Case Title: SCHOOL DIST NO 4 v COLBURG

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12996 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 S C H O O L DISTRICT NO 4, Lincoln County, Montana, Relator and Appellant, D O L O R E S C O L B U R G , Superintendent of Public Instruction, S t a t e of Montana, and J A M E S G. SICHTING, Respondents and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert Keller, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Smith, Smith & Sewell, Helena, Montana Chadwick H. Smith argued, Helena, Montana William A. Douglas appeared, Libby, Montana For Respondents : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana -- -- - - W H + z f i W ~ ~ ~ - r C : 3 e ~ ~ ~ a Carroll C. Blend argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Fennessey, Crocker and Harman, Libby, Montana David W. Harman argued, Libby, Montana Submitted: February 4 , 1976 Decided: f d : t . r . r , . : M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This appeal i s from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t court, Lincoln County, which affirmed a decision of respondent S t a t e Superintendent of Public Instruction i n a matter where appellant, Board of Trustees of School D i s t r i c t No. 4, Lincoln County, de- cided not t o renew a teaching contract and the County Superintendent and the S t a t e Superintendent reversed t h a t holding. The Board of Trustees of School D i s t r i c t No. 4, Lincoln County, r e l a t o r and appellant, hereinafter referred t o a s Trustees, determined a t a ~ r u s t e e s ' meeting on March 20, 1972, t h a t the teaching contract of James G. Sichting would not be renewed f o r the 1972-73 school year. A l e t t e r from the D i s t r i c t Superintendent informed Sichting of t h i s action taken by the Trustees. Following a request from Sichting f o r a statement of reasons f o r the ~ r u s t e e s ' decision pursuant t o section 75-6104, R.C.M. 1947, the D i s t r i c t Superintendent replied by a l e t t e r s t a t i n g s i x reasons f o r the termination on April 1, 1972. A t s i c h t i n g l s request a hearing before the Trustees was held April 24, 1972. A t t h a t hearing t h e Trustees reaffirmed t h e i r decision not t o renew ~ i c h t i n g ' s contract. That decision was appealed by Sichting t o the Lincoln County Superintendent of Schools. Prior t o the hearing, counsel f o r t h e Trustees and f o r Sichting met i n an e f f o r t t o define the issues t o be heard. Subsequently, a t the hearing counsel f o r the Trustees read a s t i p u l a t i o n i n t o the record. Counsel f o r Sichting made no objection t o t h e stipulation. When a t the hearing counsel f o r the Trustees introduced l e t t e r s which r e l a t e d t o the s t i p u l a t i o n , Sichting's attorney s t a t e d they were acceptable "to show t h e procedural 8 1 steps. Following testimony of witnesses f o r both p a r t i e s , the County Superintendent reversed the decision of the Trustees because t h e l e t t e r of April 1, 1972 t o Sichting f a i l e d t o meet require- ments of section 75-6104. This decision was appealed t o the State Superintendent who affirmed the County Superintendent on August 10, 1972. The Trustees then sought t o have the decisions of the State Superintendent and County Superintendent s e t aside by the d i s t r i c t court. That court remanded the matter t o the County Superintendent f o r further testimony regarding t h e s t i p u l a t i o n , and whether Sichting was given s u f f i c i e n t n o t i c e by the April 1, 1972 l e t t e r . Thereafter t h e County Superintendent again reversed the ~ r u s t e e s ' decision. O n appeal t o the S t a t e Superintendent, the County superintendent's decision was affirmed. The next procedural s t e p was a p e t i t i o n f o r c e r t i o r a r i f o r review of the State Superintendent's decision-*taken by .the Trustees t o the d i s t r i c t court. Affirmance of the S t a t e Superin- tendent's decision precipitated t h i s appeal. These issues a r e s e t f o r t h on appeal, but a consideration of Issue No. 3 i s a c t u a l l y determinative. W e discuss t h e others i n t h a t context. 1) Whether the l e t t e r of April 1, 1972, from D i s t r i c t Superintendent Watkins t o Sichting purporting t o s t a t e t h e reasons f o r termination was supplied by t h e Board of Trustees of the School D i s t r i c t a s required by section 75-6104, R.C.M. 1947? 2) Whether the l e t t e r of April 1, 1972, was a statement declaring c l e a r l y and e x p l i c i t l y t h e specific reasons f o r termina- t i o n , a s required by section 75-6104, R.C.M. 1947? 3) Whether a s t i p u l a t i o n entered i n t o by t h e counsel of record a t the hearing on May 16, 1972, was binding and e f f e c t i v e l y precluded consideration of the section 75-6104, R.C.M. 1947, re- quirement t h a t the April 1, 1972 l e t t e r declare "clearly and e x p l i c i t l y the specific reason o r reasons f o r the termination of h f s services. * *.*." Simply put, t h e basis f o r t h i s appeal from the reversal of t h e Trustees April 24, 1972 decision t o reaffirm t h e i r e a r l i e r decision not t o renew ~ i c h t i n g ' s teaching contract revolves about the ~ r u s t e e s ' compliance with s t a t u t o r y procedures of n o t i f i c a t i o n t o the teacher. Only the hearing before the Trustees on April 24, 1972, a c t u a l l y reached the merits of the reasons f o r the nonrenewal of ~ i c h t i n g ' s contract. - 3 - W e discuss f i r s t the matter of the s t i p u l a t i o n before the County Superintendent. There i s no dispute t h a t p r i o r t o the hearing counsel f o r the Trustees and counsel f o r the teacher met with t h e County Superintendent concerning management of t h e hearing. It i s a l s o not disputed t h a t these same counsel, with the addition of Gary Christiansen, co-counsel f o r Sichting, were present a t t h e hearing before t h e County Superintendent on May 26, 1972. A t t h a t time the County Superintendent read t h i s statement i n t o the record: " A t a pre-hearing conference, the following s t i p u l a t i o n s were agreed upon by counselors: "(I) That M r . Sichting, an I n d u s t r i a l Arts Teacher i n the Libby Junior High School, i s e n t i t l e d t o the protection of the Teacher Tenure Statutes; "(2) That the Board of Trustees resolved by majority vote of i t s membership t o terminate h i s services a t the end of the current school year, and t h a t he was so n o t i f i e d ; "(3) That t h e r e a f t e r he requested and received a written statement, c l e a r l y and e x p l i c i t l y declaring the specific reason f o r termination of h i s services; "(4) That he then requested a hearing before the Board t o reconsider i t s decision; "(5) That t h e Hearing so requested was held and the Board reaffirmed its decision t o terminate h i s services. "It now becomes the duty of t h e County Superintendent t o determine the t r u t h of t h e charges, and t h e i r s u f f i - ciency t o support t h e termination. In the t r i a l of t h i s issue, the burden of proof i n i t i a l l y r e s t s upon the Respon- dent School Board, With t h a t , M r . Douglas, you may begin." (Emphasis supplied.) Counsel f o r Sichting raised no objection t o t h e stipula- tions. Statements from M r . Christiansen only c l a r i f i e d t h a t ,he was not present a t t h e prehearing conference and explained the presentation of t h e summation of ~ i c h t i n g ' s case. Later a t t h e May 26, 1972 hearing, Christiansen made t h i s statement with regard t o l e t t e r s r e f e r r i n g t o Items (2) and (3) of t h e stipulation: "MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor, i f these a r e offered solely t o show the procedural s t e p s , we have no objectionp I f they a r e offered t o show t h e proof of any basis for the action, we would object to them on that grounds. "MR. DOUGLAS: Your Honor, or Mr. Superintendent, excuse me, we offer these only to show the procedural steps that were taken. "MR. CHRISTIANSEN: With that explicit understanding, we would have no objection"(Emphasis supplied.) Taken together with the understanding of the stipulation indicated by Mr. Christiansen in his deposition, it appears clear that counsel intended to limit the issues to be considered at the hearing before the County Superintendent. On review of the State superintendent's affirmance of the County superintendent's decision, the district court was bound by the stipulation of the parties unless contrary to law, court rule, or public policy. Capital Nat. Bank of Sacramento v. Smith, 62 C.A.2d 328, 144 P.2d 665. Here, both parties agreed the issue to be resolved was the substance and truth of the charges against Sichting and whether they merited his termination. Of such a stipulation the Supreme Court of Kansas in Manhattan Bible College v. Stritesky, 192 Kan. 287, 387 P.2d 225,228, said: " * * * A stipulation that only one issue, or only particular issues, are involved authorizes entry of judgment for the one party or the other as the stipulated fact or issue is decided. ik * * Where parties by stipulation prescribe the issues on which the case is to be tried, they are estopped from thereafter asserting that the case was tried or submitted on the wrong theory; and a stipulation of this nature, unlike a stipulation which merely eliminates a single issue, amounts to a binding waiver or elimination of all i.ssues not included. I I In the instant case, counsel for Sichting waived any objections to the sufficiency of the notice in the April 1, 1972 letter; such waiver of an advantage of any provision of a law intended solely for his benefit is proper. Section 49-105, R.C.M. 1947; Shea v. North-Butte Min. Co., 55 Mont. 522, 538, 179 P. 499; Commercial Credit Co. v. O'~rien, 115 Mont. 199, 216, 146 P.2d 637. Thus the district court erred, as a matter of law, in basing its judgment on a conclusion of law concerning a claim not within the stipulation made by the parties concerning the issue to be determined. Frye v. Switzer, 145 Colo. 401, 359 P.2d 370,371. Further discussion of the sufficiency of the notice in the April 1, 1972, letter is unnecessary in view of our determination the parties stipulated to its completeness. Next, we consider the conclusion reached by the district court that the statement of reasons given to Sichting by the District Superintendent did not satisfy the requirement of section 75-6104, R.C.M. 1947, which provides that such a statement shall be supplied by the Trustees. In our view such an argument exalts form over substance. The stipulation noted heretofore states in part : " ( 2 ) That the Board of Trustees resolved by majority vote of its membership to terminate his services at the end of the current school year, and that he was so notified". (Emphasis supplied.) It cannot be disputed then that the Trustees did resolve not to renew ~ichting's contract. Considering whether the delegation of the statutory responsibility to notify the teacher was proper, we take note of the discussion in the Anno. 92 ALR2d 751,763: "The statutes requiring that a teacher who is to be discharged, or whose contract is not to be renewed, be given notice of the matter, ordinarily specify the person or officials to give the notice in question, and the sufficiency of such notice has sometimes been attacked, although with little success, on the ground that the action was taken by one other than the authorized officials." (Emphasis supplied.) The annotation cites two cases. In Baugh v. Board of Education, 244 Ala. 522, 14 S.2d 508, and Knickerbocker v . Redlands High School District, 49 Cal.App.2d 722, 122 P.2d 289, the courts held that notification of a decision already reached by the school board and sent by the superintendent did not constitute an improper delegation. The superintendent's action here was purely a ministerial one by the chief executive officer of the Trustees. Hence the conclusion of the district court on this issue was error, as a matter of law. In sum, section 75-6104, R.C.M. 1947, was fully complied with by the Trustees in their action notifying Sichting of the nonrenewal of his teaching contract. There is thus no legal basis for the reversal of that decision by the County Superintendent and the subsequent affirmance of the County Superintendent by the State Superintendent. Similarly, it was reversible error for the district court on certiorari to base its judgment on noncompliance with the procedures provided for in that statute and for it to neglect a valid stipulation of the parties. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for entry of judgment in accordance with this opinion and the ~rustees' decision of April 24, 1972. ,.- - We Concur: I + d I F \ 9 - , - ~+8, d,. fa:,'< i -* Chief Justaice ~ ~ d d W p ! L * Justices.