Case Title: In re Bonfield

Citation: 2002-Ohio-4182

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re Bonfield, 96 Ohio St.3d 218, 2002-Ohio-4182.] 
 
 
IN RE BONFIELD. 
[Cite as In re Bonfield, 96 Ohio St.3d 218, 2002-Ohio-4182.] 
Custody — Pursuant to its authority under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2), a juvenile court 
may determine whether a shared custody agreement between partners in 
a same-sex relationship is in the best interests of the children. 
(No. 2001-0625 — Submitted March 13, 2002 — Decided August 28, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, Nos. C-000436 and C-
000437. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶1} 
Appellants, Teri J. Bonfield and Shelly M. Zachritz, have lived 
together since 1987 as partners in a same-sex relationship.  During that time, Teri 
has adopted two children, Joseph, born in 1993, and Jacob, born in 1995.  Shelly 
participated equally with Teri in the decision to adopt the boys. 
{¶2} 
Teri has also given birth to three children, a son born in 1996, and 
twins born in 1998, each of whom was conceived through anonymous artificial 
insemination.  Shelly actively participated in the planning and births of the 
children, assisted with Teri’s artificial insemination, and was present throughout 
Teri’s doctor’s visits during the pregnancies and actual births.  According to Teri 
and Shelly, since the children’s respective adoptions and births Shelly has acted 
as their primary caregiver and has come to be seen by them as their parent in the 
same way as has Teri. 
{¶3} 
Appellants’ description of their family is echoed by Dr. Leslie 
Swift, a licensed clinical psychologist, who testified that appellants operate jointly 
in caring for the children, and have created a loving and committed home.  Dr. 
Swift identified Shelly as the children’s primary caretaker, as she is responsible 
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for the day-to-day care of the children.  Dr. Swift found that both Teri and Shelly 
function as parents, and that the children are bonded to each of them and “go to 
each for similar things and also for different needs.”  Finally, Dr. Swift testified 
that should the children be separated from Shelly, their primary caregiver, it could 
be devastating to them. 
{¶4} 
Notwithstanding her role as the primary caregiver for their 
children, Shelly has no legally recognized rights with regard to Joseph, Jacob, 
Nicholas, Matthew, or Samantha.  Lacking such legal rights, she does not have 
equal access to the children’s medical or school records, and is unable to 
authorize medical care or obtain medical insurance coverage for the children. 
{¶5} 
An option in some states would be for Shelly to pursue a “second 
parent adoption.”  M. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: 
Adjudicating Maternity for Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents (2002), 50 Buff.L.Rev. 
341, 345, fn. 15.  Second parent adoption is a process by which a partner in a 
cohabiting and nonmarital relationship may adopt his or her partner’s biological 
or adoptive child, without requiring the parent to relinquish any parental rights.  
E. Zuckerman, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parental Families: Legal 
Recognition of the Other Mother (1986), 19 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 729, 731, fn. 8.  
However, because second parent adoption is not available in Ohio, Shelly cannot 
adopt the children.  Instead, if Shelly were to adopt the children herself, the effect 
would be to terminate Teri’s rights and responsibilities as an adoptive parent.  See 
R.C. 3107.15(A).  Therefore, because Teri wishes to retain her rights as a parent, 
adoption of the children by Shelly is not a viable option. 
{¶6} 
Concerned that Shelly’s lack of legally recognized rights is 
contrary to the children’s best interests both currently and in the future, appellants 
filed their Petition for Allocation of Parental Rights and Responsibilities in the 
Common Pleas Court of Hamilton County, Juvenile Division.  They sought to 
“confirm their commitment that they will both continue to raise the children 
January Term, 2002 
3 
regardless of what happens to their relationship.”  In addition to concerns about 
Shelly’s status with respect to the children in the event that Teri and Shelly 
separate, appellants seek to secure Shelly’s legal rights to the children in the event 
of Teri’s death.  For instance, if Teri were to die, Shelly’s care and physical 
custody of the children could be interrupted for a time or even terminated, should 
a relative of Teri decide to petition the court for custody. 
{¶7} 
Adopting the recommendation of the magistrate, the juvenile court 
found that it did not have jurisdiction to grant the petition because Shelly is not a 
parent within the meaning of R.C. 3109.04.  The record reveals that the trial court 
questioned why appellants did not apply for joint custody, since custody is a much 
broader term than shared parenting and “the award of joint custody does not 
divest any party of their [own] custody.”  The trial court suggested that the better 
approach would be a shared custody arrangement and declined to “circumvent the 
laws of Ohio by torturing the shared parenting agreement [law] where there is no 
parentage.”  The court stated that custody of the children in a shared custody 
arrangement “would not be a fiction [but] a reality, [whereas] parenting is a bit of 
fiction in this situation.”  The court then invited appellants to petition for a joint 
custodial arrangement, without reference to “shared parenting.”  The record does 
not indicate that appellants acted upon the advice offered by the trial court. 
{¶8} 
Upon appeal of the trial court order denying shared parenting, the 
court of appeals held that pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(A)(2), the juvenile court has 
exclusive original jurisdiction to determine the custody of any child who is not a 
ward of a court.  As none of the Bonfield children is a ward of a court, the court 
of appeals concluded that the juvenile court has jurisdiction to hear the petition.  
However, the court held that the juvenile court must exercise its jurisdiction in 
child custody matters in accordance with R.C. 3109.04.  Although R.C. 3109.04 
does not define “parent,” the court applied the definition of “parent and child 
relationship” in R.C. 3111.01(A) to define “parent” in R.C. 3109.04, and 
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concluded that a juvenile court has no authority to award to a person who is not a 
biological or adoptive parent parental rights or shared parenting.  Accordingly, the 
court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of appellants’ petition. 
{¶9} 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶10} R.C. 3109.04(A)(2) provides: 
{¶11} “If at least one parent files a pleading or motion in accordance with 
division (G) of this section and a plan for shared parenting pursuant to that 
division and if a plan for shared parenting is in the best interest of the children and 
is approved by the court in accordance with division (D)(1) of this section, the 
court may allocate the parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the 
children to both parents and issue a shared parenting order requiring the parents to 
share all or some of the aspects of the physical and legal care of the children in 
accordance with the approved plan for shared parenting.” 
{¶12} The specific issue is whether Shelly is a “parent” for purposes of 
R.C. 3109.04(A)(2). 
Analysis of R.C. 3109.04(A)(2) 
{¶13} R.C. 3109.04(A)(2) provides that a court may, upon determining 
that a proposed shared parenting plan is in the best interest of the children, 
allocate parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children to both 
“parents.”  “Parent” is not defined in this section. 
{¶14} The legal concept of “shared parenting” is relatively new in Ohio 
law and refers to an agreement between parents regarding the care of their 
children that was previously termed “joint custody.” Ohio Legislative Service 
Commission, Analysis of 1990 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 3, at 20.  In 1990, the General 
Assembly adopted recommendations of the Domestic Relations Task Force 
established by the 116th General Assembly to change “[c]hild custody and 
visitation laws [to] reflect a shared parenting concept where both divorcing parties 
January Term, 2002 
5 
remain important to their children’s development.”  Domestic Relations Task 
Force Report, 116th General Assembly, 1990, at 40. 
{¶15} Am.Sub.S.B. No. 3 replaced references to “joint custody” in 
domestic-relations-related statutes with “shared parenting.”  See, e.g., former R.C. 
3109.04(D)(1)(a)(i), (E)(2)(c), and 3113.215(B)(6), 143 Ohio Laws, Part I, 116, 
121, 187.  “Party,” in this context, was replaced with “parent.”  See former R.C. 
3109.05(A)(3), 143 Ohio Laws, Part I, 128.  However, the Act did not replace all 
references to “custody” of a child, or “parent, legal guardian,” or “custodian,” 
leaving intact those references where the context and scope of the statutory 
language did not warrant change.  For example, R.C. 2151.06 was not amended, 
and it provides that “a child has the same residence or legal settlement as his 
parents, legal guardian of his person, or his custodian who stands in the relation of 
loco parentis.” 
{¶16} Appellants argue that the doctrine of in loco parentis applies to the 
definition of “parent” in R.C. 3109.04(A)(2), and urge the court to find that Shelly 
stands in loco parentis to Teri’s children for purposes of that statute.  They rely on 
State v. Noggle, which held that a “person in loco parentis has assumed the same 
duties as a guardian or custodian, only not through a legal proceeding.” State v. 
Noggle (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 31, 33, 615 N.E.2d 1040.  However, the court’s 
determination in Noggle was based on an analysis of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5), which 
specifically provides: 
{¶17} “No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the 
spouse of the offender, when any of the following apply: 
{¶18} “* * * 
{¶19} “(5) The offender is the other person’s natural or adoptive parent, 
or stepparent, or guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis.” 
{¶20} Thus, in contrast to R.C. 3109.04(A)(2), which uses only the word 
“parent” in the context of a shared parenting agreement, R.C. 2907.03(A)(5) 
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expressly includes a person in loco parentis in defining a sexual offender.  The 
General Assembly could have provided juvenile courts with the authority to 
allocate parental rights and responsibilities not only to parents, but also to 
guardians, custodians, and others who stand in loco parentis.  That the statute 
refers to “parent” reflects legislative intent to exclude from the benefits of R.C. 
3109.04 guardians or custodians in loco parentis. 
{¶21} The court of appeals applied R.C. 3111.01(A) to 3109.04(A)(2), 
finding that Shelly is not a “parent” within the meaning of R.C. 3111.01(A).  R.C. 
3111.01(A) provides: 
{¶22} “As used in sections 3111.01 to 3111.85 of the Revised Code, 
‘parent and child relationship’ means the legal relationship that exists between a 
child and the child’s natural or adoptive parents and upon which those sections 
and any other provision of the Revised Code confer or impose rights, privileges, 
duties, and obligations. The ‘parent and child relationship’ includes the mother 
and child relationship and the father and child relationship.” 
{¶23} “(B) The parent and child relationship extends equally to all 
children and all parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents.” 
{¶24} Appellants argue that by its terms R.C. 3111.01(A) applies only to 
“sections 3111.01 to 3111.85 of the Revised Code.”  Therefore, it applies only for 
purposes of the Parentage Act, R.C. Chapter 3111, and should not be used to 
define the term “parent” in R.C. 3109.04.  We disagree. 
{¶25} Since there is no definition of “parent” in R.C. 3109.04, it is 
appropriate to search related sections of the Revised Code for a definition.  A 
plain reading of R.C. 3111.01 indicates that there are three ways a “parent and 
child relationship” can be established: by natural parenthood, by adoption, or by 
other legal means in the Revised Code that confer or impose rights, privileges, 
and duties upon certain individuals. 
January Term, 2002 
7 
{¶26} Appellants argue that the domestic relations code contains other 
means by which parenthood is recognized beyond simply being a “natural or 
adoptive parent.”  They point to R.C. 3111.95(A), which accords the consenting 
husband of a woman inseminated through nonspousal artificial insemination the 
status of father of the child so conceived, even though the husband has no natural 
or adoptive relationship to the child.  They also observe that R.C. 3111.95(B) 
provides that a sperm donor for a nonspousal artificial insemination “shall not be 
treated in law or regarded as the natural father” of any child resulting from such a 
procedure, despite having a biological relationship with the child. 
{¶27} Accordingly, appellants argue that a “psychological” or “second” 
parent should be treated as a parent under R.C. 3109.04 for purposes of entering a 
shared parenting agreement.  Appellants advocate a four-part test to determine 
whether a person is a “psychological” or “second” parent.  Under this test, the 
court considers (1) whether the legal parent consents to and fosters the 
relationship between the “psychological” or “second” parent and the child, (2) 
whether the “psychological” or “second” parent has lived with the child, (3) 
whether the “psychological” or “second” parent performs parental functions for 
the child to a significant degree, and (4) whether a parent-child bond has been 
forged between the “second” parent and the child. 
{¶28} This four-part test has been used in other states to determine 
whether a psychological or second parent may be awarded custody.  See V.C. v. 
M.J.B. (2000), 163 N.J. 200, 223, 748 A.2d 539 (test provides good framework 
for determining psychological parenthood in cases where petitioner has lived for a 
substantial period of time with child); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. (1995), 193 
Wis.2d 649, 658, 533 N.W.2d 419 (court may determine whether visitation is 
appropriate where nonparent petitioner first proves petitioner’s parent-like 
relationship with child using four-part test, and a significant triggering event 
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justifies state intervention in the child’s relationship with biological or adoptive 
parent). 
{¶29} Ohio has adopted a similar test in the context of a wrongful death 
action.  R.C. 2125.02(A)(1), the statute at issue in Lawson v. Atwood (1989), 42 
Ohio St.3d 69, 536 N.E.2d 1167, provides that “an action for wrongful death shall 
be brought in the name of the personal representative of the decedent for the 
exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, the children, and the parents of the 
decedent.”   We held that such an action could be brought by a nonparent for his 
own exclusive benefit only when the nonparent could prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that (1) the natural parents of the child have disclaimed or 
abandoned parental rights to the child, (2) the person claiming the status of parent 
has performed the obligations of parenthood for a substantial period of time, (3) 
the child and the alleged parent have held themselves out to be parent and child 
for a substantial period of time, and (4) the relationship between the child and the 
alleged parent has been publicly recognized. Id. at syllabus. 
{¶30} The existence of such a test in a wrongful death action is not 
dispositive of the case at issue.  A difference between Lawson and the case at 
issue is the absence of a statutory definition of “parent” in R.C. 2125.02, and the 
definition of “parent and child relationship” in R.C. 3111.01(A).  Additionally, in 
Lawson, we emphasized that there is a significant distinction between the 
wrongful death action at issue and a dispute between parties competing for 
custody or the privileges and obligations of parenthood with respect to the child.  
Id., 42 Ohio St.3d at 72, 536 N.E.2d 1167.  Moreover, R.C. 2125.02 is a remedial 
law and must be construed to compensate those who have been deprived of a 
relationship. Id. at 70, 536 N.E.2d 1167.  In contrast, R.C. 3109.04(A)(2) focuses 
on the best interests of the child.  Finally, in Lawson, prior to the child’s death, the 
person claiming to be the child’s parent had been awarded legal custody of the 
child.  Id. at 71, 536 N.E.2d 1167. 
January Term, 2002 
9 
{¶31} Therefore, as R.C. 3109.04 specifically uses the term “parent” and 
this term is defined in R.C. 3111.01, we find it inappropriate to adopt appellants’ 
four-part test to broaden the narrow class of persons who are statutorily defined as 
parents for purposes of entering a shared parenting agreement. 
{¶32} Appellants argue that a biological or adoptive parent has the 
fundamental constitutional right, which may not be restricted by statute, to 
voluntarily enter into a court-approved shared parenting plan with a 
“psychological” or “second” parent.  The fundamental due process right to make 
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of one’s children has been 
upheld in Troxel v. Granville (2000), 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 
L.Ed.2d 49.  However, this right does not embrace the right to have all decisions 
recognized or approved in law.  In other words, although Teri’s decision to co-
parent her children with Shelly may be protected from interference by the state, 
Teri is not entitled to the benefit of statutes that are clearly inapplicable to such a 
familial arrangement. 
{¶33} Although we have concluded that Shelly does not qualify as a 
parent pursuant to R.C. 3109.04, we, like the court of appeals, “do not intend to 
discredit [appellants’] goal of providing a stable environment for the children’s 
growth.”  We note that although appellants urged the trial court to find that “both 
Petitioners have equal standing to parent the minor children,” their brief filed in 
this court contains repeated references to “custody,” and concludes with a plea for 
the court to recognize that they are “equal custodial parents.”  Similarly, although 
their petition to the trial court is ostensibly for the allocation of parental rights and 
responsibilities of minor children, the petition clearly states that appellants request 
that the court award them “the legal status of co-custodians [of] the children.”  
Accordingly, we have examined their claim for shared parenting in the custody 
context and conclude that the juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine whether 
a petition for shared custody is appropriate. 
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{¶34} R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) provides: 
{¶35} “(A) The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction under 
the Revised Code as follows:  
{¶36} “* * * 
{¶37} “(2) Subject to division (V) of section 2301.03 of the Revised 
Code, to determine the custody of any child not a ward of another court of this 
state.” 
{¶38} The court of appeals held that the juvenile court has exclusive 
original jurisdiction to determine the custody of the Bonfield children under R.C. 
2151.23(A)(2), but that the court must exercise this jurisdiction in accordance 
with R.C. 3109.04.  R.C. 2151.23(F)(1).  The court concluded that R.C. 3109.04 
limits the juvenile court’s jurisdiction in allocating parental rights and 
responsibilities to “parents,” and that Shelly is not a parent. 
{¶39} The juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine the custody of any 
child not a ward of another court, even though the court has not first found the 
child to be delinquent, neglected, or dependent.  In re Torok (1954), 161 Ohio St. 
585, 53 O.O. 433, 120 N.E.2d 307, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.  This 
exclusive responsibility “to determine the custody of any child not a ward of 
another court” of this state cannot be avoided merely because the petitioner is not 
a “parent” under R.C. 3109.04. 
{¶40} It is well settled under Ohio law that a juvenile court may 
adjudicate custodial claims brought by the persons considered nonparents at law.  
For example, In re Perales (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 6 O.O.3d 293, 369 N.E.2d 
1047, concerned a child whose biological mother had placed her from infancy in 
the care of a nonparent. The child lived with the nonparent for two years.  In the 
ensuing custody dispute between the parent and the nonparent, Perales relied on 
R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) rather than R.C. 3109.04, since the child at issue was not a 
ward of another court. 
January Term, 2002 
11 
{¶41} In contrast, this court has held that in a case where custody of 
children had already been determined by a domestic relations court in a divorce 
decree, and where the children are later determined to be abused, neglected, or 
dependent, the juvenile court has jurisdiction under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) to make a 
custody determination, but must do so in accordance with R.C. 3109.04.  In re 
Poling (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 211, 594 N.E.2d 589, paragraph two of the 
syllabus.1 
{¶42} However, the court in Poling limited its holding to cases where the 
juvenile court has obtained jurisdiction over a child under R.C. 2151.353 on the 
basis that the child is abused, neglected, or dependent.  The court did not consider 
whether all custody cases arising under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) must be decided 
under R.C. 3109.04, nor could such an interpretation of Poling be reconciled with 
Ohio’s long-standing precedent that a juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine 
custody claims brought by nonparents.  Therefore, we distinguish Poling and hold 
that the juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine the custody of the Bonfield 
children pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) without reference to R.C. 3109.04. 
{¶43} We next elucidate the standard the juvenile court should use in 
disposing of appellants’ petition.  In Perales, we found that in the custody dispute 
between a parent and a nonparent, the juvenile court may not award custody to the 
nonparent without first making a finding of parental unsuitability. In re Perales, 
52 Ohio St.2d 89, 6 O.O.3d 293, 369 N.E.2d 1047, syllabus.  This is because 
custody proceedings between a parent and a nonparent, unlike those between two 
parents, pose the possibility of terminating a parent’s rights in favor of one who is 
not a parent.  Id. at 96, 6 O.O.3d 293, 369 N.E.2d 1047. 
                                          
 
1. 
{¶a} R.C. 2151.23(F)(1) provides: 
 
{¶b} 
“The juvenile court shall exercise its jurisdiction in child custody matters in 
accordance with sections 3109.04, 3109.21 to 3109.36, and 5103.20 to 5103.28 of the Revised 
Code.” 
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{¶44} However, Perales involved an actual dispute between parties 
competing for custody. This is not the case here.  In fact, appellants’ petition was 
unopposed at the trial level and remains unopposed.  In the petition, Teri 
voluntarily seeks to relinquish her right to sole custody of the children in favor of 
shared custodial rights with Shelly. 
{¶45} Parents may waive their right to custody of their children and are 
bound by an agreement to do so.  Masitto v. Masitto (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 63, 65, 
22 OBR 81, 488 N.E.2d 857.  The parents’ agreement to grant custody to a third 
party is enforceable subject only to a judicial determination that the custodian is a 
proper person to assume the care, training, and education of the child.  Id. at 65-
66, 22 OBR 81, 488 N.E.2d 857. 
{¶46} Upon remand the trial court shall exercise its discretion in giving 
due consideration to all known factors in determining what is in the best interest 
of the children.  In re Adoption of Charles B. (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 88, 552 
N.E.2d 884, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶47} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that pursuant to its authority 
under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2), the juvenile court may determine whether a shared 
custody agreement between Teri and Shelly is in the best interests of the children.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in part and reverse it 
in part, and remand to the juvenile court for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Judgment reversed in part, 
affirmed in part 
and cause remanded. 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs separately. 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2002 
13 
PFEIFER, J., concurring. 
{¶48} Terms of art change.  What used to be known as joint custody is 
now known as shared parenting.  Whatever the label, custody is still at the heart 
of what Teri Bonfield and Shelley Zachritz want the court to recognize and what 
they want to see endure.  With an award of custody comes an acceptance of the 
responsibility for the care and direct supervision of children.  Custody connotes 
more than a bond, it connotes presence. 
{¶49} The General Assembly’s shift in terminology from joint custody to 
shared parenting was never meant to make custody of children exclusive to what 
are considered traditional parents.  As the majority points out, R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) 
sees to that.  Ohio’s custody laws allow for the legal recognition of an adult’s 
commitment to a child, and that adult’s right and responsibility to continue that 
commitment.  What we call that adult is not important.  What her children call her 
is. 
__________________ 
COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶50} The majority holds that “pursuant to its authority under R.C. 
2151.23(A)(2), the juvenile court may determine whether a shared custody 
agreement between Teri and Shelly is in the best interests of the children.”  In 
deciding this, the majority states that “the juvenile court has jurisdiction to 
determine the custody of the Bonfield children pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) 
without reference to R.C. 3109.04.”  (Emphasis added.)  I cannot agree. 
{¶51} As the majority correctly notes, R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) provides that 
the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction under the Revised Code “to 
determine the custody of any child not a ward of another court of this state.”  This 
statutory provision merely empowers a juvenile court to entertain custody 
determination actions; it does not, however, provide the enabling mechanism by 
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14 
which such actions come before the juvenile court.  Instead, R.C. 2151.23(F)(1) 
dictates how a party invokes the juvenile court’s R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) jurisdiction: 
{¶52} “The juvenile court shall exercise its jurisdiction in child custody 
matters in accordance with sections 3109.04, 3109.21 to 3109.36, and 5103.20 to 
5103.28 of the Revised Code.” 
{¶53} Thus, it is R.C. 2151.23(F)(1), not (A)(2), that targets procedures 
by which a party can properly invoke the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.  Under the 
majority’s reading of the statutory scheme, anyone could file for custody of any 
child simply by filing an “R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) motion.”  Yet, the Revised Code 
generally limits the consideration of issues of custody/parenting of children to  (1) 
circumstances of abuse, dependency, or neglect, see, generally, R.C. Chapter 
2151, and (2) circumstances surrounding changes in the legal relationship of 
parents, such as divorce, legal separation, or annulment,  R.C. 3109.04(A).  By 
legislative choice, there must be a statutory trigger to invoke R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) 
jurisdiction. 
{¶54} Here, the appellants sought to invoke the juvenile court’s R.C. 
2151.23(A) jurisdiction by way of R.C. 3109.04.  Although this statute is a proper 
vehicle by which a party can invoke the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, the party 
must be a parent of a minor child from a marriage.  R.C. 3109.04(A) provides that 
“in any proceeding pertaining to the allocation of parental rights and 
responsibilities for the care of a child, * * * the court shall allocate the parental 
rights and responsibilities for the care of the minor children of the marriage.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The statute then goes on to provide for ways in which the 
court may allocate parental rights and responsibilities.  In this case, the R.C. 
3109.04(A) marriage requirement forecloses reaching determinations under the 
remaining portions of R.C. 3109.04, such as whether Shelly is a “parent” under 
R.C. 3109.04(G).  Because the General Assembly does not permit same-sex 
marriages, see R.C. 3101.01, Teri and Shelly are not married, the children are not 
January Term, 2002 
15 
“of the marriage,” and R.C. 3109.04(A) is inapplicable.  The juvenile court thus 
did not err in denying a grant of custody under R.C. 3109.04. 
{¶55} Accordingly, I concur with the majority’s judgment only insofar as 
it affirms at least in part the judgment of the court of appeals.  As to the majority’s 
reasoning and the remainder of the judgment, I respectfully dissent. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Sallee Fry Waterman, for appellants. 
 
Susan J. Becker, urging reversal for amici curiae, National Association of 
Social Workers, American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 
American Counseling Association, American Public Health Association, and 
Ohio Psychological Association. 
 
Patricia M. Longue, urging reversal for amici curiae, Lambda Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, Inc., National Center for Lesbian Rights, and Ohio 
Human Rights Bar Association. 
 
David R. Langdon; Keating, Muething & Klekamp and Joseph L. Trauth, 
urging affirmance for amici curiae the Honorable Thomas E. Brinkman, Jr., Larry 
L. Flowers, Timothy J. Grendell, Jim Jordan, Linda Reidelbach, Twyla Roman, 
Michelle G. Schneider, and William J. Seitz III, Members of the Ohio General 
Assembly. 
 
David R. Langdon, urging affirmance for amici curiae American Family 
Association of Ohio, Citizens for Community Values, Equal Rights Not Special 
Rights, Family First, and National Legal Foundation. 
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