Case Title: Ducote v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 118, 2004

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2005-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
GLEN W. DUCOTE,                       
           
Defendant Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
     
 
 
     
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
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   No. 118, 2004 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for New Castle County  
   Cr. A. Nos. IN03-05-0577-0579 
                      IN03-05-1800
 
Submitted: April 1, 2005  
   Decided: May 18, 2005    
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 18th day of May 2005, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and 
the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
On January 15, 2004, the defendant-appellant, Glen W. Ducote, was 
found guilty by a Superior Court jury of Attempted Murder in the First Degree, 
Kidnapping in the First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the 
Commission of a Felony. In a separate proceeding, Ducote also was convicted of 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited.  On March 19, 2004, 
Ducote was declared a habitual offender.1  He was sentenced to life in prison on 
the attempted murder conviction and, on the other convictions, was sentenced to a 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(a). 
 
 
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total of 5 years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 4 years for 1 year at 
Level IV.  This is Ducote’s direct appeal.2   
 
(2) 
Ducote raises four issues for this Court’s consideration.  He claims 
that: a) the trial judge deprived him of a fair trial by refusing to declare a mistrial 
after the jury witnessed the victim and a victims’ rights counselor hugging each 
other; b) the trial judge imposed a sentence that violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments; c) he was deprived of his right 
to counsel on his direct appeal because he had meritorious claims that his public 
defender did not believe had merit;3 and d) his public defender provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to put on a defense at trial.  
 
(3) 
The facts adduced at trial are as follows.  Theresa Bare was 
romantically involved with Ducote for four to five years.  Bare and Ducote had 
lived together in various residences in Chester, Pennsylvania, and had purchased a 
home together.  After Bare broke up with Ducote, he continued to telephone her on 
a daily basis.  On May 4, 2003, Bare, who worked as a cleaning woman at the 
Woodlawn Apartments near Route 141, Wilmington, Delaware, was cleaning a 
vacant apartment.  While getting some cleaning supplies out of her van, Bare was 
approached by Ducote, who punched her in the face and yelled obscenities at her.  
                                                 
2 Following a hearing in the Superior Court, this Court issued an Order on October 4, 2004, 
permitting Ducote to proceed pro se in this direct appeal.  
3 According to Ducote, this is why he was forced to file a motion to proceed pro se. 
 
 
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Ducote then pulled a steak knife out of the pocket of his sweatshirt and stabbed her 
in the back and legs.  Ducote threatened to kill Bare unless she told him the address 
of the woman she had stayed with after their break-up.  During the course of the 
attack, Ducote stabbed Bare multiple times and knocked her down repeatedly as 
she attempted to stand up.  He also repeatedly threatened to kill her. 
 
(4) 
Following the attack, Ducote bound and gagged Bare with some of 
her cleaning rags, put her in the van and drove out of the apartment complex 
toward Route 141.  As Ducote stopped and waited for oncoming traffic to pass, 
Bare managed to reach a door handle and jump out of the van.  As the van started 
moving again, one of the rags got caught on the outside door latch, forcing Bare to 
run alongside the van.  With full knowledge of Bare’s predicment, Ducote drove 
faster and faster.  Finally, Bare fell under the van, resulting in injuries to her chest, 
leg and hand.  She managed to run to a nearby residence, where the occupant 
called 911.             
 
(5) 
Bare was transported to Christiana Hospital by paramedics.  Her 
heartbeat and blood pressure were alarmingly low and a chest tube needed to be 
inserted for a collapsed lung.  She had surgery to stop her internal bleeding and to 
repair a tear in her spleen.  Doctors also determined that Bare had suffered a 
 
 
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broken wrist, a broken ankle and a broken shoulder.  She also sustained lacerations 
and bruising to her face, neck and hand.4   
 
(6) 
After Bare finished her testimony concerning the attack and left the 
witness stand, she and a social worker employed by the New Castle County police 
as a victim assistant hugged each other.  No words were spoken by either Bare or 
the social worker at the time of the hug.  After the jury had left the courtroom, the 
judge called the victim assistant back into the courtroom and strongly admonished 
her regarding the incident.  At trial the following day, Ducote’s public defender 
moved for a mistrial or, in the event the judge was unwilling to grant a mistrial, 
requested that a curative instruction be given to the jury.  The judge denied the 
motion for a mistrial, but agreed to give a curative instruction.   
 
(7) 
When the jury returned to the courtroom prior to counsel’s closing 
arguments, the judge told the jury that it had been inappropriate for Bare and the 
social worker to hug each other in the courtroom, but that it was human nature to 
do so.  He also stated that the incident should have no bearing on their decision in 
the case and that they should base their verdict solely on the evidence presented.  
In addition, prior to delivering the regular jury instructions, the judge reiterated his  
comment that the jury should rely solely and exclusively on the evidence in the 
                                                 
4 Ducote’s mother testified that her son told her on the day of the attack that he had hurt Bare 
badly.   
 
 
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case in reaching a decision, and should not permit passion, prejudice, bias or 
sympathy to influence them in any manner whatsoever.   
 
(8) 
Ducote’s first claim is that the judge should have declared a mistrial 
after Bare and the social worker hugged each other in the presence of the jury.  
Several factors must be considered in evaluating whether a display of emotion by a 
witness necessitates a mistrial.  The first consideration is the nature, persistence 
and frequency of the emotional display.  The second consideration is the likelihood 
that the jury was misled or prejudiced by the emotional display.  The third 
consideration is the closeness of the case.  The final consideration is the curative or 
mitigating action taken by the trial judge.5   
 
(9) 
In this case, the inappropriate behavior occurred only once and when 
the jury was leaving the courtroom.  Immediately after the incident, the judge 
strongly admonished the social worker not to engage in any such behavior in the 
future.  He also gave the jury two specific cautionary instructions with respect to 
the incident---one the next morning and the other immediately prior to reading the 
regular jury instructions.  There is little chance that the jury would have been 
misled or prejudiced in such circumstances.  Finally, this was not a close case.  The 
evidence against Ducote was overwhelming.  In these circumstances, we find no 
                                                 
5 Taylor v. State, 690 A.2d 933, 935 (Del. 1997). 
 
 
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error or abuse of discretion on the part of the judge in denying Ducote’s motion for 
a mistrial.6     
 
(10) Ducote next claims that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.  There is no dispute that Ducote 
was eligible to be sentenced as a habitual offender.  At the sentencing hearing, 
Ducote’s counsel acknowledged, and the Superior Court determined on the basis of 
the record before it, that Ducote had three separate felony convictions and 
previously had been declared a habitual offender.  Because Ducote was convicted 
of Attempted Murder in the First Degree, which, like Murder in the First Degree,7 
is designated as a violent felony,8 the Superior Court was required under the 
habitual offender statute to sentence Ducote to a life term for Attempted Murder in 
the First Degree.9  Moreover, because Ducote has presented no evidence 
suggesting that his life term is grossly disproportionate to the crime of attempted 
murder,10 we find his Eighth Amendment claim to be without merit. 
                                                 
6 To the extent Ducote challenges his conviction on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, 
that challenge, which Ducote presents for the first time in this direct appeal and which we, 
therefore, review for plain error, also fails.  Barnett v. State, 691 A.2d 614, 618 (Del. 1997); 
Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 531 (2001). 
8 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4201(c) (2001). 
9 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(a) (2001). 
10 Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894, 906, 908 (Del. 2003). 
 
 
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(11) Ducote’s final two claims are, fundamentally, that his counsel 
provided ineffective assistance both at trial and on appeal.  It is well-established 
that this Court will not consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the 
first time on direct appeal.11  Because Ducote’s claims that his counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance have not been fully addressed by the Superior Court 
previously,12 we decline to address them here.       
 
(12) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Ducote’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 
issue.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   /s/ Henry duPont Ridgely     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
                                                 
11 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 
12 It appears that, prior to trial, Ducote filed a motion to dismiss his counsel, which was 
summarily denied by a Superior Court judge other than the trial judge.  However, Ducote’s 
complaints, as he has presented them here, have not previously been addressed by the Superior 
Court.