Case Title: State v. Richmond

Citation: 347 N.C. 412

Docket Number: 347A95

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-02-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 347A95
FILED: 6 February 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
EARL RICHMOND, JR.
Appeal of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from a
judgment imposing three sentences of death entered by Johnson
(E. Lynn), J., on 1 June 1995 in Superior Court, Cumberland
County, upon jury verdicts finding defendant guilty of three
counts of first-degree murder.  Defendant's motion to bypass the
Court of Appeals as to an additional judgment was allowed 3 July
1996.  Heard in the Supreme Court 10 December 1996.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by G. Patrick
Murphy, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
Sam J. Ervin, IV, for defendant-appellant.
WHICHARD, Justice.
On 6 July 1992 defendant was indicted for three counts
of first-degree murder and one count of first-degree rape, all
occurring during the early morning hours of 2 November 1991. 
Defendant was tried capitally, and the jury returned verdicts
finding him guilty of the first-degree rape and the first-degree
murder of Helisa Hayes, the latter based on malice,
premeditation, and deliberation and under the felony murder rule;
the first-degree murder of Phillip Hayes based on malice,
premeditation, and deliberation; and the first-degree murder of
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Darien Hayes based on malice, premeditation, and deliberation. 
Following a capital sentencing proceeding pursuant to N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000, the jury recommended that defendant be sentenced to
death for each of the three murders.  The trial court sentenced
defendant accordingly and additionally sentenced him to a
consecutive term of life imprisonment for the first-degree rape. 
For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that defendant
received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error, and that the
sentence of death is not disproportionate.
The evidence tended to show that in the early morning
hours of 2 November 1991, defendant went to the home of victim
Helisa Hayes, where she resided with her two children, Phillip
and Darien.  Defendant was a close friend of Helisa's ex-husband. 
While at the home, defendant had "forceful" sex with Helisa, beat
her, and strangled her to death.  Defendant then took her son
Phillip into the bathroom, where defendant strangled him with the
electrical cord of a curling iron and stabbed him numerous times
in his head and body with a pair of scissors.  After killing
Phillip, defendant went into Darien's bedroom, sat her up on her
bed, and strangled her to death with a curling-iron cord.
In his first assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to ask
prospective jurors whether, after being informed that defendant
had been previously convicted of first-degree murder, they would
still be able to consider mitigating circumstances and impose a
life sentence.  He contends that the trial court's ruling
violated his state and federal constitutional rights as
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enunciated in Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492
(1992).  We disagree.
The question defense counsel proposed to ask
prospective jurors, and the trial court's response, were as
follows:
MR. BRITT:  I want to ask them if . . .
knowing that he had a previous first[-]degree
murder conviction, they could still consider
mitigating circumstances . . . in determining
what their ultimate recommendation as to life
or death is going to be.
THE COURT:  I'm afraid, Mr. Britt, no
matter how you want to couch the question, it
is always going to come back to being a
stakeout question.  I will permit you to ask
broad questions about whether they can
consider any and all aggravating
circumstances and balance that against any
and all mitigating circumstances, whatever
they might be.
This Court was presented with an almost identical scenario in
State v. Robinson, 339 N.C. 263, 451 S.E.2d 196 (1994), cert.
denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995).  In that case,
as in the case at bar, the defendant had a prior conviction for
first-degree murder, and his counsel wished to ask the
prospective jurors:
[I]f you were to . . . find during the
sentencing hearing that the defendant had a
previous first[-]degree murder conviction
prior to the murders for which he is being
sentenced this week, could you still follow
the Court's instructions and weigh the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and
consider life imprisonment as a sentencing
option.
Id. at 272, 451 S.E.2d at 202.  This Court held this question "to
be an improper attempt to 'stake out' the jurors as to their
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answers to legal questions before they are informed of legal
principles applicable to their sentencing recommendation."  Id.
at 273, 451 S.E.2d at 202.
There is no meaningful distinction between the question
proposed in Robinson and the one proposed here.  Both seek to
discover in advance what a prospective juror's decision will be
under a certain state of the evidence.  This Court has held that
it is not permissible to ask a prospective juror how a certain
set of facts would affect his or her decision.  State v. Kandies,
342 N.C. 419, 441, 467 S.E.2d 67, 79, cert. denied, --- U.S. ---,
136 L. Ed. 2d 167 (1996); State v. Vinson, 287 N.C. 326, 336, 215
S.E.2d 60, 68 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 902, 49 L.
Ed. 2d 1206 (1976).  This is because
such questions are confusing to the average
juror who at that stage of the trial has
heard no evidence and has not been instructed
on the applicable law. . . . [and because]
such questions tend to "stake out" the juror
and cause him to pledge himself to a future
course of action.
Vinson, 287 N.C. at 336, 215 S.E.2d at 68.  Questions that seek
to indoctrinate prospective jurors regarding potential issues
before the evidence has been presented and jurors have been
instructed on the law are impermissible.  State v. Parks, 324
N.C. 420, 423, 378 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1989).
Further, a stake-out question is not made permissible
simply because it is predicated on a set of facts that is cast as
uncontroverted rather than hypothetical.  In State v. Bond, 345
N.C. 1, 478 S.E.2d 163 (1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 138 L.
Ed. 2d 1022 (1997), the defendant was tried capitally for a
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first-degree murder that was committed by his cohort.  During
jury selection the State asked a prospective juror if he could
follow the law by considering the punishment of death for an
accessory who "did not actually 'pull the trigger.'"  Id. at 14,
478 S.E.2d at 169.  Defendant argued that this constituted an
impermissible stake-out question.  Id. at 16, 478 S.E.2d at 170. 
This Court disagreed, noting that the predicate for the State's
inquiry was not a hypothetical set of facts but the
uncontroverted fact that the defendant was neither "charged nor
going to be tried as a principal."  Id. at 17, 478 S.E.2d at 170. 
This observation should not be construed to allow any or all voir
dire questions premised on uncontroverted facts, regardless of
their tendency to stake out or indoctrinate jurors.  Rather, it
indicates only this Court's conclusion that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to inquire into
the prospective jurors' ability to follow the law regarding the
death penalty for accessories in a manner that neither
indoctrinated the venire regarding unproven facts nor committed
prospective jurors to a decision prior to their being instructed
on the law.
With regard to defendant's contention that the trial
court here violated Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed.
2d 492, by refusing to allow the proposed questioning, this Court
has held that Morgan does not require that a defendant be allowed
to ask stake-out questions.  See Kandies, 342 N.C. at 440-41, 467
S.E.2d at 78-79 (holding that "Would the age of the victim in
this case . . . make a difference to you as to whether you would
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impose a life sentence or a death sentence?" is a stake-out
question which Morgan does not require that a defendant be
allowed to ask); State v. Lynch, 340 N.C. 435, 451-52, 459 S.E.2d
679, 685-86 (1995) (holding that "How about in a case where a
child is killed?  Would you automatically tend to feel that the
death penalty should be imposed?" comprise a stake-out question
which Morgan does not require that a defendant be allowed to
ask), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 134 L. Ed. 2d 558 (1996).  The
trial court in this case properly refused to allow questioning
about defendant's prior first-degree murder conviction, while
allowing defendant to ask prospective jurors whether they would
be able to consider all aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
This ruling did not violate Morgan.  This assignment of error is
overruled.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court improperly excused for cause prospective
jurors Oakman and Futch based on the conclusion that they would
not be able to give fair consideration to both potential
sentences because of personal feelings concerning the death
penalty.  Defendant argues that the trial court erred under
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1968),
and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985),
contending that the voir dire of these jurors did not reveal that
their views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially
impair the performance of their duties as jurors as those cases
require for a for-cause excusal.
-7-
The granting of a challenge for cause based on a
prospective juror's unfitness is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion.  State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 343, 451
S.E.2d 131, 145 (1994).  "[A] prospective juror's bias may not
always be 'provable with unmistakable clarity [and,] [i]n such
cases, reviewing courts must defer to the trial court's judgment
concerning whether the prospective juror would be able to follow
the law impartially.'"  State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 43, 430
S.E.2d 905, 908 (1993) (quoting State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607,
624, 386 S.E.2d 418, 426 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 905, 110
L. Ed. 2d 268 (1990)) (second and third alterations in original).
During Oakman's voir dire, she was equivocal at times
about her ability to impose the death penalty.  However, on
several occasions she clearly stated her inability to fairly
consider the death penalty as a punishment.  At one point the
State asked her whether, if the trial proceeded to the sentencing
stage, she "could consider, under appropriate circumstances,
voting for the death penalty as a punishment."  She responded,
"To be honest, I think I'd have problems with it."  When asked to
clarify her feelings, she stated, "I just don't -- I feel like,
you know, you're taking a life.  I mean, because they took a life
is not -- that's not a proper answer, to take his life.  That's
not going to bring them back."  The State continued to probe by
asking, "[D]o you think that, if called upon to make that
decision, that, because of your feelings, you would vote for life
imprisonment?"  Oakman answered "yes."  The court asked Oakman
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whether she could fairly consider both the death penalty and life
imprisonment.  She responded that she could not.  The trial court
was within its discretion in excusing this prospective juror for
cause.
Similarly, prospective juror Futch, though equivocal at
times, made several statements which indicated his inability to
follow the law.  Futch worked for a newspaper and said he knew
DNA had linked defendant to the victim and that defendant had
been involved in another murder.  In response to questioning by
the State concerning his feelings about the death penalty, Futch
stated that he was "[j]ust opposed to the idea of it."  When
asked how his personal feelings might impact his sentencing
decision if defendant was found guilty, he stated, "I probably
would go with [life imprisonment]."  The trial court did not
abuse its discretion by excusing this prospective juror for
cause.  This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next argues that the trial court, in
violation of Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492,
erred by failing to allow his for-cause challenge of prospective
juror Richardson.  Defendant contends that Richardson's responses
during death qualification indicated that she would vote to
sentence to death anyone convicted of first-degree murder.  In
response to questioning by defense counsel, Richardson indicated
that she would be inclined to vote for the death penalty in the
case of a murder that was "intentional, premeditated, and without
any legal justification or excuse."  After questioning by the
State and defendant, the trial court stated its suspicion that
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the prospective juror may have been confused by questions asked
"in a vacuum."  After explaining the process of weighing
mitigating and aggravating circumstances in a sentencing
proceeding, the trial court asked Richardson whether she believed
she could fairly consider both sentencing alternatives. 
Richardson stated three times that she could.  The trial court
thus did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's for-
cause challenge.  This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next assigns error to the introduction of
evidence that he attended and participated in the victims'
funeral.  The State elicited testimony that defendant had
attended the funeral of the three victims and had served as a
pallbearer for one of the child victims.  This testimony revealed
defendant's statement that carrying the body of a victim he had
killed "never gave [him] a bad feeling."  Defendant argues this
evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial and thus
inadmissible under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rules 401 and 403.
Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401
(1992).  This Court has held that evidence is relevant if it
"tend[s] to shed light upon the circumstances surrounding the
killing."  State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 322, 406 S.E.2d 876,
901 (1991).  Here, evidence of defendant's participation and
demeanor at the funeral tended to shed light on the circumstances
of the murders and defendant's intent at the time of the
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offenses.  See id. at 321-22, 406 S.E.2d at 900-01 (holding no
error in admission of evidence that the defendant was calm and
not crying shortly after the victim's death and that she disposed
of his personal effects the day after his funeral); State v.
Gallagher, 313 N.C. 132, 138, 326 S.E.2d 873, 878 (1985) (holding
no error in admission of evidence that the defendant did not
appear to be grieving at husband's funeral).  Therefore, this
evidence was relevant under Rule 401.
Rule 403 provides that "evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1,
Rule 403 (1992).  "Whether to exclude evidence under Rule 403 is
a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its
ruling may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a
showing that the ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have
been the result of a reasoned decision."  State v. Collins, 345
N.C. 170, 174, 478 S.E.2d 191, 194 (1996).  The evidence
complained of was probative of the circumstances surrounding the
offenses and of defendant's intent.  The trial court was within
its discretion in ruling that its probative value was not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.  Accordingly, this
assignment of error is overruled.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of first-
degree rape, thus undermining his conviction for the first-degree
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murder of the adult victim which was based, in the alternative,
on the felony murder rule.  He contends specifically that there
was insufficient evidence that he inflicted serious personal
injury on the adult victim as required by N.C.G.S. § 14-
27.2(a)(2)(b). 
In determining whether serious personal injury has been
inflicted for purposes of satisfying the elements of first-degree
rape, "the court must consider the particular facts of each
case."  State v. Herring, 322 N.C. 733, 739, 370 S.E.2d 363, 367
(1988).  The element of infliction of serious personal injury is
satisfied
when there is a series of incidents forming
one continuous transaction between the rape
or sexual offense and the infliction of the
serious personal injury.  Such incidents
include injury inflicted on the victim to
overcome resistance or to obtain submission,
injury inflicted upon the victim or another
in an attempt to commit the crimes or in
furtherance of the crimes of rape or sexual
offense, or injury inflicted upon the victim
or another for the purpose of concealing the
crimes or to aid in the assailant's escape.
State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C. 232, 242, 333 S.E.2d 245, 252
(1985).
  Defendant argues that this Court's decisions in State
v. Thomas, 332 N.C. 544, 423 S.E.2d 75 (1992), and State v.
Boone, 307 N.C. 198, 297 S.E.2d 585 (1982), establish that in
cases of first-degree rape, serious personal injury does not
include injury that results in death.  Defendant further contends
that the evidence of injury aside from that leading to death in
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this case is insufficient to satisfy the serious personal injury
requirement.
The rule that serious personal injury cannot include
injury causing death appears to have its genesis in State v.
Jones, 258 N.C. 89, 128 S.E.2d 1 (1962), a case involving the
charge of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill.  The
charge in Jones was brought under a statute then codified as
N.C.G.S. § 14-32.  Id. at 90, 128 S.E.2d at 2.  This statute
included as an element that the assault "inflicts serious injury
not resulting in death."  Id.  This Court gave this element its
plain meaning.  Id. at 91, 128 S.E.2d at 3.  It was logical for
the General Assembly to limit the injuries capable of supporting
assault charges to those that do not cause death because injury
causing death would have elevated the assault to murder.  For the
crime to be punishable as an assault, it was necessary that the
injury fall short of death.
In Boone, 307 N.C. 198, 297 S.E.2d 585, this Court
addressed the question of whether a mental injury was sufficient
to satisfy the serious personal injury requirement in a case of
attempted first-degree rape.  The Court cited Jones, the assault
case, for its definition of serious bodily injury, including
language which stated that "[t]he injury must be serious but it
must fall short of causing death."  Id. at 203, 297 S.E.2d at
588-89.  In Thomas, a case involving a first-degree sexual
offense conviction, this Court cited Boone for the proposition
that serious personal injury cannot include injury resulting in
death.  Thomas, 332 N.C. at 555, 423 S.E.2d at 81.  Thomas thus
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completed the migration of this restricted definition of serious
injury from the assault context to the sexual offense and rape
context.
This restricted definition was not essential to the
holding of either Boone or Thomas.  Further, unlike the assault
statute at issue in Jones, the statutes governing first-degree
rape and first-degree sexual offense do not limit the injuries
underlying the charge to those not resulting in death.  N.C.G.S.
§§ 14-27.2, 14-27.4 (Supp. 1997).  While defining serious injury
to exclude fatal injuries is appropriate in the context of
assault charges, the underlying logic does not extend to cases of
first-degree rape and sexual offense.  Serious injuries that
prove fatal transform an assault into a murder, but they do not
similarly change a first-degree rape into a different crime. 
Rather, it is proper based on such facts to charge a defendant
with both first-degree rape and murder.  Fatal injuries are
obviously serious, and it would be absurd to allow a defendant to
escape a first-degree rape conviction because his victim did not
survive the injuries he inflicted in the course of the sexual
assault.  Any language in Thomas and Boone suggesting that the
serious personal injury element of first-degree rape or sexual
offense cannot be injury causing death is therefore disavowed.
Here, there was sufficient evidence to support the
element of serious personal injury.  In the opinion of Dr. John
D. Butts, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy, the
adult victim died as the result of strangulation.  She had
numerous blunt-force injuries; tears, scrapes, and bruises;
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abrading of the skin in the entrance to her vagina; and blood
over a portion of her brain beneath a bruise on her scalp. 
Defendant's first-degree rape conviction properly supports his
conviction for the first-degree murder of the adult victim under
the felony murder theory.  This assignment of error is overruled.
 
Next, defendant assigns error to the trial court's
refusal to submit second-degree murder to the jury in connection
with the murders of the two children.  Murder in the first
degree, the crime of which defendant was convicted with regard to
all three victims, is the "intentional and unlawful killing of a
human being with malice and with premeditation and deliberation." 
State v. Fisher, 318 N.C. 512, 517, 350 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1986). 
Murder in the second degree is the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice but without premeditation and deliberation. 
State v. Brown, 300 N.C. 731, 735, 268 S.E.2d 201, 204 (1980).  A
defendant is entitled to have a lesser-included offense submitted
to the jury only when there is evidence to support it.  Id. at
735-36, 268 S.E.2d at 204.  "The sole factor determining the
judge's obligation to give such an instruction is the presence,
or absence, of any evidence in the record which might convince a
rational trier of fact to convict the defendant of a less
grievous offense."  State v. Wright, 304 N.C. 349, 351, 283
S.E.2d 502, 503 (1981).
Defendant argues that there was evidence that permitted
a finding that he did not kill the child victims with
premeditation and deliberation.  Specifically, he argues that
evidence was presented which indicated that he killed the
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children after an altercation with their mother and that he had
consumed alcohol and cocaine that night.  Defendant contends that
this evidence was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact
that the murders of the two children did not involve
premeditation and deliberation, thus entitling him to a jury
instruction on second-degree murder.  We disagree.
The evidence showed that after defendant killed the
adult victim, he awakened one child, took him into the bathroom,
wrapped a cord around his neck five times, and stabbed him at
least twenty times in the head and body with a pair of scissors. 
Defendant then went into the other child's room, awakened her,
sat her on the edge of the bed, and strangled her with the cord
of a curling iron.  This evidence shows that defendant acted with
deliberation and does not show anger or emotion that overcame his
reason so as to reduce the killing to second-degree murder.  A
rational trier of fact could not have convicted defendant of
second-degree murder under this evidence.  This assignment of
error is overruled.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on
voluntary intoxication.  He argues that the evidence showed that
he had consumed crack cocaine and large amounts of alcohol on the
night of the murders and that his mental faculties were
consequently impaired.  He argues that, based on this evidence,
he was incapable of forming the specific intent required for a
first-degree murder conviction.
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We have stated the law on voluntary intoxication as
follows:
A defendant who wishes to raise an issue
for the jury as to whether he was so
intoxicated by the voluntary consumption of
alcohol that he did not form a deliberate and
premeditated intent to kill has the burden of
producing evidence, or relying on evidence
produced by the state, of his intoxication. 
Evidence of mere intoxication, however, is
not enough to meet defendant's burden of
production.  He must produce substantial
evidence which would support a conclusion by
the judge that he was so intoxicated that he
could not form a deliberate and premeditated
intent to kill.
The evidence must show that at the time
of the killing the defendant's mind and
reason were so completely intoxicated
and overthrown as to render him utterly
incapable of forming a deliberate and
premeditated purpose to kill.  In [the]
absence of some evidence of intoxication
to such degree, the court is not
required to charge the jury thereon. 
State v. Strickland, 321 N.C. 31, 41, 361
S.E.2d 882, 888 (1987) (quoting State v.
Medley, 295 N.C. 75, 79, 243 S.E.2d 374, 377
(1978)) [(citations omitted)].
State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339, 346, 372 S.E.2d 532, 536 (1988).
Here, the evidence showed at best that defendant was
intoxicated at some time prior to the murders.  While defendant
may have consumed alcohol and cocaine prior to the murders, there
is little evidence of the degree of his intoxication at the time
of the murders.  Defendant argues that because he was unable to
recall the murders clearly, he must have been severely
intoxicated at the time.  The evidence, however, suggests that
defendant methodically killed everyone in the house, leading one
victim into the bathroom and sitting another on the edge of the
-17-
bed.  He also tried to hide his crimes by pouring alcohol on the
adult victim's genitals and taking with him the scissors he had
used to stab one of the child victims.  Such behavior is
indicative of a capacity for premeditation and deliberation. 
Defendant has not made the necessary showing that he was "utterly
incapable" of forming the requisite intent.  State v. Skipper,
337 N.C. 1, 36, 446 S.E.2d 252, 271 (1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1134, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995).  This assignment of error is
overruled.
Defendant next assigns error to the trial court's
failure to intervene ex mero motu in response to statements the
prosecutor made during closing arguments.  Defendant did not
object to any of the challenged comments at trial.  "In deciding
whether the trial court improperly failed to intervene ex mero
motu to correct an allegedly improper argument of counsel at
final argument, our review is limited to discerning whether the
statements were so grossly improper that the trial judge abused
his discretion in failing to intervene."  State v. Holder, 331
N.C. 462, 489, 418 S.E.2d 197, 212 (1992).
Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly
commented on defendant's failure to testify when discussing the
evidence of his intoxication on the night of the murders.  The
prosecutor pointed out that defendant never told anyone he had
been drinking or taking drugs that night.  The prosecutor argued,
"What you did hear was two sisters -- and I'm sure they love him
deeply, no matter what he has done.  Out of 35 or 40 people at
that party, why are the only two that you hear his own relatives,
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his own blood kin?"  These statements did not improperly comment
on defendant's failure to testify.  Rather, they properly
suggested potential bias in defendant's sisters' testimony
concerning the degree of his intoxication.  See State v. Brown,
327 N.C. 1, 20, 394 S.E.2d 434, 445-46 (1990) (holding it proper
for prosecutor to argue that jury should scrutinize the testimony
of a witness for bias).
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor misstated
the law concerning the serious personal injury element of first-
degree rape.  While telling the jury what the court would
instruct on first-degree rape, the prosecutor said that "the
State must prove that the Defendant inflicted serious personal
injury upon the victim," and remarked, "Doesn't get any more
serious than death.  This is a serious injury."  As clarified
above, this was a proper statement of the law.
Defendant adds that the prosecutor erred by stating
that the mere act of choking someone establishes premeditation
and deliberation.  The prosecutor stated:
And I submit to you that you have to
premeditate when you choke someone to death. 
It's not like pulling out a gun and snapping
a shot off.  It's as deliberate, as
premeditated an act as you can have.  Some
time period, however short.  When you have to
walk all the way to a back bedroom and you
take a cord back there with you, that is
premeditation.  Nothing but.  When you take
an 8-year-old to the floor, who is
struggling, and you stab him and stab him and
stab him; when you drive an instrument all
the way through his body, that is
premeditation.
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Defendant contends that this argument is contrary to this Court's
description of premeditation and deliberation in State v.
Walters, 275 N.C. 615, 170 S.E.2d 484 (1969), where we said it is
sufficient if these mental processes occur prior to, and not
simultaneously with, the killing.  Id. at 623, 170 S.E.2d at 490.
This Court has explained the element of premeditation
and deliberation in greater detail in other cases.  We have
recognized that because "premeditation and deliberation are
processes of the mind, they are not ordinarily subject to direct
proof but generally must be proved if at all by circumstantial
evidence."  State v. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 109, 322 S.E.2d
110, 121 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009, 85 L. Ed. 2d 169
(1985).  The brutal manner of the killing and the nature of the
victim's wounds are circumstances from which the jury can infer
premeditation and deliberation.  State v. Jackson, 317 N.C. 1,
23, 343 S.E.2d 814, 827 (1986), vacated on other grounds, 479
U.S. 1077, 94 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1987).  The jury may infer
premeditation and deliberation from the circumstances of a
killing, including the fact that death was by strangulation. 
State v. Vereen, 312 N.C. 499, 515, 324 S.E.2d 250, 260 (holding
evidence of a brutal attack, sexual assault, and strangulation
sufficient to support a finding of premeditation and
deliberation), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094, 85 L. Ed. 2d 526
(1985); State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. 274, 293, 298 S.E.2d 645,
658 (1983) (finding sufficient evidence of premeditation and
deliberation where victim was bound and died of strangulation),
-20-
overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 317 N.C.
193, 344 S.E.2d 775 (1986).
The prosecutor's argument was not a misstatement of the
law or of the facts.  The trial court thus did not err by failing
to intervene ex mero motu.
Finally, defendant contends that the prosecutor
misstated the evidence when he argued that defendant killed
Darien Hayes to eliminate a witness.  The prosecutor stated that
defendant intended to "eliminate somebody that might be a
possible witness" to her mother's rape and murder.  Defendant
argues this statement is not supported by the evidence because
the evidence shows that Darien Hayes was asleep while her mother
and brother were being murdered.
This is not a gross misstatement of the evidence.  Had
the child lived, she certainly would have been a possible witness
to the events before and after, if not during, the murders.  None
of the statements defendant complains of was so grossly improper
as to require the trial court to intervene ex mero motu.  This
assignment of error is therefore overruled.
Defendant next assigns error to the trial court's
charge on first-degree murder based on malice, premeditation, and
deliberation in the cases of Helisa and Darien Hayes.  The trial
court instructed as follows:
Malice means not only hatred, ill-will or
spite, as it is ordinarily understood.  To be
sure, that is malice.  But it also means that
condition of mind that prompts a person to
take the life of another intentionally or to
intentionally inflict serious injury upon
another which proximately results in her
-21-
death without just cause, excuse or
justification, or to wantonly act in such a
manner as to manifest depravity of mind, a
heart devoid of a sense of social [duty] and
a callous disregard for human life.
(Emphasis added.)  Defendant contends that although such "wanton
malice" or "depraved heart" malice may support a conviction for
second-degree murder, the type of unintentional conduct
associated with such malice is inconsistent with guilt of first-
degree murder on the basis of malice, premeditation, and
deliberation, which necessarily involves a specific intent to
kill.
Contrary to defendant's contentions, depraved-heart
malice can support a first-degree murder conviction provided the
State proves premeditation and deliberation.  See State v. Rose,
335 N.C. 301, 329-30, 439 S.E.2d 518, 533-34 (upholding use of
the same pattern jury instruction in a case of first-degree
murder based on premeditation and deliberation), cert. denied,
512 U.S. 1246, 129 L. Ed. 2d 883 (1994).  The trial court
properly instructed the jury on malice, specific intent,
premeditation, and deliberation in its first-degree murder
instructions.  Further, there was sufficient evidence of malice,
premeditation, and deliberation to support defendant's three
first-degree murder convictions based on this theory.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting
testimony of Arthur Nadeau that was not within his personal
knowledge and constituted inadmissible hearsay.  At defendant's
-22-
sentencing proceeding, the State introduced a certified copy of a
criminal judgment wherein defendant had been convicted of murder
in the United States District Court, District of New Jersey, on
28 May 1993.  The victim was Lisa Ann Nadeau.  The State called
her father, Arthur Nadeau, as a witness, and he identified
photographs of his daughter at the autopsy and the crime scene in
addition to testifying about the cause of her death.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by
permitting the State to present the circumstances surrounding the
death of Ms. Nadeau through the testimony of Mr. Nadeau. 
Defendant concedes that the North Carolina Rules of Evidence do
not apply to capital sentencing proceedings but argues that
according to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause in Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 66, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 608 (1980), such hearsay
evidence is prohibited unless the State proves the hearsay
declarant is unavailable or that the evidence is reliable. 
In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638
(1990), the Court explained in greater detail the Confrontation
Clause's requirements with respect to hearsay evidence.  To
comport with the Confrontation Clause, hearsay must contain
sufficient "indicia of reliability."  Id. at 815-16, 111 L. Ed.
2d at 652-53.  "[T]he 'indicia of reliability' requirement [can]
be met in either of two circumstances:  where the hearsay
statement 'falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,' or
where it is supported by 'a showing of particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness.'"  Id. at 816, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 653 (quoting
-23-
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 608).  These guarantees
of trustworthiness are based on the totality of the circumstances
"surround[ing] the making of the statement and that render the
declarant particularly worthy of belief."  Id. at 820, 111 L. Ed.
2d at 655-56.
The hearsay at issue consisted of Mr. Nadeau's
recitation of Ms. Nadeau's cause of death, a description of her
injuries, the position of her body after her death, and the
identification of certain photographs of her body.  Defendant
points out that Mr. Nadeau is not a pathologist and was not
present when his daughter's body was discovered.  Defendant
contends that Mr. Nadeau's testimony thus consists of hearsay not
within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.
Assuming this hearsay testimony not to be within a
recognized exception, we review it to determine whether it is
supported by "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."  Id.
at 816, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 653.  Though Mr. Nadeau was not present
when his daughter's body was discovered, he actively followed the
investigation of the murder and attended defendant's trial
"[f]rom day one."  It is not clear from the record from whom Mr.
Nadeau received the information regarding his daughter's injuries
and cause of death.  Given his paternal relationship to the
victim and his intense involvement in the case, however, we are
satisfied that his testimony concerning how his daughter was
murdered and the injuries she sustained as well as his
identification of postmortem photographs of her were sufficiently
reliable to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. 
-24-
Moreover, error, if any, in the admission of such testimony was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because clearly competent
evidence of defendant's first-degree murder conviction for this
offense was admitted in the form of a certified copy of his
criminal judgment.  This evidence adequately supported the trial
court's submission of the (e)(3) aggravating circumstance that
defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the
use or threat of violence to the person.  See State v. Roper, 328
N.C. 337, 359-60, 402 S.E.2d 600, 612-13 (employing similar
analysis), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902, 116 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1991). 
This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by
admitting Mr. Nadeau's testimony that the victim of defendant's
prior violent felony was survived by two small children. 
Defendant argues this evidence was irrelevant and therefore
inadmissible.  We disagree.
In State v. Reeves, 337 N.C. 700, 448 S.E.2d 802
(1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1114, 131 L. Ed. 2d 860 (1995),
this Court held that the trial court properly admitted evidence
that the victim was a good person, wife, and mother who died not
knowing what had happened to her two-and-a-half-year-old child. 
Id. at 722-23, 448 S.E.2d at 811.  The evidence in this case is
closely analogous to that held admissible in Reeves.  This case
differs from Reeves in that the evidence in Reeves pertained to
the victim of the crime for which the defendant was being
sentenced, while this case involves evidence pertaining to a
victim in a crime for which defendant had previously been
-25-
convicted and sentenced.  In Reeves this Court concluded that
this type of evidence was "relevant to give the jury information
as to all the circumstances of the crime."  Id. at 723, 448
S.E.2d at 811.  We conclude that the evidence at issue here is
similarly relevant for the jury's deliberations.  This assignment
of error is overruled.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by
refusing to submit the following nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances to the jury:  (1) defendant had a long-standing
alcohol abuse problem; (2) defendant had a long-standing cocaine
abuse problem; (3) defendant's use of alcohol and drugs tended to
make him act in a violent manner; (4) defendant never received
proper treatment for his psychological problems; (5) defendant
has had a positive influence on other inmates; and (6) since his
arrest, defendant has sought forgiveness for his crimes from God. 
In order for defendant to succeed on this
assignment, he must establish that (1) the
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance is one
which the jury could reasonably find had
mitigating value, and (2) there is sufficient
evidence of the existence of the circumstance
to require it to be submitted to the jury.
State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 325, 372 S.E.2d 517, 521 (1988). 
If a proposed nonstatutory mitigating circumstance is subsumed in
other statutory or nonstatutory mitigating circumstances which
are submitted, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to
submit it.  Id. at 327, 372 S.E.2d at 521-22.
With regard to the proposed circumstances that
defendant had long-standing alcohol and cocaine abuse problems,
we conclude that both were subsumed by other circumstances
-26-
submitted to the jury.  The trial court submitted the following
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances:  (1) defendant has
suffered and suffers from a mixed substance abuse problem; (2)
the crime was committed while defendant was under the influence
of alcohol; (3) the crime was committed while defendant was under
the influence of crack-cocaine; and (4) defendant's use of
alcohol and drugs had an effect on his behavior.  The trial court
further submitted the statutory (f)(2) mitigating circumstance,
"[t]he murder was committed while this defendant was under the
influence of mental or emotional disturbance," and the statutory
(f)(9) "catchall" mitigating circumstance, "[a]ny other
circumstance or circumstances arising from the evidence which any
one of you deems to have mitigating value."  Because these
submitted mitigating circumstances subsumed both proposed
circumstances in question, the trial court did not err by
refusing to submit them. 
The proposed circumstance that defendant's use of
alcohol and drugs tended to make him act violently was also
subsumed in submitted mitigating circumstances.  The trial court
submitted as nonstatutory mitigating circumstances:  (1)
defendant's use of alcohol and drugs had an effect on his
personality, and (2) defendant's use of alcohol and drugs had an
effect on his behavior.  Further, as indicated above, the trial
court also submitted the statutory (f)(2) circumstance that the
crime was committed while defendant was under the influence of a
mental or emotional disturbance and the (f)(9) circumstance, the
catchall.  These circumstances allowed the jury to consider all
-27-
of the mitigating evidence raised by the proposed circumstance at
issue.
It is not clear that the proposed circumstance that
defendant was never given proper treatment for his psychological
problems has mitigating value, because there was no evidence that
defendant ever sought or requested such treatment.  Assuming the
proposed circumstance to be mitigating, however, it was subsumed
by the following nonstatutory circumstances that were submitted: 
(1) defendant suffered and suffers from a mixed substance abuse
problem, (2) defendant suffers from a severe personality
disorder, and (3) defendant has suffered from chronic depression. 
In addition, the (f)(9) circumstance allowed further
consideration of any mitigating evidence raised by this proposed
circumstance. 
The proposed mitigating circumstance that defendant has
had a positive influence on other inmates was subsumed by the
following nonstatutory circumstances that were submitted:  (1)
defendant has exhibited good conduct in jail following his
arrest, and (2) defendant has helped other inmates develop their
religious faiths.
Finally, the proposed mitigating circumstance that
defendant has sought forgiveness from God was subsumed in the
following circumstance:  since his arrest, defendant has sought
forgiveness for his crimes.  This circumstance, combined with the
(f)(9) catchall circumstance, provided an adequate vehicle for
the jury to consider the mitigating value of this evidence.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
-28-
Defendant next assigns error to the trial court's
refusal to peremptorily instruct the jury with respect to one
statutory and ten nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  "[A]
trial court should, if requested, give a peremptory instruction
for any mitigating circumstance, whether statutory or
nonstatutory, if it is supported by uncontroverted and manifestly
credible evidence."  State v. McLaughlin, 341 N.C. 426, 449, 462
S.E.2d 1, 13 (1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 133 L. Ed. 2d
879 (1996). 
Defendant first argues that the trial court should have
given a peremptory instruction on the (f)(2) statutory mitigating
circumstance, that he was under the influence of a mental or
emotional disturbance at the time of the murders.  Whether
defendant was under the influence of such a disturbance when he
committed the crimes was controverted by the State's evidence,
however.  The State's experts testified that the existence of any
psychological problems in defendant did not necessarily mean that
these problems influenced defendant at the time.  These experts
also testified that defendant's behavior during the commission of
the crimes was goal-directed, which indicates that he was not
influenced by a mental or emotional disturbance at the time.
Defendant next argues he was entitled to a peremptory
instruction on the circumstance that he had a severe personality
disorder.  All of the evidence supporting this circumstance came
from mental health professionals who conducted their evaluations
in preparation for this criminal trial.  As a result, this
evidence lacks sufficient indicia of reliability to permit the
-29-
conclusion that it is manifestly credible.  See State v. Bishop,
343 N.C. 518, 557-58, 472 S.E.2d 842, 863 (1996) (holding that a
social history prepared for trial testimony, rather than for
treatment, "lacks the indicia of reliability based on the self-
interest inherent in obtaining appropriate medical treatment"),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 136 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1997).  The trial
court thus did not err in failing to peremptorily instruct the
jury on this circumstance.
Defendant next argues that the following three
circumstances concerning his childhood should have received
peremptory instructions:  (1) defendant was reared in a family
whose father was an alcoholic, (2) defendant's father introduced
him to alcohol at an early age, and (3) defendant's father
attempted to introduce him to adult sexual experiences at an
early age.  These circumstances were based largely on the
testimony of defendant's sister.  Because it is common for a
defendant's family members to be biased in his favor, the
evidence supporting these circumstances is not manifestly
credible.  The trial court thus properly refused to peremptorily
instruct the jury on this circumstance.
Defendant next contends that the trial court should
have peremptorily instructed the jury with regard to the
mitigating circumstances that:  (1) defendant confessed to law
enforcement officers; and (2) upon his arrest, defendant
cooperated with law enforcement officers and submitted to
multiple interviews over several days.  The evidence supporting
these circumstances was clearly controverted because defendant
-30-
initially lied to the officers about his involvement in the
murders, maintaining his innocence even after DNA evidence showed
he was the donor of semen found in the adult victim.  These
circumstances thus did not merit peremptory instructions.
Defendant next argues that the following circumstance
should have received a peremptory instruction:  defendant would
adjust well to prison life.  Evidence was presented that
defendant told an officer, "I can't say I won't kill again.  S---
just happens."  This evidence indicates that defendant freely
acknowledged his future dangerousness, thus controverting any
evidence suggesting he would be a well-behaved prisoner.
The next circumstance that defendant argues should have
received a peremptory instruction was that "defendant has
expressed remorse for the murders he has committed."  This was
controverted by evidence that when asked about being a pallbearer
at the funeral of one of the child victims, defendant responded,
"It never gave me a bad feeling."
Defendant next argues that evidence supporting the
circumstance that "defendant has exhibited good conduct in jail
following his arrest" warranted a peremptory instruction.  The
State presented evidence which indicated that while defendant was
in pretrial confinement, he was interviewed by Dr. Louis
Schlesinger and fabricated stories about when and why he poured
alcohol over the adult victim's genitals.  This evidence
controverts the circumstance in question.
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court should
have peremptorily instructed the jury regarding the circumstance
-31-
that "defendant has helped other inmates develop their religious
faiths."  While there was evidence that defendant was involved in
prison ministry, there was no evidence that his efforts had in
fact aided in the development of another inmate's faith.  There
was evidence that defendant gave other inmates positive things to
think about based on the Bible and that one inmate was attending
Bible study more frequently due to defendant's efforts.  There
was no evidence, however, as to the effect of defendant's
admonitions on other inmates or of the Bible study attendance on
this one inmate.  The evidence thus did not require a peremptory
instruction that "defendant has helped other inmates develop
their religious faiths."  This assignment of error is overruled. 
 Defendant next assigns error to the trial court's
failure to intervene ex mero motu on a number of occasions during
the State's sentencing phase argument to the jury.  Argument that
passes without objection by defense counsel at trial "must be
gross indeed for this Court to hold that the trial court abused
its discretion in not recognizing and correcting ex mero motu the
comments regarded by defendant as offensive only on appeal." 
Brown, 327 N.C. at 19, 394 S.E.2d at 445.  Further, in carrying
out their duty to advocate zealously that the facts in evidence
warrant imposition of the death penalty, prosecutors are
permitted wide latitude in their arguments.  State v. Geddie, 345
N.C. 73, 97, 478 S.E.2d 146, 158 (1996), cert. denied, --- U.S.
---, --- L. Ed. 2d ---, 66 U.S.L.W. 3255 (1997).
Defendant first contends that the State improperly
focused on one aspect of the concept of mitigation to the
-32-
exclusion of others.  The State repeatedly focused on the idea
that mitigation is that which reduces moral culpability, while
neglecting to argue that mitigating value may also be based on a
defendant's age, character, prior record, mentality, education,
habits, and environment.  As we recognized when presented with
substantially the same argument in State v. Bishop, 343 N.C. 518,
472 S.E.2d 842, although these factors "may be relevant
considerations in a sentencing hearing, these words are not
essential to the basic definition of a mitigating circumstance." 
Id. at 552, 472 S.E.2d at 860.  It was not error for the trial
court to abstain from intervention ex mero motu here.
Defendant next contends that the trial court should
have intervened ex mero motu when the State argued that the jury
should not find defendant's voluntary consumption of alcohol and
drugs mitigating.  Defendant contends that the State's argument
was tantamount to misstating North Carolina law, which allows
voluntary intoxication to be considered as mitigating evidence. 
The statement was not one of law, however, but one of advocacy;
it did not tell the jury that it could not find this evidence
mitigating, but that it should not.  This was well within the
wide latitude permitted to prosecutors in their arguments.  It
did not require intervention ex mero motu.
Defendant next contends that the State's arguments
regarding the mitigating circumstances which focused on
defendant's dysfunctional family and his father's alcoholism
warranted intervention ex mero motu.  The State argued that
"[e]very one of us grew up in a dysfunctional family"; that
-33-
"you've probably got a dysfunctional family right now if you let
the psychologists look at it and tell you about it"; that
"[e]very one of us has got some kind of psychological problems,
basically"; and that "[h]e didn't grow up any better or any worse
than 95 percent of us and 95 percent of you."  With regard to
defendant's father being an alcoholic, the State argued,
"[w]elcome, probably, to about 35 percent of the world."  While
these comments may have been oversimplifications, they were
within the wide latitude allowed parties in hotly contested
cases.
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court should
have intervened ex mero motu when the State argued that it was an
insult to the jurors' intelligence for defendant to claim that
his recent religious activity should be considered mitigating, as
well as when the State sarcastically suggested that defendant's
service as a pallbearer at the funeral of one of the victims
should be included in the (f)(9) catchall mitigating
circumstance.  Neither of these arguments was so egregious that
the trial court should have intervened in the absence of an
objection by defendant.  This assignment of error is overruled. 
Defendant next assigns error to the trial court's
refusal to allow him to inform the jury that he was serving a
federal sentence of life without parole for a prior murder
conviction.  Defendant contends specifically that the trial court
erred in denying his motions (1) to permit voir dire of
prospective jurors regarding their conceptions of parole
eligibility, (2) to be allowed to inform the jury as to the law
-34-
in North Carolina regarding parole eligibility on a life sentence
for first-degree murder, and (3) to permit psychiatric testimony
concerning defendant's parole ineligibility under his federal
conviction and its effect on his current mental state and
adjustment to incarceration.  Defendant acknowledges that this
Court has held contrary to his contentions in State v.
McLaughlin, 341 N.C. 426, 462 S.E.2d 1; State v. Price, 337 N.C.
756, 448 S.E.2d 827 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1021, 131 L.
Ed. 2d 224 (1995); and State v. Bacon, 337 N.C. 66, 446 S.E.2d
542 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1159, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1083
(1995).  We decline to revisit our prior holdings here.
Defendant further contends that, following the State's
final summation, the trial court erred by rejecting his request
for a jury instruction informing jurors that defendant is
ineligible for parole under his federal sentence.  Defendant
argues, based on Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 129 L.
Ed. 2d 133 (1994), that because the State argued defendant's
future dangerousness, he was entitled to such an instruction.
Simmons involved a murder prosecution in South Carolina
in which the jury's sentencing options were limited to either the
death penalty or life imprisonment.  According to the state law
applicable to the defendant in Simmons, a life sentence meant
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.  During
the sentencing phase argument, the prosecutor in Simmons argued
that the question for the jury was "what to do with [the
defendant] now that he is in our midst."  Id. at 157, 129 L. Ed.
2d at 139.  The prosecutor further argued that a death sentence
-35-
would be "a response of society to someone who is a threat.  Your
verdict will be an act of self-defense."  Id.  The defendant
requested that the trial court instruct the jury that the
defendant would never be eligible for parole under South Carolina
law.  Id. at 158, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 139.  The trial court refused
to so instruct.  Id. at 159-60, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 140.
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, recognized
that
prosecutors . . . frequently emphasize a
defendant's future dangerousness in their
evidence and argument at the sentencing
phase; they urge the jury to sentence the
defendant to death so that he will not be a
danger to the public if released from prison.
Id. at 163, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 142.  The Court then noted:
In assessing future dangerousness, the
actual duration of the defendant's prison
sentence is indisputably relevant. . . .
Indeed, there may be no greater assurance of
a defendant's future nondangerousness to the
public than the fact that he never will be
released on parole.
Id. at 163-64, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 142.  The Court limited its
analysis to arguments by the State regarding dangerousness to the
public, stating:
Of course, the fact that a defendant is
parole ineligible does not prevent the State
from arguing that the defendant poses a
future danger.  The State is free to argue
that the defendant will pose a danger to
others in prison and that executing him is
the only means of eliminating the threat to
the safety of other inmates or prison staff.
Id. at 165 n.5, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 143 n.5.  It concluded:
The State may not create a false dilemma
by advancing generalized arguments regarding
the defendant's future dangerousness while,
-36-
at the same time, preventing the jury from
learning that the defendant never will be
released on parole.
Id. at 171, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 147.
The Court thus sought to protect against prosecutorial
arguments that mislead jurors into believing that if they do not
sentence a defendant to death, he will eventually be released
from prison and once again be a threat to society.  If a
defendant would be imprisoned for life in the absence of a death
sentence, then when the State makes such an argument, Simmons
requires that the defendant be allowed to inform the jury of the
nature of his life-without-parole sentence.  If, on the other
hand, the State refers to future dangerousness only in terms of
dangerousness while incarcerated, the concerns of the Court in
Simmons are not implicated.
Read as a whole, the State's closing argument here did
not set up a false dilemma like that addressed in Simmons. 
During the course of the State's closing argument, the prosecutor
commented on the proposed nonstatutory mitigating circumstance
that defendant was not able to form close relationships with
others.  The State argued that "the people [defendant] gets close
and intimate to, die," and "[t]hank God he doesn't get too close
and intimate with people because they die."  These statements
referred to the evidence that defendant's murders had been
perpetrated on women he had known for some period of time and
with whom he had had sexual relations.  This was not
argumentation about defendant's future dangerousness.
-37-
Later, the prosecutor focused on the mitigating
circumstance that defendant had exhibited good conduct in jail
following his arrest.  The State argued that defendant "can
control himself when he wants to control himself" and that the
"[p]roblem is, you and I don't know when he's going to want to
and when he's not, even in a jail cell."  To the extent this
argument implies that defendant may be dangerous in the future,
the State clearly focused on the possibility of his dangerousness
while incarcerated.  The rule announced in Simmons is not
triggered by arguments that a defendant may be dangerous while in
prison.  The potential for dangerousness in prison exists apart
from eligibility for parole.
Focusing on the mitigating circumstance that defendant
"would adjust well to prison life," the State argued, "[A]re you
convinced he won't kill in prison?  Are you convinced he won't
kill now?"  As described above, the rule in Simmons is not
implicated by arguments about future dangerousness while
incarcerated.
Finally, in the State's final remarks to the jury, the
prosecutor argued:
All I ask you to do is pay close attention to
what Judge Johnson says and use your common
sense . . . .  When you know that someone has
killed not just once, Lisa Ann Nadeau, not
just twice, H[e]lisa Hayes, not just three
times, Darien Hayes, not just four times,
Philip Hayes.  Four times, folks.  What does
it take?  What does it take?  There is only
one way you can ensure that this Defendant
does not kill again, and that is to impose
the penalty that he has earned and worked for
and deserves.  I ask you to impose the death
penalty on all three cases.
-38-
These remarks followed the State's argument that defendant's
conduct "in a jail cell" could not be predicted and that it was
possible he would kill again "in prison."  Read in context, the
State's argument does not present the type of danger that
concerned the Supreme Court in Simmons.  The trial court did not
err by refusing to instruct the jury as to the nature of
defendant's federal sentence.  This assignment of error is
overruled. 
Defendant next assigns error to the manner in which
some of the jurors were polled regarding their recommendation of
three death sentences.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b) requires, in
pertinent part:
Upon delivery of the sentence recommendation
by the foreman of the jury, the jury shall be
individually polled to establish whether each
juror concurs and agrees to the sentence
recommendation returned.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b) (1997).  The clerk in the trial court
questioned each juror individually regarding each of the three
death sentences.  With respect to each, the clerk asked each
juror:
As to Count No. [], the jury has returned as
its recommendation that the Defendant be
sentenced to death.  Is that your
recommendation?
Following each juror's affirmative response, the clerk then asked
each juror, "Do you still assent thereto?"  Each juror answered
this question affirmatively as well.  During the questioning of
three jurors, however, the clerk failed to ask, "Do you still
assent thereto," with respect to one of defendant's murder
-39-
convictions; and during the questioning of one juror, the clerk
failed to ask, "Do you still assent thereto," with respect to two
of defendant's murder convictions.  Defendant argues that this
omission amounts to a violation of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b), thus
entitling him to a new sentencing proceeding.  We disagree.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b) requires the polling of the jury
to establish "whether each juror concurs and agrees to the
sentence recommendation returned."  The clerk informed every
juror with respect to all three of defendant's convictions that
the jury had recommended "that the Defendant be sentenced to
death."  The clerk then asked every juror, again with respect to
each of defendant's three convictions, "Is this your
recommendation?"  This questioning satisfies the requirements of
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b) because it establishes that each
individual juror agreed with the sentence recommendation returned
by the jury with respect to each of defendant's convictions. 
This assignment of error is overruled. 
Defendant next raises several issues which he concedes
this Court has decided against his position, including:  (1) that
North Carolina's capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional;
(2) that the short-form indictment drawn in accordance with
N.C.G.S. § 15-144 is unconstitutional; (3) that the State should
have been prohibited from exercising peremptory challenges to
remove jurors who had expressed some hesitancy about being able
to return a sentence of death; (4) that the trial court should
have allowed defendant on voir dire to ask prospective jurors
whether they could consider specific mitigating circumstances
-40-
during the sentencing phase; (5) that the trial court's
instruction that malice may be inferred from an intentional
killing with a deadly weapon is unconstitutional; (6) that the
trial court's refusal to grant defendant the right of allocution
violated his constitutional rights; (7) that the admission of
evidence pertaining to the facts and circumstances surrounding
defendant's prior violent felony violated his constitutional
rights; (8) that the trial court's instruction to the jury that
it might consider all of the evidence introduced during both
phases of the trial in making a sentencing recommendation
violated his constitutional rights; (9) that the trial court's
instructions concerning the (e)(4) and (e)(11) statutory
aggravating circumstances violated his constitutional rights;
(10) that the trial court's definition of "mitigating
circumstance" violated his constitutional rights; (11) that the
trial court's failure to peremptorily instruct the jury with
regard to certain proposed nonstatutory mitigating circumstances
in spite of the lack of manifestly credible evidence supporting
them violated his constitutional rights; (12) that the trial
court's instructions regarding the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances violated his constitutional rights; (13)
that the (e)(3) statutory aggravating circumstance is
unconstitutional; (14) that the (e)(4) statutory aggravating
circumstance is unconstitutional; (15) that the (e)(5) statutory
aggravating circumstance is unconstitutional; (16) that the
(e)(9) statutory aggravating circumstance is unconstitutional;
(17) that the (e)(11) statutory aggravating circumstance is
-41-
unconstitutional; (18) that the trial court's refusal to instruct
the jury that all twelve jurors must agree in order to sentence
defendant to death and that if the jurors could not agree the
trial court was required by law to impose a sentence of life
imprisonment violated his constitutional rights; and (19) that
the trial court's instructions regarding nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances violated his constitutional rights.  We have
reviewed defendant's arguments, and we find no compelling reason
to reconsider our prior holdings.  These assignments are
overruled.
Having found no error in defendant's trial or separate
sentencing proceeding, we are required to review the record and
determine:  (1) whether the evidence supports the aggravating
circumstances found by the jury; (2) whether passion, prejudice,
or "any other arbitrary factor" influenced the imposition of the
death sentence; and (3) whether the sentence is "excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant."  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(d)(2).
With respect to the murder of Helisa Hayes, the jury
found as aggravating circumstances that defendant had been
previously convicted of a felony involving the use of violence to
the person; the murder was committed by defendant while he was
engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit first-degree
rape; and the murder was part of a course of conduct in which
defendant engaged, and that course of conduct included the
-42-
commission by defendant of other crimes of violence against
another person or persons.
With respect to the murder of Phillip Hayes, the jury
found as aggravating circumstances that defendant had been
previously convicted of a felony involving the use of violence to
the person; the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding
or preventing a lawful arrest; the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel; and the murder was part of a course of
conduct in which defendant engaged, and that course of conduct
included the commission by defendant of other crimes of violence
against another person or persons.
With respect to the murder of Darien Hayes, the jury
found as aggravating circumstances that defendant had been
previously convicted of a felony involving the use of violence to
the person; the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding
or preventing a lawful arrest; and the murder was part of a
course of conduct in which defendant engaged, and that course of
conduct included the commission by defendant of other crimes of
violence against another person or persons.
We conclude that the record fully supports the jury's
finding of these aggravating circumstances.  Further, we find no
indication that the sentence of death was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. 
We therefore turn to our final duty of proportionality review.
One purpose of proportionality review is to "eliminate
the possibility that a sentence of death was imposed by the
action of an aberrant jury."  State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 294,
-43-
439 S.E.2d 547, 573, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891, 130 L. Ed. 2d
162 (1994).  Another is to guard "against the capricious or
random imposition of the death penalty."  State v. Barfield, 298
N.C. 306, 354, 259 S.E.2d 510, 544 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S.
907, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1137 (1980).  To determine whether the sentence
of death is disproportionate, we compare this case to other cases
that "are roughly similar with regard to the crime and the
defendant."  State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 648, 314 S.E.2d 493,
503 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1120, 86 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1985).
We have found the death penalty disproportionate in
seven cases:  State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517;
State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v.
Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert.
denied, --- U.S. ---, --- L. Ed. 2d ---, 66 U.S.L.W. 3262 (1997),
and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988);
State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v.
Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant,
309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C.
26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).  This case is distinguishable from
each of these.  First, defendant here was convicted of three
murders.  This Court has never found a death sentence
disproportionate in a multiple-murder case.  State v. Heatwole,
344 N.C. 1, 30, 473 S.E.2d 310, 325 (1996), cert. denied, ---
U.S. ---, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1997).  Second, all three of
defendant's first-degree murder convictions were based on
premeditation and deliberation, and one was also based on the
-44-
felony murder rule.  We have consistently stated that "[t]he
finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates a more
cold-blooded and calculated crime."  State v. Artis, 325 N.C.
278, 341, 384 S.E.2d 470, 506 (1989), sentence vacated on other
grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990).  Third,
defendant was also convicted of the first-degree rape of his
adult victim.  "[T]his Court has never found a death sentence
disproportionate in a case involving a victim of first-degree
murder who was also sexually assaulted."  State v. Penland, 343
N.C. 634, 666, 472 S.E.2d 734, 752 (1996), cert. denied, --- U.S.
---, 136 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1997).  Finally, there are four statutory
aggravating circumstances which, standing alone, this Court has
held sufficient to sustain a sentence of death.  Bacon, 337 N.C.
at 110 n.8, 446 S.E.2d at 566 n.8.  The jury found all four in
this case:  the (e)(3) and (e)(11) circumstances with regard to
all three murders, the (e)(5) circumstance with regard to the
murder of the adult victim, and the (e)(9) circumstance with
regard to the murder of one of the child victims. 
We conclude that the present case is more similar to
cases in which we have found the sentence of death proportionate
than to those in which we have found it disproportionate or those
in which juries have returned recommendations of life
imprisonment.  We conclude that the sentence of death is not
disproportionate and hold that defendant received a fair trial
and capital sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error.
NO ERROR.
=========================
-45-
Justice FRYE dissenting.
I join Justice Webb’s dissenting opinion, but with one
caveat.  State v. Robinson, 339 N.C. 263, 451 S.E.2d 196 (1994),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995), seems at
odds with State v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 478 S.E.2d 163 (1996), cert.
denied, --- U.S. ---, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (1997).  Because State
v. Bond is the more recent case, I would follow it.
============================
Justice WEBB dissenting.
I dissent because I believe there were two errors in
the trial requiring a new sentencing proceeding.
At a pretrial conference, the State indicated that if
the defendant was found guilty, it would introduce evidence at
the sentencing proceeding that the defendant had previously been
convicted of first-degree murder and rape.  The defendant’s
attorney then told the court that he wished to inform the jury
during the voir dire that the defendant had been convicted
previously of first-degree murder and ask each prospective juror
whether he or she could still consider the mitigating
circumstances before rendering a verdict.  The court held that
this would be a stake-out question and would not allow it.
Counsel may not pose hypothetical questions designed to
elicit in advance what a juror’s decision will be under a certain
state of evidence or upon a given state of facts.  Such questions
tend to stake out the juror and cause him to pledge himself to a
future course of action.  State v. Vinson, 287 N.C. 326, 336, 215
S.E.2d 60, 68 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 902, 49 L.
-46-
Ed. 2d 1206 (1976).  In State v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 17, 478 S.E.2d
163, 170-71 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 138 L. Ed. 2d
1022 (1997), we held it was not a stake-out question when the
district attorney during voir dire informed the jury of
uncontroverted facts and asked the jurors whether they could
impose the death penalty in view of these uncontroverted facts.
I believe we are bound by Bond.  As in Bond, the
defendant in this case wanted to inform the jurors of
uncontroverted facts and ask them how these facts would affect
their votes.  He should have been allowed to do so.
The majority attempts to distinguish Bond from this
case.  It acknowledges that the predicate for this State’s
inquiry in Bond involved an uncontroverted fact, but says this
indicates only this Court’s conclusion that the superior court
did not abuse its discretion.  The majority reads something in
Bond that I do not read.  As I read Bond, we held that if the
jurors are informed of an uncontroverted fact and are asked how
this fact would affect their votes, the question is not
hypothetical and is not a stake-out question.
The majority contends that this case is governed by
State v. Robinson, 339 N.C. 263, 273, 451 S.E.2d 196, 202 (1994),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995), in which
we held it was an improper stake-out question to ask a juror if
he could follow the judge’s instructions and consider life in
prison as a sentencing option if the juror found that the
defendant had committed a murder in addition to the three for
which he was being tried.  This case is distinguished from
-47-
Robinson in that the matter about which the defendant wanted to
inquire in Robinson was controverted.
I also believe it was error for the superior court not
to grant the defendant’s request to instruct the jury that he is
ineligible for parole under his federal sentence.  The majority
says this was unnecessary because the State’s argument in regard
to future dangerousness was limited to dangerousness while the
defendant is in prison.  I cannot agree.  When the prosecuting
attorney argued that “[t]here is only one way you can ensure that
this Defendant does not kill again, and that is to impose the
. . . death penalty,” I believe Simmons v. South Carolina, 512
U.S. 154, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1994), required that the court
instruct the jury as requested by the defendant.  I do not
believe this statement was so related to a previous argument that
the jury would know the prosecuting attorney was referring only
to killings in prison.
I vote for a new sentencing proceeding.  State v.
Conner, 335 N.C. 618, 440 S.E.2d 826 (1994).