Case Title: Ronald R. Cardenas, Jr. V. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC02-1264

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2004-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC02-1264
____________
RONALD R. CARDENAS, JR.
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
____________
No. SC02-927
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
HOWARD RUSSELL BONINE,
Respondent.
[February 26, 2004]
PARIENTE, J.
These cases, which we have consolidated for purposes of this opinion,
present two related questions concerning a standard jury instruction in prosecutions
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for driving or boating under the influence of alcohol.  The questions are, first,
whether giving the standard jury instruction on the presumption of impairment
contrary to our decision in State v. Miles, 775 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 2000), is
fundamental error and second, if preserved, whether the error in giving the
instruction is harmful per se or instead subject to a harmless error analysis. 
In Miles, we held that the jury should not be instructed on the presumption
of impairment when the State introduces blood-alcohol evidence that it obtained
without complying with the quality assurance requirements of the implied consent
law.  See id. at 956-57.  The standard jury instruction on the presumption of
impairment, which was given in both cases under review, provides that a blood-
alcohol level of .08 percent "is sufficient by itself" to establish that the driver was
impaired.
In Cardenas v. State, 816 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), the First District
Court of Appeal concluded that giving the standard instruction on the presumption
of impairment contrary to Miles is not fundamental error that can be raised initially
on appeal, and certified the following question of great public importance:
IS IT FUNDAMENTAL ERROR TO GIVE A JURY INSTRUCTION
ON THE PRESUMPTION OF IMPAIRMENT IN VIOLATION OF
THE PRECEPTS OF STATE V. MILES, 775 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 2000)?
1.  The Second District Court of Appeal certified the same question in
Daigle v. State, 848 So. 2d 1233, 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), notice to invoke
discretionary review filed, No. SC03-1284 (Fla. July 21, 2003).  The First District
also certified a similar question in Leveritt v. State, 817 So. 2d 891, 897-98 (Fla.
1st DCA 2002), notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction filed, No. SC02-1369
(Fla. June 18, 2002).  We have stayed the proceedings in Daigle and Leveritt
pending our decision in Cardenas.
2.  The Second District subsequently certified conflict with Bonine on the
harmless error issue in Searles v. State, 816 So. 2d 793, 795 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002),
notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction filed, No. SC02-1254 (Fla. June 3,
2002).  We have stayed the proceedings in Searles pending our decision in Bonine.
McBride v. State, No. SC02-619 (Fla. notice filed March 18, 2002), is also pending
review in this Court based on an alleged express and direct conflict with Bonine
and three other Fifth District decisions.  The proceedings in McBride have also
been stayed.
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Cardenas, 816 So. 2d at 726.1  
In Bonine v. State, 811 So. 2d 863, 866 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), the Fifth
District Court of Appeal concluded that instructing the jury on the presumption of
impairment in violation of Miles is harmful error per se.  The Fifth District certified
conflict with McBride v. State, 816 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), notice to
invoke discretionary jurisdiction filed, No. SC02-619 (Fla. Mar. 18, 2002), in
which the Second District concluded that giving the improper instruction was
harmless error.  See Bonine, 811 So. 2d at 867.2  We have jurisdiction in both
cases.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  
For the reasons that follow, we approve Cardenas, quash Bonine, and
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disapprove McBride to the extent that it holds that the error is harmless solely
because of overwhelming evidence of actual impairment. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.  Cardenas
Cardenas was charged with two counts of boating under the influence (BUI)
manslaughter and one count of BUI causing serious bodily injury, among other
offenses.  On the BUI counts, the State alleged that Cardenas was operating the
boat either while he was impaired or while he had a blood- or breath-alcohol level
of 0.08 percent or higher.  At trial, the State introduced evidence that Cardenas had
been drinking before the fatal collision and had a blood-alcohol level of 0.0999
percent.  Cardenas's theory of defense was that another person was operating the
boat at the time of the accident.  
The trial court gave the standard jury instruction that provided two
alternative methods in which to prove the crimes charged: that the State had to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of the fatal accident, Cardenas
"was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal
faculties were impaired or had a blood alcohol level of .08 or higher."  The court
instructed the jury that "[n]ormal faculties include but are not limited to the ability
to see, hear, walk, talk, judge distances, drive an automobile, make judgments, act
3.  The standard instructions on the presumptions arising from blood- or
breath-alcohol test results provide:
1.  If you find from the evidence that the defendant had a blood
or breath alcohol level of 0.05 or less, you shall presume that the
defendant was not under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the
extent that [his] [her] normal faculties were impaired.
2.  If you find from the evidence that the defendant had a blood
or breath alcohol level in excess of 0.05 but less than 0.08, you may
consider that evidence with other competent evidence in determining
whether the defendant was under the influence of alcoholic beverages
to the extent that [his] [her] normal faculties were impaired; or
3.  If you find from the evidence that the defendant had a blood
or breath alcohol level of 0.08 or more, that evidence would be
sufficient by itself to establish that the defendant was under the
influence of alcohol to the extent that [his] [her] normal faculties were
impaired.  However, such evidence may be contradicted or rebutted
by other evidence.
These presumptions may be considered along with any other
evidence presented in deciding whether the defendant was under the
influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that [his] [her] normal
faculties were impaired.
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.8, 28.1, 28.3.
4.  A general verdict is one in which the jury determines guilt or innocence
without making explicit findings.  See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 283
(1993).
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in emergencies, and in general, to normally perform the many mental and physical
acts of our daily lives."  The court also gave the standard jury instruction on the
presumptions of impairment contained in the implied consent law.3  The jury,
utilizing a general verdict form, found Cardenas guilty as charged.4  
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On appeal, Cardenas asserted that the trial court committed reversible error
under Miles by giving the standard jury instruction on the presumption of
impairment after the State failed to comply with the requirements of the implied
consent law in obtaining the blood-alcohol evidence relied upon for the
presumption.  The First District affirmed Cardenas's convictions, concluding that
the issue was not preserved for appeal.  The court also concluded that the
instruction did not constitute fundamental error, but certified the question as having
great public importance.  See Cardenas, 816 So. 2d at 727. 
B.  Bonine
Bonine was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) manslaughter
and leaving the scene of a fatal accident after the vehicle he was driving struck and
killed a motorcyclist.  On the DUI manslaughter count, the State alleged in the
alternative that Bonine was impaired by alcohol or a controlled substance, or had a
blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher.  In a dissenting opinion, Judge Harris
summarized the evidence supporting both impairment and unlawful blood-alcohol
level:
A witness observed the defendant's vehicle "weaving in front of him"
to such an extent that the witness dropped back, only to observe the
defendant's vehicle further up the road stopped by the side of the
highway about a quarter of a mile beyond the accident scene where it
had run into a concrete sign/bench. The witness saw a motorcycle on
the ground and the body of the victim lying in the ditch. The
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motorcycle had been rear-ended. The witness then observed appellant
staggering back toward the scene of the accident and heard him admit
that he had hit the motorcyclist but thought it was a deer. An officer
described the defendant as "smelling of alcohol" and as having slurred
speech. Further, defendant admitted to having consumed beer on the
day in question and his blood-alcohol level was .226.
Bonine, 811 So. 2d at 869 (Harris, J., dissenting).  The theories of defense were
reasonable doubt that Bonine was impaired and unreliability of the blood-alcohol
evidence.
As in Cardenas, the trial court instructed the jury that the crime of DUI could
be established either by actual impairment or by having a blood-alcohol level of .08
or higher.  The court also instructed the jury on the presumption of impairment. 
Utilizing a general verdict form, the jury found Bonine guilty as charged, and
Bonine appealed the conviction.  The Fifth District, sitting en banc, determined that
giving the instruction despite the State's failure to comply with the requirements of
the implied consent law constituted error under Miles, and held that the error was
harmful per se.  See Bonine, 811 So. 2d at 866.
II.  DUI AND THE PRESUMPTION OF IMPAIRMENT
The statute criminalizing DUI currently provides that a defendant can be
charged and convicted under three alternative theories:
(1) A person is guilty of the offense of driving under the
influence and is subject to punishment as provided in subsection (2) if
the person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle within
5.  At the time of Cardenas's convictions, sections 316.193 and 327.35 each
contained a single subsection that addressed both unlawful blood- and breath-
alcohol content.  Specifically, sections 316.193(1)(b) and 327.35(1)(b), Florida
Statutes (1995), provided that a person was guilty of driving and boating under the
influence if the person "had a blood or breath alcohol level of .08 percent" or
above.  In a 1996 amendment, the Legislature separated into different subsections
the levels of blood- and breath-alcohol content that constitute the crimes.  See ch.
96-330, Laws of Fla., eff. Oct. 1, 1996.  
6.  The alternative DUBAL theory of driving with an unlawful breath-
alcohol level, currently contained in subsection (1)(c), is not involved in these
cases.  
-8-
this state and:
(a) The person is under the influence of alcoholic beverages,
any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance
controlled under chapter 893, when affected to the extent that the
person's normal faculties are impaired;
(b) The person has a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams
of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood; or
(c) The person has a breath-alcohol level of .08 or more grams
of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
§ 316.193(1), Fla. Stat. (2003).  Section 327.35, Florida Statutes, (1995), the BUI
statute under which Cardenas was convicted, is identical to the DUI statute in
regard to the alternative elements of impairment and unlawful blood- or breath-
alcohol level.5  Thus, subsection (1)(a) requires proof of impairment, while the
strict liability approach of subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c) requires proof of driving
with an unlawful blood- or breath-alcohol level, otherwise known as DUBAL.6  
The blood-alcohol evidence that proves DUBAL may be admitted under
7.  When Robertson was decided, the threshold for DUBAL was a blood-
alcohol level of .10 percent.  The Legislature subsequently reduced the threshold
for both DUBAL and the presumption of impairment to .08 percent.  See ch. 93-
124, § 1-2, 4, Laws of Fla. 
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either the common law governing scientific test results or the implied consent law. 
Under the common law, a scientific test result on intoxication is admissible "if a
proper predicate established that (1) the test was reliable, (2) the test was
performed by a qualified operator with the proper equipment and (3) expert
testimony was presented concerning the meaning of the test."  State v. Bender, 382
So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1980).  
Admission of blood-alcohol evidence under the common law predicate does
not trigger any presumption regarding impairment.  The State may rely on the
presumption of impairment only if the additional requirements of the implied
consent law for quality assurance of the blood sample are met.  See Robertson v.
State, 604 So. 2d 783, 792 (Fla. 1992).7  Following Robertson, we held in Miles
that the administrative rule governing blood collection and testing procedures
under the implied consent law was invalid because it did not adequately provide
for the preservation of blood-alcohol evidence.  We further held in Miles that
noncompliance with these strict quality assurance requirements precludes the State
from relying on the presumption of impairment.  See 775 So. 2d at 953-57. 
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Because the implied consent provisions are identical in all material respects for
DUI and BUI, Miles, which involved DUI, applies in BUI cases as well.  See
Cameron v. State, 804 So. 2d 338, 342 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ("It is true that Miles
and Robertson arose under the motor vehicle statutes and not the boating statutes,
but the two statutory schemes are identical and the result under the latter should be
no different than the result under [the] former.").  The State does not contend
otherwise.
In certifying the question in Cardenas, the First District calls upon this Court
to determine whether improperly instructing the jury on the presumption of
impairment, contrary to Miles, is fundamental error, which can be raised for the
first time on appeal.  The certified conflict in Bonine relates to properly preserved
error and requires us to determine whether an erroneous instruction on the
presumption of impairment can be subjected to a harmless error analysis or,
instead, is harmful per se.
III.  ANALYSIS
A.  Fundamental Error
This Court recently reiterated longstanding principles concerning
preservation of instructional error:
Instructions . . . are subject to the contemporaneous objection rule,
and, absent an objection at trial, can be raised on appeal only if
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fundamental error occurred.  To justify not imposing the
contemporaneous objection rule, the error must reach down into the
validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not
have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.  In
other words, fundamental error occurs only when the omission is
pertinent or material to what the jury must consider in order to
convict.
Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002) (quoting State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d
643, 644-45 (Fla. 1991)) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
supplied).  Applying this test in Reed, we concluded that the trial court committed
fundamental error in giving a standard instruction that incorrectly defined malice,
an essential element of the offense of aggravated child abuse, when that element
was disputed at trial.  See id. at 369.
We first address whether giving a presumption of impairment instruction in
violation of Miles reaches into the validity of the trial itself such that a guilty
verdict "could not have been obtained without the assistance of" the error.  Id. at
370 (quoting Delva, 575 So. 2d at 644).  We conclude that, because of the unique
nature of the DUI statutory scheme, the improper instruction does not meet this test
of fundamental error.
As we have explained, there are alternative methods of proving
DUI—impairment or DUBAL.  The presumption of impairment instruction assists
the State in proving only one of these alternatives, impairment.  As we explained in
8.  DUI and DUBAL were originally separate offenses with separate
penalties.  In 1982, the Legislature amended the DUI statute to make impairment
and unlawful blood-alcohol level, which had been separate offenses with separate
penalties, into alternative theories of guilt of a single offense.  See State v. Rolle,
560 So. 2d 1154, 1155 (Fla. 1990).
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Robertson, the revision to the DUI statute that made impairment and DUBAL
alternative methods of proving the same offense, rather than separate offenses,
created a redundancy in the statute, "since impairment is presumed if the blood-
alcohol content is 0.10 or higher." 604 So. 2d at 792 n.14.8  As noted by the
Second District, the DUBAL instruction "is available to the State regardless of the
presumption instruction."  Tyner v. State, 805 So. 2d 862, 867 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). 
We recognized in Robertson that the availability of the DUBAL alternative
makes the presumption of impairment "a moot concern if the state proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant operated a motor vehicle with an unlawful
blood-alcohol level."  604 So. 2d at 792 n.14.  Nonetheless, as the cases under
review demonstrate, juries have continued to be instructed on the presumption of
impairment as an alternative to DUBAL in both DUI and BUI cases.
When the jury is instructed on DUBAL after the State has introduced blood-
alcohol evidence under the three-prong test of Bender, as occurred in each of these
cases, the jury may find the defendant guilty based on the same evidence that
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supports the presumption of impairment without considering whether the defendant
was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that his or her normal faculties
were impaired.  As we observed in State v. Rolle, 560 So. 2d 1154, 1156 (Fla.
1990), in which we upheld the presumption of impairment instruction against a
constitutional challenge, 
[t]o the extent the challenged instruction allowed the jury to substitute
proof of a blood-alcohol level of 0.10 percent or higher for proof of
impairment it correctly stated the law. Essentially, section 316.193
allows proof of a blood-alcohol level of 0.10 percent or higher to be
substituted for proof of impairment—not as an unconstitutional
presumption, but as an alternate element of the offense.
Id. at 1156.  This statement applies equally to the current .08 percent threshold for
DUBAL and the presumption of impairment.  In his dissenting opinion in Bonine,
Judge Harris also explained that the presumption is unnecessary when the jury is
instructed on DUBAL:
In order to receive the presumption instruction the State must first
prove the alternative theory for conviction, unlawful blood alcohol
level.  If the State proves this theory, then proving impairment is
surplusage and the presumption instruction is redundant.  On the other
hand, if the State fails to prove an unlawful blood alcohol level, then
the presumption, even if the instruction is given, does not come into
play.
811 So. 2d at 868 n.2 (Harris, J., dissenting).
An instruction on a DUI theory that is surplusage, or whose redundancy
makes it a "moot concern" as we stated in Robertson, 602 So. 2d at 792 n.4, cannot
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be "pertinent or material to what the jury must consider in order to convict."  See
Reed, 837 So. 2d at 370 (emphasis supplied).  Accordingly, it is not fundamental
error to instruct the jury on the presumption of impairment when a jury finds the
defendant guilty of DUI after being instructed on DUBAL.  
We next consider whether erroneously instructing the jury on the
presumption of impairment can be considered fundamental error if the jury is also
instructed on actual impairment but not DUBAL.  We answer this question in the
negative because the presumption neither omits nor incorrectly defines the element
of impairment.  As noted by the First District in Cardenas,
[a]n improper instruction or failure to instruct as to an essential
element of a crime may rise to the level of fundamental error.  The
instruction in the instant case, however, neither omitted from the
definition of an offense one of the essential elements, nor misdefined
one of the essential elements of an offense.  The challenged
instruction merely advised the jury of an evidentiary presumption or
permissible inference that they were free to accept or reject.
. . . .
The use of the standard impairment presumption instruction
here did not constitute fundamental error because it did not affect the
fairness of the proceeding.  There is no assertion that the blood
samples taken from appellant on the night of the accident were tainted
in any way.  We fail to see how the giving of the standard impairment
presumption instruction under these circumstances influenced the
outcome of the trial or that the guilty verdict could not have been
obtained without the improper instruction.
816 So. 2d at 727 (citations omitted).  The First District analogized the improper
instruction on the statutory presumption to erroneous instructions on affirmative
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defenses.  The court observed that in Holiday v. State, 753 So. 2d 1264, 1269-70
(Fla. 2000), and Smith v. State, 521 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1988), this Court held
that instructions improperly shifting the burden of proof on the affirmative
defenses of entrapment and insanity did not violate due process, and thus were not
fundamental error.  See Cardenas, 816 So. 2d at 727.  The First District in
Cardenas also cited to Rolle, in which we determined that the implied consent law
created a permissive inference, not an unconstitutional presumption, on only one of
the two theories supporting conviction.  See id. (citing to Rolle, 560 So. 2d at
1156).  The Second District, relying on Cardenas, has also held that "it is not
fundamental error to give the instruction."  Daigle v. State, 848 So. 2d 1233, 1234
(Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
We agree with the conclusion of the First District that the improper
instruction on the presumption of impairment neither omitted nor misdefined an
essential element of the crime.  Cf. Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285, 290 (Fla.
1993) (finding that failure to give instruction on voluntary intoxication did not
constitute fundamental error because voluntary intoxication was a defense to, but
not an essential element of, the charged crime).  This situation is different from
cases such as Reed, in which the trial court incorrectly defined malice, an essential
element of the crime of aggravated child abuse.  See 837 So. 2d at 370. 
9.  We disagree with Justice Wells' assertion in his separate opinion that
there is no reason to address the harmless error issue in Bonine.  The interdistrict
conflict on this issue, which was certified by the Fifth District and also appears on
the face of the opinion in Bonine, should be reconciled.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3)-(4),
Fla. Const.; Fla. Patient's Compensation Fund v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
559 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1990) (concluding that conflict on the face of the opinions
"must be harmonized").  This conflict is between Bonine and McBride rather than
Bonine and Cardenas, as suggested by Justice Wells, because the Fifth District
opinion in Bonine does not reveal whether the error in that case was preserved for
appeal.  The same conflict over harmless error was subsequently certified by the
Second District in Searles, 816 So. 2d at 795, in which we have stayed proceedings
before merits briefing pending resolution of Bonine.  In certifying conflict with
Bonine, the Second District in Searles also cited several other decisions in which
the Fifth District concluded that the error in giving the presumption of impairment
instruction could not be harmless.  See Servis v. State, 802 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla.
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Therefore, we conclude that the improper instruction does not constitute
fundamental error when the jury is instructed on either DUBAL or actual
impairment, or both.  Accordingly, we answer in the negative the First District's
certified question in Cardenas as to whether instructing on the presumption in
violation of Miles is fundamental error. 
B.  Harmless Error
We next address the certified conflict between the Fifth District decision in
Bonine and the Second District decision in McBride on harmless error.  The Fifth
District held in Bonine that the instruction on the presumption of impairment is per
se harmful, while the Second District in McBride conducted a harmless error
analysis.9  Many of the same considerations that guided our determination that the
5th DCA 2001) (refusing to find error harmless because there was no way to
determine the theory upon which the jury relied in reaching its verdict); Bass v.
State, 801 So. 2d 975, 975-76 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (refusing to find error harmless
even given "other evidence presented of Bass's impairment" because "we cannot
conclude that use of presumption did not likely contribute to the verdict");
Hembree v. State, 790 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (finding error "clearly
prejudicial" and "clearly preserved").  In short, this is an issue certain to recur.  In
fact, if we do not address harmless error in Bonine, which has been fully briefed,
we will have to order briefing and address the issue in Searles, a case that has been
stayed pending our disposition of these cases. 
10.  The Fifth District has reversed other DUI convictions based on the same
reasoning.  See Servis, 802 So. 2d at 359-60; Bass, 801 So. 2d at 976; Hembree,
790 So. 2d at 591.
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improper instruction is not fundamental error lead us also to conclude that the
improper instruction on the presumption of impairment is not harmful per se when
the defendant is charged with DUBAL and the jury is correctly instructed thereon. 
In Bonine, the Fifth District did not address the effect of the DUBAL allegation
and instruction in holding that the improper instruction on the presumption of
impairment was harmful error per se.  Instead, the Fifth District analogized the
erroneous instruction on the presumption of impairment to cases in which reversal
was compelled because the appellate court could not discern the effect of a legal
error in instructing on one of two theories supporting a general guilty verdict.  See
Bonine, 811 So. 2d at 866-67.10  Taking a contrary view in McBride, the Second
District found the erroneous instruction to be harmless "due to the overwhelming
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evidence of McBride's impairment presented by the State," without discussing
whether the State charged and the trial court instructed on DUBAL.  816 So. 2d at
658.   
We conclude that the "general verdict" precedent relied on by the Fifth
District in Bonine to hold that the erroneous instruction constitutes per se harmful
error does not apply to the DUI statutory scheme.  In Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957), overruled on other grounds, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1
(1978), the Supreme Court held that a conviction under a general verdict is
improper when it rests on multiple bases, one of which is legally inadequate. 
Accordingly, the Court reversed a conviction of conspiracy based on a general
verdict where one of the possible grounds for conviction was legally inadequate
because of a statutory time bar.  See Yates, 354 U.S. at 311-12.  In Griffin v.
United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991), the Court distinguished Yates from situations in
which the evidence on one theory is merely factually insufficient, explaining that
when "jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory,
there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and expertise will save them
from that error."  Griffin, 502 U.S. at 59.  However, when the evidence is factually
insufficient to support conviction on one of the two theories, "jurors are well
equipped to analyze the evidence" and reject that theory.  Id.  Applying these
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principles, the Court held in Griffin that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment does not require that a general guilty verdict on a multiple-object
conspiracy charge be set aside if the evidence is inadequate to support conviction
as to only one object of the conspiracy.  See id. at 60.
In accord with Griffin, this Court has held that legally insufficient evidence
on one of two theories supporting a general verdict does not warrant reversal, even
with proper objection at trial:
While a general guilty verdict must be set aside where the
conviction may have rested on an unconstitutional ground or a legally
inadequate theory, reversal is not warranted where the general verdict
could have rested upon a theory of liability without adequate
evidentiary support when there was an alternative theory of guilt for
which the evidence was sufficient.  
San Martin v. State, 717 So. 2d 462, 470 (Fla. 1998) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
supplied); see also Mungin v. State, 689 So. 2d 1026, 1029 (Fla. 1995).  In both
San Martin and Mungin, this Court affirmed first-degree murder convictions based
on felony murder although the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the
alternative theory of premeditated murder, concluding in each case that the error
was "clearly harmless."  San Martin, 717 So. 2d at 469; Mungin, 689 So. 2d at
1029.
The distinction between legally inadequate and factually insufficient theories
of guilt recognized in these cases turns on the discrete nature of each theory.  The
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reasoning is that where the theories are independent, a reviewing court cannot
determine whether a jury relied on the evidence supporting a theory on which it
was erroneously instructed through a mistake in the law, rather than the evidence
supporting the valid theory.  This distinction does not apply in the cases under
review because when the jury is instructed on both DUBAL and the presumption
of impairment, the alternative methods for proving DUI through blood test results
rely on the same evidentiary fact—the existence of a .08 blood-alcohol level.  A
blood-alcohol level of .08 or higher both establishes DUBAL and assists the State
in proving impairment.  To either conclude that a defendant is guilty under the
DUBAL alternative or apply the presumption of impairment, the jurors must first
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated a motor vehicle with a
.08 blood-alcohol level.  This fact independently establishes DUI via DUBAL
under section 316.193(1)(b) without regard to the alternative of impairment under
section 316.193(1)(a).  Thus, jurors instructed on both DUBAL and the
presumption of impairment are capable of determining that when the State has
established a .08 percent blood-alcohol level beyond a reasonable doubt, the
presumption of impairment is, as the Court stated in Robertson, a "moot concern."
604 So. 2d at 792 n.14. 
Relying on our statement in Robertson, the Fourth District has held that the
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improper instruction on the presumption of impairment is harmless error when the
State proves DUBAL "beyond a reasonable doubt."  State v. Cameron, 837 So. 2d
1111, 1113 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); cf. Rolle, 560 So. 2d at 1157 (Barkett, J.,
specially concurring) ("As long as the jury was properly instructed on the DUBAL
theory, any error in the other theory was, in effect, harmless.").  Moreover, as
Judge Harris recognized in Bonine, if the proof of unlawful blood alcohol level
falls short, the instruction on the presumption of impairment "does not come into
play" and is harmless.  811 So. 2d at 868 n.2 (Harris, J., dissenting).
As to the proper harmless error analysis when the jury is not instructed on
DUBAL, we disagree with the view of Judge Harris in Bonine, 811 So. 2d at 870,
and the holding of the Second District in McBride, 816 So. 2d at 656, that
overwhelming evidence of impairment alone can render the error in instructing on
the presumption of impairment harmless.  As noted by the Fifth District in the
majority opinion in Bonine, we have emphasized that the test of harmless error 
is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct result, a not clearly
wrong, a substantial evidence, a more probable than not, a clear and
convincing, or even an overwhelming evidence test.  Harmless error is
not a device for the appellate court to substitute itself for the
trier-of-fact by simply weighing the evidence.  The focus is on the
effect of the error on the trier-of-fact.  The question is whether there is
a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.  The burden
to show the error was harmless must remain on the state.  If the
appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition harmful.  
11.  The Second District relied on the following facts in finding the error
harmless in McBride:
At trial, the State presented evidence from several witnesses
that McBride drove at approximately 70 miles per hour in a 35 miles
per hour zone, swerved in and out of lanes, had trouble maintaining a
lane, nearly rear-ended a minivan, barely missed hitting a bicyclist,
and swerved into oncoming traffic, where he hit the victim's car head
on. Additionally, testimony showed that McBride's tires were
screeching as he wove through traffic and that he cut so closely in
front of other cars that the drivers were forced to slam on their brakes
in order to avoid being hit by McBride's vehicle. Furthermore, two of
the paramedics that responded to the scene testified that while in the
ambulance with McBride, they smelled alcohol on his breath, and a
police officer testified that McBride said he had been drinking all day.
816 So. 2d at 657.
-22-
811 So. 2d at 866 (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986)). 
Relying on the same passage from DiGuilio, this Court held that an
unconstitutional predecessor to the instruction on the presumption of impairment
given in these cases was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt even though there
was other evidence of actual impairment.  See Wilhelm v. State, 568 So. 2d 1, 3
(Fla. 1990). 
Where the evidence of actual impairment is strong, as it was in both Bonine
and McBride,11 the jury may nonetheless choose to rely in part or whole on the
presumption of impairment instruction that a blood alcohol level of .08 percent "is
sufficient by itself to establish that the defendant was under the influence of
12.  In addition to the strength of the evidence of impairment, other relevant
considerations in a determination of harmlessness include the exact language used
in instructing the jury on the presumption, the margin by which the blood-alcohol
test result exceeded the .08 percent threshold, and the degree to which the defense
challenged the reliability of the test results or rebutted the presumption with
evidence showing lack of impairment.  As we stated in Bender,
[t]he presumptions are rebuttable, and a defendant may in any
proceeding attack the reliability of the testing procedures, the
qualifications of the operator, and the standards establishing the zones
of intoxicant levels.  In addition, other competent evidence may be
presented to rebut the presumptions concerning whether the person
was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or
her normal faculties were impaired.
382 So. 2d at 699.  With these considerations stated, we leave the determination of
whether an improper instruction on the presumption of impairment is harmless
error in the absence of a DUBAL instruction to the district courts of appeal and to
the circuit courts acting in their appellate capacity in reviewing misdemeanor DUI
convictions. 
-23-
alcohol to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired."  We therefore
disapprove McBride to the extent that it departs from the DiGuilio test for harmless
error.12  See also Williams v. State, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S853 (Fla. Dec. 11, 2003)
(quashing district court decision that incorrectly applied DiGuilio test); Knowles v.
State, 848 So. 2d 1055, 1059 (Fla. 2003) (same). 
IV.  THE INSTANT CASES
Based on these conclusions, we address the decisions below in Cardenas and
Bonine.  There is no indication in these cases either that the State failed to carry its
13.  In a subsequent case, the Fifth District asserted that Bonine was "not [a]
fundamental error case[]," suggesting that the error in Bonine was preserved for
appeal.  See Rodriguez v. State, 837 So. 2d 478, 481 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), review
denied, No. SC03-475 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2004).  The Fifth District in Rodriguez further
stated in dicta that an improper instruction on the presumption of impairment
would not be fundamental error, citing to the First District decisions in Cardenas
and Leveritt.  See id.
-24-
burden of laying the common law predicate for blood-alcohol evidence or that the
evidence was improperly admitted.  Thus, the State properly introduced evidence
that Cardenas' blood-alcohol level was .0999 percent and Bonine's blood-alcohol
level was .226 percent.  
In both Cardenas and Bonine, the juries rendered general verdicts of guilt
after being properly instructed on the alternative theories of DUBAL and actual
impairment.  Accordingly, in Cardenas the improper instruction on the presumption
of impairment was not fundamental error both because the blood alcohol evidence
was properly admitted, thereby providing a factually sufficient basis to prove
DUBAL, and because there was evidence to establish actual impairment. 
The Fifth District concluded in Bonine that the error under Miles in giving
the instruction was harmful per se without first addressing whether the issue was
preserved for appeal.  See Bonine, 811 So. 2d at 866.13  Our independent review of
the record reveals that Bonine did not object to the instruction, and therefore failed
to preserve the issue for appeal.  Accordingly, the Fifth District erred in reversing
-25-
Bonine's conviction on an issue that was neither preserved nor fundamental error. 
See Reed, 837 So. 2d at 370 (absent an objection at trial, challenges to jury
instructions can be raised on appeal only if fundamental error occurred).  For this
reason and because the court in Bonine also incorrectly held that the error was
harmful per se, contrary to our decision today, we quash the Fifth District's
decision.
V.  CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we hold that an improper instruction on the statutory
presumption of impairment, given contrary to the holding in Miles, is not
fundamental error if the State charges DUBAL and the jury is correctly instructed
thereon, or if the jury is correctly instructed on actual impairment.  As to improper
instructions that are preserved by a timely objection, we hold that error under Miles
is harmless under a general verdict when the State charges and the jury is also
correctly instructed on DUBAL.  However, if no DUBAL instruction is given and
the jury must rely on impairment as the sole theory of guilt of DUI, then any
preserved error in giving an improper instruction on the statutory presumption of
impairment should be assessed under the harmless error test of DiGuilio.  Based on
these conclusions, we approve the First District decision in Cardenas and answer
the question certified therein in the negative.  In Bonine, we quash the Fifth
14.  We decline to address the additional issues raised by the parties that are
beyond the scope of the certified question.  See Wheaton v. State, 789 So. 2d 975,
975 n.2 (Fla. 2001); McMullen v. State, 714 So. 2d 368, 373 (Fla. 1998).
-26-
District decision and remand for affirmance of Bonine's conviction of DUI
manslaughter.  We disapprove McBride to the extent it is inconsistent with this
opinion.14
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
QUINCE, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s decision in approving the First District’s
decision in Cardenas v. State, 816 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), and in
quashing the Fifth District’s decision in Bonine v. State, 811 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2002).  I do not join in the majority opinion in respect to harmless error,
which I conclude is dicta.  I dissent from the majority’s partial disapproval of the
Second District’s decision in McBride v. State, 816 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 2d DCA
2002).
The reason that the majority’s discussion of the harmless error is dicta in
-27-
Bonine is plain in that the majority opinion acknowledges, at page 24, that there
was no objection to the instruction.  In light of there being no objection, as this
Court pointed out in Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 369-70 (Fla. 2002), the proper
analysis is whether the error is fundamental—not whether the error is harmless. 
Bonine conflicts with Cardenas but not with McBride.
Thus, this Court does not have jurisdiction to disapprove a part of McBride. 
But even if there was jurisdiction, I would not agree with the partial disapproval of
the McBride decision because the majority gives the Second District’s opinion too
cramped a reading and unnecessarily and inappropriately corrects the Second
District.  The majority ignores that the Second District’s opinion specially states:
Error is harmless only “if it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt
that the verdict could not have been affected by error.”  State v.
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986).
McBride v. State, 816 So. 2d at 657.  I do not join in disapproving the district court
for its use of a word which the majority simply decides it will not use.
I do agree with the Second District’s decision that any error in respect to the
instruction was harmless.
QUINCE, J., concurs.
Two Cases Consolidated:
-28-
No. SC02-1264
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Great Public Importance
First District - Case No. 1D00-3833
(Escambia County)
Ronald R. Cardenas, Jr., pro se, DeFuniak Springs, Florida,
for Petitioner
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau
Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Robert L. Martin, Assistant Attorney General,
Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent
No. SC02-927
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fifth District - Case No. 5D00-1717
(Citrus County)
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Rebecca Roark Wall, Assistant
Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Rosemarie Farrell, Assistant Public
-29-
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent