Case Title: Timothy A. Dunlap v. State of Idaho Murder

Citation: 

Docket Number: 33061

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2008-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No.  33061 
 
TIMOTHY A. DUNLAP,                     
                                    
                                  Petitioner-Appellant,     
                                    
v.                                  
                                    
STATE OF IDAHO,              
                                    
                                 Respondent.      
                                    
                                                               
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Boise, May 2008 Term 
 
2008 Opinion No.  76 
 
Filed:  June 10, 2008 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Caribou County.  
Hon. Don L. Harding, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Hampton & Elliott, Boise, for appellant.  Teresa Hampton argued. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.  Lamont 
Anderson argued. 
_______________________________________ 
 
 
W. JONES, Justice 
Timothy Dunlap pled guilty to the first-degree felony murder of Tonya Crane; he was 
then sentenced to death by the district court on April 20, 1992.  On January 10, 2005, Dunlap 
filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code §§ 19-4901 through -4911, 
-2719 alleging a violation of his rights under the Idaho and United States Constitutions.  
Specifically, Dunlap seeks relief on the claims that this Court refused to address in Dunlap III 
because they were raised for the first time on appeal.1  See Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56-58, 
                                                 
1 Dunlap III refused to address; (1) whether Dunlap was deprived due process because the trial court failed to ensure 
he was competent to plead guilty, (2) whether his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in relation to previous offenses committed in Ohio, (3) whether his constitutional rights were 
violated due to a conflict relating to the public defender contract and the plea agreement, (4) whether his 
constitutional rights were violated because of prosecutorial misconduct, (5) whether his guilty plea violated the 
 
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106 P.3d 376, 382-84 (2005).  The district court, Honorable Don L. Harding presiding, granted 
the state’s motion for summary dismissal on Dunlap’s successive petition for post-conviction 
relief.  The court held that Dunlap’s successive petition for post-conviction relief was untimely 
under I.C. § 19-2719(5), and alternatively, that Dunlap had failed to raise any genuine issue of 
material fact which would warrant an evidentiary hearing.  Dunlap appeals that decision to this 
Court. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Dunlap, in his first appeal to this Court, alleged errors in his first sentencing hearing.  In 
1993, this Court affirmed Dunlap’s original sentence.  State v. Dunlap, 125 Idaho 530, 873 P.2d 
784 (1993).  Dunlap then initiated federal proceedings, where his appointed counsel discovered 
that no post-conviction proceedings had been initiated in state court.  In 1994, Dunlap filed his 
first petition for post-conviction relief.  The trial court summarily dismissed his claims and held 
that they were waived under I.C. § 19-2719(5).  In 1998, this Court reversed that decision, and 
allowed Dunlap’s state petition for post-conviction relief of a capital case.  Dunlap v. State, 131 
Idaho 576, 576-77, 961 P.2d 1179, 1179-80 (1998) (holding that Dunlap made a prima facie 
showing that he did not know or could not reasonably have known that no petition for post-
conviction relief was filed on his behalf prior to the appointment of his current counsel). 
On remand, prior to the evidentiary hearing on Dunlap’s post-conviction petition, the 
state conceded error in the original sentencing procedures.  On January 11, 2002, the district 
court ordered re-sentencing and denied Dunlap’s other post-conviction claims.  The state filed, 
and the district court granted, a motion to stay re-sentencing pending appeal.  Dunlap then 
appealed the denial of his post-conviction claims to this Court, alleging additional claims on 
appeal.  On November 30, 2004, this Court affirmed the district court’s decision, declining to 
address those issues which were raised for the first time on appeal.  Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 
50, 106 P.3d 376 (2004). 
In 2005, within 42 days of this Court’s opinion in Dunlap III, Dunlap filed a successive 
petition for post-conviction relief, which raised the issues that this Court refused to address in 
                                                                                                                                                             
federal and state constitution because he was not informed of the true nature of the charges against him and the full 
extent of the rights waived by a guilty plea, and (6) whether he was deprived of his constitutional rights because trial 
counsel failed to ensure a complete record of all proceedings and counsel’s failure to ensure that Dunlap was present 
for all proceedings.  Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 58, 106 P.3d 376, 384 (2004). 
 
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Dunlap III.2  The district court granted the state’s motion for summary dismissal and dismissed 
Dunlap’s successive post-conviction complaint.  Dunlap now appeals that dismissal to this Court. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court lacked jurisdiction over the 2005 post-conviction petition 
because no valid death sentence existed until the February 2006 resentencing hearing. 
2. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Dunlap’s 2005 successive 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
3. Whether post-conviction counsel acted outside of his authority by failing to raise the 
issues dismissed in the 2005 and 1994 petitions. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Post-conviction proceedings are generally governed by I.C. §§ 19-4901 through -4911 
(the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act).  Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature 
and governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 699-
700, 992 P.2d 144, 148-49 (1999).  Summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is 
governed by the same standard as summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56.  Id.  On review, this 
Court liberally construes any inferences in favor of the non-moving party and determines, based 
on the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists.  Id. 
This Court freely reviews questions of law.  State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 485, 80 
P.3d 1083, 1086 (2003).  Typically, this Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal.  McKinney, 133 Idaho at 708, 992 P.2d at 157 (citing McCoy v. State, 129 Idaho 70, 75, 
921 P.2d 1194, 1199 (1996)).  Whether a court lacks jurisdiction to hear a case is a question of 
law, and may be raised at any time.  Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 471, 903 P.2d 58, 60 (1995) 
(citations omitted).  Questions of jurisdiction are fundamental, and should be addressed prior to 
any other claims in the appeal.  Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084 (citing H & V 
Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. Of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 
646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 57 (1987)). 
                                                 
2 Dunlap’s petition alleges that his state and federal constitutional rights were deprived because; (1) he was 
incompetent when he pled guilty, (2) the district court failed to ensure that he was competent when he pled guilty, 
(3) Dunlap’s guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel, 
(4) Dunlap was denied his right to counsel due to a conflict of interest, (5) Dunlap was denied his right to a fair trial 
because of prosecutorial misconduct, (6) Dunlap was not informed of the true nature of the charges against him or 
the full extent of the rights waived by pleading guilty, and (7) counsel’s failure to ensure a complete record of all 
proceedings and that Dunlap was present for all proceedings. 
 
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The statutory procedures for post-conviction proceedings in capital cases are governed by 
I.C. § 19-2719.  Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 226, 912 P.2d 110, 113 (1996).  I.C. § 19-2719 
supersedes the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act (UPCPA) only to the extent that they 
conflict.  McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700, 992 P.2d at 149.  A petition for post-conviction relief in a 
capital case must be filed within 42 days of the entry of judgment imposing the death penalty.  
I.C. § 19-2719(3).  Any claim which is known or reasonably could have been known at the time 
that the first petition is filed must be brought, or it is deemed waived.  I.C. § 19-2719(5).  This 
Court has no power to review a waived claim.  I.C. § 19-2719(5); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700, 
992 P.2d at 149.  This Court will not construe the plain language of an unambiguous statute.  
State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999) (citing State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 
362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 (1996)).  “Absent some extraordinary showing that claims in a 
successive petition for post-conviction relief [in a capital case] could not have been brought 
within the statutory time frame, the courts of this state lack the authority to consider them.”  
Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at 472, 903 P.2d at 61. 
The district court did not lack jurisdiction over the 2005 petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
Dunlap filed his pro se successive petition for post-conviction relief in response to this 
Court’s 2004 ruling, which refused to address issues raised for the first time on appeal.  The 
2005 petition was filed pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 19-4901 through -4911, and -2719.  The state 
filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely under I.C. § 19-2719(5), or in the alternative, 
under I.C. § 19-4908.3 
The district court heard arguments, on both grounds for dismissal, on October 7, 2005.  A 
ruling on the motion to dismiss was not made until April of 2006, after Dunlap had been re-
sentenced.  Because Dunlap was sentenced to death, the district court held that the successive 
petition for post-conviction relief was procedurally barred as being untimely under I.C. § 19-
2719(5).  That is, any claims which were known by Dunlap, or could have been known were 
deemed waived because they were not in Dunlap’s first petition for post-conviction relief. 
                                                 
3 I.C. § 19-4908 states, “[a]ll grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his original, 
supplemental or amended application.  Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily 
and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the 
applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground 
for relief asserted which for sufficient reasons was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, 
supplemental, or amended application.” 
 
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The district court has jurisdiction over all petitions for post-conviction relief.  See I.C.R. 
57 (stating that all petitions for post-conviction relief shall be filed with the district court and 
governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure).  That is, the district court has jurisdiction over 
all post-conviction claims, regardless if the petitioner has been sentenced to death.  Dunlap’s 
successive petition was made under both I.C. §§ 19-4901 through -4911 (the UPCPA) and I.C. § 
19-2719 (Special appellate and post-conviction procedures for capital cases).  The state filed its 
motion to dismiss under alternative theories, presumably because no valid death sentence was in 
place.  The state’s position was that Dunlap’s petition for post-conviction relief was procedurally 
barred under both statutes.  After arguments, the district court’s decision did not issue until 
Dunlap was re-sentenced.  At the time that a decision was issued by the district court, Dunlap 
had been re-sentenced to death.  The district court expressly held that I.C. § 19-2719 was the 
governing statute because of Dunlap’s death sentence.  This Court finds that the district court had 
jurisdiction when Dunlap filed his successive petition for post-conviction relief under the 
UPCPA, and that jurisdiction remained through the issuance of the district court’s decision.  The 
district court properly waited for Dunlap’s re-sentencing prior to making a ruling because there 
were alternative theories for dismissal contingent on the applicable statutory framework. 
The district court did not err by summarily dismissing Dunlap’s successive petition 
for post-conviction relief as untimely under I.C. § 19-2719(5). 
Dunlap does not argue that the claims were not known or reasonably could not have been 
known at the time that Dunlap’s first petition for post-conviction relief was filed.  Courts are 
without jurisdiction to hear post-conviction claims in capital cases, challenging any legal or 
factual challenge to the sentence or conviction, unless they are filed within 42 days of filing the 
judgment.  Dunlap is not challenging his current death sentence from his 2006 re-sentencing 
hearing in his successive petition for post-conviction relief, but the facts surrounding his 1991 
guilty plea.  These facts were known at the time his original petition for post-conviction relief 
was filed, and therefore, this Court is without the statutory authority to consider Dunlap’s claims.  
I.C. 19-2719(5).4  Dunlap failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact in his successive 
petition, and therefore, dismissal by the district court was proper.  This Court affirms the district 
                                                 
4 “If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the time limits specified, he shall be 
deemed to have waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been known.  The courts of 
Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief.”  
I.C. § 19-2719(5) (emphasis added). 
 
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court’s findings that the 2005 petition is untimely, and therefore, any claims that were known or 
reasonably could have been known to Dunlap at the time he filed his first petition for post-
conviction relief should be deemed waived in accordance with I.C. § 19-2719(5).  Dunlap failed 
to show any genuine issue of material fact as to whether the claims were not known or could not 
have been known at the time his first petition was filed. 
This Court will not consider whether post-conviction counsel acted outside of his 
authority by failing to raise the issues dismissed in the 2005 and 1994 petitions because it is 
being raised for the first time on appeal. 
Dunlap argues that his attorney was without authority to waive any issues that were not 
raised in his original petition for post-conviction relief.  Dunlap raises this issue for the first time 
on appeal.  This Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.  McKinney, 133 
Idaho at 708, 992 P.2d at 157 (citing McCoy, 129 Idaho at 75, 921 P.2d at 1199).  Therefore, this 
Court will not address this issue. 
Dunlap argues that his attorney did not “knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily” waive 
Dunlap’s claims in his first petition for post-conviction relief and therefore, there was no 
“‘voluntary relinquishment’ of the issue.”  Specifically, he argues that this preserves the issue of 
agency and the lawyer-client relationship for appeal.  This Court finds this argument unavailing. 
When Dunlap’s attorney argued that the claims were not waived “knowingly, 
intelligently or voluntary” he was speaking in relation to whether Dunlap’s claims should be 
dismissed under the UPCPA.  The UPCPA allows for successive post-conviction relief on all 
claims that are not “knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily” waived in the first petition for post-
conviction relief.  Dunlap’s attorney’s argument was opposing dismissal of the petition under the 
UPCPA, not arguing agency law.  The issue of whether Dunlap’s petition was timely under the 
UPCPA is entirely separate from the issue of whether Dunlap’s attorney in his first petition for 
post-conviction relief acted outside of his agency authority.  Therefore, this Court finds that 
Dunlap failed to raise the issue of whether his attorney in his first petition for post-conviction 
relief acted outside his agency authority. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the decision of the district court. 
 
 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, HORTON and Justice Pro Tem KIDWELL, CONCUR