Case Title: Leatherbury v. Greenspun,et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 200, 2007

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CHARLES LEATHERBURY,  
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 200, 2007 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   C.A. No. 05C-08-059 
BERTRAM GREENSPUN, D.O., 
§  
CHRISTIANA CARE HEALTH 
§  
SERVICES, INC., and BRIAN  
§  
H. SARTER, M.D., 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Defendants Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellees.  
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  October 24, 2007 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  November 30, 2007 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Gary W. Aber, Esquire (argued), Aber, Goldlust, Baker & Over, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant, Charles Leatherbury. 
 
 
 
William L. Doerler, Esquire (argued) and John D. Balaguer, Esquire, 
White and Williams, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee, Bertram 
Greenspun, D.O. 
 
 
 
Dennis D. Ferri, Esquire and Amy A. Quinlan, Esquire (argued), 
Morris, James, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee, Christiana Care 
Health Services, Inc. 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
The plaintiff-appellant, Charles Leatherbury, appeals from final 
judgments entered by the Superior Court that dismissed his complaint as to 
all defendants on the basis that it was barred by the applicable two-year 
statute of limitations.  The Superior Court rejected Leatherbury’s contention 
that he had tolled the two-year statute of limitations by complying with the 
“Notice of Intent to investigate” provisions of Title 18, section 6856(3) of 
the Delaware Code.  The Superior Court ruled that Leatherbury’s efforts at 
complying with the statute had failed because he sent those Notices of Intent 
via Federal Express rather than by “certified mail, return receipt requested.”  
We have concluded that the judgments of the Superior Court must be 
affirmed.  
Facts 
 
 
This negligence action arises from medical care that was provided to 
Leatherbury, by the defendants-appellees, Christiana Care Health Services, 
Inc. (“CCHS”), Dr. Bertram Greenspun and Dr. Brian H. Sarter.  
Leatherbury was a patient in Christiana Hospital from April 24, 2003, 
through May 13, 2003.  On April 24, 2003, Leatherbury underwent a 
coronary angiography procedure.  He was subsequently diagnosed with a 
resulting right pseudoaneurysm.  Leatherbury had cardiac bypass surgery on 
April 29, 2003.  He was transferred to the Wilmington Hospital 
 
3
Rehabilitation Facility (a/k/a Christiana Rehabilitation Facility) on May 13, 
2003.   
 
Leatherbury was discharged from that facility on May 29, 2003.  After 
his release, the pseudoaneurysm redeveloped and Leatherbury was admitted 
to Christiana Hospital for treatment.  His treatment included a resection in 
the operating room.  The complaint alleges the defendants were negligent in 
failing to instruct Leatherbury regarding post-hospitalization care and 
maintenance of the site of the pseudoaneurysm/coronary catheterization in 
the event that the condition redeveloped, so as to avoid future complications.  
 
On April 22, 2005, Leatherbury’s attorney sent defendants Greenspun, 
CCHS and Sarter, by Federal Express “Notice of Intent to investigate.”  The 
letters constituting the “Notice of Intent” stated: 
Please be advised we have been retained by Mr. Leatherbury to 
investigate possible medical negligence with respect to 
complications from a cardiac catheterization and subsequent 
lower extremity nerve damage performed on or about April 25, 
2005.  The purpose of this letter is to provide you with “Notice 
of Intent” to investigate these claims pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 
6856.   
 
Leatherbury filed his complaint in this matter on August 5, 2005.  The 
complaint alleges that “the defendants named herein were provided notices 
 
4
of these proceedings by correspondence dated April 22, 2005, copies of 
which are attached hereto as Exhibit No. 1.”1   
Statute of Limitations 
The applicable statute of limitations in this medical malpractice action 
is two years.2  An injured party may toll the statute of limitations for ninety 
days, however, if he or she complies with section 6856(3) of the Delaware 
Code,3 which relevantly provides: 
(3) A plaintiff may toll the above statutes of limitations for a 
period of time up to 90 days from the applicable limitations 
contained in this section by sending a Notice of Intent to 
investigate to each potential defendant(s) by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, at the defendant(s’) regular place of 
business. The notice shall state the name of the potential 
defendant(s), the potential plaintiff and give a brief description 
of the issue being investigated by plaintiff’s counsel. The 90 
days shall run from the last day of the applicable statute of 
limitations contained in this section. The notice shall not be 
filed with the court. If suit is filed after the applicable statute of 
limitations in this section, but before the 90 day period in this 
section expires, a copy of the notice shall be attached to the 
complaint to prove compliance with the statute of limitations.4 
 
                                                 
1 Included with Exhibit 1 of the complaint were three additional letters, also dated April 
22, 2005.  These letters indicated that they are “Corrected Versions” of the original 
letters.  The correction is described as a change in the date of the referenced cardiac 
catheterization to April 25, 2003.   
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 6856. 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 6856(3).  
4 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
5
The Superior Court dismissed Leatherbury’s complaint, as time barred, 
because he did not send his Notices of Intent to investigate in strict 
accordance with the statute. 
Issue on Appeal 
 
The question that must be answered in this appeal is whether section 
6856(3) permits compliance by sending a Notice of Intent to investigate via 
a means other than “certified mail, return receipt requested.”  Leatherbury 
contends that section 6856(3) is a remedial statute and, therefore, should be 
construed liberally. Accordingly, Leatherbury argues, his failure to comply 
with the statute by sending a Notice of Intent to investigate by Federal 
Express instead of by registered mail should have tolled the statute of 
limitations.  Therefore, his complaint should not have been dismissed as 
untimely.  The defendants-appellees argue that the statute is not subject to 
judicial interpretation because it is unambiguous.          
 
This Court reviews a final judgment granting a motion to dismiss de 
novo.5  This Court also reviews statutory construction rulings de novo to 
                                                 
5 Candlewood Timber Group, LLC v. Pan Am. Energy, LLC, 859 A.2d 989, 997 (Del. 
2004).   
 
6
determine whether the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in formulating 
or applying legal precepts.6 
Statutory Construction Generally 
 
 
It is well-settled that unambiguous statutes are not subject to judicial 
interpretation.7 “If the statute as a whole is unambiguous and there is no 
reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the words used, the court’s role is 
limited to an application of the literal meaning of those words.”8  
Accordingly, the first step in any statutory construction requires us to 
examine the text of the statute to determine if it is ambiguous.9  Under 
Delaware law, a statute is ambiguous if:  first, it is reasonably susceptible to 
different conclusions or interpretations; or second, a literal interpretation of 
the words of the statute would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result that 
could not have been intended by the legislature.10 
Certified Mail – One Meaning 
 
 
Title 18, section 6856(3) of the Delaware Code requires the use of 
“certified mail, return receipt requested.”  The General Assembly has 
                                                 
6 Christiana Hosp. v. Fattori, 714 A.2d 754, 756 (Del. 1998) (citing Grand Ventures, Inc. 
v. Whaley, 632 A.2d 63, 66 (Del. 1993)). 
7 Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 238 (Del. 1982).   
8 In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1096-97 (Del. 1993) (citing Coastal Barge 
Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., 492 A.2d 1242, 1244 (Del. 1985)); accord 
Pavulak v. State, 880 A.2d 1044, 1046 (Del. 2005).   
9 Newtowne Village Serv. Corp. v. Newtowne Road Dev. Co., 772 A.2d 172, 175 (Del. 
2001). 
10 Grand Ventures, Inc. v. Whaley, 632 A.2d at 68. 
 
7
decreed that words and phrases in statutes “shall” be read in context, and be 
construed “according to the common and approved usage of the English 
language.”11  We have determined that the term “certified mail” has a 
common usage with only one meaning that does not include delivery by 
Federal Express.   
 
The term “certified mail,” as defined by the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, means:  “First class mail for which proof of delivery is secured 
but no indemnity value is claimed.”12  The term “mail” refers to “’letters, 
packages, etc., sent or delivered by the postal service.’”13  The term “postal 
service,” in turn, refers to the “post office,” which is defined as “‘an office 
or station of a governmental postal system at which mail is received and 
sorted, from which it is dispatched and distributed.’”14   
                                                 
11 Del. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 303.  
12 See http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/certified%20mail; Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. Twp. of 
Flint, 656 N.W.2d 215, 221 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Random House Webster’s 
College Dictionary (1997), and defining the term “certified mail” as “uninsured first-
class mail requiring proof of delivery”); 39 C.F.R. Pt. 3001, Subpt. C, App. A (defining 
the term “certified mail service” as a service provided by the Postal Service and stating 
that “[c]ertified mail must be deposited in a manner specified by the postal service”).   
13 W.A. Foote Mem’l Hosp. v. City of Jackson, 686 N.W.2d 9, 13-14 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2004) quoting Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997).  See Northland v. 
Pioneer Coll. v. Zarco, 875 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (indicating that 
although there are many private companies available to deliver documents for a fee, “the 
only entity authorized to deliver mail is the United States Postal Service”). 
14 W.A. Foote Mem’l Hosp. v. City of Jackson, 686 N.W.2d at 14 (quoting Random House 
Webster’s College Dictionary (1997)). 
 
8
 
We hold, in this case, that the applicable statutory provision is not 
reasonably susceptible to different conclusions or interpretations.15  The 
ability to toll the two-year statute of limitations is limited and that limited 
method for tolling is clearly set forth in section 6856(3).  A plaintiff may toll 
the running of the two-year statute of limitations for ninety days by sending 
a Notice of Intent to investigate only by certified mail, return receipt 
requested.  We further hold that the term “certified mail” does not include 
delivery through private carriers, such as delivery by Federal Express.16 
Legislature Intended Result 
 
If a statute is not reasonably susceptible to different conclusions or 
interpretations, courts must apply the words as written, unless the result of 
such a literal application could not have been intended by the legislature.17  
This Court has recognized that the main reason for the passage of the 
                                                 
15 Rubick v. Sec. Instrument Corp., 766 A.2d 15, 18 (Del. 2000). 
16 Although no Delaware court has previously addressed the significance of whether 
service by Federal Express, satisfies the mandate of section 6856(3), several Delaware 
decisions have strictly construed statutes where a specific method of mailing is required.  
See e.g., First Union Nat’l Bank v. Harman, 1996 WL 769343 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 
1996) (noting the distinction between registered and certified mail, the court invalidated 
service made by means other than as prescribed by statute); Greenly v. Davis, 486 A.2d 
669, 671 (Del. 1984) (sending notice by means other than that which was required by 
statute did not constitute sufficient compliance with the long-arm statute); Purnell v. 
Dodman, 297 A.2d 391, 395 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972) (stating that the Court had no 
authority to vary the terms of the clearly worded statute to accept non-complying means 
of service); Allen v. Reddish, 2006 WL 1688121, *2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 20, 2006) 
(enforcing clearly worded statutory requirement for method of mailing to effectuate 
service). 
17 Rubick v. Sec. Instrument Corp., 766 A.2d 15, 18 (Del. 2000). 
 
9
Delaware Medical Malpractice Act was the concern over the law extant at 
the time of its passage and the rising costs of malpractice liability 
insurance.18  As this Court noted in Christiana Hospital v. Fattori: 
Prior to the enactment of the Medical Malpractice Act of 1976 
(“the Act”), medical malpractice actions were governed by 
Chapter 81 of Title 10, pertaining to personal actions.  The 
Delaware General Assembly adopted the Act in response to 
increasing costs of insurance coverage for health care providers 
and out of concern for the potentially open-ended period of 
limitations established in this Court’s decision in Layton v. 
Allen, Del. Supr. 246 A.2d 794 (1968) (citations omitted).  
Included in the Act was Section 6856 of Title 18, which 
reimposes a definite two-year statute of limitations upon 
medical malpractice actions with only two limited exceptions. . . 
.19  
 
The preamble of the Medical Malpractice Act of 1976 is also instructive, and 
provides: 
WHEREAS, the General Assembly determined it is necessary 
to make certain modifications to its current legal system as it 
relates to health care malpractice claims if the citizens of 
Delaware are to continue to receive a high quality of health care 
while still assuring that any person who has sustained bodily 
injury or death as a result of a tort or breach of conduct on the 
part of the health care provider resulting from professional 
services rendered, or which should have been rendered, can 
obtain a prompt determination of adjudication of that claim and 
receive fair and reasonable compensation from financially 
responsible health care providers who are able to insure their 
liability. . . .20 
 
                                                 
18 Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d 653, 658 (Del. 1987).   
19 Christiana Hosp. v. Fattori, 714 A.2d at 756 (emphasis added).   
20 60 Del. Laws 373 (emphasis added). 
 
10
 
In addition, the report to the Governor by the Delaware Medical 
Malpractice Commission, which drafted the 1976 statute, states that:  “[t]he 
overall effect will be to eliminate the uncertainty created by the present 
open-ended period of limitations . . . .”21   
 
As this Court noted in Fattori, “the sweeping nature of the 1976 
legislation conveys an intention of a complete break with the past legal 
treatment of medical malpractice claims.”22  As part of an effort in tort 
reform, the General Assembly clearly intended to ameliorate the rising cost 
of medical malpractice insurance by limiting law suits to those litigants who 
properly avail themselves of the judicial system by strict compliance with 
the Act.   
 
Subpart (3) of section 6856 was added to the Delaware Medical 
Malpractice Act in July 2003.  The synopsis accompanying the amendment 
is also instructive and reads in pertinent part: 
Additionally a process to allow up to ninety (90) days to 
investigate a potential negligence claim is added and would 
extend 
the 
medical malpractice statute of limitations 
accordingly.  It is expected that this grace period will give 
plaintiffs an opportunity to determine whether a potential claim 
has merit and will result in some lawsuits that might otherwise 
be filed not being filed.23  
                                                 
21 See Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d at 659 (citing Report of the Delaware Medical 
Malpractice Commission, pp. 3-4, February 26, 1976).   
22 Christiana Hosp.v. Fattori, 714 A.2d at 757. 
23 H.B. No. 310, 142nd Gen. Assem. (Del. 2003) (Synopsis) (emphasis added).   
 
11
 
We conclude that the various historical recitations of the purposes for 
enacting the Delaware Medical Malpractice Act, including the 2003 addition 
of subpart (3) to section 6856, clearly reflect the General Assembly’s intent 
to limit the number of medical malpractice actions.   
Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius 
 
Leatherbury admits that he failed to comply with the statutory 
requirement that he send a Notice of Intent to investigate to each potential 
defendant by “certified mail, return receipt requested.”  Leatherbury 
contends, nevertheless,  that section 6856(3) should be broadly interpreted to 
include sending a “Notice of Intent to investigate” by any means that 
provides each potential defendant with actual notice.  Leatherbury cites 
several cases in other jurisdictions which hold that actual notice effectuated 
by non-statutory means was satisfactory.24 
                                                 
24 See Wind Dance Farm, Inc. v. Hughes Supply Inc., 792 N.E.2d 79, 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2003)(“substantial compliance with a statutory notice requirement is sufficient when 
notice is timely received”); Cinder Prod. Corp. v. Shena Constr. Co., 492 N.E.2d 744, 
746 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986)(“Statutory prescription of registered mail or certified mail 
notice is to facilitate proof of delivery of notice.  If actual timely notice is proved . . . 
failure to comply with a registered or certified mail requirement is not a fatal deviation 
from statutory procedures.”); Norquip Rental Corp. v. Sky Steel Erectors, Inc., 854 P.2d 
1185, 1192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)(Arizona has held that failure to use the prescribed 
delivery method is “not fatal so long as the letter actually reached the addressee”).  
Clymer v. Employment Sec. Dept., 917 P.2d 1091 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)(determining 
that Federal Express satisfies the delivery method when the statute requires delivery by 
“mail”).   
 
12
 
Leatherbury is not advocating for a construction of the statute.  
Instead, he is arguing for a judicial enlargement of the statute, such that 
methods of notice which were omitted by the General Assembly, 
presumably through inadvertence, may be included within the scope of its 
terms.25  As the United States Supreme Court has noted, for a court to supply 
alleged statutory omissions by the legislature transcends the judicial function 
in a constitutional system that provides for a separation of powers.26   
 
The maxim “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius” is particularly 
applicable in this case.27  “As the maxim is applied to statutory 
interpretation, where a form of conduct, the manner of its performance and 
operation, and the persons and things to which it refers are affirmatively or 
negatively designated, there is an inference that all omissions were intended 
by the legislature.”28  A limited review of the Delaware Code reflects that, if 
the General Assembly had intended to permit Notice of Intent to investigate 
in section 6856(3) by using alternative means of actual notice, it would have 
done so.29   
                                                 
25 W. Virginia Univ. Hosp. v. Carey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991). 
26 Id. 
27 See Walt v. State, 727 A.2d 836 (Del. 2001) and Hickman v. Workman, 450 A.2d 388, 
391 (1982). 
28 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 4915 (3d Ed.) 
(emphasis added).   
29 See Lewis v. Pawnee Bill’s Wild West Co., 66 A. 471,474 (Del. 1907) (discussing a 
statute of limitations and stating that “[w]here the Legislature has made no exception to 
 
13
 
In 2001, in Title 26, section 203C(e)(1), the General Assembly 
permitted notice to landowners to be sent “by certified mail or its 
equivalent.”30  In 2002, in Title 18, section 1716(d), the General Assembly 
permitted notification of termination to insurance producers to be mailed “by 
certified mail, return receipt requested . . . or by overnight delivery using a 
nationally recognized carrier.”31  The language of those sections is 
consistent with our conclusion in this opinion that the General Assembly’s 
use of the term “certified mail” refers to the United States Postal Service, 
and that when the General Assembly wants to permit notice through the use 
of equivalent services provided by private, nationally recognized carriers, 
the General Assembly has explicitly provided for that type of delivery.   
 
It is well established that “a court may not engraft upon a statute 
language which has clearly been excluded therefrom.”32  Where, as here, 
when provisions are expressly included in one statute but omitted from 
another, we must conclude that the General Assembly intended to make 
those omissions.33  Therefore, in 2003, by requiring notice only through 
certified mail and by not including a reference in section 6856(3) to either 
                                                                                                                                                 
the positive terms of a statute, the presumption is that it intended to make none, and it is 
not in the province of the court to do so”). 
30 Del. Code Ann. tit. 26, § 203C (emphasis added). 
31 Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 1716(d) (emphasis added). 
32 In Re Adoption of  Swanson, 623 A.2d at 1097 (Del. 1993). 
33 Id.   
 
14
equivalent service or service by a nationally recognized private carrier, the 
General Assembly clearly intended that notice by those means would not 
comport with the statute.34 
Literal Compliance Required 
 
Section 6856(3) imposes an affirmative duty on a plaintiff seeking to 
avoid the impact of the two-year statute of limitations to establish 
compliance with section 6856(3) in the complaint.  The statute directs 
plaintiffs to attach a copy of the Notice of Intent required by section 
6856(3), that was sent by “certified mail, return receipt requested.”35  Courts 
have “no authority to vary the terms of a statute of clear meaning or ignore 
mandatory provisions . . . .”36   
 
Delaware courts have consistently held that strict construction is 
particularly important when construing statutes of limitation where “the 
General Assembly has evinced its intent to bar claims filed after the stated 
                                                 
34 1001 Jefferson Plaza P’ship, L.P. v. New Castle County Dep’t of Fin., 695 A.2d 50 
(1997); Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 238 (Del. 1982). 
35 Cf. State v. White, 939 S.W.2d 113 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1996) (stating that where the 
prosecuting files an indictment after the expiration of the statute of limitations the 
indictment must contain factual allegations establishing the tolling of the statute period).   
36 Brandywine Balloons, Inc. v. Custom Computer Serv., Inc., 1988 WL 90527, at *1 
(Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 1988) (citing Purnell v. Dodman, 297 A.2d 391, 396 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 1972)); Watts v. Hanson, 1994 WL 714001, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct.) (stating that 
statutes of limitation are not open to judicial construction if they are unambiguous). 
 
15
time.”37  With respect to Title 18, section 6856, this Court has previously 
held that the plain terms of the statute must be enforced, even if they 
produce a “somewhat unfortunate result.”38  In Ewing, this Court considered 
whether it was appropriate to apply the termination of relationship or the 
continuous treatment doctrines to expand the two-year limitations period set 
forth in section 6856.  After a review of the legislative of section 6856, this 
Court refused to expand the period, reasoning that where the legislature has 
made no exception to the positive terms of a statute, the presumption is that 
it intended to make none, and it is not the province of the court to do so.39  
As this Court further explained:   
We have no alternative but to enforce Section 6856 in 
accordance with its plain terms despite the somewhat 
unfortunate result produced.  As we have previously stated: 
 
[this Court does not] sit as a super legislature to eviscerate 
proper legislative enactments.  If the policy or wisdom of a 
particular law is questioned as unreasonable or unjust, then only 
the elected representatives of the people may amend or repeal 
it.  Judges must take the law as they find it, and their personal 
predilections as to what the law should be have no place in 
efforts to override properly stated legislative will. 
 
                                                 
37 Wilson v. King, 673 A.2d 1228, 1231 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996); see also, Ewing v. Beck, 
520 A.2d 653 (Del. 1987) (“Since at least 1907, this Court has refused to rewrite clear 
statutes of limitations to provide exceptions.”); Riggs v. Riggs, 539 A.2d 163, 164 (Del. 
1988) (citing Mary A.O. v. John J.O., 471 A.2d at 995, n.4) (recognizing that statute of 
limitations establishes jurisdictional prerequisites for initiating or maintaining a suit). 
38 Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d at 660.  
39 Id.  
 
16
Although construing a statute of limitations does not constitute the creation 
of an exception to the statute in violation of the prohibition against judicial 
legislation,40 creating an exception under the guise of “construction” where a 
statute is clear and unambiguous is improper.41   
 
In this case, the certified mail requirement is not reasonably 
susceptible to different conclusions or interpretations.  A literal 
interpretation of the term “certified mail” does not lead to an absurd or 
unreasonable result.  The General Assembly provided for Notice of Intent to 
investigate to be sent only by certified mail when section 6856(3) was 
enacted in 2003, notwithstanding its use of broader service provisions in 
prior statutory enactments in 2001 and 2002.  We, therefore, hold that strict 
compliance with the unambiguous certified mail provision in section 
6856(3) was required.   
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
                                                 
40 Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d at 662. 
41 Id. at 661 (stating that the Court will not engage in “judicial legislation” where the 
statute at issue s clear and unambiguous).