Case Title: People v. Esquivel

Citation: 

Docket Number: S262551

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
RANDOLPH STEVEN ESQUIVEL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S262551 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Five 
B294024 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
NA102362 
 
 
June 17, 2021 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, 
Groban, and Jenkins concurred.  
 
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVEL 
S262551 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
When new legislation reduces the punishment for an 
offense, we presume that the legislation applies to all cases not 
yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.  (In re Estrada 
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada).)  A case in which a defendant is 
placed on probation with imposition of sentence suspended is 
not yet final for this purpose if the defendant may still timely 
obtain direct review of an order revoking probation and 
imposing sentence.  (People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40 
(McKenzie).)  We hold that a case in which a defendant is placed 
on probation with execution of an imposed state prison sentence 
suspended is not yet final for this purpose if the defendant may 
still timely obtain direct review of an order revoking probation 
and causing the state prison sentence to take effect.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
Defendant Randolph Steven Esquivel pleaded no contest 
to a felony and admitted two prior prison terms.  In 2015, the 
trial court sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment for the 
felony and one additional year for each of the two priors.  The 
court then suspended execution of the state prison sentence and 
placed defendant on probation.  Defendant did not challenge his 
sentence on appeal at that time.  About three years later, in 
2018, the court found defendant in violation of a condition of 
probation and ordered the sentence into effect. 
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVEL 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
Defendant appealed.  During the pendency of his appeal, 
the Legislature amended the provision under which the trial 
court had imposed the two 1-year enhancements.  Specifically, 
the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. 
Sess.) (hereafter Senate Bill 136), which made the enhancement 
provision applicable only to prison terms imposed for certain 
sexually violent offenses.  (See Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1, eff. 
Jan. 1, 2020, amending Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).)  If the 
amended provision had been in effect at the time of defendant’s 
sentencing, it would not have applied to his prior prison terms.  
The parties agreed that the amendment applies to all cases that 
were not final when the legislation took effect.  The parties 
disagreed, however, about whether defendant’s case was 
already final. 
The Court of Appeal held that it was.  The court reasoned 
that defendant could have appealed his sentence when that 
sentence was imposed, in 2015.  The sentence became final, the 
court continued, when defendant failed to timely appeal from 
the order imposing sentence.  (People v. Esquivel (Mar. 26, 2020, 
B294024) [nonpub. opn.].)  We granted review.1 
II.  THE ESTRADA PRESUMPTION 
George Ramirez Estrada was convicted of a misdemeanor 
drug offense and committed to a rehabilitation center.  (Estrada, 
supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 742.)  He escaped.  (Ibid.)  At that time, a 
person convicted of such an escape could not be paroled without 
 
1  
The parties continue to agree, and the Court of Appeal has 
held, that Senate Bill 136 applies retroactively to nonfinal 
judgments.  (See, e.g., People v. Lopez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 337, 
341–342.)  Our grant of review did not include that issue, and 
nothing in this opinion casts doubt on that conclusion.    
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVEL 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
first serving two years in prison.  (Id. at pp. 742–744.)  Before 
Estrada was convicted and sentenced, however, new legislation 
that afforded earlier parole eligibility took effect.  (Id. at p. 744.)  
This court held that Estrada was entitled to the benefit of the 
new legislation.  (Ibid.)  “If the amendatory statute lessening 
punishment becomes effective prior to the date the judgment of 
conviction becomes final,” we concluded, then “it, and not the old 
statute in effect when the prohibited act was committed, 
applies.”  (Ibid.) 
The issue, we reasoned, was one of legislative intent.  
(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.)  “Had the Legislature 
expressly stated which statute should apply, its determination, 
either way, would have been legal and constitutional.”  (Ibid.)  
In the absence of such a declaration of intent, we identified “one 
consideration of paramount importance” (ibid.):  “When the 
Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment[,]  
it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty 
was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as 
punishment for the commission of the prohibited act.  It is an 
inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended 
that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now 
deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it 
constitutionally could apply.  The amendatory act imposing the 
lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts 
committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting 
the defendant of the act is not final.  This intent seems obvious, 
because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the 
Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a 
conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of 
penology.”  (Id. at p. 745.)  Under those theories, punishment is 
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVEL 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
appropriate to deter, confine, and rehabilitate; “ ‘[t]here is no 
place in the scheme for punishment for its own sake.’ ”  (Ibid.)2   
Estrada’s presumption of retroactivity has been a fixture 
of our criminal law for more than 50 years.  During this time, 
“the development of modern theories of penology has continued 
to unfold.”  (In re Pedro T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1041, 1045, fn. 1.)  
About 10 years after we decided Estrada, our Legislature 
“declare[d] that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is 
punishment.”  (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 273, p. 5140, adding Pen. 
Code, § 1170.)  The Legislature did not directly address the 
Estrada presumption, however, and we adhered to that 
presumption in the years that followed.  (See People v. Nasalga 
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792 (plur. opn.); see also id. at p. 799 
(conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  More recently, our Legislature 
conveyed that “the purpose of sentencing is public safety 
achieved through punishment, rehabilitation, and restorative 
justice” — echoing a premise on which Estrada was based.  (Pen. 
Code, § 1170, subd. (a)(1), as amended by Stats. 2016, ch. 696, 
§ 1.)  And regardless of the reasons for imposing punishment, 
ameliorative legislation reflects a determination that a “former 
penalty was too severe and that lighter punishment is proper.”  
(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.)   
Estrada thus continues to stand for the proposition that 
(i) in the absence of a contrary indication of legislative intent, 
 
2  
We also drew upon common law principles to contextualize 
two statutory provisions and explain why those provisions did 
not support a contrary inference regarding legislative intent.  
(See Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 746–748 [discussing 
Pen. Code, § 3 and Gov. Code, § 9608].) 
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVEL 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
(ii) legislation that ameliorates punishment (iii) applies to all 
cases that are not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.   
Our case law has explored each of those three issues.  
First, we have considered whether an enactment was intended 
to apply only prospectively.  (See, e.g., In re Kapperman (1974) 
11 Cal.3d 542, 546; In re Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1045–
1047; People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 185–186; People v. 
Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657–659 (Conley); People v. 
Dehoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 594, 603; People v. Gentile (2020) 
10 Cal.5th 830, 851–859 (Gentile); cf. People v. Viera (2005) 
35 Cal.4th 264, 305–306 [discussing legislation both enacted 
and repealed during pendency of a case].)  An express indication 
of intent is sufficient but not necessary to overcome the Estrada 
presumption.  (Conley, at p. 656.)  For example, “when 
ameliorative legislation sets out a specific mechanism as the 
exclusive avenue for retroactive relief, we have held that such 
legislation does not apply retroactively to nonfinal judgments on 
direct appeal.”  (Gentile, at p. 852.) 
Second, we have evaluated whether several kinds of 
legislation ameliorate punishment.  Our precedent relevant to 
that issue focuses primarily on whether a change in law is 
ameliorative.  (See, e.g., People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 
76 [discretion to impose lesser punishment]; In re Boyle (1974) 
11 Cal.3d 165, 168 [limiting class of persons who may be denied 
bail]; People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 300–301 [eliminating 
punishment] (Rossi); People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 94 
[making available a defense]; People v. Superior Court (Lara) 
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303 [possibility of trial and sentencing as 
a juvenile rather than an adult]; People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 
618, 631 (Frahs) [pretrial diversion with potential for more 
lenient treatment]; People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 699 
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVEL 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
[discretion to strike an enhancement]; but see In re Griffin 
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 757, 760–761 [change that was detrimental to 
defense overall]; People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 325 
[change to accrual of good behavior credits incentivized future 
conduct rather than altering the penalty for a crime, and thus 
did not ameliorate punishment in the relevant sense].)  We have 
also considered whether the consequence ameliorated was 
punishment covered by the presumption.  (See People v. Durbin 
(1966) 64 Cal.2d 474, 479 [civil penalties or forfeitures]; People 
v. Foster (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1202, 1210 [“it is not clear that [a 
particular kind of] commitment, which we have characterized as 
‘not penal or punitive’ [citation], is a type of judgment covered 
by Estrada[]”]; cf. Frazer v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 564, 569 
[considering application of amended rule of professional conduct 
in state bar disciplinary proceeding].) 
Third, and in dispute here, we have addressed when a case 
becomes “final” for purposes of the presumption.  Estrada used 
varied terminology to describe this issue, speaking of the finality 
of “the judgment of conviction” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at 
p. 744); of “all cases not reduced to final judgment” (id. at 
p. 746); and, when describing a related common law rule, of “all 
prosecutions not reduced to final judgment” (id. at p. 747).  (See 
McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 46.)  Regardless of the 
terminology, it is well settled that a matter is not “final” for this 
purpose merely because the defendant has already been 
sentenced.  A defendant who is convicted and sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment without probation, for example, is 
presumptively entitled to the benefit of ameliorative legislation 
that takes effect before direct review is complete.  (See 
McKenzie, at p. 45; In re Corcoran (1966) 64 Cal.2d 447, 449; In 
re Kirk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 761, 763.)  The question in this case 
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVEL 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
arises because ameliorative legislation took effect after the 
initial time for defendant to challenge his 2015 sentence had 
elapsed, but before the conclusion of his appeal from the 2018 
decision ordering that sentence into effect.  
III.  DISCUSSION 
Estrada presumed that our Legislature intends for 
ameliorative 
enactments 
to 
apply 
as 
broadly 
as 
is 
constitutionally permissible.  The significance of finality was 
that legislation “constitutionally could apply” to nonfinal 
judgments.  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.)  After 
Estrada, however, various provisions have ameliorated 
punishment in connection with judgments that were clearly 
final at the time the provisions were enacted, without apparent 
constitutional infirmity.  (See Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at 
p. 853 [“the Legislature crafted a specific mechanism for seeking 
retroactive relief, and that mechanism does not distinguish 
between persons whose sentences are final and those whose 
sentences are not”]; cf., e.g., Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 657 
[discussing provision enacted by the electorate that “draws no 
distinction between persons serving final sentences and those 
serving nonfinal sentences, entitling both categories of prisoners 
to petition courts for recall of sentence”].)  And if the Legislature 
is not categorically prohibited from mitigating punishment 
connected to final judgments, this naturally raises questions 
about the precise reach of the presumption that “the Legislature 
must have intended that the new statute imposing the new 
lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to 
every case to which it constitutionally could apply.”  (Estrada, 
at p. 745.)  
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVEL 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
We adhere to the Estrada doctrine’s longstanding 
nonfinality requirement, on which our Legislature may have 
relied when declining to limit the retroactive application of its 
enactments.  (Cf. Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 635 [“when the 
Legislature enacted [Penal Code] section 1001.36, it was aware 
that if it did not want the statute to apply retroactively to 
nonfinal judgments, it needed to clearly and directly indicate 
such intent” (italics added)].)  But the role of finality in Estrada’s 
reasoning counsels against importing a rigid understanding of 
the term “final” into this context.  (See McKenzie, supra, 
9 Cal.5th at p. 48.)  Instead, we must look deeper to discern the 
meaning and significance of Estrada’s finality limit.  
Recently, in McKenzie, we held that “a convicted 
defendant who [was] placed on probation after imposition of 
sentence [was] suspended, and who [did] not timely appeal from 
the order granting probation, [could] take advantage of 
ameliorative statutory amendments that [took] effect during a 
later appeal from a judgment revoking probation and imposing 
sentence.”  (McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 43.)  We reasoned 
that the defendant’s “prosecution had not been ‘reduced to final 
judgment at the time’ ” the ameliorative legislation was enacted 
(id. at p. 45), as the “ ‘ “criminal proceeding . . . ha[d] not yet 
reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to 
review it” ’ ”  (ibid.). 
We then turned to the People’s position.  They argued that 
“[t]he relevant cutoff point under Estrada for applying 
ameliorative amendments is the date the ‘judgment of 
conviction becomes final,’ ” and that the defendant’s underlying 
conviction became final when he did not appeal the order placing 
him on probation.  (McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 46.)  We 
disagreed.  Part of our reasoning was specific to the suspended-
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVEL 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
imposition context; we observed that “the terms ‘judgment’ and 
‘ “sentence” ’ are generally considered ‘synonymous,’ ” such that 
the absence of a sentence in a suspended-imposition case also 
implies the absence of a final judgment.  (Ibid.)  But part of our 
reasoning was more general; we further observed that Estrada 
referred not only to the finality of the judgment of conviction, 
but also to the finality of the “ ‘case[]’ ” or “ ‘prosecution[].’ ”  
(McKenzie, at p. 46.)  A decision issued after Estrada similarly 
spoke in terms of the criminal proceeding as a whole.  
(McKenzie, at p. 46, citing Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 304.)  
Accordingly, we concluded that the defendant in McKenzie was 
entitled to relief because “it [could not] be said that this criminal 
prosecution or proceeding concluded before the ameliorative 
legislation took effect.”  (McKenzie, at p. 46.) 
So too here.  This case was not final, for purposes of the 
Estrada presumption, because the “criminal prosecution or 
proceeding” brought against defendant was not complete when 
the ameliorative legislation at issue took effect.  (McKenzie, 
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 46.)  Defendant had not exhausted direct 
review of the order causing his carceral punishment to take 
effect.  The time for him to seek that review had not expired.  
And he had not successfully completed probation.  (Cf. ibid. 
[noting our rejection in People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771 
(Chavez) of an argument that “ ‘the criminal action terminates’ 
when ‘the court orders a grant of probation’ ”].) 
To the extent they are discernable, the constitutional 
concerns underlying Estrada’s rationale comport with our focus 
on the end of the criminal prosecution or proceeding.  Estrada 
reasoned 
that 
nonfinal 
judgments 
could 
be 
modified 
constitutionally; it did not explicitly say that final judgments 
could never be modified.  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.)  
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVEL 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
Presumably, Estrada understood finality to trigger at least a 
potential constitutional restraint (i) on the Legislature’s power 
to intervene in judicial decisionmaking or (ii) on the judiciary’s 
power to affect matters that were no longer pending.  But any 
constraint on the Legislature’s power to affect “final” criminal 
judgments would appear to arise from the conclusion of a 
criminal proceeding as a whole.  (Cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 
Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211, 227 [focusing on “the last word of the 
judicial department with regard to a particular case or 
controversy”].)  Certainly, the mere fact that a court has already 
addressed an issue in a case poses no insuperable constitutional 
bar to legislative activity affecting resolution of that issue.  (See 
People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 727 & fn. 10; People v. 
Charles (1967) 66 Cal.2d 330, 335; cf. Bank Markazi v. Peterson 
(2016) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [136 S.Ct. 1310, 1325] [“Congress may 
indeed direct courts to apply newly enacted, outcome-altering 
legislation in pending civil cases”].)  Nor does there appear to be 
any constitutional obstacle to the judiciary’s reduction of a 
sentence imposed in a criminal prosecution that remains 
pending before that branch.  True, there are some constraints 
on a trial court’s ordinary discretion to modify suspended 
execution sentences.  (See People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 
1081.)  But those constraints are statutory, and in any event, 
defendants entitled to the benefit of ameliorative legislation 
may be able to obtain relief by other procedural means.  (People 
v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 895.)3   
 
3  
Whether or not some condition of finality might bear on 
the manner in which the Legislature can ameliorate 
punishment, Estrada does not hold, and we do not imply, that 
 
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVEL 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
To be clear, we need not and do not draw any precise 
constitutional lines to resolve this case.  The Estrada doctrine is 
one of presumed legislative intent, not of constitutional law.  
The point is that to the extent Estrada’s unarticulated 
constitutional concerns shed light on the meaning of “final” for 
purposes of the presumption of retroactivity, those concerns 
appear to point toward an inquiry focused on whether the 
criminal prosecution or proceeding as a whole is complete.   
Viewed through that lens, much of the People’s briefing is 
unpersuasive.  Whether the imposition of defendant’s 
suspended execution sentence gave rise to a final judgment for 
purposes of appealability says little about whether the criminal 
prosecution or proceeding had concluded — and, thus, says little 
about whether the matter is “final” for purposes of Estrada. 
The People also briefly argue that “[t]reating an imposed 
but suspended sentence as the source of a final judgment for 
Estrada purposes is consistent with the goals of the different 
forms of probation.”  They contend that “by imposing and 
suspending a sentence, the trial court tells a defendant that 
violating probation will result in ‘irreversible consequences.’  
Telling defendants that these ‘irreversible consequences’ can . . . 
be reversed if the Legislature passes a new law — allowing them 
to escape from a sentence that is supposed to be ‘hanging over’ 
their heads — would tend to undermine this message.”  
This is no doubt true, to a point.  The possibility that a 
punishment will be ameliorated may reduce the deterrent effect 
of that punishment.  But this possibility already exists in the 
 
the Legislature lacks constitutional authority to mitigate 
punishment connected to final criminal judgments.  (See, e.g., 
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 853.)   
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVEL 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
suspended execution context — threats of irreversible 
consequences notwithstanding.  A case in which a defendant is 
convicted and placed on probation with execution of sentence 
suspended is not final while direct review of the order imposing 
sentence remains ongoing.  (See McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 
p. 46.)  That process of direct review can be time consuming, 
including, for example, an appeal to the Court of Appeal; a 
petition for review directed to this court; and a petition for writ 
of certiorari directed to the United States Supreme Court.  
Through all these steps, a suspended execution sentence is not 
final, and the Estrada presumption remains available.  Through 
all these steps, the “irreversible consequences” threatened at 
sentencing remain reversible by legislative enactment.  The 
People’s argument fails to explain why the Legislature would 
wish to ameliorate consequences during an appeal from an order 
imposing a suspended execution sentence, but not during an 
appeal from an order causing that sentence to take effect.  We 
are not persuaded that any marginal difference in deterrence 
warrants denial of relief to those in defendant’s position.  (Cf. 
McKenzie, at p. 49 [argument regarding deterrence “did not 
persuade us in Estrada not to apply ameliorative revisions to 
defendants who have already committed criminal acts”].)   
Finally, the People assert that “[r]eopening” suspended 
execution “case[s]” would deprive victims of a “certain degree of 
closure.”  But when an appeal from an order causing 
punishment to take effect is ongoing, there is no closed case to 
reopen; the criminal proceeding remains pending, and closure 
has yet to be obtained.  Indeed, at the time when the People 
would have us deem suspended execution cases final (after 
direct review of the order imposing sentence is complete), it may 
be unclear whether the court will revoke probation and require 
PEOPLE v. ESQUIVEL 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
the defendant to suffer the punishment imposed.  Even the 
terms of probation itself remain subject to modification.  
(Chavez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 782.)  So whatever degree of 
closure attends imposition of the sentence is not much closure 
at all; the defendant’s ultimate fate “ ‘depends on the outcome of 
the probationary proceeding.’ ”  (Id. at p. 781.)   
At bottom, this is a case about presumed legislative intent.  
We see no persuasive reason to presume that the Legislature 
would wish to extend the benefit of ameliorative legislation to 
suspended-imposition defendants whose probation is revoked 
(per McKenzie), but not to suspended-execution defendants 
whose probation is revoked.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
legislation ameliorating punishment presumptively applies to 
suspended execution cases pending on appeal from an order 
causing a previously imposed sentence to take effect. 
IV.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Esquivel 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)   
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 3/26/2020 – 2d 
Dist., Div. 5 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S262551 
Date Filed:  June 17, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior     
County:  Los Angeles    
Judge:  Jesus I. Rodriguez    
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Counsel: 
 
Mark R. Feeser, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Paul 
R. Kraus, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen, David W. Williams, Steven D. 
Matthews and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Mark R. Feeser 
Attorney at Law 
3940-7174 Broad Street 
San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 
(805) 542-0189 
 
David W. Williams 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring St., Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6182