Case Title: Com. v. Jones

Citation: 374 Pa. Super. 493, 543 A.2d 579

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1988-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
374 Pa. Superior Ct. 493 (1988) 543 A.2d 579 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. D'Angelo JONES, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. D'Angelo JONES, Appellee. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted March 17, 1988. Filed June 15, 1988. *495 Thomas A. Dill, Sharon, for appellant (at 1413) and appellee (at 1499). James P. Epstein, District Attorney, Mercer, for Com., appellee (at 1413). Lorinda L. Hinch, Assistant District Attorney, Mercer, for Com., appellant (at 1499). Before TAMILIA, POPOVICH and HOFFMAN, JJ. POPOVICH, Judge: This case involves consolidated appeals. At 1413 Pittsburgh 1987 the defendant questions the order denying his motion to dismiss for alleged violations of his right to a speedy trial under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100. At No. 1499 Pittsburgh 1987 the Commonwealth challenges the order granting the defendant a new trial, which is appealable under Pa.R.App.P. 311(a)(5). We affirm in both instances. As for the facts attendant to No. 1413 Pittsburgh 1987, a review of the record indicates that the defendant was charged by criminal complaint on June 6, 1987, with Theft by Unlawful Taking and Criminal Conspiracy. This made the Rule 1100 rundate December 3, 1986. Because the defendant was not tried until December 8, 1986, five (5) days need to be excluded from the run-period to render the defendant's trial date timely under Rule 1100. Instantly, no one disputes that the originally scheduled trial of the defendant was to occur during the October, 1986, term of court. However, the case was continued by the court from October, 1986 to November, 1986 trial term because of an overcrowded docket. Since court-related delay is, in itself, a justification for an extension (see Commonwealth v. Hollingsworth, 346 Pa.Super. 199, 499 A.2d 381 (1985)), the five (5) day delay in prosecuting the defendant was subsumed by the period elapsing between the October November, 1986 trial term. Therefore, we need not examine the defendant's Interstate Agreement on Detainers argument since we find that the trial of the *496 accused, having taken place following the grant of a timely extension to the Commonwealth, was timely and not violative of Rule 1100. We next turn our attention to the issue raised at No. 1499 Pittsburgh 1987, i.e., the Commonwealth contests the lower court's grant of a new trial to the defendant on the ground that the prosecution's peremptorily striking the sole black person from the jury panel was not violative of the standards enunciated in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986). The Supreme Court in Batson allowed a defendant claiming discrimination in selecting the venire to prove a prima facie case of the same by establishing that: 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S. Ct. at 1723-1724 (Citations omitted). Also, the Court went on to set forth some of the indicia reflective of a purposeful exclusion of a racial class from the jury, as well as the rebuttal available to the prosecution once a prima facie establishment of the same has occurred; to-wit: 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S. Ct. at 1723-1724 (Citations omitted; footnote omitted). The facts at bar, viewed in light of the aforesaid, indicate that once the prosecuting attorney excluded a Ms. Savage from the list of prospective jurors, she was called to side bar to give her reasons for the action she took, and the following exchange ensued: Initially, the trial court denied the defendant's Batson claim. It was only with the filing of post-trial motions, and the trial court's reassessment of the prosecution's explanations for striking Ms. Savage, that the trial court reversed its position. In so doing, it stated: The eloquence with which the trial court stated its assessment of the facts need not be embellished by this Court. However, we would add that Batson's requirements that a defendant challenging an empaneled jury be a member of a cognizable racial group (instantly, the race is negro) and that the prosecution's reasons for peremptorily excluding a member of a racial group were satisfied in the trial court's evaluation of the defendant's claim of racial discrimination in the selection of the jury. Moreover, it would appear that the prosecution was merely "assuming" that Ms. Savage's proximity to Ms. Ferguson's residence created the potential for partiality in favor of the defendant. Carrying the presumption to its logical end, which we note is not condoned by Batson, we ponder why Mr. Kauffman's impartiality was not rendered suspect because of his proximity to the defendant's residence. It is obvious to this Court, as it was to the court below, that the reasons proffered by the prosecution for its actions were merely veiled attempts to exclude the only black person on the list of prospective jurors because of her race and not because of her residence or the number of siblings she had who might know of Ms. Ferguson transparent reasons not justifying the action taken in removing Ms. Savage from the juror selection process. Accordingly, we join in the actions of the court below and affirm the appeal of the order docketed at No. 1413 Pittsburgh *502 1987 and the order docketed at No. 1499 Pittsburgh 1987. [2] Mr. Chapman was not tried along with Mr. Jones, although he was also charged criminally for his participation in the purse snatching incident. Mr. Chapman was a Commonwealth witness against Jones. Mr. Jones had given notice of an alibi defense and had listed Ms. Ferguson as the alibi witness, but that defense had apparently been abandoned by trial time.