Case Title: State v. Marrington

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49100

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed: July 31, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Respondent on Review,
	v.
JAY DEE MARRINGTON,
	Petitioner on Review.
(CC 99CR0566; CA A108321; SC S49100)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted May 5, 2003.
	Anne Fujita Munsey, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause for petitioner on review.  With her on the briefs were
David E. Groom, Acting Executive Director, and Beth Corbo, Deputy
Public Defender.
	Katherine H. Waldo, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for respondent on review.  With her on the brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.
	DE MUNIZ, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Curry County Circuit Court, William L. Lasswell, Judge. 176 Or App 651, 34 P3d 754 (2001).
		DE MUNIZ, J.
		This criminal case requires that we decide whether an
expert's testimony that delay in reporting is a predominant
feature in a child's disclosure of sexual abuse is scientific
evidence and therefore subject to the standards for evidentiary
admission established by this court in State v. Brown, 297 Or
404, 687 P2d 751 (1984), and State v. O'Key, 321 Or 285, 899 P2d
663 (1995).  At trial, over defendant's objection on foundation
grounds, the trial court permitted the state's expert to testify
that delay in reporting is a predominant feature in a child's
disclosure of sexual abuse.  Defendant was convicted and, on
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed from the bench.  State v.
Marrington, 176 Or App 651, 34 P3d 754 (2001).  We allowed
defendant's petition for review.  We now hold that the expert's
testimony possessed the potential to influence the trier of fact
as scientific assertions and required an appropriate foundation
that the state failed to provide.  We therefore reverse and
remand.
		We state the facts and review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the state.  State v. Oatney, 335 Or 276, 278,
66 P3d 475 (2003).  Defendant was a family friend of the victim. 
In April 1999, the victim, who was 12 years old, visited
defendant's home for several days.  Defendant's son also was
visiting during his spring break.
		One day during that time period, while the three of
them were watching television, defendant and the victim were
seated on a couch.  Defendant touched the victim's genitals and
rubbed her hand on the crotch of his pants.  To get away from
defendant, the victim told defendant that she wanted to play with
defendant's son, left the couch, and played with the son.  The
victim then telephoned her father and asked him to take her home
because she felt uncomfortable.  
		The victim testified that she did not tell her father
about the abuse because "I thought that it would ruin our
friendship together and I didn't want this to happen because of
me."  Later, her mother arrived to take her home, but the victim
did not tell her mother about the incident either.
		Over a month later, the victim revealed the incident to
her mother.  The victim testified that she had told her mother
"[b]ecause I thought that if I didn't tell her then it might
happen some time later and then it would be my fault because I
didn't say anything and then they would think that mine was not
true."  Later, she related her story to her father, her pastor,
and a police detective.
		Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree
sexual abuse, ORS 163.427 -- one count for touching the victim
and one count for rubbing the victim's hand on the crotch of his
pants.  In its case-in-chief, the state offered the testimony of
Shouse, a program manager and clinical supervisor at Family
Friends, a private nonprofit organization that specializes in the
treatment of sexually abused children.  In discussing her
background, Shouse stated that she had earned bachelor's and
master's degrees in psychology, and that she was licensed by the
state and certified by the National Board of Certified
Counselors.  She also testified that she had worked at Family
Friends for 12 years and that she was current with the literature
and research in the area of child sexual abuse.  
		After the witness had related her background, the
following exchange took place:
		"Q.  Does [the victim] display any characteristics
of a sexually abused child?
		"A.  She would display a very prevalent
characteristic of abused children in her delayed
reporting in that I believe the incident had been
identified as being around Spring break in March and
then the disclosure came out a couple of months later.
		"Q.  Okay.  So based on your expertise can you say
whether or not it is unusual for a child not to have
reported an incident of sexual abuse immediately?
		"A.	Delayed reporting is more * * *
		"[Defense Counsel]: (Interposing) I think that
kind of thing gets into what is essentially a
scientific analysis and that the criteria established
by State v. Brown and the cases that follow it have not
been met for that kind of statistical presentation.
		"THE COURT: This kind of testimony is routinely
received in Oregon courts.
		"Go ahead.
		"* * * * *
		"Q.  Based on your expertise, can you say whether
or not it's unusual for a child not to report an
incidence of sex abuse immediately?
		"A.  Actually it is anticipated that a child would
not report abuse immediately.  The delay is a
predominate [sic] feature in disclosure.  Part of this
body of literature really jelled in the mid-eighties by
Dr. Roland Summit from Harbor Medical School at UCLA. 
In his work as a psychiatrist he came to realize that
this delayed disclosure is very much against what most
adults would have believed.  Most adults would have
believed that if a child is harmed they would tell
right away and reach out for some safety.  But that's
not what was happening.  So in his study of sexual
abuse and looking at the elements of secrecy and
helplessness that kind of surround this that the abuse
happens in isolation; that the child is most frequently
advised not to tell; there may be real or implied
threats to insure that secrecy and also looking at the
imbalance of power between a child and a caretaking
adult, the child is in a helpless state.
		"So some of these -- understanding this background
help us to understand delayed reporting.  Now, delayed
reporting is never used to prove a molest but it holds
up against the myths of what an adult might expect.
		"There are so many reasons for a child not to
tell.  Shame is one; talking about sexual content is
not something that we leap forward to do.  Also that
sense the child feels that they may be in trouble or
that a loved one would get into trouble or that a
family or relationships might separate.  Those are
really disturbing to a child.  Children seem to have
this sense of self that the larger outside world is
really dependent upon their behavior and they do a lot
to protect adults.
		"We find not only is delayed reporting really
prevalent but we have so many instances where we have
substantiated abuse either through a confession of an
offender or a child having a sexually transmitted
disease and the child continues to deny that abuse
happens."
		In his own defense, defendant testified that no sexual
contact had occurred and that the victim had accused him of
sexual abuse as revenge because he had expressed anger at her for
repeatedly turning off the television while he had been watching
it.  
		At the outset, we clarify the scope of the evidentiary
question that we resolve in this case.  Based on some of the
prosecutor's opening and closing remarks, (1) and the manner in
which the prosecutor phrased certain questions to Shouse, (2) it
appears that the state might have intended the trier of fact to
consider Shouse's testimony about the victim's delay in reporting
the incident as a "characteristic" of a child who had been
sexually abused or, in other words, as substantive proof that the
child had been abused.  The state now concedes on review that
evidence regarding the child's delay in reporting was not
admissible for that purpose.  However, Shouse later clarified her
testimony, stating that "delay is a predominate [sic] feature in
disclosure" and that "delayed reporting is never used to prove
[sexual abuse,] but it holds up against the myths of what an
adult might expect."  Thus, it is that assertion -- that delayed
reporting is a predominant feature of disclosure in otherwise
verified cases of child sexual abuse -- that frames the
evidentiary question in this case.  We now turn to that question.
		Defendant argues that Shouse's testimony regarding the
victim's delayed reporting of the alleged abuse is "scientific"
evidence and therefore must comply with the standards for
admission of "scientific" evidence.  The state responds that
"evidence about typical reactions of victims of abuse, when
offered to explain otherwise puzzling behavior does not require
such a foundation."  As explained below, we agree with defendant.
		This court has never precisely defined what makes
evidence "scientific."  In Brown, this court observed that "[t]he
term 'scientific' * * * refers to evidence that draws its
convincing force from some principle of science, mathematics and
the like."  297 Or at 407.  Later, in O'Key, this court
emphasized that whether proffered expert testimony is scientific
evidence, requiring an appropriate foundation, depends primarily
on whether the trier of fact will perceive the evidence as such. 
In that regard, the O'Key court explained:
		"Evidence perceived by lay jurors to be scientific
in nature possesses an unusually high degree of
persuasive power.  The function of the court is to
ensure that the persuasive appeal is legitimate.  The
value of proffered expert scientific testimony
critically depends on the scientific validity of the
general propositions utilized by the expert. 
Propositions that a court finds possess significantly
increased potential to influence the trier of fact as
scientific assertions, therefore, should be supported
by the appropriate scientific validation.  This
approach 'ensure[s] that expert testimony does not
enjoy the persuasive appeal of science without
subjecting its propositions to the verification
processes of science.'"
321 Or at 291-92 (footnote and citations omitted).
		More to the point, this court has made it clear that
expert testimony concerning matters within the sphere of the
behavioral sciences possesses the increased potential to
influence the trier of fact as scientific assertions, just as
expert testimony dealing with the "hard" sciences does. 
See Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 331 Or 285, 304, 14 P3d
596 (2000) (scientific evidence subject to requirements of Brown
and O'Key even though science involved is not "hard" science). 
In State v. Milbradt, 305 Or 621, 756 P2d 620 (1988), this court
observed that evidence of "how normal children usually react to
sexual abuse" or sexual abuse "syndrome" testimony was scientific
evidence subject to the Brown foundational requirements.  In that
regard, this court stated:
		"We suggest that in future cases involving
'syndrome' testimony, full foundations be established,
if indeed it can be shown that so-called 'typical'
reactions can be demonstrated to be either typical or
reliable."
Milbradt, 305 Or at 631.
		The state suggests that the foregoing statement from
Milbradt is directed solely to the use of "syndrome" evidence,
i.e., a constellation of symptoms or characteristics, typical of
a sexually abused child, offered as substantive proof that the
victim in the instant case had been abused.  Nevertheless, the
state concedes that:
		"Milbradt is correct in the broad sense:  Some
foundation for testimony about 'typical' reactions of
child-victims is necessary even when that evidence is
offered to explain a child's behavior.  That
foundation, however, may be as simple as the witness
testifying from her own observations in working with
children over the years.  Thus, even if the evidence is
offered only for the purpose of explaining
superficially bizarre behavior, the state agrees that
the proponent must demonstrate some kind of
experiential or observational foundation for the
witness's testimony."
		We do not agree that the distinction that the state
advances is a tenable one in this case, or in most cases like
this one, because the distinction is based, for the most part, on
the label used to characterize the evidence.  Whether evidence
comparing the behavior of allegedly similarly situated children
is labeled as syndrome evidence or the "typical reactions of
child-victims" is not the point. (3)  Instead, a court must
determine whether the  expert's assertions "possess significantly
increased potential to influence the trier of fact as scientific
assertions[.]"  O'Key, 321 Or at 292.  We now evaluate the
evidence here in that light.
		In this case, Shouse testified that she has
undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in the field of
psychology, a behavioral science.  She also stated that she is
licensed by the State of Oregon and is a nationally certified
counselor.  Shouse testified that she has taught a class on child
abuse and neglect at a community college and that she provides
training for the grand jury in Josephine County on sex abuse
cases and for the Court Appointed Special Advocates program.  She
represented to the court that she has testified as an expert on
the topic of child sexual abuse and estimated that she has spoken
with about 200 children who have complained of being sexually
abused.  Finally, Shouse stated that she was familiar with the
"recent literature and research in the area of sexual abuse of
children."  The reference to "research" implies a scientific
foundation, with the results published in the "literature" of the
area of study.
		In her substantive testimony, Shouse referred to "the
characteristics of sexually abused children," implying that there
is a well-defined, empirically verified, set of characteristics
that a significant percentage of sexually abused children
display.  Shouse asserted that delayed reporting is "a very
prevalent characteristic of abused children."  In discussing
delayed reporting, she referred to the "body of literature"
initiated by "Dr. Roland Summit from Harbor Medical School at
UCLA," "his work as a psychiatrist," and "his study of sexual
abuse."  Shouse's use of the terms such as "study," "body of
literature," and "psychiatrist" involve the vocabulary of
scientific research.
		Shouse also testified that the theories that she
espoused have been confirmed empirically:
		"We find not only is delayed reporting really
prevalent but we have so many instances where we have
substantiated abuse either through a confession of an
offender or a child having a sexually transmitted
disease and the child continues to deny that abuse
happens."
Finally, Shouse stated that she had been "involved in a lot of
grant writing that includes a great deal of study of research
material." 
		An expert like Shouse, who has a background in
behavioral sciences and who claims that her knowledge is based on
studies, research, and the literature in the field, announces to
the factfinder that the basis of her testimony is "scientific,"
i.e., is grounded on conclusions that have been reached through
application of a scientific method to collected data.  Because
that is how the factfinder would understand it, a court has a
duty to ensure that such information possesses the necessary
indices of scientific validity.
		As the proponent of Shouse's testimony regarding
delayed reporting as a predominant feature of child sexual abuse,
the state had the obligation to show that that asserted rule of
behavior was scientifically valid under the standards established
in Brown and O'Key.  The trial court erred in not requiring the
state to make that showing.
		The state contends that, even if the trial court erred
in failing to require a proper foundation for Shouse's testimony,
we need not reverse defendant's conviction.  According to the
state, there are three related rules of appellate review that
require this court to affirm defendant's conviction despite the
evidentiary error.  First, the state claims that, "[a]s a matter
of general principle, this court has adopted a rule that
evidentiary error in a trial to the court is presumed harmless in
the absence of an affirmative indication that the court actually
relied on the erroneously admitted evidence."  Second, the state
asserts that, under OEC 103(1), evidentiary error is not presumed
to be prejudicial.  Finally, the state relies on the harmless
error rule, to the effect that, an adverse verdict may be
affirmed notwithstanding the evidentiary error, if there is
little, if any, likelihood that the error affected the verdict.
		Each rule that the state advances, although phrased a
bit differently, is an attempt to express the principle that, in
determining whether an evidentiary error requires reversal, an
appellate court must assess the impact of the error on the
outcome of the case.  However, before undertaking that assessment
in this case, we wish to comment on the state's contention that,
"in a trial to the court, evidentiary error is presumed harmless
in the absence of an affirmative indication that the court
actually relied on the erroneously admitted evidence." 
		In support of that contention, the state relies on
State v. Cafarelli, 254 Or 73, 456 P2d 999 (1969), and a number
of civil cases.  Cafarelli was a murder case tried to the court. 
The central issue on appeal to this court was whether sufficient
evidence demonstrated that the defendant had conspired with her
17-year-old paramour to murder the defendant's husband.  However,
the defendant also had assigned error to various evidentiary
rulings by the trial court.  In response to those asserted
evidentiary errors, this court stated:
	"In a trial to the court we can assume that any
questionable evidence would be disregarded.  There is
no indication that the court relied on the evidence in
reaching the verdict of guilty.  There was no need to
rely on the questioned evidence.  State v. Voshell,
1967, 247 Or 534, 430 P2d 1010; Annotation 116 ALR
558."
254 Or at 76.
		It may be that the foregoing statement in Cafarelli describes a rule of appellate review that is applicable in an
appropriate case.  We have no occasion in this case, however, to
undertake an extensive analysis of its origin or the
appropriateness of its application in criminal cases. 
Nonetheless, suffice it to say that, if carried to its logical
extreme, that rule -- if that is indeed what it is -- would
obviate the need to conduct any other kind of harmless error
analysis.  That cannot be true in all cases.  If, for example,
the erroneously admitted evidence had been crucial to a
particular outcome in a case, then some further analysis must be
undertaken.  This case is illustrative.     
		The state argues that, at most, the erroneously
admitted evidence, i.e., the scientific assertion that a delay in
reporting is a predominant feature in the disclosure of child
sexual abuse, was relevant only to the trial court's credibility
assessment and that "[n]othing in the court's remarks should lead
this court to conclude that the admission of Shouse's testimony,
if erroneous, had any impact on the trial court's decision-making
[process]."  
		We disagree with the state's assertion that, in this
case, the trial court's failure to mention Shouse's testimony in
its remarks surrounding the announcement of its decision should
play some role in our assessment of the impact of the erroneously
admitted evidence.  This case involved a swearing contest.  The
victim claimed that there had been sexual contact in the form of
inappropriate touching; defendant denied that it had occurred. 
There were no other witnesses to the touching, and there was no
physical evidence of any kind that corroborated the alleged
abuse.
		The victim's delayed reporting was not a tangential
issue, but a central factual issue in this case.  Shouse's
testimony directly addressed that issue and there is nothing in
the record to indicate that the testimony played no role in the
trial court's assessment of the state's proof.  Under the
circumstances, we cannot conclude that there is little, if any,
likelihood that the error affected the court's verdict.  See
State v. Isom, 306 Or 587, 595-96, 761 P2d 524 (1988) (explaining
harmless error standard under OEC 103(1)). 
		It follows that this court must reverse defendant's
conviction and remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.  If the state again chooses to offer Shouse's
testimony on delayed reporting, the trial court must ensure that
the evidence satisfies the Brown and O'Key foundational
standards.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.


1. 	During opening statement, the prosecutor asserted that
it was "indicative of sex abuse that [the victim] waited a month
and a half before disclosing what had happened."  In closing
argument, the prosecutor stated that, "[i]n addition, [the
victim] delayed making these allegations until a month and a half
after they happened.  That, in and of itself, is a characteristic
of someone who has been sexually abused as our expert testified
to."

2. 	At trial, the prosecutor asked Shouse whether the
victim had "display[ed] any characteristics of a sexually abused
child."  Shouse responded that the victim had "display[ed] a very
prevalent characteristic of abused children in her delayed
reporting" of the sexual abuse.

3. 	The state also asserts that this court, in Milbradt,
erroneously characterized the expert testimony approved in State
v. Middleton, 294 Or 427, 657 P2d 1215 (1983), as "syndrome"
evidence.  As this opinion makes clear, the label used to
characterize the evidence has little to do with its
admissibility.  This opinion also should make clear that, because
Middleton was decided before Brown and O'Key, its precedential
value is limited.