Case Title: EDWARD ALLEN HOLCOMB V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-288

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
EDWARD ALLEN HOLCOMB V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 131165 P.3d 105Case Number: 06-288Decided: 08/16/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 

EDWARD 
ALLEN HOLCOMB,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Nicholas 
H. Carter and Kurt A. Infanger of Carter Law Office, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Paul S. Rehurek, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the sentence imposed upon the appellant after he pled guilty to felony 
stalking pursuant to a plea agreement.  
The issue presented is whether the district court abused its discretion 
or erred as a matter of law when, prior to sentencing, it denied the appellant's 
motion to withdraw his plea.  We 
reverse.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶2]      At a 
change-of-plea hearing in district court, the appellant pled guilty to felony 
stalking.  He did so pursuant to a 
plea agreement, the primary term of which was that "we have agreed to 
propose to the sentencing judge that he be considered for deferral under 
7-13-301."1  The district court accepted the guilty 
plea, but did not enter a conviction, pending completion of a presentence 
investigation report.  With specific 
regard to deferred prosecution, the following colloquy 
occurred:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  One of the things that 
applies in this situation is that the State is going to make a recommendation 
under Wyoming Statute 7-13-301, which is a deferred sentence [sic].  The final decision on that would be made 
at sentencing.  This case is Judge 
Perry's case; I'm doing the change of plea today, so that - 
-

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  I'm 
sorry.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  - - so that the trial that 
was going to start in this case on Monday can be cancelled, and we don't have to 
worry about the jury coming in and wasting their time.  At least that's what I was told, so I'm 
just going to take a 7-13-301; any other decision on the recommendations that 
might be made will be up to Judge Perry.  
He won't be bound by any of those recommendations.  If he doesn't follow any of the 
recommendation, he - - or you, I mean, will not be able to withdraw the guilty 
plea and have a trial; you'll have to live with the decision that he makes in 
this case.  Do you understand 
that?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Have you entered into this 
plea agreement voluntarily?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
[¶3]      Later in the 
hearing, after a factual basis for the crime was established, the district court 
went to great lengths to detail for the appellant what would happen if he 
received deferred prosecution and what would happen if he did not receive 
deferred prosecution:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  . . . 
.

 
 
            
Now those are both possible, ten years in jail to which a fine of up to 
$10,000 could be added if you don't receive the deferral under Section 
7-13-301.

 
 
            
And I want to explain to you as best I can under the proceedings today 
what the differences are.  I'm sure 
you and [Defense Counsel] have gone over those, but I want the record to be 
clear that you've heard those today.

 
 
            
There is a difference between getting the deferral and not getting the 
deferral.  Now in some of the things 
there's no difference, in some of the things there is a big, big 
difference.  I'll start out with one 
of the big differences.

 
 
            
If you get a deferral, there would be no jail sentence or a fine.  And if you comply with the probation, 
there would never be a jail sentence or a fine, okay?  But if you don't get the deferral, both 
of those are possible.

 
 
            
Under either situation there would be an assessment of $10 court costs; 
under either situation there would be an assessment for the Victims of Crime 
Compensation Fund in the minimum amount of $100.  Under either situation you could be 
required to make restitution.

 
 
            
There are additional consequences under either situation.  First of all, under either situation 
your guilty plea would be part of your criminal record, and a criminal record is 
permanent.  And that would be the 
case even if you get the deferred, because it would be part of the criminal 
record showing that you pled guilty and that you got the deferred, and it would 
always be there even if you were successful in getting the deferred.  And the reason is, you're only allowed 
to have one in your lifetime, so they keep a record of it so to make sure that a 
person doesn't accident[al]ly get two.  
And because of that, it could be someone might feel that you are not a 
good risk for employment, deferred or not deferred.  And under either situation it could have 
a negative affect upon your reputation in the community.  

 
 
            
Now if you get or don't get the deferred, the civil rights you lose are 
the right to vote, right to serve on a jury, right to hold public office.  Those rights would be lost until you 
received a pardon or restoration of rights, and there's no guarantee that you 
would get that.  And even if you are 
successful in probation, those rights would never be restored, they are lost 
under either.  You lose the right to 
possess or use weapons.  If you were 
on probation or parole even from a different court or a different jurisdiction, 
your probation or parole could be revoked.  
If you are on probation for a felony, you won't be eligible for a 
deferred; you have to have no prior felonies to be 
eligible.

 
 
            
If you plead guilty, you give up your right to complain about any errors 
or omissions in the charging documents, except that they failed to charge a 
crime.

 
 
            
The last thing I want to mention if there is a conviction and no 
deferred, you will have to submit a blood or tissue sample for DNA testing and 
record-keeping.  Those are the main 
consequences, although there would be others if you enter a plea of guilty.  And it would, depending upon the 
consequences, there would not be a difference of whether you get the deferred or 
not get the deferred.

 
 
            
Do you feel that you understand these consequences?

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Do you understand 
the charges 

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Do you have an 
understanding of the differences between getting a deferred and not getting the 
deferral?

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 
 
[¶4]      In addition, 
during another lengthy explanation of the effect of entering a guilty plea, the 
judge further detailed that the plea agreement entailed a recommendation for the 
sentencing judge to consider deferred prosecution:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  A guilty plea 
gives up the right to a trial.  
There would be no confrontation of witnesses, no evidence presented; the 
only issue would be what sentence should be imposed.  Although in your case it recommends a 
deferral, the Court would consider that, but first, as I told you before, once 
the Court makes a decision on any of that, you won't be able to change your 
mind. . . .

 
 
Finally, 
in summing up after accepting the plea and the factual basis, the court stated 
that it would "not enter the conviction in order to give possible consideration, 
or to give consideration to the expected recommendation for the deferred under 
Section 7-13-301."

 
 
[¶5]      Unfortunately for 
the appellant's prospects under his plea agreement, the presentence 
investigation report indicated that in 1999, he had received a "deferred 
judgment" in a Colorado case involving disturbing the peace 
and interference with police authority, both misdemeanors.  Thus, as the parties appear later to 
have agreed, he was ineligible from the outset for deferred prosecution under 
Wyoming's 
statute.

 
 
[¶6]      Prior to 
sentencing, the appellant filed a motion under W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) for permission to 
withdraw his plea.  In his motion, 
the appellant explained that an attorney had handled the Colorado charges for him and that he was not aware that he 
had received the equivalent of a Wyoming deferred prosecution.  W.R.Cr.P. 32 (d) provides as 
follows:

 
 
            
(d) Plea withdrawal.  If a 
motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made before 
sentence is imposed, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing 
by the defendant of any fair and just reason.  At any later time, a plea may be set 
aside only to correct manifest injustice.

 
 
[¶7]      The State 
contested the appellant's motion by arguing that:  (1) the State was unaware of the 
Colorado disposition when it entered into the plea agreement; (2) the appellant 
was in the best position to have knowledge of the Colorado disposition; and (3) 
the court had explained to the appellant that he would not be allowed to 
withdraw his plea if the court did not accept the plea agreement.  The district court denied the motion 
without a hearing, concluding in its decision letter that the appellant had not 
shown a "fair and just reason" to permit withdrawal of his plea.  The court then sentenced the appellant to 
a term of 18 to 48 months in the custody of the Department of Corrections, but 
suspended that sentence in favor of probation.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      A general 
statement of our role in reviewing the denial of an appellant's motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea is found in Burdine v. State, 974 P.2d 927, 929-30 
(Wyo. 1999):

 
 
A 
defendant has no absolute right to withdraw his plea of guilty prior to 
sentencing.  Grady v. State, 914 P.2d 1230, 1232 
(Wyo. 1996); Kaldwell v. State, 908 P.2d 987, 990 
(Wyo. 
1995).  The discretion afforded to 
the trial court will not be deemed abused in those cases where "the requirements 
of W.R.Cr.P. 11 have been met and the record is clear that the defendant 
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered into his plea of guilty."  Kaldwell, supra., quoting Triplett v. State, 802 P.2d 162, 165 
(Wyo. 
1990).

 
 
(Footnote 
omitted.)  Stating the test somewhat 
differently, we said the following in Herrera v. State, 2003 WY 25, ¶ 10, 64 P.3d 724, 727 (Wyo. 2003):

 
 
            
Decisions concerning whether a trial court properly denied a motion for 
withdrawal of a guilty plea, either pre-sentence or post-sentence, are 
determined under an abuse of discretion standard of review.  In deciding whether or not a trial court 
abused its discretion, this court must "determine whether the trial court could 
reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary 
or capricious."  Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 44, 46 P.3d 309, ¶ 44 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Cook 
v. State, 7 P.3d 53, 58-59 (Wyo. 2000) and Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 152 (Wyo. 
1998)).

 
 
We look 
to the following seven factors, identified in Frame v. State, 2001 WY 72, ¶ 7, 29 P.3d 86, 89 (Wyo. 2001), as pertinent in determining whether the district court 
properly exercised its discretion:

 
 
1.    Whether the defendant has 
asserted his innocence?

 
 
2.    Whether the government would 
suffer prejudice?

 
 
3.    Whether the defendant has 
delayed in filing his motion?

 
 
4.    Whether withdrawal would 
substantially inconvenience the court?

 
 
5.    Whether close assistance of 
counsel was present?

 
 
6.    Whether the original plea was 
knowing and voluntary?

 
 
7.    Whether the withdrawal would 
waste judicial resources?

 
 
[¶9]      There is more to 
the question, however, when a guilty plea has been entered pursuant to a plea 
agreement.  A plea agreement is a 
contract between the State and the appellant, and it is subject to the general 
principles of contract law.  
Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27, ¶ 13, 151 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Wyo. 2007); Browning v. 
State, 2001 WY 93, ¶ 32, 32 P.3d 1061, 1071 (Wyo. 2001).  In determining whether to allow 
withdrawal of a guilty plea, the district court should look to the terms of the 
agreement in light of the appellant's reasonable expectations at the time the 
agreement was made.  Frederick, ¶ 13, 151 P.3d  at 1141; Herrera, ¶ 12, 64 P.3d  at 727.  Where performance of the agreement is 
impossible, the State should not be allowed to retain the benefits of its 
bargain while avoiding the burdens.  
Fernandez v. State, 2006 WY 8, 
¶ 6, 126 P.3d 111, 113 (Wyo. 2006); Spencer v. State, 2005 WY 105, ¶ 13, 118 P.3d 978, 983 (Wyo. 2005); Ford v. 
State, 2003 WY 65, ¶ 17, 69 P.3d 407, 412 (Wyo. 2003).  Where performance is not possible, 
withdrawal of the plea is the correct remedy.  Fernandez, ¶ 6, 126 P.3d  at 113; Spencer, ¶ 13, 118 P.3d  at 983.  In particular, where the terms of the 
agreement do not specify what should happen when an expectation of the agreement 
cannot be fulfilled, "we are reluctant to place the risk and consequence of such 
an eventuality on the [appellant] alone."  
Ford, ¶ 17, 69 P.3d  at 
412.

 
 
[¶10]   In reviewing the district court's 
exercise of its discretion in ruling upon a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
where that plea is entered pursuant to a plea agreement, we must review these 
contract considerations, and not just the seven Frame factors set forth above.  See supra ¶ 8.  When a guilty plea has been entered 
pursuant to a plea agreement, we will review de novo the question of whether the 
agreement has been fulfilled.  Fernandez, ¶ 6, 126 P.3d  at 113; Clingman v. State, 2001 WY 46, ¶ 4, 23 P.3d 27, 28 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   The simple facts of this case 
demand reversal, not upon the district court's consideration of the Frame factors, but upon the failure of 
the plea agreement underlying the plea.  
Clearly, there was no agreement that the appellant would receive deferred prosecution, but 
there was an agreement that, in exchange for the appellant's guilty plea, the 
district court would consider deferred prosecution.  That did not happenthe district court 
never considered deferred prosecution because it was prevented from doing so by 
a mutual mistake of the parties:  
neither the State nor the appellant knew that the appellant was 
ineligible for deferred prosecution.  
The proper remedy upon collapse of the plea agreement was to allow the 
appellant to withdraw his plea.

 
 
[¶12]   The State argues that the appellant 
should be stuck with his bargain because he was in a better position to know of 
the earlier Colorado proceedings.  While that contention has some surface 
appeal, the truth is that criminal defendants often are not aware of the 
technicalities of the criminal justice system, and the truth also is that modern 
criminal information sharing systems give the State immediate access to criminal 
record information from other jurisdictions.  In the instant case, in fact, the 
existence of the Colorado deferral was discovered during 
preparation of the presentence investigation report.

 
 
[¶13]   Logic and justice combined in this 
case to create a "fair and just reason" to have allowed the appellant to 
withdraw his plea before sentencing.  
Logic suggests that the appellant would not have entered a guilty plea to 
a felony, bargaining for something he knew he could not get, and that the 
prosecutor certainly would not, to obtain a guilty plea from the appellant, 
offer a benefit that he or she knew to be illusory.  Perhaps an earlier investigation of the 
specifics of the appellant's Colorado conviction would have avoided the 
futile plea agreement, but such did not happen.  Instead, when the district court could 
not and did not consider deferred prosecution, the bargain was 
lost.

 
 
[¶14]   When a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea is determined without a hearing, as happened here, the allegations made in 
the motion should be accepted as true, unless they are contradicted by the 
record, inherently unreliable, or merely conclusions.  Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465, 468-69 
(Wyo. 
1999).  Here, the appellant stated 
in his motion that he did not realize that the Colorado disposition was equivalent to a Wyoming deferral.  Therefore, without a hearing, that 
alleged fact could not be determined otherwise in denying the plea-withdrawal 
motion.

 
 
[¶15]   We conclude that the district court 
erred in disregarding the collapse of the parties' plea agreement in denying the 
appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  This is not a case where the 
recommendation that deferred prosecution be considered was an immaterial 
condition of the agreement.  The 
lengthy quotations from the change-of-plea hearing set forth above make evident 
that the possibility of deferred prosecution was central to the change of 
plea.  See supra ¶¶ 2-4.  In fact, all the appellant received in 
exchange for pleading guilty to a felony was the expectation that the judge 
would consider a deferral.  While 
these facts are not as egregious as when a prosecutor breaches a plea agreement, 
the total failure of the consideration underlying the agreementthe fact that 
the agreement was impossible to performstill required that the appellant be 
allowed to withdraw his plea.

 
 
[¶16]   The underlying principle of law is 
the voluntariness of the plea:

 
 
            
In Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Wyo. 1993), this court set forth the standard 
for evaluating the validity of a guilty plea that results from a plea 
agreement:

 
 
            
A guilty plea is valid when it ""represents a voluntary and intelligent 
choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant."'"  Osborn [v. State], 806 P.2d [259], 271 
[(Wyo. 1991)](quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S. Ct. 366, 
369, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985) and North 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970)).  See W.R.Cr.P. 
11(d) (Former Rule 15(d)).  The 
acknowledged standard, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 
to test whether a plea is voluntary states:

 
 
            
"[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct 
consequences, including the actual value of any 
commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, 
must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper 
harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable 
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as 
having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).'. . 
."

 
 

Herrera, ¶ 17, 
64 P.3d  at 728 (quoting Brady v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1472, 
25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970)) (emphasis added).

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   Unknown to either the State or the 
appellant, the agreement that resulted in the appellant's entry of a guilty plea 
to felony stalking was impossible to perform, ab initio.  Therefore, the district court erred in 
allowing the State to retain the benefit of its bargainthe guilty pleawithout 
bearing the burdenconsideration of deferred prosecution.  The motion to allow withdrawal of the 
guilty plea should have been granted.

 
 
[¶18]   Reversed and remanded to the 
district court for entry of an order allowing the appellant to withdraw his 
guilty plea.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-13-301 (LexisNexis 2007) provides in pertinent part as 
follows:

 
 
            
(a)  If a person who has not 
previously been convicted of any felony is charged with or is found guilty of or 
pleads guilty or no contest to any misdemeanor except any second or subsequent 
violation of W.S. 31-5-233 or any similar provision of law, or any second or 
subsequent violation of W.S. 6-2-501(a) or (b) by a household member as defined 
by W.S. 35-21-102 against any other household member or any similar provision of 
law, or any felony except murder, sexual assault in the first or second degree, 
aggravated assault and battery or arson in the first or second degree, the court 
may, with the consent of the defendant and the state and without entering a 
judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings and place the person 
on probation for a term not to exceed five (5) years upon terms and conditions 
set by the court. . . .