Case Title: PRINCIPAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. SUMMIT WELL SERVICE, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRINCIPAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. SUMMIT WELL SERVICE, INC.2002 WY 17257 P.3d 1257Case Number: 01-183, 01-184Decided: 11/22/2002
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                
     

PRINCIPAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

 
 
  

Appellant(Third 
Party Defendant),

 

v.

 

SUMMIT 
WELL SERVICE, INC., a

corporation; 
ANN P. ALLEN, in her

capacity 
as the Personal Representative and

Executrix 
of the Estate of ROBERT M.

ALLEN, 
deceased; and ANN P. ALLEN,

individually,

                                                                                    

Appellees(Defendants/ThirdParty 
Plaintiffs).

 

BYRON R. WOODARD,

 
 
 

Appellant(Plaintiff/ThirdParty 
Defendant),

 

v.

PRINCIPAL 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

a corporation,

 
 

Appellee(Third 
Party Defendant).

 

Appeals 
from the District Court of Uinta County

The 
Honorable John D. Troughton, Judge

 

Representing 
Principal Life Insurance Company:

            
Peter K. Michael of Peter K. Michael, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming  

Representing 
Byron Woodard:

            
V. Anthony Vehar of Vehar Law Offices, P.C., Evanston, Wyoming

 
          

Representing 
Summit Well Service, Inc.:

Ray G. Martineau, Anthony R. Martineau, and Brett D. Cragun 
of Salt Lake City, Utah

 
 
              

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

* Chief Justice at time of oral argument

 
 
      

            
KITE, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      Upon the death of 
its insured, Robert Allen, Principal Life Insurance Company (Principal) 
delivered the proceeds under Mr. Allen's life insurance policy to his business 
associates, Brent Nelson and Byron Woodard.  Ann Allen, Mr. Allen's widow, claims the 
delivery to Mr. Nelson and Mr. Woodard was improper and the insurance policy 
proceeds should have been paid to her.  
She contends Summit Well Service, Inc., a Utah corporation owned solely 
by her late husband, was the named beneficiary under the policy and she, as the 
only authorized representative of the corporation after her husband's death, was 
entitled to the policy proceeds.  
Principal argues delivery to Mr. Nelson and Mr. Woodard was proper 
because the named beneficiary under the policy was Summit Well Service (Summit), 
a partnership consisting of Mr. Allen, Mr. Woodard, and Mr. Nelson.  After a bench trial, the trial court 
agreed with Mrs. Allen and ordered Principal to pay $1,516,046.74 (the amount of 
the policy plus interest, costs, and attorney's fees) to Mrs. Allen.  We reverse and 
remand.

 
    

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Principal, as the 
appellant in Case No. 01-183, raises the following issues:
   
        

I.  Whether 
the trial judge's conclusion that Principal breached the insurance contract was 
clearly erroneous[.]

II.  Whether 
the claims against Principal were barred by W.S. § 
26-15-102(d)[.]

III.  Whether 
the claims against Principal were barred by equitable 
estoppel[.]

IV.  Whether 
the claims against Principal were barred by ratification of the delivery of 
policy benefits[.]

V.  Whether 
the third party plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees and interest under 
W.S. § 26-15-124(c)[.]

VI.  Whether 
the trial judge abused his discretion in awarding over $220,000 in attorneys' 
fees[.]

VII[].  Whether 
the trial judge abused his discretion in awarding costs[.]

Summit Well Service, Inc., an appellee in Case No. 01-183, 
lists the same issues in its brief.

 
 
               

[¶3]      Mr. Woodard, the 
appellant in Case No. 01-184, presents the following 
issues:

A.  Did 
the district court err in its interpretation of the written contract between 
Robert M. Allen and Appellant Byron R. Woodard?

B.  Was 
the district court clearly erroneous in its finding that Appellant Woodard was 
guilty of intentional misrepresentation (deceit) in regard to the payment of 
death benefit proceeds by Principal Life Insurance Company to Summit Well 
Service by and through Brent Nelson?

Principal, 
as the appellee in Case No. 01-184, phrases the issues as:

            
I.  Whether Principal had any liability to Third Party 
Plaintiff Summit Well Service, Inc. that would create a basis for the 
cross-claim against Woodard[.]

            
II.  Whether Principal's cross-claim for indemnity could be 
based on fraud, as well as its other legal theories[.]

 
       
         

FACTS

 

[¶4]      In 1997, Mr. 
Allen was the sole shareholder, officer, and director of three companies:  Summit; Duel Production, Inc. (Duel); 
and Trans Pacific Investments, Inc., doing business as A.C.T. (A.C.T.).  During that year, Mr. Allen was also 
involved in business dealings with Mr. Woodard and Mr. Nelson relating to the 
three companies.  On July 2, 1997, 
in furtherance of their business dealings, Mr. Allen and Mr. Woodard and Mr. 
Allen and Mr. Nelson, respectively, entered into letter agreements intended to 
set out the parameters of their business relationships.  In the letter agreements, Mr. Allen 
agreed to transfer a twenty percent interest in Summit, Duel, and A.C.T. to Mr. 
Woodard and a forty percent interest in those entities to Mr. Nelson.  In return for 
receiving the equity interests, Mr. Woodard and Mr. Nelson agreed to operate and 
manage the businesses on a day-to-day basis.

 
      
            
    

[¶5]      In September of 
1997, Mr. Allen, Mr. Woodard, and Mr. Nelson applied with Principal for 
individual $1 million life insurance policies.  The information provided to Principal 
when the applications were made showed Mr. Nelson and Mr. Allen were the owners 
of Summit and Mr. Woodard was an employee.  
All three applications listed Summit as "owner."  The 
men submitted applications and authorization forms with their applications which 
were signed by Mr. Nelson as owner of the insurance.

 
     
            
   

[¶6]      Initially, Mr. 
Allen and Mr. Nelson named their respective estates as beneficiaries under their 
policies, and Mr. Woodard named Summit as his beneficiary.  After discussions between Principal's 
agents and Mr. Allen and Mr. Nelson, their policies were amended to name Summit 
as the beneficiary under their policies.  
The policies were issued with the amendments on January 28, 1998.  Mr. Nelson's signature appears on the 
acknowledgement of delivery form as "contract owner."  Insurance premiums for the policies were 
paid by checks signed by either Mr. Allen alone or Mr. Allen and Mr. Woodard 
jointly and issued from bank accounts in the name of Summit, A.C.T, or 
Duel.  Three months after the insurance policies were 
issued, on April 24, 1998, Mr. Allen died in a motorcycle accident.

 
    
             
 

[¶7]      On April 1, 1998, 
three weeks before Mr. Allen's death, the State of Utah involuntarily dissolved 
Summit Well Service, Inc. because it failed to file an annual report.  There is no evidence in the record that, 
prior to Mr. Allen's death, any steps were taken to officially transfer 
ownership interests in Summit, Duel, or A.C.T. to Mr. Woodard or Mr. Nelson or 
to make them officers or directors.  
There also is no 
indication in the record of any formal partnership agreement other than the July 
2, 1997, letter agreements, nor are there any other partnership records.

 
            
             
   

[¶8]      After her 
husband's death, Mrs. Allen attempted to obtain a copy of the policy and a claim 
form from Principal.  In making the 
request, Mrs. Allen informed Principal that her husband was the sole owner of 
Summit Well Service, Inc. and she was his personal representative.  Mrs. Allen enclosed copies of the will 
appointing her personal representative of the estate and the stock purchase 
agreement reflecting her late husband's purchase of Summit Well Service, 
Inc.  Principal denied Mrs. Allen's 
request for a copy of the policy and a claim form on the ground that she did not 
provide sufficient proof that she was an authorized representative of the policy 
owner or beneficiary.  It did refer 
Mrs. Allen to claims specialist Mike Wagner who was investigating the claim, and 
he came to Wyoming to interview her.  
Mrs. Allen also informed Mr. Wagner during the interview that her husband 
was the sole owner and director of Summit Well Service, Inc.  On May 22, 1998, Mrs. Allen filed an 
application for reinstatement of Summit Well Service, Inc., and the State of 
Utah granted the  
application.

 

[¶9]      On June 15, 1998, 
Mr. Nelson submitted a claim for payment of benefits under the policy, listing 
himself as beneficiary and signing his name in the signature block.  Upon receipt of his claim on June 26, 
1998, Principal informed Mr. Nelson that he needed to submit a new claim listing 
Summit rather than himself as the beneficiary and signing as the authorized 
representative of the business.  Mr. 
Nelson submitted a second claim form on June 30, 1998.   Meanwhile, on June 19, 1998, Mr. Woodard and Mr. Nelson filed a complaint 
against Mrs. Allen, Summit, Duel, and A.C.T. alleging Mrs. Allen had assumed 
control of, and was refusing to recognize their interest in, the three 
businesses and she was attempting to bypass their interest in the insurance 
policy proceeds by having the benefits paid directly to her.

 
      
             
             
             
            
  

[¶10]   On July 9, 1998, Principal issued a 
check in the amount of $1,008,370.41 (the policy proceeds plus interest) to 
Summit.  The check was hand 
delivered to Mr. Woodard on July 10, 1998.  
It was deposited 
into a bank account in Utah, and the proceeds were later split between Mr. 
Woodard and Mr. Nelson.

 
              
      

[¶11]   On the morning of July 10, 1998, 
prior to delivering the insurance proceeds to Mr. Woodard, Principal received a 
telephone call from Billie Crocker, counsel for Mrs. Allen.  Jerry Mogenson, senior claim 
administrator, took the call and informed Ms. Crocker that he did not have 
sufficient documentation substantiating Mrs. Allen's status with Summit to allow 
him to release a copy of the policy and a claim form to her.  Ms. Crocker indicated she would send 
additional documentation by facsimile.  
At 9:10 a.m., a facsimile arrived informing Principal that Mr. Nelson was 
terminated from his employment with Summit on May 6, 1998, and Mrs. Allen was 
the sole shareholder, president, and director.  Attached to the facsimile were a letter 
from Mrs. Allen to Summit Well Service, Inc. directing the corporation to 
transfer all ownership to her as personal representative of the estate; a 
written consent in lieu of directors meeting executed by Mrs. Allen appointing 
herself director of the corporation; and a certificate of good standing for 
Summit Well Service, Inc. dated June 1, 1998, from the Utah Department of 
Commerce.  Upon reviewing the 
documentation, Mr. Mogenson left a message for Ms. Crocker at 11:15 a.m. 
indicating he would send her a copy of the policy and a claim form.  He also told her Principal had already 
issued a check that was on its way to Mr. Nelson, the authorized business 
representative at the time of Mr. Allen's death.  Except perhaps for a 
follow-up call from Ms. Crocker to Mr. Mogenson on July 10, 1998, clarifying the 
earlier telephone message, Principal received no further communication from Mrs. 
Allen or her representatives concerning the policy or the proceeds until 
February 16, 1999, when a subpoena duces tecum was served at Principal's 
business office for insurance company records.

 
       
             
           
           
            
   

[¶12]   On August 10, 1998, Mrs. Allen, 
Summit, Duel, and A.C.T. filed an answer to the complaint alleging Mr. Woodard 
and Mr. Nelson were merely former employees of the businesses and had no 
ownership interest in the companies or the life insurance proceeds.  Mrs. Allen also filed a counterclaim 
alleging Mr. Woodard and Mr. Nelson had wrongfully obtained the insurance 
proceeds and converted them to their personal use.  Numerous and lengthy 
procedural wranglings followed, and, on January 27, 1999, it was disclosed to 
the court that the insurance proceeds were not available and had not been 
available for a number of months because they had been spent on the 
business.

 
    
             
              
          

[¶13]   Additional motions and hearings 
followed, and, on May 27, 1999, Mrs. Allen, Summit, Duel, and A.C.T. requested 
leave to file a third-party complaint against Principal.  The trial court granted the motion, and, 
on July 2, 1999, a third-party complaint was filed alleging various claims, 
including breach of contract and bad faith against Principal.  Principal answered the complaint and filed a cross-claim for indemnity 
against Mr. Woodard and Mr. Nelson.

 
     
          

 [¶14]  A trial to the court commenced on October 
18, 2000, on Mrs. Allen's claims against Principal for breach of contract and 
bad faith and Principal's claim for indemnity against Mr. Woodard and Mr. 
Nelson.  The court issued its ruling 
on November 17, 2000, finding in favor of Mrs. Allen, Summit, Duel, and A.C.T. 
and against Principal for breach of contract based upon improper payment of the 
insurance proceeds.  The court found in favor of Principal on the 
bad faith claim and on the cross-claim against Mr. Woodard.

 
   
               

[¶15]   On April 26, 2001, the court 
entered lengthy findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Of most importance to the issues this court 
finds determinative, the trial court reached the following conclusions as a 
matter of law:

 
       
           
   

1.  No 
partnership ever existed by or between Allen, Woodard, and/or 
Nelson.

2.  Allen's policy/contract of insurance is not 
ambiguous and Principal is charged with full notice that Summit was a 
corporation and not a partnership.

 
 
            
         

 [¶16]  The trial court entered judgment against 
Principal in the amount of  
$1,516,049.74 (the policy amount plus interest, attorney's fees, and 
costs).  It entered an amended order 
on June 29, 2001, awarding Principal judgment against Mr. Nelson and Mr. 
Woodard, jointly and severally, in the amount of $1,516,046.74 plus costs and 
attorney's fees.  Principal and Mr. 
Woodard timely appealed.  

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
 

[¶17]   An insurance policy constitutes a 
contract between the insurer and the insured.  Evans v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2001 WY 110, ¶8, 34 P.3d 284, ¶8 (Wyo. 
2001); Helm v. Board of County Commissioners, Teton County, 
Wyoming, 989 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 1999).  As with other types of contracts, our 
basic purpose in construing or interpreting an insurance contract is to 
determine the parties' true intent.  
Polo Ranch Company v. City of Cheyenne, 969 P.2d 132, 136 (Wyo. 
1998).  We must determine intent, if 
possible, from the language used in the policy, viewing it in light of what the 
parties must reasonably have intended.  
Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Republic Insurance Company, 929 P.2d 535, 540 (Wyo. 1996).  The nature of 
our inquiry depends upon how clearly the parties have memorialized their 
intent.  Evans, 2001 WY 110, ¶8.  Where the contract is clear 
and unambiguous, our inquiry is limited to the four corners of the 
document.  Id.; Sierra Trading 
Post, Inc. v. Hinson, 996 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
   

[¶18]   We interpret an unambiguous 
contract in accordance with the ordinary and usual meaning of its terms.  St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance 
Co. v. Albany County School District No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Wyo. 
1988).  The parties to an insurance 
contract are free to incorporate within the policy whatever lawful terms they 
desire, and the courts are not at liberty, under the guise of judicial 
construction, to rewrite the policy.  
Hulse v. First American Title 
Company of Crook County, 2001 WY 
95, ¶37, 33 P.3d 122, ¶37 (Wyo. 2001); St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance 
Co., 763 P.2d  at 1258.  
It is only when a contract is ambiguous that we construe the document by 
resorting to rules of construction.  
Evans, 2001 WY 110, ¶9; 
Sinclair Oil Corporation, 929 P.2d  at 539; Martin v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 894 P.2d 618, 620 (Wyo. 1995).  Whether a contract is ambiguous is a 
question for the court to decide as a matter of law.  Evans, 2001 WY 110, ¶9; Martin, 894 P.2d  at 620.  

 

[¶19]   A contract is ambiguous if 
indefiniteness of expression or double meaning obscure the parties' intent.  Evans, 2001 WY 110, ¶9; Hansen v. Little 
Bear Inn Company, 9 P.3d 960, 964 (Wyo. 2000).  Ambiguity cannot be created by the 
subsequent disagreement between the parties regarding the meaning of a 
contract.  Farmers Insurance Exchange v. 
Dahlheimer, 3 P.3d 820, 826 
(Wyo. 2000); Frost Construction Company v. Lobo, Inc., 951 P.2d 390, 394 (Wyo. 1998).  If the 
meaning of a provision in a contract is not readily apparent, the court may 
resort to competent evidence of extraneous circumstances to determine the 
parties' intent.  Wilder v. Cody 
Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo. 1994).  Reviewing courts are free to make a 
determination as to the existence of ambiguity whether or not the parties agree 
one way or the other and whether or not the trial court has reached a conclusion 
one way or the other.  
Examination Management Services, Inc. v. Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 
689 (Wyo. 1996); Amoco Pro­duction Company v. Stauffer Chemical Company 
of Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463, 465 (Wyo. 1980).  

 

[¶20]   The trial court in this case 
entered extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We review a trial court's conclusions 
de novo.  Polo Ranch 
Company, 969 P.2d  at 136; Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 1993).  A 
judge's factual findings are subject to a broader scope of review than a jury 
verdict is; the appellate court may examine all the properly admissible evidence 
appearing in the record.  Polo 
Ranch Company, 969 P.2d  at 136.  
We will not disturb the trial court's findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Id.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.  
Id.

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.        
Breach of Contract

 

[¶21]   Mrs. Allen alleges the intended 
beneficiary of the life insurance proceeds is Summit Well Service, Inc., a Utah 
corporation owned solely by her late husband.  Principal claims Summit, a partnership 
consisting of Mr. Allen, Mr. Woodard, and Mr. Nelson, was the intended 
beneficiary.  Faced with these 
opposing claims, the trial court held as a matter of law that:  (1) no partnership ever existed among 
Mr. Allen, Mr. Woodard, and Mr. Nelson; and (2) the policy unambiguously 
provides Summit Well Service, Inc., the corporation owned solely by Mr. Allen, 
was the intended beneficiary.  
Accordingly, the court held Principal breached the insurance contract by 
paying the policy proceeds to Mr. Woodard and Mr. Nelson.  It ordered Principal to repay the policy 
amount to Mrs. Allen as the authorized representative of Summit Well Service, 
Inc.  

 

[¶22]   We begin by determining whether the 
trial court properly concluded as a matter of law that the insurance contract 
was unambiguous.  In making this 
determination, we look to the printed policy itself, the application, and any 
amendments.  "The general rule is 
that the application becomes a part of the agreement between the parties, and 
that the policy and application, taken together, constitute the contract of 
insurance."  3 Eric Mills Holmes, 
Appleman on Insurance 2d § 15.16 at 266-67 (1998).

 
    
         

[¶23]   The insurance policy issued by 
Principal on Mr. Allen's life contains the original application for insurance 
and an amendment to the application.  
The original application lists Mr. Allen as the insured, his estate as 
the beneficiary, and Summit as the owner of the policy and his employer.  It also lists Mr. Allen's occupation as 
"owner" of Summit.  On a separate 
page of the application, Mr. Nelson, "CEO" of Summit, is listed as the owner of 
the insurance.  The amendment to the 
application dated January 28, 1998, and stamped "received" February 9, 1998, 
changes the beneficiary from the estate to "Summit Well Service  
Employer."  Mr. Nelson is listed again on the amendment to 
the application as the policy owner.

 
    
          

[¶24]   Looking at these provisions of the 
policy, we hold the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding the 
insurance contract is unambiguous.  
The insurance contract on its face is susceptible to double meaning.  It is not clear from the four corners of 
the document whether the Summit Well Service named as beneficiary is Summit Well 
Service, Inc., the Utah corporation which Mrs. Allen alleges was owned solely by 
her late husband, or is instead Summit, which Principal alleges was jointly 
owned and operated by Mr. Allen, Mr. Woodard, and Mr. Nelson.  Because we find the beneficiary 
description on the face of the insurance contract susceptible to double meaning 
and, therefore, ambiguous, we look to all the surrounding circumstances and 
extrinsic evidence pertaining to the context within which the contract was 
formed in order to determine the parties' intent.  Polo Ranch Company, 969 P.2d 140.  

 

[¶25]   The parties to the insurance 
contract were Mr. Allen as the insured with Mr. Nelson as the owner and 
Principal as the insurer.  It is 
their intent in entering into the insurance contract that we must look to in 
determining the meaning of the beneficiary provision.  The intent of persons not party to the 
contract, or their suppositions as to the intent of the contracting parties, is 
not relevant to our inquiry except to the extent that it may shed light on 
circumstances surrounding formation of the contract.  

 

[¶26]   Principal agent Nancy Douglas 
testified Mr. Allen and Mr. Nelson provided the information contained in the 
application for insurance.  Based 
upon that information, Ms. Douglas testified that, in September when contract 
negotiations began, she understood the purpose of the insurance was to provide 
protection for Mr. Allen and Mr. Nelson in the event something happened to Mr. 
Woodard.  She testified further that, based upon her 
discussions with Mr. Allen, Mr. Nelson, and Mr. Woodard, she did not understand 
Summit to be a corporation; rather, she understood there were three companies 
being operated under the umbrella of Summit which were jointly owned by Mr. 
Allen, Mr. Woodard, and Mr. Nelson.

 
   
             
             
            
          

[¶27]   As to the precise nature of the 
business entity, Ms. Douglas testified the owners themselves were unsure 
throughout the discussions what they wanted although at some point they told her 
Summit was a partnership with Mr. Woodard owning twenty percent and Mr. Allen 
and Mr. Nelson each owning forty percent.  
In a discussion between Mr. Allen and Ms. 
Douglas sometime between September 26 and October 2, 1997, Mr. Allen said that 
Mr. Woodard had been given twenty percent of all three businesses, Mr. Woodard 
was the only one with working knowledge of the businesses, and Mr. Allen and Mr. 
Nelson each owned forty percent of the businesses.

 
           
               
             
             
    

[¶28]   Ms. Douglas' understanding of the 
business relationship is memorialized in the  following excerpts from an undated letter, 
which she faxed to another Principal representative on October 2, 
1997:

 
     
           

The 
[c]ompany is owned by Brent Nelson and Robert Allen.  The [i]nsurance on them[]selves is for a 
buy out in case of either death.  I 
can provide guidelines for the company for a buy sell agreement, [i]f 
necessary. . . . But within their [c]orporation there are 
three [c]ompanies, Summit Well Service . . . A.C.T[.] [and] Duel . . . . Byron 
Woodard is the [k]ey [e]mployee for all three companies.  He also owns 20% interest in all three 
companies.  He not only is the [k]ey 
employee, [h]e is the only one who knows the workings of all 3 companies.  Robert Allen and Brent Nelson are the 
investors behind all three companies.  
Byron's duties include [s]enior [r]ig [s]uperintendent, for Summit, and 
he is a [c]onsultant for both of the other companies.  Robert and Brent over[]see the 
[a]dministration and [f]inancial duties.

 
     
   

Ms. 
Douglas testified this, in essence, was her understanding throughout her 
discussions with Mr. Allen, Mr. Woodard, and Mr. Nelson.  She 
also testified that, before writing the letter, she reinterviewed all three 
business associates to make sure her understanding was correct.

 
      
            
   

[¶29]   Ms. Douglas further testified she 
did not know there was a corporation by the name of Summit Well Service, Inc. 
and she had never heard mention of Mrs. Allen during the time the policy was 
being discussed.  None 
of the three business associatesMr. Allen, Mr. Woodard, or Mr. Nelsonever used 
the name Summit Well Service, Inc. or indicated the beneficiary under the policy 
was a Utah corporation.

 
    
           
             
 

[¶30]   Ms. Douglas' testimony is supported 
by Mr. Woodard's testimony that it was his understanding the three policies were 
purchased to protect the partnership"if anything happened to any one of the 
three of us, the other two would have this to rely on to continue in 
business."  Mr. 
Nelson likewise testified:

 
   
 

[T]he 
intent of the [insurance] was for the benefit of the remaining two surviving 
partners if one passed away and it was explained to the insurance broker that 
way.  The insurance broker explained it back to us 
that way and even went so far as to explain that this does not cover the estate, 
this does not cover your family, if you wanted family insurance then you need to 
take out additional insurance.

 
    
                  
             
        

 [¶31]  With respect to the nature of their 
business association, Mr. Woodard testified Mr. Allen told him "he allowed all 
of the corporations to lapse intentionally, that his ultimate intention was to 
tie all of the entities into a public stock offering."  Mr. Nelson testified, "We didn't have a 
corporation. . . . We let it lapse.  We had no intent of operating it as that 
corporation, we started this public shell to roll all of these companies 
into."  Mr. Nelson further 
testified, "Bob never wanted . . . the organization to be tightly 
defined because it put him in a box that maybe he couldn't get out of.  He never knew which would be to his 
advantage, to be a corporation, a private entity, a public corporation, a 
partnership, and that's the way he did business."  

  

[¶32]   The testimony of Mrs. Allen's 
attorney lends support to the evidence that Mr. Allen never intended for the 
Utah corporation to be the beneficiary under the policy and, in fact, intended 
to let it lapse.  Ms. 
Crocker testified Summit Well Service, Inc. was dissolved on April 1, 1998, and, 
as a consequence, its authority to do business in Wyoming was revoked on July 1, 
1998.

 
  
              
             

[¶33]   The testimony of these witnesses is 
supported by documentation in the record showing that each of the participants 
in the business associationMr. Allen, Mr. Woodard, and Mr. Nelsonmet with Ms. 
Douglas in the same time frame for the purpose of taking out individual life 
insurance policies.  Each 
participant designated Summit as beneficiary under his policy, Mr. Woodard doing 
so from the beginning and Mr. Allen and Mr. Nelson accomplishing the same by 
amendment to their policies.  Each 
policy names Mr. Nelson as owner of the insurance, a fact of some importance 
given there is no contention he was involved in Summit Well Service, Inc., the 
Utah corporation owned solely by Mr. Allen.  Mr. Nelson also signed off as "owner" on 
the forms acknowledging Principal had delivered the three policies.  The businesses paid the premiums on the 
policies with checks signed by Mr. Allen alone or Mr. Allen and Mr. Woodard 
jointly.  These factors, together 
with the testimony of Principal's agent who handled the negotiations and the 
corroborative testimony of Mr. Nelson and Mr. Woodard as to the circumstances 
surrounding the formation of the contract, persuade us the parties' intent was 
that Summit, a business association of Mr. Allen, Mr. Woodard, and Mr. Nelson, 
was to be the beneficiary under the policy.  Given this 
determination, Principal did not breach the contract of insurance when it paid 
the policy proceeds to Mr. Nelson.

 
     
              

[¶34]   In reaching this result, we find it 
unnecessary to determine whether the "Summit Well Service" named in the policy 
is a partnership, corporation, or some other type of business entity.  The record clearly establishes the 
insurance was intended to protect the business, and, upon the death of the 
insured, the insurer delivered the proceeds to the authorized representative of 
that business irrespective of the form of the business entity.  Mr. Nelson, to whom the proceeds were 
paid as the authorized representative of Summit, was either a partner or an 
officer of the business.  These are the 
factors we find determinative, not whether Summit was a partnership or a 
corporation or whether Mrs. Allen had authority to act on behalf of the 
corporation.

 
  
             
             

[¶35]   We are aware Mrs. Allen will be 
negatively affected by our holding that Principal properly delivered the 
proceeds to Mr. Nelson and Mr. Woodard.  
However, we are convinced from the record before us that our ruling 
effectuates the parties' intent to the insurance contract.  Moreover, throughout these proceedings, 
other remedies were available to Mrs. Allen to protect her interests.  Some of those remedies were pursued 
early on; others apparently were not.  
We cannot let concern for Mrs. Allen or the 
fact she may not have pursued all available remedies determine the outcome in 
this case. Our duty is to review the record before us and arrive at the result 
supported by the law.

 
               
              
             

[¶36]   We hold the business, Summit Well 
Services, was the intended beneficiary under the policy; Principal properly paid 
the policy proceeds to Mr. Woodard and Mr. Nelson as authorized representatives 
of that business; and there was no breach of contract.  This holding makes it unnecessary for us 
to address Principal's claims under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-102(d) (LexisNexis 
2001) of the Wyoming Insurance Code or for equitable estoppel and 
ratification.  Our holding also is 
determinative of Principal's claim that the trial court improperly awarded 
attorney's fees, costs, and interest.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c) (LexisNexis 2001) allows the award of 
attorney's fees and interest where it is determined the insurance company's 
refusal to pay is unreasonable or without cause.  Costs are awardable under W.R.C.P. 
54(d)(1) to the "prevailing party."  
Having determined that payment of the policy proceeds to Mr. Woodard and 
Mr. Nelson was proper, we conclude no basis exists for awarding fees, costs, and 
interest to Mrs. Allen.  Our holding likewise 
makes it unnecessary for us to consider the issues raised by Mr. Woodard in Case 
No. 01-184.
  
             
    

CONCLUSION

 

[¶37]   We hold the trial court erred in 
concluding as a matter of law that the insurance contract unambiguously 
designated Summit Well Service, Inc. as beneficiary.  Applying the applicable de novo 
standard of review, we hold the beneficiary designation contained in the 
contract is ambiguous as a matter of law.  
Reviewing all the circumstances surrounding formation of the contract, we 
are persuaded the parties' intent was to name Summit, the business association 
of Mr. Allen, Mr. Woodard, and Mr. Nelson, as beneficiary under the policy.  Principal properly 
paid the insurance proceeds to Mr. Nelson as the authorized representative of 
Summit, and there was no breach of contract.

 
     
             
   

[¶38]   The judgment in favor of Mrs. Allen 
against Principal is reversed.  The 
judgment in favor of Principal against Mr. Woodard and Mr. Nelson is also 
reversed.  The cases are remanded to 
the trial court with directions that an amended judgment be entered which is 
consistent with this opinion.