Case Title: League of Women Voters v. Data Targeting, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC14-987

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2014-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-987 
____________ 
 
THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLORIDA, et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
DATA TARGETING, INC., et al.,  
Respondents. 
 
[May 27, 2014] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on an emergency petition for the issuance of a 
constitutional writ, filed by the League of Women Voters of Florida, Common 
Cause, and eleven individually named parties, who are all plaintiffs in an ongoing 
lawsuit challenging the constitutional validity of the 2012 plan apportioning 
Florida’s congressional districts under the “Fair Districts Amendments” approved 
by Florida voters in 2010 to prohibit improper partisan and discriminatory intent in 
redistricting.  See art. III, § 20(a), Fla. Const.  The Respondents—political 
consulting organization Data Targeting, Inc., its president, and two company 
employees—are non-parties to the litigation that possess documents that the 
 
 
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Petitioners contend demonstrate “the surreptitious participation of partisan 
operatives in the apportionment process,” in alleged violation of the Fair Districts 
Amendments to the Florida Constitution.   
In consideration of the parties’ arguments, this Court’s case law, and the 
importance and statewide significance of this case, and for the reasons that follow, 
we grant the petition.  Pursuant to our constitutional authority to issue “all writs 
necessary to the complete exercise of [our] jurisdiction,” art. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla. 
Const., we stay the enforcement of the First District Court of Appeal’s order that 
reversed the circuit court and prevented the disclosure or use of the documents at 
trial.   
Based on the narrow and specific relief requested in the emergency petition, 
we determine that the circuit court is not precluded from admitting the documents 
into evidence, subject to a proper showing of relevancy, but that any disclosure or 
use of the documents must take place under seal in a courtroom closed to the 
public.  We conclude that this is the only adequate, available remedy to maintain 
the status quo during the trial that is currently ongoing, and that there is a strong 
likelihood of irreparable harm to the Petitioners if the trial is conducted without the 
ability to offer this evidence—and no harm to the Respondents if the documents, 
which have already been produced, are admitted in this manner.  In fact, this is 
similar to the remedy the Respondents themselves originally proposed in the circuit 
 
 
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court after producing the documents.  See Non-Parties’ Motion to Determine 
Confidentiality of Court Records at 8, Romo v. Detzner, Nos. 2012-CA-00412 & 
2012-CA-00490 (Fla. 2d Jud. Cir. Ct. May 12, 2014).  However, in granting the 
petition, we emphasize that this opinion is not a determination that these 
documents will be permanently under seal or that they are in fact protected by the 
associational privilege and should be shielded from the public.           
BACKGROUND 
 
The issue presented by this emergency petition for extraordinary writ relief 
concerns certain documents in the possession of non-parties to the redistricting 
litigation, which are allegedly relevant to the constitutional claims currently being 
argued in the trial that is taking place in a Leon County circuit court.  After the 
circuit court determined that the challenged documents were not privileged, the 
Respondents subsequently produced the documents to the trial judge and to 
counsel and experts for the Petitioners, although the circuit court directed that the 
documents would remain confidential.  See Romo v. Detzner, Nos. 2012-CA-
00412 & 2012-CA-00490, Order at 2-3 (Fla. 2d Jud. Cir. Ct. May 2, 2014).   
The circuit court stated that it would provide further guidance at a later time 
as to how the documents could be used at trial, see id. at 3, which the court then 
did in a second order entered two weeks later, in anticipation of the start of the trial 
the following week.  See Romo v. Detzner, Nos. 2012-CA-00412 & 2012-CA-
 
 
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00490 (Fla. 2d Jud. Cir. Ct. May 15, 2014).  In this order, the circuit court 
determined that the documents themselves were to remain confidential, even “if 
offered as an exhibit in witness examination or entered into evidence in the trial of 
this case,” but that the proceedings “shall remain open” during use of the 
documents by any party at trial.  Id. at 3. 
 
Thereafter, in a short ruling that promised a forthcoming opinion explaining 
its reasoning in greater detail, the First District reversed the circuit court, stating in 
full as follows: 
The orders of the lower tribunal entered May 2, 2014, and May 
15, 2014, are REVERSED to the extent the orders permit any degree 
of disclosure or use at trial of the constitutionally-protected contents 
of the privileged and confidential documents that are the subject of 
those orders.  See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 
2010).  An opinion of this court explaining its reasoning will follow. 
Non-Parties, Pat Bainter, Matt Mitchell v. League of Women Voters of Fla., No. 
1D14-2163 (Fla. 1st DCA order filed May 22, 2014) (reversing circuit court).   
The case cited by the First District in its order arises from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and pertains to the First Amendment 
associational privilege.  See id. (citing Perry, 591 F.3d 1147).  The First District 
also denied the Petitioners’ emergency motion to stay its decision during the 
pendency of the trial.  See Non-Parties, Pat Bainter, Matt Mitchell v. League of 
Women Voters of Fla., No. 1D14-2163 (Fla. 1st DCA order filed May 22, 2014) 
(denying emergency request for stay).   
 
 
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The following day, the Petitioners filed the emergency petition now before 
this Court, seeking to stay the enforcement of the First District’s order precluding 
the admission of the documents “so that the trial can be completed with this 
evidence, which has already been disclosed to the parties’ counsel and the trial 
court, in time for the trial court to fashion meaningful relief before the upcoming 
2014 midterm elections.”  The petition asserts that these documents are relevant to 
the Petitioners’ claims as to the unconstitutionality of the 2012 congressional 
apportionment plan because they allegedly indicate that the non-parties worked 
with other partisan operatives to submit, through “public front persons,” draft 
redistricting maps for the Legislature’s consideration.  In other words, the 
Petitioners contend that these documents are important evidence for establishing 
their claim that there was “a parallel redistricting process” to the open and 
transparent one, which was “conducted in the shadows” in an effort to “subvert[] 
the public process” and produce a partisan map favoring Republicans and 
incumbents in violation of the Florida Constitution. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Since the passage of the Fair Districts Amendments, this Court has 
considered their impact and the “more stringent requirements as to apportionment” 
that they provide in a series of important decisions.  In re Senate Joint Resolution 
of Legislative Apportionment 1176 (Apportionment I), 83 So. 3d 597, 598 (Fla. 
 
 
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2012); see also In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 2–B 
(Apportionment II), 89 So. 3d 872 (Fla. 2012); Fla. House of Representatives v. 
League of Women Voters of Fla. (Apportionment III), 118 So. 3d 198 (Fla. 2013); 
League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Fla. House of Representatives (Apportionment 
IV), 132 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 2013).  Indeed, in December of last year, this Court 
addressed a claim of privilege concerning the very types of information implicated 
by this petition, in a case related to the same ongoing circuit court litigation.  See 
Apportionment IV, 132 So. 3d at 140-41. 
Specifically, in that case, this Court held that even the significance of a 
legislative privilege founded on the fundamental principle of separation of powers 
must yield to the compelling, competing interest in effectuating the constitutional 
Fair Districts reapportionment standards and “ensuring that the Legislature does 
not engage in unconstitutional partisan political gerrymandering.”  Id. at 148.  Our 
decision in Apportionment IV, as well as our other recent redistricting cases, 
makes clear that this litigation is unique because it impacts the statewide operation 
of government and the validity of Florida’s current system of government through 
the alleged unconstitutionality of the 2012 apportionment plan. 
 
Article V, section 3(b)(7), of the Florida Constitution provides that this 
Court may issue “all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.” 
(Emphasis added.)  In Roberts v. Brown, 43 So. 3d 673 (Fla. 2010), we explained 
 
 
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that although the doctrine of all writs is not an independent basis for jurisdiction, 
this Court may utilize the constitutional all writs provision as a means of 
“preserving jurisdiction that has already been invoked or protecting jurisdiction 
that likely will be invoked in the future.”  Id. at 677 (emphasis added); see also 
Petit v. Adams, 211 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1968) (providing that this Court may use 
its all writs authority if necessary to preserve the status quo and protect this Court’s 
ability to completely exercise jurisdiction at a future time).  
 
We have fully considered the First District’s order, the underlying orders of 
the circuit court, and the parties’ arguments concerning our jurisdiction.  After 
careful review, we have determined that the First District’s forthcoming decision 
on this issue is highly likely to construe both the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and the Fair Districts Amendments of the Florida Constitution.  
Indeed, in reversing the circuit court, the First District relied on a case holding that 
courts are required to consider the importance of the litigation in evaluating 
whether information is protected by the associational privilege.  See Perry, 591 
F.3d at 1161.  In this case, this determination is highly likely to require the 
construction of not only the First Amendment, but also the Fair Districts 
Amendments and this Court’s decision in Apportionment IV, which repeatedly 
emphasized the important “public interest in ensuring that the Legislature does not 
engage in unconstitutional partisan political gerrymandering.”  Apportionment IV, 
 
 
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132 So. 3d at 148.  While we are unable at this time to determine the likelihood 
that the First District’s forthcoming decision will expressly affect a class of 
constitutional officers, as argued by the emergency petition, we observe that we 
previously accepted jurisdiction on this basis regarding a related issue in 
Apportionment IV.  See id. at 142.  In addition, given the statewide importance of 
this litigation and the lack of Florida precedent regarding the associational 
privilege, we note that the First District may certify a question to this Court in 
issuing its forthcoming decision, which would undeniably vest us with jurisdiction 
under article V, section 3(b)(4), of the Florida Constitution.         
In order to maintain the status quo during the ongoing trial, preserve this 
Court’s ability to completely exercise the eventual jurisdiction it is likely to have to 
review the First District’s decision, and prevent any irreparable harm that might 
occur if the Petitioners are prevented from using the challenged documents, we 
conclude that we must grant the petition and stay the enforcement of the First 
District’s reversal of the circuit court, pending the completion of the trial.  See 
Amends. to Fla. Rules of Crim. P. 3.853(d)(1)(A) (Postconviction DNA Testing), 
857 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 2003) (exercising all writs authority to hold a statute in 
abeyance while this Court considered its jurisdiction and other matters in order to 
avoid rendering proceedings moot and precluding this Court, should it determine it 
had jurisdiction, from the “complete exercise” thereof); cf. Monroe Educ. Ass’n v. 
 
 
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Clerk, Dist. Ct. of Appeal, Third Dist., 299 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1974) (noting the 
importance of the Court’s all writs authority with respect to “certain cases [that] 
present extraordinary circumstances involving great public interest where 
emergencies and seasonable considerations are involved that require expedition”).   
Accordingly, we hereby exercise our discretion under article V, section 
3(b)(7), of the Florida Constitution to issue all writs necessary to the complete 
exercise of our jurisdiction, and stay the enforcement of the First District’s May 
22, 2014, order reversing the circuit court’s May 2, 2014, and May 15, 2014, 
orders, pending the conclusion of the ongoing trial.  As specifically requested in 
the emergency petition, the circuit court is not precluded from admitting the 
documents into evidence, subject to a proper showing of relevancy, but shall 
maintain the confidentiality of the documents by permitting any disclosure or use 
only under seal of the court and in a courtroom closed to the public.       
 
No motion for rehearing will be entertained by the Court.  It is so ordered.   
PARIENTE, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.  
LEWIS, J., concurs with an opinion. 
POLSTON, C.J., dissents with an opinion in which CANADY, J., concurs. 
 
 
LEWIS, J., concurring. 
 
I concur with the decision to grant the petition, but write separately to 
explain why the exercise of all writs jurisdiction is appropriate here.  If the order of 
 
 
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the First District Court of Appeal, which precludes the disclosure or use during 
trial of documents that were determined by the circuit court to be discoverable with 
regard to the 2012 redistricting, remains in effect, the trial will proceed without 
their admission.  Such an outcome will frustrate the fact-finding ability of the 
circuit court to determine whether the 2012 redistricting was conducted in a fair, 
impartial, and nonpartisan fashion, as required by the Florida Constitution.  The 
First District has, by preventing consideration of these documents during trial, 
jeopardized the stability and integrity of our governmental structure and authorized 
those who interact with the Florida Legislature on a critical matter such as 
redistricting to operate under a veil of secrecy.  This outcome should be most 
disconcerting to any supporter of our democratic form of government.   
 
The First District stated that it will issue an opinion to provide the rationale 
for the reversal of the circuit court orders.  As previously discussed in the opinion 
granting the petition, precedent establishes that we possess the authority under the 
doctrine of all writs to intervene now and protect the status quo while we 
determine whether jurisdiction ultimately exists to review the issue presented.1  
The issue is one that impacts the statewide operation of Florida government and is, 
therefore, one of paramount importance.  In Petit v. Adams, 211 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 
                                          
 
 
1.  Indeed, the opinion granting the petition demonstrates it is highly likely 
that this Court will have jurisdiction to review the forthcoming opinion by the 
district court.  See majority op. at 7-8. 
 
 
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1968), when presented with an electoral challenge that impacted Dade County, the 
Court utilized its all writs authority to maintain the status quo where action by a 
county canvassing board would have otherwise rendered the proceedings moot: 
[I]t is apparent from the disclosures of the petition that it is the 
intention of the respondents constituting the Dade County Canvassing 
Board to erase the counters on all of said machines beginning at 5 
o’clock p.m., Friday, June 7th, unless this Court directs otherwise.  
The erasure of such counters would render these proceedings moot 
and would in effect prevent this Court, in the event it determines it has 
jurisdiction, from the complete exercise thereof. 
Upon consideration of the matter and pursuant to Article V, 
Section 4(2) which provides “the Supreme Court may issue all writs 
necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction,” the 
respondents in this cause are hereby directed to refrain from in any 
way erasing the results of said second primary election on any voting 
machine used therefor in Dade County, Florida until the further order 
of this Court. 
 
Id. at 566.  More recently, this Court utilized the all writs power to preserve 
physical evidence for DNA testing so that two pending emergency petitions related 
to the issue could be considered.  See Amends. to Fla. Rule of Crim. P. 
3.853(d)(1)(A) (Postconviction DNA Testing), 857 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 2003).  The 
Court explained: 
To allow this Court an opportunity to fully consider the 
petitions, the deadline of October 1, 2003, set forth in rule 
3.853(d)(1)(A), is hereby suspended until further order of this Court. 
Further, as petitioners point out, operation of the same deadline in 
section 925.11(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2002), may result in the non-
preservation of physical evidence for DNA testing under section 
925.11(4)(b).  Because such a result would render these proceedings 
moot and in effect preclude this Court, should it determine it has 
jurisdiction, from the “complete exercise” thereof, the deadline in 
 
 
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section 925.11(1)(b)1. is hereby held in abeyance while this Court 
considers its jurisdiction and other matters before it.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(7), Fla. Const.  By our actions herein, we express no opinion on 
the merits of the underlying petitions.  Accordingly, by operation of 
the terms of the statute, the evidence described in section 925.11(4)(a) 
“shall be maintained for at least the period of time” controlled by the 
abeyance.  No other provision of the rule or statute is affected by this 
order. 
Id. at 190. 
 
 
While the use of all writs in this manner occurs in only the most urgent of 
situations, I cannot think of a situation more urgent than precluding the disclosure 
and use of documents during trial to potentially demonstrate that our entire 
legislative structure is a façade and was not redistricted in compliance with the 
Florida Constitution.  Moreover, if the trial proceeds in accordance with the order 
of the First District, this issue will become moot due to the time sensitive nature of 
the proceedings, and there will be no adequate remedy to correct a possible 
manifest injustice.  Therefore, utilization of the doctrine of all writs to preserve the 
status quo is unquestionably within the parameters of our authority.  See id. at 190; 
Petit, 211 So. 2d at 566.  This is the only way the validity and operation of our 
democratic system of government in Florida—and public faith in that system—can 
be protected.   
 
Accordingly, I wholeheartedly concur with the decision of the majority to 
grant the petition.     
 
 
 
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POLSTON, C.J., dissenting. 
 
Because Florida’s constitution does not grant this Court the jurisdiction to 
generally weigh in on evidentiary rulings and discovery disputes in ongoing civil 
trials, I respectfully dissent.  In fact, with today’s decision, this Court effectively 
and unconstitutionally usurps the role of the First District Court of Appeal as the 
appellate court vested with jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal of a civil 
evidentiary ruling.  
The petitioners seek to invoke this Court’s all writs jurisdiction, but before 
exercising all writs jurisdiction, this Court must first have an independent basis for 
jurisdiction.  This is because “[t]he all writs provision of section 3(b)(7) does not 
confer added appellate jurisdiction on this Court, and this Court’s all writs power 
cannot be used as an independent basis of jurisdiction.”  St. Paul Title Ins. Corp. v. 
Davis, 392 So. 2d 1304, 1305 (Fla. 1980).  In Williams v. State, 913 So. 2d 541, 
543 (Fla. 2005), this Court emphasized that the all writs provision of the Florida 
Constitution “does not constitute a separate source of original or appellate 
jurisdiction.  Rather, it operates as an aid to the Court in exercising its ‘ultimate 
jurisdiction,’ conferred elsewhere in the constitution.”         
Here, the petitioners concede that this Court does not currently have 
jurisdiction over this case.  The proceedings below involve a dispute over allegedly 
privileged and confidential documents and a district court order (and an expected, 
 
 
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eventual opinion) in the interlocutory appeal of a trial court’s ruling regarding that 
dispute.  The petitioners and the majority hypothesize about what the First District 
might eventually discuss in its opinion reversing the trial court, but such guesses 
do not constitute an independent basis for jurisdiction.  If the First District, as the 
majority hypothesizes, issues an opinion construing the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution or an amendment to the Florida Constitution, then this 
Court could eventually choose to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction pursuant to 
article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.  However, granting an all 
writs petition at this point is improper because an independent basis for jurisdiction 
does not currently exist.  
The majority quotes Roberts v. Brown, 43 So. 3d 673, 677 (Fla. 2010), and 
claims it is granting this all writs petition to “protect[] jurisdiction that likely will 
be invoked in the future.”  But, unlike this case, there was an independent and 
nonspeculative basis for this Court’s jurisdiction in Roberts, namely this Court’s 
exclusive jurisdiction over pre-election challenges to constitutional amendments 
proposed through the citizen initiative process.  Id. at 678 (“The applicability of the 
writ of prohibition in this case hinges upon the identical issue that is determinative 
of whether the doctrine of all writs applies; that is, the exclusiveness of this Court’s 
jurisdiction to consider pre-election challenges to proposed citizen-initiative 
constitutional amendments.”); see also United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Goodman, 826 
 
 
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So. 2d 914, 915 (Fla. 2002) (exercising all writs jurisdiction to vacate circuit court 
orders that encroached on this Court’s exclusive jurisdiction to adopt rules 
pursuant to article V, section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution); Fla. Senate v. 
Graham, 412 So. 2d 360, 361 (Fla. 1982) (“Because jurisdiction of the issue of 
apportionment will vest in this Court with certainty in this year we have the 
jurisdiction conferred by article V, section 3(b)(7), to issue all writs necessary to 
the complete exercise and in aid of the ultimate jurisdiction imposed by article III, 
section 16(b), (c) and (f).”).  Additionally, the First District’s current order is most 
akin to an unelaborated per curiam opinion or order merely citing another decision, 
and this Court has ruled that it does not have extraordinary writ jurisdiction over 
such opinions and orders.  See Persaud v. State, 838 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2003) (stating 
that this Court lacks discretionary review jurisdiction to review per curiam 
decisions of the district courts that simply affirm with citations to cases not 
pending review in this Court, and that extraordinary writs also cannot be used to 
seek review of such decisions); see also Dodi Publ’g Co. v. Editorial Am., S.A., 
385 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1980), and Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981) 
(together standing for proposition that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review per 
curiam opinions citing a case not pending review in this Court).        
The majority’s action in this case is truly unprecedented.  The majority is 
simply guessing at what the First District’s opinion will state as the basis for its 
 
 
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ruling in order to engage in the active trial management of evidentiary rulings that 
are subject to the jurisdiction of Florida’s district courts of appeal.  Moreover, by 
requiring admission of the evidence at issue, rather than a proffer pending review 
by this Court of the yet-issued First District opinion, the majority has adjudicated 
the opinion not yet written to be in error.  In short, this Court has predetermined 
appellate error and awarded the petitioners full relief in the trial court by requiring 
admission of evidence.  Such action does not act to protect this Court’s 
jurisdiction; it expands it outside the bounds of the constitution.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
CANADY, J., concurs. 
 
Original Proceedings – All Writs 
 
Mark Herron, Robert J. Telfer, III, and Angelina Perez of Messer, Caparello & 
Self, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; John Stewart Mills, Andrew David Manko, and 
Courtney Rebecca Brewer of The Mills Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; and 
David B. King, Thomas Alan Zehnder, Frederick Stanton Wermuth, and Vincent 
Falcone, III, of King, Blackwell, Zehnder & Wermuth, P.A., Orlando, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioners 
 
D. Kent Safriet, Thomas Roy Philpot, and Mohammad Omar Jazil of Hopping 
Green & Sams, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
 
for Respondents