Case Title: State v. Nucklos

Citation: 2009-Ohio-792

Docket Number: 20070754

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Nucklos, 121 Ohio St.3d 332, 2009-Ohio-792.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. NUCKLOS, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Nucklos, 121 Ohio St.3d 332, 2009-Ohio-792.] 
Criminal law — R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) — To convict a licensed health professional 
of trafficking in drugs under R.C. 2925.03(A), the state bears the burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the inapplicability of the licensed-
health-professional exception in R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) by submitting 
evidence that the licensed health professional violated statutes or 
regulations that define the standard of care for dispensing controlled 
substances. 
(No. 2007-0754 — Submitted March 11, 2008 — Decided March 4, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clark County,  
No. 06CA0023, 171 Ohio App.3d 38, 2007-Ohio-1025. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
To convict a licensed health professional of trafficking in drugs under R.C. 
2925.03(A), the state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt the inapplicability of the licensed-health-professional exception in 
R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) by submitting evidence that the licensed health 
professional violated statutes or regulations that define the standard of care 
for dispensing controlled substances.  (R.C. 2925.03(B)(1), construed.) 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
I. Introduction 
{¶ 1} R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) provides that the criminal offense of 
trafficking in drugs under R.C. 2925.03(A) “does not apply” to a licensed health 
professional who complies with applicable statutory or regulatory requirements.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether proving regulatory compliance is 
an affirmative defense to trafficking in drugs that the accused must establish, or 
whether proving noncompliance is an element of the offense of trafficking in 
drugs that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  For the reasons that 
follow, we hold that proving a licensed health professional’s noncompliance with 
statutory or regulatory requirements is an element of trafficking in drugs that the 
state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals. 
II. Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} In 2004, a Clark County grand jury indicted Dr. William Nucklos 
on ten counts of drug trafficking and ten counts of illegal processing of drug 
documents.  The indictment alleged that Dr. Nucklos, in violation of R.C. 
2925.03, prescribed painkilling drugs to his patients when his conduct was not in 
accordance with R.C. Chapters 3719, 4729, and 4721.  The case proceeded to a 
jury trial, resulting in a verdict of guilty on all counts.  For purposes of 
sentencing, the trial court found that the two types of offenses merged, and the 
state elected to proceed to sentencing only on the convictions for drug trafficking.  
The trial court sentenced Dr. Nucklos to two years on each count, which resulted 
in an aggregate sentence of 20 years. 
{¶ 3} On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeals sustained two 
distinct assignments of error.  One involved the trial court’s instruction to the jury 
on whether the licensed-health-professional exception is an affirmative defense, 
and the other involved the trial court’s admission of “other acts” evidence under 
Evid.R. 404.  The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and 
remanded the case for further proceedings because it found that the trial court 
erred when it instructed the jury that the licensed-health-professional exception in 
R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) was an affirmative defense. 
January Term, 2009 
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{¶ 4} The state appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction only 
on the state’s first proposition of law, pertaining to the affirmative defense.  114 
Ohio St.3d 1507, 2007-Ohio-4285, 872 N.E.2d 949.  We denied a motion to 
reconsider the state’s second proposition of law.  115 Ohio St.3d 1445, 2007-
Ohio-5567, 875 N.E.2d 104.  Therefore, in this appeal, we consider only whether 
the licensed-health-professional exception to a drug-trafficking offense under 
R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) is an affirmative defense or whether the state bears the burden 
of proving the inapplicability of the exception in order to convict a licensed health 
professional of drug trafficking. 
III. Analysis 
{¶ 5} The state argues that R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) defines an affirmative 
defense that requires a licensed health professional to prove statutory and 
regulatory compliance in order to avoid criminal prosecution for trafficking in 
drugs.  Although we have previously held that a physician may be convicted of 
drug trafficking in State v. Sway (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 112, 15 OBR 265, 472 
N.E.2d 1065,1 we have never addressed who bears the burden of proving a 
licensed health professional’s statutory or regulatory compliance. 
                                                 
1.  In Sway, a physician “prescribed” controlled substances to a woman in return for sex.  Sway, 15 
Ohio St.3d 112, 113, 15 OBR 265, 472 N.E.2d 1065.  The state charged the physician with 
trafficking in drugs pursuant to R.C. 2925.03(A).  The physician argued that he could not be 
charged with drug trafficking, reasoning that statutes and regulations such as those found under 
R.C. 3719.06 are sufficient to cover a physician who illegally prescribes drugs.  Recognizing that 
it is possible for a physician to be charged with drug trafficking pursuant to R.C. 2925.03(B)(1), 
we determined that R.C. 2925.03(A) was intended to impose criminal liability on physicians who 
fail to comply with statutory or regulatory requirements for administering a controlled substance. 
Sway at 114, 15 OBR 265, 472 N.E.2d 1065.  We found that Sway’s actions of prescribing drugs 
in return for sex made it “patently clear” that he “departed from the minimal standards of his 
profession when he unlawfully prescribed the illicit drugs in question.”  Id.  Thus, we ultimately 
held that “[a] physician who unlawfully issues a prescription for a controlled substance not in the 
course of the bona fide treatment of a patient is guilty of selling a controlled substance in violation 
of R.C. 2925.03.”  Sway at syllabus.  The burden of proving the physician’s compliance was not 
an issue in that case.   
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 6} In a criminal case, the state must prove that the accused engaged in 
“a voluntary act, or an omission to perform an act or duty that the person is 
capable of performing,” with the “requisite degree of culpability” for each 
element of the alleged offense in order to obtain a conviction.  R.C. 2901.21(A).  
“The state has the burden of establishing all material elements of a crime by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Manley (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 342, 346, 643 
N.E.2d 1107, citing Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975), 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 
L.Ed.2d 508; State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 153, 16 O.O.3d 169, 404 
N.E.2d 144.  “[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute 
the crime with which [the accused] is charged.”  (Emphasis added.)  In re Winship 
(1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368. 
{¶ 7} In contrast, “[t]he burden of going forward with the evidence of an 
affirmative defense, and the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
for an affirmative defense, is upon the accused.”  R.C. 2901.05(A).  An 
affirmative defense is defined as either “[a] defense expressly designated as 
affirmative,” R.C. 2901.05(D)(1)(a), or “[a] defense involving an excuse or 
justification peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, on which the 
accused can fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  R.C. 2901.05(D)(1)(b). 
A. R.C. 2925.03 
{¶ 8} Ohio’s drug-trafficking statute, R.C. 2925.03, provides as follows: 
{¶ 9} “(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following: 
{¶ 10} “(1) Sell or offer to sell a controlled substance; 
{¶ 11} “(2) Prepare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for 
distribution, or distribute a controlled substance, when the offender knows or has 
reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance is intended for sale or 
resale by the offender or another person. 
January Term, 2009 
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{¶ 12} “(B) This section does not apply to any of the following: 
{¶ 13} “(1) Manufacturers, licensed health professionals authorized to 
prescribe drugs, pharmacists, owners of pharmacies, and other persons whose 
conduct is in accordance with Chapters 3719., 4715., 4723., 4729., 4730., 4731., 
and 4741. of the Revised Code * * * .”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 14} R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) does not expressly state that it is an affirmative 
defense.  Therefore, we begin our analysis by considering whether R.C. 
2925.03(B)(1) falls within the definition of an affirmative defense in R.C. 
2901.05(D)(1)(b). 
1. Evidence of Statutory Regulatory Compliance Is Not 
Peculiarly within the Knowledge of the Accused 
{¶ 15} In the instant case, the issue is whether Dr. Nucklos complied with 
certain regulations that define the standard of care for prescribing controlled drugs 
to patients who have chronic pain. 
{¶ 16} R.C. 4731.052(B) provides that the state medical board shall adopt 
rules that establish standards and procedures to be followed by physicians 
regarding the treatment of intractable pain, including standards for prescribing 
dangerous drugs.  One of those rules is Ohio Adm.Code 4731-21-02, which 
defines the standard of care for prescribing prescription drugs to patients who 
have intractable pain.  In regulating treatment of such patients, Ohio Adm.Code 
4731-21-02 requires a physician to extensively document a patient’s evaluation, 
diagnosis, and individualized treatment plan.  Therefore, compliance or 
noncompliance with Ohio Adm.Code 4731-21-02 can be established by proper 
documentation, or lack thereof.  Accordingly, compliance is not peculiarly within 
the knowledge of the accused. 
{¶ 17} Our conclusion is consistent with the state’s prosecution of this 
case as shown by the state’s offer of expert testimony that there were insufficient 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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records from which to conclude that Nucklos met the standard of care in 
prescribing the controlled substances to his patients. 
2. R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) Does Not Provide an Excuse or Justification 
{¶ 18} Had the General Assembly intended R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) to be an 
affirmative defense as defined in R.C. 2901.05(D)(1), it could have stated that a 
licensed health professional who complies with applicable regulations is excused 
from criminal liability for trafficking in drugs, or is justified in distributing a 
controlled substances.  However, it did not use either of these terms.  Instead, 
R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) states that the offense of trafficking in drugs “does not apply” 
to licensed health professionals who comply with applicable statutes or 
regulations. 
{¶ 19} Physicians legally and legitimately prescribe drugs to treat their 
patents on a daily basis.  To accept the state’s argument that R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) is 
an affirmative defense would place an unreasonable burden upon all doctors who 
prescribe drugs to prove compliance with statutes or regulations to avoid criminal 
liability for merely practicing medicine.  We do not believe that the General 
Assembly intended to criminalize legitimate medical treatment.  Rather, we 
believe that the General Assembly consciously avoided such an absurd result by 
stating that trafficking in drugs “does not apply” to licensed health professionals 
who comply with applicable statutory or regulatory requirements.  Thus, R.C. 
2925.03(B)(1) differs from the language used in R.C. 2901.05(D)(1)(b), which 
provides that an affirmative defense provides an “excuse” or “justification” to 
criminal liability. 
{¶ 20} Accordingly, we hold that proving a health professional’s 
compliance with statutes or regulations does not fall within the definition of an 
affirmative defense in R.C. 2901.05(D)(2) because it is not an excuse or 
justification, and proof of compliance is not peculiarly within the knowledge of 
the accused. 
January Term, 2009 
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B. A Licensed Health Professional’s Noncompliance Is an 
Element of Drug Trafficking 
{¶ 21} The state cannot convict a licensed health professional of 
trafficking in drugs under R.C. 2925.03(A) unless the licensed health professional 
has failed to comply with applicable statutory or regulatory requirements.  R.C. 
2925.03(B)(1).  Proving noncompliance is therefore necessary to prove the 
offense of drug trafficking when a licensed health professional is charged.  See In 
re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368.  
Accordingly, we hold that a licensed health professional’s failure to comply with 
statutory or regulatory requirements is an element of the offense of drug 
trafficking that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 
IV. Conclusion 
{¶ 22} R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) excludes licensed heath professionals from 
being subject to drug-trafficking charges, and the burden of proving the 
inapplicability of this exclusion rests upon the state.  Therefore, to convict a 
licensed health professional of trafficking in drugs under R.C. 2925.03(A), the 
state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the inapplicability of 
the licensed-health-professional exception in R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) by submitting 
evidence that the licensed health professional violated statutes or regulations that 
define the standard of care for dispensing controlled substances. 
{¶ 23} In the instant case, the court of appeals reversed and remanded 
Nucklos’s convictions, finding that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury 
that the licensed-health-professional exception under R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) was an 
affirmative defense.  Because we hold that the state has the burden of proving the 
inapplicability 
of 
the 
licensed-health-professional 
exception 
in 
R.C. 
2925.03(B)(1) beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., 
concur. 
 
CUPP, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, William Marshall, Solicitor General, 
Elise Porter, Deputy Solicitor, and Daniel Fausey, Assistant Solicitor; and 
Stephen Schumaker, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Zukerman, Daiker & Lear Co., L.P.A., and Larry W. Zukerman; and 
Campbell Miller Zimmerman, P.C., and John P. Flannery II, for appellee. 
______________________