Case Title: STATE EX REL DOUGLAS v DISTRICT C

Citation: 

Docket Number: 12462

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1973-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
140. 12402 IN THE SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE OF MONTANA THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , on t h e r e l a t i o n of WILLIAM A . DOUGLAS, County Attorney of Lincoln County, P e t i t i o n e r , THE LIISTKICT COURT of t h e ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT of the S t a t e of Montana, i n and f o r the County of Lincoln, and t h e HON. ROBERT S . KELLER, D i s t r i c t Judge, Respondents. ;IRLGTTJAL PROCEEDING : Counsel of Record: For P e t i t i o n e r : William A . Douglas argued, County Attorney, Libby, Montana For Respondents: Joseph F. Daley argued, K a l i s p e l l , Montana. Submitted : March 5, 1973 Decided : MAR 2 6 1973 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding i n which p e t i t i o n e r , William A. Douglas, county attorney of Lincoln County, seeks va- cation of a d i s t r i c t court w r i t of supervisory control issued t o the j u s t i c e court of Libby, Montana. This matter commenced on December 9, 1972, when P a t r i c i a Hughes complained t o the j u s t i c e of the peace of Libby, Montana, t h a t her daughter had been given intoxicating beverages by one Allen Beito. Mrs. Hughes placed under oath by the j u s t i c e of t h e peace, t o l d him her f i f t e e n year old daughter had come home a t 5:00 a.m. intoxicated. That the intoxicating beverages had been given t o her daughter by Allen Beito. Thereupon, t h e j u s t i c e drew up a complaint which M r s . Hughes signed. A warrant was issued f o r the a r r e s t of Allen Beito. Beito was taken i n t o custody, arraigned, and following h i s plea of g u i l t y he was sentenced t o 90 days i n the county j a i l . After sentence had been imposed, defendant gave notice of appeal and applied t o the d i s t r i c t court f o r a w r i t of supervisory control, A hearing was held before D i s t r i c t Judge Robert S. Keller, and on December 28, the court ordered the judgment of the j u s t i c e court vacated. He a l s o s e t aside both the complaint and t h e warrant of a r r e s t . The question here i s whether there was adequate probable cause t o f i l e a complaint and issue a warrant of a r r e s t ; and thus whether t h e d i s t r i c t court abused i t s discretion i n s e t t i n g them aside, I n the order s e t t i n g aside the complaint and quashing the a r r e s t warrant, t h e d i s t r i c t court judge s t a t e d the case of State ex r e l . Wicks v. D i s t r i c t Court, M o n t . , 498 P,2d 1202, 1203,1204, 30 St.Rep, 506, was controlling. k review of t h a t case leads t h i s Court t o find t h a t Wicks does not go a s f a r a s the d i s t r i c t court found. I n Wicks, t h e f a c t s a r e much d i f f e r e n t than those of the i n s t a n t case. There, the alleged offense had taken place four months before the deputy county attorney sought a warrant of a r r e s t . Here, the distraught mother went promptly t o the magistrate with her complaint. I n Wicks,neither the deputy county attorney nor t h e magistrate could remember whether an examination under oath occurred p r i o r t o issuing the complaint. Here, the complaint was prepared by the magistrate during a detailed examination of the complainant under oath. I n Wicks, t h i s Court said: "The complaint of the deputy county attorney, * ; k * discloses nothing more than the bald conclusion t h a t Wicks sold a quantity of mari- huana t o Hunter on a c e r t a i n date some four months previously * *. I' I n the i n s t a n t case there was conclusion made by the magistrate based' upon a, f a c t u a l submission given by the complainant. The second challenge raised t o t h e complaint and a r r e s t warrant by the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order, concerns the use of hearsay evidence a s a b a s i s f o r probable cause t o issue a complaint. The d i s t r i c t court w a s unwilling t o accept t h e evidence of the mother of the victim, since there was no evidence given by the victim h e r s e l f , nor anyone who was a c t u a l l y present. I n looking a t the question of hearsay and whether it can be used t o e s t a b l i s h the necessary probable cause, we look t o United States Supreme Court cases which deal with t h e question. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S,Ct. 1509, 12 L ed 2d 723, held t h a t an a f f i d a v i t may be based upon hearsay and need not r e f l e c t the d i r e c t personal observations of the a f f i a n t . That p a r t i c u l a r case was dealing with a search warrant; however, a s we said i n Wicks: "The showing of 'probable cause' required f o r issuance of a warrant of a r r e s t i s similar and analogous t o the &owing of Iprobable cause' re- quired f o r issuance of a search warrant." It follows t h a t the reasoning of Aguilar would be applicable t o t h e i n s t a n t case. Hearsay can be used a s the basis of probable cause f o r a complaint andlor a r r e s t warrant. This concept was further expanded by United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct, 741, 13 L ed 2d 684, which recognized that a finding of probable cause may be based upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial and the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to war- rants. Looking at the facts in the instant case, and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and this Court, we find there was probable cause to issue the warrant and the arrest was valid. Petitioner in his application for a writ of supervisory control prayed for relief in defining the latitude permissible in and the limitations upon the process of determining probable cause for issuing a warrant of arrest. In his brief in support of his application for a writ of supervisory control, petitioner argues that a district court is without jurisdiction to exercise supervisory control of lower courts. That issue was not raised in the proceedings of this matter and was not part of the relief asked for by petitioner in his petition to this Court. Since the matter is a question of constitutional law concerning the power and jurisdiction of the district court, we follow our long established practice of not discussing constitutional questions, unless they are necessarily involved or necessary to the decision. National Surety Corp. v. Kruse, 121 Mont. 202, 192 P.2d 317; Stenberg v. Stenberg, Mont . , 505 P,2d 110, 30 St.Rep.50. Accordingly, we will not discuss the constitutional question of the use of a writ of supervisory control by district courts over justice courts, In reviewing the district court's order, we find the judgment of the justice court was vacated and set aside. This action of the district court is supportable not on the basis of a writ of supervisory control, as argued by petitioner, but on the basis of appeal from the judgment, which defendant also filed. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order allows defendant a new t r i a l and a l s o allows defendant t o change h i s plea of g u i l t y t o not g u i l t y , Such action by the d i s t r i c t court i s analogous t o t h e power of t h i s Court, The s i t u a t i o n i s the same a s when a de- fendant would appeal a conviction t o t h i s Court, a f t e r having plead g u i l t y t o the charge. In S t a t e v. McBane, 128 Mont. 369, 275 P.2d 218, t h i s Court ordered t h a t a judgment be s e t aside and allowed the defendant t o change h i s plea from g u i l t y t o not g u i l t y , Since t h a t power l i e s i n t h i s Court over the d i s t r i c t court, it would follow t h a t a similar power would l i e with the d i s t r i c t courts over j u s t i c e courts on appeal. The order of the d i s t r i c t court insofar a s it vacates the judgment of the j u s t i c e court i s affirmed; however, t h a t portion of t h e order which s e t s aside the complaint and warrant of a r r e s t i s reversed. W e issue Supervisory Control and t h e cause is remanded t o the d i s t r i c t court f o r proceedings not inconsistent with t h i s opinion. Assochke J u s t i c e