Case Title: In re Guardianship of Lado

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12143

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-11-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12143 
 
GUARDIANSHIP OF DUKU LADO. 
 
 
 
November 7, 2017. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Probate Court, Guardian.  Practice, Civil, Guardianship 
proceeding.  Guardian. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Betty Hinds, appeals from a judgment of a 
single justice of this court denying her petition pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We affirm. 
 
 
In her petition, Hinds asked the court to stay an order of 
the Suffolk Probate and Family Court appointing a temporary 
guardian for her adult son, Duku Lado.  In denying the petition, 
the single justice noted that Hinds had already sought the same 
relief in the Appeals Court and that a single justice of that 
court had denied the request without prejudice to Hinds first 
seeking a stay in the trial court.  Hinds instead filed her 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, is available only in exceptional circumstances and when no 
other remedy is available.  Here, the single justice denied the 
petition essentially on the basis that Hinds did have an 
adequate alternative remedy -- that is, to seek a stay in the 
trial court and then, if the request were denied, to challenge  
that denial, or perhaps make a fresh request for a stay, in the 
Appeals Court.  
 
 
In her appeal from the single justice's judgment, Hinds no 
longer focuses on her motion to stay, but rather asks the court 
to vacate the trial court order appointing the temporary 
guardian.  As far as we can tell from the record that was before 
the single justice as well as the record that is before us, both 
2 
 
 
of which are difficult to discern, Hinds did not raise this 
issue before the single justice, and we therefore need not 
consider it.  See Carvalho v. Commonwealth, 460 Mass. 1014, 1014 
(2011), and cases cited.  Even if we were to consider it, 
however, Hinds would fare no better.  As with the motion to 
stay, G. L. c. 211, § 3, does not provide a means for Hinds to 
pursue the relief that she seeks in the circumstances presented.  
Rather, she can adequately challenge any adverse rulings 
regarding the guardianship in the ordinary course in the Appeals 
Court, whether pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., with 
respect to any interlocutory rulings of the trial court, or by 
way of an appeal from any final, appealable orders and 
judgments.  This case, particularly on the materials that have 
been put before us, does not  present an exceptional circumstance 
that requires this court to exercise our extraordinary power of 
general superintendence pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the 
face of these perfectly adequate alternatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
Betty Hinds, pro se, submitted a brief.