Case Title: JUDITH D. KIMBLE, f/k/a JUDITH D. ELLIS v. JAMES D. ELLIS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-5

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
JUDITH D. KIMBLE, f/k/a JUDITH D. ELLIS v. JAMES D. ELLIS2004 WY 161101 P.3d 950Case Number: 04-5Decided: 12/10/2004NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                
   

 
 
JUDITH 
D. KIMBLE, f/k/a

JUDITH 
D. ELLIS,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff) 
,

 
 
v.

 
 
JAMES D. 
ELLIS,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant) 

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Richard 
H. Peek, Casper, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

D. 
Stephen Melchoir, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 
 
 
 
            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Judith D. Kimble 
(Mother) filed a petition to recover unpaid child support, medical expenses, and 
other monies due her pursuant to a decree of divorce.  The district court denied the petition, 
finding that Mother had entered into an oral agreement with James D. Ellis 
(Father), wherein she agreed to relinquish any right to pursue recovery of 
monies she had expended prior to the emancipation of the parties' children in 
exchange for a lump sum settlement.  
The district court concluded that the agreement did not violate the 
stricture that a custodial parent has no authority to waive child support as set 
forth in cases like Whitt v. State ex 
rel. Wright, 2001 WY 128, 36 P.3d 617 (Wyo. 2001) because Mother was 
compromising a claim that was personal to her and there were no adverse affects 
on the children, as they were emancipated.  
We conclude that the oral agreement is void because it violated our 
bright-line rule prohibiting a custodial parent from waiving unpaid child 
support.  We reverse and 
remand.

 
 
ISSUES

[¶2]      Mother presents a 
single issue for our review:

Did the 
trial court commit reversible error when it found that the parties reached an 
enforceable agreement in 1998 waiving the sums owed by [Father] for child 
support and health costs for the parties' minor children, together with 
[Mother's] other claims, since the verbal agreement of the parties, which was 
entered into in 1998, was void and unenforceable as against public policy and 
[Mother] did not have the authority to enter into such an 
agreement?

 
 
The 
Father expresses the issue as:

Did the 
trial court commit reversible error when it denied [Mother's] Verified Petition to Revive Judgment 
after learning that the parties had entered into an oral settlement agreement 
whereby [Mother] agreed she would not pursue reimbursement from [Father] of 
monies expended by [Mother] during the parties' children's minor 
years?

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      The parties were 
divorced in 1988.  Father did not 
make an appearance, and the divorce decree was entered by default.  The parties had two daughters, one born 
on September 6, 1978, and the other on July 6, 1980.  Pursuant to the divorce decree, Mother 
was awarded custody of the children, subject to reasonable visitation, and 
Father was required to pay child support until the children had reached the age 
of nineteen or were otherwise emancipated, half of the children's health care 
costs, and $2,500.00 as his portion of the marital indebtedness.  At the time of the divorce, Father was 
disabled and so initially was required to pay child support at the rate of 
$100.00 per month per child with the amount of his obligation becoming 15% of 
his gross monthly income once he was released to return to full-time 
work.

 
 
[¶4]      Father left 
Wyoming 
sometime around the divorce and had no contact with his children or Mother for 
five years.  Father made no child 
support payments or contributions to the children's health care during this 
period.  In the spring of 1993, 
Mother learned of Father's whereabouts in Colorado and contacted him.  Father re-established a relationship 
with his children and began to make sporadic child support payments.  In 1998, Father offered to pay Mother 
$6,000.00, along with the children's college and wedding expenses, if she would 
forego all claims against him for past child support, health care costs, and the 
amount of marital indebtedness he had been required to pay.  Later, Father requested that the amount 
he was to pay be reduced to $4,500.00 because he could not afford to pay more. 
Mother agreed and accepted the offer, which was not put into writing nor 
submitted to a court for approval.

 
 
[¶5]      The parties' two 
children were emancipated in 1996 and 1999 respectively.  Mother had come to believe that Father 
had reneged on his part of their settlement, so on December 20, 2001, she filed 
a Verified Petition to Revive Judgment seeking to recover the child support, 
health care costs, and marital indebtedness amounts that Father had failed to 
pay under the divorce decree.  On 
January 8, and 12, 2002, after the petition had been filed, both of the children 
executed assignments transferring any interest they may have had in the unpaid 
child support to Mother.

 
 
[¶6]      A hearing was 
held on Mother's petition on January 28, 2003, and continuing on June 13, 
2003.  The court issued a decision 
letter on August 14, 2003, denying the petition.  The court concluded that the parties' 
agreement did not contravene the public policy considerations underlying 
Whitt, ¶ 19, which held that a custodial parent cannot legally waive 
back child support because the obligation is for the exclusive benefit of the 
children.  The court relied on the 
fact that the children were emancipated and had assigned their rights to Mother 
so they would not be affected by enforcement of the settlement agreement.  The court concluded that Mother could 
clearly compromise any claim that was solely hers on whatever terms were 
acceptable to her.  The court held 
that the settlement agreement was enforceable and precluded Mother from any 
further action to collect child support.  
Mother has now appealed.

 
 

 
 
[¶7]      When a matter has 
been tried before the district court without a jury, our review of the court's 
findings of fact is under the clearly erroneous standard.  Broek v. County of Washakie, 2003 WY 164, ¶ 5, 82 P.3d 269, ¶ 5 (Wyo. 2003).  
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  Id.; Davis v. Chadwick, 2002 WY 
157, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d 1267, ¶ 8 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 

[¶8]      We have 
consistently stated that child support is for the benefit of the children, and 
that the custodial parent stands in the shoes of a trustee who administers the 
money for the exclusive benefit of the children based upon their needs and 
welfare.  Sue Davidson, P.C. v. 
Naranjo, 904 P.2d 354, 356-57 (Wyo. 1995); 
Bellamy v. Bellamy, 949 P.2d 875, 877 (Wyo. 1997); Hammond v. Hammond, 14 P.3d 199, 202-03 (Wyo. 2000); 
Erhart v. Evans, 2001 WY 79, ¶ 15, 30 P.3d 542, ¶ 15 (Wyo. 
2001).  A child's right to adequate 
support cannot be bargained away by a contract between the parents regardless of 
the validity of the agreement between the parents themselves.  Whitt, ¶ 19; Hurlbut v. 
Scarbrough, 957 P.2d 839, 842 (Wyo. 1998).  This is a bright-line rule from which we 
have not wavered:

 
 
This 
Court has noted that child support orders have a unique and special position in 
the law.  Sue Davidson, P.C. v. 
Naranjo, 904 P.2d 354, 356 (Wyo. 1995).  We have stated that child support 
payments are the children's monies:

 
 
Often 
misunderstood by parents embittered by divorce, "child support" represents a 
legal obligation of the parents to the children.  "[C]hild support is for the benefit of 
the children as [a parent's] obligation to contribute to the upbringing of [the] 
children.  A support payment is the 
children's money administered in trust by [the custodial parent] for their 
benefit."

 
 

Cranston 
v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo. 1994)(quoting Macy v. 
Macy, 714 P.2d 774, 777 (Wyo. 1986)).  Child support is indeed the children's 
money to be used for their exclusive benefit. Sue Davidson P.C., 904 P.2d  
at 357.  As we acknowledged in 
Hurlbut v. Scarbrough, 957 P.2d 839, 842 (Wyo. 1998):  "[B]ecause a child support obligation 
does not belong to the custodial parent, that parent does not have the authority 
to bargain it away."  Equity cannot 
operate to override this basic policy behind the enforcement of a child support 
order.  Following this reasoning, we 
conclude that the right to obtain support is not waived by the custodial 
parent's inability to act, inaction, or acquiescence to the nonpayment of 

child 
support if an action is brought within the statute of limitations.  In addition, it is of no consequence 
that the arrearage will be paid to the mother rather than directly to the grown 
children. "Money paid to the custodial parent for past-due support serves to 
reimburse the custodian for monies actually expended."  Capetillo v. Kivett, 85 Wash. App. 311, 932 P.2d 691, 694 (1997).

 
 

Hammond, 14 P.3d  at 202-03. 

 
 
[¶9]      Mother argues 
that the district court's decision was erroneous because the agreement between 
her and Father was void from its inception under this Court's precedent just 
noted.  Father counters that the 
district court's enforcement of the agreement was proper because Mother only 
bargained away her personal right to pursue any child support arrearage, not his 
obligation to the children or their right to seek those monies.  Father contends that the public policy 
considerations underlying the prohibition against the waiving of child support 
do not apply here because the children are emancipated and no longer require the 
protection of the courts so that they will not be adversely affected by Mother's 
relinquishment of her right to reimbursement.

 
 
[¶10]   The question presented by this case 
is whether or not the custodial parent has the authority to waive his or her 
right to reimbursement for monies spent because of the failure of the other 
parent to maintain his or her child support obligations.  Under the circumstances of this case, we 
conclude that there was no such authority.  
Since a custodial parent may not waive child support through an 
extrajudicial agreement or contract, it then logically follows that the parent 
has no authority to waive his or her procedural remedies.  This is especially true where, at the 
time of the agreement, the children are still beneficiaries under the child 
support provisions of the divorce decree.  
The custodial parent is in the position of trustee to those children with 
respect to child support monies.  
The parent cannot fulfill the duties and obligations of that position, 
having compromised the right to the remedy for unpaid 
support.

 
 
[¶11]   Custodial parents who have been 
forced to provide for their children in the absence of child support can find 
themselves in a vulnerable position in which they are forced to choose between 
their immediate financial needs and their duty as trustee of their children's 
welfare.  An obligor, secure in the 
knowledge that his or her children will be unlikely to ever seek to collect the 
arrearages owed, could exploit the situation through persuasion or coercion, and 
obtain an agreement with the custodial parent that by the use of artful language 
referring only to the right to seek reimbursement, would allow obligor to avoid 
indirectly those obligations that he or she is explicitly prohibited from 
avoiding. 

 
 
[¶12]   Those concerns are highlighted by 
the circumstances of this case.  At 
the time the parties entered into their settlement agreement, one of the 
children was emancipated and no longer the subject of child support.  The other child, however, was entitled 
to child support for another thirteen months.  Mother was faced with a difficult 
financial situation.  Father had not 
paid any child support for approximately five years after the divorce and then 
only sporadically thereafter until 1998, when he offered Mother a lump sum of 
money in exchange for a promise not to pursue any unpaid child support.  The amount offered by Father was only a 
small fraction of the amount owed, but that was obviously appealing to Mother in 
a situation where she was facing financial difficulties and was not receiving 
support payments anyway.  The result 
is that the parties' minor child was deprived of the support to which she was 
legally entitled and for which Father was legally obligated.  Mother, despite her status as trustee, 
was effectively precluded from enforcing her child's rights to Father's support 
under the agreement.  Such a result 
cannot stand under our precedent and the public policy rationale underlying 
it.1

 
 
[¶13]   The thrust of our precedent is that 
parties may not unilaterally or jointly modify or abrogate the terms of a child 
support order.  A court that obtains 
proper jurisdiction over a divorce action retains jurisdiction to modify or 
enforce the support provisions of the decree.  Hurlbut, 957 P.2d  at 841.  Contract law has no place in the 
consideration of child support agreements.  
Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 213-14 (Wyo. 1995).  If the parties reach an agreement that 
would effect a modification of the child support order, then the proper 
procedure is the filing of a petition for modification.

 
 
"Under 
our statute the obligation of support is a continuing one; it is also one which 
is at all times subject to change upon proper request to the court for 
modification or clarification contingent upon a change in circumstances 
of the parties."

 
 

Erhart, 
¶ 15 (emphasis in original) (quoting Redman v. Redman, 521 P.2d 584, 
587 (Wyo. 
1974)).  The parties failed to 
follow the proper procedure and, therefore, the agreement was never valid and 
was not enforceable.

 
 
[¶14]   We hold that any agreement that 
purports to waive unpaid child support or the custodial parent's right to 
enforce the support order without proper approval from a court of competent 
jurisdiction is void ab initio.  
We reverse the district court's judgment and remand for a determination 
of the amount of arrearages.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1The situation confronted here must be 
distinguished from those where the custodial parent is a recipient of government 
aid pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-106(a) (LexisNexis 2003).  In those cases, the custodial parent's 
right to child support, accrued, present or future, are assigned by operation of 
law to the Department of Family Services.  
See Whitt, ¶ 19.