Case Title: Toledo Bar Assn. v. Harvey

Citation: 2012-Ohio-4545

Docket Number: 2011-1760

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Toledo Bar Assn. v. Harvey, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4545.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-4545 
TOLEDO BAR ASSOCIATION v. HARVEY. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Toledo Bar Assn. v. Harvey,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4545.] 
Attorney misconduct, including failing to act with reasonable diligence in 
representing a client and engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice—One-year suspension, stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2011-1760—Submitted February 7, 2012—Decided October 4, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-012. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Beauregard Maximillion Harvey of Toledo, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0078717, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
2005.  On June 22, 2011, relator, Toledo Bar Association, filed a four-count 
amended complaint charging Harvey with multiple violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 
(requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), 
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1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the 
status of a matter), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice).  All but three of the charged 
violations arose from his alleged failure to timely file documents in 14 bankruptcy 
cases. 
{¶ 2} The parties submitted, and the panel and board adopted, 
stipulations of fact and misconduct with regard to Harvey’s handling of seven 
clients’ bankruptcy cases and one client’s small-claims case.  The panel 
conducted a hearing, however, because Harvey denied having committed 
misconduct in the seven additional bankruptcy cases.  In four of the seven 
contested cases, the panel and board found that Harvey had committed all the 
charged violations; in the fifth case, they found that he had committed two of the 
charged violations; and with respect to the sixth and seventh cases, they found no 
misconduct. 
{¶ 3} Based upon these findings of misconduct, the panel and board 
recommend that we suspend Harvey for one year, with six months stayed on the 
conditions that he submit to monitored probation during the stayed suspension 
and that he commit no further misconduct. We adopt the board’s findings of fact 
and misconduct, but in light of the significant mitigating factors present in this 
case, we find that a one-year suspension fully stayed on the conditions that 
Harvey satisfactorily complete a one-year period of monitored probation and 
commit no further misconduct is the appropriate sanction. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} Harvey stipulates to the fact that his failure to file required 
documents in seven client bankruptcy cases resulted in the closing of those cases 
without discharge.  In addition, Harvey was once verbally admonished on the 
record and was twice sanctioned by the bankruptcy court for his failure to timely 
file documents. 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 5} Harvey testified that during the relevant time period, he did not 
monitor whether he was receiving these documents from his clients in time to 
meet the deadlines for filing them with the bankruptcy court.  Instead, he relied on 
his clients to provide the documents to him in a timely fashion.  And even when 
his clients did timely provide the forms to him, he sometimes failed to submit 
them to the bankruptcy court.  Those are the cases in which Harvey stipulates to 
his misconduct.  Harvey stipulated that this conduct resulted in the closing of 
bankruptcy cases initiated on behalf of clients Kreamer, Sittler, Krieger, Yglasias, 
Bowman, Gibson, and Richardson. 
{¶ 6} In seven bankruptcy cases, however, Harvey claimed that his 
clients were responsible for his failure to file documents.  Specifically, he argued 
that these clients were at fault because they had not given him the documents even 
though they had been advised in both a packet of information he provided at the 
beginning of his representation and in a document they received directly from the 
bankruptcy court of the deadlines for filing the documents and the consequences 
for failing to timely file them.  The panel, however, rejected that argument and 
placed the blame squarely on Harvey in four of the cases, finding that he violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), and 8.4(d) in the cases involving clients Fair, Elchert, 
Daughenbaugh, and Seiler.  The panel noted that Harvey’s clients are laymen who 
had retained Harvey for his expertise, diligence, and competence. 
{¶ 7} With regard to the Freeman case, the panel found that Harvey had 
had difficulty communicating with the client because Freeman did not return 
telephone calls, and, therefore, the panel concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3).  But because Harvey 
had attended the first meeting of creditors with Freeman, the panel found that he 
should have discovered that the client had completed the required financial-
management course and should have requested his certificate of completion.  
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Therefore, the panel concluded that Harvey’s failure to obtain the certificate and 
timely file it with the court violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 and 8.4(d). 
{¶ 8} Regarding the sixth case, involving client Gunn, the panel found 
that Harvey did not violate Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), or 8.4(d), because the 
client had terminated his representation (though Harvey never filed a motion or 
notice of withdrawal with the court) and Harvey had assumed she would file the 
certificate of completion of the required financial-management course herself. 
{¶ 9} In the seventh case, involving client Messenger, the panel found 
that the bankruptcy court had issued three separate show-cause orders due to the 
failure to timely file required documents.  The client did not appear at the final 
show-cause hearing, and the court closed the case.  The panel found that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish that Harvey’s conduct in the Messenger 
case violated the rules as alleged by relator. 
{¶ 10} With respect to count four, the parties stipulated that Harvey had 
failed to file an answer to a counterclaim filed against a client in a small-claims 
action and that as a result, the defendant had obtained a default judgment against 
the client.  Although Harvey later moved the court to vacate that judgment, 
neither he nor his client appeared at the scheduled hearing on the motion to 
vacate, and the default judgment remained in force.  The parties stipulated, and 
the panel agreed, that this conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 and 1.4(a)(3). 
{¶ 11} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct, as 
do we. 
Sanction 
{¶ 12} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
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listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 13} As aggravating factors, the panel and board found that Harvey had 
engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses, and, in some 
instances, had attempted to justify his missing filing deadlines by blaming his 
clients.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c), (d), and (g).  They found the following 
factors to be mitigating: the absence of a prior disciplinary record, the absence of 
a dishonest or selfish motive, Harvey’s cooperative attitude toward the 
disciplinary proceedings, his stipulation to numerous violations, and his timely 
and good-faith effort to both rectify the consequences of his misconduct and alter 
his office practices to prevent future misconduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(a), (b), (c), and (d).  The panel and board noted that in most of the cases, 
Harvey had voluntarily paid the costs for reopening the bankruptcy cases that had 
been closed due to his failure to timely file documents and that he had charged no 
additional fee for his services.  After relator began investigating this case, Harvey 
hired a paralegal and purchased a computer program to track his bankruptcy 
cases.  These office changes make it easier for him to remind bankruptcy clients 
about impending deadlines. 
{¶ 14} Relying primarily upon Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Nance, 124 
Ohio St.3d 57, 2009-Ohio-5957, 918 N.E.2d 1000, relator argued before the panel 
that Harvey’s misconduct warrants a one-year suspension with six months stayed 
on conditions.  In Nance, we imposed that sanction on an attorney who 
mistakenly represented to a bankruptcy court that he had paid the requisite filing 
fee in a case, failed to timely file required documents in two additional 
bankruptcy cases, and was found in contempt for failing to disgorge fees paid in 
each of those cases.  Id. at ¶ 5-10. 
{¶ 15} Harvey argued that his case is different from Nance’s because he 
does not have a disciplinary record, he promptly paid the fees to refile his client’s 
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bankruptcy cases and completed their cases, and he made Dickerson whole.  
Nance, in contrast, waited more than three years to comply with the bankruptcy 
court’s first disgorgement order, and his contempt fines remained outstanding at 
the time of his disciplinary hearing.  Id. at ¶12, 16. 
{¶ 16} The panel and board adopted relator’s proposed sanction.  Harvey 
filed objections to the board’s recommended sanction.  He asserts that the 
sanction is too harsh and that the board erred in not giving mitigating weight to 
the events in his life at the time of the misconduct—his mother’s death and his 
protracted divorce.  Relator, however, contends that these life-events do not 
satisfy the stringent requirements of BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(i) through (iv) 
for a mitigating mental disability. 
{¶ 17} We agree with relator’s contention that Harvey’s stress due to the 
sudden death of his mother at the age of 58 and his protracted divorce proceeding, 
does not qualify as a mitigating mental disability.  We note that in light of the fact 
that there are unique circumstances in each disciplinary case, BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B) directs the board to consider “all relevant factors,” including, but not 
limited to, the factors specifically enumerated in the rule. 
{¶ 18} On at least two occasions, we have accepted the board’s 
recommended sanction in cases in which the board considered stress as a factor in 
mitigation.  In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fidler, 83 Ohio St.3d 396, 700 N.E.2d 323 
(1998), the panel received evidence that the respondent was under great personal 
stress at the time he committed two minor theft offenses.  And in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Spencer, 71 Ohio St.3d 316, 643 N.E.2d 1086 (1994), we adopted 
panel findings that the attorney’s in-laws had been living with him for about five 
months, refusing to work, and causing marital discord.  While we do not accord 
evidence of stressful life events as much weight as evidence of a qualifying 
mental disability, they are, nonetheless, relevant factors that may be considered in 
determining the appropriate sanction for an attorney’s misconduct. 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 19} The primary purpose of the disciplinary process is not to punish 
the offender but to protect the public from lawyers who are unworthy of the trust 
and confidence essential to the attorney-client relationship.  Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-6510, 858 N.E.2d 368, ¶ 10.  
Harvey’s misconduct caused, at the very least, unnecessary aggravation and delay 
to his clients.  But in light of the significant mitigating factors in this case—
including the stress caused by his divorce and the sudden death of his mother, but 
most importantly, Harvey’s efforts to remedy the effects of his mistakes and 
ensure that he does not make similar mistakes in the future—we believe that a 
one-year suspension, all stayed on the conditions that he commit no further 
misconduct and submit to a one-year period of monitored probation in accordance 
with Gov.Bar R. V(9), with particular emphasis on the oversight of Harvey’s 
case-management system, will sufficiently protect the public. 
{¶ 20} Accordingly, Beauregard Maximillion Harvey is hereby suspended 
from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, but the suspension is stayed on the 
conditions that he commit no further misconduct and submit to a one-year period 
of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(9).  If Harvey fails to 
comply with the conditions of the stay, the stay will be lifted, and he will serve 
the entire one-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to Harvey. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Michael A. Bonfiglio, Bar Counsel; and Barry & Feit and Gordon R. 
Barry, for relator. 
Beauregard Maximillion Harvey, pro se. 
______________________