Case Title: Saunders v. Edenton OB/GYN Ctr

Citation: 352 N.C. 136

Docket Number: 469A99

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 469A99
FILED 16 JUNE 2000
BARBARA SAUNDERS,
Employee
v.
EDENTON OB/GYN CENTER,
Employer
and
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY,
Carrier
Appeal by defendants pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2)
from an unpublished decision of a divided panel of the Court of
Appeals, 134 N.C. App. 733, 527 S.E.2d 94 (1999), affirming an
opinion and award entered by the North Carolina Industrial
Commission on 15 July 1998.  On 2 December 1999, this Court
allowed defendants’ petition for discretionary review as to
additional issues.  Heard in the Supreme Court 14 March 2000.
The Twiford Law Firm, L.L.P., by Branch W. Vincent,
III, for plaintiff-appellee.
Brooks, Stevens & Pope, P.A., by Michael C. Sigmon and
Joy H. Brewer, for defendant-appellants.
LAKE, Justice.
This case arises from proceedings before the North
Carolina Industrial Commission (the Commission) and primarily
raises the issues of whether, under the facts of this case, there
was an ongoing presumption of total disability in favor of
plaintiff and, if so, whether defendants rebutted that
presumption.
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On 7 December 1992, plaintiff Barbara Saunders, an
employee of Edenton Ob/Gyn Center (Edenton), was injured while
attempting to break the fall of a patient who had fainted.  Ms.
Saunders stopped working on 31 December 1992 because of back pain
resulting from her injury.  The parties executed a Form 21,
“Agreement for Compensation for Disability,” on 28 January 1993,
which the Commission approved on 19 March 1993.  The agreement
specified plaintiff had returned to work on 28 January 1993 and
had received $231.68, the compensable amount applicable to
plaintiff for total disability pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 97-29, for
the four weeks she was out of work between 31 December 1992 and
28 January 1993.  On 14 April 1993, the parties executed a Form
26, “Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement as to Payment of
Compensation,” which the Commission approved on 24 May 1993,
reflecting that plaintiff did not actually return to work at
Edenton until 8 March 1993, at which time her weekly earning
power “was increased” from “$-0-” to “varies” for “necessary”
weeks, and wherein the parties agreed that plaintiff had a
disability of “temp. partial disability.”
As of 2 June 1993, plaintiff’s physician noted that
plaintiff was working full time, although she was not performing
any significant lifting and continued to experience pain and
tightening in her neck.  Plaintiff was assessed as having reached
maximum medical improvement on 21 September 1993, and on 30
December 1993, Dr. Helen Harmon assigned a three percent
permanent partial impairment rating to plaintiff’s cervical
spine.
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Plaintiff worked full time until 20 October 1993, at
which time she resigned from her position at Edenton because of
pain from her injury and stress from the lack of sleep caused by
her pain.  Although plaintiff asked her office manager if there
was a lighter-duty job in the Edenton office, the manager advised
plaintiff that no such job was available.
In 1994, plaintiff worked as a secretary two to four
hours per week for Saunders & Sons, Inc., a family-owned
construction company, and earned $37.53 per week, for a total of
$3,600.00 in 1994.  After a year, she left that employment
because the company could no longer afford to pay her, and on 5
May 1995, she found employment at Chowan Hospital as a ward
secretary.  Plaintiff worked thirty-six hours per week until she
resigned on 17 September 1995 because of the recurrence of
symptoms associated with her 1992 back injury, including muscle
spasms and pain and stiffness in her neck and back.  Plaintiff
earned a total of $4,180.24 working for Chowan Hospital.
On 29 March 1995, plaintiff filed a Form 33, “Request
that Claim be Assigned for Hearing,” indicating that she believed
she was entitled to permanent total disability from the date of
her resignation from Edenton on 20 October 1993.  The case was
heard by a deputy commissioner, who filed an opinion and award on
18 September 1997 concluding defendants had successfully rebutted
the presumption of disability by showing that plaintiff’s job
with Edenton was suitable to her restrictions, that plaintiff
resigned for reasons unrelated to her compensable injury, and
that plaintiff obtained two other jobs which demonstrated her
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retention of wage-earning capacity.  The deputy commissioner
denied temporary total, temporary partial, and permanent total
compensation claims and awarded nine weeks of permanent partial
impairment compensation.
Plaintiff appealed to the full Commission.  The
Commission, with one commissioner dissenting, filed an opinion
and award on 15 July 1998, finding, inter alia, that as a result
of her traumatic incident on 7 December 1992, plaintiff was
unable to earn wages in her former position or in any other
employment except for the weeks she was employed by Saunders &
Sons, Inc. and Chowan Hospital and that in those positions,
plaintiff was capable of earning only reduced wages.  The
Commission concluded that the Form 21 agreement for compensation
“created a presumption of continuing disability in plaintiff’s
favor” and that defendants had “not presented evidence sufficient
to rebut the presumption of continued disability raised by the
approved Form 21 Agreement.”  Based on their findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the Commission reversed the holding of the
deputy commissioner and awarded plaintiff the following: 
temporary total disability compensation from 20 October 1993, the
date of her resignation from Edenton, through such time as she
returns to work, with adjustment for the weeks in 1994 and 1995
that she was able to work for Saunders & Sons and Chowan
Hospital; temporary partial disability for the weeks she was able
to work for Saunders & Sons and Chowan Hospital; and all medical
expenses.
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Defendants appealed to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, which, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the opinion
and award of the Commission.  Defendants gave notice of appeal to
this Court on the basis of the dissent from the Court of Appeals
and petitioned for discretionary review of additional issues,
which was granted on 2 December 1999.
Defendants first contend the terms of the Form 21 and
Form 26 agreements in the instant case do not establish a
presumption of ongoing total disability.  For the reasons stated
hereinafter, we agree.
Settlement agreements between the parties, approved by
the Commission pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 97-17, are binding on the
parties and enforceable, if necessary, by court decree.  Pruitt
v. Knight Publishing Co., 289 N.C. 254, 258, 221 S.E.2d 355, 358
(1976).  The Commission and the Court of Appeals correctly
acknowledged precedent establishing that an approved Form 21
agreement is considered a settlement between the parties, which
results in a rebuttable presumption of continuing disability. 
See Saums v. Raleigh Community Hosp., 346 N.C. 760, 763, 487
S.E.2d 746, 749 (1997); Watkins v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 279
N.C. 132, 137, 181 S.E.2d 588, 592 (1971); Franklin v. Broyhill
Furniture Indus., 123 N.C. App. 200, 205, 472 S.E.2d 382, 386,
cert. denied, 344 N.C. 629, 477 S.E.2d 39 (1996); Dalton v. Anvil
Knitwear, 119 N.C. App. 275, 283, 458 S.E.2d 251, 257, disc. rev.
denied and cert. denied, 341 N.C. 647, 462 S.E.2d 507 (1995);
Radica v. Carolina Mills, 113 N.C. App. 440, 447, 439 S.E.2d 185,
190 (1994).  In all of the aforementioned cases, however, the
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presumption of continuing disability was established because the
agreement between the parties stipulated that the disability
would continue for “necessary weeks” or “for a period to be
determined,” as opposed to a limited or specified period of time. 
In each case, it was the specific terms of the agreement which
resulted in the ongoing presumption, not the Form 21 itself. 
Although in the case sub judice the issue is whether plaintiff
was presumptively entitled to permanent, temporary, partial or
total disability and not necessarily the period of disability,
resolution of the issue is determined by the terms of the
agreement between the parties.
In the instant case, the Commission approved the Form
21 agreement and limited plaintiff’s disability for a specified
period of four weeks, with a return to work date of 28 January
1993.  Although the Form 21 agreement did not specifically note
the type of disability for which plaintiff was being compensated,
the weekly compensation rate was fixed at a level equivalent to
the amount payable for total disability under N.C.G.S. § 97-29. 
When plaintiff did not return to work on 28 January, the parties
entered into a Form 26 supplemental agreement which specified
that plaintiff was entitled to a varied rate of compensation for
“temp. partial disability” for “necessary” weeks.  Based on the
terms of the Form 26 agreement, the presumption that plaintiff
was temporarily partially disabled, and not totally disabled, was
created through plaintiff’s agreement to, and the Commission’s
approval of, those terms.  When plaintiff thereafter petitioned
the Commission for a hearing and claimed entitlement to permanent
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total disability, a status substantially different in economic
impact from partial disability, she bore the burden of proving
total disability.  See Saums, 346 N.C. at 763, 487 S.E.2d at 749
(claimant has burden of proving the existence of disability and
its extent).
The Court of Appeals reasoned that plaintiff’s
stipulation that she was totally disabled for four weeks was not
a stipulation that her total disability ended after those four
weeks.  However, it is unnecessary to theorize on the impact of
the terms of the Form 21 agreement, as those terms were revised
by the terms of the Form 26 supplemental agreement, which
specified, with plaintiff’s approval as evidenced by her
signature, that her disability would extend for an ongoing period
of “necessary” weeks, at a varied rate for “temp. partial
disability.”  The terms of the supplemental agreement, entered
into by the parties and approved by the Commission, are the final
terms which became binding between the parties.
The Court of Appeals also reasoned that the inclusion
of the word “partial” before “disability” does not amount to a
rebuttal of the “presumption of disability” in favor of
plaintiff.  Although we agree that the presumption of disability
was not lost, we disagree that the presumption of total
disability was not lost through the subsequent agreement of
“partial disability.”  While the inclusion of the word “varies”
for plaintiff’s compensation rate does indicate uncertainty
regarding the extent of plaintiff’s partial disability, it
precludes coverage for total disability under N.C.G.S. § 97-29,
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unless plaintiff rebuts the presumption of partial disability
through the presentation of evidence supporting total disability
at a hearing before the Commission.
Although the findings of fact made by the Commission
are conclusive upon appeal when supported by competent evidence,
Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 6, 282 S.E.2d 458, 463
(1981), the Commission’s conclusions of law are fully reviewable,
Long v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Co., 321 N.C. 82, 86, 361
S.E.2d 575, 577 (1987).  In the instant case, the Commission
concluded, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that defendants had
the burden of proof to present evidence sufficient to rebut the
presumption of continued disability raised by the approved Form
21 agreement, that defendants had not met the burden of proof and
that plaintiff was therefore entitled to the continuing
presumption of total disability.  Based on this conclusion, the
Commission awarded plaintiff temporary total disability
compensation from 20 October 1993 through the present and
continuing until such time as she returns to work.  The
Commission’s conclusions, and the resulting award, ignore the
terms of the Form 26 agreement between the parties and were based
on the incorrect impression that plaintiff was entitled to an
ongoing presumption of total disability.  Because the award was
reached through the erroneous application of law, we therefore
reverse the Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming the award and
remand to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the
Commission for determination in accord with this opinion.
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In light of our conclusion that there was no continuing
presumption of total disability, we do not reach the question of
whether defendants rebutted the presumption.  Likewise, the
dissent from the Court of Appeals questions the sufficiency of
the Commission’s findings of fact addressing the reason plaintiff
left her employment with Saunders & Sons, Inc., and whether that
employment should have been sufficient to rebut the presumption
of disability.  As the opinion of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and on remand to the Commission plaintiff will have the
burden of rebutting an ongoing presumption of partial disability
in her claim for total disability, it is unnecessary for us to
address the issues raised by the dissent.  Additionally, with
respect to defendants’ contention that the Commission relied on
medical records not properly in evidence, after careful
consideration of the record, briefs and oral arguments of the
parties, specifically including the findings and conclusions of
the Commission, we conclude discretionary review of this issue
was improvidently allowed.
In summary, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the Commission finding an ongoing presumption of
total disability in favor of plaintiff.  The Form 26 agreement
between the parties established an ongoing presumption of “temp.
partial disability,” and plaintiff has the burden of rebutting
that presumption in moving to establish a claim for total
disability.  Likewise, in order to rebut plaintiff’s claim of
ongoing partial disability, in the event such issue arises,
defendants have the burden of proving “‘not only that suitable
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jobs are available, but also that the plaintiff is capable of
getting one, taking into account both physical and vocational
limitations.’”  Saums, 346 N.C. at 763-64, 487 S.E.2d at 749
(quoting Kennedy v. Duke Univ. Medical Ctr., 101 N.C. App. 24,
33, 398 S.E.2d 677, 682 (1990)).  The opinion of the Court of
Appeals is reversed and this case is remanded to that court for
further remand to the North Carolina Industrial Commission for
disposition in accordance with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART; DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED IN PART.