Case Title: N. Royalton City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision

Citation: 2011-Ohio-3092

Docket Number: 20092057

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as N. 
Royalton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 
2011-Ohio-3092.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-3092 
NORTH ROYALTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE, 
v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES;  
RISER FOODS COMPANY, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as N. Royalton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. 
of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-3092.] 
Real property taxation — Recent, arm’s-length sale — Sale of property was 
recent and at arm’s length, even though sale price was negotiated seven 
years before sale was consummated. 
(No. 2009-2057 — Submitted June 21, 2011 — Decided June 30, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2006-M-1421. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, the property owner, Riser Foods Company 
(“Riser”), challenges a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) in which 
the BTA determined the true value of Riser’s real estate to be $450,000 for tax 
year 2005, rather than  $73,700 as determined by the county auditor and the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (“BOR”).  The BTA’s determination of 
value is predicated on the price paid for the property in 2005 in accordance with a 
buy-out option agreed to by the parties in a ground lease.  The ground lease was 
entered into on December 16, 1998, and ownership was transferred in December 
2005.1  The BTA regarded the buy-out-option price as a recent, arm’s-length sale 
price that furnished the criterion of value for the property as of January 1, 2005, 
pursuant to R.C. 5713.03. 
{¶ 2} On appeal, Riser advances several reasons why the $450,000 buy-
out-option price does not reflect a recent, arm’s-length sale price under R.C. 
5713.03.  Riser argues that the school board had the burden of proving that the 
sale price was probative of value, both because it was the appellant at the BTA 
and because the sale was a transaction between “related parties.”  Riser contends 
that the fact that seven years lapsed between the 1998 contract and the 2005 
transfer of the property shows that the sale was not recent, and Riser contests the 
characterization of the sale as an open-market sale and a voluntary sale, urging 
that it did not qualify as an arm’s-length transaction. 
{¶ 3} Riser’s arguments are not well taken, and we therefore affirm the 
decision of the BTA. 
I. Facts 
{¶ 4} The auditor assigned a value of $73,700 to the property for 2005.  
The school board filed a complaint against that valuation on March 28, 2006, 
seeking an increase to $450,000 in true value based on a sale of the property in 
December 2005.  A hearing was held before the BOR on August 23, 2006, at 
which the school board presented the conveyance-fee statement showing a 
                                                 
1 A “ground lease” is a “lease that grants the right to use and occupy land.”  American Institute of 
Real Estate Appraisers, The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal (1984) 146.  In the present case, 
the contract is captioned “ground lease,” but it is actually a ten-year lease with a sale to the lessee 
to occur at the end of the lease.  The contract includes a buy-out option exercisable at any time by 
the seller. 
 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
transfer from Gregory and Vincenza Caniglia to Riser for a consideration of 
$450,000. 
{¶ 5} In response, Riser presented a so-called ground lease dated 
December 16, 1998.  Riser argued that the sale was neither recent nor at arm’s 
length, given that the price was specified in a buy-out option as part of the 1998 
ground lease, and that the sale was part of “like-kind exchange” under Section 
1031, Title 26, U.S.Code.  For its part, the school board argued that the sale price 
reflected on the conveyance-fee statement should be adopted as the value of the 
property for 2005 and urged that the statements regarding value made by Riser’s 
counsel on behalf of its client, Riser, were not admissible, because the school 
board did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the client. 
{¶ 6} The BOR retained the auditor’s valuation, and the school board 
appealed to the BTA.  At the BTA, a stipulation was filed through which Riser, 
the BOR, and the school board agreed to the admissibility, the authenticity, and 
the truth of the facts contained in the ground lease.  The BTA held no hearing, and 
the parties reasserted their positions to the BTA by brief. 
{¶ 7} The ground lease presented to the BOR2 is a contract dated 
December 16, 1998, and executed on that date between Gregory and Vincenza 
Caniglia as landlord and Giant Eagle, Inc., as tenant.3  It contemplated the 
adaptation of the .501-acre site into a parking area for a neighboring Giant Eagle 
store.  The lease stated a ten-year term and specified a rent of $34,600 per lease 
                                                 
2 The stipulation filed at the BTA recites that the ground lease is attached, but in the record 
certified by the BTA that copy of the ground lease is missing.  We therefore rely on the copy of 
the ground lease presented to the BOR, which we assume is the same. 
 
3 Also attached to the letter were a December 18, 1998 Memorandum of Ground Lease that was 
recorded on January 5, 1999, and an Assignment and Assumption of Reliquished Property dated 
December 29, 2005 documenting an assignment from the Caniglias to Surety 1031 Exchange, Inc.  
These documents were not subject to the stipulation at the BTA, and in a footnote the BTA 
concluded that Riser Foods was an assignee of Giant Eagle, Inc.’s interest in the ground lease.  In 
this opinion, the term “Riser” refers to Riser Foods or to Giant Eagle, Inc., as appropriate given 
the context. 
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4 
 
year for the first five years and $37,500 per year for the second five years.  
Throughout the term of the lease, the tenant was responsible for repairs, utilities, 
and taxes.  The contract conferred on the landlord a “buy-out option,” under 
which it could require the tenant to purchase the property for $400,000 during the 
first five years of the contract term or $450,000 during the second five years.  
Another contract provision provided that if the buy-out option were not exercised 
during the term of the lease, the landlord was to sell and the tenant was to buy the 
property at the price of $450,000 at the end of the lease term. 
{¶ 8} On October 13, 2009, the BTA issued its decision.  The BTA 
considered and rejected several arguments advanced by Riser that the $450,000 
purchase price did not furnish the criterion of value of the property pursuant to 
R.C. 5713.03.  First, the BTA rejected the contention that the purchase had not 
been voluntary, or had occurred under duress.  Although the sale was obligatory 
under the terms of the 1998 ground lease, the BTA saw no reason to conclude that 
the underlying lease agreement itself was anything but voluntary.  Second, the 
BTA rejected the contention that the sale was not arm’s-length on account of the 
overarching relationship between the parties created by the ground lease.  Here, 
the BTA found that the parties had acted in their own best interest, and it treated 
the arm’s-length character of the underlying lease agreement as dispositive of the 
arm’s-length character of the sale.  Third, the BTA rejected the contention that 
because the sale was a like-kind-exchange sale pursuant to Section 1031, Title 26, 
U.S.Code, it was not an arm’s-length sale.  In this regard, the BTA relied upon a 
previous decision in which the presence of a like-kind exchange did not prevent 
the use of the sale price as the criterion of value. 
{¶ 9} Finally, the BTA rejected the contention that because the buy-out-
option price was agreed to in 1998, the actual resulting sale in 2005 was not 
“recent.”  Here, the BTA relied on one of its previous decisions and on the 
general preference of the law for using a sale price. 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
{¶ 10} Because it found that Riser had not impugned the recency or 
arm’s-length character of the sale, the BTA used the sale price of $450,000 as the 
criterion of value of the property as of January 1, 2005.  Riser timely appealed, 
and we now affirm. 
II. Analysis 
{¶ 11} R.C. 5713.03 states the general rule that when a “tract, lot, or 
parcel has been the subject of an arm’s length sale between a willing seller and a 
willing buyer within a reasonable length of time, either before or after the tax lien 
date, the auditor shall consider the sale price * * * to be the true value for taxation 
purposes.”  Under this provision “ ‘the uniform rule [in real property taxation] is 
that property should be valued in accordance with an actual sale price where the 
criteria of the recency and the arm’s-length character of the sale are satisfied.’ ”  
Woda Ivy Glen Ltd. Partnership v. Fayette Cty. Bd. of Revision, 121 Ohio St.3d 
175, 2009-Ohio-762, 902 N.E.2d 984, ¶ 21, quoting Cummins Property Servs., 
L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 117 Ohio St.3d 516, 2008-Ohio-1473, 885 
N.E.2d 222, ¶ 25.  Moreover, when a school board seeks an increase in property 
valuation, its presentation of basic evidence of the sale and the sale price such as 
the conveyance-fee statement usually suffices to place a burden on the owner to 
rebut that the sale price is the value.  FirstCal Indus. 2 Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. 
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 125 Ohio St.3d 485, 2010-Ohio-1921, 929 N.E.2d 
426, ¶ 23, 25.  In such cases, the “basic documentation of [the] sale invokes a 
‘rebuttable presumption’ that ‘the sale has met all the requirements that 
characterize true value.’ ”  FirstCal at ¶ 24, quoting Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 325, 327, 677 N.E.2d 
1197. 
{¶ 12} Although presenting documentation of the sale and the sale price 
generally raises the presumption that the sale price reflects the value of the 
property, that presumption can be rebutted if the recency or the arm’s-length 
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character of the sale is successfully challenged.  Cummins Property Servs. at ¶ 13.  
And the rebuttal may lie within the documentation associated with the sale.  See 
Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 127 Ohio 
St.3d 63, 2010-Ohio-4907, 936 N.E.2d 489, ¶ 5, 21 (settlement statement showed 
that sale involved a foreclosure sale by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, which called into question the voluntary character of the sale). 
{¶ 13} In the present case, the dispute centers on whether the December 
2005 sale price that was negotiated as part of the December 1998 ground lease 
qualifies as the price in a recent, arm’s-length transaction for purposes of R.C. 
5713.03. 
A. As the opponent of using the sale price as the criterion of value, 
Riser had the initial burden to show that the 2005 sale 
was either not recent or not at arm’s length 
{¶ 14} At the outset, we address Riser’s third proposition of law, under 
which Riser contends that the BTA should have put the burden on the school 
board to “establish that the transfer was probative evidence of value despite the 
fact that the sale was negotiated seven years before [the] lien date and by related 
parties.”  Riser predicates this argument on the fact that the BOR rejected the 
school board’s contention that the sale price established the value of the property. 
{¶ 15} It is true that the appellant at the BTA typically bears the burden to 
establish a different valuation from the one determined below, Colonial Village, 
Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 123 Ohio St.3d 268, 2009-Ohio-4975, 
915 N.E.2d 1196, ¶ 23.  But when the issue is whether a proffered sale price 
should be used to value the property, the burden at the BTA is usually on the 
same party who bore that burden at the BOR: the opponent of using the sale price.  
Cummins Property Servs., 117 Ohio St.3d 516, 2008-Ohio-1473, 885 N.E.2d 222. 
{¶ 16} That burden does not shift at the BTA even if the BOR decided not 
to use the sale price as the criterion of value.  In Worthington City Schools Bd. of 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 27, 2009-Ohio-5932, 918 
N.E.2d 972, the board of revision had rejected the sale price as the value of the 
property at issue.  Id. at ¶ 11.  The property owner contended that the board of 
education had the burden at the BTA to show that the proposed sale price was 
indicative of value.  Id. at 27.  But we rejected that contention, holding that “the 
BTA was justified in viewing the conveyance-fee statement and the deed that the 
school board had presented to the BOR as constituting a prima facie showing of 
value.”  Id. at ¶ 28.  By the same token, the conveyance-fee statement on which 
the school board relies in the present case formed an adequate basis for the BTA 
to find a recent, arm’s-length sale, subject to rebuttal by Riser. 
{¶ 17} Thus, the burden at the BTA lay on Riser to show why the price 
reported for the 2005 sale did not constitute the criterion of value for the property. 
B. Riser failed to negate the recency of the sale 
{¶ 18} Under its first proposition of law, Riser focuses primarily on the 
contention that “the instant matter does not involve a recent, arm’s-length sale 
because the sale price was agreed upon seven years prior to the lien date and 
[was] thus not reflective of current market conditions as of January 1, 2005.”  As 
a result, according to Riser, the sale did not occur “within a reasonable length of 
time, either before or after the tax lien date” as required by R.C. 5713.03 for using 
the sale price as the true value.  At oral argument, Riser distinguished between the 
“sale” of the property and the “transfer” that occurs pursuant to, or as a part of, 
the “sale.”  According to Riser, the recency of the sale is determined based on the 
time of the negotiation and execution of the contract (here, December 1998), not 
on the date the title to the property is transferred (here, December 2005). 
{¶ 19} Riser is mistaken.  Although the sale price in this case was 
negotiated in 1998, the sale was not consummated until 2005.  R.C. 5713.03 does 
not require that an arm’s-length sale price be negotiated within a reasonable time 
before or after the lien date; it is the time of the sale itself that the “reasonable 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
time” language of the statute addresses.  Whether “sale” is defined as the “transfer 
of property or title for a price,” or as the “agreement by which such a transfer 
takes place,” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed.2009) 1454, the transfer is an 
essential element and the sale has not occurred until the property has been 
transferred. 
{¶ 20} We hold that Riser’s position cannot be reconciled with our 
analysis of the meaning of “recent” in HIN, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 481, 2010-Ohio-687, 923 N.E.2d 1144.  In HIN, the 
court confronted a situation in which two sales of a property had occurred close to 
the tax-lien date, one before and one after that date.  After determining that R.C. 
5713.03 required that the sale closest to the lien date be presumed to be indicative 
of the property’s value, the court considered which element in the sale transaction 
should determine the point in time that each of the sales had occurred for purposes 
of applying the statute.  Id. at ¶ 20-23.  The court concluded that the “auditor 
should use the date that the real property conveyance-fee statement is filed in the 
auditor’s office as the sale date of the property” under R.C. 5713.03.  Id. at ¶ 24.  
In so holding, the court specifically rejected the contention that the time the sale 
price was negotiated was a better date to use in determining the recency of the 
sale.  Id. at ¶ 22.  The reason the court chose the date that the conveyance-fee 
statement was filed lay in the fact that, by law, the auditor must be informed about 
the sale as an event affecting the value of the property; indeed, the statutes require 
the filing of the conveyance-fee statement in part so that the auditor has notice of 
the sale for tax-valuation purposes. 
{¶ 21} Under HIN, L.L.C., December 29, 2005, is the date of the sale in 
this case.  Because the sale occurred within a year after the tax-lien date, and 
because Riser offered no evidence of a change in market conditions between the 
lien date and the filing of the conveyance-fee statement, the sale was “recent” for 
purposes of R.C. 5713.03. 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
{¶ 22} In so holding, we do not mean to say that evidence of market 
change between the date the sale price was negotiated and the date the sale was 
consummated or a change to the property itself would never be relevant to 
whether the sale price constitutes the value of the property under R.C. 5717.03.  
However, such evidence is relevant to the voluntary character of the sale, which is 
discussed below, rather than to the sale’s recency. 
{¶ 23} For the foregoing reasons, Riser failed to show that the December 
2005 sale was not within a reasonable time after the January 1, 2005 tax-lien date 
for tax-valuation purposes. 
C. Riser did not show that the long-standing contractual obligation to  
purchase made the sale involuntary or that a lack of open-market  
elements was significant 
{¶ 24} An 
arm’s-length 
transaction 
possesses 
three 
primary 
characteristics: it is “ ‘voluntary, i.e., without compulsion or duress; it generally 
takes place in an open market; and the parties act in their own self-interest.’ ”  
Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 112 Ohio St.3d 309, 
2007-Ohio-6, 859 N.E.2d 540, ¶ 13, quoting Walters v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Revision 
(1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 23, 25, 546 N.E.2d 932.  Under Riser’s second proposition 
of law, Riser asserts that the 2005 sale was not voluntary, because under the 1998 
ground lease the “parties were compelled to comply with the buy-out provisions 
in the lease when the option was exercised, despite the fact that the buy-out price 
was determined in 1998.”  To this contention Riser adds that “the transfer did not 
take place on the open market.”  Neither of these contentions establishes legal 
error in the BTA’s decision. 
1. Riser did not prove duress 
{¶ 25} As noted, a sale must be voluntary to be at arm’s-length, 
Strongsville, ¶ 13, and R.C. 5713.03 underscores that requirement by demanding 
that the sale occur between “a willing seller and a willing buyer.”  In essence, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
Riser asserts that the contractual obligation to purchase under the ground lease 
negates the voluntary element and reflects duress. 
{¶ 26} Of course the contractual obligation to purchase does not establish 
duress as a general matter.  Most sales occur pursuant to a sale contract, and the 
mere fact that the parties obligate themselves before actually transferring the 
property does not negate the voluntary character of the sale, nor establish that the 
sale did not occur on an open market. 
{¶ 27} What makes the present case atypical is the duration of the sales 
contract—i.e., the unusual length of time between the agreement on the sale price 
and the consummation of the sale.  Riser argues that the longer the lapse of time 
between the negotiation of a sale price and the consummation of the sale, the 
more likely it is that the character of the property or the market for that property 
has changed.  See Quarto Mining Co. v. Litman (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 73, 87, 71 
O.O.2d 58, 326 N.E.2d 676 (the owner of mineral rights and accompanying 
option to purchase was entitled to compel the sale of some of the surface land, but 
the price agreed on decades before had to be adjusted to reflect current market 
value).  Riser proposes that the court adopt a six-year bright-line rule, under 
which a lapse of six years between the execution of a sales contract and the tax-
lien date would raise a presumption that the sale price does not reflect true value. 
{¶ 28} Although the time between the 1998 ground lease and the 2005 
sale is lengthy, the record does not suggest any frustration of contractual 
expectations on the part of either party to the 1998 ground lease.  That agreement 
expressly provided the purchaser with the opportunity to develop the property as a 
parking area for its store.  Nor has Riser presented any evidence of changes in 
market conditions from 1998 to 2005 that affected the property or of changes to 
the property during that time that would indicate that the contract price does not 
reflect the property’s value.  Because the 1998 contract contemplated the 
adaptation of the property as a parking lot, and because that development 
January Term, 2011 
11 
 
apparently occurred, there is no basis for concluding that the agreed price does not 
reflect the property’s value. 
2. The lack of elements of an open-market sale did not negate the  
arm’s-length character of the sale 
{¶ 29} As for the open-market character of the sale, we have held that an 
arm’s-length transaction is one that “ ‘generally takes place in an open market.’ ” 
(Emphasis added.)  Strongsville, 112 Ohio St.3d 309, 2007-Ohio-6, 859 N.E.2d 
540, ¶ 13, quoting Walters, 47 Ohio St.3d at 25, 546 N.E.2d 932.  The case law 
does not condition character of a sale as an arm’s-length transaction on whether 
the property was advertised for sale or was exposed to a broad range of potential 
buyers.  See Walters at 26 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment only) 
(distinguishing “private sale” transactions from open-market sales and asserting 
that “[p]rivate sale transactions which are at arm’s length occur every day”). 
{¶ 30} After Walters, the BTA in a long line of cases has correctly applied 
the definition of arm’s-length transaction to “private sales,” i.e., sales that do not 
bear the indicia of open-market transactions.4  Although the presence of open-
market elements definitely militates in favor of finding a transaction to have been 
at arm’s length, the BTA decisions establish that their absence does not 
necessarily negate the arm’s-length character of the transaction. 
{¶ 31} As a result, the arm’s-length character of the sale provision of the 
ground lease is not impugned by the fact that the seller may not have solicited 
offers from purchasers other than the nearby Giant Eagle, which wanted to use the 
property as a parking lot. 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Al Gammarino v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (Oct. 7, 2008), B.T.A. No. 2006-A-
1711, 2008 WL 4561471, *3-4; DiVincenzo v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Revision (Aug. 26, 2008), BTA 
Nos. 2006-A-1107 and 2007-A-1514, 2008 WL 3999500, *4-5; Caleb & Joshua, L.L.C. v. 
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (June 1, 2007), BTA No. 2006-A-480, 2007 WL 1650691, *4; 
Beatley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (June 18, 1999), BTA Nos. 97-M-262 and 97-M-263, 
1999 WL 416995, *5; MACQ, Inc. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Revision (Sept. 11, 1998), BTA No. 96-
K-1457, 1998 WL 637991, *3; Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (Feb. 16, 
1990), BTA No. 88-C-1105, 1990 WL 35143, *5. 
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D. Riser failed to present a specific argument in support of its contention that the 
seller and buyer under the ground lease should be deemed related parties 
{¶ 32} Riser also challenges the arm’s-length character of the sale by 
characterizing the landlord-seller (the Caniglias) and the tenant-buyer (Riser) 
under the ground lease as “related parties.”  Although Riser’s argument in support 
of this contention is vague, Riser does assert that the seller and buyer were related 
because they were landlord and tenant under the ground lease.  Because the buyer 
and seller were related, Riser argues, the $450,000 sale price was not the result of 
an arm’s-length transaction for purposes of R.C. 5713.03.  Riser argues that the 
relationship proves that the transaction was not an arm’s-length sale, or at a 
minimum, shifts the burden back to the school board to show that the sale price 
agreed to by the related parties reflected the property’s true value.  Either way, 
Riser would prevail, because the school board has not introduced evidence of the 
sale beyond the conveyance-fee statement. 
{¶ 33} As already noted, one primary characteristic of an arm’s-length 
sale is that the parties act in their own self-interest.  Strongsville, 112 Ohio St.3d 
309, 2007-Ohio-6, 859 N.E.2d 540, ¶ 13.  The allegation that the parties to a sale 
are related bears on whether they are self-interested for purposes of R.C. 5713.03.  
That is so because related parties may be pursuing the identical interest of 
common owners rather than acting as separately interested, typically motivated 
actors in the marketplace.  See Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision (Jan. 18, 1990), Franklin App. No. 89AP-448, 1990 WL 2926, *3 (“The 
term ‘arm’s-length transaction’ connotes more than just lack of compulsion on the 
part of the buyer and seller.  It means that the willing parties have disinterested 
interests, i.e., that they stand separate from each other”).  Although in a given 
instance “ ‘related parties can and do effect transfers at fair market prices,’ ” a 
sale transacted between related parties should not qualify as the criterion of value 
without an affirmative demonstration that the price actually reflects fair market 
January Term, 2011 
13 
 
value in spite of the relationship of the parties.  Shiloh Automotive, Inc. v. Levin, 
117 Ohio St.3d 4, 2008-Ohio-68, 881 N.E.2d 227, ¶ 30, quoting the BTA.  In 
Shiloh, this court held that the sale price of personal property from one related 
party to another was properly disregarded when the proponent of using the sale 
price “introduced no evidence outside the purchase price to support its claim that 
the purchase price represented the true value of the assets acquired.”  As the 
Tenth District has explained, “[c]losely related parties transfer property between 
themselves for various reasons, and the sale price frequently is not freely 
negotiated but, rather, is based upon factors between the parties not connected 
with the value of the property being transferred.”  Columbus Bd. of Edn., *3. 
{¶ 34} Do the parties to the ground lease in this case qualify as related 
parties with respect to the sale?  Beyond the bare reference to the landlord-tenant 
aspect of the ground lease, Riser has offered no explanation for why the parties 
should be considered related.  Absent such an explanation, we regard this issue as 
having been waived, and we decline to address it.  See Util. Serv. Partners, Inc. v. 
Pub. Util. Comm., 124 Ohio St.3d 284, 2009-Ohio-6764, 921 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 53 
(although appellant asserted a takings claim, it effectively waived that point by 
supplying “[n]o argument * * * regarding whether the relevant case law, applied 
to the facts of this case, justifies a decision in [the appellant’s] favor”). 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 35} For the reasons set forth, we reject Riser’s contentions and find 
that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully when it adopted the sale price as the 
value of the property.  We therefore affirm the decision of the BTA. 
Decision affirmed. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Britton, Smith, Peters & Kalail Co., L.P.A., and Karrie M. Kalail, for 
appellee North Royalton City School District Board of Education. 
 
Siegel, Siegel, Johnson & Jennings Co., L.P.A., J. Kieran Jennings, and 
Jason P. Lindholm, for appellant. 
______________________