Case Title: Hays v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hays v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.1989 WY 19768 P.2d 11Case Number: 88-82Decided: 01/19/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARTIN L. 
HAYS, APPELLANT (CLAIMANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, EX REL., WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLEE (OBJECTOR).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, CarbonCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 
 
Catherine 
MacPherson of MacPherson Law Offices, Rawlins, for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., Ron Arnold, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Josephine T. Porter, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     In this worker's 
compensation case, appellant Martin L. Hays, deceased,1 through his surviving widow and 
children, appeals from the denial of his motion for a new trial and for relief 
from judgment under W.R.C.P. 59 and 60.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant presents the 
following issues:

 
 
     1. Whether a partner 
whose business is classed as extrahazardous is an "employee" as defined by W.S. 
§ 27-12-102(a)(viii) (1977 Repub.Ed.)[2] and, therefore, entitled to 
coverage under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act if injured while actually 
subject to the hazards of the business.

 
 
     2. If the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act is construed to deny coverage to a partner, does that 
construction deny equal protection of the law, in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 34 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 
 

[¶4.]     On October 25, 1986, 
appellant fell from a scraper that he was cutting into scrap metal with a blow 
torch. He suffered fatal head injuries and died within a few hours of the 
fall.

 
 

[¶5.]     On December 8, 1986, 
appellant's widow, Tammy S. Hays, filed an employee's report of injury, alleging 
that appellant was a laborer for Hays Transportation Co.3 and that his death was a result of 
his employment. This report was followed by an application for death benefits 
filed by Mrs. Hays on December 30, 1986, on behalf of herself and appellant's 
two minor children. The district court approved the application and on January 
12, 1987, awarded an aggregate sum of $100,223.05 in death benefits plus costs 
of the last hospitalization and funeral service for 
appellant.

 
 

[¶6.]     On January 30, 1987, 
appellee Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division filed an objection to the award, 
alleging that Hays Transportation Co. had not submitted an accident report and 
did not have a current worker's compensation account.4 The objection further alleged that 
appellant was not an "employee" as defined in § 27-12-102(a)(viii)5 but instead that he was a partner 
in Hays Transportation Co., and, as such, he was not entitled to benefits under 
the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.

 
 

[¶7.]     On the basis of 
extensive testimony received at a hearing on April 17, 1987, the trial court 
entered its order on July 14, 1987, making the specific finding and conclusion 
of law that appellant and Steven Hays were in a partnership relationship on the 
date of appellant's death. The trial court requested the parties to submit 
memoranda of law addressing whether a partner was covered by the Act and, if 
not, whether the denial of coverage was a violation of equal protection under 
the United States and Wyoming Constitutions. The trial court considered both 
parties' submissions. By a decision letter dated August 13, 1987, and a 
subsequent order, the court concluded that partners were not included within the 
coverage of the Act, as partners were not "employees" as defined in the statute, 
and that such an exclusion of coverage was not a violation of equal protection. 
It thus denied the application for death benefits.

 
 

[¶8.]     On September 30, 1987, 
appellant's representatives filed a motion for a new trial and for relief from 
judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 59 and 60, with accompanying affidavits. The 
motion was denied on December 22, 1987, by a decision letter, which was 
incorporated into a subsequent order on March 2, 1988. This appeal 
followed.

 
 

[¶9.]     Appellant's 
representatives assert that, despite his status as a partner, he was 
nevertheless an employee and, therefore, he and his survivors are entitled to 
benefits under the Act. To recover death benefits under the Act, the decedent 
must have been an "employee" involved in extrahazardous work as that term was 
defined in § 27-12-102(a)(viii). Thus, the first question to be addressed is 
whether a member of a partnership, the business of which was classified as 
extrahazardous, was an "employee" within the meaning of § 27-12-102(a)(viii). 
This determination involves the statutory interpretation of § 
27-12-102(a)(viii). Our rules of statutory interpretation have often been cited 
and need not be reiterated here except to note that, when a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, this Court will not resort to rules of statutory construction and 
the words will be given their plain and ordinary meaning. State Board of 
Equalization v. Jackson Hole Ski Corporation, 737 P.2d 350, on reh'g 745 P.2d 58 
(Wyo. 1987); Wyoming Insurance Department v. Avemco Insurance Company, 726 P.2d 507 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 

[¶10.]  Section 27-12-102(a)(viii) defined an 
"employee" as

 
 
any person 
who has entered into the employment of or works under contract of services or 
apprenticeship with an employer engaged in an extrahazardous occupation, except 
a person whose employment is purely casual and not for the purpose of the 
employer's usual trade or business, or those engaged in clerical work and not 
subject to the hazards of the business. "Employee" also includes the officers of 
a corporation, the business of which is classed as extrahazardous, if the 
officers are actually subject to the hazards of the business in the regular 
performance of their duties, and the employer elects to come under the 
provisions of a this act by notifying the division by registered mail at least 
thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of the coverage. Coverage remains 
effective until withdrawn by written notice to the division. Any reference to an 
employee who has been injured and dies, includes his dependents or his legal 
representatives, or his guardian or next friend if the employee is a minor or 
incompetent. No minor employee shall be denied the benefits of this act for the 
sole reason that his employment is in violation of the labor laws governing the 
employment of minors[.]

 
 
The plain 
and unambiguous language of § 27-12-102(a)(viii) mandates the conclusion that 
partners could not receive benefits as "employees" under the Act. The language 
specifically defined an "employee" as one who had "entered into the employment 
of or works under contract of services or apprenticeship with an employer." To 
accept appellant's argument that a partner was an employee under the Act would 
be to ignore the plain language of § 27-12-102(a)(viii) and the legal 
characteristics of a partner. The language of the statute clearly anticipated 
that an employer and employee would be separate legal entities. Thus, a 
partner-employer could not be included in the language of the statute as one 
covered under the Act, as the Act was intended to cover employees only. Although 
this Court has held that worker's compensation statutes are to be construed so 
that industry, rather than an injured workman, bears the burden of an industrial 
accident, Robinson v. Bell, 767 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 1989), we nevertheless are not 
permitted to ignore clear statutory language so as to extend coverage and 
benefits to situations that do not reasonably fall within the intended ambit of 
the statutes. Lehman v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, 752 P.2d 422 (Wyo. 1988). Here, the statutory language 
cannot be construed so as to extend employee benefits to a 
partner/employer.

 
 

[¶11.]  Even though this Court has never had 
occasion to address the question of whether a partner was an "employee" within 
the meaning of § 27-12-102(a)(viii), many other jurisdictions have answered this 
question in relation to statutes substantially similar to ours, and the 
overwhelming majority have found that partners are not eligible to receive 
compensation as employees under their worker's compensation acts. See 1C A. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 54.30 (1986), and cases cited therein. 
Illustrative of the cases from those jurisdictions is In re W.A. Montgomery 
& Son, 91 Ind. App. 21, 169 N.E. 879, 880 (1930), in which the Indiana court 
stated:

 
 
     In the early history 
of Workmen's Compensation Acts, it was decided by the courts of 
England that a partner working for 
his partnership and receiving compensation therefor independent of his share of 
the profits is not entitled to compensation for injuries sustained. And in the 
courts of the United 
States the great weight of authority is to the 
effect that a copartner in a partnership business cannot become an employee of 
himself and his copartners so as to be covered by a policy taken under the 
provisions of Workmen's Compensation Acts, insuring the partnership against 
liability for injury to employees.

 
 
(Citation 
omitted.)

 
 

[¶12.]  Benefits for injuries to partners have 
traditionally been denied under worker's compensation acts because of the legal 
characteristics of partners and partnerships. A partnership is not an entity 
separate from its partners. 1C A. Larson, supra at § 54.31. "Therefore, since 
the partnership is nothing more than the aggregate of the individuals making it 
up, a partner-employee would also be an employer." Id. at 9-253, quoted in Ryder's Case, 341 Mass. 661, 171 N.E.2d 475, 477-78 (1961). The worker's compensation acts cannot be presumed to have 
envisioned any such combination of employer and employee. Fink v. Fink, 64 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 
1953). As early as 1926, the New York Court of Appeals recognized the 
inconsistency when it stated in Lyle v. H.R. Lyle Cider & Vinegar Co., 243 N.Y. 257, 153 N.E. 67, 67-68, 47 A.L.R. 840 (1926):

 
 
The 
copartners, of course, are the principals and employers, and we do not think 
that it is within the contemplation of the Workmen's Compensation Act that one 
of them may become the employee of himself and his associates, and thus at the 
same time occupy the inconsistent attitudes of employer and employee. The 
Workmen's Compensation Law, in our opinion, does not contemplate any such 
anomalous situation and it is entirely opposed to well and long established 
principles of law which, to a certain extent, furnish the foundation for the 
Compensation Law, that a partner should have a claim against himself and his 
copartners for an accident springing out of the work of the copartnership and 
for the conduct of which he is responsible.

 
 

[¶13.]  In view of the overwhelming weight of 
authority and the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, we align 
ourselves with the majority of jurisdictions in holding that members of a 
partnership, the business of which was classified as extrahazardous, were not 
employees as that term was defined in § 27-12-102(a)(viii) and, therefore, were 
not entitled to compensation under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act for 
injuries received while they were actually subjected to the hazards of the 
business.

 
 

[¶14.]  Appellant argues that, if § 
27-12-102(a)(viii) is construed to mean that partners were not "employees" under 
the Act and thereby were not entitled to the Act's benefits, then § 
27-12-102(a)(viii) violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution6 and article 1, section 34 of the 
Wyoming Constitution.7 Appellant makes this argument on 
the basis that, in the statute's specific classification, officers of a 
corporation were "employees" entitled to receive benefits under the Act while 
members of a partnership were not classified as such.

 
 

[¶15.]  Appellant is correct in the citation of 
O'Brien v. State, 711 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 1986), for the proposition that there are 
two tests that may be applied in an equal protection challenge to determine if 
the classification is proper. A strict scrutiny standard is employed when a 
fundamental interest is affected or if the classification is inherently suspect. 
Baskin v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division, 722 P.2d 151 (Wyo. 1986). Under this 
standard, the classification is subject to close scrutiny to determine if it is 
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and the state is required to 
establish that there is no less onerous alternative by which it may achieve its 
objective. O'Brien, 711 P.2d 1144. When an ordinary interest is involved, 
however, a rational basis standard is applied, pursuant to which a court must 
determine whether the classification made by the statute is reasonably related 
to a legitimate state interest. Baskin, 722 P.2d 151. If, in the court's 
perception, the legislature had some arguable basis for choosing the ends and 
the means, the law will be sustained. O'Brien, 711 P.2d 1144. Appellant is 
incorrect, however, in contending that worker's compensation cases invoke a 
fundamental interest subject to the strict scrutiny standard. The right to 
worker's compensation benefits is not a fundamental right, but instead it is an 
ordinary interest. Baskin, 722 P.2d 151. Thus, the distinction between officers 
of a corporation and members of a partnership within § 27-12-102(a)(viii) needed 
merely to have a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective in order 
to withstand the constitutional challenge. There must only be some difference 
that furnishes the rational basis for different legislation as to different 
classes. Bell v. State, 693 P.2d 769 (Wyo. 1985); United States Steel Corporation v. Wyoming Environmental Quality Council, 575 P.2d 749 
(Wyo. 1978). 
We have held that the legislature possesses broad authority to classify persons 
who are entitled to receive awards under the Act, Trent v. Union Pacific Coal 
Company, 68 Wyo. 146, 231 P.2d 180 (1951) (overruled on other grounds), and that 
appellate courts should give substantial deference to that authority. Bell, 693 P.2d 769. The 
differences in classifications, however, cannot be arbitrary and without just 
relation to the matter being legislated. Id.; 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351 (Wyo. 
1978).

 
 
In Meyer v. 
Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1238-39 (Wyo. 1982) (quoting Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904, 910 (Wyo. 1980)), we stated:

 
 
     When the 
constitutionality of a statute is assailed, we are governed by the following 
standards:

 
 
"Statutes 
are presumed to be constitutional unless affirmatively shown to be otherwise, 
and one who would deny the constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden. 
The alleged unconstitutionality must be clearly and exactly shown beyond any 
reasonable doubt. One who assails a classification must carry the burden of 
showing that it does not rest on a reasonable basis, but is essentially 
arbitrary, and if any state of facts can be reasonably conceived which 
sustain[s] the classification, such facts will be 
assumed."

 
 
(Citations 
omitted.) See also Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Company, 220 U.S. 61, 31 S. Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. 369 
(1911). In addition, we adhere to the general rule that this Court has the duty 
to uphold the constitutionality of statutes enacted by the legislature if that 
is at all possible and any doubt must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. 
Meyer, 641 P.2d 1235, and cases cited therein. Moreover, statutes are presumed 
to rest upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the 
legislators. United States v. 
Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144, 58 S. Ct. 778, 82 L. Ed. 1234 
(1938).

 
 

[¶16.]  The Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 34 
of the Wyoming Constitution guarantee that "similar people will be dealt with 
similarly and that people in different circumstances will not be treated as 
though they were similar." Bell, 693 P.2d  at 771. In an attempt to fulfill 
the burden to show that no rational basis existed for the different treatment of 
officers of a corporation as opposed to members of a partnership, appellant 
argues that the legal distinctions between officers and partners were not 
sufficient to permit unequal treatment under the statute. We do not 
agree.

 
 

[¶17.]  A corporation has a separate legal 
existence, distinct from its officers. The corporation, as a separate entity, is 
the employer, and the officers are employees. Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 
(Wyo. 1981). A 
partnership, however, is fundamentally unlike a corporation. A partnership is 
merely the aggregate of the individuals comprising it, and it is not an entity 
distinct from its members. 1C A. Larson, supra at § 54.31. The partners' status 
is one of both employer and employee. Professor Larson has observed that, in 
cases

 
 
in which a 
partner (or someone claiming compensation on the strength of his status) is the 
claimant, * * * the almost insuperable conceptual obstacle is encountered of 
having the same person appear as employer and employee.

 
 

Id. at 9-255. 
Thus, an officer of a corporation and a member of a partnership are not 
similarly situated. A partner is an employer and employee, whereas an officer is 
simply an employee. A rational basis exists, therefore, for the disparate 
treatment afforded under the Act to partners as opposed to corporate officers, 
and appellant's equal protection challenge of the statute must 
fail.

 
 

[¶18.]  We hold that a member of a partnership 
was not an employee within the definition of § 27-12-102(a)(viii) and was not 
entitled to benefits under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. Further, 
appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Act unconstitutionally 
discriminates between partners and corporate officers in such a manner as to 
offend the Equal Protection Clauses of United States and Wyoming 
Constitutions.

 
 

[¶19.]  AFFIRMED.

 
 

URBIGKIT and GOLDEN, JJ., files specially concurring 
opinions.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Throughout the 
proceedings below, the decedent, Martin L. Hays, was identified as the claimant, 
and this appeal was taken in his name. Thus, we will refer to the decedent as 
the appellant, with the understanding that his widow and children are actually 
prosecuting this appeal as his representatives.

 
 

2 Chapter 12 of Title 
27 (Worker's Compensation, §§ 27-12-101 to -805) was repealed in 1986 and 
recreated as current Chapter 14 (Wyo. Stat. §§ 27-14-101 to -804 (1977)) 
effective July 1, 1987. This case arose under the prior Act and, unless 
specified otherwise, reference in this opinion will be to the earlier 
Act.

 
 

3 The report was filed 
denoting Hays Construction as the employer on the belief that Steven Hays, 
appellant's cousin, was doing business under that name. However, it was later 
learned that Steven Hays was actually doing business under the name of Hays 
Transportation Co. A motion to reform the employer's name in the pleadings was 
filed and accepted by the court.

 
 

4 An employer's failure 
to pay into the worker's compensation fund does not defeat a surviving spouse's 
and children's rights to receive compensation if the deceased spouse was an 
employee doing extrahazardous work. See §§ 27-12-207(a), 27-12-408, and 
27-12-409 (currently Wyo. Stat. §§ 27-14-203(a), 27-14-403(e)(iii), and 
27-14-403(d)(ii) and (e)(iv) (1977)).

 
 

5 Now Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-102(a)(vii) (1977).

 
 

6 U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part that no state shall "deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

 
 

7 Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 34 
provides for equal protection in the following language:

 
 
            
All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform 
operation.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶20.]  I agree to affirm the benefit denial, but 
differ in extension of this decision to determinations not required for present 
disposition. Controlling in my perspective are the facts that the partnership 
had no account for worker's compensation and that neither partner made any 
effort to comply with premium payment requirements which would demonstrate 
intent to establish an employer/employee status within the partnership operation 
for worker's compensation purposes or otherwise.

 
 

[¶21.]  I do not necessarily agree that a 
partnership is not a separate entity from its constituent partners as is to be 
found within various contexts, including initial liability and tax reporting 
status. Similarly, I see no need nor justification to presently determine that 
coverage will not be established if the partnership establishes the account and 
lists the partners as covered workers in premium payment. This result may be 
required by the constitutional mandate of Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4, establishing 
worker's compensation, and as similarly defined in due process and equal 
protection by Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6 and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 34, uniform operation of 
general law, which serve by conception of the Wyoming Constitutional Convention 
of 1890 to amplify and synthesize restrictions imposed by U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV.

 
 

[¶22.]  Finding a specific factual basis for 
affirmation, I do not join the majority in presently pursuing the more pervasive 
issues of legislative intent, statutory construction or constitutional 
limitation that need not now be considered. In due time, if W.S. 
27-12-102(a)(vii) (1983 Replacement) remains unamended, this court can then 
consider those broader issues when presented by the employee claimant partner 
who, having been listed for coverage with premium paid, sustains a job related 
injury.

 
 

GOLDEN, Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶23.]  I concur in the majority's analysis of 
the first issue in this case. On the second issue, I agree with the result 
reached by the majority, but disagree with its analysis in arriving at that 
result.

 
 

[¶24.]  In the second issue, appellant 
specifically argues that if the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act is construed 
such that working partners cannot qualify as employees eligible for death 
benefits, the act violates appellant's right to equal protection under the U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 34. Appellant asserts 
that all persons who do extrahazardous work in Wyoming, whether they are working partners or 
corporate officers, are similarly situated such that the legislature cannot 
rationally categorize among them when it defines an "employee" under the 
worker's compensation laws. Before we reach the rational basis test analysis set 
forth in the majority opinion, we should satisfy ourselves that persons who are 
working partners and persons who are corporate officers are all persons 
"similarly situated" in the first instance when those categories are viewed in 
terms of the purpose behind Wyoming's worker's compensation 
laws.

 
 

[¶25.]  The concept of equal protection deals 
with the government's legislative ability to further a rational governmental 
objective or purpose by categorizing a specific group of persons from a larger 
initial group of persons who are "similarly situated." Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 333-40, 42 S. Ct. 124, 
129-32, 66 L. Ed. 254, 263-67 (1921). See also Tussman and tenBroeck, The Equal 
Protection of the Laws, XXXVII Calif.L.Rev. 341, 344-47 (1949). To be "similarly 
situated," the initial group of persons must all possess some basic trait in 
relation to the purpose that the legislative classification attempts to achieve. 
Tussman and tenBroeck, supra. See also the analysis used by this court in Small 
v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 424-27 (Wyo. 1984), 
cert. denied, sub nom. Small v. Wyoming, 469 U.S. 1224, 105 S. Ct. 1215, 84 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985).

 
 

[¶26.]  For example, consider the legislative 
classification presented by a zoning law restricting the height of buildings 
that can be constructed on city lots. Similarly situated persons affected by the 
law all possess the basic trait of ownership of a city lot upon which a building 
can be constructed; the classification among those persons targets those who 
want to build tall structures on their lots. The basic trait which similarly 
situates the initial group is evident only when viewed in terms of the purpose 
of the law making the classification. Tussman and tenBroeck, 
supra.

 
 

[¶27.]  The purpose behind the constitutional 
amendment and the subsequent legislation that created the Wyoming worker's 
compensation system was an economic one that essentially embodied "a compromise 
between employers and employees who 
recognized the need for a new system to compensate employees for employment 
related injuries without the employee 
having to rely upon tort concepts." Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885, 887 (Wyo. 1984) (emphasis added). See also Meyer v. 
Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Wyo. 1982) and cases there cited. The basic 
trait all employees shared in light of this governmental purpose was that, 
before worker's compensation, they all possessed the common law right to sue 
their employers in tort for injuries they received during the course of their 
employment. Therefore, to be similarly situated in the first instance under the 
worker's compensation laws, a person had to be an employee who would have been able to sue his or her 
employer in tort for work related injuries.

 
 

[¶28.]  Working partners did not possess that 
basic trait when the legislature passed the worker's compensation laws. At 
common law, a working partner has never been able to maintain an action at law, 
here a tort action, for injuries arising out of work that furthers the object of 
the partnership. Svetik v. Svetik, 377 Pa. Super. 496, 547 A.2d 794, 799 (1988). This 
is because partners are co-owners in a business for profit, who, like joint 
ventures, would have to sue themselves to sue the partnership entity. Id. See also W.S. 
17-13-201(a); W.S. 17-13-305; W.S. 17-13-307(a)(i); W.S. 17-13-401(a)(ii). Cf. 
Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 706 (Wyo. 1987) (discussing 
the rule for joint venturers).

 
 

[¶29.]  Viewed in this way, working partners 
never were "employees" who gave up the right to sue their employees in tort when 
the legislature made its worker's compensation compromise between employees and 
employers. They were not "similarly situated" with corporate officers when the 
legislature passed the law that makes the challenged classification. Further, 
the legislature has the right to address a desired governmental objective in a 
piecemeal fashion if it desires to do so. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 
488-90, 75 S. Ct. 461, 465-66, 99 L. Ed. 563, 573 (1955). Since appellant cannot 
show that working partners and corporate officers were "similarly situated" 
under the purpose behind the worker's compensation legislation, her argument 
fails at the outset.

 
 

[¶30.]  I would affirm on appellant's second 
issue using this approach.