Case Title: MAX ALAN ROESCHLEIN V. STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-182

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAX ALAN ROESCHLEIN V. STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 156168 P.3d 468Case Number: 06-182Decided: 10/02/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
MAX ALAN 
ROESCHLEIN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price, II, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

D. Terry 
Rogers, InterimState Public Defender, PDP; 
Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

            

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant 
Attorney General.         
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

            

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; HILL, J., files a specially concurring 
opinion.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Mr. Roeschlein 
was convicted of three counts of delivery of marijuana to minors in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(ii) and 35-7-1036 (LexisNexis 2007).1  He appeals, claiming the district court 
erred by allowing the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b) without holding a hearing and failing to order a new presentence 
investigation report when the report included information about dismissed sexual 
assault charges.  Mr. Roeschlein 
also argues that the affidavit executed by a law enforcement officer was 
insufficient to establish probable cause to support issuance of a warrant to 
search Mr. Roeschlein's home and vehicle.  
We conclude the district court did not err, and, consequently, 
affirm.                         

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Roeschlein 
presents the following issues on appeal:

 
 
[1.] 
Whether Rule 404(b) was violated when testimony was elicited regarding an 
uncharged act of delivery of marijuana. 

 
 
[2.] 
Whether the district court erred when it denied appellant's request for a new 
presentence investigation report.

 
 
[3.] 
Whether the affidavit executed in support of the search warrant was inadequate 
to establish probable cause to search.

 
 
The 
State phrases the issues similarly.  

 
 
FACTS

            

[¶3]      Mr. Roeschlein, 
who was fifty-one years old at the time of trial, owned rental property in 
Gillette, Wyoming.  
Each of his victims was living or staying at one of his rental 
properties.  In June of 2001, Mr. 
Roeschlein hired fourteen-year-old RV to help him hand out bill notices around 
his trailer court.  When they 
finished, they went to Mr. Roeschlein's house and smoked marijuana supplied by 
him.   

 
 
[¶4]      In January and 
February 2005, LF and RF were living in one of Mr. Roeschlein's apartments with 
their mother and her boyfriend.  LF 
was fifteen years old and RF was thirteen years old.  Mr. Roeschlein was remodeling an 
apartment across the hall from their apartment and they often went across the 
hall to watch him work.  Several 
times during these visits, Mr. Roeschlein shared his marijuana with the 
boys.  RF also testified that, on 
one occasion, Mr. Roeschlein sold him a bag of marijuana for $30.      

 
 
[¶5]      Based upon a 
report from a confidential informant that Mr. Roeschlein was providing marijuana 
to minors, an investigator with the Campbell County Sheriff's Office executed an 
affidavit to obtain a warrant to search Mr. Roeschlein's home and vehicle.  After the search, Mr. Roeschlein was 
arrested and charged with several offenses, including one count of delivery of 
marijuana to RF in February 2005; one count of delivery of marijuana to RF on 
February 16, 2005; one count of delivery of marijuana to LF on February 16, 
2005; one count of delivery of marijuana to RV in 2001; a count of delivery of 
marijuana to another minor, LW, in February 2005; and two counts of sexual 
assault against RV and LW.  The 
circuit court ruled there was insufficient evidence to bind Mr. Roeschlein over 
to the district court on the sexual assault charges and, consequently, they were 
dismissed.    

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court convened a jury trial on the charges alleging delivery of marijuana to RV, 
LF, RF and LW.  The State, however, 
moved to dismiss the delivery charge involving LW because he could not be 
located to testify at trial.  At the 
conclusion of the trial, the jury found Mr. Roeschlein guilty of delivery of 
marijuana to RV in 2001 (Count I) and delivery to RF and LF on February 16, 
2005, (Counts III and IV), but not guilty of delivery to RF in February 2005 
(Count II).    

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI).  The probation and parole agent who 
prepared the report quoted the full text of the original probable cause 
affidavit, which included the dismissed sexual assault allegations.  In addition, she recommended against 
probation, partly because of her concern about the sexual assault 
allegations.  Mr. Roeschlein 
objected to the references to the sexual assaults and asked that those portions 
of the report be stricken or a new PSI be prepared.  The district court stated that it would 
not consider the information pertaining to the sexual assaults, but denied the 
request for a new PSI.  The district 
court then sentenced Mr. Roeschlein to serve three to six years on each count, 
with the sentences to run concurrently.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
            
1.         Uncharged Misconduct Evidence 

 
 
[¶8]      The State's 
general theory of the case was that Mr. Roeschlein had delivered the marijuana 
to the minors by sharing his supply of the substance with them.  At trial, however, RF testified that, in 
addition to smoking marijuana with Mr. Roeschlein, he also purchased a bag of 
marijuana from him.  Mr. Roeschlein 
claims the district court erred by allowing the evidence of the sale of 
marijuana to RF to be presented at the trial without conducting a hearing.   Rule 404(b) 
states:

 
 
Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.  

 
 
We have 
adopted a mandatory procedure for testing the admissibility of uncharged 
misconduct evidence.  Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d 332, 340 (Wyo. 2002).  To be 
admissible, 

 
 

(1)               
the 
evidence must be offered for a proper purpose;  (2) the evidence must be relevant;  (3) the probative value of the evidence 
must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice;  and (4) upon request, the trial court 
must instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only 
for the proper purpose for which it was admitted. 

 
 

Id.  See also, Cazier v. State, 2006 WY 153, ¶ 29, 148 P.3d 23, 33 (Wyo. 2006).  The 
determination of whether these requirements are satisfied in any given case is 
to be made by the trial court.  Gleason, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d  at 340.  Our role on appeal is, simply, to decide 
whether admission of the evidence was erroneous.   Id.  
     

 
 
[¶9]      Although Mr. 
Roeschlein did not object to RF's testimony at trial, he had filed a demand for 
notice of 404(b) evidence prior to the trial.  The State did not give notice that it 
intended to introduce evidence of the sale.  We have ruled that "[w]hen a criminal 
defendant has filed a demand for notice of other bad acts evidence the State 
intends to introduce at trial, we consider an objection to any such evidence to 
have been made."  Barker v. State, 2006 WY 104, ¶ 15, 141 P.3d 106, 112 (Wyo. 2006).  See also, Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 34, 152 P.3d 376, 385-86 (Wyo. 2007).  We, 
therefore, review the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence in this 
case using the abuse of discretion standard.  Id.  
  

 
 
[¶10]   The initial question we must answer 
in resolving this case, however, is whether the challenged evidence even falls 
within the purview of Rule 404(b).  
The State claims that it does not because it was part of the evidence of 
a charged crime.  Rule 404 governs 
evidence introduced "only to demonstrate that the defendant has a disposition 
to commit crimes.'" Cazier, ¶ 30, 148 P.3d  at 33-34, quoting Gleason, ¶ 17, 
57 P.3d  at 340.   Using this 
principle, we have ruled that testimony which explains some aspect of the 
charged crime is not uncharged misconduct evidence.  See, e.g., Bromley, ¶ 27, 150 P.3d  at 1211.  We explained this concept in Barker, ¶ 36, 141 P.3d  at 118 (some 
citations omitted), as distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic 
evidence:

 
 
            
"Other act evidence is intrinsic' when the evidence of the other act and 
the evidence of the crime charged are inextricably intertwined' or both acts 
are part of a single criminal episode' or the other acts were necessary 
preliminaries' to the crime charged."  
United 
States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 825 (5th 
Cir.1990).  

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Roeschlein was charged with two 
deliveries to RF:  Count IVdelivery 
to RF on February 16, 2005 (at the same time as the delivery to LF), and Count 
IIdelivery to RF on an unspecified date in February 2005.  At trial, LF testified that he and RF 
had smoked marijuana with Mr. Roeschlein at the apartment he was 
remodeling.  Defense counsel then 
questioned LF as follows:

 
 

Q.                
Okay.  Now, had you ever been to Max 
Roeschlein's house?

 
 

A.                 
In 
Sleepy Hollow?

 
 

Q.                
Uh-huh.

 
 

A.                 
Once, 
but never inside.

 
 

Q.                
Okay.  You and [LW] and your brother [RF] were 
along with Max one day; is that right?  
And he ran in  he parked in the driveway and he ran in and got something 
and came back out?

 
 

A.                 
Yes.

 
 

Q.                
So you 
never went inside the residence?

 
 

A.                 
No.

 
 
On 
redirect examination, the prosecutor questioned LF as follows: 

 
 
Q.        Do you 
recall when it was  you've described for [defense counsel] that apparently at 
some point you and your brother and the defendant take a trip from the apartment 
complex over to his house? 

 
 
A.        
Yes.

 
 
Q.        Do you 
remember when that was in relation to the day that Max got 
arrested?

 
 

A.                 
It's got 
to be at least over two weeks before, or at least a week.

 
 

Q.                
Okay.  And I believe you testified you guys 
drive from the apartment complex to the house in Sleepy Hollow; is that 
right?

 
 

A.                 
Yeah.

 
 

Q.                
And the 
only person that gets out of the car is the defendant?

 
 

A.                 
Yes.

 
 

Q.                
He goes 
inside and gets something and then comes back out?

 
 

A.                 
Yes.

 
 

Q.                
And you 
guys leave?

 
 

A.                 
Yes.

 
 

Q.                
Did you 
observe what it was that he retrieved from his house?

 
 

A.                 
It was a 
bag of weed.

 
 

Q.                
A bag of 
weed.  What's a bag of 
weed?

 
 

A.                 
Marihuana.

 
 

Q.                
Okay.  Did you observe him give that to anyone 
after he got in the car?

 
 

A.                 
My 
brother.

 
 
[¶12]   It was in this context that the 
State elicited the challenged testimony by RF on direct 
examination:

 
 

Q.                
[Prosecutor] 
All right.  Do you recall after this 
first incident of smoking marihuana there in the apartment ever accompanying Mr. 
Roeschlein and going over to his residence, to his house?

 
 

A.                 
Was 
there a time that we went to his house?

 
 

Q.                
Yes.

 
 

A.                 
Yes.

 
 

Q.                
Do you 
recall how it was that you went from your apartment complex over to his 
house?

 
 

A.                 
How did 
we?

 
 

Q.                
Yeah.

 
 

A.                 
We drove 
his truck.

 
 

Q.                
Who all 
went from the apartment complex over to his house?

 
 

A.                 
Me, my 
brother, Max.

 
 

Q.                
When you 
got over to his house  do you know what subdivision it was 
in?

 
 

A.                 
Sleepy 
Hollow.

 
 

Q.                
Okay.  Once you get over to that residence, did 
anyone get out of the truck and go into the house?

 
 

A.                 
Max.

 
 

Q.                
Did 
anyone go with him?

 
 

A.                 
No. Me 
and my brother stayed in the car  in the truck.

 
 

Q.                
Was 
there a particular reason why the three of you were going over 
there?

 
 

A.                 
We were 
going to get some cables, some cables for his TV or something like 
that.

 
 

Q.                
All 
right.  Do you know if he was able 
to find those cables?

 
 

A.                 
Yeah, he 
brought them back in the truck.

 
 

Q.                
Did he 
bring anything else with him?

 
 

A.                 
He 
brought me and my brother a bag.

 
 

Q.                
A bag of 
what?

 
 

A.                 
Marihuana.

 
 

Q.                
Did you 
pay Mr. Roeschlein for those  for that marihuana?

 
 

A.                 
Yes.

 

Q.                
How much 
did you pay him?

 
 

A.                 
$30.

 
 
[¶13]   Mr. Roeschlein claims the testimony 
about the sale was not intrinsic to the charged crime because it was "not at the 
same time as the charged delivery and it was of a different nature than the 
charged delivery."  The record does 
not support his contention.  The 
charge and the jury instructions regarding Count II simply alleged that Mr. 
Roeschlein delivered marijuana to RF in CampbellCounty during the month of February 
2005.  The documents did not state 
whether the alleged delivery occurred by Mr. Roeschlein selling the marijuana to 
RF or sharing it with him.  The 
boys' testimony placed the date of the sale as a week or two prior to Mr. 
Roeschlein's arrest in mid-February 2005.  
The evidence of the sale was, therefore, distinguishable from the 
evidence of the other charged delivery to RF on February 16, 2005, which was 
near the date Mr. Roeschlein was arrested.  
Consequently, the sale evidence pertained to the crime charged in Count 
II and was not, therefore, uncharged misconduct evidence under Rule 
404(b).

 
 
[¶14]   Moreover, even if the evidence did 
fall under Rule 404(b) any error in admitting it without a hearing was harmless 
under W.R.Cr.P. 52 and W.R.A.P. 9.04.2  Mr. Roeschlein claims the evidence could 
have inflamed the jury because it is more egregious for an adult to sell 
marijuana to a minor than to simply share it.  We are not completely convinced by Mr. 
Roeschlein's logic; however, it is unnecessary to delve into his reasoning 
because it is clear any error in admitting the evidence did not affect his 
substantial rights. 

 
 
[¶15]   As we stated earlier, the evidence 
of the sale pertained to Count II, which generally charged a delivery to RF in 
February 2005.  The jury was not 
convinced that Mr. Roeschlein committed that crime, either by sharing the 
marijuana with, or selling it to, RF and, consequently, found him not guilty of 
Count II.  The acquittal on Count II 
is in contrast to the jury's verdict finding Mr. Roeschlein guilty of Counts III 
and IV for delivery of marijuana to both RF and LF on February 16, 2006.    

 
 
[¶16]   Under these circumstances, where 
the challenged testimony was part of the offense charged in Count II and did not 
fall under the ambit of Rule 404(b), we conclude the district court did not err 
by failing to conduct a hearing to determine whether the sale evidence was 
admissible under Rule 404(b). 

 

            
2.         
Sentencing

 
 
[¶17]   We review a district court's 
sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion.  "A sentence will not be disturbed 
because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show an abuse of 
discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, circumstances which manifest 
inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of 
fair play."  Smith v. State, 941 P.2d 749, 750 
(Wyo. 
1997).  See also, Lee v. State, 2001 WY 129, ¶ 10, 36 P.3d 1133, 1138 (Wyo. 2001).  "An error 
warrants reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's 
substantial rights.  The party who 
is appealing bears the burden to establish that an error was prejudicial."  Lee, ¶ 10, 36 P.3d  at 1138, quoting Trusky v. State, 7 P.3d 5, 13 (Wyo. 
2000), which quoted Candelaria v. 
State, 895 P.2d 434, 439-40 (Wyo. 1995) (citations omitted).  

 
 
[¶18]   After the jury returned its 
verdict, the district court ordered a PSI.  
A probation and parole agent from the Wyoming Department of Corrections 
prepared the report which quoted the probable cause affidavit supporting the 
original information.  The probable 
cause affidavit referred to the two sexual assault counts that were dismissed 
after the circuit court determined there was insufficient evidence to bind Mr. 
Roeschlein over to the district court on those counts.  In addition, the "Evaluation & 
Recommendation" section of the PSI included the following 
statement:

 
 
What is 
troubling to this Writer is the Defendant's denial of any wrongdoing at all and 
that he feels he was wrongly convicted.  
It is difficult to determine the extent of the Defendant's inappropriate 
behavior with juveniles and how far that has gone.  . . . Though some of the original 
charges were dismissed, which alleged inappropriate sexual behavior the 
Defendant was involved in with these same juveniles, this Writer cannot, in good 
conscience, simply disregard that information in determining an appropriate 
sentence.  The Defendant's 
unwillingness to discuss any aspects of these charges makes it even more 
difficult to determine what would be best for the protection of society and for 
the Defendant's own rehabilitation needs.

 
 
Therefore, 
this Writer would recommend the Defendant be denied the [privilege] of probation 
at this time.  It is felt the first 
priority is to ensure that the children of this community are safe.  Secondary to that would be the 
Defendant's rehabilitation needs, which could be better assessed in a structured 
environment.

 
 
Mr. 
Roeschlein filed a motion to strike portions of the PSI or, in the alternative, 
for a new PSI.  He complained 
generally about the references to the sexual assault allegations because he 
never had an opportunity to confront the witnesses about those charges.     

 
 
[¶19]   At the sentencing hearing, Mr. 
Roeschlein specifically objected to including the portions of the probable cause 
affidavit pertaining to the sexual assaults in the PSI.  In response to Mr. Roeschlein's 
objection, the district court stated that it did not believe the PSI was 
"inaccurate" because it properly quoted the probable cause affidavit which was 
part of the court record.  
Nevertheless, the district court stated that it would not consider that 
information in its sentencing decision.  
Mr. Roeschlein also objected to the probation agent's reference to the 
sexual assault charges in the evaluation and recommendation section.  The judge did not respond directly to 
that objection. 

 

[¶20]   W.R.Cr.P. 32 governs presentence 
investigations and states, in relevant part:

 
 
(a) Presentence 
Investigation.

 
 
            
(1) When Made.  In every felony case the Department of Probation and 
Parole shall conduct a presentence investigation and submit a report to the 
court.   . . .  In felony cases the investigation and 
report may not be waived but, with the parties' consent, the court may permit 
the report to be filed after sentencing.  
Otherwise, it shall be considered by the court before the imposition of 
sentence or the granting of probation. 

 
 
            
(2) Report.  The report of the presentence investigation shall 
contain:

 
 
     (A) Information about 
the history and characteristics of the defendant, including prior criminal 
record, if any, financial condition, and any circumstances affecting the 
defendant's behavior that may be helpful in imposing sentence or in the 
correctional treatment of the defendant;

 
 
            
* * * *

            

            
(3) Disclosure.

 
 
    (A) . . . The court shall 
afford the defendant and the defendant's counsel an opportunity to comment on 
the report and, in the discretion of the court, to introduce testimony or other 
information relating to any alleged factual inaccuracy contained in 
it.

 
 
            
* * * *

 
 
(C) If 
the comments of the defendant and the defendant's counsel or testimony or other 
information introduced by them allege any factual inaccuracy in the presentence 
investigation report or the summary of the report or part thereof, the court 
shall, as to each matter controverted, make:

 
 
            
(i) A finding as to the allegation; or

 
 
          
(ii) A determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter 
controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing.  A written record of such findings and 
determinations shall be appended to and accompany any copy of the presentence 
investigation report thereafter made available to penal 
institutions.

 
 
[¶21]   On appeal, Mr. Roeschlein claims 
that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to order a new PSI 
that did not include the information from the probable cause affidavit about the 
dismissed sexual assault charges or a recommendation tainted by that 
information.  Mr. Roeschlein 
maintains that the district court misunderstood his objection to the PSI:  "Defense counsel was not stating that 
the probable cause was inaccurate.  
Defense counsel was arguing that since there were two counts which were 
not bound over to the district court, one count dismissed prior to trial and 
another count Mr. Roeschlein was acquitted on, the presentence investigation 
report should not contain that information."     

 
 
[¶22]   Mr. Roeschlein argued that the 
district court was required, by our decision in Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, 78 P.3d 257 
(Wyo. 2003), to order a new PSI in his case.  In Bitz, we ruled that the district court 
erred by considering, over the defendant's objection, dismissed charges 
referenced in the PSI in making its sentencing decision without first complying 
with W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C).  Bitz, ¶ 17, 78 P.3d  at 261.  In contrast to the situation in Bitz, when Mr. Roeschlein objected to 
the inclusion in the PSI of the information from the probable cause affidavit 
pertaining to the dismissed charges, the district court ruled that it would not 
consider the dismissed charges in its sentencing decision.  Thus, regardless of whether or not the 
district court fully understood Mr. Roeschlein's objection, its ruling complied 
with the requirements of Rule 32(a)(3)(C)(ii).  

 
 
[¶23]   Mr. Roeschlein also claims that he 
is entitled to a new PSI and another sentencing hearing because the district 
court did not strike the probation agent's recommendation that was based, at 
least partly, upon the dismissed sexual assault charges.  Although the district court did not 
specifically address Mr. Roeschlein's objection to the probation agent's 
recommendation, we are confident that, after stating it would not consider the 
dismissed charges in its sentencing decision, the court also disregarded the 
agent's recommendation to the extent it relied upon those charges.  

 
 
[¶24]   In any event, there is no 
indication that the district court blindly relied upon the probation agent's 
recommendation in deciding upon Mr. Roeschlein's sentences.  The court's rationale for the sentences 
was well-reasoned and aptly stated.  
The judge specifically stated that he would not consider the dismissed 
charges and recognized that the jury returned a "not guilty" verdict on one 
count of delivery to RF.      

 
 
[¶25]   The district court then reviewed 
the evidence presented at trial concerning the counts for which Mr. Roeschlein 
was convicted.  The judge noted the 
legislature had adopted enhanced penalties for adults who deliver controlled 
substances to minors, stating the maximum jail sentence under the statute was 
twenty years per count.  The 
district court carefully addressed the defendant's request for probation, 
stating that "[b]ecause of the seriousness of the offense and the involvement of 
minors, I'm going to find that the defendant is not a good candidate for 
probation at this time."  
Ultimately, the judge sentenced Mr. Roeschlein to serve three to six 
years of incarceration on each count, and, rejecting the State's argument that 
the sentences should run consecutively, he ordered them to be concurrent.    

 
 
[¶26]   The record is clear that the 
district court thoughtfully evaluated Mr. Roeschlein's situation and crimes and 
imposed sentences well within, and in fact at the lower end of, the range 
approved by the legislature.  There 
is no indication that the district court was improperly influenced by the 
dismissed charges.  Instead, the 
record demonstrates that the district court properly exercised its discretion in 
imposing sentence against Mr. Roeschlein.  

 
 
            
3.         
Search Warrant 
Affidavit

 
 

[¶27]   Mr. Roeschlein claims that the 
affidavit given by a law enforcement officer in support of the search warrant 
was insufficient to establish probable cause.  Mr. Roeschlein did not challenge the 
adequacy of the affidavit in a motion to suppress in the district court.  Moreover, the 
affidavit is not part of the record on appeal and, according to the parties, was 
not part of the record delivered to the district court when the case was bound 
over.  Mr. Roeschlein, however, 
attached the affidavit to his appellate brief.  

 
 
[¶28]   We have consistently ruled that 
"[a]n appellant bears the burden of bringing to the reviewing court a 
sufficient record on which to base its decision,' Aragon 
[v. Aragon], 
2005 WY 5, ¶ 20, 104 P.3d [756,] 761 [Wyo. 2005], and he cannot supplement the 
appellate record by attaching documents to his brief."  Barnes v. Barnes, 998 P.2d 942, 945 
(Wyo. 2000).  CJ v. SA, 2006 WY 49, ¶ 10, n. 1, 132 P.3d 196, 201 (Wyo. 2006).  See also, Hornecker v. State, 977 P.2d 1289, 
1291-92 (Wyo. 
1999).  The rules of appellate 
procedure provide a basis for supplementing the official record, and we will not 
condone a party's failure to utilize the rules by considering documents which 
are simply attached to a brief.  See, e.g., W.R.A.P. 3.04; Follett v. State, 2006 WY 47, ¶ 6, n. 1, 
132 P.3d 1155, 1158, n. 1 (Wyo. 2006).   Because the probable cause 
affidavit is not included in the official record, we refuse to consider its 
sufficiency on appeal.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶29]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion by failing to conduct a 404(b) hearing concerning the 
admissibility of RF's testimony about Mr. Roeschlein's sale of marijuana to 
him.  The testimony was part of the 
evidence about a charged delivery and, consequently, was not "other misconduct" 
evidence mandating a hearing under Rule 404(b).   Furthermore, Mr. Roeschlein was 
not prejudiced by admission of the testimony because the jury acquitted him on 
the charge related to that evidence.

 
 
[¶30]   In addition, the district court 
properly complied with W.R.Cr.P. 32 when it stated that it would not consider 
the information in Mr. Roeschlein's presentence investigation report pertaining 
to the dismissed sexual assault charges.  
The district court did not, therefore, abuse its discretion by refusing 
to order a new presentence investigation report. 

 
 
 [¶31]  Affirmed. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) states:

 
 
            
(a) Except as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to 
manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a 
controlled substance.  Any person 
who violates this subsection with respect to:

 
 
            
 * * * 
*

 
 
                       
(ii) Any other controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II or III, 
is guilty of a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten 
(10) years, fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or 
both;

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1036(a) states, in relevant part: 

 
 
Any 
person eighteen (18) years of age or over who violates W.S. 35-7-1031(a) by 
distributing any other controlled substance listed in Schedules I, II, III, to a 
person under eighteen (18) years of age who is at least three (3) years his 
junior is punishable by the fine authorized by W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(ii), by a term 
of imprisonment up to twice that authorized by W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(ii), or 
both.

            

2W.R.Cr.P. 
52(a) and W.R.A.P. 9.04 both state that "any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded."

 
 
 
 

HILL, 
Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 
[¶32]   I write separately because I do not 
agree that we should affirm this case because the affidavit is not in the 
record.  Rather, I would affirm on 
the merits because the affidavit in support of the search warrant is 
adequate.

 
 
[¶33]   W.R.Cr.P. 41(f) provides:    
"(f) Filing of papers with 
clerk.  The judicial officer who 
has issued a search warrant shall attach to the warrant the copy of the return, 
inventory and all of the papers in connection therewith and shall file them with 
the clerk of the district or circuit court in the county in which the property 
was seized."

 
 
[¶34]   For this reason, I would not 
decline to treat Roeschlein's issue on its merits.  The papers should be in the record, and 
it was not Roeschlein's responsibility to get them there.  Taking that one step further, it was 
certainly the responsibility of both trial counsel and appellate counsel to see 
to it that the record was complete in this regard.  It is most difficult to discern an 
adequate excuse for such an oversight.  
In the fulfillment of our responsibility, I would direct the clerk of the 
district court to forward the missing papers to this Court and have them added 
to the record on appeal.  Upon 
receipt of those papers, I would assess the issue on its merits and affirm the 
judgment and sentence.