Case Title: DUSTIN EVERETT EZRA CRAPO V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-258

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
DUSTIN EVERETT EZRA CRAPO V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 194172 P.3d 393Case Number: 06-258Decided: 12/11/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
DUSTIN 
EVERETT EZRA CRAPO,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Ryan R. Roden, Deputy Public Defender; Tina N. 
Kerin, Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Timothy Justin Forwood, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Dustin 
Crapo pled guilty to the crime of receiving, concealing, or disposing of stolen 
property.  As part of his sentence, 
the district court ordered Mr. Crapo to pay restitution.  He now challenges that restitution 
order.  We 
reverse.

 
 

 

[¶2]           
We 
rephrase the issue presented for our review as follows:

 
 
Did the district court have 
statutory authority to order Mr. Crapo to pay restitution to burglary victims 
when Mr. Crapo did not plead guilty to the burglaries or conspiracy to commit 
the burglaries and did not, as part of his plea agreement, agree to pay 
restitution to the burglary victims?

 
 

 

[¶3]         
The State 
charged Mr. Crapo with one count of receiving, concealing, or disposing of 
stolen property in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-4031 and one count of conspiracy to 
receive, conceal, or dispose of stolen property in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 6-3-403 and 6-1-303.2 

 
 

[¶4]         
Several 
days before the trial was scheduled to begin, Mr. Crapo and the State entered 
into a plea agreement.  Mr. Crapo 
agreed to plead guilty to receiving, concealing, or disposing of stolen 
property.  In exchange, the State 
agreed to drop the conspiracy charge and agreed to recommend a maximum sentence 
of three to five years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  The only mention of restitution at the 
change of plea hearing was the court's advisement to Mr. Crapo that he "could be 
required to pay restitution."  The 
actual plea occurred as follows:

 
 
The Court: Mr. Crapo, how do you 
plead to Count 1 of this Information?

 
 
[Mr. Crapo]: Guilty, Your 
Honor.

 
 
The Court: Generally, between 
October 26th of 2005 and January 5th of 2006, were you in NatronaCounty?

 
 
[Mr. Crapo]: Yes, I 
was.

 
 
The Court: Did you come into 
possession ofI think it was primarily hand and power tools at that 
time?

 
 
[Mr. Crapo]: Yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
The Court: Did you understand that 
those had been stolen?

 
 
[Mr. Crapo]: Yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
The Court: Do you agree that the 
value of those tools exceeded $1,000?

 
 
[Mr. Crapo]: Yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
The Court: And all of that occurred 
in NatronaCounty?

 
 
[Mr. Crapo]: Yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
The Court: [Prosecutor]? 

 
 
[Prosecutor]: I think that's 
satisfactory.  Thank 
you.

 
 
The Court: The Court finds that Mr. 
Crapo is alert, he's not under the influence of anything that would adversely 
affect his ability to understand the proceedings, and he's competent to enter a 
plea; the plea has been entered knowingly and voluntarily, there are no improper 
inducements or conditions, the plea is free of coercion; and Mr. Crapo 
understands the charge and the consequences, he consulted with competent 
counsel, and has established an appropriate factual basis.  So I will accept and enter the plea of 
guilty and request a Presentence Investigation.

 
 
(Paragraph breaks omitted.)  The order for the Presentence 
Investigation Report (PSI) included a requirement "that counsel for the State 
and Defense shall file and serve on opposing counsel, not less than three (3) 
working days prior to sentencing, any material objections as to the accuracy of 
the Presentence Investigation Report concerning: . . . 3.) Restitution and 
costs."  Neither Mr. Crapo nor the 
State appears to have objected to the PSI prior to the sentencing 
hearing.

 
 

[¶5]         
The PSI 
identified six individuals whose property was stolen in six burglaries occurring 
in the Casper area in late 2005.  All six individuals were listed in the 
PSI as victims for restitution purposes, although only four of those individuals 
sought restitution.  Randy Colpits 
requested $3,800.  John Gaviotis 
requested $4,944.55 and Robert Erickson requested $6,800.  Andrew Hintz sought $500 in 
restitution.  Dale Zitterkopf did 
not request restitution.  Jeremy 
Eynetich could not be located and no restitution claim was made on his behalf. 

 
 

[¶6]         
At the 
sentencing hearing, defense counsel expressed his concern regarding the adequacy 
of the restitution information presented to the district 
court:

 
 
Regarding the restitution, Your 
Honorand this is problematic in this case.  This case involves several burglaries 
and then [Mr. Crapo] having possession of some of the items from some of those 
burglaries.  I looked at the police 
report, and it indicated that $2,800 of the items from the Gaviotis theft were 
recovered from [Mr. Crapo]'s vehicle; also, $220 of the items from the Erickson 
burglary were recovered when he was arrested.  I couldn't find any other items 
thatthat were actually in his possession when they arrested him.  Again, we haveas [the prosecutor] 
indicated, we have issues here where some property was recovered.  There's people that used the property as 
part of their employment.  They 
indicate that they have purchased new items.  I don't know what they have 
purchased.  So I'll just leave that 
matter to theto the judgment of the Court.  I just have my doubts whether the Court 
can make the required statutory findings based on what is contained in thein 
the PSI at the bottom of page 12.

 
 
(Paragraph breaks omitted.)3  Ultimately, defense counsel said he was 
leaving the matter "to the judgment of the [c]ourt."

 
 

[¶7]         
The 
district court also expressed some concern about restitution, but ultimately 
relied on the State's assurances:

 
 
The Court: It is unclear to me.  Is this restitution exclusive of the 
matters of the items that have been seized or are going to be 
returned?

 
 
[The prosecutor]: Your Honor, there 
are some mattersthe only matters that I know that are subsequently going to be 
seized and returned are some of the tools.  
As I indicated, Mr. Gaviotis's situation was discussed in the Presentence 
Investigation Report.  Secondly, 
Your Honor, I would note under the order entered by the Court on June 7, 2006, 
any objections to restitution or costs were to be made three days before 
sentencing.

 
 
The Court: That is correct.  And it appears to me that restitution is 
substantially well supported here.

 
 
(Paragraph breaks omitted.)  The district court went on to order 
restitution payable to Messrs. Colpits, Gaviotis, and Erickson for a total 
amount of $15,544.00.  The district 
court denied Mr. Hintz's award because it lacked sufficient evidentiary 
support.  Mr. Crapo now appeals the 
restitution order.

 
 

 

[¶8]         
The 
standard of review that we employ in evaluating a restitution order depends upon 
whether the appellant is challenging the factual basis for the restitution order 
or is challenging the trial court's authority to make the restitution 
award.  We previously 
explained:

 
 
The distinction between whether a 
defendant is making a factual challenge to an order of restitution or whether he 
is challenging the authority of the trial court to make a particular award of 
restitution is an important one.  
Challenges to the factual basis of an award of 
restitution can be waived in certain circumstances by the defendant's voluntary 
actions, such as entering into a plea agreement, and then failing to make any 
objection at sentencing, as occurred in Meerscheidt [v. State, 931 P.2d 220 (Wyo. 
1997)].  See also Aldridge v. State, 956 P.2d 341, 343 
(Wyo. 
1998).  Outside the context of a 
plea agreement, the failure to object to a factual determination in the awarding 
of restitution results in an appellate review for plain error.  See Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, [859] 
(Wyo. 
1998).  In contrast, a challenge by 
a defendant to the authority of a trial court to make a 
particular award of restitution is reviewed on appeal under a de novo statutory interpretation 
standard whether or not the defendant objected or entered into a plea 
agreement.  Meerscheidt, 931 P.2d  at 223-224, 
226-227.  While not explicit in our 
decision in Meerscheidt, the reason 
for conducting a de novo review under 
such circumstances is that a court has only that authority to act which is 
conferred by the subject statute.

 
 

Merkison v. State, 996 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Wyo. 2000) 
(emphasis in original).  Mr. Crapo 
contends that his challenge is to the district court's authority to order the 
contested restitution award and asserts that the proper standard of review is de novo.  We agree.

 
 

 

[¶9]           
Mr. Crapo 
alleges that the district court ordered restitution for losses attributable to 
burglary, rather than the crime to which he pled guilty: receiving, concealing, 
or disposing of stolen property.   Mr. Crapo contends that the 
district court lacked authority to impose restitution for pecuniary loss 
resulting from the burglaries because: (1) he was never charged with committing 
the burglaries; (2) the conspiracy charge was dismissed pursuant to the plea 
agreement; (3) he did not admit to committing the burglaries; and (4) he did not 
agree to pay restitution for those crimes as part of his plea agreement.  The State's position is that by 
admitting to possessing some of the property stolen in the burglaries, Mr. Crapo 
was effectively admitting responsibility for all the property stolen in the 
burglaries.  The State also contends 
that Mr. Crapo waived his right to contest the restitution order because he 
failed to file an objection to the PSI three days prior to the sentencing 
hearing.

 
 

[¶10]       
As an 
initial matter, we must address the effect of the district court's pretrial 
order setting a deadline for objections "to the accuracy of the [PSI] 
concerning: . . . 3.) Restitution and costs."  This Court has held that restitution is 
not an inherent power of the district court.  Rather, it is a power that exists solely 
by statute.  E.g., Hampton v. 
State, 2006 WY 103, ¶ 8, 141 P.3d 101, 104 (Wyo. 2006).  As a 
consequence, "[a]n order of restitution by a trial court which exceeds the 
authority granted by the statutes governing restitution would be void, and a 
void order may be challenged at any time."  
Merkison, 996 P.2d  at 
1141-42.  We also note that the 
pretrial order only required objections to the accuracy of the information in 
the PSI.  Mr. Crapo did not assert 
below that the PSI was inaccurate, nor does he do so now.  Rather, he claims that the district 
court lacked the authority to order restitution for pecuniary loss resulting 
from any crime other than the one to which he pled guilty, possession of stolen 
property.  Accordingly, this appeal 
is not precluded by Mr. Crapo's failure to file a timely objection to the 
accuracy of the PSI.

 
 

[¶11]       
A 
district court's authority to order restitution is governed by statute.  Hampton, ¶ 8, 141 P.3d  at 104.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-102 requires that 
a court, "upon conviction for any misdemeanor or felony, order a defendant to 
pay restitution to each victim as determined under W.S. 7-9-103 and 
7-9-114."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-9-103(b) specifies that "the court shall fix a reasonable amount as 
restitution owed to each victim for actual pecuniary damage resulting from the defendant's criminal 
activity."  (Emphasis 
added.)  Additionally, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-9-101 contains several definitions that are pertinent to our 
analysis:

 
 
(a)  As used in this 
chapter:

 
 
(i)  "Criminal activity" means any crime for 
which there is a plea of guilty, nolo contendere or verdict of guilty upon which 
a judgment of conviction may be rendered and includes any other crime which is 
admitted by the defendant, whether or not prosecuted. In the case of restitution 
ordered under W.S. 7-13-301, "criminal activity" also includes a crime charged 
against the defendant;

 
 
. . .

 
 
(iii) "Pecuniary damage" means all 
damages which a victim could recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the same facts or event, including damages for wrongful death. It 
does not include punitive damages and damages for pain, 
suffering, mental anguish and loss of consortium;

 
 
(iv) "Restitution" means full or 
partial payment of pecuniary damage to a victim;

 
 
(v) "Victim" means a person who has 
suffered pecuniary damage as a result of a defendant's criminal activities. An 
insurer which paid any part of a victim's pecuniary damages shall be regarded as 
the victim only if the insurer has no right of subrogation and the insured has 
no duty to pay the proceeds of restitution to the insurer.  

 
 

[¶12]       
We 
emphasize that a district court has authority to order restitution only for 
losses "resulting from the defendant's criminal activity."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103(b).  For an act to qualify as "criminal 
activity" for restitution purposes, the defendant must either plead guilty to 
the crime, be convicted of the crime, or admit to the crime.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(i).  If the pecuniary damages do not arise 
from a defendant's "criminal activity" as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-9-103(b), a district court lacks authority to order restitution for those 
damages.

 
 

[¶13]       
In Penner v. State, for example, the 
defendant was originally charged with three counts of burglary.  2003 WY 143, ¶ 3, 78 P.3d 1045, 1046 
(Wyo. 2003).  He entered into a plea 
agreement providing that he would plead nolo contendere to one of the burglary 
charges and the State would dismiss the other two charges.  Id., ¶ 4, 78 P.3d  at 1046.  At the change of plea 
hearing, the prosecutor recited the facts of one particular burglary in order to 
provide the necessary factual basis for acceptance of the plea.  The restitution documentation that the 
State relied upon at sentencing listed restitution amounts for all three 
burglaries, but there was no supporting documentation for the particular 
burglary to which Mr. Penner pled nolo 
contendere.  Id., ¶ 6, 78 P.3d  at 1047.  The trial court did 
not order restitution at the sentencing hearing for that burglary because there 
was no documentation.  The court 
did, however, order restitution for losses resulting from the other two 
burglaries.  Id., ¶ 9, 78 P.3d  at 1048.

 
 

[¶14]    
In Penner, we held that trial court lacked 
the authority to order restitution where there was no admission of the crimes or 
agreement to pay restitution as part of the plea agreement. We noted 
that:

 
 
This case first went awry at the 
change-of-plea hearing when the orally announced plea agreement did not indicate 
whether the appellant would admit the charges that were being dismissed or would 
agree to pay restitution for those crimes. . . .  The record simply contains no admission of those 
crimes or express agreement to pay those amounts, and we are not at liberty 
in reviewing criminal sentencing proceedings to draw from a blank record 
inferences that are contrary to the appellant's interests.  

 
 

Id., ¶ 11, 78 P.3d  at 1048 (emphasis 
added); see also Van Riper v. State, 
999 P.2d 646 (Wyo. 2000) (defendant was not liable for larceny of a car's 
contents where he specifically denied stealing the car and the contents and was 
not convicted of stealing the contents, though he agreed to pay restitution for 
damage to the car's value).

 
 

[¶15]    
Mr. 
Crapo's situation is similar to that presented in Penner.  It is undisputed that Mr. Crapo was 
never charged with committing any of the burglaries.  Although he was charged with one count 
of conspiracy to conceal stolen property, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
6-3-403 and 6-1-303, that charge was dismissed pursuant to the plea 
agreement.  The record does not 
contain any evidence that Mr. Crapo admitted to committing those crimes, nor 
does it contain any evidence of an agreement by Mr. Crapo to pay restitution 
resulting from those crimes.  The 
only "criminal activity" to which Mr. Crapo pled guilty or admitted, is 
receiving or possessing stolen property.  
Accordingly, the district court's authority to order restitution is 
limited to pecuniary damages incurred by victims arising from that criminal 
activity.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-9-103(b); Penner, ¶ 11, 78 P.3d  at 
1048.  Our review of the record, 
however, establishes that the restitution award was predicated upon the 
pecuniary loss resulting from the burglaries, not the "criminal activity" 
admitted by Mr. Crapo.

 
 

[¶16]    
The State 
did not present any witnesses or other evidence in support of the restitution 
request at the sentencing hearing.  
Support for the restitution order must be found in the plea agreement, 
PSI, or Mr. Crapo's guilty plea.  
There is no question that Mr. Crapo possessed some of the property that 
was stolen in the burglaries.  The 
PSI report identified the property that Mr. Crapo possessed.  Significantly, however, the PSI reflects 
that all of the stolen property found in Mr. Crapo's possession was either 
returned to the owner or, at the time of sentencing, continued to be held by the 
police.  We have no doubt that, if 
properly presented, the owners of the property are entitled to restitution for 
pecuniary loss occasioned by Mr. Crapo's possession of the stolen items.  The problem here, however, is that there 
is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Mr. Crapo ever 
possessed any of the stolen property that had not been 
recovered.

 
 

[¶17]    
The 
Restitution & Costs section of the PSI summarizes the restitution claim as 
follows:

 
 
Several items taken from the Victims 
have been recovered and are currently being held by the Casper Police 
Department.  The Victims have 
requested restitution on the items that 
they have not received.  Some 
Victims did not include the items that they know to have been recovered and 
anticipate receiving back.  Dale 
Zitterkopf stated that he has recovered most of the stolen items and did not care to receive 
any restitution from the Defendant.  
Andrew Hintz reported that he could not provide any documentation for the 
stolen items and has not replaced 
much of the lost property.  Mr. Hintz estimated the total value of the stolen property.  Robert Erickson reported that he had to 
replace most of the items that were stolen by the Defendant.  The total balance of replaced 
merchandise was $6,800.  John 
Gaviotis reported that he replaced much of the merchandise stolen by the Defendant.  Mr. Gaviotis provided receipts from the 
replacement of the taken tools.  Randy Colpits reported that he has 
replaced most of the stolen equipment 
and has provided receipts for the items he replaced.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  It is abundantly clear that, in the PSI, 
the probation agent focused on property stolen in the burglaries, rather than 
property Mr. Crapo possessed.  Such 
focus is a proper basis for restitution only if Mr. Crapo agreed to pay 
restitution for pecuniary loss resulting from the burglaries or admitted to 
committing the burglaries.  He did 
neither.  The State does not contend 
that Mr. Crapo agreed to pay restitution for damage arising from the burglaries 
as part of the plea agreement.  The 
State also does not contest Mr. Crapo's contention that the PSI restitution 
claims are founded upon the burglaries rather than the stolen property.  Instead, the State apparently relies 
upon inferences to be drawn from Mr. Crapo's guilty plea.  According to the 
State:

 
 
[Mr. Crapo's] plea effectively 
conceded he had contributed to the success of every burglary to which he had 
been tied by the discovery of that property and, therefore, had contributed to 
the successful theft of all the property taken in those burglaries by his 
willingness to receive and conceal portions of that property.  That is to say, the extent of the loss 
suffered by the victims was as much a result of his illegal activities as it was 
a result of the thief's activities.

 
 

[¶18]       
We are 
unable to make the inferential leap suggested by the State.  Penner, ¶ 11, 78 P.3d  at 1048.  Simply put, there is no support in the 
record for the State's position.  
There is no plea agreement to pay restitution for the burglaries.  Mr. Crapo did not admit to the 
burglaries.  The one charge against 
Mr. Crapo which might have provided legal justification for the restitution 
award, the conspiracy charge, was dismissed by the State pursuant to the plea 
agreement.  We would uphold any 
portion of the restitution order supported by Mr. Crapo's plea, but given the 
lack of support in the record for such an award, we are unable to determine any 
proper restitution amount.

 
 

[¶19]    
Finally, 
we should note that, because of the double jeopardy implications, restitution 
orders overturned for failure of proof will not be remanded for the purpose of 
relitigating the restitution issue.  
E.g., Van Riper, 999 P.2d  at 648.  Because the trial court improperly 
ordered restitution for losses not attributable to Mr. Crapo's criminal activity 
as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-403, and because the record does not provide 
any evidence to support a proper calculation of pecuniary damages that are 
properly attributable to Mr. Crapo's criminal activity, we must vacate the 
entire restitution portion of his judgment and sentence.  We note that our decision does not 
preclude the individuals from pursuing appropriate civil claims against Mr. 
Crapo.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-9-110(a).

 
 

[¶20]    
Reversed 
and remanded for entry of an amended judgment and sentence consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-403 (LexisNexis 2007) states in relevant part:

 
 
(a)  A person who buys, receives, conceals or 
disposes of property which he knows, believes or has reasonable cause to believe 
was obtained in violation of law is guilty of:

 
 
(i)  A felony punishable by imprisonment for 
not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars 
($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00) or more.

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-1-303 states in relevant part:

 
 
(a)  A person is guilty of conspiracy to 
commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) or 
more of them will commit a crime and one (1) or more of them does an overt act 
to effect the objective of the agreement.

 
 

3In 
referring to page 12 of the PSI, defense counsel was directing the district 
court's attention to the PSI language that we have set forth in paragraph 17 of 
this opinion.