Case Title: Linda Margaret Salveson v. Douglas County

Citation: 2001 WI 100

Docket Number: 1999AP000946

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 100 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0946 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Linda Margaret Salveson,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Douglas County and Wisconsin County Mutual 
Insurance Corporation,  
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 80 
Reported at:  234 Wis. 2d 413, 610 N.W.2d 184 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 10, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 11, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Douglas 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael T. Lucci 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by John J. Prentice, Andrew T. Phillips and Prentice 
& Phillips, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Andrew T. Phillips  
and John J. Prentice. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by 
Kyle H. Torvinen and Hendricks, Knudson, Gee, Hayden, Torvinen & 
Weiby, S.C., Superior, and oral argument by Kyle H. Torvinen. 
 
2 
 
2001 WI 100 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No.  99-0946 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Linda Margaret Salveson,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Douglas County and Wisconsin County  
Mutual Insurance Corporation,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   Linda Salveson was employed by 
Douglas County from 1981 until 1995.  In 1996, she filed suit 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e to e-17 (1994) (Title VII),1 alleging that she had been 
subjected to illegal sexual harassment and gender discrimination 
virtually the entire time of her service with the County.  The 
perpetrator of the harassment and discrimination was Richard 
Collyard, Salveson's supervisor at the Douglas County Ambulance 
Service. 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the United States Code are to 
the 1994 version unless otherwise noted.   
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
2 
¶2 
On August 14, 1998, after a weeklong trial, a Douglas 
County jury awarded Salveson $356,220 in damages.  The Douglas 
County Circuit Court, Michael T. Lucci, Judge, denied the 
County's post-trial motion to reduce the award to $200,000 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), a provision that limits 
awards of compensatory and punitive damages based upon the 
number of persons employed by the employer.  However, the court 
reduced the award to $300,000, plus $1,220 for past medical 
expenses.  As to "equitable remedies" that were left to the 
court to determine separately, Judge Lucci awarded Salveson back 
pay, front pay, attorney fees, interest, and costs totaling 
$254,559.07, bringing the total judgment to $555,779.07. 
¶3 
Douglas County appealed, and the court of appeals 
affirmed.  Salveson v. Douglas County, 2000 WI App 80, 234 Wis. 
2d 413, 610 N.W.2d 184.   
¶4 
On review, the following issues are presented: 
 
(1) Did the circuit court err in awarding Linda 
Salveson back pay, notwithstanding her vocational 
disability? 
 
(2) Did the circuit court err in awarding Salveson 
front pay, notwithstanding her vocational disability? 
 
(3) Did the circuit court err in declining to offset 
the awards of back pay and front pay by the amount of 
the disability benefits received by Salveson? 
 
(4) Did the circuit court err in determining that 
Salveson's award of front pay is not subject to the 
damages cap imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), which 
limits compensatory and punitive damages? 
 
(5) Did the circuit court err in determining that for 
purposes of the damages cap, the number of persons 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
3 
employed by Douglas County should be measured at the 
time the discrimination occurred, rather than at the 
time of the judgment awarding Salveson damages? 
¶5 
We conclude that the circuit court properly exercised 
its discretion in awarding back pay and front pay, and in 
declining to offset the awards by the disability benefits 
Salveson also received.  We further conclude that the circuit 
court correctly determined that front pay does not fall under 
compensatory or punitive damages and therefore is not subject to 
the damages cap, and properly measured the number of employees 
at the time the discrimination occurred.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
¶6 
Linda Salveson began work as a part-time employee with 
the Douglas County Ambulance Service in 1981.  Over the next 14 
years, she enhanced her professional credentials, moving from a 
certified nurse's assistant, to a licensed practical nurse, to 
an emergency medical technician, to a nationally registered 
paramedic.  In 1986, she was given a full-time position with the 
County, but only after she challenged a maneuver to deny her the 
promotion. 
¶7 
During her employment with 
the County 
ambulance 
service, Salveson was subjected to crude sexual harassment and 
discrimination by her supervisor, Richard Collyard.  The long 
litany of epithets, insults, abuses, actions, and discrimination 
which she endured eventually led to serious psychological 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
4 
problems affecting Salveson's future employment.  The County 
concedes 
that 
Collyard's 
conduct 
toward 
Salveson 
was 
"abhorrent."  It is less forthcoming about its failure to take 
remedial action 
¶8 
On December 24, 1993, Salveson injured her knee while 
at work.  The County describes her injury as "wholly unrelated 
to unlawful discriminatory conduct."  Salveson's testimony at 
trial, undisputed by the County or any witness at trial, tells a 
different story.  On the day before Christmas, Collyard brought 
his personal tractor to work, intending that work be done on it 
on County time.  The tractor was transported on a single-axle 
trailer.  Collyard insisted that Salveson assist him in 
attaching a particular part to the tractor.  Although she 
resisted, Salveson did not feel she had any choice but to 
comply.  Salveson was unable to attach the part without climbing 
onto the tractor, so she asked Collyard to stabilize the 
trailer, and he assured her he would.  After she climbed onto 
the trailer, however, Collyard walked to the back of the 
trailer, and the trailer tipped.  The tractor moved off of the 
trailer into Salveson's legs, pinning her knee against the 
trailer.  Salveson was suspended in the air and had to be helped 
down. 
¶9 
As a result of this incident, Salveson suffered a knee 
injury and later required knee surgery.  This permanent knee 
injury ultimately led to Salveson's referral for duty disability 
benefits in 1995.  Meanwhile, Collyard told others Salveson had 
injured the knee skiing. 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
5 
¶10 After the knee operation, Salveson was put on light 
duty, working in an office capacity.  Salveson testified at 
trial that while on light duty, she was in closer contact with 
Collyard and his harassment intensified.  She returned to her 
paramedic work in December 1994, but hurt her back in a fall in 
April 1995.  She was again put on light duty, consisting 
primarily of clerical work.  She also began to work part-time 
for a hospital as a licensed practical nurse.  When Salveson 
began working light duty in April 1995, her wages were 
inexplicably and improperly reduced from $10.21 per hour to 
$4.25 per hour.  Salveson did not receive her full pay until 
months later.  On September 27, 1995, she was transferred to the 
Douglas County Register of Deeds, where she worked for the 
remainder of her employment with Douglas County. 
¶11 Salveson initially filed a complaint with the Douglas 
County Harassment and Discrimination Committee in November 1994. 
 Harassment 
investigators 
found 
"a 
systematic 
pattern 
of 
harassment" by Salveson's department head, Collyard.  The 
investigators reported their findings to the County's personnel 
director, but he did nothing and later testified that Collyard, 
a personal friend, was never disciplined for his behavior.  
¶12 Salveson filed complaints with both the Wisconsin 
Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations (DILHR), and 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging 
unlawful employment discrimination and sexual harassment.  On 
October 31, 1995, DILHR made an initial determination of 
"probable cause to believe County of Douglas Ambulance Dept. 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
6 
violated 
the 
Wisconsin 
Fair 
Employment 
Law . . . by: 
discriminating against [Salveson] in terms or conditions of 
employment because of sex."  DILHR certified the need for a 
hearing on the matter. 
¶13 Salveson left her job as an LPN in August 1995.  In 
November 1995 she was granted a disability pension due to her 
back and knee injuries, and terminated her employment with 
Douglas County. 
¶14 On January 1, 1996, Gold Cross Ambulance took over the 
operations of the Douglas County Ambulance Service, and Collyard 
began to work for Gold Cross.  His presence with the company 
made it impossible for Salveson to seek employment with the new 
operation. 
¶15 On 
March 
21, 
1996, 
the 
EEOC 
granted 
Salveson 
permission to sue Douglas County and Collyard for alleged 
violations of Title VII and of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102-12213, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).  Salveson brought 
a lawsuit against Douglas County and Collyard on June 17, 1996, 
alleging violations and seeking damages under Title VII as 
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.  She 
also raised numerous other claims.2  
                     
2 Salveson also raised claims under the Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Act, Wis. Stat. §§ 111.31-111.395 (WFEA) (1997-98), 
and the ADA, as well as numerous common law claims, alleging 
assault 
and 
battery, 
intentional 
infliction 
of 
emotional 
distress, negligence, and misrepresentation.  In her amended 
complaint, Salveson added Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance 
Corporation as a party. 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
7 
¶16 Salveson went to trial on her Title VII and ADA claims 
in 1998.3  She testified that Collyard and Douglas County had 
sexually harassed her and discriminated against her because of 
her gender.  Dr. Ken Pride, a psychologist who had treated 
Salveson, testified that Salveson suffered from anxiety, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and depression.  He stated that these 
conditions were caused at least in part by her "hostile" work 
environment, and opined that she would be unable to work full-
time for three years.  Collyard did not testify at the trial. 
¶17 At the end of the trial, the jury rendered a verdict 
finding 
that 
Douglas 
County, 
by 
its 
employees, 
had: 
discriminated 
against 
Salveson, 
subjected 
her 
to 
sexual 
harassment, retaliated against her, discriminated against her on 
the basis of her disability, and by doing these things, caused 
her injury.  The jury awarded Salveson $1,220 for past medical 
expenses, $15,000 for future medical expenses, $40,000 for 
future loss of earning capacity, $200,000 for past pain and 
suffering, and $100,000 for future pain and suffering, for a 
total of $356,220. 
                                                                  
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise noted.  
3 On July 6, 1998, the circuit court dismissed all of 
Salveson's common law claims because she failed to file a notice 
of claim with Douglas County, as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80.  The court also dismissed Salveson's claim regarding 
violation of the WFEA, because the claim sought an essentially 
administrative remedy.  Finally, the court dismissed Collyard 
from the suit, since the parties agreed that he was not properly 
subject to the Title VII or ADA claims, and all the remaining 
claims had been dismissed.  
No. 99-0946  
 
 
8 
¶18 The County filed post-verdict motions, claiming that 
the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the 
awards of damages, and that the total damages awarded should be 
reduced to $200,000 pursuant to the damages limitation (damages 
cap) imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.  Under the damages cap, the sum of compensatory and 
punitive damages is limited based on the number of persons 
employed by the employer.  Damages are capped at $200,000 for 
employers with between 200 and 500 employees, and at $300,000 
for employers 
with 
more 
than 500 
employees. 
 
42 
U.S.C 
§ 1981a(b)(3)(C) and (D).  The County asserted that the number 
of employees should be determined at the time damages were 
awarded, when Douglas County had fewer than 500 employees. 
¶19 The circuit court upheld the verdict in a memorandum 
decision issued November 10, 1998.4  It denied the County's 
motion to cap the damages at $200,000, finding that the number 
of employees 
was 
properly 
measured 
at the 
time of the 
discrimination, when Douglas County had more than 500 employees. 
 The court therefore determined that compensatory and punitive 
damages should be limited to $300,000.5  The circuit court also 
awarded $89,434 in back pay from Salveson's last day of work, 
                     
4 The circuit court issued an Amended Memorandum Decision on 
November 16, 1998, adjusting its calculation of interest on 
Salveson's award. 
5 The circuit court reduced the jury award from $356,220 to 
$301,220——$1,220 for past medical expenses, and $300,000 in 
compensatory and punitive damages, as limited by 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981a(b)(3). 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
9 
November 1, 1995, until August 14, 1998, the day the verdict was 
rendered.  In addition, it awarded $27,744 in front pay, 
extending one year from the date of the verdict.  The court 
determined that these awards should not be subject to the cap on 
damages, but that they should be offset by the disability 
benefits Salveson received beginning November 1, 1995.  The 
court also awarded attorney fees, interest, and costs totaling 
$137,374, bringing Salveson's total award to $555,779.07.6  
¶20 Salveson later filed a motion for reconsideration, 
claiming that that her awards of back pay and front pay should 
not be reduced by the amount of disability benefits paid to her. 
 After briefing and oral argument, the circuit court granted 
Salveson's motion. 
¶21 The County appealed the circuit court's decision, 
claiming that: (1) insufficient evidence supported the jury's 
finding that Salveson suffered a loss of earning capacity; (2) 
the circuit court erred in awarding back pay; (3) the circuit 
court erred in awarding front pay; (4) the court erroneously set 
the damages cap at $300,000 instead of $200,000; and (5) the 
court erroneously allowed Salveson to present new evidence on 
her motion for reconsideration. 
                     
6 The circuit court initially determined that the duty 
disability benefits received by Salveson should be deducted from 
her award of back pay and front pay, but did not determine the 
amount of the duty disability benefits she received. 
The amount of disability benefits received by Salveson is 
not established in the record.   
No. 99-0946  
 
 
10
¶22 In an opinion authored by Judge Gregory A. Peterson, 
the court of appeals denied the County's appeal except as to the 
first claim, on which it found that insufficient evidence 
supported the jury finding of lost earning capacity.  Salveson, 
234 Wis. 2d 413, ¶¶9-10.  The court of appeals determined that 
the circuit court had properly awarded front pay and back pay 
and determined that neither was subject to offset.  Id. at ¶¶19, 
21, 24, 27 n.12.  The court also determined that the award of 
front pay was not subject to the damages cap, that compensatory 
and punitive damages were properly limited to $300,000, and that 
the circuit court had not erred in allowing new evidence on 
reconsideration.  Id. at ¶¶35-36, 40, 43-44.  The court of 
appeals therefore affirmed the full award of $555,779.07.7  Id. 
at ¶45.  
¶23 We granted the County's petition for review.  The 
County now argues that the circuit court should not have awarded 
Salveson back pay or front pay because her inability to work was 
due to her knee and back injuries, not to harassment and 
discrimination.  It claims that if back pay or front pay is 
awarded, each must be offset by the amount of the duty 
disability benefits Salveson received.  It asserts that if front 
                     
7 The finding that Salveson was not entitled to damages for 
lost earning capacity had no effect on Salveson's award.  The 
jury awarded Salveson $356,420, including $40,00 in lost earning 
capacity.  Reducing the award by $40,000 leaves $316,420.  
Regardless of the $40,000 reduction, Salveson's compensatory and 
punitive damages were limited to $300,000 by application of 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
11
pay is awarded, it is subject to the damages cap imposed by 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).  Finally, the County claims that damages 
should be limited based on the number of employees at the time 
the award is made, not at the time the harassment or 
discrimination occurred, so compensatory and punitive damages 
awarded to Salveson should be limited to $200,000, instead of 
$300,000. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
¶24 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 serves two 
purposes.  It deters employers from discriminating against 
employees on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, or 
national origin, and it serves to make persons whole for 
injuries suffered because of unlawful employment discrimination.8 
 Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. 
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).  A victim under Title VII 
is presumptively entitled to full relief.  Hutchison v. Amateur 
                     
8 While Title VII applied to discrimination based on gender 
from the inception of Title VII in 1964, sexual harassment was 
not recognized as a form of sex discrimination until 1976, in 
Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).  Barbara T. 
Lindemann & David D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment in Employment Law 
3, 13 (1992).  
In 1980, 
the EEOC 
published 
guidelines 
interpreting Title VII as applying to sexual harassment.  Equal 
Employment 
Opportunity 
Comm'n, 
1980 
Guidelines 
on 
Sexual 
Harassment, reprinted in Lindemann & Kadue, supra, at 655.  In 
1986, the Supreme Court recognized "hostile environment" sexual 
harassment as a claim under Title VII, in Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB 
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986).  Lindemann & Kadue, supra, 
at 3,8. 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
12
Elec. Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1994).  Making 
a victim of employment discrimination whole may entail the use 
of both legal and equitable remedies.  Albemarle Paper Co., 422 
U.S. at 418. 
¶25 Under the original Civil Rights Act of 1964, equitable 
relief was the sole available remedy.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.  
Equitable relief consisted primarily of reinstatement of the 
employee with or without back pay.  Id.  In 1972, § 706(g) was 
amended to allow courts to award "any other equitable relief as 
the court deems appropriate."  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).9  
Equitable 
relief 
generally 
consisted 
of 
"back 
pay, 
reinstatement, and/or front pay."  Equal Employment Opportunity 
Comm'n, Policy Guide on Compensatory and Punitive Damages Under 
1991 Civil Rights Act  § 1 n.5 (1992), reprinted in Mary Rose 
Strubbe et al., Sexual Harassment in Employment Law 405 (1999 
Supp.).  Then, in 1991, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 again, allowing courts to award compensatory and punitive 
damages.10 
                     
9 Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified 
at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g).  
10 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, providing in relevant part: 
(a) Right of recovery 
(1) Civil rights 
In an action brought by a complaining party under 
section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 
U.S.C. 2000e-5, 2000e-16] against a respondent who 
engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination . . . 
the complaining party may recover compensatory and 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
13
¶26 The circuit court in this case awarded Salveson back 
pay and front pay, which are equitable remedies meant to make 
her whole for the injuries she suffered due to unlawful 
employment discrimination.  The County contends that the circuit 
court should have awarded neither back pay nor front pay.  We 
will first address the award of back pay. 
 
A. Back Pay 
 
                                                                  
punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this 
section, in addition to any relief authorized by 
section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from 
the respondent. 
 
. . . . 
(b) Compensatory and punitive damages 
 
(1) Determination of punitive damages 
 
A complaining party may recover punitive damages 
under this section against a respondent (other than a 
government, 
government 
agency 
or 
political 
subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates 
that 
the 
respondent 
engaged 
in 
a discriminatory 
practice or discriminatory practices with malice or 
with reckless indifference to the federally protected 
rights of an aggrieved individual. 
 
(2) Exclusions from compensatory damages 
 
Compensatory damages awarded under this section 
shall not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any 
other type of relief authorized under section 706(g) 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
42 U.S.C. § 1981a. 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
14
 
¶27 Back pay is an equitable remedy commonly utilized to 
compensate the victim of unlawful employment discrimination and 
to deter employers from discriminating.  Albemarle Paper Co., 
422 U.S. at 421.  The appropriate amount of a back pay award is 
determined by ascertaining the difference between actual wages 
earned and what would have been earned if not for the 
discrimination.  Taylor v. Philips Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 783, 
786-87 (7th Cir. 1979). 
¶28 Whether to award back pay in Title VII cases is a 
discretionary decision for a circuit court.  Franks, 424 U.S. at 
763-64. 
 
However, 
when 
a 
plaintiff 
proves 
unlawful 
discrimination under Title VII, "an award of backpay is the 
rule, not the exception."  Carrero v. N. Y. City Hous. Auth., 
890 F.2d 569, 580 (2d Cir. 1989).  Once a court finds unlawful 
discrimination, it is to presume that back pay should be 
awarded.  Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co., 224 F.3d 1014, 1020 
(9th Cir. 2000); Booker III v. Taylor Milk Co., 64 F.3d 860, 864 
(3d Cir. 1995); see EEOC v. Delight Wholesale Co., 973 F.2d 664, 
670 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 
421.  In such cases, "backpay should be denied only for reasons 
which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central 
statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the 
economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through 
past discrimination."  Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 421.  If 
a circuit court elects not to award back pay, it must "carefully 
articulate its reasons."  Id. at n.14. 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
15
¶29 As we have noted, the decision to award back pay is 
discretionary for the circuit court.  Franks, 424 U.S. at 763-
64.  We therefore will not disturb the decision unless it 
constitutes an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Meier v. 
Champ's Sport Bar & Grill, Inc., 2001 WI 20, ¶42, 241 Wis. 2d 
605, 623 N.W.2d 94.  A circuit court has not erroneously 
exercised its discretion if it "considered the relevant facts, 
properly interpreted and applied the law, and reached a 
reasonable determination."  Id. 
¶30 In deciding to award back pay, the circuit court found 
that Salveson was physically unable to work as a full-time 
street paramedic, but that she was able to perform other, less 
rigorous paramedic work.  The court noted that after she became 
physically unable to work as a full-time street paramedic, 
Salveson worked as an LPN, a medical examiner, and a file clerk 
for the Douglas County register of deeds.  The circuit court 
concluded that the evidence adduced at trial supported a finding 
that "[Salveson] was qualified to work as a paramedic with Gold 
Cross either as a paramedic instructor or in some other limited 
capacity to accommodate her physical limitations, and although 
she would have been hired if she had applied, she did not 
[apply] because of the presence of her former supervisor."  In 
referring to the discrimination and harassment, the court 
further concluded that "had it not been for this conduct, 
plaintiff would most likely have been hired by Gold Cross either 
as an instructor or in some other light capacity." 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
16
¶31 The County asserts that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in awarding back pay because Salveson 
presented no evidence showing that she was qualified to work as 
a paramedic for Gold Cross, or that she would have been hired by 
Gold Cross had no discrimination or harassment occurred.  It 
further 
claims 
that 
regardless 
of 
the 
effect 
of 
the 
discrimination, Salveson would have been unable to work as a 
paramedic at Gold Cross because of her back and knee injuries. 
¶32 We disagree.  The court's conclusion that back pay is 
equitable and appropriate in this case is supported by evidence 
in the record indicating that Salveson would likely have been 
hired by Gold Cross had she applied.  Mark Stansberry, an 
employee of Gold Cross who was responsible for evaluating 
candidates for employment and recommending candidates for hire, 
testified that Gold Cross had a training department and stressed 
community outreach.  Stansberry also testified that he knew 
Salveson and would have recommended that Gold Cross hire her as 
an 
instructor 
or 
trainer 
if 
she 
had 
met 
the 
basic 
qualifications.  Stansberry further stated that the basic 
qualifications for a position as a paramedic instructor or 
trainer were 2000 to 4000 hours of street experience, CPR 
instructor certification, and the possession of other instructor 
cards. 
¶33 Nothing in the record indicates that Salveson would 
not have met the basic qualifications as set out by Mark 
Stansberry.  Salveson was a nationally registered paramedic and 
had worked ample time (often 56 hours per week) to log the 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
17
requisite hours of street experience.  Former colleagues 
regarded her as a well-qualified paramedic.  Stephen Smith, a 
paramedic with Gold Cross, rated her skills as "above-average" 
and stated that he would prefer to work with Salveson, rather 
than with some other paramedics.  Terence Stachovich, another 
Gold Cross paramedic, called her "a good partner to work with." 
 Patrick Mackiewicz rated her skills as "[e]xceptional.  At 
least well above average," and called her a "good partner to 
work with."  Steven Morley, a paramedic who had worked with 
Salveson 
for 
Douglas 
County, 
testified 
that 
she 
was 
an 
"excellent paramedic."  Even Richard Collyard called Salveson "a 
good paramedic" in his deposition.  The circuit court therefore 
could have reasonably determined that had Salveson applied to 
work for Gold Cross, she likely would have been hired as an 
instructor. 
¶34 Evidence in the record also supports the circuit 
court's finding that Salveson was unable to work for Gold Cross 
because of the psychological injuries she suffered as a result 
of sexual harassment and discrimination, and because Collyard 
was employed by Gold Cross.  Salveson testified she did not 
apply to work for Gold Cross because Collyard was employed 
there.  Dr. Pride, a licensed psychologist who assessed Salveson 
in February 1993, and treated her from 1993 until 1995, and 
again in 1998, also testified.  He asserted that Salveson 
suffered from anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress 
disorder, and that the atmosphere at the Douglas County 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
18
Ambulance Service was the catalyst to Salveson's conditions.11  
He further stated that he had determined in 1998 that Salveson 
would require three years of intensive therapy before she would 
be able to hold and work a full-time job. 
¶35 Based on this evidence, the circuit court could 
reasonably have determined that Salveson could not work for Gold 
Cross both because of her condition and because Collyard was 
employed there. 
¶36 The County asserts that Salveson did not establish an 
entitlement to back pay, because she had previously claimed 
"total vocational disability" in her proceedings before the 
Department of Workforce Development (DWD).12  This disability was 
based on the knee injury in 1993 that required surgery and her 
subsequent fall in 1995.  The County claims that Salveson's 
application for duty disability benefits is 
fundamentally 
inconsistent with her assertion that she could have worked for 
Gold Cross.  It contends that Salveson should therefore be 
judicially estopped from raising her argument in this case. 
¶37 Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, generally 
applied by circuit courts, that "precludes a party from 
                     
11 The County's expert, Dr. Marcus Desmonde, testified that 
Salveson appeared to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder 
and other conditions, but asserted that her maladies were not 
caused by her work environment. 
12 Salveson's application for duty disability benefits and 
documentation of DWD's approval of her application are not part 
of the record in this case.  The parties agree, however, that 
Salveson applied for duty disability in April 1995 and that her 
application was granted on November 1, 1995. 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
19
asserting a position in a legal proceeding and then subsequently 
asserting an inconsistent position."  State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 
2d 337, 347, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996).  The purpose of judicial 
estoppel is to "protect the judiciary as an institution."  Id. 
at 346 (quoting State v. Fleming, 181 Wis. 2d 546, 558, 510 
N.W.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1993)).  In Wisconsin, the doctrine is used 
to prevent litigants from playing "fast and loose with the 
judicial system" by "maintain[ing] inconsistent positions during 
the course of the litigation."  Id. at 354. 
¶38 Three elements are required for a court to invoke the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel: (1) the later position must be 
clearly inconsistent with the earlier position; (2) the facts at 
issue should be the same in both cases; and (3) the party to be 
estopped must have convinced the first court to adopt its 
position.  Id. at 348; Harrison v. LIRC, 187 Wis. 2d 491, 497, 
523 N.W.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1994).  Whether to invoke judicial 
estoppel is left to the discretion of the circuit court. 
Fleming, 181 Wis. 2d at 558.  A reviewing court determines de 
novo, however, whether the elements of judicial estoppel apply 
to the facts of a given case.  Petty, 201 Wis. 2d at 347. 
¶39 Neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals 
explicitly addressed judicial estoppel in this case.  However, 
both courts addressed the elements of judicial estoppel and both 
courts implicitly determined that the doctrine is not applicable 
to this case.  The circuit court found that Salveson "became 
physically unable to work as a street paramedic because of 
injury," yet concluded that "she was qualified to work as a 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
20
paramedic with Gold Cross either as a paramedic instructor or in 
some 
other 
limited 
capacity 
to 
accommodate 
her 
physical 
limitations."  The circuit court therefore recognized the 
difference between working as a street paramedic and working as 
a paramedic instructor or as a limited capacity paramedic. 
¶40 Similarly, the court of appeals did not use the term 
"judicial estoppel" but addressed the issue of whether Salveson 
had taken "inconsistent positions with regard to her ability to 
work."  The court of appeals was "not persuaded that Salveson 
has been inconsistent."  Salveson, 234 Wis. 2d 413, ¶19. 
¶41 We agree with the determinations of the circuit court 
and the court of appeals and find that Salveson's positions are 
not clearly inconsistent, and therefore are not subject to 
judicial estoppel.  See Petty, 201 Wis. 2d at 347.  It is 
undisputed that the DWD determined that Salveson was physically 
unable to perform her duties as a street paramedic.  To grant 
Salveson duty disability benefits, the DWD was required to find 
that while performing her duties, Salveson suffered an injury 
resulting in a permanent disability, and the disability caused 
her to retire, to have her pay reduced, or to be assigned to 
light duty.13  
                     
13 Wisconsin Stat. 40.65(4) (1995-96) provided: 
(4) 
A 
protective 
occupation 
participant 
is 
entitled to a duty disability benefit as provided in 
this section if: 
 
(a) The employe is injured while performing his 
or her duty or contracts a disease due to his or her 
occupation; 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
21
¶42 After receiving duty disability benefits, Salveson did 
not claim that she was physically capable of working as a street 
paramedic for Gold Cross.  She claimed only that she believed 
she "would have been hired as an instructor" had she applied.  
It is undisputed that the duties and physical requirements of 
being a street paramedic differ from those required to be a 
trainer or instructor.  We conclude that the positions taken by 
Salveson are not clearly inconsistent, that judicial estoppel is 
not appropriate on the facts of this case, and that the circuit 
court properly exercised its discretion in not invoking the 
doctrine. 
¶43 We further conclude that the County has not overcome 
the presumption that back pay should be awarded, and that the 
circuit court properly exercised its discretion in finding that 
had 
Salveson 
not 
suffered 
from 
the 
effects 
of 
sexual 
discrimination and harassment, she likely would have been hired 
by Gold Cross.  We therefore affirm the decision to award 
Salveson back pay.   
                                                                  
 
 
(b) The disability is likely to be permanent; and 
 
(c) 1. The disability causes the employee to 
retire from his or her job; 
 
2. The employe's pay or position is reduced or he 
or she is assigned to light duty; or 
 
3. The employe's promotional opportunities within 
the service are adversely affected if state or local 
employer 
rules, 
ordinances, 
policies 
or 
written 
agreements specifically prohibit promotion because of 
the disability.    
No. 99-0946  
 
 
22
 
B. Front Pay 
 
¶44 We turn next to the question of whether the circuit 
court properly exercised its discretion in awarding Salveson one 
year of front pay. 
¶45 As we have noted, Title VII plaintiffs who prevail in 
unlawful employment discrimination suits are "presumptively 
entitled to full relief."  Hutchison, 42 F.3d at 1044.  
Reinstatement 
is 
an 
equitable 
remedy 
that 
is 
explicitly 
enumerated in Title VII as appropriate for victims of unlawful 
employment discrimination.  Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 
F.3d 944, 952 (7th Cir. 1998).  Courts order reinstatement to 
make victims of discrimination whole, by putting them in the 
position they would have been in had the discrimination not 
occurred.  Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 419 n.11. 
¶46 However, while reinstatement is the preferred remedy 
for lost future earnings for victims of discrimination, it is 
not appropriate in some situations, such as when the employer 
and employee have an overly hostile relationship, or when no 
position is available.  Williams, 137 F.3d at 952. 
¶47 When reinstatement is not appropriate, courts often 
award front pay.  Id.  Front pay is used to compensate an 
employee for the difference in earnings between what the 
employee would have received in his or her former employment, 
and what he or she can expect to receive in his or her present 
and future employment.  Downes v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 41 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
23
F.3d 1132, 1141 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994).  In other words, front pay 
is "a monetary award equal to the gain [the employee] would have 
obtained if reinstated."  Williams, 137 F.3d at 952 (quoting 
Tobey v. Extel/JWP, Inc., 985 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
¶48 Whether to award front pay is a discretionary decision 
for the circuit court.  Downes, 41 F.3d at 1141.  In making its 
determination, 
courts 
should 
consider 
factors 
including: 
"whether the plaintiff has a reasonable prospect of obtaining 
comparable employment, whether the time period for the award is 
relatively short," and "whether the plaintiff intended to work 
or was physically capable of working."  Id. 
¶49 The circuit court determined that reinstatement was 
not appropriate in this case due to the "circumstances," clearly 
referring to Gold Cross's taking over the ambulance service, as 
well as Collyard's employment with Gold Cross.  The circuit 
court also stated that it would be inequitable for Salveson to 
be reinstated to her most recent position, as a file clerk for 
the Douglas County register of deeds, because she was a trained 
paramedic and should not be forced to accept a lesser position 
because of unlawful employment discrimination.  The court 
therefore awarded Salveson one year of front pay in the amount 
of $29,744. 
¶50 The County asserts that the circuit court erred in 
awarding front pay, by failing to consider whether Salveson 
could obtain comparable employment or whether she is physically 
capable of working.  The County claims that Salveson could have 
obtained comparable employment at Gold Cross, but that she was 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
24
unwilling to work there because of Mr. Collyard.  Alternatively, 
it argues that even if Salveson could not have worked at Gold 
Cross, "it is difficult to imagine that there are no other 
employers within a reasonable distance of [Salveson's] residence 
that would have an interest in hiring her."  Finally, the County 
asserts that Salveson could not have worked in any event because 
of her back and knee problems. 
¶51 The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in 
awarding Salveson front pay.  "[F]ront pay awards, while often 
speculative, cannot be unduly so.  The longer a proposed front 
pay period, the more speculative the damages become."  McKnight 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1372 (7th Cir. 1992).  We 
do not find that the award of front pay in this case was 
excessively speculative.  The circuit court considered the 
possibility of Salveson working for Gold Cross as a trainer or 
instructor, but determined that she could not do so because 
Collyard was employed by Gold Cross.  The court clearly took 
into account Salveson's physical problems, but determined that 
even with those problems, she likely would have been hired by 
Gold Cross if she had applied for employment at Gold Cross. 
¶52 The court did not specifically state that Salveson 
could not have obtained comparable employment other than at Gold 
Cross.  However, a Title VII plaintiff is not required to 
establish that he or she could not have obtained comparable 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
25
employment.14  Under Title VII, a victim of discrimination is 
presumptively entitled to full relief.  Hutchison, 42 F.3d at 
1044.  Once a Title VII plaintiff establishes the amount of 
damages he or she suffered because of his or her employer's 
unlawful discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer "to 
show that the plaintiff failed to mitigate [his or her] damages 
or that the damages were in fact less than plaintiff asserts."  
Gaddy v. Abex Corp., 884 F.2d 312, 318 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing 
Taylor, 593 F.2d at 787); see also Hutchison, 42 F.3d at 1044. 
¶53 The County did not establish at trial or in the post-
trial motion hearing that Salveson could have found a position 
comparable to the one she held as a paramedic for Douglas 
County.  Nothing in the record indicates that Salveson could 
have mitigated her damages by obtaining employment comparable to 
her position as a Douglas County paramedic, other than by 
working for Gold Cross.  The testimony of Salveson and Dr. Pride 
makes clear that Salveson could not reasonably be expected to 
apply for work with Gold Cross, because Collyard was employed by 
Gold Cross.  While the County argues that Salveson has shown no 
vocational disability as a result of the discrimination, the 
record contains Dr. Pride's testimony stating that the work 
environment at the Douglas County Ambulance Service was a 
                     
14 A "comparable" job is one with "virtually identical 
promotional opportunities, compensation, job responsibilities, 
working conditions and status."  Rasimas v. Mich. Dep't. of 
Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614, 624 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Ford 
Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982)).  
No. 99-0946  
 
 
26
catalyst for the post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and 
depression from which Salveson suffers.  
¶54 Finally, we note that while Salveson sought three 
years of front pay, the circuit court awarded her front pay for 
only one year, limiting the speculation often involved in 
awarding front pay.  See McKnight, 973 F.2d at 1372.  The record 
supports the circuit court's conclusions that reinstatement was 
inappropriate, and that front pay should have been awarded.  We 
therefore conclude that the circuit court properly exercised its 
discretion in awarding Salveson one year of front pay. 
 
C. Offset of Back Pay and Front Pay for Disability Benefits 
 
¶55 We next address whether the amount of back pay and 
front pay awarded to Salveson should have been offset by the 
disability payments she received.  In its Amended Memorandum 
Decision, the circuit court ordered both Salveson's back pay and 
front pay offset as a matter of equity.  On reconsideration, the 
circuit court amended its order, finding that Salveson's duty 
disability benefits had come from a source collateral to her 
employment.  The court determined that under the collateral 
source rule, it would be inequitable to offset Salveson's back 
pay and front pay awards by her disability payments. 
¶56 Under the federal collateral source rule, it is within 
the circuit court's discretion to determine whether benefits 
received from a source collateral to employment should offset an 
award of back pay or front pay.  Flowers v. Komatsu Mining Sys., 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
27
Inc., 165 F.3d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. O'Grady, 857 
F.2d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 1988).  In exercising their discretion, 
courts are guided by certain equitable principles.  The 
collateral source rule operates "not to prevent the plaintiff 
from being overcompensated but rather to prevent the tortfeasor 
from paying twice."  Flowers, 165 F.3d at 558.  "If the employer 
is the source of the funds at issue, then the payments can be 
deducted from the award."  Id.  However, if employees earn the 
benefits as part of their compensation, the payments should not 
be subject to an offset.  O'Grady, 857 F.2d at 391. 
¶57 The 
circuit court 
found 
on 
reconsideration 
that 
Salveson, 
as 
a 
member 
of 
the 
Douglas 
County 
Paramedics 
Association Union (paramedics union), had negotiated to receive 
eligibility for duty disability benefits, giving up salary 
increases and other benefits.  The court concluded that although 
the County paid the employee contribution to the Wisconsin 
retirement system (WRS), Salveson had earned the benefit by 
giving up other compensation. 
¶58 The court based its decision on affidavits and 
supporting documents submitted by Salveson establishing that the 
paramedics union made concessions in its 1992 negotiations with 
Douglas County, in exchange for the paramedics being classified 
as protective services employees.  Salveson submitted affidavits 
from Steve Mackiewicz, the president of the paramedics union in 
1992, and Steve Morley and William Kalin, paramedics union 
negotiators in 1992.  Mackiewicz, Morley, and Kalin all stated 
in their affidavits that the paramedics union gave up wage 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
28
compensation and sick leave time in order that the paramedics be 
classified as protective services employees.  They further 
stated that the paramedics union's primary purpose in becoming 
protective services employees was to become eligible for duty 
disability benefits through the WRS.  Kalin also submitted a 
copy of the pertinent portion of the paramedics union's contract 
with Douglas County, documenting the concessions made by the 
union to become classified as protective services employees. 
¶59 The County asserts that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in not offsetting Salveson's award by 
the amount of her disability benefits.  It acknowledges that 
under the collateral source rule, defendants should not receive 
a windfall for collateral benefits received by a plaintiff, and 
should not profit from benefits purchased by a plaintiff.  
However, the County asserts that it paid all premiums to the WRS 
for Salveson and that not offsetting her award would result in 
Douglas County taxpayers paying her twice.  The County does not 
dispute that 
Salveson's 
disability 
benefits 
resulted 
from 
collective bargaining by the paramedics union, and therefore 
were essentially paid for by giving up potential compensation 
and benefits.  It instead terms these facts "irrelevant" because 
Douglas County actually paid the premiums to the WRS. 
¶60 We accept Salveson's undisputed assertion that she 
received disability benefits based on the paramedics union's 
collective bargaining.  We find that Salveson earned and 
essentially paid for the benefits, and conclude that these 
benefits came from a source collateral to her employment.  
No. 99-0946  
 
 
29
O'Grady, 857 F.2d at 391.  While the County may have contributed 
funds from which the benefits were paid, it does not dispute 
that Salveson paid for some of the benefits through collective 
bargaining.  "Funds supported in part——but not entirely——by 
contributions 
from 
the 
defendant 
are 
generally 
considered 
collateral."  Id. at 390. 
¶61 We conclude that Salveson's awards of back pay and 
front pay should not be offset by benefits she received for her 
disability; she and other paramedics paid for those benefits by 
foregoing pay increases and other benefits.  Douglas County 
should not benefit simply because Salveson also received 
collateral disability benefits.  The County will not pay twice. 
¶62 The court of appeals correctly observed that "the 
policy 
reasons 
for 
providing 
[disability] 
benefits 
for 
protective occupation participants are independent from the 
considerations involved in determining workplace discrimination. 
 The County's contributions do not discharge any duty to 
maintain a suitable working environment."  Salveson, 234 Wis. 2d 
413, ¶21.  They do not relieve the County from paying for 
illegal discrimination. 
¶63 The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in 
determining that Salveson contributed to the retirement fund 
from which her disability benefits are paid, and that pursuant 
to the collateral source rule, her benefits should not be 
offset. 
 
D. Damages Limitation 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
30
 
¶64 The two remaining issues presented in this case 
concern the damages cap imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).15  
The parties disagree whether an award of front pay is subject to 
the damages cap, and whether the number of employees for 
purposes of the damages cap should be measured at the time the 
discrimination occurs or at the time the award is given.  We 
turn first to the question of the applicability of the damages 
cap to awards of front pay. 
                     
15 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) provides: 
(3) Limitations 
 
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages 
awarded under 
this 
section for 
future 
pecuniary 
losses, 
emotional 
pain, 
suffering, 
inconvenience, 
mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other 
nonpecuniary losses, 
and 
the amount of 
punitive 
damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, 
for each complaining party—— 
 
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 
14 and fewer than 101 employees in each of 20 or more 
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar 
year, $50,000; 
  
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 
100 and fewer than 201 employees in each of 20 or more 
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar 
year, $100,000; and 
 
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 
200 and fewer than 501 employees in each of 20 or more 
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar 
year, $200,000; and 
 
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 
500 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in 
the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000. 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
31
¶65 The circuit court determined that the front pay it 
awarded to Salveson is not subject to the damages cap imposed by 
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).  The court based its decision of the 
legislative history of Title VII, and noted that front pay was 
awarded before Title VII was amended in 1991 and therefore does 
not 
constitute 
compensatory 
damages 
awarded 
under 
§ 1981a(b)(3)). 
¶66 The court of appeals agreed with the circuit court's 
decision that front pay is not subject to the damages cap, also 
basing its determination on the legislative history of the 
statute, and on its finding that front pay was often awarded 
prior to the 1991 amendment to Title VII.  Salveson, 234 Wis. 2d 
413, ¶35. 
¶67 After the circuit court and court of appeals issued 
their decisions in this case, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals determined that front pay is not subject to the damages 
cap imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).  Pals v. Schepel Buick 
and GMC Truck, Inc., 220 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 2000). 
¶68 The County urges this court to reject the analysis of 
the Seventh Circuit in Pals.  It contends that under the plain 
language of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), front pay is "compensatory 
damages . . . for future pecuniary losses." 
¶69 After the parties briefed and argued this case, the 
United States Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether front 
pay is included under the damages cap.  In Pollard v. E.I. 
duPont de Nemours Co., the Supreme Court held that "the 
statutory cap of § 1981a(b)(3) is inapplicable to front pay."  
No. 99-0946  
 
 
32
121 S. Ct. 1946, 1949 (2001).  The Court found that courts may 
award front pay under § 706(g), id. at 1950, which, as amended 
in 1972, authorizes "any other equitable relief as the court 
deems appropriate."  Id.  It therefore concluded that  "front 
pay is not within the meaning of compensatory damages in 
§ 1981a(b)(3), and thus front pay is excluded from the statutory 
cap."  Id. at 1951.  
¶70 This issue is settled.  The circuit court correctly 
applied § 1981a(b)(3) and properly excluded the front pay 
awarded to Salveson from the damages cap.  
 
E. Size of Employer for Purposes of the Damages Limitation 
 
¶71 The final issue presented is a question of whether the 
size of an employer for purposes of the 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) 
damages cap should be measured at the time the discrimination 
occurs, or at the time the award is made. 
¶72 The damages cap was enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, so that the amount of compensatory and punitive damages 
awarded in Title VII cases would be dependent on the size of the 
company guilty of discrimination.  Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm 
Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1354 (7th Cir. 1995).  "The bigger 
the company, the more it pays."  Id. 
¶73 It is undisputed that Douglas County had more than 500 
employees 
from 
1981, 
when 
the 
sexual 
harassment 
and 
discrimination against Salveson began, until 1993, but fewer 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
33
than 500 from 1994 until 1998, when Salveson was awarded 
damages. 
¶74 The question for the court concerns the effect of 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), which limits "the sum of the amount of 
compensatory damages awarded . . . and the amount of punitive 
damages awarded" to: 
 
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more 
than 200 and fewer than 501 employees in each of 20 or 
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding 
calendar year, $200,000; and 
 
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more 
than 500 employees in each of 20 or more calendar 
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, 
$300,000. 
¶75 The County asserts that the number of employees should 
be determined at the time damages are awarded, so that paragraph 
(C) applies to limit the amount of punitive and compensatory 
damages to $200,000.  Salveson replies that the number of 
employees should be determined at the time the discrimination 
occurs, so that paragraph (D) applies to limit damages to 
$300,000. 
¶76 The circuit court determined that "the only reasonable 
interpretation of this statute is that 'current or preceding 
calendar year' applies to the time when the discrimination or 
harassment occurred."  The court of appeals cited 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(b), under which Title VII applies only to employers with 
"fifteen or more employees for each working day of each of 20 or 
more 
calendar 
weeks 
in 
the 
current 
or 
preceding 
year."  
Salveson, 234 Wis. 2d 413, ¶39.  It noted that federal courts 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
34
interpret this parallel statute to apply to the year of 
discrimination, not the year of award, id., and concluded that 
Congress 
did 
not 
intend 
for 
courts 
to 
determine 
the 
applicability 
of 
Title 
VII 
based 
on 
the 
year 
of 
the 
discrimination, and then to apply the damages limitation based 
on the year it awarded damages.  Id. at ¶40.  
¶77 The County claims that the statutory language is clear 
and unambiguous, referencing the time of the award, not the time 
of the harassment.  It asserts that since no award is given at 
the time of the discrimination, the term "current or preceding 
year" must refer to the time the award is given.  The County 
distinguishes the reference to "current" year in this statute 
from identical language in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), stating that 
§ 2000e(b) relates to coverage, not to awards.  It cites no 
precedent supporting its position, but stresses that public 
policy would best be served if companies with more employees 
face a larger damages cap, than that faced by companies with 
fewer employees. 
¶78 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this 
issue in Vance v. Union Planters Corp., determining that 
"current" year in 42 U.S.C § 1981a(b)(3) refers to the year the 
discrimination took place, not to the year damages are awarded. 
 209 F.3d 438, 446 (5th Cir. 2000). 
¶79 In Vance, the employer argued that "current" year 
refers to the year the discrimination occurred, while the victim 
contended that "current" year refers to the year the award was 
given.  Id.  The district court agreed with the victim that 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
35
"current" year means the year damages are awarded.  Id.  The 
Fifth Circuit reversed, stating that "sound policy analysis" 
supports its reading of the statute.  Id.  "The best reason to 
use 'the year of occurrence' is that any other interpretation 
allows 
parties 
to 
engage 
in 
gamesmanship 
by 
structuring 
companies, or timing the progress of lawsuits, to maximize gain 
or to minimize loss."  Id.  The court also stated that part of 
the reason that the damages cap allows greater damages for 
larger employers is that those employers are better able to 
prevent discrimination by use of "specially trained human-
resource personnel."  Id. 
¶80 While the Fifth Circuit is the only federal circuit to 
specifically 
decide 
this 
issue, 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit 
has 
implicitly determined that "current" year means the year of the 
discrimination.  In Hennessy, the employee was terminated from 
her position on April 7, 1992.  69 F.3d at 1348.  The employee's 
case was heard in 1994, and damages were awarded.  Id. at 1347, 
1349.  Under the County's interpretation of the statute, the 
relevant time period for determining number of employees would 
be the year of the award (1994) and the preceding calendar year 
(1993).  However, the Seventh Circuit determined that damages 
were limited pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) based on the 
number of employees in April 1992, when the discrimination 
occurred.  Id. at 1354-55.  The court therefore implicitly 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
36
interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) as applicable to the year 
the discrimination occurred and the preceding calendar year.16 
¶81 Our research has revealed no case, and the County has 
cited no case, in which a court has either implicitly or 
explicitly interpreted "current" year in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) 
as referring to the year in which the award was given.  We are 
not convinced that Congress intended "current" year to refer to 
the time the discrimination occurs in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), but 
to the year the award is given in § 1981a(b)(3).  We agree with 
the court of appeals in this case, and the Fifth Circuit in 
Vance, that applying the damages cap at the time damages are 
awarded could lead to manipulation of the number of employees 
and the timing of a lawsuit to alter the amount of damages for 
which an employer may be liable.  Salveson, 234 Wis. 2d 413, ¶40 
n.20; Vance, 209 F.3d at 446. 
¶82 We conclude that the size of the employer for purposes 
of the 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) damages cap must be measured at 
the time the discrimination occurs.  The discrimination in this 
                     
16 Similarly, in Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court order which 
had limited the sum of compensatory and punitive damages to 
$300,000 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).  137 F.3d 944, 
947-48 (7th Cir. 1998).  The plaintiff (Williams) had been 
discharged in August 1994, and after prevailing in a sexual 
discrimination trial, she was awarded compensatory and punitive 
damages by the jury on March 7, 1996.  Williams v. Pharmacia 
Opthalmics, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 791, 792-93 (N.D. Ind. 1996).  
The district court limited the total of compensatory and 
punitive damages because the employer "had between 700 and 800 
employees in the two years immediately before Ms. Williams's 
discharge."  Id. at 793 (emphasis added). 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
37
case occurred from 1981 until 1995.  The parties agree that 
Douglas County had more than 500 employees for each of 20 or 
more weeks in 1991, 1992, and 1993.  We conclude that the 
circuit court therefore properly determined that Douglas County 
was an employer with more than 500 employees, and correctly 
limited compensatory and punitive damages to $300,000, pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
¶83 We hold that an award of front pay is excluded from 
the cap on damages imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), and that 
the number of persons employed by an employer for purposes of 
the damages cap, is properly determined at the time the 
discriminatory act occurs.  We conclude that the circuit court 
properly exercised its discretion in awarding Salveson back pay 
and front pay, and in determining that the awards should not be 
offset by the duty disability payments she received.  We 
therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-0946  
 
 
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