Case Title: Workman v. Agency of Transportation

Citation: 163 Vt 606, 657 A.2d 174

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
WORKMAN_V_AGENCY_OF_TRANSPORTATION.93-357; 163 Vt 606; 657 A.2d 174

[Filed 28-Dec-1994]


                           ENTRY ORDER

                 SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 93-357
                       NOVEMBER TERM, 1994


Richard A. Workman, Sr.      }         APPEALED FROM:
                             }
                             }
     v.                      }         Chittenden Superior Court
                             }
Vermont Agency               }
Transportation               }         DOCKET NO. S532-91CnC


        In the above entitled cause the Clerk will enter:

  Plaintiff Richard Workman appeals from the Chittenden Superior Court's
damage award in a condemnation action by defendant, the Vermont Agency of
Transportation, involving plaintiff's land in the Town of Essex.  Plaintiff
argues that the court failed to include business losses in its award
calculation, that plaintiff's right to receive just compensation under the
Takings Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
includes expected profit, that the court improperly valued construction
permits, and that the court improperly offset the condemnation award with
$33,000 defendant paid to plaintiff pursuant to an agreement for plaintiff's
cessation of construction.  On cross-appeal, defendant argues that the trial
court improperly included amounts for construction permits and for site
improvements.  We affirm. 

  In 1986, plaintiff began the planning and permit application process for
the construction of two industrial warehouses on a 4.68 acre parcel of land. 
By 1990, plaintiff had improved the drainage grading and obtained final
permit approvals for the project, but had not started construction.  Later
that year, in anticipation of the Chittenden Circumferential Highway project,
defendant paid plaintiff $33,000 as part of a written agreement whereby
plaintiff relinquished all developmental rights to the property.  In 1991,
defendant condemned the entire parcel, and this litigation ensued regarding
the final damage award. 

  The trial court concluded that the value of plaintiff's property was the
sum of three factors:  the raw value of the land, the value of site
improvements, and the value of the construction permits.  Plaintiff first
contends that the trial court improperly excluded business losses from this
calculation.  Business losses are only compensable for a "fixed and
established business," and where the loss is not already accounted for in the
damages award.  Raymond v. Chittenden County Highway, 158 Vt. 100, 105, 604 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1992).  Plaintiff does not meet these requirements.  Merely
obtaining permits and grading the land does not create an established
business, and in any event, plaintiff has already been compensated for these
items in the trial court's award.  Further compensation would be either
duplicative or for business activity that never existed.  Id. at 105, 604 A.2d  at 1285. 

  Plaintiff urges us to reexamine this analysis based on the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).  Plaintiff argues that Lucas requires that just
compensation under the Takings Clause includes expected profit.  Lucas,
however, determined only that a state must compensate a property owner when a
state-promulgated regulation destroys all economically beneficial use of that
property.  Id. at 2901.  Lucas is not applicable in this context where
plaintiff contests not whether compensation is required, but how much
compensation is required. 

  Plaintiff's next argument asserts that the trial court's valuation of the
construction permits is not supported by the evidence.  We have reviewed the
record and conclude that the trial court's valuation of the permits is fully
supported, and therefore must be sustained on appeal. See Highgate Assocs. v.
Merryfield, 157 Vt. 313, 315, 597 A.2d 1280, 1281 (1991) (findings 

 

must stand
if supported by credible evidence).  The trial court found that the permits
should be valued at 20% of the undeveloped value of the land, a determination
consistent with defendant's expert's testimony. 

  Plaintiff's final argument concerns whether the trial court erroneously
offset the condemnation order by $33,000, the amount plaintiff received from
defendant as part of an agreement for plaintiff's developmental rights. 
Plaintiff contends that the agreement was intended to authorize an offset
only against lost profits and not the value of the land or permits. The
written agreement specifically provided that any money received by plaintiff
"shall be deducted" from plaintiff's compensation for the property.  When an
agreement is clear and unambiguous, its plain meaning governs its
interpretation.  Northern Aircraft, Inc. v. Reed, 154 Vt. 36, 44, 572 A.2d 1382, 1388 (1990).  Accordingly, the trial court appropriately reduced
plaintiff's award. 

  On cross-appeal, defendant contends that the trial court's award was
improper because it included the value of site improvements and construction
permits.  Defendant argues that the trial court's valuation of the site
improvements is not supported by the evidence, and that the court's method of
valuing the construction permits erroneously combined evidence offered by
competing experts.  As we stated above, findings of fact must stand unless
they are clearly erroneous.  Highgate Assocs., 157 Vt. at 315, 597 A.2d  at
1281.  Here, the trial court reached its decision as to the value of the site
improvements based on evidence submitted for similar work at other sites;
therefore, its finding is fully supported.  See In re Quechee Lakes Corp, 154
Vt. 543, 554, 580 A.2d 957, 963 (1990) (evidence reasonably adequate to
support conclusion will be upheld).  Similarly, we find no error with the
trial court's decision to combine information presented by the parties'
respective experts in valuing the construction permits.  See Bonanno v.
Bonanno, 148 Vt. 248, 250-51,