Case Title: Commonwealth v. Narvaez

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13275

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13275 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANGEL O. PEREZ NARVAEZ. 
 
 
 
Hampshire.     September 7, 2022. - November 22, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Dismissal.  Probable Cause.  Statute, 
Construction.  Words, "Noxious or filthy substance." 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Northampton Division 
of the District Court Department on February 10, 2020. 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Maureen E. Walsh, J. 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Andrew C. Covington, Assistant District Attorney (Thomas H. 
Townsend, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
Rachel T. Rose for the defendant. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, Angel O. Perez Narvaez, was 
charged with vandalizing with a "noxious or filthy substance" in 
2 
 
violation of G. L. c. 266, § 103 (§ 103).1  This case requires us 
to determine whether urine constitutes a noxious or filthy 
substance within the parameters of the statute.  Because we 
conclude that it does not, we affirm the dismissal of the 
criminal complaint brought against the defendant for violation 
of § 103. 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts set forth in the 
criminal complaint.  See Commonwealth v. Ilya I., 470 Mass. 625, 
626 (2015) ("Our review of [a] judge's order of dismissal is 
confined to the four corners of the application for complaint 
. . ."). See also Commonwealth v. Richardson, 479 Mass. 344, 352 
(2018).  On February 10, 2020, at approximately 2:30 A.M., the 
defendant was stopped and arrested for operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.  While the 
defendant was handcuffed, the officer attempted to read him the 
Miranda rights, but the defendant became increasingly angry and 
uncooperative.  The defendant began to scream at the officer, "I 
hope your mother dies of cancer"; "I hope you die[,] pig"; and 
"You should [have] been killed in Afghanistan."  After the 
officer transported the defendant to the State police barracks 
 
1 The defendant also was charged with operation of a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, second 
offense, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1); and a 
marked lanes violation, pursuant to G. L. c. 89, § 4A.  Neither 
of these two charges, however, is the subject of this appeal. 
3 
 
to complete the booking process, the defendant became even more 
hostile and uncooperative.  When the officer again tried to read 
the defendant the Miranda rights, the defendant refused to 
cooperate, and screamed, "I am not blowing."  The defendant 
eventually was placed in a jail cell and was told he must 
cooperate with the booking process before he could be released 
on bail.  The defendant instead refused to be fingerprinted and 
repeatedly yelled, "Just take me to the judge[;] he will dismiss 
this right away." 
At approximately 7 A.M. later that morning, another officer 
performed a cell check on the defendant and observed that the 
defendant had "made a complete mess of [his] cell."  The 
defendant had urinated on the floor both inside and outside of 
the cell.  Based on the location of the toilet in the cell, the 
officer stated that "it [was] apparent that [the defendant] 
purposely urinated through the cell bars on to the floor outside 
the cell."  The urine had "seeped into the cracks between the 
floor tiles, potentially causing permanent damage to the sub 
floor beneath."  Because urine, like other bodily fluids, can 
carry potentially dangerous bacteria and viruses, police hired a 
cleanup company specializing in cleaning hazardous fluids and 
spills to clean the defendant's cell. 
As a result of his urinating inside and outside of the jail 
cell, the defendant was charged with vandalizing with a "noxious 
4 
 
or filthy substance" in violation of § 103.  A judge of the 
District Court allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss the 
complaint for lack of probable cause.  The judge determined that 
urine was not a noxious or filthy substance under § 103 and that 
the facts serving as the basis for the criminal complaint did 
not demonstrate sufficiently that the defendant intentionally 
injured, defaced, or defiled the jail cell.  The Commonwealth 
sought review in the Appeals Court, which reversed the dismissal 
in an unpublished decision.  See Commonwealth v. Perez Narvaez, 
100 Mass. App. Ct. 1122 (2022).  We granted the defendant's 
application for further appellate review. 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant filed a motion to dismiss 
the complaint, arguing that, because urine is not a noxious and 
filthy substance within the meaning of the statute, there was no 
probable cause to arrest him.  Probable cause exists only where 
the facts and circumstances warrant a person of reasonable 
caution to believe that an offense has been committed.  See 
Commonwealth v. Coggeshall, 473 Mass. 665, 667 (2016).  See also 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 3 (g) (2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1502 
(2004).  "[An] application for the complaint must establish 
probable cause as to each element of the [charged] offense."  
Coggeshall, supra.  Probable cause is, however, "a decidedly low 
standard."  See Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 311 
(2013). 
5 
 
We review a judge's determination of probable cause de 
novo.  See Commonwealth v. Long, 454 Mass. 542, 555 (2009), 
S.C., 476 Mass. 526 (2017).  Here, whether probable cause 
existed to issue a criminal complaint under § 103 depends on 
whether the Legislature intended to include urine as a "noxious 
or filthy substance." 
"In interpreting the meaning of a statute, we look first to 
the plain statutory language."  Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 490 Mass. 
398, 405 (2022), citing Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 
465 Mass. 134, 138 (2013).  See Desrosiers v. Governor, 486 
Mass. 369, 376 (2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 83 (2021) ("In 
interpreting a statute, we follow the plain language when it is 
unambiguous and when its application would not lead to an absurd 
result, or contravene the Legislature's clear intent" 
[quotations and citation omitted]).  The words of the statute 
generally are the main source from which we ascertain 
legislative purpose.  See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 
688 (2015).  "Where the language of a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent . . . and 
the courts enforce the statute according to its plain wording 
. . . so long as its application would not lead to an absurd 
result" (citation omitted).  Cavanaugh, supra.  However, 
"[w]here there is doubt or ambiguity about the meaning of a 
statutory provision, the court may turn to extrinsic sources to 
6 
 
determine legislative purpose and intent."  Id., citing Malloy 
v. Department of Correction, 487 Mass. 482, 496 (2021). 
Section 103 provides: 
"Whoever wilfully, intentionally and without right throws 
into, against or upon a . . . building . . . or puts or 
places therein or thereon oil of vitriol, coal tar or other 
noxious or filthy substance, with intent unlawfully to 
injure, deface or defile such . . . building . . . shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the [S]tate prison for not more 
than five years or in jail for not more than two and one 
half years or by a fine of not more than [$300]" (emphasis 
added). 
 
 
The term "other noxious or filthy substance" is not defined 
in the statute.  See G. L. c. 266, § 103.  Therefore, we first 
consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase.  See 
Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 511 (2012).  See also 
G. L. c. 4, § 6, Third ("Words and phrases shall be construed 
according to the common and approved usage of the language 
. . .").  "Noxious" is defined as "[h]armful to [one's] health," 
or "injurious."  See Black's Law Dictionary 1283 (11th ed. 
2019).  See also American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1207 (5th ed. 2016) ("noxious" defined as "[h]armful to 
living things").  The term "filthy" is defined as "[c]overed or 
smeared with filth" and "disgustingly dirty."  See id. at 659.  
The Commonwealth contends that where urine so obviously is 
"disgustingly dirty," our inquiry into the meaning of the term 
7 
 
"other noxious or filthy substance" ought to end there.2  We 
disagree. 
Ordinarily, we do not turn to extrinsic sources of 
legislative intent where a statute seemingly is clear and 
unambiguous on its face.  See Cianci v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 
178 (2019).  In McCarthy v. Commissioner of Revenue, 391 Mass. 
630, 633 (1984), however, where the term "any person" was so 
general, yet undefined by G. L. c. 64E, § 15, this court found 
it necessary to go beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
language of the statute, to reach its legislative history, to 
afford properly the statutory term its intended meaning.  In the 
context of G. L. c. 64E, § 15, the term "any person" was an 
"equivocal word," one with "no fixed and rigid signification," 
having "different meanings dependent upon contemporary 
 
2 The Commonwealth cites three out-of-State cases to support 
its argument that urine constitutes a noxious or filthy 
substance.  See People v. Aponte, 45 Misc. 3d 29, 30 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2014).  See also State v. Narmore, 107 Haw. 94 (Ct. App. 
2005); State in the Interest of J.J., 125 So. 3d 1248, 1250-1251 
(La. App. 2013).  However, in two of those cases, the defendant 
seemingly did not even challenge whether urine was a noxious 
substance for the purposes of the relevant charged offense.  See 
Aponte, supra.  See also Narmore, supra.  Moreover, in State in 
the Interest of J.J., supra, while urine was described as a 
"noxious substance," the defendant was charged with battery by 
way of intentionally administering "a poison or other noxious 
liquid or substance to another."  The offense charged was vastly 
different from the charge against the defendant here, as a 
charge of simple battery does not possess the same history 
behind its enactment as does G. L. c. 266, § 103 (§ 103), the 
latter being enacted in response to the antitemperance violence, 
as discussed infra. 
8 
 
conditions, the connection in which it [was] used, and the 
result intended to be accomplished."  Id., quoting Commonwealth 
v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 404 (1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 
684 (1932).  Because the term was so general, yet undefined, 
only through inquiry into the statute's legislative history 
could this court properly determine what group of people were 
included in the term "any person," and were thus subject to the 
special fuel tax of G. L. c. 64E, § 15.  See id. at 633-634.  
Our holding in McCarthy demonstrates that in some circumstances, 
even though a statutory term may seem clear and unambiguous on 
its face, proper statutory analysis nonetheless may require us 
to go beyond the plain and ordinary meaning to afford the 
language its intended effect.  See id. at 633. 
Here, as in McCarthy, the term "other noxious or filthy 
substance" may seem clear and unambiguous on its face, but it 
too, like the term "any person," is a general, yet undefined 
statutory term, the intended meaning of which cannot be fully 
discerned without going beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of 
the language of § 103.  See id.  What is "noxious," "filthy," 
"harmful to one's health," or "disgustingly dirty" is equivocal 
and extremely fact dependent, having no "fixed and rigid 
signification."  It is a term that may have "different meanings 
dependent upon contemporary conditions, the connection in which 
it is used, and the result intended to be accomplished."  See 
9 
 
id. at 633.  Therefore, the term "other noxious or filthy 
substance" lends itself to ambiguity, an ambiguity that only is 
furthered by the oddity of the specific substances that precede 
the statutory term, oil of vitriol and coal tar.3 
Thus, "[w]here [as here] there is [still] doubt or 
ambiguity about the meaning of a statutory provision, the court 
[must] turn to extrinsic sources to determine legislative 
purpose and intent."  Cavanagh, 490 Mass. at 405, citing Malloy, 
487 Mass. at 496.  See Anderson v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. 
of Pittsburgh PA, 476 Mass. 377, 382 (2017), citing Kain v. 
Department of Envtl. Protection, 474 Mass. 278, 286 (2016) 
(court looks beyond plain and ordinary meaning of statutory 
language where such language is sufficiently ambiguous to 
support multiple, rational interpretations).  Among those 
 
3 Where what is "harmful to one's health" or "disgustingly 
dirty" may be the subject of many interpretations, we also are 
cognizant of the need to construe narrowly the term "noxious or 
filthy substance" so as to avoid any constitutional problems.  
See O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 420-421 (2012) (we often 
have sought to construe narrowly statutory language to avoid 
constitutional problems).  See also Oracle USA, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 487 Mass. 518, 525 (2021) ("When 
statutory language is susceptible of multiple interpretations, a 
court . . . should adopt a construction that avoids potential 
constitutional infirmity").  Were we to adopt the Commonwealth's 
argument, we risk interpreting the statute in a manner that 
would render it potentially constitutionally vague.  See 
Commonwealth v. St. Louis, 473 Mass. 350, 355 (2015) ("A 
criminal statute must not be so vague that it opens itself up to 
arbitrary enforcement and prosecution," because of "its lack of 
reasonably clear guidelines" [citation omitted]). 
10 
 
extrinsic sources of legislative intent are "the historical and 
legal environment in which the statute was enacted to [help] 
discern the objectives which the Legislature expected the law to 
achieve."  International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, Atl. & 
Gulf Maritime Region, AFL-CIO v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & 
Nantucket S.S. Auth., 392 Mass. 811, 815 (1984), citing 
Chouinard, petitioner, 358 Mass. 780, 782 (1971). 
Section 103 was enacted in 1851.  See St. 1851, c. 129, 
§ 3.  During this time, the temperance movement was sweeping the 
country in the decades preceding the Civil War.  See Langill, 
Levi Hubbell and the Wisconsin Judiciary:  A Dilemma in Legal 
Ethics and Non-partisan Judicial Elections, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 
985, 990 (1998) (Langill).  "The Temperance Movement in the 
United States was born out of growing public dismay over what 
was perceived to be alcohol's corrosive effect on societal 
morality."  See Hawkins, Great Beer, Good Intentions, Bad Law:  
The Unconstitutionality of New York's Farm Brewery License, 56 
B.C. L. Rev. 313, 324 (2015).  This moral movement "sought and 
eventually obtained a prohibition on the sale of alcohol."  See 
Calabresi, "A Shining City on a Hill":  American Exceptionalism 
and the Supreme Court's Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 
B.U. L. Rev. 1335, 1364 (2006).  The mission of the temperance 
movement was to demonstrate that "[t]he saloon [was] the sum of 
all villainies" (citation omitted).  Id.  "It [was] the crime of 
11 
 
crimes" (citation omitted).  Id.  This movement, while having 
its roots in morality, was met with great resistance across the 
country.  See Langill, supra.  The resistance came in the form 
of riots and outrage.  Id.  The antitemperance movement was 
comprised of agitators of violence, threatening to seek revenge 
on any who supported abstinence from the consumption of alcohol.  
See W. Thomas, Enemies of the Constitution Discovered, or, an 
Inquiry into the Origin and Tendency of Popular Violence 128 n.* 
(1835) (antitemperance movement led by "agitators of . . . 
violence"). 
Massachusetts too fell victim to this violence, as those 
opposed to the temperance movement made their opposition well 
known, often in a "loud and boisterous" manner.  See generally 
Commonwealth v. Porter, 1 Gray 476, 476 (1854) (three defendants 
indicted for willfully disturbing and interrupting assembly of 
people "in a loud and boisterous manner," in attempt to 
interfere with lawful meeting in which subject of temperance was 
to be discussed).  In June 1847, four years before § 103 was 
enacted, four bottles of coal tar were thrown through the 
windows of two "prominent temperance men."  See Another Outrage, 
Liberator, June 18, 1847, at 3.  The next night more coal tar 
was thrown through the windows of a local deacon, doing "great 
injury to the furniture . . . [and] paintings" located within 
the building.  See Outrage, The Liberator, June 18, 1847, at 3.  
12 
 
"The weapon of choice" so to speak, in carrying out these acts 
of violence and vandalism, often was coal tar or oil of vitriol.  
See New England Farmer, Sept. 22, 1855, at 3 ("On Monday 
evening, several bottles of coal tar were thrown into the 
sitting-room of Marshal Kingman, of Watertown.  The motive of 
the assault, probably, was the fact of Mr. Kingman being in 
favor of the enforcement of the liquor law").  See also New 
England Farmer, Aug. 13, 1853, at 3 ("scoundrel threw six 
bottles of oil of vitriol" into parlor windows of man who served 
as member of temperance vigilance committee); House Attacked 
with Coal Tar, Boston Evening Transcript, Sept. 18, 1855, at 2 
("Some dastardly scoundrels called at the residence of Mr. 
Marshall Kingman, on Walnut Hill, Watertown, last evening, and 
on the door being opened by a lad, several bottles of coal tar 
were hurled into the sitting room, badly damaging the carpet and 
furniture, but fortunately not injuring any of the occupants.  
This assault is supposed to have been made in revenge for Mr. 
Kingman's active efforts towards the enforcement of the liquor 
law").  Both substances seemingly were popular not simply for 
the destruction that they caused in the building into which they 
were thrown, but also for their potential to injure those 
inside.  See New England Farmer, supra; House Attacked with Coal 
Tar, Boston Evening Transcript, supra. 
13 
 
 
In light of this historical context, the Legislature was 
forced to take a significant measure to combat the 
antitemperance violence that began to grow in the decades 
preceding the Civil War, by enacting § 103 in 1851.  To read 
this statute without such cause in mind would disregard "the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished" by the statute, and would run afoul of the 
Legislature's intent.  See DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 
454 Mass. 486, 490 (2009), citing Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360, 364 (1975) (intent of Legislature 
also derived from "cause of [statute's] enactment, the mischief 
or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
effectuated").  See also Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 
786, 795 (2018) ("Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is 
to effectuate the intent of the Legislature . . ." [citation 
omitted]). 
But the historical analysis still does not, by itself, as 
the plain language of the statute does not, define what the 
Legislature intended the term "other noxious or filthy 
substance" to encompass.  We must turn to our canons of 
statutory interpretation to determine the full meaning behind 
"other noxious or filthy substance," as intended by the 
Legislature.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Krasner, 358 Mass. 727, 730, 
14 
 
S.C., 360 Mass. 848 (1971) ("no occasion to resort to canons" of 
statutory interpretation where plain language and legislative 
history were conclusive in court's interpretation of burglary 
statute). 
One such canon, ejusdem generis, is Latin for "of the same 
kind or class."  People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 
Inc. v. Department of Agric. Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 287 
(2017).  Under this doctrine, "[w]here general words follow 
specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are 
construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those 
objects enumerated by the preceding specific words" (citation 
omitted).  Banushi v. Dorfman, 438 Mass. 242, 244 (2002).  The 
doctrine is most appropriate where "a series of several terms is 
listed that concludes with the disputed language."  Id., citing 
Perlera v. Vining Disposal Serv., Inc., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 491, 
496 n.8 (1999).  Here, the statute lists two specific terms, oil 
of vitriol and coal tar, followed by more general language, "or 
other noxious or filthy substance," i.e., the disputed language.  
Thus, ejusdem generis applies.  Cf. Carey v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 479 Mass. 367, 370 n.6 (2018) (ejusdem generis 
inapplicable where listed items in statute began with general 
term followed by nonexclusive examples, rather than specific 
terms followed by disputed general term). 
15 
 
In Commonwealth v. Escobar, 479 Mass. 225, 228-229 (2018), 
this court used the doctrine of ejusdem generis to discern the 
Legislature's intent behind the term "anything of value" to 
determine whether a defendant committed identity fraud within 
the context of G. L. c. 266, § 37E (b) (§ 37E [b]).  The 
defendant argued that evasion from criminal prosecution was not 
"anything of value" within the meaning of § 37E (b) and that, 
thus, the Commonwealth failed to establish an essential element 
of the charged offense.  See id. at 227-228.  This court agreed 
because where the general term "anything of value" was preceded 
by the specific terms "money, credit, goods, [or] services," the 
term "anything of value" in § 37E (b) necessarily must have been 
intended to be limited only to "that which can be exchanged for 
a financial payment."  Id. at 229.  The phrase "anything of 
value" necessarily was added "to encompass any other items that 
do not appear but are similar to those items that do appear."  
See id. 
Here, coal tar is "tar obtained by distillation of 
bituminous coal and [is] used [especially] as an industrial 
fuel, in making dyes, and in the topical treatment of skin 
disorders."  See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 237 
(11th ed. 2020).  Oil of vitriol is concentrated sulfuric acid.  
See id. at 862.  Both are listed on the Massachusetts Oil and 
Hazardous Material List.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.1600 
16 
 
(2014).  Urine is neither listed on the Massachusetts Oil and 
Hazardous Material List nor similar substantially in form to 
either of these two substances.  See id. 
Applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis to § 103, the 
general term "should itself be controlled and defined by 
reference to the enumerated categories of [substances] which are 
recited just before it."  See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001).  Thus, we must construe the 
term "other noxious or filthy substance" to encompass only those 
substances substantially similar to the specifically listed 
items, coal tar and oil of vitriol, both of which were used as 
items to throw at buildings as part of the antitemperance 
violence in the decades leading up to the Civil War.4  See id. at 
114 (specific statutory terms "seamen" and "railroad employees," 
which immediately preceded more general statutory term "any 
other class of workers engaged in . . . commerce," necessarily 
demonstrated congressional intent to limit and define by 
reference what classes of workers were to be included within 
 
4 In coming to this conclusion, we note the particularly 
harsh penalty that accompanies a violation of § 103.  The 
statute permits imprisonment for up to five years in State 
prison, making the crime a felony.  See G. L. c. 266, § 103.  
See also G. L. c. 274, § 1 ("A crime punishable by . . . 
imprisonment in the state prison is a felony").  Where violation 
of the statute constitutes a felony with a substantial potential 
prison sentence, we believe that our holding more closely 
effectuates the Legislature's intent behind the statute's 
enactment. 
17 
 
residual clause of 9 U.S.C. § 1).  See also Escobar, 479 Mass. 
at 229.  Compare Banushi, 438 Mass. at 244 (pursuant to doctrine 
of ejusdem generis, where specific terms of statute described 
places of public or commercial use, more general term "building" 
also must refer to "places of public or commercial use, places 
of assembly or places of work"), with Desrosiers, 486 Mass. at 
378 (where plain language of statutory term "other natural 
causes" was clear and unambiguous, no need to resort to doctrine 
of ejusdem generis, as Governor's power to declare state of 
emergency necessarily extended to COVID-19 pandemic where COVID-
19 was said to be caused naturally, likely originating from some 
type of animal). 
Any other view "would . . . strip the more specific terms 
of any meaning whatsoever," and would rid them of their limiting 
effect.  See Escobar, 479 Mass. at 229, citing Santos v. 
Bettencourt, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 90, 93 (1996).  Construing the 
term "other noxious or filthy substance" to include urine "fails 
to give independent effect to the statute's enumeration of the 
specific categories of [substances] which precedes it."  See 
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 114.  Put differently, 
there would have been no need for the Legislature to have used 
the terms oil of vitriol or coal tar if those terms simply were 
going to be "subsumed within the meaning" of the more general 
term "other noxious or filthy substance."  See id. 
18 
 
Accordingly, we hold that under the statutory canon of 
interpretation of ejusdem generis, the more specific statutory 
terms of "coal tar" and "oil of vitriol" necessarily were 
intended to limit the more general term "other noxious or filthy 
substance."5,6  See id.  See also Banushi, 438 Mass. at 244. 
Thus, where we hold that urine is not a noxious or filthy 
substance within the context of § 103, the criminal complaint 
against the defendant undoubtedly lacks probable cause.  See 
Coggeshall, 473 Mass. at 667 ("application for the complaint 
must establish probable cause as to each element of the 
[charged] offense"). 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
motion judge's order allowing the defendant's motion to dismiss 
the criminal complaint. 
 
5 Where we hold that urine is not a noxious or filthy 
substance under § 103, we need not address whether probable 
cause existed on the defendant's intent to injure, deface, or 
defile his jail cell, as would be required by the statute.  See 
G. L. c. 266, § 103 ("Whoever wilfully, intentionally and 
without right throws into, against or upon a . . . building 
. . . or puts or places therein or thereon oil of vitriol, coal 
tar or other noxious or filthy substance, with intent unlawfully 
to injure, deface or defile such . . . building . . . shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the [S]tate prison for not more than 
five years or in jail for not more than two and one half years 
or by a fine of not more than [$300]" [emphasis added]). 
 
6 We also note, however, that our holding is a narrow one.  
We do not speculate whether different substances, in the same or 
similar circumstances, may come within the purview of what the 
statute seeks to criminalize. 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.