Case Title: In re Child of Jonathan D.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 14

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 14 
Docket: 
And-18-198 
Submitted 
On Briefs: January 17, 2019 
 
Decided: 
January 24, 2019 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF JONATHAN D. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Jonathan D. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Lewiston, 
Montgomery, J.) terminating his parental rights to his child pursuant to 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2017).1  We affirm the judgment.   
[¶2]  On July 7, 2016, the Department of Health and Human Services filed 
a child protection petition when the child was approximately fifteen months 
old.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4032 (2017).  The petition alleged that the father is a 
registered sex offender with a history of serious untreated mental health issues 
and that the mother was unable to keep unsafe persons—including the father—
away from the child.  On August 3, 2016, the Department requested a 
preliminary protection order.  The court (Oram, J.) held a hearing on the 
                                         
1  The Department sought termination of the father’s rights only.  The child has been in the care of 
the mother since September 1, 2017, and custody was returned to the mother on November 16, 2017.   
 
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Department’s request on August 16, 2016, and entered an order transferring 
custody of the child to the Department the following day.   
[¶3]  On November 1, 2016, the court (Dow, J.) held a jeopardy hearing 
and, after issuing findings of facts, entered an order relieving the Department 
of its obligation to pursue reunification efforts with the father based on the 
aggravating factor of his 2008 conviction of unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 
17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E-1) (2017), involving a two-year-old child.  See 22 
M.R.S. §§ 4002(1-B)(A)(1), 4035(1), (2) (2017).  Despite the cease reunification 
order, the court ordered the Department to provide the father with sex offender 
treatment and individual counseling.   
[¶4]  On January 25, 2018, the Department filed a petition for termination 
of the father’s parental rights.  The court (Montgomery, J.) held a hearing on the 
petition on April 10, 2018, and, on May 14, 2018, issued an order granting the 
Department’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights.  Based on the 
testimony presented at the hearing and other competent evidence in the 
record, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of 
the father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child because he is 
unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for 
 
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the child within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s need.  
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii).   
[¶5]  The court based its decision on the following factual findings, all of 
which are supported by competent evidence in the record.   
As a very young child, [the father] was subjected to egregious 
. . . abuse as well as neglect.  He has been diagnosed with a variety 
of mental illnesses, including schitzo-affective disorder, bipolar 
disorder, dissociative identity disorder, PTSD, and depression.  
This extended and severe childhood trauma has likely caused 
and/or exacerbated [the father’s] mental illness and demonstrable 
anger.   
 
 
In 2008, [the father] was convicted of Class B Unlawful Sexual 
Contact and sentenced to five years with all but two years 
suspended and six years of probation.  His crime involved sexual 
contact with a two-year-old girl while babysitting her. . . .   
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
 
As for sex offender treatment, [the father’s] engagement has 
been sporadic over the course of the last six or so years.  Despite 
repeated attempts to engage in the therapy, he has expressed a lack 
of confidence in the efficacy of such treatment and at least twice 
refused to sign treatment contracts, which is a required step in the 
treatment.   
 
. . . .  
 
 
. . .[The father’s] failure to wholeheartedly embrace and 
engage in treatment has increased the significant safety risks he 
poses to [the child] in a parenting role.   
 
. . . .  
 
 
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. . . [T]he risk to [the child] from [the father] for sexual abuse 
remains high as he refuses to take full responsibility for the 
conduct leading to his sex offense conviction.  His claim that the 
conviction resulted from him having a seizure while caring for the 
child victim is not only not credible, it shows a complete refusal to 
take one of the most important steps toward recovery, which is 
acknowledgment of his own action.  As long as [the father] attempts 
to convince himself and others that any sexual touching of that 
child victim was outside of his own control, he will be unable to 
make the changes necessary to reduce the risk of harm he poses to 
young children.   
 
[The father] faces great challenges as he attempts to address 
his very serious mental health conditions and to take responsibility 
for his past actions.  He remains an untreated sex offender who 
poses a threat of sexual abuse to [the child].  Since [the mother] and 
DHHS refuse to grant permission, he is statutorily prohibited from 
having contact with [the child]. . . . In addition, [the father] would 
be unable to protect [the child] from Jeopardy as [the child] would 
be subject to the threat of sexual abuse by him.   
 
 
. . . .  
 
[The child] has not had any contact with [the] father since 
[the child] was about 15 months old.  [The child] is now three years 
old . . . . The record evidence supports the conclusion that any 
future contact with [the father] would be akin to granting contact 
with a stranger.   
 
Moreover, [the father] has historically demonstrated a 
familiarity with the court system and its processes.  In the first 15 
months of [the child’s] life, [the father] estimated that he and [the 
mother] had appeared in the Lewiston District Court 20 to 30 
times. . . . The chance of a successful reunification between [the 
mother and the child] is possible only if [the father] is prohibited 
from disrupting [the child’s] life with [the] mother.  Given [the 
father’s] demonstrated inclination to excessively engage the court 
system, it is likely that without a termination of his parental rights, 
 
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he will continue to use the system in a way that is disruptive to [the 
child’s] progress.   
 
[¶6]  The father timely appealed.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2017); M.R. 
App. P. 2B(c).  On September 21, 2018, pursuant to the process outlined in In re 
M.C., 2014 ME 128, ¶ 7, 104 A.3d 139, counsel for the father filed a brief 
containing the factual and procedural history of the case, stating that she 
believed that there are no meritorious issues for appeal.  Counsel also filed a 
motion for an enlargement of time to allow the father to personally file a 
supplemental brief.  Although we granted the father an enlargement of time, he 
did not file a supplemental brief.  
[¶7]  Based on the court’s findings of fact, all of which have evidentiary 
support, the court did not err in determining that the father remains unable to 
protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time 
that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii); see also In re Child of Gustavus E., 2018 ME 43, ¶ 8, 
182 A.3d 153; In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195; In re 
Alexander D., 1998 ME 207, ¶ 18, 716 A.2d 222.  Nor did the court err or abuse 
its discretion in determining that termination of the father’s parental rights was 
in the child’s best interest.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a); see also In re A.H., 
 
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2013 ME 85, ¶ 16, 77 A.3d 1012; In re Marcus S., 2007 ME 24, ¶ 11, 916 A.2d 
225. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heidi M. Pushard, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant Father 
 
The Department of Health and Human Services did not file a brief 
 
 
Lewiston District Court docket number PC-2016-50 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY