Case Title: Colbert v. Cleveland

Citation: 2003-Ohio-3319

Docket Number: 20020101

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Colbert v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 215, 2003-Ohio-3319.] 
 
 
COLBERT, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Cite as Colbert v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 215, 2003-Ohio-3319.] 
Political subdivision tort liability — “Emergency call” as defined in R.C. 
2744.01(A) involves a situation to which a response by a peace officer is 
required by the officer’s professional obligation. 
(No. 2002-0101 — Submitted February 25, 2003 — Decided July 9, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 77635. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
As defined in R.C. 2744.01(A), “emergency call” involves a situation to which a 
response by a peace officer is required by the officer’s professional 
obligation. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
 
I. Introduction 
{¶1} 
Today we are asked to interpret the term “emergency call,” as used 
in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a), which provides a defense to political-subdivision tort 
liability.  Generally, a political subdivision will not be liable for damages caused 
by a police officer’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle if the officer was 
responding to an emergency call at the time of the accident. 
{¶2} 
Appellant, James Colbert, argues that an “emergency call” must 
involve an inherently dangerous situation to be present.  Appellee, the city of 
Cleveland, argues that an emergency call requires a “call to duty” only.  We agree 
with the city of Cleveland. 
 
II. Facts 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶3} 
While on patrol in the early morning hours of December 6, 1998, 
Officers Daniel Connors and Michael Shay of the Cleveland Police Department 
observed two white males in a car make an apparent exchange for money with 
another male on foot on 114th Street in Cleveland.  Because this area had a 
reputation as a “high-drug, high-crime area,” the officers believed that they had 
just witnessed a drug deal.  Accordingly, the officers started out in their patrol car, 
intending to pursue the suspects’ car on a parallel route, but they did not activate 
their emergency lights or siren or call for backup. 
{¶4} 
Officer Connors testified that when the patrol car reached the 
intersection of 114th and Harvard, he stopped the vehicle and looked both ways.  
However, upon entering the intersection, the patrol car was struck broadside by a 
vehicle driven by appellant, James Colbert.  Colbert was injured. 
{¶5} 
Colbert filed suit against appellee, the city of Cleveland, alleging 
that Officer Connors had been negligent in operating the patrol car, thereby 
causing Colbert injury.  The trial court granted summary judgment to Cleveland, 
holding that as a political subdivision, it was immune from liability because its 
officers were responding to an “emergency call.” 
{¶6} 
Colbert appealed.  The court of appeals held that “emergency call” 
is broadly defined as a “call to duty” by R.C. 2744.01(A).  The appellate court 
held that observation of a suspected drug deal was a call to duty.  Therefore, the 
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment that Cleveland was immune 
from liability under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a), which establishes a defense to 
political-subdivision tort liability when a police officer operates a motor vehicle 
in response to an emergency call.  The matter is before this court pursuant to a 
discretionary appeal. 
 
III. The Law 
 
a.  Political-Subdivision Immunity: The Framework 
January Term, 2003 
3 
{¶7} 
Determining whether a political subdivision is immune from tort 
liability pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744 involves a three-tiered analysis.  Greene 
Cty. Agricultural Soc. v. Liming (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 551, 556-557, 733 N.E.2d 
1141.  The first tier is the general rule that a political subdivision is immune from 
liability incurred in performing either a governmental function or proprietary 
function.  Id. at 556-557, 733 N.E.2d 1141; R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).  However, that 
immunity is not absolute.  R.C. 2744.02(B); Cater v. Cleveland (1998), 83 Ohio 
St.3d 24, 28, 697 N.E.2d 610. 
{¶8} 
The second tier of the analysis requires a court to determine 
whether any of the five exceptions to immunity listed in R.C. 2744.02(B) apply to 
expose the political subdivision to liability.  Id. at 28, 697 N.E.2d 610.  At this 
tier, the court may also need to determine whether specific defenses to liability for 
negligent operation of a motor vehicle listed in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a) through (c) 
apply. 
{¶9} 
If any of the exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B) do apply 
and no defense in that section protects the political subdivision from liability, then 
the third tier of the analysis requires a court to determine whether any of the 
defenses in R.C. 2744.03 apply, thereby providing the political subdivision a 
defense against liability. 
 
b.  Definition of “Emergency Call” 
{¶10} The dispute in this case is over the definition of the term 
“emergency call” as used in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a).  Pursuant to R.C. 
2744.02(B)(1), a political subdivision is generally liable for death or injury caused 
by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by one its employees.  However, the 
political subdivision has a full defense to such liability where “[a] member of a 
municipal corporation police department or any other police agency was operating 
a vehicle while responding to an emergency call and the operation of the vehicle 
did not constitute willful or wanton conduct.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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2744.02(B)(1)(a).  “ ‘Emergency call’ means a call to duty, including, but not 
limited to, communications from citizens, police dispatches, and personal 
observations by peace officers of inherently dangerous situations that demand an 
immediate response on the part of a peace officer.”  R.C. 2744.01(A). 
{¶11} Colbert argues that in drafting R.C. 2744.01(A), the General 
Assembly intended that only those calls to duty that concern inherently dangerous 
situations qualify as emergency calls.  We disagree. 
{¶12} “In construing a statute, courts have an obligation to give effect to 
the intention of the General Assembly.”  Basic Distrib. Corp. v. Ohio Dept. of 
Taxation (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 287, 291, 762 N.E.2d 979.  In determining 
legislative intent, a court must first look to the language of the statute.  State ex 
rel. Rose v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 229, 231, 736 
N.E.2d 886.  Courts must give “words used their usual, normal, or customary 
meaning.”  State ex rel. Wolfe v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 88 Ohio 
St.3d 182, 184, 724 N.E.2d 771, citing R.C. 1.42; State ex rel. Purdy v. Clermont 
Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 338, 340, 673 N.E.2d 1351. 
{¶13} R.C. 2744.01(A) states that “emergency call” means “a call to 
duty.”  (Emphasis added.)  “Duty” is defined as “obligatory tasks, conduct, 
service, or functions enjoined by order or usage according to rank, occupation, or 
profession.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 705.  Thus, a 
“call to duty” involves a situation to which a response by a peace officer is 
required by the officer’s professional obligation. 
{¶14} Following the term “call to duty,” R.C. 2744.01(A) continues with 
the phrase “including, but not limited to, communications from citizens, police 
dispatches, and personal observations by peace officers of inherently dangerous 
situations that demand an immediate response on the part of a peace officer.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The phrase “including, but not limited to,” “ ‘indicates that 
what follows is a nonexhaustive list of examples.’ “  (Emphasis added.)  State v. 
January Term, 2003 
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Thompson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 584, 588, 752 N.E.2d 276, quoting State v. 
Lozano (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 560, 562, 740 N.E.2d 273.  Examples are typically 
intended to provide illustrations of a term defined in the statute, but do not act as 
limitations on that term.  Moreover, of the three examples listed in R.C. 
2744.01(A), only the third example, “personal observations by peace officers of 
inherently dangerous situations that demand an immediate response on the part of 
a peace officer,” refers to a dangerous situation, thereby indicating that the other 
listed examples need not involve an inherently dangerous situation.  Therefore, 
we find that the phrase “inherently dangerous situations” places no limitation on 
the term “call to duty.” 
{¶15} Had the General Assembly intended to limit an emergency call to 
only those situations that were inherently dangerous, it could have expressly 
imposed that limitation.  Because no such limiting language exists in R.C. 
2744.01(A), we will not add it by judicial fiat.  Accordingly, we hold that an 
“emergency call” as defined in R.C. 2744.01(A) involves a situation to which a 
response by a peace officer is required by the officer’s professional obligation. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
{¶16} Applying this definition, we hold that the officers’ investigation of 
the men suspected of dealing drugs was an “emergency call” as that term is 
defined in R.C. 2744.01(A).  While on patrol, Officers Connors and Shay spotted 
what appeared to be the purchase of some object by persons in a car from a person 
on foot.  The purchase took place in a high-crime, high-drug area in the early 
morning hours.  Thus, the officers believed that they had just witnessed a drug 
deal and proceeded in their patrol car to intercept the suspects.  The need to 
investigate this possible criminal act was a call to duty.  Thus, the officers were 
responding to an emergency call when their patrol car collided with Colbert’s car.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
MOYER, C.J., dissents. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
WISE, J., dissents. 
JOHN W. WISE, J., of the Fifth Appellate District, sitting for COOK, J. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶17} The parties agree that at about 3:30 a.m. on December 6, 1998, a 
vehicle driven by James Colbert Jr. struck a vehicle driven by Officer Daniel 
Connors.  The only issue is whether Officer Connors was responding to an 
emergency call at the time of the collision.  If he was, the city of Cleveland is 
immune from liability. 
{¶18} As a threshold issue, I believe sovereign immunity is 
unconstitutional.  See Garrett v. Sandusky (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 139, 141, 624 
N.E.2d 704 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  Accordingly, I would hold that Cleveland is 
not immune from liability in this case. 
{¶19} However, since a majority of this court does not agree with me, it 
is necessary to discuss whether Officer Connors was responding to an 
“emergency call” as defined in R.C. 2744.01(A).  An “emergency” is “an 
unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for 
immediate action.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 741.  
The facts of this case do not suggest that something unexpectedly occurred or that 
immediate action was necessary.  The officers saw money, and nothing else, 
change hands.  Then they drove toward a street that paralleled their suspects’ 
route without sirens and without radioing for backup.  None of this suggests an 
emergency.  Further, these facts indicate that the officers would not have had 
probable cause to stop the occupants of the suspects’ car. 
January Term, 2003 
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{¶20} The majority does not stress the definition of “emergency”; it 
stresses the definition of “duty.”  Although I agree with the majority that the list 
of items in R.C. 2744.01(A) is not exhaustive, I will not treat it as nonexistent.  
The General Assembly included the list for a reason; otherwise the definition 
would have ended after the word “duty.”  I believe that the General Assembly was 
attempting to distinguish emergency calls to duty from ordinary calls to duty.  In 
doing so, the General Assembly implicitly differentiated ordinary personal 
observations of peace officers from “personal observations by peace officers of 
inherently dangerous situations that demand an immediate response.”  The 
majority’s reading of R.C. 2744.01(A) renders this significant limitation 
meaningless. 
{¶21} I do not believe the officers were on an “emergency call.”  
Accordingly, I do not believe the city of Cleveland is entitled to immunity from 
liability even assuming the constitutionality of the statute.  I dissent. 
__________________ 
WISE, J., dissenting. 
{¶22} I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the phrase “including, 
but not limited to,” contained in R.C. 2744.01(A) indicates a nonexhaustive list of 
examples of what “call to duty” includes in defining the term “emergency call.”  I 
further agree that the phrase “inherently dangerous situations” applies only to the 
personal observations of a peace officer. 
{¶23} I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the 
examples provided in the statute have no application to this case.  The fact that the 
list of examples is nonexhaustive does not mean that the examples may be 
ignored.  Examples are meant to be illustrative.  They provide meaning and 
definition.  The language “including, but not limited to,” means just that.  Because 
the examples are included in the definition of “emergency call,” they must be 
considered when determining the issue of immunity for peace officers.  This is in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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accordance with the general rule that “[i]n matters of construction, it is the duty of 
this court to give effect to the words used, not to delete words used or to insert 
words not used.”  Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 
50, 524 N.E.2d 441, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶24} However, when the facts of a given situation do not fit any of the 
examples provided in the statute, the courts are not prevented from further 
analyzing, outside of the examples contained in R.C. 2744.01(A), what is a “call 
to duty.”  In those circumstances, courts must look beyond the examples provided 
in the statute in order to determine whether a “call to duty” arose. 
{¶25} In R.C. 2744.01(A), the General Assembly provides the example 
that a “call to duty” includes “personal observations by peace officers of 
inherently dangerous situations that demand an immediate response on the part of 
a peace officer.”  The example of the peace officer’s personal observations limits 
“call to duty” for purposes of immunity, and this limitation is not placed on 
“communications from citizens” or “police dispatches.”  If we are to give effect to 
the intentions of the General Assembly, we must include in our analysis the 
examples provided, including the limitations to those examples. 
{¶26} Therefore, when the facts of a given situation are similar to an 
example provided in the statute, the analysis of the facts must be based upon that 
example.  In the case sub judice, the facts of this case fit the example of a peace 
officer’s personal observations so closely that it must be analyzed with it in mind.  
Here, the officers’ challenged conduct was in response to their personal 
observations.  Thus, the trial court, in its analysis, should have determined 
whether the observation of a suspected felony drug transaction was an observation 
of an inherently dangerous situation that created a call to duty requiring an 
immediate response and, if so, whether the complained-of conduct was in 
response to that call to duty. 
January Term, 2003 
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{¶27} Accordingly, I dissent and would reverse and remand this matter to 
the trial court for further analysis as set forth above. 
__________________ 
 
Peltz & Birne, Kenneth A. Birne, Kathleen A. Nitschke and Kristen L. 
Craig, for appellant. 
 
Subodh Chandra, Director of Law, and Scott J. Davis, Assistant Director 
of Law, for appellee. 
 
Byron & Byron Co., L.P.A., Barry M. Byron and Stephen L. Byron; and 
John Gotherman, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League. 
__________________