Case Title: Young v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 22S-CR-00306

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 22S-CR-306 
Marquis David Young, 
Appellant (Defendant below) 
–v– 
State of Indiana, 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
Argued: November 3, 2022 | Decided: December 13, 2022 
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court 
No. 45G03-2012-MR-48 
The Honorable Diane Ross Boswell, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 21A-CR-2341 
Opinion by Justice Goff 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Molter concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Dec 13 2022, 10:14 am
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-306 | December 13, 2022 
Page 2 of 15 
Goff, Justice. 
In this case, Marquis David Young challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting his convictions for murder and two counts of 
attempted murder. He claims the jury could not have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that it was he who fired the shots which rang out at a 
gas station in Gary in 2020. And, in an unusual twist on a sufficiency 
claim, Young contends that the State’s own evidence proves he was not at 
the scene of the crimes when they took place. The State’s case did indeed 
contain conflicts and uncertainties that could have led the jury to harbor 
reasonable doubt as to Young’s guilt. We ultimately conclude, however, 
that the jury permissibly resolved these issues of fact against Young. We 
will not reweigh the evidence for ourselves. Consequently, we affirm 
Young’s convictions. 
Facts and Procedural History 
On May 3, 2020, at approximately 11:40 p.m., Young was inside the 
store of a gas station on the southwest corner of 45th Avenue and 
Broadway in Gary. He was smoking a cigarette and wearing a white shirt, 
black hooded coat, dark pants, black stocking cap, and white shoes with 
horizontal black stripes. Young left the store and got into a car next to one 
of the gas pumps. As Young began to drive forward, he found a Hyundai 
pulling up to the pump in front of him. The Hyundai was driven by Dion 
Clayton, with Virgil King and Ajee Spence as passengers. Clayton was 
wearing a bullet-proof vest for his safety as he had “a lot going on.” Tr. 
Vol. IV, p. 179. Young reversed his car, drove around the pump, 
proceeded west along 45th Avenue, and turned north up Washington 
Street. Meanwhile, Clayton and King went into the gas station store. 
When they came out, Clayton talked to his uncle at another pump and 
King got back into the car. 
Approximately two minutes after Young drove away, surveillance 
video captured somebody who appeared near an alleyway entrance 
opposite the gas station and walked across 45th Street. This person ran 
onto the gas station lot, fired multiple gunshots, then walked back 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-306 | December 13, 2022 
Page 3 of 15 
towards the alleyway and disappeared from view. Both Clayton and King 
had been hit. Police responded and, following a trail of blood, found 
Clayton dead two blocks away. Investigation of the scene led to the 
recovery of twenty-three bullet casings and multiple spent bullets. 
As police investigated, they secured surveillance videos from three 
locations: the gas station (both interior and exterior); 4444 Broadway, a 
property abutting the alleyway some distance away; and Bugsy’s Tavern, 
on the northeast corner of 45th Avenue and Broadway. The videos from 
the gas station exterior and Bugsy’s Tavern showed the shootings, 
although their low quality did not permit police to identify the shooter by 
appearance. The Broadway video showed somebody in the alleyway 
tossing a lit object onto the ground and running towards 45th Avenue, 
apparently around the time of the shootings. Police searched for the 
discarded object two days after the shootings. There were multiple 
cigarette butts in the alleyway, but officers found a single cigarette in the 
immediate area where the lit object had fallen. This cigarette was 
photographed and collected. After receiving an anonymous tip about 
Young, police sent the cigarette to the Indiana State Police Laboratory. 
Young’s DNA was found on the cigarette.  
Police had also determined that the bullets were of .40 caliber and had 
been struck with a Glock-type firing pin. Upon searching Young’s internet 
history, they discovered that he had searched for videos on disassembling 
and cleaning a Glock .40 caliber pistol in the two weeks after the 
shootings. And a search of Young’s cellphone revealed that his location 
data had been turned off when the shootings occurred. 
The State charged Young with the murder of Clayton and the 
attempted murders of King and Spence. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) 
(2019); I.C. § 35-41-5-1. At the jury trial, the State argued that the diverse 
pieces of evidence meshed into a coherent picture, as follows: Young was 
at the gas station, smoking, just before the shooting. He saw the car 
carrying Clayton, King, and Spence arrive. Young drove away west along 
45th Avenue and north up Washington Street. He presumably stopped 
somewhere on the northern side of the alleyway because he tossed a 
cigarette there, just outside 4444 Broadway, and ran south back towards 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-306 | December 13, 2022 
Page 4 of 15 
45th Avenue. Shortly thereafter, the State argued, Young emerged from 
the alleyway and started firing shots at the gas station. In an effort to hide 
his crimes, he had turned off his cellphone location data and later 
searched for how to clean his gun. Young did not present any defense 
evidence. The trial court denied his motion for a directed verdict. The jury 
found Young guilty as charged and the trial court sentenced him to 115 
years. 
On appeal, Young argued that the State’s evidence was insufficient to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the shooter. In a split 2-1 
published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed Young’s convictions. 
Young v. State, 187 N.E.3d 969, 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The majority set 
aside most of Young’s concerns about discrepancies in the video footage, 
but held that the State had failed to present the “substantial evidence of 
probative value” necessary to support the verdicts. Id. at 975 & n.5 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Judge Crone dissented, 
opining that the jury was entitled to resolve conflicts in the evidence and 
that probative evidence did support a reasonable inference of Young’s 
guilt. Id. at 976–77. The State filed a petition to transfer, which we granted, 
vacating the Court of Appeals decision. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
Standards of Review 
Our well-established standard of review for the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a conviction reflects two fundamental constitutional 
imperatives. Our state constitution mandates that, in any criminal case, 
“the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.” Ind. 
Const. art. 1, § 19. It is the role of the jury, as fact-finder, “to assess witness 
credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to 
support a conviction.” Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). 
When there are conflicts in the evidence, the jury must resolve them. Lott 
v. State, 690 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. 1997). This responsibility means that a 
criminal trial is “the ‘main event’ at which a defendant’s rights are to be 
determined.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994) (internal citation 
omitted). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-306 | December 13, 2022 
Page 5 of 15 
Equally critical to the trial process is the federal guarantee that nobody 
may be convicted “except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). To preserve the jury’s primacy in 
determining whether the State has met this burden, appellate courts 
“consider only the evidence most favorable to the State together with all 
reasonable and logical inferences which may be drawn therefrom.” Lyles 
v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. 2012). A conviction must be affirmed 
unless “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 
(Ind. 2000). Hence, “the task for us, as an appellate tribunal, is to decide 
whether the facts favorable to the verdict represent substantial evidence 
probative of the elements of the offenses.” Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 147. 
This Court has recognized, however, a class of evidence that is so 
demonstrative of innocence that an appellate court may rely on it to 
reverse a guilty verdict. Where “video evidence indisputably contradicts 
the trial court’s findings, relying on such evidence and reversing the trial 
court’s findings do not constitute reweighing.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 
699 (Ind. 2017). A contradiction is indisputable if “no reasonable person 
could view the video and conclude otherwise.” Id. Indisputability depends 
on “whether the video is grainy or otherwise obscured, the lighting, the 
angle, the audio and whether the video is a complete depiction of the events 
at issue, among other things.” Id. But if the video is “not clear or complete or 
is subject to different interpretations,” then the fact-finder receives the usual 
deference. Id. at 699–70. 
Discussion and Decision 
I. The State presented sufficient evidence to identify 
Young as the shooter. 
The case against Young presented no direct evidence identifying him 
as the shooter. Nobody testified that they saw Young commit the crimes. 
Rather, the State built its case entirely on circumstantial evidence. In a 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-306 | December 13, 2022 
Page 6 of 15 
circumstantial case, no single piece of evidence in isolation—no “smoking 
gun”—is offered to persuade the jury to convict. Yet a jury may be 
convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, by looking at “a web of facts in 
which no single strand may be dispositive.” Kriner v. State, 699 N.E.2d 659, 
664 (Ind. 1998). Indeed, the “evidence in the aggregate may point to guilt 
where individual elements of the State’s case might not.” Id. Just as in the 
probable cause context, when presented with a sufficiency challenge we 
look at the “whole picture” without taking a “divide-and-conquer 
approach” to individual pieces of evidence. See McGrath v. State, 95 N.E.3d 
522, 529 (Ind. 2018) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
A useful analog for our analysis here comes from Kriner.1 In that case, 
the defendant stood accused of murdering a guard in a foundry security 
booth. 699 N.E.2d at 660. This Court recalled that “a murder conviction 
may be based entirely on circumstantial evidence” and held the following 
facts sufficient to support the conviction. Id. at 663. Surveillance video 
from a camera several hundred yards from the crime scene captured the 
defendant parking his car, retrieving something from the back seat, and 
walking towards the security booth. Id. at 661. An hour later, the video 
captured him returning in a different shirt. Id. Police found a shotgun in 
bushes nearby. Id. A lead projectile recovered from the crime scene was 
consistent with that shotgun. Id. at 662. The defendant’s landlord testified 
to being the owner of the gun. Id. A pair of the defendant’s shoes bore a 
similar pattern to a footprint made in blood at the security booth. Id. 
Testimony revealed that the defendant and the victim had insulted and 
threatened one another and the defendant admitted to paying money to 
the victim earlier in the day. Id. at 661, 663. This money was not found on 
 
1 The cases principally relied on by both parties bear less resemblance to the present case. 
Young offers Webb v. State, in which the Court of Appeals held that no probative evidence 
placed the defendant at the scene of the crime, let alone identified him as the shooter. 147 
N.E.3d 378, 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). We find the evidence of Young’s guilt considerably more 
coherent and convincing than the evidence in Webb. The State offers Meehan v. State, which 
largely hinged on a single, highly incriminating piece of evidence—the defendant’s DNA on a 
glove inside the point of entry for a burglary—rather than on the assembly of various 
suggestive facts into a cohesive whole. 7 N.E.3d 255, 258–59 (Ind. 2014). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-306 | December 13, 2022 
Page 7 of 15 
the victim or in the security booth after the murder. Id. at 663. In affirming 
the defendant’s conviction, this Court explained that the facts and 
permissible inferences in the case worked in “combination” to “reinforce 
one another” and showed more as a “composite” than each did in 
isolation. Id. at 664 (quoting Mitchell v. State, 541 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. 
1989)). As such, “the evidence viewed as a whole and most favorably to 
the judgment” supported the defendant’s guilt. Id. 
As in Kriner, the pieces of evidence before us here fit together into a 
coherent whole that incriminates the defendant. In other words, the 
totality of the evidence favorable to the State, and the reasonable 
inferences that the jury could draw from that evidence, were substantially 
probative of Young’s guilt. 
To begin with, Young was filmed at the gas station mere minutes 
before the shootings. Ex. 196 at 00:10–01:15.2 At that time, he was smoking 
a cigarette and wearing a white shirt, dark pants, and white shoes with 
horizontal black stripes. Id. at 00:20–01:08. As he was leaving the gas 
station, Young saw the car carrying Clayton, King, and Spence. Id. at 
01:50–02:11. Young was known to Clayton and King. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 162–
63, 172. Clayton was wearing a bullet-proof vest for protection. Id. at 175, 
179. The jury could thus infer that Young knew his intended victims were 
at the gas station. Young then drove west on 45th Avenue and north on 
Washington, from where a right turn would have brought him to the 
alleyway. Ex. 196 at 02:05–02:40. 
Video from the infrared surveillance camera at 4444 Broadway showed 
a figure enter the scene from the north, toss a lit item, then run southward. 
Id. at 04:04–04:10. Less than two minutes later, it showed a figure walking 
northward.3 Id. at 05:48–06:00. Detective Reginald Sanders testified that 
 
2 For ease of reference, most citations to the video evidence in this opinion are made to Exhibit 
196, the State’s demonstrative composite video. 
3 The State does not mention that this section of the Broadway video appears to show (albeit 
in infrared) that the figure was wearing white shoes with horizontal black stripes, similar to 
those Young was wearing inside the gas station. Ex. 151 at 24:13–24:18. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-306 | December 13, 2022 
Page 8 of 15 
the video was recorded at a date and time corresponding to the shootings. 
Tr. Vol. III, p. 135. Detective Kristopher Adams testified that, two days 
after the shootings, he used the recorded Broadway video and a live video 
feed to direct Detective Antwan Jakes to the location “exactly where” the 
recorded video showed the lit item being discarded. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 27–28. 
A cigarette butt was found there. Id. Detective Anthony Rendina testified 
that he saw no other cigarettes in the “immediate vicinity.” Id. at 97–98. 
The jury could thus have believed that police recovered the very cigarette 
shown in the Broadway video. The chances of the DNA detected on that 
cigarette coming from anybody but Young were “270 nonillion times” to 
one. Id. at 136. From this evidence, the jury could infer that Young was the 
figure captured on video in the alleyway, first seen tossing a cigarette and 
running southward towards the gas station, and next seen walking back 
northward. 
Video from Bugsy’s Tavern showed the shooter coming into view near 
the alleyway entrance, carrying out the shootings, running back towards 
the alleyway entrance, and disappearing from view. Ex. 196 at 04:33–05:05. 
Exterior surveillance footage from the gas station showed the shooter 
wore a light-colored shirt, dark pants, and white shoes (the top half of the 
body was almost entirely out of shot). Id. at 04:45–04:59. Detective Sanders 
testified that the shooting took place between the time when a person 
went down the alleyway and the time when a person walked back up it, 
as captured by the Broadway camera. Tr. Vol. III, p. 146. The jury could 
infer that Young, having run down the alleyway, was in fact the person 
who was seen on video near the alleyway entrance and firing the shots at 
the gas station. 
Detective Samuel Perez testified that the casings and bullets police 
collected at the gas station were .40 caliber. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 63, 70. The 
casings had been struck by “a Glock-type firing pin most commonly 
known from a Glock firearm.” Id. at 68.  Detective Jakes testified that 
Young searched, in the week or two after the shootings, for how to clean 
and disassemble a Glock .40 caliber gun. Tr. Vol. V, p. 37. The jury could 
thus infer that Young had access to a gun capable of firing the casings and 
bullets recovered from the crime scene. And Young’s cellphone location 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-306 | December 13, 2022 
Page 9 of 15 
data was turned off at the time of the crime, suggesting he intended to 
conceal his whereabouts. Id. at 36. 
To summarize, the jury could reasonably have inferred that Young 
spotted the victims at the gas station, drove somewhere nearby with 
alleyway access, tossed his cigarette in the alleyway, ran to the gas station 
to carry out the shootings, walked back up the alleyway to get away, and 
later looked up how to clean the weapon he had used. His deactivated 
location data suggested he was concealing his activity. No single 
“smoking gun” was presented, but we cannot say that a reasonable fact-
finder was unable to draw the conclusion that Young was guilty. 
II. The doubts Young raises about the evidence 
present factual disputes that the jury was entitled 
to resolve. 
While Young recognizes our deferential standard of review, he urges 
us to find that the evidence necessarily left room for reasonable doubt. 
Reasonable doubt may arise, he submits, “from the evidence presented, a 
lack of evidence presented, or a conflict in the evidence.” Appellant’s Br. 
at 11 (citing Kien v. State, 782 N.E.2d 398, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). He 
draws our attention to three alleged failures of proof: uncertainty whether 
the cigarette collected by police was the lit item captured on the Broadway 
video; differences in the appearance of the figure in the Broadway video 
from that of Young himself; and the apparent inconsistency in two videos 
placing him respectively in the alleyway and at the gas station at the exact 
same time. 
We agree that the jury might have derived a reasonable doubt from the 
identified problems with the evidence. But the issues surrounding this 
evidence presented debatable questions of fact that the jury could 
reasonably have determined either for or against the defense. And, 
applying our standard of review, we may not substitute our weighing of 
the evidence for that of the jury. Nor will we divide and conquer the 
evidence by interpreting each piece individually in the defendant’s favor, 
rather than considering the composite picture and drawing reasonable 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-306 | December 13, 2022 
Page 10 of 15 
inferences in support of the verdict. Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146; McGrath, 95 
N.E.3d at 529. 
A. Evidence tied Young’s cigarette to the figure seen on 
video. 
Young contends that there was a “gap in the evidence” supposedly 
placing him in the alleyway. Appellant’s Br. at 11. He argues that 
Detective Adams’s own testimony cast doubt on whether the cigarette 
recovered from the alleyway was the item shown on the Broadway video. 
Young cites the following exchange between the State and Detective 
Adams: 
Q: Okay. And you said you saw somebody 
throw down a cigarette or a cigar? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Did you know which one? 
A: No. 
Id. at 12 (quoting Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 33–34). 
According to Young, Detective Adams meant that he did not know 
whether the cigarette he found was the one that was discarded in the 
video. We read the testimony differently. Detective Adams appears to 
have meant that he did not know whether the lit item in the video was a 
cigarette or a cigar. In any case, the jury heard testimony that the police 
carefully directed their attention to the place where the lit item appeared 
to fall and that, although it was two days later, only one cigarette was 
found in the immediate area. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 27-28, 34, 88-89, 97-98; Tr. 
Vol. V, p. 8. It was the jury’s responsibility to weigh all the evidence. It 
cannot be said that no substantial probative evidence identified the 
cigarette that was found with the item shown in the video. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-306 | December 13, 2022 
Page 11 of 15 
B. Video footage did not indisputably exonerate Young. 
Young argues that a comparison of his appearance in the gas station 
interior video and the figure in the Broadway video demonstrates that 
they are not the same person. According to Young, he had a thicker build 
and was wearing black headgear, whereas the figure in the alleyway was 
slimmer and wore white headgear. 
This claim is subject to the standard of review for video evidence set 
out in Love v. State. As an appellate court, we may draw our own factual 
conclusions only from video that “indisputably contradicts” the verdict. 73 
N.E.3d at 699. The quality and characteristics of a video, including poor 
lighting and grainy resolution, affect whether its evidence is indisputable. Id. 
If differing interpretations are reasonable, we defer to the fact-finder. Id. at 
699–700. 
The gas station interior video showed Young wearing a black stocking 
cap. Ex. 196 at 00:20–01:08. Young correctly notes that his head area 
appears as a light patch in the Broadway video. Id. at 04:08–04:10. But that 
video was captured by an infrared camera. Tr. Vol. III, p. 168. Detective 
Sanders explained that this type of camera detects warmth and cannot be 
used to determine color. Id. at 169. A light-colored garment might appear 
light on an infrared camera, but so might a warm dark-colored garment. 
Id. As such, it is not indisputable that the light area around the head of the 
figure in the Broadway video indicated the color white, rather than 
something dark but warm. Moreover, even if the figure were wearing 
white headgear, that fact would not indisputably exonerate Young. 
As to the purportedly slimmer build of the figure in the Broadway 
video, we cannot deem this indisputable. The resolution of the picture is 
poor and the whole area of the alleyway where the figure appears is dark. 
It is not clear beyond reasonable disputation that the figure shown was 
not Young. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-306 | December 13, 2022 
Page 12 of 15 
C. The jury could reasonably have resolved the issue of the 
conflicting timestamps in the State’s favor. 
We come finally to Young’s strongest challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence. All the videos bore timestamps. Concerning the Broadway 
video, Detective Sanders testified that he reviewed the accuracy of its 
timestamp and determined that it was “dead-on accurate” by comparison 
of the recording system with “official U.S. government time.” Id. at 134. 
The video from Bugsy’s Tavern, however, had an erroneous timestamp. 
Id. at 130–31. Detective Sanders testified about the process he performed 
for working out the degree of error that existed on the day of the 
shootings. Id. at 131. On August 23, 2020, Sanders inspected the system 
and found it to be fast by one day, 17 minutes, and 24 seconds. On May 
24, 2021, he visited again and found it was fast by one day, 22 minutes, 
and 8 seconds. He concluded from those inspections that the system sped 
up by 1.03 seconds per day. Thus, the degree of error on May 3, 2020, the 
day of the shootings, was calculated as one day, 15 minutes, and 28 
seconds. By subtracting this error from the timestamp displayed on the 
Bugsy’s Tavern video at the time of the shootings, Sanders concluded that 
the footage was recorded on May 3. Id. at 132. The gas station video 
timestamps were also incorrect, but there was no evidence as to their 
degree of error. 
Young points out, correctly, that the timestamps created a conflict in 
the evidence. The “dead-on accurate” Broadway video showed a figure 
running through the alleyway at 11:43:47 p.m. on May 3. Ex. 151 at 22:34. 
When corrected according to Detective Sanders’s calculation, the Bugsy’s 
Tavern video seemed to show that, at the very same time, the shootings 
were taking place at the gas station.4 Ex. 150 at 04:15. The following table 
summarizes the alleged conflict in the evidence: 
 
 
4 In closing, the State used as a demonstrative exhibit a video, Exhibit 196, which combined 
footage from multiple cameras. This composite placed a 25-second interval between the figure 
running past the Broadway camera in the alleyway and his appearance on 45th Avenue. Ex. 
196 at 04:07–04:32. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-306 | December 13, 2022 
Page 13 of 15 
 
Broadway video 
Bugsy’s Tavern video 
Timestamp accuracy 
“Dead on accurate” 
One day, 15 minutes, and 
28 seconds fast 
Time video captured 
11:43:47 p.m. on May 3 
Timestamp: 
23:59:15 on May 4 
 
Corrected time: 
23:43:47 on May 3 
Scene captured on 
video 
A figure running down 
the alleyway and tossing 
a cigarette 
A figure opening fire on 
the gas station lot 
 
Young argues that, since he could not physically be in the alleyway 
and at the gas station simultaneously, no reasonable juror could have 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the shooter at the gas 
station. 
We conclude that this inconsistency in the evidence did not compel a 
finding of reasonable doubt. It was precisely the kind of dispute which the 
jury was responsible for deciding by weighing the evidence and resolving 
conflicts in it. Trials are intended for this purpose. Young had the 
opportunity to cross-examine Detective Sanders about the timestamps and 
to argue about them to the jury. The jury, having listened to Detective 
Sanders testify and having assessed his credibility, did not have to believe 
every word he said. See Wood v. State, 999 N.E.2d 1054, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2013). Even if the jury believed everything Sanders told them he observed, 
the jury did not have to take his inductive conclusions at face value.5 
Sanders did not testify as to when he inspected the Broadway video 
system and found its timestamp to be accurate. See Tr. Vol. III, p. 134. It 
was not certain that it was perfectly accurate on May 3. Nor was evidence 
 
5 Indeed, Detective Sanders gave two different answers for how fast he calculated the Bugsy’s 
Tavern timestamp to be on May 3. Compare Tr. Vol. III, p. 131 (one day, 15 minutes, and 28 
seconds), with id. at 142 (one day, 17 minutes, and 24 seconds). His second answer appears to 
have been erroneous, but it produced another conflict in the evidence. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-306 | December 13, 2022 
Page 14 of 15 
presented to show that the timestamp on the Bugsy’s Tavern video system 
had sped up at a constant rate over the course of fifteen months. This was 
an unspoken assumption. The jury could reasonably have determined, 
considering all the evidence, that the most likely explanation for the 
inconsistent timestamps was a slight error of a few seconds either in 
Sanders’s observations or in his inferences about the state of the video 
systems on the day of the shootings. The jury was not required to find that 
the apparent incompatibility of the timestamps outweighed the rest of the 
web of facts that suggested Young was indeed the shooter. Looking, as we 
must, at the evidence favorable to the verdict, and drawing only favorable 
inferences, we cannot say there was no substantial probative evidence of 
Young’s guilt. 
Conclusion 
We reiterate the point made by Judge Crone, dissenting in the Court of 
Appeals, that the evidence of guilt reviewed on appeal “need not 
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” to pass muster. 
Young, 187 N.E.3d at 976. It is sufficient that a reasonable jury could have 
inferred that the defendant committed the crimes charged. We leave the 
weighing of all the evidence and resolution of conflicts in it to the jury. 
Because a reasonable inference that Young was guilty as charged may be 
drawn from the whole picture of the evidence in this case, the judgment of 
the trial court is affirmed. 
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ., concur. 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T  
Sean C. Mullins 
Appellate Public Defender 
Crown Point, Indiana 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-306 | December 13, 2022 
Page 15 of 15 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Angela N. Sanchez 
Chief Counsel, Appeals 
Office of the Indiana Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Andrew A. Kobe 
Megan M. Smith 
Robert M. Yoke 
Office of the Indiana Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana