Case Title: Justice v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 324, 2023

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2024-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ALEX JUSTICE, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 324, 2023 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§ Cr. ID No. 1203006756 (S) 
§  
§ 
 
Submitted: November 9, 2023 
Decided: 
January 11, 2024  
 
 
ORDER 
 
Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices. 
 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to 
affirm and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Alex Justice, filed this appeal from the Superior Court’s 
denial of his motion for correction of illegal sentence.  The State of Delaware has 
filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the 
face of Justice’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
In April 2012, a grand jury indicted Justice on eight counts of sex 
offender unlawful sexual conduct against a child under 11 Del C. § 777A.  Seven 
counts were based on the underlying sexual offense of second-degree rape (“USC 
Second-Degree Rape”) and one count was based on the underlying sexual offense 
 
2 
of second-degree unlawful sexual contact.  The charges arose from Justice’s sexual 
contact with a thirteen-year old child in March 2012.   
(3) 
The trial was bifurcated as required by Monceaux v. State.1  After a jury 
trial on whether Justice was guilty of second-degree rape and unlawful sexual 
contact and a bench trial on whether Justice was guilty of being a sex offender at the 
time of the crimes, Justice was convicted of two counts of sex offender unlawful 
sexual conduct against a child (one count based on second-degree rape and one count 
based on second-degree unlawful sexual contact) and acquitted on the remaining 
counts.  After that, the Superior Court granted the State’s petition to declare Justice 
a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) as to the USC-Second Degree Rape 
conviction and sentenced Justice as follows: (i) for USC Second-Degree Rape, life 
imprisonment under Section 4214(a); and (ii) for sex offender unlawful sexual 
conduct against a child based on second-degree unlawful sexual contact, five years 
of Level V incarceration, suspended for Level III probation.  This Court affirmed 
the Superior Court’s judgment on direct appeal.2 
(4) 
In 2015 and 2022, the Superior Court denied Justice’s motions for 
postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.3  In 2020, the Superior 
 
1 51 A.3d 474 (Del. 2012). 
2 Justice v. State, 2013 WL 3722357 (Del. July 11, 2013). 
3 Justice v. State, 2016 WL 2585918 (Del. May 2, 2016) (affirming the Superior Court’s denial of 
first motion for postconviction relief); Justice v. State, 2022 WL 2438814 (Del. Super. Ct. July 1, 
2022) (denying second motion for postconviction relief). 
 
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Court denied Justice’s pro se motion for a certificate of eligibility under Section 
4214(f).        
(5) 
On April 12, 2023, Justice filed a motion for correction of illegal 
sentence based on alleged defects in the indictment.  The Superior Court denied the 
motion.  On July 31, 2023, Justice filed a motion for correction of illegal sentence 
based on alleged double-jeopardy violations.  The Superior Court returned the 
motion to Justice on the basis that it was repetitive under Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 35(b).  On August 9, 2023, Justice filed a letter requesting that the Superior 
Court treat his July 31, 2023 motion as a motion for correction of illegal sentence 
under Rule 35(a) instead of a repetitive motion for sentence reduction under Rule 
35(b).  The Superior Court treated the letter as a motion for correction of illegal 
sentence and denied it.  This appeal followed. 
(6) 
We review the denial of a motion for sentence correction for abuse of 
discretion.4  We review questions of law de novo.5  A sentence is illegal if it exceeds 
statutory limits, violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the time and 
manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required 
to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the 
judgment of conviction did not authorize.6   
 
4 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 
5 Id. 
6 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
 
4 
(7) 
In his opening brief, Justice argues that the Superior Court erred in 
denying his motion for correction of illegal sentence without addressing his claims 
that his sentence was illegal.  He contends that his life sentence for USC Second-
Degree Rape is illegal because: (i) references to different ages of a child in §§ 777A 
and 4205A make the meaning of “child” ambiguous; and (ii) it was based on the age 
of the victim as well as his status as a registered sex offender and habitual offender 
in violation of double-jeopardy principles.  These contentions are without merit.   
(8) 
At the time of Justice’s crimes in March 2012, the relevant portions of 
the statutes implicated by Justice’s arguments provided: 
§ 772. Rape in the second degree; class B felony 
(a) A person is guilty of rape in the second degree when the person: 
(1) Intentionally engages in sexual intercourse with another person, and 
the intercourse occurs without the victim’s consent…. 
 
(b) Nothing in this section shall preclude a separate charge, conviction 
and sentence for any other crime set forth in this title, or in the Delaware 
Code. 
 
(c) Notwithstanding any provision of this title to the contrary, the 
minimum sentence for a person convicted of rape in the second degree 
in violation of this section shall be 10 years at Level V.7 
 
§ 777A. Sex offender unlawful sexual conduct against a child 
 (a) A sex offender who knowingly commits any sexual offense against 
a child is guilty of sex offender unlawful sexual conduct against a child. 
 
 
7 11 Del. C. § 772 (effective since June 30, 2010). 
 
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(b) For purposes of this section, “sex offender” means as defined in § 
4121 of this title. 
 
(c) For purposes of this section, the term “sexual offense” shall mean 
any offense designated as a sexual offense by § 761(i) of this title.8 
 
(d) For purposes of this section, “child” means any individual who has 
not reached that child’s eighteenth birthday…. 
 
(e) Sex offender unlawful sexual conduct against a child shall be 
punished as follows…. 
 
(2) If the underlying sexual offense is a class C, D, E, F, or G felony, 
the crime of sex offender unlawful sexual conduct against a child shall 
be a felony 1 grade higher than the underlying offense except where the 
child against whom a sexual offense is committed is a child younger 
than 12 years of age in which case the crime of sex offender unlawful 
sexual conduct against a child shall be a class B felony…. 
 
(5) If the underlying sexual offense is a class A or B felony, the crime 
of sex offender unlawful sexual conduct against a child shall be the 
same grade as the underlying offense, and the minimum sentence of 
imprisonment required for the underlying offense shall be doubled.9 
 
§ 4205A. Additional penalty for serious sex offenders or pedophile 
offenders. 
 
(a) 
Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter or any other laws 
to the contrary, a defendant convicted of any crime set forth in § 
771(a)(2), § 772, § 773, § 777, § 777A, § 778(1) or (2) of this title shall 
be sentenced to not less than 25 years up to life imprisonment to be 
served at Level V if: 
 
(1) The defendant has previously been convicted or adjudicated 
delinquent of any sex offense set forth in this title and classified as a 
class A or B felony, or any similar offense under the laws of another 
state, the United States or any territory thereof; or 
 
8 Second-degree rape under § 772 is one of the designated sexual offenses. 
9 11 Del. C. § 777A (effective June 30, 2010 to September 2, 2015). 
 
6 
 
(2) The victim of the instant offense is a child less than 14 years of 
age….10 
 
§ 4214. Habitual criminal; life sentence 
(a) Any person who has been 3 times convicted of a felony…who shall 
thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony of this State is declared 
to be an habitual criminal, and the court in which such 4th or subsequent 
conviction is had, in imposing sentence, may in its discretion, impose a 
sentence of up to life imprisonment upon the person so convicted. 
Notwithstanding any provision of this title to the contrary, any person 
sentenced pursuant to this subsection shall receive a minimum sentence 
which shall not be less than the statutory maximum penalty provided 
elsewhere in this title for the 4th or subsequent felony which forms the 
basis of the State’s petition to have the person declared to be an habitual 
criminal except that this minimum provision shall apply only when the 
4th or subsequent felony is a Title 11 violent felony, as defined in § 
4201(c) of this title….11 
 
(9) 
Contrary to Justice’s contentions, the references to different ages of a 
child in §§ 777A and 4205A that he cites do not make the meaning of “child” 
ambiguous.  Section 777A(e) increases felony grades for sexual offenses against 
younger child victims.  For example, if the underlying sexual offense is a class G 
felony (which has a sentencing range of up to two years of Level V incarceration 
under § 4205) and the child victim is twelve or older, then the crime of sex offender 
conduct is increased to a class F felony (which has a sentencing range of up to three 
years of Level V incarceration under § 4205).12  If, however, the underlying sexual 
 
10 11 Del. C. 4205A (effective June 30, 2010 to May 27, 2015). 
11 11 Del. C. § 4214 (effective September 1, 2011 to May 31, 2012). 
12 11 Del. C. § 777A(e)(2). 
 
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offense is a class G felony and the child victim is younger than twelve, then the crime 
of sex offender conduct is increased to a class B felony (which has a sentencing 
range of two to twenty-five years of Level V incarceration under § 4205).13  
Similarly, § 4205A at the time of Justice’s crimes increased the sentence for certain 
sexual offenses, including sex offender conduct against a child under § 777A, to 
twenty-five years to life imprisonment if the child victim was under the age of 
fourteen.14  There is no ambiguity that Justice’s victim, who was thirteen, was a child 
under §§ 777A and 4205A.   
(10) To the extent Justice claims that the jury did not determine whether the 
victim was under the age of fourteen in finding him guilty of second-degree rape, he 
is mistaken.  The jury instructions for the second-degree rape counts required the 
jury to decide, among other things, whether the State had proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the victim was under the age of fourteen.   
(11) Neither the age of the child victim nor Justice’s status as a registered 
sex offender and  habitual offender caused him to be sentenced in violation of 
double-jeopardy principles.  “The Constitutional double jeopardy clause prohibits 
multiple punishments for the same offense.”15  Justice does not dispute that the 
 
13 Id.  Although second-degree rape is a class B felony, the minimum sentence for second-degree 
rape is ten years of Level V incarceration instead of two years of Level V incarceration.  11 Del. 
C. § 772(c).   
14 11 Del. C. § 4205A(a)(2). 
15 Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365, 375 (Del. 1999). 
 
8 
victim was under fourteen, that he was a registered sex offender at the time he 
committed USC Second-Degree Rape, and that he was a habitual offender.  Under § 
4205A(a)(2), the sentencing range for Justice’s USC Second-Degree Rape 
conviction was twenty-five years to life imprisonment because the victim was under 
the age of fourteen.  Under § 4214(a), the Superior Court was required to sentence 
Justice to life imprisonment because that was the maximum sentence for his USC 
Second-Degree Rape conviction under § 4205A, which was a violent felony under 
§ 4205(c).   
(12) It is not a violation of double jeopardy if, as Justice contends, the 
conviction that required him to register as a sex offender was one of the predicate 
offenses underlying his habitual offender status.  Nor is there any violation of double 
jeopardy based on the fact that Justice’s status as a registered sex offender was an 
element of USC Second-Degree Rape.  Under § 777A, “[i]t is a separate crime for a 
registered sex offender to knowingly commit a sexual offense against a child.”16 
(13) Justice was punished once, not multiple times, for USC Second-Degree 
Rape.  The enhancement of his USC Second-Degree Rape sentence under §§ 4205A 
and 4214 did not violate double jeopardy.17  Justice has not shown that his sentence 
 
16 Monceaux, 51 A.3d at 476. 
17 See, e.g., Adams v. State, 2020 WL 1651685, at *3 (Del. Apr. 2, 2020) (rejecting the defendant’s 
claim that using a prior conviction to enhance the sentence for a later conviction violated double 
jeopardy principles); Epperson v. State, 2002 WL 480932, at *1 (Del. Mar. 22, 2022) (“The United 
States Supreme Court has consistently rejected double jeopardy challenges…to sentencing 
 
9 
for USC Second-Degree Rape is illegal.  We therefore affirm the Superior Court’s 
denial of Justice’s motion for correction of illegal sentence, albeit on grounds 
different than those relied upon by the Superior Court.18 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court be AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
schemes that enhance a defendant’s sentence because of a prior conviction.”) (citing Witte v. 
United State, 515 U.S. 389, 398 (1995)). 
18 Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (noting that the Delaware 
Supreme Court may affirm a trial court’s judgment for reasons different than those articulated by 
the trial court).