Case Title: Dalgo v. State

Citation: 435 So. 2d 628

Docket Number: 53269

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1983-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
435 So. 2d 628 (1983) Phillip J. DALGO v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 53269. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 30, 1983. Vick & Diaz, Gregory L. Harper, Jackson, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Marvin L. White, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. En Banc. ROY NOBLE LEE, Justice, for the Court: The petition for rehearing is granted, the former opinion in this case rendered October 6, 1982, is withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted therefor. Phillip J. Dalgo was indicted and tried in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District, Harrison County, Honorable J. Ruble Griffin, presiding, for carrying a concealed weapon after conviction of a felony and for being an habitual criminal. The jury having found Dalgo guilty as charged, he was sentenced by the trial judge to life imprisonment as a habitual criminal under Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1981), and he has appealed here. On October 31, 1979, Detective James Bessee was driving in the area of the west gate, Keesler Air Force Base, when he observed a small group of people in front of Mother Tucker's Lounge. One of the persons in the crowd appeared to be Dickey Foster, for whom there was an outstanding warrant. Bessee drove his car up to the curb, got out, and then realized the person was not Foster, but Dalgo (whom he knew). He observed a marijuana cigerette in Dalgo's hand, which was passed to a companion. Bessee radioed for assistance and when a backup unit arrived, he placed Dalgo under arrest and asked Patrolman Kevin Ladnier to frisk Dalgo for weapons. Ladnier found a .22-caliber Colt revolver, Huntsman model, loaded with a full nine-round clip, inside the waistband of Dalgo's pants and covered by his shirt. Dalgo's defense at trial was that he had been threatened previously with bodily harm and was authorized to carry a concealed weapon for protection. The jury rejected that defense. We have carefully examined the assignments of error and find no merit in them. However, we address the question of whether or not the lower court conducted a proper sentencing hearing prior to imposing sentence upon Dalgo. *629 The indictment sets forth the substantive crime and the habitual criminal requirements in clear and unambiguous language. [See Appendix] The habitual criminal portion of the indictment charges Dalgo with four previous convictions; that he served at least one year of each conviction in the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi; and that one such conviction, assault with intent to rape, involved a crime of violence. The indictment sets forth with certainty that the habitual criminal statute violated is Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1981), which follows: The events occurring in the courtroom from the time the jury returned its verdict until imposition of sentence follow: In Wilson v. State, 395 So. 2d 957 (Miss. 1981), the Court said: After return of the jury verdict, the district attorney introduced into evidence certified copies of the previous convictions. At that point, the trial judge specifically asked appellant's attorney, Mr. Tisdale, if he had anything to say, that is, did he wish to offer anything in rebuttal of the records and convictions. The attorney responded in the negative. The court then inquired of Dalgo whether he had anything to say, and he stated that he did not. Clearly, appellant and his attorney were given the right to refute the evidence of convictions and they declined to do so or to request any additional hearing. At the least, there was a waiver of appellant's right to proceed and introduce evidence on his behalf in the sentencing phase. The indictment here was sufficient to apprise the appellant that the State was seeking to impose a life sentence without eligibility for parole or probation. Although including the habitual offender section number in the indictment would be helpful to parties and the court, it is not essential to the validity of the indictment. In Osborne v. State, 404 So. 2d 545, 547-548 (Miss. 1981), we said: See also Diddlemeyer v. State, 398 So. 2d 1343 (Miss. 1981); Taylor v. State, 426 So. 2d 775 (Miss. 1983). Dalgo received a fair trial. His criminal record is conclusive and his habitual criminal status was proved beyond reasonable *631 doubt. The lower court committed no reversible error and its judgment is affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and BROOM, P.JJ., and PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, HAWKINS and BOWLING, JJ., dissent. DAN M. LEE, Justice, dissenting: With great deference to my colleagues, I must dissent from the majority. In the case sub judice, the trial judge, after admitting into evidence certain documents of appellant's previous convictions, found appellant to be an habitual criminal before affording him any opportunity to dispute the truth of the assertion by the state that he was an habitual offender. Such a finding was clearly made prior to the trial judge's inquiry as to whether appellant had anything to say. The record reflects the following sequence of events in this regard: After the trial judge made his finding that appellant was an habitual offender, there was nothing left for appellant to say except to plead for mercy. By the action of the trial judge, appellant was denied the opportunity to dispute or rebut the evidence tendered in support of the habitual offender charge. This valuable opportunity must exist prior to such a finding and not thereafter. Accord dissent in Wilson v. State, 395 So. 2d 957, 961 (Miss. 1981). An examination of the record establishes beyond peradventure that the trial judge made his finding prior to any opportunity being given to appellant or his counsel to refute the accuracy or credibility of the evidence tendered. In my humble opinion, appellant was neither given the right to refute such evidence or the opportunity to waive his rights thereto because he had already been adjudicated an habitual offender prior to being asked whether he had anything to say. I would therefore reverse appellant's sentence and remand the case to the circuit court for resentencing, affording appellant the opportunity to refute any evidence tendered to support a charge as an habitual offender. BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., join this dissent. HAWKINS, Justice, dissenting: I join in the dissent of Justice Dan Lee. This case is Exhibit A for the wisdom of requiring a jury to pass upon the actual fact of whether a defendant is a habitual offender. See Wilson v. State, 395 So. 2d 957, 961-64 (Miss. 1981) (Hawkins, J., dissenting).