Case Title: Sybert v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-09-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sybert v. State1986 WY 170724 P.2d 463Case Number: 85-273Decided: 09/02/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Steven Ralph SYBERT, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

Leonard Munker, 
State Public Defender, Julie Naylor, Appellate Counsel, Gerald M. Gallivan, 
Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, Laramie, and Edward G. Luhm, Student Intern 
(argued), for appellant 
(defendant).

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Terry L. Armitage, Legal Intern (argued), and Margery Boyd Cozzens, 
Student Intern, for appellee 
(plaintiff).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Steven Sybert 
was convicted of first degree arson in violation of § 6-3-101, W.S. 1977.1 He raises three issues on appeal, 
all of which involve limiting instructions relating to prior inconsistent 
statements of a witness. We must decide: (1) whether appellant made a timely 
objection to an allegedly inadequate limiting instruction which the court gave 
at trial; (2) whether appellant made a sufficient request for a second limiting 
instruction which the court refused to give; and, (3) assuming that appellant's 
request for the second instruction was insufficient, whether the court committed 
plain error by failing to give the instruction on its own 
motion.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶3.]     On the morning of July 
5, 1985, a mobile home leased by appellant's girlfriend, Patsy Cole, was 
destroyed by fire. Ms. Cole's two small children and her niece, Candy Matskus, 
also lived in the trailer.

[¶4.]     The evening before the 
fire, appellant and Ms. Cole had an argument during which he knocked over a 
table and threatened to report her for welfare fraud. After appellant left, Ms. 
Cole went to the sheriff's department where she told Officer Danny Anderson that 
appellant had threatened to burn her trailer. She requested that patrolling 
officers watch her trailer to keep appellant away. She then returned home and 
was joined by Candy Matskus.

[¶5.]     Appellant returned to 
the trailer about 2:00 a.m. and spoke to Ms. Matskus who told him that Ms. Cole 
was taking a walk. In reality, Ms. Cole was hiding in the bathroom. Appellant 
concluded that Ms. Cole was out with her ex-boyfriend, John, and he slapped Ms. 
Matskus in anger saying, "this is what is going to happen to John." When 
appellant left, Ms. Cole and Ms. Matskus took the children to a neighbor's 
trailer where all four spent the rest of the night.

[¶6.]     At about 5:40 a.m., 
Peter Galloway, one of Ms. Cole's neighbors, heard a car start up, looked out 
his window, and saw appellant back his car out of Ms. Cole's driveway and drive 
off. Five minutes later, Mr. Galloway saw smoke and flames coming from the 
trailer. He ran to the landlord's house, reported the fire, and returned to Ms. 
Cole's trailer with an extinguisher. Firemen arrived about fifteen minutes later 
and put out the fire, but not before the trailer was totally 
destroyed.

[¶7.]     The deputy sheriff 
dispatched to the fire, Robert Jones, spoke with Ms. Cole at the scene. She told 
him that appellant had threatened to burn the trailer down during their argument 
the previous evening. She also gave a description of appellant and his vehicle 
which enabled the police to stop him within an hour after the fire was reported. 
In his car were two nearly empty cans of automobile starting fluid and a can of 
carburetor cleaner. He smelled of petroleum products, and there were two small 
burn marks on his shirt and a black substance on his 
hands.

[¶8.]     About two hours after 
the fire, Ms. Cole gave the police a written statement which elaborated on the 
report she gave Deputy Jones at the fire. According to the statement, the 
argument leading to appellant's arson threat was quite violent. Ms. Cole was so 
afraid of appellant when he returned at 2:00 a.m. that she took a sledgehammer 
with her when she hid in the bathroom. She later saw him around her trailer 
every fifteen or twenty minutes between 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., and just before 
the fire she saw him near the trailer, heard a bang, and saw 
smoke.

[¶9.]     Appellant was charged 
with first degree arson, pled not guilty, and went to trial on September 9, 
1985. At trial Ms. Cole admitted that there had been an argument the night 
before the fire but contradicted the most incriminating parts of her prior 
statements. She testified that the night before the fire she had lied to Officer 
Anderson about appellant's arson threats, that she had repeated the lie to 
Deputy Jones on the morning of the fire, and that she had repeated it again in 
her written statement. She said she lied because she was very angry and "just 
wanted to see Steve put away." She admitted that between appellant's arrest and 
the trial she had learned that she was pregnant with his child. She also 
admitted that she loved him.

[¶10.]  To impeach Ms. Cole's exculpatory 
testimony, the prosecution offered into evidence a copy of her written 
statement. Defense counsel did not object, but asked for "a limiting instruction 
directing the jury that it could be considered to reflect on the credibility of 
this witness." The court responded by giving the following 
instruction:

"This will be received as 
Exhibit 1-A. It is the prior statement received by the Court in this matter and 
may be considered as evidence of prior statements made by this witness that are 
inconsistent with her testimony today."

 

Defense counsel 
made no objection to the form or substance of this instruction after it was 
given.

[¶11.]  In addition to Ms. Cole's written 
statement, the prosecution offered the oral statement which Ms. Cole gave to 
Deputy Jones at the scene of the fire. At a bench conference, defense counsel 
objected to Deputy Jones's repetition of this out-of-court statement on grounds 
that it was hearsay which could only be used to impeach Ms. Cole. The 
prosecution countered that the statement was admissible for both substantive and 
impeachment purposes because it was an excited utterance under Rule 803(2), 
W.R.E. The court did not accept the excited utterance argument but 
observed:

"I think a prior 
inconsistent statement may be received both as something that contradicts or 
shows a willingness to speak untruths on a part of a party, but the prior 
statement can also be received to establish the truth of the facts alleged 
therein, or stated therein in their statements, so I think there's two basic 
instructions to the jury that would be to that effect."

Defense counsel 
replied:

"We just want to make 
clear that we do object to that ruling, and it's our contention that under the 
hearsay rule that this may be admissible to establish that she's not a credible 
witness, her unreliability, but it cannot be used."

[¶12.]  The trial judge then said, "I disagree, I 
think it can be used in substantive fashion." Defense counsel made no further 
objection, did not specifically request a limiting instruction, and did not 
suggest any wording for a limiting instruction. The direct examination of Deputy 
Jones continued, and he recounted Ms. Cole's prior inconsistent 
statement.

[¶13.]  The inconsistent-statement issue was 
raised one more time before Deputy Jones completed his testimony. On redirect 
examination, defense counsel interrupted Jones as he began to repeat Ms. Cole's 
explanation of how she hid in the bathroom. The judge invited the lawyers to the 
bench so that he could explain why he was allowing the statement for substantive 
as well as impeachment purposes. After the court made it clear that it was not 
relying on the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule, defense counsel 
stated:

"I don't know that we 
have particularly any objection to keep all of this out, but I do think that 
perhaps at the instruction conference we maybe need to rediscuss what we may 
need for substantive purposes or credibility."

The trial judge 
responded, "I've already drafted an instruction that covers that 
area."

[¶14.]  At the close of trial, over the 
prosecution's objection, the court instructed the jury as 
follows:

"Evidence that at some 
other time a witness has said or done something which is inconsistent with the 
witness' testimony at the trial, may be considered by the jury for the sole 
purpose of judging the credibility of the witness, but may never be considered 
as evidence or proof of the truth of any such statement."

[¶15.]  The jury found appellant guilty of second 
degree arson, and he was sentenced to a term of five to eleven years in the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary.

OBJECTION TO THE FIRST 
LIMITING INSTRUCTION

[¶16.]  Appellant contends that the limiting 
instruction the court gave in connection with Ms. Cole's written statement was 
inadequate. We need not decide whether the instruction was inadequate, for 
counsel did not object to it after it was given.

[¶17.]  When counsel makes a request for a valid 
jury instruction either in the midst of trial or just prior to deliberations, it 
is error for the court to refuse it. Channel v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1145, 1150 
(1979). If, however, the court responds to the request by giving an instruction 
which is claimed to be inadequate, counsel must still object to preserve any 
error for appellate review. Otte v. State, Wyo., 563 P.2d 1361 (1977); Oldham v. State, Wyo., 534 P.2d 107 
(1975). We have consistently applied this rule to instructions given to the jury 
at the close of evidence when it retires to deliberate. Cutbirth v. State, 
Wyo., 663 P.2d 888 (1983); Rule 31, W.R.Cr.P.; Rule 51, W.R.C.P. The rule applies in the same 
manner to instructions given during the course of trial. The rationale is the 
same in both instances, "to inform the trial judge of possible errors so he may 
have an opportunity to correct them." Haley v. Dreesen, Wyo., 
532 P.2d 399, 402 (1975).

[¶18.]  The defense did not object to the 
instruction given by the court. The alleged error was not preserved as an issue 
on appeal.

THE COURT'S FAILURE TO 
GIVE THE SECOND INSTRUCTION

[¶19.]  Appellant contends that a limiting 
instruction was requested at the first bench conference during the direct 
examination of Deputy Jones. But, at that conference, defense counsel did not 
request a "limiting instruction" and did not offer a proposed instruction either 
orally or in writing. Instead, defense counsel stated:

"We just want to make 
clear that we do object to that ruling, and it's our contention that under the 
hearsay rule that this may be admissible to establish that she's not a credible 
witness, her unreliability, but it cannot be used."

[¶20.]  This objection simply does not qualify as 
a request for an instruction. An objection under Rule 103, W.R.E., is the means 
by which a party preserves error in the admission of evidence which is not 
admissible for any purpose. But when evidence is admissible for some purposes, a 
limiting instruction under Rule 105, W.R.E., is the method of telling the jury 
to accept the evidence for the proper purposes and reject the evidence for the 
forbidden purposes. Even if an objection is made, a limiting instruction must be 
requested if desired. Dincau v. Tamayose, 131 Cal. App. 3d 780, 182 Cal. Rptr. 855 
(1982); State v. Hunt, 72 N.C. App. 59, 323 S.E.2d 490 
(1984).

[¶21.]  As a matter of trial strategy, counsel 
may decide against a limiting instruction to avoid emphasizing unfavorable 
testimony. This consideration is discussed in 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 
Federal Evidence § 45, at 342-343 (1977):

"There are sound reasons 
for requiring the opponent to request the trial judge to limit the scope of the 
evidence by instructing the jury. * * * [T]his manner of proceeding 
appropriately leaves to the opposing trial counsel the option of concluding 
that, as a matter of strategy, he is better off without an instruction than with 
one, in that an instruction would serve only to remind the jury of what it has 
heard or to re-emphasize the evidence in the minds of the jurors, and perhaps to 
suggest to the jury a use for the evidence which is best left 
unmentioned."

[¶22.]  It is not the function of the trial judge 
to second-guess the strategy of counsel. In Connolly v. State, Wyo., 610 P.2d 1008, 1011 
(1980), we said:

"To charge the trial 
court with the duty of protecting defendant's right to receive a limiting 
instruction, thereby relieving the attorney of that obligation, would be an 
exercise of role-switching which we are not ready to condone * * 
*."

[¶23.]  In the case at bar, it is clear that 
defense counsel knew how to make an explicit request for an immediate limiting 
instruction because such a request had been made when Ms. Cole's written 
statement was admitted into evidence. It is possible that counsel made a 
conscious decision during the direct examination of Deputy Jones to wait until 
the end of trial for the instruction. This strategy is consistent with the 
following statement made by defense counsel at the bench conference held during 
Deputy Jones' redirect testimony:

"I don't know that we 
have particularly any objection to keep all of this out, but I do think that 
perhaps at the instruction conference we maybe need to rediscuss what we may 
need for substantive purposes or credibility."

[¶24.]  The court did not err in failing to give 
a limiting instruction in connection with Deputy Jones's hearsay testimony where 
none was requested. Grabill v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 802, 813 
(1980).

PLAIN 
ERROR

[¶25.]  Appellant maintains that the trial court 
committed plain error in not giving limiting instructions on its own motion. In 
Connolly v. State, supra, 610 P.2d  at 1011, we considered this precise question 
and held that a trial court must give a limiting instruction only upon request. 
See also Rule 105, W.R.E.

[¶26.]  The court gave a limiting instruction on 
both occasions that one was requested, i.e., at the introduction of Patsy Cole's 
written statement and at the close of trial. The court's failure to give an 
instruction at any other time was not error at all, much less plain 
error.

[¶27.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 6-3-101(a), W.S. 
1977, states:

"A person is guilty of 
first-degree arson if he maliciously starts a fire or causes an explosion with 
intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure."