Case Title: Proctor v. Sullivan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 241, 2000

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
110 Del. C. § 8803(b).
2We grant Proctor’s request to file a non-conforming brief.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
RONALD E. PROCTOR, JR.,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellant,
v.
LAWRENCE SULLIVAN and
LLOYD SCHMID,
Defendants Below-
Appellees.
§
§
§  No. 241, 2000
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for Kent County
§  C.A. No. 00C-04-019 
§
§
§
Submitted: August 30, 2001
  Decided:   October 18, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices
O R D E R
This 18th day of October 2001, upon consideration of the briefs on
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Ronald E. Proctor, Jr., filed an appeal
from the April 24, 2000 order of the Superior Court dismissing his legal
malpractice complaint against his public defender as frivolous.1  We find no
merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.2
3State v. Proctor, Del. Super., Cr. A. Nos. 98-02-0667I, 98-02-0522, 98-02-
0632I.
410 Del. C. § 8802.
510 Del. C. § 8803; Browne v. Robb, Del. Supr., 583 A.2d 949, 952-53 (1990).
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(2)
In this appeal, Proctor claims that his complaint should not have
been dismissed summarily and that a hearing should have been conducted in
his criminal case3 regarding his public defender’s “conflict of interest.”  
(3)
Beginning in January 1998, Proctor was represented by the Public
Defender’s Office in connection with several felony charges.  On April 11,
2000, Proctor filed a complaint against his public defender and the public
defender’s supervisor, alleging legal malpractice.  On April 24, 2000, the
Superior Court granted Proctor’s request to proceed in forma pauperis,4 but
also dismissed the complaint as frivolous, noting that Proctor’s criminal case
was still pending and that his complaint failed to overcome the qualified
immunity accorded to public defenders.5 
(4)
On October 26, 2000, still represented by the same public
defender on the same criminal charges, Proctor pleaded guilty to Burglary in
the Third Degree, Receiving Stolen Property and Possession of Burglar Tools
6Pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(e) (1) (C).
7Pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 8803(b), which provides that the complaint “shall be
dismissed” upon a finding of frivolousness.
810 Del. C. § 4001.
-3-
and admitted to being an habitual offender.6  He was sentenced to 3 years at
Level V on the burglary conviction, with the sentences on the other two
convictions suspended for probation.  The transcript of the plea colloquy
reflects that the Superior Court judge asked Proctor if he had discussed the
plea carefully and fully with his attorney and if he was satisfied that the
attorney had done all he reasonably could for him.  Proctor answered “yes”
to both questions.        
(5)    The Superior Court was correct in dismissing Proctor’s complaint
summarily as frivolous.7  Because Proctor’s criminal case was still pending,
there was no basis for a claim of damages, an essential element of a legal
malpractice case.  In addition, a public defender is entitled to qualified
immunity and Proctor failed to allege facts showing that the public defender’s
actions either constituted gross negligence or were motivated by bad faith.8
Moreover, the entry of Proctor’s guilty plea extinguishes his claim of legal
9Haskins v. Durstein, Del. Supr., No. 316, 1989, Horsey, J., 1990 WL 209230
(April 11, 1990) (ORDER) (citing McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606 (1980), cert. denied
451 U.S. 983 (1981)). 
10Murphy v. State, Del. Supr., 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1993).
11Supr. Ct. R. 8.
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malpractice.9  Proctor’s contention that his complaint was deficient because
he was denied access to the prison law library was asserted for the first time
in his reply brief and, therefore, has been waived.10  The contention is
meritless in any case since the complaint is deficient in factual, rather than
legal, support for a claim that the public defender’s actions constituted gross
negligence or were motivated by bad faith. 
(6)
Proctor also claims that a hearing should have been held in his
criminal case to determine whether his legal malpractice complaint against his
public defender created a conflict of interest.  Because this claim was not
presented to the Superior Court in the first instance, we decline to address it
in this appeal.11  The claim is moot as a result of the entry of Proctor’s guilty
plea in any case.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
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/s/ E. Norman Veasey
Chief Justice