Case Title: State of Oregon v. Anderson

Citation: 207 Or. 675, 298 P.2d 195

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1956-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Affirmed May 31, 1956.
Petition for rehearing denied June 27, 1956.
*677 Robert L. Welch, Lakeview, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Herbert P. Welch, Lakeview.
Charles E. Raymond, special deputy District Attorney for Klamath County, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Richard C. Beesley, District Attorney for Klamath County, Klamath Falls.
Before WARNER, Chief Justice, and TOOZE, ROSSMAN, LUSK, BRAND and PERRY, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
PERRY, J.
The defendant was indicted by the grand jury of Klamath county for the crime of murder in the first degree for the death of Richard Miller. He entered a plea of "not guilty." On motion of the defendant for a change of venue, the cause was transferred to Harney county. The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, and from this conviction he appeals.
There is some conflict in the testimony, but the evidence discloses these facts:
In the afternoon of November 4, 1954, Hazel Hecocta Robinson, Richard Miller (the deceased, hereinafter *678 referred to as "Miller"), and the defendant, together with other persons, were in Curley's Bar in Beatty, Klamath county, Oregon. When the bar closed at 11 p.m., Hazel, her brother Clifford, and Miller left the bar and drove to Hazel's home (generally known as the Hecocta house) in the latter's pickup. At the house they drank wine and beer, and danced to recorded music. After a time three girls, Shirley Foster, Rosetta Crane, and Winifred Anderson, accompanied by a Walter Garcia (also known as "Choppo" and "Crosby"), joined them. They all had more wine and dancing, Hazel dancing with Miller. Quite late that night, and after midnight, the defendant, accompanied by Wendell Brown, Don Barkley and Mary Barkley, his wife, joined the party. Walter Garcia attempted to introduce the defendant and Miller; there were some words, and Miller, in an attempt to strike the defendant, struck Garcia and Garcia knocked Miller down. Miller then left the Hecocta house in anger, and drove to his home where he armed himself with a knife, a revolver, and a shotgun; he then returned in his pickup truck to the Hecocta house where he stood in the road outside the house and fired the shotgun. Wendell Brown, Donald Barkley, Garcia, and the defendant ran outside; the girls stayed in the house. Garcia's testimony of what then occurred is as follows:
The defendant's version of what occurred after Richard Miller returned to the Hecocta house is as follows:
The defendant then stated that after the pickup was driven away he went to the back porch of the house and saw the lights of the pickup go down the road; then he was gone about five minutes to the toilet and returned again to the house where he stayed that night.
The evidence is uncontradicted that the pickup truck, in which Miller was instantly killed, left the Hecocta house, traveled to the Paiute Road, then through a barrow pit and fence to a point on a logging *687 road on the Anderson property, a total distance of 1920 feet, where it was not visible from the main traveled roads in that vicinity. Miller's body was found outside of the cab on the ground beside the truck.
The defendant assigns as error the refusal of the trial court to give his requested instruction as follows:
This instruction is the equivalent of a motion for a directed verdict.
Defendant's contention is that it was physically impossible for the witness Garcia to see what he claims he saw when testifying that the defendant fired the shot "down through the window" of the pickup. The impossibility is based upon the fact that Garcia had to observe the actions of the defendant at night from a distance of about 147 feet. It must be noted, however, that the lights of the truck were burning and there was an electric light burning in the Hecocta house which would shine through the open doorway toward Miller's pickup. Under these circumstances a court could not say as a matter of law that Garcia could not have seen and recognized the outline of the defendant and his actions.
1. We have carefully reviewed all of the evidence in this case, and, while it is conflicting, we are satisfied the trial court did not err in submitting the question of the guilt of the defendant for determination by the jury.
The defendant contends (1) the trial court was in error in permitting the introduction of any evidence in this cause; and (2) in its failure to grant his motion for discharge at the conclusion of the selection of the jury.
The basis of each contention is that, since no appearance was entered by the district attorney of Harney *688 county, the district attorney of Klamath county and his duly appointed special deputy were without authority in law to proceed with the prosecution of the cause after the change of venue to Harney county was granted by the circuit court of Klamath county.
There can be no question, as contended by the defendant, but that, when a change of venue has been granted and the cause assigned and transferred, the court granting the change of venue loses jurisdiction over the trial of the cause. It is stated in 56 Am Jur 79, Venue § 78:
The above statement illustrates the fact that the matter of the jurisdiction of the court on a change of venue refers solely to the authority of the court to try the cause, and will not aid us in determining the territorial jurisdiction of a district attorney.
The defendant cites and relies upon the following statement from 27 CJS 396, District and Prosecuting Attorneys § 12 (2):
The authority for this statement is Bevington v. Woodbury County, 107 Iowa 424, 78 NW 222. A study of this case discloses that its foundation rests upon interpretation of the statutory law of that state as it then *689 existed. The section cited in 27 CJS, supra, also states as a headnote:
See, also, State v. Carothers, 1 Greene (Iowa) 464; People v. Neff, 191 NY 286, 84 NE 63.
A study of the cases above cited, and others, leads us to conclude that the solution of the question lies in the interpretation of our own statutes governing the duties of district attorneys.
2. We might properly terminate at this juncture the defendant's contentions by applying the correct rule of law applicable to this situation; that is, the defendant cannot attack the right of the district attorney of Klamath county to conduct the State's prosecution against him in Harney county collaterally, but must proceed directly to test his authority to act. State ex rel. Madden v. Crawford, 207 Or 76, 295 P2d 174; State v. Brumfield, 104 Or 506, 209 P 120. However, since the matter is one of public interest, we will examine the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions of this jurisdiction.
The original Article VII, § 17, of our constitution reads as follows:
*690 The provisions therein remain in force, notwithstanding the amendment of Article VII in 1910, except where modified by legislative enactment. State ex rel. v. Farrell, 175 Or 87, 92, 151 P2d 636.
Statutory enactments setting forth the duties of district attorneys are as follows:
*691 ORS 8.650, 8.660, and 8.670, carefully set forth a district attorney's duties involving criminal matters, while ORS 8.680 and 8.690 prescribe the duties of the office as they pertain to the civil business of the state and county within his district.
The pertinent statutes relating to a change of venue are as follows:
3. The general rule is to the effect that "the powers and duties of prosecuting attorneys are ordinarily confined to their respective counties or districts in the absence of any statute extending their territorial jurisdiction." 42 Am Jur 241, Prosecuting Attorneys § 9.
It follows, therefore, that if the territorial jurisdiction *692 of a district attorney is extended, the enlargement must be found in the statutory law above set out.
It appears without contradiction under the statutes cited that the district attorney has sole charge within the district for which he is elected of the prosecution of all crimes committed within its territorial boundaries.
The defendant emphasizes the words "within his county" and "therein" in ORS 8.660, contending these words refer to and require only his attendance upon and prosecution of matters in the courts having jurisdiction of public offenses within his county.
We do not believe this is the correct construction of the statute. It is clear that, in enacting the statutes pertaining to the duties of district attorneys, the legislature was considering the general and usual duties of district attorneys within their territorial jurisdiction, and, in speaking of the courts having jurisdiction of public offenses, it was speaking of the jurisdiction of the court which arises by reason of the public offense having been committed within its territorial jurisdiction, and the statute is concerned with the duties of a district attorney relative to crimes committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the district attorney and enjoins upon him the duty of carrying on the prosecution of these offenses. This is shown by these facts: Article I, § 11, of the Oregon Constitution, enacted in 1859, and unaffected by the amendments of 1932 and 1934, guaranteed to a person charged with a crime the right of trial in the county in which the offense was committed. The duties of district attorneys under the statutes here considered were enacted by the legislature in 1862, and at a time when there was no statutory provision for a change of venue; it was not until *693 1864 that the legislature provided for a change of venue in criminal actions.
4. The constitution and legislative acts having charged the district attorneys with the duty of prosecuting all public offenses committed within their jurisdiction, the conclusion must be drawn that their duty continues until the action is terminated, unless they are relieved by some other provision of statutory law.
We find nothing in the statutes providing for a change of venue that in anywise pertains to the duties of district attorneys; and we find nothing elsewhere that relieves them of this duty imposed upon them by law.
The defendant relies heavily upon State ex rel. v. Farrell, supra, written by Mr. Justice LUSK; there is language in the opinion which, when withdrawn from the context and the question involved, affords some comfort to the defendant, but the court there was considering the territorial duties of a district attorney in the commencement of a suit beyond the boundaries of his district, and not the territorial duties of a district attorney as they refer to suits or actions rightfully commenced within the territorial jurisdiction of his district.
5. We can reach no other reasonable conclusion than that it is the duty of the district attorney upon a change of venue to follow the cause to the place of change. This view expressed conforms, we believe, with the general practice in the past in such matters, and, also, we believe, with a practice best calculated to subserve the public interest. The district attorney of the county in which the indictment is found must of necessity be more familiar with the facts upon which the indictment is returned, and, therefore, he is best equipped to secure and present the evidence against an accused.
*694 The defendant requested instructions upon justifiable homicide, which request was refused, and no instructions were given upon this phase of the law. The defendant contends the trial court erred.
6. In 26 Am Jur 540, Homicide § 549, it is stated:
The general rule there stated is the rule of this state. State v. Steidel, 98 Or 681, 194 P 854.
Since the state of the evidence is the controlling factor in whether or not instructions on self-defense should be given, we must be governed by what the law requires shall appear in the evidence to invoke this defense in homicide actions. So far as is applicable to the matter before us, ORS 163.100 provides:
*695 And in State v. Radar, 94 Or 432, 456, 186 P 79, we stated:
7. Therefore, whether or not the defendant denies the homicide, a court should instruct a jury on the law of self-defense of the person whenever there are facts in the case from which a jury might draw the conclusion that at the time the act of homicide was committed the defendant could reasonably believe his person was in imminent danger of great bodily harm.
The defendant argues that the following facts are sufficient for this purpose: Richard Miller, the deceased, together with one Garcia and several girls, was attending a drinking party at the home of Hazel Hecocta Robinson near Beatty, Oregon, on the evening of November 4, 1954. The defendant, who had been drinking in Bly, Oregon, went to the Hecocta house, and upon arrival Garcia undertook to introduce the defendant to Miller. When the introduction was made an argument ensued, Garcia struck Miller, inflicting certain injuries about his mouth. Thereupon, Miller left the Hecocta house and went approximately five miles to his home where he armed himself with a shotgun, and shells, a .45 caliber revolver, a hunting axe, and a knife; he was very angry with Anderson at this time, and he returned to the Hecocta house. After Miller returned to the Hecocta house he fired the shotgun and the defendant and others came out of the house, and Miller fired the shotgun in the general direction of the house at the defendant and Garcia. The others left, but defendant, being afraid of being shot as he left, because of the lights about, crawled under the pickup truck belonging to Miller. Miller discovered *696 the defendant under the pickup and poking the shotgun under the running board said, "I've got one of you Indian bastards anyway." The defendant grabbed the barrel of the gun, got out from under the pickup and managed to take the gun from Miller. During this struggle the defendant learned of the pistol and knife, in addition to the shotgun, in Miller's possession, as Miller had tried to "grab" them during the scuffle for possession of the shotgun. After defendant got possession of the shotgun, Miller ran around the side of the pickup and got inside, being still armed.
The defendant, however, fails to consider the fact that Miller, while seated in his pickup truck, was killed by shotgun fire into his back at close range through the rear window of his pickup truck, and that defendant testified as follows:
The defendant relies upon State v. Way, 120 Or 134, 249 P 1045, 251 P 761, and State v. Steidel, 98 Or 681, 194 P 854, and particularly upon our statement in the latter case. Speaking through Mr. Justice BURNETT, we said at page 688:
This statement is authority for the proposition that it is not necessary to show in a given situation the felonious intent of a party who creates a situation which may be dangerous to those about him. But it is not authority for the statement that the defendant need not show he was apprehensive of a felonious act against himself, or others. In the cases relied upon by defendant, the rule is that to justify his actions there must be shown a state of facts from which a jury may draw a conclusion that reasonable apprehension of danger existed in the mind of a defendant.
8. In this case there is a total lack of facts from which a jury could draw an inference that at the time *698 Richard Miller was killed the defendant was taking any justifiable steps to avert any real or apparent danger to himself or anyone else. From the defendant's own lips we are informed that all danger was past when he obtained Miller's shotgun and the truck started to leave the Hecocta house.
The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury upon self-defense as an issue.
The defendant assigns as error the refusal of the trial court to give the following requested instruction:
9. The trial court did instruct the jury upon the presumption of innocence, which attaches to all defendants in criminal cases. The requested instruction would be no more than a comment upon the evidence, and would have been error. The requested instruction is far different from its converse, which permits, by reason of a rule of law of long standing, a jury to consider flight as a consciousness of the guilt of the defendant to aid in overcoming the presumption of innocence which surrounds the defendant.
In the course of the trial the following occurred:
The defendant states the trial court therein committed error because:
*700 ORS 17.505 provides:
ORS 17.510 provides:
10, 11. The word "instruction" as used in the statute is not limited to the charge to the jury, but applies to all directions given the jury as to their conduct in the course of the trial. Therefore, the failure of the defendant to except thereto precludes our consideration of the matter, unless we can say that the record considered in its entirety shows that the defendant did not have such a trial as is contemplated by law. State v. Bouse, 199 Or 676, 264 P2d 800.
We are of the opinion, gathered from the entire record, that the jurors were cognizant of the fact, not only from what occurred at this time, but also when *701 examined on their voir dire, that they were to try the case upon the evidence lawfully submitted in the court for their consideration, and not upon the newspaper reports, and no prejudice to the rights of the defendant resulted.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.