Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson

Citation: 2010-Ohio-5709

Docket Number: 20100735

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5709.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-5709 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. JACKSON. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5709.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Two-year license suspension partially stayed on 
conditions. 
(No. 2010-0735 — Submitted August 10, 2010 — Decided November 30, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-042. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Stanley Jackson Jr. of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0077011, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2003.  In 
a three-count amended complaint, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged 
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respondent with violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the 
Rules of Professional Conduct arising from his representation of two clients and 
his conduct in the ensuing disciplinary investigation.1  A panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the case, including the 
testimony of respondent and other witnesses, and considered the parties’ 
stipulations to certain facts and misconduct.  Based upon findings that he has 
committed multiple ethical violations by charging a clearly excessive fee, 
dividing his fees with other lawyers without disclosing the terms of that division, 
intentionally damaging or prejudicing a client during the course of his 
representation, and making knowingly false statements of material fact during a 
disciplinary investigation, the panel recommended that respondent’s license to 
practice law be suspended for two years, with the second year stayed on 
conditions.  Adopting the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct, the board 
nevertheless recommends that we suspend respondent’s license for two years with 
no stay. 
{¶ 2} Respondent objects to the board’s recommended sanction and 
urges us to adopt the panel’s recommendation that a portion of the suspension be 
stayed.  We accept the board’s findings of fact and misconduct.  Because we 
conclude that the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct is a two-year 
suspension with six months stayed on conditions, we sustain respondent’s 
objections. 
Misconduct 
                                          
 
1.  Relator charged respondent with misconduct pursuant to applicable rules for acts occurring 
before and after February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
superseded the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
 
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3 
Count I 
{¶ 3} The stipulations and evidence adduced at the panel hearing 
demonstrate that in December 2007, respondent received $25,000 to represent a 
professional rap artist who was charged with carrying a concealed weapon into 
the Cleveland Hopkins International Airport.  Fifteen days after the representation 
commenced and while the criminal case was still pending, the client terminated 
respondent’s legal services and requested a $22,000 refund.  Respondent did not 
answer several letters he received from the client’s representative and did not 
refund any portion of the fee.  Respondent claimed that he had earned the $30,000 
flat fee he had quoted the client by (1) making sure the client’s bond was not 
excessive, (2) obtaining the client’s release from jail, (3) negotiating with federal 
authorities to ensure that the client did not face federal prosecution for his actions, 
and (4) having the matter prosecuted by the city of Cleveland. 
{¶ 4} The parties stipulated and the panel and board found that 
respondent’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
charging or collecting a clearly excessive fee) and 1.16(e) (failing to promptly 
refund unearned attorney fees).  The panel dismissed six other alleged violations, 
having unanimously concluded that relator failed to satisfy its burden of proving 
them by clear and convincing evidence.  See Gov.Bar R. V (6)(H) (permitting a 
hearing panel to dismiss a charge or count of misconduct upon a unanimous 
finding that there is insufficient evidence to support it). 
Count II 
{¶ 5} The panel found that in October 2004, a man had hired respondent 
to recover $55,000 that the Willoughby Hills Police Department had seized from 
him during a traffic stop the previous month.  The man had executed a limited 
power of attorney authorizing respondent alone to seek the return of the seized 
money and had also agreed to pay a $750 flat fee plus 30 percent of any funds 
recovered. 
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{¶ 6} At respondent’s request, another attorney, who was not a member 
of his firm, agreed to serve as co-counsel in exchange for a portion of the attorney 
fees.  The client never received a writing detailing that attorney’s participation in 
his case or explaining respondent’s fee agreement with that attorney.  Nor did the 
client consent to the arrangement.  When the client advised the additional attorney 
that he did not want his services, that attorney claimed that he was owed fees of 
$5,000 and had a lien against any money eventually received by the client in the 
case. 
{¶ 7} Respondent filed a notice of appeal in the case after receiving an 
unfavorable court ruling and consulting with the client.  A second attorney, also 
unaffiliated with respondent’s firm, agreed to serve as co-counsel for the appeal in 
exchange for a portion of the attorney fees.  Again, respondent did not advise the 
client that this attorney would be serving as lead counsel or disclose the terms of 
the fee division to him. 
{¶ 8} With the appeal pending, and without the client’s knowledge or 
consent, respondent and his co-counsel filed a federal civil rights action on the 
client’s behalf.  After the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in the 
client’s first case, respondent settled the related civil rights lawsuit for $2,500 
without the client’s knowledge and filed a stipulation to dismiss the action with 
prejudice. 
{¶ 9} Respondent received a settlement check payable to himself, the 
two attorneys who had assisted him in the actions, and the client.  He signed the 
client’s name on the back of the check without the client’s consent, deposited it 
into his client trust account, and immediately withdrew $2,500 in cash.  
Respondent claims to have distributed the entire $2,500 to his former co-counsel 
in the municipal court case and admits that he did not distribute any of the 
settlement proceeds to the client or provide him with a closing statement detailing 
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the distribution of those proceeds.  He has not complied with the client’s requests 
for his file and asserts that the co-counsel was responsible for maintaining it. 
{¶ 10} Based upon these findings, the panel concluded that respondent’s 
conduct violated DR 2-107(A)(2) (requiring a lawyer to disclose to a client in 
writing the terms of the division of the fee), 1-102(A)(6) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law), 7-101(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
intentionally prejudicing or damaging a client during the course of the 
professional relationship), and 9-102(B)(4) and 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer to 
promptly deliver funds or other property that the client is entitled to receive).  The 
board adopted these findings of misconduct and also found that respondent’s 
conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) as charged in the amended complaint.2  We 
accept these findings of fact and misconduct. 
Count III 
{¶ 11} Consistent with the parties’ stipulations, the panel and board found 
that respondent has made inconsistent statements of material fact throughout this 
disciplinary proceeding.  At his February 12, 2009 deposition, respondent testified 
that in representing the client in Count I, he “ended up getting to the airport, 
talking to the FBI, [and] convinced them not to charge [his client].”  In contrast, at 
his October 8, 2009 deposition, respondent testified that he “turned around before 
[he] actually reached the airport” because “before [he] could get to the airport, 
they [the FBI] had released [the client] and started taking him to Cleveland.” 
                                          
 
2.  The board found that the panel had dismissed the alleged violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), yet the 
board proceeded to find that respondent’s conduct violated that rule.  The record reveals, however, 
that the panel dismissed only the alleged violations of DR 1-102(A)(5) and 4-101(B)(1) and 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and that it made no finding with respect to the alleged violation of DR 1-
102(A)(4).   
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{¶ 12} Respondent also gave conflicting testimony regarding his handling 
of the settlement check issued in Count Two.  He initially testified that one of the 
attorneys who served as co-counsel had signed the client’s name to the check.  He 
later admitted that he had signed the client’s name, but claimed that he had “no 
direct knowledge” as to how or to whom the settlement funds were distributed.  
Then, in a written response to relator’s request for information regarding the 
distribution of the settlement proceeds, respondent stated that the client had 
authorized the payment to his former co-counsel, who had asserted a lien on the 
file.  Although he testified that he cashed the settlement check and presented the 
entire amount to his former co-counsel, that attorney testified that respondent had 
paid him only $600. 
{¶ 13} The panel and board concluded that respondent’s false and 
inconsistent statements violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) (prohibiting knowingly 
making a false statement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter) 
and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (requiring a lawyer to cooperate with a disciplinary 
investigation).  We accept these findings of fact and misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 14} In recommending a sanction, the panel and board considered the 
ethical duties that respondent violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.  See, 
e.g., Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 
N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16; Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-
Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 15} The panel and board found that respondent’s commission of 
multiple offenses and false and inconsistent statements during the disciplinary 
process were aggravating factors weighing in favor of a greater sanction. BCGD 
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Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d) and (f).  But they also considered respondent’s lack of a 
prior disciplinary record, reported good-faith effort to make restitution to the 
client in Count I, 3 and eight letters from civic leaders, business people, clients, 
and family members, as factors in mitigation.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (c), 
and (e).  Although they did not specifically cite them as mitigating factors, the 
panel and board also noted respondent’s volunteer work and creation of a 
scholarship program for underprivileged students at his alma mater, Bowling 
Green State University.  While the panel recommended that respondent be 
suspended for two years with the second year stayed on the conditions that he pay 
restitution to the client in Count I and receive education regarding proper law-
office management, the board recommended that we impose a two-year 
suspension with no stay.  Respondent objects and argues that Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 84, 2009-Ohio-500, 902 N.E.2d 25; Cleveland 
Metro. Bar Assn. v. Kealy, 125 Ohio St.3d 238, 2010-Ohio-1554, 927 N.E.2d 591; 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Larson, 124 Ohio St.3d 249, 2009-Ohio-6766, 921 N.E.2d 
618; and Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Mishler, 118 Ohio St.3d 109, 2008-Ohio-1810, 
886 N.E.2d 818, and the mitigating factors present in this case weigh in favor of a 
less exacting sanction. 
{¶ 16} In Davis, we imposed a sanction of a two-year suspension with 12 
months stayed on conditions.  Davis had failed to provide notice of a settlement to 
the client’s automobile insurer as required to obtain underinsured-motorist 
coverage, had made false representations to the client about the status of the case, 
and had evaded relator’s inquiries during the resulting disciplinary investigation.  
                                          
 
3.  On August 11, 2010, respondent’s counsel filed a motion to clarify the record, based upon his 
belief that his response to questions at oral argument may have given the impression that his client 
had made no payment toward his $15,000 restitution obligation.  Because the record reflects that 
respondent has made one payment of $1,000 pursuant to his agreement with the affected client, we 
hereby grant respondent’s motion.  
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Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 84, 2009-Ohio-500, 902 N.E.2d 25, ¶ 4-11.  As 
aggravating factors, we accepted the board’s findings that she had had a dishonest 
motive, had engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses, and 
had caused serious harm to the client.  Id. at ¶ 16, citing BCGD Proc. Reg. 
10(B)(1)(b), (c), (d), and (h). 
{¶ 17} In mitigation, however, we recognized that Davis was very new to 
the bar and had had no experience in personal-injury litigation when she accepted 
the client’s case and that she later conceded the gravity of her misconduct.  Id. at ¶ 
16.  Although Davis initially evaded the relator’s investigation, she eventually 
cooperated, and the parties stipulated to her good character and reputation.  Id.; 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d) and (e). 
{¶ 18} In Kealy, we suspended the respondent for 18 months with 12 
months stayed on conditions based upon findings that he had neglected an 
entrusted legal matter, intentionally failed to carry out a contract of employment, 
intentionally prejudiced or damaged a client, engaged in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, accepted a loan from a client when 
he and the client had differing interests, and knowingly made false statements of 
material fact during the resulting disciplinary investigation.  Kealy, 125 Ohio 
St.3d 238, 2010-Ohio-1554, 927 N.E.2d 591, ¶ 4, 6, 8, 19. 
{¶ 19} Aggravating factors in Kealy included a pattern of misconduct, a 
refusal to completely acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct, an initial 
failure to be forthcoming in the resulting disciplinary investigation, and harm to 
clients.  Id. at ¶ 12; BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c), (e), (g), and (h).  In mitigation, 
however, we found that Kealy had practiced law for 30 years without incident, 
had performed a “staggering amount” of pro bono work, and had a long history of 
volunteerism.  Id. at ¶ 13; BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2(a) and (e). 
{¶ 20} In Larson, we imposed a two-year suspension with one year stayed 
on conditions, including one year of monitored probation, based upon findings 
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that the attorney had misled a client about the status of her driver’s license 
suspension and other traffic citations, had failed to perform his duties as counsel 
for that client and two others, had failed to return unearned fees to all three 
clients, and had failed to cooperate in two of the resulting disciplinary 
investigations.  Larson, 124 Ohio St.3d 249, 2009-Ohio-6766, 921 N.E.2d 618, ¶ 
2.  In mitigation, we adopted the board’s findings that the respondent had no prior 
disciplinary offenses, had presented testimony of three judges attesting to his 
good character, and had produced medical evidence demonstrating that a medical 
condition had contributed to his misconduct.  Id. at ¶ 20; BCGD Proc. Reg. 
10(B)(2)(a) and(e).  But in aggravation, we noted that respondent had engaged in 
a pattern of misconduct that harmed three clients, had failed to respond to the 
disciplinary investigation until compelled to do so by subpoena, and had given 
evasive answers during the disciplinary investigation.  Id. at ¶ 41; BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c), (e), and (h). 
{¶ 21} The panel and board cite Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Mishler, 118 Ohio 
St.3d 109, 2008-Ohio-1810, 886 N.E.2d 818, in support of their respective 
recommendations.  In Mishler, we imposed a two-year suspension with the last 
year stayed on conditions where an attorney had accepted a settlement offer 
without his client’s knowledge, had obtained settlement proceeds by forging the 
client’s endorsement, had charged excessive fees, had failed to refund 
unexpended client funds or provide an accounting, and had failed to obtain a 
client’s consent to have another attorney who was not a member of his firm assist 
in the representation.  Id. at ¶ 15, 23, 26, 47. 
{¶ 22} In mitigation, we noted that Mishler did not have a prior 
disciplinary record, presented evidence of his good character, and made an effort 
to repay the clients harmed by his misconduct.  Id. at ¶ 41; BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(a), (c), and (e).  We found, however, that these factors were outweighed 
by the facts that he had acted out of self-interest, had committed multiple 
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offenses, had engaged in a pattern of misconduct, and either could not or would 
not explain his actions.  Id. at ¶ 41; BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (c), and (d). 
{¶ 23} We acknowledge that each of these cases involves some conduct 
comparable to respondent’s misconduct in this case, and that each of these cases 
resulted in a suspension of 18 to 24 months with some portion of that suspension 
stayed on conditions.  We conclude, however, that none of these cases accurately 
reflect the full spectrum of ethical violations that respondent has been found to 
commit. 
{¶ 24} Davis, a young attorney like respondent, had intentionally caused 
damage or prejudice to a client and had engaged in conduct adversely reflecting 
upon her fitness to practice.  But she did not engage in undisclosed fee splitting, 
fail to promptly deliver funds that a client was entitled to receive, or charge an 
illegal or clearly excessive fee.  Moreover, while she initially “evaded inquiries 
during relator’s investigation,”  Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 84, 2009-Ohio-500, 902 
N.E.2d 25,  at ¶ 11, she later fully disclosed her misconduct, without making false 
statements or misrepresentations.  Id. at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 25} Like respondent, Kealy’s ethical infractions included violations of 
Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) for conduct that occurred during his 
disciplinary investigation.  Kealy, 125 Ohio St.3d 238, 2010-Ohio-1554, 927 
N.E.2d 591, ¶ 5, 12.  But while Kealy was “not initially forthcoming in the 
investigation of his ethical infractions” and made a false statement to 
investigators, Kealy at ¶ 5-6 and 12, respondent’s multiple false statements have 
occurred throughout the investigation and panel hearing.  Likewise, while Larson 
initially failed to cooperate in two disciplinary investigations, he later cooperated 
and ultimately admitted that he had committed multiple violations of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Professional Conduct and Gov.Bar 
R. V(4)(G).  Larson, 124 Ohio St.3d 249, 2009-Ohio-6766, 921 N.E.2d 618, ¶ 8, 
13, 15.  And although Mishler “either could not or would not explain his 
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misdeeds,”  Mishler, 118 Ohio St.3d 109, 2008-Ohio-1810, 886 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 41, 
we made no findings that he either failed to cooperate or made false or misleading 
statements in his disciplinary investigation. 
{¶ 26} In this case, although respondent offered limited cooperation in the 
disciplinary proceedings by stipulating to numerous facts and admitting two of the 
charged ethical violations, his cooperation is far outweighed by the fact that his 
misconduct continued throughout the investigation and panel hearing.  The record 
also reflects that he has violated his agreement to repay his client in Count I.  
Moreover, respondent’s character evidence is of limited value in mitigation. 
{¶ 27} Having weighed respondent’s misconduct and having given due 
consideration to the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors and the sanctions 
imposed for similar misconduct, we conclude that the appropriate sanction for 
respondent’s misconduct is a two-year suspension of his license to practice law in 
Ohio, with six months stayed on the conditions that he (1) commit no further acts 
of misconduct, (2) comply with his written agreement to pay restitution to the 
client affected by the misconduct in Count I, and (3) serve one year of monitored 
probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(9)(B) upon his reinstatement to the 
practice of law.  If respondent fails to comply with the conditions of the stay, the 
stay will be lifted, and respondent will serve the entire two-year suspension.  
Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
BROWN, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Philip A. King, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Alvin E. Mathews Jr. and Richard Koblentz, for respondent. 
______________________