Case Title: Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 18S-CQ-134

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2018-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 18S-CQ-00134 
Akeem Daniels, Cameron Stingily, and  
Nicholas Stoner 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
–v– 
FanDuel, Inc. and DraftKings, Inc. 
Defendants-Appellees 
Argued: June 28, 2018 | Decided: October 24, 2018 
Certified Question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
Case No. 17-3051 
The Honorable Frank H. Easterbrook, Judge 
Opinion by Justice David 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Oct 24 2018, 3:10 pm
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David, Justice  
Indiana’s right of publicity statute provides, “a person may not use an 
aspect of a personality’s right of publicity for a commercial purpose… 
without having obtained previous written consent.”  Ind. Code § 32-36-1-
8(a).  Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 64, our Court accepted a 
certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, which asked:   
Whether online fantasy-sports operators that condition entry 
on payment, and distribute cash prizes, need the consent of 
players whose names, pictures, and statistics are used in the 
contests, in advertising the contests, or both. 
In short, we answer this question narrowly and find online fantasy sports 
operators that condition entry to contests on payment and distribute cash 
prizes do not violate the Indiana right of publicity statute when those 
organizations use the names, pictures, and statistics of players without 
their consent because the use falls within the meaning of “material that 
has newsworthy value,” an exception under the statute.  
Facts and Procedural History 
Plaintiff-Appellants Akeem Daniels, Cameron Stingily, and Nicholas 
Stoner were collegiate student–athletes at various times between 2014-
2016.  The players’ on-field performances were collected as numerical 
statistics and published by various fantasy sports website operators 
including Defendants-Appellees DraftKings, Inc. and FanDuel, Inc.  
Consumers wishing to use Defendants’ products could pay a fee to access 
detailed information such as Plaintiffs’ names, images, and statistics, 
assess the athletes’ weekly performances, and assemble a virtual team of 
real-life athletes to compete against other users’ teams on the Defendants’ 
websites. 
To participate in Defendants’ fantasy sports competitions, consumers 
were required to follow certain rules imposed by the Defendants.  For 
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example, Defendants assigned a fictional dollar value to each Plaintiff 
based on the player’s statistics and overall performance.  To prevent a 
consumer from assembling a team composed only of the league’s best 
players, each consumer’s fantasy team was subjected to an overall salary 
cap.  Each athlete’s performance on the field translated to a point value 
determined by Defendants.  At the end of a designated period, consumers 
were eligible to win cash prizes based on the points accumulated by their 
fantasy sports team. 
Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against Defendants in Marion 
County alleging that Defendants “used their names and likenesses in 
operating and promoting online fantasy sports contests without Plaintiffs' 
consent, and that doing so was a violation of their right of publicity under 
Indiana law.”  Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 2017 WL 4340329, at *1 (S.D. Ind. 
Sept. 29, 2017).  Defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of Indiana and moved to dismiss, arguing that 
Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 
because the use of Plaintiffs’ names and statistics fell under certain 
statutory exceptions to the right of publicity.  Id.  The District Court 
dismissed the suit, finding no violation of Plaintiffs’ right of publicity 
because the use of their likenesses was in material that had newsworthy 
value and was a matter of public interest under the exceptions in Indiana 
Code section 32-36-1-1(c).  Id., at *7, *9.  Plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which certified a question of Indiana law to this 
Court.  Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 884 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2018). 
Discussion 
The parties in this case ask us to consider a wide range of issues 
touching on the right of publicity and its implications in our State.  We 
recognize at the onset that our decision will carry considerable weight not 
only with respect to these parties, but for other potential right of publicity 
litigants in our state courts.  We also understand that certain factual 
determinations and allegations remain unresolved and are squarely 
within the jurisdiction of our federal colleagues.  We therefore proceed 
cautiously, maintaining a narrow focus on the question before us.   
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To maintain this narrow focus, we begin with a brief overview of the 
statutory scheme for the right of publicity.  We then examine in detail the 
“newsworthy value” exception to the statute, finding that certain 
principles of statutory construction inform our reading of that exception.  
Through this lens, we next analyze the spectrum of “material that has 
newsworthy value” to evaluate the parties’ arguments.  The conclusions 
we draw from this analysis lead to the ultimate result that the use of 
players’ names, pictures, and statistics in fantasy sports contests do not 
violate the right of publicity in Indiana. 
The Statute  
We turn first to the right of publicity statute, including its pertinent 
definitions and exceptions.  Since its enactment in 1994 and recodification 
in 2002, the statutory right of publicity in Indiana has remained largely 
untouched.1  See, e.g., H.E.A. 1258, 117th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 
2012) (adding an exception for a personality that has commercial value 
solely because that personality has been charged with or convicted of a 
crime and clarifying the chapter’s application to rights of a deceased 
personality).  Be that as it may, our Court has never had the opportunity 
to review Indiana’s right of publicity statute.  
In relevant part, the statute provides, “a person may not use an aspect 
of a personality's right of publicity for a commercial purpose during the 
personality's lifetime or for one hundred (100) years after the date of the 
personality's death without having obtained previous written consent.”  
Ind. Code § 32-36-1-8(a).  The right of publicity is defined as “a 
personality’s property interest in the personality’s (1) name; (2) voice; (3) 
signature; (4) photograph; (5) image; (6) likeness; (7) distinctive 
                                                 
1 Indiana is not unique in identifying a right of publicity.  Other states have also recognized 
this right either in statute, through the common law, or both.  See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 
51, Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 657-58 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing a common law right of 
publicity in Texas), and Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 307, 312 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001) (recognizing that California’s right of publicity is both a common law and a 
statutory right). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-CQ-00134 | October 24, 2018 
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appearance; (8) gestures; or (9) mannerisms.”  Ind. Code § 32-36-1-7.  A 
person who violates this right of publicity may be liable for damages.  Ind. 
Code § 32-36-1-10. 
The legislature has codified several key exceptions to this statute, two 
of which were argued before our Court.  The “newsworthy value” 
exception provides that the right of publicity does not apply to “[t]he use 
of a personality’s name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, 
distinctive appearance, gestures, or mannerisms in … [m]aterial that has 
political or newsworthy value.”  Ind. Code. § 32-36-1-1(c)(1)(B).  Another 
provision, the “public interest” exception, concerns the use of a 
personality’s right of publicity “in connection with the broadcast or 
reporting of an event or a topic of general or public interest.”  Ind. Code § 
32-36-1-1(c)(3).  If the use of a personality’s right of publicity falls into 
either of these categories, the statute does not apply and no consent is 
needed for its use. 
Keeping in mind our narrow approach to answering the certified 
question, and because we find that the use of players’ names, pictures, 
and statistics by fantasy sports operators falls into the “newsworthy 
value” exception, we decline to examine the “public interest” exception.  
We will, however, examine the contours of the “newsworthy value” 
exception to determine its scope. 
The “Newsworthy Value” Exception 
We turn our focus now to whether the use of the players’ names, 
pictures, and statistics fall within the newsworthy value exception.    
Because “newsworthy value” is not expressly defined in the statute, our 
primary goal is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature.  
Moryl v. Ransone, 4 N.E.3d 1133, 1137 (Ind. 2014).  In doing so, we examine 
the statutory language itself to “give effect to the plain and ordinary 
meaning of statutory terms.”  State v. Hancock, 65 N.E.3d 585, 587 (Ind. 
2016).  We also presume that the legislature “intended the statutory 
language to be applied logically and consistently with the statute’s 
underlying policy and goals.”  Walczak v. Labor Works-Ft. Wayne LLC, 983 
N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 2013).   
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We begin by addressing two arguments advanced by plaintiffs in this 
case.  First, we are not persuaded that the statutory exception for 
newsworthiness does not apply in the context of commercial use.  The 
statute itself does prohibit the use of a person’s right of publicity “for a 
commercial purpose.”  See Ind. Code § 32-36-1-8.  The newsworthy value 
exception, however, removes the material from the right of publicity’s 
application.  Ind. Code § 32-36-1-1(c).  We therefore decline to read such a 
requirement into the otherwise facially clear language of the statute.  
Second, whether Defendants are media companies or news 
broadcasters is immaterial in the context of the newsworthiness exception.  
The plain language of the statute only speaks to the use of a personality’s 
right of publicity in “[m]aterial that has political or newsworthy value.”  
Ind. Code § 32-36-1-1(c)(1)(B).  The statute is silent on whether there are 
any restrictions on who publishes or uses the material.  Conversely, there 
is a different exception that applies specifically to a “news reporting or an 
entertainment medium.”  See Ind. Code § 32-36-1-1(c)(1)(D).  Given that 
the legislature defined2 and carved out an exception that applies only to 
news reporting entities, we decline to place a similar restriction on the 
“newsworthy value” exception at issue here.  If this was not the intent of 
the legislature at the statute’s inception, it is free to revisit and redraw the 
exceptions. 
The scope of the “newsworthy value” exception becomes considerably 
less clear as we consider the parties’ competing interests in this case.  The 
statute references “material that has political or newsworthy value,” but 
provides no corresponding definitions or apparent clues as to the breadth 
of these ambiguously familiar terms.  Ultimately, however, we think there 
are several compelling reasons why our Court should understand the 
                                                 
2 See Ind. Code § 32-36-1-4, which defines “news reporting or an entertainment medium” as “a 
medium that publishes, broadcasts, or disseminates advertising in the normal course of its 
business, including the following: (1) Newspapers. (2) Magazines. (3) Radio and television 
networks and stations. (4) Cable television systems.” 
 
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term “newsworthy value” to incorporate fantasy sports operators’ use of 
players’ names, pictures, and statistics.   
First, there is a presumption that when the legislature enacts a statute, it 
is aware of the common law and does not intend to make a change unless 
it expressly or unmistakably implies that the common law no longer 
controls.  Gunderson v. State, Indiana Dep’t of Natural Res., 90 N.E.3d 1171, 
1182 (Ind. 2018).  Although no Indiana court has directly created a 
common law right of publicity in our state, we find the historical 
progression of this right to be particularly illuminating.   
Prior to any discussion of a right of publicity, courts struggled with the 
inherent tension of applying the right of privacy in the context of 
commercial appropriation of a personality.  See O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 
124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941), reh’g denied (declining to extend the right 
of privacy to an action by a TCU football player whose picture appeared 
in a calendar for Pabst Blue Ribbon beer because there were “no 
statements or representations made…which were or could be either false, 
erroneous or damaging to plaintiff”).  A decade later, the idea of the right 
of publicity began to gain traction independent of the right of privacy 
when the Second Circuit announced this new right as it applied to 
“prominent persons.”  See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 
Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2nd Cir. 1953).  The court in Haelan Laboratories 
wrote:  
[I]n addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which 
in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the 
publicity value of his photograph… For it is common 
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and 
ball-players) …would feel sorely deprived if they no longer 
received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing 
their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, 
busses, trains, and subways.   
Id. at 868.  The right of publicity, however, would not gain the attention of 
the Supreme Court of the United States until 1977, when that Court 
recognized Ohio’s statutory right of publicity as a distinctly separate right 
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from the right of privacy.  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 
U.S. 562, 573, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 2856, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977).  
The Zacchini decision involved a “human cannonball” act performed by 
Hugo Zacchini at an Ohio county fair.  Id. at 563.  Members of the public 
were charged a fee to enter the fair and watch the performance, but a 
reporter at the event videotaped the act and showed the routine in its 
entirety on the eleven o’clock news.  Id. at 563-64.  Zacchini sued, alleging 
“unlawful appropriation of [his] professional property.” Id. at 564.  The 
Court held that publishing the entire performance without Zacchini’s 
consent violated his right of publicity, finding that the economic value of 
the performance gave Zacchini a right to control its publicity.  Id. at 575-
76.  Important to our analysis today, however, the Court also noted, “It is 
evident…that petitioner’s state-law right of publicity would not serve to 
prevent respondent from reporting the newsworthy facts about 
petitioner’s act…[but] the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not 
immunize the media when they broadcast a performer’s entire act without 
his consent.”  Id. at 574-75.  Thus, it seems to us that the Supreme Court 
recognized that at least some “newsworthy facts” could be published 
outside the scope of a personality’s right of publicity. 
Closer to home in Indiana and prior to the statute’s enactment in 1994, 
the term “newsworthy” was understood to encompass a broad privilege 
that was “defined in most liberal and far reaching terms.”  Time, Inc. v. 
Sand Creek Partners, L.P., 825 F.Supp. 210, 212 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (quoting 
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F.Supp. 112, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).  More specifically: 
The privilege of enlightening the public is by no means limited 
to dissemination of news in the sense of current events but 
extends far beyond to include all types of factual, educational 
and historical data, or even entertainment and amusement, 
concerning interesting phases of human activity in general.  
Id.  Considering the genesis and evolution of the right of publicity, and 
presuming the General Assembly was aware of the right of publicity, its 
origins, and the definitions available from caselaw in this area, we find 
that the term “newsworthy” was meant to be construed broadly.   
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Another compelling reason for a broad construction of the term 
“newsworthy” is that we follow the “familiar canon of statutory 
interpretation that statutes should be interpreted so as to avoid 
constitutional issues.”  City of Vincennes v. Emmons, 841 N.E.2d 155, 162 
(Ind. 2006) (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989)).  When 
considering a statute through the lens of the First Amendment, one 
component of our typical inquiry involves whether the statute is content 
neutral.  State v. Economic Freedom Fund, 959 N.E.2d 794, 801 (Ind. 2011).  
As such, a broad interpretation of the term “newsworthy value” would 
likely avoid a First Amendment issue in parsing acceptable forms of 
speech.  See, e.g., Dillinger, LLC v. Electronic Arts Inc., 795 F.Supp.2d 829, 
836 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (finding it likely that the Indiana Supreme Court 
would adopt a broad definition of “literary works” to include videogames 
to avoid constitutional issues with a narrow definition).   
To bolster this point, the General Assembly has also built in exceptions 
for other types of material that had been given First Amendment 
consideration prior to the statute’s enactment in 1994.  Compare 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 
1246, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975) (finding “theatrical works” protected by the 
First Amendment), Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 2755, 
41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974) (film), and Ward v. Rock against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 
790, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2753, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (music) with Ind. Code § 
32-36-1-1(c)(1) (the right of publicity does not apply to theatrical works, 
musical compositions, or film).  These enumerated exceptions, including 
“material with newsworthy value,” represent an obvious attempt to avoid 
constitutional issues with the statute.  Against this backdrop, we find no 
indication within the text of the statute that the legislature intended to 
abrogate the expansive common law view of the term “newsworthy.” 
Considering the arguments presented in this case, Defendants’ use of 
players’ names, images, and statistics in conducting fantasy sports 
competitions bears resemblance to the publication of the same information 
in newspapers and websites across the nation.  We agree that, “it would 
be strange law that a person would not have a first amendment right to 
use information that is available to everyone.”  C.B.C. Distribution and 
Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball, 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007).  
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This information is not stripped of its newsworthy value simply because it 
is placed behind a paywall or used in the context of a fantasy sports game.  
On the contrary, fantasy sports operators use factual data combined with 
a significant, creative component that allows consumers to interact with 
the data in a unique way.  Although fictional salary values are assigned to 
players, this does not change the function of the underlying data.  It is 
difficult to find that the use of this otherwise publicly available 
information is somehow drastically different such that it should be placed 
outside the definition of “newsworthy.”    
Use in Advertisements 
We now confront whether Defendants’ use of players’ names, pictures, 
and statistics could constitute unauthorized advertising.  At minimum, 
both parties would seem to agree that the statistics of college athletes are 
newsworthy.  The public fascination with these facts and figures provides 
context and standards by which past, present, and future players are 
judged.  See generally C.B.C. Distrib., 505 F.3d at 823 (discussing how sports 
like baseball occupy a large portion of public discourse) and CBS 
Interactive Inc. v. National Football League Players Ass’n, 259 F.R.D. 398, 419 
(D.Minn. 2009) (noting that, “[c]onsumers of fantasy football… like 
consumers of fantasy baseball, closely track player statistics”).  This 
fascination extends to our own state where many fans of the Notre Dame 
Fighting Irish, Purdue Boilermakers, Indiana Hoosiers, and all other 
collegiate sports teams argue, debate, and commiserate over the statistical 
value of each player and where his or her achievements fall in the history 
of football or basketball.  Few activities invoke such fervor among so 
many over so little.  
At the other end of the newsworthy spectrum, we recognize that the 
unauthorized use of a personality to advertise or promote a product likely 
lies outside the scope of what is considered newsworthy.  See generally 
Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 416 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that Kareem Abdul-Jabbar could state a claim under California’s 
right of publicity when GMC gained a commercial advantage in using 
Abdul-Jabbar’s former name in a television advertisement).  The right to 
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control one’s identity from direct appropriation would seem central to the 
right of publicity recognized in Indiana.3  Cf. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major 
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967-68 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing how the right of publicity in Oklahoma involves property 
rights for the full commercial value of an identity). 
In the context of fantasy sports, however, courts have recently 
concluded the risk of unauthorized advertising is minimal.  See C.B.C. 
Distrib., 505 F.3d at 824 (holding that the use of statistics and likenesses of 
baseball players in a fantasy sports context does not implicate a right of 
publicity in terms of advertising “because the fantasy baseball games 
depend on the inclusion of all players and thus cannot create a false 
impression that some particular player with ‘star power’ is endorsing 
CBC’s products.”); CBS Interactive, 259 F.R.D. at 419 (reasoning that “[n]o 
one seriously believes that the subjects of news reports are endorsing the 
company that provides the report”).  We embrace this understanding and 
find that under similar circumstances—when informational and statistical 
data of college athletes is presented on a fantasy sports website—it would 
be difficult to draw the conclusion that the athletes are endorsing any 
particular product such that there has been a violation of the right of 
publicity.  Importantly, however, this finding does not foreclose a court 
from closely scrutinizing the actions of a particular defendant to ensure no 
unauthorized endorsements are being made.  At the risk of overstepping 
the bounds of the certified question, we defer making any factual 
determination on this issue to our federal colleagues. 
Conclusion 
We conclude that Indiana’s right of publicity statute contains an 
exception for material with newsworthy value that includes online fantasy 
                                                 
3 The statute reportedly came about after concerns that profiteers were selling baseball-style 
cards of an AIDS victim without the consent of his surviving family.  Dan Wetzel, Law ends 
pirating of celebrities, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 25, 1994, at B1. 
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sports operators’ use of college players’ names, pictures, and statistics for 
online fantasy contests.   
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L A N T 
Stephen B. Caplin 
Stephen B. Caplin Professional Corporation 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
W. Clifton Holmes 
The Holmes Law Group, Ltd. 
Chicago, Illinois 
Todd L. McLawhorn 
Siprut PC 
Chicago, Illinois 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L E E 
Ian H. Gershengorn 
Kenneth L. Doroshow 
Ishan K. Bhabha 
Jenner & Block LLP 
Washington, District of Columbia  
John R. Maley  
Peter J. Rusthoven 
Barnes & Thornburg 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Damien J. Marshall 
Boies Schiller Flexner 
New York, New York 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  AMI CU S CU R IAE  
C M G W O R L D WI D E  
Theodore J. Minch 
Sovich Minch, LLP 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-CQ-00134 | October 24, 2018 
Page 13 of 13 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  AMI C I C U R IAE  
I N TE LL EC TUA L P RO P E R T Y LA W P R O FE SS O RS  
John A. Conway 
LaDue Curran & Kuehn LLC 
South Bend, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AM IC US  CU R IA E  
F A N TAS Y  S P O RT S TR A D E  ASS O CI AT I ON  
Rudolph A. Telscher, Jr.  
Kara R. Fussner 
Husch Blackwell LLP 
St. Louis, Missouri 
John W. Borkowski 
Husch Blackwell LLP 
South Bend, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AM IC I CU R IA E  
M AJ O R LE A GUE  BAS EBA L L  P LA Y E RS ASS ’ N,  E T A L. 
Michael Rubin 
P. Casey Pitts 
Altshuler Berzon LLP 
San Francisco, California 
Gabriel A. Hawkins 
Lynn Toops 
Cohen & Malad, LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  AMI CU S CU R IAE  
N E W SP O R TS  E C O NO M Y  I NS T ITU TE  
Libby Yin Goodknight 
Krieg DeVault LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana