Case Title: B.Y., The Grandmother V. Florida Department Of Children And Families

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC04-258

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida 
____________ 
No. SC04-258 
____________ 
B.Y., the grandmother,  
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, 
Respondent. 
[November 10, 2004] 
QUINCE, J. 
We have for review Department of Children & Family Services v. B.Y., 863 
So. 2d 418 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), which expressly and directly conflicts with the 
decisions in In re Adoption by Alexander, 206 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), and 
B.B. v. Department of Children & Families, 854 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For the reasons more fully 
set forth below, we quash the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal and 
hold that under the circumstances of this case, the trial court acted appropriately to 
finalize the adoption. 
 
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The Facts 
In September 2001, the Department of Children and Families took custody 
of J.L.P., B.D.P., and J.S.P., the children in this case.  The children were 
adjudicated dependent and remained in the protective custody of the department 
until they were placed with their grandmother, B.Y.1   In March 2002, the 
department undertook a preliminary home study in anticipation of the placement of 
the children with B.Y.  The study was favorable, and B.Y. was awarded temporary 
custody.  B.Y. had relocated from Pennsylvania to take care of the children and 
was assisted by a transitional housing program sponsored by the YWCA of Palm 
Beach County.   This transitional housing was provided for up to two years.  The 
department considered the placement with B.Y. to be a suitable permanent custody 
arrangement for the children.  In anticipation of adoption by B.Y., parental rights 
were terminated.  The guardian ad litem fully supported placement with B.Y., 
stating that B.Y. was a loving parent and the children were in a loving home. 
At the final adoption hearing, however, the department refused to consent to 
the adoption, arguing that a final home investigation was required but had not been 
and could not be conducted because B.Y. was in temporary housing.  The 
department also argued that adoption subsidies would not be payable to B.Y. in the 
absence of its consent to the adoption, and subsidies could not be applied for 
                                        
1.  Two of the three children are actually B.Y.'s grandchildren. 
 
 
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because B.Y.'s fingerprints, necessary for the application process, had been 
damaged.  In response, the attorney ad litem for the three children argued that a 
final home investigation was not required under section 63.125, Florida Statutes 
(1999), because B.Y. was within the third degree of consanguinity with two of the 
children.  The trial court ruled that no home investigation was required in this case.  
After resolving the fingerprint problems, the judge ordered the parties to return the 
following week for finalization.  The parties returned, and the department again 
refused to consent to the adoption because B.Y. had not obtained permanent 
housing and the home investigation had not been completed.  The trial court 
reiterated its prior rulings and finalized the adoption without the department's 
consent. 
On appeal, the Fourth District reversed and held that the department's 
consent was mandatory and that absent the department's consent, the trial court 
could not finalize the adoption.  We quash the Fourth District's decision. 
Law and Analysis 
The standard of appellate review on issues involving the interpretation of 
statutes is de novo.  See State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004) (“This 
question of statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review.”); In re 
Guardianship of J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (“Because this 
case involves the application of statutory law, and is a pure question of law, the 
 
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standard of review is de novo.”).  The department argues that the statutes found in 
chapters 39 and 63, Florida Statutes (2002), require the department's consent 
before an adoption can be finalized.  B.Y. argues that the statutes make the 
department's consent permissive but not necessary. 
The first stated goal of chapter 39, Florida Statutes, is “to provide for the 
care, safety, and protection of children in an environment that fosters healthy 
social, emotional, intellectual, and physical development; to ensure secure and safe 
custody; and to promote the health and well-being of all children under the state's 
care.” § 39.001(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002).  The department's role in achieving this 
goal is important, and the department does a tremendous service by providing care, 
safety, and protection to the children in its custody.  In addition to the State's 
statutory responsibilities, the courts also have statutory responsibilities for these 
children.  The courts are charged with the duty of ensuring that the best interests of 
the children are advanced.  See In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989) 
(stating that the best interest of the child in adoption proceedings is the paramount 
consideration); see also, §§ 63.022(2)(l), 63.122(5), 63.142(4), Fla. Stat. (2002).  
This duty exists during the dependency proceedings, and continues through the 
adoption proceedings.  See B.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 854 So. 2d 822, 
825 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (finding that the dependency court is not divested of 
 
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jurisdiction after a termination of parental rights trial and retains exclusive 
jurisdiction throughout the adoption process).   
Furthermore, for both the department and the courts, the paramount concern 
is expeditiously achieving permanent stability for the children, specifically, 
achieving permanent placement within one year.  See § 39.001(1)(h)-(i), Fla. Stat. 
(2002); see also C.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 854 So. 2d 777, 779 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“ [C]ourts are compelled to expedite proceedings to prevent 
children from languishing in the foster care system. . . . Achieving permanent 
stability in the child's life is the paramount concern of the judicial process.”).  
Thus, it is the department's role to protect the children in the State's care and to 
select suitable and permanent placement for these children, and it is the courts' role 
to oversee that the expeditious and suitable placement of these children is 
consistent with the policies of the state as set forth by the Legislature.  In order to 
fulfill its role, the court has “inherent and continuing jurisdiction to entertain 
matters pertaining to child custody and to enter any order appropriate to a child's 
welfare.”  B.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 854 So. 2d 822, 825 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2003) (quoting Henry & Rilla White Found., Inc. v. Migdal, 720 So. 2d 568, 
573 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). 
The courts’ continuing jurisdiction is supported by the various statutory 
provisions of chapters 39 and 63.  For example, section 39.812(4), Florida Statutes, 
 
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states that “[t]he court shall retain jurisdiction over any child placed in the custody 
of the department until the child is adopted,” and section 39.813 provides that 
“[t]he court which terminates the parental rights of a child who is the subject of 
termination proceedings pursuant to this chapter shall retain exclusive jurisdiction 
in all matters pertaining to the child's adoption pursuant to chapter 63.”  
Additionally, the court is statutorily required to enter orders necessary to protect 
the best interests of the children involved in adoption proceedings.  See § 
63.022(2)(l), Fla. Stat. (2002) (“In all matters coming before the court under this 
chapter, the court shall enter such orders as it deems necessary and suitable to 
promote and protect the best interests of the person to be adopted.”). 
In this case, the children were removed from their mother's care and were 
adjudicated dependent.  When the paternal grandmother learned that the children 
were in the department's care, she relocated from Pennsylvania to Florida with the 
intent of adopting the children.  She visited the children at least two times a week.    
After a preliminary home study was found to be favorable, B.Y. was awarded 
temporary custody.  Upon obtaining temporary custody of the children, B.Y. began 
living in a transitional housing program which provided her with housing for up to 
two years.  All parties proceeded with the goal of permanent placement with the 
grandmother, and this goal was enthusiastically supported by the guardian ad litem.  
The department's only concern was the grandmother's temporary housing situation.  
 
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The record indicates that the grandmother was participating in a program which 
provided housing for up to two years, and that she followed the program 
requirements.  However, the department seemed to equate the temporary nature of 
the housing program with instability, and argued that the risk of B.Y. becoming 
financially unable to care for these children prevented its consent to the final 
adoption.  At the time of the final hearing, the children had been wards of the state 
more than one year, longer than the optimum time limit set by the Legislature for 
permanent placement.  With the nature of B.Y.'s housing being the only obstacle 
expressed by the department for permanency, the trial court made a finding that it 
was in the children's best interests to finalize the adoption.  In so doing, the trial 
court effectively held that the department acted unreasonably by withholding 
consent to the final adoption.2 
We find that the trial court acted within its authority in finalizing the 
adoption without the department’s consent when, as in this case, the trial court 
found that withholding consent was unreasonable.  The trial court’s order advanced 
the best interests of these children, and the adoption was consistent with the stated 
                                        
2.  Our holding is consistent with the 2004 legislative amendment to section 
39.812 which, in discussing the court’s continuing jurisdiction in adoption matters, 
clarifies that a copy of the department’s consent must be attached to the adoption 
petition “unless the court determines that such consent is being unreasonably 
withheld and provided that the petitioner has filed with the court a favorable 
preliminary adoptive home study performed by a licensed child-placing agency, a 
child-caring agency registered under s. 409.176, or a licensed professional or 
agency described in s. 61.20(2).”  § 39.812(5), Fla. Stat. (2004). 
 
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legislative policies.  By denying its consent in this case, the department was well-
intentioned.  However, the Legislature has mandated the court's continuing 
jurisdiction to advance the children's best interests.  The court in this case fulfilled 
its responsibilities by ensuring that the termination of parental rights and 
subsequent adoption were done appropriately, consonant with the department's 
policies and in an expeditious manner.  The record demonstrates that the trial court 
considered the appropriateness of placing these children with B.Y., considered 
B.Y.'s financial resources, and was aware of B.Y.'s temporary housing situation.  
In addition, the court considered the department and the guardian ad litem's 
endorsement of B.Y. as the appropriate caregiver and the department’s preliminary 
home study finding B.Y. to be a suitable parent.  Failure to finalize the adoption in 
this case would have been inconsistent with the goal of expeditiously providing a 
stable and permanent home for these children. 
Conclusion 
For these reasons, we quash the decision of the Fourth District Court of 
Appeal.  We hold that the trial court in this case acted consistently with the stated 
legislative policies and within its statutory authority to advance the best interests of 
the children. 
It is so ordered. 
 
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PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
CANTERO, J., concurs with an opinion, in which, PARIENTE, C.J., concurs. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
CANTERO, J., concurring. 
 
The critical question in this case is whether a trial court may finalize the 
adoptions of children for whom parental rights have been terminated, despite the 
refusal of the Department of Children and Families to consent to the adoptions.  I 
agree with the majority that a court may finalize these adoptions without the 
department’s consent.  I write separately, however, to explain in greater detail why 
this holding follows from the adoption statute. 
The statutes that provide for the department’s consent to adoptions of 
children in its custody are permissive, not mandatory.  The department “may 
provide consent to the adoption.”  § 63.062(7), Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis added); 
see also id. § 39.812(1) (“The department may thereafter . . . consent to the 
adoption . . . .”) (emphasis added).  If the department does consent, then “that 
consent alone shall in all cases be sufficient,” id. § 39.812(1), and “no other 
consent is required,” id. § 63.062(7).  If the department withholds its consent, 
however, the permissive phrasing of the statute indicates that the trial court may 
 
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nevertheless grant the adoption.  In other words, the department’s consent is a 
sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for a court to finalize the adoptions of 
children for whom parental rights have been terminated.   
Despite this permissive phrasing, the department contends that the 
Legislature intended to give the department a veto power over adoptions.  The 
department cites section 39.812(5), Florida Statutes (2003), which states that a 
“copy of the consent executed by the department as required under section 
63.062(7) must be attached to the [adoption] petition.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
According to the department, the mandatory language of section 39.812(5) 
supersedes the permissive language of sections 63.062(7) and 39.812(1).   
This argument overlooks a fundamental principle of statutory construction––
that courts should favor an interpretation that harmonizes potentially conflicting 
statutory provisions.  See, e.g., Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So. 2d 
998, 1008 (Fla. 2003) (“Courts are obligated ‘to adopt an interpretation that 
harmonizes two related, if conflicting, statutes while giving effect to both.’”) 
(quoting Palm Harbor Special Fire Control District v. Kelly, 516 So. 2d 249, 250 
(Fla. 1987)).  The provisions addressing the department’s consent are easily 
harmonized.  Section 39.812(5) states that a “copy of the consent executed by the 
department as required under section 63.062(7)” must be attached to the adoption 
petition.  This does not necessarily mean that the department’s consent is always 
 
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required under section 63.062(7).  A more harmonious interpretation is that the 
department’s consent must be attached to the adoption petition only to the extent it 
is required under section 63.062(7).  The statute’s other provision addressing the 
content of adoption petitions confirms such an interpretation.  See § 63.112(2)(a), 
Fla. Stat. (2003) (explaining that an adoption petition must include “the required 
consent, unless such consent is excused by the court”). 
Even if these provisions could not be so harmonized, they remain, at best, 
ambiguous.  No provision unequivocally requires the department’s consent to 
adoptions.  In the absence of a clear legislative statement to that effect, granting the 
department a veto power over adoption determinations would contradict the 
broader statutory scheme, which focuses on the best interests of the child. 
When faced with an apparent ambiguity or conflict within a statute, “courts 
must consider the statute as a whole.”  Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 
(Fla. 2003) (quoting State v. Anderson, 764 So. 2d 848, 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)).  
The adoption statute, when considered as a whole, clearly expresses the 
Legislature’s intent to allow trial courts to bypass non-parental consent 
requirements when it is in the children’s best interests.3  One provision, for 
                                        
3 For obvious reasons, parental consent is treated more deferentially than 
non-parental consent.  Parental consent may be waived only if (1) the parent has 
deserted or abandoned the child; or (2) parental rights have been terminated by a 
court; or (3) the parent has been judicially declared incompetent and is medically 
unlikely to regain competence.  § 63.064(1)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). 
 
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example, allows the trial court to waive the consent of any non-parental legal 
guardian or custodian who, after receiving notice, “is found by the court to be 
withholding his or her consent unreasonably.”  § 63.064(4), Fla. Stat. (2003).  An 
analogous provision allows the consent of the adopted person’s spouse to be 
waived if it is being unreasonably withheld.  Id. § 63.064(5).  Yet another 
provision allows parental rights pending adoption to be terminated “if written 
consent has been executed … or notice has been served” to the listed parties.  Id. § 
63.062(1) (emphasis added).  In the absence of a clear statement to the contrary, it 
is safe to assume that the Legislature also intended for the trial court to bypass the 
department’s consent when it is in a child’s best interests. 
As the majority notes, Majority op. at 7 note 2, the Legislature’s recent 
amendments to the statute support this reading.  See Ch. 2004-389, §§ 1-2, Laws of 
Fla.  Although not retroactive to this case, the amendments effectively resolve the 
statutory ambiguities concerning the department’s consent.  Cf. Finley v. Scott, 
707 So. 2d 1112, 1116 (Fla. 1998) (“Although the 1993 statute applies to this case, 
we accept the [subsequent] addition of [a] sentence to the statute as clarifying 
legislative intent.”).  The new section 63.062(7), Florida Statutes (2004), which 
became effective on July 1, 2004, contains the following language:  
The consent of the department shall be waived upon a determination 
by the court that such consent is being unreasonably withheld, 
provided that the petitioner has filed with the court a favorable 
 
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preliminary adoptive home study performed by [one of various 
licensed agencies].   
See also id. § 39.812(5) (containing a new waiver provision with similar wording). 
If the 2004 amendments had been effective when the trial court finalized the 
adoptions in this case, the trial court clearly would have been justified in waiving 
the department’s consent.  The petitioner in this case already had obtained a 
favorable preliminary adoptive home study from the department in March 2002.  
The department then refused to consent to the adoptions due to the lack of a 
favorable final home study, even though two of the three adoptions in this case 
were exempt from such a study because of the children’s blood relationship with 
the petitioner.  See § 63.125(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (“Unless directed by the court, a 
[final home] investigation and recommendation are not required … if the minor is 
related to one of the adoptive parents within the third degree of consanguinity.”).  
It would be unreasonable for the department to withhold its consent simply 
because the petitioner failed to obtain a report that the Legislature had explicitly 
exempted her from having to obtain. 
 
While the 2004 amendments do not control this case, they are consistent 
with our interpretation of the pre-amendment statute.  The purpose of the consent 
provisions is for the department, with its expertise in family matters, to aid the trial 
court in its determination, not to immobilize it.  The 2004 amendments make 
explicit what was formerly implicit in the statutory scheme: that the department, 
 
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like every other non-parent involved in an adoption proceeding, cannot 
unreasonably thwart an otherwise beneficial adoption.  Thus, the trial court’s 
decision to finalize the adoptions in this case, despite the department’s 
unreasonable withholding of consent, was justified. 
 
PARIENTE, C.J., concurs. 
 
 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D03-715 
 
 
(Palm Beach County) 
 
Michelle Hankey, William Booth, Maxine Williams, and Barbara Briggs of Legal 
Aid Society of Palm Beach County, Inc., West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Jeffrey Dana Gillen, Crystal Y. Yates-Hammond and Josefina Tamayo, West Palm 
Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent