Case Title: Griffith v. JumpTime Meridian, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 44133

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2017-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 44133-2016 
 
SETH GRIFFITH, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
JUMPTIME MERIDIAN, LLC, an Idaho 
Limited Liability Company, 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
  
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Boise, February 2017 Term 
 
2017 Opinion No. 29   
 
Filed: April 10, 2017 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for Ada County.  Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
 Eric Clark, Clark & Associates, Eagle, argued for appellant. 
 
 William Fletcher, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, Boise, argued for   
 respondent. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Justice. 
 
This is an appeal out of Ada County from a judgment dismissing an action brought 
against JumpTime Meridian, LLC, by Seth Griffith seeking damages for an injury he received 
while attempting a triple front flip when he was seventeen years of age.  We affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
I. 
Factual Background. 
 
 
 On January 11, 2014, seventeen-year-old Seth Griffith (“Plaintiff”) was seriously injured 
when he attempted a triple front flip into a pit filled with foam blocks (“foam pit”) at an indoor 
trampoline park owned and operated by JumpTime Meridian, LLC (“JumpTime”).  Plaintiff 
went to the facility with his girlfriend and her younger brother and sister.  Plaintiff initially 
played with the brother on trampolines for about ten or fifteen minutes, and then they went to an 
 
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area where there were runway trampolines.  Plaintiff spent about fifteen to twenty minutes doing 
front flips, back flips, and cartwheels on the runway trampolines, and he taught the brother to do 
a front flip.  He then started showing off to the brother, doing various gymnastic tricks.  He 
jumped up, did a back flip, jumped up, and did another back flip, and a female JumpTime 
employee, who was monitoring the foam pit area, told him it was pretty cool. 
The facility had foam pits, one large (sixteen feet by eighteen feet) and one small (nine 
feet by sixteen feet).  The large foam pit had twin trampolines that were each twelve feet long 
leading to it, and the small foam pit had a 58-foot-long trampoline runway leading to it. 
Plaintiff’s girlfriend and her sister were near the large foam pit.  He walked over to where 
they were and talked to them.  While he was there, he jumped into the large foam pit a few times.  
He then spent about 45 minutes “kind of horsing around on both the runway trampoline and the 
foam pit and the twin trampolines.”  After he did a double front flip into the small foam pit, the 
monitor came up to him and asked if he had ever done a double before.  He answered that he 
had, and she said, “Oh, that was pretty sweet.”  As he continued performing double front flips 
into the small foam pit, he noticed that doing them was easier than it used to be for him.  He 
decided to try a triple front flip.  When he attempted it, he did not rotate far enough and landed 
on his head and neck, suffering a cervical dislocation and fracture, which required a fusion of his 
C6 and C7 vertebrae. 
Plaintiff filed this action alleging that JumpTime negligently caused his injury.  He 
contended that because he was under the age of eighteen, JumpTime had a duty to supervise him.  
He had been intentionally landing the double front flips on his back in the pit.  He testified that 
he did so “because you don’t want to land on your feet because you can bash your head against 
your knees.”  JumpTime’s written policy manual instructed its employees with respect to the 
foam pit to “[f]ollow the rules outlined on the wall and continuously enforce it.”  There were 
signs on the walls near the two pits that instructed customers to land on their feet.  A large sign 
painted on the wall next to where the runway trampoline ended at the small foam pit said: 
• Jump feet first into the pit 
• Land on your feet and seat 
• No landing on your head or Stomach 
 
Just past the small foam pit was a sign titled “FOAM PIT RULES,” which included the 
admonition:  “WHILE YOU JUMP:  DO NOT land on head, neck or belly.  NO DIVING; FEET 
 
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FIRST.”  A third sign located on the wall near the large foam pit was titled “FOAM PIT 
PATRON RESPONSIBILITY CODE,” and it included the admonition, “Jump and land on two 
feet.”  Plaintiff contended that had the attendant told him to land on his feet, he would not have 
attempted the triple front flip. 
JumpTime moved for summary judgment alleging that there was no negligence, based 
upon the opinion of an expert that industry standards permitted landing a front flip into a foam 
pit on one’s feet, buttocks, or back, and that there was no evidence of causation.  In response, 
Plaintiff contended that the signs on the wall stating how to land in the foam pit established the 
standard of care and that because of the attendant’s failure to admonish him for landing 
incorrectly, he was not discouraged from attempting a more difficult maneuver like a triple front 
flip.  The district court granted JumpTime’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff 
had failed to produce evidence of negligence and causation.  Plaintiff then timely appealed. 
 
II. 
Did the District Court Err in Granting JumpTime’s Motion for Summary Judgment? 
 
When reviewing on appeal the granting of a motion for summary judgment, we apply the 
same standard used by the trial court in ruling on the motion.  Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 
Idaho 45, 46–47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1101–02 (2002).  We construe all disputed facts, and draw all 
reasonable inferences from the record, in favor of the non-moving party.  Id. at 47, 44 P.3d at 
1102.  Summary judgment is appropriate only if the evidence in the record and any admissions 
show that there is no genuine issue of any material fact regarding the issues raised in the 
pleadings and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. 
 
“The elements of common law negligence have been summarized as (1) a duty, 
recognized by law, requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a 
breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting 
injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage.” Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 
137 (1980).  In  this case, there were no facts in the record showing a causal connection between 
JumpTime’s alleged negligence and Plaintiff’s injury. 
 
The issue of causation is why Plaintiff attempted the triple front flip.  He did not tell 
anyone he was going to attempt it, nor is there any evidence indicating that the monitor knew or 
should have known that he would try a triple front flip.  Plaintiff argues on appeal that he is 
 
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“entitled to the reasonable inference that had JumpTime enforced its rules and interceded when 
[he] was landing improperly and dangerously on his back, [he] would not have felt emboldened 
and would never have attempted a triple flip.” 
 
First, there is no evidence that it was dangerous to land on one’s back.  Even Plaintiff 
testified that he believed it was safer because it avoided the risk of hitting his face with his knees. 
Second, Plaintiff did not testify during his deposition that had the monitor admonished 
him to land on his feet that he would not have attempted the triple front flip, nor did he testify 
that the conduct of the monitor was part of that decision.  He testified that he decided to attempt 
the triple front flip because completing the double front flips was easier than previously had been 
for him, that he was having to come out of his rotation earlier than he previously had to, and that 
he was confident he was in the air long enough to do a triple front flip, which would be exciting. 
 
Plaintiff testified that performing the double front flips was easier than it previously had 
been for him. 
Q.  
Well, tell me everything.  Let’s just move in chronological order 
about what is happening and work up to the incident.  So if you are at that point, 
then go ahead. 
A.   
After about 45 minutes of just kind of horsing around on both the 
runway trampoline and the foam pit and the twin trampolines, I got onto the 
runway trampoline, plus the foam pit, and I kind of noticed I had been doing 
doubles easier than what I was normally used to, like I was just either spinning 
faster or getting higher.  It was just easier than what I was accustomed to.  So I 
decided to go for a triple. 
 
 
He was asked why he attempted the triple front flip, and he did not answer that 
JumpTime was in any way responsible for that decision.  He said that when doing double front 
flips he had to come out of his rotation earlier than he previously had to and he thought he had 
enough air to perform a triple front flip. 
Q.   
Okay.  So was the reason that you attempted this triple flip in the 
small foam pit just because it had a longer runway? 
A.  
No.  I had been doing doubles easier, like I was—I had to break 
from my rotation earlier than I previously would have to.  So it was like I was 
having more time in the air to actually do the flips.  So I kind of thought that I 
would be able to have enough air to do a triple. 
 
 
He also stated that he was confident he could perform the triple front flip and was excited 
to try. 
 
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Q.  
Did you have any concerns about being able to do the triple 
without hurting yourself? 
A.  
No.  The time when I was about to do it I was pretty confident that 
I could. 
. . . . 
Q.  
Were you nervous at all before attempting the triple? 
A.  
No.  I was actually pretty excited about it. 
Q.  
Why would you say that? 
A.  
Just because, like I used to be an avid gymnastics person, so doing 
a new trick, like if I could—like if I added a 360 onto a front flip, I’d get pretty 
excited.  If I did like an aerial for the first time, like I got excited.  So new things 
kind of excited me. 
 
 
Plaintiff’s testimony does not support an inference that JumpTime was in any way 
responsible for his decision to try the triple front flip.  Therefore, the district court did not err in 
granting summary judgment to JumpTime based upon the lack of evidence regarding causation. 
 
III. 
Is Either Party Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal? 
 
Both parties request an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 
12-121.  An award of attorney fees under that statute will be awarded to the prevailing party on 
appeal only when this Court is left with the abiding belief that the entire appeal was brought, 
pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.  McGrew v. McGrew, 
139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003); Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 231–32, 
268 P.3d 1167, 1183–84 (2012).  Because Plaintiff is not the prevailing party on appeal, he is not 
entitled to an award of attorney fees under that statute.  VanderWal v. Albar, Inc., 154 Idaho 816, 
824, 303 P.3d 175, 183 (2013).  Although it is a close question, we decline to award attorney 
fees on appeal to JumpTime because we do not find that this appeal meets the requirements for 
such an award. 
IV. 
Conclusion. 
 
We affirm the judgment of the district court, and we award Respondent costs, but not 
attorney fees, on appeal. 
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices JONES, HORTON and BRODY CONCUR.