Case Title: State v. Boone

Citation: 

Docket Number: S42791

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  July 2, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

		Petitioner on Review,

	v.

JAMES DANIEL BOONE,

	Respondent on Review.

(CC 93-2156-CR; CA A84673; SC S42791)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted September 6, 1996; reassigned February
3, 1998; resubmitted June 25, 1998.

	Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the brief
were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, Virginia L.
Linder, Solicitor General, and Jonathan H. Fussner, Assistant
Attorney General.

	Michael Ratliff, of Parks & Ratliff, Klamath Falls, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Leeson, Justices.**

	VAN HOOMISSEN, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed.  The case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.

	*Appeal from Klamath County Circuit Court,

	 Rodger J. Isaacson, Judge.

	 136 Or App 614, 901 P2d 990 (1995).

	**Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision; Kulongoski, J.,
did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.

		VAN HOOMISSEN, J.

		The principal issue in this criminal case is whether a
city ordinance that authorizes police to impound a car also
authorizes them to conduct an inventory search of the car's
contents.  The Court of Appeals held that the city ordinance did
not constitute an authorization from an extra-executive,
politically accountable body to conduct an inventory search. 
State v. Boone, 136 Or App 614, 901 P2d 990 (1995) (per curiam)
(citing State v. Cook, 136 Or App 525, 901 P2d 911 (1995), which
so held with respect to a similar inventory search).  We allowed
review and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

		This court reviews for errors of law.  We are bound by
the trial court's findings of historical fact if evidence
supports them.  State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-27, 806 P2d 92
(1991).  Our function is to decide whether the trial court
applied legal principles correctly to those facts.  Id. (citation
omitted).

		A Klamath Falls police officer lawfully impounded
defendant's car pursuant to Klamath Falls City Code section
6.102, which provides:

	"Whenever a traffic citation is issued, or a
physical arrest made for a violation of the Vehicle
Code of the State of Oregon, or local traffic
regulations, and the driver of such motor vehicle does
not possess a valid operator's license, is driving on a
suspended or revoked license, or is without proof of
liability insurance as required by the Oregon Vehicle
Code, the vehicle shall be impounded and towed by a
licensed towing company to the towing company's garage. 
The towing and storage of a vehicle pursuant to this
Section shall create a lien against the vehicle and any
property left within the vehicle in favor of the towing
company as provided by ORS 87.152."

		The Klamath Falls Police Department (department) has a
written policy requiring that if police impound a car they must
conduct an inventory of the car's contents before it is towed. 
The policy requires that the inventory be conducted using a
department inventory checklist.  Pursuant to that department
policy and the implementing checklist, the officer conducted an
inventory search of the contents of defendant's car. 

		During the inventory search, the officer discovered two
bindles of methamphetamine between the front seats of the car. 
Police arrested and searched defendant and found more
methamphetamine on his person.  The present charges followed.

		Before trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence of
the controlled substances the police had found in his car and on
his person.  After a hearing, the trial court found in part:

		"The Klamath Falls Police Department has a written
policy that whenever a vehicle is impounded, the
officer must conduct an inventory search of the vehicle
before it is towed.

		"[Officer] Rote had a checklist form issued by the
Klamath Falls Police Department.  The purpose of the
checklist is to remind the officer of all the different
areas of a vehicle he is required to search pursuant to
the inventory search policy.

		"The inventory search policy is an administrative
program designed and systematically administered so
that the officer has no discretion on when, what or
whether to search.

		"Office[r] Rote searched the automobile before the
arrival of the towing company.  Rote followed the
checklist and searched defendant's car, finding
controlled substances in clear plastic baggies between
the two front seats."

Relying primarily on State v. Atkinson, 298 Or 1, 688 P2d 832
(1984), the trial court ruled that the evidence must be
suppressed, because a politically accountable body had not
authorized the department's inventory policy and, therefore, that
the search violated Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution.(1)

		On appeal, the state argued that, although Klamath
Falls City Code section 6.102 does not expressly authorize
inventory searches, such authorization is implicit in the
ordinance.  The Court of Appeals disagreed, relying on its
contrary holding in State v. Cook, discussed infra.  We allowed
the state's petitions for review in the present case and in Cook.

		On review, the state again argues that a police
department's vehicle-inventory policy need not be approved by a
politically accountable legislative or quasi-legislative body,
provided that the initial impoundment of the vehicle is
authorized by a politically accountable body and that the
inventory search was conducted pursuant to a policy that is
properly authorized by the police department and is designed and
systematically administered so that the inventory involves no
exercise of discretion by the officer conducting the inventory
search.  Defendant responds that, without explicit authorization
from an extra-executive, politically accountable body, a police
agency has no authority to adopt an inventory search policy. 
Therefore, defendant reasons, the inventory search in this case
was unauthorized.

		Because it is pivotal to our analysis, we first examine
the Court of Appeals' decision in Cook.  In that case, the
defendant was stopped by Portland police for a traffic infraction
and was arrested when he was unable to produce a valid driver's
license.  The car was impounded.  As in the present case, an
ordinance authorized such an impoundment, although, unlike here,
the Portland ordinance did not create a lien in favor of the
towing company.  Pursuant to a written policy of the Portland
Police Bureau, the officer conducted an inventory search of the
defendant's car and, during that search, discovered evidence that
led to criminal charges being filed against the defendant.  The
trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence.

		On the defendant's appeal in Cook, the Court of Appeals
reversed.  Relying primarily on Atkinson, that court held:

"[W]here politically accountable officials have
authorized impoundments, they may also,
constitutionally, authorize inventories of impounded
property.  Here, the Portland City Council, in enacting
PCC § 16.04.020, did the former, but not the latter. 
Because there was no extra-executive authorization for
the inventory of defendant's car, the search cannot be
sustained as a lawful inventory."  136 Or App at 531
(emphasis in original).

In Cook, as in the present case, the state argued to the Court of
Appeals that, although the Portland ordinance did not expressly
authorize inventory searches of impounded cars, it implicitly
authorized such searches.  The Court of Appeals rejected that
argument, holding that authority for an inventory search had to
be given explicitly by an extra-executive, politically
accountable body.  Cook, 136 Or App at 530-31.

		On review, both parties rely on Atkinson.  At the
outset of its discussion of whether an inventory search
implicates Article I, section 9, the Atkinson court stated:

"It is not our function to decide as a matter of policy
how, and for what purpose, automobiles or other private
property that come into official custody should be
examined.  That is a matter for politically accountable
officials to decide by laws, ordinances, or delegations
of rulemaking authority.  Our role * * * is to assure
that such policies and procedures as are adopted do not
violate constitutional guarantees."  298 Or at 6
(emphasis added).

The Atkinson court held that a police inventory policy adopted by
"responsible policy makers * * * is not inherently 'unreasonable'
within the meaning of Article I, section 9," if it complies with
certain requirements.  Id. at 8.(2)

		Atkinson's first requirement is that the car must be
impounded lawfully.  Id. at 8.  Atkinson emphasizes that, when
determining the source of authority for the custody, or seizure,
of a car, the scope of that authority also is an important
consideration, relating both to the authority to seize and the
authority to search the car.  In that regard, the court provided
the following examples:

		"ORS 483.351 et seq, authorizes police officers to
take custody of 'abandoned' vehicles.  The statute also
authorizes a lien on the vehicle and its contents to
pay storage and towing charges.  The police may then
dispose of both the vehicle and its contents.  Because
of the broad statutory authority conferred, a detailed
inventory of the contents of the vehicle in preparation
for its sale would be permitted. * * * [Emphasis in
original.]

		"Similarly, under ORS 133.663, if the possessory
rights in items seized are disputed, the court may
'impound' the items seized, give notice and hold a
hearing to determine their ownership.  Whenever the
court 'impounds' items seized pursuant to statutes such
as this, a full inventory of their contents is
permissible, subject to the conditions discussed [later
in the Atkinson opinion].  [Emphasis added.]

		"By contrast, where government officials are
allowed only limited authority to take temporary
control of personal property -- such as to move an
automobile after a traffic accident -- the officers'
authority does not extend to conducting a general
inventory of the automobile's contents.  However, if
statutes, ordinances, or other laws provide that
overparked cars can be 'impounded,' inventories of the
contents of cars so impounded also may lawfully be
authorized, including inspection and inventorying the
contents of unlocked glove or trunk compartments and
open containers as set forth [later in the Atkinson
opinion]."  Id. at 9-10 (footnote omitted).  

In short, under Atkinson, the scope of the authority to exercise
control over a car may be instructive in determining whether the
police also may have implied authority to conduct an inventory
search of the car's contents.  As illustrated by the second
example quoted above, Atkinson determined that explicit
authorization to impound a car also implicitly authorizes the
police to conduct an inventory search of the car.

		Atkinson sets forth a second requirement:

"[The inventory] must be conducted pursuant to a
properly authorized administrative program, designed
and systematically administered so that the inventory
involves no exercise of discretion by the law
enforcement person directing or taking the inventory." 
Id. at 10 (citations omitted).  

Further, if the evidence shows that the inventory search deviated
from the established policy or procedures of the particular
police agency, the search should be deemed invalid.  Id.  

	"The scope of the inventory must be limited to that --
an inventory.  Objects found within the inventoried
vehicle should be scrutinized only to the extent
necessary to complete the inventory."  Id.

		Defendant does not challenge the lawfulness of the
Klamath Falls ordinance or of the impoundment of his car pursuant
to it.  Following the Atkinson methodology, therefore, the first
question in this case is whether the City of Klamath Falls'
ordinance, which explicitly granted police the authority to
impound, tow, and store any car when its operator did not have a
valid operator's license, implicitly authorized the inventory
search of defendant's car.  Based on the foregoing analysis, we
conclude that the inventory search of defendant's car satisfied
Atkinson's requirement that an inventory search must be "properly
authorized."  We hold that authority to conduct the inventory
search in these circumstances is implied from the authority
granted to the department by the city to impound defendant's car.

		That brings us to the second question posed by this
case:  whether Atkinson's requirement that an inventory search be
conducted pursuant to a "properly authorized administrative
program" may be satisfied by an inventory policy adopted by the
police agency itself.  From our conclusion that authority to
conduct an inventory search may be implied from authority granted
by the city to impound, it follows that a law enforcement agency
itself may adopt an inventory policy, provided that the policy
comports with Atkinson's other requirements.  Just as police
officers are required to adhere to inventory policies enacted by
a city, county, or state, they also are required to adhere to
inventory policies promulgated by their own agencies.  An
inventory policy, properly adopted by a police agency and
followed by its officers, protects citizens' rights as
effectively as would the same policy, enacted by politically
accountable officials.  Of course, any policy is subject to
judicial review "to assure that such policies and procedures as
are adopted do not violate constitutional guarantees."  Atkinson,
298 Or at 6.

		Our final task is to determine whether the
administrative program promulgated by the department satisfies
Atkinson's requirement that the program be "designed and
systematically administered so that the inventory involves no
exercise of discretion by the law enforcement person directing or
taking the inventory."  Id. at 10.  We conclude that the
department's program satisfies that requirement. 

		For the reasons explained above, we disagree with the
contrary conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals in Cook and
with that court's reliance on Cook in affirming the judgment of
the trial court in the present case.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed.  The case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.

1. 	Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides:

		"No law shall violate the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized."

2. 	This court has explained that "[n]ot all government
intrusions * * * trigger Article I, section 9, protections." 
State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 206, 729 P2d 524 (1986).
/TT>