Case Title: WHITMAN v WHITMAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1974-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12538 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 FRANCIS J. WHITMAN, P l a i n t i f f and Cross Defendant and Appellant, THELMA S. WHITMAN, Defendant apd Cross Complainant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable @ ~ 3 - . I = 2 * , Judge presiding. 4 M , ~ if+j~-c&* Counsel of Record : L For Appellant : Bennett*and Bennett, Bozeman, Montana Lyman H. Bennett I11 argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent : Drysdale, McLean and Scully, Bozeman, Montana John P. Scully argued, Bozeman, Montana , # ** Submitted : January 15, 1974 Decided : HfiR ~l1974, r+? 1 Filed : MAR -. 1 1974 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of the Court. This appeal by p l a i n t i f f Francis J. Whitman, i s from a judg- ment of divorce entered by t h e d i s t r i c t court, s i t t i n g without a jury, i n the eighteenth j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Gallatin County. Due t o the f a c t issues a r i s i n g out of two hearings a r e in- volved, we w i l l s e t f o r t h the procedu.ra1 matters a s they arose p r i o r t o t h i s appeal. The divorce judgment was entered by Judge Lessley on February 22, 1973. The decree granted defendant Thelma S. Whitman a divorce; provided f o r a property settlement; an.d required p l a i n t i f f t o pay defendant $800 per month a s alimony,plus $1,500 attorney fees. Subsequent t o the f i l i n g of notice of appeal, defendant f i l e d a motion supported by an a f f i d a v i t t o require p l a i n t i f f t o commence alimony payments and pay the attorney fees. Thereafter Judge Lessley issued an order t o show cause, dated June 5 , 1973, r e - quiring p l a i n t i f f t o appear i n opposition t o the motion. Upon receiving t h e order t o show cause, p l a i n t i f f disqualified Judge Lessley and Judge Freebourn was called t o hear the show cause motion. Hearing was held on July 3 , 1973. Subsequently Judge t o Freebourn ordered p l a i n t i f f l P a y temporary alimony of $800 per month, plus t h e attorney fee. P l a i n t i f f appeals from the decree and Judge ~ r e e b o u r n ' s order. The p a r t i e s were married i n 1937 and have lived i n West Yellowstone, Montana a l l t h e i r married l i f e . Three children were born a s i s s u e of t h e marriage, but a r e now of l e g a l age. I n the e a r l y years of t h e marriage the p a r t i e s had l i t t l e i n t h e way of wealth o r property, but commencing i n t h e mid-1940's~ through t h e i r j o i n t e f f o r t s , they accumulated both r e a l and personal property which a t t h e time of t h e divorce amounted t o several hundred thou- sand dollars. A t the time of the divorce the husband was 67 years of age and t h e wife 58 years of age. For some 35 years they lived and worked together i n what could be described a s a good marriage. Most of t h a t time defendant was a mother and housewife, but during p a r t of the time she cared f o r t h e i r t o u r i s t cabins when needed and worked a s a c l e r k i n t h e i r store. Except f o r high blood pressure and diabetes she was a well person. P l a i n t i f f obviously had worked hard over those years and had successfully accumulated considerable assets. I n 1971 he r e t i r e d and the gas s t a t i o n he owned was leased, bringing him $1,000 per month. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t one of the reasons f o r r e t i r i n g was h i s health and t h a t he f l was worn outff. For t h i s couple retirement brought problems. P l a i n t i f f r e t i r e d on January 1, 1971. B y summer he had moved out t o a lake i n a t r a i l e r where he stayed u n t i l t h a t f a l l ; when he returned t o t h e i r home he was t o l d he was not welcome. For the next s i x months he was away from the home. When he returned t o West Yell~w- stone i n t h e spring of 1972, he was informed by defendant t h a t the marriage was over and a f t e r f a i l i n g i n h i s e f f o r t f o r reconcilla- tion, he f i l e d f o r a divorce. Defendant cross-complained charging c r u e l t y and the czuse went t o a hearing. Due t o the issues raised here, we note t h a t p l a i n t i f f i n h i s complaint evidenced a willingness pay $400 per month f o r support of defendant. I n her cross-complaint defendant asked f o r $700 per month, a division of property and attorney fees. After hearing, t h e t r i a l court awarded defendant t h e divorce; the home and land on which it was situated; one-half the savings of the p a r t i e s ; an automobile; a boat; and $800 per month support. P l a i n t i f f was allowed t o keep the income producing property. To the date of the divorce and during the period of separation p l a i n t i f f had been giving defendant $400 per month, plus approximately $10,500 i n cash. Defendant challenges t h a t figure but admits re- ceiving money from p l a i n t i f f . Following Judge ~ e s s l e y ' s judgment, p l a i n t i f f stopped payment of the $400 support money and refused t o pay the ordered $800 per month award o r the attorney fee, which re- f u s a l brought about t h e hearing presided over by Judge Freebourn some four and a h a l f months l a t e r . P l a i n t i f f r a i s e s several issues on appeal which we w i l l combine, f o r purposes of t h i s opinion. Did the court e r r i n granting : 1. A divorce t o defendant and not t o p l a i n t i f f ? Alimony defendant i n t h e o r i g i n a l action and i n the special proceedings pending the appeal? 3. Attorney fees i n both proceedings? The f i r s t i s s u e challenges t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s discretionary power provided i n section 21-103, R.C.M 1947. Here, p l a i n t i f f f i r s t sought the divorce by f i l i n g h i s complaint. Defendant answered and f i l e d a cross-complaint. I f proven, p l a i n t i f f ' s allegations were s u f f i c i e n t t o grant him a divorce, but a f t e r a f u l l hearing the t r i a l judge determined t h a t he had not proven h i s allegations but t h a t defendant had proven hers. B y the provisions of the s t a t u t e the t r i a l judge had the discretionary power t o so find. The complaint was couched i n t h e language of section 21-106, R.C.M. 1947, charging mental cruelty. This Court i n Judson, Adm. v. Anderson, 118 Mont. 106, 109, 165 P.2d 198, held: "The sole question presented on t h i s appeal i s t h a t of the sufficiency of the evidence t o sup- port the decree and judgment. The answer t o t h i s depends upon whether or not the evidence substan- t i a l l y established the i n f l i c t i o n of extreme c r u e l t y by the defendant upon t h e p l a i n t i f f , a s contemplated by s t a t u t e and a s alleged i n the complaint. A t the outset we affirm and r e i t e r a t e the r u l e t h a t i n cases of t h i s nature the findings of the t r i a l court w i l l not be disturbed by t h i s court where the record con- t a i n s substantial evidence upon which they may be sustained; t h a t when the evidence furnishes a substan- t i a l basis f o r the findings they w i l l be permitted t o stand." See also: Boggs v. Boggs, 119 Mont. 540, 177 P.2d 869; B r i s t o l v. B r i s t o l , 65 Mont. 508, 211 P. 205. W e have carefully examined the record and find no e r r o r i n the t r i a l c o u r t ' s granting t h e divorce t o defendant. The second i s s u e concerns the awarding of $800 per month support f o r defendant. P l a i n t i f f argues there i s not one i o t a of evidence upon which t h e t r i a l court could have arrived a t t h a t figure. W e have read the record with utmost care and find it f a i l s t o support t h e $800 award. This Court w i l l not disturb the findings of the t r i a l court where such findings a r e j u s t i f i e d by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence, but it w i l l s e t aside findings not supported o r j u s t i f i e d . Judson, Adm. v. Anderson, supra; Putnam v. Putnam, 86 Mont. 135, 282 P. 855. I n reviewing the t r i a l c o u r t ' s findings, we find there i s a lack of substantial evidence t o support such findings and con- clusions. W e note, commencing with finding of f a c t No. 5, which has f i v e subparagraphs devoted t o a breakdown of the property owned by t h e p a r t i e s and which assigns valuations t o such property, t h a t the findings do not follow the evidence: 1) Concerns t h e home, f a c i l i t i e s and the l o t . The valuation s e t by t h e t r i a l court was $40,000. P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d he had turned down an o f f e r of $80,000 f o r the home several years before the t r i a l . He made an o f f e r of $40,000 f o r the home i n l i e u of alimony t o defendant. Defendant t e s t i f i e d she thought the house and l o t were worth a t l e a s t $50,000. 2) Concerns t h e service s t a t i o n , s t o r e and l o t and places the value a t $400,000 and p l a i n t i f f ' s one-half i n t e r e s t a t $200,000. p l a i n t i f f ' s testimony indicated the service s t a t i o n grossed $70,000 a year from 1962 t o 1970; t h a t the n e t per year was $35,000 (his share being $17,500); t h a t he received $15,000 when he r e t i r e d and s t i l l receives $1,000 per month on a lease t h a t i s t o be renego- t i a t e d i n 1975. 3) Sets the t o t a l value of a l l savings accounts, c e r t i f i - cates of deposit and U.S. Savings Bonds, held i n j o i n t tenancy, a t $100,000. P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d the savings totaled $40,000, plus approximately $40,000 i n U.S. Bonds, making a t o t a l of $80,000. In answer t o an interrogatory he s e t h i s savings a t $39,000. Viewing the testimony i n a l i g h t most favorable t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s findings, we can find no basis f o r the $100,000 figure. A t b e s t , the items t o t a l $80,000. 4) Concerns reference made t o f i v e shares of c a p i t a l stock i n the F i r s t Security Bank of West Yellowstone, Montana. N o finding of value was made, nor was there any testimony given a t the t r i a l a s t o the value of the stock, 5) Concerns a pickup truck owned by p l a i n t i f f ; a 1971 Ford s t a t i o n wagon j o i n t l y owned by the p a r t i e s ; two boats; household goods; and a boat t r a i l e r owned by p l a i n t i f f . N o valuations a r e given. Testimony a t the t r i a l and answers t o interrogatories a r e confusing a s t o the year models and values of the pickup and t h e Ford. The Ford was given t o defendant by p l a i n t i f f a t t h e time of t h e i r separation. Although household furnishings a r e usually included i n a house valuation, there was no separate testimony a s t o the value of the furnishings, except t h a t i n interrogatory 24 which gave a $2400 value. The ownership and valuation of t h e two boats and a snowmobile was l e f t i n doubt by t h e various witnesses. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s finding of f a c t No. 7 records p l a i n t i f f ' s income a s : $205 per month from s o c i a l security; $1,000 per month from a lease of the service s t a t i o n ; undetermined amount of i n t e r e s t from savings accounts, etc.; f o r a t o t a l of $2,000 per month. Obviously t h i s t o a l monthly income i s erroneous. P l a i n t i f f t e s t i - f i e d he received t h e $205 per month s o c i a l security, and i n t e r e s t on savings accounts, c e r t i f i c a t e s of deposits and bonds i n the amount of $66.02 per quarter or approximately $22 per month. The j o i n t federal income t a x return f o r 1972, shows dividend and i n t e r e s t income t o be $4,257.56 o r approximately $354.96 per month f o r t h a t year. Here again, the figures and testimony do not add. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s finding of f a c t No. 9 concerns the defendant wife's income, It notes an approximate $10,000 i n her name of which $9,500 was given t o her by p l a i n t i f f . Then, considering the d i s p a r i t y of income and property i n p l a i n t i f f ' s name, t h e court finds defendant e n t i t l e d t o attorney's fees and costs. A t t r i a l p l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d he gave defendant $9100 a t the time of t h e i r separation i n addition t o a monthly payment of $400 f o r four months, o r a t o t a l of $1600. I n addition he t e s t i f i e d he gave her an addi- t i o n a l $1700 bringing h i s t e s t i f i e d t o t a l t o $12,400. I n any event the amount of money she received i s i n c o n f l i c t with the finding of t h e t r i a l court. The trial court's finding of fact No. 1 0 is directed to all the property heretofore described and divides it equally based on the parties' joint efforts. This finding is totally inconsistent with its finding of fact No.12 which makes the actual division, leaving plaintiff valued at $250,000 (court val~ation) and de- fendant valued at $90,000 (court valuation). Finding of fact No. 11 notes that defendant wife is not trained for any occupation and her minimal support and maintenance requirements amount to $800 per month. For the record we note she asked for $750 in her cross-complaint; she testified that with an equal division of the property she would need no alimony; otherwise she would require from $600 to $700 per month alimony. On cross-examination, she testified that if she could sell the home for $50,000 and then invest the money she could get $200 per month interest and would need only from $500 to $600 per month alimony. The trial court's finding of fact No. 12 makes this property division : Husband Interest in service station $200,000 (inc luding lease) Bank Stock ? Pickup Truck ? Boat d Trailer ? 1/2 Savings,Bonds,etc. 40,000 Total assets found by Court $250,000. Wife - House with furniture $40,000 Boat (Inboard) ? 1971 Ford Wagon ? 1/2 Savings,Bonds,etc 40,000 Total assets found by Court $90,000. In addition, items not mentioned in the trial court's findings but testified to or mentioned in the interrogatories were a life insurance policy of plaintiff naming defendant wife as beneficiary and valued in excess of $2000 and a jointly owned Travelease trailer valued at $4000. In view of the discrepancies above noted, it is obvious that the case must be remanded to the trial court for a hearing to establish a proper division of property and/or alimony for the support of defendant. Section 93-216, R.C.M. 1947, establishes the duty imposed on this Court in determining questions of fact in equity cases. Unless for good reason a new trial or the taking of additional evidence is ordered in the district court, that court's decision will be affirmed. In approaching our decision here, we are not unmindful that, notwithstanding the provisions of section 93-216, it is the settled rule that this Court will hesitate to overrule findings, even though based on substantially conflicting evidence. Kasala v. Kalispell Pee Wee Baseball League, 151 P l o n t . 109, 439 P.2d 65; Bouma v . Bynum Irrigation Dist., 139 Mont. 360, 364 P.2d 47. However in a case such as the instant one, where insufficient evidence has been furnished to confirm the findings of the trial court, this Court will not hesitate to return the cause to the trial court. plaintiff's third issue is directed to the awarding of attorney fees in both hearings to defendant. Section 21-137, R . C . M . 1947, provides the statutory authority for such awards and states in pertinent part: 1 t While an action for divorce is pending the court or judge may, in its or his discretion, require the husband to pay as alimony any money necessary to en- able the wife to support herself or her children, or to prosecute or defend the action," (Emphasis added). Over the years that this issue has been raised in cases considered by this Court, from Bordeaux v . Bordeaux, 29 Mont. 478, 75 P . 359, to State ex rel. Sowerwine v . Dist. Ct., 145 Mont. 375, 401 P.2d 568, the Court has consistently held that a showing of necessity is a condition precedent to the exercise of the court's discretion to grant attorney fees. Therefore, the decree is modified by striking the provision awarding defendant attorney fees. The cause i s remanded t o the d i s t r i c t court f o r a f u r t h e r hearing t o e s t a b l i s h a proper division of property and/or alimony f o r the defendant. Each party i s t o bear i t s own costs. W e Concur: -r-,,-,-,-,L,,-,-,-------------- C.. Chief J u s t i c e