Case Title: Quinlan v. Camden USA, Inc.

Citation: 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 30

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
426 Nev., Advance Opinion 30

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

AUDREY QUINLAN, No. 53521

ira FILED

CAMDEN USA, INC, ,

Respondent. UL 29 201
xceun

 

ou

Speers

Appeal from a district court judgment on abjury verdict
tort action. ighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; James M.

  

Bixler, Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded,

Benjamin B. Childs, Las Vegas,
for Appellant,

Parnell & Associates and Richard B. Parnell, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

BEFORE HARDESTY, DOUGLAS and PICKERING, J.

opr
By the Court, PICKERING, J.

Audrey Quinlan sued Camden USA, Inc. for damages after she
tripped on a sidewalk in its apartment complex. She lost at trial and was
ordered to pay Camden $41,976 in attorney fees and costs, The distriet
court based its award on the offer of judgment Camden made under NRS
17.115 and NRCP 68, which Camden sent by facsimile. Although
Quinlan’s lawyer received the offer of judgment, he had not expressly
consented to fax service as NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) requires. It was error to shift

fees and costs based on Camden's offer of judgment because NRS 17.115,

J0- 19589

 
   

NRCP 5(a), and NRCP 68(a) all require an offer of judgment to be served
in compliance with NRCP 5 and Camden's was not.

With the exception of the fee award, no other reversible error
appears. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment but reverse the award of
foes and costs and remand so the district court can calculate and award
Camden its taxable costs under NRS 18.020(3),

L

In contesting Camden's offer of judgment, Quinlan does not
deny she received it. Her challenge is technical: An offer of judgment is a
creature of statute and rule; NRS 17.115, NRCP 5(a), and NRCP 68 all
require “service” for an effective offer of judgment; Camden’s faxed offer of
judgment, though received, was not “served” in a way NRCP 5(b)
recognizes; thus, the district court erred in using Camden's offer of
judgment to shift fees and costs to Quinlan.

Quinlan makes a valid argument. NRCP 6(a) is entitled
“Service: When Required,” while NRCP 5(b) is entitled “Same: How Made.”
NRCP 6(a) specifies that “every... offer of judgment... shall be served
upon each of the parties.” NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68(a) also say an offer of,
judgment must be “servefd].” For an offer of judgment to shift fees and
costs as NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68 allow, its service must comply with
NRCP 5(b). See Magnuson v. Video Yestervear, 85 F.3d 1424, 1429 (9th
Cir, 1996) (‘In cases involving Rule 68 offers, service... must comply with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)”).

Quinlan had counsel. NRCP 5(b)(1) provides that, “[w]henever
under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party
represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney.”
NRCP 5(b)(2) lists the permissible ways to serve a party's attorney. While
NRCP 5(b)(2) permits fax service, it does so only if the receiving attorney

2

 
—

 

“has consented to service by electronic means.’ The consent must be
express, filed with the clerk, and include specific information:

The served attorney’s...consent to service by
electronic means shall_be expressly stated and
filed_in_writing with the clerk of the court and
served on the other parties to the action. The

written consent shall identify:

(@ the persons upon whom service must be
made;

Gi) the appropriate address or location for
such service, such as the electronic-mail address
or facsimile number;

(ii) the format to be used for attachments;
and

(iv) any other limits on the scope or duration
of the consent.

NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) (emphasis added).

Neither Quinlan nor her attorney filed the written consent to
fax service that NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) requires. However, Quinlan’s lawyer
occasionally sent case-related papers via facsimile—including the informal
offer to settle that prompted Camden's offer of judgment. Camden urges
us to accept implied consent as an adequate substitute for express consent
on these facts.

Camden's implied consent argument fails. NRCP 5(b)(2)(D)
uses “shall” to state its requirement of express written consent, filed with
the clerk, to service by electronic means. The “use of ‘shall! is mandatory
unless a rule's construction demands a different interpretation to carry
out the rule’s purpose.” Moseley v, Dist, Ct, 124 Nev. 654, 664, 188 P.3d
1136, 1144 (2008), Nevada adopted NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) in 2006 to “permit{ }
service by electronic means, including facsimile and electronic-mail,

consistent with the 2001 amendments to the federal rule.” NRCP 5

 

 
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drafter's note (2004). Under Fed. R. Civ, P, 5, as amended in 2001, “[tJhe
consent [to fax service] must be express, and cannot be implied from
conduct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 advisory committee's note (2001).!

We agree with the federal cases that have rejected implied
consent to service by fax as a basis for upholding a faxed offer of judgment
5 and 68, Ortiz-Moss v, New York City Dept. of Transp, 623,
F. Supp. 2d 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[clonsent to service by electronic

under Rul

 

means must be specifically agreed to in writing and cannot be implied
from past conduct”; absent specific written consent, faxed acceptance of an
offer of judgment is not effective even though the party receiving the fax
did not object to such service earlier in the litigation) (internal citations
omitted); McKenna_v. Nat'l Action Fin, Serva,, No. 07-60880-CIV, 2008
WL 1741495, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2008) (rejecting faxed offer of
judgment where no written consent to fax service had been filed; Fed. R.
Civ. P. 5 “requires service of an offer of judgment” and “service may be
made by electronic means or other alternate means only if written consent
is given’), reh’g denied, 2008 WL 5572637 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2008); see 4B
C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1147 (3d ed. 2002)
(Consent to service under Rule 5()(2(D) must be in writing
[and] . ... cannot be inferred from the conduct of the intended recipient,”);
Magnuson, 85 F.3d at 1429 (service by fax of the Rule 68 offer was

{We note that Rules 9(c) and 13 of Nevada's Electronic Filing Rules
are not at issue on this appeal but that they impose consent and
registration requirements that satisfy NRCP 5(b)(2)(D).

 
om

 

inadequate, even though Magnuson apparently did receive a faxed copy of
the offer) (decided under the pre-2001 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(6)(2))

In providing parties with the means to shift foes and costs,
NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68 offer a tool not available at common law. See
Albios v, Horizon Communities, Inc,, 122 Nev. 409, 431, 132 P.3d 1022,
1036-37 (2006) (“statutes permitting costs are in derogation of the common
law [and] should be strictly construed”) (citing Bergmann_v. Boyce, 109
Nev. 670, 679, 856 P.2d 560, 565-66 (1993), Use of this tool depends on
meeting stated time deadlines, Palace Station Hotel & Casino v, Jones,
116 Nev. 162, 165, 978 P.2d 323, 325 (1999) (time calculations are critical
to a predictable application of the offer of judgment rules), and other
formal requirements. Pombo v. Nevada Apartment Ass'n, 113 Nev. 559,
562, 938 P.2d 725, 727 (1997) (An offer of judgment must be
unconditional and for a definite amount in order to be valid for purposes of
NRCP 68°). Predictability and fairness are not served by reading the
formal service requirements out of NRS 17.115, NRCP 5, and NRCP 68,
including NRCP 5(b)(2)(D)'s requirement of express written consent to
service by electronic means.

“The facts before us stop short of those found to work an estoppel in
Albertson v. Winner Automotive, No. Civ.A.01-116KAJ, 2004 WL 2435290
(D. Del. Oct. 27, 2004). ‘There, the defendant served its offer of judgment
on the plaintiff by fax. The plaintiff accepted the offered judgment by
written “Notice of Acceptance,” which he formally served by hand. The
court treated the plaintiff's “Notice of Acceptance” as consent to service by
fax and held, further, that the defendant was estopped to disavow the
validity of its faxed offer of judgment, noting that Rule 5(b) protects the
recipient not the sender. Id, at *5.

 

 
‘The district court upheld the fax service under EDCR
7.26(a)(3), which lists facsimile service as a permissible form of service but
is silent on whether consent to such service is required and, if so, what
form it must take? Considered by itself, in isolation from NRCP
5(b)(2)(D), EDCR 7.26(a)(3) can fairly be read to permit fax service as
freely as service by mail or by hand. When EDCR 7.26(a)(3) is road
together with NRCP 6(b)(2)(D), however, the only reading that gives

meaning to both rules is to read EDCR 7.26(a)(3) as permitting fax service

 

in general, provided NRCP 5(b)(2)(D)'s express consent requirement has
been met. See Albios, 122 Nev. at 418, 422, 132 P.3d at 1028, 1030-31 Gf
possible, “this court will interpret a rule or statute in harmony with other

 

rules and statutes,” especially where, as here, one provision is silent on

specifics included in another). A contrary reading puts EDCR 7,26(a)(3) in

 

SEDCR 7.26(a) states, in relevant part:

If service of an order or other paper is to be made

 

must be made on the attorney unless service on
the party is ordered by the court. Service on the
attorney or on a party must be made by:

(1) delivering a copy or by mailing it to
the last known address; or

(2) if no address is known, by leaving
it with the clerk of the court; or

(8) facsimile transmission; or

(electronic transmission through
the Court's electronic filing system if the system
provides for electronic serviee.

 

 
oe

 

conflict with NRCP 6(b)(2)(D)'s express written consent requirement, in
which case NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) still controls. Cheek v. FNF Constr., Inc,, 112
Nev. 1249, 1253, 924 P.2d 1347, 1950 (1996) (“‘{tJhe district courts have
rule-making power, but the rules they adopt must not be in conflict with
the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure” (alteration in original) (quoting
Western Mercury, Inc, v. ‘The Rix Co., 84 Nev. 218, 222-23, 438 P.2d 792,
795 (1968), and citing NRCP 83, which states that “[eJach district
court ...may from time to time make and amend rules governing its
practice not inconsistent with these rules”)

Since Camden's offer of judgment was not properly served, it
does not operate to shift fees and costs. We therefore reverse their award
and remand for the district court to determine Camden’s taxable costs,

Th

Quinlan also asserts error in the district court's admission of
daytime photographs when her injury occurred at night; its refusal to
grant her request for a jury view of the sidewalk; its allowance of a late-
designated witness's testimony; and its denial of her new trial motion. We
review these claims of evidentiary, trial, and post-trial error for an abuse
of discretion, Sheehan & Sheehan v. Nelson Malley & Co., 121 Nev. 481,
492, 117 P.3d 219, 226 (2005) (explaining that the district court has “broad
discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence” (internal quotation
omitted); Dep't of Hwys. v. Haapanen, 84 Nev. 722, 723, 448 P.2d 703,
704 (1968) (indicating that the decision to grant or deny a jury viewing is
reviewed for abuse of discretion); Southern Pac. Transp. Co, v. Fitzgerald,
94 Nev. 241, 244, 577 P.2d 1234, 1236 (1978) (“[tJhe decision to grant or
deny a motion for new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be disturbed . . . absent palpable abuse), and none exists
here.

 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment on the jury's verdict,
vacate the judgment awarding fees and costs, and remand for calculation
of taxable costs.

Pickering

We concur:

bea cleste 3.

Hardesty