Case Title: North Dakota v. Ayala

Citation: 

Docket Number: 20160369

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 2017-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA 2017 ND 116State of North
Dakota, Plaintiff and Appelleev.Miguel Ayala, Defendant and AppellantNo. 20160369Appeal from the District Court of Mercer County, South
Central Judicial District, the Honorable David E. Reich,
Judge.AFFIRMED.Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.Jessica J. Binder, State's Attorney, Stanton, N.D., for
plaintiff and appellee.Mark A. Kaffar, Hazen,
N.D., for defendant and appellant.State v. AyalaNo. 20160369Tufte, Justice.[¶1] Miguel Ayala appeals a criminal judgment entered on his conditional plea of
guilty to driving under the influence. He reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of
his motion to suppress his blood test result, arguing that law enforcement failed to "inform" him
as required under the implied-consent law. We affirm the judgment, concluding the district court
did not err in finding the deputy properly informed Ayala.I[¶2] The facts relied upon by the district court were not disputed. A deputy sheriff
stopped Ayala when he failed to dim his bright lights for oncoming traffic. The deputy testified
that he questioned Ayala and detected the odor of alcohol emitting from the car. It became
apparent to the deputy that Ayala struggled with English. A video recording of the stop showed
the deputy attempting to communicate with Ayala and allowing him to ask
questions.[¶3] The deputy conducted the horizontal gaze
nystagmus field sobriety test and observed six out of six clues that Ayala was intoxicated. He
then read Ayala the implied-consent advisory in English, requesting that Ayala submit to a
preliminary screening breath test. The deputy repeated and rephrased portions of the advisory in
an attempt to ensure Ayala's understanding, but did not read the advisory in Spanish, Ayala's
primary language. Ayala submitted to the test, which showed his blood alcohol concentration to
be 0.18. The deputy arrested Ayala and brought him to the Mercer County Jail. Once there, the
deputy again read the implied-consent advisory and asked Ayala to submit to an Intoxilyzer
breath test. Ayala submitted to the test, which revealed a blood alcohol concentration of
0.212.[¶4] The State charged Ayala with driving under the
influence. Ayala moved the district court to suppress evidence of his breath test, arguing the
deputy failed to "inform" him of North Dakota's implied-consent laws as required. He argued an
"officer fails to inform the individual charged" under N.D.C.C.
§ 39-20-01(3)(b) unless the implied-consent advisory is conveyed to the driver
and the driver is "actually informed." The district court denied Ayala's motion, concluding that
despite the language difficulties between them, the deputy properly informed Ayala under the
implied-consent law. Ayala pled guilty, reserving this issue, and now appeals.II[¶5] The issue on appeal is the meaning of
"inform" as used in N.D.C.C.
§ 39-20-01. This is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de
novo. State v. Kuruc, 2014 ND 95, ¶ 32, 846 N.W.2d 314. We begin
with the plain language of the statute to determine whether it is unambiguous. We interpret the
words in a statute to give them their commonly understood meaning unless, reading the statute as
a whole, a contrary meaning plainly appears. State v. Davis, 2016 ND 145, ¶ 11, 882 N.W.2d 281 (citing N.D.C.C.
§§ 1-02-02 and 1-02-07). If a
statute is ambiguous and susceptible to multiple rational interpretations the court may resort to
extrinsic aids, "including the object sought to be attained, the circumstances under which the
legislation was enacted, and the legislative history." Id. (citing N.D.C.C.
§ 1-02-39).[¶6] When a law enforcement officer
requests a chemical test to determine if a driver has alcohol in his system, the test results are not
admissible "if the law enforcement officer fails to inform the individual" of the implied-consent
law. N.D.C.C.
§ 39-20-01(3)(b). To satisfy this requirement, a complete implied-consent
advisory must be provided to the driver. State v.
O'Connor, 2016 ND 72, ¶ 8, 877 N.W.2d 312. We have not
previously considered the question of whether the advisory must simply be read or whether
something more is required to "inform" a driver.[¶7] On appeal,
the State argues that the requirement to "inform" a driver is equivalent to giving the advisory or
notifying the driver. The State concedes that reading at an inaudible volume or at the speed of an
auctioneer would create an unjust result, which we presume is not intended. N.D.C.C.
§ 1-02-38(3). Ayala argues in his brief that the legislature intended to create an
objective test in which the officer is expected to act in an objectively reasonable manner to
convey the advisory to drivers. During oral argument, however, he asked us to create a bright-line
rule by which officers must convey the advisory in the primary language of the driver. After
finding that the video showed Ayala was "properly informed," the district court concluded that
the statutory requirement to "inform" did not necessarily include reading or otherwise conveying
the implied-consent advisory in the driver's primary or preferred language.[¶8] To the extent that "inform," in this statutory context, means something more
than the officer simply reading the advisory, we hold that it must be conveyed in an objectively
reasonable way calculated to be comprehensible to the driver. Ordinarily, reading the advisory
will be sufficient. In the context of the implied-consent law, we must consider that 39-20-01 is a
requirement for admissibility but consent has been given by the act of driving. McCoy v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2014 ND
119, ¶ 23, 848 N.W.2d 659
("implied consent occurs at the time an individual operates a motor vehicle"). We also recognize
that these advisories are given to individuals who are under arrest for driving under the influence.
To read "inform" as requiring the deputy to assess the level of actual understanding of a driver
whom the deputy has observed exhibiting signs of intoxication is not a rational reading of
"inform" in this context. It would require an officer to perform a near-impossible task as to most
impaired drivers. A requirement that the officer confirm some level of knowledge transfer to a
driver is unworkable and would move away from the bright line rules pervasive in this statutory
scheme.[¶9] We decline Ayala's invitation to interpret § 39-20-
01 as requiring an officer in every case to convey the advisory in the primary or preferred
language of the driver. Nothing in the statute suggests the legislature intended this meaning.
Moreover, implied consent has already been given by the driver through the act of driving--the
advisory is given to allow an opportunity to ratify or withdraw consent. McCoy, 2014 ND 119, ¶ 23, 848 N.W.2d 659. Where, as
here, a driver has difficulty communicating with the officer owing to limited fluency in English,
the test remains the same: was the implied-consent advisory presented in a way reasonably
calculated to be comprehensible to the driver.[¶10] Having
determined the meaning of "inform" in § 39-20-
01(3)(b), we now look to whether the officer here conveyed the advisory in a manner
sufficient to satisfy this requirement. When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to
suppress, we defer to its findings of fact, affirming "if there is sufficient competent evidence
capable of supporting the court's findings and if its decision is not contrary to the manifest weight
of the evidence." State v. Canfield,
2013 ND 236, ¶ 6, 840 N.W.2d 620. In making its findings, the court relied significantly on the video recording of the traffic
stop. From this, it appeared to the court that Ayala's English proficiency was limited but not so
limited that he could not converse to some degree with the deputy. The record shows that the
deputy repeated and rephrased portions of the advisory in an attempt to help him understand. The
video recording of their communication shows that before the advisory was conveyed, Ayala
responded to the officer's questioning and communicated with the officer. The court found the
officer had "properly informed" Ayala of the implied-consent law. We conclude there is
sufficient competent evidence fairly supporting the district court's findings and those findings are
not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.III[¶11] We affirm the judgment, concluding the district court did not err in finding
law enforcement had "informed" Ayala of the required implied-consent advisory.[¶12] Jerod E.
TufteDaniel J. CrothersLisa Fair McEversCarol Ronning KapsnerGerald W.
VandeWalle, C.J.