Case Title: State ex rel. Vanni v. McMonagle

Citation: 2013-Ohio-5187

Docket Number: 2013-0353

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Vanni v. McMonagle, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5187.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-5187 
THE STATE EX REL. VANNI ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. MCMONAGLE, JUDGE, 
APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Vanni v. McMonagle,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5187.] 
Prohibition—Writ 
sought 
to 
prevent 
judge 
from 
hearing 
litigation—
Jurisdictional-priority rule—Adequate remedy at law—Court of appeals’ 
dismissal of complaint for writ affirmed. 
(No. 2013-0353—Submitted September 10, 2013—Decided December 3, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 99507, 2013-Ohio-500. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We affirm the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals 
denying the request of appellants, Julian Vanni and Vanni & Associates, Inc. 
(collectively, “Vanni”), for a writ of prohibition against Cuyahoga County 
Common Pleas Court Judge Richard McMonagle. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
Background 
{¶ 2} The present case is the outgrowth of earlier litigation, Kleem v. 
Southwest Sports Ctr. Inc., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-07-624066.  Kleem involved a 
dispute over the valuation of certain real property.  Kleem retained Vanni to 
appraise the property.  The trial court entered judgment in favor of Kleem and 
against Southwest and the court of appeals affirmed.  Kleem v. Southwest Sports 
Ctr., Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No 92674, 2009-Ohio-3100. 
{¶ 3} Some time thereafter, Southwest filed suit against Kleem and 
Vanni.  Southwest Sports Ctr., Inc. v. Kleem, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-11-771733.  
Southwest alleged that Vanni and Kleem conspired to provide fraudulent 
testimony in the Kleem case.  The case was assigned to Judge McMonagle. 
{¶ 4} Vanni filed a complaint in the Eighth District Court of Appeals 
seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge McMonagle from hearing the 
Southwest litigation.  Vanni argued that Judge McMonagle lacked jurisdiction 
based on the jurisdictional-priority rule, claim preclusion, and witness immunity. 
{¶ 5} The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the case on the grounds 
that Judge McMonagle did not “patently and unambiguously” lack jurisdiction 
and that the relators had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  2013-
Ohio-500, ¶ 10.1  Vanni timely appealed. 
Analysis 
{¶ 6} To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, Vanni must 
establish that (1) the judge is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of 
that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury 
                                                 
1  Vanni objects to the appellate court’s decision to dismiss the complaint sua sponte.  Sua sponte 
dismissal without prior notice is appropriate only if the complaint is frivolous or the claimant 
“ ‘obviously cannot prevail’ ” on the facts alleged in the complaint.  State ex rel. Mayer v. Henson, 
97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 11, quoting McAuley v. Smith, 82 Ohio 
St.3d 393, 395, 696 N.E.2d 572 (1998).  For the reasons discussed below, we find no error in the 
lower court’s decision to act sua sponte.  State ex rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham Unruh, 118 Ohio St.3d 
76, 2008-Ohio-1734, 886 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 19, 22. 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex 
rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 18.  If 
the absence of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, a relator need not establish 
the lack of an adequate remedy at law.  State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court 
of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 7} Judge McMonagle is undoubtedly about to exercise judicial power.  
The question is whether Vanni has established any basis to question whether that 
exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law. 
The jurisdictional-priority rule 
{¶ 8} The jurisdictional-priority rule provides that as between state 
courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal whose power is first invoked 
acquires exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the whole issue and settle the rights 
of the parties.  State ex rel. Dunlap v. Sarko, 135 Ohio St.3d 171, 2013-Ohio-67, 
985 N.E.2d 450, ¶ 9.  The court of appeals held that the jurisdictional-priority rule 
did not deprive Judge McMonagle of jurisdiction to hear Southwest because that 
case does not involve the same parties as did the underlying Kleem case.  2013-
Ohio-500, ¶ 6.  We find that the jurisdictional-priority rule does not apply in this 
case for a more basic reason. 
{¶ 9} The common pleas court’s docket indicates that the trial court 
entered final judgment in the Kleem case on December 16, 2008, and that 
Southwest did not file the second suit until December 19, 2011. 
{¶ 10} The jurisdictional-priority rule does not apply if the first action 
terminates before the second action commences.  State ex rel. Flower v. Rocker, 
52 Ohio St.2d 160, 162, 370 N.E.2d 479 (1977).  In other words, “the 
jurisdictional priority rule requires that there be two cases pending.”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  Family Med. Found., Inc. v. Bright, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 00AP-1476, 
2001 WL 722103, *4 (June 28, 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 96 Ohio St.3d 183, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
2002-Ohio-4034, 772 N.E.2d 1177; see also Fronk v. Chung, 11th Dist. Lake No. 
98-L-079, 1999 WL 266571 (April 30, 1999). 
{¶ 11} For this reason, Vanni has not established that the jurisdictional-
priority rule bars Judge McMonagle from exercising jurisdiction. 
Claim preclusion 
{¶ 12} Claim preclusion is a subset of the doctrine of res judicata.  Grava 
v. Parkman Township, 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 381, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995).  And res 
judicata is not a basis for prohibition because it does not divest a trial court of 
jurisdiction to decide its applicability.  McClellan v. Mack, 129 Ohio St.3d 504, 
2011-Ohio-4216, 954 N.E.2d 123, ¶ 2; see also State ex rel. Caskey v. Gano, 135 
Ohio St.3d 175, 2013-Ohio-71, 985 N.E.2d 453, ¶ 5; State ex rel. Hamilton Cty. 
Bd. of Commrs. v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 111, 
2010-Ohio-2467, 931 N.E.2d 98, ¶ 36. 
Witness immunity 
{¶ 13} Witnesses are absolutely immune from civil liability for 
defamatory remarks made during judicial proceedings.  Willitzer v. McCloud, 6 
Ohio St.3d 447, 448-449, 453 N.E.2d 693 (1983).  However, “immunity is an 
affirmative defense, which must be raised and proven, i.e., it usually does not 
affect the jurisdiction of the court.”  State ex rel. Koren v. Grogan, 68 Ohio St.3d 
590, 594, 629 N.E.2d 446 (1994). 
{¶ 14} Ohio courts have applied this principle to a host of statutory and 
common-law immunities, including statutory sovereign immunity, BCL Ents. v. 
Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control, 77 Ohio St.3d 467, 471, 675 N.E.2d 1 (1997); 
political-subdivision immunity, Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. DiGioia-Suburban 
Excavating, L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 89708 and 89907, 2008 WL 802641, 
¶ 13 (March 27, 2008); common-law judicial immunity, White v. Goldsberry, 4th 
Dist. Athens No. CA-1525, 1992 WL 368801, *3 (Dec. 4, 1992); and charitable 
immunity, Burke v. St. Raphael’s Church, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 46673, 1983 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
WL 2773, *1 (Nov. 17, 1983); see also Brown v. Lincoln Hts., 195 Ohio App.3d 
149, 2011-Ohio-3551, 958 N.E.2d 1280, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.) (holding that 
recreational-user immunity under R.C. 1533.181 is a waivable affirmative 
defense). 
{¶ 15} We agree with the appellate court that the defense of witness 
immunity is not a jurisdictional defect, but rather an affirmative defense that 
Vanni can and must present to Judge McMonagle in the first instance. 
{¶ 16} Neither can Vanni show the absence of an adequate remedy at law.  
Vanni contends that seeking dismissal of the suit and appealing any adverse final 
judgments are not adequate remedies because of the costs of litigation.  However, 
“[a]ppeal following judgment is not rendered inadequate,” such that a party may 
secure a writ of prohibition, “due to the potential time and expense involved.”  
State ex rel. Jackim v. Ambrose, 118 Ohio St.3d 512, 2008-Ohio-3182, 890 
N.E.2d 324, ¶ 6, citing State ex rel. Abner v. Elliott, 85 Ohio St.3d 11, 17, 706 
N.E.2d 765 (1999). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 17} Because Judge McMonagle does not patently lack jurisdiction, and 
Vanni has an adequate remedy by way of appeal, the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals was correct to dismiss the prohibition action. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_____________________ 
Toma & Associates, L.P.A., Inc., Timothy N. Toma, and Stephen S. 
Ellsesser, for appellants. 
Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles 
E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_________________________