Case Title: Bd. of Educ. v. Howard County Educ. Ass'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 18/15

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Board of Education of Howard County v. Howard County Education Association-ESP, 
Inc., No. 18, September Term 2015 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION — EDUCATION LAW ARTICLE — The Public 
School Labor Relations Board has the exclusive authority to decide the legality of a term 
in a collective bargaining agreement.  Section 6-510(c)(5)(i) provides that the Public 
School Labor Relations Board, not the State Board of Education, is the agency with the 
authority to decide whether a topic of negotiation is an illegal subject of a collective 
bargaining agreement.  In this case, the Public School Labor Relations Board reasonably 
concluded that a binding arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement was not 
an illegal topic bargaining, and therefore, the arbitration provision was enforceable.      
Circuit Court for Howard County 
Case No. 13-C-12-090823 
Case No. 13-C-12-091545 
Argued:  October 6, 2015 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 18 
 
September Term, 2015 
 
 
 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
HOWARD COUNTY 
 
v. 
 
HOWARD COUNTY EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION-ESP, INC. 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
 
Battaglia 
 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts 
Harrell, Jr., Glenn T. (Retired, 
Specially Assigned), 
         
 
               JJ. 
 
 
Opinion by Barbera, C.J. 
 
 
                   Filed: December 21, 2015 
 
We decide in this case whether a local public school superintendent’s decision to 
terminate a “noncertificated” employee—that is, an employee who does not have a 
professional teaching certificate issued by the Maryland State Board of Education—is a 
proper subject of binding arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.  In 
order to answer that question we must resolve important questions concerning the 
interpretation and interplay of statutes affecting two State agencies, the Maryland State 
Board of Education and the Public School Labor Relations Board. 
We shall answer those important questions and, applying those answers to the 
ultimate question posed by this case, we conclude that the termination of a noncertificated 
employee is a proper subject of binding arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining 
agreement. 
I. 
The parties to this dispute are Petitioner Board of Education of Howard County 
(“Howard County Board”) and Respondent Howard County Education Association-ESP, 
Inc. (“Association”).  The Association is the exclusive bargaining representative of non-
supervisory, noncertificated employees of the Howard County Public School System.  In 
the present case, the Association is acting on behalf of a school nurse who was terminated 
by the Howard County Public School System in January 2012. 
The Association and the Howard County Board negotiated a collective bargaining 
agreement (“CBA”) in July 2010.  Article 4, entitled “Employee Rights,” provides in 
Section 4.1 that “[n]o employee will be discharged without cause.”  Article 2 provides for 
a grievance process.  Article 2 defines “grievance” as a dispute “involving the express 
 
2 
 
provisions of the terms of” the CBA and establishes a three-step procedure.1  In the present 
case, the school nurse opted to challenge her termination by way of the grievance process.  
                                              
1  The three steps of the grievance procedure are: 
 
Step I - Between the Grievant and his/her representative, and/or the 
Association, at the request of the grievant, and the employee’s immediate 
supervisor and/or his/her designated representative.  The immediate 
supervisor shall schedule a meeting with the employee within seven (7) week 
days after receiving the written statement from the employee.  The immediate 
supervisor shall respond to the employee in writing within eight (8) week 
days as to his/her disposition of the grievance.  In the event that the grievant 
is not satisfied with the supervisor’s response, he/she may appeal to Step II.  
 
Step II - Between the Grievant and the Superintendent’s designee.  Within 
eight (8) week days of the receipt of the supervisor’s response (Step I), the 
employee may appeal the immediate supervisor’s decision to the 
Superintendent’s designee.  The appeal must be in writing.  The 
Superintendent’s designee shall arrange for a meeting with the employee 
within ten (10) week days after receipt of the written appeal.  The immediate 
supervisor may be present at a Step II hearing at the discretion of the 
Superintendent/designee.   
 
The Superintendent designee shall provide a written decision pursuant 
to the grievance within seven (7) week days after completion of the meeting. 
 
Step III - Submitted to Arbitration - In the event that the employee and the 
Association are not satisfied with the decision at Step II, the grievance may 
be submitted to arbitration under the Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules of 
the American Arbitration Association within 40 calendar days from the date 
the decision at Step II was forwarded via certified mail.  Grievances filed by 
the Association are not subject to binding arbitration.  The arbitrator’s 
decision shall be final and binding on all the parties.   
 
The jurisdiction and authority of the arbitrator and any opinion of 
award shall be confined to the express provisions of this Agreement at issue 
between the Association and the Board.  The arbitrator shall not add to, alter 
from, amend, or modify any provision/s of this Agreement.  The costs of the 
aforementioned arbitration shall be equally divided between the Association 
and the Board. 
 
 
3 
 
Upon completion of Step I she proceeded to Step II.  At that juncture, the Superintendent 
of the Howard County Public School System, acting through a designee, denied the 
grievance on the ground that a superintendent’s decision to terminate a noncertificated 
employee is an illegal subject of collective bargaining and therefore not subject to the 
grievance process set forth in the CBA.  The Association, on behalf of the school nurse, 
made a demand for arbitration, which in Step III of the grievance process provides that 
“[t]he arbitrator’s decision shall be final and binding on all the parties.” 
The Litigation 
Upon receipt of the Association’s demand, the Howard County Board filed a Motion 
for Injunctive Relief in the Circuit Court for Howard County, seeking to enjoin the 
arbitration.  The Howard County Board argued that the final decision on the termination of 
a noncertificated employee is committed to the exercise of the superintendent’s authority; 
therefore, a dispute concerning the termination of that employee cannot be the subject of 
binding arbitration.  The Association opposed the injunction. 
The Circuit Court granted the Howard County Board preliminary injunctive relief 
and entered an order staying the arbitration to give both parties the opportunity to request 
an opinion from either or both the Maryland State Board of Education (“State Board”) and 
the Public School Labor Relations Board (“PSLRB”).  The Howard County Board sought 
an opinion from the State Board.  The Association sought an opinion from the PSLRB. 
The State Board and the PSLRB issued conflicting opinions.  We later detail the 
reasoning of the respective agencies.  For now, however, it suffices to note that the State 
Board concluded that a provision of the Education Article authorizing the county school 
 
4 
 
superintendent to make hiring decisions also, albeit impliedly, commits to the 
superintendent the exclusive authority to terminate, thereby rendering illegal the binding 
arbitration provision of the CBA.  The PSLRB came to the opposite conclusion by 
reference to other provisions of the Education Article that permit binding arbitration of 
matters relating to the discipline and discharge of noncertificated employees.  Therefore, 
according to the PSLRB, the binding arbitration provision of the CBA is not illegal. 
Each party petitioned the Circuit Court for Howard County for judicial review of 
the respective opinions of the State Board and the PSLRB, and each party sought, in 
response to the other’s petition, an order to enforce the opinion of the agency that ruled in 
its favor.2  The Circuit Court, agreeing with the State Board’s determination, entered orders 
that affirmed the decision of the State Board, reversed the decision of the PSLRB, and 
permanently enjoined the arbitration.   
  The Association appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the 
judgments of the Circuit Court.  Howard Cty. Educ. Ass’n-ESP, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Howard Cty., 220 Md. App. 282, 284 (2014).  The intermediate appellate court concluded 
in a thorough and well analyzed opinion that the State Board’s opinion would “clearly be 
contrary to the statute’s plain meaning”; therefore, deference may not be afforded to the 
State Board in this case.  Id. at 307 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court of Special 
Appeals held that the PSLRB, not the State Board, is the entity with the jurisdiction to 
                                              
2 The Howard County Board’s petition and the Association’s petition for judicial review 
were consolidated and assigned Case No. 13-C-12-091545.  The Howard County Board’s 
petition for injunctive relief was assigned Case No. 13-C-12-090823. 
 
5 
 
resolve the dispute; moreover, the PSLRB reasonably concluded that the sections of the 
Education Article concerning collective bargaining permit a local board to be bound to an 
agreement containing an arbitration provision for grievance matters.  Id. at 305-06.  The 
Howard County Board petitioned this Court for review.   
We granted the Howard County Board’s petition for writ of certiorari to address two 
questions,3 which we have combined into one:  Does the PSLRB have the exclusive 
authority to decide the legality of a term in a collective bargaining agreement that provides 
for arbitration of a county superintendent’s decision to discharge a noncertificated 
employee? 
II. 
A State agency’s declaratory ruling “is subject to judicial review in the same manner 
as provided for a ‘contested case’ decided under the Administrative Procedure Act.”  
Potomac Valley Orthopaedic Assocs. v. Md. State Bd. of Physicians, 417 Md. 622, 635 
(2011).  When, as here, the administrative rulings at issue do not involve any disputed facts, 
this Court’s “role is limited to determining . . . if the administrative decision is premised 
upon an erroneous conclusion of law.”  Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
                                              
3 Petitioner presents the following questions: 
 
Whether the PSLRB must apply the State Board’s interpretation of statutes 
within the State Board’s jurisdiction when exercising its authority to 
determine if a proposed subject of collective bargaining is illegal because it 
is precluded by applicable statutory law. 
 
Whether conflicting interpretations of § 6-201(c)(1) and § 6-510(c)(1) can be 
reconciled. 
 
 
6 
 
omitted).  In conducting that inquiry, we generally afford “considerable weight” to “the 
agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers.”  Id. 
at 635-36 (internal quotation marks omitted).  This Court, however, is not bound by an 
agency’s decision that is “premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law.”  Id. at 
636 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
This Court has recognized that “the paramount role of the State Board of Education 
in interpreting the public education law sets it apart from most administrative agencies.”  
Montgomery Cty. Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cty., 311 Md. 303, 309 
(1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We therefore accord considerable deference to 
an opinion of the State Board interpreting public education law.  See Balt. City Bd. of Sch. 
Comm’rs v. City Neighbors Charter Sch., 400 Md. 324, 343 (2007).  Such deference to the 
State Board’s decision, however, is not absolute; rather, a reviewing court must reject a 
decision of the State Board, or, for that matter, of the PSLRB, if either agency’s decision 
“would clearly be contrary to the statute’s plain meaning.”  See Montgomery Cty. Educ. 
Ass’n, 311 Md. at 309. 
When, as in the present case, a party to a collective bargaining agreement has sought 
judicial intervention to stay arbitration, the court’s role is limited.  Balt. Cty. Fraternal 
Order of Police Lodge No. 4 v. Baltimore County, 429 Md. 533, 549 (2012).  We have said 
that, “[i]f one could decide that [the] grievance was arbitrable without interpreting the 
underlying [collective bargaining agreement] or addressing the merits of [the party’s] 
claims,” then arbitrability is “an issue for the court to decide initially.”  Id. at 553. 
III. 
 
7 
 
Before delving further into the respective opinions of the State Board and the 
PSLRB, it is helpful to review the legislative grant of authority to each of them.  The 
General Assembly created the PSLRB in 2010.  Since then, the Education Article has 
contained multiple references to the division of authority between the PSLRB and the State 
Board.  We begin with § 2-205.  Md. Code (2010, 2014 Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp.), § 2-205 
of the Education Article.4   
Section 2-205(e) delineates the respective powers and duties of the State Board and 
the PSLRB.  Subsections (e)(1), (2) and (3) address the authority of the State Board:  
(1) . . . [T]he State Board shall explain the true intent and meaning of the 
provisions of:  
 
(i)  This article that are within its jurisdiction[.]  
(2)  Except as provided in paragraph (4) of this subsection and in Title 6, 
Subtitles 4 and 5 of this article, the [State] Board shall decide all 
controversies and disputes under these provisions. 
(3)  The decision of the [State] Board is final. 
 
Subsection (e)(4) in turn provides: 
 
(i) The Public School Labor Relations Board shall decide any 
controversy or dispute arising under Title 6, Subtitle 4 or Subtitle 5 of this 
article. 
 
(ii)  A decision of the Public School Labor Relations Board is final. 
 
Read together, these subsections expressly transfer from the State Board to the PSLRB the 
authority to decide any controversy or dispute arising under Subtitles 4 and 5, i.e., the 
collective bargaining subtitles of Title 6. 
 
Title 6 is entitled “Teachers and Other Personnel.”  Section 6-510(c)(5)(i) provides 
that,  
                                              
4 Hereafter all statutory references are to the Education Article.   
 
8 
 
[i]f a public school employer and an employee organization dispute whether 
a proposed topic for negotiation is a mandatory, a permissive, or an illegal 
topic of bargaining, either party may submit a request for a decision in 
writing to the [PSLRB] for a final resolution of the dispute. 
 
The General Assembly added, as well, § 6-807(a)(2), which provides that the PSLRB 
“[s]hall decide controversies and disputes” concerning matters covered by Title 6, Subtitle 
4 (providing for collective bargaining between public school employers and certificated 
employees) and Subtitle 5 (providing for collective bargaining between public school 
employers and noncertificated employees).  And in § 6-807(d), the General Assembly 
provided that “a prior order, action or opinion issued by the State Board before the 
enactment of this section may be considered as precedent in matters arising after the 
enactment of this section, but it is not binding on the [PSLRB].”   
 
Particularly relevant to the present case are several additional subsections of § 6-
510.  Subsection (b) states that a negotiated agreement between the public school employer 
and the employee organization “may provide for binding arbitration of the grievances 
arising under the agreement that the parties have agreed to be subject to arbitration.”  
Subsection (c)(1) provides that representatives of the public school employer and the 
employee organization “shall meet and negotiate . . . on all matters that relate to . . . working 
conditions, including the discipline and discharge of an employee for just cause.”  
(Emphasis added).  Subsection (c)(3) provides:  “A public school employer may not 
negotiate the school calendar, the maximum number of students assigned to a class, or any 
matter that is precluded by applicable statutory law.”  (Emphasis added).  Subsection 
(c)(5)(i) provides that, “[i]f a public school employer and an employee organization dispute 
 
9 
 
whether a proposed topic for negotiation is a mandatory, a permissive, or an illegal topic 
of  bargaining, either party may submit a request for a decision in writing to the [PSLRB] 
for final resolution of the dispute.”   
The Agencies’ Opinions 
 
The State Board recognized in its opinion in the present case5 that the school nurse 
challenged her termination by resort to Section 4.1 of the CBA (providing that “[n]o 
employee will be discharged without cause”) and Article 2 of the CBA (providing that, at 
Step III of the grievance process, a dissatisfied employee is entitled to submit the dispute 
to binding arbitration).  The State Board further acknowledged that, pursuant to § 6-
510(c)(5), the PSLRB is authorized to decide whether a “proposed topic for negotiation is 
a mandatory, a permissive, or an illegal topic of [collective] bargaining.”  The State Board 
concluded nonetheless that it “retain[s] jurisdiction to explain the true intent and meaning 
of all other sections of the Education Article,” including § 6-201, which addresses the 
superintendent’s power to appoint noncertificated employees.   
 
The State Board looked specifically to § 6-201(c)(1), which provides:  “Except in 
Worcester County and Baltimore City, the county superintendent shall appoint clerical and 
other nonprofessional personnel.”  The State Board concluded that “the true intent and 
meaning of § 6-201 is that the power to hire and fire is non-delegable”; consequently, “[i]f 
the superintendent’s decision to terminate is subject to mandatory binding arbitration,” then 
such action “would violate” § 6-201(c)(1) of the Education Article. 
                                              
5 In re: Petition for Declaratory Ruling, MSBE Op. No. 12-28 (2012). 
 
10 
 
 
In so deciding, the State Board essentially reaffirmed the position it had taken in an 
earlier opinion, Harford County Board of Education v. Harford County Educational 
Services Council, MSBE Op. No. 05-24 (2005) (“the 2005 Harford County Board 
decision”).  In that 2005 opinion, the State Board determined that the express authority 
granted in § 6-201(c)(1) to the county superintendent to appoint noncertificated personnel 
carries with it the implied authority to discharge such personnel.  Relying upon the 2005 
Harford County Board decision, about which we shall say more, infra, the State Board 
reemphasized in its opinion in the present case that under § 6-201 the superintendent’s 
“power to hire and fire is non-delegable.”  The State Board adhered in the present case to 
its reasoning in its 2005 decision, notwithstanding the State Board’s recognition that since 
2009 the General Assembly has provided for mandatory negotiation of just cause for 
employee discharge.   
The PSLRB came to the opposite conclusion in its opinion.6  The PSLRB noted its 
jurisdiction to decide the legality of a topic of negotiation, referring in particular to the 
authority granted to the PSLRB in § 6-510(c)(5)(i) to resolve any dispute between “a public 
school employer and an employee organization” concerning “whether a proposed topic for 
negotiation is . . . an illegal topic of bargaining.”   
The PSLRB thoroughly traced the legislative history of Maryland’s collective 
bargaining subtitle, including the 2009 amendments to what was then § 6-510(b) and now 
                                              
6 In the Matter of: Howard Cty. Educ. Ass’n – Educ. Support Prof’ls (ESP) v. Bd. of Educ. 
of Howard Cty., PSLRB Op. No. N-2012-01 (Aug. 2, 2012). 
 
 
11 
 
is renumbered at § 6-510(c), which effectively overruled the State Board’s 2005 Harford 
County Board decision.  The PSLRB described the 2009 amendments to § 6-510(c)(1) as 
“limit[ing] a superintendent’s authority to discipline and discharge non-certificated 
employees by making both the procedural and substantive aspects of due process 
mandatory subjects of bargaining.”7   
Given the legislative history of § 6-510(c), the PSLRB wrote:  “If there was nothing 
more involved, our analysis could begin—and end—with Section 6-510(c)(1).”  The 
PSLRB noted that it nevertheless would respond to the argument raised in a memorandum 
the Howard County Board had sent to the PSLRB.  In that memorandum, the Howard 
County Board raised § 6-510(c)(3), which provides that “A public school employer may 
not negotiate . . . any matter that is precluded by applicable statutory law.”  The Howard 
County Board asserted that § 6-510(c)(3) essentially trumped § 6-510(c)(1), which 
provides that the parties are required to negotiate the “discharge of an employee for just 
cause.”  The Howard County Board recounted the State Board’s interpretation of § 6-
201(c)(1) (providing the county superintendent with the power to appoint noncertificated 
employees).  The State Board interpreted that section (consistent with that Board’s 
adherence to its 2005 Harford County Board decision) as committing to the superintendent 
the sole authority to hire and discharge noncertificated employees.  Relying on that 
                                              
7 For a further examination of the PSLRB’s opinion in the present case, see the opinion of 
the Court of Special Appeals, which quotes extensively and approvingly from the opinion 
of the PSLRB, Howard County Education Ass’n-ESP, Inc. v. Board of Education of 
Howard County, 220 Md. App. 282, 287-92 (2014). 
  
 
12 
 
interpretation, the Howard County Board argued that § 6-201(c)(1) is “applicable statutory 
law” that pursuant to § 6-510(c)(3) precludes the negotiation of an arbitration clause to 
review a superintendent’s termination of an employee, thereby rendering the arbitration 
clause in this case “unenforceable.”   
The PSLRB made short work of that aspect of the Howard County Board’s 
argument: 
We need not for present purposes debate the merit of the State Board’s 
interpretation of Section 6-201(c)(1).  We acknowledge that the State Board 
had the authority to interpret the provisions of the Education Article other 
than those in Title 6, Subtitles 4 and 5.  But the operative provision—i.e., 
“any matter that is precluded by applicable statutory law”—appears in Title 
6, Subtitle 5, and, as the County Board concedes, it is the PSLRB that has the 
authority to interpret the provisions of that Subtitle.  This means that the 
PSLRB has jurisdiction to determine what does and does not constitute 
“applicable statutory law.”  We conclude that the State Board’s interpretation 
of Section 6-201(c)(1) does not constitute “applicable statutory law” 
precluding the negotiation of “the discipline and discharge of an employee 
for just cause.”  The “applicable statutory law” for purposes of this 
negotiability dispute is Section 6-510(c)(1), and the clear and unambiguous 
language of that Section provides that “the discipline and discharge of an 
employee for just cause” is a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
. . . .  
 
In the context of this case, that means that Article 4.1 of the [CBA] is 
enforceable, and the grievance involving that provision is subject to 
arbitration under Section 2.2 of the [CBA].   
 
IV. 
The opinions of the two agencies discuss, to a greater or lesser degree, the General 
Assembly’s amendments of the Education Article between 2002 and 2010, which led 
ultimately to the creation of the PSLRB, among other changes to the Education Article.  
Certain of those amendments can be traced back to a 1994 decision of the Court of Special 
 
13 
 
Appeals, Livers v. Board of Education of Charles County, 101 Md. App. 160 (1994).  The 
Court of Special Appeals was presented in Livers with generally the same question as the 
one before us in the present case, but the procedural posture and statutory law differed at 
that time.  See id. at 162.  
Appellant Livers was employed as a building equipment technician for the Charles 
County Board of Education until his dismissal in 1991.  The local branch of the American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees sought to arbitrate the dismissal on 
behalf of Livers, pursuant to a negotiated agreement between it and the County Board of 
Education.  When the County Board refused to submit to arbitration, Livers submitted to 
the State Board the question of whether the County Board was required to participate in 
the grievance arbitration.  The State Board ruled that Livers’s termination was an illegal 
topic of bargaining.  Id. 
The Circuit Court for Charles County, on judicial review of the State Board’s ruling, 
agreed with the State Board, as did the Court of Special Appeals.  Id. at 168.  The State 
Board had reasoned that “discipline or discharge decision[s] are non-negotiable matters of 
educational policy within the exclusive province of the local school system.”  Id. at 166.  
In affirming the State Board’s decision, the Court of Special Appeals noted that it is the 
State Board’s “task to determine a proper subject of negotiation” and the State Board’s 
decision was not arbitrary.  Id. at 167, 169.  The Livers court quoted the then-extant version 
of § 6-510(b), which at the time Livers was decided provided for negotiation “on all matters 
that relate to salaries, wages, hours, and other working conditions” but not for matters of 
discipline or discharge of employees.  See id. at 164. 
 
14 
 
 
The General Assembly effectively overruled Livers in 2002 by amending the 
collective bargaining provisions of the Education Article to create mandatory, permissive, 
and illegal subjects of bargaining.8  The General Assembly added to § 6-510(b) the 
italicized language below:   
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, a public school 
employer or at least two of its designated representatives may negotiate with 
at least two representatives of the employee organization that is designated 
as the exclusive negotiating agent for the public school employees in a unit 
of the county on other matters, including due process for discipline and 
discharge, that are mutually agreed to by the employer and the employee 
organization. 
  
The 2002 amendment permitted parties to negotiate due process for discipline and 
discharge but did not clarify whether this topic of negotiation encompassed both procedural 
and substantive due process for discipline and discharge.   
 
Against the backdrop of the 2002 statutory framework, the State Board issued its 
2005 Harford County Board decision.  The State Board, citing Livers, determined that a 
superintendent had the sole authority to appoint noncertificated employees pursuant to § 6-
201(c)(1), and incident to the power to appoint is the power to dismiss.  Applying that 
interpretation, the State Board decided that the reference to due process in then-extant § 6-
510(b)(2) addresses only the procedural aspects of due process, not substantive due 
process. 
                                              
8 The legislative history behind the 2002 amendments to § 6-510 leaves no doubt that those 
amendments were intended to overrule Livers.  For a thorough discussion of that history, 
from the statutory framework of the Education Article that led to Livers to the 2010 
amendments to the Education Article, which we further address infra, see the Court of 
Special Appeals’s discussion in the present case.  220 Md. App. at 295-304.   
 
15 
 
In 2009, the General Assembly, in response to efforts to overturn the State Board’s 
2005 Harford County Board decision, amended § 6-510(b) to add in (b)(1) the language 
we have italicized and to delete in (b)(2) the language we have bracketed: 
(b)(1) On request, a public school employer or at least two of its 
designated representatives shall meet and negotiate with at least two 
representatives of the employee organization that is designated as 
the exclusive negotiating agent for the public school employees in a 
unit of the county on all matters that relate to salaries, wages, hours, 
and other working conditions, including the discipline and discharge 
of an employee for just cause. 
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, a public 
school employer or at least two of its designated representatives may 
negotiate with at least two representatives of the employee 
organization that is designated as the exclusive negotiating agent for 
the public school employees in a unit of the county on other matters[,  
including due process for discipline and discharge,] that are mutually 
agreed to by the employer and the employee organization. 
 
 
The legislative history behind these 2009 amendments, as summarized in the Court 
of Special Appeals’s opinion,9 underscores that the purpose of the amendments was to limit 
                                              
9 The Court of Special Appeals recounted that legislative history: 
 
The testimony of the Maryland Association of Boards of Education 
(“MABE”) recognized the implication of these amendments in the written 
testimony that it submitted to the Senate Finance Committee on March 5, 
2009, in opposition to Senate Bill 569.  MABE, speaking on behalf of “all of 
the state’s boards of education,” noted that Senate Bill 569 would: 
limit the superintendent’s discretion to discipline or discharge 
support staff.  MABE strongly opposes the mandated negotiation of 
the subjects of discipline and discharge of non-certificated staff.  
And yet again, this bill goes further.  Senate Bill 569 would impose 
the standard of employee rights under disciplinary or termination 
actions to be “just cause.”  MABE has consistently opposed 
legislation proposing this standard of review for superintendent 
decisions regarding non-tenured, non-teaching staff. 
 
220 Md. App. at 291 (citation omitted). 
 
16 
 
“a superintendent’s authority to discipline and discharge non-certificated employees by 
making both the procedural and substantive aspects of due process mandatory subjects of 
bargaining.”  220 Md. App. at 291 (citation omitted). 
Finally, in 2010, the General Assembly enacted The Fairness in Negotiations Act to 
create the PSLRB and revise the collective bargaining statutes.  See Laws of Maryland, ch. 
590 (2010).  Subsection (b) of § 6-510 was renumbered as subsection (c) but the mandatory 
topic at issue in this case did not change in substance:  subsection (c)(1) provides the 
mandatory topics of negotiation; (c)(2) specifies the permissive topics of negotiation; and 
(c)(3) prescribes the illegal topics of negotiation.  The 2010 amendment also specified in § 
6-510(c)(5) that the PSLRB would resolve any dispute concerning the legality of a topic 
of negotiation.  These provisions expressly grant to the PSLRB the jurisdiction to decide 
disputes arising under Subtitles 4 and 5 of Title 6 of the Education Article.  
V. 
The parties’ arguments have remained essentially the same throughout the litigation.  
Each party relies upon the agency opinion that supports that party’s side of the dispute.  
Now, as before the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals, Petitioner Howard 
County Board advances an interpretation of the Education Article that is entirely consistent 
with the opinion of the State Board.  Respondent Association adheres to the opinion of the 
PSLRB, just as it did before the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals.  We 
conclude, as did the Court of Special Appeals, that the PSLRB properly resolved the 
relevant question to be decided in this case.   
We agree with the following observation of our colleagues on the Court of Special 
 
17 
 
Appeals:  “[I]t seems plain to us that the present dispute turns on the question of whether 
a collective bargaining agreement could properly provide for arbitration of an employee’s 
discharge, which is clearly a matter committed to the authority of the [PSLRB] to decide.”  
220 Md. App. at 294-95.  We further agree with the Court of Special Appeals that what 
“seems plain” is in fact the answer to the question posed by this case.  We arrive at that 
answer by application of the rules of statutory construction.  
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to effectuate the intent of the 
Legislature.  Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel Cty. Bd. of Educ., 358 Md. 129, 
135 (2000).  We begin by giving effect to the plain and unambiguous meaning of the 
statute.  Id.  If the plain language is “consistent with the statute’s goals and apparent 
purpose, our inquiry normally ends with that language.”  Id.  We must “interpret the statute 
as a whole, where the statute to be construed is a part of a statutory scheme[;] the legislative 
intention is not determined from that statute alone, rather it is to be discerned by 
considering it in light of the statutory scheme.”  Blitz v. Beth Isaac Adas Israel 
Congregation, 352 Md. 31, 40 (1998) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also City of Balt. Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assocs., 395 Md. 299, 318 (2006).  The 
statutory language should be read so that no word or phrase renders any part of it 
“meaningless, surplusage, superfluous, or nugatory.”  Blitz, 352 Md. at 40.  Even if the 
plain language is unambiguous, courts may refer to the legislative history to ensure their 
interpretation is correct.  Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cty. v. Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. 200, 215 
(2009). 
We conclude, as the Court of Special Appeals evidently did, that there is no 
 
18 
 
ambiguity in any of the provisions of the Education Article that apply to and inform the 
decision in this case.  Each section we have examined appears to us quite plain both on its 
face and when considered in relation to the other relevant sections of the Education Article.  
Moreover, the evident legislative purpose of the amendments to that Article, in 2002, 2009, 
and 2010, is readily confirmed by the considerable legislative history of the amendments 
to the collective bargaining provisions of the Article. 
We cannot improve upon the excellent legal analysis of the Court of Special 
Appeals, nor do we part company with that Court’s legal conclusions in this case.  The 
Honorable Timothy E. Meredith, writing for the Court of Special Appeals, concluded: 
[T]he State Board focused on the wrong question.  The issue in this case is 
not whether, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a 
superintendent’s power of appointment includes the power to discharge an 
employee.  Rather, the issue presented in this case is whether or not it was 
illegal, under applicable Maryland statutes, for the Board of Education of 
Howard County to enter into a collective bargaining agreement which 
expressly agreed that an employee’s grievance is arbitrable.  The answer to 
that question is found in Subtitle 5 of Title 6 of the Education Article, which 
is a matter within the jurisdiction of the [PSLRB]. 
 
 
Section 6-510(a) provides that, if a public school employer and an 
employee organization “negotiate under this section,” they shall do so in 
good faith, in a way as to honor and administer existing agreements, and shall 
“[m]ake every reasonable effort to conclude negotiations with a final written 
agreement in a timely manner . . . .”  Here, after a period of negotiations, the 
parties entered into [the CBA], covering a three-year period.  Article 2 of the 
[CBA] provided for a grievance procedure, and specified the means by which 
an employee could file a grievance.  Section 2.2C3 of the [CBA] provided:  
“In the event that the employee and the Association are not satisfied with the 
decision at Step II . . . the grievance may be submitted to [binding] arbitration 
. . . .”  This is clearly allowed under Educ. § 6-510(b), which provides that 
negotiated agreements between a public school employer and an employee 
organization, of the sort entered into here, “may provide for binding 
arbitration of the grievances arising under the agreement that the parties have 
agreed to be subject to arbitration.” 
 
19 
 
 
 . . . . 
 
We reject the [Howard County Board’s] argument that, when the legislature 
expressly included the discharge of an employee as a mandatory subject of 
collective bargaining, the legislature simultaneously intended to exclude that 
topic because of the general reference to “applicable statutory law.”  Instead, 
we agree with the conclusion of the [PSLRB] that, with respect to resolution 
of disputes regarding the topics that may be the subject of collective 
bargaining, the General Assembly has designated the [PSLRB]—and not the 
State Board of Education—as the agency empowered to decide what is a 
“matter that is precluded by statutory law.” 
 
220 Md. App. at 305-07. 
We adopt in full the reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals.  Accordingly, we, 
like the Court of Special Appeals, hold that the Circuit Court for Howard County erred in 
affirming the opinion of the State Board and reversing the opinion of the PSLRB, and 
further erred in granting the Howard County Board, in Case No. 13-C-12-090823, a 
permanent injunction preventing the arbitration demanded by the Association on behalf of 
the discharged school nurse.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals in that case as well as in Case No. 13-C-12-091545.  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; 
COSTS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
PETITIONER.