Case Title: Stanberry v. Stanberry

Citation: 303 P.2d 706, 81 Ariz. 215

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1956-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
81 Ariz. 215 (1956) 303 P.2d 706 Chauncy O. STANBERRY, Appellant, v. Ruth Ida STANBERRY, Appellee. No. 6226. Supreme Court of Arizona. November 20, 1956. *216 Westover, Mansfield, Westover & Copple, Yuma, for appellant. Rolle, Jones & Pace, Yuma, for appellee. STRUCKMEYER, Justice. This action was commenced by Ruth Ida Stanberry against her husband, Chauncy O. Stanberry, for a divorce, division of the community property, custody of two minor children and their support. From an order awarding custody of the children to Mrs. Stanberry this appeal has been perfected. Since the principal questions here presented involve the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain an award of the custody of the children to Mrs. Stanberry, a somewhat lengthy examination of the transcript of the proceedings in the lower court is necessary. However, certain preliminary observations should be first made: (1) In awarding the custody of a minor, the trial court is to be guided by the best interests of the child and its decision will not be altered unless it clearly appears that there was an abuse of discretion. Grimditch v. Grimditch, 71 Ariz. 198, 225 P.2d 489, rehearing 71 Ariz. 237, 226 P.2d 142. (2) Because no findings of fact appear in the *217 record, the presumption is that the court found every fact necessary to support the judgment; and such presumptive finding must be sustained if the evidence on any reasonable construction justifies it. Porter v. Porter, 67 Ariz. 273, 195 P.2d 132. Appellant's evidence strongly suggests that for many years Mrs. Stanberry has suffered from a mental condition which caused her to act in an erratic manner to the extent of requiring hospitalization and preventing her from caring for home and children; that, while she was not actively psychotic at the time of the trial, she was subjected to episodical attacks possibly on a two-year basis, and that, in the future, further periods of hospitalization could be expected; that appellee's illness was characteristic of one type of manic-depressive psychosis with a possibility of suicide and unintentional homicide. The evidence of the mental condition of Mrs. Stanberry is extensive. It includes not only the evidence submitted at the trial of the case, but that of a related cause, being a petition for letters of guardianship filed by Mr. Stanberry and resisted by Mrs. Stanberry. Since we have concluded that we cannot say that the trial court necessarily abused its discretion in awarding the children to Mrs. Stanberry, some of the evidence which may have been considered in arriving at a decision is detailed. In December of 1937 Mrs. Stanberry, who was then 21 years of age and unmarried, went on the recommendation of her private physician to the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas. At that time she became the patient of Dr. Karl Menninger who saw her every day for several weeks. Dr. Menninger testified: Dr. Menninger was also queried as to whether Mrs. Stanberry's condition reflected a "manic-depressive" type insanity, to which he answered: Dr. Menninger later saw Mrs. Stanberry in 1941 when she stopped by to see him apparently not in a professional capacity at which time "everything was going fine." He next saw her in September of 1952, about which he testified: In response to questioning by counsel as to whether their troubles were ones which would be settled by marriage counselling rather than by psychiatric treatment, he answered: Dr. Menninger was then asked if based on his experience was it his opinion that the welfare of the two children would be better served by living with their mother. He answered: And in answer to the question whether that would be true in the case of Mrs. Stanberry and her children, he answered: Dr. Menninger further testified on cross-examination: The testimony of Dr. William B. McGrath specializing in neurology and psychiatry is illustrative of Mrs. Stanberry's case. On July 26, 1955, he made a physical and psychiatric examination of Mrs. Stanberry. Ten days later at the guardianship hearing he testified: And testifying in answer to the question "What is the incident of suicide or homicide in a manic state." He further testified: He also testified: He also testified: We believe that there is an irreconcilable conflict in the evidence as to the nature and extent of Mrs. Stanberry's illness and the resulting effect on her ability to care for the children and, accordingly, it is not clear to us that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the custody of these children to their mother. Appellant urges that the medical evidence in favor of Mrs. Stanberry was wholly negative and without probative force because the doctors who testified on her behalf did not examine or treat her during the episodes, nor did they testify that she was not afflicted with manic-depressive psychosis. While we express doubt as to appellant's conclusions in the light of Dr. Menninger's testimony, still, and irrespective, since the trial court is to be guided by the best interests of the child, the ultimate question to be determined was whether Mrs. Stanberry was so incapacitated by her illness that the children ought not be placed in her custody. On this the evidence is not wholly negative. As Dr. Menninger said: Or even assuming that appellee is subject to episodes of a manic psychotic nature, as Dr. McGrath testified: Further error is assigned in the refusal of the trial court to admit in evidence a letter from Kirk C. Brown, a physician who treated appellee when she resided in the State of Washington some years before. This letter was written by Dr. Brown to a doctor in Yuma. Appellant argues that the letter should have been admitted in evidence because it was written in response to a telephone request by Mrs. Stanberry. The letter reads: Appellant argues that it should be admitted in evidence without proof of its authenticity because it categorically falls in the same class as a letter received in due course of mail purporting to be written in answer to another letter. Without expressly ruling on appellant's contention, it is sufficient to point out that the letter would have to be excluded in any event by other applicable rules of evidence. It principally consists of opinions of the writer which must necessarily have been based upon facts not in evidence and known only to the writer. An opinion predicated on facts not in evidence is inadmissible. Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n v. Theodore, 47 Ariz. 314, 55 P.2d 806. There are other possible objections to statements in this letter but we think it unnecessary to dwell thereon further. In the light of our often pronounced holdings that the decision of a trial court will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears *222 that there was an abuse of discretion and otherwise finding no prejudical error in the record as presented, it is our judgment that the order of the trial court must be affirmed and it is so ordered. LA PRADE, C.J., and UDALL, WINDES and PHELPS, JJ., concur.