Case Title: Teel v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 252, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2013-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KENNETH TEEL, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 252, 2013 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0608016078 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 13, 2013 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
November 15, 2013 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
This 15th day of November 2013, upon consideration of the 
appellant’s opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm, it appears to 
the Court that: 
(1) 
In October 2007, the appellant, Kenneth Teel, pled guilty to 
Rape in the First Degree and Sexual Solicitation of a Child.  On January 4, 
2008, Teel was sentenced to a lengthy prison term.  On direct appeal, we 
affirmed Teel’s convictions.1 
                                          
 
1 Teel v. State, 2008 WL 4483731 (Del. Oct. 7, 2008). 
2 
 
(2) 
This appeal is from the Superior Court’s denial of Teel’s fourth 
motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 
61 (“Rule 61”).  It is well-settled that when reviewing a denial of 
postconviction relief, this Court will address any procedural bars before 
considering the merits of any claim for relief.2 
(3) 
Having considered the Rule 61(i) procedural bars in this case, 
the Court has determined, as did the Superior Court, that Teel’s fourth 
postconviction motion is procedurally barred as repetitive3 and formerly 
adjudicated.4  Also, Teel’s motion is untimely.5 
(4) 
In the absence of a constitutional violation,6 a newly recognized 
retroactively applicable right,7 or any indication that reconsideration of 
Teel’s claims is warranted in the interest of justice,8 we conclude that the 
                                          
 
2 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
3 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (barring any ground for relief not asserted in a 
prior postconviction proceeding). 
4 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (barring formerly adjudicated claim). 
5 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (barring claim filed more than one year after 
judgment is final). 
6 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing in pertinent part that the procedural bar 
of (i)(1) and (2) shall not apply to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice 
because of a constitutional violation). 
7 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (providing that an untimely motion may be 
considered when the movant asserts a retroactively applicable right that has been newly 
recognized). 
8 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2), (4) (barring claim unless consideration is 
warranted in the interest of justice). 
3 
 
Superior Court did not err when denying Teel’s fourth motion for 
postconviction relief.  We further conclude that the Superior Court properly 
denied, as without merit, Teel’s claim that, under the 2012 United States 
Supreme Court decision in Martinez v. Ryan, he had a right to counsel in the 
postconviction proceedings.9 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
9 See Martinez v. Ryan, ___U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012) (holding 
that a procedural default will not bar a federal court from hearing a substantial claim of 
ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no 
counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective).