Case Title: ANGLERS OF THE AUSABLE INC V DEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 138866

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED DECEMBER 29, 2010 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
ANGLERS OF THE AuSABLE, INC., 
MAYER FAMILY INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
and NANCY A. FORCIER TRUST, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
Nos. 138863 to 138866 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, DIRECTOR OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, and MERIT ENERGY 
COMPANY, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
DAVIS, J.  
 
In this case we determine whether defendant Merit Energy Company’s plan to 
discharge contaminated water from an environmental cleanup site in the Manistee River 
watershed into a previously unpolluted site in the AuSable River watershed is an 
allowable use of water.  We also determine in this case whether the Michigan Department 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Marilyn Kelly 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Diane M. Hathaway 
Alton Thomas Davis 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
of Environmental Quality (DEQ) (which is now the Department of Natural Resources and 
Environment) can be sustained as a defendant in an action brought under the Michigan 
environmental protection act (MEPA), MCL 324.1701 et seq., when the DEQ is alleged 
to have authorized activity that will harm the environment. 
We hold that Merit’s discharge plan is not an allowable use of water because it is 
manifestly unreasonable, and we further hold that the DEQ can be sustained as a 
defendant in a MEPA action when the DEQ has issued a permit for activity that it is 
alleged will cause environmental harm.  Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment in part and remand the case for reinstatement of the trial court’s decision 
holding the DEQ accountable for violating MEPA. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
This case arises out of Merit’s proposed plan to discharge treated, but still partially 
contaminated, water from the Manistee River watershed into the AuSable River water 
system in an effort to clean a plume of contaminated groundwater. 
In 2004, Merit acquired the Hayes 22 Central Production Facility (CPF) located in 
Otsego County, Michigan.  As a condition to purchasing the CPF, Merit entered into a 
settlement agreement with the DEQ to remediate the plume of contaminated groundwater 
that had originated from the CPF.  
The exact size of the plume, which at the time was continuing to expand, is 
unknown.  The plume contains benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes and chlorides 
contained in brine, among other contaminants.  The plume is known to have 
 
 
 
3 
contaminated several residential drinking wells and may have contaminated other 
residential wells as it continued to expand. 
Merit evaluated a number of options for remediation and ultimately chose air 
stripping—a process that forces a stream of air through water, causing hydrocarbons to 
evaporate.1
The plan was to send the 1.15 million gallons a day through a 1.3-mile pipeline 
from the air-stripping site to be discharged into Kolke Creek.  Kolke Creek forms the 
headwater system for the AuSable River watershed.  Kolke Creek feeds into Bradford 
Creek, Lynn Lake, and the AuSable River.
  Merit submitted a corrective action plan to the DEQ to remediate 1.15 
million gallons of plume water a day through the use of air stripping.   
2
                                              
1 The air-stripping process does not remove any brines or chlorides from the water.  Thus, 
although the water is cleaner at discharge than when it was first removed from the ground 
at the CPF, the water remains contaminated in some respects. 
2 The plaintiffs in this case are either riparian owners along these waterways or users of 
the waterways for recreational purposes such as fishing.  The waterways are considered 
prime trout-fishing locations because of their purity and mineral content. 
 
The DEQ approved Merit’s corrective action plan and issued a general permit and 
certificate of coverage allowing discharge of treated water from the air stripper into the 
wetland area flowing into Kolke Creek.  The DEQ also granted Merit an easement 
through state-owned land to allow Merit to construct the pipeline from the air stripper to 
the discharge point. 
 
 
 
4 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Merit and the DEQ in the Otsego County 
Circuit Court.  Plaintiffs alleged violations of surface-water law, riparian law, and 
MEPA.  Plaintiffs sought an injunction against the discharge plan. 
After a bench trial on plaintiffs’ complaint, the trial court issued an opinion and 
injunction preventing Merit from discharging the air-stripped water into Kolke Creek.  
The court made detailed findings of fact and concluded that the proposed discharge plan 
would severely harm the AuSable River water system because of the increased flow of 
water and the increased level of substances not previously found in Kolke Creek.3
In applying the reasonable-use balancing test from Nestlé, the trial court concluded 
that Merit’s proposed amount of discharge constituted an unreasonable use.  The court 
ruled that the proposed discharge, and the DEQ’s authorization of the discharge, violated 
MEPA.  However, in its injunction preventing the discharge, the court left open the 
possibility that Merit could discharge treated water into Kolke Creek at a lower rate that 
might be considered reasonable under the reasonable-use balancing test.
  It 
applied the “reasonable use balancing test” from Mich Citizens for Water Conservation v 
Nestlé Waters North America Inc, 269 Mich App 25; 709 NW2d 174 (2005). 
4
                                              
3 The trial court also made findings about whether Merit had properly obtained rights to 
discharge the treated water through the state-land easement.  However, because we do not 
find those issues to be outcome-determinative in this appeal, we will not address them in 
this opinion. 
  
4 Merit contends that this case is now moot because it has abandoned the Kolke Creek 
discharge plan and is instead treating the CPF contamination plume through another 
method.  However, as correctly argued by the plaintiffs, the trial court has left open the 
door for Merit to discharge treated water into Kolke Creek at a lower than originally 
 
 
 
 
5 
All parties appealed in the Court of Appeals.  In a unanimous opinion, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision regarding the reasonableness of Merit’s 
proposed discharge plan.  Anglers of the AuSable, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 
283 Mich App 115; 770 NW2d 359 (2009).  The Court applied the reasonable-use 
balancing test and noted that the trial court had left open the possibility that Merit could 
discharge treated water at a lower, more reasonable rate.  Id. at 136-137.  The Court of 
Appeals also unanimously dismissed the DEQ as a defendant, applying this Court’s 
precedent from Preserve the Dunes, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 471 Mich 
508; 684 NW2d 847 (2004). 
Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal in this Court.  We granted leave to appeal, asking 
the parties to discuss, among other issues, whether Mich Citizens for Water Conservation 
v Nestlé Waters North America Inc, 479 Mich 280; 737 NW2d 447 (2007), and Preserve 
the Dunes were correctly decided.5
                                              
proposed rate.  Because there is still a court order keeping the Kolke Creek discharge 
plan alive, we cannot treat this case as moot. 
5 Anglers of the AuSable, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 485 Mich 1067 (2010). 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review a trial court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions 
de novo.  Hendee v Putnam Twp, 486 Mich 556, 566; 786 NW2d 521 (2010).  Whether 
this Court’s decision in a previous case should be overruled is a question of law that this 
Court reviews de novo.  Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156, 164; 772 NW2d 272 (2009). 
 
 
 
6 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  PRESERVE THE DUNES v DEP’T OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
In our order granting leave to appeal, we asked the parties to address whether this 
Court’s opinion in Preserve the Dunes was correctly decided.  After further review of the 
Preserve the Dunes decision, we conclude that it was decided incorrectly and, 
accordingly, we overrule it. 
Preserve the Dunes involved a group of citizens suing the DEQ for authorizing a 
permit for a sand dune mining operation6
The concerned citizens in that case filed a lawsuit against the DEQ under MEPA 
to protect “the air, water, and other natural resources and the public trust in these 
resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction.”  MCL 324.1701(1).  The majority 
in Preserve the Dunes held that reviewing the DEQ’s permit decisions was outside the 
judicial authority under MEPA.  Preserve the Dunes, 471 Mich at 519.  The majority 
noted that MEPA provides for a private cause of action regarding damage to the 
 in violation of the sand dune mining act 
(SDMA).  MCL 324.63701 et seq.  The dune that was to be mined had previously been 
designated as a protected dune that could not be mined unless one of two exceptions 
contained in the SDMA applied.  The two exceptions were not applicable in that case; 
therefore, the DEQ’s permit allowing the mining operation on the protected dune violated 
the law. 
                                              
6 The mining operation was also sued, but the focus relevant to this case is the suit against 
the DEQ. 
 
 
 
7 
environment.  Id. at 516.  The majority stated that the DEQ’s permit application review 
was based on technical aspects of the application process, and not damage to the 
environment itself.  Id. at 519.  The Court concluded that even if violation of the 
technical aspects of the application process resulted in environmental damage, that level 
of causation was not grounds for a private cause of action.  The Court stated that the 
permit process was “unrelated” to any subsequent environmental harm caused by the 
permitted action.  Id.  
The Preserve the Dunes dissent correctly concluded that the majority’s holding 
“that permit eligibility is unrelated to whether the conduct permitted will harm the 
environment is untenable.”7
Before a majority of this Court decided Preserve the Dunes, this Court had 
previously decided other cases in which a permit application had been the subject of a 
MEPA action.  Until Preserve the Dunes, this Court had never ruled that a permit 
decision was insulated from a MEPA action.
  Without a permit from the DEQ, a party such as the mining 
operator in Preserve the Dunes or Merit in the instant case lacks the authority to 
commence the conduct that will harm the environment.  The permit from the DEQ serves 
as the trigger for the environmental harm to occur.  The permit process is entirely related 
to the environmental harm that flows from an improvidently granted, or unlawful, permit. 
8
                                              
7 Id. at 533-534 (KELLY, J., dissenting). 
  The majority’s decision in Preserve the 
8 See, e.g., Eyde v Michigan, 393 Mich 453, 454; 225 NW2d 1 (1975), Ray v Mason Co 
Drain Comm’r, 393 Mich 294, 304-305; 224 NW2d 883 (1975), West Mich 
Environmental Action Council v Natural Resources Comm, 405 Mich 741, 751; 275 
 
 
 
 
8 
Dunes frustrated the legislative intent behind MEPA, and it represented a departure from 
this Court’s precedent.  As the Preserve the Dunes dissent noted: 
MEPA is intended to prevent conduct that is likely to harm the 
environment as well as to stop conduct that is presently harming it. In 
WMEAC [West Mich Environmental Action Council v Natural Resources 
Comm, 405 Mich 741; 275 NW2d 538 (1979)], this Court ordered that a 
permanent injunction be entered prohibiting the drilling of oil and gas wells 
pursuant to a DNR permit. The “issuance of permits was properly before 
the circuit court as conduct alleged to be likely to pollute, impair, or 
destroy” natural resources under MEPA. WMEAC at 751. The drilling 
would cause “apparently serious and lasting, though unquantifiable, 
damage” to elk herd population. WMEAC at 760. This Court concluded that 
the previous MEPA, MCL 691.1203(1), is violated whenever the effects of 
permit issuance harm the environment to the requisite degree. WMEAC at 
751, 760.  [Preserve the Dunes, 471 Mich at 534 (KELLY, J., dissenting).] 
 
Because the Preserve the Dunes opinion violated the legislative intent behind 
MEPA, and because the opinion conflicted with this Court’s caselaw that came before it, 
we hold that Preserve the Dunes was incorrectly decided to the extent that it insulated the 
DEQ’s permit application process from review under MEPA. 
There are further compelling justifications for overruling Preserve the Dunes.  The 
first is that MEPA is a statute that was enacted as part of the environmental protection 
mandate to the Legislature contained in Article 4, § 52 of Michigan’s Constitution.  In 
Ray v Mason Co Drain Comm’r, 393 Mich 294, 304-306; 224 NW2d 883 (1975), this 
Court stated: 
Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act marks the Legislature’s 
response to our constitutional commitment to the “conservation and 
                                              
NW2d 538 (1979), and Nemeth v Abonmarche Dev, Inc, 457 Mich 16; 576 NW2d 641 
(1998). 
 
 
 
9 
development of the natural resources of the state . . .”  Const 1963, art 4, 
§ 52 in its entirety reads:  
 
“Section 52. The conservation and development of the natural 
resources of the state are hereby declared to be of paramount public 
concern in the interest of the health, safety and general welfare of the 
people.  The legislature shall provide for the protection of the air, water 
and other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment and 
destruction.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Michigan’s EPA was the first legislation of its kind and has attracted 
worldwide attention.  The act also has served as a model for other states in 
formulating environmental legislation.  The enactment of the EPA signals a 
dramatic change from the practice where the important task of 
environmental law enforcement was left to administrative agencies without 
the opportunity for participation by individuals or groups of citizens.  Not 
every public agency proved to be diligent and dedicated defenders of the 
environment.  The EPA has provided a sizable share of the initiative for 
environmental law enforcement for that segment of society most directly 
affected—the public.  
 
The act provides private individuals and other legal entities with 
standing to maintain actions in the circuit courts for declaratory and other 
equitable relief against anyone “for the protection of the air, water and other 
natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or 
destruction”.  MCLA 691.1202(1); MSA 14.528(202)(1). 
 
*   *   * 
 
But the EPA does more than give standing to the public and grant 
equitable powers to the circuit courts, it also imposes a duty on individuals 
and organizations both in the public and private sectors to prevent or 
minimize degradation of the environment which is caused or is likely to be 
caused by their activities.  [Emphasis added and citations omitted.]  
 
The majority’s decision in Preserve the Dunes not only violated the Legislature’s 
intent to protect the environment encapsulated in MEPA, it subverted the people’s will as 
expressed in Michigan’s constitutional requirement that the Legislature “shall” protect 
the environment.   
 
 
 
10 
Another compelling reason for overruling Preserve the Dunes is that it appears 
from the instant case that the DEQ has done more than simply issue a permit that would 
result in the harm of natural resources.  It has also granted an easement over state land to 
facilitate the harmful actions.  Under Preserve the Dunes, the DEQ cannot be required to 
account for its actions.  By overruling Preserve the Dunes, this Court can restore the 
accountability that was intended under MEPA. 
Because the Preserve the Dunes decision to insulate DEQ permit decisions from 
MEPA violated the Legislative intent behind MEPA, conflicted with previous caselaw 
regarding MEPA, and subverted the will of the people contained in article 4 of 
Michigan’s constitution, we overrule it.9
In the order granting leave to appeal, we also asked the parties to brief whether 
Nestlé was correctly decided.
 
B.  NESTLÉ AND STANDING 
10
                                              
9 We do not overrule Preserve the Dunes without proper consideration of the principle of 
stare decisis.  The approach taken to stare decisis in any given case will be dependent on 
the facts and circumstances presented.  See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 854-855; 112 S Ct 2791; 120 L Ed 2d 674 (1992).  
Historically, many different approaches to stare decisis have been taken.  See Petersen v 
Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300; 773 NW2d 564 (2009); Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins 
Co, 487 Mich 289, 314-317; ___ NW2d ___ (2010) (HATHAWAY, J., concurring).  The 
reasons given in Justice KELLY’s dissent in Preserve the Dunes, and the further reasons 
given in this opinion, make clear that Preserve the Dunes must be overruled and the law 
must be returned to how it was applied before Preserve the Dunes was incorrectly 
decided. 
  However, Nestlé has already been overruled in part.   
10 We also asked the parties to brief whether an easement could grant Merit riparian 
rights on land the state of Michigan owned.  Under Thompson v Enz, 379 Mich 667; 154 
NW2d 473 (1967), and its progeny, including Little v Kin, 249 Mich App 502; 644 
 
 
 
 
11 
One of the issues in Nestlé was whether the plaintiffs had standing to appear in 
court to protect property from being affected by the defendant’s pumping of groundwater 
that it intended to bottle and sell.  At the time, a majority of this Court held that the 
plaintiffs only had standing with respect to property that they owned or used, no more.  
Nestlé, 479 Mich at 285.  The majority relied on the theory of standing adopted in Lee v 
Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726; 629 NW2d 900 (2001).  Nestlé, 479 Mich at 
294-295.  But this Court has recently explained that statutes granting standing should be 
applied as written, thus overruling the standing doctrine adopted in Lee and followed in 
Nestlé.  Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 371 & n 18; ___ NW2d 
___ (2010) (LSEA).  Accordingly, MEPA, which specifies that “any person may maintain 
an action . . . against any person for the protection of the air, water, and other natural 
resources and the public trust in these resources from pollution, impairment, or 
destruction,” should be applied as it is written.  MCL 324.1701(1) (emphasis added). 
We therefore need not address the standing issue from Nestlé.  Plaintiffs in this 
case have interests that differ from the citizenry at large.11
                                              
NW2d 375 (2002), riparian rights may be conveyed to a nonriparian landowner by 
easement under certain circumstances.  However, even assuming arguendo that the 
proposed easement in this case is valid, we conclude that the proposed use is 
unreasonable.  Thus, it is unnecessary to consider this issue further. 
11 Plaintiffs use or own property along waterways that would be affected under Merit’s 
proposed discharge plan. 
  LSEA, 487 Mich at 359.  And, 
even if they did not, it is clear that under MEPA “any person” has standing to maintain an 
action protecting Michigan’s natural resources; indeed, the Attorney General admitted at 
 
 
 
12 
oral argument that that was the state’s position as well.  Because plaintiffs most certainly 
qualify under the statute’s designation of “any person,” plaintiffs would have standing 
regardless of this Court’s decision in Nestlé. 
C.  REASONABLENESS OF THE PROPOSED KOLKE CREEK DISCHARGE 
 
Nonetheless, this Court’s decision to overrule Nestlé in LSEA did not affect the 
reasonable-use balancing test.  In its Nestlé opinion, this Court explicitly declined to 
“pass on the merits” of, among other things, the “reasonable use balancing test” that had 
been applied by the Court of Appeals.12
The parties have agreed that the reasonableness of the water’s use is the 
determining factor in deciding water-use cases,
  Thus, this Court has not passed judgment on the 
merits of that test. 
13
                                              
12 Nestlé, 479 Mich at 289 n 12, 291. 
 and they have also all noted that the 
facts in this case are distinguishable from those in Nestlé.  In Nestlé, the diverted water 
was potable water being pumped out of the ground, packaged, and sold in many locations 
in and out of Michigan.  In the instant case, contaminated water is being pumped from the 
ground in one watershed, treated and stripped of hydrocarbons but not fully 
decontaminated, and then pumped as surface water into a separate, previously 
uncontaminated watershed.   
13 While the parties agree that the reasonableness of the water’s use is the determining 
factor in deciding water-use cases, they do not agree on using the “reasonable use 
balancing test” from Nestlé.  We do not pass judgment on that test in this case because, 
under any test and by any standard, the discharge plan at issue is manifestly 
unreasonable. 
 
 
 
13 
Plaintiffs focus much of their attention on the seminal Michigan water-law case of 
Dumont v Kellogg, 29 Mich 420 (1874), and its progeny14
It is clear from this Court’s water-law precedent cited in both sides’ briefs that an 
unreasonable use of water has never been deemed an allowable use and is not now an 
allowable use.
 for the proposition that water 
cannot be diverted for an unreasonable use that would damage a riparian owner’s use of 
the waterway.  While it is true that Michigan courts have held that water should generally 
not be diverted from a watershed, we find that argument unpersuasive here.  We 
distinguish Dumont and its progeny on the facts of this case. 
Plaintiffs are seeking to protect the AuSable River watershed.  Water is not being 
diverted from the AuSable River watershed in this case.  The water that is being diverted 
is coming from the Manistee River watershed, and the reasonableness of merely diverting 
water out of the Manistee River watershed is not at issue.  Thus, the cases that plaintiffs 
cite are not helpful on these facts. 
15
                                              
14 Hall v City of Ionia, 38 Mich 493 (1878); Kennedy v Niles Water Supply Co, 173 Mich 
474; 139 NW 241 (1913); Hoover v Crane, 362 Mich 36; 106 NW2d 563 (1960). 
15 The cases cited include Dumont; Hall; Schenk v City of Ann Arbor, 196 Mich 75; 163 
NW 109 (1917); Kennedy; and Hoover. 
  Defendants have presented no authority for the proposition that the 
diversion of contaminated water from one source to an uncontaminated watershed should 
 
 
 
14 
be considered reasonable.  It would be incongruous to hold that it is reasonable to 
decontaminate water by contaminating different water.16
Accordingly, we affirm the lower courts’ rulings preventing Merit’s proposed 
discharge from the CPF into Kolke Creek.
 
Furthermore, it would be unconscionable and destructive for this Court to 
determine that it is reasonable to spread dangerous contamination throughout Michigan 
as we have described.  The necessarily resulting harm would be spread not only to 
immediate downstream users but, in the end, to anyone in Michigan who relies, directly 
or indirectly, on our state’s water remaining clean. 
17
We hold that Merit’s discharge plan is not an allowable use of water because it is 
manifestly unreasonable.  We hold that the DEQ can be sustained as a defendant in a 
MEPA action for its permitting decisions.  We uphold the lower courts’ determination 
that the proposed discharge plan is unreasonable, and we remand the case for 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
                                              
16 We do not hold that diverting water from one watershed to another is ipso facto 
unreasonable.  Our concern today is with the discharge of contaminated water into an 
uncontaminated watershed.   
17 In reaching this decision, it is important to note that we focus our ruling on the 
reasonableness of using Kolke Creek as a discharge point for contaminated water 
removed from a separate watershed.  We are not basing this decision on Merit’s status as 
a riparian or groundwater user.  We are not basing this decision on Merit’s status as an 
off-tract or on-tract water user.  And we are not basing this decision on the fact that Merit 
is seeking to divert water out of the Manistee River watershed. 
 
 
 
15 
reinstatement of the trial court’s decision holding the DEQ accountable for violating 
MEPA. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
Alton Thomas Davis 
Diane M. Hathaway 
 
 
 
1 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
ANGLERS OF THE AuSABLE, INC., 
MAYER FAMILY INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
and NANCY A. FORCIER TRUST, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
Nos. 138863 to 138866 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, DIRECTOR OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, and MERIT ENERGY 
COMPANY, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
KELLY, C.J. (concurring). 
I concur in parts I, II, III(A), III(B), and IV of the lead opinion.  I concur in the 
result only with respect to part III(C) of the lead opinion.  I write separately to articulate 
my preferred approach to stare decisis. 
Even when a decision is wrongly decided, we must apply the doctrine of stare 
decisis when deciding whether to overrule it.  Our analysis should always begin with a 
presumption that upholding precedent is the preferred course of action.1
                                              
1 Petersen v Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300, 317; 773 NW2d 564 (2009) (opinion by 
KELLY, C.J.). 
  That 
presumption should prevail unless effectively rebutted by the conclusion that a 
 
 
 
2 
compelling justification exists to overturn it.2  By contrast, when analyzing precedent that 
itself represents a departure from established caselaw, we should apply a decreased 
presumption in favor of upholding precedent.3
In determining whether a compelling justification exists to overturn precedent, the 
Court may consider numerous evaluative criteria, none of which, standing alone, is 
dispositive.  These criteria include, but are not limited to, whether (1) the precedent has 
proved to be intolerable because it defies practical workability, (2) reliance on the 
precedent is such that overruling it would cause a special hardship and inequity, (3) 
related principles of law have so far developed since the precedent was pronounced that 
no more than a remnant of it has survived, (4) facts and circumstances have so changed, 
or have come to be seen so differently, that the precedent no longer has significant 
application or justification, (5) other jurisdictions have decided similar issues in a 
different manner, (6) upholding the precedent is likely to result in serious detriment 
prejudicial to public interests, and (7) the prior decision was an abrupt and largely 
unexplained departure from then-existing precedent.
 
4
Not all of these factors will be applicable in a given case.  Nor is there a magic 
number of factors that must favor overruling a case in order to establish the requisite 
 
                                              
2 Id. 
3 Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co, 487 Mich 289, 303; ___ NW2d ___ (2010), citing 
Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena, 515 US 200, 233-234; 115 S Ct 2097; 132 L Ed 2d 
158 (1995). 
4 Petersen, 484 Mich at 320. 
 
 
 
3 
compelling justification.  Rather, the conclusion about overturning the precedent should 
be reached on a case-by-case basis. 
I believe that Preserve the Dunes, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality5 was 
wrongly decided with respect to whether the Department of Environmental Quality 
(DEQ) may be liable for an alleged violation of the Michigan environmental protection 
act (MEPA) by issuing a permit.6
First, I consider whether Preserve the Dunes has proved intolerable because it 
defies practical workability.  I believe that it does.  The Preserve the Dunes majority held 
that the DEQ’s issuance of a permit is “unrelated to” alleged environmental harm and 
thus insulated from scrutiny under MEPA.
  However, this fact alone does not constitute the 
requisite compelling justification to overrule the decision.  Instead, we must examine 
additional factors. 
7
                                              
5 Preserve the Dunes, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 471 Mich 508; 684 NW2d 
847 (2004). 
6 MCL 324.1701 et seq. 
7 Preserve the Dunes, 471 Mich at 511. 
  This conclusion was directly contrary to a 
simple reading of MEPA.  MCL 324.1701(1) provides, in pertinent part: 
any person may maintain an action in the circuit court . . . where the alleged 
violation occurred or is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief 
against any person for the protection of the air, water, and other natural 
resources . . . from pollution, impairment, or destruction.  [Emphasis 
added.] 
 
 
 
4 
Under the act, a plaintiff makes a prima facie case by showing “that the conduct of the 
defendant . . . is likely to . . . destroy . . . natural resources or the public trust in these 
resources.”8
 
The Preserve the Dunes majority’s conclusion that eligibility for a permit is 
unrelated to whether the conduct permitted will harm the environment is untenable.  
Issuance of a permit to an ineligible party to engage in an activity that will harm the 
environment will certainly allow “conduct . . . likely to pollute, impair, or destroy . . . 
natural resources or the public trust in these resources” under MCL 324.1703(1).  Indeed, 
before Preserve the Dunes, this Court observed that a violation of a permitting procedure 
can support a prima facie claim under MEPA.
 
9
Second, I consider whether reliance interests weigh in favor of overruling 
Preserve the Dunes.  I conclude that they do.  Preserve the Dunes is of relatively recent 
vintage, having been decided a mere six years ago.  Hence, any reliance on its holding 
has been of limited duration.  Moreover, Preserve the Dunes represented a sea change in 
  Thus, by gutting the environmental 
protections afforded to Michigan citizens by MEPA, Preserve the Dunes mocked our 
Legislature’s intent to prevent environmental harm.  Accordingly, Preserve the Dunes 
was inherently unworkable under the statutory provisions provided by the Legislature. 
                                              
8 MCL 324.1703(1). 
9 A “plaintiff’s prima facie case is ‘not restricted to actual environmental degradation but 
also encompasses probable damage to the environment as well.’”  Nemeth v Abonmarche 
Dev, Inc, 457 Mich 16, 25; 576 NW2d 641 (1998), quoting Ray v Mason Co Drain 
Comm’r, 393 Mich 294, 309; 224 NW2d 883 (1975). 
 
 
 
5 
one area of the law and toppled settled interpretations of MEPA that had existed for 
nearly 30 years.10
Fourth, I examine whether facts and circumstances have so changed, or have come 
to be seen so differently, that Preserve the Dunes has been robbed of significant 
justification.  Like the previous factor, I discern no factual or circumstantial changes that 
  In doing so, Preserve the Dunes disrupted the reliance interests of 
Michigan citizens who relied on MEPA’s provisions to bring suit for alleged 
environmental pollution, impairment, or destruction. 
I recognize that there exists a competing reliance interest in the continuing validity 
of Preserve the Dunes: that of the DEQ in defending its permitting decisions.  Yet 
Preserve the Dunes’ annihilation of the crux of a MEPA complainant’s claim—the desire 
to quell environmental degradation—effectively removed altogether the ability to 
challenge permitting decisions as allowed by MEPA.  I conclude that, while the DEQ’s 
reliance on this interpretation is understandable, it is not sufficient to preclude overruling 
Preserve the Dunes given the extent of prejudice to those availing themselves of MEPA’s 
straightforward language. 
Third, I consider whether related principles of law have developed since Preserve 
the Dunes was decided.  This factor is inapplicable to my stare decisis analysis in this 
case, as no intervening change in the law further supports or undermines the continuing 
legitimacy of Preserve the Dunes. 
                                              
10 See, e.g., Eyde v Michigan, 393 Mich 453, 454; 225 NW2d 1 (1975); Ray, 393 Mich at 
304-305; West Mich Environmental Action Council v Natural Resources Comm, 405 
Mich 741, 751; 275 NW2d 538 (1979); Nemeth, 457 Mich 16. 
 
 
 
6 
counsel for or against overruling Preserve the Dunes.  Therefore, this factor is also 
inapplicable to my analysis. 
Fifth, I consider whether other jurisdictions have decided similar issues in a 
different manner.  This factor is likewise inapplicable to my stare decisis analysis.  
MEPA is unique to our state.  Although other states’ environmental legislation may share 
the fundamental underpinnings of MEPA, judicial interpretations thereof have evolved 
independently of those of other states with similar environmental schemes.  Thus, other 
jurisdictions’ interpretations of similar statutes are unhelpful to our analysis in this case. 
Sixth, I examine whether upholding Preserve the Dunes is likely to result in 
serious detriment prejudicial to public interests.  This factor weighs heavily in favor of 
overruling Preserve the Dunes.  In one swoop of a pen, the Preserve the Dunes majority 
obliterated environmental protection statutes enacted by the Legislature.  As persuasively 
noted by Justice DAVIS,  MEPA was enacted in response to our state’s constitutional 
commitment to the conservation and development of the natural resources.  Our 
constitution provides: 
 
The conservation and development of the natural resources of the 
state are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern in the interest 
of the health, safety and general welfare of the people.  The legislature 
shall provide for the protection of the air, water and other natural 
resources of the state from pollution, impairment and destruction.[11
                                              
11 Const 1963, art 4, § 52 (emphasis added). 
] 
 
Furthermore, as we stated in Ray: 
 
 
 
7 
 
Michigan’s EPA was the first legislation of its kind and has attracted 
worldwide attention.  The act also has served as a model for other states in 
formulating environmental legislation.  The enactment of the EPA signals a 
dramatic change from the practice where the important task of 
environmental law enforcement was left to administrative agencies without 
the opportunity for participation by individuals or groups of citizens.  Not 
every public agency proved to be diligent and dedicated defenders of the 
environment.  The EPA has provided a sizable share of the initiative for 
environmental law enforcement for that segment of society most directly 
affected—the public. 
 
*   *   * 
 
 
But the EPA does more than give standing to the public and grant 
equitable powers to the circuit courts, it also imposes a duty on individuals 
and organizations both in the public and private sectors to prevent or 
minimize degradation of the environment which is caused or is likely to be 
caused by their activities.[12
Finally, I consider whether Preserve the Dunes represented an abrupt and largely 
unexplained departure from precedent.  I conclude that this factor also weighs heavily in 
favor of overruling Preserve the Dunes.  As previously noted, Preserve the Dunes 
] 
 
Thus, whereas MEPA represents the culmination of the Legislature’s deliberative 
process, Preserve the Dunes undermined the Legislature’s decision to allow challenges to 
both real and potential harms to the environment.  The impact of Preserve the Dunes was 
undoubtedly felt not only by the environment, but by the public.  The citizens of 
Michigan were stripped of their ability to enforce environmental protection mechanisms 
granted by the Legislature. 
                                              
12 Ray, 393 Mich at 304-306. 
 
 
 
8 
implicitly overruled numerous previous decisions of this Court interpreting MEPA.13
                                              
13 See n 10 of this opinion. 
  
Those decisions stood as principled interpretations of MEPA until Preserve the Dunes 
unexpectedly swept them aside decades later.  Therefore, Preserve the Dunes represented 
an abrupt and unexplained departure from precedent. 
In summary, Preserve the Dunes (1) is unworkable because it usurped the 
Legislature’s grant of a cause of action regarding environmental harm, (2) caused serious 
detriment prejudicial to public interests, and (3) represented an abrupt and largely 
unexplained departure from precedent.  Accordingly, I conclude that a compelling 
justification exists for overruling it. 
Marilyn Kelly 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
ANGLERS OF THE AUSABLE, INC; 
MAYER FAMILY INVESTMENTS, LLC; 
and NANCY A. FORCIER TRUST, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
No. 138863 to 138866 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, DIRECTOR OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, and MERIT ENERGY 
COMPANY, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
 
YOUNG, J. (dissenting). 
I respectfully, but vigorously, dissent from the extraordinarily lawless and 
profoundly dangerous lead opinion and from the results reached by a majority of this 
Court.   
This case represents one of the most shocking examples of the assertion of power 
that is not grounded in the constitution or any statute.  This case is simply an empty 
vehicle to reach desired policy results.1
                                              
1 The shocking paucity of legal authority relied on by the lead opinion is a prime 
indicator that no more than naked judicial policymaking is afoot. 
  This is so because this case was moot in June 
2010 when the majority inexplicably denied defendants’ meritorious motion to dismiss 
 
 
 
 
2 
for mootness;2
Unwilling to forgo the opportunity to resolve a nonexistent conflict to attack 
precedent with which they disagree, the lead and concurring opinions overturn this 
Court’s decision in Preserve the Dunes v Dep’t of Environmental Quality
 this case was moot in November 2010 when this Court heard oral 
arguments on the case, despite its obvious mootness; and this case remains moot today, 
despite the majority’s raw exercise of power in deciding a nonjusticiable case.  The lead 
opinion does not even attempt to respond to this dissent because there are no satisfactory 
responses.  Because I continue to believe that this Court should not decide moot cases, I 
would dismiss this appeal. 
3 that the 
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)4 may not be sued under the Michigan 
environmental protection act (MEPA)5
                                              
2 Anglers of the AuSable, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 486 Mich 982 (2010). 
3 Preserve the Dunes v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 471 Mich 508; 684 NW2d 847 
(2004). 
4 The DEQ is now part of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources and 
Environment (DNRE). 
5 MCL 324.1701 et seq. 
 for issuing a permit.  Indeed, the lead and 
concurring opinions now conclude that the DEQ may be sued even if the permit it issued 
was already successfully challenged under the appropriate administrative procedures.  
Furthermore, the lead opinion fashions a new common law rule governing water rights 
out of whole cloth and without citing any authority for its new categorical rule.  Instead, 
the lead opinion’s categorical rule usurps the ability of the DEQ’s environmental experts 
to determine what action appropriately protects the natural resources held in public trust, 
 
 
 
 
3 
and it usurps the ability of lower courts to judge the validity of those expert analyses by 
interposing a categorical rule prohibiting “contamination,” regardless of actual harm to 
the relevant watercourse.  Because Michigan law has not heretofore provided for such a 
categorical rule, I must vigorously dissent from this palpably erroneous decision.  Again, 
the lead opinion reaches its decision on the substantive merits of this case without 
responding to any of the critiques I make of its argument. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant Merit Energy Company owns land in the Manistee River watershed that 
contains a plume of contaminated groundwater.  When Merit purchased the land, the 
contaminated plume already existed and threatened private wells for drinking water.  
Merit’s purchase of the land was contingent on an agreement with the DEQ requiring 
Merit to remediate the plume.  Accordingly, Merit devised a corrective action plan to 
treat the contaminated water and to discharge the treated water into Kolke Creek, part of 
the AuSable River watershed.  To effect this plan, Merit obtained an easement from the 
Michigan Department of Natural Resources (DNR)6
                                              
6 The DNR is now part of the DNRE.  However, at the time the DNR granted Merit an 
easement, it was a separate executive agency. 
 to “place, construct, operate, repair 
and maintain [a] Pipeline” beginning on Merit’s property and ending at Kolke Creek.  
Merit also sought DEQ approval of its plan.  The DEQ issued a certificate of coverage 
(COC), which affirmed that the proposed discharge was consistent with a general permit 
that allowed “discharges of wastewater contaminated by gasoline and/or related 
 
 
 
 
4 
petroleum products . . . .”  Therefore, Merit received the requisite certification that it 
could discharge under “a valid national or state permit . . . .”7
Plaintiffs include riparian owners along Kolke Creek.  They challenged the COC 
in a contested case hearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act.
 
8  After the 
administrative referee affirmed the DEQ’s decision, plaintiffs appealed by right to the 
Otsego Circuit Court.  In addition to appealing the contested case decision, plaintiffs 
brought original claims against defendants for alleged MEPA violations and alleged 
violations of plaintiffs’ common law riparian rights.  The circuit court separated 
plaintiffs’ appeal of the contested case decision from their original claims and remanded 
the contested case decision for review by the director of the DEQ.  The director affirmed 
the administrative decision to issue Merit a COC.  On appeal, the circuit court vacated the 
COC because the discharge allowed under the COC contained contaminants beyond 
those allowed under the general permit the COC purported to enforce.  The circuit court’s 
decision invalidating the COC remains in force.9
The circuit court conducted a 13-day bench trial to consider plaintiffs’ common 
law and MEPA claims.  The court held that the DNR’s proposed easement did not 
 
                                              
7 Mich Admin Code, R 323.2106(1). 
8 MCL 24.201 et seq. 
9 The Court of Appeals denied defendants’ delayed application for leave to appeal.  This 
Court initially remanded the appeal to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave 
granted, 482 Mich 1078 (2008), but subsequently granted reconsideration and denied the 
application, 483 Mich 887 (2009).  Accordingly, the circuit court’s vacation of the COC 
remains intact. 
 
 
 
 
5 
provide Merit with the necessary riparian rights to discharge anything into Kolke Creek.10  
The circuit court also concluded that the proposed discharge would violate plaintiffs’ 
riparian rights.  In reaching this decision, the court applied the “reasonable use balancing 
test” that the Court of Appeals articulated in Mich Citizens for Water Conservation v 
Nestlé Waters North America Inc.11
Defendants appealed in the Court of Appeals, and plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal in 
that court.  The DEQ challenged the circuit court’s ruling that it could be sued on the 
theory that its COC violated MEPA.  Merit challenged the circuit court’s conclusions 
regarding the scope of the DNR’s easement, the application of the “reasonable use 
balancing test” in determining that the proposed discharge was unreasonable, and the 
  Because “[t]he proposed use is for the benefit of 
distant non-riparian parcels at the expense of local riparian rights” and because “[t]he 
delicate ecosystem of Kolke Creek is not a suitable location for the discharge of treated 
water in the quantities proposed,” the court concluded that the proposed discharge would 
constitute an unreasonable use of Kolke Creek.  Accordingly, it enjoined defendants from 
discharging the treated water into Kolke Creek in the volume proposed, 1.15 million 
gallons a day.  The court also determined that plaintiffs had presented a prima facie 
MEPA violation with respect to both Merit and the DEQ. 
                                              
10 The circuit court subsequently clarified its order to indicate that the DNR could assign 
its riparian rights to Merit, but that it had not done so in the easement before the court. 
11 Mich Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North America Inc, 269 Mich 
App 25; 709 NW2d 174 (2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded on other 
grounds 479 Mich 280 (2007). 
 
 
 
 
6 
application of MEPA and the common law to the proposed discharge.12
A unanimous Court of Appeals panel reversed in part the circuit court’s ruling.
  On cross-appeal, 
plaintiffs argued that the circuit court should not have applied the Nestlé “reasonable use 
balancing test” because, as part of the common law pertaining to groundwater, it was 
inapplicable to their surface water riparian rights. 
13  
Citing this Court’s opinion in Preserve the Dunes,14 the Court of Appeals concluded that 
the DEQ’s administrative decision to issue permits to Merit did not violate MEPA.  The 
Court of Appeals also reversed the circuit court’s ruling on the scope of the DNR’s 
easement to Merit and concluded that the DNR conveyed the right to discharge water, 
which the panel characterized as “inherently riparian and therefore connected to, rather 
than apart from, the land.”15  However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s 
application of the “reasonable use balancing test,”16
Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal in this Court, claiming that this Court should, 
among other requested relief, overturn the “reasonable use balancing test” and this 
Court’s decisions in Preserve the Dunes and Mich Citizens for Water Conservation v 
 thereby leaving in place the 
injunction against Merit’s proposed discharge. 
                                              
12 Defendants also raised several evidentiary errors, none of which are at issue in the 
instant appeal. 
13 Anglers of the AuSable, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 283 Mich App 115; 770 
NW2d 359 (2009). 
14 Preserve the Dunes, 471 Mich at 512. 
15 Anglers, 283 Mich App at 131-132. 
16 Id. at 136. 
 
 
 
 
7 
Nestlé Waters North America Inc.17  Defendant Merit did not cross-appeal.  This Court 
granted plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal on January 29, 2010, and specifically 
asked the parties to brief, among other issues, “whether Michigan Citizens v Nestlé 
Waters . . . and Preserve the Dunes v DEQ . . . were correctly decided.”18
In the intervening period, however, Merit quitclaimed its interest in the easement 
back to the newly combined Department of Natural Resources and Environment and 
provided thorough documentation to this Court to prove that it had done so.  Accordingly, 
Merit moved to dismiss, claiming that plaintiffs’ appeal was moot because Merit had 
abandoned its plan to discharge water into Kolke Creek, as evidenced by its 
relinquishment of the DNR easement.  Because Merit no longer had physical access to 
Kolke Creek, it argued that it could not violate MEPA or plaintiffs’ common law riparian 
rights in the way plaintiffs alleged.  Further, Merit offered proof that it had filed for a 
new groundwater discharge permit to achieve its treatment goals by an alternative plan 
that would avoid discharging treated water into Kolke Creek.  Nevertheless, a majority of 
this Court denied Merit’s motion to dismiss for mootness on June 18, 2010.
   
19
                                              
17 Mich Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North America Inc, 479 Mich 
280; 737 NW2d 447 (2007). 
18 Anglers of the AuSable, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 485 Mich 1067 (2010) 
(citations omitted). 
19 Anglers, 486 Mich 982. 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case implicates issues of constitutional law, statutory interpretation, and the 
common law.  Each of these issues is a question of law, which this Court reviews de 
novo.20
This Court has the constitutional authority to exercise only the judicial power, not 
“powers properly belonging to another branch . . . .”
 
III.  JUSTICIABILITY 
A.  BACKGROUND 
21  The people of Michigan have 
ratified this “cardinal principle”22 of republican government into each of their successive 
constitutions since the first, the Michigan Constitution of 1835.23  Moreover, this 
principle is “‘in harmony with American political theory . . . .’”24
                                              
20 Little v Hirschman, 469 Mich 553, 557; 677 NW2d 319 (2004). 
21 Const 1963, art 3, § 2. 
22 Civil Serv Comm v Auditor General, 302 Mich 673, 683; 5 NW2d 536 (1942).   
23 Const 1908, art 4, § 2 (“No person belonging to one department shall exercise the 
powers properly belonging to another, except in the cases expressly provided in this 
constitution.”); Const 1850, art 3, § 2 (“No person belonging to one department shall 
exercise the powers properly belonging to another, except in the cases expressly provided 
in this constitution.”); Const 1835, art 3, § 1 (“The powers of the government shall be 
divided into three distinct departments; the Legislative, the Executive and the Judicial; 
and one department shall never exercise the powers of another, except in such cases as 
are expressly provided for in this constitution.”). 
  Indeed, the drafters of 
the United States Constitution made it clear that each branch of government could not 
24 Civil Serv Comm, 302 Mich at 683, quoting Wood v State Admin Bd, 255 Mich 220, 
224; 238 NW 16 (1931). 
 
 
 
 
9 
exercise the powers of the other two branches.25
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, 
in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, 
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny.  Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with 
the accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a 
dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would 
be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system.[
  James Madison considered the principle 
of separation of powers essential to the operation of the federal government: 
26
It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of 
the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by 
either of the other departments.  It is equally evident, that none of them 
ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the 
others, in the administration of their respective powers.[
] 
Madison went on to explain that, despite the strong disagreements between federalists 
and antifederalists over the proper scope of the federal government, all agreed that the 
tripartite form of government was sacrosanct: 
27
                                              
25 See US Const, art I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives.”) (emphasis added); US Const, art II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States of America.”) (emphasis added); US Const, art 
III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”) 
(emphasis added). 
26 Madison, The Federalist No. 47. 
27 Madison, The Federalist No. 48. 
] 
 
 
 
 
10 
In the nearly two and a quarter centuries since the United States Constitution’s 
ratification, the separation of powers doctrine has become “[p]erhaps the most 
fundamental doctrine in American political and constitutional thought . . . .”28
Although the Michigan Constitution does not expressly define “the judicial 
power,” as early as 1859, this Court limited the judicial power to “the power to hear and 
determine controversies between adverse parties, and questions in litigation.”
 
29
[A] marked difference exists between the employment of judicial 
and legislative tribunals.  The former decide upon the legality of claims and 
conduct, and the latter make rules upon which, in connection with the 
constitution, those decisions should be founded.  It is the province of judges 
to determine what is the law upon existing cases.[
  Justice 
THOMAS COOLEY wrote: 
30
[T]he exercise of judicial power in its strict legal sense can be 
conferred only upon courts named in the Constitution.  The judicial power 
referred to is the authority to hear and decide controversies, and to make 
binding orders and judgments respecting them.[
] 
Justice CHAMPLIN applied this principle in Risser v Hoyt, explaining: 
31
Thus, there is more than a century and a half of authority from this Court that 
limits the constitutional power of the judiciary to deciding live cases and controversies 
] 
                                              
28 Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 418; ___ NW2d ___ (2010) 
(CORRIGAN, J., dissenting). 
29 Daniels v People, 6 Mich 381, 388 (1859). 
30 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (1st ed), p 92 (emphasis added). 
31 Risser v Hoyt, 53 Mich 185, 193; 18 NW 611 (1884). 
 
 
 
 
11 
between interested parties.  Moreover, the current constitutionally defined exceptions to 
this rule32
Indeed, even with regard to the limited expansion of judicial power 
represented by the proposed advisory opinion provision, delegates were 
expressly concerned that it would “adversely affect[] the separation of 
powers doctrine . . . .” Id. at 1545 (Delegate Wanger); see also id. at 1546 
(Delegate Jack Faxon indicating that the convention “should be wary of any 
violation of the separation of powers”); id. at 1547 (Delegate King stating: 
“I think we have established through the English common law and our 
 help to prove the rule itself: 
In considering whether the Court should have the power to issue 
advisory opinions in nonadversarial proceedings at the request of other 
branches of government, the delegates’ entire discussion was clearly 
premised on the unquestioned assumption that the judicial power, 
generally, was rooted in a case or controversy requirement.  At the outset, 
Delegate Harold Norris explicitly asked with regard to the proposed 
section: “Does that mean that as far as this committee is concerned, they do 
not wish to preserve the traditional notion that there must be a case or 
controversy presented before the court may exercise its judicial power?” 1 
Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 1544 (emphasis added).  
When the question was raised whether the power to issue an advisory 
opinion would be equivalent to the courts’ preexisting power to issue 
declaratory judgments, Delegate Eugene Wanger similarly specified that 
the courts’ preexisting power, even in the arena of declaratory judgments, 
distinctly required “an actual controversy between individuals . . . .”  Id. at 
1545.  Delegate Raymond King may have expressed the understanding 
most clearly when he remarked: 
“We are indeed contemplating a very serious change in what I think 
to be the history and the tradition of justice in this country.  Mr. Wanger 
has pointed out the troubles that the Massachusetts supreme court got into 
when they allowed themselves to leave the theory of case and controversy.”  
[Id. at 1546 (emphasis added).] 
                                              
32 See Const 1963, art 9, § 32 (conferring standing upon “[a]ny taxpayer of the state” to 
bring suit to enforce the provisions of the Headlee Amendment); Const 1963, art 11, § 5 
(empowering “any citizen of the state” to bring injunctive or mandamus proceedings to 
enforce the civil service laws of the state); Const 1963, art 3, § 8 (allowing either house 
of the Legislature or the Governor to request that this Court issue an advisory opinion on 
the “constitutionality of legislation”). 
 
 
 
 
12 
adherence thereto a system of justice, a system of separation of powers 
which has proven itself, and I think we ought to be very reluctant at this 
time to try something new.”).[33
Perhaps the most critical element of the “judicial power” has been its 
requirement of a genuine case or controversy between the parties, one in 
which there is a real, not a hypothetical, dispute, Muskrat v United States, 
219 US 346; 31 S Ct 250; 55 L Ed 246 (1911), and one in which the 
plaintiff has suffered a “particularized” or personal injury.  Massachusetts v 
Mellon, 262 US 447, 488; 43 S Ct 597; 67 L Ed 2d 1078 (1923).  Such a 
“particularized” injury has generally required that a plaintiff must have 
suffered an injury distinct from that of the public generally.  Id.[
] 
More recently, this Court has articulated the following core definition of the 
judicial power: 
The “judicial power” has traditionally been defined by a 
combination of considerations: the existence of a real dispute or case or 
controversy; the avoidance of deciding hypothetical questions; the plaintiff 
who has suffered real harm; the existence of genuinely adverse parties; the 
sufficient ripeness or maturity of a case; the eschewing of cases that are 
moot at any stage of their litigation; the ability to issue proper forms of 
effective relief to a party; the avoidance of political questions or other non-
justiciable controversies; the avoidance of unnecessary constitutional 
issues; and the emphasis upon proscriptive as opposed to prescriptive 
decision making. 
34
This case involves an issue central to this Court’s constitutional exercise of the 
judicial power: mootness.
] 
35
                                              
33 Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n, 487 Mich at 423-425 (CORRIGAN, J., dissenting). 
34 Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608, 615; 684 NW2d 
800 (2004).  Nat’l Wildlife was overruled by Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n, 487 Mich 349. 
 
35 This Court also asked the parties to brief whether Nestlé was correctly decided.  Nestlé 
involved an aspect of this Court’s standing doctrine: the injury-in-fact requirement.  In 
that case, this Court held that “[w]here the plaintiff claims an injury related to the 
environment, this Court lacks the ‘judicial power’ to hear the claim if the plaintiff cannot 
aver facts that he has suffered or will imminently suffer a concrete and particularized 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
B.  ANALYSIS 
The long-established mootness doctrine prevents courts from hearing abstract 
questions of law in cases that no longer contain live controversies.  This Court has 
recently reaffirmed that moot questions generally cannot be adjudicated.36
Street R Co of East Saginaw v Wildman, an 1885 case of this Court, is an 
especially apt application of the mootness doctrine.
  People v 
Richmond is merely the most recent affirmation of this well-established principle and is 
entirely consistent with over a century of precedent of this Court. 
37  In Street R Co, the plaintiff railroad 
sought to enjoin the defendant from moving a building along its railroad tracks “to the 
great interruption of its business and profits, the serious inconvenience of the public, and 
the hindrance and delay of the United States mails which it carried . . . .”38
                                              
injury in fact.”  Nestlé, 479 Mich at 295.  It is improvident for this Court to consider the 
broader question that Nestlé presented because there is no serious doubt that plaintiffs 
have standing under Nestlé. 
36 People v Richmond, 486 Mich 29, 35-41; 782 NW2d 187 (2010). 
37 Street R Co of East Saginaw v Wildman, 58 Mich 286; 25 NW 193 (1885). 
  Shortly after 
the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, but before the plaintiff appealed in this 
Court, the defendant moved the building, thereby negating any ability for a court to 
prevent the claimed harm through the injunctive relief sought.  On appeal, this Court 
determined that “[i]f the complainant was ever entitled to the [equitable] relief prayed for, 
38 Id. 
 
 
 
 
14 
we cannot now make any decree to aid it” because “[w]e can hardly prevent [the 
defendant] from doing what has already been done.”39
“Courts of judicature are organized only to decide real controversies 
between actual litigants.  When, therefore, it appears, no matter how nor at 
what stage, that a pretended action is not a genuine litigation over a 
contested right between opposing parties, but is merely the proffer of a 
simulated issue by a person dominating both sides of the record, the court, 
from a sense of its own dignity, as well as from regard to the public 
interests, will decline a determination of the fabricated case so fraudulently 
imposed upon it.”[
 
In a subsequent case, Anway v Grand Rapids R Co, this Court further articulated 
the scope of the judicial power as it related to moot questions: 
40
The Court concluded with a nonexhaustive list of cases in which the Michigan Supreme 
Court had previously “declined to consider abstract questions of law and which [it] 
declined to decide where our conclusions could not be made effective by final judgment, 
decree, and process . . . .”
] 
41
                                              
39 Id. at 287. 
40 Anway v Grand Rapids R Co, 211 Mich 592, 612-613; 179 NW 350 (1920), quoting 
Judson v Flushing Jockey Club, 14 Misc 350; 36 NYS 126, 127 (NY Common Pleas, 
1895). 
 
41 Anway, 211 Mich at 622, citing Schouwink v Ferguson, 191 Mich 284; 157 NW 726 
(1916) (involving mandamus against a municipality to issue a license to operate a 
motorbus business that, by its own terms, would have expired before the writ of 
mandamus could have entered); Carlson v Wyman, 189 Mich 402; 155 NW 418 (1915) 
(involving mandamus against a municipality to issue a liquor license that, by its own 
terms, would have expired before the writ of mandamus could have entered); Howe v 
Doyle, 187 Mich 655; 154 NW 62 (1915) (involving an appeal of an injunction 
prohibiting the Michigan Securities Commission from enforcing a blue sky law that the 
Legislature had since repealed); Street R Co, 58 Mich 286; Hicks v J B Pearce Co, 158 
Mich 502; 122 NW 1087 (1909) (involving an injunction prohibiting the sale of chattels 
that had already been sold); Brown, ex rel Van Buren v Lawrence, 197 Mich 178; 163 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
The facts of this case make clear that Merit no longer has the physical means of 
discharging treated water into Kolke Creek, and the circuit court vacated the certificate 
of coverage issued by the DEQ.  Thus, the very harms that plaintiffs sought to enjoin no 
longer exist.  Merit has no legal means to injure plaintiffs.42  The plain fact that the lead 
opinion ignores is that this Court simply cannot remedy harms that cannot now possibly 
occur.43
                                              
NW 862 (1917) (involving a quo warranto proceeding questioning the legitimacy of a 
corporate officer’s ouster after that officer had since been elected again to the corporate 
board); Ideal Furnace Co v Int’l Molders’ Union, 204 Mich 311; 169 NW 946 (1918) 
(involving an appeal of a contempt citation that had since been discharged by payment of 
the disputed fine); Blickle v Grand Rapids Bd of Ed, 210 Mich 196; 177 NW 385 (1920) 
(involving mandamus against a school board to admit a student who had since become 
too old to attend the school); Tierney v Union Sch Dist of Bay City, 210 Mich 424; 177 
NW 955 (1920) (involving an appeal seeking an injunction prohibiting a school board 
from expending monies to campaign for a ballot proposal after the election had already 
occurred). 
42 Further, any renewed plan to discharge water into Kolke Creek would require Merit to 
undertake anew not only the DEQ’s permitting process, which plaintiffs may challenge 
through the appropriate administrative process, but also the negotiation of a new 
easement with a riparian landowner. 
43 The conclusion that the harm plaintiffs feared cannot possibly occur is further 
strengthened by evidence that Merit is heavily invested in an alternative plan for 
discharge.  Merit’s discharge permit and corrective action plan have been modified to 
allow its alternative plan.  Merit is now discharging the water by alternative means, albeit 
with considerable costs to the company.  Specifically, Merit relates that its current 
modified permit allows for a much lower discharge volume, which will extend the time 
required to clean up the plume that previously threatened the surrounding private 
drinking wells.  Further, the new plan required Merit to clear-cut 40 acres of forest in 
order to construct infiltration basins. 
  Stunningly, all of this is a matter of indifference to those who subscribe to the 
lead opinion’s result.  Apparently, the conclusive facts of the case are of no moment or 
 
 
 
 
16 
hindrance when the goal is to use this case as a vehicle to reach policy objectives that the 
lead opinion wishes to address. 
As established by Street R Co and subsequent caselaw regarding mootness, it 
obviously follows for all but a majority of this Court that, without the threatened 
construction and use of the pipeline and without any DEQ permit authorizing the 
discharge, there remains no threatened injury to plaintiffs’ riparian rights, and certainly 
none that this Court can remedy.  Similarly, there remains no threatened MEPA violation, 
either by Merit or by the DEQ. 
In short, plaintiffs’ common law riparian rights and their rights under MEPA are 
secure.  Indeed, plaintiffs do not now contend that they have an immediate injury at stake; 
they nevertheless want this Court to rule on the substantive legal issues—for the benefit 
of future cases.  This is the definition of mootness.  Again, the Street R Co decision 
provides guidance: 
It was suggested on the hearing that we ought to settle the rights of 
the parties so that the principle established might be a guide in other cases 
likely to arise.  But courts of equity will not lend their aid by injunction for 
the enforcement of a right or the prevention of a wrong in the abstract, not 
connected with any injury or damage to the person seeking relief, nor when 
such injury or damage can be fully and amply recovered in an action at law.  
Nor are courts of equity established to decide or declare abstract questions 
of right for the future guidance of suitors.[44
                                              
44 Street R Co, 58 Mich at 287. 
] 
 
 
 
 
17 
In their brief opposing Merit’s motion to dismiss, plaintiffs claimed that this case 
fits into an exception to the mootness doctrine, that “the issue is one of public 
significance that is likely to recur, yet evade judicial review.”45
The issues presented here are not the sorts of issues whose transitory nature—
often because the issues involved are time-sensitive—makes it likely that future litigation 
would “evade judicial review.”
  Not so.   
46
The lead opinion claims that “the trial court has left open the door for Merit to 
discharge treated water into Kolke Creek at a lower than originally proposed rate.”
  To the contrary, any riparian owner aggrieved by the 
actions or imminently threatened actions of another can seek injunctive or other relief.   
47
                                              
45 Federated Publications, Inc v City of Lansing, 467 Mich 98, 112; 649 NW2d 383 
(2002). 
46 Socialist Workers Party v Secretary of State, 412 Mich 571, 582 n 11; 317 NW2d 1 
(1982).  Socialist Workers Party cited several federal cases for the proposition that a 
court can consider a moot question that is capable of repetition, yet evading review, 
including Storer v Brown, 415 US 724; 94 S Ct 1274; 39 L Ed 2d 714 (1974) (allowing a 
constitutional challenge to a California requirement that a person may not run for election 
as an independent candidate within six months of having been a registered member of a 
political party after the plaintiff had met the independence requirement); Dunn v 
Blumstein, 405 US 330; 92 S Ct 995; 31 L Ed 2d 274 (1972) (allowing a constitutional 
challenge to a Tennessee voter eligibility requirement that a person be a resident of the 
state for one year after the plaintiff had met the residency requirement); Moore v Ogilvie, 
394 US 814; 89 S Ct 1493; 23 L Ed 2d 1 (1969) (allowing a constitutional challenge to an 
Illinois requirement that independent candidates for presidential electors receive at least 
200 signatures from each of at least 50 of the state’s 102 counties); Southern Pacific 
Terminal Co v Interstate Commerce Comm, 219 US 498; 31 S Ct 279; 55 L Ed 310 
(1911) (allowing a challenge to a temporary ICC cease and desist order after the order 
had already expired).  See also Roe v Wade, 410 US 113; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147 
(1973) (allowing a constitutional challenge to a Texas abortion law after the plaintiff had 
given birth). 
47 Ante at 4 n 4. 
  
 
 
 
 
18 
This claim appears plausible when looking solely at the circuit court’s June 26, 2007, 
amended opinion.  But that opinion was superseded by subsequent events.  In particular, 
the circuit court’s January 31, 2008, opinion ruled that the DEQ had erroneously issued a 
permit to Merit.  Both the Court of Appeals and, eventually, this Court denied 
defendants’ applications for leave to appeal, leaving intact the circuit court’s opinion.  
Accordingly, even if the circuit court’s June 26, 2007, decision “left open the door for 
Merit to discharge treated water into Kolke Creek,” its January 31, 2008, decision closed 
that door, and this Court’s denial of leave bolted the door shut.  Further, without either 
physical access to Kolke Creek or a valid permit, Merit has no lawful authority to 
discharge any amount of anything into Kolke Creek. 
In short, there is not a clearer instance of mootness than this case: the action 
originally challenged by plaintiffs can no longer be physically or legally accomplished by 
any of the defendants.  Nevertheless, a majority of this Court has seen fit to decide the 
substantive issues of this case.  The decision of four members of this Court to proceed on 
the substantive merits is profoundly flawed and inconsistent with longstanding principles 
of constitutional law.  Worse still, the lead opinion is itself profoundly flawed and 
inconsistent with longstanding principles of the common law and of statutory 
interpretation.  Therefore, I am compelled to respond seriatim to the lead opinion’s 
substantive claims. 
IV.  PLAINTIFFS’ COMMON LAW RIPARIAN CLAIMS 
I vigorously dissent from the lead opinion’s creation of a new common law rule 
that certain discharges of contaminants are per se unreasonable infringements on riparian 
 
 
 
 
19 
owners’ rights.  Unfortunately, I fear that the haste to render a decision in this case before 
the end of calendar year 2010, while perhaps grounded in a good intention to protect this 
state’s environmental resources, could result in great mischief to the law.  Indeed, 
“[g]ood intentions, unsupported by well informed policy choices, often result in bad 
law.”48  In its haste to fashion its rule, the lead opinion elided several necessary 
inquiries.49
                                              
48 Young, A judicial traditionalist confronts the common law, 8 Tex R L & Pol 299, 307 
(2004). 
49 For a preliminary example, the lead opinion assumes, without deciding, that the DNR’s 
easement allowed Merit to discharge treated water into Kolke Creek.  The lead opinion 
acknowledges that this issue is properly before the Court, because “[t]he trial court . . . 
made findings as to whether Merit had properly obtained rights to discharge the treated 
water through the state-land easement.”  Ante at 4 n 3.  Yet the lead opinion refuses to 
reach this issue because it “[did] not find those issues to be outcome-determinative . . . .”  
Ante at 4 n 3.  The lead opinion puts the cart before the horse in making this 
determination without explanation, because this issue is a condition precedent to every 
subsequent one in this section.  This is another indicator that the lead opinion is not 
interested in legal analysis but instead is driven to reach a particular result.  Nevertheless, 
I agree with the Court of Appeals that, because the easement unambiguously allowed 
Merit to “operate” the pipeline, the easement purported to grant Merit the right to 
discharge treated water into Kolke Creek. 
The lead opinion also refuses to decide whether the DNR can grant an easement for 
Merit’s physical access to Kolke Creek, instead claiming that “it is unnecessary to 
consider this issue” because “even assuming arguendo that the proposed easement in this 
case is valid, . . . the proposed use is unreasonable.”  Ante at 10 n 10.  Plaintiffs argue that 
the easement impermissibly severed the DNR’s riparian rights from the land and claim 
that, because the easement benefits a nonriparian tract, it violates the requirement in 
Thompson v Enz, 379 Mich 667; 154 NW2d 473 (1967), that limits artificial riparian uses 
to those benefitting the riparian land itself. 
  More troubling, the lead opinion created out of whole cloth a palpably 
erroneous common law standard that is not grounded in this state’s water law.     
Michigan law allows the DNR to grant Merit an easement to access Kolke Creek 
precisely because it does not operate to sever the DNR’s underlying riparian rights from 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
A.  REASONABLENESS OF EASEMENT AND PROPOSED DISCHARGE 
Although plaintiffs have won at all levels below on the issue whether the proposed 
discharge would have violated their riparian rights, they challenge the underlying law that 
the lower courts applied to the analysis.50
The Nestlé “reasonable use balancing test” applies a multifactor balancing test to 
determine whether the alleged violation of a plaintiff’s water rights (in Nestlé, 
groundwater rights, and in the instant case, surface riparian rights) amounts to an 
  The lower courts applied the “reasonable use 
balancing test” as outlined in the Court of Appeals’ Nestlé opinion.  Plaintiffs claim that 
this was erroneous, first, because the Nestlé panel ignored or changed Michigan water 
law and, second, because the instant panel improperly extended Nestlé’s groundwater 
decision to competing riparian surface water claims. 
                                              
the land.  This Court’s decision in Thompson is instructive inasmuch as it proves the 
opposite of plaintiffs’ argument.  Thompson involved a developer’s attempt to divide a 
large parcel of land adjoining a lake into several smaller parcels, so that some of the 
newly created parcels no longer touched the lake.  Nevertheless, the developer sought to 
maintain riparian rights on the parcels no longer touching the lake.  The Court rejected 
this attempt, concluding that “riparian rights are not alienable, severable, divisible or 
assignable apart from the land which includes therein, or is bounded, by a natural water 
course.”  Id. at 686 (opinion by T. M. KAVANAGH, J.).  However, Thompson also 
recognized that riparian rights could be granted by easement: “While riparian rights may 
not be conveyed or reserved[,] . . . easements, licenses and the like for a right-of-way for 
access to a water course do exist and ofttimes are granted to nonriparian owners.”  Id.  
Such an access grant is exactly what occurred here.  The instant easement provided 
access to Kolke Creek, which included the right to dispose of treated water into Kolke 
Creek.  The Court of Appeals correctly determined that “plaintiffs’ argument does not 
hold water.”  Anglers, 283 Mich App at 132. 
50 Merit has not cross-appealed the lower courts’ decisions that its proposed discharge 
violates plaintiffs’ riparian rights, although it argues that the lower courts applied the 
appropriate test. 
 
 
 
 
21 
unreasonable infringement of those rights.  The Nestlé panel defined the “reasonable use 
balancing test” as follows: 
While the nature of the balancing test requires that the appropriate 
factors be ascertained on a case-by-case basis, . . . several factors can be 
discerned that will be relevant to every application of the test.  These 
factors include (1) the purpose of the use, (2) the suitability of the use to the 
location, (3) the extent and amount of the harm, (4) the benefits of the use, 
(5) the necessity of the amount and manner of the water use, and (6) any 
other factor that may bear on the reasonableness of the use. 
When determining the purpose of the use, the court should consider 
whether the use is for an artificial or a natural purpose and whether the use 
benefits the land from which the water is extracted.  Natural purposes 
include all those uses necessary to the existence of the user and his or her 
family, including the use of the water for drinking and household needs. . . .  
Further, in order to ensure that the needs of local water users are met first, 
water uses that benefit the riparian land or the land from which the 
groundwater was removed are given preference over water uses that ship 
the water away or otherwise benefit land unconnected with the location 
from which the water was extracted. 
In assessing the suitability of the use to the location, the court should 
examine the nature of the water source and its attributes.  A particularly 
large aquifer, stream, or lake may be unaffected even by extensive water 
withdrawals, whereas a marginal water resource may be unduly strained 
even by relatively modest withdrawals. . . . 
In assessing the harm and benefits, the court should examine not 
only the economic harm and benefits to the parties, but should also examine 
the social benefits and costs of the use, such as its effect on fishing, 
navigation, and conservation. . . . 
The court should also examine the extent, duration, necessity, and 
application of the use, including any effects on the quantity, quality, and 
level of the water.  If the amount or method of water use is excessive or 
unnecessary and harms another’s use, it will be unreasonable.  Furthermore, 
if the harm caused by a water use can be readily modified to mitigate or 
 
 
 
 
22 
eliminate the harm, the failure to take such steps may make the particular 
use unreasonable.[51
The lead opinion refuses to determine whether the Nestlé panel’s “reasonable use 
balancing test” might be appropriate in some instances, but it conclusively determines 
this test to be inappropriate in the instant case because the proposed discharge was 
“manifestly unreasonable.”
] 
52  Although the lead opinion cautions that it is not concluding 
that “diverting water from one watershed to another is ipso facto unreasonable,”53 it does 
provide a categorical rule regarding contaminants when it observes that “[i]t would be 
incongruous to hold that it is reasonable to decontaminate water by contaminating 
different water.”54
This Court’s decision in Attorney General ex rel Wyoming Twp v Grand Rapids
  The categorical rule that the lead opinion fashions in its haste to 
render a decision in this case is inconsistent with longstanding principles of Michigan 
water law. 
55
                                              
51 Nestlé, 269 Mich App at 71-74 (opinion by SMOLENSKI, J.) (citations omitted). 
52 Ante at 2. 
53 Ante at 13 n 18. 
54 Ante at 13. 
55 Attorney General ex rel Wyoming Twp v Grand Rapids, 175 Mich 503; 141 NW 890 
(1913). 
 
provides a prime example of the lead opinion’s determination—willful or not—to ignore 
longstanding principles of Michigan water law.  Wyoming Twp is particularly significant 
because it employed a reasonable use balancing test under circumstances similar to the 
facts here.  In Wyoming Twp, the plaintiff riparian owners sought to enjoin the defendant 
 
 
 
 
23 
city—also a riparian owner—from discharging its citizens’ sewage into the Grand River.  
It is clear from the facts of the case that many of the citizens whose land was therefore 
benefitted lived on nonriparian parcels.  Further, as will often be the case when a 
governmental entity disposes of sewage, it is possible—and potentially likely—that 
citizens of the defendant lived on land outside the watershed.  But such facts were 
irrelevant; the Court’s decision rested entirely on a reasonable use test to balance the 
rights of the competing riparian owners to use the waterway as they saw fit. 
Writing for the majority, Justice STONE applied a balancing test to determine the 
extent to which the plaintiffs’ riparian rights suffered as a result of the defendant’s 
discharge.  The Court explained that “city has the right to make a reasonable use of the 
waters of the river as a riparian owner.”56  Accordingly, it articulated a rule that “where 
an unreasonable pollution of the water, amounting to a nuisance, or impairing the rights 
of the lower riparian proprietor, is created or maintained, an injunction will issue to 
restrain its continuance.”57
The central issue was the plaintiffs’ ability to exercise their riparian rights, not 
simply the defendant’s pollution of the Grand River.  The Court explained: “Sewage 
cannot be thrown into the stream in such a way as to render the water foul and unfit for 
use.”
   
58
                                              
56 Id. at 534. 
57 Id. at 535 (emphasis added). 
58 Id. at 538 (emphasis added). 
  It emphasized that discharges of pollutants themselves were not per se 
 
 
 
 
24 
impermissible; only the harmful effect of a particular discharge rendered it 
impermissible: 
The maxim, “Use your own property in such a manner as not to 
injure that of another,” can equitably be applied to the defendants in this 
case.  It appears undisputed that the construction of a septic tank or tanks 
by the defendants within a reasonable time is feasible and practicable, and 
that thereby the sewage would be relieved from contaminating properties 
and so purified as to take away the offensive, unhealthful, and nauseating 
odors.[59
Accordingly, the Court enjoined the defendant from discharging sewage “until the same 
shall have first been, by the use of a septic tank or tanks, so deodorized and purified as 
not to contain the foul, offensive, or noxious matter (which it now contains) capable of 
injuring the complainants or their property, or causing a nuisance thereto . . . .”
] 
60
The Court explicitly tied the reasonableness of a riparian discharge to the 
existence of a private nuisance.  The two concepts are related because the existence of a 
private nuisance is itself dependent on whether the defendant’s actions “‘constitute 
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.’”
 
61
                                              
59 Id. at 543. 
60 Id. (emphasis added). 
61 Adkins v Thomas Solvent Co, 440 Mich 293, 305; 487 NW2d 715 (1992), quoting 
Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 87, p 623. 
  Overall, the 
Court’s decision in Wyoming Twp shows not only that the Nestlé panel’s “reasonable use 
balancing test” is firmly rooted in the Michigan common law, but also that such a test 
was applied historically even when a riparian owner used a waterway to benefit 
nonriparian lands.  By contrast, the lead opinion’s claim that any pollutant from a 
 
 
 
 
25 
different watershed discharged into Kolke Creek is unreasonable per se is a sharp 
divergence from established Michigan water law. 
Indeed, historical water law in Michigan consistently supports the lower courts’ 
application of the “reasonable use balancing test” instead of the lead opinion’s new 
categorical common law rule.  Michigan riparian law dates to Justice COOLEY’s 1874 
decision in Dumont v Kellogg.62  In Dumont, the defendant “constructed a dam across a 
natural water course, and by means thereof wrongfully detained the water in the stream to 
the prejudice and injury of the plaintiff, who was proprietor of a mill previously erected 
on the stream below.”63
But as between different proprietors on the same stream, the right of 
each qualifies that of the other, and the question always is, not merely 
whether the lower proprietor suffers damage by the use of the water above 
him, nor whether the quantity flowing on is diminished by the use, but 
whether under all the circumstances of the case the use of the water by one 
is reasonable and consistent with a correspondent enjoyment of right by the 
other.  “Each proprietor is entitled to such use of the stream, so far as it is 
reasonable, conformable to the usages and wants of the community, and 
having regard to the progress of improvement in hydraulic works, and not 
inconsistent with a like reasonable use by the other proprietors of land on 
the same stream above and below.” . . .  It is a fair participation and a 
reasonable use by each that the law seeks to protect. . . .  It is therefore not a 
diminution in the quantity of the water alone, or an alteration in its flow, or 
either or both of these circumstances combined with injury, that will give a 
  The claim of error involved the trial court’s instruction of the 
law to the jury, and so the Court articulated the proper law involving competing riparian 
claims.  Justice COOLEY determined that equality of riparian ownership requires some 
sort of balancing of riparian interests: 
                                              
62 Dumont v Kellogg, 29 Mich 420 (1874). 
63 Id. 
 
 
 
 
26 
right of action, if in view of all the circumstances, and having regard to 
equality of right in others, that which has been done and which causes the 
injury is not unreasonable.  In other words, the injury that is incidental to a 
reasonable enjoyment of the common right can demand no redress.[64
This Court also articulated important principles involving riparian rights in People 
v Hulbert.
] 
65  The central issue in Hulbert was whether, by swimming in the lake on 
which he owned property, the defendant criminally polluted the lake, which also served 
as a water supply to the city of Battle Creek.  The prosecution presented expert witnesses 
who testified “that germs might have been thrown off the body of the respondent while 
swimming, which would produce disease, and that some of those germs might reach the 
intake pipe, and through it the consumers of the water, and be a source of ill health,” even 
though “[i]t is not shown any such germs ever did reach the intake pipe, or that any 
illness in Battle Creek could be traced to the use of the water taken from this lake.”66
Writing for the majority, Justice MOORE concluded that Michigan and foreign 
caselaw made it clear “that the lower proprietor [i.e., the city] has no superior right to the 
upper one, and may not say to him that, because the lower proprietor wants to use the 
water for drinking purposes only, the upper proprietor may not use the water for any 
other purpose.”
 
67
[e]ach proprietor has an equal right to the use of the stream for the ordinary 
purposes of the house and farm, even though such use may in some degree 
  Rather,  
                                              
64 Id. at 423-425, quoting Cary v Daniels, 49 Mass (8 Met) 466, 476-477 (1844). 
65 People v Hulbert, 131 Mich 156; 91 NW 211 (1902). 
66 Id. at 159. 
67 Id. at 173. 
 
 
 
 
27 
lessen the volume of the stream, or affect the purity of the water. . . .  This 
right is not affected by the fact that the lower proprietor is a municipality 
instead of an individual.[68
In what we have said we do not mean to intimate that an upper 
proprietor may convert his property into a summer resort, and invite large 
numbers of people to his premises for purposes of bathing, and give them 
the right possessed only by the riparian owner and his family.  We are 
undertaking to decide only the case which is presented here.[
] 
The Court also implicitly required a fact-intensive balancing of the rights and effects of 
the riparian users: 
69
As this explication of Michigan water law shows, the lead opinion’s creation of a 
categorical common law rule out of whole cloth is hasty and inconsistent with established 
water law.  Believing that it is “unconscionable and destructive for this Court to 
determine that it is reasonable to spread dangerous contamination throughout 
Michigan,”
] 
70
                                              
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 174. 
70 Ante at 13. 
 the lead opinion nevertheless would adopt a categorical rule without 
requiring a finding that the contamination is, in fact, “dangerous” to the watershed at 
issue!  This is so because the circuit court only made an initial finding of fact that the 
volume of the proposed discharge (1.15 million gallons a day) could cause unreasonable 
harm to plaintiffs.  It did not find that the treated water was harmful to Kolke Creek 
regardless of volume; to the contrary, the circuit court specifically ruled that “the parties’ 
proximity to and use of the watercourse, as well as the volume, source, and nature of the 
proposed discharge, were considered while determining whether the proposed discharge 
 
 
 
 
28 
would be reasonable.”  Furthermore, its decision expressly contemplated that defendants 
might offer a planned discharge of contaminant that would be reasonable.  Instead of 
reviewing the factual determinations of the circuit court, the lead opinion makes a ruling 
as a matter of law that any amount of discharge is per se unreasonable.  There is simply 
no basis in law or fact for its ruling. 
Incredibly, the lead opinion reaches its preferred result by creating a new 
categorical rule both without citing a single case in support and with apparent 
unawareness that caselaw has already established how courts should weigh water use on 
the basis of whether it benefits riparian or nonriparian land, if the specific facts of a case 
warrant a distinction.71  Citing longstanding precedent of this Court, the Court of Appeals 
panel in Nestlé expressly held that “water uses that benefit the riparian land . . . are given 
preference over water uses that . . . benefit land unconnected with the location [of the 
water withdrawal].”72  A court should “ensure that the needs of local water users are met 
first . . . .”73
                                              
71 The reasons underlying some courts’ distinctions between riparian and nonriparian 
benefits would generally apply equally to any distinction between on-watershed and off-
watershed uses.  But, notably, the lead opinion’s categorical new rule for off-watershed 
uses—as opposed to uses benefitting nonriparian lands, generally—appears drawn from 
thin air. 
72 Nestlé, 269 Mich App at 72. 
73 Id. 
  Indeed, as the lower courts obviously concluded here, the factors listed in 
Nestlé directly address, on the basis of historical tests for reasonableness, each of 
plaintiffs’ concerns about Merit’s proposed water use.  For example, Nestlé also asserted 
that “natural purposes,” including “uses necessary to the existence of the user and his or 
 
 
 
 
29 
her family,” take precedence over artificial uses.74  As is particularly relevant to plaintiff 
Anglers of the AuSable, Inc., a court must also consider the proposed use’s “effect on 
fishing, navigation, and conservation.”75  Finally, the circuit court’s ruling clearly took 
into account the Nestlé panel’s holdings that “[i]f the amount or method of water use is 
excessive or unnecessary and harms another’s use, it will be unreasonable,” and “if the 
harm caused by a water use can be readily modified to mitigate or eliminate the harm, the 
failure to take such steps may make the particular use unreasonable.”76
With little explanation that cites no proposition of law, save the unremarkable and 
uncontested principle that an unreasonable use of a watershed is prohibited, the lead 
opinion upends water law and declares a categorical per se rule precluding any amount of 
contaminant into Kolke Creek.  The lead opinion attempts to bouleverse the existing law 
of this state, the negative impacts of which attempt cannot fully be foreseen.  It fails to 
 
The lead opinion’s conclusion that Merit’s proposed use is manifestly 
unreasonable simply because it involves two watersheds is unnecessary and displays a 
patent disregard for the rule of law and for this Court as an institution.  Its unreasoned 
conclusion also threatens vast negative consequences for the residents and businesses of 
this state. 
B.  POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE LEAD OPINION’S RULE 
                                              
74 Id. at 71-72. 
75 Id. at 73. 
76 Id. at 73-74 (citations omitted). 
 
 
 
 
30 
account even for several obvious hypothetical situations in which its unbending rule 
inappropriately precludes reasonable discharges that do not harm riparian owners’ rights.   
For example, suppose the presence of a contaminant in a small watershed causes 
significant harm to the environment and to the people living within that watershed.  
Suppose further that environmental engineers determine that diverting that contaminant 
to a large watershed (or several other watersheds) via riparian owners’ access easements 
would not harm the water contained in the larger watershed because the contaminant is 
safe when diluted in a large body of water.  In this situation, the diversion would not 
harm the riparian rights of the larger watershed’s users, but it would significantly 
improve the environmental conditions of the smaller watershed.  Nevertheless, the lead 
opinion’s categorical rule would seem to provide riparian owners at the point of 
discharge a cause of action to enjoin the discharge, despite no finding of harm to the 
larger watershed. 
The lead opinion also seems to call into question whether and to what extent 
municipalities can discharge their residents’ sewage.  Suppose that a municipality’s 
residents receive their water from one watershed and that the municipality discharges its 
residents’ sewage into a different watershed.  May riparian owners at the point of 
discharge successfully enjoin the municipality from discharging its residents’ sewage 
upon a simple showing that the discharge was created from water taken from a different 
watershed?  Although the Wyoming Twp decision would allow this discharge (assuming a 
finder of fact were to make appropriate findings of reasonableness), the rationale of the 
lead opinion would forbid it. 
 
 
 
 
31 
Consider an even simpler scenario: may a farmer no longer import water during 
dry seasons to irrigate his crops if any amount of the water, once sprayed onto his land, 
will drain into a river?  According to the rationale of the lead opinion, arguably he may 
not.  It appears that it will not matter whether the farmer uses potentially damaging 
fertilizers or harmless organic ones—either would “contaminate” the water as it runs off 
the plants and soil—given that actual injury to the watershed from his irrigation is 
irrelevant under the lead opinion’s categorical rule.  Indeed, because the lead opinion 
never even defines “contamination,” farmers are left to wonder: Is irrigation precluded if 
the off-watershed irrigation water is contaminated with mere soil?  With plant matter?  
Further, because the lead opinion’s rule makes it no longer appropriate to balance the 
benefits and detriments of the particular use in relation to other uses of the watershed, the 
categorical prohibition would not be superseded even if the farm were a significant 
source of food or economic support for the farmer’s community.77
                                              
77 Significantly, we cannot assume that, even if the farmer’s use does not actually injure 
the watershed or interfere with other riparian users, such hypothetical situations are 
irrelevant for the practical reason that no one will sue to enjoin the irrigation.  To the 
contrary, a per se rule divorced from any factual inquiry into the nature and level of harm 
invites mischief, particularly when combined with the minimal test for standing 
established by the majority in Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n, 487 Mich 349, relied on by the lead 
opinion here.  Under the prudential standing test from that case, any user of the watershed 
may seemingly sue our farmer for reasons unrelated to either party’s water needs and in 
disregard of the needs of the community.  Indeed, another watershed user could sue 
simply because that user is, for example, a farm operator wishing to reduce competition 
or even a vindictive riparian neighbor who disapproves of the farmer’s choice in overalls; 
neither plaintiff would have to show that he was actually harmed by the farmer’s 
irrigation. 
  Thus, the lead 
 
 
 
 
32 
opinion’s rule has the potential to cripple agriculture in this state—an industry that has an 
economic impact of more than $70 billion annually in this state’s economy.78
                                              
78 Knudson & Peterson, Second Interim Update on the Economic Impact of Michigan’s 
Agri-Food and Agri-Energy System, available at  
(accessed 
December 22, 2010). 
 
These are only a few hypothetical situations that the lead opinion’s categorical rule 
would seem to forbid.  Yet as these examples make clear, application of the lead 
opinion’s rule—which requires water use to be enjoined on the basis of a vague notion of 
“contamination” instead of on the basis of relative harm—would stifle activity that 
simply does not harm existing watersheds and that is clearly beneficial to the community 
at large. 
The lead opinion also fails to address arguments of defendants and their amici 
curiae—which raise additional critical concerns about the soundness and workability of 
the new rule—that on-watershed and off-watershed uses may be impossible to 
differentiate under some facts.  The lead opinion’s categorical rule suggests that a 
watershed’s boundaries are sacrosanct, yet it has provided no authority for this principle.  
It does not even note Merit’s related observation that its land—like countless other 
parcels in Michigan—sits nearly on the border of the surface water divide between the 
AuSable and Manistee watersheds, exemplifying Merit’s argument that, as a matter of 
geographical fact, determining which watershed a parcel sits in is not always a black and 
white inquiry.  Yet under the lead opinion’s categorical rule, courts would have to make 
this determination, even when scientists and geographers cannot. 
 
 
 
 
33 
Finally, and most telling, as explained earlier, plaintiffs successfully enjoined 
Merit from discharging 1.15 million gallons a day into Kolke Creek in the instant original 
action, and they successfully vacated the DEQ’s COC on appeal of the contested case 
decision.  Those proceedings were designed to take into account the very analyses that 
the lead opinion elides: namely, whether the particular proposed discharge would 
unreasonably interfere with plaintiffs’ riparian rights and whether it would violate 
Michigan’s environmental laws.  This case’s procedural history illustrates that the careful 
balance Michigan’s riparian law has struck for more than a century serves citizens of this 
state, including riparian owners such as plaintiffs, well: not one drop of treated water has 
ever been allowed to enter the bodies of water plaintiffs sought to protect; the permit that 
would have allowed a discharge was vacated; and plaintiffs were awarded fees and costs 
pertaining to their claims against Merit.  This litigation demonstrates that there is no need 
to disturb Michigan’s balanced and effective riparian law.  Ultimately, the broad strokes 
that the lead opinion uses in its haste to render its preferred policy decision in this case 
would severely damage this state’s common law and its economy. 
V.  PLAINTIFFS’ MEPA CLAIMS 
Plaintiffs claim that both Merit and the DEQ violated MEPA.79
                                              
79 As stated in part III(B) of this opinion, plaintiffs’ MEPA claims are now moot.  Their 
MEPA claim against Merit is moot because Merit no longer has either physical access to 
Kolke Creek or a valid DEQ permit.  Their MEPA claim against the DEQ is moot 
because the circuit court has already vacated the underlying permit.  Nevertheless, the 
majority has decided to rule that plaintiffs’ MEPA claims against Merit and the DEQ may 
  MCL 324.1701(1) 
provides, in whole: 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
The attorney general or any person may maintain an action in the 
circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is 
likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief against any person for 
the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources and the public 
trust in these resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction. 
MCL 324.1703(1) requires the plaintiff to make “a prima facie showing that the conduct 
of the defendant has polluted, impaired, or destroyed or is likely to pollute, impair, or 
destroy the air, water, or other natural resources or the public trust in these 
resources . . . .”   
Plaintiffs claim that the DEQ’s issuance of the COC “is likely to pollute, impair, 
or destroy” Kolke Creek and the AuSable River watershed in violation of MCL 
324.1703(1).80
In Preserve the Dunes, the plaintiff sought to enjoin a sand dune mining operation 
for which the DEQ had granted a permit.  Although the plaintiff did not challenge the 
  The lower courts applied this Court’s precedent in Preserve the Dunes to 
rule that the mere issuance of a permit is not itself “conduct” that “is likely to pollute, 
impair, or destroy the air, water, or other natural resources or the public trust in these 
resources” in violation of MCL 324.1703(1). 
A.  PRESERVE THE DUNES WAS CORRECTLY DECIDED 
                                              
proceed.  Therefore, while I would dismiss the entire case as moot, my analysis proceeds 
on the substantive merits of the claims. 
80 Plaintiffs also claim that Merit’s proposed discharge “is likely to pollute, impair, or 
destroy” Kolke Creek and the AuSable River watershed in violation of MCL 
324.1703(1).  The circuit court agreed with plaintiffs that the proposed discharge would 
violate MEPA and enjoined Merit from undertaking its proposed discharge.  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the injunction, and Merit has not appealed that decision of the Court of 
Appeals.  Accordingly, this Court is not presented with the substantive question whether 
Merit’s proposed discharge violates MEPA. 
 
 
 
 
35 
mining operation’s eligibility for the permit during the appropriate time for review, it 
sought to undertake a collateral attack on the permit’s issuance, claiming that the DEQ’s 
mere issuance of the permit violated MEPA. 
Writing for the majority, Justice CORRIGAN explained that, even if the DEQ had 
erred by issuing the permit, “[a]n improper administrative decision, standing alone, does 
not harm the environment.  Only wrongful conduct offends MEPA.”81
The lead opinion claims that Preserve the Dunes “frustrated the legislative intent 
behind MEPA, and . . . represented a departure from this Court’s precedent.”
  Accordingly, the 
Court rejected the plaintiff’s collateral attack on the issuance of the mining permit.  Of 
course, the Court’s holding that “[o]nly wrongful conduct offends MEPA” did nothing to 
prevent an action against the mining operation for harming the environment.  Indeed, if 
nothing else, the opinion underscored that the appropriate avenue to enforce MEPA is to 
seek relief from the entities whose actual conduct violates or would imminently violate 
MEPA. 
82
When interpreting a statute, courts must “ascertain the legislative intent that may 
reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute.”
  To the 
contrary, Preserve the Dunes applied the language that the Legislature used in MEPA, 
and its holding was consistent with the holdings contained in this Court’s earlier 
precedent. 
83
                                              
81 Preserve the Dunes, 471 Mich at 519. 
82 Ante at 7. 
83 Koontz v Ameritech Servs, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). 
  This requires courts to 
 
 
 
 
36 
consider “the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as ‘its placement and 
purpose in the statutory scheme.’”84  In enacting MEPA, the Legislature specified that it 
was regulating “conduct of the defendant [that] has polluted, impaired, or destroyed or is 
likely to pollute, impair, or destroy the air, water, or other natural resources or the public 
trust in these resources . . . .”85
The word “conduct” is not defined in MEPA, nor is it defined in the Natural 
Resources and Environmental Protection Act,
 
86 within which all environmental 
regulations, including MEPA, fall.  “[W]e give undefined statutory terms their plain and 
ordinary meanings.”87  Accordingly, it is appropriate to use a dictionary to determine the 
appropriate meaning of the word “conduct” in MCL 324.1703(1).88  Merriam-Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary defines “conduct,” in relevant part, as “the act, manner, or process 
of carrying on[.]”89
It is apparent from the placement of the term “conduct” within MCL 324.1703(1) 
that not only must a defendant engage in “conduct” to violate MEPA, but the defendant’s 
  This definition makes it clear that conduct requires some sort of 
action. 
                                              
84 Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 237; 596 NW2d 119 (1999), quoting 
Bailey v United States, 516 US 137, 145; 116 S Ct 501; 133 L Ed 2d 472 (1995). 
85 MCL 324.1703(1) (emphasis added). 
86 MCL 324.101 et seq. 
87 Koontz, 466 Mich at 312. 
88 Id. 
89 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (1998). 
 
 
 
 
37 
conduct must itself “pollute[], impair[], or destroy[] or [be] likely to pollute, impair, or 
destroy the air, water, or other natural resources or the public trust in these 
resources . . . .”  It is simply not the case that the issuance of a permit, by itself, pollutes, 
impairs, or destroys or is likely to pollute, impair, or destroy the air, water, or other 
natural resources or the public trust in these resources.90
The lead opinion also claims that Preserve the Dunes “insulate[s] DEQ permit 
decisions from MEPA.”
  While a permit might precede 
conduct that pollutes, impairs, or destroys this state’s environmental resources, it does not 
do so without subsequent action by an individual or entity.  The lead and concurring 
opinions thus have not shown how the mere issuance of a permit violates MEPA. 
91  As already demonstrated, this case is a perfect illustration that 
this is simply untrue.  Judicial review of agency decisions is available through an appeal 
to circuit court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) after a contested 
case hearing.92
                                              
90 This conclusion is strengthened by a contextual reading of MEPA that considers the 
use of “conduct” in MCL 324.1705, which mandates that an agency make a pollution 
determination, and then states that “conduct shall not be authorized or approved that has 
or is likely to have [a polluting] effect . . . .”  MCL 324.1705(2) (emphasis added).  This 
provision recognizes a distinction between the “conduct” of a MEPA defendant and the 
“authorization” or “approval” of the agency.  Thus, the language of the statute makes 
clear that the drafters of MEPA did not consider authorization or approval alone to 
constitute “conduct,” just as Preserve the Dunes held. 
91 Ante at 10. 
92 MCL 24.302.   
  In other words, a person seeking judicial review of an administrative 
agency’s issuance of a permit may assert that the agency failed to apply MEPA.  As 
discussed, that is precisely what happened in this case.  In plaintiffs’ appeal of the 
 
 
 
 
38 
contested case decision, the circuit court concluded that the DEQ’s “approval of Merit’s 
COC is illegal . . . because the proposed discharge and the proposed volume of discharge 
is likely to violate MEPA.” 
Accordingly, contrary to the lead opinion’s unsupported assertion, the permitting 
process is far from “insulated.”  In this very case, MEPA was vindicated through an 
appropriate and entirely adequate procedural vehicle: the APA appeal.  There was no 
need for plaintiffs to file a separate complaint under MCL 324.1701, alleging again that 
the MDEQ’s issuance of the (already-invalidated) COC violated MEPA.  As the 
procedural history of this case illustrates, and as Preserve the Dunes recognized, a MEPA 
case challenging the issuance of a permit constitutes an improper “collateral attack” that 
is nowhere contemplated by the statute.93
                                              
93 Preserve the Dunes, 471 Mich at 511. 
 
B.  PRESERVE THE DUNES WAS CONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT’S 
PRECEDENT 
The lead and concurring opinions also have not shown how Preserve the Dunes 
departed from this Court’s precedent.  The lead and concurring opinions both refer to 
several cases that they urge support their claim, but they fail to examine those cases in 
sufficient detail to show how they are inconsistent with Preserve the Dunes.  In fact, the 
cases cited provide little support for the claim that Preserve the Dunes was incorrectly 
decided. 
 
 
 
 
39 
First, the lead and concurring opinions refer to Eyde v Michigan.94  However, the 
plaintiffs in Eyde claimed that “the construction of a sewer [was] violative of” MEPA’s 
predecessor statute.95  Thus, Eyde unquestionably involved conduct, namely, the 
construction of a sewer.  Moreover, the Court expressly indicated that its holding was 
“restricted to the unique facts of this case.”96
Second, the lead and concurring opinions refer to Ray v Mason Co Drain 
Comm’r.
  As a result, the lead and concurring 
opinions’ reliance on this case is specious. 
97  Ray involved “the kind of findings of fact required of the trial judge . . . in 
deciding an action brought under” MEPA’s predecessor statute.98
Third, the lead and concurring opinions refer to West Mich Environmental Action 
Council v Natural Resources Comm (WMEAC).
  Ray neither involved 
nor discussed whether the mere issuance of a permit can itself violate MEPA.  
Accordingly, it is simply irrelevant to the position that the lead and concurring opinions 
seek to advance. 
99
                                              
94 Eyde v Michigan, 393 Mich 453; 225 NW2d 1 (1975). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 456. 
97 Ray v Mason Co Drain Comm’r, 393 Mich 294; 224 NW2d 883 (1975). 
98 Id. at 298. 
99 West Mich Environmental Action Council v Natural Resources Comm, 405 Mich 741; 
275 NW2d 538 (1979) (WMEAC). 
  The plaintiffs in WMEAC challenged a 
consent order between the Natural Resources Commission (NRC) and several private 
 
 
 
 
40 
entities to allow oil and gas development in a state forest.  Pursuant to that consent order, 
the NRC granted permits for those private entities to drill 10 exploratory wells in the 
forest.  Even before the NRC granted those permits, however, the plaintiffs claimed that 
the consent order “was likely to lead to the impairment of wildlife in the Forest.”100  This 
Court’s ultimate disposition was to order the trial court to enter “a permanent injunction 
prohibiting the drilling of the ten exploratory wells pursuant to permits issued on August 
24, 1977.”101
Finally, the lead and concurring opinions refer to Nemeth v Abonmarche Dev, 
Inc.
  Thus, this Court’s injunction was not issued to enjoin the NRC from 
issuing permits or even to vacate the existing permits but to enjoin the underlying 
conduct that the permits purported to allow.  WMEAC is, therefore, inapplicable to 
whether Preserve the Dunes was correctly decided. 
102  Nemeth involved a proposed development in the city of Manistee that the 
plaintiffs alleged would cause soil and sand erosion.  At issue in Nemeth was whether the 
developers’ (undisputed) violations of the soil erosion and sedimentation control act 
(SESCA)103
                                              
100 Id. at 750. 
101 Id. at 760. 
102 Nemeth v Abonmarche Dev, Inc, 457 Mich 16; 576 NW2d 641 (1998). 
103 MCL 324.9101 et seq. 
 also violated MEPA.  This Court concluded that substantive SESCA 
violations can present a prima facie MEPA violation.  Thus, Nemeth similarly involved 
whether conduct underlying a permit—not the actual issuance of a permit—violates 
MEPA. 
 
 
 
 
41 
Accordingly, and contrary to the lead and concurring opinions’ ipse dixit, 
Preserve the Dunes was not inconsistent with this Court’s prior holdings.   
C.  THE LEAD OPINION’S ADDITIONAL RATIONALES 
The lead opinion claims that it provides two additional “compelling justifications 
for overruling Preserve the Dunes.”104
First, the lead opinion claims that Preserve the Dunes violates article 4, § 52 of the 
Michigan Constitution, which indicates that the “conservation and development of the 
natural resources of the state . . . [are] of paramount public concern” and that “[t]he 
legislature shall provide for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of 
the state from pollution, impairment and destruction.”
  Neither of these justifications withstands scrutiny. 
105
This Court has recognized that the predecessor statute of MEPA was “the first 
legislation of its kind” and that its passage “attracted worldwide attention.”
   
106  Nothing in 
Preserve the Dunes prevented any plaintiffs who alleged an imminent injury to their 
property from participating in what former Chief Justice WILLIAMS called “the important 
task of environmental law enforcement . . . .”107
                                              
104 Ante at 8. 
105 Const 1963, art 4, § 52. 
106 Ray, 393 Mich at 304. 
107 Id. at 305. 
  Indeed, plaintiffs here have already 
succeeded in enforcing MEPA by receiving an injunction preventing Merit from 
undertaking conduct that the circuit court concluded would violate MEPA.  Preserve the 
 
 
 
 
42 
Dunes did not stifle enforcement of MEPA.  On the contrary, it focused enforcement of 
MEPA against those individuals and entities who are actually harming, or whose 
imminent conduct threatens to harm, this state’s natural resources.108
The lead opinion also determines that Preserve the Dunes should be overruled 
because, in the instant case, the DEQ “has done more than simply issue a permit that 
would result in the harm of natural resources” because it “has also granted an easement 
over state land to facilitate the harmful actions.”
 
109
                                              
108 The lead opinion’s holding has the opposite effect in that it arguably makes countless 
individuals and entities subject to MEPA claims, even when their “conduct” itself does 
not harm the environment.  The lead opinion reasons that the DEQ is subject to a MEPA 
claim because its “permit process is entirely related to the environmental harm . . . .”  
Ante at 7.  However, the lead opinion provides no guidance as to what nexus would be 
sufficient to satisfy its “entirely related” test.  Should the bank that makes the loan for a 
building project on wetlands be subject to a MEPA suit?  Should the contractor who 
supplies the labor?  Should the builders themselves be?  Certainly, by the lead opinion’s 
reasoning, all of these individuals’ “conduct” is “entirely related” to a harm, or to a likely 
harm, to the environment. 
109 Ante at 9. 
  It is simply incongruous to assert that 
the holding in Preserve the Dunes—that the mere issuance of a permit does not constitute 
“conduct”—should be overruled because the lead opinion concludes that the DEQ’s 
actions in the instant case exceeded the mere issuance of a permit!  Indeed, nothing in 
Preserve the Dunes prohibited actions against administrative agencies whose conduct 
actually pollutes or threatens to pollute the environment.  Moreover, the lead opinion is 
simply incorrect in stating that the DEQ granted Merit an easement to facilitate its 
allegedly harmful actions.  The DNR granted the easement to Merit, not the DEQ.  
Although today they are within the same entity (the Department of Natural Resources and 
 
 
 
 
43 
Environment), they were separate executive agencies at the time the easement was 
granted.  Thus, to the extent that the DNR’s act of granting the easement arguably can be 
said to have been actionable “conduct” violating the relevant environmental statutes, this 
is not related to DEQ’s issuance of the permit.  But this circumstance is not a problem for 
the lead opinion.  Simply put, the lead opinion’s argument that the issuance of the 
successfully challenged permit caused an environmental injury is specious. 
D.  STARE DECISIS PRINCIPLES MILITATE AGAINST OVERRULING PRESERVE 
THE DUNES 
Not only does a majority of this Court erroneously conclude that Preserve the 
Dunes was incorrectly decided and was inconsistent with this Court’s precedent, but the 
lead and concurring opinions do not seriously consider what effect the principle of stare 
decisis has on whether to overrule Preserve the Dunes.  Stare decisis “‘promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance 
on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 
process.’”110
Although the lead and concurring opinions (erroneously) conclude that Preserve 
the Dunes was wrongly decided, it is well established that “the mere fact that an earlier 
case was wrongly decided does not mean overruling it is invariably appropriate.”
 
111
                                              
110 Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), quoting Hohn v 
United States, 524 US 236, 251; 118 S Ct 1969; 141 L Ed 2d 242 (1998). 
111 Robinson, 462 Mich at 465. 
  
Instead, this Court must determine the effects of overruling its prior decision, “including 
 
 
 
 
44 
most importantly the effect on reliance interests and whether overruling would work an 
undue hardship because of that reliance.”112  The lead opinion simply states, with no 
explanation, that “the law must be returned to how it was applied before Preserve the 
Dunes was incorrectly decided.”113
In fact, the lead opinion fails to make this analysis because such an analysis shows 
that Preserve the Dunes should be maintained.  To overrule Preserve the Dunes, even if it 
were wrongly decided, “would produce chaos.”
  The lead opinion’s failure to undertake this analysis 
with any degree of seriousness further illustrates its haste to render a decision.  
114
                                              
112 Id. at 466. 
113 Ante at 10 n 9. 
114 Robinson, 462 Mich at 466 n 26. 
  The Preserve the Dunes majority’s 
response to the dissent in that case provides a glimpse into the world the lead opinion 
seeks to create, one in which no administrative decision achieves finality: 
Imagine the world that the dissent’s reasoning would create.  The 
present energy crisis offers a good example.  For many years, our country 
has sought to decrease our reliance on foreign sources of oil.  Suppose an 
oil company decided to invest in oil exploration in Michigan in reliance on 
a DEQ-issued permit.  Under the dissent’s view, MEPA would authorize a 
challenge at any time to flaws in the permitting process.  Moreover, under 
the dissent’s reasoning, a court must accept as true the bare assertion that a 
company’s conduct will destroy natural resources.  It can never rely on a 
permit to do business.  What sane investor would take such a risk?  As gas 
prices soar, few people in Michigan would thank this Court for “protecting” 
the environment in this radical fashion. 
The dissent’s regime would render the permitting process a useless 
exercise.  It would cripple economic expansion in Michigan and probably 
lead to disinvestment.  No one would invest money to obtain a permit that 
is subject to endless collateral attacks. 
 
 
 
 
45 
MEPA nowhere strips the permitting process of finality.  It is the 
dissent that makes a mockery of legislative intent by failing to anchor its 
exaggerated claims in the statute’s actual language.  MEPA does not 
impose the radical requirement that courts indefinitely police administrative 
agencies’ permit procedures and decisions.[115
The concurring opinion attempts to undertake an analysis of stare decisis 
principles, but it also falls short of proving that Preserve the Dunes should be overruled.  
In particular, the lead and concurring opinions have not shown how Preserve the Dunes 
defies “practical workability,” another factor militating against its claim that Preserve the 
Dunes should be overruled.
] 
The lead opinion’s rationale, such as it is, provides scant assurance that it has considered 
how disruptive overruling Preserve the Dunes will be to this state. 
116
                                              
115 Preserve the Dunes, 471 Mich at 523. 
116 Robinson, 462 Mich at 466. 
  To the contrary, even under Preserve the Dunes, the 
instant plaintiffs successfully enjoined the conduct that the DEQ’s permit purported to 
allow and they successfully challenged the issuance of that permit on appeal from the 
appropriate administrative procedures.  Indeed, if anything, this case shows how Preserve 
the Dunes appropriately and effectively interpreted Michigan’s environmental law, 
permitting the successful protection of the environment and plaintiffs’ riparian rights.  
This fact alone should have been persuasive to any jurist committed to stare decisis to 
avoid an unnecessary overruling of existing precedent. 
Preserve the Dunes was correct when it was decided, and it remains correct today.  
The lead and concurring opinions have not provided any serious reason for determining 
otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
46 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This case is moot.  Not only has Merit voluntarily abandoned the easement that 
granted it physical access to Kolke Creek, the circuit court has also vacated the 
underlying DEQ permit that would have allowed it to make its proposed discharge.  
Accordingly, any substantive decision that this Court renders only affects the parties in 
the abstract.  This Court has long stated that it is not a constitutional exercise of the 
judicial power to decide abstract cases.  Therefore, I vehemently dissent from this Court’s 
decision to render a substantive ruling in this case. 
Furthermore, I strongly dissent from the lead opinion’s unnecessarily disruptive 
disposition of the substantive issues in this case.  The lead opinion fashions out of whole 
cloth a categorical rule that “contaminated” water originating from one watershed can 
never be discharged into watercourses in another watershed because such a discharge 
inherently violates the riparian rights of landowners at the point of discharge.  This 
decision has no basis in Michigan’s well-established water law, under which the 
touchstone of “reasonableness” has served the citizens of this state, including these 
riparian plaintiffs, very well.  Finally, the lead and concurring opinions’ claim that 
Preserve the Dunes was wrongly decided is inconsistent with the plain language of 
MEPA and will wreak havoc on this state’s legal system. 
In short, the lead opinion’s palpably erroneous decision and the concurring 
justices’ acquiescence in the result of that decision are affronts to the rule of law and 
reflect the majority’s unseemly haste to render a decision in this case before the end of 
calendar year 2010.  The decision this Court renders today is a prime example of the 
 
 
 
 
47 
naked exercise of power without constitutional warrant.  While there may be some who 
will welcome today’s result, they should fear a judiciary that is willing to bend the law to 
accomplish its will.  Those who support it may live to see this decision further undermine 
the state’s fragile economy. 
For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully, but strenuously, dissent. 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Stephen J. Markman