Case Title: MATT BECK and PAM BECK v. ALLEN TOWNSEND AND T&T GUNS and AMMO, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
MATT BECK and PAM BECK v. ALLEN TOWNSEND AND T&T GUNS and AMMO, INC.2005 WY 84116 P.3d 465Case Number: No. 04-239Decided: 07/29/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                                                                                                                        

MATT BECK 
and PAM BECK,       

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),           

 
 
 v.        

 
 
ALLEN 
TOWNSEND and T&T GUNS AND AMMO, INC.,          

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

 
 
Paul J. 
Drew of Drew Law Office, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

 
 
Sean P. 
Durrant of Palmerlee & Durrant, LLC, Buffalo, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

HILL, C.J., 
delivered 
the opinion of the court.  VOIGT, 
J., filed a specially concurring opinion.

 
 
HILL, Chief 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellants, Matt 
and Pamela Beck (the Becks), challenge the judgment of the district court 
contending that it erred by, in effect, instructing the jury that it must find 
"solid proof" of trespass in order to award damages for trespass, when the 
actual burden of proof was a preponderance of the evidence.  The Becks also contend that the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees, T & T Guns 
and Ammo, Inc. (T & T) and Allen Townsend (Townsend), on the Becks' claim 
for punitive damages as an element of the underlying tort claim.  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The Becks raise 
these issues:

 
 
A.  Did 
the trial court err by instructing the jury that it must find "solid proof" of 
trespass to award damages?

 
 
B.  Did 
the trial court err by granting summary judgment against [the Becks] on their 
claim for punitive damages as an element of the underlying tort 
claims?

 
 
T & T 
enlarges on those issues as follows:

 
 
A.  Whether 
[the Becks'] challenge of the jury's verdict for the first time on appeal is 
untimely, procedurally flawed and, therefore, fails.

 
 
B.  Whether 
[the Becks'] claim of error against the district court is procedurally flawed 
and, therefore, fails because the additional instruction requested by [the 
Becks] was not tendered to the trial court in writing.

 
 
C.  Whether 
the pattern jury instructions approved by the trial court and parties adequately 
advised the jury of the applicable law as to the burden of proof to be 
applied.

 
 
D.  Whether 
the district court had the authority to grant partial summary judgment as to 
[the Becks '] claim for punitive damages.

 
 
FACTS AND 
PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      There are only a 
few facts that are pertinent to the issues on appeal, however, we will set out 
some additional facts in order to provide background and context for the 
issues.  The Becks have lived on a 
piece of property they own near Rozet, in CampbellCounty since 1988.  T & T has operated a shooting range 
on its adjoining property since 1974.  
The shooting range is located so that it is plausible that bullets might 
stray onto the Becks' property.  In 
fact, the Becks claim that routinely happens, and that is the reason they 
brought this litigation to the district court.  The Becks sought to enjoin Townsend from 
operating the shooting range on the basis that it was a nuisance, as well as an 
award of damages for trespass (i.e., for the trespass of bullets onto their 
property).

 
 
[¶4]      Both matters were 
tried simultaneously.  The nuisance 
issue was tried only to the district court sitting in equity, and the trespass 
portion of the complaint was tried to a jury.  The trial court found that the shooting 
range was not a nuisance, the jury found there was no trespass, and the trial 
court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of T & T as to the Becks' 
claim for punitive damages as an element of both nuisance and 
trespass.

 
 
[¶5]      The central issue 
in this appeal arises because during its deliberations the jury asked this 
question:

 
 
     On 
Jury Instruction 6.  If we cannot 
find solid proof of trespass, can we award damages.

 
 
The trial 
court simply wrote the answer "No" on the same piece of paper used by the jury 
for its question and returned it to the jury.  At the time the trial court answered the 
question, the attorneys for the parties were not present in the courtroom.  However, the trial court informed the 
attorneys by telephone of the question from the jury and that he intended to 
answer the question "No."  Counsel 
for the Becks did not object at that time, although, as set out more fully 
below, he did object upon his arrival at the courthouse, and the objection was 
made before the jury completed its deliberations.  The trial court also asked the attorneys 
to return to the courthouse at that time, as the jury's verdict was expected 
imminently.

 
 
[¶6]      The jury was 
given Instruction No. 6 which provided:

 
 
In this 
action, the plaintiffs have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence the following:

(a)  That 
the defendant trespassed or caused a trespass or trespasses upon the land of the 
plaintiffs; and,

                        
(b)  That the plaintiffs were damaged by the acts of the 
defendant.

 
 
            
In determining whether an issue has been proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence, you should consider all of the evidence bearing upon that issue 
regardless of who produced it.

 
 
[¶7]      "Preponderance of 
the evidence" was defined in Instruction No. 7:

 
 
            
"A preponderance of the evidence" is defined as the amount of evidence, 
taken as a whole, which leads the jury to find the existence of a disputed fact 
is more probable than not.  You 
should understand that "a preponderance of the evidence" does not necessarily 
mean the greater number of witnesses or exhibits.

 
 
[¶8]      The jury was also 
given Instruction No. 11:

 
 
There are, 
generally speaking, two types of evidence from which a jury may properly find 
the truth as to the facts of a case. One is direct evidence  such as the 
testimony of an eyewitness.  The 
other is indirect or circumstantial evidence  the proof of a chain of 
circumstances pointing to the existence or nonexistence of certain 
facts.

The law 
makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial  evidence, but simply requires that the 
jury find the facts in accordance with the preponderance of all the evidence in 
the case, both direct and circumstantial.

 
 
[¶9]      The first 
question on the verdict form was this:  
"1.  Have Plaintiffs proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant has trespassed?"  The jury answered that question, 
"No."

 
 
[¶10]   After the attorneys for the parties 
returned to the courthouse, the Becks' attorney initiated this 
discussion:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  We're here in chambers.  
Here's Paul's question before we bring the jury back, 
Paul.

MR. 
DREW:  Okay.  My concern, 
if I understand the question as it was read over the phone, was -- from the 
question from the jury was, do they have to have solid proof of trespass to 
award damages.

My concern 
is that --

THE 
COURT:  I need  I need the  I need you to get the question back from 
the jury.  We need to look at their 
question one more time.  
Okay.

(off the 
record briefly.)

THE 
COURT:  Okay.  Here's what 
the question says:  If we cannot 
find solid proof of trespass, can we award damages?

MR. 
DREW:  I guess my concern is that solid proof is not, in fact, the  
the standard.  It's preponderance of 
the evidence and if, in fact, they mean to dispose of the preponderance problem 
by saying it is solid proof or not, it's not the standard.

                        
THE COURT:  Okay.  
Mr. Durrant.

            
MR. DURRANT:  Well, I agree it's not the standard but, you 
know, they're not  I don't think they're using the proper term of art and I'm 
sure that  I don't know how you typically do that but 

THE 
COURT:  Well, the question is could the  the question we need to ask 
[ourselves] is could the standard that the jury is supposed to apply in the jury 
instructions, could there be some misunderstanding about the standard, in other 
words, we probably ought to look at the jury instructions and see if there's any 
place in there that makes a reference to a burden other than the preponderance 
of the evidence to see if there's some way the instructions can confuse the jury 
as to the burden they are to apply.

                        
MR DREW:  Well 

                        
MR DURRANT:  Or the verdict form or just the 
instructions?

            
THE COURT:  The verdict form, too, and the verdict form:  Have plaintiffs proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has trespassed? 

The test is 
put on each of the questions.

Have 
plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants' 
trespass on plaintiffs ' land was on or after September 18, 
1998?

It seems to 
me that if they have answered question number one no, then they have a fair 
statement of the burden that they are to apply, plus the relevant definition 
right there in the instructions.

MR. 
DREW:  Yes, they do, and having asked this question of  regarding a 
solid proof of trespass, I think the corrective action would be to send them an 
instruction that says, yes, we  while your question was answered in the 
negative, you are not to construe this to eliminate your ultimate finding to be 
by a preponderance of the evidence.  
I mean, it's  because it is a substitution of 
burden.

                        
THE COURT:  It may or may not be.  I don't know what that 
means.

                        
MR. DREW:  Well 

                        
THE COURT:  It may be the way a juror asked the 
question.

                        
MR. DREW:  Okay.

THE 
COURT:  That's why I say the test we're to apply is whether there's 
something in the instructions that could mislead the jury as to the burden that 
they have to apply.

MR. 
DREW:  What I'm saying is I don't want the answer to this question to 
do just that.

                        
THE COURT:  What, do you don't want the answer to be 

            
MR. DREW:  To  to mislead them as to the burden that is 
adequately set out in the instruction.

                        
THE COURT:  You think this answer misleads 
them?

            
MR. DREW:  Well, I sure think it's got that possibility.  I mean, with the solid in there just 
really, really kind of throws me for what is intended by it.  You know, because it seems to me that 
there's some implied degree of proof there, which if there is a degree of proof 
it's a preponderance.  That's my 
problem.

THE 
COURT:  Okay.  I will  
like I say, I will note your objection.  
It's on the record.  It seems 
to me, like I say, unless there's something  and I'm fairly sure of the 
rule.  Unless there's something we 
can point to in the instructions that would have misled them, then I think that 
the better course that I need to follow is to just assume that they have read 
the instructions, that they understand them and that they have followed the 
instructions and they want this question answered.

 
 
[¶11]   The jury then returned its verdict 
as set out above.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶12]   The standard of review applicable 
to the circumstances of this case is fairly clear.  In Rissler & McMurry v. 
Snodgrass, 854 P.2d 69, 70-71 (Wyo. 1993) we held:

 
 
The 
statutory directions and the court rules concerning the manner in which jury 
trials are to be conducted are mandatory and are for the purposes of protecting 
the fundamental rights of the parties, e.g. in this instance:  to have only open court official contact 
with the jury by the court and/or counsel after submission of the case to the 
jury, together with the maintenance of a record on the instructions given to the 
jury.

 
 
The unusual 
aspect in this case is that the jury contact and subsequent procedure occurred 
with full knowledge of both counsel.  
Although the substance of the incident is not here pertinent, jurymen 
affidavits made subsequent to the incident and acknowledgements of judge and 
both counsel reflect that the jury requested an instruction on whether they 
could fix their own value, or whether they must accept a value fixed by a 
witness.  The return message from 
the court provided such instruction.

 
 
If the 
court's instruction had been given to the jury after they had been conducted 
back before the court, and if it had been made a matter of the record, the 
requirements of the statutes and rules would have been met, and there would be 
no error.  However, such was not 
done, and even though an objection was not made thereto (in fact, there is 
indication to the contrary, i.e., that it was done with the approval of 
counsel), there was plain error in the proceedings.

 
 
"Plain 
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were 
not brought to the attention of the court."  W.R.A.P. 9.05.  To qualify as plain error, there must be 
(1) a clear record of what happened at the hearing, (2) a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law shown to exist, and (3) the facts of the case must clearly and 
obviously transgress such rule.  
Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 1057 (Wyo.1981); Westmark v. 
State, 693 P.2d 220 (Wyo.1984).  
We have here a clear record of what happened procedurally (part of such 
clear record is the fact that the occurrence was not made a part of the trial 
record).  The applicable statute and 
rule are noted, and they were clearly transgressed.

 
 
Agreement 
to the procedure by appellant's counsel may be suggested here.  Parties to a legal contest may stipulate 
and agree to many aspects thereof, but we cannot give approval or effect to such 
when the agreement is to disregard or circumvent the specific requirement of a 
statute or rule. 

 
 
[¶13]   In Carlson v. Carlson, 888 P.2d 210, 212-15 (Wyo. 1995) we commented at length on this subject:

 
 
At the 
hearing on the Motion for New Trial, it was revealed that the jury had 
written a note to the judge, prior to filling out the verdict form, asking 
whether they could write comments on the verdict form.  Neither the note nor the judge's 
response was preserved for the record.

 
 
Several 
jurors testified at the hearing as to their recollections about the note and 
response.  Although their memories 
differed as to the actual question asked of the judge, they did agree that their 
purpose was to find out if they could "add something" to the verdict form.  The "something" appears to have been 
their desire to make sure appellant would be reimbursed for improvements to the 
farm.  The jury foreman, who wrote 
the note, testified that it said "may we add comments to the verdict 
form?"

 
 
During the 
hearing on the Motion for New Trial, the trial judge agreed with the jury 
foreman as to the substance of the note.  
Further, he indicated that his written response was "fill out the verdict 
form."   There was no consensus 
among the jurors who testified as to whether they recalled a written response or 
a verbal response through the bailiff, nor did they agree on the precise wording 
of the response.  The general sense 
of their recollections as to the response, however, was that they could not 
write comments on the jury form.

 
 
Before 
analyzing these issues under relevant statutes and case law, it is appropriate 
to address the concepts of "plain error" and "harmless error."   Appellant characterized the facts 
of this case as demonstrating plain error because this court's prior 
requirements for the doctrine's application are met:  (1) a clear record of what happened at 
the hearing;  (2) a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law shown to exist; and (3) the facts of the case must 
clearly and obviously transgress such rule.  Rissler & McMurry v. 
Snodgrass, 854 P.2d 69, 71 (Wyo.1993);  
Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 1057 (Wyo.1981).  While this may or may not be true, it is 
irrelevant.  The plain error 
doctrine merely allows a reviewing court to address issues that were not brought 
to the attention of the trial court.     Wyo.R.Evid. 103(d); 
Wyo.R.App.P. 9.05; Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1115 
(Wyo.1992).  In the instant case, 
the alleged error was not only brought to the attention of the trial court, it 
formed the basis for the Motion for New Trial.   Plain error analysis is not 
necessary.

 
 
Wyo.R.Civ.P. 
59, guides the trial court when a motion for new trial has been 
filed:

 
 
(a) 
Grounds--A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties, and on all or 
part of the issues * * *.  
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted 
for any of the following causes:

(1) 
Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, referee, master or 
prevailing party, or any order of the court or referee, or abuse of discretion, 
by which the party was prevented from having a fair 
trial.

(Emphasis 
added).

 
 
Wyo.R.Civ.P. 
61, in turn, is entitled "Harmless Error."   It reads as 
follows:

 
 
No error in 
either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any 
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the 
parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for 
vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal 
to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial 
justice.  The court at every stage 
of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which 
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added).

 
 
It follows 
that, under the harmless error rule, even if this court were to find error by 
the trial court, such error would not require reversal unless it "prevented a 
fair trial," was "inconsistent with substantial justice" or affected the 
"substantial rights of the parties."   
Given the trouble and expense of another retrial, for both the parties 
and the court, and given the public policy favoring the finality of judgments, 
it is not surprising that the court rules require such a showing of 
prejudice.

 
 
Appellant's 
argument rests in Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-11-205(a)(vii) and 1-11-209 (1988), and in 
this court's recent ruling in Rissler, 854 P.2d  at 71.   It is true that in Rissler, 
this court reversed a jury verdict because the trial court's failure to abide by 
these statutes was found to be plain error.  But before we distinguish that decision 
from the facts of this case, it may be helpful to address the rules and statutes 
dealing with jury instructions.

 
 
            
Wyo. Stat. § 1-11-205(a) (1988) provides in relevant part as 
follows:

 
 
(v)  When 
the evidence is concluded, and either party desires special instructions to be 
given to the jury, the instructions shall be reduced to writing, numbered and 
signed by the party or his attorney asking the same, and delivered to the 
court;

 
 
(vi)  Before 
argument of the cause is begun, the court shall give such instruction of the law 
to the jury as may be necessary.  
The instructions shall be in writing, numbered and signed by the 
judge;

 
 
(vii)  Where 
either party asks special instructions to be given to the jury, the court shall 
either give such instructions as requested, give the instruction with 
modifications, or refuse to give them.  
The court shall mark each instruction offered so that it shall appear 
which instructions were given in whole or in part, and which were refused, so 
that either party may except to the instructions as given, refused or 
modified.  All instructions given by 
the court together with those refused shall be filed as a part of the 
record.

 
 
            
Wyo.Stat. § 1-11-209 (1988) reads as follows:

 
 
After the 
jurors have retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement between them as 
to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed as to any part of 
the law arising in the case, they may request the officer to conduct them to the 
court where information upon the matter of law shall be given.  The court may give its recollection as 
to the testimony on the points in dispute, in the presence of or after notice to 
the parties or their counsel.

 
 
Finally, 
Wyo.R.Civ.P. 51, reads as follows:

 
 
(a)  General 
instructions--At any time the court may give the jury such general instructions 
as to the duties and functions of the court and jury, and the manner of 
conducting the trial, as it may deem desirable to assist the jury in performing 
its functions.  Such instructions, 
exclusive of rulings which are recorded by the court reporter for inclusion in 
any record, shall be reduced to writing, numbered and delivered to the jury with 
the other instructions and shall be a part of the record in the case.  

 
 
(b)  Further 
instructions; objections--At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time 
during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written 
requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the 
requests.  The court shall inform 
counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the 
jury.  Before the argument of the 
case to the jury has begun, the court shall give to the jury such instructions 
on the law as may be necessary and the same shall be in writing, numbered and 
signed by the judge, and shall be taken by the jury when it retires.  No party may assign as error the giving 
or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before 
the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected 
to and the grounds of the objection.  
Opportunity shall be given to make the 
objection out of the hearing of the jury.

 
 
The 
official comment following Rule 51 explains that it "states the substance of § 
1-11-205(a)(v) and (vi)."

                        

            
These statutes and rules concern only certain defined communications 
between judge and jury:

 
 
1.  Special 
instructions desired by a party [WYO.STAT. § 1-11-205(a)(v) and 
(vii)].

 
 
2.  Such 
instructions of the law as may be necessary or requested by a party [Wyo. Stat. 
§ 1-11-205(a)(vi);  Wyo.R.Civ.P. 
51(b)].

 
 
3.  Jury 
disagreement as to testimony [Wyo. Stat. § 1-11-209].

 
 
4.  Jury 
requests to be informed as to any part of the law arising in the case [Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-11-209].

 
 
5.  General 
instructions as to the duties and functions of the court and jury, and the 
manner of conducting the trial [Wyo.R.Civ.P. 51(a)].

 
 
With the 
exception of the provision allowing the trial court to address the jury upon its 
request concerning disputed testimony, the balance of these provisions specify 
communications involving "instructions."   In Wyoming, the term "instructions" has been 
defined as "directions in reference to the law of the case guiding the jury in 
arriving at correct conclusions."  
Gale v. Kay, 390 P.2d 596, 600 (Wyo.1964).  The reversal in Rissler was 
precisely because an instruction on the law of the case was given without 
following the mandates of Wyo.Stat. §§ 1-11-205(a)(vii) and 1-11-209, with 
resultant prejudice.

 
 
The "issue" 
now facing the court is actually two "issues":  the status of communications between 
judge and jury that do not involve instructions on the law, and whether the 
harmless error doctrine applies to such communications.  The parties have pointed out in their 
briefs the lack of unanimity nationwide on these questions.  Many courts have found any communication 
between a judge and a deliberating jury that is made off the record and outside 
counsels' presence to be reversible error.  
See, e.g., Danes v. Pearson, 6 Ind.App. 465, 33 N.E. 976 
(1893);  Hastings v. Top 
Cut Feedlots, Inc., 285 Or. 261, 590 P.2d 1210 (1979);  Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612, 228 A.2d 195 
(1967).  Other courts have refused 
to reverse absent prejudice, or have identified an area of "administrative 
directives" by the court that are not considered to be "instructions."   See, e.g., Sanders v. 
Buchanan, 407 F.2d 161 (10th Cir.1969);   Gen. Motors Corp. v. Walden, 406 F.2d 606 (10th Cir.1969);  Dixon v. 
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 579 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.1978);  People in the Interest of E.S., 
681 P.2d 528 (Colo.App.1984);  
Commonwealth v. Bradley, 501 Pa. 25, 459 A.2d 733 (1983) 
(overruling Argo);  
Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979).

 
 
This court 
agrees with the latter cases that the better approach is to recognize the 
concept of "administrative directives," and to allow trial courts to communicate 
with a deliberating jury in a less formal manner when such communication does 
not concern the matters covered in the statutes and court rules cited 
above.  Further, the court holds 
that harmless error analysis is the appropriate measure for the review of such 
communications.  As an aside, it 
should be pointed out that this analysis may be more stringent in criminal cases 
than in civil cases.  See John P. 
Ludington, Annotation, Postretirement Out-of-Court Communications Between 
Jurors and Trial Judge as Grounds for New Trial or Reversal in Criminal 
Case, 43 A.L.R.4th 410 (1986); Annotation, Russell J. Davis, Propriety 
and Prejudicial Effect, in Federal Civil Cases, of Communications Between Judge 
and Jury Made out of Counsel's Presence and After Submission for 
Deliberation, 32 A.L.R.Fed. 392 (1977).  So long as no party suffers prejudice 
thereby, the interests of judicial economy and common sense suggest that a trial 
judge should be allowed to exercise discretion in communicating with a jury on 
administrative matters in an efficient and reasonable 
manner.

 
 
As stated 
earlier, these issues now come before this court in the form of an appeal from 
the denial of a motion for a new trial.  
Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on a motion for a new 
trial, and they will not be reversed absent an abuse of such discretion.  Cody v. Atkins, 658 P.2d 59, 64 
(Wyo.1983).  The party seeking 
reversal has a heavy burden to show an abuse of discretion; indeed, he must show 
that a different result would have been obtained absent the abuse.  Walton v. Texasgulf, Inc., 634 P.2d 908, 912-13 (Wyo.1981).  An 
abuse of discretion occurs when the court could not reasonably conclude as it 
did.  Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 
838 (Wyo.1980).

 
 
In the case 
now before the court, the issue is whether the trial court, upon hearing the 
motion for new trial, could reasonably find that the communication between judge 
and jury did not affect the outcome of the trial.  We are convinced that the trial court 
was correct, and that no error occurred.  
While the better practice would be to have such communications in 
counsels' presence, and to preserve both the jury question and the response, 
even when the mandatory statutes and rules do not apply, a sufficient record 
exists in this case from which to determine the nature of the 
communication.  The trial court's 
response was not an instruction on the law, and was, therefore, outside the 
parameters of the cited statutes and Wyo.R.Civ.P. 51.  Further, no version of either the 
question or the response, as evidenced by the testimony at the hearing, was 
substantially prejudicial to any of the parties.

 
 
[¶14]   The circumstances of this case are 
very much akin to those found in Beck v. Wessel, 237 N.W.2d 905, 908-9 
(S.D. 1976).  There, the trial court 
answered a jury question about liability insurance "No," without observing the 
formalities required by governing South Dakota law.  The Supreme Court of South Dakota 
held:

 
 
This case 
was tried to a jury at the courthouse in Mound City, South 
Dakota.  
Instructions were given to the jurors by the court and they began their 
deliberations at approximately 3:55 p.m. on May 16, 1974.  At approximately 4:15 p.m. the jury sent 
a note to the judge asking, "Can you tell us the amount of insurance each party 
has?"  The attorneys for the parties 
were not in the courtroom, having apparently adjourned to one of the local 
business establishments to await  
the verdict.  Without 
attempting to locate the attorneys, the judge simply wrote "No" on the same 
piece of paper as the inquiry and returned the note to the jury 
room.

 
 
Defendant 
argues that this was error and that because of it a new trial must be 
granted.  He contends that the 
judge's actions in answering the note were contrary to SDCL 15-6-51(a).  The sixth paragraph of that section is 
the one which is relevant and it reads as follows:

 
 
"After the 
jury have retired for deliberations if there be a disagreement between them as 
to any part of the testimony or if they desire to be informed of any point of 
law arising in the case, they may require the officer to conduct them into 
court.  Upon their being brought 
into court the information required, if given, must be given in the presence of, 
or after notice to the parties or counsel, and the instruction given shall be 
taken down by the court reporter."

 
 
There is no 
doubt that in a technical sense the court erred in answering the note sent by 
the jury without consulting counsel and following the other procedures set out 
above.  If the jury had asked for 
the additional instruction on the law of the case or for an explanation of an 
instruction already given, we might be disposed to remand for a new 
trial.

 
 
Here, 
however, the situation was quite different.  The jury was inquiring about the amounts 
of liability insurance owed each party.  
This was not their concern in deliberating on the questions of liability 
and damages.  Had counsel or any 
other of the witnesses mentioned liability insurance during testimony or 
arguments, a mistrial would probably have had to be declared.  Behrens v. Nelson, 1972, 86 D.D. 
312, 195 N.W.2d 140.  In the instant 
case one or more members of the jury apparently raised the possibility that the 
parties were insured.  The judge 
understandably felt when he received the jury's note that it was necessary to 
get the jury away from the issues of liability insurance and back onto the 
issues of liability and damages.

 
 
We hold 
that while the judge erred in not consulting counsel, the error was not 
prejudicial in this case and does not merit a reversal.  His "No" to the question was the only 
answer that could have been given under the circumstances.  He certainly could not have answered 
"yes" and revealed to the jury the limits of liability insurance policies 
involved.  Indeed, if he had 
consulted counsel and called the jury back into open court to admonish them not 
to consider liability insurance, he may well have compounded the problem by 
making a much larger issue of liability insurance in the minds of the jury.  In the absence of other evidence, we 
cannot say that the judge's error was prejudicial and we decline to remand for a 
new trial.  A conference between the 
judge and all the attorneys could not have come up with a better answer than the 
simple "No" which was sent back to the jury.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Answer to 
Jury's Question

 
 
[¶15]   The Becks contend that the district 
court's answer to the jury's question told the jury that, "If you cannot find 
solid proof of trespass, you cannot award damages."  Continuing, they contend that this 
creates two problems.  First, it 
creates an obvious conflict in the instructions.  Second, there is no instruction 
explaining what " solid proof" is and, therefore, the jury was allowed to apply 
the "solid proof" standard in their wholly unfettered 
discretion.

 
 
[¶16]   Given the circumstances we have set 
out in detail above, we cannot agree that the trial court's action constitutes 
reversible error requiring a new trial.  
Although it is somewhat a closer question, like the South Dakota case cited 
above, it would have been difficult to come up with a better answer than 
"No."  Here, the trial court did 
consult with counsel by phone, and on the record, the Becks' attorney did not 
object to the trial court's proposal to simply answer the question with a 
definitive "No," leaving no room for further jury confusion or undue emphasis on 
any particular instructions.  The 
question gave no indication that the jury was confused about what "preponderance 
of the evidence" meant, and the jury instructions bear out that the possibility 
for confusion was inconsequential.  
It is evident that the jury may have felt some sympathy for the Becks' 
problem and sought to ask if it could award some damages, even though the proof 
offered by the Becks did not meet the specific burden placed on them.  Of course, better practice would have 
been to have called counsel back to the courthouse and gone through the same 
process that was gone through after the fact.  And, perhaps, an equally good answer 
would have been to tell the jury to re-read all the instructions.  However, it would constitute an 
elevation of form over substance to discern prejudice and reversible error in 
these circumstances.  We decline to 
reverse the district court's judgment on this basis.

 
 
Summary 
Judgment on Punitive Damages

 
 
[¶17]   The Becks contend that this Court's 
jurisprudence is clear that punitive damages are an element of a claim or cause 
of action and not a separate claim.  
Errington v. Zolessi, 9 P.3d 966, 972 (Wyo. 2000) and see Sears 
v. Summit, Inc., 616 P.2d 765, 770 (Wyo. 1980).  Although better practice again would 
counsel that the trial court should have reserved ruling on the partial summary 
judgment until it had heard all the evidence, there is no indication that it 
prevented the Becks from presenting evidence to the jury that was pertinent to 
their claim and their damages.  
Although we will not set out the evidence in detail, it suffices to note 
that the Becks did not offer evidence that would have warranted the giving of a 
punitive damages instruction.  There 
can be no error with respect to the nuisance claim, because the district court 
found there was no nuisance.  
Likewise, there can be no error with respect to the trespass claim 
because the jury did not find that there was a trespass, much less one that was 
willful and wanton and otherwise calling into play punitive 
damages.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶18]   We hold that the trial court's 
actions in answering the jury's question did not constitute reversible 
error.  Likewise, the trial court 
did not commit reversible error in granting summary judgment as to the Becks' 
punitive damages claims.  The 
judgment of the district court is affirmed.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Justice, specially 
concurring.

 
 
[¶19]   I agree with the result reached by 
the majority because I do not believe the appellants were prejudiced by the 
manner in which the jury question was answered.  I write separately, however, because I 
also do not believe the majority directly identifies the district court's 
handling of the jury question as error.  
The questionif we cannot find solid proof of trespass, can we award 
damages?is a question "as to any part of the law arising in the case . . 
.."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-209 
(LexisNexis 2005) requires, in part, as follows:

 
 
After the 
jurors have retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement between them as 
to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed as to any 
part of the law arising in the case, they may request the officer to conduct 
them to the court where information upon the matter of law shall be 
given.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶20]   It was error for the district court 
to respond as it did to this question about the law.  An appropriate response should have been 
reduced to writing, and then should have been read to the jury in open court, 
just as any other instruction on the law would be.  Carlson v. Carlson, 888 P.2d 210, 
213-15 (Wyo. 1995); Rissler & McMurry v. 
Snodgrass, 854 P.2d 69, 70-71 (Wyo. 1993).  Furthermore, W.R.C.P. 51(b)'s 
requirement that counsel object to the giving of or the failure to give an 
instruction before assigning error to such presupposes a reasonable opportunity 
to object.  In the instant case, it 
is not reasonable to expect counsel to have been able to formulate an objection 
in answering the judge's telephone call.  
Counsel did object upon returning to the courthouse, and I would have 
found that objection to be sufficient.