Case Title: State v. Price

Citation: 106 Ariz. 433, 477 P.2d 523

Docket Number: 2116

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1970-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
106 Ariz. 433 (1970) 477 P.2d 523 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Sid PRICE, Jr., Appellant. No. 2116. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. December 9, 1970. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Carl Waag, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Lewis & Roca, by Scott E. Little, Phoenix, for appellant. McFARLAND, Justice. Sid Price, Jr., hereinafter referred to as defendant, was tried and convicted of Count I possession of marijuana, and Count II sale of marijuana to one Edwin Scott. He was sentenced to serve not less than two nor more than three years on Count I and not less than five nor more than seven years on Count II, sentences to run concurrently. From the judgment and sentence he appeals. Officer Scott met the defendant at approximately 9 P.M. on December 30, 1968. After conversation the officer followed the defendant to a different location where he left the officer and entered some apartments. When he returned he informed the officer that the man he went to see at the apartment was not at home and suggested the officer meet him at 10:30 that evening, telling him he would have the marijuana for him at that time. At the scheduled time they met at the location of the first meeting and again proceeded to the same apartments. The defendant then told the officer "give me the money and I will be right back." The officer handed the defendant $125.00 and he entered the apartment complex. In about five minutes defendant returned with a kilo of marijuana and handed it to the officer. The defendant presents three questions The first contention is governed by: This court has held in construing this section that where marijuana is obtained for the purpose of a sale there is but one transaction which permits but one conviction and sentence. State v. Vallejos, 89 Ariz. 76, 358 P.2d 178; State v. Duplain, 102 Ariz. 100, 425 P.2d 570. In Vallejos, supra, we said: In the instant case it is clear that the defendant went in the apartment returning with marijuana which was sold to the officer. Under these facts it is plain that the possession of the marijuana was obtained for the purpose of the particular sale and that there was but one transaction. The state in its brief in support of its contention that there was an additional possession of marijuana referred to the following testimony of the officer: The Attorney General states that this "testimony was sufficient to support an inference that the defendant had in his possession additional marijuana he was capable of delivering upon order." We cannot agree with this construction. The evidence indicates the contrary because he said "he could obtain any amount". We therefore hold that the judgment of the conviction on the first count must be vacated. The questions 2 and 3 relate to the impeachment of the defendant. First by showing criminal conduct of the defendant not relating to the charges pending in the trial which conduct did not result in the conviction of a felony. There appears in the cross-examination of the defendant the following questions and answers: In State v. Johnson, 94 Ariz. 303 at 305, 383 P.2d 862, we said: The testimony of the defendant on cross-examination was made without objection of his counsel. However, we also held in Johnson, supra, that: The particular evidence which the counsel for the defendant contends was error was the testimony in regard to a Mustang car and that of the witness Grace Wells who testified in regard to a conversation which she said she overheard the appellant offer to sell marijuana to her son. This testimony in regard to the Mustang and of Grace Wells' hearing the defendant offer to sell marijuana was objected to by the defendant. The testimony in regard to the Mustang car was collateral and not admissible for impeachment purposes. Section 68, Udall on Evidence; State v. Johnson, and State v. Harris, supra. Grace Wells' testimony in regard to the offer of sale was as follows: The court stated that it also admitted the evidence for impeachment purposes, not only was there not a proper foundation made for the admission of the evidence but it was clearly not admissible for impeachment purposes. This being a collateral issue and highly prejudicial. State v. Reyes, 99 Ariz. 257, 408 P.2d 400, 14 A.L.R.3d 1262; State v. Johnson, supra; State v. Harris, supra. We accordingly hold that the case must be reversed on the second count for re-trial. It is ordered that the judgment of conviction on Count I be and herewith is set aside, and Count II is hereby remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial in accordance with this decision. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and UDALL, J., concur.