Case Title: Warden v. City of Wichita

Citation: 232 Kan. 838, 658 P.2d 1043

Docket Number: 54,780

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1983-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
232 Kan. 838 (1983)
658 P.2d 1043
PATRICIA WARDEN, Appellant,
v.
THE CITY OF WICHITA, A Municipal Corp., Appellee.
No. 54,780

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed February 19, 1983.
Daniel S. Garrity, of Garrity, Fletcher & Haines, P.A., of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
H.E. Jones, assistant city attorney, argued the cause, and John Dekker, city attorney, and Joe Allen Lang, assistant city attorney, were with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
This is an action by plaintiff, Patricia Warden, against defendant City of Wichita seeking recovery for personal injuries she received as a result of mob violence. The district court dismissed the action pursuant to K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6) on the grounds plaintiff had failed to state a claim against the defendant municipality upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff appeals from said determination.
The facts, as stated in plaintiff's petition, are summarized as follows. Shortly after 6:00 p.m. on April 21, 1980, a large crowd of disorderly persons assembled near the intersection of Grove and 21st streets in Wichita. The mob started attacking passing vehicles by diverse means including the throwing of various types of projectiles. Plaintiff, while a passenger in an automobile being driven through the area approximately an hour later, was injured when she was struck in the face by a brick thrown by an unidentified member of the mob.
On April 1, 1982, plaintiff filed suit against the defendant City alleging the municipality: (1) had a duty to keep its streets safe; *839 (2) was negligent in failing to warn her of the danger from the mob; and (3) negligently allowed her vehicle to move into the unsafe area. The trial court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
On appellate review of such dismissals, the question for determination is whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in plaintiff's favor, the petition states any valid claim for relief. Dismissal is justified only when the allegations of the petition clearly demonstrate plaintiff does not have a claim. Robertson v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan. 358, 644 P.2d 458 (1982).
On appeal plaintiff concedes that her "claim is not based upon any act of negligence in the efforts of city personnel to disperse the crowd and thus remove the defect." Rather, plaintiff bases her claim on the defendant City's alleged negligence in failing to warn her of a street defect  to wit, the presence in the area of a violent mob. In his attempt to scale the formidable barrier of governmental immunity plaintiff's counsel has exhibited a certain creativity, but his position is untenable.
The plain fact is plaintiff's unfortunate injuries were occasioned by mob violence. From 1868 to July 1, 1979, Kansas had statutes holding municipalities liable for injuries resulting from mob violence. K.S.A. 12-203 and 204 (Weeks). However, when the Kansas Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 75-6101 et seq., was enacted the mob violence statutes were repealed. L. 1979, ch. 186, § 33. Originally, the Act as proposed to the 1979 Kansas Legislature contained a comprehensive section still permitting persons injured by mob violence to recover from municipalities and counties. 1979 Sub. S.B. No. 76, new sec. 9. However, significant opposition arose to continued government liability for mob actions. Indicative of this opposition were the comments of the League of Kansas Municipalities made to the House Judiciary Committee.
*840 Ultimately (after renumbering of the section from 9 to 5), the mob violence provision was deleted in toto from the final version of the Tort Claims Act. See 1979 Sub. S.B. No. 76, new sec. 5, as deleted by House Committee of the Whole, pp. 5-6. The legislative intent to eliminate municipal liability for mob violence is clear and undeniable.
Further, K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 75-6104(d) and (m), Kansas Tort Claims Act, specifically exempts:
....
Plaintiff, obviously aware of the defendant City's immunity from liability for failing to quell the mob, seeks instead to call the mob action by another name  a street defect. In asserting this novel theory plaintiff relies on the following language in Grantham v. City of Topeka, 196 Kan. 393, 411 P.2d 634 (1966):
The particular issue in Grantham was whether the failure to replace bent-over stop and one-way signs could constitute failure to remedy street defects. The language in Grantham is admittedly broad.
*841 Black's Law Dictionary 506 (4th ed. rev. 1968) defines road defects as follows:
Obviously a specific definition cannot be stated that adequately includes all possible street defects, so broad language must be employed. This does not mean, however, that there are no limitations on the nature, qualities or characteristics of street defects.
Plaintiff cites no authority from any jurisdiction holding a riot can be classified as a street defect nor has our research revealed any. Indeed, as noted by defendant, in reviewing street defect cases one obtains the clear impression defects must be of a physical, structural or static nature in or near the road including design and maintenance of traffic signs and signals.
In Kansas the closest case factually to the issue before us is Everly v. City of Gas, 95 Kan. 305, 147 Pac. 1134 (1915), which involved a milk cow, described as vicious, who was wandering the streets of Gas and terrorizing its inhabitants. The plaintiff brought an action against Gas for failure to keep the streets safe and failure to enforce a local anti-loose stock ordinance. Plaintiff was, however, attacked in her garden and not on the street. The court in Everly, after discussing a city's immunity for governmental acts, commented:
*842 In jurisdictions other than Kansas, Ellmer v. City of St. Petersburg, 378 So. 2d 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), appears most in point. In Ellmer, plaintiff drove into a riot area and was attacked by rioters. Plaintiff brought an action against the city for alleged negligent failure to warn him of the riot danger and argued failure to warn was comparable to failing to warn of a street defect. In rejecting this contention the court held:
In Ellmer plaintiff did not contend the riot was itself a street defect  he just likened the duty to warn to that of a street defect.
Plaintiff's injuries in the case here do not arise from any quality or condition existing in the street but rather from an unlawful use being made of the street. Plaintiff was the victim of a crime, not a street defect. We conclude an unlawful in-progress act of human violence, such as a member of an unruly mob throwing a brick at a passing vehicle, is not, as a matter of law, a street defect upon which liability of a municipality can be predicated.
Having concluded that plaintiff's injuries did not occur as a result of a "street defect," we obviously do not reach the question of whether there was a duty to warn plaintiff of the "street defect."
We therefore further conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition herein for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The judgment is affirmed.