Case Title: State v. Deadwiller

Citation: 2013 WI 75

Docket Number: 2010AP002364-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 75 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Richard Lavon Deadwiller, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 343 Wis. 2d 703, 820 N.W.2d 149 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Published) 
PDC No: 2012 WI App 89    
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 10, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Patricia D. McMahon   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. BRADLEY, J., concurs 
with Part I.(Opinion filed). BRADLEY, J., 
concurs with Section III.B of majority opinion. 
(Opinion filed.)  
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: GABLEMAN, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Mark S. Rosen and Rosen and Holzman, Ltd., Waukesha, and oral 
argument by Mark S. Rosen.   
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief by Maura FJ 
Whalen, assistant attorney general, and J.B. Van Hollen, 
attorney general. The cause was argued by Warren D. Weinstein, 
assistant attorney general. 
  
 
 
2013 WI 75
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2007CF4140 & 2007CF4858) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard Lavon Deadwiller, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals,1 which affirmed 
judgments of conviction entered by the Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, Judge Patricia D. McMahon, after a jury found Richard 
Lavon Deadwiller (Deadwiller) guilty of two counts of second-
degree sexual assault by use of force, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.225(2)(a) (2005-06).2  During Deadwiller's trial, Wisconsin 
                                                 
1 State v. Deadwiller, 2012 WI App 89, 343 Wis. 2d 703, 820 
N.W.2d 149.   
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
2 
 
State Crime Lab analyst Ronald G. Witucki (Witucki) testified 
that an out-of-state lab, Orchid Cellmark (Orchid), analyzed 
vaginal and cervical swabs taken from the two victims, Kristina 
S. and Chantee O.  Orchid produced DNA profiles of semen found 
on the victims' swabs.  After receiving the DNA profiles from 
Orchid, Witucki entered the DNA profiles into the DNA database, 
which resulted in a match to Deadwiller.  No one from Orchid 
testified at Deadwiller's trial.  The jury convicted Deadwiller 
of two counts of second-degree sexual assault by use of force.  
Deadwiller appealed, arguing that his right to confrontation was 
violated when the circuit court allowed Witucki to rely on the 
DNA profiles produced by Orchid.  The Confrontation Clause 
prohibits the introduction of testimonial hearsay of a witness 
who is absent from trial unless the witness is unavailable and 
the defendant had the prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 59 (2004).  
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Deadwiller's 
right to confrontation was not violated because the DNA profiles 
produced by Orchid were not testimonial under Williams v. 
Illinois, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).  State v. 
Deadwiller, 
2012 
WI 
App 
89, 
¶14, 
343 
Wis. 2d 703, 
820 
N.W.2d 149.  We affirm the court of appeals.   
¶2 
We conclude that on the facts of this case, Witucki's 
testimony did not violate Deadwiller's right to confrontation.  
Applying the various rationales of Williams, a majority of the 
United States Supreme Court would come to the same conclusion as 
in Williams, that the expert's testimony did not violate the 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
3 
 
defendant's right to confrontation.  Moreover, Deadwiller did 
not challenge the substance of Witucki's testimony because his 
defense was that the intercourse did occur but that the victims 
consented.     
¶3 
Further, assuming arguendo that the admission of 
Witucki's 
testimony 
violated 
Deadwiller's 
right 
to 
confrontation, we conclude that the error was harmless in light 
of the defendant's previous admissions of sexual intercourse 
with the victims and the fact that throughout the proceedings, 
he maintained a defense that the victims consented. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
On August 27, 2007, Deadwiller was charged with one 
count of second-degree sexual assault by use of force in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a).  The complaint alleged 
that on July 12, 2006, Deadwiller sexually assaulted Kristina S. 
by striking her in the head, forcing her to the ground, and 
forcing her to have sexual intercourse.  On October 4, 2007, 
Deadwiller was charged in a separate case with one count of 
second-degree sexual assault by use of force contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 940.225(2)(a).  The complaint alleged that on August 12, 
2006, Deadwiller sexually assaulted Chantee O. by grabbing her 
from behind, punching her in the jaw, forcing her to the ground, 
and forcing her to have sexual intercourse.3   
                                                 
3 The case involving Kristina S. was assigned circuit court 
case number 2007CF4140.  The case involving Chantee O. was 
assigned circuit court case number 2007CF4858.  On October 25, 
2007, 
the 
circuit 
court 
granted 
the 
State's 
motion 
to 
consolidate the cases.   
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
4 
 
¶5 
On March 26, 2008, the State filed a motion in limine 
seeking a ruling that the testimony of Witucki would be 
admissible at trial.  The motion confirmed that Witucki was not 
the analyst who developed the DNA profiles from the semen 
recovered on the victims' vaginal and cervical swabs.  However, 
Witucki entered Orchid's DNA profiles into the DNA database and 
obtained a match to Deadwiller.  Thereafter, Witucki received a 
buccal (cheek) swab from Deadwiller and compared the new sample 
to the Orchid DNA profiles, again resulting in a match.  The 
State 
argued 
that 
Witucki 
independently 
concluded 
that 
Deadwiller was a match for the DNA recovered from the victims 
and that "[a] defendant's confrontation right is satisfied if a 
qualified expert testifies as to his or her own independent 
opinion, even if the opinion is based in part on the work of 
another."  State v. Barton, 2006 WI App 18, ¶20, 289 
Wis. 2d 206, 709 N.W.2d 93 (citing State v. Williams, 2002 WI 
58, ¶¶9, 11, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 919).4  Deadwiller 
opposed the State's motion, arguing that he was entitled to 
confront the Orchid analysts who completed the DNA profiles on 
the victims' swabs.  The circuit court ruled that under Barton 
and State v. Williams, Witucki would be permitted to testify 
about the DNA results, assuming the proper foundation and 
credentials were presented.   
                                                 
4 In this case, we rely on two different cases with the name 
"Williams": Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2221 
(2012), and State v. Williams, 2002 WI 58, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 644 
N.W.2d 919.  As Williams v. Illinois is much more important to 
our analysis, it will be referred to as "Williams."  We refer to 
the other case as "State v. Williams."  
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
5 
 
¶6 
In preparation for trial, Deadwiller hired an expert 
to review the DNA evidence in this case, and the trial was 
delayed several times because Deadwiller's expert had not 
completed his analysis.  At a pretrial conference on March 26, 
2008, Deadwiller reported that he wanted to go forward with the 
trial even though he had not received the expert's analysis.  
The circuit court confirmed that Deadwiller wanted to proceed to 
trial without his expert: 
THE COURT:  
The question is do you want to go to 
trial and waive your right, give up 
your right to have this expert who is 
working on some information, or shall 
we set another date so your expert can 
complete the work he started. . . . 
THE DEFENDANT:  I want to go to trial. 
THE COURT:  
You want to go to trial on Monday 
without an expert. 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.    
The State then added that Deadwiller's decision was reasonable 
because 
"Deadwiller's 
made 
statements 
admitting 
sexual 
intercourse. . . . It's going to be in my view a credibility 
case, so I think this is a reasonable decision if he wants a 
speedy trial."  Deadwiller agreed with the prosecutor that the 
main issue in the case was whether the women consented or 
whether he forced them to have intercourse:  "I agree with [the 
prosecutor] 100 percent."  In other words, even before the trial 
began, Deadwiller's defense was that the women consented to the 
intercourse.  He did not challenge that his DNA was found in the 
victims.       
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
6 
 
¶7 
On April 7, 2008, Deadwiller's jury trial began.  The 
jury heard testimony from Kristina S., Chantee O., a sexual 
assault nurse, several police officers, Witucki, and Deadwiller.  
Kristina S. testified that on July 12, 2006, she had an argument 
with her boyfriend, left the apartment where they had been 
staying, and was locked out.  Kristina S. testified that she 
walked to a nearby gas station to call her boyfriend to let her 
back into the apartment but was unable to reach him.  Walking 
back 
towards 
the 
apartment, 
Kristina 
S. 
testified 
that 
Deadwiller began talking to her and offered to let her use the 
phone at his house.  She testified that she walked with him 
until they approached a dark alley, at which point she stopped.  
She then testified that Deadwiller grabbed her arm, hit her in 
the face, told her to take her pants down, threatened to kill 
her if she refused, then forced her to have sexual intercourse.  
Kristina S. testified that she immediately reported the crime, 
went to the Sexual Assault Treatment Center at Aurora Sinai 
Hospital, and underwent a sexual assault examination.  Kristina 
S. testified that she did not consent to having sex with 
Deadwiller, nor did she agree to have sex with Deadwiller in 
exchange for money or drugs.  Rather, she testified that "he 
raped me."           
¶8 
Chantee O. testified that on August 12, 2006, she was 
walking on the 16th Street bridge in Milwaukee and was going to 
catch a bus home.  She testified that three people, including 
Deadwiller, were waiting for the bus on the opposite side of the 
street.  According to Chantee O.'s testimony, Deadwiller 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
7 
 
informed her that her bus stop was down a set of stairs and that 
he would show her where it was located.  Chantee O. testified 
that Deadwiller led her a short way from the bottom of the 
stairs, hit her in the jaw, told her to take down her pants, 
then forced her to have sexual intercourse.  Chantee O. 
testified that immediately after the assault, she flagged down a 
police car, went to the Sexual Assault Treatment Center at 
Aurora 
Sinai 
Hospital, 
and 
underwent 
a 
sexual 
assault 
examination.  Similar to Kristina S., Chantee O. testified that 
she did not have sex with Deadwiller voluntarily nor did she 
have sex in exchange for drugs or money.   
¶9 
The State then called several witnesses to establish a 
chain of custody for the evidence collected during the victims' 
sexual assault examinations.  Tanya Wieland, a sexual assault 
nurse examiner at Aurora Sinai, testified that she conducted the 
examination on both victims, packaged and labeled all of the 
evidence collected, including vaginal and cervical swabs, and 
turned the evidence over to hospital security, which keeps 
evidence in a secure room until picked up by the police.  Two 
officers testified that they picked up the evidence collected 
from Kristina S. and Chantee O. from the secure room at Aurora 
Sinai, opened the outer bag (without opening the bags on the 
individual items) to inventory the evidence, and turned over the 
evidence to the police department's property control section.  
Detective Lori Gaglione then testified that the items of 
evidence were transported from the property control section to 
the State Crime Lab (SCL), which gives a receipt when evidence 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
8 
 
is submitted.  Gaglione testified that in both cases, the case 
number on the SCL receipt corresponded to the case number on the 
police inventory sheet.   
¶10 Witucki then testified regarding the DNA evidence, 
including that, in his opinion, DNA recovered from the victims 
matched Deadwiller.  He testified to his qualifications, 
including 20 years of working at the SCL, degrees in technology 
and 
biology, 
and 
training 
in 
forensic 
serology, 
semen 
identification techniques, and DNA typing methods.  Witucki 
testified that the SCL had a contract with Orchid to reduce the 
backlog of DNA case work, whereby the SCL sent evidence to 
Orchid, which ran the necessary testing and sent back results 
for the SCL to review.  Witucki testified that he was familiar 
with Orchid's protocols because it was accredited by the same 
agency that accredited the SCL and Orchid submitted its 
protocols when it first applied for the contract with the SCL.   
¶11 The SCL received evidence in Kristina S.'s case in 
July 2006 and evidence in Chantee O.'s case in August 2006.  
Between the time the SCL receives the evidence and the time it 
is sent to Orchid, Witucki testified that the evidence is 
individually sealed and stored in a freezer or evidence control 
room.  The SCL sent samples to Orchid in Kristina S.'s case in 
April 2007 and Chantee O.'s case in November 2006.  The SCL 
received samples from Orchid in Kristina S.'s case on July 5, 
2007, and Chantee O.'s case on July 6, 2007.  Witucki testified 
that the SCL follows protocols and maintains records of evidence 
by assigning a case number upon receipt of evidence, storing the 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
9 
 
evidence in a control room or freezer, and recording the 
shipping labels if evidence is sent to an out-of-state lab.5  
¶12 Witucki testified that he received a "report and all 
the electrophoreticgrams6 and the necessary documentation" from 
Orchid with respect to both victims, and that he personally 
completed all of the work on the cases after the SCL received 
the reports from Orchid.  Witucki testified that the case number 
on the documentation received from Orchid corresponded to the 
SCL case numbers for Kristina S. and Chantee O.  Upon receipt of 
Orchid's report, Witucki testified that he analyzed both 
cervical swabs and determined that there was a foreign male DNA 
profile present in both swabs.  Witucki testified that he 
"check[ed] to see that [Orchid] followed their procedures, that 
their quality control measures were followed, [and] they got 
                                                 
5 In addition to witness testimony, the State introduced 
exhibits documenting how the evidence for both victims was 
collected through the testimony of the sexual assault nurse, was 
transferred from the hospital to the police station through the 
testimony of the police officers, and was submitted to the SCL 
through the testimony of the police officers and Witucki.  The 
State did not submit shipping labels showing how the evidence 
was sent to Orchid and returned to the SCL.  However, Witucki 
testified to the SCL's protocols for maintaining the chain of 
custody through shipping label manifests and testified that the 
case numbers on documentation received from Orchid corresponded 
to the SCL case numbers for Kristina S. and Chantee O.  
6 The 
jury 
trial 
transcript 
uses 
the 
spelling 
"electrophoreticgram," although reference sources present it as 
an "electrophoretogram" which is "[a] record of the results of 
an electrophoresis."  The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language 594 (3d ed. 1992).  "Electrophoresis," in turn, 
is "[a] method of separating substances, especially proteins, 
and analyzing molecular structure."  Id.   
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
10 
 
acceptable results on their control values."  He testified that 
he "evaluate[d] the electrocphoreticgrams, [sic] which is the 
end product or the typing results from the evidence, and we 
determine if it's of sufficient quality for entry into our local 
DNA data base."  Witucki testified that he entered the DNA 
profiles from Orchid into the DNA database, which returned a 
result that DNA recovered from both victims matched each other 
and matched Deadwiller.  Once the match was returned, Witucki 
testified that he checked that the profiles were entered 
correctly into the database and personally confirmed that the 
DNA profiles matched.  He then testified that a computer match 
is 
not conclusive 
proof, but "investigative information."  
Thereafter, the police obtained a buccal swab from Deadwiller, 
and Witucki testified that he "develop[ed] a DNA profile from 
those buccal swabs, then compare[d] them to the profiles that 
were generated by Orchid Cellmark from the cervical swabs of 
Chantee O. and vaginal swabs of Kristina S."  Witucki concluded 
that there was a match: 
State: 
Did you reach an opinion to a reasonable 
degree of scientific certainty with respect 
to whether or not Mr. Deadwiller was the 
source of the male DNA found in [Chantee 
O.'s] cervical swabs? 
Witucki: Yes, I did. 
State: 
What is your opinion? 
Witucki: Well, they matched all 13 genetic locations 
that we test for; and I ran a statistical 
calculation on that profile, and it was of a 
sufficient 
number 
that 
allowed 
me 
to 
determine in my opinion that the semen found 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
11 
 
on 
the 
cervical 
swabs 
of 
Chantee 
O. 
originated from Richard Deadwiller. 
. . . . 
State: 
With respect to Kristina S., did you compare 
the DNA profile that you developed from 
Richard Deadwiller with the foreign DNA 
found on her vaginal swabs? 
Witucki: Yes, I did.  
State: 
Do you know what the source of that foreign 
male DNA found on her vaginal swabs was? 
Witucki: Again, as in Chantee O.'s case, for the 
profile developed from the vaginal swabs of 
Kristina S., there was a match [for] all 13 
genetic locations; and I ran a statistical 
calculation and that allowed me to determine 
that in my opinion, it was a high enough 
number 
that 
Richard 
Deadwiller 
was 
the 
source of the semen . . . .  
None of the documentation completed by Orchid was introduced 
into evidence.  The State rested its case after Witucki's 
testimony.   
¶13 Deadwiller testified in his defense.  In his version 
of the events, both women offered to have sex with him for money 
and consented to having sex with him.  He testified that 
Kristina S. may have had motivation to lie because she tried to 
run away from him after he paid Kristina S. upfront, and he 
"slapped her on the side of the head like to stop her and she 
fell."  Further, he testified that Chantee O. may have had 
motivation to lie because he paid her only $10 after they had 
agreed on a price of $15.   
¶14 The jury found Deadwiller guilty on both counts.  
Deadwiller was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment on each 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
12 
 
count, consisting of 15 years of confinement and 5 years of 
extended supervision for each count.   
¶15 Deadwiller appealed, arguing that "the trial court 
violated his right to confrontation by allowing a technician 
from the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory to rely on a 
scientific report that profiled the DNA left on the victims by 
their attacker."  Deadwiller, 343 Wis. 2d 703, ¶1.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the conviction, and it relied on the recent 
United States Supreme Court case of Williams, which presented 
very similar facts to Deadwiller's case.  Id., ¶¶8, 14.  Though 
Williams is a fractured opinion, "five justices agreed at the 
core that the outside laboratory's report was not testimonial."  
Id., ¶12.  The court of appeals declined to adopt exclusively 
any of the three rationales presented, stating that it was 
"bound by the judgment in Williams."  Id., ¶14.   
¶16 Deadwiller petitioned this court for review, and we 
granted his petition on January 14, 2013.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 The question presented in this case is whether 
Deadwiller's right to confrontation was violated by Witucki's 
use of the DNA profiles developed by Orchid.  While "a circuit 
court's decision to admit evidence is ordinarily a matter for 
the court's discretion, whether the admission of evidence 
violates a defendant's right to confrontation is a question of 
law subject to independent appellate review."  State v. 
Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶7 (citing State v. Ballos, 230 
Wis. 2d 495, 504, 602 N.W.2d 117 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
13 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶18 We conclude that on the facts of this case, Witucki's 
testimony did not violate Deadwiller's right to confrontation.  
Applying the various rationales of Williams, a majority of the 
United States Supreme Court would come to the same conclusion as 
in Williams, that the expert's testimony did not violate the 
defendant's right to confrontation.  Moreover, Deadwiller did 
not challenge the substance of Witucki's testimony because his 
defense was that the intercourse did occur but that the victims 
consented.     
¶19 Further, assuming arguendo that the admission of 
Witucki's 
testimony 
violated 
Deadwiller's 
right 
to 
confrontation, we conclude that the error was harmless in light 
of the defendant's previous admissions of sexual intercourse 
with the victims and the fact that throughout the proceedings, 
he maintained a defense that the victims consented. 
A. Confrontation Clause 
¶20 The 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against 
him." 
 
In 
Crawford, 
the 
Court 
held 
that 
the 
Confrontation Clause permitted the admission of "[t]estimonial 
statements of witnesses absent from trial . . . only where the 
declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine."  541 U.S. at 59.  The Court 
stated that "witnesses" against the defendant are "those who 
bear testimony."  Id. at 51.  The Court defined "testimony" as 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
14 
 
"a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact."  Id.  The Confrontation 
Clause is concerned with "a specific type of out-of-court 
statement," 
such 
as 
affidavits, 
depositions, 
custodial 
examinations, prior testimony, and "statements that were made 
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for 
use at a later trial."  Id. at 51-52.  
¶21 After Crawford, a flurry of Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence has ensued over what constitutes a "testimonial 
statement."7  The Court recently decided Williams, which is 
                                                 
7 The State and Deadwiller disagree about the application of 
two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the Confrontation 
Clause: Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), and 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).  
The State argues that both cases are distinguishable, and 
Deadwiller argues that both are controlling.  In Melendez-Diaz, 
at 
the 
defendant's 
trial 
for 
distribution 
of 
cocaine, 
prosecutors 
introduced 
into 
evidence 
three 
notarized 
"certificates of analysis" indicating that test results revealed 
the distributed substance to be cocaine.  557 U.S. at 308.  No 
analyst testified. 
 Id. at 309.  In a straightforward 
application of Crawford v. Washington,541 U.S. 36 (2004), the 
Court held that the certificates were testimonial because they 
were "quite plainly affidavits" and were "a solemn declaration 
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving 
some fact."  Id. at 310.  Indeed, "the sole purpose of the 
affidavits 
was 
to 
provide 
prima 
facie 
evidence 
of 
the 
composition, quality, and the net weight of the analyzed 
substance."  Id. at 311.   
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
15 
 
factually similar to Deadwiller's case.8  See infra, ¶32.  In 
that case, Williams was charged with aggravated sexual assault 
of a woman, L.J.   Williams, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2229.  
After the assault, L.J. reported the attack, went to the 
hospital, and underwent a sexual assault examination.  Id.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
In 
Bullcoming, 
at 
the 
defendant's 
DWI 
trial, 
the 
prosecution 
introduced 
into 
evidence 
a 
crime 
lab 
report 
completed by Curtis Caylor certifying that, shortly after the 
traffic accident involving the defendant, Bullcoming's blood-
alcohol 
concentration 
(BAC) 
was 
0.21 
grams 
per 
hundred 
milliliters.  564 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2711-12.  The 
prosecution did not call Caylor as a witness because he had been 
placed "on unpaid leave," but instead, called Gerasimos Razatos, 
who had not participated in or supervised Caylor's work nor did 
Razatos have an independent opinion about Bullcoming's BAC.  Id. 
at 2715-16.  The Court held that Razatos's substitute testimony 
did not satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause 
because the report contained more than machine generated results 
(for example, that Caylor received the blood sample with the 
seal intact and that Caylor followed a particular protocol), and 
that under Melendez-Diaz, the report was testimonial because it 
was formalized and created solely for an evidentiary purpose.  
Id. at 2715-17.   
8 Both cases involve sexual assault.  In both cases, the 
victim underwent a sexual assault examination, which produced 
vaginal swabs containing DNA of the perpetrator.  Police 
officers in both cases retrieved the evidence, inventoried the 
evidence, and sent the evidence to the state crime lab, which 
then sent the evidence to an out-of-state laboratory for DNA 
testing.  Further, the out-of-state laboratories sent back the 
swabs and a DNA profile of the perpetrator produced from the 
vaginal swabs.  In both cases, state crime lab analysts entered 
the DNA profile into a DNA database, which resulted in a match 
to the defendant.  When called to testify, the state crime lab 
analysts reported that the DNA profile sent by the out-of-state 
lab matched the DNA profile resulting from the DNA database.  
The DNA profile was not introduced into evidence in either case.  
Prosecutors in both cases introduced inventory reports and 
evidence receipts to prove a chain of custody, i.e. that the DNA 
profile was produced from swabs taken from the victims. 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
16 
 
police picked up the evidence collected from L.J., labeled the 
evidence with an inventory number, and sent it under seal to the 
state crime lab.  Id.  The crime lab sent the evidence to a 
Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory in Maryland.  Id.  Cellmark sent 
back L.J.'s swabs and a "report containing a male DNA profile 
produced from semen taken from those swabs."  Id.  Williams was 
not under suspicion at the time Cellmark completed its analysis.  
Id.  Sandra Lambatos, a forensic specialist at the Illinois 
state crime lab, entered Cellmark's DNA profile into the state 
DNA database, resulting in a match to Williams.  Id.    
¶22 Williams was charged with, inter alia, aggravated 
sexual assault and was tried before a state judge.  Id.  
Lambatos testified that it was common for "one DNA expert to 
rely on the records of another DNA expert," that Cellmark was an 
"accredited crime lab," that the state crime lab often sent 
genetic samples to Cellmark to reduce its backlog, and that the 
state crime lab employees relied on the sealed shipping 
containers and shipping manifests to preserve the chain of 
custody.  Id. at 2229-30.  Lambatos was shown shipping manifests 
and "explained what they indicated, namely, that the [state 
crime lab] had sent L.J.'s vaginal swabs to Cellmark, and that 
Cellmark had sent them back, along with a deduced male DNA 
profile."  Id. at 2230.  The prosecutor asked Lambatos whether 
there was a computer match between "the male DNA profile found 
in semen from the vaginal swabs of [L.J.]" and the "male DNA 
profile that had been identified" from Williams' blood.  Id.  
Over the defendant's objection, Lambatos testified that based on 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
17 
 
her comparison of the two DNA profiles, there was a match.  Id.  
The prosecutor did not enter the Cellmark report into evidence, 
nor did Lambatos read from or identify the report as the source 
of any of her conclusions.  Id.  On cross-examination, Lambatos 
confirmed that she did not conduct or observe any testing on the 
vaginal swabs, and that her testimony relied on Cellmark's DNA 
profile.  Id.  She testified that she trusted Cellmark's work 
because it was an accredited lab and that it was unlikely the 
samples had been degraded or compromised because the state crime 
lab checked for degradation before sending the samples to 
Cellmark and the samples would have exhibited telltale signs had 
they degraded.  Id. at 2230-31.  Williams moved to exclude parts 
of Lambatos' testimony based on the Confrontation Clause, but 
the judge did not exclude the evidence because Lambatos' opinion 
"was based on her own independent testing of the data received 
from [Cellmark]."  Id. at 2231.  The judge found Williams 
guilty, and his conviction was affirmed by the state court of 
appeals and supreme court.  Id.     
¶23 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
affirmed 
in 
a 
fractured opinion, concluding for various reasons that Lambatos' 
testimony did not violate Williams' right to confrontation.  Id. 
at 2228, 2255.  Justice Alito wrote for the lead opinion, which 
was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, and 
Justice Breyer.  Id. at 2227.  Justice Thomas concurred in the 
result, but not in the lead opinion's reasoning.  Id. at 2255.  
Justice Alito gave two rationales to support his conclusion.  
First, he reasoned that the DNA profile was not used to prove 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
18 
 
the truth of the matter asserted, namely, that "the report 
contained an accurate profile of the perpetrator's DNA."  Id. at 
2240.  Williams argued that Lambatos' testimony violated his 
right to confrontation because she lacked personal knowledge 
that Cellmark's DNA profile was produced from the vaginal swab 
of the victim, L.J.  Id. at 2236.  Justice Alito rejected this 
argument, stating that under the Illinois and Federal Rules of 
Evidence,9 Lambatos' testimony was not admissible for the purpose 
of proving that the DNA profile was produced from L.J.'s vaginal 
swab.  Id.  Nor did the record support Williams' argument that 
the fact finder relied on Lambatos' testimony for the truth of 
the matter.  Further, Justice Alito rebutted the dissent's 
argument that even if the report itself was not put into 
evidence, Lambatos testified to the substance of the report, and 
without the report, the State had insufficient evidence to prove 
that Cellmark's DNA profile was based on L.J.'s swab and that 
Cellmark's analysis was reliable.  Id. at 2238.  Justice Alito 
                                                 
9 See Fed. R. Evid. 703: 
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in 
the case that the expert has been made aware of or 
personally observed.  If experts in the particular 
field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or 
data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need 
not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.  But 
if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, 
the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the 
jury only if their probative value in helping the jury 
evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their 
prejudicial effect.  
See also Wis. Stat. § 907.03.   
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
19 
 
reasoned that the state put in traditional chain of custody 
evidence to prove that Cellmark's DNA profile was based on 
L.J.'s swab.  Id. at 2237, 2239.  Further, Justice Alito 
reasoned that it was simply improbable that shoddy lab work 
would result in the DNA profile of Williams, especially where 
Williams was not under suspicion at the time of Cellmark's 
testing.  Id. at 2239.   
¶24 Justice 
Alito 
explained 
that 
his 
rationale 
was 
consistent with Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 
(2009), and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 
2705 (2011).  Id. at 2240.  In both of those cases, the forensic 
report was introduced for the truth of what they asserted, that 
Bullcoming's BAC exceeded the legal limit and that the substance 
Melendez-Diaz was charged with distributing was cocaine.  Id.  
In contrast, Cellmark's report was not used for the truth of the 
matter: 
In this case, the Cellmark report was not introduced 
into evidence.  An expert witness referred to the 
report not to prove the truth of the matter asserted 
in the report, i.e., that the report contained an 
accurate profile of the perpetrator's DNA, but only to 
establish that the report contained a DNA profile that 
matched the DNA profile deduced from petitioner's 
blood. 
 
Thus, . . . the 
report 
was 
not 
to 
be 
considered for its truth but only for the distinctive 
and limited purpose of seeing whether it matched 
something else.  The relevance of the match was then 
established by independent circumstantial evidence 
showing that the Cellmark report was based on a 
forensic sample taken from the scene of the crime. 
Id. at 2240-41 (citation omitted).   
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
20 
 
¶25 Justice Alito then explained a second, independent 
rationale for concluding that Lambatos' testimony did not 
violate Williams' right to confrontation.  Id. at 2242.  He 
explained that the Confrontation Clause refers to "witnesses 
against" the accused, and that in post-Crawford cases, there 
were 
two 
common 
characteristics 
of 
Confrontation 
Clause 
violations: "(a) they involved out-of-court statements having 
the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of 
engaging in criminal conduct and (b) they involved formalized 
statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions."  Id.   In Williams, the Cellmark report was not 
"prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted 
individual."  Id. at 2243.  Rather, "its primary purpose was to 
catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large, not to obtain 
evidence for use against petitioner, who was neither in custody 
nor under suspicion at that time."  Id.   
¶26 Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, but he 
disagreed with Justice Alito's reasoning.  Id. at 2255.  Justice 
Thomas 
reached 
his 
conclusion 
"solely 
because 
Cellmark's 
statements lacked the requisite 'formality and solemnity' to be 
considered 'testimonial' for purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause":     
In Crawford, the Court explained that '[t]he text of 
the Confrontation Clause . . . applies to 'witnesses' 
against the accused——in other words, those who 'bear 
testimony.''  'Testimony,' in turn, is '[a] solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact.'  In light of its 
text, I continue to think that the Confrontation 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
21 
 
Clause regulates only the use of statements bearing 
'indicia of solemnity.'   
Id. at 2255, 2259-60 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (internal 
citations omitted)).  Justice Thomas concluded that Cellmark's 
report did not meet this standard because it lacked the 
solemnity of an affidavit or deposition.  Id. at 2260.  The 
report was "neither a sworn nor a certified declaration of 
fact."  Id.  Even though the report was produced at the request 
of the police, "it was not the product of any sort of formalized 
dialogue resembling custodial interrogation."  Id.   
¶27 Thus, although Williams was a fractured opinion, five 
Justices concluded that Lambatos' testimony did not violate 
Williams' right to confrontation.  Id. at 2228, 2255. 
¶28 Deadwiller argues that his right to confrontation was 
violated when the circuit court allowed Witucki to rely on the 
DNA profiles created by Orchid.  He argues that Orchid's DNA 
profiles were testimonial because "[t]he State needed these 
results in order to prove or establish some fact, the identity 
of the perpetrator, at the jury trial."  He argues that this 
case is distinguishable from Williams first because Deadwiller 
"sought substantive use" of Orchid's result.  In other words, 
"Witucki testified substantively that the Orchid Cellmark DNA 
results revealed the name of Richard Deadwiller."  He argues 
that Williams is further distinguishable because Deadwiller had 
a jury trial and Williams had a bench trial.   
¶29 The State argues that the judgment of Williams is 
controlling.  It asserts that Deadwiller and Williams stand in 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
22 
 
substantially identical positions, and therefore, the result in 
Williams——that 
the 
witness' 
reliance 
on 
the 
out-of-state 
laboratory's DNA profile did not violate the defendant's right 
to confrontation——is controlling.   
¶30 "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments 
on the narrowest grounds."  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188, 193 (1977) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
This rule is applicable only when "at least two rationales for 
the majority disposition fit or nest into each other like 
Russian dolls."  Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The 
Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 33 n.120 (1994).  If no theoretical overlap 
exists between the rationales employed by the plurality and the 
concurrence, 
"the 
only 
binding 
aspect 
of 
the 
fragmented 
decision . . . is its 'specific result.'"  Berwind Corp. v. 
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 307 F.3d 222, 234 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation 
omitted).  A fractured opinion mandates a specific result when 
the parties are in a "substantially identical position."  Id.   
¶31 "We need not find a legal opinion which a majority 
joined, but merely 'a legal standard which, when applied, will 
necessarily produce results with which a majority of the Court 
from that case would agree.'"  People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 
455 (Cal. 2012) (Chin, J., concurring) (citation omitted).  
Therefore, "we must identify and apply a test which satisfies 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
23 
 
the requirements of both Justice [Alito's] plurality opinion and 
Justice [Thomas's] concurrence."  Id. at 456.   
¶32 Though the opinions of Justice Alito and Justice 
Thomas in Williams have no theoretical overlap, we still apply 
the case because Deadwiller and Williams are in substantially 
identical positions.  Further, applying the tests of Justice 
Alito and Justice Thomas results in the same conclusion as in 
Williams, a conclusion with which five Justices agree that 
Witucki's testimony did not violate Deadwiller's right to 
confrontation.  Deadwiller and Williams are in substantially 
identical positions, in fact, the facts of this case are 
strikingly similar to the facts in Williams.  We reject the 
defendant's arguments that Orchid's DNA profiles were used 
"substantively" in this case but not in Williams, and we reject 
his argument that because he had a jury trial, Witucki's 
testimony violated the Confrontation Clause.  See infra, n.11.  
Both cases involve defendants accused of sexually assaulting a 
victim.  In both cases, the victim reported the crime and 
underwent a sexual assault examination, which produced vaginal 
swabs containing DNA of the perpetrator.  In both cases, police 
officers picked up the evidence, inventoried the evidence, and 
sent the evidence to the state crime lab, which then sent the 
evidence 
to 
an 
out-of-state 
laboratory 
for 
DNA 
testing.  
Further, the out-of-state laboratory in both cases sent back the 
genetic material and a DNA profile of the perpetrator produced 
from the vaginal swabs.  In both cases, state crime lab analysts 
entered the DNA profile into a DNA database, which resulted in a 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
24 
 
match to the defendant.10  When called to testify, the state 
crime lab analyst in both cases reported that the DNA profile 
sent by the out-of-state lab matched the DNA profile resulting 
from the database.  The DNA profile was not introduced into 
evidence in either case.  Prosecutors in both cases introduced 
inventory reports, evidence receipts, and testimony to prove a 
chain of custody, i.e. that the DNA profile was produced from 
swabs taken from the victims.   
¶33 Applying the rationales of Justice Alito and Justice 
Thomas "'necessarily produce[s] results with which a majority of 
the Court from that case would agree.'"  Dungo, 286 P.3d at 455 
(Chin, J. concurring)(citation omitted).  Under Justice Alito's 
first rationale, Orchid's DNA profiles were not used for the 
truth of the matter asserted.  Williams, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2236.  Just as Lambatos' testimony was not admissible for 
the purpose of proving that Cellmark's DNA profile was produced 
from semen found in L.J.'s vaginal swabs under Illinois and 
federal law, see id., nor is Witucki's testimony admissible for 
proving that Orchid's DNA profiles were produced from semen 
found in Kristina S. or Chantee O.'s vaginal swabs.  See Wis. 
                                                 
10 To 
the 
extent 
that 
the 
facts 
differ, 
Witucki's 
involvement in the DNA testing was more substantial than 
Lambatos' involvement.  After Witucki obtained a match from the 
database, he obtained a buccal swab from Deadwiller, developed a 
DNA profile from that swab, and reconfirmed that Deadwiller was 
a match to the DNA profiles produced by Orchid.  Witucki's more 
substantial involvement in the DNA testing weighs against 
Deadwiller's argument that Witucki's testimony violated his 
right to confrontation.   
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
25 
 
Stat. § 907.03.  As the prosecutor did in Williams, the State 
used traditional chain of custody evidence to prove that 
Orchid's DNA profiles were produced from the swabs taken from 
Kristina S. and Chantee O.11  567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2237, 
2239.   
¶34 Under Justice Alito's second rationale, Orchid's DNA 
profiles did not run afoul of the Confrontation Clause because 
they did not involve "out-of-court statements having the primary 
                                                 
11 Deadwiller makes much of Justice Alito's statement that 
"there would have been a danger of the jury's taking Lambatos' 
testimony as proof that the Cellmark profile was derived from 
the sample obtained from the victim's vaginal swabs.  Absent an 
evaluation of the risk of juror confusion and careful jury 
instructions, the testimony could not have gone to the jury."  
Williams, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2236.  However, Justice 
Alito 
followed 
that 
statement 
by 
confirming 
that 
the 
Confrontation Clause applies equally to bench and jury trials: 
"We do not suggest that the Confrontation Clause applies 
differently depending on the identity of the factfinder.  
Instead, our point is that the identity of the factfinder makes 
a 
big 
difference 
in 
evaluating 
the 
likelihood 
that 
the 
factfinder 
mistakenly 
based 
its 
decision 
on 
inadmissible 
evidence."  Id. at 2237 n.4.  Similar to Williams, we find no 
evidence in the record that the jury understood Witucki's 
testimony to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that 
Orchid's DNA profiles were produced from the swabs of Kristina 
S. and Chantee O.  First, the State called several police 
officers and introduced inventory reports and receipts to prove 
a chain of custody for the swabs.  See supra, ¶¶9-12.  Second, 
the jury was given instructions on how to evaluate an expert's 
testimony: "In determining the credibility of each witness and 
the 
weight you give to the testimony of each witness, 
consider . . . the opportunity the witness had for observing and 
knowing 
the 
matters 
the 
witness 
testified 
about . . . .  
Ordinarily a witness may testify only about facts, but a witness 
with expertise in a particular field may give an opinion in that 
field. 
 
So 
you 
should 
consider 
the 
qualifications 
and 
credibility of the expert, the facts upon which the opinion is 
based, and the reasons given for the opinion."   
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
26 
 
purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in 
criminal conduct."  Id. at 2242.  As in Williams, Deadwiller was 
not under suspicion at the time Orchid conducted its analysis.  
In seeking the DNA profile, the State's "primary purpose was to 
catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large, not to obtain 
evidence for use against petitioner, who was neither in custody 
nor under suspicion at that time."12  Id. at 2243. 
¶35 Under Justice Thomas' rationale, Orchid's DNA profiles 
lacked the solemnity of an affidavit or deposition.  Id. at 
2260.  There is no indication that the Orchid analyst swore to 
the test results or that the DNA profiles contained certified 
declarations of fact.13  Id.  Even though the reports were 
produced at the request of the police, there is no evidence that 
they were the product "of any sort of formalized dialogue 
resembling custodial interrogation."  Id.    
¶36 Deadwiller is in a substantially identical position as 
Williams.  Berwind, 307 F.3d at 234.  Applying the rationales of 
                                                 
12 The Supreme Court recently concluded that criminal 
suspects can be subjected to a DNA test after being arrested and 
brought to the police station for a serious offense but before 
they are convicted of the offense.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 
1958 (2013).  In reaching that conclusion, the Court highlighted 
the importance of DNA evidence with respect to solving crimes.  
Id. at 1966-80.   
13 Orchid's DNA profiles are not in the record before this 
court.  When an appellate record is incomplete with respect to 
an issue raised by the appellant, we assume that the missing 
material supports the trial court's ruling.  State v. Benton, 
2001 WI App 81, ¶10, 243 Wis. 2d 54, 625 N.W.2d 923 (citing 
Duhame v. Duhame, 154 Wis. 2d 258, 269, 453 N.W.2d 149 (Ct. App. 
1989)).   
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
27 
 
Justice Alito and Justice Thomas leads to the same conclusion as 
in Williams——Witucki's testimony did not violate Deadwiller's 
right to confrontation.  Further, it is worth nothing that in 
this case, Deadwiller did not challenge the substance of 
Witucki's testimony.  The accuracy of the DNA results was a side 
issue in this case because Deadwiller's defense was that the 
intercourse did occur but that the victims consented.   
¶37 Our conclusion is consistent with past Wisconsin 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, namely State v. Williams and 
Barton.  In State v. Williams, the defendant was charged with, 
inter alia, possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver.  
253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶1.  At trial, the original analyst was 
unavailable to testify, and another analyst, Sandra Koresch, who 
had performed a peer review of the original analyst's work, 
testified 
that 
the 
substance 
Williams 
was 
charged 
with 
possessing was cocaine.  Id., ¶4.  The defendant argued that 
Koresch's testimony violated his right to confrontation.  Id., 
¶5.  The court concluded that Williams' right to confrontation 
had not been violated: 
[T]he presence and availability for cross-examination 
of a highly qualified witness, who is familiar with 
the procedures at hand, supervises or reviews the work 
of the testing analyst, and renders her own expert 
opinion is sufficient to protect a defendant's right 
to confrontation, despite the fact that the expert was 
not the person who performed the mechanics of the 
original tests. 
Id., ¶20.  However, "one expert cannot act as a mere conduit for 
the opinion of another."  Id., ¶19.   
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
28 
 
¶38 In Barton, the defendant was charged with arson.  289 
Wis. 2d 206, ¶3.  The original analyst, David Lyle, had retired 
by the time of Barton's trial, and the technical unit leader, 
Kenneth 
Olson, 
testified 
that 
there 
had 
been 
ignitable 
substances found at the scene of the crime.  Id., ¶4.  Olson had 
performed a peer review of Lyle's tests and presented his own 
conclusions regarding the tests to the jury.  Id.  Under State 
v. Williams, the court concluded that Barton's right to 
confrontation had not been violated:  
Like 
the 
unit 
leader's 
testimony 
in [State 
v.] 
Williams, Olson's 
testimony 
was 
properly 
admitted 
because he was a qualified unit leader presenting his 
individual, expert opinion.  Olson not only examined 
the results of Lyle's tests, but he also performed a 
peer review of Lyle's tests.  He formed his opinion 
based on his own expertise and his own analysis of the 
scientific testing.  He then presented his conclusions 
to the jury, and he was available to Barton for cross-
examination. 
 
Thus, 
Olson's 
testimony 
satisfied 
Barton's confrontation right and is admissible under 
the supreme court's decision in [State v.] Williams. 
Id., ¶16.  The court of appeals also rejected Barton's argument 
that Crawford undermined the rule of State v. Williams.  Id., 
¶20.  The court stated that "[a] defendant's confrontation right 
is satisfied if a qualified expert testifies as to his or her 
independent opinion, even if the opinion is based in part on the 
work of another" expert: 
Crawford does not undermine the established rule 
that experts can testify to their opinions on relevant 
matters, and relate the information and sources upon 
which they rely in forming those opinions.  This is so 
because an expert is subject to cross-examination 
about his or her opinions and additionally, the 
materials on which the expert bases his or her opinion 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
29 
 
are not elicited for the truth of their contents; they 
are examined to assess the weight of the expert's 
opinion. 
Id., ¶¶20, 22 (quoting People v. Thomas, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 582, 
587 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)).     
¶39 Deadwiller asserts that this case is distinguishable 
from State v. Williams and Barton because Witucki was merely a 
conduit for Orchid's analysis.  The State argues that just as in 
State 
v. 
Williams 
and 
Barton, 
a 
defendant's 
right 
to 
confrontation was not violated because Witucki was highly 
qualified 
as 
an 
analyst, 
reviewed 
Orchid's 
work, 
and 
independently determined that the DNA recovered from the victims 
was a match to Deadwiller.   
¶40 In this case, Witucki's testimony was similar to that 
of the testifying analyst in State v. Williams and Barton.  
Witucki was a highly qualified expert.  When the victims' swabs 
first came in, Witucki confirmed the presence of semen.  Once 
Witucki received Orchid's DNA profile, he reviewed the profile 
to make sure that Orchid followed its procedures and quality 
control measures and that it obtained acceptable results.  
Witucki also evaluated the profile to make sure it was of 
sufficient quality to enter into the DNA database.  After the 
computer showed a match between Deadwiller and the Orchid DNA 
profiles, Witucki obtained a buccal swab from Deadwiller, 
developed a DNA profile from that swab, and reconfirmed that 
Deadwiller was a match.  Thus, Witucki was not merely a conduit 
for Orchid's DNA profiles, but he independently concluded that 
Deadwiller was a match to Orchid's DNA profiles.  See State v. 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
30 
 
Williams, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶20.  Therefore, Witucki's testimony 
was sufficient to protect Deadwiller's right to confrontation.   
B. Harmless Error 
¶41 Assuming arguendo that allowing Witucki to testify 
about Orchid's DNA profiles violated Deadwiller's right to 
confrontation, that violation was harmless.  A Confrontation 
Clause violation does not result in automatic reversal, but is 
subject to harmless error analysis.  State v. Jensen, 2011 WI 
App 3, ¶30, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 794 N.W.2d 482; State v. Weed, 2003 
WI 85, ¶28, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485; State v. Williams, 
253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶50.  For an error to be harmless, the party who 
benefitted from error must show that "'it is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error.'"  State v. Martin, 2012 WI 
96, ¶45, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270 (quoting State v. 
Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶49, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189).  In 
other words, "an error is harmless if the beneficiary of the 
error proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained 
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."  Id. (internal 
quotations omitted).  To conclude that the error was harmless, 
this court must determine that "the jury would have arrived at 
the same verdict had the error not occurred."  Id. (citations 
omitted).  Several factors guide our analysis: "the frequency of 
the error; the importance of the erroneously admitted evidence; 
the 
presence 
or 
absence 
of 
evidence 
corroborating 
or 
contradicting the erroneously admitted evidence; whether the 
erroneously admitted evidence duplicates untainted evidence; the 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
31 
 
nature of the defense; the nature of the State's case; and the 
overall strength of the State's case."  Id., ¶46.     
¶42 Deadwiller argues that the introduction of Witucki's 
testimony was not harmless.  Deadwiller points out that his 
prior statements to the police——that he had sexual intercourse 
with both women (asserting that it was consensual and that he 
paid them)——were not introduced by the State.  Deadwiller argues 
that he had to change his defense strategy because of the 
violation, i.e. he decided to testify that the sex was 
consensual only after the State introduced the DNA evidence.  
The State, on the other hand, argues that any error was 
harmless.  Deadwiller admitted that he was the source of the 
semen, and his defense strategy throughout the whole proceedings 
was that the sex was consensual.   
¶43 We agree with the State and conclude that even if 
admitting Witucki's testimony violated Deadwiller's right to 
confrontation, that error was harmless.  First, Deadwiller made 
statements 
to 
the 
police 
admitting 
that 
he 
had 
sexual 
intercourse with the victims.  At a pretrial conference, the 
court asked the prosecutor whether he intended to use those 
statements, and he responded that "I guess that is going to 
depend on the DNA and if the Court allows Mr. Witucki to 
testify.  I don't intend to use his statements.  If that is not 
resolved, then I may put his statements on just to show this is 
really a consent case."  If Witucki had not testified, the State 
could have used Deadwiller's statements to prove the same fact——
that Deadwiller was the source of the semen recovered from the 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
32 
 
victims.  Second, Deadwiller made several statements indicating 
that he did not challenge the DNA results, but rather was basing 
his defense on the theory that Kristina S. and Chantee O. 
consented to the sexual intercourse.  At a pretrial conference 
days before the trial was scheduled to begin, Deadwiller 
reported that his DNA expert had not completed the review of 
evidence in this case.  The court informed Deadwiller that he 
"could go to trial with your expert if we put it at another date 
at a later time" and asked him several times whether he wanted 
to proceed without his DNA expert.  The defendant answered 
affirmatively six times, insisting that he wanted to proceed 
without his expert.  The State added that the DNA was going to 
be a side issue in the case; that Deadwiller's defense was going 
to be that the victims consented, and that this was going to be 
a credibility case.  Deadwiller responded that "I agree with him 
100 percent."  In other words, whether intercourse occurred, the 
subject of the expert's testimony was irrelevant to Deadwiller's 
defense because his defense was that the intercourse did occur 
but that the victims consented.  At trial, the defendant 
testified that Kristina S. and Chantee O. both consented to 
having sexual intercourse with him and that he did not dispute 
that his semen was found in both victims.  Throughout the entire 
proceedings, Deadwiller's defense strategy was that the sexual 
intercourse was consensual.  Therefore, even if Witucki's 
testimony violated Deadwiller's right to confrontation, that 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.    
IV. CONCLUSION 
No. 
2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR   
 
33 
 
¶44 We conclude that on the facts of this case, Witucki's 
testimony did not violate Deadwiller's right to confrontation.  
Applying the various rationales of Williams, a majority of the 
United States Supreme Court would come to the same conclusion as 
in Williams, that the expert's testimony did not violate the 
defendant's right to confrontation.  Moreover, Deadwiller did 
not challenge the substance of Witucki's testimony because his 
defense was that the intercourse did occur but that the victims 
consented.     
¶45 Further, assuming arguendo that the admission of 
Witucki's 
testimony 
violated 
Deadwiller's 
right 
to 
confrontation, we conclude that the error was harmless in light 
of the defendant's previous admissions of sexual intercourse 
with the victims and the fact that throughout the proceedings, 
he maintained a defense that the victims consented. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
¶46 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶47 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring).1 
This 
writing is really a lament.  A lament that the majority opinion 
reaches a result without a rationale.  Because the majority 
opinion offers no rationale for the result, the majority opinion 
does 
not 
help 
answer 
the 
recurring 
significant 
central 
constitutional/evidentiary question presented, namely, "How does 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
apply 
to 
the 
panoply 
of 
crime 
laboratory reports and underlying technical statements written 
by (or otherwise made by) laboratory technicians?"2  This central 
question is ubiquitous in trial courts every day. 
¶48 The majority opinion reaches its result based on the 
result reached by the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. 
Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).  Williams was a plurality 
decision.  As a result of issuing a plurality decision, the 
United States Supreme Court has not synthesized its case law 
interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), to 
adequately delineate the intersection of the Confrontation 
Clause and the rules of evidence and the application of the 
Confrontation Clause to the use of crime laboratory reports at 
trial.  The instant case presents this court an opportunity to 
                                                 
1 I concur in judgment because the alleged error, if error, 
was harmless.  The record indicates that before trial, the 
defendant told detectives that he did indeed have sexual 
relations with the victims, but that the relations were 
consensual.  It is not entirely clear when the defendant made 
these statements and the detectives did not testify at trial 
regarding the statements.  What is clear is that at the pretrial 
hearing when the State remarked that the case centered on the 
issue of consent, the defendant did not object. 
2 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2244 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
No.  2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
do so.  Yet the majority opinion sidesteps this opportunity and 
in doing so, fails to advance the law in this important area. 
¶49 I write for two reasons.   
¶50 First, I conclude that this court is not obligated to 
follow the United States Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. 
Illinois in reaching its result.  The decision is not binding 
upon this court because there is no single or narrowest 
rationale upon which the majority of the United States Supreme 
Court relied in reaching its conclusion.   
¶51 Second, in relying on Williams to dictate the result 
in the present case, the majority opinion misses an opportunity 
to examine more fully the important question raised regarding 
the intersection of the Confrontation Clause and the rules of 
evidence and the application of the Confrontation Clause to the 
numerous types of crime laboratory reports and the witnesses 
testifying about them.    
I 
¶52 The first issue is what role Williams should play in 
our court's decision in the present case.  Williams was a 
plurality decision.  It is not the first plurality decision of 
the United States Supreme Court (or this court), and it will not 
be the last.   
¶53 Rules have been developed instructing federal and 
state courts how to interpret and apply plurality decisions.   
¶54 The United States Supreme Court declared in Marks v. 
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), that when it issues a 
plurality decision, with no five Justices agreeing on a 
No.  2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR.ssa 
 
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rationale, courts should regard the opinion of the Justice 
concurring on the narrowest possible grounds as the Court's 
ultimate holding.   
¶55 This court has followed Marks in applying plurality 
opinions of the United States Supreme Court and in applying 
plurality decisions of this court.  See, e.g., Vincent v. 
Voight, 2000 WI 93, ¶46, n.18, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388; 
Lounge Mgmt., Ltd. v. Town of Trenton, 219 Wis. 2d 13, 21-22, 
580 N.W.2d 156 (1998); Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 284, 
578 N.W.2d 166 (1998) (Crooks, J. concurring) (quoting Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, 
Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)).          
¶56 The Marks narrowest grounds rule has been interpreted 
as applying only when "one opinion can be meaningfully regarded 
as 'narrower' than another——only when one opinion is a logical 
subset of other, broader opinions" and can "represent a common 
denominator of the Court's reasoning . . . ."  King v. Palmer, 
950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)).  Therefore, "in 
cases where approaches differ, no particular standard is binding 
on an inferior court because none has received the support of a 
majority of the Supreme Court."  Ankar Energy Corp. v. 
Consolidation Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1999).  "When 
it 
is not possible to discover a single standard that 
legitimately constitutes the narrowest ground for a decision on 
that issue, there is then no law of the land because no one 
standard commands the support of a majority of the Supreme 
No.  2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
Court."  United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 
189 (2d Cir. 2003). 
¶57 No narrowest opinion exists in Williams.  No one 
opinion is a logical subset of another broader opinion.3 
¶58 Five Justices of the United States Supreme Court 
concluded in Williams that a DNA report similar to the one 
introduced in the present case did not violate the Confrontation 
Clause.  They could not agree on the reason.  Four of these 
Justices concluded that the admission of a Cellmark report did 
not violate the Confrontation Clause because the report was not 
used to prove the truth of the matter asserted and its primary 
purpose was not to accuse a targeted individual of a crime.  
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243.  One Justice agreeing with the 
disposition of the case concluded that the report was non-
testimonial because it "lacked the requisite 'formality and 
solemnity' to be considered 'testimonial' . . . ."  Williams, 
132 S. Ct. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring).4   
¶59 Four Justices dissented, concluding that the admission 
of a Cellmark report was a Confrontation Clause violation.  
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
                                                 
3 For a recent law review commentary on the Marks rule, see 
W. Jesse Weins, Note, A Problematic Plurality Precedent: Why the 
Supreme Court Should Leave Marks Over Van Orden v. Perry, 85 
Neb. L. Rev. 830 (2007). 
4 Justice 
Thomas's 
concurrence 
in 
Williams 
explicitly 
rejects the plurality's "flawed analysis" and asserts that 
"there 
was 
no 
plausible 
reason 
for 
the 
introduction 
of 
Cellmark's statements other than to establish their truth."  
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2255-56 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
No.  2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶60 I do not view the Williams decision as binding on this 
court.  There is no "narrowest" rationale upon which to rely.  
The plurality opinion and Justice Thomas's concurrence employ 
differing approaches to reach the same conclusion that no 
Confrontation Clause violation occurred, but no opinion is a 
"logical subset" of another. 
¶61 As Justice Kagan noted in her dissent, "[I]n all 
except [the plurality's] disposition, [Justice Alito's] opinion 
is a dissent:  Five Justices specifically reject every aspect of 
its reasoning and every aspect of its explication."  Williams, 
132 S. Ct. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Therefore, although 
the inclusion of Justice Thomas's concurrence means five 
Justices 
reached 
the 
same 
result, 
the 
reasoning 
of 
the 
concurrence cannot be considered the narrowest grounds or the 
"logical subset" of the plurality opinion.   
¶62 The majority opinion follows the result in Williams 
because the defendant in Williams and the defendant in the 
present case are in "substantially identical positions."  Thus, 
the majority opinion asserts that five Justices of the United 
States Supreme Court would most likely reach the same conclusion 
as they reached in Williams if presented with the instant case.  
Majority op., ¶¶31-34.5   
                                                 
5 The facts of the present case and Williams are somewhat 
different.  The question is whether the differences matter.  
Here a jury, rather than a judge, determined the defendant's 
guilt.  Justice Alito's plurality opinion hinted that a change 
in the fact-finder might be an issue.  Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 
2236; majority op., ¶34 n.11.   
No.  2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶63 Without explaining why it is deviating from our 
precedent that relies on the Marks plurality opinion rule, the 
majority opinion adopts a different way of approaching a 
plurality decision of the United States Supreme Court.  The 
majority opinion's new approach to a plurality decision is to 
ask (and answer) how five members of the United States Supreme 
Court would dispose of the present case.  In other words, the 
majority opinion asks (and answers) the following question:  
What result would the four-member plurality in Williams plus 
Justice Thomas reach in the present case? 
¶64 I ask, what is the effect of the majority opinion's 
new approach on our prior cases adopting the Marks rule?  Does 
the majority opinion's "follow the result" rule replace the 
"follow the narrowest rationale" rule from Marks?  Is it an 
interpretation of or an alternative to the Marks rule?  Does the 
majority opinion's "follow the result" rule require that the 
facts of each new case be on all fours with the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court?  Does the majority opinion's 
"follow the result" rule require this court to follow a certain 
rationale that led to that result, even though no rationale has 
received the support of a majority of the United States Supreme 
Court?  Does the majority opinion's "follow the result" rule 
require that all of the United States Supreme Court Justices who 
agreed on the result still be on the Court when a new state case 
is presented?  
¶65 Because there is no single or narrowest rationale upon 
which the majority in the United States Supreme Court relied on 
No.  2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
reaching its conclusion in Williams, I conclude that there is no 
standard in Williams for this court to follow.   
II 
¶66 I turn now to my second point.  In relying on Williams 
to dictate the result in the present case, the court misses an 
opportunity to examine the question raised regarding the 
intersection of the Confrontation Clause and the rules of 
evidence and the application of the Confrontation Clause to a 
wide array of crime laboratory reports and the witnesses who 
testify about them. 
¶67 It may be fairly easy to speculate what result the 
Williams Court would reach in the present case when Williams was 
so recently decided and is so similar to the facts of the 
present case.  It will not be as easy in other cases in the near 
and distant future that present different fact situations.  
¶68 By adopting the result of Williams without fully 
setting forth a rationale, a standard, that Wisconsin courts 
should follow in future cases, the court has failed to strive to 
unbundle Confrontation Clause doctrine.   
¶69 I agree with Justice Breyer, who lamented at length in 
Williams about the gravity of the issues left unresolved by the 
Williams decision.  Justice Breyer would have preferred that the 
Court take a fresh look at the intersection of the Confrontation 
Clause and the rules of evidence and synthesize Crawford, 
Melendez-Diaz,6 and Bullcoming7 with the issues presented in 
                                                 
6 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).  
7 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
No.  2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
Williams.8  This synthesis is essential because the Justices of 
the United States Supreme Court have expressed widely divergent 
views in these cases. 
¶70 One commentary concluded that the Williams plurality 
opinion deferred to the Illinois rules of evidence, thus 
"intermingl[ing] the Confrontation Clause with state rules of 
evidence, . . . precisely the evil that Crawford helped to 
remedy . . . [and] amounting to an unacknowledged departure from 
Crawford itself."  The Supreme Court, 2011 Term——Leading Cases, 
126 Harv. L. Rev. 176, 273 (2012).  This law review piece opines 
on Williams as follows:  "The Court could have avoided such a 
confusing outcome, if only a single additional Justice had 
either joined the Justices in the plurality to write a majority 
opinion overruling Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming or joined the 
dissent and thereby strengthened and clarified the requirements 
of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming."  The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—
—Leading Cases, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 176, 276 (2012). 
¶71 Justice 
Breyer 
also 
raised 
important 
practical 
questions.  Who may the prosecution call to testify and how many 
people who were involved in the laboratory should have to 
testify to satisfy the Confrontation Clause?9  Justice Breyer 
noted that the Williams plurality decision, like decisions 
before it, has failed to produce a clear, generally applicable 
practical answer to the Confrontation Clause issue with respect 
to routine crime laboratory results: 
                                                 
8 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2248 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
9 Id. at 2246-47 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
No.  2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
Once one abandons the traditional [Federal] rule [of 
Evidence 703], there would seem often to be no logical 
stopping place between requiring the prosecution to 
call as a witness one of the laboratory experts who 
worked on the matter and requiring the prosecution to 
call all of the laboratory experts who did so.  
Experts——especially laboratory experts——regularly rely 
on the technical statements and results of other 
experts to form their own opinions.  The reality of 
the matter is that the introduction of a laboratory 
report 
involves 
layer 
upon 
layer 
of 
technical 
statements (express or implied) made by one expert and 
relied upon by another.10 
¶72 Although Justice Breyer concurred to criticize the 
plurality for failing to produce a clear, generally applicable 
rule, Justice Kagan dissented to fault the plurality for 
tarnishing what she viewed as the clear rule that the Court had 
recently 
espoused. 
 
Before 
Williams, 
two 
landmark 
Court 
decisions within the last three years in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming demanded that "a prosecutor wishing to admit the 
results of forensic testing had to produce the technician 
responsible for the analysis."11  "But that clear rule is clear 
no longer," lamented Justice Kagan.12  In failing to follow these 
recent decisions, the Court has "left significant confusion in 
[its] wake."13 
¶73 Commentators have levied criticism at all four of the 
Williams opinions: 
                                                 
10 Id. at 2246 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
11 Id. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
12 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
13 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
No.  2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR.ssa 
 
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The lack of either a majority opinion or a clear 
holding, in addition to the internal flaws of the 
various opinions, deeply muddles Confrontation Clause 
doctrine, leaving the clause's application to forensic 
evidence in question.14   
¶74 This court should, I think, take Justice Breyer's 
advice and examine the issues presented and decide the present 
case on the basis of constitutional precedent of the United 
States Supreme Court and this court, learning to the extent 
possible from the diversity of opinions in these cases.  
Although the United States Supreme Court has failed to provide 
clear, consistent answers on the interplay of the Confrontation 
Clause and evidentiary rules when laboratory reports and 
statements are introduced or relied upon, this court should 
attempt to craft a constitutional standard and fashion an 
approach that is theoretically and practically sound.   
¶75 Our re-examination of the applicable state and federal 
precedent 
would 
be 
fruitful 
to 
guide 
circuit 
courts, 
prosecutors, defense counsel, and expert witnesses in the 
conduct of trials in which an array of laboratory reports and 
statements are introduced or relied upon.15  Unless we do so, 
courts and litigants will have little or no guidance on how to 
proceed when the next cases are presented in the circuit courts 
with different sets of circumstances and different kinds of 
crime laboratory reports and witnesses at issue. 
                                                 
14 The Supreme Court, 2011 Term——Leading Cases, 126 Harv. L. 
Rev. 176, 267 (2012). 
15 For examples of courts taking this approach of re-
examining 
the 
case 
law 
to 
address 
Confrontation 
Clause 
challenges, see United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 
2013); People v. Pealer, 985 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y. 2013). 
No.  2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR.ssa 
 
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¶76 Justice Breyer began this examination in his Williams 
concurrence when he acknowledged that courts and treatise 
writers have recognized the problem and have suggested at least 
six different solutions.16  All of the approaches assume some 
kind of Crawford boundary——some kind of limitation upon the 
scope of Crawford——delineating who may be permitted to testify 
and upon what evidence they may rely.17  This standard would 
respect defendants' 
constitutional rights to confront the 
witnesses who collect, process, and analyze the evidence 
presented at trial while not requiring every person who has ever 
touched the evidence to testify in court. 
¶77 Not only must this court harmonize Williams with 
Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming, but it must also 
                                                 
16 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2247-48 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
17 Id. at 2248 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
As a basis for discussion, Justice Breyer's concurrence 
provides the following alternative solution to help satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause: 
[S]hould the defendant provide good reason to doubt 
the laboratory's competence or the validity of its 
accreditation, 
then 
the 
alternative 
safeguard 
of 
reliability would no longer exist and the Constitution 
would entitle [the] defendant to Confrontation Clause 
protection.   
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2252 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
For commentary on Williams, see, e.g., Michael A. Sabino & 
Anthony Michael Sabino, Confronting the "Crucible of Cross-
Examination": Reconciling the Supreme Court's Recent Edicts on 
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, 65 Baylor L. Rev. 
255 (2013). 
No.  2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
harmonize Wisconsin court decisions such as State v. Williams18 
and State v. Barton.19  The majority opinion, relying more on the 
result of Williams than the rationale of the Crawford line of 
cases, leaves this major task undone. 
¶78 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.  
¶79 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins Part I of this opinion. 
                                                 
18 State v. Williams, 2002 WI 58, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 644 
N.W.2d 919. 
19 State v. Barton, 2006 WI App 18, 289 Wis. 2d 206, 709 
N.W.2d 93.  
No.  2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶80 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion in concluding that even if Deadwiller's rights 
under the Confrontation Clause were violated, the error here is 
harmless.  Majority op., ¶3.  Therefore I join Section III.B of 
the majority opinion. 
¶81 However, for the reasons set forth in Section I of the 
concurring opinion, I cannot join the majority's discussion of 
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) or its application 
of Williams to this case.  See majority op, ¶¶20-35; Chief 
Justice Abrahamson's Concurrence, ¶¶52-65.  Therefore I join 
Section 
I 
of 
the 
concurring 
opinion. 
 
Accordingly, 
I 
respectfully concur.     
 
No.  2010AP2363-CR & 2010AP2364-CR.awb 
 
1