Case Title: Edson v. State

Citation: 175 Vt. 330, 2003 VT 32, 830 A.2d 671

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Edson v. State (2001-446); 175 Vt. 330; 830 A.2d 671

2003 VT 32

[Filed 28-Mar-2003)

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2003 VT 32

                                No. 2001-446

       	
  Leslie Edson	                                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Washington Superior Court

  State of Vermont	                         June Term, 2002

  Matthew I. Katz, J.

  David R. Edwards and Pamela A. Stonier, Law Clerk (On the Brief),
    Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

  William Sorrell, Attorney General, and Joseph L. Winn, Assistant Attorney
    General, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse (FN1), Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       ¶  1.  AMESTOY, C.J.   Plaintiff Leslie Edson, who was injured while
  working for a trucking firm that had a contract to load and deliver
  merchandise for the Vermont Department of Liquor Control, appeals the
  superior court's determination that the State was plaintiff's "statutory
  employer" within the meaning of 21 V.S.A. § 601(3) and therefore immune
  from plaintiff's tort suit under 21 V.S.A. § 622 (right to workers'
  compensation benefits excludes all other rights and remedies against
  employer).  We affirm.
   
       ¶  2.  Plaintiff worked for Jerry Nelson, owner of J.E. Nelson
  Trucking.  Nelson entered into a delivery contract with the Department of
  Liquor Control, which has the statutory duty to "[s]upervise the opening
  and operation of local agencies for the sale and distribution of spirituous
  liquors."  7 V.S.A. § 104(2).  The contract required Nelson to deliver
  liquor from the liquor control warehouse in Montpelier to various liquor
  outlets throughout the state.  The contract also required Nelson to provide
  personnel during the day to load and move trailers at the Montpelier
  warehouse.  Plaintiff performed these loading duties for Nelson.

       ¶  3.  In August 1995, plaintiff was injured in a trailer owned by
  Nelson and parked at the State's warehouse loading dock.  His hand was
  crushed between a conveyor belt and a roller that extended into the
  trailer.  Because of his injury, plaintiff was out of work for
  approximately five weeks.  Pursuant to his contract with the State, Nelson
  provided workers' compensation benefits to plaintiff, including a full
  salary during his absence and payments for all medical bills related to the
  accident.  In November 1997, plaintiff filed a third-party negligence claim
  against the State based on the accident.
   
       ¶  4.  In July 1998, the State filed a motion for summary judgment,
  asserting that because it was plaintiff's "statutory employer" within the
  meaning of § 601(3), plaintiff could not file a third-party tort action
  against the Department pursuant to 21 V.S.A. § 624(a) (receipt of worker's
  compensation benefits does not preclude action against liable third party). 
  After initially denying the State's motion, the superior court bifurcated
  the case and ordered a bench trial to determine if the State was
  plaintiff's statutory employer.  Following the November 2000 bench trial,
  the court found that plaintiff's job loading trucks was conducted in
  accordance with the warehouse's specifications, designed to provide for
  efficient delivery of liquor to multiple destinations, and that plaintiff's
  work schedule was largely determined by state employees at the warehouse. 
  Based on these and other findings, the court ruled that the State was
  plaintiff's statutory employer and, therefore, immune from further tort
  liability.

       ¶  5.  Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the evidence does not support
  either the court's findings or its ultimate conclusion that the State is
  plaintiff's statutory employer.  In making these arguments, plaintiff
  focuses primarily on the degree to which the State's warehouse supervisor
  had the authority to control plaintiff's work.  Our review of the evidence
  reveals sufficient support for the court's findings, but, for the reasons
  explained below, we focus on the language of § 601(3) and our prior case
  law construing that provision rather than on the degree of control that the
  State had over plaintiff's work.  See Welch v. Home Two, Inc., 172 Vt. 632,
  633, 783 A.2d 419, 421 (2001) (mem.)  (statutory provisions are
  all-embracing in determining whether employee-employer relationship is
  covered by Workers' Compensation Act).

       ¶  6.  Section 601(3) defines the word "Employer" to include "the
  owner or lessee of premises or other person who is virtually the proprietor
  or operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there
  being an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct
  employer of the workers there employed."  As we stated in King v. Snide,
  144 Vt. 395, 400,