Case Title: Payne v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RONALD PAYNE,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 244, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No.  88000107DI 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                             Submitted:  October 25, 2013 
 
 
 
 
        Decided:  December 6, 2013 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 6th day of December 2013, upon consideration of the briefs of 
the parties and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Ronald Payne, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s April 23, 2013 order denying his third motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find 
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in January 1988, Payne was 
indicted on two counts of Assault in a Detention Facility and one count of 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony.  Trial 
 
2
was scheduled for May 1988.  On May 4, 1988, the Superior Court declared 
a mistrial after the jury failed to reach a verdict.   
 
(3) 
Payne was re-tried in November 1988.  The jury found Payne 
guilty of one count of Assault in a Detention Facility and one count of 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony.  He 
was sentenced as a habitual offender to life in prison with the possibility of 
parole.1  This Court affirmed Payne’s convictions on direct appeal.2  Payne 
subsequently filed two postconviction motions, both of which were denied 
by the Superior Court.  Payne appealed the denial of his first postconviction 
motion and this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.3  This is 
Payne’s appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his third postconviction 
motion. 
 
(4) 
In his appeal, Payne claims that a) the Superior Court should 
have considered the merits of his claims because he is actually innocent of 
the crimes of which he was convicted; b) his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to impeach the credibility of a racist police officer 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4214(a). 
2 Payne v. State, 1990 WL 84673 (Del. May 29, 1990). 
3 Payne v. State, 1994 WL 91244 (Del. Mar. 9, 1994).  
 
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witness; and c) he is entitled to the application of good time credits to 
advance his release date.4 
 
(5) 
Payne’s first claim is that the Superior Court should have 
considered the merits of his postconviction claims pursuant to Rule 61(i) (5) 
because he is actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted and 
lacked counsel to assert that claim in his previous postconviction motions.  
The record before us reflects that Payne did not raise the issue of “actual 
innocence” in the Superior Court in the first instance.  Moreover, we can 
discern no factual or legal basis for Payne’s contention that he should have 
been appointed counsel in connection with his previous two postconviction 
motions.  In the absence of any showing that Payne’s first claim should be 
considered in the interest of justice, we decline to address it for the first time 
in this appeal.5   
 
(6) 
To the extent that Payne claims that the Superior Court either 
erred or abused its discretion when it denied his postconviction motion on 
procedural grounds, we reject that contention as well.  In considering a 
postconviction motion, Delaware law requires the Superior Court to first 
determine whether a defendant has met the procedural requirements of Rule 
                                                 
4 To the extent that Payne has not presented claims in this appeal that were raised 
previously in the Superior Court, all such claims are deemed to be waived and will not be 
addressed by the Court.  Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 
5 Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
 
4
61 before reaching the merits of his claims.6  We can discern no error or 
abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court in determining that 
Payne’s postconviction claims were procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 
61(i) (1)-(5).  For all of the above reasons, we conclude that Payne’s first 
claim is without merit.  
 
(7) 
Payne’s second claim is that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to impeach the credibility of a racist police 
officer witness.7  In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different.8  The defendant must make 
concrete allegations of ineffective assistance, and substantiate them, or risk 
summary dismissal.9   
 
(8) 
Here, Payne’s claim fails for two reasons---first, his claim of 
racism on the part of the police officer witness is without any factual support 
in the record and, second, he does not explain why he waited until his third 
postconviction motion to raise this particular allegation of ineffective 
                                                 
6 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
7 We assume for the purposes of this Order that this claim was raised in the Superior 
Court in the first instance. 
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
9 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
 
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assistance.  As such, the claim is procedurally barred under Rule 61(i) (2).  
For all of the above reasons, we conclude that Payne’s second claim also is 
without merit.   
 
(9) 
Payne’s third, and final, claim is that he is entitled to the 
application of good time credits against his life sentence to advance his 
release date.  The record does not reflect that Payne raised this issue in the 
Superior Court and it, therefore, is not properly before us.10  The claim is 
without merit in any case.  Under Delaware law, prisoners serving life 
sentences with the possibility of parole may advance their parole eligibility 
dates with good time credits, but are not entitled to use those credits to 
advance their ultimate release date.11  We, therefore, conclude that Payne’s 
third, and final, claim is likewise without merit.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
                                                 
10 Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
11 Evans v. State, 872 A.2d 539, 557 (Del. 2005).