Case Title: State ex rel. Childs v. Lazaroff

Citation: 2001-Ohio-9

Docket Number: 20001520

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Childs v. Lazaroff, 90 Ohio St.3d 519, 2001-Ohio-9.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CHILDS, APPELLANT, v. LAZAROFF, WARDEN, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Childs v. Lazaroff (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 519.] 
Habeas corpus sought to compel warden to release relator from prison – Court 
of appeals’ dismissal of petition affirmed – Res judicata bars relator 
from filing successive habeas corpus petitions. 
(No. 00-1520 — Submitted November 29, 2000 — Decided January 3, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Madison County, No. CA2000-05-025. 
 
Per Curiam.  In June 1995, an Akron police officer filed a complaint in 
the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, charging 
appellant, Tawan R. Childs, with delinquency.  The officer alleged that when 
Childs was seventeen years old, he committed aggravated murder by purposely, 
and with prior calculation and design, causing the death of Christopher E. 
Robinson. 
 
In October 1995, the juvenile court found probable cause that Childs had 
committed aggravated murder and bound him over to the general division of the 
common pleas court for trial as an adult.  At the bindover hearing, the juvenile 
court admitted a psychological report concerning Childs.  In January 1996, the 
common pleas court convicted Childs of murder and a firearm specification.  The 
court sentenced Childs to fifteen years to life for his murder conviction and to a 
three-year term of actual incarceration for the firearm specification conviction, to 
be served consecutively.  On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment.  
State v. Childs (Sept. 18, 1996), Summit App. No. 17653, unreported, 1996 WL 
525631, appeal dismissed (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 1519, 674 N.E.2d 372. 
 
In 1997, Childs filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for Madison 
County for a writ of habeas corpus to compel his release from prison.  Childs 
claimed that his convictions were void because he was charged in the juvenile 
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court with a different crime from the one upon which he was extradited.  The 
court of appeals dismissed the petition, and, on appeal, we affirmed the dismissal.  
State ex rel. Childs v. Wingard (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 346, 699 N.E.2d 1278. 
 
In 1999, Childs filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this 
court, claiming that his sentencing court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.  We 
sua sponte dismissed the cause.  State ex rel. Childs v. Wingard (1999), 85 Ohio 
St.3d 1475, 709 N.E.2d 848. 
 
In May 2000, Childs filed a third petition for a writ of habeas corpus, this 
time with the Court of Appeals for Madison County.  Childs requested the writ to 
compel appellee, his prison warden, to release him from prison.  Childs claimed 
that his convictions and sentence were void because he was never given the 
physical examination required by the then-applicable versions of R.C. 2151.26 
and Juv.R. 30 before being bound over.  The court of appeals granted appellee’s 
motion and dismissed the petition.  The court held that res judicata barred 
Childs’s claims. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
Childs asserts that the court of appeals erred in denying the writ.  He 
contends that his petition stated a viable habeas corpus claim and that res judicata 
did not bar him from raising his jurisdictional claim. 
 
We have held that a juvenile who alleges that he received no physical 
examination before being bound over, as required by the then-applicable versions 
of R.C. 2151.26 and Juv.R. 30, states a potentially viable habeas corpus claim.  
See Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 150-151, 656 N.E.2d 1282, 
1283-1284; State v. Golphin (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 546-547, 692 N.E.2d 608, 
611-612.1  We have additionally recognized that habeas corpus actions are 
                                                          
 
1.  R.C. 2151.26 and Juv.R. 30 were subsequently amended to delete the physical-examination 
requirement.  Golphin, 81 Ohio St.3d at 546, 692 N.E.2d at 612; 146 Ohio Laws, Part I, 19-20. 
 
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typically exempt from res judicata  because “ ‘[c]onventional notions of finality 
of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake.’ ”  Natl. Amusements, 
Inc. v. Springdale (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 558 N.E.2d 1178, 1181, quoting 
Sanders v. United States (1963), 373 U.S. 1, 8, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 10 L.Ed.2d 
148, 157. 
 
Nevertheless, in Hudlin v. Alexander (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 153, 155-156, 
586 N.E.2d 86, 87, after noting the foregoing statement from Natl. Amusements, 
we held that res judicata is applicable to successive habeas corpus petitions 
because habeas corpus petitioners have the right to appeal adverse judgments in 
habeas corpus cases.  See, also, McCleskey v. Zant (1991), 499 U.S. 467, 479, 111 
S.Ct. 1454, 1462, 113 L.Ed.2d 517, 535 (“As appellate review became available 
from a decision in habeas refusing to discharge the prisoner, courts began to 
question the continuing validity of the common-law rule allowing endless 
successive [habeas corpus] petitions”).  We have since consistently applied res 
judicata to bar petitioners from filing successive habeas corpus petitions.  See, 
e.g., Smith v. Walker (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 431, 432, 700 N.E.2d 592, 593; State 
ex rel. Cotton v. Ghee (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 404, 696 N.E.2d 580, 581; State ex 
rel. Brantley v. Ghee (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 287, 288, 685 N.E.2d 1243, 1244; 
Freeman v. Tate (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 440, 441, 605 N.E.2d 14, 15. 
 
Childs previously filed two habeas corpus actions in which he could have 
raised his present claim.  See id., 65 Ohio St.3d at 441, 605 N.E.2d at 15 (“In this 
case, the record demonstrates that appellant has previously filed at least one 
habeas corpus action * * * in which [his successive habeas corpus claim] could 
have been raised”). 
 
Based on the foregoing, res judicata barred Childs from filing successive 
habeas corpus petitions.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Tawan R. Childs, pro se. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Diane Mallory, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
__________________