Case Title: ROBERTS v. ESTATE OF RANDALL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-77

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBERTS v. ESTATE OF RANDALL2002 WY 11551 P.3d 204Case Number: 00-77Decided: 07/26/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

ROBERT H. 
ROBERTS and

CINTA 
ROBERTS, 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

THE ESTATE 
OF STEVEN CHARLES

RANDALL, 
deceased, 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Lincoln County

The 
Honorable John D. Troughton, Judge 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Mel C. Orchard, III, of Meyer and Williams, P.C., Jackson, 
Wyoming. 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
S. B. Freeman, III, of Bormuth Freeman & Stinson, LC, Cody, Wyoming. 

 

Before 
LEHMAN** and GOLDEN, JJ., and SPANGLER, D.J.*** 

GOLDEN, 
J., filed 
the majority opinion; SPANGLER, D.J., filed a specially concurring 
opinion.

 

*This 
case was originally assigned to Justice Thomas on November 17, 2000, for the 
rendering of a proffered majority opinion.  
The case was reassigned to Justice Golden on February 5, 
2001. 

** Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument 

*** 
Justice Kite recused herself from this case following oral argument
  

GOLDEN, 
Justice.  

[¶1]           
This 
appeal primarily presents the issue whether a jury properly considered 
violations of certain motor vehicle statutes as evidence of negligence by 
persons operating snowmobiles.  
After the snowmobiles operated by Appellant Robert H. Roberts and Steven 
Charles Randall collided, killing Randall and partially paralyzing Roberts, 
Roberts and his wife Cinta (the Robertses) brought suit against Randall's estate 
(Estate).  At trial, the district 
court instructed the jury that various statutes from Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-5-101 
through 31-5-1507, Wyoming's Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (Chapter 
Five), were applicable in determining the negligence, if any, of the two 
snowmobile operators.  The jury 
returned a verdict finding that Roberts was seventy-four percent at fault and 
Randall was twenty-six percent at fault.  
The Robertses contend that motor vehicle statutes are not applicable to 
snowmobile operation and the jury instructions constituted errors entitling them 
to a new trial.  The Robertses also 
contend that they were entitled to a jury instruction on the sudden emergency 
doctrine and the trial court's refusal to provide that instruction was 
error.

 

[¶2]           
We hold 
that Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-5-101 through 1507 (Chapter Five) do apply, and the 
district court's jury instructions properly instructed on the applicable 
law.  We hold that the sudden 
emergency doctrine survived enactment of the comparative negligence statutes but 
did not apply based on the evidence.  
We affirm the order of judgment on the verdict.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
The 
Robertses presents these issues for our review:

 

A.  The trial court improperly instructed 
the jury regarding the use of vehicles on Wyoming highways in a case involving 
snowmobiles being operated on a snowmobile trail.

B.  The trial court failed to instruct the 
jury on the sudden emergency doctrine in the face of its decision to instruct 
the jury regarding the application of Wyoming statutes.

C.  The trial court failed to instruct the 
jury on Appellants' "theory of the case" and "concurrent cause," and then 
proceeded to give an inference of negligence instruction based upon Appellee's 
assertions that Appellants violated the Motor Vehicle Regulations, while 
continuing to refuse to instruct the jury on sudden emergency which would have 
justified Appellants' conduct even if such conduct violated the Motor Vehicle 
Regulations.

D.  The trial court abused its discretion 
when it refused to grant Appellants' motion for new trial or in the alternative, 
refused to amend the jury's apportionment of fault to reflect that the Appellant 
was not negligent as a matter of law.

 

The 
Estate states that the issues are:

 

1.  Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction 
due to an untimely filing of a notice of appeal by the 
Appellants?

2.  Whether the trial court properly denied 
Appellants' "Motion for a New Trial, for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or, in the 
Alternative for Amendment of the Jury Verdict"?

3. 
Whether the trial court properly refused to give the Appellants' theory of the 
case instruction?

4. 
Whether the trial court properly refused to give the Appellants' concurrent 
cause instruction?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
The 
Greys River area on the Wyoming Range in western Wyoming is a popular 
recreational area.  Greys River Road 
in the Bridger-Teton National Forest is a national forest service road (No. 
10138) that is accessible for wheeled traffic in the summer but closed to that 
traffic during winter.  Although 
Greys River Road is not plowed during winter, it is groomed for a snowmobile 
trail and frequently used by snowmobilers.  

 

[¶5]           
On 
February 7, 1998, two different parties of snowmobilers departed east from 
Alpine, Wyoming, to snowmobile on Greys River Road.  The Randall party, a group of five men, 
left Alpine about ten o'clock that morning and began returning towards Alpine 
that afternoon.  The Roberts party 
left Alpine later that day and traveled away from Alpine.  The Roberts party included Roberts, his 
wife and their two children, and Shane Brown, Brown's wife and Brown's two 
children.  Each person had his or 
her own snowmobile.  Roberts 
cautioned everyone in his party that because they were getting a late start, 
other riders would be coming out, and because the weather was not ideal, other 
riders would not be expecting people coming up the trail that late in the 
day.  The wives and children 
departed first, and Roberts and Brown followed them up the trail. 

 

[¶6]           
Soon, 
however, Roberts and Brown took the lead and raced each other.  At the time of the accident, Randall and 
Roberts were traveling towards each other.  
Roberts was closely following Brown, who was positioned to the right of 
the trail.  Roberts testified that 
he was positioned fifty feet behind and to the left of Brown's snowmobile 
because it was spraying snow in a roostertail behind it.  Brown testified that at the crest of a 
hill an oncoming Randall passed dangerously close to him.  Roberts testified that he saw Randall on 
Roberts' side of the trail and Roberts swerved to his own left; however, Randall 
also veered in that direction, and the two snowmobiles collided.  Each was thrown off, and the two 
collided in mid-air.  Randall was 
killed; Roberts was seriously injured. 

 

[¶7]           
The 
trial focused on disputed evidence of each snowmobile's position immediately 
before the collision with each claiming that the other had not safely stayed to 
the right of the center of the trail.  
Roberts claimed that although he was close to the trail's center, he was 
proceeding to his right of the trail's center until Randall's position left of 
center forced him to swerve left.  
He explained that he moved left instead of right because he had just 
noted on his right a steep drop-off down an embankment to a river.  The Estate claimed that Roberts was left 
of center the entire time despite cresting a hill and this position caused him 
to collide with Randall. Evidence at trial established that an ungroomed turnout 
was immediately to Roberts' right, but Roberts failed to see it. 

 

[¶8]           
At trial, jury 
instructions numbered twelve and thirteen instructed the jury that every person 
operating a vehicle upon a roadway should do so with reasonable control and 
while keeping a proper lookout for other persons using the roadway.  Instruction number fourteen advised that 
violation of a statute is evidence of negligence.  The jury was then instructed based upon 
Chapter Five.  In this regard, 
instructions numbered fifteen through eighteen stated:

 

Jury 
Instruction No. 15

 

YOU ARE 
INSTRUCTED that Wyoming Statute § 31-5-202[1] provides that:

"Drivers 
of vehicles proceeding in oppose [sic] directions shall pass each other to the 
right and upon roadways having width for not more than one (1) line of traffic 
in each direction each driver shall give to the other at lease [sic] one-half 
(1/2) of the main-traveled portion of the roadway as nearly as 
possible."

 

 

Jury 
Instruction No. 16

 

YOU ARE 
INSTRUCTED that Wyoming Statute § 31-5-205[2] provides in part that no vehicle shall be 
driven on the left side of the roadway when approaching or upon the crest of a 
grade or a curve in the highway where the driver's view is obstructed within 
such distance as to create a hazard in the event another vehicle might approach 
from the opposite direction.

 

 

Jury 
Instruction No. 17

 

YOU ARE 
INSTRUCTED that Wyoming Statute § 31-5-210[3] provides in part that the driver of a vehicle 
shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, 
having due regard for the speed of the vehicles and the traffic upon and the 
condition of the highway.

 

 

Jury 
Instruction No. 18

 

YOU ARE 
INSTRUCTED that Wyoming Statute § 31-5-301[4] provides in part that no person 
shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and 
prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential 
hazards then existing.  Consistent 
with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed 
when approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing, when 
approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hillcrest, when 
traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway and when special hazards exist with 
respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway 
conditions.

 

[¶9]           
The 
Robertses and the Estate each submitted a proposed jury instruction on the 
sudden emergency doctrine.  At the 
jury instruction conference, the district court rejected both of those 
instructions, deciding that both misstated the applicable rule of law.  At that time, the attorney for the 
Robertses stated that he withdrew his proposed instruction on the sudden 
emergency doctrine. 

 

[¶10]      
The district 
court acknowledged that it had a duty to draft a proper instruction if both the 
law and the evidence required it, but upon consideration, found that the sudden 
emergency doctrine is no longer viable under Wyoming's comparative negligence 
statutes.   The jury returned a 
verdict generally in favor of the Estate.  
The Robertses filed motions for a new trial that were denied, and this 
appeal followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Standard of 
Review

 

[¶11]      
The 
issues presented require that we determine whether Chapter Five applies to 
snowmobile operation and whether enactment of the comparative negligence 
statutes precludes application of the sudden emergency doctrine.  Statutory interpretation is a question 
of law; therefore, our standard of review is de novo.  Sellers v. Dooley Oil Transport, 
2001 WY 44, ¶10, 22 P.3d 307, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001).  If the conclusion of law is in 
accordance with the law, we affirm it; if it is not, we correct it.  We try to interpret statutes in 
accordance with the legislature's intent.  
We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning 
of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all 
parts of the statute in pari materia.  
Id.  Statutes should 
be construed in pari materia with other statutes to which they relate, and 
courts should strive to give meaningful effect to the purpose of these 
statutes.  Corkill v. Knowles, 
955 P.2d 438, 445 (Wyo. 1998).  

 

 

Chapter 
Five

 

[¶12]      
The Act 
governing motor vehicles, Title 31, consists of eighteen chapters.  In the first article of Chapter One, the 
words "this act" are defined to mean Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-1-101 through 
31-4-104.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-1-101(a)(xxii) (LexisNexis 2001).5  Accordingly, the definitions in  § 31-1-101 apply only to Chapters One 
through Four of Title 31, but not to Chapter Five.  Title 31, Chapter Five contains fifteen 
articles and states the short title of "this act" to be "Uniform Act Regulating 
Traffic on Highways." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-101 (LexisNexis 2001).  The meaning of "this act" is defined as 
"W.S. § 31-5-101 through 31-5-1507."   
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-102(a)(lix) (LexisNexis 2001).  

 

[¶13]      
In part, 
Chapter Five addresses the statutory traffic code and "rules of the road."  See Johnston v. Wortham Machinery 
Co., 60 Wyo. 301, 309, 151 P.2d 89, 91 (Wyo. 1944). It defines motor vehicle 
as "every vehicle which is self-propelled except vehicles moved solely by human 
power and golf carts . . . ." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-102(a)(xxiv) (LexisNexis 
2001).  A snowmobile is defined as 
"any mechanically driven vehicle of a type which utilizes sleet type 
runners, or skis or any endless belt tread or combination of these, designed 
primarily for operation over snow."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-102(a)(xlv) (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis 
added).  Chapter Five provides that 
"[t]he provisions of this act relating to the operation of vehicles refer 
exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon highways" subject to certain 
exceptions not applicable here.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-103 (LexisNexis 2001).   Chapter Five's many definitions do 
not provide a single definition of highway, but define "controlled access 
highways," "laned roadway," "roadway," "street or highway" and "through 
highway."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
31-5-102(a)(vii); (xviii); (xl); (xlix); (li) (LexisNexis 2001).  Article Two of Chapter Five provides 
generally for the operation of vehicles. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-5-201 through 235 
(LexisNexis 2001).  Specific 
regulations for certain types of conveyances and drivers have been provided and 
state that those persons riding bicycles, animals or driving animal-drawn 
vehicles are granted all the rights and are subject to all of the duties 
applicable to the driver of a vehicle by the act except as to those provisions 
which by their very nature can have no application.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-5-107, -702 
(LexisNexis 2001).  Other provisions 
supply special regulations for the operation of public vehicles, emergency 
vehicles, motorcycles, pedestrian vehicles, off-road recreational vehicles when 
operated on public streets or highways, and bicycles. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
31-5-105, -106, -115, -124, -701-06 (LexisNexis 2001).  

 

[¶14]      
Article Eight 
applies to snowmobiles and contains only one provision, § 31-5-801.  The subsections of § 801 govern 
snowmobile operations upon Wyoming roads and highways.  That statute 
provides:

 

(a) Snowmobiles may be operated upon 
the highways of Wyoming subject to the following 
conditions:

(i) Snowmobiles may be operated 
within the right-of-way but not on the main traveled roadway except as provided 
hereafter;

(ii) Crossings of main-traveled 
roadways shall be made at right angles to the roadway or as nearly so as 
practicable, but in any case yielding the right-of-way to all traffic in the 
main-traveled roadway;

(iii) Snowmobiles may be operated on 
the highways within the cities and towns pursuant to 
ordinance;

(iv) Snowmobiles may be operated on 
the main-traveled roadway when the highway is closed to wheeled vehicular 
traffic or subject to approval of the state highway department, upon a 
designated and posted portion of a state roadway within the boundaries of a 
national park;

(v) If allowed by the county 
commissioners, snowmobiles may be operated on a designated and posted portion of 
a county roadway. 

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-801 
(LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added).

 

[¶15]      
Under subsection 
(a)(iv) permitting snowmobile operation on highways closed to wheeled vehicular 
traffic, Wyoming, through its Department of State Parks and Cultural 
Resources/Division of State Parks and Historic Sites and through cooperation 
agreements with the U.S. Forest Service, has developed extensive snowmobile 
trails across the state and divided the state into eleven snowmobile areas.  The Wyoming Range snowmobile area covers 
the southwest area of the state and to its north are snowmobile areas in the 
Continental Divide Region, the Grand Teton National Park, and the Yellowstone 
National Park.  When not closed 
during winter, Greys River Road is also known as Forest Service Road 10138; 
however, during winter it is closed to wheeled traffic and is a trail in the 
Wyoming Range snowmobile area.  
Generally, the Greys River Road snowmobile trail travels east of Alpine 
for some distance and then diverts southerly.  The Wyoming Range trail system is 
maintained through efforts of the Wyoming Department of State Parks and Cultural 
Resources/Division of State Parks and Historic Sites, the U.S. Forest Service, 
and local snowmobile clubs.  

 

[¶16]      
The Robertses 
contend that the Legislature did not intend that Chapter Five's rules of the 
road should apply to a groomed snowmobile trail.  They base their assertion on the 
definitions found in § 31-1-101 which, as we have already discussed, differ from 
the definitions found in § 31-5-102.  
Because the definitions of § 31-1-101 apply only to Chapters One through 
Four, the legislative intent concerning snowmobiles is ascertainable by the 
Legislature's express inclusion of snowmobiles in Chapter Five's definitions and 
the specific reference to snowmobiles in Article Eight.  § 31-5-102(a)(xlv); § 31-5-801.  Plainly, the Legislature considered 
snowmobiles a vehicle for purposes of Chapter Five and its articles, including 
Article Two.  This trial presented 
the issue whether the snowmobiles had been operated negligently.  The trial court determined that Article 
Two's provisions generally governing the operation of a vehicle were applicable 
and instructed the jury accordingly.   
We agree with the trial court's determination that Article Two's "rules 
of the road" provisions apply to snowmobile operations as well as other articles 
of Chapter Five.  Accordingly, we 
hold that Chapter Five, Article Eight, authorizes the State to allow snowmobile 
operation on the Greys River Road snowmobile trail, and further, those 
snowmobiles operating on the snowmobile trail are subject to the applicable 
statutory provisions of Chapter Five.

 

 

Sudden 
Emergency Doctrine

 

[¶17]      
Both 
parties submitted instructions on the sudden emergency doctrine that were 
rejected by the trial court for misstating the law.  The trial court acknowledged that it had 
a duty to fashion its own instruction if necessary, but decided that because of 
the enactment of comparative fault, the sudden emergency doctrine is no longer 
viable in Wyoming.  The Estate does 
not cross-appeal, and although the Robertses eventually withdrew the 
instruction, they challenge the trial court's legal ruling on appeal. We have 
previously held that withdrawal of an instruction fails to preserve that issue 
for appeal and review must be for plain error.  Triton Coal Co., Inc. v. Mobil Coal 
Producing, Inc., 800 P.2d 505, 511 (Wyo. 1990).  We consider four factors before applying 
the plain error doctrine:  whether 
(1) the record reflects clear and unequivocally the fact complained of; (2) the 
facts prove a transgression of a clear rule of law; (3) the error affects a 
substantial right of the accused; and (4) the defendant has been materially 
prejudiced by that violation.  
Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 1164 (Wyo. 1992).  

 

[¶18]      
We have 
ruled that the comparative fault statutes have eliminated certain rules 
absolutely barring recovery upon a finding that the plaintiff had been 
negligent. Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1180 (Wyo. 1989) ("Gone are the days when a scintilla of negligence by the 
plaintiff will bar recovery.").  
Before the enactment of the comparative negligence statute, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-1-109, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the obvious 
danger rule operated as absolute defenses to a negligence action.  Id. at 1179; Barnette v. 
Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1361 (Wyo. 1981); Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo. 1979).  With the 
advent of comparative negligence legislation, however, these contributory 
negligence rules became a basis for an apportionment of fault and no longer 
operated as a complete bar to recovery.  
Stephenson at 1179; Barnette at 1361; 
Brittain at 534.  "Thus, if 
appellant was negligent, it was for the jury to measure the relative degrees of 
fault."  Stephenson at 
1179.

 

[¶19]      
In 
contrast, we have recognized that the existence of an emergency is not an 
affirmative defense, but it is one of the circumstances to be considered by the 
finder of fact in determining whether a party has acted negligently.  Sannes v. Olds, 458 P.2d 729, 731 
(Wyo. 1969). "[W]hen one must act suddenly in the face of imminent danger 
he is not required to use the same degree of care as at other times, but this 
rule is applicable only when the person claiming its advantage has been placed 
in a position of sudden peril without his own fault."  Id. at 732.  The emergency rule does not mean that 
any different standard is to be applied: the conduct required is still that of a 
reasonable person under the circumstances as they would appear to one who was 
using proper care, and the emergency is only one of the circumstances.  Eslinger v. Ringsby Truck Lines, 
Inc., 636 P.2d 254, 259 (Mont. 1981).  
Although the Montana Supreme Court disfavors the instruction, it 
continued to permit a trial court's giving an emergency instruction after the 
adoption of the comparative negligence standard.  Id. at 260.  That court has long held, however, that 
some "emergencies" must be anticipated and the actor must be prepared to meet 
them when he engages in an activity in which they are likely to arise.  Kudrna v. Comet Corp., 572 P.2d 183, 191 (Mont. 1977).  After 
adopting comparative negligence principles, the Montana Supreme Court continued 
its cautious application of the sudden emergency doctrine, ruling its use in the 
ordinary automobile accident case would be unnecessary and confusing, and the 
ordinary rules of negligence are applicable and afford a sufficient gauge by 
which to appraise conduct.   
Eslinger at 260.  The 
Montana Court developed the following test to determine if sufficient evidence 
warrants the instruction:

 

1) the 
claimed emergency actually or apparently existed;

2) the 
perilous situation was not created or contributed to by the person 
confronted;

3) 
alternative courses of action in meeting the emergency were open to such person 
or there was an opportunity to take some action to avert the threatened 
casualty; and 

4) the 
action or course taken was such as would or might have been taken by a person of 
reasonable prudence in the same or similar situation.

 

Id. at 
259.  Giving the instruction when 
the evidence did not support giving it would be a comment on the evidence that 
would confuse and potentially prejudice the jury.  Ewing v. Esterholt, 684 P.2d 1055, 1059 (Mont. 1984).

 

[¶20]      
For our 
part, we have considered issues arising from this doctrine both before enactment 
of the comparative negligence statutes and after, reviewing it most recently in 
Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 718 (Wyo. 1993). Although 
comparative negligence principles applied at trial, our Haderlie opinion 
did not consider whether the doctrine was viable in a comparative negligence 
action.  In Haderlie, we 
considered the following "sudden emergency" instruction:

 

Where a 
person finds himself or herself confronted with a sudden emergency, which was 
not brought on about his or her own negligence or want of care, such person has 
a legal right to do what appears to him or her at the time he or she should do, 
so long as he or she acts in a reasonable manner as any other person would have 
done under like or similar circumstances, to avoid an injury; and if he or she 
does so act, he or she will not be deemed to have been negligent even though it 
might afterwards be apparent that some other course of action would have been 
safer.  

 

Id. 
In 
Haderlie, appellee James Sondgeroth sought to recover personal injury 
damages resulting from his automobile striking a horse that had earlier been 
struck and killed by appellant Haderlie.  
Id. at 706-07.  The 
trial court refused the sudden emergency instruction and reasoned 
that:

 

This 
Court does not deem that there has been any evidence of a sudden emergency. 
That's more applicable to a driver's suddenly finding someone in his own lane, 
or a spot of ice that he's onto, or something very immediate.  In this case, there was an attenuation 
of approximately ten minutes of time from the time that Mr. Haderlie struck the 
horse until the Plaintiff struck the horse; and the Court does not deem that to 
be a sudden emergency.  

 

Id. at 
718.  We determined that the 
instruction was properly refused as unsupported by the evidence.  Id.  When evidence of an emergency has 
existed, we have said that it was the province of the finder-of-fact to 
determine from all the circumstances disclosed by the record whether the 
emergency had been created by the person claiming the benefit of the rule, and 
by reasonable implication we held the existence or nonexistence of an emergency 
to be thus determined.  
Sannes, 458 P.2d  at 732.    

 

[¶21]      
We 
discussed similar sudden-emergency instructions in Holly Sugar Corp. v. 
Perez, 508 P.2d 595, 601 (Wyo. 1973), and Gerdom v. Gerdom, 444 P.2d 34, 35-36 (Wyo. 1968), in light of the particular facts of each.  In Perez, we found that without 
evidence demonstrating that some unknown and sudden condition caused an 
accident, it was proper to refuse an instruction on sudden emergency.  508 P.2d  at 601.  However, in Gerdom, we determined 
that the instruction was proper where a jury could determine that a driver 
pulling a trailer was confronted with a sudden emergency when he hit 1000 feet 
of ice causing the trailer to begin sliding, and the jury also might have found 
this condition was unforeseen and without negligence on the part of that 
driver.  444 P.2d  at 
36.

 

[¶22]      
We have 
addressed facts involving moving left of center instead of to the right to avoid 
a head-on collision in Dallason v. Buckmeier, 74 Wyo. 125, 284 P.2d 386 
(1955).  There, we recognized that 
the general principle states:

 

Statutes, 
ordinances or other regulations or rules requiring motor vehicles to be driven 
on the right-hand side of the highway or street are not intended to and do not, 
prohibit a motorist from driving to the left of the center of the highway or 
street in trying, in an emergency, to avoid an accident.  In case of an emergency it may be not 
only excusable but perfectly proper for an automobilist to turn to the left side 
of the road in order to escape from danger or avoid injuring 
others.

 

Id. 
at 135, 
284 P.2d  at 390 (quoting 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 282, at 660). We 
also recognized that generally the law permits traveling on the wrong side of 
the road; however, if visibility is poor, special care is required to stay on 
the right side of the road.  Thus, 
we noted:

 

"Where 
there is a clear view, it is not negligence to drive in the center of the 
highway, or even on the opposite side; but, in rounding a curve or approaching 
the summit of a hill, where the view is shortened, it is the driver's duty to 
keep on the right side."  The 
Annotation in 57 A.L.R. cites cases from seven jurisdictions in which the 
foregoing rule was applied when the parties involved were rounding a curve.  In fact the rule is attempted to be 
prescribed by § 60-505, W.C.S.1945, stating that a traveler must turn to the 
right "when approaching the crest of a grade or upon a curve in the highway 
where the driver's view along the highway is obstructed."   

 

Id. 
at 132, 
284 P.2d  at 388 (quoting partially from Bloom v. Bailey, 292 Pa. 348, 141 A. 150, 152 (Pa 1928)).  Following a 
detailed discussion of the circumstances of the collision, we affirmed the trial 
court's judgment that a tanker truck rounding a curve partially in the wrong 
lane proximately caused the collision with another vehicle that moved left of 
center to avoid the tanker.  
Id. at 136, 284 P.2d  at 390.

 

[¶23]      
This 
review of past decisions reveals that, like the Montana courts, we have long 
considered an emergency as one of the circumstances to be considered when 
determining whether a party used proper care.  Both at trial and on appeal, our courts 
have reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence to determine if the instruction is 
warranted.  Before enactment of the 
comparative negligence statutes, we did not consider it a form of contributory 
negligence the existence of which would bar recovery, but rather a special 
circumstance relevant to determining negligence.  Now that comparative negligence 
standards apply, we continue to see that such circumstances are relevant to a 
jury's proper apportionment of fault and hold that comparative negligence 
statutes have not eliminated the necessity of the sudden emergency 
doctrine.

 

[¶24]      
We do 
agree, however, with the Montana Supreme Court that this doctrine is not 
relevant in ordinary motor vehicle accident cases and, consequently, we think it 
may not be relevant in this particular snowmobile collision case.  We further agree that we should be 
cautious in applying the doctrine and should recognize "that some emergencies' 
must be anticipated, and the actor must be prepared to meet them when he engages 
in an activity in which they are likely to arise."  Kudrna, 572 P.2d  at 191.  The Montana four-part test may be 
helpful to trial courts in determining whether the evidence supports giving the 
instruction; however, trial courts should be careful to leave to the jury those 
questions that juries must decide while refusing to submit the instruction when 
doing so would result in an improper comment on the evidence and confuse the 
jury.  

 

[¶25]      
Reviewing 
all of the evidence in this case, we see that Roberts testified that an 
emergency situation was created by Randall's presence in his lane of 
travel.  This testimony might be 
sufficient to permit the instruction if the evidence, viewed in Roberts' favor, 
established that the emergency was created or contributed to through no 
negligence on the part of Roberts.  
Roberts testified that he was approaching the crest of a hill close to 
the center of a snowmobile trail when Randall came over the hill in Roberts' 
lane of travel after having safely passed Brown who had stayed to his far right 
on the trail.  The centers of 
snowmobile trails are not marked, of course, and a reasonably prudent snowmobile 
operator should always anticipate that another operator may also be traveling 
close to the center of the trail, and take appropriate action which in this case 
would have been to travel on the far right side of the trail.  Under no circumstances could it ever be 
proper to ascend a hill at the center of the trail when vision of what might be 
coming from the other side is obscured.  
In other words, it appears to us that this very emergency was one that 
Roberts should have anticipated and should have prepared to meet when he engaged 
in snowmobiling activity in an area where it was likely to arise.  Kudrna, 572 P.2d  at 191.  

 

[¶26]      
Unmistakably, 
Roberts did not do that.  By his own 
testimony, despite warning his party beforehand of the particular dangers 
presented by other riders to them because of their late start, Roberts was at 
least close to the center of the trail and not to its far right.  Reasonable minds could not have decided 
that Roberts was using proper care when faced with a sudden emergency.  The trial court properly allowed this 
case to proceed to the jury upon instructions proper in an ordinary motor 
vehicle accident case.  The judgment 
of the court is affirmed.

  
SPANGLER, District Judge, Retired, 
concurring.

 

[¶27]      
I agree 
with the majority opinion except in its discussion of the sudden emergency 
doctrine and the obvious danger rule.  
I would discard both concepts.  
The sudden emergency instruction contradicts itself.  It begins by stating that one who must 
act suddenly in the face of imminent danger is not required to use the same 
degree of care as at other times.  
But in the next breath, it says that the emergency rule does not mean 
that any different standard is to be applied.  In any event, the instruction is 
unnecessary.  The conduct required 
is still that of a reasonable person under the circumstances.  Trial judges are left in the dark as to 
when this instruction should be used.

 

[¶28]      
The 
majority opinion indicates that the obvious danger rule is no longer an absolute 
defense.  This is contrary to the 
holding in the case of Valance v. VI-Doug, Inc., 2002 WY 113 (Wyo. 
2002).  In my concurring and 
dissenting opinion in that case, I proposed that the obvious danger rule should 
be eliminated for all purposes.   

  

FOOTNOTES

1§ 31-5-202.  Passing of vehicle approaching from 
opposite direction.

            
Drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each 
other to the right and upon roadways having width for not more than one (1) line 
of traffic in each direction each driver shall give to the other at least 
one-half (1/2) of the main-traveled portion of the roadway as nearly as 
possible. 

2§ 31-5-205.  Additional limitations on driving on the 
left; exceptions.

            
(a) No vehicle shall be driven on the left side of the roadway under the 
following conditions:

(i) When approaching or upon the crest 
of a grade or a curve in the highway where the driver's view is obstructed 
within such distance as to create a hazard in the event another vehicle might 
approach from the opposite direction;

            
(ii) When approaching within one hundred (100) feel of or traversing any 
intersection or railroad grade crossing unless otherwise indicated by official 
traffic-control devices;

(iii) When the view is obstructed upon 
approaching within one hundred (100) feet of any bridge, viaduct or 
tunnel.

            
(b) Subsection (a) of this section does not 
apply:

                        
(i) Upon a one-way roadway; 

                        
(ii) Under the conditions described in W.S. 
31-5-201(a)(ii);

            
(iii) To the driver of a vehicle turning left into or from an alley, 
private road or driveway. 

3§ 31-5-210.  Following too 
closely.

            
(a) The driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely 
than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicles 
and the traffic upon and the condition of the 
highway.

            
(b) The driver of any vehicle when traveling upon a roadway outside of a 
business or residence district, and which is following another vehicle shall, 
whenever conditions permit, leave sufficient space so that an overtaking vehicle 
may enter and occupy the space without danger.

            
(c) Motor vehicles being driven upon any roadway outside of a business or 
residence district in a caravan or motorcade whether or not towing other 
vehicles shall be so operated as to allow sufficient space between each vehicle 
or combination of vehicles so as to enable any other vehicle to enter and occupy 
such space without danger.  This 
provision shall not apply to funeral processions.

 4§ 31-5-301. Maximum speed 
limits.

            
(a) No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than 
is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual 
and potential hazards then existing.  
Consistent with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and 
appropriate speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad 
grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a 
hillcrest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway and when special 
hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of 
weather or highway conditions.

            
(b) Except when a special hazard exists that requires lower speed for 
compliance with subsection (a) of this section, the limits specified in this 
subsection or established as otherwise authorized shall be maximum lawful speeds 
and no person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed in excess of maximum 
limits:

            
(i) Twenty (20) miles per hour when passing a school building, or the 
grounds thereof, or a school crossing if appropriate signs giving notice of that 
limit are erected;

            
(ii) Thirty (30) miles per hour in any urban 
district;

            
(iii) Seventy-five (75) miles per hour on interstate highways.  Nothing in this paragraph shall be 
construed to:

            
(A) Affect the authority of the superintendent to otherwise designate 
lower maximum speed limits on interstate highways in accordance with other laws; 
or

            
(B) Authorize noncompliance with posted speed limits on interstate 
highways.

            
(iv) Sixty-five (65) miles per hour in other 
locations;

            
(v) Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 61, § 2.

            
(c) The maximum speed limits set forth in this section may be altered as 
authorized in W.S. 31-5-302 and 31-5-303.

(d) Speeding violations of up to eighty 
(80) miles per hour under W.S. 31-5-301(b)(iii) or up to seventy (70) miles per 
hour under W.S. 31-5-301(b)(iv), except violations received while operating a 
commercial motor vehicle as defined by W.S. 31-7-102(a)(viii), shall not be made 
a part of the abstracts or records kept by the department of transportation 
pursuant to W.S. 31-5-1214 or 31-7-120. 

5Unless otherwise indicated, the statutes 
in effect at the time of the accident have not been 
amended.