Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Allen

Citation: 537 So. 2d 105

Docket Number: 71019

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1989-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
537 So. 2d 105 (1989)
THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant,
v.
Sandra E. ALLEN, Respondent.
No. 71019.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 19, 1989.
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and John T. Berry, Staff Counsel, Tallahassee, and Thomas E. DeBerg, Asst. Staff Counsel, Tampa, for complainant.
John A. Weiss, Tallahassee, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary proceeding is before us on a complaint of The Florida Bar and *106 report of the referee. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 15, Florida Constitution.
The facts of this case, as taken from the referee's report, are as follows:
Pursuant to a consent judgment entered into by both parties, the referee found Sandra E. Allen guilty of the following violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(6) (conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law); D.R. 5-101(A) (accepting employment without full disclosure of a conflict of interest); D.R. 5-104(A) (entering into a business transaction with a client without full disclosure); D.R. 5-105(A) (accepting employment when the exercise of independent judgment is likely to be affected); and Integration Rule 11.02(3)(a) (conduct contrary to honesty, justice, or good morals). The referee recommended that Allen receive a public reprimand as discipline for the above violations. Neither party contests the referee's findings as to guilt or discipline.
The Bar does contest the referee's refusal to assess costs of $1,819.48 against Allen for an investigator's time and expenses. The referee's report concluded:
Rule 3-7.5(k)(1) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar provides in pertinent part:
The Bar asserts that because the rule only states that taxable costs "shall include" certain specified items, it should not be interpreted to exclude other items. When read in its entirety, the rule is too clear to permit such a construction. If investigative time and expenses or any other unspecified items are to be taxed as costs, the rule will need to be amended.
We acknowledge that in The Florida Bar v. Gold, 526 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1988), we held that the costs of investigating and prosecuting a bar disciplinary case should be assessed against the misbehaving Bar member where the costs incurred were necessary, not excessive, and properly authenticated. However, the legality of taxing investigators' costs was not at issue in Gold. Rather, the respondent was only seeking a reduction in the total amount of the costs assessed against him because he had been found not guilty on one of the charges.
In view of the clear language of rule 3-7.5(k)(1), the referee had no authority to tax as costs the time and expenses of the investigator. Therefore, we need not decide whether the investigative time was excessive and unreasonable.
We adopt the referee's report as to guilt and discipline and approve the imposition of costs. Publication of this opinion shall serve as respondent's public reprimand. Costs in the amount of $1,616.30 are hereby taxed against Sandra E. Allen, for which sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, J., concurs in result only with an opinion.
McDONALD, Justice, concurring in result only.
In scores of cases we have approved the taxing of investigative costs against a lawyer found guilty in disciplinary actions. We have, therefore, implicitly construed the rule allowing the assessment of costs to include investigative costs. Surely we would approve a proposed rule explicitly allowing the taxing of reasonable investigative expenses as costs. The pronouncement of the majority will virtually shut down all investigation of bar complaints until a rule change is effected. I think this is unnecessary.
In this case, I do find support for the referee's report that some of the investigation was unnecessary. Only reasonable investigative costs should be taxed. If a lawyer is not guilty of a particular charge he should not pay the costs of that unsuccessful prosecution even though he is found guilty of another charge. Hence, I concur in result only.