Case Title: COMO v RHINES

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1982-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. 81-405 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982 GARY COMO, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS. JIM RHINES and SOUND WEST, INC., Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Hirst, Dostal & Withrow, Missoula, Montana Submitted on briefs: February 11, 1982 Decided: MAY 2 7 m a Filed: &@ $ 4 y v Clerk M r . J u s t l c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Oplnion o f t h e Court. T h i s is an a p p e a l from a judgment i s s u e d by t h e D l s t r l c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d ~ c i a l D i s t r i c t , Missoula County, i n which t h e District Court found t h a t a p p e l l a n t s b r e a c h e d a n employment c o n t r a c t w i t h r e s p o n d e n t . The D l s t r i c t C o u r t awarded damages t o respondent a g a i n s t b o t h a p p e l l a n t s i n t h e amount o f $3,754, including $1,000 f o r one month's s a l a r y , $1,754 f o r t r a v e l and moving expenses, and a p e n a l t y of $1,000 as provided by s e c t l o n 39-3-206, MCA. Respondent was a l s o awarded r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s under s e c t i o n 39-3-214, MCA. A p p e l l a n t , J i m Rhines, is p r e s i d e n t and a s t o c k h o l d e r of: Sound West, I n c . (Sound West). Sound West owns a c h a i n of s t o r e s , one i n Missoula, Montana. Respondent, Gary Como, h a s a background i n b u s i n e s s and accounting. I n 1964, he r e c e i v e d a c o l l e g e d e g r e e i n b u s i n e s s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i t h a minor i n a c c o u n t i n g . H e h a s had a b o u t t e n y e a r s o f e x p e r i e n c e as an a c c o u n t a n t and worked w l t h a computer f o r two y e a r s o f t h a t t i m e . From J a n u a r y 1977 to March 1978, respondent worked as a manager o f a f a m i l y r e s t a u r a n t i n S t . P a u l , Minnesota. D e s i r i n g t o f i n d work i n w e s t e r n Montana, r e s p o n d e n t c o n t a c t e d s e v e r a l employment a g e n c i e s i n Missoula, Montana. On A p r i l 1 8 , 1978, an employment agency n o t i f i e d respondent t h a t J i m Rhines a t Sound N e s t w a s l o o k i n g f o r someone w i t h e x p e r i e n c e i n a c c o u n t i n g and computer programming. Respondent c a l l e d Rhines. They b r i e f l y d i s c u s s e d r e s p o n d e n t ' s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and set a d a t e f o r an i n t e r v i e w I n Missoula. Respondent t r a v e l e d t o Missoula by t r a i n and m e t w i t h Rhines on A p r i l 26, 1978. 'The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t a t t h e f i r s t i n t e r v i e w Rhines t o l d r e s p o n d e n t t h a t he wanted an a c c o u n t a n t who could use an IBM computer to handle inven- t o r y , a c c o u n t s payable and bank a c c o u n t s . Rhines claims t h a t , i n f a c t , he wished t o h i r e a computer programmer, n o t an a c c o u n t a n t . Rhines a d m i t s , however, t h a t he n e v e r t o l d r e s p o n d e n t t h i s . A t t h e f i r s t i n t e r v i e w , r e s p o n d e n t ' s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s were d i s c u s s e d . H e m e t w i t h Sound West's a c c o u n t a n t , A 1 Hawley, d i s c u s s e d t h e a c c o u n t i n g system and was shown t h e computer p r i n t o u t s of t h e a c c o u n t i n g programs used by Sound West. H e w a s t o l d by Rhines t o r e t u r n t h e n e x t day. A t t h e second i n t e r v i e w , r e s p o n d e n t c l a i m s , and t h e District Court found, t h a t Rhines t o l d r e s p o n d e n t t h a t he would l i k e t o t a k e him on. Compensation, b e n e f i t s , and d u t i e s of t h e job were t h e n d i s c u s s e d and, a c c o r d i n g to t h e t l n d l n g s o f t h e District C o u r t , a g r e e d upon. Respondent made n o t e s of t h e terms o f h i s employment: h e would be p a i d $1,000 p e r month f o r two months; t h e n $1,200 p e r month, and $1,500 p e r month sometime i n t h e f a l l . Respondent would work f i v e d a y s a week u n l e s s more were n e c e s s a r y . He would have s i x d a y s of p a i d v a c a t i o n . The D i s t r i c t Court concluded t h a t , a s p a r t of t h i s agreement, r e s p o n d e n t ' s moving expenses a s w e l l as e x p e n s e s f o r h i s i n t e r v i e w t r l p would be reimbursed by J i m Rhines and Sound W e s t . The D i s t r i c t Court a l s o found t h a t Rhines dgreed respondent would n o t have t o move from S t . Paul u n t i l J u n e 5, s o h i s c h i l d r e n could f i n i s h scl?ool. Respondent would t h e n s t a r t work as soon as he w a s s e t t l e d . On A p r i l 28, 1978, respondent went to t h e Missoula J o b S e r v i c e and completed an i n t e r s t a t e wage claim. On t h e form, respondent s t a t e d t h a t on A p r i l 26 he had been h i r e d by Sound West as a n a c c o u n t a n t w i t h a s t a r t i n g d a t e o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y June 19, 1978. H e a l s o noted t h a t Sound West was paying f o r t h e move. I n e a r l y June r e s p o n d e n t r e n t e d a t r u c k and moved h i s f a m l l y and t h e i r b e l o n g i n g s to Missoula. On J u n e 9, 1978, r e s p o n d e n t went t o t h e Sound West s t o r e and t o l d Rhines t h a t h l s housing arrangements had n o t worked o u t and he would n o t be a b l e t o b e g i n work f o r two weeks. Respondent t e s t i f i e d , and t h e D i s t r i c t Court found, t h a t Rhines a d v i s e d r e s p o n d e n t t o d o what he had to d o t o s e t t l e i n and t h e n r e p o r t f o r work l a t e r i n t h e month. On o r about June 21, 1978, r e s p o n d e n t r e t u r n e d t o t h e Sound West s t o r e and r e q u e s t e d a d a t e t o s t a r t work. Rhines s e n t r e s p o n d e n t t o Sound West ' s a c c o u n t a n t . The a c c o u n t a n t d l d n o t g i v e a s p e c i f i c d a t e f o r r e s p o n d e n t t o s t a r t work dnd s a i d he would c o n t a c t respondent t h e f o l l o w i n g week. Respondent c o n t i n u e d t o c a l l and p e r s o n a l l y go to t h e Sound West s t o r e t o set a s t a r t i n g d a t e . Rhines was non- committal. Respondent gave Rhines a list of h i s moving e x p e n s e s , b u t Rhines r e f u s e d to pay them. F i n a l l y , on o r about June 30, 1978, Rhines t o l d r e s p o n d e n t he d i d n o t have a l o b a t Sound West. Respondent t h e n began l o o k i n g f o r o t h e r work i n Mlssoula. H e r e c e i v e d temporary work i n J a n u a r y 1979. I n March 1979 he r e c e i v e d permanent employment a s an a c c o u n t a n t with t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Montana, where he remains employed. The D i s t r i c t Court concluded t h a t under t h e above f a c t s J i m Rhines, as t h e p r e s i d e n t and manager of Sound West, o f f e r e d employment to respondent w i t h e x p r e s s t e r m s and respondent a c c e p t e d t h e o f f e r . The D i s t r i c t Court t h e n concluded t h a t Rhines and Sound West, Inc., breached t h i s c o n t r a c t by f a i l i n g t o pay s a l a r y and b e n e f i t s , and f a i l i n g t o a l l o w r e s p o n d e n t t o perform h i s employment. The District Court concluded t h a t r e s p o n d e n t had been h i r e d on a month-to-month b a s i s and awarded r e s p o n d e n t $1,000 i n one month's s a l a r y ; $1,754 i n moving expenses were a l s o awarded a s p a r t o f t h e employment c o n t r a c t . Under s e c t i o n 39-3-206, MCA, t h e D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t Khlnes and Sound West also owed $1,000 a s a p e n a l t y . F l n a l l y , under s e c t i o n 39-3-214, MCA, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t dwarded r e s p o n d e n t a r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y f e e and c o s t s . Both R h i n e s and Sound West were h e l d l i a b l e f o r t h e 1 udgment . A p p e l l a n t s raise t h r e e i s s u e s : 1. Is t h e r e s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e D l s t r l c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t r e s p o n d e n t had a c o n t r a c t o f employment w i t h Sound West, Inc.? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err by a p p l y i n g s e c t l o n s 39-3-206, MCA, and 39-3-214, MCA, t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t a c t i o n ? 3. Did t h e Dlstrict Court e r r by h o l d i n g a p p e l l a n t J i m Rhines l i a b l e f o r r e s p o n d e n t ' s damages? The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s judgment is a f f i r m e d to t h e e x t e n t t h a t a c o n t r a c t w a s agreed upon and breached and t h a t Khlnes 1s p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e f o r damages r e s u l t i n g from t h e breach. The case is remanded, however, f o r a r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f damages. A p p e l l a n t s contend under t h e f i r s t i s s u e t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t "we would l i k e to t a k e you on" is n o t d e f l n i t e o r c e r t a i n and does n o t c o n s t i t u t e an o f f e r . They claim t h a t Sound West had an openlng f o r a computer programmer o n l y . ~ a s t l y , Rhines c l a i m s he t o l d t h e r e s p o n d e n t t h a t he would be h i r e d i n June 197b o n l y i f he were needed. Where t h e e x i s t e n c e of an oral c o n t r a c t is c o n t e s t e d and t h e e v i d e n c e is c o n f l i c t i n g , t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e c o n t r a c t is a q u e s t i o n f o r t h e t r i e r of f a c t . K e i l v. G l a c l e r P a r k , I n c . ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 614 P.2d 502, 505, 37 St.Kep. 1151, 1154. The c r e d i b i l i t y of w i t n e s s e s and t h e weight g i v e n t h e i r t e s t i m o n y are matters e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h i n t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n a n o n j u r y c a s e . h a r r i s v. Harrls ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont. - , 616 P.2d 1099, 1102, 37 St.Rep. 1696, 1699. T h i s Court w i l l not d i s t u r b a judg- ment on a p p e a l where s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e judgment a p p e a r s on t h e r e c o r d . See, K e i l , 614 P.2d a t 505, and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . Here, t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s con- c l u s i o n t h a t an agreement w a s reached between r e s p o n d e n t and Rhines. The D i s t r i c t Court was i n t h e b e s t p o s l t i o n t o weigh t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e t e s t i m o n y and i t chose to b e l i e v e r e s p o n d e n t . R e s p o n d e n t ' s a c t i o n s were t o t a l l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h o s e of a person who, i n good f a i t h , thought he had a job. H e took n o t e s o f t h e terms o f h i s employment. H e f i l l e d o u t a Job S e r v i c e form s t a t i n g t h a t he had a job a s a n a c c o u n t a n t a t Sound West. H e moved h i m s e l f and h i s f a m i l y t o Missoula a t a g r e a t expense. Most i m p o r t a n t l y , however, a r e t h e a d m i t t e d a c t i o n s of Khines and Sound West's a c c o u n t a n t , A 1 Hawley. When r e s p o n d e n t went t o t h e Sound West s t o r e i n e a r l y J u n e , Rhines was t o t a l l y noncommittal. H e d i d not t e l l r e s p o n d e n t a t t h a t time he d i d n o t have a job. I n s t e a d , Rhines r e f e r r e d r e s p o n d e n t t o Bawley, who t e s t i f i e d t h a t he remembered t h a t t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n took p l a c e b u t could n o t remember what w a s s a i d . Respondent's u n c o n t r a d i c t e d t e s t i m o n y is t - h a t he asked Hawley a b o u t a s t - a r t i n g d a t e and Hawley asked him to r e t u r n l a t e r . The above f a c t s amply s u p p o r t t h e District C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a c o n t r a c t was e n t e r e d i n t o between respon- d e n t and m i n e s . A p p e l l a n t s cont-end i n t h e i r second i s s u e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by a p p l y i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s found i n T i t l e 39, Chapter 3, P a r t 2, o f t h e Mont-ana Code Annotated. A p p e l l a n t s ' c o n t e n t i o n is w e l l - taken. I n s e c t . i o n 39-3-201, MCA, " e m p l o y , " " e m p l o y e e , " "employer" and "wages" are d e f i n e d f o r t h i s part.: " ( 2 ) 'Employ' means p e r m i t or s u f f e r to work. " ( 3 ) 'Employee' i n c l u d e s any p e r s o n who works f o r a n o t h e r f o r h i r e . " ( 4 ) ' E m p l o y e r ' i n c l u d e s a n y i n d i v i d u a l , p a r t n e r s h i p , a s s o c i a t i o n , c o r p o r a t i o n , b u s i n e s s t r u s t , l e g a l r e s p r e s e n t a t i v e , o r any o r g a n i z e d group of p e r s o n s a c t i n g d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y i n t-he i n t e r e s t of a n employer i n r e l a t i o n to an employee b u t s h a l l n o t i n c l u d e t h e United S t a t e s . "(5) 'Wages' i n c l u d e s a n y money d u e a n employee f r o m t h e e m p l o y e r o r e m p l o y e r s , whether to be p a i d by t h e h o u r , d a y , week, semimonthly, monthly, o r y e a r l y and s h a l l i n c l u d e b o n u s , p i e c e w o r k , t - i p s , a n d y r a t u i t - i e s of any k i n d . " (Emphasis added. ) Respondent w a s n o t an employee w i t h i n t h e meaning of t h e s t a t u t e s . H e n e v e r a c t u a l l y performed work f o r Sound West. F u r t h e r , t.he g e n e r a l p r o v i s i o n o f sect i o n 39-3- 204 (1) , MCA, p r o v i d e s : "Every employer o f l a b o r i n t h e s t a t e of Montana s h a l l pay to each employee t h e wages e a r n e d by such employee . . . and no p e r s o n f o r whom l a b o r h a s been performed may wit-h- L . . h o l d from any employee any wages earned or - - unpaid f o r a- l o n g e r p e r i o d t.han 10 b u s i n e s s d a y s a f t e r t h e same are due . . ." Here, respondent. n e i t h e r e a r n e d , nor performed, any work f o r Sound West. Respondent, by d e f i n i t i o n , d o e s n o t come under t-he p r o t e c t i o n s of t h e s e s e c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g s e c t i o n 39-3-206, MCA, which p e r m i t s t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f a p e n a l t y and s e c t i o n 39-3-214, MCA, which allows t.he award o f a r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y f e e and c o s t s . F u r t h e r , r e s p o n d e n t ' s p o s i t i o n is not. support-ed by t h e p o l i c y u n d e r l y i n g t h e wage claim s t a t - u t e s . The Oregon Supreme Court h a s s t a t e d : "The p o l i c y o f t-he [wage c l a i m ] s t a t u t e is t o a i d an employe i n t h e prompt c o l l e c t i o n o f compensation due him and to d i s c o u r a g e an employer from u s i n g a p o s i t i o n of economic s u p e r i o r i t y as a l e v e r to d i s s u a d e an employe f r o m p r o m p t l y c o l l e c t i n g h i s a g r e e d upon compensation. . . " S t a t e ex rel. N i l s e n v. Oregon S t a t e Motor Assoc. ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 248 O r . 133, 432 P.2d 512, 515. The D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d , t h e r e f o r e , by imposing a $1,000 p e n a l t y under s e c t i o n 39-3-206, MCA, and awarding a t t o r n e y f e e s and costs under s e c t i o n 39-3-214, MCA. A r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of damages must be made by t h e District Court. I n r e d e t e r m i n i n g damages, t h e District Court should be guided by t h e g e n e r a l r u l e f o r damages r e s u l t i n g from a b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t . T h i s g e n e r a l r u l e is found i n s e c t i o n 27-1-311, MCA, which p r o v i d e s : "For t h e b r e a c h o f an o b l i g a t i o n a r i s i n g from c o n t r a c t , t.he measure of damages, e x c e p t when o t h e r w i s e e x p r e s s l y provided by t h i s code, is t h e amount which w i l l compensate t h e p a r t y a g g r i e v e d f o r a l l t h e det-riment which was p r o x i m a t e i y caused t h e r e b y or i n t.he o r d i n a r y c o u r s e of t h i n g s would be l i k e l y to r e s u l t therefrom. Damages which a r e n o t c l e a r l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e i n b o t h t h e i r n a t u r e and o r i g i n c a n n o t b e r e c o v e r e d f o r a b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t ." I n c o n s t r u i n g t h e above s e c t i o n , t h i s Court h a s emphasized t h a t its purpose is to compensate an a g g r i e v e d p a r t y f o r t h e loss h e h a s s u s t a i n e d , and t h a t t h e nonbreaching p a r t y should r e c e i v e a sum which w i l l g i v e him a n economic s t a t u s i d e n t i c a l t.o t-hat which he would have enjoyed had t h e c o n t r a c t been performed. Wyatt v. School D i s t r i c t N o . 104, Fergus County ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 148 Mont. 83, 89, 417 P.2d 221, 224; and see a l s o , Laas v. Montana S t - a t e Highway Commission ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 157 Mont.. 121, 483 P.2d 699; and Whitney v. Bails ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 121, 560 P.2d 1344. W e acknowledged i n Wyatt. t h a t t h e measure of damages f o r b r e a c h of an employment c o n t r a c t by an employer is prima f a c i e t-he sum s t i p u l a t e d t.o be p a i d f o r t h e s e r v i c e s . More impor- t a n t l y , however, we also noted t h a t ot-her expenses, such a s t h o s e i n c u r r e d w h i l e s e e k i n g a l t . e r n a t i v e employment., may a l s o be a l l o w a b l e i f such a c t i v i t y is c o n s i d e r e d t.he n a t u r a l consequence of t.he b r e a c h . Wyat-t, 417 P. 2d a t 224-225. A p p e l l a n t s ' l a s t cont.ention is t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by h o l d i n g Rhines p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e f o r respon- d e n t ' s damages. The Dist.rict Court concluded a s a matter o f l a w t h a t "Jim Rhines as t h e p r e s i d e n t and manager of Sound West, I n c . , d i d o f f e r employment to Gary Como f o r an ac- c o u n t i n g p o s i t i o n w i t h e x p r e s s t.erms." ( C o n c l u s i o n o f Law N o . 2.) The D i s t r i c t Court t.hen went on to conclude t h a t J i m Rhines - and Sound West, I n c . , breached t h e employment c o n t r a c t and t h a t both Rhines and Sound West were l i a b l e f o r t h e damages a r i s i n g o u t o f t h i s b r e a c h . T h i s Court h a s recognized t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t an a g e n t is not p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e on a c o n t r a c t e n t e r e d i n t o by him on b e h a l f o f h i s p r i n c i p a l i f it a p p e a r s , i n f a c t , that. he d i s c l o s e d t h e i d e n t i t y of h i s p r i n c i p a l and made t h e engagement f o r him. F a r r v. S t e i n ( 1 9 1 8 ) , 54 Mont.. 529, 172 P. 135; Budget I n s . & Finance v. Leight.y ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 607 P.2d 1125, 37 St.Rep. 411. I n F a r r , t - h i s Court. a l s o recognized t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e agency must b e d i s c l o s e d i n a p p r o p r i a t e terms, i n c l u d i n g t h e name o f t h e p r i n c i p a l f o r whom t h e a g e n t is a c t i n g . F a r r , 172 P. a t 136. Moreover, merely because t h e a g e n t , i n making t h e c o n t r a c t f o r h i s p r i n c i p a l , u s e s t h e t r a d e name under which h i s p r i n c i p a l t r a n s a c t s b u s i n e s s i s n o t o f i t s e l f a s u f f i c i e n t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p a l t o p r o t e c t t h e a g e n t from l i a b i l i t y . Myers-Leiber Sign C o . v. W e i r i c h T h i s g e n e r a l r u l e of agency a l s o a p p l i e s to t h e c o r p o r a t e s e t t i n g : "'The r u l e t h a t where an a g e n t e n t e r s i n t o a c o n t r a c t i n h i s own name f o r an u n d i s c l o s e d p r i n c i p a l , t h e o t h e r p a r t y t o t h e c o n t r a c t may hold t h e a g e n t p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e , a p p l i e s e q u a l l y w e l l t o c o r p o r a t e o f f i c e r s o r a g e n t s . It h a s been h e l d t h a t t h e managing o f f i c e r o f a c o r p o r a t i o n , even though a c t i n g f o r t h e company, becomes l i a b l e as a p r i n c i p a l where he d e a l s w i t h one i g n o r a n t o f t h e company's e x i s t e n c e and of h i s r e l a t i o n t o it, and f a i l s t o inform t h e l a t t e r o f t h e f a c t s . ' 3 F l e t c h e r ' s Cyclopedia on C o r p o r a t i o n s , S1120, p. 762 (1965) ." McCluskey Commissary, I n c . v. S u l l i v a n ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 96 Idaho 91, 524 P.2d 1063, 1065. Here, t h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t i n d i c a t e that. Rhines t o l d respondent he would be working f o r Sound West, Inc. I n f a c t , t h i s lawsuit. was i n i t i a t e d by r e s p o n d e n t a g a i n s t "Jim Rhines, d/b/a ( d o i n g b u s i n e s s a s ) Sound West." While t h e agency was d i s c l o s e d d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t h i s l i t i g a t i o n , t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f t h e p r i n c i p a l a f t e r t h e c o n t r a c t is e x e c u t e d w i l l n o t r e l i e v e t h e agent. from l i a b i l i t y . Myers- L e i b e r S i g n Co., s u p r a , 410 P.2d a t 493. I n t h e absence o f a showing by a p p e l l a n t - s t h a t respondent understood Rhines was a c t i n g as an a g e n t f o r t h e c o r p o r a t i o n , Sound West, Inc., and n o t as an i n d i v i d u a l doing b u s i n e s s as Sound West, it c a n n o t be s a i d t-he D i s t r i c t Court. e r r e d by h o l d i n g Rhines p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e on t h e c o n t r a c t . W e t h e r e f o r e a f f i r m t h e D i s t . r i c t C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t . a p p e l l a n t s b r e a c h e d a n employment c o n t r a c t w i t h r e s p o n d e n t . W e remand, however, f o r a r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f damages i n accordance w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n . W e concur : Chief J u s t i c e I would a f f i r m t h e District