Case Title: State v. Hayward

Citation: 

Docket Number: S43096

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: July 24, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

		Respondent,

	v.

MICHAEL JAMES HAYWARD,

	Appellant.

(CC 10-94-08860; SC S43096)

	On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction
and the sentence of death imposed by the Circuit Court of Lane
County.

	Pierre L. Van Rysselberghe, Judge.

	Argued and submitted May 4, 1998.

	Stephen J. Williams, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for appellant.  With him on the
brief was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender. 

	Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent.  With her on the
brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Leeson, Justices.*  

	LEESON, J.

	The judgment of conviction and the sentence of death are
affirmed.

	*Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.

		LEESON, J.

		This is an automatic and direct review of a judgment of
conviction and a sentence of death.  ORS 163.150(1)(g); ORAP
12.10(1).  Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction on three
counts of aggravated murder, ORS 163.095, one count of
intentional murder, ORS 163.115, two counts of felony murder, ORS
163.115, two counts of attempted aggravated murder, ORS 161.405;
ORS 163.095, one count of first-degree assault, ORS 163.185, one
count of first-degree kidnapping, ORS 163.235, one count of
first-degree robbery, ORS 164.415, and one count of first-degree
burglary, ORS 164.225.  Alternatively, defendant asks this court
to vacate his death sentence.  We affirm the judgment of
conviction and the sentence of death.

I. FACTS

		Because the jury found defendant guilty, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the state.  State v.
McDonnell, 313 Or 478, 480, 837 P2d 941 (1992).

		On April 10, 1994, four young men -- Jason Brock,
Daniel Rabago, Jason Brumwell, and Johl Brock -- met at
Brumwell's house and discussed committing a robbery in order to
get money to buy marijuana.  They decided to rob the Dari Mart on
Royal Avenue in Eugene.  That afternoon, they went to the store
to see how many people worked there and whether there were
surveillance cameras.  They returned to Brumwell's house and
continued to discuss the robbery.  Jason Brock then went to work
and played no role in the events that followed.

		The other three drove to defendant's house in Johl
Brock's car to ask defendant, Michael Hayward, if he would like
to join them in robbing the Dari Mart.  Defendant agreed to
participate and got into Brock's car to discuss plans for the
robbery.  They listened to "death metal" music(1) while they made
their plans.  Rabago, Brumwell, and Brock, who considered
themselves satanists, were members of a death metal band. 
Defendant was not a member of the band, but he enjoyed listening
to death metal music.  As Rabago testified, "we were all into
evil and we were all pretty much deathers."  Rabago described a
"deather" as "someone that has a lot of hate in them and sees 
 * * * the morbid things in life."  During the discussions that
took place in Brock's car, the four young men decided to kill
their victims.  They also discussed whether they would carve
satanic symbols on the victims' bodies and whether they would
leave a message written in the victims' blood on the Dari Mart
wall.  During the afternoon, they drove to Rabago's house to get
weapons -- a dumbbell bar, a thin metal bar about two feet long
with one pointed end, a chisel-type hammer, and a knife.  From
Rabago's house, the four drove to the Dari Mart.  Defendant and
Johl Brock went in, and defendant bought cigarettes.  They left
the store to wait until closer to its 11:00 p.m. closing time
before committing the crimes.

		Just before returning to the Dari Mart, the group
listened to more death metal music to "kill time" and become
motivated about the crimes they were about to commit.  At about
10:35 p.m., Donna Ream, one of the two clerks on duty at the Dari
Mart, saw defendant standing in front of a window outside the
store.  He smiled and waved at her.  A few minutes before 11:00
p.m., Rabago, Brumwell, Brock, and defendant went into the Dari
Mart.  Each young man had an assigned "job" with respect to what
transpired next.

		Defendant, followed by Brock, went to the back of the
store.  Brumwell and Rabago remained in the front.  Brumwell,
holding the dumbbell bar over his head and emitting a deep growl,
ran toward Ream, who was standing behind the check-out counter. 
Ream said the growl sounded like a growl she heard later on a
death metal compact disc by a group called Cannibal Corpse.  Ream
jumped back in fright.  Brumwell said he was just joking and
asked her to give him the money in the cash register.  Ream did
so.(2)

		Meanwhile, defendant and Brock encountered the second
clerk, Frances Wall, stocking the cooler in the back of the
store.  Brock watched defendant strike Wall in the back of the
head with the pointed, thin metal bar, knocking her to the
ground.  Wall attempted to protect her head from more blows by
putting her arms in front of her face.  Defendant struck her on
the head with the bar five or six more times, striking her as
hard as he could.  The blows shattered Wall's skull.  Brock left
the store, drove his car some 50 yards away and waited for the
others to come out.  Meanwhile, Brumwell handed Rabago the
dumbbell bar and told him to watch Ream while he joined defendant
in the back room.  At some point, defendant shoved the pointed
bar completely through Wall's skull.  She died at the scene.

		Brumwell and defendant returned to the front of the
store.  Defendant, Brumwell, and Rabago then led Ream to the back
room.  Defendant told the others to hit her.  Defendant told
Brumwell that he had "killed his" and wanted to know why Brumwell
could not kill Ream.  Despite Ream's efforts to defend herself,
defendant and Brumwell hit her with the dumbbell bar and the bar
that defendant had used to kill Wall.  They struck her more than
50 times on her head and on her arms, which she had raised to try
to shield herself from the blows.  They also kicked her and
stabbed her with the knife.  She ran into the Dari Mart's
bathroom and tried to shut the door, but was unable to, because
both of her arms had been broken in several places.  Defendant
and Brumwell followed her into the bathroom, where they continued
to beat her.  At one point Brumwell paused and asked her, "Why
won't you just die, bitch?"  Both men yelled profanities at Ream
while they beat her.  At one point, Brumwell shoved the dumbbell
bar into Ream's mouth, knocking out two of her teeth.

		Sometime during the attack on Ream, the young men heard
the bell that rings in the back room when someone comes in the
front door.  They stopped beating Ream and left the store.  Ream
threw herself against the bathroom door to close it.  When she
heard a boy's voice in the front of the store, she called out to
him to call the police.  Then Ream ran from the store to a house
across the street and collapsed on the floor when the residents
let her in.  A large portion of her scalp was torn off by the
blows to her head, a disk in her neck was herniated, she lost
almost half of the blood in her body, and she suffered permanent
damage to her arms and hands.  Nonetheless, Ream never lost
consciousness, and some months later she was able to identify
photographs of her attackers, including defendant.

		Several months after the Dari Mart crimes, Rabago,
Brumwell, and defendant camped in the woods outside the town of
Curtin for an extended period of time.  While there, they
discussed committing another crime, and possibly another murder,
after the 1994 Labor Day weekend.  They were arrested at the camp
just before Labor Day.  Soon after his arrest, defendant told
police that he was not a satanist, but that he believed that "God
is weak and Satan is strong."  During his initial police
interview, he showed no remorse for Wall's murder or the assault
on Ream.  He declared that Wall's was just another death, that
"life ain't worth shit," and that Wall would have died anyway. 
Defendant seemed amused about the crimes and the fact that he had
been arrested.

		Rabago pleaded guilty to felony murder, attempted
aggravated murder, first-degree assault, first-degree robbery,
first-degree burglary and first-degree kidnapping for the Dari
Mart crimes.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, if Rabago testified
truthfully for the state at defendant's trial, he would be
sentenced to 12 years in prison.  Johl Brock pleaded guilty to
felony murder, first-degree kidnapping, first-degree robbery, and
first-degree burglary.  His plea agreement provided that if he
testified truthfully for the state at defendant's trial, he would
receive a sentence of 9 to 11 years.  A jury convicted Brumwell
of aggravated murder, intentional murder, two counts of felony
murder, two counts of attempted aggravated murder, first-degree
assault, first-degree robbery, first-degree kidnapping, and
first-degree burglary.  He was sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole.  

		Rabago, Johl Brock, Jason Brock, and Donna Ream
testified for the state at defendant's trial.  As noted at the
outset, defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated
murder and many other crimes.  During the penalty phase,
defendant testified that he read the bible in prison, that he now
believes in God, and that he cares about the victims' families. 
The jury voted unanimously to impose the death penalty.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

A.  Assignments of Error Regarding Pretrial Proceedings

	1.  Plea Bargaining

		Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to prohibit the death penalty, because

	"the district attorney did not have a systematic policy
concerning plea negotiations in capital cases. 
Defendant's death sentence should be reversed because
he was denied the opportunity to enter into plea
negotiations in this case." 

According to defendant, evidence in the record does not support
the conclusion that the state had a systematic policy of plea
negotiations in capital cases.  Defendant's argument appears to
be that, if a systematic plea bargaining system had been in
place, the prosecutor would have entered into plea negotiations
with him.  The state responds that defendant's general, abstract
concerns regarding the alleged lack of a systematic plea
bargaining policy are irrelevant to the validity of his
conviction and sentence and that defendant failed to complain at
trial about the state's failure to engage in plea negotiations
with him.  

		At trial, defendant argued that 

	"[t]he manner in which the State makes its decision to
seek the death penalty, not seek the death penalty, or
to undertake plea bargaining is arbitrary and
capricious and is not based upon a coherent and
systematic scheme and therefore it violates the
Defendant's rights under the 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article [I],
[s]ection 20[,] of the Oregon Constitution."

The trial court interpreted defendant's motion to prohibit the
death penalty in this case "as an attack on the plea bargaining
system" and conducted a pretrial hearing to examine whether the
Lane County District Attorney's office had a systematic policy
for determining when to engage in plea negotiations in capital
cases.  The trial court ultimately denied defendant's motion. 
Because the trial court interpreted defendant's motion as a
challenge to the Lane County District Attorney's policy for
offering plea bargains and ruled on that issue, we conclude that
defendant preserved his challenge to that policy.  See State v.
Hitz, 307 Or 183, 188, 766 P2d 373 (1988) (efficient judicial
procedure requires that positions of parties are presented to
initial tribunal and on appeal).  As defendant has structured his
argument, resolution of that issue also resolves his claim that
the death penalty should be prohibited in this case, based on the
state's refusal to engage in plea negotiations with him.  

		Whether a criminal defendant was improperly denied a
plea offer is reviewed for an error of law.  McDonnell, 313 Or at
484.  The defendant must demonstrate the error.  Id. at 494. 
Standardless or irrational prosecutorial plea bargaining
decisions violate Article I, section 20, of the Oregon
Constitution, State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 66, 880 P2d 431
(1994), but prosecutorial discretion regarding plea bargaining
does not violate Article I, section 20, if that discretion is
exercised in the context of a coherent, systematic policy.  Id.
(citing State v. Buchholz, 309 Or 442, 446-47, 788 P2d 998
(1990)).  If the decision not to offer a plea bargain satisfies
the requirements of Article I, section 20, the Equal Protection
Clause is complied with as well.  State v. Tucker, 315 Or 321,
328, 845 P2d 904 (1993).  

		In this case, the trial court conducted a two-day
hearing regarding the Lane County District Attorney's policy on
plea bargaining.  The district attorney, as well as present and
past deputy district attorneys, described the manner in which
death penalty cases had been charged since 1984, the year in
which the death penalty was reinstated in Oregon.  They testified
that the responsibility for charging in serious cases is
delegated to the most senior deputies and that it is office
policy to discuss charging and plea bargaining decisions with the
district attorney as well as with trial team leaders.  In
deciding whether to seek the death penalty in an aggravated
murder case, Lane County prosecutors are guided by the criteria
listed in ORS 163.095 (defining aggravated murder) and by their
perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of the state's case,
both in the guilt and penalty phases.  Prosecutors offer plea
bargains if they conclude that they have "significant proof
problems."  At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
stated:

	"I do not find improper motive.  I do not find
arbitrariness with respect to the way in which these
cases that I've heard about have been handled.  And I
do not therefore find a basis to grant the motion to
prohibit the death penalty."

The record supports the trial court's findings.  

		The Lane County District Attorney's policy is to charge
aggravated murder when the facts of the crime fit within one or
more of the statutory definitions in ORS 163.095.  That policy is
permissible.  See State v. Farrar, 309 Or 132, 137-38, 786 P2d
161 (1990) (probable cause to believe that the defendant
committed the crime of aggravated murder is a sufficient reason
to charge that crime).  On this record, we conclude that
defendant has not met his burden of proving that the Lane County
District Attorney's office lacked a coherent, systematic policy
regarding plea negotiations in capital cases.  Moreover,
defendant has not alleged that he was treated disparately, nor
does he contend that he was denied the opportunity to plea
bargain based on class discrimination, on concerns collateral to
a fair prosecution for aggravated murder, or on animus towards
defendant or his attorney. 

	2.  Proportionality Review

		Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in
denying his pretrial motion to compel the state to disclose on a
statewide basis the cases in which a defendant had been charged
with aggravated murder and was eligible for the death penalty so
that the court could conduct a proportionality review.  
Defendant acknowledges that the issue he presents in this
assignment of error was decided against him in Cunningham, but he
contends that "this court should reexamine its holding in
Cunningham and grant defendant relief in this case."  We decline
defendant's invitation to reexamine Cunningham.

B.  Guilt-Phase Assignments of Error

	1.  Admissibility of Death Metal Music and Satanism Evidence

		In separate assignments of error, which we consider
together, defendant contends that the trial court erred in
overruling his objections to the introduction of evidence about
death metal music and satanism, because that evidence was not
relevant under OEC 401.  Defendant further contends that, even if
the evidence were relevant to any theory in the state's case, it
was more prejudicial than probative, in violation of OEC 403, and
amounted to evidence of prior bad acts, in violation of OEC
404(3). 

		The state responds that defendant made only sporadic
objections to the introduction of evidence of death metal music
and satanism, that a considerable amount of death metal music and
satanism evidence was received without objection, that the
evidence supported the state's theory regarding at least one of
the motives for the crimes and that, in the context of other
unchallenged evidence on those subjects, the evidence to which
defendant objects was not unfairly prejudicial. 

		At trial, defendant objected to Jason Brock's
description of death metal music and to Jason Brock's testimony
that the lyrics in Cannibal Corpse songs "explain or picture
through words killing people maybe."  Defendant objected to Johl
Brock's testimony that the death metal lyrics to which the group
listened "described basic satanic practices, ceremonies and
stuff."   Defendant also objected to Johl Brock's testimony that 

	"pretty much what got [Rabago and me] dabbling in
satanism was the message this particular CD [by the
band Deicide] gave us.  I mean, looking through the
lyrics and stuff.  That's how we got involved in
satanism." 

Defendant further objected to Johl Brock's testimony that
satanism is "just another religion.  Just a religion that doesn't
believe in the same things as Christians."  Finally, defendant
objected to Detective Ryan's testimony about statements defendant
made to him after defendant was arrested regarding defendant's
involvement in satanism when he was 16 or 17 years of age.

		Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."  OEC 401.  This court has held
that whether a fact or proposition is material is determined "by
the pleadings and the substantive law."  State v. Clowes, 310 Or
686, 691-92, 801 P2d 789 (1990).  The state is entitled to prove
a defendant's motive for a charged crime.  State v. Rose, 311 Or
274, 283, 810 P2d 839 (1991).  

		Defendant was charged in multiple counts with
"intentionally" causing Wall's death.  One of the theories
underlying those charges was that death metal music and satanism
provided at least one of the motives for defendant, Rabago,
Brumwell, and Johl Brock when they planned and committed the Dari
Mart crimes.  The testimony to which defendant objected was
relevant to the state's theory that defendant and the others
intended to commit murder, not merely robbery, when they entered
the Dari Mart on the night of their crimes.  The evidence also
was relevant to help explain the brutality of the attacks on Wall
and Ream and to explain the group's intention that Ream also die,
not merely to cover up evidence of their other crimes, but also
to allow them to carve satanic symbols in the bodies or to leave
other blood evidence of satanism at the scene.  For the forgoing
reasons, we hold that the evidence was relevant under OEC 401.

		Nonetheless, defendant contends, the evidence to which
he objected was unfairly prejudicial and was "introduced to the
jury to inflame them."  OEC 403 provides, in part, that relevant
evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."  We review the
trial court's decision to overrule an objection on the grounds of
unfair prejudice for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Moore, 324
Or 396, 407, 927 P2d 1073 (1996).

		The state informed the jury during its opening
statement that it would present evidence about death metal music
and satanism.  The state presented such evidence, and defendant
objected only to some of it.  Without objection, at least two
witnesses who saw defendant and the others on the day of the
crimes described their black T-shirts and the markings on them,
and one of those witnesses stated that his "first impression" of
defendant was that he was "a Satan worshiper."  As explained
earlier, Rabago testified that all four men were "into evil and
we were all pretty much deathers."  Rabago also testified that
"maybe" the group listened to death metal music before entering
the Dari Mart in order to prepare themselves for the crimes and
that Rabago had committed the crimes "in the essence" of, or to
honor, members of the death metal bands Deicide and Cannibal
Corpse.  Ream testified that Brumwell emitted a "death metal
growl" just before he attacked her and that the growl sounded
like one she heard later on a Cannibal Corpse compact disc.  Johl
Brock and Rabago testified that the group discussed their plan to
carve satanic symbols into the bodies of whomever they killed at
the Dari Mart.  In that context, the evidence to which defendant
objects was not unfairly prejudicial.  The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in overruling defendant's motion to exclude
the evidence on that ground.

		Defendant also argues that the evidence regarding death
metal music and satanism should have been excluded under OEC
404(3) (1993), which prohibits the introduction of evidence of
"other crimes, wrongs or acts * * * to prove the character of a
person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith."(3)  According to defendant, the death metal music
evidence "does not come within any of the exceptions to OEC
404(3)," and the evidence of satanism could have led the jury to
convict defendant simply because he was a "bad person."  The
state responds that, even if OEC 404(3) applies to evidence of
death metal music and satanism, the evidence was admissible to
establish motive, which is one of the exceptions to an objection
made under OEC 404(3). 

		A three-part test governs our analysis under OEC
404(3):  Was the evidence independently relevant for a
noncharacter purpose; was there sufficient proof that the conduct
occurred; and did the probative value of the conduct outweigh the
danger of unfair prejudice under OEC 403?  See State v. Hampton,
317 Or 251, 254, 855 P2d 621 (1993) (identifying test).

		Defendant's argument under OEC 404(3) assumes that
listening to death metal music and believing in satanism are
"acts" under OEC 404(3).  Whether they are, for purposes of
analysis under that rule, has not been briefed or argued by the
parties and is not before us for decision in this case.  However,
even assuming, as defendant does, that listening to death metal
music and believing in satanism are "acts" under OEC 404(3), we
agree with the state that the trial court did not err in
admitting the evidence to which defendant objects.  As explained
above, the evidence was relevant to the state's theory regarding
defendant's motive: Wall's murder and Ream's beating were more
than simply a robbery gone awry.  Defendant does not dispute that
the group listened to death metal music or that he made the
statements to Ryan about being influenced by satanism when he was
16 or 17 years old.  Also as explained above, viewed in the
context of the other evidence about death metal music and
satanism that was received without objection at trial, the
evidence was not unfairly prejudicial.

		Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a mistrial.  That motion was based on his
contention that evidence of death metal music should not have
been admitted.  The state responds that defendant's motion was
not timely.

		To be preserved for appeal, a motion for mistrial must
be made in a timely manner.  State v. Williams, 322 Or 620, 631,
912 P2d 364 (1996).  Assuming a proper objection, a motion for
mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Moore, 324 Or at
425-26.  Defendant did not move for a mistrial until after the
state had rested its case.  His motion, therefore, was not timely
and hence was not preserved.  See Williams, 322 Or at 631 (motion
for mistrial "is timely if it is made when the allegedly
objectionable statement was made").  

		For the reasons stated above, we conclude that
defendant cannot prevail on these assignments of error.

	2.  Jury Instruction on Coexisting Intents

		Defendant assigns error to the following jury
instruction, which the trial court gave over his objection:

		"A person often acts with two or more coexisting
intents.  If the state proves to your satisfaction
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with
a particular criminal intent as to one count of the
indictment, it is possible that you may find that the
defendant had one or more other coexisting intents
which were also reasons for that behavior."

At trial, defendant argued that the instruction was "a comment on
the evidence and it's an inappropriate instruction[], something
that['s] subject to argument but not to instruction."

		On review, defendant contends that the instruction
should not have been given, because it was a comment on the
evidence, impermissibly instructed on an inference that could
have been drawn against defendant from the evidence, and was
"confusing and may have led the jury to conclude that the state
had proven that defendant acted with criminal intent but on an
improper basis."  The state responds that defendant preserved
only the argument that the instruction was a comment on the
evidence.  

		At trial, a party must object to a jury instruction
based on a specific theory in order to preserve that argument for
review.  State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355, 800 P2d 259 (1990).  In
this case, defendant objected at trial to the instruction only on
the theory that it was a comment on the evidence.  Therefore, we
address only defendant's argument that the instruction on
coexisting intents, which the trial court gave immediately after
the instruction on intent, was a comment on the evidence.  

		It is well established that a trial court is not
permitted to comment on the evidence.  ORCP 59 E; ORS 136.330(1)
(ORCP 59 E is applicable in criminal cases); Tucker, 315 Or at
333.  A court impermissibly comments on the evidence when it
gives a jury instruction that tells the jury how specific
evidence relates to a particular legal issue.  Brown, 310 Or at
373.  A court also impermissibly comments on the evidence if it
instructs the jury to draw an inference against the defendant
that shifts the burden of proof from the state to the defendant. 
State v. Nefstad, 309 Or 523, 551-52, 789 P2d 1326 (1990); State
v. Rainey, 298 Or 459, 464, 467, 693 P2d 635 (1985).  An
inference cannot relieve the state of its burden of proving each
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Rainey, 298 Or
at 464-65. 

		The twelve-count indictment against defendant in this
case alleged that he acted "intentionally" with respect to some
of the crimes, "recklessly" with respect to other crimes, and
"knowingly" with respect to still others.  The state was required
to prove each element of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The instruction on coexisting intents did not tell the jury how
specific evidence adduced at trial related to a particular legal
issue regarding any element of any crime.  Neither did the
instruction tell the jury that the state had proven any element
of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.  Finally, the
instruction did not tell the jury that it could draw an inference
against defendant that shifted the state's burden of proving
criminal intent with respect to any of the crimes.  The
instruction merely reminded the jury that it was "possible" for
it to find that defendant acted with more than one intent, as the
state had alleged in the multiple-count indictment.  We conclude
that the trial court did not err in giving the coexisting intents
jury instruction.

		For the foregoing reasons, and finding no error, we
affirm the judgment of conviction.  We turn to defendant's
assignments of error concerning the penalty phase of his trial.

C. Penalty-Phase Assignments of Error

	1.  Victim Impact Evidence

		Defendant assigns error to the trial court's denial of
his motion, made at the beginning of the penalty phase, that the
state not be allowed to introduce victim impact evidence.  In
order to address this assignment of error, we must provide the
context in which defendant and the state contest the issue. 

	 	The 1995 Legislature amended ORS 163.150(1)(a)
regarding the admissibility of victim impact evidence.  That
section, which became effective on July 7, 1995, provides, in
part:

	"In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any
matter that the court deems relevant to sentence including,
but not limited to, victim impact evidence relating to the
personal characteristics of the victim or the impact of the
crime on the victim's family and any aggravating or
mitigating evidence relevant to the issue in paragraph
(b)(D) of this subsection; however, neither the state nor
the defendant shall be allowed to introduce repetitive
evidence that has previously been offered and received
during the trial on the issue of guilt."  (Emphasized
material added by 1995 Legislature.)

The statute contemplates that evidence that may be used as victim
impact evidence during the penalty phase may have been introduced
for some other purpose during the guilt phase of a capital trial. 
See State v. Montez, 324 Or 343, 348-49, 927 P2d 64 (1996)
(evidence from guilt phase considered in penalty phase).

		Opening statements in the guilt phase of defendant's
trial began on November 15, somewhat over four months after the
amended version of ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1995) went into effect. 
During the guilt phase, the state introduced a photograph of
Frances Wall that was taken while she was alive.(4)  The state
called David Wall as a witness in order to lay a foundation for
the introduction of that photograph.  Before asking him to
identify the person in the photograph, the prosecutor asked David
Wall if Frances Wall was his wife.  Wall responded that she was. 
Defendant did not object to that evidence, and the court properly
received it into the record. 

		At the beginning of the penalty phase of his trial,
defendant made a general objection to the introduction of any
victim impact evidence.  He argued that, under State v. Guzek,
322 Or 245, 906 P2d 272 (1995), such evidence was inadmissible,
because it was irrelevant.  He also argued that allowing victim
impact evidence pursuant to the 1995 amendment to ORS
163.150(1)(a) violated the ex post facto provisions of the
Oregon(5) and United States Constitutions.(6)  The trial court
overruled defendant's objection and, during the penalty phase,
David Wall testified that he and Frances Wall were the parents of
two children and that Frances Wall had worked at the Dari Mart
for almost five years.  Wall also described telling their son
that the boy's mother was dead and described the boy's reaction
to that news.  Apart from defendant's general objection to the
introduction of victim impact evidence at the beginning of the
penalty phase, he did not make a specific objection to any of
Wall's testimony.

		On review, defendant argues that the trial court erred
in allowing David Wall to give victim impact testimony during the
penalty phase pursuant to ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1995), because
retroactive application of the 1995 version of ORS 163.150(1)(a)
violated ex post facto prohibitions.  The state responds that
defendant failed to preserve his ex post facto argument, because
the state introduced victim impact evidence during the guilt
phase of defendant's trial.  The state relies on our analysis in
Brown:

		"'It is well established that when evidence is
offered as a whole and an objection is made to the
evidence as a whole and is overruled, the trial court
will ordinarily not be reversed on appeal if any
portion of the offered evidence was properly
admissible, despite the fact that other portions would
not have been admissible had proper objections been
made to such portions of the offered evidence.'  Sproul
v. Fossi, 274 Or 749, 755, 548 P2d 970 (1976)
(citations omitted)."

310 Or at 359.

		David Wall's testimony during the guilt phase of the
trial -- that Frances Wall was his wife -- provided a foundation
for his subsequent identification of a photograph of Frances Wall
that was taken while she was alive.  However, under ORS
163.150(1)(a) (1995), that testimony also was victim impact
evidence, because it related to a personal characteristic of
Frances Wall.  Because David Wall's guilt-phase testimony was
properly admitted victim impact evidence, the state was entitled
to have the jury consider it during the penalty phase, if one
occurred.  When the state offered Wall's testimony that Frances
Wall was his wife, defendant failed to alert the trial court, in
any appropriate way that would have allowed the trial court to
respond, that defendant objected to the introduction of victim
impact evidence should there be a penalty phase, or that he
wanted the court to limit the jury's consideration of Wall's
testimony that Frances Wall was his wife.  Applying Brown to
these facts, we conclude that, when defendant asserted his
objection to the introduction of victim impact evidence, the
record already included such evidence and that defendant's
generic objection for the first time at the beginning of the
penalty phase was insufficient to preserve his ex post facto
argument.  Consequently, we do not consider the merits of that
argument.  

	2.  Constitutionality of the Death Penalty

		Finally, defendant assigns error to the trial court's
rejection of his contention that Oregon's statutory death penalty
scheme is unconstitutional.  He concedes that his challenges have
been rejected by this court in previous death penalty appeals. 
That concession is well taken.  See Moore, 324 Or at 429 n 19
(declining to discuss such challenges because it would not
benefit bench or bar in light of previous holdings).

		Having rejected defendant's assignments of error
concerning the penalty phase of his trial, we affirm the sentence
of death.

		The judgment of conviction and the sentence of death
are affirmed.

1. 	"Death metal" music, a variation on heavy metal music,
features lyrics about death and satanism.  Titles of death metal
music to which the young men listened include, "The Pick-Axe
Murders," "An Experiment in Homicide," "Hammer Smashed Face,"
"Meat Hook Sodomy," "Gutted," and "Living Dissection."

2. 	Rabago also took lottery tickets from the Dari Mart
during the episode.  Codes on the winning tickets that the men
eventually cashed helped police identify and apprehend defendant
and the others several months later.

3. 	The 1997 Legislature amended OEC 404 by adding a new
subsection that makes evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by
a criminal defendant admissible, subject to exceptions not
relevant here.  Or Laws 1997, ch 313, § 29.  The amendment
applies to all criminal actions pending or commenced after
December 5, 1996.  Or Laws 1997, ch 313, § 38.  Because we
conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the
evidence under OEC 404(3), we need not decide the applicability 
of OEC 404 (1997) in this case.

4. 	 ORS 41.415 provides:

		"In a prosecution for any criminal homicide, a
photograph of the victim while alive shall be admissible
evidence when offered by the district attorney to show the
general appearance and condition of the victim while alive."

5. 	Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:

		"No ex-post facto law * * * shall ever be passed

	* * *."  (Emphasis in original.)

6. 	Article I, section 10, of the United States
Constitution, provides, in part:

		"No State shall * * * pass any * * * ex post facto
Law * * *."