Case Title: People v. Birge

Citation: 2021 IL 125644

Docket Number: 125644

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2021-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 IL 125644 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
(Docket No. 125644) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
BRIAN BIRGE, Appellant. 
Opinion filed February 19, 2021. 
JUSTICE MICHAEL J. BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Garman, Theis, Overstreet, and 
Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
Justice Neville dissented, with opinion. 
OPINION 
¶ 1 
Following a jury trial, defendant Brian Birge was convicted of burglary (720 
ILCS 5/19-1(a), (b) (West 2014)) and arson (id. § 20-1(a)(1), (c)), both Class 2 
felonies carrying mandatory class X sentencing based on defendant’s criminal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
history (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2014)). The Livingston County circuit court 
sentenced defendant to 24 years and 6 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be 
served concurrently, and further ordered defendant to pay the victim $117,230 in 
restitution. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that (1) the trial court failed to 
properly admonish the jurors in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 
431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012), (2) contrary to the statutory requirement, the restitution 
order lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis for the amount imposed (730 ILCS 5/5­
5-6(f) (West 2014)), and (3) defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to 
the restitution order. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s convictions and 
rejected his restitution argument. 2019 IL App (4th) 170341-U. 
¶ 2 
We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. 
Oct. 1, 2019). For the following reasons, we hold that the jurors were correctly 
admonished pursuant to Rule 431(b). The restitution order, however, was 
erroneously entered due to the lack of a sufficient evidentiary basis, which thereby 
affected the integrity of the judicial process and the fairness of the restitution 
portion of the sentencing proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the 
appellate court’s judgment that affirmed defendant’s convictions. But we vacate the 
restitution portion of the circuit court’s sentencing order and remand for a new 
hearing on that matter. 
¶ 3 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 4 
In February 2017, the case against defendant proceeded to a jury trial on the 
charges of burglary and arson. During voir dire, the trial court separated the venire 
into two groups of 16 each. It admonished the first group regarding the principles 
enumerated in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) as follows: 
“THE COURT: This is a criminal case as I mentioned. The defendant is 
presumed innocent. There are a number of propositions of law that you must be 
willing to follow if you are going to serve as a juror in this case. So I am going 
to recite those for you now. Please listen carefully as I will be asking if you 
understand these principles of law and if you accept these principles of law. 
- 2 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A person accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent of the charge 
against him. The fact that a charge has been made is not to be considered as any 
evidence or presumption of guilt against the Defendant. 
The presumption of innocence stays with the Defendant throughout the trial 
and is not overcome unless from all of the evidence you believe the State proved 
the Defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The State has the burden of proving the Defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The defendant does not have to prove his innocence. The 
Defendant does not have to present any evidence on his own behalf and does 
not have to testify if he does not wish to. If the Defendant does not testify, that 
fact must not be considered by you in any way in arriving at your verdict. 
So by a show of hands, do each of you understand these principles of law? 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS: (All hands raised.) 
THE COURT: Okay. And do each of you accept these principles of law? 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS: (All hands raised.)” 
¶ 5 
Defense counsel also questioned these same prospective jurors, asking whether 
they understood that defendant is presumed innocent and that the State had to prove 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. All potential jurors raised their hands, 
indicating that they understood those principles. Nine jurors were selected from this 
first group. 
¶ 6 
The court then brought in a second group of 16 prospective jurors and 
admonished them in the same manner as it did the first group. It again asked, “By 
a show of hands, do each of you understand these principles of law?” All 16 of 
these venire members raised their hands. The court next asked, “Do each of you 
accept these principles of law?” All 16 venire members raised their hands again. 
When defense counsel questioned these prospective jurors, he too asked if they 
understood that defendant is presumed innocent and that the State must prove 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. All 16 raised their hands to indicate 
that they understood those principles. From this group, three jurors and one 
alternate were selected. And the case proceeded to trial. 
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¶ 7 
Pontiac police sergeant Brad Baird testified at trial that he was on routine patrol 
on May 28, 2016, around 1:30 a.m., when he was flagged down by Willie Williams, 
who reported that a nearby store known as Chief City Vapor was on fire. Sergeant 
Baird went to the location and noticed that smoke and flames were coming from 
the building, the door was ajar, and broken glass lay scattered on the floor of the 
entryway. Nobody was in the building at the time. A trail of merchandise outside 
the store led to the southeast of the building, where there where several boxes with 
hundreds of items. 
¶ 8 
Officer Jonathan Marion testified that he was on duty at the time in question 
when he responded to a report from Sergeant Baird of a structure on fire at Chief 
City Vapor. Officer Marion arrived at the scene and saw heavy smoke and flames 
showing from inside the building. Officer Marion testified that Sergeant Baird, 
another officer, and the person who had flagged down Baird on the street were 
already at the scene when Marion arrived. The only other person in the vicinity was 
defendant, who was one block south of Chief City Vapor. Officer Marion 
approached defendant and noticed that he appeared nervous and was sweating 
profusely. Blood was dripping from his hand. Defendant told Marion that he cut his 
hand while working on a lawn mower. Marion testified that defendant was wearing 
shorts, a coat, and a hoodie. Glass shards and plastic tags were stuck to his clothing 
and legs. Defendant consented to a search of his person. Officer Marion recovered 
two pairs of pliers, a large amount of change, a set of keys, a lighter, and $115 in 
cash. Three of the keys recovered from defendant were for opening the locks for 
storage units on the property of Chief City Vapor. 
¶ 9 
Detective Michael Henson testified that he investigated the Chief City Vapor 
burglary after the fire was extinguished. Several stacks of clear plastic tags that read 
“sealed for your protection” were strewn about, both inside and outside the store. 
The tags were just like the ones that Officer Marion had recovered from defendant’s 
person. Henson also received keys recovered from defendant and learned that they 
opened an exterior garage and storage unit connected to Chief City Vapor. Finally, 
Henson testified that the store’s video surveillance system was badly damaged in 
the fire and that he was therefore unable to obtain any video of the crime. He 
decided against making further efforts to obtain surveillance video of the incident 
because the recovery attempt would be both costly and unlikely to be successful. 
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¶ 10 
Tom Roe testified he owned the business known as Chief City Vapor but that 
his father owned the building that the business was located in. Roe did not give 
anyone permission to enter the building after the store closed on the night of the 
fire. Roe kept some change and approximately $100 in cash in the store’s cash 
register. The keys discovered on defendant’s person unlocked the outbuildings on 
the property and were always kept in Roe’s desk, located inside the building. The 
trail of items found outside the building were the property of his business. That 
included the clear plastic tags (which were stored on shelves and used to seal bottles 
of vaping liquid). When asked about the damage the fire caused, Roe testified that 
he “had to gut the entire building down to pulling studs, pulling insulation, 
furnace.” He further stated that “everything was lost,” including the merchandise 
and furniture. 
¶ 11 
Shane Arndt, an arson investigator, testified that the Chief City Vapor fire was 
caused by someone introducing an open flame to the couch inside the store. He 
ruled out any accidental ignition source, such as faulty wiring or a furnace. The 
only potential source he could not rule out was the possibility that the disposable 
lighter recovered from defendant had been used to set the fire. He also testified that 
the glass door to the business was broken prior to the fire because the shattered 
glass on the floor did not have any smoke damage. 
¶ 12 
Defendant testified that he had overdosed on drugs approximately 12 hours 
prior to the fire and had been hospitalized. After discharge, defendant’s mother 
dropped him off at “Aly Anne’s” gambling parlor, which was located close to 
where Officer Marion later questioned defendant. Defendant testified that he did 
not remember many of the details from the relevant time because he was heavily 
medicated, drinking, and using drugs. He remembered leaving the gambling parlor 
and walking to his sister’s house. Defendant knocked on the door, but his sister did 
not answer, so he decided to return to Aly Anne’s to continue gambling. On his 
walk back, he observed some “commotion” and people running back and forth from 
a vehicle parked near Chief City Vapor. He watched as they drove away. Defendant 
then noticed stuff scattered outside. One of the items was a jacket, which he put on. 
He went through the pockets of the jacket and cut his hand on glass. 
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¶ 13 
Defendant further testified that he remembered talking to Officer Marion “a 
little bit” but did not recall discussing the cut on his hand. Defendant denied any 
involvement with the fire and testified that he never set foot on the property. 
¶ 14 
The jury found defendant guilty of both charges. At the sentencing hearing, a 
presentence investigation report (PSI) was admitted without objection. It showed 
defendant had four prior felony convictions—aggravated criminal sexual abuse, 
residential burglary, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and theft. 
Defendant reported no physical or mental health issues but did report a history of 
substance abuse. The PSI recommended that the trial court order defendant to pay 
restitution to the victim. Although a letter had been sent to the victim requesting 
information about restitution, the victim did not respond. The PSI noted that 
defendant may have difficulty paying restitution. 
¶ 15 
The trial court sentenced defendant on both counts to 24 years and 6 months’ 
imprisonment, with the sentences to run concurrently. The court also ordered 
defendant to pay $117,230 in restitution. The restitution order stated as follows: 
“Defendant shall pay all said restitution *** in any event within five (5) years after 
this date, and as follows: *** full payment within 12 months after defendant’s 
release from imprisonment in this case.” 
¶ 16 
Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court’s Rule 431(b) 
admonishments, which grouped the principles enunciated in the rule into one 
statement, constituted plain error. He maintained that the court should have recited 
each of the four principles in the rule individually and asked the venire members if 
they understood and accepted each principle after each was recited. He also argued 
that the circuit court erred in ordering restitution without sufficient evidentiary 
support or, in the alternative, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the State’s recommended restitution order. Defendant conceded before the 
appellate court that he did not object to the Rule 431(b) admonishments or the 
restitution order and, further, that he failed to raise the issues in a posttrial motion, 
but he asked the court to nevertheless consider these arguments under the plain-
error doctrine. 
¶ 17 
In response, the State argued that Rule 431(b) does not require the court to recite 
each principle separately and consequently no error, much less plain error, 
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occurred. The State, however, conceded that the case should be remanded to the 
circuit court for a new hearing to substantiate the amount of restitution ordered. 
¶ 18 
The appellate court agreed defendant forfeited his claims; it then reviewed them 
for plain error. 2019 IL App (4th) 170341-U, ¶¶ 28, 57. With respect to the Rule 
431(b) admonishments, it found that no clear or obvious error occurred because the 
circuit court’s admonishments satisfied the requirements of the rule. Id. ¶¶ 32, 34. 
It concluded that the circuit court complied with the “ ‘specific question and 
response’ ” process outlined in People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 607 (2010), 
and People v. Curry, 2013 IL App (4th) 120724, ¶ 65 (which recommended first 
reading verbatim all four principles to the venire members and then confirming that 
they understood and accepted those principles). 2019 IL App (4th) 170341-U, 
¶¶ 31-32 (quoting Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 607). 
¶ 19 
The appellate court also rejected defendant’s request to excuse his forfeiture of 
the restitution argument as second-prong plain error. Id. ¶ 60. It found that the 
alleged error—the lack of some receipt or testimony in the record proving the 
restitution amount—was not sufficiently grave that it denied defendant a fair trial. 
Id. The appellate court also found that defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim failed. Id. ¶ 55. Even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient, 
defendant could not demonstrate prejudice—the appellate court reasoned—where 
defendant failed to allege that the amount of restitution was incorrect or that the 
outcome of the sentencing hearing would have been any different had counsel 
objected to the restitution order, especially in light of the victim’s testimony that he 
had to “ ‘gut the entire building’ and ‘everything was lost’ in the fire.” Id. 
¶ 20 
As noted above, we granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. 
¶ 21 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 22 
I. Admonishments Under Rule 431(b) 
¶ 23 
Before this court, defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admonishing 
the venire under Rule 431(b) because, by grouping the principles into one broad 
statement of law, the court failed to ensure that the potential jurors understood and 
accepted each of the four distinct concepts enumerated in the rule. Defendant 
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concedes that he forfeited this argument by failing to object at trial and by failing 
to raise the alleged error in a posttrial motion but asks this court to review it under 
the first prong of the plain-error doctrine. 
¶ 24 
It is well settled that, under the plain-error doctrine, a reviewing court may 
consider an unpreserved error if (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the 
evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of 
justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear 
or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of 
the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless 
of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564-65 
(2007). Under either prong, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion. 
Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 613. However, a violation of Rule 431(b) is not a second-
prong, structural error that requires automatic reversal under a plain-error analysis. 
Id. at 608, 611 (decided under amended version of Rule 431(b)); People v. Glasper, 
234 Ill. 2d 173, 199-200 (2009) (decided under preamendment version of the rule). 
The first step under either prong of the plain-error doctrine in a case involving an 
alleged Rule 431(b) violation is to assess if a clear or obvious error occurred 
(People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49), and our review of the matter is de novo 
(People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934, ¶ 15). 
¶ 25 
Determining whether the circuit court erred by reciting all four Rule 431(b) 
principles together to the group of prospective jurors requires this court to construe 
the rule. See Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 606. The same well-settled canons of 
statutory construction that are employed for interpreting statutes apply as well when 
a reviewing court is tasked with construing Illinois Supreme Court rules. Id. As 
always, the chief objective of this court is to ascertain and give effect to the intent 
of the drafters. Id. The best indication of that intent is the language of the rule itself, 
giving it its plain and ordinary meaning. When the plain language of the rule is 
unambiguous, it will be applied as written without resort to any other aids of 
construction. Id. 
¶ 26 
Rule 431(b) states as follows: 
“The court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in a group, whether 
that juror understands and accepts the following principles: (1) that the 
defendant is presumed innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; (2) that 
- 8 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
before a defendant can be convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer any 
evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that if a defendant does not testify it 
cannot be held against him or her; however, no inquiry of a prospective juror 
shall be made into the defendant’s decision not to testify when the defendant 
objects. 
The court’s method of inquiry shall provide each juror an opportunity to 
respond to specific questions concerning the principles set out in this section.” 
Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). 
¶ 27 
Here, the circuit court read the specific principles set forth in the rule verbatim 
to the prospective jurors and asked the specific questions required by the rule. Each 
of the prospective jurors indicated that they understood and accepted those 
principles by a show of hands. The rule plainly states that the court can ask the 
questions to the potential jurors as a group, and the rule does not require that their 
response be conveyed orally rather than by a show of hands. We believe that the 
procedure followed by the circuit court was all that was required by the plain 
language of the rule, and we therefore find that defendant’s argument must be 
rejected. 
¶ 28 
This conclusion is consistent with the committee comments to the rule and our 
case law on the subject. The committee comments state that the intent of the rule is 
“to ensure compliance with the requirements of People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472 
(1984).” Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b), Committee Comments. The comments further state 
that the rule “seeks to end the practice where the judge makes a broad statement of 
the applicable law followed by a general question concerning the juror’s 
willingness to follow the law.” Id. 
¶ 29 
In Zehr, this court observed the following: 
“[E]ssential to the qualification of jurors in a criminal case is that they know 
that a defendant is presumed innocent, that he is not required to offer any 
evidence in his own behalf, that he must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that his failure to testify in his own behalf cannot be held against 
him. If a juror has a prejudice against any of these basic guarantees, an 
- 9 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
instruction given at the end of the trial will have little curative effect.” People 
v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472, 477 (1984). 
¶ 30 
After setting forth the above-mentioned precepts, the Zehr court found that it 
was error not to submit to the prospective jurors the questions tendered by defense 
counsel during voir dire about these principles. Id. at 477-78. It was not enough 
that the potential jurors were generally “asked whether they would follow the law 
as given them by the court even though they might personally disagree with it and 
whether any reason, moral, religious or otherwise, would prevent their being fair 
and impartial.” Id. at 477. 
¶ 31 
The holding in Zehr was subsequently codified in our Rule 431(b). See 
Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 617 (Burke, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman, J.). As 
originally adopted, Rule 431(b) required the trial court to ask the Zehr questions 
only upon a request by the defendant. Id. at 617-18. This court, however, amended 
the rule in 2007 to impose an affirmative duty on trial courts to sua sponte ask 
potential jurors whether they “understood and accepted the principles.” Id. at 618 
(citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007)). 
¶ 32 
In Thompson, this court had the opportunity to address a violation of the same 
amended version of Rule 431(b) that is at issue in the present case. The trial court 
in Thompson did not ask any of the prospective jurors whether they “accepted” the 
principle set forth in the rule dealing with the presumption of innocence. Id. at 607 
(majority opinion). And, “[m]ost notably, the trial court did not question any of the 
prospective jurors on the third principle, whether they understood and accepted that 
defendant was not required to produce any evidence on his behalf.” Id. This court 
found that “[t]he failure to address the third principle, by itself, constitutes 
noncompliance with the rule.” Id. 
¶ 33 
Thompson construed Rule 431(b) to mandate a “specific question and response 
process.” Id. “The trial court must ask each potential juror whether he or she 
understands and accepts each of the principles in the rule.” (Emphasis added.) Id. 
Additionally, “the rule requires an opportunity for a response from each 
prospective juror on their understanding and acceptance of those principles.” 
(Emphasis added.) Id. 
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¶ 34 
Defendant relies upon Thompson in support of his position. But neither 
Thompson nor any other case decided by this court has held that the trial court must 
recite the principles separately to the prospective jurors, and the plain language of 
the rule, as we have already noted, does not require the court to explain the 
principles to the jurors in any particular fashion. Under the plain language, a court 
complies with Rule 431(b) if it (1) instructs the prospective jurors on the four 
principles, (2) asks if the prospective jurors understand those principles, and 
(3) asks if the prospective jurors accept those principles. Again, there is no 
requirement that the trial court recite the four principles separately. 
¶ 35 
Our construction of the rule is consistent with the appellate court decisions 
addressing the issue. All agree that reciting the Rule 431(b) principles together 
satisfies the requirements of the rule. See, e.g., People v. Kinnerson, 2020 IL App 
(4th) 170650, ¶ 62 (held trial court need not recite each principle separately); 
People v. Choate, 2018 IL App (5th) 150087, ¶ 44 (combining principles is not a 
per se violation of Rule 431(b)); People v. Smith, 2012 IL App (1st) 102354, ¶ 105 
(Rule 431(b) does not mandate separate questioning for each principle); People v. 
Davis, 405 Ill. App. 3d 585, 590 (2010) (court is not required to separate the 
principles). We do note that some appellate court decisions have suggested that the 
better practice is to separate the principles and ask, after each principle is read one 
at a time, if the jurors understood and accepted each principle individually. See, 
e.g., People v. Perry, 2011 IL App (1st) 081228, ¶ 74 (opining that the “better 
practice” would be for the court to ask the jurors if they “understand and accept 
each of the principles, after each principle is read”). But again, none of these 
decisions holds definitively that not separating the principles constitutes a violation 
of Rule 431(b). 
¶ 36 
Defendant cites several cases in an attempt to show a conflict among appellate 
court panels on how the four principles ought to be presented, but none of these 
cases supports his position. Rather than finding error in how the court presented the 
four principles, each of his cited cases found error because the trial court failed to 
ask if the prospective jurors understood and accepted all four principles or omitted 
a principle altogether. See, e.g., People v. Othman, 2020 IL App (1st) 150823-B, 
¶¶ 65-66 (court failed to ask if jurors understood one of the principles and failed to 
ask if they accepted another); People v. Lampley, 2011 IL App (1st) 090661-B, ¶ 35 
(court failed to ask if jurors understood and accepted the principles and instead 
- 11 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
asked if they had “ ‘any problems’ ” with the principles); People v. McCovins, 2011 
IL App (1st) 081805-B, ¶ 36 (court provided prospective jurors with a broad 
statement of the law “interspersed with commentary on courtroom procedure and 
the trial schedule, and then concluded with a general question about the potential 
jurors’ willingness to follow the law”); Perry, 2011 IL App (1st) 081228, ¶ 73 
(asked general questions about jurors’ willingness to follow the law but did not ask 
specifically whether they understood and accepted the principles); People v. Hayes, 
409 Ill. App. 3d 612, 626-27 (2011) (finding error when the court combined the 
first three principles into one broad principle and failed to ask if prospective jurors 
“accepted” that principle); People v. Johnson, 408 Ill. App. 3d 157, 171 (2010) 
(court failed to ask if the prospective jurors understood and accepted any of the 
principles and omitted the fourth principle altogether). Unlike the trial courts in the 
above-noted appellate cases cited by defendant, the trial court in this case presented 
the Rule 431(b) principles to the venire members without eliminating any one of 
them, without interspersing the principles with other instructions, and without 
failing to ask whether the venire understood and accepted the principles. 
¶ 37 
Defendant reiterates the criticism expressed in the committee comments of our 
rule toward the past practice of trial judges making a broad statement of applicable 
law during voir dire followed by a general question about the potential juror’s 
willingness to follow the law. Defendant intimates that the instant trial judge’s 
verbatim recital of the Rule 431(b) criteria was akin to the broad statement and 
general question condemned by the committee comments. 
¶ 38 
But we find no merit to defendant’s argument and find no such cause for 
concern under the circumstances of the present case. Here, the trial court did not 
provide a “broad statement of applicable law.” Nor did it follow those four 
principles in the rule with “a general question concerning the juror’s willingness to 
follow the law.” Rather, the trial court carefully recited the four specific principles 
in the rule verbatim and then asked specific questions about whether the jurors 
accepted and understood those principles. Nor are there present any of the concerns 
involved in Zehr where the trial court in that case did not admonish about the four 
principles but instead asked a general question about whether the jurors would be 
willing to follow the law given to them. See Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 477. 
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¶ 39 
Defendant also argues that the four principles in the rule involve “abstract and 
complicated concepts, which an ordinary layperson might struggle to take in.” He 
maintains that grouping the principles together undermines the purpose of the rule, 
which is to exclude any juror “who is prejudiced against these bedrock principles.” 
¶ 40 
We disagree that the purpose of the rule was undermined by reciting the 
principles together or that there was any danger of confusion by doing so. The 
“bedrock principles” defendant refers to are concepts that are familiar to the 
average layperson and relatively easy to understand. Jurors are often presented with 
far more numerous, and far more complicated, instructions at trial. Yet jurors are 
presumed to follow those instructions. See People v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414, 438 
(1995). 
¶ 41 
In Zehr, and again in Thompson, this court stated that it is the prospective jurors’ 
understanding and acceptance of the bedrock principles that is essential to ensuring 
that the jurors are fair and impartial. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 477; Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 
at 609. Here, the prospective jurors expressed their understanding and acceptance 
of the principles by a show of hands. Nothing in the record suggests that the jurors 
were confused by the court’s presentation of the Rule 431(b) principles. And 
defense counsel asked follow-up questions about the presumption of innocence and 
the burden of proof to ensure to his satisfaction that the prospective jurors 
understood those principles. In sum, we find no merit to defendant’s argument that 
the purpose of the rule is thwarted by reciting the four principles together. 
¶ 42 
Because we find that no error occurred with respect to this matter, we need not 
address defendant’s argument on the remaining portion of the first prong of the 
plain-error analysis as to whether the evidence presented at his trial was closely 
balanced. 
¶ 43 
II. Restitution 
¶ 44 
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $117,230 
in restitution without any evidentiary support for awarding that amount. Once 
again, defendant recognizes that he did not properly preserve the claim but now 
argues that it is reviewable under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine. As 
noted above, under the second prong of the doctrine, we may consider a forfeited 
- 13 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
claim when “a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious it affected 
the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial 
process.” Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. 
¶ 45 
In response, the State concedes both that (1) the trial court erred in ordering 
defendant to pay the amount of restitution imposed without any evidentiary basis 
for it and (2) defendant was denied a fair sentencing hearing because of the error. 
Citing People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 48-49 (2009), both defendant and the State 
urge that the proper remedy is for this court to remand the cause to the circuit court 
for a compliant hearing limited to the amount of restitution to be imposed. 
¶ 46 
We agree that a plain error occurred, affecting the integrity of the judicial 
process and the fairness of the proceeding; therefore, we find that the cause must 
be remanded for a new hearing on restitution. 
¶ 47 
As a component of the sentence, a trial court may order a defendant to pay 
restitution for an economic loss caused by his criminal conduct. 730 ILCS 5/5-5­
6(a) (West 2014); see also People v. Brooks, 158 Ill. 2d 260, 265 (1994). Section 
5-5-6(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections, however, provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
“In fixing the amount of restitution to be paid in cash, *** the court shall assess 
the actual out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, and injuries suffered by the 
victim named in the charge and any other victims who may also have suffered 
out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, and injuries proximately caused by 
the same criminal conduct of defendant ***.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5­
5-6(b) (West 2014). 
C.f. Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “assess” as “[t]o calculate 
the amount *** of (a tax, fine, etc.)”). 
¶ 48 
According to the statute’s plain language, the trial court must evaluate the actual 
costs incurred by the victim and cannot rely on conjecture or speculation as to the 
amount to be awarded. See People v. Dickey, 2011 IL App (3d) 100397, ¶ 25. To 
satisfy the requirement, then, the trial court must receive sufficient information to 
evaluate the accuracy of the victim’s restitution claim. 
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¶ 49 
Here, there was no numerical evidence presented of the victim’s losses. Roe did 
testify about the damages to his merchandise, the furniture, and his father’s 
building. But his testimony merely described the general damage that occurred. It 
did not ultimately assist in calculating the cost of his actual losses. As the restitution 
amount awarded had no actual basis in the trial or sentencing evidence and was 
simply declared by the prosecutor and accepted by the sentencing court, we find 
that the restitution order requiring defendant to pay $117,230 was clear error. 
¶ 50 
We do note that there is a split of authority among appellate court panels over 
whether the lack of sufficient evidentiary support for a restitution order is an error 
so serious that it affects the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenges the 
integrity of the judicial process. Compare People v. Jones, 206 Ill. App. 3d 477, 
482 (1990) (under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine, a forfeited claim 
that the restitution order lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis is reviewable), with 
People v. Hanson, 2014 IL App (4th) 130330, ¶¶ 36, 40 (declining to follow Jones 
and instead finding that the restitution claim was not reviewable as plain error 
because it was not sufficiently grave that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial). 
We find that Jones took the correct approach. Accordingly, we now overrule 
Hanson. 
¶ 51 
Our conclusion is supported by an analogous decision of this court in Lewis, 
234 Ill. 2d at 47-49, which held that an unpreserved challenge to the assessment of 
a street-value fine was a plain error that affected the integrity of the judicial process 
and the fairness of the proceeding. In resolving the claim, this court noted that the 
relevant statute provided that the street-value fine “ ‘shall be determined by the 
court on the basis of testimony of law enforcement personnel and the defendant as 
to the amount seized and such testimony as may be required by the court as to the 
current street value of the *** controlled substance seized.” Id. at 44 (quoting 730 
ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(a) (West 2004)). This court then found that the clear statutory 
language required some evidentiary basis for the circuit court to determine the 
current street value of the contraband and, as there was no such evidence before it, 
the circuit court clearly erred in ordering the street-value fine. Id. at 46-47. 
¶ 52 
Lewis then held as follows: 
“The error here is more than a simple mistake in setting the fine. Rather, it 
is a failure to provide a fair process for determining the fine based on the current 
- 15 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
street value of the controlled substance. Plain-error review is appropriate 
because imposing the fine without any evidentiary support in contravention of 
the statute implicates the right to a fair sentencing hearing. [Citation.] The 
integrity of the judicial process is also affected when a decision is not based on 
applicable standards and evidence, but appears to be arbitrary.” Id. at 48. 
In concluding that plain-error review was appropriate, Lewis further determined 
that “[a]n error may involve a relatively small amount of money or unimportant 
matter, but still affect the integrity of the judicial process and the fairness of the 
proceeding if the controversy is determined in an arbitrary or unreasoned manner.” 
Id. Finally, Lewis determined that the appropriate remedy was to vacate the street-
value fine and to remand the cause for imposition of a new fine based on evidence 
of the street value of the drugs seized. Id. at 49. 
¶ 53 
Similar to the street-value statute at issue in Lewis, the restitution statute in the 
instant case requires the trial court to determine the amount of restitution based on 
such factors as “actual out-of-pocket expenses, losses, [and] damages.” 730 ILCS 
5/5-5-6(b) (West 2014). In light of our holding in Lewis, we vacate the restitution 
order in the present case and remand to the circuit court for a new hearing and a 
determination as to the appropriate amount of restitution owed. 
¶ 54 
Our resolution of this issue makes it unnecessary to address defendant’s 
remaining claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to 
object to the restitution order. 
¶ 55 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 56 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellate court correctly found that 
no error occurred in the admonishments given to the prospective jurors pursuant to 
Rule 431(b). However, the restitution order requiring defendant to pay $117,230 
was entered erroneously without sufficient evidentiary support and constituted 
plain error. The appellate court consequently erred in affirming that restitution 
order. The restitution order must therefore be vacated and the cause remanded for 
a new hearing on restitution. 
- 16 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 57 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court in part and reverse 
in part and remand the cause to the circuit court for a new hearing on the amount 
of restitution to be imposed. 
¶ 58 
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
¶ 59 
Circuit court judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
¶ 60 
Cause remanded with directions. 
¶ 61 
JUSTICE NEVILLE, dissenting: 
¶ 62 
The majority holds that the trial court did not err during voir dire because the 
voir dire procedure employed by the trial court was all that is required by Illinois 
Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) and the jurors were properly 
admonished by the trial court. I disagree with the majority’s holding. 
¶ 63 
First, I believe the trial court erred when it (1) conducted group rather than 
individual questioning of each of the 32 prospective jurors; (2) asked two sets of 16 
prospective jurors two compound questions about each of the four principles in 
Rule 431(b) and elicited no information about the jurors’ beliefs and opinions 
because it accepted silent, nonverbal, show-of-hands group answers from the 32 
jurors to the two compound questions; (3) inferred from the prospective jurors’ 
silent, nonverbal, show-of-hands group answers that the prospective jurors 
understood the four legal principles; (4) used silent, nonverbal, show-of-hands 
group answers, which precluded a record about each juror’s biases and prejudices 
and left the trial court and this court with no information to evaluate each juror’s 
qualifications to serve impartially on a jury; (5) failed to read the four principles 
verbatim when it read the four principles and omitted the numbers separating the 
principles; (6) omitted the numbers separating the four principles and by doing so 
collapsed the four Rule 431(b) principles into one broad statement; (7) failed to 
read the four principles verbatim when it added words to the four legal principles; 
(8) abdicated its duty to determine the 32 jurors’ knowledge of the four principles 
and their biases and prejudices by permitting the 32 jurors to provide silent, 
nonverbal, show-of-hands group answers to two compound questions, which did 
- 17 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
not provide information for the court to assess credibility, and therefore, the jurors’ 
silent, nonverbal, group, show-of-hands answers did not provide the trial court with 
information to make a judicial decision about the 32 jurors’ impartiality. I believe 
that the aforementioned errors individually constitute clear and obvious errors and, 
collectively, they rise to the level of second prong plain error, or structural error, 
because they denied defendant his right to a fair trial. People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 
2d 598, 614, (2010) (“A finding that defendant was tried by a biased jury would 
certainly satisfy the second prong of plain-error review because it would affect his 
right to a fair trial and challenge the integrity of the judicial process.”). 
¶ 64 
Second, because the evidence in this case is circumstantial and because there is 
no eyewitness testimony or forensic or video evidence that establishes defendant 
committed the burglary and arson, the evidence in this case can only be considered 
closely balanced. Because I find error under both the first and second prong of the 
plain-error doctrine, I would reverse defendant’s conviction and remand for a new 
trial. 
¶ 65 
Finally, I believe that Rule 431(b) is unconstitutional on its face because the 
rule permits group questioning of jurors and silent, nonverbal, show-of-hands 
answers and because that procedure prevents the trial court from obtaining 
information about each prospective juror’s biases and opinions. I believe that Rule 
431(b) must be amended to codify a voir dire procedure that protects a defendant’s 
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
¶ 66 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶ 67 
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) requires the trial court to 
“conduct voir dire examination of prospective jurors by putting to them questions 
it thinks appropriate, touching upon their qualifications to serve as jurors in the case 
at trial.” The court must allow the parties to examine the prospective jurors for a 
reasonable period of time. Id. But the court must specifically ask “each potential 
juror, individually or in a group, whether that juror understands and accepts” four 
legal principles. Id. The text of the rule then enumerates each of those principles: 
“(1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; 
(2) that before a defendant can be convicted the State must prove the defendant 
- 18 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer 
any evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that if a defendant does not 
testify it cannot be held against him or her; however, no inquiry of a prospective 
juror shall be made into the defendant’s decision not to testify when the 
defendant objects.” Id. 
¶ 68 
Additionally, Rule 431(b) explains how the trial court should elicit information 
from prospective jurors: “The court’s method of inquiry shall provide each juror an 
opportunity to respond to specific questions concerning the principles set out in this 
section.” (Emphases added.) Id. 
¶ 69 
A. The Trial Court’s Application of Rule 431(b) 
¶ 70 
In this case, the trial court conducted voir dire by questioning 32 prospective 
jurors in two panels consisting of 16 jurors each. The record reveals the trial court 
admonished the first panel of 16 prospective jurors as follows: 
“THE COURT: This is a criminal case as I mentioned. The Defendant is 
presumed innocent. There are a number of propositions of law that you must be 
willing to follow if you are going to serve as a juror in this case. So I am going 
to recite those for you now. Please listen carefully as I will be asking if you 
understand these principles of law and if you accept these principles of law. 
A person accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent of the charge 
against him. The fact that a charge has been made is not to be considered as any 
evidence or presumption of guilt against the defendant. 
The presumption of innocence stays with the defendant throughout the trial 
and is not overcome unless from all of the evidence you believe the State proved 
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The State has the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The defendant does not have to prove his innocence. The 
defendant does not have to present any evidence on his own behalf and does 
not have to testify if he does not wish to. If the defendant does not testify, that 
fact must not be considered by you in arriving at your verdict. 
- 19 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So by a show of hands, do each of you understand these principles of law? 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS: (All hands raised). 
THE COURT: Okay. And do each of you accept these principles of law? 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS: (All hands raised). 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.” 
Next, the trial court instructed the second panel of 16 jurors as follows: 
“THE COURT: All right. Again, I have to recite the propositions of law 
with you because, well, because I am required to, but also because it’s very 
important. So please listen carefully. 
A person accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent of the charge 
against them. The fact that a charge has been made is not to be considered as 
any evidence or presumption of guilt against the defendant. 
The presumption of innocence stays with the defendant throughout the trial 
and is not overcome unless from all of the evidence you believe the State proved 
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The State has the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The defendant does not have to prove his innocence. The 
defendant does not have to present any evidence on his own behalf and does 
not have to testify if he does not wish to. If the defendant does not wish to 
testify, that fact must not be considered by you in any way in arriving at a 
verdict. 
So by a show of hands, do each of you understand these principles of law? 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS: (All hands raised). 
THE COURT: And do each of you accept these principles of law? 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS: (All hands raised). 
THE COURT: All hands have gone up. Thank you.” 
- 20 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 71 
The trial judge’s admonishments make it clear that the trial judge read the four 
principles but omitted the numbers that separate the principles. Compare Ill. S. Ct. 
R. 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012), with supra ¶¶ 69-70. The trial judge not only omitted 
the numbers that separated the four principles but included her own thoughts about 
the rules, and the judge’s comments are not included in the rule. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 
431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). Finally, the trial court’s admonishments are not a 
verbatim reading; by omitting the numbers from the four principles, the trial judge’s 
admonishment became one long statement of the principles that is not separated by 
numbers and was interspersed with the judge’s personal comments. See Ill. S. Ct. 
R. 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). 
¶ 72 
After the trial court’s voir dire, the court permitted defense counsel to question 
the prospective jurors regarding the principles. Defense counsel only asked the 
following group questions: 
“MR. BERTRAM [(DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY)]: First of all, and if 
you agree, please raise your hand like you’ve done before here. Do all of you 
understand as my client sits here beside me that he is presumed innocent and 
it’s the State’s job, it’s the State’s burden to prove him guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt? Does everybody understand that? Would you please raise 
your hand? 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS: (All hands raised.) 
MR. BERTRAM: All hand raised. Okay. And do you also understand that 
it is not, my client does not have to present any evidence? He does not have to 
stand up and testify. That is, again it’s the burden of the State to bring enough 
evidence here to prove him guilty; and if they do not do so, then, well, I won’t 
to get that until the end.” 
Defendant’s attorney also asked the jurors generally about their ability to focus on 
the trial and to be fair to defendant. Defense counsel ended his voir dire this way: 
“MR. BERTRAM: Ladies and gentlemen, one final question; and this is for 
all of you and please raise your hands. If the State is unable to prove my client 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after you’ve heard all the evidence in this 
case—well, you know what? I’m sorry. I’m going to ask one question first. Can 
- 21 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
you all wait and hear all of the evidence and go back when you deliberate to 
deliberate [sic]this to decide whether the State’s proved my client guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt? Can you all do that? If we can, please raise your hand. 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS: (All raise hands.) 
MR. BERTRAM: And now my final question. If the State was unable to 
prove my client guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, can you all return a verdict 
of not guilty? If you can, please raise your hand. 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS: (All hands raised.)” 
¶ 73 
Defendant’s attorney questioned the second panel of the prospective jurors 
about the principles by asking only the following: 
“MR. BERTRAM: And as you all stand there, and again raise your hand if 
you agree with this, do you understand that as my client sits here that he is 
presumed innocent and it’s the job of the State to prove him guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt? Does everybody understand that? If so, please raise your 
hand. 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS: (All hands raised.) 
MR. BERTRAM: All hands raised. Does everybody agree with that? Sorry. 
Jumped the gun. Does anybody not agree with that, think we should do it 
another way? If so, raise your hand. *** 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS: (No response.) 
MR. BERTRAM: Okay. No hands raised. Good.” 
¶ 74 
Twelve of the thirty-two prospective jurors were selected, and the case 
proceeded to trial. The jury convicted defendant of burglary and arson and the trial 
court sentenced him to 24 years and 6 months’ imprisonment on each count to be 
served concurrently. Defendant filed an appeal. 
¶ 75 
B. The Appellate Court’s Holding 
- 22 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 76 
In the appellate court, defendant argued the trial court failed to properly 
admonish the prospective jurors pursuant to Rule 431(b) because the trial court 
conflated all four principles and asked whether the prospective jurors understood 
and accepted this one broad proposition, rather than asking whether the prospective 
jurors understood and accepted each individual principle. 2019 IL App (4th) 
170341-U, ¶ 28. Defendant admitted he forfeited that argument but asked the 
appellate court to review it under the plain-error rule. The appellate court conducted 
the first step in the plain-error analysis and held that “no error occurred with the 
Rule 431(b) admonishments in this case.” Id. ¶ 32. 
¶ 77 
C. This Court’s Holdings 
¶ 78 
The majority affirms the appellate court. The majority concludes the trial court 
committed no errors during voir dire based on the following holdings: 
First, the majority holds the trial court did not err when it admonished the 
32 prospective jurors in two groups consisting of 16 prospective jurors each. 
Supra ¶ 27. 
Second, the majority holds the rule plainly states that the trial court can ask 
the questions to prospective jurors as a group. Supra ¶ 27. 
Third, the majority holds that the rule does not require that jurors’ responses 
be oral rather than by a show of hands. Supra ¶ 27. 
Fourth, the majority holds the procedure followed by the trial court was all 
that was required by the plain language of the rule. Supra ¶ 27. 
Fifth, the majority also holds that the procedure followed by the trial court 
was consistent with the committee comments to the rule, which state the rule 
seeks to end the practice where courts make a broad statement of the law. Supra 
¶ 28; see Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b), Committee Comments. 
Sixth, the majority holds the trial court did not err by admonishing the 
prospective jurors about the principles in a group because it “asked specific 
questions about whether the jurors accepted and understood those principles.” 
Supra ¶ 38. 
- 23 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seventh, the majority also holds that the trial court did not err because it did 
not provide a “ ‘broad statement of applicable law.’ ” Supra ¶ 38. 
Eighth, the majority holds that the trial court did not err when it “carefully 
recited the four specific principles in the rule verbatim.” Supra ¶ 38. 
Ninth, the majority holds the trial court did not ask “ ‘a general question 
concerning the juror’s willingness to follow the law.’ ” Supra ¶ 38. 
Tenth, the majority holds the four Rule 431(b) principles do not involve 
“ ‘abstract and complicated concepts, which an ordinary layperson might 
struggle to take in.’ ” Supra ¶ 39. 
Eleventh, the majority holds that the “ ‘bedrock principles’ ” defendant 
refers to “are concepts that are familiar to the average layperson and relatively 
easy to understand.” Supra ¶ 40. 
Twelfth, the majority holds that the prospective jurors expressed their 
understanding and acceptance of the principles by a show of hands and that 
there is nothing in the record to suggest that the jurors were confused by the 
trial court’s presentation of the Rule 431(b) principles. Supra ¶ 41. 
¶ 79 
I disagree with all of the majority’s holdings. 
¶ 80 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶ 81 
A. Standard of Review 
¶ 82 
When reviewing the plain language of Rule 431(b), and the case law 
interpreting the rule, our review is de novo. People v. Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, 
¶ 18 (“interpretation of a supreme court rule [is] *** subject to de novo review”); 
Nolan v. Weil-McLain, 233 Ill. 2d 416, 429 (2009) (where judgment is “based upon 
*** interpretation of existing case law” the “review is de novo”). However, in 
reviewing the trial court’s implementation and execution of the voir dire 
admonishments in Rule 431(b), we review the trial court’s manner and scope of 
voir dire for an abuse of discretion. See People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, ¶ 16 
(“the manner and scope of the examination rests within the discretion of the trial 
court, and we review such decisions for an abuse of discretion”). 
- 24 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 83 
Reviewing the manner and scope of the trial court’s examination means that we 
examine the trial court’s voir dire questions to determine whether the trial court 
elicited information from prospective jurors to learn of each prospective juror’s 
beliefs and opinions, biases, and prejudices, so defendant is assured a fair and 
impartial jury. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729-30 (1992); Wainwright v. Witt, 
469 U.S. 412, 424 n.6 (1985). I believe the manner and scope of the trial court’s 
implementation and execution of the procedure prescribed in the plain language of 
Rule 431—group questions and silent, show-of-hands answers by jurors—provided 
no information and denied defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred and abused its discretion when it conducted 
voir dire in this case. 
¶ 84 
B. Plain-Error Review 
¶ 85 
On appeal to this court, defendant acknowledges he did not preserve his Rule 
431(b) claim before the trial court and, as a result, he has forfeited the argument. 
Accordingly, defendant seeks plain-error review of the issue in this case. 
¶ 86 
“Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they 
were not brought to the attention of the trial court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 
1967). “The plain error doctrine is a narrow and limited exception to the general 
rule of procedural default. [Citation.]” People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934, ¶ 15. As 
this court has explained, 
“the plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error 
when (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely 
balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the 
defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious 
error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the 
defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless 
of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 
(2007). 
¶ 87 
“ ‘Clear’ or ‘obvious’ in the context of the plain-error doctrine means that the 
law is well settled at the time of trial; if the law was unclear at the time of the trial, 
but becomes clear (i.e., settled) during the appeal, then the error is not ‘plain’ for 
- 25 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
purposes of the plain-error doctrine. [Citations.]” People v. Downs, 2014 IL App 
(2d) 121156, ¶ 20 (citing In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 431 (2009), citing Piatkowski, 
225 Ill. 2d at 565 n.2, citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)), 
rev’d on other grounds, 2015 IL 117934, ¶ 20; see also United States v. Sumner, 
265 F.3d 532, 539 (7th Cir. 2001) (“ ‘Plain’ in this context is synonymous with 
clear or obvious. At a minimum, this means the error must be clear under current 
law.” (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 734)). 
¶ 88 
C. The United States Supreme Court Has Settled Voir Dire Law 
¶ 89 
The law is settled on how the trial court should conduct voir dire. A criminal 
defendant’s right to trial by a fair and impartial jury is guaranteed by both the 
United States and Illinois Constitutions. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, §§ 8, 13; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (“In essence, the 
right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of 
impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing 
violates even the minimal standards of due process.”). The constitutional guarantee 
of a fair and impartial jury includes the right to an adequate voir dire to identify 
and “remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the 
court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729-30. “The purpose of voir dire is to ascertain sufficient 
information about prospective jurors’ beliefs and opinions so as to allow removal 
of those members of the venire whose minds are so closed by bias and prejudice 
that they cannot apply the law as instructed in accordance with their oath.” People 
v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 495-96 (1993) (citing Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424); 
see also Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723. 
¶ 90 
Voir dire errors occurred in this case when no information was elicited from 
prospective jurors during group questioning with silent, nonverbal, show-of-hands 
group answers about each prospective juror’s beliefs and opinions, so that the trial 
court could determine each potential juror’s qualifications to sit as an impartial 
juror. Accordingly, because no information was elicited from prospective jurors by 
the trial court, no voir dire took place in this case. 
¶ 91 
D. Voir Dire Questions to Be Answered by This Court 
- 26 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 92 
In this case we must determine whether the trial judge’s admonishments and 
questioning of two panels of 16 prospective jurors complied with the constitution’s 
voir dire requirements, which mandate that the trial judge’s admonishments and 
questioning permit him or her to elicit information from each prospective juror 
about their beliefs and opinions so the trial judge can make a decision about the 
prospective jurors’ impartiality. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 394­
95 (2010). In Skilling, the jurors affirmed on their pretrial questionnaires that they 
would have no trouble basing a verdict only on the evidence at trial. See id. at 388 
(pretrial questionnaire “helped to identify prospective jurors excusable for cause”). 
Nevertheless, the trial court followed up by questioning each prospective juror 
individually to uncover concealed biases and prejudices. Id. at 373-74, 388. The 
Skilling Court pointed out that the federal district court’s “face-to-face opportunity 
to gauge demeanor and credibility, coupled with information from the 
questionnaires regarding jurors’ backgrounds [and] opinions *** gave the court a 
sturdy foundation to assess fitness for jury service.” Id. at 395. We must determine 
whether the voir dire procedure in this case permitted the trial court to determine 
the 32 prospective jurors’ fitness for jury service. 
¶ 93 
E. Group Voir Dire Procedures Denied Defendant His Right to a Fair Trial 
¶ 94 
In this case, we must determine whether the group admonishments and 
questioning of prospective jurors and the silent, nonverbal, show-of-hands group 
answers by prospective jurors elicited any information about the prospective jurors’ 
beliefs, opinions, biases, or prejudices so that the trial court could make a decision 
about each juror’s impartiality. We must also determine whether the trial court’s 
questions—(1) “do you understand these principles of law” and (2) “do you accept 
these principles of law”—produced a record that permitted the trial court to 
ascertain information about each prospective juror’s beliefs and opinions in order 
to allow removal of any of the 32 members with a bias or prejudice against 
defendant. I submit that the trial court’s group questioning and silent, show-of­
hands answers allowed the jurors’ possible prejudices to go undiscovered, thus 
thwarting the very purpose of voir dire. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 
127, 143 (1994) (“If conducted properly, voir dire can inform litigants about 
potential jurors ***. Voir dire provides a means of discovering actual or implied 
bias ***.”). Accordingly, I maintain the trial court committed multiple errors and 
- 27 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
abused its discretion when it exercised its discretion and selected group instead of 
individual questioning of the 32 jurors. See id. 
¶ 95 
F. The Trial Court’s Plain Errors 
¶ 96 
1. The Trial Court Erred When It Conducted 
Group Rather Than Individual Questioning 
of Each of the 32 Prospective Jurors 
¶ 97 
The majority holds the trial court did not err when the trial court questioned the 
prospective jurors in two groups of 16. Rule 431(b) provides that the trial court may 
ask questions of “each potential juror, individually or in a group.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 
431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). Thus, the rule gives the trial court discretion to determine 
whether it will use individual or group questioning. In this case, the trial court 
exercised its discretion and elected to conduct voir dire of the 32 jurors with group 
questioning. By doing so, the trial court violated defendant’s right to a fair trial 
because group questioning did not permit the trial court to elicit information from 
each of the 32 jurors so the court could identify impartial jurors. 
¶ 98 
While Rule 431(b) does permit group questioning, defendant’s right to a fair 
trial was violated because group questioning of individual jurors does not permit a 
trial court to elicit information about each prospective juror’s beliefs and opinions 
so that the trial court can determine each prospective juror’s impartiality. Morgan, 
504 U.S. at 729-30; Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424; Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723. The plain 
language of Rule 431(b) prescribes how the trial court should elicit information 
from each prospective juror: “The court’s method of inquiry shall provide each 
juror an opportunity to respond to specific questions concerning the principles set 
out in this section.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). Here, the trial court’s 
group method of inquiry did not provide each prospective juror with an opportunity 
to respond to specific questions concerning the juror’s beliefs, opinions, biases, or 
prejudices. 
¶ 99 
I think the trial court abused its discretion when it elected to question the 32 
jurors in a group, instead of individually. See id. In order to avoid violating the 
defendant’s constitutional rights, each prospective juror must be questioned 
individually in order to comply with the constitution’s command to ascertain 
- 28 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
information about each prospective juror’s beliefs and opinions to determine the 
prospective jurors’ impartiality. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729-30 (“part of the 
guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to 
identify unqualified jurors. *** ‘Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge’s 
responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to 
follow the court’s instructions *** cannot be fulfilled.’ ” (quoting Rosales-Lopez v. 
United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (plurality opinion))); Wainwright, 469 U.S. 
at 424 (“determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer 
sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism”); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723 
(the duty to adjudicate the question of impartiality lies with the judge); see also 
Skilling, 561 U.S. at 394 (holding the district court’s voir dire did not fall short of 
constitutional requirements where district court questioned potential jurors 
independently and did not “simply take venire members who proclaimed their 
impartiality at their word”). Therefore, the trial court erred and abused its discretion 
when it conducted group rather than individual questioning of each of the 32 
prospective jurors. 
¶ 100 
2. The Trial Court Erred When It Asked Potential 
Jurors Two Compound Questions About the 
Four Principles in Rule 431(B) and Received 
No Information About the Juror’s Beliefs and Opinions 
Because It Accepted Silent, Nonverbal, 
Show-of-Hands Group Answers From 
the 32 Jurors to the Two Compound Questions 
¶ 101 
In this case the trial judge omitted the four numbers separating the principles, 
recited all four principles in a broad statement, and then asked the prospective jurors 
if they understood the principles. When the court asked two questions about the 
unnumbered principles, (1) do you understand the principles and (2) do you accept 
the principles, the court was asking the 32 prospective jurors whether they 
(1) understood each of the four principles and (2) whether they accepted each of 
the four principles. By asking the 32 prospective jurors if they understood the four 
principles incorporated in the court’s broad statement, the trial court was asking a 
compound question: whether the jurors understood each of the four principles in 
the court’s broad statement. The court’s compound question asked about the four 
- 29 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
principles but permitted prospective jurors to give only one answer about the four 
principles collectively. If prospective jurors give one answer to a question 
concerning four principles, the answer will be unclear. Craig Lee Montz, Trial 
Objections From Beginning to End: The Handbook for Civil and Criminal Trials, 
29 Pepp. L. Rev. 243, 289 (2002). 
¶ 102 
Compound questions cause confusion and are objectionable because when a 
witness or juror answers a question consisting of two or more questions, it is hard 
to determine which question is being answered. See E. Cleary & M. Graham, 
Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 611.20, at 550 (7th ed. 1999). Here, asking the 
group of 32 jurors two compound questions involving four principles prevented the 
trial court from determining whether each prospective juror both understood and 
accepted each of the four legal principles. By not asking about the four principles 
in separate questions, it cannot be determined from the record which of the four 
principles, if any, the prospective jurors understood and accepted. 
¶ 103 
The 32 prospective jurors’ silent, group answers to the two compound questions 
elicited no information for the trial court to assess the prospective jurors’ beliefs 
and opinions. Therefore, because the trial court had no information about these 
jurors’ biases and prejudices, the trial court had no information about the 
prospective jurors’ impartiality, and the trial court’s lack of information denied 
defendant a fair trial. Accordingly, the trial court erred and abused its discretion 
when it asked two sets of 16 prospective jurors a compound question about each of 
the four principles in Rule 431(b) and accepted silent, nonverbal, show-of-hands 
group answers from 32 jurors to the two compound questions. 
¶ 104 
3. The Trial Court Erred When It Inferred 
From the Potential Jurors’ Nonverbal, Show-of-Hands 
Group Answers That the Potential Jurors 
Understood the Four Legal Principles 
¶ 105 
The majority concludes, without citation of any authority, that the “ ‘bedrock 
principles’ *** are concepts that are familiar to the average layperson and relatively 
easy to understand.” Supra ¶ 40. I disagree because commentators point out that 
legal principles are not only difficult for lay jurors to understand and apply but are 
also difficult for law students to understand and apply. Christopher N. May, “What 
- 30 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do We Do Now?”: Helping Juries Apply the Instructions, 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 
869, 870 (1995) (“[T]he problem that these juries face[ ] is identical to that which 
confounds most law students—sometimes well into the second year. Lay jurors, 
who have received no more than an hour or two of legal instruction, cannot be 
expected to perform better than those who have studied diligently for months.”). 
¶ 106 
The majority also finds that “[j]urors are often presented with far more 
numerous, and far more complicated, instructions at trial.” Supra ¶ 40. Jurors are 
certainly presented with “far more numerous, and far more complicated, 
instructions at trial.” But what the majority fails to note is that the pretrial 
instructions in this case are different from posttrial instructions, which are presented 
to the jury in writing, for their use during deliberations, where they can study, 
discuss, and agree on their meaning. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 2013 IL App 
(4th) 110936, ¶ 22 (“ ‘The purpose of [a jury] instruction is to guide the jury in its 
deliberations and to help it reach a proper verdict through the application of legal 
principles as applied to the evidence and the law.’ [Citation.]”). Here, the pretrial 
instructions about the four legal principles were communicated to the 32 
prospective jurors without a written copy being given to the jurors, without an 
opportunity for them to read the four principles, and without an opportunity for 
them to discuss the four principles with other jurors. The trial court’s presentation 
of the four principles was complicated by the fact that the 32 prospective jurors 
were asked a compound question: one question—do you understand—and that one 
question asked about four different principles. 
¶ 107 
a. Presumption of Innocence 
¶ 108 
I maintain that even the use of the phrase “presumption of innocence,” without 
more, can confuse jurors. Other courts have noted that “[i]t is not unusual for a juror 
to be confused or uncertain about the presumption of innocence because it is a 
difficult legal concept.” People v. Young, 16 P.3d 821, 825 (Colo. 2001) (en banc). 
Scholars have studied laypersons’ ability to understand legal principles and found 
that even second-year law students struggle with understanding jury instructions. 
May, supra, at 870. “Studies literally abound demonstrating the extent to which 
jurors misapprehend the relevant law. The problem is especially severe when the 
law is set forth in pattern instructions that—because they are designed without the 
- 31 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
facts of any particular case in mind—tend to be abstract, general, and technical.” 
Id. at 872. Rule 431(b) only says “the defendant is presumed innocent of the 
charge(s) against him or her.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). I believe the 
32 prospective jurors’ silent, show-of-hands group answer to the trial court’s 
compound question, which includes the jurors’ understanding of the presumption 
of innocence, did not provide enough information for the trial court to make a 
judicial determination about whether each prospective juror both understood and 
accepted that principle. 
¶ 109 
b. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
¶ 110 
In addition, commentators point out that jurors can experience difficulty 
applying jury instructions to the facts of a given case. May, supra, at 870 (“We 
must try to recapture our innocence if we are to make the jury’s task a meaningful 
one.”); see also Lawrence T. White & Michael D. Cicchini, Is Reasonable Doubt 
Self-Defining?, 64 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2019) (reviewing studies and concluding that 
jurors struggle with the concept of beyond a reasonable doubt); Firoz Dattu, 
Illustrated Jury Instructions: A Proposal, 22 Law & Psychol. Rev. 67, 100 (1998) 
(noting that “[s]ome legal concepts are inherently difficult to explain” to jurors). 
Empirical studies have shown that, without instruction, “jurors may underestimate 
the quantum of evidence needed for a criminal conviction.” Timothy P. O’Neill, 
Instructing Illinois Juries on the Definition of “Reasonable Doubt”: The Need for 
Reform, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 921, 924 (1996). Commentators have found that 
“instructions should carefully define reasonable doubt for jurors.” White, supra, at 
2. 
¶ 111 
Studies have also shown that jurors’ comprehension of instructions in any form 
“varies among jurors, partly in relation to their educational level,” and more “telling 
are studies showing that jurors frequently cannot answer simple true-false questions 
concerning statements of law taken from instructions they were given in court. 
Their understanding is often little better than that of persons who never heard the 
instructions at all.” May, supra, at 879-80. 
¶ 112 
I think the majority’s assumption that the prospective jurors understood the four 
principles without evidence in the record (the 32 prospective jurors answered with 
a show of hands) denied defendant a fair trial before an impartial jury. “[T]he most 
- 32 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
pressing constitutional issue in this case is whether the jury eventually selected was 
able to lay aside any preconceived notions and enter the jury box impartial.” Sophia 
R. Friedman, Sixth Amendment—The Right to an Impartial Jury: How Extensive 
Must Voir Dire Questioning Be?, 82 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 920, 937 (1992). 
The trial court’s recital of the four principles to a diverse group of prospective 
jurors, without probing whether each prospective juror understood the four 
principles, is an abuse of the court’s discretion. 
¶ 113 
Clearly questioning prospective jurors individually will require additional time, 
which I also note could be mitigated with the use of an appropriate prescreening 
questionnaire. See State v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Dist. Ct. Hennepin 
County, Minn.), Special Juror Questionnaire, https://www.mncourts.gov/mncourts 
gov/media/High-Profile-Cases/27-CR-20-12646/JurorQuestionnaire12222020.pdf 
(Dec. 22, 2020) [https://perma.cc/F5TW-39ML] (juror questionnaire for trial of 
four police officers in the death of George Floyd). Taking additional time to ensure 
that a criminal defendant facing a deprivation of liberty is judged by an impartial 
jury is a small price to pay. 
“[I]t would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that persons 
entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and that 
inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were barred. No surer 
way could be devised to bring the processes of justice into disrepute.” (Internal 
quotation marks omitted.) Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 446 (1991) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.) (quoting 
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 315 (1931)). 
The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it inferred from the prospective 
jurors’ silent, nonverbal, show-of-hands group answers that the prospective jurors 
understood the four legal principles. 
¶ 114 
4. The Trial Court Erred When It Used Silent, Nonverbal, 
Show-of-Hands Group Answers, Which Precluded a Record 
About Each Juror’s Biases and Prejudices and 
Left the Trial Court and This Court With No Information 
to Evaluate Each Juror’s Qualifications to Serve 
Impartially on a Jury 
- 33 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 115 
The trial court asked prospective jurors to indicate their response to a compound 
question—one question: do you understand, which inquired about the four legal 
principles—by a show of hands. The show-of-hands, group answer by the 32 
prospective jurors was a silent, nonverbal answer. A silent, nonverbal answer leaves 
no record concerning the individual prospective juror’s beliefs and opinions. 
Without a record for the court to evaluate the prospective juror’s beliefs and 
opinions, there is no way for the trial court or this court to assess juror impartiality. 
This trial court violated defendant’s right to a fair trial by not eliciting information 
from each prospective juror to determine their impartiality. Therefore, the trial court 
abused its discretion by permitting the prospective jurors to provide silent, 
nonverbal answers to the court’s questions. 
¶ 116 
Commentators have also stated, “It is arguably impossible for a trial judge to 
assess demeanor when there is no demeanor to assess, only silence.” Friedman, 
supra, at 940. In Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 419-20, the trial court asked potential jurors, 
in a group, whether outside information they may have learned about the case 
would affect their impartiality. One potential juror responded affirmatively, but the 
remaining potential jurors simply remained silent. Id. at 420. The process in this 
case of having prospective jurors raise their hands if they believe they understand 
and accept the four legal principles is directly analogous to the silent response to 
group questioning in Mu’Min. See id. at 452 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“I fail to see 
how the trial court could evaluate the credibility of the individuals seated on this 
jury. The questions were asked of groups, and individual jurors attested to their own 
impartiality by saying nothing.”). In neither case was the trial court provided with 
any information about individual jurors’ biases or prejudices, nor with their actual 
understanding of the principles and ability to apply them to the case. 
¶ 117 
“[T]he trial court [has] no effective opportunity to assess the demeanor of each 
prospective juror in disclaiming bias” by simply having prospective jurors raise 
their hands along with everyone else. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See id. at 
451 (quoting Mu’Min v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 886, 901 (Va. 1990) (Whiting, 
J., dissenting, joined by Stephenson and Hassell, JJ.)). The raising of a hand is 
lacking in “tone of voice *** [which may] suggest[ ] [bias] to the trial judge.” See 
id. at 433 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 
n.14 (1984) (“Demeanor plays a fundamental role not only in determining juror 
credibility, but also in simply understanding what a potential juror is saying. Any 
- 34 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
complicated voir dire calls upon lay persons to think and express themselves in 
unfamiliar terms, as a reading of any transcript of such a proceeding will reveal. 
Demeanor, inflection, the flow of the questions and answers can make confused 
and conflicting utterances comprehensible.”). The trial court erred and abused its 
discretion when it used silent, nonverbal, show-of-hands group answers, which did 
not create a record about each juror’s biases and prejudices, and therefore there is 
no basis for the trial court or this court to evaluate each prospective juror’s 
qualifications to serve as an impartial juror. 
¶ 118 
5. The Trial Court Erred When It Failed to Read the 
Four Principles Verbatim When It Read the 
Four Principles and Omitted the Numbers 
Separating the Principles 
¶ 119 
The majority holds the trial court did not err because “the circuit court read the 
specific principles set forth in the rule verbatim to the prospective jurors.” 
(Emphasis added.) Supra ¶ 27. A review of Rule 431(b) will reveal that the majority 
has misstated the facts. The trial court did not read Rule 431(b) verbatim. Compare 
Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012), with supra ¶¶ 69-70. Therefore, by failing 
to read Rule 431(b) to the prospective jurors as written, the trial court abused its 
discretion. 
¶ 120 
Rule 431(b) numbers each principle. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). 
By doing so, Rule 431(b) demonstrates that each principle constitutes a distinct 
legal concept that should be recited separately by the trial court and answered 
separately by each prospective juror. A review of the trial transcript reveals the trial 
court omitted the numbers when it read the Rule 431(b) principles. See id. When 
the trial court failed to read the numbers “(1),” “(2),” etc., it failed to separate the 
principles into four distinct legal concepts. By failing to number the principles into 
separate, distinct legal concepts, the trial court made it difficult for the jurors to 
distinguish between the four principles and for the trial court to gauge each juror’s 
understanding and acceptance of each of the four principles. The trial court’s 
unnumbered admonishments thwarted the purpose of voir dire by engendering 
juror confusion as to the meaning of the four principles. Accordingly, the trial court 
erred and abused its discretion when it failed to read the Rule 431(b) principles 
- 35 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
verbatim, because it read the four principles but omitted the numbers separating the 
principles. 
¶ 121 
6. The Trial Court Erred When It Omitted the 
Numbers Separating the Four Principles and 
by Doing So Collapsed the Four Rule 431(B) 
Principles Into One Broad Statement 
¶ 122 
In this case, the record reveals the trial court read the Rule 431(b) principles 
without the numbers when it admonished the 32 prospective jurors. By omitting the 
numbers separating the Rule 431(b) principles, the principles were collapsed into a 
broad statement. See supra ¶¶ 69-70 (The Trial Court’s Application of Rule 
431(b)). Supreme court case law holds that the trial court must refrain from making 
a broad statement about the applicable law embodied in the four legal principles 
enumerated in the rule. See People v. Hunter, 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 17; Thompson, 
238 Ill. 2d at 607; Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 332-33 (2002). The 
committee comments to Rule 431 also state that the rule “seeks to end the practice 
where the judge makes a broad statement of the applicable law followed by a 
general question concerning the juror’s willingness to follow the law.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 
431, Committee Comments. Here, the trial court violated supreme court case law 
and the committee comments and abused its discretion, when it omitted the 
numbers separating the four principles and by doing so collapsed the four Rule 
431(b) principles into one broad statement. 
¶ 123 
7. The Trial Court Erred When It Failed to 
Read the Four Principles Verbatim When 
It Added Words to the Legal Principles 
¶ 124 
Additionally, instead of reading the principles “verbatim,” a review of the trial 
transcript reveals the trial court added words that are not included in the principles. 
See supra ¶¶ 69-70. For example, the trial court stated, “there are a number of 
propositions of law that you must be willing to follow if you are going to serve as 
a juror in this case.” The trial court also stated, “a person accused of a crime is 
presumed to be innocent of the charge against him.” Rule 431(b) provides “the 
defendant is presumed innocent of the charge(s) against him or her.” Rule 431(b) 
- 36 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
uses the word “defendant,” connecting the principle to Mr. Birge, the man on trial. 
But the trial court used the word “person,” which does not connect the jury to Mr. 
Birge. Next, Rule 431(b) uses the word “charge(s),” and defendant was charged 
with “burglary and arson,” but the trial court used the word “charge.” 
¶ 125 
It is clear from the preceding that the trial court added words and changed words 
in Rule 431(b). Therefore, the majority is misrepresenting facts when it stated the 
trial court read Rule 431(b) verbatim. The trial court abused its discretion when it 
added words and changed words and failed to read the four principles verbatim, 
with numbers separating the principles, so the 32 jurors could distinguish between 
the four principles of law. It would be impossible for the trial court to determine 
the 32 jurors’ beliefs and opinions from the Rule 431(b) admonishments that 
contained added words, changed words, and silent answers. Therefore, the trial 
court erred and abused its discretion when it failed to read the principles verbatim 
when it added its own words to the legal principles. 
¶ 126 
8. The Trial Court Erred When It Abdicated Its Responsibility 
to Determine the 32 Jurors’ Knowledge of the Four 
Principles and Their Biases and Prejudices by 
Permitting the 32 Jurors to Provide Silent, Nonverbal, 
Show-of-Hands Group Answers to the Two Compound 
Questions, Which Did Not Provide Information for 
the Court to Assess Credibility, and Therefore the 
Jurors’ Silent, Nonverbal Answers Did Not Provide 
the Trial Court With Information to Make a Judicial 
Decision About the 32 Jurors’ Impartiality 
¶ 127 
The trial court has the obligation in the first instance to impanel an impartial 
jury. Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189. The Supreme Court has held that 
“[v]oir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that 
his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored. Without an 
adequate voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility to remove prospective jurors 
who will not be able impartially to follow the court’s instructions and evaluate 
the evidence cannot be fulfilled. [Citation.]” Id. at 188. 
- 37 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 128 
I subscribe to the principle that it is “axiomatic that the greater the depth of the 
questions, the greater the opportunity to observe demeanor and the greater the 
quantum of information available to enable the trial judge to make an accurate 
assessment of credibility.” Friedman, supra, at 941. “ ‘[S]earching questioning of 
potential jurors . . . to screen out those with fixed opinions’ ” (emphasis omitted) 
(Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 440 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and 
Stevens, JJ.) (quoting Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976))) 
and content-based questions involving a juror’s beliefs and opinions must be asked 
of prospective jurors for the trial court to fulfill its obligation. In this case, the trial 
court’s failure to ask content-based questions—questions eliciting information 
from potential jurors about their beliefs and opinions—so that the court could 
determine the 32 jurors’ impartiality made the trial court’s Rule 431(b) 
admonishments an unreliable procedure for the court to determine each prospective 
juror’s impartiality so that an impartial jury could determine defendant’s guilt or 
innocence. 
¶ 129 
Raising one’s hand in a group is at best the prospective juror’s “own 
‘assurance[ ] that he is equal to [the] task’ ” but is not a substitute for a judge’s 
determination the juror can be fair and impartial. (Emphasis in original.) Id. 
(quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975)). A prospective juror’s own 
assurances “ ‘cannot be dispositive of the accused’s rights.’ ” Id. (quoting Murphy, 
421 U.S. at 800). The prospective jurors are not to make their own determination 
as to whether they understand the principles for themselves. 
¶ 130 
The determination of whether the jurors understand and can be impartial is the 
exclusive function of the trial court. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 800 (“the juror’s 
assurances that he is equal to this task cannot be dispositive of the accused’s 
rights”). I agree with Justice Marshall’s dissent in Mu’Min, where he stated that 
“the trial court must do more than elicit a simple profession of open-mindedness 
before swearing that person into the jury.” Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 440 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.). By letting jurors determine their 
own understanding and impartiality, the trial court completely abdicated its duty to 
protect defendant’s right to a fair trial by conducting a sufficient voir dire to 
empanel an unbiased jury. 
- 38 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 131 
The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it abdicated its duty to 
determine the prospective jurors’ understanding and impartiality by permitting the 
prospective jurors to determine their own understanding of the principles and their 
own impartiality. When the trial court judge cannot make a judicial determination 
about each prospective juror’s impartiality because the jurors have provided silent, 
nonverbal, show-of-hands group answers to the court’s questions, the defendant has 
been denied his right to a fair trial. 
¶ 132 
G. The Evidence Is Closely Balanced 
¶ 133 
The second question to be answered in a first prong plain-error analysis is 
whether the evidence is closely balanced. The eight errors I have identified establish 
that “ ‘a clear or obvious error occurred’ ” in this case. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 
119445, ¶ 48 (quoting Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565). Next we must determine 
whether “ ‘the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip 
the scales of justice against the defendant.’ ” Id. (quoting Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 
565). 
¶ 134 
The State presented the testimony of two police officers who arrived on the 
scene within minutes of being alerted to smoke and flames coming from Chief City 
Vapor. Neither officer testified that they saw defendant enter or leave Chief City 
Vapor or start the fire. The State also presented an arson investigator as an expert. 
He opined that the fire was incendiary in origin and was caused by someone 
introducing an open flame to a couch inside the store. But he agreed with defense 
counsel that the source of the open flame that ignited the fire could have been the 
lighter found on the countertop in the store or an unfiltered lit cigarette left on the 
couch. Considering all the State’s evidence, the State did not present any 
eyewitness testimony, or any forensic evidence, such as fingerprints or DNA 
(blood) or videos that connected defendant to the crimes charged. 
¶ 135 
Defendant testified that he did not burglarize or start the fire in Chief City 
Vapor. Defendant testified that, after he was released from the hospital for a drug 
overdose, his mother dropped him off at a gambling parlor. Defendant gambled at 
the parlor and then decided to walk over to this sister’s house, which is located 
several blocks past Chief City Vapor. After no one answered the door at his sister’s 
house, defendant started walking back to the gambling parlor. On his way back to 
- 39 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the gambling parlor defendant walked by Chief City Vapor, where, he testified, he 
picked up the hooded sweatshirt containing items the owner testified were removed 
from his store. Defendant testified that the items found in his possession when he 
was arrested were picked up off the sidewalk outside Chief City Vapor. 
¶ 136 
Without any eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence, or video evidence to 
connect defendant to the burglary or arson, and without any testimony to contradict 
defendant’s statement that he picked up items from the store off the sidewalk near 
the store, this court has a case where it must determine whom to believe. A 
commonsense assessment of the evidence reveals that the evidence was closely 
balanced in this whom-to-believe case. Id. ¶¶ 61, 63. 
¶ 137 
H. Rule 431(b) Is Facially Unconstitutional 
¶ 138 
Sometimes, “[i]n the exercise of its judicial responsibility, it is necessary *** 
for the Court to consider the facial validity” of a statute or rule when that argument 
has not been raised by the parties. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 
U.S. 310, 333 (2010); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. ___, ___,136 
S. Ct. 2292, 2307 (2016). The due process clause of the fourth amendment to the 
United States Constitution “guarantees more than fair process; it offers heightened 
protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and 
liberty interests.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, 
¶ 24 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997)). Although 
a Rule 431(b) violation does not itself “implicate a fundamental right or 
constitutional protection” (Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 614-15), criminal defendants 
do enjoy a fundamental right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. See People v. 
Peeples, 205 Ill. 2d 480, 517-18 (2002); Kingston v. Turner, 115 Ill. 2d 445, 466 
(1987) (citing People v. Gaston, 125 Ill. App. 3d 7 (1984)). 
¶ 139 
Laws that interfere with or place an undue burden on constitutional rights may 
be facially unconstitutional. See Whole Woman’s Health, 579 U.S. at ___, 136 S. 
Ct. at 2318 (holding Texas law facially unconstitutional where it placed an “ ‘undue 
burden’ on [a] constitutional right”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763 
(1972) (first amendment rights “ ‘may not constitutionally be abridged’ ” (quoting 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 395 U.S. 367, 
390 (1969)); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (“Interference with [a 
- 40 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
constitutional] right, [properly] exercised, by state action is intolerable under our 
Constitution.”). Our rules, like statutes, “must be construed to avoid an *** 
unconstitutional result.” In re Loss, 119 Ill. 2d 186, 194 (1987). A rule will be 
deemed facially invalid if no set of circumstances exist under which the statute or 
rule would be constitutional. Burns v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board of the 
Village of Elk Grove Village, 2020 IL 125714, ¶ 13. A rule that “ ‘has the effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a’ ” defendant’s right to a fair trial by 
an impartial jury “ ‘cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its 
legitimate ends.’ ” See Whole Woman’s Health, 579 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 877 (1992)). 
¶ 140 
I believe we must ask whether the plain language of Rule 431(b) affords a 
criminal defendant the fair-trial protections, during voir dire, that he or she is 
entitled to under our constitutions or whether the current rule serves to deprive a 
criminal defendant of those rights and whether, therefore, Rule 431 is facially 
unconstitutional. 
¶ 141 
In Rinehart, this court stated: 
“Because there is no precise test for determining which questions will filter out 
partial jurors [citation], the manner and scope of the examination rests within 
the discretion of the trial court, and we review such decisions for an abuse of 
discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the conduct of the trial court 
thwarts the purpose of voir dire examination—namely, the selection of a jury 
free from bias or prejudice. [Citations.] Stated differently, a trial court does not 
abuse its discretion during voir dire if the questions create ‘a reasonable 
assurance that any prejudice or bias would be discovered.’ [Citation.]” 
(Emphasis added.) Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, ¶ 16 (citing, inter alia, People v. 
Clark, 278 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1003 (1996)). 
¶ 142 
I believe the plain language of Rule 431 actually does “thwart[ ] the purpose of 
voir dire examination—namely, the selection of a jury free from bias or prejudice” 
(id.) and is therefore facially unconstitutional. The rule undermines the goals of 
voir dire in the following ways: the rule on its face (1) approves group questions; 
(2) permits silent, nonverbal, group answers; and (3) permits questions that lack 
content and, therefore, do not elicit information about each prospective juror so a 
- 41 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
determination can be made about each prospective juror’s qualifications to serve 
on a jury. The rule does not require a voir dire that elicits information about each 
juror’s beliefs, opinions, biases, and prejudices in order to allow the removal of 
those prospective jurors who are biased or prejudiced to ensure an impartial jury is 
empaneled. See Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 188. 
¶ 143 
The purpose of voir dire is to ascertain sufficient information about prospective 
jurors’ beliefs and opinions so the trial court can make a judicial determination of 
their qualifications to serve on a jury impartially and remove those prospective 
jurors whose minds are so closed by bias and prejudice that they cannot apply the 
law as instructed. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729 (“part of the guarantee of a 
defendant’s right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified 
jurors”); Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424; Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723. Rule 431(b) does not 
pass the Morgan test. 
¶ 144 
Rule 431(b) is intended to allow information to be elicited to protect a criminal 
defendant’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. However, the current language 
of Rule 431(b) does not require the trial court to conduct a voir dire that requires 
the court to ascertain sufficient information about prospective jurors to enable the 
court to protect that right or so that attorneys can make informed decisions about 
the use of their peremptory challenges. Clark, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1003 (“purpose 
of voir dire is to enable the trial court to select an impartial jury and to ensure that 
the attorneys have an informed and intelligent basis on which to exercise 
peremptory challenges” (citing, inter alia, Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 431)). 
¶ 145 
Rule 431(b) does not require that Illinois trial courts engage in constitutionally 
mandated voir dire that ensures a defendant receives a fair trial before an impartial 
jury. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729-30; see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 385-95 (addressing 
the argument voir dire did not adequately detect and defuse juror bias). Because 
Rule 431(b) permits group questioning and silent group answers and does not 
ensure that defendants receive a fair trial before an impartial jury, the rule should 
be amended. In light of the facial infirmities of Rule 431(b), I would find Rule 431 
unconstitutional. 
¶ 146 
I. Remedies to the Voir Dire Procedure 
- 42 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 147 
First, to comply with the constitution’s guarantee of a defendant’s right to a fair 
trial before an impartial jury, I would amend Rule 431(b) by requiring the trial court 
to ask content-based individual questions of each juror. The constitutional 
guarantee of a fair trial includes the defendant’s right to an adequate voir dire, 
which means the trial court asks questions of the jurors with content designed to 
elicit information to identify and remove those prospective jurors who will not be 
able to impartially follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence in the 
case. 
¶ 148 
Second, the amended Rule 431(b) should not only prohibit group questions but 
should also prohibit silent, nonverbal, show-of-hands answers. As previously 
pointed out, silent, nonverbal, show-of-hands answers do not provide the court with 
any information about the individual juror’s beliefs and opinions so the court can 
determine each juror’s biases and prejudices and can use that information to remove 
those jurors who cannot be impartial and give the defendant a fair trial. 
¶ 149 
Third, the amended Rule 431(b) should prohibit questions that ask jurors 
whether they understand the four principles. The determination as to whether a juror 
understands the principles is not a juror determination but a judicial determination. 
By permitting the jurors to assess their own understanding, Rule 431(b) currently 
permits the jurors to invade the province of the judge and denies the defendant his 
right to a fair trial. 
¶ 150 
Fourth, the amended Rule 431(b) should include a definition of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a principle that lay people 
have difficulty understanding (how much evidence the State must present to convict 
a defendant of a crime). Commentators have made it clear that jurors and even law 
students have problems understanding legal principles. Commentators have also 
pointed out that 39 other states explain the concept of reasonable doubt: 
“Currently, the state courts are split on the issue of whether to define 
reasonable doubt. Illinois is in the minority of jurisdictions that admonish trial 
courts from defining the term reasonable doubt, even when asked by the jury 
for guidance. Only 10 other states find themselves in agreement with Illinois’ 
position. As for the remaining 39 states, they leave the decision to define the 
term up to the trial court if there is no pattern jury instruction. The Federal 
Courts are also split as to defining reasonable doubt.” Bobby Greene, 
- 43 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reasonable Doubt: Is It Defined by Whatever Is at the Top of the Google Search 
Page?, 50 J. Marshall L. Rev. 933, 941 (2017). 
See also Timothy James Ting, It’s Time to Define “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”, 
106 Ill. B.J. 24 (2018); O’Neill, supra. 
¶ 151 
Therefore, because Illinois is in the minority of jurisdictions that do not define 
reasonable doubt, I would define the principle in order to ensure the principle is 
applied properly by jurors and to ensure that every defendant receives a fair trial. 
¶ 152 
Finally, I would amend Rule 431(b) by mandating that a pretrial questionnaire 
be sent prior to trial to every prospective criminal trial juror. See State v. Chauvin, 
No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Dist. Ct. Hennepin County, Minn.), Special Juror 
Questionnaire, 
https://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/High-Profile­
Cases/27-CR-20-12646/JurorQuestionnaire12222020.pdf (Dec. 22, 2020) [https:// 
perma.cc/F5TW-39ML] (reprinted in full in appendix A, infra); see also Race IAT, 
Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/selectatest.html [https:// 
perma.cc/BB9Z-3TJU] (last visited Feb. 11, 2021) (excerpt from the Race IAT 
(Implicit Association Test) gauging implicit racial bias reprinted in appendix B); 
see also Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 1.08 (approved May 2018) 
(Implicit Bias). The pretrial questionnaire can be used to familiarize jurors with 
legal principles, e.g., proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption of 
innocence, and implicit and unconscious bias. See Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the 
Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 827 
(2012); Michael B. Hyman, Implicit Bias in the Courts, 102 Ill. B.J. 40 (2014); 
Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 UC Irvine L. Rev. 
843 (2015). The pretrial questionnaire can also be used to elicit information about 
each juror’s beliefs and opinions and would assist the court and the attorneys in 
examining jurors during voir dire. This court can take judicial notice of the fact that 
the United States incarcerates more people than any other country in the world and 
that the largest percentage of the people incarcerated are people of color. See E. 
Ann Carson, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prisoners in 2018 (Apr. 2020), https://www. 
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p18.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2NF-3PKG]. In light of the 
aforementioned facts, absent a discussion of implicit bias with each juror during 
voir dire, there is an impermissible risk that jurors’ individual biases will influence 
their jury deliberations. Finally, I make the aforementioned suggestions in order to 
- 44 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ensure that every criminal defendant receives equal protection of the laws. See, e.g., 
Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 161 (2009). 
¶ 153 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶ 154 
In sum, the trial court exercised its discretion to implement and execute Rule 
431 and followed the procedure prescribed by the plain text of the rule and this 
court’s interpretation of the rule. In doing so, the trial court in this case committed 
eight errors that singularly and in combination denied defendant his right to a fair 
trial by an impartial jury. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595-96 (1976) (and 
cases cited therein, stating that in Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973), the 
Court “recognized that some cases may present circumstances in which an 
impermissible threat to the fair trial guaranteed by due process is posed by a trial 
court’s refusal to question prospective jurors specifically about racial prejudice 
during voir dire” and holding that view was “consistent with other determinations 
*** that a State had denied a defendant due process by failing to impanel an 
impartial jury”). Currently, Rule 431 permits group questioning of jurors, permits 
jurors to give silent, nonverbal, group answers to questions, and permits compound 
questions—which confuse jurors and produce incomprehensible answers—during 
voir dire. The current rule is also unconstitutional because it does not mandate 
individual questioning of jurors about their beliefs and opinions so the court can 
make a judicial determination of each juror’s impartiality and ensure the defendant 
receives a fair trial. The amended rule must mandate that the trial judge’s questions 
to the jurors are content-based, dependent upon the facts of the case, so that the trial 
court and this court have information that permits a judicial determination about 
each juror’s qualifications to serve as an impartial juror. 
¶ 155 
This court must codify and promulgate a procedure that complies with the 
constitution and protects a defendant’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. To 
comply with the constitution, the amended rule must prohibit group voir dire and 
mandate individualized content-based questioning of each juror so that the trial 
court and this court have a basis upon which to gauge each prospective juror’s 
credibility and qualifications to serve impartially on a jury. Finally, the amended 
rule must mandate that the judge is the only person who makes the decision as to 
each juror’s qualifications to serve and specifically prohibit relying exclusively on 
- 45 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“the juror’s assurances that he [or she] is equal to this task.” Murphy, 421 U.S. at 
800 (“the juror’s assurances that he is equal to this task cannot be dispositive of the 
accused’s rights”). 
¶ 156 
In my opinion, the record does not establish that Mr. Birge received a fair trial 
before an impartial jury because the voir dire in this case was structurally defective. 
Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the appellate court, reverse defendant’s 
conviction, and remand the case for a new trial. Consequently, I respectfully 
dissent. 
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l\lIN:\'ESOT. 
\ 
.Jl 
1DICIAL BRANCH 
.. 
OlKIJI.JlDICl\l.Dl,IRICI • m,'\IPl'("
Ol'I\ 
27-CR-20•12646 
Hennepin County Special 
Juror Questionnaire 
You are a potential juror in the trial of 
four former police officers charged in connection with 
the 
death of 
George Floyd. From this day forward, DO NOT read or intentionally view anything 
about these cases or do 
any 
investigation or 
research related to these cases. 
The information in this questionnaire is for the judge and attorneys that will be involved in this 
trial and is required information. This questionnaire will be filed as a public document in the 
court record at the end of 
the trial, but until then, your name and the fact that you are a 
potential juror will NOT be public. For that reason, DO NOT disclose to 
anyone that you are a 
potential juror in this case. 
* 
.. 
PLEASE USE BLACK PEN ONLY AND DO NOT WRITE ON THE BACK OF ANY PAGE. 
Filed in DisO'iel Court 
State of Minneso1a 
12/22/2020 12:14 PM 
·••you MUST RETURN THIS SHEET ANO THE COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE BY JANUARY 2, 2021. 
Your Juror Identification Number 
(9 digits): ______________ 
_ 
Your Full Name: _______________________ 
_ 
Your Phone Numbers (cell, work and home): _________ ____ 
_ 
Your Email Address: ______________________ 
_ 
You should bring a picture ID with you when you come to court for the first time. 
Your contact information will remain confidential and available only 
to District Court staff. The parties 
and attorneys for the parties will have access to 
your name, but will refer to you in the 
courtroom by 
a 
random number to be assigned by District Court. Contact the District Court Jury Office at (612) 348-3158 
if 
you have any questions. 
By returning the completed questionnaire, you are declaring under penalty of perjury that 
everything you have stated in t his document is t rue and correct. 
I understand and do so declare. 
Sign Here: ___________________ 
_ 
Signed on this date _______ 
in ______ 
County. 
¶ 157 
APPENDIX A 
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STATE OF M INNESOTA 
COUNTY OF HENNEPIN 
DIS
TRICT COURT 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
S
tate of Minnesota, 
Plaintiff, 
SPECIAL JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE 
vs. 
Derek Michael Chauvin, 
Tou Thao, 
Dist Ct. File 27·CR-20-12646 
Dist Ct. File 27·CR-20-12949 
Dist Ct. File 27•CR-20-12951 
Dist Ct. File 27·CR-20-12953 
Thomas Kiernan Lane , 
J. Alexander Kueng, 
Defendants. 
Please answer all of the questions as completely and honestly as you can. You must answer all 
questions, but 
you may 
answer "PRIVATE" if disclosure of 
some of 
your past experiences would be 
particularly sensitive, traumatic, or embarrassing and the judge will address those questions in 
court as privately as possible. As you answer these questions, please keep in mind that there are 
no "right" or "wrong" answers, but you are answering these questions under oath and YOU WILL 
BE REQUIRED TO VER
IFY UNDER OATH THAT YOUR ANSWERS ARE TRUE WHE
N YOU COME TO 
COURT FOR THE FIRST TIME. 
***Extra blank pages are attached if 
you need additional room for answers*** 
PART I. KNOWLEDGE OF THE CASE 
On May 25, 2020, George Floyd died after an interaction with Minneapolis Police. The 
charges in t his case stem from that incident. 
2 
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1. What do you know about this case from media reports? 
Filed 
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IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE PARTIES TO KNOW ALL OF THE DE
TAILS YOU REMEMBER ABOUT 
THESE EVENTS, THE CASE, GEORGE FLOYD, ANO DEFENDANTS DEREK CHAUVIN, TOU THAO, J. 
ALEXANDER KUENG ANO THOMAS LANE. PLEASE TAKE YOUR TIME TO SEARCH YOUR MEMORY 
AND PROVIDE A FULL ACCOUNT OF WHAT YOU RECALL FROM WHAT YOU HAVE HEARD OR 
SEEN IN THE MEDIA. THIS WILL 
HELP TO SHORTEN THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS. 
3 
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2. From what you have seen, read, or heard, do you have a general impression of 
the defendants? 
D Very negative 
D Somewhat negative 
D Neutral 
D Somewhat positive 
D Very positive 
D Other: 
Why do you feel that way? 
3. From what you have seen, read, or heard, do you have a general impression of 
George Floyd? 
D Very negative 
D Somewhat negative 
□ 
Neutral 
□ 
Somewhat positive 
□ 
Very positive 
□ 
Other: 
Why 
do 
you feel that way? 
4. Do you, or someone close to you, have any direct or 
indirect connections to these events? 
0 Yes D No If 
yes, please explain: 
5. Have you ever watched video of 
George Floyd's death on the news or the Internet? 0 Yes O No 
If 
yes, how many times have you seen videos from the incident, in whole or in part, on TV or on 
the Internet? 
□ 
1 time □ 
2-3 times D 4-5 times D 6 or more times 
6. Have you ever talked about George Floyd's death with your family, friends, or co-workers, or 
discussed it online, for example, on social media? □Yes □ 
No 
If 
yes, what opinions have you expressed? 
7. Did you, or someone close to you, participate in any of 
the demonstrations or marches against 
police brutality 
that took place in Minneapolis after George Floyd's death? 
□ 
Yes, me □ 
Yes, 
someone close to me □ 
No. 
If you participated, explain how much you were involved. 
If 
you participated, did you carry a sign? What did it say? 
4 
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8. Did you or 
someone you know get injured or 
suffer any property damage during the protests that 
took place after George Floyd's death? □ 
Yes □ 
No 
9. Do you believe your community has been negatively or positively affected by any of 
the protests 
that have taken place in the Twin-Cities area since George Floyd's death? 
10. No matter 
what 
you have heard or 
seen about this case, and no matter 
what opinions you might 
have formed, can you put 
all of 
that aside and decide this 
case only on the evidence you receive 
in court, follow the law, and decide the 
case in a fair and impartial manner? 
PART II. MEDIA HABITS 
1. What is your primary source of 
news? 
2. How often do you read a hard copy or 
on 
line version of 
a newspaper? D E
very 
day D Several 
times a week □ 
Once or 
twice a week □ 
Less often than once a week □ 
Never 
3. What newspapers do you regularly read? 
4. What podcasts do you regularly listen to? 
5. How often do you listen to local news on the radio Qr watch news on television? □ 
Every day 
□ 
Several times a week □ 
Once or twice a week □ 
Less often than once a week □ 
Never 
6. Which local radio or 
television news station do you listen to or watch most? 
7. How often do you see local news or 
news related updates on social media sites such as Facebook 
or 
Tw itter? □ 
Every d ay □ 
Several times a week D Once or 
twice a week D Less often than once 
a week □ 
Never 
8. What social media platforms do you use regularly, if 
any? 
5 
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PART Ill. POLICE CONTACTS 
27-CR·20·12646 
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1. The defendants in this case were officers for the Minneapolis Police Department. Is there 
anything about their 
employment with the MPD that would prevent you from rendering a fair and 
impartial verdict in this case? 
2. Do you have regular contact with any law enforcement agencies, employees, or officers through 
your work, your neighborhood, or in your social life? 
If "Yes," please explain: 
3. Have you, or 
someone close to you, ever helped support or advocated in favor of 
or 
against police 
reform? If 
"Yes," please explain: 
4. Have you, or someone close to you, ever been arrested for a crime? 
□Yes □ 
No 
If yes, how did the police handle the arrest? □ 
They acted professionally □ 
They acted 
unprofess ionally □ 
They were verbally abusive □ 
They used excessive force □ 
I don't know 
5. Have you, or someone close to you, ever been the victim of 
a crime where the police were called? 
□Yes □ 
No 
If 
"Yes," please explain the circumstances: 
6. Were you satisfied or unsatisfied with how 
the police responded? □ 
Very satisfied □ 
Somewhat 
satisfied □ 
Neutral □ 
Somewhat unsatisfied □ 
Very unsatisfied □ 
I don't know 
7. Have you ever personally seen the police use more force than was needed? 
□Yes □ 
No 
If "Yes," please explain: 
6 
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8. Have you ever been restrained or put in a chokehold, for example, by law enforcement or during a 
self-defense class? □ 
Yes □ 
No If 
"Yes," please explain: 
9. Please circle t he choice that reflects your honest opinion: 
a. 
Discrimination is not as bad as the media 
makes it out to be. 
b. 
Blacks and other minorities do not receive 
equal treatment as whites in the criminal 
justice system. 
c. 
Police in this country treat whites and blacks 
equally. 
d. 
Police in my 
community make me feel safe. 
e. 
I support defunding the Minneapolis Police 
Department. 
f. 
Minneapolis police officers are more likely 
to 
respond with force when confronting black 
suspects than when dealing with white suspects. 
g. 
h. 
Because law enforcement officers have such 
dangerous jobs, it is 
not right to 
second guess 
decisions they make while on duty. 
The criminal just system is biased against racial 
and ethnic minorities. 
I do 
not trust the police. 
j. 
People today do not give our law enforcement 
officers the respect they deserve. 
k. 
Local police departments try to 
cover up 
excessive force rather than correct it. 
I.. 
I think that news reports about police brutality 
against racial minorities is only the tip of 
the 
iceberg. 
Strongly 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
No Opinion 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Strongly 
Disagree 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
10. Have you ever been trained on how to restrain someone or use a chokehold? □ 
Yes □ 
No 
11. Do you have any martial arts training or experience? D Yes D No 
7 
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12. Other than what you have already described above, have you, or 
anyone close to you, 
participated in protests about police use of 
force or police brutality? 
□Yes □ 
No 
Filed 
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13. How favorable or unfavorable are you about Black Lives Matter? D Very favorable D Somewhat 
favorable □ 
Neutral □ 
Somewhat 
unfavorable □ 
Very unfavorable. 
Please explain your choice: 
14. How favorable or unfavorable are you about Blue lives Matter? □ 
Very favorable □ 
Somewhat 
favorable □ 
Neutral □ 
Somewhat unfavorable □ 
Very unfavorable. 
Please explain your choice: 
PART IV. PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
1. 
Age\Gender: 
2. 
Highest level of education you have completed (list any degrees and areas of 
study for any 
education beyond high school)? 
3. Your Work Status (Full-time, Part-Time, Self-employed, Disabled, Student, Retired, etc.)? Your 
occupation\employer? 
4. Previous five positions or occupations (only if 
within last 10 years)? 
5. What city do you live in and how long have you lived there? 
B 
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6. Please list other cities or 
states you have lived in and approximately how long: (include up to 5 
most recent places) 
7. 
Marital status? 
8. Spouse or partner's work status (Full-time, Part-Time, Self.employed, Disabled, Student, Retired, 
etc.)? 0ccupation\employer? 
9. Highest level of 
education completed by spouse or partner (list any degrees and areas of 
study 
beyond high school)? 
10. What are the ages, genders and work of 
your children if you have any? 
11. Have you ever served in the military? If so, please list Branch, Highest Rank, Approximate Dates of 
Service and whether you served in combat. 
12. Do you, or anyone close to you, have any training or experience (work or 
volunteer) in the 
following areas? 
No 
Yes 
Please Provide Limited Details 
Law 
D 
□Se lf D Spouse 
D Family 
D Close Friend 
Law enforcement 
D 
0 Self D Spouse 
D Family 
D Close Friend 
Criminal justice or 
D 
D Self D Spouse 
criminology 
D Family 
D Close Friend 
Forensic Science 
D 
□Se lf D Spouse 
D Family 
D Close Friend 
9 
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Medicine or 
□ 
□ 
Self 
□ 
Spouse 
Healthcare 
□ 
Family 
□ 
Close Friend 
Counseling, 
□ 
□ 
Self 
□ 
Spouse 
Psychology or 
□ 
Family 
Mental Health 
□ 
Close Friend 
Civil Rights or Social 
D 
□ 
Self 
□ 
Spouse 
Justice Issues 
□ 
Family 
□ 
Close Friend 
13. 
Have you, or anyone close to you, had any of 
the following experiences? 
No 
Yes 
Please Provide Limited Details 
Victim of 
Crime? 
□ 
□ 
Self 
□ 
Spouse 
□ 
Family 
□ 
Close Friend 
Accused of a Crime? 
□ 
□ 
Self 
□ 
Spouse 
□ 
Family 
□ 
Close Friend 
Struggle with Drug 
□ 
□Se lf □ 
Spouse 
Addiction? 
□ 
Family 
□ 
Close Friend 
Filed 
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14. 
W ould any of 
t he experiences you noted above make it difficult for you to be fair and impartial? 
If 
so, why? 
15. 
Have you had any of 
the following court experiences? 
No 
Yes 
Please Provide Limited Details 
Served on a jury in a 
□ 
□ 
criminal case? 
Served on a jury in a 
□ 
□ 
civil case? 
Testified as a 
□ 
□ 
witness in a court 
case? 
Served on a grand 
□ 
□ 
jury? 
10 
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Worked for the 
judicial branch? 
I 
O 
I 
27-CR·20· 12646 
□ 
16. Would any of 
the experiences you noted above make it difficult for you to be fair and 
impartial? Is so, why? 
17. Please list any hobbies or special interests you have: 
18. Please list any organizations you have belonged to or in which you participate, 
including as an active volunteer or financial supporter. This could include veterans 
groups, service clubs, social clubs, unions, professional, volunteer, neighborhood, 
educational or political groups. 
PART V. OPINIONS REGARDING JUSTICE SYSTEM 
1. Do you believe that 
the jury system in this country is a fair 
system? Why or why not? 
2. Do you believe our criminal justice system works? Why or 
why not? 
3. 
Under our system of 
justice, defendants are presumed innocent of 
the 
criminal 
charges against them. Would you have any difficulty 
following this principle of law? 
11 
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4. Under our 
system of 
justice, the prosecution has the burden of 
proving the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Would you have any 
difficulty following this principle of law? 
5. Under our 
system of 
justice, defendants have the right to remain silent, and if 
they exercise 
that right, their silence is not to be used against them. Would you have any difficulty 
following this principle of law? 
6. Under our 
system of 
justice, the potential consequences of your verdict, including potential 
penalty or punishment, must not in any way affect the jury's decision as to whether or not 
the prosecution has proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Would you 
have any difficulty 
following this principle of law? 
7. Under our 
system of 
justice, the jury must decide the case solely on the evidence 
produced in court and the law that the judge instructs, and not because of bias, passion, 
prejudice, or 
sympathy. Would you have difficulty 
following this principle of law? 
PART VI. TRIAL LENGTH AND ABILITY TO SERVE 
Filed ln Dislricl Courl 
State of Minnesota 
12122/2020 12:14 PM 
1. Our best prediction is that jury selection will last from March 8, 2021 to March 26, 2021. You will 
have to appear at 
the Hennepin County 
Government Center for 1-2 days in that timeframe (your 
time to appear will be assigned later). If 
you are selected for the jury 
in this case, you will have to 
appear every weekday starting March 29, 2021 until trial and deliberations are finished (estimated 
to be three to four weeks). Is there any significant hardship or reason why you cannot serve during 
this t ime period? 
2. During jury 
deliberation (and possibly for part of the trial), the jury will be sequestered. That 
means the jury will work into the evenings and be taken to 
a hotel to stay overnight. Is 
t here any 
reason you cannot be sequestered overnight? 
12 
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3. Secure parking will be provided for jurors, free of 
charge. Are you able to drive yourself, or have 
someone drop you off each day? 
4. How difficult 
do you think it would be for you to 
evaluate graphic photographs 
or video, including photos and video of a person who has died? 
5. The jury 
is told not to read, watch, or listen to news accounts of a trial they are involved in 
until it 
is over, and not to 
talk to anyone about the case, not even to one another, and to not 
post anything on social media or elsewhere, including through jury 
deliberations. Would you 
find it difficult to follow these instructions for any reason? 
6. Is there a reason why you would not be able to give your complete attention to a trial during 
your time as a juror? 
7. Do you have any religious or philosophical beliefs, which would make it 
difficult for you to 
be a juror? 
8. Do you have any medical, visual, hearing, physical, or other impairment that may affect 
your ability 
to serve as a juror on this case? 
9. Is there any other reason that you could not be a fair and impartial juror in this case? If 
yes, 
please explain. 
13 
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10. Is there anything 
else the judge and attorneys should know about you in relation to 
serving on this jury? 
11. Do you want to serve as a juror in this case? D Yes D No D Not Sure 
12. Why do you feel that way about serving as a juror 
in this case? 
14 
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27.CR-20-12646 
District Court Use Only: 
16 
Fiktd in Dl:S10Ct COurt 
State of Minnesota 
12122/2020 12 14 PM 
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Experiment 
Questionnaire 
Which statement best describes you? 
I strongly 
prerer V\/h1
te people to Black people. 
I moderately prefer \l\-1lite people to Black people. 
I slightly prefer White people to Blaek people. 
I like 
White 
people and Blaek 
people equally. 
I sfightly prefer Black people to 'J\lhite people. 
I moderately prarer Black people to White people 
I strongly p,efer Black people 
to 
White people. 
Page 1 out of 3 
Tip: For quick response, ciick to serect your answer. and then clack again to submil. 
[-
Submit 
I of I 
https:'iimplil:Rlian 
ard 
.cdu 'implicit-'S1udy11
1
d• -
Oectine to Answer 
2/1012021, 2:06 Pl 
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APPENDIX B 
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