Case Title: Maxwell v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 130810

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2014-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
 
DERRICK GANSON MAXWELL, S/K/A 
DERICK GANSON MAXWELL 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 130810 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
FEBRUARY 27, 2014 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
VINCENT A. ROWE 
 
v.  Record No. 130881 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
We consider these two appeals together because they present 
two different applications of the provision in Code § 8.01-
384(A) that addresses the absence of a contemporaneous objection 
when there is no opportunity to make a timely objection. 
 
In each case, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in holding that Rule 5A:18 barred consideration of issues 
on appeal when the litigant had failed to make a 
contemporaneous objection in the circuit court. 
I. 
Background 
A. 
Maxwell 
Derick Ganson Maxwell was indicted for unlawful wounding in 
violation of Code § 18.2-51.  On September 26, 2011, Maxwell was 
tried by jury for the offense in the Circuit Court of Frederick 
County.  Immediately after the jury left the courtroom to begin 
 
2 
deliberations, Maxwell's counsel requested to be excused to go 
to her office because she had not "had the opportunity to eat 
anything."  Maxwell's counsel indicated that the courtroom was 
within ten minutes from her office, and that "[t]hey know my 
phone number." 
The circuit court recessed while the jury deliberated, and 
Maxwell's counsel, Maxwell, and the Assistant Commonwealth's 
Attorney left the courtroom to await the return of the jury's 
verdict.  Upon its return, the jury found Maxwell guilty of 
unlawful wounding.  After brief testimony, closing arguments, 
and deliberations on sentencing, the jury recommended a sentence 
of five years' imprisonment. 
After the circuit court dismissed the jury, Maxwell's 
counsel indicated that "[i]t has been brought to my attention 
that there may have been a jury question.  I am not quite sure 
what that is."  The circuit court confirmed that the jury had 
submitted questions during deliberations but was unable to find 
the questions at that time.  The circuit court went on to 
explain the questions and answers, and to indicate that there 
was no reason for Maxwell or his counsel to be present: 
The Court:  Counsel, I will be happy to 
address [the jury questions and answers] at 
sentencing, but I can tell you what it was.  
I told them to re-read the instructions.  
They asked a question and I told them the 
answer was in the instructions.  To re-read 
the instructions was the answer to one of 
 
3 
the particular questions.  And the other 
question was . . . it was one again where it 
was in the instructions and I just told them 
to read the instructions that they already 
received.  They were not given any new 
instructions whatsoever or were not given 
any new directions.  It was just simply to 
read the instructions. 
 
Ms. Hackett:  Okay.  And I would just 
inquire because I was not present in court. 
 
The Court:  No one was present because the 
nature of the question only called for them 
to read the instructions.  There was no 
reason to bring the Defendant back or 
Counsel back.  You were in your office.  I 
think [you] had gone for lunch. 
 
On October 31, 2011, Maxwell filed a motion to set aside 
the unlawful wounding conviction.  Maxwell argued, in part, that 
the court's ex parte communications with the jury violated his 
Sixth Amendment rights and his right under Code § 19.2-259 to be 
"personally present during the trial."  Maxwell also alleged 
that the court's communications with the jury violated Code 
§ 19.2-263.1, which prohibits judges from "communicat[ing] in 
any way with a juror in a criminal proceeding concerning . . . 
any aspect of the case during the course of the trial outside 
the presence of the parties or their counsel."  The circuit 
court denied Maxwell's motion. 
Maxwell filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals and 
assigned error to the circuit court's ex parte communications 
with the jury.  The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished 
 
4 
decision, held that Rule 5A:18 prohibited consideration of the 
merits of Maxwell's assignment of error because Maxwell did not 
make a contemporaneous objection to the circuit court's 
allegedly improper communications with the jury.  We awarded 
Maxwell this appeal. 
B. 
Rowe 
Vincent A. Rowe was tried by jury in the Circuit Court for 
the City of Portsmouth and found guilty of grand larceny in 
violation of Code § 18.2-95 and grand larceny with intent to 
sell in violation of Code § 18.2-108.01.  During closing 
argument, the attorney for the Commonwealth indicated that 
inferences could support a finding of guilt: 
That's why they're part of this case, that's 
why they're referred to as circumstantial 
evidence, and that possession – in order to 
eliminate this inference, if you feel it's 
justified in th[is] case, what has to happen 
is some evidence has to be brought forth by 
the defense to eliminate it.  And as you 
know at this point, the defense has offered 
no evidence. 
 
After just two additional sentences, the Commonwealth concluded 
its closing argument.  Rowe's counsel stated, "Actually, before 
I make my argument, there is a motion I would like to make 
outside the presence of the jury."  The circuit court responded, 
"We'll deal with it when the jury goes out to retire," and Rowe 
replied, "Very well." 
 
5 
 
After the jury left to begin deliberations, Rowe made a 
motion for mistrial.  Rowe argued that the Commonwealth's 
statements that "the defendant didn't testify or the defendant 
did not present any evidence" were unduly prejudicial and 
warranted a mistrial.  The circuit court denied Rowe's motion. 
 
Rowe filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, alleging in 
part that the circuit court erred by denying his motion for a 
mistrial because the Commonwealth's comments during closing 
argument prejudiced Rowe by shifting the burden to the defense 
to produce evidence.  The Court of Appeals, by order, refused to 
reach the merits of this assignment of error, holding that 
Rowe's objection to the Commonwealth's closing statement was not 
timely made and, as a result, the Court of Appeals could not 
reach the alleged error under Rule 5A:18.  We awarded Rowe this 
appeal. 
II. 
Discussion 
A. Rule 5A:18 
The Court of Appeals' "interpretation of the Rules of this 
Court, like its interpretation of a statute, presents a question 
of law that we review de novo."  LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 
465, 469-70, 722 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2012).  Rule 5A:18 contains 
the contemporaneous objection rule applicable to the Court of 
Appeals and parallels the requirements of the contemporaneous 
 
6 
objection rule applicable to this Court as provided in Rule 
5:25.  See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217, 688 
S.E.2d 185, 189 (2010) (observing that Rule 5:25 is the 
"counterpart" to Rule 5A:18).  Rule 5A:18 provides, in relevant 
part: 
No ruling of the trial court . . . will be 
considered as a basis for reversal unless 
an objection was stated with reasonable 
certainty at the time of the ruling, except 
for good cause shown or to enable the Court 
of Appeals to attain the ends of justice. 
 
See also Rule 5:25.  The purpose of the contemporaneous 
objection rule "is to avoid unnecessary appeals by affording the 
trial judge an opportunity to rule intelligently on objections."  
State Highway Comm'r v. Easley, 215 Va. 197, 201, 207 S.E.2d 
870, 873 (1974).  For the circuit court to rule intelligently, 
the parties must inform the circuit court "of the precise points 
of objection in the minds of counsel."  Gooch v. City of 
Lynchburg, 201 Va. 172, 177, 110 S.E.2d 236, 239-40 (1959). 
For an objection to meet the requirements of Rule 5A:18, it 
must also "be made . . . at a point in the proceeding when the 
trial court is in a position, not only to consider the asserted 
error, but also to rectify the effect of the asserted error."  
Scialdone v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 422, 437, 689 S.E.2d 716, 724 
(2010).  This requirement allows the circuit court to remedy the 
 
7 
error while also giving "the opposing party the opportunity to 
meet the objection at that stage of the proceeding."  Id. 
B. Code § 8.01-384(A) 
Under Code § 8.01-384(A), "[f]ormal exceptions to rulings 
or orders of the court" are not required.  Rather, in order to 
preserve an issue for appeal a party must, "at the time the 
ruling or order of the court is made or sought, make[] known to 
the court the action which he desires the court to take or his 
objections to the action of the court and his grounds therefor." 
However, Code § 8.01-384(A) continues, "if a party has no 
opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is 
made, the absence of an objection shall not thereafter prejudice 
him on motion for a new trial or on appeal." (Emphasis added.)  
Thus, this provision of Code § 8.01-384(A) requires appellate 
courts to consider issues on appeal that do not satisfy the 
contemporaneous objection requirement when the litigant had no 
opportunity to make the requisite timely objection. 
Both Maxwell and Rowe contend that Code § 8.01-384(A) 
applies to preserve their respective assignments of error for 
appellate review.  However, the statute that they base their 
arguments on is where their similarities end, as the factual 
differences between the two cases dictate disparate 
dispositions. 
C. Maxwell 
 
8 
Maxwell argues that the Court of Appeals erred in applying 
the contemporaneous objection requirement of Rule 5A:18 to 
refuse to reach his challenge to the circuit court's sua sponte 
response to jury questions in his absence.  Maxwell contends 
that he had no opportunity to make a contemporaneous objection 
to the circuit court's consideration of the jury questions 
because Maxwell and his counsel were absent from the courtroom, 
and the circuit court did not inform them that the jury 
submitted questions to the court or that the court was going to 
provide an answer.  Maxwell maintains that he made an objection 
when he became aware of the alleged error.  Furthermore, he 
contends that because he had no opportunity to object 
contemporaneously when the court considered the jury's questions 
in his absence, any delay in subsequently making his objection 
cannot prejudice his right to appeal pursuant to Code § 8.01-
384(A). 
The Commonwealth argues that Rule 5A:18 bars Maxwell's 
appeal because Maxwell had the opportunity to bring the matter 
to the circuit court's attention when the court was still in a 
position to take corrective action.  The Commonwealth contends 
that because the record supports a finding that the parties 
learned of the ex parte communications while the jury was still 
deliberating, albeit after the question was considered and 
answered by the circuit court in the parties' absence, Maxwell 
 
9 
did have an opportunity to object in a timely manner and failed 
to do so, and the Court of Appeals did not err by applying Rule 
5A:18 to bar consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal. 
Rule 5A:18 requires the appellant to make an objection to 
the court's ruling "with reasonable certainty at the time of the 
ruling" in order to preserve the issue for appeal.  The record 
is clear that neither Maxwell nor his attorney were present when 
the court considered and responded to the jury's questions, and 
that Maxwell and his attorney had no opportunity to object to 
the court's act of responding to the jury's questions in their 
absence. 
Code § 8.01-384(A) requires consideration of Maxwell's 
argument on appeal.  Maxwell’s argument in the Court of Appeals 
was not to the content of the circuit court's answers to the 
jury's questions, but to the circuit court's act of entertaining 
and answering the jury's questions when neither he nor his 
counsel were present.  The record, specifically the portion of 
the transcript in which the court discusses their absence, 
reflects that Maxwell and his attorney, through no fault of 
their own, were not present in the courtroom when the judge 
received and answered the jury's questions.  Thus, by their 
absence, Maxwell and his counsel did not have the opportunity to 
be present and challenge the court's decision to address 
questions from the jury in their absence.  By its plain 
 
10 
language, Code § 8.01-384(A) prevents Maxwell from being 
prejudiced on appeal due to his lack of opportunity to make an 
objection contemporaneously with the court’s act of proceeding 
in his absence.  See Commonwealth v. Amos, 287 Va.    ,   ,     
S.E.2d   ,    (2014)(this day decided). 
D. Rowe 
Rowe contends that he did make a contemporaneous objection, 
but that he had no opportunity to articulate the reasons for his 
objection in compliance with the requirement of Code § 8.01-
384(A) because the circuit court denied his request to make a 
motion outside the presence of the jury.  Rowe contends that his 
failure to make a sufficient contemporaneous objection is 
excused by the provision of Code § 8.01-384(A) that prohibits 
prejudice to his appeal. 
The Commonwealth contends that Rule 5A:18 bars review of 
Rowe's objection because Rowe did not make a contemporaneous 
objection to the prosecutor's closing argument.  The 
Commonwealth argues that Rowe failed to alert the circuit court 
of the nature of his objection before the jury retired and, 
consequently, Rule 5A:18 applies to bar consideration of the 
objection on appeal. 
We agree with the Commonwealth that Rowe failed to make an 
objection with the requisite specificity to satisfy Rule 5A:18.  
Assuming without deciding that Rowe's delayed objection, made 
 
11 
after the conclusion of the Commonwealth's argument and only two 
sentences after the allegedly improper comment, would have been 
timely if its content had been sufficient, we hold that Rowe 
failed to articulate a cognizable objection at a time when the 
court could take appropriate action. 
As we have previously addressed, the purpose of the 
requirement that a litigant make a contemporaneous objection is 
that the objection be made at a time when the circuit court, in 
considering the objection, can take appropriate action to 
correct the error.  Scialdone, 279 Va. at 437, 689 S.E.2d at 
724.  Further, it is well-established that the Court will not 
consider a defendant's "assignments of error alleging that 
improper remarks were made by the prosecutor" unless he "has 
made a timely motion for a cautionary instruction or for a 
mistrial."  Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 148, 547 
S.E.2d 186, 200 (2001); see also Blount v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 
807, 811, 195 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1973)(refusing to reach the 
assigned error because the defendant "did not ask that a 
cautionary admonition be given directing the jury to disregard 
[an] allegedly improper [remark in closing] argument, nor did he 
make a motion for a mistrial").  The defendant must make the 
motion for mistrial before the jury retires or it "is untimely 
and properly refused."  Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 39, 
393 S.E.2d 599, 606 (1990). 
 
12 
We have also specifically required an appellant who objects 
to an allegedly improper statement to do more than merely state 
his objection.  See Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 410 
S.E.2d 254 (1991).  In Yeatts, defense counsel noted his 
objection to a statement by the Commonwealth's witness that "Mr. 
Yeatts spoke of his prior convictions and his drug abuse."  242 
Va. at 136, 410 S.E.2d at 263.  The circuit court sustained the 
objection.  Id., 410 S.E.2d at 264.  Later, after the prosecutor 
proceeded with his direct examination of the witness, defense 
counsel made a motion for mistrial based on the aforementioned 
statement.  Id. at 136-37, 410 S.E.2d at 264.  We held that the 
circuit court did not err in denying Yeatts' motion for mistrial 
because the second objection, made with reasonable certainty and 
specifically requesting a mistrial, was not timely made.  Id. at 
137, 410 S.E.2d at 264. 
Therefore, Yeatts' initial and timely objection, which was 
limited to "[y]our Honor, I object," was not sufficient to 
preserve for appeal Yeatts' argument concerning his motion for 
mistrial.  Id. at 136, 410 S.E.2d at 264; see also Hargrow v. 
Watson, 200 Va. 30, 35, 104 S.E.2d 37, 40 (1958) ("[Plaintiff's] 
counsel . . . simply stated to the court, 'I object to [defense 
counsel's] statement that the defendant . . . made a fraudulent 
statement as to his marriage.'  No request to declare a mistrial 
was included in the objection, and no request was made that the 
 
13 
court instruct the jury to disregard the remark.  If such remark 
was improper, which we do not here decide, the error was 
waived."). 
Before the jury retired, Rowe's counsel stated only, 
"Actually, before I make my argument, there is a motion I would 
like to make outside the presence of the jury."  Rowe's "motion" 
was not an "objection . . . stated with reasonable certainty at 
the time of the ruling" as required by Rule 5A:18 because it 
failed to state for the court the details of his objection or 
the time-sensitive nature of his motion.  Further, Rowe’s 
counsel did not move for a mistrial at a time when the circuit 
court could have taken action to correct the asserted error. 
Rowe's counsel did not lack the opportunity to make his 
objection to the allegedly improper comments to the court.  
After the court indicated its intent to "deal with it when the 
jury goes out to retire," Rowe chose to respond, "[v]ery well," 
rather than express his need to contemporaneously preserve his 
objection.  Rowe's counsel's colloquy with the court makes it 
clear that he had the opportunity to make his objection known to 
the court and articulate more clearly the action he desired the 
court to take and that the action needed to be taken before the 
jury retired. 
Nothing in the record supports a finding that Rowe had no 
opportunity to make a contemporaneous objection to the 
 
14 
Commonwealth's argument at a time and in a manner that would 
make it clear to the court the relief that Rowe sought.  When 
Rowe did subsequently make his objection sufficiently clear to 
the court, pursuant to our case law, it was too late for the 
court to take the corrective action sought.  The Court of 
Appeals did not err in refusing to consider Rowe's challenge to 
the allegedly improper statements made by the Commonwealth 
during closing argument. 
III.  Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the Court of 
Appeals' judgment in Maxwell and remand the case to the Court of 
Appeals to consider the assignment of error that it erred in 
determining was defaulted.  We will affirm the Court of Appeals' 
judgment in Rowe. 
Record No. 130810 – Reversed and remanded. 
Record No. 130881 - Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE LEMONS, with whom JUSTICE MIMS joins, dissenting - 
Record No. 130881. 
 
When considering questions of preservation and Code § 8.01-
384(A), there has to be a recognition of real world trial 
practice.  All the participants, including the judge, are imbued 
with a certain amount of understanding regarding what goes on in 
trial.  In this case, at the end of the Commonwealth's closing 
 
15 
argument, the Commonwealth's Attorney made the following 
comment, "[a]nd as you know at this point, the defense has 
offered no evidence."  The Commonwealth's Attorney then 
concluded his argument. 
 
Within a reasonable amount of time thereafter, defense 
counsel stated, "Actually, before I make my argument, there is a 
motion I would like to make outside the presence of the jury."  
Everyone acquainted with trial practice would know what this 
motion was – a motion for a mistrial based upon the 
Commonwealth's Attorney's reference to the defendant's failure 
to present evidence.  Defense counsel's request could have 
included a lesser remedy than a mistrial, such as a jury 
instruction to disregard the comment.  Regardless, this 
statement by defense counsel, taken in context, made "known to 
the court the action which he desire[d] the court to take."  
Code § 8.01-384(A).  Thereafter, the trial judge responded, 
"[w]e'll deal with it when the jury goes out to retire."  The 
trial judge directed the attorney to postpone addressing the 
question until a later time. 
 
Presumably, this case does not represent the first time the 
trial judge has seen this scenario: the prosecutor makes remarks 
to the jury that may be construed as a comment upon the 
defendant’s constitutional right not to testify, and defense 
counsel responds with a request to make a motion outside the 
 
16 
presence of the jury.  It is objectively unreasonable to 
conclude that the trial judge did not know the basis for defense 
counsel’s request; it was readily apparent under these 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 
386, 484 S.E.2d 898, 906 (1997)(relying on "training and 
experience" of trial judges regarding evidence issues and 
presuming the trial judge considers only that evidence which is 
permissible); Smith v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 178, 184, 694 
S.E.2d 578, 581 (2010)(relying on "training, experience and 
judicial discipline" of trial judges as a basis to conclude that 
a judge "separate[s], during the mental process of adjudication, 
the admissible from the inadmissible, even though he has heard 
both").  In my judgment, defense counsel’s request of the judge 
was therefore sufficient to preserve the matter for appellate 
review. 
It is important to remember that this was a criminal trial 
before a jury, and the jury was about to retire to decide the 
fate of the defendant.  Defense counsel had to decide whether to 
argue with the judge in front of the jury and demand that his 
motion be heard before the jury retired, or to abide by the 
trial court's ruling.  By arguing with the judge immediately 
before the jury was to retire, defense counsel risked 
prejudicing the jury against him, and by extension, his client.  
By acknowledging the trial court's authority to hear the motion 
 
17 
at a later time, counsel should not have to risk waiving his 
client's fundamental right to an appeal.  Civility and decorum 
on the part of defense counsel should not be equated to a waiver 
of the defendant's fundamental right to appeal.  See Ashley 
Flynn, Procedural Default: A De Facto Exception to Civility, 12 
Cap. Def. J. 289, 297-303 & n.63 (2000). 
In this case, defense counsel made known to the trial court 
the action he wanted the court to take when he informed the 
court that he wished to make a motion immediately after the 
Commonwealth concluded its closing argument which included 
commentary on the defendant’s lack of evidence and failure to 
testify.  To the extent any ambiguity remained regarding exactly 
what type of motion he wished to make, defense counsel did not 
have a reasonable opportunity to provide a more detailed 
objection at that time, in light of the trial court's direction 
that defense counsel's motion would be dealt with at a later 
time.  Any failure to raise a more specific objection was a 
result of the trial court's actions, and Rowe should not be 
prejudiced on appeal as a result of the trial court's action.  
Therefore, the preservation exception of Code § 8.01-384(A) 
should apply, and Rowe's appeal should be considered on the 
merits.  Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's decision to 
affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals. 
 
 
18 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, dissenting - Record No. 130810. 
 
I disagree with the majority's interpretation and 
application of Code § 8.01-384(A), and would affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals.  The majority begins by incorrectly 
framing the issue on appeal.  This leads to its flawed 
conclusion that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that 
Maxwell failed to timely raise his objection to the circuit 
court's challenged communication with the jury. 
I. 
 
According to the majority, "Maxwell's argument in the Court 
of Appeals was not to the content of the circuit court's answers 
to the jury's questions, but to the circuit court's act of 
entertaining and answering the jury's questions when neither he 
nor his counsel were present."  (Emphasis in original.)  The 
majority thus determines that no objection could have been made 
that would have remedied the circuit court's purported 
constitutional error in answering the jury's questions without 
Maxwell and his attorney present.  This is merely recognition of 
the obvious - that nothing could have been done after the fact 
to effect their presence at the time the circuit court answered 
the jury's questions.  Under this limited view of the appeal, 
the content of the circuit court's answers to the jury's 
questions would be irrelevant.  Moreover, there would be no 
reason to remand this case to the Court of Appeals, as the 
 
19 
majority does, because there would be no basis for a harmless 
error analysis absent consideration of the substance of the 
circuit court's answers.  In sum, the fact that the ex parte 
communication occurred is all that matters.  This, however, is a 
misconception of the relevant considerations presented in 
Maxwell's appeal to the Court of Appeals. 
 
A circuit court's act of communicating ex parte with a jury 
is inextricably intertwined with the content of that 
communication in the context of a party's constitutional 
challenge to that communication, as presented here.  Indeed, as 
Maxwell has contended from the time he filed his Petition for 
Appeal with the Court of Appeals, "the jury questions posed go 
to the heart of the issues in the pending case," to which he was 
purportedly given "no opportunity to have his counsel argue 
appropriate responses."  "The jury questions and the responses 
given by the trial judge in [his] absence," Maxwell asserted, 
"may have had a significant impact on the outcome of [his] trial 
in this case."  (Id. at 23) 
Thus, the content of the circuit court's ex parte 
communication with the jury is the overriding substantive 
consideration in Maxwell's constitutional challenge to that 
communication.  Indeed, highlighting the fact that the actual 
content of a circuit court's challenged ex parte communication 
with a jury obviously matters, Maxwell himself acknowledged in 
 
20 
his opening brief to the Court of Appeals that there would be no 
basis for such challenge if, for example, the communication 
"raised by the jury regard[ed] comfort and convenience."  That 
is because the determining legal factor is whether or not the 
communication was prejudicial, triggering a harmless error 
analysis.  See Angel v. Commmonwealth, 281 Va. 248, 264, 704 
S.E.2d 386, 396 (2011) ("[E]rrors, arising from the denial of a 
constitutional right[,] are subject to a harmless error 
analysis.") (citing Lilly v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 548, 551, 523 
S.E.2d 208, 209 (1999)).  As Maxwell also acknowledged, for the 
Court of Appeals to determine whether the circuit court's ex 
parte communication with the jury "should give rise to a 
reversal of [his] conviction, [the Court of Appeals] must first 
determine whether that error was harmless."  See Clay v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 259, 546 S.E. 2d 728, 731 (2001) 
(cases cited by Maxwell, addressing harmless constitutional 
error); Corado v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 315, 323, 623 S.E.2d 
452, 456 (2005) (same). 
II. 
Accordingly, the dispositive procedural issue in Maxwell's 
appeal is whether he preserved the right to assert that he was 
prejudiced by the content of the circuit court's ex parte 
communication with the jury, i.e., an argument that the 
communication was not harmless error.  We must therefore decide 
 
21 
whether Maxwell was required, after the fact, to raise an 
objection with the circuit court concerning the challenged 
communication in light of the preservation provisions in Code § 
8.01-384(A). 
Under the express terms of Code § 8.01-384(A), a party, 
like Maxwell, will not be "prejudice[d]" by his failure to make 
a contemporaneous objection if he has no opportunity to do so.  
Nevertheless, if that party later has an opportunity to make his 
objection in time for the circuit court to correct the purported 
error, but fails to object, it is that failure which causes him 
"prejudice" on appeal, i.e., default, not the absence of a 
contemporaneous objection.  Id.  And, manifestly, the statute 
makes no provision to the contrary. 
This Court has long recognized that the purpose of the 
contemporaneous objection rule, presently contained in Rules 
5:25 and 5A:18, is not "'to obstruct petitioners in their 
efforts to secure writs of error, or appeals.'"  Scialdone v. 
Commonwealth, 279 Va. 422, 437, 689 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2010) 
(quoting Kercher v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., 
150 Va. 108, 115, 142 S.E. 393, 395 (1928)).  Rather, its 
paramount purpose is "'to protect the trial court from appeals 
based upon undisclosed grounds, to prevent the setting of traps 
on appeal, to enable the trial judge to rule intelligently, and 
to avoid unnecessary reversals and mistrials.'"  Brandon v. Cox, 
 
22 
284 Va. 251, 255, 736 S.E.2d 695, 696 (2012) (quoting Reid v. 
Boyle, 259 Va. 356, 372, 527 S.E.2d 137, 146 (2000)); see also 
Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 414, 374 S.E.2d 46, 52 
(1988); Harlow v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 269, 273, 77 S.E.2d 851, 
854 (1953).  In effecting this policy, we have held that a party 
satisfies Rules 5:25 and 5A:18 if he makes an objection "'at a 
point in the proceeding when the trial court is in a position, 
not only to consider the asserted error, but also to rectify the 
effect of the asserted error.'"  Scialdone, 279 Va. at 437, 689 
S.E.2d at 724 (quoting Johnson v. Raviotta, 264 Va. 27, 33, 563 
S.E.2d 727, 731 (2002)).  Thus, our analysis of whether these 
rules have been satisfied "has consistently focused on whether 
the trial court had the opportunity to rule intelligently on the 
issue" raised on appeal.  Id. 
 
Pursuant to these principles, Maxwell was required to 
object to the trial court's ex parte communication with the jury 
to the extent there was an opportunity for him to do so in time 
for the trial court to give purportedly "'rectify[ing]'" 
instructions to the jury.  Id.  Maxwell was presented with such 
an opportunity but did not pursue it.  While the jury was still 
deliberating its verdict, Maxwell learned of the trial court's 
subject communication with the jury but did not bring the  
 
 
 
23 
asserted error to the trial court's attention at that time.1  It 
was only after the jury was discharged upon finding Maxwell 
guilty of unlawful wounding that he raised with the trial court 
the issue of its communication with the jury.  As the Court of 
Appeals noted, "'[a] party litigant should not await the return 
of the verdict and have a chance of securing a favorable one, 
and then, if unfavorable, make a motion for a new trial.'"2  
Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 120, at *9 (Va. Ct. 
App. Apr. 16, 2013) (unpublished) (quoting Crockett v. 
Commonwealth, 187 Va. 687, 707, 47 S.E.2d 377, 386-87 (1948)). 
 
For these reasons, I would hold that Maxwell failed to 
preserve for appeal a challenge to the trial court's 
communication with the jury, and affirm the decision of the 
Court of Appeals.  I therefore dissent.
                     
 
1 This fact was established through the prosecutor's 
unchallenged, unilateral avowal at oral argument on Maxwell's 
motion to set aside the verdict.  (App. 431)  See Whitaker v. 
Commonwealth, 217 Va. 966, 969, 234 S.E.2d 79, 81 (1977) ("[A] 
unilateral avowal of counsel, if unchallenged . . . constitutes 
a proper proffer."). 
 
2 It is here worth noting that during oral argument, 
Maxwell's counsel could not provide a cogent explanation as to 
why the circuit court's answers to the jury's questions were 
wrong and what the circuit court should have said differently. 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring - Record No. 130810. 
 
I disagree with the majority’s implicit holding that every 
ex parte communication between a circuit court judge and a 
deliberating jury automatically excuses a party’s subsequent 
failure to object to that communication.  Rather, in my opinion, 
the determinative fact is whether the party had a reasonable 
opportunity to object to the trial court’s ex parte 
communication “at a point in the proceeding when the trial court 
is in a position, not only to consider the asserted error, but 
also to rectify the effect of the asserted error.”  Johnson v. 
Raviotta, 264 Va. 27, 33, 563 S.E.2d 727, 731 (2002). 
 
Here, it is highly unlikely that either Maxwell or his 
attorney became aware of the ex parte communication, much less 
had the opportunity to object, at a point when the circuit court 
could address any error that may have resulted from the ex parte 
communication.  The record demonstrates that the jury only 
deliberated for one hour and thirty-six minutes, and during that 
time, Maxwell’s attorney had left the courthouse with the 
circuit court’s express permission.  On these facts alone, I 
agree with the majority’s decision to reverse and remand.