Case Title: State v. Madison

Citation: 163 Vt 390, 659 A.2d 124

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_MADISON.95-046; 163 Vt 390; 659 A.2d 124

[Filed 22-Mar-1995]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont
Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any
errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to
press. 


                                 No. 95-046


State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 3, Washington Circuit

Jason Madison                                     March Term, 1995



David Suntag, J.

Phillips B. Keller, Washington County Deputy State's Attorney, Barre, and
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney
General, Montpelier, for plaintiff- appellee 

Peter S. Sidel and Diana Pikulski of Sidel & Pikulski, Waitsfield,for
defendant-appellant 



PRESENT:  Morse, J.


     MORSE, J.  Defendant Jason Madison appeals to a justice of this Court
for review de novo of an order of the Washington District Court denying him
bail under Chapter II, Section 40 of the Vermont Constitution and 13 V.S.A.
 7553a.  Defendant was charged with two counts of sexual assault and issued
a citation to appear in court on January 26, 1995.  Before his first
appearance, however, defendant nearly ran over the alleged victim with his
Jeep. Because of this incident, defendant was arrested and arraigned on both
sexual assault charges. Defendant was also arraigned on contempt charges for
violating conditions of release related to other crimes and on one count of
obstructing justice for nearly  running down the victim. 

     A full bail hearing commenced on January 18, 1995, and was completed the
next day. The district court concluded that the evidence of defendant's guilt
was great and found by clear and convincing evidence that defendant's release
posed a substantial threat of physical violence 

 

to the victim and that no combination of probation conditions would
reasonably prevent the violence. Accordingly, the court denied bail on
January 25. 

     Defendant sought a hearing de novo and immediately challenged the
procedure set forth in the Emergency Amendment to Vermont Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9 (allowing review de novo), contending that defendant was entitled
to no less than a second full bail hearing.  The reviewing justice referred
this issue to the full Court which upheld the procedure outlined in V.R.A.P.
9(b)(1)(C).  See State v. Madison, No. 95-046, slip op. at 18 (Mar. 1,
1995) (per curiam).  Defendant's motion under that rule for leave to present
additional evidence because time was not sufficient to adequately prepare for
the first court hearing was denied in an unpublished entry order that stated,
"[i]f lack of time per se were good cause, it would be grounds to present
additional evidence in every bail review.  More specified reasons are
necessary to establish good cause."  Defendant and the State were then given
the opportunity to brief and argue. 

     Defendant quarrels with the reviewing justice's requirement that issues
be raised and briefed.  In its opinion of March 1, the Court stated that
"[t]he justice must review the record created in the district court,
including the transcript or video tape, and make an independent determination
based upon that record."  State v. Madison, slip op. at 2.  Defendant
believes that this statement requires the reviewing justice to make a second,
independent determination on every factual and legal issue implicated in the
District Court proceedings, whether raised on appeal or not, thereby
relieving defendant of any obligation under the rules of appellate procedure.
 V.R.A.P. 28; see also State v. Lynaugh, 158 Vt. 72, 76 n.2, 604 A.2d 785,
787 n.2 (1992) (declining to reach inadequately briefed issues); Rowe v.
Brown, 157 Vt 373, 379, 599 A.2d 333, 336-37 (1991) (issues not raised in
brief are waived).  V.R.A.P. 9(b)(1)(C) provides, however, that the single
justice is to review the record as "presented by the parties." Issues in this
appeal have been raised haphazardly, but, given the untraditional nature of
these proceedings, I address all points mentioned at any point. 

 

     In conducting a review de novo of a challenged finding or conclusion, a
justice must come to an independent decision based on the record.  V.R.A.P.
9(b)(1)(C); State v. Madison, slip op. at 2; see also United States v. Leon,
766 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1985) (district court must reach independent
conclusion, not simply defer to judgment of magistrate under federal bail
statute).  The justice need not pay any deference to decisions of the lower
court when reviewing the challenged findings and conclusions.  See State v.
Madison, at 2; id. at 10-12 (comparing different applications of de novo
review).  Of course, nothing prevents a reviewing court from adopting
unchallenged findings and conclusions of the trial court, and I do. 

                                     I.
     A person may not be held without bail under 13 V.S.A.  7553a unless
"the evidence of guilt is great."  Defendant argues first that our
interpretation of the identically-worded standard requiring that evidence of
guilt be "great" to hold a person charged with an offense punishable by life
imprisonment, 13 V.S.A.  7553, should not apply to the recently enacted 
7553a. 

     In State v. Blackmer, 160 Vt. 451, 454,