Case Title: Shaheen v. County of Mathews

Citation: 

Docket Number: 021350

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
FREDERICK J. SHAHEEN, ET AL. 
v.  Record No. 021350  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  April 17, 2003 
COUNTY OF MATHEWS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MATHEWS COUNTY 
William H. Shaw, III, Judge 
 
Frederick J. Shaheen and Susan L. Shaheen challenge 
the circuit court’s judgment permitting the County of 
Mathews and the Board of Supervisors of Mathews County to 
withdraw admissions under Rule 4:11(b) and affirming an 
easement in a landing and road for the benefit of the 
public.  Because the admissions effectively eliminated 
presentation of the case on its merits and the Shaheens did 
not show that they would be prejudiced in maintaining their 
defense on the merits, we will affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment on that issue.  We will also affirm the court’s 
judgment regarding the easement because the Shaheens were 
not innocent purchasers without constructive notice in 
their chain of title regarding the public landing and road, 
and because they implicitly agreed to a 1959 description of 
the landing. 
I. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
The Shaheens own a 4.52-acre parcel of real estate 
located in Mathews County.  The parcel is part of a larger 
tract of land formerly known as “Auburn.”  A plat of a 
survey of the Shaheens’ property, which was referred to in 
their December 21, 1994 deed and recorded in the land 
records of Mathews County, delineated an area identified as 
the “Auburn Public Landing” situated on the North River and 
a road, 40 feet in width, extending from the landing along 
the eastern edge of the Shaheens’ property.  Both the 
landing and the road are situated within the boundaries of 
the Shaheens’ parcel.  The plat also contained a reference 
to the Mathews County Board of Supervisors Minute Book 
(Supervisors Minute Book) 4, at page 370 (where the Board 
had directed that a March 14, 1959 plat of the landing and 
road be recorded in the County’s land records), and Plat 
Book 5, at page 8 (where the 1959 plat was recorded). 
 
After purchasing their property, the Shaheens placed 
barriers and no trespassing signs on the road leading to 
the landing, thereby blocking access to both the road and 
the landing.  As a result of the Shaheens’ actions, the 
County and its Board of Supervisors (collectively, “the 
County”) filed a bill of complaint against the Shaheens.  
The County asked the circuit court to “affirm” its fee 
simple ownership of the landing and road or, alternatively, 
 
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to “affirm” the existence of an easement for public use of 
the landing and road.  The County also asked the court to 
“affirm” the dimensions of the road and landing and to 
enjoin the Shaheens from interfering with the public’s use 
of those areas. 
The County’s alleged ownership of the “Auburn Public 
Landing” and the road, formerly referred to as the “Wharf 
Road,” was based on a petition filed in 1896 by Thomas F. 
Nelson and others in the County Court of Mathews County 
(the Nelson suit).  One of the petitioners was Morgan J. 
Evans, who, along with trustees for his wife, owned the 
tract of land known as “Auburn.”  The petitioners asked the 
court to open a public landing and road 
commencing in front of the residence of J.W. 
Down, which is situated on the public road 
leading from Mathews Court House to Gloucester 
Court House; and running in a southwesterly 
direction to a point on North [R]iver at the 
intersection of the boundary line between the 
lands of Mr. Morgan J. Evans and Dr. H.W.M. 
Washington, better known as Auburn and Green 
[P]lains farms:  The said road [and] landing on 
Auburn farm[.] 
 
 
Based on reports filed by “viewers” and 
“commissioners” appointed in that proceeding, the court 
“establish[ed] the road and landing as in the petition 
prayed and as set forth in the diagram filed with the 
report.”  “[I]t further appearing that all the land owners 
 
3
will give to the county the proposed road save and except H 
W M Washington [and] wife and that Morgan J Evans will give 
a landing on North River of one half acre without 
compensation[,]” the court ordered the county surveyor to 
lay off a road “over the lands of Morgan J. Evans to North 
River . . . 33 feet wide, and lay off the landing of [o]ne 
half acre at the terminus of said road on North River in 
such place as the said Morgan J Evans may direct.”  On 
December 15, 1897, H. C. Jones, a county commissioner, 
informed the court that he had “been over the road leading 
. . . to North River[.]”  He reported that the road was “33 
ft. wide from where it begins at Auburn farm[,]” and the 
landing was “51 X 138 ft. including the width of [the] 
road[.]” 
 
The orders entered by the court in the Nelson suit 
were recorded in the Minute Books of the County Court of 
Mathews County (County Court Minute Books).  The indices 
found in the front of those individual books contained 
entries from T. F. Nelson to the County and from the County 
to Nelson.  The orders were not indexed in the name of the 
landowner, Morgan J. Evans.  The diagram referred to by the 
court when it established the road and landing was filed 
with the papers in the Nelson suit, but it was not recorded 
in the County Court Minute Books or in a plat book.  The 
 
4
diagram showed only the road and did not depict the 
landing. 
 
In 1955, the Board of Supervisors of Mathews County 
requested an attorney, Alfred L. Marchant, to review the 
records regarding the Auburn road and landing.  Marchant 
reported that, although a public road and landing had been 
established in 1896 or 1897 as a result of the Nelson suit 
and although both could be readily observed, 
the exact boundaries of [the landing] appear 
impossible of determination from the records, as 
no survey of the same can be located, and if it 
is the desire of the Board to have this area 
definitely established it will appear necessary 
to do so by mutual agreement between the Board 
and the present owners of the Auburn property, 
and if this is done it is suggested that a survey 
of the same be made[.] 
 
 
The next year, William C. Coulbourn, the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney, filed with the Board a “Plat of 
Survey of the Auburn Public Landing . . . and the road to 
it from the present hard surfaced road.”  Jefferson K. 
Sinclair prepared that plat, which was dated July 29, 1956.  
According to its minutes, the Board suggested “that if a 
slight change can be made in the western boundary of the 
landing near a small house on the ‘Auburn’ property, the 
boundary lines as established by the said survey will be 
 
5
accepted by all parties.”  Sinclair then prepared a revised 
plat dated March 14, 1959.1
 
When that plat was filed with the Board at its April 
29, 1959 meeting, the Board stated in its minutes that the 
revised plat of survey “gives the correct and definite 
boundaries of said public landing area,” and ordered that 
“it be approved as showing the exact boundaries of said 
public landing area and the public road leading thereto.”  
The revised plat was recorded in the land records of 
Mathews County in Plat Book 5, at page 8.  It is the plat 
referenced on the Shaheens’ plat of their property.  
Despite attempts by the County to obtain the owner’s 
consent, the owner of Auburn at that time did not sign 
Sinclair’s 1959 plat or otherwise indicate consent to or 
agreement with the boundaries of the public landing as 
shown on that plat.  However, in a letter to Sinclair 
                     
1 At trial, Charles J. Kerns testified that he assisted 
Sinclair in performing the 1956 survey.  Kerns stated that 
the low water mark appearing on the revised plat was the 
same as that used on the 1956 plat.  He also testified 
that, during the 1956 survey, no attempt was made to 
determine the 1896 low water mark.  Kerns admitted that, 
although it was possible to determine how much erosion had 
occurred in the landing area since 1896, that determination 
was not made during the survey.  He agreed that it would be 
difficult for a surveyor to take the orders in the Nelson 
suit and draw a description of the landing without making 
some assumptions, in part, because the landing’s dimensions 
specified in those orders did not equate to one-half acre. 
 
 
6
requesting that he resurvey the landing and prepare a 
revised plat, Coulbourn advised that he had been informed 
that the owner of Auburn had consented to a change “in the 
fence line separating the public landing from the Auburn 
property.” 
At trial, the Shaheens presented testimony from two 
title examiners who stated that they were unable to find 
any instrument in the Shaheens’ chain of title that vested 
in the County either title or an easement in the Auburn 
landing and road, or that indicated the source of the 
County’s claimed ownership.  Both title examiners reached 
their respective conclusions despite the language found in 
a 1901 deed from Morgan J. Evans and others to Charles 
Heath.2  The derivative clause of that deed “except[ed] that 
portion of Auburn Farm now used as a public road and 
leading down to what is called and known as Auburn Wharf 
located upon the Auburn property.”  Similarly, a 1898 lease 
from Evans and others described the leased premises as “one 
half of an acre of land . . . at the foot of the public 
road running through the lands of [Morgan Evans] and 
adjoining the public landing on North River.” 
                     
2 The grantors in that deed also included Evans’ wife 
and three individuals who were trustees for the benefit of 
Evans’ wife. 
 
 
7
Michael Malone, who was hired by the Shaheens to 
perform a title examination prior to purchasing their 
parcel of real estate, was one of the title examiners 
testifying at trial.  He stated that, although the 
reference on the Shaheen’s plat to the “Auburn Public 
Landing” and to the Plat Book and Supervisors Minute Book 
alerted him that there might be documents regarding a 
public landing and road, neither the recorded 1959 plat nor 
the Supervisors Minute Book mentioned the Nelson suit.  He 
testified that, “upon scour[ing] the ind[ices] for owners 
of Auburn,” including Morgan J. Evans, he was unable to 
find anything “pertaining to [the] creation of the landing 
or the road.”  However, virtually all his conclusions were 
based on his search of the general indices to the County’s 
land records.3  For example, Malone stated that he checked 
for the County’s name in the grantee general indices.  But, 
he could not recall whether he looked for the County’s name 
in the indices to the County Court Minute Books although he 
had searched for Morgan J. Evans’ name in the indices to 
                     
3 The general indices to the County’s land records now 
cover the period back to 1865, but the circuit court clerk 
did not know when those indices were compiled. 
 
 
8
those books.4  Malone also reported disclaimers in a 
succession of deeds after Sinclair’s 1959 plat was recorded 
rejecting that plat and disavowing the existence of a 
public landing and road.  Finally, he stated that the 
records kept by the commissioner of the revenue during the 
time of the Nelson suit did not reflect any reduction in 
the amount of land owned by Evans. 
The second title examiner, David Adams, testified that 
he also found nothing in the Shaheen’s chain of title that 
referenced the 1896 Nelson suit.  Adams opined that, based 
on record title, the Shaheens own the road and Auburn 
landing claimed by the County.  His opinion, like that of 
Malone, was primarily based on a search of the general 
indices to the County’s land records. 
A certified land surveyor, James R. Gray, testified at 
trial.  Gray indicated that the 1959 Sinclair plat depicted 
the road as 40 feet in width, whereas the court’s order in 
the Nelson suit established it as 33 feet wide.  He also 
stated that a surveyor could not use the one-half acre 
designation of the landing or the dimensions specified in 
the Nelson suit and accurately survey and plat the Auburn 
landing.  Using old, recorded surveys, triangulation 
                     
4 The County conceded at trial that the name of Morgan 
J. Evans is not listed in the indicies to the County Court 
 
9
points, and other data, Gray opined that the Auburn 
landing, as designated in 1896, is now under water. 
On August 6, 1998, during pretrial discovery, the 
Shaheens filed a request for admissions.  They subsequently 
filed a second request for admissions on September 22, 
1998.  The County did not respond to either request for 
admissions until November 6, 1998.  That same day, the 
County filed a motion acknowledging that its responses had 
not been filed within the 21 days specified by Rule 4:11 
but requesting that “the Answers to [the Shaheens’] Request 
for Admissions be accepted rather than the Admissions 
themselves set forth in the Request for Admissions being 
admitted.”  The Shaheens objected, stating that, 
“[p]ursuant to Rule 4:11 . . . , the matters contained in 
the defendants’ request for admission and the defendants’ 
second request for admissions are deemed admitted.”  During 
a telephonic hearing two days before the trial date, a 
transcript of which is not part of the record in this case, 
the circuit court indicated that it would allow the County 
to file the late responses. 
The circuit court considered the County’s motion again 
on the morning of trial.  The court allowed the County to 
withdraw the admissions that were “deemed admitted by [Rule 
___________________ 
Minute Books. 
 
10
4:11] and the passage of time.”  The court stated that Rule 
4:11 was not intended to put “the responding party in a 
position of admitting away his case[,]” or “to deal with 
controverted facts.”  The court concluded that the 
admissions taken as a whole would, in fact, result in the 
County’s “admitting away the case.”  However, the court 
indicated that, “[i]f it turns out that in order to prove 
something that [the Shaheens] thought was admitted but is 
not by virtue of [this] ruling,” it would recess the trial 
to give the Shaheens time “to provide the support or basis 
for the fact or item that they thought had been admitted.”  
Finally, the court required the County to pay the expense 
of all or a part of the trial transcript if the Shaheens 
needed it in order to present additional evidence with 
regard to the withdrawn admissions. 
 
Consequently, after hearing evidence, the court 
recessed the trial for approximately eight months.5  When 
                     
5 At the recessed hearing, Adams testified on behalf of 
the Shaheens again.  He reiterated that T. F. Nelson was 
“[a] stranger” to the Shaheens’ chain of title.  However, 
he acknowledged that the references to the Supervisors 
Minute Book and the 1959 Sinclair plat that appear on the 
plat of the Shaheens’ property put him on a duty to inquire 
about a conflicting claim of ownership.  Douglas W. Dewing 
also testified at that hearing as an expert in title 
examinations.  He agreed that there were enough references 
to a public landing and road in the Shaheens’ chain of 
title to require a title examiner to investigate the 
matter, but he stated that, given the facts in this case, a 
 
11
the trial reconvened, the Shaheens again moved the court to 
deem the “matters set forth in [their] first and second 
request for admissions” admitted pursuant to Rule 4:11 and 
asked for summary judgment based on those admissions.  The 
court denied both motions. 
 
In a letter opinion, the court again addressed the 
issue regarding the requests for admissions.  Noting that 
Rule 4:11(b) gives a court discretion to allow a party to 
amend or withdraw an admission, the court concluded that it 
was proper, given the issues involved in the case, to 
permit the County to withdraw the “ ‘admission[s].’ ”  The 
court explained: 
The merits of this case should have been 
developed only by a full hearing.  The County’s 
claim for a fee simple title or an easement was 
pleaded and rested upon the records.  If the 
County has by default admitted a matter that is 
not only genuinely in dispute, but the core of 
its case, then the merits are not served by 
application of the rule.  There was no real 
urgency to resolve the case beyond the desire for 
and convenience of the prompt resolution of the 
issues. . . . Further, the Court ordered that the 
County pay certain costs for the defendants’ 
inconvenience.  The defendants were not 
prejudiced in maintaining their defense on the 
merits. 
 
___________________ 
title examiner would not have been able to find an 
instrument vesting in the County either fee simple interest 
or an easement in the road and landing.  Dewing also opined 
that the 1896 description of the landing was “void for 
vagueness.” 
 
12
 
With regard to the merits of the case, the court, in 
its letter opinion, concluded that “[t]he road and landing 
were properly established by the [c]ourt under the 
prevailing law and the orders issued in the [Nelson] suit 
[were] properly recorded in the Minute Books of the County 
Court of Mathews County and indexed in the Books, all in 
County clerk’s office.”  The Court noted that the existence 
of the road and landing for the benefit of the public was 
recognized not only by Morgan J. Evans in a subsequent 
lease and deed but also by some other owners of Auburn.  
Although the court concluded that “the evidence would just 
as likely affirm the existence of fee simple ownership,” it 
granted the County’s requested affirmation of a public 
easement in the Auburn landing and road.  Finally, the 
court established the location of the road and landing as 
shown on the 1959 Sinclair plat. 
 
In summary, the court concluded that the County had 
“established an easement for the benefit of the public on 
and over the road and landing shown on the Sinclair plat” 
and that, when the Shaheens “took title to their property, 
they had actual notice of the physical existence of the 
road and landing, as well as constructive notice thereof, 
as a matter of law.”  The court subsequently entered a 
final order incorporating its letter opinion and 
 
13
permanently enjoining the Shaheens from interfering with 
the free use and enjoyment of the easement for a public 
road and public landing.  The Shaheens appeal from that 
judgment. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, the Shaheens raise five assignments of 
error: (1) the circuit court erred by allowing the County 
to withdraw its admissions; (2) the court “erred by 
deciding that the [C]ounty had properly recorded an 
instrument vesting title in the [C]ounty to the claimed 
road and landing[;]” (3) the court erred by finding that 
“there was an instrument in the Shaheens’ chain of title 
giving notice of the [C]ounty’s ownership[;]” (4) the court 
erred by finding that “the 1896 description of the landing 
was valid[;]” and (5) “[t]he [C]ounty had the burden of 
proof, and it failed to meet that burden.”  We will address 
the assignments of error in that order. 
A. ADMISSIONS 
 
The Shaheens acknowledge that a trial court has 
discretion under Rule 4:11 with regard to whether a party 
should be allowed to amend or withdraw admissions.  
However, they assert that, in this case, the circuit court 
abused its discretion by allowing the County to file 
responses to two sets of requests for admissions when those 
 
14
responses were, according to the Shaheens’ calculations, 
“71” and “24” days late, respectively, and the County did 
not offer any reason or excuse for its tardiness.  
Accordingly, the Shaheens request this Court to reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court and hold that the requests 
for admissions were deemed admitted.  The issue before us 
is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in 
allowing the County to withdraw the admissions. 
 
Several provisions of Rule 4:11 are relevant to this 
question.6  Pursuant to Rule 4:11(a), “[e]ach matter of 
which an admission is requested” is deemed admitted if “the 
party to whom the request is directed” does not serve “upon 
the party requesting the admission a written answer or 
objection addressed to the matter” within 21 days after 
service of the request.  Any matter admitted under the 
provisions of Rule 4:11 is “conclusively established unless 
the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the 
admission.”  Rule 4:11(b).  A trial court’s discretion to 
permit such withdrawal or amendment must be exercised 
within certain parameters: (1)“when the presentation of the 
                     
6 Rule 4:11 is virtually identical to Rule 36 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  TransiLift Equip., Ltd. 
v. Cunningham, 234 Va. 84, 90, 360 S.E.2d 183, 187 (1987).  
Thus, federal courts’ interpretations of Rule 36 are 
informative but not necessarily binding on this Court.  See 
 
15
merits of the action will be subserved thereby[;]” and (2) 
“the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the 
court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in 
maintaining his action or defense on the merits.”  Rule 
4:11(b); see American Automobile Ass’n v. AAA Legal Clinic 
of Jefferson Crooke, P.C., 930 F.2d 1117, 1119 (5th Cir. 
1991); Farr Man & Co., Inc. v. M/V Rozita, 903 F.2d 871, 
875-76 (1st Cir. 1990); Farm Credit Bank of Omaha v. 
McLaughlin, 474 N.W.2d 883, 887 (N.D. 1991). 
 
Some courts have referred to these parameters as a 
“two-part test.”  E.g., Perez v. Miami-Dade County, 297 
F.3d 1255, 1264 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied ___ U.S. 
___, 123 S.Ct. 1291 (2003); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. 
Prusia, 18 F.3d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 1994); American 
Automobile Ass’n, 930 F.2d at 1119; Farr, 903 F.2d at 876; 
Farm Credit, 74 N.W.2d at 887; Tank v. Munstedt, 504 N.W.2d 
866, 868 (S.D. 1993); In re Pendleton, 11 P.3d 284, 295 
(Utah 2000).  This test, which we adopt, “ ‘emphasizes the 
importance of having the action resolved on the merits, 
while at the same time assuring each party that justified 
reliance on an admission in preparation for trial will not 
operate to his prejudice.’ ”  Perez, 297 F.3d at 1265 
___________________ 
Brown v. Black, 260 Va. 305, 311, 534 S.E.2d 727, 730 
(2000). 
 
16
(quoting Smith v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 837 F.2d 
1575, 1577-78 (11th Cir. 1988)). 
 
Under the first prong of this two-part test, the 
moving party has the burden to demonstrate that withdrawal 
or amendment of an admission will “subserve” the 
presentation of the merits of the action.  Gary Mun. 
Airport Auth. v. Peters, 550 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ind. App. 
1990); Farm Credit, 474 N.W.2d at 888.  This aspect of the 
test is “satisfied when upholding the admissions would 
practically eliminate any presentation of the merits of the 
case.”  Hadley v. United States, 45 F.3d 1345, 1348 (9th 
Cir. 1995); accord Perez, 297 F.3d at 1266; Prusia, 18 F.3d 
at 640; ADM Agri-Industries, Ltd. V. Harvey, 200 F.R.D. 
467, 471 (M.D. Ala. 2001); Westmoreland v. Triumph 
Motorcycle Corp., 71 F.R.D. 192, 193 (D. Conn. 1976); Gary 
Munc. Airport, 550 N.E.2d at 831; Farm Credit, 474 N.W.2d 
at 888. 
 
The record in this case demonstrates that the County 
satisfied the first prong of the two-part test.  The 
circuit court found that the admissions, viewed as a whole, 
would result in the County’s “admitting away the case,” and 
we agree.  For example, the Shaheens requested the County 
to admit that it had not recorded in the land records of 
Mathews County the final order in the Nelson suit and that 
 
17
there was no index reference in the land records of Mathews 
County reflecting the County’s ownership interest in the 
road and landing site at Auburn.  The County admitted by 
default matters that were at the core of its case.  Thus, 
allowing the County to withdraw the admissions aided in the 
“ ‘ascertainment of the truth and the development of the 
merits.’ ”  Smith, 837 F.2d at 1577 (quoting with approval 
the district court’s opinion in that case).  The admissions 
in this case, if not withdrawn, would have “practically 
eliminate[d] any presentation of the merits of the case.”  
Hadley, 45 F.3d at 1348. 
 
The second prong of the two-part test in Rule 4:11(b) 
requires the non-moving party to demonstrate that amendment 
or withdrawal of an admission will prejudice that party in 
maintaining the action or a defense.  This prejudice has 
been described as 
not simply that the party who initially obtained 
the admission will now have to convince the fact 
finder of its truth.  Rather, it relates to the 
difficulty a party may face in proving its case, 
e.g., caused by the unavailability of key 
witnesses, because of the sudden need to obtain 
evidence with respect to the questions previously 
answered by the admissions. 
 
Brook Village North Assocs. v. General Elec. Co., 686 F.2d 
66, 70 (1st Cir. 1982); accord Gallegos v. City of Los 
Angeles, 308 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 2002); Hadley, 45 F.3d 
 
18
at 1348; Prusia, 18 F.3d at 640; American Automobile Ass’n, 
930 F.2d at 1120; Smith, 837 F.2d at 1578; Farm Credit, 474 
N.W.2d at 888. 
 
In this case, the Shaheens did not establish this 
type of prejudice.  Instead, the Shaheens focused on the 
lateness of the County’s responses to the requests for 
admissions and the unfairness of allowing the County to 
withdraw the admissions less than 48 hours before 
commencement of the trial.  They did not demonstrate that 
they would have difficulty in the presentation of their 
defense or that they were less able to obtain the evidence 
needed to prove the matters that had been admitted. 
 
Furthermore, the court recessed for several months 
in order for the Shaheens to present additional evidence 
regarding the withdrawn admissions and required the County 
to bear certain costs to facilitate the Shaheens’ 
presentation of that evidence.  The court also noted that 
the County had responded to the requests for admissions 
“with great deliberation” and that the County, at one 
point, had opened its file to the Shaheens.  Any 
inconvenience suffered by the Shaheens did not involve the 
type or level of prejudice that would have justified a 
denial of the County’s motion to withdraw or amend the 
admissions. 
 
19
 
Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing the County to withdraw and 
amend the admissions since those admissions effectively 
eliminated presentation of the case on its merits and the 
Shaheens did not show that they would be prejudiced in 
maintaining their defense on the merits.7  Our decision 
today does not diminish the seriousness of requests for 
admissions or the requirements for prompt responses.  The 
purpose of Rule 4:11 is to expedite a trial by narrowing 
the contested facts and issues, but the rule should not be 
used as a weapon “with the wild-eyed hope that the other 
side will fail to answer and therefore admit essential 
elements.”  Perez, 297 F.3d at 1268.  Even though the 
consequences of failing to comply with the requirements of 
Rule 4:11 are harsh, a party who does so should not readily 
escape those consequences. 
B. INSTRUMENT IN SHAHEENS’ CHAIN OF TITLE 
 
The crux of the Shaheens’ second and third assignments 
of error is that the County failed to record properly the 
final order in the Nelson suit that established the public 
landing and road.  Relying on § 2510 of the 1887 Code, they 
                     
7 In light of our decision, it is not necessary to 
address an issue discussed by the circuit court in its 
letter opinion, whether a request for admissions can only 
be used to force the admission of facts not in dispute. 
 
20
claim that the order should have been recorded in a deed 
book rather than in the County Court Minute Books.8  Because 
of the alleged improper recordation of the order, the 
Shaheens assert that there is no instrument in their chain 
of title giving notice of the County’s interest in the 
public landing and road. 
 
It is not necessary for this Court to decide whether 
the provisions of § 2510 of the 1887 Code required the 
final order in the Nelson suit to be recorded in a deed 
book.9  The dispositive issue is whether there is an 
                     
8 At oral argument, the Shaheens acknowledged that, if 
the final order in the Nelson suit had been recorded in a 
deed book, the order would have been sufficient, except for 
an allegedly inadequate description, to vest in the County 
either a fee simple interest or an easement.  Thus, we do 
not need to address their arguments or their experts’ 
testimony suggesting that the order was insufficient on its 
face to vest title in the County to the road and landing.  
Moreover, the circuit court found that “[t]he road and 
landing were properly established by the [c]ourt under the 
prevailing law.”  This finding is not the subject of an 
assignment of error.  See Rule 5:17. 
 
9 In pertinent part, § 2510 of the 1887 Code provided 
that  
[t]he clerk of the court wherein there is any 
partition of, or assignment of dower in, land under 
any order, or any recovery of land under judgment or 
decree, shall transmit to the clerk of the court of 
each county or corporation wherein such land is . . . 
a copy of such order . . . [a]nd the clerk of court of 
such county or corporation . . . shall record the same 
in his deed book, and index it in the name of the 
person who had the land before, and also in the name 
of the person who became entitled under such 
partition, assignment, or recovery. 
 
21
instrument in the Shaheens’ chain of title giving 
constructive notice of the County’s claim either to a fee 
simple interest or an easement in the Auburn landing and 
road.  The issue of constructive notice implicates the 
provisions of § 2465 of the 1887 Code.  That statute, which 
was in effect while the Nelson suit was pending, provided 
that 
 
[e]very such contract in writing, every deed 
conveying any such estate or term, and every deed 
of gift, or deed of trust, or mortgage, conveying 
real estate or goods and chattels, shall be void 
as to subsequent purchasers for valuable 
consideration without notice, and creditors, 
until and except from the time that it is duly 
admitted to record in the county or corporation 
wherein the property embraced in such contract or 
deed may be. 
 
See Jones v. Folks, 149 Va. 140, 144, 140 S.E. 126, 127 
(1927) for a discussion of this statute.  See also, Code 
§ 55-96 (current version of former § 2465).  If, as the 
Shaheens contend, there is no instrument in their chain of 
title giving constructive notice of the County’s claim, 
then the final order in the Nelson suit establishing the 
public landing and road is “void” as to the Shaheens, who 
were “subsequent purchasers.”  Code § 2465. 
 
“The main purpose of recordation statutes is to give 
constructive notice to purchasers and encumbrancers who 
___________________ 
The Shaheens did not cite this statutory provision in the 
 
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acquire or seek to acquire some interest or right in 
property.”  Chavis v. Gibbs, 198 Va. 379, 381, 94 S.E.2d 
195, 197 (1956).  “[W]here a party purchases an estate 
which is subject to the right of another, and that right is 
shown by the chain of title papers, the purchaser is 
charged with notice of all that the title paper or papers 
to which they refer may disclose upon complete 
examination.”  Id. at 382, 94 S.E.2d at 197 (citing 
Effinger v. Hall, 81 Va. 94, 105 (1885); Burwell’s Adm’rs 
v. Fauber, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 446, 463 (1871); Virginia 
Iron & Coke Co. v. Roberts, 103 Va. 661, 681, 49 S.E. 984, 
986, (1905)); see also Fox v. Templeton, 229 Va. 380, 385, 
329 S.E.2d 6, 8-9 (1985).  However, a bona fide purchaser 
is charged with constructive notice of only those matters 
of record in the purchaser’s chain of title referred to or 
about which the purchaser is placed on inquiry.  Kiser v. 
Clinchfield Coal Corp., 200 Va. 517, 523, 106 S.E.2d 601, 
606 (1959); Providence Forge Fishing & Hunting Club v. 
Gill, 117 Va. 557, 560, 85 S.E. 464, 465 (1915). 
 
To constitute constructive notice, 
the registered or recorded instrument must afford 
to subsequent purchasers or [i]ncumbrancers the 
means of not only ascertaining with accuracy what 
property is conveyed or affected by the 
instrument registered or recorded and where it 
___________________ 
proceedings before the circuit court. 
 
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is, but its language must be such that, if a 
subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer should 
examine the instrument itself, he would obtain 
thereby actual notice of all the rights which 
were intended to be created or conferred by it; 
and if it contained these essential requisites 
the registry or recordation thereof operates as 
constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and 
incumbrancers[.] 
 
National Cash Register Co. v. Burrow, 110 Va. 785, 790, 67 
S.E. 370, 371-72 (1910).  Stated differently, a purchaser 
“must look to the title papers under which he buys, and is 
charged with notice of all the facts appearing upon their 
face, or to the knowledge of which anything there appearing 
will conduct him.  He has no right to shut his eyes or his 
ears to the inlet of information, and then say he is a bona 
fide purchaser without notice.”  Burwell’s Adm’rs, 62 Va. 
(21 Gratt.) at 463; quoted in Chavis, 198 Va. at 383, 94 
S.E.2d at 198.  Only a purchaser without notice can take 
advantage of a failure to record an instrument.  National 
Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blair, 98 Va. 490, 498, 36 S.E. 
513, 515 (1900). 
 
In this case, there were three instruments in the 
Shaheens’ chain of title giving constructive notice of the 
County’s interest in the public landing and road.  The 
first two instruments were the 1898 lease and the 1901 deed 
from Morgan J. Evans, a predecessor-in-title to the 
Shaheens and one of the petitioners in the Nelson suit.  
 
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The third instrument was the plat of the Shaheens’ 
property. 
 
Specifically, the 1901 deed contained the following 
relevant language: 
 
 
The property herein conveyed being the same 
property conveyed to Morgan J. Evans . . . by 
. . . . Deed dated October 20, 1893 and recorded 
in the Clerk’s Office of Mathews County, Virginia 
. . . , (save and except that portion of Auburn 
Farm now used as a public road and leading down to 
what is called and known as “Auburn Wharf,” 
located upon the Auburn property[)]. 
 
Although this exception appeared in the derivative clause 
of that deed, it, nevertheless, placed subsequent 
purchasers, including the Shaheens, on notice that there 
was a public road and landing located on the Auburn 
property.  The 1898 lease also referred to a “public road 
running through the lands of [Morgan Evans] and adjoining 
the public landing on North River.” 
“[T]he recordation of an instrument gives constructive 
notice of all the facts expressly stated in the instrument 
and other[] matters therein suggested which might be 
disclosed upon prudent inquiry.”  Chavis, 198 Va. at 382, 
94 S.E.2d at 197.  Since the 1898 lease and the 1901 deed 
both referred to a “public” road and landing, a “prudent 
inquiry” in this case would have led to the conclusion that 
the County must have acquired an interest in the road and 
 
25
landing by virtue of an instrument such as a deed or 
through a condemnation proceeding.  Orders entered in 
county court proceedings in Mathews County were recorded in 
the County Court Minute Books during the period when the 
Nelson suit was pending.  Thus, searching for the County’s 
name in the indices to the County Court Minute Books, since 
general indices were not required until 1919, see former 
Code § 3394, would have revealed the orders in the Nelson 
suit that established the landing and road. 
Apparently, Marchant found those orders in 1955.  In a 
report to the County’s Board of Supervisors, Marchant 
discussed the orders and recited the volumes of the County 
Court Minute Books and page numbers at which those orders 
were recorded.  He also opined that the orders “appear[ed] 
to establish definitely that such a road and landing were 
opened.” 
 
Similarly, the plat of the Shaheens’ property not only 
depicted the “Auburn Public Landing” and road on its face 
but also referenced the Supervisors’ Minute Book and the 
plat book where the 1959 Sinclair plat was recorded.  
Despite disclaimers regarding the 1959 plat in some of the 
deeds to the Shaheens’ predecessors-in-title, the plat of 
their property and the references contained therein again 
 
26
provided constructive notice of the existence of a “public” 
road and landing. 
The scope of a “prudent inquiry” was at issue in 
Chavis.  There, the owner of two tracts of real estate 
conveyed the tracts to a trustee to secure payment of two 
promissory notes.  198 Va. at 380, 94 S.E.2d at 196.  The 
owner subsequently conveyed the property to another 
individual, but that deed did not mention the prior deed of 
trust.  Id.  The second owner then sold the property to 
C. L. Chavis.  Id.  The deed to Chavis, which was recorded 
on January 19, 1948, stated that the conveyance was made 
subject to the lien of the prior deed of trust.  Id. at 
381, 94 S.E.2d at 196.  However, default occurred in the 
payment of the notes, and the trustee, prior to the 
conveyance to Chavis, sold the property to two receivers 
for a bank, who in turn conveyed the property to Louis C. 
Gibbs.  Both the deed to the receivers and the deed to 
Gibbs were recorded subsequent to the recordation of the 
deed to Chavis.  Id. at 380, 94 S.E.2d at 196. 
The issue in the case was whether Chavis or Gibbs had 
title to the property.  Id. at 381, 94 S.E.2d at 197.  
Chavis contended that the deed from the trustee to the 
receivers was void as to him because it had not been 
recorded prior to the time that he had acquired the 
 
27
property and recorded his deed.  Id. at 381, 94 S.E.2d at 
196-97.  Gibbs, on the other hand, claimed that the deed of 
trust and the recitals in Chavis’ deed charged Chavis with 
sufficient notice to put him on inquiry, which if pursued, 
would have revealed the foreclosure sale and conveyance by 
the trustee under the deed of trust.  Id. at 381, 94 S.E.2d 
at 197.  We agreed with Gibbs.  Id. at 388, 94 S.E.2d at 
201. 
In our decision, we quoted with approval this 
statement from 66 C.J.S., Notice, § 11, p. 642: 
A person who has sufficient information to lead him to 
a fact is deemed conversant with it, and a person who 
has notice of facts which would cause a reasonably 
prudent person to inquire as to further facts is 
chargeable with notice of the further facts 
discoverable by proper inquiry. 
 
Id. at 385, 94 S.E.2d at 199.  We concluded that the 
recitals in the deed to Chavis put him on inquiry regarding 
the deed of trust and the rights of the beneficiary.  Id.  
“If reasonable and prudent inquiry had been made and full 
answers obtained, [Chavis] would have discovered that 
because of default in the payment of the notes, the 
property had been sold in accordance with the provisions of 
the deed of trust.”  Id. at 387, 94 S.E.2d at 201.  Thus, 
we held that Chavis was not a purchaser without notice and 
did not take title to the property.  Id. at 388, 94 S.E.2d 
 
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at 201.  In Chavis, a prudent inquiry was not limited to 
facts disclosed solely within the four corners of the 
recorded instruments.  The fact that the deed of trust was 
of record and remained outstanding when Chavis purchased 
the property placed on him a duty to inquire further about 
the status of the notes secured by the deed of trust. 
Our decision today is consistent with an analogous 
case decided by this Court many years ago.  In Whitlock v. 
Johnson, 87 Va. 323, 330, 12 S.E. 614, 616 (1891), the 
question we considered was whether the defendants were 
innocent purchasers for value, with notice.  Several deeds 
in Whitlock’s chain of title contained a reference to “a 
plat of the sub-division of E. F. Peticolas’s estate, which 
plat is filed with the report of Commissioner W. F. Watson, 
in the clerk’s office of the county court of Henrico, with 
the causes ended October, 1861.”  Id. at 330, 12 S.E. at 
617.  The referenced plat, which was only filed with the 
commissioner’s report and not in the deed books, had the 
name of “Dr. C. P. Johnson” on lot No. 25 and the word “do” 
on each of the other lots in question.  Id. at 331, 12 S.E. 
at 617.  The deed to Whitlock did not, however, mention the 
plat, but it did refer to the other deeds in Whitlock’s 
chain of title.  Id. at 330-31, 12 S.E. at 617. 
 
29
We concluded that Whitlock was put on inquiry as to 
the commissioner’s report which conclusively showed that 
Johnson purchased the lots in question.  Id. at 331, 12 
S.E. at 617.  Although the cause in which the report and 
plat were filed was not specifically named in the deeds, it 
was sufficient that the deeds contained the term of court 
in which the cause was ended and referred to the plat, and 
that the plat named the cause in which the property was 
sold.  Id.  Thus, we held that Whitlock had constructive 
notice of the outstanding title of Johnson to the lots in 
question.  Id. at 332, 12 S.E. at 617. 
Similarly, the instruments in the Shaheens’ chain of 
title did not mention the Nelson suit, but those 
instruments provided sufficient information to put the 
Shaheens on constructive notice about the existence of a 
public landing and road.  And, as we have already stated, a 
“prudent inquiry” would have led to the Nelson suit orders 
recorded in the County Court Minute Books. 
Thus, we conclude that the circuit court did not err 
in “affirming” the existence of an easement for the benefit 
of the public in the Auburn landing and road.  The Shaheens 
were not innocent purchasers without constructive notice of 
the County’s interest in the landing and road. 
C. DESCRIPTION OF LANDING 
 
30
In their fourth assignment of error, the Shaheens 
contend that the description of the Auburn landing as set 
forth in the Nelson suit was so vague as to be invalid or 
void, thereby causing the County’s claim to the landing to 
fail.  The circuit court, in its letter opinion, discussed 
the difficulties with the description of the landing and 
stated that “[t]he precise location of the road and landing 
cannot be established by review of the Nelson suit.”  
However, the court ultimately adopted the description of 
the landing as shown on the 1959 Sinclair plat. 
Irrespective of any inadequacies in the description of 
the landing when it was established in the Nelson suit or 
whether the description was sufficient to give notice under 
the registry laws as to enable a subsequent purchaser to 
determine where the landing was situated, see Merritt v. 
Bunting, 107 Va. 174, 178, 57 S.E. 567, 568 (1907), we 
conclude that the Shaheens cannot now dispute the 
description adopted by the circuit court.  The plat 
depicting the Shaheens’ property delineated the ”Auburn 
Public Landing” and specifically referred to the plat book 
where the 1959 Sinclair plat was recorded in the County’s 
land records.  The Shaheens implicitly agreed to the 
accuracy of the 1959 Sinclair description of the public 
landing by accepting their own deed.  See Shooting Point, 
 
31
L.L.C. v. Wescoat, 265 Va. 256, 264, 576 S.E.2d 497, 501 
(2003); Johnson v. Powhatan Mining Co., Inc., 127 Va. 352, 
364, 103 S.E. 703, 707 (1920).  Thus, we find no merit in 
this assignment of error. 
D. BURDEN OF PROOF 
Finally, the Shaheens argue that the County had the 
burden of proof and failed to carry that burden.  We do not 
agree. For the reasons already stated, we conclude that the 
County established, by clear and convincing evidence, an 
easement in the Auburn landing and road for the benefit of 
the public. 
III. CONCLUSION 
With regard to each of the assignments of error raised 
by the Shaheens, we find no error in the judgment of the 
circuit court.  Thus, we will affirm that judgment. 
Affirmed. 
 
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