Case Title: State v. Arrington

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019AP002065-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2022-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2022 WI 53 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP2065-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Richard Michael Arrington, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 398 Wis. 2d 198, 960 N.W.2d459 
PDC No:2021 WI App 32 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 10, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy A. Hinkfuss   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Sara Lynn Shaeffer, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There 
was an oral argument by Sara Lynn Shaeffer.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Suzanne 
L. Hagopian, assistant state public defender. There was an oral 
argument by Suzanne L. Hagopian.  
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 53 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2019AP2065-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2016CF516) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard Michael Arrington, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review the court of 
appeals'1 decision reversing the circuit court's judgment of 
conviction of Richard Michael Arrington on the charge of first- 
degree intentional homicide with use of a dangerous weapon 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 940.01 (2019-20),2 as well as being a 
                                                 
1 State v. Arrington, 2021 WI App 32, 398 Wis. 2d 198, 960 
N.W.2d 459.  
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
2 
 
felon in possession of a firearm under Wis. Stat. § 941.29.3  On 
appeal, the State asks us to reverse the court of appeals, 
arguing that it did not violate Arrington's Sixth Amendment 
right 
to 
counsel 
when 
a 
jail 
inmate 
secretly 
recorded 
conversations with Arrington.  The State further argues that 
defense counsel's failure to object to the admission of the 
recordings as evidence against Arrington was not deficient 
performance and did not prejudice him, so as to warrant a new 
trial for ineffective assistance of counsel.  
¶2 
We conclude that Arrington's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel was not violated because the jail inmate, Jason Miller, 
was not acting as a State agent when he recorded his 
conversations with Arrington.  Further, a new trial is not 
warranted because Arrington's counsel's performance was not 
deficient and Arrington was not prejudiced by his counsel's 
failure to object to the State's use of the recordings.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
affirm the circuit court's judgment of the convictions.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Arrington's convictions stem from a shooting that 
occurred on April 2, 2016, and resulted in the death of Ricardo 
Gomez.  The shooting itself was described as the culmination of 
                                                                                                                                                             
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted. 
3 The Honorable Timothy A. Hinkfuss of Brown County Circuit 
Court presided. 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
3 
 
a weeks-long feud between Arrington and a third individual, 
Rafeal Santana-Hermida, also known as "Shorty." 
¶4 
The feud began a few weeks before the shooting when a 
"drug deal [went] bad" and Arrington robbed Shorty at gunpoint, 
stealing Shorty's machine gun.  Shorty responded by attacking 
Arrington through a car window with a knife, cutting his lip.  
At trial, witnesses testified that, following Shorty's attack, 
Arrington threatened to "[expletive] Shorty up" and stated that 
he was going to "handle his business."  Another witness 
testified that Arrington was "highly upset" and had been seen 
carrying a machine gun.   
¶5 
On the day of the shooting, Shorty and his girlfriend 
were at Craig Taylor's house.  Taylor testified that he had seen 
Arrington in a car near his house and was worried that he wanted 
to kill Shorty.  Arrington was circling the block in his car and 
looked "like he was hunting."  Taylor further testified that 
Arrington "had that look in his eye like he wanted to kill 
something."  A separate witness, Lawrence Hawkins, came and left 
Taylor's house prior to the shooting.  Hawkins testified that 
when he left Taylor's house, he saw Arrington parked across the 
street.  Arrington asked him if Shorty was inside and Hawkins 
responded that he did not know.  When he walked away, Hawkins 
called Taylor and told him that Arrington was outside asking 
about Shorty.   
¶6 
In the moments immediately preceding the shooting, 
Ricardo Gomez arrived at Taylor's house.  Gomez walked up to the 
front door and told Shorty, who was standing in the open 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
4 
 
doorway, that someone was "outside looking for him."  According 
to Taylor, Arrington began shooting into the doorway as soon as 
he saw Shorty.  Taylor testified that he "was right there when 
the bullets hit [Gomez]" and that he saw Gomez fall onto Shorty 
after being hit.  Taylor further asserted that he did not see 
Shorty with a gun and Shorty "never reached for [anything]."  
¶7 
Two other witnesses, AVT4 and David Landrum, were in 
the car with Arrington on the day of the shooting.  AVT, who was 
seated in the front passenger seat of the car, stated that 
Arrington rolled down her window and exchanged words with 
Shorty.  Then Arrington started "shooting a gun right by [her] 
face."  AVT testified that a "shell hit me in my head, and 
[Arrington] told me to shut up."  She also never saw Shorty 
shooting at the car and explained that if Shorty had returned 
fire, she likely would have been hit in the process because she 
"was sitting right there."  She asserted that "[t]here was no 
gun [that] came out [of] that house . . . ."  This assertion was 
confirmed by a thorough police search of Taylor's house, the 
people in Taylor's house, and the neighborhood that revealed no 
firearms.  
¶8 
Following the shooting, AVT said she told Arrington 
that she wanted to get out of the car, and he responded, "you on 
a murder case with me now, you ain't going nowhere."  She 
testified that Arrington threatened to kill her and her family 
                                                 
4 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.81(8), we use a 
pseudonym when referring to the juvenile witnesses. 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
5 
 
if she spoke to the police.  He also told her to burn her 
clothes and clean the car that they used the day of the 
shooting.  AVT stated that Arrington later approached her in a 
different car and ordered her to get in.  He had a gun in his 
lap and was wearing a mask and latex gloves.  He threw her phone 
out the window of the car and drove her around for the night 
while threatening to "ice her" if she left.  She woke up alone 
in the car the next morning and ran.   
¶9 
Eugene and Erica Herrod testified that the night of 
the shooting, Arrington came to their home and used bleach to 
clean his hands, face, and hair.  He told them that he had 
"popped" someone and asked Eugene for a ride to Milwaukee.  
Arrington told Eugene that he had "fanned Shorty down."  
However, upon later learning that he had killed the wrong 
person, Arrington told Eugene that he would come back and "get 
that [expletive] Shorty and finish my job."  Arrington testified 
that after the shooting, he changed his hair and appearance to 
try to hide from law enforcement.   
¶10 After Arrington turned himself in, he was charged and 
brought to Brown County jail.  While he was in custody, and had 
already made his initial appearance with counsel, Arrington 
began having conversations with another inmate, Jason Miller.  
Miller used a recording device given to him by law enforcement, 
to 
record 
his 
conversations 
with 
Arrington. 
 
In 
these 
recordings, Arrington made incriminatory statements regarding 
his on-going feud with Shorty and his role in the shooting of 
Gomez.   
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
6 
 
¶11 Finally, almost a year after the shooting, Arrington 
requested an interview with Detective Brad Linzmeier.  In this 
interview, Arrington suggested, for the first time, that his 
shooting was in self-defense.  Regarding his earlier feud with 
Shorty, Arrington claimed to have nothing to do with the machine 
gun robbery and explained that he was seeking to give Shorty 
money as repayment for the robbery when Shorty stabbed him 
through the car window.  On the day of the shooting, Arrington 
claimed that the only reason he began to shoot was because he 
saw Shorty reaching into his waistband.  Even then, Arrington 
claimed to have fired only at the porch.  Arrington said that 
Shorty, after ducking out of the way of Arrington's bullets, 
fired a single shot in response to Arrington and hit Gomez.  
Linzmeier testified that this was the first time that he heard 
about Shorty having a handgun and shooting Gomez.   
¶12 The case proceeded to a jury trial, which lasted six 
days and saw a total of forty-two witnesses testify.  At trial, 
the State introduced the recorded evidence that it received from 
Miller in addition to the statements of witnesses relayed above.  
Defense counsel acknowledged to the court that he had the 
recordings "for quite some time" and had reviewed them "long 
before trial."  He told the court he had "no objection" to their 
admission.  He did, however, object to providing a transcript to 
the jury, which objection was sustained.   
¶13 Miller testified that, before he and Arrington began 
speaking, he had been helping law enforcement with an unrelated 
homicide investigation.  Specifically Miller had been gathering 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
7 
 
information on a defendant named Antwon Powell.  Miller 
explained 
that 
Arrington 
was 
the 
one 
who 
began 
their 
conversations by asking him to read the criminal complaint 
against him and asking whether "there was enough there."   
¶14 Miller 
testified 
that, 
following 
their 
initial 
conversation about the complaint, he and Arrington spoke about 
the events of the shooting at Taylor's house.  Arrington told 
Miller that, upon seeing Shorty, all he could think about was 
Shorty stabbing him, and then he "just got to shooting."  
However, Arrington confessed that "when he got to shooting, 
Shorty jumped back, and when he jumped back, it hit [Gomez]."  
Miller 
also 
testified 
that, 
over 
the 
course 
of 
their 
conversations, Arrington never mentioned that he saw Shorty with 
a gun in his hand or that he saw Shorty shoot Gomez. 
¶15 Later, Miller asked Arrington if Shorty was "acting 
like a beast?" And Arrington replied, "Yeah, that's what added 
fuel to the fire," and that Shorty was "acting like a gorilla."  
Miller told Arrington that his aim "ain't shit" because when he 
shot 
at 
Shorty, 
Arrington 
"hit 
the 
other 
[expletive]."  
Arrington replied that he "just dumped the crib down" because he 
did not know if Shorty would come back and retaliate.   
¶16 Later in the trial, Arrington took the stand and 
denied feuding with Shorty.  Arrington testified that he forgave 
Shorty following the stabbing and, contrary to other witness 
testimony, was not upset at Shorty.  Similarly, Arrington 
explained that he was at Taylor's house the day of the shooting 
only because Landrum wanted to get some marijuana.  When Shorty 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
8 
 
saw 
Arrington, 
Shorty 
started 
"going 
crazy." 
 
Arrington 
testified that he thought he saw Shorty reach for a gun, but 
that he actually didn't see a gun.  In response to this, 
Arrington fired three shots at the house.  As he drove away, 
Arrington explained that, what he saw was "Shorty come around 
the door with the gun in his hand at the same time that 
[Gomez] . . . was coming into the house, and what it looked like 
to me was that Gomez had been shot by [Shorty]." 
¶17 Following 
the 
shooting, 
Arrington 
denied 
doing 
anything that would incriminate him in Gomez's shooting, and he 
dismissed significant testimony to the contrary.  For example, 
Arrington denied speaking with Erica Herrod and asking for 
bleach after "popping" someone.  He denied having any contact 
with AVT following the shooting, let alone kidnapping her.  He 
described AVT's testimony as "all lies."  When asked why Eugene 
Herrod testified that Arrington told him that he "got the wrong 
guy but I'm going to come back and finish the job and get 
Shorty," Arrington replied, "I don't know why Eugene told you 
guys that."  Arrington also agreed when the State asked him 
whether it "sound[ed] like a lot of people are making stuff up."   
¶18 The jury convicted Arrington on both the first-degree 
intentional homicide and being a felon in possession of a 
firearm.  After obtaining new counsel, Arrington moved for 
postconviction relief.  He asserted that the State violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it used Miller to obtain 
recorded conversations after he had been charged and was 
represented by counsel.  Arrington argued that the introduction 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
9 
 
of those statements was plain error, entitling him to a new 
trial.  Alternatively, he sought a new trial, asserting that his 
attorney's failure to object to Miller's recordings at trial 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.   
¶19 The circuit court held a Machner5 hearing during which 
Arrington, his trial counsel, Michael Hughes, and Detectives 
Michael J. Wanta and Linzmeier testified.  Hughes re-affirmed 
that he had the recordings for "quite some time" before trial 
and did not consider moving to suppress the recordings.  The 
circuit court also heard testimony from the detectives regarding 
the origin of Miller's involvement in Arrington's case.  
¶20 Wanta testified that Miller was assisting him on the 
Powell homicide case.  Wanta testified that, in an April 6, 2016 
meeting, 
Miller 
had 
expressed 
an 
interest 
in 
"recording 
conversations that he was having with the parties that we 
identified [in regards to the Powell case].  Wanta told Miller 
that the detectives would help "facilitate that.  And the 
information he [gathered] would . . . be used as part of his 
consideration."  This conversation occurred before Arrington had 
turned himself in on April 8, 2016.  Accordingly, it had zero 
relationship to any investigation into Arrington because no 
investigation into Arrington existed at that time.  Indeed, 
Wanta explained that he was not "aware of any possibility of 
                                                 
5 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1979). 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
10 
 
Mr. Miller's speaking to Mr. Arrington during [the] April 6 
meeting[.]" 
¶21 Following Arrington's custody, Miller approached Wanta 
about recording Arrington.  Wanta became aware of Miller's 
request to speak with law enforcement about Arrington when 
Miller's attorney contacted the District Attorney's office.  The 
District Attorney's office passed the request onto Wanta, who 
met with Miller at the jail.  Miller told Wanta that Arrington 
"was talking with him and he believed that Mr. Arrington would 
tell him things about the case and he asked if he should record 
it.  I said he could record conversations with Mr. Arrington."  
The detectives also testified that they told Miller, "if you 
want to record the conversation you can."  Miller was never 
instructed that he should record Arrington.   
¶22 Wanta was aware that Miller was seeking consideration 
for gathering information on Arrington, but testified that he 
made it "very clear from the start" that he would "not get 
involved in specifics regarding consideration" because that 
"comes from the District Attorney."  There was never an offer of 
consideration from law enforcement to Miller for information 
gathered on Arrington.6  Wanta also explained that he did not 
                                                 
6 Any indication or inference that the April 6 discussion of 
consideration for information gathered in the Powell case was 
tantamount to an offer of consideration for information gathered 
on Arrington's case is factually incorrect and purposefully 
misleading.  The police did not assure Miller that information 
he gathered on Arrington "would . . . be used as part of his 
consideration."  Linzmeier and Wanta, as instructed by their 
standard practice and training, were straightforward and "very 
clear from the start" that they would not speak to Miller about 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
11 
 
give any direction to Miller regarding the types of information 
he should record or what type of questions he should ask 
Arrington.   
¶23 Wanta testified that law enforcement provided Miller 
with the recording device and that there was no way "to monitor 
it or listen to this particular device.  It is a matter of 
basically flipping a switch on the side of it on and off."  They 
could not listen "in live-time," and only Miller had the ability 
to turn the recorder on and off.  Miller made the recording that 
was played at trial on April 13.  There is no support in the 
record for any agreement between Wanta and Miller that Miller 
acted as the State's agent when he made that recording.    
¶24 The postconviction court concluded that Miller was not 
acting as an agent for the State when he recorded his 
conversations with Arrington.  Therefore, Arrington's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel was not violated.  In the course of 
its decision, the court made numerous findings of fact.  First, 
the court found that the "State did not put Mr. Miller and 
Mr. Arrington together in Fox Pod.  It was a coincidence."  It 
also found that "[t]he police never approached Mr. Miller about 
                                                                                                                                                             
consideration or make promises of consideration to Miller for 
any information Miller provided on Arrington.  No conversation 
regarding consideration for Miller's work on the Arrington case 
occurred.  In the postconviction motion hearing, Wanta was asked 
whether "Mr. Miller ask[ed him] specifically for consideration 
in this case?" Wanta replied, "Not any specific consideration."  
Later Linzmeier was also asked if "[he] ever [spoke] to 
Mr. Miller about any consideration?"  Linzmeier replied, "No, 
not specifics of anything."   
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
12 
 
recording Mr. Arrington."  Rather, it was Miller's attorney that 
spoke to the District Attorney's office "about him voluntarily 
contributing information to the police" and that this was what 
prompted the police to "have a discussion with him" in the 
Arrington investigation. 
¶25 Furthermore, "before making any recordings, Mr. Miller 
voluntarily asked the police if he should record any information 
from Mr. Arrington, and the detective informed him that he could 
record such conversations."  And although the police were aware 
that Miller was seeking consideration for gathering information 
on Arrington from the District Attorney's office, "they made no 
promises to Mr. Miller that the fact that he was giving 
information would lead to a reduced sentence."  
¶26 It was Miller who was "wearing a wire that he could 
turn on and off on his own initiative."  Arrington began talking 
to Miller about his case "without Mr. Miller prompting the 
conversation" and law enforcement "could not listen in on any 
conversation, and had not told what questions Mr. Miller should 
ask Mr. Arrington."  Law enforcement personnel have "no 
affirmative duty to keep Mr. Miller away from Mr. Arrington when 
they knew Mr. Miller was assisting with another case" and it is 
not their responsibility "to protect defendants from their own 
'loose talk.'"  The postconviction court closed by explaining 
that, although each of the facts on its own is likely 
insufficient to disprove agency, "all the points together 
certainly show that Mr. Miller was not an agent." 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
13 
 
¶27 The postconviction court also concluded that there was 
no ineffective assistance of counsel based on its decision about 
the Sixth Amendment.  It further found that the conversation 
between Arrington and Miller was not prejudicial or ineffective 
but "consistent with the defendant's version of events.  The 
statements bolster[ed] defendant's self-defense claim." 
¶28 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court and 
granted Arrington a new trial.  The court concluded that the 
conduct of the detectives in equipping Miller with a recording 
device was prohibited by the United States Supreme Court and 
Wisconsin case law and that the State "violated Arrington's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel when Miller made the recordings 
of conversations with Arrington while acting as an agent of the 
State."  State v. Arrington, 2021 WI App 32, ¶2, 398 Wis. 2d 198, 
960 N.W.2d 459.   
¶29 To support this conclusion, the court of appeals noted 
that the detectives' decision to equip Miller with a recording 
device and expressly authorize him to surreptitiously record his 
conversations 
with 
Arrington 
clearly 
showed 
an 
agency 
relationship.  Id., ¶36.  Further, the detectives' actions 
"violated the Sixth Amendment because they created a situation 
likely to induce Arrington to make incriminating statements 
without his counsel's assistance."  Id. (citing United States v. 
Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980)).  
¶30 After 
concluding 
that 
the 
detectives 
violated 
Arrington's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the court of 
appeals also concluded that Arrington's trial counsel was 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
14 
 
ineffective.  It concluded that trial counsel's "failure to seek 
suppression of the recording, or to object to Miller's testimony 
at trial, for no strategic reason, fell far below an objective 
standard of reasonableness."  Arrington, 398 Wis. 2d 198, ¶44.  
It also concluded that, had the tapes not been admitted into 
evidence, "there would have been sufficient questions regarding 
whether Arrington was acting in self-defense so as to raise a 
reasonable doubt about Arrington's guilt on the homicide 
charge."  Id., ¶48.   
¶31 Accordingly, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed 
and 
remanded the matter for a new trial on the homicide charge 
without the use of the recordings and Miller's testimony about 
his jailhouse conversations with Arrington.7  We granted the 
State's petition for review, and now reverse the court of 
appeals.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review  
¶32 Arrington asks us to review the State's admission of 
Miller's recordings at trial under the plain error doctrine or, 
alternatively, for a determination that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Under the doctrine of plain error, an 
appellate court may review error that was otherwise waived by a 
party's failure to object properly or preserve the error for 
                                                 
7 Arrington conceded that, regardless of the violation of 
his 
Sixth 
Amendment 
rights 
or 
his 
counsel's 
deficient 
performance, reversal of his felon in possession of a firearm 
charge was not warranted.  Arrington, 398 Wis. 2d 198, ¶48.   
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
15 
 
review as a matter of right.  State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶29, 
301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115.  We do not remedy errors under 
the 
plain 
error 
doctrine 
unless 
they 
are 
"obvious 
and 
substantial[,]" and "so fundamental that a new trial or other 
relief must be granted even though the action was not objected 
to at the time."  State v. Bell, 2018 WI 28, ¶8, 380 Wis. 2d 
616, 909 N.W.2d 750 (quoting State v. Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, 
¶21, 310 Wis. 2d 138, 754 N.W.2d 77).   
¶33 The 
"plain 
error" 
that 
Arrington 
asserts 
is 
a 
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which 
"involves the application of constitutional principles to 
historical facts."  State v. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, ¶10, 332 
Wis. 2d 620, 796 N.W.2d 741 (quoting State v. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, 
¶34, 261 Wis. 2d 294, 661 N.W.2d 407).  We have adopted a two-
part standard of review for questions of constitutional fact.  
Forbush, 332 Wis. 2d 620, ¶10.  We uphold the circuit court's 
findings of historical or evidentiary fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶12, 311 Wis. 2d 
358, 752 N.W.2d 748.  We then independently review the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.  
State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, ¶17, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236.  
In addition, we independently review as a question of law 
whether the undisputed facts establish an agency relationship.  
Lang v. Lions Club of Cudahy Wis., Inc., 2020 WI 25, ¶20, 390 
Wis. 2d 627, 939 N.W.2d 582.     
¶34 Furthermore, a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact.  State v. 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
16 
 
Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶19, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695.  We 
will uphold the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous. 
 Id.  Findings of fact include the 
circumstances of the case and counsel's conduct and strategy.  
Id. (citing State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 
665 N.W.2d 305).  Whether counsel's performance satisfies the 
constitutional standard for effective assistance of counsel is a 
question of law, which we independently review.  Carter, 324 
Wis. 2d 640, ¶19.  
B.  Sixth Amendment 
¶35 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees that "the accused shall enjoy . . . the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defense."8  Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution similarly guarantees that "[i]n all criminal 
                                                 
8 In full, the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution reads:   
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
The Supreme Court applied the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel to the states through incorporation by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963).   
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
17 
 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by 
himself and counsel."9  Generally, "the right to counsel under 
the Sixth Amendment [of the United States Constitution] and 
Article I, Section 7 [of the Wisconsin Constitution] 'attaches 
only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings 
have been initiated against [a defendant].'"  Forbush, 332 
Wis. 2d 620, ¶15 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 
180, 187 (1984)); see also State v. Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 
226, 548 N.W.2d 69 (1996) (concluding that the Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution right to counsel does 
not create a right different from the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel).   
1.  Historical facts 
¶36 In concluding that Miller was not acting as a 
government 
agent 
at 
the 
time 
of 
the 
recordings, 
the 
postconviction court made several relevant findings of fact.  
                                                 
9 In 
full, 
Article 
I, 
Section 
7 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, "Rights of accused," reads:  
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein 
the offense shall have been committed; which county or 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law. 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 7. 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
18 
 
Initially, it found that Arrington was not the target of law 
enforcement's 
initial 
investigation 
and 
that 
it 
was 
a 
coincidence that Miller and Arrington ended up being in the same 
facility.  It also found that Arrington was the person who 
prompted the initial conversation between him and Miller.  It 
was after that initial conversation that Miller, through his 
attorney, 
approached 
law 
enforcement 
about 
voluntarily 
contributing information by recording Arrington.  This offer was 
what prompted law enforcement to consider using Miller in 
Arrington's investigation. 
¶37 Furthermore, the court found that Miller was under no 
obligation to record the conversations.  The detectives told 
Miller 
that 
"he 
could 
record 
such 
conversations." 
 
The 
detectives did not tell Miller what questions to ask Arrington 
and the detectives could not listen in on any conversations.  
Miller wore a recording device "that he could turn on and off on 
his own initiative."   
¶38 And although the detectives were aware that Miller was 
seeking consideration for gathering information on Arrington 
from the District Attorney's office, "they made no promises to 
Mr. Miller that the fact that he was giving information would 
lead to a reduced sentence."  The circuit court found that 
"Miller was acting with the hope that the prosecutors in his 
case would give him a more lenient sentence[.]"   
¶39 The postconviction court held a hearing during which 
it heard testimony from the detectives and Arrington regarding 
both parties' dealings and interactions with Miller.  Upon 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
19 
 
review of the record, we conclude that the factual findings of 
the postconviction court are supported by the record and are, 
therefore, not clearly erroneous.   
2.  Constitutional principles 
¶40 Once the right to counsel has attached and been 
asserted, the State must honor it.  Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 
159, 170 (1985).  In a seminal Sixth Amendment case, Massiah v. 
United States, the United States Supreme Court established that 
the Sixth Amendment prohibits the government from deliberately 
eliciting incriminating statements from a defendant, in the 
absence of counsel, after the defendant has been indicted.  
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).   
¶41 In United States v. Henry, the FBI sought information 
on a suspected bank robber, Henry, and reached an agreement with 
Henry's cellmate, Nichols, to be a paid informant.  Henry, 447 
U.S. at 266.  The FBI told Nichols to "be alert to any 
statements" made by Henry, but not to initiate any conversation 
with or question Henry regarding the bank robbery.  Id.  The 
arrangement between Nichols and the FBI was on a "contingent-fee 
basis; Nichols was to be paid only if he produced useful 
information."  Id. at 270.  Nichols was later released from 
prison and was paid for the information he provided.  Id. at 
266.   
¶42 In determining whether Nichols "deliberately elicited" 
incriminating statements, the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that three factors were important.  Id. at 270.  
First, "Nichols was acting under instructions as a paid 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
20 
 
informant for the Government; second, Nichols was ostensibly no 
more than a fellow inmate of Henry; and third, Henry was in 
custody and under indictment at the time he was engaged in 
conversation by Nichols."  Id.  These factors, when combined, 
"intentionally creat[ed] a situation likely to induce Henry to 
make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, 
[and therefore,] violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel."  Id. at 274.   
¶43 In Moulton, the United States Supreme Court concluded 
that law enforcement violated the defendant's rights when it 
arranged to record conversations between the defendant and its 
informant, Colson.  Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176.  As part of his 
arrangement with police, Colson agreed that, in exchange for "no 
further charges [being] brought against him[,]" he would 
"testify 
against 
Moulton 
and 
otherwise 
cooperate 
in 
the 
prosecution of Moulton on the pending charges."  Id. at 163.   
¶44 The police had Colson record his phone conversations 
with the defendant, and then after learning from these phone 
recordings that Colson planned to meet with the defendant in-
person, told Colson to wear a recording device to the meeting.  
Id. at 164-66.  At the meeting, Colson actively questioned the 
defendant about facts and dates of the crime, in response to 
which the defendant made incriminating statements.  Id. at 165-
66.  These statements then were used at the defendant's trial 
that resulted in a conviction.  Id. at 177.  The Court held that 
the State had deliberately elicited the statements by "knowingly 
circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
21 
 
confrontation between the accused and a state agent."  Id. at 
176. 
¶45 In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 439 (1986), 
detectives reached an agreement with the defendant's cellmate to 
be an informant.  The detectives told the cellmate not to ask 
questions, but rather to simply "keep his ears open" to what the 
defendant 
said. 
 
Id. 
 
The 
defendant 
made 
incriminating 
statements which the informant reported to police.  Id.  The 
United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does 
not forbid "admission in evidence of an accused's statements to 
a jailhouse informant who was 'placed in close proximity but 
[made] no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime 
charged.'"  Id. at 456 (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 n.9).  
The Court concluded that the defendant in Kuhlmann did not 
"demonstrate that the police and their informant took some 
action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately 
to elicit incriminating remarks."  Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459. 
¶46 From these cases, courts have determined that in order 
to find a Sixth Amendment violation, "the statements in question 
must have been (1) deliberately elicited (2) by a government 
agent."  United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1995).  
Here, there is no dispute that Miller deliberately elicited 
information from Arrington.10  Therefore, we turn next to the 
second prong of the Sixth Amendment analysis, whether Miller was 
                                                 
10 Miller had conversations with Arrington about his case, 
recorded those conversations, and gave the recordings to law 
enforcement for use in Arrington's trial.   
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
22 
 
acting as a government agent when he recorded his conversations 
with Arrington.  We conclude that he was not.  
¶47 Initially, a brief review of general agency principles 
will be helpful to our discussion.11  We note that "a person or 
business acting on behalf of another, and subject to control of 
another, is an agent and the person or business they are acting 
on behalf of, a principal."  Lang, 390 Wis. 2d 627, ¶25.   
¶48 An agency relationship is based on an agreement 
between 
the 
principal 
and 
agent 
that 
expresses 
three 
elements:  "(1) the conduct of the principal showing that the 
agent is to act for him or her; (2) the conduct of the agent 
showing that he or she accepts the undertaking; and (3) the 
understanding of the parties that the principal is to control 
the undertaking."  City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., 2008 WI App 
181, 315 Wis. 2d 443, 485, 762 N.W.2d 757 (quoting Wis JI——Civil 
4000).  At times, the existence of an agency relationship "is a 
question of fact because the determination turns on 'the 
understanding between the alleged principal and agent.'"  Lang, 
390 Wis. 2d 627, ¶20 (citing Soczka v. Rechner, 73 Wis. 2d 157, 
163, 242 N.W.2d 910 (1976)).   
¶49 "The agent's duty is to act solely for the benefit of 
the principal in all matters connected with the agency, even at 
the expense of the agent's own interests."  Losee v. Marine 
                                                 
11 Although we acknowledge that, in prior Sixth Amendment 
"state agent" precedents, the United States Supreme Court has 
used a more specific, nuanced analysis to determine agency 
status, we include this discussion of common law agency 
principles for a fuller understanding of the concept as a whole.   
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
23 
 
Bank, 2005 WI App 184, ¶16, 286 Wis. 2d 438, 703 N.W.2d 751.  
Generally, an agent has the duty to obey all reasonable 
directions as to its manner of performing the service it has 
agreed to perform.  See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 385 
(1958).  "What matters in forming an agency relationship is that 
the principal has the right to control that conduct."  Lang, 390 
Wis. 2d 627, ¶30. 
¶50 In the specific context of examining the work of a 
government informant for purposes of an alleged Sixth Amendment 
violation, federal courts have determined that "there is no 
[Sixth Amendment] infringement unless the informant was a 
government agent, and there is no agency absent the government's 
agreement to reward the informant for his services."  United 
States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th Cir. 1991), overruled 
on other grounds by Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 
1999); see also Henry, 447 U.S. 26 at 270.  In York, an inmate, 
Beaman, reported to FBI that his cellmate, York, had confessed 
to murdering his wife.  York, 933 F.2d at 1355.  Beaman had been 
acting as a prison informant for the FBI for years prior, but 
the FBI did not purposefully place him in the same cell as York 
to gather information.  Id. at 1356.  The FBI learned of York 
only when Beaman came to them with York's confessions.  Id.   
¶51 After Beaman reported the confessions, the FBI told 
him that they wanted him to gather more information on specific 
crimes:  murder, official corruption, and drug offenses.  Id.  
The FBI also conceded that there was an agreement with Beaman to 
assist his parole application by detailing the extent of his 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
24 
 
cooperation with the government on York's case.  Id. at 1358.  
The Court concluded that, as a matter of law, Beaman had acted 
as an agent on behalf of the government.  Id.  It concluded that 
the relevant question was whether the FBI "told Beaman to 
collect information" and specifically noted that FBI agent Stoll 
"told Beaman the type of information he was interested in 
receiving; that statement was tantamount to an invitation to 
Beaman to go out and look for that type of information."  Id.   
¶52 The Court further explained that, in deciphering 
whether an agreement between law enforcement and an inmate is 
formed, 
"[w]e 
must 
not 
confuse 
speculation 
about 
[an 
informant's] motives for assisting the police for evidence that 
the police promised [the informant] consideration for his help 
or, otherwise, bargained for his active assistance."  Id. at 
1357 (quoting Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1021 (11th 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934, 109 S. Ct. 329 (1988)).  
Undoubtedly, "most inmates who provide information to law 
enforcement officials harbor the hope that their service will 
not go unrewarded[;]" however, just because "inmates realize 
there is a market for information about crime does not make each 
inmate who enters the market a government agent."  Id.  "[T]here 
is no agency absent the government's agreement to reward the 
informant for his services."  Id.   
¶53 Furthermore, federal courts have also concluded that 
agency status is particularized to specific defendants.  "[A]n 
informant becomes a government agent for purposes of [Massiah] 
only when the informant has been instructed by the police to get 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
25 
 
information about the particular defendant."  Moore v. United 
States, 178 F.3d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States 
v. Birbal, 113 F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 1997)).  In Moore, the 
defendant, Moore, had been arrested for bank robbery and placed 
in jail awaiting trial.  Moore, 178 F.3d at 997.  At trial, 
Hartwig, a prisoner housed in the same cellblock with Moore, 
testified for the government as to conversations he overheard 
while in jail, in which Moore admitted his crimes.  Id.   
¶54 Importantly, during the same timeframe that Moore was 
admitting to his crimes in jail, Hartwig had received and signed 
a letter from the United States Attorney Office agreeing to 
"provide an informal proffer of information concerning his 
knowledge of drug-related criminal activity."  Id. at 999.  "The 
stated purpose of the meeting was to assist the government 'in 
determining what, if any, consideration should be afforded 
[Hartwig] in exchange for [his] agreement to provide information 
or other cooperation[.]'"  Id.  Hartwig revealed his information 
regarding Moore's admissions in his next statement to law 
enforcement, as required under the proffer agreement.12  Moore 
argued that Hartwig was a government agent and, therefore, his 
                                                 
12 "A proffer agreement is an agreement between a defendant 
and the government in a criminal case that sets forth the terms 
under which the defendant will provide information to the 
government during an interview, commonly referred to as a 
'proffer session.'"  Robert I. Smith, III, Fair Play and 
Criminal Justice:  Drafting Proffer Agreements in Light of Total 
Waiver of Rule 410, 66 S.C. L. Rev. 809, 812 (2015) (quoting 
1 Stephen 
E. 
Arthur 
& 
Robert 
S. 
Hunter, 
Federal 
Trial 
Handbook:  Criminal § 31:3 (4th ed. 2014)). 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
26 
 
testimony regarding the jailhouse admissions ran afoul of his 
Sixth Amendment rights.   
¶55 The Court disagreed and reaffirmed that an informant 
becomes a government agent only when law enforcement instructs 
the informant to gather information on a particular defendant.  
Id.  "To the extent there was agreement between Hartwig and the 
government, there is no evidence to suggest it had anything to 
do with Moore."  Id.  Rather, the proffer served as evidence 
that Hartwig was willing to disclose pertinent criminal activity 
in hopes of receiving a more favorable plea agreement.  Id.  In 
rejecting Moore's Sixth Amendment claim, the court concluded 
that 
"the 
link 
between 
Hartwig's 
relationship 
with 
the 
government and his conduct at issue" was insufficient to be 
considered a Massiah violation against Moore.  Id. at 999–1000.   
¶56 The Eighth Circuit doubled down on this particularized 
agency analysis in United States v. Johnson, 338 F.3d 918, 921 
(8th Cir. 2003) ("There is nothing obscure about this language. 
. . . we said that an informant becomes a government agent for 
Massiah purposes only when the informant has been instructed by 
the police to get information about a particular defendant.") 
(emphasis in original).  The district court in Johnson concluded 
that agency was established, even in the "absence of express 
instructions from the government to get information about a 
particular defendant[,] 'by proof of an implicit agreement 
arising 
from 
a 
longstanding 
informant's . . . "symbiotic 
relationship"' with the government."  Id. at 922. 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
27 
 
¶57 The 
Eighth 
Circuit 
rejected 
this 
analysis 
and, 
instead, described Moore as a "bright-line rule[:]  If an 
informant has not been instructed by the police to get 
information about the particular defendant, that informant is 
not a government agent for Massiah purposes."  Id.  The Court 
concluded that Moore's language could not be "explained away."  
Id.   
¶58 Likewise, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals concluded 
that both (1) proof of an agreement between law enforcement and 
the 
informant 
and 
(2) law 
enforcement 
control 
over 
the 
investigation are necessary to a conclusion that the informant 
was a state agent.  State v. Lewis, 2010 WI App 52, ¶¶21-25, 324 
Wis. 2d 536, 781 N.W.2d 730.  In Lewis, an inmate, Gray, 
approached police with information on his cellmate, Lewis, who 
was awaiting trial on robbery charges.  Id., ¶4.  Law 
enforcement had not placed Gray in the cell with Lewis and had 
no knowledge of Gray until he approached them with information.  
Id., ¶8.  Gray testified that Lewis volunteered the information 
without 
prompting, 
id., 
¶10, 
and 
"admitted 
that 
no 
law 
enforcement agency or officer ever promised anything to him in 
exchange for him providing information."  Id., ¶9.  He said he 
came forward "in the hope that the government would take his 
willingness to inform into account."  Id.  The circuit court 
found that it was a "unilateral decision by Gray to volunteer 
this information."  Id., ¶15.   
¶59 After being convicted, Lewis filed a postconviction 
motion 
arguing 
that 
Gray's 
testimony 
violated 
his 
Sixth 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
28 
 
Amendment right to counsel.  Id., ¶7.  Regarding Gray's status 
as a government agent, Lewis argued that if the government 
creates circumstances "whereby a person predisposed toward 
giving information in the hope of a possible reward is in a 
jailhouse setting, . . . that predisposed person is an agent 
when information is retrieved, agreement or no agreement, 
control or no control."  Id., ¶21.  The court of appeals 
disagreed and concluded that there was no agreement between law 
enforcement and Gray.  Id., ¶23.  The court explained that "the 
key issue is the extent of government involvement.  When the 
government pays the informant, it is evidence (although not 
conclusive) that a prior agreement between the government and 
the informant existed, whether that agreement was explicit or 
implicit."  Id., ¶22 (quoting United States v. Surridge, 687 
F.2d 250, 254 (8th Cir. 1982)).  "The fact that the government 
might know an informant 'hopes' to receive a benefit as a result 
of providing information does not translate into an implicit 
agreement[.]"  Lewis, 324 Wis. 2d 536, ¶23.   
¶60 The court refused to "extend the rule of Massiah and 
Henry to situations where an individual, acting on his [or her] 
own initiative, deliberately elicits incriminating information."  
Id. (quoting United States v. Malik, 680 F.2d 1162, 1165 (7th 
Cir. 1982)).  It held that "[a]s long as the police do nothing 
to direct or control or involve themselves in the questioning of 
a person in custody by a private citizen, such questioning does 
not violate the . . . [S]ixth Amendment[]."  Lewis, 324 Wis. 2d 
536, ¶25 (quoting Surridge, 687 F.2d at 255).   
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
29 
 
¶61 Here, the circuit court found that Miller voluntarily 
came to law enforcement and asked whether he could record his 
conversations with Arrington.  Rather than directing Miller to 
speak with Arrington, the detectives simply told Miller, "if you 
want to record the conversation you can."  Like the informant in 
Lewis, Miller made a unilateral decision to volunteer his 
information to law enforcement.  Miller acted on his own 
initiative.   
¶62 Additionally, Miller was not paid or promised payment 
by the detectives for gathering information on Arrington.  
Although not conclusive, payment is evidence of an agreement 
between law enforcement and an informant.  In Henry, one of the 
Supreme Court's factors for determining that an inmate was a 
government agent was that he was a paid informant.  See Henry, 
447 U.S. at 270 ("First, Nichols was acting under instructions 
as a paid informant for the Government[.]").  See also Moulton, 
474 U.S. at 163 (describing Colson's agreement to testify 
against defendant and cooperate in police investigation in 
exchange for no further charges); York, 933 F.2d at 1359 
(describing agreement with FBI to assist Beaman's parole 
application 
by 
detailing 
his 
cooperation 
in 
York 
case).  
Conversely, in Lewis, the court of appeals concluded that an 
informant's "hope" that his services would be rewarded was not 
enough to form the basis of an implicit agency agreement.  
Something more is needed.   
¶63 Here, the detectives were very clear to make no 
promises 
to 
Miller 
regarding 
consideration 
for 
gathering 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
30 
 
information on Arrington.  They told Miller that any payment or 
consideration would come from the District Attorney's office.  
On this basis, the circuit court found that "Miller was acting 
with the hope that the prosecutors in his case would give him a 
more lenient sentence[.]"  As with the court's conclusion in 
Lewis, we similarly refuse to extend the application of Sixth 
Amendment to instances where an individual is acting on his own 
initiative to deliberately elicit information in the hope of 
receiving consideration.  Miller's decision to entrepreneurially 
enter the information marketplace did not transform him into a 
government agent.  For Miller to be a government agent, there 
must have been a prior agreement with the government.  Whether 
there was a promise of consideration is strong evidence of 
whether there was a prior agreement.  No consideration was ever 
promised to Miller for gathering information on Arrington.   
¶64 Moreover, to the extent that Miller had an agreement 
regarding consideration for information he gathered on the 
Powell case, there is no evidence to suggest that it had 
anything to do with Arrington.  Moore, 178 F.3d at 999 (setting 
out particularized agency determination); Johnson, 338 F.3d at 
922 (describing Moore's particularized agency analysis as a 
"bright-line rule").  The alleged agreement and the statement 
that the information he gathered "would . . . be used as part of 
his consideration" was particularized and concerned only the 
Powell case.  Furthermore, the statement occurred before 
Arrington was in police custody; and therefore, it occurred 
before Miller had the opportunity to talk with Arrington.   
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
31 
 
¶65 As the court in Moore explained, even the close 
timeframe is not enough to impute an agreement regarding 
information gathered on one case as an agreement regarding 
information gathered on a separate case.  See Moore, 178 F.3d at 
999 (explaining that Moore was arrested and taken to jail on 
February 20, 1998, and Hartwig had signed his proffer agreement 
with law enforcement "[s]ometime between February 17 and 
February 25, 1998").  Miller's readiness to gather information 
on Powell in exchange for consideration showed nothing more than 
his willingness to enter the informational market.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that there was no agency agreement between Miller 
and the State for gathering information on Arrington.   
¶66 The Lewis court similarly concluded that an element of 
the agency analysis is whether law enforcement have control of 
the questioning.  It is a bedrock principle of agency law in 
Wisconsin that "the principal has the right to control [the 
agent's] conduct."  Lang, 390 Wis. 2d 627, ¶30.  Applying this 
principle in a Sixth Amendment context, the court in Lewis held 
that "[a]s long as the police do nothing to direct or control or 
involve themselves in the questioning of a person in custody by 
a 
private 
citizen, 
such 
questioning 
does 
not 
violate 
the . . . [S]ixth Amendment[]."  Lewis, 324 Wis. 2d 536, ¶25 
(quoting Surridge, 687 F.2d at 255).  Law enforcement personnel 
have no duty to protect defendants from their own "loose talk."  
Lewis, 324 Wis. 2d 536, ¶24 (citing Malik, 680 F.2d at 1165).   
¶67 Likewise, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
concluded that the level of government involvement and control 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
32 
 
of questioning are relevant to whether an agency relationship 
exists.  Compare Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176-77 (finding Sixth 
Amendment violation when a wired informant actively questioned 
defendant on details of a crime at request of police) with 
Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 439 (finding no Sixth Amendment violation 
when informant was told by police to just "keep his ears open" 
to what the defendant said). 
¶68 Here, the detectives did not direct or control 
Miller's questioning of Arrington.  Unlike the FBI agent in 
York, who told Beaman which crimes to question York on, the 
detectives never gave Miller any direction to speak with 
Arrington, question Arrington, or ask Arrington follow-up 
questions.  The circuit court found that they did not tell 
Miller which questions to ask Arrington or what information to 
gather.  Miller was under "no obligation" to record his 
conversations with Arrington.  Furthermore, when Miller did 
choose to record, he was in control of what was recorded.  
Miller wore a recording device "that he could turn on and off on 
his own initiative."  The detectives could not listen into the 
conversations in real-time.  They did not control Miller's 
recording or questioning.   
¶69 The detectives also had no affirmative duty to protect 
Arrington from Miller.  If a defendant prompts conversations 
with another inmate, he puts himself at risk.  Law enforcement 
has no duty to protect him from his own decisions regarding with 
whom he chooses to converse.  Similarly, the mere act of 
providing Miller with a recording device is not enough to 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
33 
 
constitute control of his questioning.  The recording device in 
this case was nothing more than an avenue for the police to 
place a "listening ear" into Arrington's cell.  See Kuhlmann, 
477 U.S. at 461 (Burger, C.J., concurring).  By itself, this act 
did not elicit information from Arrington and did not violate 
his Sixth Amendment rights.   
¶70 Accordingly, because the detectives did not have an 
agreement with Miller or control his questioning, we conclude 
that there was no agency relationship between Miller and law 
enforcement and no violation of Arrington's Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.  Consequently, having determined that there 
was no Sixth Amendment violation, Arrington has not identified 
an error to which we may apply the plain error doctrine.  This 
necessarily means that we need not consider whether, if the 
recordings had been improper, the impropriety "would have been 
so 
obvious, 
substantial, 
and 
fundamental 
that 
it 
would 
necessitate a new trial[.]"  Bell, 380 Wis. 2d 616, ¶59. 
C.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶71 "Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, a criminal defendant is guaranteed 
the right to effective assistance of counsel."  State v. 
Lemberger, 2017 WI 39, ¶16, 374 Wis. 2d 617, 893 N.W.2d 232 
(quoting State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶21, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 
805 N.W.2d 334).  The right to effective assistance of counsel 
also is provided under Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Lemberger, 374 Wis. 2d 617, ¶16.  That counsel's 
assistance was ineffective, may be demonstrated by establishing 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
34 
 
that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient 
performance was prejudicial.  State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, 
¶37, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93 (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  Courts need not address 
both deficient performance and prejudice if the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim can be resolved either way.  See id. 
at 697.   
¶72 To establish that an attorney's performance was 
deficient, the defendant must prove that "counsel's performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."  State v. 
Maday, 2017 WI 28, ¶54, 374 Wis. 2d 164, 892 N.W.2d 611.  Courts 
"must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  See also State v. Maloney, 2005 WI 
74, ¶25, 281 Wis. 2d 595, 698 N.W.2d 583 ("Judicial scrutiny of 
an attorney's performance is highly deferential.").  "A fair 
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be 
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, 
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the 
time."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
¶73 Because we conclude that there was no Sixth Amendment 
violation, it is necessarily true that Arrington's counsel was 
not deficient in failing to object to the admission of the 
recordings.  See State v. Johnson, 2004 WI 94, ¶24, 273 Wis. 2d 
626, 681 N.W.2d 901.  Moreover, even if the law on this area 
were unsettled, which it is not, "ineffective assistance of 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
35 
 
counsel cases [are] limited to situations where the law or duty 
is clear such that reasonable counsel should know enough to 
raise the issue."  Maloney, 281 Wis. 2d 595, ¶29 (quoting State 
v. McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 85, 519 N.W.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1994)).  
"[I]t is axiomatic that '[c]ounsel is not required to object and 
argue a point of law that is unsettled.'"  Maday, 374 Wis. 2d 
164, ¶55.  Consequently, we conclude that counsel's performance 
was not deficient and, therefore, Arrington was not denied 
effective assistance of counsel.   
¶74 Although we need not address prejudice to conclude 
that Arrington was not denied effective assistance of counsel, 
see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, we choose to do so in this 
case.  To establish prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  State v. 
Domke, 2011 WI 95, ¶54, 337 Wis. 2d 268, 805 N.W.2d 364 (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  "When a defendant challenges a 
conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable 
probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have 
had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt."  Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 
268, ¶54.  "It is not sufficient for the defendant to show that 
his counsel's errors 'had some conceivable effect on the outcome 
of the proceeding.'"  Id. (quoting Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 
¶37).  We examine the totality of the circumstances to determine 
whether counsel's errors, in the context of the entire case, 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
36 
 
deprived the defendant a fair trial.  Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, 
¶54 (citing Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶¶62-63).   
¶75 Arrington argues that he was prejudiced by the 
recordings because they "eviscerated" his claim of self-
defense.13  In the tapes, Arrington did not discuss Shorty having 
a gun or that it was actually Shorty who shot Gomez, both of 
which were crucial to his theory of the case.  Conversely, the 
State argues that Miller's recordings were cumulative evidence 
piled on top of an already substantial amount of evidence of 
guilt.  The State presented numerous witnesses who testified to 
Arrington's actions before, during, and after the shooting.  
Each of these witnesses undermined Arrington's own testimony 
regarding the shooting.  Based on our review of the totality of 
the evidence, we agree with the State and conclude that there is 
not a reasonable probability that, but for the introduction of 
the recordings, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.   
¶76 A total of forty-two witnesses testified at trial.  
The jury heard testimony concerning the existing, violent feud 
between Shorty and Arrington, as well as Arrington's pledge to 
"[expletive] Shorty up" and "handle his business" prior to the 
shooting.  This testimony supported the State's case against 
Arrington, specifically supplying a motive for why Arrington 
would shoot at Shorty.  The jury also heard testimony that 
Arrington had the opportunity to commit this shooting, notably 
                                                 
13 Def. Appellant's Br. at 35. 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
37 
 
that Arrington was seen circling the block the day of the 
shooting and "had that look in his eye like he wanted to kill 
something."  Additional witnesses testified that Arrington 
opened fire on Taylor's house and that Shorty did not return 
fire or have a gun.  This testimony was further corroborated by 
the results of the police search that found no firearms at the 
scene or in Taylor's house.   
¶77 Finally, there was also testimony that Arrington tried 
to silence witnesses and evade capture in the aftermath of the 
shooting.  AVT, who was in the car with Arrington during the 
shooting, testified that Arrington found her at a gas station in 
Milwaukee, threatened her with a gun, kidnapped her, and then 
stranded her in a car the next morning.  Erica Herrod testified 
that, after the shooting, Arrington asked her for bleach to 
clean his gun and his body after "popp[ing] someone."  Eugene 
Herrod testified that Arrington admitted that he "fanned Shorty 
down" and vowed to "finish the job and get Shorty" after 
learning that he had shot the wrong person.  The defendant 
himself admitted to changing his hair and appearance following 
the shooting to hide from law enforcement.   
¶78 Arrington's evidence in response to this testimony is 
comparatively weak.  Regarding his on-going feud with Shorty, 
Arrington testified that he had forgiven Shorty for stabbing him 
and that he had not been the one to rob Shorty.  Arrington 
explained that he was only at Taylor's house to get drugs and 
that he shot at Shorty only when he saw Shorty reaching for 
something.  In addition, Arrington said he aimed only at the 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
38 
 
bottom of the porch, rather than shooting to injure or kill.  
Linzmeier testified that Arrington had not raised self-defense 
until almost a year after the shooting of Gomez.  Linzmeier had 
heard nothing about Shorty having a gun until Arrington's 
interview with him in the jail.   
¶79 Arrington further denied all testimony that implied 
that he tried to cover up evidence.  For example, Arrington 
described AVT's testimony as "all lies."  When questioned about 
Eugene Herrod's testimony, that Arrington told him he would 
"finish the job and get Shorty," Arrington replied, "I don't 
know why Eugene told you guys that."   
¶80 As both parties acknowledge, the scientific evidence 
in this case did not definitively confirm or refute either 
side's theory.14  Instead, this case turned on the credibility of 
each side's witnesses.  The State had detailed testimony from 
numerous witnesses who testified to Arrington's actions before, 
during, and after the shooting.  Arrington countered that the 
State's witnesses were spreading lies and making things up.  
Even without Miller's recordings, Arrington's testimony was 
sufficiently discredited by the multiple witnesses who all 
corroborated the State's theory of the case.  The recordings 
merely provided additional discrediting support.  Upon our 
examination of the totality of the evidence, we conclude that 
                                                 
14 Arrington, 398 Wis. 2d 198, ¶47 ("The prosecutor conceded 
in the State's closing argument that '[s]cience in this case 
hasn't been able to prove anything really for sure.'"); Def. 
Appellant Br. at 40-43. 
No. 
2019AP2065-CR   
 
39 
 
the result of the trial would not have been different without 
the introduction of Miller's recordings.  Accordingly, we 
further conclude that the admission of Miller's recordings at 
trial did not prejudice Arrington.  Therefore, a new trial is 
not warranted.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶81 We conclude that Arrington's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel was not violated because Miller was not acting as a 
State agent when he recorded his conversations with Arrington.  
Further, a new trial is not warranted because Arrington's 
counsel's performance was not deficient and Arrington was not 
prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the State's use 
of the recordings.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals and affirm the circuit court's judgment of 
conviction.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
1 
 
 
¶82 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  This case 
involves a textbook example of a Sixth Amendment violation.  In 
a series of cases culminating nearly 40 years ago, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the police violate a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel when they use a jailhouse informant 
to secretly gather incriminating statements from the defendant.  
The majority misapplies that law, concluding that Arrington's 
right to counsel was somehow not violated when a jailhouse 
informant, using a recording device provided by the police, 
interrogated Arrington and recorded him making incriminating 
statements.  That said, there is no reasonable probability the 
jury would have reached a different outcome if Arrington's 
recorded statements or the informant's testimony had been 
suppressed, because neither was inconsistent with Arrington's 
defense theory.  And so, although Arrington's trial counsel's 
performance was deficient for failing to move to suppress those 
statements, it did not prejudice Arrington's defense.  I 
therefore agree with the majority opinion's conclusion reversing 
the court of appeals' decision. 
I 
¶83 While he was incarcerated in the Brown County Jail, 
Jason Miller "agree[d] to cooperate with law enforcement and 
wear a . . . recording device" in exchange for "consideration" 
in his case.  Initially, Miller was gathering information 
regarding an unrelated homicide case (the "Powell case") that 
Green Bay Detectives Wanta and Linzmeier were investigating.  
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
2 
 
The detectives had provided Miller with a digital recording 
device 
to 
"help 
facilitate" 
his 
information-gathering 
activities, and they instructed him on how to use it.  Wanta 
would pick up the recordings each day and provide Miller with a 
"fresh" recording device.  Wanta assured Miller that "the 
information [Miller] would gather would . . . be used as part of 
his consideration" in his case.  He explained that, although the 
final consideration decisions are made by the district attorney, 
generally the more information an informant produces, the more 
he gets in return. 
¶84 Several days after Miller began working with the 
detectives, Arrington was arrested and placed in Miller's cell 
block and started speaking to Miller about his case.  Miller 
then asked the detectives if he should record his conversations 
with Arrington in addition to those related to the Powell case.  
Linzmeier, who was investigating Arrington's case (Wanta was 
not), told Miller that he should.  Miller's first recording in 
both cases occurred on April 11.  Wanta collected the recording 
device each day, and reviewed the recordings and passed along to 
Detective Linzmeier any information related to Arrington's case.  
Linzmeier then prepared reports detailing the information he 
received from Miller. 
¶85 Miller initiated conversations with Arrington between 
April 11 and 13 and he recorded each one.  On April 11, Miller 
went to Arrington's cell and asked him if he wanted to read a 
magazine.  Arrington testified at the post-conviction hearing 
that, although he wasn't sure, he believed that Miller asked to 
see Arrington's criminal complaint.  The next day, Miller called 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
3 
 
Arrington over to Miller's cell so they could talk.  The third 
day, April 13, is the when the conversation occurred that was 
played at Arrington's trial. 
¶86 During 
that 
conversation, 
Miller 
interrogated 
Arrington about his case, including asking him how he "handled" 
what Miller thought was problematic evidence against him.  For 
instance, regarding possible gunshot-residue evidence, Miller 
asked Arrington if he "g[o]t rid of it"; if he "wipe[d] 
everything down."  Miller testified that, at the time, neither 
he nor Arrington knew whether the police had, in fact, collected 
or tested any gunshot-residue evidence.  Miller also questioned 
Arrington about his version of the shooting.  Arrington told him 
that he was sitting in his car with a woman when he saw two 
people, Gomez and Santana-Hermida (also known as "Shorty"), 
talking to each other outside of Taylor's house.  Santana-
Hermida and Arrington had a violent history:  three days before 
the shooting, Santana-Hermida had stabbed Arrington.  Arrington 
told Miller that seeing Santana-Hermida in the driveway gave him 
a "flashback" to Santana-Hermida stabbing him, which Arrington 
claimed caused him to "just [start] shooting."  Miller asked 
Arrington if he "hit the wrong person."  Arrington responded 
that he "hit Ricky [Gomez]" because "[Santana-Hermida] jumped 
out of the way."  After Arrington told Miller that Santana-
Hermida was unlikely to testify at trial, Miller commented that 
the woman who was in the car with him was the only witness 
Arrington had to "worry about," as she was the only other 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
4 
 
eyewitness.1  Miller then suggested that Arrington should arrange 
for the woman's friends to convince the woman not to come to 
court. 
¶87 At trial, Arrington took the stand and testified that 
he had started shooting in self-defense.  He testified that 
Santana-Hermida had previously "made an attempt [on his] life" 
and that, before he started shooting, he saw Santana-Hermida 
"reach for what [he] thought was a gun."  Arrington described 
firing three shots toward the bottom of the porch to "create a 
diversion" allowing him to drive away.  He asserted that he 
"purposely" shot at the porch and not any person because he 
"didn't want to hit anybody."  According to Arrington's 
testimony, as he started to drive away, he saw Santana-Hermida 
"come around the door with the gun in his hand at the same 
time . . . Gomez was coming into the house," at which point 
Santana-Hermida fired and Gomez fell.  Arrington claimed that 
Gomez had "tried to move out of the way, but he was too late."  
The jury ultimately rejected Arrington's self-defense theory, 
convicting him of first-degree intentional homicide. 
¶88 Arrington sought post-conviction relief on the grounds 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to 
suppress Miller's testimony and jailhouse recording.  At his 
post-conviction hearing, Arrington explained that he did not 
know that Miller was a police informant or that Miller was 
wearing a recording device when they talked in jail, and that he 
                                                 
1 Taylor, whose house the shooting occurred at, also 
testified, but he said he did not see the shooting.  Santana-
Hermida was on the State's pre-trial witness list, but he did 
not testify at trial. 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
5 
 
would not have talked to Miller had he known Miller was 
recording their conversations.  Arrington's trial counsel, 
Hughes, testified that he knew the prosecution had recordings of 
Arrington's conversations with Miller and that he had received 
those recordings "quite some time" before trial.  Based on those 
recordings and police reports the State turned over before 
trial, Hughes said that he was "aware that Jason Miller [was] 
working as a confidential informant" while he was in the Brown 
County 
jail. 
 
He 
also 
knew 
that 
Miller 
recorded 
his 
conversations with Arrington after Arrington had obtained 
counsel.  Yet Hughes said that he did not consider whether 
Miller's recordings violated Arrington's right to counsel——
indeed, he had never even researched the issue.  Finally, Hughes 
admitted that if he hadn't "missed" the issue, he "likely would 
have" filed a pretrial motion to suppress Miller's testimony and 
jailhouse recording. 
II 
¶89 Once a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
attaches, the State has an "affirmative obligation not to act in 
a manner that circumvents the protections accorded the accused 
by invoking th[at] right."  Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 
(1985).  That obligation bars the police not only from directly 
questioning the defendant without his counsel present but also 
from using an informant to "deliberately elicit[]" incriminating 
information from the defendant.  See Massiah v. United States, 
377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).  The Sixth Amendment's protections 
extend to information deliberately obtained by the State through 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
6 
 
an agent, such as a jailhouse informant, preventing the police 
from circumventing a defendant's right to counsel via an 
indirect source: 
An accused speaking to a known Government agent is 
typically aware that his statements may be used 
against him.  The adversary positions at that stage 
are well established; the parties are then "arms' 
length" adversaries. 
When the accused is in the company of a fellow inmate 
who is acting by prearrangement as a Government agent, 
the same cannot be said.  Conversation stimulated in 
such circumstances may elicit information that an 
accused would not intentionally reveal to persons 
known to be Government agents.  Indeed, the Massiah 
Court noted that if the Sixth Amendment "is to have 
any 
efficacy 
it 
must 
apply 
to 
indirect 
and 
surreptitious 
interrogations 
as 
well 
as 
those 
conducted in the jailhouse."  The Court pointedly 
observed that Massiah was more seriously imposed upon 
because he did not know that his codefendant was a 
Government agent. 
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 273 (1980).  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has explained that even when the police do not 
purposely place an informant in jail with the defendant, their 
"knowing exploitation" of such "an opportunity to confront the 
accused without counsel being present is as much a [Sixth 
Amendment violation] as is the intentional creation of such an 
opportunity."  Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176.  Determining whether 
the police's use of an informant violates a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel turns on three factors:  (1) the 
informant is an agent of the police; (2) the informant is 
"ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate" of the defendant's; 
and 
(3) 
the 
informant 
takes 
"some 
action" 
to 
"deliberately . . . elicit" incriminating information after the 
defendant has been indicted and placed in custody.  See Henry, 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
7 
 
447 U.S. at 270; Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459–60 
(1986).  There is no dispute that the second factor is present 
here.  The issues before the court are whether Miller was an 
agent of the police and whether he took some action to 
deliberately elicit incriminating information from Arrington. 
A 
¶90 Regarding whether an informant is an agent of the 
police, 
the 
majority 
wrongly 
looks 
to 
state 
law 
agency 
principles.  That novel approach has no support in either 
Wisconsin or federal case law——unsurprising, given that no state 
law can deprive a person of a federal constitutional right.  
See, e.g., Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 801 (2020).  
Accordingly, the correct place to look for how to analyze 
whether someone is an agent of the police for Sixth Amendment 
purposes 
is 
the 
U.S. 
Supreme 
Court's 
Sixth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
¶91 The Court's jurisprudence reveals that an agent is a 
certain kind of informant; not every person who reports 
information to the police is an agent of the police.  Rather, a 
person is an agent if she obtains information from the defendant 
pursuant to an agreement with the police.  See Henry, 447 U.S. 
at 270.  Evidence of such an agreement includes a promise by the 
police to compensate the informant for information, either with 
money or by reducing the informant's sentence or the charges 
against him.  See id. at 270 & n.7.  Such agreements don't have 
to be formal or written; all that is needed is some "evidence 
that the parties behaved as though there were an agreement 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
8 
 
between them."  See United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1357 
(7th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. 
Williams, 182 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1999).  And the agreement 
doesn't have to specify exactly what consideration the informant 
will receive, so long as there is some evidence that the reason 
the informant gave the police information is because the 
government "assured [him] that his good deeds would not go 
unrewarded."  See id. at 1358.  Fundamentally, the question 
turns on whether there was some "prearrangement" between the 
informant 
and 
the 
police 
to 
collect 
information 
on 
the 
defendant, as opposed to the informant acting on his own 
initiative prior to any contact with the police.  See Henry, 447 
U.S. at 270–71; United States v. Malik, 680 F.2d 1162, 1165 (7th 
Cir. 1982). 
¶92 Just because an informant is an agent of the police, 
however, does not mean that everything the agent does amounts to 
a violation of a defendant's right to counsel.  The Sixth 
Amendment is not violated when the State obtains incriminating 
information by "luck or happenstance," Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176, 
because the State is not obligated to protect defendants from 
their own "loose talk," see Malik, 680 F.2d at 1165.  Thus, 
there is no Sixth Amendment violation when an agent who "only 
listen[s]" 
to 
a 
defendant's 
"spontaneous 
and 
unsolicited 
statements" and "at no time ask[s] any questions" reports those 
statements to the police.  Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 460.  For an 
agent of the police to violate the Sixth Amendment, the agent 
must take "some action, beyond merely listening, that was 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
9 
 
designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks."  Id. at 
459. 
B 
¶93 Here, the record clearly demonstrates that Miller was 
an agent of the police and that his actions violated Arrington's 
right to counsel. 
1 
¶94 Regarding Miller being an agent of the police, Miller 
approached 
police 
about 
recording 
his 
conversations 
with 
Arrington "while he was still working as an informant" in the 
Powell case.  The police had already given Miller a recording 
device and assured him that information he gathered in the 
Powell case "would . . . be used as part of his consideration."  
Detective Linzmeier then gave Miller the go-ahead to record his 
conversations with Arrington.  Armed with both the understanding 
that he would receive consideration in exchange for information 
and 
a 
police-issued 
recording 
device, 
Miller 
questioned 
Arrington 
about 
his 
case 
and 
recorded 
those 
exchanges.  
According to Wanta, the "first day that [Miller] made a 
recording for . . . [the Powell case] was on the 11th"——the same 
day that Miller made his first recording of Arrington.  Miller 
questioned and recorded Arrington for two more days, with Wanta 
collecting the recording device and replacing it with a "fresh" 
one each day.  Under these circumstances, Miller was an agent of 
the police when he questioned and recorded Arrington.  See 
Henry, 447 U.S. at 273 (explaining that a jailhouse informant is 
an agent of the police when he is "acting by prearrangement" 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
10 
 
with 
the 
police 
to 
"stimulate[]" 
conversation 
with 
the 
defendant). 
¶95 The majority floats two explanations for why Miller 
wasn't an agent of the police, neither of which is supported by 
case law or the record.  First, it claims that Miller's 
consideration agreement was only for the unrelated homicide case 
and that without the police instructing him to target Arrington 
specifically, he was not acting as an agent of the police when 
he questioned Arrington.  That approach, however has been 
rejected by many other courts, both federal and state and it has 
never been adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Henry, 
447 U.S. at 271; Ayers v. Hudson, 623 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 
2010) (explaining that "direct" instructions to target the 
defendant "would be sufficient to demonstrate agency," but they 
were not necessary (emphasis added)); York, 933 F.2d at 1357 
("Whether the principal exercises its control strictly, by 
targeting specific individuals, or casually, by loosing an 
informant on the prison population at large, is irrelevant."); 
State v. Marshall, 882 N.W.2d 68, 94 (Iowa 2016) ("The invasion 
of an incarcerated prisoner's Sixth Amendment rights is not 
affected by whether the informant is operating at large or with 
a specific target.").  There are good reasons why not:  the 
majority's simplistic, bright-line approach "would allow the 
State to accomplish 'with a wink a nod' what it cannot do 
overtly."  See Ayers, 623 F.3d at 312.  That is why determining 
whether an informant is an agent of the police turns on "the 
facts and circumstances of a particular case," id. at 311, which 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
11 
 
here demonstrate that Miller was such an agent when he 
questioned Arrington. 
¶96 Second, the majority asserts that Miller was not an 
agent because the police made him no specific promise about the 
consideration he would receive for gathering information on 
Arrington.  That may be true, but it doesn't mean Miller wasn't 
a government agent.  As both Wanta and Linzmeier testified, they 
do not promise specific consideration in advance.  Instead, the 
district attorney negotiates the specifics after the fact, based 
on the usefulness of the information the informant gathers.  
Thus, if the majority were right that the absence of a specific 
promise in Arrington's case meant that Miller wasn't an agent of 
the police, then it's unclear how anyone could ever be. 
¶97 But that is not the law.  What matters for determining 
whether someone is a government agent isn't whether they have a 
promise of specific consideration in hand before gathering 
information, but whether there was a "prearrangement" with the 
police to gather the information, Henry 447 U.S. at 270-71, and 
whether the police and the informant "behaved as though" there 
was an agreement between them, York, 933 F.2d at 1357-58.  Both 
of these conditions are met here.  There is no question that the 
police 
told 
Miller 
that 
the 
information 
he 
gathered 
"would . . . be used as part of his consideration."  To be sure, 
they made that arrangement with Miller regarding the Powell case 
and before Arrington arrived at the jail.  But it was mere days 
later that Miller approached the police about also recording his 
conversations with Arrington.  And the police never told Miller 
that the information-for-consideration deal applied only to the 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
12 
 
Powell case.  In fact, they gave Miller the green light to 
record Arrington.  Thus, when Miller questioned and recorded 
Arrington——using the same police-issued device, on the same day 
he recorded Powell, and after "prearrang[ing]" with the police 
to do so, see Henry, 447 U.S. at 273——both Miller and the police 
were 
"behav[ing] 
as 
though" 
the 
general 
consideration 
arrangement in the Powell case applied equally to Arrington's 
case.2  See York, 933 F.2d at 1357–58 (holding that the police 
promising some reward for information and evidence the parties 
behaved consistent with that understanding is sufficient to 
establish an agreement between the informant and the police); 
Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.  Accordingly, Miller was an agent of 
the police. 
2 
¶98 Miller also took "some action" to deliberately elicit 
information from Arrington, and therefore violated Arrington's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 
459.  In fact, Miller acted exactly as the police agents did in 
Moulton and Henry.  Miller wore a recording device given to him 
by the police and engaged Arrington in "prolonged discussion of 
the pending charges," asking Arrington "what actually had 
occurred."  See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 165; Henry, 447 U.S. at 
271, 274.  He asked Arrington "what the State's evidence would 
                                                 
2 The 
district 
attorney's 
eventual 
offer 
of 
specific 
consideration confirms that understanding, as it states that the 
"offer contemplates consideration" for Miller's information and 
testimony regarding both "Powell 
and Arrington" (emphasis 
added). 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
13 
 
show," including possible gunshot residue.  See Moulton, 474 
U.S. at 165; Henry, 447 U.S. at 271, 274.  And he suggested 
"what [Arrington] should do to obtain a verdict of acquittal"——
namely, that Arrington should convince the woman who was with 
him in the car at the shooting not to testify.  See Moulton, 474 
U.S. at 165.  Miller was no "passive listener"; he actively 
conversed 
with 
Arrington, 
and 
Arrington's 
"incriminating 
statements were the product of [those] conversations."  See 
Henry, 447 U.S. at 271; cf. United States v. Moore, 178 F.3d 
994, 999 (8th Cir. 1999).  Also as in Henry, Miller was already 
working as a police informant at the time he arranged to record 
Arrington's statements.  See Henry, 447 U.S. at 270–71.  As far 
as Arrington knew, however, Miller was "no more than a fellow 
inmate," giving Arrington a false sense that he was not talking 
to the police.  See id. at 270, 272–73.  Thus, Arrington's Sixth 
Amendment to counsel was violated. 
¶99 The majority's opposite conclusion rests on its 
misunderstanding 
of 
both 
the 
U.S. 
Supreme 
Court's 
Sixth 
Amendment precedents and the Wisconsin court of appeals decision 
in State v. Lewis, 2010 WI App 52, 324 Wis. 2d 536, 781 
N.W.2d 730.  In claiming that Miller is like the informant in 
Kuhlmann, the majority ignores the fact that the Kuhlmann Court 
limited its holding to an informant who "merely listen[s]" but 
does not engage with the defendant.  See 477 U.S. at 459.  As 
explained above, however, Miller "took some action . . . that 
was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks" from 
Arrington.  See id.  Indeed, he took far more than some action——
he sought out Arrington for a lengthy conversation about the 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
14 
 
charges against him, the State's case, and strategized with 
Arrington about how to obtain an acquittal, including suggesting 
that Arrington encourage the only other eyewitness not to 
testify.  See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 165; Henry, 447 U.S. at 267.  
Simply put, this case is not Kuhlmann.  The majority likewise 
errs in its reliance on Lewis.  There, the informant had 
gathered information on the defendant prior to any discussion 
with 
the 
police 
about 
the 
defendant. 
 
See 
Lewis, 
324 
Wis. 2d 536, ¶¶4–6.  Here, however, Miller gathered information 
on Arrington only after he told the police that he could get 
Arrington to talk and the police outfitted him with a recording 
device and told him to record Arrington's statements. 
¶100 The majority also focuses on the wrong facts.  It 
doesn't matter that the police did not tell Miller what 
questions to ask or what to record.  See majority op., ¶¶66–68.  
The Henry Court rejected that distinction 42 years ago, 
concluding that what matters is that the police knew that Miller 
"had access to [Arrington] and would be able to engage him in 
conversations without arousing [Arrington's] suspicions" and 
without Arrington's counsel present.  See 477 U.S. at 270–71 & 
n.8.  Likewise, it doesn't matter that it was Miller's idea to 
record Arrington.  See majority op., ¶¶61–65.  As the Moulton 
Court put it, that position "fundamentally misunderstands the 
nature of the right [to counsel]."  474 U.S. at 174–76.  The 
Court clarified that "the identity of the party who instigated 
the meeting at which the Government obtained incriminating 
statements [is] not decisive or even important."  Id. at 174 
(adding that the Court in Beatty v. United States, 389 U.S. 45 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
15 
 
(1967) (per curiam), had summarily reversed a conviction even 
though the defendant requested a meeting with an undercover 
informant and led the conversation).  It then explained that the 
Sixth Amendment is violated when the police "knowing[ly] 
exploit[] . . . an opportunity to confront the accused without 
counsel 
being 
present," 
regardless 
of 
who 
initiates 
the 
confrontation.  Id. at 176.  Here Miller presented the police 
with an opportunity to confront Arrington about his case without 
his counsel present and the police knowingly exploited that 
opportunity, thus improperly "circumventing" Arrington's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  See id. 
¶101 The U.S. Supreme Court's cases therefore make clear 
that Arrington's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated 
when Miller, acting as an agent of the police, asked Arrington 
questions about his case and used the police-provided recording 
device to secretly record those conversations. 
III 
¶102 Because the law is clear that Arrington's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel was violated, his trial counsel's 
performance was deficient for failing to raise a Sixth Amendment 
challenge.  For different reasons than the majority, however, I 
conclude that counsel's error did not prejudice Arrington. 
¶103 An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim requires 
the defendant to show both prongs of the Strickland test:  "that 
counsel's performance was deficient" and "that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense."  Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Savage, 2020 WI 93, ¶27, 395 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
16 
 
Wis. 2d 1, 951 N.W.2d 838.  Deficient performance is performance 
that falls "below an objective standard of reasonableness."  
State v. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, ¶36, 355 Wis. 2d 180, 848 
N.W.2d 786.  Generally, the court is "highly deferential to the 
reasonableness of counsel's performance," provided there is some 
strategic reason for counsel's decisions.  Id.  But because 
there is almost never a strategic reason for "fail[ing] to raise 
an issue of settled law," such a failure generally meets 
Strickland's first prong.  See, e.g., Savage, 395 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶37; State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶49, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 
N.W.2d 93.  Prejudice to the defense is established when "there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's professional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."  
Id., ¶32 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
¶104 Here, Arrington's counsel's performance was deficient 
because Arrington's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was 
violated when the police provided Miller with a recording device 
and Miller then interrogated Arrington and recorded him making 
incriminating statements.  Arrington's counsel therefore had a 
clear duty to raise the issue and he did not.  Cf. Breitzman, 
378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶49.  Indeed, counsel testified that he had not 
even researched the issue.  Such performance is objectively 
unreasonable and, therefore, deficient under the first prong of 
Strickland.  See Jenkins, 355 Wis. 2d 180, ¶47 (concluding that 
counsel's performance was deficient because it was not the 
result of "any reasonable trial strategy"). 
¶105 The second prong of Strickland's test is not met, 
however, because even with counsel's error, there is no 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
17 
 
reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a 
different verdict.  The question is not whether the jury would 
have acquitted Arrington of all charges absent counsel's error, 
but rather whether there is a reasonable probability the jury 
would have either acquitted Arrington or convicted him of one of 
the lesser-included charges.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695–
96.  The jury was instructed on the lesser-included charges of 
second-degree intentional homicide and first- and second-degree 
reckless homicide. 
¶106 Miller's testimony and jailhouse recording likely had 
no effect on the jury's contemplation of first- versus second-
degree 
homicide. 
 
To 
convict 
Arrington 
of 
second-degree 
intentional homicide, the jury would have had to find that 
Arrington believed he had to kill Santana-Hermida to save his 
own life but that Arrington's belief was unreasonable.  Neither 
Miller's 
testimony 
nor 
his 
jailhouse 
recording, 
however, 
contains evidence related to self-defense.  Although Miller 
testified that Arrington told him that when Santana-Hermida saw 
Arrington at Taylor's house, Santana-Hermida was acting "overly 
aggressive" and made a "challenging" gesture to Arrington, 
Miller also testified that Arrington did not say anything about 
Santana-Hermida having a gun or otherwise threatening him.  
Thus, nothing in Miller's testimony or jailhouse recording 
speaks to the factual predicates for self-defense——whether 
Arrington believed he was in imminent danger of death or great 
bodily harm and that he needed to fire three shots to repel that 
threat.  The evidence the jury had on Arrington's self-defense 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
18 
 
claim is therefore the same with or without Miller's testimony 
and jailhouse recording. 
¶107 Similarly, nothing in Miller's testimony or jailhouse 
recording was antithetical to a jury finding Arrington guilty of 
the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide.  To convict 
Arrington of first- or second-degree reckless homicide, the jury 
would need to find that Arrington shot Gomez and that he was 
aware that shooting at Taylor's house created an unreasonable 
and substantial risk of great bodily harm or death.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 940.02 (first-degree reckless homicide also requires a 
finding that the circumstances show an "utter disregard for 
human life"); 940.06.  Arrington told Miller that he "just 
started shooting" after he had a "flashback" to Santana-Hermida 
stabbing him and that he hit Gomez when he was shooting at the 
house.  Those statements are consistent with what Arrington said 
on the stand when he claimed that he shot at the house to create 
a distraction so he could drive away.  Miller's testimony and 
jailhouse recording are also consistent with the only other 
eyewitness's testimony——the woman in the car with Arrington.  
She told the jury that Arrington "just started shooting," but 
did not specify who or what Arrington was shooting at.3  
Therefore, the substance of Miller's testimony and jailhouse 
recording did not prevent the jury from concluding that 
Arrington did not intend to shoot Santana-Hermida or Gomez or 
                                                 
3 The woman's testimony also supports a finding that 
Arrington intended to kill Santana-Hermida and instead killed 
Gomez.  Nothing in her testimony forecloses a finding that 
Arrington acted recklessly, however. 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
19 
 
that he knowingly created an unreasonable and substantial risk 
of their death by firing at the house. 
¶108 Ultimately, Miller's testimony and jailhouse recording 
neither supported nor foreclosed the possibility that the jury 
could convict Arrington of reckless homicide.  Accordingly, 
there is no reason to suspect that it had an impact on the jury 
rejecting the reckless-homicide charge and convicting Arrington 
of first-degree intentional homicide.  As a result, although 
Arrington's counsel's performance was deficient in failing to 
challenge Miller's testimony and jailhouse recording on Sixth 
Amendment grounds, there is no reasonable probability that, 
absent that deficient performance, the jury would have reached a 
different conclusion. 
IV 
¶109 I agree with the majority that the court of appeals' 
decision should be reversed, but for different reasons.  The 
majority wrongly interprets the U.S. Supreme Court's precedents, 
which clearly establish that Arrington's Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel was violated.  Arrington's counsel's failure to raise 
that obvious violation was objectively unreasonable, but, given 
the substance of the statements made by Arrington to Miller, 
counsel's 
error 
did 
not 
prejudice 
Arrington's 
defense.  
Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
¶110 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this opinion. 
No.  2019AP2065-CR.rfd 
 
 
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