Case Title: PEGGY ANN COOK BLACK, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate V. WILLIAM INSULATION COMPANY, INC., a Wyoming corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
PEGGY ANN COOK BLACK, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate V. WILLIAM INSULATION COMPANY, INC., a Wyoming corporation2006 WY 106141 P.3d 123Case Number: 05-249Decided: 08/29/2006
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 

PEGGY ANN COOK BLACK, Individually and as Personal 
Representative of the Estateof 
Richard Black, Deceased,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
WILLIAM INSULATION COMPANY, INC., aWyoming corporation,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLincolnCounty

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Sharon 
M. Rose of Lavery & Rose, P.C.; Evanston, 
Wyoming; and Elizabeth Greenwood of Pinedale, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Rose.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Murphy and Jakob Z. Norman of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C.; 
Casper, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Murphy.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      On January 21, 
2004, David Ibarra-Viernes fell asleep while operating his motor vehicle on U.S. 
Highway 189.  The vehicle crossed 
the center line and collided with another vehicle, killing Richard Black 
(decedent).  Peggy Ann Cook Black 
(Black), individually and as personal representative of the estate of her late 
husband filed a wrongful death action against Ibarra-Viernes's employer, William 
Insulation Company, Inc. (WIC), alleging that it negligently required 
Ibarra-Viernes to commute long distances and work long hours without providing 
proper training or safeguards, breaching a duty to the public to prevent its 
employees from traveling to or from work when exhausted and tired.  The district court granted WIC's motion 
for summary judgment concluding that there was no duty owed by WIC to the 
decedent under the circumstances. We agree and affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Black sets out 
two issues on appeal:

 
 

1.      
Did the 
trial court err in failing to recognize a duty of care from an employer to 
innocent third parties who are injured, or in this case, killed by its employees 
who are exhausted due to the working conditions imposed by the employer and thus 
fall asleep at the wheel[?]

 
 

2.      
Did the 
trial court err in granting summary judgment and summarily dismissing 
Appellant's negligent misrepresentation claim[?]

 
 
WIC 
responds with the following statement:

 
 
Whether 
the District Court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendant/employer 
when it found that Wyoming law does not, and should not, impose a legal duty of 
reasonable care on Wyoming employers to protect the motoring public from the 
negligence of their off-duty employees when those off-duty employees drive 
to-and-from their Wyoming worksites in their personal vehicles outside the scope 
of their employment.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In 2003, WIC was 
hired as a subcontractor on an expansion project (the project) at the 
Exxon/LaBarge Shute Creek Plant (the Plant).  The Plant is located in a remote area of 
southwest Wyoming approximately twenty-six and 
forty miles from the nearest population centers, Green River and Kemmerer respectively.  Given the remoteness of the worksite, WIC 
provided a thirty dollar per day subsistence pay to each of its employees to 
defer part of the cost of a motel room or apartment in Green River or Kemmerer.  WIC did not require its employees to 
spend the money on lodgings.  The 
employees were free to spend it (or not) as they deemed fit.  Another alternative was provided by The 
Industrial Company (TIC), the general contractor on the project.  TIC arranged for buses to transport its 
employees daily to and from Evanston, Green River, and Kemmerer and the Plant.  The buses were made available by TIC to 
the employees of its subcontractors; however, WIC's project manager erroneously 
informed his employees that they could not ride the buses because there was only 
room for TIC's employees.1 

 
 
[¶4]      Ibarra-Viernes 
was hired by WIC in the fall of 2003 and by January of 2004, he was working on 
the project.2  Ibarra-Viernes received the thirty 
dollars a day subsistence pay from WIC but he elected to make the commute from 
his home in Evanston, 
Wyoming, to the plant, which was 
ninety miles away.  Ibarra-Viernes 
carpooled with a group of co-workers, who took turns driving.  Ibarra-Viernes's work schedule was Monday 
through Friday, 7 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. with a half hour lunch and no, or minimal, 
breaks.  In addition to his 
employment with WIC, Ibarra-Viernes worked a second job at night washing dishes 
at a restaurant.3

 
 
[¶5]      Ibarra-Viernes 
completed his regular shift on Tuesday, January 20, 2004, and returned to 
Evanston at 8:30 
p.m.  He then worked his second job 
before going to bed around 11:00 p.m.  Ibarra-Viernes rose at 4:00 a.m. to get 
his vehicle and collect his co-workers for the daily commute to the Plant where 
he worked his normal shift.  The 
carpool, with Ibarra-Viernes driving, left the Plant around 6:00 p.m.  Shortly thereafter near milepost 25 on 
U.S. Highway 189, Ibarra-Viernes's 
vehicle crossed the centerline and collided head-on with a vehicle in which 
Black's decedent was a passenger.

 
 
[¶6]      On December 7, 
2004, Black filed a wrongful death action in the district court against WIC. 
 She alleged that WIC owed a duty of 
care to other travelers on the highway to prevent injury caused by employees who 
had become exhausted after being required to commute long distances and work 
long hours.  Black claimed that WIC 
breached that duty and was negligent by, among other things, "failing to take 
precautionary measures to prevent employees from becoming so exhausted that they 
pose a threat of harm to the traveling public and failing to provide alternative 
transportation to its exhausted employees or in the alternative, failing to 
provide living quarters to its employees within a reasonable distance from the 
plant site."  WIC filed a motion for 
summary judgment. After a hearing, the district court granted the motion 
concluding that WIC did not owe a duty to the decedent.  Black appeals that 
determination.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]                              
When we review the granting of a summary judgment, we employ the same 
standards and use the same materials as were employed and used by the trial 
court. We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party 
who opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record. Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine 
issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would 
have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of 
action or defense which the parties have asserted. We review a grant of summary 
judgment deciding a question of law de novo and afford no deference to the trial 
court's ruling.

 
 

Burnett 
v. Imerys Marble, Inc., 2005 
WY 82, ¶ 10, 116 P.3d 460, 462 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Act I, LLC v. Davis, 2002 WY 183, 
¶ 9, 60 P.3d 145, 148 (Wyo. 2002)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      We recently set 
out in detail the analytical framework for determining whether a duty 
exists:

 
 
"Whether 
a legal duty exists is a question of a law, and absent a duty, there is no 
liability." Bevan v. Fix, 2002 WY 43, 
¶ 46, 42 P.3d 1013, 1027 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Bowen v. Smith, 838 P.2d 186, 198 
(Wyo. 1992) 
(Brown, J., concurring)).

 
 
"  "Duty" 
is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is 
entitled to protection.'" [Anderson v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, 
¶ 44, 49 P.3d 1011, 1024 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195 
(Wyo. 1986)).] 
* * * A duty may arise by contract, statute, common law, "or when the 
relationship of the parties is such that the law imposes an obligation on the 
defendant to act reasonably for the protection of the plaintiff." Hamilton v.  
Natrona 
County 
Educ. 
Ass'n, 901 P.2d 381, 384 (Wyo. 1995). The legal question to be answered 
by the court is

 
 
"  "whether, 
upon the facts in evidence, such a relation exists between the parties that the 
community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the other  
or, more simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered 
invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant. This is 
entirely a question of law, to be determined by reference to the body of 
statutes, rules, principles and precedents which make up the law; and it must be 
determined only by the court." '"

 
 

Thomas 
By Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water and Sewer Dist., 702 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts, § 37 at 
206 (4th ed. 1971) and Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Wyo. 1983).

 
 
In 
deciding whether to adopt a particular tort duty, a court's focus must be much 
broader than just the case at hand:

 
 
"[T]he 
courts have merely reacted to the situation in the way in which the great mass 
of mankind customarily react,' and that as our ideas of human relations change 
the law as to duties changes with them. Various factors undoubtedly have been 
given conscious or unconscious weight, including convenience of administration, 
capacity of the parties to bear the loss, a policy of preventing future 
injuries, the moral blame attached to the wrongdoer, and many others. Changing 
social conditions lead constantly to the recognition of new duties. No better 
general statement can be made than that the courts will find a duty where, in 
general, reasonable persons would recognize it and agree that it exists." 
Prosser & Keaton on Torts, § 53, pp. 357-359 (5th ed. 
1984).

 
 
"* * * 
The judge's function in a duty determination involves complex considerations of 
legal and social policies which will directly affect the essential determination 
of the limits to government protection. Consequently, * * * the imposition and 
scope of a legal duty is dependent not only on the factor of foreseeability ([Cunis v. Brennan] 56 Ill. 2d 372, 375, 
308 N.E.2d 617) but involves other considerations, including the magnitude of 
the risk involved in defendant's conduct, the burden of requiring defendant to 
guard against that risk, and the consequences of placing that burden upon the 
defendant. [Citations.]" Nelson by Tatum 
v. Commonwealth Edison Company, 124 Ill. 
App. 3d 655, 662, 80 Ill. Dec. 401, 465 N.E.2d 513, 519 
(1984).

 
 

Mostert 
v. CBL & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Wyo. 1987). In Gates, 719 P.2d  at 196, we further 
detailed the factors to be considered:

 
 
Some of 
the key policy factors to be considered are: (1) the foreseeability of harm to 
the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's 
conduct and the injury suffered, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) 
the policy of preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the 
defendant, (7) the consequences to the community and the court system, and (8) 
the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 342, 83 A.L.R. 3d 1166 (1976).

 
 

Killian 
v. Caza Drilling, Inc., 2006 
WY 42, ¶ 8, 131 P.3d 975, 979-80 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Borns ex rel. Gannon v. Voss, 2003 WY 
74, ¶¶ 30-31, 70 P.3d 362, 273-74 (Wyo. 2003)).

 
 
[¶9]      Before we can 
proceed to our analysis, we must identify the nature of the duty that Black 
seeks to impose on WIC.  Black 
insists that she is not seeking to impose a duty through vicarious liability or 
to establish a broad duty of care for an employer to control an off-duty 
employee's conduct.  Instead, she 
argues that an employer has an obligation to ensure that the conditions of 
employment do not cause an employee to become fatigued and, to the extent that 
they do, the employer has a duty to take reasonable actions to protect the 
traveling public from the foreseeable consequences of those employees traveling 
from their worksite. 

 
 
[¶10]   Essentially, the question of duty 
that we must determine in this case is whether WIC's actions and/or inactions 
prior to the accident created a foreseeable risk of harm that the employer had a 
duty to guard against.  In other 
words: whether or not Ibarra-Viernes's fatigue arose out of, and in the course 
of, his employment.  See Van Devander v. Heller Electric Co., 
Inc., 405 F.2d 1108, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Gene P. Bowen, Note: Wherein 
Lies the Duty? Determining Employer Liability for the Actions of Fatigued 
Employees Commuting From Work, 42 Wayne L. Rev. 2091, 2109-10 (1996). 

 
 
[¶11]   We turn to the first Gates factor: The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff. 
 We recently stated that this 
factor is essentially a consideration of proximate cause:

 
 
Proximate 
cause is explained as "the accident or injury must be the natural and probable 
consequence of the act of negligence."  Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., 
735 P.2d 722, 726 (Wyo. 1987); followed 
in, Natural Gas Processing Co. v. 
Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Wyo. 1994); Lynch v. Norton Const., Inc., 861 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Wyo. 1993).  The ultimate test of proximate cause is 
foreseeability of injury.  Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light 
Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Wyo. 1989); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 
414 (Wyo. 
1983).  In order to qualify as a 
legal cause, the conduct must be a substantial factor in bringing about the 
plaintiff's injuries.  Natural Gas Processing Co., 886 P.2d  at 1186; Stephenson, 779 P.2d  at 
1178.

 
 

Turcq v. 
Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 51 (Wyo. 1997) (emphasis added).  In considering the concept of proximate 
cause, we have noted not only what constitutes proximate cause but what does 
not:

 
 
In Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791, 793 
(1921), this court first defined proximate cause as "[t]hat which, in a natural 
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces 
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."  This same definition has been relied upon 
in recent years. Robertson v. TWP, 
Inc., 656 P.2d 547 (Wyo. 1983); Kopriva v. Union Pacific R. Co., 592 P.2d 711 (Wyo. 
1979).  In Lemos v. Madden, supra, 200 P.  at 794, the court also 
rejected a "but for" rule of causation, stating:

 
 
"* * * 
But if the original wrong furnished only the condition or occasion, then it is 
the remote and not the proximate cause, notwithstanding the fact that there 
would have been no loss or injury but for such condition or occasion. * * 
*"

 
 
In later 
cases our court has identified legal causation as that conduct which is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injuries identified in the complaint. 
McClellan v. Tottenhoff, Wyo. 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983); Chrysler Corporation v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978); Phelps v. Woodward Construction Co., 66 
Wyo. 33, 33, 204 P.2d 179 (Wyo. 1949).  The obvious rationalization of that 
approach with the two propositions found in Lemos v. Madden, supra, is that if the 
conduct is "that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by a 
sufficient intervening cause produces the injury, without which the result would 
not have occurred," it must be identified as a substantial factor in bringing 
about the harm.  If, however, it 
created only a condition or occasion for the harm to occur then it would be 
regarded as a remote, not a proximate, cause, and would not be a substantial 
factor in bringing about the harm.

 
 
An 
alternative method for explaining these concepts is found in the discussions of 
intervening cause in our cases.  McClellan v. Tottenhoff, supra; Koprina v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra; Gilliland v. Rhoads, 539 P.2d 1221 
(Wyo. 1975); Fagan v. Summers, 498 P.2d 1227 
(Wyo. 1972); and Tyler v. Jensen, 75 Wyo. 249, 295 P.2d 742 (Wyo. 1956). An intervening cause is one that 
comes into being after a defendant's negligent act has occurred, and if it is 
not a foreseeable event it will insulate the defendant from liability. It is 
reasonably foreseeable if it is a probable consequence of the defendant's 
wrongful act or is a normal response to the stimulus of the situation created 
thereby.

 
 
                        
Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1091-92 (Wyo. 
1985).

 
 

Killian, 
¶ 20, 131 P.3d  at 985. 

 
 
[¶12]   The question then is whether or not 
WIC's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the death of the 
decedent.  Or more precisely, a 
showing of causation necessitates a showing that Ibarra-Viernes's work was a 
substantial contributing factor to his fatigue.  Bowen, 42 Wayne L. Rev., supra, at 2108, n.73.  This means that for an "employer to be 
liable for the actions of a fatigued employee on a theory of negligence, the 
fatigue must arise out of and in the course of employment  [because]  [t]o 
hold otherwise would charge an employer with knowledge of circumstances beyond 
his control."  Id. at 2109. 
Naturally then, the scope of an employer's duty is "bound by activity that the 
employer can actually control within the employment relationship." Id.

 
 
[¶13]   Black contends that the accident 
was a foreseeable consequence of WIC's conduct.  Specifically, she claims that it was 
foreseeable that the large influx of workers into the remote, rural area where 
the Plant was located would cause traffic problems and that despite being aware 
of this, WIC required its employees to work long hours and make long commutes. 
 She argues that workers who were 
commuting and working twelve to fourteen hours a day would not have sufficient 
time in the day to take care of life activities and still get sufficient sleep. 
 Given these conditions, Black 
contends that without employer supplied alternatives such as bus transport, it 
was foreseeable that sleep deprived workers would likely fall asleep and cause 
injury to other travelers on the roads. 

 
 
[¶14]   We begin by noting that we are 
puzzled by Black's emphasis on the apparent traffic problems created by the 
influx of workers into the area by the project.  Black stresses throughout her brief the 
dangerous conditions the increased traffic created on the rural roads 
surrounding the Plant.  After noting 
that WIC's President acknowledged the traffic problems, Black states what 
follows in the portion of her brief addressing this Gates factor:

 
 
Likewise, 
TIC witnesses acknowledged that traffic problems were created when workers were 
rushing to get home because they had little time in the day for any other 
activities. TIC provided the bus as a "safety precaution" because of all the 
above factors, but due to [WIC's] refusal to allow David Ibarra and his 
coworkers to use that safety precaution, two people are dead and five were 
seriously injured. When the consequence of an act or omission is "predictable 
and severe", this factor weighs in favor of establishment of a duty of care. In 
this case the fatal crash was predictable and foreseeable.

 
 
Black 
defined the issue before us as whether or not there was "a duty of care from an 
employer to innocent third parties who are injured, or in this case, killed by 
its employees who are exhausted due to the working conditions imposed by the 
employer and thus fall asleep at the wheel."  Our puzzlement is derived from an 
inability to determine the relevance of the alleged traffic problems on the 
roads around the project and that workers "rushed to get home" with the 
contention that the accident was caused by the employee falling asleep at the 
wheel of his vehicle due to his working conditions.  There is no evidence in the record that 
Ibarra-Viernes was driving in an unsafe or reckless manner in a "rush to get 
home."  There is no evidence that 
any condition of the road or of the traffic caused or contributed to this 
accident.  All that the evidence 
shows is that Ibarra-Viernes was fatigued and he fell asleep while driving, 
causing his vehicle to cross the centerline into oncoming traffic.  There is perhaps an inference that the 
increased traffic affected the length of Ibarra-Viernes's commute, contributing 
to his fatigue, but Black does not make that argument and there is no supporting 
evidence in the record.  We decline 
to speculate in that direction.  Since we are concerned with the factors 
that caused or contributed to Ibarra-Viernes's fatigue, we will confine our 
analysis to those facts relevant to that consideration, and to the extent that 
Black's argument is predicated on irrelevancies, we will not consider 
it.

 
 
[¶15]   The most obvious factor within the 
employer's control that could cause fatigue in an employee is the number of 
hours the employee is required to work.  On the day of the accident and those 
preceding it, Ibarra-Viernes worked his normal shift of ten hours.  A ten-hour shift within a 
twenty-four-hour period is not, on its face, an objectively unreasonable period 
of work when compared with those situations where an employer was held liable 
for the damages caused by a fatigued employee driving home from work.  Compare Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563, 
568-69 (W.Va. 
1983) (employee required to work thirty-two consecutive hours) and Faverty v. McDonald's Restaurants of Oregon, 
Inc., 892 P.2d 703, 705 (Ore. App. 1995) (eighteen-year-old employee worked 
twelve and a half hours in a seventeen-hour period). Crucially, in both of those 
cases, the employer had actual knowledge of their employee's fatigued state. 
Id. There is no evidence that WIC had notice 
that Ibarra-Viernes was fatigued on the day of the accident. 

 
 
[¶16]   Black seeks to expand 
Ibarra-Viernes's hours of work to include the time of his commute claiming that 
WIC "required" him to make the lengthy drive to and from the Plant citing WIC's 
refusal to allow its employees to ride the buses provided by TIC.  First, Black cites no authority for the 
proposition that WIC was required to provide its employees with alternatives, 
such as busing, to commuting.  See 
Bowen, 42 Wayne L. Rev., supra, at 
2112-13 (noting that no court has held that an employer is under an affirmative 
duty to institute policies to guard against fatigue in the workplace though 
commenting that to the extent such policies are adopted, they may mitigate a 
determination that a breach of duty has occurred).  Furthermore, WIC did, in fact, provide an 
alternative to long distance commuting for its employees:  WIC provided its employees, including 
Ibarra-Viernes, with a daily thirty dollar subsistence payment to partially 
offset the cost of taking lodging closer to the worksite.  Ibarra-Viernes, however, elected to 
pocket that money and commute every day from his home in Evanston.  That was a voluntary choice made by 
Ibarra-Viernes.

 
 
[¶17]   In making her argument, Black fails 
to address a significant factor: Ibarra-Viernes's decision to work a second job. 
 After returning to Evanston upon completion 
of his work day for WIC, Ibarra-Viernes would go to a second job at a 
restaurant.  On the night before the 
accident, Ibarra-Viernes stated that he returned home about 8:30 p.m. and then 
went to work his second job.  Ibarra-Viernes said he got to bed around 
11:00 p.m. that night.  Certainly, 
the second job had an affect on Ibarra-Viernes's ability to get rest, if not 
actual sleep.  Ibarra-Viernes 
admitted that he normally got only about five to six hours of sleep a night. 
 Nevertheless, Black neglects to 
discuss the consequences of the second job in her brief.  Her failure to do so seriously undermines 
her argument.

 
 
[¶18]   In Depew v. Crocodile Enterprises, Inc., 63 Cal. App. 4th 480, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673 (Cal. 
App. 1998), the employee worked a seventeen and a half hour shift, had sixteen 
hours off, and then fell asleep on the way home after working a six-hour shift. 
 The court explained that the 
employee was responsible for managing his time off work:

 
 
Indeed, 
in light of [the employee's] 16-hour break between shifts, he "should be charged 
with the ability to manage his time in accord with the nature of his job. The 
employer had every reason to assume that the employee, upon reporting to work, 
had received sufficient rest in the previous [16] hours, just as an employer 
whose employees report to work on Monday morning has every right to assume that 
those employees received sufficient rest over the weekend." (Note, Wherein Lies the Duty? Determining Employer 
Liability for the Actions of Fatigued Employees Commuting From Work (1994) 
42 Wayne L. Rev. 
2091, 2098-99, fn. 31.) To the extent [the employee] was too tired to drive home 
without causing a fatal crash, his condition was neither an "outgrowth" of his 
employment nor "  "inherent in the working environment." ' " [Citation 
omitted.]

 
 

Depew, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d  
at 679. Ibarra-Viernes had thirteen and a half hours between shifts during the 
work week.  The burden was on him to 
manage his own time to ensure that he was capable of performing his job.  Ibarra-Viernes elected to expend a 
significant portion of his time making a lengthy commute and working a second 
job.  These were voluntary decisions 
made by Ibarra-Viernes for which he is responsible.  Under these circumstances, it cannot be 
said that his employment was the substantial factor in contributing to 
Ibarra-Viernes's fatigue. 

 
 
[¶19]   We conclude that decedent's 
injuries were not the "natural and probable consequence of" any acts of 
negligence by WIC in the course of Ibarra-Viernes's employment; rather, the 
decisions and conduct of Ibarra-Viernes were the substantial factor that brought 
about the injuries.  Since the harm 
to Black's decedent was not a foreseeable consequence of WIC's actions (or 
inactions), we decline to impose a duty under the circumstances.  Given this conclusion, the remaining Gates factors are not persuasive, and we 
decline to discuss them.

 
 
[¶20]   There remain two additional issues 
that we will briefly discuss.  First, Black suggests that the Industrial 
Development Information and Siting Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-12-101 through 
35-12-119, may provide a basis for finding a duty of care on the part of WIC or, 
at a minimum, satisfy the Gates 
factor of finding a "policy of preventing future harm" in favor of imposing a 
duty.  Black's argument is moot 
insofar as it relates to the Gates 
factors given our finding on foreseeability.  As for the claim that the Act could be an 
independent basis for imposing a duty, Black has failed to provide a cogent 
argument.  Her brief does not 
contain a statement of the issue setting forth this claim. W.R.A.P. 7.01(d). 
 The Act is cited once in Black's 
main brief and no analysis of the Act's language within the context of this case 
is provided.  She does present some 
semblance of an analysis in her reply brief.  However, the reply brief is not the 
proper forum for that argument.  A 
reply brief is intended "to allow the appellants the opportunity to address 
issues and arguments raised by the appellees."  RT 
Communications, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 11 P.3d 915, 927 (Wyo. 
2000).  Given the lack of cogent 
argument, we decline to consider the matter.

 
 
[¶21]   Finally, Black contends that the 
district court erred in dismissing a negligent misrepresentation claim.4  Her claim is that even if there was no 
duty of care, WIC might be liable for the negligent misrepresentation made by 
WIC's project manager when he informed WIC's employees that they could not ride 
the TIC buses.  This claim is not 
properly before us.  We said 
recently:

 
 
This 
distinction is important in the instant case because, although the Birts briefed 
and argued non-disclosure in their appeal, they did not allege it in their 
complaint nor was it ruled upon by the district court. Consequently, 
non-disclosure as a separate tort is not properly before this 
Court.

 
 

Birt v. 
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 2003 
WY 102, ¶ 43, 75 P.3d 640, 657 (Wyo. 2003).  Black did not plead negligent 
misrepresentation, and the district court did not rule on such a claim.  She contends that the claim is 
sufficiently implicit in her complaint to have given notice of it.  That may be; however, there is nothing in 
the record establishing that the claim was made to the district court.  We generally will not consider issues 
raised for the first time on appeal.  Yates v. Yates, 2003 WY 161, 
¶¶ 18-20, 81 P.3d 184, 190 (Wyo. 2003).  We decline to do so 
here.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶22]   Under the circumstances of this 
case, the defendant employer did not owe a duty to the plaintiff's decedent. 
 The district court order granting 
the defendant summary judgment is affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1The parties 
bitterly dispute this point.  Black 
cites deposition testimony from the president of TIC, who stated that 
subcontractor employees could ride the buses and that he did not know of any 
reason why WIC employees could not, and statements from Ibarra-Viernes that he 
was not allowed to ride on the buses.  
In contrast, WIC cites two affidavits: (1) from TIC's subcontract 
superintendent on the project who states that he informed WIC's project manager 
that "WIC employees could not ride the buses that TIC had arranged for its 
employees" and that he was authorized by TIC to convey that information to WIC; 
and (2) from TIC's subcontract coordinator on the project who averred that he 
was present when WIC was informed that its employees could not ride the TIC 
buses.  For purposes of summary 
judgment, the district court presumed that the evidence cited by Black, as the 
party opposing the motion, was true.  For purposes of this appeal, we do 
likewise.

 
 

2In her 
brief, Black stresses that Ibarra-Viernes was not legally in the country.  Black asserts that WIC had a practice of 
hiring illegal aliens and cites this as a factor in imposing a duty.  Black has not asserted a claim of 
negligent hiring, see Cranston v. Weston 
County Weed and Pest Board, 826 P.2d 251, 258 (Wyo. 1992), and she cites no 
evidence (nor could we find any) supporting any allegation that Ibarra-Viernes's 
residential status was a causative factor in the accident.  Accordingly, Ibarra-Viernes's residential 
status is not relevant to our duty inquiry, and it plays no part in our 
analysis.

 
 

3WIC had no 
knowledge of Ibarra-Viernes's other employment.

 
 

4Black 
asserted in her main brief that a claim for negligent misrepresentation had been 
raised before the district court.  
No citation to the record was provided in support of that assertion. 
 We were unable to find any 
reference to such a claim in the record before us.  It is not the duty of this Court to scour 
the record to find confirmation of party assertions; it is the duty of the 
proponent to support their position with proper citation to the record.  W.R.A.P. 7.01.