Case Title: Hudson v. Summit Cty.

Citation: 2002-Ohio-6507

Docket Number: 20011328

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Hudson v. Summit Cty., 97 Ohio St. 3d 296, 2002-Ohio-6507.] 
 
 
HUDSON, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, v. SUMMIT COUNTY ET AL., 
APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Hudson v. Summit Cty., 97 Ohio St.3d 296, 2002-Ohio-6507.] 
Public utilities — County water supply system — Neither the Ohio Constitution 
nor the Revised Code provides that upon incorporation, a municipality 
acquires, by operation of law, existing water systems located within the 
boundaries of the municipality — R.C. Chapter 6103 does not prohibit a 
county from conveying a water system to a municipal corporation in 
which the system is not located. 
(No. 2001-1328 — Submitted May 22, 2002 — Decided December 11, 2002.) 
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 
20358. 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  Neither the Ohio Constitution nor the Revised Code provides that upon 
incorporation a municipality acquires, by operation of law, existing water 
systems located within the boundaries of the municipality. 
2.  R.C. 6103.22 does not prohibit a county from conveying a water system to a 
municipal corporation in which the system is not located. 
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MOYER, C.J. 
{¶1} From 1977 to 1993, 26 residential subdivisions were built in what 
was then known as Hudson Township.  Pursuant to contracts between appellant 
and cross-appellee Summit County and the developers of those subdivisions, 
water lines were constructed at the developers’ expense and then conveyed to 
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Summit County.  In exchange, the county allowed the developers to connect the 
water system to the county’s existing water service facilities. 
{¶2} On January 1, 1994, the village of Hudson and Hudson Township 
merged to create appellee and cross-appellant, city of Hudson.  Five years later, 
Hudson filed a complaint in the Summit County Common Pleas Court seeking a 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against appellants and cross-appellees, 
Summit County and the city of Akron.  Hudson sought a declaration that the 
water system located in Hudson had passed by operation of law to Hudson upon 
its incorporation.  Hudson also sought an injunction to restrain Summit County 
and Akron from interfering with Hudson in governing, managing, and controlling 
the water system. 
{¶3} Summit County subsequently issued a request for proposals for the 
purchase of all of its water service facilities, including the water system at issue in 
this case.  Akron expressed an interest in purchasing the facilities, and Hudson 
moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent 
the sale of the Hudson water system. 
{¶4} The trial court determined that the water system had not passed to 
Hudson by operation of law. The court further determined that Summit County 
owned the water system and that Hudson was not entitled to an order prohibiting 
Summit County from selling the system.  Accordingly, the trial court denied 
Hudson’s complaint for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. 
{¶5} The court of appeals unanimously affirmed the trial court’s finding 
that the water system had not passed to Hudson and that Summit County 
continued to hold the water system in trust for the public good.  However, in a 
split decision, the court reversed the trial court and held that R.C. 6103.22 
prohibits Summit County from transferring the water system to any municipal 
corporation other than Hudson. 
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{¶6} The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal and cross-appeal. 
{¶7} Summit County and Akron argue that R.C. Chapter 6103 does not 
require the county to sell the water system only to Hudson.  Hudson, in its cross-
appeal, argues that upon incorporation of the township in which the water system 
was located, the water system passed by operation of law to Hudson.  Both the 
appeal and cross-appeal present issues of first impression.  We dispose of the 
cross-appeal first. 
{¶8} The Ohio Constitution grants to a municipality the power to 
provide water services to its residents. Ottawa Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Marblehead 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 43, 45, 711 N.E.2d 663.  Pursuant to Section 4, Article 
XVIII of the Ohio Constitution: 
{¶9} “Any municipality may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate 
within or without its corporate limits, any public utility the products or service of 
which is or is to be supplied to the municipality or its inhabitants, and may 
contract with others for any such product or service. The acquisition of any such 
public utility may be by condemnation or otherwise, and a municipality may 
acquire thereby the use of, or full title to, the property and franchise of any 
company or person supplying to the municipality or its inhabitants the service or 
product of any such utility.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶10} This provision was “primarily intended to confer the power of 
eminent domain on municipalities for the purpose of acquiring existing public 
utilities.” Blue Ash v. Cincinnati (1962), 173 Ohio St. 345, 352, 19 O.O.2d 274, 
182 N.E.2d 557.  However, we have held that a municipality may exercise 
eminent domain over a public water system owned by another political 
subdivision only so long as the taking will not result in the destruction of an 
existing public use.  Northwood v. Wood Cty. Regional Water & Sewer Dist. 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 92, 95, 711 N.E.2d 1003. 
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{¶11} R.C. 6103.22 governs water system contracts between counties and 
municipal corporations.  The version of R.C. 6103.22 in effect at the time of 
Hudson’s incorporation on January 1, 1994, is the version pertinent to this issue.  
It provided:  
{¶12} “Any completed water supply or water-works system * * * located 
within any municipal corporation or within any area which may be incorporated 
as a municipal corporation or annexed to an existing municipal corporation, or 
which provides water for such area, may by mutual agreement between the board 
of county commissioners and such municipal corporation be conveyed to such 
municipal corporation, which shall thereafter maintain and operate such water 
supply and water-works.”  (Emphasis added.)  134 Ohio Laws, Part I, 695, 757-
758. 
{¶13} Summit County maintained and operated the water system prior to 
Hudson’s incorporation and continues to do so.  Hudson did not object to Summit 
County’s ownership and maintenance until in 1999, five years after Hudson’s 
incorporation, when Hudson commenced this litigation, arguing that it 
automatically acquired the water system upon incorporation. 
{¶14} The court of appeals held that neither the Ohio Constitution nor 
Revised Code provides that upon incorporation a municipality acquires, by 
operation of law, existing water systems located within the boundaries of the 
municipality.  The court concluded that Hudson could acquire the water system 
either by eminent domain or by reaching an agreement with Summit to convey the 
water system to Hudson pursuant to R.C. 6103.22. 
{¶15} We agree.  Section 4, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution states 
only that a municipality “may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate within or 
without its corporate limits” any public utility.  (Emphasis added.)  Similarly, 
R.C. 6103.22 provided that a water system within a municipal corporation “may * 
* * be conveyed to such municipal corporation.”  (Emphasis added.)  Neither of 
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these makes transfer automatic.  Therefore, we affirm that portion of the court of 
appeals’ decision holding that Summit still owns the water system. 
{¶16} Having disposed of the cross-appeal, we consider Summit’s and 
Akron’s appeals, which present the issue whether a county that owns a water 
system located within one municipality may sell it to any other municipality.  
Summit argues that Section 4, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, and R.C. 
6103.21, 6103.22, and 6103.31 empower Summit to sell its water system to “any 
municipality or county that it, in its discretion, deems appropriate to serve the best 
interest of the County as a whole.” 
{¶17} The version of R.C. 6103.21 in effect at the time this lawsuit was 
filed provided: 
{¶18} “At any time after the formation of any sewer district, the board of 
county commissioners may enter into a contract upon such terms and for such 
period of time as are mutually agreed upon with any municipal corporation or any 
other county to prepare necessary plans and estimates of cost and to construct any 
water supply improvement to be used jointly by the contracting parties, and to 
provide for the furnishing of water and for the joint use by such contracting 
parties of such water supply improvement or the joint use of any suitable existing 
water supply or water mains belonging to either of such parties.”  1953 H.B. No. 
1. 
{¶19} R.C. 6103.22 was amended in 1997.  The cross-appeal addresses 
the 1994 incorporation of Hudson; therefore, we applied the pre-1997 version of 
R.C. 6103.22 to the issue on cross-appeal.  The issue we now address, however, 
concerns Summit County’s ability to sell the water system at the time the lawsuit 
commenced, i.e., January 22, 1999.  Therefore, the version of R.C. 6103.22 
relevant to this issue was the version in effect in 1999, which contained the 1997 
amendments.  That version of R.C. 6103.22 provided: 
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{¶20} “All contracts under section 6103.21 of the Revised Code shall 
provide for payment to the county or municipal corporation owning, constructing, 
or agreeing to construct the water supply improvement to be jointly used of the 
amount agreed upon as the other party's share of the cost of the water supply 
improvement. The contract also shall provide for payment to the county or 
municipal corporation owning or constructing and maintaining the improvement 
of the amount agreed upon for the other party's share of the cost of operating and 
maintaining the water supply improvement, including the cost of water, or in lieu 
of all other payments an agreed price per unit for water furnished. A county or 
municipal corporation owning, constructing, or agreeing to construct a water 
supply improvement and permitting the use of it by another county or municipal 
corporation shall retain full control and management of the construction, 
maintenance, repair, and operation of the improvement, except when conveyed to 
a municipal corporation as provided in this section. 
{¶21} “A completed water supply or water-works system, as defined in 
sections 6103.01 and 6103.02 of the Revised Code, for the use of any sewer 
district, constructed under this chapter, and any part thereof, located within any 
municipal corporation or within any area that may be incorporated as a municipal 
corporation or annexed to an existing municipal corporation, or that provides 
water for such an area, by mutual agreement between the board of county 
commissioners and the municipal corporation may be conveyed to the municipal 
corporation, which shall thereafter maintain and operate the water supply or 
water-works. The board may retain the right to joint use of the water supply or 
water-works for the benefit of the district.”  (Emphasis added.)  147 Ohio Laws, 
Part II, 2495, 2511. 
{¶22} R.C. 6103.21 empowers a board of county commissioners to 
contract with a municipal corporation to construct a water supply improvement so 
that both entities can use it.  R.C. 6103.22 addresses contractual requirements for 
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such joint ventures and states the parties’ rights with respect to such an 
arrangement.  It further provides for the conveyance of a completed water system 
from a county to a municipal corporation. 
{¶23} We conclude that R.C. 6103.21 and 6103.22 must be read in pari 
materia; however, the phrase “may be conveyed to the municipal corporation” in 
R.C. 6103.22 is permissive, not prohibitive.  Therefore, R.C. 6103.22 does not 
prohibit a county from conveying a water system to a municipal corporation in 
which the system is not located. 
{¶24} Furthermore, R.C. 6103.31 specifically authorizes a board of 
commissioners to sell a water system.  The version of R.C. 6103.31 in effect when 
this lawsuit was filed provided: 
{¶25} “If the best interests of the county and the users of a public water 
supply of the county so require, the board of county commissioners may sell or 
otherwise dispose of such public water supply to another political subdivision, 
person, firm, or private corporation.”  132 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2056-2057; 132 
Ohio Laws, Part II-III, 2342-2343. 
{¶26} The term “public water supply” as used in R.C. 6103.31 is not 
defined in the Revised Code.  However, former R.C. 6103.01 defined “public 
water supply” to include distribution facilities such as the water system at issue in 
this case.  1953 H.B. No. 1.  Although R.C. 6103.01 stated that the definition was 
for the term used in “sections 6103.02 to 6103.30 inclusive,” we believe that it 
was simply an oversight that the General Assembly did not amend R.C. 6103.01 
to extend the definition to R.C. 6103.31 when it was enacted in 1967.  We 
therefore construe the term as used in R.C. 6103.31 to have the same meaning that 
it has in the rest of the chapter. 
{¶27} Tellingly, R.C. 6103.31 does not limit a county to selling its water 
system only to the municipality within which the water system is located.  
Instead, the board is given the freedom to sell to a political subdivision, person, 
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firm, or private corporation so long as the sale is in the best interests of the county 
and users of the public water system. 
{¶28} Finally, as previously mentioned, a municipality may acquire, 
construct, own, lease, and operate water systems outside its corporate limits. 
Section 4, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution.  Reading into R.C. 6103.21, 6103.22, 
and 6103.31 a requirement that a board of county commissioners is restricted to 
sell only to a municipality within which the water system at issue is located would 
impose an additional restriction not supported by Section 4, Article XVIII of the 
Ohio Constitution.  In other words, if a municipality may acquire, own, lease and 
operate water systems located outside its corporate limits, then surely a county 
may sell its water system to a municipal corporation other than the one in which 
the system is located.  Therefore, we hold that Summit County may sell the water 
system to Akron or any other municipality. 
{¶29} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed in part 
and affirmed in part. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
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COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶30} I agree with the majority’s conclusion that neither the Ohio 
Constitution nor the Revised Code provides that Hudson’s incorporation meant 
that it acquired the water system by operation of law.  I disagree, however, with 
the majority’s determination that Summit County may sell the water system to 
Akron.  In regard to this second issue, I would follow the opinion of the court of 
appeals. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
January Term, 2002 
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Walter & Haverfield, L.L.P., Charles T. Riehl, Barbara R. Marburger, and 
R. Todd Hunt, for appellee and cross-appellant. 
 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sandy J. 
Rubino, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant and cross-appellee Summit 
County 
 
Max Rothal, Akron Law Director, and Cheri Burt Cunningham, Assistant 
Law Director, for appellant and cross-appellee city of Akron. 
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