Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Keiner

Citation: 

Docket Number: 24ag/10

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2011-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gregory Raymond Keiner, Misc. Docket AG No. 24,
Sept. Term 2010
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT – Disbarment is the
appropriate sanction for an attorney who violated Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.4(a) and (b) and 8.4 (a) - (d), by wrongfully deleting and altering his law firm’s
clients’ electronic computer files in an effort to make viable cases appear closed for lack of
merit.  The attorney engaged in such conduct in order to conceal the cases from the firm, with
the intent of pursuing the cases on his own once he started his own law practice.  The
attorney also wrongfully used the firm’s resources in an effort to solicit new clients for his
proposed law practice.  Given the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances, the
attorney’s intentional, dishonest conduct warranted disbarment.
Circuit Court for Howard County
Misc. Pet. No. 13-C-10-83694
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 24
September Term, 2010
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
GREGORY RAYMOND KEINER
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Barbera
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,            
Specially Assigned)
                             JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, J.
Bell, C.J., Murphy and Eldridge, JJ.,
Dissent.
Filed: August 19, 2011
1 MRPC 1.4 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect
to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is required
by these Rules;
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s
conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not
permitted by the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.
2 MRPC 8.4 provides in relevant part:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
On July 28, 2010, the Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel,
filed a Petition for Disciplinary Action or Remedial Action (“Petition”) against Gregory
Raymond Keiner (“Respondent”).  See Md. Rule 16-751.  Bar Counsel charged Respondent
with violating Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) 1.4
(Communication)1 and 8.4 (Misconduct).2  Pursuant to Maryland Rules 16-773 and 16-
752(a), we referred the Petition to the Honorable Timothy J. McCrone of the Circuit Court
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for Howard County, to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and
conclusions of law in accordance with Maryland Rule 16-757.  
Before that hearing, Judge McCrone was asked by the parties to resolve several
discovery and evidentiary matters.  Respondent had filed Interrogatories and Requests for
Admission, seeking, inter alia, information in connection with Bar Counsel’s decision not
to enter into a conditional diversion agreement with Respondent.  See Md. Rule 16-736.  Bar
Counsel responded to those discovery requests by filing a Motion for Protective Order.  
Judge McCrone held a hearing to (1) address the motion for protective order, and (2)
determine whether Respondent would be permitted to enter into evidence at the hearing on
the Petition both a Report of the Peer Review Panel concerning Respondent and letter
communications between Bar Counsel and Respondent regarding the possibility of a
conditional diversion agreement.  Judge McCrone issued the protective order requested by
Bar Counsel on the ground that the information Respondent sought in connection with such
an agreement is not relevant to any claim or defense at issue at the hearing on the Petition.
Judge McCrone further ruled that, because the “Peer Review process is a confidential
mediation that is irrelevant to the issues before the court” at the hearing on the Petition,
Respondent would not be permitted to have the Report of the Peer Review Panel entered into
evidence.
On December 17, 2010, Judge McCrone conducted the evidentiary hearing on the
Petition.  Respondent appeared with counsel at the hearing and testified.  On January 18,
2011, Judge McCrone issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law.  He found by
3 Citations to exhibits have been omitted.
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clear and convincing evidence that Respondent had violated MRPC 1.4(a) and (b), and
8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d).
I.
Judge McCrone made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law3:
FINDINGS OF FACT & ANALYSIS
Respondent was admitted as a member of the Maryland Bar on
December 18, 2002 and maintained his law practice at 100 E. 23rd Street,
Baltimore, Maryland 21218.  From February 2003 until March 2009
Respondent worked as an Associate Attorney at The Law Offices of Evan K.
Thalenberg, P.A. (hereinafter “law firm”), practicing primarily lead paint
litigation.  As of 2008, Respondent’s income with the firm was $268,700.00.
In 2008, Respondent decided that he wanted to leave the law firm and
establish his own practice.  From approximately June 2008 until March 2009,
in order to facilitate opening his own practice, Respondent began altering and
deleting documents in the firm’s client files to give the appearance to the firm
that client files had been closed, when in fact the files were still active.
Respondent deleted and altered documents in the firm’s client files to show
lower-than-actual or, in some cases, the absence of, blood-lead levels to
support his drafting of a termination letter to the clients of the firm.  The
subject false termination letters were not sent to the client, but were placed in
the firm’s file to give the false impression to other members of the firm that the
file had been closed.  Respondent conceded that he engaged in deception to
facilitate taking these clients with him once he left the firm.  Respondent
further conceded that he did not inform the clients of his actions in misleading
the firm to believe these cases lacked merit.
The evidence adduced by [Bar Counsel] further made clear that
Respondent solicited approximately two hundred (200) potential clients and
sought medical and/or laboratory results for potential clients using his own
letterhead while working for the firm.  Respondent conceded in his testimony
that he utilized the firm’s resources such as postage, paper, various office
supplies, and the firm’s Accurint subscription to locate potential clients.
Respondent’s deception was discovered when a client contacted the firm and
produced a letter from Respondent on Respondent’s own letterhead.  When
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Respondent was confronted with the solicitation letter, he wrote a letter to Mr.
Thalenberg admitting that he had altered computer records at the firm in four
cases.
Mr. John Kazmierczak, another attorney with the firm, was assigned the
task of investigating cases Respondent may have altered while working at the
firm.  Mr. Kazmierczak located four additional client files that were
inappropriately altered by Respondent.  Mr. Kazmierczak’s investigation
revealed that Respondent deleted the blood-lead levels in the case summary in
the Raven Banks and Derrick Young file, to give the false impression that no
blood-lead levels had been found.  Respondent then generated a termination
letter to the file based upon Respondent’s misrepresentation concerning blood-
lead levels.  Mr. Kazmierczak was able to review an electronic back-up file at
the firm which revealed the correct blood-lead levels for Raven Banks of 18
on July 29, 1992, 16 on September 22, 1993, and 17 on November 4, 1993.
These numbers were consistent with the actual medical records of Raven
Banks and Derrick Young located in the firm’s file.  Mr. Kazmierczak, who
also practiced primarily in the area of lead-paint litigation, testified that these
blood-lead levels were sufficient to support a claim.
In the Tyana Baker and Tyrone Baker file, Mr. Kazmierczak located a
termination letter in the file drafted by Respondent.  When Mr. Kazmierczak
reviewed the electronic back-up file he found a case summary reflecting blood-
lead levels for Tyrone Baker of 8 on February 28, 1995, 15 on May 24, 1996,
and of 9 on January 30, 1997; numbers inconsistent with the termination letter
placed in the file by Respondent.  
In the Shade Brice, et al. file[,] Mr. Kazmierczak observed similar
changes to the firm computer file by Respondent.  A termination letter
generated by Respondent was placed in the file to mislead others at the firm
concerning blood-lead levels and the potential for a claim.  Upon review of the
electronic back-up file at the firm, Mr. Kazmierczak was able to confirm
blood-lead levels for Shade Brice, Zhane McDougle, and Kareen McDougle
ranging from 17 to 6 for Shade Brice, 17 to 9 for Zhane McDougle, and 3 for
Kareen McDougle.  According to Mr. Kazmierczak, these blood-lead levels
would again support filing a lawsuit, and would not be consistent with the
termination letter placed in the file by Respondent.
In the Da’Shira Coley, et al. file, Mr. Kazmierczak found a similar
effort to mislead by Respondent.  No case summary was found for the case.
However, a review of the electronic back-up file revealed blood-lead levels for
Shanece Coley of 13 on March 16, 1995 and 12 on May 12, 1995 and
Da’Shira Coley of 4 on March 15, 1999.
In each of these four client files, Respondent admitted to making the
misleading entries in the firm’s computer files.  Respondent testified that he
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engaged in these misrepresentations in order to avoid filing claims while
working at the firm, and to facilitate filing these claims once he was practicing
law on his own.  Respondent testified that he returned sixty (60) to seventy
(70) files to the firm after his actions were discovered.
In addition to the four client files that Respondent admitted to altering,
Mr. Kazmierczak was able to locate four additional client files that had similar
alterations.  In the Ronald Dalton, Jr. file, Mr. Kazmierczak found no case
summary in the file.  Respondent had generated a termination letter to the file.
Upon review of the electronic back-up file at the firm, a case summary was
found that indicated blood-lead levels for Ronald Dalton, Jr. of 6 on August
26, 1997 and 5 on September 3, 1998.  In fact, a draft complaint was found
approved by the child’s mother.  According to Mr. Kazmierczak, the blood-
lead levels were sufficient to support a viable suit. 
In the Devontae Davis file, Respondent had drafted a termination letter
despite blood-lead levels for Davontae Davis ranging from 17 to 10.  Again,
these blood-lead levels were sufficient to be viable for suit.
In the case of Lavontre Ford, et al., Mr. Kazmierczak again found no
case summary in the file, and Respondent had drafted a termination letter to
the file.  Again, a review of the electronic back-up revealed blood-lead levels
ranging from 9 to 12 for Lavontre Ford and 8 to 3 for Michaela Harris.
Respondent had prepared a draft complaint inconsistent with the termination
letter he placed in the file.  In addition, the electronic back-up revealed a letter
Respondent had sent to the owner of the subject property requesting
permission for an environmental testing of the property - a letter that,
according to Mr. Kazmierczak, would not have been drafted unless the case
was considered to be viable for suit.
In the Shaquille Davis file, the case summary generated by Respondent
indicated no blood-lead levels for the children and Respondent had placed a
termination letter in the file.  Again, the electronic back-up was reviewed and
blood-lead levels were found for Shaquille Davis of 18 on September 23, 1997
and 14 on April 23, 1999.  These blood-lead levels would be considered viable
for suit.
Respondent was unable to recall having altered or deleted these last
four files, but did not deny having done so.  Respondent was clearly
responsible for all of the files in question and the effort to deceive the firm was
clearly consistent.  While the Court is convinced that Respondent made his
best effort to disclose the files he had altered or included misinformation in,
he was unable to identify certain files.  This lack of precise recall leaves room
for concern that not all files have been identified.  With respect to the eight
files identified, the Court finds that Respondent made alterations, deletions,
and included misinformation to give the impression to the firm that the files
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were closed because they would not be viable claims - and to facilitate
Respondent taking the clients and their cases to Respondent’s new private
practice.  This Court finds that Respondent revealed his misconduct to the firm
only after the firm had become aware of Respondent’s misconduct.
Respondent was terminated by the firm shortly after his misconduct was
discovered.  Shortly thereafter, Respondent was voluntarily admitted to
Howard County General Hospital and was found to be suffering from Major
Depressive Disorder and Suicidal Ideations.  Respondent was later treated by
Christiane Tellefsen, M.D., who diagnosed Respondent with Adjustment
Disorder with Depression, Dysthymia and Alcohol Dependence.  Respondent
suffered from depression during his college years, where he attempted suicide
by overdose upon breaking up with his girlfriend.  Respondent has been unable
to completely refrain from alcohol consumption, although he is working
towards that goal.
While the Court finds that alcohol abuse and depression have no doubt
adversely impacted Respondent, this Court is not convinced that such
difficulties resulted in Respondent being unable to conform his conduct in
accordance with the law and with the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct.  Respondent was a very capable lawyer and was able to
manage an extremely busy practice with considerable efficiency.  Respondent
was able to generate substantial income for the firm because of his skill and
obvious attention to detail.  The cause of Respondent’s actions was a desire to
keep for himself more of the income he had been generating for the firm.  Of
course, an ambition to improve one’s financial circumstances is not a fault or
defect.  The manner in which such goals are pursued is key.
Respondent is clearly remorseful and has generally been very
cooperative with Bar Counsel.  The success Respondent has enjoyed in
representing clients in the past leads this Court to conclude that he must be a
skilled advocate.  To date, no client appears to have suffered pecuniary loss
because of Respondent’s misbehavior.  And while Respondent’s misbehavior
came to light because of circumstances he had not anticipated, once
discovered, Respondent was forthcoming.  Several former clients, employers
and opposing counsel have written letters of support on behalf of Respondent.
This Court further notes that the instant case represents the only allegation of
misconduct ever reported against Respondent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent’s acts of altering and deleting documents within the firm’s
client files constitute criminal acts in violation of Maryland Criminal Law
Code Ann. § 7-302 and, therefore, violations of Rules 8.4(a), (b), (c) and (d)
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of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC).
Respondent’s criminal conduct reflects adversely on Respondent’s honesty,
trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.  Respondent’s conduct was deceitful
and prejudicial to the administration of justice as Respondent carried out his
deception after hours, when others would not observe his actions, because
Respondent understood his actions to be inappropriate and unauthorized.  
Rules 1.4(a) and (b) require that an attorney communicate with his
client regarding representation, including material changes in representation.
Because Respondent failed to inform the firm’s clients of his intentions, they
were unable to consent to a potentially significant change in representation.
Therefore, Respondent acted in a deceptive manner and exceeded the scope of
his authority when he altered or deleted documents without his client’s
permission.  Respondent’s failure to communicate with his clients regarding
a material change in their representation represents a violation of Rules 1.4(a)
and (b).
Rule 8.4 describes specific acts that constitute professional misconduct
including purposefully violating the MRPC, committing a criminal act that
reflects negatively on a lawyer’s honesty, and engaging in fraud,
misrepresentation or conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
In this case, Respondent knowingly violated the MRPC when he altered and
deleted documents with the intent to solicit said clients for his own law
practice while he was still employed by The Law Offices of Evan K.
Thalenberg, P.A.  [Respondent] committed a criminal act that reflected
adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer by altering
and deleting the firm’s electronic files on the firm’s computers in order to
solicit these clients for his own financial benefit.
[Respondent] engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation when he altered and deleted documents and sent hundreds
of solicitation letters on his own letterhead to his law firm’s current clients,
using his firm’s resources.  [Respondent] engaged in conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice when he lied about the blood-lead levels in
order to have his firm believe that the clients did not have a viable case.
Therefore, there is clear and convincing evidence that [Respondent’s] acts of
misconduct were in violation of Rules 8.4(a), (b), (c) and (d).  
Additionally, although there was proof that [Respondent] suffered from
Depression and Alcoholism, the evidence presented by Respondent was
insufficient to conclude that his conduct was the result of these ailments.
Therefore, this Court cannot find, based upon the evidence adduced, that
[Respondent] was experiencing debilitating mental or physical health
conditions that would interfere with his ability to accomplish normal day to
day activities and result in [Respondent’s] utter inability to conform his
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conduct according to the law and with the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct.  
In summary, the Court finds that [Bar Counsel] has sustained each
alleged violation of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, the
Maryland Rules and Md. Code Ann., § Crim. Law § 7-302, and that such proof
was by a standard of clear and convincing evidence.
II.
This Court “has original and complete jurisdiction” over attorney discipline matters.
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fox, 417 Md. 504, 528, 11 A.3d 762, 776 (2010) (citation
omitted).  Although we conduct an independent review of the record developed before the
hearing judge, we will not disturb the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless clearly
erroneous.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Edib, 415 Md. 696, 706, 4 A.3d 957, 964 (2010).
The hearing judge is entitled to weigh the evidence, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Byrd,
408 Md. 449, 479, 970 A.2d 870, 887 (2009), assess the witnesses’ credibility, Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Jarosinski, 411 Md. 432, 448, 983 A.2d 477, 487 (2009), and resolve
any conflict in the evidence, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. MBA-Jonas, 402 Md. 334, 344,
936 A.2d 839, 844 (2007).  We review de novo the hearing judge’s recommended
conclusions of law.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ugwuonye, 405 Md. 351, 368, 952 A.2d
226, 236 (2008) (citation omitted).  
At the hearing on the Petition, Bar Counsel “has the burden of proving the averments
of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.”  Md. Rule 16-757(b).  Respondent has the
burden of establishing matters of mitigation or extenuation, if any, by a preponderance of the
evidence.  Id.  
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Bar Counsel filed no exceptions to Judge McCrone’s findings of fact or conclusions
of law.  Respondent takes no exception to Judge McCrone’s conclusion that Respondent’s
conduct violated Rules 1.4 and 8.4.  Indeed, Respondent throughout the disciplinary
proceeding has conceded those violations.  
Respondent, though, has noted exceptions to certain of the hearing judge’s factual
findings.  He assails: 
(1) “The trial court’s misidentification of Christian Tellefsen, M.D. and
omission of Mr. Keiner’s treating health care providers”; 
(2) “The trial court’s failure to acknowledge the circumstances surrounding
Mr. Keiner’s alcohol abuse and Mr. Keiner’s continuing substance abuse
treatment with James P. Quinn”;
(3) “The trial court’s failure to consider the recommendation of the Peer
Review Committee”;
(4) “The trial court’s errors regarding the computer altered files”;
(5) “The trial court’s failure to identify mitigating factors on behalf of Mr.
Keiner”; and
(6) The trial court’s “err[or] in making its ultimate conclusion,” i.e., “that Mr.
Keiner’s behavior was not the result of his depression and alcohol abuse.”  
With respect to the third of these exceptions, Respondent refers in “Respondent’s
Exceptions to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Hearing Judge”
(“Exceptions”) both to the recommendations and commentary found in the Peer Review
Report and to the letter communications between his counsel and Bar Counsel in connection
with a possible conditional diversion agreement.  Respondent argues that the circumstances
of this case warrant a return of the matter to the Attorney Grievance Commission for a
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conditional diversion agreement between him and Bar Counsel.  Respondent attached as an
Exhibit to the Exceptions the documents to which he refers.  Those are the very documents
that Judge McCrone had ruled inadmissible at the hearing on the Petition.
Bar Counsel has filed a motion to strike the Exhibit and all of Respondent’s references
to the Exhibit in his Exceptions.  Because the substance of the motion to strike goes to
Respondent’s third exception, we shall rule on the motion as we address that exception later
in this opinion.
III.
We consider, in turn, each of Respondent’s exceptions. 
1.  “The trial court’s misidentification of Christiane Tellefsen, M.D. and
omission of Mr. Keiner’s treating health care providers”
In support of this exception, Respondent makes several arguments.  He asserts, first,
that Judge McCrone erroneously stated in the written findings of fact that Respondent was
treated by Dr. Christiane Tellefsen, when in fact Dr. Tellefsen was hired by Bar Counsel to
evaluate Respondent for purposes of the disciplinary proceeding.  Bar Counsel likewise
points out this factual error in the hearing judge’s findings, albeit not as a “formal exception.”
The record makes clear that Dr. Tellefsen did not treat Respondent.  We therefore sustain that
aspect of Respondent’s first exception. 
Respondent further argues that Judge McCrone overlooked Respondent’s mental
health treatment, which included eight months of psychiatric treatment from Dr. Maguid N.
Mansour followed by weekly therapy sessions with psychologist Philip D. Robison, Ph.D.
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In support of that contention, Respondent points out that there is no mention in Judge
McCrone’s findings of Dr. Mansour’s report, in which Dr. Mansour opined that
Respondent’s “depression was a major contributing factor in his recent aberrant behavior,”
and, “with proper treatment of his Depressive Disorder, [Respondent] should be able to go
back to practicing law, with no further problems relating to his firm or to his clients.”
Respondent also notes that Judge McCrone’s findings do not mention Dr. Robison’s report,
in which Dr. Robison opined that Respondent “has been very cooperative with treatment,”
“has made significant efforts to work on his problems,” and “has gained significant insight
into how his typically unconscious automatic ways of thinking and perceptions have greatly
contributed to his depression and at times poor judgment.”  
It is true that Judge McCrone did not mention in his factual findings Drs. Mansour and
Robison or their reports.  That does not mean, though, that Judge McCrone failed to consider
the opinions of Respondent’s treatment providers.  In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Braskey, 378 Md. 425, 836 A.2d 605 (2009), we faced a similar exception to omissions in
a hearing judge’s findings and responded with the following:
The hearing judge, in his report, made no note of [certain phone calls that the
respondent testified he had made to Blue Cross/Blue Shield in connection with
representation of a client].  We are unable to say why the hearing judge
omitted reference to respondent’s testimony regarding [those] calls.  It may be
that the judge did not believe respondent; it may have been an oversight.  In
any case, even if the judge believed respondent, the hearing judge is not
required to recount all of the evidence presented at the hearing.  Accordingly
this exception is overruled.   
Id. at 446, 836 A.2d at 618 (citation omitted). 
4 Judge McCrone did not find that Respondent suffers from alcoholism, although,
as we have said, he did find that Respondent abused alcohol.  In Palmer, we included, for
purposes of that opinion, “drug and alcohol abuse and dependency” “under the banner of
‘mental disability.’”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Palmer, 417 Md. 185, 209 n.13, 9
A.3d 37, 51 n.13 (2010).  We shall do likewise here.
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Furthermore, barring explicit evidence in the record to the contrary, we presume that
any hearing judge in conducting attorney grievance matters, as in any other legal proceeding,
understands and carries out his or her obligation to follow the law.  See, e.g., Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Jeter, 365 Md. 279, 288, 778 A.2d 390, 395 (2001) (“[W]e presume
trial judges know the law and correctly apply it.”).  
Respondent made his alcohol abuse and diagnosed depression the centerpiece of his
defense to the MRPC charges, and he and Bar Counsel gave much attention to those issues
at the hearing.  Furthermore, both Respondent and Bar Counsel submitted to Judge McCrone
proposed factual findings and legal conclusions, in both of which submissions Respondent’s
mental health issues4 were thoroughly addressed.  We therefore can safely presume that
Judge McCrone considered the information supplied in the reports of Respondent’s mental
health treatment providers, gave that evidence the weight the judge believed it deserved, and
ultimately was not persuaded that Respondent’s mental health issues caused, or even
contributed to a large degree, to the conduct that underlay Respondent’s violations of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.  Judge McCrone specifically addressed Respondent’s alcohol
abuse and depression.  He wrote:  “While the Court finds that alcohol abuse and depression
have no doubt adversely impacted Respondent, this Court is not convinced that such
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difficulties resulted in Respondent being unable to conform his conduct in accordance with
the law and with the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.”  There is support
in the record for Judge McCrone’s findings and, as such, they are not clearly erroneous.
In sum, though we sustain the part of Respondent’s first exception that relates to the
judge’s mistake in identifying Dr. Tellefsen as Respondent’s treating physician, we overrule
the balance of the exception.
2.  “The trial court’s failure to acknowledge the circumstances
surrounding Mr. Keiner’s alcohol abuse and Mr. Keiner’s continuing
substance abuse treatment with James P. Quinn”
Respondent’s second exception involves two sub-contentions, each relating to his
alcohol dependency.  Respondent first contends that Judge McCrone failed to acknowledge
Respondent’s alcohol dependency while he was working at The Law Offices of Evan K.
Thalenberg, P.A.  In support, Respondent directs us to his testimony that, during the time in
which his misconduct occurred, he was consuming 2-7 alcoholic drinks every night,
approximating consumption of a gallon of whiskey every week.  Respondent’s second sub-
contention is that Judge McCrone failed to acknowledge that, following the discovery of
Respondent’s misconduct, he “voluntarily has been meeting with James P. Quinn,” the
Director of the Lawyer Assistance Program of the Maryland State Bar Association, “and
undergoing alcohol abuse treatment.”  In addition, Respondent refers us to the letter Mr.
Quinn wrote to Judge McCrone in support of Respondent, in which Mr. Quinn opined that
Respondent “is a good candidate for a conditional diversion agreement.”
This exception fails for much the same reasons as does Respondent’s first exception.
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We agree with Respondent that Judge McCrone’s factual findings omit any reference to the
amount of alcohol Respondent said he was consuming during the time he was engaging in
the misconduct at issue.  Likewise omitted from the hearing judge’s findings is any reference
to the counseling Respondent was receiving from Mr. Quinn.  It does not follow, though, that
Judge McCrone necessarily failed to consider the evidence; rather, we presume that the judge
simply gave the evidence the weight he believed it deserved, in finding that, although
“alcohol abuse and depression have no doubt adversely impacted Respondent, this Court is
not convinced that such difficulties resulted in Respondent being unable to conform his
conduct in accordance with the law and with the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional
Conduct.”  We therefore overrule this exception.
3.  “The trial court’s failure to consider the recommendation of the Peer
Review Committee”
At bottom, this exception challenges the legal correctness of Judge McCrone’s ruling
on the inadmissibility of the Report of the Peer Review Panel (hereafter, “Peer Review
Report”) and the letter communications between Bar Counsel and Respondent’s counsel
concerning the availability to Respondent of a conditional diversion agreement.  In
connection with this exception is Bar Counsel’s motion asking us to strike from the record
the Exhibit containing the Peer Review Report and letter communications, and all references
to them in Respondent’s Exceptions.  For the reasons that follow, we grant the motion and
overrule the exception.
Respondent makes plain in his Exceptions why, in his view, he should be permitted
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to rely on the contents of the Exhibit.  He states that he seeks to use the “Report of the Peer
Review Committee to support his contention that a conditional diversion agreement is the
appropriate disposition.”  Respondent does not contend that the Peer Review Report and
letter communications are relevant to either the charged rule violations or mitigation.  
For his part, Bar Counsel argues in the motion to strike (as he did before Judge
McCrone) that the Peer Review Report and letter communications are irrelevant to  the issues
to be decided, either by the hearing judge, or, ultimately, by us.  In support, Bar Counsel
directs us to several of our opinions on the subject, among which we find Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Kinnane, 390 Md. 325, 888 A.2d 1178 (2005), particularly instructive.
In that case, the respondent Kinnane had sought at his evidentiary hearing to have
admitted into evidence  the Peer Review Panel’s Report, for the purpose of  “clarify[ing] the
record ‘with respect to how the formal Bar Counsel petition ultimately was arrived at and
filed with the Circuit Court’ and that filing of [the petition] was not recommended to Bar
Counsel.”  Kinnane, 390 Md. at 334, 888 A.2d at 1184.  The hearing judge refused to admit
the Peer Review Report into evidence, reasoning that the Peer Review recommendation was
“irrelevant for any material purpose and that admission of the Panel Report would violate
Maryland Rule 16-723(a) . . . .”  Id. at 333-34 n.9, 888 A.2d at 1184 n.9.
We upheld the hearing judge’s evidentiary ruling and therefore overruled Kinnane’s
exception to it.  We emphasized that Rule 16-743—the rule providing for the Peer Review
process—“makes clear the limited office” that it performs.  Kinnane, 390 Md. at 335, 888
A.2d at 1185.  We explained that the Peer Review Panel’s recommendation function, like that
5 For a thorough discussion of the Peer Review process, see Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Lee, 387 Md. 89, 108-09, 874 A.2d 897, 908 (2005).
-16-
of Bar Counsel, is solely for the benefit of the Attorney Grievance Commission, which then
determines “whether, and what, charges are to be filed[.]”  Id., 888 A.2d at 1185.  “Thus,
whether Bar Counsel [or the Peer Review Panel] recommends the filing of charges or another
procedure is not only not dispositive . . . it is irrelevant.”  Id. at 335-36, 888 A.2d at 1185;
see also id. at 338, 888 A.2d at 1187 (characterizing the function of Peer Review Panels as
merely “recommendatory, one that is not binding and certainly not dispositive” and,
consequently,  “there is even more reason to ‘insulate’ Peer Review Panel Reports from
subsequent disclosure at later stages of the attorney discipline process”).
In short, the recommendation of the Peer Review Panel suggests to the Attorney
Grievance Commission, but not to us, what the majority of the panel members considers to
be the appropriate course of a given attorney discipline investigation.  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Lee, 387 Md. 89, 108-09, 874 A.2d 897, 908 (2005) (“the purpose of the Peer
Review Panel is not principally to make recommendations as to the appropriateness of formal
charges”; if it appears to the panel that there is a “substantial basis for formal charges and
there is reason to believe that the [respondent] attorney has committed professional
misconduct or is incapacitated, the Panel may . . . make an appropriate recommendation to
the Commission or . . . inform the parties of its determination and allow the attorney an
opportunity to consider a reprimand or a Conditional Diversion Agreement”).5  If it happens
that the Attorney Grievance Commission directs Bar Counsel to file a Petition for
6 Although not expressly addressed in the Kinnane opinion, we surmise that the
only plausible reason for Kinnane’s seeking admission of the Peer Review Panel’s
recommendation was that he hoped that this Court, upon being confronted with that
recommendation, would be persuaded that a sanction less severe than that recommended
by Bar Counsel was appropriate.
-17-
Disciplinary or Remedial Action, as was the case here, then the Peer Review Panel’s
recommendation has no further relevance.  Cf. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cappell, 389
Md. 402, 420, 886 A.2d 112, 123 (2005) (“The issue of assessing the appropriate sanction
to be imposed after review of the merits of a disciplinary action is a matter left solely to the
province of this Court.”).
Furthermore, and in any case, Peer Review Panel Reports are confidential.  See
Kinnane, 390 Md. at 336, 888 A.2d at 1185 (“The Report of the Peer Review Panel qualifies
as ‘records and proceedings [that] are confidential and not open to public inspection [whose]
contents may not be revealed by the Commission, the staff of the Commission, Bar Counsel,
the staff and investigators of the Office of Bar Counsel, members of the Peer Review
Committee, or any attorney involved in the proceeding.’” (quoting Md. Rule 16-723)).
Respondent presents us with no exception to this rule of confidentiality, and we know of
none.
Respondent’s exception and Bar Counsel’s motion to strike are both controlled by
Kinnane.  Much as the respondent in Kinnane evidently sought ultimately to accomplish in
his case,6 Respondent sought to have the Peer Review Report entered into evidence at the
hearing on the Petition, and now considered by us, for no reason other than to suggest that
7 We ordered a remand in Olver to allow Bar Counsel to consider “whether to
propose a conditional diversion agreement,” because the conditional diversion agreement
rule went into effect after the Petition for Disciplinary and Remedial Action was filed,
and therefore neither Bar Counsel nor Olver had the opportunity to consider the
possibility of resolving the matter through such an agreement.  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Olver, 376 Md. 650, 658, 831 A.2d 66, 71 (2003).
-18-
a conditional diversion agreement should have been the appropriate disposition of the matter,
rather than the filing of formal charges.  As in Kinnane’s case, Judge McCrone properly ruled
the evidence inadmissible.  And, as in Kinnane, we uphold that evidentiary ruling.  We
therefore grant Bar Counsel’s motion to strike and overrule the exception insofar as the
motion and exception relate to the Peer Review Report.  
For much the same reasons, we likewise grant the balance of Bar Counsel’s motion
to strike and overrule the remainder of Respondent’s exception, in connection with a
conditional diversion agreement.  By the plain language of Maryland Rule 16-736, a
conditional diversion agreement is entirely voluntary in nature.  The rule provides that
“neither Bar Counsel nor the [attorney] is obliged to propose or enter into a conditional
diversion agreement.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Olver, 376 Md. 650, 658, 831 A.2d
66, 71 (2003).7  Respondent nevertheless argues that:  (1) a conditional diversion agreement
is appropriate under the circumstances of his case; (2) Bar Counsel “failed to properly
consider a conditional diversion agreement”; and (3) therefore, the case should be remanded
to the Attorney Grievance Commission, to permit consideration of a conditional diversion
agreement.  Respondent relies heavily on Cappell, 389 Md. 402, 886 A.2d 112, to advance
the argument.
-19-
In Cappell, the attorney respondent was found by the hearing judge to have committed
several acts of misappropriation by using client funds for personal and firm expenses.  In
addition to other mitigating factors, the hearing judge found that Cappell’s major depression
and personality disorder were the “root cause” of his misconduct.  Id. at 405, 886 A.2d at
114.  We took the unusual step of remanding the case so the Attorney Grievance Commission
and Bar Counsel could reconsider a conditional diversion agreement even though disciplinary
proceedings had begun.  See id. at 426, 886 A.2d at 126.
Respondent characterizes what occurred in Cappell this way:  “[U]nder the facts and
circumstances of that case, particularly Mr. Cappell’s depression, this Court found that
remand for proper consideration of a Conditional Diversion Agreement by the Attorney
Grievance Commission was required.”  Respondent’s characterization of the reason for
remand misses the mark.
We deemed a remand necessary in Cappell because it was evident to us that Bar
Counsel misunderstood the scope and availability of conditional diversion agreements under
Maryland Rule 16-743.  Specifically, Bar Counsel believed that our decision in Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 773 A.2d 463 (2001), rendered conditional
diversion agreements per se unavailable “in matters involving misappropriation of client
funds or other dishonest conduct.”  Cappell, 389 Md. at 415, 886 A.2d at 119-20.  In
correcting Bar Counsel’s misconception, we explained that a conditional diversion agreement
may be appropriate when “there is competent evidence presented from which Bar Counsel
and therefore the Commission may conclude that an attorney’s unprofessional conduct was
-20-
not solely the result of wilful or intentional[] dishonesty . . . .”  Id. at 426, 886 A.2d at 126.
We noted that the Committee note for Maryland Rule 16-736(a) provides:  “Examples of
conduct that may be susceptible to a conditional diversion agreement include conduct arising
from[,]” inter alia, “emotional stress or crisis or abuse of alcohol or other drugs.”  Under
those circumstances, we explained, the resulting “[m]ental impairment is a mitigating factor
and may tend to negate the wilful or intentional nature of an attorney’s misconduct.”
Cappell, 376 Md. at 422, 886 A.2d at 124.  We took pains to make clear that the Vanderlinde
standard of mitigation (i.e., that “when faced with proffers of mitigation involving mental
disability, such proffers must pass the ‘root cause’ analysis” to be compelling, see Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Palmer, 417 Md. 185, 209, 9 A.3d 37, 51-52 (2010) (emphasis
omitted)) is “a separate standard and is not a factor in deciding whether a case qualifies for
disposition under Rule 16-736.”  Cappell, 376 Md. at 422, 886 A.2d 124.  
Important for present purposes, we said nothing in Cappell concerning whether a
conditional diversion agreement was in fact advisable in that case.  Indeed, Cappell does not
stand remotely for the proposition that a conditional diversion agreement is available to us
as a potential disposition of formal charges that have been filed, heard, and proved.
Respondent does not contend that Bar Counsel misunderstood the scope of the
conditional diversion agreement rule, as was the case in Cappell.  Respondent argues instead
merely that the “facts, circumstances, and mitigating factors” warrant remand for
reconsideration of a conditional diversion agreement.  We have explained why that argument
fails at its start; there is simply no authority in either the pertinent rules of procedure or our
-21-
cases interpreting them that supports the argument at this stage of the grievance process.
To summarize what we have decided with regard to this exception and Bar Counsel’s
motion to strike:  For all the reasons we have set forth, Judge McCrone did not err in ruling
inadmissible the Peer Review Report and the letter communications between Bar Counsel
and Respondent’s counsel concerning conditional diversion agreements.  Therefore, we grant
the motion to strike in its entirety, and we overrule the exception.
4.  “The trial court’s errors regarding the computer altered files”
Judge McCrone included the following in his written findings:  “While the Court is
convinced that Respondent made his best effort to disclose the files he had altered or
included misinformation in, he was unable to identify certain files.  This lack of precise recall
leaves room for concern that not all files have been identified.”  Respondent excepts to Judge
McCrone’s finding that “not all of the [altered client] files have been identified.”  Respondent
contends that this finding is clearly erroneous because “[i]t is undisputed that [Respondent]
only altered files on the firm’s computer system in July and August 2008,” and “all eight
[files] would never have been discovered by the Thalenberg Firm absent [Respondent’s]
honest disclosure to the firm.”  Respondent asserts that it was the firm’s decision not to
search its computer files to ensure that no other files had been altered outside of the July
through August 2008 time window.  Respondent reasons that Judge McCrone drew upon that
evidence to “speculate” that the firm might not have accounted for all files altered by
Respondent.  Respondent concludes that “[t]he Thalenberg [Firm] chose not to complete a
full investigation of its files and Mr. Keiner should not be assigned with speculative findings
-22-
of the trial court based on what that investigation might have revealed.”  
G i v e n  t h e
evidence showing that not all of the firm’s computer files were searched, it of course remains
theoretically possible that one or more altered files remain undiscovered.  We suspect that
might be the extent of what Judge McCrone inferred from the evidence.  By the same token,
the evidence of a less-than-complete search of the computer files allows for no more than a
mere “theoretical” possibility; such evidence is legally insufficient to establish, by the
required “clear and convincing evidence” standard of proof, that Respondent altered
additional client files.  We therefore sustain that aspect of this exception.
Respondent also argues in this exception that Judge McCrone clearly erred in finding
that all eight of the client cases he altered were “viable.”  Respondent argues:  “Mr.
Kazmierczak testified that only four of the eight cases were litigated by the Thalenberg Firm,
thereby indicating that the non-prosecuted claims were not viable.”  Judge McCrone,
however, could reasonably conclude from the evidence, and he obviously did, that
Respondent altered each of the eight files because Respondent believed the cases were
“viable,” and it mattered very little how the firm ultimately decided to handle those cases.
We therefore overrule that aspect of this exception.
5.  “The trial court’s failure to identify mitigating factors on behalf of Mr. Keiner”
In prior opinions we have recognized twelve factors identified by the American Bar
Association as appropriate for consideration in mitigation if proved by a respondent, by a
preponderance of the evidence.  E.g., Fox, 417 Md. at 538-39, 11 A.3d at 782 (2010);
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sweitzer, 395 Md. 586, 598-99, 911 A.2d 440, 447 (2006).
-23-
 Respondent asserts that he proved the existence of all but one of those factors, and he takes
exception to Judge McCrone’s failure to identify them as factors in mitigation.  Specifically,
Respondent asserts that Judge McCrone erred in not explicitly identifying the following facts
as mitigating factors:
1.  [Respondent] has an absence of a prior disciplinary record.  This is the first
and only disciplinary proceeding instituted against [Respondent].
2.  [Respondent] suffered from personal and emotional problems.
[Respondent] is an alcoholic and suffers from depression.  Dr. Maguid
Mansour, [Respondent’s] treating psychiatrist, opined that Respondent “has
been suffering from a Depressive Disorder all through his life” and that his
“depression was a major contributing factor in his recent aberrant behavior.”
Dr. Christiane Tellefsen, the psychiatrist for the [Bar Counsel], opined that
[Respondent] “has suffered from Dysthymia or chronic mild depression and
Alcohol Dependence for years.”  According to Dr. Tellefsen, [Respondent] is
“definitely an empty glass person.”  She went on to explain that
[Respondent’s] Dysthymia “does contribute to the dishonesty.”  
3.  [Respondent] made timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify
the consequence of his misconduct.  Following the discovery of his conduct,
[Respondent] provided the Thalenberg Firm with a list of cases including the
statute of limitations date for each case which he generated in his own name
and as a potential client of his own.  He handed over all of the materials he had
collected for each [of] these potential clients.  [Respondent] also disclosed to
the Thalenberg Firm that he had altered on the firm computer the client files
for four clients (1) Raven Bank and Derrick Young, (2) Tyanna Baker, (3)
Shade Bride, Zhane McDougle, Raheem McDougle, and Kareen McDougle,
(4) Da’Shira Coley and Shanece Coley.  But for [Respondent’s] honest
disclosure, the Thalenberg Firm would not have learned about [Respondent’s]
alteration to the client files for the clients (1) Raven Bank and Derrick Young,
(2) Tyanna Baker, (3) Shade Bride, Zhane McDougle, Raheem McDougle, and
Kareen McDougle, (4) Da’Shira Coley and Shanece Coley, (5) Ronald Dalton,
Jr., (6) Davontae Davis, (7) Lavontre Ford and Michaela Harris, and (8)
Shaquille Davis, Tristian Davis, and Imani Frazier.  
4.  [Respondent] made full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and
exemplified a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings.  [Respondent]
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voluntarily met with the Attorney Grievance Commission’s investigator and
psychiatrist.  He answered all of their questions and was cordial, truthful, and
cooperative.  
5.  [Respondent] is inexperienced in the practice of law.  [Respondent] was
admitted to the Bar in December 2002, five and one-half years before his
admitted offense.  In that time period he took only one case to trial and only
as second chair.  
6.  [Respondent] has good character and a good reputation.  Six former clients,
five former opposing counsel, and two former co-workers wrote letters of
support on behalf of [Respondent].  John Kazmierczak, testifying on behalf of
the Thalenberg Firm, even acknowledged that [Respondent] was a “reasonably
competent lawyer.”
7.  [Respondent] suffered from depression.
8.  There was no delay in the disciplinary proceedings.  [Respondent] timely
responded to discovery that was propounded on him.  He made himself
available for deposition and did not cause any delay in the disciplinary
proceedings.  And he answered all questions ever asked of him.  
9.  [Respondent] has undergone interim rehabilitation.  Since the discovery of
his actions, [Respondent] has undergone regular mental health treatment.
[Respondent] voluntarily admitted himself to Howard County General Hospital
for the treatment of his depression and suicidal ideation.  [Respondent]
regularly meets with James P. Quinn, Director of the Lawyer Assistance
Program and attends AA meetings.
10.  [Respondent] has had the imposition of other penalties or sanctions.  In
March 2009, [Respondent] was fired from the Thalenberg Firm.  Since that
time he has not generated any income as a lawyer.
11.  [Respondent] is remorseful for his conduct.  [Respondent] testified that he
was remorseful for his actions.  He broke down and cried on the stand when
he testified about his conduct. 
Judge McCrone did not explicitly identify each of the above items as factors in
mitigation of Respondent’s violations.  Judge McCrone, though, did make express written
-25-
findings of the existence of each of the above set of facts.  Moreover, Bar Counsel, in his
“Recommendation for Sanction,” does not dispute any of Judge McCrone’s findings, much
less those upon which Respondent relies in this exception.  We therefore shall sustain
Respondent’s exception, as it is phrased, and consider the relevant, undisputed factual
findings in determining the appropriate sanction for his misconduct.
6.  “The trial court erred in making the ultimate conclusion,” i.e., “that
Mr. Keiner’s behavior was not the result of his depression and alcohol
abuse.”  
Respondent’s final exception flows from the first two of his exceptions, namely, Judge
McCrone’s failure to account for the state of Respondent’s mental health and the treatment
therefor.  Respondent argues that, based on those exceptions, it is evident that Judge
McCrone erred in drawing the ultimate factual conclusion that Respondent’s behavior was
not the result of his depression and alcohol dependency. 
We have sustained certain aspects of each of Respondent’s first and second
exceptions.  We have agreed with Respondent that Judge McCrone mistakenly identified Dr.
Tellefsen as his treating physician; omitted any specific reference to his mental health
therapists (Dr. Mansour and Dr. Robison) and their favorable reports; and omitted any
reference to the undisputed evidence that Respondent was meeting regularly with James
Quinn, who wrote favorable comments on Respondent’s behalf.  We disagreed with
Respondent, though, that it followed from those omissions in Judge McCrone’s written
findings that Judge McCrone failed to consider any of that evidence; accordingly we
overruled the thrust of those two exceptions.
-26-
We concluded that the record supported Judge McCrone’s ultimate factual finding
that, although Respondent abused alcohol and suffered from depression, those conditions
were not the cause of his misconduct.  Judge McCrone further found that Respondent was
not “experiencing debilitating mental or physical health conditions that would interfere with
his ability to accomplish normal day to day activities and result in Respondent’s utter
inability to conform his conduct according to the law and with the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules
of Professional Conduct.”  Indeed, even Dr. Mansour and Dr. Robison did not go so far as
to opine in their written reports (neither testified at the hearing) that Respondent’s alcoholism
and depression were the “cause” of Respondent’s misconduct.  The most Dr. Mansour and
Dr. Robison could say was that Respondent’s mental health issues were a “major
contributing factor” of the misconduct.  Further, Respondent himself admitted, during his
cross-examination by Bar Counsel, that his depression and alcoholism had not caused him
to neglect any of his clients’ cases or rendered him unable to otherwise function at a high
level in his legal and financial affairs.  
We have mentioned that, at the time Judge McCrone issued his factual findings and
conclusions of law, he had before him both Bar Counsel’s and Respondent’s proposed
findings and conclusions of law.  We repeat that, notwithstanding Judge McCrone’s omission
of any reference to Respondent’s mental health practitioners and treatment, we safely can,
and do, presume that Judge McCrone considered all of the evidence before him, including
the reports of Drs. Mansour and Robison.  The evidence presented at the hearing amply
supported Judge McCrone’s finding on this point.  Accordingly, we overrule Respondent’s
8 In the alternative, Respondent has asked this Court to remand this disciplinary
matter so that the Commission could consider a Conditional Diversion Agreement.  For
(continued...)
-27-
exception to Judge McCrone’s finding that Respondent’s “behavior was not the result of his
depression and alcohol abuse.”
IV.
We have said that Respondent concedes that his conduct violated Rules 1.4(a) and (b)
and 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d), and we agree that those violations are supported by clear and
convincing evidence. Accordingly, our remaining task is to determine the appropriate
sanction.  
The purpose of disciplinary proceedings is “not to punish the lawyer, but to protect
the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Sucklal, 418 Md. 1, 10 n.3, 12 A.3d 650, 655 n.3 (2010) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).  We have explained that the public is protected “in two ways” by the
imposition of sanctions upon attorneys who engage in professional misconduct:
We protect the public through sanctions against offending attorneys in two
ways:  through deterrence of the type of conduct which will not be tolerated,
and by removing those unfit to continue in the practice of law from the rolls
of those authorized to practice in this State.  The public is protected when
sanctions are imposed that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the
violations.
Id., 12 A.3d at 655 n.3 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Bar Counsel recommends disbarment as the appropriate sanction for Respondent’s
misconduct.  Respondent urges this Court  to impose a period of suspension,8 arguing that
8(...continued)
the reasons explained supra, we decline to do so.
9 Maryland Code (2002), § 7-302 of the Criminal Law Article provides, inter alia,
that a person may not intentionally and willfully exceed that person’s authorized access to
a computer with the intent to “alter, damage, or destroy all or any part of data or a
computer program stored, maintained, or produced by a computer . . . .”
-28-
he has established sufficient mitigation to obviate the need for disbarment.  To decide this
question, we consider the egregiousness of Respondent’s misconduct in conjunction with the
established mitigation.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 176, 994
A.2d 928, 945 (2010).
The violations found in this case are serious.  In addition to failing to communicate
with certain clients in violation of Rule 1.4, Respondent misappropriated the law firm’s
resources, by using the firm’s postage, paper, various office supplies, and Accurint
subscription to locate potential clients.  In addition, Respondent altered and deleted
documents within the firm’s electronic client files.  Respondent does not contest Judge
McCrone’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that this conduct violates Maryland
Code (2002), § 7-302 of the Criminal Law Article (CrL).9  Judge  McCrone further found,
and Respondent does not dispute, that he altered the law firm’s computer files to make it
appear that the cases were meritless and therefore “closed,” when in fact those cases
appeared to have merit.  Respondent took those actions with the intention of taking those
clients from the law firm and making them his, once he established his own practice. 
All of the above was caused, not by mental illness or alcohol abuse but rather, as
-29-
Judge McCrone found, by Respondent’s “desire to keep for himself more of the income he
had been generating for the firm.”  Put simply, Respondent’s conduct was dishonest, it was
intentional, and it was solely motivated by the desire for personal gain.  
Conduct “involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit, carries the risk of the ultimate
sanction by this Court.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. White, 354 Md. 346, 366, 731 A.2d
447, 458 (1999).  Accordingly, “[when] it appears that the attorney has engaged in intentional
dishonest conduct . . . , [the] bar is set especially high, and disbarment will be the appropriate
sanction absent ‘compelling extenuating circumstances.’”  Palmer, 417 Md. at 207, 9 A.3d
at 50 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Steinberg, 395 Md. 337, 375, 910 A.2d 429,
451 (2006)).  Accord Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guberman, 392 Md. 131, 137, 896
A.2d 337, 340-41 (2006) (stating that “disbarment follows as a matter of course ‘when a
member of the bar is shown to be willfully dishonest for personal gain by means of fraud,
deceit, cheating or like conduct, absent the most compelling extenuating circumstances’”
(quoting Maryland State Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 553, 318 A.2d 811, 817
(1974))). 
Before examining whether there exists in Respondent’s case the requisite “compelling
extenuating circumstances” that make appropriate a sanction less than disbarment, we say
a few words about Vanderlinde, upon which Bar Counsel relies in arguing for the ultimate
sanction.  In Vanderlinde, we set forth what, from the text of that case alone, would suggest
a bright line rule that,
in cases involving intentional dishonesty, misappropriation, fraud, stealing,
-30-
serious criminal conduct and the like, we will not accept, as “compelling
extenuating circumstances,” anything less than the most serious and utterly
debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from any source that
is the “root cause” of the misconduct and that also result in an attorney’s utter
inability to conform his or her conduct in accordance with the law and with the
MRPC.  
Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 413-14, 773 A.2d at 485.  
We recently clarified, though, that the “bright line rule of Vanderlinde should be
understood to apply only to ‘the facts and circumstances of that case’ – i.e., cases of
misconduct involving intentional misappropriation, intentional dishonesty, fraud, stealing,
and serious criminal offenses where mental disability is offered as mitigation of the normal
sanction of disbarment.”  Palmer, 417 Md. at 211, 9 A.3d at 52-53 (emphasis added).  And,
we extracted from Vanderlinde a three-part test.  First, the evidence of mental disability must
be “almost conclusive, and essentially uncontroverted” that the attorney “ had a serious and
debilitating mental condition.”  Id. at 212, 9 A.3d at 53.  Second, the mental disability must
be the “‘root cause’ for the misconduct – meaning, it must ‘affect[] the ability of the attorney
in normal day to day activities, such that the attorney was unable to accomplish the least of
those activities in a normal fashion.’”  Id., 9 A.3d at 53.  Third, the mental disability must
have “result[ed] in the attorney’s utter inability to conform his or her conduct in accordance
with the law and with the [Rules of Professional Conduct].” Palmer, 417 Md. at 212, 9 A.3d
at 53 (quoting Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 414, 733 A.2d at 485, 488).  
10 We have assumed for purposes of this case that Respondent’s alcohol abuse
comes under the banner of mental disability.  See supra note 4.
-31-
As applied to the present case, Respondent’s mental disabilities10 fail the Vanderlinde
test; indeed, Respondent does not attempt to argue the contrary.  Judge McCrone found that
Respondent’s misconduct was not the result of his alcohol abuse and depression, and those
conditions did not “result in the attorney’s utter inability to conform his or her conduct in
accordance with the law and with the [Rules of Professional Conduct].”  Respondent’s
psychological issues at the time of his misconduct are not “sufficient to meet Vanderlinde’s
requirements, and therefore, without more, do not mitigate the sanction here to less than
disbarment.”  See Palmer, 417 Md. at 212-13, 9 A.3d at 53.
Respondent argues that the other mitigating factors in the case, taken together, amount
to the “compelling extenuating circumstances” that would entitle him to a sanction less than
disbarment.  Those factors, which are based on undisputed factual findings by Judge
McCrone and we have accepted as mitigating, are:  Respondent suffered from depression and
alcoholism at the time of the incident; no client was harmed as a result of his actions; he is
remorseful; he was cooperative with Bar Counsel; he is well-regarded by his clients and
peers; he has no previous disciplinary record; he has suffered other consequences as a result
of his misconduct (loss of employment, income, and professional reputation); he underwent
interim rehabilitation; there was no delay in the disciplinary proceedings; he was
inexperienced in the practice of law; and he made timely good faith efforts to make
restitution or to rectify the consequences of his misconduct.  In support of his argument that,
-32-
in sum, these mitigating factors are sufficiently compelling to reduce the sanction to less than
disbarment, Respondent directs us to two cases, Cappell, 389 Md. 402, 886 A.2d 112, and
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Potter, 380 Md. 128, 844 A.2d 367 (2004).  
Cappell does little to advance Respondent’s cause.  Beyond the fact that Cappell was
primarily a case regarding the scope of conditional diversion agreements, see supra, the
attorney in Cappell, unlike Respondent, was found by the hearing judge to be suffering from
a mental disability that was the “root cause” of the attorney’s misconduct.  389 Md. at 405,
886 A.2d at 114.  In that sense, the attorney in Cappell established that his mental health
disability was a “compelling extenuating circumstance[]” as described in Vanderlinde.
Respondent does not enjoy a similarly favorable finding.
Potter, though factually similar in some respects, is ultimately inapposite.  In Potter,
the attorney violated MRPC 8.4(b), (c), and (d), in addition to other rules.  380 Md. at 163,
844 A.2d at 388.  Potter, who had been working as an attorney for a law firm, decided to
leave that firm.  Potter properly informed several of the law firm’s clients of his decision,
which resulted in two of his clients electing to terminate their relationship with the firm in
order to continue with Potter as their attorney.  Prior to his departure from the firm, Potter
wrongly “accessed the firm’s computer and deleted the files maintained on the computer”
related to  those two clients.  Id. at 137, 844 A.2d at 372.  That conduct constituted violations
of Rule 8.4(b), (c), and (d) in addition to CrL § 7-302, much as in Respondent’s case.  
Like Respondent, Potter “acted intentionally and dishonestly.”  Id. at 161, 844 A.2d
at 386.  We emphasized, though, that Potter “acted in an effort to facilitate his representation
11 The out-of-state cases upon which Respondent relies are also distinguishable. 
Though In re Complaint as to the Conduct of Corey B. Smith, 843 P.2d 449 (Or. 1992),
and In the Matter of Gary M. Cupples, 952 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. 1998), both involved
attorneys who wrongly and dishonestly took their respective firms’ clients upon departing
from their respective firms and deliberately failed to account for certain cases so as to
avoid detection, neither case involved the additional dishonest (and potentially criminal)
conduct present here—that is, Respondent’s affirmative acts of modification, deletion,
and falsification of the firm’s electronic client records in violation of CrL § 7-302, in an
effort to conceal his scheme. 
-33-
of the two clients and the hearing judge found that he had the clients’ best interests in mind.”
Id., 844 A.2d at 387.  The actions of Respondent, in contrast, were motivated by a desire for
personal gain.  In the end, Potter and Respondent’s case are materially different.11 
On balance, given Respondent’s intentional dishonest misconduct, motivated
exclusively by his desire for personal gain, the totality of the mitigation Respondent has
proven does not constitute the “compelling extenuating circumstances” necessary to permit
a sanction less than disbarment.  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Coppola,       Md.
     ,       A.2d       (filed April 29, 2011) (disbarring an attorney who committed a “pattern”
of intentional dishonest conduct related to the execution of a will, despite the fact that various
mitigating factors were present in the case); Palmer, 417 Md at 216, 9 A.3d at 58 (holding
that disbarment of the attorney was warranted, even though he had no prior disciplinary
record and was well-regarded in the legal community, where the attorney repeatedly and
intentionally misappropriated client funds by transferring them from the law firm’s escrow
account to the firm’s general account, in order to make it appear, for purposes of partnership
consideration, that the attorney was bringing in more money to the firm than in fact he did,
12 By mandating that all costs be paid by Respondent, we necessarily have declined
Respondent’s request for assignment of costs to the Attorney Grievance Commission,
regardless of the outcome.
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and there was no evidence that his conduct was the result of a serious and debilitating mental
condition); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garcia, 410 Md. 507, 979 A.2d 146 (2009)
(disbarring an attorney who committed immigration fraud by drafting and sending to the INS
a fraudulent employment verification letter); Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 413-14, 773 A.2d at
485 (disbarring an attorney who intentionally misappropriated $4000 from her employer and
used those funds for her own purposes, and there was no evidence that her mental disability
was the “root cause” of her conduct).  Accordingly, we order disbarment. 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE
CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING
COSTS 
OF 
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS,
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761,
FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST
GREGORY RAYMOND KEINER.12
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 24
September Term, 2010
_________________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
GREGORY RAYMOND KEINER
________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
        Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Barbera
Eldridge, 
John 
C. 
(Retired,
Specially Assigned)
                  JJ.
________________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Eldridge, J.
        which Bell, C.J. and Murphy, J., Join.
_________________________________________
Filed: August 19, 2011
Eldridge, J., dissenting.
In this case, I would impose a sanction of an indefinite suspension rather than
disbarment.  Among this Court’s prior attorney grievance cases, the present case is most
similar to Attorney Grievance Commission v. Potter, 380 Md. 128, 844 A.2d 367 (2004), in
which the Court unanimously imposed a ninety-day suspension.  The facts of the present case
are not significantly different from the facts in Potter.  The imposition of a suspension in the
case at bar would comport with consistency and a respect for precedent.  
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Murphy join this dissenting opinion.