Case Title: Anderson v. Bauer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Anderson v. Bauer1984 WY 40681 P.2d 1316Case Number: 83-129, 83-130, 83-137Decided: 04/19/1984JIMMY L. ANDERSON, CAROL A. ANDERSON, AND HERITAGE VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS AND THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS),

v.

RAYMOND BAUER AND DIANA BAUER, HUSBAND AND WIFE; RUSSELL I. BELL AND MARILEE BELL, HUSBAND AND WIFE; ROBERT E. JAUCH AND KATHY L. JAUCH, HUSBAND AND WIFE; RAYMOND M. RICCI AND BERNADETTE RICCI, HUSBAND AND WIFE; PHILLIP W. PATRICK AND DIANA PATRICK, HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONNIE R. HANEY AND SANDRA HANEY, HUSBAND AND WIFE; NONA GAIL ANDERSON AND BEULA HAWLEY; LEO R. HENDRICKS AND BETTY L. HENDRICKS, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS),

and

PLAINS ENGINEERING, INC., APPELLEE (THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT).

STEVE BEILGARD AND HERITAGE HOMES, INC., APPELLANTS (THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS),

v.

DONNIE R. HANEY AND SANDRA HANEY, HUSBAND AND WIFE; NONA GAIL ANDERSON AND BEULA HAWLEY; LEO R. HENDRICKS AND BETTY L. HENDRICKS, HUSBAND AND WIFE; RAYMOND M. RICCI AND BERNADETTE RICCI, HUSBAND AND WIFE; AND PHILLIP W. PATRICK AND DIANA PATRICK, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS),

and

PLAINS ENGINEERING, INC., APPELLEE (THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT).

BEULA HAWLEY AND NONA GAIL ANDERSON, DONNIE R. HANEY AND SANDRA HANEY, HUSBAND AND WIFE, LEO R. HENDRICKS AND BETTY L. HENDRICKS, HUSBAND AND WIFE; RUSSELL I. BELL AND MARILEE BELL, HUSBAND AND WIFE, ROBERT E. JAUCH AND KATHY JAUCH, HUSBAND AND WIFE, PHILLIP W. PATRICK AND DIANA PATRICK, HUSBAND AND WIFE, RAYMOND BAUER AND DIANA BAUER, HUSBAND AND WIFE, RAYMOND M. RICCI AND BERNADETTE RICCI, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

JIMMY L. ANDERSON, CAROL A. ANDERSON, HERITAGE VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., THE CAMPBELL COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, CAMPBELL COUNTY, WYOMING, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
JIMMY L. ANDERSON, CAROL 
A. ANDERSON, AND HERITAGE VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, 
APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS AND THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS),

v.

RAYMOND BAUER AND DIANA 
BAUER, HUSBAND AND WIFE; RUSSELL I. BELL AND MARILEE BELL, HUSBAND AND WIFE; 
ROBERT E. JAUCH AND KATHY L. JAUCH, HUSBAND AND WIFE; RAYMOND M. RICCI AND 
BERNADETTE RICCI, HUSBAND AND WIFE; PHILLIP W. PATRICK AND DIANA PATRICK, 
HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONNIE R. HANEY AND SANDRA HANEY, HUSBAND AND WIFE; NONA GAIL 
ANDERSON AND BEULA HAWLEY; LEO R. HENDRICKS AND BETTY L. HENDRICKS, HUSBAND AND 
WIFE, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS),

and

PLAINS ENGINEERING, INC., 
APPELLEE (THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT).

STEVE BEILGARD AND 
HERITAGE HOMES, INC., APPELLANTS (THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS),

v.

DONNIE R. HANEY AND 
SANDRA HANEY, HUSBAND AND WIFE; NONA GAIL ANDERSON AND BEULA HAWLEY; LEO R. 
HENDRICKS AND BETTY L. HENDRICKS, HUSBAND AND WIFE; RAYMOND M. RICCI AND 
BERNADETTE RICCI, HUSBAND AND WIFE; AND PHILLIP W. PATRICK AND DIANA PATRICK, 
HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS),

and

PLAINS ENGINEERING, INC., 
APPELLEE (THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT).

BEULA HAWLEY AND NONA 
GAIL ANDERSON, DONNIE R. HANEY AND SANDRA HANEY, HUSBAND AND WIFE, LEO R. 
HENDRICKS AND BETTY L. HENDRICKS, HUSBAND AND WIFE; RUSSELL I. BELL AND MARILEE 
BELL, HUSBAND AND WIFE, ROBERT E. JAUCH AND KATHY JAUCH, HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
PHILLIP W. PATRICK AND DIANA PATRICK, HUSBAND AND WIFE, RAYMOND BAUER AND DIANA 
BAUER, HUSBAND AND WIFE, RAYMOND M. RICCI AND BERNADETTE RICCI, HUSBAND AND 
WIFE, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

JIMMY L. ANDERSON, CAROL 
A. ANDERSON, HERITAGE VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., THE CAMPBELLCOUNTYBOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, CAMPBELL COUNTY, WYOMING, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

Franklin J. 
Wallahan (argued), Rapid 
City, S.D., and Leslie 
W. Hawkey, Jr., Gillette, for Developer Andersons and Heritage Village 
Development Company, Inc.

Dwight F. 
Hurich, Gillette, for builder Beilgard 
and Heritage Homes, Inc. submitting on brief.

Rex O. Arney, 
Sheridan, for CampbellCountyBoard of 
Commissioners.

H.W. Rasmussen 
and Fred R. Dollison (argued), Badley & Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, for homeowners.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN, and 
CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Eight homeowners 
brought separate actions in negligence and breach of warranty against the land 
developer, builders, and CampbellCounty to recover damages to their houses 
from seepage of water. These appeals are from a judgment in favor of the county 
and against the developer and builders.

[¶2.]     We will affirm in part 
and reverse in part.

[¶3.]     The issues for our 
determination, as stated by the parties are as follows:

1. Were plaintiff 
homeowners' claims barred by a statute of limitations?

2. Were the builders and 
developer liable for damages to the plaintiffs' homes on the theories of 
negligence and breach of implied warranty?

3. Was the proper measure 
of damages applied in determining the plaintiffs' loss under the 
circumstances?

[¶4.]     Eight plaintiff 
homeowners brought eight separate lawsuits to recover damage from water seeping 
into their basements. The defendants were: the developer of the subdivision in 
which the homes were built, Jimmy L. Anderson, Carol A. Anderson, and Heritage 
Village Development Company, Inc.; the builders of the homes: D.W. Birks, 
Kenneth Hoffner, Steve Beilgard and Heritage Homes, Inc.; and Campbell County, 
Wyoming. The eight separate actions were consolidated for trial. During trial, 
builder D.W. Birks settled with plaintiff Bauer, and Kenneth Hoffner settled 
with plaintiffs Bell and Jauch. At the conclusion of 
plaintiffs' cases, an order of dismissal as to CampbellCounty was entered in all cases. After 
trial, the court entered judgments in favor of the plaintiffs and against both 
the developer and builders. The developer has appealed. The builders, Beilgard 
and Heritage Homes, Inc. have appealed. The plaintiffs have appealed and are 
both appellants and appellees. For the sake of clarity, we will refer to 
appellants Andersons and Heritage Village Development Company, Inc. as 
developer, appellants Beilgard and Heritage Homes, Inc. as builder, 
appellees-appellants-plaintiffs as homeowners, except where reference to a 
specific homeowner is necessary, and appellee CampbellCounty as County.

[¶5.]     At the outset, when 
considering the facts and evidence upon appeal, we reiterate 
that

"[w]e assume that 
evidence in favor of the successful party is true, disregarding entirely the 
evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give to the 
evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may be 
reasonably and fairly drawn from it. `So long as there exists substantial 
evidence supporting the trier of fact's determination, we will not second guess 
it on appeal.' * * *" Richardson v. Green, Wyo., 644 P.2d 778, 779 
(1982).

[¶6.]     In 1974, Anderson purchased eighty acres of land near Gillette, Wyoming for the purpose of subdivision and 
development. A corporation, Heritage Village Development Company, Inc., was 
formed with the Andersons being the sole stockholders, officers 
and employees for the corporation. Andersons employed an engineering firm to 
study, lay out and subdivide the land, prepare and file required plats, comply 
with applicable rules and regulations for subdivisions and obtain final approval 
of the County for the subdivision. The plat and subdivision was approved July 
1975; there was later an amendment to the plat and it was reapproved August 
1976. Andersons 
began selling lots. The engineering firm then advised that a soils test was 
needed to secure FHA approval, and a soils test and report were done by Northern 
Testing Laboratories. The soils test report described a potential water table 
problem.

[¶7.]     In 1977 and early 1978, 
each of the builders began purchasing lots for building homes, taking title by 
warranty deed. The eight houses, all with basements, involved in this litigation 
were constructed by the builders upon these lots and then sold and conveyed by 
warranty deed to the respective plaintiffs. Generally, within a few months after 
purchase, each of the plaintiffs experienced water seepage into their basements 
causing damage to property. They complained to the building contractor. A sump 
pump was installed, but that proved inadequate as a solution to the water 
problems. The seepage worsened, and this litigation 
ensued.

[¶8.]     Upon completion of the 
consolidated trials, the court entered judgment in favor of each homeowner 
against the developer and builder finding each equally at fault. The homeowners 
were held to be without fault. CampbellCounty had previously been dismissed from 
the litigation at the close of plaintiffs' case.

I

BAR OF THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS

[¶9.]     The time within which 
the homeowners can bring suit to recover this kind of damage for negligence is 
four years after their cause of action accrues.1 The following table summarizes the 
critical dates relating to timeliness of commencing suit against the developer, 
builder, and CampbellCounty:



Builder

Homeowner

First 
      Water

Noted

Suit 
      Filed

Against

Dev. & 
      Bldr.

First 
      Claim

Against

County

1. Heritage Homes, 
      Inc.

Ricci

4 or 
      5/78

1/12/82

10/18/82

2. 
      Hoffner

Bell

4/78

1/12/82

10/18/82

3. 
      Hoffner

Jauch

4/78

1/12/82

10/18/82

4. Heritage Homes, 
      Inc.

Green 
      who

conveyed

to 
      Patrick

 
 
 
 
4/78

 
 
 
 
1/12/82

 
 
 
 
10/18/82

5. D. W. 
      Birks

Bauer

7 or 
      8/78

1/12/82

10/18/82

6. Heritage Homes. 
      Inc.

Haney

5/78

4/26/82

10/18/82

7. Heritage Homes. 
      Inc.

Anderson/

Hawley

 
 
7/78

 
 
5/17/82

 
 
10/18/82

8. Heritage Homes, 
      Inc.

Hendricks

5/78 
      &

6/78

 
 
5/21/82

 
 
10/18/82

 
 
 
 

 [¶10.] The trial court in ruling on motions late in 
the day at the end of the fourth day of trial, stated:

"THE COURT: The Court 
will deny all the motions with the exceptions of the one based on the Statute of 
Limitation as to the three plaintiffs. Grant that on the basis of the Statute of 
Limitations."

and, after 
additional argument:

"MR. SCOTT: It's my - 
getting awfully late.

"THE COURT: Well, 
gentlemen, I'm going to reverse myself, I'm going to deny all 
motions."

When court 
resumed the next morning, the court stated:

"The Court first wishes 
to make an announcement and clarification of its ruling last evening in regards 
to the dismissal of the county * * *. The Court feels that the county * * * was 
acting in either a quasi legislative or judicial manner and [in] giving its 
approval to the subdivision and * * * [t]he [court] has not reversed itself on 
the statute of limitations and that was the sole grounds for the removal of the 
county."

[¶11.]  The statute of limitations begins to run 
when the injured party knows or reasonably ought to know that some damage has 
resulted from the wrongful act. That is true although the damage is slight, 
continues to occur, or additional damage caused by the same wrongful act may 
result in the future. Duke v. Housen, Wyo., 589 P.2d 334 (1979); ABC Builders, Inc. v. 
Phillips, Wyo., 
632 P.2d 925 (1981). In the instant case, the water seepage first noted 
generally caused damage either immediately or within a few days to the basement 
foundations, walls, sheetrock, carpets, furniture, items stored, or personal 
property. Each homeowner's cause of action accrued on or about the date water 
seepage was first noticed and damage occurred, and unless suit was filed within 
the ensuing four years, it was barred.

[¶12.]  The summary of critical dates indicates 
that the first water seepage and resulting damage to the various homeowners 
occurred from April 1978 through July 1978. All of the homeowners first asserted 
claims against Campbell County October 18, 1982, which was more than four years 
after their action had accrued. Their respective actions, therefore, were barred 
by the running of the period of limitation; and the court correctly entered its 
order of dismissal as to CampbellCounty.

[¶13.]  The trial court stated that its basis for 
granting the County's motion to dismiss was that the statute of limitations had 
run, governmental immunity was a bar to these suits, the actions of the County 
in approving the plat and subdivision were quasi-judicial in nature and 
therefore did not give rise to liability upon the County, and it was not the 
intent of the legislative enactments pertaining to subdivisions to create 
liability upon the County in acting pursuant to those statutes. Having concluded 
that the homeowners' cases against the County were barred because not filed 
within the limitation period for such cases, we need not consider the propriety 
of the other bases for the entry of the order dismissing the cases against the 
County, for, as noted in ABC Builders, 
Inc. v. Phillips, supra at 935,

"* * * If the 
determination of a trial court is correct on any theory, it will not be 
disturbed. * * *"

[¶14.]  With respect to the builders and 
developer, the table summarizing critical dates (which is the evidence most 
favorable to the prevailing parties) demonstrates that each of the homeowners 
commenced her or his respective action within the four-year statutory period and 
were not, for that reason, subject to dismissal. We are aware of the contention 
that the limitation period had expired as to the homeowners Jauch, Ricci, 
Bell, Hendricks, 
and Haney. With respect to Jauch and Bell, their earlier complaints concerned sewer 
problems, not water seepage. Ricci conceded on cross-examination that he might 
have first noticed water seepage in March 1978, but even accepting that date, he 
had filed within the four-year limitation period. Mr. Beilgard testified very 
briefly that Hendricks called his office on March 13, 1978 and Haney called 
March 27, 1978, complaining of water problems. Hendricks and Haney both 
testified that seepage of water into their basements causing damage occurred 
during May of 1978. Accepting that as evidence most favorable to the prevailing 
party, as we must do, we cannot conclude that the statute of limitations had run 
as to any of the homeowners against the builder or developer at the time their 
respective cases were filed. Their cases, therefore, were not barred by the 
statute of limitations or subject to dismissal for this 
reason.

II

LIABILITY OF THE BUILDER 
AND DEVELOPER

[¶15.]  The doctrine of caveat emptor (let the 
buyer beware) was long applied in the sale of real estate, effectively 
insulating a vendor from liability to a purchaser. As we developed from a rural 
to an urban society, large subdivisions were developed for housing. Builders 
constructing great numbers of houses acquired considerable knowledge and 
exertise in the area and used engineering services and studies to determine soil 
conditions and identify drainage and water problems, foundation requirements, 
and other questions concerning suitability for construction. Recognizing that a 
builder is in the business of constructing houses and is in a position of 
superior knowledge, we held that,

"* * * [w]here a vendor 
builds new houses for the purpose of sale, the sale carries with it an implied 
warranty that it is constructed in a reasonably workmanlike manner and is fit 
for habitation. * * *" Tavares v. 
Horstman, Wyo., 
542 P.2d 1275, 1282 (1975).

We further held 
that:

"* * * A home builder's 
implied warranty of fitness for habitation extends to subsequent purchasers for 
a reasonable length of time and is limited to latent defects which become 
manifest after the purchase. * * *" (Emphasis in original.) Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 
Wyo., 600 P.2d 733, 736 (1979).

[¶16.]  Subsequently we held that a builder might 
be held liable for negligence in selecting a building site upon a theory of 
breach of implied warranty or negligence. An owner, subsequent to one who 
purchased from the builder, was allowed recovery. The interim owner was held not 
liable in the absence of knowledge or warning that his activities might have 
been a cause of the ultimate damage to that home, ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 
supra.

[¶17.]  Liability for property damage occurring 
after the transfer of title and possession of real property has generally been 
limited to contractor-builders who sell directly to lay purchasers. Schepps v. Howe, Wyo., 665 P.2d 504 
(1983); Century Display Manufacturing 
Corp. v. D.R. Wager Construction Co., Inc., 46 Ill. App.3d 643, 4 Ill.Dec. 
913, 360 N.E.2d 1346 (1977). Thus far we have restricted liability for defects 
in construction or selection of a building site to builders of new homes sold to 
purchasers who lacked knowledge or expertise about building. We have left open 
the question whether vacant land in a proper setting might be the subject to 
recovery for breach of an implied warranty and for negligence where damage 
results to a purchaser, Tavares v. 
Horstman, supra.

[¶18.]  In Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, Alaska, 594 P.2d 30 (1979), the question presented was that 
of a developer's liability to builders for breach of implied warranty or upon 
strict liability where subdivided lots, not suitable for construction, were sold 
to builders for construction of homes for sale. The subdivided lots were 
unsuitable for building because of the presence of permafrost. The subdivider 
had conducted engineering studies in preparation for the subdivision which did 
not disclose the presence of permafrost. The court held that the subdivider 
would be liable for failure to disclose the presence of a condition, which 
caused the subdivided lots to be unsuitable for construction, only if the 
condition were known to the subdivider or could have been known through the 
exercise of reasonable care. After finding the developer had exercised 
reasonable care in employing the engineering firm, a judgment holding the 
subdivider not liable was affirmed. 

[¶19.]  Development of new land into subdivided 
lots for building, with streets, sewer, water and utilities is a necessary and 
beneficial activity that ought to be encouraged. The developer ought to also 
have responsibility for his activities. Yet, he should not be subject to 
liability for all misfortune that might befall a purchaser. Thus, it is 
reasonable that, where land is subdivided and sold for the purpose of 
constructing residential dwelling houses, the developer has a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for construction 
of some type of ordinary, average dwelling house and he must disclose to his 
purchaser any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to know makes the 
subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building. He has a further duty 
to disclose, upon inquiry, information he has developed in the course of the 
subdivision process which is relevant to suitability of the land for its 
expected use.

[¶20.]  In this case, the developer had employed 
an engineering firm that conducted a drilling program, a soils study and 
analysis, and a determination of the depth of water table and drainage for the 
subdivision. The soils test report noted that in some areas the water table was 
within 3.8 feet of the surface; and, if basements were built below or within two 
feet of the water table, specific precautionary measures should be taken. The 
report also contained suggestions concerning soil compaction, concrete, sloping 
of lots, and use of drain tile. The developer advised the builders of the 
no-basement areas described in the soils report and further advised that they 
should stay two feet above the water table in building homes. He furnished no 
other information or warnings to the builders, nor did the builders seek or 
request additional information. There is no dispute about the fact that all of 
the subdivided lots are suitable for building homes and that most are suitable 
for homes with basements. It is also undisputed that some of the lots are not 
suitable for homes with basements. But, whether the particular house to be built 
was a house with no basement, a half basement, a tri-level house, or a full 
basement was a decision not involving the developer. The builder alone made that 
decision, and he neither sought out nor made inquiry of the developer about 
it.

[¶21.]  The developer furnished lots that were 
suitable for construction of dwelling houses. That satisfied his duty to the 
purchasers. The developer, therefore, was not negligent nor was there a breach 
of an implied warranty resulting in liability; and he should not have been found 
liable.

[¶22.]  With respect to the builders of these 
homes for sale to purchasers, it is apparent from all we have said that they had 
a duty to furnish a site that was suitable for the building they selected and 
determined should be erected. ABC 
Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, supra. Numerous courts have held that where a 
basement of a home is constructed below the water table and there is seepage of 
water into the basement which causes cracks, damage to the foundation, damage to 
personal property and causes the basement to be uninhabitable, there may be 
liability for breach of the implied warranty that the house is reasonably fit 
for habitation and for negligence in selection of the type of building, 
construction site selection or in the construction itself. Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc., 
83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967) and cases cited therein. In this case, 
each of the homeowners testified extensively to the seepage of water into their 
basements, to the damage resulting, to dampness and their inability to use or 
inhabit the basement. The evidence was overwhelming in support of the court's 
finding of liability, both upon breach of warranty and for 
negligence.

III

DAMAGES

[¶23.]  The greatest difficulty in stating a 
general rule for recovery of damages has been in those cases involving damage to 
realty. 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 135. So much is subjective and uncertain in 
determining fair market values before and after the damage, diminished values, 
whether the damage is permanent or temporary, the nature and extent of the 
damage and methods of repair. Thus, it is generally held 
that:

"* * * [W]here the injury 
to real property is of a permanent character, or cannot be repaired except at 
great expense, the measure of damages is the difference between the value of the 
property before and after the injury. * * *

* * * * * 
*

"* * * [W]here the damage 
to real property is of a temporary character, or where it can be repaired at a 
small expense, the cost of the repair has often been held to be the measure of 
damages. * * *" Town Council of Town of 
Hudson v. Ladd, 37 Wyo. 419, 263 P. 703, 705 (1928).

[¶24.]  Either method of determining damages is 
acceptable. Neither is preferred over the other. These kinds of damages cannot 
be calculated with certainty. However,

"* * * if there is 
evidence from which a reasonable estimate of money damages may be made, that is 
sufficient, the primary objective being to determine the amount of loss, 
applying whatever rule is best suited for that purpose. * * *" Douglas Reservoirs Water Users Ass'n v. 
Cross, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1280, 1284 (1977).

[¶25.]  Where the damage is to a dwelling house 
used for the personal purpose of the owner, it may be just that recovery be had 
for the amount of the repairs, even though that exceeds the entire value of the 
building, Restatement of Law, Torts 2d § 929; the diminished value of the 
property, because of a public awareness of a water problem, is also recoverable, 
that damage being measured as of the date of the injury. Sagebrush Development, Inc. v. Moehrke, 
Wyo., 604 P.2d 198 (1979).

[¶26.]  In this case the builder's expert, using 
1978 cost figures, testified that the injury resulting from water seepage could 
be corrected by the installation of drain tile around the foundations of the 
eight homes and removal and replacement of two of the basement floors at costs 
ranging from $3,520 to $9,813.95. The homeowners' expert testified that in 
addition to tiling around the foundations, removal and replacement of basement 
floors and other repairs were also necessary; and that using 1983 prices for 
labor and material, the cost of these repairs for the eight houses would range 
from $21,428 to $39,433. The builder contends that the cost of repair should 
have been determined as of the time of the injury, i.e., 1978, rather than 
1983.

[¶27.]  It is true the homeowners had a duty to 
mitigate their damage. That means that once an injury occurs, they must take 
reasonable measures (which may include repairs) to protect their property so 
that additional damage would not occur unnecessarily. This duty does not require 
that they repair the damage immediately to protect the tortfeasor from the 
effect of inflation or themselves from deflation in the future. Rovetti v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 131 Cal. App. 3d 973, 183 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1982). There was no evidence 
that additional damage resulted from a failure to repair. The homeowners had 
just purchased their homes. Usually that is the most significant purchase one 
makes during a lifetime and requires a substantial down payment. Most did not 
repair. Perhaps they could not. They lived with seepage, water, uninhabitable 
basements. The tortfeasor has had the use of the money that should have gone to 
those repairs. That has value, is of benefit to him, and he will not be heard to 
complain. Thus where, at the time of trial, the damage has not been repaired, 
the homeowner is entitled to recover the amount reasonably necessary for the 
repairs at that time.

[¶28.]  The court found that after the 
installation of tile and completion of repair, each of the eight homeowners 
incurred additional damage described as the diminished value of their property 
because of the reputation of the area for the water problem. This item of 
damage, as to each of the eight houses, was between $9,450 and $14,000. The 
damage for diminished value was calculated based upon an appraisal of each of 
the properties as of April 1983. This element of damage was determined by 
applying a percentage described as "economic obsolescence" to the fair market 
value of each dwelling house as determined by the April 1983 appraisal. This was 
error. This element of damage should have been determined as of the time of the 
injury in 1978. Sagebrush Development, 
Inc. v. Moehrke, supra.

[¶29.]  The purchase price of each of these homes 
was in evidence and before the court. It was evidence of the fair market value 
of each home at the time of purchase in 1978. Damage from seepage resulted to 
each home within a few months of purchase. If the sum allowed for diminution in 
value is reduced by taking the purchase price of each home as its fair market 
value in 1978, and applying the percentage diminution fixed by the homeowners' 
expert witness, the resulting sum when added to the cost of repairs still 
exceeded the total amount awarded by the court.

[¶30.]  The trial court noted that the 
homeowners' expert witness had considered factors that were inappropriate in 
arriving at his estimate of damage and the court, therefore, awarded a lesser 
sum to each homeowner than testified to by this witness. For example, with 
respect to the Haney residence, the homeowners' expert testified that the cost 
of repair was $21,428, the diminution in value, $13,900, making the total amount 
of damage $35,328. The court awarded Haney $24,731. In Hendricks' claim, the 
witness testified to the cost of repair as $31,350, the diminution in value as 
$12,900 for total damages of $44,250. The court awarded damages to homeowner 
Hendricks in the amount of $30,975. The court awarded similar lesser amounts to 
the other homeowners. We cannot determine how the amount of damages awarded to 
each homeowner was determined. In giving this decision, the court stated that, 
referring to the homeowners' expert witness:

"* * * [H]e did consider 
other factors other than the water in the basement as having caused some of the 
depreciation * * * The Court has subtracted some of the award or the suggested 
damages * * and it is most fair to the Plaintiffs."

With an 
appropriate reduction of diminished value using 1978 fair market value and a 
further reduction for other factors improperly considered, the amount of damage 
awarded each homeowner is supported by the evidence.

[¶31.]  We have recognized that these kinds of 
damages cannot be determined with mathematical precision, that they may be 
inherently uncertain, that it is sufficient that they be determined with a 
reasonable degree of certainty based upon the evidence adduced and the nature of 
the injury. Sagebrush Development, Inc. 
v. Moehrke, supra. The homeowners all have appealed claiming the awards of 
damage by the court were too low. The builder, on the other hand, has appealed 
claiming the awards of damage were too high. The trial judge stated the awards 
were fair. We agree with the trial court's determination. The damages awarded 
were within the range of damages established and are supported by the evidence. 
Therefore, they will not be disturbed on appeal.

[¶32.]  Generally, if the trial court arrives at 
a correct result, no matter how incorrectly it reasons, errors occurring at the 
trial, if not prejudicial, are cured by a proper final decision. Rock Springs National Bank v. Luman, 6 
Wyo. 123, 42 P. 874 (1895). Prejudicial error is never presumed; it must be 
established by the parties. Cervelli v. 
Graves, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1032 (1983). Error is harmless when it is not 
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the party asserting it. 5 Am.Jur.2d 
Appeal and Error § 776. There were other factors the homeowners' expert 
considered in arriving at the diminished value, and taking these into 
consideration together with all other evidence in the case, we must conclude 
that the award of damages appears reasonable under the circumstances. 

[¶33.]  Damages were not awarded for injury to 
personal property. The decision announced from the bench was as 
follows:

"The Court is not going 
to award damages for personal property. I feel that almost in toto there was a 
lack of proof of the amount of damages that should be awarded. * * 
*"

The trial 
judge's determinations with respect to facts and sufficiency of proof will not 
be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Error does not appear in these 
determinations.

[¶34.]  The decision of the trial court is 
reversed as to the developer and is affirmed in all other 
respects.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 
1-3-105(a)(iv)(B) and (C), W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) Civil actions other 
than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following 
periods after the cause of action accrues:

* * * * * 
*

"(iv) Within four (4) 
years, an action for:

* * * * * 
*

"(B) The recovery of 
personal property or for taking, detaining or injuring personal 
property;

"(C) An injury to the 
rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein enumerated * * 
*."