Case Title: Patricia Working et al. v. Jefferson County Election Commission et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1070850

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 06/30/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1070850
____________________
Patricia Working et al.
v.
Jefferson County Election Commission et al.
____________________
1070893
____________________
Governor Bob Riley, in his official capacity
v.
Jefferson County Election Commission et al.
____________________
1070917
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
2
____________________
George F. Bowman
v.
State of Alabama ex rel. Fred L. Plump and William A. Bell,
Sr.
Appeals from Jefferson Circuit Court 
(CV-08-900316)
PER CURIAM. 
These appeals arise from challenges to the attempts to
fill the district 1 seat on the Jefferson County Commission
left vacant when Commissioner Larry Langford was elected mayor
of the City of Birmingham in October 2007.  The trial court
held that the vacant seat was to be filled by a special
election rather than by gubernatorial appointment.  For the
reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court's judgment.
I. Facts, Procedural Background, and Applicable Statutes
On October 9, 2007, Larry Langford, the member of the
Jefferson County Commission representing district 1, was
elected mayor of the City of Birmingham.  He thereafter
resigned his seat on the Jefferson County Commission.  On
October 29, 2007, the Jefferson County Election Commission,
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
The Alabama Legislature enacted Act No. 784 effective May
1
25, 1977, as a local law that purported to authorize a special
election to fill a vacancy on the Jefferson County Commission
caused by "death, resignation, impeachment, or any cause
except normal expiration of terms." § 1, Act No. 784.
Section 11-3-1(b) now provides:
2
"Unless a local law authorizes a special election,
any vacancy on the county commission shall be filled
by appointment by the Governor.  If the appointment
occurs at least 30 days before the closing of party
qualifying as provided in Section 17-13-5, the
person appointed to the vacated office shall only
serve until seven days after the next general
election following the appointment as provided
herein.  The person so appointed to fill the vacancy
shall meet the residency requirements in subsection
(a), and shall hold office from the date of
3
pursuant to Act No. 784, Ala. Acts 1977,  adopted a resolution
1
calling for a special election to fill the seat vacated by
Langford.  The resolution set the special election for
February 5, 2008 –- the date of Alabama's presidential-
preference primaries.  Fred L. Plump, George F. Bowman, and
William A. Bell, Sr., were among those who qualified to run
for the district 1 seat on the county commission. 
On November 21, 2007, Governor Bob Riley appointed George
F. Bowman to fill the vacant district 1 seat on the Jefferson
County Commission.  The Governor's appointment was made
pursuant to a general law, § 11-3-1(b), Ala. Code 1975.2
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
appointment until the eighth day following the next
general election.  If the original term in which the
vacancy occurred would not have expired on the
eighth day following the next general election after
the appointment, the person elected at the election
required by operation of this subsection shall serve
for a period of time equal to the remainder of the
term in which the vacancy was created.  Thereafter,
election for the county commission seat shall be as
otherwise provided by law."
The emphasized language, however, was first included in this
statutory scheme effective in 2004. See Act No. 2004-455, Ala.
Acts 2004. The substance of the first sentence, without the
emphasized language, was part of the Alabama Code prior to the
enactment of Act No. 784 in 1977. Until September 1, 2007, it
was codified as § 11-3-6, Ala. Code 1975.  Effective September
1, 2007, the entire provision, including the emphasized
language and additional language, was renumbered by Act No.
2007-488 as § 11-3-1(b).
4
On January 31, 2008, Patricia Working and Rick Erdemir
filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the Jefferson
Circuit Court, naming as defendants the Jefferson County
Election Commission and its individual members, namely
Jefferson County Probate Judge Alan King, Jefferson County
Sheriff Mike Hale, and Jefferson County Circuit Clerk Anne-
Marie Adams.  Among other things, they alleged that they were
residents and taxpayers in Jefferson County and that the
special 
election 
was 
unauthorized 
and 
unconstitutional
because, they said, Act No. 784, Ala. Acts 1977, violated §
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
Section 105 provides:
3
"No special, private, or local law, except a law
fixing the time of holding courts, shall be enacted
in any case which is provided for by a general law,
or when the relief sought can be given by any court
of this state; and the courts, and not the
legislature, shall judge as to whether the matter of
said law is provided for by a general law, and as to
whether the relief sought can be given by any court;
nor shall the legislature indirectly enact any such
special, private, or local law by the partial repeal
of a general law."
5
105 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901,  and that, even if
3
Act No. 784 was not unconstitutional and authorized the
special election, the date set by the Election Commission for
the special election was incorrect.  Accompanying the
complaint were an application for a temporary restraining
order and a motion for a preliminary injunction.
On February 1, 2008, the Jefferson Circuit Court
conducted an expedited hearing in which it noted the absence
of potentially interested parties and issued an order holding
that it would not have subject-matter jurisdiction until the
attorney general was served with a copy of the complaint
pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-227.  It further stated that
the matter would be held under submission until the plaintiffs
had complied with § 6-6-227.  Subsequent to the entry of that
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
Plump, a resident of district 1, is a plaintiff in a
4
federal action challenging Governor Riley's appointment of
Bowman to fill the district 1 vacancy on the Jefferson County
Commission; that action is based on § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000) and is presently pending
review by the United States Supreme Court.
6
order, the attorney general was served with a copy of the
complaint and filed an answer stating that he was entitled to
be heard on the issue of the constitutionality of Act No. 784,
and that because Act No. 784 is unconstitutional, the circuit
court should enjoin the Election Commission from canvassing
the votes and certifying the results of the special election.
In addition, on February 6, 2008, Plump filed a motion to
intervene as a defendant, which the court later granted.4
The special election was held on February 5, 2008.  On
February 12, Floyd McGinnis filed a "Joinder of Verified
Complaint" and, with Working and Erdemir, amended the
complaint to add Bell as a defendant.  McGinnis, Working, and
Erdemir (collectively referred to as "the Working plaintiffs")
each filed a verification in support of the amended complaint.
On February 13, 2008, the Working plaintiffs filed a
notice of appeal to this Court from the trial court's February
1, 2008, order and, specifically, its effective denial of a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction by
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
7
holding the case "under submission."  On February 14, 2008,
this Court granted an emergency motion filed by the Working
plaintiffs, enjoining the Election Commission from certifying
the results of the special election until further order of
this Court.  On February 20, 2008, this Court issued an order
noting that it appeared the statutory notice requirements
pertaining to the attorney general had been met, remanding the
cause to the trial court for a ruling on the merits of the
Working plaintiffs' claims, and maintaining in place the
injunction prohibiting the certification of the results of the
February 5 special election pending further order of this
Court.  (Case no. 1070693.)
On February 21, 2008, the defendants moved to dismiss the
action on the bases, among others, that the Working plaintiffs
lacked standing to pursue their claims because, as was
undisputed, Working and Erdemir did not actually reside in
district 1 of Jefferson County and McGinnis had not suffered
a sufficient, particularized injury.  On February 27, 2008,
Plump filed an answer to the complaint and a third-party
complaint asserting a quo warranto action as a relator for the
State against Bowman.  See Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-597.
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
8
On February 28, 2008, Governor Riley filed a motion,
which was later granted, to intervene as a plaintiff.  Also on
February 28, the Working plaintiffs filed a second amended
complaint, among other things, adding a claim that the
Election Commission was required by Act No. 2007-488 to hold
an election at the November 2008 general election to fill the
district 1 vacancy and that its refusal to do so was a
violation of plaintiff McGinnis's right to vote in such an
election. 
On March 6, 2008, Bell filed, and on March 9, 2008, the
trial court granted, a motion to join and to amend Plump's
third-party quo warranto complaint against Bowman.  The
amended third-party complaint alleged that Bell was entitled
to hold the office of County Commissioner for district 1 based
on the result of the special election and that Bowman was
unlawfully holding that office.  Specifically, Bell and Plump
alleged:
"Governor Riley did not have the authority to
appoint George Bowman to the District 1 seat because
it is clear that a general state statute, Act 2007-
488 codified at § 11-3-1(b), that begins 'Unless a
local law authorizes a special election,' allows
local laws on the same subject to coexist without
violating § 105 of the Alabama Constitution.
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
9
Baldwin County v. Jenkins, 494 So. 2d 584 (Ala.
1986)." 
After conducting a hearing, the trial court issued a
final judgment.  In its judgment, the trial court held that
the Working plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims.
As to the merits of the litigation, the trial court determined
that the local law on which the special election was based,
Act No. 784, Ala. Acts 1977, did not conflict with the general
law, § 11-3-1(b), and therefore did not violate § 105 of the
Alabama Constitution of 1901, because of the proviso at the
beginning of § 11-3-1(b) allowing local laws to authorize
special elections to fill vacancies on county commissions.
Finally, the trial court held that the Election Commission had
set the special election for the correct day. 
Consistent with the foregoing determinations, the trial
court specifically ruled that Governor Riley's appointment of
Bowman to the district 1 seat for the Jefferson County
Commission was unauthorized and that, when the final results
of the election of February 5, 2008, are certified by the
Election Commission, the winner of the election will be
entitled to hold the office of Jefferson County commissioner
for district 1. 
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
They also note that, as residents of Jefferson County,
5
they will be governed by the winner of the election in his
capacity as a member of the Jefferson County Commission.  In
addition, McGinnis notes his status as a voter in district 1
and, further, seeks the right to participate in the election
of a county commissioner that, he asserts, should be scheduled
for November 2008 in keeping with § 11-3-1(b), Ala. Code 1975.
10
The Working plaintiffs, the Governor, and Bowman each
appeal.
II. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
We are presented with two issues pertaining to subject-
matter jurisdiction.  These include the standing of the
Working plaintiffs to pursue their claims and the potential
effect of § 17-16-44, Ala. Code 1975.
A. The Standing of the Working Plaintiffs
In the trial court, the Working plaintiffs asserted that
they have standing to bring their claims in this case based on
their status as residents and taxpayers of Jefferson County
whose taxes go to the general fund of the County.   They
5
alleged that their status in this regard gives them standing
to challenge the expenditure of moneys from the general fund
for conducting an election not authorized by law. 
In their February 21 motion to dismiss, the Election
Commission and Sheriff Hale argued to the trial court that the
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
In their motion to dismiss, the Election Commission and
6
Sheriff Hale also argued, and the trial court subsequently
found, that because plaintiffs Working and Erdemir did not
have standing, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
over the case as originally filed, and therefore the amendment
by which McGinnis joined the action as a plaintiff "cannot
relate back to the filing of the original complaint, because
there is nothing 'back' to which to relate."  Because of our
disposition of the issue of the Working plaintiffs' standing
as taxpayers, we need not address the issue whether McGinnis's
joinder of the complaint related back to the date of the
filing of the original complaint or, if it did not, whether
the 
trial 
court 
nonetheless 
acquired 
subject-matter
jurisdiction over McGinnis's claims as of the date they were
filed.
11
Working plaintiffs did not have standing to pursue their
claims because (1) Working and Erdemir were not residents or
voters of district 1 and (2) McGinnis, although a district 1
voter, had "not stated or shown with particularity the injury
in fact necessary to grant him standing to challenge the
constitutionality of 1977 Ala. Act No. 784."   The motion to
6
dismiss did not specifically address the Working plaintiffs'
status as taxpayers of Jefferson County or whether that status
contributed to their standing to obtain the relief they
sought. 
In proposed conclusions of law submitted to the trial
court in preparation for the final hearing and in arguments
presented at that hearing, the Working plaintiffs reasserted
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
12
their position that their status, particularly as taxpayers,
gave them standing to pursue their claims.  As noted, however,
in its final judgment, the trial court ruled against the
Working plaintiffs on the issue of standing.  Specifically, it
held that because neither Working nor Erdemir were residents
of district 1 they did not suffer a legal injury as a result
of the special election.  Among other things, it agreed with
the Election Commission and Sheriff Hale that McGinnis lacked
standing 
because 
he 
"had 
not 
stated 
or 
shown 
with
particularity [an] injury in fact."  The trial court did not
directly address the issue of taxpayer standing.  
On appeal, the Working plaintiffs again assert their
status as residents and taxpayers of Jefferson County and
again contend that that status gives them standing to pursue
this case.  In response, the Election Commission and Sheriff
Hale urge this Court to uphold the trial court's ruling as to
standing on the same grounds cited in the trial court's
opinion; they make no substantive argument as to the issue of
taxpayer standing. 
We note at the outset of our analysis that the fact that
neither the defendants nor the trial court has directly
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
13
addressed the Working plaintiffs' argument as to the issue of
taxpayer standing does not provide us with a reason to
conclude, by default, that such standing exists.  Standing is
a component of a court's subject-matter jurisdiction and, as
such, is not subject to waiver.  See Waite v. Waite, 959 So.
2d 610, 613 (Ala. 2006); RLI Ins. Co. v. MLK Ave. Redev.
Corp., 925 So. 2d 914, 918 (Ala. 2005).  See also United
States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995).  
Whether a party has standing "turns on 'whether the party
has been injured in fact and whether the injury is to a
legally protected right'" so as "'to ensure that he will
vigorously present his case.'" State v. Property at 2018
Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1027-28 (Ala. 1999).  This
Court has said that a party has standing where, among other
things, there is "an actual, concrete and particularized
'injury in fact' -- 'an invasion of a legally protected
interest.'"  Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Henri-
Duval Winery, LLC, 890 So. 2d 70, 74 (Ala. 2003) (relied upon
in Town of Cedar Bluff v. Citizens Caring for Children, 904
So. 2d 1253 (Ala. 2004)).  We conclude that the Working
plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims.
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
14
"In a long line of decisions this Court has recognized the
right of a taxpayer to challenge, either as unconstitutional
or as not conforming to statute, the expenditure of public
funds by county officers."  Zeigler v. Baker, 344 So. 2d 761,
763 (Ala. 1977) (quoted with approval in Henson v. HealthSouth
Med. Ctr., 891 So. 2d 863, 866 (Ala. 2004)).  See also
Alabama State Florists Ass'n, Inc. v. Lee County Hosp. Bd.,
479 So. 2d 720, 722 (Ala. 1985); Court of County Revenues for
Lawrence County v. Richardson, 252 Ala. 403, 412, 41 So. 2d
749, 754 (1949); Reynolds v. Collier, 204 Ala. 38, 39, 85 So.
465, 466 (1920).  In Broxton v. Siegelman, 861 So. 2d 376
(Ala. 2003), this Court stated:
"[T]he right of a taxpayer to sue '"'is based upon
the taxpayer's equitable ownership of such funds and
their liability to replenish the public treasury for
the 
deficiency 
which 
would 
be 
caused 
by 
the
misappropriation.'"'  Hunt v. Windom, 604 So. 2d
[395] at 396-97 [(Ala. 1992)] (quoting Zeigler v.
Baker, 344 So. 2d 761, 763 (Ala. 1977), quoting in
turn, Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 314, 110 N.E.
130, 135 (1915))."
861 So. 2d at 385 (emphasis omitted).
The standing of taxpayers to challenge the expenditure of
public funds extends to funds expended for holding elections
not authorized by law.  In City of Mobile v. Mobile Electric
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
The common-law "demurrer" has been succeeded by a motion
7
filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) seeking dismissal of a
complaint on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.  See Roberts v. Meeks, 397 So. 2d
111, 114 (Ala. 1981).
15
Co., 203 Ala. 574, 578, 84 So. 816, 819 (1919), the Supreme
Court held that an election to adopt or reject a municipal
ordinance would be improper and that "the complainant, as a
taxpayer, had the right to enjoin the same." See also Dennis
v. Prather, 212 Ala. 449, 103 So. 59 (1925) (citing City of
Mobile with approval).  We also take note of the result in
Petree v. McMurray, 210 Ala. 639, 98 So. 782 (1923), a case in
which 
an 
appointed 
county 
superintendent 
of 
education
challenged an election that was to be held pursuant to a local
law that he contended was in violation of Ala. Const. 1901, §
175.  The Court affirmed the trial court's order overruling a
demurrer  to the complaint, which contained the following
7
allegations:
"[N]otwithstanding the invalidity of said act,
respondents, acting as an election commission, [were]
threatening to and [were] about to advertise and call
a special election, to appoint inspectors, clerks,
etc., in the various voting precincts, and to
purchase election supplies, all of which [was]
without warrant of law, and it [was] alleged that the
pay vouchers for the proposed election officers and
the purchase of supplies [would] constitute illegal
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
16
claims and expenses against the county, to the
detriment of [the plaintiff] as a taxpayer; and that
the holding of said election [would] tend to
interfere with the proper discharge of the duties of
his office."
210 Ala. at 640, 98 So. at 782.
Other jurisdictions also hold that a taxpayer has standing
to challenge an election paid for with tax funds.  For
example, in Bulgo v. Maui County, 50 Haw. 51, 430 P.2d 321
(1967), a taxpayer challenged the holding of an election that
was based on a newly enacted law providing for a special
election to fill the term of a county chairman-elect who dies
before assuming office.  Describing the taxpayer's contention
with regard to his standing to challenge the election, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii wrote:
"Plaintiff bases his standing to sue on the fact
that he pays real property tax to the county of Maui,
which tax goes into the county general fund out of
which the expenses of the special elections are
payable.  He claims the requested relief on the
ground that the challenged provision is a special
law, violative of Article VII, Section 1, of the
State constitution, and, unless restrained by the
court, defendant will irreparably damage plaintiff by
illegally expending funds raised by taxation in
holding 
elections 
under 
an 
invalid 
statutory
provision."
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
Our view of the standing issue in the present case finds
8
further support in the fact that § 105 affirmatively directs
the judicial branch to decide disputes under that provision:
"[T]he courts, and not the legislature, shall judge as to
17
Bulgo, 50 Haw. at 54, 430 P.2d at 324.  The Court held that
this was sufficient to confer standing on the plaintiff to
pursue his challenge of the election:
"We hold that plaintiff has a standing to sue in
this case.  We base this holding on Castle v.
Secretary of the Territory, 16 Haw. 769 [(1905)].
Although 
defendant 
urges 
that 
Castle, 
as 
a
controlling authority on the point at issue, has been
eroded by Wilson v. Stainback, 39 Haw. 67 [(1951)];
Munoz v. Commissioner of Public Lands, 40 Haw. 675
[(1951)]; Air Terminal Services v. Matsuda, 47 Haw.
499, 393 P.2d 60 [(1964)]; and Helela v. State, 49
Haw. 365, 418 P.2d 482 [(1966)], and should be
overruled, we see no reason for doing so.  Plaintiff
has alleged sufficient personal interest in the
controversy to entitle him to a day in court."
50 Haw. at 55, 430 P.2d at 324.  See also, e.g., Board of
Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel County v. Smallwood,
327 Md. 220, 233 n.7, 608 A.2d 1222, 1228 n.7 (1992)
("[I]ndividual taxpayers in each county also contested the
proposed amendments' validity.  Individual taxpayers have
standing to sue for an injunction against submitting a
proposal to the electorate; otherwise, they would be 'put to
wrongful expense for the publication of the referendum and the
printing of it on the ballots of the next general election.'"8
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
whether the matter of said law is provided for by a general
law, and as to whether the relief sought can be given by any
court ...."  The doctrine of standing is rooted in concerns
that courts not exceed their proper scope of authority by
intruding into matters more properly decided by another branch
of government or by citizens as part of the political process.
"The power of the judiciary ... is 'the power to [decide] ...
a particular case or controversy.'"  City of Daphne v. City of
Spanish Fort, 853 So. 2d 933, 942 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex
parte Jenkins, 723 So. 2d 649, 656 (Ala. 1998)) (emphasis
added).  In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the United
States Supreme Court explained that "the several doctrines
that have grown up to elaborate" the "case or controversy"
requirement, including that of standing,
"are 'founded in concern about the proper -- and
properly limited -- role of the courts in a
democratic society'  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498 ... (1975).
"'All of the doctrines that cluster
about Article III -- not only standing but
mootness, 
ripeness, 
political 
question, 
and
the like -- relate in part, and in
different though overlapping ways, to an
idea, which is more than an intuition but
less than a rigorous and explicit theory,
about the constitutional and prudential
limits to the powers of an unelected,
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of
government.'  Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 226
U.S. App. D.C. 14, 26-27, 699 F.2d 1166,
1178-1179 (1983) (Bork, J., concurring)."
468 U.S. at 750.  The Supreme Court further explained that the
standing 
inquiry 
turns 
on 
whether 
"adjudication 
 
is
'consistent with a system of separated powers and [the dispute
is one] traditionally thought to be capable of resolution
through the judicial process,' Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97
... (1968)."  468 U.S. at 752.  The concerns expressed in
Flast v. Cohen as to whether a court's resolution of a dispute
18
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
would be "consistent with a system of separated powers" and
whether "the dispute is one traditionally thought to be
capable of resolution through the judicial process" are
ameliorated in this case by the constitutional directive in §
105 for courts to decide disputes arising under that
provision.
At least in regard to the payment of election expenses,
9
the legislature has indicated that a presidential-preference
primary is to be treated as if it were an election in which
"candidates for federal or state offices are nominated or
federal or state offices are elected."  See § 17-13-100(d)
(providing that the State of Alabama's obligation to reimburse
a county for sums expended in holding and conducting a
presidential-preference primary shall be "as provided in
Section 17-16-4").
19
In the present case, it is clear that Jefferson County
incurred costs in holding the special election for the
district 1 county commission seat that it otherwise would not
have incurred in administering the presidential-preference
primary election on February 5, 2008.  Section 17-16-4, Ala.
Code 1975, provides that "[t]he State of Alabama shall
reimburse a county for all sums expended by the county in
payment of expenses incurred in holding and conducting an
election in which only candidates for federal or state offices
are nominated or federal or state officials are elected."9
(Emphasis added.) Section 17-16-2 defines, but also limits,
the "expenses" for which the State must reimburse counties:
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
20
"As used in this chapter, the term 'expenses'
shall include the following items, and no other:
"(1) The per diem and mileage provided
by law for election officials.
"(2) The per diem provided by law for
the clerk or other official acting in his
or her stead for handling absentee ballots.
"(3) The costs of ballots, supplies,
and other materials required by law to be
furnished 
to 
election 
officials 
and
certified by the judge of probate as chief
election official of the county. In those
counties where electronic voting machines
are used, such voting equipment shall not
be considered as ballots, supplies, or
materials, as herein used.
"(4) The costs of absentee ballots,
supplies, and other materials required by
law 
to 
be 
furnished 
to 
the 
official
handling absentee ballots.
"(5) 
The 
cost 
of 
preparing 
and
furnishing the lists of qualified electors
to the election officials as required by
law."
Ala. Code 1975, § 17-16-2.
Even as to the specific "expenses" listed in § 17-16-2,
however, § 17-16-4 does not obligate the State to reimburse a
county for "all sums" expended by the county if the election
is one in which candidates or officials for other than federal
or state offices are to be nominated or elected.  As to an
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
Section 17-16-3 begins with the caveat "[e]xcept as
10
provided in Section 17-8-12."  Section 17-8-12, entitled
"Compensation of election officials," provides:
"(a) The inspector and clerks shall each be
entitled to base compensation of fifty dollars
($50).  The compensation of the election officials
shall be paid as preferred claims, out of moneys in
the county treasury not appropriated, on proper
proof of service rendered. In all counties in which
the compensation of election officials is prescribed
by local law or general law of local application at
an amount in excess of the amount prescribed, the
compensation of the election officials shall not be
decreased 
under 
this 
section 
and 
the 
county
commission 
may 
increase 
the 
compensation 
so
prescribed.  In those counties in which compensation
of election officials is set at an amount in excess
of five dollars ($5) per day, but less than fifty
dollars ($50) per day, the provision of the local
law or general law of local application relative
thereto 
is 
superseded 
and 
the 
compensation
prescribed herein shall be the total compensation of
election officials in the counties.
"(b) In addition to the compensation provided in
subsection (a), each clerk shall be entitled to
supplemental compensation paid by the state to
ensure that the total compensation paid to each
shall be in an amount of at least seventy-five
21
election "in which candidates for both federal or state and
county offices" are nominated or elected, § 17-16-3 governs.
It provides that the State of Alabama is required to reimburse
the county only "for one half of all sums expended by the
county in payment of expenses incurred in holding and
conducting" the election.  Ala. Code 1975, § 17-16-3.10
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
dollars ($75) per day, and each inspector shall be
entitled to supplemental compensation paid by the
state in an amount that ensures that the total
compensation of an inspector is at least one hundred
dollars ($100) per day. Upon completion of a local
election school or being certified as a qualified
poll worker by the probate judge, or both, each
clerk and inspector shall be entitled to receive an
additional twenty-five dollars ($25) per day in
compensation from the state.  The increase provided
for in this subsection shall not increase or
decrease any salary supplement paid under a local
law which is in effect on October 1, 2005. The
provisions of this subsection shall only apply to
those statewide elections for which county expenses
are reimbursed by the state as defined in Chapter
16. The provisions of this subsection shall not
apply to special county or other elections held at
any time other than at the time of holding statewide
elections."
(Emphasis added.)
22
Finally, we note that, consistent with all of the above-
discussed statutory provisions from Chapter 16, the parties
stipulated as follows to the trial court:
"46. Jefferson County's General Fund is used to
pay persons to administer elections at the direction
of 
the 
Jefferson 
County 
Election 
Commission,
including 
the 
February 
5, 
2008, 
presidential
preference primary election.  As a result of the
Election 
Commission's 
resolving 
to 
conduct 
an
election, 
monies 
appropriated 
from 
Jefferson 
County's
General Fund pay for the printing of ballots used
during the February 5, 2008, presidential preference
primary election."
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
23
As previously noted, this Court has stated that standing
"turns on 'whether the party has been injured in fact and
whether the injury is to a legally protected right.'"  State
v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d at 1027.  On the
basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the Working
plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims.
B. The Effect of § 17-16-44 
Although the trial court did not address the issue, Plump
argues on appeal that the trial court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over all but his and Bell's third-party quo
warranto action against Bowman on the basis of Ala. Code 1975,
§ 17-16-44.  That statute provides:
"No jurisdiction exists in or shall be exercised
by any judge or court to entertain any proceeding for
ascertaining the legality, conduct, or results of any
election, except so far as authority to do so shall
be specially and specifically enumerated and set down
by statute; and any injunction, process, or order
from any judge or court, whereby the results of any
election are sought to be inquired into, questioned,
or affected, or whereby any certificate of election
is sought to be inquired into or questioned, save as
may be specially and specifically enumerated and set
down by statute, shall be null and void and shall not
be enforced by any officer or obeyed by any person.
If any judge or other officer hereafter undertakes to
fine or in any wise deal with any person for
disobeying any such prohibited injunction, process,
or order, such attempt shall be null and void, and an
appeal shall lie forthwith therefrom to the Supreme
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
24
Court then sitting, or next to sit, without bond, and
such proceedings shall be suspended by force of such
appeal; and the notice to be given of such appeal
shall be 14 days."
We disagree.
We begin by noting that § 17-16-40 prescribes grounds for
an election contest that go to the manner in which the
election was conducted and the eligibility of a candidate to
hold the office at issue, and, in those respects, whether the
particular outcome of the election was lawful or correct.
Those grounds are as follows:
"(1) Malconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part of
any 
inspector, 
clerk, 
returning 
officer, 
canvassing 
board,
or other person.
"(2) When the person whose election to office is
contested was not eligible thereto at the time of
such election.
"(3) On account of illegal votes.
"(4) On account of the rejection of legal votes.
"(5) Offers to bribe, bribery, intimidation, or
other malconduct calculated to prevent a fair, free,
and full exercise of the elective franchise.
"(6) The results of a recount conducted under
Section 17-16-20 name as a winner a person other than
the person initially certified."
§ 17-16-40, Ala. Code 1975. 
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
25
The present challenge to the February 5 election does not
fall within the scope of an election-contest statute as
suggested by the grounds of contest outlined in § 17-16-40.
This conclusion comports with even more fundamental principles
regarding the jurisdiction of our circuit courts as courts of
general jurisdiction and of equity. In King v. Campbell, [Ms.
1060804, Nov. 30, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2007), this Court
relied upon those fundamental principles to explain the
jurisdiction of our circuit courts in relation to election
challenges:
"Article VI, § 142(b), Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.
Recomp.), provides:
"'(b) The circuit court shall exercise
general jurisdiction in all cases except as
may otherwise be provided by law. The
circuit court may be authorized by law to
review decisions of state administrative
agencies and decisions of inferior courts.
It shall have authority to issue such writs
as may be necessary or appropriate to
effectuate its powers, and shall have such
other powers as may be provided by law.'
"....  The legislature has restricted the jurisdiction of
the circuit courts by enacting § 17-16-44. ...  In Dennis
v. Prather, 212 Ala. 449, 103 So. 59 (1925), this Court
construed a predecessor statute to § 17-16-44.  This Court
noted:
"'The general rule without question is that
courts of equity will not interfere by
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
26
injunction with the holding of elections
political 
in 
character, 
nor 
take
jurisdiction 
of 
a 
contest 
after 
the
election is held.  But this court is
committed to the proposition that equity
will interfere by injunction to restrain
elections not authorized by law. It will
also restrain the usurpation of office, or
the assumption of functions of office where
no lawful office exists.'
"212 Ala. at 452, 103 So. at 61-62 (emphasis added).
Speaking to the predecessor to § 17-16-44, the Dennis
Court stated:
"'Statutes restricting the jurisdiction of
courts of equity, as defined at common law,
and reiterated by statute in Alabama,
should be strictly construed.  Construing
this statute as a whole, it appears,
broadly speaking, to cover cases inquiring
into the validity of elections theretofore
held--a proceeding in the nature of a
contest 
of 
an 
election, 
whether 
the
legality, 
conduct 
or 
results 
of 
the
election be the point of attack.  We doubt
if it would include a case of injunction
against 
the 
exercise 
of 
any 
form 
of
official power, derived through or by
virtue of an election not authorized by law
and therefore wholly void. The equity
jurisdiction in such case does not rest so
much upon matters going to the conduct of
the election, but upon the usurpation or
abuse of official power under color of a
void election.'
"212 Ala. at 452-53, 103 So. at 62 (emphasis added)."
___ So. 2d at ___ (some emphasis omitted).  Thus, we concluded
in King, "litigation challenging the consequences of a void
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
27
election does not come within the sweep of the limitation on
subject-matter jurisdiction in § 17-16-44." __ So. 2d at __.
This principle controls in the present case.  The Working
plaintiffs, the Governor and Bowman make no challenge to the
manner in which the February 5 special election was conducted
or the particular results of that election; the challenge here
is to the very holding of the election.  It is a challenge to
the election as one "not authorized by law and therefore
wholly void."  The jurisdictional limitations imposed by § 17-
16-44 therefore are not applicable.
III. The Validity of the February 5 Special Election
We turn now to the substantive question presented, the
validity of the February 5 special election.  Two issues are
presented by the parties for our consideration: (1) whether
Act No. 784, Ala. Acts 1977, upon which the election was
based, is unconstitutional in light of the prohibition of
certain 
local 
laws 
imposed 
by 
§ 
105 
of 
the 
Alabama
Constitution of 1901, and (2) whether Act No. 784 has been
repealed by § 11-3-1(f).  We first turn our attention to the
latter issue because an affirmative response to it will make
it unnecessary for us to address the constitutionality of a
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
28
legislative enactment.  See generally, e.g., Lowe v. Fulford,
442 So. 2d 29, 33 (Ala. 1983) ("'Generally courts are
reluctant to reach constitutional questions, and should not do
so, 
if 
the 
merits 
of 
the 
case 
can 
be 
settled 
on
non-constitutional grounds.  White v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co.,
646 F.2d 203 (5th Cir.1981).'" (quoting trial court's order));
Becton v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 706 So. 2d 1134, 1142 (Ala.
1997) (explaining that "because we hold that [the federal
statute] does not apply under the facts of this case, it is
unnecessary for us to determine any constitutional issue
concerning [that statute's] preemption of Alabama's applicable
statute of limitations").
     We begin our analysis with a brief examination of the
decision of this Court in Stokes v. Noonan, 534 So. 2d 237
(Ala. 1988).  At issue in Stokes was § 11-3-6, the precursor
statute to § 11-3-1(b), the general law at issue in the
present case.  At the time Stokes was decided, however, § 11-
3-6 contained no exception for local laws.  It stated simply
as follows with respect to a vacancy in a county commission
seat:  
"In case of a vacancy, it shall be filled by
appointment by the governor, and the person so
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
29
appointed shall hold office for the remainder of the
term of the commissioner in whose place he is
appointed."
This general law was in place when the legislature enacted
Act No. 85-237, Ala. Acts 1985.  Similar to the local law at
issue here, Act No. 85-237 was a local law intended to provide
for filling vacancies on a county commission of one particular
county, specifically Mobile County, by a special election.
Addressing the constitutionality of Act No. 85-237, the Stokes
Court reasoned that
"the 
legislature, 
by 
enacting 
a 
general 
law
containing no ... provision or exception for contrary
local laws, thereby intended that general law to be
primary and the subject subsumed entirely by the
general law.  In that situation, § 105 does operate
to prohibit the enactment of contrary local laws." 
Stokes, 534 So. 2d at 239 (quoting Baldwin County v. Jenkins,
494 So. 2d 584, 587 (Ala. 1986)(emphasis omitted)).  On this
basis, the Stokes Court declared Act No. 85-237 to be
unconstitutional. 
Riley v. Kennedy, 928 So. 2d 1013 (Ala. 2005), dealt with
the same local law as did Stokes, Act No. 85-237.  By the time
this Court decided Riley, however, the legislature had amended
§ 11-3-6 to add the beginning proviso "[u]nless a local law
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
30
authorizes a special election." Act No. 2004-455.  The
plaintiffs in Riley argued that that made all the difference:
"Kennedy argues that Act No. 2004-455, which
amended § 11-3-6, Ala. Code 1975, manifests an intent
by the legislature to cure the impediment to the
enforceability this Court found as to Act No. 85-237
and to now give effect to that Act and that,
consequently, a special election is the proper
procedure by which to fill the vacancy created on the
Mobile County Commission by Jones's resignation."
928 So. 2d at 1016.  The Court in Riley disagreed:
"This Court has consistently held that
"'"statutes are to be prospective only,
unless 
clearly 
indicated 
by 
the
legislature.  Retrospective legislation is
not favored by the courts, and statutes
will not be construed as retrospective
unless the language used in the enactment
of the statute is so clear that there is no
other possible construction. Sutherland
Stat. Const., § 41.04 (4th ed 1984)."'"
Riley, 928 So. 2d at 1016.  The Court continued:
"Here, the plain language in Act No. 2004-455,
amending § 11-3-6, Ala. Code 1975, provides for
prospective application only, and that language must
be given effect according to its terms.  Nothing in
the language in Act No. 2004-455 demonstrates an
intent by the legislature that the amendment of §
11-3-6 apply retroactively.  The argument that Act
No. 2004-455 applies prospectively only is further
supported by the preamble of the Act, which provides
that the purpose of the Act is '[t]o amend Section
11-3-6 of the Code of Alabama 1975, relating to
county commissions, to authorize the Legislature ...
to provide for the manner of filling vacancies in the
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
31
office of the county commission.' (Emphasis added.)
The language 'to authorize the Legislature ... to
provide' the means by which vacancies on the county
commission are to be filled further indicates an
intention by the legislature that the Act is to be
prospectively applied.  Therefore, we hold that Act
No. 
2004-455 
applies 
prospectively 
only;
consequently, Governor Riley is authorized to fill
the vacancy on the Mobile County Commission by
appointment."
Riley, 928 So. 2d at 1017 (most emphasis added; some emphasis
omitted).
The Election Commission and Sheriff Hale argue that the
issue in Riley was whether Act No. 2004-455 could "revive" a
local act, Act No. 85-237, which previously had been declared
unconstitutional in Stokes.  Act No. 784, they point out, was
at no time before the enactment of Act No. 2004-455 judicially
declared to be unconstitutional.  "It follows," according to
the Election Commission and Sheriff Hale, "that Act No. 77-784
does not need to be revived.  Therefore, the issue before this
Court in Riley v. Kennedy is not present in this case and the
Riley v. Kennedy decision is inapposite to this case."  
The reasoning unanimously adopted by this Court in Riley
does not admit of the distinction urged by the appellees.
Again, as this Court stated, "the plain language in Act No.
2004-455 ... provides for prospective application only";
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
32
"[n]othing in the language in Act No. 2004-455 demonstrates an
intent by the legislature that the amendment [to the general
law] apply retroactively," and "the preamble of the Act ...
provides that the purpose of the Act is '... to authorize the
Legislature by local law to provide'" for exceptions to the
general law.  928 So. 2d at 1017.
Thus, in Riley, the introductory proviso in § 11-3-6 --
"[u]nless a local law authorizes a special election" -- was
interpreted to apply only to local laws enacted after Act No.
2004-455.  Approximately two years after this Court's decision
in Riley was issued, the legislature, in Act No. 2007-488,
reenacted the same language -- including the aforesaid proviso
-- which had been interpreted in Riley.  It did so without
choosing to make any changes to it (other than to renumber it
as § 11-3-1(b)).  The Working plaintiffs, the Governor, and
Bowman argue that the meaning of this language was decided in
Riley and that this Court has now but to apply that meaning in
the present case.  We agree.  Other than the renumbering of
the section in which this language appears, there has been no
change in this language since the decision in Riley. 
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
33
Our agreement with the appellants' position is buttressed
by long-established and fundamental principles of statutory
construction. 
"[T]here exists, and has long existed, in this state,
a principle that when the legislature readopts a code
section, or incorporates it into a subsequent Code,
prior decisions of this court permeate the statute,
and it is presumed that the legislature deliberately
adopted the statute with knowledge of this court's
interpretation thereof."  
Edgehill Corp. v. Hutchens, 282 Ala. 492, 495-96, 213 So.2d
225, 227-28 (1968). See also, e.g., Galloway Coal Co. v.
Stanford, 215 Ala. 79, 81, 109 So. 377, 379 (1926) ("'It is a
settled rule, that, in the adoption of the Code, the
Legislature is presumed to have known the fixed judicial
construction pre-existing statutes had received, and the
substantial re-enactment of such statutes is a legislative
adoption of that construction.'  Morrison v. Stevenson, 69
Ala. 448, [450 (1881)]."); 2B Norman J. Singer, Sutherland
Statutory Construction § 49.09 (5th ed. 1992) (compiling
numerous Alabama cases to the same effect).  As the Court
aptly put it in the early case of Barnewall v. Murrell, 108
Ala. 366, 377, 18 So. 831, 836 (1895), it is "an elementary
rule of statutory construction" that, where a reenacted
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
34
statute has previously been construed by the courts, it is
"presumed the legislature intended the adoption of that
construction, or [it] would have varied the words, adapting
them to a different intent."  Here, the legislature could have
"varied the words" of former § 11-3-6 in an effort to "adapt
them to a different intent," but did not.  
In accordance with the previous decision of this Court in
Riley v. Kennedy and based on well-established principles of
statutory construction, we conclude that § 11-3-1(b) requires
vacancies on a county commission to be filled by gubernatorial
appointment and that the proviso at the outset of that
subsection (making an exception for local laws that authorize
special elections) does not apply retroactively, that is to
local laws that predate the legislature's adoption of that
proviso.  Act No. 784, Ala. Acts 1977, is such a local law.
In 2007, the legislature added subsection (f) to § 11-3-1.
See Act No. 2007-488, Ala. Acts 2007.  Section 11-3-1(f) now
expressly repeals local laws in conflict with any other
provision of § 11-3-1: "Any existing local law or portion
thereof in conflict with this section is specifically repealed
to the extent of the conflict effective with the next election
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
The Working plaintiffs also contend that  Act No. 784
11
violates their equal-protection rights and that, even if Act
No. 784 governed, the Election Commission set the special
election on the wrong day.  As is true of the issue of the
constitutionality of Act No. 784 in relation to § 105 of the
Alabama constitution, our holding today makes it unnecessary
for us to reach these additional issues.
35
following September 1, 2007."  Act No. 784, by purporting to
provide for special elections to fill vacancies on the
Jefferson County Commission, is "in conflict" with § 11-3-
1(b), which requires vacancies to be filled by gubernatorial
appointment, with no exception for preexisting local laws.
Act No. 784, as a preexisting local law, therefore was
repealed by the legislature's adoption of § 11-3-1(f).  The
trial court's validation of the February 5 special election on
the basis that it was authorized by Act No. 784 is due to be
reversed.11
IV. The Right to a November 2008 Election
McGinnis argues on appeal that he is entitled to an order
requiring the Election Commission to include the county
commission seat for district 1 on the November 2008 general
election ballot.  In support of this view, he cites us to the
portion 
of 
§ 
11-3-1(b) 
that 
provides 
that 
"[i]f 
the
appointment [by the Governor to fill a vacancy on a county
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
The opposition of the Election Commission to placing the
12
county commission seat on the November ballot has been
premised on its view that Act No. 784 supersedes the
provisions of the general law in this regard. 
36
commission] occurs at least 30 days before the closing of
party qualifying as provided in Section 17-13-5," a condition
that exists in this case, "the person appointed to the vacated
office shall only serve until seven days after the next
general election following the appointment ...."  We also
observe that the penultimate sentence of § 11-3-1(b) includes
a reference to "the election required by operation of this
subsection."  Given our ruling today as to the repeal of Act
No. 784, McGinnis's understanding of § 11-3-1(b) as it relates
to the conduct of an election to fill the vacancy in the
Jefferson County Commission is correct.
  McGinnis seeks a
12
judgment requiring that the election prescribed by § 11-3-1(b)
be placed on the November 2008 general election ballot and
"such additional orders as may be needed to secure full and
appropriate relief consistent with the right of political
parties to nominate candidates" for that election.  The trial
court is instructed to enter an appropriate order declaring
that the required election is to be placed on the November
2008 general election ballot.  As for the remainder of the
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
37
relief requested by the appellants, this Court is confident
that appropriate officials will take the necessary and
appropriate steps as may be called for or allowed in any
applicable provisions of Title 17, Ala. Code 1975, and any
other applicable law, whether relating to the selection by
political parties of nominees or any other aspect of the
election process.  Nothing herein shall prevent the parties
from petitioning the trial court for such further relief as
may be necessary and appropriate to fulfill the intent of this
Court's judgment.   
V. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed, the judgment of the trial court
upholding the validity of the February 5 special election on
the basis of its conclusion that Act No. 784 authorized that
election was in error.  The Governor's appointment of George
F. Bowman to fill the vacant district 1 seat on the Jefferson
County Commission was in accordance with § 11-3-1(b) and was
lawful.  An election for that seat is to be held as part of
the November 2008 general election.  Accordingly, we reverse
the trial court's judgment and remand the cause before us to
1070850, 1070893, 1070917
38
the trial court for the entry of a judgment consistent with
this opinion.
1070850–-REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1070893–-REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1070917–-REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.