Case Title: Reynolds v. Armstead

Citation: 443 P.2d 990

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1968-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
443 P.2d 990 (1968) Merrill REYNOLDS and Bernarr G. Roper, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Richard L. ARMSTEAD, d/b/a Armstead Masonry Company, Defendant in Error. No. 23268. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. July 22, 1968. Klauber, Kayne & Kerner, Boulder, for plaintiffs in error. No appearance for defendant in error. MOORE, Chief Justice. Richard L. Armstead, doing business as Armstead Masonry Company, brought this action on account against the plaintiff in error herein, Bernarr G. Roper. The Boulder County district court entered an amended judgment for $267.62 in Armstead's favor, from which Roper brings the present writ of error. The record shows, and the district court accordingly found, that the parties had entered into an oral contract whereby Roper agreed to pay $535.25 for Armstead's construction of a brick veneer as an addition to Roper's house. Armstead expressly promised to use new brick matching as closely as possible the color and appearance of Roper's existing brickwork. The district court found that Armstead breached the oral contract by failing to use brick which reasonably conformed to Roper's brickwork, although Armstead's veneer was in all other respects of sound construction. The judgment of the district court originally awarded Armstead the contract price of $535.25, less damages of $80 accruing to Roper by reason of Armstead's breach. On Roper's motion for new trial, however, the court heard further testimony of damages resulting from Armstead's failure to perform, reassessed Roper's damages at $267.63, and entered an amended judgment in Armstead's favor for $267.62that is, the contract price of $535.25 less damages of $267.63. *991 This court has repeatedly held that a contractor may recover the agreed price for substantial performance of his contract, subject to a deduction for damages for the contractor's failure to adhere to the contract in minor details. See Campbell v. Koin, 154 Colo. 425, 391 P.2d 365; Zambakian v. Leson, 77 Colo. 183, 234 P. 1065; Louthan v. Carson, 63 Colo. 473, 168 P. 656; Morris v. Hokosona, 26 Colo.App. 251, 143 P. 826. The question presented here, however, is whether as a matter of law Armstead substantially performed his contract with Roper, and therefore became entitled to a recovery on the contract. Our authorities judiciously decline to state a formula determining with mathematical certainty what constitutes substantial performance, but instead rely upon the application of general principles. Thus, in Morris v. Hokosona, supra, we stated: And in Newcomb v. Schaeffler, 131 Colo. 56, 279 P.2d 409: In the instant case the trial court, in legal effect, found that there had not been a substantial compliance with the terms of the contract, and that to the extent of fifty per cent of the contract price there was a failure to perform. Armstead's failure to install brick which reasonably matched the existing veneer damaged the appearance of Roper's house to the extent of half the value of the contract. The parties entered into their agreement with the acknowledged intent that Armstead's brickwork should be aesthetically, as well as functionally, acceptable. Consequently, we hold that as a matter of law Armstead's breach was material and cannot be deemed a "slight and trivial defect" "not materially detracting from the benefit the other party would derive from a literal performance." Armstead's failure to substantially perform his contract deprived him of the right to recover under the "theory" of express contract. However we are not concerned with the "theory" upon which an action is tried where, as here, all the pertinent evidence is presented without objection. In Bridges v. Ingram, 122 Colo. 501, 223 P.2d 1051, we find the following pertinent language: In the instant case the complaint was sufficient to give notice to the defendants concerning the transaction upon which the claim was based. All the evidence pertinent to determining the rights of the parties was presented. If upon any "theory" the plaintiff had established a right to relief, "the cause should proceed to judgment." Upon a "theory" of quantum meruit the plaintiff, under the evidence, was entitled to the judgment entered by the trial court. The judgment is affirmed. DAY, J., not participating.