Case Title: JUSTIN DEAN EICKBUSH v. LISA ANN EICKBUSH

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0030

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
JUSTIN DEAN EICKBUSH v. LISA ANN EICKBUSH2007 WY 179171 P.3d 509Case Number: S-07-0030Decided: 11/09/2007Modified: 11/16/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 

JUSTIN 
DEAN EICKBUSH,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.LISA ANN 
EICKBUSH,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from theDistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

DaNece 
Day of Lubnau & Bailey, PC, Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

No 
appearance.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This appeal 
arises from the divorce proceeding of Appellant, Justin Dean Eickbush 
("Father"), and Appellee, Lisa Ann Eickbush ("Mother").  In a pretrial conference, Father's 
attorney represented to the district court that the parties had reached an 
agreement on custody and that the parties would exercise shared custody, 
alternating weekly.  When the 
parties later were unable to agree on the terms of custody, Mother filed a 
motion to enforce the settlement agreement.  At a hearing, Mother insisted that their 
agreement should be enforced; however, Father contended that shared custody was 
not in the children's best interests and he should be awarded primary 
custody.  The court enforced the 
agreement and ordered shared custody.  
Father appeals from that order.  
For reasons set forth below, we will reverse and remand for a custody 
hearing.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The dispositive 
issue here is whether the district court abused its discretion in granting 
Mother's motion to enforce the settlement agreement and ordering shared custody. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Father filed a 
complaint for divorce on October 27, 2003.  
After the divorce was initiated, Mother and Father decided to attempt to 
repair the marriage and determined that the best way to do so was to finalize 
the divorce and remarry, hoping for a fresh start.  On October 7, 2004, they filed a 
stipulated motion to bifurcate the proceedings requesting the district court 
enter a divorce decree, but allowing them six months to work out their marital 
issues and remarry.  On October 13, 
2004, a decree of divorce was entered without addressing issues of custody, 
visitation, property or debt, and allowing the parties six months to 
remarry.

 
 
[¶4]      The attempt at 
repair and reunification was unsuccessful, and on January 10, 2006, Father filed 
a motion for temporary custody, support, and temporary possession of the 
residence.  A trial was set for 
November 20, 2006.  A scheduling 
conference was held on March 28, 2006.  
We are not provided with a transcript of that proceeding; however, the 
record indicates that Father's attorney represented to the district court that 
the parties had agreed to shared custody, with the parenting time split 
equally.  Following the scheduling 
conference, a series of communications occurred aimed at formalizing that 
agreement, and the parties exchanged proposed orders reflecting their 
understanding of the agreement.

 
 
[¶5]      The parties were 
unable to reach an agreement, and on July 13, 2006, Father requested that the 
setting be amended to allow eight hours for trial (instead of the four 
previously agreed upon), stating that he "did not believe the issue of custody 
is agreed upon as was earlier reported to the Court at a scheduling conference 
give (sic) the course of dealing between the parties since that time."  The trial was rescheduled for one full 
day.  On October 11, 2006, Mother 
filed a motion to enforce the agreement, asserting that the parties had agreed 
to joint legal custody with physical custody alternating weekly.  In his response to Mother's motion, 
Father asserted that he should be awarded primary physical custody and contended 
that the family therapist would testify that the week-on, week-off custodial 
arrangement was not in the children's best interests.

 
 
[¶6]      On November 20, 
2006, the district court held a hearing to address Mother's motion to enforce, 
as well as all other outstanding issues regarding the division of the marital 
estate.  Although the family 
therapist had been issued a subpoena to testify at the hearing, only Mother and 
Father provided testimony regarding their respective positions.  At the close of the hearing, the district 
court took the matter under advisement.

 
 
[¶7]      On December 6, 
2006, the district court issued an order awarding joint legal custody and shared 
physical custody, alternating weekly.  
Although the order roughly defined the week-on, week-off custody 
schedule, it contained no specific findings regarding the disputed question of 
whether this arrangement was in the children's best 
interests.

 
 
[¶8]      Father filed a 
timely notice of appeal.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      In this 
appeal, Father challenges the district court's shared custody order.  The standard of review utilized when 
reviewing a district court's custody determination is well 
established:

 
 
Custody, 
visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the sound discretion 
of the district court. Scherer v. Scherer, 931 P.2d 251, 253-54 (Wyo. 1997); Triggs v. Triggs, 920 P.2d 653, 657 (Wyo. 1996); Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 352 (Wyo. 1995). It has been 
our consistent principle that in custody matters, the welfare and needs of the 
children are to be given paramount consideration. Scherer, 931 P.2d  at 254; Rowan v. 
Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 890 
(Wyo. 1990); see also Gurney v. 
Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 
(Wyo. 1995); and Fink v. Fink, 685 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1984). The 
determination of the best interests of the child is a question for the trier of 
fact. "We do not overturn the decision of the trial court unless we are 
persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of a violation of some legal 
principle." Fink, 685 P.2d  at 36.

 

 
A court 
does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances. Pinther v. Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 440 (Wyo. 1993)). Our review 
entails evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the district 
court's decision, and we afford the prevailing party every favorable inference 
while omitting any consideration of evidence presented by the unsuccessful 
party.  Triggs, 920 P.2d  at 657; Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 351 (Wyo. 1994).  Findings of fact not supported by the 
evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great weight of 
the evidence cannot be sustained.  Jones v. Jones, 858 P.2d 289, 291 (Wyo. 1993).  Similarly, an abuse of discretion is 
present "when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored.'" 
 Triggs, 920 P.2d  at 657 (quoting Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 996 (Wyo. 1993)).

 
 

Pahl v. 
Pahl, 2004 WY 
40, ¶ 6, 87 P.3d 1250, 1252 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 
(Wyo. 1998)). 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   Even when parties agree on the 
issue of custody, "[i]t is well settled that the district court is not bound to 
accept a stipulation of the parties and that the court's major consideration in 
determining custody of minor children is the welfare of those children."  Forbes v. Forbes, 672 P.2d, 428, 429 
(Wyo. 1983); see also Fink v. Fink, 685 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1984).  In fact, "[c]ourts have a duty to disregard, if necessary, agreements 
entered into by parents and to make provision for the proper support and care of 
minor children according to their best 
interests."  
Grosz v. Grosz, 506 P.2d 46, 48 (Wyo. 1973).  This obligation arises because although 
the settlement agreement significantly impacts the children, they are not 
parties to the contract nor are they typically represented in the negotiation 
thereof.  Id.   Finally, the district court must consider 
the interest of the children at the time of the hearing, not at the time the 
parties separated or some other time prior to the hearing.  Morris v. Jackson, 66 Wyo. 369, 212 P.2d 78, 82 
(1949).  

 
 
[¶11]   We have repeatedly said that 
divided or shared custody is not favored by this Court absent good reason 
therefore.  Martin v. 
Martin, 798 P.2d 321, 322 
(Wyo. 1990); Feaster v. Feaster, 721 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Wyo. 1986); Fink, 685 P.2d  at 36 n.1; 
Forbes, 672 P.2d  at 430; 
Ayling v. Ayling, 661 P.2d 1054, 1055 n.3 (Wyo. 1983). 

 
 
There 
are several reasons for our reluctance to embrace the concept, but first and 
foremost is the recognition that stability in a child's environment is of utmost 
importance to the child's well-being, and divided custody places the stability 
of a child's environment at risk. Whether termed "divided," "shared," or "joint" 
physical custody, "a measure of instability is inherent" in the arrangement. 
 Gurney [v. Gurney], 899 P.2d [52,] 55 
[(Wyo. 
1995)].  We do not dispute that there may be cases 
where joint or shared physical custody may approximate the former family 
relationships more closely than other custodial arrangements, or for other good 
reason may be in the best interests of the children.  However, divided physical custody may not 
be indiscriminately substituted for an award of sole custody to one parent in 
order to appease one party.

 
 

Reavis 
v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 432 (Wyo. 1998).  

 
 
[¶12]   In the present case, we must 
evaluate whether, based on the record before us, the district court abused its 
discretion in ordering shared custody.  
Essentially, we must determine whether the award of shared custody is 
contrary to the evidence, or whether the district court's "best interest" 
determination was factually supported.  
Unfortunately, the district court's order contained no specific findings 
concerning the factors it considered in deciding to award shared custody.  Therefore, the hearing transcript 
provides the only record evidence of the district court's reasons for awarding 
shared custody.  After the parties 
had presented their respective arguments on custody, the district court made the 
following statements:

 
 
From the 
evidence that has been adduced, the Court concludes there was an agreement, and 
the Court is going to enforce that agreement, and the agreement was for joint 
custody with physical custody week on and week off, and from a legal standpoint 
that it was joint custody.

            
Now, the question becomes whether or not that is in the best interests of 
the children, because the Court doesn't have to enforce their agreements if the 
Court concludes that it isn't in the best interests of the children.  The Court cannot discern from the 
evidence that has been presented that it is not in the best interests of the 
children.

            
These problems that your son is having, unfortunately, your kids are 
going to have or not have problems irrespective of what this decree says.  In their little minds, they don't read 
these things.  And so it is really 
important, no matter what happens here today, that you have a successful divorce 
in as far as the kids are concerned, and work together.  

 
 
[¶13]   Although the evidence presented at 
the hearing was sparse with respect to the effect the shared custody arrangement 
was having, or might have on the children, both parents did provide testimony on 
that issue.  Father and Mother both 
acknowledged that the family therapist had suggested that the shared custody 
arrangement was difficult for the children.  On cross-examination, Mother 
stated:

 
 

Q.                
Your 
children counsel with Susan Wrightburn?

A.                 
Uh-huh.

Q.                
And have 
been for several months?

A.                 
Uh-huh.

Q.                
During 
that time has she talked to you about the problems your children are 
having?

A.                 
As well 
as I have.

Q.                
And she 
has talked to you about the frustration that [the oldest child] feels because of 
the bouncing back and forth between the homes, hasn't she?

A.                 
A 
little.

Q.                
So then 
to say that it is working for your children isn't true, is 
it?

A.        I 
guess I know what is best for my children.  
I believe that it has worked.  
During that same conversation she has also congratulated [Father] and I 
in what a difference the kids have been doing since they first started, so that 
does lead me to believe that what we are doing is working for the kids.  

 
 
Similarly, 
Father testified as follows:

 
 

Q.                
As part 
of your children's therapy with Susan Wrightburn[] are you aware that [your 
oldest child] is having problems with the week on week off situation.  

A.                 
Yes, I 
am.

Q.                
And has 
that been discussed with both you and Lisa with the children's 
counselor?

A.                 
Yes.

Q.                
How does 
that factor into your feelings about a shared custody 
arrangement?

A.                 
That is 
my primary concern because it  if what we are doing isn't working for the kids, 
we need to do something that actually works for them that is healthy for 
them.

 
 
Father 
also outlined specific difficulties the parties' oldest child was having with 
the shared custody arrangement stating:

 
 
He is 
angry.  He doesn't understand why he 
needs to go back and forth.  [He] is 
angry because he is unable to sleep at [Mother's] residence because of the 
people upstairs and loud music.  He 
has made mention of that numerous (sic), that he is unable to sleep because of 
the loud music of whoever is in the apartment up above them.  He doesn't have  he is really confused 
on, when he goes from one house to the next, that why he can get away with stuff 
at her house, that he can't get away with stuff in my house, and I imagine it is 
probably  I mean that same goes true when he goes to her house, that, you know, 
that there isn't the consistency there that was there when we were married.  

 
 
[¶14]   As noted above, shared custody is 
disfavored absent good reason therefore.  
See supra at ¶ 11.  While there are circumstances where such 
an arrangement may be appropriate, the record does not demonstrate that this is 
such a case.  Rather, here the facts 
would seem to point away from shared custody.  We have said that "[t]he success of a 
joint or shared custody arrangement hinges on the extent to which the parents 
are able to communicate and agree on the matters relevant to the children's 
welfare."  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 433.  Not only did the parents disagree as to 
whether shared custody was in the children's best interests, but the record 
indicates they had different parenting styles and philosophies.  

 
 
[¶15]   Furthermore, the record indicates 
that the children were having difficulties with the shared custody 
arrangement.  Although the district 
court acknowledged the problems the children were having, it concluded that the 
difficulties would exist regardless of what form of custody was ordered.  See supra at ¶ 12.  This conclusion is unsupported by the 
evidence presented at the hearing and inconsistent with undisputed1 evidence that the children 
(particularly the oldest) were having problems with the week-on, week-off 
schedule.

 
 

[¶16]   Not only was the district court's 
justification for awarding shared custody inconsistent with the evidence 
presented, but the record indicates that the district court was not even 
possessed of sufficient evidence to allow it adequately to address the disputed 
question of custody.  After hearing 
the testimony of the parties, the district court stated it was unable to 
"discern from the evidence that has been presented that [shared custody] is not 
in the best interest of the children."  
This conclusion regarding the paramount issue of best interests is simply 
inadequate  especially when the court is contemplating ordering a disfavored 
form of custody.  In 
performing a "best interests" analysis, the district court must satisfy itself 
that it is possessed of sufficient facts to support its determination.   Martin, 798 P.2d  at 323 ("[t]he test for child custody is the best interests of the 
children, and such a decision cannot be made without the district court having 
before it all facts necessary to make such a determination").  The district court never stated that the 
shared custody arrangement most closely approximated the former familial 
relationship or found that there was good reason to order shared custody.  In fact, the district court never even 
affirmatively stated that shared custody was in the children's best 
interest.  Instead, it concluded 
that it did not have enough evidence to decide that shared custody was 
not in the children's best interest.  In short, the district court failed to 
ensure that the children's best interests were protected when it ordered shared 
custody without having all of the facts necessary, accurately, and fully to 
evaluate the impact that shared custody might have on the 
children.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   
Both parents acknowledged at the custody hearing that the family 
therapist had expressed some concern about the impact the shared custody 
arrangement was having on the children.  
Also, Father testified that the parties' oldest child was struggling with 
this arrangement.  Although the 
district court acknowledged these problems, it found that the children would 
have these problems no matter what form of custody was ordered.  This conclusion is unsupported in the 
record and inconsistent with the evidence presented.  Furthermore, the court abused its 
discretion by ordering shared custody without having sufficient facts adequately 
to evaluate whether this disfavored form of custody was in the children's best 
interests. 

 
 
[¶18]   Reversed and 
remanded.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1While 
Mother acknowledged the concerns of the children's counselor regarding the 
shared custody arrangement, she presented no evidence refuting those 
concerns.  Likewise, Mother did not 
dispute Father's report of the difficulties the oldest child was experiencing 
with the week-on, week-off arrangement, but rather indicated that Father had not 
informed her of his concerns and emphasized that the settlement agreement should 
be enforced.