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8637cc97-865a-4bd5-bb40-93eb099706dc
Ex parte Don Davis
null
1140456
alabama
Alabama Supreme Court
STATE OF ALABAMA -- JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT THE SUPREME COURT OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015 1140456 Ex parte Don Davis, Judge of Mobile County Probate Court oRDER The petition filed in this Court by the Mobile County Probate Judge on February 9, 2015, in substance is a request for an advisory opinion. Section 12-2-10, Ala. Code 1975, authorizes this Court to address requests for advisory opinions fron only the Governor or the Legislature. See opinion of the Justices No, 199, 286 Ala. 156, 158, 238 So. 2d 326, 327 (1970). Because this Court is not authorized to address this petition, the petition is dismissed, PETITION DISMISSED stuart, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur. Bolin, Murdock, and Shaw, JJ., concur specially. Parker, J., concurs in the result Moore, C.d., recuses himself. hherowith set out as same appear(s) of recordin aid Wiese my hae this Ly op orcs 1 conccloerlonn asta 1140456 BOLIN, Justice (concurring specially). “What has been an orderly process, I suspect, will soon resemble a three-ring circus." Tyson v. Macon Cnty, Greyhound Kk, Inc., 43 So, 3d 587, 595 (Ala, 2010) (Woodall, dissenting). Admittedly this quotation is taken out of context. From the perspective of a probate judge in Alabama, however, the events that have unfolded subsequent to the issuance of the memorandum opinion and order by United States District Judge Callie S$. Granade, in the United states District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, Southern Division, in Civil Action No. 14-0208-cG-N surely brings to mind this quotation. I do not intend to trivialize the important constitutional questions presented by this controversy, but the unfortunate path this litigation has taken so far has resulted in mass confusion that I suspect has led the public to wonder what has happened to the orderly rule of law. As a former probate judge, I am aware of the many duties imposed by law upon the office of probate judge, only one of waich is judicial. Some of the other "hats" worn by some or all probate judges include being the keeper of records and 1140456 documents that must be maintained for posterity, serving as the chief election official of the county in all elections, and, although this particularly may vary from county to county, issuing a variety of licenses, e.g., hunting licenses, fishing licenses, driver's license renewals, automobile-tag renewals, and marriage licenses. Although I concur fully with the dismissal of the action herein, as will be addressed further below I am disappointed and concerned that, amongst everyone heretofore connected with the constitutional issues and the litigation, nowhere has there been a probate judge with a seat as a party at any of these proceedings, except for Mobile County Probate Judge Don Davis, who was diemissed from the proceedings on duly 25, 2014, and added again as a party on February 10, 2015. The only two judicial participants who exercised wisdom, restraint, and discretion on the record were United states Supreme Court Justices Thomas and Scalia. I specifically refer to Justice Thomas's dissent to the United states Supreme Court's denial of a stay in the federal court matter, which Justice Scalia joined and which states as follows: wThe Attomey General of Alabama asked us to stay a federal injunction preventing him from 1140456 ' enforcing several provisions of Alabama law defining marriage as a legal union of one man and one woman pending our consideration of Obergefell v. Hodses, No. 14-556; Tanco v. Haslam, No. 14-562; DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-571; and Bourke v. Beshear, No. 14-574, Those cases are scheduled to be argued this ‘Term and present the same constitutional question at issue here: Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize unions between two people of the same sex as a marriage under state law. en courts declare state laws unconstitutional \ and enjoin state officials from enforcing then, our ordinary practice is to suspend those injunctions from taking effect pending appellate review. see, e.g., Herbert v. Kitchen, (Ms. 13A687, January 6, 2014] 571 U.S. (2014); see also san Diegans for Mt, Soledad Nat War Menoxial v. Paulson, 548 9.8. 1301 (2006) (Kennedy, J., in chambers) (staying an i injunction requiring a city to renove its religious | memorial). Although a stay is not a matter of right, this practice reflects the particularly strong showing that States are often able to make in favor of such a stay. Because States are required to i comply with the Constitution, and indeed take care to do so when they enact their laws, it is a rare case in which a State will be unable to make at least some showing of a likelihood of success on the merits. States also easily meet the requirement of irreparable injury, for '"{alny time a state is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury."' Maryland v, King, (Ms. 12948, July 30, 2012] 567 U.S. (2012) (quoting New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W, Fox Co,, 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers)). The equities and public interest likewise generally weigh in favor of enforcing duly enacted state laws (slip op., at 2-3) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) | 1140456 "It was thus no surprise when we granted a stay in eimilar circumstances a little over a year ago. See Herbert v. Kitchen, gupra. Nor was it a surprise when we granted a stay in similar circumstances less than six months ago. McQuigg v, Bostic, [Ms. 140196, Aug. 20, 2014] 573 U.S. _ (2024). Those decisions reflected the appropriaté respect we owe to States as sovereigns and to the people of those States who approved those laws. "This application should have been treated no differently. That the Court more recently denied several stay applications in this context is of no moment. Those denials followed this Court's decision in October not to review seven petitions seeking further review of lower court judgments invalidating state marriage laws. Although I disagreed with the decisions to deny those applications, Armstrong v. Brenner, ante, p. __; Hilson v. Condon, ante, D. _i Moser v. Marie, ake, p. __, 1 acknowledge that there was at least an argument that the October decision justified an inference that the Court would be less likely to grant a writ of certiorari to consider subsequent petitions. That argument is no longer credible. The Court has now granted a writ of certiorari to review these important issues and will do so by the end of the Term. The Attorney General of Alabama is thus in an even better position than the applicant to whom we granted a stay in Herbert yet rather than treat like applicants alike, the Court looks the other way as yet another Federal District Judge caste aside state laws without making any effort to preserve the status quo pending the Court's resolution of a constitutional question it left open in United States v. Windsor, [Ms. 12-307, June 26, 2013] 570 U.S (2013) (slip op., at 25-26). This acquiescence may well be seen as a signal of the Court's intended resolution of that question. This is not the proper way to discharge our Article III responsibilities. And, it is 1140456 indecorous for this Court to pretend that it is. Today's decision represents yet another example this rt's increasingly cavi toward the States. Over the past few montns, the Court has repeatedly denied stays of lower court judgments enjoining the enforcement of state laws on questionable constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Mari ey v z-Valenzuela, (Ms. 140493, Nov. 13, 2014) 574 U.S. __, (2014) (slip op., at 2) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., respecting denial of application for stay) (collecting cases) It has similarly declined to grant certiorari to review such judgments without any regard for the people who approved those laws in popular referendums or the elected representatives who voted for them. In this case, the Court refuses even to grant a temporary stay when it will resolve the issue at hand in several months. "I respectfully dissent from the denial of this application. I_would have shown the people of Alabama the x: they deserve and preserved the 1 Et resol: his important constitutional question." Strange v. Searcy, [Ms. 140840, February 9, 2015] 574 U.S , —— (2015) (emphasis addeq) . The highly emotional issue involved in the federal proceeding, on both sides of the argument, it appears will be decided only by the United states supreme Court. The plaintiffs in the two cases decided by the federal district court could have joined the various probate judges in the State as parties, if nothing else, as relief parties. For 1404s chat matter, the federal district court could have provided chat the probate judges were made defendants. see Rules 19 and 20, Fed. 8. Civ. P, (allowing for joinder and permissive joinder, respectively). This would have allowed the probate judges notice and an opportunity to be heard. Rather, the only probate judge made an original party to the federal court action was Judge Davis, the petitioner in the instant proceeding, who was later dismissed from that action with prejudice and who has now been added as a party again, The federal district judge in her order acknowledged both that the united states Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case to be decided in this Term of Court and that that case will "definitively" decide the important constitutional issues involved, However, the same federal district court denied a stay past February 9, 2015, although the definitive decision lies just four months ahead. rt is my judgment that the united states Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, with due respect, also contributed to the resulting confusion by refusing to take further action in this and similar same-sex- marriage cases in that circuit until the United States Supreme Court issues a decision and by denying a stay of the federal 1140456 court matter before Judge Granade. While all of the above was occurring, the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court sent a letter to the probate judges giving them advice on how to address this issue, together with a memorandum of law, and finally issued an order to the probate judges on the eve of yn of the federal court's temporary stay that the expiral reflected a view of the law that directly conflicted with the federal judge's view of the law as espoused in her order. The ensuing legal "circus" has left the probate judges, who had no voice or opportunity to be heard in this matter, an untenable position -- caught between a federal district judge's order, the statewide precedential value of which is uncertain, and an order from the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court. If the term "circus" is hyperbole, the current predicament at least qualifies as a "darned if I do, darned if 1 don't" dilemma for the probate judges, and this is no way to wisely, fairly, and deliberately administer justice. ‘The Chief Justice has wide powers pursuant to § 12-2- 30(b) (7) and (8), Ala, Code 1975, but the question arises as to whether those powers apply to probate judges’ administrative, as opposed to judicial, actions. should a 1140456 probate judge follow the order of the chief judicial officer in the State of Alabama? Or should the probate judge follow an order of a federal district judge, of which he or she has possibly been made aware by media or by word of mouth through his or her professional association, not by having had a seat at the table in the courtroom as a party? There are many federal district judges in the three federal districts in Alabama, From a precedential standpoint, what happens if the which opinions of two federal district judges conflict: opinion, if either, would be the binding precedent on a federal question? who wins if there is a conflict between a federal court order and a state-court opinion on a federal question? Although I do not agree with the entirety of the article, these questions were recently examined in the introduction to that article in the Vanderbilt Law Review, which does state correctly the following pivotal questions: "Lower federal court precedent cannot bind state courts, or so we are told, Most state courts assert that they are free to reach their own conclusions about the meaning of federal law, even when doing so creates a conflict with the federal court of appeals presiding over the geographic region in which they sit. Several federal circuits have conceded that their decisions are not binding on state courts, and, in concurring opinions, two justices have emphatically agreed. A number of federal courts 1140456 scholars have declared that state courts need not follow lower federal court precedent because state courts are ‘coordinate’ with lower federal courts and not ‘subordinate! to them. ‘and yet, upon closer inspection, the role of lower federal court precedent in state court decisionmaking remains unclear. A few state courts appear to believe that they are bound to follow the decisions of the federal courts of appeals on questions of federal law, and many others have issued inconsistent opinions on that question. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Bighth and Ninth Circuits claim that state courts must follow their lead on federal questions, creating a circuit split that has never been resolved by the Supreme Court. only a handful of legal scholars have opined on the matter, and most have done so in passing in articles devoted to other subjects. Remarkably, then, this significant question about the interplay between the state and federal judicial systems lingers anresolved more than two-hundred years after the Constitution's ratification. t "the xelationship between the lower federal courts and the state courts raises foundational questions about the place of those federal courts in Gur constitutional structure, Are the lower federal rts’ interpretatis f_federal lay i the Supreme Col Alternatively, are state _and lower federal courts | soequals under the Constitution such that neithe: 1_the other's ruling: ‘the Supreme Court have the constitutional authority fo Tequire that stare courte follow lower federal Z oR ‘sourt_pr 2 i inci ft federalien forbid ouch intexference with state institutions, or bec: ni Judicial independence, or both? "similar foundational questions were 10 1140456 seventy-five years ago in Erie Railroad v, Tompkins, [304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938),] when the Supreme Court overruled swift v, Tyson, [41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842),] and held that federal courts must follow state law as articulated by a state's highest court. The Court explained that federal courts undermined state sovereignty by failing to treat state courts’ views on state law as controlling. Although Exie focused on the federal courts’ obligation to adopt state common law, the decision confirmed that federal courts ‘must follow state courts’ interpretations of state positive law as well. The bottom line after Erie is that state courts have the final word on the meaning of state law. “Exie is one of a handful of iconic cases that has shaped our understanding of not only the relationship between state and federal courts but s0 our entire federal system, According to John Hart Ely, Brie ‘implicates, indeed perhaps it is, the very essence of our federalism.’ And yet Brie left the job half done. The case tells us how federal courts should treat state courts’ precedent on state law, but it does not address how state courts should respond to federal courts’ interpretation of federal law. Of course, some might argue that Exie supports the conclusion that state courts are bound only by the Supreme Court on questions of federal law, just as federal courts are required to follow only the precedent of the highest court of the state on questions of state law. And yet the unique and limited role of the Supreme Court creates a significant disjunction: the Court cannot quickly resolve disputes between state and federal courts on the meaning of federal law, leaving intrastate splits to linger between these court systems for decades.” Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, a 3404s 68 Vand. L. Rev. 53, 55-59 (2015) (footnotes omitted; emphasis added) . The purpose of this writing is not to try today to answer the questions posed by the article quoted above. It is offered solely to illustrate the probable angst and consternation that each of the 68 probate judges of this state has undergone since the federal court's order and Chief Sustice Moore's order were issued, and it did not have to be this way. Ae stated above, I place the blame for the confusion that now exists in the various probate courts of this State since the two-week stay expired at the feet of everyone involved, save the Attorney General, who has properly requested a stay at all levels, and gustices Thonas and Scalia, who offered a solution that would have delayed this matter for only four months or less -- after which we would have had the final answer, no confusion, and, most importantly, an orderly administration of justice In conclusion, I feel compelled to comment on a portion of the amended pleading in the “In Rem Action" that is actually before thie Court and that the Court properly 12 1140456 dismisses. There is 2 portion contained in the "action" with which T sharply disagree. 1 quote from paragraph 7 of the "action": "7, If this Court either fails to docket this amended in rem action regarding the Administrative Order or fails to address this amended in rem action filed within this Court before the federal court in the Southern District of Alabama enters an Order requiring Judge Davis to abide by the above federal court orders, then Judge Davis will accept this Honorable Court's failure to act on this amended in xem _matter ae an implicit directive to Judge Davis to abide by the Orders of the Southern District of Alabama on January 23rd and also January 28th, 2015 Judge Davis anticipates that Judge Granade could enter this Order as quickly as tomorrow based on the Order the judge has entered today." (Bmphasis added.) With due regard for the fact that the above document was submitted to this Court by a probate judge who is suffering the uncertainties set forth in this writing, I would caution any litigant coming before this court that, although, proverbially, silence may be golden, the silence of this court, as an institution, should never be treated as an “implicit directive" to take any particular course of action. 13 1140456 MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially). ‘The amended petition before us quotes from the February 2015, order of Judge Granade in the case of Searcy v. Strange (Ms, 14-0208, S.D, Ala., gan, 23, 2015), stating that her injunction in that case “enjoined ... [the] Attorney General for the state of Alabama" and those under his supervision and that, because the petitioner was not a party to that case, his actions or inactions did not constitute a “fail[ure] to comply with th[at] order." ‘The petitioner asks this Court for guidance with respect to the issue of the constitutionalicy of the various statutes enacted by the Alabama Legislature providing for the governmental licensing and recognition of what are referred to in those statutes as vmarriages," see Ala. Code 1975, §§ 30-1-3 through -19. Inherent in the petitioner's request for guidance, particularly given the facts alleged in the petition, is whether, under the terms of those statutes, particularly § 30- 1-9, @ probate judge has an affirmative obligation to issue marriage licenses at all, and whether, under the principles articulated in such cases as Newton v, City of Tuscaloosa, 251 Ala, 209, 36 So, ad 487 (1948), and City of Birmingham v. 14 1140456 smith, 507 So, 24 1312 (Ala. 1987), and considering the meaning of the term "marriage" intended by the Legislature in those statutes, they may be deemed to survive, or mist be stricken as wholly void, i¢ they are not to be applied solely co a union between a man and a woman.’ These are substantial questions. These questions, however, are not before us in an adversary proceeding or in the context of a request for an advisory opinion by the Governor or the Legislature, Nor has exe been a showing that these questions are properly before us on some other basis. I therefore concur in the order of this court. inthe act ‘ought not to be wholly void unless the invalid portion is so important to the general plan and operation of the law in its entirety as reasonably to lead to the conclusion that it would not have been adopted if the legislature had perceived the invalidity of the part so held to be unconstitutional.'" 251 Ala. at 217, 36 So. 2d at 493 (quoting A, Bertolla & Sons v. State, 247 Ala. 269, 271, 24 So. 2d 23, 25 (1945)). "The test is ... whether the legislature would have passed the statute without the [unconstitutional aspect included therein]." 507 So. 2d at 1317. 1s 1140456 SHAW, Justice (concurring specially) In the matter before this Court, Mobile County Probate court Judge Don Davis references an order of the United states District Court for the Southern District of Alabama that states: "Ala. Const. Art. I, § 36.03 (2006) and Ala. Code 1975, § 30-1-19 are unconstitutional ...." Searcy v, Strange (Ms. 14-0208, Jan. 23, 2015). Judge Davis then notes that on February 8, 2015, Alabama's Chief Justice issued an administrative order stating that “no Probate Judge of the State of Alabama nor any agent or employee of any Alabama Probate Judge shall issue or recognize a marriage license that is inconsistent with Article I, Section 36.03, of the Alabama Constitution or § 30-1-19, Ala. Code 1975." ‘he matter Judge Davis filed in this Court states that it "is filed in order to give this Honorable Court acting as the entixe Supreme Court of Alabama the opportunity to review the application of the above Administrative order." ‘This invitation to "review" the administrative order issued by the Chief gustice, in my view, is a request for an advisory opinion. However, only the governor or the legislature may request an advisory opinion. Ala. Code 1975, § 12-2-10 ("The 16 1140456 Governor, by a request in writing, or either house of the Legislature, by a resolution of such house, may obtain a written opinion of the justices of the Supreme Court of Alabama or a majority thereof on important constitutional questions."). See also Opinion of the Justices No, 199, 236 Ala. 156, 158, 238 So. 24 326, 327 (1970) ("[T]he present request originated not with the Governor, but with the Contest Subcommittee of the State Committee ..., which course of action is not within the purview of (§ 12-2-10). To hold otherwise would add a new concept to the prerogatives of [§ 22-2-10] and set a new precedent for litigants to request advisory opinions whenever the constitutionality of a law arises."). This Court is not empowered "'to give advisory opinions, however convenient it might be to have these questions decided for the government of future cases.'* Stamps_v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Hduc., 642 So. 2d 941, 944 (Ala. 1994) (quoting Town of Warrior v. Blaylock, 275 Ala 113, 114, 152 So. 24 661, 662 (1963) (emphasis omitted)). See also AIRCO, Inc, v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 360 So, 24 970, 971 (Ala. 1978) ("To render an opinion based solely upon the Commission's alleged improper actions (without seeking a a7 1140456 remedy therefrom) or upon its prospective improprieties would be to render impermissible advisory opinions.) 28
b513f47fa3d1518ad1b3372e111f9170de149bc934637678449f598a1553bf52
2015-02-11T00:00:00Z
7b8c2141-c097-44a3-ac90-858fcc7b15cc
Ex parte Scottsdale Insurance Company.
null
1140631
alabama
Alabama Supreme Court
STATE OF ALABAMA -- JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBBR TERM, 2014-2015 1140631 Ex parte Scottsdale Insurance Company. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Har-Mar Collision, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Company et al.) (Mobile Circuit Court: cv-11-838) ORDER The petition for a writ of mandamus of Scottsdale Insurance Company directed to the Honorable Michael A Youngpeter, Judge of the Circuit Court of Mobile County, having been filed and submitted to the Court, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the emergency motion to stay the proceedings in the trial court is moot Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur. Murdock, J., concurs specially. 1140631 MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially}. Scottsdale Insurance Company seeks mandamus relief fron this Court in regard to the Mobile Circuit Court's decision to deny its motion to dismiss certain claims against it for lack of standing. I concur in the denial of this petition As a general rule, interlocutory appellate review is not available by way of a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to overturn a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss or its denial of a motion for a summary judgment. x par: Liberty Nat'l Life Ing, Co., 825 So. 24 758, 761-62 (Ala. 2002). Among the exceptions to this general rule is one that allows this Court to consider a petition for a writ of mandamus when the petitioner's motion asserts a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the trial court. Bx_paxte Heal hcorp., 974 So. 24 288, 292 (Ala. 2007). Here, Scottsdale Insurance asserts a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that Har-Mar Collision, Inc., the plaintiff below, does not have "standing" to file an action alleging breach of contract and bad faith because, according to Scottsdale Insurance, Har-Mar is not a party to the contract at issue. 1140631 It may be considered axiomatic, however, that a party who claims a private right of action against another has standing to assert its claim in our courts. The claim may fail for lack of support in the law or in the facts, including, in the case of a claim of breach of contract, a lack of proof of the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. such a failure, however, is a failure on the merits, not a failure of standing on the part of the plaintiff to assert its claim and to attempt to prove the claim. And the prospect of failure of a claim on such grounds certainly does not deprive the trial court of the subject-matter jurisdiction to decide whether a claim properly presented to At does in fact find support in the law and in the facts. Our precedents are now clear to this effect. See Ex parte Home Loans Servicing, LP, (Ms. 1110373, Sept. 13, 2013] So. 34__, ___ (Ala. 2013) (overruling Cadle v. Shabani, 950 So. 2d 277 (Ala. 2006), and discussing at length the inapplicability of standing as a gatekeeping mechanism in private-law actions, as opposed to public-law actions); Ex parte Rhodes, 144 So, 34 316, 318-19 (Ala. 2013); Whitty v. Montgomery cnty,, 141 So. 3d 1015, 1020-21 (Ala. 2013); 1140631, EX parte MERSCORP, , 141 So, 3d 984, 991-92 (Ala. 2013); Ex parte Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 78 So, 34 959, 978-79 (Ala. 2011); Steele v, Federal Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 69 So. 34 89, 91 n.2 (Ala. 2010); and Wyeth, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 42 So. 3d 1216, 1219-21 (Ala. 2010).
2690f4041034027ba9bf76c0cf14524289fa087b1a00b1d77f9ae038483b0dff
2015-04-17T00:00:00Z
fcbe0fa9-12b0-4ced-b522-6cf855361420
Ex parte Corey Beantee Melton. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Corey Beantee Melton v. State of Alabama) (Shelby Circuit Court: CC-06-1139; Criminal Appeals : CR-08-1767). Writ Denied. No Opinion.
null
1100327
alabama
Alabama Supreme Court
RELEASED. WAR 11 2011 ures CSOT OF MARA Yotice: Tals opinion ie subject to forms! revision before publication in the advance sh ot Southern Heporter. Readers are requested co nobity she Reporter of Deckelons, Alabata Kepeilace Coures, 300 Dexter hvense, Nonegowary, Alabana 36104-3741 { (224) 229-0609), oF any Cypoarapaical or’ other ezvora, in Seder ease corrections may be ade betore the opinion 1s printed’ in Zoutharn Reporter. SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011 1100327 Bx parte Corey Beantee Melton PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 10 THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (tm xe: Corey Beantee Melton ve State of Alabama) (Shelby Circuit Court, CC-06-1139; Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-08-1767) WOODALL, Justice. WRIT DENIED, NO OPINION Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, and Shaw, JJ., Murdock, J., concurs specially Main and Wise, JJ., recuse themselves.* *gustice Main and Justice Wise were members of the Court of Criminal Appeale when that court considered this case. 1100327 MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially). I concur in denying the petition for the writ of certiorari in this case. The sole question raised in the petition to this Court is whether the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals in its opinion in this case conflicts with the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Walter v, United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). The facts of the two cases and, consequently, the holdings of the two courts are sufficiently different that those holdings do not conflict with one another. In Walter, there was no dispute that the government clearly exceeded the scope of the search actually conducted by a third party. Likewise, in the present case, there is little dispute that the government exceeded the scope of the search actually conducted by a third party. In Walter, however, there was no dispute but that the government exceeded the scope of any search that had been authorized by the defendant. The same cannot be said here. More specifically, the petition focuses on evidence indicating that employees of Best Buy electronics retail stores who were working on customers’ computers were restricted by their employer from opening computer files they suspected of containing illegal content. The petition does not address, nor assert a conflict or an issue of first impression with respect to, whether Corey Beantee Melton knew or reasonably should have 2 1100327 known that employees of Best Buy would need to open certain folders on his computer and thereby gave up any expectation of privacy with respect to such folders. Compare Commonwealth v. Sodomsky, 939 A.2d 363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (finding that a defendant reasonably should have expected that a third party hired to install a new DVD drive in his computer might use videos already in his computer as a method to test the newly installed equipment) . Although I concur in denying the petition for the writ of certiorari in this case, I do not wish to be understood as agreeing in all respects with the analysis employed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Among other things, I am concerned about the treatment of the inquiry, in the second half of Part II of that court's opinion, into whether any expectation of privacy Melton retained in his computer files was "an expectation that society is prepared to consider reasonable," __ $0. 3d at _, as somehow different from the inquiry in the first half of Part II into "whether Melton had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the files," ___ So, 3d at __. By definition, the two inquiries are the same. See United States v, Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1983) ("A ‘search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.)
412c852714804141fcefddcd2e2fe319b17c882d47573628bd332c30a8d6eddd
2011-03-11T00:00:00Z
58a726ac-425b-4249-8d13-bcad1ec83fbb
Chris Dwayne Williams v. Alabama Department of Corrections
null
1180400
alabama
Alabama Supreme Court
LEASED supe COURT OE ALABAMA STATS OF ALABAMA -- JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT THE SUPREME COURT SPECIAL TERM, 2019 1180400 Chris Dwayne Williams v. Alabama Department of Corrections (Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court: CV-18-667). PARKER, Chief Justice. AFFIRMED. NO OPINION Seo Rule 53{a) (1) and (a) (2) (P), Ala. 8. App. P Shaw, Wise, Bryan, and Mendheim, JZ., concur. Mitchell, J., recuses himself.
8e89c0138f7044056b3778a60e493f69201d950cbf1e7b1d2350a5abda3a9af7
2019-08-09T00:00:00Z
e3fd4e28-0f32-4484-8d13-d38cca31bb52
Ex parte Clarence E. Haynes, Talladega County Circuit Clerk, and Amber Edwards, Talladega County Juvenile Intake Officer. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Ex parte G.L. (In the Matter of H.C.L., a minor child))
null
1081171
alabama
Alabama Supreme Court
RELEASED Notice: This opinion is subject to fora! revision before publication in the advance ‘sheets of Southern Reporter. eaders are rogsasted to notity the Raporear Of Deciaionay Alabama. appellate” Courtsy. 300, Dexter Avenue, Mantgcnacy, Alabama 36106-3761 (S00) Zascaeto}, ‘of any typograpnice: or other errors, in eeder that corrections may be sade otore the opinion is printed in gesthasn Rapoxtar SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA SPECIAL TERM, 2009 1081171, Ex parte Clarence E. Haynes, Talladega County Circuit Clerk, and Amber Edwards, Talladega County Juvenile Intake Officer PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (in re: Ex parte G.L. (in the Matter of H.C.L., @ minor child)) (Talladega Juvenile Court; Court of Civil Appeals, 2080260) SHAW, Justice. ‘The petition for the writ of certiorari is denied. 1081271 In denying the petition for the writ of certiorari, this Court does not wish to be understood as approving all the language, reasons, or statements of law in the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion, Horsley v, Horsley, 291 Ala. 782, 280 So. 24 185 (1973). WRIT DENIED. Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.
445287ab5bc588e6146aa4e2ab599d57a28367ce6def5edca8ba0479ef4516c9
2009-09-04T00:00:00Z
c6e49f67-47eb-4f37-a060-dfe365faec05
Ex parte State of Alabama ex rel. Alabama Policy Institute, Alabama Citizens Action Program, and John E. Enslen, in his official capacity as Judge of Probate for Elmore County.
null
null
alabama
Alabama Supreme Court
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA March 10, 2015 1140460 Bx parte State of Alabama ex rel, Alabama Policy Institute, Alabama Citizens Action Program, and John &. Enslen, in his official capacity as Judge of Probate for Elmore County. ORDER In an opinion issued on March 3, 2015, this Court ordered Judge Don Davis, the Probate Judge for Mobile County, "to advise thie Court, by letter brief, no later than 5:00 p.m. on Thursday, March 5, 2015, as to whether he is bound by any existing federal court order regarding the issuance of any marriage license other than the four marriage licenses he was ordered to issue in Strawser (yv. Strange (Civil Action No 14-0424-cG-c, Jan. 26, 2015)]. [*] on March 5, dudge Davis filed a motion seeking an 11-day extension of time, until March 16, 2015, to comply with this court's order. On March 9, Judge Davis filed a "Response to Show Cauge Order" in which he asserts that he should not be included in this Court's March 3 order out of concern that doing so would require him to violate the federal district ‘The decision of the federal district court in strawser was premised on its earlier decision in Searcy v. Strange, [Civil Action No. 14-0208-CG-N, Jan. 23, 2015] __ F. Supp. 34 __. (8.D. Ala. 2015). 1140460 court order previously entered in Strawser.? Because we find Judge Davis's concern to be without merit, and for the additional reasons discussed below, Judge Davis's motion for extension is denied, and he is added as a respondent to this mandamus proceeding and is enjoined from issuing any further marriage licenses contrary to Alabama law. Judge Davis asks for the 11-day extension to respond to this Court's question because he has asked for a "ruling* as to that question from the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Conmission (tthe are") : "As grounds for this Motion, Judge Davis sets out as follow: "2, Judge Davis has sought instruction today from the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Coumission. "3, Proper response to this Court is best made after [United States District Court] Judge Granade rules and/or after the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission rules." (amphasis added.) Our inguiry to Judge Davis was intended as a factual one. We fail to see what knowledge the JIC might have as to the facts regarding whether Judge Davis is bound by 2, "corrected" copy of Judge Davis's response has since been filed with this Cour. aaaoaso an order in any case other than Strawser v. Strange (Civil Action No. 14-0424-CG-C, Jan. 26, 2015), or the fact of what the gtrawser order says. As to the latter, the task of reading the order in Strawser and understanding what it says is the task of this court, not the JIC.” Judge Davis also notes that he has asked the federal district court "for a stay" of its order in Strawser. The fact of this request offers no basis for delay here; indeed, the prospect of such a stay by the federal court is compatible with the action of this Court. Further, Judge Davis has made no showing that the federal court order for which he seeks a stay is one that has not already been executed, i.e., one that concerns any license other than those already issued to the plaintiffs in that case. ‘The latter task is to read the Strawser order and to consider the import, if any, of that order as a decision by a court in a coordinate judicial system. The JIC is a tribunal commissioned solely for the investigation and prosecution of "complaints" against judges regarding violation of the Canons of Judicial mthics and the physical and mental ability of judges to perform their duties. Ala. Const. 1901, § 156. It is not a court of law, and it has no authority -- and no role in the performance by this Court of its nal duties as a court of law to decide the cases brought before it. 1140460 Our opinion of March 3 serves as binding statewide precedent. To ensure compliance with that precedent, we also entered on that date and as part of our opinion an order specifically directing Alabama probate judges not to issue marriage licenses contrary to that precedent. Davis has made no showing that he was, or is, the subject of any previously entered federal court order other than the one issued in Strawser, and he makes no showing that that order has any continuing, binding effect on him as to any marriage-license applicants beyond the four couples who were the plaintiffs in that case and who already have received the relief they requested. The inapplicability of the federal court order to any other couple is evident from the terms of the order itself: "probate Judge Don Davis is hereby ENJOINED from refusing to iseue marriage licenses to plaintiffs due to the Alabama laws which prohibit same-sex marriage. If Plaintiffe take all steps that are required in the normal course of business as a prerequisite to issuing a marriage license to opposite-sex couples, Judge Davis may not deny them a_license on the ground th intifts r same-sex Couples er because it is prohibited by the Sanctity of Marriage Amendment [, Ala. Const. 1901, § 36.03,] and the Alabama Marriage Protection Act [, Ala, Code 1975, § 30-1-19,] or by any other Alabama law or Order pertaining to same-sex marriage." 1140460 (capitalization in original; emphasis added.) In his motion, Judge Davis himself places emphasis on the same passages we have emphasized above, In the absence of a showing otherwise, we are left to read this language in accordance with its plain meaning: It grants injunctive relief against gudge Davis only as "to [the] plaintiffs" in Strawser. our reading of this plain language is confirmed by the fact that the plaintiffs in Strawser sought relief only on their own behalf, not on behalf of any others, and by the fact that federal jurisprudence contemplates that a federal court decides only the case before it, see Ex parte State ex rel. natitute, IMs. 1140460, March 3, 2015] So. 34, ___ (Part 11.¢.) (Ala. 2025),4 in turn binding the ‘as we noted in Part II.C., "'"[a] decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the game judge in a different case,"'*" So. 3d at (quoting Camreta v, Greene, U.S. H.7, 1318. GT 2020, 2033 n.7 (2021), quoting in turn i8 ¢. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 134.02(1] (dl, pp. 134-26 (3d ed. 2011)), much less upon'a defendant sued by new plaintiffs in a different case. The principle quoted above from the United States Supreme Court decision in Camreta was manifestly reflected in orders entered on this date by the United states istrict Court for the Middle District of Alabama, in which that court chose to stay its consideration of a case similar to Strawser and stated that "{tJhis court is not bound by Searcy.". Hard v, Bentley (Case No. 2:13-cv-00922-WKW; 5 1140460 parties before then only with respect to the other parties in the case.* Notwithstanding the plain description of the activity enjoined by the quoted language in the federal court order requiring Judge Davis to issue licenses "to [the] plaintiffs" in the Strawser case, dudge Davis questions whether the following language somehow was intended to enjoin him in relation to persons other than the four couples who sued and obtained a judgment against him for their personal benefit: March 10, 2015) (M.D. Ala.) °tn Brenner v. Scott (No. 4:14cvi07, Jan. 1, 2015) (N.D. Fla.), a case similar in many respects to the present one, the court explained that "[t]he Clerk has acknowledged that the preliminary injunction requires her to issue a marriage license to the two unmarried plaintiffs," but that, in "the absence of any request by any other plaintiff for a license," "(t}he preliminary injunction now in effect does not require the Clerk to issue licenses to other applicants." See also Vikram David Amar, Justia-Verdict, February 13, 2015; https: //verdict justia. com/2015/02/13/ just-lawless-alabama- state-court-judges-refusing-issue-sex-marriage-licenses (explaining that generally a federal district court can enjoin a defendant only with respect to the defendant's treatment of plaintiffs actually before the court and that the remedial limitation on federal district courts is defined by the identity of the plaintiffs, not just the identity of the defendants) (last visited March 10, 2015; a copy of the Web page containing this information is available in the case file of the clerk of the Alabama Supreme Court) 6 1140460 “This injunction binds Judge Don Davis and all his officers, agents, servants and employees, and others in active concert or participation with any of them, who would seek to enforce the marriage laws of Alabama which prohibit or fail to recognize same-sex marriage." ‘The apparent purpose of this latter passage was to clarity who is bound by the federal court's order, not what action that order requires of those persons. ‘The question of wwhat" is the subject of the clear statement in the previous paragraph quoted above, i.e., that the enjoined parties are directed to issue marriage licenses specifically “to [thel plaintiffs." The subsequent reference to persons who "would seek to enforce the marriage laws of Alabama" is in reference to Judge Davis and his agents, employees, etc., to the extent that they would seck to enforce the marriage laws of Alabaa as “to [the] plaintiffs.” We are further confirmed in our reading of the federal court's order by our understanding, as, discussed in notes 4 and 5, supra, that federal court jurisprudence contemplates that a federal district court adjudicates the obligations, if any, of a defendant or defendants only with respect to the plaintifé or plaintiffs in the case before the court. See also Meinhold v, United States Dep! fense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994) ("An 1140460 injunction ‘should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.’ califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99S. Ct. 2545, 2558, 61 L, Ra, 24176 (1979). ... This is not a class action, and Meinhold sought only to have his discharge voided and to be reinstated. ... Beyond reinstatement ..., DOD should not be constrained from applying its regulations to Meinhold and all other military personnel." (emphasis added)); Zepeda v, United States Inmig, & Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983) ("A federal court ... may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court."); Hollon v. Mathis Indep, Sch, Dist., 491 F.2d 92, 93 (sth Cir. 1974) (holding that "the injunction against the School District from enforcing its regulation against anyone other than [the plaintiff] reaches further than is necessary" (emphasis added) ). ‘As we explained in our March 3 opinion, this Court has acted to ensure statewide compliance with Alabama law in an orderly and uniform manner. We have before us in this case @ petitioner in the form of the State that has an interest in and standing as to the actions of every probate judge in the aas0aso State. Moreover, as we noted in the opinion, Alabama's probate judges took a variety of different positions in the wake of the federal district court's decisions, and no single circuit court has jurisdiction over all probate judges to enable it to address that disarray. The inclusion of oudge Davis, along with all the other probate judges in this state, as a respondent subject to this Court's March 3 order as to future margiage-License applicants is necessary and appropriate to the end of achieving order and uniformity in the application of Alabama's marriage laws. : Based on the foregoing, Judge Davis is added to this mandamus proceeding as a respondent and is subject to this court's order of March 3, 2015. Section 30-1-9, Ala. Code 1975, provides that gudge Davis "may" issue "marriage licenses." To the extent he exercises this authority, he must issue those licenses in accordance with the meaning of the term "marriage" in that Code section and in accordance with other provisions of Alabama law, as discussed in our March 3 opinion. Murdock, Main, Wise, and Bryan, dissents 1140460 SHAW, Justice (dissenting) As explained in my dissent in Ex parte State ex re. Ali 2 , (Ms. 1140460, March 3, 2015) So. 3d __, ___ (Ala. 2015), I do not believe that this Court has jurisdiction in this case; therefore, I dissent. a
5c825c09e40b29d15c56a1b425aac1801964b07fe0ff0ce7c2c30875f7da1706
2015-03-10T00:00:00Z
6e438a17-bd5a-4380-91b0-a765623039da
Korte v. Betsey Bayless, ...Preserve Arizona -- Yes on Proposition 100 Committee... (Supreme Court Order)
null
CV-00-0308-AP/EL
arizona
Arizona Supreme Court
FILED ‘AUG 3 1 2000 SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA VIRGINIA KORTE; CARLA, Arizona Supreme Court No. CV-00-0308-AP/EL Plaintiffs/Appeliees, Maricopa County Superior court No. cv 2000-01435 BETSEY BAYLESS, Secretary of State for the State of Arizona, Defendant, PRESERVE ARTZONA--YES ON PROPOSITION 100 COMMITTEE, RUTH HAMILTON, Chairwoman, Defendant /Appeliant. ORDER > ) ) ) > ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) i ) ) ‘The court having considered this expedited appeal, IT 18 ORDERED vacating and reversing the judgment of the trial court entered on August 14, 2000. A formal opinion of the court will follow in due course DATED this lst day of August, 2000. THOMAS A. Chief Justice Supreme Court No. CV-00-0308-AP/EL Page 2 of 2 To: Andrew § Gordon, Esq., Coppersmith & Gordon PLC ‘Timothy J Casey, Esq., Snell & Wilmer LLP Hon. Janet A Napolitano, Arizona Attorney General Hon. Joseph A Kanefield, Esq., W Scott Bales, Esq. Jack Pfister John # Lundin, Esq., Jeffrey D Gross, Esq., John D DiTullio, Esq, Gallagher @ Kennedy Hon Susan R Bolton, Maricopa County Superior Court Hon Colin F Campbell, Presiding Judge, Maricopa County Superior Court Michael K Jeanes, Clerk, Maricopa County Superior Court, Central Court Building ame
e5f34f2e1b4be23a967b01163955b0a4d64e39b2f1d1c38bd821f3221b173485
2000-08-31T00:00:00Z
77f5a6e2-0631-40ee-977a-9a87e97d7dcd
MARK V. SCHEEHLE v JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT et al
null
CV-04-0103-CQ
arizona
Arizona Supreme Court
SUPREME COURT OF ARTZONA MARK V. SCHEEHLE, Arizona Supreme Court No, CV=04-0103-co Plaintife, United states District court No. CIV-98-1095-PHx-siat QUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA: STANLEY G. FELDMAN, CHARLES = JONES, FREDERICK J. MARTONE, RUTH V. MCGREGOR, and THOMAS A. 2UAKET; JUDGES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, IN_AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA: MICHAEL R. MoVEY, ROBERT D. MYERS, JONATHAN H. SCHWARTZ and CHRISTOPHER M SKELLY, oprNnron Defendants. Certified Question from the United states District Court for the District of Arizona ‘The Honorable Stephen M. McNamee, Chief Judge QUESTION ANSWERED MARK V. SCHEEHLE Fountain Hills Plaintiff Pro Se TERRY GODDARD, ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix sy Paula S. Bickett, Chief Counsel, Civil Appeals Attorneys for Defendants SNOW, tude a ‘The United States District Court for the District of Arizona has asked us whether this Court ‘can promulgate court rules mandating experienced attorneys to serve as arbitrators in light of the statutory language of Arizona Revised statutes (*A.R.S.") section 12-133 (2000) authorizing only voluntary service?" We h Jurisdiction to decide the certified question pursuant to A.R.S § 12-1861 (2001) .* 2 We hold that this Court has authority to promulgate a court rule authorizing the superior courts in each county of this state to require active members of the state bar to provide limited service as arbitrators, We further hold that the exercise of that authority is neither constricted by, nor inconsistent with, A.R.S. 12-133. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY x3 In 1971, the legislature passed a statute permitting the superior courts to implement by court rule non-binding mandatory arbitration programs. The statute assigned to the courts the responsibility for appointing arbitrators in such cases and further specified that courts opting to create a mandatory arbitration Program ‘shall maintain a list of qualified persons within its jurisdiction who have agreed to serve as arbitrators, subject to the right of each person to refuse to serve in a particular The district court also requested that we determine whether the Maricopa County Superior Court had authority under A.R.S. § 12-133 to promulgate a program mandating experienced attorneys to serve as arbitrators. Because, as we explain in this opinion, the Supreme Court Rule explicitly authorizes the superior court to include active members of the Arizona bar on its list of eligible arbitrators, this question is not presented by the facts of this case. We thus decline to answer it. 2 assigned case.*? 1971 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 142, § 1 (current version codified at A.R.S. § 12-133(C) (2003)). The legislature has amended the statute several times, to raise the mandatory arbitration limits and to require, as opposed to merely permit, superior courts to create mandatory arbitration programs, among other reasons. See, e.g., 1978 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 35, § 1; 1984 Ariz. Seas. Laws, ch. 53, § 1; 1986 Ariz. Seas. Lawa, ch. 360, § 1; 1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 110, § 1; 1992 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 9, $2) 2000 Ariz. Seas. Laws, ch. 35, § 1. ry In 1974, this Court promulgated the Uniform Rules of Procedure for Arbitration. Rule 1 indicated that the Uniform Rules were for those superior courts that implemented a mandatory arbitration program under A.R.S. § 12-133, and further directed the superior courts how to enact rules for such programs. Rule 2 specified how arbitrators would be appointed. That rule provided that if the parties could not stipulate to an arbitrator, the court would, through a randon selection procedure, appoint an arbitrator froma list. The list would be comprised of ‘members of the Bar of the State of Arizona residing within the County in which the Court is located." Unif. R.P. Arb. 2(b) (1980). The rule allowed * the statute also provided that an arbitrator be paid fifty dollars per day for conducting an arbitration hearing. The statute has since been amended to raise the payment to seventy-five dollars per day. A.R.S. § 12-133(6) This rule and its successor, Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 73, have been modified several tines. Rule 73 currently 3 attorneys to remove their names from the list and also allowed then to refuse to serve if appointed as an arbitrator. 5 In 1984, pursuant to the rule and the statute, Maricopa County added a local rule implementing the mandatory arbitration program.* x6 In 1986, the legislature amended the statute to require, 8 opposed to merely permit, superior courts to implement mandatory arbitration programs by rule. in 1989 and 1990, the State Bar of Arizona, the Maricopa County Superior Court, and other attorneys, judges, and court administrators, petitioned this Court to remove the provisions from Rule 2 allowing attorneys to opt out of arbitration service absent good cause. In response, we adopted four changes to Rule 2. First, we omitted the provisions allowing practicing attorneys to renove their names from the list of Potential arbitrators. Second, we specified the reasons that would permit an arbitrator to be excused from service. Third, we added @ provision allowing an attorney who “has served as an Arbitrator provides that ‘all residents of the county in which the court is located, who, for at least four years, have been active members of. the State Bar of Arizona” may be placed on a county's list of eligible arbitrators. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 73(b) (1). Tt also permits the superior court to place on this list other lawyers of any bar. both active and inactive, who “have agreed to serve as arbitrators in the county where the action is pending.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 73(b) (2). <The Maricopa County Superior Court initially set the mandatory arbitration threshold at $15,000. Ariz. Local R. Prac. Super. Ct. (Maricopa) 3.10 (1984), In 1994 it adopted the $50,000 maximum threshold authorized by A.R.S. § 12-133. Pursuant to these Rules for two or more days during the current year to be excused." Unif, R.P. Arb. 2(e)(3) (1992). Fourth, we ‘added a comment to the rule confirming that "[i]t is the obligation of all qualified lawyers to serve as Arbitrators and only exceptional circumstances should justify removal from the list.* Unit. R.P, Arb. 2 emt, (1992). Im 2000, the Uniform Rules for Arbitration were incorporated into the Arizona Rules of civil Procedure as Rules 72-76. Rules 1 and 2 of the Uniform Rules are how renumbered respectively as Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 72 and 73.° 0 In this case, attorney Mark V. Scheehle challenges the provision of Rule 73 authorizing the Maricopa County Superior Court to include him on its list of eligible arbitrators without his consent. Scheehle’s federal court complaint alleged that mule 73 violated a number of his federal constitutional rights. scheehle also raised a pendent state law claim that Rule 73 was invalid because it compelled him to serve as an arbitrator, whereas A.R.S. § 12-133 authorized the appointment only of arbitrators who had agreed to serve. 5 In 2000, this provision was amended to excuse an appointed arbitrator who had “completed contested hearings and ruled as an arbitrator . . . in two or more cases assigned during the calendar year.* Ariz. R. Civ. P. 73(e) (3). ‘The balance of this opinion will refer to these rules as they are currently codified in the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. x8 The district court granted summary judgment a Scheehle on his federal civil rights claims. It then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law clains after resolution of all the federal questions and accordingly dismissed the state law claims. The Ninth Circuit initially affirmed the decision, Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 257 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir, 2001), but then withdrew that opinion. Scheehle v. Justices of the Suprene Court, 269 P34 1127 (9th Cir. 2001). It then certified a question to this Court asking whether A.R.S. § 12- 133 mandated compulsory participation of attorneys as arbitrators ry This Court, addressing only that very limited question, held that A.R.S. § 12-133 does not require that lawyers serve as arbitrators. Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 203 Ariz. 520, $22, 4 6, 57 P.34 379, 381 (2002). after our decision, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further consideration. Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 315 F.3d 3191 (9th cir. 2003). mo Upon remand, the district court again reaffirmed its rejection of Scheehle’s federal constitutional arguments and dismissed them from this case mi In the same order, the district court certified the following question to this Court: Whether the Arizona Supreme Court under its exclusive constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law can promulgate court rules 6 mandating experienced attorneys to serve as arbitrators in light of the statutory language of A.R.S. § 12-133 authorizing only voluntary The district court stayed all further consideration as to Scheehle’s state law claim pending the anewer to its certified question.” ANALYSIS uz In his briefing on the certified question, Scheehle makes three alternative arguments. First, Scheehle argues that Rule 73 violates the Takings Clause, U.S. Const. amend, V, and the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Second, he argues that Rule 73 impermissibly conflicts with the legislation authorizing the mandatory arbitration program. Third, he asserts that this Court’s power to regulate the practice of law does not extend to compelling attorneys to serve as arbitrators. we analyze each argument in turn, The District Court Was Already Decided scheehi Federal Law Claims. m3 Scheehle acknowledges that the district court has already dismissed his federal constitutional claims, But he nonetheless asserts that it would be improper for this Court “to answer the Upon certification, Scheehle objected to the participation of Justices McGregor, Berch, Ryan, and Murwitz in answering the certified questions because they are defendants in the underlying federal court complaint. We considered and rejected Scheehle’s objections in a previous order that is appended to thi decision and incorporated herein. 7 certified questions, when the district court seeks answers from this Court devoid of any analysis of the impact of the Constitution of the United States on such state law authority.” We disagree 4 It is not the role of this Court in responding to a certified question of state law to review the federal law rulings of the certifying federal court. The authority pursuant to which we respond to the district court's questions permits us to answer only questions of state law. A.R.S. § 12-1861 (The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it . . . if there are involved in any proceedings before the certifying court questions of the law of this state which may be determinative of the cause"). This opinion is thus limited to the question certified: Does this Court have authority under state law to promulgate the rules at issue and, if it does, is that authority limited by the provisions of A.R.S. § 12-1337 Rule 73 Does Not Conflict with A.R.S. § 12-133, ms Scheehle next contends that A.R.S. § 12-133(c), by requiring each superior court to “naintain a list of qualified persons within its jurisdiction who have agreed to serve as arbitrators," limits the court to appointing arbitrators from that List. A.R.S. § 12-133(c). We disagree. wus In interpreting a statute, we “try to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent.” Hayes v. Cont’l Ing. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 268, 872 P.2d 668, 672 (1994). T£ we cannot do so by looking at the plain language of the statute, “we consider the statute’s context; its language, subject matter, and historical background; its effects and consequences; and ite spirit and purpose." Id. We also avoid interpretations that unnece: ily implicate constitutional concerns. In re Shannon, 179 Ariz. 52, 78, 876 P.2d 548, 574 (1994) (opting for statutory interpretation that does not limit this court in interpreting range of sanctions it could impose on attorneys so as not to implicate constitutional concerns); Hayes, 178 Ariz. at 273, 872 P.2a at 677. 7 The language upon which Scheehle relies has been in A.R.S. § 12-133 since its adoption in 1971. ‘The full text of the relevant provision states: ‘The court shall maintain a list of qualified persons within its jurisdiction who have agreed to serve as arbitrators, subject to the right of each person to refuse to serve in a particular assigned case and subject further to the right of any party to show good cause why an appointed arbitrator should Rot serve in a particular assigned case. ‘The court rules shall provide that the case Subject to arbitration shall be assigned for hearing to a panel of three arbitrators, or in the alternative, to a single arbitrator, each of whom shall be selected by the court. ALRS. § 12-133(¢). us Scheehle argues that under this statute the list of voluntary arbitrators is the only source from which the superior court may appoint arbitrators. Nowhere, however, does the statute say so. Rather, the plain text of the statute vests in the superior court the authority, without limit, to select each arbitrator. “The court rules shall provide that the ca: subject to arbitration shall be assigned . . . to [an arbitrator or arbitrators] . . . each of whom shall be selected by the court.* ALR.S. § 12-233(¢) m9 While implying a limitation not explicitly stated in a statute may be appropriate in some circumstances, it is not in this case for several reasons. First, the legislature has been aware since 1974 that this Court, by rule, authorized superior courts to Place active members of the bar on their lists of eligible arbitrators. After we promulgated the rule, the legislature repeatedly amended the statute, but never indicated that the court could appoint only arbitrators who volunteered. we, therefore presume that the legislature approved of the rule’s operation. as we have said in the context of statutory interpretation: it is universally the rule that where a statute which has been construed by a court of last resort is reenacted in the same or Substantially the same terms, the legislature is presumed to have placed its approval on the judicial interpretation given and to have adopted such construction and made it part of the reenacted statute. State v. Superior Court of Pima County, 104 Ariz. 440, 442, 454 P.2d 982, 984 (1969) (quoting Madrigal v. indus. Comm'n, 69 Ariz 338, 142, 210 P.24 967, 971 (1949)). 20 After this Court promulgated the rule authorizing superior courts to appoint active members of the bar as 10 arbitrators, the legislature amended the statute both to increas the jurisdictional limit on cases that must be referred to mandatory arbitration and to require, as opposed to merely authorize, each superior court to adopt a mandatory arbitration Program. In doing so the legislature mist have anticipated a corresponding increase in the demand for arbitrators. Yet it made no provision for additional arbitrators. We therefore presume that the legislature relied on this Court's rule authorizing the service of the members of the bar as arbitrators to meet that demand, 21 Second, nothing in the statute seeks to regulate attorneys. To imply in the statute a limitation on the court's power of appointment would limit not only a superior court's power to appoint arbitrators but also the scope of this Court's power to require bar menbers to assist in the administration of justice by authorizing superior courts, on a limited basis, to appoint menbers of the bar as arbitrators. We do not interpret a statute as intending to limit the court's ability to otherwise act unless the legislature explicitly indicates such an intent. Hayes, 178 ariz. at 273, 872 P.2d at 677. None is evident here s22 As Scheehle acknowledges, this Court has exclusive authority over the regulation of attorneys. “[T]he practice of law is a matter exclusively within the authority of the Judiciary. The determination of who shall practice law in Arizona and under what condition is a function placed by the state constitution in this un court." Hunt v, Maricopa County Employees Merit Sys. Comm'n, 127 Ariz. 259, 261-62, 619 P.24 1036, 1038-39 (1980). 23 This Court fulfills the administrative responsibilities assigned to it under the constitution by, among other methods, promulgating rules. Those rules are distinct from those enacted by state administrative agenci Pursuant to legislation. when this Court promulgates rules pertaining to attorneys or to court Procedures, it does so pursuant to its own constitutional authority over the bench, the bar, and the procedures pertaining to them. Heat Pump Equip. Co. v. Glen Alden Corp., 93 Ariz. 361, 363, 380 P.2d 1036, 1017 (1963) (stating that courts have constitutional Power to promulgate rules on judicial matters); Burney v. Lee, 59 Ariz. 360, 363, 129 P.2a 308, 309 (1942) (courts have power to promulgate rules to fulfill constitutional mandates). 24 Such rules are valid even if they are not completely cohesive with related legislation, so long as they are an appropriate exercise of the court’s constitutional authority. Although the legislature may, by statute, regulate the practice of Jaw, such regulation cannot be inconsistent with the mandates of this Court. Creasy, 198 Ariz. at 544, 4 18, 12 P.3d at 219 * Since the early days of statehood, we have recognized that our constitution gives authority to this Court to regulate the Practice of law. See, e.g., State Bar of Ariz. v. Ariz. Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961); In re Miller, 29 Ariz. 582, 244 P. 376 (1926); In re Bailey, 30 Ariz, 407, 248 P. 29 (2326). 12 (stating that legislature cannot authorize by statute activity that would result in the unauthorized practice of law because a court rule governing the practice of law “trumps statutory law"); see also Ariz. Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. at 95, 366 P.2d at 14 (although the legislature may impose additional restrictions which affect the licensing of attorneys, it cannot infringe on the ultimate power of the courts to determine who may practice law") (citing In re Greer, 52 Ariz. 385, 389-90, 81 P.24 96, 98 (1938); Conway, 60 Ariz. at 81, 132 P.2d at 988 (*When, however[,) it appears that the legislative rule unduly hampers the court in the @uties imposed upon it by the Constitution, the rule adopted by the court will prevaii.*). ss We are reluctant to imply a statutory limitation that would create a conflict in the constitutional prerogatives of Separate branches of Arizona government. Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 78, 876 F.2d at 574; Hayes, 178 Ariz. at 273, 872 2.24 at 677. Scheehle’s proposed interpretation would unnecessarily create such a conflict. $26 We therefore hold that A.R.S, § 12-133 does not limit the courts right to appoint persons other than volunteers to serve as arbitrators B This Court’s Responsibility to Administer an Integrated Judicial system Gives it Authority to Promilgate Rules Requiring Limited Service by Attorneys to the Judiciary. 27 Scheehle finally argues that the power to regulate the practice of law does not permit this Court to oblige attorneys to serve as court-appointed arbitrators because appointing such arbitrators “is not a function of regulating the practice of law.* This argument reflects a misunderstanding of the constitutional basis from which this Court derives its power to regulate the Practice of law.’ This Court's power to regulate the practice of law is a function of its responsibility to administer an integrated judiciary. The power to administer the judicial branch allows this Court to regulate the practice of law to further the administration of justice. x28 Article 6, section 1 of our constitution vests the judicial power "in an integrated judicial department,” which includes a11 of the courts of this state. Because “the practice of law is so intimately connected and hound up with the exercise of judicial power in the administration of justice . . . the right to ° Wholly apart from the power to regulate the bar given by our state constitution to the judiciary, extensive authority supports the inherent authority of the courts to regulate the practice of law. Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 75, 876 P.2d at 571 (*the judiciary’s authority to regulate and control the practice of law is universally accepted and dates back to the year 1292."); Bridegroom v. State Bar, 27 Ariz. App. 47, 49, 550 P.2d 1089, i091 (2976) (“There is no question but that the Supreme Court has inherent power to integrate the bar of this state.*) (citations omitted) . a4 define and regulate its practice naturally and logically belongs to the judicial department.* Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 76, 876 P.24 at 572 (quoting In re Integration of Neb. state Bar Ass'n, 275 N.W. 265, 268 (1937)). m9 Consequently, the Arizona Constitution's creation of an integrated judiciary gives to this Court the power not just to Fegulate all courts but also to regulate the practice of law. Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 76, 876 P.2d at 572; see also Creasy, 198 Ariz. at $41, 97, 12 P.3d at 216 (“The court’s authority over the practice of law is also based on the creation of an integrated judicial department and the revisory jurisdiction of this court as Provided in article VI sections 1 and 5(4) of the arizona Constitution. *); In re Smith, 189 Ariz. 144, 146, 939 2.24 422, 424 (2997) (The State Bar exists only by virtue of this court’s rules, adopted under authority of article III and article VI, §§ 1 and 5 of the Arizona Constitution.) . 30 The constitution’s mandate in article 6, section 3 that this Court shall have ‘administrative supervision” over the courts of this state enables this Court to supervise judicial officers, including attorneys. “Administrative supervision contemplates managing the conduct of court personnel. . . . attorneys are universally recognized as ‘officers of the court,’ . . . and officers of the court, attorneys are amenable to the court as their Superior.* Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 76-77, 876 P.2d at 573 (citations 15 omitted); Bailey, 30 Ariz. at 412, 248 P, at 30 (quoting In re Splane, 16 A. 421 (Pa. 1899)) (*The attorney is an officer of the court, and is brought into close and intimate relations with the court.*) 31 By virtue of our constitutional power over attorneys ai officers of the court, this Court created the State Bar of Arizona. Ariz. R. Sup, Ct. 32(a)(1). We require those practicing law in this state to be members of this bar. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 31. As officers of the court, State Bar members are invested with significant rights and responsibilities. As the United states Supreme Court has observed: As an officer of the court, a menber of the bar enjoys singular powers that others do not possess; by virtue of admission, members of the bar share a kind of monopoly granted only to lawyers. Admission creates a license not only to advise and counsel clients but to appear in court and try cases; as an officer Of the court, a lawyer can cause persons to drop their private affairs and be called as witnesses in court, and for depositions and other pretrial processes that, while subject to the ultimate control of the court, may be conducted outside courtrooms. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644 (1985). Attorneys are invested with these powers because they have an individual and collective role in achieving “(t]he primary duty of courts (which) is the Proper and efficient administration of justice.* Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 76, 876 P.2d at 572 (quoting In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass‘n, 275 N.W. at 268) 16 32 Contrary to Scheehle’s argument, this Court’s exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law is therefore not independent from its responsibility to supervise an integrated judiciary, Tt is derived from that very power. The power extended to this Court by the constitution includes the authority to Promilgate regulations assigning limited quasi-judicial functions to lawyers as judicial officer 23 Scheehle cites Schware v. Board of Examiners of the State of New Mexico, 363 U.S. 232, 239 (1957), and its progeny, for the Proposition that any qualification a state places on the entry to the practice of law ‘mist have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law.* The obligation to perform limited service as an arbitrator, however, is not a restriction placed on the entry to the practice of law in this state. Rather it is a uniform regulation requiring limited service to the judiciary for those already admitted to practice relating to their roles as officers of that judiciary. 4 A state may engage in reasonable regulation of licensed professionals. See, e.g., Lupert v. Cal. State Bar, 761 F.24 1325, 3328 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical, 342 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955)); Watson v. Md., 218 U.S. 173, 177 (1910); se0 also Ohralik v. Ohio state Bar Ase’n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978). Our precedents involving attorney regulation underscore this point. 25 For example, this Court has rejected a challenge to its uv constitutional authority to require annual continuing legal education ("CLE") as a condition of continued practice. smith, 189 Ariz. at 146, 939 P.2d at 424; Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 45. Compliance with the mandatory CLE rule generally requires not only that an attorney spend unreimbursed time attending the courses but also that the lewyer pay for the course. Nevertheless, we rejected a constitutional challenge to such a rule because, like the requirement to provide limited arbitration services to benefit the Judiciary, “auch requirements . . . are rationally related to the court’s obligation to serve the public interest.* zd. 36 An attorney's right “to pursue a profession is subject to the paramount right of the state . . . to regulate . professions . . . to protect the public . . . welfare." Cohen v. State, 121 Ariz. 6, 10, 588 P.2d 299, 303 (2978) (citing Ariz. state ‘Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Hyder, 114 Ariz. 544, 546, 562 P.24 727, 719 (1977)). In addition to exacting time and money to meet the continuing standards necessary to retain a license, the state may exact @ reasonable consideration from those who are engaged in a profession that it regulates. Duncan v. Truman, 74 Ariz. 328, 332, 248 P.24 879, 883 (1952) (*[A] ‘License’ is a ‘permit, granted by the sovereign, generally for a consideration . . . to a person, firm, or corporation to pursue some occupation or to carry on sone business subject to regulation ) (quoting State Bd. of Barber sxam‘rs v. Walker, 67 Ariz, 156, 167, 192 P.2d 723, 730 (2948)) 18 (emphasis added). that consideration need not be exclusively monetary, but can also be in the form of limited service to the bench, bar, or community 337 Scheehle, citing zarabia v. aradshaw, 185 Ariz. 1, 912 P.2d 5 (1996), argues that whatever this Court's authority to tion in compel service from attorneys without adequate compen: individual cas + it has no authority to enact rules that systematically deprive attorneys of their time, no matter how small the deprivation. We do not so read Zarabia. 38 Jn Zarabia, attorneys and defendants challenged Yuna County's procedures for providing criminal representation to indigent defendants. 185 Ariz. at 2, 912 P.2d at 6. At the tine, Yuma County had no public defender’s office and provided representation to indigent defendants in criminal cases through a mix of contract attorneys and attorneys appointed from the private bar. Id. The private practitioners were appointed on a rotational basis and were obliged to provide the representation regardless of experience or expertise. These lawyers were reimbursed “a total of $375 for up to twenty hours’ work on a case ($17.50 per hour), and $50 an hour if more than twenty hours [were] required to complete the representation.” Id. at 3, 912 P.2d at 7. x9 In reviewing that appointment system, we decided no constitutional questions. Rather we held that the system violated both A.R.S. § 13-4013, which requires that an attorney receive a3 *reasonable* compensation when appointed to represent an indigent criminal defendant, and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.5(C), which requires that in appointing an attorney to represent a Gefendant in a criminal matter the court take “into account the skill Likely to be required in handling a particular case.” Zarabia, 185 Ariz. at 3, 912 P.2d at 7 40 We expressly recognized in zarabia, however, that the court has authority to require a lawyer's services, even on a pro bono basis, to assist in the administration of justice. ~{NJothing we say here should be interpreted as limiting a judge's inherent authority to achieve justice by appointing a particular lawyer to represent a [party] in a particular case, even if the appointment is pro bono or causes financial hardship to the appointed lawyer.” Id, at 4, 912 P.2d at 8. We thus confirmed, as have other courts, the ability of a court to require attorneys, by virtue of their effice, to provide pro bono publico service in certain circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.24 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Courts have long recognized that attorneys, because of their profession, owe some duty to the court and to the public to serve without compensation when called on... . This duty of public service is a condition of Practicing law, and constitutes neither a taking under the fifth amendment, nor involuntary servitude under the thirteenth amendment.) (citations omitted): see algo United States v. Dillon, 20 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965) (the state can condition a lawyer‘s ability to practice law upon the acceptance of certain responsibilities in the furtherance of the administration of justice) wat Stressing that such power was limited, however, we remarked upon the difference between “requiring @ lawyer to handle one case or @ few and conscripting lawyers to handle “all cases regardless of their ability or willingness to do so." Zarabia, 185 Ariz. at 4, 912 P.2d at 8, We therefore noted that “{w)hatever appointment process a court adopts should reflect the principle that lawyers have the right to refuse to be drafted on a systematic basis and put to work at any price to satisfy a county's obligation vo provide counsel to indigent defendants.* rd. 42 Contrary to the appointment system in Zarabia, which was neither quantitatively nor qualitatively limited, the system authorized by Rule 73 contains several inherent limitations. First, Rule 73 does not, in and of itself, compel a lawyer to be an arbitrator. It merely authorizes superior courts to place attorneys on a list of eligible arbitrators. thus, presumably, if sufficient volunteers exist in a particular county to meet that county’s need for arbitrators, that county’s superior court need not place eligible members of the state bar on the list of persons eligible for appointment. 43 Second, Rule 73 provides for random appointment of au arbitrators from the list. Thus, placement on the list does not necessarily result in service as an arbitrator in any given year. m4 Third, when a lawyer is randomly selected to serve, Rule 73 explicitly limits the extent of that service, Under Rule 73, an attorney cannot be compelled to accept arbitrations in any year in which the attorney has already held hearings and ruled on two matters. According to Schechie’s own affidavit, service as an arbitrator typically requires only four to eight hours of his time Because Schechle and imposes only minor out-of-pocket expen was asked to serve twice in 1997, he would have provided no more than sixteen hours of arbitration service in that year. this simply does not constitute the systematic deprivation condemned in zarabia. sas Citing Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 1966), Scheehle also argues that this Court cannot condition his practice of law on the deprivation of his constitutional rights. The district court, however, has already determined that no such rights were infringed upon here. “When the annual time an attorney might be required to serve as an arbitrator is combined with the fifteen hours of continuing legal education an attorney is obliged to obtain, it is still well within the range of training hours required by state administrative agencies from other professionals. See, @.9., A.A.C. R4-1-453(D) (requiring accountants to obtain between sixty and eighty hours of continuing education every two years); ALAC, R4-26-207 (requiring psychologists to obtain sixty hours every <wo years); A.A.C. R4-11-1203 (requiring dentists to obtain seventy-two hours every three years); A.A.C. R4-16-101 (requiring physicians co obtain forty hours every two years). 22 conctusroN a6 We therefore answer the Certified Question as follows This Court has the constitutional authority to require active menbers of the state bar to serve as arbitrators pursuant to Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 73. Further, A.R.S. § 12-133 does not restrict this Court’s authority to promulgate that rule. G Murray Snow, Juage™ Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice Rebecca white Berch, Vice Chief Justice Michael D. Ryan, Justice Rndrew D. Hurwitz, Justice ‘The Honorable Charles E. Jones recused himself; pursuant to Article 6, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable G. Murray Snow, Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division One, was designated to sit in his stead. 23 SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA MARK V. SCHEBHLE, Arizona Supreme Court No. CV-04-0103-cQ Plaintite, United States District court No. CV-98-1095-PHX-siat QUSTICES OF THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA: STANLEY G. FELDMAN, CHARLES E. JONES, FREDERICK J. MARTONE, RUTH V. MCGREGOR, and THOMAS A. ZLAKET; JUDGES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA: MICHAEL R. MevEY, ROBERT D. MYERS, JONATHAN H. SCHWARTZ and CHRISTOPHER M. SKELLY, ORDER Defendants. When this Court accepted questions certified to it by the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, chief Justice Jones recused himself, Thereafter, the Plaintiff in the underlying federal action, Mark V. Scheehle, filed with this Court an “Objection to Defendants in Plaintiff’s Federal Action Participating in the Adjudication of the Questions Certified to this Court by the District Court." In it, ur. Scheehle argues that the remaining four permanent members of this Court, gustices MeGregor, Berch, Ryan, and Hurwitz, are disqualified from answering the certified questions. We here decide that objection. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ‘The Maricopa County Superior Court assessed a $900 fine against ur. Scheehle for his refusal to accept assignment as an arbitrator pursuant to court rules that require Arizona attorneys with more than five years’ of experience to serve as arbitrators in matters in which a Limited damage amount is at issue. Mr. Scheehle filed a special action in this Court challenging the fine and the right of the superior court to require his service as an arbitrator. This Court declined to exercise its special action jurisdiction. Thereafter, instead of seeking appellate review of the fine, Mr. Scheehle filed a civil rights complaint in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) Im his First Amended Complaint in the federal action, Mr. Scheehle named a number of defendants. Among them he named che superior court judge who had assessed the fine, several other judges of the superior court who enforced the arbitration program, the Maricopa County Superior Court, and “the Justices of the Arizona Supreme Court, Stanley G. Feldman, Charles =. Jones, Frederick J. Martone, Ruth V. McGregor, and Thomas A. Zlaket.* Although Mr. Scheehle sued all of the judyes individually, he specified that the action was brought against them in their official capacities. Thus, he alleged, they were not immune from his federal civil rights action. In the federal complaint, Mr, Scheehle attacked the arbitration program on both constitutional and state law grounds. He asked for declaratory relief establishing that the Arizona statute and court rule implementing the program are unconstitutional. He also sought injunctive relief ordering the Maricopa County Superior Court to remove his name from the list of arbitrators and enjoining the court from enforcing the $900 sanction entered against him. He finally requested that he be awarded costs and his co-counsel’s reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).! The district court entered summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on all of Mr. Scheehle’s § 1963 claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the State law claims. The Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 257 F.34 1082 (9th Cir. 2001), but later withdrew the opinion. Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme court, 269 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit then certified a 2 Of course “[sJuits brought against individual officers for injunctive relief are for all practical purposes suits against. the State itself. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 700 (1978). The public officials sued are not personally liable for any attorneys" fees that might be awarded. Id.; see also Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d. 201, 213 (Sth Cir. 1990) (“Any such [attorneys’ fees) award, however, must be paid by the state and cannot be assessed against the defendants in their individual capacity, as the injunctive relief sought and won by Scott can be obtained from the defendants, only in their official capacity as commissioners."); Echols v. Parker, 909 P.2d 795, 800 (Sth Cir. 1990) (concluding State liable for attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 when county prosecutor, district attorney, and justice court judge were sued in Official capacities as enforcing agente of an unconstitutional statute) question to our Court asking whether Arizona Revised statutes (A.R.S.") section 12-133 (Supp. 2001) authorized a system of compulsory participation of attorneys in the mandatory arbitration system, Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 203 Ariz. 520, 521, 4 1, $7 P.34 379, 380 (2002), After accepting jurisdiction of the certified question, all justices named in the complaint recused themselves. ‘Their positions on this Court were filled for purposes of responding to the certified question by four judges from the Court of Appeals and @ judge from the Yuma County Superior Court.! This court then Fesponded that A.R.S. § 12-133 does not authorize the creation of an arbitration system mandating lawyer participation. rd. at 522, 416, 57 P.3d at 381, The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case to the district court for further consideration in light of our answer. Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 315 F.3d 1191 (seh cir. 2003). After remand, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1861 (2003), the Gistrict court certified the following state law question to this court: ‘These judges were the Honorable Edward C. Voss, Susan A. Ehrlich, John C. Genmill, and Jefferson L. Lankford, of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division one, and the Honorable Tom C. Cole, Presiding Judge of the Yuna County Superior Court. Scheehle, 203 Ariz. at 523 n.2, $7 P.2d at 382. 4 Whether the Arizona Supreme Court under ite exclusive constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law can promulgate court rule: mandating experienced attorneys to serve as arbitrators in light of the statutory language of A.R.S. § 12-133 authorizing only voluntary service? Tf the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, then the district court aleo requests that we answer the following question: Whether the Maricopa County Superior court, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-133, has authority independent from the Arizona Supreme Court, to promulgate a program mandating experienced attorneys to serve as arbitrators in light of statutory language that the superior courts ‘shall maintain a list of qualified persons . who have agreed to serve?" The district court stayed all further consideration of Mr. Scheehle’s state law claim pending the answer to these questions. After the district court certified the questions to thie Court, and before filing his objection, Mr. Scheehle filed with the district court a “Motion to Tdentify for the Record and to Notify the Arizona Supreme Court of Current Defendants and Counsel." in that motion, Mr. Scheehle noted that the caption on the action reflected the nai of the individual defendants against whom he had originally brought suit, but who had left office since that time. He requested that the court update the caption and inform the individual menbers of this court that, pursuant to the operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they were automatically substituted as defendants in this action Mr. Scheehle noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a) provides that a public official sued in an official capacity is automatically replaced as a defendant in any action by his successor in office In denying Mr. Scheehie’s motion to amend the caption, the district court acknowledged that becaui Mr. Scheehie only brought suit againat the original defendants in their official capacities, the federal rule automatically substituted their successors as defendants in this case. Nevertheless it denied ur. Scheehle’s request to anend the caption because, given the length of the case and the number of officials originally named, there would be many such substitutions, and it is clear from the record that all current defendants were avare of their status as defendants in the action. Two weeks after this order was entered, Mr. Schechle filed his objection to the four justices answering the certified question. We treat it as a motion to disquality. ANALYSIS Im his objection, Mr. Scheehle asserts that the participation of the permanent members of this Court in this case ® Mr. Scheehle also filed documente in this Court in which he apparently requested that this Court update the caption. The questions certified to us are certified from the case in which they arose. We have no authority to alter the district court’s caption. is prohibited by two of the rules set forth in Canon 3(B) of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct. He alleges that the justices are Gisqualified from hearing the case because they are parties to it and are thus interested in it. Model Code of Jud. Conduct Canon 3(B) (1) (4) (4. He also alleges that they are biased and prejudiced with respect to the case, rd. at 3(E)(1) (a). In addition to these reasons, Mr. Schechle asserts several other reasons for Aisqualification that are not related to the Code of Judicial Conduct. We examine each in turn. The Code of Judicial conduct Justices as Parti to the Proceeding Canon 3(B) (1) (a) (i) requires a judge to ‘disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which . . . (a) the judge (4) is a party to the proceeding. Mr. Scheehle argues that this canon admits of no exceptions and that if a judge is named as @ defendant in an action, the judge is disqualified from hearing it. Although we have no doubt that the canon requires such a result in the general run of cases, Mr. Scheehle is incorrect that it admits of no exceptions. This Court, in a similar factual context, has recognized at least one. In In re Ronwin, Baward Ronwin, a repeatedly unsuccessful applicant to the Arizona bar, filed a number of civil rights and antitrust actions in federal court alleging that a conspiracy existed to keep him from being admitted to the practice of law in this state. 139 Ariz. $76, 580-81, 680 P.2d 107, 111-12 (1983). Ronwin named the menbers of this Court as defendants in a nunber of those actions. id. After filing the claims, Ronwin filed yet another application for admission to the Arizona bar. zd. Because “(t]he ultimate responsibility for admitting candidates for the practice of law is vested in* the supreme court, id. at 578, 680 P.24 at 109, we ruled on the application directly. in raising and Giscussing the ethical issues created by each justice’s status as @ defendant in the federal court actions, we noted: If we are to recuse ourselves simply because we have been sued by the applicant, then who is left to decide this case? As the Ninth Circuit stated: **(A) judge is not disqualified merely because a litigant sues or threatens to sue him.’ Such an easy method for obtaining disqualification should not be encouraged or allowed.’* Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d at 701, quoting United States v. Grismore, $64 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977); see also smith y. Smith, 115 Ariz. 299, 303, 564 P.2d 1266, 1270 (App. 1977). we agree; the mere fact that a judge has been sued by reason of his rulings in a case does not require recusal. Nor can the fact that all judges in the court have been sued require yecusal. To honor such a technique would be to put the weapon of disqualification in the hands of the most unscrupulous. Id. at 586, 680 P.2d at 117. We thus decided that it was the obligation of the individual justices comprising this Court to decide on Ronwin's application, despite any possible appearance of impropriety. rd. We did so, ultimately denying that application. Id. at 587, 680 P.2d at 118. Even though in Ronwin we did not specially identify a doctrine that justified our decision to sit, euch a doctrine, known as the rule of necessity, is widely applied by other jurisdictions. Although there are several formslations of the rule, a common one is that the rule of necessity will prevail over disqualification standards when it is not possible to convene a body of Judges who fare not subject to the disqualification standards. United states v. Wi21, 449 U.S. 200, 212 (1980); Dacey v. Conn. Bar Ass'n, 368 A.2d 125, 129 (Conn. 1976); State v. Rome, 685 P.24 290, 296 (Kan. 1984); Jeffrey M. Shaman et al., Judicial Conduct and Ethics § 4.03, at 112 (34 ed. 2000) (*(DJisqualification mst yield to necessity if recusal would thwart the only tribunal where relief [is] available. In Ronwin we concluded that because it was ultimately the responsibility of the supreme court to determine who could be admitted to the bar, the supreme court would have to answer the question. 139 Ariz. at 578, 680 P.2d at 109. ‘Thus, practically, the permanent members of the Court could not recuse thenselves. Similarly in this case, Mr. Scheehle’s suit requires a definitive interpretation of the scope of this Court's administrative authority to regulate the practice of law in this state. Such questions are inevitably questions of Arizona law. This Court is the court of last resort on the interpretation of such questions. Ariz. Const. art. 3; Hedlund v. superior court, 171 Ariz. 566, 567, 832 P.24 219, 220 (1992) (The supreme court has the final say on the interpretation of rules.). It is presumably for this reason that the legislature authorized only this court to answer questions of state law certified by other jurisdictions. A.R.S. § 12-1861 ("The Supreme Court may answer questions of law certified to it by* federal and tribal courts involving dispositive questions of state law.). Mr. Scheehle’s objection thus presente the same question this Court asked in Ronwin, “If we are to recuse ourselves simply because we have been sued by the applicant, then who is left to decide this case?" Ronwin, 139 Ariz. at 586, 680 P.ad at 117. Although Mr. Scheehle does not raise the rule of necessity in his objection, and hence offers no argument why it should not apply, we have an independent ethical obligation to ensure that this exception to the general rule of disqualification does apply before sitting on this case. we note that there are some distinctions between this matter and Ronwin. Though the Court was called upon to exercise authority that ultimately rested with it, as we are here, the matter at issue in Ronwin did not also require the Court, as it does here, to determine the scope of its own authority. Moreover, the Ronwin Court did not consider whether each justice should recuse as the justices did the last time a 10 question was certified to this Court in this matter. Given that recusal is possible, it could be argued that it is not "necessary" that any single justice sit on this case, because a replacenent can be appointed to sit in each justice’s stead. Finally, in Ronwin, unlike the present case, the justices thenselves were not parties to the matter they decided. Courts in other jurisdictions have determined that when @ litigant names each menber of a state's highest court as a party to litigation challenging the court's authority or actions, and then moves to disqualify each menber of the court from sitting on the case, the rule of necessity obliges the individual members of the court to sit. See New York State ass’n of Criminal Def. Counsel v. Kaye, 744 N.B.24 123 (N.¥. 2000) (holding that the rule of necessity required the individual judges of the New York Court of Appeals to serve even though they were named defendants in Proceeding challenging capital fee structure promulgated by that court); Vermont Supreme Ct. admin. Directive No. 17 v. vermont Supreme Court, 576 A.2d 127, 132 (Vt. 1990) (determining that the rule of necessity required individual justices to serve even though they were named defendants in proceeding challenging administrative order that they had entered); see also Office of State Ct. Adn’r v. Background Info. Servs., 994 P.24 420, 425-26 (Colo. 1999) (upholding rule that required members of supreme court to sit in determining whether its own order restricting access to court un records was valid); Rome, 685 P.2d at 296 (determining that supreme court must sit even though it is interpreting its own authority); x parte Farley, 570 S.W.2d 617, 623 (Ky. 1978) ( Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998, 1002 (Me. 1980) appeal dismissed by 450 U.S. 1036 (1981) (same); Berberian v. Kane, 425 A.24 527, 527 (R.T. 1981) (same); Cameron v, Greenhill, 582 $.W.2d 778, 776 (Tex. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979) (same); State ex rel. Hash v. Mcgraw, 376 $.£.24 634, 638 (W. Va. 1988) (same). The rule of necessity applies even when there are provisions for a member of the court to be temporarily replaced in @ matter, See Kaye, 744 N.E.2d at 128 (*The constitutional provision for the designation of substitute Judges is not to be used as a vehicle to force removal of the constitutionally appointed members of this Court by naming them as parties when challenging adninistrative actions of the Court.*). For the following reasons, we agree that the rule of necessity obliges us to sit in answering the questions certified in this case even though we are nominal parties to the action. As Mr. Scheehle’s complaint and subsequent motions indicate, he has sued the permanent menbers of this Court in their offic: 1 capacities only, He does not argue that any of the four justices he seeks to disqualify has a personal stake in the Litigation, when a justice has a personal conflict or is otherwise unable to serve, there is a procedure for the substitution of that 2 individual justice Substitution based on individual considerations, however, is very different from an assertion that every sitting justice is disqualified by virtue of his or her position as a member of this Court. Téa permanent menber of this Court being sued in an official capacity steps aside so that another judge can be appointed to sit, the person temporarily appointed then becomes a temporary member of this Court. That person thus suffers from the me infirmity, albeit on a temporary basis, that caused the Permanent menber’s recusal. [If] . . . the court could be regarded as an adversary of the petitioners, how would matters be any different if its regular members saw fit to vacate the bench? ‘The special members appointed temporarily to replace them would still constitute that same court and, perforce, they too would be @isqualified.* Farley, 570 $.W.2d at 623; see also Morgenthau v. Cooke, 436 N.E.24 467, 469 n.3 (N.Y. 1962) (finding use of substitutes for all menbers of the court would turn the substitutes into the Court of Appeals); Vermont Supreme Court, 576 A.2d at 132 (stating that ‘[s]ince the actions challenged in this proceeding were taken in our official capacity as the Vermont Supreme Court, the asserted disqualification to act cannot be eliminated simply by a temporary reconstitution of the Court") Mr. Scheehle bases his objection, in part, on the operation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), which B automatically substitutes as defendants to a federal lawsuit Successors in office to those public officials who are sued in sued the their public capacities. Because Mr. Scheehle hi permanent members of this Court only in their official capacity, it appears that, should a menber recuse or be disqualified, the temporary replacement would be substituted in by operation of the Rule. The replacement would thus also be subject to Gisqualitication under the Rule. Even if temporary successors were not automatically substituted in as parties, the reconstituted Court still could not address Mr. Scheehle's objections as set forth in his First Amended Complaint. That complaint alleges that ‘Arizona courts do not provide an impartial forum for litigating this cause because if Plaintiff is successful in his challenge of the System, arizona judges may face a substantial increase in workload. Thus, even assuming the merit of Mr. Scheehle’s objection, if any Arizona court would be incapable of answering the certified question without bias, it would not be possible, by appointing temporary replacements on this Court, to cure the basis of his objection. Even assuming disqualification or recusal could cure the problem, it would create additional problems of constitutional @imension if the menbers of this Court recused for the reasons Suggested by Mr. Scheehle. The Arizona Constitution specifies the qualifications for justices of this Court and the process by which 1a justices mist be appointed and retained. Ariz. Const. art. 6, 55 6, 36-38. The constitution further specifies the unique duties and prerogatives of this Court, ‘These constitutional prerogatives involve both administrative responsibilities, Ariz. const. art. 6 S$ 1, 3 (placing judicial power in an integrated judicial Gepartment and providing the supreme court with administrative Supervisory authority over all lower courts), and the authority to interpret the law. Ariz. Const. art. 3 (creating a judicial Gepartment separate from executive and legislative departments) The constitution requires that’ those _—_ constitutional responsibilities be exercised by the justices appointed to this Court. A disqualification of all menbers of this Court based only on an asserted conflict that arises from each justices’s performance of his or her constitutional function would be an abdication of duty by those who are constitutionally designated to perform such functions. Other courts have also recognized this Problem. See Kaye, 744 N.E.2d at 126 (“If disqualification were vequired whenever the Judges were sued as individuals upon a challenge to an act of the Court, the result could be substitution of the entire constitutionally appointed court, leaving ‘the most fundamental questions about the Court and its powers’* to be decided by persons who were not appointed to that purpose.); Berberian, 425 A.2d at 528 (Disqualifying the justices of the supreme court each time their administrative powers are challenged a5 would “render the rule-making process self-defeating and hugatory."); Vermont Supreme Court, 576 A.2d at 226 (finding Substitution of all members of the court “leaves the most fundamental questions about the Court and its powers to persons whose selection and retention are not tested by constitutional processes") Further, as we previously recognized in Ronwin, if Sisqualification were allowed in this case, it would provide Litigants the ability to disqualify the membership of this entire Court merely by naming each member as a party. 139 Ariz. at 586, 680 P.2a at 117, Such an easy method for obtaining @isqualification should not be encouraged or allowed." 1d. This Court is regularly called upon to interpret or decide the validity of its own rules. see, e.g., State ex rel. Napolitano v. Brown, 194 Ariz. 340, 342, 43 6-8, 982 P.24 815, 817 (2999) (rule granting 120 days to file a petition for post conviction relief upheld); In re Smith, 189 Ariz. 144, 146, 939 P.24 422, 424 (1997) (upholding rule imposing mandatory continuing legal education); Stapleford v. Houghton, 185 Ariz. 560, 562, 917 P.2d 703, 705 (1996) (finding provision of Rules of Criminal Procedure superseded by Victim's Bill of Rights); state v. Rosco 105 Ariz. 68, 912 F.2d 1297 (1996) (same) . Our adoption of a rule does not constitute a prior determination that the rule is valid and constitutional against any 16 challenge. (CJourt rules and comments thereto cannot be given effect if they conflict with valid provisions of the constitution.” Stapleford, 185 Ariz. at 562, 917 P.2d at 705, Such a determination awaits a judicial proceeding in which opposing interests are provided a full opportunity to be heard. See, e.9., Kaye, 744 N.B.24 at 127 (quoting Vermont Supreme Court, 576 A.24 at 30) (*COlur promulgation of the [rule] is not a prior determination that it is valid and constitutional. That determination must await the adjudication in this or a future case.*). Both this Court and lower Arizona courts have upheld challenges to the validity of rules promulgated by this Court in such settings. See, e.g., Stapleford, 185 Ariz, at 560, 917 P.2d at 70: Roscoe, 185 Ariz. at 68, 912 P.2d at 129 State v. Uriarte, 194 Ariz. 275, 981 P.2d 575 (App. 1996) (holding court rules must give way to statutes appropriately implementing constitutional provisions). It is unusual, however, for the individual justices of this Court to be named as nominal defendants to a suit challenging @ court rule. Declaratory judgment actions brought in state court challenging procedural or administrative rules of this Court do not require that the individual justices be named to obtain relief. Although Mr. Scheehle’s § 1983 action brought in federal court presumably does require that a public official be named, Mr. Scheehle named a number of officials, including the superior court judge who enforced the rule and imposed the nction against rd him. Presumably, therefore, he did not have to name each justice of this Court as a defendant to obtain the relief identified in his complaint.‘ That he did so, however, does not, under these facts. require our disqualification. the rule of necessity mandates our individual participation in responding to the questions certified. See will, 449 U.S. at 214 2, Bias and Prejudice Me. Scheehle alleges that each of the four permanent justices should be disqualified because each is already committed to a view on the certified questions. This partiality, according to Mr. Scheehle, constitutes bias or prejudice sufficient to @isqualify the justices pursuant to Canon 3(#)(1)(a), which specifies that [a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding . . . where . . . the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer.” The objection asserts that the bias of the justices is clear because of “the pleadings and papers filed over the past < Opinion 96-14 of the Arizona Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee, entitled “Limitations on Disqualification Requirement,” November 21, 1996, posits that if a disinterested but informed observer would conclude that suit was brought against a judge solely to disqualify the judge from presiding over litigation, the judge is not disqualified, so lang as the judge feels that he or she can fairly preside over the case. We need not decide whether a disinterested but informed observer would make such a determination as to Mr. Scheehle’s suit against the individual menbers of this Court because we conclude that the rule of necessity requires the permanent menbers to sit in answering the certified questions. 38 seven years or so by the defendants in (this action] (which include, of course, the four justices in question).* sven suning that the pleadings filed by the Attorney General representing all the defendants could be attributed for purposes of this motion to represent the views of each of the permanent menbera of this Court, ech, Ryan and Hurwitz) are relatively three of the four justices ( recent appointees to the Court, and Mr. Scheehle suggests no pleading filed during the tine of their service on the Court that would suggest that any of them has a preconceived view on the Sasue, ‘The only specific pleading mentioned in the objection is the brief filed by defendants with our reconstituted supreme court when the Ninth Circuit first certified a question to us in this same proceeding in 2002. According to Mr. Schechle, in that pleading the defendants took the position that the supreme court “had the inherent power to require the attorneys it regulates to serve as arbitrators." Because Justice McGregor was a menber of the Court at that time, Mr. Scheshle asserts that the defendants’ position can be attributed to her for purposes of establishing her personal bias. There are both legal and factual problens with this argunent. As a matter of law, even if Mr. Scheehle could establish that any of the justices has a view on the question at issue, such an allegation does not constitute the kind of bias or prejudice as required for disqualification under the canon. Canon 3(8) (1) (a) specifies that disqualification is appropriate when “the judge has @ personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer.* “Bias and prejudice means a hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will . . . towards one of the litigants. The fact that a judge may have an opinion as to the merits of the cause or a strong feeling about the type of litigation involved, does not make the judge biased or prejudiced.* State v. Perkins, 141 Ariz. 278, 286, 686 P.24 1248, 1256 (2984) (quoting State v. Myers, 117 Ariz. 79, 86, 570 P.2a 1252, 1259 (1977) (quoting In re Guardianship of Styer, 24 Ariz. App. 148, 151, 536 P.24 717, 720 (1975))); Shaman etal., supra, § 4.04, at 113 (*However, neither bias nor prejudice refer to the attitude that a judge may hold about the subject matter of @ lawsuit... . That a judge has a general opinion about a legal . . . matter that relates to the case before him or her does not disqualify a judge from presiding over the case.) (citations omitted); see also Leslie W. Abramson, Judicial Disqualification Under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial conduct 24 (24 ed. 1992) (“only personal bias or prejudice constitutes a disqualifying factor.*). Thus, Mr. Scheehle’s allegation that the four permanent justices already have a view about the questions certified does not constitute a basis for disqualification even if it could be established. 20 And, even as a factual matter, Mr. Scheehle ie unable to establish such a pre-existing view. when the supreme court or other departments of the State require representation, they obtain that representation from the Attorney General’s office. For cases involving the supreme court, the legal representation is coordinated with the Chief Justice, only he was aware of the position taken by the defendants in this case. That is the basis for his own recusal in this matter, Ae the New York Court of Appeals noted in Kaye, “[i]t is not an uncommon practice for the Chief [Justice] alone to be recused in similar appeals involving judicial administration.* 744 N.E.2d at 125 n.2. Neither Justice McGregor nor any of the other justices who are challenged by Mr. Scheehle’s motion tock any role in the defense, nor were they aware of the positions or theories advocated by the State before the State's papers were filed. Mr. Scheehle challenges the validity of a court rule, names each of the individual justices as nominal party defendants, and then asserts that any answer or argument advanced by the State in favor of the validity of the rule mist be attributed to each of the justices for the purpose of establishing his or her individual bias. In cases in which the rule of necessity requires the permanent members of this Court to sit on a question, and the justices have taken no role in the preparation of the defense, such an attribution cannot be made. The rule of necessity itself requires such an accommodation. Cf, Disqualification Concerns When the Attorney General's Office Represents Judges, Op. 02-05 Ariz. Supreme ct. Jud, Ethics Advis. Comm. (Sept. 12, 2002) (While normally a judge should recuse from hearing a case in which the Assistant Attorney General representing him in other mattera appears before him, “if the lawyer currently represents all judicial officers in the county or state (e.g., in a challenge to entire court’® authority or an attack on a judicial policy or rule), the ‘rule of necessity’ may prevail, making disqualification impractical and unnecessary. B. Other Arguments for Disqualification In addition to these argunents, Mr. Scheehle also briefly argues that the individual justices should recuse because (1) he has filed a complaint against the individual justices with the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct resulting from their failure to recuse themselves in this matter, and (2) the naned defendant justices previously recused themselves when a question was earlier certified in this same matter. 41. Complaint to the Commission on Judicial conduct Mr. Scheehle asserts that the individual justices are disqualified from deciding this matter because he has filed a complaint against each of them with the Commission on Judicial Conduct resulting from their failure to recuse. As far as we can discern, every state that has considered the question, including Arizona, has determined that a complaint to 22 the Commission on Judicial Conduct alone does not require recusal. “The mere fact that a complaint has been made against a judge alleging the judge is biased and cannot be impartial does not require automatic disqualification or recusal by the judge. Tf this were so any party or attorney could easily disrupt court proceedings at any time by filing a complaint against the judge. Disqualification Considerations When Complaints Are Filed Against Judges, Op. 98-2 Ariz. Supreme Ct. Jud. Ethics Advie. Comm. (Mar. , 1998) (quoting Shaman et al., Judicial Conduct and Ethics § 4.06 (24 ed, 1995)); see also Op. No. 98-04 Wash. Ethics Advis. comm. (Apr. 20, 1998); Op. 45 calif. (gan. 23, 1997). ‘Thus, Mr. Scheehle’s complaint against the justices with the Commission on Judicial Conduct does not alone merit disqualification. 2. The Justic Previously Recused in this Matter Mr. Scheehle correctly asserts that when the Ninth Circuit previously certified a question to us in this matter, the five permanent justices then on the Court all recused themselves. ‘The recusal did not cone as a result of an objection brought by Mr. Scheehle. Each justice recused on his or her own motion. We have no record of their reasons for recusal. Even when the canons do not require recusal, a judge may recuse from judicial duties Zuniga v. Superior Court, 17 Ariz. 222, 224, 269 P.2d 720, 721 (2954) ("A judge may on his own motion, if he acts timely, recuse 23 himself even though the reason given might not be sufficient to form the basis of a legal disqualification. *) We do not now question the decision of each of the members of this Court at that time to recuse themselves. Nor are we bound by that decision. zt is, however, our determination for the reasons set forth above that Mr. Scheehle presents no legal or factual argument requiring the disqualification of ali four Permanent justices, merely because the last time a question was certified in this matter each individual justice chose to recuse. concuusron We recognize that each justice in this case has a continuing individual responsibility to exercise “considerable introspection and intellectual honesty,“ in determining whether he or she may appropriately sit upon any matter that cones before the Court. op. 98-2 Ariz. Supreme Ct. Jud. Ethics Advis. Comm. (Mar. 24, 1998). Such an evaluation depends on considerations that may be unique to each justice and cannot be evaluated or discussed in this collective opinion. Apart. «from such individual, considerations, however, we here determine that Mr. Scheehle has set forth no arguments in his objection that would compel @isqualification of any of the four justices from sitting on the certified questions. Therefore, 24 XT IS ORDERED, denying Scheehle’s motion to disqualify. G. Murray Snow, Judge CONCURRING: Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Justice Michael D. Ryan, Justice Rndvew D. Hurwitz, Justice * The Honorable Charles E. Jones recused himself, pursuant to article 6, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution. The Honorable ¢. Murray Snow, Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division One, waa designated to sit in his stead. 25.
3a4c836b03cf83e156dc0e2039f60131b81830475a4bf59d5272848f30afb21b
2005-10-05T00:00:00Z
8e048733-33a0-4851-9a0c-235c696a3abd
State of Alabama ex rel. Luther Strange v. Tyrone Clark, Sr.
null
1151021
alabama
Alabama Supreme Court
In the Supreme Court of Alabama duly 27, 2016 State of Alabama ex rel. Luther Strange, Attorney General 1151021 Tyrone Clark, sr., Sheriff of Sumter County PER CURIAM. In January 2015, Tyrone Clark, Sr., began his present term of office as the sheriff of sumter County. on June 30, 2016, the State of Alabama, by and through its attorney General, pursuant to §§ 36-11-4 and 36-11-5, Ala. Code 1975, filed an information of impeachment and a prayer for ouster, charging that sheriff Clark, during his present term of office, willfully neglected his duty and engaged in corruption while in office, in violation of § 36-11-1, Ala. Code 1975,? 'section 36-11-1 provides, in pertinent part: (a) The following officers may be impeached and removed from office: ... sheriffs "(b) The officers specified in subsection (a) of this section may be impeached and removed from office for the following causes: "(1) Willful neglect of duty; "(2) Corruption in office; 3151021 and Art. VII, § 173 and § 174, Ala. Const. 1901.7 ‘The information contained two charges: willful neglect of "(3) Incompetency; (4) Intemperance in the use of intoxicating liquors or narcotics to such an extent in view of the dignity of the office and importance of its duties as unfits the officer for the discharge of such duties; or "(5) Any offense involving moral turpitude while in office or committed under color thereof or connected therewith." *article VII, § 174, Ala. Const. 1901, provides: “The chancellors, judges of the circuit courts, judges of the probate courts, and judges of other courts from which an appeal may be taken directly to the supreme court, and solicitors and sheriffs, may be removed from office for any of the causes specified in (Art. VII, § 173,] or elsewhere in this Constitution, by the supreme court, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. The legislature may provide for the impeachment or removal of other officers than those named in this article.” Article VII, § 173, Ala. Const. 1901, provides that officials "may be removed from office for willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency, or intemperance in the ‘use of intoxicating liquors or narcotics to such an extent, in view of the dignity of the office and importance of the duties, as unfits the officer for the discharge of such duties, or for any offense involving moral turpitude while in office, or committed under color thereof, or connected therewith ...." See also § 36-11-1, Ala. Code 1975 2 3151021 @uty and corruption in office. With regard to Charge one in the information, willful neglect of duty by Sheriff clark during his present term of office, the information included the following nine specifications, namely that Clark 1. “{WJillfully neglected his duty to secure and Supervise inmates in his custody under Ala. Code (1975,] § 14-6-1[,] when he made Rodney Coats, an inmate in the Sumter County Jail, a trust [y]. Coats had an extensive criminal history for drug-related offenses, and he was placed in jail under these criminal’ — charge: Trafficking in Cocaine, Trafficking in Methamphetamine, Possession of a Controlled Substance, Possession of Marijuana First Degree, Receiving stolen Property Second Degree, Certain Persons Forbidden to Possess a Pistol, Assault First Degree, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. His bond for these charges totaled $675,000.00. “when he made Coats a trust(y], Sheriff Clark gave Coats privileges, including allowing him to move freely about both the Jail and Administration Buildings of the Sumter County Sheriff's Office and allowing Coats to leave the Jail, sometimes without law enforcement oversight." 2. "{W)illfully neglected his duty to prevent the introduction of contraband into the Jail and supervise the inmates housed therein under Ala. Code (1975,] §§ 14-6-1 and 13A-10-37 and -38. Specifically, Sheriff Clark aided Rodney Coats in bringing contraband into the Sumter County Jail by ordering the Sumter County Detention Officers not to search Coats when he would return to the Jail after being outside of the Jail and free of law enforcement oversight. This contraband included controlled substances, cell phones, and cigarettes 1181021 "sheriff Clark also protected Coats from ‘shake downs’ performed by the Sumter County Jail Staff, as well as ‘drug sweeps’ at the Jail by outside la enforcement agencies, by removing him from the Jail or instructing Jail staff to leave Coats alone. "Furthermore, Sheriff Clark allowed Coats to receive visitors at the Sumter County Sheriff's Office Administrative Building who were not searched or subjected to any security measures before meeting with Coats. These visitors were also allowed to access the Sumter County Sheriff's Office Administrative Building through an entrance that was not monitored by surveillance cameras." 3. _"(W]illfully neglected his duty under Ala. Code [1975,] § 14-6-1[,] to supervise the inmates in the Sumter County Jail and prevent inmates from possessing a deadly weapon under Ala. Code (1975, ] § 13A-10-36, by allowing Rodney Coats to have access to firearms, even though Coats had pending charges for Assault First Degree and Certain Persons Forbidden from Possessing a Handgun." 4, "{W]ilifully neglected his duty under Ala. code [1975,] § 14-6-16[,] to safely preserve the process or order by which prisoners are committed to jail by permitting Rodney Coats, himself an inmate, to process prisoners." 5. "{W]illfully neglected his duty under Ala, code [1975,] § 14-6-1[,] to maintain custody of inmate Ronald James. Sheriff Clark gave James, who was serving a 10-year sentence, split to serve 14 months, for the violent offense of Burglary Second Degree, a ‘jail pass.' This allowed James to leave the custody of the Sumter County Jail for extended periods of time, endangering the safety of the victim involved in the case for which James was incarcerated, as well as endangering the safety of the residents of sumter County." 1152021 6. "(W]illfully neglected his duty under Ala. Code [1975,] § 14-6-1[,] to maintain custody of inmate James Markell Bell. Sheriff Clark also failed to swear out an arrest warrant, apprehend, or arrest Bell after Bell escaped from the Sumter County Jail in violation of Ala. Code [1975,] § 13A-10-32." " (w] il1fully neglected his duty to supervise jail inmates and secure the Jail under Ala. Code [1975] § 14-6-11,] by giving inmate Rodney Coats access to an unsecured room in the administration building, where Coats had sexual intercourse with female visitors. The visitors were never searched, and the entrance to the room was not monitored by cameras or otherwise." " (w] i11 fully neglected his duty to supervise jail inmates, secure the Jail, and enforce the law under Ala. Code [1975,] §§ 14-6-1 and 36-22-3[,] when he provided an environment in the Administration Building that allowed Rodney Coats to engage in Human Trafficking in the Second Degree, in violation of Ala. Code (1975,] § 13A-6-153 (a) (2 9. "{W]illfully neglected his duty to properly appoint and supervise deputies under Ala. Code (1975,]_ § 36-22-3[,] when he appointed Johnny Archibald a deputy sheriff and directed Archibald to patrol on his own, even though Archibald had not been certified as a law enforcement officer by the Alabama Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission, in violation of Ala. Admin. Code [ (Peace Officers Training), Rule] 650-X-2-.01." With regard to Charge two in the information, corruption in office by Sheriff Clark during his present term of office, the information included the following three specifications, namely that Clark: 3181022 1. "[U)sed his official position or office to benefit himself by personally and privately employing inmates of the Sumter County Jail, namely Rodney Coats and Glenn Brown, in violation of Ala Code [1975,] §§ 14-5-11 and 36-25-5. Among other things, Sheriff Clark directed Coats and Brown to perform work at his personal home "[U]sed his official position or office to benefit himself by operating an undocumented work release program, wherein he allowed inmates from the Sumter County Jail to be released for the purpose of working for individuals and/or businesses on the condition that the inmates pay Sheriff Clark a portion of their wages, in violation of Ala. Code (2975,] §§ 36-22-16 and 14-8-37. 3. "{A] tempted to use his official position or office to coerce a female employee to have sexual intercourse with him." On June 30, 2016, this Court ordered Sheriff Clark to appear before it on July 25, 2016, to answer the information filed against him. The clerk of this Court issued a summons, ordering Terry W. Peeler, the coroner of Sumter County, to serve the summons to appear and the attached order and information on Sheriff Clark. ‘That same day, Peeler served Sheriff Clark with the summons and the attached order and information on duly 25, 2016, Sheriff Clark appeared before this Court, waived the reading of the information, denied each and every specification charged in the information, and entered a 2151022 plea of not guilty. The Court then heard ore tenus testimony. Alabama caselaw is well settled that a proceeding brought pursuant to Art. VII, § 174, Ala. Const. 1901, is criminal in nature. Alonzo v. State ex rel, Booth, 283 Ala. 607, 219 So. 2d 858 (1969); State ex rel. Mullis v. Matthews, 259 Ala. 125, 66 So, 24 1105 (1953). The State must prove the charges on which the proceeding is based beyond a reasonable doubt. State ex rel. Mullis, supra; State ex rel. Attorney Gen, v. Robinson, 111 Ala. 482, 20 So. 30 (1896); and State v. Buckley, 54 Ala. 599 (1875). Justice McClellan, concurring specially in State ex rel. Attorney General v. Martin, 180 Ala. 458, 461, 61 So. 491, 492 (1913), defined "willful neglect of duty" as an "intentional failure or omission of an officer to perform a plain and manifest duty which he is able to perform when he omits to do 80. “Corruption in office," also known as “official misconduct," has been defined as "[a] public officer's corrupt violation of assigned duties by malfeasance," misfeasance, °Malfeasance is defined as "(a] wrongful, unlawful, or dishonest act; esp., wrongdoing or misconduct by a public official." Black's Law Dictionary 1100 (10th ed. 2014). ‘Misfeasance is defined as "[a] lawful act performed in a wrongful manner." Black's Law Dictionary 1151 (10th ed. 7 1151021 or nonfeasance."" Black's Law Dictionary 1150 (10th ed 2014) (defining "official misconduct" as an entry under the term "misconduct®) . Based on specifications 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Charge one in the information and the evidence adduced in support thereof, the Court finds that Sheriff Tyrone Clark, Sr., is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of willful neglect of duty during his present term of office. Based on specifications 1, and 3 of Charge two in the information and the evidence adduced in support thereof, the Court finds that Sheriff Tyrone Clark, Sr., is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of corruption during his present term of office. It is the judgment of this Court that sheriff Clark be impeached, and Tyrone Clark, Sr., is hereby ousted from the office of sheriff of Sumter County, Alabama. Parker, Murdock, and Wise, JJ., concur. Stuart, Bolin, Shaw, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur specially. 2014). ‘Nonfeasance is defined as "(t]he failure to act when a duty to act exists." Black's Law Dictionary 1216 (10th ed. 2014). 2181021 BOLIN, Justice (concurring specially). I concur fully with the findings of the per curiam opinion that Sheriff Tyrone Clark, Sr., is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of corruption in office during his present term of office, as set forth in Charge two of the information, and that Sheriff Tyrone Clark, Sr., is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of willful neglect of duty during his present term of office, as set forth in Charge one of the information, and as reflected in the seven acts specified in the opinion as supporting that finding. I write specially to state that I find from the evidence that Sheriff Tyrone Clark, Sr., is also guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of specified acts 4 and 9 in charge one. Stuart, Shaw, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
c247d7fd516e3483b10fb161a02b82308b7880e2990369d1e110db84fb6f1b2a
2016-07-27T00:00:00Z
07932394-a56b-4791-9436-6b7073efdecf
Zimmerman v. Betsey Bayless, ...and House of Representatives and Senate of the State of Arizona ...and Arizonans for Wildlife Conservation (Supreme Court Order)
null
CV-00-0316-AP/EL
arizona
Arizona Supreme Court
FILED AUG 3 1 2000 SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA DOUGLAS G. ZIMMERMAN, Arizona Supreme Court No. C¥-00-0326-a8/E2, Plaintiff-Appellant/ Cross-Appeliee, ) Maricopa County Superi: Cours No. CV 2000-15083 BETSEY BAYLESS, Secretary of State for the State of Arizona, De! dant-Appellee, and ‘THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and SENATE OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, by and through BRENDA BURNS, President of the Senate and JEFF GROSCOS?, Speaker of the House, Real Parties in Intere Appellee/Cross Appellat ORDER and ARIZONANS FOR WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, Intervenor-Appellee/ Gross-Appellant, , ) ‘ ) ) 5 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) This Court has read and considered all the briefs in this case on appeal and cross-appeal. hile the late filing in superior court may not have prejudiced that court's consideration of this matter on the merits, the matter reached this Court far too late for the Court to address the merits in a meaningful yet timely way. Harris v. Purcell, 193 Ariz. 409, 973 P.2d 1166 (1998). Therefore, dismissing the appeal. ORDERED dismissing the cross-appeal as moot. DATED this 31" day of August, 2000. THOMAS A. Zi Chief Justice 10: Stephanie Nichols-Young, Esq. Lisa T. Hauser, Esq., Meyers Taber Meyers P.C. Hon. Janet A. Napolitano, Esq., Arizona Attorney General Attn: Joseph A. Kanefield, Esq. Hon. Robert D. Myers, Judge, Maricopa County Superior Court Hon. Colin F, Campbell, Presiding Judge, Maricopa County Superior Court Michael K. Jeanes, Clerk, Maricopa County Superior Court
432888e5dadaf4f7644881b856d8a24c956154c61abc29c9c758e75957230ec9
2000-08-31T00:00:00Z
e235637a-3976-4140-9396-52ad51cab9c1
THOMAS HANEY v TOM RICE et al
null
CV-08-0195-AP/EL
arizona
Arizona Supreme Court
FILED JUL 11 2008 soieueueic SUPREME COURT OF ARTZONA In Division THOMAS HANEY, an individual and qualified elector, Arizona Supreme Court No. CV-08-0195-AP/EL Appellant, ) Maricopa County Superior Court No. cv2008-014383 ‘THE HONORABLE R. FULTON BROCK, DON STAPLEY, ANDREW KUNASEK, MAX W. WILSON and MARY ROSE WILCOX, THE DULY ELECTED or APPOINTED MEMBERS OF THE MARICOPA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, WHO ARE NAMED SOLELY IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY: THE MARTCOPA COUNTY ) ) > ) ) ) ) ) ) ) MEMORANDUM DECISION ) ) > ) ) BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; THE ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) (Not for Publication - Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111) HONORABLE HELEN PURCELL, THE DULY ELECTED MARICOPA COUNTY RECORDER, WHO IS NAMED SOLELY IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND THE HONORABLE KAREN OSBORNE, THE DULY APPOINTED MARICOPA’ COUNTY DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS, WHO 15 NAMED SOLELY IN HER OFFICIAL capacrTy, Appellees, ‘ToM RICE, an individual, Real Party in Interest. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County ‘The Honorable Douglas L. Rayes, Judge AFFIRMED WILLIAMS & ZINMAN, P.C. Scottsdale By Scott £. Williams Mark B. Zinman Attorneys for Thomas Haney RAYMOND, GREER @ SASSAMAN, P.C. Phoenix By Michael J. Raymond Attorneys for Tom Rice BERCH, Vice Chief Justice a We have been asked to decide whether nominating petitions that contain only twelve signature lines per page comply with Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 16- 315(A) (3) (2006). Under the facts of this case, we hold that they do. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 Tom Rice seeks his party’s nomination to run for Justice of the Peace of the Dreamy Draw Justice Precinct. To be eligible, Rice needed to submit 441 valid signatures to the Maricopa County Elections Department. Rice submitted forty-five petition sheets that contained 498 valid signatures. only thirty-six of the forty-five petition sheets contained the statutorily prescribed fifteen signature lines; the other nine contained only twelve lines per page. Those nine sheets bore a total of sixty-seven valid signatures. 2 Thomas Haney, a qualified elector, challenged Rice’s petitions on the ground that the nine petition sheets containing only twelve signature lines were invalid, and therefore, Rice -2- failed to submit the required 441 signatures (498 less 67 is 431). On June 23, 2008, the superior court conducted a hearing and held that the deficient petition sheets substantially complied with § 16-315(A)(3). Haney subsequently appealed to this Court, and by an order dated July 1, 2008, we affirmed. In that order we informed the parties that a written decision would follow; this is that decision. oo We have jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 8.1 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure and A.R.S. § 16- 391(A) (2006). II. pIscussrow 45 Arizona law prescribes the form in which nominating petitions must be made. At the center of this controversy is A.R.S. § 16-315(A) (3), which provides as follows: A, The nomination petitions shall be in substantially the following form: 3. There shall be fifteen lines spaced three-eighths of an inch apart and consecutively numbered one through fifteen. a6 Haney argues that the text of § 16-315(A)(3) is clear on its face ~ that is, because the statute uses the word “shall,” the doctrine of “substantial compliance” does not apply, and the petitions are therefore deficient because they contain only twelve lines. To support his argument, Haney -3- asserts that our decision in Clark v. Pima County Board of Supervisors, 128 Ariz. 193, 624 P.24 871 (1981), requires strict adherence to the statute's text. He also maintains that accepting Rice's position would open the door to future interpretations of § 16-315(A), which would frustrate the statute’s purpose. Haney urges us to reject the nine petitions containing only twelve signature Lines. 7 Rice agrees that the text of § 16-315(A) governs. Unlike Haney, however, Rice argues that the prefatory clause of § 16-315(A) requires only that the petition substantially comply with the specific enumerated subsections. Rice distinguishes Clark and asserts that our decisions in Moreno v. Jones, 213 Ariz. 94, 139 P.3d 612 (2006), Clifton v. Decillis, 187 Ariz. 112, 927 P.2d 772 (1996), and Marsh v. Haws, 111 Ariz. 139, 526 P.2d 161 (1974), support the textual conclusion that substantial compliance suffices. a8 Resolution of this case requires us to answer two related inguiries: first, whether substantial compliance is the correct standard, and second, if so, whether Rice's petitions satisfy that standard. Both questions present issues of law, which we review de novo. Moreno, 213 Ariz. at 101-02, $ 40, 139 P.3d at 619-20. A. The Applicable Standard 9 We agree with the trial court that the correct standard is substantial compliance. Although Haney is certainly correct that § 16-315(A) uses the term “shall,” the term must be viewed in context with the remaining parts of § 16-315(A). See Ariz. Dep't of Rev. v. Action Marine, Inc., 218 Ariz. 141, 143, $ 10, 181 P.3d 188, 190 (2008) (construing statutes as a whole, considering context, language, and purpose). The prefatory clause of § 16-315(A) requires the nominating petitions to be in “substantially the . . . form” of the enumerated subsections. Reading subsection (3) in isolation, as Haney does, without reference to the prefatory clause, would strip the words “substantially the following form” of meaning and purpose. Although the term “shall” and the phrase “substantially the following form” are not entixely consistent, the statute should be read to avoid a construction that would render the latter meaningless, while also giving due weight to the former. See Keiz v. Buckeye Petroleum Co., 145 Ariz. 374, 379, 701 P.2d 1182, 1187 (1985). Thus, we conclude that the best reading of § 16-315(A) gives weight to both; that is, the statute requires substantial compliance with the mandatory enumerated statutory subsections. s10 We concluded similarly in Clifton. There, we decided whether nominating petitions for a general election complied -~5- with the requirements of A.R.S. § 16-341(D) when the petition forms did not designate the party affiliation of an independent candidate who left the party designation portion of the petition blank. 187 Ariz. at 113, 927 P.24 at 773. Like § 16-315(A), the statutory provision at issue in Clifton required that “(t}he nomination petition shall be . . . substantially” in the form provided by the statutory text requiring the candidate to indicate the party name or its equivalent. To be sure, Clifton explored a different statute, but we find its analysis particularly persuasive because the prefatory clause in § 16- 341(A) is almost identical to that for § 16-315(A). saa The statutory purpose behind nominating petitions also supports our conclusion, As we stated in Clifton: (WJominating petitions were designed to “in some measure [weed] out the cranks, the publicity seekers, the frivolous candidates who have no intention of going through with the campaign” . . . “yet not keep out those who are serious in their efforts and have a reasonable nunber of supporters.” 187 Ariz. at 115, 927 P.2d at 775 (second alteration in Clifton) (quoting Adams v. Bolin, 77 Ariz. 316, 320, 271 P.2d 472, 475 (1954)). Requiring only substantial compliance furthers this statutory purpose, and we therefore conclude that § 16-315(A) “does not mandate perfection but only that candidates substantially comply with its requirements.” Id. at 116, 927 P.2d at 776. m2 Finally, we find Haney's citation to Clark unhelpful. The issue in Clark was whether “the signers of nominating petitions must sign with the exact name under which they are registered to vote,” not whether the forms thenselves substantially complied with the statutory requirements. 128 Ariz. at 194, 624 P.2d at 872. Clark required only that the proponent be prepared to offer additional proof that the signatories were properly registered when their names did not natch voter registration affidavits. Id. at 195, 624 P.2d at 873; see also 1993 Ariz, Sess. Laws, ch. 98, $ 22 (Ist Reg. Sess.) (modifying statutory section at issue in Clark). B. Substantial Compliance with A.R.S. § 16-315 3 Having determined that substantial compliance is the appropriate standard, we must now determine whether the petitions containing only twelve lines substantially comply with § 16-315. We conclude that they do. na ‘In determining whether a nomination petition form substantially complies with the statutory requirements, this court has focused on whether the omission of information could confuse or mislead electors signing the petition.” Moreno, 213 Ariz. at 102, $ 42, 139 P.3d at 620. To be sure, § 16-315(A) ‘allows a measure of inconsistency” so long as it does not affect the result. Id. (quoting Clifton, 187 Ariz. at 116, 927 P.2d at 776). 1s Here, the nominating petition sheets containing only twelve signature lines were identical, in both form and substance, to the unchallenged petition sheets with the exception that the bottom three lines were cut off. This was likely the result of copier error. Indeed, all the information necessary to understand the petitions was present - the name of the court and office sought, the party affiliation, the nane of the candidate, the candidate’s address, the county, and the date of the election. No potential signer would distinguish between the deficient and non-deficient sheets, and any signer would be able to reject or accept the petition on its face. s6 We believe that having fewer lines than required by $ 16-315 does nothing to confuse or mislead an elector. Finally, having fewer lines is considerably less substantial than those deficiencies that were not disqualifying in Moreno, 213 Ariz. at 102, J 44, 139 P.3d at 620 (omission of day and month of primary election date), Clifton, 187 Ariz. at 116, 927 P.2d at 176 (omission of party designation for independent candidate), and Marsh, 111 Ariz. at 140, 526 P.2d at 162 (using “SO. PHX. Precinct” as an abbreviation for the South Phoenix Precinct). Thus, we hold that the petitions in this case substantially comply with § 16-315(A) (3). III. CONCLUSION m7 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the superior court. Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice CONCURRING: Michael 0. Ryan, Justice W Scott Bales, Justice
0bed4ca1c78ba52b77a95d28d963f66f23d166b29dec2f79b89ed7e47fcd5c40
2008-07-11T00:00:00Z

The Case-law, centralizing legal decisions for better use, a community Dataset.

The Case-law Dataset is a comprehensive collection of legal decisons from various countries, centralized in a common format. This dataset aims to improve the development of legal AI models by providing a standardized, easily accessible corpus of global legal documents.

Join us in our mission to make AI more accessible and understandable for the legal world, ensuring that the power of language models can be harnessed effectively and ethically in the pursuit of justice.

Objective

The primary objective of this dataset is to centralize laws from around the world in a common format, thereby facilitating:

  1. Comparative legal studies
  2. Development of multilingual legal AI models
  3. Cross-jurisdictional legal research
  4. Improvement of legal technology tools

By providing a standardized dataset of global legal texts, we aim to accelerate the development of AI models in the legal domain, enabling more accurate and comprehensive legal analysis across different jurisdictions.

Dataset Structure

The dataset is organized with the following columns:

  • id: A unique identifier for each document
  • title: The title of the legal document
  • citation: The citation information for the document, referencing legal precedents or sources
  • docket_number: The docket number associated with the legal case or document
  • state: The state or jurisdiction related to the document (e.g., "Maine"...)
  • issuer: The entity or authority that issued the document
  • document: The full text content of the legal document
  • hash: A SHA-256 hash of the document for verification purposes, ensuring data integrity
  • timestamp: The timestamp indicating when the document was created, enacted, or last updated

Easy-to-use script for hashing the document:

import hashlib
import datasets

def hash(
  text: str
) -> str:
    """
    Create or update the hash of the document content.

    This function takes a text input, converts it to a string, encodes it in UTF-8, 
    and then generates a SHA-256 hash of the encoded text.

    Parameters
    ----------
    text : str
        The text content to be hashed.

    Returns
    -------
    str
        The SHA-256 hash of the input text, represented as a hexadecimal string.
    """
    return hashlib.sha256(str(text).encode()).hexdigest()

dataset = dataset.map(lambda x: {"hash": hash(x["document"])})

Country-based Splits

The dataset uses country-based splits to organize legal documents from different jurisdictions. Each split is identified by the ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of the corresponding country.

ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 Codes

ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 codes are two-letter country codes defined in ISO 3166-1, part of the ISO 3166 standard published by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).

Some examples of ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 codes:

  • France: fr
  • United States: us
  • United Kingdom: gb
  • Germany: de
  • Japan: jp
  • Brazil: br
  • Australia: au

Before submitting a new split, please make sure the proposed split fits within the ISO code for the related country.

Accessing Country-specific Data

To access legal documents for a specific country, you can use the country's ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code as the split name when loading the dataset. Here's an example:

from datasets import load_dataset

# Load the entire dataset
dataset = load_dataset("HFforLegal/case-law")

# Access the French legal decisions
fr_dataset = dataset['fr']

Ethical Considerations

While this dataset provides a valuable resource for legal AI development, users should be aware of the following ethical considerations:

  • Privacy: Ensure that all personal information has been properly anonymized.
  • Bias: Be aware of potential biases in the source material and in the selection of included laws.
  • Currency: Laws change over time. Always verify that you're working with the most up-to-date version of a law for any real-world application.
  • Jurisdiction: Legal interpretations can vary by jurisdiction. AI models trained on this data should not be used as a substitute for professional legal advice.

Citing & Authors

If you use this dataset in your research, please use the following BibTeX entry.

@misc{HFforLegal2024,
  author =       {Louis Brulé Naudet, Timothy Dolan},
  title =        {The case-law, centralizing legal decisions for better use},
  year =         {2024}
  howpublished = {\url{https://huggingface.co/datasets/HFforLegal/case-law}},
}

Feedback

If you have any feedback, please reach out at louisbrulenaudet@icloud.com.

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