Case Title: Sochor v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC17-929

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2018-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-929 
____________ 
 
DENNIS SOCHOR, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[March 1, 2018] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
We hereby affirm the denial of Appellant’s third successive motion for 
postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  
Because the motion was legally insufficient on its face and refuted by the record, 
we find that the trial court’s failure to hold a case status conference was harmless 
error, and that no evidentiary hearing was required.  See Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 
985, 999 (Fla. 2009); Rutherford v. State, 926 So. 2d 1100, 1108 (Fla. 2006). 
Additionally, the trial court did not err by summarily denying his claim 
based on newly discovered evidence and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
Sochor alleges that a recent declaration obtained from Marvin Droste details a 
 
 
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confession from Gary Sochor, Appellant’s brother, that Gary was actually “more 
responsible than anyone else” for the murder of Patricia Gifford.  However, the 
declaration itself is inadmissible because it does not fall within a hearsay 
exception.  See Robinson v. State, 707 So. 2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1998); § 90.804(2), 
Fla. Stat.  Accordingly, the declaration from Marvin Droste would not “probably 
produce an acquittal on retrial or yield a less severe sentence.”  Kormondy v. State, 
154 So. 3d 341, 353 (Fla. 2015).  Therefore, the newly discovered evidence claim 
was properly denied.  See id.  Further, the new information obtained from Droste is 
not material under the Brady standard.  See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-
82 (1999).  Viewing the declaration by Droste in the context of the entire record, 
the content of the impeachment evidence against Gary Sochor does not undermine 
our confidence.  See Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 2d 161, 172 (Fla. 2004) (explaining 
that the materiality prong of Brady is satisfied if “there is a reasonable probability 
that this evidence ‘put[s] the whole case in such a different light as to undermine 
confidence in the verdict.’ ” (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 435 (1995)).   
 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief.  
 
It is so ordered.   
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 
and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,  
Paul L. Backman, Judge - Case No. 061986CF015270A88810  
 
Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Rachel Day, Assistant Capital 
Collateral Regional Counsel, Jessica Houston and Jason Kruszka, Staff Attorneys, 
Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Donna M. Perry, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee