Case Title: THOMAS HANEY v TOM RICE et al

Citation: 

Docket Number: CV-08-0195-AP/EL

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED

JUL 11 2008

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SUPREME COURT OF ARTZONA
In Division

THOMAS HANEY, an individual and
qualified elector,

Arizona Supreme Court

No. CV-08-0195-AP/EL

Appellant, ) Maricopa County
Superior Court

No. cv2008-014383

 

‘THE HONORABLE R. FULTON BROCK,
DON STAPLEY, ANDREW KUNASEK, MAX
W. WILSON and MARY ROSE WILCOX,
THE DULY ELECTED or APPOINTED
MEMBERS OF THE MARICOPA COUNTY
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, WHO ARE
NAMED SOLELY IN THEIR OFFICIAL
CAPACITY: THE MARTCOPA COUNTY

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) MEMORANDUM DECISION
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BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; THE )
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(Not for Publication -
Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111)

HONORABLE HELEN PURCELL, THE
DULY ELECTED MARICOPA COUNTY
RECORDER, WHO IS NAMED SOLELY IN
HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND THE
HONORABLE KAREN OSBORNE, THE
DULY APPOINTED MARICOPA’ COUNTY
DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS, WHO 15
NAMED SOLELY IN HER OFFICIAL
capacrTy,

Appellees,
‘ToM RICE, an individual,

Real Party in Interest.

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
‘The Honorable Douglas L. Rayes, Judge

AFFIRMED
WILLIAMS & ZINMAN, P.C. Scottsdale
By Scott £. Williams
Mark B. Zinman
Attorneys for Thomas Haney

RAYMOND, GREER @ SASSAMAN, P.C. Phoenix
By Michael J. Raymond

Attorneys for Tom Rice

BERCH, Vice Chief Justice

a We have been asked to decide whether nominating

petitions that contain only twelve signature lines per page

comply with Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 16-
315(A) (3) (2006). Under the facts of this case, we hold that
they do.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

2 Tom Rice seeks his party’s nomination to run for

 

Justice of the Peace of the Dreamy Draw Justice Precinct. To be
eligible, Rice needed to submit 441 valid signatures to the
Maricopa County Elections Department. Rice submitted forty-five
petition sheets that contained 498 valid signatures. only
thirty-six of the forty-five petition sheets contained the
statutorily prescribed fifteen signature lines; the other nine
contained only twelve lines per page. Those nine sheets bore a
total of sixty-seven valid signatures.

2 Thomas Haney, a qualified elector, challenged Rice’s
petitions on the ground that the nine petition sheets containing

only twelve signature lines were invalid, and therefore, Rice
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failed to submit the required 441 signatures (498 less 67 is
431). On June 23, 2008, the superior court conducted a hearing
and held that the deficient petition sheets substantially
complied with § 16-315(A)(3). Haney subsequently appealed to
this Court, and by an order dated July 1, 2008, we affirmed. In
that order we informed the parties that a written decision would
follow; this is that decision.
oo We have jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 8.1 of the
Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure and A.R.S. § 16-
391(A) (2006).

II. pIscussrow
45 Arizona law prescribes the form in which nominating
petitions must be made. At the center of this controversy is
A.R.S. § 16-315(A) (3), which provides as follows:

A, The nomination petitions shall be in substantially
the following form:

3. There shall be fifteen lines spaced three-eighths
of an inch apart and consecutively numbered one
through fifteen.

a6 Haney argues that the text of § 16-315(A)(3) is clear

on its face ~ that is, because the statute uses the word

“shall,” the doctrine of “substantial compliance” does not

apply, and the petitions are therefore deficient because they

contain only twelve lines. To support his argument, Haney

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asserts that our decision in Clark v. Pima County Board of
Supervisors, 128 Ariz. 193, 624 P.24 871 (1981), requires strict
adherence to the statute's text. He also maintains that
accepting Rice's position would open the door to future
interpretations of § 16-315(A), which would frustrate the
statute’s purpose. Haney urges us to reject the nine petitions
containing only twelve signature Lines.

7 Rice agrees that the text of § 16-315(A) governs.
Unlike Haney, however, Rice argues that the prefatory clause of
§ 16-315(A) requires only that the petition substantially comply
with the specific enumerated subsections. Rice distinguishes
Clark and asserts that our decisions in Moreno v. Jones, 213
Ariz. 94, 139 P.3d 612 (2006), Clifton v. Decillis, 187 Ariz.
112, 927 P.2d 772 (1996), and Marsh v. Haws, 111 Ariz. 139, 526
P.2d 161 (1974), support the textual conclusion that substantial
compliance suffices.

a8 Resolution of this case requires us to answer two
related inguiries: first, whether substantial compliance is the
correct standard, and second, if so, whether Rice's petitions
satisfy that standard. Both questions present issues of law,
which we review de novo. Moreno, 213 Ariz. at 101-02, $ 40, 139

P.3d at 619-20.
A. The Applicable Standard
9 We agree with the trial court that the correct standard
is substantial compliance. Although Haney is certainly correct
that § 16-315(A) uses the term “shall,” the term must be viewed
in context with the remaining parts of § 16-315(A). See Ariz.
Dep't of Rev. v. Action Marine, Inc., 218 Ariz. 141, 143, $ 10,
181 P.3d 188, 190 (2008) (construing statutes as a whole,
considering context, language, and purpose). The prefatory
clause of § 16-315(A) requires the nominating petitions to be in
“substantially the . . . form” of the enumerated subsections.
Reading subsection (3) in isolation, as Haney does, without
reference to the prefatory clause, would strip the words
“substantially the following form” of meaning and purpose.
Although the term “shall” and the phrase “substantially the
following form” are not entixely consistent, the statute should
be read to avoid a construction that would render the latter
meaningless, while also giving due weight to the former. See
Keiz v. Buckeye Petroleum Co., 145 Ariz. 374, 379, 701 P.2d
1182, 1187 (1985). Thus, we conclude that the best reading of
§ 16-315(A) gives weight to both; that is, the statute requires
substantial compliance with the mandatory enumerated statutory
subsections.

s10 We concluded similarly in Clifton. There, we decided

whether nominating petitions for a general election complied
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with the requirements of A.R.S. § 16-341(D) when the petition
forms did not designate the party affiliation of an independent
candidate who left the party designation portion of the petition
blank. 187 Ariz. at 113, 927 P.24 at 773. Like § 16-315(A),
the statutory provision at issue in Clifton required that “(t}he
nomination petition shall be . . . substantially” in the form
provided by the statutory text requiring the candidate to
indicate the party name or its equivalent. To be sure, Clifton
explored a different statute, but we find its analysis
particularly persuasive because the prefatory clause in § 16-
341(A) is almost identical to that for § 16-315(A).
saa The statutory purpose behind nominating petitions also
supports our conclusion, As we stated in Clifton:

(WJominating petitions were designed to “in some

measure [weed] out the cranks, the publicity seekers,

the frivolous candidates who have no intention of

going through with the campaign” . . . “yet not keep

out those who are serious in their efforts and have a

reasonable nunber of supporters.”
187 Ariz. at 115, 927 P.2d at 775 (second alteration in Clifton)
(quoting Adams v. Bolin, 77 Ariz. 316, 320, 271 P.2d 472, 475
(1954)). Requiring only substantial compliance furthers this
statutory purpose, and we therefore conclude that § 16-315(A)
“does not mandate perfection but only that candidates
substantially comply with its requirements.” Id. at 116, 927

P.2d at 776.
m2 Finally, we find Haney's citation to Clark unhelpful.
The issue in Clark was whether “the signers of nominating
petitions must sign with the exact name under which they are
registered to vote,” not whether the forms thenselves
substantially complied with the statutory requirements. 128
Ariz. at 194, 624 P.2d at 872. Clark required only that the
proponent be prepared to offer additional proof that the
signatories were properly registered when their names did not
natch voter registration affidavits. Id. at 195, 624 P.2d at
873; see also 1993 Ariz, Sess. Laws, ch. 98, $ 22 (Ist Reg.
Sess.) (modifying statutory section at issue in Clark).

B. Substantial Compliance with A.R.S. § 16-315

3 Having determined that substantial compliance is the
appropriate standard, we must now determine whether the
petitions containing only twelve lines substantially comply with
§ 16-315. We conclude that they do.

na ‘In determining whether a nomination petition form
substantially complies with the statutory requirements, this
court has focused on whether the omission of information could
confuse or mislead electors signing the petition.” Moreno, 213
Ariz. at 102, $ 42, 139 P.3d at 620. To be sure, § 16-315(A)
‘allows a measure of inconsistency” so long as it does not
affect the result. Id. (quoting Clifton, 187 Ariz. at 116, 927

P.2d at 776).
1s Here, the nominating petition sheets containing only
twelve signature lines were identical, in both form and
substance, to the unchallenged petition sheets with the
exception that the bottom three lines were cut off. This was
likely the result of copier error. Indeed, all the information
necessary to understand the petitions was present - the name of
the court and office sought, the party affiliation, the nane of
the candidate, the candidate’s address, the county, and the date
of the election. No potential signer would distinguish between
the deficient and non-deficient sheets, and any signer would be
able to reject or accept the petition on its face.

s6 We believe that having fewer lines than required by
$ 16-315 does nothing to confuse or mislead an elector.
Finally, having fewer lines is considerably less substantial
than those deficiencies that were not disqualifying in Moreno,
213 Ariz. at 102, J 44, 139 P.3d at 620 (omission of day and
month of primary election date), Clifton, 187 Ariz. at 116, 927
P.2d at 176 (omission of party designation for independent
candidate), and Marsh, 111 Ariz. at 140, 526 P.2d at 162 (using
“SO. PHX. Precinct” as an abbreviation for the South Phoenix
Precinct). Thus, we hold that the petitions in this case

substantially comply with § 16-315(A) (3).
III. CONCLUSION
m7 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of

the superior court.

Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice

CONCURRING:

Michael 0. Ryan, Justice

W Scott Bales, Justice