Case Title: Tribbett v. State

Citation: 394 So. 2d 878

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1981-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
394 So. 2d 878 (1981) Josephous TRIBBETT v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 52365. Supreme Court of Mississippi. February 18, 1981. Rehearing Denied March 18, 1981. *879 Delos H. Burks and Nova Carroll, Stewart, Burks & Pace, Picayune, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Wayne Snuggs, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before SMITH, LEE and BOWLING, JJ. LEE, Justice, for the Court: Josephous Tribbett was indicted, tried and convicted in the Circuit Court of Pearl River County, Honorable R.I. Prichard, III, presiding, for the sale of less than one (1) kilogram of marijuana, and was sentenced to a term of ten (10) years with the Mississippi Department of Corrections. He has appealed and assigns five (5) errors in the trial below. On May 22, 1978, Tim Wilkinson, agent for the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics, and Thomas K. Phillips, a confidential informant, went to Bill's Quick Stop in Picayune, arriving there about 4:30 p.m. Phillips made a telephone call to appellant, who drove to the Quick Stop about twenty (20) minutes later. According to Wilkinson, he and Phillips got out of Wilkinson's car, walked over to appellant's automobile, and had a short conversation, after which Wilkinson asked appellant if he had the marijuana. Appellant answered affirmatively that he had nine (9) bags, reached behind the driver's seat in his car and removed a large paper bag containing marijuana, and placed it on the driver's seat. Wilkinson took it to his own vehicle, opened it, observed several bags of a substance which was later identified to be marijuana, and asked the appellant the price of the marijuana. Appellant replied that it was ninety dollars ($90.00). Wilkinson gave him the money and drove away. Wilkinson radioed another narcotics agent who was in an adjacent parking lot and who had observed the exchange from a parked car thirty (30) to forty (40) feet away, and the two agents proceeded to Gulfport. Appellant was arrested approximately five (5) months later at NASA, his place of employment, and was charged with the sale of a controlled substance. Except for character witnesses, appellant was the only witness to testify in his behalf. He stated that Phillips was a co-employee with him at NASA and that, beginning in March, 1978, and continuing until the May 22, 1978 incident, Phillips had constantly badgered and begged him for drugs; that Phillips requested him ten or twelve times over a three-month period to supply him with drugs. Appellant said that he finally told Phillips that he would get some marijuana, if Phillips would stop worrying him about it. On May 22, 1978, according to appellant, he purchased some marijuana from a man named "Blue" in downtown Picayune, and took the marijuana to Phillips at Bill's Quick Stop. When he arrived at the Quick Stop, Phillips was sitting in a car under the driver's wheel and the passenger seat was occupied by another man. Both men got out of the car but it was Phillips who handed him the money for the drugs. Appellant said that he did not make any money off the drugs and gave the $90.00 to the man called "Blue." He stated that no threats had been made against him by Phillips or any other person, that he knew the sale of marijuana was illegal and that he was aware he was breaking the law at the time of the transaction. The confidential informant, Thomas K. Phillips, did not testify. Did the lower court err in overruling appellant's motion for a continuance on account of the absence of Thomas K. Phillips? *880 This case was originally set for trial during the April 1979 Term of court. However, on motion of appellant, he was granted a continuance until the November 1979 Term when the case was set for trial at 9:00 a.m. on April 1, 1980. About 9:30 a.m. on the day of trial, appellant filed another motion for continuance due to the absence of Thomas K. Phillips, the confidential informant, who had been subpoenaed as a witness by the defense on August 22, 1979. Phillips was served and did not appear, but no attachment for him was requested. The motion was overruled by the court. Appellant argues that the denial of his motion for a continuance was reversible error because he was denied an opportunity to confront and cross-examine his original accuser. However, we are of the opinion that such argument is misplaced. Phillips was a confidential informant, not an accuser, and appellant had no right to call him as an adverse witness and to cross-examine him. If the State had attempted to show something that Phillips said or did, the appellant then would have the right to be confronted with the witness and to cross-examine him. Thus, the reason for the hearsay evidence rule. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-15-29 (1972) is the statute governing continuances: The law with reference to continuances, considering that statute, was enunciated in the old case of Lamar v. State, 63 Miss. 265 (1885), where the Court said: See also Fermo v. State, 370 So. 2d 930 (Miss. 1979); McLendon v. State, 335 So. 2d 887 (Miss. 1976); and Ladnier v. State, 273 So. 2d 169 (Miss. 1973). Appellant contends he did everything possible to obtain the presence of the witness. However, he was granted continuances from two (2) terms, and it is assumed that, if the witness did not answer "Present" when the witnesses were called, appellant should have taken proper action to obtain his presence. The simple procedure after a person has been served with process is to ask for an attachment against the witness. Suffice it to say, the procedure set out and approved in Lamar v. State, supra, was not followed and the lower court correctly overruled a motion for new trial. The lower court's action is particularly correct in light of the discussion of the other assignments of error hereinafter. The next four assignments of error relate to the defense of entrapment and (1) whether or not the lower court erred in denying appellant jury instructions on entrapment, and in declining to submit that issue to the jury; (2) whether or not the court erred in overruling appellant's motion to quash the indictment or suppress the evidence by reason of the entrapment; (3) whether or not the jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence and the jury was improperly instructed by the court's allowing the State an instruction denying the defense of entrapment; and (4) whether or not the trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a directed verdict when the unrebutted testimony established a prima facie case of entrapment. In Boone v. State, 291 So. 2d 182 (Miss. 1974), the Court said: Jones v. State, 285 So. 2d 152 (Miss. 1973) answers the argument of appellant to the effect that he was entrapped because of the efforts of Phillips to get him to sell marijuana. There, the Court said: In Jones v. State, supra, citing McLemore v. State, 241 Miss. 664, 675, 125 So. 2d 86, 91 (1960), the Court defined "entrapment" and said: In Alston v. State, 258 So. 2d 436 (Miss. 1972), the Court said: Apparently, appellant takes the position that an officer or confidential informant who induces an accused to sell marijuana is guilty of entrapment. There is no evidence in this record to support a prima facie case of entrapment and the lower court did not err in declining to submit that issue to the jury and did not err in overruling appellant's motion to quash the indictment and suppress the evidence because of entrapment. Even though the lower court should not have given a peremptory instruction for the State to the effect that there was not sufficient evidence to show entrapment and that the jury was not to consider the issue of entrapment, granting the instruction was not reversible error, considering all the evidence. Suffice it to say, the evidence supported the jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The usual entrapment case which arises under Mississippi law involves a confidential informant or police officer who originates the sale of contraband by supplying it to the accused, who then, acting in complicity with the confidential informant or police officer, sells or disposes of it to another officer or person who initiates the prosecution. There being no reversible error in the record, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., concur.