Case Title: State v. Vanessa Brockdorf

Citation: 2006 WI 76

Docket Number: 2004AP001519-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 76 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP1519 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Vanessa Brockdorf, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 278 Wis. 2d 814, 691 N.W.2d 928 
(Ct. App. 2004–Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 28, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 12, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Frederick C. Rosa 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER and BUTLER, JR. J.J., join the dissent. 
BUTLER, JR., J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Martin E. Kohler, Brian Kinstler, and Kohler & Hart, LLP, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Brian Kinstler. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Daniel 
J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Aaron Nisenson, 
Alexandria, VA, and Jonathan Cermele and Eggert & Cermele, S.C., 
Milwaukee, on behalf of the International Union of Police 
Associations, AFL-CIO. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Gordon E. McQuillen, 
Madison, 
on 
behalf 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Professional 
Police 
Association/Law Enforcement Employee Relations Division. 
 
 
2
 
 
2006 WI 76
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP1519-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2003CM10122) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Vanessa Brockdorf, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 28, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The defendant, Milwaukee Police 
Officer Vanessa Brockdorf (Brockdorf), seeks review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 which reversed an 
order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Frederick C. Rosa, 
Judge, suppressing a statement Brockdorf made to Detective 
Michele Harrison (Harrison) of the Internal Affairs Division 
(IAD) of the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD).  
                                                 
1 State v. Brockdorf, No. 2004AP1519-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2004). 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Brockdorf contends that the United States Supreme 
Court decision of Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), 
requires the suppression of a police officer's incriminating 
statement given in an internal investigation when the officer 
has the subjective belief that she must answer questions in an 
internal investigation or lose her job and that belief is 
objectively reasonable.   
¶3 
Today, we adopt a two-pronged subjective/objective 
test for determining whether, as a matter of law, an officer's 
statements given in a criminal investigation are coerced and 
involuntary, and therefore subject to suppression under Garrity.  
Under this test, we examine the totality of the circumstances, 
but an express threat of job termination or a statute, 
regulation, rule, or policy in effect at the time of the 
questioning which provides for an officer's termination for 
failing to answer the questions posed, will be a sufficient 
circumstance to constitute coercion in almost any conceivable 
situation.  Using this analysis, we conclude Brockdorf's 
incriminating statement was not unconstitutionally coerced under 
the Fifth Amendment, and Garrity immunity does not apply.  As 
such, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.   
I 
¶4 
On December 15, 2003, the State filed a criminal 
complaint against Brockdorf and her then-partner Officer Charlie 
Jones, Jr. (Jones) alleging various charges related to an 
alleged beating of a shoplifting suspect on September 14, 2003, 
and the investigation that followed.  Specifically, Brockdorf 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
3 
 
was charged with obstructing Harrison by knowingly giving false 
information to her with the intent to mislead, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1) (2003-04).  
Jones was 
charged 
with 
battery and two counts of obstructing an officer by providing 
false information.   
¶5 
On the evening of September 14, Brockdorf and Jones 
responded to a shoplifting complaint at a Kohl's Department 
Store on South 27th Street in Milwaukee.  When the officers 
arrived at the store, they met with Kohl's loss prevention 
supervisor and the suspect, Gilberto Palacios (Palacios).  While 
Brockdorf interviewed store personnel, Jones took Palacios 
outside, as Palacios was agitated and loud in the store.  
Palacios was placed in the squad car, and the officers drove to 
a nearby Noodles restaurant.  Brockdorf went into the restaurant 
to place a takeout order.  While she was inside ordering, 
several witnesses observed Jones take Palacios out of the squad 
car, repeatedly punch him in the head, and then place him back 
in the squad car.  When Brockdorf returned, Jones was out of 
breath, and he told her that the suspect had tried to kick out 
the squad car windows and had ripped his shirt.  The officers 
returned to Kohl's parking lot, at which time they called for a 
sergeant.  The responding sergeant was told that the scuffle 
between Jones and Palacios had occurred at Kohl's.  Brockdorf 
and Jones then transported Palacios to the hospital.   
¶6 
In response to a citizen's complaint about the 
incident at Noodles, the MPD initiated a criminal investigation.  
Harrison, an IAD detective who works solely in criminal 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
4 
 
investigations, first spoke with Brockdorf on September 19, 
2003, at Brockdorf's home.  At that time, Brockdorf stated that 
when she exited Kohl's, she noticed Palacios' shirt was ripped.  
Jones told her that the shirt ripped while Palacios was knocking 
over mannequins in the store.  The officers then called for a 
sergeant, who directed them to take Palacios to a hospital.  
Brockdorf stated that she then drove to Noodles, went inside to 
order food, and when she returned Jones told her that Palacios 
had tried to kick out the windows in the squad car.  Brockdorf 
then proceeded on to the hospital. 
¶7 
On 
October 
3, 
2003, 
Harrison 
again 
spoke 
with 
Brockdorf at the Milwaukee Police Academy on Teutonia Avenue.  
Although the parties dispute the details of what occurred on 
that date, Brockdorf eventually changed her story, telling 
Harrison that she and Jones had gone to Noodles before the 
sergeant was called, and the alleged beating occurred at that 
location.   
¶8 
After the criminal complaint was filed, Brockdorf 
filed a motion to suppress the statement she gave on October 3.2  
She argued the statement was not voluntary under Garrity.  The 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Frederick C. Rosa, Judge, 
presiding, held a hearing on April 2, 2004, at which both 
Brockdorf and Harrison appeared.   
                                                 
2 Brockdorf concedes that she is unable to challenge her 
September 19, 2003, statement because it is untruthful.  See 
Herek v. Police & Fire Comm'n, 226 Wis. 2d 504, 517, 595 
N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1999).  
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
5 
 
¶9 
Brockdorf testified that when she arrived at work on 
October 3, a sergeant informed her that internal affairs wanted 
to meet with her.  She reported immediately to the IAD office 
located on the third floor of the Police Academy and met with 
Harrison 
and 
Detective 
Ivan 
Wick 
(Wick) 
who 
wanted 
to 
"requestion 
[her] 
regarding 
the 
battery, 
regarding 
[her] 
partner."  Brockdorf testified that she told them she did not 
want to talk without a union representative present.  Further, 
she testified that she sat for an hour before she said anything 
and that both detectives told her "[i]f you don't talk now, 
you're going to get charged with obstructing."  Brockdorf said 
she did not want to get charged with obstructing, so she decided 
to answer the detectives' questions. 
MR. KOHLER (COUNSEL FOR BROCKDORF):  Did you feel as a 
police officer you had to answer their questions? 
BROCKDORF:  Yes.  Because I would have been charged 
with obstructing if I didn't.   
Q:  Is that the only reason you answered their 
questions? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  Did you think what would happen to you if you were 
charged with obstructing? 
A:  Well, they always say in the academy that you get 
fired for lying, that it's a grave disqualification. 
 . . . .  
Q:  Other than being charged, did you fear for your 
job at that point? 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
6 
 
A:  Yes, because I didn't——first I wasn't the target, 
and then all of a sudden I became the target of this 
investigation. 
Q:  What did you think was going to happen to you if 
you didn't talk to them, other than being charged with 
obstructing? 
A:  I figured I'd later be fired. 
Q:  So are those the two reasons why you consented to 
the interview? 
A:  Yes. 
¶10 On cross-examination, Deputy District Attorney Jon N. 
Reddin asked Brockdorf the following: 
MR. REDDIN:  Did either Officer Wick or Officer 
Harrison tell you that you'd be fired if you didn't 
talk to them? 
BROCKDORF:  No, they just said I'd be charged with 
obstructing. 
Brockdorf also indicated that she believed she would be charged 
with obstructing for not telling the truth.  On redirect, 
Brockdorf then insisted that she believed she would be charged 
with obstructing if she did not answer the questions posed to 
her. 
¶11  Harrison 
described 
the 
events 
of 
October 
3 
differently.  She testified that when she met with Brockdorf, 
she advised her about the nature of the investigation.  That is,  
the detectives wanted to question her regarding the use of force 
complaint and that she was not the target of the investigation.  
Specifically, Harrison said that there were some inconsistencies 
in Brockdorf's statement and other facts discovered during the 
course of the investigation that made a second interview 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
7 
 
necessary, but Harrison did not believe Brockdorf had been 
untruthful prior to the interview.   Harrison testified that she 
recalled 
Brockdorf 
asking 
if 
she 
should 
call 
for 
union 
representation; she told Brockdorf it was up to her to make that 
decision.  Brockdorf did not call a union representative and 
subsequently gave a statement in which she essentially admitted 
her first statement was untrue.  Harrison further stated that 
she never told Brockdorf that she would be terminated or charged 
with obstructing for refusing to give a statement.  Indeed, 
Harrison testified that she advises everyone she talks to that 
they may choose not to answer any of the questions asked of 
them.  Finally, she conceded that Brockdorf was not offered 
Garrity immunity, nor had she ever heard of such a concept.     
¶12 The circuit court granted the suppression motion in a 
written decision issued April 21, 2004.  The court concluded 
that when looking at the totality of the circumstances, 
Brockdorf's subjective fear that her job was on the line was 
well-founded.  Further, the court determined that despite 
Harrison's statements to the contrary, Brockdorf was a target of 
the investigation, and it was not unreasonable for Brockdorf to 
believe that a failure to answer questions during an internal 
investigation could result in termination.  Pursuant to Garrity 
and Oddsen v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners for the City 
of Milwaukee, 108 Wis. 2d 143, 321 N.W.2d 161 (1982), the court 
held that a statement made under the circumstances was the 
product of a coercive choice and Brockdorf was entitled to an 
offer of Garrity immunity. 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
8 
 
¶13 The State appealed the order, and the court of appeals 
reversed.  The court of appeals concluded that "Brockdorf's 
October 3 statement was not forced or compelled.  Rather, she 
made a voluntary statement during a routine police interview."  
State v. Brockdorf, No. 2004AP1519-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶13 
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2004).  Furthermore, the court 
distinguished this case from Garrity: 
Brockdorf's free choice to speak out or to remain 
silent was not compromised.  She was not told that she 
would be fired if she exercised her Fifth Amendment 
right to remain silent.  She was told that she would 
be charged with obstruction if she refused to answer 
questions 
in 
the 
criminal investigation. 
 
This, 
however, does not rise to the level of coercive 
conduct so as to negate the voluntariness of her 
statement.  She was not forced to give a statement nor 
was she told that she could not invoke her right 
against self-incrimination. 
Id., ¶9.  As such, the court of appeals reversed and remanded 
the circuit court's decision.  Brockdorf petitioned for review, 
and we now affirm.   
II 
¶14 "In reviewing a motion to suppress, we apply a two-
step standard of review.  First, we review the circuit court's 
findings of historical fact, and will uphold them unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  Second, we review the application of 
constitutional principles to those facts de novo."  State v. 
Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶9, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625 (internal 
citations omitted).   
 
 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
9 
 
III 
¶15 Brockdorf claims that the incriminating statement she 
made on October 3 was coerced and therefore inadmissible under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  She rests her coerced statement claim on Garrity, 
385 U.S. 493. 
¶16 The Fifth Amendment states that no person "shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."  
U.S. Const. amend. V.  The Fifth Amendment is applied to each 
state through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
U.S. 1, 8 (1964).  The privilege against self-incrimination is 
generally not self-executing.  Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 
420, 427-29 (1984); Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 
(1976).  When a witness chooses not to remain silent in the face 
of questioning, "his choice is considered to be voluntary since 
he was free to claim the privilege and would suffer no penalty 
as the result of his decision to do so."  Murphy, 465 U.S. at 
429. 
 
However, 
"application 
of 
this 
general 
rule 
is 
inappropriate in certain well-defined situations [where] some 
identifiable factor was held to deny the individual a free 
choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer."  Id. 
(internal quotations omitted).  One such situation is the so-
called "penalty" case, where the state seeks to induce a witness 
to "forgo the Fifth Amendment privilege by threatening to impose 
economic or other sanctions 'capable of forcing the self-
incrimination which the Amendment forbids.'"  Id. at 434 
(quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977)).  
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
10 
 
Between 1967 and 1977, the Supreme Court heard a number of these 
types of cases providing for a "penalty" exception; one of the 
first such cases was Garrity, 385 U.S. 493.3   
¶17 In Garrity, the Supreme Court of New Jersey directed 
the State's Attorney General to investigate allegations of 
fixing traffic tickets by New Jersey police officers.  Id. at 
494.  A state statute in force at the time required public 
employees to cooperate with investigations or such employee 
would be subject to removal from office and the loss of his or 
her pension.  Id. at 494 n.1.  Before the officers were 
questioned, they were also verbally warned of the following: (1) 
anything said could be used against the officer; (2) the officer 
could refuse to respond if the answer would incriminate him; but 
(3) a refusal to respond would subject the officer to removal 
from office.  Id. at 494.  The officers fully cooperated with 
the investigation and answered all of the questions posed to 
them.  Id. at 495.  Over their objections, some of the officers' 
statements given in the investigation were used against them in 
a later criminal proceeding.  Id.  The officers were convicted 
and they appealed, claiming their statements were coerced 
because a failure to answer subjected them to job termination.  
Id. 
                                                 
3 See Stephen D. Clymer, Compelled Statements From Police 
Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1309, 1315-16 
n.16 (2001), for citations to the other "penalty" cases of this 
era.   
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
11 
 
¶18 In a five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that statements given under threat of 
discharge from public employment are compelled and may not be 
used 
in 
subsequent 
criminal 
proceedings. 
 
Id. 
at 
500.  
Characterizing the situation as one in which the officers were 
forced 
to 
choose 
between 
"self-incrimination 
or 
job 
forfeiture[,]" the Supreme Court stated the issue as follows:  
"The question is whether the accused was deprived of his 'free 
choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.'"  Id. at 496 
(quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941)).  
The option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay 
the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of 
free choice to speak out or to remain silent.  That 
practice, like interrogation practices we reviewed in 
Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464-465 
[(1966)], is "likely to exert such pressure upon an 
individual as to disable him from making a free and 
rational choice."  We think the statements were 
infected by the coercion inherent in this scheme of 
questioning and cannot be sustained as voluntary under 
our prior decisions. 
Id. at 497-98 (internal footnote omitted).  The Court ultimately 
concluded that "the protection of the individual under the 
Fourteenth Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use in 
subsequent criminal proceedings of statements obtained under 
threat of removal from office, and that it extends to all, 
whether they are policemen or other members of our body 
politic."  Id. at 500. 
¶19 In 
the 
words 
of 
the 
dissent, 
"[t]he 
majority 
employe[d] a curious mixture of doctrines to invalidate these 
convictions."  Id. at 501 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Seemingly, 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
12 
 
the majority offered two rationales for its decision:  (1) the 
statements were inadmissible under the Due Process Clause as 
coerced confessions; and (2) the state's threat to fire the 
officers unless they gave statements was an unconstitutional 
condition.4  Stephen D. Clymer, Compelled Statements From Police 
Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1309, 1317 
(2001).  The Court did, however, later compare the officers' 
compelled 
statements 
to 
immunized 
testimony, 
which 
is 
inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  Id. at 1317 n.31 (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 
414 U.S. 70 (1973)).  As Professor Clymer notes, lower courts 
followed suit "describing Garrity as a case involving a 
privilege and compelled statements as 'immunized.'"  Id. at 
1318, 1318 nn.32 & 33. 
¶20 This court has not had much occasion to analyze and 
apply Garrity, save for the decision of Oddsen, 108 Wis. 2d 143.  
In Oddsen, a male and female officer were discharged for 
violating the adultery statute.  Id. at 145.  The officers' 
discharge was based on admissions each made during separate 
custodial interrogations that they had sexual intercourse with 
                                                 
4 See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1963) 
("There are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a 
State may not condition by the exaction of a price.").  "The 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits governments from 
conditioning 
government-sponsored 
benefits 
on 
recipients' 
willingness to engage in or abstain from activity that the 
Constitution 
shields 
from 
direct 
government 
interference."  
Clymer, Compelled Statements From Police Officers and Garrity 
Immunity, at 1348.   
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
13 
 
each other on three separate occasions.  Id.  Officer Gail Quade 
(Quade) made her statement after 14 hours of interrogation, 
during which time she complained of severe stomach pains, 
vomited blood, and was told she could not see her doctor until 
they were done interrogating her.  Id. at 150-51.  Quade was 
told to "submit to the investigation or be subject to further 
charges."  Id. at 148-49.  Further, it was "undisputed that she 
knew that her failure to answer questions could result in her 
discharge."  Id. at 149.  Similarly, Officer Timothy Oddsen 
(Oddsen) made his statement after being questioned in excess of 
13 hours and without having slept for nearly two days.  Id. at 
151.  Both of the officers were also denied counsel despite 
their requests for one.  Id. at 157.  Furthermore, "Oddsen, like 
Quade, knew, and in fact was told, that the failure to answer 
questions truthfully could result in being discharged from the 
police force."  Id. at 154.   
¶21 After considering these facts, we held that "the 
confessions extracted from Quade and Oddsen, as a matter of fact 
and law, were coerced, involuntary, the result of denial of due 
process, and contrary to fundamental principles of decency and 
fair play."  Id. at 146.  We further concluded that the 
officers' statements were coerced and inadmissible as a matter 
of law under Garrity.  Id. at 165. 
In the instant case, it is clear that both Oddsen 
and Quade knew that they could be fired if they 
refused to answer the questions.  It is equally clear 
that they were not told that, were they to speak, the 
statements they gave could not be used against them in 
a 
prosecution 
for 
adultery. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
14 
 
statements they gave were barred as a matter of law. 
Absent the advice that they could not be prosecuted on 
the basis of the statement given, their statement was 
the product of a coercive choice.  They were truly 
between Scylla and Charybdis.  If they did not speak, 
they knew that they would be fired.5  If they spoke, 
what they said could lead to prosecution, and most 
likely, in any event, to conviction and dismissal from 
their jobs.  Absent the warning spelled out in 
[Confederation of Police v.] Conlisk, [489 F.2d 891 
(7th Cir. (1973)] these coerced statements cannot be 
used. . . . If 
a statement is 
taken under 
these 
conditions, i.e., a threat of job forfeiture, a 
defendant is given immunity from prosecution, at least 
to the extent that the statement could be the basis 
for the prosecution.  Accordingly, in the instant 
case, in order to prevent the statement being excluded 
as a matter of law, where its purpose is discipline, 
it 
was 
incumbent 
upon 
the 
interrogating 
police 
officers 
to 
advise: . . . "the 
employee 
of 
the 
consequences of his choice, i.e., that failure to 
answer will result in dismissal but that answers he 
gives and fruits thereof cannot be used against him in 
criminal proceedings." 
Id. at 164-65 (quoting Conlisk, 489 F.2d at 894).  Thus, without 
even considering the egregious facts of the interrogation, the 
statements were inadmissible as a matter of law because the 
officers' Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
was essentially eradicated under the duress of an expressly 
stated 
"choice" 
between 
self-incrimination 
or 
the 
known 
possibility of job termination for remaining silent.  In other 
words, it was expressly communicated to the officers that a 
failure to answer the questions posed could actually result in 
their termination.  As discussed further below, such a threat 
                                                 
5 From all indications from the prior language in the 
opinion, the Oddsen court inadvertently used the phrase "would 
be fired" as opposed to "could be fired."    
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
15 
 
was not communicated to Brockdorf, and she could not have been 
fired for choosing to remain silent. 
¶22 Turning specifically now to the facts of this case, it 
is undisputed that there was no express threat that Brockdorf 
would be dismissed if she refused to answer the questions posed 
to her by Harrison and Wick.  However, Brockdorf takes the 
position that such a threat was implied when looking at the 
totality of the circumstances as determined by the circuit 
court.  Under the circumstances, Brockdorf argues she had to 
answer the questions in the interview or face termination, and 
therefore, she was in the same position as the officers in 
Garrity. 
¶23 Conversely, the State argues that Garrity does not 
apply in the present action as the circumstances between the two 
cases are significantly different in the following respects:  
(1) There is no Wisconsin statute providing that an officer will 
be fired for exercising his or her right to silence during the 
course of an internal affairs investigation; (2) There is no MPD 
policy or regulation providing that an officer has the choice 
between self-incrimination or job forfeiture; and (3) Brockdorf 
was never told by her interviewers that she faced this choice.  
The State contends Garrity applies to situations where an 
express threat of job loss was conveyed to the officer who might 
otherwise have chosen to remain silent.   
¶24 As one court has noted, "[w]here the state has 
directly presented the defendant with the Hobson's choice of 
either making an incriminating statement or being fired, 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
16 
 
application of Garrity to suppress the statement is clear-cut.  
However, in cases where the state did not make a direct threat 
of 
termination, 
application 
of 
Garrity 
becomes 
more 
problematic."  United States v. Camacho, 739 F. Supp. 1504, 1515 
(S.D. Fla. 1990).  In this case, we must now confront this 
problematic situation.   
¶25 Several federal and state jurisdictions have adopted a 
two-part subjective/objective analysis to determine if Garrity 
immunity applies.  In other words, "in order for statements to 
be considered compelled by threat of discharge, (1) a person 
must subjectively believe that he will be fired for asserting 
the 
privilege, 
and 
(2) 
that 
belief 
must 
be 
objectively 
reasonable under the circumstances."  People v. Sapp, 934 P.2d 
1367, 1372 (Colo. 1997).  The case frequently cited for this 
analysis is United States v. Friedrick, 842 F.2d 382, 395 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988) (The defendant "must have in fact believed his [] 
statements to be compelled on threat of loss of job and this 
belief must have been objectively reasonable.").  See also 
McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Vangates, 287 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Najarian, 915 F. Supp. 1460, 1478-79 (D. Minn. 
1996); Camacho, 739 F. Supp. 1504; State v. Connor, 861 P.2d 
1212 (Idaho 1993); State v. Lacaillade, 630 A.2d 328, 332 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) ("Fear that loss of employment will 
result from the exercise of the constitutional right to remain 
silent must be subjectively real and objectively reasonable."); 
State v. Chavarria, 33 P.3d 922 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).  Thus, 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
17 
 
cases applying the subjective/objective test have determined 
that "Garrity may be applied to render statements inadmissible 
even where the threat of termination is implied rather than 
explicit."  Camacho, 739 F. Supp. at 1520.   
¶26 Other courts have applied a similar standard for 
analyzing the reach of Garrity without embracing a specific 
test.  For example, in United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711, 
715 (1st Cir. 1980), a police officer claimed that he was 
entitled 
to 
Garrity 
immunity 
because 
he 
was 
implicitly 
threatened with termination for refusing to answer questions in 
an investigation.  Id.  The officer based this claim on the 
state police department rules, with which the officer was 
thoroughly familiar, that provided for the dismissal of any 
officer who refused to obey the lawful order of superiors.  Id.  
The First Circuit rejected the officer's claim, concluding that 
nothing in the record suggested that the rules meant an officer 
who refused on Fifth Amendment grounds to comply with an order 
to provide self-incriminating statements would be dismissed.  
Id. at 716.  The Indorato court noted that the officer was not 
"within the ambit of the coerced testimony doctrine" of Garrity: 
In all of the cases flowing from Garrity, there 
are two common features:  (1) the person being 
investigated is explicitly told that failure to waive 
his constitutional right against self-incrimination 
will result in his discharge from public employment 
(or a similarly severe sanction imposed in the case of 
private citizens); and (2) there is a statute or 
municipal ordinance mandating such procedure.  In this 
case, there was no explicit "or else" choice and no 
statutorily mandated firing is involved.  We do not 
think that the subjective fears of defendant as to 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
18 
 
what might happen if he refused to answer his superior 
officers are sufficient to bring him within Garrity's 
cloak of protection. 
Id. at 716. 
¶27 At least one jurisdiction has interpreted Indorato and 
Friedrick as applying two distinct lines of authority.  State v. 
Stinson, 536 S.E.2d 293, 295 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) ("[Courts] have 
developed two distinct lines of authority, one [Indorato] 
requiring an explicit threat of termination and mandatory 
termination for a failure to cooperate and the other [Friedrick] 
requiring an objectively reasonable, subjective belief on the 
part of the officer that he must answer questions or lose his 
job.").  
¶28 There is also authority that suggests the Indorato 
court essentially applied a subjective/objective test without 
explicitly naming it as such.  See Vangates, 287 F.3d at 1322 
n.7 ("Effectively . . . the First Circuit [in Indorato] found 
that the officer's subjective belief that his testimony was 
compelled was not objectively reasonable.").  
¶29 In our view, the analyses of Friedrick and Indorato 
are functionally equivalent.  Although the First Circuit did not 
explicitly adopt a subjective/objective test in Indorato, the 
court essentially concluded that the implied threat the officer 
subjectively believed in was not objectively reasonable without 
an actual, overt threat of termination for invoking the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
¶30 A number of jurisdictions, citing to Indorato, have 
concluded that when there is no overt threat of termination——
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
19 
 
either through a direct communication of the threat or through a 
statute, regulation or settled practice to that effect——for an 
officer who elects to use his Fifth Amendment rights, Garrity 
does not apply.  That is, where dismissal is not "an imminent 
consequence of failing to answer questions[,]" People v. Coutu, 
599 N.W.2d 556, 561 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999), Garrity immunity will 
not attach.  Thus, these courts have given Garrity a very narrow 
interpretation.  See, e.g., People v. Bynum, 512 N.E.2d 826 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Commonwealth v. Harvey, 491 N.E.2d 607, 
611 (Mass. 1986) ("[T]he fact that there existed the possibility 
of 
adverse 
consequences 
from 
the 
defendant's 
failure 
to 
cooperate 
does 
not 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
defendant 
was 
'compelled' to incriminate himself."); Coutu, 599 N.W.2d  at 561 
("We find that because there was no overt threat of employment 
termination in the event that defendants chose to remain silent 
instead of answering questions as part of the investigation, 
Garrity 
does 
not 
apply, 
and 
suppression 
of 
defendants' 
statements was error."); State v. Litvin, 794 A.2d 806 (N.H. 
2002).   
¶31 Brockdorf contends that the subjective/objective test 
is the appropriate analysis for determining whether an officer's 
statement 
given 
during 
an 
internal 
investigation 
was 
unconstitutionally coerced and therefore inadmissible in a 
subsequent criminal trial.  In regards to the application of the 
subjective component of the proposed test, Brockdorf notes that 
a court can make a finding of subjective belief in the same way 
it makes a finding of credibility.  State v. Owens, 148 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
20 
 
Wis. 2d 922, 933, 436 N.W.2d 869 (1989) ("The defendant's state 
of mind or belief is an historical fact and is reviewed by the 
clearly erroneous or against the great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence standard."). 
¶32 As for the objective component of the test, Brockdorf 
contends that "a necessary prerequisite to concluding that a 
subjective belief is objectively reasonable is that the belief 
derived from actions taken by the state."  Camacho, 739 F. Supp. 
at 1515; accord United States v. Montanye, 500 F.2d 411, 415 (2d 
Cir. 1974) ("The controlling factor is . . . the fact that the 
state has involved itself in the use of a substantial economic 
threat to coerce a person into furnishing an incriminating 
statement.").  Under Brockdorf's proposed analysis, any type of 
coercive action on behalf of the state is apparently sufficient 
to conclude that the officer's subjective belief is objectively 
reasonable. 
¶33 Cases from other jurisdictions have detailed the 
objective component of the subjective/objective test with more 
specificity than merely that the coerciveness arose from state 
action.  See, e.g., Vangates, 287 F.3d at 1322 ("In making this 
[objective] determination, we examine (as we must) the totality 
of the circumstances surrounding the testimony."); Sapp, 934 
P.2d at 1373 ("In order for such a belief to be objectively 
reasonable the belief must result from some significant coercive 
action of the state.  The action of the state must be more 
coercive than that resulting from the general obligation imposed 
on a witness to give truthful testimony."); Chavarria, 33 P.3d 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
21 
 
at 927 (quoting Camacho, 739 F. Supp. at 1515) ("In applying the 
test we 'examine the totality of the circumstances.'").   
¶34 For its part, the State argues that Garrity should be 
interpreted narrowly and applied to situations where an express 
threat of job loss was conveyed to the officer who might 
otherwise have chosen to remain silent.  Under the State's 
analysis, 
Garrity 
immunity 
clearly 
does 
not 
attach 
to 
Brockdorf's statement, and the question then becomes whether 
Brockdorf's statement was voluntary under the totality of the 
circumstances.   
¶35 After reviewing the abundant case law interpreting 
Garrity, we elect to adopt the two-pronged subjective/objective 
test, as we believe it provides the most useful mode of analysis 
for determining whether, as a matter of law, an officer's 
statements given in a criminal investigation are coerced and 
involuntary, and therefore subject to suppression under Garrity.  
Thus, in order for statements to be considered sufficiently 
compelled such that Garrity immunity attaches, a police officer 
must subjectively believe he or she will be fired for asserting 
the privilege against self-incrimination, and that belief must 
be 
objectively 
reasonable. 
 
The 
determination 
of 
the 
voluntariness of a statement is a question of constitutional 
fact, which is a mixed question of fact and law reviewed with a 
two-step process.  State v. Hajicek, 2001 WI 3, ¶¶14-15, 240 
Wis. 2d 349, 620 N.W.2d 781.  We review the circuit court's 
findings 
of 
historical 
fact 
under 
the 
clearly 
erroneous 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
22 
 
standard, 
while 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determinations 
of 
constitutional fact are reviewed de novo.  Id., ¶15. 
¶36 In applying this analysis, we must ultimately examine 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements, 
State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 235-36, 401 N.W.2d 759 
(1987).  However, in accordance with the analysis of Indorato 
and its progeny, an express threat of job termination or a 
statute, regulation, rule, or policy in effect at the time of 
the questioning which provides for an officer's termination for 
failing to answer the questions posed, will be a sufficient 
circumstance to constitute coercion in almost any conceivable 
situation.  We believe that the subjective/objective test we 
adopt today is most in line with the original intent of Garrity. 
¶37 We now apply this test to the case before us.  
Brockdorf testified at the motion hearing that she figured she 
would later be fired if she elected not to talk to the 
detectives on October 3.  The circuit court found this testimony 
credible.  As this finding of fact was not clearly erroneous, we 
cannot overturn this decision.  Owens, 148 Wis. 2d at 933.  
Therefore, the subjective prong of the analysis is satisfied.    
The issue to be resolved is whether this subjective belief was 
objectively reasonable. 
¶38 First, we consider whether an express threat was 
communicated to Brockdorf or if a statute, rule, regulation, or 
policy actually existed.  It is undisputed that neither Harrison 
nor Wick expressly threatened Brockdorf with the loss of her job 
for choosing to exercise her right to remain silent in the 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
23 
 
interrogation.  Additionally, there is no state law, ordinance, 
departmental regulation, or longstanding departmental policy 
that forces an officer to choose between job loss and self-
incrimination.  Thus, if Brockdorf had elected to exercise her 
Fifth 
Amendment 
privilege 
against 
self-incrimination, 
termination would not have automatically followed for that 
reason.  In other words, "dismissal was not an imminent 
consequence of failing to respond."  Coutu, 599 N.W.2d at 559.   
¶39 Next, we consider the other facts and circumstances of 
this case and examine whether we are presented with a situation 
where the lack of an express threat is inconsequential when 
compared to the totality of the circumstances.  We conclude this 
case does not present such a drastic situation.  First, it is 
important to note that Brockdorf was not in custody at the time 
of the interview, and therefore, Miranda warnings were not 
required.  Also, Brockdorf was questioned pursuant to a criminal 
investigation as opposed to a personnel investigation.  The MPD 
Policies and Procedures Manual6 clearly provides a detailed set 
of 
rules 
that 
investigators 
must 
follow 
for 
personnel 
investigations apart from criminal investigations.  In personnel 
investigations, police officers may legitimately be compelled to 
                                                 
6 After oral argument and pursuant to an order dated October 
14, 2005, the parties submitted to the court the relevant 
provisions of the MPD Policies and Procedures Manual.  Pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 902.01, in our discretion, we elect to take 
judicial notice of this document, which is "capable of accurate 
and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned."  Wis. Stat. § 902.01(2)(b) 
(2003-04).   
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
24 
 
answer questions with the threat of job termination as long as 
those statements are not used against the officer in a 
subsequent criminal proceeding.7  These are the warnings mandated 
by Garrity, and prior to the interview, they are explicitly laid 
out to the officer in a PI-21 report that the officer must sign 
prior to the investigation.8  In this case, the record shows that 
Brockdorf was interviewed as part of a criminal and not a 
                                                 
7 The state, of course, can compel a public employee to 
answer questions in a formal or informal proceeding by 
granting that employee immunity from future criminal 
prosecution based on the answers given.  Such immunity 
is the equivalent of the protection afforded an 
officer under Garrity, and is referred to as "use 
immunity."  Ultimately, however, the state must decide 
whether to demand a statement from an employee on job-
related matters, in which case it may not use the 
statement in a criminal prosecution. 
United States v. Vangates, 286 F.3d 1315, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(internal citations omitted). 
8 This form reads in pertinent part as follows: 
1.) The Milwaukee Police Department is presently 
investigating you concerning –  
2.) Disciplinary action may result. 
3.) This is an internal investigation, and the 
answers you give, or the fruits thereof, cannot 
be used against you in a criminal proceeding. 
 . . . . 
5.) Refusal to respond during this investigation, or 
any response, which is untruthful, could result 
in your 
suspension 
or termination 
from the 
Milwaukee Police Department. 
Milwaukee Police Department Rules and Procedures Manual, Form 
PI-21:  "Internal Investigation Informing the Member."   
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
25 
 
personnel investigation, and Harrison informed Brockdorf of the 
nature of the investigation prior to interviewing her.  Indeed, 
it is not surprising that Harrison did not give an offer of 
Garrity immunity because as an internal affairs investigator who 
always works on criminal matters as opposed to personnel 
matters, she never has to make such offers or complete PI-21 
forms. 
¶40 Brockdorf highlights some of the General Rules and 
Regulations of the MPD Policies and Procedures Manual, as 
support for her position that it was objectively reasonable for 
her to believe her job was in jeopardy.  These rules generally 
speak to an officer's duty to obey a lawful order of a superior 
officer. 
 
We 
are 
not 
persuaded 
that 
these 
rules 
were 
sufficiently 
coercive 
as 
to 
render 
Brockdorf's 
statement 
involuntary.  See Sapp, 934 P.2d at 1372 ("[C]ourts applying 
Garrity in non-automatic penalty situations have emphasized that 
ordinary job pressures, such as the possibility of discipline or 
discharge for insubordination, are not sufficient to support an 
objectively reasonable expectation of discharge.").  
¶41 Furthermore, Brockdorf has never argued that she 
confused the criminal battery investigation with a personnel 
inquiry or that the officers expressly did anything to cause her 
to 
believe 
the 
interview 
concerned 
a 
personnel 
matter.  
Ignorance of the MPD Rules and Procedures Manual is not a 
sufficient defense for a police officer.   
¶42 Brockdorf points to the following facts, which she 
claims render objectively reasonable her subjective belief that 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
26 
 
she would be terminated if she invoked her Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination:  (1) she was ordered by a 
supervisor to report to IAD; (2) she was a target of the 
investigation contrary to the testimony of Harrison; and (3) she 
was threatened with a charge of obstructing an officer if she 
failed to cooperate by providing a statement.   
¶43 In our view, however, the only "significant coercive 
action of the state[,]" Sapp, 934 P.2d at 1373, that Brockdorf 
can point to is the alleged threat Harrison and Wilk made to 
Brockdorf to talk or get charged with obstructing.  Without an 
express threat of termination, however, we conclude that this 
admonishment did not deprive Brockdorf of her right to make a 
free and reasoned decision to remain silent.  In other words, 
Brockdorf's belief that she would be terminated for maintaining 
silence remained objectively unreasonable.  Under the totality 
of the circumstances, we conclude that Brockdorf felt compelled 
to give a statement because:  (1) she had lied to investigators 
in September about her partner's criminal conduct; (2) she 
realized she had been caught in the lie; and (3) she concluded 
the best course of action at that time was to confess to the 
truth as opposed to continuing to lie or remaining silent.  
Nothing that Harrison or Wick did was objectively coercive 
enough for us to conclude that Brockdorf's statement was 
involuntary under Garrity.  Subjectively believing that a charge 
of obstructing an officer might lead to an eventual dismissal 
somewhere down the line does not mean that it was objectively 
reasonable to conclude that the right to remain silent on 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
27 
 
October 3 was effectively eradicated. Given the fact that 
Brockdorf had already lied to Harrison in her first interview, 
Brockdorf could have reasonably concluded that her job was in 
jeopardy, but again she still had the choice to remain silent in 
the 
second 
interview. 
 
When 
we 
objectively 
analyze 
the 
circumstances before Brockdorf, we conclude that Brockdorf was 
not forced to choose between "the rock and the whirlpool[,]" 
Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496.  Her statement was, as a matter of 
law, voluntary.  
IV 
¶44 If any other citizen had made the statement Brockdorf 
did in a similar non-custodial, criminal investigation, a court 
would have no difficulty in concluding such statement was 
voluntary as a matter of law.  Essentially, Brockdorf is looking 
for greater constitutional protection than the average citizen 
because she is a police officer; we do not interpret the Fifth 
Amendment or Garrity as providing the expansive protection 
Brockdorf asks for.   
¶45 Today, we adopt a two-pronged subjective/objective 
test for determining whether, as a matter of law, an officer's 
statements given in a criminal investigation are coerced and 
involuntary, and therefore subject to suppression under Garrity.  
Under this test, we examine the totality of the circumstances, 
but an express threat of job termination or a statute, 
regulation, rule, or policy in effect at the time of the 
questioning, which provides for an officer's termination for 
failing to answer the questions posed, will be a sufficient 
No. 
2004AP1519-CR   
 
28 
 
circumstance to constitute coercion in almost any conceivable 
situation.  Using this analysis, we conclude Brockdorf's 
incriminating statement was not unconstitutionally coerced under 
the Fifth Amendment, and Garrity immunity does not apply.  As 
such, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
No.  2004AP1519-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶46 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
sets forth the test to determine whether, as a matter of law, a 
police officer's statements given in a criminal investigation 
are coerced, and therefore subject to suppression under Garrity 
v. New Jersey,1 385 U.S. 493 (1967).  The majority opinion 
articulates the test as follows:  "in order for statements to be 
considered sufficiently compelled such that Garrity immunity 
attaches, a police officer must subjectively believe he or she 
will be fired for asserting the privilege against self-
incrimination, and that belief must be objectively reasonable."  
Majority op., ¶35.  The majority then sets forth a framework 
within which to apply this subjective/objective test: 
Under this test, we examine the totality of the 
circumstances, 
but 
an 
express 
threat 
of 
job 
termination or a statute, regulation, rule, or policy 
in effect at the time of the questioning which 
provides for an officer's termination for failing to 
answer 
the 
questions 
posed, 
will 
be 
sufficient 
circumstance to constitute coercion in almost any 
conceivable situation. 
Id., ¶3 (emphasis added).  I agree wholeheartedly with the test 
laid out by the majority.  I write separately because it is my 
belief that Vanessa Brockdorf's (Brockdorf) circumstances fall 
                                                 
1 In Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), the United 
States Supreme Court considered a case in which police officers 
who were the subject of an investigation were given the choice 
to incriminate themselves or to face termination.  The Supreme 
Court held that, under those circumstances, the confessions 
elicited 
from 
the 
officers 
were 
coerced, 
and 
therefore 
inadmissible in any subsequent criminal prosecution under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
No.  2004AP1519-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
squarely within that test.2  She received no warnings, either 
those required by Miranda v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 436 (1966) had 
she been in custody, nor those required by Garrity, and 
reasonably believed that she could face a criminal charge and 
ultimately termination of her job as a Milwaukee police officer, 
if she invoked her privilege against self-incrimination, and 
thus failed to cooperate by answering the questions posed by the 
internal affairs detectives.  If what occurred here is not 
coercion, without any of the required warnings, then I don't 
know what is.  Her subsequent statement, given under such 
circumstances, was properly suppressed by the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court, since it was not a voluntary statement.  Applying 
a totality of the circumstances approach, what occurred here was 
clearly coercive in nature, and certainly was not voluntary 
under the Garrity decision.  Consistent with this court's 
holding in Oddsen v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners for 
the City of Milwaukee, 108 Wis. 2d 143, 321 N.W.2d 161 (1982), 
the 
statement 
extracted 
from 
Brockdorf 
was 
"coerced, 
involuntary, the result of a denial of due process, and contrary 
to fundamental principles of decency and fair play."  Oddsen at 
146. 
¶47 When Brockdorf arrived at work on October 3, 2002, she 
was ordered by her sergeant to report to internal affairs.  
                                                 
2 The majority opinion appropriately concludes that Vanessa 
Brockdorf (Brockdorf) satisfied the subjective portion of the 
test.  See majority op., ¶37.  I take issue only with the 
majority's conclusion that Brockdorf's subjective belief was 
objectively unreasonable.  Majority op., ¶43.   
No.  2004AP1519-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
Brockdorf testified that she immediately went to internal 
affairs, where Detectives Harrison and Wick informed her that 
they 
wanted 
to 
"requestion 
[her] 
regarding 
the 
battery, 
regarding [her] partner."   
 
¶48 While it is undisputed that neither Detective Harrison 
nor Detective Wick made any statement to the effect that 
Brockdorf would be terminated if she refused to answer their 
questions, as the majority has explained such an express threat 
is not necessary to support an objectively reasonable fear of 
termination.  Any "regulation, rule, or policy in effect at the 
time of the questioning which provides for an officer's 
termination for failing to answer the questions posed, will be 
sufficient circumstance to constitute coercion in almost any 
conceivable situation."  Majority op., ¶3.  The Milwaukee Police 
Department Policies and Procedures themselves clearly lend ample 
support 
to 
the 
objective 
reasonableness 
of 
Brockdorf's 
subjective belief that she would ultimately be fired, if she did 
not answer the questions of the detectives from internal 
affairs.   
¶49 The undisputed facts show that upon arriving at work, 
Brockdorf was ordered by her supervisor to report to internal 
affairs.  After requesting the presence of a police union 
representative, she sat for an hour without responding to the 
internal affairs detectives' questions.  Brockdorf soon became a 
target 
of 
the 
investigation, 
contrary 
to 
the 
initial 
representations of Detective Harrison.  Further, Brockdorf was 
No.  2004AP1519-CR.npc 
 
4 
 
threatened with a charge of obstructing an officer if she failed 
to cooperate by providing a statement. 
¶50 At the hearing on the motion to suppress her October 
3, 2003 statement, the following occurred:   
[Attorney Kohler:] Be specific on who said what to 
you, if you recall. 
[Officer Brockdorf:]  
Well 
what 
I 
recall 
is 
I 
remember I was up there for like an hour before I even 
said anything, because I said, "I don’t want to talk 
without a union rep."  And I don’t remember who said 
it, but they were both saying to me——I remember they 
both said to me, "If you don’t talk now, you’re going 
to get charged with obstructing."  And I went back and 
forth on if I should wait.  But then I was like, well, 
I don’t want to get charged with obstructing.  
Q 
Did you feel as a police officer you had to 
answer their questions? 
A 
Yes.  Because I would have been charged with 
obstructing if I didn’t. 
Q 
Is that the only reason you answered their 
questions? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
Did you think what would happen to you if you 
were charged with obstructing? 
A 
Well they always say in the academy that you get 
fired for lying, that it’s a grave disqualification. 
. . . . 
Q 
Other than being charged [with obstructing], did 
you fear for your job at that point? 
A 
Yes, because I didn’t——first I wasn’t the target, 
and then all of a sudden I became the target of this 
investigation.  
Q 
What did you think was going to happen to you if 
you didn’t talk to them, other than being charged with 
obstructing? 
No.  2004AP1519-CR.npc 
 
5 
 
A 
I figured I’d later be fired. 
Q 
So are those the two reasons why you consented to 
the interview? 
A 
Yes. 
¶51 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 946.41 
(2003-04) 
provides, 
in 
relevant part: "Resisting or obstructing officer.  (1) Whoever 
knowingly resists or obstructs an officer while such officer is 
doing any act in an official capacity and with lawful authority, 
is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor."  Being charged with a Class 
A 
misdemeanor 
violates 
Milwaukee 
Police 
Department 
(MPD) 
Policies and Procedures,3 Rule 2/015.00, which requires that 
"[m]embers of the police force shall . . . conform to, abide by 
and enforce all the criminal laws of the State of Wisconsin and 
the ordinances of the city of Milwaukee. . . ."  Furthermore, as 
a member of the MPD, Brockdorf was required to "promptly obey 
any lawful order emanating from any officer of higher rank. . . 
."  MPD Policies and Procedures, Rule 4, Section 2/030.00.  A 
Milwaukee police officer may be terminated based upon the 
violation of such rules.  Rule 1, Section 1/010.20 provides, in 
relevant part, "[t]he Chief of Police may at his discretion 
punish by dismissal, demotion, or suspension any member of the 
Department 
guilty 
of 
violating 
any 
of 
its 
rules 
and 
                                                 
3 The several Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) regulations, 
rules and policies I cite are variously referred to in MPD 
materials 
as 
"General 
Rules 
and 
Regulations," 
"Rules 
& 
Procedures," and "Policies and Procedures." For the sake of 
consistency, I will refer to them, collectively, as "Policies 
and Procedures."  The MPD Policies and Procedures referred to in 
this opinion were either submitted by the parties, or were taken 
from the Milwaukee Police Department web site.  Available at:  
http://www.city.milwaukee.gov/display/router.asp?docid=5011. 
No.  2004AP1519-CR.npc 
 
6 
 
regulations."  In addition, obstructing or failing to give the 
statement demanded could place Brockdorf in violation of Rule 4, 
Section 2/010.00, which states in relevant part "Failure on the 
part of members of the Department to acquaint themselves with 
and abide by the provisions of the Department's Rules and 
Procedures Manual as hereby directed shall be considered neglect 
of duty and shall subject such members to disciplinary action." 
¶52 Similarly, a charge of obstructing or failing to give 
the statement demanded could also violate Rule 4, Section 
2/110.00, requiring that "Members of the Department shall 
communicate 
promptly 
to 
their 
commanding 
officer 
all 
catastrophes, crimes . . . which may come to their attention.  
Members shall not withhold 'tips' or information with a view to 
personal achievement or for any other reason."  In addition, 
obstructing or failing to give the statement demanded could be 
considered a violation of Rule 4, Section 2/035.00, which 
requires that members of the MPD "promptly communicate in 
writing to their commanding officer any violation of the 
Department Rules and Procedures Manual or disobedience of others 
by any other member that may come to their knowledge."  
Moreover, obstructing or failing to give the statement demanded 
could legitimately be considered "shrink[ing] from . . . 
responsibility" in violation of Rule 4, Section 2/050.00, which 
results in one being "considered guilty of gross neglect of duty 
and unworthy of a place in the service."   
 
¶53 Brockdorf knew that internal affairs wanted to meet 
with her.  She was told that if she failed to respond to the 
No.  2004AP1519-CR.npc 
 
7 
 
investigators' questions, she would be charged with obstructing. 
In light of the MPD Policies and Procedures, it was objectively 
reasonable for Brockdorf to believe that she faced a Garrity-
like choice of self-incrimination or job forfeiture.  Garrity, 
385 U.S. at 469.  As the Garrity Court explained, "[w]here the 
choice is 'between the rock and the whirlpool,' duress is 
inherent in deciding to 'waive' one or the other."  Id. at 498. 
¶54 The majority emphasizes the fact that "Brockdorf was 
questioned pursuant to a criminal investigation as opposed to a 
personnel investigation."  Majority op., ¶39 (emphasis in 
original).  Only in personnel investigations, the majority 
opinion claims, does the MPD Policies and Procedures Manual 
require Garrity warnings.4  Id.  Therefore, the majority 
concludes, it was unreasonable for Brockdorf to believe she 
faced termination if she failed to answer internal affairs' 
questions.  However, the majority opinion fails to be persuasive 
when it claims that Brockdorf knew she was being interviewed 
only 
as 
part 
of 
a 
criminal, 
rather 
than 
a 
personnel, 
investigation.  Where in the record is it established that she 
understood such meaningful distinction where internal affairs 
was involved?  Nowhere in the record before us. 
¶55 The 
direct 
examination 
of 
Detective 
Harrison 
establishes 
that 
the 
internal 
affairs 
division 
has 
                                                 
4 The Garrity warnings used by the MPD provide "'Refusal to 
respond during this investigation, or any response which is 
untruthful, could result in your suspension or termination from 
the Milwaukee Police Department.'"  Majority op., ¶39 n.8 
(citation omitted).   
No.  2004AP1519-CR.npc 
 
8 
 
responsibility 
to 
investigate 
both personnel 
and criminal 
matters. 
[Mr. Reddin:] How long have you been a Milwaukee 
police officer? 
[Detective Harrison:]  In April it will be 11 years. 
Q  And what is your current duty assignment? 
A  I'm a detective in internal affairs division. 
Q  And are you in the personnel side or the criminal 
side? 
A  Criminal side. 
We again emphasize that nothing in the record shows that it was 
made clear to Brockdorf that the investigation by internal 
affairs was criminal, and not a personnel matter.  As Detective 
Harrison further testified: 
[Attorney Reddin:]  And did you advise her prior to 
speaking to her about the nature of the investigation? 
[Detective Harrison:]  Yes. 
Q  What did you tell her? 
A I advised her that we wanted to question her 
regarding a use of force complaint and that she was 
not the target of the investigation. 
Such a statement certainly does not clearly indicate that the 
investigation was criminal in nature.  It appears that no one 
explained to Brockdorf the difference between a criminal and a 
personnel investigation by internal affairs.   
 
¶56 It is also apparent from Brockdorf's own testimony 
that she was confused as to the nature of the investigation that 
resulted in her questioning by internal affairs.   
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[Officer Brockdorf:] 
I said I didn't want to talk 
without a union rep. 
. . . . 
[Attorney Kohler:] And why did you want a union rep? 
A 
Because I didn't know what was going on, and I 
should have had a union rep the first time they talked 
to me. 
Furthermore, although the detectives might have indicated the 
questioning concerned the actions of her partner, during the 
course of her interview with internal affairs, as noted 
previously, it became clear to Brockdorf that she, herself, had 
now become the target of an investigation——one that she 
subjectively, and reasonably, believed could ultimately lead to 
her termination as a Milwaukee police officer.   
¶57 Therefore, while the record may arguably show that 
Brockdorf was interviewed on October 3, 2003, as part of a 
criminal, 
rather than 
a 
personnel, 
investigation, nothing 
establishes that Brockdorf herself understood such a significant 
distinction, nor could she reasonably be expected to understand 
the difference under the totality of the circumstances that 
occurred here.   
¶58 The MPD Policies and Procedures contain several rules 
that a charge of obstructing or failing to give the statement 
demanded could have violated, thus subjecting Brockdorf to 
disciplinary charges.  That, coupled with the fact that such 
disciplinary actions for such violations could result in 
termination, clearly establishes that "a . . . regulation, rule, 
or policy . . . which provides for an officer's termination for 
failing to answer the questions posed" was in effect at the time 
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Brockdorf was forced to choose.  Majority op., ¶3.  Her 
impossible 
choice 
was 
between 
self-incrimination 
and 
the 
resulting criminal charge of obstructing, or a charge of 
obstructing or failing to give the statement demanded.  Either 
way, the likely result was the ultimate termination of her job 
as a Milwaukee police officer.  Under the totality of the 
circumstances, it was objectively reasonable that Brockdorf 
subjectively believed she would ultimately face termination for 
failing to answer questions of the detectives from internal 
affairs, and her answers were, therefore, coerced, and Garrity 
applies.  Her statement was correctly suppressed by the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court, since it was inadmissible under 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.   
¶59 For the above stated reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶60 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
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¶61 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (dissenting).  I join the 
dissent of Justice N. Patrick Crooks, as I conclude there was 
compulsion in this case.  I write separately to emphasize the 
necessity 
and 
importance 
of 
police 
department 
internal 
investigations. 
¶62 Every criminal prosecution depends upon the quality 
and accuracy of the work done by those working in law 
enforcement.  Each police investigation must be carefully 
conducted to ensure that the guilty are apprehended and that the 
innocent go free.  Citizens regularly depend on law enforcement 
officers for aid, comfort and assistance.  Trust is the 
cornerstone of the relationship that law enforcement shares with 
the rest of the community. 
¶63 When that trust is broken, people lose respect for law 
enforcement.  Thus, it is critically important that law 
enforcement officers tell the truth at all times.  The integrity 
of individual officers is a necessary component of the criminal 
justice system.  Every investigation must be done in a thorough 
and thoughtful manner.  And when problems occur with individual 
officers in the performance of their duties, law enforcement 
must be able to police itself in a constitutionally permissible 
fashion.  Garrity1 warnings provide the mechanism for conducting 
internal investigations in a constitutionally permissible way. 
¶64 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.        
                                                 
1 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
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