Case Title: Cypress v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 070815

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Millette, 
JJ., and Russell and Lacy, S.JJ. 
 
SHELDON A. CYPRESS 
 
v.  Record No. 070815 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
   OPINION BY 
JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
MARK A. BRISCOE  
        September 16, 2010 
 
v.  Record No. 070817 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
These two appeals are before this Court on remand from the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  In a per curiam opinion, 
the Supreme Court vacated this Court's judgment in Magruder v. 
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 283, 657 S.E.2d 113 (2008), and remanded 
the cases for further proceedings "not inconsistent with the 
opinion" in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. ___, 129 
S.Ct. 2527 (2009).  Briscoe v. Virginia, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 
S.Ct. 1316, 1316 (2010).  The specific legal question we decide 
on remand is a narrow one: in light of the decision in Melendez-
Diaz, did the admission into evidence of certificates of 
analysis pursuant to former Code §§ 19.2-187 and -187.1 violate 
rights secured by the Confrontation Clause?  We conclude that it 
did. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In Magruder, this Court affirmed the judgments of the Court 
of Appeals of Virginia upholding the respective convictions of 
the defendants, Sheldon A. Cypress and Mark A. Briscoe.1  275 Va. 
at 309, 657 S.E.2d at 127.  Cypress had been convicted in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake for possession of 
cocaine with the intent to distribute, second or subsequent 
offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-248(C).  Id. at 291, 657 
S.E.2d at 116.  Briscoe had been convicted in the Circuit Court 
of the City of Alexandria for possession with the intent to 
distribute cocaine, in violation of Code § 18.2-248(C), and 
unlawful transportation of cocaine into the Commonwealth with 
the intent to distribute, in violation of Code § 18.2-248.01.  
Id. at 293, 657 S.E.2d at 117. 
In each trial, the Commonwealth introduced, over the 
respective defendant's objection, a certificate of analysis 
pursuant to former Code § 19.2-187.2  Id. at 291, 293, 657 S.E.2d 
                     
1 We also affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
upholding a conviction of Michael Ricardo Magruder.  Magruder, 
275 Va. at 309, 657 S.E.2d at 127.  That conviction is not at 
issue in these appeals. 
2 The certificate of analysis admitted into evidence during 
Cypress' trial confirmed that the substance at issue was 60.5 
grams of cocaine.  Magruder, 275 Va. at 290, 657 S.E.2d at 116.  
In Briscoe's trial, the Commonwealth introduced two certificates 
of analysis, which together established that certain confiscated 
substance was "'solid material' cocaine" totaling 36.578 grams.  
Id. at 292, 657 S.E.2d at 117. 
 
2
116, 117.  That statute provided that a certificate of analysis 
was admissible at trial as evidence of the facts stated therein 
and the results of the analysis if the certificate was duly 
attested by the person performing the analysis and was filed 
with the clerk of the trial court at least seven days before 
trial.  Former Code § 19.2-187 (2008).  Pursuant to former Code 
§ 19.2-187.1, an accused, however, had the right to call the 
person performing the analysis as an adverse witness.  Former 
Code § 19.2-187.1 specifically stated: 
The accused in any hearing or trial in which a 
certificate of analysis is admitted into evidence 
. . . shall have the right to call the person 
performing such analysis or examination or 
involved in the chain of custody as a witness 
therein, and examine him in the same manner as if 
he had been called as an adverse witness. Such 
witness shall be summoned and appear at the cost 
of the Commonwealth.[3]  
                     
3 Shortly after the decision in Melendez-Diaz, the General 
Assembly amended former Code §§ 19.2-187 and –187.1.  2009 Acts 
chs. 1, 4 (Spec. Sess. I).  In pertinent part, the current 
version of Code § 19.2-187 states:  
In any hearing or trial of any criminal offense 
. . . , a certificate of analysis of a person 
performing an analysis or examination, duly 
attested by such person, shall be admissible in 
evidence as evidence of the facts therein stated 
and the results of the analysis or examination 
referred to therein, provided . . . (ii) the 
requirements of subsection A of § 19.2-187.1 have 
been satisfied and the accused has not objected 
to the admission of the certificate pursuant to 
subsection B of § 19.2-187.1.  
Section 19.2-187.1, in turn, now states in relevant 
part: 
 
3
Cypress and Briscoe each argued at trial and on appeal that 
the introduction of a certificate of analysis without any 
testimony from the forensic analyst who performed the testing 
                                                                  
A.  In any trial and in any hearing other than 
a preliminary hearing, in which the attorney for 
the Commonwealth intends to offer a certificate 
of analysis into evidence pursuant to § 19.2-187, 
the attorney for the Commonwealth shall:  
1.  Provide by mail, delivery, or otherwise, a 
copy of the certificate to counsel of record for 
the accused, or to the accused if he is 
proceeding pro se, at no charge, no later than 28 
days prior to the hearing or trial;  
2.  Attach to the copy of the certificate so 
provided under subdivision 1 a notice to the 
accused of his right to object to having the 
certificate admitted without the person who 
performed the analysis or examination being 
present and testifying;  
. . . . 
B.  The accused may object in writing to 
admission of the certificate of analysis, in lieu 
of testimony, as evidence of the facts stated 
therein and of the results of the analysis or 
examination. . . . If timely objection is made, 
the certificate shall not be admissible into 
evidence unless (i) the testimony of the person 
who performed the analysis or examination is 
admitted into evidence describing the facts and 
results of the analysis or examination during the 
Commonwealth's case-in-chief at the hearing or 
trial and that person is present and subject to 
cross-examination by the accused, (ii) the 
objection is waived by the accused or his counsel 
in writing or before the court, or (iii) the 
parties stipulate before the court to the 
admissibility of the certificate.  
 
 
4
and reported the results of the analysis violated his rights 
guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause.  Magruder, 275 Va. at 
297, 657 S.E.2d at 120.  We disagreed.  Assuming that a 
certificate of analysis is "testimonial" under Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and applying then-controlling 
Supreme Court precedent, this Court held: 
Pursuant to [former] Code § 19.2-187.1, the 
defendants could have insured the physical 
presence of the forensic analysts at trial 
by issuing summons for their appearance at 
the Commonwealth's cost, or asking the trial 
court or Commonwealth to do so.  At trial, 
the defendants could have called the 
forensic analysts as witnesses, placed them 
under oath, and questioned them as adverse 
witnesses, meaning the defendants could have 
cross-examined them. . . . In short, if the 
defendants had utilized the procedure 
provided in [former] Code § 19.2-187.1, they 
would have had the opportunity to cross-
examine the forensic analysts.  Contrary to 
the defendants' position, the Confrontation 
Clause does not insure that opportunity 
before a certificate of analysis is admitted 
into evidence. 
 
Magruder, 275 Va. at 299, 657 S.E.2d at 120-21 (citations 
omitted).  Rejecting the defendants' argument that former Code 
§ 19.2-187.1 impermissibly burdened the exercise of their 
Confrontation Clause rights by requiring them to take certain 
actions to preserve those rights, the Court noted that an 
accused is frequently required to take affirmative steps to 
assert constitutional rights.  Id. at 299-300, 657 S.E.2d at 
121.   
 
5
The defendants also claimed that the provisions of former 
Code § 19.2-187.1 shifted the burden of producing evidence by 
requiring them to call the forensic analysts in order to 
confront those witnesses.  Id. at 301, 657 S.E.2d at 122.  The 
Court, however, held the argument "[was] not cognizable under 
the Confrontation Clause [but rather] raise[d] due process 
concerns that [were] not properly before [the Court]."  Id.  We 
further explained that because the defendants had not exercised 
their rights under former Code § 19.2-187.1 to have the forensic 
analysts at trial, "they were never in the position of being 
forced, over their objection, to call a forensic analyst as a 
witness."  Id.  Thus, "'the trial court never had occasion to 
address the proper order of proof.'"  Id. (quoting Brooks v. 
Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 155, 168, 638 S.E.2d 131, 138 (2006)).   
Finally, the Court concluded that,  
 
[b]ased on the provisions of [former] Code 
§§ 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1, no criminal 
defendant can seriously contend that he is 
not on notice that a certificate of analysis 
will be admitted into evidence without 
testimony from the person who performed the 
analysis unless he utilizes the procedure 
provided in [former] Code § 19.2-187.1. 
 
Id. at 304, 657 S.E.2d at 124.  Thus, we held "that the 
procedure in [former] Code § 19.2-187.1 adequately safeguard[ed] 
a criminal defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause and 
that [Cypress' and Briscoe's] failure . . . to utilize that 
 
6
procedure waived their right to be confronted with the forensic 
analysts."  Id. at 305, 657 S.E.2d at 124. 
Cypress and Briscoe petitioned the United States Supreme 
Court for writs of certiorari.  Briscoe v. Virginia, 557 U.S. 
___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 2858, 2858 (2009).  Subsequently, the 
Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz.  There, the trial court 
admitted into evidence three certificates of analysis 
establishing that substances seized by the police and connected 
to the defendant contained cocaine.  557 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. 
at 2530-31.  Pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws Annotated, 
Chapter 111, § 13, the certificates served "as prima facie 
evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight" of the 
substances analyzed.  557 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2531 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Although the forensic 
analysts who tested the substances swore to the certificates 
before a notary public as required by the statute, they did not 
testify at trial.  Id.  The defendant objected, claiming that 
the decision in Crawford required the analysts to testify in 
person.  Id. 
The Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz first held that the 
certificates of analysis fell within the "'core class of 
testimonial statements'" described in Crawford because they were 
"quite plainly affidavits" and were "incontrovertibly a 'solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing 
 
7
or proving some fact.'"  Id. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 (quoting 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Thus, "[a]bsent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to 
testify at trial and that the petitioner had a prior opportunity 
to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to 'be confronted 
with' the analysts at trial."  Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 54) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In response to the 
argument that the forensic analysts were not "accusatory" 
witnesses and thus not subject to confrontation, the Supreme 
Court pointed out that the analysts testified against the 
defendant by proving the substance he possessed was cocaine.  
Id. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2533.  Contrasting the Confrontation 
Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause, the Supreme Court 
stated: "The text of the [Sixth] Amendment contemplates two 
classes of witnesses - those against the defendant and those in 
his favor.  The prosecution must produce the former [and] the 
defendant may call the latter."  Id. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2534. 
The Supreme Court then addressed the argument relevant to 
these appeals: whether the defendant's "ability to subpoena the 
analysts" preserved his confrontation rights.  Id. at ___, 129 
S.Ct. at 2540.  Concluding such power to be "no substitute for 
the right of confrontation," the Supreme Court explained: 
Unlike the Confrontation Clause, those 
provisions [of state law or the Compulsory 
Process Clause] are of no use to the 
 
8
defendant when the witness is unavailable or 
simply refuses to appear.  Converting the 
prosecution's duty under the Confrontation 
Clause into the defendant's privilege under 
state law or the Compulsory Process Clause 
shifts the consequences of adverse-witness 
no-shows from the State to the accused.  
More fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause 
imposes a burden on the prosecution to 
present its witnesses, not on the defendant 
to bring those adverse witnesses into court.  
Its value to the defendant is not replaced 
by a system in which the prosecution 
presents its evidence via ex parte 
affidavits and waits for the defendant to 
subpoena the affiants if he chooses. 
 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, made clear that an accused 
could waive his confrontation rights "by fail[ing] to object to 
the offending evidence" and that "States may adopt procedural 
rules governing the exercise of such objections."  Id. at ___ 
n.3, 129 S.Ct. at 2534 n.3.  Noting that many States "permit the 
defendant to assert (or forfeit by silence) his Confrontation 
Clause right after receiving notice of the prosecution's intent 
to use a forensic analyst's report," the Supreme Court described 
"notice-and-demand statutes": 
In their simplest form, notice-and-demand 
statutes require the prosecution to provide 
notice to the defendant of its intent to use 
an analyst's report as evidence at trial, 
after which the defendant is given a period 
of time in which he may object to the 
admission of the evidence absent the 
analyst's appearance live at trial. 
Id. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2540-41.  
 
9
Such statutes, according to the Supreme Court,  
shift no burden whatever [because] [t]he 
defendant always has the burden of raising 
his Confrontation Clause objection; notice-
and-demand statutes simply govern the time 
within which he must do so.  States are free 
to adopt procedural rules governing 
objections.  It is common to require a 
defendant to exercise his rights under the 
Compulsory Process Clause in advance of 
trial . . . .  There is no conceivable 
reason why he cannot similarly be compelled 
to exercise his Confrontation Clause rights 
before trial. 
 
Id. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2541 (citation omitted).  The Supreme 
Court specifically cited with approval three such "notice-and-
demand" statutes, Georgia Code Annotated § 35-3-154.1, Ohio 
Revised Code Annotated § 2925.51(C), and Section 4 of Article 
38.41 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Annotated, as well 
as the decision in Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 670 
(Colo. 2007), which approved Colorado's notice-and-demand 
statute.4  
In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he Sixth 
Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via 
ex parte out-of-court affidavits, and the admission of such 
evidence against Melendez-Diaz was error."  Melendez-Diaz, 557 
U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2542.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
                     
4 Colorado Revised Statutes § 16-3-309(5) allows a 
laboratory report to be admitted as evidence but permits a 
defendant to request that the person performing the analysis 
testify live on behalf of the State at a criminal trial. 
 
10
reversed the judgment of the Appeals Court of Massachusetts.  
Id. 
Following its decision in Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court 
granted the petitions filed by Briscoe and Cypress, vacated the 
judgments, and remanded the cases for further proceedings "not 
inconsistent with the opinion."  Briscoe, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 
S.Ct. at 1316. 
ANALYSIS 
In light of the decision in Melendez-Diaz, the question now 
before us is whether the admission of the certificates of 
analysis pursuant to former Code §§ 19.2-187 and -187.1 violated 
the rights of Cypress and Briscoe under the Confrontation 
Clause.  To answer this question, we initially decide an issue 
that we did not reach in Magruder: whether the certificates of 
analysis that were admitted into evidence in the defendants' 
trials were "testimonial."  We conclude that they were.  As in 
Melendez-Diaz, each certificate contained the forensic analyst's 
signature and attestation that she performed the analysis and 
that the certificate accurately reflected the results of the 
analysis.  Magruder, 275 Va. at 290-92, 657 S.E.2d at 116-17.  
In each instance, the certificate established that the substance 
analyzed was cocaine and the amount of such cocaine.  Id. at 
290, 292, 657 S.E.2d at 116-17.  Thus, the certificates set 
forth information akin to the testimony a forensic analyst would 
 
11
be expected to give on direct examination and were "functionally 
identical to live, in-court testimony."  Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 
at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2532. 
When we previously decided that the provisions of former 
Code § 19.2-187.1 adequately safeguarded a criminal defendant's 
rights under the Confrontation Clause, we focused on whether 
that statutory procedure supplied the "'elements of 
confrontation - physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and 
observation of demeanor by the trier of fact.'"  Magruder, 275 
Va. at 298-99, 657 S.E.2d at 120 (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 
U.S. 836, 846 (1990)).  We concluded that it did, primarily 
because an accused could have guaranteed the physical presence 
of a forensic analyst at trial by issuing a summons for his/her 
appearance at the Commonwealth's cost, or by asking the trial 
court or the Commonwealth to do so.  Id. at 299, 657 S.E.2d at 
120-21.  The accused then could have called the analyst as a 
witness, placed the analyst under oath, and cross-examined 
him/her as an adverse witness.  Id. at 299, 675 S.E.2d at 121.  
We also held that the question whether the procedure set forth 
in former Code § 19.2-187.1 shifted the burden of producing 
evidence by requiring a defendant to call a forensic analyst was 
not cognizable under the Confrontation Clause but rather was a 
due process concern.  Id. at 301, 657 S.E.2d at 122. 
 
12
The Supreme Court, however, held that "the ability to 
subpoena the analysts[,] whether pursuant to state law or the 
Compulsory Process Clause[,] is no substitute for the right of 
confrontation" in part because "the Confrontation Clause imposes 
a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the 
defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court."  
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2540.  Examining 
the text of the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court explained 
that an accused's right to be confronted with the witnesses 
"'against him'" requires the prosecution to produce such 
witnesses.  Id. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2534 (quoting U.S. Const. 
amend. VI.).  In short, the Supreme Court held that a 
defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause cannot be 
"replaced by a system in which the prosecution presents its 
evidence via ex parte affidavits and waits for the defendant to 
subpoena the affiants if he chooses."  Id. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 
2540.   
While former Code § 19.2-187 informed an accused that a 
certificate of analysis would be introduced into evidence 
without testimony from the forensic analyst, the procedure set 
forth in former Code § 19.2-187.1 required the accused to call 
the analyst to the witness stand.  Specifically, former Code 
§ 19.2-187.1 gave a defendant the "right to call" the analyst 
"as a witness"; it did not require the Commonwealth to call the 
 
13
forensic analyst.  In fact, the language in former Code § 19.2-
187.1 allowing a defendant to examine the forensic analysts "as 
if he had been called as an adverse witness" presupposed that 
the Commonwealth had in fact not called the analyst as a witness 
against the defendant.  Although former Code § 19.2-187.1 did 
allow a defendant to cross-examine the forensic analyst if the 
defendant chose to call him/her, the Supreme Court in Melendez-
Diaz held that such a system runs afoul of a defendant's rights 
under the Confrontation Clause.  This is so because it 
impermissibly relieves the prosecution of its burden to present 
its witnesses against a defendant and imposes a burden on the 
defendant to bring into court and call those adverse witnesses.  
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2540.  Calling 
witnesses against the defendant is "the prosecution's duty" and 
cannot be "[c]onvert[ed] . . . into the defendant's privilege 
under state law."  Id.  
Former Code §§ 19.2-187 and –187.1 are not analogous to the 
type of permissible "notice-and-demand" statutes discussed in 
Melendez-Diaz.  The three notice-and-demand statutes cited by 
the Supreme Court all require the prosecution to give a 
defendant pretrial notice of its intent to use a forensic 
analyst's report and allow the defendant to object to the use of 
the report absent testimony from the analyst.  Georgia Code 
Annotated § 35-3-154.1 states that a report "of the methods and 
 
14
findings of any examination or analysis conducted by an employee 
of the state crime laboratory . . . is prima-facie evidence 
. . . of the facts contained therein" and requires the 
prosecution to serve a defendant with a copy of the report 
"prior to the first proceeding in which the report is to be used 
against the defendant."  Ga. Code Ann. § 35-3-154.1(a), (c).  
The statute further states: "The defendant may object in writing 
any time after service of the report, but at least ten days 
prior to trial, to the introduction of the report," in which 
case "the judge shall require the employee to be present to 
testify."  Ga. Code Ann. § 35-3-154.1(e). 
Similarly, Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 2925.51 makes 
certain laboratory reports prima facie evidence and requires the 
prosecution to serve a copy of the report on a defendant prior 
to its first use at trial against the defendant.  Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 2925.51(A)-(B).  That statute, however, provides that 
"[t]he report shall not be prima[]facie evidence . . . if the 
accused . . . demands the testimony of the person signing the 
report, by serving the demand upon the prosecuting attorney."  
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925.51(C).  Finally, Sections 1 and 4 of 
Article 38.41 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Annotated 
state that a certificate of analysis is admissible evidence 
"without . . . the analyst personally appearing in court," but 
it must be provided to the defendant at least twenty days before 
 
15
trial commences.  "The certificate is not admissible [if] the 
opposing party files a written objection to the use of the 
certificate" at least ten days before trial.  Tex. Code Crim. 
Proc. Ann., art. 38.42, § 4. 
Although former Code § 19.2-187 allowed an accused to 
receive a copy of a certificate of analysis by requesting such 
from the clerk of court or the Commonwealth's Attorney, neither 
that statute nor former Code § 19.2-187.1 allowed the accused to 
object to the admission of the certificate unless the 
Commonwealth called the forensic analyst as a witness.  In other 
words, the former statutory framework did not contain the type 
of "notice-and-demand" procedures that the Supreme Court 
indicated are sufficient to safeguard an accused's rights under 
the Confrontation Clause.  As the Supreme Court explained, the 
simplest form of "notice-and-demand" statutes "require the 
prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its intent to 
use an analyst's report as evidence at trial, after which the 
defendant is given a period of time in which he may object to 
the admission of the evidence absent the analyst's appearance 
live at trial."  Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 
2541.  While a defendant "always has the burden of raising his 
Confrontation Clause objection," former Code § 19.2-187.1 did 
more than merely "govern the time within which he must do so."  
Id. 
 
16
Thus, in light of the decision in Melendez-Diaz, we now 
hold that the procedure established in former Code § 19.2-187.1 
did not adequately safeguard a criminal defendant's rights under 
the Confrontation Clause.  Accordingly, in both Cypress' and 
Briscoe's trials, the admission into evidence of the 
certificates of analysis at issue without testimony from the 
forensic analysts violated the Confrontation Clause.  The 
respective circuit courts erred in admitting the certificates.  
Further, because former Code § 19.2-187.1 placed an 
impermissible burden on Cypress and Briscoe to call the forensic 
analysts as adverse witnesses and did not adequately protect 
their Confrontation Clause rights, neither defendant waived his 
Confrontation Clause objection by failing to utilize the 
statutory procedure.  See Magruder, 275 Va. at 294, 657 S.E.2d 
at 118 ("The dispositive issue before us is whether . . . 
[former] Code § 19.2-187.1 adequately protects a criminal 
defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment, and if so, whether [the defendants] waived their 
Confrontation Clause challenges.") (emphasis added).  
This conclusion, however, does not end our analysis with 
regard to Briscoe.  The Commonwealth argues that the admission 
of the certificates of analysis in Briscoe's trial, if error, 
was nevertheless harmless.  We agree. 
 
17
A federal constitutional error can be harmless provided it 
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Stevens v. Commonwealth, 
272 Va. 481, 486, 634 S.E.2d 305, 308 (2006).  In conducting a 
federal constitutional harmless error analysis, the Court must 
determine " 'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the 
evidence complained of might have contributed to the 
conviction.' "  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) 
(quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)). 
In making that determination, the reviewing court 
is to consider a host of factors, including the 
importance of the tainted evidence in the 
prosecution's case, whether that evidence was 
cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence 
corroborating or contradicting the tainted 
evidence on material points, and the overall 
strength of the prosecution's case. 
 
Lilly v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 548, 551, 523 S.E.2d 208, 209 
(1999). 
Briscoe was convicted of possession with the intent to 
distribute cocaine and unlawful transportation of cocaine into 
the Commonwealth with the intent to distribute.  Magruder, 295 
Va. at 293, 657 S.E.2d at 117.  The two certificates of analysis 
admitted as evidence in his trial established that the substance 
seized by the police during the execution of a search warrant 
for Briscoe's apartment and his person was " 'solid material' 
cocaine" totaling 36.578 grams.  Id. at 292, 657 S.E.2d at 117.  
Because the nature and amount of the confiscated substance were 
 
18
elements of the charged offenses, see Code §§ 18.2-248 and –
248.01, this Court must determine whether evidence introduced at 
Briscoe's trial, other than the certificates of analysis, proved 
those particular facts beyond a reasonable doubt. 
During the search of Briscoe's apartment, the police 
discovered suspected crack cocaine in Briscoe's kitchen sink.  
In the kitchen cabinets next to the sink, the police recovered 
two scales, sandwich bags, a 100-gram weight, a razor blade, and 
a plate.  Several of the objects had what appeared to be crack-
cocaine residue on them, including several tied sandwich bags, 
the razor blade, one of the scales, and the plate.  On the 
counter next to the sink, the police discovered a small rock of 
suspected crack cocaine and an ice tray containing additional 
rocks.  Finally, the police recovered additional suspected crack 
cocaine on Briscoe's person. 
After the search was completed, the police transported 
Briscoe to the police department where he then waived his 
Miranda rights and made a statement to the police.  The 
interviewing police officer testified at trial about the details 
of Briscoe's statement.  According to the officer, Briscoe 
admitted that everything seized from his apartment, "the coke, 
the crack, the baggies," belonged to him as did the item taken 
from his person.  He further told the officer that the cocaine 
found in the kitchen sink "should have been around 40 grams."  
 
19
When asked where he obtained the cocaine, Briscoe stated: 
" '[from] my man in D.C. two weeks ago[;] I brought it over 
here.' "  Briscoe explained that he typically bought a 62-gram 
package of cocaine "almost every day" and the last time he had 
purchased that amount was two weeks prior to his arrest.  In 
response to a question about whether his most recent purchase of 
cocaine was "crack or powder," he answered that it was "hard."  
He further explained that about half of his purchased cocaine is 
powder and the other half is "hard, meaning already crack 
cocaine."  Briscoe also admitted that he has "three main guys in 
D.C." from whom he buys cocaine and that he had made as many as 
80 purchases from two of the suppliers. 
"[L]ay testimony and circumstantial evidence may be 
sufficient, without the introduction of an expert chemical 
analysis, to establish the identity of the substance involved in 
an alleged narcotics transaction."  United States v. Dolan, 544 
F.2d 1219, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976); accord Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 
52 Va. App. 281, 301, 663 S.E.2d 117, 127 (2008).  Even when the 
identity of a substance is an element of the charged offense, 
courts “will uphold a conviction as long as the evidence that 
the substance was illegal is adequate.”  United States v. 
Uwaeme, 975 F.2d 1016, 1020 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing United 
States v. Scott, 725 F.2d 43, 45 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding a 
drug-possession conviction although the prosecution introduced 
 
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no expert testimony identifying the substance as cocaine but 
instead presented lay testimony regarding the nature of the 
substance in question)). 
Briscoe's numerous and regular purchases of either "powder" 
or "crack" cocaine from suppliers in Washington, D.C., as well 
as his experience with cocaine distribution, demonstrated his 
familiarity with the illegal drug.  In his statement, he 
repeatedly referred to the substance seized in his apartment as 
cocaine and stated that the specific cocaine found in the 
kitchen sink was about "40 grams."  One ounce is approximately 
28.35 grams.  In light of his purchasing and distribution 
experience, the recovery of scales and drug packaging materials, 
and his admissions with respect to the nature and amount of the 
confiscated substance, we conclude that the evidence proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance seized during the 
execution of the search warrant was cocaine and that the amount 
Briscoe transported into the Commonwealth was "one ounce or 
more" as required by Code § 18.2-248.01. 
When the elements of the charged offenses are established 
beyond a reasonable doubt by admissible evidence, the erroneous 
admission of evidence probative of the same elements is 
harmless.  See Mu'Min v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 433, 446-47, 389 
S.E.2d 886, 895 (1990) (holding that any error resulting from 
the trial court's admitting into evidence a previous order of 
 
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conviction was rendered harmless by the defendant's own 
statement relating the same facts as those contained in the 
order).  Because a violation of the Confrontation Clause, like 
other constitutional violations, is subject to a harmless error 
analysis, see United States v. Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d 581, 587 
(5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1229 
n.1 (11th Cir. 2010), we hold that the admission of the 
certificates of analysis in violation of Briscoe's Confrontation 
Clause rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals affirming Cypress' conviction for possession of 
cocaine with the intent to distribute, second or subsequent 
offense, vacate the conviction, and remand to the Court of 
Appeals with directions that the case be remanded to the Circuit 
Court of the City of Chesapeake for a new trial if the 
Commonwealth be so advised.5  We will, however, affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding Briscoe's convictions 
for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine and 
                     
5 Cypress' argument that this Court should not remand his 
case for a new trial but should instead vacate his conviction 
and dismiss the indictment to avoid "manifest injustice" because 
he has already served 5 years in confinement is without merit.  
As the Commonwealth notes, Cypress was actually sentenced to 15 
years of incarceration, with 10 years suspended and supervised 
probation for an indeterminate period. 
 
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unlawful transportation of cocaine into the Commonwealth with 
the intent to distribute. 
Record No. 070815 – Reversed, vacated, and remanded. 
   Record No. 070817 - Affirmed. 
 
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