Case Title: Williams v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 220034

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2023-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
VIRGINIA:  
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court Building in the 
City of Richmond on Thursday the 20th day of April, 2023. 
 
Present:  All the Justices 
 
 
Monique Alicia Williams, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
 against 
Record No. 220034 
Circuit Court No. CL21001850-00 
 
Commonwealth of Virginia,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
Upon an appeal from a judgment 
rendered by the Circuit Court of Arlington 
County. 
 
 
Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of counsel, the Court is of opinion 
that the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed. 
 
Monique Williams appeals from the denial of her expungement petition.  She was 
arrested on one charge, accessory after the fact of homicide, and she pleaded guilty to an 
amended charge, obstruction of justice.  She argues that the accessory after the fact of homicide 
charge was “otherwise dismissed” and, therefore, qualifies for expungement.  For the reasons 
that follow, we reverse the order denying expungement and remand for further proceedings. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Williams was arrested on the charge of accessory after the fact of a homicide, in violation 
of Code § 18.2-19, a felony.  A grand jury indicted her on that charge.  Williams pleaded “not 
guilty” to this charge.  Several months later, the prosecution amended the indictment, striking out 
the accessory after the fact charge and substituting in its place a new charge: obstruction of 
justice in violation of Code § 18.2-460, a Class 1 Misdemeanor.  Williams did not object to the 
amendment.  She pleaded guilty to the amended charge.  The circuit court found her guilty and 
sentenced her to a suspended sentence of 12 months in jail. 
 
Williams later filed a petition for expungement under Code § 19.2-392.2.  She argued 
that under Dressner v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 1 (2013), the amendment to the indictment 
operated as an acquittal on the charge of being an accessory after the fact to a homicide, and thus 
2 
 
she had the right to have the records related to the initial accessory to murder charge expunged.  
The Commonwealth did not oppose Williams’ petition for expungement. 
 
The circuit court, however, disagreed.  In a memorandum opinion, the circuit court 
distinguished Williams’ case from Dressner.  It observed that, in Dressner, the amended charge 
“share[d] absolutely nothing similar in any respect” with the original charge.  The circuit court 
assumed without deciding that obstruction of justice was not a lesser included offense of the 
accessory after the fact of homicide charge.  That was not the end of the inquiry, however.  The 
circuit court explained that, in this case, the indictment itself showed that the original accessory 
after the fact of homicide charge and the amended obstruction of justice charge “share[d] many 
similarities.”  Relying on Necaise v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 666 (2011), the circuit court 
reasoned that “[a]mending an indictment from accessory to a charge of the same ‘nature or 
character’ — obstruction of justice — does not render [Williams] an ‘innocent citizen’ ‘falsely 
accused.’”  The circuit court concluded that “[o]bstruction of justice and accessory after the fact 
are not completely different or separate or unrelated charges by operation of statute and 
interpretation of precedent.”  The circuit court added a footnote explaining that Williams’ role in 
the events surrounding the murder are explained in the record of Commonwealth v. Jason Allen 
Johnson, No. CR18000379-00 (Arlington Cnty. Cir. Ct. July 31, 2018), which was attached as an 
exhibit to its memorandum opinion. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Virginia law permits the expungement of criminal records in certain circumstances.  
“[T]he threshold determination to be made by the trial court on considering any petition for 
expungement . . . is whether the petitioner has a right to seek expungement of those records 
under an applicable provision of Code § 19.2-392.2(A).”  Daniel v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 
523, 530 (2004).  The expungement statute specifies that a person may ask for expungement 
when the petitioner has been acquitted, or “[a] nolle prosequi is taken or the charge is otherwise 
dismissed, including dismissal by accord and satisfaction pursuant to § 19.2-151.”  Code 
§ 19.2-392.2(A)(2). 
 
Williams contends that the circuit court employed an incorrect standard in adjudicating 
her petition for expungement.  According to Williams, expungement of a charge that has been 
amended “rests on a comparative analysis of the elements between criminal offenses.  In other 
3 
 
words, the inquiry is whether the misdemeanor the petitioner was convicted of is a 
lesser-included offense of the felony sought to be expunged.”1  We disagree. 
I. 
DETERMINING WHEN A CHARGE IS “OTHERWISE DISMISSED.” 
 
The terms acquittal and nolle prosequi, or nolle prosse, are readily understood.  The 
meaning of the phrase “otherwise dismissed” is not as clear.  A criminal case may be dismissed 
for a variety of reasons.  See, e.g., Code § 19.2-8 (misdemeanor statute of limitations); Code 
§ 19.2-294 (statutory double jeopardy); Groffel v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 681, 687 (2019) 
(constitutional double jeopardy), aff’d, 299 Va. 271 (2020).  We have construed the phrase 
“otherwise dismissed” more broadly, however, to encompass more than a literal dismissal. 
 
Whether a charge has been “otherwise dismissed” is a question of law that we review de 
novo.  Dressner, 285 Va. at 5.  In construing the expungement statute, we have considered the 
purpose of the statute, which is to allow “innocent citizens” to avoid the consequences that flow 
from the existence of arrest records.  Code § 19.2-392.1. 
 
Where a petitioner is convicted of a lesser included offense of the original charge, the 
original charge does not qualify for expungement.  Necaise, 281 Va. at 669-70.  In Necaise, the 
petitioner pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor charges that were lesser-included offenses of two 
original felony charges.  Id. at 667-69.  We held that these original charges were ineligible for 
expungement.  We explained that “[b]ecause the misdemeanors of which Necaise was convicted 
were lesser included offenses of the felonies with which he was charged, all of the elements of 
the offenses of which he was convicted were subsumed within the felony charges and they 
form[ed] the sole bases for the convictions.”  Id. at 669.  When a person is convicted of lesser 
included offenses, that person has “been found guilty of offenses charged within the warrants 
upon which he was arrested,” and is “not an ‘innocent citizen’ entitled to the benefit of the 
expungement statutes.”  Id. at 670. 
 
When a charge is not a lesser included offense, the inquiry turns on whether the charge is 
a “completely separate and unrelated charge.”  Dressner, 285 Va. at 6.  In Dressner, the 
petitioner was originally charged by summons with possession of marijuana.  Id. at 3.  The 
 
1 In their briefs and at oral argument, both sides draw from existing precedent.  Neither 
party has asked us to discard our existing approach in favor of a radically new test.  Stare decisis, 
therefore, not only applies as it ordinarily would, Selected Risks Insurance Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 
260, 265 (1987), it applies with all the more force when neither side has asked us to overturn our 
precedent. 
4 
 
charge was amended to reckless driving.  Id. at 3-4.  The petitioner sought to expunge the police 
and court records related to the marijuana charge.  Id. at 4.  We concluded that the petitioner was 
entitled to seek expungement, reasoning that the marijuana charge was “otherwise dismissed.”  
Id. at 7.  We observed that reckless driving is a “completely separate and unrelated” charge 
compared to possession of marijuana.  Id. at 6.  Furthermore, “[r]eckless driving is not a 
lesser-included offense of possession of marijuana.”  Id.  We observed that “‘the elements of the 
offense[] of which [Dressner] was convicted’ were not ‘subsumed within the [possession of 
marijuana charge]’ and did not ‘form the sole bas[i]s for the conviction[].’”  Id. (alterations in 
original) (quoting Necaise, 281 Va. at 669).  Consequently, the petitioner “occupie[d] the ‘status 
of “innocent”’” with respect to that charge.  Id. at 7 (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 
92, 102 (2009)). 
 
In A.R.A. v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 153, 157 (2018), “[t]he dispositive question [before 
us was] whether the petitioner established that the continued existence and possible 
dissemination of a felony arrest record would constitute an actual or a potential ‘manifest 
injustice.’”  Nevertheless, as a threshold matter, we held that the petitioner’s charges were 
“otherwise dismissed” so as to render them eligible for expungement.  Id. at 158.  We reiterated 
Dressner’s standard for when a criminal charge is “otherwise dismissed.”  Id. 
 
In determining whether a charge qualifies for expungement on the basis that it was 
“otherwise dismissed,” a court should examine whether the charge for which the petitioner was 
convicted is a lesser included offense of the original charge.  If it is, the petitioner does not 
occupy the status of innocent, and the original charge cannot be expunged.  Necaise, 281 Va. at 
670.  Similarly, as a majority of the Court has recently held, if “[an] amendment to the arrest 
warrant [for the original charge] relate[s] only to the sentencing enhancement sought to be 
imposed, [and] not the underlying offense,” it “simply cannot be said that the amendment 
resulted in a completely separate and unrelated charge” that would render the original charge 
eligible for expungement.  Forness v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. ___, ___, 882 S.E.2d 201, 203 
(2023).  However, if the original charge is “completely separate and unrelated” to the charge the 
petitioner was convicted of, and the elements of that offense are not subsumed within the original 
charge, the petitioner is eligible to seek expungement of the original charge.  Dressner, 285 Va. 
at 6. 
5 
 
 
A determination of whether an amended charge is “completely separate [from] and 
unrelated” to the original charge is not equivalent to a mechanical application of the 
Blockburger2 test.  Rather, a court should (1) compare the conceptual similarities and differences 
between the original charge and the amended charge and (2) examine whether the two charges 
share a common nucleus of operative facts.  For example, a charge of robbery that is amended to 
a charge of grand larceny from the person is not “completely separate and unrelated” if both 
originate from the same background facts. 
 
In determining whether an original charge is “completely separate and unrelated,” a court 
may consult the underlying records of the petitioner’s criminal case, or related criminal cases, 
including any transcripts.3  However, the presentation of new evidence to prove the petitioner’s 
guilt or innocence is not permitted.  The focus of an expungement proceeding is on existing court 
records; its purpose is not to engage in a retrial of a concluded criminal case.  A.R.A., 295 Va. at 
159. 
 
The burden rests with the petitioner to show that the original charge that was later 
amended qualifies as one that was “otherwise dismissed.”  Eastlack v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 
120, 123 (2011).4 
II. 
WE REMAND FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD. 
 
The circuit court did not rely on a Blockburger comparison of the elements to deny the 
expungement petition.  Rather, the circuit court below relied on Code § 19.2-231, which governs 
the amendment of a charging instrument, to determine whether the amended obstruction of 
justice charge was completely separate from and unrelated to the original charge of accessory 
after the fact of murder.  In light of our clarification of the standard that applies to the review of 
expungement petitions when the claim is that the original charge was “otherwise dismissed,” we 
reverse the judgment below and remand for the circuit court to review anew Williams’ 
 
2 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
 
3 Williams also assigns error to the trial court’s taking of judicial notice of court records 
in a separate case.  We need not address this issue in light of our remand.  Nevertheless, we note 
that if a court does take judicial notice of court records, such notice must be taken in conformity 
with the rules that govern such notice.  See Rule 2:201. 
4 The General Assembly, as the policy making body of our Commonwealth, remains free, 
of course, to narrow or to broaden the scope of the expungement statute.  Whether it should do so 
is for that body to determine.  It is not the province of the courts to “inquire into the wisdom of 
legislation.”  Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 161 (1919). 
6 
 
expungement petition.
 
JUSTICE MANN, concurring in the judgment. 
 
The majority’s decision today culminates in a reversal.  I, much like the majority, am 
trying my best to work within the constraints in which the Code’s ambiguity has placed the 
Court.  In doing so, I come to the majority’s result, but by considerably different measures. 
Over the passage of time, the remedial intent of Code § 19.2-392.2 has been neutralized 
by the common law this Court has been forced to create.  The tests we have crafted to construe 
the statute were only necessary to begin with because the statutory expungement framework was 
really a vision without direction.  Tasked with interpreting the statute, this Court had no good 
options when it began to populate the resulting vacuum with different analytical rules to 
determine who was the recipient of the legislature’s grace.  The resulting jurisprudential structure 
has become unworkable and unwieldy.  The body of expungement law created by a well-
intentioned redefinition of eligibility has left the bench and bar in a difficult position. 
I recognize and appreciate that our function is to engage in the process of statutory 
construction to determine the intent of the legislature.  Once we do that our function “is to 
resolve cases based on the law.”  Taylor v. Northam, 300 Va. 230, 247 (2021).  Stated more 
starkly, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.”  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
Further recognizing our preference to conform to the restrictions of the doctrine of 
judicial review, there is a point where the statute in question which has been construed by this 
Court in different factual settings creates ongoing difficulties relative to its practical and 
common application.  That is where we are now.  As such, it is appropriate for this Court to 
identify the issue for the legislature and request clarification.  This is not unprecedented.  See, 
e.g., Butcher v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 392 (2020) (Mims, J. concurring). 
The practical application of the expungement statute as applied to different factual 
scenarios cause difficulties for the reasons set out below.  “It therefore is not in the interest of 
justice to postpone resolving the issue highlighted by our diverging interpretations of what the 
statute requires.”  Id. at 407.  While an unusual request, I respectfully write separately to ask the 
General Assembly to “clarify the statute to express its legislative intent now.”  Id.  
7 
 
Notwithstanding my analysis as to the legislature’s intent below, should the legislature decide to 
clarify “otherwise dismissed” it will be our function to interpret and to apply the law. 
I. 
A STATUTORY OVERVIEW 
The majority, using the “completely separate and unrelated charge” language from 
Dressner1 as guidance, argues that using a factual-relatedness test2 is necessary to determine 
whether a petitioner is eligible for expungement.  I suggest that the construction of the plain 
language of Code § 19.2-392.2 should control in the absence of guidance from the legislature, 
not a factual-relatedness test.  But that guidance is needed. 
A. 
LOOKING FOR GUIDANCE 
Before I turn to Code § 19.2-392.2, it is helpful to look at expungement procedures from 
other states.  There are three states whose statutes share the “otherwise dismissed” phrase used in 
Code § 19.2-392.2.  Each state naturally differs in which charges they deem eligible for 
expungement.  As examined below, in jurisdictions where a factual-relatedness test is used, the 
legislature of that jurisdiction has expressly included the requirement in their Code, and often 
only requires the test when multiple charges arise out of one course of conduct.  In the absence 
of clear instruction from our General Assembly, the manner in which these states use “otherwise 
dismissed” provides persuasive guidance. 
Iowa’s expungement statute contains language most similar to ours.  See Iowa Code 
§ 901C.2.  In State v. Doe, the Iowa Court of Appeals held that a case had been “otherwise 
dismissed” when it became inactive.  949 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (holding that when 
a case has been “transferred” or merged into another case number, the original case becomes 
inactive and is considered otherwise dismissed).  The Iowa Supreme Court has rejected a 
“factual-relatedness” test for expungements because their statute, much like ours, does not 
contain language enacted by their legislature permitting that analysis.  See State v. Doe, 903 
 
1 Dressner v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 1 (2013). 
 
2 Many jurisdictions that follow a form of the majority’s test refer to it as a factual-
relatedness test.  For simplicity, I refer to the majority’s test in this manner.  Often, this test is 
only used when a petitioner is seeking expungement of one or more charges from a group of 
charges received simultaneously that have not been formally dismissed.  See, e.g., Md. Code 
Ann., Crim. Proc. § 10–107.  It does not appear that any jurisdiction has expanded this factual-
relatedness test to require a factual comparison of conduct giving rise to a single charge that is 
thereafter amended in the manner our majority does today. 
8 
 
N.W.2d 347 (Iowa 2017), as amended (Nov. 15, 2017). 
Similarly, Delaware’s expungement statute states that a case is eligible for expungement 
if the case is “terminated in favor of the accused” in seven specific manners, one of which is 
when “[a]ll charges related to the case are otherwise dismissed.”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§ 4372(b)(4).  Delaware does not require a factual-relatedness test to determine eligibility of 
“otherwise dismissed” charges but does require that all charges related to the case are dismissed.  
Id.  Delaware’s expungement statute also shares a purpose similar to Code § 19.2-392.2 in 
recognizing that “criminal history is a hinderance to a person’s present and future ability to 
obtain employment, housing, education, or credit,” and was enacted “to protect persons from 
unwarranted damage which may occur when the existence of a criminal history continues 
indefinitely.”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4371. 
Finally, Maryland’s expungement statute also contains “otherwise dismissed” language.  
Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 10–105(a).  However, Maryland has separately enacted Md. Code 
Ann., Crim. Proc. § 10–107 specifically for expungement of charges arising from the same 
incident, transaction, or set of facts.  Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 10–107 states that if two or 
more charges . . . arise from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts, they are considered to 
be a unit,” (a)(1), and “[i]f a person is not entitled to expungement of one charge or conviction in 
a unit, the person is not entitled to expungement of any other charge or conviction in the unit.”  
(b)(1).  Therefore, Maryland’s legislature has expressly approved a factual-relatedness test only 
in situations arising from two or more charges. 
Our General Assembly has not codified the test in any situation.  Accordingly, our Code 
does not explicitly permit trial courts to engage in fact-finding to determine the relatedness of 
original and amended charges in resolving expungement eligibility.  Instead, the General 
Assembly has provided only a narrow mechanism to allow for the introduction of information 
barring an expungement.  See Code § 19.2-392.2(F) (providing the Commonwealth’s Attorney 
an opportunity to show good cause as to why an expungement should not be granted).  The 
introduction of evidence showing good cause can serve as a mechanism to assist a trial court in 
determining whether a petitioner should receive an expungement.  Without explicit language 
enacted by the General Assembly, this Court should avoid erecting procedural hurdles that the 
legislature chose not to incorporate into the Code.  It bears repeating: clarity provided by the 
9 
 
General Assembly would provide much-needed guidance for this Court to use in determining 
expungement eligibility. 
In looking for guidance, many states take a similar approach to Delaware in explicitly 
listing the circumstances that permit an expungement.  See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.105(1) (“If 
the person arrested is charged but the case is subsequently nolle prossed, dismissed, or the 
accused is found not guilty or imposition of sentence is suspended in the court in which the 
action is prosecuted, official records pertaining to the case shall thereafter be closed records 
when such case is finally terminated.”).  By providing explicit circumstances in which an 
expungement can be granted, the legislature leaves no vacuum for the courts to populate. 
Importantly, there are states that have chosen to embrace the remedial nature of 
expungements and permit the expungement of a case where no disposition has been reached or 
the case has not been prosecuted.  See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-57(2); § 99-15-26(5)  (“Upon 
petition therefor, the court shall expunge the record of any case in which an arrest was made, the 
person arrested was released and the case was dismissed or the charges were dropped, there was 
no disposition of such case, or the person was found not guilty at trial.”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
651:5(II-a)(a) (“For an offense disposed of on or after January 1, 2019, any person whose arrest 
has resulted in a finding of not guilty on all charges that resulted from the arrest, or whose case 
was dismissed or not prosecuted, shall have the arrest record and court record annulled.”); 18 Pa. 
Stat. § 9122(a) (“Criminal history record information shall be expunged in a specific criminal 
proceeding when: (1) no disposition has been received or, upon request for criminal history 
record information, no disposition has been recorded in the repository within 18 months after the 
date of arrest and the court of proper jurisdiction certifies to the director of the repository that no 
disposition is available and no action is pending.”). 
Unfortunately, while “otherwise dismissed” is broad language, it does not provide broad 
relief, thus leaving this Court’s hands tied.  In the interim, I turn to Code § 19.2-392.2, using the 
above guidance from states to help guide the analysis. 
B. 
UNTANGLING CODE § 19.2-392.2 
To remain true to the express legislative purpose of the statute, the Commonwealth can 
simplify that which has become complicated thusly: “otherwise dismissed” means a criminal 
defendant was not convicted of the charge which brought him or her into the criminal justice 
system. 
10 
 
I do not suggest anything groundbreaking.  Rather, through traditional statutory 
construction the legislature’s intent can be gleaned.  “‘[T]he primary objective of statutory 
construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.’”  Conger v. Barrett, 280 Va. 
627, 630 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 
(1983)).  “‘When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning 
of that language.’”  Commonwealth v. Morris, 281 Va. 70, 76 (2011) (quoting Conyers v. 
Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104 (2007)).  “‘If a statute is subject to more 
than one interpretation, we must apply the interpretation that will carry out the legislative intent 
behind the statute.’” Id. (quoting Conyers, 273 Va. at 104) (emphasis added). 
A petitioner is eligible for an expungement if they have been acquitted of the charged 
crime or a “nolle prosequi is taken or the charge is otherwise dismissed.” 
Code §§ 19.2-392.2(A)(1) and (2) (emphasis added).  Argument over the phrase “otherwise 
dismissed” continues to come before this Court and is the source of many of our judicially 
defined criteria for Code § 19.2-392.2 eligibility.  See, e.g., Forness v. Commonwealth, 302 Va. 
___, ___, 882 S.E.2d 201, 203 (2023) (holding that an admittedly wrongfully charged felony was 
nonetheless ineligible for expungement because the original charge had been amended to a 
lesser-included offense and was therefore not “otherwise dismissed”); Dressner, 285 Va. 1 
(holding that when a criminal charge is amended to a separate and unrelated charge, and the 
elements of that amended charge are not subsumed within the original charge, the petitioner is 
eligible for expungement); see also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 255 Va. 552, 555-56 (1998) 
(holding that a defendant who pleaded nolo contendere and later received a dismissal of his 
charge was ineligible for expungement). 
However, the General Assembly has recently abrogated some of this Court’s precedent to 
permit expungement of charges resulting from deferred dispositions despite the entry of guilty 
pleas.  See, e.g., Code § 19.2-298.02(D) (“Upon agreement of all parties, a charge that is 
dismissed pursuant to [deferred disposition] may be considered as otherwise dismissed for 
purposes of expungement of police and court records in accordance with § 19.2-392.2.”).  With 
these legislative trends guiding the way, the General Assembly has provided the initial 
framework for this Court, but without more specific guidance on the term “otherwise dismissed,” 
this Court is still bound by its prior precedent and is unable to free itself from its constraints. 
11 
 
Without additional guidance concerning whether “otherwise dismissed,” applies to an 
unadjudicated original charge where a petitioner has been convicted of an amended charge, I 
look to the General Assembly’s intent.  Code § 19.2-392.1 states, in relevant part, that “[t]he 
General Assembly finds that arrest records can be a hindrance to an innocent citizen’s ability to 
obtain employment, an education and to obtain credit.”  We should therefore read 
Code § 19.2-392.2 with this policy statement inspiring and pervading all analysis.  See Rector 
and Visitors of University of Virginia v. Harris, 239 Va. 119, 124 (1990) (quoting Board of Sup. 
v. King Land Corp., 238 Va. 97, 102-03 (1989)) (“Every statute should be read so as to ‘promote 
the ability of the enactment to remedy the mischief at which it is directed. . ..’  All other rules of 
construction are subservient to that intent.”). 
The definition of “otherwise” is broad, but instructive here.  “Otherwise” means “in a 
different way or manner” or “in different circumstances.”  Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 1598 (2002).  The definition of “dismiss” provides additional guidance.  “Dismiss” 
means “to put (a legal action or a party) out of judicial consideration:  refuse to hear or hear 
further in court.”  Id. at 652.  It appears to me that the term “otherwise dismissed” therefore 
means to put a legal action out of consideration in a different way or manner than a nolle prosse 
or dismissal in fact by the trial court.  This definition is consistent with the General Assembly’s 
intent to ensure that an innocent citizen’s arrest records are not “a hindrance to an innocent 
citizen’s ability to obtain employment, an education and to obtain credit.”  Code § 19.2-392.1. 
This interpretation makes practical sense as well.  A nolle prossed charge may be 
resurrected by the Commonwealth so long as the proper procedural requirements are met.3  If a 
nolle prossed charge is eligible for an expungement, an indictment preceding an amended charge 
should likewise be eligible for expungement.  Both a nolle prosse and a motion to amend an 
indictment have the same result: the criminal proceeding of the initial charge ceases 
immediately.  Thus, they should not be treated differently.  If a charge has been put out of 
 
3 For the Commonwealth’s Attorney to resurrect a nolle prossed charge, a new indictment 
is required.  Miller v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 929, 935 (1977).  This “indictment is 
a new charge, distinct from the original charge or indictment.”  Harris v. Commonwealth, 258 
Va. 576, 585 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 
12 
 
judicial consideration in any manner, unless explicitly prohibited by the General Assembly,4 the 
charge should be eligible for expungement so that it does not become a hinderance to 
employment, education, or credit.5  The language allows for a simple application without the 
need for further statutory construction.6  
As previously explained, there is nothing groundbreaking in the call for legislative 
clarification.  No philosophical or conceptual legislative debate need occur to populate the 
General Assembly’s intent as construed herein, but a clarifying definition is necessary 
 
4 See, e.g., Code § 19.2-57.3(E) (“No charges dismissed pursuant to this section shall be 
eligible for expungement under § 19.2-392.2”). 
 
5 I emphasize that this reading does not lead to a result whereby every petitioner will be 
granted an expungement, it merely provides a petitioner with procedural eligibility for an 
expungement.  It does not abrogate or affect the Commonwealth’s discretion to object to an 
expungement, to show good cause, or to request that a showing of manifest injustice be made. 
 
6 I recognize that my proposed path forward is the minority view.  My concurrence is one 
borne out of two problems with the majority’s test:  its requirement of a factual determination, 
and the costs borne by the petitioner. 
We have expressly held that, “[a] petitioner . . . cannot simultaneously occupy the status 
of innocent and be required to prove her actual innocence of a crime the Commonwealth 
declined to prosecute.” A.R.A. v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 153, 159 (2018).  The majority’s 
framework could compel a petitioner to do just that.  The majority’s opinion states that a trial 
judge is not to engage in the retrial of the petitioner’s original charge, but the practical effect of 
asking a judge to look at the underlying facts of an unadjudicated original charge could lead a 
trial court to engage in machinations which will surely degrade the guidance of A.R.A.  The 
reality of the matter is that if a person is charged with a crime based on certain conduct, any 
amended charge is almost always going to result from the same “common nucleus of operative 
facts.”  Supra at 6.  If there is unrelated conduct, it is more likely to have resulted in a separate 
charge than become the basis for an amended charge. 
The most concerning impact of this test is the heavy burden it places on petitioners.  
Courts in this Commonwealth do not retain records indefinitely, leaving certain warrants, 
transcripts, and plea agreements unavailable.  See, e.g., Code § 16.1-69.55.  How is a petitioner 
seeking expungement of an older charge expected to overcome this factual-relatedness test if 
there is no evidence available to him to meet this burden?  The test also encourages trial judges 
to look through “related criminal cases,” which a petitioner may not have access to, particularly 
if relevant materials in the file are sealed.  The procedural difficulties petitioners face are not 
only issues of access, but issues of cost.  The majority suggests that “a court may consult the 
underlying records of the petitioner’s criminal case, or related criminal cases, including any 
transcripts.”  Supra at 6.  Leaving aside evidentiary and admissibility concerns, if the trier of fact 
requires court transcripts, the burden will be on the petitioner to provide them.  Transcripts are 
not affordable, especially when a petitioner may already be struggling with employment or 
housing stability because of his or her arrest over a charge which was otherwise dismissed. 
13 
 
nonetheless given this Court’s precedent.  I recognize that this Court is bound by the doctrine of 
stare decisis, which demands that “precedent is to be respected unless the most convincing of 
reasons demonstrates that adherence to it puts us on a course that is sure error.”  Citizens United 
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 362-63 (2010).  This adherence “does not, however, 
compel [this Court] to perpetuate what [it] believe[s] to be an incorrect application of the law” 
and this Court will not ignore the “duty to develop the orderly evolution of the common law of 
this Commonwealth.”  Nunnally v. Artis, 254 Va. 247, 253 (1997).  Thus, my analysis continues. 
II. 
HOW CLARIFICATION WOULD INFORM THIS SPECIFIC CASE 
A. “OTHERWISE DISMISSED” BROADLY CONSIDERED 
In the struggle over the application of “otherwise dismissed,” this Court has not yet 
addressed the unique question presented by this case as to whether an indictment amended to a 
charge that is not a lesser-included charge under Blockburger is eligible for expungement.  To 
effectively answer the question before us, it is necessary to address the meaning of “otherwise 
dismissed,” in a way that is consistent with traditional guidelines of statutory construction.  In 
this way, once again, it is my hope that the legislature will see this construction as naturally 
flowing from its intent rather than any type of transformational amendment. In this way the trial 
courts of the Commonwealth will be able to apply a uniform standard in the statute’s routine 
application. 
B. MS. WILLIAMS’ EXPUNGEMENT ELIGIBILITY 
Using the proposed definition of “otherwise dismissed,” instead of a factual-relatedness 
test, Ms. Williams was eligible for an expungement.  However, she was also eligible for an 
expungement under this Court’s prior Blockburger standard. 
Ms. Williams’ felony indictment for accessory after the fact to homicide in violation of 
Code § 18.2-19 was struck and the indictment was amended to misdemeanor obstruction of 
justice in violation of Code § 18.2-460.  The amended indictment deleted all the language from 
the original indictment;  not a single word of the original charge is included in the amended 
indictment for obstruction of justice.  There can be no question that the original charge was put 
out of judicial consideration by the trial court.  Accordingly, amending the original charge in the 
indictment otherwise dismisses that charge, thus making it eligible for expungement under a 
logical reading of Code § 19.2-392.2. 
14 
 
Under my proposed interpretation of “otherwise dismissed,” a Blockburger analysis 
would become unnecessary.  Nevertheless, a Blockburger test would render her charge eligible 
for expungement.  Comparing the elements of the two crimes7 reveals that they share no 
similarities under a traditional Blockburger analysis.  The majority and trial court relied on the 
“separate and unrelated” language from Dressner.  285 Va. at 6.  However, the holding of 
Dressner made clear that the elements of the two charges were separate and unrelated, and 
therefore, the petitioner “occupie[d] the ‘status of “innocent”’” because the elements of her 
amended charge were not subsumed within her original charge.  Id. at 7 (quoting Brown v. 
Commonwealth, 278 Va. 92, 102 (2009)).  Thus, under a plain language definition of “otherwise 
dismissed,” or the traditional Blockburger analysis, Ms. Williams is eligible for an 
expungement.8 
CONCLUSION 
In truth, expungement was always somewhat of a paradox: a remedy conceived in 
hope but forged through an accompanying set of procedures that diminished that 
promise, limiting its relief to the fortunate few rather than the necessary many.  
The procedural limits of expungement law have always stunted the potential of 
the remedy.9 
 
 
7 The elements of accessory after the fact to a homicide are:  (1) the homicide must be 
complete, (2) the accused must know that the felon is guilty, and (3) the accused must receive, 
relieve, comfort, or assist the felon.  Commonwealth v. Dalton, 259 Va. 249, 253 (2000); 
Code § 18.2-19 (establishing the punishment for a conviction of accessory after the fact).  Under 
Code § 18.2-460, obstruction of justice requires either that the accused (1) knowingly obstructs 
an enumerated officer of the law or does not cease obstruction when requested, (2) by threat or 
force intimidates or impedes an enumerated officer, (3) knowingly or willfully makes a 
materially false statement to an officer during an investigation, or (4) intentionally prevents or 
tries to resist their own lawful arrest. 
 
8 Because I would find that Ms. Williams was eligible for expungement of her original 
charge, I would decline to rule on the other assignments of error, as our decision should be based 
on the best and narrowest ground possible.  McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620, 626, n.4 
(2010) (citing Air Courier Conference v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 531 
(1991) (Stevens, J., concurring) (faithful adherence to the doctrine of judicial restraint warrants 
decision of cases “on the best and narrowest ground available”)). 
 
9 Brian M. Murray, Completing Expungement, 56 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1165, 1167 (2022) 
(internal citations omitted). 
15 
 
Because I urge the General Assembly to make clear that the term “otherwise dismissed” 
means to render a legal action out of consideration in a different way or manner than a nolle 
prosse or formal dismissal by the trial court, Ms. Williams would be eligible for expungement.  
In this case, the petitioner was saddled with a process we have made so difficult and then, by 
extension, the trial court was required to utilize a conceptual framework that collapses under its 
own weight.  Therefore, I concur only in the judgment of the majority, and entreat the General 
Assembly to provide this Court with the necessary guidance so that the bench and bar may utilize 
a clear framework to access Code § 19.2-392.2’s remedial relief. 
 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports and certified to the Circuit Court of 
Arlington County. 
 
 
 
 
 
   A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clerk