Case Title: In re Aubrey R.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 37

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 37 
Docket: 
Han-16-441 
Submitted 
 
On Briefs: February 23, 2017 
Decided: 
March 7, 2017 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE AUBREY R. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The parents of Aubrey R. appeal from a judgment of the District 
Court (Ellsworth, Roberts, J.) terminating their parental rights to Aubrey 
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2) (2016).  The mother 
argues that the court’s findings are insufficient to inform the parties of the 
basis for its determination of parental unfitness and to allow for meaningful 
appellate review.  She further challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the court’s findings of unfitness.1  We affirm the judgment.   
[¶2]  As we have stated, we will not infer factual findings in a 
termination case.  In re Amber B., 597 A.2d 937, 938 (Me. 1991); see also 
M.R. Civ. P. 52(a) (“[I]n every action for termination of parental rights, the 
court shall make specific findings of fact and state its conclusions of law 
                                         
1  In contrast, the father acknowledges that the court’s findings are “detailed and . . . accurate.”  
The father’s only argument on appeal—namely, that if the mother’s parental rights are restored, his 
should be as well—is not persuasive, and we do not address it further.   
 
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thereon as required by 22 M.R.S. § 4055.”).  Rather, the trial court’s findings 
must be sufficient to inform the parties of the basis for the termination 
decision and to allow for “meaningful review” on appeal.  In re Amber B., 
597 A.2d at 938. 
[¶3]  Here, the court found that the mother is unable to protect the child 
from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child in a reasonable time, 
because, while this case was pending, she continued to associate with unsafe 
individuals—particularly the father—in violation of the court’s jeopardy 
order and the reunification plan.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).  
These findings are sufficient to inform the parties of the basis for the parental 
unfitness determination and to allow for our review.  Compare In re David G., 
659 A.2d 859, 862 (Me. 1995) (stating that findings were sufficient to inform 
the parties of the basis for the decision even though they “could have been 
more explicit”), with In re Dylan B., 2001 ME 31, ¶ 4, 766 A.2d 577 (stating 
that a termination order that did not include any findings of fact, but merely 
summarized the testimony, was insufficient to allow for appellate review). 
[¶4]  The mother next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the court’s determination that she is unable to protect the child from 
jeopardy in a reasonable time.  Specifically, she argues that the Department 
 
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failed to present evidence that her continued contact with the father would 
result in “[s]erious harm or [the] threat of serious harm” to the child.  22 M.R.S. 
§ 4002(6)(A) (2016) (emphasis added) (defining “jeopardy” for purposes of 
the child protection statutes, including section 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)); see also 
22 M.R.S. § 4002(10)(B) (2016) (defining “serious harm” to include “[s]erious 
mental or emotional injury or impairment which now or in the future is likely 
to be evidenced by serious mental, behavioral or personality disorder”). 
[¶5]  Notably, the mother does not appear to challenge the evidence 
supporting the separate basis of parental unfitness found by the court, that 
the mother was unable to take responsibility for the child and will not be able 
to do so in a reasonable time.  The court’s determination of that type of 
unfitness was not erroneous, and we affirm the termination order based on 
that unchallenged finding.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b); In re K.M., 
2015 ME 79, ¶ 9, 118 A.3d 812 (“Where the court finds multiple bases for 
unfitness, we will affirm if any one of the alternative bases is supported by 
clear and convincing evidence.” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
[¶6]  Additionally, contrary to the mother’s contention, the court’s 
determination that the mother is also unable to protect the child from 
jeopardy was based on competent evidence, which demonstrated the threat 
 
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that the child would suffer serious mental and behavioral issues in the 
mother’s care.  See In re Jazmine L., 2004 ME 125, ¶ 15, 861 A.2d 1277 (stating 
that “when the asserted parental deficit is alleged to cause emotional 
harm . . . the Legislature has required that the existence of the emotional harm 
or threat of emotional harm be of sufficient severity that, now or in the future, 
it is ‘likely to be evidenced by serious mental, behavioral or personality 
disorder’” (quoting 22 M.R.S. § 4002(10)(B))).  That evidence included the 
following: 
• evidence from several witnesses that the father committed acts of 
domestic violence against the mother to a degree that would jeopardize 
the child’s safety;  
 
• a therapist’s testimony that the mother’s inability to separate from the 
father demonstrated that she could not “be counted on to protect [the 
child]” from exposure to domestic violence and drug abuse, and that if 
the mother did not “turn around her choice of men,” the child would be 
in a “very unsafe environment” that could lead to future psychological 
and behavioral problems for the child;  
 
• a clinical psychologist’s report stating that the mother had little insight 
into how her relationships with unsafe individuals might affect the 
child; 
 
• the guardian ad litem’s report stating that “the risk to [the child] is that 
she will suffer the same developmental trauma [the mother] suffered 
because [the mother] has not been able to address her own childhood 
trauma”;  
 
• the mother’s own testimony that she believes that the father is safe 
around the child when he is not drinking, which, as the court properly 
 
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found, demonstrated the mother’s failure to recognize the risk that the 
father’s chronic substance abuse issues pose to the child; and  
 
• the mother’s testimony that she maintained contact with the father 
throughout these proceedings in violation of the court’s jeopardy order 
and the Department’s reunification plan even though she knew that 
losing the child was a likely consequence. 
 
 
[¶7]  Based on this and other evidence, the court did not err by finding, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother is unable to protect the 
child from jeopardy and will not be able to do so in a reasonable time.  See 
In re Cameron Z., 2016 ME 162, ¶¶ 14, 17, --- A.3d --- (affirming a court’s 
finding of unfitness based, in part, on the mother’s unwillingness to end a 
relationship with the father who himself posed a risk of harm to the children 
who were the subject of the termination petition).  
[¶8]  Further, although not challenged by the mother on appeal, the 
court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest does not reflect 
any error or abuse of discretion.  See id. ¶ 16; 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Robert Van Horn, Esq., Van Horn Law Office, Ellsworth, for appellant mother 
 
Jeffrey C. Toothaker, Esq., Ellsworth, for appellant father 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Ellsworth District Court docket number PC-2014-28 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY