Case Title: State v. Cesar G.

Citation: 2004 WI 61

Docket Number: 2002AP002106

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 61 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2106 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Interest of Cesar G., 
a person Under the Age of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Cesar G.,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 264 Wis. 2d 894, 664 N.W.2d 127 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 3, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 24, 2004 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Dietz 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Eileen A. Hirsch, assistant state public 
defender.  
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Shannon Wittenberger, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2004 WI 61 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2106  
(L.C. No. 
01 JV 266) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Interest of Cesar G., 
a person Under the Age of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Cesar G.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 3, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This case is a review of 
an unpublished decision of the court of appeals.1  Cesar G. seeks 
review of a court of appeals decision affirming the circuit 
court's order of the circuit court for Brown County, Richard J. 
Dietz, judge, refusing to stay that portion of the dispositional 
                                                 
1 State v. Cesar G., No. 02-2106, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. April 1, 2003).  
No. 
02-2106   
 
2 
 
order requiring Cesar to register as a sex offender.  We granted 
review on two issues:   
1) 
Does Wis. Stat. § 938.34(16) (2001-02)2 authorize a 
circuit court to stay that part of a dispositional 
order requiring a delinquent child to register as 
a sex offender?3   
2) 
If a circuit court has discretion to stay a 
dispositional order requiring a delinquent child 
to register as a sex offender, what criteria 
should the circuit court consider in exercising 
that discretion? 
¶2 
We answer the first question in the affirmative.  A 
circuit court has discretion under Wis. Stat. § 938.34(16) to 
stay that part of a dispositional order requiring a delinquent 
child to register as a sex offender.   
¶3 
In response to the second question, we conclude that 
in determining whether to stay such an order, a circuit court 
should consider the seriousness of the offense as well as the 
factors 
enumerated 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 938.34(15m)(c) 
and 
301.45(1m)(e).  The court of appeals concluded that the circuit 
court properly exercised its discretion in the present case by 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 The court of appeals did not address this issue.  State v. 
Cesar G., No. 02-2106, unpublished slip op., ¶3 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Apr. 1, 2003).  
No. 
02-2106   
 
3 
 
refusing to stay the sex offender registration requirement.  We 
disagree with the court of appeals.   
¶4 
We conclude that the circuit court based its decision 
not to issue the stay on the incorrect assumption that it did 
not 
have 
the 
authority 
to 
issue 
a 
stay 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 938.34(16).  Accordingly, we reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit 
court to exercise its discretion in deciding whether to issue a 
stay based on the appropriate factors.  
I 
¶5 
Cesar G. was adjudicated delinquent for first-degree 
sexual assault, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(1)(c), and 
first-degree sexual assault of a child, party to a crime, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1).  Cesar was 12 years old at 
the time of the assault. 
¶6 
At trial, 12-year-old Elizabeth M. testified that she, 
Cesar, Tony, and Kristian were at Cesar's house listening to 
music and hanging out.  According to Elizabeth, she and the 
three boys went into Cesar's garage and Tony closed and locked 
the door to the garage.  Cesar told her to "flash" them and she 
refused.  Cesar then grabbed her arms and Tony grabbed her legs 
and she fell.  Once Elizabeth was on the ground Tony pulled her 
shirt over her head and Tony and Cesar grabbed her breasts.  
Elizabeth struggled to get away but Cesar and Tony were holding 
her down.  Tony then pulled the victim's pants and underwear 
down and put his fingers in her vagina.  Cesar then put his 
No. 
02-2106   
 
4 
 
fingers in her vagina and she kicked and he stopped.  They then 
let her up and everyone left the garage. 
¶7 
Cesar testified that he only grabbed the victim to try 
to help her get away from Tony and that he never touched her 
sexually.  The court found Cesar delinquent on both counts:  
first-degree sexual assault and first-degree sexual assault of a 
child, party to a crime. 
¶8 
At a dispositional hearing a social worker from the 
Brown County Human Services Department Juvenile Court Unit 
recommended that Cesar be placed at Lincoln Hills School.  The 
circuit court ordered a psychological evaluation to help 
appraise 
dispositional 
alternatives. 
 
The 
psychologist 
recommended in-home placement with intensive supervision.  The 
circuit court ordered that Cesar G. be placed at Lincoln Hills 
School but then stayed the execution of that order.  The circuit 
court did not, however, stay the numerous other provisions set 
forth in the dispositional order.4 
                                                 
4 Cesar's dispositional order states in pertinent part: 
Cesar shall be placed in the secure correctional 
facility at Lincoln Hills School, W4380 Copper Lake 
Rd, Irma, WI, 54442-9720.  This order shall be STAYED. 
Cesar shall serve 30 days in Secure Detention, to 
report on 3/21/02, and upon release, is to have at 
least 60 days electronic monitoring, unless more time 
is deemed necessary by the Department. 
Cesar is to have no contact with the victim listed in 
the petition. 
Cesar is to be responsible for up to $200 in 
restitution, to be paid through the Family Service 
Restitution Program. 
No. 
02-2106   
 
5 
 
¶9 
Cesar's attorney requested the circuit court to stay 
that portion of the dispositional order requiring Cesar to 
register as a sex offender.  The circuit court denied the 
motion.   
¶10 On appeal, Cesar argued that the circuit court denied 
his request because it incorrectly concluded that it did not 
have the authority to stay the sex offender registration 
requirement.  The court of appeals determined that the circuit 
                                                                                                                                                             
Cesar shall attend a sexual perpetrator treatment 
program. 
Cesar 
shall attend 
a 
Cultural 
Education 
Program 
through 
Catholic 
Social 
Services, 
for 
continued 
acculturation and assimilation guidance, sex-respect 
and education, and facilitation of any community 
service. 
Cesar shall submit to a DNA sample. 
Cesar shall attend school daily and work up to the 
best of his ability.  The Department is to contact the 
school to see if Cesar's educational needs are 
properly addressed. 
Cesar and his family shall go through counseling, as 
deemed appropriate by the Department. 
Cesar shall have no contact with the co-defendant, 
Tony C. 
Cesar shall be responsible for a $25.00 Victim/Witness 
fee. 
Cesar must register as a sex offender. 
Cesar shall have no contact with anyone under the age 
of 13, unless supervised by an adult. 
Cesar shall have no further law violations. 
No. 
02-2106   
 
6 
 
court had assumed that it had the authority to stay the 
registration requirement and that it properly exercised its 
discretion when it denied Cesar's request to stay the sex 
offender registration requirement.   
II 
¶11 We turn first to the issue of whether a circuit court 
has 
authority 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 938.34(16) 
to 
stay 
a 
dispositional order requiring a delinquent child to register as 
a sex offender.  Interpretation of a statute presents a question 
of law that this court decides independently of the circuit 
court and court of appeals but benefiting from their analyses. 
¶12 We 
begin 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 938.34(15m)(am), 
which 
states that "except as provided in par. (bm)," if a juvenile is 
adjudicated delinquent on the basis of a violation under 
chapters 940, 944, or 948 or §§ 943.01 to 943.15, the circuit 
court may require the juvenile to comply with the registration 
requirements of § 301.45 if the court determines that the 
underlying conduct was sexually motivated and that it would be 
in the interest of public protection to have the juvenile 
register.5  The word "may" in (15m)(am) appears to grant the 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.34(15m)(am) provides in pertinent 
part: 
 
Except as provided in par. (bm), if the juvenile is 
adjudicated delinquent on the basis of any violation, 
or the solicitation, conspiracy or attempt to commit 
any violation, under ch. 940, 944 or 948 or ss. 943.01 
to 943.15, the court may require the juvenile to 
comply with the reporting requirements under s. 301.45 
if the court determines that the underlying conduct 
was sexually motivated, as defined in s. 980.01 (5), 
No. 
02-2106   
 
7 
 
circuit court discretion to determine whether to require a 
juvenile to comply with the registration requirements of 
§ 301.45.  Cesar was adjudicated delinquent on the basis of 
violations of chapters 940 and 948 and thus comes within 
§ 938.34 (15m)(am).  
¶13 We must next determine whether Cesar falls within the 
"except clause" of Wis. Stat. § 939.35(15)(am).  The except 
clause refers to § 939.34(15m)(bm).  Wisconsin Stat. § 938.34 
(15m)(bm) states that if a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent on 
the basis of a violation of one or more of the statutes listed 
in that section, then "the court shall require the juvenile to 
comply with the reporting requirements under s. 301.45 unless 
the court determines, after a hearing on a motion made by the 
juvenile, that the juvenile is not required to comply under s. 
301.45(1m)."6  Cesar falls within (bm).  He was found delinquent 
                                                                                                                                                             
and that it would be in the interest of public 
protection to have the juvenile report under s. 
301.45. 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.34(15m)(bm) provides in pertinent 
part: 
If the juvenile is adjudicated delinquent on the basis 
of a violation, or the solicitation, conspiracy, or 
attempt to commit a violation, of s. 940.22 (2), 
940.225 (1), (2), or (3), 944.06, 948.02 (1) or (2), 
948.025, 948.05, 948.055, 948.06, 948.07, 948.075, 
948.08, 948.095, 948.11 
(2)(a) or 
(am), 
948.12, 
948.13, or 948.30, or of s. 940.30 or 940.31 if the 
victim was a minor and the juvenile was not the 
victim's parent, the court shall require the juvenile 
to comply with the reporting requirements under s. 
301.45 unless the court determines, after a hearing on 
a motion made by the juvenile, that the juvenile is 
not required to comply under s. 301.45 (1m). 
No. 
02-2106   
 
8 
 
based on violations of two of the statutes listed under 
Wis. Stat. § 938.34(15m)(bm).  The word "shall" in (15m)(bm) 
appears to require a circuit court to mandate compliance with 
the registration requirements unless the juvenile falls within 
§ 301.45(1m).   
¶14 Thus far our analysis leads to the conclusion that the 
circuit court was required to order Cesar to comply with sex 
offender registration pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1m). 
¶15 As a result, we must examine Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1m) 
to determine whether a circuit court may relieve Cesar from the 
registration requirement under Wis. Stat. § 301.45.7  Section 
301.45(1m) lists several requirements, all of which must be met 
before an individual may qualify for an exception to the 
registration 
requirement. 
 
Cesar 
does 
not 
meet 
these 
requirements and does not qualify for the section 301.45(1m) 
exception.   
¶16 We therefore turn to the statutory provision for a 
stay to determine whether the stay provision would enable a 
circuit court to stay that part of a dispositional order 
requiring the juvenile to register.  The stay provision of Wis. 
Stat. § 938.34(16) provides that after ordering a disposition 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(1g) requires that "[e]xcept as 
provided in sub. (1m), a person shall comply with the reporting 
requirements under this section if he or she meets one or more 
of the following criteria:  (a) Is convicted or adjudicated 
delinquent 
on 
or 
after 
December 
25, 
1993, 
for 
a 
sex 
offense. . . . " 
No. 
02-2106   
 
9 
 
under § 938.34, a circuit court may "enter an additional order 
staying the execution of the dispositional order."8 
¶17 The State argues that the stay provision of Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.34(16) is not applicable to the registration requirement.  
The State asserts that because § 301.45 requires registration of 
juvenile delinquents and provides an exception, § 301.45 cannot 
be trumped by § 938.34(16) relating to a stay.  Nothing in the 
texts 
of 
the 
statutory 
provisions 
supports 
the 
State's 
interpretation.    
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.34(16) provides as follows: 
 
(16) Stay of order.  After ordering a disposition 
under this section, enter an additional order staying 
the execution of the dispositional order contingent on 
the 
juvenile's 
satisfactory 
compliance 
with 
any 
conditions that are specified in the dispositional 
order and explained to the juvenile by the court.  If 
the juvenile violates a condition of his or her 
dispositional 
order, 
the 
agency 
supervising 
the 
juvenile shall notify the court and the court shall 
hold a hearing within 30 days after the filing of the 
notice to determine whether the original dispositional 
order should be imposed, unless the juvenile signs a 
written waiver of any objections to imposing the 
original dispositional order and the court approves 
the waiver.  If a hearing is held, the court shall 
notify the parent, 
juvenile, guardian 
and 
legal 
custodian, 
all 
parties 
bound 
by 
the 
original 
dispositional order and the district attorney or 
corporation counsel in the county in which the 
dispositional order was entered of the time and place 
of the hearing at least 3 days before the hearing.  If 
all parties consent, the court may proceed immediately 
with the hearing.  The court may not impose the 
original dispositional order unless the court finds by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the juvenile has 
violated a condition of his or her dispositional 
order.  
No. 
02-2106   
 
10 
 
¶18 The 
State 
further 
contends 
that 
because 
Wis. Stat. § 938.34(16) refers to the staying of a dispositional 
order and not to the conditions set forth in that order, like 
registration, 
the 
stay 
provision 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
the 
registration 
requirement. 
 
The 
State 
posits 
that 
the 
registration requirement listed in Cesar's dispositional order 
is not a disposition, but instead is "a condition of a 
disposition."  The State argues that upon adjudication of a 
qualified 
sex 
offense, 
a 
dispositional 
order 
includes 
a 
placement (the disposition) and conditions, such as treatment, 
payment of fines or restitution, or compliance with sex offender 
treatment.     
¶19 The State argues that the sex offender registration 
requirement is a condition rather than a disposition for two 
reasons:  It "cannot stand alone"; and  Wis. Stat. § 938.354(16) 
allows for a stay of a dispositional order, not a stay of 
conditions or parts of a dispositional order.  In other words, 
if a dispositional order (the placement) is stayed, the stay is 
contingent on the completion of conditions. 
¶20 The State's argument relies in large part on the court 
of appeals decision in In re Daniel T.9  In that case, the 
circuit court ordered placement of the juvenile defendant in 
custody for one year and registration as a sex offender pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 301.45. 
 
Daniel 
T. 
sought 
to 
have 
his 
                                                 
9 In re Daniel T., 2003 WI App 200, 266 Wis. 2d 1032, 670 
N.W.2d 95. 
No. 
02-2106   
 
11 
 
registration 
requirement 
stayed, 
but 
the 
circuit 
court 
questioned its authority to do so.  The court of appeals adopted 
the disposition-condition distinction and held that § 301.45 
provides the only exception to the mandatory registration 
requirement.    
¶21 In adopting the disposition-condition distinction, the 
court of appeals explained that Wis. Stat. § 938.34(16) did not 
allow a stay of the condition of sex offender registration,  
reasoning as follows: 
[Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 938.34(16)] 
allows 
the 
dispositional order to be stayed provided the stay is 
contingent on the juvenile fulfilling the conditions 
set forth in the original dispositional order.  Here, 
the 
disposition 
is 
the 
year-long 
placement; 
registration 
as 
a 
sex 
offender 
is 
a 
condition 
"specified in the dispositional order . . . ."  If a 
stay were issued, the most it could do would be to 
stay 
Daniel's 
placement 
at 
Northwest 
Child 
and 
Adolescent Center.  Even then, he would have to 
fulfill the registration condition to keep the full 
disposition in abeyance.10 
The court of appeals further stated in Daniel T. that a circuit 
court could not stay a part or single condition of a 
dispositional order.11  In this respect the court of appeals 
contravened a prior court of appeals decision, In re Kendall 
G.,12 that interpreted Wis. Stat. § 938.34(16) to permit a 
                                                 
10 Id., ¶10. 
11 Id., ¶10 n.4. 
12 In re Kendell G., 2001 WI App 95, 243 Wis. 2d 67, 625 
N.W.2d 918. 
No. 
02-2106   
 
12 
 
circuit court "to stay the imposition of a dispositional order 
or a portion thereof."13 
 
¶22 In Daniel T., the court of appeals has in effect 
rewritten subsection (16) to read as follows:  "After ordering a 
disposition under this section, other than a sub. (15m) 
disposition 
[relating 
to 
sex 
offender 
registration 
requirements], [a circuit court may] enter an additional order 
staying the execution . . . ."  
¶23 The Daniel T. case is not precedential for this court, 
however, because a petition for review was filed.  The Daniel T. 
case is presently being held awaiting the disposition of the 
case at bar.   
¶24 We are not persuaded by either the State's or the 
Daniel T. court of appeals' reading of these statutes.  Neither 
the text of Wis. Stat. § 938.34 nor any authority supports the 
State's or court of appeals' interpretation of the sex offender 
registration requirement in § 938.34(15m) as a "condition" 
rather than a disposition.  
¶25 Upon examination of the text, history, and purpose of 
these statutory provisions, we conclude that the sex offender 
registration 
requirement 
is 
part 
of 
a 
disposition 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 938.34 and that § 938.34(16) allows a circuit court 
                                                 
13 Id., ¶16.  The Daniel T. court characterized the Kendell 
G. language as dicta.  Daniel T., 266 Wis. 2d 1032, ¶10 n.4.  
No. 
02-2106   
 
13 
 
to stay a dispositional order or any number of the dispositions 
set forth within the dispositional order.14    
¶26 The text of Wis. Stat. § 938.34 supports our reading 
of § 938.34(16).  First of all, § 938.34 begins by stating that 
if a circuit court adjudges a juvenile delinquent, it "shall 
enter an order deciding one or more of the dispositions of the 
case."15  The statute thus explicitly envisions the possibility 
of several dispositions.    
¶27 Second, 
Wis. Stat. § 938.34 
lists 
40 
different 
programs, activities or placements a circuit court might order, 
and refers to them as "[t]he dispositions under this section."  
This list includes, among others, counseling,16 supervision,17 
teen 
court 
program,18 
intensive 
supervision,19 
placement,20 
                                                 
14 We note that "a disposition under sub. (4m) [correctional 
placement] must be combined with a disposition under sub. 
(4n)[aftercare 
supervision 
on 
release 
from 
a 
secured 
correctional institution]."  See Wis. Stat. § 938.34. 
15 The introduction to Wis. Stat. § 938.34 states in 
pertinent part:   
Disposition of juvenile adjudged delinquent.  If the 
court adjudges a juvenile delinquent, the court shall 
enter 
an 
order 
deciding 
one 
of 
more 
of 
the 
dispositions of the case as provided in this section 
under 
a 
care 
and 
treatment 
plan . . . . 
The 
dispositions under this section are: . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (emphasis added). 
16 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (1). 
17 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (2). 
18 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (2m). 
19 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (2r). 
No. 
02-2106   
 
14 
 
electronic monitoring,21 transfer of legal custody,22 type 2 child 
caring 
institution 
placement,23 
serious 
juvenile 
offender 
program,24 correctional placement,25 restitution,26 supervised 
work program or other community service work,27 victim offender 
mediation 
program,28 
drug 
testing,29 
deoxyribonucleic 
acid 
analysis 
requirements,30 
and 
sex 
offender 
registration 
requirements.31   
¶28 The list in § 938.34 does not differentiate between 
"conditions" 
and 
"dispositions," 
and 
the 
entire 
list 
is 
encompassed in the words "dispositions under this section."  
Section 938.34(16) speaks of "conditions that are specified in 
the dispositional order" but does not describe what it means by 
conditions.  Nothing in the text of § 938.34 explicitly or 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (3). 
21 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (3g). 
22 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (4). 
23 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (4d). 
24 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (4h). 
25 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (4m). 
26 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (5). 
27 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (5g). 
28 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (5r). 
29 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (6s). 
30 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (15). 
31 Wis. Stat. § 938.34 (15m). 
No. 
02-2106   
 
15 
 
implicitly prohibits a circuit court from staying sex offender 
registration.   
 
¶29 Furthermore, the State's argument that the legislature 
intended to divide the list set forth in Wis. Stat. § 938.34 
into dispositions and conditions is not supported in the history 
of the statute. 
¶30 A review of the statute's history reveals that the 
legislature intended the stay in Wis. Stat. § 938.34(16) to 
apply to the registration requirement.  Mandatory sex offender 
registration was added to chapter 48, the Children's Code, as 
§ 48.34(5) by 1993 Act 98, effective December 25, 1993.  When 
the legislature revised the Children's Code and created the 
Juvenile Justice Code (JJC), the legislature included new 
dispositional 
options, 
including 
sex 
offender 
registration 
(§ 938.34(15)) and the new authority to stay any disposition.  
That the legislature did not continue the prior mandatory sex 
offender 
registration by 
expressly 
excluding 
sex offender 
registration from the dispositions that could be stayed under 
Wis. Stat. § 938.34(16) 
supports 
the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
legislature intended a circuit court to have the power to stay a 
sex offender registration dispositional order.     
¶31 Although 
the State 
offers 
treatment, 
payment of 
forfeitures or restitution, and compliance with sex offender 
treatment, as well as sex offender registration, as examples of 
conditions of disposition, both the Juvenile Justice Study 
No. 
02-2106   
 
16 
 
Committee Report32 (that led to the adoption of the Juvenile 
Justice Code) and the Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of 
the law creating the Juvenile Justice Code treat fines, 
restitution, and treatment as "dispositions."33 
¶32 Moreover, the State's argument that the circuit court 
should be prevented from staying portions of a dispositional 
order is inconsistent with the purpose of the Judicial Justice 
Code.  A goal of the Code is to "allow[] the judge to utilize 
the most effective dispositional plan" in order to "respond to a 
juvenile offender's needs for care and treatment, consistent 
with the prevention of delinquency, each juvenile's best 
interest and protection of the public."34  
                                                 
32 See Juvenile Justice Study Committee, Juvenile Justice:  
A Wisconsin Blueprint for Change at 16-17 (Jan. 1995) ("The 
committee also recommends the creation of the following new 
dispositions: . . . Contribution of a percentage of any income 
that the juvenile receives while placed in an out-of-home 
placement 
as 
restitution 
to 
the 
juvenile's 
victim. . . . Inpatient 
alcohol 
or 
other 
drug 
abuse 
treatment . . . . A forfeiture not to exceed $100 for a 
violation of a criminal law that is applicable only to a 
juvenile . . . ."). 
33 The Legislative Reference Bureau's Analysis contained in 
1995 Wisconsin Assembly Bill 130 is derived from the Juvenile 
Justice Study Committee Report and states: "This bill creates 
the following 
new 
dispositions: . . . . 
Contribution 
of a 
percentage of any income that the juvenile receives while placed 
in 
an 
out-of-home 
placement 
towards 
restitution 
of 
the 
juvenile's victim. . . . Inpatient alcohol or other drug abuse 
treatment . . . . A forfeiture not to exceed $100 for a 
violation of a criminal law that is applicable only to a 
juvenile . . . ." 
34 Wis. Stat. § 938.01(2)(f). 
 
No. 
02-2106   
 
17 
 
¶33 Allowing a stay of that part of the dispositional 
order requiring registration might, in a given case, be 
consistent 
with 
the 
offender's 
needs, 
the 
prevention 
of 
delinquency, the protection of the public and the juvenile's 
best interest.  A statutory scheme designed to give circuit 
courts flexibility to tailor dispositional orders to the 
circumstances of a particular case would give a circuit court 
discretion to stay all or some portions of a dispositional 
order, including sex offender registration.    
¶34 If the stay applies to the registration requirement, 
then when a circuit court enters an order mandating registration 
                                                                                                                                                             
Two of the Juvenile Justice Code's authors have expressed 
the Code's goal of permitting a circuit court to create 
individualized dispositional plans in each case in the following 
terms:  
The balance of rehabilitation, personal accountability 
and community protection created in the new code will 
provide juvenile courts statewide with a broader range 
of options to respond to young people's unlawful 
behavior.  Courts will be better able to create a 
dispositional plan appropriate to the needs of the 
individual and society under the circumstances of a 
particular case.   
Dennis J. Barry & Bonnie Ladwig, Time Ripe for Change, 69 
Wisconsin Lawyer 4, 10, 13 (Apr. 1996).   
"Written 
views 
of 
members 
of 
the 
committee 
can 
be 
considered as authoritative statements regarding legislative 
intent."  State v. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d 133, 143, 330 N.W.2d 564 
(1983) (citing State v. Genova, 77 Wis. 2d 141, 151, 252 
N.W.2d 380 (1977)).  See also State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, ¶14, 
261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381, (citing William A. Platz, The 
Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 350).  William A. Platz was one 
of the chief architects of the 1953 and 1955 versions of the 
Wisconsin Criminal Code. 
No. 
02-2106   
 
18 
 
and also enters an order staying registration, the stayed 
registration requirement never goes into effect if the juvenile 
successfully completes the dispositional order.  If the juvenile 
violates the dispositional order, the mandatory registration 
requirement goes into effect.  This result is consistent with 
the rehabilitative purposes of the Juvenile Justice Code. 
 
¶35 In contrast, the State argues that allowing courts to 
stay the sex offender registration requirement runs counter to 
the purpose of the Juvenile Justice Code, with its emphasis on 
protecting the public.  The State asserts that the legislature 
did not intend to treat adult and juvenile sex offenders 
differently 
with 
regard 
to 
the 
registration 
requirement.  
According to the State, the statutory scheme evidences the 
legislative intent to protect the public by requiring a person 
who is adjudicated delinquent or convicted of a qualifying sex 
offense and who does not fall within the statutory exception to 
register as a sex offender.   
¶36 The State's emphasis on the public protection purpose 
exaggerates this aspect of the Juvenile Justice Code at the 
expense of the other purposes, including rehabilitation.35  The 
purpose of the Juvenile Justice Code was to adopt an approach 
                                                 
35 See In re Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 873, 580 N.W.2d 660 
(1998) ("Although the legislature subsequently enacted the JJC 
to incorporate a new balanced approach in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings, the legislature did not lose sight of the fact that 
the 
JJC 
provisions 
are 
distinct 
from 
the 
criminal 
code 
provisions, and that the rehabilitation of juveniles is a 
primary objective."). 
No. 
02-2106   
 
19 
 
that 
"balances 
rehabilitation, 
personal 
accountability 
and 
public protection and which best serves both the offender and 
society."36  Allowing a circuit court to stay sex offender 
registration is consistent with this purpose and approach.  A 
circuit court should have the flexibility to tailor a juvenile's 
dispositional plan to achieve the equally important goals.   
¶37 The policies the State urges that favor a mandatory 
registration requirement in non-juvenile cases simply do not 
apply in juvenile cases where a circuit court has flexibility to 
tailor a juvenile's disposition to achieve the multiple goals of 
the Juvenile Justice Code.  As we explained in In re Hezzie R.,37 
which did not involve a stay, the Juvenile Justice Code is not a 
criminal code:  
The requirements of § 301.45, therefore, are only 
imposed on a juvenile who is adjudicated delinquent 
where the particular facts of the case and concerns 
for public safety dictate it.  This is not criminal 
punishment and does not equate the JJC to a criminal 
code.38 
¶38 The State attempts to combat this reasoning by 
contending that Wis. Stat. § 301.45, not § 938.34, is the more 
specific statute, and therefore § 301.45 controls when a 
juvenile may be excused from the sex offender registration 
                                                 
36 Juvenile Justice Study Committee, supra note 32, at 10. 
See also the statement of legislative purpose set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 938.01(2). 
37 In re Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998). 
38 Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d at 881. 
No. 
02-2106   
 
20 
 
requirements.  The State relies on Daniel T., in which the court 
of appeals explained the relationship of the general and 
specific statutes as follows: 
Here, the more specific statute is the mandatory 
registration of Wis. Stat. § 301.45.  If § 301.45 did 
not exist, a different sanction could replace it for 
adjudicatory 
purposes 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.34(15m)(bm).  In other words, when the court is 
confronted with a juvenile sex offender, the general 
juvenile justice statute refers courts to the specific 
statute of § 301.45 to discover the penalty.  Section 
301.45(1m) 
is 
very 
specific 
about 
when 
the 
registration requirement is inapplicable——no part of 
§ 301.45 allows registration to be superceded by a 
judicial stay.  Moreover, § 301.45(5)(a) makes the 
registration requirements applicable for fifteen years 
after adjudication, with no mention of the court's 
ability to toll this time limit by issuing a stay.  
Thus, a stay may not be issued to circumvent § 301.45 
registration requirements.39 
¶39 In this instance, it is difficult to determine which 
is the more specific statute.  Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45 is 
specific as to sex offender registration, while § 938.34(16) is 
specific as to juvenile dispositional orders.  In such a case, 
the canon of construction that a specific statute governs a 
general one does not assist us in interpreting the statutes.  
¶40 In sum, we conclude that the sex offender registration 
requirement established in Wis. Stat. § 938.34(15m) is a 
disposition.  Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 938.34(16) allows the 
circuit court to stay one or more of the § 938.34 dispositions 
contained in its dispositional order, including the disposition 
requiring the juvenile to register as a sex offender. 
                                                 
39 Daniel T. 266 Wis. 2d 1032, ¶9. 
No. 
02-2106   
 
21 
 
¶41 Reading the statutes in this way comports with the 
texts, is consistent with the statutes' history and purpose, and 
harmonizes the statutes.   
III 
¶42 Having 
concluded 
that 
a 
circuit 
court 
has 
the 
authority to stay the execution of that part of a dispositional 
order requiring a delinquent child to register as a sex 
offender, we now turn to the question whether the circuit court 
properly exercised its discretion in denying Cesar's motion for 
a stay.  The function of this court is not to exercise 
discretion in the first instance but to review a circuit court's 
exercise of discretion.  "[A] discretionary determination must 
be the product of a rational mental process by which the facts 
of record and law relied upon are stated and are considered 
together 
for 
the 
purposes 
of 
achieving 
a 
reasonable 
determination."40  An appellate court will affirm a circuit 
court's discretionary decision as long as the circuit court 
"examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, 
and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion 
that a reasonable judge could reach."41  Therefore, the record on 
appeal must "reflect the circuit court's reasoned application of 
                                                 
40 Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 
(1981). 
41 Long v. Long, 196 Wis. 2d 691, 695, 539 N.W.2d 462 (Ct. 
App. 1995).  See also State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 
Wis. 2d 536, 541, 363 N.W.2d 419 (1985); Shuput v. Lauer, 109 
Wis. 2d 164, 177-78, 325 N.W.2d 321 (1982). 
No. 
02-2106   
 
22 
 
the appropriate legal standard to the relevant facts in the 
case."42   
¶43 The circuit court denied the motion to stay, expressly 
stating that it was "not convinced" that it had the statutory 
authority to stay the sex offender registration requirement.  In 
its discussion, the circuit court referred to Cesar's age and 
stated that it considered the charge a "serious offense."  The 
circuit court failed to compare Cesar's age to the age of the 
victim and it did not discuss the relationship of Cesar and the 
victim, the bodily and emotional harm to the victim, or the 
probability that Cesar will commit other violations in the 
future.  The circuit court's ordered evaluation concluded that 
Cesar was "a physically and emotionally immature youngster" who 
was amenable to treatment, and who would not be likely to 
continue "perpetration of antisocial behaviors."   
¶44 The circuit court offered the following reasons for 
its decision to deny the stay: 
The sexual offender registration by my recollection is 
something that stays in effect for fifteen years and I 
harken back and again I understand Cesar's age.  I 
understand the——the circumstances involved here but I 
harken back to my comments at the beginning of this 
that this was a serious offense.  If Cesar were 17, on 
the facts of this case probably he would——he would be 
looking at some period of incarceration.  Certainly he 
would be looking at——at sexual——as——as a registrar—— 
register of——in as a sexual offender.  And although 
I've stayed that in one other case that I can recall 
by stipulation between Defense counsel and the State I 
                                                 
42 State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 281, 588 N.W.2d 1 
(1999). 
No. 
02-2106   
 
23 
 
am still not convinced that I have the statutory 
authority to——to stay that. 
 
 . . . . 
Under 
the 
circumstances 
that 
will 
keep 
Cesar 
registered until he is 27 or 28 years old.  I don't 
think that's unreasonable.  I am not going to stay 
execution of that.  He shall register as a sexual 
offender. 
¶45 The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court 
had "assumed it had the authority to stay the registration 
requirement" and "exercised its discretion when it denied 
Cesar's 
request 
to 
stay 
the 
sex 
offender 
registration 
requirement."43  Furthermore, the court of appeals concluded that 
it was "within the circuit court's prerogative to emphasize the 
seriousness of the offense as the driving factor in denying 
Cesar's request."44  
¶46 In contrast to the court of appeals, we view the 
circuit court's statement that it was not convinced it had the 
statutory authority to stay the sex registration requirement as 
persuasive that it made its decision based on an incorrect view 
of the law.  As such, the circuit court's decision denying 
Cesar's motion to stay the registration requirement constitutes 
an erroneous exercise of discretion.  The court of appeals 
decision must therefore be reversed and the cause remanded to 
the circuit court for exercise of its discretion.  
                                                 
43 State v. Cesar G., No. 02-2106, unpublished slip op., ¶3 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2003). 
44 Id., ¶6. 
No. 
02-2106   
 
24 
 
¶47 Both parties suggest that if the cause is remanded the 
circuit court should consider the seriousness of the offense, as 
well as the factors listed in Wis. Stat. § 938.34(15m)(c) and 
repeated in § 301.45(1m)(e), when deciding whether to stay its 
sex offender registration order under § 938.34(16). 
¶48 It is, of course, entirely appropriate that a circuit 
court consider the seriousness of the offense in deciding any 
dispositional order of a juvenile.  
¶49 Moreover, because the legislature has provided that a 
circuit court may consider certain factors when deciding under 
Wis. Stat. § 938.34(15m)(c) whether it is in the interest of 
public protection to require a juvenile to register as a sex 
offender, 
and 
because 
the 
legislature 
has 
set 
forth 
substantially the same factors in § 301.45(1m)(e) for a circuit 
court to consider in determining whether it is not necessary in 
the interest of public protection to require the person to 
comply with the sex offender registration requirements, we 
conclude a circuit court should consider these factors (as well 
as the seriousness of the offense) in deciding whether to stay a 
dispositional order requiring a juvenile to register as a sex 
offender.45 
¶50 The 
factors 
set 
forth 
by 
the 
legislature 
in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 938.34(15m)(c) and § 301.45(1m)(e) and which this 
court adopts, along with the seriousness of the offense, for the 
circuit court to consider in deciding whether to grant a stay of 
                                                 
45 See Wis. Stat. §§ 938.34(15m)(c), 301.45(1m)(e). 
No. 
02-2106   
 
25 
 
that part of a dispositional order requiring a juvenile to 
register as a sex offender, are as follows: 
1. The ages, at the time of the violation, of the 
juvenile and the victim of the violation; 
2. The relationship between the juvenile and the 
victim of the violation; 
3. Whether the violation resulted in bodily harm, as 
defined in s. 939.22 (4), to the victim; 
4. Whether the victim suffered from a mental illness 
or mental deficiency that rendered him or her 
temporarily 
or 
permanently 
incapable 
of 
understanding or evaluating the consequences of 
his or her actions; 
5. The probability that the juvenile will commit 
other violations in the future; and 
6. Any other factor that the court determines may be 
relevant to the particular case.  
 
¶51 We also hold that, upon moving the circuit court to 
issue a stay of the sex offender registration requirement, the 
juvenile has the burden to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that, based on these factors, a stay should be granted 
in his or her case.   We so hold because the legislature placed 
this burden of proof on the person seeking an exception to the 
registration requirement under Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1m)(e).  The 
burden of proof we set forth attaches when a juvenile files a 
motion requesting a stay of the sex offender registration 
requirement; the circuit court may, on its own initiative, 
without a motion by the juvenile, decide to stay the sex 
offender registration requirement as part of its dispositional 
order. 
No. 
02-2106   
 
26 
 
¶52 In sum, we conclude that a circuit court has the 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 938.34(16) to stay that part of a 
dispositional order requiring a delinquent juvenile to register 
as a sex offender.  In considering whether to stay such an 
order, a circuit court should consider the seriousness of the 
offense as well as the factors enumerated in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 938.34(15m)(c) and 301.45(1m)(e).  Because we conclude that 
the circuit court based its decision not to stay the sex 
offender registration on an erroneous view of the law, that is, 
that it did not have the authority to stay an order requiring a 
delinquent juvenile to register as a sex offender, we reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the 
circuit court so that it may exercise its discretion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
¶53 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No. 
02-2106   
 
 
 
1