Case Title: THE STATE OF WYOMING V. RITA ANN HUMPHREY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-10-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF WYOMING V. RITA ANN HUMPHREY2005 WY 131120 P.3d 1027Case Number: 05-2Decided: 10/06/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Petitioner,

 
 
v.

 
 
RITA ANN 
HUMPHREY,

 
 
Respondent.

 
 
Petition 
for Writ of Review 

 

Representing 
Petitioner:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Michael A. Blonigan, Special 
Assistant Attorney General; and Ryan P. Healy, Special Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Mr. 
Blonigan.

 
 

Representing 
Respondent:

Michael 
J. Krampner, Casper, 
Wyoming

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]           
This 
Court granted the State's petition for writ of review to determine whether the 
district court erred in dismissing, on speedy trial grounds, the first degree 
murder charge against Rita Ann Humphrey.  
We hold the district court erred as a matter of law in relying upon the 
lapse in time between the dismissal of the initial first degree murder 
indictment and the filing of the instant information in holding that Humphrey's 
constitutional right to a speedy trial was abridged.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand for 
further proceedings.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]           
The 
State presents the following issue for our review:

 
 
Did the 
district court err in including time when no charges were pending in determining 
whether the Respondent's rights under the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article One, Section 6 of the 
Wyoming Constitution were violated?

 
 
While 
Humphrey has phrased the issue somewhat differently than the State, the thrust 
of the issues she presents is essentially the same as that posed by the 
State.

 
 

FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
The 
procedural history of this case is not in dispute.  On November 23, 1977, Jack Humphrey, 
Rita Humphrey's (Humphrey) husband, died from a single gunshot wound to the 
head.  On April 11, 1980, a grand 
jury returned an indictment against Humphrey, charging her with first degree 
murder in the death of her husband.  
Humphrey was arrested that same day.  Three days later, Humphrey requested, 
and was later granted, a preliminary hearing.  The parties stipulated to a June 23, 
1980, hearing date, and Humphrey waived her right to a speedy preliminary 
hearing.  The preliminary hearing 
failed to produce sufficient probable cause to support the murder charge, and 
the county court judge dismissed the case on July 2, 1980.  The district court formally dismissed 
the indictment on August 22, 1980.  

 
 

[¶4]           
The 
State reopened the investigation into Jack Humphrey's death in 1999.  On March 5, 2004, the State once again 
arrested Humphrey and charged her with the first-degree murder of her 
husband.  Following a preliminary 
hearing on May 26, 2004, Humphrey was bound over to district court.  

 
 

[¶5]           
Humphrey's 
trial was initially set for September 27, 2004, stacked with other criminal 
trials.  On July 8, 2004, Humphrey 
filed a motion requesting that a "date certain" be set for her trial.  A month later, Humphrey appeared at her 
arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.  A scheduling conference was held on 
August 25, 2004, and the parties agreed to a January 3, 2005, trial date.  

 
 

[¶6]           
Two days 
later, on August 27, 2004, Humphrey filed a motion to dismiss the first degree 
murder charge for lack of a speedy trial as guaranteed by the 
United 
States and Wyoming Constitutions.  Humphrey premised her speedy trial claim 
on the 24-year lapse in time between the filing of the initial indictment in 
1980 and the filing of the instant information.  She claimed the State's delay in 
pursuing the case to trial substantially prejudiced her ability to defend 
against the charge.  The State filed 
its response to the motion on September 15, 2004.  In addition to the initial motion and 
response, the parties filed numerous other pleadings and documents supporting 
their respective positions regarding Humphrey's speedy trial claim.  

 
 

[¶7]           
The 
district court heard testimony and argument on Humphrey's speedy trial motion on 
October 28, 2004, and took the matter under advisement.  On December 2, 2004, the district court 
issued a decision letter stating it was granting Humphrey's motion to 
dismiss.  The district court entered 
its order dismissing the case on December 20, 2004.  The State filed the instant petition for 
writ of review seeking reversal of the district court's order, which this Court 
granted on January 25, 2005.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶8]           
This 
Court examines de novo the constitutional question of whether a defendant has 
been denied a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution.  Warner v. State, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 9, 28 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo. 2001).  We review 
the district court's factual findings for clear error.  Id.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶9]           
The 
Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Art. 1, § 10 of the 
Wyoming Constitution guarantee that the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy trial.  In determining 
whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial, this Court adheres to the 
test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 
407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).  Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 31, 93 P.3d 222, 230 (Wyo. 2004); Caton v. 
State, 709 P.2d 1260, 1263-64 (Wyo. 1985); 
Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1405 
(Wyo. 
1972).  The Barker test requires the balancing of 
four factors: the length of the delay; the reason for the delay; the defendant's 
assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and the prejudice to the 
defendant.  Berry, ¶ 31, 93 P.3d  at 230-31.  None of these 
factors alone is sufficient to establish a speedy trial violation.  Rather, they must be considered together 
and balanced in relation to all relevant circumstances.  Id. 
at 231; Warner, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d  at 
26.  If a speedy trial violation is 
found to have occurred, the charge must be dismissed.  Id.; Barker, 407 U.S.  at 522, 92 S. Ct.  at 2188.

 
 

[¶10]       
Our 
primary focus in this case is the district court's conclusion regarding the 
first factor of the Barker test, the 
length of delay attendant to the criminal proceedings.  In finding a speedy trial violation, the 
district court considered the entire period between the initial April 11, 1980, 
indictment and the January 3, 2005, trial date, constituting a delay of 
approximately twenty-four years and eight months.  The court then used the twenty-four-year 
time frame as the foundation upon which it based its further analysis.      

 
 

[¶11]       
The 
State contends that the district court erred in its computation of the length of 
delay.  We agree.  The speedy trial clock begins to run 
upon arrest or when charges are filed.  
Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1078 
(Wyo. 
1992).  See also United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7, 102 S. Ct. 1497, 1501, 71 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1982); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 
314-15, 92 S. Ct. 455, 460, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971).  However, the speedy trial guarantee is 
no longer applicable once charges are dismissed.  MacDonald, 456 U.S.  at 8, 102 S. Ct.  at 1502.  In MacDonald, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a delay which occurs between the dismissal of a charge and the 
subsequent refiling of the charge does not count in speedy trial 
calculations.  Id. at 6-10, 102 S. Ct.  at 1501-03.  Four years later, 
the Supreme Court reemphasized that the Speedy Trial Clause has no application 
to the period of time in which a defendant is neither under arrest nor formally 
charged.  United 
States v. Loud 
Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 106 S. Ct. 648, 88 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1986).

 
 

[¶12]       
The 
district court correctly determined the speedy trial clock in the instant case 
initially began to run when the indictment was filed and Humphrey was arrested 
in 1980.  However, the district 
court erred in failing to stop the clock when the indictment was dismissed a few 
months later.  The speedy trial 
clock only resumed running again when the second murder charge was filed against 
Humphrey on March 5, 2004.  The 
twenty-four-year gap between the dismissal of the first charge and the filing of 
the second charge is excluded from the speedy trial clock.

 
 

[¶13]       
Humphrey 
initially argues that MacDonald and 
Loud Hawk have been implicitly 
overruled by Doggett v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1992).  We disagree.  Doggett is in accord with MacDonald and Loud Hawk on the issue pertinent to our review.  In Doggett, the Supreme Court expressly 
reaffirmed its holding in MacDonald 
and Loud Hawk that "the Sixth 
Amendment right of the accused to a speedy trial has no application beyond the 
confines of a formal criminal prosecution."  Doggett, 505 U.S.  at 655, 112 S. Ct.  at 2692.  The formal criminal 
prosecution begins when "a defendant is indicted, arrested, or otherwise 
officially accused" and ends when "the Government, acting in good faith, 
formally drops charges."  MacDonald, 456 U.S.  at 6-7, 102 S. Ct.  at 1501.  Contrary to 
Humphrey's contentions, Doggett 
clearly adheres to the MacDonald 
formula for computing the length of delay applicable to a speedy trial 
analysis.

 
 

[¶14]       
Turning 
to Wyoming law, Humphrey argues that Wyoming precedent mandates consideration of 
the entire time period from the filing of the initial charge to the ultimate 
date of trial, regardless of whether that trial stems from the initial charge or 
a subsequent charge, citing Caton v. 
State, 709 P.2d 1260 (Wyo. 1985), and 
Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, 93 P.3d 222 (Wyo. 2004).  Humphrey misreads Caton and Berry.  In both cases, this Court limited the 
time periods relevant to speedy trial analysis to those during which formal 
criminal prosecutions were pending.  
Caton, 709 P.2d  at 1264; 
Berry, ¶¶ 32-33, 
93 P.3d  at 231-32.  

 
 

[¶15]       
Caton very 
specifically demonstrates that the time period between charges arising from the 
same criminal act are not included in the speedy trial calculation.   In Caton, the initial information against 
Caton was filed on July 19, 1983.  
Ultimately, due to some confusion regarding what charges should be 
brought against Caton, three different informations were filed against him.  The trial was finally held on August 29, 
1984.  Caton, 709 P.2d  at 1263.  Caton appealed, alleging in part that he 
was denied a speedy trial.  This 
Court initially noted that the speedy trial calculation was not affected by the 
fact that the State changed the charges against Caton during the course of the 
formal criminal prosecution.  In 
response to argument by the State, this Court reaffirmed that the speedy trial 
period begins to run upon the filing of formal charges and continues to run 
during the entire time the defendant remains under charge.  If one charge is dismissed and 
supplanted by a different charge, the time the defendant is under either charge 
will be tacked as long as the different charges relate to the same criminal 
act.  Id. at 
1264.

 
 

[¶16]       
For our 
purposes, the more important aspect of Caton is this Court's actual computation 
of time.  At one point, while 
awaiting trial, the State dismissed its then current information against Caton 
and did not file a new information against Caton until two days later.  This Court, in accord with MacDonald, considered only the time that 
Caton was under formal charge, excluding from its speedy trial calculation the 
two-day period when no charges were pending against him.  Id. at 1264.  The result was that this Court, in its 
speedy trial calculation, considered the period of time from the filing of the 
initial information up until the dismissal of the first two informations.1  This Court then excluded the two-day 
time period from that dismissal until the filing of the third information.  With the filing of the third 
information, this Court resumed its calculation and considered the time period 
between the filing of the third information and trial.

 
 

[¶17]       
Berry 
likewise does not support Humphrey's contention.  The primary analysis in Berry concerned how to compute the 
length of delay for speedy trial purposes when a defendant is held in continuous 
custody from the time of initial arrest to trial.  Berry, ¶¶ 32-33, 
93 P.3d  at 231-32.  Clearly, that 
analysis is not applicable in the instant case.  This Court did, however, present 
discussion on some fundamental principles generally applicable to computing time 
for speedy trial analysis:

 
 
Once the 
defendant's speedy trial right has attached, it "continues until the defendant 
is convicted, acquitted or a formal entry is made on the record of his case that 
he is no longer under indictment."  
This is commonly taken to mean 
that in the event of reindictment the date of the original arrest or charge is 
still controlling, but that the time between the dismissal and recharging are 
[sic] not counted, provided of course that the defendant is not held in custody 
in the interim awaiting the new charge.

 
 

Berry, ¶ 32, 
93 P.3d  at 231 (emphasis in original) (quoting LaFave, Israel and King, 4 Criminal Procedure § 18.1(c), pp. 
670-71).   The Berry decision 
rested upon the fact Berry was held in continuous custody.  Humphrey was not held in custody during 
the twenty-four-year period between the time the first charge against her was 
dismissed and the second charge was filed.  
Therefore, the time between the dismissal and recharging is not 
counted.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶18]       
We hold 
that the twenty-four years between the dismissal and refiling of charges must be 
excluded when computing the length of delay for constitutional speedy trial 
purposes.  We therefore reverse the 
order of the district court and remand the case to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Should the occasion arise, the district 
court must recalculate the length of delay, excluding the twenty-four-year time 
period.  This new calculation will 
necessarily require the district court to engage in a new analysis under the 
four-part Barker 
test.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Both the first and second 
informations were pending against Caton at the same time.