Case Title: State ex rel. Miller v. Reed

Citation: 1999-Ohio-315

Docket Number: 19991003

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-11-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Miller v. Reed, 87 Ohio St.3d 159, 1999-Ohio-315.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. MILLER, APPELLANT, v. REED, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Miller v. Reed (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 159.] 
Prohibition — Writ sought to prohibit common pleas court judge and county 
prosecuting attorney from conducting a sexual predator classification 
hearing — Dismissal of complaint affirmed. 
(No. 99-1003 — Submitted September 14, 1999 — Decided November 10, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Allen County, No. 1-99-27. 
 
In 1993, appellant, Jerry S. Miller, was convicted of rape and gross sexual 
imposition and sentenced to prison.  In July 1997, after the Ohio Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction had recommended that Miller be adjudicated a 
sexual predator pursuant to R.C. 2950.09, Miller’s trial court declined to make a 
determination concerning the classification, instead finding that R.C. 2950.09, as 
applied to Miller, violated the Retroactivity Clause of Section 28, Article II of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
 
We subsequently held in a different case that “R.C. 2950.09(B)(1), as 
applied to conduct prior to the effective date of the statute, does not violate the 
Retroactivity Clause of Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.”  State v. 
Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570, paragraph one of the syllabus.  
In February 1999, based on Cook, appellee, Allen County Court of Common Pleas 
Judge Jeffrey L. Reed, ordered a hearing pursuant to R.C. 2950.09(C)(2) to 
determine whether Miller is a sexual predator. 
 
Miller then filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Allen County for a 
writ of prohibition to prevent appellees, Judge Reed and Allen County Prosecuting 
Attorney David E. Bowers, from conducting the hearing.  Miller claimed that the 
trial court’s July 1997 decision declaring R.C. 2950.09 unconstitutional as applied 
 
 
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to Miller barred any further sexual predator classification hearing because of res 
judicata.  The court of appeals dismissed Miller’s complaint. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Jerry S. Miller, pro se. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  On appeal, Miller asserts that the court of appeals erred in 
dismissing his prohibition action against Judge Reed and the prosecuting attorney 
because the trial court’s July 1997 decision was res judicata and R.C. 
2950.09(B)(1) is unconstitutional.  Miller further asserts that because he should 
have been the prevailing party, the court of appeals erred in assessing costs against 
him. 
 
Notwithstanding Miller’s claims to the contrary, “res judicata is not a basis 
for prohibition because it does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to decide its 
applicability and it can be raised adequately by postjudgment appeal.”  State ex rel. 
Soukup v. Celebrezze (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 549, 550, 700 N.E.2d 1278, 1280, 
citing State ex rel. Smith v. Smith (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 418, 420, 662 N.E.2d 366, 
369, and State ex rel. Lipinski v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate 
Div. (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 19, 21, 655 N.E.2d 1303, 1305-1306. 
 
In addition, we need not address the merits of Miller’s constitutional claim 
because Miller did not raise this issue in his complaint or amend his complaint to 
include this claim, and appellees did not expressly or impliedly consent to 
litigation of this claim.  See, e.g., State ex rel. BSW Dev. Group v. Dayton (1998), 
83 Ohio St.3d 338, 344-345, 699 N.E.2d 1271, 1276-1277; State ex rel. Massie v. 
Gahanna-Jefferson Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 584, 589, 669 
N.E.2d 839, 843.  Although Miller cited in his complaint State v. Williams (Jan. 29, 
1999), Lake App. No. 97-L-191, unreported, 1999 WL 76633, discretionary appeal 
 
 
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allowed (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 1406, 711 N.E.2d 233, and noted that Williams held 
that R.C. 2950.09 is unconstitutional, he did so only to allege that he would suffer 
harm if classified as a sexual predator, and not to establish that his trial court’s 
attempt to hold a sexual predator classification hearing was unauthorized because 
of the claimed unconstitutionality of the statute. 
 
Furthermore, Miller was not entitled to a writ of prohibition against the 
prosecuting attorney because the prosecutor does not exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial power in a sexual predator classification hearing.  See, e.g., R.C. 
2950.09(C); State ex rel. Gray v. Leis (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 102, 16 O.O.3d 106, 
403 N.E.2d 977; State ex rel. Jefferys v. Watkins (1994), 92 Ohio App.3d 809, 811, 
637 N.E.2d 345, 347. 
 
Finally, Miller’s contention that the court of appeals should not have 
assessed costs against him because he should have prevailed lacks merit.  Miller 
was not the prevailing party in this case.  And while he claims discrimination 
against his claimed indigency status due to the costs assessment, he did not comply 
with the R.C. 2969.25(C) requirement of a statement certified by his prison cashier 
setting forth the balance in his inmate account for each of the preceding six 
months, although he asserted in his complaint that he would comply with that 
provision.  See, generally, State ex rel. Alford v. Winters (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 
285, 685 N.E.2d 1242. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.