Case Title: Dresher v. Burt

Citation: 1996-Ohio-107

Docket Number: 19942612

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Dresher v. Burt, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 1996-Ohio-107.] 
Dresher et al., Appellees, v. Burt; St. Elizabeth Medical Center, Appellant. 
[Cite as Dresher v. Burt (1996), __ Ohio St.3d __.] 
Civil procedure -- Standards for granting summary judgment under 
Civ.R. 56 when a moving party asserts that a nonmoving party 
has no evidence to establish an essential element of the 
nonmoving party’s case -- Civ.R. 56, construed and applied. 
 
(No. 94-2612 -- Submitted January 10, 1996 -- Decided March 6, 1996.) 
 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 13088. 
 
The case at bar is one of many winding its way through Ohio’s court 
system relating to the infamous surgical practices of Dr. James C. Burt during 
his former service at St. Elizabeth Medical Center (“SEMC”) in Dayton.  We 
have previously addressed two similar cases involving Burt’s former practice 
of performing “Love Surgery” or “vaginal reconstruction surgery” at SEMC.  
See Browning v. Burt (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993.  Many of the 
underlying facts in this appeal are strikingly similar to the facts in Browning.  
Indeed, our holdings in Browning1 have resolved a number of matters that were 
formerly at issue in this case.  However, the sole remaining issue in this appeal 
involves a question that is unrelated to the matters addressed in Browning.  The 
 
2 
question here involves the standards for granting summary judgment under 
Civ.R. 56 when a moving party asserts that a nonmoving party has no evidence 
to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case.  The facts and 
events giving rise to this appeal are as follows. 
 
On September 8, 1989, Judy K. Dresher (“Dresher”) and her husband, 
Larry E. Dresher, appellees, filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Montgomery County against Dr. Burt and appellant, SEMC.  Dresher alleged 
that on or about December 17, 1970, following the delivery of her child at 
SEMC, Dr. Burt negligently, willfully, wantonly and fraudulently performed 
unnecessary and experimental vaginal reconstruction surgery upon her without 
her consent, restructuring her genital organs into an abnormal, non-functional 
configuration.  Dresher claimed that SEMC knew or should have known that 
Dr. Burt was performing experimental surgery on female patients at the 
hospital, and that SEMC “negligently and fraudulently concealed the * * * 
facts known to them, from the plaintiff, which if revealed to plaintiff would 
have prevented such surgery and the resulting injuries.”  She also claimed, 
 
3 
among other things, that SEMC negligently permitted Dr. Burt to perform the 
unnecessary and experimental surgery at SEMC by failing to provide adequate 
peer review of Dr. Burt, by failing to investigate Burt’s qualifications and 
practices, and by failing to protect Dresher from a known incompetent 
physician. 
 
In her complaint, Dresher sought recovery from Dr. Burt for medical 
malpractice.  She sought recovery from SEMC for, among other things, 
negligent credentialing, i.e., for SEMC’s alleged negligence in granting and/or 
continuing Dr. Burt’s staff membership or professional privileges at the 
hospital.  Larry Dresher sought recovery from Dr. Burt and SEMC for loss of 
consortium. 
 
Dr. Burt failed to respond to the complaint and, upon motion, appellees 
obtained a default judgment against him.  SEMC answered the complaint and 
asserted a defense based upon the “applicable statute of limitation.”  During 
discovery, SEMC deposed Dresher to establish its statute-of-limitations 
defense.  Additionally, in July 1990, SEMC served appellees with a request for 
 
4 
admissions and for production of documents.  See Civ.R. 36 and 34, 
respectively.  Specifically, SEMC requested that appellees admit to having no 
documents or other evidence to support their claims against SEMC and, in the 
event that appellees denied the requests for admissions, SEMC sought 
production of all documents supporting such denial(s).  In response to these 
requests, appellees denied that they had no documents or other evidence 
substantiating the claims against SEMC, but objected to the requests for 
production of documents as improper and “overbroad.”2 
 
In August 1990, SEMC filed a motion for summary judgment on all 
claims asserted against SEMC.  In a memorandum in support of the motion, 
SEMC argued that summary judgment was appropriate for several reasons.  
First, SEMC argued that appellees’ claims against SEMC were time-barred by 
the one-year statute of limitations for “medical claims” set forth in R.C. 
2305.11(B)(1) and/or the two-year statute of limitations for bodily injury 
actions set forth in R.C. 2305.10.  Second, SEMC argued that, pursuant to R.C. 
2305.25, it was immune from liability for any acts, omissions and decisions in 
 
5 
connection with peer review.  Third, SEMC asserted that appellees had no 
evidence to substantiate the claim for negligent credentialing, arguing that 
“[t]he * * * allegations of negligence * * * are pertinent to this case, if at all, 
only if they precede Ms. Dresher’s date of delivery and surgery by Dr. Burt on 
December 17, 1970.  * * *  Otherwise, such (alleged) acts or omissions could 
not possibly be deemed to have proximately caused Ms. Dresher’s injuries.  
Plaintiffs lack any proof to support the * * * allegations, none exists, and, 
accordingly, SEMC is entitled to summary judgment.”  (Emphasis sic.)  To 
support this argument, SEMC relied upon appellees’ responses to the request 
for admissions and for production of documents which, according to SEMC, 
demonstrated that appellees had no proof to substantiate the negligent 
credentialing claim.  Finally, SEMC argued that it was entitled to summary 
judgment on Larry Dresher’s loss-of-consortium claim because Judy Dresher’s 
injuries had occurred prior to appellees’ marriage. 
 
Dresher responded to the motion for summary judgment and specifically 
addressed SEMC’s contentions regarding the statute-of-limitations issue.3  
 
6 
However, Dresher never specifically responded to SEMC’s argument that there 
was no evidence to establish that SEMC knew or should have known of Dr. 
Burt’s incompetence prior to the date of Dresher’s 1970 “Love Surgery” and 
that, therefore, Dresher lacked proof of essential elements of her negligent 
credentialing claim. 
 
On September 5, 1991, the trial court issued a decision in this case and in 
eighteen other consolidated cases granting summary judgment in favor of 
SEMC.4  The trial court found, among other things, that the causes of action 
against SEMC in each of the consolidated cases were time-barred and/or that 
SEMC was immune from liability for negligent peer review pursuant to R.C. 
2305.25.  The trial court did not address SEMC’s contentions in Dresher’s case 
that SEMC was entitled to summary judgment due to Dresher’s lack of proof 
on essential elements of the negligent credentialing claim. 
 
Appellees appealed to the court of appeals.  On March 2, 1992, the court 
of appeals ordered the appeal to be held in abeyance pending this court’s 
decision in Browning, supra, 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993.  After the 
 
7 
release of our decision in Browning, the court of appeals vacated the stay and 
ordered the appeal to proceed to determination.  Thereafter, the court of 
appeals, applying Browning, reversed that portion of the trial court’s judgment 
that had granted summary judgment in favor of SEMC on the claim for 
negligent credentialing.  Specifically, the court of appeals held that SEMC was 
not immune from liability for negligent peer review, and that Dresher’s claim 
had been timely filed. 
 
In the court of appeals, SEMC argued that there was an independent 
basis for the court of appeals to affirm the trial court’s decision granting 
summary judgment in favor of SEMC on the claim for negligent credentialing.  
Specifically, SEMC, citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317, 106 
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, and Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 
59 Ohio St.3d 108, 570 N.E.2d 1095, argued that it was entitled to summary 
judgment on the claim for negligent credentialing because appellees, in 
response to SEMC’s motion for summary judgment, never produced any 
evidence that SEMC knew or should have known prior to Dresher’s surgery 
 
8 
that Dr. Burt was an incompetent physician.  The court of appeals rejected 
SEMC’s arguments, holding that summary judgment would not have been 
proper even on this basis under the circumstances of this case since neither 
party had presented evidentiary materials demonstrating that there were no 
material facts in dispute concerning SEMC’s alleged liability for negligence.   
 
Thereafter, the court of appeals, finding its judgment on this issue to be 
in conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth District in 
Miller v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Edn. (Sept. 21, 1994), Summit App. No. 16493, 
unreported, 1994 WL 511043, entered an order certifying a conflict.  This 
cause is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists. 
 
Sambol & Associates and Marylee Gill Sambol, for appellees. 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl, K.C. Green, Deborah R. Lydon and Sara Sinrall 
Rorer, for appellant. 
 
Dale E. Creech, Jr., urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Association 
of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
 
9 
 
Bricker & Eckler, James J. Hughes, Jr., and Catherine M. Ballard, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Hospital Association. 
 
DOUGLAS, J.     The sole issue in this appeal involves the standards for 
granting summary judgment when the moving party asserts that the nonmoving 
party has no evidence to establish an essential element of the nonmoving 
party’s case.  In particular, the issue certified to this court by the Court of 
Appeals for Montgomery County is, “[m]ay a court grant summary judgment 
when neither the movant nor the non-movant provides evidentiary materials 
demonstrating that there are no material facts in dispute and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law?”  (Emphasis sic.)  Resolution of this 
issue requires an interpretation of Civ.R. 56, a detailed review of Celotex, 
supra, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, and an examination of 
our holding in paragraph three of the syllabus in Wing, supra, 59 Ohio St.3d 
108, 570 N.E.2d 1095. 
 
In Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, Myrtle 
Catrett (“Catrett”), administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, Louis 
 
10 
H. Catrett, filed a wrongful death action in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia against fifteen named corporations.  In the complaint, 
Catrett alleged that her husband’s death had been caused by exposure to 
products containing asbestos that had been manufactured or distributed by the 
defendants.  Several of the defendants, including the Celotex Corporation 
(“Celotex”), filed motions for summary judgment.  In support of its motion, 
Celotex argued that summary judgment was proper because Catrett had “‘failed 
to produce evidence that any [Celotex] product * * * was the proximate cause 
of the injuries alleged within the jurisdictional limits of [the District] Court.’”  
Id. at 319-320, 106 S.Ct. at 2551, 91 L.Ed.2d at 272.  In particular, Celotex 
noted that Catrett had failed to identify, in answering interrogatories 
specifically requesting such information, any witnesses who could testify about 
the decedent’s exposure to Celotex’s asbestos products.  Catrett responded to 
the motion for summary judgment and produced three documents to counter 
Celotex’s assertions.  The three documents included a transcript of a 
deposition, a letter from an official of one of the decedent’s former employers 
 
11 
whom Catrett planned to call as a witness at trial, and a letter from an insurance 
company to Catrett’s attorney.  These documents tended to establish that the 
decedent had been exposed to Celotex’s asbestos products in Chicago in 1970 
and 1971.  Catrett claimed that the three documents demonstrated that there 
was a genuine and material factual dispute concerning the decedent’s exposure 
to Celotex’s asbestos products.  With respect to this evidence, Celotex asserted 
that the three documents were inadmissible hearsay and thus could not be 
considered in opposition to Celotex’s motion for summary judgment. 
 
The district court in Celotex granted the motion for summary judgment, 
finding that there was “‘no showing that the plaintiff was exposed to the 
defendant Celotex’s product in the District of Columbia or elsewhere within 
the statutory period.’”  Id., 477 U.S. at 320, 106 S.Ct. at 2551, 91 L.Ed.2d at 
272.  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, in a split decision, reversed the judgment of the district court.  
Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (C.A.D.C.1985), 756 F.2d 181.  The 
court of appeals’ majority stated, in part: 
 
12 
 
“We need not, however, reach the evidentiary issue [raised by Celotex 
that none of the evidence produced by Catrett in response to the motion for 
summary judgment would have been admissible at trial], inasmuch as 
defendant’s [Celotex’s] moving papers were patently defective on their face, 
rendering inappropriate the grant of summary judgment on the record as it 
stood before the District Court.  Celotex offered no affidavits, declarations or 
evidence of any sort whatever in support of its summary judgment motion.  To 
the contrary, Celotex’s motion was based solely on the plaintiff’s purported 
failure to produce credible evidence to support her claim.  While Celotex may 
have faced difficulty, to be sure, in ‘proving the negative’ that plaintiff’s 
decedent had not been exposed to its products, * * * [Celotex] made no effort 
to adduce any evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, to support its 
motion.  * * * [T]hat undisputed failure renders its motion fatally defective.”  
(Emphasis sic and footnotes omitted.)  Catrett, supra, 756 F.2d at 184. 
 
In Celotex, supra (477 U.S. 317), the United States Supreme Court 
reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.  Justice (now Chief Justice) 
 
13 
Rehnquist authored the lead opinion in Celotex, which mustered the full 
support of Justices Marshall, Powell and O’Conner.  Justice White concurred 
separately.  Id. at 328-329, 106 S.Ct. at 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d at 277 (White, J., 
concurring).  Justice Brennan, joined by then Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Blackmun, dissented.  Id. at 329-337, 106 S.Ct. at 2555-2560, 91 L.Ed.2d at 
277-282 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens also filed a separate 
dissenting opinion.  Id. at 337-339, 106 S.Ct. at 2560-2561, 91 L.Ed.2d at 283-
284 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Virtually all of the Justices agreed that the court 
of appeals had erred in concluding that Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 requires a defendant 
seeking summary judgment to produce affirmative evidence disproving 
(“negating”) the plaintiff’s case.  We quote, at length, from the lead opinion in 
Celotex because, with all due respect to the United States Supreme Court, its 
opinion in Celotex is somewhat confusing as to the appropriate standard for 
granting summary judgment in cases where the moving party asserts that the 
nonmoving party has no evidence to establish a material element of the 
 
14 
nonmoving party’s case.  In the lead opinion in Celotex, Justice Rehnquist 
offered the following analysis of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56:5 
 
“The majority of the Court of Appeals held that petitioner’s [Celotex’s] 
summary judgment motion was rendered ‘fatally defective’ by the fact that 
petitioner ‘made no effort to adduce any evidence, in the form of affidavits or 
otherwise, to support its motion.’  * * * [Catrett, supra, 756 F.2d at 184] 
(emphasis in original).  According to the majority, Rule 56(e) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and this Court's decision in * * * [Adickes v. S.H. 
Kress & Co. (1970), 398 U.S. 144, 159, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1609, 26 L.Ed.2d 142, 
155], establish that ‘the party opposing the motion for summary judgment bears 
the burden of responding only after the moving party has met its burden of 
coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issues of material 
fact.’  * * *  [Catrett, supra, 756 F.2d at 184] (emphasis in original; footnote 
omitted).  The majority therefore declined to consider petitioner’s argument 
that none of the evidence produced by respondent [Catrett] in opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment would have been admissible at trial. * * * 
 
15 
 
“We think that the position taken by the majority of the Court of Appeals 
is inconsistent with the standard for summary judgment set forth in Rule 56(c) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment 
is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.’  In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) 
mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and 
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish 
the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that 
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.  In such a situation, there can be ‘no 
genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily 
renders all other facts immaterial.  The moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law’ because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient 
 
16 
showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the 
burden of proof.  * * * 
 
“Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial 
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 
identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ 
which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.  
But unlike the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in 
Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other 
similar materials negating the opponent's claim.  On the contrary, Rule 56(c), 
which refers to ‘the affidavits, if any’ (emphasis added), suggests the absence 
of such a requirement.  And if there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 
56(c) in this regard, such doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), 
which provide that claimants and defendants, respectively, may move for 
summary judgment ‘with or without supporting affidavits’ (emphasis added).  
The import of these subsections is that, regardless of whether the moving party 
 
17 
accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the motion may, 
and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court 
demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth 
in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.  One of the principal purposes of the summary 
judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or 
defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to 
accomplish this purpose. 
 
“Respondent [Catrett] argues, however, that Rule 56(e), by its terms, 
places on the nonmoving party the burden of coming forward with rebuttal 
affidavits, or other specified kinds of materials, only in response to a motion 
for summary judgment ‘made and supported as provided in this rule.’  
According to respondent’s argument, since petitioner [Celotex] did not 
‘support’ its motion with  affidavits, summary judgment was improper in this 
case.  But as we have already explained, a motion for summary judgment may 
be made pursuant to Rule 56 ‘with or without supporting affidavits.’  In cases 
like the instant one, where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof 
 
18 
at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be 
made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file.’  Such a motion, whether or not 
accompanied by affidavits, will be ‘made and supported as provided in this 
rule,’ and Rule 56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the 
pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial.’ 
 
“We do not mean that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in a 
form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.  
Obviously, Rule 56 does not require the nonmoving party to depose her own 
witnesses.  Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be 
opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), 
except the mere pleadings themselves, and it is from this list that one would 
normally expect the nonmoving party to make the showing to which we have 
referred. 
 
19 
 
“The Court of Appeals in this case felt itself constrained, however, by  
language in our decision in Adickes * * * [, supra, 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 
26 L.Ed.2d 142].  There we held that summary judgment had been improperly 
entered in favor of the defendant restaurant in an action brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  In the course of its opinion, the Adickes Court said that ‘both 
the commentary on and the background of the 1963 amendment conclusively 
show that it was not intended to modify the burden of the moving party * * * to 
show initially the absence of a genuine issue concerning any material fact.’  Id., 
at 159 [, 90 S.Ct. at 1609, 26 L.Ed.2d at 155].  We think that this statement is 
accurate in a literal sense, since we fully agree with the Adickes Court that the 
1963 amendment to Rule 56(e) was not designed to modify the burden of 
making the showing generally required by Rule 56(c).  It also appears to us 
that, on the basis of the showing before the Court in Adickes, the motion for 
summary judgment in that case should have been denied.  But we do not think 
the Adickes language quoted above should be construed to mean that the 
burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to produce evidence 
 
20 
showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with respect to an 
issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof.  Instead, as we 
have explained, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 
‘showing’-- that is, pointing out to the district court -- that there is an absence 
of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. 
 
“* * * 
 
“In this Court, respondent’s [Catrett’s] brief and oral argument have been 
devoted as much to the proposition that an adequate showing of exposure to 
petitioner's asbestos products was made as to the proposition that no such 
showing should have been required.  But the Court of Appeals declined to 
address either the adequacy of the showing made by respondent in opposition 
to petitioner's motion for summary judgment, or the question whether such a 
showing, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be sufficient to carry 
respondent's burden of proof at trial.  We think the Court of Appeals with its 
superior knowledge of local law is better suited than we are to make these 
determinations in the first instance. 
 
21 
 
“* * * 
 
“The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”  
(Emphasis added in part and footnotes omitted.)  Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. 317, 
321-328, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2551-2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 272-277. 
 
Justice White, who provided the fifth and deciding vote in Celotex, 
stated, in a separate concurring opinion: 
 
“I agree that the Court of Appeals was wrong in holding that the moving 
defendant must always support his motion with evidence or affidavits showing 
the absence of a genuine dispute about a material fact.  I also agree that the 
movant may rely on depositions, answers to interrogatories, and the like, to 
demonstrate that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case and hence that 
there can be no factual dispute.  But the movant must discharge the burden the 
Rules place upon him:  It is not enough to move for summary judgment without 
supporting the motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the 
plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case. 
 
22 
 
“A plaintiff need not initiate any discovery or reveal his witnesses or 
evidence unless required to do so under the discovery Rules or by court order. 
Of course, he must respond if required to do so; but he need not also depose his 
witnesses or obtain their affidavits to defeat a summary judgment motion 
asserting only that he has failed to produce any support for his case.  It is the 
defendant's task to negate, if he can, the claimed basis for the suit. 
 
“Petitioner Celotex does not dispute that if respondent [Catrett] has 
named a witness to support her claim, summary judgment should not be 
granted without Celotex somehow showing that the named witness' possible 
testimony raises no genuine issue of material fact.  * * *  It asserts, however, 
that respondent has failed on request to produce any basis for her case.  
Respondent, on the other hand, does not contend that she was not obligated to 
reveal her witnesses and evidence but insists that she has revealed enough to 
defeat the motion for summary judgment.  Because the Court of Appeals found 
it unnecessary to address this aspect of the case, I agree that the case should be 
 
23 
remanded for further proceedings.”  (Emphasis added.)  Celotex, supra, 477 
U.S. at 328-329, 106 S.Ct. at 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d at 277 (White, J., concurring). 
 
Again, with the utmost respect to the United States Supreme Court, we 
find the court’s decision in Celotex to be perplexing.  As Justice Brennan so 
ably recognized in his dissenting opinion in Celotex, “[t]he Court clearly rejects 
the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the defendant [Celotex] must provide 
affirmative evidence disproving the plaintiff’s case.  Beyond this, however, the 
Court has not clearly explained what is required of a moving party seeking 
summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot prove its 
case.”  (Footnote omitted.)  Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. at 329, 106 S.Ct. at 2556, 
91 L.Ed.2d at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan went on to suggest 
that Celotex had failed to meet its burden of establishing that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact concerning the essential elements of Catrett’s 
claims and that, therefore, summary judgment was improper.  Id., 477 U.S. at 
329-337, 106 S.Ct. at 2555-2560, 91 L.Ed.2d at 277-282 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  He also questioned what the court of appeals was supposed to do 
 
24 
on remand, given that Justice White, who provided the court’s fifth vote in 
Celotex, “plainly believes that the Court of Appeals should reevaluate whether 
the defendant met its initial burden of production.”  Id. at 329, 106 S.Ct. at 
2556, 91 L.Ed.2d at 277, fn. 1.6 
 
Our reading of Celotex and of Civ.R. 567 is that there is simply no 
requirement that a party who moves for summary judgment must support the 
motion with affidavits negating the opponent’s claims.  Accord Mitseff v. 
Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 114, 526 N.E.2d 798, 800-801.  See, also, 
Civ.R. 56(A) and (B), and Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. at 323-324, 106 S.Ct. at 
2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274.  Indeed, there is no requirement in Civ.R. 56 that the 
moving party support its motion for summary judgment with any affirmative 
evidence, i.e., affidavits or similar materials produced by the movant.  
However, even Celotex makes clear that the moving party bears the initial 
responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and 
identifying those portions of the record before the trial court which demonstrate 
the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving 
 
25 
party’s claim.  Accord Mitseff, supra, 38 Ohio St.3d at 114-115, 526 N.E.2d at 
801.  That is, the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that 
there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning an essential element of 
the opponent’s case.  To accomplish this, the movant must be able to point to 
evidentiary materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) that a court is to 
consider in rendering summary judgment.  The evidentiary materials listed in 
Civ.R. 56(C) include “the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and 
written stipulations of fact, if any.”  These evidentiary materials must show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  While the movant is not necessarily 
obligated to place any of these evidentiary materials in the record, the evidence 
must be in the record or the motion cannot succeed.  In this regard, Celotex 
makes clear, especially in light of Justice White’s concurring opinion in that 
case, that a moving party does not discharge its initial burden under Civ.R. 56 
simply by making a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no 
 
26 
evidence to prove its case.  The assertion must be backed by some evidence of 
the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively shows that the nonmoving 
party has no evidence to support that party’s claims.  If the moving party fails 
to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied.  
If the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party has a 
reciprocal burden outlined in the last sentence of Civ.R. 56(E), which provides 
that: 
 
“When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavit or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial.  If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Accordingly, we hold that a party seeking summary judgment, on the 
ground that the nonmoving party cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden 
of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those 
 
27 
portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact on the essential element(s) of the nonmoving party’s claims.  The 
moving party cannot discharge its initial burden under Civ.R. 56 simply by 
making a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence to 
prove its case.  Rather, the moving party must be able to specifically point to 
some evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively 
demonstrates that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the 
nonmoving party’s claims.  If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, 
the motion for summary judgment must be denied.  However, if the moving 
party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal 
burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party. 
 
The foregoing principles have been firmly established in Ohio 
jurisprudence for some time.  In Mitseff, supra, 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 114-115, 
526 N.E.2d 798, 800-801, we recognized that: 
 
28 
 
“While Celotex [, supra, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265,] 
says that a moving party does not have to support its motion with affidavits 
negating the opponent's claims, Celotex also plainly states that ‘a party seeking 
summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the 
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence 
of a genuine issue of material fact.’  Celotex, supra, at 323 [, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 
91 L.Ed.2d at 274]. 
 
“Accordingly, even Celotex makes clear that a party moving for 
summary judgment has certain obligations that must be met.  These obligations 
are set forth in Massaro v. Vernitron Corp. (D.Mass. 1983), 559 F. Supp. 1068.  
Massaro held that the party seeking summary judgment ‘* * * bears the burden 
of affirmatively demonstrating that, with respect to every essential issue of 
each count in the complaint, there is no genuine issue of fact.’  Massaro, supra, 
at 1073 (citing Mack v. Cape Elizabeth School Board [C.A.1, 1977], 533 [sic 
 
29 
553] F.2d 720, 722).  The moving party bears this burden ‘* * * even with 
regard to issues on which plaintiffs * * * would have the burden of proof 
should the case go to trial.’  Massaro, supra, at 1073, citing Ramsey [sic 
Ramsay] v. Cooper (C.A.1, 1977), 553 F.2d 237, 240-241, fn. 8; Adickes v. 
S.H. Kress & Co. (1970), 398 U.S. 144, 159-161.  See, also, Bird v. 
Zimmerman Fur Institute, Inc. (S.D.Ohio 1968), 294 F. Supp. 202. 
 
“The requirement that a party seeking summary judgment disclose the 
basis for the motion and support the motion with evidence is well founded in 
Ohio law.  ‘The burden of showing that no genuine issue exists as to any 
material fact falls upon the moving party in requesting a summary judgment.’  
Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 8 O.O.3d 
73, 74, 375 N.E.2d 46, 47, citing Hamlin v. McAlpin Co. (1964), 175 Ohio St. 
517, 519-520, 26 O.O.2d 206, 207, 196 N.E.2d 781, 783-784.  Reading the 
requirement of Harless, supra, in conjunction with Civ.R. 56 and 7(B)(1), it 
can readily be seen that the moving party must state specifically which areas of 
 
30 
the opponent's claim raise no genuine issue of material fact and such assertion 
may be supported by affidavits or otherwise as allowed by Civ.R. 56(C). 
 
“It should be noted that placing the above-mentioned requirements on 
the moving party does not mean the nonmoving party bears no burden.  
Requiring that the moving party provide specific reasons and evidence gives 
rise to a reciprocal burden of specificity for the non-moving party [outlined in 
Civ.R. 56(E)].”  (Footnote omitted.) 
 
However, in Wing, supra, 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 570 N.E.2d 1095, 
paragraph three of the syllabus, a majority of this court held that, “A motion for 
summary judgment forces the nonmoving party to produce evidence on any 
issue for which that party bears the burden of production at trial.  (Celotex v. 
Catrett [1986], 477 U.S. 317 [, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265,] approved and 
followed.)”  We now believe that this holding in Wing is too broad.  
Specifically, paragraph three of the syllabus in Wing fails to account for, 
among other things, the burden Civ.R. 56 places upon a moving party.  We 
therefore limit paragraph three of the syllabus in Wing to bring it into 
 
31 
conformity with Mitseff, supra, 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 526 N.E.2d 798, Celotex, 
supra, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, the requirements of 
Civ.R. 56, and our discussion and holdings supra. 
 
In the case at bar, SEMC served appellees with a request for admissions 
and for production of documents.  Specifically, SEMC sought admissions from 
appellees that they possessed no documents or other evidence to support the 
negligent credentialing claim.  In the event that appellees denied the requests 
for admissions, SEMC sought production of all documents supporting the 
denials.  Appellees denied that they possessed no documents or other evidence 
to substantiate the negligent credentialing claim, and entered specific 
objections to the requests for production of documents.  SEMC never moved to 
compel production of the requested documents.  Rather, SEMC moved for 
summary judgment, urging that appellees had no evidence to establish essential 
elements of the negligence cause of action.  To support the motion, SEMC 
relied on appellees’ responses to the request for admissions and for production 
 
32 
of documents as proof that appellees had no evidence to substantiate the 
negligence claims. 
 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of SEMC on other 
(unrelated) grounds.  However, on appeal, the court of appeals addressed and 
rejected SEMC’s arguments that SEMC was entitled to summary judgment on 
the basis that appellees lacked evidence to prove the negligent credentialing 
claim.  The court of appeals found that summary judgment on this issue was 
not warranted since neither SEMC nor appellees had submitted any evidence 
demonstrating the lack of a genuine issue of material fact concerning the 
essential elements of the negligence credentialing cause of action.  We agree 
with the court of appeals’ conclusion in this regard.8 
 
We find that appellees’ responses to the request for admissions and for 
production of documents fail to demonstrate that appellees had no evidence to 
prove the essential elements of the negligent credentialing cause of action.  
Indeed, we find that appellees’ responses to the request for admissions and for 
production of documents indicate that appellees were in possession of evidence 
 
33 
necessary to prove the negligence claim, but that they were unwilling to 
divulge the evidence unless presented with a proper discovery request.  
Therefore, SEMC’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that appellees 
lacked evidence to prove the essential elements of a negligent credentialing 
cause of action was supported by nothing more than SEMC’s own conclusory 
assertions in its memorandum in support of the motion.  Since the motion was 
not properly supported by evidence in the record, appellees had no duty under 
Civ.R. 56(E) to respond to SEMC’s allegations that they lacked proof on 
essential elements of the negligent credentialing cause of action.  See 
discussion, supra. 
 
The question certified by the court of appeals in this case is, “[m]ay a 
court grant summary judgment when neither the movant nor the non-movant 
provides evidentiary materials demonstrating that there are no material facts in 
dispute and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law?”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  We answer that question in the negative.  As stated in our discussion 
supra, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial 
 
34 
court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record 
which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element 
of the nonmoving party’s claim.  The “portions of the record” to which we refer 
are those evidentiary materials listed in Civ.R. 56(C), such as the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, etc., that have been filed in the case.  
Here, SEMC could point to no such evidence clearly demonstrating that 
appellees lacked proof of the negligence claim.  Where, as here, the moving 
party does not satisfy its initial burden under Civ.R. 56, the motion for 
summary judgment must be denied. 
 
We also agree, in part, with the ultimate conclusion reached by the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth District in Miller, supra, Summit App. No. 16493, 
unreported, 1994 WL 511043.  In Miller, the plaintiff, Dorothy Miller, was a 
school bus driver who applied for re-certification for the 1990-1991 school 
year.  As part of the certification process, Miller submitted to a medical 
examination, the results of which revealed that Miller suffered from high blood 
pressure and heart problems.  Miller was denied re-certification.  She then 
 
35 
submitted to a second medical examination (a medical re-examination) and was 
found unfit to be a school bus driver.  Accordingly, Miller was not re-hired for 
the 1990-1991 school year. 
 
Miller sued the Summit County Board of Education, the Manchester 
Local School District Board of Education, and others, alleging that the 
defendants had breached Miller’s contract of employment by not re-hiring her.  
In the complaint, Miller conceded that she had received two separate medical 
examinations and that both doctors had concluded she did not meet the 
physical requirements for driving a school bus.  Miller did not allege that either 
or both of the physicians who had examined her were not proper medical 
authorities.  Eventually, defendants moved for summary judgment.  To support 
their motion, the defendants apparently directed the trial court’s attention to (1) 
Miller’s pleadings, and (2) relevant portions of the Ohio Administrative Code 
that defeated Miller’s claims.  The defendants also apparently relied on certain 
affidavits.  The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. 
 
36 
 
In Miller, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  
The Miller court observed that Ohio Adm.Code 3301-83-07 establishes the 
physical qualifications for school bus drivers and the procedures for 
ascertaining medical fitness.  The court specifically cited Ohio Adm.Code 
3301-83-07(F)(4), which provides that the results of a medical re-examination 
“shall be final.”  Judge (now Justice) Cook, writing for the court in Miller, 
stated, in part: 
 
“We find that the trial court acted appropriately in granting Appellees' 
motion for summary judgment.  In her complaint, Miller conceded that she 
received two separate medical examinations and that both doctors concluded 
that she did not meet the physical requirements for driving a school bus.  Miller 
claims that the two medical examinations she received were substandard.  
However, she produced no evidence cognizable under Civ.R. 56 showing that 
she was entitled to a third medical examination and that the results of this 
examination could be used to contradict the results of the prior examinations.  
Ohio Adm.Code  3301-83-07(A) states that the physical qualifications must be 
 
37 
certified by ‘a proper medical authority.’  Ohio Adm.Code 3301-83-07(B) 
further requires each county board of education to appoint ‘[o]ne or more 
licensed doctors of medicine or osteopathy’ annually.  These sections ensure 
that prospective bus drivers will be examined by competent medical personnel.  
Miller does not argue that either of the two doctors who examined her were not 
proper medical authorities.  Accordingly, we find that the trial court was 
correct in granting Appellees’ [the defendants’] motion for summary judgment 
as to Miller’s declaratory judgment, concluding that she had no right to submit 
results from a third medical examination in order to advance her breach of 
contract claim. 
 
“Although Miller contests two issues pertaining to Appellees’ affidavits, 
these arguments do not warrant reversing summary judgment for Appellees.  
Even if Appellees’ affidavits were defective or non-existent, a party who 
moves for summary judgment need not support its motion with affidavits, 
provided that the party does not bear the burden of proof on the issues 
contained in the motion.  Appellees, therefore, are still entitled to summary 
 
38 
judgment because they would not bear the burden of proof at trial.”  Id. at 4-5, 
1994 WL 511043 at 2. 
 
We read Miller as standing for the proposition that summary judgment 
may be rendered where the pleadings and the arguments of the party seeking 
summary judgment clearly establish that the nonmoving party has no legally 
cognizable cause of action.9  Thus, in Miller, the defendants were entitled to 
summary judgment merely by pointing out to the trial judge the applicable 
provisions of the Ohio Administrative Code which, when read in conjunction 
with Miller’s complaint, defeated Miller’s claims.  In other words, by pointing 
out the requirements of Ohio Adm.Code 3301-83-07, and those portions of the 
plaintiff’s pleadings that showed plaintiff was entitled to no relief, the 
defendants succeeded in demonstrating, by evidence permitted under Civ.R. 
56(C) (the pleadings), that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  However, we take issue with the statement in Miller that “* * * a party 
who moves for summary judgment need not support its motion with affidavits, 
provided that the party does not bear the burden of proof on the issues 
 
39 
contained in the motion.”  (Emphasis added.)  Again, we note that there is no 
requirement in Civ.R. 56 that any party submit affidavits to support a motion 
for summary judgment.  See, e.g., Civ.R. 56(A) and (B).  There is a 
requirement, however, that a moving party, in support of a summary judgment 
motion, specifically point to something in the record that comports with the 
evidentiary materials set forth in Civ.R. 56(C). 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment (but not necessarily 
the reasoning) of the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County on the matter 
certified for our review. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
MOYER, C.J., WRIGHT and COOK, JJ., dissent. 
 
Pfeifer, J., concurring in judgment only.  I concur in the judgment of the 
majority, but share some of the same concerns raised in Justice Cook’s dissent 
regarding the future use of Civ.R. 56.  In most cases, Civ.R. 56 serves the 
 
40 
interests of the parties and our system of justice well.  This was not one of 
those cases. 
 
When a summary judgment motion was first filed in this case, the 
overriding question in the case was the statute of limitations issue.  Could 
Dresher even bring a claim this long after her injuries?  While summary 
judgment was well suited for the resolution of that issue, the remainder of the 
case was undeveloped.  Extensive discovery on the factual issues had not yet 
begun.  In short, the case was immature but for the statute of limitations 
question -- the issue of whether Dresher had a meritorious case was not yet in 
full bloom.  I believe that summary judgment was improperly granted on that 
issue -- the time and circumstances were not right.  Also, Dresher’s responses 
and objections to SEMC’s discovery requests could be viewed as creating a 
general issue as to material facts. 
 
Since this case does not present us with a good example of how Civ.R. 
56 works or should work, I respectfully decline to join an opinion which may 
reshape the way the rule is used in Ohio.  I do, however, agree with the lead 
 
41 
opinion’s limiting of the third syllabus in Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas 
(1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 570 N.E.2d 1095. 
 
Cook, J., dissenting.  Dr. Burt’s conduct in grossly injuring Judy Dresher 
is reprehensible and Dresher’s suffering great.  Neither event, however, should 
be the basis for curtailing the usefulness of summary judgment, the most 
important tool Ohio courts have for disposing of issues without a trial.  When 
properly used, the rule embodies all the laudatory goals of tort reform -- early 
assessment of the merits of cases, pretrial judgments, and dismissal of frivolous 
claims.  It benefits both plaintiffs and defendants and best serves our system of 
civil justice. 
 
In the present clime of cynicism about the effectiveness of our courts, it 
is absolutely critical that judges retain the full measure of this procedure to 
accomplish its purpose -- isolating and disposing of factually unsupported 
claims or defenses.  Today’s majority decision not only severely limits the 
utility of summary judgment, but also reaches its decision by employing an 
analysis that the United States Supreme Court considered and rejected ten years 
 
42 
ago in the Celotex case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317, 106 
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265. 
 
Notwithstanding the sympathy Judy Dresher’s case evokes, she never 
produced any evidence that could render the hospital liable.  I, therefore, 
respectfully dissent. 
 
The new standard for summary judgment announced by today’s majority 
erroneously requires the defendant to produce affirmative evidence that the 
plaintiff has no evidence to support her claim.  This is the precise concept that 
the United States Supreme Court rejected when it reversed the decision of the 
circuit court of appeals in Celotex. 
 
In the lower court opinion to Celotex, Catrett v. Johns-Mansville Sales 
Corp. (C.A.D.C.1985), 756 F.2d 181, the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals leveled the same critique as the majority herein at the moving party -- 
that “Celotex proffered nothing.  It advanced only the naked allegation that the 
plaintiff had not come forward in discovery with evidence to support her 
allegations of decedent’s exposure* * *.” Id. at 185.  Because Celotex made 
 
43 
“no effort to adduce any evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, to 
support its motion” (emphasis sic), the court of appeals concluded that this 
“undisputed failure” rendered the motion “fatally defective.” Id. at 184.  
According to the appellate court, this “barebones approach” was insufficient to 
meet Celotex’s burden. Id. at 185. 
 
In his dissent to the D.C. Circuit’s decision, Judge Bork argued that 
“[t]he majority errs in supposing that a party seeking summary judgment must 
always make an affirmative evidentiary showing, even in cases where there is 
not a triable, factual dispute.” Id. at 188.  The dissent pointed to the problem 
that the majority approach required the defendant “to prove a negative -- that 
the plaintiff can never find evidence * * * [which] means that the plaintiff need 
never proffer evidence until she faces a motion for a directed verdict at  trial.” 
Id. at 187.   Instead of requiring the movant to prove “in effect the negative of 
plaintiff’s case, even though the plaintiff has no evidence on an essential 
element of her claim[,] * * * [t]he majority should have required the defendant 
 
44 
only to persuade the trial judge that there is no triable, factual dispute on 
causation.” Id. at 190.   
 
In adopting this view, the United States Supreme Court concluded that 
there is “no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party 
must support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the 
opponent’s claim.” Celotex at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274. 
 
Altogether contrary to the analysis of the Supreme Court, this court with 
today’s opinion requires a movant to “specifically point to some evidence of 
the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively demonstrates that the 
nonmoving party has no evidence to support the nonmoving party’s claims.”  In 
effect, this burden would require SEMC, as the movant, to affirmatively 
disprove non-existent facts.   As acknowledged by the court of appeals, the 
record contains no evidence from which a jury could infer that SEMC had 
known or should have known of Dr. Burt’s surgeries. Yet, in order to entitle 
SEMC to summary judgment, this court requires SEMC, whose basis for 
 
45 
seeking summary judgment is that the plaintiff has no basis for her claim, to 
affirmatively demonstrate the absence of these facts.   
 
What would the majority have SEMC put forth to demonstrate that the 
hospital did not have notice of Dr. Burt’s mistreatment prior to Dresher’s 
surgery?  The majority concedes that “there is simply no requirement that a 
party who moves for summary judgment must support the motion with 
affidavits negating the opponent’s claims.” If an affidavit from an SEMC 
source is not required, what affirmative evidence could SEMC produce to 
demonstrate the absence of facts supporting Dresher’s claim?  
 
While the majority may find Celotex perplexing, the Celotex court made 
clear that the moving party’s burden cannot be enhanced to require proof of a 
negative in this fashion.  477 U.S. at 325-326, 106 S.Ct. at 2554 , 91 L.Ed.2d at 
275.  I agree that much of the time, defendants will only be able to establish the 
absence of a factual dispute by producing positive evidence.  So long as 
plaintiffs have some inferential evidence, the defendants will have the burden 
of attacking it to prove that there is no factual dispute fit for trial.  In a case 
 
46 
such as this, where the nonmoving party has produced no evidence, the 
“barebones” delimiting of the absence of proof on an essential element suffices.  
See Catrett, 756 F.2d at 190-191 (Bork. J, dissenting).  See, also, Celotex, at 
325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554 , 91 L.Ed.2d at 275. (“[T]he burden on the moving party 
may be discharged by ‘showing’ -- that is, pointing out to the district court - 
that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”); 
Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Sys., Inc. (C.A.4, 1994), 33 
F.3d 390, 393 (The moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial 
is not required to produce evidence but can simply argue that there is an 
absence of evidence by which the nonmoving party can prove his case.); Street 
v. J.C. Bradford & Co. (C.A.6, 1989), 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (“[T]he movant 
could challenge the opposing party to ‘put up or shut up’ on a critical issue.”). 
 
There seems little reason why Dresher should not have been required to 
establish the existence of potential evidence to support her factual allegations, 
when properly challenged by the motion for summary judgment.  
Approximately one year after Dresher filed her complaint, SEMC “pointed out” 
 
47 
to the trial court the specific basis entitling it to summary judgment --Dresher 
had no evidence that SEMC had knowledge of Dr. Burt’s now infamous 
surgeries prior to December 17, 1970, and thus, no evidence of causation.  
SEMC was not required to support its motion with evidence, since that would 
require SEMC to negate Dresher’s claims.  To the contrary, SEMC’s arguments 
were specific enough to provide Dresher a meaningful opportunity to respond 
and shifted the burden upon the nonmovant to show a genuine issue of material 
fact.   
 
On five separate occasions, Dresher had the opportunity to produce some 
evidence of her claim or at least address SEMC’s argument that she had none.  
On two occasions, SEMC requested Dresher produce documents to support her 
claim. Dresher objected to these requests on the ground that they were 
“overbroad.”  As was done in Celotex, SEMC moved for summary judgment, 
rather than moving to compel responses to the discovery requests. See Catrett, 
756 F.2d at 184, fn. 8. Dresher altogether failed to address SEMC’s argument 
that she had no evidence to support her negligent credentialing claim. If 
 
48 
Dresher needed more time for discovery in order to respond to this part of the  
motion, Civ.R. 56(F) provided her such an option.  On appeal, Dresher did not 
even address SEMC’s argument on this point.  In fact, Dresher’s brief to this 
court is the first time she has addressed this aspect of SEMC’s motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The majority focuses on Dresher’s objections to SEMC’s discovery 
requests as an indication that she was in possession of some evidence but was 
unwilling to divulge it.  Objections to discovery requests certainly ought not 
obviate the requirement that a party come forward with evidence in response to 
a targeted motion for summary judgment.  Moreover, the analysis of the 
majority encourages objections to discovery, a tactic far too regularly used for 
evasion and delay.   
 
The Supreme Court expressly endorsed summary judgment practice in 
Celotex.  The court stated, “[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly 
regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather * * * designed ‘to 
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’ * * * 
 
49 
Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons 
asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those 
claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing 
such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, 
prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.” Celotex, 477 
U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d at 276.  And so it should be in Ohio. 
 
I would reverse the court of appeals on the negligent credentialing claim 
and reinstate the summary judgment granted by the trial court to SEMC. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and WRIGHT, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
 
 
 
50 
FOOTNOTES: 
1 
In Browning v. Burt (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993, 
paragraphs one through five of the syllabus, this court held that: 
 
“1.  Hospital negligence arising out of the ‘care’ of a patient is a ‘medical 
claim’ within the meaning of R.C. 2305.11(D)(3) and is subject to the period of 
limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.11(B)(1).  ‘Care’ as used in R.C. 
2305.11(D)(3) is the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or 
illness. 
 
“2.  Negligent credentialing of a physician by a hospital is not ‘medical 
diagnosis, care, or treatment’ within the meaning of R.C. 2305.11. 
 
“3.  An action against a hospital for bodily injury arising out of the 
negligent credentialing of a physician is subject to the two-year limitations 
period set forth in R.C. 2305.10. 
 
“4.  The period of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.10 commences to run 
when the victim knows or should have discovered that he or she was injured as 
a result of the hospital's negligent credentialing procedures or practices. 
 
51 
 
“5.  R.C. 2305.25 does not provide a hospital with immunity from 
liability for the hospital's negligence in granting and/or continuing the staff 
privileges of an incompetent physician.” 
2 
Several of SEMC’s requests for admissions and for production of 
documents, and appellees’ corresponding responses, were as follows: 
 
“[Request for Admission:]  1. Admit that Plaintiffs possess no 
documents, statements, or other proof supporting their allegation that * * * 
[SEMC] negligently and fraudulently concealed facts from Plaintiff Judy 
Dresher. 
 
“[Response:]  Plaintiff refuses to admit such fact because plaintiff 
certainly does have such records which include plaintiff’s hospital record from 
SEMC, Dr. Burt’s office records and Houston letter, Book ‘Surgery of Love’, 
testimony of Dr’s [sic Drs.] Hilty and Reiling, Nancy Goodman, and others.  
Plaintiff is in the early discovery of this case and may be able to obtain such 
documents from the SEMC Board of Trustees * * *, and other substantiating 
documents and information. 
 
52 
 
“[Request for Production:]  2. If Plaintiffs’ response to No. 1 above is 
anything other than an unqualified admission, produce each and every 
document which supports Plaintiffs’ complete or partial denial of No. 1. 
 
“[Response:]  Plaintiff has executed a medical release relating to medical 
records.  * * *  Discovery is in process.  OBJECTION -- overbroad -- not a 
proper request, Fails to sufficiently identify requested documents. 
 
“* * * 
 
“[Request for Admission:]  9. Admit that Plaintiffs possess no 
documents, communications, statements, or other evidence pre-dating 
December 17, 1970 to support their claim in Paragraph 14 of the Complaint 
that ‘St. Elizabeth Medical Center was aware or should have been aware that 
Defendant James Burt, M.D. was performing non-scientific, non-acceptable 
and experimental surgery on female patient’s sexual organs, without such 
patient’s knowledge or consent.’ 
 
“[Response:]  Denied 
 
53 
 
“[Request for Production:]  10. If Plaintiffs’ response to No. 9 above is 
anything other than an unqualified admission, produce all documents which 
support Plaintiffs’ complete or partial denial of No. 9. 
 
“[Response:]  Objection -- improper request ‘All Documents’ fails to 
request designated documents.  Overbroad * * * [-- Civ.R. 34(A) and (B) -- the 
request fails to describe the documents with reasonable particularity]. 
 
“[Request for Admission:]  11. Admit that Plaintiffs possess no 
documents, communications, statements, or other evidence pre-dating 
December 17, 1970 to support their allegation in Paragraph 20(b) of the 
Complaint that * * * [SEMC] failed to ‘investigate the abilities, qualifications 
and practices of James Burt, M.D.’ 
 
“[Response:]  Deny 
 
“[Request for Production:]  12. If Plaintiffs’ response to No. 11 above is 
anything other than an unqualified admission, produce all documents which 
support Plaintiffs’ complete or partial denial of No. 11. 
 
54 
 
“[Response:]  Objection -- ‘All Documents’ is not a proper request -- 
overbroad and fails to sufficiently designate any documents with reasonable 
particularity. 
 
“[Request for Admission:]  13. Admit that Plaintiffs possess no 
documents, communications, statements, or other evidence pre-dating 
December 17, 1970 which support Plaintiffs’ allegations in Paragraph 20(d) of 
the Complaint that * * * [SEMC] failed to provide proper and adequate peer 
review and quality control. 
 
“[Response:]  Deny 
 
“[Request for Production:]  14. If Plaintiffs’ response to No. 13 above is 
anything other than an unqualified admission, produce all documents which 
support Plaintiffs’ complete or partial denial of No. 13. 
 
“[Response:]  Objection -- ‘All Documents’ is not a proper request -- 
overbroad and fails to sufficiently designate any request[ed] documents * * * 
[Civ.R. 34 (A) and (B)] with reasonable particularity. 
 
55 
 
“[Request for Admission:]  15. Admit that Plaintiffs possess no 
documents, communications, statements, or other evidence pre-dating 
December 17, 1970 which support Plaintiffs’ allegations in Paragraph 20(e) of 
the Complaint that * * * [SEMC] was negligent in failing to remove James 
Burt, M.D. from the hospital’s medical staff. 
 
“[Response:]  Deny 
 
“[Request for Production:]  16. If Plaintiffs’ response to No. 15 above is 
anything other than an unqualified admission, produce all documents which 
support Plaintiffs’ complete or partial denial of No. 15. 
 
“[Response:]  Objection -- ‘All documents’ is an improper request -- 
overbroad and fails to designate any requested documents with reasonable 
particularity * * * [Civ.R. 34(A) and (B)].” 
3 
In response to SEMC’s argument that it was entitled to summary 
judgment on the basis of the applicable statute of limitations, Dresher pointed 
to portions of her deposition testimony and offered two supporting affidavits.  
The deposition and affidavits indicated that Dresher did not know until October 
 
56 
30, 1988, that she may have been the victim of Dr. Burt’s experimental surgery.  
On that date, Dresher had viewed a “West 57th Street” television program 
concerning Dr. Burt’s surgical practices, and realized that her symptoms were 
the same as those discussed by Burt’s ex-patients appearing on the show.  In 
1989, Dresher was examined by a physician who informed her that she had 
been the victim of Dr. Burt’s “Love Surgery.” 
4 
On December 8, 1989, the case at bar had been consolidated with 
numerous other cases involving similar claims and allegations against Dr. Burt 
and SEMC. 
5 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, which is similar to Ohio Civ.R.56, provides, in part: 
 
“(a)  For Claimant.  A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any 
time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or 
after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move 
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s 
favor upon all or any part thereof. 
 
57 
 
“(b)  For Defending Party.  A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought 
may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part thereof. 
 
“(c)  Motion and Proceedings Thereon.  The motion shall be served at 
least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing.  The adverse party prior to 
the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.  The judgment sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.  A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, 
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue 
as to the amount of damages. 
 
“* * * 
 
“(e)  Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required.  
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
 
58 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.  
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.  The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits.  When a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse 
party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.  If the adverse 
party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against the adverse party.” 
6 
Ultimately, on remand from the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 
265, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia once again 
held that the district court had erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 
 
59 
Celotex.  See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (C.A.D.C.1987), 826 F.2d 
33.  The United States Supreme Court denied further review.  Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett (1988), 484 U.S. 1066, 108 S.Ct. 1028, 98 L.Ed.2d 992. 
7 
Civ.R. 56 provides, in part: 
 
“(A)  For party seeking affirmative relief.  A party seeking to recover 
upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment 
may, at any time after the expiration of the time permitted under these rules for 
a responsive motion or pleading by the adverse party, or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof.  If the action has been set for pretrial or trial, a motion for summary 
judgment may be made only with leave of court. 
 
“(B)  For defending party.  A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought 
may at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.  If the action has been set for 
 
60 
pretrial or trial, a motion for summary judgment may be made only with leave 
of court. 
 
“(C)  Motion and proceedings thereon.  The motion shall be served at 
least fourteen days before the time fixed for hearing.  The adverse party prior to 
the day of hearing may serve and file opposing affidavits.  Summary judgment 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the 
pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  No evidence or stipulation may 
be considered except as stated in this rule.  A summary judgment shall not be 
rendered unless it appears from such evidence or stipulation and only 
therefrom, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that 
conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary 
judgment is made, such party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation 
construed most strongly in his favor.  A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
 
61 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
 
“* * * 
 
“(E)  Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required.  
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.  
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.  The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions or by further 
affidavits.  When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided 
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial.  If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
 
62 
 
“(F)  When affidavits unavailable.  Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion for summary judgment that he cannot for 
sufficient reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or may 
make such other order as is just.” 
8 
However, we note, in passing, that we do not agree with the court of 
appeals’ legal analysis in this case insofar as certain portions of the court of 
appeals’ opinion imply that SEMC was obligated under Civ.R. 56 to set forth 
evidence that it was not negligent. 
9 
Where there are no evidentiary materials other than the pleadings, and 
the pleadings themselves demonstrate that the claimant has no cause of action, 
a motion may be made for judgment on the pleadings.  See Civ.R. 12(C).