Case Title: Wilde v. State

Citation: 123 P. 85, 1912 WY 27, 20 Wyo. 302

Docket Number: 116986

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1912-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wilde v. State1985 WY 133706 P.2d 251Case Number: 84-232Decided: 09/09/1985DENNIS BOYD WILDE, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
DENNIS BOYD WILDE, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Larry N. Long, 
Salt Lake City, 
for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was charged 
with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver, in 
violation of § 35-7-1031(a)(ii), W.S. 1977. He was convicted by a jury and 
sentenced to a term of not less than one and one-half nor more than two and 
one-half years in the state penitentiary. Appellant raises the following issues 
on appeal:

The trial court abused 
its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a 
continuance.

The trial court should 
not have allowed testimony from the officer regarding defendant's 
confession.

The trial court should 
have suppressed evidence obtained from a van since the search of it was not by 
consent and the search was conducted without a warrant.

[¶2.]     On August 26, 1983, 
Deputy Ferrin, an investigator with the Teton County Sheriff's Office, received 
a phone call from a previously reliable informant. This informant, calling from 
Cody, told the deputy that she had seen two men, named Dennis and Les, handing 
out cocaine at a swimming hole in Cody, and that they had been staying at the 
Rainbow Park Motel. She also said that they were heading into Jackson to distribute more cocaine and were driving a gold 
colored van with Montana license plates. Deputy Ferrin 
confirmed the fact that two men driving a gold colored van with Montana license plates 
had stayed at the Rainbow Park Motel in Cody, and had checked out that 
morning.

[¶3.]     Shortly after noon, a 
local law enforcement officer in Jackson observed a van meeting the description 
furnished to Deputy Ferrin. After the van had stopped at the Executive Inn in 
Jackson, the 
officer approached the single occupant of the van and requested identification, 
which was produced. The officer then radioed for assistance, and two other 
officers, including Deputy Ferrin, responded immediately.

[¶4.]     The officers informed 
the driver of the van, appellant Dennis Wilde, that they had information that 
there was a large amount of cocaine in the van and requested permission to 
search the vehicle. The officers testified that Wilde consented to the search, 
but Wilde testified that he was scared and that he said nothing. The officers 
did search the van, and found large amounts of cash and of what was later proven 
to be cocaine and also a .357 magnum revolver. After having been advised of his 
rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974, reh. denied 
385 U.S. 890, 87 S. Ct. 11, 17 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1966), Wilde told the officers that 
he was just holding the cocaine and the cash for a friend that he had dropped 
off at the airport, and that he had been "set up." Wilde repeated this story to 
the officers as they drove him to the jail.

[¶5.]     At approximately 4:00 
that afternoon, Wilde was brought to Deputy Ferrin's office, where he was again 
advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda 
v. Arizona, supra. Wilde then signed a waiver of such rights, and he told 
the deputy that he was acting as a "middle man," introducing people who wanted 
to buy drugs to people who sold them. Deputy Ferrin testified that he had tried 
to tape record this conversation by use of a hidden tape recorder, but that 
something had gone amiss and the conversation had not been recorded. Wilde 
testified that he knew Ferrin was recording the conversation, because the tape 
recorder was not hidden, but was sitting on the desk, and that the only reason 
he talked to Ferrin was because he believed his statement would be protected as 
to accuracy by the recording; he said that he had only repeated his story that 
he had been "set up."

[¶6.]     Wilde was charged with 
possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Subsequently he and 
his girl friend, Gay Arneson, contacted Deputy Ferrin to have the van released 
from impoundment. The van belonged to Arneson. Upon learning that the van would 
not be released until a thorough search could be conducted, both Wilde and 
Arneson signed a form consenting to the search. When Deputy Ferrin conducted the 
search, he found several items such as a balance beam and gram measurement, a 
razor blade coated with a white residue, spoons, a sifter, and a container of 
Ultracane, a substance commonly used to dilute cocaine for street 
sale.

MOTION FOR 
CONTINUANCE

[¶7.]     Appellant's first 
attorney was A.A. Zvegintzov. On February 23, 1984, at the arraignment, 
appellant indicated that he was satisfied with Mr. Zvegintzov's representation 
of him up to that point. The trial judge set March 6, 1984 as the final date for 
the defendant to file all motions, and April 6 as the final date for discovery. 
The trial was set for May 14, 1984.

[¶8.]     Several motions were 
filed by Mr. Wilde's attorney, including a Motion to Suppress Evidence, a Motion 
to Suppress Statements, a Motion for Discovery and a Motion for Additional 
Preliminary Examination. A motions hearing was held on April 30, 1984. At the 
beginning of that hearing, Mr. Zvegintzov informed the court that Mr. Wilde had 
called him the night before and had fired him. Mr. Wilde, who was in attendance 
at the hearing, verified this and stated that he had not had a chance to find a 
new attorney.

[¶9.]     The trial judge denied 
Zvegintzov's request to be removed as counsel, and the hearing proceeded as 
scheduled. Mr. Wilde's new attorney, Mr. Long, entered his appearance on Monday, 
May 14, the first day of the trial. On May 11, 1984, the Friday prior to the 
14th, Mr. Long made a motion, over the telephone, to have the trial continued. 
The motion was denied; the appellant argued this to be an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion and that it resulted in ineffective assistance of 
counsel.

[¶10.]  Such a motion for continuance is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb 
the ruling on it unless the discretion has been abused. Ash v. State, Wyo., 555 P.2d 221, 225 
(1976), reh. denied 560 P.2d 369, cert. denied 434 U.S. 842, 98 S. Ct. 139, 54 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1977); Irvin v. State, 
Wyo., 584 P.2d 1068, 1073 (1978); Adger v. State, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1056, 
1058-1059 (1978). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court acts in a manner 
which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. The question is 
whether a court could reasonably conclude as it did. Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980).

[¶11.]  An abuse of discretion did not occur 
here. Mr. Long did not enter his appearance until the first day of the trial, 
May 14, at which time he filed an Appearance of Counsel and Renewal of All 
Motions Heretofore Made by Prior Defense Counsel, relating in 
part:

"COMES NOW, Larry N. 
Long, Attorney for Defendant, and hereby makes his Appearance as Counsel for the 
above-named Defendant and certifies that he has read the file in the 
above-entitled matter and that he is as ready as he possibly could be under the 
circumstances and that he certifies that he understands that there will be no 
continuances in this matter although he made such a Motion on Friday Afternoon 
last during a telephone conversation with his Honor based upon the fact that he 
had just been retained that very afternoon by the Defendant and had not had 
ample time to prepare an adequate defense."

[¶12.]  However, the record shows that he had 
contacted Mr. Zvegintzov on May 5, at which time he received a full review of 
the case.1 He also renewed all the motions 
that had been made by Mr. Zvegintzov. Furthermore, Mr. Zvegintzov was required 
by the trial court to be present at counsel table during the entire trial to 
assist Mr. Long.

[¶13.]  The trial judge also made it clear that 
he thought the defendant was receiving good representation, by Mr. Zvegintzov at 
the motions hearing, after he had been fired:

"THE COURT: Mr. 
Zvegintzov, let me say for an attorney that's been fired that was an excellent 
cross examination. The Court wants to commend you for understanding what the 
rules are, and knowing we have a Wyoming Supreme Court case on all fours. The 
opinion's written by Justice Guthrie with reference to lawyers who have been 
fired or want to withdraw in a criminal case. Once there, you're there until the 
Court allows you to withdraw, which I have not done. You obviously are familiar 
with that case, and I want to compliment you for being so well prepared for this 
even though you were fired."

And by Mr. 
Long:

"THE COURT: Now, what I 
want to say was, now, Mr. Wilde, you're being well represented; you understand 
that?

"MR. WILDE: Yes, 
sir.

"THE COURT: Mr. Long, 
you're doing a good job.

"MR. LONG: Thank you, 
your Honor.

"THE COURT: That was a 
good cross examination * * *

* * * * * 
*

"THE COURT: You were 
hired to have him found not guilty and you did a good job, Mr. 
Long."

 

[¶14.]  It is clear that the defendant contacted 
Mr. Long in sufficient time to prepare for the trial, and that Mr. Long was in 
fact preparing for trial prior to his official entry of appearance. The only 
delay appears to be due to the defendant's failure to pay Mr. Long a retainer 
until the last moment.

[¶15.]  We have said before that a court is 
justified in refusing to allow a defendant to manipulate the orderly procedure 
of the court by the exercise of his right to counsel. Irvin v. State, supra, 584 P.2d  at 1073. 
With this in mind, and no manifest injustice being shown, we hold that it was 
not an abuse of discretion by the trial court to deny the motion for 
continuance.

TESTIMONY

[¶16.]  At trial, Deputy Ferrin testified about a 
conversation had between himself and the defendant. The deputy's testimony as to 
what the defendant said was in direct conflict with the defendant's testimony at 
trial. The defendant objected to this testimony because Deputy Ferrin had 
attempted to tape record the conversation, but due to some mishap, the attempt 
was not successful, i.e., the tape did not contain the conversation. Appellant 
argues that the prosecution has a duty to preserve and disclose evidence 
compiled by any of the government's agencies, citing United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 
(D.C. Cir. 1971).

[¶17.]  This latter argument would hold more 
weight if there was a showing that the deputy had recorded the conversation and 
then erased it. As it is, however, the government has no duty to manufacture 
evidence, it has only a duty to produce exculpatory evidence within its 
possession.

[¶18.]  If the government had possession of 
exculpatory evidence, failure to produce it would violate due process where the 
evidence is material to either guilt or punishment, regardless of the good faith 
or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-1197, 10 L. Ed. 215 (1963). The United States Supreme Court has 
discussed the State's duty to preserve evidence, and held that such duty is 
limited to evidence which can be expected to play a significant role in the 
defendant's defense; such "evidence must possess an exculpatory value" apparent 
before its destruction, and "be of such a nature that the defendant would be 
unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." 
California v. Trombetta, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 
104 S. Ct. 2528, 2529-2530, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984).

[¶19.]  Appellant's argument fails in two 
respects: This is not a case of evidence which was destroyed2, and there is comparable evidence 
readily available, inasmuch as both Deputy Ferrin and Wilde, himself, testified 
as to the substance of the conversation. The jury could thus choose which 
rendition to believe, and they believed Deputy Ferrin. We see no reason to 
disturb that finding of fact here.

SEARCH OF 
VAN

[¶20.]  Appellant argues that the initial search 
of the van, at the time he was arrested outside the Executive Inn, was not 
pursuant to a valid consent. At trial Wilde's testimony was limited to the 
circumstances surrounding his conversation with Deputy Ferrin in the latter's 
office. But there was a motions hearing specifically on the issue of consent to 
search the van. At that hearing, Deputy Ferrin testified:

"A I stated to Mr. Wilde 
that I had information to believe that there was a large amount of cocaine in 
his van and I would like permission to search his van. 

"Q Okay. Now, how long 
did this conversation last?

"A Just as long as it 
took me to say it to you.

"Q What was Mr. Wilde's 
response to that?

"A He stated, `You're 
[sic] information is bad. Go ahead and search my van.'

"Q 
Okay.

"A This was after I had 
identified myself, also as working for the sheriff's 
office."

[¶21.]  At the trial, outside of the hearing of 
the jury, Mr. Wilde testified:

"Q [By Mr. Long] That's 
at the point where Ferrin confronted you with the information that he had that 
you had a large amount of cocaine in the van?

"A 
Yes.

"Q And then tell us what 
happened.

"A I was shocked and very 
scared at the time. And he said he wanted to search the van, and I don't 
remember saying anything. I was so amazed. I was thinking to myself, I'm 
wondering if the person that it belonged to had taken it with him when I dropped 
him off.

* * * * * 
*

"Q (By Mr. Fix) I'm not 
quite sure, then, Mr. Wilde, what you're saying. They went ahead and searched 
the van without your consent?

"A 
Yes.

"THE COURT: No, he said 
he didn't say anything that he remembers.

"A I didn't give 
consent.

"Q (By Mr. Fix) You 
didn't say anything?

"A No, not that I 
remember."

The court ruled 
that there was a consent which was freely and voluntarily given. Appellant 
argues that he was surrounded by three police officers, that he was afraid and 
told not to move, and that any consent was not voluntary but a mere submission 
to authority. Further, appellant claims in this brief, "no sane man who denies 
his guilt would actually be willing to allow authorities to search his vehicle 
for contraband which is certain to be discovered."

[¶22.]  Fortunately, we have the impressions of 
the trial court relative to the argument that Wilde was somehow "bullied" or 
frightened, by the multitude of officers confronting him, into giving a 
consent.

"* * * I would like the 
record to show the Court's observations with reference to Mr. Wilde. He is a 
young, healthy male, caucasian. Obviously in good health. He's husky, looks 
strong, looks tough, however that is, not the kind of a person who could be 
easily intimidated by anyone. I want the record to show that. * * 
*"

[¶23.]  The general rule is that warrantless 
searches and seizures are unreasonable, both under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 4, of the Wyoming Constitution, with a 
few well-established exceptions. Hunter 
v. State, Wyo., 704 P.2d 713 (1985). One of these 
exceptions is a search pursuant to valid consent. Ortega v. State, Wyo., 669 P.2d 935, 941 (1983); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). A valid consent is one which is voluntary, in light of the totality 
of the circumstances. Amin v. State, 
Wyo., 695 P.2d 1021, 1024 (1985); Stamper v. State, Wyo., 662 P.2d 82, 87 
(1983). The burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the consent was voluntary. Stamper 
v. State, supra. This involves a question of fact, and on appeal the 
evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party below. Amin v. State, 
supra.

[¶24.]  At the motions hearing, the trial court 
heard the testimony of two of the officers present at the arrest. At the trial 
the issue was reargued with the same two officers testifying again, and in 
addition the defendant and the third officer testified. The trial court ruled 
both times that the consent was voluntary. Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State, we must agree with the trial court's ruling. Three 
police officers testified that appellant consented to the search, while 
appellant merely said that he was shocked and scared and didn't remember saying 
anything.

[¶25.]  Appellant urges that under Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543, 
39 A.L.R. 790 (1925), and Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970), probable cause and exigent circumstances are required. We need not 
reach this argument, inasmuch as we find defendant's consent to have been 
voluntarily given.

[¶26.]  Accordingly, the trial court is affirmed 
in all respects.

1 Mr. Long apparently was 
contacted as early as May 5, but did not enter his appearance until the 14th 
because he did not receive his retainer until then.

2 Deputy Ferrin testified 
that the recorder used was hidden in a wall, and activated by a switch on 
another wall. He and the officer who shared an office with him tried to keep a 
new tape in the machine at all times. He speculated that the machine was 
accidently activated by someone who thought the switch was a light switch, 
causing the tape to record office background noise, thus when he switched on the 
machine to record Wilde, the tape had already run. In any event, the tape at no 
time contained the conversation between Ferrin and Wilde.