Case Title: Marks v. Frantz

Citation: 183 Kan. 47, 325 P.2d 368

Docket Number: 40,892

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1958-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
183 Kan. 47 (1958)
325 P.2d 368
MANUEL M. MARKS, Appellant,
v.
WAYNE E. FRANTZ, EDWIN C. CATHERS, and J.C. RUST, as members of the KANSAS STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN OPTOMETRY; and WAYNE E. FRANTZ, EDWIN C. CATHERS and J.C. RUST, individually, Appellees.
No. 40,892

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 10, 1958.
T.M. Lillard, of Topeka, argued the cause, and O.B. Eidson, Philip H. Lewis, James W. Porter, Charles S. Fisher, Jr., E. Gene McKinney and William R. Stewart, all of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Wendell L. Garlinghouse, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Warren W. Shaw and William Hergenreter, both of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
Plaintiff is an optometrist. His license was revoked by the Kansas State Board of Examiners in Optometry. He brought this action to enjoin the board from enforcing its order of revocation. His petition for an injunction was denied and he has appealed.
For a proper understanding of the over-all issue and questions involved it is necessary that the background of the case be related.
The plaintiff, Dr. Manuel M. Marks, a resident of Wichita, was duly licensed to practice optometry in Kansas in July, 1949. Commencing in the spring of 1952 he conducted his practice in the Zale Jewelry Company store in Wichita. As early as May 25, 1954, a complaint was filed with the board against plaintiff charging him with a number of violations of the statutes (G.S. 1949, 65-1501, et seq.) relating to the practice of optometry. On June 10, 1954, he was served with a copy of the complaint and was advised by the board that he had ten days in which to file his answer; that he was entitled to a public hearing and an opportunity to produce testimony and to confront the witnesses against him, and that the hearing would be held in the Sedgwick County district courtroom on July 8, 1954.
On June 25, 1954, plaintiff commenced an action in the district court of Sedgwick County to have G.S. 1949, 74-1501 to 1504, creating the board of examiners in optometry, and G.S. 1949, 65-1501, et seq., providing for the examination and registration of optometrists, with amendments thereto, declared unconstitutional and void. Defendant board's demurrer to his petition, on the ground it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, was sustained. *49 Plaintiff appealed and this court affirmed in Marks v. Frantz, 179 Kan. 638, 298 P.2d 316, the effect of our decision being to uphold the validity of the statutes under attack. The opinion was filed on June 9, 1956.
Prior to the filing of the above action, and on April 16, 1953, the State of Kansas, on the relation of the attorney general, filed in this court an action in quo warranto against the Zale Jewelry Company seeking to oust that corporation from engaging in the practice of optometry. The action also sought forfeiture of Zale's charter and the appointment of a receiver. Allegations of the petition in that case will not be repeated here, and neither will we summarize the evidence heard by our commissioner. Both are to be found in this court's opinion hereinafter cited. It should be stated, however, that the entire case against Zale was based on and grew out of the business arrangement, dealings and relationship among Zale, Douglas Optical and Dr. Marks. Our commissioner found that neither Dr. Marks nor Douglas Optical had violated the laws relating to the practice of optometry; that Zale had at no time been engaged in the practice of optometry, and concluded that judgment should be entered in favor of Zale. We refused to follow the commissioner's findings and conclusions and rendered judgment ousting Zale from the practice of optometry in this state. Our decision is found at State, ex rel., v. Zale Jewelry Co., 179 Kan. 628, 298 P.2d 283, and at page 638 of the opinion appears the following:
The opinion, as was the one in Marks v. Frantz, above, was filed on June 9, 1956.
Following the announcement of those two decisions, the board, in September, 1956, held a hearing on the complaints filed against Dr. Marks. The complaints, proceedings thereon, and the findings and order of the board, are set out in
"THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD CANCELLING
DR. MARKS' LICENSE TO PRACTICE OPTOMETRY,"
which is attached as an appendix to, and by reference made a part of, this opinion.
The order revoking, setting aside and cancelling Dr. Marks' license was dated February 21, 1957, and on March 15, 1957, he *50 brought this action in the district court of Shawnee County to enjoin the board from enforcing its order. The petition alleges that the order of defendant board is an abuse of discretion, unwarranted, capricious, unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive and discriminatory; that until the final decision in the Zale case, above, was rendered, plaintiff believed in good faith that his business arrangement with Zale was entirely proper, and that his optometry practice was being carried on in full compliance with the laws governing the practice of optometry. The prayer seeks a permanent injunction enjoining the board from enforcing its order. At the time the action was filed plaintiff was granted a temporary restraining order against the board. The trial court had before it the transcript of proceedings before the board, and in addition some further oral evidence was received. Following a full hearing the trial court, on June 24, 1957, found that the decision and order of defendant board cancelling plaintiff's license to practice optometry was not unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and dissolved the restraining order and denied plaintiff's petition for a permanent injunction against the board. His motion for a new trial being overruled, plaintiff has appealed. On July 15, 1957, this court ordered that the judgment be stayed pending disposition of the appeal.
The specifications of error are that the court erred in (1) finding that the decision of the defendant board of examiners in optometry was not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive; (2) denying the injunction against the enforcement of the order of the board, and (3) overruling the motion for a new trial.
We first take note of the board's motion to dismiss the appeal based on a technicality with reference to the filing of a transcript of the evidence and proceedings before the trial court. We have considered the motion. Under all of the facts and circumstances, it is conceded that no one has been prejudiced. Without further discussion, the motion to dismiss is denied.
G.S. 1949, 74-1504 (amended in 1953, see same section in G.S. 1957 Supp)., provides that the board of examiners in optometry (defendant board here) is authorized, empowered and directed to grant all certificates of registration as to it shall seem just and proper and to revoke any such certificates granted for any of the causes specified in G.S. 1935, 65-1504, as amended, that is, G.S. 1949, 65-1504, 1504a, and 1504b. The three last-mentioned sections list thirteen acts which are declared to be unlawful. Because it is *51 desired to keep this opinion within reasonable length, those sections, together with other sections of the optometry act, will not be set out in full. Furthermore, the substance of pertinent ones is contained in the decision and findings of the board attached hereto as an appendix.
G.S. 1949, 65-1506, authorizes and empowers the board to revoke the certificate of registration of any optometrist for any one of thirteen enumerated causes, one of which is the violation of any of the provisions of the optometry act. Violations of the provisions of this section are referred to in finding 39 of the board (see appendix). G.S. 1949, 65-1509 (amended in 1951, see same section in G.S. 1957 Supp)., imposing the duty on each registered optometrist to notify the board of his location and of any change thereof, is mentioned in finding 36 of the board (see appendix). The unlawful acts mentioned in G.S. 1949, 65-1510 (a) and (c), are referred to in findings 37 and 38 of the board (see appendix).
In passing, it should be noted that G.S. 1949, 65-1507, provides that the revocation of any certificate of registration revoked for any of the reasons (except two, which are not pertinent here) specified in the optometry act, may be set aside upon application of the holder of such certificate at any time within six months from the date of such revocation upon proof being made to the satisfaction of the optometry board that the cause of such revocation no longer exists and that the applicant has been sufficiently punished. The record does not show that Dr. Marks ever availed himself of the procedure afforded by this statute. Instead, for reasons best known to him, he filed the instant action for an injunction to enjoin the board from enforcing its order of revocation, but it must be conceded that in so doing he was within his legal rights.
The one and only question in this case is whether, under all of the facts and circumstances, the board was justified and warranted in revoking plaintiff's license and certificate to practice optometry in Kansas. Determination of the question necessarily involves consideration of certain principles applicable to administrative bodies, such as defendant board, in hearings of this kind, and also of certain rules pertaining to appellate review of proceedings of such boards.
The license to engage in the practice of a profession such as optometry, in conformity with the laws, rules and regulations pertaining thereto, is a statutory right conferred by the state, and it is within the police power of the state to prescribe the qualifications *52 of one desiring to practice the profession, and also to provide for the creation of a board to determine whether an applicant for a license to practice possesses the required qualifications. It naturally follows that the state also may confer upon the same board the power and authority to revoke such license if it should thereafter be found that the license should not have been issued, or if for any reason the holder thereof, since its issuance, has become disqualified. (Meffert v. Medical Board, 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247, 1 L.R.A. (NS) 811, 195 U.S. 625, 49 L. Ed. 350, 25 S. Ct. 790; Brinkley v. Hassig, 130 Kan. 874, 289 Pac. 64 (cert. denied), 282 U.S. 800, 75 L. Ed. 720, 51 S. Ct. 39; Board of Dental Examiners v. Bohl, 162 Kan. 156, 174 P.2d 998; Marks v. Frantz, 179 Kan. 638, 298 P.2d 316). An administrative body, such as defendant board, cannot be the final judge of the reasonableness of its own orders, and while courts will not be permitted to substitute their judgment for that of administrative bodies, nevertheless, they are definitely charged with the solemn duty of determining whether the procedure employed in reaching that judgment, or whether the judgment itself as rendered, is unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive under the circumstances of each particular case. In the nature of things, an administrative body, such as defendant board, has wide discretion in determining its judgments, but such discretion cannot be abused and must actually be exercised reasonably in view of all, and not merely some, of the circumstances involved. (Capland v. Board of Dental Examiners, 149 Kan. 352, 87 P.2d 597; Byrd v. Cason, 179 Kan. 753, 298 P.2d 301).
It follows, therefore, in a case such as this, the true test of the validity of the board's action in revoking plaintiff's license to practice optometry involves not only the question whether the board's findings are supported by competent and substantial evidence, but also includes the determination whether the order of revocation was unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive under all of the circumstances of the case.
With respect to the first proposition, but without detailing the voluminous evidence (including numerous exhibits), all of which has been read and considered, and without taking up and discussing in detail the findings of the board, which speak for themselves, we are unable to arrive at any other conclusion than that the findings are supported by competent and substantial evidence. In other *53 words, the record fully supports the fact that Dr. Marks was guilty of the violations as found by the board.
The further question remains  was the order of the board revoking his license unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive, under all of the circumstances of the case?
In our opinion the question must be answered in the negative.
The charges preferred against Dr. Marks did not arise out of and were not based upon an "isolated instance" of professional misconduct. He was no "novice" concerning the matters, in any sense of the word. Two separate lawsuits, heretofore referred to, concerning the very matters in issue, were instituted  one by the state against Zale, and the other by Dr. Marks himself to test the constitutionality of the law under which the board was proceeding in its effort to enforce disciplinary measures against him. It is true that Dr. Marks was not a party litigant in the Zale case, and, therefore, the decision in that case may not be said to be binding on him. He concedes, however, that the evidence in that case was substantially identical to that heard by the board in this case. In the Zale case the basic question was whether defendant corporation was practicing optometry through Dr. Marks. We held that it was. Basically, the question here is essentially the same  that it to say, did the business arrangement and the various activities of Dr. Marks with Zale and Douglas Optical constitute a violation by him of the statutes in question, and, if so, was the board justified in revoking his license?
As previously stated, we think that in view of all the facts and circumstances shown, the action of the board cannot be said to have been unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive.
In passing, we pause to note plaintiff's strenuous objections to findings 32 and 39 of the board (see appendix), in which he is branded as a person of "bad moral character." We have no doubt but that such designation is not to be construed in the ordinary acceptation and meaning of the words, that is, it is not to be construed as involving moral turpitude.
There is nothing in this record to indicate that Dr. Marks did not have a full and complete hearing. In fact, it affirmatively shows that he did, and that he was represented by able counsel throughout all of the proceedings. Realizing fully the severity and harshness of any order which revokes the license of a professional man, nevertheless, *54 under all of the facts and circumstances of this case we are unable to say that the action of the board was unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive. The judgment of the trial court denying an injunction against enforcement of the order is therefore affirmed.
FATZER and JACKSON, JJ., not participating.