Case Title: In re Hardy

Citation: 

Docket Number: S022153

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 7/26/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re JAMES EDWARD HARDY 
) 
 
 
)           S022153 & S093694 
on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner James Edward Hardy was convicted in 1983, along with 
codefendant Mark Anthony Reilly, of the first degree murders of Nancy Morgan 
and her young son, Mitchell Morgan, and of conspiracy to commit murder to 
collect life insurance proceeds.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 182.)1  The jury also 
sustained six special-circumstance allegations against both Hardy and Reilly, 
finding as to each murder that it was committed for financial gain, that the 
defendants committed a multiple murder and that they killed while lying in wait.  
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1), (3), (15).)  The jury set the penalty for both defendants at 
death.  On appeal, this court affirmed, striking one superfluous multiple-murder 
special circumstance.  (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86.)   
Our prior opinion in this matter was not the end of the legal road for 
petitioner Hardy.  After the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a 
writ of certiorari (Hardy v. California (1992) 506 U.S. 987), he filed his first 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this court (In re Hardy, S022153 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
specified. 
 
 
2
(Hardy I)).  Because the petition alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate a prima 
facie case for relief from the penalty judgment (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 
464), we issued an order directing respondent to show cause “why petitioner is not 
entitled to reversal of the penalty judgment because his trial attorney rendered 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call, at the penalty 
phase of the trial, available witnesses who would have presented evidence of 
mitigating circumstances.”  (Italics added.)  After receiving briefing, we directed a 
referee to hold a hearing and take evidence on two disputed questions of fact.  
After receiving additional briefing, we amended the order of reference to add an 
additional question for the referee’s consideration.   
Some delay ensued, but the referee eventually held a hearing at which 
several witnesses testified.  The referee filed his report with this court in 1999.  
Petitioner then filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on facts 
adduced at the evidentiary hearing.  (In re Hardy, S093694 (Hardy II).)  This new 
petition alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate a prima facie case for relief from 
the guilt judgment.  Accordingly, we issued a second order to show cause on two 
interrelated issues.  Our order stated:  “The petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed 
December 13, 2000, has been read and considered.  The Director of Corrections is 
ordered to show cause before this court at its courtroom, when the proceeding is 
ordered on calendar, why petitioner is not entitled to reversal of his guilt judgment 
because [1] he is innocent of the capital crimes of which he was convicted, [in 
that] a third party named Calvin Boyd committed the murders, and [2 that] 
petitioner’s trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel 
by failing to present evidence demonstrating petitioner’s innocence.”  (Italics 
added.)  
We consolidated Hardy I and Hardy II on April 18, 2007, and now reach 
the following conclusions:  (1) Because petitioner’s allegations in Hardy II are 
 
 
3
based on facts found by the referee as a result of the evidentiary hearing in 
Hardy I, a second hearing is unnecessary; (2) petitioner’s allegations, to the extent 
they were sustained by the referee, fail to demonstrate petitioner is actually 
innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted because they do not undermine 
the prosecution’s entire case or point unerringly to innocence; (3) petitioner’s 
allegations that a third party named Calvin Boyd committed the murders, largely 
sustained by the referee, demonstrate his trial counsel’s representation was 
deficient because he failed, without a supportable tactical reason, to investigate 
reasonably available evidence of third party culpability; (4) such deficient 
representation nevertheless does not require reversal of the guilt judgment because 
counsel’s failure to investigate did not undermine the prosecution’s theory that 
petitioner conspired to commit the murders, and such conspiracy rendered 
petitioner liable for first degree murder irrespective of the possibility that a third 
party actually killed the victims; (5) the allegations of third party culpability, as 
sustained by the referee, require we vacate the penalty judgment because, had the 
jury entertained a reasonable doubt that petitioner was the actual killer and 
concluded he was merely a coconspirator, there is a reasonable probability it 
would have returned a sentence of life instead of death; and (6) in light of the latter 
conclusion, we discharge the order to show cause in Hardy I and dismiss that 
petition as moot.   
II.  BACKGROUND2 
Clifford and Nancy Morgan lived in Van Nuys and had a son, Mitchell, 
who was eight years old at the time of the murders.  Clifford Morgan (Morgan) 
                                              
2  
Facts of the case, especially those related to codefendants Reilly and 
Clifford Morgan, are recounted in greater detail in People v. Hardy, supra, 
2 Cal.4th at pages 118-126.  
 
 
4
devised a plan to kill his wife and son in order to collect on some unusually large 
life insurance policies he had purchased.  He enlisted the assistance of Reilly, a 
much younger coworker over whom he had acquired some influence.  At this time, 
Reilly and petitioner, as well as many of the witnesses and coconspirators in this 
case, lived in the same apartment complex on Vose Street in Van Nuys.  The depth 
and breadth of the ensuing conspiracy to kill the victims need not be recounted 
here in full; suffice it to say, Reilly agreed to Morgan’s plan and sought a partner 
for the planned murders.  Reilly’s attempt to hire a kickboxer named Marc 
Costello to kill the victims came to naught.  Reilly then turned to fellow Vose 
Street resident Calvin Boyd3 and his friend Marcus.4  Many of the residents of the 
Vose Street apartment complex were acquainted with Boyd, a key player in 
petitioner’s present collateral challenge to his convictions, who, unknown to them, 
was at the time a fugitive from justice.  After much preliminary involvement in the 
conspiracy, Boyd (according to his trial testimony) declined to participate in the 
murders of Nancy and Mitchell Morgan due to Reilly’s inability to pay him any 
money or cocaine in advance. 
Reilly then turned to petitioner as a third option, believing he could 
convince him to commit the murders.  A few weeks before the murders, Reilly 
told his friend Joe Dempsey that petitioner might agree to assist in the murders.  
Sometime later, Reilly told his friend Michael Mitchell that petitioner had agreed 
to help him.   
                                              
3  
Boyd was also known as Washington Kelvin Boyd, Calvin McKay and 
Kelvin Boyd.  We will refer to him by his apparently true name, Calvin Boyd. 
4  
Marcus, whose last name is unknown and who was not produced at the 
evidentiary hearing, was apparently a confidante or close acquaintance of Boyd 
around the time of the murders. 
 
 
5
Debbie Sportsman provided critical evidence against Reilly and about the 
conspiracy in general.  She met Reilly in April 1981 and began an intimate 
relationship with him.  While having dinner with Sportsman and her parents, 
Reilly mentioned that Morgan wanted to have his wife killed in order to collect on 
some insurance policies.  Sportsman’s mother thought this was “just talk.”  As 
Sportsman later found out, however, Reilly was quite serious.  He told her he had 
agreed to help Morgan find someone to kill his wife.  In return, Morgan had 
agreed to allow Reilly to live in Morgan’s home and to manage a bar that Morgan 
intended to open. 
In May 1981, Morgan moved to Carson City, Nevada, ostensibly for 
business reasons, but more probably to establish an alibi.  Sometime in the night of 
May 20-21, 1981, two persons alleged to be petitioner and Reilly went to 
Morgan’s Van Nuys home, entered with a key provided by Morgan, cut the chain 
lock with bolt cutters and went to the back bedroom where Nancy slept.  Because 
her husband was away from home, their son, Mitchell, was sleeping in his 
mother’s bedroom.  The assailants stabbed Nancy and Mitchell Morgan to death.  
Evidence showed Nancy was stabbed 45 times and her son 21 times, including 
multiple wounds on his neck.  Police found a pillow soaked in blood with several 
puncture marks, indicating the assailants had stabbed the victims through the 
pillow.  Experts testified that physical evidence suggested at least two persons 
were responsible for the slayings.  The estimated time of death was between 3:30 
and 5:30 a.m. 
The conspiracy began to unravel almost immediately.  After the murders, 
Reilly admitted his guilt to Sportsman and made numerous other incriminating 
admissions to her, including that victim Nancy Morgan had said “Please don’t kill 
me,” that more than one perpetrator was involved, that bolt cutters had been used 
 
 
6
to cut the chain lock on the door (a fact not made public by the police) and that a 
fish knife had been used in the killings.   
Boyd testified that shortly after the murders, when he and Reilly were 
together in the apartment’s laundry room, Reilly admitted that he and petitioner 
Hardy were the killers.  Boyd also testified that Reilly showed him some 
boltcutters he had recently purchased.   
Michael Mitchell, Reilly’s roommate, testified that he came home from a 
baseball game the night of the murders and went to sleep sometime after 
11:00 pm.  At that time, no one else was in the apartment.  He got up around 
midnight and saw petitioner, Reilly, Colette Mitchell (apparently no relation) and 
possibly a neighbor, Steven Rice, in the apartment.  Later that night, he heard male 
voices in the apartment and some people taking showers.  The next morning, he 
found wet towels in the bathroom, suggesting someone had taken a shower, but he 
saw no evidence of blood.   
Boyd testified that the morning after the murders, sometime after 8:00 a.m., 
he walked through Steven Rice’s apartment as a shortcut to the street, something 
he often did.  There, he saw Reilly and petitioner sleeping, thereby placing the two 
men together shortly after the crimes.  Boyd also testified he saw Rice and Colette 
Mitchell in the apartment.   
Morgan’s purchase of an unusually large amount of life insurance shortly 
before the murders was suspicious, as were his statements to a neighbor shortly 
before the murders that his wife was worth more dead than alive and he expected 
she would die before him.  A web of circumstantial evidence, not relevant to the 
instant collateral attack, linked Reilly to Morgan.  In addition, Reilly could not 
explain how a stain of human blood came to be on his shoe.  No physical 
evidence, such as blood, hair, fingerprints or footprints linked petitioner to the 
murders.   
 
 
7
Colette Mitchell, petitioner’s girlfriend at the time, gave testimony that was 
important in connecting him to the crimes.  She had initially given petitioner an 
alibi, testifying at the preliminary hearing that she was with him the entire night of 
the murders.  By the time of trial she had changed her story and admitted she had 
perjured herself at the preliminary hearing.  Although she often claimed she could 
not remember many of the details of the events in question and admitted she 
intentionally tried to forget things about the case, she no longer was sure petitioner 
was with her the entire night of the murders.  She testified at trial under a grant of 
immunity, but admitted that even after receiving immunity and consulting an 
attorney, she contacted petitioner in jail intending to assist him.  
Nevertheless, Colette testified to the following:  On the night of the 
murders, she was working at a restaurant.  Reilly, petitioner and Steven Rice met 
at the restaurant shortly after 9:00 p.m., and Colette served them drinks.  The four 
then returned to the Vose Street apartments around 10:00 p.m. to “party” and use 
cocaine.  They also used a beer bong.5  Colette admitted to doing several large 
lines of cocaine and drinking at least three beers using the beer bong.  She 
quarreled with petitioner, left Reilly’s apartment and went to Rice’s apartment 
next door.6  Sometime between midnight and 2:00 a.m., she and Rice went out and 
purchased more beer.  After she returned, petitioner sought her out at Rice’s 
apartment and told her not to leave him because he “needed her” that night.  
Although she had consumed an unusually large amount of cocaine, which usually 
                                              
5  
A beer bong is “a funnel-type device which enables the user to pour beer 
directly down his throat and into his stomach.”  (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th 
at p. 182.) 
6  
Reilly lived in an apartment with Michael Mitchell.  Steven Rice rented the 
apartment next to them, and at the time petitioner lived with Rice. 
 
 
8
had the effect of keeping her awake, she testified she fell asleep or passed out in 
Rice’s apartment sometime thereafter and did not awaken until around 11:00 a.m. 
the next morning.  Hardy was asleep next to her, and Reilly was asleep on the 
sofa. 
Colette testified she misled police by telling them she was with petitioner 
the entire night.  Although immediately after the crimes she was sure she had been 
with both Reilly and petitioner the entire night, she had changed her mind by the 
time of trial.  At trial, she claimed she was either asleep or passed out for much of 
the night and thus did not know if petitioner left the apartment or not.  Reilly told 
her once that he and petitioner had left the apartment while she was asleep, but 
another time told her they had not left.  When speaking with petitioner after the 
murders, they discussed his alibi “all the time.”   
Some of Colette’s testimony implicated petitioner directly in the murders.  
For example, prior to the murders, petitioner led her to believe he was going to 
steal something from someone to enable an unnamed person to collect on an 
insurance policy.  Petitioner told her at least twice that he had been to the victims’ 
home the night of the murders.  First, he told her “that he went to the house and 
that the people were still alive because he heard them snoring.”  Later he told her 
“that he went to the house and that they [had] already been dead, killed.”  Another 
time, he told her:  “I’ll say one thing; we were at the house.”  These statements 
were contradicted by other of petitioner’s statements to her, such as that “he didn’t 
do it.”  In addition, although Reilly admitted to Colette that he knew the identity of 
the killers, petitioner disclaimed such knowledge.  When she asked Reilly directly 
whether petitioner was the killer, Reilly told her:  “No.”  When she asked 
petitioner himself, he also answered in the negative.  On cross-examination, 
Colette admitted petitioner had never told her he actually killed either victim. 
 
 
9
Colette recounted other statements petitioner had made that, although not 
directly implicating him in the murders, suggested he was at least a coconspirator.  
For example, he told her the crime was to be accomplished by cutting a chain, 
entering the back door and then making it appear as if a robbery had occurred.  
Petitioner was to receive a portion of $40,000 or $50,000, but in fact received only 
$1,000.  She remembered the $1,000 because she put the stack of bills in a 
particular cedar box.  Petitioner told her that Morgan was not worried about the 
delay the trial caused because his insurance proceeds were earning 12¾ percent 
interest; the less she knew about the crimes, the better off she would be; Reilly 
was in charge of the situation; people who said the murder was committed by 
more than one person were wrong because petitioner “ ‘[knew] for a fact it was 
one’ ”; petitioner took something from Morgan’s home to make it look like a 
robbery; and the killers used wire cutters.  Colette also testified Reilly had told her 
that Boyd and his friend Marcus were supposed to commit the crimes but backed 
out because Reilly declined to go with them.   
Petitioner’s connection to a rifle and some shoes also provided evidence of 
his participation in the conspiracy.  Clifford Morgan had reported several items 
missing in the attack, including an M-1 carbine World War II-era rifle.  Colette 
testified that petitioner, although in pretrial detention, asked her to ask his brother, 
John Hardy, to retrieve and dispose of an M-1 carbine rifle in Reilly’s apartment.  
She complied, and John Hardy thereafter retrieved the rifle and took it to his 
girlfriend’s house.  He later turned it in to police.  In addition, Colette testified 
petitioner told her police had discovered a footprint at the crime scene and asked 
her to retrieve and destroy some of his shoes.  She did so, throwing the shoes in 
the garbage. 
Petitioner, Reilly and Clifford Morgan were tried together in Los Angeles 
County Superior Court.  Petitioner was represented by Los Angeles County 
 
 
10
Deputy Public Defender Michael Demby.  At trial, Morgan denied conspiring with 
Reilly to commit the murders, but testified that while in pretrial detention, Reilly 
admitted he had attempted to find someone who would kill Morgan’s wife, but had 
failed in the attempt and then let the matter drop.  On Demby’s advice, petitioner 
did not testify.  In fact, Demby presented no evidence at the guilt phase of the trial, 
but rested on the state of the People’s evidence.  Reilly also declined to testify.   
Petitioner and Reilly were convicted of two counts of first degree murder 
(§ 187), one count of conspiracy to commit murder to collect life insurance 
proceeds (§ 182) and several special-circumstance allegations (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(1), (3), (15)).  Clifford Morgan was also convicted of capital murder charges, 
but after the guilt phase, the trial court severed his case from petitioner’s and 
Reilly’s penalty trial due to his failing health.  Morgan, the apparent mastermind 
of the deadly conspiracy, died of bone cancer before the penalty phase of his 
separate trial could be held.   
At petitioner’s penalty phase, the prosecution introduced into evidence 
three photographs of the crime scene, including the victims, that had been 
excluded from the guilt phase.  In addition, the prosecution presented evidence of 
a 1980 domestic disturbance in which police had found petitioner marching with a 
rifle, military style, apparently unaware of his surroundings.  At the request of the 
police, petitioner put the rifle as well as two knives on the ground, but then 
brandished a nunchaku and assumed a martial arts fighting stance.  He stayed in 
that stance for five or 10 minutes, but eventually agreed to lay down his nunchaku 
if one of the officers would holster his revolver.  The matter ended peacefully, and 
petitioner explained he had been in a quarrel with his family.  The rifle was not 
loaded.  Petitioner later pleaded guilty to two misdemeanors and was placed on 
probation.  (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 126-127.)   
 
 
11
Petitioner’s mother, Carolyn Hardy, testified at the penalty phase and 
recalled that petitioner had had a fight with his brother John, punching him and 
tearing a gold chain off his neck.  When Carolyn called the police, petitioner 
kicked down her door.  She also testified that the nunchakus belonged to Robert, 
petitioner’s other brother.  Robert had threatened to commit suicide, but petitioner 
did not believe him.  When Robert in fact committed suicide, petitioner blamed 
himself and jumped off a cliff, breaking both his legs.  (People v. Hardy, supra, 
2 Cal.4th at p. 127.)  Petitioner’s mother believed he needed psychiatric help. 
In mitigation, Carolyn Hardy recalled that when petitioner was a teenager, 
he “participated in a program called Outward Bound, which involved camping and 
hiking in Colorado.  He was chosen for the program because of his high scholastic 
potential.”  (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 127.)  Defense counsel 
presented no other mitigating evidence.  During closing argument, counsel argued 
the jury should return a verdict of life due to a lingering doubt about petitioner’s 
guilt. 
III.  HARDY I 
Petitioner filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Hardy I with this 
court on July 26, 1991, and filed a set of supplemental allegations on February 24, 
1992.  In those filings, petitioner alleged his trial attorney was constitutionally 
ineffective in three ways:  (1) for failing to call available witnesses at the penalty 
phase who would have provided mitigating evidence; (2) for failing to investigate 
to determine whether such witnesses existed; and (3) for making an unreasonable 
tactical decision to rely solely on a lingering doubt defense at the penalty phase.  
For example, petitioner alleged in Hardy I that several family members and 
friends, if called, would have testified to his positive attributes and difficult 
upbringing.  Petitioner alleged that his father was schizophrenic and had 
physically abused him as a child, one time holding him out of a 12th floor window 
 
 
12
and threatening to drop him.  After his father’s hospitalization, petitioner alleged 
he assumed the role of father figure to his siblings and the family lived in a poor 
area of Newark, New Jersey.  Declarations accompanying the petition in Hardy I 
alleged that petitioner was a caring and considerate child who did well in school 
and that he did not finish high school, leaving school at age 16 to marry Patricia 
May, the mother of his child.  The declarants asserted petitioner had a second child 
before divorcing, and that later in life, petitioner was a devoted and loving father.  
These declarants stated it was inconceivable petitioner could have murdered a 
child. 
In addition to the suicide of petitioner’s brother, the petition in Hardy I 
revealed two other major incidents that greatly affected him.  First, Tina, his live-
in lover whom he planned to marry, was killed in a car accident.  Declarations 
filed in support of the petition in Hardy I state that after Tina died, petitioner 
“didn’t want to do anything with his life [and] had no ambition for a long time.”  
A second incident involved petitioner’s involuntary commitment to a state mental 
hospital after a drug-induced psychotic episode.  The tentative diagnosis of mental 
health professionals was chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia.  
Petitioner’s children, who were ages 11 and eight at the time of trial, declared that 
they would have testified they loved petitioner, that he was a “very good and caring 
father,” and that they would have asked the jury to spare their father’s life.  Petitioner 
alleged Demby provided no reason why he did not call the children to testify at the 
penalty phase.  In his supplemental allegations, petitioner alleged his trial attorney should 
have presented evidence that petitioner, then working as a municipal bus driver, had 
acted heroically when he intervened to stop the robbery of an elderly woman on his bus.  
Petitioner allegedly sustained serious injuries as a result.  
After receiving appropriate briefing, this court issued an order directing the 
Director of Corrections to show cause “why petitioner is not entitled to reversal of 
 
 
13
the penalty judgment because his trial attorney rendered constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call, at the penalty phase of the trial, 
available witnesses who would have presented evidence of mitigating 
circumstances.”  (Italics added.) 
We then referred the matter to a referee to resolve disputed allegations of 
fact.  Our order of reference, as later amended for reasons unnecessary to relate 
here, provided:  “(1) Did petitioner Hardy engage in an act of heroism while 
employed as a driver for the Southern California Rapid Transit District?  
[¶] (2) Was defense counsel Michael Demby made aware of the facts surrounding 
the incident?  [¶] (3) What were Mr. Demby’s reasons why he did not present 
evidence of this incident, or the uncontradicted evidence of other available 
witnesses who would have provided mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of 
the trial?  [¶] (4) Were Mr. Demby’s reasons supportable?” 
After an evidentiary hearing, the referee filed his report on September 21, 
1999.   
Petitioner then filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Hardy II, 
alleging—based on facts adduced at the hearing for Hardy I—that he was entitled 
to relief not just from his penalty judgment but from his guilt judgment as well.  
Based on some of the allegations in the Hardy II petition, we issued an order to 
show cause on February 14, 2001, and have held Hardy I in abeyance.  As we 
explain post, because we conclude petitioner is entitled to relief from his penalty 
judgment based on the allegations in his Hardy II petition, we address that petition 
here and dismiss the Hardy I petition as moot. 
 
 
14
IV.  HARDY II 
A.  Preliminary Issues 
1.  A Second Evidentiary Hearing Is Unnecessary 
Although petitioner presented numerous allegations in Hardy II attacking 
both his guilt and penalty judgments, we issued an order to show cause as to only 
two interrelated claims:  Is petitioner “entitled to reversal of his guilt judgment 
because [1] he is innocent of the capital crimes of which he was convicted, [in 
that] a third party named Calvin Boyd committed the murders, and [2] because 
petitioner’s trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel 
by failing to present evidence demonstrating petitioner’s innocence[?]”  Issuance 
of the order indicates we concluded petitioner’s allegations on these issues state a 
prima facie case for relief.  We have also concluded that the allegations were made 
without substantial delay; the petition asserts that its allegations are timely, and 
respondent does not allege otherwise. 
Respondent denies the facts alleged in the Hardy II petition, and petitioner 
reasserts his factual allegations in his traverse; hence, we normally would order an 
evidentiary hearing before a referee to determine the truth of the disputed 
allegations of facts:  “[I]f the return and traverse reveal that petitioner’s 
entitlement to relief hinges on the resolution of factual disputes, then the court 
should order an evidentiary hearing.  (Pen. Code, § 1484.)  Because appellate 
courts are ill-suited to conduct evidentiary hearings, it is customary for appellate 
courts to appoint a referee to take evidence and make recommendations as to the 
resolution of disputed factual issues.”  (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 
739-740.)  Following receipt of the referee’s report, we would entertain the 
parties’ exceptions to its accuracy.  (See In re Malone (1996) 12 Cal.4th 935, 941; 
 
 
15
In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 709-710; In re Branch (1969) 70 Cal.2d 200, 
203.) 
Under unusual circumstances, however, this court may decline to order a 
hearing and simply decide the case.  For example, “[i]f the written return admits 
allegations in the petition that, if true, justify the relief sought, the court may grant 
relief without an evidentiary hearing.  [Citations.]  Conversely, consideration of 
the written return and matters of record may persuade the court that the 
contentions advanced in the petition lack merit, in which event the court may deny 
the petition without an evidentiary hearing.”  (People v. Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th 
at p. 739.)  Apparently invoking this latter option, respondent asserts the instant 
petition “may be denied without an evidentiary hearing.”   
We agree an evidentiary hearing is not required to resolve the issues raised 
in the present petition, but for a different reason.  The circumstances of this case 
are unusual, in that our referee has already held one evidentiary hearing (albeit in 
response to allegations in the petition for Hardy I) and petitioner’s present factual 
allegations are based on both evidence presented at that hearing that has already 
been evaluated by the referee, and on witnesses who testified at the hearing whom 
the referee has already found credible.  Stated differently, petitioner has already 
presented evidence in a contested hearing, and the referee has already determined 
the truth of facts alleged, including the credibility of various witnesses.  Moreover, 
as we explain post, we largely reject respondent’s exceptions to the accuracy of 
the referee’s conclusions.   
Respondent’s denials in Hardy II of the same facts alleged and found true 
in Hardy I cannot undermine the referee’s considered factual conclusions at this 
late date.  Holding a second evidentiary hearing on those facts would also be 
futile.  Respondent had an adequate opportunity to examine the witnesses who 
testified at the hearing in Hardy I.  Indeed, one witness was ordered returned from 
 
 
16
Kentucky to permit respondent to cross-examine him.  Although respondent 
contends he did not cross-examine petitioner’s witnesses (e.g., Raynall Burney, 
James Moss, Rickey Ginsburg and Michael Small) “with an interest and motive 
similar to that which respondent has in the present habeas corpus proceeding,” he 
does not persuasively explain in what different fashion he would have conducted 
his cross-examination.  Although respondent objected to the examination of these 
witnesses on the ground that questions of factual innocence were beyond the scope 
of the reference order, the referee overruled the objection.  (See discussion, post.)  
Accordingly, respondent had every incentive to aggressively question these 
witnesses at the evidentiary hearing in Hardy I. 
Nor is it likely respondent could show how he would have conducted his 
cross-examination differently.  The third question in our amended order of 
reference for Hardy I stated:  “(3) What were Mr. Demby’s reasons why he did not 
present . . . the uncontradicted evidence of other available witnesses who would 
have provided mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of the trial?”  Evidence of 
Boyd’s culpability would have constituted strong mitigating evidence for the 
penalty phase, supporting defense counsel’s strategic choice to rely on a lingering 
doubt defense; thus, respondent had ample incentive to demonstrate why counsel 
would have been justified in not presenting this evidence.  Moreover, the record 
reveals no lack of effort on respondent’s part to discredit petitioner’s witnesses on 
cross-examination.  Accordingly, to the extent petitioner’s present claims for relief 
are based on facts already litigated and determined by the referee, respondent’s 
 
 
17
continued disputation of those facts is fruitless, and no reason appears to justify 
the holding of an additional, superfluous evidentiary hearing.7 
2.  Was Evidence of Third Party Culpability Outside the Scope of Our 
Reference Order? 
In response to the referee’s report in Hardy I, respondent—before this court 
issued its order to show cause in Hardy II—filed his exceptions to the report.  
Respondent raises among those exceptions an important threshold question:  Was 
evidence of Boyd’s possible guilt of the murders outside the scope of our order of 
reference in Hardy I?  Recalling that our order to show cause in Hardy I 
concerned the penalty phase only, respondent, as he did before the referee, argues 
that “nothing in the habeas corpus petition [in Hardy I] or the supplemental 
pleadings thereto filed by petitioner set forth a claim of factual innocence [and] 
this Court obviously did not have a factual innocence claim before it for 
consideration when it filed the amended reference order in July of 1994.”  As we 
explain, we conclude the referee did not err in ruling the issue was within the 
scope of our reference order. 
At the outset of the evidentiary hearing in Hardy I, respondent objected to 
third party culpability evidence he anticipated petitioner would present, arguing 
that such evidence was not within the terms of our amended reference order.  The 
referee declined to rule on the motion, wishing to see the direction the evidence 
would take, but later raised the issue sua sponte, essentially having respondent 
renew his objection.  After hearing from both sides, the referee ruled he would not 
strike the evidence, explaining:  “I am going to deny [respondent’s] motion to 
                                              
7  
  As we explain at various points post, we accord no weight to those factual 
allegations for which the referee did not make any factual findings.  (See, e.g., pt. 
IV.B.8., post.) 
 
 
18
strike [the evidence] because I think it [is] relevant to the lingering doubt issue.”  
The referee stated, however, that the evidence of third party culpability was 
beginning to appear cumulative and he reserved the right to control the evidence 
on that ground.   
Petitioner in Hardy I alleged his trial attorney was ineffective at the penalty 
phase for failing to present available mitigating evidence.  He claimed Demby 
should have presented evidence that he engaged in an act of heroism, coming to 
the aid of a bus passenger being robbed, at great peril to himself, and evidence of 
his Outward Bound experience as a teenager.  After referencing those issues, this 
court’s order asked the referee to determine Demby’s reasons for not presenting 
this available mitigating evidence and whether his reasons were “supportable.”   
In order for the referee to decide whether Demby’s reasons were 
supportable, the referee was required to assess the overall strength of the 
mitigating evidence available to counsel.  If strong mitigating evidence was 
available (e.g., family history, mental illness), counsel’s decision to forgo it was 
more likely unreasonable.  Similarly, if the available evidence supporting lingering 
doubt was weak, Demby’s tactical decision to rely solely on that defense at the 
penalty phase would be questionable.  On the other hand, if persuasive evidence of 
third party culpability was reasonably available, Demby’s failure to discover and 
present such evidence would tend to suggest his strategic decision to rely solely on 
a lingering doubt defense was an ill-considered choice, unsupported by a 
reasonable investigation.  Accordingly, we conclude evidence of third party 
culpability was properly admitted and considered by the referee, as it was within 
the scope of our order of reference. 
We turn now to petitioner’s allegations in this proceeding and an 
assessment of the referee’s findings following the contested evidentiary hearing in 
Hardy I. 
 
 
19
B.  The Allegations 
Petitioner makes a number of allegations in support of his twin claims that 
(1) he is innocent, and (2) his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for 
failing to discover and present reasonably available evidence of Boyd’s 
involvement in the murders, which could have created a reasonable or a lingering 
doubt as to petitioner’s guilt.  The applicable law is settled.  “[W]e give great 
weight to those of the referee’s findings that are supported by substantial evidence.  
(In re Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 974, 998; In re Johnson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 447, 461; 
In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 201.)  This is especially true for findings 
involving credibility determinations.  The central reason for referring a habeas 
corpus claim for an evidentiary hearing is to obtain credibility determinations (In 
re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 824); consequently, we give special deference to 
the referee on factual questions ‘requiring resolution of testimonial conflicts and 
assessment of witnesses’ credibility, because the referee has the opportunity to 
observe the witnesses’ demeanor and manner of testifying’ (In re Malone[, supra,] 
12 Cal.4th [at p.] 946). 
“Though we defer to the referee on factual and credibility matters, in other 
areas we give no deference to the referee’s findings.  We independently review 
prior testimony (In re Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 998, fn. 2), as well as all mixed 
questions of fact and law (In re Ross, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 201).  Whether 
counsel’s performance was deficient, and whether any deficiency prejudiced the 
petitioner, are both mixed questions subject to independent review.  (Ibid.) 
Ultimately, the referee’s findings are not binding on us (In re Malone, supra, 12 
Cal.4th at p. 946; In re Ross, at p. 201; In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 603); 
it is for this court to make the findings on which the resolution of [petitioner’s] 
habeas corpus claim will turn (In re Visciotti (1996) 14 Cal.4th 325, 349; see In re 
 
 
20
Scott, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 824).”  (In re Thomas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1249, 1256-
1257.) 
Respondent is entitled to challenge the referee’s findings, both on the 
ground that they are not supported by substantial evidence and for accuracy, and 
he does so in his brief filed after the hearing in Hardy I.  The grounds for these 
exceptions are largely duplicated in respondent’s return in Hardy II, wherein he 
denies most of the allegations in the Hardy II petition.  Unless otherwise stated, 
we consider these objections together. 
With these rules in mind, we examine petitioner’s factual allegations.8   
1.  Boyd’s Admissions 
Petitioner alleges Calvin Boyd made incriminating admissions to several 
people, strongly suggesting he had participated in the murders.  As we describe 
below, various witnesses testified at the evidentiary hearing and, although Boyd 
refuted their claims, the referee found Boyd was not a credible witness.  
Respondent takes exception to the referee’s findings as to these witnesses on the 
ground that Boyd testified and contradicted them, but the referee made credibility 
determinations to which we defer because they are supported by substantial 
evidence.  Accordingly, we overrule respondent’s exceptions.  Evidence of Boyd’s 
incriminating admissions, coupled with other evidence, could have convinced a 
reasonable jury to entertain some doubt as to the extent of petitioner’s 
participation in the murders.   
                                              
8  
Respondent takes exception to many if not most of the referee’s findings.  
To the extent certain facts found by the referee (but challenged by respondent) 
play little or no role in the proceedings, we do not mention them or resolve 
respondent’s exceptions to them. 
 
 
21
a.  Raynall Burney 
Raynall Burney was a resident of the Vose Street apartments at the time of 
the murders.  Petitioner alleges that “[s]hortly before the killings, Raynall Burney 
overheard Boyd say that he was looking for a hit man; Boyd later told Burney that 
he should say nothing about the conversation about the hit man.”  These 
allegations are supported by Burney’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing that he 
heard Boyd tell a friend that “someone had asked him if he knew someone that 
could do a hit for this certain individual, and that they would get paid for doing it.” 
Later, Burney overheard Boyd tell the same person not to mention the 
conversation to anyone.   
The referee specifically credited Burney’s testimony, concluding that “[i]n 
testifying at the reference hearing, Boyd made a number of statements which were 
shown to be false[, including] . . . that he did not tell . . . Raynall Burney . . . that 
he had participated in the planning and/or the carrying out of the murders in this 
case.”  The referee also concluded that although Boyd denied making the 
statements overheard by Burney, “Boyd generally lacked credibility.”  (Italics 
added.)   
Respondent, in his return, denies Burney actually overheard Boyd make 
such comments, relying on Boyd’s testimony in which he denied participation in 
the murders and claimed that, on the night of the murders, he was in his apartment, 
having passed out from consuming too much alcohol.9  The referee, however, 
reasonably found Boyd was not credible. 
                                              
9  
Respondent’s further contention that Burney never mentioned a “hit man” 
per se, but merely testified that he heard Boyd ask a friend “if he knew someone 
that could do a hit for this certain individual, and that they would get paid for 
doing it” (italics added), is frivolous.   
 
 
22
Respondent takes exception to the referee’s finding that Burney was 
credible on the grounds that Burney had suffered a 1983 felony conviction for oral 
copulation and had failed to come forward with his evidence at the time of trial.  
The referee was aware of Burney’s felony conviction, but determined he was 
nevertheless truthful.  In addition, Burney explained in his declaration why he did 
not come forward earlier—he was not aware petitioner faced the death penalty and 
would have come forward had he known—and he testified at the hearing that 
everything in his declaration was true.  As the referee “ha[d] the opportunity to 
observe the witnesses’ demeanor and manner of testifying” (In re Malone, supra, 
12 Cal.4th at p. 946), information unavailable to this court, and his conclusion is 
supported by substantial evidence, we defer to his credibility determination (In re 
Thomas, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1256).   
Respondent also takes exception to the referee’s finding that Burney was a 
credible witness on the ground that his testimony was hearsay.  Respondent 
forfeited this claim for our review by failing to object on this ground at the 
hearing.  Nor does it appear respondent objected to Burney’s declaration.  Were 
we to overlook this forfeiture and address the claim, we would find Boyd’s 
comment, overheard by Burney, that someone asked Boyd “if he knew someone 
that could do a hit for this certain individual, and that they would get paid for 
doing it,” was admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.   
“Hearsay evidence is of course generally inadmissible.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 1200.)  Hearsay statements by coconspirators, however, may nevertheless be 
admitted against a party if, at the threshold, the offering party presents 
‘independent evidence to establish prima facie the existence of . . . [a] conspiracy.’  
[Citations.]  Once independent proof of a conspiracy has been shown, three 
preliminary facts must be established:  ‘(1) that the declarant was participating in a 
conspiracy at the time of the declaration; (2) that the declaration was in 
 
 
23
furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy; and (3) that at the time of the 
declaration the party against whom the evidence is offered was participating or 
would later participate in the conspiracy.’ ”  (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at 
p. 139.) 
Evidence Code section 1223 provides in pertinent part:  “Evidence of a 
statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if:  
[¶] (a) The statement was made by the declarant while participating in a 
conspiracy to commit a crime or civil wrong and in furtherance of the objective of 
that conspiracy; [and] [¶] (b) The statement was made prior to or during the time 
that the party was participating in that conspiracy.”   
The information, as amended, alleged that Clifford Morgan, Mark Reilly 
and petitioner “conspire[d] together and with other persons including but not 
limited to Colette Mitchell, Ron Leahy, Calvin Boyd and Debbie Sportsman, to 
commit the crime of [m]urder for the purpose of collecting life insurance proceeds 
upon the life of Nancy Carol Morgan and Mitchell Raymond Morgan and to do so 
by defrauding the Equitable Life Assurance Company and the Provident Alliance 
Life Assurance Company.”  (Italics added.)  There was thus no question at trial 
that Boyd was a coconspirator, i.e., that he was “participating in a conspiracy.”  
Boyd’s comment, overheard by Burney, plainly betrays planning behavior in 
furtherance of the conspiracy (see People v. Brawley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 277, 288 
[statements construed as attempts to recruit a person to join the criminal scheme 
are in furtherance of the conspiracy]) and thus would not have been barred by the 
hearsay rule had respondent objected on that ground.  Accordingly, we overrule 
respondent’s exceptions and adopt the referee’s finding on this point. 
Respondent next takes exception to the referee’s conclusion that “[t]he 
testimony of Raynall Burney indicated that, shortly before the killings, Burney 
overheard Boyd say that he was looking for a hit man.”  (Italics added.)  
 
 
24
Respondent argues that Burney’s testimony indicates only that he overheard Boyd 
say that someone had asked him (i.e., Boyd) if he knew a hit man, not that Boyd 
was himself searching for one.  We agree and sustain this exception. 
b.  Rickey Ginsburg10 
Petitioner alleges that “a few days before the killings, Boyd and Marcus 
tried to recruit Ollie Epps, another one of Boyd’s friends, to help with the 
killings.”  This allegation is supported by the testimony of Rickey Ginsburg, who 
at the time of the crimes resided with his mother at the Vose Street apartments.  
Ginsburg testified that Epps, his mother’s boyfriend, told him that Boyd and 
Marcus had attempted to recruit him, but he had declined.  Respondent denies the 
allegation, relying on Boyd’s testimony denying he had asked anyone to commit 
the murders.  Other than to conclude Boyd was generally not credible, the referee 
made no specific findings regarding Boyd’s alleged attempt to recruit Epps.  
Accordingly, we assign this fact no weight. 
Petitioner also alleges that after the murders, Ginsburg “overheard Boyd 
say to Ollie Epps that he (Boyd) had ‘tripped upon the kid and grabbed a pillow 
and put it over his face and stabbed him.’ ”  This allegation is supported by 
Ginsburg’s testimony that, sometime after the murders, he was shooting pool with 
Boyd, Epps and others, and he heard Boyd tell Epps:  “Yes, man, I went in to do 
the lady in and Marcus and I were stumbling through the house, and I went 
through one room, I tripped upon the kid and grabbed a pillow and put it over his 
face and stabbed him.”  The referee found the allegation to be true, concluding 
that, “[i]n testifying at the reference hearing, Boyd made a number of statements 
                                              
10  
Ginsburg’s mother’s name is Marcia King, although she was also known as 
Marcia Sanders.  Rickey Ginsburg is referred to in defense counsel’s investigation 
reports as “Rickey Sanders.” 
 
 
25
which were shown to be false[, including] . . . that he did not tell . . . Ollie Epps 
[or] Rick Ginsburg . . . that he had participated in the planning and/or the carrying 
out of the murders in this case.”  (Italics added.) 
Respondent denies Ginsburg actually overheard Boyd make these 
incriminating comments; in support, respondent argues that Boyd testified and 
denied participation in the murders, Ginsburg’s credibility is suspect because he 
has a felony conviction for selling cocaine, Ginsburg failed to give police this 
information when they interviewed him around the time of the crimes, and 
Ginsburg never told his mother about the incident although for him to conceal 
such important information from her would have been unusual.11  Respondent also 
formally takes exception to the referee’s findings, arguing Ginsburg’s testimony 
was not credible. 
Although Boyd denied making the statements overheard by Ginsburg, the 
referee found that “Boyd generally lacked credibility.”  (Italics added.)  The 
referee also specifically credited Ginsburg’s testimony on this point.  This was a 
classic credibility determination to which we defer, inasmuch as the referee’s 
conclusion on this point is supported by substantial evidence, namely, Ginsburg’s 
own testimony.  We thus overrule respondent’s exceptions and adopt the referee’s 
findings. 
Petitioner also alleges that after the murders, Boyd told Ginsburg in a 
threatening manner to tell the police he knew nothing about them.  This allegation 
                                              
11  
The parties stipulated that Rickey Ginsburg’s mother, Marcia King 
Sanders, if called to testify, would say she was living at the Vose Street apartments 
around the time of the murders and that her son “never told her that he . . . had any 
information about Calvin Boyd being involved in the murders of Nancy or 
Mitchell Morgan.” 
 
 
26
is supported by Ginsburg’s testimony that sometime after he was interviewed by 
the police, Boyd confronted him and said:  “ ‘And what did you tell them?  And 
what do you know?  And now you know nothing.’ ”  Ginsburg took these 
comments to be a threat.  The referee found “[t]he evidence showed that, at some 
point after the killings, . . . Boyd told Ginsburg [in a threatening manner that] he 
should tell the police that he knew nothing about the killings.”  As noted, the 
referee specifically credited Ginsburg’s testimony and found “Boyd generally 
lacked credibility.”   
Respondent impliedly denies this allegation in his return, alleging:  “Boyd 
did not tell . . . Rickey Ginsburg . . . that he committed one or both of the 
murders.”  We may assume respondent’s attack on Ginsburg’s credibility applies 
here as well.  Respondent also takes exception to the referee’s finding that Boyd 
threatened Ginsburg.  The referee, however, reasonably weighed Ginsburg’s 
credibility against that of Boyd and, inasmuch as Ginsburg testified specifically 
that Boyd threatened him, substantial evidence supports the referee’s finding.  We 
thus overrule respondent’s exception.  Respondent’s further exception to the 
referee’s description of the exact nature of the threat is meritless:  That Boyd said, 
“ ‘And now you know nothing,’ ” in context, was reasonably construed as a threat. 
Respondent also takes exception to the referee’s finding regarding 
Ginsburg because his testimony recounting Boyd’s threat was inadmissible 
hearsay.  It is unclear whether respondent properly objected on this ground.  
Although respondent made a continuing hearsay objection during Ginsburg’s 
testimony, that objection could be construed as applying only to Ginsburg’s 
testimony regarding the comments of Ollie Epps.  As the matter is unclear from 
the record, however, we give respondent the benefit of the doubt and conclude the 
issue is preserved for our review.  (People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, 
fn. 6, overruled on another point in People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 860.) 
 
 
27
Turning to the merits of the hearsay question, we conclude Boyd’s threat to 
Ginsburg falls under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.  (See 
discussion, ante, at pt. IV.B.1.a.)  Although the threat was made after the crimes 
had occurred, there is no question Boyd’s statement was made “while” he was 
engaged in the conspiracy.  As we explained on appeal:  “The conspiracy did not 
. . . end with the death of the insureds.  Instead, for purposes of this case, it 
continued until the coconspirators received the insurance proceeds [citation], or 
[Clifford] Morgan was convicted of unjustifiable homicide of the victims, thus 
disabling him from legally collecting the insurance proceeds.  [Citation.]  Because 
the insurance companies had not yet paid out at the time of trial, the conspiracy 
was a continuing one, permitting the introduction of hearsay statements made 
during the time between the crime and the trial, pursuant to Evidence Code section 
1223.”  (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 144, fn. omitted.) 
Respondent contends Boyd’s threat to Ginsburg was not uttered in 
furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy.  Although respondent’s argument 
lacks detail, we conclude Boyd’s threat not to reveal his name to the police was a 
clear attempt to avoid detection and thus protect the aims of the conspiracy.  (See 
People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1231 [statements fell within the 
coconspirator exception because they “could reasonably be viewed as an attempt 
to commit a potential witness to silence, thereby concealing the murder”].)  We 
thus conclude that, assuming respondent preserved this issue, the referee properly 
admitted the evidence over the hearsay objection. 
As the referee’s conclusions with regard to Ginsburg are supported by 
substantial evidence, they are entitled to deference and we adopt them. 
 
 
28
c.  James Moss 
Petitioner alleges that after the murders, James Moss had a conversation 
with Boyd in which Boyd said he was angry with petitioner because petitioner had 
failed to show up for something, that Boyd had to go in his place, that Marcus had 
to drive the getaway car, and that Boyd later told Moss to forget the conversation.  
Moss, who now lives in Tennessee, testified that he lived at the Vose Street 
apartments in 1981 and knew Boyd as well as Boyd’s wife, Arzetta Harvey.  Moss 
testified that sometime after the crimes, after he had learned of Reilly’s arrest for 
the murders, Moss, Boyd and Marcus were milling around the swimming pool at 
the apartment complex when Boyd said he was angry because petitioner had not 
shown up to do something he was supposed to do and Boyd had to go in his place.  
Boyd criticized petitioner’s courage, saying he “was too chicken shit to go along.”  
Boyd was angry because “he needed his part of the money to get the drugs that he 
wanted and needed.”  Marcus added that petitioner “mess[ed] the whole thing up 
because he didn’t go, [and] that if they got caught, [petitioner] would get away 
free because he did not—you know, he did not go, he did not show up to do what 
they was supposed to do.”  Boyd echoed this sentiment, saying that if Boyd were 
arrested, petitioner would “walk away free because he did not do anything.”  
Marcus said that as a result of petitioner’s failure to show up, he (Marcus) had to 
drive the getaway car.  Sometime after the poolside conversation, Boyd told Moss 
to forget it had taken place.  Moss admitted on cross-examination that, at the time, 
he did not know what Boyd and Marcus were talking about and did not know they 
may have been referring to the murders.  Boyd specifically denied Moss’s account 
of the alleged conversation. 
The referee specifically credited James Moss’s testimony on this point, 
concluding that, “[i]n testifying at the reference hearing, Boyd made a number of 
statements which were shown to be false[, including] . . . that he did not threaten, 
 
 
29
bully, pressure or otherwise try to intimidate any of the Vose Street residents . . . 
[and] that he did not tell . . . James Moss that he had participated in the planning 
and/or the carrying out of the murders in this case.” 
Respondent denies that Moss heard Boyd make these incriminating 
comments, noting that Moss admitted he did not know what Boyd was talking 
about and that Moss had a motive to testify falsely because his present wife, then 
21 years old, had had a one-day affair with Boyd’s stepson, who was only 15 or 16 
years old at the time.  In addition, respondent alleges Moss’s failure to come 
forward until now undermines his credibility.  Respondent takes exception to the 
referee’s findings on these same grounds. 
The referee concluded that although Boyd denied making the statements 
reported by Moss, “Boyd generally lacked credibility.”  The referee’s decision to 
credit Moss’s testimony and not Boyd’s is a credibility determination to which we 
must defer if supported by substantial evidence.  We conclude that it is, namely, 
the testimony of James Moss himself and that of Sandra Harris Moss, who 
testified that she had immediately apologized to Arzetta Harvey about her affair 
with Harvey’s son and that their friendship was back to normal within 24 hours. 
Respondent takes exception to the referee’s finding concerning Moss’s 
testimony recounting Boyd’s admissions, contending the comments were 
inadmissible hearsay.  Respondent failed to object on this ground and thus failed 
to preserve the issue for our review.  Were we to overlook this forfeiture and 
address the claim, we would find Boyd’s comment, warning Moss that he should 
forget the conversation he had heard, was admissible under the coconspirator 
exception to the hearsay rule.  (See discussion, ante, at pt. IV.B.1.a.)  Like the 
threat to Ginsburg, Boyd’s warning to Moss was an attempt to shield the 
conspiracy from discovery.  (People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1231.)   
 
 
30
Boyd’s other comments, overheard by Moss, that petitioner had not shown 
up for something he was supposed to do, that Boyd went in his place, that 
petitioner “was too chicken shit to go along,” and that Boyd “needed his part of 
the money to get the drugs that he wanted and needed” require a different analysis 
for they do not appear to have been uttered in furtherance of the conspiracy.  We 
find, however, that these comments were admissible because they recounted 
Boyd’s prior inconsistent statements.  Evidence Code section 1235 provides in 
part:  “Evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the 
hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing.”  
Boyd testified at trial that he did not kill the victims, had not agreed to kill the 
victims, was never asked to do it, had never told Reilly “that Marcus had backed 
out” or that he (Boyd) would do the killing, and that no agreement existed 
whereby he was to receive money in return for the murders.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, he similarly maintained he was completely innocent of the murders and 
uninvolved in the conspiracy.   
In light of these denials, James Moss’s testimony was admissible under 
Evidence Code section 1235 as evidence of Boyd’s prior inconsistent statements.  
Even if respondent had preserved this issue, therefore, the referee would properly 
have admitted the evidence over the hearsay objection.  We thus overrule 
respondent’s exceptions and adopt the referee’s conclusions regarding James 
Moss’s evidence. 
d.  Michael Small/Sandra Harris Moss 
Petitioner alleges that sometime after the murders, Boyd told Michael 
Small he had killed a child and would do it again; that he took a pillow, put it over 
the child’s face and stabbed him through the pillow; and that he expected to 
receive a large sum of money.  These allegations are supported by the testimony of 
 
 
31
both Small and Sandra Harris Moss, then known as Sandra Harris.  Small, now a 
minister living in Kentucky, testified that he lived at the Vose Street apartments in 
1981 and was friends with Arzetta Harvey’s son (Boyd’s stepson).  Small 
observed an altercation between Boyd and Raynall Burney in which Boyd drew a 
knife and said:  “I play for keeps.  I have already taken out one young kid.  I can 
do the same.”  Boyd made these statements after the Nancy and Mitchell Morgan 
murders.  A few days later, Small asked Boyd whether his comments were true 
and Boyd replied in the affirmative, explaining:  “I took the pillow and I put it 
over him and I just stabbed him.”  The conversation was “[v]ery vivid” in Small’s 
memory.  At one point, Boyd said he expected to receive a “large sum” of money, 
but later said the money he was expecting to receive “wasn’t there.”  Sandra 
Harris Moss testified that Arzetta Harvey, Boyd’s wife, told her Boyd was 
expecting to receive some insurance money, although in her testimony Harvey 
denied the account.  Boyd denied making the statements to Small or making any 
statements with regard to insurance proceeds. 
At the hearing, respondent emphasized that there was a discrepancy 
between Small’s declaration (introduced without objection) and his testimony, in 
that his declaration made no mention of Boyd’s admitting to killing a child.  Small 
explained that he had told the defense investigator who prepared the declaration 
that, in light of the many years that had passed, he might still remember some 
additional facts.  Respondent fully cross-examined Small regarding the 
discrepancy.  Regarding why he did not immediately come forward with his 
evidence, Small testified that he initially declined to go to the police because he 
feared Boyd, then left the state for a few months for a military commitment, and 
that when he returned to California, he heard nothing more about the murders.   
The referee specifically credited Small’s testimony on these points and 
concluded Boyd’s denials were not credible, stating that, “[i]n testifying at the 
 
 
32
reference hearing, Boyd made a number of statements which were shown to be 
false[, including] . . . that he did not threaten, bully, pressure or otherwise try to 
intimidate any of the Vose Street residents . . . [and] that he did not tell . . . 
Michael Small . . . that he had participated in the planning and/or the carrying out 
of the murders in this case.”  (Italics added.)  The referee also found Arzetta 
Harvey’s testimony (denying she had told Sandra Harris Moss that Boyd was 
coming into some insurance money) “to be unreliable.” 
Respondent in his return denies these allegations concerning Boyd’s 
statements to Small and also takes exception to the referee’s findings, on a number 
of grounds.  First, respondent argues the discrepancy between Small’s declaration 
and his hearing testimony, as well as his failure to come forward earlier, indicates 
he was not credible.  Small addressed these points in his testimony.  Respondent 
adds that Small’s credibility is further undermined because Burney in his 
testimony never mentioned that Boyd said he had killed a child by stabbing him.  
Although Raynall Burney’s failure to mention that Boyd had admitted to killing a 
child tends to undermine Small’s testimony, this is the type of credibility 
assessment we commit to the referee, and he specifically found Boyd was not 
truthful when he denied telling Small about his involvement in the murders.  
Because the referee’s credibility determination is supported by substantial 
evidence, namely Small’s own testimony and his declaration, it is entitled to 
deference.  (In re Thomas, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1256.)  Accordingly, we 
overrule respondent’s exceptions. 
Second, respondent takes exception to the referee’s acceptance of Small’s 
testimony, on grounds his credibility was undermined by:  (1) his claim he was an 
“ordained” minister of the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith, when in fact his Kingdom 
Hall does not use that title; and (2) when he was 17 years old, he obtained an 
identification card from the Department of Motor Vehicles with a false birth date.  
 
 
33
These matters were fully aired at the hearing, with Small explaining the 
circumstances of each, and we assume the referee considered them in weighing 
Small’s credibility against that of Boyd.  Because the referee’s credibility 
determination is supported by substantial evidence, namely Small’s own 
testimony, it is entitled to deference.  (In re Thomas, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1256.)  
Accordingly, we overrule these exceptions. 
Third, respondent takes exception to the referee’s findings with regard to 
Small’s testimony, on the ground that evidence Small was afraid of Boyd, that 
Boyd “lived the life of a gangster,” and that other Vose Street residents were 
afraid of Boyd was inadmissible evidence of Boyd’s bad character.  Because 
respondent did not object to Small’s testimony on this ground, he has forfeited the 
claim in this court.  In any event, the testimony was admissible to show Small’s 
state of mind, which was relevant to show his fear of Boyd and thus his reluctance 
to come forward until years later.  We thus overrule this exception. 
Fourth, respondent takes exception to the referee’s finding that Boyd ever 
told anyone he was expecting to receive money from some insurance proceeds or 
that Harvey had mentioned anything about such money to Sandra Harris Moss, 
arguing that no evidence supports the proposition that Boyd told this to Small 
personally.  Respondent is mistaken, as Small so testified.  We thus overrule this 
exception. 
Fifth, respondent takes exception to the referee’s finding that Arzetta 
Harvey told Sandra Harris Moss that she and Boyd expected to get some insurance 
money “soon.”  The referee’s interpretation of the evidence is reasonable; Sandra 
Moss testified that Harvey had said she and Boyd were “coming into some 
insurance money,” and, in context, Moss reasonably understood the use of the 
colloquial phraseology to mean “soon” and not at some distant future time.  We 
thus overrule this exception. 
 
 
34
Sixth, respondent takes exception to the referee’s finding crediting Small’s 
testimony recounting Boyd’s admissions, contending the comments were 
inadmissible hearsay.  Respondent failed to object on this ground and thus failed 
to preserve the issue for our review.  Were we to overlook this forfeiture and 
address the claim, we would find Boyd’s comments that (1) with a drawn knife, he 
told Raynall Burney (overheard by Small):  “ ‘I play for keeps.  I have already 
taken out one young kid.  I can do the same’ ”; (2) he told Michael Small:  “I took 
the pillow and I put it over him and I just stabbed him”; and (3) he told Small he 
(Boyd) expected to be receiving a large sum of money, all were admissible under 
Evidence Code section 1235 because they recounted Boyd’s prior inconsistent 
statements.  (See discussion, ante, at pt. IV.B.1.c.)  We thus conclude that, even 
had respondent preserved this issue, the referee would properly have admitted the 
evidence over the hearsay objection.   
As the referee’s conclusions concerning the testimony of Michael Small 
and Sandra Harris Moss are supported by substantial evidence, namely, the 
testimony of Small himself as well as that of Sandra Harris Moss, we overrule 
respondent’s exceptions and adopt the referee’s conclusions.   
e.  Michael Mitchell 
Petitioner alleges that a few days after the murders, Boyd demanded from 
codefendant Reilly a share of the insurance proceeds.  This allegation is supported 
by the testimony of Michael Mitchell, who testified that he was Reilly’s roommate 
at the Vose Street apartments in 1981.  Mitchell answered in the affirmative when 
he was asked whether Reilly told him a few days after the murders “that [Boyd] 
had actually threatened him because he wanted his cut for the killing.”  
Respondent denies these allegations.   
 
 
35
The referee made no specific findings as to this particular alleged threat 
Boyd issued to Reilly, or whether Mitchell was telling the truth, although he made 
the related finding that “Boyd told [Michael] Small that he expected to receive a 
large sum of money,” that Boyd was not credible when he denied threatening or 
trying to intimidate any Vose Street residents, and that “Boyd generally lacked 
credibility.”  Because the referee failed to make a specific finding with regard to 
the allegation based on Michael Mitchell’s testimony, we are left with disputed 
factual allegations, the resolution of which would require another evidentiary 
hearing.  Accordingly, for purposes of the present case, we will ignore the 
allegation based on Michael Mitchell’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing. 
f.  Steven Rice 
In 1981, Steven Rice lived at the Vose Street apartments in an apartment 
next to Reilly’s.  Rice was allowing petitioner to live with him rent-free.  
Petitioner alleges that “at some point after the killings,” Boyd entered Rice’s 
apartment, began beating Rice, and warned him that he should not mention Boyd’s 
name to the police or Boyd would kill him.  These allegations are supported by 
Rice’s testimony.  Rice, who now lives in Utah, testified he was friends with the 
Hardy family and lived in the Vose Street apartment with petitioner in 1981.  He 
testified that about two weeks after the murders, Boyd entered his apartment while 
he was sleeping, began hitting him in the face, and told him not to mention his 
name to the police “or he was going to kill my white ass.”  Boyd denied 
threatening Rice in this manner.   
The referee found “[t]he evidence showed that, at some point after the 
killings, Boyd came into Steve Rice’s apartment while he was asleep and began 
hitting Rice, telling him ‘he better not mention his name [to the police] or he was 
going to kill [Rice’s] white ass.’ ”  As noted, the referee specifically found Boyd 
 
 
36
lied when he denied threatening and intimidating the Vose Street residents and that 
he “generally lacked credibility.”   
Respondent denies Boyd ever threatened Rice not to go to the police and 
also raises a number of exceptions to the referee’s findings regarding Rice.  First, 
respondent takes exception to the referee’s findings on the ground that Rice never 
mentioned to the police investigating the murders that Boyd had threatened him, 
although he had opportunities to do so.  Although that fact tends to undercut 
Rice’s credibility, we note Rice testified that Boyd threatened him with harm 
should he reveal Boyd’s involvement.  In addition, Rice states in his declaration 
that he complained several times to the police about Boyd’s attempt to retaliate 
against him, and the police did nothing in response.12  In agreeing with Rice and 
not Boyd, the referee made a classic credibility determination that is entitled to 
deference if supported by substantial evidence.  Because the referee’s decision is 
supported by Rice’s own testimony and his declaration, we overrule this 
exception. 
Second, respondent takes exception to the referee’s findings on the ground 
that Rice’s testimony regarding Boyd’s assault on him was inadmissible evidence 
of bad character.  (Evid. Code, § 1101.)  Respondent did not object on this ground 
                                              
12  
For example, Rice declared that after Boyd broke into his apartment and 
threatened him, Rice began sneaking into his apartment through a window so as to 
avoid meeting Boyd.  Although Rice asked the police for protection against Boyd, 
“they did nothing” and “[t]hey did not take me seriously.”  Rice declared that a 
few days later, Boyd and Marcus confronted him in the Vose Street apartment’s 
parking lot and chased him, but he escaped.  “I never returned to my apartment 
after that because I was afraid for my life and the police did nothing to protect me 
from [Boyd].  Finally, I decided just to leave the state and move in with my father 
in Wyoming.”  Although respondent objected to the declaration at the hearing, it is 
unclear whether he raises the same objection before this court.  In any event, the 
content of the declaration was largely duplicated by Rice’s hearing testimony. 
 
 
37
at the hearing and thus forfeited its consideration in this court.  In any event, 
Rice’s testimony was admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay 
rule because it was an attempt to keep the conspiracy from being discovered and 
its ends thwarted, while it was still an ongoing enterprise.  (See discussion, ante, at 
pt. IV.B.1.a.) 
Third, respondent takes exception to the referee’s finding that when Demby 
interviewed Rice, he “repeatedly told Mr. Demby that after the killings, Boyd had 
physically attacked him and ordered him not to mention his (Boyd’s) name to the 
police.”  (Italics added.)  We have reviewed the transcript of the interview (which 
was admitted without objection) and are satisfied the referee’s conclusion on this 
point is accurate.  We thus overrule this exception. 
As the referee’s conclusions regarding Rice’s evidence are supported by 
substantial evidence, namely the testimony of Rice himself as well as his 
declaration and the transcript of his interview with defense counsel, the referee’s 
conclusions are entitled to deference, and we adopt them. 
2.  Boyd Habitually Carried a Knife Similar to the Murder Weapon 
In addition to Boyd’s numerous incriminating statements, petitioner also 
presented evidence that Boyd habitually carried and brandished a knife similar to 
the murder weapon.  The victims were killed with a knife approximately six inches 
long and one-half inch wide.  Petitioner alleges that, had trial counsel conducted a 
reasonable investigation, he would have discovered that Boyd habitually carried a 
knife of substantially similar dimensions as the murder weapon.  The testimony of 
several witnesses supports this allegation.  For example, Rickey Ginsburg testified 
Boyd habitually carried a knife about seven inches long.  Wesley Frank, another 
resident of the Vose Street apartments in 1981, testified Boyd carried a dagger, 
sharp on one side only, but stopped wearing it after the murders.  Raynall Burney 
 
 
38
testified Boyd kept a knife in his back pocket or on his belt.  He saw Boyd with a 
switchblade-style knife about six inches long and one-half inch wide.  Also 
testifying that Boyd habitually carried a knife were Steven Rice, Michael Mitchell, 
Michael Small, James Moss and Sandra Harris Moss. 
Respondent denies that Boyd carried a knife of the same dimensions as the 
murder weapon.  He emphasizes the difference between a single-bladed knife and 
a stiletto (which is sharp on both sides of the blade) and asserts the expert 
testimony at petitioner’s trial indicated the victims were killed with a stiletto.  
Although expert testimony indicated the victims were killed by the same or similar 
knives and it appeared from the wounds the knife was sharp on both sides of the 
blade, the referee made no finding on whether the knife Boyd carried was of the 
same dimensions or characteristics as the murder weapon.  The referee did 
conclude, however, that Boyd carried a knife around the time of the murders and 
that Boyd’s testimony “that he did not possess [or] carry . . . a knife during the 
time he lived at the Vose Street apartments” was false.  Moreover, only Wesley 
Frank specified that the knife he saw Boyd carrying was sharp on one side only.  
None of the other witnesses related this detail, although some reported the length 
and width of the blade as being consistent with the murder weapon.   
Respondent also takes exception to the referee’s finding that Boyd 
habitually carried a knife, arguing evidence he did so was improperly admitted at 
the hearing because it was evidence of his bad character.  Respondent did not 
object to the evidence on that ground and must be held to have forfeited the claim 
in this proceeding.  Respondent’s further exception that a drawing of the knife 
used at the hearing was not drawn to scale must suffer the same fate.  Accordingly, 
we overrule respondent’s exceptions. 
 
 
39
There being substantial, indeed overwhelming, evidence to support the 
referee’s finding that Boyd habitually carried a knife around the time of the 
murders, we adopt it.   
3.  Boyd Had Previously Committed Several Assaults with a Knife 
Petitioner alleges that, had trial counsel conducted a reasonable 
investigation, he would have discovered that Boyd, on numerous occasions, 
threatened various people with a knife and admitted having stabbed people in the 
past.  Thus, petitioner alleges, Boyd several times threatened his wife, Arzetta 
Harvey, with a knife.  This allegation is supported by Harvey’s testimony 
admitting Boyd threatened her with a knife and that he once put a knife to her 
throat and threatened to kill her.  Harvey’s son testified that Boyd, during an 
argument, brandished a knife, chased Harvey and threw a knife at her.  Raynall 
Burney described a different incident; he saw Boyd arguing with Harvey and then 
point the knife at her side in a threatening manner.   
The record also supports petitioner’s further allegations that Boyd once 
brandished a knife at Raynall Burney, as well as at a group of people gathered 
around the swimming pool at the Vose Street apartments, including Michael Small 
and others, and that Boyd bragged he previously had cut someone’s throat.  
Although Boyd denied these incidents, the referee ruled generally in petitioner’s 
favor on this point.   
Respondent does not specifically deny that any of these events occurred but 
contends that because the victims were killed with a two-bladed knife, the 
testimony recounting incidents in which Boyd threatened Burney, Harvey and 
Small with a knife was “irrelevant and immaterial.”  Respondent also takes 
exception to the referee’s findings, arguing they are incorrect and based on 
inadmissible evidence, being merely evidence of Boyd’s bad character.  
 
 
40
Respondent did not object on these grounds at the reference hearing and thus 
failed to preserve the issue for review in this court.  Accordingly, we overrule 
respondent’s exception to these latter statements. 
There being substantial evidence (in the form of testimony by Harvey, her 
son, Burney, and Small) to support the referee’s finding that Boyd threatened 
people with, and brandished, a knife on several occasions, and because respondent 
forfeited the evidentiary objections he now presents, we adopt the referee’s 
conclusions.  
4.  Boyd Had a Reputation for Violence and Threatening Behavior 
Relying on many of the same facts, petitioner alleges that, had trial counsel 
conducted a reasonable investigation, he would have discovered that Boyd had a 
reputation for violence and a history of violent and threatening behavior.  With the 
exception of evidence relevant to Harvey’s and her son’s state of mind (Evid. 
Code, § 1101, subd. (c)), such evidence would have been inadmissible at trial on 
the question of Boyd’s character (id., § 1101), and thus counsel cannot have been 
ineffective for failing to discover and present it.   
5.  Boyd Had Cuts on His Hands After the Killings 
Petitioner alleges that, had trial counsel conducted a reasonable 
investigation, he would have discovered that shortly after the murders, Boyd had 
numerous cuts on his hands and told a false story in an attempt to explain them.  
Testimony at the evidentiary hearing supports this allegation:  James Moss 
testified that shortly after the murders, when he overheard Boyd and Marcus make 
incriminating comments about their complicity in the murders, he noticed Boyd’s 
hands were “partially wrapped” and he had cuts on his hands and “puncture 
wounds up around the knuckles.”  The cuts looked like they could have been made 
by a knife.  Steven Rice testified that shortly after the murders, he noticed Boyd 
 
 
41
had a cut on his knuckles as if he had “punched something.”  Sandra Harris Moss 
testified that shortly after Reilly was arrested, she noticed Boyd had a long cut on 
his right hand, near the knuckle, that looked infected.  Boyd told her he had 
injured it working with a friend on a car engine.  Boyd testified he did not recall 
having any cuts on his hands in the days following the murders and denied having 
injured himself working on a car, admitting, “I was never a mechanic.”  Arzetta 
Harvey testified she did not recall seeing any cuts on Boyd’s hands around the 
time of the murders.  
The referee noted that “several witnesses noticed cuts on Boyd’s hands” in 
the days following the crimes and concluded Boyd’s denial that he had cuts on his 
hands was not credible and was, in fact, “false.”  
Respondent denies petitioner’s factual allegations, relying on Boyd’s and 
Harvey’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and further contends that even if 
Boyd had the alleged cuts, it does not prove he was the murderer or that petitioner 
was innocent of the murders, as there was no evidence indicating the 
circumstances under which Boyd had sustained the cuts or whether the victims’ 
killers had cut their hands during the crimes.  Respondent takes exception to the 
referee’s findings on the same grounds.  Although having cuts on his hands just 
after the brutal double murder and telling a falsehood as to their origin does not 
prove definitively that Boyd was the murderer, this evidence is certainly relevant, 
especially as to Boyd’s state of mind and, coupled with other evidence such as his 
incriminating admissions, could have convinced the jury to entertain some doubt 
as to the scope of petitioner’s involvement in the murders.  We thus overrule 
respondent’s exceptions.   
Substantial evidence (i.e., the testimony of James Moss, Steven Rice and 
Sandra Moss) supports the referee’s findings regarding the cuts on Boyd’s hands.  
Accordingly, those findings are entitled to deference, and we adopt them.  
 
 
42
6.  Boyd’s Alibi Was False 
Boyd had an alibi for the night of the murders:  His wife, Arzetta Harvey, 
testified at the preliminary hearing that she had purchased some bedroom furniture 
from her friend, Sandra Harris Moss, and moved it to her apartment on May 20, 
1981, the day before the victims were murdered.  Harvey testified at the 
preliminary hearing that Boyd came home drunk that night and passed out on the 
new bed around 11:00 p.m.  (Recall the victims were killed in the early morning 
hours on May 21, 1981.)  Boyd himself testified that someone must have slipped 
him an intoxicating substance that night without his knowledge, resulting in his 
passing out. 
Petitioner alleges that, had trial counsel conducted a reasonable 
investigation, he would have discovered Boyd’s alibi was false.  Testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing supports this allegation:  Sandra Harris Moss testified that on 
the day she sold her bedroom furniture to Harvey and helped her move it into her 
bedroom, she saw Boyd on the bed late that evening, but contrary to Harvey’s 
preliminary hearing testimony, the night she saw Boyd on the bed could have been 
any night, and she did not know whether it was the night of the murders.  
Suspiciously, after the murders, Harvey put pressure on Moss nearly every day to 
say the night she saw Boyd on the bed was the night of the murders.  Harvey, at 
that time Moss’s good friend, had never pressured Moss about anything, but 
uncharacteristically brought up this subject every day “like a ritual.”  Moss “felt as 
though [Harvey] was pressuring me and brainwashing me to remember that the 
night that I sold her the bedroom set and the night that we moved the bedroom set 
was the night that [Boyd] was at home laying [on] the bed.”  Arzetta Harvey’s son 
testified consistently with Moss’s account, asserting that Boyd asked him to lie to 
the police and tell them that he (Boyd) was home the night of the murders.  
Harvey denied badgering Moss to give Boyd an alibi, but admitted at the 
 
 
43
evidentiary hearing that she did not know if she had bought the bedroom set 
around the time of the murders or not.  
Other evidence undermined Boyd’s alibi as well.  Although Boyd claimed 
he had passed out in his and Harvey’s apartment the night of the murders, three 
witnesses reported seeing him in the common areas of the apartment complex that 
evening.  Wesley Frank, a resident of the Vose Street apartments, testified that on 
the evening of May 20, 1981, he saw Boyd and Marcus at the Vose Street 
apartment complex around 8:00 or 9:00 p.m., standing in a stairway and talking.  
Later, between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., he heard Marcus start up his motorcycle and 
then heard Marcus and Boyd arguing.  Boyd said:  “ ‘I don’t want to get on the 
back of the bike.  I’ll fall off.’ ”  Nevertheless, Frank saw the two men leave on 
the motorcycle with Boyd on the back.  They were dressed in dark clothing and 
appeared sober.  In addition, Rickey Ginsburg testified he saw Boyd and Marcus 
in the late evening that same night, between two buildings of the apartment 
complex.  They asked to borrow his car but Ginsburg declined, instead loaning 
them some money.  Finally, Colette Mitchell, petitioner’s then girlfriend, told 
police she was in Reilly’s Vose Street apartment that critical night and saw Boyd 
walk by Reilly’s apartment window around 11:00 p.m. 
The referee concluded the evidence presented at the hearing “undermined 
Boyd’s purported alibi for the night of the killings and supported petitioner’s 
contention that Boyd was the killer.”  Critically, the referee specifically found 
Boyd’s testimony “that he did not leave the Vose Street apartments with Marcus 
on the night of the murders” was false and that Arzetta Harvey’s testimony about 
Boyd’s alibi was “unworthy of belief.” 
Respondent denies the allegation that Boyd’s alibi was false, relying on 
Boyd’s denial and Harvey’s testimony.  The referee specifically disbelieved Boyd 
 
 
44
and Harvey, however, making a credibility determination that is entitled to this 
court’s deference. 
Respondent takes exception to a number of the referee’s findings.  First, he 
argues the referee’s findings are “incomplete” because they fail to note the 
contrary evidence, to wit, that Sandra Harris Moss initially told police she had 
seen Boyd passed out on the bed the night of the murders.  The referee was 
undoubtedly aware of Moss’s earlier position when he weighed her past 
representation to police with her contrary testimony at the reference hearing.  The 
referee’s conclusion that Moss was truthful at the hearing, and that Boyd and 
Harvey were not credible, is the type of credibility determination that is entitled to 
our deference.  Accordingly, we overrule this exception. 
Second, respondent argues any reliance on Colette Mitchell’s transcribed 
interview with the police is improper because it was inadmissible, both because it 
was hearsay and because it was polygraph-related, being an interview conducted 
in connection with a polygraph test.  The transcript of this interview was admitted 
without objection at the hearing but, inasmuch as the referee’s conclusion 
regarding Boyd’s false alibi is sufficiently supported by Ginsburg’s and Frank’s 
testimony in any event, we assign Colette’s interview transcript no weight. 
Respondent’s third exception challenges Sandra Harris Moss’s testimony 
concerning Harvey’s attempt to pressure her on the ground that Moss’s testimony 
was not “uncontradicted.”  The argument is meritless.  Although the point was 
contested and our July 20, 1994, order asked the referee to determine why Demby 
failed to present “the uncontradicted evidence of other available witnesses who 
would have provided mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of the trial” (italics 
added), the referee was also directed by our order to take evidence and determine 
whether Demby’s tactical decision not to present this evidence was “supportable.”  
The relative strength of the evidence of third party culpability was relevant to 
 
 
45
determining whether Demby’s decision not to present it was supportable.  We thus 
overrule this exception.   
Fourth, respondent takes exception to the referee’s conclusion that Sandra 
Harris Moss told her then boyfriend, James Moss, that Harvey was putting 
pressure on her to support Boyd’s alibi.  Respondent claims no evidence supports 
this conclusion because James Moss’s testimony to that effect was not admitted 
for its truth.  Although respondent is correct that James Moss’s testimony on this 
point was not offered for its truth, he is mistaken that no other evidence supports 
the referee’s conclusion.  Sandra Harris Moss herself testified that she told James 
Moss that Boyd and Harvey were trying to “brainwash” her into believing the day 
she saw Boyd passed out was the night of the murders.  We thus overrule this 
exception. 
Fifth, respondent takes exception to the referee’s conclusion that Harvey’s 
son falsely gave police petitioner’s name at Boyd’s urging because he was afraid 
of Boyd.  Although respondent contends the evidence supporting this conclusion is 
ambiguous, the record strongly supports the referee’s finding.  For example, 
Harvey’s son affirmed that Boyd approached both him and his mother and told 
them they “should tell a certain story to police.”  Regarding the fact he told police 
he had heard petitioner was the killer, Harvey’s son admitted:  “That is what I was 
told by Calvin to say.”  Ample evidence also supports the notion that Harvey’s son 
feared Boyd.  He testified he believed Boyd was a violent person, based on Boyd’s 
violent abuse of his mother, Arzetta Harvey, his slapping, hitting, verbally yelling 
“and just constantly coming home drunk, taking it out on me and my mother.”  He 
also related an incident in which Boyd had threatened them with a knife.  Given 
this evidence, the referee was well within his discretion to conclude that Harvey’s 
son was afraid of Boyd.   
 
 
46
Respondent also takes exception to the referee’s findings regarding 
Harvey’s son on the ground that his credibility was compromised because he had 
sustained two felony convictions and because he did not come forward earlier with 
his evidence.  We have no doubt the referee considered these factors when 
assessing the witness’s credibility.  As the referee’s conclusion on this point is 
supported by substantial evidence, it is the type of credibility determination that is 
entitled to deference.  (In re Thomas, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1256.)  We thus 
overrule respondent’s exceptions regarding Harvey’s son’s testimony. 
Sixth, respondent takes exception to the referee’s finding that the evidence 
undermines Boyd’s alibi, arguing that other evidence supports the alibi.  This is a 
factual determination well within the referee’s discretion to make.  Accordingly, 
we overrule the exception. 
Seventh, respondent takes exception to the referee’s finding that the 
evidence undermines Boyd’s alibi, arguing that Harvey’s son’s testimony that 
Boyd had coerced him to support the alibi was hearsay evidence of Boyd’s bad 
character, inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 1101-1103.  Although 
respondent objected to Harvey’s son’s testimony that Boyd had a reputation for 
violence, respondent did not raise a hearsay objection to his testimony that Boyd 
had coerced him to support Boyd’s alibi.  Accordingly, respondent failed to 
preserve the hearsay objection for this court’s consideration.  In any event, Sandra 
Harris Moss’s testimony amply supports the referee’s conclusion that Boyd’s alibi 
was false.  We thus overrule the exception. 
As substantial evidence (i.e., the testimony of Wesley Frank, Rickey 
Ginsburg, Sandra Harris Moss, James Moss and Harvey’s son) supports the 
referee’s findings that evidence presented at the hearing “undermined Boyd’s 
purported alibi for the night of the killings and supported petitioner’s contention 
that Boyd was the killer,” and that Boyd’s testimony “that he did not leave the 
 
 
47
Vose Street apartments with Marcus on the night of the murders” was false, we 
adopt those findings.  
7.  Boyd Had a Motive to Commit the Murders 
Petitioner alleges that at the time of the murders, Boyd was a drug user who 
habitually used alcohol, marijuana, heroin, cocaine and possibly phencyclidine 
(PCP), and that he was unemployed and in constant need of money.  Petitioner 
contends this evidence provides Boyd with a motive for the killings.  For example, 
Harvey’s son testified Boyd was his stepfather in 1981 and that he had gotten to 
know Boyd fairly well.  He said that people often came to speak with his mother 
about Boyd, complaining that Boyd was “constant[ly] badgering [them] for money 
to buy the drugs.”  Michael Small testified that in 1981, Boyd was often under the 
influence.  According to Small:  “[Boyd] wasn’t trying to hide his drug use in any 
way.  Over back by the pool he would smoke Sherm [i.e., PCP-laced cigarettes] or 
marijuana.”  According to Small, Boyd “always had Southern Comfort with him, 
and if he didn’t he was going to get a bottle.  So that was his recreation.”  Asked if 
this occurred every day, occasionally or just on weekends, Small replied:  “All the 
time.”  James Moss confirmed that Boyd drank on a “daily basis” and that he 
appeared to be addicted to heroin, saying, “he was on that real bad.”  Sandra 
Harris Moss testified Boyd did not work, but “[h]ung around, loafed around” all 
day, drinking and smoking marijuana and Sherm cigarettes.  Although she never 
saw Boyd inject heroin, she saw needle marks on his arms.  James Moss testified 
that after the murders, he overheard Boyd say he was angry and that “he needed 
his part of the money to get the drugs that he wanted and needed.” 
The referee concluded “[t]he evidence at the hearing showed that Boyd had 
a motive for the killings:  i.e., to obtain money to support his drug habit.”  
Moreover, the referee found that Boyd’s testimony that “he did not use . . . 
 
 
48
cocaine, heroin or PCP during the time he lived at the Vose Street apartments” 
was false and that the evidence confirmed “that Boyd’s drug habit was his motive 
for participating in the conspiracy[, namely] that, after the killings, Boyd was 
heard to say that he wanted to be paid for his part in the killings soon so that he 
could buy drugs.”  
Without specifically denying the allegations regarding Boyd’s drug 
addiction and impecunious circumstances, respondent denies that these alleged 
facts provide Boyd with any greater motive for the double murder than any other 
poor, unemployed person.  Although respondent is correct that the presence of a 
motive does not prove Boyd was the killer, this evidence, combined with the other 
evidence, could have convinced a reasonable jury to entertain some doubt as to the 
scope of petitioner’s involvement in the murders.  Moreover, James Moss’s 
testimony ties Boyd’s drug addiction to his need for money. 
Respondent also takes exception to the referee’s findings, arguing the 
evidence showing Boyd’s drug and alcohol habits was inadmissible evidence of 
his bad character.  Respondent did not object on this ground at the hearing and has 
thus forfeited the claim for this proceeding.  Assuming the issue was preserved, 
the evidence was admissible to challenge Boyd’s credibility (Evid. Code, § 1101, 
subd. (c)), as he testified he did not use drugs or alcohol and was not part of the 
conspiracy.  (See discussion, ante, at pt. IV.B.1.g.)  Respondent’s further 
argument that no evidence supports the referee’s finding that Boyd was heard to 
say he wanted to be paid for his part “in the killings” is meritless; James Moss’s 
testimony, read in context, adequately supports the referee’s finding.  We thus 
overrule respondent’s exceptions. 
As the referee’s conclusions regarding Boyd’s motive for the slayings are 
supported by substantial evidence (i.e., the testimony of Harvey’s son, Michael 
Small, James Moss and Sandra Harris Moss), we adopt them. 
 
 
49
8.  Boyd’s Postcrime Behavior Evidenced Consciousness of Guilt 
In addition to Boyd’s many incriminating admissions, the suspicious cuts 
on his hands, his having carried a knife around the time of the murders and all the 
other evidence described above, petitioner also alleges that Boyd’s behavior and 
demeanor following the murders suggested he suffered from a consciousness of 
guilt.  For example, as described above, Boyd claimed a false alibi and pressured 
and threatened others to support it.  In addition, Boyd threatened those who had 
heard him make incriminating statements to keep silent.  At Boyd’s urging, 
Harvey’s son, who was only 13 or 14 years old at the time, falsely told police he 
had heard from a schoolmate that petitioner and someone named “Buck” were 
planning on committing a murder.  (“Buck” was codefendant Mark Reilly’s 
nickname.)  Boyd denied pressuring his stepson in this way, but the referee found 
Boyd was not credible on this point.  
Petitioner also alleges that, indicative of his guilty state of mind, Boyd 
testified falsely at both the preliminary hearing and the trial in petitioner’s case.  
For example, at the preliminary hearing, Boyd testified under a false name and 
testified falsely that he had never been to prison.  By the time of trial, Boyd had 
admitted his status as a felon but falsely testified he had received no consideration 
for his trial testimony, although he had received immunity for his perjury at the 
preliminary hearing.  The referee ruled specifically on this point, concluding:  “At 
the reference hearing, Boyd admitted that prior to his testimony at trial, [the 
prosecutor] promised him that he would not be prosecuted for perjury committed 
at the preliminary hearing.  This evidence, as well as the secret grant of immunity 
which [the prosecutor] awarded Boyd prior to the hearing,[13] showed that Boyd 
                                              
13  
Apparently surprising both habeas corpus defense counsel and the deputy 
attorney general, at the evidentiary hearing Boyd announced from the witness 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
50
testified falsely when he stated at trial that [the prosecutor] had not promised him 
anything in connection with his testimony.”  
At trial, Boyd testified that on the morning after the murders, he entered 
Steven Rice’s apartment around 8:00 a.m. or 9:00 a.m. and used it as a shortcut to 
exit the apartment complex by jumping over a wall.  Once in the apartment, he 
saw Reilly and petitioner sleeping; Colette Mitchell and Rice were also present.  
He testified that he used Rice’s apartment as a shortcut “mostly every day.”  This 
evidence placed petitioner in Reilly’s company just hours after the crimes and 
rendered it more plausible the two of them had acted together in murdering the 
victims, a point the prosecution emphasized in closing argument.  But at the 
evidentiary hearing, Boyd testified he never used Rice’s apartment as a shortcut as 
there was no need to do so.  The referee cited this inconsistency as evidence of 
Boyd’s lack of credibility. 
Petitioner makes a number of additional allegations essentially highlighting 
inconsistencies in Boyd’s testimony at trial and argues these discrepancies 
comprise further evidence of Boyd’s duplicity and demonstrate he was the real 
killer.  Two examples suffice:  Petitioner first alleges that after the murders Boyd’s 
demeanor changed.  He appeared nervous and stopped carrying his knife.  This 
allegation is supported by Rickey Ginsburg’s testimony that after the murders 
Boyd appeared “more nervous and paranoid and . . . real edgy.”  Harvey’s son 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
stand that he had been granted immunity by the trial prosecutor, Jeffrey Jonas.  At 
the referee’s request, Boyd produced the letter, dated a few days before the 
evidentiary hearing, which stated in part that Boyd was not considered a suspect 
for the murders of Nancy and Mitchell Morgan “and will not ever be prosecuted 
for any criminal charge against him relating to the case of People v. Hardy.”  
 
 
51
similarly observed that after the killings Boyd “became paranoid, shaking, 
everything that he done he done in a rush.”   
Petitioner also alleges Boyd, at trial, falsely testified he had received no 
consideration from the Santa Clara County Superior Court in recognition of his 
assistance in testifying against petitioner.  Petitioner alleges Boyd, facing 
sentencing for a burglary conviction in that county at the time of petitioner’s trial, 
allegedly received the lightest possible sentence in Santa Clara County and, in 
fact, suffered no penalty at all for having fled the jurisdiction prior to sentencing.  
Although Boyd touched on the subject at the evidentiary hearing, suggesting that 
prosecuting authorities in Los Angeles County had made some overtures to obtain 
leniency for him in Santa Clara County, the referee made no specific findings of 
fact for these allegations.  Accordingly, we assign no weight to them, nor to 
several other allegations that were not contradicted at the evidentiary hearing, but 
for which the referee made no finding, such as those involving the precise time 
Boyd learned of the murders, Boyd’s alleged lie about seeing a red stain on 
petitioner’s boots, Boyd’s alleged accusation of Reilly, Boyd’s alleged 
conversations with Reilly in the apartment laundry room in which Reilly allegedly 
made damaging admissions, Reilly’s alleged solicitation of Boyd to commit the 
murders, and others.   
C.  Actual Innocence 
Based on the foregoing allegations, as sustained by the referee and which 
we have in large part adopted, petitioner contends he is entitled to relief because 
he is actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted and that his 
“conviction, sentence and confinement are unlawful” because they were achieved 
in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 1, 7, 13, 14, 
 
 
52
15 and 17 of the California Constitution.  As we explain, we conclude petitioner is 
not entitled to relief on the ground of actual innocence.14 
Habeas corpus will lie to vindicate a claim that newly discovered evidence 
demonstrates a prisoner is actually innocent.  A criminal judgment may be 
collaterally attacked on habeas corpus on the basis of newly discovered evidence if 
such evidence casts “fundamental doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the 
proceedings.  At the guilt phase, such evidence, if credited, must undermine the 
entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability.  
(In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 417; In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 724.)”  
(People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1246.)  “[N]ewly discovered evidence 
does not warrant relief unless it is of such character ‘as will completely undermine 
the entire structure of the case upon which the prosecution was based.’ ”  (In re 
Weber, at p. 724, quoting In re Lindley (1947) 29 Cal.2d 709, 723.)  An example 
of such evidence is a confession of guilt by a third party.  (In re Weber, at p. 724.) 
In this context, “ ‘newly discovered evidence’ is evidence that could not 
have been discovered with reasonable diligence prior to judgment.”  (§ 1473.6, 
subd. (b).)  As we explain post, in part IV.D.1., the evidence of alleged innocence 
on which petitioner now relies was reasonably available to him had Demby 
conducted a reasonably thorough pretrial investigation.  It thus seems unlikely this 
evidence would qualify as “newly discovered.” 
We need not determine whether evidence of Boyd’s involvement qualifies 
as newly discovered evidence because, even assuming it does, we conclude 
petitioner’s factual allegations, though largely sustained by our referee, fail to 
                                              
14  
As will appear post, even if petitioner were found to be innocent of the 
actual killing, he would still be guilty of first degree murder as a coconspirator and 
an aider and abettor. 
 
 
53
demonstrate petitioner is actually innocent.  The evidence of Boyd’s many lies, his 
several inculpatory admissions of his involvement in the murders, his multiple 
attempts—by threats of violence and other coercive behavior—to prevent 
witnesses from reporting his inculpatory remarks to police, his false alibi, his 
threats to Harvey and her son to falsely support his alibi, the cuts on his hands and 
his ineffectual attempt to explain them away, his habitual possession and 
brandishing of a knife, all serve to inculpate him in the murders and to throw some 
doubt on the scope of petitioner’s role—said by the prosecutor at trial to be a 
primary one—in the crimes.  Moreover, had the jury heard this evidence, it would 
have had good reason to doubt Boyd’s trial testimony, which was itself extremely 
damaging to petitioner’s case, for Boyd testified to a critical fact, namely, that 
when he was in the laundry room sometime after the murders, Reilly told him he 
had committed the murders with petitioner. 
None of this evidence, however, is enough for us to conclude petitioner has 
carried his heavy burden of demonstrating he is actually innocent.  “ ‘Depriving’ 
an accused of facts that ‘strongly’ raise issues of reasonable doubt is not the 
standard.  Where newly discovered evidence is the basis for a habeas corpus 
petition, as alleged by defendant, the newly discovered evidence must 
‘undermine[] the prosecution’s entire case.  It is not sufficient that the evidence 
might have weakened the prosecution case or presented a more difficult question 
for the judge or jury.  [Citations.]’  (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 766.)”  (In 
re Alcox (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 657, 670.)  The evidence adduced at the hearing 
and endorsed by the referee tends to show Boyd had some hand in the murders, 
very possibly a primary role; that he lied when he testified he saw petitioner with 
Reilly in Steven Rice’s apartment early in the morning after the crimes; and that 
he probably lied when he testified that Reilly had told him he (Reilly) and 
petitioner committed the murders.   
 
 
54
But this evidence does not undermine other critical evidence, such as the 
testimony of Colette Mitchell, who testified petitioner told her he was going to 
steal something from someone to enable the collection of insurance proceeds; that 
he had been to the victims’ home the night of the murders; that he knew the crime 
was to be accomplished by cutting the chain on the door; that he received $1,000, 
apparently for his participation in either the conspiracy or the murders themselves; 
that Morgan was not worried about the delay the trial caused because his money 
was earning interest while he was in jail; or that people who said the murder was 
committed by more than one person were wrong because he “ ‘[knew] for a fact it 
was one.’ ”  The referee’s findings also do not fatally undermine Colette’s 
testimony regarding petitioner’s suspicious instructions to her to help dispose of 
both the stolen M-1 carbine rifle and his shoes.  That petitioner went to the 
victims’ home with Reilly and Boyd is also possible.  In short, although the weight 
and breadth of the evidence showing Boyd participated in the murders is 
disturbing, such evidence does not fatally undermine the prosecution’s entire case 
against petitioner.  The most that can be said is that this evidence would have 
presented a more difficult decision for the jury and may well have created in the 
minds of the jurors a reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s guilt.  As explained ante, 
this is not the standard.  (In re Weber, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 724, In re Clark, 
supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 766.)   
When we issued an order to show cause on the question of petitioner’s 
actual innocence, our order represented a “preliminary assessment that . . . 
petitioner would be entitled to relief if his factual allegations are proved.”  (People 
v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 475.)  After further consideration of the briefs, the 
record and the referee’s report, we conclude our preliminary assessment was 
wrong, and the allegations, though largely sustained by the referee, fail to 
undermine the prosecution’s entire case against petitioner or point unerringly to 
 
 
55
his innocence or reduced culpability.  Accordingly, we conclude he has not shown 
he is actually innocent of the crimes. 
D.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Petitioner also alleges he is entitled to relief because his trial attorney, 
Michael Demby, provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, in that 
he failed to investigate, discover and present a significant amount of evidence 
indicating petitioner may have been innocent and that Calvin Boyd was probably 
the person who killed Nancy and Mitchell Morgan.  The legal standard for 
determining whether one’s attorney was constitutionally ineffective, thereby 
depriving a defendant of his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution,15 is 
settled.  “ ‘ “[I]n order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must first show counsel’s performance was ‘deficient’ because his 
‘representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under 
prevailing professional norms.’  (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 
687-688 [(Strickland)]; [People v.] Ledesma [(1987)] 43 Cal.3d [171,] 215-216.)  
Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from counsel’s performance or lack 
thereof.  [Citations.]  Prejudice is shown when there is a ‘reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
                                              
15  
In the same paragraph, petitioner also alleges his “conviction, death 
sentence and confinement were obtained in violation of [his] right to . . . due 
process and a fair trial, to confrontation of witnesses, to a jury trial, to present a 
defense, to a fair, individualized, reliable and/or nonarbitrary guilt and penalty 
determination and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, sections 1, 7, 13, 15, 16 of the California Constitution.”  In light of our 
decision finding counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the Sixth 
Amendment, we express no opinion on these additional contentions. 
 
 
56
have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” ’  (In re Avena, supra, 12 Cal.4th at 
p. 721; accord, People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1211.)”  (In re Thomas, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1256.)  This second part of the Strickland test “is not solely 
one of outcome determination.  Instead, the question is ‘whether counsel’s 
deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding 
fundamentally unfair.’  (Lockhart v. Fretwell (1993) 506 U.S. 364, 372.)”  (In re 
Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 833.) 
1.  Demby’s Deficient Performance 
Much of the briefing before this court concerns whether Demby’s 
investigation into Boyd’s possible involvement was reasonable, what Demby 
knew about Boyd and when he knew it, and whether the evidence of Boyd’s 
alleged participation in the crimes was reasonably available had Demby 
investigated.  Thus, for example, petitioner alleges his trial counsel was aware, at 
the time of trial, of the importance to petitioner’s defense of investigating Boyd’s 
role in the crimes and therefore knew “further investigation was necessary.”  
(People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937.)  Petitioner also alleges his trial 
counsel was “on notice” that Boyd’s alibi was “potentially false”; that, had Demby 
“been aware of the evidence of third party culpability which was presented at the 
reference hearing, he would have presented it at the guilt phase of petitioner’s 
trial”; that several witnesses with relevant evidence regarding Boyd’s culpability 
were available at the time of trial; that “[a]lthough Mr. Demby requested that his 
investigator interview some of the relevant witnesses, including those whom he 
called the ‘Boyd connection,’ most of the interviews were never done and the few 
that were done were done incompetently”; and that “Mr. Demby’s investigation 
 
 
57
was deficient insofar as he relied on the contents of police reports to decide 
whether several key witnesses had information helpful to petitioner’s defense.”   
The referee ruled in petitioner’s favor on these points.  Respondent, in his 
briefing before this court in both Hardy I and Hardy II, denied many of these 
factual allegations and raised many objections to the referee’s conclusions.  At 
oral argument, however, when asked whether trial counsel Demby was 
“ineffective,” respondent conceded that he was.  We assume respondent meant 
only that he agreed Demby’s investigation of Boyd’s involvement in the crimes 
was deficient (that is, that the investigation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness), for respondent went on to argue Demby’s failure to conduct a 
reasonable investigation was not prejudicial.  We accept the concession but find in 
any event that ample evidence supports petitioner’s allegations (and the referee’s 
conclusions) that Demby knew more investigation of Boyd was justified;16 that 
the witnesses with favorable information were reasonably available had Demby 
investigated the Boyd connection; and that had Demby uncovered this 
information, he would have presented it to the jury.  We specifically find the 
evidence demonstrates that Demby had reason to interview Raynall Burney, 
Rickey Ginsburg, James Moss, Sandra Harris Moss, Michael Small, Harvey’s son, 
Steven Rice and Wesley Frank and that their evidence inculpating Boyd was 
reasonably available at the time of petitioner’s trial.  The referee so found, and his 
conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.  (In re Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 
p. 998 [referee’s findings on the question of the availability of the evidence is a 
                                              
16  
The referee concluded that, “[a]s a general proposition, Mr. Demby 
acknowledged that at the time he was preparing for trial in petitioner’s case, he 
realized that investigating Boyd and his relationship to the crime was of great 
importance to petitioner’s defense.”  (Italics added.)   
 
 
58
factual determination entitled to great weight if supported by substantial 
evidence].)   
Thus, petitioner’s factual allegations, based on evidence presented in the 
evidentiary hearing in Hardy I, as sustained by the referee and adopted herein by 
this court, demonstrate that numerous witnesses were available at the time of trial 
and, if contacted, would have testified and recounted (1) Calvin Boyd’s numerous 
statements implicating himself as the one who actually killed the victims; 
(2) Boyd’s personal threats to various people, warning them not to reveal his 
admissions or his involvement in the murders; (3) several witnesses’ observations 
of Boyd the night of the murders and in the days following that tended to 
demonstrate his alibi was false and that he participated in the murders (e.g., the 
suspicious cuts on his hands); and (4) Boyd’s efforts to coerce others to 
corroborate his alibi.  Although Boyd denied this evidence, the referee concluded 
that “both Boyd’s own testimony and other evidence presented at the reference 
hearing showed that at the time of the hearing, Boyd lacked credibility and 
reliability as a witness.”  Substantial evidence supports the referee’s conclusions 
regarding the credibility of the witnesses who testified at the evidentiary hearing. 
Because Demby failed to ensure the investigation was reasonably thorough, 
several witnesses with critical information about Boyd’s involvement in the 
murders were not interviewed and their information was not presented at trial.  
Had Demby been armed with this additional evidence, he would have presented it 
to bolster petitioner’s defense.  As the referee concluded, “[i]n his closing 
arguments at both the guilt and penalty phases, Mr. Demby argued that Calvin 
Boyd and Marcus, not petitioner, had committed the killings.  This suggests that if 
Mr. Demby had been aware of the evidence, he would probably have presented it.”  
Substantial evidence supports this conclusion, and we adopt it. 
 
 
59
Based on this evidence, the referee concluded:  “In sum, this Referee finds 
that the reason for which Mr. Demby did not present the available evidence 
pertaining to Calvin Boyd was that Mr. Demby’s investigation and that of his 
office fell below the standard of care, and that therefore Mr. Demby’s reasons for 
not presenting the available evidence [were] not supportable.”  This conclusion is 
a mixed question of fact and law subject to independent review.  (In re Ross, 
supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 201 [whether counsel’s performance was deficient and 
whether any deficiency prejudiced the petitioner, are both mixed questions subject 
to independent review]; In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 694 [same].)   
Even had respondent not conceded the point, we would have found, after 
applying independent review, that the referee’s negative assessment of Demby’s 
performance was inescapable.  Demby made no opening statement at the guilt 
phase of the trial and called no witnesses of his own, contenting himself to cross-
examine the witnesses called to the stand by other parties, i.e., the prosecutor and 
petitioner’s codefendants Reilly and Morgan.  While that strategy, standing alone, 
is not per se unreasonable, Demby’s closing guilt phase argument made clear that 
his strategy was to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors by 
convincing them it was Boyd—not petitioner—who, along with Reilly and 
possibly Marcus, went to the victims’ home that deadly night in May 1981, and 
that Boyd was the actual killer.  That Demby had planned on making this line of 
argument his primary means of attacking the prosecution’s case is apparent from 
his pretrial instructions to his investigators to investigate the Boyd connection and 
to interview witnesses at the Vose Street apartments in an attempt to uncover 
evidence of Boyd’s culpability.  That this was Demby’s strategy is also apparent 
from the absence of any other defense (other than to emphasize discrepancies in 
the prosecution witnesses’ testimony) and by Demby’s own testimony at the 
 
 
60
evidentiary hearing that more potent evidence of Boyd’s culpability would have 
been consistent with his “defense theme.”  
We thus turn to whether defense counsel’s failure to investigate was 
prejudicial to petitioner.   
2.  Prejudice at the Guilt Phase 
Demby’s unreasonable failure to conduct a more thorough and reasonably 
comprehensive pretrial investigation into the Boyd connection, and his subsequent 
failure to present reasonably available evidence of Boyd’s guilt at petitioner’s trial, 
would not require relief on the ground of ineffective assistance unless his deficient 
performance was prejudicial.  (Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510, 534.)  In 
this context, we assess prejudice by evaluating three factors:  What evidence was 
available that counsel failed reasonably to discover?  How strong was that 
evidence?  How strong was the evidence of guilt produced at trial?  (See In re 
Thomas, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1265.)  We have already described in detail the 
evidence from various witnesses that implicated Boyd in the murders.  To recap 
here:  Boyd was a felon who was a fugitive from the law.  In the days following 
the murders, he made comments to several people suggesting he was the actual 
killer, including that he tripped on a child, then put a pillow over his face and 
stabbed him.  (There was evidence the victims were stabbed through a pillow.)  
Boyd was heard to exclaim that he wanted his share of the money for the killing 
and that petitioner changed the plan by failing to appear and would now get away 
free because “he did not do anything.”  Boyd threatened several people with 
violence, warning them not to give his name to the police, and he habitually 
carried a knife similar to the murder weapon.  More than one witness reported that, 
shortly after the murders, Boyd had cuts on his hands and tried to conceal their 
origin, telling a false story about working on a friend’s car.  Boyd concocted a 
 
 
61
false alibi and coerced his wife and young stepson to support it, indicating a 
consciousness of guilt.  Boyd falsely claimed he had traversed Steven Rice’s 
apartment early in the morning after the murders and saw petitioner and Reilly 
together.  Perhaps most incriminating, although Boyd claimed to have passed out 
in his apartment the night of the murders, one witness saw him walking around the 
apartment complex between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., and another witness saw 
him leave the apartment complex with his friend Marcus around 11:00 p.m.  The 
referee found the witnesses who provided the foregoing evidence were credible 
and that Boyd, in denying the evidence, was not.  This evidence, reasonably 
available to counsel, was strong and persuasive, coming from several different 
witnesses who had interlocking recollections of the night before and the days after 
the murders.   
The evidence from the witnesses petitioner now presents, missing at trial 
but reasonably available to counsel, would have pointed the finger of guilt at 
Boyd, undermined his alibi and severely damaged his credibility, which in turn 
would have impeached two critical pieces of evidence on which the prosecution 
relied to convict petitioner:  Reilly’s alleged confession to Boyd in the laundry 
room that petitioner was one of the killers, and Boyd’s claim that he saw petitioner 
and Reilly together just a few hours after the murders.  Indeed, the referee found 
this latter assertion was untrue. 
By contrast, the prosecution argued at trial that petitioner and Reilly 
committed the murders, that petitioner was the actual killer, and that Reilly either 
held the victims down or waited outside while petitioner alone stabbed them to 
death.  Subtracting Boyd’s testimony, the evidence that petitioner was the actual 
killer was weak and circumstantial.  Reilly did not testify.  Although codefendant 
Clifford Morgan testified, he knew of no evidence linking petitioner to the 
murders.  (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 126.)  No eyewitness to the 
 
 
62
crimes testified, and no witness placed petitioner at the scene of the crime at the 
time of the murders.  No witness reported seeing petitioner leave the apartment 
complex the night of the crimes.   
Although the murders spilled much of the victims’ blood, no blood 
evidence linked petitioner to the crime scene.  By contrast, police found a spot of 
human blood on one of Reilly’s shoes.  (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 
121-122.)  (Michael Mitchell, Reilly’s roommate, reported hearing two male 
voices and the shower running in the middle of the night.  While this might 
explain the police’s failure to find any blood evidence on petitioner’s clothes, it 
may equally well have been Reilly and Boyd who took the showers.) 
No fingerprint, footprint, hair or other forensic evidence connected 
petitioner to the crimes.  The murder weapon was never found.  Petitioner was not 
known to carry a knife, and no evidence was presented that he had ever used a 
knife in any sort of criminal endeavor.  
Although Harvey’s son told police he had heard both at school and from 
Steven Rice that petitioner was one of the killers, he disavowed those statements at 
the evidentiary hearing, explaining that Boyd had pressured him to say them.  
Because Boyd, whom he feared, was in custody at the time of trial, Harvey’s son 
would have testified and revealed the falsity of his accusations. 
Aside from Boyd’s now discredited evidence, the main evidence 
implicating petitioner in the murders came from Colette Mitchell, petitioner’s then 
girlfriend.  She testified she had passed out that fateful night and thus did not 
know if petitioner had left the apartment and later returned.  Her inability, 
however, to account for petitioner’s whereabouts during the hours of the 
murders—between sometime after 2:00 a.m., when she passed out, and 11:00 a.m., 
when she woke up and found petitioner sleeping in the apartment—is not the same 
as saying she saw petitioner leave the apartment during the night.  As far as 
 
 
63
Colette knew, petitioner was with her in the apartment the entire night.  The only 
evidence petitioner left the apartment that night came in the form of a statement 
Colette testified Reilly allegedly made to her.   
Colette testified and recounted some of petitioner’s and Reilly’s comments 
to her, revealing that petitioner made inconsistent statements about the crimes.  
Although his comments implicated him in the conspiracy, he never admitted to 
Colette that he was the actual murderer.  For example, Colette testified that after 
the murders, she and petitioner discussed his alibi “all the time,” but this may have 
been because he participated in the conspiracy, not the actual murders.  Colette 
also testified that prior to the crimes, petitioner led her to believe he was going to 
steal something from someone to enable an unnamed person to collect on some 
insurance policy.  But an anticipated theft is far different than the double murder 
that was planned by Clifford Morgan and Reilly and eventually committed by 
Reilly and his confederates. 
Regarding the actual murders, Colette testified petitioner told her at least 
twice that he had been to the victims’ home the night of the murders, but he also 
made comments suggesting he was not the actual killer.  Although Reilly admitted 
to knowing the identity of the killers, petitioner denied such knowledge and 
further denied he was the killer.  When she asked petitioner directly whether he 
was the killer, he also answered in the negative.  Despite his suspicious comments 
suggesting he knew many details surrounding the crimes, Colette conceded 
petitioner never actually admitted having killed or stabbed anyone.  In short, 
Colette’s account of petitioner’s alleged statements was contradictory and 
equivocal. 
Colette also reported that Reilly told her Boyd and Marcus were supposed 
to commit the crimes but had backed out because Reilly declined to go with them, 
thereby suggesting it was petitioner who substituted in.  This evidence could have 
 
 
64
been met with the testimony of James Moss, who could have testified that he 
heard Boyd angrily state that it was petitioner who had not shown up and that 
Boyd had to go in his place.   
Petitioner made many statements to Colette that suggested he participated 
in the conspiracy to kill the victims and collect the insurance, but in none of them 
did he admit that he actually stabbed the victims.  For example, Colette testified 
petitioner told her that Clifford Morgan was not worried about the trial delay 
because his insurance proceeds were earning interest.  This statement merely 
shows petitioner had knowledge of the crimes and may have been a conspirator.  
Similarly, his statement that Reilly was in charge, that he knew “for a fact” there 
was only one killer, and that wire cutters were used to enter the house clearly 
implicate him in the conspiracy but do not strongly support the prosecution’s 
theory that it was petitioner, and not some other actor such as Reilly or Boyd, who 
personally stabbed the victims.  Although Colette testified petitioner received 
$1,000, apparently for his role in the crimes, she admitted on cross-examination 
that she did not know where the money came from, could not remember who 
informed her of the money’s origin, could not remember the first time she saw the 
money, but remembered seeing it in her cedar box.  She could not even remember 
whether it was she herself who put the money in the box.  Moreover, this evidence 
also was equivocal:  Was it payment for petitioner’s part in the conspiracy or 
because he actually killed the victims?  
Colette also testified that petitioner asked her to help dispose of a pair of 
shoes and the stolen M-1 carbine rifle, but this evidence similarly was equivocal.  
Presumably petitioner sought the disposal of both items because they potentially 
incriminated him in the conspiracy (though in fact no footprints were found), but 
neither the shoes nor the rifle strongly demonstrate petitioner was the actual killer.   
 
 
65
In short, although Colette testified and recounted several statements 
petitioner had made that implicated him in the conspiracy to kill the victims for 
financial gain, petitioner’s comments do not strongly support the prosecutor’s 
theory that he was the actual killer.  The persuasive power of Colette’s testimony 
was further undermined by the fact she was subject to impeachment due to her 
drug and alcohol use and that she admitted lying for petitioner at his preliminary 
hearing. 
In a habeas corpus petition alleging trial counsel’s investigation or 
presentation of evidence was incompetent, “the petitioner must show us what the 
trial would have been like, had he been competently represented, so we can 
compare that with the trial that actually occurred and determine whether it is 
reasonably probable that the result would have been different.”  (In re Fields 
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1071.)  After weighing the available evidence, its strength 
and the strength of the evidence the prosecution presented at trial (In re Thomas, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1265), can we conclude petitioner has shown prejudice?  
That is, has he shown a probability of prejudice “sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome”?  (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694; In re Thomas, 
at p. 1256.)   
Were we considering a situation in which petitioner was convicted solely 
on the theory that he was the actual killer—the person who personally stabbed 
Nancy and Mitchell Morgan to death—we would conclude the amount and quality 
of reasonably available evidence showing Boyd was the killer, coupled with the 
general dearth of evidence indicating petitioner personally killed the victims, 
undermined confidence in the verdicts to such an extent as to require that we 
vacate the murder convictions.   
But although the prosecutor proceeded primarily on the theory that 
petitioner was the actual killer, he also presented to the jury two theories of 
 
 
66
derivative liability:  conspiracy, and aiding and abetting.  As we explain, both 
theories support the jury’s verdict of first degree murder. 
a.  Conspiracy 
One who conspires with others to commit a felony is guilty as a principal.  
(§ 31.)  “ ‘Each member of the conspiracy is liable for the acts of any of the others 
in carrying out the common purpose, i.e., all acts within the reasonable and 
probable consequences of the common unlawful design.’  (1 Witkin & Epstein, 
Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Elements, § 93, pp. 310-311; see also People v. 
Kauffman (1907) 152 Cal. 331, 334 [92 P. 861].)”  (People v. Flores (2005) 129 
Cal.App.4th 174, 182.)  Thus, if petitioner conspired with others to kill the victims 
for financial gain, he is as guilty of their murders as the person who actually 
stabbed them.  (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 188-189.) 
The amended information demonstrates that the prosecutor intended to rely 
on a conspiracy theory.  That document charged petitioner with conspiracy “to 
commit the crime of [m]urder for the purpose of collecting life insurance proceeds 
upon the life of Nancy Carol Morgan and Mitchell Raymond Morgan.”  Although 
many of the alleged overt acts involve Reilly and Clifford Morgan only, the list of 
24 overt acts also specifies that “Reilly and defendant Hardy met on May 20th at 
the Vose Street apartments in Van Nuys with Colette Mitchell to formulate their 
alibi.”  In addition, “[s]ometime between 12:30 AM and 7:30 AM on the 21st of 
May, defendants Reilly and Hardy left the Vos[e] Street apartments to commit the 
murders at [Morgan’s home].”  In addition, “Reilly, Hardy and Morgan, while in 
custody and during the preliminary hearing, attempted to fabricate an alibi,” 
including passing notes to each other in jail.  Further, the information alleged that 
“Reilly and defendant Hardy had over 60 contacts [with coconspirators] while 
awaiting and during the preliminary hearing,” and that petitioner asked his brother 
 
 
67
to dispose of an M-1 carbine rifle.  The jury was given a copy of the amended 
information listing the alleged overt acts.   
With regard to conspiracy liability, the jury was instructed:  “The persons 
concerned in the commission or attempted commission of a crime who are 
regarded by law as principals in the crime thus committed or attempted and 
equally guilty thereof include: 
“1.  Those who directly and actively commit or attempt to commit the act 
constituting the crime, or 
“2.  . . .  
“3.  Those who, whether present or not at the commission or attempted 
commission of the crime, advise and encourage in its commission or attempted 
commission.”  (Italics added.) 
Further instructions also make clear the prosecutor was relying on a 
conspiracy theory of liability.  With regard specifically to coconspirator liability 
for murder, the jury was instructed that if it had a reasonable doubt any of the 
charged defendants was present at the scene of the crime when the murders were 
committed, it should acquit him, with this caveat:  “However, if the evidence 
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant aided and abetted the 
commission of or was a coconspirator in the commission of the offenses charged 
in this case, the fact, if it is a fact, that he was not present at the time and place of 
the commission of the alleged offenses for which he is being tried is immaterial 
and does not, in and of itself, entitle him to an acquittal. 
“A conspiracy is an agreement entered into between two or more persons 
with the specific intent to agree to commit a public offense and with the further 
specific intent to commit such offense, followed by an overt act committed in this 
state by one or more of the parties for the purpose of accomplishing the object of 
the agreement. 
 
 
68
In order to find a defendant guilty of conspiracy, in addition to proof of the 
unlawful agreement and specific intent, there must be proof of the commission of 
at least one of the overt acts alleged in the information.  It is not necessary to the 
guilt of any particular defendant that he himself committed the overt act, if he was 
one of the conspirators when such an act was committed.”  (Italics added.)   
After defining the meaning of the phrase “overt act,” the instructions 
continued:  “The act of one conspirator pursuant to or in furtherance of the 
common design of the conspiracy is the act of all conspirators.  Every conspirator 
is legally responsible for an act of a coconspirator that follows as one of the 
probable and natural consequences of the object of the conspiracy even though it 
was not intended as a part of the original plan and even though he was not present 
at the time of the commission of such act.”  No doubt because Clifford Morgan 
and Reilly were the ones who originally hatched the plot to kill the victims for the 
insurance money, with petitioner joining the conspiracy later, the jury was also 
instructed:  “Every person who joins a criminal conspiracy after its formation and 
who adopts its purposes and objects, is liable for and bound by the acts and 
declarations of other members of the conspiracy done and made during the time 
that he is a member and in pursuance and furtherance of the conspiracy.  [¶] . . .  
[¶] Evidence of any acts or declarations of other conspirators prior to the time such 
person becomes a member of the conspiracy may be considered by you in 
determining the nature, objectives and purposes of the conspiracy, but for no other 
purpose.”  
The prosecutor raised the conspiracy theory of first degree murder in 
closing argument, stating that “based upon the facts of this case, . . . if one 
conspires to commit a murder for the purposes of collecting insurance, what is it 
other than premeditation and deliberation [justifying a verdict of first degree 
murder]?”  More pointedly, the prosecutor later argued:  “We submit to you that 
 
 
69
Mr. Hardy joined that conspiracy, and when he joins the conspiracy, he adopts 
those acts [committed by Reilly and Morgan].”  
The prosecution presented substantial evidence supporting its theory that 
petitioner participated in a conspiracy to kill Nancy and Mitchell Morgan for 
financial gain.  For example, it presented evidence that Clifford Morgan was the 
mastermind of the plot and stood financially to gain from some suspiciously 
lucrative life insurance policies; that he recruited Mark Reilly to play the principal 
role in carrying out the murder by offering to share the money and set him up as 
the manager in a bar; and that Reilly tried to convince several people to commit 
the murders, going so far as to pay someone (Marc Costello) in an aborted attempt 
to have the victims killed.  Strong evidence linked Reilly to the actual killings.  As 
we explained in our opinion on appeal:  “When Debbie [Sportsman] read about the 
murders in the newspaper the next day, she became hysterical and went to Reilly’s 
apartment.  She found him there with Hardy; Reilly was calm and both were 
laughing and drinking.  Reilly told her to behave normally so people would not 
suspect something was amiss.  Without revealing the identity of his crime partner, 
Reilly admitted to her that he had gone with another person to Morgan’s home, 
unlocked the front door, cut the security chain lock with bolt cutters, and entered 
the house, his partner apparently entering the bedroom.  Reilly said that when he 
heard Nancy Morgan pleading for her life, he went to wait outside.  His partner, 
the actual killer, eventually emerged and told him Nancy ‘just wouldn’t die.’  
Reilly told Debbie that ‘you just don’t know how it feels’ to stab someone.  He 
encouraged Debbie to speak to Hardy and another friend, Colette Mitchell, in 
order to coordinate their alibi stories.  He then gave her a few $100 bills that he 
had received from Morgan.”  (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 120-121.)  
In addition, Reilly could not explain how human blood came to be on his shoe.   
 
 
70
Although the evidence that petitioner committed the murders was much 
weaker, especially in light of the evidence at the reference hearing that Boyd was 
the actual killer, he was strongly linked to the conspiracy.  “According to Debbie 
Sportsman, Reilly began associating with Hardy around May 10, 1981.  She 
testified that the two men had many private conversations during this period and 
often drank and took drugs together.  On the evening of May 20, 1981, the night of 
the killings, Debbie met with Hardy and Reilly at the latter’s apartment.  Reilly 
spoke with Morgan on the telephone and asked him if he wanted to go through 
with the killing.  Morgan, who was in Carson City, answered that he did.”  (People 
v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 120.)  Petitioner thereafter discussed his alibi with 
Colette Mitchell “all the time,” and he coordinated his alibi with Reilly as well.  
According to Colette, petitioner knew several details about the crimes, including 
that the assailants had used a tool to cut the chain lock, that life insurance proceeds 
were the reason for the killing, that the money was collecting interest, and that 
Reilly was in charge.  Most incriminating was petitioner’s receipt of $1,000 in 
$100 bills after the murders, his instruction to Colette to dispose of his shoes on 
learning that police might have discovered some footprints at the crime scene, and 
his direction to dispose of the M-1 carbine rifle allegedly stolen from the Morgan 
home.  Even discounting petitioner’s inconsistent statements to Colette about 
whether he had participated in the actual killing, there is ample evidence showing 
he participated in the plan to kill the victims as part of a wider conspiracy to 
defraud the insurance companies.   
The jury relied, at least in part, on a conspiracy theory to convict petitioner, 
for it separately convicted him of conspiracy to commit murder for purposes of 
insurance fraud in violation of section 182.  We thus conclude substantial evidence 
supports the theory that petitioner was guilty of first degree murder on a 
conspiracy theory. 
 
 
71
b.  Aiding and Abetting 
The prosecutor also relied on an aiding and abetting theory of liability for 
first degree murder, which provides an alternative reason for concluding petitioner 
was not prejudiced at the guilt phase by Demby’s deficient investigation.  Thus, 
with regards to aiding and abetting liability, the jury was instructed:  “The persons 
concerned in the commission or attempted commission of a crime who are 
regarded by law as principals in the crime thus committed or attempted and 
equally guilty thereof include: 
“1.  Those who directly and actively commit or attempt to commit the act 
constituting the crime, or 
“2.  Those who, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the person who 
directly and actively commits or attempts to commit the crime, aid and abet in its 
commission or attempted commission . . . .” 
In addition, the jury was instructed:  “One who aids and abets is not only 
guilty of the particular crime that to his knowledge his confederates are 
contemplating, but he is also liable for the natural and reasonable or probable 
consequences of any act that he knowingly aided or encouraged. 
“A person aids and abets the commission of a crime if, with knowledge of 
the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator or the crime, he aids, promotes, 
encourages or instigates by act or advice the commission of such crime.  Mere 
presence at the scene of a crime and failure to take steps to prevent a crime do not 
in themselves establish aiding and abetting.” 
The prosecutor argued this theory of liability to the jury, informing it that 
“[i]f you find that this is a first degree murder and if you find that each one of 
these individuals participated in that, either by aiding, abetting, by personally 
becoming involved, by encouraging, by soliciting, by aiding and abetting, each 
one of them individually [is guilty of first degree murder].”  And later, the 
 
 
72
prosecutor argued that although petitioner was not charged personally with 
solicitation to commit murder because he was the one solicited by Reilly, 
petitioner nevertheless “could be an aider and abettor.”  
For much the same reasons we found substantial evidence supported a 
conspiracy theory of liability for first degree murder, we also find substantial 
evidence supports an aiding and abetting theory of liability.  To recap:  
Overwhelming evidence tied Reilly to the conspiracy and the murders, he told 
people he solicited petitioner to participate, petitioner was often in Reilly’s 
company in the days before and after the murders, petitioner was in the apartment 
when Reilly received the final approval from Morgan to proceed with the murders, 
petitioner discussed his alibi frequently in the days following the murders, he 
knew many details about the crimes, and he instructed Colette Mitchell to help 
dispose of a potentially incriminating M-1 carbine rifle and a pair of shoes. 
We thus conclude substantial evidence supports the theory that petitioner 
was guilty of first degree murder as an aider and abettor.   
c.  Conclusion 
After weighing this evidence and considering what petitioner’s trial would 
have looked like had he been represented by competent counsel (In re Fields, 
supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1071), we conclude that although there is a reasonable 
probability the jury would not have convicted petitioner on the prosecution’s 
proffered theory that he was the actual killer, ample evidence remains that 
petitioner was guilty of the murders on the alternative theories that he conspired 
with, and aided and abetted, Reilly, Morgan and others to commit the murders.  
As, according to their joint plan, Reilly, Boyd or possibly some third party killed 
the victims in furtherance of their conspiracy to fraudulently obtain insurance 
proceeds, petitioner, as a coconspirator and aider and abettor, is as guilty of the 
 
 
73
murders as if he stabbed the victims himself.  Because petitioner would have been 
convicted of two first degree murders on these two theories of derivative liability 
irrespective of Demby’s unreasonable failure to investigate and present evidence 
of the Boyd connection, petitioner fails to demonstrate he would have achieved a 
more favorable outcome at the guilt phase had Demby competently investigated 
the Boyd connection.  Accordingly, we conclude petitioner fails to demonstrate 
prejudice at the guilt phase flowing from Demby’s deficient representation.  
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687-688.) 
3.  Prejudice at the Penalty Phase 
Our conclusion that petitioner was not prejudiced at the guilt phase by trial 
counsel’s failure to investigate and present available evidence of Boyd’s 
involvement in the murders does not end our inquiry; we must still determine 
whether Demby’s failings prejudiced petitioner at the penalty phase.  As we are 
now concerned exclusively with the penalty phase, we must address a threshold 
question raised by respondent:  Would evidence suggesting Boyd was guilty of 
murdering Nancy and Mitchell Morgan have been admissible at the penalty phase 
of petitioner’s trial? 
a.  Admissibility of Boyd’s Guilt at the Penalty Phase 
We have previously explained why evidence of Boyd’s possible guilt of the 
murders did not fall outside the scope of our reference order in Hardy I.  (See ante, 
at pt. IV.A.2.)  In a related argument, respondent contends such evidence should 
not have been admitted at the hearing (or considered by the referee) because 
evidence of Boyd’s possible guilt of the murders (not having been admitted at the 
guilt phase) would have been inadmissible at the penalty phase of petitioner’s trial, 
and Demby’s failure to offer it therefore could not have been deficient 
performance.  Respondent raised this objection at the reference hearing, thus 
 
 
74
preserving it for our review.  He also now takes exception to many of the referee’s 
factual findings on this ground. 
We overrule respondent’s exception because the referee correctly 
concluded petitioner’s evidence of Boyd’s culpability would have been admissible 
at the penalty phase.  Evidence that Boyd was the actual killer—and that petitioner 
was not present during the commission of the murders—would have been 
admissible under factors (a), (j) and (k) of section 190.3 to show the circumstances 
of the crimes and allow the jury to consider whether petitioner’s participation in 
the offenses, which rendered him legally culpable for the murders, also justified 
imposition of the harshest penalty.  Because we find the evidence was admissible 
on these grounds, we express no opinion on respondent’s assertion that the 
evidence was inadmissible under In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 814.17 
                                              
17  
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Oregon v. Guzek 
(2006) 546 U.S. 517 does not alter our conclusion.  In Guzek, a capital defendant 
sought to introduce new evidence showing he was not present at the time of the 
murder.  The Oregon Supreme Court held the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution did not create a constitutional right enabling the defendant to 
introduce this evidence at his sentencing proceeding.  The high court affirmed, 
explaining:  “the federal question before us is a narrow one.  Do the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments grant Guzek a constitutional right to present evidence of 
the kind he seeks to introduce, namely new evidence that shows he was not present 
at the scene of the crime.  That evidence is inconsistent with Guzek’s prior 
conviction.  It sheds no light on the manner in which he committed the crime for 
which he has been convicted. . . .  We can find nothing in the Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendments that provides a capital defendant a right to introduce new evidence 
of this kind at sentencing.”  (Guzek, at p. 523.)  “[S]entencing traditionally 
concerns how, not whether, a defendant committed the crime.  [Citation.]  But the 
evidence at issue here—alibi evidence—concerns only whether, not how, he did 
so.”  (Id. at p. 526.) 
Even assuming without deciding that Guzek is retroactive to this case, the 
evidence of lingering doubt petitioner argues Demby should have presented is 
distinguishable from the evidence sought to be admitted in Guzek.  Unlike in 
Guzek, petitioner’s evidence that Boyd was the actual murderer and petitioner 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
75
Having rejected respondent’s argument that the referee erred in admitting 
evidence of Boyd’s possible guilt of the murders at the hearing, we turn, finally, to 
the question whether Demby’s deficient performance regarding the investigation 
and presentation of evidence of the Boyd connection prejudiced petitioner at the 
penalty phase. 
b.  Prejudice Analysis 
We have determined Demby acted unreasonably in failing to investigate, 
discover and present evidence of Boyd’s possible culpability in the murders.  We 
have also determined that this evidence was reasonably available to Demby and 
that it would have been admissible at the penalty phase of petitioner’s trial.  The 
final piece to the puzzle is one of prejudice.  In order for petitioner to obtain relief 
on the theory of ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the penalty phase, he must 
establish that he suffered prejudice as a result of Demby’s failures.  “Prejudice is 
established when ‘ “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors [of 
counsel], the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”  [Citations.]  As in the guilt 
phase, reasonable probability is defined as one that undermines confidence in the 
verdict.’  ([In re] Marquez, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 606.)”  (In re Gay, supra, 19 
Cal.4th at p. 790.)18  “In assessing prejudice [at the penalty phase], we reweigh the 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
merely a coconspirator, is relevant to how, and not whether, petitioner is guilty.  
Evidence of the Boyd connection also “sheds . . .  light on the manner in which he 
committed the crime for which he has been convicted.”  (Oregon v. Guzek, supra, 
546 U.S. at p. 523.)  
18  
“Alternatively, the petitioner may establish that as a result of counsel’s 
inadequacy, the prosecution case was not subject to meaningful adversarial testing, 
thereby raising a presumption that the result is unreliable.  (United States v. Cronic 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
76
evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence.”  
(Wiggins v. Smith, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 534.)  As we explain, after engaging in 
reweighing the evidence, we conclude there is a reasonable probability the jury, 
had it heard the evidence indicating Boyd and not petitioner was most likely the 
person who actually killed the victims, would have voted for a life sentence 
instead of the penalty of death.   
The aggravating evidence against petitioner consisted of the circumstances 
of the offense, as presented in the guilt phase, and as augmented by three 
photographs of the victims that were not admitted at the guilt phase.  In addition, 
the prosecution presented evidence of a prior incident involving petitioner that 
required law enforcement intervention:  “On August 6, 1980, Officers Hansen and 
Wicks responded to a report of a domestic disturbance. They found Hardy 
assuming a military marching pose holding a rifle.  He appeared unaware of his 
surroundings.  Although he complied with Hansen’s request to put the rifle down, 
Hardy refused to move away from it.  At Hansen’s request, Hardy also removed 
two knives from his waistband and placed them next to the rifle. Hardy then 
produced a nunchaku[] and assumed a fighting stance.  Although Officer Hansen 
directed Hardy to place the nunchaku on the ground, Hardy remained in a fighting 
stance for five or ten minutes.  He eventually agreed to put down his nunchaku if 
Officer Wicks put down his service revolver.  When Wicks complied, Hardy 
surrendered peacefully and explained he had just been in a family quarrel.  The 
rifle was not loaded.  Hardy later pleaded guilty to misdemeanor possession of 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
(1984) 466 U.S. 648, 658-659.)”  (In re Gay, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 790.)  No 
issue of error under Cronic is presented. 
 
 
77
nunchakus and disturbing the peace; he was placed on probation.”  (People v. 
Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 126-127.) 
Petitioner’s mother testified to another incident, explaining she once called 
the police after petitioner “punched his brother John and pulled a gold chain off 
John’s neck.”  (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 127.)  When petitioner 
realized his mother had called the police, “he kicked down her door.”  (Ibid.)  His 
mother told police she was concerned petitioner had taken some PCP.   
Petitioner’s showing in mitigation was meager.  Carolyn Hardy, petitioner’s 
mother, testified that “the nunchaku [petitioner] brandished belonged to his other 
brother, Robert.  She explained that Robert had told his family he intended to 
commit suicide but [petitioner] did not believe him.  When Robert carried out his 
threat, [petitioner] blamed himself for Robert’s death.  The day after Robert’s 
death, [petitioner] threw himself off a mountain, broke both his legs, and was 
bedridden for six months.  Carolyn Hardy believed [petitioner] needed psychiatric 
help.”  (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 127.)  In addition, “Carolyn Hardy 
testified [petitioner] had participated in a program called Outward Bound, which 
involved camping and hiking in Colorado.  He was chosen for the program 
because of his high scholastic potential.  [Petitioner] presented no other 
affirmative mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.”  (Ibid.) 
The prosecution’s theory of the case was that petitioner was the actual 
perpetrator of the murders.  The prosecutor argued Reilly did not stab the victims 
himself, that he went to the Morgans’ home, but “became horrified” and left, 
waiting outside while the victims were killed by a confederate.  By contrast, the 
prosecutor argued that petitioner personally stabbed both Nancy and Mitchell 
Morgan and then walked out of the house and calmly described the scene to 
Reilly.  
 
 
78
Demby’s strategy at the penalty phase was to attempt to convince the jury 
that a lingering doubt existed as to petitioner’s guilt.  Indeed, the referee found 
“Demby’s sole penalty phase defense was lingering doubt.”  Thus, Demby argued:  
“I have to respect [the jury’s guilt judgment] even though personally I don’t agree 
with it.  I have doubts.  [¶] The things that are bothering me, I am not certain if 
[petitioner] participated, if he did participate, what his participation was.”  Demby 
noted that when Reilly was arrested, Sportsman asked him about the night in 
question, whether Reilly had left the apartment and whether petitioner had taken 
part in the murder.  As Demby recounted it, Reilly told Sportsman:  “Well, 
[petitioner] didn’t know I left.  He was too loaded.”   
Demby continued:  “I guess that bothers me because I can’t, because of that 
statement and others, I can’t be certain that [petitioner] is the killer.  [¶] I keep 
going back to the testimony and demeanor of Calvin Boyd because I honestly 
believe Calvin Boyd participated and that thought causes problems because what 
you are being asked to do is decide the fate of [petitioner], should he live or should 
he die.  Die in the gas chamber or should he spend the rest of his life in prison.”  
“I am not talking about [being] certain beyond a reasonable doubt, but absolutely 
certain what [petitioner’s] participation was.”  
The jury was instructed and then retired to deliberate at 11:25 a.m. on 
September 22, 1983, being excused at 3:45 p.m. later that day.  Deliberations 
continued all day on September 23, 1983, and resumed at 9:10 a.m. on Monday, 
September 26, 1983.  The jury announced it had reached a verdict at 10:12 a.m. 
that same day.  It thus appears the jury deliberated less than two days to decide 
both Reilly and petitioner deserved the death penalty. 
Petitioner has discovered considerable mitigating evidence that was not 
presented at his penalty phase, and this evidence forms the basis of his petition in 
Hardy I.  But without considering this mitigating evidence, we conclude that, had 
 
 
79
the jury been aware that petitioner was likely not the actual killer, but merely 
participated in the conspiracy to kill for insurance proceeds, there is a reasonable 
probability the jury would have viewed the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances differently and concluded petitioner did not deserve the death 
penalty.  (In re Gay, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 790.)  He was young and had but a 
minor criminal record.  He had experienced substantial emotional problems after 
his brother committed suicide and may have blamed himself for failing to take his 
brother’s warnings seriously.  He descended into despair and drug abuse, and 
conspired with Reilly, Morgan and others to kill the victims for money.  This 
much the jury knew. 
But the jury operated under the understanding, fostered by the prosecutor’s 
closing argument, that petitioner personally stabbed the victims.  If that were true, 
petitioner’s moral responsibility for the crimes would be at the zenith, with no 
coconspirator having greater culpability.  That he killed more than one victim, that 
he killed a child, that he did so in such a brutal and horrific manner, that he did so 
simply for money and according to a preconceived plan, all these factors 
substantially aggravated the case and amply justified the jury’s verdict that he 
should suffer the death penalty for his crimes.  But if he did not kill anyone, if he 
merely conspired with Reilly and Morgan and Boyd, if he did not show up at the 
appointed hour, if he was lying passed out from drink and drugs that fateful night 
instead of stabbing a defenseless woman and child in the dark of night, the nature 
of his moral culpability is quite different.  More to the point, the jury’s weighing 
of the relative aggravating and mitigating factors would have been entirely 
different.  Under the circumstances, Demby’s unreasonable failure to discover and 
present evidence of Boyd’s involvement so undermines our confidence in the 
penalty verdict (In re Gay, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 790; In re Marquez, supra, 
1 Cal.4th at p. 606) that we conclude, after weighing the totality of the evidence 
 
 
80
(Wiggins v. Smith, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 534), that we must vacate the penalty 
judgment.19   
V.  CONCLUSION 
In light of the above discussion, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
Hardy II, S093694, is granted in part and denied in part, as explained below:   
(1)  Petitioner fails to demonstrate he is actually innocent of the crimes of 
which he was convicted.  To the extent the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
Hardy II is based on that allegation, it is denied.  To the extent the order to show 
cause in Hardy II was based on a claim of actual innocence, it is discharged.   
(2)  Although petitioner has proven, and respondent concedes the truth of, 
his allegations that his trial counsel unreasonably failed to investigate, discover 
and present available evidence of Calvin Boyd’s culpability for the murders of 
                                              
19  
Because we conclude there was substantial evidence to support aiding and 
abetting as an alternative theory of petitioner’s liability for the murders, we also 
reject petitioner’s argument, raised at oral argument, that the special circumstance 
allegations cannot attach to a murder that a person did not personally commit.  At 
the time of the crimes (1981), section 190.2, subdivision (b) provided:  “Every 
person whether or not the actual killer found guilty of intentionally aiding, 
abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, soliciting, requesting, or assisting 
any actor in the commission of murder in the first degree shall suffer death or 
confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole, in 
any case in which one or more of the special circumstances enumerated [in 
certain] paragraphs . . . of subdivision (a) of this section has been charged and 
specially found under Section 190.4 to be true.”  (§ 190.2 , former subd. (b), as 
added by initiative, Prop. 7, § 6, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978), 
italics added.)  Petitioner’s jury was instructed with the then current version of 
CALJIC No. 8.84 (1981 rev.) (4th ed. 1979), which tracked the language of this 
statute. 
 
Accordingly, even if petitioner was not the actual killer and is guilty of first 
degree murder only as an aider and abettor, he may still, on remand, be sentenced 
to life without the possibility of parole or death following a new penalty phase 
trial.  The same conclusion follows were he guilty of first degree murder on a 
conspiracy theory.  (People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 866.) 
 
 
81
Nancy and Mitchell Morgan, this failure does not require vacation of his two 
convictions for first degree murder with special circumstances because this new 
evidence does not undermine our confidence that the jury would nevertheless have 
convicted him of murder by relying on a conspiracy theory, there being ample 
evidence petitioner was a coconspirator in the scheme to kill the victims in order 
to share in the anticipated insurance payout.  To the extent the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in Hardy II is based on that allegation, it is denied.  To the extent 
the order to show cause in Hardy II was based on a claim that counsel’s 
ineffectiveness requires we vacate the guilt judgment, it is discharged.  
(3)  Because the jury returned a verdict of death after a penalty trial in 
which the prosecution argued that petitioner was the actual killer, and because 
substantial doubt now exists that this was so, this new evidence casting doubt that 
petitioner was the killer so undermines our confidence in the penalty verdict (In re 
Gay, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 790; In re Marquez, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 606) that 
we conclude, after reweighing the totality of the evidence (Wiggins v. Smith, 
supra, 539 U.S. at p. 534), that a different, more favorable result was reasonably 
probable had this evidence been presented to the jury.  Accordingly, we grant the 
petition in Hardy II to that extent and vacate the judgment insofar as the penalty of 
death was imposed.  
(4)  The balance of the petition in Hardy II, which raises a number of other 
issues, is denied as having failed to raise a prima facie case for relief.   
(5)  Having granted petitioner relief from the penalty judgment in Hardy II, 
we need not resolve his various other challenges to the penalty judgment in 
Hardy I, S022153.  Accordingly, the order to show cause is discharged, and the 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Hardy I, to the extent it was based on the 
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present 
 
 
82
reasonably available mitigating evidence, is dismissed as moot.  We express no 
opinion as to whether trial counsel was ineffective on that ground. 
(6)  The balance of the petition in Hardy I, which raises a number of other 
issues, is denied as having failed to raise a prima facie case for relief.   
Petitioner is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of the County of Los 
Angeles (see § 1493) to be held pending retrial of the penalty phase.  Respondent 
shall cause notice of the writ to be served on the District Attorney of the County of 
Los Angeles upon the finality of this opinion.  (See § 1382, subd. (a)(2).)  Should 
petitioner not be granted a new penalty trial within the time specified in section 
1382 or any continuances granted by the superior court, the court shall impose the 
penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Hardy on Habeas Corpus 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S093694 & S022153 
Date Filed: July 26, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Fern M. Laethem, Lynne S. Coffin and Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defenders, and Philip M. Brooks, 
Robin Kallman and Peter Silten, Deputy State Public Defenders, for Petitioner James Edward Hardy. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Daniel E. Lungren, Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, George Williamson, David 
P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, and 
Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorneys General, Keith H. Borjon, Susan Lee Frierson, William T. 
Harter, Robert S. Henry, Robert F. Katz, Sharlene A. Honnaka and Roy C. Preminger, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Respondent State of California. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Peter Silten 
Deputy State Public Defender 
221 Main Street, 10th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Roy C. Preminger 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2263