Case Title: City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Ctr., Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S198638

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 5/6/13 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
CITY OF RIVERSIDE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S198638 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/2 E052400 
INLAND EMPIRE PATIENTS HEALTH ) 
AND WELLNESS CENTER, INC., et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
Riverside County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. RIC10009872 
 
____________________________________) 
 
The issue in this case is whether California‘s medical marijuana statutes 
preempt a local ban on facilities that distribute medical marijuana.  We conclude 
they do not. 
Both federal and California laws generally prohibit the use, possession, 
cultivation, transportation, and furnishing of marijuana.  However, California 
statutes, the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA; Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11362.5,1 added by initiative, Prop. 15, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. 
(Nov. 5, 1996)) and the more recent Medical Marijuana Program (MMP; 
§ 11362.7 et seq., added by Stats. 2003, ch. 875, § 2, pp. 6422, 6424), have 
removed certain state law obstacles from the ability of qualified patients to obtain 
and use marijuana for legitimate medical purposes.  Among other things, these 
statutes exempt the ―collective[ ] or cooperative[ ] cultiva[tion]‖ of medical 
                                              
1  
All unlabeled statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code. 
 
2 
marijuana by qualified patients and their designated caregivers from prosecution 
or abatement under specified state criminal and nuisance laws that would 
otherwise prohibit those activities.   (§ 11362.775.) 
The California Constitution recognizes the authority of cities and counties 
to make and enforce, within their borders, ―all local, police, sanitary, and other 
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.‖  (Cal. Const., 
art. XI, § 7.)  This inherent local police power includes broad authority to 
determine, for purposes of the public health, safety, and welfare, the appropriate 
uses of land within a local jurisdiction‘s borders, and preemption by state law is 
not lightly presumed. 
In the exercise of its inherent land use power, the City of Riverside (City) 
has declared, by zoning ordinances, that a ―[m]edical marijuana dispensary‖ — 
―[a] facility where marijuana is made available for medical purposes in accordance 
with‖ the CUA (Riverside Municipal Code (RMC), § 19.910.140)2 — is a 
prohibited use of land within the city and may be abated as a public nuisance.  
(RMC, §§ 1.01.110E, 6.15.020Q, 19.150.020 & table 19.150.020 A.)  The City‘s 
ordinance also bans, and declares a nuisance, any use that is prohibited by federal 
or state law.  (RMC, §§ 1.01.110E, 6.15.020Q, 9.150.020.) 
Invoking these provisions, the City brought a nuisance action against a 
facility operated by defendants.  The trial court issued a preliminary injunction 
against the distribution of marijuana from the facility.  The Court of Appeal 
affirmed the injunctive order.  Challenging the injunction, defendants urge, as they 
did below, that the City‘s total ban on facilities that cultivate and distribute 
medical marijuana in compliance with the CUA and the MMP is invalid.  
                                              
2  
The RMC can be examined at  (as 
of May 6, 2013). 
 
3 
Defendants insist the local ban is in conflict with, and thus preempted by, those 
state statutes. 
As we will explain, we disagree.  We have consistently maintained that the 
CUA and the MMP are but incremental steps toward freer access to medical 
marijuana, and the scope of these statutes is limited and circumscribed.  They 
merely declare that the conduct they describe cannot lead to arrest or conviction, 
or be abated as a nuisance, as violations of enumerated provisions of the Health 
and Safety Code.  Nothing in the CUA or the MMP expressly or impliedly limits 
the inherent authority of a local jurisdiction, by its own ordinances, to regulate the 
use of its land, including the authority to provide that facilities for the distribution 
of medical marijuana will not be permitted to operate within its borders.  We must 
therefore reject defendants‘ preemption argument, and must affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal. 
LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Medical marijuana laws. 
The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA; 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.) 
prohibits, except for certain research purposes, the possession, distribution, and 
manufacture of marijuana.  (Id., §§ 812(c) (Schedule I, par. (c)(10)), 841(a), 
844(a).)  The CSA finds that marijuana is a drug with ―no currently accepted 
medical use in treatment in the United States‖ (id., § 812(b)(1)(B)), and there is no 
medical necessity exception to prosecution and conviction under the federal act 
(United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative (2001) 532 U.S. 483, 
490). 
California statutes similarly specify that, except as authorized by law, the 
possession (§ 11357), cultivation, harvesting, or processing (§ 11358), possession 
for sale (§ 11359), and transportation, administration, or furnishing (§ 11360) of 
marijuana are state criminal violations.  State law further punishes one who 
 
4 
maintains a place for the purpose of unlawfully selling, using, or furnishing, or 
who knowingly makes available a place for storing, manufacturing, or distributing, 
certain controlled substances.  (§§ 11366, 11366.5.)  The so-called ―drug den‖ 
abatement law additionally provides that every place used to unlawfully sell, 
serve, store, keep, manufacture, or give away certain controlled substances is a 
nuisance that shall be enjoined, abated, and prevented, and for which damages 
may be recovered.  (§ 11570.)  In each instance, the controlled substances in 
question include marijuana.  (See §§ 11007, 11054, subd. (d)(13).) 
However, California‘s voters and legislators have adopted limited 
exceptions to the sanctions of this state‘s criminal and nuisance laws in cases 
where marijuana is possessed, cultivated, distributed, and transported for medical 
purposes.  In 1996, the electorate enacted the CUA.  This initiative statute 
provides that the state law proscriptions against possession and cultivation of 
marijuana (§§ 11357, 11358) shall not apply to a patient, or the patient‘s 
designated primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the 
patient‘s personal medical purposes upon the written or oral recommendation or 
approval of a physician.  (§ 11362.5, subd. (d).) 
In 2004, the Legislature adopted the MMP.  One purpose of this statute was 
to ―[e]nhance the access of patients and caregivers to medical marijuana through 
collective, cooperative cultivation projects.‖  (Stats. 2003, ch. 875, § 1, 
subd. (b)(3), pp. 6422, 6423.)  Accordingly, the MMP provides, among other 
things, that ―[q]ualified patients . . . and the designated primary caregivers of 
qualified patients . . ., who associate within the State of California in order 
collectively or cooperatively to cultivate marijuana for medical purposes, shall not 
solely on the basis of that fact be subject to state criminal sanctions under [s]ection 
11357 [possession], 11358 [cultivation, harvesting, and processing], 11359 
[possession for sale], 11360 [transportation, sale, furnishing, or administration], 
 
5 
11366 [maintenance of place for purpose of unlawful sale, use, or furnishing], 
11366.5 [making place available for purpose of unlawful manufacture, storage, or 
distribution], or 11570 [place used for unlawful sale, serving, storage, 
manufacture, or furnishing as statutory nuisance].‖  (§ 11362.775.) 
The CUA and the MMP have no effect on the federal enforceability of the 
CSA in California.  The CSA‘s prohibitions on the possession, distribution, or 
manufacture of marijuana remain fully enforceable in this jurisdiction.  
(Gonzalez v. Raich (2005) 545 U.S. 1.) 
B.  Riverside’s ordinances. 
As noted above, the Riverside ordinances at issue declare as a ―prohibited 
use‖ within any city zoning classification (1) a ―[m]edical marijuana dispensary‖ 
— defined as ―[a] facility where marijuana is made available in accordance with‖ 
the CUA — and (2) any use prohibited by state or federal law.  (RMC, 
§§ 19.150.020 & table 19.150.020 A, 19.910.140.)  The RMC further provides that 
any condition caused or permitted to exist in violation of the ordinance is a public 
nuisance which may be abated by the city.  (Id., §§ 1.01.110E, 6.15.020Q.) 
C.  The instant litigation. 
Since 2009, defendant Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness Center, 
Inc. (Inland Empire), has operated a medical marijuana distribution facility in 
Riverside.  Defendants Meneleo Carlos and Filomena Carlos (the Carloses) are the 
owners and lessors of the Riverside property on which Inland Empire‘s facility is 
located.  Their mortgage on the property is financed by defendant East West 
Bancorp, Inc. (Bancorp).  Defendant Lanny Swerdlow is the lessee of the property, 
and defendant Angel City West, Inc. (Angel), provides the property with 
management services.  Swerdlow is also a registered nurse and the manager of an 
immediately adjacent medical clinic doing business as THCF Health and Wellness 
Center (THCF).  Though THCF has no direct legal link to Inland Empire, the two 
 
6 
facilities are closely associated, and THCF provides referrals to Inland Empire 
upon patient request.  Defendant William Joseph Sump II is a board member of 
Inland Empire and the general manager of Inland Empire‘s Riverside facility. 
In January 2009, the planning division of Riverside‘s Community 
Development Department notified Swerdlow by letter that the definition of 
―medical marijuana dispensary‖ in Riverside‘s zoning ordinances ―is an all-
encompassing definition, referring to all three types of medical marijuana 
facilities, a dispensary, a collective and a cooperative,‖ and that, as a consequence, 
―all three facilities are banned in the City of Riverside.‖  In May 2010, the City 
filed a complaint against the Carloses, Bancorp, Swerdlow, Angel, THCF, Sump, 
and various Doe defendants for injunctive relief to abate a public nuisance.  Inland 
Empire was later substituted by name for one of the Doe defendants.  The 
complaint alleged that defendants were operating a ―medical marijuana 
distribution facility‖ in violation of the zoning provisions of the RMC.3 
Thereafter, the City moved for a preliminary injunction against operation of 
Inland Empire‘s facility.4  After a hearing, the trial court granted the preliminary 
                                              
3  
The complaint asserted that defendants‘ facility was being operated within 
the city‘s business and manufacturing park zone, and that a ―medical marijuana 
distribution facility‖ was a prohibited use within that zone.  But the RMC in fact 
makes a ―[m]edical marijuana dispensary‖ — the broadly defined phrase used in 
the ordinance — a prohibited use in every zone within the city (see RMC 
provisions cited above), and Riverside has never denied that such a facility is 
banned everywhere within the city. 
 
4  
In its briefs, Inland Empire describes itself as ―a not for profit California 
Mutual Benefit Corporation established for the sole purpose of forming an 
association of qualified individuals who collectively cultivate medical marijuana 
and redistribute [it] to each other.‖  No party disputes this description.  Moreover, 
all parties further appear to assume that Inland Empire distributed medical 
marijuana from an established business address.  But the record contains few 
details about Inland Empire‘s actual operations.  The only real clues appear in 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
7 
injunction, prohibiting the defendants and all persons associated with them, during 
the pendency of the action, from using, or allowing use of, the subject property to 
conduct ―any activities or operations related to the distribution of marijuana.‖ 
The trial court found the case was controlled by City of Claremont v. Kruse 
(2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1153 (Kruse), which held that cities may abate, as 
nuisances, uses in violation of their zoning and licensing regulations, and that 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
declarations supporting and in opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction.  
In support of the motion, Riverside Police Officer Darren Woolley declared as 
follows:  He visited the THCF clinic at 647 North Main Street, suite 1B, in 
Riverside, where he received a medical marijuana authorization.  Thereafter, 
THCF‘s receptionist provided him with a list of ―collective storefronts‖ in 
Riverside County.  Inland Empire headed the list, and its address was stated as 647 
North Main Street, suite 2A, in Riverside.  Woolley asked if he was already at that 
address.  The receptionist directed him to a location ―right across the lot‖ and said 
he could ―purchase [his] medicine‖ there.  Woolley walked to suite 2A, presented 
his authorization, passed through security, and was directed to a room ―with a 
large counter displaying marijuana food and drink products.‖  He was introduced 
to a ―runner‖ who said she would keep track of his selections and take them to the 
checkout area where he would pay for and receive his purchases.  He was then 
―led to the rear of the [facility] that was separated into small stalls.  Each of these 
stalls was manned by a different seller of marijuana products.‖  Woolley 
purchased $40 worth of marijuana from one seller and $25 worth of hashish from 
another.  He also bought an $8 marijuana brownie.  On another occasion, he 
attended the ―Farmer‘s Market‖ at Inland Empire, when ―individual growers sell 
their product.‖  On this latter day, Woolley purchased marijuana from two separate 
vendors. 
 
 
In opposition to the motion, defendant Swerdlow insisted that THCF and 
Inland Empire were not connected.  However, Swerdlow‘s declaration did not 
dispute Inland Empire‘s basic method of operation, as observed by Woolley.  
Indeed, Swerdlow stated that Inland Empire chose its location, coincidentally 
adjacent to THCF, ―because of its low cost, large size, central location with plenty 
of parking and [because] it was located in an Industrial Warehouse zone and was 
not near any schools, churches, etc. . . .‖ 
 
 
8 
neither the CUA nor the MMP preempts local zoning and licensing regulation of 
facilities that furnish, distribute, or make available medical marijuana — 
including, in Kruse itself, a moratorium on all such facilities within city 
boundaries.  Moreover, though the court insisted it was not holding that federal 
prohibitions on the possession, distribution, or cultivation of marijuana preempted 
state medical marijuana laws, it nonetheless concluded that Riverside ―[could] use 
its . . . zoning regulations to prohibit the activity [of dispensing medical marijuana] 
especially given the conflict between state and federal laws.‖ 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the order.  The appellate court agreed with 
defendants that the City could not assert federal preemption of state law as 
authority for its total ban on medical marijuana dispensing facilities.  However, the 
court rejected defendants‘ argument that Riverside‘s zoning prohibition of such 
facilities was preempted by state law, the CUA and the MMP.  In the Court of 
Appeal‘s view, Riverside‘s provisions do not duplicate or contradict the state 
statutes concerning medical marijuana, nor do they invade a field expressly or 
impliedly occupied by those laws. 
We granted review.  We now conclude the Court of Appeal‘s judgment 
must be affirmed. 
 
9 
 
DISCUSSION5 
A.  Principles of preemption. 
As indicated above, ―[a] county or city may make and enforce within its 
limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in 
conflict with general laws.‖  (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.)  ―Land use regulation in 
California historically has been a function of local government under the grant of 
police power contained in article XI, section 7. . . .  ‗We have recognized that a 
city‘s or county‘s power to control its own land use decisions derives from this 
inherent police power, not from the delegation of authority by the state.‘ ‖  (Big 
Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1151 (Big 
Creek Lumber Co.), fn. omitted.)  Consistent with this principle, ―when local 
government regulates in an area over which it traditionally has exercised control, 
such as the location of particular land uses, California courts will presume, absent 
a clear indication of preemptive intent from the Legislature, that such regulation is 
not preempted by state statute.‖  (Id., at p. 1149; see IT Corp. v. Solano County 
Bd. of Supervisors (1991) 1 Cal.4th 81, 93.) 
However, local legislation that conflicts with state law is void.  (E.g., 
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897 (Sherwin-
Williams Co.).)  ― ‗A conflict exists if the local legislation ― ‗duplicates, 
                                              
5  
An amicus curiae brief on behalf of defendants has been submitted by 
Americans For Safe Access.  Amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the City have been 
submitted by (1) the League of California Cities and the California State 
Association of Counties (League of California Cities et al.), (2) the California 
State Sheriffs‘ Association, the California Police Chiefs Association, and the 
California Peace Officers‘ Association (California State Sheriffs‘ Association et 
al.), and (3) the City of Los Angeles. 
 
10 
contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by 
legislative implication.‘ ‖ ‘  [Citations.]‖  (Ibid.) 
―Local legislation is ‗duplicative‘ of general law when it is coextensive 
therewith.  [Citation.] 
―Similarly, local legislation is ‗contradictory‘ to general law when it is 
inimical thereto.  [Citation.] 
―Finally, local legislation enters an area that is ‗fully occupied‘ by general 
law when the Legislature has expressly manifested its intent to ‗fully occupy‘ the 
area [citation], or when it has impliedly done so in light of one of the following 
indicia of intent:  ‗(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered 
by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of 
state concern; (2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law 
couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not 
tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has been 
partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the 
adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs 
the possible benefit to the‘ locality.  [Citations.]‖  (Sherwin-Williams Co., supra, 
4 Cal.4th 893, 897-898; see Great Western Shows, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 853, 860-861 (Great Western Shows); California Grocers 
Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177, 188.) 
The ―contradictory and inimical‖ form of preemption does not apply unless 
the ordinance directly requires what the state statute forbids or prohibits what the 
state enactment demands.  (Big Creek Lumber, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1161; 
Great Western Shows, supra, 27 Cal.4th 853, 866; Sherwin-Williams Co., supra, 
4 Cal.4th 893, 902.)  Thus, no inimical conflict will be found where it is 
reasonably possible to comply with both the state and local laws. 
 
11 
In addition, ―[w]e have been particularly ‗reluctant to infer legislative intent 
to preempt a field covered by municipal regulation when there is a significant 
local interest to be served that may differ from one locality to another.‘ ‖  (Big 
Creek Lumber Co., supra, 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149, quoting Fisher v. City of 
Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 707.)  ― ‗The common thread of the cases is that if 
there is a significant local interest to be served which may differ from one locality 
to another then the presumption favors the validity of the local ordinance against 
an attack of state preemption.‘ ‖  (Big Creek Lumber Co., supra, at p. 1149, 
quoting Gluck v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 121, 133.) 
B.  The CUA and the MMP do not preempt Riverside’s ban. 
When they adopted the CUA in 1996, the voters declared their intent ―[t]o 
ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for 
medical purposes‖ upon a physician‘s recommendation (§ 11362.5, 
subd. (b)(1)(A)), ―[t]o ensure that patients and their primary caregivers who obtain 
and use marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician 
are not subject to criminal prosecution or sanction‖ (id., subd. (b)(1)(B)), and ―[t]o 
encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for 
the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need‖ of 
the substance (id., subd. (b)(1)(C)). 
But the operative steps the electorate took toward these goals were modest.  
In its substantive provisions, the CUA simply declares that (1) no physician may 
be punished or denied any right or privilege under state law for recommending 
medical marijuana to a patient (§ 11362.5, subd. (c)), and (2) two specific state 
statutes prohibiting the possession and cultivation of marijuana, sections 11357 
and 11358 respectively, ―shall not apply‖ to a patient, or the patient‘s designated 
primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the patient‘s personal 
 
12 
medical use upon a physician‘s recommendation or approval (§ 11362.5, 
subd. (d)). 
When it later adopted the MMP, the Legislature declared this statute was 
intended, among other things, to ―[c]larify the scope of the application of the 
[CUA] and facilitate the prompt identification of qualified [medical marijuana] 
patients and their designated primary caregivers‖ in order to protect them from 
unnecessary arrest and prosecution for marijuana offenses, to ―[p]romote uniform 
and consistent application of the [CUA] among the counties within the state,‖ and 
to ―[e]nhance the access of patients and caregivers to medical marijuana through 
collective, cooperative cultivation projects‖ (Stats. 2003, ch. 875, § 1, subd. (b), 
pp. 6422, 6423). 
Again, however, the steps the MMP took in pursuit of these objectives were 
limited and specific.  The MMP established a program for issuance of medical 
marijuana identification cards to those qualified patients and designated primary 
caregivers who wish to carry them, and required responsible county agencies to 
cooperate in this program.  (§§ 11362.71, subds. (a)-(d), 11362.715, 11362.72, 
11362.735, 11362.74, 11362.745, 11362.755.)  It provided that the holder of an 
identification card shall not be subject to arrest for possession, transportation, 
delivery, or cultivation of medical marijuana, within the amounts specified by the 
statute, except upon reasonable cause to believe the card is false or invalid or the 
holder is in violation of statute.  (§ 11362.71, subd. (e); see § 11362.77, subd. (a).)   
The MMP further specified that certain persons, including (1) a qualified 
patient, or the holder of a valid identification card, who possesses or transports 
marijuana for personal medical use, or (2) a designated primary caregiver who 
transports, processes, administers, delivers, or gives away, in amounts no greater 
than those specified by statute, marijuana for medical purposes to or for a qualified 
patient or valid cardholder ―shall not be subject, on that sole basis, to criminal 
 
13 
liability‖ under section 11357 (possession of marijuana), 11358 (cultivation of 
marijuana), 11359 (possession of marijuana for sale), 11360 (sale, transportation, 
importation, or furnishing of marijuana), 11366 (maintaining place for purpose of 
unlawfully selling, furnishing, or using controlled substance), 11366.5 (knowingly 
providing place for purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, or distributing 
controlled substance), or 11570 (place used for unlawful selling, furnishing, 
storing, or manufacturing of controlled substance as nuisance).  (§ 11362.765, 
subd. (a).)   
Finally, as indicated above, the MMP declared that ―[q]ualified patients, 
persons with valid identification cards, and the designated primary caregivers of 
[such persons], who associate within the State of California in order collectively or 
cooperatively to cultivate marijuana for medical purposes, shall not solely on the 
basis of that fact be subject to state criminal sanctions under Section 11357, 
11358, 11359, 11360, 11366, 11366.5, or 11570.‖  (§ 11362.775, italics added.)  
However, an amendment adopted in 2010 declares that no medical marijuana 
―cooperative, collective, dispensary, operator, establishment, or provider,‖ other 
than a licensed residential or elder medical care facility, that is ―authorized by 
law‖ to possess, cultivate, or distribute medical marijuana, and that ―has a 
storefront or mobile retail outlet which ordinarily requires a local business 
license,‖ shall be located within 600 feet of a school.  (§ 11362.768, subds. (a)-(e), 
as added by Stats. 2010, ch. 603, § 1.) 
Our decisions have stressed the narrow reach of these statutes.  Thus, in 
Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 920 (Ross), a 
telecommunications company discharged an employee from his supervisory 
position after an employer-mandated drug test disclosed the presence of 
tetrahydrocannabinol, a chemical found in marijuana.  The employee sued, urging 
that his termination for this reason violated both the state‘s Fair Employment and 
 
14 
Housing Act (FEHA) and public policy.  The employee‘s complaint alleged that 
he ingested medical marijuana, as a qualified patient under the CUA, to alleviate 
his chronic back pain, but was nonetheless able to perform his duties satisfactorily.  
Hence, the complaint asserted, the employer was obliged, under the FEHA, to 
accommodate his disability by accepting his use of medical marijuana.  The trial 
court sustained the employer‘s demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the 
action. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed, and we upheld the Court of Appeal‘s 
judgment.  We noted that neither the CUA‘s findings and declarations, nor its 
substantive provisions, mention employment rights, except in their protection of 
physicians who recommend medical marijuana to patients. 
The employee urged that such rights were implied in the voters‘ declaration 
of their intent in the CUA ―[t]o ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right 
to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes.‖  (§ 11362.5, subd. (b)(1)(A).)  
We rejected this notion.  As we observed, ―[p]laintiff would read [this declaration] 
as if it created a broad right to use marijuana without hindrance or inconvenience, 
enforceable against private parties such as employers.‖  (Ross, supra, 42 Cal.4th 
920, 928.)  On the contrary, we stated, ―the only ‗right‘ to obtain and use 
marijuana created by the [CUA] is the right of ‗a patient, or . . . a patient‘s primary 
caregiver, [to] possess[] or cultivate[] marijuana for the personal medical purposes 
of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician‘ 
without thereby becoming subject to punishment under sections 11357 and 11358 
of the Health and Safety Code.  [Citation.]‖  (Ross, supra, at p. 929.) 
In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized the CUA‘s ―modest objectives‖ 
(Ross, supra, 42 Cal.4th 920, 930), pointing out that the initiative‘s proponents 
had ―consistently described the proposed measure to the voters as motivated‖ only 
―by the desire to create a narrow exception to the criminal law‖ for medical 
 
15 
marijuana possession and use under the circumstances specified.  (Id., at p. 929.)  
We endorsed the observation that ― ‗the proponents‘ ballot arguments reveal a 
delicate tightrope walk designed to induce voter approval, which we would upset 
were we to stretch the proposition‘s limited immunity to cover that which its 
language does not.‘ ‖  (Id., at p. 930, quoting People v. Galambos (2002) 
104 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1152.) 
In People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274 (Mentch), a defendant charged 
with cultivation and possession for sale of marijuana sought to raise the defense, 
among others, that he was immune from conviction as a ―primary caregiver‖ 
protected by the CUA.  Two witnesses testified they had medical marijuana 
recommendations and obtained their marijuana from the defendant, paying him in 
cash for their supplies.  The defendant testified that he himself had a medical 
marijuana recommendation; had studied how to grow marijuana; had thereafter 
opened a ―caregiving and consultancy business‖ to give people safe access to 
medical marijuana; and supplied medical marijuana to five patients.  The 
defendant also stated that he  took ― ‗a couple‘ ‖ of patients to medical 
appointments ―on a ‗sporadic‘ basis,‖ and that he provided shelter to one patient 
during a brief part of the time he was selling her marijuana.  (Mentch, at p. 280.) 
Finding insufficient evidence on the point, the trial court declined to 
provide a ―primary caregiver‖ instruction, and the defendant was convicted as 
charged.  The Court of Appeal reversed the convictions.  The appellate court 
concluded that evidence the defendant grew medical marijuana for qualified 
patients, counseled them on how to grow and use medical marijuana, and 
occasionally took them to medical appointments was sufficient to warrant a 
―primary caregiver‖ instruction.  (Mentch, supra, 45 Cal.4th 274, 281-282.) 
We reversed the Court of Appeal.  We first examined the CUA‘s definition 
of a ―primary caregiver‖ as ―the individual designated by [a qualified medical 
 
16 
marijuana patient] who has consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, 
health, or safety of that person.‖  (§ 11362.5, subd. (e), italics added.)  This 
language, we reasoned, ―impl[ied]‖ an ongoing ―caretaking relationship directed at 
the core survival needs of a seriously ill patient, not just one single pharmaceutical 
need.‖  (Mentch, supra, 45 Cal.4th 274, 286.)  Further, we observed, the ballot 
arguments for Proposition 215, which became the CUA, suggested that a patient 
would be primarily responsible for noncommercially supplying his or her own 
medical marijuana, but that a ―primary caregiver‖ should be allowed to act for a 
seriously or terminally afflicted patient who was too ill or bedridden to do so.  
Accordingly, we held that a person cannot establish ―primary caregiver‖ status 
simply by showing he or she was chosen and used by a qualified patient to assist 
the patient in obtaining and ingesting medical marijuana.  Instead, we concluded, a 
―primary caregiver‖ must prove, at a minimum, that he or she consistently 
provided care in such areas as housing, health, and safety, independent of any help 
with medical marijuana, and undertook such general caregiving duties before 
assuming responsibility for assisting with medical marijuana. 
Alternatively, the defendant urged that the MMP, specifically section 
11362.765, provides a defense against charges of cultivation and possession for 
sale to those who assist patients and primary caregivers in administering, or 
learning how to cultivate or administer, medical marijuana.  By failing to so advise 
his jury, the defendant insisted, the trial court breached its sua sponte duty to 
instruct on any affirmative defense supported by the evidence. 
We responded that the defendant‘s reading of the MMP was too broad.  We 
explained that while the MMP ―does convey additional immunities against 
cultivation and possession for sale charges to specific groups of people, it does so 
only for specific actions; it does not provide globally that the specified groups of 
people may never be charged with cultivation or possession for sale.  That is, the 
 
17 
immunities conveyed by section 11362.765 have three defining characteristics: 
(1) they each apply only to a specific group of people; (2) they each apply only to 
a specific range of conduct; and (3) they each apply only against a specific set of 
laws.‖  (Mentch, supra, 45 Cal.4th 274, 290.) 
Moreover, we noted, section 11362.765 declares only that the specified 
groups of people engaged in the specified conduct shall not ―on that sole basis‖ be 
subject to criminal liability under the specified laws.  Hence, we determined, 
section 11362.765, subdivision (b)(3), which grants immunity from certain state 
marijuana laws to one who ―provides assistance to a qualified patient or . . . 
primary caregiver, in administering medical marijuana to the . . . patient or 
acquiring the skills necessary to cultivate or administer marijuana for medical 
purposes to the . . . patient,‖ affords the specified criminal immunities only for 
providing the described forms of assistance.  This subdivision, we said, ―does not 
mean [the defendant] could not be charged with cultivation or possession for sale 
on any basis . . . . ‖  (Mentch, supra, 45 Cal.4th 274, 292, original italics.)  On the 
contrary, ―to the extent he went beyond the immunized range of conduct, i.e., 
administration, advice, and counseling, he would, once again, subject himself to 
the full force of the criminal law.‖  (Ibid.)  Because it was undisputed that the 
defendant ―did much more than administer, advise, and counsel,‖ we said, the 
MMP afforded him no defense, and no instruction was required.  (Mentch, at 
p. 292.) 
Similarly, the MMP provision at issue here, section 11362.775, provides 
only that when particular described persons engage in particular described 
conduct, they enjoy, with respect to that conduct, a limited immunity from 
specified state marijuana laws.  As previously noted, section 11362.775 simply 
declares that ―[q]ualified patients, persons with valid identification cards, and the 
designated primary caregivers of qualified patients and persons with identification 
 
18 
cards, who associate . . . in order collectively or cooperatively to cultivate 
marijuana for medical purposes shall not solely on the basis of that fact be subject 
to state criminal sanctions‖ for the possession, furnishing, sale, cultivation, 
transportation, or possession for sale of marijuana, or for providing or maintaining 
a place for the manufacture, processing, storage, or distribution of marijuana.  
(Italics added; see People v. Urziceanu (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747, 785 
(Urziceanu).) 
Recognizing the limited reach of the CUA and the MMP, Court of Appeal 
decisions have consistently held that these statutes, by exempting certain medical 
marijuana activities — including the collective cultivation and distribution of 
medical marijuana under specified circumstances — from the sanctions otherwise 
imposed by particular state antimarijuana laws, do not preempt local land use 
regulation of medical marijuana collectives, cooperatives, and dispensaries, even 
when such regulation amounts to a total ban on such facilities within a local 
jurisdiction‘s borders. 
Thus, in Kruse, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 1153, the defendant‘s application 
for a business license to operate a medical marijuana dispensary was denied by 
Claremont‘s city manager in September 2006.  The grounds cited were that such a 
facility was not a permitted use under Claremont‘s land use and development 
code.  The denial letter advised the defendant he could appeal to the city council, 
and could also seek an amendment to the code.  He did not seek such an 
amendment, and he began operating his facility on the day his permit was denied.  
Meanwhile, he filed an administrative appeal.  Therein he urged that a code 
amendment was unnecessary because state law (i.e., the CUA and the MMP) 
rendered ― ‗[a] medical marijuana caregivers collective . . . a legal but not 
conforming business anywhere in the state where it is not regulated.‘ ‖  (Kruse, 
 
19 
supra, at p. 1160.)  He further alleged that, before beginning operations, he had 
given the city notice and opportunity to adopt such regulations if it chose. 
In late September 2006, while the administrative appeal was pending, the 
city adopted a 45-day moratorium on the issuance of any permit, variance, license, 
or other entitlement for operation of a medical marijuana dispensary within its 
boundaries.  The city manager promptly advised the defendant that adoption of the 
moratorium rendered his appeal moot.  Thereafter, the city extended the 
moratorium several times, ultimately for a period ending on September 10, 2008. 
Defendant continued to operate his facility.  After he ignored two cease and 
desist orders, he was cited, tried, convicted, and fined for operating without a 
business license in violation of city ordinances.  Thereafter, he continued to 
operate despite the issuance of yet another cease and desist order and a succession 
of administrative citations.  Accordingly, in January 2007, the city sued for 
injunctive relief to abate a public nuisance.  The trial court issued a temporary 
restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and ultimately, in May 2008, a 
permanent injunction.  Among its other conclusions of law, the court determined 
that the CUA did not preempt the city‘s moratorium on medical marijuana 
dispensaries, ―because ‗there is nothing in the text or history of the [CUA] that 
suggests that the voters intended to mandate that municipalities allow [such 
facilities] to operate within their city limits.‘ ‖  (Kruse, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 
1153, 1162.) 
On appeal, the defendant urged, inter alia, that the CUA and the MMP 
preempted the city‘s moratorium on medical marijuana dispensaries and precluded 
the city from denying permission to operate such a facility.  The Court of Appeal 
rejected this and the defendant‘s other claims and affirmed the judgment. 
On the issue of preemption, the appellate court first found no express 
conflict between the state medical marijuana statutes and the city‘s action.  By 
 
20 
their terms, the Court of Appeal observed, the CUA and the MMP do no more 
than exempt specific groups and specific conduct from liability under particular 
criminal statutes. 
Second, the Court of Appeal concluded, there was no implied preemption 
under either state statute.  The court reasoned as follows:  Neither provision 
addresses, much less covers, the areas of zoning, land use planning, and business 
licensing.  The city‘s moratorium ordinance was not ―inimical‖ to the state 
statutes, in that it did not conflict with those laws by requiring what they forbid or 
prohibiting what they require.  Nor does the CUA or the MMP impose a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme ―demonstrating that the availability of medical 
marijuana is a matter of ‗statewide concern,‘ thereby preempting local zoning and 
business licensing laws.‖  (Kruse, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1175.)  In 
particular, the CUA‘s statement of intent ― ‗[t]o ensure that seriously ill 
Californians have the right of access to obtain and use marijuana for medical 
purposes‘ ‖ (Kruse, at p. 1175) does not demonstrate a matter of preemptive 
statewide concern, for that declaration by the voters ―[did] not create ‗a broad right 
to use marijuana without hindrance or inconvenience‘ [citation], or to dispense 
marijuana without regard to local zoning and business licensing laws‖ (ibid.).  
Additionally, there is no partial state coverage of medical marijuana in terms 
indicating clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or 
additional local action.  Indeed, the CUA expressly states that it does not preclude 
legislation prohibiting conduct that endangers others, and the MMP explicitly 
provides that it does not prevent a local jurisdiction from adopting and enforcing 
laws that are consistent with its provisions. 
In sum, the Court of Appeal concluded, ―[n]either the CUA nor the MMP 
compels the establishment of local regulations to accommodate medical marijuana 
dispensaries.  The [c]ity‘s enforcement of its licensing and zoning laws and its 
 
21 
temporary moratorium on medical marijuana dispensaries do not conflict with the 
CUA or the MMP.‖  (Kruse, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1176.) 
Though it did not involve a complete moratorium or ban, the Court of 
Appeal in County of Los Angeles v. Hill (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 861 (Hill) 
similarly concluded that the CUA and the MMP do not preempt a local 
jurisdiction from applying its zoning and business licensing powers to regulate 
medical marijuana dispensaries.  In particular, the Hill court observed, the 
―collective cultivation‖ provision of the MMP, section 11362.775, ―does not 
confer on qualified patients and their caregivers the unfettered right to cultivate or 
dispense marijuana anywhere they choose.‖  (Hill, supra, at p. 869.) 
The county ordinance at issue in Hill placed various restrictions on the 
establishment and operation of medical marijuana dispensaries: it provided that 
such a facility could operate in a C-1 zone, but it required the operator to obtain a 
conditional use permit and a business license, and it prohibited the location of a 
dispensary within 1,000 feet of a school, playground, park, public library, place of 
worship, childcare facility, or youth facility.6  County ordinances declared 
generally that any use of property in violation of zoning laws was a public 
nuisance.  (Hill, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 861, 864-865.) 
The county brought a nuisance action alleging that the defendants were 
violating the ordinance by operating a medical marijuana dispensary in an 
unincorporated area of the county without obtaining a business license, a 
conditional use permit, and a zoning variance to allow operation within 1,000 feet 
                                              
6  
The Court of Appeal took judicial notice that in December 2010, while the 
Hill appeal was pending, the county‘s board of supervisors had enacted a complete 
ban on medical marijuana dispensaries.  (Hill, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 861, 866, 
fn. 4.)  The court indicated that the validity of the 2010 ordinance was not at issue, 
and would not be addressed, in the pending appeal.  (Ibid.) 
 
22 
of a public library.  The defendants did not deny they were operating next to a 
public library without the required authorizations.  Instead, they urged that the 
ordinance‘s requirements were unconstitutional and preempted by state law.  The 
trial court disagreed.  It issued a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 
injunction against operation of the defendants‘ facility without the necessary 
permits.  (Hill, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 861, 865.) 
The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.  The appellate 
court rejected the defendants‘ claims that the county‘s regulations were 
inconsistent with the MMP, and thus preempted.  The defendants acknowledged 
that section 11362.83 as then in effect (added by Stats. 2003, ch. 875, § 2, 
pp. 6424, 6434; former section 11362.83) expressly authorized ―a city or other 
local governing body [to] adopt[ ] and enforc[e] laws consistent with‖ the MMP.  
However, the defendants insisted this provision only permitted local restrictions 
that were ― ‗the same as‘ ‖ those imposed by the MMP.  (Hill, supra, 
192 Cal.App.4th 861, 867.)  The Court of Appeal disagreed, indicating that former 
section 11362.83 showed the Legislature ―expected and intended that local 
governments adopt additional ordinances.‖  (Hill, supra, at p. 868.)  The 
defendants also conceded that section 11362.768, then recently adopted to impose 
a minimum 600-foot distance between a medical marijuana facility and a school 
(id., subd. (b), added by Stats. 2010, ch. 603, § 1), explicitly permits a local 
jurisdiction to ―adopt[ ] ordinances or policies that further restrict the location or 
establishment of a medical marijuana cooperative, collective, dispensary, operator, 
establishment, or provider‖ (id., subd. (f)).  Nonetheless, the defendants insisted, 
the 600-foot limit established by subdivision (b), added by Stats. 2010, ch. 603, 
§ 1) impliedly preempted a local jurisdiction from imposing greater distance 
restrictions.  The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument, noting the plain words 
of subdivision (f). 
 
23 
Finally, the Court of Appeal found no merit in the defendants‘ contention 
that because section 11362.775 affords qualified collective cultivation projects a 
limited immunity from nuisance prosecution under the state‘s ―drug den‖ 
abatement law, section 11570, the county was precluded from applying its own 
nuisance laws to enjoin operation of a medical marijuana dispensary in violation 
of its zoning ordinance.  Noting that the immunity provided by section 11362.775 
only applies where the state-law nuisance prosecution is premised ―solely on the 
basis‖ of the collective activities described in that section, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the MMP ―does not prevent the [c]ounty from applying its nuisance 
laws to [medical marijuana dispensaries] that do not comply with its valid 
ordinances.‖  (Hill, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 861, 868.) 
We now agree, for the reasons expressed below, that the CUA and the 
MMP do not expressly or impliedly preempt Riverside‘s zoning provisions 
declaring a medical marijuana dispensary, as therein defined, to be a prohibited 
use, and a public nuisance, anywhere within the city limits.  We set forth our 
conclusions in detail. 
  1.  No express preemption. 
As indicated above, the plain language of the CUA and the MMP is limited 
in scope.  It grants specified persons and groups, when engaged in specified 
conduct, immunity from prosecution under specified state criminal and nuisance 
laws pertaining to marijuana.  (Mentch, supra, 45 Cal.4th 274, 290; Kruse, supra, 
177 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1175.)  The CUA makes no mention of medical marijuana 
cooperatives, collectives, or dispensaries.  It merely provides that state laws 
against the possession and cultivation of marijuana shall not apply to a qualified 
patient, or the patient‘s designated primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates 
marijuana for the patient‘s personal medical use upon a physician‘s 
recommendation.  (§ 11362.5, subd. (d).) 
 
24 
Though the CUA broadly states an aim to ―ensure‖ a ―right‖ of seriously ill 
persons to ―obtain and use‖ medical marijuana as recommended by a physician 
(§ 11362.5, subd. (b)(1)(A)), the initiative statute‘s actual objectives, as presented 
to the voters, were ―modest‖ (Ross, supra, 42 Cal.4th 920, 928), and its 
substantive provisions created no ―broad right to use [medical] marijuana without 
hindrance or inconvenience‖ (id., at p.  928; see Kruse, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 
1153, 1163-1164; Urziceanu, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 747, 773 [CUA created no 
constitutional right to obtain medical marijuana]).  There is no basis to conclude 
that the CUA expressly preempts local ordinances prohibiting, as a nuisance, the 
use of property to cooperatively or collectively cultivate and distribute medical 
marijuana. 
The MMP, unlike the CUA, does address, among other things, the 
collective or cooperative cultivation and distribution of medical marijuana.  But 
the MMP is framed in similarly narrow and modest terms.  As pertinent here, it 
specifies only that qualified patients, identification card holders, and their 
designated primary caregivers are exempt from prosecution and conviction under 
enumerated state antimarijuana laws ―solely‖ on the ground that such persons are 
engaged in the cooperative or collective cultivation, transportation, and 
distribution of medical marijuana among themselves.  (§ 11362.775.) 
The MMP‘s language no more creates a ―broad right‖ of access to medical 
marijuana ―without hindrance or inconvenience‖ (Ross, supra, 42 Cal.4th 920, 
928) than do the words of the CUA.  No provision of the MMP explicitly 
guarantees the availability of locations where such activities may occur, restricts 
the broad authority traditionally possessed by local jurisdictions to regulate zoning 
and land use planning within their borders, or requires local zoning and licensing 
laws to accommodate the cooperative or collective cultivation and distribution of  
 
25 
 
medical marijuana.7  Hence, there is no ground to conclude that Riverside‘s 
ordinance is expressly preempted by the MMP.8 
                                              
7  
The MMP imposes only two obligations on local governments.  It 
specifies the duties of a county health department or other designated county 
agency with respect to the establishment and implementation of the voluntary 
medical marijuana identification card program.  (§§ 11362.72, 11362.74.)  And it 
prohibits a local law enforcement agency or officer from refusing to accept an 
identification card as protection against arrest for the possession, transportation, 
delivery, or cultivation of specified amounts of medical marijuana, except upon 
―reasonable cause to believe that the information contained in the card is false or 
fraudulent, or the card is being used fraudulently.‖  (§ 11362.78; see § 11362.71, 
subd. (e).) 
 
8  
The City claims sections 11362.768, as added in 2010, and 11362.83, as 
amended in 2011, expressly authorize total local bans on medical marijuana 
facilities.  Section 11362.768 specifies that a ―medical marijuana cooperative, 
collective[, or] dispensary‖ with ―a storefront or mobile retail outlet which 
ordinarily requires a local business license‖ may not be located within 600 feet of 
a school (id., subds. (b), (e)), but further provides that ―[n]othing in this section 
shall prohibit a city [or] county . . . from adopting ordinances or policies that 
further restrict the location or establishment of‖ such a facility (id., subd. (f), 
italics added; see also id., subd. (g)).  Section 11362.83 now declares that nothing 
in the MMP shall prevent a city or other local governing body from ―[a]dopting 
local ordinances that regulate the location, operation, or establishment of a 
medical marijuana cooperative or collective‖ (id., subd. (a), italics added) or from 
―[t]he civil and criminal enforcement‖ of such ordinances (id., subd. (b)).  The 
City urges that by granting local jurisdictions express authority to regulate the very 
―establishment‖ of such facilities, the MMP plainly sanctions ordinances that 
preclude such ―establishment‖ within local boundaries.  Our review of the 
language and legislative history of these provisions does not persuade us the 
Legislature necessarily intended them to provide affirmative authority for total 
bans.  But we need not resolve the point.  Local authority to regulate land use for 
the public welfare is an inherent preexisting power, recognized by the California 
Constitution, and limited only to the extent exercised ―in conflict with general 
laws.‖  (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.)  As we otherwise conclude herein, the CUA and 
the MMP, by their substantive terms, grant limited exemptions from certain state 
criminal and nuisance laws, but they do not expressly or impliedly restrict the 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
26 
  2.  No implied preemption. 
The considerations discussed above also largely preclude any determination 
that the CUA or the MMP impliedly preempts Riverside‘s effort to ―de-zone‖ 
facilities that dispense medical marijuana.  At the outset, there is no duplication 
between the state laws, on the one hand, and Riverside‘s ordinance, on the other, 
in that the two schemes are coextensive.  The CUA and the MMP ―decriminalize,‖ 
for state purposes, specified activities pertaining to medical marijuana, and also 
provide that the state’s antidrug nuisance statute cannot be used to abate or enjoin 
these activities.  On the other hand, the Riverside ordinance finds, for local 
purposes, that the use of property for certain of those activities does constitutes a 
local nuisance. 
Nor do we find an ―inimical‖ contradiction or conflict between the state and 
local laws, in the sense that it is impossible simultaneously to comply with both.  
Neither the CUA nor the MMP requires the cooperative or collective cultivation 
and distribution of medical marijuana that Riverside‘s ordinance deems a 
prohibited use of property within the city‘s boundaries.  Conversely, Riverside‘s 
ordinance requires no conduct that is forbidden by the state statutes.  Persons who 
refrain from operating medical marijuana facilities in Riverside are in compliance 
with both the local and state enactments.  (Compare, e.g., Great Western Shows, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th 853, 866 [ordinance banning sale of firearms or ammunition on 
county property was not ―inimical‖ to state statutes contemplating lawful existence 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
authority of local jurisdictions to decide whether local land may be used to operate 
medical marijuana facilities. 
 
27 
of gun shows; ordinance did not require what state law forbade or prohibit what 
state law demanded].) 
Further, there appears no attempt by the Legislature to fully occupy the 
field of medical marijuana regulation as a matter of statewide concern, or to 
partially occupy this field under circumstances indicating that further local 
regulation will not be tolerated.  On the contrary, as discussed in detail above, the 
CUA and the MMP take limited steps toward recognizing marijuana as a medicine 
by exempting particular medical marijuana activities from state laws that would 
otherwise prohibit them.  In furtherance of their provisions, these statutes require 
local agencies to do certain things, and prohibit them from doing certain others.  
But the statutory terms describe no comprehensive scheme or system for 
authorizing, controlling, or regulating the processing and distribution of marijuana 
for medical purposes, such that no room remains for local action. 
The presumption against preemption is additionally supported by the 
existence of significant local interests that may vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.  Amici curiae League of California Cities et al. point out that 
―California‘s 482 cities and 58 counties are diverse in size, population, and use.‖  
As these amici curiae observe, while several California cities and counties allow 
medical marijuana facilities, it may not be reasonable to expect every community 
to do so. 
For example, these amici curiae point out, ―[s]ome communities are 
predominantly residential and do not have sufficient commercial or industrial 
space to accommodate‖ facilities that distribute medical marijuana.  Moreover, 
these facilities deal in a substance which, except for legitimate medical use by a 
qualified patient under a physician‘s authorization, is illegal under both federal 
and state law to possess, use, furnish, or cultivate, yet is widely desired, bought, 
sold, cultivated, and employed as a recreational drug.  Thus, facilities that dispense 
 
28 
medical marijuana may pose a danger of increased crime, congestion, blight, and 
drug abuse,9 and the extent of this danger may vary widely from community to 
community. 
Thus, while some counties and cities might consider themselves well suited 
to accommodating medical marijuana dispensaries, conditions in other 
communities might lead to the reasonable decision that such facilities within their 
borders, even if carefully sited, well managed, and closely monitored, would 
present unacceptable local risks and burdens.  (See, e.g., Great Western Shows, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th 853, 866-867 [noting, in support of holding that state gun show 
regulations did not occupy field, so as to preclude Los Angeles County‘s complete 
ban of gun shows on county property, that firearms issues likely require different 
treatment in urban, as opposed to rural, areas].)  Under these circumstances, we 
                                              
9  
For example, when considering the 2011 amendment to section 11362.83, 
as proposed by Assembly Bill No. 1300 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.), the Senate 
Committee on Public Safety noted the bill author‘s assertions about the 
―controversial picture of dispensaries,‖ as revealed in ―[a] scan of headlines.‖  As 
reported by the committee, the bill author recounted that some dispensaries ―have 
been caught selling marijuana to people not authorized to possess it, many 
intentionally operate in the shadows without any business licensure or under 
falsified documentation, and some have been the scene of violent robberies and 
murder.‖  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1300 (2011-
2012 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 1, 2011, pp. E-F.)  Courts of Appeal dealing 
with local regulation of medical marijuana dispensaries have cited similar 
concerns.  (See, e.g., Hill, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 861, 871 [because of evidence 
that the ― ‗cash only‘ ‖ nature of most medical marijuana dispensary operations 
presents a disproportionate target for robberies and burglaries, and that such 
facilities affect neighborhood quality of life by attracting loitering and marijuana 
smoking on or near the premises, they are not similarly situated to pharmacies for 
public health purposes and need not be treated equally]; Kruse, supra, 
177 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1161 [noting local findings of a correlation between 
medical marijuana dispensaries and increased crime].) 
 
 
29 
cannot lightly assume the voters or the Legislature intended to impose a ―one size 
fits all‖ policy, whereby each and every one of California‘s diverse counties and 
cities must allow the use of local land for such purposes.10 
O’Connell v. City of Stockton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1061 (O’Connell), on 
which defendants rely, is readily distinguishable.  There, a state law, the Uniform 
Controlled Substances Act (UCSA), established a comprehensive scheme for the 
treatment of such substances, specifying offenses and corresponding penalties in 
detail.  Included among the sanctions provided by the UCSA was a defined 
program for forfeiture of particular categories of property, including vehicles, used 
to commit drug crimes.  Under this system, vehicles were subject to forfeiture if 
they had been employed to facilitate the manufacture, possession, or possession 
for sale of specified felony-level amounts, as explicitly set forth, of particular 
controlled substances.  Vehicle forfeiture under the UCSA required proof beyond 
reasonable doubt that the subject property had been so used.  Provisions of the 
UCSA stated that law enforcement, not revenue, was the principal aim of 
forfeiture, that forfeiture had potentially harsh consequences for property owners, 
and that law enforcement officials should protect innocent owners‘ interests by 
providing adequate notice and due process in forfeiture proceedings.   
The City of Stockton adopted an ordinance providing for local forfeiture of 
vehicles used simply to acquire or attempt to acquire any amount of any 
controlled substance, even if the offense at issue was a low-grade misdemeanor 
warranting only a $100 fine and no jail time, and was not eligible for forfeiture 
                                              
10  
Nor, under these circumstances, can we find implied preemption on 
grounds that a local ban on medical marijuana facilities would so impede the 
ability of transient citizens to obtain access to medical marijuana as to outweigh 
the possible benefit to the locality imposing the ban. 
 
30 
under the UCSA.  Stockton‘s ordinance permitted forfeiture upon proof by a 
preponderance of evidence that the vehicle had been used for the described 
purpose.  Forfeited vehicles were to be sold at auction, with net proceeds payable 
to local law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies. 
Under these circumstances, the O’Connell majority concluded, ―[t]he 
comprehensive nature of the UCSA in defining drug crimes and specifying 
penalties (including forfeiture) is so thorough and detailed as to manifest the 
Legislature‘s intent to preclude local regulation.  The UCSA accordingly occupies 
the field of penalizing crimes involving controlled substances, thus impliedly 
preempting the City‘s forfeiture ordinance‖ calling for forfeiture of vehicles 
involved in the acquisition or attempted acquisition of drugs regulated under the 
UCSA.  (O’Connell, supra, 41 Cal.4th 1061, 1071.)  The majority explained that 
―the Legislature‘s comprehensive enactment of penalties for crimes involving 
controlled substances, but exclusion from that scheme of any provision for vehicle 
forfeiture for simple possessory drug offenses, manifests a clear intent to reserve 
that severe penalty for very serious drug crimes involving the manufacture, sale, or 
possession for sale of specified amounts of certain controlled substances.‖  (Id., at 
p. 1072.)  
As indicated above, there is no similar evidence in this case of the 
Legislature‘s intent to preclude local regulation of facilities that dispense medical 
marijuana.  The CUA and the MMP create no all-encompassing scheme for the 
control and regulation of marijuana for medicinal use.  These statutes, both 
carefully worded, do no more than exempt certain conduct by certain persons from 
 
31 
certain state criminal and nuisance laws against the possession, cultivation, 
transportation, distribution, manufacture, and storage of marijuana.11 
The gravamen of defendants‘ argument throughout is that the MMP 
―authorizes‖ the existence of facilities for the collective or cooperative cultivation 
and distribution of medical marijuana, and that a local ordinance prohibiting such 
facilities thus cannot be tolerated.  But defendants‘ reliance on such decisions as 
Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277 (Cohen) and City of 
Torrance v. Transitional Living Centers for Los Angeles, Inc. (1982) 30 Cal.3d 16 
(City of Torrance) for this proposition is misplaced. 
Cohen, addressing a local ordinance that closely regulated escort services, 
stated that ―[i]f the ordinance . . . attempted to prohibit conduct proscribed or 
permitted by state law, either explicitly or implicitly, it would be preempted.‖  
(Cohen, supra, 40 Cal.3d 277, 293.)  However, Cohen made clear there is no 
preemption where state law expressly or implicitly allows local regulation.  (Id., at 
                                              
11  
Defendants also cite Northern Cal. Psychiatric Society v. City of Berkeley 
(1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 90, which struck down, as preempted by state law, a local 
ordinance banning the administration of electroconvulsive, or electric shock, 
therapy (ECT) within the city.  The Court of Appeal found that, after expressly 
considering the benefits, risks, and invasive nature of ECT, a therapy recognized 
by the medical and psychiatric communities as useful in certain cases, the 
Legislature had indicated its intent that the right of every psychiatric patient to 
choose or refuse this therapy be ― ‗fully recognized and protected‘ ‖ (id., at 
p. 105), and had ―enacted detailed legislation extensively regulating the 
administration of ECT, and requiring, among other things, stringent safeguards 
designated to insure that psychiatric patients have the right to refuse ECT.‖  (Id., at 
p. 99.)  Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeal concluded that the state 
had occupied the field, thus precluding a locality from prohibiting the availability 
of ECT within its borders.  By contrast, the MMP simply removes otherwise 
applicable state sanctions from certain medical marijuana activities, and exhibits 
no similar intent to occupy the field of medical marijuana regulation. 
 
 
32 
pp. 294-295.)  As indicated, the MMP implicitly permits local regulation of 
medical marijuana facilities. 
Similarly, in City of Torrance, supra, 30 Cal.3d 16, a state statute 
promoting the local community care of mental patients specifically provided that 
local zoning rules or use permit denials could not be used to exclude psychiatric 
care facilities from areas in which hospitals or nursing homes were otherwise 
allowed.  By contrast, the MMP imposes no similar limits, express or implicit, on 
local zoning and permit rules. 
More fundamentally, we have made clear that a state law does not 
―authorize‖ activities, to the exclusion of local bans, simply by exempting those 
activities from otherwise applicable state prohibitions.  Thus, as discussed in 
Nordyke v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 875 (Nordyke), a state statute, Penal Code 
section 171b, made it a crime to possess firearms in any state or local public 
building, but exempted a person who, for the purpose of sale or trade, brought an 
otherwise lawfully possessed firearm into a gun show conducted in compliance 
with state law.  Under an Alameda County ordinance, it was a misdemeanor to 
bring any firearm onto county property.  The ordinance specified certain 
exceptions, but these did not include gun shows.  Hence, a principal effect of the 
ordinance was to forbid the presence of firearms at gun shows on county property, 
thus making such shows impractical. 
Gun show promoters challenged the ordinance, arguing, inter alia, that 
Penal Code section 171b prohibited the outlawing of guns at gun shows on public 
property, and thus preempted the ordinance‘s contrary provisions.  We disagreed.  
As we explained, section 171b ―merely exempts gun shows from the state criminal 
prohibition on possessing guns in public buildings, thereby permitting local 
government entities to authorize such shows.  It does not mandate that local 
 
33 
government entities permit such a use . . . .‖  (Nordyke, supra, 27 Cal.4th 875, 
884, first italics added.) 
Similarly here, the MMP merely exempts the cooperative or collective 
cultivation and distribution of medical marijuana by and to qualified patients and 
their designated caregivers from prohibitions that would otherwise apply under 
state law.  The state statute does not thereby mandate that local governments 
authorize, allow, or accommodate the existence of such facilities. 
Defendants emphasize that among the stated purposes of the MMP, as 
originally enacted, are to ―[p]romote uniform and consistent application of the 
[CUA] among the counties of the state‖ and to ―[e]nhance the access of patients 
and caregivers to medical marijuana through collective, cooperative cultivation 
projects‖ (Stats. 2003, ch. 875, § 1, subd. (b), pp. 6422, 6423).   Hence, they insist, 
the encouragement of medical marijuana dispensaries, under section 11362.775, is 
a matter of statewide concern, requiring the uniform allowance of such facilities 
throughout California, and leaving no room for their exclusion by individual local 
jurisdictions. 
We disagree.  As previously indicated, though the Legislature stated it 
intended the MMP to ―promote‖ uniform application of the CUA and to ―enhance‖ 
access to medical marijuana through collective cultivation, the MMP itself adopts 
but limited means of addressing these ideals.  Aside from requiring local 
cooperation in the voluntary medical marijuana patient identification card 
program, the MMP‘s substantive provisions simply remove specified state-law 
sanctions from certain marijuana activities, including the cooperative or collective 
cultivation of medical marijuana by qualified patients and their designated 
caregivers.  (Mentch, supra, 45 Cal.4th 274, 290.)  The MMP has never expressed 
or implied any actual limitation on local land use or police power regulation of 
facilities used for the cultivation and distribution of marijuana.  We cannot employ 
 
34 
the Legislature‘s expansive declaration of aims to stretch the MMP‘s effect 
beyond a reasonable construction of its substantive provisions. 
Defendants acknowledge that the MMP expressly recognizes local 
authority to ―regulate‖ medical marijuana facilities (§§ 11362.768, subds. (f), (g), 
11362.83), but they rely heavily on a passage from our decision in Great Western 
Shows, supra, 27 Cal.4th 853, for their claim that local governments, even if 
granted regulatory authority, may not wholly exclude activities that are sanctioned 
or encouraged by state law.  On close examination, however, the premise set forth 
in Great Western Shows is not applicable here. 
In Great Western Shows, we described several federal decisions under the 
federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), including Blue Circle 
Cement, Inc. v. Board of County Comm’rs (10th Cir. 1994) 27 F.3d 1499 (Blue 
Circle Cement), as ―stand[ing] broadly for the proposition that when a statute or 
statutory scheme seeks to promote a certain activity and, at the same time, permits 
more stringent local regulation of that activity, local regulation cannot be used to 
completely ban the activity or otherwise frustrate the statute‘s purpose.‖  (Great 
Western Shows, 27 Cal.4th 853, 868.) 
But there are important distinctions between the RCRA and the California 
statutes at issue in this case.  As explained in Blue Circle Cement, the RCRA ―is 
the comprehensive federal hazardous waste management statute governing the 
treatment, storage, transportation, and disposal of hazardous wastes which have 
adverse effects on health and the environment.‖  (Blue Circle Cement, supra, 
27 F.3d 1499, 1505.)  The federal statute aims ―to assist states and localities in the 
development of improved solid waste management techniques to facilitate 
resource recovery and conservation.‖  (Ibid.)  It ―enlists the states and 
municipalities to participate in a ‗cooperative effort‘ with the federal government 
to develop waste management practices that facilitate the recovery of ‗valuable 
 
35 
materials and energy from solid waste.‘ ‖  (Id., at p. 1506.)  Under these 
circumstances, the court in Blue Circle Cement, like other federal courts, 
concluded that a complete local ban on the processing, recycling, and disposal of 
industrial waste, imposed without consideration of specific and legitimate local 
health and safety concerns, would frustrate the RCRA‘s overarching purpose to 
encourage state and local cooperation in furtherance of the efficient treatment, use, 
and disposal of such material.  (Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d 1499, 1506-1509, & 
cases cited.) 
The MMP, by contrast, creates no comprehensive scheme for the protection 
or promotion of facilities that dispense medical marijuana.  The sole effect of the 
statute‘s substantive terms is to exempt specified medical marijuana activities 
from enumerated state criminal and nuisance statutes.  Those provisions do not 
mandate that local jurisdictions permit such activities.  (See Nordyke, supra, 
27 Cal.4th 875, 883-884.)  Local decisions to prohibit them do not frustrate the 
MMP‘s operation.  Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the premise of Blue 
Circle Cement, supra, 27 F.3d 1499, as paraphrased in Great Western Shows, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th 853, is applicable here. 12 
                                              
12  
Defendants also cite Big Creek Lumber Co., supra, 38 Cal.4th 1139, in 
support of their assertion that local regulation of an activity sanctioned and 
encouraged by state law cannot include a total ban.  But this decision, too, is 
distinguishable.  In Big Creek Lumber Co., the plaintiffs argued that a county 
ordinance specifying the zones where timber harvesting could occur was 
preempted by comprehensive state forestry statutes enacted to encourage the 
sound and prudent exploitation of timber resources.  The principal statute at issue, 
the Forest Practices Act (FPA), forbade counties from ― ‗regulat[ing] the conduct 
of timber operations.‘ ‖  (Big Creek Lumber Co., supra, at p. 1147.)  Among other 
things, we found no ―inimical‖ state-local conflict, because it was not impossible 
for timber operators to comply simultaneously with both the state and county 
enactments.  We also concluded, in essence, that by limiting the locations within 
the county where timber harvesting was permitted, the ordinance did not 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
36 
Finally, defendants urge that by exempting the collective or cooperative 
cultivation of medical marijuana by qualified patients and their designated 
caregivers from treatment as a nuisance under the state’s drug abatement laws 
(§ 11362.775; see § 11570 et seq.), the MMP bars local jurisdictions from 
adopting and enforcing ordinances that treat these very same activities as 
nuisances subject to abatement.  But for the reasons set forth at length above, we 
disagree.  Nuisance law is not defined exclusively by what the state makes subject 
to, or exempt from, its own nuisance statutes.  Unless exercised in clear conflict 
with general law, a city‘s or county‘s inherent, constitutionally recognized power 
to determine the appropriate use of land within its borders (Cal. Const., art. XI, 
§ 7) allows it to define nuisances for local purposes, and to seek abatement of such 
nuisances.  (See Golden Gate Water Ski Club v. County of Contra Costa (2008) 
165 Cal.App.4th 249, 255-256.) 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
impermissibly ―regulate‖ the ―conduct‖ of such operations.  (Id., at p. 1157.)  
Addressing the plaintiffs‘ ―overriding concern‖ that unless preempted, counties 
could use locational zoning to entirely prohibit timber harvesting (id., at p. 1160), 
we simply observed that ―[t]he ordinance before us does not have that effect, nor 
does it appear that any county has attempted such a result.‖  (Id., at pp. 1160-
1161.) 
 
 
Here, as we have noted, the MMP is a limited measure, not a 
comprehensive scheme for the regulation and encouragement of medical 
marijuana facilities.  As in Big Creek Lumber Co., the local ordinance at issue here 
does not stand in ―inimical‖ conflict with state statutes by making simultaneous 
compliance impossible.  And unlike the FPA at issue in Big Creek Lumber Co., 
the MMP includes provisions recognizing the regulatory authority of local 
jurisdictions.  For these reasons, nothing we said in Big Creek Lumber Co. 
persuades us that Riverside‘s ordinance is preempted. 
 
37 
No such conflict exists here.  In section 11362.775, the MMP merely 
removes state law criminal and nuisance sanctions from the conduct described 
therein.  By this means, the MMP has signaled that the state declines to regard the 
described acts as nuisances or criminal violations, and that the state’s enforcement 
mechanisms will thus not be available against these acts.  Accordingly, localities 
in California are left free to accommodate such conduct, if they choose, free of 
state interference.  As we have explained, however, the MMP‘s limited provisions 
neither expressly or impliedly restrict or preempt the authority of individual local 
jurisdictions to choose otherwise for local reasons, and to prohibit collective or 
cooperative medical marijuana activities within their own borders.  A local 
jurisdiction may do so by declaring such conduct on local land to be a nuisance, 
and by providing means for its abatement.13 
We thus conclude that neither the CUA nor the MMP expressly or 
impliedly preempts the authority of California cities and counties, under their 
traditional land use and police powers, to allow, restrict, limit, or entirely exclude 
facilities that distribute medical marijuana, and to enforce such policies by 
                                              
13  
As defendants note, the court in Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim 
(2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 734 suggested that, ―at first glance,‖ it seemed 
―incongruous‖ and ―odd‖ to conclude the CUA and the MMP, which exempt 
specified medical marijuana activities from state criminal and nuisance laws, 
might leave local jurisdictions free to use nuisance abatement procedures to 
prohibit the same activities.  (Id., at p. 754.)  However, this issue was not 
presented or decided in Qualified Patients Assn.  There the court conceded the 
answer ―remain[ed] to be determined‖ and was ―by no means clear cut or easily 
resolved on first impressions.‖  (Ibid.)  After careful review, and for the reasons 
expressed at length herein, we are not persuaded by the tentative view expressed in 
Qualified Patients Assn. 
 
 
38 
nuisance actions.  Accordingly, we reject defendants‘ challenge to Riverside‘s 
MMD ordinances.14 
As we have noted, the CUA and the MMP are careful and limited forays 
into the subject of medical marijuana, aimed at striking a delicate balance in an 
area that remains controversial, and involves sensitivity in federal-state relations.  
We must take these laws as we find them, and their purposes and provisions are 
modest.  They remove state-level criminal and civil sanctions from specified 
medical marijuana activities, but they do not establish a comprehensive state 
system of legalized medical marijuana; or grant a ―right‖ of convenient access to 
marijuana for medicinal use; or override the zoning, licensing, and police powers 
of local jurisdictions; or mandate local accommodation of medical marijuana 
cooperatives, collectives, or dispensaries. 
Of course, nothing prevents future efforts by the Legislature, or by the 
People, to adopt a different approach.  In the meantime, however, we must 
conclude that Riverside‘s ordinances are not preempted by state law. 
                                              
14  
Our analysis makes it unnecessary to address the City‘s argument that, were 
the CUA and the MMP construed to require local jurisdictions to accommodate 
medical marijuana facilities, it would be preempted by the federal CSA.  Nor need 
we confront the related argument of amici curiae California State Sheriffs‘ 
Association et al. that a state law, Government Code section 37100, forbids a city 
to adopt ordinances authorizing the use of local land for operation of medical 
marijuana facilities because such ordinances would ―conflict with the . . . laws of 
. . . the United States,‖ i.e., the CSA. 
 
 
39 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
 
I join the court‘s opinion and write separately to clarify the proper test for 
state preemption of local law. 
As the court says, ―[L]ocal legislation that conflicts with state law is void.  
[Citation.]  ‗ ―A conflict exists if the local legislation ‗ ―duplicates, contradicts, or 
enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative 
implication.‖ ‘ ‖  [Citations.]‘ ‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 9–10.) 
The court further states:  ―The ‗contradictory and inimical‘ form of 
preemption does not apply unless the ordinance directly requires what the state 
statute forbids or prohibits what the state enactment demands.  [Citations.]  Thus, 
no inimical conflict will be found where it is reasonably possible to comply with 
both the state and local laws.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.) 
The first sentence of the above statement should not be misunderstood to 
improperly limit the scope of the preemption inquiry.  As the court‘s opinion 
makes clear elsewhere, state law may preempt local law when local law prohibits 
not only what a state statute ―demands‖ but also what the statute permits or 
authorizes.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 31–32, 34–35, discussing Cohen v. Board 
of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 293 (Cohen); Great Western Shows v. 
County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 853, 867–868 (Great Western Shows). 
In a similar vein, the second sentence of the above statement –– ―no 
inimical conflict will be found where it is reasonably possible to comply with both 
 
2 
the state and local laws‖ (maj. opn., ante, at p. 10) –– also should not be 
misunderstood.  If state law authorizes or promotes, but does not require or 
demand, a certain activity, and if local law prohibits the activity, then an entity or 
individual can comply with both state and local law by not engaging in the 
activity.  But that obviously does not resolve the preemption question.  To take an 
example from federal law, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) promotes arbitration, 
and a state law prohibiting arbitration of employment disputes would be 
preempted.  (See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U. S. __ [131 
S.Ct. 1740, 1747].)  Such preemption obtains even though an employer can 
comply with both the FAA, which does not require employers to enter into 
arbitration agreements, and the state law simply by choosing not to arbitrate 
employment disputes. 
Accordingly, in federal preemption law, we find a more complete statement 
of conflict preemption:  ― ‗We have found implied conflict pre-emption where it is 
―impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal 
requirements‖ [citation], or where state law ―stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.‖ ‘ ‖  (Sprietsma v. Mercury Maine (2002) 537 U.S. 51, 64–65, italics 
added.)  This more complete statement no doubt applies to California law.  Local 
law that prohibits an activity that state law intends to promote is preempted, even 
though it is possible for a private party to comply with both state and local law by 
refraining from that activity.  (See Great Western Shows, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
pp. 867–868; Cohen, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 293.)   
I do not understand today‘s opinion to hold otherwise.  In this case, 
defendants argue that the Medical Marijuana Program (MMP) authorizes and 
intends to promote what the City of Riverside prohibits:  the operation of medical 
marijuana dispensaries.  If such legislative authorization were clear, then the 
 
3 
ordinance in question might well be preempted.  But I agree with my colleagues 
that although the MMP provides medical marijuana cooperatives and collectives 
with a limited exemption from state criminal liability, ―state law does not 
‗authorize‘ activities, to the exclusion of local plans, simply by exempting those 
activities from otherwise applicable state prohibitions.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 32.)  
As the court‘s opinion makes clear, notwithstanding some language in the MMP 
regarding the promotion of medical marijuana cooperatives and collectives, ―the 
MMP itself adopts but limited means of addressing these ideals.  Aside from 
requiring local cooperation in the voluntary medical marijuana patient 
identification card program, the MMP‘s substantive provisions simply remove 
specified state-law sanctions from certain marijuana activities, including the 
cooperative or collective cultivation of medical marijuana by qualified patients 
and their designated caregivers.  [Citation.]  The MMP has never expressed or 
implied any actual limitation on local land use or police power regulation of 
facilities used for the cultivation and distribution of marijuana.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 33.)   
Because state law does not clearly authorize or intend to promote the 
operation of medical marijuana dispensaries, I agree that the City of Riverside‘s 
prohibition on such dispensaries is not preempted. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patient‘s Health and Wellness Center, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 200 Cal.App.4th 885 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S198638 
Date Filed: May 6, 2013 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: John D. Molloy 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Law Offices of J. David Nick and J. David Nick for Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Joseph D. Elford for Americans for Safe Access as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Gregory P. Priamos, City Attorney, James E. Brown and Neil Okazaki, Deputy City Attorneys; Best Best & 
Krieger, Jeffrey V. Dunn, Lee Ann Meyer, Roderick E. Walston, Daniel S. Roberts, Laura Dahl; Greines, 
Martin Stein & Richland, Timothy T. Coates and Gary D. Rowe for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney (Los Angeles) and William W. Carter, Chief Deputy City Attorney, 
for City of Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Jones & Mayer, Martin J. Mayer, Krista MacNevin Jee and Elena Q. Gerli for California State Sheriffs‘ 
Association, California Police Chiefs Association and California Peace Officers‘ Association as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Thomas B. Brown and Stephen A. McEwen for League of California Cities 
and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
J. David Nick 
Law Offices of J. David Nick 
345 Franklin Street 
San Francisco, CA  94102 
(415) 552-4444 
 
Jeffrey V. Dunn 
Best Best & Krieger 
18101 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 1000 
Irvine, CA  92612 
(949) 263-2600