Case Title: Cambridge Street Realty, LLC v. Stewart

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12440 & 12563

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12440 
SJC-12563 
 
CAMBRIDGE STREET REALTY, LLC  vs.  MELINDA STEWART 
(and a consolidated case1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 7, 2018. - December 20, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Housing.  Summary Process, Notice to quit.  Jurisdiction, 
Housing Court, Summary process.  Housing Court, 
Jurisdiction.  Practice, Civil, Summary process, Default, 
Continuance, Bond, Judgment, Execution. 
 
 
 
 
Summary Process.  Complaint filed in the Boston Division of 
the Housing Court Department on October 11, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Jeffrey M. Winik, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on June 25, 2018. 
 
 
The case was reported by Gaziano, J. 
 
 
 
Joshua J. Bone for the tenant. 
 
Eleftherios S. Papadopoulos for the landlord. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Melinda Stewart  vs.  Cambridge Street Realty, LLC. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Melinda Stewart (tenant), a recipient of a 
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
Housing Choice Voucher (Section 8 voucher), fell behind on her 
rent, and her landlord, Cambridge Street Realty, LLC (landlord), 
served her with a notice of termination of tenancy (notice to 
quit) before bringing a summary process eviction action against 
her in the Boston Division of the Housing Court Department.2  
Following a trial that, without advance notice, occurred on the 
same day as a hearing on the tenant's motion to vacate a default 
judgment, the landlord received a judgment of execution and 
forty-four dollars in back rent.  Although the case was 
initially stayed after the tenant posted an appeals bond in the 
amount of forty-four dollars, the Housing Court judge 
nonetheless allowed the execution to issue on the landlord's 
representation that the tenant had violated a nonfinancial 
condition of the bond.  Execution was then again stayed after 
the tenant filed a G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition with a single 
justice of this court. 
This case presents a number of unresolved questions of law:  
whether (1) termination of a residential tenancy by a legally 
                                                          
 
 
2 After this case was brought, the Housing Court Department 
was reorganized by statute, and the Boston Division became part 
of the Eastern Division.  St. 2017, c. 47, § 78. 
3 
 
 
 
adequate notice to quit is necessary to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction on the Housing Court; (2) the judge erred or 
otherwise abused his discretion when he failed to provide 
advance notice that he might conduct trial on the same day as a 
motion hearing on a default judgment and denied a continuance 
requested under Housing Court Standing Order 1-01 (2001) to a 
self-represented litigant represented by a limited assistance 
volunteer attorney who was willing to enter a full appearance; 
and (3) a judge has the authority to impose a nonfinancial 
condition on an appeals bond issued under G. L. c. 239, § 5, 
with respect to an appeal from a judgment for possession of land 
or tenements. 
We hold that a legally effective notice to quit is a 
condition precedent to a summary process action and part of the 
landlord's prima facie case but is not jurisdictional.  We 
further explain that the notice to quit was not defective in the 
instant case.  We nonetheless vacate the judgment and remand for 
a new trial because we hold that the Housing Court judge abused 
his discretion when, without providing advance notice that he 
would conduct trial on the same day as the scheduled hearing on 
the motion to vacate the default, he denied the volunteer 
attorney's request for a continuance provided by Housing Court 
Standing Order 1-01.  In addition, we hold that the judge lacked 
statutory authority to impose a nonfinancial condition on the 
4 
 
 
 
appeals bond, and we therefore reverse the order of execution 
arising from the tenant's alleged noncompliance with the appeals 
bond. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Standard of review.  When reviewing 
the decision of a trial judge in a summary process action, "we 
accept [the judge's] findings of fact as true unless they are 
clearly erroneous," but "we scrutinize without deference the 
legal standard which the judge applied to the facts" (citation 
omitted).  Andover Hous. Auth. v. Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300, 306 
(2005). 
 
b.  Facts and procedural history.  The facts, according to 
the undisputed facts in the record, the parties' joint statement 
of facts, and the judge's decision below, are as follows.  In 
the summer of 2010, the tenant began to lease an apartment from 
the landlord.  Due to her low income, the tenant qualified to 
receive a Section 8 voucher administered by the Boston Housing 
Authority (BHA).3  The tenant and the landlord entered into a 
                                                          
 
 
3 "In the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) Housing Choice Voucher Program (Section 8), 
HUD pays rental subsidies so eligible families can afford 
decent, safe and sanitary housing.  The Section 8 program is 
generally administered by State or local governmental entities 
called public housing agencies (PHAs).  HUD provides housing 
assistance funds to the PHA.  HUD also provides funds for PHA 
administration of the programs.  Section 8 housing assistance 
may be 'tenant-based' or 'project-based.'  With tenant-based 
assistance, [f]amilies select and rent units that meet program 
housing quality standards.  If the PHA approves a family's unit 
5 
 
 
 
BHA-provided lease (model lease) and a HUD-approved addendum 
(HUD addendum).  The landlord agreed in the HUD addendum that it 
would "only terminate the tenancy in accordance with the lease 
and HUD requirements."  These requirements included specific 
notice provisions.  In particular, per the HUD addendum, the 
landlord had to provide "the tenant a notice that specifies the 
grounds for termination of tenancy."  Additionally, the model 
lease stated that the landlord "shall" include specific 
termination language in its termination notice.4 
The tenant's lease began to run in August 2010, and 
provided that, after a year, it would automatically renew in 
successive month-to-month terms, unless the landlord terminated 
the lease for one of several permissible reasons.  The tenant 
initially lived in the apartment with her son until he was 
killed in a homicide in 2013.  The son's death reduced the 
                                                          
 
and tenancy, the PHA contracts with the owner to make rent 
subsidy payments on behalf of the family."  (Quotations and 
citations omitted.)  Figgs v. Boston Hous. Auth., 469 Mass. 354, 
355 n.2 (2014).  Due to limited funds, PHAs typically maintain a 
waiting list for Section 8 voucher applicants.  18B D.A. Randall 
& D.E. Franklin, Municipal Law and Practice § 25.18 (5th ed. 
2006). 
 
 
4 "The termination notice shall include the following 
language:  'Your tenancy can be terminated only at the end of 
the Initial Term or at the end of a Successive Term for other 
good cause, or during the Initial Term or Successive Term for 
serious or repeated violations of this Lease, violation of 
Federal, State or local law.  The reason for termination of your 
Lease is _____________.[']" 
6 
 
 
 
income available to the tenant.  Despite receiving financial 
support from a rental assistance organization, the tenant began 
to fall behind on her share of the monthly rent each month 
starting in February 2015.5  The landlord sent the tenant 
numerous "rent reminders" stating the amount of overdue rent 
each month. 
In August 2016, the landlord began the process of evicting 
the tenant.  Through its counsel, the landlord had a constable 
serve the tenant with a notice to quit on August 31, 2016, 
informing the tenant that it was terminating her lease for 
serious and repeated lease violations, specifically, paying her 
rent after the first of the month, as well as improperly storing 
items in the building's common areas.  The notice to quit 
demanded that the tenant vacate the premises within thirty days 
or face eviction. 
After the tenant declined to move out by September 30, 
2016, the landlord served the tenant with a summary process 
summons and complaint that set a hearing date of October 20, 
                                                          
 
 
5 The landlord and the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) had 
entered into a "Housing Assistance Payments" contract that 
required the BHA to pay most of the tenant's rent each month 
promptly and directly to the landlord.  At the time of lease 
signing, the tenant's total monthly rent was $1,324, with the 
landlord receiving $1,044 of the rent from the BHA.  The 
tenant's monthly rent increased to $1,500 in June 2016, with her 
share increasing to $332.  The tenant's income at the time of 
trial was $700 per month. 
7 
 
 
 
2016.  The landlord received a default judgment when the tenant 
did not appear for trial on that date.6  The same day, however, 
the tenant filed a motion to vacate the default judgment on the 
advice of a clerk at the Housing Court.  The court sent the 
parties a "Notice of Motion Hearing" informing them that the 
tenant's motion to vacate the default judgment would be heard on 
November 10, 2016, which it was.  At the motion hearing, the 
landlord was represented by counsel, while the tenant engaged a 
volunteer attorney participating in the Housing Court's "lawyer 
for a day program" (LDP attorney) on a limited assistance basis 
to represent her in settlement talks and on the motion.7  The 
court granted the motion to vacate the default and announced 
that it would conduct a trial on the same day, which it did. 
Shortly after the trial commenced, the LDP attorney who had 
been providing limited representation to the tenant in 
settlement talks and on the motion to vacate told the judge that 
she would be willing to enter a full appearance and requested a 
                                                          
 
 
6 The tenant claimed that she inadvertently went to the 
wrong court room on the original trial date, and that by the 
time she realized her mistake she had been defaulted. 
 
 
7 As discussed infra, while not expressly stated in the 
record, we infer that the tenant's attorney was participating in 
the "lawyer for a day" program established by Housing Court 
Standing Order 1-01 whereby volunteer attorneys provide limited 
assistance to self-represented parties in the Housing Court. 
8 
 
 
 
continuance pursuant to Housing Court Standing Order 1-01.8  That 
standing order provides that if an LDP attorney assisting a pro 
se litigant in mediation does not enter an appearance but 
assists the litigant in preparing a motion for a continuance, 
the "motion shall be allowed if good cause is shown," while if 
the LDP attorney does enter an appearance, "the litigant shall 
be entitled to a two (2) week continuance of trial."  Housing 
Court Standing Order 1-01(5).  After the LDP attorney's motion, 
the judge declared that, absent a settlement, "the trial's going 
forward today."  When no settlement was reached, the LDP 
attorney withdrew her motion for a continuance and submitted her 
withdrawal of limited appearance, and the tenant went through 
the trial self-represented. 
Judgment entered for the landlord on November 15, 2016.  In 
his written decision, the Housing Court judge held that the 
landlord had not proved that the tenant committed a lease 
violation by improperly storing her personal property.  With 
                                                          
 
 
8 The form Notice of Limited Appearance used by the Housing 
Court instructs attorneys participating in the Housing Court's 
"lawyer for a day program" (LDP attorneys) to "identify the 
discrete issues within the event covered by the appearance" by 
checking one of several boxes.  Here, the tenant's attorney 
checked the box next to "[m]otion to vacate default judgment," 
but not the box next to "[m]ediation."  Nonetheless, the LDP 
attorney had been assisting the tenant in settlement talks that, 
as she informed the judge, had been proceeding for several hours 
prior to the trial.  The landlord's settlement demand would have 
required the tenant to pay the outstanding rent balance and move 
out within a certain amount of time. 
9 
 
 
 
respect to the late payment of rent, the judge found that the 
outstanding balances due each month were not large, and that the 
total amount of the rent arrearage was modest.  The judge 
nonetheless held that the tenant's late payments constituted a 
serious and repeated lease violation that entitled the landlord 
to recover possession of the premises.  The judge ordered 
execution and damages in the amount of the outstanding rent, 
forty-four dollars. 
The tenant timely appealed from the judgment and filed a 
motion to waive the statutorily required appeals bond.  The 
judge subsequently held a hearing on the motion to waive the 
bond at which the landlord was represented by counsel and the 
tenant was self-represented.  The judge issued an "appeal bond 
order" that declined to waive the bond and ordered it set at 
$234.51, the judgment amount plus certain costs and fees, which 
the tenant was to post or have her appeal dismissed.  The order 
also stated that "[a]s a further condition of the bond" the 
tenant had to pay $332 in monthly use and occupancy to the 
landlord during the pendency of the appeal, provide the landlord 
with a key to her apartment, and allow the landlord access to 
perform repairs on twenty-four hours' advance written notice.  
The appeal bond order stated that failure to comply with these 
conditions would entitle the landlord to file a motion to 
dismiss the appeal.  The tenant appealed from the denial of her 
10 
 
 
 
motion to waive the bond and the amount of the bond, and a 
single justice of the Appeals Court affirmed the order, except 
for reducing the amount of the bond to forty-four dollars, which 
the tenant posted. 
 
The appeal entered in the Appeals Court in July 2017, and 
we transferred the case to this court on our own motion in 
November 2017.  The landlord subsequently filed two motions to 
dismiss the appeal for failure to comply with conditions of the 
appeals bond.9  The first of these motions, concerning the 
tenant's payment of use and occupancy, was denied by the Housing 
Court judge.  The second motion, based on the tenant's alleged 
refusal to allow the landlord access, was likewise denied by a 
different judge.  Despite denying the motion, however, the 
judge's order stated that execution would issue if the landlord 
submitted affidavits averring that the tenant had not permitted 
the landlord entry on June 15, 2018, to adjust the water 
pressure. 
On June 18, 2018, the landlord submitted two affidavits 
from its counsel and a contractor alleging that the tenant had 
interfered with their diagnostic test on the water pressure in 
                                                          
 
 
9 The landlord filed two motions to dismiss the appeal 
before the appeal was entered in the Appeals Court based on the 
tenant's failure to provide the landlord with keys to her unit 
and to order a hearing transcript.  These motions were either 
rendered moot or denied. 
11 
 
 
 
her bathroom sink.  Execution issued, a notice of levy was set, 
and the tenant's application to the Housing Court for a 
temporary restraining order was denied.  On June 25, the day 
before the levy, the tenant filed her G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
petition before a single justice of this court, seeking a stay 
of execution.  The single justice stayed the execution and 
subsequently issued a reservation and report consolidating the 
tenant's petition with her pending appeal. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Subject matter jurisdiction.  We first 
address the tenant's argument that the Housing Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over her summary process action 
because the landlord's notice to quit failed to comply with the 
notice provisions of her lease and thus never terminated her 
tenancy.  The tenant argues that a defective notice to quit 
deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction, and thus she 
may raise it at any stage of the proceedings, even though she 
did not raise it in the Housing Court.  See, e.g., Maxwell v. 
AIG Dom. Claims, Inc., 460 Mass. 91, 99 (2011) ("the question of 
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the parties at any 
time").  The landlord argues, to the contrary, that the legal 
adequacy of its notice to quit was not jurisdictional, and that 
the tenant waived any challenges to that notice by failing to 
raise them below.  We conclude that a legally adequate notice to 
quit is not jurisdictional but rather a condition precedent to a 
12 
 
 
 
summary process action that is part of the landlord's prima 
facie case.  Consequently, the tenant waived the issue when she 
failed to object to the adequacy of the notice at trial.  
Regardless, the notice to quit here was legally adequate. 
 
We start our jurisdictional analysis with the text of the 
summary process statute, G. L. c. 239.  See Northeast Energy 
Partners, LLC v. Mahar Regional Sch. Dist., 462 Mass. 687, 692 
(2012) ("The starting point of our analysis is the language of 
the statute . . ." [citation omitted]).  There is no question 
that summary process eviction actions generally fall within the 
Housing Court's jurisdictional grant.  See G. L. c. 185C, § 3 
(vesting Housing Court with jurisdiction over "all civil 
actions" arising under G. L. c. 239).  See also Federal Nat'l 
Mtge. Ass'n v. Rego, 474 Mass. 329, 338 (2016) (observing that 
G. L. c. 185C, § 3, grants Housing Court jurisdiction to hear 
summary process evictions).  Indeed, hearing eviction actions is 
an express and essential Housing Court function. 
 
The plain text of the summary process statute, G. L. 
c. 239, § 1, also defines the role of a notice to quit in the 
exercise of that jurisdiction.  That statute provides in 
relevant part that "if the lessee of land or tenements or a 
person holding under him holds possession without right after 
the determination of a lease by its own limitation or by notice 
to quit or otherwise . . . the person entitled to the land or 
13 
 
 
 
tenements may recover possession thereof under this chapter."  
Termination of a lease, by its own terms or by a notice to quit, 
is thus a condition precedent to bringing suit.  See Boston v. 
Talbot, 206 Mass. 82, 92 (1910) (proper termination is "[o]ne of 
the conditions" that must be fulfilled before "summary process 
may be maintained").  See also New Bedford Hous. Auth. v. Olan, 
435 Mass. 364, 373 (2001) (analyzing termination notice as 
"prerequisite to filing suit" that may be waived). 
 
There is a split of authority in the case law of other 
States regarding whether a defective notice to quit is 
jurisdictional or a condition precedent to bringing suit that 
does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.  Compare, e.g., 
Waterbury Twin, LLC v. Renal Treatment Ctrs.-N.E., Inc., 292 
Conn. 459, 466 (2009) (defective notice to quit concerns subject 
matter jurisdiction), with Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852, 
854 n.3 (Utah 1979) (defective notice to quit does not concern 
subject matter jurisdiction).  There is also not a great deal of 
explanation why different State courts reach the result they do 
on the jurisdiction question.  Based on our own analysis of the 
legal, practical, and institutional considerations involved, we 
conclude that the issue whether a notice to quit is legally 
adequate is not jurisdictional. 
We begin by recognizing that this is a question properly 
within the Housing Court's general subject matter jurisdiction, 
14 
 
 
 
and indeed one that draws on the Housing Court's knowledge and 
expertise.  "Subject matter jurisdiction is jurisdiction over 
the nature of the case and the type of relief sought" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Middleborough v. Housing Appeals Comm., 
449 Mass. 514, 520 (2007).  As discussed, a summary process 
eviction action is clearly a question at the core of the Housing 
Court statute and the relief that the court provides. 
Even where the general subject matter is covered by the 
statute, however, the party bringing suit must have standing for 
the court to have subject matter jurisdiction.  See HSBC Bank 
USA, N.A. v. Matt, 464 Mass. 193, 199 (2013) ("standing is a 
question of subject matter jurisdiction").  The standing 
requirement exists because "[c]ourts are not established to 
enable parties to litigate matters in which they have no 
interest affecting their liberty, rights or property," but 
rather only those matters in which they have a "definite 
interest" such that their "rights will be significantly affected 
by a resolution of the contested point" (citations omitted).  
Id. at 199, 200.  In Rental Prop. Mgt. Servs. v. Hatcher, 479 
Mass. 542, 546-547 (2018) (Hatcher), we found that a litigant 
who did not have an ownership, leasehold, or other property 
interest in the property at issue had no standing to bring a 
summary process action, and therefore we held that the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  Here, by contrast, there is 
15 
 
 
 
no dispute that the landlord had such an interest.  An 
inadequate notice would not deprive the landlord of that 
interest; rather, it would be a failure of the landlord's prima 
facie case.  See, e.g., Middleborough, 449 Mass. at 520-521 
("fundability" requirement for administrative permit properly 
viewed not as "jurisdictional requirement" for appeal from 
permit denial but as "substantive aspect of . . . prima facie 
case").  See also Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3974 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 457 Mass. 53, 57 (2010) (Doe No. 3974) 
(requirement that board establish residency element of "sex 
offender" classification "a question of substance, not subject 
matter jurisdiction").  The landlord here thus has standing. 
We also consider the practical and institutional 
consequences of treating an inadequate notice to quit as 
jurisdictional.  If jurisdiction were in fact dependent on the 
adequacy of the notice, the issue would not need to be raised in 
the first instance in the Housing Court.  See Hatcher, 479 Mass. 
at 547, quoting HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 464 Mass. at 199 ("whenever 
a problem of subject matter jurisdiction becomes apparent to a 
court, the court has 'both the power and the obligation' to 
resolve it, 'regardless [of] whether the issue is raised by the 
parties'"); Doe No. 3974, 457 Mass. at 458 ("questions of 
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time . . . and 
are not waived even when not argued below" [quotations and 
16 
 
 
 
citation omitted]).  This would be inconsistent with both the 
timely resolution of landlord-tenant disputes and the importance 
of litigating the issue in the first instance in the Housing 
Court rather than on appeal.  See Bank of N.Y. v. Bailey, 460 
Mass. 327, 333, 334 (2011) (noting that Legislature created 
Housing Court as "specialized forum" for housing matters, 
specifically to further "just, speedy, and inexpensive" 
resolution of summary process cases [citations omitted]). 
 
Accordingly, we make explicit today that a defective notice 
to quit "represents merely the failure to comply with a 
condition precedent to suit and cannot properly be said to 
affect the court's jurisdiction."  170 W. 85th St. Tenants Ass'n 
v. Cruz, 173 A.D.2d 338, 339 (N.Y. 1991).  See Residential 
Landlord-Tenant Benchbook 32 (W.E. Hartwell ed., 3d ed. 2013) 
(notice to quit requirement is not "'jurisdictional' in 
nature").  To clarify further, the legal adequacy of the notice 
to quit "is more properly characterized as an element of the 
landlord's prima facie case, waivable by the tenant, than as a 
part of the subject matter jurisdiction of the court" (citation 
omitted).  Priel v. Priel, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 5, 1993, at 25, cols. 
3-4 (App. Term Jan. 3, 1992).  Cf. Middleborough, 449 Mass. at 
520-521. 
 
Because we conclude that the adequacy of the notice to quit 
requirement of G. L. c. 239, § 1, is not jurisdictional, and the 
17 
 
 
 
issue was not raised below, we therefore decide that the tenant 
waived the issue of the adequacy of the notice to quit. 
 
b.  Legal sufficiency of the notice to quit.  Despite 
concluding that the tenant waived the argument, we nonetheless 
address the issue whether the landlord substantially complied 
with the requirements for a legally adequate notice to quit 
because the issue has been fully briefed and merits 
clarification.  See Olan, 435 Mass. at 372 (despite waiver of 
tenant's challenge to notice to quit, "[b]ecause there is some 
uncertainty over the question, because it involves a matter of 
public interest that is likely to arise in the future, and where 
the issue has been fully briefed, we will address the issue"). 
 
As discussed supra, the lease agreements between the 
parties contained several provisions concerning termination.  
Because a lease is a contract, Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 
363 Mass. 184, 198 (1973), its proper interpretation is a 
"question of law for the court" (citation omitted).  Freelander 
v. G. & K. Realty Corp., 357 Mass. 512, 516 (1970).  Here, we 
conclude that the landlord substantially complied with the 
notice requirements imposed by the lease with respect to lease 
termination. 
 
Our case law on the adequacy of a notice to quit has long 
distinguished between minor errors of technicality or form and 
material errors of substance.  See Torrey v. Adams, 254 Mass. 
18 
 
 
 
22, 25-26 (1925) ("Technical accuracy in the wording of such a 
notice is not required, but it must be so certain that it cannot 
reasonably be misunderstood . . .").  To be defective such that 
it fails to terminate a lease, a notice to quit must involve a 
material error or omission, i.e., a defect that has some 
meaningful practical effect.  Compare, e.g., Steward v. Harding, 
2 Gray 335, 335 (1854) (notice defective where it failed to 
indicate day on which tenant was to quit), with Clark v. 
Keliher, 107 Mass. 406, 409 (1871) (in absence of uncertainty, 
notice not defective despite mistake in name of tenant).  In 
other words, substantial compliance with statutory or 
contractual notice to quit requirements is necessary to effect 
lease termination, but minor errors or omissions will not render 
the notice to quit defective such that a summary process action 
cannot be maintained.  Cf. Bank v. Thermo Elemental, Inc., 451 
Mass. 638, 670 (2008) ("[m]inor inaccuracies, omissions, and 
errors" in notice required prior to commencing suit under 
environmental protection statute does not require dismissal of 
action). 
 
Here, as discussed, the landlord agreed in paragraph 13(e) 
of the model lease that it "shall" include specific termination 
language in its notice to quit.  This required language, 
however, did not accurately convey the landlord's termination 
19 
 
 
 
options under the lease.10  While the landlord failed to include 
the specific language, it did more accurately state, "Pursuant 
to Paragraph 13 of your Lease, you understood and agreed that 
the owner could terminate the tenancy for serious or repeated 
violations of lease, and/or other good cause." 
 
This does not conclude our analysis.  Per the HUD addendum, 
the landlord had to provide "the tenant a notification that 
specifies the grounds for termination of tenancy."11  A notice to 
quit may still be defective if it fails to comply with the 
                                                          
 
 
10 The verbatim language required the landlord to represent 
that the lease may be "terminated only . . . during the . . . 
Successive Term for serious or repeated violations" of the lease 
or violations of State and Federal law, and may be terminated 
only "at the end of a Successive Term for other good cause" 
(emphases added).  But paragraph 13(a)(8) of the model lease 
also entitled the landlord, under certain circumstances, to 
terminate the lease "[d]uring . . . any Successive Term . . . 
for 'other good cause'" (emphasis added).  While that paragraph 
restricted the types of "other good cause" terminations 
available to the landlord, paragraph 13(c) went on to provide 
that the "other good cause" situations explicitly provided in 
the lease were "non-exclusive" examples that "shall in no way be 
construed as a limitation on the application of 'other good 
cause' to situations not included" in the lease.  The verbatim 
notice to quit language required by the model lease therefore 
required the landlord to represent that its termination options 
were more limited than actually was permitted under the 
contract. 
 
 
11 This paragraph closely follows 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(e)(1) 
(2016), the HUD regulation -- binding on the landlord by virtue 
of paragraph 8(a) of the HUD addendum -- whereby a landlord of a 
tenant holding a Section 8 voucher "must give the tenant a 
written notice that specifies the grounds for termination of 
tenancy during the term of the lease.  The tenancy does not 
terminate before the owner has given this notice, and the notice 
must be given at or before commencement of the eviction action." 
20 
 
 
 
lease's requirement that it be specific.  See, e.g., Residential 
Landlord-Tenant Benchbook, supra at 8 (collecting cases where 
notice was insufficiently specific).  See also Dejan vs. Storms, 
Mass. Hous. Ct., No. 12H84SP0001030 (Boston Div. Apr. 13, 2012) 
(dismissing summary process action where notice to quit lacked 
"sufficient clarity and specificity" required by HUD-mandated 
lease).  Here, the three-page notice to quit gave the tenant 
thirty days' advance notice and knowledge that her tenancy was 
terminating at the end of the month for detailed conduct that 
violated certain accurately referenced lease provisions.  The 
notice to quit thus complied with the contractual requirement 
that it be specific. 
 
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the landlord 
substantially complied with its notice obligations for purposes 
of lease termination.  Therefore, even if the issue had not been 
waived, we would have agreed with the Housing Court judge that 
the notice to quit was legally sufficient for the landlord to 
maintain its summary process action. 
 
c.  Notice and opportunity to be heard.  Although we 
conclude that the court properly had subject matter jurisdiction 
over the summary process eviction, we nonetheless must consider 
whether, as the tenant argues, she was deprived of her right to 
a meaningful opportunity to be heard.  We conclude that the lack 
of any advance notice of trial to a self-represented party, 
21 
 
 
 
combined with an improper denial of a continuance provided by a 
Housing Court standing order that would have allowed the self-
represented party to obtain full representation at a trial to be 
held two weeks later, constituted an abuse of discretion.  We 
therefore vacate the Housing Court judge's judgment of November 
15, 2016, and remand for a new trial. 
 
The Housing Court Standing Orders require that "each judge 
. . . must, consistent with applicable statutes and the rules of 
court, exercise sound judgment in a manner that affords the 
parties a fair opportunity to develop and present their claims 
to the court."  Housing Court Standing Order 1-04(I) (2004).  In 
the Housing Court, where self-representation is common, and thus 
the potential for confusion is high, this can be particularly 
challenging.  See Hatcher, 479 Mass. at 554 n.11 (in 2017, 
ninety-three percent of tenants and thirty-three percent of 
landlords in summary process housing cases were self-
represented); I.S.H. v. M.D.B., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 561 
(2013) ("our courts have recognized that self-represented 
litigants must be provided the opportunity to meaningfully 
present claims and defenses").  The volunteer "lawyer for a day" 
program created by Housing Court Standing Order 1-01 seeks to 
address the challenge and promote the fairness of the process by 
allowing self-represented parties to obtain limited 
representation from volunteer attorneys. 
22 
 
 
 
 
In the instant case, the tenant's ability to have a fair 
opportunity to present and develop her claims or defenses was 
compromised when she did not receive any notice that a trial on 
the merits would occur until the very day -- indeed the very 
afternoon -- of the trial, November 10, 2016.  Without further 
guidance from the judge, notification of the original trial date 
of October 20, 2016, did not provide adequate notice that trial 
would occur immediately following the vacating of the default 
judgment on a different day, weeks later.  Cf. Konstantopoulos 
v. Whately, 384 Mass. 123, 135 (1981) ("oral notice given one 
and one-half hours prior to the revocation hearing . . . did not 
comport with a rudimentary standard of due process"); Adoption 
of Zev, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 905, 906 (2009) (court's unannounced 
conversion of pretrial conference concerning termination of 
parental rights into trial on merits on same day violated 
parent's due process rights).12 
                                                          
 
 
12 As mentioned, the notice of the hearing on the tenant's 
motion to vacate the default judgment did not indicate that, if 
the motion were allowed, the tenant should be prepared to go to 
trial the same day.  Neither the Uniform Summary Process Rules 
nor the Housing Court Standing Orders provides for notice of a 
new hearing date to a defendant who has removed a default 
judgment.  The Uniform Summary Process Rules "provide an 
automatic hearing date that can be predetermined and 
communicated to the defendant with the summons and complaint."  
Commentary to Rule 2 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules, 
Massachusetts Rules of Court, at 477 (Thomson Reuters 2018).  
See Rule 2(c) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1993) 
(scheduling hearing for second Thursday after entry date of 
23 
 
 
 
 
Although not specifically addressed by the parties, the 
tenant's ability to present a meaningful defense was further 
compromised by the judge's denial of a continuance, requested 
pursuant to the court's standing order, which forced the tenant 
immediately to proceed to trial pro se.  As discussed, under 
certain circumstances, such a continuance is mandatory under the 
Housing Court Standing Orders.  Specifically, Housing Court 
Standing Order 1-01(5) provides that if a pro bono attorney in 
the "lawyer for a day program" who is "assisting or representing 
a pro se litigant in mediation does enter an appearance in that 
litigant's action, the litigant shall be entitled to a two (2) 
week continuance of trial" (emphasis added).  See Housing Court 
Standing Order No. 1-04(V) (same).  The standing order also 
provides separately that, if the LDP attorney assisting the 
litigant does not enter an appearance, a motion for continuance 
"shall be allowed if good cause is shown."  Housing Court 
Standing Order 1-01(5). 
                                                          
 
summary process action); Housing Court Standing Order 1-04(V) 
(2004) (declining to issue scheduling orders in summary process 
cases and instead referring parties to Uniform Summary Process 
Rules to determine hearing date).  We recognize, however, that 
summary process proceedings are intended to be "just, speedy, 
and inexpensive."  Rule 1 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules 
(1980).  Therefore, to prevent unnecessary delay and to provide 
proper notice, the Housing Court could, for example, state on 
its notice of motion hearing that trial may occur on the same 
day if the default is vacated. 
24 
 
 
 
 
Here, the lawyer, who was apparently acting pursuant to the 
lawyer for a day program, had filled out a notice of limited 
appearance form on which she checked the box indicating that she 
was representing the tenant on the motion to vacate the default.  
She had not, however, checked a different box on the form 
entitled "Mediation."  She had nonetheless been involved in 
settlement talks and had communicated the existence of these 
talks to the judge.  She expressly stated to the judge, "[W]e 
are requesting a continuance under the standing order, and we're 
willing to enter a full appearance."  Although the form and her 
request were not perfectly clear, we infer from them that she 
was referencing and relying on the provision of standing order 
1-01 providing for the mandatory two-week continuance. 
 
The judge nonetheless rejected the request, stating that he 
would not grant any continuance.13  The attorney then withdrew 
                                                          
 
 
13 The judge insisted that the tenant either accept the 
landlord's settlement offer or face trial, apparently because he 
did not want to inconvenience the landlord's counsel and 
witnesses:  
 
 
"I'll give you [(the tenant's attorney)] two minutes 
to talk to your client.  If not, I'm proceeding with the 
trial.  I'm not going to have these people wait here till 
four o'clock today, and at four o'clock you come in saying 
someone will enter an appearance when we're on for . . . 
trial.  So the trial's going forward today. . . . I will 
give you a chance to communicate with the tenant as to 
whether she wants to resolve it.  If not, I'm proceeding 
with the trial." 
25 
 
 
 
both the continuance motion and her limited appearance.14  The 
tenant then immediately had to proceed to trial pro se against 
the represented landlord. 
 
We conclude that the continuance should have been granted 
in the instant case.  It appears to have been mandatory pursuant 
to the standing order.  The purpose of the continuance in the 
standing order is to facilitate representation at trial.  
Although the "mediation" box was not checked, the attorney was 
assisting in settlement talks and the judge was aware of that 
assistance.  Even if the continuance were not mandatory, it was 
error to reject the request, as there was good cause shown 
because the judge's failure to grant the continuance 
significantly compromised the tenant's ability to receive "a 
fair opportunity to develop and present [her] claims to the 
court."  Housing Court Standing Order 1-04(I).15 
                                                          
 
 
14 Housing Court Standing Order 1-10 (2010) provides that 
"an attorney shall withdraw" after "completion of the 
representation within the scope of a limited appearance" 
(emphasis added).  After vacating the default judgment, 
therefore, the tenant's attorney was obliged to withdraw. 
 
 
15 While the decision "[w]hether a continuance ought to be 
granted commonly rests in the discretion of the trial tribunal" 
(citation omitted), Soe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 252997 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 381, 392 (2013), we have 
found the denial of a motion for a continuance improper where 
"good cause" existed for its granting, see Monahan v. Washburn, 
400 Mass. 126, 129 (1987). 
26 
 
 
 
In sum, the combination of requiring a self-represented 
party to proceed immediately to trial without advance notice and 
denying an apparently mandatory continuance that would have 
provided the party with counsel at such a trial only two weeks 
later constituted an abuse of discretion that deprived the self-
represented party of a meaningful opportunity to develop and 
present her claims as provided by the Housing Court Standing 
Orders.  See Housing Court Standing Order 1-04(I).  We thus 
vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial. 
 
d.  Appeals bond.  Having decided that the Housing Court 
judge erred, we must consider the matter reported to us by the 
single justice concerning the tenant's petition for relief under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the order of execution that the judge 
issued after finding that the tenant had violated a condition of 
her appeals bond.  Because we conclude that the judge exceeded 
his authority when he placed a nonfinancial condition on the 
appeals bond, and then ordered an execution of judgment based on 
his determination that the tenant had violated the nonfinancial 
condition of the bond, we grant the requested relief and reverse 
the execution of judgment ordered by the judge on June 18, 
2018.16 
                                                          
 
 
16 The single justice reported the petition as one seeking 
relief from the Housing Court judge's June 25, 2018, order 
denying the tenant's application for a stay of levy.  The tenant 
27 
 
 
 
 
To obtain review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, a petitioner must 
face an "irreparable loss of significant rights" that cannot be 
remedied in "the normal course of trial and appeal" (citation 
omitted).  DuPont v. Superior Court, 401 Mass. 122, 123 (1987).  
Given the unusual procedural posture of this case, and the novel 
legal issue presented, we conclude that the requirements of 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, are met in the instant case, and that the 
petitioner is entitled to relief. 
 
Here, the tenant complied with the normal procedure of the 
appeals bond statute, G. L. c. 239, § 5, and posted the required 
bond.17  But the judge then ordered an execution of judgment 
based on his determination that the tenant had violated a 
condition of the bond requiring the tenant to grant access to 
the landlord to make repairs.18  This occurred while the appeal 
                                                          
 
properly moved first for a stay in the Housing Court under Mass. 
R. A. P. 6 (a) (1), as appearing in 454 Mass. 1601 (2009).  We 
consider the tenant's petition to challenge the validity of the 
underlying execution issued on June 18 as a result of the June 
12 order. 
 
 
17 The summary process appeals bond statute requires a 
defendant who has lost a summary process case to post bond as a 
condition of prosecuting an appeal.  G. L. c. 239, § 5 (c).  An 
indigent tenant with a meritorious appeal can move in the 
Housing Court for an appeals bond waiver.  Id. at § 5 (e).  A 
tenant can further appeal from a denial of a waiver or the 
amount of any periodic payments to a single justice of the 
Appeals Court.  Id. at § 5 (f). 
 
 
18 The landlord argues that the tenant waived her challenge 
to the appeals bond by failing to raise it when she appealed 
28 
 
 
 
of the summary process case was pending in this court.  Unless 
specifically authorized, the judge had an obligation to refrain 
from issuing an order that would "render the appeal moot or 
otherwise affect the issues before the appellate court."  
Springfield Redev. Auth. v. Garcia, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 432, 435 
(1998).  See Rule 11(b) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules 
(1980) (applying Mass. R. Civ. P. 62 [d], 365 Mass. 829 [1974], 
requiring automatic stay of execution of judgment pending 
appeal, to summary process actions).  Here, the judge did not 
have the authority to order execution of judgment. 
 
Specifically, we hold that the plain text of the appeals 
bond statute does not authorize the inclusion of nonfinancial 
conditions on the bond and the execution of judgment based on 
the failure to comply with such nonfinancial conditions.  The 
statute states that "the defendant shall . . . give bond in a 
                                                          
 
from the denial of the bond waiver and the amount of the bond to 
the single justice of the Appeals Court.  But it is not clear 
that the tenant could have raised her challenge when the bond 
was first set, because G. L. c. 239, § 5 (f), provides that a 
tenant may only challenge the amount of the bond or any periodic 
payments and expressly limits the power of a single justice 
reviewing the terms of the bond to modifying factual findings or 
reducing or rescinding a "bond, deposit or periodic payment."  
Regardless, as the nonfinancial bond condition exceeds the 
statutory authority of the judge, and thus implicates subject 
matter jurisdiction, we may consider it now.  See Maxwell v. AIG 
Dom. Claims, Inc., 460 Mass. 91, 99 (2011) (challenge to subject 
matter jurisdiction can be raised at any point in proceedings).  
See also Ryan v. Kehoe, 408 Mass. 636, 641 (1990) ("The 
statutory grant of jurisdiction to the Housing Court limits the 
court's equity powers to enumerated statutory claims . . ."). 
29 
 
 
 
sum as the court orders, payable to the plaintiff," in an amount 
"conditioned to pay to the plaintiff . . . all rent accrued at 
the date of the bond, all intervening rent, and all damage and 
loss which the plaintiff may sustain" while the appeal is 
pending (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 239, § 5 (c).  By its plain 
text, the statute is clear that a judge may only impose 
financial obligations on the appeals bond.  See Camargo's Case, 
479 Mass. 492, 498 (2018) (legislative intent may be clear from 
"plain and unambiguous" language of statute).  The statute also 
provides for an expedited process, including review by a single 
justice of the Appeals Court, and dismissal of the case when 
these financial conditions are not met.19  Adding nonfinancial 
conditions to the appeals bond process, and allowing execution 
of judgment based on the failure to comply with such conditions, 
                                                          
 
 
19 The statute permits dismissal of an appeal by the trial 
court only when a tenant fails to post the initial appeals bond 
or use and occupancy payment.  See G. L. c. 239 § 5 (h) ("the 
appeal from the judgment shall be dismissed" within five days 
if, after seeking review of amount of bond or periodic payments 
from single justice of Appeals Court, tenant fails to file "the 
amount of bond, deposit or periodic payment").  See also PGR 
Mgt. Co. v. Credle, 427 Mass. 636, 639 (1998) (as provided by 
statute, tenant's appeal properly dismissed through her failure 
to file appeals bond).  Conversely, "if the defendant posted 
bond after losing an appeal of the trial court's denial of 
waiver of that bond, execution would continue to be unavailable 
pending the completion of the appeal of the underlying judgment 
under Rule 62(d)."  Commentary to Rule 13 of the Uniform Summary 
Process Rules, Massachusetts Rules of Court, at 481 (Thomson 
Reuters 2018).  Here, the tenant does not challenge the 
propriety of the financial conditions on the bond. 
30 
 
 
 
transforms the limited nature and purpose of the appeals bond 
statute, generating the type of overlapping trial and appellate 
court processes and confusion present here. 
 
The landlord raises the practical concern that, in the 
absence of nonfinancial conditions on an appeals bond, the 
landlord would have "no ability" to maintain its property during 
the pendency of an appeal.  This is not the case.  The proper 
procedure for the landlord to seek this variety of relief would 
have been an injunction seeking interlocutory relief while the 
appeal was pending.20  Such an injunction could have provided the 
landlord with access to the apartment without an automatic 
execution.  It would have allowed the landlord to protect its 
property and the trial court to act appropriately without 
disrupting the case on appeal.  Indeed, while the appeal has 
been pending in this court, the landlord has followed this very 
                                                          
 
 
20 If properly requested, an injunction, as the landlord 
conceded at oral argument, would be available in these 
circumstances.  See G. L. c. 185C, § 3 (vesting Housing Court 
with equitable jurisdiction); G. L. c. 231, § 117 (Housing Court 
may make "proper interlocutory orders, pending . . . appeal," 
including injunctions); Rule 9 of the Uniform Summary Process 
Rules (1980) (equitable relief available in summary process 
actions); New Bedford Hous. Auth. v. Olan, 435 Mass. 364, 375 
(2001) (Sosman, J., concurring) (observing that preliminary 
injunctions are available under Rule 9 of Uniform Summary 
Process Rules "to prevent the ongoing harm of violence or 
threatened violence on public housing premises"); C.F. Downing, 
Residential and Commercial Landlord-Tenant Practice in 
Massachusetts § 9.8.5 (3d ed. 2016) (describing process for 
landlords to obtain injunctions). 
31 
 
 
 
course and obtained an injunction requiring the tenant to permit 
the landlord access to the apartment to make repairs. 
 
We therefore hold that the Housing Court judge's order of 
execution of judgment for failure to comply with a nonfinancial 
condition of the bond was improper.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
June 18, 2018, order of execution.21 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed, we vacate the 
judgment of November 15, 2016, and remand for a new trial.  
Additionally, we reverse the June 18, 2018, order of execution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
21 We thus do not reach the tenant's due process argument 
that she should have received a prior adversary hearing to 
determine noncompliance with the appeals bond condition.  We 
deny the landlord's request for attorney's fees because the 
tenant's case is not frivolous.