Case Title: ROBERT TROY DUNSMORE V. AMY JO DUNSMORE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-263

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBERT TROY DUNSMORE V. AMY JO DUNSMORE2007 WY 202173 P.3d 389Case Number: 06-263Decided: 12/18/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
ROBERTTROY 
DUNSMORE,Appellant(Defendant),v.AMY JO 
DUNSMORE,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Mitchell 
E. Osborn, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Philip 
White Jr., Laramie, 
Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Robert 
Troy Dunsmore (Father), seeks review of a decree divorcing him from Appellee, 
Amy Jo Dunsmore (Mother).  Father 
contends that the district court erroneously rescinded its Order Allowing Telephonic Testimony, denied Father's Motion to Continue, and denied Father's 
request to keep the record open so that Father could present deposition 
testimony.  We will affirm the 
district court.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Father presents 
three issues:

 
 

1.     
The 
District Court abused its discretion by rescinding the Order allowing [Father's] 
witnesses to testify by telephone at the time of trial (thereby excluding 
witnesses and evidence regarding the methamphetamine use of [Mother] and the 
exposure of the parties' minor child to the drug);

 
 

2.     
The 
District Court abused its discretion by denying [Father's] motion for a 
continuance after the Court rescinded its Order allowing his witnesses to 
testify by telephone;

 
 

3.     
The 
District Court abused its discretion by refusing to keep the record open in 
order for [Father] to submit deposition testimony from the witnesses that were 
not allowed to testify by telephone.

 
 
Mother 
advances two issues:

 
 

1.      
Are the 
issues listed by [Father] relating to telephone testimony essentially moot 
because he has not appealed the trial court's oral ruling granting [Mother's] 
motion to strike those witnesses for other reasons?

 
 

2.      
Did the 
trial court abuse its discretion by denying [Father's] last-minute request to 
present witnesses by telephone or to continue the trial so as to allow 
supplementation of the evidence?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      Mother filed for 
divorce on March 18, 2005, and, in doing so, requested custody of the parties' 
minor child, a son (RDD) born June 24, 2003.  Mother was granted temporary custody of 
the child and Father was granted visitation.

 
 
[¶4]      The path to trial 
in this matter was a tortuous one.  
Several motions to continue were filed by both sides for varying reasons, 
travel to Europe and scheduling conflicts among 
them.  Trial was finally reset for 
December 6, 2005, and was stacked first on the docket.  However, Father's counsel filed yet 
another Motion to Continue "because 
of other hearings" that were scheduled for the same morning.  Mother's counsel objected, and a hearing 
was set on the Motion to 
Continue.  The motion was 
granted, and trial was reset for February 8, 2006, at 9 
a.m.

 
 
[¶5]      The parties 
continued to file motions, including a Motion to Reduce Time to Answer and Respond 
to Discovery filed by Mother.  
In large part this motion 
referred to positive results of 
drug tests performed on the child and declared that "[Father]'s counsel stated 
to the Court that [Father] has material and significant evidence that may or may 
not be important as to the custody of the child," "most or all of [the] evidence 
is outside of the State of Wyoming," and "[Mother] believes that much of the 
evidence is probably adulterated, false, and misleading."  Finally, Mother stated in her motion 
that she believed "[Father] is attempting to stall the above-entitled 
matter."  Mother asked the court to 
order Father to answer discovery in a "shorter time," which the court did.1

 
 
[¶6]      On December 19, 
2005, Mother filed a Motion for Order to 
Show Cause claiming that Father had not timely returned the child to Mother 
in compliance with the temporary custody order.  Father responded to the motion and 
explained that, because he suspected Mother was using drugs, he had the child 
tested for exposure to methamphetamines, and the test came back positive.  Because of the positive result, and 
other reasons, Father refused to return the child to Mother, who he believed was 
"abusing methamphetamine, cocaine, and other controlled substances."  Mother filed a response denying Father's 
accusations.

 
 
[¶7]      The court found 
Father to be in contempt for violating the parties' custody order, for removing 
the child from the state, for refusing to return the child to Mother, and for 
refusing to pay child support.

 
 
[¶8]      The discovery 
issue remained unresolved, and Mother filed a motion to compel because "[Father] 
has failed to respond to said discovery."  
A hearing on the motion was set for February 24, 2006.  However, Father served his Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Have 
Defendant Show Cause and to Modify Temporary Order on that same day, negating the 
necessity of a hearing.

 
 
[¶9]      Eventually, after 
several postponements, the court scheduled the trial for May 17, 2006.  On May 12, 2006, Father filed his Pretrial Statement, listing six expected 
witnesses.  That same day, Father 
filed a motion requesting that most of his witnesses be allowed to testify by 
telephone because " all of the witnesses  are outside the State of Wyoming," and it would have been an "undue 
hardship" for the witnesses to appear in person.  The day before trial, Mother objected to 
the motion, and filed a motion to strike the witnesses altogether, based on 
delays in obtaining discovery and Father's failure to provide a detailed 
description of the proposed witnesses' testimony in the pretrial statement.  Apparently unaware of Mother's 
objection, the district court signed Father's proposed order granting the motion 
for telephonic testimony.

 
 
[¶10]   After signing the order but prior 
to trial, the court reviewed the case file.  The court was made aware of Mother's 
objection and reminded of Father's failure to comply with discovery requests 
and, accordingly, changed its mind on Father's motion for telephonic testimony, 
and on the day of trial, granted Mother's motion to strike Father's proposed 
witnesses.  The court also denied 
Father's motion for telephonic testimony, denied Father's request for a 
continuance, and the trial proceeded.  
Ultimately, the court awarded custody of the child to Mother.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]   We will not overturn a decision of 
the trial court unless we are convinced that it constitutes an abuse of 
discretion or violates some legal principle.  Donnelly v. Donnelly, 2004 WY 72, 
¶ 19, 92 P.3d 298, 306 (Wyo. 2004).  
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria.  
It means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the 
circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  Belless v. Belless, 2001 WY 41, 
¶ 6, 21 P.3d 749,750-51 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶12]   Our review includes an evaluation 
of the evidence supporting the trial court's decision, and we afford the 
prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any consideration of 
evidence presented by the unsuccessful party.  We cannot sustain findings of fact that 
are not supported by the evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the 
great weight of the evidence.  An 
abuse of discretion is present when a material factor deserving significant 
weight is ignored.  Donnelly, ¶ 19, 92 P.3d  at 306.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Telephonic 
Testimony

 
 
[¶13]   Father's first issue is whether or 
not the district court abused its discretion on the day of trial when it 
rescinded its order allowing telephonic testimony of witnesses.  Father argues that he was "denied his 
day" in court, ultimately, by the effect of that ruling, which was to exclude 
witnesses and evidence regarding Mother's drug use, and the resulting exposure 
to the minor child.

 
 
[¶14]   Mother responds that Wyoming rules support the 
court's ruling, that courts have a strong preference for in-court testimony and, 
perhaps most importantly, Father did not show compelling circumstances for the 
telephonic testimony, nor did he give adequate notice.

 
 
[¶15]   Mother also presents a "threshold" 
issue and argues that Father's argument is "essentially moot because he has not 
appealed the trial court's oral ruling granting [Mother's] motion to strike 
those witnesses for other reasons."  
However, Father properly appealed the final order in this case - the Decree of Divorce.  As we have stated before, the general 
rule is that all provisional or interlocutory proceedings in a matter are merged 
in, and disposed of, by the final decree.  
Geerts v. Jacobsen, 2004 WY 
148, ¶ 13, 100 P.3d 1265, 1269 (Wyo. 2004).  Accordingly, Father's arguments are 
properly before this Court, and are not "moot."

 
 
[¶16]   We now turn to the issue before 
us.  In Wyoming, telephonic 
testimony is allowed in limited circumstances.  W.R.C.P. Rule 43(a) states in pertinent 
part:

 
 

Form 
and admissibility. - 

In 
every trial, the testimony of witnesses shall be taken in open court, unless 
these rules, a statute, the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, or other rules adopted by 
the Supreme Court of Wyoming provide otherwise. The court may, for good cause 
shown in compelling circumstances and upon appropriate safeguards, permit 
presentation of testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a 
different location. 

 
 
[¶17]   Presumably, the court signed the 
order allowing telephonic testimony pursuant to this rule.  However, after initially granting 
Father's proposed order granting 
telephonic testimony, the court rescinded it after considering Mother's objection.  In fact, the court heard argument as to 
whether or not Father's witnesses should be allowed to testify by 
telephone.  In lieu of reciting those lengthy arguments, we paraphrase 
the case made by each side.

 
 
[¶18]   The basic gist of Mother's argument 
was that the testimony from the proposed witnesses would be unreliable, 
especially the Rock Springs doctor who was to testify about the parties' 
son's positive drug test.  Mother 
asserted that the evidence to be introduced through the doctor was "fabricated," 
"altered," and "improper," and that she objected to a witness testifying as to 
the documents over the telephone.  
Mother's counsel also argued that discovery took too long and that Father 
did not timely provide responses to Mother's discovery requests.  In addition, Mother objected generally 
based upon her right to confront witnesses.

 
 
[¶19]   Father's counsel responded that a 
Utah doctor 
would authenticate the documents Mother questioned.  Furthermore, a Rock Springs lab 
technician would authenticate the lab tests conducted on the parties' son.  Father also argued that another of his 
witnesses could not attend due to childcare issues.

 
 
[¶20]   Following the parties' arguments, 
the Court reached a decision and stated as follows:

 
 
            
Well, first, I have not, for some time, read through this file, and I did 
this morning preparatory to this hearing.  
Overall, it represents a very adverse comment, as far as the efficiency 
and the performance of our civil justice system.  Sometimes, individually, the various 
steps, the various continuances may appear to be legitimately made, and when you 
take it all together, it is some kind of unacceptable 
picture.

            
These parties should have been before this Court for a final resolution 
of this dispute months ago, and for various reasons, they have not been.  There are a number of things of which I 
was not mindful before going through the file, and that trip through the file 
reminded me; one, I had not recalled that that there had been a motion and order 
for the response to production of discovery.  That does make a difference.  

            
Then, in a similar vein, when Mr. Osborne on behalf of Mr. Dunsmore 
presented his ex parte motion for leave to call witnesses by telephone, I wasn't 
aware that Mr. Pretty had objected.  
The motion didn't indicate that, and Mr. Osborne probably didn't know 
that at the time.  I don't know if 
the file would have contained that objection at the time the order was signed or 
not.  But, be that as it may, taken 
all together, clearly that order was entered and is hereby 
rescinded.

            
This is a matter containing far too many important disputes to use 
telephone testimony.  So, Mr. 
Pretty, your motion is granted in both respects; that is, these witnesses are 
stricken and they may not appear by telephone.  But, there is a 
proviso.

            
Later, after the other evidence is taken, we will conduct an inquiry into 
the extent of which witnesses should be granted release from the order, and we 
will have to consider these items individually and determine whether striking 
the proposed testimony is appropriate under the circumstances or not.  But, until that inquiry and the results 
of it, the motion is granted.

 
 
[¶21]   Taking into consideration both 
attorneys' arguments, the court's commentary, and the resulting hearing from the 
record before us, we hold that the district court could reasonably have reached 
the conclusion that it did.  Alhough 
the court had initially signed the order granting the motion, it was entitled to 
rescind that order.  The action may 
have been unusual, but it is not unprecedented.  See Merkison v. State, 996 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Wyo. 2000) (discussing 
Brunsvold v. State, 864 P.2d 34 (Wyo. 
1993), wherein defendant was granted a 
refund of money he paid to the crime victims fund.  The refund order was 
subsequently rescinded 
by the district court and defendant appealed.).  See also Blankinship v. State, 974 P.2d 377, 378 (Wyo. 
1999).

 
 
[¶22]   Furthermore, evidence was presented 
showing that Father  through his counsel  resisted following through with 
discovery requests, and the record reflects as much.  Although each side presented an extreme 
view of the events leading up to trial, it was up to the court to make 
"conclusions drawn from objective criteria" and to make those conclusions by 
"exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Belless, ¶ 6, 21 P.3d  at 
750-51.  In our view, the court did 
just that.

 
 
Motion 
to Continue

 
 
[¶23]   Father's second issue is whether or 
not the district court abused its discretion when it denied Father's motion for 
a continuance after the court rescinded its order allowing telephonic 
testimony.

 
 
[¶24]   The granting of a continuance is 
among those matters within the trial judge's discretion:

 
 
The 
trial court has broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for 
continuance, and absent a manifest abuse of discretion, the reviewing court will 
not disturb such a ruling.  To find 
an abuse of discretion, the refusal must be so arbitrary as to deny appellant 
due process, and the burden rests upon appellant to prove actual prejudice and a 
violation of his rights.  Upon 
review, we look at the peculiar circumstances of the case and the reasons 
presented to the trial judge at the time of the request.  Abraham v. Great Western Energy, LLC, 2004 WY 145, ¶ 16, 101 P.3d 446, 454 (Wyo. 2004) (citing Byrd v. 
Mahaffey, 2003 WY 137, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 671, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2003)); also see 
Urich v. Fox, 687 P.2d 893, 894-897 
(Wyo. 1984) (it is an abuse of discretion to set trial with only five days of 
notice).  Husband relies heavily 
upon our decision in Abraham even 
though it is not pertinent authority for the proposition he brings before 
us.  In Abraham, the district court set a 
deadline for discovery as a part of its pretrial order, but then held a hearing 
on a motion for summary judgment before that deadline had passed.  We held that that was an abuse of 
discretion and a denial of due process, especially because Abraham was in the 
process of conducting important discovery in response to materials submitted 
with the motion for summary judgment.  
The circumstances of Husband's case differ markedly from those presented 
by Abraham.  We conclude that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for 
continuance.

 
 

Richard 
v. Richard, 2007 
WY 180, ¶ 6, 170 P.3d. 612, 614 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶25]   As indicated previously, this 
matter had already been pending for quite some time in the district court.  In large part, the conflicts in the case 
were due to Father keeping his son against court order.  Regarding the trial date, Father was 
well aware that it was upcoming and had been granted at least one continuance 
due to scheduling conflicts.  
Finally, the record clearly reflects that Father's motion for telephonic 
testimony was filed only five days prior to trial, while he had been aware of 
the trial date for almost two 
months.

 
 
[¶26]   As we stated in Byrd v. Mahaffey, 2003 WY 137, ¶ 26, 78 P.3d 671, 
678 (Wyo. 2003):

 
 
[T]his 
court has traditionally not favored those who have contributed to delay and 
caused the need for continuance by their own actions. See Inskeep v. 
Inskeep, 752 P.2d 434, 437 (Wyo. 1988); 
Urich v. Fox, 687 P.2d 893, 894 (Wyo. 
1984); Sharp v. Sharp, 671 P.2d 317, 319 (Wyo. 1983); Cates v. Eddy, 669 P.2d  at 916; 
Teton v. Teton, 933 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Wyo. 1997). In Sharp, at 319 (footnote 
omitted), we stated: 

 

 
A 
continuance will be granted only upon good cause and a court will deny a 
continuance where the problem which gives rise to the request is the fault of 
the movant.  We said as much in 
Craver v. Craver, [601 P.2d 999 (Wyo. 1979)] at 1000, where it was held: 

 
 
... that 
the trial court may deny a continuance if the problem which gives rise to the 
request for a continuance is the fault of the party moving for the 
continuance.

 
 
Keeping 
the Record Open

 
 
[¶27]   Father's third and final argument 
is that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to keep the record 
open in order for Father to submit deposition testimony from the witnesses who 
were not allowed to testify by telephone.  
This issue is presented in a 
single paragraph without cogent argument or citation to pertinent 
authority.  Our rules of appellate procedure require 
that arguments be supported with "citations to the authorities, statutes and 
parts of the record relied on."  
W.R.A.P. 7.01(f)(1).  "We 
have consistently refused to address claims not supported by cogent argument or 
citation to pertinent 
authority whether a pro se litigant or counsel files the 
brief."  Odegard v. Odegard, 
2003 WY 67, ¶ 29, 69 P.3d 917, 925 (Wyo. 2003).  Because Father failed to comply with our 
appellate rules, we will not consider this issue.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶28]   We conclude that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in rescinding the order to allow witnesses to testify 
telephonically, or by denying Father's Motion to Continue.  Finally, we do not give substantive 
consideration to Father's subsequent request to keep the record open in order 
for him to submit deposition 
testimony from the witnesses who were not allowed to testify by telephone, because it was not supported by 
cogent argument or pertinent authority.  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The court ordered discovery to be 
provided within 10 days of the actual order.