Case Title: Commonwealth v. Ellis

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11993

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11993 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SEAN K. ELLIS. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 5, 2016. - September 9, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, New trial, Disclosure of evidence.  
Evidence, Exculpatory.  Estoppel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 27, 1993. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 432 Mass. 746 (2000), a 
motion for a new trial, filed on March 13, 2013, was heard by 
Carol S. Ball, J. 
 
 
A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Spina, J., in 
the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
 
Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney (Edmond J. Zabin, 
Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth. 
 
Rosemary Curran Scapicchio (Jillise McDonough with her) for 
the defendant. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Justices Spina and Duffly participated in the deliberation 
on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  On September 14, 1995, a Superior Court jury 
found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and 
armed robbery in the killing of Boston police Detective John 
Mulligan.  In 2000, we affirmed the defendant's convictions and 
the denial of his motion for a new trial.  Commonwealth v. 
Ellis, 432 Mass. 746, 765 (2000).  In 2013, the defendant filed 
a second motion for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence regarding the victim's participation in crimes of 
police corruption with several Boston police detectives who 
investigated his murder, and information provided to the police 
regarding possible third-party culprits.  A Superior Court judge  
allowed the new trial motion, concluding that the newly 
discovered evidence cast real doubt on the justice of his 
convictions.  We conclude that the judge did not abuse her 
discretion in ordering a new trial.  
 
Background.  1.  Evidence at trial.  The convictions at 
issue in this case arose from the defendant's third trial.  At 
the first trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of the 
illegal possession of two firearms without a license, but were 
unable to render verdicts on the murder and armed robbery 
indictments, and a mistrial was declared as to those 
indictments.  The jury in the second trial were also unable to 
render verdicts on the murder and armed robbery indictments, 
3 
 
 
resulting again in a mistrial.  We recount the evidence 
presented at the defendant's third trial.   
 
The victim had been a Boston police detective for seventeen 
years before his death.  In the early morning of September 26, 
1993, he was working a paid security detail at a Walgreens 
pharmacy in the Roslindale section of Boston, a detail that he 
worked several times a week.   
 
The defendant, after waiving the Miranda rights, told 
police that, at approximately 2:30 A.M., his cousin asked him to 
buy some diapers on his way home.  His friend, Terry Patterson, 
drove him and a woman to the Walgreens, where he purchased the 
diapers.2  He had earlier received a page from a friend, whom he 
telephoned from a public pay telephone outside the store at 
about 3:00 A.M.  According to the defendant, Patterson then 
drove the defendant and the woman to the defendant's apartment, 
where he spent the rest of the early morning.   
 
At approximately 3:05 A.M., Rosa Sanchez arrived at the 
Walgreens with her husband to buy soap.  As she walked past the 
victim's vehicle, she noticed that the victim was asleep in his 
vehicle.  She also saw a man, whom she later identified as the 
                                                          
 
 
2 There was evidence that a black male was seen in the 
diaper aisle of Walgreens at about 3:10 A.M. and that diapers 
were found at the defendant's apartment during a search 
conducted on October 1, 1993.   
 
4 
 
 
defendant, crouching by the victim's vehicle.  She entered the 
Walgreens and remained in the store for about twenty minutes.   
 
Patterson owned a maroon or burgundy Volkswagen Rabbit 
vehicle with tinted windows, custom wheels, and a "bra" on the 
front.  At approximately 3:20 A.M., a newspaper deliverer was 
nearly struck by a vehicle matching that description as it was 
driven away from the Walgreens with two men in the front seat 
and a woman in the rear seat.  At about that same time, Victor 
Brown was awakened by a loud vehicle, and saw two African-
American men, one tall, the other short and stocky,3 standing 
near a brown Volkswagen Rabbit parked on the sidewalk with a 
woman sleeping in the rear seat.  The two men walked into a 
wooded area, reemerged from the woods, and walked down a 
footpath in the direction of the Walgreens, which was five 
minutes away on foot.  At approximately 3:35 A.M., Brown heard 
vehicle doors close and a vehicle engine start, and saw the 
brown vehicle drive away. 
As Sanchez left the Walgreens at 
approximately 3:25 A.M., she saw the man she previously had seen 
crouching by the victim's vehicle standing with another man by a 
pay telephone near the vehicle.  At about this same time, 
another customer arrived at the Walgreens.  She spent a few 
minutes in the store, and, as she left, she saw two men fitting 
                                                          
 
 
3 The defendant was tall and thin; Terry Patterson was short 
and stocky.  
5 
 
 
the descriptions of the defendant and Patterson walking toward 
the pay telephones.  She noticed as she was entering and leaving 
the store that the victim appeared to be asleep in his vehicle 
with his seat reclined.    
 
At 3:30 A.M., a Walgreens employee left the store during a 
break to get coffee, noticing as he left that the victim was in 
the victim's vehicle and appeared to be fine.  The employee 
drove to get coffee at a shop that was about five minutes away.  
When he returned to the Walgreens several minutes later, he saw 
that the victim, who was still in the driver's seat of the 
vehicle with his seat reclined, had blood on his face.  After 
unsuccessfully trying to rouse the victim, the employee ran into 
the store and told the manager to call the police.  The 911 call 
was made at 3:49 A.M.   
 
The victim had been shot five times in the face; each of 
the shots would have proved fatal.  The front driver's side door 
of the victim's car was unlocked; the front passenger's side 
door was locked.  The police officers who responded to the scene 
saw that the victim was wearing a holster for his service 
weapon, but the weapon was missing.  Several of the individuals 
who were at the Walgreens that morning gave statements to 
police.  Several witnesses recounted seeing two males whose 
descriptions were consistent with the defendant and Patterson in 
the area of the Walgreens between 3:00 and 3:30 A.M., but 
6 
 
 
Sanchez was the only witness who later identified either the 
defendant or Patterson.   
 
Early in the morning of September 30, police located 
Patterson's vehicle.  The vehicle no longer had a license plate, 
and the windows were no longer tinted; instead, they bore 
scratch marks and a glue-like residue, consistent with the 
tinting having been removed.   
 
Under a grant of immunity, Letia Walker, the defendant's 
girl friend, testified that on the morning of September 30, she 
went with the defendant to his apartment.4  The defendant entered 
the apartment, and returned with a bag.  When they went to 
Walker's home, the defendant removed two guns from the bag, a 
nine-millimeter Glock pistol and a .25 caliber pistol with a 
"white" handle.  The defendant then hid the guns under Walker's 
dresser.  On October 1, Kurt Headen, a friend of the defendant, 
came to Walker's home.  Walker and Headen removed the guns from 
under the dresser, and Walker touched the clip of the .25 
caliber pistol.  Headen took the guns and discarded them in a 
field by Walker's house.   
 
On October 7, Boston police recruits found the two guns in 
that field.  The Glock recovered from the field was the service 
                                                          
 
 
4 On September 29, two cousins who lived with the defendant 
were murdered in his apartment.  The jury did not learn of this 
killing.  There is no evidence connecting their murder to the 
defendant. 
7 
 
 
weapon registered to the victim.  Forensic testing revealed that 
the .25 caliber pistol was the murder weapon.   
 
On the evening of October 5, Sanchez was brought to the 
Boston police homicide unit with her husband by Detectives 
Walter Robinson and Kenneth Acerra to view photographic arrays.  
Detective Acerra knew Sanchez personally -- he lived with, and 
had a child by, Sanchez's aunt, and he was a good friend of 
Sanchez's mother.  Sanchez was shown two photographic arrays, 
one that contained a photograph of the defendant and another 
that contained a photograph of Patterson.  When she was first 
shown the array containing the defendant's photograph, Sanchez 
became upset and told the police that one of the people in the 
array had stalked her.5  The detectives who administered the 
array covered that photograph, and Sanchez looked at the 
remaining seven photographs.  She pointed to the photograph of 
someone other than the defendant, stating that she "[thought] 
that may be the person" she saw crouching by the victim's 
vehicle.6  She left the police station with her husband and 
                                                          
 
 
5 At the motion to suppress the identification testimony, 
Rosa Sanchez was presented with the same photographic array and 
asked to point to the photograph of the person who had stalked 
her.  She selected a different photograph from the one she 
initially said was her stalker during the identification 
procedure that was conducted at the police station.  
 
 
 
6 Rosa Sanchez's husband, who drove her to the Walgreen's 
pharmacy on the morning of the killing, identified the same man 
when he was shown a photographic array a few days earlier.   
8 
 
 
Detectives Robinson and Acerra.  Sanchez returned to the 
homicide unit minutes later, however, after she told her husband 
that she had intentionally selected the wrong person and her 
husband related that information to Detective Robinson.  Sanchez 
testified that she picked the wrong person because she was 
afraid and did not want to get involved.  When she returned to 
the homicide unit, she was shown the same photographic array and 
identified the photograph of the defendant as the person she had 
seen crouching by the victim's vehicle.7  Sanchez later 
identified the defendant in an in-person lineup and made an in-
court identification of the defendant.  
 
A forensic fingerprint examiner testified to his opinion 
that a fingerprint, found on the clip of the murder weapon, was 
made by Walker.  The same fingerprint examiner processed the 
victim's vehicle and found four latent prints on the driver's 
side door.  The examiner testified that the four fingerprints 
were left simultaneously by different fingers of the same hand.  
The examiner identified the four fingerprints as belonging to 
Patterson and opined that the fingerprints were left by the act 
of closing the vehicle's door.8   
                                                          
 
 
 
7 Sanchez did not identity anyone in the array containing 
the photograph of Patterson.  
 
8 Patterson was convicted of murder in the first degree, 
armed robbery, and possession of a dangerous weapon in a 
9 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth's theory of the case, as presented in 
closing argument, was that the defendant spotted the victim 
sleeping in his vehicle and saw the opportunity to steal a 
police officer's service weapon.  The defendant and Patterson, 
it was argued, then drove to the side street near the Walgreens 
and left Patterson's vehicle there to avoid detection and 
facilitate their escape.  They then walked back to the Walgreens 
and waited in the parking lot until no witnesses were present.  
When the parking lot was otherwise empty, "they" shot the 
victim, took his service weapon, ran back to Patterson's car, 
and drove away.  Under the Commonwealth's theory, the motive for 
the murder was to take the victim's service weapon as a trophy.  
 
The jury convicted the defendant of armed robbery and of 
murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or 
                                                          
 
separate trial, but his convictions were reversed on appeal and 
his case was remanded for a new trial.  Commonwealth v. 
Patterson, 432 Mass. 767, 768, 781 (2000).  On remand, Patterson 
moved in limine to bar the admission of the fingerprint 
identification, claiming that the identification opinion did not 
meet the reliability standards set forth in Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590-595 (1993), and 
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 25-26 (1994).  
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 627-628 (2005).  The 
judge determined the fingerprint identification evidence to be 
admissible but reported the question, and we granted direct 
appellate review.  Id. at 628.  We held that it was an abuse of 
discretion to conclude that the identification opinion was 
admissible because the methodology used by the examiner to 
identify simultaneous latent fingerprint impressions was not 
reliable and thus not admissible.  Id. at 639, 654-655.  
Patterson later pleaded guilty to the lesser included crime of 
manslaughter, and was sentenced to time served.   
10 
 
 
cruelty and felony-murder.  The judge denied the defendant's 
motion for a new trial, and on appeal we affirmed both the 
convictions and the denial of the motion for a new trial.  
Ellis, 432 Mass. at 747.  In that motion for a new trial, the 
defendant argued that newly discovered evidence concerning 
corrupt police practices committed by Detectives Robinson, 
Acerra, and Brazil "cast enough doubt on the integrity of the 
police investigatory procedures leading up to the Sanchez 
identification to necessitate a new trial and a new hearing on 
his motion to suppress."  Id. at 764.  We noted that in 1997, 
two years after the defendant's convictions at his third trial, 
a Federal grand jury returned indictments against Acerra and 
Robinson alleging, among other things, that they submitted false 
search warrant applications and affidavits and illegally seized 
property and funds obtained through the searches conducted 
pursuant to those warrants.  Id.  Acerra and Robinson pleaded 
guilty to fourteen counts of criminal conduct; Brazil was not 
charged with criminal wrongdoing but, after being granted 
immunity, admitted his involvement in the wrongdoing.  Id. at 
764 & n.12.  We also noted that Acerra, Robinson, and Brazil 
"were each directly involved in the investigation and 
prosecution of the defendant."  Id. at 764-765.  Brazil 
testified at trial "to the circumstances and content of the 
defendant's statement to the police."  Id. at 765.  Acerra and 
11 
 
 
Robinson did not testify at trial, but both testified at the 
hearing where the defendant's motion to suppress the 
identification of the defendant by Sanchez was denied.  Id.  The 
defendant argued that "evidence of [the detectives'] misconduct 
in other investigations should be admissible (1) to impeach 
their credibility concerning the photographic array, and (2) to 
suggest that Sanchez's identification of the defendant's 
photograph was the product of corrupt police tactics, and that a 
new trial is required for this purpose."  Id.  We concluded that 
the defendant had failed to meet his burden of showing that 
Sanchez's identification was "unnecessarily suggestive" and 
therefore should have been suppressed, because there was an 
"absence of evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, suggesting that 
the subject detectives procured false evidence in connection 
with the investigation of this defendant."  Id.  
 
2.  Second motion for a new trial.  On March 13, 2013, the 
defendant filed a second motion for a new trial, arguing that he 
was entitled to a new trial because of newly discovered evidence 
and the Commonwealth's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.  
In support of his motion, the defendant offered documentary 
evidence obtained through public records requests.  The judge 
assigned to hear the motion, who was not the trial judge,9 
                                                          
 
 
9 The trial judge had retired.   
12 
 
 
allowed the defendant's request for further discovery, which 
resulted in additional documentary evidence on which the 
defendant relies.  In addition to considering the documentary 
evidence, the motion judge held an evidentiary hearing over the 
course of seven days.  The testimony focused on three issues:  
the alleged inadequacies in the investigation, the involvement 
of corrupt detectives in the investigation, and the discovery 
that was provided to the defendant's trial counsel.   
 
In her decision allowing the motion for a new trial, the 
judge identified various categories of evidence that she 
concluded were newly discovered:  (1) information regarding the 
theft on September 9, 1993, seventeen days before the victim's 
death, of approximately $26,000 from Robert Martin by Detectives 
Robinson, Acerra, and Kenneth Beers, Sergeant Detective Leonard 
J. Marquardt, and the victim (Martin theft); (2) Federal Bureau 
of Investigation informant reports (FBI informant reports); (3) 
information regarding an allegation by Boston police Detective 
George Foley that the son of a Boston police officer had told 
him in late August, 1993, that his father was going to kill the 
victim because the victim would not leave the son's fourteen 
year old sister alone (Foley allegation); (4) information from 
Boston police anti-corruption division (ACD) files regarding 
Detective Robinson and the victim together robbing two mid-level 
drug dealers of a large sum of money in or around May of 1992 
13 
 
 
(drug dealer robbery); (5) information from ACD files regarding 
the victim obtained through Ronald Hansen (Hansen report); and 
(6) tips from the Boston police "hotline" established after the 
victim's killing to obtain investigative leads (hotline tips).  
We briefly summarize the most relevant information in the 
judge's findings regarding each of these categories of evidence. 
 
a.  Martin theft.  As described in the Federal grand jury 
testimony of Martin and his roommate in September and October, 
1996, respectively, and an ACD report of Martin's interview with 
an investigator, Martin was stopped on September 9, 1993, by 
Detectives Robinson, Acerra, and Beers, along with the victim 
and Sergeant Detective Marquardt, while Martin was in a vehicle 
conducting a sale of marijuana with another individual.  Acerra 
identified himself as an "INS" officer and gave a false name 
during the encounter.  The detectives confiscated Martin's 
knapsack, which contained seven pounds of marijuana, and served 
Martin with a search warrant for his apartment.  Robinson and 
Acerra took Martin's keys and left Martin in the vehicle 
"guarded by" the victim.  Robinson later returned to the vehicle 
and told Martin to come to the apartment to open a safe, which 
Martin did.  The safe contained twenty-two pounds of marijuana.  
The victim appears to have entered the apartment either with 
Martin or after Martin left the vehicle.  
14 
 
 
 
Martin's roommate arrived at the apartment to find Martin, 
Martin's girl friend, and another friend of Martin being 
detained by the detectives.  Two detectives took the roommate to 
his room and asked him to open a safe, from which they 
confiscated marijuana.  Robinson then took Martin to a second 
apartment with Acerra and Marquardt to open another safe, 
leaving the victim and Beers in the first apartment to detain 
Martin's roommate and the others.  When the detectives asked 
Martin to open the safe in the second apartment, Martin asked 
Marquardt whether, in exchange, the detectives would release 
Martin's friends.  Marquardt told him he would release them only 
if there was more money in the safe, because they had found only 
$8,000.10  When Martin opened the safe, Acerra removed 
approximately $18,000 to $20,000.  After a telephone call from 
one of the detectives at the second apartment, the roommate and 
the others were released.  The police report documenting the 
execution of the warrant, which was signed by both Detective 
Robinson and the victim, declares that "several pounds of 
marijuana" and drug paraphernalia were seized; the report makes 
no reference to the seizure of any money.11   
                                                          
 
 
10 The detectives already had found $8,000 that Robert 
Martin kept in a filing cabinet in that apartment.  
 
 
11 The Federal indictment against Detectives Walter Robinson 
and Kenneth Acerra stated that Robinson falsely reported in the 
search warrant inventory that only $14,000 was seized.  
15 
 
 
 
b.  FBI informant reports.  An FBI informant who had "an 
intimate knowledge" of the victim reported on November 12, 1993, 
that the victim "regularly . . . 'shook down' pimps, 
prostitutes, and drug dealers for money."  The victim, according 
to this informant, also dealt drugs, extorted other police 
officers, and "used every means available to blackmail people."  
The informant "has heard often that [the victim] committed 
murder as a cop."   
 
An FBI informant reported on November 1, 1993, that 
Detective Foley was recently disciplined for accusing Officer 
Raymond Armstead, Sr. (Armstead Sr.) of involvement in the 
victim's murder.  The reports also contain allegations that the 
victim was a "rogue" officer who "[shook] down" bar owners, 
bookmakers, and the owners of second-hand jewelry stores, and 
paid a prostitute to drop charges against a third party.  The 
reports also reveal that the victim "'liked' young black girls" 
and was the subject of a Federal investigation as early as 1986.  
 
c.  Foley allegation.  Detective Foley was originally 
assigned to the Boston police task force that was constituted in 
the wake of the victim's death to investigate his murder (task 
force).  On September 30, 1993, Detective Foley related to 
several detectives that, in August of that year, he was 
investigating threats made against Raymond Armstead, Jr. 
(Armstead Jr.), a correction officer for the Suffolk County 
16 
 
 
sheriff's department and son of Armstead Sr.  Detective Foley 
reported that Armstead Jr. told Foley that his father had a 
"beef" with the victim because the victim would not "leave 
[Armstead Jr.'s] fourteen year old sister alone."  Foley stated 
that Armstead Jr. told Foley that his father was going to kill 
the victim and that his father knew that the victim worked a 
detail at Walgreens and slept in his vehicle during the detail.  
Foley said that Armstead Jr. told him that Foley would "read 
about it in the papers" that the victim had been "[s]hot between 
the eyes at Walgreens."   
 
A report authored by Sergeant Detective Daniel Keeler 
stated that, later in the day on September 30, Keeler and 
Sergeant Detective Thomas J. O'Leary met with Armstead Jr. to 
discuss the allegations.  During this interview, Armstead Jr. 
confirmed that Foley had investigated the threats against 
Armstead Jr. but denied telling Foley that his father was going 
to kill the victim, denied knowing the victim, and denied that 
the victim had any involvement with a younger sister, stating 
that he was the youngest child in his family.12   
                                                          
 
 
12 In 2014, Boston police detectives contacted retired 
Officer Raymond Armstead, Sr., to inquire about his children.  
Officer Armstead informed the detectives that, in 1993, he had 
four daughters:  two biological daughters and two foster 
daughters.  Officer Armstead further stated that in 1993 one of 
his foster daughters was twelve or thirteen years old.  
17 
 
 
 
Confronted with the information elicited from Armstead Jr.,  
Foley said that he may have been "totally wrong," but ultimately 
insisted that he was telling the truth.  At 11:30 P.M. on 
September 30, Captain Detective Edward J. McNelley told Foley 
that the information he had supplied was false.  McNelley 
concluded that Foley was suffering from "severe emotional 
depression" and was unable to perform his duties, so he 
requested that Foley surrender his gun and badge, and relieved 
him of duty.   Foley later received treatment at a hospital.  A 
psychological evaluation concluded that Foley could return to 
work and carry a gun.    
 
d.  Drug dealer robbery.  An ACD report dated November 17, 
1993, reported that an anonymous tipster had reported that, 
eighteen months earlier, the victim and Robinson had robbed two 
drug dealers at gunpoint.  The reliability of the tip was rated 
"good," and an ACD lieutenant met with the tipster that day and 
learned that the robbery involved a large sum of money.  
 
e.  Hansen report.  The ACD files contained notes from an 
interview with Ronald Hansen, dated May 9, 1996.  Detective 
Robinson used Hansen and Hansen's ex-wife as informants.  The 
interview notes recount that the ex-wife had known the victim 
since she was sixteen years old and that the victim "used to 
take young girls for rides in his car."  The notes also state 
that Detective Robinson asked Hansen if he knew anything about 
18 
 
 
the victim's murder and Hansen responded that the victim "took 
drugs from the girl friend of one of the killers and told her if 
her boy friend wanted the drugs back he would have to come and 
see [the victim] or he'd arrest her."  Hansen added that "[o]ne 
of the girls killed in Mattapan was the girl friend," apparently 
referring to one of the defendant's cousins who was killed on 
September 29, 1993.  See note 4, supra.  The notes also reflect 
that another detective asked the ex-wife if the victim carried a 
.25 caliber gun on his ankle, and she answered that the victim 
did.  
 
f.  Hotline tips.  The same day as the victim's shooting, 
the Boston police department publicized a hotline for people to 
call with tips regarding the victim's murder.  While the motion 
for a new trial was being litigated, the defendant requested and 
the Commonwealth disclosed written reports of the tips received 
on the hotline, some of which the defendant had received in 
redacted form from a prior public records request.   
 
Many of the tips allege or suggest that someone other than 
the defendant committed the murder or participated in the 
murder.  The notes memorializing the tips show, among other 
things, that (1) on the afternoon of September 26, 1993, a 
detective "called and stated that his brother . . . , who is a 
guard at South Bay . . . told him that an inmate, William Bell, 
told [his brother] that a drug dealer, named Armstead, had a 
19 
 
 
contract out on [the victim]"; (2) a tip dated September 30, was 
purportedly from a taxicab driver who drove the victim's girl 
friend to the parking lot the night of the murder where she shot 
him with a .25 caliber gun that the victim had given her for 
self-defense;13,14 (3) police received two separate tips, one on 
September 27, 1993, and another on September 29, alleging that a 
"Royce Hill" was an accomplice to the shooting; and (4) police 
received three separate tips stating that someone at the Essex 
County house of correction had information relating to the 
victim's murder.  
 
At the evidentiary hearing on the second motion for a new 
trial, Sergeant Detective O'Leary testified that he was the 
"shepherd" of the victim's homicide investigation, and that, as 
tips came in, "they were handed out" to pairs of investigators 
who were part of the task force engaged in the homicide 
investigation.  O'Leary stated that he would write the names of 
the detectives he assigned to investigate the tip on the report 
of the tip and that those detectives should have documented any 
                                                          
 
 
13 Another tip, also dated September 30, 1993, stated that 
the victim kept a .25 caliber firearm in his closet that his 
girl friend did not know about.  
 
 
14 One witness gave a statement to police on September 27, 
1993, in which she said that she was at the Walgreens on the 
night of the shooting, arriving at approximately 2:50 A.M.  She 
stated she saw a woman, who was white and in her mid-thirties to 
early-forties, in the victim's car talking to the victim.  She 
did not testify at trial.  
20 
 
 
investigation that was done to follow up on the tip in a report 
that was filed with him.  He admitted, however, that there was 
only one tip that showed that detectives had been assigned to 
investigate it, and that the tip had been assigned to Sergeant 
Detective Marquardt and Detective Acerra.  O'Leary further 
conceded that there are no reports or records showing that any 
investigation was done to follow up on any of the tips received 
on the hotline.  
 
The judge concluded that these six categories of newly 
discovered evidence showed that the investigators "failed to 
vigorously pursue other leads" and, when combined with evidence 
of the "conflict of interest" of Acerra, Robinson, and Brazil,  
formed the basis for "a potentially powerful" defense under 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980).15   The 
judge found that Robinson, Acerra, and Brazil "were involved in 
nearly every aspect of the homicide investigation" that resulted 
in the defendant's prosecution.  All three were on the fifty-
person task force conducting the investigation.  Acerra and 
Marquardt were among the first to enter the victim's home after 
he was killed.16  Acerra and Brazil were the first to respond to 
                                                          
 
 
15 The judge left open the question whether any of the newly 
discovered evidence would be admissible as evidence of a third-
party culprit; she did not rest her decision on this ground.  
 
 
16 Tina Erti, the roommate of the victim's girl friend, 
reported that after the girl friend learned about the victim's 
21 
 
 
Sanchez's home on the day of the killing.  Acerra and Robinson 
were present when Sanchez was first shown the photographic array 
and were with Sanchez after she selected the photograph of 
someone other than the defendant and before she identified the 
defendant.  Acerra and Detective Richard Ross found the victim's 
cellular telephone below a tray in the center console of the 
victim's vehicle on October 1, even though an inventory search 
of the vehicle had been conducted on the day of the shooting and 
a cellular telephone was not among the twenty-two items listed 
in the inventory.17  Acerra and Robinson drove Headen, who 
allegedly hid the firearms in the field, to the police station 
to be interviewed on October 12, 1993.18  Brazil was one of the 
                                                          
 
death, the girl friend went to his apartment to look for money 
she knew he kept there.  She did not find the money and told 
Detective Robinson, who said the police had taken it.   
 
 
17 Both Sergeant Detective Thomas O'Leary and Detective 
Robert Foilb, who took custody of the cellular telephone after 
it was recovered, testified they were unaware of any steps taken 
to examine the contents of the cellular telephone for any 
information, such as the last call made or received.  Foilb 
testified that the telephone was processed for fingerprints but 
no fingerprints were found on the telephone, including the 
victim's.   
 
 
18 On October 2, 1993, five days before the two firearms, 
including the .25 caliber handgun with a pearl handle that was 
determined to be the murder weapon, were found in the field, 
Detectives John McCarthy, Randall Halstead, and Dennis Harris 
interviewed Tina Erti, the roommate of the victim’s girl friend, 
and asked, "Have you ever seen [the victim] with a small caliber 
gun with a pearl handle?"  Erti answered, "Never."   
 
22 
 
 
detectives who questioned the defendant, and he was one of the 
detectives who interviewed the defendant's uncle.19   
 
The conflict of interest the judge identified was that  
"Detectives Brazil, Acerra, and Robinson had a personal 
interest in solving [the victim's] homicide as quickly as 
possible before any members of the . . . [t]ask [f]orce, 
who were not part of the corruption scheme, or anyone else, 
could look further into why [the victim] may have rubbed 
people the wrong way or was rumored to be a 'dirty cop.'  
In other words, they needed to prevent others from finding 
out that they and [the victim] had been engaging in illegal 
activities."  (Emphasis in original.)   
 
The judge stated that, with this newly discovered evidence, the 
defendant could have argued that the corrupt detectives 
"compromised potential evidence of the identity of [the 
victim's] killer while attempting to conceal evidence of their 
own wrongdoing."  
 
The judge also found that  
"[t]he newly discovered evidence would have further 
supported a powerful Bowden defense by revealing that the 
Commonwealth failed to investigate numerous other parties 
with reason to kill [the victim].  Such a defense could 
have raised a reasonable doubt as to whether, as the 
Commonwealth claimed at trial, [the defendant] decided to 
                                                          
 
 
19 The defendant's uncle testified at the first two trials, 
but not at the third trial.  In his statement to police, the 
uncle stated that the defendant told him that he (the defendant) 
went to Walgreens to buy diapers.  The defendant said that, when 
he left the store, he noticed that Patterson's vehicle was no 
longer in the parking lot, but was parked across the street near 
some bushes.  He then saw Patterson run towards him, urging him 
to come.  When they got to the vehicle, Patterson told him that 
he (Patterson) had shot someone, and handed the defendant two 
guns, which the defendant and Patterson later placed in plastic 
bags and buried.  The defendant made clear to the uncle that he 
was not the shooter.   
23 
 
 
kill [the victim] simply because the opportunity presented 
itself."   
 
 
The judge concluded that the newly discovered evidence of 
the conflict of interest of Acerra, Robinson, and Brazil, and 
the Boston police department's "failure to follow up on leads 
implicating third-party suspects is material, credible, and 
would have been a real factor in the jury's deliberations," such 
that "this is a case where justice has not been done."20  
 
Discussion.  The Commonwealth essentially makes three 
challenges to the motion judge's new trial order.  First, the 
Commonwealth contends that the judge was clearly erroneous in 
finding that the Foley allegation and the hotline tips were 
newly discovered.  Second, the Commonwealth claims that, in 
considering the first motion for a new trial, the motion judge 
and this court knew of the evidence of police corruption 
committed by Detectives Acerra, Robinson, and Brazil and the 
defendant therefore is barred by the principle of direct 
estoppel from relitigating this issue in a second motion for a 
                                                          
 
 
20 The motion judge also concluded that the drug dealer 
robbery information, the reports on the Foley allegation, and 
the hotline tips were exculpatory evidence that the Commonwealth 
failed to disclose in violation of its constitutional obligation 
to do so under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  The 
judge concluded that this Brady violation "provides an 
additional basis" for ordering a new trial.  Because we rest our 
affirmance of the judge's new trial order on the ground of newly 
discovered evidence, we do not set forth her findings regarding 
a Brady violation or otherwise address it.   
24 
 
 
new trial.  Third, the Commonwealth argues that the motion judge 
abused her discretion in ordering a new trial.  We address each 
of these three arguments.   
 
1.  Newly discovered evidence.  Evidence is newly 
discovered if it "was unknown to the defendant or trial counsel 
and not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial" or at an 
earlier motion for a new trial.  Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 
Mass. 607, 616 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Shuman, 445 Mass. 
268, 271 (2005).  See Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 306 
(1986).  The Commonwealth claims that the judge's finding that 
the Foley allegation and the hotline tips were newly discovered 
was clearly erroneous because it had disclosed this information 
to defense counsel before the third trial.21  The Commonwealth 
points to the testimony at the evidentiary hearing on the motion 
for a new trial presented by the lead prosecutor on the case, 
Assistant District Attorney Phyllis Broker (the prosecutor).  
Sergeant Detective O'Leary testified that he had numbered and 
indexed all the police reports filed in the investigation, and 
numbered and indexed the hotline tips into two indices:  one of 
tips about the murder generally and another of tips regarding 
the Volkswagen that eventually became a focus of the 
                                                          
 
 
21 The Commonwealth does not challenge the judge's finding 
regarding the other newly discovered evidence.   
25 
 
 
investigation.  He further testified that he had turned over all 
of the numbered and indexed reports to the prosecutor.   
 
The prosecutor testified that she had no memory of her 
disclosure of specific items of discovery in the defendant's 
case but recalled that her routine practice regarding discovery 
was to disclose "everything" unless there was a reason not to, 
in which case she would "have a hearing on it."  In producing 
discovery to defense counsel, she would number the police 
reports as they came in, make copies, and then write a discovery 
letter enclosing the reports and referencing them by number.   
 
As to the Foley allegation, the prosecutor testified from 
her review of the Commonwealth's files that a copy of Detective 
Keeler's report regarding Detective Foley's allegations was 
numbered 186, that this number was circled, and that there is a 
corresponding entry referencing the Keeler report in an index of 
police reports that she created.  She testified that this was 
consistent with her routine practice and indicative that she 
turned over the report to defense counsel.22   
                                                          
 
 
22 The Commonwealth also cites a letter to the prosecutor 
from one of defendant's trial counsel that asks about missing 
attachments to a document numbered 184 "in [the Commonwealth's] 
initial discovery list."  The Commonwealth argues that this 
letter shows that defense counsel was provided with the index of 
police reports that included a reference to the report of 
Detective Daniel Keeler, which was numbered 186, and therefore 
either received the Keeler report or were on notice of its 
existence.   
 
26 
 
 
 
As to the hotline tips, the Commonwealth points to two 
indices of the hotline tips in the Commonwealth's files that 
have the handwritten words "given to counsel" on the first page.  
the prosecutor testified that the handwriting is hers and 
indicates that she provided the indices, and inferentially the 
reports of the tips themselves, to defense counsel.   
 
The defendant, however, introduced evidence suggesting that 
the discovery process in his case was not as orderly as it 
appeared.  The defendant introduced two versions of indices of 
police reports related to the investigation, which contain the 
same documents numbered somewhat differently.  The defendant 
also introduced several transmittal letters that enclosed 
discovery sent by the prosecutor to the defendant's trial 
counsel.  These discovery letters showed that some documents 
that were disclosed to the defense were not referenced by 
number, that those documents that were referred to by number 
were not disclosed sequentially -- one letter enclosed seven 
documents including one document numbered 138 and one document 
numbered 197 -- and that at least one of the documents referred 
to by number in a discovery letter did not correspond to the 
prosecutor's numbered index, which she claims listed all of the 
documents disclosed to the defense.    
 
Attorneys David Duncan and Norman Zalkind, the defendant's 
trial attorneys, testified that they did not receive any report 
27 
 
 
of the Foley allegation or any hotline tips alleging that third 
parties were involved in the victim's murder.  In addition to 
having no recollection of receiving those materials, trial 
counsel testified that, if they had received them, they either 
would have sent an investigator to follow up on the allegations 
or would have filed discovery motions seeking additional 
information from the Commonwealth, but they did neither in this 
case.  The defendant also introduced evidence showing that, when 
the defendant's trial counsel received a letter from then State 
Senator Diane Wilkerson stating that she had received a 
telephone call from a person claiming to have information about 
the victim's murder and attaching her notes of the call, they 
filed a discovery motion that sought information from the 
Commonwealth regarding those allegations.   
 
We conclude that the judge's finding that the Foley 
allegation and the hotline tips were newly discovered was not 
clearly erroneous.  The judge was entitled to credit the 
testimony of the defendant's trial counsel that they did not 
receive this information and that, if they had, they surely 
would have followed up on it through additional investigation or 
requests for further discovery.  In addition, where there was 
evidence of irregularities in the discovery process, the judge 
also was not obliged to find that these documents had been 
furnished in discovery based on the numbering and indexing of 
28 
 
 
investigative documents and on the prosecutor's description of 
her routine discovery practices.  
 
2.  Direct estoppel.  The Commonwealth contends that the 
newly discovered evidence adds nothing material to what was 
presented to the judge in the first motion for a new trial and, 
on appeal, to this court when we affirmed the defendant's 
convictions and the denial of the motion for a new trial after 
plenary review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  It correctly notes 
that we knew then that Detectives Acerra, Robinson, and Brazil 
had been implicated in submitting false search warrant 
applications and affidavits in other cases and in illegally 
seizing property and money while executing those fraudulent 
warrants, and that Acerra and Robinson had pleaded guilty to 
Federal indictments arising from those allegations.  Ellis, 432 
Mass. at 764.  It also correctly notes that the defendant 
attached to his first motion for a new trial a Boston Globe 
article, dated February 18, 1996, reporting that the Boston 
police "anticorruption unit" was investigating Detective 
Robinson and the victim for their alleged involvement in the 
robbery of money from two drug dealers in 1991.  Because this 
information was known to us when we concluded, after reviewing 
the entire record under § 33E, that we found "nothing that 
compels us to exercise our discretion to disturb the jury's 
verdict," id. at 765-766, the Commonwealth contends that the 
29 
 
 
motion judge should have denied the defendant's motion for a new 
trial "based on the principle of direct estoppel," and cites 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 443 Mass. 707, 709-712 (2005), in 
support of this argument.  We disagree. 
 
In Rodriguez, supra at 710-711, we declared that, where a 
defendant "raises no new factual or legal issue" in a motion 
under Mass R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 
(2001), and simply seeks to relitigate a motion that was 
previously denied by the motion judge and rejected on direct 
appeal, "principles of direct estoppel operate as a bar to the 
defendant's attempt in [the] rule 30 (b) motion to relitigate 
issues."  For direct estoppel to apply, however, "the 
Commonwealth must show that the issues raised in the defendant's 
rule 30 (b) motion were actually litigated and determined on the 
defendant's original motion," which here means the defendant's 
first motion for a new trial.  Id. at 710.   
 
In affirming the denial of the first motion for a new 
trial, we recognized that Detectives Acerra, Robinson, and 
Brazil had engaged in police misconduct in other cases, but we 
concluded that the defendant had failed to meet his burden of 
furnishing evidence "suggesting that the subject detectives 
procured false evidence in connection with the investigation of 
this defendant."  Ellis, 432 Mass at 765.  We did not know at 
that time that these detectives had been engaged with the victim 
30 
 
 
in criminal acts of police misconduct as recently as seventeen 
days before the victim's murder.23  The complicity of the victim 
in the detectives' malfeasance fundamentally changes the 
significance of the detectives' corruption with respect to their 
investigation of the victim's murder.  Without the victim's 
complicity, the defendant could argue that these detectives had 
engaged in misconduct with respect to other investigations and 
therefore might have been more likely to have engaged in 
misconduct with respect to this investigation.  But with the 
victim's complicity, these detectives would likely fear that a 
prolonged and comprehensive investigation of the victim's murder 
would uncover leads that might reveal their own criminal 
corruption.  They, therefore, had a powerful incentive to 
prevent a prolonged or comprehensive investigation, and to 
discourage or thwart any investigation of leads that might 
reveal the victim's corrupt acts.  This issue was not "actually 
litigated and determined on the defendant's original motion," 
see Rodriguez, 443 Mass. at 710-711, and therefore is not barred 
by direct estoppel.   
                                                          
 
 
23 The Boston Globe article that was in the record in our 
affirmance of the denial of the first motion for a new trial 
reported simply that Detective Robinson and the victim were 
under investigation for an alleged robbery of two drug dealers 
two years before the murder.  This information, standing alone, 
falls well short of admissible evidence demonstrating the 
victim's corrupt relationship with the investigating detectives.   
31 
 
 
 
3.  Abuse of discretion.  Having determined that the judge 
did not clearly err in her findings on the newly discovered 
evidence and that her consideration of the issue is not barred 
by direct estoppel, we now address whether the judge abused her 
discretion in concluding that "justice has not been done" and 
ordering a new trial.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) ("The trial 
judge . . . may grant a new trial at any time if it appears that 
justice may not have been done").   
 
"Whether an appeal is from the granting or the denial of a 
motion for a new trial, an appellate court will examine the 
motion judge's conclusion only to determine whether there has 
been a significant error of law or other abuse of discretion."  
Grace, 397 Mass. at 307.  See Commonwealth v. Raymond, 450 Mass. 
729, 733 (2008).  "Under the abuse of discretion standard, the 
issue is whether the judge's decision resulted from 'a clear 
error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the 
decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the range of 
reasonable alternatives.'"  Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 
664, 672 (2015), quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 
185 n.27 (2014). 
 
A judge may order a new trial where newly discovered 
evidence "casts real doubt on the justice of the conviction."  
Cowels, 470 Mass. at 616, quoting Grace, 397 Mass. at 305.  To 
conclude that the evidence casts real doubt on the justice of 
32 
 
 
the conviction, "[t]he motion judge decides not whether the 
verdict would have been different, but rather whether the new 
evidence would probably have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations."  Cowels, supra, quoting Grace, supra.  
Consequently, the issue before us is whether the judge made a 
clear error of judgment in determining that the newly discovered 
evidence "would probably have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations."  See Cowels, supra. 
 
The Commonwealth contends that there is no doubt cast on 
the justice of the convictions because none of the newly 
discovered evidence affects the compelling evidence that the 
defendant was in possession of the murder weapon and the 
victim's service pistol and that he caused the weapons to be 
discarded in a field in the days following the killing.  The 
Commonwealth notes that the judge did not vacate the defendant's 
convictions from the first trial of the unlawful possession of 
these firearms and that the defendant does not challenge these 
convictions on appeal.  The Commonwealth contends, in essence, 
that given the defendant's possession of these weapons, the 
newly discovered evidence regarding the victim's complicity with 
the corrupt detectives and the unexplored leads regarding third-
33 
 
 
party culprits is nothing more than "a tale . . . , full of 
sound and fury, signifying nothing."24   
 
We agree that the defendant's possession and concealment of 
these weapons only days after the killing, combined with the 
evidence that he was at the Walgreens at or about the time of 
the killing, is evidence that he was involved in the killing in 
some fashion.  And, had the defendant been charged with being an 
accessory after the fact to this murder, this evidence would be 
more than sufficient to support his conviction of that 
indictment.  See Commonwealth v. Simpkins, 470 Mass. 458, 462 
(2015).  But, as demonstrated in the first trial, where the jury 
found the defendant guilty of the firearm indictment but were 
unable to reach a verdict regarding the indictments for murder 
and armed robbery, his possession and concealment of these 
firearms does not necessarily mean that he was the shooter or 
knowingly participated with Patterson in the shooting.  See id. 
at 461-463.  See also Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 
470 (2009) (Appendix).  There are at least two alternative 
scenarios that a jury would need to reject in order to find the 
defendant guilty of armed robbery and murder.  
 
First, the jury would need to reject the possibility, 
argued in closing by the defendant, that Patterson alone shot 
                                                          
 
 
24 William Shakespeare, MacBeth act V, scene 5.   
34 
 
 
the victim, without the defendant's knowing participation, and 
then passed the murder weapon and the victim's service weapon to 
the defendant.  The strongest evidence of the defendant's 
knowing participation in the murder was the testimony of Rosa 
Sanchez, who testified that at approximately 3:05 A.M., which 
was between thirty and forty-five minutes before the victim's 
shooting, she saw a man she later identified as the defendant 
"crouching by" the victim's vehicle in front of the Walgreens 
where the victim sat sleeping.  No doubt for this reason, much 
of the defendant's closing argument was devoted to challenging 
the accuracy of her testimony.  Trial counsel noted in closing 
argument that she had said nothing to the store clerk or her 
husband about this suspicious behavior at the time of the event; 
she instead went to look at greeting cards inside Walgreens.  
Counsel also noted in closing argument that Acerra, whom Sanchez 
knew, was with her when she was shown the photographic arrays, 
that she was told to "pick out the guy,"25 and that Acerra was a 
"close friend" of the victim.26  
 
It is not difficult to imagine how different the 
defendant's closing argument would have been had he known then 
                                                          
 
 
25 On cross-examination, Sanchez agreed that Detective 
Richard Ross told her to "pick the guy out."  
 
 
26 Defense counsel did not mention that Detective Robinson 
was with Detective Acerra.  
35 
 
 
that Acerra not only was a close friend of the victim, but also 
was complicit with the victim in criminal acts of police 
corruption, including a theft of thousands of dollars in cash 
from a marijuana dealer earlier that month.  Defense counsel 
could have argued that the detectives had a strong motive to 
shore up the case against the two men in the Volkswagen -- 
suspects unconnected to the detectives' involvement with the 
victim in illegal activities -- by ensuring that they obtained 
an identification of one of them in an incriminating position 
shortly before the shooting.  Defense counsel could further have 
argued that, in addition to motive, Detectives Robinson and 
Acerra had the opportunity to strengthen the case against the 
defendant and Patterson by leaning on Sanchez to pick the 
"right" person immediately after she had picked the "wrong" 
person.  Sanchez's identification of the defendant was already 
suspect because she initially had identified someone else -- the 
same person whom her husband selected -- as the person she saw 
crouching near the victim's vehicle, and because she claimed to 
be rattled by the photograph of her stalker in the array, but 
later was unable to identify the photograph of the person she 
said had stalked her.  We cannot say with confidence that a 
reasonable jury would have credited her identification if they 
had known of the newly discovered evidence regarding the 
36 
 
 
victim's complicity with the corrupt detectives who helped 
procure the identification.   
 
Second, the jury would also need to reject the possibility 
that someone other than the defendant and Patterson shot the 
victim, and that the defendant somehow recovered and took 
possession of the murder weapon and the victim's service weapon 
after the killing.  This was not an argument presented by the 
defendant at trial, but as the judge noted, the defense strategy 
may have changed had the newly discovered evidence been known to 
the defense.  As the motion judge noted, the newly discovered 
evidence revealed that many individuals had a motive to kill the 
victim because of his various misdeeds, that there were 
investigative leads indicating that others may have been 
responsible for his murder, and that, apart from the Foley 
allegation, none of these leads was explored.27  The newly 
discovered evidence also would have provided an explanation why 
these leads were not explored -- that corrupt detectives did not 
wish any of these leads to uncover evidence that might reveal 
their own criminal misconduct.   
                                                          
 
27 Defense counsel could have argued that even the 
exploration of the Foley allegation was inadequate, in that the 
two detectives only interviewed Raymond Armstead, Jr., and 
failed to confirm a verifiable fact upon which the allegation 
was premised:  that Armstead Jr. had a teenaged sister.   
  
37 
 
 
 
Perhaps most important, with this newly discovered 
evidence, a reasonable jury likely would have had diminished  
confidence in the integrity and thoroughness of the police 
investigation in general.  Not only would this likely have 
caused them to question the reliability of some of the evidence 
presented by the prosecution, it also may have elevated in 
significance certain aspects of the investigation that may 
otherwise have appeared unimportant.  For instance, how did the 
police know to ask Tina Erti, the roommate of the victim's girl 
friend whether the victim possessed a small caliber gun with a 
pearl handle five days before a small caliber gun with a pearl-
colored handle was found that was later determined to be the 
murder weapon?28  Did this suggest that the police had 
information that the victim had been shot with his own firearm, 
which would itself suggest the possibility that the victim was 
killed by someone he knew (or by someone assisted by someone he 
knew)?   
 
The Commonwealth argues that the newly discovered evidence 
is limited only to Bowden evidence that impeaches the 
investigation by the police and that we have previously stated 
that "[n]ewly discovered evidence that tends merely to impeach 
the testimony of a witness does not ordinarily warrant a new 
                                                          
 
 
28 See note 18, supra. 
38 
 
 
trial."  Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 150 (2014), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Simmons, 417 Mass. 60, 72 (1994).  We 
agree that it would be a rare case where newly discovered Bowden 
evidence alone would warrant a new trial.  But it is a rare case 
where police detectives investigating the killing of another 
police detective were complicit with the victim in numerous 
recent acts of criminal police misconduct and where the 
integrity of the investigation was potentially compromised by 
their conflicting interest in ensuring that the investigation of 
the murder did not uncover their own criminal misdeeds.   
 
In discussing the admissibility of Bowden evidence, we have 
said that  
"the inference that may be drawn from an inadequate police 
investigation is that the evidence at trial may be 
inadequate or unreliable because the police failed to 
conduct the scientific tests or to pursue leads that a 
reasonable police investigation would have conducted or 
investigated, and these tests or investigation reasonably 
may have led to significant evidence of the defendant's 
guilt or innocence.  A jury may find a reasonable doubt if 
they conclude that the investigation was careless, 
incomplete, or so focused on the defendant that it ignored 
leads that may have suggested other culprits."  
 
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 801 (2009).  
Implicit in this description of the potential inferential 
significance of Bowden evidence is that the investigation, 
however flawed, was conducted in good faith by honest police 
officers.  Where, as here, the newly discovered Bowden evidence 
raises substantial doubts regarding the good faith and honesty 
39 
 
 
of some of the investigating detectives, its potential 
inferential significance is multiplied many-fold, because a jury 
reasonably may have had diminished confidence in the integrity 
and good faith of the investigation and the evidence that arose 
from it.   
 
The determination of whether newly discovered evidence 
would have been a real factor in the jury's deliberations 
requires that the new evidence be considered in light of the 
totality of the evidence presented at trial, and the evidence 
supporting the defendant's knowing participation in the murder 
and armed robbery in this case was not overwhelming.  There was 
no eyewitness to the shooting and no physical evidence linking 
the defendant to the victim's vehicle.29  Sanchez's 
identification of the defendant occurred only after she 
identified another individual from the photographic array.  The 
motive offered by the Commonwealth -- that the defendant saw a 
police officer sleeping in his vehicle when he went to Walgreens 
to purchase diapers and hatched a scheme to kill him and take 
his service weapon as a trophy -- is not particularly 
compelling.  Although several witnesses testified to seeing 
                                                          
 
 
29 As already noted, the only physical evidence linking 
Patterson to the victim's vehicle were the fingerprints 
identified as belonging to him, and this expert opinion was 
subsequently determined by this court not to meet the 
reliability standards necessary for admission at trial.  See 
note 8, supra.  
40 
 
 
people matching the descriptions of the defendant and Patterson 
in the Walgreens parking lot and surrounding areas, the 
significance of that evidence is limited by the defendant's 
admission early in the investigation that he was at Walgreens 
that night.  The strongest consciousness of guilt evidence is 
the alteration of Patterson's vehicle after the shooting, but 
there is no evidence that the defendant participated in that 
alteration.    
 
When we consider the newly discovered evidence together 
with the totality of the evidence presented at trial, we 
conclude that, in the unusual circumstances of this case, the 
judge did not abuse her discretion in determining that the newly 
discovered evidence "would have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations" and that a new trial is required for justice to 
be done.  
 
Conclusion.  The motion judge did not abuse her discretion 
in ruling that the newly discovered evidence warrants a new 
trial.  The order allowing the defendant's motion for a new 
trial as to the indictments of murder and armed robbery is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.