Case Title: Packer v. Riverbend Communications

Citation: 

Docket Number: 46964

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2020-08-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 46964 
 
NICOLE C. PACKER, 
 
     Plaintiff-Appellant, 
  
v. 
 
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; 
RIVERBEND 
COMMUNICATIONS  
HOLDING, LLC; and RIVERBEND  
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,  
dba RIVERBEND EVENTS, 
 
     Defendants-Respondents, 
 
and 
 
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.,  
and DK ENTERPRISES, INC.,  
 
     Defendants. 
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Boise, May 2020 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: August 3, 2020 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Bonneville County. Bruce L. Pickett, District Judge.  
 
The order of the district court granting summary judgment is reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings. 
 
Browning Law, Idaho Falls, for appellant Nicole C. Packer. Allen Browning 
argued. 
 
Hawley Troxell, Pocatello, for respondents Riverbend Communications. John A. 
Bailey argued. 
_____________________ 
 
STEGNER, Justice. 
This is a premises liability case involving Nicole Packer who was injured when she fell 
from an unlit loading dock at the Kingston Plaza in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Packer, who was working 
as a vendor at a Christmas-themed exposition, alleges that she had been directed to use the rear 
exit by a representative of Riverbend Communications, LLC, the organizer of the exposition and 
the occupier of the property at the heart of this litigation. The rear exit was unlit, and when Packer 
 
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left the building, she was unable to re-enter. Because of the lack of light, Packer did not realize 
she was on a loading dock which was five feet above the adjoining pavement. When she proceeded 
towards the lit parking lot, she fell to the asphalt and was seriously injured. Packer sued the owner 
of the property, Kingston Properties, as well as Riverbend Communications, LLC.1 Following 
discovery, the defendants sought and were granted summary judgment. Packer unsuccessfully 
moved for reconsideration. She timely appealed only the district court’s decision granting 
summary judgment in favor of Riverbend. For the reasons set out below, we reverse the district 
court’s decision granting summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Factual background. 
On Friday, December 4, 2015, Packer participated as a vendor in a Christmas-themed expo 
(Expo) in Idaho Falls, Idaho. The Expo was held in Kingston Plaza, a building owned by Kingston 
Properties, L.P., and DK Enterprises, Inc. The property was leased to Riverbend, a company which 
organizes and hosts events at which vendors rent space to set up booths to exhibit and sell their 
products and services.  
Packer had previously been a vendor at an event at the Plaza and was familiar with the 
building. The Plaza has several exits, only three of which are relevant to this case. The main access 
doors are on the north side of the building, and are available to members of the public. There is a 
second exit on the west side of the building which is adjacent to the wrap-around parking lot. 
Finally, there is a rear exit to the south, where the loading dock is situated. According to Packer, 
she had never used the rear exit before and was not familiar with that side of the building. 
On the first day of the Expo, Packer brought and assembled the furnishings for her booth 
in the morning. She parked in the west parking lot and used the west side of the Plaza to access 
the building. While she set up, she was approached by Jay Dye, an employee of Riverbend who 
                                                 
1 The original complaint named the following entities as defendants: Riverbend Communications, LLC; Riverbend 
Communications Holdings, LLC; and Riverbend Communications, LLC, doing business as Riverbend Events. 
However, the parties stipulated below to dismissal of Riverbend Communications Holdings, LLC, and Riverbend 
Communications, LLC, doing business as Riverbend Events, leaving only Riverbend Communications, LLC, as a 
defendant. However, even though a stipulation had been agreed upon, these two parties were not dismissed by the 
district court until the district court dismissed the entire case with prejudice, which precipitated this appeal. The caption 
has never been amended to delete the dismissed parties. In this opinion, unless otherwise noted, Riverbend 
Communications, LLC, will be referred to as “Riverbend.” 
 
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supervised the vendors at the Expo. Dye told Packer that vendors were not to use the west entrance, 
but instead should use the rear exit.2 According to Packer, Dye stated that there was a problem 
with her using the west door. Packer also stated that Dye directed vendors not to use the main 
doors to the north, because those doors were exclusively for the Expo’s patrons. 
By 8:00 p.m., the Expo’s patrons had thinned and many vendors had already left for the 
day. Packer headed outside through the rear exit as instructed by Dye. She had a cup from Jamba 
Juice in one hand, her purse slung over her shoulder, and some other items in her other hand. 
Packer pushed open the rear door and stepped outside. The door closed behind her. According to 
Packer, the door locked when it closed. 
The area immediately outside the door was dark and unlit. Packer was apparently 
disoriented in the darkness, but she could see light from the western parking lot to her right. Packer 
briefly paused and then began walking toward the parking lot where she had parked. Unbeknownst 
to her, the rear exit opened onto a loading dock five feet from the pavement. It is unclear from the 
record whether the lights were off or broken. What is not disputed is that the entire dock was unlit. 
In the darkness, Packer stepped off the loading dock, fell five feet, and landed on the asphalt. She 
was initially unable to move, but ultimately found her phone and called her husband, who came 
and took her to the emergency room. Packer’s father later retrieved the items she had been carrying. 
According to Packer, she was seriously injured in the fall. These injuries allegedly included 
bulging discs, knee sprain, and pain in her arms, neck, and back. 
B. Procedural background. 
Packer filed suit on December 4, 2017, naming as defendants Kingston Properties, L.P.; 
DK Enterprises, Inc.; and Riverbend. Packer alleged two dangerous conditions existed on the 
property: (1) the lack of lighting outside on the loading dock, and (2) the exit door that 
automatically locked behind her. Packer alleged these dangerous conditions were the fault of 
Kingston Properties, L.P., and DK Enterprises, Inc., (collectively, Kingston Defendants) as the 
owners of the premises. Packer also alleged that Dye’s instruction that she exclusively use the back 
door—“an unmarked and dangerous exit”—was also negligent, and could be imputed by virtue of 
agency law and respondeat superior to Riverbend. 
                                                 
2 The district court observed that the parties disputed Dye’s reason for giving this direction. However, the district court 
found that Dye had told Packer to use the rear exit. While a court should refrain from making findings at a summary 
judgment proceeding, such a “finding” is immaterial to our analysis, because as the non-moving party, Packer was 
entitled to the inference that she was told by Riverbend’s representative to exit through the rear door. 
 
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Riverbend and the Kingston Defendants separately filed for summary judgment. Riverbend 
accompanied its brief in support of summary judgment with several exhibits, including excerpts 
from Packer’s deposition; an unsigned “multi show payment agreement”; photographs of the 
loading dock and back door; and the Articles of Incorporation and Annual Report Forms for 
Riverbend Communications, LLC, and Riverbend Communications Holdings, LLC. Riverbend 
argued that at most Packer was a licensee. As such, she was obligated to put on evidence that 
Riverbend was “aware of any dangerous condition” and because she had not done so, Riverbend 
was entitled to summary judgment. Riverbend also argued that Packer’s claims were barred by an 
indemnity clause in the “multi show payment agreement.” However, Riverbend did not offer any 
evidence showing that Packer had in fact signed such an agreement, instead producing only a 
sample agreement for the Expo. 
In response to Riverbend’s motion, Packer argued that she was an invitee, not a licensee, 
and therefore was owed a higher duty than that contended by Riverbend. She also asserted that it 
was foreseeable that she would have been injured by following Dye’s direction. Packer further 
maintained that Riverbend’s arguments about the indemnity agreement in the “multi show 
payment agreement” were irrelevant without a showing that Packer had signed this agreement. In 
an affidavit, Packer denied she had received the agreement, the argument being that without a 
signed agreement, the indemnity provision had no applicability to her. 
Riverbend filed a reply brief and a motion to strike Packer’s affidavit. In its reply brief, 
Riverbend contended that, at most, Packer was a licensee on the premises and also that she was 
precluded from making her claims by the terms of the “multi show payment agreement.” 
Packer responded to the motion for summary judgment, arguing that Riverbend had failed 
to attack Packer’s alleged status as an invitee, that Riverbend could not show the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact, and that Packer could not be held to the terms of an agreement that 
Riverbend could not prove she had signed. 
Following a hearing on the pending motions, the district court entered multiple 
memorandum decisions. First, the district court denied Riverbend’s motion to strike Packer’s 
affidavit. The district court then granted Kingston’s motion for summary judgment because 
Kingston had relinquished control over the premises to Riverbend and because Packer had not 
shown that Kingston knew or should have known about the alleged dangerous conditions. 
 
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The district court also granted Riverbend’s motion for summary judgment. First, the district 
court determined that the undisputed facts showed that Packer was a licensee, not an invitee. 
Because Packer was a licensee, she was required—and had failed—to show that Riverbend was 
aware or should have been aware of the alleged dangerous conditions. Second, the district court 
held that even if Packer was an invitee, she had failed to show that Riverbend had actual or 
constructive notice of the alleged dangerous conditions. In particular, the district court pointed out 
that Dye “instructed her to use the back door in the morning of December 4th, but it wasn’t until 
eight at night that [Packer] was injured.” Based on the district court’s analysis, summary judgment 
was granted in favor of Riverbend. 
Packer moved for reconsideration. In addition to arguing that she was an invitee of 
Riverbend, Packer asserted that, apart from premises liability, Riverbend was liable to her for 
negligence because Dye instructed vendors to use the rear exit. Packer relied on the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 311 (2019) for this argument.3 
Riverbend opposed Packer’s motion. Riverbend argued that Packer’s “negligent 
misrepresentation” theory of liability was first raised on her motion for reconsideration and should 
therefore be rejected. Packer’s response was that she had pleaded general negligence in her 
complaint, and was not injecting a new “negligent misrepresentation” theory into her suit. 
The district court denied Packer’s motion for reconsideration, ruling that Packer had failed 
to present new facts or law in her motion. The district court held that Packer had not sufficiently 
pleaded a cause of action for ordinary negligence outside her premises liability claim, stating that 
“[a]lthough [Packer] asserts that Riverbend was negligent, it does not de facto establish a claim 
for negligence.” The district court further concluded that even if Packer had sufficiently pleaded 
negligence, Packer could not show that Riverbend owed her a duty independent from premises 
liability. Finally, the district court determined that section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts was inapplicable in Packer’s case. 
Packer timely appealed. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court employs the same standard as the district court when reviewing 
rulings on summary judgment motions. La Bella Vita, LLC v. Shuler, 158 Idaho 
799, 804–05, 353 P.3d 420, 425–26 (2015) (citing Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. 
                                                 
3 This Restatement section relied upon is titled, “Negligent Misrepresentation Involving Risk of Physical Harm.” 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 311.  Given our ultimate conclusion that Packer was an invitee of Riverbend and 
afforded a cause of action under that theory, we find it unnecessary to address the applicability of this provision. 
 
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Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 890, 243 P.3d 1069, 1078 (2010)). “The court must grant 
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 
56(a). 
Eldridge v. West, 166 Idaho 303, 308, 458 P.3d 172, 177 (2020). 
 
“The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times 
with the party moving for summary judgment.” Davison v. Debest Plumbing, Inc., 163 Idaho 571, 
574, 416 P.3d 943, 946 (2018) (quoting Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 
982, 986 (2009)). “Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden 
shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged 
element of the claim does exist.” Venable v. Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc., 156 Idaho 574, 581, 
329 P.3d 356, 363 (2014) (quoting Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 85, 73 P.3d 94, 98 (2003)). When 
that occurs, “[t]he nonmoving party must come forward with evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, 
that contradicts the evidence submitted by the moving party in order to survive summary 
judgment.” Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 317, 246 P.3d 961, 970 
(2010) (citation omitted). 
“A party may not rely on his pleadings nor merely assert that there are some facts which 
might or will support his legal theory, but rather he must establish the existence of those facts by 
deposition, affidavit, or otherwise.” Fischer v. Croston, 163 Idaho 331, 339, 413 P.3d 731, 739 
(2018) (quotation omitted). “A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment.” 
McGimpsey v. D&L Ventures, Inc., 165 Idaho 205, 210, 443 P.3d 219, 224 (2019) (quotation 
omitted). 
“Questions of law are reviewed de novo.” D.A.F. v. Lieteau, 166 Idaho 124, 126, 456 P.3d 
193, 195 (2019) (citing Berkshire Invs., LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 80, 278 P.3d 943, 950 
(2012)). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Riverbend 
because Packer was an invitee. 
1. The district court erred as a matter of law in determining that Packer was a licensee. 
In granting summary judgment, the district court determined that Packer was a licensee on 
the property leased by Riverbend. The district court first set out the difference between a licensee 
and an invitee, and then reasoned that there was a “difference between vendors and patrons of 
 
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businesses for the purposes of designation in premises liability.” Because Packer was “at the expo 
. . . primarily for her own purpose in advertising and selling her own business[,]” the district court 
concluded that Packer was a licensee, not an invitee, and the fact that Packer provided “minor or 
tangential benefits” to Riverbend did not elevate her status from licensee to invitee. The district 
court contrasted Packer’s status as vendor with the Expo patrons. As a result, the district court 
concluded that Riverbend’s duty to Packer was only to inform her of dangerous conditions which 
were known, or should have been known, by Riverbend. 
On appeal, Packer contends that the district court erroneously “framed its opinion in terms 
of guests on the premises[,]” instead of analyzing the relationship between vendors and an event 
promoter. Packer argues that Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 545, 347 P.2d 341, 347 (1959), 
identifies the proper distinction between a licensee and an invitee. Packer contends that she was 
more of an invitee than the Expo patrons themselves, reasoning that the primary revenue source 
for an event promoter is “vendors purchasing space for their booths to sell their wares.” Packer 
calls this “a well-known business model and practice.” Accordingly, Packer argues that she was 
in fact “conferring a primary benefit upon Riverbend,” while the Expo patrons were conferring a 
mere tangential benefit. 
We begin our analysis with a recitation of the elements of a claim of negligence and 
premises liability. 
A cause of action for common law negligence in Idaho has four elements: “(1) a 
duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard 
of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the 
defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage.” 
Brooks v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 Idaho 22, 27, 423 P.3d 443, 448 (2018) (quoting Griffith v. 
JumpTime Meridian, LLC, 161 Idaho 913, 915, 393 P.3d 573, 575 (2017)). “Generally, ‘[w]hether 
a duty exists is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.’” Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc. v. Massey, 155 Idaho 942, 948, 318 P.3d 932, 938 (2014)). 
“When a negligence cause of action is based on premises liability, the element of duty 
depends on the status of the injured person in relation to the landowner, i.e., invitee, licensee (social 
guest), or trespasser.” Id. at 28, 423 P.3d at 449 (citing Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 548, 
328 P.3d 520, 528 (2014)). “An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of another for a 
purpose connected with the business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be said that 
the visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the landowner.” 
 
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Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012) (quoting Holzheimer v. 
Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 400, 871 P.2d 814, 817 (1994)).  
On the other hand, “[a] licensee is a visitor who goes upon the premises of another with 
the consent of the landowner in pursuit of the visitor’s purpose.” Chapman v. Chapman, 147 Idaho 
756, 762–63, 215 P.3d 476, 482–83 (2009) (quoting Holzheimer, 125 Idaho at 400, 871 P.2d at 
817). A social guest is a licensee. Holzheimer, 125 Idaho at 400, 871 P.2d at 817. “The fact that a 
guest may be rendering a minor, incidental service to the host does not change the relationship 
[between them as a landowner and a licensee].” Ball, 152 Idaho at 677, 273 P.3d at 1270 
(alterations in original) (quoting Wilson, 81 Idaho at 545, 347 P.2d at 347). 
Under either alternative of establishing Packer’s status as an invitee,4 Packer was 
Riverbend’s invitee. First, the record establishes that Riverbend procured the property from 
Kingston to then rent space to vendors to exhibit at the Expo. As a vendor, Packer was present on 
the land “for a purpose connected with the business conducted [by Riverbend] on the land[.]” Ball, 
152 Idaho at 677, 273 P.3d at 1270. The business of Riverbend was to lease space to vendors to 
sell their products and services at the Expo. Second, the district court’s conclusion that the fee 
Packer paid to participate in the Expo as a vendor was only a “minor or incidental” benefit to 
Riverbend is not accurate because Packer paid a fee to Riverbend to have a booth at the Expo. 
Packer’s presence was neither minor nor incidental to Riverbend’s business. Further, the district 
court’s use of the language from Wilson regarding “minor, incidental service[s]” conferred by a 
visitor on a property owner is inapposite; unlike the plaintiff in Wilson, Packer was not a social 
guest. Packer was present for a purpose directly related to Riverbend’s business on the property. 
She also conferred a sufficient benefit on Riverbend to elevate herself to the status of an invitee. 
See Wilson, 81 Idaho at 545, 347 P.2d at 347.  
Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding that Packer was not an invitee and that 
Riverbend only owed her the duty owed a licensee. 
                                                 
4 The district court below did not identify that there are two separate ways to establish that a visitor is an invitee. Ball, 
152 Idaho at 677, 273 P.3d at 1270 (italics added) (“An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of another for a 
purpose connected with the business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be said that the visit may 
confer a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the landowner.”). Instead, the district court 
focused on language from Wilson where we concluded that a social guest—a classic licensee—was not elevated to the 
status of an invitee by rendering some “minor, incidental service” to the host. Wilson, 81 Idaho at 545, 347 P.2d at 
347. The district court’s failure to recognize Packer’s presence as being connected to and conferring a benefit on 
Riverbend constituted error in two alternative ways. 
 
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2. The district court erred in concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether of Riverbend breached the duty it owed to Packer. 
After concluding that Packer was not an invitee, the district court nevertheless proceeded 
to discuss the scope of the duty owed to Packer assuming, for purposes of argument, that she was 
an invitee. While the district court did not clearly separate its analysis regarding the existence of a 
duty, its scope, and whether a duty had been breached, it concluded that “[e]ven if [Packer] was 
[sic] an [i]nvitee, she failed to show that [Riverbend] had actual or constructive notice of the 
dangerous condition.” The district court reasoned that Packer had not shown that Riverbend “knew 
or should have known about the lights over the loading dock,” despite Dye’s instruction to use the 
back door: 
[A]n instruction by Mr. Dye does not de facto create actual or constructive 
knowledge of a danger. [Packer] does not establish how long the light was off or 
broken for, did not establish that Mr. Dye, when giving his instruction, knew or 
should have known about the lights, nor did she establish why the lights were off 
or broken. Furthermore, [Packer] even asserts in her own affidavit that Mr. Dye 
instructed her to use the back door in the morning of December 4th, but it wasn’t 
until eight at night that [Packer] was injured. Because [Packer] did not establish or 
even present any evidence on the cause of the lighting being off or broken, she 
therefore could not establish that Mr. Dye knew or should have known about the 
lighting condition. There are simply not enough facts for this [c]ourt to make any 
reasonable inference as to the actual or constructive notice necessary to establish 
that Riverbend had a duty to [Packer]. 
“A landowner’s duty to an invitee is to warn of hidden or concealed dangers and to keep 
the land in a reasonably safe condition.” Peterson v. Romine, 131 Idaho 537, 540, 960 P.2d 1266, 
1269 (1998) (citation omitted). “An invitee must show ‘that the owner or occupier knew, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the existence of the dangerous condition.’” 
Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 Idaho 53, 57, 423 P.3d 1005, 1009 (2018) (quotation 
omitted).  
The district court also erred in its analysis of the duty owed Packer with respect to the 
lighting conditions. After concluding that she was a licensee and not an invitee, the district court 
proceeded in its analysis by assuming for the sake of argument that Packer was an invitee. 
However, its subsequent analysis was incorrect for two reasons. First, while the district court stated 
it was applying the duty owed an invitee, it failed to correctly apply the duty owed an invitee. The 
crux of the district court’s reasoning was that Packer could not establish that Riverbend had “actual 
or constructive knowledge” of the lighting conditions. The district court erred as a matter of law 
 
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by analyzing only Riverbend’s knowledge (actual or constructive), and not the affirmative duty 
owed by an occupier (Riverbend) to an invitee (Packer) to “keep the premises in a reasonably safe 
condition.” Holzheimer, 125 Idaho at 400, 871 P.2d at 817; see also IDJI 3.11 (“The 
[owner/occupier] owes a duty to exercise ordinary care in inspection of the premises for the 
purpose of discovering dangerous conditions.”). Further, according to the record on appeal, a 
genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether Riverbend kept the premises in a reasonably 
safe condition when there was no proper lighting on the loading dock. 
Second, the district court also erred in granting summary judgment against Packer because 
a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether Riverbend had constructive knowledge of 
the dangerous conditions. In its statement of undisputed facts, the district court found that the 
record established that Dye had instructed Packer to exit through the back door.5 The district court 
also found that it was undisputed that when Packer exited, the back dock was unlit. In its later 
analysis, the court relied on the fact that Dye had given his instruction in the morning, but that 
Packer had not left the Expo until that evening. Nevertheless, a jury could conclude that Dye’s 
instruction breached the duty owed to Packer. It is undisputed that Riverbend required that the 
vendors’ exhibits “be open and staffed during all expo hours: Friday December 4, 2015, 10am to 
7pm & Saturday December 5, 2015, 10am to 7pm.” (Emphasis omitted.) A jury could reasonably 
conclude that it would be dark after 7:00 p.m. in December when vendors left the Expo, and that 
Riverbend breached the duty owed to Packer by directing her to exit via an unlit, unsafe loading 
dock in the dark. 
Much has been made by the district court and Riverbend of the fact that Packer did not 
attempt to explain why the back dock was unlit. The district court suggested that Packer should 
have established whether the light fixture was broken, had burned out, or was turned off. However, 
the cause of the unlit conditions is relevant to the scope of duty only if Packer was a licensee, and 
is irrelevant given her status as an invitee. Because the district court incorrectly concluded that 
Packer could not be an invitee, it incorrectly analyzed the duty owed to Packer. 
The district court erred in its determination that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether Riverbend breached the duty it owed Packer as a result of the dangerous 
condition of the unlit dock. Because Packer was an invitee, Riverbend owed her the duty to warn 
                                                 
5 In its brief, Riverbend contends that it “has at all times denied that Jay Dye ever told Packer to use the back door to 
exit the building.” 
 
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her of hidden or concealed dangers and to keep the property in reasonably safe condition. On these 
facts a jury could reasonably conclude that Riverbend breached either or both of the duties it owed 
to Packer. Accordingly, the district court’s decision granting summary judgment is reversed. 
B. Packer is entitled to costs as the prevailing party. Neither party is entitled to attorney 
fees. 
Packer has not requested attorney fees on appeal. As a result, we need not address the issue. 
I.A.R. 41(a). Riverbend requests attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(1), arguing that Packer “brought, pursued or defended [her case] frivolously and without 
foundation.” Because Packer has prevailed on appeal, it is not possible to conclude that her appeal 
was brought “frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.”  The opposite holds true. As a 
result, Riverbend is not entitled to an award of attorney fees.  
As the prevailing party on appeal, Packer is entitled to an award of costs under Idaho 
Appellate Rule 40.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court reverses the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment because (1) it erred in determining that Packer was not an invitee; and (2) a genuine 
issue of material fact exists as to whether Riverbend breached the duty it owed Packer. The case 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Packer, as the prevailing party, is awarded costs under Idaho Appellate Rule 40. 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices BRODY, BEVAN and MOELLER CONCUR.