Case Title: P. Cornwell

Citation: 

Docket Number: S046176

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 8/18/05 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S046176 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
GLEN CORNWELL, 
) 
 
) 
Sacramento County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 93F06212 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
Defendant Glen Cornwell was charged in the Sacramento County Superior 
Court with first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187)1 for the June 1, 1993 slaying of 
William Reagan.  Defendant also was charged with robbery (§ 211) and, in 
connection with both offenses, it was alleged defendant personally used a firearm 
and that the offenses were serious felonies.  (§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. 
(c)(1).)  Defendant additionally was charged with unlawful possession of a 
firearm.  (§ 12021, subd. (a).)  A robbery-murder special circumstance was alleged 
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).)  It also was alleged that defendant had suffered a prior 
serious felony conviction and had served a separate prison term for robbery.  
(§§ 667, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (b), 1192.7.) 
                                              
1 
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
2 
Defendant’s first trial ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach 
a verdict at the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial.  A second jury was 
empanelled and returned a guilty verdict on the murder and robbery charges; the 
robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation and firearm-use allegations were 
found to be true.  After defendant waived jury trial, the court found defendant 
guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm and found true the prior conviction and 
prior-prison-term allegations.  At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, 
the jury returned a verdict of death.  This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).) 
We affirm the judgment in its entirety for the reasons set forth below. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase Evidence 
The principal participants in the narrative of defendant’s crime are 
defendant; his girlfriend, Juanita Washington; his friend, Roland Johnson; his 
acquaintance, security guard Michael Johnson (no relative of Roland’s); Kimberly 
Scott, owner of Cashland, a check-cashing business in Sacramento; and William 
Reagan, the victim, who assisted Kimberly Scott in her business and also was 
romantically involved with her.  Several identification witnesses testified, and 
other witnesses testified on various points.  The principal defense witnesses 
testified concerning the issue of identification, including possible deficiencies in 
the eyewitness identification evidence proffered by the prosecution.  One witness 
provided defendant with an alibi. 
The setting of the crime was the sidewalk in front of Cashland.  The 
business was located on 16th Street between F and G Streets in Sacramento.  
There was an alley next to the business, and beyond the alley was an empty lot 
that served as a parking lot.  Also nearby, in the general vicinity, was a 
supermarket located at 23d and F Streets. 
 
3 
The crime was committed at approximately 1:30 p.m. on June 1, 1993.  The 
evidence against defendant, however, reflected preparatory activity on his part 
beginning on the previous day, May 31, 1993, when he borrowed an automobile, a 
brown Toyota, belonging to Juanita Washington, his girlfriend.  Defendant drove 
this automobile to the home of his friend, Roland Johnson, a drug dealer.  
Defendant asked Johnson for the loan of a handgun, explaining he needed the 
weapon “to try to make a move on something,” and that he had “eyes,” — 
statements Johnson interpreted as an announcement that defendant planned a 
robbery and that he had an accomplice who was an insider at the scene of the 
robbery.  Roland Johnson supplied defendant with a loaded .357 magnum revolver 
and observed defendant drive away in Washington’s Toyota. 
According to Washington, defendant departed for work at 7 a.m. on June 1, 
1993, driving her Toyota.  Washington’s vehicle was parked on the 600 block of 
17th Street on that date and was ticketed by a city parking enforcement officer at 
that location at 3:52 p.m., the ticket noting that the vehicle’s tires had been marked 
at approximately 1:00 p.m. on that date and that the vehicle had exceeded a two-
hour parking limit.  
William Reagan generally assisted at Cashland by delivering checks to the 
business’s bank and returning with cash.  He performed this task successfully on 
the morning of June 1, 1993, but his second run of the day ended in his death.  He 
departed from Cashland at 12:30 p.m. and withdrew $9,500 in cash from the bank 
at approximately 1:00 p.m.  The withdrawal consisted of $4,000 in $100 bills, 
$1,500 dollars in $50 bills, and $4,000 in $20 bills.  He was killed on his return as 
he walked from his automobile, which was parked behind Cashland, through the 
alley to the front of the establishment.  It was noted at the trial that the first day of 
the month ordinarily was a busy one for Cashland. 
 
4 
The prosecution theorized that the insider whom defendant mentioned to 
Roland Johnson was Michael Johnson, a man with whom defendant was 
acquainted and who was employed as a uniformed security guard at Cashland.  
Michael Johnson generally worked only on the first day of the month and 
occasionally accompanied other employees on their bank runs.  Usually he was 
armed, but on the day of the crime he was not.  During Reagan’s second bank run 
on June 1, 1993, Michael Johnson remained at Cashland and was observed pacing 
back and forth and looking out the front windows of the business. 
At approximately 1:30 p.m. on June 1, 1993, Reagan was walking from the 
alley to the Cashland business carrying his briefcase, his usual means of 
transporting the business’s cash.  A man whom five witnesses identified as 
defendant approached him from behind and attempted to wrest the briefcase from 
his grasp.  (Robert Blair’s observations were made from a vantage point across the 
street from Cashland, Maria Ramos’s from the passenger side of an automobile 
stopped on 16th Street directly in front of Cashland, Frances Rivers’s from an 
automobile idling in the alley adjacent to Cashland and again from the automobile 
as it crossed the parking lot behind Cashland, Susan Erickson’s through a window 
inside Cashland, and Cassandra Henderson’s from directly in front of Cashland.)  
When Reagan resisted, defendant produced a weapon and ordered him to drop the 
briefcase.  When Reagan did not comply, defendant fired the weapon.  Reagan fell 
to the ground, the briefcase still in his grasp.  Defendant fired a second time, 
striking Reagan’s neck, took the briefcase, and ran down the alley next to 
Cashland, waving the revolver over his head as if signaling.  Defendant ran to the 
rear of Cashland and into the empty lot behind it.  Frances Rivers, one of the 
persons who observed the shooting, drove away from Cashland after the incident 
and circled back through the lot.  There she came face to face with defendant, 
 
5 
whom she recognized as the shooter, and witnessed him run away, accompanied 
by another man.   
Witnesses who were inside Cashland at the time heard someone yell, 
“they’re fighting,” then heard gunfire, and crouched on the floor.  Scott, the owner 
of Cashland, heard someone yell, “it’s Bill.”  She ran outside and found Reagan 
lying on his back on the sidewalk, bleeding from his neck.  She could see that he 
was dying.  He was killed by a gunshot wound to his neck that was consistent with 
impact by a bullet fired from a .357 magnum positioned against his neck.  His face 
and his left hand displayed gunpowder stippling such as would be present if a 
firearm had been fired at him at short range, but missed.  At the scene of the crime, 
police investigators discovered a bullet and a bullet casing from a .357 magnum 
revolver. 
There was evidence defendant was at a supermarket located a few blocks 
from Cashland at 23d and F Streets at 2:15 p.m. on June 1, 1993.  A police search 
of defendant’s bedroom produced a receipt from the supermarket bearing this date 
and time.  At some time between 2:30 and 3:00 p.m. on the day of the crimes, 
defendant arrived at an auto dismantling business and purchased a used white 
Camaro, paying for the automobile, which cost $1,400, with $20 bills.  The 
purchase was finalized at 3:39 p.m.  Defendant was accompanied by another man 
who was not identified, but who may have been an accomplice. 
Between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on June 1, 1993, defendant arrived in the 
Camaro at Roland Johnson’s home.  According to Johnson, defendant appeared 
frightened and agitated.  He stated he had used Johnson’s weapon but could not 
return it because he no longer possessed it.  Defendant paid Johnson $500 in $20 
bills for the firearm and for other favors.  Defendant reported he had committed a 
robbery and had been forced to “smoke” the victim.  Johnson gave this testimony 
after receiving certain benefits from law enforcement authorities related to his 
 
6 
August 1993 imprisonment for a parole violation.  Johnson claimed he began to 
suffer from a guilty conscience concerning the murder defendant had committed 
and feared the consequences of his own part in lending defendant the murder 
weapon.  Johnson contacted law enforcement authorities and supplied them with 
the foregoing information and, in return for testifying, he received an eight-month 
reduction of his term of imprisonment for the parole violation as well as immunity 
from prosecution for any act connected with the charged crimes.   
Juanita Washington testified concerning events that took place later on the 
day of the fatal shooting, June 1, 1993.  She reported that defendant returned to 
their home at 5:15 p.m. rather than at his usual hour of 4:00 p.m.  He arrived in a 
white Camaro she had not seen previously, explaining that his supervisor at work 
had purchased the automobile for him and that defendant would make periodic 
payments.  Washington was concerned because of “the money situation that we 
were in.”  Washington observed a briefcase in the trunk of the Camaro.  Defendant 
informed her he had left her Toyota downtown because he had worked in the 
neighborhood that day.  He drove her to the vehicle’s location on the 600 block of 
17th Street, where, as noted previously, it had been ticketed. 
Defendant’s supervisor at his place of employment testified, denying 
having purchased the Camaro.  Another employee, a record keeper, added that 
defendant failed to report for work on June 1, 1993. Defendant, although he was 
employed at the time of the crime, had $1.20 in his bank account as of May 21, 
1993, had passed three checks with insufficient funds in May, 1993, and had at 
least one overdue bill.   
The defense presented was one of mistaken identity and alibi.  Although, as 
noted previously, five prosecution witnesses positively had identified defendant as 
the perpetrator, four other witnesses who stood in front of or near Cashland and 
witnessed the crime testified at trial that defendant was not the shooter.  (These 
 
7 
defense witnesses included Alicia McKee, who had stood immediately in front of 
Cashland; her sister, Sharlean McKee, who had stood approximately four feet 
from the victim as he was shot; Marvin Napoleon, whose observations were made 
from a position 15 feet from the shooting; and Alice Sanchez, who was standing 
with Napoleon 15 feet from the shooting.)  Two of these witnesses, Alicia and 
Sharlean McKee, had identified someone other than defendant at a live lineup, 
whereas two others, Marvin Napoleon and Alice Sanchez, had been unable to 
make a positive identification at the live lineup.  An additional defense witness, 
Robert Young, a teller at Cashland, had identified someone at the live lineup other 
than defendant as the perpetrator, but at trial Young testified he was unable to say 
whether or not defendant was involved. 
The prosecution impeached these witnesses to varying degrees.  For 
example, Alicia McKee previously had testified she was not certain whether 
defendant was the assailant.  Sharlean McKee testified the defense investigator 
had shown her a photograph of defendant and had informed her he was not 
responsible for the shooting.  Marvin Napoleon was a heavy drinker who 
conceded he had focused on the weapon, not the face of the assailant, during the 
crime.  Alice Sanchez, who also was a heavy drinker, noted the defense 
investigator had shown her a photograph of defendant, commenting that defendant 
was innocent.  
The defense also introduced evidence establishing that one of the 
prosecution’s identification witnesses, Susan Erickson, was being treated for 
heroin addiction, was taking methadone at the time of the crime, and was awaiting 
trial on a robbery charge at the time of her testimony.  In addition, the defense 
investigator testified that when he showed Erickson a photo lineup that did not 
include defendant’s photograph, she selected someone other than defendant as the 
shooter.  Erickson qualified her identification with the comment that the man in 
 
8 
the photograph merely resembled the shooter.  The investigator also denied 
informing identification witnesses that defendant was innocent. 
The defense also offered the expert opinion testimony of Dr. Geoffrey 
Loftus, a professor of psychology and an expert in eyewitness identification.  Dr. 
Loftus explained that human memory does not operate as a mechanical recording 
device but instead is constructed from various sources, including information 
learned after an incident.  Loftus asserted that stressful events that occur quickly 
often are not recalled accurately, especially after the passage of considerable time.  
He discussed the impact of race on eyewitness identification2 and further 
explained that a weapon generally becomes the focus of any observation of a 
crime.   
In addition, defendant produced an alibi witness, Billy Mackey, a person 
with three prior felony convictions, who testified he had spent the day of June 1, 
1993 from 8:00 or 8:30 a.m. until after 2:00 p.m. with defendant at the auto 
dismantling shop where defendant acquired the Camaro, at a restaurant, and at the 
witness’s home.  According to Mackey, defendant did not have an automobile in 
his possession during this period.  Mackey did not testify at defendant’s first trial, 
although he was aware of the legal proceedings, but came forward two weeks prior 
to the retrial.   
                                              
2  
The court placed on the record its observations concerning the ethnic 
identity of certain witnesses, stating that prosecution witnesses Blair, Ramos, and 
Erickson were White and that prosecution witnesses Rivers and Henderson were 
African-American.  The court stated that defense witnesses Johnson and Young 
were African-American, that defense witnesses Sanchez and Napoleon were either 
Native American or Hispanic, and that defense witnesses Alison and Sharlean 
McKee were White.  The record also reflects that defendant is African-American 
and that the murder victim, William Reagan, was White. 
 
9 
Michael Johnson, the Cashland security guard, testified that he was barely 
acquainted with defendant and was not involved in any plan to rob Reagan.   
B.  Penalty Phase Evidence 
By stipulation, the prosecution presented evidence that in February 1985, 
defendant was convicted of eight robberies.  These eight offenses occurred as 
separate incidents during a four-month period in 1983.  On each occasion, 
defendant robbed an employee of a commercial establishment at gunpoint. There 
were no injuries, although in some instances defendant either displayed a firearm 
or threatened the victims with a firearm.  Defendant was sentenced to prison for 
these crimes and was released on parole on September 24, 1992, less than a year 
preceding the murder in the present case.  It was stipulated that defendant’s 
convictions rendered it illegal for him to be in possession of a firearm at the time 
of the murder.   
The sole witness to testify for the prosecution at the penalty phase was 
Robin Reagan, one of the murder victim’s five children.  She offered brief 
testimony describing the victim’s admirable qualities, the shock she had suffered 
at the moment she learned of his death, and the sad impact of his absence on his 
children and grandchildren. 
Defendant testified in his own behalf at the penalty phase.  He explained 
that his father had left the family when defendant was six years of age.  Defendant 
described a generally happy childhood in a close-knit family.  In June 1973, 
defendant joined the Unites States Navy.  He did not see combat during his 
service, but traveled extensively.  After three years of active service, defendant 
served in a Navy Reserve unit.  Upon his honorable discharge in 1979, he was able 
to find civil service employment, although he did not stay long at various 
positions.  During his reserve service and extending until 1981, defendant suffered 
 
10 
from depression.  During his employment with the United States Postal Service, 
defendant suffered a mental heath crisis.  He was diagnosed as suffering from 
bipolar disorder and was hospitalized on more than one occasion.  Defendant 
testified that various medications, including lithium, haldol, prolixin, and 
thorazine were prescribed for him. 
According to defendant, he suffered continuing stress from his 
employment, his difficult romantic relationship, and the absence of his family.  He 
conceded that he “probably” committed the eight robberies referred to in the 
stipulation.  He acknowledged his conduct had been “terrible, terrible.”  He 
declared he had not been motivated by the need for money but by his enjoyment of 
the role of an outlaw, asserting he had given away some the proceeds of the eight 
robberies.  He stated he was not taking his prescribed medication at the time of the 
robberies.  Defendant testified he worked while imprisoned for the robbery 
convictions and also when he was on parole.  In June 1993, he had temporary 
employment as a clerical worker, was employed by a company called Bell Carter 
Distributing, and also refurbished and sold used motorcycles.  Defendant did not 
believe he was suffering from a mental disease at the time of the murder, and did 
not want to take the psychotropic medication prescribed for him because of its 
negative side effects, including mental confusion.  Defendant testified he had no 
current relationship with the members of his family, including his daughter, who 
was then 20 years of age.  
On cross-examination, defendant stated that his recollection of the eight 
stipulated robberies was impaired.  He testified he had been accused of 40 
robberies, was tried for 16 of them, and convicted of 8.  He also conceded that he 
recalled that — at a minimum — he at least had displayed a firearm during each of 
the eight robberies and, by implication, having threatened his robbery victims with 
death in the event they failed to comply with his demands. 
 
11 
Defendant married Carolyn Cornwell on June 3, 1993 (two days after 
Reagan was murdered).  She testified that she and defendant had a happy 
relationship and that he worked full-time five or six days a week. 
Deputy Sheriff Raymond Roberts testified that defendant had served as a 
trustee during his incarceration pending trial and had performed diligently. 
Crendell Polee, Jr., defendant’s older brother, testified that defendant had 
been a studious, athletic youth and never was in trouble as a child.  He testified 
that schizophrenia is “quite common” in the family, that (in his opinion) defendant 
had exhibited signs of the disease, and that, when Polee last had seen defendant in 
1982, defendant exhibited signs of stress and communicated in a rapid, stuttery 
form of speech.   
James Esten, formerly an administrative employee for the California 
Department of Corrections, described the various levels of confinement within the 
prison system, the unlikelihood that a prisoner serving a sentence of life without 
possibility of parole would be housed in any but the most restrictive custody 
(which Esten described), and the circumstance that such prisoners never can be 
and never have been paroled.  When defendant arrived at the prison, he had been 
taking lithium, Mellaril, and Elavil, and Esten explained that during defendant’s 
incarceration for robbery, his behavior was good and he was a valuable worker.  
Eston predicted that defendant would make an excellent prisoner, could assist 
correctional officers in pacifying other inmates, and again would be a valuable 
worker. 
Dr. Shawn Johnston, a clinical psychologist, reviewed defendant’s medical 
records and also met with defendant in order to perform a psychological 
evaluation.  Dr. Johnston concluded that defendant suffered from a bipolar 
disorder, as defendant had since the late 1970’s.  Dr. Johnston noted that defendant 
had been prescribed medication for this condition on a number of occasions. 
 
12 
Dr. Johnston testified that defendant’s record demonstrated that he had 
exhibited periods of agitation, pressured speech, “flights of ideas,” and paranoid 
delusions — symptoms that are characteristic of bipolar disorder.  Dr. Johnston 
described the manic phase of the disease, noting that afflicted persons feel 
wonderful, enjoying superabundant energy.  At the same time, persons in the 
manic phase of the disease engage in reckless behavior and suffer from memory 
disorders.  Psychological tests performed by Dr. Johnston on defendant disclosed 
likely learning disability, psychoneurological deficits or brain damage, confused 
thinking, agitation, and indications of mania and schizophrenia. 
Dr. Johnston explained that bipolar disorder impairs the subject’s judgment 
and, during extreme manic phases, may deprive the subject of the ability to know 
right from wrong.  On cross-examination he conceded that a person diagnosed 
with bipolar disorder ordinarily is able to distinguish right from wrong.  Dr. 
Johnston also noted that on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, 
defendant scored in the third highest range in psychopathic deviance, a score 
outside the normal range, but the witness predicted that defendant would function 
well in a highly structured environment such as prison.  
II.  GUILT PHASE CLAIMS 
 
A.  Wheeler Motion  
Defendant, who is African-American, contends the prosecutor exercised a 
peremptory challenge against Juror T., who also is African-American, because of 
her race, in violation of the federal constitutional guaranty of equal protection of 
the laws (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 84 (Batson)) and the state 
 
13 
constitutional right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the 
community.  (See People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277 (Wheeler).)3   
“ ‘Exercising peremptory challenges because of group bias rather than for 
reasons specific to the challenged prospective juror violates both the California 
Constitution and the United States Constitution.  [Citations.]’ ” (People v. 
Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 732.)  In a recent decision, the United States 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that Batson states the procedure and standard to be 
employed by trial courts when challenges such as defendant’s are made.  “First, 
the defendant must make out a prima facie case by ‘showing that the totality of the 
relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’  [Citations.]  
Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the ‘burden shifts to 
the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion’ by offering permissible race-
neutral justifications for the strikes.  [Citations.]  Third, ‘[i]f a race-neutral 
explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent 
of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.’  [Citation.]”  (Johnson v. 
California (June 13, 2005, No. 04-6964) __U.S. __ [2005 WL 1383731, at p.* 4], 
fn. omitted (Johnson).) 
The court went on to explain that “a defendant satisfies the requirements of 
Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to 
draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”  (Johnson, supra, ___U.S. 
___ [2005 WL 1383731, at p.* 5].)  The defendant having shown membership in a 
cognizable class, and keeping in mind “that peremptory challenges constitute a 
jury selection practice that permits ‘ “ those to discriminate who are of a mind to 
                                              
3 
At trial, defense counsel referred only to Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258.  
We permit defendant to raise his Batson claim for the first time on appeal, because 
the claims are so closely related.  (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1174.) 
 
14 
discriminate,” ’ ” the defendant “ ‘must show that these facts and any other 
relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to 
exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
In the present case, as we shall explain, our scrutiny of the record causes us 
to believe that defendant failed to meet the standard imposed by Batson, supra, 
476 U.S. 79, and Johnson, supra, ___ U.S. ___ [2005 WL 1383731].  We note that 
because we reach this conclusion, we are not obliged to consider the 
persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s justifications.  (People v. Young, supra, 34 
Cal.4th at p. 1173; People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 135; see also 
Johnson, supra, ___U.S. ___ [2005 WL 1383731, at p.  * 6] [“ ‘It is not until the 
third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant — the step 
in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried 
his burden of proving purposeful discrimination’ ” ].) 
Only two African-American persons were included in a venire of 117 
persons.  The prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against one of them, 
Juror T.; the prosecutor repeatedly passed the other African-American prospective 
juror, and the individual served on the jury.  In her juror questionnaire, Juror T. 
noted that she had relatives and several close friends who had worked in law 
enforcement, commented that the criminal justice system seemed to involve more 
spectacle than substance, that in that system, process is exalted above truth, and 
that “[t]he law seems to exist to perpetuate its system rather than do justice.  
Minorities are not treated the same as whites.”  She added that several of her close 
relatives had been arrested and that her aunt served a prison sentence for homicide.  
The juror stated that “nearly all” of her close relatives have been subjected to 
“burglaries, robberies, car theft or break ins” and that she had suffered a burglary 
and an auto theft.  She expressed the view that the criminal justice system 
sometimes treats citizens unfairly because of race, offering an example:  “The first 
 
15 
Rodney King trial where the officers were acquitted seemed to be a blatant 
miscarriage of justice, because the victim . . . was black[.]”    She wrote that 
“Blacks, poor people, minorit[ies and] women seem to get harsher treatment than 
whites, rich people.  I’ve known many studies & research to show this as fact.”  
On the other hand, she appeared to favor use of the death penalty and consistently 
acknowledged a juror’s duty to consider the evidence fairly and to follow the law 
as directed by the court.   
It was the trial court, not counsel, who conducted the individual voir dire.  
During voir dire, the same juror noted that her brother-in-law was a superior court 
judge in Los Angeles, that other family members or friends were lawyers or were 
involved in law enforcement, and that she had received some instruction on the 
basics of criminal law and criminal procedure in connection with her employment.  
She explained that she believed that the aunt who had served a prison term for 
homicide had been wrongly convicted. 
The court, having posed several questions concerning her aunt’s conviction, 
asked: “Has that left you with any feelings about the criminal justice system, 
especially in murder cases, that you feel that you’ve developed any negative 
feelings about the system because of that case?”  The juror responded: “No, not 
about the system.  It’s just that things aren’t always the way they seem.”   
Voir dire continued the following morning.  The court posed additional 
questions to Juror T., commenting that in her questionnaire “[i]n terms of the 
justice system treating people unfairly you said that yes, sometimes you feel it 
does, and as an example apparently you wrote in the first Rodney King trial.  What 
do you mean by the injustice that you perceive there?” 
The juror responded:  “Well, it seemed that even with the major evidence, 
that having it on videotape there was still some lack of believing that police could 
treat a black man like that.  And then when the trial took place, the first trial they 
 
16 
were acquitted, even though almost the whole world saw it happening.  And 
coming from Los Angeles and having had relatives treated like that myself it just 
— it makes it very very hard to keep trusting.”   
The juror also felt law enforcement officers were too “casual” in 
investigating the crimes committed against her and her family.  Her questionnaire 
and voir dire disclosed that she believed the criminal justice system was too 
cumbersome and proceeded far too slowly.  She consistently assured the court, 
however, that she would put aside her personal views in evaluating the evidence 
and the potential penalty. 
When the prosecutor excused Juror T., defendant objected.  Defense 
counsel offered to submit the matter without argument, but the court requested that 
counsel attempt to establish a prima facie case that the juror was excused because 
of bias against African-American persons, asking defense counsel to give “specific 
reasons . . . that would tend to indicate that there has been an invidious 
discrimination in the selection of jurors.”  Defense counsel responded briefly, 
making only two points.  First, he noted there were only two African-Americans 
on the two jury panels in the venire, and that the prosecutor excused one of them, 
Juror T.  Second, defense counsel asserted that neither Juror T.’s questionnaire nor 
her responses during voir dire indicated she was subject to challenge for cause or 
“that she couldn’t sit as a fair and impartial juror in this matter.” 
The trial court determined defendant had not made a prima facie showing 
of group bias.  The court noted that Juror T.’s questionnaire, which it had 
reviewed prior to its voir dire of the juror, caused the court to pose substantially 
more follow-up questions in a “much larger number of areas” than had been the 
case for other jurors.  The court complimented the juror for her thoughtful 
responses but stated that the juror, unlike others, was distinguished by the 
circumstances that her aunt had been prosecuted for the crime of murder and by 
 
17 
the juror’s strongly held view that the criminal justice system is not fair when 
questions of race are presented.  Specifically, the court observed, she had lost faith 
that the criminal justice system operates fairly for African-American persons.  
“While she did say some of her faith had been restored by the second Rodney 
King trial, she did indicate some continuing concerns about it, especially as it 
relates to participants in the trial who are black.”  The court also noted that 
although the other African-American juror, who had “been there since the 
beginning as a second juror,” had been passed repeatedly by the prosecutor, the 
prosecutor challenged Juror T. “the moment she sat down.”   
Although the court expressly determined that defendant had not made a 
prima facie showing of group bias and denied the defense motion on that basis, it 
permitted the prosecutor to comment upon defendant’s claim.  The prosecutor 
asserted that defense counsel themselves had exhibited some interest in 
challenging Juror T.  The prosecutor explained that his challenge was motivated, 
not by group bias, but by the fear that Juror T. might not give the prosecution case 
against defendant, an African-American, a fair hearing because she believed 
“blacks were treated unfairly in the system” and “she’s had relatives . . . ‘treated 
like Rodney King.’ ”  The prosecutor also alluded to the juror’s statement that her 
aunt had been wrongly convicted of homicide. 
As noted, in support of his claim in the trial court, defendant alluded to 
nothing more than the circumstance that (1) one of the two African-Americans 
among the potential jurors had been challenged, and (2) the juror would not have 
been subject to excusal for cause.  The circumstance that the prosecutor 
challenged one out of two African-American prospective jurors does not support 
an inference of bias, particularly in view of the circumstance that the other 
African-American juror had been passed repeatedly by the prosecutor from the 
beginning of voir dire and ultimately served on the jury.  (See People v. Box 
 
18 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1188-1189; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 136, fn. 
15; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 119.)  The circumstance that the 
juror was not subject to exclusion for cause certainly did not support an inference 
that the exercise of a peremptory challenge against her was motivated by group 
bias.  (See People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 165, disapproved on another 
point in People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 555, fn. 5 [a prosecutor may act 
on a hunch or apparently arbitrarily, as long as the peremptory challenge is not 
based on group bias]; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 136.) 
The juror’s own remarks also clearly do not support an inference she was 
excused because of her race — on the contrary, despite her obvious intelligence 
and good faith, her voir dire disclosed a large number of reasons other than racial 
bias for any prosecutor to challenge her, including but not limited to her personal 
experience with an allegedly unfair homicide prosecution of a close relative and 
her express distrust of the criminal justice system and its treatment of African-
American defendants — a view not restricted to African-American persons.  (See 
People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 138; People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 
Cal.4th at p. 733; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 195, 230.)  Nor do we find 
anything else in the record to supply a basis for an inference that the prosecutor 
was motivated by racial prejudice.  
Defendant claims the trial court erroneously required him to prove the 
existence of “systematic discrimination” (that is, proof that minorities are 
underrepresented in the venire), citing People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92.  In 
that case, we commented that “[c]ertain aspects of the trial court’s findings were 
neither necessary nor relevant, since a Wheeler violation does not require 
‘systematic’ discrimination [citation], and is not negated simply because both 
sides have dismissed minority jurors or because the final jury is ‘representative.’ ”  
(Id. at pp. 136-137.)  Contrary to defendant’s claim, however, the trial court in the 
 
19 
present case did not suggest that a prima facie case of group bias could not be 
established so long as a member of the cognizable group remained on the jury, nor 
did the court refer to systematic discrimination or to minority jurors struck by the 
defense.4 
Defendant asks us to examine the responses of jurors other than Juror T. in 
determining whether the trial court erred in finding that defendant failed to establish 
a prima facie case of group bias.  In earlier cases we explained that, although such 
an examination is appropriate at the trial court level when the issue properly is 
brought to that court’s attention, such an examination for the first time on appeal is 
unreliable.  (See People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1190; People v. Ervin (2000) 
22 Cal.4th 48, 76, and cases cited.)  Defendant urges reconsideration of these cases 
in light of the high court’s decision in Johnson, supra, ___ U.S. ___ [2005 WL 
1383731], in which the court did not comment upon whether comparative analysis 
should be undertaken for the first time on appeal, and another decision issued the 
same day, Miller-El v. Dretke (June 13, 2005, No. 03-9659) ___ U.S. ___ [2005 WL 
1383365], in which the court employed comparative juror analysis in circumstances 
in which it was undisputed that a prima facie case had been made.  Assuming 
without deciding that a comparative juror analysis should be undertaken under the 
circumstances presented, we conclude defendant’s proffered analysis fails to 
establish a prima facie case of group bias.   
                                              
4  
On appeal, defendant for the first time suggests it would be inaccurate to 
conclude a member of the cognizable group remained on the jury, claiming the 
relevant group was African-American women.  We have agreed that such persons 
constitute a cognizable group (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1173), but 
the claim was not raised in the trial court and is forfeited.  (People v. Cleveland, 
supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 734.)  In any event, the underlying premise that the court 
assumed no prima facie case had been established as long as one African-
American man served on the jury simply is not supported by the record. 
 
20 
In the present case, defendant did not direct the trial court’s attention to voir 
dire or questionnaire response of jurors other than Juror T. other than to comment 
on the thoroughness of Juror T.’s questionnaire and voir dire responses.  Assuming 
without deciding that a comparative analysis is appropriate for the first time on 
appeal when a reviewing court is engaged in determining whether a prima facie 
case of group bias was established, we agree with respondent that, contrary to 
defendant’s claims, defendant has not identified prospective jurors of other 
ethnicities who were not challenged but had a similar background and views, 
including personal experience with a close relative’s assertedly wrongful homicide 
conviction.  We note that two jurors were excused who also had the experience of 
having close relatives prosecuted for murder (Juror S. and Juror F.), whereas the 
jurors cited by defendant and not excused experienced the prosecution of relatives 
for much less serious matters such as driving offenses and, moreover, these jurors 
did not express the belief that their relatives had been wrongly convicted.  (E.g., 
Juror J. [driving offense], Juror R. [juvenile theft offense], Juror W. [driving 
offense; this juror also had a relative who had served prison time but she knew 
nothing else about that matter], Juror O. [a long-deceased relative had been 
convicted of many theft-related crimes].)  Nor did the jurors to whom defendant 
refers share Juror T.’s marked view that the criminal justice system treats African-
American persons unfairly.  (Cf. Juror M. [police officers fail to handle inebriated 
persons well], Juror R. [O.J. Simpson was treated differently from the way 
ordinary citizens would have been treated during the so-called Bronco chase], 
Juror C. [this juror, examined subsequent to the Wheeler motion, commented on 
the Rodney King trial but related her concerns about racial issues in the criminal 
justice system to the riots that followed that individual’s first trial and the effect of 
this civil strife upon his second jury, denying the episode caused her to lose faith 
in the jury system:  “I’m not concerned about it being fair, I’m concerned about 
 
21 
the riot continuing and the civil disorder and how it may have related to the 
thinking of the second jury”], Juror O. [suggesting that justice is not always done, 
because the criminal justice system is overburdened].)   
Defendant urges that Juror T. appeared more knowledgeable about legal 
procedure than jurors who served on the jury, pointing to her statement that 10 
years prior to trial, she had received some training in law enforcement issues in 
connection with her employment in an administrative capacity, whereas other 
jurors displayed some confusion concerning matters such as delay in prosecution 
and the right to public trial.  We see no reason why Juror T.’s limited training 
would render her a more desirable juror for the prosecution or that a comparison 
with the other jurors would support an inference Juror T. was challenged on the 
basis of racial bias.  Defendant also emphasizes Juror T.’s connection to persons 
involved in law enforcement and the judicial system, including the late Attorney 
Johnnie Cochran, contending that some other jurors who served actually were less 
desirable for the prosecution by virtue of their lack of similar relationships.  
Again, we do not see that the comparison supports an inference that Juror T. was 
excused because of racial bias.  Defendant claims that Juror T. exhibited many 
views favoring the prosecution’s case, including support for the death penalty and 
the view that there should be more vigorous prosecution of crime.  He contends 
that the unchallenged jurors expressed more equivocal views on such subjects and 
that some failed to exhibit the enthusiasm for jury service expressed by Juror T.  
He notes Juror T. repeatedly acknowledged a juror’s duty to put aside personal 
opinions and to follow the law.  These circumstances do not signify, however, that 
the prosecutor was bound to accept her as a juror if reasons apart from group bias 
supported his challenge, nor, in view of the totality of the evidence, do such 
circumstances support an inference that the prosecutor challenged Juror T. because 
of her race. 
 
22 
In supplemental briefing, defendant contends reversal is required on the 
ground that the trial court determined (or may have determined) whether 
defendant established a prima facie case by asking whether it was “more likely 
than not” that the prosecutor challenged Juror T. on the basis of impermissible 
group bias.  As defendant observes, the high court in Johnson, supra, ___ U.S. ___ 
[2005 WL 1383731, at p. * 4] expressly disapproved of that standard for purposes 
of establishing a prima facie case.  He points out that we must presume the trial 
court followed existing law, and that at the time of trial the court would have 
relied upon our Wheeler decision, which alluded to a “reasonable inference” of 
group bias as a basis for a prima facie showing and also called for the defendant to 
establish a “strong likelihood” that a juror has been peremptorily challenged on the 
basis of group bias.  (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280, 281.)  Our subsequent 
decision holding that both of the quoted terms were essentially the same as the 
Batson standard, and that a prima facie showing called for a demonstration that it 
was “more likely than not” that group bias accounted for the challenge, was 
disapproved in Johnson, supra, ___ U.S. ___ [2005 WL 1383731, at pp. * 3, 7] 
(revg. People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302). 
We are not persuaded.  Regardless of the standard employed by the trial 
court, and even assuming without deciding that the trial court’s decision is not 
entitled to deference, we have reviewed the record and, like the United States 
Supreme Court in Johnson, supra, ___ U.S. ___ [2005 WL 1383731], are able to 
apply the high court’s standard and resolve the legal question whether the record 
supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race.  The 
record does not support such an inference; it is devoid of any suggestion that the 
basis for the challenge to Juror T. was even “close” or “suspicious.”  (Johnson, 
supra, ___ U.S. ___ [2005 WL 1383731, at p. * 7].) 
 
23 
In his supplemental brief, defendant also contends that the trial court’s 
determination was flawed because it speculated as to the prosecutor’s reasons for 
challenging the juror when it referred to the juror’s views on the criminal justice 
system and the circumstance that her aunt had been convicted of murder.  He 
relies again upon the Johnson decision, in which the court stated:  “The Batson 
framework is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that 
discrimination may have infected the jury selection process.  [Citation.]  The 
inherent uncertainty present in inquiries of discriminatory purpose counsels 
against engaging in needless and imperfect speculation when a direct answer can 
be obtained by asking a simple question.  See Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 
1090 [9th Cir.] 2004) (‘[I]t does not matter that the prosecutor might have had 
good reasons . . . [w]hat matters is the real reason they were stricken’ . . .  ).”  
(Johnson, supra, ___ U.S. ___ [2005 WL 1383731, at p. *6].)  The quoted caution 
against speculation must be read in light of the high court’s statement that a prima 
facie case is established when the “defendant satisfies the requirements of 
Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to 
draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”  (Id. at p. ___ [2005 WL 
1383731, at p. * 5].)  Once the trial court concludes that the defendant has 
produced evidence raising an inference of discrimination, the court should not 
speculate as to the prosecutor’s reasons—it should inquire of the prosecutor, as the 
high court directed.  But there still is a first step to be taken by the defendant, 
namely producing evidence from which the trial court may infer “that 
discrimination has occurred.”  (Ibid.)  We have concluded that the evidence 
alluded to by defendant in the trial court did not support such an inference, nor 
was such an inference supported by the challenged juror’s own statements or 
anything else in “ ‘the totality of the relevant facts’ ” (Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 
 
24 
__ U.S. __ [2005 WL 1383365, at p. *6]) that we have seen in our examination of 
the record (including the statements of other prospective jurors).    
B.  Conflict of Interest 
Defendant contends a potential conflict of interest came to light when, prior 
to defendant’s first trial, the prosecutor informed the court that prosecution witness 
Roland Johnson recognized one of defendant’s two defense counsel, Emory King, 
as the man who had represented Johnson’s wife when the couple were prosecuted 
jointly for drug sales nine years prior to the trial in the present case.  The court 
instituted an inquiry of King and found there was no conflict of interest.  
Defendant contends the court’s failure to conduct a more thorough hearing 
constituted a violation of his federal constitutional right to the effective assistance 
of counsel, specifically to counsel free from a conflict of interest.  He contends we 
must reverse the judgment or at least remand for further hearing in the trial court.  
We are not persuaded. 
The trial court questioned the prosecutor and King at a brief hearing, 
ascertaining the nature of the case in which King had been involved and noting 
that King had not represented prosecution witness Roland Johnson, but his wife.  
The court reasoned that the wife’s interest must have been adverse to her 
husband’s, judging by the appointment of separate counsel for each defendant.  
King did not recall having been involved in any previous prosecution of Roland or 
his wife.  The court saw no indication of any potential conflict of interest, adding 
that King was not responsible for the examination of witnesses during the guilt 
phase of defendant’s trial.  The court requested that King check his own records.  
At a subsequent hearing, the court asked the parties whether there was any further 
information to be placed on the record and directed “[b]oth sides [to] try to look 
into that to see if there’s any further information to be brought to the [c]ourt’s 
 
25 
attention.”  King then agreed that the court was accurate in stating that King had 
not represented Roland Johnson, but instead his wife.  King stated that he still was 
looking for the relevant case file, but added that he did not believe there was any 
potential conflict of interest.  Prior to the second trial, the court expressly found 
that King and defendant had no conflict of interest.  Neither defendant nor defense 
counsel objected. 
The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel under the 
federal Constitution includes the right to representation free from any conflict of 
interest that impairs counsel’s efforts on behalf of his or her client.  (Mickens v. 
Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 166, 171; see Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, 
271; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 135.)  We have recognized that 
counsel’s current or prior representation of a witness may create a conflict, 
because counsel bears professional responsibilities both to the witness and to the 
client and may have confidential information concerning his or her representation 
of the witness.  (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 949; People v. Bonin (1989) 
47 Cal.3d 808, 835.)  But when the attorney has not received any pertinent 
confidential information from the witness, ordinarily there is no actual or potential 
conflict of interest.  (People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 949.) 
Under the federal Constitution, a defendant who did not object to an 
asserted conflict at trial must demonstrate on appeal that there was an actual 
conflict of interest that “adversely affected [the] lawyer’s performance.”  (Cuyler 
v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335, 348.)  In some circumstances, the defendant in 
such a situation is not obliged to establish that the conflict and its adverse effect on 
counsel’s representation was prejudicial ⎯ that is, that it is reasonably probable, 
in the absence of the conflict and its effect on counsel’s performance, that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different.  Reversal is required simply on a 
showing of actual conflict that adversely affected counsel’s representation.  
 
26 
(Mickens v. Taylor, supra, 535 U.S. at pp. 166, 172-175 [assuming, without 
deciding, that lower courts correctly have extended this rule beyond an attorney’s 
concurrent representation of multiple defendants]; see also People v. Cox, supra, 
30 Cal.4th at p. 948.)   
When a court “ ‘knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict 
exists,’ ” it should inquire into the conflict even in the absence of objection by 
defendant or his or her counsel.  (Mickens v. Taylor, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 168; 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 347; People v. Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at 
p. 836.)  Under the federal Constitution, the duty to inquire is not triggered merely 
because of “a vague, unspecified possibility of conflict.”  (Mickens v. Taylor, 
supra, 535 U.S. at p. 169.)  Although the trial court is required to perform some 
inquiry once it knows or reasonably should know of a particular conflict of 
interest, the court may decline to pursue the matter if, in its view, the potential for 
conflict is too slight.  (See People v. Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 837.)  In Cuyler 
v. Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S. 335, for example, although the high court recognized 
the trial court’s duty to inquire into potential conflicts, the circumstance that 
defense counsel represented three defendants charged and tried separately for 
murder did not trigger a duty to inquire in the absence of any objection from a 
defendant.  The separate prosecutions mitigated the potential for conflicting 
defenses, the defenses were consistent, and there was no indication counsel 
provided less than a vigorous defense.  (Id. at pp. 346-347; see also Mickens v. 
Taylor, supra, 535 U.S. at pp. 168-169.)  The trial court may place substantial 
weight on counsel’s assertion that no conflict of interest exists.  (People v. Lawley 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 146.)  
As noted, neither defendant nor his counsel objected to King’s continued 
representation at the first or second trial.  Indeed, King stated he believed there 
was no potential for a conflict.  The circumstance that many years prior to the first 
 
27 
trial in the present case one of defendant’s attorneys had taken responsibility for 
the defense of a person who was not a witness in the present case and whose 
interest was adverse to that of a prosecution witness does not suggest that defense 
counsel’s loyalty to defendant was impaired in any manner.  Defendant speculates 
that Johnson’s wife might have related to King some statement by her husband 
that might have been useful to the defense.  Defendant urges that defense counsel 
would be obliged to treat such a statement as a privileged communication between 
spouses.  There was no indication, however, that King had received any 
confidential information that would relate to the present case.  There is no basis 
even for informed speculation that such a communication, had it occurred, had any 
bearing on the present unrelated case many years later.  We believe that the 
potential conflict identified by defendant in this appeal was so remote and tenuous 
that it did not require the trial court to inquire further than it did. 
Even if we were to conclude that the court should have conducted further 
inquiry, any error would not require reversal.  This court repeatedly has concluded 
that “[a] conviction will be reversed on the ground the trial court failed to satisfy 
its duty to inquire into a possible conflict, or to adequately respond to its inquiry, 
only where the defendant demonstrates that an actual conflict of interest existed, 
and that the conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance.”  (People v. Frye 
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 999, and cases cited, italics added.) 
Defendant does not attempt to demonstrate how the alleged conflict 
affected King’s performance.  As noted, there is no evidence defense counsel 
actually possessed confidential information arising from his prior representation; 
indeed, defense counsel agreed with the court that there was no potential for 
conflict.  As the trial court observed, King was not responsible for examining 
Johnson.  (See People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1002 [noting a similar 
circumstance].)  Defendant offers no basis for concluding that the performance of 
 
28 
either of his attorneys was adversely affected by King’s prior contact with Roland 
Johnson’s wife. 
Defendant contends he should not be required to establish that the asserted 
conflict had an impact on his attorney’s performance.  He claims that the standard 
of review we have applied in our prior cases — namely, that failure to conduct an 
adequate inquiry does not require reversal of the conviction unless the defendant 
can establish actual conflict, including an adverse impact on counsel’s 
performance — is contrary to the high court’s approach and analysis in Wood v. 
Georgia, supra, 450 U.S. 261.  In Wood, the trial court failed to conduct an 
inquiry although it was on notice that the defendants, former employees charged 
with failure to pay a fine imposed as a condition of probation, were represented by 
counsel retained by their employer, whose interest diverged from theirs.  The 
employees’ defense was that (1) imposition of the fine violated equal protection 
principles because the employees would be incarcerated on the basis of their 
inability to pay, and (2) they had believed their employer would pay the fine.  The 
interests of the former employees and the employer were in potential conflict, 
because it was in the employer’s interest to avoid its obligation to pay the fines by 
permitting heavy fines to be levied against its employees and then to raise the 
equal protection defense on their behalf.  (Id. at pp. 264, 267.)  The employer’s 
counsel “may not have pursued [the employees’] interests single-mindedly,” as the 
trial court should have recognized.  (Id. at pp. 271-272.)  The high court vacated 
the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether an 
actual conflict existed, without clearly referring to any adverse effect on counsel’s 
performance.   
But the high court in the Mickens case specifically rejected the view that the 
Wood decision stands for the proposition that a trial court’s failure to perform an 
adequate inquiry into a potential conflict requires reversal in the absence of a 
 
29 
showing of an adverse effect on counsel’s performance.  In Mickens, in which it 
also was alleged that the trial court had conducted an inadequate inquiry, the high 
court explained that prior cases held that failure to conduct an adequate inquiry 
required reversal when the defendant demonstrated an “actual conflict.”  An actual 
conflict and an adverse effect on counsel’s performance are not separate 
considerations, however.  Rather, an actual conflict is demonstrated precisely 
when it can be established that a conflict of interest “adversely affected counsel’s 
performance.”  (Mickens v. Taylor, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 171.)   
In Mickens, the court explained that its conflict of interest doctrine is a 
product of its enforcement of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel.  (Mickens v. Taylor, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 166.)  Denial of that right 
ordinarily does not require reversal of a conviction in the absence of a showing 
that it is reasonably probable the attorney’s ineffective representation affected the 
outcome.  (Ibid., citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 685-686, 
694.)  Exceptions to the Strickland prejudice standard arise when a defendant has 
been denied the assistance of counsel entirely, or has been denied the assistance of 
counsel at a critical stage or in other “ ‘circumstances of that magnitude.’ ”  
(Mickens v. Taylor, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 166.)  An attorney who actively 
represents conflicting interests may create a situation “ ‘of that magnitude’ ” 
(ibid.), but only after it is established that the conflict of interest actually affected 
counsel’s representation.  A trial court’s duty to inquire into a potential conflict 
does not involve a problem of the same magnitude.  When a defendant claims that 
a trial court’s inquiry into a potential conflict was inadequate, the defendant still 
must demonstrate the impact of the conflict on counsel’s performance.  (Id., at pp. 
173-174.)  
Further, contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the Wood decision certainly did 
not conclude that due process or Sixth Amendment principles require, if not an 
 
30 
outright reversal, an automatic remand for further hearing whenever a trial court 
has not inquired sufficiently into a potential conflict of interest.  Rather, the high 
court relied upon a record demonstrating an obvious potential conflict of interest 
that seriously implicated the  employees’ counsel’s decision to pursue a theory of 
the case that benefited the employer rather than the employees.  The case before us 
does not present such a record. 
Accordingly, even if the trial court should have inquired further, we reject 
defendant’s argument in light of the record as a whole and the absence of any 
evidence — or even a claim — that a conflict of interest affected defense 
counsel’s performance. 
C.  Limitations on Defense Evidence   
Defendant contends that two asserted errors in limiting the testimony of 
defense witnesses deprived him of his right to present a defense, in violation of the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
1.  Dr. Loftus 
At defendant’s second trial, Dr. Geoffrey Loftus, a professor of psychology 
at the University of Washington in Seattle, was permitted to testify as an expert on 
the subject of memory, specifically memory as it functions during the stress of 
witnessing a crime or other disturbing event.  As a witness, his thesis was that 
memory’s function should not be compared to a recording device.  Rather, 
memory is a creative endeavor that employs fragments of perception in the 
construction of a coherent narrative of an event.  Dr. Loftus also commented upon 
the function of stress, intoxication, bias, and the lapse of time on a witness’s 
ability accurately to recall events such as violent crimes.  He commented 
specifically that witnesses who observe or feel threatened by weapons often fail to 
pay attention to other circumstances.  Among several other topics, he also 
commented upon the effect of events subsequent to a crime upon a witness’s 
 
31 
recollection of the crime itself, the weight to be accorded the degree of confidence 
expressed by a witness in an identification, and cross-racial identification.  (As 
already noted, defendant is African-American.  Some of the identification 
witnesses were African-American and some were White.)  The court gave a 
pattern jury instruction specifically advising the jury that many of the topics 
touched upon by Dr. Loftus, including stress, lapse of time, focus upon a weapon, 
the witness’s confidence in his or her identification, and problems of cross-racial 
identification, were relevant to their evaluation of the identification witnesses.  
(See CALJIC No. 2.92.)  Defense counsel relied extensively upon Dr. Loftus’s 
testimony in closing argument to the jury. 
Defendant nonetheless claims prejudicial error occurred when the trial court 
placed a limitation upon Dr. Loftus’s testimony.   
Defense counsel had sought to call Dr. Loftus as a witness at defendant’s 
first trial, but the court excluded his testimony pursuant to Evidence Code section 
352.  The court announced that the same ruling would remain in effect for the 
second trial.  After the eyewitnesses testified at the second trial, defendant urged 
the court to reconsider.  Further arguments of counsel ensued, and defendant made 
a thorough offer of proof as to the subjects upon which it was proposed the expert 
would testify.  Placing the burden on defendant to establish the relevance of the 
evidence, and the burden on the prosecution to support its claim that the evidence 
should be excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, the court reversed its 
earlier ruling, concluding all of the subject matter proposed for expert testimony 
was relevant and sufficiently probative, with very limited exceptions described 
below. 
Defense counsel proposed to ask Dr. Loftus to “testify to unconscious 
transference.  And . . . what that is[,] is if [defendant] had been seen in that 
neighborhood at some earlier time, either that day or some previous day, some of 
 
32 
the witnesses may have recognized him on that basis, rather than the observation 
itself, but as being someone they had seen in the area.” 
The court declined to permit this line of questioning, determining that the 
“unconscious transference” evidence was irrelevant and commenting that “it 
would be entirely speculative based on this record to suggest that any of the 
witnesses who testify in this case would be unconsciously transferring a prior 
examination of the [d]efendant at the scene to this event.”  The court went on to 
explain that the evidence was to a certain extent cumulative to other admissible 
evidence:  “To the extent that the transference refers to other things such as seeing 
him in a photograph or seeing him in a prior proceeding, that is able to be 
explained under those theories and offers of testimony.” 
As noted, the court determined that most of the proposed expert testimony  
was admissible:  “The remaining theories of . . . Dr. Loftus’s testimony of factors 
such as duration, distance, attention, weapon focus, stress, cross-racial 
identification, retention intervals, effect of prior trial and photo bias, statistical 
versus chance identification, and the relationship between confidence and 
accuracy, I find all to be relevant to these proceedings.” 
The court reiterated the limitations it was imposing on Dr. Loftus’s 
testimony, referring both to relevance and undue confusion of the jury: “[H]e may 
not make reference to the unconscious transference by seeing someone at the 
scene.  Those are facts as I already indicated are irrelevant.  And they should not 
be added to confuse the jury and cause them to speculate that maybe someone did 
see Mr. Cornwell there before, since there was no evidence he was ever there 
before.”  Defense counsel acknowledged that he understood the court’s ruling.5 
                                              
5  
The People assert that the trial court properly excluded elements of Dr. 
Loftus’s testimony pursuant to Evidence Code section 352.  The People also assert 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
33 
On appeal, defendant complains that the court erred in refusing to “permit 
Dr. Loftus to explain the concept of ‘unconscious transference,’ that is, if the 
witnesses had seen defendant at or near Cashland weeks or months before the 
crime, they might have based their identification of defendant as the robber on 
their earlier sighting, and not on what they saw at the scene of the crime.”  
According to defendant, such testimony would have been relevant because, in 
testimony subsequent to the hearing on Dr. Loftus’s testimony, Michael Johnson 
testified that defendant had been present at the scene “a couple of months” before 
the crime.  Defendant surmises that he may have been present on the same 
occasion at which certain identification witnesses previously had been at 
Cashland.  He points out that Kimberly Scott testified that Michael Johnson 
ordinarily worked at Cashland only on the first day of the month.  According to 
defendant, it follows that Johnson “probably” saw him (defendant) at Cashland on 
the first of the month.  Further, defendant claims, there was evidence that three 
identification witnesses were present at Cashland to transact business on the 
busiest day of the month, which would coincide with the first business day of any 
month.  He refers to Cassandra Henderson, who was outside waiting for her 
children to transact business, Susan Erickson, who was inside Cashland, and 
Frances Rivers, who was waiting for her sister to transact business.  Defendant 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
that defendant forfeited the claim that the limitation on the expert’s testimony 
constituted a violation of defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense.  The 
People note that defendant did not make such a claim in the trial court.  We need 
not reach the question whether the constitutional claim was forfeited.  (People v. 
Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6; disapproved on another point in 
People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 369, fn. 2.)  Even assuming, without 
deciding, that defendant’s constitutional claim was preserved, it lacks merit, as 
explained in the text above. 
 
34 
further observes that one of the witnesses testified that she came to Cashland to 
cash her welfare check on a monthly basis.  According to defendant, “[t]hese 
undisputed facts give rise to a reasonable inference that these eyewitnesses had, 
perhaps unwittingly, observed defendant on a prior occasion.  ‘Standing alone the 
inference may have been weak, but that does not make the evidence irrelevant.’ ” 
Defendant does not claim he renewed his efforts to broaden the testimony 
of Dr. Loftus after Michael Johnson testified he had seen defendant at Cashland on 
a prior occasion.  Moreover, the question whether defendant presented an adequate 
foundation to establish the relevance of this line of questioning lies within the trial 
court’s broad discretion.  (People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1175.)  
Additionally, even if the “unconscious transference” theory was of some tenuous 
relevance under the facts presented to the court, the court also excluded the line of 
questioning because of its tendency to confuse the jury.  Defendant certainly did 
not present evidence that any of the identification witnesses had seen defendant at 
Cashland on a previous occasion, and the chain of inference recited above in 
support of the claim that the witnesses and defendant might have been at the 
establishment on the same day and at the same time is highly speculative.  It also 
would be speculative to draw the inference that, even had their prior visits to 
Cashland coincided, the witnesses unconsciously had observed defendant.  Expert 
testimony concerning the possibility that a prior sighting could have influenced a 
witness’s identification might have led the jury to believe there was evidence the 
witnesses had observed defendant prior to the commission of the crime.  
Moreover, the court permitted thorough questioning of the identification expert on 
multiple topics that were highly relevant to the facts of the case; the court 
reasonably could conclude the time necessary to develop the “unconscious 
transference” theory was not worth the speculative probative value of the 
evidence. 
 
35 
“Exclusion of evidence as more prejudicial, confusing or distracting than 
probative, under Evidence Code section 352, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”  
(People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 134.)  But “exclusion of evidence that 
produces only speculative inferences is not an abuse of discretion.”  (People v. 
Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 684.)  The trial court acted within its discretion in 
concluding that, even if relevant, the very limited and speculative relevance of the 
evidence and its marginal probative value was outweighed by the time necessary 
to explain the point and by the potential that the evidence would confuse the jury.  
Moreover, any possible error cannot have been prejudicial, in light of the broad 
scope of the far more significant testimony the expert was permitted to give, the 
instruction focusing the jury’s attention on many of the factors relied upon by the 
expert, and the circumstance that defense counsel was permitted to and did weave 
in the expert’s testimony throughout his extensive evaluation of the eyewitness 
testimony.  
Citing Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, defendant claims that 
exclusion of testimony on the subject of “unconscious transference” violated his 
federal constitutional right to present a defense.  We are not persuaded.  A 
defendant has the general right to offer a defense through the testimony of his or 
her witnesses (Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 19), but a state court’s 
application of ordinary rules of evidence — including the rule stated in Evidence 
Code section 352 — generally does not infringe upon this right (People v. Lawley, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 154-155; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 464.)  
The excluded evidence in the present case was not so vital to the defense that due 
process principles required its admission.  (See People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 43, 56-58; People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 684.)  Although the 
high court in Chambers determined that the combination of state rules resulting in 
the exclusion of crucial defense evidence constituted a denial of due process under 
 
36 
the unusual circumstances of the case before it, it did not question “the respect 
traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of 
their own criminal trial rules and procedures.”  (Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 
410 U.S. at pp. 302-303.)  Defendant is unable to point to the exclusion of 
evidence of vital or significant probative value (see People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 
Cal.3d at p. 684), and the court accorded him broad latitude to examine Dr. Loftus, 
including examination on the far more probative question whether the witness’s 
proven observation of defendant in photo lineups or at the prior trial might have 
affected the confidence with which they identified him in the present case.  (See 
People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1178-1179.) 
2.  Dr. Shoenfeld  
The defense called Dr. Eugene Shoenfeld, a psychiatrist with particular 
expertise in the field of drug addiction and the properties of heroin and methadone, 
who testified concerning the effect of those substances on the perception, ability to 
recall, and veracity of persons using them.  
Defense counsel questioned Dr. Shoenfeld about Elavil, lithium, and 
Stelazine, which are psychotropic medications that Roland Johnson testified he 
was taking at the time of the events underlying the present crime.  Instead of 
pursuing the question of the effect of such medication on the ability of a person to 
perceive and recollect, however, defense counsel inquired as to the condition for 
which Stelazine was prescribed.  Dr. Shoenfeld testified that Stelazine is a 
“[m]ajor tranquilizer[] . . . generally used in the treatment of psychoses.  Stelazine 
is one of the older drugs used for the treatment of psychosis.  It’s related closely to 
[T]horazine, for example.  It’s another antipsychotic drug.”  When defense counsel 
asked, “[W]hat do you mean by psychoses?  Is that some sort of mental 
condition?,” the prosecutor objected.  The prosecutor explained to the court that he 
feared defense counsel was “trying to establish what’s wrong with Roland Johnson 
 
37 
mentally and physically based on these short questions of what drugs he was 
taking.  And I don’t believe [there is] a proper foundation for this doctor to now 
discuss that we use this drug for psychoses.  We don’t know what—anything 
about [why] Roland  Johnson . . . was prescribed this drug, and I don’t think 
[defense counsel] has laid a foundation for that.  [¶]  And I would note that he 
[Roland Johnson] said he used them as needed.  And without knowing more about 
it, this doctor’s never treated him, we don’t know when, why he’s on them.” 
In questioning by the court, Dr. Shoenfeld commented that, in addition to 
its use as an antipsychotic, Stelazine may be prescribed for relief of nausea or as a 
tranquilizer.  It was established that the witness had neither examined Roland 
Johnson nor reviewed Johnson’s medical records.  The court determined defendant 
had not established a foundation “from Mr. Johnson’s doctor as to whether he, in 
fact, has prescribed [S]telazine . . . .  Roland Johnson’s not even qualified to tell us 
for sure what he’s getting.  More importantly, we don’t have a medical opinion 
why it was prescribed for him.”  The court also commented that, according to Dr. 
Shoenfeld, the drug is prescribed for reasons other than psychosis, and hence 
further questioning concerning the psychiatric condition for which Roland 
Johnson might have been prescribed the drug would be speculative.   
The court ultimately ruled that defense counsel could explore the likely 
effects upon a person taking Stelazine and lithium but that counsel could not elicit 
Dr. Shoenfeld’s opinion concerning the probable condition for which the drugs 
had been prescribed.  The court explained that this sort of “reverse diagnosis” on 
the basis of prescribed medication was too speculative, referring to Evidence Code 
section 352.  The court characterized the line of inquiry as speculative, because 
Dr. Shoenfeld had not examined Roland Johnson or prescribed medication for 
him.  In addition, the court pointed out that defendant could introduce direct 
 
38 
evidence of Roland Johnson’s condition and the reasons he took the medication by 
calling his prescribing physician as a witness. 
Contrary to defendant’s claim, neither the trial court’s application of the 
rule of evidence requiring the proponent of evidence to supply an adequate 
foundation (Evid. Code, § 403), nor the court’s exercise of discretion pursuant to 
Evidence Code section 352, deprived defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to 
present a defense.6  “The decision whether foundational evidence is sufficiently 
substantial is a matter within the court’s discretion.”  (People v. Lucas, supra, 12 
Cal.4th at p. 466.)  We see no abuse of discretion in the present case, particularly 
because Dr. Schoenfeld lacked personal knowledge concerning Johnson’s 
condition.  (See ibid.)  In addition, the physician informed the court that there 
were a number of reasons Stelazine might be prescribed.  Defendant was able to 
elicit testimony from Dr. Shoenfeld demonstrating that Stelazine primarily is used 
to treat psychosis, and thus the jury could have surmised that Johnson suffered 
from some variety of psychosis.  More specific information concerning Johnson’s 
condition could have been made available by calling Johnson’s prescribing 
physician as a witness.  There was nothing fundamentally unfair about applying 
ordinary rules of evidence to exclude speculative opinion testimony, especially 
because of the availability of an obvious other source for the same information, as 
pointed out by the trial court.  (See People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 
1175-1176.) 
                                              
6  
As with the preceding claim, we assume without deciding that the 
constitutional claim was preserved by defendant’s efforts to meet the prosecutor’s 
evidentiary objections, despite defendant’s failure to have claimed, in the trial 
court, that constitutional principles required the admission of the evidence. 
 
39 
 
D.  Spectator Misconduct   
Defendant contends “continuing and unchecked” spectator misconduct 
violated his right to a fair trial and a trial by an impartial jury, in violation of the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  He refers to 
the following circumstances.  
After the jury rendered its guilty verdict, defendant requested an evidentiary 
hearing and moved for new trial on the basis of spectator misconduct he asserted 
occurred during trial.  In support, he offered the declarations of Defense Attorney 
Lyons, defense investigator Michael Sailors, and defendant’s wife, Carolyn 
Cornwell.   
In his declaration, Defense Counsel Lyons stated that spectators  had burst 
into the courtroom during the defense closing argument, and that spectators had 
rolled their eyes and sighed audibly.  He believed the spectators were attempting 
to influence the jury.  
Sailors declared that he had observed “constant whispered remarks, 
snickers, laughter and gasps of disbelief from both Ms. Reagan [the victim’s 
daughter] and Ms. Scott [the owner of Cashland], and similar activity from the 
group seated in front of them” during certain defense testimony.  He believed the 
remarks “could have been overheard by the jurors,” who seemed to redouble their 
attention to the testimony during these episodes ⎯ possibly, Sailors believed, in 
order to “shut out” the disturbance. 
Defendant’s wife stated in her declaration that she observed members of the 
victim’s family gesturing, whispering, and frowning in response to testimony.  She 
observed Ms. Scott, who was the owner of Cashland and was the victim’s 
romantic partner, leave her seat briefly during prosecution witness Erickson’s 
testimony, then greet and touch Erickson as she left the courtroom.  Mrs. Cornwell 
also claimed one juror observed Ms. Scott making a dismissive gesture and 
 
40 
statement concerning questions put to Roland Johnson during defense cross-
examination — questions related to Johnson’s potential access to information 
concerning the crime through newspaper reports.  Mrs. Cornwell declared that Ms. 
Scott gasped, sighed, and shook her head visibly during testimony she found 
objectionable and that, addressing a spectator seated behind her, she stated:  “you 
think he would just jump up saying I did it, I did it.”  According to Mrs. Cornwell, 
Ms. Scott was admonished by the prosecutor to stop conversing about the case 
with the other spectator.  Mrs. Cornwell stated that, when the prosecutor remarked 
in closing argument that defendant had underestimated Reagan, Ms. Scott audibly 
said “that’s right.” 
The prosecutor opposed defendant’s motion for an evidentiary hearing and 
for a new trial, noting that because the jurors’ mental processes were not subject to 
inquiry, an evidentiary hearing could establish only whether or not the jurors 
observed the alleged misconduct.  The prosecutor made an offer of proof based 
upon his own observations, stating that (1) the juror referred to in Mrs. Cornwell’s 
declaration who allegedly observed Ms. Scott’s dismissive gesture was an 
alternate who did not serve during the guilt phase deliberations; and (2) the 
prosecutor’s admonition to Ms. Scott occurred in response to a conversation he 
had witnessed on an occasion when the jury was not present in the courtroom.  
The prosecutor reminded the court that it had witnessed the alleged disturbance 
during defense counsel’s closing argument, and contended the incident had been 
inadvertent and at most had constituted a brief distraction.  The comment made 
during the prosecutor’s closing argument “wasn’t a loud outburst of screaming, 
but you could hear it.  That was the only thing I heard throughout the entire trial.  
And I . . . thought the Court heard it, because I thought you mentioned something 
to the people who were here present in court afterwards.  Make sure you keep it 
down, something to that effect.” 
 
41 
The prosecutor urged:  “I’m asking this court to assume that they [the 
jurors] did observe some of these items and to rule that because of the nature of 
them and trivial nature of them, that there’s no substantial likelihood that could 
have possibly influenced the jury.” 
The court carefully described the layout of the courtroom for the record.  It 
noted that it frequently had glanced at counsel during trial, and at those times 
could not help but observe the spectators.  The court pointed to the prosecutor’s 
invitation to the court to assume the defense allegations were true, noting that the 
concession eliminated the need for an evidentiary hearing to “resolve material, 
disputed issues of fact.”  The court also commented that “[t]he persons necessary 
to shed light on the actual physical actions are all available to the [c]ourt without 
the jury having to come forward.”  It also commented upon the potentially 
disruptive effect of examining the jury between the conclusion of the guilt phase 
and commencement of its continued service during the penalty phase.  The court 
denied the defense’s motion for an evidentiary hearing.   
The court subsequently denied a motion for new trial based upon the 
alleged misconduct,7 explaining that it was “aware of the overall conduct [of 
spectators] and the overall impact that the matter would have” and therefore was 
in a unique position to interpret the “otherwise undisputed facts.”  As to each 
                                              
7  
The trial court raised the question whether the motion was timely, 
commenting that defense counsel were under an obligation to bring the alleged 
misconduct to the court’s attention as soon as they became aware of the problem.  
In the present case, in lieu of declarations concerning when the defense became 
aware of spectator problems, the prosecutor accepted defense counsel King’s 
assertion that he, King, had not been aware of the problems prior to the rendering 
of the verdict and that cocounsel, Lyons, was not available.  The trial court 
therefore accepted the motion as timely, a determination that respondent does not 
contest. 
 
42 
allegation, the court commented that, to the extent it witnessed the events, they 
were minor and innocuous in their impact.  For example, the court stated that 
when the spectators entered the courtroom during defense closing argument, they 
did not “burst” in but merely entered, permitting the noise from the hallway to 
penetrate the courtroom.  The court found that the statement “that’s right,” made 
by a spectator during the prosecutor’s closing argument, could be heard only as a 
soft sibilant at the front of the courtroom.  The court acknowledged it had 
admonished the spectators concerning courtroom demeanor, but stated this had 
occurred after the bailiff noted there had been a great deal of “eye rolling.”   
The court characterized Ms. Scott’s demeanor and behavior during trial as 
polite and quiet, and added that the jury would not interpret any comments made 
by her as based on personal knowledge, because she did not witness the crime.   
As for the remaining alleged incidents, the court did not observe them but, 
accepting each of them as true, concluded they were minor and innocuous, as the 
court explained at length.  The court also commented that it had observed the jury 
frequently during the trial, and that the jurors always seemed attentive and never 
distracted by events involving the spectators.  Having compared the allegations 
with those in other cases, including People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959 
(disapproved on another ground in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
1046, 1069, fn. 13), the court concluded “there is no substantial likelihood, there is 
no likelihood whatsoever that anything that occurred during this [trial] deprived 
the [d]efendant of a fair trial and meets the standards applicable to granting a new 
trial pursuant to Penal Code section 1181 or any [c]onstitutional standard for due 
process of law.” 
Although spectator misconduct constitutes a ground for new trial “if the 
misconduct is of such a character as to prejudice the defendant or influence the 
verdict,” the trial court must be accorded broad discretion in evaluating the effect 
 
43 
of claimed spectator misconduct.  (People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 
1022.)  The reason is obvious: the court ordinarily is present in the courtroom at 
any time when a spectator engages in an outburst or other misconduct in the jury’s 
presence and is in the best position to evaluate the impact of such conduct on the 
fairness of the trial.  (See, e.g., Messer v. Kemp (11th Cir. 1985) 760 F.2d 1080, 
1087.)  We believe the trial court in the present case acted within its discretion in 
concluding that the alleged spectator misconduct was not of the sort that would be 
prejudicial and influence the verdict.  As the court explained, defendant assumed 
that the jury witnessed various alleged acts of misconduct or viewed the events as 
disruptive or prejudicial.  From its own observations, however, the court was 
satisfied that defendant’s assumptions were unjustified and that the effect of the 
incidents was innocuous or, at most, trivial. 8 
The trial court’s proper exercise of discretion also is illustrated by a 
comparison of these incidents with other cases that uphold the discretion of trial 
courts in the face of claims of spectator misconduct.  In Lucero, for example, the 
anguished mother of a child murder victim screamed incriminating information to 
the jury as it departed for deliberation and was removed from the courtroom, still 
screaming.  (People v. Lucero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1022.)  Although the conduct 
in the Lucero case was far more dramatic than anything alleged in the present 
case, we determined the court acted within its discretion in denying a motion for 
mistrial.  (Id., at pp. 1023-1024; see also People v. Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 
1002.)  In the present case, although more than one incident was alleged and, 
                                              
8  
We agree with the trial court in the present case that, in general, a party 
promptly should object to audible comments from spectators that have the 
potential to prejudice the jury, thereby enabling the trial court to correct the 
problem at the outset.   
 
44 
unlike the situation in Lucero, there was no pointed admonition from the court, 
defendant does not claim that the spectators actually attempted to convey 
information to the jury; there was no dramatic, anguished outburst, and the 
spectator conduct, even taking defendant’s claims at face value, was not 
particularly disruptive or likely to influence the jury.   
As defendant concedes, prejudice is not presumed when spectators 
misbehave during trial; rather, the defendant must establish prejudice.  He was 
unable to do so in the trial court and has failed in this court as well.9 
Defendant also claims a denial of due process occurred because the alleged 
spectator misconduct undermined the fairness of the fact-finding process.  The 
record, which establishes the limited nature and impact of any misconduct, refutes 
this claim.  
E.  Instructional Error—CALJIC No. 2.11.5  
As the Attorney General concedes, the trial court erred in instructing the 
jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.11.5:  “There has been evidence in this case 
indicating that a person other than the defendant was or may have been involved in 
the crime for which the defendant is on trial.  [¶]  There may be many reasons why 
such a person is not here on trial.  Therefore, do not discuss or give any 
consideration as to why the other person is not being prosecuted in this trial or 
whether he has been or will be prosecuted.  Your sole duty is to decide whether 
the People have proved the guilt of the defendant on trial.”  A court should “not 
use this instruction if the other person is a witness for either the prosecution or the 
defense.”  (Use note to CALJIC No. 2.11.5 (7th ed. 2005), p. 43.)  When an 
                                              
9 
Defendant’s attempt to characterize the issue as one involving jury 
misconduct giving rise to a presumption of prejudice is unavailing.  There is no 
indication of misconduct by any juror.  
 
45 
accomplice ⎯ as may have been both prosecution witness Roland Johnson and 
defense witness Michael Johnson ⎯ testifies, the instruction might suggest to the 
jury that it need not consider the factors it otherwise would employ to weigh the 
credibility of these witnesses, such as the circumstance that the witness has been 
granted immunity from prosecution in return for his or her testimony.  (See People 
v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 226-227; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 
445-446 
We conclude, however, that the error was harmless.  Other instructions 
adequately directed the jury how to weigh the credibility of witnesses.  (See 
CALJIC Nos. 2.20 [weighing credibility and considering such factors as the 
existence of bias, interest, or other motive to lie], 3.00-3.11 [specific instructions 
on accomplice testimony].)  The court also specifically informed the jury to keep 
in mind any sentencing benefits received by a witness in the jury’s evaluation of 
the witness’s credibility.  As our cases recognize, such instructions adequately 
channel the jury’s consideration of the testimony of possible accomplices ⎯ even 
in the face of error in instructing pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.11.5.  (See People v. 
Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 845; People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 227.) 
Ordinarily, defendants contend, error in instructing pursuant to CALJIC 
No. 2.11.5 is prejudicial because it diminishes the ability of the defense to 
impeach the prosecution’s witnesses.  In the present case, defendant adds a 
contention that the instructional error may have caused the jury to fail to consider 
defense witness Michael Johnson’s denial of culpability as evidence in support of 
defendant’s position.  Defendant asks us to believe that the jury would discount 
whatever exculpatory weight otherwise was produced by Michael Johnson’s 
denial that he was an accomplice simply because the instruction informed them 
they should not consider or speculate on why Michael Johnson was not being 
prosecuted.  We are not persuaded it is reasonably likely that, taken as a whole, the 
 
46 
instructions misled the jury in the manner claimed by defendant or that they 
relieved the prosecution of any part of its burden of proof.  (See People v. Cole 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1212 [standard of review for comparable asserted 
instructional error is whether the instructions as a whole were reasonably likely to 
mislead the jury]; People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 151 [same].)  In the 
present case, the instructions as a whole supplied adequate direction concerning 
the process of evaluating the testimony of the witnesses.10 
Defendant contends the erroneous instruction pursuant to CALJIC No. 
2.11.5 substantially interfered with the jury’s consideration of exculpatory 
evidence, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution.  Under the circumstances, he claims, the error requires reversal 
unless it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, applying the Chapman 
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24) standard of review.  Defendant’s 
citation to cases such as Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. 284, is of no 
assistance to his claim.  He asserts error in instructing the jury, not in the 
admission of evidence, and, as we have observed, the instruction did not 
substantially interfere with his ability to introduce exculpatory evidence.  
Although certain instructional error — such as failure to instruct on an element of 
the charged offense — constitutes a violation of the federal Constitution and 
requires reversal unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (People 
v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 502-504; see also People v. Cole, supra, 33 
                                              
10 
Although Roland Johnson was an important witness for the prosecution, 
and Michael Johnson was of modest importance to the defense case, we do not 
agree with defendant’s claim that “[d]efendant could not be convicted unless the 
jury credited Roland’s testimony,” nor is it true that defendant could not be 
convicted if the jury credited Michael Johnson’s claim that he did not act as 
defendant’s “inside man.” 
 
47 
Cal.4th at p. 1208), any error in the present case was not of a similar magnitude 
and did not implicate defendant’s federal constitutional rights.  
F.  Prosecutorial Misconduct—Griffin Error   
It was significant to the prosecution’s case that the automobile defendant 
had borrowed from his girlfriend, Juanita Washington, had been parked near the 
scene of the homicide at or near the time of the crime.  Washington testified 
defendant told her that his work had brought him to the neighborhood where he 
left the vehicle, but defendant’s employer testified otherwise. 
During closing argument, the prosecutor commented upon the above 
circumstances, noting the close proximity of the vehicle to the scene of the crime, 
the ease of access from the crime scene to the alley that led to the parking space, 
and the circumstance that defendant did not reside or work in the area where the 
crime was committed.  The prosecutor continued:  “Have you heard one single 
piece of evidence from the defense that tells you why that car was there?  [¶]  
Weren’t you waiting for it?  Weren’t you waiting for it?  I’m sure you were 
waiting for it.  You know that’s uncontroverted.  You knew that can’t be denied.”  
The prosecutor questioned the likelihood the vehicle would be parked so near the 
crime scene if defendant had not been involved in the crime, adding:  “And what 
are the odds that we go through this whole trial and not a single witness came in 
here to take the stand and tell you why.  [¶]  There is no why.  The only why 
points directly to [defendant], that’s why.  [¶]  There is no other explanation [aside 
from defendant’s guilt].  If there was, you saw the investigator, you know he’s 
been working on a case.  You saw witnesses that have been subpoenaed by the 
defense, they could bring in anybody they want and they could bring in a person to 
say why that car was parked there.  But you already know why.”  In his rebuttal 
argument, the prosecutor again stated that the defense “didn’t bring a single person 
in here to explain why that car was there.” 
 
48 
Defendant contends the quoted remarks constituted a comment on his 
failure to testify in his own defense, a violation of his privilege against self-
incrimination as secured by the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  (See Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615.) 
We disagree.  Although a prosecutor is forbidden to comment “ ‘either 
directly or indirectly, on the defendant’s failure to testify in his defense,’ ” the 
prosecutor may comment “ ‘on the state of the evidence, or on the failure of the 
defense to introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses.”  (People v. 
Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 419.)  The prosecutor’s comments fell within the 
latter category.  The presence of Washington’s vehicle close to the crime scene 
and near the time of the crime constituted material inculpatory evidence, and it 
was fair comment to draw the jury’s attention to the failure of the defense to call 
witnesses who might logically explain the presence of the vehicle.  We do not 
view the prosecutor’s argument as a comment upon defendant’s failure to testify.  
We are not persuaded otherwise by defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s 
argument would be understood as a comment on defendant’s failure to testify 
because only defendant could explain the vehicle’s location.  Defense witness 
Mackey, who testified he was with defendant much of the day, defendant’s 
employer, or Washington, who lent defendant the vehicle, all were persons who 
might be expected to know why the vehicle was parked where it was, and the 
circumstance that they did not testify concerning that point was a fair subject for 
comment by the prosecutor. 
Moreover, defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s comments.  We are 
not persuaded that we should overlook this failure, which ordinarily bars 
consideration of such a claim on appeal, on the ground that a prompt admonition 
by the court could not have cured any harm.  (See People v. Medina (1995) 11 
Cal.4th 694, 756; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 794.)  Defendant has 
 
49 
not offered any persuasive explanation in support of his theory that the jury would 
have disregarded any such admonition from the court.11 
G.   Prosecutorial Misconduct—Comments on Discipline and a Free 
Society  
At the beginning of his argument to the jury, the prosecutor discussed the 
role of the jury in a democratic society.  He asked the jury to understand the 
somewhat paradoxical interplay between the freedom that democracy promises 
and the discipline democracy requires of its citizens.  
In the context of these remarks, the prosecutor commented on the rule of 
law:  “[A]nybody who’s lived a life . . . knows that in reality discipline is the 
cornerstone of freedom.  And that’s what we are doing here today, and that’s why 
I’m bringing this up.”  The prosecutor pursued the theme that law and its 
enforcement constitute the “[d]iscipline [that] is the cornerstone of freedom.”  He 
observed:  “I mean, if you don’t have some kind of control, some type of law and 
order in your society, you have chaos, obviously.  And the next step from chaos is 
anarchy.  And you don’t have to be a history major, you just need to read the 
newspaper once in a while and you can see what it’s like in those Third World 
countries where there is no law and order, where there is no discipline.  Do those 
people feel free because there’s nobody looking over their shoulder or because 
there’s no law?  You don’t even have to go that far.  You can go right here in 
Sacramento in some of the neighborhoods where people were afraid to go out on 
their porch at night, [fearing] they might get involved in a drive-by shooting.  
                                              
11 
Defendant’s contention that defense counsel’s failure to object constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel fails because, as demonstrated in the text above, 
the comments were not objectionable under Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 
609, 615.  (See People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 475.) 
 
50 
Those people, what would they give for a little bit of discipline, a little bit of 
control?”   
The prosecutor explained he was making these points because he 
understood that jury service makes uncomfortable demands upon citizens.  In the 
prosecutor’s words, “[y]ou have gotten yourself into the duty that every citizen 
has, but every citizen wishes [he or she] could avoid.”  The prosecutor went on to 
acknowledge how difficult it is for most persons to impose discipline on others, 
but expressed the view that most individuals are willing to do so — as, for 
example, by firing an incompetent employee — “because they realize it’s essential 
to our society.”  Bringing the point closer to home, the prosecutor asked the 
members of the jury to shoulder the unenviable task of judging defendant just as 
they would shoulder the task of firing an incompetent employee.  He went on to 
caution those quick to make decisions to be patient and open minded during 
deliberations, and urged those who had difficulty reaching a decision not to act 
simply on the basis of a reluctance to participate in imposing harsh sanctions on 
defendant.   
Defendant contends these remarks constituted an appeal to the passion and 
prejudice of the jury, because they focused on the chaos and danger that follow 
from the absence of law and order.  Defendant alleges a violation of his right  to 
trial by jury and to due process of law as guarantied by the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.  Defendant claims the 
prosecutor “implicitly urged the jury to convict defendant in order to bring 
discipline and freedom to the community” and to “keep society free of crime.” 
Considering the prosecutor’s remarks in their context, as we must (People 
v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 475), the prosecutor’s argument did not urge the 
members of the jury to act on the basis of their fear of chaos and crime in the 
community, but to act with an understanding of the importance of law in the 
 
51 
abstract.  The prosecutor acknowledged the onerous task faced by the jury in 
applying the law and in fulfilling its important function.  Far from asking the jury 
to act on the basis of fear, the prosecutor urged the jurors to remain patient, open-
minded, and unaffected by emotion during their deliberations.  And far from 
asking the jury to disregard the evidence, the prosecutor asked the jury to sift 
through it with care. 
Although it is improper for a prosecutor to appeal to the passion or 
prejudice of the jury (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1195), there is no 
indication that the prosecutor’s temperate speech concerning the function of the 
jury and of the rule of law constituted such an appeal.  Moreover, as respondent 
points out, defendant failed to object to the comments at the time of trial, an 
omission that ordinarily bars consideration of the claim on appeal.  (People v. 
Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 756; People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 794.)  
Defendant has not supplied any plausible basis for his contention that an objection 
and admonition could not have cured any harm that assertedly flowed from the 
prosecutor’s remarks, despite his claim that “the harm was done the moment the 
prosecutor committed the misconduct.”12 
H.  Restriction on Cross-examination 
As noted above, prosecution witness Roland Johnson claimed it was the 
prompting of his conscience that caused him, while serving a prison term, to 
contact law enforcement authorities concerning defendant’s role in the death of 
William Reagan.  Johnson testified he also was fearful because he knew he was 
implicated in the crime; although he was not responding to an active threat, he 
                                              
12 
Contrary to defendant’s claim, defense counsel’s failure to object did not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, because the prosecutor’s remarks came 
within the bounds of proper argument. 
 
52 
would be held responsible for it.  Law enforcement authorities assertedly were 
unaware he had any connection with the crime until he came forward.   
Seeking to establish Johnson’s bias and motive for fabrication, the defense 
conducted vigorous cross-examination.  Defense counsel asked why Johnson’s 
conscience had lain dormant until he was incarcerated, and elicited admissions that 
Johnson was testifying under a grant of immunity, that he had received a sentence 
reduction in return for his testimony, and that, when he first contacted the 
authorities, he did not refer to his conscience but requested an interview with 
detectives concerning “a matter involving [his] judgment relating to [his] prison 
sentence.”  Defense counsel impeached Johnson’s credibility in numerous other 
ways, including by eliciting the information that Johnson had been making his 
living as a drug dealer, had been taking various psychotropic medications and 
using marijuana at the time of the crimes, and could have learned facts concerning 
the crime through news reports.  Through this cross-examination, defense counsel 
provided the jury with evidence that Johnson’s testimony was not disinterested, 
that his hope of early release provided him with a motive for fabrication, and that 
there were various reasons to doubt his veracity. 
On redirect examination, Johnson explained that the grant of immunity 
followed his admission to law enforcement authorities that he had provided 
defendant with a weapon.  Seeking to demonstrate Johnson’s candor and thereby 
enhance his credibility, the prosecutor asked Johnson whether he had committed 
other crimes, which Johnson candidly admitted he had, volunteering that he had 
shot someone but had not been charged with the crime. 
Defense counsel further questioned Johnson concerning this shooting.  It 
was during this exchange that defendant alleges the court imposed an 
unconstitutional limitation upon his right to confront the witnesses against him.  In 
response to defense counsel’s questions, Johnson stated that the prior shooting 
 
53 
occurred in 1983, that he had not killed anyone, that the shooting occurred while 
Johnson was dealing in drugs, that Johnson viewed the shooting as having 
involved self-defense, that no one ever was arrested for the shooting, and that this 
was the only occasion Johnson had shot anyone. 
At this point defense counsel asked Johnson whether he had “ever heard 
[of] ‘Three Strikes and you’re out?’ ”  The court sustained the prosecutor’s 
relevance objection, subsequently explaining:  “First, any ‘Three Strikes’ law 
could not have applied to Mr. Johnson since any crime he would have committed 
relative to this case would have been before the effective date . . . of the ‘Three 
Strikes’ law.  And, secondly, I looked back in my notes to look at his prior 
convictions that were brought out during his impeachment . . . and I noted that 
[they] . . .do not qualify as strikes.  [¶]  And, therefore, I did not see any relevance 
of the ‘Three Strikes’ law to any motivation of his testimony here.” 
Defense counsel countered that he was interested in the witness’s own 
understanding of the law, not the state of the law in fact.  Counsel hoped to 
establish that, however misguided Johnson’s concern may have been, Johnson 
feared future incarceration for life under the Three Strikes law and that it was this 
fear that caused him to contact authorities with information concerning the present 
case.  The trial court was not persuaded, reiterating that Johnson was not actually 
subject to Three Strikes sentencing. 
It appears to us that the court’s ruling on relevance would not have 
precluded counsel from asking his question more directly.  Counsel simply could 
have asked Johnson what criminal liability he believed he risked for his part in the 
murder of William Reagan.  It was unnecessary to pursue the basis for Johnson’s 
belief, if he had one (such as fearing that he faced a life sentence).  In any event, 
any error in excluding this testimony was harmless as a matter of state law because 
of the ample other evidence that came before the jury suggesting reasons to 
 
54 
believe that Johnson’s cooperation with law enforcement was not altruistic and 
that his testimony was the product of his hope to secure early release from prison.   
Nor do we believe that any error in the application of state rules of evidence 
rose to the level of a constitutional violation pursuant to Chambers v. Mississippi, 
supra, 410 U.S. 284, 295.  As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the 
confrontation clause permits trial courts to retain “wide latitude” to impose  limits 
on cross-examination concerning matters of marginal relevance.  (Delaware v. 
Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678-679.)  In the present case, the source of 
whatever fear Johnson might have entertained that he might face a life sentence 
was of the most marginal relevance.  (See People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at 
p. 946 [the source of a witness’s knowledge concerning marijuana was of marginal 
relevance].) 
Further, even if we were of the view that the court should not have 
sustained the prosecutor’s objection to the defense questions and that defendant 
has demonstrated a constitutional violation, any error would be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Defense counsel was able to conduct searching cross-
examination concerning Johnson’s unsavory past and motives for volunteering 
evidence to law enforcement officials.  The jury was provided with an ample basis 
for doubting Johnson’s veracity, without being informed that he feared a life 
sentence under the Three Strikes law.  The jurors knew that he had supplied 
defendant with the murder weapon in the present case and could have been subject 
to prosecution as an accomplice in the absence of his cooperation with the police, 
that he had dealt in drugs, that he had shot another person, that his prison sentence 
had been reduced as a reward for his testimony, and that he had received immunity 
from prosecution as an accomplice to a murder in exchange for his testimony.  As 
we have explained, “unless the defendant can show that the prohibited cross-
examination would have produced ‘a significantly different impression of [the 
 
55 
witness’s] credibility’ [citation], the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in this 
regard does not violate the Sixth Amendment.”  (People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 
at p. 946, quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680.)  
Questioning Johnson concerning his fears of a life sentence under the Three 
Strikes law would not have afforded the jury a significantly different impression of 
Johnson’s credibility. 
I.  Evidence Concerning Defendant’s Financial Status 
Defendant contends admission of evidence concerning his depleted bank 
balance in May 1993 and his limited income in the weeks prior to the commission 
of the crime constituted a violation of his right to due process of law.  He refers to 
evidence that three of his checks had been returned to his bank for insufficient 
funds during the month of May and that two checks were returned for insufficient 
funds in June 1993.  Evidence was admitted that defendant’s bank account 
contained $1.20 on May 21, 1993 and that defendant deposited $100 on May 28 
and $300 on June 3, 1993.  Defendant earned approximately $1,500 in May 1993.  
Cable service to defendant’s home was discontinued on April 16, 1993 for 
nonpayment of the bill, and was restored on June 4, 1993.  Referring to this 
evidence, the prosecutor stressed at closing argument: “It’s not because 
[defendant] is destitute and that he was desperate for money.  That is not the 
reason the evidence of his finances [was] put on.  That was to show he didn’t have 
money and then did. . . .” 
We observe first that the claim is forfeited because, as defendant concedes, 
at trial defense counsel failed to object on any basis to the admission of this 
 
56 
evidence.  (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1076.)  In any event, the 
claim lacks merit.13 
Ordinarily it would be unfair to persons in difficult financial circumstances 
to permit general evidence of their poverty to be introduced for the purpose of 
establishing a motive for theft or robbery.  The risk of causing suspicion of 
indigent persons generally outweighs the probative value of such evidence.  
(People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1076 [evidence of a defendant’s poverty 
“generally may not be admitted to prove a motive to commit a robbery or theft; 
reliance on such evidence is deemed unfair to the defendant, and its probative 
value is outweighed by the risk of prejudice”]; see also People v. Wilson (1992) 3 
Cal.4th 926, 939.) 
Relying on federal court authority, a recent Court of Appeal decision 
explains that although evidence of poverty to establish motive for theft seems 
logically relevant, “ ‘ [t]he trouble is that it would prove too much against too 
many.’  [Citation.]  As the court explained in United States v. Mitchell (9th Cir. 
1999) 172 F.3d 1104, ‘Lack of money gives a person an interest in having more.  
But so does desire for money, without poverty.  A rich man’s greed is as much a 
motive to steal as a poor man’s poverty.  Proof of either, without more, is likely to 
amount to a great deal of unfair prejudice with little probative value.’ ”  (People v. 
Carrillo (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 94, 102, italics added.) 
On the other hand, evidence of the defendant’s indebtedness or relative 
poverty may be admitted without undue prejudice to persons of limited means in 
order “to eliminate other possible explanations for a defendant’s sudden wealth 
                                              
13 
Because it was within the court’s discretion to admit this evidence, 
counsel’s failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, as 
explained in the text, above.   
 
57 
after a theft offense.”  (People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1024; see also 
People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1076; United States v. Weller (10th Cir. 
2001) 238 F.3d 1215, 1221 [trial court properly admitted evidence of the 
defendant’s possession of large sums of money after a robbery, when prior to the 
crime “she had an empty bank account, ‘maxed out’ credit cards, and no other 
obvious source from which to obtain cash”].)  A recent federal court decision 
supplies a helpful illustration: “If a man is notoriously broke and cannot buy a 
pack of cigarettes Tuesday, that night a laundromat is burglarized, and on 
Wednesday the man buys a carton of cigarettes and a $40 bottle of scotch, all with 
quarters, the man’s financial circumstances have obvious and significant probative 
value.”  (United States v. Mitchell, supra, 172 F.3d at p. 1108.)   
Persons at most economic levels have limits to their wealth; sudden 
possession of greater wealth than usual is relevant circumstantial evidence in a 
theft-related prosecution, but does not present a risk of unfair prejudice to persons 
of limited means.  Contrary to defendant’s claim that admission of the evidence 
rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, it was within the trial court’s discretion to 
admit evidence of defendant’s financial circumstances, in light of the evidence of 
his “sudden wealth” and, indeed, his possession of currency in the denominations 
taken in the charged robbery, immediately following the robbery.  The possibility 
that he came into possession of the money legitimately was rendered more 
doubtful by the circumstances that his earnings were extremely modest and his 
bank account was depleted at the time of the crime.  Defendant’s effort to dress his 
claim in constitutional garb adds nothing to the merit of his position.  He cites 
Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, but that case does not suggest that the 
admission of relevant evidence in a criminal trial led to a denial of due process.  
(Id., at pp. 70-71 [permitting admission of evidence of battered child syndrome to 
be admitted as relevant evidence in a prosecution for murder of a child and 
 
58 
observing that, although the due process clause “ ‘guarantees the fundamental 
elements of fairness in a criminal trial,’ ” it does not turn the high court into a 
body responsible for making rules of evidence for the states].) 
Defendant claims that the admission of this evidence as part of the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief “forced [him] to explain that he was not impecunious, 
a difficult task given that much of [his] income apparently came in under-the-table 
cash payments for carpentry work and sales of refurbished vehicles,” and that “[t]o 
force a person to establish income is the ‘relative disadvantage’ [that has been 
noted] as the inherent danger of admitting this sort of evidence.”  Defendant, 
having failed to object below, did not offer this explanation in the trial court, so 
we cannot fault that court for failing to identify the potential source of prejudice to 
which defendant alludes.  In any event, the evidence in question was relevant to 
the prosecution’s case and was admissible pursuant to the authority cited above, 
and its introduction no more “forced” defendant to respond than any other 
probative evidence presented by the prosecution.  Nor did the evidence unfairly 
“force” defendant to respond under circumstances in which a person of greater 
wealth who suddenly possessed an unusual sum of money would not be forced to 
respond.  We also do not understand why it would have been particularly difficult 
for defendant to secure evidence from various employers or clients establishing 
that they had paid him for his work, even “under the table.”    
Also unpersuasive is defendant’s claim that there was no evidence of the 
“suddenness” with which he came into possession of $1,500 in cash, and that the 
court merely assumed he acquired the money suddenly.  Prior to admission of the 
evidence of which defendant complains, defendant’s girlfriend testified that she 
was concerned about his purchase of an automobile on the date of the crime 
because she and defendant were then experiencing financial difficulties.  It was 
within the court’s discretion to conclude the evidence did not constitute mere 
 
59 
general evidence of poverty going to the issue of motive, but instead constituted 
admissible circumstantial evidence that defendant was the person who committed 
the crime. 
J.  Cumulative Error 
Having reviewed defendant’s claims, we have identified only one clear 
error, namely the giving of an unmodified instruction pursuant to CALJIC No. 
2.11.5.  The instructional error was harmless and, even assuming there was 
additional error in the trial court’s limitation on Roland Johnson’s testimony, any 
so-called cumulative error was harmless even under the most exacting standard of 
review.   
K.  Motion for New Trial—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Relying upon this court’s decision in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 
572, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in allegedly refusing 
to consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with 
defendant’s pro se request for a new trial. Defendant contends that arbitrary 
deprivation of his right to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by way 
of a motion for new trial constituted a violation of his right to due process of law.  
Making no effort to establish that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the 
trial court had merit, defendant merely contests the court’s failure to reach the 
merits of the claim. 
We note at the outset that defense counsel never made a motion for new 
trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, nor was defendant permitted 
actually to file such a motion pro se; the trial court explained that defendant could 
not do so while represented by counsel.  Rather, in hearings spread over several 
days, the court sought to determine whether defendant had stated grounds for 
substitution of counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 
(Marsden), whether defendant was requesting leave to proceed in propria persona, 
 
60 
and whether a motion for new trial should be filed on defendant’s behalf by 
substitute counsel.  The court’s ultimate ruling on the matter was based upon an 
evaluation of the undue time that would be consumed by consideration of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the context of such a motion in lieu of 
consideration by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
The record establishes that on November 2, 1994, after entry of the guilty 
verdicts, defense counsel informed the court that defendant wished to make a 
motion for new trial.  Defendant personally addressed the court, urging that the 
attorney who represented him during the guilt phase of the trial had provided 
ineffective assistance.  The court explained that as long as defendant was 
represented by counsel, a motion for new trial could not be brought by defendant 
independently, although the court would entertain a motion for substitution of 
counsel under Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, or for self-representation under 
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.  Defendant stated various grounds for 
dissatisfaction with William Lyons, one of his trial counsel, and moved to have 
him discharged.  The trial court initially treated the motion as a Marsden motion, 
carefully examining defendant outside the presence of the prosecutor and 
encouraging him to make a full statement of the grounds for his dissatisfaction 
with counsel.  The court permitted defendant to explain his concerns very 
specifically and at great length.  The court also questioned defendant and required 
defense counsel to respond to each of defendant’s points, which concerned 
counsel’s asserted failure to investigate, to introduce evidence or call particular 
witnesses, and to rebut elements of the prosecution’s case. 
The court concluded that defendant was attacking the validity of the guilty 
verdicts on the ground he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Concluding the claim was one that could be brought by means of a motion for new 
trial, the court cited People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, but observed it 
 
61 
would be difficult to expect defendant’s attorneys to decide to bring such a 
motion.  The court determined that defendant’s allegations were serious and 
complete enough for the court to appoint separate counsel, who would be charged 
with examining the record and the evidence that defendant claimed had not been 
proffered at trial, in order to determine whether there were grounds for filing a 
motion for new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
A further hearing on defendant’s claims concerning trial counsel was 
conducted on November 9, 1994, and defendant again was given an opportunity to 
air his complaints concerning counsel’s asserted omissions.  The court appointed 
Attorney John Lippsmeyer to assist defendant in evaluating whether a motion for 
new trial should be filed.  In the meantime, the jury returned its verdict of death.   
On December 2, 1994, the court asked Lippsmeyer to make a preliminary 
estimate of how long it would take him to determine whether a motion for new 
trial should be made.  Lippsmeyer estimated the task would take four to six 
months.  The matter was set for further hearing on December 9, 1994, when 
defendant made a motion to relieve King, the attorney responsible for presenting 
the defense at the penalty phase of the trial.  At a further closed hearing, defendant 
explained his specific concerns with counsel, who was required to respond.  The 
court denied the motion to relieve penalty phase counsel.   
At a final hearing held on December 12, 1994, the court explained it had 
requested that Lippsmeyer determine whether a motion for new trial should be 
filed and what “time and resources” such a motion would consume.  Lippsmeyer 
reported to the court that it would take a substantial period of time, probably at 
least six months, for him to be prepared for a hearing on a motion for new trial.  
The court agreed with Lippsmeyer’s estimate, observing that the issue “would take 
a considerable time to review and a massive amount of documentation would have 
to be evaluated and presented to the [c]ourt.”  The court concluded that, under the 
 
62 
circumstances, it was not possible to decide the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim expeditiously in a motion for new trial, explaining that “[t]he issues could 
only be resolved by a presentation and evaluation of the evidence that would be 
made in the equivalent of a habeas corpus review.” The court further concluded 
that “the only practical approach” would be by way of “post trial habeas corpus 
review based on the claim that counsel performed inadequately in matters that 
occurred outside the courtroom.”  (Italics added.)  The court announced it would 
deny the motion for substitution of counsel, deeming defendant’s oral 
presentations in the closed court sessions to be a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
and assigning the matter a separate superior court number for the purpose of 
further proceedings.  The court directed that a written petition be filed within six 
months and also appointed counsel to represent defendant in the habeas corpus 
proceeding. 
Contrary to the implication of defendant’s argument in this court, the trial 
court did not conclude that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not 
cognizable in a motion for new trial, nor did it refuse to consider a properly 
brought motion for new trial.  Rather, our review of the record discloses that the 
court closely considered two of this court’s relevant decisions, People v. 
Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, and People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 
concluding defendant’s case was not an appropriate one in which to resolve the 
issue by way of such a motion.  We conclude the trial court did not err in reaching 
this conclusion. 
Our cases explain that, in appropriate circumstances, the trial court should 
consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a motion for new trial, 
because “justice is expedited when the issue of counsel’s effectiveness can be 
resolved promptly at the trial level.”  (People v. Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 695, 
italics added.)  But our assumption has been that courts would decide such claims 
 
63 
in the context of a motion for new trial when the court’s own observation of the 
trial would supply a basis for the court to act expeditiously on the motion.  As we 
stated in People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572:  “It is undeniable that trial 
judges are particularly well suited to observe courtroom performance and to rule 
on the adequacy of counsel in criminal cases tried before them.  [Citation.]  Thus, 
in appropriate circumstances justice will be expedited by avoiding appellate 
review, or habeas corpus proceedings, in favor of presenting the issue of counsel’s 
effectiveness to the trial court as the basis of a motion for new trial.  If the court is 
able to determine the effectiveness issue on such motion, it should do so.”  (Id., at 
pp. 582-583, italics added.)   
It is evident in the present case that, after lengthy deliberation, the trial 
court concluded justice would not be expedited by entertaining defendant’s claim 
in a motion for new trial.  The basis for this conclusion is readily apparent; the 
matter would have been delayed for at least six months while substitute counsel 
examined trial counsel’s case records and performed additional investigation 
concerning witnesses who did not appear at trial and evidence that was not in the 
record, in order to decide whether to make a motion for new trial.  This was not a 
case in which a motion readily could be resolved because of the circumstance that 
the trial judge was “particularly well suited to observe courtroom performance and 
to rule on the adequacy of counsel . . . .”  (People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 
at p. 582.)  Rather, in the present case the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel at the guilt phase of trial rested primarily upon matters other than what the 
trial court could have observed during trial, and the court acted within its 
discretion in concluding the claim should be litigated in a habeas corpus 
proceeding. 
Defendant objects that the court could have decided the merits of his claim 
because, by the time the court reached its conclusion, the penalty verdict had been 
 
64 
entered and the jury discharged.  He claims that any delay in the court’s ruling on 
the automatic motion for reconsideration and in imposing sentence would not have 
posed any serious consequences, and observes that sentencing did not occur until 
several months after the trial court had ruled on the motion for new trial, further 
diminishing the significance of the delay anticipated by the court and by 
Lippsmeyer. 
We remain unpersuaded that the court erred.  It reasonably concluded that 
the volume of out-of-court material upon which defendant based his claim simply 
removed the case from the category of trials in which justice would be expedited 
by appointing substitute counsel to prepare a motion for new trial that raised an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
Defendant contends that an assertedly arbitrary violation of his state law 
right to consideration of this claim in the context of a motion for new trial 
constituted a violation of his federal constitutional due process rights, citing Hicks 
v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346.  Defendant’s claim fails at the outset, 
because we have concluded he has not demonstrated a violation of state law.  We 
also note that defendant has not attempted to explain why the trial court’s decision 
not to undertake what essentially would have been a habeas corpus hearing has 
prejudiced him, considering the circumstance that defendant’s right to obtain 
consideration of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by way of a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus has not been abridged.14  Finally, we note that defendant 
has not attempted to argue or cite any support in the appellate record for his claim 
that he would have or should have prevailed on this ground in a motion for new 
trial.  
                                              
14  
Our review of the record has not disclosed whether the habeas corpus 
matter proceeded to judgment in the superior court. 
 
65 
III.  PENALTY PHASE CLAIMS 
Defendant’s contentions concerning the penalty phase principally are 
limited to attacks on aspects of the California death penalty law that we have 
found unpersuasive in many past cases.  Having rejected the same claims in prior 
cases, we see no reason to reconsider them. 
Specifically, “[t]he statute (§ 190.2) does not impose overbroad death 
eligibility, either because of the sheer number and scope of special circumstances 
which define a capital murder, or because the statute permits capital exposure for 
an unintentional felony murder.”  (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 601; 
see also People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 730.)  Our interpretation of the 
lying-in-wait special circumstance does not change this conclusion.  (People v. 
Crittendon, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83 at pp. 155-1560.)  The state death penalty scheme 
meets Eighth Amendment requirements through its listing of special 
circumstances; the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in section 
190.3 do not and need not perform a narrowing function.  (See People v. 
Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 477.)   
The giving of CALJIC No. 8.85, the pattern instruction concerning the 
factors in aggravation and mitigation to be considered by the jury in imposing 
penalty, did not violate defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights under the 
Eighth Amendment or state and federal constitutional guaranties of due process of 
law or equal protection of the laws.  We have rejected the claim that the 
instruction is unconstitutionally vague.  (People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 
p. 600.)  The court need not instruct sua sponte on the issue of “double counting.”  
(People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 669.)  There was no misleading 
prosecutorial argument on this point, and defendant does not claim otherwise.  
(See ibid.) 
 
66 
Instruction pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.88, another pattern instruction 
concerning the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, did not 
deprive defendant of rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution or parallel state constitutional 
provisions.  Defendant claims the instruction is vague and is biased in favor of a 
death judgment, fails adequately to define circumstances in mitigation or to 
describe the process of weighing the circumstances in aggravation and mitigation, 
“and deprived defendant of the individualized consideration the Eighth 
Amendment requires.”  He claims that the instruction would permit imposition of 
the death penalty “whenever aggravating circumstances were merely ‘of 
substance’ or ‘considerable,’ even if they were outweighed by mitigating 
circumstances,” and that the instruction “improperly reduced the prosecution’s 
burden of proof.”  
Defendant concedes that his claims have been rejected in past decisions, 
which we decline to reconsider.  (People v. Boyette ( 2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 464-
467.)  In addition, we reject defendant’s claim that the instruction misleads the 
jury by failing to supply a definition of life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole.  (See People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 172; see also People v. 
Hawthorne, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 75-76.)  Nothing in Kelly v. South Carolina 
(2002) 534 U.S. 246, or Shafer v. South Carolina (2001) 532 U.S. 36, suggests the 
pattern instruction is inadequate; in those cases the jury was not instructed that a 
life sentence was without the possibility of parole, whereas the instruction under 
review did so inform the jury.  (People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 699.) 
Contrary to defendant’s contention, “[t]he death penalty is not 
unconstitutional for failing to impose a burden of proof—whether beyond a 
reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence—as to the existence of 
aggravating circumstances, the greater weight of aggravating circumstances over 
 
67 
mitigating circumstances, or the appropriateness of a death sentence.”  (People v. 
Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 401.)  Nor, contrary to defendant’s claim, do the 
high court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. 
Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, or Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, alter 
this conclusion, either with respect to the existence of an aggravating factor or, as 
defendant contends in his supplemental brief, as to the determination whether 
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors.  (People v. Morrison, supra, 34 
Cal.4th at p. 730; People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 590, fn. 14 [“death is 
no more than the prescribed statutory maximum for the offense . . . .  Hence, facts 
which bear upon, but do not necessarily determine, which of these two alternative 
penalties is appropriate do not come within the holding of Apprendi”]; see also 
People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 796; People v. Griffin, supra, 33 
Cal.4th at p. 595.)  Nor do we find any basis for defendant’s claim that if his other 
contentions fail, the jury still must be instructed on the absence of a burden of 
proof.  (See People v. Turner, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 439 [“The jury need not be 
instructed on the burden of proof during the penalty phase because the sentencing 
function is ‘not susceptible to a burden-of-proof quantification’ ”].) 
Defendant asserts the imposition of a death sentence in his case violates the 
state and federal constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment, claiming the 
sentence is not a “constitutionally proportionate punishment for a homicide that 
occurs in the course of a robbery and which is unattended by the sort of heinous 
aggravating circumstances that one associates with death penalty cases.  The 
circumstances of defendant’s life, including his upbringing, his military service 
and the mental illness that affects him, show he is not the sort of depraved killer 
for which the death penalty is theoretically reserved.”  
Examining the nature of the crime in the abstract, the circumstances of the 
particular offense, and the character of the defendant (see People v. Dillon (1983) 
 
68 
34 Cal.3d 441, 479; In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410), we are not persuaded that 
the death penalty is “grossly disproportionate to the defendant’s individual 
culpability as shown by such factors as his age, prior criminality, personal 
characteristics, and state of mind.”  (People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 479.)  
The penalty is not disproportionate to defendant’s “personal responsibility and 
moral guilt.” (People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 938.)  Defendant was 37 
years of age at the time of the capital murder and had an extensive record of prior 
armed robberies similar to the robbery in the present case, and the capital offense 
occurred within a year of his release from prison for robbery convictions, 
demonstrating a marked lack of rehabilitation.  Defendant shot the murder victim 
at point-blank range to halt the victim’s resistance to the robbery.  Mitigating 
factors included diagnosed bipolar disorder, but defendant apparently refused to 
resolve his disorder by means of the medication that was prescribed for him.  
Defendant’s childhood was relatively benign, and he was able to find employment 
as an adult, first through military service and then in various civilian placements.  
He denied that financial need motivated his prior robberies, but stated he enjoyed 
the excitement of the crimes.  We are unable to conclude the punishment imposed 
is “grossly disproportionate to [his] individual culpability.”  (People v. Dillon, 
supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 479.) 
Defendant contends that multiple errors allegedly committed at the guilt 
phase undermined the reliability of the penalty phase of the trial.  We have 
rejected the claim that the cumulative effect of error at the guilt phase was 
prejudicial at that stage of the proceedings, and defendant fails to persuade us that 
the same asserted error was prejudicial at the penalty phase. 
Contrary to defendant’s claim, written findings concerning the aggravating 
factors used as a basis for imposing a death sentence are not constitutionally 
required.  (People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 275; People v. Boyette, supra, 
 
69 
29 Cal.4th at p. 466.)  Intercase proportionality review is not required by the 
federal Constitution, and we decline to reconsider our prior relevant holdings on 
this issue.  (People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 276;  People v. Weaver (2001) 
26 Cal.4th 876, 992.)  Our state’s death penalty law is not constitutionally flawed 
because of the assertedly excessive charging discretion afforded to prosecutors.  
(People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 467; People v. Weaver, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at p. 992.) 
Defendant contends the methods of execution employed in California 
violate the federal Constitution.  First, he claims that his due process rights have 
been or will be denied, and his execution should not be carried out, because “the 
state has failed to comply with the statutory requirement that standards for lethal 
injection be established by the Department of Corrections.”  Second, he claims the 
death judgment should be vacated and the sentence should not be carried out 
because “both of the statutory methods of execution constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of defendant’s rights under the Eighth Amendment.”  As 
this court repeatedly has recognized, however, such claims are not cognizable on 
direct appeal, because “an imperfection in the method of execution does not affect 
the validity of the judgment and is not a basis for reversal of the judgment on 
appeal.”  (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 702; see also People v. Young, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1234; People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 864; 
People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1059.)  On direct appeal, defendant is 
restricted to claims “bear[ing] on the validity of the death sentence itself.”  (People 
v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 128.)  His claim regarding the existence or 
nonexistence of regulations that may or may not be in effect when the judgment is 
to be carried out does not affect the validity of the death sentence.  In essence, 
defendant’s claim is premature.  (Ibid.) 
 
70 
Defendant contends that “the violations of state and federal law articulated 
above also violate international law and the judgment must be set aside.”  This 
claim is not convincing, first because defendant has not established the premise for 
his argument that “violations of state and federal law” occurred during his trial.  
(See People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1055.)  To the extent defendant 
alleges violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
which he alleges incorporates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, his 
claim lacks merit, even assuming he has standing to invoke this covenant.  (People 
v. Turner, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 439-440; People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at 
p. 404 [“ ‘International law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in 
accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements’ ”].) 
Contrary to defendant’s claims, there were no errors at the penalty phase of 
his trial whose cumulative effect was prejudicial. 
In his supplemental brief, defendant asserts that he was constitutionally 
entitled to separate guilt and penalty phase juries in order to ensure his right to an 
impartial jury, and that the trial court therefore erred in denying his motion for 
separate juries.  He does not point to any particular circumstances unique to his 
case that rendered trial by a single jury unfair or that demonstrated good cause for 
empanelling separate juries, and he fails to persuade us to reconsider our decisions 
holding that the statutory preference for trial by a single jury is consistent with 
constitutional principles.  (See § 190.4, subd. (c); People v. Catlin, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at p. 114; People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 357-358.)   
 
71 
IV.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
WE CONCUR: 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Cornwell 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S046176 
Date Filed: August 18, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Kenneth G. Peterson 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Robert Derham, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, 
Assistant Attorney General, Ward A. Campbell, Jean M. Marinovich and Tami M. Warwick, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert Derham 
524 San Anselmo Avenue 
San Anselmo, CA  94960 
(415) 457-4946 
 
Tami M. Warwick 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5292