Case Title: State v. Elmore

Citation: 2006-Ohio-6207

Docket Number: 20040041

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Elmore, 111 Ohio St.3d 515, 2006-Ohio-6207.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. ELMORE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Elmore, 111 Ohio St.3d 515, 2006-Ohio-6207.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Conviction and death penalty upheld. 
(No. 2004-0041 — Submitted August 8, 2006 — Decided December 13, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County, No. 02 CR 275. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, defendant-appellant, Phillip E. Elmore, raises 17 
propositions of law.  We find one proposition to be meritorious and remand the 
case to the trial court to resentence Elmore on the noncapital offenses for which 
he was convicted.  We find that none of his other propositions of law has merit 
and affirm Elmore’s convictions.  We have also independently weighed the 
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating factors and have compared 
Elmore’s sentence of death to those imposed in similar cases, as R.C. 2929.05(A) 
requires.  We find that the sentence of death imposed in this case was appropriate, 
and we therefore affirm it. 
{¶ 2} On June 1, 2002, 47-year-old Pamela Annarino attended her son’s 
wedding ceremony and reception.  While Annarino was attending these activities, 
Elmore broke into her Newark home and waited for her to return.  Elmore and 
Annarino had previously had a personal relationship. 
{¶ 3} After she arrived home, Elmore murdered Annarino by strangling 
her and hitting her in the head with a pipe.  Elmore then stole Annarino’s purse 
and fled in her car.  Subsequently, Elmore was convicted of the aggravated 
murder of Annarino and sentenced to death. 
State’s case 
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{¶ 4} Around 9:30 a.m. on June 1, 2002, Annarino left her home on 
West Postal Avenue in Newark to attend her son’s wedding.  Annarino and her 
sister, Janna Wilfong, drove to the wedding in Wilfong’s car.  Around 10:00 a.m. 
or 11:00 a.m., Timothy Grooms, a friend of Annarino, went to her house to look 
after Annarino’s dog while she was at the wedding.  However, Grooms could not 
get into the house because he could not find the house key where Annarino was 
supposed to have left it. 
{¶ 5} At 12:30 p.m., Annarino arrived home from the wedding and went 
into her house.  Shortly thereafter, Annarino drove her Toyota Camry to the 
wedding reception. 
{¶ 6} During the late afternoon on June 1, Annarino arrived home.  
Gloria Cooperider, Annarino’s next-door neighbor, saw Annarino exit her car and 
walk toward the back door of her house.  “Very shortly thereafter,” Cooperider 
saw Elmore “get in [Annarino’s] car, start it up and pull away.”  Cooperider 
recognized Elmore because she had met him approximately two years earlier 
when Elmore and Annarino were dating. 
{¶ 7} Around 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m. on June 1, John Williams, who 
lived with Cooperider, was returning to their home on West Postal Avenue.  As 
Williams turned onto West Postal Avenue, he saw Elmore driving Annarino’s car.  
Williams waved at Elmore, and Elmore “[k]ind of smiled” and waved back, 
according to Williams. 
{¶ 8} On June 2 and 3, Grooms returned to Annarino’s home, but he still 
had no key to the house, and he left after concluding that Annarino was not there.  
On June 4, Grooms and Clifton Rodeniser, Annarino’s brother-in-law, went to 
Annarino’s home to check on her.  They found the front and back doors locked, 
but Grooms pried open a window, and they entered the house.  After an extensive 
search of the home, Grooms and Rodeniser found Annarino’s body in a bathtub in 
the second-floor bathroom.  Rodeniser then notified the police by calling 911. 
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{¶ 9} Around 7:15 p.m. on June 4, police arrived at Annarino’s home.  
Annarino’s body was covered in blood.  A paramedic testified at Elmore’s trial 
that Annarino “had a large laceration over the right side of her skull above the eye 
approximately three to four inches in length with bone fragments sticking out.”  A 
pair of elastic leggings was tied around her neck. 
{¶ 10} Police investigators found blood spatters on the ceiling, the tub, 
and the wall area behind the tub.  According to Timothy Elliget, a Newark police 
criminalist, “blood spatter on the ceiling area above the tub * * * was consistent 
with castoff from a weapon.”  Elliget testified that blood spatters also “came out 
in a V pattern from the head and deposited on * * * the wall surrounding the back 
of the tub” and that the spatter pattern “was consistent with * * * an object 
striking the victim’s head in that area.”  Finally, the absence of blood spatters at 
the end of the bathtub created a “void pattern” that led Elliget to conclude that 
Annarino was in the bathtub when the attack occurred. 
{¶ 11} Investigators found evidence that the back door had been forced 
open.  The inside edge of the door near the door lock had been damaged, and pry 
marks were visible on the door as well.  The lock plate was also missing.  Newark 
police officers found three fingerprints on the back door, and Officer Elliget 
testified that those prints were a match to Elmore’s “left ring finger, the left 
middle finger and the left index finger.” Police officers also found a shotgun and a 
shell underneath Annarino’s bed. 
{¶ 12} The garage behind the house was also searched by the officers, 
who found shoe prints on the garage floor and on a piece of paper inside the 
garage.  A shoe print from the garage and a shoe print from the shoes that Elmore 
was wearing at the time of his arrest were later compared.  According to Elliget, 
the shoe print from the garage and Elmore’s shoe print “are of a similar pattern.” 
{¶ 13} On June 5, Dr. Charles Lee, a Deputy Coroner for Licking County, 
conducted the autopsy on Annarino.  The victim had several lacerations on the top 
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of her head caused by “four to five” blows from a blunt instrument.  Dr. Lee 
found that the “multiple blunt force injuries to the head” were the cause of 
Annarino’s death.  He also determined that Annarino had been strangled with the 
leggings that were found around her neck.  Strangulation could have easily 
rendered Annarino unconscious, and it was a contributing factor in her death, 
according to Dr. Lee.  Finally, Dr. Lee testified that lacerations on Annarino’s left 
forearm were defensive wounds caused by a blunt instrument before Annarino 
was killed. 
{¶ 14} After speaking with Annarino’s neighbors on the evening of June 
4, the police determined that Elmore was their primary suspect, and they 
broadcast his name and the description of Annarino’s Toyota Camry to other law-
enforcement agencies.  Around 4:00 a.m. on June 5, a Columbus police officer, 
Shea McCracken, spotted Annarino’s Toyota Camry in Columbus and followed 
the car into a parking lot.  The two occupants of the car exited the vehicle, and 
they were identified as Scott Darthard and Shawnta Hale. 
{¶ 15} Based upon information received from Darthard and Hale, 
Columbus police officers conducted a stakeout of Hale’s home in Columbus.  
During the early morning hours of June 5, police officers saw Elmore leave 
Hale’s home and walk down the street.  They then arrested Elmore and 
transported him to the headquarters of the Columbus Police Department. 
{¶ 16} Around 7:00 a.m. on June 5, Newark Detectives Steven Vanoy and 
Steven Baum interviewed Elmore.  After being advised of his Miranda rights and 
waiving those rights, Elmore admitted going to Annarino’s home on June 1.  He 
also told the detectives that he and Annarino had argued that day, and he 
acknowledged that he had taken Annarino’s car.  According to Detective Vanoy, 
Elmore then said, “I did it.  I’m guilty.  That’s it.”  Later that morning, Elmore 
was transported to the Newark Police Department. 
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{¶ 17} At around 10:00 a.m. on June 5, Elmore informed Detective Vanoy 
that he wanted to talk further.  After again waiving his Miranda rights, Elmore 
provided a detailed confession to Annarino’s murder.  Detectives Vanoy and 
Baum recorded Elmore’s statement on audiotape.  Elmore stated that around 6:00 
a.m. on June 1, he went to Annarino’s house and “stayed in the garage until she 
left.”  He then broke into the house by prying open the back door with a 
screwdriver.  Elmore went to the upstairs bedroom and found the shotgun that 
Annarino had kept under her bed.  He then took the shotgun to the downstairs 
kitchen. 
{¶ 18} According to Elmore, after Annarino arrived home from the 
wedding reception, they sat in the kitchen, talked, and argued.  Elmore held the 
shotgun while he was talking to her.  During their argument, Elmore gave 
Annarino the shotgun and told her “if you want to kill me you can kill me.”  
Elmore explained to the detectives that he had taken the shells out of the shotgun, 
but it is unclear whether Annarino knew that the gun was unloaded.  Annarino 
then went to her upstairs bedroom to change clothes.  She took the shotgun with 
her.  Elmore followed Annarino, and they continued to argue upstairs. 
{¶ 19} While they were in the upstairs bathroom, Annarino “just went off 
on [him],” according to Elmore.  He said, “She just got in my face and started * * 
* screaming and stuff.”  Elmore told Annarino “I’m gonna get outta here.  * * * 
[Y]ou go where you have to go and I’m gonna leave. * * * [B]ut let me tie you up 
before you get a chance to call the police.” 
{¶ 20} According to Elmore, they continued to argue.  At some point, 
Elmore went downstairs, picked up a lead pipe that he had brought into the house 
when he broke in, and returned to the upstairs bathroom.  He then “hit her in the 
arm and she fell back in the tub.” Elmore explained to the detectives, “It’s like I 
just blacked out * * * [and] I hit her again * * * three or four times” on her head. 
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{¶ 21} Then, according to Elmore, he went downstairs, “grabbed her 
purse, locked the door * * * got in the car and * * * left.”  He went to a friend’s 
house, changed his pants, and drove Annarino’s car to Columbus.  He said that he 
put the pipe and Annarino’s purse into a bag and threw the bag into a dumpster in 
Columbus. 
{¶ 22} Elmore told the detectives, “[I] just wanted to scare [Annarino]. * 
* * I didn’t want to hurt her at all.”  He denied tying the leggings around her neck, 
explaining instead that he had put them “around her mouth.” 
{¶ 23} On June 6, Elmore was questioned again by the detectives.  After 
waiving his Miranda rights for a third time, Elmore continued to deny that he had 
strangled Annarino.  However, Elmore recalled that he had tied her hands with a 
“yellow floral pattern” dress or shirt.  He added that he had untied her hands when 
she complained that they were bound too tightly. 
{¶ 24} On June 14, Detective Baum interviewed Elmore again.  After 
waiving his Miranda rights, Elmore said that he had remembered additional 
details of the crime, including “choking [Annarino] before [he] hit her.”  He 
added, “I didn’t choke her with the stretch pants.  I choked her with my hands.” 
{¶ 25} The police never found the lead pipe, Annarino’s stolen purse, or 
the yellow floral-patterned dress or shirt.  They did, however, recover the 
bloodstained shorts that Elmore was wearing on the day of the murder.  A key and 
a lock-plate cover were found in the shorts pocket.  Investigators found that the 
key operated the deadbolt lock on Annarino’s back door.  The lock plate also fit 
into the door panel and was the same brand as the deadbolt lock. 
{¶ 26} Jennifer Duvall, a DNA analyst at the Ohio Bureau of Criminal 
Identification and Investigation, conducted DNA tests on the bloodstain found on 
Elmore’s shorts.  Testing revealed that DNA from the bloodstain on the shorts 
was consistent with Annarino’s DNA.  According to Duvall, the chance of finding 
this same DNA profile in a random member of the population “would be one in 
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over five quadrillion in the Caucasian population, one in over six quadrillion in 
the African-American population, and one in more than 14 quadrillion in the 
Hispanic population.” 
{¶ 27} At Elmore’s trial, the defense introduced a laboratory report 
showing that the shotgun found under the victim’s bed was fully functional.  The 
defense presented no further evidence until the penalty phase of the trial. 
Case history 
{¶ 28} The grand jury in Licking County indicted Elmore on one count of 
aggravated murder.  That first count in the indictment alleged that Elmore 
committed the aggravated murder of Annarino while also committing kidnapping, 
aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary.  Appended to Count 1 were four 
death-penalty specifications: murder for the purpose of escaping apprehension or 
detection, R.C. 2929.04(A)(3); murder while committing, attempting to commit, 
or fleeing after committing kidnapping, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7); murder while 
committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing after committing aggravated 
robbery, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7); and murder while committing, attempting to 
commit, or fleeing after committing aggravated burglary, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). 
{¶ 29} Elmore was also charged with five noncapital offenses:  Count 2 
charged Elmore with murder, Count 3 charged kidnapping, Count 4 charged 
aggravated robbery, Count 5 charged aggravated burglary, and Count 6 charged 
grand theft for taking Annarino’s Toyota Camry. 
{¶ 30} Elmore pleaded not guilty to the indictment.  At trial, the jury 
found Elmore guilty of all charges, and he was sentenced to death. 
{¶ 31} Elmore now appeals to this court as a matter of right. 
Pretrial and guilt-phase issues 
{¶ 32} Motion to suppress.  In proposition of law XV, Elmore argues that 
he was improperly arrested without a warrant on the morning of June 5, 2002.  
Elmore claims that his subsequent statements to the police were the fruits of his 
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improper arrest and should not have been introduced at trial.  See Brown v. 
Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 603-605, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416. 
{¶ 33} During the pretrial hearing on Elmore’s motion to suppress, 
Detective Vanoy testified that neighbors had seen Elmore drive off in Annarino’s 
car around the time she was thought to have been killed.  During the early 
morning hours of June 5, 2002, the Newark police sent a broadcast to other law-
enforcement agencies indicating that Elmore was wanted in connection with the 
homicide of Pamela Annarino.  The broadcast included a description of Elmore 
and information about Annarino’s Toyota Camry. 
{¶ 34} Around 4:00 a.m. on June 5, Columbus police officer Shea 
McCracken saw Annarino’s car drive past him.  He confirmed that this was 
Annarino’s car by checking the license plate number on his on-board computer.  
McCracken also called a nearby patrolman, who verified that the Newark police 
were looking for this vehicle as part of a homicide investigation.  Officer 
McCracken then signaled the driver of the Toyota Camry to stop, and he 
determined that the occupants of the car were Scott Darthard and Shawnta Hale. 
{¶ 35} Columbus police officer Eric Everhart testified at the suppression 
hearing that he talked with Darthard and Hale on the morning of June 5.  Officer 
Everhart had known Darthard for more than five years and had had frequent 
contact with him.  Darthard had provided him with reliable information on several 
occasions.  Darthard told Everhart that he had gotten the vehicle from a crack 
cocaine user and described him as an older, short, black male.  Darthard was 
supposed to return the vehicle to that person at 7:00 a.m. at Oak and Morrison 
Streets in Columbus. 
{¶ 36} Based upon Darthard’s information, several police officers 
conducted a stakeout of Hale’s home near the corner of Oak and Morrison.  
Around 6:00 a.m., a man matching Elmore’s description was observed exiting 
Hale’s home.  Elmore started walking toward Everhart’s location, and when 
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Elmore saw the police, he did an about-face and started walking in the other 
direction.  Officer Brett Bodell approached Elmore and asked, “Hey, bub, what’s 
your name?”  After identifying himself, Elmore was placed in handcuffs and 
searched, but nothing was found.  Elmore was then taken into custody. 
{¶ 37} Elmore contends that his warrantless arrest violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  Elmore claims that once he identified himself, answered the 
officer’s questions, and was patted down, a procedure that revealed nothing 
suspicious, the police were required to let him go.  We reject this argument. 
{¶ 38} The warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place upon 
probable cause does not violate the Fourth Amendment.  See United States v. 
Watson (1976), 423 U.S. 411, 423-424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598; United 
States v. Santana (1976), 427 U.S. 38, 42, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300.  
Moreover, in Ohio, warrantless arrests are permitted by statute.  R.C. 2935.04 
provides:  “When a felony has been committed, or there is reasonable ground to 
believe that a felony has been committed, any person without a warrant may arrest 
another whom he has reasonable cause to believe is guilty of the offense, and 
detain him until a warrant can be obtained.”  Thus, the question becomes whether 
there was probable cause for making the arrest. 
{¶ 39} Probable cause for a warrantless arrest requires that the arresting 
officer, at the time of the arrest, possess sufficient information that would cause a 
reasonable and prudent person to believe that a criminal offense has been or is 
being committed.  Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103, 111-112, 95 S.Ct. 854, 
43 L.Ed.2d 54; Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 
142.  In determining whether probable cause existed, we examine the “totality” of 
facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest.  See State v. Homan (2000), 89 
Ohio St.3d 421, 427, 732 N.E.2d 952. 
{¶ 40} Before his arrest, police knew that Elmore had been identified 
leaving Annarino’s home shortly after she was killed and that he had driven off in 
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her car.  Police later stopped Annarino’s car in Columbus.  The driver, who was 
known as a reliable informant, provided the police with a detailed description of 
the person who had loaned him the car.  The driver also told the police where and 
when they could find this person.  The police then went to the corner of Oak and 
Morrison and observed a man who matched the description walking down the 
street.  When Officer Bodell approached him, Elmore immediately identified 
himself.  Based upon the totality of these circumstances, we hold that the police 
had probable cause to arrest Elmore. 
{¶ 41} Thus, we hold that Elmore was properly arrested, and proposition 
XV is overruled. 
{¶ 42} Sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence.  In proposition 
of law VI, Elmore challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
kidnapping specification, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), and the underlying kidnapping 
charge, R.C. 2905.01.  In proposition of law II, Elmore contends that the 
kidnapping charge and the kidnapping specification are not supported by the 
manifest weight of the evidence. 
{¶ 43} In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, “[t]he relevant 
inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio 
St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. 
Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560. 
{¶ 44} A claim that a jury verdict is against the manifest weight of the 
evidence involves a separate and distinct test.  “ ‘The court, reviewing the entire 
record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the 
credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the 
evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of 
justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.  The 
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discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the 
exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ”  
State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting State 
v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 20 OBR 215, 485 N.E.2d 717. 
{¶ 45} During the penalty phase, the trial court merged Specification 1 
(murder to escape apprehension) and Specification 2 (kidnapping) into separate 
Specification 3 (aggravated robbery) and Specification 4 (aggravated burglary).  
The jury was therefore instructed to consider only the latter two specifications 
during the penalty phase of the trial.  In ruling that the jury should not consider 
the kidnapping to be an aggravating circumstance in the penalty phase, the trial 
court explained (outside the presence of the jury):  
{¶ 46} “[T]he Kidnapping specification is part and parcel of the offenses 
of Aggravated Murder, Aggravated Robbery and Aggravated Burglary and * * * 
the defendant lacked a separate animus to commit the Kidnapping offense.  The 
kidnapping did not involve a substantial transportation of the victim to a location 
different than that where the Aggravated Murder, Aggravated Burglary or 
Aggravated Robbery occurred and did not involve a substantial restraint of the 
victim’s freedom separate and distinct from the offenses of Aggravated Murder, 
Aggravated Robbery and Aggravated Burglary.” 
{¶ 47} Nonetheless, the trial court sentenced Elmore to ten years on Count 
3, the separate kidnapping charge.  Thus, the trial court never found that its 
reasoning relating to the specifications affected the separate kidnapping offense.  
Because the kidnapping specification was merged into other specifications, the 
underlying kidnapping charge is the basis for this challenge. 
{¶ 48} For a kidnapping conviction to be upheld, “there must be 
significant restraint or movement, not just that incident to the killing itself.”  State 
v. Cook (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 524, 605 N.E.2d 70.  Elmore argues that there 
was no movement to support the kidnapping charge, because Annarino was not 
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moved from the bathroom before she was killed.  He also asserts that there was 
insufficient evidence of restraint and that the leggings around her neck were 
“incidental to the act of murder [but do] not support a kidnapping.” 
{¶ 49} The record refutes Elmore’s claim.  During his police statement on 
June 6, 2002, Elmore admitted that he had tied Annarino’s hands before killing 
her.  He later untied her hands when she complained that they were bound too 
tightly.  Thus, Elmore restrained Annarino for some period of time before 
murdering her.  We have affirmed a kidnapping conviction in similar 
circumstances.  See State v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 280-281, 754 
N.E.2d 1150 (victim restrained by being tied to her bed and gagged before she 
was murdered); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 
N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (kidnapping charge dismissed because the murder victim was 
neither restrained nor moved from the room where she was killed).  Therefore, we 
hold that there was sufficient evidence to prove kidnapping in Count 3, and we 
overrule proposition VI. 
{¶ 50} As to Elmore’s manifest-weight challenge, Elmore reiterates that 
there was no evidence of asportation or restraint to support his conviction for 
kidnapping.  As discussed, Elmore tied Annarino’s hands before killing her.  
Accordingly, after carefully reviewing the record and weighing the evidence, we 
cannot say that the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of 
justice in convicting Elmore of the separate offense of kidnapping.  Thus, we 
reject proposition II. 
{¶ 51} Allied offenses.  In proposition of law III, Elmore argues that 
aggravated murder and kidnapping are allied offenses of similar import and, 
therefore, he cannot be convicted of both crimes.  R.C. 2941.25(A) provides: 
“Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or 
more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment * * * may contain counts 
for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.”  This court 
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has repeatedly held that aggravated murder and kidnapping are not allied offenses 
of similar import under R.C. 2941.25.  See State v. Coley (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 
253, 265, 754 N.E.2d 1129; State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 154, 689 
N.E.2d 929; State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22, 32-33, 559 N.E.2d 464.  
Thus, we reject proposition III. 
{¶ 52} In proposition of law VIII, Elmore argues that he was improperly 
convicted and sentenced for aggravated robbery and grand theft because the two 
crimes constitute allied offenses of similar import.  However, the defense failed to 
raise this issue at trial and thus waived all but plain error.  See State v. Williams 
(1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the 
syllabus; State v. Comen (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 206, 211, 553 N.E.2d 640. 
{¶ 53} Aggravated robbery and theft may constitute allied offenses of 
similar import under R.C. 2941.25(A).  See State v. Parson (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 
442, 446, 6 OBR 485, 453 N.E.2d 689; State v. Johnson (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 420, 
6 OBR 466, 453 N.E.2d 595, paragraph one of the syllabus.  However, further 
analysis is necessary.  R.C. 2941.25(B) provides, “Where the defendant’s conduct 
* * * results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed 
separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment * * * may contain 
counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.”  
Thus, Elmore’s conduct must be reviewed to determine whether the offenses were 
committed separately or with a separate animus as to each. 
{¶ 54} Elmore committed aggravated robbery as charged in Count 4 by 
taking Annarino’s purse after he killed her.  He committed grand theft as charged 
in Count 6 after he left the house and drove off in Annarino’s car.  Thus, Elmore’s 
theft of Annarino’s purse was committed separately from his theft of her car.  See 
State v. Houseman (1990), 70 Ohio App.3d 499, 509, 591 N.E.2d 405 (aggravated 
robbery of car keys and an antique gun inside the house committed separately 
from the theft of the victim’s car); State v. Reyna (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d 79, 82, 
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24 OBR 148, 493 N.E.2d 555 (aggravated robbery of money inside the house 
committed separately from the theft of the victim’s car).  Accordingly, we 
overrule proposition VIII. 
{¶ 55} Ineffective assistance of counsel.  In proposition of law XIII, 
Elmore argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Reversal of a 
conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel requires that the defendant show, 
first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and second, that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.  
Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two 
of the syllabus. 
{¶ 56} Elmore argues that his counsel’s performance was ineffective 
because the lawyers conceded during closing arguments in the guilt phase of the 
trial that Elmore was guilty of kidnapping after those lawyers had made an earlier, 
unsuccessful motion for an acquittal on the kidnapping charge and specification.  
Elmore contends that counsel were deficient by presenting “inconsistent theories 
on outcome determinative matters.” 
{¶ 57} At the conclusion of the state’s case, the defense moved for an 
acquittal on the kidnapping charge and the kidnapping specification.  See Crim.R. 
29(A).  The defense, citing State v. Logan (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 14 O.O.3d 
373, 397 N.E.2d 1345, argued that the state did not prove that the kidnapping was 
committed with a separate animus from the underlying murder.  The trial court 
denied this motion. 
{¶ 58} During final trial-phase arguments, the defense focused on 
convincing the jury that Elmore was guilty of murder rather than aggravated 
murder.  Trial counsel argued: “And we maintain that * * * you’ll not find Phillip 
Elmore innocent, but you will find him not guilty of aggravated murder, and you 
should find him guilty of murder, and that’s what we’re asking you to do.  Phillip 
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Elmore committed a burglary, he committed a kidnapping, he committed a 
robbery, he committed a theft of a motor vehicle, and he committed a murder.  He 
did not commit aggravated murder.” 
{¶ 59} Trial counsel’s motion for acquittal on the kidnapping charge and 
specification and his final argument acknowledging that a kidnapping had 
occurred were not inconsistent.  Trial counsel’s motion for acquittal was based 
upon a legal argument about the alleged inseparability of the animus underlying 
the murder and the kidnapping.  In making this argument, trial counsel did not 
argue that the elements of kidnapping had not been proven.  Moreover, counsel’s 
legal argument was presented to the trial court, and the final argument was 
presented to the jury. 
{¶ 60} Trial counsel’s tactical decision to concede Elmore’s guilt on the 
kidnapping charge maintained defense credibility and allowed the defense to focus 
the jury’s attention on defense counsel’s argument that Elmore was guilty of 
murder rather than aggravated murder.  Cf. State v. Scott, 101 Ohio St.3d 31, 
2004-Ohio-10, 800 N.E.2d 1133, ¶ 60-61.  As his closing argument shows, trial 
counsel argued vigorously for the jury to find Elmore guilty only of murder and 
not aggravated murder.  Had Elmore succeeded in obtaining an acquittal on the 
aggravated-murder charge, he would have been ineligible for the death penalty.  
Thus, we reject this ineffectiveness claim. 
{¶ 61} Furthermore, given the overwhelming evidence of Elmore’s guilt, 
even if counsel’s performance had been deficient, Elmore was not prejudiced.  
Moreover, the kidnapping specification was merged before sentencing.  Thus, 
defense counsel’s efforts on the kidnapping issue did not affect the penalty phase.  
Accordingly, we reject proposition XIII. 
{¶ 62} Prosecutor’s closing argument.  In proposition of law IV, Elmore 
argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to facts outside the 
record during the guilt-phase closing argument.  “The test regarding prosecutorial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
misconduct in closing arguments is whether the remarks were improper and, if so, 
whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of the defendant.”  State v. 
Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 14 OBR 317, 470 N.E.2d 883. 
{¶ 63} Elmore attacks the following segment of the prosecutor’s rebuttal 
argument:  “What happened, we submit to you, a reasonable theory is that Pam 
Annarino didn’t know that [the back] door had been forced open, and she goes 
inside.  She does not sit down at the kitchen table and talk.  Instead, she does what 
I suspect many women would do who have been dressed in relatively formal 
clothes since 8:00 that morning, she walks upstairs and she changes her clothes.  
Do any of you believe for one minute that that woman would have walked 
upstairs, let alone changed clothes, knowing that Phillip Elmore is in the house?  
Of course, not. 
{¶ 64} “And we submit * * * that when she was upstairs, Phillip Elmore 
comes upstairs and he surprises her.  You want to know why that knot’s in the 
back?  Because we submit he came up behind her with those pants and put them 
around her neck, and that’s the beginning of the kidnapping.  And we submit to 
you that that defendant, for however long he had been in the house, was sitting 
there getting, as he said, mad, mad and madder.  You want to know why?  
Because he had been rejected by Pam Annarino and his ego is more important —
.”  Defense counsel objected at that point on the ground that the argument 
assumed facts not in evidence, but the objection was overruled. 
{¶ 65} Elmore argues that the prosecutor made an unsupported accusation 
in asserting that Annarino would not have gone upstairs if she had known that he 
was in the house.  Elmore also claims that the prosecutor improperly argued that 
he had sneaked up behind Annarino and choked her.  According to Elmore, the 
prosecutor’s improper comments led the jury to find that he purposely killed 
Annarino. 
January Term, 2006 
17 
{¶ 66} The defense, however, opened the door to the prosecutor’s rebuttal 
argument.  During the defense argument, trial counsel argued that Elmore had 
gone to Annarino’s house to talk to her but had not intended to hurt her.  Trial 
counsel claimed that “[i]f it was [Elmore’s] specific intent to cause her death, why 
upstairs?  Why not in the kitchen when she comes in the door where he has the 
crow bar, the pipe and the screwdriver?  * * *  It doesn’t make sense.  What 
makes sense is what Mr. Elmore tells us happened:  An argument escalates to the 
point where he snaps, where he loses it, and where he does a terrible thing.” 
{¶ 67} The prosecutor’s rebuttal then refuted these defense claims.  
Moreover, “[p]rosecutors are entitled to latitude as to what the evidence has 
shown and what inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.”  State v. 
Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 111, 684 N.E.2d 668.  The prosecutor’s argument 
— that Elmore surprised Annarino after she went upstairs and that he strangled 
her from behind — represented fair comment based on reasonable inferences that 
could be drawn from the evidence.  Argument that Elmore waited in the house for 
Annarino to arrive home and got “mad and madder” because she had “rejected” 
him was also fair comment. 
{¶ 68} We find that the prosecutor committed no misconduct in making 
his rebuttal argument.  Thus, proposition IV is overruled. 
{¶ 69} Instructions.  In proposition of law V, Elmore argues that the 
instructions improperly defined aggravated burglary as a theft offense. 
{¶ 70} Over defense objection, the trial court provided the following 
instructions on the aggravated-robbery charge: 
{¶ 71} “Fourth Count.  The Defendant is charged with aggravated 
robbery.  Before you can find the Defendant guilty, you must find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that on or about the 1st day of June, 2002, and in Licking 
County, Ohio, the Defendant, while committing or attempting to commit or 
fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit a theft offense, had 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
a deadly weapon, a pipe or other blunt object, on or about his person or under his 
control and displayed the weapon, brandished it, indicated that he possessed it, or 
used the weapon. 
{¶ 72} “* * * 
{¶ 73} “Underlying Theft Offense.  Theft is defined as knowingly 
obtaining or exerting control over the property of another without the consent of 
the owner or with purpose to deprive the owner of said property.  You are further 
instructed that Aggravate[d] Burglary is defined as a theft offense under Ohio 
law.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 74} First, Elmore claims that the trial court erred by instructing that 
aggravated burglary is a theft offense.  However, this argument lacks merit.  R.C. 
2913.01(K)(1) defines a theft offense to include “[a] violation of section * * * 
2911.11 * * * of the Revised Code.”  That latter provision defines the crime of 
aggravated burglary.  Moreover, the intent of the General Assembly concerning 
the definition of a theft offense is reflected in the Legislative Service 
Commission’s 1973 comment on R.C. 2913.01:   
{¶ 75} “ ‘Theft offense’ is broadly defined to include not only a series of 
specific offenses contained in the new code, but also to include any felony or 
misdemeanor, under state or federal law or municipal ordinance, of which 
robbery, burglary, breaking and entering, theft, conversion, embezzlement, fraud, 
forgery, counterfeiting, or similar act is an element * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Thus, there was no error, because the trial court’s instruction was a correct 
statement of the law. 
{¶ 76} Second, Elmore argues that the instruction defining aggravated 
burglary as a theft offense relieved the state of its burden to prove that an 
underlying theft offense had been committed.  We also reject this argument.  The 
trial court’s instruction simply supplied the definition of a theft offense.  These 
instructions conveyed no findings that aggravated burglary had been committed.  
January Term, 2006 
19 
See State v. Nelson (June 15, 1983), Summit App. Nos. 10973, 10975, 10993, and 
10999, 1983 WL 4137, at *5 (instruction defining breaking and entering as a 
“theft offense” was proper). 
{¶ 77} Finally, Elmore’s reliance on Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), 442 
U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, is misplaced.  Sandstrom held that a jury 
instruction that shifts to the defendant the burden of proof on an element of the 
crime at issue violates due process.  Sandstrom is not implicated here, because the 
trial court’s definition of theft did not supply a missing element of the state’s 
proof and did not shift any burden to the defendant. 
{¶ 78} Based on the foregoing, proposition V is overruled. 
{¶ 79} In proposition of law XIV, Elmore argues that the trial court erred 
by refusing the defense request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. 
{¶ 80} R.C. 2903.03(A), which defines “voluntary manslaughter,” 
provides: “No person, while under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden 
fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the 
victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly force, 
shall knowingly cause the death of another * * *.”  Voluntary manslaughter is 
considered an inferior-degree offense to aggravated murder.  See State v. Benge 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 136, 140, 661 N.E.2d 1019. 
{¶ 81} Before giving an instruction on voluntary manslaughter in a 
murder case, the trial court must determine “whether evidence of reasonably 
sufficient provocation occasioned by the victim has been presented to warrant 
such an instruction.”  State v. Shane (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 590 N.E.2d 272, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  In making that determination, trial courts must 
apply an objective standard:  “For provocation to be reasonably sufficient, it must 
be sufficient to arouse the passions of an ordinary person beyond the power of his 
or her control.”  Id. at 635, 590 N.E.2d 272. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
{¶ 82} First, Elmore asserts that he was entitled to an instruction on 
voluntary manslaughter because Annarino provoked him by threatening and 
screaming at him.  Elmore’s argument relies on his version of events in his 
statements to the police.  Elmore told the police, “[Annarino] got in my face and 
started * * * screaming and stuff.  She said, I ought * * * [to] just kill you * * * 
and I just told her * * * [to] leave me alone and quit going off on me.”  Elmore 
claimed that he told Annarino, “[Y]ou’re making me angry * * * [and] I’m gonna 
go off on you Pam.  She just kept on * * * so I went downstairs and I got the pipe.  
I came back up.  She just started * * * arguing at me * * * [s]o * * * I hit her.” 
{¶ 83} Even if Elmore’s version of events is true, Annarino’s alleged 
comments did not provide sufficient provocation to warrant an instruction on 
voluntary manslaughter.  In State v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d at 638, 590 N.E.2d 272, 
we held that an admission of infidelity by the defendant’s fiancée was not 
reasonably sufficient to provoke the defendant into using deadly force.  We found 
that the victim had done very little to provoke that defendant and that words alone 
will not constitute reasonably sufficient provocation to incite the use of deadly 
force in most situations.  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  In the case now 
before us, there was even less provocation because Elmore and Annarino were no 
longer involved in a personal relationship, and Elmore broke into her house 
before confronting her. 
{¶ 84} Second, Elmore argues that he was entitled to an instruction on 
voluntary manslaughter because Annarino “could have been the aggressor by 
physically fighting” with him.  But there was no evidence that Annarino was the 
aggressor.  Rather, Elmore broke into Annarino’s home, waited for her to arrive 
home from her son’s wedding, and then attacked and killed her.  Dr. Lee testified 
that lacerations and contusions on Annarino’s forearms were defensive wounds.  
Moreover, Elmore’s claim that the presence of black hairs in dried blood on 
January Term, 2006 
21 
Annarino’s hand and an injury to her thumbnail provide evidence that Annarino 
attacked him is pure conjecture. 
{¶ 85} The evidence shows that when Elmore killed Annarino, he was not 
under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage.  During his 
argument with Annarino, Elmore went downstairs, picked up the lead pipe that he 
had brought into the house, went back upstairs, and hit her on the head with the 
pipe four to five times, killing her.  From the evidence presented, the trial court 
could rightly find that a voluntary-manslaughter instruction was not warranted.  
See State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354, 2003-Ohio-1325, 785 N.E.2d 439, ¶ 70 
(voluntary-manslaughter instruction not warranted when one victim was shot five 
times and the other victim was shot in the back of the head); State v. Carter 
(2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 602, 734 N.E.2d 345 (voluntary-manslaughter 
instruction not warranted where victim was stabbed 18 times). 
{¶ 86} Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion by refusing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, and proposition 
XIV is overruled. 
{¶ 87} Juror smoke breaks during deliberations.  In proposition of law I, 
Elmore argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the jury’s 
request to smoke during the guilt-phase and penalty-phase deliberations. 
{¶ 88} While the guilt-phase deliberations were underway, the jury sent 
the trial court a request to smoke.  The trial court responded: 
{¶ 89} “The Court:  * * * Jury has a question, can we smoke.  The Court 
has indicated, sorry, no.  Agreed to by counsel? 
{¶ 90} “Mr. Rigg:  By defense, yes. 
{¶ 91} “Mr. Rossi: Yes, your Honor.” 
{¶ 92} The jury returned its guilt-phase verdict approximately three and 
one-half hours after making this request.  The jury deliberated slightly more than 
three hours before returning its sentencing verdict. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
{¶ 93} Elmore claims that the trial court erred by refusing to permit the 
jurors to smoke during deliberations because of the “well known features of 
nicotine withdrawal.”  Elmore argues that the juror who was not permitted to 
smoke “may have spent more time reviewing and concentrating on the case if [he 
or she] had been allowed to satisfy [his or her] nicotine addiction.”  Elmore 
suggests that the trial court’s refusal to permit smoking may explain the brevity of 
the jury’s deliberations.  However, counsel consented to the trial court’s ruling 
and thus waived all but plain error.  See State v. Green (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 
371, 738 N.E.2d 1208; State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 
N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 94} The record indicates that there was only one smoker on this jury.  
Elmore’s claim that this juror suffered from nicotine withdrawal is totally 
speculative.  The simple request, “can we smoke?” does not indicate any type of 
emergency.  There is no support in the record for Elmore’s claim that the juror 
who wished to smoke was under any additional stress occasioned by “mentally 
wanting, and physically needing to smoke tobacco.”  Nor is there any evidence 
that this juror rushed the other jurors during their deliberations.  There is also no 
protected class of jurors who have the right to smoke during a trial. 
{¶ 95} In any event, jurors could not take smoking breaks outside the jury 
room after submission of the case because “R.C. 2945.33 and Crim.R. 24(G) 
clearly contemplate that jurors in capital cases generally must not be permitted to 
separate during their * * * deliberations.”  State v. Davis (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 
44, 48, 584 N.E.2d 1192; see, also, State v. Sanders (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 
249, 750 N.E.2d 90 (trial court under no obligation to provide jurors with smoke 
breaks).  Based on the foregoing, we find no plain error, and proposition I is 
rejected. 
Penalty-phase issues 
January Term, 2006 
23 
{¶ 96} Ineffective assistance of counsel.  In proposition of law X, Elmore 
argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance during the penalty phase. 
{¶ 97} Testimony about Elmore’s prison records.  Elmore claims that 
his lawyers were ineffective when they elicited testimony about his bad behavior 
and inappropriate sexual conduct while in prison.  Elmore claims that trial 
counsel’s questioning opened the door on cross-examination to testimony that he 
had masturbated “at female officers.” 
{¶ 98} Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon, a clinical psychologist, was a defense 
mitigation witness.  During Dr. Smalldon’s testimony, trial counsel asked the 
following question about Elmore’s prison records: 
{¶ 99} “Q:  * * * What do you learn from those records that you’ve 
collected * * * when he was incarcerated.  What did you learn from those records 
in terms of his adjustment and in terms of his abilities while he was in prison? 
{¶ 100} “A:  Well, most of these records document the years that he’s 
spent in the Ohio prison system.  They’re full of bad behavior.  * * * [H]e’s been 
a difficult inmate most of the time.  * * * [T]here are documented instances of 
sexually inappropriate behavior.  There are instances documented in those records 
where he’s refused orders of people in positions of authority.  There are 
documented instances of interpersonal conflict with other * * * inmates.” 
{¶ 101} During cross-examination, Dr. Smalldon was asked about a 
memorandum addressing Elmore’s prison behavior that was prepared by Dr. J. 
Michael Harding, a clinical psychologist: 
{¶ 102} “Q:  We just have one more exhibit that’s been marked State’s 
Exhibit 59 for identification purposes, and I want * * * [to ask] if you can identify 
what that is? 
{¶ 103} “A:  This is a memorandum dated April 28th, 2000.  It’s from 
Noble Correctional Institution. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
{¶ 104} “Q:  You testified on direct exam that Mr. Elmore had been cited 
while he was incarcerated * * * for some sexual misconduct? 
{¶ 105} “A:  Right. 
{¶ 106} “Q:  Does that refer to that sexual misconduct? 
{¶ 107} “A:  Yes. 
{¶ 108} “* * * 
{¶ 109} “Q:  What type of sexual misconduct? 
{¶ 110} “A:  This says that he’s received several tickets for masturbating 
at female officers. 
{¶ 111} “* * * 
{¶ 112} “Q:  In the letter, Dr. Harding writes with regard to this particular 
type of conduct, ‘Some individuals tend to engage in such behavior because of 
poor impulse control or similar reasons that stem from symptoms of mental 
illness.  Lastly, some individuals engage in such behavior because [they] make a 
conscious decision to do that independent of any influence [of] mental illness or 
psychological distress.’  Would you agree with that? 
{¶ 113} “A:  I agree that that’s what he wrote, and I agree that that’s true 
of some individuals, yes. 
{¶ 114} “Q:  And he finishes by saying, ‘It is likely that he,’ meaning Mr. 
Elmore, ‘masturbates in the presence of female officers because he chooses to do 
so.  It is suggested that this situation be viewed as a custody rather than a mental 
health issue[.’] 
{¶ 115} “A:  I read that record.  I remember that very well.  What struck 
me the most about it is the reason that he cited for that conclusion, which was the 
fact that Mr. Elmore refused to talk with him.  In my opinion, that’s not an 
adequate foundation for the clinical conclusion that he arrived at.” 
{¶ 116} The defense decision to call or not call a mitigation witness is a 
matter of trial strategy.  State v. Keith (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 530, 684 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2006 
25 
47.  Likewise, the scope of questioning is generally a matter left to the discretion 
of defense counsel.  Debatable trial tactics generally do not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  State v. Singh, 157 Ohio App.3d 603, 2004-Ohio-3213, 813 
N.E.2d 12, ¶ 43. 
{¶ 117} Eliciting testimony that Elmore’s prison records are “full of bad 
behavior,” contain “documented instances of sexually inappropriate behavior,” 
and include “instances * * * where he’s refused orders of people in positions of 
authority” could have been a trial tactic to support the defense theory that Elmore 
was impulsive, lacked control over his behavior, and made foolish choices, in an 
attempt to counteract the claim of aggravated murder and seek a reduction to 
murder, which did not carry the death penalty.  While such testimony was also 
damaging, counsel needed some evidence to support the theory of an impulsive 
act.  These are risks counsel must weigh, especially when confronted with such 
strong evidence as here.  “[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674.   Even 
if 
trial 
counsel’s 
questioning 
reflected 
deficient 
performance, Elmore fails to establish prejudice under the Strickland test.  
Testimony that Elmore behaved badly in prison, disobeyed orders, and 
masturbated at female officers cannot be viewed as affecting his death sentence 
when weighed against the proven aggravating circumstances of the murder itself.  
Moreover, we shall disregard such testimony during our independent reassessment 
of the sentence, which will correct any error.  See State v. Twyford (2002), 94 
Ohio St.3d 340, 363, 763 N.E.2d 122; State v. Davie (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 
322, 686 N.E.2d 245. 
{¶ 118} Failure to call family members as mitigation witnesses.  
Elmore contends that his counsel were ineffective by failing to call his brother, 
Demetrius Elmore, and other family members as mitigation witnesses. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
{¶ 119} “The decision to forgo the presentation of additional mitigating 
evidence does not itself constitute proof of ineffective assistance of counsel.”  
State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d at 536, 684 N.E.2d 47.  Moreover, “ ‘[a]ttorneys 
need not pursue every conceivable avenue; they are entitled to be selective.’ ”  
State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 542, 747 N.E.2d 765, quoting United 
States v. Davenport (C.A.7, 1993), 986 F.2d 1047, 1049. 
{¶ 120} First, Elmore claims that his counsel should have called 
Demetrius as a witness to corroborate Dr. Smalldon’s testimony about Elmore’s 
dysfunctional family life.  After repeated attempts to contact Demetrius, Dr. 
Smalldon talked with Demetrius on the day before Dr. Smalldon testified.  Dr. 
Smalldon testified that Demetrius was living in Arizona and had “had relatively 
little contact with [Elmore] or with other members of [the Elmore] family for 
years.”  According to Dr. Smalldon, Demetrius confirmed that their father had 
been an alcoholic, “very violent,” and had sexually abused Elmore’s two sisters.  
Demetrius also confirmed that, as young children, “they were frequent witnesses 
to their father beating their mother.” 
{¶ 121} Thus, Dr. Smalldon testified about what Demetrius had told him 
about Elmore’s dysfunctional family life, and the jury heard that testimony.  It is 
totally speculative whether Demetrius could have provided other favorable 
mitigating testimony in view of his limited contact with Elmore and other family 
members.  We conclude that counsel’s decision not to call Demetrius as a 
mitigation witness was a “tactical choice” that cannot rightly be viewed as the 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  See State v. Hand, 107 Ohio St.3d 378, 2006-
Ohio-18, 840 N.E.2d 151, ¶ 241. 
{¶ 122} Second, Elmore claims that his counsel were deficient by failing 
to call Florence Elmore, his stepmother, and Sonya and Nicki, his two sisters, as 
mitigation witnesses.  Elmore contends that these family members could have 
provided relevant and credible mitigating evidence. 
January Term, 2006 
27 
{¶ 123} Dr. Smalldon interviewed Florence before he testified.  
According to Dr. Smalldon, Florence did not provide any reliable information 
about Elmore’s upbringing.  Florence denied any history of violence in the family.  
She also stated that she “didn’t know a thing about [the sexual-abuse allegations] 
at the time.”  Moreover, Dr. Smalldon testified that Florence “wanted nothing to 
do with these proceedings.”  Thus, it is highly questionable whether Florence’s 
testimony would have helped the defense case, and it evidently would have 
contradicted Demetrius’s testimony and could have damaged the defense strategy 
in mitigation.  Under these circumstances, trial counsel made a legitimate tactical 
decision in not calling her as a mitigation witness. 
{¶ 124} We also reject Elmore’s claim that his lawyers were ineffective 
by not calling Elmore’s sisters, Nicki and Sonya, as witnesses.  Dr. Smalldon 
testified about allegations that Elmore’s father sexually abused Nicki and Sonya.  
However, the defense could not talk to Nicki because, according to Dr. Smalldon, 
“[s]he is currently * * * living with Florence Elmore [and] categorically refused 
to speak with anyone who was involved in her brother’s defense.”  The defense 
could also not contact Sonya because, as Smalldon testified, she “has not * * * 
been in any sort of regular contact with family members in at least 16 years * * * 
[and n]o one even knows where Sonya is at this point.”  Elmore has failed to 
proffer additional information that Sonya and Nicki would have provided as 
witnesses.  Thus, it is highly speculative whether their testimony would have 
added anything to Elmore’s mitigation or made any difference in the outcome of 
the case, even if they could have been located or compelled to testify.  Moreover, 
trial counsel presented other evidence about the sexual-abuse allegations.  Dr. 
Smalldon testified that Elmore discussed watching his father sexually abuse his 
two sisters, Demetrius verified Elmore’s allegations, and Franklin County 
Children Services records documented that allegations of sexual abuse had been 
made against Elmore’s father, again putting this evidence before the jury.  Under 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
these circumstances, we conclude that trial counsel’s failure to call Nicki and 
Sonya as witnesses did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
{¶ 125} Based on the foregoing, we overrule proposition X. 
{¶ 126} Merger.  In proposition of law XI, Elmore claims that the trial 
court erred by failing to merge the aggravated-burglary and aggravated-robbery 
aggravating circumstances.  He argues that merger was required because the two 
aggravating circumstances arose from the same course of conduct. 
{¶ 127} Elmore’s failure to object to the allegedly duplicative nature of 
the two aggravating circumstances waived all but plain error.  State v. Monroe, 
105 Ohio St.3d 384, 2005-Ohio-2282, 827 N.E.2d 285, ¶ 65; State v. Cook, 65 
Ohio St.3d at 528, 605 N.E.2d 70. 
{¶ 128} In any event, the aggravated-burglary and aggravated-robbery 
specifications were not subject to merger, because they were committed with a 
separate animus.  The burglary was complete as soon as Elmore broke into 
Annarino’s home with the intent to commit murder, robbery, theft, or kidnapping.  
Elmore committed aggravated robbery when he stole Annarino’s purse after 
killing her.  Thus, the aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery were separate 
offenses and constituted separate aggravating circumstances because they arose 
from different acts.  See State v. Monroe, 105 Ohio St.3d 384, 2005-Ohio-2282, 
827 N.E.2d 285, ¶ 68; State v. Williams (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 580, 660 
N.E.2d 724; State v. Frazier (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 253, 256, 12 O.O.3d 263, 389 
N.E.2d 1118. 
{¶ 129} Accordingly, we find no plain error, and proposition XI is 
overruled. 
{¶ 130} Noncapital sentencing.  In supplemental proposition of law 
XVII, Elmore argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him on his noncapital 
offenses to maximum and consecutive sentences in violation of Blakely v. 
Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403. 
January Term, 2006 
29 
{¶ 131} The trial court sentenced Elmore to ten years’ confinement for 
kidnapping (Count 3), ten years’ confinement for aggravated robbery (Count 4), 
ten years’ confinement for aggravated burglary (Count 5), and 18 months’ 
confinement for grand theft (Count 6).  The trial court ordered in its sentencing 
entry that “Count 3 shall run concurrently with all other counts; Counts 4, 5, and 6 
shall all run consecutively to one another and consecutive to Count 1.” 
{¶ 132} The trial court made the following findings for imposing 
maximum and consecutive sentences:   
{¶ 133} “The Court is imposing the maximum penalty for the counts 
finding specifically that a shorter term would not adequately punish the defendant 
nor protect the public; further, that the worst form of the offense has been 
committed; and that the offender poses a great likelihood of committing future 
crimes if he were to be released. 
{¶ 134} “The Court is also ordering * * * consecutive sentences finding 
specifically * * * that it is necessary to protect the public; that it is appropriate 
with regard to punishing the defendant; that the sentences are not 
disproportionate; further, that the harm caused was so great that a single term 
would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the criminal conduct; and that the 
offender’s criminal history shows that consecutive terms are needed to protect the 
public. 
{¶ 135} “The Court would also adopt the facts and circumstances with 
regard to the consecutive sentences and the maximum sentences that have been 
presented in this case that are relevant to what it has previously indicated 
regarding consecutive sentences and the maximum sentence.” 
{¶ 136} Trial counsel objected on the record to the imposition of the 
maximum and consecutive sentences “in light of recent Supreme Court holdings 
concerning the sentencing of criminal defendants.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
{¶ 137} Based upon Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), 530 U.S. 466, 490, 
120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, and Blakely v. Washington, we recently 
declared parts of Ohio’s felony-sentencing scheme unconstitutional.  State v. 
Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470.  The unconstitutional 
provisions include R.C. 2929.14(C), which relates to the imposition of maximum 
sentences, and R.C. 2929.14(E)(4), which relates to the imposition of consecutive 
sentences.  Following Blakely, we ruled that the sentencing criteria set forth in 
R.C. 2929.14(C) and 2929.14(E)(4) are unconstitutional because of the 
requirement for judicial findings of fact beyond those determined by the jury or 
admitted by the defendant.  Foster at ¶ 62-67, 83. 
{¶ 138} In Foster, we severed the unconstitutional provisions of the 
sentencing code, including R.C. 2929.14(C) and 2929.14(E)(4), and remanded the 
cases for resentencing.  We further stated that “trial courts have full discretion to 
impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to 
make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum [or] consecutive * * * 
sentences.”  Id. at ¶ 100. 
{¶ 139} In the present case, we hold that the trial court’s factfinding in 
support of maximum and consecutive sentences violated Foster.  We reject the 
state’s argument that Elmore’s challenge to the noncapital sentences is rendered 
moot by Elmore’s death sentence.  The trial court’s reliance on unconstitutional 
sentencing statutes when imposing maximum and consecutive sentences on the 
noncapital offenses violated Elmore’s constitutional rights and must be corrected. 
{¶ 140} We find that proposition XVII has merit.  Thus, we remand 
Elmore’s case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing on the noncapital 
offenses in accordance with State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 
845 N.E.2d 470. 
Cumulative errors 
January Term, 2006 
31 
{¶ 141} In proposition of law XVI, Elmore argues that cumulative trial 
errors deprived him of a fair trial and mandate a reversal of his death sentence.  
However, Elmore received a fair trial.  Moreover, “errors cannot become 
prejudicial by sheer weight of numbers.”  State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 
212, 661 N.E.2d 1068.  Thus, this proposition is rejected. 
Constitutionality 
{¶ 142} In proposition of law IX, Elmore attacks the constitutionality of 
Ohio death-penalty statutes.  We also reject this claim.  See State v. Carter, 89 
Ohio St.3d at 607, 734 N.E.2d 345; State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 
OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
Proportionality 
{¶ 143} In proposition of law VII, Elmore claims that his death sentence 
is disproportionate to death sentences imposed in similar cases.  We shall address 
this argument during our independent sentence evaluation. 
Sufficiency and weight of the aggravating circumstances 
{¶ 144} In proposition of law XII, Elmore argues that his death penalty 
must be vacated because the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh the 
mitigating factors.  This argument will also be addressed during our independent 
sentence evaluation. 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE EVALUATION 
{¶ 145} Aggravating circumstances.  The evidence established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Elmore was properly convicted of the murder of Pamela 
Annarino while committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery, R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7), and murder while committing or attempting to commit aggravated 
burglary, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). 
{¶ 146} As discussed earlier, the trial court merged Specifications 1 
(escaping detection) and 2 (kidnapping) with Specifications 3 (aggravated 
robbery) and 4 (aggravated burglary) during the penalty phase.  Thus, we – as did 
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32 
the jury – will consider only Specifications 3 and 4 in weighing the aggravating 
circumstances against the mitigating factors. 
{¶ 147} Mitigation evidence.  Elmore called one mitigation witness and 
made an unsworn statement. 
{¶ 148} Elmore’s unsworn statement.  Elmore stated, “First and 
foremost, I have to say to Pamela’s family that I’m truly sorry for what I’ve done.  
Why it happened, I just * * * don’t know.  I really don’t know.  But I feel that I 
deserve the worst punishment that there is.  That’s one thing I agree with the 
prosecutor.  And I never knew that I could take someone’s life, and each and 
every day I relive that, * * * and it’s never going to go away.  If I could bring her 
back, I would bring her back.  I really would.  I don’t understand why I did it.  I 
ask myself that every day, each and every day.  The nightmares, it’s just too 
much.  If I could give my life for her right now, I would with no hesitation, none.  
And I’m sorry.  I’m truly sorry.” 
{¶ 149} Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon evaluated and conducted psychological 
testing of Elmore, reviewed Elmore’s records, and interviewed Elmore’s family 
members.  Dr. Smalldon’s evaluation raised no questions about Elmore’s sanity or 
competency. 
{¶ 150} Elmore was raised in a dysfunctional family.  Elmore’s father 
was described by Dr. Smalldon as an alcoholic who was “very violent * * * 
particularly when he was drinking.”  According to Dr. Smalldon, Elmore told him 
that as a child, Elmore “wanted [his father] dead because [he] watched him beat 
[his] mother.  He beat me.  He beat my brother.” 
{¶ 151} Elmore and his brother, Demetrius, reported to Dr. Smalldon that 
their father had sexually abused their sisters, Sonya and Nicki.  Elmore told 
Smalldon that when he was approximately six years old, he saw his father having 
sexual intercourse with Nicki.  On another occasion, Elmore, according to Dr. 
Smalldon, “observed his father having sexual intercourse with Sonya.”  Franklin 
January Term, 2006 
33 
County Children Services records also document allegations that Elmore’s father 
sexually abused Sonya and Nicki.  According to Dr. Smalldon, Elmore 
“experienced intense feelings of helplessness and rage in response to the things 
that he observed in his home.” 
{¶ 152} Elmore was not a very motivated student and did not do well in 
school.  He would “typically get C grades.”  Elmore’s work history, Dr. Smalldon 
explained, is “almost nonexistent.”  Elmore worked for a couple of years at a 
Wendy’s restaurant, and this was his longest period of employment.  Elmore was 
described in the prison records that Dr. Smalldon recounted for the jury as an 
“excellent worker” and a “hard worker” in his prison jobs. 
{¶ 153} Dr. Smalldon told the jury that Elmore has a “history of 
aggressive behavior.”  Records that Smalldon described at the trial indicated that 
Annarino had applied for a civil protection order because “she felt threatened by 
[Elmore] prior to this offense.” 
{¶ 154} Elmore was first sent to prison when he was approximately 20 
years old.  Elmore’s records, according to Dr. Smalldon, show that he was “in and 
out [of prison] * * * many times” until his release in 2001.  Dr. Smalldon testified 
that Elmore “repeatedly found himself * * * unable to cope out in the community 
and would behave * * * in a self-defeating way that would assure [that he would 
be] sent back into an environment that was more structured and * * * [where] he 
felt more comfortable.” 
{¶ 155} Tests administered by Dr. Smalldon before the trial indicated that 
Elmore suffered from a “clinically significant amount of depression.”   
Personality testing indicated “rebellious or anti-social attitudes.”  According to 
Dr. Smalldon, Elmore has always viewed himself as an “outsider, something of a 
rebel, someone who doesn’t like rules, doesn’t like people telling him what to do, 
and has, at times, responded badly when they’ve attempted to.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
{¶ 156} Elmore reported to Dr. Smalldon before the trial that he had 
sustained a head injury when he was 17 years old.  Medical records could not be 
found to corroborate those injuries.  However, Dr. Smalldon testified that 
neuropsychological testing points to the existence of a “relatively mild brain 
impairment.” 
{¶ 157} Dr. Smalldon testified that Elmore knew that what he was doing 
was wrong when he murdered Annarino and committed the other crimes.  He also 
testified that Elmore is not mentally retarded. 
{¶ 158} Testing showed that Elmore has a full-scale IQ in the low 70s.  
Dr. Smalldon believes that “at his best, when he wasn’t in jail,” Elmore would 
score in the high 70s or very low 80s on an IQ test. 
{¶ 159} Dr. Smalldon diagnosed Elmore with dysthymia, a longstanding 
relatively low-grade depression.  Elmore was also diagnosed with “a history of 
polysubstance abuse, including abuse of crack cocaine.”  Additionally, Dr. 
Smalldon diagnosed Elmore with “a personality disorder not otherwise specified” 
and “low intellectual functioning.” 
{¶ 160} Finally, Dr. Smalldon testified that Elmore expressed remorse for 
what he did.  Elmore told him that “it would demean the victim * * * [to] go 
before the jury and ask for forgiveness.” 
Sentence evaluation 
{¶ 161} We find nothing in the nature and circumstances of the offense to 
be mitigating.  On the afternoon of June 1, 2002, Elmore broke into Annarino’s 
home.  That same day, Elmore murdered Annarino by strangling her and hitting 
her on the head with a pipe.  Afterwards, Elmore stole her purse and fled in her 
car.  These facts establish a horrific crime without any mitigating features. 
{¶ 162} Elmore’s character offers nothing in mitigation.  However, his 
history and background provide some mitigating features.  Elmore was raised in a 
dysfunctional family.  His father was a violent alcoholic.  As a child, Elmore 
January Term, 2006 
35 
watched his father beat his mother and sexually abuse his two sisters.  His father 
also beat Elmore.  Moreover, Elmore has a low IQ. 
{¶ 163} The statutory mitigating factors are generally inapplicable, 
including R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement); (B)(2) (duress, coercion, or 
strong provocation); (B)(4) (youthfulness of the offender; i.e., Elmore was 38 
years old at the time of the offense); (B)(5) (lack of a significant criminal record); 
and (B)(6) (accomplice only). 
{¶ 164} We find that Elmore’s intellectual deficiencies, longstanding 
depression, and mild brain impairment do not qualify as an R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) 
factor because there was no evidence that Elmore’s condition caused him to lack 
the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.  See State v. 
Williams (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 174, 652 N.E.2d 721; State v. Gumm (1995), 
73 Ohio St.3d 413, 432, 653 N.E.2d 253. 
{¶ 165} Nevertheless, we give some weight to Elmore’s limited 
intellectual abilities and other mental deficiencies under the catchall provision of 
R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  Testing showed that Elmore’s IQ is in the low 70s.  
However, Elmore is not mentally retarded.  Dr. Smalldon also testified that 
Elmore knew he was wrong when he murdered Annarino and committed his other 
crimes. 
{¶ 166} We give weight to Elmore’s cooperation with the police after his 
arrest under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  See State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-
Ohio-2417, 847 N.E.2d 386, ¶ 104.  We also give weight to Elmore’s apology to 
the victim’s family and expressions of remorse in his unsworn statement.  See 
State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 509, 709 N.E.2d 484.  We find no 
evidence of any other mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). 
{¶ 167} We find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  Elmore murdered Annarino during 
the course of an aggravated robbery and an aggravated burglary.  Compared with 
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36 
these serious aggravating circumstances, Elmore’s mitigating evidence has little 
significance. 
{¶ 168} Finally, we find that the death penalty is proportionate to death 
sentences approved for other robbery-murder and burglary-murder cases.  See 
State v. Thomas, 97 Ohio St.3d 309, 2002-Ohio-6624, 779 N.E.2d 1017, ¶124; 
State v. Jones (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 403, 423, 739 N.E.2d 300; State v. Stallings 
(2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 301, 731 N.E.2d 159; State v. Murphy (1992), 65 Ohio 
St.3d 554, 586, 605 N.E.2d 884. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 169} We affirm Elmore’s convictions and sentence of death.  
However, we remand this case to the trial court for resentencing on the noncapital 
offenses in accordance with State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 
845 N.E.2d 470. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, 
JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Robert L. Becker, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kenneth W. 
Oswalt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
W. Joseph Edwards and Keith A. Yeazel, for appellant. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, and Diane 
Richards Brey and Franklin E. Crawford, Deputy Solicitors, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor 
and Seth L. Gilbert, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
______________________