Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Richard W. Voss

Citation: 2014 WI 75

Docket Number: 2012AP000931-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 75 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP931-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Richard W. Voss, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
     v. 
Richard W. Voss, 
          Respondent-Respondent.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST VOSS  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 18, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the complainant-appellant, there were briefs by Julie 
M. Spoke and the Office of Lawyer Regulation. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief by Richard 
W. Voss and Voss Law Office, Rhinelander.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 75
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP931-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Richard W. Voss, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard W. Voss, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 18, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
appeals from that portion of a referee's report recommending 
that the license of Attorney Richard W. Voss to practice law in 
Wisconsin be suspended for one year as a sanction for 
professional misconduct.  The OLR argues that Attorney Voss's 
license to practice law should be revoked. 
¶2 
Upon careful review of this matter, we conclude that 
an eighteen-month suspension of Attorney Voss's license to 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
2 
 
practice law is an appropriate sanction for his misconduct.  We 
agree with the referee that Attorney Voss should be ordered to 
make restitution to his former client's estate in the amount of 
$2,077.18 and that he be ordered to pay the full costs of this 
proceeding, which are $4,625.48 as of April 2, 2014.  We further 
concur with the referee's recommendation that, as a condition of 
the reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin, 
Attorney Voss be required to demonstrate that he has in place a 
proper trust account consistent with supreme court rules. 
¶3 
Attorney 
Voss 
was 
admitted 
to 
practice 
law 
in 
Wisconsin in 1976, and practices in Rhinelander.  In 2004 
Attorney Voss was privately reprimanded for violating Supreme 
Court Rules (SCRs) 20:1.1 and 20:1.4(a).  Private Reprimand, 
No. 2004-24.1  In 2006 Attorney Voss received a public reprimand 
for various trust account violations.  Public Reprimand of 
Richard W. Voss, No. 2006-7. 
¶4 
On May 2, 2012, the OLR filed a complaint alleging 11 
counts of misconduct arising out of Attorney Voss's work as the 
court-appointed guardian of J.K., who is now deceased.  In 
September of 1987, Attorney Voss was appointed by the Oneida 
County circuit court as the guardian of the person and estate of 
J.K.  J.K. suffered from mental illness, complicated by alcohol 
abuse and diabetes, requiring a long period of protective 
                                                 
1 The OLR's complaint cited Private Reprimand No. 2004-25, 
but that matter involved criminal conduct by a lawyer, which 
clearly does not fit the description of Attorney Voss's 
misconduct.  Private Reprimand No. 2004-24 involved violations 
of SCRs 20:1.1 and 20:1.4(a). 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
3 
 
placement.  The circuit court never approved or authorized any 
guardianship fees to be paid to Attorney Voss from J.K.'s funds. 
¶5 
Attorney Voss did not set up a separate guardianship 
account to handle J.K.'s income and expenses.  Instead, Attorney 
Voss deposited J.K.'s monthly social security benefits in an 
account at M&I Bank designated as his client trust account.  The 
account at M&I Bank is not an Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts 
(IOLTA) account but rather a personal checking account that does 
not accrue interest.  Attorney Voss also maintained a separate 
business account at M&I Bank designated as a non-personal 
account.  Attorney Voss is responsible for recordkeeping for his 
client trust account and is the sole person authorized to sign 
checks. 
¶6 
From 1987 through 1990, J.K. resided in a private 
facility and substantially all of his income was used to pay for 
the costs of his care.  In 1990 J.K. was moved to a facility run 
by the Veterans Administration (VA).  The VA did not require a 
payment for J.K.'s room, board, and care.  Attorney Voss made 
regular disbursements to the VA for J.K.'s personal needs and 
incidentals. 
¶7 
Between 1990 and 2008, Attorney Voss received social 
security benefits on J.K.'s behalf totaling between $5,250 and 
$7,848 annually.  Between 1990 and 2008, Attorney Voss disbursed 
no more than $4,320 per year to the VA on behalf of J.K.  From 
1991 until September of 2002, Attorney Voss made disbursements 
to the VA for J.K.'s personal needs and incidentals in the 
amount of $70 per week.  In September of 2002, Attorney Voss 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
4 
 
increased the disbursement to $80 per week.  In October of 2007, 
Attorney Voss ceased to make any payments to the VA for J.K.'s 
personal needs and incidentals. 
¶8 
Attorney 
Voss 
should 
have 
accumulated 
at 
least 
$1,767.60 per year attributable to J.K. in his trust account 
over and above the amounts disbursed for J.K.  In some years the 
trust account should have accumulated over $3,000 more than was 
disbursed on J.K.'s behalf. 
¶9 
In October of 2007, J.K.'s social worker suggested 
that Attorney Voss establish a burial fund for J.K.  Attorney 
Voss opened a separate account at People's State Bank in 
December of 2007.  The account was titled "[J.J.K.] Richard [W.] 
Voss, Guardian" to be held as a burial account.  Attorney Voss 
transferred $5,690 from his trust account into J.K.'s burial 
account. 
¶10 Between 1987 and 1996, Attorney Voss filed annual 
accountings with the Oneida County circuit court regarding his 
guardianship for J.K.  In January of 1998, the circuit court 
entered an order waiving any further annual accountings for 
J.K., finding, based on Attorney Voss's representations, that it 
was unlikely J.K. would have an estate worth more than $1,000 in 
the foreseeable future.  After 1998, Attorney Voss periodically 
filed affidavits with the circuit court advising the court that 
J.K.'s assets remained under $1,000 in the preceding calendar 
year.  Attorney Voss filed no further accounting until 2008. 
¶11 On April 16, 2008, Attorney Voss filed an annual 
accounting with the Oneida County circuit court showing that 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
5 
 
J.K. had assets of $10,102.06 as of December 31, 2007.  
Following J.K.'s death, on December 8, 2008, Attorney Voss filed 
a summary assignment petition showing J.K.'s assets totaling 
$14,145.93. 
¶12 Since the circuit court had believed that J.K.'s 
assets had not exceeded $1,000 in any calendar year, the court 
requested an explanation from Attorney Voss regarding J.K.'s 
assets.  At the direction of the circuit court, Oneida County 
Register in Probate Susan Ohman also began communicating with 
Attorney Voss asking for information about J.K.'s assets. 
¶13 The circuit court subsequently obtained records from 
the VA for all amounts paid to it on J.K.'s behalf and obtained 
records from the Social Security Administration to confirm 
J.K.'s income from 1990 until the date of his death.  Ms. Ohman 
performed a "rough fraud audit" and determined there was more 
than $40,000 in income attributable to J.K. that Attorney Voss 
had not accounted for that should have been in Attorney Voss's 
client trust account.  Ultimately, the circuit court concluded 
that Attorney Voss had not accounted for $46,103.88 of J.K.'s 
funds. 
¶14 The circuit court removed Attorney Voss as a special 
administrator of J.K.'s estate and appointed former Register in 
Probate Maxine Meyer as special administrator of the estate.  
After 
demand 
was 
made 
by 
Meyer 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.20(1)(b) in October of 2009, Attorney Voss sent two checks 
to Meyer to reimburse J.K.'s estate.  The first check was in the 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
6 
 
amount of $44,501.88, and the second check was in the amount of 
$1,602. 
¶15 In correspondence dated August 14, 2009, Attorney Voss 
told Ohman that he did not keep good track of what money was 
going in and out of his trust account, that he did not maintain 
separate trust account ledgers for each client, and that his 
recordkeeping problems were compounded by the fact that client 
monies of his brother, Attorney Frederick Voss, were also in his 
trust account. 
¶16 On September 11, 2009, during a meeting with Ohman and 
a detective from the Oneida County sheriff's department, 
Attorney Voss said that when he received a bankruptcy retainer 
fee, he would deposit the client's retainer check into his 
business account and then, when he paid the bankruptcy filing 
fee, he would pay it out of his trust account using J.K.'s 
money. 
¶17 In December of 2009, Oneida County Circuit Court 
Judges Mark A. Mangerson and Patrick F. O'Melia filed a 
grievance with the OLR, asking for an investigation into 
Attorney Voss's conduct while he was serving as the guardian of 
the person and estate of J.K.  On January 28, 2010, the OLR sent 
Attorney Voss a letter providing notice of the investigation 
into the J.K. matter.  The OLR requested certain information and 
records, including copies of Attorney Voss's banking and trust 
account records for the time period he served as J.K.'s 
guardian.  Attorney Voss was unable to provide the OLR with 
copies of all bank statements, cancelled checks or imaged 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
7 
 
checks, and deposit slips and items he was required to maintain 
pursuant to SCR 20:1.15. 
¶18 Although Attorney Voss provided the OLR with a 
transaction register for the requested time period, the register 
failed to maintain a running balance, failed to document all 
deposits and disbursements, failed to identify the client matter 
regarding 
all 
deposits 
and 
disbursements, 
and 
included 
inaccurate entries. 
¶19 In a March 9, 2010 letter sent in response to the 
OLR's investigative request that he describe in detail his 
procedures for managing J.K.'s funds, Attorney Voss described a 
process that looked at the overall balance in his trust account 
compared to the overall disbursements, but that did not include 
recording specific deposits and disbursements for J.K. 
¶20 In a letter to the OLR dated August 22, 2011, Attorney 
Voss explained his firm's procedures for handling client money 
between January 1, 2004, and October 31, 2008.  He said: 
[M]ost of the money which was deposited into the 
client trust account was for work done on bankruptcy 
cases and a flat fee was agreed upon between myself 
and the client.  That fee included an amount to be 
paid for filing fees and an amount for the work to be 
done and was payable in full before the work would be 
done due to the fact that most bankruptcy clients are 
not good risks to pay attorney fees after their case 
is filed.  The funds would be deposited in the amount 
necessary to pay the filing fees which was done in 
every bankruptcy case and then the remainder would be 
transferred at the time of deposit and denominated as 
cash in many instances and deposited into my personal 
account.  I was aware of what cases were being filed 
and made sure the amount necessary to pay the fees was 
in the account.  At no time was there an insufficient 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
8 
 
amount to pay any filing fees received from any 
clients. 
¶21 Attorney Voss also stated that he used two credit 
cards to pay his clients' bankruptcy filing fees and that he 
would look at the amounts forwarded to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
during a billing period and would then issue a check to the 
credit card company for payment of those amounts. 
¶22 Attorney Voss told the OLR that Frederick J. Voss was 
his brother and rented space from him but Frederick was not a 
partner, employee, or member of the firm and received no money 
from Attorney Voss.  However, Frederick Voss paid some of the 
office expenses.  Attorney Voss and his brother practiced from 
the same location, used the same letterhead, which stated "Voss 
Law Office," and used both names on the letterhead without 
indicating that Frederick Voss was not an employee, associate, 
partner, or member of the law firm.  Funds received by 
Frederick J. Voss relating to his representation of clients were 
deposited and disbursed from the Voss Law Office trust account. 
¶23 The OLR created a transaction register and client 
ledger reconstructing activity in Attorney Voss's client trust 
account between January 1, 2004, and October 31, 2008.  The 
OLR's reconstructed trust account ledger showed that Attorney 
Voss's trust account was repeatedly and chronically out of trust 
and but for J.K.'s funds in the account, the account would have 
been overdrawn on numerous occasions.  The OLR's audit of 
Attorney Voss's trust account also revealed numerous instances 
where Attorney Voss disbursed funds from the trust account, 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
9 
 
including bankruptcy filing fees, before he deposited the source 
of those funds for disbursement, thereby at least temporarily 
using one client's funds for the benefit of another client. 
¶24 The recreation of Attorney Voss's trust account showed 
that, during the period of time he served as J.K.'s guardian, 
Attorney Voss converted at least $48,791.73 of J.K.'s funds 
either for his own use or to cover expenditures for other client 
matters.  Since Attorney Voss repaid $46,103.88 to J.K.'s 
estate, the OLR's audit revealed that Attorney Voss still owes 
$2,077.18 in restitution to J.K.'s estate. 
¶25 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct:  
 
[COUNT ONE] By failing to safeguard and hold in 
trust client and third party funds and by converting 
client funds to his own use or for the use of other 
clients and third parties, Voss violated former 
SCR 20:1.15(a),2 in effect prior to July 1, 2004, 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.15(a) (effective prior to July 1, 2004) provided:  
 
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 
third persons that is in the lawyer's possession in 
connection with a representation or when acting in a 
fiduciary capacity.  Funds held in connection with a 
representation or in a fiduciary capacity include 
funds held as trustee, agent, guardian, personal 
representative of an estate, or otherwise.  All funds 
of clients and third persons paid to a lawyer or law 
firm shall be deposited in one or more identifiable 
trust accounts as provided in paragraph (c).  The 
trust account shall be maintained in a bank, savings 
bank, trust company, credit union, savings and loan 
association or other investment institution authorized 
to do business and located in Wisconsin.  The trust 
account shall be clearly designated as "Client's 
Account" or "Trust Account" or words of similar 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
10 
 
current SCR 20:1.15(b)(1),3 in effect as of July 1, 
2004, and SCR 20:8.4(c).4 
 
[COUNT TWO] By, at such time as [J.K.'s] expenses 
ceased to equal his income, failing to hold [J.K.'s] 
assets in a separate fiduciary account or to seek the 
court's guidance as to whether he should hold [J.K.'s] 
assets in a separate fiduciary account, Voss violated 
                                                                                                                                                             
import.  No funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm, 
except funds reasonably sufficient to pay or avoid 
imposition 
of 
account 
service 
charges, 
may 
be 
deposited in such an account.  Unless the client 
otherwise directs in writing, securities in bearer 
form shall be kept by the attorney in a safe deposit 
box in a bank, savings bank, trust company, credit 
union, 
savings 
and 
loan 
association 
or 
other 
investment institution authorized to do business and 
located in Wisconsin.  The safe deposit box shall be 
clearly designated as "Client's Account" or "Trust 
Account" or words of similar import.  Other property 
of a client or third person shall be identified as 
such and appropriately safeguarded.  If a lawyer also 
licensed in another state is entrusted with funds or 
property 
in 
connection 
with 
an 
out-of-state 
representation, this provision shall not supersede the 
trust account rules of the other state. 
3 SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) (effective July 1, 2004) provides:   
 
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 
3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 
connection with a representation.  All funds of 
clients and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm 
in connection with a representation shall be deposited 
in one or more identifiable trust accounts. 
4 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
11 
 
former SCR 20:1.15(c)(2),5 in effect prior to July 1, 
2004, and former SCR 20:1.15(c)(2),6 in effect between 
July 1, 2004 and December 31, 2009. 
                                                 
5 SCR 20:1.15(c)(2) (effective prior to July 1, 2004) 
provided: 
A lawyer shall deposit all client funds in the 
account specified in paragraph (1) unless they are 
deposited in any of the following: 
a.  A separate interest-bearing trust account for 
the particular client or client's matter, the interest 
on which shall be paid to the client, net of any 
transaction  costs. 
b.  A pooled interest-bearing trust account with 
sub-accounting 
by 
the 
financial 
institution, 
the 
lawyer 
or 
the 
law 
firm 
that 
will 
provide 
for 
computation of interest earned by each client's funds 
and the payment thereof to the client, net of any 
transaction costs. 
c.  An 
interest-generating 
investment 
vehicle 
selected by the client and designated in specific 
written instructions from the client or authorized by 
the court or other tribunal, on which income shall be 
paid to the client or as directed by the court or 
other tribunal, net of any transaction costs. 
cg.  An 
income-generating 
investment 
vehicle 
selected by the lawyer and approved by a court where 
the lawyer serves as guardian for a ward, under 
chs. 880 and 881, stats. 
cm.  An 
income-generating 
investment 
vehicle 
selected by the lawyer to protect and maximize the 
return 
on 
funds 
in 
a 
bankruptcy 
estate, 
which 
investment vehicle is approved by the trustee in 
bankruptcy and by a bankruptcy court order, consistent 
with 11 USC 345. 
d.  A 
demand 
deposit 
or 
other 
non-interest-
bearing account for funds that are neither nominal in 
amount nor expected to be held for a short term, 
provided the client specifically so directs. 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
12 
 
 
[COUNT 
THREE] 
By 
knowingly 
making 
misrepresentations to the Oneida County Circuit Court 
regarding:  (i) [J.K.'s] assets; (ii) Voss' handling 
of [J.K.'s] assets; and (iii) that he represented 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 SCR 20:1.15(c)(2) 
(effective 
from 
July 
1, 
2004 
to 
December 31, 2009) provided: 
A lawyer shall deposit all client funds in the 
account specified in par. (1) unless the funds are 
deposited in any of the following: 
a.  a separate interest-bearing trust account for 
the particular client or client's matter, the interest 
on which shall be paid to the client, less any 
transaction  costs; 
b.  a pooled interest-bearing trust account with 
sub-accounting 
by 
the 
financial 
institution, 
the 
lawyer, or the law firm that will provide for 
computation of interest earned by each client's funds 
and the payment of the interest to the client, less 
any transaction costs; 
c.  an 
income-generating 
investment 
vehicle 
selected by the client and designated in specific 
written instructions from the client or authorized by 
the court or other tribunal, on which income shall be 
paid to the client or as directed by the court or 
other tribunal, less any transaction costs; 
d.  an 
income-generating 
investment 
vehicle 
selected by the lawyer and approved by a court for 
guardianship funds if the lawyer serves as guardian 
for a ward under chs. 880 and 881, stats.; 
e.  an 
income-generating 
investment 
vehicle 
selected by the lawyer to protect and maximize the 
return 
on 
funds 
in 
a 
bankruptcy 
estate, 
which 
investment vehicle is approved by the trustee in 
bankruptcy and by a bankruptcy court order, consistent 
with 11 USC 345; or 
f.  a 
demand 
deposit 
or 
other 
non-interest-
bearing account for funds that are neither nominal in 
amount nor expected to be held for a short term, if 
the client specifically so approves. 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
13 
 
[J.K.] in the capacity as [J.K.'s] attorney with 
regard to a 2005 Watts hearing, when Voss knew or 
should have known that he was providing the court with 
an inaccurate information or impression regarding the 
same, and by failing to take reasonable steps to 
correct misrepresentations previously made to the 
court 
once 
Voss 
knew 
that 
he 
had 
made 
misrepresentations, 
Voss 
violated 
former 
SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) and (4),7 in effect prior to July 1, 
2007, current SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) and (3),8 in effect as 
of July 1, 2007, and SCR 20:8.4(c). 
 
[COUNT FOUR] By depositing or authorizing others 
to deposit advanced costs paid by clients in his 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) and (4) (effective prior to July 1, 2007) 
provided that a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1)  make a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal; 
. . . . 
 
(4)  offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be 
false.  If a lawyer has offered material evidence and 
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take 
reasonable remedial measures. 
8 SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) and (3) (effective July 1, 2007) provides 
that a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1)  make a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of 
material fact or law previously made to the tribunal 
by the lawyer; 
. . . . 
 
(3)  offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be 
false.  If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness 
called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence 
and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the 
lawyer 
shall 
take 
reasonable 
remedial 
measures, 
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.  
A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the 
testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is false. 
 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
14 
 
business or personal account, rather than his client 
trust account, Voss violated former SCR 20:1.15(a), in 
effect 
prior 
to 
July 
1, 
2004 
and 
current 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(1), in effect as of July 1, 2004. 
 
[COUNT FIVE] By, after July 1, 2004, taking cash 
withdrawals from his client trust account and by 
taking cash from deposits to his client trust account, 
or 
authorizing 
others 
to 
do 
so, 
Voss 
violated 
SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)a.9 
 
[COUNT SIX] By, after July 9, 2006:  (i) failing 
to maintain a pooled interest-bearing account; (ii) 
failing to participate in the Interest on Trust 
Accounts Program; and (iii) by depositing client and 
third party funds that are nominal in amount and/or 
intended to be held for a short period of time in a 
non-interest bearing account, Voss violated former 
SCR 20:1.15(c)(1),10 in effect as of July 1, 2004, 
current SCR 20:1.15(c)(1),11 in effect as of January 1, 
2010, and SCR 13.04.12 
                                                 
9 SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)a. provides that "[n]o disbursement of 
cash shall be made from a trust account or from a deposit to a 
trust account, and no check shall be made payable to 'Cash.'" 
10 SCR 20:1.15(c)(1) (effective July 1, 2004) provides: 
 
A lawyer who receives client funds shall maintain 
a pooled interest-bearing demand account for deposit 
of client or 3rd-party funds that are: 
 
a.  nominal in amount or expected to be held for 
a short period of time; or 
 
b.  not deposited in an account or investment 
under SCR 20:1.15 (c) (2); or 
 
c.  not eligible for an account or investment 
under SCR 20:1.15 (c) (2) because the client is a 
corporation or organization not permitted by law to 
maintain such an account or the terms of the account 
are not consistent with a need to make funds available 
without delay.  
11 SCR 20:1.15(c)(1) (effective January 1, 2010) provides: 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
15 
 
 
[COUNT SEVEN] By, prior to July 1, 2004, failing 
to maintain complete records of trust account funds 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
A lawyer or law firm who receives client or 3rd-
party funds that the lawyer or law firm determines to 
be nominal in amount or that are expected to be held 
for a short period of time such that the funds cannot 
earn income for the benefit of the client or 3rd party 
in excess of the costs to secure that income, shall 
maintain a pooled interest-bearing or dividend-paying 
draft 
trust 
account 
in 
an 
IOLTA 
participating 
institution. 
 
12 SCR 13.04 provides: 
 
(1)  An attorney shall participate in the program 
as provided in SCR 20:1.15 unless: 
 
(a)  The attorney certifies on the annual trust 
account statement filed with the state bar that: 
 
1.  Based on the attorney's current annual trust 
account 
experience 
and 
information 
from 
the 
institution in which the attorney deposits trust 
funds, service charges on the account would equal or 
exceed any interest generated; or 
 
2.  Because of the nature of the attorney's 
practice, the attorney does not maintain a trust 
account; or 
 
(b)  The board, on its own motion or upon 
application from an attorney, grants a waiver from 
participation in the program for good cause. 
 
(2)  The 
board 
may 
reimburse 
an 
attorney 
incurring service charges on an account established 
under 
SCR 20:1.15 (c) (1) 
if 
the 
charges 
are 
reasonably and necessarily related to the attorney's 
participation in the program. 
 
(3)  Refusal 
or 
neglect 
by 
an 
attorney 
to 
participate in the program, except as provided under 
sub. (1), constitutes professional misconduct and may 
be grounds for disciplinary action under the rules 
governing 
enforcement 
of 
attorneys 
professional 
responsibility. 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
16 
 
and other property, by, after June 30, 2004 and before 
July 1, 
2007, 
failing 
to 
maintain 
a 
compliant 
transaction 
register, 
client 
ledgers, 
ledger 
for 
account fees and charges, deposit records, monthly 
statements and reconciliation reports, and by, after 
June 30, 
2007, 
failing 
to 
maintain 
a 
compliant 
transaction 
register, 
client 
ledgers, 
ledger 
for 
account 
fees 
and 
charges, 
deposit 
records, 
disbursement 
records, 
monthly 
statements 
and 
reconciliation 
reports, 
Voss 
violated 
former 
SCR 20:1.15(e),13 in effect prior to July 1, 2004, 
                                                 
13 SCR 20:1.15(e) 
(effective 
prior 
to 
July 
1, 
2004) 
provided: 
 
Complete records of trust account funds and other 
trust property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall 
be preserved for a period of at least six years after 
termination of the representation.  Complete records 
shall include:  (i) a cash receipts journal, listing 
the 
sources 
and 
date 
of 
each 
receipt, 
(ii) 
a 
disbursements journal, listing the date and payee of 
each disbursement, with all disbursements being paid 
by check, (iii) a subsidiary ledger containing a 
separate page for each person or company for whom 
funds have been received in trust, showing the date 
and amount of each receipt, the date and amount of 
each disbursement, and any unexpended balance, (iv) a 
monthly schedule of the subsidiary ledger, indicating 
the balance of each client's account at the end of 
each month, (v) a determination of the cash balance 
(checkbook balance) at the end of each month, taken 
from the cash receipts and cash disbursement journals 
and a reconciliation of the cash balance (checkbook 
balance) with the balance indicated in the bank 
statement, and (vi) monthly statements, including 
canceled 
checks, 
vouchers 
or 
share 
drafts, 
and 
duplicate deposit slips.  A record of all property 
other than cash which is held in trust for clients or 
third persons, as required by paragraph (a) hereof, 
shall also be maintained.  All trust account records 
shall be deemed to have public aspects as related to 
the lawyer's fitness to practice.  
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
17 
 
former SCR 20:1.15(f)(1),14 in effect between July 1, 
2004 
and 
June 
30, 
2007, 
and 
current 
SCR 20:1.15(f)(1),15 in effect  as of July 1, 2007. 
 
[COUNT EIGHT] By commingling personal funds or 
funds belonging to the Voss Law Office in his client 
trust account, Voss violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(3).16 
 
[COUNT NINE] By disbursing from his trust account 
the advanced payments of costs for clients, before 
their filing fees had been paid to the court, Voss 
violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(4).17 
 
[COUNT TEN] By: (i) holding Frederick J. Voss out 
as a partner, member, associate or employee of the 
Voss Law Office; and (ii) allowing Frederick J. Voss 
to hold himself out as a partner, member, associate or 
                                                 
14 SCR 20:1.15(f)(1) (effective between July 1, 2004 and 
June 30, 2007) provided that "[c]omplete records of a trust 
account that is a demand account shall include a transaction 
register; individual client ledgers; a ledger for account fees 
and charges, if law firm funds are held in the account pursuant 
to sub. (b) (3); deposit records; disbursement records; monthly 
statements; and reconciliation reports . . . ." 
15 SCR 20:1.15(f)(1) (effective July 1, 2007) provides that 
"[c]omplete records of a trust account that is a demand account 
shall include a transaction register; individual client ledgers; 
a ledger for account fees and charges, if law firm funds are 
held in the account pursuant to sub. (b)(3); deposit records; 
disbursement records; monthly statements; and reconciliation 
reports . . . ." 
 
16 SCR 20:1.15(b)(3) provides that "[n]o funds belonging to 
the lawyer or law firm, except funds reasonably sufficient to 
pay monthly account service charges, may be deposited or 
retained in a trust account." 
17 SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) provides that, "[e]xcept as provided in 
par. (4m), unearned fees and advanced payments of fees shall be 
held in trust until earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant 
to sub. (g).  Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for 
payment of costs shall be held in trust until the costs are 
incurred. 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
18 
 
employee of the Voss Law Office, Voss violated 
SCR 20:7.5(d).18 
 
[COUNT ELEVEN] By making misrepresentations to 
OLR during . . . the investigation of this matter, 
Voss 
violated 
SCR 
22.03(2) 
and 
(6),19 
via 
SCR 20:8.4(h).20 
¶26 Attorney Voss filed an answer to the complaint on 
May 29, 2012.  Robert E. Kinney was originally appointed referee 
                                                 
18 SCR 20:7.5(d) provides that "[l]awyers may state or imply 
that they practice in a partnership or other organization only 
when that is the fact."  
19 SCR 22.03(2) and (6) provides: 
(2)  Upon 
commencing 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director shall notify the respondent of the matter 
being investigated unless in the opinion of the 
director the investigation of the matter requires 
otherwise.  The respondent shall fully and fairly 
disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served 
by ordinary mail a request for a written response.  
The director may allow additional time to respond.  
Following receipt of the response, the director may 
conduct further investigation and may compel the 
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and 
present 
any 
information 
deemed 
relevant 
to 
the 
investigation. 
. . . . 
(6) In the course of the investigation, the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
20 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)."  
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
19 
 
in this matter.  On October 1, 2012, a motion for substitution 
of referee was granted and John B. Murphy was appointed referee. 
¶27 On May 9, 2013, a stipulation and no contest plea was 
filed.  In the stipulation, Attorney Voss withdrew his answer to 
the complaint and pled no contest to the 11 counts of misconduct 
as set forth in the complaint.  The parties jointly requested 
the referee to file a report with this court finding facts based 
on Attorney Voss's no contest plea and asked the referee to 
consider the issue of the appropriate sanction. 
¶28 The referee filed his findings and recommendation on 
September 5, 2013.  Based on the stipulation and the facts set 
forth in the OLR's complaint, the referee found that Attorney 
Voss engaged in the 11 counts of misconduct alleged in 
complaint. 
¶29 As to the appropriate sanction, the referee said that 
the OLR made a good case for revocation since Attorney Voss has 
been disciplined previously for trust account offenses and, in 
spite of that discipline, has persisted in not changing his law 
office practices.  The referee said, "Either Voss is incapable 
of learning from his mistakes or simply indifferent to what the 
Court or OLR thinks about how he runs his practice.  Whatever 
the case, strong action is needed to prevent future harm to 
clients and the legal system."  The referee further said that, 
in addition to the trust account problems, Attorney Voss was 
willing to mislead the court with misrepresentations and 
fabrications.  The referee went on to say: 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
20 
 
In spite of all of the above, it should be noted 
that Voss did, upon request, repay [J.K.'s] estate for 
the missing funds.  Additionally, it appears that Voss 
did not use these funds for his own personal gain and 
that [J.K.] did not suffer directly from Voss' 
misbehavior.  Further, Voss ultimately "admitted" his 
mistake by withdrawing his Answer and entering a no 
contest plea to the allegations. 
¶30 The referee said while he gave the OLR's request for 
revocation careful consideration, he was not fully persuaded, 
given the need for progressive discipline, that revocation was 
required in this case.  The referee recommended that Attorney 
Voss's license to practice law be suspended for a period of one 
year; that he be ordered to pay additional restitution of 
$2,077.18 to J.K.'s estate; and that he be assessed the full 
costs of this proceeding.  The referee also recommended that 
before he is allowed to reinstate his license, Attorney Voss be 
required to demonstrate that he has in place a proper trust 
account consistent with supreme court rules. 
¶31 The OLR has appealed, arguing that revocation is the 
appropriate sanction for Attorney Voss's misconduct.  In support 
of its argument, the OLR cites various cases including In re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Krombach, 
2005 WI 170, 
286 Wis. 2d 589, 707 N.W.2d 146, In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Conmey, 2005 WI 166, 286 Wis. 2d 514, 706 N.W.2d 633, 
and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weigel, 2012 WI 124, 
345 Wis. 2d 7, 823 N.W.2d 798.  The OLR says that similar to the 
Weigel case, it is not entirely clear here whether Attorney Voss 
may or may not have misappropriated J.K.'s funds specifically 
for his own personal use.  The OLR says what is clear is that 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
21 
 
Attorney Voss systematically, during the time he acted as J.K.'s 
guardian, robbed Peter to pay Paul by utilizing J.K.'s funds in 
his trust account to either pay for other clients' bankruptcy 
fees or potentially pay his own attorney fees or office expenses 
through the years.  The OLR says while Attorney Voss may not 
have been proven to have engaged in an intentional scheme of 
misappropriation, his behavior was, at a minimum, reckless. 
¶32 The OLR notes that Attorney Voss has been sanctioned 
by this court on two prior occasions and, as a result of his 
public reprimand, was ordered to attend trust account school.  
It says despite his previous discipline, Attorney Voss continued 
to maintain a lackadaisical attitude about his trust account and 
failed to maintain adequate trust account records.  The OLR 
argues that progressive discipline, in the form of revocation of 
Attorney Voss's license, is warranted in this case. 
¶33 Attorney Voss argues that revocation is not warranted 
and that the sanction imposed should be no greater than the one-
year suspension recommended by the referee.  Attorney Voss 
admits that he paid some client fees from money in his trust 
account that should have been attributable to J.K.'s account.  
He says the amount of money incorrectly reported averaged about 
$250 a month.  He says: 
Rather than characterize the behavior as reckless the 
Respondent 
would 
submit 
that 
the 
behavior 
was 
negligent to the extent that a more careful inspection 
of the accounting system would have eliminated this 
from happening.  It is true that the Respondent should 
have known what the true amount in the account should 
be.  Unfortunately, that was not the case. . . . The 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
22 
 
incremental amount of improperly transferring was not 
sufficient at any time to make the Respondent believe 
it was improper. 
¶34 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless 
clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Eisenberg, 
2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The court may 
impose whatever sanction it sees fit regardless of the referee's 
recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶35 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings 
of fact are erroneous.  Accordingly, we adopt them.  We also 
agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney Voss 
violated all of the supreme court rules set forth above. 
¶36 Revocation of an attorney's license to practice law is 
the most severe sanction this court can impose, and is reserved 
for the most egregious cases.  While Attorney Voss's misconduct 
is serious, we do not agree that it rises to the level of 
warranting revocation.  The cases cited by the OLR in support of 
its argument that revocation is an appropriate sanction are 
distinguishable.  In Conmey, 286 Wis. 2d 514, and Krombach, 
286 Wis. 2d 589, the attorneys made payments to themselves out 
of trust funds.  In this case the referee said it did not appear 
that Attorney Voss used J.K.'s funds for his personal gain.  In 
Weigel, the attorney's trust account ran a deficit ranging from 
$100,000 
to 
$1,000,000 
over 
a 
period 
of 
many 
years.  
345 Wis. 2d 7, ¶8.  The conduct here simply does not rise to 
that level. 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
23 
 
¶37 In In Re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Raneda, 
2012 WI 42, 340 Wis. 2d 273, 811 N.W.2d 412, this court imposed 
a one-year suspension for 14 counts of misconduct, the majority 
of which involved trust account violations.  The attorney's 
misconduct included diverting client funds to his own use.  In 
In Re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Biester, 2013 WI 85, 
350 Wis. 2d 707, 838 N.W.2d 79, this court also imposed a one-
year 
suspension 
for 
29 
counts 
of 
misconduct, 
including 
transferring large sums of money from the attorney's client 
trust account to pay for the attorney's personal debts and 
office expenses.  We find Attorney Voss's situation to be more 
closely akin to Raneda and Biester than to Weigel, Conmey or 
Krombach, although because J.K. was a particularly vulnerable 
client and Attorney Voss's misconduct with respect to his 
handling of J.K.'s funds went on for a significant period of 
time, a suspension slightly longer than the one imposed in 
Raneda and Biester is appropriate. 
¶38 Wisconsin does adhere to a system of progressive 
discipline.  Attorney Voss has been licensed to practice law in 
Wisconsin for nearly four decades.  His disciplinary history 
consists of one private reprimand and one public reprimand.  
After careful consideration, we conclude that an eighteen-month 
suspension of his license to practice law is an appropriate 
sanction.  We agree with the referee that Attorney Voss should 
be required to pay additional restitution in the amount of 
$2,077.18 to J.K.'s estate and that he be assessed the full 
costs of this proceeding.  We further agree with the referee 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
24 
 
that, as a condition of the reinstatement of his license, 
Attorney Voss be required to demonstrate that he has in place a 
proper trust account consistent with supreme court rules. 
¶39 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Richard W. Voss to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of eighteen 
months, effective August 22, 2014. 
¶40 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Richard W. Voss be required 
to pay restitution in the amount of $2,077.18 to the estate of 
J.K. 
¶41 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Richard W. Voss shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶42 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the restitution specified 
above is to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation. 
¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.29(4)(c). 
¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a condition of the 
reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin, 
Richard W. Voss be required to demonstrate that he has in place 
a proper trust account consistent with supreme court rules. 
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Richard W. Voss shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
an attorney whose license to practice law has been suspended. 
 
No. 
2012AP931-D   
 
 
 
1