
and 
observed 
that 
statutes 
of 
limitation and repose share common objectives including notice 
to a potential defendant of when it will be required to defend a 
suit.  Id., ¶51; see also Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶27. 
¶18 In addition, and more important to discerning the 
meaning of "statute of limitations" in § 655.44, we noted in 
Landis that the legislature has never denominated a period of 
limitation in the Wisconsin Statutes as either a "statute of 
repose" or a "period of repose."  Landis, 245 Wis. 2d 1, ¶61.  
Instead, the legislature has lumped statutes of repose together 
with 
other 
temporal 
limitation 
statutes 
under 
various 
"limitations" headings.  Id., ¶61 n.14.  Landis concluded that 
the term "statute of repose" is largely a judicial label for a 
particular type of limitation on actions.  Id., ¶5.  After 
looking to the purpose, context, and history of Chapters 655 and 
893 to discern legislative intent, the court equated statutes of 
limitation and statutes of repose for purposes of § 655.44(4)'s 
reference to "any statute of limitations."  Id.  
¶19 Wenke and Gehl dispute the impact of Landis on the 
continuing viability of Leverence's interpretation of § 893.07.  
Resolving this dispute involves more than one inquiry.  Landis 
was a statutory interpretation case involving a different 
statute.  It supplies a method of analysis.  In applying the 
Landis analysis to § 893.07, we might determine that the 
rationale in Leverence was not correct, but nonetheless conclude 
on the basis of independent statutory construction that the 
No. 01-2649   
 
11 
 
holding of the case——that § 893.07 does not borrow foreign 
statutes of repose——is still sound.   
III 
¶20 We must first determine whether Leverence's holding 
regarding § 893.07 remains valid and should be applied to 
Wenke's claim or, conversely, whether the legal analysis 
underpinning 
that 
holding 
is 
objectively 
wrong, 
thereby 
warranting this court to conduct its own interpretation of 
§ 893.07. 
¶21 Wenke leans upon the doctrine of stare decisis in 
urging us to retain Leverence.  The principle of stare decisis 
applies to the published decisions of the court of appeals, 
State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, ¶42, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 
N.W.2d 1; Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 186, 560 N.W.2d 246 
(1997), and stare decisis requires us to follow court of appeals 
precedent unless a compelling reason exists to overrule it.  
Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶42.  Nonetheless, stare decisis 
contemplates that under limited circumstances our court may 
overrule erroneous holdings.  See Cook, 208 Wis. 2d at 186.  We 
are not required to adhere to interpretations of statutes that 
are objectively wrong.  See Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶42.  
Gehl's burden is to show not only that Leverence was mistaken 
but also that it was objectively wrong, so that the court has a 
compelling reason to overrule it. 
¶22 We begin by observing that Leverence's decision not to 
apply foreign statutes of repose was unquestionably influenced 
by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Beard v. J.I. Case Co., 823 
No. 01-2649   
 
12 
 
F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1987).  Leverence, 158 Wis. 2d at 91-93.  In 
Beard, the Seventh Circuit refused to borrow Tennessee's 10-year 
statute of repose under § 893.07(1) to bar a claim arising out 
of an accident that occurred in Tennessee involving a piece of 
machinery from a Wisconsin manufacturer.  Beard, 823 F.2d at 
1096, 1103.  The court's decision to interpret § 893.07 to 
exclude a foreign statute of repose was based upon a prediction 
that this court would confine application of the phrase "period 
of limitation" to statutes of limitation.  Id. at 1100, 1103.10  
The court said in part: 
Because the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not defined 
"period of limitations" as used in the borrowing 
statute, we are required to determine how the court 
would define the term if it were faced with the 
question.  The possibility exists that the court might 
hold that the borrowing statute requires the use of 
any provision that the jurisdiction in which the cause 
of action accrues would consider to be a period of 
limitation.  However, we do not believe that the court 
would take this view. 
Id. at 1100 n.4 (emphasis added).  The court reasoned that a 
narrow 
construction 
would 
avoid 
potential 
constitutional 
problems 
with 
Article 
I, 
Section 9 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
                                                 
10 The Seventh Circuit noted several decisions of this court 
that had construed Wisconsin statutes to avoid barring a 
plaintiff's claims before they had accrued through actual 
injury.  Beard, 823 F.2d at 1101-02 (discussing Rosenthal v. 
Kurtz, 62 Wis. 2d 1, 213 N.W.2d 741 (1974); Kallas Millwork 
Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975); 
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. E.D. Wesley Co., 105 Wis. 2d 305, 
313 N.W.2d 833 (1982)). 
No. 01-2649   
 
13 
 
Constitution, which is Wisconsin's "right to remedy" provision.11  
Id.   
¶23 Beard's concern about Article I, Section 9 was echoed 
by the court of appeals in Leverence, which pointed to "grave 
constitutional concerns" articulated in previous cases by this 
court.  Leverence, 158 Wis. 2d at 93. 
¶24 Subsequent to both Beard and Leverence, however, this 
court squelched any misgivings that statutes of repose violate 
Article 
I, 
Section 
9. 
 
In 
Aicher, 
we 
upheld 
the 
constitutionality of two medical malpractice statutes of repose.  
Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶85.  Aicher involved a 13-year-old who 
brought a medical malpractice claim against her physician's 
insurers, alleging that she became blind in her right eye 
because of malpractice following her newborn examination.  Id., 
¶¶2, 8.  The issue we ultimately addressed was whether the 
repose periods in Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56 were 
constitutional.12  Id., ¶6.  In overruling Estate of Makos v. 
                                                 
11 Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the 
laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive 
in his person, property, or character; he ought to 
obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to 
purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly 
and without delay, conformably to the laws. 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(1) provides: 
(1) Except as provided by subs. (2) and (3), an action 
to recover damages for injury arising from any 
treatment or operation performed by, or from any 
omission by, a person who is a health care provider, 
No. 01-2649   
 
14 
 
Wisconsin 
Masons 
Health 
Care 
Fund, 
211 
Wis. 2d 41, 
564 
N.W.2d 662 (1997), we held that the statutes of repose at issue 
did not violate the remedy for wrongs provision of the Wisconsin 
Constitution because the legislature had expressly chosen not to 
recognize rights after the conclusion of the repose periods.  
Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶54. 
¶25 Aicher effectively undermined the precedent upon which 
Beard and Leverence rested.  Id., ¶45 (overruling Estate of 
Makos v. Wis. Masons Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 564 
N.W.2d 662 (1997), which in turn relied upon Kallas Millwork v. 
Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975), and 
Rosenthal v. Kurtz, 62 Wis. 2d 1, 213 N.W.2d 741 (1974), both of 
which were discussed in Beard).  Without the concern about the 
effect of Article I, Section 9 on the constitutionality of 
                                                                                                                                                             
regardless of the theory on which the action is based, 
shall be commenced within the later of: 
(a) Three years from the date of the injury, or 
(b) One year from the date the injury was discovered 
or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have been discovered, except that an action may not be 
commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years from 
the date of the act or omission. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.56 provides in the relevant portion: 
Any person under the age of 18, who is not under 
disability 
by 
reason 
of 
insanity, 
developmental 
disability or imprisonment, shall bring an action to 
recover damages for injuries to the person arising 
from any treatment or operation performed by, or for 
any omission by a health care provider within the time 
limitation under s. 893.55 or by the time that person 
reaches the age of 10 years, whichever is later. 
No. 01-2649   
 
15 
 
statutes of repose, the foundation of the Beard decision largely 
disappears, and Leverence's reliance on that decision falls 
accordingly. 
¶26 Wenke 
minimizes 
Aicher's 
effect on 
Leverence by 
arguing that Leverence, despite its extensive discussion of 
Beard, 
was 
not 
premised 
on 
constitutional 
reservations 
surrounding statutes of repose; rather, it was based on a plain 
language 
analysis. 
 
To 
the 
extent 
that 
Wenke 
correctly 
characterizes Leverence's holding,13 it does not take him very 
far. 
                                                 
13 There is some doubt as to whether the court in Leverence 
actually analyzed the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 893.07.  
The court relied significantly upon Beard and did not even 
attempt to inspect the statute's plain language according to the 
defendant-insurers' argument that the distinction between the 
terms "statute of limitations" and "statutes of repose" is 
blurry and causes ambiguity.  Leverence, 158 Wis. 2d at 93.  In 
fact, the extent of the court's plain language analysis was the 
following: 
We conclude that the plain language of sec. 893.07, 
Stats., refers to a period of limitation, not a period 
of repose, and, even if, as the insurers suggest, the 
distinction between the two terms is sufficiently 
blurred as to result in an ambiguity, we agree with 
the 
rationale 
expressed 
in Beard: 
the 
Wisconsin 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
chosen 
a 
route 
of 
statutory 
construction 
that 
avoids 
potential 
constitutional 
impediments.  It is, however, unnecessary to address 
the remedy for wrongs constitutional argument because 
we conclude sec. 893.07's plain language compels our 
result. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  These statements followed a four-
paragraph discussion of Beard.  Moreover, at no point did the 
Leverence court refer to the Judicial Council Committee Notes of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 893.07 and 893.05. 
No. 01-2649   
 
16 
 
¶27 Much of the analysis in Landis scrutinizes other 
contexts in which the legislature employs statutory language 
referring to "statutes of limitation," or similar phraseology.  
Without recounting the entire analysis, we highlight some key 
elements.  As to the ambiguity of the phrase "statute of 
limitation," we observed that the fifth edition of Black's Law 
Dictionary, which was the version contemporaneous with the 
revision of Chapter 893 in 1980, did not separately define 
"statutes of repose" or distinguish them from "statutes of 
limitation."  Landis, 245 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶32-33.  Rather, the fifth 
edition contained a definition of statutes of limitation that 
included a statement that "statutes of limitation are statutes 
of repose."  Id., ¶33.  This definitional understanding of 
statutes of limitation indicates that use of the term "period of 
limitation" in § 893.07 could include a period of repose.  Id., 
¶36. 
¶28 Landis also observed that "the phrase 'statute of 
repose' 
is 
judicial 
terminology 
and 
is 
not 
featured 
in 
legislative lingo."  Id., ¶61.14  When the legislature uses the 
                                                 
14 By way of context, the entire paragraph in which this 
line appears reads: 
A review of Wis. Stat. Ch. 893——a chapter that 
substantially regulates time limitations on commencing 
a variety of actions——shows the legislature does not 
employ 
the 
phrase 
"statute 
of 
repose." 
 
The 
legislature does, however, use many other phrases to 
describe temporal limitations on actions.  Moreover, 
computer database searches of the statutes show the 
legislature has not used the words "repose," "statute 
of repose," or "statutes of repose" in the text of any 
statute in force.  It is apparent that the phrase 
No. 01-2649   
 
17 
 
term "statutes of limitation," it generally contemplates all 
limitation statutes, including statutes of repose.  Justice 
Bradley's concurrence to Landis aptly addressed this point.  
Justice Bradley wrote, "the term 'statute of repose' is not part 
of the legislature's lexicon, but rather is a judicially created 
label used to describe a particular type of limitation on 
action."  Landis, 245 Wis. 2d 1, ¶67 (Bradley, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
¶29 Elements of the Landis decision apply to this case.  
They negate Leverence's "plain meaning" analysis and suggest 
that descriptive phrases like "any applicable statute of 
limitations" and "the foreign period of limitation" in Chapter 
893 are ambiguous as to whether they include statutes of repose.  
Landis, 245 Wis. 2d 1, ¶36.  It is simply not feasible to 
reconcile the analysis of ambiguity in Landis with the cursory 
plain language analysis of the phrase "period of limitation" in 
Leverence.15  We conclude that Leverence erred by holding that 
the 
phrase 
"foreign 
period 
of 
limitation" 
in 
§ 893.07 
unambiguously excludes foreign statutes of repose. 
                                                                                                                                                             
"statute of repose" is judicial terminology and is not 
featured in legislative lingo. 
Landis, 245 Wis. 2d 1, ¶61 (footnotes omitted). 
15 Even Wenke acknowledges that the court of appeals, if it 
had the benefit of Landis when it decided Leverence, might have 
concluded that the phrase "foreign period of limitation" 
contained in § 893.07(1) was ambiguous. 
No. 01-2649   
 
18 
 
¶30 The rationale of Leverence was wiped out by the Landis 
and Aicher decisions.  Even if we were to determine that 
§ 893.07 properly applies only to foreign statutes of limitation 
and not foreign periods of repose, we could not reach that 
conclusion on the bases advanced in Leverence.16 
¶31 Anticipating problems, Wenke argues to preserve the 
Leverence 
holding 
by 
invoking 
the 
canon 
of 
statutory 
construction 
that 
legislative 
silence 
following 
judicial 
interpretation 
of 
a 
statute 
demonstrates 
legislative 
acquiescence in that interpretation.  See, e.g., State v. 
Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d 239, 246, 558 N.W.2d 375 (1997) (citing 
State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 566, 456 N.W.2d 143 (1990)).17  
He contends that the legislature has acquiesced in the Leverence 
interpretation of § 893.07 by virtue of its inaction in 
                                                 
16 This court did not intend in Landis, nor do we intend 
now, to equate statutes of limitation with statutes of repose 
for all purposes, including interpretation of the meaning of 
various statutory references.  Although the tenor of Landis was 
certainly in this direction, it is critical to realize that 
Landis involved an issue of statutory construction, in which we 
were obligated to discern the meaning of the phrase "statute of 
limitations" in Wis. Stat. § 655.44.  Landis was not, as was the 
decision in Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2000 
WI 98, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849, an exposition on the 
nature or validity of statutes of repose vis-à-vis statutes of 
limitation.  In the context of statutory construction, it 
remains prudent to inspect on an issue-by-issue basis whether 
use of the phrase "statute of limitations," or some equivalent, 
in various statutes is understood to include statutes of repose. 
17 This rule of construction is a counterpart to the canon 
that a judicial construction of a statute becomes part of the 
statute unless subsequently amended by the legislature.  See, 
e.g., State v. Rosenburg, 208 Wis. 2d 191, 196, 560 N.W.2d 266 
(1997). 
No. 01-2649   
 
19 
 
legislatively "overturning" the decision.  Therefore, Wenke 
argues, this court should refrain from disrupting the accepted 
interpretation of § 893.07 as excluding statutes of repose. 
¶32 Legislative acquiescence is a familiar argument in 
statutory construction cases.  Yet, as a principle, it is 
subsidiary to a more important principle——that the goal of 
statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the 
statute's intended purpose.  State v. Eesley, 225 Wis. 2d 248, 
254, 591 N.W.2d 846 (1999); Lake City Corp. v. City of Mequon, 
207 Wis. 2d 155, 162, 558 N.W.2d 100 (1997).  A cardinal rule in 
interpreting statutes is to favor a construction that will 
fulfill the purpose of the statute.  Watkins v. LIRC, 117 
Wis. 2d 753, 
761, 
345 
N.W.2d 482 
(1984). 
 
Hence, 
the 
"legislative acquiescence" argument is often vulnerable to 
rebuttal. 
 
See 
William 
N. 
Eskridge, 
Jr., 
Interpreting 
Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 67 (1988) (discussing the 
competing views of legal scholars and jurists on the doctrine of 
legislative inaction).   
¶33 At most, the established rule is that "[l]egislative 
inaction following judicial construction of a statute, while not 
conclusive, evinces legislative approval of the interpretation."  
Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d at 566 (citing Green Bay Packaging v. 
DILHR, 72 Wis. 2d 26, 35, 240 N.W.2d 422 (1976)).  Confirming 
approval by positive demonstration is more persuasive than 
"evincing" approval by doing nothing.  Numerous variables, 
unrelated 
to 
conscious 
endorsement 
of 
a 
statutory 
interpretation, may explain or cause legislative inaction.  
No. 01-2649   
 
20 
 
These variables include the possibility that the legislature did 
not have its attention directed to a decision, had other 
priorities, 
or 
was 
passive 
or 
indifferent 
because 
the 
legislators who authored the original legislation were no longer 
present.  See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940) 
("To explain the cause of non-action by Congress [following a 
judicial construction of a statute] when Congress itself sheds 
no light is to venture into speculative unrealities."). 
¶34 In any event, a subsequent legislature's approval of a 
judicial construction is not as probative as the intent of the 
legislature when it enacted the statute.  See Maus v. Bloss, 265 
Wis. 627, 633-34, 62 N.W.2d 708 (1954) overruled in part on 
other grounds by Lovesee v. Allied Dev. Corp., 45 Wis. 2d 340, 
173 N.W.2d 196 (1970).18  As explained in Green Bay Packaging, 
legislative inaction does not: 
rais[e] a conclusive presumption of tacit adoption and 
ratification by the legislature.  The weight accorded 
to this evidence is overcome where this court can 
unequivocally 
conclude, 
as here, 
that 
the 
prior 
construction is contrary to the clear and express 
language of the statute.  The aim of all statutory 
construction 
is 
to 
discern 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature, and where the meaning of the statute is 
plain, this is better evidence of the true legislative 
intent 
than 
nearly 
complete 
legislative 
inaction 
following a construction by this court. 
Green Bay Packaging, 72 Wis. 2d at 35.   
                                                 
18 The rule of legislative acquiescence is also at odds with 
the understanding that a construction placed on a statute by a 
different legislature from the one that enacted it is not 
binding upon the courts.  See State ex rel. Thompson v. Nash, 27 
Wis. 2d 183, 190, 133 N.W.2d 769 (1965). 
No. 01-2649   
 
21 
 
¶35 One need not believe that reliance on legislative 
inaction following a judicial decision is a "canard," Johnson v. 
Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting), to realize that proper invocation of 
the doctrine of legislative acquiescence requires more than 
merely noting that the legislature has not amended a statute to 
"correct" a prior judicial construction.  The doctrine of 
legislative acquiescence is merely a presumption to aid in 
statutory construction. 
¶36 It is especially unreliable to rely on legislative 
inaction in this case.  First, the presumption that the 
legislature has adopted a judicial interpretation is entitled to 
less weight when there is nearly complete inaction by the 
legislature.  See Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 471, 290 
N.W.2d 510 (1980).  Our legislature has not amended or reenacted 
§ 893.07 since its adoption in 1980.  We have not been advised 
of any bill that was introduced to substantively amend this 
section or address the issue since Leverence was decided in 
1990.  Second, because legislators have not generally focused on 
the 
nuanced 
concept 
of 
statutes 
of 
repose, 
Landis, 
245 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶61 n.13, we question whether the court of appeals 
decision would have generated much discussion on point.  Third, 
this court's pronouncements in pre-Aicher decisions regarding 
the questionable constitutionality of statutes of repose may 
have dissuaded legislators from correcting any error in the 
court of appeals' interpretation of § 893.07, if they had taken 
note of it.  Finally, the primary holdings from Leverence, which 
No. 01-2649   
 
22 
 
may in fact have garnered the attention of legislators, dealt 
with issues that greatly overshadowed the question of whether 
§ 893.07 borrows foreign statutes of repose.  Under these 
circumstances, we assign little weight to inaction by the 
legislature. 
¶37 In any event, the cases that Wenke cites as expounding 
upon the doctrine of legislative acquiescence presume that the 
original interpretation of the statute was not objectively 
wrong.19  If statutory interpretation by a court was objectively 
wrong when it was made, a strained theory of legislative 
countenance of that interpretation by inaction will not restrict 
this court from correcting that interpretative error. 
IV 
¶38 Unconstrained by Leverence's analysis of § 893.07, we 
now decide, as a matter of first impression before this court, 
whether 
Wisconsin's 
borrowing 
statute 
applies 
to 
foreign 
statutes of repose.  As in Landis, the dispute in this case is 
purely one of statutory construction.  We must discern the 
meaning of the phrase "foreign period of limitation" in 
§ 893.07.  We have already explained why § 893.07's reference to 
"foreign period of limitation" is ambiguous.  Therefore, we look 
to the full array of intrinsic and extrinsic factors to 
ascertain its meaning.  These factors include the statute's 
                                                 
19 Wenke cites Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 470-71, 290 
N.W.2d 510 (1980); Zimmerman v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 38 
Wis. 2d 626, 
633, 
157 
N.W.2d 648 
(1968); 
and 
Bauman 
v. 
Gilbertson, 7 Wis. 2d 467, 469-70, 96 N.W.2d 854 (1959). 
No. 01-2649   
 
23 
 
scope, context, subject matter, and object, discernible from the 
statutory text and structure, as well as legislative history.   
¶39 As to history, § 893.07 shares a common history with 
many of the provisions in Chapter 893.  As we noted in Landis, 
"1979 Assembly Bill 326, which led to Chapter 323 [Laws of 
1979], described itself as 'An Act . . . relating to claim 
procedures 
against 
government 
entities 
and 
employes, 
and 
statutes of limitations.' (emphasis added)."  Landis, 245 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶47.  Consequently, § 893.07 was enacted as part of 
the same bill that created § 893.55 and § 893.56——the medical 
malpractice statutes of repose at issue in Landis and Aicher.  
See ch. 323, Laws of 1979, § 28. 
¶40 The predecessor to § 893.07 was Wis. Stat. § 893.205 
(1977-78).20  Unlike the present borrowing statute, § 893.205 
permitted a Wisconsin resident who was injured outside the state 
to bring an action in Wisconsin to recover damages for that 
                                                 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.205 (1977-78) provided: 
Within 3 years: 
(1) An action to recover damages for injuries to 
the person for such injuries sustained on and after 
July 1, 1955, unless notice in writing as provided in 
s. 330.19 (5), 1955 statutes, was served prior to July 
1 1959, in which event s. 330.19 (5), 1955 statutes, 
shall apply.  But no action to recover damages for 
injuries to the person, received without this state, 
shall be brought in any court in this state when such 
action is barred by any statute of limitations of 
actions of the state or country in which such injury 
was received unless the person so injured shall, at 
the time of such injury, have been a resident of this 
state.   
No. 01-2649   
 
24 
 
injury after the limitation statute of the state of injury had 
expired.  By contrast, the statute treated an out-of-state 
resident as being bound by the law of the state in which the 
injury occurred.  This court interpreted this § 893.205 in 
Central Mutual Insurance Co. v. H.O. Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 54, 216 
N.W.2d 239 (1974).  An out-of-state resident was injured in 
North Carolina in an explosion involving a gas cylinder 
manufactured in Wisconsin.  This court explained that the 
manufacturer's defense depended on North Carolina products 
liability law.  The court said:  
Under the present North Carolina statute, appellant's 
cause of action for personal injuries sustained as a 
result of the cylinder's explosion would be deemed to 
accrue at the time "the injury was discovered by the 
claimant, or ought reasonably to have been discovered 
by him." [citing North Carolina Statute].  The 
limitation upon the action being brought is ten years 
from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the 
claim for relief.  However, this statute became 
effective July 21, 1971, and does not affect pending 
litigation.   
63 Wis. 2d at 57-58.  This paragraph implies that under 
§ 893.205 (1977-78), an applicable statute of repose would have 
been applied. 
¶41 As to context, we observe that Chapter 893 itself is 
titled "Limitations of commencement of actions . . ." yet it 
plainly contains statutes of repose.  Landis, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 
No. 01-2649   
 
25 
 
¶61.21  In addition, § 893.07 is located within sub-chapter I of 
Chapter 893, titled "Commencement, computation, action in non-
Wisconsin forum and miscellaneous provisions."  From another 
section located within this sub-chapter, we detect a legislative 
decision to include both statutes of repose and statutes of 
limitation 
under 
the 
concept 
of 
"period 
of 
limitation."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.04, which deals with the computation of 
periods within which civil actions must be commenced, states: 
"Unless otherwise specifically prescribed by law, a period of 
limitation within which an action may be commenced is computed 
from the time that the cause of action accrues until the action 
is commenced."  Wis. Stat. § 893.04 (emphasis added).  Statutes 
of repose are precisely the type of period of limitation that is 
"otherwise specifically prescribed by law," since a limitation 
period based upon computation from some primary event or conduct 
by a defendant does not necessarily entail accrual because the 
event or conduct may not have produced a cause of action on that 
date.22  By the grammatical structure of § 893.04, it is obvious 
                                                 
21 Besides Wis. Stat. § 893.55, other examples of statutes 
of repose in chapter 893 include Wis. Stat. §§ 893.37 (six-year 
limitation on actions against persons who conduct land surveys); 
893.51 (requiring an action on wrongful taking, conversion, or 
detention of property to be brought within six years of when the 
taking or conversion occurs, or the detention begins); 893.66 
(six-year limitation on actions against accountants). 
22 In Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 578 N.W.2d 166 
(1998), we stated that, if anything, a claim subject to a 
statute of repose limitation period "accrues" on the date of the 
primary conduct triggering the limitation period occurs.  Id. at 
254. 
No. 01-2649   
 
26 
 
that a "period of limitation" includes periods that do not begin 
computation based on the time the cause of action accrues, such 
as the period in a statute of repose.  See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 
2003 WI 50, ¶29, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832.  Reading 
§ 893.04 in pari materia with § 893.07, which is proper given 
their shared purpose and subject matter, see State v. Clausen, 
105 Wis. 2d 231, 244, 313 N.W.2d 819 (1982), we assume that the 
legislature intended the same meaning for the phrase "period of 
limitation" in both sections. 
¶42 As to the purpose of § 893.07, we again perceive a 
decision to apply foreign statutes of repose.  "When construing 
statutes, courts must presume that the legislature intends for a 
statute to be interpreted in a manner that advances the purposes 
of the statute, not defeats those purposes."  Beard v. Lee 
Enters., Inc., 225 Wis. 2d 1, 22, 591 N.W.2d 156 (1999) (citing 
Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 635, 547 
N.W.2d 602 (1996)).  We believe that excluding statutes of 
repose from the scope of § 893.07 is antagonistic to the 
objective of the borrowing statute, which is to eliminate 
difficult choice of law questions, thereby promoting certainty 
and reducing forum shopping.  See Doe v. Am. Nat. Red Cross, 847 
F. Supp. 643, 650-51 (W.D. Wis. 1994); Guertin, 141 Wis. 2d at 
631-32, 634-35. 
¶43 There is no dispute that, by virtue of Wenke's 
injuries occurring in Iowa, this is a "foreign cause of action."  
See Guertin, 141 Wis. 2d at 630.  Iowa has adopted a two-year 
statute of limitations for claims on injuries to a person.  Iowa 
No. 01-2649   
 
27 
 
Code Ann. § 614.1(2).  However, Iowa also forbids any actions 
brought against the manufacturer of a product allegedly causing 
injury if the action is brought more than 15 years after the 
product was first purchased.  Iowa Code Ann. § 614.1(2A).  If 
Wenke had brought his action in Iowa, he could have done so 
within two years of his injury (thereby satisfying Iowa Code 
Ann. § 614.1(2)), but he could not have commenced the action 
within 15 years after Gehl first sold the baler in 1981. 
¶44 Therefore, Wenke is attempting to sustain claims on a 
cause of action that had been extinguished under Iowa law.  
Allowing Wenke's claim to go forward in Wisconsin would 
encourage forum shopping and would provide a non-resident of 
Wisconsin with a longer limitation period in which to bring a 
suit than he or she would have in the state in which the injury 
occurred.  As this court explained when it first interpreted 
§ 893.07, "The manifest intent of the legislature in enacting 
this borrowing statute was to adopt the shortest possible 
limitation 
period 
for 
actions 
litigated 
in 
this 
state 
potentially subject to more than one statute of limitations."  
Guertin, 141 Wis. 2d at 631 (emphasis added).  In making this 
statement, we expressly noted that a reduction of forum shopping 
is one of the policies advanced by the borrowing statute.  Id.23  
Wenke's attempt to commence this action in Wisconsin epitomizes 
                                                 
23 We also noted the policies of preventing stale claims, 
expediting litigation, and removing the uncertainty in assessing 
the timeliness of bringing actions in Wisconsin. Guertin v. 
Harbour Assurance Co. of Bermuda, 141 Wis. 2d 622, 631-32, 415 
N.W.2d 831 (1987). 
No. 01-2649   
 
28 
 
forum shopping, and validating his action would disregard one of 
the clear purposes of § 893.07.24 
¶45 Indeed, 
were 
we 
to 
adopt 
Wenke's 
argument 
and 
determine that § 893.07 does not cover a foreign statute of 
repose, there would theoretically be no limit on the time when a 
products liability suit could be brought in Wisconsin, so long 
as Wisconsin had no statute of repose and the hypothetical 
plaintiff satisfied the applicable time limit for filing suit 
after a cause of action accrued (e.g., in Iowa, two years).  For 
instance, if a Gehl baler sold in 1981 were still being used in 
2012 outside Wisconsin and the baler were associated with an 
accident, suit could still be brought in Wisconsin if we adopted 
Wenke's argument.  This would be more than three times longer 
than a suit could be filed in Tennessee or Indiana, see Beard, 
823 F.2d at 1097, 1100, and twice as long as the suit could have 
been filed in Iowa.  And we do not have to resort to 
hypotheticals.  In Merner v. Deere & Co., 176 F. Supp. 2d 882 
(E.D. Wis. 2001), the case now pending in the Seventh Circuit, 
the plaintiff is seeking to recover for injuries associated with 
a lawn tractor first sold by a Wisconsin company to an Iowa 
resident in 1972.  Wenke, 267 Wis. 2d 221, ¶21. 
                                                 
24 Wenke argues that this is a forum-selection case, not an 
instance of forum shopping.  We question this characterization.  
As Wenke concedes, this action could not be brought in Iowa, nor 
has Wenke identified any other jurisdiction in which he could 
bring this action in satisfaction of both personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction, and within any applicable statutes of 
limitation.  For there to be a "selection" requires that there 
be at least one competing option. 
No. 01-2649   
 
29 
 
¶46 To 
counteract 
these 
strong 
indications 
of 
a 
legislative determination to include foreign periods of repose 
under the scope of § 893.07, Wenke points to the Judicial 
Council Committee Notes for §§ 893.05 and 893.07.  The Committee 
Note accompanying § 893.07 provides, in relevant part: 
Subsection (1) applies the provision of s. 893.05 that 
the running of a statute of limitations extinguishes 
the right as well as the remedy to a foreign cause of 
action on which an action is attempted to be brought 
in Wisconsin in a situation where the foreign period 
has expired.  Subsection (1) changes the law of prior 
s. 893.205(1), which provided that a resident of 
Wisconsin could sue in this state on a foreign cause 
of action to recover damages for injury to the person 
even if the foreign period of limitation had expired. 
Judicial Council Committee Note, 1979, § 893.07, Stats.  This 
Committee Note refers to § 893.05, titled "Relation of statute 
of limitations to right and remedy," which provides: "When the 
period within which an action may be commenced on a Wisconsin 
cause of action has expired, the right is extinguished as well 
as the remedy."  The Committee Note accompanying § 893.05 
provides: 
This new section is a codification of Wisconsin case 
law.  See Maryland Casualty Company v. Beleznay, 245 
Wis. 390, 14 N.W.2d 177 (1944), in which it is stated 
at page 393:  "In Wisconsin the running of the statute 
of limitations absolutely extinguishes the cause of 
action for in Wisconsin limitations are not treated as 
statutes of repose.  The limitation of actions is a 
right as well as a remedy, extinguishing the right on 
one side and creating a right on the other, which is 
as of high dignity as regards judicial remedies as any 
other 
right 
and 
it 
is 
a 
right 
which 
enjoys 
constitutional protection." 
No. 01-2649   
 
30 
 
Judicial 
Council 
Committee 
Note, 
1979, 
§ 893.05, 
Stats. 
(emphasis added). 
¶47 Wenke is correct in examining these notes to assist in 
statutory 
interpretation.25 
 
His 
error 
comes 
from 
misunderstanding the notes. 
¶48 The Judicial Council Committee Notes do not support 
Wenke's assertion.  The linchpin of Wenke's argument is that the 
Wisconsin 
case 
law 
codified 
by § 893.05 
stands 
for 
the 
proposition that limitation periods that operate as statutes of 
repose are outside the scope of § 893.05 and——by virtue of some 
incorporation by reference——outside the scope of § 893.07.  
Wenke's premise is unfounded, for he has taken the concept 
embodied in § 893.05, which is reflected in the Committee Notes 
to §§ 893.05 and 893.07, and has fundamentally misconstrued it. 
¶49 In a sense, we can hardly blame Wenke for this error.  
The language of these Committee Notes does appear, on its face, 
to speak exactly to Wenke's construction of both §§ 893.05 and 
893.07.  Moreover, Wenke's error is the by-product of a largely 
                                                 
25 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.07, as with § 893.05, originated 
through the Judicial Council, which is a statutory, independent 
judicial agency that often acts in an advisory capacity to 
assist the supreme court in exercising its authority to 
promulgate rules regulating pleading, practice, and proceedings 
in Wisconsin courts.  See Waters ex rel. Skow v. Pertzborn, 2001 
WI 62, ¶20 n.5, 243 Wis. 2d 703, 627 N.W.2d 497 (citing 
Wis. Stat. § 751.12); see also Wis. Stat. § 758.12.  Although 
the Judicial Council Committee's Notes are not controlling 
authority, they are persuasive authority for the meaning of 
procedural rules.  See State v. Williquette, 190 Wis. 2d 677, 
692-93, 526 N.W.2d 144 (1995). 
No. 01-2649   
 
31 
 
unperceived shift in the meaning attached to the phrase "statute 
of repose." 
¶50 Over the years the term "statute of repose" has been 
defined in a variety of ways.  See Francis E. McGovern, The 
Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability 
Statutes of Repose, 30 Am. U. L. Rev. 579, 582-87, 621 (1981).  
Two competing definitions are at play in the dispute over the 
meaning of § 893.05.  The first definition is the modern 
definition, which recognizes the term "statute of repose" as a 
judicial description of a certain type of limitation period that 
operates differently from an ordinary statute of limitation.  We 
acknowledged this operational distinction last term in Hamilton, 
stating: 
Statutes of repose operate differently from statutes 
of limitations.  A statute of limitations usually 
establishes the time frame within which a claim must 
be initiated after a cause of action actually accrues.  
A statute of repose, by contrast, limits the time 
period within which an action may be brought based on 
the date of an act or omission.  A statute of repose 
does not relate to the accrual of a cause of action.  
In fact, it may cut off litigation before a cause of 
action arises. 
Hamilton, 261 Wis. 2d 458, ¶29 (citations omitted).  Based on 
this distinction, when the court of appeals in Leverence stated 
the functional difference between statutes of repose and of 
limitation, Leverence, 158 Wis. 2d at 92, it did so accurately.  
This understanding of "statutes of repose," as distinguished 
from statutes of limitation, is the common meaning followed 
today. 
No. 01-2649   
 
32 
 
¶51 When 
the 
Leverence 
court 
stated, 
"in 
Wisconsin, 
limitations are not treated as statutes of repose," id. at 91, 
it was again stating accurately a fundamental precept of 
Wisconsin law.  The problem is that the precise nature of this 
precept is not what the court of appeals implied. 
¶52 For many decades, the majority rule in this country 
provided that "statutes of limitations are statutes of repose."  
This rule was declared in legions of cases both predating and 
following our 1944 decision in Maryland Casualty.26  In the vast 
majority of these declarations, courts were not applying 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 
(1979); Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 
70 (1873); Pillow v. Roberts, 54 U.S. (1 How.) 472, 477 (1851); 
Titus v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 134 F.2d 223, 224 
(5th Cir. 1943); Cent. Pac. Ry. v. Costa, 258 P. 991, 999 (Cal. 
App. 1927); Cassell v. Lowry, 72 N.E. 640, 641 (Ind. 1904); Van 
Diest v. Towle, 179 P.2d 984, 989 (Colo. 1947); Gabrielle v. 
Hosp. of St. Raphael, 635 A.2d 1232, 1236 (Conn. App. 1994); 
Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1202 (D.C. 
1984); Burns v. Burns, 11 N.W.2d 461, 462-63 (Iowa 1943); 
Lenawee County v. Nutten, 208 N.W. 613, 614 (Mich. 1926); 
Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 81 N.E.2d 45, 47 (N.Y. 1948); 
Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300, 302 (Okla. 1961); Openhowski v. 
Mahone, 612 N.W.2d 579, 582 (S.D. 2000); Templeman's Adm'r v. 
Pugh, 46 S.E. 474, 475 (Va. 1904).  The foregoing cases are only 
a sample of a large number of federal and state court decisions 
stating that a statute of limitations is a statute of repose. 
Subsequent to Maryland Casualty Co. v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 
390, 14 N.W.2d 177 (1944), even this court indicated that the 
purported longstanding judicial distinction between statutes of 
limitation and statutes of repose does not exist.  In Ash Realty 
Corp. v. City of Milwaukee, 25 Wis. 2d 169, 130 N.W.2d 260 
(1964), we stated, "the policy of the law [is] that some 
reasonable lapse of time should end all controversies . . . .  
This is the philosophy of statutes of limitation.  They are 
therefore called 'statutes of repose.'"  Id. at 176 (quoting 
Oconto Co. v. Jerrard, 46 Wis. 317, 326, 50 N.W. 591 (1879)). 
No. 01-2649   
 
33 
 
limitation periods that operated as statutes of repose (such as 
Iowa's statute of repose for products liability), nor was any 
distinction 
being 
made 
between 
statutes 
that 
operate 
as 
traditional statutes of limitation, based on accrual, and those 
that operate as statutes of repose.  This is why, as we noted in 
Landis, the fifth edition of Black's Law Dictionary stated in 
its definition of "statutes of limitations" that "statutes of 
limitations are statutes of repose."  Landis, 245 Wis. 2d 1, ¶33 
(quoting Black's Law Dictionary 835 (5th ed. 1979)).27 
¶53 Because these declarations from older authority are 
inconsistent with our modern understanding of statutes of 
repose, they must have had some alternative meaning.  Indeed, 
when looking at cases,28 legal dictionaries,29 and treatises30 
                                                 
27 This same language is also located in the third edition 
of Black's Law Dictionary, which was the version available when 
Maryland Casualty was decided.  Black's Law Dictionary 1119 (3d 
ed. 1933). 
28 See, e.g., McMillan v. Wehle, 55 Wis. 685, 13 N.W. 694 
(1882) (explaining that a limitations period, in a case 
involving adverse possession and the recording of a tax deed, 
was a "statute of repose, giving perfect security to the 
possessor, and terminating all inquiry on the part of any who 
might otherwise question his title or disturb the possession"). 
29 See Ballentine's Law Dictionary 1233 (2d ed. 1930) 
(defining "statutes of repose" as "Statutes of limitation, 
fixing the period of time after a cause of action has accrued, 
within which an action thereon must be brought, are often 
referred to as statutes of repose"); see also 2 Pope's Legal 
Definitions 1518 (1920) (equating statutes of limitations with 
statutes of repose). 
No. 01-2649   
 
34 
 
that either precede or are contemporaneous with the Maryland 
Casualty decision, one realizes that a second meaning of 
"statute of repose" was intended by the Committee Note to 
§ 893.05. 
¶54 Before the contemporary concept of 
"statutes of 
repose" became popular, the term "statute of repose" was 
commonly used to refer to general limitations periods that 
simply provided peace, or "repose," to potential litigants, 
                                                                                                                                                             
30 A popular treatise on limitations law in the United 
States during the late 1800s and early 1900s makes clear the 
understanding of the Maryland Casualty statement.  According to 
the fourth edition of Wood on Limitations, published in 1916: 
"The weight of authority now is that the statute of limitations 
as to personal actions affects only on the remedy, and does not 
extinguish the right. . . .  They only apply to the remedy, 
without canceling the obligation."  1 Wood on Limitations § 1 
(4th ed. 1916) (footnotes omitted).  Later, the relevant 
distinction is further described: 
[Statutes of limitation] are rules deemed demanded by 
the soundest principles of public policy, and are now 
favorably regarded as statutes of repose, the object 
of which is to prevent fraudulent and stale claims 
from springing up after a great lapse of time.  The 
statute of limitation is a statute of repose, enacted 
as a matter of public policy to fix a limit within 
which an action must be brought, or the obligation be 
presumed to have been paid . . . . 
 
. . . .  
 
Statutes of limitation are regarded as statutes 
of repose, and not presumption.  The theory of 
statutes of limitation is that they do not affect the 
right, but simply destroy the remedy for the assertion 
of the right in court, for the purposes of quieting 
title and preserving the peace of society. 
Id. at § 4 (footnotes omitted). 
No. 01-2649   
 
35 
 
taking away the remedy for an otherwise valid claim.  A modern 
court has aptly explained how this understanding evolved: 
Early treatise writers and judges considered time bars 
created by statutes 
of 
limitations, escheat and 
adverse possession as periods of repose.  As the 
courts began 
to modify 
statutory 
limitations by 
applying the "discovery rule," legislatures responded 
by enacting absolute statutes of repose.  Modern 
limitations and statutes of repose are similar because 
they both provide repose for the defendant.  Yet, they 
are 
significantly 
different 
since 
a 
statute 
of 
limitation merely extinguishes the plaintiff's remedy 
while a statute of repose bars a cause of action 
before it arises. 
Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816, 819-20 (Okla. 1988) (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
¶55 This explanation is helpful.  To repeat, in most 
states, "a statute of limitation merely extinguishes the 
plaintiff's remedy."  Id.  This, however, was not and is not the 
law in Wisconsin.  In Wisconsin, we adopted the minority 
proposition that "the limitation of actions is a right as well 
as a remedy, extinguishing the right on one side and creating a 
right on the other."  Maryland Casualty, 245 Wis. at 393 
(emphasis added).31  That is why the Maryland Casualty court 
                                                 
31 To be sure, Maryland Casualty was not the first Wisconsin 
decision to announce that the running of a statute of limitation 
destroys both the remedy and the right to the claim.  See, e.g., 
Whereatt v. Worth, 108 Wis. 291, 299-300, 84 N.W. 441 (1900); 
Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 103 Wis. 373, 378, 79 N.W. 433 
(1899); Brown v. Parker, 28 Wis. 21, 27-28 (1871); Sprecher v. 
Wakeley, 11 Wis. 451, 456 (1860); see also Haase v. Sawicki, 20 
Wis. 2d 308, 312, 121 N.W.2d 876 (1963) (citing other pre-1944 
cases).  This court has recognized that our treatment of 
statutes of limitations is the minority view.  See In re Hoya's 
Will, 173 Wis. 196, 207, 180 N.W. 940 (1921); Hite v. Keene, 149 
Wis. 207, 213, 134 N.W. 383 (1912). 
No. 01-2649   
 
36 
 
stated that "in Wisconsin limitations are not treated as 
statutes of repose."  Under Wisconsin law, "statutes of 
limitation [are viewed as] substantive statutes because they 
create and destroy rights."  Betthauser v. Med. Protective Co., 
172 Wis. 2d 141, 149, 493 N.W.2d 40 (1992).  The language from 
Maryland Casualty was actually expressing that all Wisconsin 
limitations periods are more than merely statutes providing 
"repose," because that kind of "repose" would not be substantive 
in effect.32 
¶56 We have extensively reviewed Wisconsin cases that have 
invoked the term "statute of repose" and conclude that its use 
at the time of Maryland Casualty, which is the proper context of 
the 
Committee 
Note 
to 
§ 893.05, 
was 
merely 
to 
describe 
limitation periods that apply only to bar an available remedy, 
                                                 
32 See Adams v. Albany, 80 F. Supp 876, 881 (S.D. Cal. 1948) 
("Statutes of limitation are mere statutes of repose.  They 
affect the remedy only.  The passage of time does not destroy 
the obligation.  It still exists."); Carwood Realty Co. v. 
Gangol, 232 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Mo. 1950) (describing Missouri 
statute as "one of 'repose,' meaning, in legal parlance, that it 
simply precludes the bringing of an action to enforce rights, it 
affects the remedy only and may not be employed in securing 
affirmative relief"); Schmucker v. Naugle, 231 A.2d 121, 123 
(Pa. 1967) ("[T]he defense of statute of limitations is not a 
technical defense but substantial and meritorious.  Such 
statutes are not only statutes of repose, but they supply the 
place of evidence lost or impaired by lapse of time, by raising 
a presumption, which renders proof unnecessary.").  This 
understanding also explains the statement in Strassman v. 
Muranyi, 225 Wis. 2d 784, 792, 594 N.W.2d 398 (Ct. App. 1999), 
that "[s]tatutes of limitations serve a much different purpose 
than simply providing notice and repose." 
No. 01-2649   
 
37 
 
not affect substantive rights.33  Many of our early twentieth 
century Wisconsin cases distinguishing "statutes of limitation" 
from "statutes of repose" dealt with claims related to probate 
proceedings, see, e.g., Weiss v. First Nat. Bank of Monroe, 224 
Wis. 192, 271 N.W. 918 (1937), tax deed and title claims, see, 
e.g., Laffitte v. City of Superior, 142 Wis. 73, 125 N.W. 105 
(1910),34 and other debt collection matters, see, e.g., Heifetz 
v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973).  These issues 
                                                 
33 The best example of this understanding is found in a 1921 
decision of this court: 
There is no question raised here as to the 
general rule that a person accepting such a trust as 
executor becomes thereby chargeable in some way with 
existing 
obligations 
of 
his 
to 
the 
estate 
he 
undertakes to administer. 
There is a conflict of authorities as to whether 
or not the same rule applies as to obligations against 
which a statute of limitations had run during the 
lifetime of the testator.  The general line of 
authorities holding that the statute of limitations 
does not bar the application of such general rule is 
held in those jurisdictions wherein the statute of 
limitations is considered merely a statute of repose 
applying to the remedy only, while the contrary view 
is maintained where it is considered that the statute 
of limitations destroys the right of action itself and 
gives rise to a new property right in the debtor.  
This latter view as to the statute of limitations has 
been repeatedly asserted by this court, although such 
view is deemed to be contrary to that of many of the 
sister states and of the United States Supreme Court. 
In re Hoya's Will, 173 Wis. at 207-08 (emphasis added). 
34 Weiss and Laffitte are notable since they are the two 
cases cited by Maryland Casualty as authority for the statements 
quoted in the Committee Note to § 893.05. 
No. 01-2649   
 
38 
 
are precisely where the difference between the Wisconsin view 
and majority view of statutes of limitation is the most 
relevant.  See 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions §§ 25-29 
(2003).  In all, the longstanding judicial distinction between 
statutes of limitation and statutes of repose alluded to in the 
Note to Wis. Stat. § 893.05 has nothing to do with how the two 
concepts are differentiated today.  Rather, it relates solely to 
the effect of a limitation period——any limitation period——
expiring. 
¶57 A look at the modern understanding of the term 
"statute of repose" also reveals that, in Wisconsin, statutes of 
repose and statutes of limitation are the same in terms of the 
effect of a period expiring.35  A clear majority of American 
courts have held that statutes of repose are substantive,36 while 
statutes of limitation are ordinarily procedural in nature and 
                                                 
35 In one decision of this court, we referred to a period of 
limitation that clearly operated as a "statute of repose," in 
the modern sense, as a "statute of limitation."  See Shaurette 
v. Capitol Erecting Co., 23 Wis. 2d 538, 128 N.W.2d 34 (1964) 
(referring repeatedly to Wis. Stat. § 330.155 (1961), which bars 
certain actions on personal injuries from being brought more 
than six years after the design, planning, or construction of an 
improvement to real property, as a "statute of limitations"). 
36 See, e.g., Myers v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 701 F. Supp. 618, 
623-24 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (citing cases); Bryant v. Don Galloway 
Homes, Inc., 556 S.E.2d 597, 600 (N.C. App. 2001); Cronin v. 
Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 913-14 (Tenn. 1995) (citing cases); 51 Am. 
Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 32 (1970 current through 2000); 
see also Craig W. Palm, The Constitutionality of Section 27A of 
the Securities Exchange Act: Is Congress Rubbing Lampf the Wrong 
Way?, 37 Vill. L. Rev. 1213, 1222 n.25 (1992) ("[S]tatutes of 
repose are characterized by the majority of jurisdictions as 
substantive") (citing cases.). 
No. 01-2649   
 
39 
 
affect only the availability of a remedy for a litigant.  See 51 
Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 22 (1970 current through 
2000).  A passage from a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision offers a concise explanation. 
In contrast to statutes of limitation, statutes 
of 
repose 
serve 
primarily 
to 
relieve 
potential 
defendants 
from anxiety 
over liability 
for 
acts 
committed long ago.  Statutes of repose make the 
filing of suit within a specified time a substantive 
part of plaintiff's cause of action.  In other words, 
where a statute of repose has been enacted, the time 
for filing suit is engrafted onto a substantive right 
created by law.  The distinction between statutes of 
limitation and statutes of repose corresponds to the 
distinction between procedural and substantive laws.  
Statutes of repose are meant to be "a substantive 
definition 
of 
rights 
as 
distinguished 
from 
a 
procedural limitation on the remedy used to enforce 
rights."  Statutes of limitation serve interests 
peculiar to the forum, and are considered as going to 
the remedy and not the fundamental right itself. 
Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 511 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(citations 
omitted) 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Because 
of 
the 
substantive nature of statutes of repose, courts have treated 
the effect of the period expiring to be jurisdictional.37  
Consistent with this view, other courts have expressly held that 
the running of a statute of repose creates a vested right not to 
be sued.38 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Hinkle v. Henderson, 85 F.3d 298, 302 (7th 
Cir. 1996).  But see First Interstate Bank of Denver v. Cent. 
Bank & Trust Co. of Denver, 937 P.2d 855, 861 (Colo. App. 1996) 
(statute of repose, though substantive, was not a jurisdictional 
requirement and could be waived). 
38 See, e.g., Nolan v. Paramount Homes, Inc., 518 S.E.2d 
789, 792 (N.C. App. 1999). 
No. 01-2649   
 
40 
 
¶58 What our survey of the law reveals is that most 
jurisdictions recognize the running of a statute of limitation 
as being procedural (affecting only the availability of a 
remedy), while some others, including Wisconsin, treat the 
running of a statute of limitation as substantive.  Nearly all 
jurisdictions treat the expiring of modern statutes of repose as 
substantive.  Given this established jurisprudence, it would be 
extremely odd for this court to adopt the nearly non-existent 
view that the running of a statute of repose is not substantive 
in effect, while adopting the minority view that the running of 
a statute of limitation is substantive in effect and generates a 
protected property interest. 
¶59 In Wisconsin, the relevant distinction between the 
concepts of statutes of limitation and statutes of repose is in 
how the limitation period is computed; they are not different in 
ultimate effect.  Statutes of limitation and statutes of repose 
are not different for purposes of applying Wisconsin's borrowing 
statute on limitation periods, nor for purposes of extinguishing 
both the right and remedy of relief.  There is no reason to 
conflate these matters by taking the quote from Maryland 
Casualty out of context.  The Judicial Council Committee Notes 
to §§ 893.07 and 893.05——understood in their proper context——do 
not establish a legislative intent to exclude from the scope of 
No. 01-2649   
 
41 
 
§ 893.07 a foreign period of limitation that operates as a 
statute of repose.39 
¶60 Wenke makes an additional argument that Landis focused 
some of its analysis on the fact that § 655.44(4) has the word 
"any" immediately preceding the phrase "applicable statute of 
limitations," while § 893.07 applies to "the foreign period of 
limitation."  He suggests that the legislature, if it had 
intended to include every limitation period in the borrowing 
statute, would have written, "If an action is brought in this 
state on a foreign cause of action and any foreign period of 
limitation 
which 
applies 
has 
expired, 
no 
action 
may 
be 
maintained in this state." 
¶61 We are not convinced.  The reason Landis emphasized 
the term "any" was because it dealt with a tolling provision 
that contemplates having an effect on multiple limitation 
                                                 
39 The dissent professes that we are rewriting the statute 
and revising the intent of the legislature.  Dissent, ¶98.  On 
the contrary, the plain language of the statute refers to "the 
foreign period of limitation," not to the "foreign statute of 
limitation."  Consistent with Landis, we must discern the 
meaning intended by use of this phrase or by use of the term 
"statute of limitation" in other contexts.  The dissent contends 
that the Judicial Council Note embodies a clear legislative 
intent that Wis. Stat. § 893.07 not apply to foreign periods of 
limitation that operate as statutes of repose.  The Note, which 
is not part of the statute, only refers to statutes of repose by 
quoting a proposition from a 1944 case of this court.  Clearly, 
if we are to use this language to interpret § 893.07, we are 
obligated to discern the meaning of the phrase being quoted and 
adopted as part of the Note.  For the reasons explained in this 
opinion, it is simply mistaken to attribute any meaning to the 
term "statute of repose" in the Maryland Casualty case, quoted 
in the Judicial Council Note, other than that which we have 
conclusively established. 
No. 01-2649   
 
42 
 
schemes.  By contrast, § 893.07(1) zeroes in on one applicable 
limitation period, because only one limitation period will 
effectively apply to a cause of action.  If Wenke had brought 
his action in Iowa, his suit would have been governed by Iowa 
Code § 614.1(2A), not Iowa Code § 614.1(2). 
¶62 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.07 directs courts to use "the 
foreign period of limitation which applies."  The singular form 
of "period" indicates that the statute of repose in Iowa Code 
§ 614.1(2A) 
is 
the 
period 
"which 
applies." 
 
Wenke's 
interpretation 
of 
§ 893.07 
asks 
us 
to 
borrow 
Iowa 
Code 
§ 614.1(2), the foreign period of limitation that does not 
apply.  This interpretation eliminates statutes of repose from 
the phrase "period of limitation" by ignoring Iowa law on the 
limitation of actions. 
¶63 This 
preceding 
discussion 
reveals 
how 
Leverence 
created an artificial distinction between periods of limitation 
and periods of repose for purposes of § 893.07.  Instead of 
following this unwarranted distinction, we believe that the 
meaning of the phrase "foreign period of limitation which 
applies" in § 893.07(1) refers to "the period of limitation," as 
defined by the foreign jurisdiction, which governs the case in 
the foreign state.  If application of this rule includes a 
limitation period that operates as a statute of repose, so be 
it.  Wisconsin courts traditionally recognize the principle 
that, once a cause of action is determined to be "foreign," the 
borrowing statute adopts as Wisconsin law the law on limitations 
No. 01-2649   
 
43 
 
of the foreign state, if that proscribed law is shorter.  See 
Guertin, 141 Wis. 2d at 631. 
¶64 Nonetheless, Wenke suggests that we should give weight 
to our decision in Scott, and the Wisconsin Academy of Trial 
Lawyers argues that including foreign statutes of repose under 
§ 893.07(1) will necessitate the overruling of Scott.  We 
disagree.  Scott is inapposite to the present controversy, and 
our conclusions today are consistent with its holding. 
¶65 In Scott, the plaintiff sustained injuries while he 
was a minor in Alberta, Canada, and he thereafter brought an 
action in Wisconsin against Wisconsin defendants involved in 
designing and manufacturing the equipment connected to the 
injury.  Scott, 155 Wis. 2d at 611-12.  The claim was commenced 
after 
the 
expiration 
of 
Alberta's 
two-year 
statute 
of 
limitation, made applicable to the action under § 893.07.  Id. 
at 613-14.  We concluded that the Alberta statute of limitation 
was tolled under § 893.16(1), Wisconsin's tolling statute for 
persons under disability.40  We did not borrow Alberta's tolling 
provision.41  Id. at 616.  In so holding, we rejected the 
                                                 
40 Under the tolling provisions of Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1), 
if a person entitled to bring an action is under the age of 18 
when a cause of action accrues, the action may be commenced 
within two years after the person reaches the age of majority.  
Wis. Stat. § 893.16. 
41 Under Alberta law at the time, the tolling provisions for 
minors did not apply to a minor "in actual custody of his 
parents."  Scott v. First State Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 608, 613 
n.3, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990) (citing Chapter L-15, Part 9, sec. 
59, Alta. Rev. Stat. (1980)). 
No. 01-2649   
 
44 
 
defendants' 
contention 
that 
§ 893.16(1) 
applied 
only 
to 
Wisconsin causes of action and not to foreign causes of action 
under § 893.07(1), explaining: 
The text of the statutes does not support the 
defendants' contention.  Section 893.16(1) makes no 
distinction between a domestic and foreign cause of 
action; 
it 
expressly 
states 
that 
the 
tolling 
provisions apply to a person entitled to bring an 
action who is a minor when the cause of action 
accrued . . . .  Nothing in sec. 893.16(1) renders the 
tolling provisions inapplicable to sec. 893.07(1) or 
to a foreign jurisdiction's statute of limitations 
incorporated 
in 
the 
law 
of 
Wisconsin 
through 
893.07(1). 
Scott, 155 Wis. 2d at 615. 
¶66 Contrary to the arguments of Wenke and the Academy, 
Iowa's applicable statute of repose is not analogous to the 
Alberta tolling provision at issue in Scott.  Tolling provisions 
operate to stall the running of an applicable limitation period.  
They 
are 
not 
properly 
understood 
as 
limitation 
periods 
themselves.  See Betthauser, 172 Wis. 2d at 153 (stating that 
when the legislature changes a tolling period it does not create 
a new statute of limitation).  Wenke's argument in reliance on 
Scott puts the cart before the horse.  The tolling provision in 
Scott was applied only after we had already adopted Alberta's 
applicable 
statute 
of 
limitation, 
as 
was 
required 
under 
§ 893.07(1).  Id. at 613.  We then stated: "through the 
operation of sec. 893.07(1) the Alberta period of limitation 
becomes a statute in chapter 893 limiting the time for 
commencement of an action."  Id. at 616.  Statutes of repose are 
not equivalent to tolling provisions, and therefore Scott has no 
No. 01-2649   
 
45 
 
application to the issue of whether a particular type of 
limitation period is borrowed by § 893.07(1). 
¶67 Finally, it is of no concern that the Wisconsin 
legislature has declined to adopt its own statute of repose for 
product liability actions.  See Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's 
Sons 
Co., 
87 
Wis. 2d 882, 
902, 
275 
N.W.2d 915 
(1979) 
(recommending that the legislature adopt a period of repose for 
products liability actions).  A borrowing statute, by its very 
nature, contemplates that foreign jurisdictions will follow 
limitation periods that vary from those recognized in Wisconsin.  
In the context of § 893.07(1), the reality that Wisconsin, 
unlike Iowa, has not adopted a statute of repose for product 
liability actions is of no greater significance than Iowa having 
adopted a two-year limitation period for personal injury 
actions, Iowa Code § 614.1(2), while Wisconsin has opted for a 
three-year statute of limitation, Wis. Stat. § 893.54.  Both 
Wisconsin and Iowa have made public policy choices as to the 
appropriate length of limitations on certain actions.  Section 
893.07 simply instructs that Wisconsin courts adhere to the 
policy reflected in the shortest applicable limitations period, 
whether it be from Wisconsin or Iowa. 
V 
¶68 Wenke raises the issue whether this ruling should be 
applied 
prospectively 
only. 
 
If 
we 
employed 
prospective 
application, the rule including periods of repose within the 
term "period of limitation" would not apply to this case, and 
Wenke's claim could go forward.  Thus, Wenke and other 
No. 01-2649   
 
46 
 
plaintiffs in similar pending cases would escape the effect of 
this ruling.  Conversely, Gehl argues that our decision should 
follow the traditional rule of retroactive application.  If we 
adhere to the rule of retroactive application, Wenke's claim is 
barred by Iowa's statute of repose. 
¶69 In civil cases, we presume retroactive application.  
Browne v. WERC, 169 Wis. 2d 79, 112, 485 N.W.2d 376 (1992).  
Wisconsin 
courts 
generally 
adhere 
to 
the 
"Blackstonian 
Doctrine," which asserts that "a decision which overrules or 
repudiates an earlier decision is retrospective in operation," 
Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 575, 157 
N.W.2d 595 (1968).  Nonetheless, because retroactive application 
might be inequitable in certain rare situations, we have 
recognized that, occasionally, the better course is to apply a 
rule prospectively.  State ex rel. Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, 
¶17, 259 Wis. 2d 630, 658 N.W.2d 427; Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 
Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 605, 624, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997).42  
¶70 In Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 108, 280 
N.W.2d 757 (1979), we recognized that retrospective application 
of 
a 
judicial 
holding 
is 
a 
question 
of 
policy, 
not 
constitutional law.  Kurtz found applicable the three-factor 
                                                 
42 The 
practice 
of 
applying 
a 
judicial 
decision 
prospectively has been referred to as "sunbursting."  See Jacque 
v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 605, 623 n.5, 563 
N.W.2d 154 (1997) (explaining that "sunbursting" is not an 
illustrative term but in fact originates from a United States 
Supreme Court case captioned Great Northern Railway Company v. 
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932)). 
No. 01-2649   
 
47 
 
inquiry set forth by Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 
(1971), where the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that 
three separate factors bear on the issue of retroactive versus 
prospective application of a judicial holding.  Bradley, 259 
Wis. 2d 630, ¶13.   
¶71 Chevron's three factors are: (1) whether the decision 
"establish[es] a new principle of law, either by overruling 
clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by 
deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not 
clearly foreshadowed;" (2) whether retroactive application would 
further or retard the operation of the new rule; and (3) whether 
retroactive application could produce substantial inequitable 
results.  Id., ¶15 (citing Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106). 
¶72 As to the first factor, Wenke asserts that he relied 
on Leverence, and, while Landis may have foreshadowed the demise 
of Leverence, this case began almost two years before that 
decision.  Putting to one side the fact that Landis foreshadowed 
this decision three years ago, and the fact that three members 
of the court voted to recognize the abrogation of Leverence the 
first time we heard this case on certification——both of which 
forecast Leverence's precarious position——we acknowledge that 
Wenke might reasonably have relied on Leverence when he 
initiated this action.  However, reliance on an old rule in 
filing a lawsuit is not the type of reliance of which this court 
is concerned when deciding whether sunbursting is warranted.  
"When tort law is changed, the court is concerned about exposing 
many individuals and institutions to liability who would have 
No. 01-2649   
 
48 
 
obtained liability insurance had they known they would no longer 
enjoy immunity."  Jacque, 209 Wis. 2d at 625 (citing Harmann v. 
Hadley, 128 Wis. 2d 371, 381, 382 N.W.2d 673 (1986)).  The 
reliance here is very different and does not overcome the 
presumption of retroactive application. 
¶73 The 
other 
factors 
do 
not 
support 
Wenke. 
 
In 
considering the second factor, retroactive application will 
further, not retard, the operation of the interpretation 
announced in this case.  As we noted above, the specific 
objective embodied in § 893.07 is to adopt the shortest possible 
limitation period for actions potentially subject to more than 
one period of limitation.  See Guertin, 141 Wis. 2d at 631.  If 
we were to apply this decision as Wenke requests, our action 
would dramatically compromise this objective.  In contrast, 
following the presumption of retroactivity by applying Iowa's 
statute of repose comports with the underlying goal of § 893.07 
by adopting the shorter limitation period.  This factor weighs 
strongly in favor of retroactive application. 
¶74 Finally, with respect to the third Chevron factor, we 
must consider whether substantial inequity would result from 
retroactive 
application. 
 
Wenke 
essentially 
rehashes 
his 
reliance position under the first Chevron factor, but also folds 
into his argument other similarly situated plaintiffs, thereby 
recasting his argument in terms of equity.  He contends that 
retroactive application will be inequitable to him and other 
plaintiffs because he and others have relied on the precedent of 
Leverence.  While we recognize that applying our ruling in its 
No. 01-2649   
 
49 
 
presumed fashion, retroactively, will prevent certain plaintiffs 
from bringing claims, we must consider whether any hardship or 
injustice will befall Gehl also.  Jacque, 209 Wis. 2d at 625-26.  
"Retroactivity is usually justified as a reward for the litigant 
who has persevered in attacking an unsound rule."  Id.  When we 
factor in the injustice that would result to Gehl, we do not 
find adequate justification for sunbursting our decision.   
¶75 Because we have not been presented adequate grounds 
for applying our ruling prospectively, and because we presume 
retroactivity, our ruling today applies to Wenke.43 
VI 
¶76 There are compelling reasons not to adhere to the 
decision in Leverence.  First, the two bases for the Leverence 
decision have been wiped out.  Second, after conducting a 
thorough exercise of statutory interpretation, we conclude that 
Wis. Stat. § 893.07 dictates a different result from the result 
reached in Leverence, and that a different result is consistent 
with the statute's purpose.  Third, to firm up the second point, 
the purpose of the statute would be thwarted if we did not 
overrule Leverence on the point at issue.  Fourth, a statute of 
repose extinguishes a cause of action and creates a substantive 
                                                 
43 The Supreme Court has abandoned the three-prong Chevron 
standard for retroactivity in civil cases in favor of a 
simplified 
analysis 
in 
Harper 
v. 
Virginia 
Department 
of 
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993).  Even if we followed the Harper 
approach, we would nonetheless apply this ruling retroactively, 
as Harper disavows any exceptions to the rule of retroactive 
application in the civil context.  
No. 01-2649   
 
50 
 
right for a defendant who might be affected by that non-existent 
cause of action.  Fifth, if we did not hold as we do, we would 
deny Gehl its substantive right and we would force reversal on 
appeal of the decision already rendered in Merner. 
¶77 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.07(1) directs Wisconsin courts 
hearing a foreign cause of action to apply "the foreign period 
of limitation which applies" if that period is shorter than the 
applicable Wisconsin limitations period.  Based on the analysis 
in Landis, we conclude that the phrase "period of limitation" is 
ambiguous as to whether it is meant to include statutes of 
repose.  However, the history, context, subject matter, and 
purpose of the borrowing statute all indicate that the statute 
meant to include foreign statutes of repose within the phrase 
"period of limitation."  Consequently, we overrule that portion 
of Leverence that incorrectly interpreted § 893.07(1), and we 
conclude, by honoring Iowa's applicable period of limitation, 
that Mr. Wenke's claim must be dismissed.  As a result, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
All work on this opinion was completed on or before June 
30, 2004.  Justice Diane S. Sykes resigned on July 4, 2004. 
 
No.  01-2649.npc 
 
1 
 
¶78 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that given this court's holding in Landis v. 
Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 86, ¶62, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 
N.W.2d 893, the distinction between statutes of limitations and 
statues of repose outlined in Leverence v. U.S. Fidelity & 
Guaranty, 158 Wis. 2d 64, 90-93, 462 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1990) 
is no longer good law.  However, I write separately to emphasize 
that I feel that I have no choice but to affirm, given the 
majority decision in Landis.   
¶79 In Landis, the majority of this court concluded that 
the 
phrase 
"any 
applicable 
statute 
of 
limitations" 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4) applied equally to both statutes of 
limitations and statutes of repose.  Landis, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶¶60-61.  In a dissent, joined by Justices William A. Bablitch 
and Jon P. Wilcox, I disagreed with the majority's conclusion 
and 
took 
issue 
with 
the 
majority's 
contention 
that 
the 
distinction between the two statutes was a matter of judicial 
labeling, 
since 
our 
opinion 
in 
Aicher 
v. 
WI 
Patients 
Compensation Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶¶26-28, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 
N.W.2d 849, 
only 
a 
year 
earlier, 
reached 
the 
opposite 
conclusion.  Landis, 245 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶83-89. 
¶80 Because the majority prevailed in Landis, I feel bound 
to follow it in the present case.  My decision to join the 
majority now is dictated by the holding in Landis that language 
quite similar to that at issue here applied to both statutes of 
limitations and statutes of repose.  
¶81 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
No.  01-2649.npc 
 
2 
 
¶82 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  01-2649.awb 
 
1 
 
¶83 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Although the 
majority makes a compelling argument by tracing precedent and 
enunciating good policy, it is easy to lose focus of the central 
question presented in this case:  whether the legislature 
intended that a foreign statute of repose be treated as a 
"limitation" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.07.   
¶84 In this case, we have the benefit of a Judicial 
Council Note which clearly sets forth the intent of the 
legislature in enacting this statute.  It is rare that 
legislative history so precisely answers the presented question.  
Because the relevant Judicial Council Note clearly states the 
intent, "in Wisconsin limitations are not treated as statutes of 
repose," I cannot join the majority's contrary interpretation.  
If the statute is to be revised, that is a task better left for 
the legislature, not the courts.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶85 Although the majority attempts at length to explain 
away this note, there is no escaping its clear mandate:  
Wisconsin's borrowing statute, § 893.07, was not intended by the 
legislature to apply to statutes of repose.  Even the majority 
acknowledges the clarity of the Judicial Council Notes which 
support Wenke's construction.  It candidly admits:  "[t]he 
language of these Committee Notes does appear, on its face, to 
speak exactly to Wenke's construction of both Wis. Stat. 
§§ 893.05 and 893.07."  Majority op., ¶49.  
¶86 In 1979, the legislature restructured Chapter 893, 
Limitations 
of 
Commencement 
of 
Actions . . . 
Against 
No.  01-2649.awb 
 
2 
 
Governmental Units.  Within that comprehensive revision, the 
Judicial 
Council 
redrafted 
Wisconsin's 
borrowing 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 893.205, renumbering it to § 893.07.   
¶87 Former § 893.205(1) provided in relevant part: 
But no action to recover damages for injuries to the 
person, received without this state, shall be brought 
in any court in this state when such action is barred 
by any statute of limitations of actions of the state 
or country in which such injury was received unless 
the person so injured shall, at the time of such 
injury, have been a resident of this state. 
(Emphasis added).   
¶88 Section 893.07(1), the statute at issue, was recreated 
to provide: 
893.07 
 
Application 
of 
foreign 
statutes 
of 
limitation.44  (1)  If an action is brought in this 
state on a foreign cause of action and the foreign 
period of limitation which applies has expired, no 
action may be maintained in this state. 
¶89 The 
Judicial Council 
Committee Note 
to § 893.07 
explains the intent of the recreated statute:  
Sub. (1) applies the provision of s. 893.05 that the 
running of a statute of limitations extinguishes the 
right as well as the remedy to a foreign cause of 
action on which an action is attempted to be brought 
in Wisconsin in a situation where the foreign period 
has expired.  Sub. (1) changes the law of prior s. 
893.205(1), 
which 
provided 
that 
a 
resident 
of 
Wisconsin could sue in this state on a foreign cause 
of action to recover damages for injury to the person 
even if the foreign period of limitation had expired.  
                                                 
44 I note that the heading of § 893.07 reads "[a]pplication 
of foreign statutes of limitation."  While a heading is not part 
of the law, it can be persuasive in the interpretation given to 
the statute.  Pure Milk Prods. Coop. v. Nat'l Farmers Org., 64 
Wis. 2d 241, 253, 219 N.W.2d 564 (1974). 
No.  01-2649.awb 
 
3 
 
Judicial Council Committee Note, 1979, § 893.07 (emphasis 
added).   
¶90 As noted, § 893.07 incorporates the provisions of 
§ 893.05.  It is entitled "Relation of statute of limitations to 
right and remedy," and provides "[w]hen the period within which 
an action may be commenced on a Wisconsin cause of action has 
expired, the right is extinguished as well as the remedy."  The 
Judicial Council Committee Note to § 893.05 reflects the intent: 
This new section is a codification of Wisconsin case 
law.  See Maryland Casualty Company v. Beleznay, 245 
Wis. 390, 14 N.W.2d 177 (1944), in which it is stated 
at page 393:  "In Wisconsin the running of the statute 
of limitations absolutely extinguishes the cause of 
action for in Wisconsin limitations are not treated as 
statutes of repose."  
Judicial Council Committee Note, 1979, § 893.05 (emphasis 
added).  
¶91 The Committee's note for Chapter 893 further states, 
"[t]he previous provisions of ch. 893 are found in the recreated 
chapter in the same form that they previously existed or are 
redrafted only for greater clarity and ease of application 
except as otherwise noted."  (Emphasis added).  It is apparent 
from the Committee's comments that the Council considered the 
phrase "period of limitation" to be synonymous with the "statute 
of limitations" language of the former borrowing statute, 
§ 893.205(1) (1977). 
¶92 We have 
previously 
determined that 
the Judicial 
Council Notes to § 893.07 are entitled to "particularly heavy 
weight" in discerning the intent of the legislature.  Guertin v. 
Harbor Assurance Co. of Bermuda, 141 Wis. 2d 622, 630, 415 
No.  01-2649.awb 
 
4 
 
N.W.2d 831 (1987) (citing Johnson v. Deltadynamics, Inc., 813 
F.2d 944, 945 (7th Cir. 1987)).  The Judicial Council not only 
drafted § 893.07, it actually sponsored the bill.   
¶93 The Judicial Council Notes were presented to the 
Wisconsin Legislature when the bill that became § 893.07 was 
introduced.  See 1979 A.B. 327, at p. 17 (March 21, 1979).  Set 
forth on the first page of the bill is a notation that the bill 
was introduced "by request of Judicial Council."   
¶94 There may be all sorts of good policy reasons, which 
the majority carefully sets forth, why statutes of repose should 
be included in § 893.07.  It may be wise for Wisconsin to borrow 
other states' statutes of repose as well as statutes of 
limitations.45  However, these policy arguments, made from the 
vantage point of 2004, are no substitute for the legislative 
intent as set out at the time the statute was enacted in 1979.  
Even strong policy arguments cannot override clear legislative 
intent.   
                                                 
45 I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority's 
conclusion 
that 
Wisconsin's decision not to adopt a statute of repose is of no 
greater significance than Iowa having adopted a two-year 
limitations period for personal injury actions while Wisconsin 
has opted for a three-year statute of limitations.  Majority 
op., ¶67.  Statutes of repose are qualitatively as well as 
quantitatively different than statutes of limitations.  As the 
majority opinion expressly notes, statutes of repose operate 
differently 
from 
statutes 
of 
limitations 
because 
they 
potentially "cut off litigation before a cause of action 
arises."  Majority op., ¶50 (quoting Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2003 
WI 50, ¶29, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832.)  Wisconsin's 
decision not to adopt a product liability statute of repose thus 
appears to me to be of great significance and represents 
contrary 
evidence 
of 
the 
majority's 
conclusion 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 893.07 borrows both statutes of limitations and 
statutes of repose. 
No.  01-2649.awb 
 
5 
 
¶95 There 
may 
be 
analogous 
case 
law, 
interpreting 
different statutes, which the majority weaves into an artful 
analysis of why, based on an extension of those cases, we should 
conclude that statutes of repose ought to be included in 
§ 893.07.  Although this analysis supports the proposition that 
it may be appropriate to include statutes of repose under the 
borrowing statute, it is extraneous to the resolution of the 
question at hand.  Even carefully crafted analysis cannot 
override clear legislative intent.   
¶96 There may be an interesting and complex history of the 
evolution of statutes of repose.  The majority skillfully charts 
the subtle shifts in meaning over time, drawing on extensive 
case law and multiple editions of legal dictionaries.  Although 
the analysis provides an informative tour of a wide range of 
case law from many jurisdictions, there is no evidence that the 
Wisconsin legislature embraced or even grasped what the majority 
admits is a "largely unperceived shift" in the meaning attached 
to the phrase "statute of repose."  Majority op., ¶49.  Even a 
sophisticated 
appreciation 
of 
this 
subtle 
and 
"largely 
unperceived" shift in legal concepts cannot override clear 
legislative intent.  
¶97 When the dust of policy arguments and analysis of 
cases involving other statutes settles, the inquiry remains:  
what was intended at the time this statute was enacted? 
¶98 The majority may not agree with what the note states.  
It may think that public policy and case law interpreting other 
statutes should lead to a different result.  However, our job is 
No.  01-2649.awb 
 
6 
 
not to rewrite the statute or revise the intent of the 
legislature.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.    
¶99 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion. 
 
No.  01-2649.awb 
 
 
 
1