Case Title: Jordan v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 121835

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2013-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
DAMON PHINEAS JORDAN 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. Record No. 121835 
JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
September 12, 2013 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia ("Court of Appeals") erred in holding that the evidence 
was sufficient to support the conviction of Damon Phineas Jordan 
("Jordan") for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 
violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings 
Jordan was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court of the City 
of Virginia Beach ("trial court") upon indictments charging 
carjacking, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, 
eluding police, and possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon.  At trial, Matthew Arrowood ("Arrowood") testified that 
he drove his father to a neighborhood convenience store in 
Virginia Beach at approximately 11:00 p.m. on June 28, 2009, and 
parked in front of the store.  Arrowood was thirteen years old 
on the night in question.  While Arrowood's father was inside, 
Jordan approached the driver's side window and began asking 
Arrowood questions about how old he was, how long he had been 
driving, and where he lived.  Arrowood testified that when he 
 
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did not respond, Jordan pointed "a gun" at his head and told him 
to get out of the truck. 
 
Arrowood testified that the object Jordan pointed at him 
was a small silver pistol.  Arrowood stated that he was familiar 
with handguns because his father was in the military, and that 
this appeared to be a silver semiautomatic pistol.  Arrowood 
identified it as a "Raven," a particular type of small pistol 
with which he was familiar.  Arrowood admitted on cross-
examination that he could not say for certain that the object 
was not a toy gun.  On re-direct he was asked, "Did it look like 
a toy gun to you?" and he responded, "[a] really detailed [one] 
if it was." 
 
Arrowood testified that after Jordan pointed the gun at his 
head, he got out of the truck and ran behind the convenience 
store.  Jordan got in the truck and drove away.  Arrowood then 
ran inside the store, and he and his father contacted police.  
Jordan was apprehended by police shortly thereafter, but no 
weapon was recovered. 
 
Jordan was convicted of carjacking, use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony, eluding police, and possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon.  The only conviction at issue in 
this appeal is possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  
Jordan concedes that he is a convicted felon. 
 
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The Court of Appeals granted Jordan's petition for appeal, 
and in a published opinion, with one judge dissenting, held that 
the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.  Jordan 
v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 675, 731 S.E.2d 622 (2012).  The 
Court of Appeals held that Arrowood's testimony describing the 
weapon, coupled with Jordan's actions in pointing it at 
Arrowood's head while demanding that he get out of the truck, 
was sufficient to prove that the object Jordan was holding was a 
firearm.  Id. at 680-81, 731 S.E.2d at 624. 
 
Jordan filed a petition for appeal with this Court, and we 
awarded him an appeal on the following assignment of error: 
 
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding 
that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant's 
conviction for possession of the firearm by a convicted 
felon because there was no evidence showing that appellant 
possessed an actual firearm and not an instrument of 
similar appearance. 
 
II.  Analysis 
A. 
Standard of Review 
We apply a de novo standard of review when addressing a 
question of statutory construction.  Harris v. Commonwealth, 274 
Va. 409, 413, 650 S.E.2d 89, 91 (2007).  When considering the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, we examine 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
the prevailing party at trial, granting it all reasonable 
inferences fairly deducible therefrom.  Dowden v. Commonwealth, 
 
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260 Va. 459, 461, 536 S.E.2d 437, 438 (2000).  The Court will 
only reverse the judgment of the trial court if the judgment is 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.  Startin v. 
Commonwealth, 281 Va. 374, 379, 706 S.E.2d 873, 876 (2011).  If 
the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, the 
reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment 
for that of the trier of fact, even if its opinion might differ 
from the conclusions reached by the trier of fact.  Id. at 379, 
706 S.E.2d at 876-77. 
B. 
Possession of a Firearm 
 
Code § 18.2-308.2 prohibits the possession of firearms by 
convicted felons.  Subsection (A) states that 
[i]t shall be unlawful for (i) any person 
who has been convicted of a felony ... to 
knowingly and intentionally possess or 
transport any firearm or ammunition for a 
firearm, any stun weapon as defined by § 
18.2-308.1, or any explosive material, or to 
knowingly and intentionally carry about his 
person, hidden from common observation, any 
weapon described in subsection A of § 18.2-
308. 
 
 
Code § 18.2-308.2 provides no express definition of the 
term "firearm."  However, in Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 
573, 562 S.E.2d 139 (2002), we held that the term "firearm" 
under Code § 18.2-308.2 means "any instrument designed, made, 
and intended to fire or expel a projectile by means of an 
explosion."  Id. at 583, 562 S.E.2d at 145.  We explicitly 
 
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rejected within that definition any element of present capacity 
or operability.  Id. at 583-84, 562 S.E.2d at 145. 
 
In Startin, we further clarified that definition by 
explaining that a replica gun and a BB gun would not be 
sufficient to convict a person under Code § 18.2-308.2 for 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because those items 
were not "designed, made, and intended to fire or expel a 
projectile by means of an explosion."  281 Va. at 382, 706 
S.E.2d at 878 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
In Redd v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 256, 511 S.E.2d 436 
(1999), the defendant entered a convenience store and placed 
what appeared to be a "long, black gun" on the counter, and 
ordered the clerk to give her all the money from the register.  
Id. at 258, 511 S.E.2d at 437.  Redd stated that she would kill 
the clerk if an alarm were activated.  Id.  In Redd, the Court 
of Appeals held that the defendant's threat to kill the clerk 
was an implied assertion that the object she held was a firearm.  
When coupled with the clerk's description of the object, the 
evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction 
for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  Id. at 259, 
511 S.E.2d at 438. 
 
We confirm that the holding in Redd is still the law of 
this Commonwealth.  In Redd, the defendant's threat to kill the 
clerk was an implied assertion that the object was a firearm.  
 
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In the case before us, Jordan did not verbally threaten to kill 
Arrowood, however, the acts of pointing the gun at Arrowood 
while directing him to get out of the car, most assuredly 
communicated the message that if Arrowood did not comply, Jordan 
would shoot him. 
 
Arrowood specifically identified the object as a "Raven."  
A Raven is a well-known, compact, .25 caliber semi-automatic 
pistol that is commonly referred to as a "Saturday Night 
Special," and can easily be concealed.  See United States v. 
Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1993); Burks v. State, 876 
S.W.2d 877, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).  The reference to a 
"Raven" indicates a specific weapon that was designed, made, and 
intended to fire or expel a projectile by means of an explosion.  
A Raven pistol clearly meets the definition of a firearm as set 
out in Armstrong. 
 
Arrowood's ability to identify a Raven pistol was subject 
to cross-examination.  The determination of how much weight to 
give to his identification of the object as a Raven pistol was a 
matter for the trier of fact. 
We are mindful of the precise question we are required to 
address when considering an appeal alleging insufficiency of the 
evidence. 
When analyzing a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party at trial and considers 
 
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any reasonable inferences from the facts proved. The 
judgment of the trial court will only be reversed upon a 
showing that it “is plainly wrong or without evidence to 
support it.” 
 
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 27, 630 S.E.2d 326, 330 
(2006) (quoting Code § 8.01-680) (citation omitted). 
 
In this case the jury found Arrowood’s testimony to be 
competent and believable.  The trier of fact was entitled to 
consider the totality of the evidence including Arrowood’s 
direct testimony identifying the weapon and Jordan’s conduct 
which included pointing that weapon to Arrowood’s head and 
demanding that Arrowood get out of the truck.  It was within the 
province of the jury to conclude that Jordan’s conduct was an 
implied assertion that the object he held was a firearm.  We may 
not substitute our judgment for that of the jury unless no 
reasonable juror could have come to this conclusion. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment 
holding that the evidence was sufficient to support Jordan's 
conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE GOODWYN and JUSTICE MILLETTE 
join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
The majority confirms that Startin v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 
374, 706 S.E.2d 873 (2011), Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 
 
8 
573, 562 S.E.2d 139 (2002), and Redd v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. 
App. 256, 511 S.E.2d 436 (1999), are the law of the Commonwealth 
but concludes that the evidence in this case is nevertheless 
sufficient to convict Jordan of possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon.  Although I agree concerning the applicable 
authority, I respectfully disagree that the evidence here was 
legally sufficient to convict Jordan.  Therefore, for the 
following reasons, I would reverse his conviction for possession 
of a firearm in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. 
 “Undoubtedly, in criminal cases, the burden of 
establishing guilt rests on the prosecution from the beginning 
to the end of the trial.”  Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 
49-50 (1897).  “[W]e will not sustain a trial court’s judgment 
that is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”  
Brickhouse v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 682, 686, 668 S.E.2d 160, 
162 (2008).  “‘Suspicion of guilt, however strong, or even a 
probability of guilt, is insufficient to support a conviction.’”  
Rogers v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307, 317, 410 S.E.2d 621, 627 
(1991) (quoting Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 42, 393 
S.E.2d 599, 608 (1990)).  Thus, the Commonwealth had the burden 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the object Jordan 
pointed at Arrowood was an instrument that was designed, made, 
and intended to expel a projectile by means of explosion and not 
merely an object that had the appearance of one.  See Startin, 
 
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281 Va. at 377, 706 S.E.2d at 876; Armstrong, 263 Va. at 583, 
562 S.E.2d at 144. 
 
Despite the certitude of Arrowood’s identification of the 
object as a Raven pistol, I believe that the Commonwealth failed 
to prove that the object Jordan used was a firearm within the 
meaning of Code § 18.2-308.2, as established by precedent.  At 
Jordan’s trial, Arrowood testified that the incident lasted 
between thirty seconds to one minute, Jordan was six inches to a 
foot away, and Arrowood had five seconds to look at the gun 
through the mirror as Jordan approached. 
 
During questioning by the Commonwealth, Arrowood testified 
[Jordan] pointed a gun at me and told me to 
get out of the truck. 
 
[Commonwealth:]  Could you describe the gun 
that he pointed at you? 
 
[Arrowood:]  Like a small pistol.  It was 
silver. 
 
[Commonwealth:]  You say a pistol.  Your dad 
. . . is or was in the military? 
 
[Arrowood:]  Uh-huh. 
 
[Commonwealth:]  So you have some 
familiarity with handguns? 
 
[Arrowood:]  Yes, sir. 
 
[Commonwealth:]  And you've fired handguns 
before? 
 
 
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[Arrowood:]  Yes, sir. 
 
[Commonwealth:]  All right. Were you able to 
recognize -- you said -- you described it as 
a pistol. What do you mean as a pistol? 
 
[Arrowood:]  Like a semiautomatic pistol. 
 
[Commonwealth:]  All right. What color was 
it? 
 
[Arrowood:]  Silver. 
 
. . . . 
 
[Commonwealth:]  Could you tell what it was? 
 
[Arrowood:]  Yes, sir. 
 
[Commonwealth:]  And what was it? 
 
[Arrowood:]  It was a -- like a Raven 
pistol. 
 
[Commonwealth:]  Okay. That's a type of 
pistol? 
 
[Arrowood:]  It's a small pistol. 
 
[Commonwealth:]  And that you are familiar 
with? 
 
[Arrowood:]  Yes, sir. 
 
(emphasis added).  When asked on redirect examination whether 
the instrument “look[ed] like a toy gun,” Arrowood responded, 
“[a] really detailed toy gun if it was.” 
 
There was no physical evidence presented regarding the 
object or its use.  It is undisputed that Arrowood never used or 
examined the instrument that Jordan pointed at him.  It is also 
undisputed that there was no testimony from anyone who had used 
 
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or examined the object or who had observed it being used, made, 
or assembled. 
 
Thus, Arrowood’s testimony based solely on his brief 
observation of the object is insufficient as a matter of law to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the instrument was 
designed, made, and intended to expel a projectile by means of 
an explosion.  Indeed, I believe his testimony is no different 
than simply describing the object as a gun, because it is merely 
an opinion based on casual observation.  Demonstrating that he 
knew the well-known brand or model name of a small, silver 
handgun in no way bolsters his testimony regarding whether what 
he saw was a real gun or a replica. 
It is almost impossible for an observer, no matter how 
experienced, to look at an object and know that it is an 
instrument designed, made, and intended to expel a projectile by 
means of an explosion.  Indeed, our ruling in Startin makes 
clear that whether an instrument was designed, made, and 
intended to fire or expel a projectile by means of an explosion 
cannot be discerned by merely looking at the instrument. * 
 
Evidence demonstrating that the object was designed, made, 
and intended to expel a projectile by means of an explosion is 
                     
* The “replica” of a pistol at issue in Startin, 281 Va. at 377, 
706 S.E.2d at 876, was rendered inoperable by the lack of a 
firing pin, a modification that is undetectable without 
disassembly. 
 
 
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necessary for a conviction under Code § 18.2-308.2.  However, 
this is not to say that in order to secure a conviction under 
Code § 18.2-308.2, the Commonwealth would have to prove its case 
beyond all possible doubt or that one could never be convicted 
of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon in the absence 
of the firearm; in fact, this is the precise proposition for 
which Redd stands.  The credible testimony of an individual who 
has examined, used or seen the instrument being used would be 
sufficient for the fact finder to conclude that an instrument 
that looks like a gun is indeed designed, made, and intended to 
expel a projectile by explosion.  This type of evidence could be 
used to validate an eyewitness’s description of an object.  See 
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 735, 737, 536 S.E.2d 922, 
922-23 (2000) (relying on circumstantial evidence to “prove 
whether a particular firearm functions” in the context of 
possession of a firearm while in possession of certain 
contraband in violation of Code § 18.2-308.4).  For example, 
evidence is sufficient when based upon the verbal implied 
assertion of the defendant, who we can infer had the opportunity 
to examine and/or use the object, that the object was designed 
to be a functioning firearm.  See Redd, 29 Va. App. at 259, 511 
S.E.2d at 438. 
 
The majority upholds the trial court’s conviction based 
solely on a witness’s belief that an instrument looked like an 
 
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admittedly well-known, specific model of firearm as a substitute 
for evidence, required by precedent, regarding whether the 
instrument met the requirements of Code § 18.2-308.2.  In doing 
so, the majority erases the distinction that the General 
Assembly so carefully drew, and which this Court and the Court 
of Appeals have previously observed, between the evidence 
necessary to prove a violation of Code § 18.2-53.1 (use) as 
opposed to a violation of Code § 18.2-308.2 (possession). 
Here, we have only the uncorroborated description of an 
unknown object made by a young boy after viewing the object for 
mere seconds.  Without more, such as physical evidence or 
testimony of an individual who has examined or used the 
instrument, such observation testimony is insufficient as a 
matter of law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
instrument was designed, made, and intended to expel a 
projectile by means of an explosion.  See Startin, 281 Va. at 
377, 706 S.E.2d at 876. 
I recognize that the difference between the statutes 
governing use of a firearm during the commission of a felony, 
Code § 18.2-53.1, and the possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon, Code § 18.2-308.2, is subtle, but the important 
distinction between the two is that the appearance of the object 
alone is appropriate and sufficient only for a conviction for 
use of a firearm.  The reliance on the presentation of the 
 
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object and mere “identification” by any observer as an implied 
assertion that the object was made to expel a projectile is 
tantamount to reliance solely on the object’s appearance which 
as a matter of law amounts to nothing more than evidence 
sufficient to prove a violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.  Indeed, 
Redd, which the majority adopts as the law, recognizes as much.  
In Redd, the Court of Appeals specifically held that the 
appearance of the gun along with its manner of presentation, 
i.e., brandishing, was insufficient to support a conviction for 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  29 Va. App. at 
259, 511 S.E.2d at 438.  Taken to its logical conclusion, the 
majority’s interpretation completely eradicates the distinction 
between the two offenses. 
Because the burden of proof in criminal cases has 
constitutional status, any conviction that rests upon legally 
insufficient evidence is a denial of due process.  Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979); Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 
Va. 505, 512, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003).  I would reverse 
Jordan’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon.