Case Title: Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid

Citation: 1999-Ohio-374

Docket Number: 19981727

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. REID. 
[Cite as Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid (1999), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Judges — Misconduct — Public reprimand — Violations of former Canons 2(A) 
and 5(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct — In disciplinary cases, the 
Supreme Court renders the final determination of the facts and conclusions 
of law — In disciplinary proceedings, relator bears the burden of proving 
the facts necessary to establish a violation. 
1. 
In disciplinary cases, the Supreme Court renders the final determination of 
the facts and conclusions of law.  Therefore, in assessing the propriety of the 
conduct in question and the appropriate sanction, if any, the Supreme Court 
is not bound by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline’s 
findings of fact or conclusions of law.  (In re Complaint Against Harper 
[1996], 77 Ohio St.3d 211, 215-216, 673 N.E.2d 1253, 1258, and Cincinnati 
Bar Assn. v. Heitzler [1972], 32 Ohio St.2d 214, 220, 61 O.O.2d 451, 454, 
291 N.E.2d 477, 482, followed.) 
2. 
In disciplinary proceedings, the relator bears the burden of proving the facts 
necessary to establish a violation.  The complaint must allege the specific 
misconduct that violates the Disciplinary Rules and relator must prove such 
misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. 
(No. 98-1727 — Submitted December 16, 1998 — Decided April 7, 1999.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 97-65. 
 
On August 11, 1997, relator, Ohio State Bar Association, filed a five-count 
complaint alleging that respondent, Judge M. David Reid, a.k.a. Marlin David 
Reid, of Beavercreek, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0008097, a judge of the 
Greene County Court of Common Pleas since 1979, violated several provisions of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct and R.C. 102.02.  Respondent answered, and the 
 
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matter was heard by a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”). 
 
Count I involved a foreclosure matter that had been on respondent’s docket.  
Eleven days after signing the journal entry confirming the sale of the property in 
question, respondent joined in the partnership that had purchased the property at 
the sheriff’s sale.  The panel concluded that by his conduct, respondent violated 
former Canon 2(A), “[a] judge should respect and comply with the law and should 
conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”  Given the timing of the order issued in 
the foreclosure action and the formation of the partnership, the panel believed that, 
at the very least, there was an appearance of impropriety.  However, the panel 
found no evidence of a violation of former Canon 3(C)(1)(c) (a judge should 
disqualify himself if he knows he has a substantial financial interest in the subject 
matter in controversy). 
 
In Count II, the panel found that respondent failed to disclose his $150,000 
investment in Wallaby’s, Inc. on his 1995 Ohio Ethics Commission Financial 
Disclosure Statement.  In August 1994, respondent’s son and others had formed 
Wallaby’s for purposes of starting a restaurant, and in March 1995, respondent had 
issued five checks to Wallaby’s for investment purposes.  This investment was not 
listed on the 1995 disclosure form. However, his 1996 Financial Disclosure 
Statement did indicate his interest in Wallaby’s. 
 
For these actions, the panel concluded that respondent violated former 
Canon 6, which provides that a judge should regularly file financial disclosure 
statements required by statutes, and, specifically, R.C. 102.02(C), which requires 
that disclosure statements be timely filed and set forth all loans and investments 
valued over one thousand dollars. 
 
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In Count III, the complaint alleged that respondent dismissed a lawsuit 
against AmeriFirst Bank, N.A., after it helped finance Wallaby’s construction with 
a $600,000 loan, and that respondent never disclosed his interest to any of the 
parties in violation of former Canons 3(C) and 2(A).  For these allegations, the 
panel did not find any violations of the Canons. 
 
As to Count IV, the panel found that between 1985 and 1994, fifteen real 
estate documents were filed.  Either respondent or one of his partnerships was 
connected with each document.  On six of these documents, respondent’s judicial 
address at the courthouse was used in connection with respondent’s name as 
preparer. The panel considered, and apparently rejected, respondent’s assertion that 
the use of the courthouse address was for safety concerns.  None of the documents 
prepared by respondent identified him as a judge.  The panel could find no 
evidence that respondent acted in any other capacity than his own in regard to 
these documents.  Nor did the panel find evidence that respondent received 
compensation for preparing these documents. 
 
However, the panel found violations of former Canon 2(A) and Canons 5(C) 
and (F).  The panel found that the preparation of the documents is the practice of 
law and had the potential of involving respondent in transactions with lawyers or 
persons likely to come before the court on which he serves.  Moreover, the panel 
concluded that respondent’s active involvement in real estate transactions 
evidenced by these documents provides an appearance of impropriety with the 
potential for eroding public confidence in the judiciary.  However, the panel did 
not believe that respondent’s conduct rose to the level of that scrutinized by this 
court in Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Dye (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 72, 572 N.E.2d 666, 
since there was no indication that anyone was under the impression that 
respondent’s chambers were his private office.  Nor was there any evidence that 
respondent’s official duties were interrupted for these actions. 
 
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Finally, as to Count V, which involves respondent’s alleged appearances 
before the Beavercreek Planning Commission, the panel found that respondent, 
while a judge, had spoken on at least four occasions at governmental meetings and 
before the commission.  On one occasion, in the Shoup case, respondent appeared 
before the planning commission, advocating a zoning variance for real estate that 
one of his partnerships, Terra Developers, had a contract to purchase.  The contract 
to purchase was contingent upon obtaining the variance.  The request was denied, 
and the property owner appealed the ruling to the Greene County Court of 
Common Pleas.  Terra Developers was an intervening party.  Ultimately, the 
variance was secured by a settlement, and respondent, not Terra Developers, 
purchased the property.  The appearances before the planning commission did not 
involve any requests concerning respondent’s personal residence. 
 
As to this count, violations of former Canons 2(A) and 5(C) were found. A 
violation of former Canon 2(A) was found because respondent’s testimony was not 
required, as other partners could have presented testimony concerning the zoning 
requests.  The panel found that respondent’s testimony was intended to lend the 
prestige of his office to advance his interests and those of others with whom he was 
aligned in a business partnership.  In addition, his activity was found to have 
violated former Canon 5(C) because the dispute about which he testified did come 
before his court, and he later purchased the property. 
 
In mitigation, the panel found that respondent did not receive substantial 
financial gain as to any of the counts.  In addition, the panel noted that the judicial 
order involved in Count I was a routine order in a foreclosure action and was not 
unreasonable under the circumstances.  Relating to Count II, the panel found that 
respondent did disclose his interest in Wallaby’s in his 1996 Financial Disclosure 
Statement, and, therefore, its omission in his 1995 Financial Disclosure Statement, 
when viewed in connection with the other evidence, was mitigated.  As to Count 
 
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IV, the panel found that the use of the courthouse address did not provide any 
pecuniary benefit to respondent.  Finally, as to Count V, respondent’s only benefit 
was the purchase of the property.  Further, the parties voluntarily settled the matter 
under the scrutiny of a Clark County visiting judge. 
 
In recommending a public reprimand, the panel relied upon the decisions of 
Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Dye; Disciplinary Counsel v. Allen (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 
494, 684 N.E.2d 31; and Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Worth (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 305, 
695 N.E.2d 749, all of which imposed this sanction.  The board adopted the 
findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the panel. 
__________________ 
 
Geoffrey Stern, Brian D. Weaver and William C. Mann, for relator. 
 
John J. Chester and Donald C. Brey, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  In disciplinary cases, the Supreme Court 
renders the final determination of the facts and conclusions of law.  Therefore, in 
assessing the propriety of the conduct in question and the appropriate sanction, if 
any, the Supreme Court is not bound by the board’s findings of fact or conclusions 
of law.  In re Complaint Against Harper (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 211, 215-216, 673 
N.E.2d 1253, 1258, and Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Heitzler (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 
214, 220, 61 O.O.2d 451, 454, 291 N.E.2d 477, 482.  Applying this standard, we 
have considered the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as the 
record and arguments presented to this court.  Upon our review, we find that 
relator failed to sustain its burden of proof as to four of the charged counts.  
Therefore, we do not adopt many of the board’s findings and conclusions. 
 
At the outset, we note that judges are held to the highest standard of ethical 
conduct and will be held accountable for their transgressions. See Mahoning Cty. 
Bar Assn. v. Franko (1958), 168 Ohio St. 17, 23, 5 O.O.2d 282, 285-286, 151 
 
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N.E.2d 17, 23; Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallagher (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 51, 52, 
693 N.E.2d 1078, 1079; Harper, 77 Ohio St.3d at 220, 673 N.E.2d at 1261.  
However, by the same token, we stress that the same rules of proof applied in 
disciplinary proceedings to attorneys apply to judges as well. 
 
In disciplinary proceedings, the relator bears the burden of proving the facts 
necessary to establish a violation.  The complaint must allege the specific 
misconduct that violates the Disciplinary Rules and relator must prove such 
misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.  Gov.Bar R. V(6)(J); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Jackson (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 308, 310, 691 N.E.2d 262, 263.  “Clear 
and convincing evidence” has been defined as “that measure or degree of proof 
which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of 
such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and 
which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to 
the facts sought to be established.”  Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469, 53 
O.O. 361, 120 N.E.2d 118, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
As to Count I, the foreclosure matter, we do not find, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that any violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct were 
committed.  There is no Disciplinary Rule that prohibits judges from acquiring an 
interest in property formerly involved in suits before them.  Indeed, public auctions 
are, by their nature, impartial with respect to any and all bidders. 
 
Here, the property in question was offered twice before at a public auction.  
Finding no bidders, the parties to the foreclosure action entered into an agreed-
upon sale price of $50,000.  At the third auction, Everett Schafer, a partner to one 
of respondent’s real estate partnerships, was the sole bidder and purchased the 
property at the agreed-upon price. 
 
However, respondent testified that he had no knowledge of Schafer’s 
purchase of the property, nor had he been approached concerning the establishment 
 
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of the new partnership before he signed the confirmation-of-sale order.  While a 
trier of fact could discount this testimony, doing so is not fatal to respondent’s 
position.  After respondent signed the October 16, 1992 confirmation order, he did 
not act in any other judicial capacity with respect to this matter. 
 
We also find it noteworthy that the parties to the foreclosure action were not 
called as witnesses in this disciplinary action.  Thus, there is no allegation that they 
were prejudiced or harmed in any way, or that respondent had anything to do with 
setting the purchase price.  Indeed, if Schafer had not purchased the property, a 
fourth sheriff’s sale would have been necessary, and the price of the property 
would have been lowered, resulting in less money received for the property. 
 
Hence, while the timing of the real estate transaction may, at first blush, 
seem suspect, suspicion alone is insufficient to establish violations of former 
Canon 2(A) or 3(C)(1)(c) by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
Pertaining to Count II, the failure to list the $150,000 Wallaby’s stock 
investment on respondent’s 1995 Financial Disclosure Statement, we again find 
that relator failed to sustain its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
Former Canon 6(C) requires the filing of the disclosure statement. 
Respondent filed this document in 1995.  Respondent testified that he issued the 
checks in 1995, but he did not receive the stock certificates until 1997.  Since he 
did not have the certificates in 1995 and because the restaurant had not yet opened, 
respondent stated that it did not come to mind that he needed to list the Wallaby’s 
investment for 1995.  The restaurant opened in May 1996 and respondent’s 
financial disclosure form for 1996 listed the Wallaby’s investment. 
 
Respondent argues that his failure to list his Wallaby’s investment in his 
1995 Financial Disclosure Statement was, at worst, negligent.  We agree.  R.C. 
102.02(C) and (D) punish only “knowingly” failing to file or failing to disclose 
loans or investments over one thousand dollars.  Cf. Disciplinary Counsel v. 
 
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Capers (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 122, 123-124, 15 OBR 273, 274, 472 N.E.2d 1073, 
1074, where a judge filed erroneous docket reports.  In Capers, it was found that 
the judge’s error was due to confusion and carelessness, rather than 
misrepresentation and, thus, there was no violation on that count.  Likewise, we 
find that while respondent’s 1995 Financial Disclosure Statement was inaccurate, 
there was no knowing falsehood associated with it.  There was no evidence 
establishing any intent or reason to conceal his involvement with Wallaby’s.  
Indeed, respondent’s involvement was a matter of public record, as a newspaper 
had already carried an article discussing his interest in the Wallaby’s restaurant.  
We conclude that relator failed to prove violations of former Canon 6(C) or R.C. 
102.02 by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
We adopt the board’s conclusions of law relating to Count III, finding no 
violations of former Canon 2(A) or 3(C).  There was no evidence indicating that 
respondent negotiated, obtained, or executed any loan agreement with AmeriFirst 
regarding Wallaby’s. 
 
As to Count IV, we find that respondent did not practice law out of his 
chambers as charged.  There were no allegations or evidence that respondent used 
court personnel, equipment, or supplies, or held the courthouse out as his personal 
law office.  While respondent used the courthouse address on six of the fifteen 
documents, respondent offered an explanation for doing so.  He testified that at the 
time the six documents were prepared, he had received threatening phone calls.  
Thus, he testified, he used his business address for safety reasons. Nor were there 
allegations or evidence that respondent received compensation for preparing the 
real estate documents for his personal investments.  It is not the practice of law 
when one performs legal services for himself or herself.  Relator failed to prove 
violations of former Canons 5(C)(2), 5(F) and 2(A) by clear and convincing proof. 
 
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However, we do find violations of former Canons 2(A) and 5(C) as they 
relate to Count V.  It has always been respondent’s position that he was a passive 
investor in all of his real estate partnerships.  He specifically testified that partner 
Leslie Morehead was the “real estate man” who did the day-to-day work.  
Morehead would find the deals and bring them to respondent.  Assuming this is so, 
we find that there was no reason for respondent to appear and speak on behalf of 
his partnership interests at zoning commission meetings.  We agree with the 
board’s conclusions that respondent’s testimony was intended to lend the prestige 
of his office to advance the interests of himself and his partners.  Thus, we find a 
violation of former Canon 2(A). 
 
We also find a violation of former Canon 5(C) for respondent’s actions 
relating to the Shoup case.  This dispute did come before the Greene County 
Common Pleas Court, the court on which respondent served, necessitating the 
services of a visiting judge from another county to hear the action. 
 
In Disciplinary Counsel v. Allen, we imposed a public reprimand upon a 
judge for her voluntary act of appearing in a thirty-second commercial on behalf of 
a private law firm.  We believe that the same sanction is appropriate for respondent 
for his violations of former Canons 2(A) and 5(C) as charged in Count V.  
Respondent is hereby publicly reprimanded.  Costs taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the sanction imposed 
by the majority.  I would suspend respondent for six months based on the conduct 
of respondent cited by the relator. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.