Case Title: Dreyer v. PGE

Citation: 

Docket Number: S52217

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: August 31, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
PHIL DREYER,
FRANK GEARHART
and KAFOURY BROS. LLC,
an Oregon limited liability corporation,
and as potential class representatives,
Plaintiffs-Adverse Parties,
v.
PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Defendant-Relator,
PATRICIA MORGAN,
an individual,
and as representative of the class of similarly situated
electric service customers of
Portland General Electric Company
between certain periods of time,
Plaintiff-Adverse Party,
v.
PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Defendant-Relator.
(CC 03 C10639, 03 C10640; SC S52217, S52284)
(Cases Consolidated for Briefing and Decision Only)
Original proceeding in mandamus.*
Argued and submitted September 13, 2005.
Barbee B. Lyon, of Tonkin Torp LLP, argued the cause and
filed the briefs for defendant-relator.
Daniel W. Meek and Linda K. Williams, argued the cause and
filed the brief for plaintiffs-adverse parties.  With them on the
brief was Phil Goldsmith. 
Mark McDougal, filed the brief for amicus curiae Utility
Reform Project.
James N. Westwood, of Stoel Rives LLP, filed the briefs for
amici curiae Northwest Natural Gas Company, Edison Electric
Institute, PacifiCorp, Idaho Power Company, and Avista
Corporation.
Erika L. Hadlock, Assistant Solicitor General, filed the
brief for amicus curiae State of Oregon.  With her on the brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor
General, and Paul A. Graham, Assistant Attorney General.
Before Carson,** Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,*** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.
GILLETTE, J.
Peremptory writ to issue.
*On petitions for writs of mandamus from orders of Marion
County Circuit Court, Paul J. Lipscomb, Judge.
**Chief Justice when case was argued.
***Chief Justice when decision was rendered.
GILLETTE, J.
In these consolidated actions against defendant
Portland General Electric Company (PGE) brought by current and
former customers of that utility, PGE asks this court to issue
writs of mandamus ordering the Marion County Circuit Court to
dismiss plaintiffs' actions and to vacate an order certifying
plaintiffs as a class.  PGE contends, among other things, that
the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to hear the actions because
the cases necessarily involve rate-setting, a function that the
legislature has delegated exclusively to the Oregon Public
Utility Commission (the PUC).  Although we reject PGE's
contention that the actions must be dismissed, we conclude that
they should be abated, at least until the PUC responds to certain
remands from the Marion County Circuit Court in related cases,
because the PUC's disposition of those remanded cases may negate
some of or all the damages that plaintiffs now claim.  We issue a
writ of mandamus accordingly.
The actions arose out of a longstanding controversy
over one of PGE's former generating facilities, the Trojan
nuclear power plant.  When Trojan first went into service in
1976, the PUC set PGE's rates in a way that allowed it to recover
its investment in Trojan over a 35-year period.  However, the
plant was plagued with technical problems and breakdowns, and PGE
finally closed it in 1993 -- long before PGE had recouped its
investment.  
By the time that Trojan was shut down, the legislature
had enacted a statute that allowed utilities to charge rates that
included their "undepreciated investment" in a retired plant --
if the PUC found the closure to be in the public interest. (1) 
PGE sought to take advantage of that provision and therefore
argued to the PUC that closing Trojan (and replacing it with
power purchased from outside sources) was in the public interest
because it was the "least cost" alternative for providing power
to PGE's customers.
In 1993, the PUC issued an order finding that PGE's
decision to close Trojan under a "least cost" theory was
"reasonable."  PUC Order No. 93-804.  However, it reserved for a
later proceeding the question of how to adjust PGE's rates to
deal with the closure.  Shortly thereafter, PGE filed a request
with the PUC pursuant to ORS 756.450 (1993), (2) asking that
body to issue a declaratory ruling as to the propriety of
charging the undepreciated portion of its Trojan investment to
PGE's ratepayers.  The PUC opened a proceeding to consider that
question, and two public interest groups -- the Citizens' Utility
Board of Oregon (CUB) and the Utility Reform Project (URP) --
intervened.  Relying on ORS 757.355 (1993), a statute that Oregon
voters had approved in 1978 as a ballot initiative, (3) CUB
argued that PGE could not include a return on its Trojan
investment in its rate base, even if ORS 757.140(2) permitted it
to recover its undepreciated investment in the plant in its
rates.  URP argued further that ORS 757.355 (1993) barred PGE
from including any aspect of its Trojan investment in its rates.
At the end of that proceeding, the PUC issued PUC Order
No. 93-1117. The order rejected both CUB's and URP's arguments
and declared that, if PGE met certain conditions and could show
certain "assumed facts" to be true in a rate case or similar
forum, (4) then PGE could set rates to obtain both a "return
of" and a "return on" its Trojan investment. (5)  The PUC also
announced that it considered its decision to be binding and that,
in any future PGE rate case, it would consider only whether PGE
had proven the "assumed facts" that it had identified.  CUB and
URP unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of the ruling and then
sought review in the Marion County Circuit Court.  After the
circuit court summarily affirmed, CUB and URP appealed.
Shortly thereafter, the PUC conducted a rate case in
which PGE submitted evidence to prove the "assumed facts" that
the PUC had identified and to show that it had met the required
conditions.  CUB and URP both intervened in that case, arguing,
respectively, that PGE could not include a return on its
investment in its rate base and that PGE could not include any
aspect of its Trojan investment in its rate base.  After a
hearing, the PUC issued PUC Order No. 95-322, which generally
allowed PGE to include in its rate base (and amortize, through
its rates, over the next 16 years) the amount that it had
identified as the unrecovered portion of its original Trojan
investment. (6)  The PUC also allowed PGE to include a return
on that investment in its new rates.  Consistent with its
comments in PUC Order No. 93-1117, the PUC refused to consider
any argument that ORS 757.355 (1993) barred "return of" or
"return on" investments in a retired plant.
The rates approved in PUC Order No. 95-322 went into
effect immediately -- even as CUB and URP filed an action against
the PUC in Marion County Circuit Court, seeking to "modify,
vacate or set aside" the order pursuant to former ORS 757.580
(1993). (7)  After hearing the evidence and arguments, the
circuit court adopted CUB's position that PGE was not entitled to
include a "return on" its Trojan investment in its rates, and
reversed.  This time the PUC appealed, and that appeal was
consolidated with CUB's and URP's earlier appeal from PUC Order
No. 93-1117, which raised similar, if not identical,
issues. (8)  
In Citizens' Utility Board v. PUC, 154 Or App 702, 962
P2d 744 (1998), the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's
decision against the PUC in the rate case and reversed the
circuit court's decision affirming the PUC in the declaratory
ruling case.  The court rejected the theory advanced by PGE and
the PUC -- that ORS 757.355 (1993) is inapplicable to retired
plants and therefore has no relevance to the issue of the rate
treatment of Trojan.  The court also rejected PUC's and PGE's
position that ORS 757.140(2) supersedes the earlier statute.  Id.
at 708-13.  The court concluded, instead, that ORS 757.140(2) and
ORS 757.355 (1993) must be read together, that ORS 757.140(2)
permits rates necessary to compensate utilities for the principal
amount of their undepreciated investment in a retired facility in
some circumstances, but that ORS 757.355 (1993) absolutely
precludes utilities from including in their rates a return on
their investment in unused or retired property.  Id. at 716.
After thus losing in the Court of Appeals, PUC and PGE
sought review in this court.  This court granted the petition for
review in 1999.  328 Or 464, 987 P2d 513 (1999).  However, the
court held the case in abeyance when certain events occurred that
appeared to have some potential for resolving the controversy
without the court's participation.  First, the PUC sought express
authorization from the legislature (in House Bill (HB) 3220
(1999)) to structure rates to allow utilities a return on
investments in plants retired in the public interest.  The bill
passed in the legislature, but was referred to the people, who
rejected it in the November 2000 election.  Second (and before
the fate of HB 3220 was decided in the election), PGE and CUB
entered into a settlement agreement that purported to "put an end
to the controversial 'return on' Trojan by wiping the unrecovered
Trojan balance off the books."  The settlement involved
offsetting PGE's remaining Trojan investment balance (by then,
$180.5 million) and certain tax liabilities relating to Trojan,
against certain existing balances running in favor of PGE's
ratepayers." (9)  After CUB agreed to the settlement, PGE
applied to the PUC for an accounting order and revised rate
schedules implementing the settlement.  PUC approved PGE's
request on September 29, 2000 (PUC Order No. 00-601), and the new
rates went into effect immediately.  Thus, as of October 1, 2000,
PGE's rates no longer purported to include any amount relating to
the utility's former Trojan investment. 
After the PUC approved the settlement and the new rate
schedules implementing it, PGE moved this court to dismiss the
petition for review in Citizen's Utility Board and to vacate the
decisions below.  PGE argued that the settlement rendered the
controversy moot.  URP, however, objected to the motion.  This
court ultimately denied PGE's motion to dismiss and vacate, but
nevertheless chose to dismiss the petition for review on its own
motion.  335 Or 91, 58 P3d 822 (2002).  
The foregoing procedural history left the Court of
Appeals 1998 decision in Citizen's Utility Board as the ultimate
decision in the case.  The Court of Appeals issued an appellate
judgment in accordance with that decision on January 8, 2003. 
The Marion County Circuit Court received that appellate judgment
in the fall of 2003 and remanded to the PUC at that time "for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion and orders of the
Court of Appeals."
In the meantime, URP had initiated a proceeding in the
PUC to challenge PUC Order No. 00-601, described above.  URP
argued that the CUB/PUC settlement that PUC Order No. 00-601
implemented was unsatisfactory in that it provided only
prospective relief to ratepayers -- that is, it provided no
mechanism for returning to ratepayers money that PGE had
collected unlawfully between 1995 and 2000 as a "return on" its
Trojan investment.  URP also argued, in a related vein, that,
even if the settlement formally removed Trojan from the
accounting/ratemaking process, it still provided PGE with the
"functional equivalent" of a return on its Trojan investment --
an outcome that the Court of Appeals decision in Citizen's
Utility Board prohibits.  
The PUC rejected those arguments in PUC Order No. 02-227.  The PUC responded, first, that it lacked authority to order
refunds or otherwise to restore to ratepayers the part of PGE's
earlier rates that provided a return on PGE's Trojan investment. 
The PUC relied, in that regard, on a principle known as the
"filed rate doctrine" and on a corollary rule against retroactive
ratemaking. (10)  The PUC also argued that nothing in Citizens'
Utility Board precluded the solution that PGE and CUB had settled
upon and that, in any event, the proposed rates were in the
public interest and resulted in "just and reasonable rates." 
Notably, the PUC appeared to acknowledge that the settlement
"preserve[d] the outcome" approved in PUC Order No. 95-322, the
order that specifically was overturned in Citizens' Utility
Board.
After an unsuccessful bid for reconsideration of the
order approving and implementing the CUB/PGE settlement, URP
filed an action against the PUC in Marion County Circuit Court,
seeking review of the order pursuant to ORS 756.580.  URP argued,
as it had before the PUC, that the new rates were unlawful in
that they failed to account for amounts that ratepayers already
(and illegally) had been required to pay to PGE, in part as a
return on the PGE's Trojan investment.  In a decision issued on
November 7, 2003, the circuit court agreed, holding that there
was no logical or legislative support for the PUC's view that the
"filed rate doctrine" absolutely precludes the PUC from in any
way refunding to ratepayers amounts collected by a utility
pursuant to a rate that a court later declares unlawful on
judicial review.  The circuit court concluded that "PGE should
have been required to account for all refunds due to rate payers
for these unlawfully collected rates as a matter of law." 
Accordingly, the circuit court reversed and remanded to the PUC 
"with directions to immediately revise and reduce the
existing rate structure so as to fully and promptly
offset and recover all past improperly calculated and
unlawfully collected rates, or alternatively, to order
PGE to immediately issue refunds for the full amount of
all excessive and unlawful charges collected by the
utility for a return on its Trojan investment as
previously determined to be improper by both this Court
and the Court of Appeals."
The PUC responded to the circuit court's decision and
remand on two fronts.  First, the PUC appealed, arguing that,
contrary to the circuit court's decision and remand, (1) the
statutes do not authorize the PUC to order refunds or otherwise
engage in retroactive ratemaking; (2) the remand in Citizens'
Utility Board did not require and could not authorize the PUC to
order a refund or otherwise engage in retroactive ratemaking; and
(3) the rates approved in PUC Order No. 02-227 were reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence.  That appeal presently is
pending in the Court of Appeals.
Secondly, the PUC decided immediately to respond to the
circuit court's remand in a hybrid proceeding that would consider
both that remand and the remand that it recently had received
from the circuit court in the Citizens' Utility Board case.  Over
URP's objection, the PUC decided to proceed with the two remands
together, but in two phases, with the first phase devoted to
determining "[w]hat rates would have been approved in [PUC Order
No. 95-322] if ORS 757.355 [(1993)] had been interpreted to
prohibit a return on Trojan," and the second phase devoted to
reconciling the results of Phase I with the rates that actually
were approved.  PUC Order No. 04-597 at 2, 7 (October 18,
2004). (11)  The PUC presently is proceeding with Phase I.
That brings us to the present case.  On January 23,
2003, two weeks after the Court of Appeals issued the appellate
judgment in Citizens Utility Board and before the PUC opened the
hybrid proceeding described above, certain past and present
ratepayers of PGE filed complaints against PGE in Marion County
Circuit Court, seeking refunds of all amounts that ratepayers
unlawfully had to pay between April 1, 1995 (the effective date
of PUC Order No. 95-322) and October 1, 2000 (when PUC Order No.
00-601 came into effect) to provide PGE with a return on its
Trojan investment. (12)  Plaintiffs, who are represented by
lawyers who also represented URP before the PUC and in the
judicial review proceedings described above, sought certification
as a class and sought relief in four separate claims.  
In their first claim, plaintiffs alleged that they were
entitled to return of the unlawful charges under ORS 756.185. 
That statute provides, in part: 
"(1) Any public utility which does, or causes or
permits to be done, any matter, act or thing prohibited
by ORS chapter 756, 757 or 758 or omits to do any act,
matter or thing required to be done by such statutes,
is liable to the person injured thereby in the amount
of damages sustained in consequence of such violation.
* * * Except as provided in subsection (2) of this
section, the court may award reasonable attorney fees
to the prevailing party in an action under this
section.
"(2) The court may not award attorney fees to a
prevailing defendant under the provisions of subsection
(1) of this section if the action under this section is
maintained as a class action pursuant to ORCP 32."
Plaintiffs alleged that PGE had done something "prohibited by * * * ORS [chapter] 757" by receiving from customers payments
"which are derived from a rate base which includes within it any
* * * installation * * * not presently used for providing utility
service."  ORS 757.355 (1993).  Plaintiffs further alleged that
they and other ratepayers were damaged in an amount equal to the
unlawful charges.
In their second claim, plaintiffs alleged that PGE
violated ORS 757.225 by (1) "directly charging and collecting
charges for service which was not rendered"; and (2) "including
charges on bills which were in excess of lawful charges in
rates."  ORS 757.225 provides, generally, that "[n]o public
utility shall charge, demand, collect or receive a greater or
less compensation for any service performed by it * * * than is
specified in printed rate schedules as may at the time be in
force." 
Plaintiffs' third claim was a common-law claim for
"money had and received."  Service Lumber Co. v. Sumpter Val. Ry.
Co., 67 Or 63, 77, 135 P 539 (1913), judgment set aside on other
grounds, 81 Or 32, 158 P 175 (1916), describes that kind of claim
as follows:  
"In the action for money had and received, it is
sufficient to show that, by any process which was
treated by the parties as a money transaction, the
defendant has received money, or its equivalent, which
in equity and in good conscience belongs to and should
be paid to the plaintiff, and this is true although the
plaintiff may never have had actual manual custody of
the specie in question."
Plaintiffs alleged that PGE charged them and other ratepayers
amounts that had been determined to be unlawful and that those
amounts in equity and good conscience belonged to and should be
paid to plaintiffs. 
In their fourth claim for relief, plaintiffs alleged
that PGE was "unjustly enriched" by the amounts that it
collected, as part of its rates, as a return on its Trojan
investment, and that it should not be permitted to retain that
money.
PGE moved to dismiss.  It argued that plaintiffs'
actions trespassed on the PUC's jurisdiction, noting that, in its
recent remand of PUC Order No. 02-227, the circuit court had
ordered the PUC to provide the very same relief that plaintiffs
were seeking.  Plaintiffs responded, however, that the PUC was
not moving forward on the remanded case and insisted that, in any
event, they were entitled to proceed in spite of the remand to
the PUC.  Plaintiffs pointed, in that regard, to ORS 756.200,
which provides:
"(1) The remedies and enforcement procedures
provided in ORS chapters 756, 757, 758 and 759 do not
release or waive any right of action by the state or by
any person for any right, penalty or forfeiture which
may arise under any law of this state or under an
ordinance of any municipality thereof.
"(2) All penalties and forfeitures accruing under
said statutes and ordinances are cumulative and a suit
for and recovery of one shall not be a bar to the
recovery of any other penalty.
"(3) The duties and liabilities of the public
utilities or telecommunications utilities shall be the
same as are prescribed by the common law, and the
remedies against them the same, except where otherwise
provided by the Constitution or statutes of this state,
and the provisions of ORS chapters 756, 757, 758 and
759 are cumulative thereto."
The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss but
indicated that it might consider abating the actions at some
later point.  PGE did later move to abate in accordance with that
suggestion.    
Plaintiffs then moved for partial summary judgment on
two of their claims.  PGE opposed that motion and filed its own
motion for a summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims.  The circuit
court granted plaintiffs' motion and denied PGE's cross-motion. 
PGE then filed the first of the two petitions for an alternative
writ of mandamus that presently are before this court, asking
this court to order the circuit court to dismiss plaintiffs'
complaints.  Shortly thereafter, the circuit court issued an
order certifying plaintiffs' actions as class actions pursuant to
ORCP 32.  PGE then filed its second petition for an alternative
writ, this time asking this court to order the circuit court to
vacate its order certifying the cases as class actions.  
On April 9, 2005, this court consolidated the cases and
issued the requested alternative writs.  The circuit court
responded, urging the court to dismiss the writs as improvidently
granted.  With respect to the first petition, the circuit court
argued that plaintiffs had instituted their actions pursuant to
ORS 756.185 and the common law, and that the statutes
(specifically, ORS 756.185 and ORS 756.200(2)) indicate such
actions and remedies are preserved, regardless of the
availability of agency remedies.  With respect to the second
petition, the circuit court argued only that certification of a
class should be treated as an act of judicial discretion with
respect to which the right to appeal is an adequate remedy. 
Since then, PGE and plaintiffs both have filed briefs on the
merits, and a number of amici have offered their views.  
Before we turn to the parties' arguments, we note that
the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus is available to
compel a court's decision only when the law requires a particular decision.  See ORS 34.110 (writ available to compel an act which
the law "specially enjoins").  We further note that such writs
ordinarily are not available when there is a "plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law."  Id.  Thus,
to obtain the specific remedy that it seeks (dismissal), PGE must
persuade us that the law requires dismissal of plaintiffs'
actions and that the ordinary remedy of reversal on appeal is
inadequate.
PGE's first argument in that regard is that none of
plaintiffs' four claims has any basis in the law -- specifically,
that plaintiffs' two statutory claims misconstrue the relevant
statutes and that the two "common law" claims in fact are based
in statute and do not exist in the common-law.  However, as will
be seen, we find PGE's arguments with respect to at least one of
those claims to be unpersuasive.  We refer, in particular, to
plaintiffs' first claim, which alleges that PGE violated ORS
757.355 (1993) by charging and receiving rates that include a
return on PGE's investment in the defunct Trojan plant and which
further alleges that, under ORS 757.185(1), PGE is liable to
plaintiffs for damages that they sustained in consequence of that
violation. 
PGE argues that that first claim involves a misreading
of ORS 757.355 (1993) and that, if properly interpreted, it
should be clear that PGE did not and could not violate that
statute.  PGE's argument in that respect begins with the premise
that, under the so-called "filed rate doctrine" embodied in ORS
756.225 (see above, ___ Or at ___) (slip op at 10 n 10), PGE's
rates during the relevant period were conclusively lawful and
were the only rates that PGE was permitted to collect.  It
follows, PGE argues, that, if ORS 757.355 (1993) is read (as
plaintiffs do) as a mandate directed at PGE, then PGE is subject
to conflicting mandates and must violate one in order to satisfy
the other. (13)  PGE contends that that situation is untenable
and that the only reasonable resolution is to read ORS 757.355
(1993) as a directive to the PUC rather than to utilities.  Such
a resolution would preclude any claim that PGE had "[done] or
cause[d] or permit[ted] to be done any matter, act or thing
prohibited by" the statute, as plaintiffs' first claim for relief
alleges.  
The obvious problem with PGE's argument is that it
would rob ORS 757.355 (1993) of any vitality.  PGE assures us
that that does not mean that ORS 757.355 (1993) is unenforceable,
but only that the proper method of enforcement is a suit to set
aside an order of the PUC as provided by ORS 756.580 (and not a
civil action against PGE itself under ORS 756.185(1)).  Of
course, PGE acknowledges, that may mean that ratepayers have no
clear mechanism for obtaining a refund of charges that the PUC
approves and that the utility collects, but that later are
determined to be unlawful.  PGE contends, however, that the
refund issue is premature because the PUC now is engaged in a
proceeding to determine whether a refund is required and, in any
event, the mechanism for obtaining a refund that plaintiffs seek
to employ here -- an action for damages under ORS 756.185(1) --
is clearly improper.    
Plaintiffs' first objection to the foregoing analysis
goes to PGE's perspective on the meaning and effect of ORS
756.225.  Plaintiffs deny that that statute embodies the extreme
form of the "filed rate doctrine" that PGE (and, apparently, the
PUC) advocate.  They suggest that, so long as it is appealed, a
rate order is not final (and, therefore, cannot serve as a shield
against a claim of unlawfulness), at least until the final
appellate judgment is entered.  In support of that argument,
plaintiffs point out that, according to ORS 756.565, a PUC-approved rate is only "prima facie" lawful:
"All rates, tariffs, [etc.] approved or prescribed
by the Public Utility Commission and any order made or
entered upon any matter within the jurisdiction of the
commission shall be in force and shall be prima facie
lawful and reasonable until found otherwise in a
proceeding brought for that purpose under ORS 756.580
to 756.610." 
Plaintiffs also note that, by its clear terms, ORS
757.355 (1993) is directed at utilities and not at the PUC ("No
public utility shall * * *.").  They contend, moreover, that
there is no need to twist the words of that statute in order to
reconcile it with ORS 757.225.  They argue that the two statutes
are easily reconciled -- that ORS 757.225 should be read as
requiring utilities to treat published rates as provisionally
lawful, but not as absolutely shielding utilities from having to
return any part of their rates that later is adjudged to be
unlawful.
We share plaintiffs' skepticism of the proposition that
is at the heart of PGE's argument -- that ORS 757.225 manifests a
legislative intent that PUC-approved rates be treated as
conclusively lawful for all purposes "until they are changed as
provided in ORS 757.210 to 757.220."  We find it significant
that, although the public utility statutes provide more than one
process for changing the filed rates for a utility, ORS 757.225
refers to only one such process -- the utility-initiated process
"provided by ORS 757.210 to 757.220."  If PGE's interpretation of
ORS 757.225 were correct, then only rate changes adopted pursuant
to the utility-initiated ratemaking process at ORS 757.210 to
757.220 would be valid.  A necessary corollary of that
interpretation would be that rate changes adopted under any
alternative process provided in the statutes, including the
ratepayer- or PUC-initiated process set out at ORS 756.500 to
756.515, would not produce a binding change to the "lawful" rate. 
Those two propositions do not persuade us. 
Based on the foregoing, we therefore agree with
plaintiffs that ORS 757.225 is most reasonably read as a
direction to utilities to charge all their ratepayers the PUC-approved rate and, if a utility is dissatisfied with a rate, to
obtain a new PUC-approved rate through the process set out at ORS
757.210 to 757.220.  The statute is not aimed, as PGE suggests,
at conclusively and permanently binding the entire world to the
rate decisions of the PUC. (14)  
It follows that, in the context of the present
controversy, there is no necessary conflict between ORS 757.225
(directing utilities to charge the filed rate and to seek a rate
change if that filed rate is unsatisfactory) and a natural
reading of ORS 757.355 (1993), i.e., as a prohibition directed at
utilities. (15)  And, because we do not accept PGE's contention
that ORS 757.355 (1993) has no application to the conduct of
utilities, we cannot accept its derivative contention that
plaintiffs' first claim has no basis in the law.  
Because PGE has failed to persuade us that plaintiffs'
first claim is legally untenable, we need not consider its
similar challenges to the other three claims.  If even one of
plaintiffs' claims is viable, then the law cannot compel the
dismissal of the complaints on the theory that none of the claims
has any basis in the law. 
PGE next argues that plaintiffs' complaints must be
dismissed because they either are time barred or amount to an
unlawful collateral attack on unappealed and final orders of the
PUC.  PGE begins by noting that plaintiffs' claims pertain to
overcharges that PGE purportedly collected between April 1995 and
October 2000, after the PUC approved the charges in PUC Order No.
95-322 and before the PUC issued its order implementing the
settlement with CUB.  PGE then notes that, although CUB and URP
timely challenged PUC Order No. 95-322 under ORS 755.580 (and
obtained by that challenge a judicial determination that the
charges were unlawful), that rate order was superseded within
eight months by a new rate order, PUC Order No. 95-1216.  PGE
contends that, because no one sought review within the time
period provided in ORS 756.580 of PUC Order No. 95-1216, it
became final and no longer can be challenged, either directly
through an action under ORS 756.580 or collaterally, as in the
present action.  Thus, PGE argues, to the extent that plaintiffs'
claims pertain to overcharges that occurred after the effective
date of PUC Order No. 95-1216, those claims are barred as
unlawful collateral attacks on unchallenged orders.  As to the 
overcharges that occurred before the effective date of PUC Order
No. 95-1216, PGE contends that any claim based on those charges
is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, ORS 12.080,
because the charges were collected more than six years before
April 17, 2003 (the date when plaintiffs filed their present
action).
PGE's argument fails on a number of grounds.  First,
the argument is premised on the idea that plaintiffs' challenge
ultimately and necessarily is directed at the PUC and its rate
orders, rather than at PGE and its alleged violation of ORS
757.355 (1993).  As we already have explained, we disagree with
that premise.  Whether or not they ever succeed, plaintiffs
clearly are suing PGE for money that they say PGE owes them. 
Furthermore, PGE fails to acknowledge that the "unchallenged"
rate orders do not address in any manner the rate treatment of
Trojan.  Those orders retained the rate treatment that previously
had been approved (and thereafter was excluded from the decision-making process), at least in part because the two prior orders
that had decided the issue were in the courts on appeal.  
In that regard, we note that the PUC first decided the
question of PGE's entitlement to a return on Trojan in the
abstract, in the declaratory ruling designated as PUC Order No.
93-1117.  CUB and URP challenged that order as provided in ORS
756.580.  Shortly thereafter, the PUC issued PUC Order No. 95-322, the rate order that implemented its decision in PUC Order
No. 93-1117.  In that order, the PUC expressly refused to revisit
its prior conclusion in PUC Order No. 93-1117 that PGE could
recover a return on its Trojan investment from ratepayers, and
noted that its conclusion was on appeal.  CUB and URP sought
judicial review of that order as well. (16)  Eight months
later, PGE sought another adjustment in its rates, but it did not
propose to change the rate treatment of its investment in Trojan. 
URP did attempt to raise the "return on Trojan" issue at that
time, but the PUC again refused to consider the matter on the
ground that it already had been presented and resolved in PUC
Order No. 95-322.  Thereafter, PGE sought and the PUC granted a
number of modifications to PGE's rates, but the rate treatment of
PGE's investment in Trojan already had been decided in PUC Order
No. 95-322 and was not raised as an issue in those cases.  As
such, the fact that no one timely challenged either PUC Order 95-1216 or any of the rate orders that followed it is irrelevant.    
 PGE argues, finally, that dismissal is required because
plaintiffs' claims pertain to matters of utility regulation that
are the exclusive province of the PUC (and, thus, are beyond the
jurisdiction of the circuit court).  PGE begins that argument
with a proposition that is beyond serious dispute -- that
ratemaking is a quasi-legislative function that is vested in the
PUC by statute.  But PGE then moves on to a more debatable
proposition, namely, that any resolution of the present action
necessarily will involve ratemaking.  PGE contends that that is
so because "the jury will have to decide what rates the PUC would
or should have set if it had not made an error in [PUC] Order
[No.] 95-322."
We disagree.  Although a jury theoretically could go
about deciding the damage question in the manner suggested, i.e.,
by determining what a "fair and reasonable" rate would have been
if the objectionable return on Trojan had been excluded and then
comparing that rate to the one actually charged during the
relevant period, it also could simply attempt to determine what
part of the rates that the PUC had approved as "fair and
reasonable" in fact represented a return on PGE's investment in
Trojan and, therefore, were unlawful under ORS 757.355 (1993), as
interpreted in Citizens' Utility Board, 154 Or App 702.  The
first approach arguably would invade the PUC's exclusive
ratemaking authority, but we are not persuaded that the latter
approach would involve a similar trespass.  
PGE also seems to argue, in a more nebulous way, that
plaintiffs' actions in circuit court fly in the face of a
"comprehensive statutory scheme" that assigns all matters
relating to utility regulation to the PUC and limits courts to
reviewing PUC orders.  We note, however, that plaintiffs rely on
provisions within that supposedly "comprehensive statutory
scheme," ORS 756.185(1) and ORS 756.200, that appear to
contemplate judicial involvement in matters other than review of
PUC orders.
Thus, we do not accept PGE's argument that the circuit
court is without jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' claims because
they necessarily involve ratemaking or pertain to utility
regulation.  Neither do we accept any of PGE's other arguments
urging that the law requires dismissal of plaintiffs' actions. 
As such, we conclude that the particular remedy that PGE seeks is
not available:  We cannot issue a peremptory writ ordering the
circuit court to dismiss plaintiffs' actions and vacate its class
certification order.
We could, at this point, dismiss the writs and leave
the parties to their ongoing struggle in the circuit court. 
However, we believe that doing so would not be appropriate
because, even if the circuit court had no duty to dismiss
plaintiffs' cases, it appears clear to us that the court had a
legal duty to abate the proceedings.
Respecting abatement, we note that the PUC now is
engaged in a proceeding that involves (essentially) the same
controversy, the same ratepayers, and the same effort at
determining a remedy for PGE's collection of unlawful rates, as
do the present actions.  That being the case, we believe, for the
reasons we describe below, that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction requires that the present actions defer to that
proceeding.  
In Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 325 Or
185, 935 P2d 411 (1997), this court described the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction as follows:
"Judicial invocation of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction generally is appropriate when a court
decides that an administrative agency, rather than a
court of law, initially should determine the outcome of
a dispute or one or more issues within that dispute
that fall within that agency's statutory authority. 
The purpose behind the doctrine is the 'recognition of
the need for orderly and sensible coordination of the
work of agencies and of courts.' * * *  The reason for
the doctrine is 'not a belief that an agency's
expertise makes it superior to a court, [but] that a
court confronted with problems within an agency's areas
of specialization should have the advantage of whatever
contributions the agency can make to the solutions.'  
That is, the doctrine is one ordinarily invoked by a
court in the traditional judicial system with the
belief that a previous agency disposition of one or
more issues before the court will assist the court in
resolving the case before it. 
"Courts vary in their approaches to invoking the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.  According to one
treatise on administrative law, with which we agree:
"'There is no fixed formula for determining
whether an agency has primary jurisdiction
over a dispute or an issue raised in a
dispute.  In making such determinations,
courts consider several factors, including
(1) the extent to which the agency's
specialized expertise makes it a preferable
forum for resolving the issue, (2) the need
for uniform resolution of the issue, and (3)
the potential that judicial resolution of the
issue will have an adverse impact on the
agency's performance of its regulatory
responsibilities. * * *'
"Upon invoking the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the disposition of the case depends on
the nature of the parties' dispute and the scope of the
agency's authority.  If an agency has primary
jurisdiction over the entire dispute, the court action
is dismissed.  However, if an agency has primary
jurisdiction over an issue in dispute
"'the court will defer any decision in the
action before it until the agency has
addressed the issue that is within its
primary jurisdiction.'" 
Id. at 192-93 (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law
Text (3d ed 1972) (citations omitted)). 
The initial question, then, is whether there are one or
more issues in the present actions as to which the PUC should be
deemed to have primary jurisdiction.  We note, in that regard,
that an essential component of plaintiffs' claim is that they
were injured by PGE's collection and retention of rates that were
based in part on amounts unlawfully representing PGE's investment
in the defunct Trojan facility.  We also note that, even before
plaintiffs filed their actions, the PUC had received two remands
from the courts, at least one of which clearly contemplated that
the PUC would fashion a remedy for those very injuries. (17) 
Finally, we note that the PUC now is engaged in carrying out
those remands in a single proceeding.
Although plaintiffs vigorously deny it, the PUC
proceeding that is underway thus has the potential for disposing
of the central issue in this cases, viz., the issue whether
plaintiffs have been injured (and, if they have been, the extent
of the injury).  In that regard, we note that the PUC has been
instructed either to revise and reduce rates to offset the
previous "improperly calculated and unlawfully collected rates"
or to order PGE to issue refunds.  Depending on how the PUC
responds to that remand, some or all plaintiffs claimed injuries
may cease to exist.  Moreover, the PUC's specialized expertise in
the field of ratemaking gives it primary, if not sole,
jurisdiction over one of the remedies contemplated in the remand:
revision of rates to provide for recovery of unlawfully collected
amounts.  Certainly, if the PUC decides to take that approach to
the problem, its special expertise makes it a far superior venue
for determining that remedy.  
The PUC also has special expertise with respect to an
issue that lurks in the background of this case:  Whether the PUC
can order refunds or any other form of retroactive relief for
amounts that PGE collected in violation of ORS 757.355
(1993). (18)  At times, plaintiffs appear to suggest in their
briefing that that issue is irrelevant, because they can proceed
in circuit court in any event.  At other times, however,
plaintiffs seem to suggest that the PUC's refusal or lack of
authority to act justifies their actions in circuit court.  We
think that the issue of PUC's authority is relevant in the
present case:  If that agency can and does provide a full or
partial remedy, then plaintiffs either are not injured at all or,
if they remain injured, their remedy is to seek judicial review
of the PUC's order.  In the former case, the circuit court can
dismiss the actions.  In the latter case, the scope of the
court's work will be usefully curtailed.  In either event, the
issue of the PUC's authority to provide a retroactive remedy is
one that, at least initially, belongs before that body.     
Turning to the other two primary jurisdiction factors
set out above, we think that this clearly is a case in which a
uniform resolution of the issue is desirable.  Conflicting or
inconsistent resolutions of the remedy issue between the PUC and
the circuit court would be highly problematic for the resolution
of this dispute and for utility regulation generally.             
Finally, we are persuaded that, in the present context,
judicial resolution of the remedies issue before the PUC has
acted would interfere with that agency's performance of its
regulatory functions.  In two judicial review actions that
preceded the present action, courts have issued remands to the
PUC that explicitly or implicitly contemplate some decision about
PGE ratepayers' entitlement to a remedy.  The PUC is performing
part of its regulatory functions when it responds to those
remands.  A contemporaneous circuit court proceeding directed at
the same issue would not, in our view, move that process
forward. (19)        
We conclude, in short, that the PUC has primary
jurisdiction to determine what, if any, remedy it can offer to
PGE ratepayers, through rate reductions or refunds, for the
amounts that PGE collected in violation of ORS 757.355 (1993)
between April 1995 and October 2000.  If the PUC determines that
it can provide a remedy to ratepayers, then the present actions
may become moot in whole or in part.  If, on the other hand, the
PUC determines that it cannot provide a remedy, and that decision
becomes final, then the court system may have a role to play. 
Certainly, after the PUC has made its ruling, plaintiffs will
retain the right to return to the circuit court for disposition
of whatever issues remain unresolved, including the question of a
fee award.  That is the way that abatement is supposed to work.  
Until the PUC has had the opportunity to do its work, parallel
circuit court litigation is duplicative and unnecessary.  It
should be abated.  Accordingly, we issue a peremptory writ
ordering the circuit court to abate the present actions.
Peremptory writ to issue.
1. The statute, ORS 757.140(2), provides:
"In the following cases the commission may allow
in rates, directly or indirectly, amounts on the
utility's books of account which the commission finds
represent undepreciated investment in a utility plant,
including that which has been retired from service:  
''(a) When the retirement is due to ordinary wear
and tear, casualties, acts of God, acts of governmental
authority; or
''(b) When the commission finds that the retirement
is in the public interest."
2. At the relevant time, i.e., 1993, ORS 756.450
provided:
"On petition of any interested person, the Public
Utility Commission may issue a declaratory ruling with
respect to the applicability to any person, property,
or state of facts of any rule or statute enforceable by
the commission.  A declaratory ruling is binding
between the commission and the petitioner on the state
of facts alleged, unless it is modified, vacated or set
aside by a court.  However, the commission may review
the ruling and modify, vacate or set it aside if
requested by the petitioner or other party to the
proceeding.  Binding rulings provided by this section
are subject to review in the circuit court in the
manner provided in ORS 756.580."
In 2005, the legislature amended ORS 756.450.  Or Laws 2005,
ch 638, § 2.  The amendments are not relevant to the case at
hand. 
3. ORS 757.355 (1993) provided:
"No public utility shall, directly or indirectly,
by any device, charge, demand, collect or receive from
any customer rates which are derived from a rate base
which includes within it any construction, building,
installation or real or personal property not presently
used for providing utility service to the customer."  
In 2003, the legislature amended ORS 757.355.  Or Laws 2003,
ch 202, § 2.  The amendments are not relevant to the case at
hand.
4. PGE would have to show, among other things, that
closing Trojan was the least-cost option and that PGE's
investments in Trojan since 1992 had been precedent and
necessary. 
5. The PUC based its decision, in part, on Oregon
Attorney General Opinion No. 6454 (June 8, 1992), which
opined that ORS 757.355 was directed at the planning and
construction phases of plants that were not yet on line, and
had no application to plants that had been retired from
service.
6. The PUC disallowed certain costs that PGE had
claimed in its rate proposal on the ground that PGE had
acted imprudently in incurring those costs.
7. Former ORS 756.580 (1993) was repealed by the
legislature in 2005.  Or Laws 2005, ch 638, § 21.  It
provided, in part:
"(1) A party to any proceeding before the Public
Utility Commission, when aggrieved by any findings of
fact, conclusion of law or order, including the
dismissal of any complaint or application by the
commission, may prosecute a suit against the commission
to modify, vacate or set aside such findings of fact,
conclusions of law or order."
8. Within eight months of issuing PUC Order No.
95-322, the PUC approved a new tariff schedule for PGE
in PUC Order 95-1216.  That schedule was superseded in
turn by the tariff schedule adopted in PUC Order 96-306.  In PUC Order No. 95-1216, the PUC reiterated its
position that PUC Order No. 93-1117 disposed of the
issue of PGE's entitlement to a return on its Trojan
investment and that it would not reconsider the issue. 
Neither CUB nor URP sought judicial review of PUC Order
No. 95-1216 or 96-306.    
9. Specifically, the settlement offset the
$180.5 million that purportedly still had not been
collected on PGE's Trojan investment balance plus a
$47.4 million "FAS 109" asset (which customers
supposedly owed to PGE for accelerated tax deductions
that PGE passed through to customers early in Trojan's
life) against (1) a "new regulatory asset" to recover
FAS 109 amounts; (2) 45 percent of the proceeds from
certain insurance policies; and (3) $161.9 million in
credits owed by PGE to ratepayers, which apparently had
arisen out of the 1996 sale of PGE to Enron, a now-defunct Texas conglomerate.  Although URP opposed
various aspects of the settlement, its primary focus
was on PGE's selection of $180.5 million as the
remaining balance.  It argued that most of that amount
reflected projected return on the Trojan investment
until 2011.        
10. The "filed rate doctrine" holds, generally,
that any rate filed with and approved by the relevant
ratemaking agency represents a contract between the
utility and the customer and is conclusively lawful
until a new rate is approved. The corollary "rule
against retroactivity" holds that approved utility
rates may be modified only prospectively and that
utilities cannot provide retrospective relief from such
rates.     
No Oregon court has expressly decided whether
Oregon accepts the filed-rate doctrine or the corollary
rule against retroactive ratemaking.  However, the PUC
long has argued that the two doctrines apply and the
Oregon Attorney General has concurred in that position. 
Letter of Advice dated March 18, 1987, to Charles
Davis, Public Utility Commissioner (op-6076).  Both the
PUC and the Attorney General suggest that there are
strong policy considerations underpinning the two
doctrines.  The PUC also contends that the doctrines
inhere in an Oregon statute, ORS 757.225.  That statute
provides:  
"No public utility shall charge, demand, collect
or receive a greater or less compensation for any
service performed by it within the state, or for any
service in connection therewith, than is specified in
printed rate schedules as may at the time be in force
or demand, collect, or receive any rate not specified
in such schedule.  The rates named therein are the
lawful rates until they are changed as provided in ORS
757.210 to 757.220."  
(Emphasis added.)
In its briefs to this court, PGE asserts that
McPherson et al v. Pacific P. & L. Co., 207 Or 433, 296
P2d 932 (1956), implicitly adopts the filed-rate
doctrine, but the validity of that assertion is
debatable.  Certainly, McPherson does not adopt any
rule about retroactive ratemaking.  In any event, our
disposition of this case eliminates any need to address
the issue in this opinion.
11. The PUC acknowledged that the first phase
would involve ratemaking but noted that it would not be
necessary to duplicate the complete 1995 rate case. 
Rather, the ratemaking process would be limited to
those aspects of the 1995 case that are affected by the
Court of Appeals' statutory interpretation of ORS
757.355 (1993) -- specifically 
"(1) the appropriate recovery period for the
Trojan investment balance; (2) the cost of
capital effects of the utility's change of
circumstances; and (3) the application of the
net benefits formula given that PGE is
precluded from recovering the cost of capital
represented by the Trojan investment." 
PUC Order No. 04-597 at 6-7.
URP intervened in the proceeding and argued
that the PUC's framing of the issues was improper in
that it directly involved engaging in retroactive
ratemaking.  URP also argued that, unless the PUC
repudiated its position that the filed rate doctrine
precluded it from providing any relief for the unlawful
charges that PGE had collected, the proceedings were
"futile" and "moot."  The PUC acknowledged URP's
position, stating that
"the uncertainty of the outcome of Phase I is one
reason these remand proceedings may proceed despite the
ongoing appeal of one of the underlying dockets, [PUC
Order No. 02-227] at the Court of Appeals.  URP
expresses concerns that these remand proceedings are
'pointless,' 'meaningless,' and 'moot,' speculating
that relief cannot be granted due to the [PUC's] legal
position [in the appeal concerning PUC Order 02-227]
that refunds violate the rule against retroactive
ratemaking.  As the Ruling observed, however, the
[PUC's] legal position that it is not authorized to
issue refunds is not necessarily implicated in the
first phase.  We agree that 'prior to completing the
investigation of what rate determinations would have
been made by the [PUC] under the statutory framework
provided by the Court of Appeals, it is impossible to
know whether any retroactive adjustment of rates will
be necessary.'" 
Id. at 7.
The PUC concluded, however, that it must proceed
because it could not avoid, modify or otherwise dispense with the
obligations imposed by reviewing courts.  Id. at 8.    
12. Originally, two different sets of plaintiffs filed
actions asserting essentially identical claims, the only
difference being that plaintiffs in Dreyer et al v. PGE (Marion
County Circuit Court Case No. 03 10639) alleged that they were
present customers of PGE while plaintiffs in Morgan v. PGE
(Marion County Circuit Court Case No. 03 10640) alleged that they
were former PGE customers.  Early on, the trial court
consolidated Morgan with Dreyer.
13. Specifically, PGE asserts that if it adheres to ORS
756.355 (1993) and excludes return-on-investment charges from its
rates, it would be charging less than the published PUC-approved
rates, thereby violating ORS 757.225.  If, on the other hand, PGE
charges the published rates because ORS 757.225 (as PGE
interprets it) requires PGE to do that, it would violate ORS
756.355 (1993), because the published rates include return-on-investment charges.          
14. Although we reject PGE's contention here that ORS
757.225 embodies the particular application of the filed-rate
doctrine that it espouses, we do not reject the possibility that
Oregon utility law incorporates some form of the doctrine.  We
simply do not address that question here.   
15. We acknowledge that that interpretation could pose a
dilemma for utilities, in that they theoretically could find
themselves to be statutorily bound to collect a PUC-approved rate
that includes amounts that, by statute, are unlawful for them to
collect.  However, realistically, utilities will rarely if ever
be placed involuntarily into such a position; rather, they will
make a calculated decision to pursue a theory that may or may not
withstand judicial review (as in the present case), with the
consequences of such a ruling factored into the choice to press
their theory in the first place.         
16. As we previously noted, the challenges to PUC Order 93-1117 and PUC Order 95-322 were combined for purposes of appeal in
Citizens' Utility Board, 154 Or App 702.  
17. They were (1) the remand in the final appellate
judgment in Citizens' Utility Board, 154 Or App 702, "for further
proceedings consistent with the opinion and orders of the Court
of Appeals"; and (2) the remand from the circuit court in Utility
Reform Project, which instructed the PUC 
"to immediately revise and reduce the existing rate
structure so as to fully and promptly offset and
recover all past improperly calculated and unlawfully
collected rates, or alternatively, to order PGE to
immediately issue refunds for the full amount of all
excessive and unlawful charges collected by the utility
for a return on its Trojan investment."
18. This is an issue that potentially affects some of the
plaintiffs -- those who were PGE customers during the pertinent
time period but no longer are customers -- differently than it
affects those who were customers during the pertinent time period
and remain so.  We note the potential dichotomy only to
demonstrate that PUC's ultimate choice of remedy can have many
possible effects.
19. We acknowledge that plaintiffs are concerned that, in
spite of the circuit court's remand, PUC will refuse to provide
any remedy for the amounts that PGE unlawfully collected between
April 1995 and October 2000 on the ground that it has no
authority to make retroactive adjustments to rates.  Plaintiffs
may be correct, but we cannot sit in review of speculation about
what an agency will decide.  Moreover, the issue that plaintiffs
raise -- whether the PUC has authority to order refunds or other
retroactive relief -- will not be ripe for decision by an
appellate court until the PUC acts.