Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Milton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 44ag/18

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2020-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Gregory J. Milton, Misc. Docket AG 
No. 44, September Term, 2018.  Opinion by Harrell, J. 
 
ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT — DISCIPLINE — INDEFINITE SUSPENSION 
 
The Court of Appeals suspended indefinitely Gregory J. Milton from the practice of law 
in Maryland.  Respondent violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
19-301.15 (Safekeeping Property), 19-303.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 19-
308.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 19-308.4(a) & (d) (Misconduct), 19-
407 (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping), and 19-410 (Prohibited Transactions).  
Respondent failed on a number of occasions to provide Bar Counsel with requested 
information regarding a bona fide investigation into his attorney trust account, failed to 
provide records to show that he maintained properly his attorney trust account, filed 
multiple frivolous motions, and made prohibited cash withdrawals from his attorney trust 
account. 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 44 
 
September Term, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
GREGORY J. MILTON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
McDonald, 
 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
 
Getty, 
 
Booth, 
Harrell, Glenn T., Jr.  
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Harrell, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed:  March 3, 2020
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County  
Case No. CAE18-51024 
Argued: 6 December 2019 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2020-03-03 09:08-05:00
 
Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Commission” or 
“AGC”), by its Bar Counsel, Lydia E. Lawless, Esq., and Assistant Bar Counsel, Jennifer 
L. Thompson, Esq., filed charges against Respondent, Gregory M. Milton (“Milton”), 
pursuant to Md. Rule 19-271.  The charging petition was assigned by us to the Honorable 
Judge Judy L. Woodall of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to conduct the 
baseline proceedings in this matter. 
Milton was served with the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action on 5 
March 2019 through the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland, pursuant to Md. 
Rule 19-723(b).1  Milton failed to answer timely by the stated deadline of 21 March 
2019.  In lieu, he filed on 8 April 2019 a belated Motion to Extend Time to Respond, 
requesting an extension until 16 April 2019.  His motion was granted.  Yet, he failed to 
answer timely the petition by that date as well.  The Commission filed a motion for order 
of default, which was granted.  Thereafter, Milton requested another extension of time to 
                                              
1 Md. Rule 19-723(b) provides: 
a) Alternative Service.  If after reasonable efforts the attorney cannot be 
served personally, service may be made on the attorney by serving the 
employee designated by the Client Protection Fund pursuant to Rule 19-
604, who shall be deemed the attorney’s agent for receipt of service.  The 
employee promptly shall (1) send, by certified and first-class mail, a copy 
of the papers so served to the attorney at the attorney’s address maintained 
in the Fund’s records and to any other address provided by Bar Counsel, 
and (2) file a certificate of the mailing with the clerk and send a copy of the 
certificate to Bar Counsel. 
2 
 
 
respond to the petition, which was denied.  On 10 June 2019, Milton filed a motion to 
dismiss the Commission’s petition and vacate the order of default.2 
An evidentiary hearing before Judge Woodall was scheduled for 8 July 2019.  At 
its inception, the court found that Milton’s failure to answer timely the petition was 
unjustified and denied his motion to vacate the order of default.  Bar Counsel entered into 
evidence first a notice the AGC received from Capital One Bank (the “Bank”) alerting it 
to the possibility of an overdraft from Milton’s attorney trust account.  Bar Counsel 
followed that with copies of the numerous letters and emails sent to Milton requesting 
financial information and documents to facilitate investigation into the handling of his 
trust account during the relevant period.  A written response by Milton to Bar Counsel’s 
initial request for information was entered also, in which Milton stated there had been no 
overdraft because it was the Bank’s error that resulted in the notice being sent.  
Accompanying his letter were bank statements from Capital One Bank that brought to 
Bar Counsel’s attention possible other violations in the form of “customer withdrawals” 
from the account (“Petitioner’s Exhibit 4”).  Other than his initial response, the only other 
evidence of “compliance” with his duty to cooperate with the inquiry and subsequent 
investigation was a single email from Milton, Petitioner’s Exhibit 9, in which he stated 
                                              
2 By operation of Md. Rules 19-724(c), 2-613, and 2-323(e), the factual averments in Bar 
Counsel’s Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action are deemed admitted by a 
respondent against whom an order of default is entered.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. De La Paz, 418 Md. 534 (2011); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lee, 390 Md. 517 
(2006). 
3 
 
 
again that he did not need to produce further documents as the Bank’s error was to blame 
for the overdraft notice.  Petitioner’s Exhibits 13-19 and 24 were an amalgam of two 
petitions filed by Milton to quash Bar Counsel’s records subpoena of Capital One Bank 
regarding his trust account records, Bar Counsel’s opposition to the petitions, and the 
orders of the circuit court denying both of Milton’s petitions.  Finally, Bar Counsel 
entered, in addition to its correspondence to Milton, a spreadsheet prepared by the Office 
of Bar Counsel analyzing the “customer withdrawals” on the bank records (part of 
Petitioner’s Exhibit 4) as “cash withdrawals.” 
Judge Woodall issued her written Findings and Conclusions on 8 August 2019.  
She concluded that Milton violated the following Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct (“MARPC”): (1) Rule 19-301.15; (2) Rule 19-303.1; (3) Rule 19-
308.1(b); (4) Rule 19-308.4(a) & (d); (5) Rule 19-407; and (6) Rule 19-410. 
The Commission filed with us no exceptions to Judge Woodall’s Findings and 
Conclusions and recommended that this Court suspend indefinitely Milton from the 
practice of law, noting that, because he is a repeat violator of the MARPC, “[r]espondent 
does not or will not grasp that his misconduct is inconsistent with his professional 
obligations.”  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Marcalus, 442 Md. 197, 211 (2015) 
(holding that the respondent “demonstrated that he is extremely likely to repeat his 
misconduct, no matter how many times this Court suspends him from the practice of law 
in Maryland”).  Milton filed timely written exceptions to Judge Woodall’s Findings and 
4 
 
 
Conclusions.  For the following reasons we overrule Milton’s exceptions and hold that 
his violations of the MARPC warrant indefinite suspension. 
 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
 
Satisfied that the Office of Bar Counsel met the clear and convincing standard of 
evidence required of it in attorney disciplinary cases, the hearing judge marshaled the 
following facts, which we rephrase and summarize. 
 
Milton was admitted to the Maryland Bar on 13 December 2006.  He maintained 
his law office in Prince George’s County.  On 21 July 2017, Capital One Bank contacted 
Milton, notifying him that his attorney trust account maintained with the Bank had 
become overdrawn on 30 June 2017.  Upon receiving the Bank’s concurrent notice to it 
of the supposed overdraft, the Office of Bar Counsel, by letter dated 1 August 2017, 
requested of Milton that he produce (within 10 days) copies of his client ledgers, deposit 
slips, cancelled checks, and monthly bank statements for May 2017 through July 2017.  
Bar Counsel called to Milton’s attention in its letter that Rule 19-308.1 required Milton to 
comply with lawful demands of Bar Counsel.  Milton received the letter on 7 August 
2017. 
 
In his August 18 reply, Milton, referring to claimed irregularities by Capital One 
Bank that resulted in the overdraft, disclaimed any personal responsibility for the episode.  
Attached to his response were copies of certain bank statements relative to his trust 
account.  Rather than provide any of the other information requested by Bar Counsel, 
5 
 
 
Milton claimed the production of the breadth of further documents sought by Bar 
Counsel was unnecessary, stating that “given the Bank’s additional documentation 
evidencing the irregularity with their own ledger, and records . . . the issue is clearly an 
irregularity with a Bank Teller, which I clearly cannot control.”3  Unfortunately for 
Milton, the bank statements he provided reflected that he made seven “customer 
withdrawals” from the trust account over the three month period totaling $4,050.00, in 
amounts varying from $200.00 to $1,000.00. 
 
Bar Counsel sent Milton a follow-up letter, dated 21 September 2017, renewing its 
request for copies of his client ledgers, deposit slips, cancelled checks, and, additionally, 
an electronic transfer log for the previously stated period.  Milton did not respond to this 
request.  Bar Counsel informed Milton on 24 October 2017 that the matter had been 
docketed for investigation, requesting anew the earlier requested documents be provided 
within 15 days.  Once again, Milton observed a vow of silence. 
 
Following Bar Counsel’s fourth attempt (13 November 2017) requesting Milton’s 
cooperation and reminding him of his obligation to respond, Milton sent a letter, dated 22 
November 2017, claiming to have “lost track” of the earlier correspondence from Bar 
Counsel and again claiming that the production of further documents was unnecessary as 
the overdraft was a result of the Bank’s ineptitude.  Consequently, he produced none of 
                                              
3 Although Milton produced bank statements for the requested time period, he failed to 
produce copies of client ledgers, deposit slips, and/or cancelled checks. 
6 
 
 
the additional documents sought.  He renewed his view that further investigation was 
unwarranted. 
 
On 7 December 2017, Bar Counsel informed Milton that, as a result of his refusal 
to provide the requested documentation, it planned to subpoena the requested records 
from Capital One Bank (or as much of the requested records as may be in the Bank’s 
possession).  Bar Counsel noted also that Milton’s cash/customer withdrawals from the 
attorney trust account (noted on the bank statements supplied by Milton with his 18 
August 2017 letter) were prohibited by Rule 19-410 and expanded its request for copies 
of his client ledgers to the period from January 2017 through November 2017.  Milton 
failed again to provide the requested documents, although he accepted service on 18 
December 2017 of his copy of the investigative subpoena to the Bank. 
 
In its last-ditch efforts to elicit information, Bar Counsel contacted Milton 
regarding his incomplete and absent responses, once by email on 30 December 2017 and 
another by letter dated 8 January 2018.  The letter set a deadline of 19 January 2018 for 
Milton to respond and provide the requested documentation.  If for no apparent reason 
other than consistency, Milton failed to respond directly.  He took a different tact 
however. 
 
On 9 January 2018, Milton filed a Petition to Quash.  In his petition, Milton 
claimed he had not committed misconduct and that there was no good faith basis on 
which to seek the requested bank records through the subpoena.  Further, he maintained 
that the financial documents requested by Bar Counsel had been denied in a prior, 
7 
 
 
unrelated, proceeding in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.  There was no 
challenge in the petition to Bar Counsel’s legal authority to issue the subpoena.  Bar 
Counsel filed an Opposition to the Petition to Quash and a Motion to Enforce Subpoena4 
on 24 January 2018, arguing that Milton’s refusal, coupled with evidence of the 
impermissible cash withdrawals, demonstrated that the subpoena was necessary to further 
its investigation. 
 
The petition to quash was denied on 26 February 2018.  The court found that 
Milton’s argument “strain[ed] credulity and logic” and stated that “there is every 
possibility [that] the documents and records sought by the Commission’s subpoena will 
produce evidence relevan[t] to the general subject matter of the Commission’s 
investigation in this matter.” 
 
Milton filed an amended petition to quash on 9 March 2018, claiming Bar 
Counsel’s investigation was based on “pure supposition.”  Again, Milton did not advance 
any assertion that Bar Counsel did not have authority to request such a subpoena.  
Petitioner filed its opposition on 23 March 2018.  The amended petition to quash was 
denied, with the court finding that “Bar Counsel [] act[ed] within its mandate,” and that it 
“has not engaged in conjecture or supposition and is carrying out its investigative 
responsibilities.” 
                                              
4 See Md. Rule 19-712(e). 
8 
 
 
 
Bar Counsel received the subpoenaed trust account records from Capital One 
Bank in March 2018.  It requested that Milton provide copies of his client ledgers by 3 
April 2018.  Attached to this letter was a list of specific and suspect trust account 
transactions.  Bar Counsel requested Milton to identify the related client matter for each 
transaction.  A constant Milton failed to respond to the letter.  Bar Counsel wrote another 
letter on 13 April 2018, requesting the materials, but to no avail. 
 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As a result of her findings of fact, the hearing judge rendered the following 
conclusions of law: 
This Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent 
violated the following Maryland Rules and Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  Additional factual findings are set forth in this 
section as necessary, to explain the Court’s conclusions. 
 
Rule 19-301.15. Safekeeping Property (1.15). 
 
Rule 19-3-1.15 provides, in part: 
 
(a) An attorney shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in an 
attorney’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the 
attorney’s own property.  Funds shall be kept in a separate account 
maintained pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 400 of the Maryland Rules, and 
records shall be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in 
that Chapter (emphasis added).  Other property shall be identified 
specifically as such and appropriately safeguarded, and records of its 
receipt and distribution shall be created and maintained.  Complete records 
of the account funds and of other property shall be kept by the attorney and 
shall be preserved for a period of at least five years after the date the 
record was created (emphasis added). 
 
9 
 
 
Respondent’s failure to create and maintain client matter records that reflect 
the receipt, maintenance, and disbursement of client funds in association 
with his attorney trust account violated Rule 19-301.15(a).  Respondent 
failed to produce any records after repeated requests to do so. 
 
Rule 19.303.1. Meritorious Claims and Contentions (3.1). 
 
Rule 19-303.1 provides: 
 
An attorney shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert 
an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, 
which includes, for example, a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law.  An attorney may nevertheless so 
defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the moving 
party’s case be established. 
 
Pursuant to M[d.] Rule 19-703(b), Bar Counsel is charged with 
investigating “professional misconduct or incapacity on the part of an 
attorney,” which includes the issuance of investigative subpoenas.  See 19-
703(b)(2).  Pursuant to M[d.] 19-712(a)(1), upon authorization of the Chair 
of the Attorney Grievance Commission, Bar Counsel may issue an 
investigative subpoena to “compel the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of designated documents or other tangible things at a time and 
place specified in the subpoena if the Chair finds that (A) the subpoena is 
necessary to and in furtherance of an investigation being conducted by Bar 
Counsel.” 
 
Respondent knowingly and repeatedly failed to provide Bar Counsel with 
the financial information and documentation sought during the 
investigation into the trust account overdraft.  By letter dated December 7, 
2017, Bar Counsel advised Respondent that “[i]n light of your refusal to 
provide Bar Counsel with your attorney trust account records, we intend to 
issue a subpoena to Capital One Bank.” Petitioner’s Ex[hibit] 10.  In 
addition, Bar Counsel made Respondent aware of the investigation into the 
impermissible cash withdrawals. 
 
On January 9, 2018, Respondent filed the Petition to Quash in the Circuit 
Court for Prince George’s County, seeking to quash Bar Counsel’s 
investigative subpoena.  In the Petition to Quash, Respondent omitted any 
mention of the true reasons for the issuance of the subpoena.  Instead, 
Respondent put forth the unsupported argument that because Capital One 
10 
 
 
Bank erroneously reported an overdraft of Respondent’s trust account, Bar 
Counsel issued the subpoena without a “good faith basis.”  The Petition to 
Quash was not supported by fact or law.  Respondent’s conduct violated 
Rule 19-303.1.  See Comment [2] to Rule 19-303.1 (“[t]he action is 
frivolous, however, if the attorney is unable [] to make a good faith 
argument on the merits of the actions taken”); Attorney Grievance 
Comm[’]n v. Phillips, 451 Md. 653[] (2017). 
 
On February 26, 2018, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
rejected Respondent’s arguments and denied the Petition to Quash.  The 
court determined that Bar Counsel’s investigative subpoena was reasonable 
under the circumstances and that there was “every possibility the 
documents and records sought by the Commission’s subpoena will produce 
evidence relevant to the general subject of the Commission’s 
investigation.”  Cognizant that the court rejected his arguments to quash the 
subpoena, on March 9, 2018, Respondent nevertheless filed an Amended 
Petition to Quash Bar Counsel’s investigative subpoena advancing similar 
claims.  Respondent’s Amended Petition to Quash failed to assert any 
credible argument that Bar Counsel lacked the legal authority to issue the 
investigative subpoena.  Respondent’s conduct violated Rule 19-303.1. 
 
[Rule 19-308.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters (8.1).] 
 
[Rule 19-308.1] provides in part: 
 
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or an attorney in 
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a 
disciplinary matter, shall not: (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct 
a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or 
knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an 
admissions or disciplinary authority (Emphasis added), except that this 
Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 
19-301.6 (1.6). 
 
Respondent violated Rule 19-308.1(b) by repeatedly failing to respond to 
Bar Counsel’s letters or supply the financial documentation requested.  By 
letter dated August 1, 2017, in response to a trust account overdraft notice 
received from Capital One Bank, Bar Counsel wrote Respondent and 
requested (among other things) copies of his “client ledgers, deposit slips, 
cancelled checks (front and back, if available),[”] and monthly bank 
statements for the period of “May 2017 to the present.”  While Respondent 
11 
 
 
provided the requested bank statements, he failed to provide the remainder 
of the documentation. 
 
On September 21, 2017, Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent and again 
requested copies of his “client ledgers, deposit slips, cancelled checks (front 
& back, if available)” for the period of “May 2017 through July 2017.”  In 
addition, Bar Counsel requested Respondent’s electronic transfer log for the 
period requested.  Respondent failed to provide the requested materials or 
otherwise respond to Bar Counsel’s letter. 
 
On October 24, 2017, Bar Counsel wrote Respondent and requested a 
response to the September 21, 2017 letter, including the requested financial 
documentation.  Respondent failed to provide the requested materials or 
otherwise respond to Bar Counsel’s letter.  On November 13, 2017, Bar 
Counsel wrote to Respondent and requested a response to Bar Counsel’s 
letters from September 21st and October 24th.  While Respondent supplied a 
written response to the letters on November 22, 2017, he failed to supply 
the requested financial documentation. 
 
By letter dated December 7, 2017, Bar Counsel requested copies of 
Respondent’s client ledgers required to be maintained pursuant to [] Rule 
19-407(a)(3) for the period of January 2017 through November 2017.  
Respondent failed to supply the requested documentation.  On December 
30, 2017, Bar Counsel emailed Respondent and asked whether he intended 
to comply with Bar Counsel’s earlier request for his client ledgers.  
Respondent failed to respond in any manner. 
 
On January 8, 2018, Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent and again requested 
copies of his client ledgers.  Bar Counsel informed Respondent that if he 
did not maintain client ledgers, he should so advise Bar Counsel.  
Respondent failed to respond to the letter or otherwise provide copies of his 
client ledgers.  Instead, on January 9, 2018, Respondent filed in the Circuit 
Court for Prince George’s County, a Petition to Quash Bar Counsel’s 
investigative subpoena. 
 
On March 19, 2018, after reviewing Respondent’s attorney trust account 
records, received from Capital One Bank, Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent 
and requested that he provide copies of his client ledgers for the period of 
January 2017 through January 2018.  With the letter, Bar Counsel attached 
a list of trust account transactions and requested Respondent identify the 
client to which each transaction related.  Respondent failed to respond to 
12 
 
 
the letter or otherwise provide the requested financial materials.  On April 
13, 2018, Bar Counsel wrote Respondent and requested a response to Bar 
Counsel’s letter of March 19, 2018.  Respondent failed to respond to the 
letter or otherwise supply the requested materials. 
 
From August 1, 2017 through April 13, 2018, Bar Counsel made nine (9) 
separate lawful requests to Respondent for information and documentation 
related to his attorney trust account.  Respondent knowingly failed and 
refused to provide Bar Counsel the materials sought, in violation of [] Rule 
19-308.1(b). 
 
Rule 19-308.4. Misconduct (8.4). 
 
Rule 19-308.4 provides, in part: 
 
It is professional misconduct for an attorney to: 
 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; 
 
Respondent’s refusal to cooperate with Bar Counsel or comply with Bar 
Counsel’s requests for information and documentation (as detailed above) 
and Respondent’s filing of two (2) petitions to quash Bar Counsel’s 
investigative subpoena, violates Rule 19-308.4(d).  See Attorney Grievance 
Comm[’]n v. Phillips, 451 Md. 476, 490[] (2017) (in refusing to cooperate 
with Bar Counsel and by filing a frivolous motion to quash an investigative 
subpoena, attorney obstructed Bar Counsel’s investigation in a manner 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, and his conduct as a whole 
brought the legal profession into disrepute, in violation of Rule 8.4(d)); 
Attorney Grievance Comm[’]n v. Kremer, 432 Md. 325, 337[] (2013) 
(attorney violated Rule 8.4(d) by failing to respond to Bar Counsel’s 
requests for information). 
 
Additionally, Respondent violated Rule 8.4(a) by violation of several other 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  See Attorney Grievance Comm[’]n v. 
Gerace, 433 Md. 632, 645[] (2013) (“Rule 8.4(a) is violated when other 
Rules of Professional Conduct are breached.”) 
 
Maryland Rule 19-407.  Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping. 
 
M[d.] Rule 19-407 provides, in part: 
 
13 
 
 
(a) Creation of Records.  The following records shall be created and 
maintained for the receipt and disbursement of funds of clients or of third 
persons: 
 
(3) Client Matter Records.  A record for each client matter in which the 
attorney receives funds in trust, as follows: 
 
(A) for each attorney trust account transaction, a record that shows (i) the 
date of the deposit or disbursement; (ii) the amount of the deposit or 
disbursement; (iii) the purpose for which the funds are intended; (iv) for a 
disbursement, the payee and the check number or other payment 
identification; and (v) the balance of funds remaining in the account in 
connection with the matter[.] 
 
Respondent’s failure to create and maintain client matter records that reflect 
the receipt, maintenance, and disbursement of client funds in association 
with his attorney trust account violates M[d.] Rule 19-407(a).  Respondent 
failed to produce any records that would indicate the creation and 
maintenance of the requested client records. 
 
Maryland Rule 19-410.  Prohibited Transactions. 
 
M[d.] Rule 19-410 provides, in part: 
 
(b) No Cash Disbursements.  An instrument drawn on an attorney trust 
account may not be drawn payable to cash or to bearer, and no cash 
withdrawal may be made from an automated teller machine or by any other 
method.  All disbursements from an attorney trust account shall be made by 
check or electronic transfer. 
 
From May 2017 through July 2017, Respondent made several withdrawals 
in cash from this attorney trust account in the following installments: 
 
Date 
Amount 
May 10, 2017 
$1,000.00 
June 19, 2017 
$500.00 
July 3, 2017 
$1,000.00 
14 
 
 
July 26, 2017 
$500.00 
July 28, 2017 
$200.00 
July 31, 2017 
$350.00 
July 31, 2017 
$500.00 
 
Respondent’s conduct violated Rule 19-410. 
 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 
In attorney grievance proceedings, the findings of fact of the hearing judge 
are “prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless they are shown to be 
clearly erroneous.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harrington, 367 Md. 36, 49 
(2001).  Moreover, when neither party takes exception to a finding of fact it is 
considered “by us as conclusively established.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
White, 448 Md. 33, 50 (2016).  When a party has filed an exception (or 
exceptions), however, we determine whether the findings of fact are proven by the 
standard of proof demanded by Md. Rule 19-727(c), which states that “Bar 
Counsel has the burden of proving the averments of the petition by clear and 
convincing evidence.  If the attorney asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of 
mitigation or extenuation, the attorney has the burden of proving the defense or 
matter by a preponderance of the evidence.”  The findings of fact will not be found 
to be clearly erroneous if they are supported by “any competent material 
evidence.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 16 (2014).  We 
15 
 
 
review conclusions of law made by the hearing judge without deference.  Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Whitehead, 405 Md. 240, 253 (2008). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Bar Counsel did not except to the hearing judge’s findings of fact or conclusions 
of law.  Respondent, however, took at least four itemized exceptions to the findings of the 
hearing judge.  Further, Respondent appears to take a fifth exception to the judge’s 
findings, although not labeling it as such. 
At the outset, we will address the non-itemized, implied exception Milton appears 
to mount.  This “exception” is based on his interpretation of Md. Rule 19-413.  The Rule 
states: 
Upon receipt of a report of overdraft on or dishonored instrument drawn on 
an attorney trust account, Bar Counsel shall contact the attorney or law firm 
maintaining the account and request an informal explanation for the 
overdraft or dishonored instrument.  The attorney or law firm shall provide 
any records of the account necessary to support the explanation.  If Bar 
Counsel has requested but has failed to receive a satisfactory explanation 
for any overdraft or dishonored check, or if good cause exists to believe 
that an attorney or law firm has failed to perform any duty under these 
Rules, Bar Counsel may secure compliance with these Rules by appropriate 
means approved by the Commission, including application for an audit 
pursuant to Rule 19-731 (Audit of Attorney Accounts and Records). 
 
According to Milton’s interpretation, upon the tendering of his explanation to Bar 
Counsel that there was no actual overdraft of his attorney trust account on 30 June 2017 
and that a bank error was to blame for the notices sent to Milton and Bar Counsel, Bar 
Counsel’s further inquiry into Milton’s trust account practices (i.e., possible cash 
16 
 
 
withdrawals) should have ended.  Bar Counsel concedes that, although the 30 June 2017 
overdraft notice was the result of the Bank’s error, the information provided by Milton in 
the bank statements appended to his 18 August 2017 response contained also information 
suggesting prohibited cash withdrawals from the trust account.  It was these withdrawals, 
as well as the failure to respond to Bar Counsel’s requests for information, that resulted in 
the charges being filed against Milton. 
 
Thus, the question raised apparently by Milton is, essentially, if the initial inquiry 
by Bar Counsel into a questionable occurrence (based on a good faith belief that perhaps 
an overdraft violation had occurred) is shown to have not been the attorney’s fault, may 
other information of possible independent wrong-doing (revealed by the attorney’s initial 
reply to Bar Counsel’s inquiry) warrant further investigation?  We hold that it can (and 
did in this case).  There is no doubt on this record that Bar Counsel’s inquiry into 
Milton’s attorney trust account was undertaken in good faith.  The information requested 
by Bar Counsel in their initial letter was a standard operating procedure when 
investigating an overdraft notice involving an attorney trust account.  See Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Mahone, 451 Md. 25, 34 (2016) (Bar Counsel requested “an 
explanation of the overdraft and client ledgers, monthly bank statements, deposit slips, 
and canceled checks”).  Although a rational and later corroborated explanation clearing 
Milton of blame was provided for the apparent overdraft, the bank statements provided 
by Milton with his explanation gave Bar Counsel good cause to continue investigating 
the circumstances of the potentially prohibited withdrawals. 
17 
 
 
 
During oral argument before this Court, Milton made reference to that part of Md. 
Rule 19-413 providing an avenue for continued investigation by Bar Counsel if there is 
good cause to believe an attorney failed to perform a duty under the rules.  Milton 
believes, as we understand his argument, that this Rule limited ongoing investigations to 
a formal audit, and possibly only one conducted by a CPA.  This is a misinterpretation of 
the regulation.   
 
Rule 19-413 states, in relevant part, “if good cause exists to believe that an 
attorney or law firm has failed to perform any duty under these Rules, Bar Counsel may 
secure compliance with these Rules by appropriate means approved by the Commission, 
including application for an audit . . . .”  Milton claims that there was no way, based on 
the bank statements provided in his initial letter, to determine whether the withdrawals 
identified in the bank statements were impermissible cash withdrawals or some type of 
permissible transfer.  Although we shall address this contention in more detail as part of 
addressing one or more of Milton’s labeled exceptions infra, based on the information 
before Bar Counsel, it had good cause, without further ado, to investigate the transactions 
that were labeled as “customer withdrawals” on the bank records supplied by Milton.  
Milton had many opportunities to prove that these were not cash withdrawals by 
providing the requested documentary information to Bar Counsel, but failed to do so.  
Further, had he not tied his hands by failing to answer the Petition timely, he would have 
had another opportunity to adduce evidence at the 8 July 2019 hearing.  His unjustified 
18 
 
 
failure to file a timely answer and the resultant order for default precluded his ability to 
advance such evidence (if it existed) at the evidentiary hearing before Judge Woodall. 
 
Although an audit may be a viable alternative to ensure compliance with the rules 
regarding monetary or book-keeping circumstances in many contexts, it is not the only 
tool available to Bar Counsel in every potential attorney financial malfeasance case.  Bar 
Counsel was well within the scope of the Rules to request additional financial 
information to conduct its investigation into the withdrawals that were discovered upon 
receipt of Milton’s initial explanation of the overdraft and the limited bank statements he 
supplied. 
 
1. “But the Overdraft Check Cleared!” Defense. 
 
A. Summary 
Milton’s first itemized exception rests, essentially, on the foundation that there 
was no “overdraft” or “dishonored check” because the check in question cleared on 18 
July 2017, and thus it was the Bank’s error that created the overdraft notice, not 
something nefarious done by him.  As Milton provided a copy of the Bank’s letter 
explaining the error and that the Bank recorded an adjustment debit, he claims that this 
explanation was sufficient to close the inquiry at that point, without him having to collect 
and transmit the other documents requested by Bar Counsel.  It is the belief of Milton 
that, because there was no overdraft, Bar Counsel “did not have ‘good cause’ to believe 
19 
 
 
that the attorney ‘failed to perform any duty under these Rules’ as the explanation was 
patently ‘satisfactory.’” 
In his exception, Milton cites to American Bar Association Rule 3.3, Candor 
Toward the Tribunal, which prohibits an attorney from making or failing to “correct a 
false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.”  It 
further prohibits attorneys from “offer[ing] evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.  If 
a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material 
evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable 
remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”  Milton’s 
contention is that once Bar Counsel accepted the explanation that that the check cleared 
and that the Bank was in error, no (further) investigation should ensue. 
 
B. Analysis 
It is accurate to point out that the check did clear ultimately and Milton provided 
to Bar Counsel the Bank’s explanation for the sending of the overdraft; however, these 
facts do not have the sweeping cabining effect on Bar Counsel’s discretion that Milton 
places on them.  The hearing judge determined that Milton violated, by his other 
misconduct, the following MARPC rules: (1) Rule 19-301.15 – Safekeeping Property; (2) 
Rule 19-303.1 – Meritorious Claims and Contentions; (3) Rule 19-308.1 – Bar Admission 
and Disciplinary Matters; (4) Rule 19-308.4 – Misconduct; (5) Rule 19-407 – Attorney 
Trust Account Record Keeping; and (6) Rule 19-410 – Prohibited Transactions.  The 
20 
 
 
facts latched onto by Milton in this exception have no bearing on any of the violations he 
has been deemed to have committed. 
In finding that Milton violated Rule 19-301.15, the hearing judge determined that 
Milton’s failure to create and maintain the proper and required documentation to show he 
was safekeeping client funds constituted a violation.5  Further, the judge determined that, 
by failing to provide the other documents upon request of Bar Counsel, Milton was in 
violation of this rule.  Milton cannot maintain that the inquiry commenced as the result of 
an apparent overdraft was opened improperly—Bar Counsel was unaware of who was 
responsible for the error (if error it was) when it first contacted Milton to seek the initial 
array of documents.  Milton produced very few of the documents sought.  His failure to 
produce the remaining documents was enough to establish a violation.  Milton failed also 
to respond to later requests related to the withdrawals from the trust account which, 
independently, were sufficient to establish violations of the Rule as well. 
As to the violation of Rule 19-303.1, the hearing judge found that Milton brought 
a motion to quash the subpoena when Bar Counsel sought some of the missing 
documents directly from the Bank.  The motion to quash was based, essentially, on 
Milton’s claim that the Bank’s error was the reason for the overdraft notice and there was 
no basis for a continuing investigation.  The court denied this motion.  Milton pursued 
                                              
5 The hearing judge determined that this nonfeasance was also in violation of Md. Rule 
19-407(a). 
21 
 
 
frivolously a second motion to quash based on the same arguments he made in the prior 
motion.  This appears to be the very essence of a frivolous claim against which Rule 19-
303.1 attempts to safeguard.  Bar Counsel had reason to pursue its investigation, as the 
withdrawals made from Milton’s attorney trust account were labeled in such a way that 
raised legitimate questions that could be resolved only by a further investigation.  Thus, 
without legal support for his claim that Bar Counsel did not have the authority to 
investigate further, both of Milton’s motions to quash were frivolous. 
Regarding Rule 19-308.1, the evidence supported amply the hearing judge’s 
findings of fact establishing that Milton failed on numerous occasions to provide relevant 
documents requested by Bar Counsel as part of its investigation.  Milton was aware of the 
requests, as well as his obligation under the MARPC to respond to them, but nevertheless 
failed to provide the proper documentation.  His failure to provide all of the documents 
sought by its first request (before Bar Counsel knew of the Bank’s error) was a violation 
of the Rule.  This was compounded each time Milton failed thereafter to provide Bar 
Counsel with that which was requested.6 
Finally, a violation of Rule 19-410 was found fairly because Milton made seven 
cash withdrawals from his attorney trust account.  Milton’s defense boils down to the 
notion that had Bar Counsel closed its file after learning of the erroneous overdraft 
                                              
6 The hearing judge determined that the repeated failure to provide the documents was 
also sufficient to establish a violation of Rule 19-308.4. 
22 
 
 
notice, the other violations would not have been found.  We find this contention troubling 
in and of itself.  The withdrawals were a clear violation of the MARPC. 
We overrule this exception. 
 
2. “Bar Counsel Violated Rule 16-731(d)” Defense. 
 
A. Summary 
 
Milton’s second exception states that Bar Counsel was in violation of Md. Rule 
16-731(d)7 “by keeping the Respondent in a constant state of being investigated.”  
Claiming that this Rule places a limit on the time in which Bar Counsel may conduct an 
investigation, to “discourage Bar Counsel from sitting on a disciplinary case when there 
is other collateral litigation pending,” Milton reasons that, because a previous 
investigation by Bar Counsel of him regarding other misconduct ended only a few weeks 
prior to the filing of charges in this matter, Bar Counsel was in violation of the Rule.  As 
his argument continues, “[t]he fact that [it] did not file anything at all is exactly the kind 
of omission and silence that the M[A]RPC is meant to police.”  Further, he claims that, in 
regard to the earlier investigation “[Bar Counsel] was concealing the very evidence that 
the Respondent and his attorney were looking for and needed.  This concealment was not 
only a fraud upon the Respondent but this Court as well.” 
                                              
7 Without substantive change, Md. Rule 19-711, adopted in 2016, is derived from former 
Rule 16-731. 
23 
 
 
This exception boils down to the notion that Milton has been under investigation in 
one way or another for a number of years recently and the present prosecution is thus a 
violation of the Rule.   
 
B. Analysis 
We struggle, as did Judge Woodall, to find the connection Milton wishes to draw 
between the prior AGC proceedings against him and the present one.  It is not disputed 
that Milton was under investigation by Bar Counsel for different misconduct prior to the 
initiation of the present case.  There is little else, however, connecting the two 
investigations beyond this temporal proximity.  The prior investigation by Bar Counsel, 
without going into too much detail, involved a distinct client interaction and resulted in 
Milton accepting a reprimand in June 2018, on the advice of his counsel.8  Following his 
consent to the reprimand, Bar Counsel filed the disciplinary petition in this case.  Milton 
stated at the evidentiary hearing before Judge Woodall in the present case that “I never 
would have consented to the reprimand if I thought that [Bar Counsel] were going to 
spring this case as soon as I did that.”  In the months following his consent, Milton 
requested on numerous occasions that the consent to the reprimand be rescinded, all of 
which were denied.  At the hearing, Milton claimed the timing of filing of the present 
                                              
8 As noted infra, Milton had been suspended for other misconduct earlier than this 
reprimand.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Milton, 430 Md. 2 (2013). 
24 
 
 
case was motivated by a desire to “trap” him, stating, “[i]f you had this disciplinary 
action, then the next one, well, that almost kind of creates three strikes.”   
On this record, we can conclude only that the timing of Bar Counsel’s filing of the 
petition in this case was purely coincidental as it related to the conclusion of the prior 
reprimand case.  Had Milton responded to any of Bar Counsel’s early requests for 
information, this case would have either moved forward or been resolved likely months 
before the reprimand became final in the earlier case.  Milton delayed completion of the 
investigation here by filing his frivolous motions to quash.  Had Milton behaved as a 
lawyer under similar circumstances is supposed to in response to a legitimate Bar 
Counsel request for information, the timelines of these matters would not have 
overlapped as much as they did.  Setting aside confirmation bias, it is not reasonable to 
interpret these events as other than coincidental.  
Regarding Bar Counsel’s asserted vindictive motives, Milton claims that, as part 
of the prior proceedings, Bar Counsel requested a similar documents subpoena, a request 
that was denied on 8 June 2017.  According to Milton, this connects further the two cases 
and makes tangible his vision that the overdraft inquiry was merely a pretextual attempt 
to reverse the denial of the earlier subpoena.  His vision is, however, an illusion.  Bar 
Counsel’s response upon advisement of the overdraft notice, received in July 2017, was 
not related to the prior request for a documents subpoena.  The practice for Bar Counsel 
when it receives a notice of overdraft (as we understand it) is to request the types of 
information it did from Milton.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mahone, 451 Md. 
25 
 
 
25, 34 (2016).  Milton is interpreting standard investigative procedure through subjective 
bias.  Put in other words, the coincidental timing of events in the two cases has been 
personalized by Milton. 
Milton argued further at the hearing before Judge Woodall that—because the prior 
investigation was a drain on his funds and time—the Bank’s error “came because I’m 
literally working seven days a week, 12 hours a day to take care of my clients and pay for 
a legal team.”  “[I]t happened because the transactions I had went up exponentially 
because I had to pay for attorney’s fees.”  If, as he claims, these are reasons for the 
Bank’s error, they have no impact on the propriety of Bar Counsel’s investigation and are 
irrelevant.  Bar Counsel received a notification of an overdraft.  It had a duty to inquire.  
Investigation of the discovered withdrawals from the attorney trust account was 
warranted. 
We overrule this exception. 
 
3. “The Cash Withdrawals were Actually Permissible Transfers of Money” 
Defense. 
 
A. Summary 
 
This exception by Milton is divided into two distinct parts.  First, Milton questions 
Bar Counsel’s and the hearing judge’s abilities to “identify a ‘prohibited transaction’ 
when they see one on a banking statement . . . [t]hat [is] how does this Court know or 
should trust that they have the skill to do so.”  Second, Milton claims that the “cash 
26 
 
 
withdrawals” referenced by the hearing judge in her findings of fact were mere transfers 
and thus permissible.  This confusion, according to Milton, arises from the fact that 
“Capital One Bank along with Sun[T]rust and Bank of America do not have ‘transfer 
tickets.[’]”  Thus, items labeled as withdrawals, identified as “cash withdrawals” by Bar 
Counsel and the hearing judge, were merely transfers.  This claim arises, in part, as a 
result of Petitioner’s Exhibit 20, which is, according to Milton, the only place cash 
withdrawals are identified as such.  Petitioner’s Exhibit 20 was a spreadsheet prepared by 
the Office of Bar Counsel identifying the suspect transactions in the attorney trust 
account during the period in question, including a number that were labeled as a “cash 
withdrawal.”  Milton pleads that this spreadsheet is not an official bank document and 
that there is no way to determine which withdrawals, labeled as “customer withdrawals” 
on bank records, were in fact cash withdrawals and which were transfers. 
 
B. Analysis 
This exception is another mischaracterization of the record.  Petitioner’s Exhibit 4, 
the bank statements provided by Milton in partial response to Bar Counsel’s initial 
request for information, provides a list of transactions regarding Milton’s attorney trust 
account during a certain period.  The transactions identified as cash withdrawals by Bar 
Counsel in Exhibit 20 were labeled as “Customer withdrawal” on the bank records.  
Impugning Milton’s claim that transactions labeled as “customer withdrawals” were 
actually transfers, the bank statements identify a number of other transactions labeled as 
27 
 
 
“ACH Withdrawal E*TRADE TRNSFR,” while others are labeled as “Wire transfer.”  
Md. Rule 19-410 states: 
An instrument drawn on an attorney trust account may not be drawn 
payable to cash or to bearer, and no cash withdrawal may be made from an 
automated teller machine or by any other method.  All disbursements from 
an attorney trust account shall be made by check or electronic transfer.   
 
Based on the record before her, it was not clearly erroneous that the hearing judge found 
that the “customer withdrawals” were cash withdrawals.  Had Milton answered timely 
and put himself in a position to produce evidence and/or dispute Bar Counsel’s factual 
allegations in the Petition at the evidentiary hearing, perhaps he could have adduced 
evidence that might have rebutted this claim.  However, as the record stands, there is no 
such evidence and the judge was not clearly erroneous in her interpretation of the record. 
This exception is overruled. 
 
4. “The AGC’s Affidavit is not Based Upon Personal Knowledge” Defense. 
 
A. Summary 
Finally, Milton argues that the affidavit accompanying Petitioner’s Exhibit 20 is 
not based on personal knowledge.  “Bar Counsel is not free to create its own glossary for 
the Capital One Bank and the Respondent and offer its own self-serving explanation of 
the respondent[’s] transactions.”  Further, Milton impugns Bar Counsel for making the 
allegation of impermissible transactions prior to the subpoena of the bank records and 
without asking him specifically for an explanation. 
28 
 
 
 
B. Analysis 
There is no additional support offered by Milton to distinguish this exception from 
the previous one in regard to the cash/customer withdrawals.  The only additional wrinkle 
here is his gravamen that Bar Counsel advanced its allegations against him prior to the 
subpoena of the bank records and without asking him for an explanation of the transfers.  
Neither of these arguments carry the day.  The bank records provided by Milton in his 
initial response to Bar Counsel’s inquiry were sufficient to establish that a probable 
violation of the MARPC occurred, regardless of the subsequent subpoena request.  
Milton’s assertion that he was not contacted for an explanation is false.  As part of the 
investigation of the withdrawals, Bar Counsel contacted Milton requesting further 
documentation expected to be maintained by a Maryland attorney, which might have 
shed further light on the activities regarding his attorney trust account. 
As such, we overrule Milton’s exceptions on the whole and hold that clear and 
convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s determination that Milton violated the 
above listed rules. 
 
THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION & AGGRAVATING AND 
MITIGATING FACTORS 
 
 
Having overruled Milton’s exceptions, we turn to identifying an appropriate 
sanction.  In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler, this Court stated that we 
29 
 
 
“sanction[] a lawyer not to punish the lawyer, but instead to protect the public and 
the public’s confidence in the legal profession,” and, by sanctioning, we not only 
deter other lawyers from engaging in similar misconduct, but also suspend or 
disbar those who are not fit to practice law.  443 Md. 494, 506 (2015).  In 
determining the proper sanction to levy against an attorney, we may consider a 
number of mitigating or aggravating factors.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Steinhorn, 462 Md. 184, 202 (2018).  The following aggravating factors may be 
considered in determining the proper sanction: 
(1) Prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern 
of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the MLRPC; (5) bad faith 
obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by intentionally failing to 
comply with the Maryland Rules or orders of this Court or the hearing 
judge; (6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to 
acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature; (8) the victim’s 
vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; (10) 
indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s 
consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of 
controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. 
 
Shuler, 443 Md. at 506–07. 
 
Judge Woodall concluded in her findings of fact and conclusions of law that there 
was clear and convincing evidence establishing three aggravating factors: a pattern of 
misconduct; multiple offenses; and bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding 
by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency. 
 
This Court has noted also a number of mitigating factors that may be considered in 
determining the proper sanction.  These include: 
30 
 
 
(1) The absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) [the] absence of a dishonest 
or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional problems; (4) timely good faith 
efforts to make restitution or to rectify [the misconduct’s] consequences []; 
(5) full and free disclosure to the Commission or a cooperative attitude 
toward the attorney discipline proceeding; (6) inexperience in the practice 
of law; (7) character or reputation; (8) physical disability; (9) a mental 
disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or drug abuse 
where (a) there is medical evidence that the lawyer is affected by a 
chemical dependency or mental disability; (b) the chemical dependency or 
mental disability caused the misconduct; (c) the lawyer’s recovery from the 
chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful 
and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and (d) the recovery 
arrested the misconduct and recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the 
attorney discipline proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or 
sanctions; (12) remorse; (13) remoteness of prior violations of the MLRPC; 
and (14) unlikelihood of repetition of the misconduct. 
 
Shuler, 443 Md. at 507. 
The attorney under scrutiny must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
one or more of the above mitigating factors apply for us to consider them in our 
determination.  Md. Rule 19-727(c).  Milton presented no evidence bearing on, and Judge 
Woodall did not find any, mitigating factors that might be folded into our analysis. 
Turning to the appropriate sanction, Bar Counsel “recommends to the Court that 
the Respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.”  Milton offers no 
sanction recommendation, sticking instead to his guns that we set aside the findings and 
conclusions of law of the hearing judge and dismiss the petition of the AGC.  For the 
following reasons, we agree with the sanction recommended by Bar Counsel and suspend 
indefinitely Respondent from the practice of law. 
31 
 
 
Although the sanction of an indefinite suspension is extreme (one of the strongest 
we may order against an attorney), we deem it necessary here as a result of Milton’s 
constant and intentional violations of the Rules.  Throughout the latter half of 2017 and 
the first few months of 2018, Respondent received at least nine requests to produce 
documents to aid Bar Counsel in its duty to investigate potential violations brought to its 
attention.  Despite Milton’s claims that the explanation of the overdraft notice sent to Bar 
Counsel by the Bank was sufficient, he failed to provide the whole of requested relevant 
documents.  Upon receipt from Milton of bank statements that depicted the possibility of 
other violations, Bar Counsel continued to request documents that would allow it to 
determine whether a violation or violations had occurred.  These requests were either 
ignored or denied outrightly by Milton.  Throughout this process, Bar Counsel contacted 
Milton, providing him with extensions (both requested and not) so that he could provide 
the documents, and reminding him of his obligations under the MARPC. 
This Court has imposed the sanction of an indefinite suspension for similar, but 
less egregious, violations by attorneys.  In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rose, we 
suspended indefinitely an attorney, with a right to seek reinstatement after six months, 
where the attorney failed to produce requested financial documentation to explain an 
overdraft of his attorney trust account.  383 Md. 385, 392 (2004).  In Rose, Bar Counsel 
requested an explanation and documents on three occasions before receiving any 
response or explanation from the attorney.  Id. at 389–90. 
32 
 
 
Respondent here not only failed to cooperate with the investigation, but went on 
the offensive (frivolously so) attempting to quash the investigation, without factual or 
legal support, and doing so apparently solely to obstruct the investigation. 
Respondent has also violated the Rules before.  In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Milton, we suspended Respondent indefinitely with a right to apply for reinstatement 
after 90 days for failing to represent clients competently and diligently, failing to 
communicate adequately with clients, and for failing to respond to requests of Bar 
Counsel during an investigation.  430 Md. 2 (2013).  We have gone as far as to disbar 
attorneys for repeat violations of those Rules.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Marcalus, 
442 Md. 197 (2015) (stating that an attorney’s third disciplinary case was enough to 
“demonstrate[] that he is extremely likely to repeat his misconduct, no matter how many 
times this Court suspends him from the practice of law in Maryland”). 
Given Respondent’s disciplinary history revealed in this case, we hold that the 
appropriate sanction is indefinite suspension from the practice of law in Maryland.   
 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY 
THE 
CLERK 
OF 
THIS 
COURT 
INCLUDING 
COSTS 
OF 
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO 
MARYLAND 
RULE 
19-709(d) 
FOR 
WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED 
IN 
FAVOR 
OF 
THE 
ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST 
GREGORY J. MILTON.