Case Title: Carryl v. Department of Corrections

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 114

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 114 
Docket: 
Ken-18-487 
Submitted 
On Briefs: June 26, 2019 
Decided: 
July 18, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
FITZGERALD CARRYL 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  Fitzgerald Carryl, an inmate at the Maine State Prison, appeals from 
a judgment of the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Stokes, J.) denying his 
petition for review of a final agency action and affirming a disciplinary action 
that resulted in the imposition of sanctions against him for the offense of 
assault.  Because the record before us contains no competent evidence to 
support the hearing officer’s determination that Carryl committed an assault, 
we vacate the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts are drawn from the procedural record.  See 
Dubois v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 2017 ME 224, ¶ 3, 174 A.3d 314.  In a disciplinary 
incident report dated April 15, 2018, a corrections officer stated that 
 
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On the above date and time after finding out about the assault on 
Prisoner [Y] I reviewed the camera system to try to determine who 
assaulted him.  On the date and time around the assault [Carryl] is 
seen on the A-pod Camera 1 at 10:41 leaving cell 108 in A-pod and 
goes upstairs to cell 204, at 10:43 he is seen exiting the cell which 
meets the time frame of the assault.  Due to this new information 
Carryl . . . will be receiving a write up for assault.  
 
[¶3]  Carryl was then scheduled for a formal disciplinary hearing on the 
assault violation, and he requested to call the victim, Prisoner Y, as a witness.  
A disciplinary hearing was held on May 1, 2018.  The disciplinary hearing 
officer denied Carryl’s request to call Prisoner Y as a witness, stating that 
Prisoner Y “is the victim and won’t be called because if he was to say that 
[Carryl] did do anything that would put him in danger.” 
[¶4]  The hearing officer determined that Carryl “is guilty based on the 
officer[’]s report.  I do believe that base[d] on the report from the officer it is 
more probable th[a]n not that [the] prisoner did do what’s in the report.”  The 
recommended disposition was a thirty-day disciplinary restriction.  Carryl 
appealed the finding of guilt and the recommended disposition to the 
Chief Administrative Officer who affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. 
[¶5]  Carryl appealed to the Superior Court in accordance with 5 M.R.S. 
§ 11001-11008 (2018) and M.R. Civ. P. 80C.  The court denied Carryl’s petition 
for review of the agency action and affirmed the disciplinary action.  Carryl now 
 
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appeals to us, see 5 M.R.S. § 11008; M.R. Civ. P. 80C(m), challenging the legality 
of the denial of his request to call a witness at the disciplinary hearing and the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  “When the Superior Court acts in an intermediate 
appellate capacity pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, we review the administrative 
agency’s decision directly for errors of law, abuse of discretion, or findings not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record.”  Richard v. Sec’y of State, 
2018 ME 122, ¶ 21, 192 A.3d 611 (quotation marks omitted). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Right to Call Witnesses 
[¶6]  Carryl first argues that the hearing officer impermissibly denied his 
request to call Prisoner Y as a witness at his disciplinary hearing.  Although an 
“inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses,” 
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974); see also 34-A M.R.S. § 3032(6)(D) 
(2018), “the inmate’s right to present witnesses is necessarily circumscribed by 
the penological need to provide swift discipline in individual cases . . . [and] by 
the very real dangers in prison life which may result from violence or 
intimidation directed at either other inmates or staff,” Ponte v. Real, 
471 U.S. 491, 495 (1985).  The inmate’s request may be denied so long as the 
 
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prison official’s “reasons are logically related to preventing undue hazards to 
institutional safety or correctional goals.”  Id. at 497 (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶7]  Here, the hearing officer’s stated reason for withholding Prisoner Y 
as a witness was that Prisoner Y “is the victim and won’t be called because if he 
was to say that [Carryl] did do anything that would put him in danger.”  The 
hearing officer’s explanation—the risk of danger to Prisoner Y—is logically 
related to the need for institutional safety.1  See id.; see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 
569 (recognizing that where courts are presented with prison officials’ 
assessments as to the dangers involved, there is a limited basis for upsetting 
such judgments).  Thus, because the denial was an effort to shield the alleged 
victim from possible harm, Carryl’s right to call witnesses was not 
unreasonably restricted. 
                                         
1  To the extent that Carryl argues that any safety concern was alleviated by the fact that Prisoner Y 
had been moved to a different MDOC facility, there is nothing to suggest that the disciplinary hearing 
officer was aware of the fact—if true—that Prisoner Y had been moved.  See Vasquez v. Coughlin, 
726 F. Supp. 466, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (determining that, when investigation into a witness’s 
whereabouts at the time of the hearing might have shown the non-existence of any institutional need 
to prevent the witness from testifying, negligence alone does not amount to a due process violation).  
Moreover, even if the hearing officer had been aware of that fact, that does not foreclose his finding 
of potential danger to Prisoner Y.  See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562 (1974) (“Relationships 
among the inmates are varied and complex and perhaps subject to the unwritten code that exhorts 
inmates not to inform on a fellow prisoner.”). 
 
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B. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
[¶8]  Carryl next contends that the hearing officer’s finding of guilt was 
not supported by substantial evidence in the record.  “Substantial evidence 
exists when a reasonable mind would rely on that evidence as sufficient 
support for a conclusion.  We examine the entire record to determine whether 
the [hearing officer] could fairly and reasonably find the facts as [he] did.”  
Richard, 2018 ME 122, ¶ 21, 192 A.3d 611 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  “Administrative agency findings of fact will be vacated only if there 
is no competent evidence in the record to support a decision.”  Friends of Lincoln 
Lakes v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2010 ME 18, ¶ 14, 989 A.2d 1128.  Carryl “bears the 
burden of persuasion on appeal because he seeks to vacate the [agency]’s 
decision.”  Richard, 2018 ME 122, ¶ 21, 192 A.3d 611. 
[¶9]  Pursuant to Maine Department of Corrections policy, the 
disciplinary hearing officer’s “finding of guilt or innocence must rest solely 
upon evidence produced at the hearing, including, but not limited to, the 
disciplinary report, the prisoner’s statement, if any, to the investigator, any 
exhibits, and the testimony of any witnesses. . . . [A] finding of guilt must be 
based on a determination that it is more probable than not that the prisoner 
committed the violation.”  1A C.M.R. 03 201 010-26 § 20.1 (VI)(C)(13) (2016). 
 
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[¶10]  Although “an agency is not obligated to include a complete factual 
record with its decision, it must include a written statement of facts sufficient 
to show a rational basis for the decision.”  Int'l Paper Co. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 
1999 ME 135, ¶ 13, 737 A.2d 1047; see also 5 M.R.S. § 9061 (2018).  Here, the 
extent of the hearing officer’s findings were that Carryl was “guilty based on the 
officer[’]s report.  I do believe that base[d] on the report from the officer it is 
more probable th[a]n not that [the] prisoner did do what’s in the report.”  The 
hearing officer’s finding of guilt therefore rested solely on the disciplinary 
incident report. 
[¶11]  The report states that, after finding out about an assault on 
Prisoner Y, a corrections officer reviewed the camera system; the officer saw 
Carryl leaving his cell at 10:41, going upstairs to cell 204, and leaving cell 204 
at 10:43.  The report states that this was the time frame of the assault.  The 
report is silent, however, on the essential elements of an assault violation, 
including any evidence that an assault on Prisoner Y in fact occurred or any 
evidence of Carryl’s involvement other than being in the vicinity of cell 204 
around the time frame of the assault. 
[¶12]  Because the hearing officer relied solely on the corrections officer’s 
report in determining Carryl’s guilt, and because that report does not provide 
 
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any evidence that another person was subjected to bodily injury or that Carryl 
inflicted or attempted to inflict bodily injury on that person, see 
1A C.M.R. 03 201 010-29 § 20.1 (VI)(E) (2016), Carryl has demonstrated that 
no competent evidence exists to support the hearing officer’s determination.  
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment.  See Fissmer v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 
2017 ME 195, ¶¶ 18-19, 170 A.3d 797; cf. Friends of Lincoln Lakes, 2010 ME 18, 
¶ 23, 989 A.2d 1128. 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fitzgerald Carryl, appellant pro se 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and James E. Fortin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Corrections 
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number AP-2018-38 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY