Case Title: IN RE: THE GENERAL ADJUDICATION OF ALL RIGHTS TO USE WATER IN THE BIG HORN RIVER SYSTEM AND ALL OTHER SOURCES, STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN RE: THE GENERAL ADJUDICATION OF ALL RIGHTS TO USE WATER IN THE BIG HORN RIVER SYSTEM AND ALL OTHER SOURCES, STATE OF WYOMING2002 WY 8948 P.3d 1040Case Number: 00-296Decided: 06/14/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                            

IN 
RE:  THE GENERAL ADJUDICATION 
OF

ALL 
RIGHTS TO USE WATER IN THE

BIG 
HORN RIVER SYSTEM AND ALL

OTHER 
SOURCES, STATE OF WYOMING,

JACK 
APPLEBY, BRAD BATH, JIM BULINE,

LEAH 
HEATHMAN, HORNECKER LIVESTOCK,

INC., 
RALPH HORNECKER, TIM SCHELL,

RALPH 
URBIGKIT, RALPH F. "RUSTY" and

KATHY 
URBIGKIT, and DONALD VAN RIPER, 

Appellants(Petitioners).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Washakie County

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman,  
Judge

Representing 
Appellants:

            
 Sky D Phifer of Phifer Law 
Office, Lander, Wyoming  

Representing 
State of Wyoming:

Thomas 
J. Davidson, Deputy Attorney General, Water and Natural Resources Division; 
Keith S. Burron, Special Assistant Attorney General, of Associated Legal Group, 
LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming; and Brian C. Shuck, Special Assistant Attorney General, 
of Dray, Thomson & Dyekman, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming   

Representing 
Northern Arapaho Tribe:

Richard 
M. Berley of Ziontz, Chestnut, Varnell, Berley & Slonim, Seattle, 
Washington 

Representing 
Eastern Shoshone Tribe:

            
John Schumacher of Law Office of John Schumacher, Ft. Washakie, 
Wyoming  

Representing 
United States of America:

John C. 
Cruden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Environment & Natural Resources 
Division; John R. Green, Interim United States Attorney, and Carol Statkus and 
Thomas Roberts, Assistant United States Attorneys, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Lynn 
Johnson, Sean Donahue, and Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Attorneys, Department of Justice, 
Washington, D.C.; and Richard Aldrich, Field Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, 
United States Department of the Interior, Billings, Montana 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J.; GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.; and E. JAMES BURKE, 
D.J.

  

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      The appellants 
own lands within the Big Horn River System and claim federal reserved water 
rights as a result of their acquiring properties from Indian allottees.  These claims are known as "Walton" claims based on the federal 
court cases which first identified them. To qualify, Walton claimants must demonstrate their 
lands were irrigated by their Indian allottee predecessors or the first 
non-Indian successors irrigated the lands within a reasonable time after they 
were conveyed. The district court denied these appellants' claims (unsuccessful 
claimants) finding they failed to show beneficial use of water within a 
"reasonable time" because they relied upon the construction of the Wind River 
Irrigation Project to make the water available to their lands and the project 
was not completed until approximately ten to thirty years after transfer of the 
allotments.  Yet, the district court 
approved other Walton claims where 
transfers of the allotments to successor non-Indians occurred significantly 
later and closer in time to the completion of the irrigation project.  We reverse in part and remand with 
instructions that unsuccessful claimants who can demonstrate beneficial use 
within a reasonable time after the federal project facilities became available 
to their properties are entitled to a reserved right.  We affirm the district court's 
determination that the "reasonable time" to establish beneficial use begins to 
run when the property first passes from allotment status and is not restarted by 
a subsequent purchase by an Indian.  
We also affirm the special master's decision concerning the appropriate 
weight to be given a proof of appropriation executed in 1943 as evidence of 
actual irrigation prior to 1910.

FACTS

[¶2]      This appeal 
arises out of the continuing, comprehensive adjudication of the water rights in 
the Big Horn River System initiated in 1977 in accordance with the provisions of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-106 (LexisNexis 2001) and the McCarran Amendment, 43 
U.S.C. § 666 (1976).  The purpose of 
the adjudication was to resolve the issue of what water rights the federal 
government reserved for the Wind River Indian Reservation's benefit.  See Riverton Valley Irrigation District v. 
Big Horn Canal Association, 899 P.2d 848, 850 (Wyo. 1995) (Big Horn V).  This immense task resulted in more than 
20,000 water rights claims being winnowed down to the seventeen disputed claims 
now before this court.  Id.  Through prior appeals to this court, we 
have provided summaries of the factual and legal background of this 
litigation.  See State v. Owl Creek Irrigation District 
Members, 753 P.2d 76, 83-86 (Wyo. 1988), cert. granted in part, 488 U.S. 1040, aff'd sub nom. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 
(1989) (Big Horn I); Alexander v. United States, 803 P.2d 61 
(Wyo. 1990) (Big Horn II); In re General Adjudication of All Rights to 
Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992); Big Horn V, 899 P.2d 848. 

[¶3]      In the initial 
appeal, Big Horn I, 753 P.2d 76, this 
court was called upon to determine whether non-Indian water users could claim a 
federal reserved right with an 1868 priority date as successors in interest to 
Indian allottees who received fee lands under the General Allotment Act of 1887 
(now 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358) and reserved water rights through the 1868 Treaty of 
Fort Bridger, which established the Wind River Indian Reservation.  Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 
(1908).  Relying on the authority of 
United States ex rel. Ray v. Hibner, 
27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928), and Colville 
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981) (Walton II), we approved Walton rights and held non-Indian 
purchasers of land from Indian allottees do obtain reserved water rights with an 
1868 priority date for the practicably irrigable acreage they can show was 
irrigated by their Indian predecessors or put under irrigation within a 
reasonable time after transfer from allotment status.  Big Horn I, 753 P.2d  at 112-14.  These claims became known as Walton claims based upon a series of 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cases dealing with rights of non-Indian 
purchasers of allotments.  Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 
460 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Wash. 1978) (Walton I); Walton II, 647 F.2d 42; Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 
752 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1985) (Walton III).  The Big Horn I, 753 P.2d 76, holding was further 
clarified in Big Horn II, 803 P.2d 61.1  The matter was remanded with 
instructions that claimants be granted a reserved right if they met the burden 
of proof that their lands were either irrigated by their Indian predecessors or 
placed into irrigation within a reasonable time after the lands were transferred 
out of Indian ownership.  

[¶4]      Much of the land 
within the Wind River Indian Reservation could not be irrigated without 
construction of substantial storage and conveyance structures.  In 1905, H.E. Wadsworth, superintendent 
and special disbursing agent of the Shoshone Agency, an employee of the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, filed multiple state diversion and appropriation permit 
applications, covering over 123,000 acres of reservation land.  These state applications were made 
preparatory to the United States government's development of the Wind River 
Irrigation Project, which proposed construction of storage and conveyance 
structures to allow irrigation of reservation lands.  Throughout the development of the 
project, from 1905 through the early 1960s, the United States requested, and the 
state engineer granted for "good cause shown," numerous extensions of time to 
put the water initially claimed in 1905 to beneficial use pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
§ 41-4-506.  Progress on the 
project, which entailed the construction of a huge network of laterals, canals, 
and water storage facilities, was steady and continuous yet protracted due to 
the sheer enormity of the task, incremental appropriation and provision of 
federal funds, and intervening world events.   

            

[¶5]      In the 
adjudication of over 200 of these Walton claims, only the eleven 
claimants,  the subjects of this 
appeal, were denied reserved water rights for failure to show beneficial use of 
the water either by their Indian allottee predecessors or within a reasonable 
time after transfers of ownership.  
The special master acknowledged in her report that, absent the United 
States' assistance in constructing the Wind River Irrigation Project, irrigation 
would not have been possible on any of the Walton claimants' 
lands.

[¶6]      The special 
master and the district court referred to the unsuccessful claimants as the 
"tacking claimants" because of their assertion they were entitled to rely on the 
efforts of the United States in developing the federal irrigation project to 
establish their reasonable diligence for Walton rights.2  The unsuccessful claimants further 
asserted that, having acquired the reserved water rights through the doctrine of 
relation back, they should also be entitled to an 1868 reserved water rights 
priority date like the successful claimants.

            
 

[¶7]      The unsuccessful 
claimants' properties passed out of allotment status during the period of 
1900-1920, substantially earlier than the successful claimants' properties.  The federal project did not begin 
delivering water for use until the 1930s and 1940s.  Because of the early transfer from 
allotment status, the period between the transfer and actual use of the project 
waters by the unsuccessful claimants was ten to twenty years as compared to a 
shorter period for the successful claimants who obtained title to the Indian 
lands much closer in time to the federal project's completion.  The special master's conclusions, 
adopted by the district court, determined the unsuccessful claimants failed to 
demonstrate beneficial use within a reasonable time after the lands were 
transferred from the allottees in order to retain the federal reserved water 
rights they had acquired upon transfers of the allotments.  Instead, the special master and district 
court concluded the unsuccessful claimants held state water rights which were 
entitled to a 1905 priority based on relation back of the state permit 
applications.

[¶8]      Eleven 
unsuccessful claimants have appealed the district court's order, which affirmed 
and adopted the special master's report rejecting their claims.  The appeal also raises two additional 
questions regarding (1) the legal effect of reacquisition of land by an Indian 
after non-Indian ownership and (2) the special master's decision to reject a 
sworn proof of appropriation as credible evidence of timely irrigation of 
land.

DISCUSSION

[¶9]      The parties filed 
a Stipulation to Issues on Appeal on February 7, 2001, to "identify the 
particular issues . . . so as to eliminate the possibility of 
collateral issues being raised by the parties in the course of briefing, and to 
enable the parties to compile the documents . . . to be included in 
the joint appendix."  The parties 
agreed the three issues set out in the document were "the only issues before the Court for 
purposes of the pending appeal."  
(Emphasis added.)  Consistent 
therewith, we address these issues:3

A.  Were 
the special master and district court correct in concluding the tacking 
claimants could not rely on the United States' diligence in developing the Wind 
River Irrigation Project to "tack" or "piggy-back" to a federal reserved 
priority date of 1868 but could benefit from the federal project's state permit 
priority date of 1905?

B.  Does 
the computation of the "reasonable time" element of a Walton claim begin to run when the 
allotted property first passes out of allotment status or, in the circumstance 
of land later repurchased by an Indian owner, from the date title transfers from 
the most recent Indian owner to a non-Indian?

C.  Did 
the district court err in accepting the special master's determination that a 
proof of appropriation sworn under oath in 1943 did not provide convincing 
evidence of irrigation of parcels prior to 1910 due to the thirty-three-year 
time lapse? 

The 
first two issues clearly present legal, as opposed to factual, questions, and 
our standard of review neither affords deference nor binds this court to the 
district court's decision. Eklund v. PRI 
Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001); Ruwart v. Wagner, 880 P.2d 586, 590 
(Wyo. 1994); City of Laramie v. 
Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 202 (Wyo. 1991).  
The third issue puts a factual finding in question, and we will not disturb a specific factual 
finding unless it is clearly erroneous or against the great weight of the 
evidence.  Barton v. Barton, 996 P.2d 1, 3 (Wyo. 
2000).

A.        Can 
Walton Claimants Rely Upon the Wind 
River Irrigation Project as Evidence of Diligence?

[¶10]   Federal reserved water rights were 
appurtenant to the allotments when they were sold, and the unsuccessful 
claimants argued they should be allowed to retain those rights because the 
properties were irrigated within a reasonable time and with due diligence 
through the federal government's development of the Wind River Irrigation 
Project.  They contend the district 
court erred when it concluded as a matter of law they could not rely upon the 
construction of the Wind River Irrigation Project as evidence of due 
diligence.

[¶11]   The district court's order 
rejecting the unsuccessful claimants' claims as a matter of law because they 
relied upon completion of the irrigation project seems misguided for several 
reasons.  First, the federal law of 
reserved rights relies upon the reasonable diligence standard established in 
state prior appropriation law to determine the validity of Walton right claims, and reliance upon 
the irrigation project met that standard.  
Second, as a matter of law, the doctrine of relation back deems 
irrigation commenced in 1905 upon the filing of the permit applications, and 
this legal fiction is capable of constituting diligent exploitation of the 
reserved rights.  If the claimants 
are legally considered to have commenced appropriation in 1905, they were 
appropriating water in the eyes of the law when they acquired the 
allotments.  Third, the evidence is 
undisputed that the irrigation project's proponents recognized the value of the 
Indian water rights and acted on behalf of the landowners, both Indian and 
non-Indian, to insure state law was followed to protect those rights.  As a matter of law, development of the 
project can be considered as having been done on behalf of the allottees and 
their successors.  Fourth, Wyoming 
law is clear that irrigation projects such as this are favored, and the courts 
have allowed significant time for such projects to be completed while protecting 
the water rights upon which they rely.  
Finally, equitable treatment of all the Walton claimants demands that those who 
acquired their lands early should not be penalized for that fact when claimants 
who acquired their lands later demonstrated no more diligence and relied on the 
irrigation project in the same fashion.  
While we agree with the arguments of the Indian tribes and the federal 
government that Walton rights must be 
narrowly construed, that is so because of the disruptive impact of reserved 
rights on the administration of water rights in general.  The fact is, the courts have created 
these rights and established the rules for determining their scope.  Now, we are bound to apply those rules 
with reason and fairness.

B.        What 
Is the Standard for Reasonable Diligence for Walton Right 
Claims?

[¶12]   In order to resolve what the proper 
test is for determining "reasonable diligence" sufficient to qualify for a Walton right, we must examine the legal 
and historical context of reserved rights.  
All the Walton claimants 
acquired their Indian predecessors' shares of the federally reserved water 
rights.  Reserved rights is a 
doctrine by which "the federal government reserves public lands for particular 
purposes, it also impliedly reserves sufficient water to effectuate those 
purposes."  4 Waters and Water 
Rights § 37.01 at 218 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1996 Repl.).  Having a unique nature, these

"reserved" 
water rights are unlike riparian[4] rights 
or prior appropriation rights, although they contain elements of both.  For example, like riparian rights, 
reserved rights are appurtenant to land; that is, land ownership is the basis of 
the right.  Also like riparian 
rights, reserved rights are not lost by nonuse.  But reserved water can be used on 
nonriparian lands.  And like prior 
appropriation rights, reserved rights have priority dates which reflect the 
security of the right. . . . However, the priority date for 
reserved rights is the date of the reservation or earlier, not the date of 
diversion, as in the case of most appropriation rights.

The chief characteristic of reserved rights is 
that they are federal rights, grounded on the 
(mostly implied) intent of the federal government to reserve water for its 
purposes.  This characteristic 
serves to distinguish reserved rights from both prior appropriation and riparian 
rights.

Id. at 
218-19 (emphasis added).  

[¶13]   The United States Supreme Court 
first recognized reserved rights for Indian reservations in Winters, 207 U.S. 564.  Therein, the Supreme Court concluded the 
Indians reserved certain water rights necessary to accomplish the purpose of the 
treaty.  Although no specific 
Congressional intent can be cited, the courts have agreed that Congress would 
have intended such a reservation.  
207 U.S.  at 576.  Ultimately, 
the courts recognized the rights of individual Indians who had been allotted 
ownership of specific tracts of land within the reservationthe right to "just 
and equal" distribution of the reserved water.  United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 
530 (1939).  That right could not be lost by nonuse 
and was appurtenant to the allottee's land. 

[¶14]   Thereafter, the right of the 
individual Indian allottees to convey their lands for full value with the 
appurtenant reserved water rights to non-Indians was recognized.  Hibner, 27 F.2d 909; Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93 
(9th Cir. 1921).  The 
court in Hibner found the transferred 
reserved water right had a different status because the purpose of protecting 
the Indian does not apply to a non-Indian.  
The non-Indian, 

as soon 
as he becomes the owner of the Indian lands, is subject to those general rules 
of law governing the appropriation and use of the public waters of the state, 
and would, as grantee of the Indian allotments, be entitled to a water right for 
the actual acreage that was under irrigation at the time title passed from the 
Indians, and such increased acreage as he might with reasonable diligence place 
under irrigation, which would give to him, under the doctrine of relation, the 
same priority as owned by the Indians; otherwise, the application of any other 
rule would permit such grantee for an indefinite period to reclaim the balance 
of his land and withhold the application of the water to a beneficial use, which 
is against the policy recognized in the development of arid 
lands.

27 F.2d  
at 912.  Thus, it can be clearly seen, from 
the beginning of the courts' recognition that reserved rights could be 
transferred to non-Indians, the overriding concern was that the rights be 
"subject to those general rules of law governing the appropriation" to ensure 
their prompt utilization consistent with the "policy recognized in the 
development of arid lands." Id.  That doctrine of prior appropriation, 
which encouraged water development in the arid West, was embraced by, and in 
fact born in, the State of Wyoming.  
Robert B. Keiter & Tim Newcomb, The Wyoming State Constitution, A 
Reference Guide at 9-10 (1993).

[¶15]   The only further articulation of 
the scope and nature of the reserved rights acquired by non-Indian successors to 
allottees is contained in the three Walton decisions of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.  Walton I, 460 F. Supp. 1320; Walton II, 647 F.2d 42; Walton III, 752 F.2d 397.  The controlling maxim of those cases is 
the elusive, unarticulated but "presumed" Congressional intent.  Unfortunately, "[t]here is nothing to 
suggest Congress gave any consideration to the transferability of reserved water 
rights.  To resolve this issue, we 
must determine what Congress would have intended had it considered it." Walton II, 647 F.2d  at 49.  The court then concluded Congress did 
not intend to limit the individual Indian's right to transfer the reserved water 
right.  We suggest Congress also 
likely intended, once transferred to a non-Indian, that right would be subject 
to the generally applicable prior appropriation laws of the respective 
state.  Hibner, 27 F.2d  at 912.

[¶16]   A fundamental difference between a 
reserved right held by an Indian and one transferred to a non-Indian was that 
the Indian did not lose the right by nonuse.  In contrast, under the prior 
appropriation doctrine adopted throughout the arid West, nonuse can affect the 
termination of a water right. The concept that these rights are created by 
federal law to protect the intent of the original treaties runs throughout the 
reserved rights cases, and, while in Indian hands, reserved rights cannot be 
abridged or diminished by state law unlike a water right held by a 
non-Indian.  So, it is not 
surprising that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the non-Indian must 
exercise the reserved right he receives upon purchasing Indian land to which the 
right is appurtenant by appropriating it "with reasonable diligence after the 
passage of title."  Walton II, 647 F.2d  at 51.  This requirement balanced the allottee's 
right to transfer with the non-Indian's obligation to comply with existing state 
law and policy to diligently put the right to use.  Congress could not have intended the 
non-Indian to enjoy the perpetual nature of a right reserved to the Indian by 
treaty.  While it is not necessary 
to speculate, it does appear logical that, irrespective of the standards 
articulated by the Walton cases, the 
non-Indian would be required to use reasonable diligence to maintain any right 
acquired under state law in any event.  
It is significant no federal court considering this issue has suggested 
Congress would have intended to impose further restrictions on the transferred 
reserved right than already existed under state law.

[¶17]   What guidance do we have, then, to 
determine what constitutes reasonable diligence in this context?  In the series of Walton cases, Mr. Walton claimed federal 
reserved rights on 170 acres which had been acquired by his predecessor from an 
allottee.  Ultimately, the court 
found only thirty of those acres had been diligently irrigated over the 
years.  No specific number of years 
was announced as constituting a "reasonable time" or "reasonable 
diligence."  We 
believe it is significant the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held "[i]t is 
appropriate to look to state law for guidance" to determine diligence. Walton III, 752 F.2d  
at 400.  
Further, it was stated:

If diligently applied, 
the priority date of the water right relates back to the 
initial diversion. The tests 
developed to determine whether or not an appropriator 
has been sufficiently 
diligent in applying water to a beneficial use to justify relating 
the priority date back to 
the initial diversion are appropriate to determine how 
much water Walton's 
predecessors appropriated with reasonable diligence, after 
the passage of title.

752 F.2d  at 402 (citations omitted).  That statement 
clearly reflects the federal court's determination that, if an appropriator was 
diligent enough to justify the application of the doctrine of relation back 
recognized in prior appropriation law, he demonstrated sufficient diligence to 
successfully preserve a Walton claim.  The federal court concluded, citing Washington 
Supreme Court cases, Mr. Walton did not demonstrate the original irrigation of 
thirty acres was increased sufficiently to meet the state law standard for 
enlargement through gradual but sure increases which manifested an original 
intent to appropriate an increasing amount of water.  Walton III, 752 F.2d  
at 402-03 (citing In 
Re Waters of Doan 
Creek, 215 P. 343, 347 (Wash. 1923); In Re Water Rights in Alpowa Creek, 224 P. 29 (Wash. 
1924)).  
Clearly, had Mr. Walton met the standard for diligence established by 
state law, the court would likely have recognized a larger reserved right for 
him.  

[¶18]   No precedent exists in state or federal 
law regarding how reasonable diligence in Walton claims should be evaluated when a large, 
multi-year irrigation project is under construction at the time of the transfer 
of the allotment and must be built in order to allow irrigation of the former 
Indian lands.  
This court has adopted and relied heavily on the above federal court 
precedent concerning the existence and the scope of federal reserved rights, 
including Walton 
rights.  We 
continue to do so in resolving the proper standard for reasonable diligence in 
the context of those rights.  That clear precedent leads us back to our own 
statutes and case law to determine whether relying upon the construction of a 
permitted, large irrigation project, when no other means of irrigation is 
available, constitutes reasonable diligence in putting the lands into 
irrigation.

C.        Legal 
Effect of Relation Back to 1905

[¶19]   No one disputes these unsuccessful 
claimants were within the Wind River Irrigation Project.  The permits filed in 
1905 constituted the initial step in perfecting water rights for their lands 
under state law.  
So long as that project proceeded at a reasonable pace and received 
proper extensions from the state engineer allowing additional time for the 
project to be completed and so long as the claimants ultimately irrigated their 
lands with project waters, the application of the doctrine of relation back 
directs these claimants be legally considered as having begun irrigation in 
1905. 

[¶20]   The doctrine of relation back has been 
long recognized in Wyoming jurisprudence in both case law and statute.  See Campbell v. Wyoming Development Co., 55 Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124 (1940); Van Tassel Real Estate & Live Stock Co. v. City of 
Cheyenne, 49 Wyo. 333, 54 P.2d 906 (1936); Moyer v. Preston, 6 Wyo. 308, 44 P. 845 (1896); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-4-506, 
41-3-401(a), 41-4-512 (LexisNexis 2001).  The doctrine invokes the "principle by which, 
when an act is done at one time, it is considered, by a fiction of law, as if 
done at some antecedent time."  2 Clesson S. Kinney, A Treatise on the Law of 
Irrigation and Water Rights § 743 at 1284-85 (2d ed. 1912).  The courts adopted 
the doctrine solely for the purpose of justice founded in law, reason, and 
convenience based on broad equitable principles.  Id. at 1285.  Water law borrowed this property doctrine to 
protect the appropriator against intervening filings that could subordinate his 
expected priority between the filing of the permit for an appropriation and the 
actual physical appropriation.  A. Dan Tarlock, Law of Water Rights and 
Resources § 5:62 at 5-104 (2001).  Hence, "[p]riority is determined from the date 
of the manifestation of intent, not the date of actual application of the water 
to beneficial use."  
Id.  

[¶21]   Relation back has always been a flexible 
doctrine generally used to protect the parties' expectations when an unexpected 
event occurs.  
Id. at 
5-105.  Its 
application in water law has been necessary to stimulate investment in water 
development. As it was initially developed, relation back was applied to small 
ditches and less complex means of water development.  Id.  Considerable delays 
in putting water to use suggested speculation and could result in loss of early 
priority.  Id.  However, 
contemporary water projects often entail extended planning, financing, and 
construction lead times, and, without application of the relation back doctrine, 
the security of the project's water right could be undermined.  Id.  This court has 
noted:

"The law [. . .] does not require impossibilities 
of the appropriator; neither does it require him to do vain or useless things. 
. . ."

            
. . . "[T]he full enjoyment of the water attempted to be 
appropriated does not, of course, commence until the works are finally completed 
and capable of conducting all of the water; but[, as] against all others[] 
subsequently attempting an appropriation of the waters of the same stream, the 
right of the first appropriator to the use of the water dates or relates back, 
by what is known as the doctrine of relation."

Van Tassel Real Estate & Live Stock Co., 54 P.2d  at 913 (quoting 2 Kinney, A Treatise on the Law of 
Irrigation and Water Rights, supra, § 740 at 1280, § 
741 at 1281).  
Relation back encourages the development of water resources by allowing 
prospective appropriators to initiate appropriation and then complete financing, 
engineering, and construction aspects of their projects with the understanding 
that, with diligent pursuit and development, their rights will become absolute 
upon beneficial use with a priority date of the initial action. 94 C.J.S. Waters § 365 
(2001).  
However, it does not encourage or promote speculation in water rights 
which have no reasonable probability of maturing into completed 
appropriations.  
Id.

[¶22]   In Campbell, we 
referred to the doctrine of relation back as the "right of gradual 
development"5 stating, "courts ought not, we think, take it 
upon themselves to declare that the right of gradual development was taken away 
from the defendant company as a matter of law by the mere fact that the 
development was slow."  
100 P.2d  at 144.  Further, work on one part of a system may 
constitute reasonable diligence in the completion of the entire system for the 
purpose of demonstrating reasonable diligence in development of the 
appropriation.  
94 C.J.S. Waters, supra at § 365; City of Lafayette v. New 
Anderson Ditch Company, 962 P.2d 955, 961 (Colo. 1998) (en banc).  Over time, other 
courts have also responded by adapting the doctrine to better address complex 
projects.  New Anderson Ditch 
Company, 962 P.2d  at 961; Dallas Creek Water Company v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27 (Colo. 
1997) (en banc); Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation v. 
Intake Water Company, 558 P.2d 1110 (Mont. 1976).  

[¶23]   The doctrine of relation back is 
significant in this case because the unsuccessful claimants can be considered to 
have begun irrigation at the time the permits were filed for the federal 
projectthat is, 1905and,  as a matter of law, the claimants should be 
considered to have been acting diligently at the time they acquired the reserved 
rights from their allottee successors. 

D.        Wind River 
Irrigation ProjectIntended to Benefit Allottes and Their Successors       

[¶24]   The unsuccessful claimants assert the 
irrigation project, permitted through the state by an employee of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, was intended to facilitate beneficial use of the reserved water 
rights.  The 
record strongly supports the conclusion the federal government's construction of 
the project and compliance with Wyoming state water law requirements were 
intended to allow beneficial use of the Indian reserved rights.  The original 
applications for permits to divert, executed by Mr. Wadsworth as superintendent 
and special disbursing agent of the Shoshone Agency, indicate he is the 
applicant in his official capacity and the use to which the water will be 
applied is "the irrigation of Indian lands hereinafter described."  In a letter to the 
state engineer dated October 10, 1918, W. S. Hanna, the supervising engineer of 
the United States Indian Irrigation Service, succinctly explained the policy 
reasons behind the Indian Irrigation Service's many filings in observance of 
Wyoming state law:

My understanding[6]of the Indian Service attitude in this matter is briefly as 
follows.  
Various court decisions have established beyond dispute the prior rights 
of the Indians to sufficient water for the irrigation of their lands.  The filing of 
requests for permits and requests for extensions of time for proof of beneficial 
use in compliance with the Wyoming State laws has been systematically followed 
out.  This plan 
of procedure was suggested in the Act of 1905 which [c]eded a portion of the 
original Indian Reservation.  In my opinion the object of this proce[]dure 
is two-fold-viz.  
Giving public notice of the prior rights of the Indians and the 
protection of the water rights of purchasers of Indian lands by permitting such 
purchasers to submit to your office proof of beneficial use and to receive 
certificate designating the date of the original filing as their priority 
date.  The 
latter is of extreme importance as large areas [of] the Indian irrigated lands 
are rapidly passing into white ownership and it is imperative that water rights 
and especially priorities of water rights be protected as practically the entire 
value of this land for agricultural purposes is dependent on the validity of the 
water right.

            
. . . .

. . . [T]racts are constantly being sold to 
white men and in order to safe-guard the interests of these white men and allow 
them, after purchasing the land, to have sufficient time in which to make proof 
of beneficial use, we wish to secure any necessary extensions of time for proof 
of beneficial use in accordance with the Wyoming State laws.

This letter was written after the Winters case made it 
clear the Indians had reserved rights in the treaties which would be extremely 
valuable given their early priority date.  

[¶25]   From the beginning, the United States 
government's clear purpose was to protect and provide water to the Indian 
lands.  The 
requests for extensions were also intended to permit the non-Indian purchasers 
to maintain the water rights they acquired from the Indian allottees by allowing 
beneficial use when the water was finally available through development of the 
project.  
Furthermore, the United States government dealt with the project and 
lands within the project as single enterprise as evidenced by the affidavit of 
Louis Twitchell, former project manager and an employee of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs Irrigation Department for over thirty years.  Of particular note, 
Mr. Twichell's affidavit reflects:

4.  In 1957, the BIA was still developing and 
constructing project structures pursuant to the original permit applications 
submitted to the State of Wyoming in 1905.  A lot of laterals to serve the project lands 
were built after 1957.

5.  Any preexisting private ditches that may have 
served the lands under this claim were subsumed into the project when the 
project encompassed those lands.  If lands were classified under the project as 
assessable, those lands have to pay their pro rata share of the project 
assessments.  

6.  All of the BIA ditches are run as one 
project.  Money 
collected for operation and maintenance charges are spent project wide. 

  

[¶26]   This evidence demonstrates the project 
was intended to irrigate all the lands within the project.  Though progress was 
incremental, it was evident and frequently reported to state water 
officials.  Any 
private ditches were subsumed by the project when it encompassed the land upon 
which those ditches were located.  One can infer whatever individual expense and 
effort were made to put private ditches in place pending arrival of the project 
facilities would be a temporary benefit to be replaced by the project 
facilities.  
Moreover, those assessable properties within the project were financially 
invested in the construction through their pro rata share of project 
assessments. 

[¶27]   The tribes argued that the non-Indian 
successors did not rely upon the existence of the reserved rights when they 
purchased the allotments.  While the legal significance of that fact is 
arguable, history suggests the opposite.  The letter from the project proponents 
specifically noted the value of the Indian rights as a direct result of the 
court decisions recognizing such rights, and, without water, the allottees' 
lands would be valueless.  On the other side of the transaction, the 
non-Indian buyer certainly had notice of the existence of those rights and the 
on-going irrigation project that would allow those rights to be realized.  It stands to reason 
the value of the lands within the project area increased after 1905 with the 
proposed construction of the federal irrigation project.  Accordingly, it must 
be assumed that most, if not all, sales of allotments within the project area 
after that time were with the expectation project waters would ultimately be 
available to those parcels for irrigation. 

[¶28]   A fundamental precept of the doctrine of 
reserved rights and the General Allotment Act of 1887 was to allow Indians 
owning allotted lands to sell the property in fee for full value conveying 
therewith the appurtenant water rights to the same extent non-Indians could sell 
fee lands with appurtenant water rights.  Absent that, the right to sell the land would 
be all but worthless to the Indian allottee.  Walton I, 460 F. Supp.  at 1328; Big Horn I, 753 P.2d  
at 112-13.  By 
the same reasoning, it is incongruent on one hand to hold the Indian allottees 
could sell their reserved water rights with their lands for full value but on 
the other hand to effectively render the reserved rights worthless because, at 
the time of transfer, the irrigation project which would allow beneficial use of 
the reserved water was incomplete.  Recognizing that we find ourselves at a place 
in history which requires us to presume what parties would have intended almost 
a century ago while at the same time knowing they were not sufficiently 
clairvoyant to foresee the courts' development of the requirements for a Walton right, we 
conclude the irrigation project, which allowed exploitation of the Indian 
reserved rights, had to have had an effect on both the value paid and received 
for the allotments and the actions on the part of the individual non-Indian 
successors to develop the water rights received with their purchases.  The project was 
constructed to benefit the reserved rights, and our application of the diligence 
test required for Walton claims must reflect that reality.

[¶29]   Relying on the due diligence of others 
to qualify for a water right essentially by proxy finds support in Wyoming case 
law:

A man cannot apply for water, or divert it, for idle 
purposes.  He 
must claim it, if he wants to separate it from the unappropriated body of 
water.  But the 
claim need not, we think, be personal in the sense that no one else can reap the 
benefit thereof.  
That was virtually held in Rutherford v. Lucerne Canal & Power Company, 12 Wyo. 
299, 313, 75 P. 445.  
In that case one Pratt made the application and received the permit.  The Lucerne Canal 
& Power Company, which he and others organized, adopted it, proceeded under 
it, though it was not assigned to it, and diverted the water pursuant 
thereto.  The 
court held that a third party could not take advantage of the fact that Pratt 
did not personally fulfill the requirements of the permit.  A ditch company in 
Colorado which diverts water is treated as an intermediate agent for the 
ultimate user of the water.  Farmers' High Line Canal & Reservoir Company v. 
Southworth, 13 Colo. 111, 130, 21 P. 1028, 4 L.R.A. 767; Wyatt v. Larimer & 
Weld Irrigation Co., 18 Colo. 298, 308, 33 P. 144, 36 Am. St. Rep. 280.  The water user, in 
such case, receives the benefit of the intent of the ditch company.  After all, 
. . . no matter who may initiate the right, if it is perfected 
the general purpose of an appropriation is 
accomplished. . . . No good reason, accordingly, appears, if the law is complied 
with in other respects, why a man should be forbidden to act as volunteer for 
another in connection with the steps leading up to a perfected 
appropriation.

Scherck v. Nichols, 55 Wyo. 4, 95 P.2d 74, 79 (1939) (some citations omitted 
& emphasis added).  
The district court's decision as a matter of law to ignore the diligence 
demonstrated by the project on behalf of the claimants was erroneous.

[¶30]   Pursuant to § 41-4-506, permit 
applicants are allowed five years to complete a project and five more years to 
provide beneficial use.  The state engineer can, for "good cause 
shown," grant extensions of the original construction deadline period.  Section 
41-4-506.  This 
court noted in Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement 
District, 578 P.2d 1359, 1365-66 (Wyo. 1978):

[Section] 41-4-506 finds its genesis in the common-law 
concept of due diligence which, in the context of water law, has been expressed 
as follows:

[T]he law does not require any unusual or extraordinary 
efforts, but it does require that which is usual, ordinary, and reasonable.  The diligence 
required in the prosecution of the construction of all works necessary for the 
diversion and application of water in an attempted appropriation of the same is 
that constancy or steadfastness of purpose or labor which is usual with men 
engaged in like enterprises, and who desire a speedy accomplishment of their 
designs.

2 Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, p. 1269.

[¶31]   Over the many decades of the project's 
development, numerous applications for extension were filed that explained the 
progress made since the last request for extension and reported additional 
irrigated acreage.  
By way of example, the August 28, 1920, extension request letter sets 
out:

The Ray Ditch Main Canal was completed many years ago.  The Enlargement of 
the LeClair-Riverton No. 3 was completed in 1916.  In each case the lateral system is not yet 
complete and some portions of the lands under the systems are unable to receive 
water at the present time.  Work has been carried on each year on every 
Government system on this Project but our Congressional appropriations have been 
so reduced that it has been impossible to complete the lateral system on any one 
unit. . . . [O]nly a small portion of the most urgent work 
could be accomplished.

The extension request letter of September 24, 1926, is 
similar if a bit more positive in developments:

Also during the period of the last extension there has been 
considerable extension work done on the lateral systems of the various units 
making it now possible to reach many tracts that were not previously able to 
receive water deliveries. . . . [T]he final completion of the 
construction work on the lateral systems is therefore dependent on the amounts 
appropriated for this purpose.

[¶32]   All the requested extensions were 
granted exhibiting the state engineer's conclusion that good cause was shown and 
adequate progress was being made on the project to warrant protecting the rights 
created by the original permit applications.  We view the fact the project took more than 
fifty years to finish as not truly relevant.  What constitutes reasonable time depends upon 
the circumstances in each case and particularly upon the magnitude of the 
enterprise and the difficulties encountered.  Campbell, 100 P.2d  at 142.  "The question of 
diligence must be determined in the light of all factors . . 
. including the size and complexity of the project; . . . the economic 
ability of the claimant; and the intervention of outside delaying factors such 
as wars, strikes and litigation." Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Twin Lakes 
Reservoir and Canal Company, 468 P.2d 853, 856 (Colo. 1970) (en banc) (citations 
omitted).  As 
long as a water system as a whole is being completed with due diligence, it is 
inconsequential that a part of it proceeds slowly.  The priority applies 
to the whole project. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Twin Lakes 
Reservoir and Canal Company, 506 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Colo. 1973) (en 
banc).  

[¶33]   The true concern is whether it was 
continually developed over time without any significant gaps indicating 
termination or some other significant work stoppage.  Lengthy development 
periods for complex projects are not unknown in our state. The water project in 
Van Tassel was 
thirty-three years in duration, and the irrigation project in Campbell took over 
forty-five years to complete. Van Tassel Real Estate & Live Stock Co., 54 P.2d 906; Campbell, 
100 P.2d 124.  
Both projects were deemed to have been diligently developed, and those 
efforts were attributed to the individual appropriators.  We see no authority 
for treating the holder of a Walton right any differently.

            

[¶34]   The district court found:

8.  The Tacking Claimants can not rely upon the 
diligence of the United States in constructing water conveyances to their 
property.  They 
may, however rely upon the diligence of the United States under its state permit 
to provide the Tacking Claimants with a priority date of 1905 
. . . .

Although the order does not explicitly provide a reason for 
that conclusion, presumably the court believed such reliance failed to 
demonstrate the claimants' "individual" diligence.  However, 
inconsistently, the court held the unsuccessful claimants could rely on the 
project for their individual diligence under state law.    

[¶35]   The district court confirmed the special 
master's definition of reasonable diligence by finding:

This Court is convinced that a better policy would be to 
address this problem in a two step process.  First, proof of irrigation within five years 
of acquisition raises a presumption of reasonableness.  This presumption can 
be rebutted as there may be cases when water and a means of applying it to the 
land was readily available during the five years after acquisition but was not 
applied.  

The second and more difficult step in this process arises 
when water is not applied to the land within five years after its sale by the 
allottee. . . . Should not reasonableness encompass other 
factors such as intent, distance and/or obstacles to the water source and 
diligence?  This 
Court believes that it should.  In the event that water is not applied to a 
beneficial use within five years, the second step would be to look at the due 
diligence of the allottee's successors in applying water to a beneficial 
use.

The district court further qualified the "reasonable time" 
description as follows:

There should be no time limit on extensions as measured in 
days, months or years.  
It is a factual issue to determine whether the allottee's successors 
demonstrated "that constancy or steadfastness of purpose or labor which is usual 
with men engaged in like enterprises, and who desire a speedy accomplishment of 
designs."  Each 
claim must be determined on its own merits.  If a claimant can make such a showing, the 
Court will infer reasonableness regardless of the time period after which the 
allotment was first sold.  

[¶36]   Despite the district court's careful and 
accurate description of how "reasonable diligence" should be determined, it 
rejected the unsuccessful claimants' claims, concluding instead, as a matter of 
law, they could not rely on the gradual development of the federal project over 
the ten- to twenty-year period after they acquired title to their 
allotments.  We 
believe the legally appropriate approach would have been for the district court 
to follow its own outline for determining reasonable diligence and take the same 
approach evidenced by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals when it applied 
Washington state "due diligence" law to ascertain how much of Mr. Walton's 
acreage had been diligently irrigated and thus was entitled to a reserved right 
priority date. Walton 
III, 752 F.2d  at 402-03.  We conclude the district court incorrectly 
ignored state law regarding "reasonable time" and instead found there must be a 
showing the claimants made an individual effort to irrigate the lands during the 
time the federal project was under way but incomplete.  

[¶37]   The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found 
any restriction on transferability would result in a diminution in value of the 
Indian's reserved right which must be supported by clear Congressional 
intent.  Walton II, 647 F.2d  
at 50.  Nowhere 
did Congress indicate its clear intent, nor do we believe it would have so 
intended, that transferees of allottees needed to meet a more stringent 
diligence standard than required for all other water right claimants. We find no 
authority for concluding the reasonable diligence required for a Walton right and 
that required to maintain a state water right are different in kind or quality. 

[¶38]   We are persuaded by the state's argument 
that a consequence of the district court's order was the successful claimants 
received preferential and inconsistent treatment as compared to the treatment 
the unsuccessful claimants received.  By way of specific example, we look to two 
claims, successful Claim No. 250 and unsuccessful Claim No. 243.  Claim No. 250, 
transferred out of allotted status in 1944, was first irrigated by project 
waters in 1947 and was found to qualify for the reserved priority.  Claim No. 243 on the 
other hand passed out of allotment status in 1923, the project sublateral was 
available to the land in 1936, and irrigation occurred in 1940.  Claim No. 243 was 
irrigated seven years earlier than Claim No. 250, yet it was denied the Walton right for 
failure to meet the "reasonable time" requirement.  Still, the 
unsuccessful claim was deemed to have been developed diligently enough to secure 
a 1905 priority.  
We can find no support for such disparate treatment in the federal law of 
reserved rights.

[¶39]   The state correctly notes the factual 
distinctions between successful claimants and unsuccessful claimants fell into 
three categories:  
(1) The unsuccessful claimants generally had lands transferred out of 
Indian ownership significantly earlier than the successful claimants, thus 
increasing the time between allotment transfer and beneficial use; (2) the 
federal project facilities were not extended to the unsuccessful claimants' 
lands until later phases of the project were completed, also thereby increasing 
the time between allotment transfer and beneficial use; and (3) in some 
instances individual unsuccessful claimants may not have acted diligently to 
irrigate after the federal project facilities became reasonably available to 
serve their lands.  
The state proposes, in order to equalize the "reasonable time" standard 
between all claimants, that the unsuccessful claimants be required to 
demonstrate what lands were put under irrigation with due diligence after the federal 
project facilities became available to the property.  We are persuaded 
this is the appropriate standard for the unique factual circumstances this 
dispute presents.  

[¶40]   We are dealing in legal fictions 
intended to impart justice in a reasoned and equitable manner.  2 Kinney, A Treatise 
on the Law of Irrigation and Water Rights, supra, § 743 at 
1285.  The 
"project availability" standard, for lack of a better term, considers all 
factors and still requires a showing of the individual diligence of the 
allottees' successors once water was available.  It does not, however, create a different 
standard for claimants due to either an earlier date or a later date of transfer 
from allotment status or availability of project water.  

[¶41]   The tribes and the United States argue 
the district court's order must be affirmed because Walton rights must 
be narrowly interpreted to limit their destabilizing effect.  At this juncture, we 
are talking about seventeen claims in addition to the approximately 200 
successful claims.  
We can reasonably infer the "destabilizing effect" is minimal.  Further, nothing in 
this opinion expands the nature or quality of Walton rights or 
reserved rights.  
Instead, we are simply applying our state law of "reasonable time" and 
"due diligence" to the Walton claimants.  We would be remiss if we ignored our state law 
because of an unfounded fear that our holding somehow erodes federal reserved 
rights.  It does 
not.  

[¶42]   The tribes and the federal government 
also argue the purpose of the "reasonable time" requirement for Walton rights is to 
assure the non-Indian successor intended to make use of the allottee's right to 
put water to use.  
This argument is reminiscent of language from Hibner we cited previously 
that "the application of any other rule would permit such grantee for an 
indefinite period to reclaim the balance of his land and withhold the 
application of the water to a beneficial use."  27 F.2d  at 912.  Simply because the non-Indian was forced to 
wait for this irrigation project, which was well known to the public and 
proceeding diligently, does not indicate a lack of intent to use the water, nor 
does it create an indefinite period of delay which may encourage speculation or 
uncertainty in water rights administration.  If the non-Indian successor took individual 
action diligently once water was available, that is satisfactory evidence of his 
original intent.  

[¶43]   As noted previously, the special master 
acknowledged in her report that, absent the United States' assistance in 
constructing the Wind River Irrigation Project, irrigation would not have been 
possible on any of the Walton claimants' lands.  It appears no one contests this 
determination.  
If there had been a reasonable means to irrigate any of these properties without 
the project, the Walton standard and state law would require the 
irrigation be accomplished through the due diligence of the individual successor 
to the allottee.  
We have no intention of altering that requirement by this decision.  We hold, under the 
circumstances of this case and presuming irrigation was not possible absent the 
project, in order to establish beneficial use of the reserved water within a 
reasonable time to retain the federal reserved right, the unsuccessful claimants 
must demonstrate their efforts to put the lands under irrigation within a 
reasonable time and with due diligence, as defined by state law, after the federal 
project facilities became available to the properties.  We remand for 
proceedings consistent with this determination.  We anticipate such further proceedings should 
not require substantial additional evidentiary proceedings; however, this is 
difficult to tell because the record submitted did not provide the special 
master's report and recommendation for all claims and, for this reason, is 
incomplete.  The 
district court must decide whether sufficient evidence exists in the record to 
determine individual claimants did or did not act with reasonable diligence 
after the federal project water was available to their lands. 

G.        G.  
"Reasonable Time" Element Dates from Transfer by Original Indian 
Allottee

[¶44]   In two of the claims subject to this 
appeal, the properties were transferred from allotment status into non-Indian 
ownership, subsequently were sold to Indian purchasers, and then were conveyed 
again to non-Indian purchasers.  The appellants contend the determination of 
the "reasonable time" element should run from the most recent conveyance out of 
Indian ownership.  
The district court held the calculation of "reasonable time" begins when 
the allotted property first passes out of allotment status, and we agree.

[¶45]   As noted above, this court in Big Horn I, 753 P.2d 76, 
relied, in large part, on the precedent of Walton II, 647 F.2d 42, to hold that non-Indian purchasers of land from Indian allottees obtain 
reserved water rights.  
In Walton 
III, 752 F.2d  at 402 (emphasis added), it was made even clearer that the 
pivotal element was the transfer from the allottee:

A careful reading leaves no doubt that the immediate 
grantee of the original 
allottee must exercise due diligence to perfect his or her inchoate 
right to the allottee's ratable 
share of reserved waters. This interpretation is supported by our 
reference to Walton II in subsequent cases.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1984) 
("use it or lose it"); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1417 (9th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 3536, 82 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1984).

[¶46]   In Big Horn I, 753 P.2d  
at 114 (emphasis added), we said:

We have already held that a non-Indian purchaser from an Indian allottee 
obtains a reserved water right with a treaty priority date, and that his 
non-Indian successor would likewise succeed to the treaty priority date.  There is no reason then 
to deny the same priority to an Indian or tribal purchaser. 

The clear meaning is that an Indian and/or tribal purchaser 
from an Indian allottee would obtain the same reserved water right with treaty 
priority date as a non-Indian purchaser from an Indian allottee. 

[¶47]   To hold, as the appellants suggest, that 
any interim purchase by an Indian would restart the computation of "reasonable 
time" would irrevocably undermine the integrity and finality of the water rights 
adjudication process.  
There would be no certainty of priority dates because mere repurchase by 
an Indian successor anywhere in the chain of title would restart the "reasonable 
time."  Further, 
such a holding could, and perhaps invariably would, lead to collusive 
transactions by those willing to find a "straw man"7 for the precise 
purpose of thwarting established priority dates.  Therefore, we affirm this portion of the 
district court's decision and hold the calculation of "reasonable time" begins 
with the immediate grantee of the original allottee. 

H.        H.  
Consideration and Weight Given 1943 Proof of Appropriation by the Special 
Master and as Adopted by the District Court

[¶48]   The district court, affirming the 
special master, discounted the evidentiary value of a sworn proof of 
appropriation executed in 1943 offered by Brad Bath to prove beneficial use of 
water on the subject land before 1910 for Parcels B-2, B-3, and B-5.  Mr. Bath was 
attempting through the document to establish irrigation within a "reasonable 
time" to qualify for the Walton right.  The special master stated:

There is evidence that none of the Singing Rabbit allotment 
was being irrigated the year before it was first sold to a non-Indian in 
1909.  Herschel 
Griffin testified that the allotment was under irrigation about 1920.  That would be 11 
years after the sale.  
The statement in the proof that beneficial use of the water was completed 
before 1910 is hardly convincing because the proof was filed 33 years after that 
date.  
Therefore, there was no credible evidence that the land was put under 
irrigation within a reasonable time after its first sale to a non-Indian.

 [¶49]  Mr. Bath argues the proof of appropriation was 
uncontradicted and unimpeached by the tribes and the United States.  Therefore, according 
to Mr. Bath, the court erred by rejecting the evidence.

[¶50]   This issue may have been rendered moot 
by our holding that unsuccessful claimants, including Mr. Bath, may establish 
the "reasonable time" factor by demonstrating due individual diligence to 
utilize reserved waters once project facilities were made available to their 
properties.  
Because it cannot be determined from the extant record whether Mr. Bath 
did exercise such individual diligence, we will consider the matter.

[¶51]   It is well established that "[t]he 
burden of proof is on the party asserting the affirmative of any issue.  Morrison v. Reilly, 
Wyo., 511 P.2d 970 (1973).'" Big Horn I, 753 P.2d  at 90 (quoting Osborn v. Manning, 
685 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Wyo. 1984)); see, e.g., Younglove v. Graham & Hill, 526 P.2d 689, 
693 (Wyo. 1974) (holding burden of proof is on one asserting an affirmative 
defense); Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Apodaca, 524 P.2d 874, 
879 (Wyo. 1974).  
The objection involves the sufficiency of the evidence. When addressing a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence question, this court looks at only the evidence most 
favorable to the prevailing party, giving it every favorable inference and 
leaving out of consideration entirely evidence in conflict therewith.  Big Horn I, 753 P.2d  
at 89; Allstar Video, 
Inc. v. Baeder, 730 P.2d 796, 798 (Wyo. 1986); Wangler v. Federer, 
714 P.2d 1209, 1216-17 (Wyo. 1986); Tremblay v. Reid, 700 P.2d 391, 392 (Wyo. 1985); City of Rock Springs v. 
Police Protective Association, 610 P.2d 975, 980 (Wyo. 1980).  In this same vein, 
we will not disturb a specific factual finding unless the finding is clearly 
erroneous or against the great weight of the evidence.  Barton, 996 P.2d  at 
3; Murphy v. 
Stevens, 645 P.2d 82, 85 (Wyo. 1982); Shores v. Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895, 899 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶52]   We cannot conclude the special master's 
discounting the evidentiary value of the proof of appropriation was clearly 
erroneous.  It 
is the fact-finder's role to evaluate the evidence as well as weigh the 
witnesses' credibility. DeWitt v. State, 917 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Wyo. 1996).  Neither of the 
individuals who signed the document testified at the hearing, and Herschel 
Griffin's live testimony indicated the date of the first beneficial use was in 
the time frame of 1920.  The evidence of the actual irrigation was 
obviously very sparse, and the special master had the opportunity to observe the 
witness giving testimony.  We cannot supplant the fact-finder's judgment 
absent overwhelming contrary evidence and, therefore, affirm.

SUMMARY

[¶53]   We acknowledge the extraordinary and 
thoughtful efforts of the district court and the special master in this 
litigation.  
However, we conclude requiring allottees' successors in the Wind River 
Irrigation Project to demonstrate irrigation within a reasonable time after the 
project water became available to the properties is the proper standard for Walton rights under 
the circumstances of this case.  We reverse in part and remand for further 
proceedings consistent herewith.  Further, we affirm both the district court's 
determination the "reasonable time" calculation begins when allotted property 
first passes out of allotment status and the weight given by the special master 
to the 1943 proof of appropriation for the Bath claim. 

[¶54]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded.

FOOTNOTES

  1"Both Indian allottees and non-Indian successors of 
Indian allottees are entitled to reserved water rights with treaty priority 
dates for the practicably irrigable acreage they are able to demonstrate was 
either irrigated by their Indian predecessors or put under irrigation within a 
reasonable time after it was conveyed."  Big Horn II, 803 P.2d  at 70.

2We decline to use the 
"tacking claimants" and "tacking claim" terminology.  As will be seen 
through the course of the Discussion section of this opinion, we are of the 
belief the majority of the successful claimants also relied on the United States 
government's diligence in constructing the Wind River Irrigation Project to 
establish their 1868 priority date.  For the sake of clarity and accuracy, we 
prefer to refer to the various Walton claimants discussed in this opinion as the 
"successful claimants" and  the "unsuccessful claimants." 

  3The issues as framed in the stipulation cited to 
various numbered paragraphs and pages of the Amended Judgment and Decree (August 
30, 2000); the Judgment and Decree (July 30, 1992); and Special Master Dolan's 
May 4, 1992, Report.  
The document references have been removed, through paraphrasing, to make 
the relevant questions more readily discerned.   The original language provided:

Issue 1 (tacking):  Are the Amended Judgment and Decree's (August 30, 2000) Findings 
of Fact Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8 and Conclusions of Law Nos. 5 (reasonable time 
element only) and 6, correct with respect to Claim Nos. 243, 244, 262, 286, 287, 
288, 291, 292, 293, 324, 351, 371, 375, and 379?  See Exhibit "A" attached hereto for citations of the 
referenced findings and conclusions.  And;

            
Are the Judgment and Decree's (July 30, 1992) 
Finding of Fact No. 10, Conclusion of Law No. 1 (last sentence only), and the 
Judgment and Decree Ruling Nos. 1 (last sentence only) and 11 correct with 
respect to Claim Nos. R2 (Hornecker Livestock, Parcels 1 and 4), R8 (DHB & 
Co. and PLB & Co., Parcels 2, 3, and 5) and R16 (Ralph F. "Rusty" and Kathy 
Urbigkit, Parcel 2)?  
Note:  In this appeal, no party contests the rule of 
law established in the first two sentences of said Conclusion of Law No. 1 and 
Judgment and Decree Ruling No. 1, but each party reserves the right to argue the 
application of said ruling to the claims referenced under this Issue No. 1.  See Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto for citations of the referenced findings, conclusions, and 
Judgments.

            
Issue 2 
(recent Indian owner):  Are the Amended 
Judgment and Decree's (August 30, 2000) Finding of Fact No. 9 and Conclusion 
of Law No. 7, set forth below, correct with respect to Claim Nos. 286, 287, and 
288?  See Exhibit "A" for 
citations of the referenced findings and conclusions.

            
Issue 3 
(credible evidence):  
Was the Judgment and Decree's (July 30, 
1992) adoption of Special Master Dolan's recommendation to deny Walton water rights 
with respect to Claim No. R8 (DHB & Co. and PLB & Co., Parcels 2, 3, and 
5) correct, (specifically referring to the findings and conclusions found at pp. 
32-38 of Master Dolan's May 4, 1992 Report)?  See Exhibit "B" attached hereto, containing pp. 32-38 of 
said Report.

4Riparian rights are

the rights of the owners of lands on the banks of 
watercourses, relating to the water, its use, ownership of soil under the 
stream, accretions, etc.  Term is generally defined as the right which 
every person through whose land a natural watercourse runs has to benefit of 
stream as it passes through his land for all useful purposes to which it may be 
applied.

Black's Law Dictionary 1327 (6th ed. 1990).  

 5"[T]he discussion in [Van Tassel] of the 
doctrine of relation--the right of gradual development--is applicable 
herein."  Campbell, 100 P.2d  
at 142.

6Mr. Hanna later in the 
letter clarifies that his view of the matter is "substantially the view of the 
Indian Office in the matter of water rights on the Wind River Indian 
Reservation." 

7Straw man or party is 
described as:

A "front"; a third party who is put up in name only 
to take part in a transaction.  Nominal party to a transaction; one who acts 
as an agent for another for the purpose of taking title to real property and 
executing whatever documents and instruments the principal may direct respecting 
the property.  
Person who purchases property for another to conceal identity of real 
purchaser, or to accomplish some purpose otherwise not allowed.

Black's Law Dictionary 1421 (6th ed. 
1990).