Case Title: Taylor v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 228, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MARCUS F. TAYLOR, 
§
§
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§ No. 228, 2002
§
v.
§ Court Below: Superior Court 
§ of the State of Delaware in and
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§ for Kent County
§ Cr. ID No.  0101020651
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted: November 19, 2002
Decided:
April 3, 2003
Before WALSH, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices.
Appeal from Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED.
Paul S. Swierzbinski, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Public
Defender, Dover, Delaware, for Appellant.
John Williams, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Dover, Delaware, for Appellee.
WALSH, Justice:
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In this appeal from the Superior Court, we again address a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct occurring during summation to a jury.  We conclude that the
prosecutor’s “concession” to the jury that the State “probably” had not provided
sufficient evidence to establish four of the eight theft charges submitted to the jury
constituted an admission that the State had not presented a prima facie case as to those
charges.  In view of that concession, the appropriate course was to decline further
prosecution of those charges.  We further conclude that it was error for the trial judge
to permit these charges to be submitted to the jury for deliberation after the State made
its concession.  Although the jury eventually acquitted the defendant of the four
“conceded” offenses, we cannot conclude that the State’s tactic did not influence the
jury’s verdict as to the remaining offenses.  Since the conduct of the prosecutor and
ruling the trial judge created prejudicial error the convictions cannot stand.
Accordingly, we reverse and order a new trial.
I
The evidence presented at trial showed the following events.  The defendant,
Marcus Taylor (“Taylor”), was the general manager of one of three McDonald’s
restaurants owned and operated by Robert Cocozzoli (“Cocozzoli”) in the Dover area.
One of Taylor’s duties, shared with two assistant managers, was to collect cash
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receipts during each of two shifts and deposit those receipts in a local bank.  The bank
would count the money and stamp the deposit tickets to verify its accuracy.  The
stamped deposit tickets, when returned to the restaurant, would be compared to the
computerized entry of receipts for the shift corresponding to the deposit ticket.  The
verification was performed by the two managers and Taylor, each of whom had
separate codes for accessing the computer program.
During the period from January 1 to January 18, 2001 Cocozzoli was notified
by the bank that deposits were insufficient to meet checks drawn against the account.
Further inquiry indicated that, apparently, deposits were reflected in the computer
program even though the bank had not verified their receipt.  At some point,
Cocozzoli confronted Taylor about the missing deposits and Taylor admitted that he
had not made some of the deposits, that they were still in his car and that he would
immediately take them to the bank.  Eventually, Cocozzoli determined that four
deposits for January 5, 6, 9, and 12 of 2001, had reached the bank but after their
validation on the computer program.  Four other deposits,  for January 15, 16, 17, and
18 of 2001 were never found or validated and the bank had no record of their receipt.
Taylor was indicted on eight counts of felony theft — representing the eight
deposits in question.  Four of the counts (Counts 1 through 4) reflect amounts that
were, in fact, delivered to the bank but several days after their verification on the store
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computer.  The remaining four counts (Counts 5 through 8) reflects amounts that were
never received by the bank.  At trial, Cocozzoli testified that he never gave Taylor
permission to keep any of the restaurant’s funds.  Taylor elected not to testify in his
defense.
II
At the conclusion of its case, the State had presented evidence from which the
jury could conclude that the deposits representing Counts 5 through 8 had not been
accounted for and that Taylor was the person responsible for the safekeeping.  As to
the other four deposits, the evidence was clear that they had in fact been accounted
for, albeit in an untimely fashion.
In his summation to the jury, the prosecutor, anticipating the argument of
defense counsel that the late deposits could not be the subject of theft because there
was no intent to permanently appropriate them, suggested that perhaps an argument
could be made that those deposits could support a theft charge.  The prosecution then
conceded that such a contention was not probable in the following statement:
But in all honesty, since money is interchangeable, the correct
answer is that there’s probably not enough to demonstrate an intent to
appropriate on those first four because they eventually showed up.  He
was arrested for eight counts, and he was, you know, charged with eight
counts.  But in all honesty, Mr. Swierzbinski’s argument probably does
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make sense, the first four deposits, and you probably can’t conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an intent to appropriate the first
four.
They showed what he was doing.  They are part of what was going
on.  Part of the evidence, the first four counts, since they eventually
showed up in the bank, you probably can’t say beyond a reasonable
doubt that there was an intent to appropriate them.  These last four that
never showed up, clearly was with an intent to appropriate because they
just vanished.  They walked out of the store at the same time just before
the defendant did, and they were never seen again.
So, the intent to appropriate is clear: The money was taken with
intent to keep it and it never came back.  So, in viewing all the evidence
and thinking about it, and thinking about the legal standards explained
by the Judge, the State would ask you to examine all of it to see what the
defendant was doing.  And the State submits, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that – the State would assert that this money, which is the only money of
these last four deposits, are permanently missing.  It’s 9,000 some
dollars.
We ask that you convict the defendant of those four counts of
felony theft.  Ask yourselves whether it makes sense to think anybody
other than him, based on this evidence, took that money?  The State
would submit to you that he did, and I would ask you to convict.
At the conclusion of the State’s summation, defense counsel, out of the
presence of the jury, requested the trial judge to grant a “judgment of acquittal” as to
Counts 1 through 4 since “[t]he State told the jury, at least twice, if not more than that,
that there probably is a reasonable doubt as to Counts 1 through 4.”  Defense counsel
further requested a mistrial as to the remaining Counts 5 through 8, because the State
“used or attempted to use Counts 1 through 4 to a tactical advantage to help bootstrap
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its case on Counts 5 through 8.  That’s not appropriate.”  Defense counsel further
contended that the State used the evidence supporting Counts 1 through 4, despite the
absence of prima facie evidence of theft, to show “false validation,” a form of bad act
evidence, to support its case as to the remaining counts.
Before ruling on the defense motions for acquittal and mistrial, the trial judge
asked the prosecutor to explain the State’s position in view of the unusual concession
made in summation.  The prosecutor replied that: “the State simply took the position
that the reason the jury probably should not convict on Counts 1 through 4, but that
doesn’t mean that a reasonable jury could not do so.”  When the trial judge indicated
that it did not “understand” the State’s position the prosecutor gave the following
explanation:
[PROSECUTOR]:  And the State’s view, the legal standard for
that is not met.  Although, based on my comments, I would expect the
jury probably to acquit on those counts.  And that does make sense, but
that’s simply assessing the inferences, and the equities of the way that
they appear to me.  I think a reasonable, rational jury could convict on
them.  But again, it is true that I asked the jury or said to the jury that it
was difficult to argue that they could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
there was an intent to appropriate.  So I expect the jury will acquit on
those, in any event.
The trial judge although acknowledging that it was “quite chancey for the State
to argue this way” and that the State’s concession had given the defense “a live
cannon for its closing argument,” found no impropriety in the prosecutor’s tactics and
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denied the defense motions for acquittal as to Counts 1 through 4 and a mistrial as to
the remaining counts.  The jury ultimately acquitted the defendant of Counts 1 through
4 but convicted him of the remaining counts.
III
Our standard of review, for a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial is one
of abuse of discretion.  Ashley v. State, 798 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Del. 2002).  Where,
however, the underlying basis for the mistrial motion is prompted by prosecutorial
misconduct or overreaching, our review necessarily includes an analysis of whether
the conduct of counsel compromised the defendant’s entitlement to “a fair trial which
is implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by which the
states are bound.”  Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d 997, 1003 (1982).
More than forty years ago this Court commented upon the prosecutor’s unique
position within the criminal justice system and emphasized the dual obligation to
present the State’s case “with earnestness and vigor” while discharging “his duty to
see that justice be done by giving defendant a fair and impartial trial.”  Bennett v.
State, 164 A.2d 442, 446 (Del. 1960).  We have since repeated this admonition and
in particular applied that dual obligation to the propriety of the content of closing
argument.  See Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 204-208 (Del. 1980) (prosecutor’s
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inflammatory comments in summation were clearly improper but cured by trial court’s
lengthy admonishment to the jury); Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 571-572 (Del.
1981) (applying three-part test for determining prejudice and holding that prosecutor’s
remarks were so clearly prejudicial as to affect substantial rights).  More recently, this
Court criticized a prosecutor for disparaging the reasonable doubt standard and noted
a repeated pattern of prosecution misconduct in summation that compromises “the
integrity of the judicial process.”  Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d  730 (Del. 2002).
The present case differs from previous instances where this Court has criticized
the context of summations by prosecutors.  Unlike several of our previous cases, the
prosecutor here did not engage in disparagement of the defendant nor did he directly
misstate the evidence.  Indeed, in a sense, the prosecutor exercised unusual candor in
conceding the weakness of his own case.  Nonetheless, the prosecutor’s comments are
problematic because they reflect on the fairness implicit in the prosecutorial role as
it relates to the function of the jury.  The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, to
which this Court looks for guidance, sets the general tone:
The prosecutor’s argument is likely to have significant persuasive force
with the jury.  Accordingly, the scope of the argument must be consistent
with the evidence and marked by the fairness that should characterize all
of the prosecutor’s conduct.  Professional conduct in argument is a
matter of special concern because of the possibility that the jury will give
special weight to the prosecutor’s arguments, not only because of the
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prestige associated with the prosecutor’s office, but also because of the
fact finding facilities presumably available to the office.
Commentary, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function §§ 2-5.8
(3d ed. 1993).
Here, the prosecutor’s argument conveyed to the jury his belief that there was
a basis in the evidence for conviction on Counts 1 through 4 while conceding that the
jury “probably can’t say beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an intent to
appropriate [the funds alleged in Counts 1 through 4].”  Such an argument is not only
disingenuous, it represents an abuse of the prosecutor’s charging responsibility.
Section 3.9 (a) of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice provides that “[i]t is
unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to institute or cause to be instituted criminal
charges when he knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause.”  ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function § 3.9(a).  The prosecutor’s
obligation not to institute criminal charges not supported by probable cause is a
continuing one and extends to the pursuit of charges at trial when the evidence fails
to support probable cause.  Here the prosecutor had a duty not to pursue such charges
when he was convinced, as he conceded to the jury, that acquittal was probable, and
not simply the possible result of exercising reasonable doubt.
1To the extent the prosecutor’s statements to the jury related to factual issues, i.e., the
strength of the State’s case, as distinct from a legal theory, they could constitute judicial admission
which bind the State.  Levinson v. Delaware Compensation Rating Bureau, Inc., 616 A.2d 1182,
1186 (Del. 1992) (quoting Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc. v. Bruton, 552 A.2d 466, 474 (1989).
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The prosecutor’s conduct was compounded by the failure of the trial judge to
take corrective action to ameliorate the prejudice.  Defense counsel made a prompt
and pointed objection to the prosecutor’s summation and thus we do not view this
claim under a plain error standard.  In view of the State’s concession that the jury
would “probably acquit” on Counts 1 through 4, the trial judge was required to enter
a judgment of acquittal since “the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction,” as
required by Super. Ct. Cr. R. 29(a).  The rule permits the judgment of acquittal  be
entered by the court on motion of the defendant or on “its own motion.”  The State’s
concession required the Superior Court to grant a judgment of acquittal1 as to Counts
1 through 4 and the failure to do so was error.
The State contends that in view of the jury’s acquittal of the charges, conceded
by the State to be weak, the guilty verdict on the remaining charges should be tested
by the usual standard of whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, could have found the essential element of felony
theft.  Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365, 369 (Del. 1999).  This argument overlooks the
potential for prejudice that arises whenever a jury is permitted to deliberate guilt on
multiple offenses, some of which should not have been submitted for jury
2Our decision granting a new trial renders moot the defendant’s contention that the Superior
Court erred in refusing to perform the analysis required by Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988),
to the extent the conduct underlying Counts 1 through 4 could be deemed bad acts, even if subject
to a judgment of acquittal.
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determination in the first place.  As the defendant argued in the Superior Court and
repeats here, the presence of unsupported charges permits the State to bootstrap its
argument of guilt on the supportable charges by (a) pointing to other acts of possible
misconduct and (b) facilitating a compromise verdict.  In either event, we cannot state
with confidence that the presence of the unsupported charges played no role in the
jury’s verdict.  Under the circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion for the Superior
Court not to declare a mistrial once it determined not to grant a judgment of acquittal
on Counts 1 through 4.
The judgment of conviction is REVERSED and the matter REMANDED to the
Superior Court for a new trial consistent with this decision.2