Case Title: O'TOOLE v. Brown

Citation: 228 Neb. 321, 422 N.W.2d 350

Docket Number: 

State: nebraska

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Date: 1988-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
422 N.W.2d 350 (1988) 228 Neb. 321 Patrick D. O'TOOLE et al., Plaintiffs, v. Carl D. BROWN et al., Defendants. No. 87-694. Supreme Court of Nebraska. April 21, 1988. Allan J. Eurek of Pierson, Ackerman, Fitchett, Akin & Hunzeker, Lincoln, for plaintiffs. Anne E. Winner of Bruckner, O'Gara, Keating, Sievers & Hendry, P.C., Lincoln, for garnishee. BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, GRANT, and FAHRNBRUCH, JJ. PER CURIAM. The U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska has requested this court to answer questions of state law, pursuant to the provisions of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 24-219 (Reissue 1985), which provides that this court may answer questions of law certified to it by the U.S. District Court if there are questions of Nebraska law which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of this court. The "Background Statement" submitted to this court by the U.S. District Court sets out, in part, the following: *352 After setting out the foregoing "Background Statement," U.S. District Court certifies three questions: The first question certified to this court asks whether the absence of the word "all" in the language of the restrictive endorsement creates an ambiguity with respect to whether the restrictive endorsement applies to coverage B, since it requires legal liability. To answer in the affirmative, we would have to ignore the clear, plain, and unambiguous language of the restrictive endorsement. Plaintiffs seek an answer which would create ambiguity where none exists. The restrictive endorsement expressly excludes "property damage [and] bodily injury ... arising out of the actions of any horses...." The language of the restrictive endorsement is in no way further qualified. It does not say "no coverage for injuries arising out of the actions of any horses except where there is legal liability." We see no reason why this court should add an additional qualification to the plain and unambiguous language of the restrictive endorsement. In Waylett v. United Servs. Auto. Assn., 224 Neb. 741, 745, 401 N.W.2d 160, 163 (1987), we observed: We hold that the absence of the word "all" from the restrictive endorsement does not create ambiguity with respect to the requirement of legal liability. The answer to the first certified question is No. The second question certified to this court asks whether the phrase "arising out of the actions of any horses" is susceptible to more than one interpretation, and, if so, is the restrictive endorsement ambiguous? We hold that on the facts of this case, the phrase is not ambiguous and therefore is not susceptible to more than one interpretation. The restrictive endorsement is drafted in plain, ordinary language. We will not attribute something other than a plain, ordinary meaning. In Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Husker Aviation, Inc., 211 Neb. 21, 26, 317 N.W.2d 745, 748 (1982), we quoted from Stone v. Physicians Casualty Ass'n, 130 Neb. 769, 266 N.W. 605 (1936), as follows: "`It does not follow, however, that the terms of an insurance policy may be distorted from their natural meaning, or that the agreed liability of the insurer should be enlarged into one which only a new contract could have imposed, nor, indeed, that a court should indulge in scholastic subtleties to extend the rights of the insured.'" *353 The answer to the second question is that the phrase "arising out of the actions of any horses" is not ambiguous. The third question asks whether the language of the restrictive endorsement requires more than the existence of a causal connection between the actions of the horses and the accident or injury. The restrictive endorsement uses clear and unambiguous language to specifically exclude injuries "arising out of the actions of any horses." Where the insureds' loss falls within specific exceptions contained in the policy, the court must apply the exception. Roth v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 220 Neb. 612, 371 N.W.2d 289 (1985); Thos v. Employers Mutual Cas. Co., 215 Neb. 424, 338 N.W.2d 784 (1983). Recognizing that we are not here deciding an actual case but, rather, rendering an opinion as to the theoretical meaning of a phrase in an insurance policy under facts recited to us, we do not interpret the language "arising out of" to require more than a causal relationship. Plaintiffs' injuries fall within the exception, and therefore it is this court's opinion that the restrictive endorsement is effective without more than a causal relationship. Again, we cannot and will not create ambiguity where none exists. In Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Husker Aviation, Inc., supra, 211 Neb. at 26, 317 N.W.2d at 748-49, quoting from Lonsdale v. Union Ins. Co., 167 Neb. 56, 91 N.W.2d 245 (1958), we stated: "`[T]he parties to an insurance contract may make the contract in any legal form they desire, and ... insurance companies have the same right as individuals to limit their liability and to impose whatever conditions they please upon their obligations, not inconsistent with public policy. If plainly expressed, insurers are entitled to have such exceptions and limitations construed and enforced as expressed.'" Defendants and garnishee, American Family Mutual Insurance Company, contractually agreed that defendants would bear the risk of any injuries arising out of the actions of horses. In the circumstances presented to us, the phrase "arising out of" is unambiguous. It would be inappropriate for this court to interpret such language as to reassign the risk of loss here to garnishee. To hold that more than a causal connection is required, we would have to attribute something other than the plain and ordinary meaning to the words "arising out of." We apply the plain and ordinary meaning and hold that the phrase "arising out of" does not require more than a causal connection between the accident and the injury. The answer to the third certified question is that the language "arising out of the actions of any horses" does not require more than the existence of a causal connection between the actions of the horses and the accident or injury for the accident or injury to be subject to the terms of the restrictive agreement. JUDGMENT ENTERED. HASTINGS, C.J., not participating.