Case Title: State v Kenneth Kampf

Citation: 2008 MT 198

Docket Number: afa0c739-8151-49e6-98cc-5a54434eac4a

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED
dune 102008
DA 06-0755
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 198

STATE OF MONTANA,

 

Pani and Appel, FILED
‘ JUN 1 0 2008
KENNETH KAMPF,
Fd smith
Defendant and Appellant. exert we Sure count

 

“Sart os wenn

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Hill, Cause No, DC 06-026
Honorable David Rice, Presiding Judge
‘COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:

Jim Wheelis, Chief Appellate Defender; Shannon L. McDonald, Assistant
‘Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Hon. Mike McGrath, Attomey General; Sheri K. Sprigg, Assistant Attorey
General, Helena, Montana

Cyndee L. Peterson, Hill County Attomey, Havre, Montana

 

Submitted on Briefs: January 4, 2008
Decided: June 10, 2008
 

Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court

{1 Kenneth Kampf (Kampf) appeals from the judgment entered by the Twelfth Judicial
District Court, Hill County, on his conviction and sentence for felony driving under the
influence of alcohol (DUD, fourth or subsequent offense, We affirm.
{2 Kampf raises the following issues on appeal:
{B 1. Did the District Court err in determining that Kampf’s 1995 DUI conviction was
constitutionally valid for purposes of enhancing his current DUI offense to a felony?
{4 2. Did the District Court impose an illegal sentence when it imposed conditions on
any period when Kampf might be released on parole?

BACKGROUND
{5 In February of 2006, the State of Montana (State) charged Kampf by information
with felony DUL, fourth or subsequent offense, and misdemeanor operation of a motor

vehicle without headlamps illuminated. ‘The State charged the DUI as a felony offense

  

‘based on information that Kampf had prior DUI convictions in April of 1995, October of
1996, and March of 2005. Kampf initially pled not guilty to both offenses. Kampf
subsequently appeared before the District Court and pled guilty tothe DUI charge, expressly
reserving his right to challenge the constitutional validity ofhis prior DUI convictions. The
District Court later granted the State's motion to dismiss the misdemeanor charge.

{6 Kampf filed a brief contending that his April of 1995 DUI conviction in Havre City

Court was constitutionally invalid because he had been denied the right to counsel and,
therefore, that conviction could not be used to enhance his current DUI offense to a felony,

Kampf also submitted his affid

 

it stating that, when he pled guilty to the DUI offense in
1995, the Havre City Court judge failed to inform him he had the right to appointed counsel
ifhe could not afford counsel, he would have accepted appointed counsel if the City Court
Judge had offered him one, and the City Court judge failed to explain that he had the rightto

challenge the evidence against him as being illegally obtained,

 

{7 The State filed a response to Kampf's brief and affidavit, and appended thereto
copies of various documents from the 1995 proceeding. One document was a Montana
Highway Patrol alcohol influence report completed at the time of Kampf's arrest on March
3, 1995, which contained a written Miranda warning and waiver of rights signed by Kampf,
AA second document contained City Court minutes indicating Kampf initially appeared on
March 7, 1995, was advised of his constitutional rights and entered a not guilty plea, and

Kampf later appeared on April 4, 1995, wai

 

having an attorney present, pled guilty and

‘was sentenced.

 

8 __Afterahearing on Kampf's challenge to the validity of his 1995 DUI conviction, the

District Court orally determined that the conviction was constitutionally valid and could be

 

used—in conjunction with the 1996 and 2005 DUI convietions—to enhance Kampf's

‘current DUI charge to a felony. The court subsequently entered a written order reiterating

 

its oral findings of fact, conclusions of law and ruling regarding the constitutional validity of

the 1995 DUI conviction.
{9 The District Court sentenced Kampf on the felony DUI offense to a 13-month
‘commitment to the Montana Department of Corrections (Department) for placement in an
appropriate correctional facility or program, with a recommendation that Kampf'be placed in
the WATCh program. The court further ordered that, should Kampf successfully complete
the WATCh program, the remainder of the 13-month commitment would be suspended.
‘The court also imposed a consecutive term of two years to the Department, all suspended.
The District Court then imposed 25 conditions on the sentence during “any term of parole or
probation.” Kampf appeals from the District Court’s judgment on the conviction and
sentence.
DISCUSSION

{10 1. Did the District Court err in determining that Kampf’s 1995 DUI conviction was
constitutionally valid for purposes of enhancing his current DUI offense to a felony?

{11 A person convicted of a DUI offense who previously has been convicted of three or
more DUI offenses is guilty of a felony. Section 61-8-731(1), MCA. Here, the State
charged Kampf with felony DUI based on information that Kampf previously had been
convicted of DUI offenses in 1995, 1996 and 2005. Kampf asserted that his 1995 DUI
conviction was constitutionally invalid and could not be used to enhance his current DUL
offense toa felony.

{12 “Itis well settled in Montana that the State may not use a constitutionally infiem
conviction to support an enhanced punishment, such as felony DUI.” State v. Mann, 2006

MT33, 4115, 331 Mont, 137, 15, 130 P.3d 164, $15. A presumption of regularity attaches
to prior convictions, however. Consequently, the prior conviction is presumed valid absent
evidence to the contrary. Mann, 4.15. A defendant can overcome the presumption of
regularity by presenting direct evidence of irregularity. In that event, the burden shifts tothe
State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the conviction was not obtained in
violation ofthe defendant's constitutional rights, Mann, $15.

$13 As stated above, Kampf filed an affidavit in the District Court supporting his
assertion that his 1995 DUI conviction was constitutionally invalid because he had been
denied his right to counsel. His affidavit stated, in pertinent part, that when he entered his

guilty plea on his second appearance in the Havre City Court, the judge

 

did not advise me that he would appoint an attorney to represent me, but asked
only if | waived having a lawyer present, which I said I did, Thad never been
arrested before, and I was unfamiliar with my rights and with criminal
procedure. I did not understand that I had a right to an attorney at state
expense before I chose to plead guilty. IfeltI was not guilty of the offense asT
was approached by an officer after I had parked my car at my residence in my
garage) and was out of my car, and the officer had not made any observations
of trafic violations. If the court had offered to appoint an attorney for me I
‘would have accepted one.

 

 

ia its response brief and appended documents relating to the 1995 DUI proceedings, the

 

‘State first contended that Kamps affidavit was insufficient to constitute the direct evidence
of irregularity necessary to rebut the presumption that the 1995 conviction was
constitutionally valid. ‘The State also asserted that, even assuming Kampf had rebutted the
presumption of validity, the documents from the 1995 DUI proceedings proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the conviction was not obtained in violation of Kampf's

constitutional rights.
{14 The District Court held a hearing on the issue at which neither party presented
testimony, and several exhibits offered by the State were admitted into evidence without
objection, The court ruled orally that the 1995 DUI conviction was constitutionally valid
and, subsequently, entered its written order denying Kampf's request to strike the 1995 DUI
conviction as invalid. The District Court first determined that Kamps affidavit was
insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity attached to his 1995 DUI convietion.
Noting that this conclusion was a sufficient basis on which to deny Kampf's request to
strike the 1995 conviction, the court proceeded to enter findings regarding the
documentation from the 1995 proceeding and ultimately concluded that “the State
«established by a preponderance of the evidence that [Kampf's] conviction was not entered in

‘violation of his right to counsel.”

 

{15 Kampfcontends the District Court erred in determining his 195 DUI con
constitutionally valid. Kampf’s brief on appeal devotes only four paragraphs to his
‘argument on this issue. The first paragraph sets forth the basis of his argument in the
District Court and a brief recitation ofthe contents of his affidavit. The second paragraph
sets forth general statements, with citation to authority, regarding an accused's constitutional
right to counsel and the requisites of a waiver of that right. The third paragraph states, in
cone sentence, that in Mann we “vacated the defendant's prior DUI convictions, determining
that he did not enter into a knowing, intelligent or voluntary waiver of his right to counsel

‘Mann, 24.” Kampf provides no analysis of how Mann is factually of legally analogous to
the present case. The fourth and final paragraph of Kampf's argument states, in its entirety,
that

{hJere, Kampf's affidavit establishes that he was not sufficiently apprised of
his right to counsel and to challenge evidence before pleading guilty to the
DUI charge. Therefore, this Court should vacate his prior conviction and
remand for resentencing as a misdemeanor.

 

{16 A district court’s determination regarding whether a prior conviction may be used to
enhance a criminal sentence is a conclusion of law which we review to determine whether

the conclusion is correct. State v. Walker, 2007 MT 34, $11, 336 Mont. $6, 411, 153 P.3d

 

614, (11. We review a district court's underlying findings of fact to determine whether
those findings are clearly erroneous. Walker, 411. Furthermore, the appellant bears the

burden of estab

 

ing that a district court erred by presenting argument and legal authority
in support thereof. See State v. Hicks, 2006 MT 71, § 22, 331 Mont. 471, § 22, 133 P3d
206, §22. It is not this Court's obligation to guess at an appellant’s precise argument or to
develop legal analysis which may support an appellant's position. Hicks, 4 22.

417 Here, Kampf's “argument” on this issue consists of a conclusory statement that his
affidavit presented sufficient direct evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity attached
tohhis 1995 DUI conviction and, therefore, that conviction cannot be used to enhance his
current offense to a felony, He does not specifically challenge any of the District Court's
findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding its determination that Kampf's affidavit was,
insufficient; nor does he provide any analysis of legal authority supporting such a challenge.

Moreover, Kampf does not even mention the District Court's alternative basis for denying,
his request to strike the 1995 convi

 

tion, which was that the State presented evidence

establishing by a preponderance of the evidence 1

 

the conviction was not obtained in
violation of Kampf's constitutional rights. “Failure to challenge each of the altemative
bases for a district courts ruling results in affirmance.” State v. English, 2006 MT 177,
147, 333 Mont. 23, £47, 140 P.34 454, 947.

{U8 We conclude Kampf has failed to establish that the District Court's determination

that

 

1995 DUI conviction was constitutionally valid was erroneous, We hold, therefore,
that the District Court did not err in determining that Kampf’s 1995 DUI conviction was
constitutionally valid for purposes of enhancing his current DUI offense to a felony.

{19 2. Did the District Court impose an illegal sentence when it imposed conditions on
‘any period when Kampf might be released on parole?

{20 The District Court sentenced Kampf to a 13-month commitment tothe Department,
with a recommendation that Kampf be placed in the WATCh program, followed by a
suspended term of two years to the Department. The court further ordered that, should
Kampf successfully complete the WATCh program, the remainder of the 13-month
‘commitment would be suspended. The court then imposed 25 conditions on the sentence

during “any term of parole or probation.” Kampf contends that the District Court was

 

‘without legal authority to impose conditions on any time period when he may be released on,
parole. We review a criminal sentence for legality only to determine whether the sentence
falls within applicable statutory parameters. State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17, 4 5, 335 Mont.

344,95, 151 P3d 892, $5,
{21 Werecently addressed whether sentencing courts have statutory authority to impose
‘conditions on parole. In State v. Burch, 2008 MT 118, §2, 342 Mont. 499, 4 2, 182.34 66,
412, Burch was sentenced to concurrent terms of eight years for sexual intercourse without
‘consent, five years for criminal sale of dangerous drugs and sixteen years, with eight years
suspended, for sexual assault. The district court imposed 19 conditions on the sexual assault

“{dluring the suspended portion of the sentence,

 

‘and upon any parole...” A little over a year after Burch was released on parole, the State
petitioned to revoke his suspended sentence based on alleged violations of his parole
conditions. Burch, $§ 4-5. The district court granted the petition and revoked the suspended
portion of Burch's sentence for the sexual assault conviction. Burch, 46.

{22 On appeal, Burch argued, in part, that the district court erred in revoking his
suspended sentence for violating conditions imposed by the court on his period of parole

because the court was without statutory authority to impose parole conditions. Burch, $8.

 

In addressing the issue, we began with the well-established rule that “district courts do not
have the power to impose a sentence unless authorized by a specific grant of statutory

authority.” Burch, $23 (citations omitted). We then observed t

 

t § 46-18-201, MCA,
defines and constrains the sentencing authority of district courts and nothing in the language
of that statute authorizes sentencing courts to impose parole conditions. Burch, $f 24 and
26. We further reviewed other provisions of Title 46 of the Montana Code Annotated
(MCA) and located nothing which would grant sentencing courts a general or residual

authority to impose conditions on a defendant's parole. We did note, however, that several
 

statutes authorize sentencing courts to impose limited, specified conditions on parole for
sexual and violent offenders. Burch, § 30 and sec e.g. §§ 46-18-206 and -255, MCA, We
‘held that, other than the limited and expressly authorized instances, sentencing courts do not
have a residual or inherent authority under Title 46, Chapter 18, Part 2 of the MCA to
generally impose parole conditions. Burch, $36.
423 Inthe present case, Kampf was convicted of, and sentenced for, the offense of felony
DUL, which is neither a sexual nor a violent offense. See § 46-23-502, MCA. Thus, the
District Court had no statutory authority to impose conditions on Kampf's sentence during
any term of parole,
{24 The State presents no argument tothe contrary. It points out, however, that § 46-20-
701(2), MCA, provides that “[a]ny error defect, regularity, or variance that does not affect
substantial rights must be disregarded.” The State asserts that, even assuming the District
‘Court erred in imposing parole conditions in Kampf°s sentence, the error is harmless
because Kampf is not eligible for parole under the circumstances of his sentence and, as a
result, the error does not affect his substantial rights, We agree.
$25 The District Court sentenced Kampf pursuant to § 61-8731(1)(a), MCA, which
‘provides that a person convicted of a fourth or subsequent DUI offense shal be punished by
sentencing the person to the department of corrections for placement in an
‘appropriate correctional facility or program for aterm of 13 months. The court
shall order that if the person successfully completes a residential alcohol
‘treatment program operated or approved by the department of corrections, the
remainder of the 13-month sentence must be served on probation. The

imposition or execution of the 13-month sentence may not be deferred oF
suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole.

 

10
‘Thus, Kampf was not eligible for parole during the 13-month commitment to the Department.
‘The District Court further sentenced Kampf pursuant to § 61-8-731(1(b), MCA, to a
consecutive two-year suspended sentence, Kampf must serve this suspended sentence on
probation, subject to various conditions imposed by the court. See § 61-8-731(4) and (5),
MCA.

{26 — Wehold tha, although the District Court imposed an illegal sentence when it imposed

condi

 

son any period when Kampf might be released on parole, the error is harmless on.
these facts,

27 Affirmed.

et Thstlee

We Concur: