Case Title: State v. Meinert

Citation: 225 Kan. 816, 594 P.2d 232

Docket Number: 50,487

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1979-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
225 Kan. 816 (1979)
594 P.2d 232
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant,
v.
WAYNE MEINERT, Appellee.
No. 50,487

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 5, 1979.
Frank J. Yeoman, Jr., assistant district attorney, argued the cause and Curt T. Schneider, attorney general, and Gene M. Olander, district attorney, were with him on the brief for appellant.
Cary L. Standiferd, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, J.:
This is an appeal by the State from an order of the district court dismissing a criminal complaint against Wayne Meinert on the ground that K.S.A. 21-3608(1)(a) is unconstitutionally vague. Defendant was charged under the statute with the offense of endangering a child. While the facts are not necessary in determining the question before this court, they will be recited briefly.
Defendant and Charlene Meinert were baby-sitting with three-year-old Jeanette Lowery. Defendant admitted having spanked Jeanette for urinating on the floor and not in the proper receptacle. The parents had not given the Meinerts permission to spank Jeanette. Ron Lowery, Jeanette's father, filed a complaint against Wayne Meinert alleging a violation of K.S.A. 21-3608(1)(a), stating in his affidavit supporting the complaint that red marks were still visible on the child's buttocks four hours after the spanking took place.
*817 K.S.A. 21-3608 provides in pertinent parts:
Defendant contended that the words "unjustifiable physical pain" as used in the statute are unconstitutional and fail to sufficiently identify the prohibited conduct as required by section 10 of the Kansas Bill of Rights and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The trial court so held and we agree with the trial court.
When statutes are challenged as unconstitutional, certain principles guide this court's consideration.
The vagueness test applicable to criminal statutes was iterated in State v. Kirby, 222 Kan. 1, 563 P.2d 408 (1977):
See also Kansas City Millwright Co., Inc. v. Kalb, 221 Kan. 658, 562 P.2d 65 (1977); State v. Gunzelman, 210 Kan. 481, 502 P.2d 705 (1972); State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365 (1962).
In State v. Hill, we stated:
With the foregoing in mind, we now turn to the issue of whether K.S.A. 21-3608(1)(a) is unconstitutionally vague on its face.
The State relies principally on two decisions from other states upholding statutes containing similar language to that in 21-3608. In the early case of People v. Curtiss, 116 Cal. App. Supp. 771, 300 Pac. 801 (1931), a school teacher who had administered a severe spanking to a child was convicted under a statute which made it a misdemeanor to inflict "unjustifiable pain or mental suffering" on a child. Cal Penal Code, § 273a. On appeal the teacher contended, among other things, the statute was unconstitutionally vague and uncertain. The court upheld the validity of the statute comparing the test for justification to that of the reasonable man concept in civil negligence actions. The decision affirmed a decision of the Glendale Police Court and was rendered by a two judge court sitting as the appellate department of the Superior Court, Los Angeles County. It should also be noted that the California statute was much more detailed than 21-3608 and contained some definitional guidelines. We do not consider the decision persuasive.
The second and more recent case relied upon by the appellant is State v. Comeaux, 319 So. 2d 897 (La. 1975). The defendant was convicted of "cruelty to a juvenile" in violation of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:93 (West), which provides in part:
*819 In Comeaux the charges against the defendant were based upon mistreatment of her five-year-old daughter. In upholding the validity of the statute the court specifically referred to other sections of the code which illuminated the questioned language. Two members of the Supreme Court of Louisiana dissented.
Nowhere in our criminal code is there any definition of "unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering." In State v. Kirby, 222 Kan. 1, we held K.S.A. 21-3431 unconstitutional and said:
It is to be noted that the title of the statute before us is "endangering a child" and in Kirby this court found the language "endangering of life" to be too indefinite to pass constitutional muster. Where is the line to be drawn in determining if discipline or other treatment of a child is justified or unjustified? How does one decide whether or not a spanking is due a child and, if so, should it be administered with the hands, a fly swatter, or a belt? Is one slap, two slaps, or five slaps too many? Are two hard slaps a violation of the statute but five very light slaps not? Do red marks lasting only one hour relieve one from prosecution? Some persons do not believe in any form of corporal punishment and to them any such treatment would be unjustified. On the other hand others may believe any correction, however severe, which produces temporary pain only, and no lasting injury or disfigurement, is justified. The statute could conceivably cover anything from a minor spanking or slapping to severe beating depending upon the personal beliefs of the individual. In State v. Conley, 216 Kan. 66, 531 P.2d 36 (1975), this court found the words "fondling or touching" in K.S.A. 21-3503(1)(b), L. 1969, ch. 180, to be indefinite, vague and overbroad in that they could conceivably cover anything from a handshake to sexual intercourse. 216 Kan. at 69.
*820 In City of Altamont v. Finkle, 224 Kan. 221, 579 P.2d 712 (1978), the language "exhibition of speed or acceleration" contained in a city traffic ordinance was found to be vague and indefinite.
Similarly, we are of the opinion that K.S.A. 21-3608(1)(a) is so vague and uncertain that it fails to establish the reasonably definite standards of guilt required by due process of law.
The judgment is affirmed.
McFARLAND and HERD, JJ., dissenting.