Case Title: CHARLIE v FOOS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1972-11-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12152 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1972 EDWARD T. CHARLIE, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - HENRY FOOS, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of R e c ~ r d : For Appellant : Michael J. Whalen, argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana. For Respondent : Anderson, Symmes, Forbes, Peete & Brown, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Weymouth D. Symmes and John L. H i l t s argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Submitted: October 27, 1972 Decided : -- NOV 1 4 1972 Filed : vnir 1 4 1 9 T l M r , Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for defendant i n a personal injury action t r i e d i n the d i s t r i c t court of the thirteenth judicial d i s t r i c t , Yellowstone County, the Honorable Robert H. Wilson, presiding. The material facts were disputed by the parties throughout the t r i a l . However, we w i l l r e c i t e them i n a view which would correspond with the jury verdict and the prevailing party. Plaintiff Edward T. Charlie was i n Laurel, Montana, on Saturday, M a y 2, 1970. H e was traveling with one Peter Spotted Wolf and they were heading toward Wyoming, looking for work. While i n Laurel, plaintiff went up t o Henry Foos, defendant herein, and asked him i f he had any work, Foos stated that he had no work a s such, but that he did have some trees t o t r i m and asked i f plaintiff would be interested i n that work. Plaintiff said he .had done t h i s type of work before and he would do i t , but he would need the help of Peter Spotted Wolf. The three parties then went out t o Foos' ranch. Foos asked p l a i n t i f f how much he wanted for the work and plaintiff replied n t e trees B that $4 was a l l he wanted. They worked /for a out an hour and then wanted t o go t o town t o eat. Foos took them back t o town and paid them $4 for the work they had done. A t t h i s time Foos thought the employment had ended, and he was through with them. However, about 1 1 p.m. that same evening, plaintiff and Spotted Wolf came again t o the home of Foos and got him out of bed. A t t h i s point Foos was afraid that he might have some trouble. Foos was 77 years old a t the time. He had from $70 t o $75 i n the house. Plaintiff told Foos that he and Spotted Wolf wanted another $2,but did not say what for. Foos was frightened and gave them the dollar he had i n h i s pocket. Plaintiff and Spotted Wolf went back into town, then returned, and slept i n FOOS' barn, Foos had no idea they were i n the barn, as he had never told them they could sleep on h i s place. The next morning, M a y 3, 1970, plaintiff and Spotted Wolf went t o the Foos home and wanted something t o eat, Because ' . & A . ":t$?; h J- intd-f was s t i l l afraid, he fed them what he could for break- fast. H e did not t e l l them t o go back out t o work i n the trees; he thought the work was ended. Plaintiff and Spotted Wolf did go back t o the trees and began trimming, While p l a i n t i f f was working i n the tree, a limb buckled back and severed h i s right arm except for a small amount of skin and flesh. Foos heard some yelling and upon coming out of h i s house saw p l a i n t i f f s t i l l up i n the tree. ~ o o s ' son, Clarence, whose farm was only about 2 blocks away, heard the yelling and came over t o a s s i s t one Les Bissonette i n removing plaintiff from the tree. H e was taken t o a hospital, where it was found necessary t o amputate p l a i n t i f f ' s arm. The cause went t o a jury t r i a l and judgment was entered for defendant, Henry Foos. From that judgment and order denying a motion for a new t r i a l , p l a i n t i f f , Edward T. Charlie,appeals. Appellant alleges four errors by the d i s t r i c t court, F i r s t , that he was deprived of a f a i r t r i a l by reason of misconduct on the part of the jury. This allegation i s based on four affidavits by members of the jury and two affidavits by b a i l i f f s i n charge of the jury. Appellant contends when the jury was returned into court l a t e on the night of April 29, 1971, it was a t such an impasse that that it was no longer capable of arriving a t a verdict from an impartial evaluation of the case. H e contends the members of the jury were disappointed because they were not discharged, but were required t o be put up for the night; and, i n t h e i r desire for discharge, they returned a verdict of expediency when they w e r e returned t o the juryroom the following morning. Appellant further contends the affidavits prove that one of the jurors made statements on voire dire examination, saying then that she would judge the case f a i r l y , However, i n the jury- room she made statements that she could not judge it f a i r l y , that she knew defendant very well; and, that she should not be on the jury. Another affidavit goes to show that one of the jurors was concerned about her young child a t home and did not want t o have t o stay the night. This juror wanted the judge t o appoint an alternate juror i n her place. With the jurors i n t h i s s t a t e of mind and apparently a t an impasse, they returned i n the morning and gave a judgment for defendant. Foos. This i s the basis for appellant's contention that he did not receive a f a i r t r i a l , due t o misconduct on the part of the jury. A review of the facts and case law leads t h i s Court t o find that, i n fact, appellant did receive a f a i r t r i a l under the jury system. Affidavits used by appellant are concerned solely with matters inherent i n the jury process. It has been established that matters which are inherent i n the jury process and not concerned with matters which r e l a t e t o outside influence upon the jury, are not a basis for establishing a charge of jury misconduct. However, an examination of the cases shows a clear distinction between those cases and the position of appellant here. Cited i n support of appellant's position i s Putro v. Baker & Mannix Electric, 147 Mont. 139, 148, 410 P.2d 717, where t h i s Court reversed a decision because of some misconduct on the part of the jury. In that case a newspaper a r t i c l e concerning the de- fendant and h i s criminal l i a b i l i t y , was carried into the juryroom by a juror during a c i v i l suit. It was established that a l l of the jurors had read the a r t i c l e before making a decision. The Court reversed because of the "contact of the jurors with outside, prejudicial influences". Appellant also c i t e s Gaff v. Kinzle, 148 Mont. 61,66,67, 417 P,2d 105. It i s true the Court did reverse that case on misconduct of a jury member, but again the situation i s clearly not the same as here. There, the night before the case went t o the jury the foreman went t o the scene of the accident and investigated the area. H e then went home and prepared a map which he took into the jury room. A new t r i a l was granted on the grounds that i t was misconduct for the foreman t o assume the role of inspector or investigator. From the cases, our position has been that when the m i s - conduct of a juror i s based on some outside influence, then juror affidavits can be the basis for overturning the judgment. O n the other hand, i n Goff, it was said when there i s nothing to demonstrate that there was any outside influence on the jury members : "'* * * the theory of our system i s that the conclusions t o be reached i n a case w i l l be induced only by evidence and argument i n open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private t a l k o r public print"'. Here, i n the record we find no evidence of any outside influence upon the jurors. In - Goff, t h i s Court cited Kincaid v. Wade, 196 Kan, 174, 410 P.2d 333, 337, and we adhere t o the position of the Kansas court when i t stated: "'The general rule is, that affidavits of jurors are admissible t o explain and uphold t h e i r verdict, but not t o impeach and overthrow it. But t h i s general rule i s subject t o t h i s qualification: that affidavits of jurors may be received, for the purpose of avoiding a verdict, t o show any matter occurring during a t r i a l , o r i n the juryroom, which does not essentially inhere i n the verdict i t s e l f , as that a juror was improperly approached by a party, h i s agent or attorney, that the verdict was determined by l o t ; but not t o show any matter which does essentially inhere i n the verdict, a s that the -juror did not assent t o the verdict, that he m i s - understood the instructions or the testimony, or any other matter resting alone i n the juror's breast. I l l The use of the affidavits by appellant i s not proper on these facts, He i s trying t o reverse a decision by juror affidavits, which were based on matters solely within the province of the jury. Second, appellant alleges the verdict was contrary t o the law and evidence i n the case, and should have been s e t aside. H e bases t h i s allegation on affidavits of the foreman of the jury, The foreman recited the jurors voted eleven t o one t o find that there was no negligence on the part of the employer, and inherent i n t h i s statement i s the fact that one of the jurors who ultimately supported the verdict for the employer, took the position that there was no negligence on appellant's part. The foreman conducted a vote on the question of contribu- tory negligence alone, and eight of the jurors voted i n the affirmative on that question, which enabled them t o return a verdict for the employer. O f necessity, these eight jurors had t o include the one juror who had previously taken a position that there was no negligence upon the part of the employer. Contributory negligence presupposes negligence upon the part of the other party. Appellant also contends the verdict i s contrary t o the evidence. H e contends the change of the vote of juror, Verne G. Partridge, came about by reason of the fact he was persuaded that the injured workman should have used the rope that was available t o him. Yet, the evidence establishes that the rope was not there a s a safety device, but used t o pull limbs away from the house. In order for the juror t o find a s he did, he would have had t o find that the workman was not a trespasser a t the time he was injured and, as a matter of fact, find he was not furnished adequate equipment t o do the work. To appellant i t i s clear the juror did not understand the evidence and t h i s should be cause for a new t r i a l . The basis of appellant's argument i s that the jurors did not understand the law of negligence and contributory negligence and did not clearly understand the facts, Therefore, appellant did not have a f a i r t r i a l . This issue has been answered by both the federal court and t h i s Court. The Ninth Circuit Court i n upholding the Montana Federal District Court, i n Bateman v. Donovan, 131 F.2d 759, 765, refused t o grant a new t r i a l , stating: "'* * * the general rule is, that affidavits of jurors w i l l not be received t o prove any mistake of the evidence or misapprehension of the law, on the part of the jury. * * * The verdict, i n which they a l l concur, must be the best evidence of t h e i r belief, both as t o the fact and the law, and there- fore must be taken t o be conclusive * * *,"' This Court i n 1969, reaffirmed that rule i n Johnson v. Green, 153 Mont. 251, 255, 456 P.2d 290: " ~ u t we go one step further, The rule i n Montana i s that a jury may not impeach i t s own verdict based on mistake of the evidence or misapprehen- sion of the law. I I Appellant would have us overrule t h i s rule by h i s argument, but nothing has been demonstrated by appellant to show that we should. It i s our view that i t w i l l remain the law of Montana, and appellant's contention f a i l s . Third, appellant contends he was prejudiced by respondent's improper appeal t o the jury. During the testimony of respondent, he stated he had worked i n Laurel constructing the Masonic Temple. With respect t o h i s work i n those early years, he stated: "1 don't know i f he i s related t o t h i s one or not, but I shouldn't t a l k about it. M r . Brevins, h i s father, I and him got down there and worked together i n the basement. I' Respondent was referring t o a member of the jury and was immediately told by h i s counsel that he should not volunteer anything, A t t h i s point, counsel for appellant objected "to t h i s l i n e of questioning for the reason that we are not concerned with any issue i n t h i s case as t o the working capacity or the work history particularly of t h i s witness1'. Appellant now contends that t h i s nentioning by the respondent of the relationship between the juror and someone he knew, served t o arouse passion and prejudice of the jury against appellant. W e cannot agree with t h i s contention for these reasons: W e do not believe that t h i s was an attempt by respondent t o influence the jury or prejudice the appellant. It was a situation of a 77 year old man, who did not clearly understand the language, trying t o answer the questions as best he could, H e stated that he was not sure that the member of the jury was even related t o the man he had worked with many years ago. This t y p e d remark, of course, i s not proper i n a t r i a l , but a close examination of the record does not show the remark i n any way prejudiced the jury against appellant, Additionally, even though w e find the remark did not arouse prejudice of the jury against appellant, i t appears from the record that counsel for appellant did not make proper or timely objection. A t the t i m e the statement was made, counsel objected on the grounds that this work history of respondent had no relevance t o the issues a t hand, W e have held that i f a party f a i l s t o make a timely objection t o the irregularity, then the irregularity i s waived, Herren v. Hawks, 139 Mont. 440, 365 P.2d 641. It i s true an objection was made, but it was not the proper objection, In Hayward v. Richard- son Const.Co., 136 Mont, 241, 249, 347 P.2d 475, t h i s Court said: I t A t some stage of the case, p l a i n t i f f must object t o the improper matter going before the jury a s being calculated t o excite prejudice before he i s i n a position t o complain. In other words, plaintiff must obtain an adverse ruling by the court on the point before he i s i n a position t o contend that the court committed some error, I 1 During t r i a l , counsel for appellant did not make the same objection he now brings forth on appeal. H e did not put the t r i a l court i n error by a timely and proper objection as t o prejudice. Counsel i s therefore barred from claiming error here. The fourth and f i n a l issue on appeal concerns instructions given by the t r i a l court. Appellant offered instructions numbered 18, 19, 20 and 21 covering the duties of an employer t o h i s employees. In place of those offered instructions, the court gave its instruction No, 13: I t A duty is imposed upon an employer t o furnish a reasonably safe place t o work t o h i s employees and t o furnish reasonably safe tools and appliances for the purpose of performing the work, Reasonably safe tools and appliances are such tools and appliances as are adapted t o and a r e reasonably safe for use for the particular purpose for which they are furnished. This i s a duty which the employer may not delegate and thereby relieve himself from performance of the duty. The duty thus imposed i s what a reasonably prudent employer under the same or similar circumstances would have done. I t Appellant argues that h i s four proposed instructions should have been given, and that the f i n a l sentence of court's instruction No. 13 would allow the jury t o decide i n favor of the employer i f he were abiding by the general custom i n the community, even though the standards do not meet the requirements of the law. W e do not agree that appellant's offered instructions should have been given, or that the court's instruction was wrong, Appellant's offered instruction No. 18 read: I t N o employer s h a l l maintain or operate, or cause t o be maintained or operated, any place of employment that i s not safe, nor shall said employer f a i l or neglect t o do anything reasonably necessary t o protect the l i f e and safety of the employees, I I This instruction is based on section 41-1710, R.C.M. 1947. W e believe the intent of the instruction, requiring that an employer furnish a safe place t o work is satisfied i n the court's instruction No. 13. Proposed instruction No. 19 read: "'Reasonably safe place t o work' means that the place of employment has been made as free from danger to the l i f e o r safety of the employee as the nature of the employment w i l l reasonably permit. 1 I This instruction did not take into account the fact that the standard of care required of the respondent would be that of an ordinarily prudent person under the same o r similar c i r - cumstances. Proposed instruction No. 20 read: "'~easonably safe tools and appliances' are such tools and appliances as are adapted t o and a r e reasonably safe for use for the particular purpose for which they are funished. I' This instruction, besides being covered by the court's instruction, was not applicable because there was no evidence i n the record that appellant was furnished any tools that were not reasonably safe, Proposed instruction No. 2 1 read: I I The duty imposed upon an employer t o furnish and use safety devices and safeguards and adopt and use methods and processes reasonably adequate t o render the place of employment safe, and t o do every other thing reasonably necessary t o protect the l i f e and safety of employees, i s a duty which the employer may not delegate t o someone else and thereby exonerates himself from non performance of the duty, or i n other words the law imposes upon the employer the absolute responsibility t o perform the duty so imposed." This instruction would impose absolute responsibility on the respondent which disregarded the reasonably prudent person rule. This instruction along with the other three representing the essential ideas that appellant wanted expressed, were given to the jury in the court's instruction No. 13. We do not find any error on the part of the trial court in not granting appellant's proposed instructions 18, 19, 20 and 21. Appellant argues that court's instruction No. 13 would allow the jury to find that if respondent was following the general custom in the community there would be no liability. First, there was no evidence concerning any general custom in the community, Second the instruction makes absolutely no reference to custom or usage in any respect. We cannot agree with appellent on this issue. Appellant contends the district court erred in giving its instruction N o . 14: "You are instructed that if you find that the plaintiff was working on the tree involved in this case without the express or implied consent of the defendant at the time this accident occurred, the plaintiff was in law a trespasser. The only duty owed by the defendant to him under such circumstances was to refrain from willful or wanton acts of misconduct. I f Appellant submits that considering the evidence as a whole, as a matter of law, the court should have determined that the status of the injured workman was not that of a trespasser. This instruction allowed the jury to consider whether or not appellant was a trespasser at the time of his injury, and a fair evaluation of the facts would justify that this instruction should not have been given. The rule is established in Montana that whenever the facts are in dispute, as here, as to whether or not appellant was a trespasser, they should be resolved by the jury, This Court stated in Maxwell v . Maxwell, 140 Mont. 59, 61, 367 P.2d 308: "The rule is well established that a question will not be taken from the jury, as the trier of facts, where there is conflicting evidence or where more than one conclusion can be drawn from the evidence, t I From the record, i t certainly appears that there was a very genuine question of fact concerning the status of appellant on the morning of the accident. Respondent t e s t i f i e d appellant was not hired, and was not t o be doing any work. Appellant t e s t i f i e d he was s t i l l working for respondent and was being told what t o do. This i s certainly a question for the jury and the court did not e r r i n leaving the determination of the status of appellant t o the jury. A careful review of the issues raised by appellant indicate the t r i a l court did not commit error during the t r i a l or i n denying a motion for a new t r i a l , Accordingly, the verdict of the t r i a l court i s affirmed. / Chief Justice Associate Justices.