Case Title: ADAMS v CHENEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82-283

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1983-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT' OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1983 ROBERT L. ADAMS, Plaintiff and Respondent, LYLE H. CHENEY and SARA CHENEY, husband and wife, Defendants and Appellants. LYLE H. CHENEY and SARA CHENEY, husband and wife, Cross-plaintiffs and Appellants, ROBERT L. ADAMS , TONY WASTCOAT, DON PFUTZENREUTER, JAMES W. MAAS and MARILYN L. MAAS, husband and wife, Cross-Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Gallatin, The Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Bolinger & Conover, Bozeman, Montana For Respondents: Morrow, Sedivy, Olson & Eck, Bozeman, Montana Landoe, Brown Law Firm, Bozeman, Montana Submitted on Briefs: December 30, 1982 Decided: March 24, 1983 Filed: - - - Clerk Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Lyle and S a r a Cheney wanted t o s e l l t h e i r 230+ a c r e ranch l o c a t e d near Belgrade, Montana. They c o n t r a c t e d w i t h Robert Adams, a r e a l t o r a s s o c i a t e d w i t h A c t i o n R e a l t y of Bozeman, t o s e l l t h e p r o p e r t y . The terms of t h e agreement i n c l u d e d : ". . . You may, i f d e s i r e d , s e c u r e t h e c o o p e r a t i o n of any o t h e r b r o k e r , o r group o f b r o k e r s , i n p r o c u r i n g a s a l e of s a i d p r o p e r t y . I n t h e e v e n t t h a t you, o r any o t h e r b r o k e r s c o o p e r a t i n g w i t h you, s h a l l f i n d a b u y e r r e a d y and w i l l i n g t o e n t e r i n t o a d e a l f o r s a i d wrice a n d t e r m s . o r + s u c h o t h e r t e r m s a n d p r i c e a s I may .................................. a c c e p t . . . I hereby a g r e e t o pay you i n cash f o r your s e r v i c e s a commission e q u a l i n amount t o 5% of t h e above s t a t e d s e l l i n g p r i c e . " (Emphasis added.) Adams l i s t e d t h e p r o p e r t y i n t h e M u l t i p l e L i s t i n g S e r v i c e . D r . James Maas was i n t e r e s t e d i n buying ranch p r o p e r t y i n t h e G a l l a t i n V a l l e y . H e was informed of t h e Cheney p r o p e r t y by h i s a g e n t s , Don P f u t z e n r e u t e r and Tony Wastcoat of Waite R e a l t y . Maas v i s i t e d t h e p r o p e r t y a number of times. H i s c h i e f concern d u r i n g t h e s e v i s i t s was whether t h e e a s t boundary of t h e p r o p e r t y bordered t h e county road. He was a s s u r e d t h a t it d i d . On September 27, 1979, D r . and Mrs. Maas and Mr. and Mrs. Cheney s i g n e d an " E a r n e s t Money R e c e i p t and Agreement t o S e l l and Purchase" which acknowl- edged t h a t $3,500 e a r n e s t money had been p a i d t o Cheneys by t h e Maases i n p a r t payment f o r t h e p r o p e r t y . The September agreement provided i n paragraph t h r e e : " I f t h e S e l l e r d o e s n o t approve t h i s s a l e w i t h i n 0 d a y s h e r e a f t e r , o r i f s e l l e r ' s t i t l e i n o t merchantable o r i n s u r a b l e and c a n n o t be made s o w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e a f t e r w r i t t e n n o t i c e c o n t a i n i n g s t a t e m e n t o f d e f e c t s i s d e l i v e r e d t o s e l l e r , then s a i d e a r n e s t money h e r e i n r e c e i p t e d f o r s h a l l be r e t u r n e d t o t h e purchaser on demand and a l l r i g h t s of p u r c h a s e r t e r m i n a t e d u n l e s s p u r c h a s e r w a i v e s s a i d d e f e c t s and e l e c t s t o purchase." The Cheneys wanted t o buy p r o p e r t y i n Arizona and thereon r e t i r e . Their a c c o u n t a n t advised them t h a t t h e y could e f f e c t a l a r g e t a x s a v i n g s i f t h e y exchanged r e a l p r o p e r t y w i t h Maas. T h u s , t h e p a r t i e s i n c l u d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n i n t h e c o n t r a c t on a c o n t i n u a t i o n s h e e t : " I t is f u r t h e r agreed by s e l l e r s and pur- c h a s e r s t h a t i n t h e e v e n t t h e s e l l e r can f i n d s u i t a b l e p r o p e r t y and make a r r a n g e - ments f o r such p r o p e r t y t o c l o s e by J a n . 15, 1980, t h a t t h e buyer w i l l purchase s u c h p r o p e r t y t o e f f e c t a t a x f r e e exchange w i t h t h e s e l l e r on t h e s a i d 230+/- a c r e s . I f seller is unable t o s e c u r e such p r o p e r t y t o e f f e c t a t a x f r e e exchange by J a n . 15, 1980, t h e s a l e w i l l be c l o s e d on c o n t r a c t f o r deed a s s t a t e d above." A f t e r l o c a t i n g p r o p e r t y i n Arizona, an o f f e r was pre- pared which t h e Maases were t o s i g n and forward t o t h e owner of t h e p r o p e r t y , Fran N i e l s e n . While Cheneys were i n Arizona, Maas employed a s u r - veyor t o survey t h e Cheney p r o p e r t y . H e found t h a t t h e Cheneys were n o t t h e r e c o r d owners of t h e e a s t e r n s t r i p of land t h a t bordered t h e county road. Maas r e l a y e d t h e problem t o P f u t z e n r e u t e r , who t h e n c o n t a c t e d kdams and on o r about November 5, Adams c o n t a c t e d Cheney i n Arizona. Cheney was completely s u r p r i s e d by t h e boundary problem a s h i s family had been ranching on t h e p r o p e r t y s i n c e 1903. When Cheneys r e t u r n e d from Arizona they gave Maas, through t h e r e a l e s t a t e b r o k e r s , t h e o f f e r t o s i g n and, w i t h $500, send t o Arizona. However, due t o t h e boundary problem, Maas would n o t comply. I n an a t t e m p t t o m o l l i f y Maas, r e a l t o r s P f u t z e n r e u t e r and Wastcoat prepared t h e f o l l o w i n g addendum t o t h e o f f e r on t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y : "This t r a n s a c t i o n is c o n t i n g e n t on t h e approval of James Maas of t h e survey on t h e e a s t boundary ( b o r d e r i n g Thorpe Road) of 230+ a c r e s l o c a t e d i n s e c t i o n 31 and 32 of TIN R4E M.P.M., G a l l a t i n County, Montana. "This o f f e r is s u b j e c t t o and c o n t i n g e n t on t h e terms of t h e e a r n e s t money r e c e i p t and agreement t o s e l l and purchase d a t e d September 27, 1979, between James W. Maas and Marilyn L. Maas, p u r c h a s e r s , and Lyle H. Cheney and S a r a F. Cheney, s e l l e r s . " T h i s addendum was prepared w i t h o u t a u t h o r i z a t i o n from e i t h e r p r i n c i p a l . Upon a d v i c e of c o u n s e l , Maas s t i l l would n o t s i g n t h e o f f e r . On December 2, 1979, t h e owner of t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y c o n t r a c t e d w i t h a t h i r d p a r t y t o s e l l t h e p r o p e r t y . Closing o c c u r r e d sometime i n January. Cheneys s t i l l wanted t o s e l l t h e ranch. Even though they a s s e r t t h a t the s t r i p of l a n d i n q u e s t i o n was under t h e i r ownership by a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n , t h e Cheneys purchased t h e s t r i p from t h e a d j a c e n t landowner f o r $1,000. T h i s p i e c e of p r o p e r t y was included i n t h e subsequent s a l e t o t h e Maases b u t Cheneys added $3,500 t o t h e o r i g i n a l p r i c e . On February 12, 1 9 8 0 , a c o n t r a c t f o r deed was s i g n e d by both p a r t i e s . No mention was made of t h e " t a x f r e e exchange." The Cheneys d i d n o t pay t h e r e a l e s t a t e commission. Consequently, Adams brought t h e primary a c t i o n t o recover h i s commission. Cheneys counterclaimed a g a i n s t Hdams f o r breach of d u t i e s a s a broker and f i d u c i a r y d u t i e s t o Cheneys f o r f a i l i n g t o r e p r e s e n t them i n t h e i r d e a l i n g s w i t h Maases. Cheneys cross-claimed a g a l n s t t h e o t h e r r e a l t o r s f o r t h e same breacn. They a s s e r t t h a t they do n o t owe any r e a l e s t a t e commission and, moreover, t h a t Adams is owing t o them t h e $ 3 , 5 0 0 e a r n e s t money. Cheneys a l s o c r o s s - c l a i m e d a g a i n s t Maases. They a l l e g e d t h a t , by n o t s u b m i t t i n g an o f f e r f o r t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y s e l e c t e d by Cheneys, t h e Naases breached t h e September 27 agreement. S p e c i f i c a l l y , they v i o i a t e d t h e c l a u s e on t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n s h e e t of t h e c o n t r a c t r e g a r d i n g t h e purchase of p r o p e r t y s e l e c t e d by t h e Cheneys. Cheneys a l l e g e d t h a t t h e i r damage from such breach is t h e expense i n f i n d i n g t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y , t h e l o s s of t h e t a x s a v i n g s and t h e l o s s of t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y . Adams contends t h a t h i s d u t y t o t h e Cheneys was performed when he procured a buyer t h a t was ready, w i l l i n g and a b l e t o purchase t h e p r o p e r t y . 'Thus, he earned h i s commission. The Maases contend t h a t t h e y were j u s t i f i e d i n n o t complying w i t h t h e e x p r e s s c o n d i t i o n s of t h e September c o n t r a c t r e y a r d l n g t h e purchase of t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y . They argue t h a t compliance was n o t r e q u i r e d s i n c e t h e Cheneys d i d - n o t have merchantable t i t l e , i . e . , t h e y were n o t record owners of t h e e a s t e r n s t r i p bordering t h e county road. Cheneys respond t o Maases' contention by s t r e s s i n g t h a t according t o paragraph t h r e e of t h e September 27 a g r e e - m e n t , t h e y had a r e a s o n a b l e time p e r i o d t o make t h e t i t l e merchantable. They, i n f a c t , d i d s o by purchasing t h e ques- t l o n a b l e s t r i p from t h e r e c o r d owners. The j u r y found f o r Adams and h e l d t h a t he recover h i s commission, c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s . Furthermore, t h e j u r y d i s m i s s e d a l l c l a i m s a s s e r t e d oy t n e Cheneys. The Cheneys a p p e a l t h e j u r y v e r d i c t and p r e s e n t s i x i s s u e s f o r our d e t e r m i n a t i o n : 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n by r e f u s i n g t o g i v e a p p e l l a n t s ' proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 25 r e g a r d i n g t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r Maases b r e a c h e d t h e i r c o n t r a c t w i t h a p p e l l a n t s and i n f a i l i n g t o g i v e any i n s t r u c - t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h l s breach? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n by r e f u s i n g t o a l l o w i n t o e v i d e n c e c e r t a i n e x h i b i t s a n d r e f u s i n g a p p e l l a n t s ' proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s , a l l r e g a r d i n g w h e t h e r t i t l e f o r t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y c o u l d b e made merchantable w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e p e r i o d of time? 3 . Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court abuse its d i s c r e t i o n i n g i v i n g i n s t r u c t i o n no. 5 which s t a t e d t h a t a r e a l e s t a t e b r o k e r is o n l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r b r i n g i n g t h e p a r t i e s t o g e t h e r ? 4 . Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court abuse its d i s c r e t i o n by r e f using t o g i v e t h e j u r y a p p e l l a n t s ' proposed i n s t r u c t i o n nos. 8, 1 0 , 11, 1 2 , 1 3 , and 14 r e g a r d i n g s p e c i i i c d u t i e s owed by t h e r e a l t o r s t o t h e a p p e l l a n t s and t h e breach of such d u t i e s ? 5. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court abuse its d i s c r e t i o n by r e c e i v i n g i n t o e v i d e n c e a n unsigned d e p o s i t i o n ? 6. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court abuse its d i s c r e t i o n by g i v i n g t h e r e s p o n d e n t s e i g h t peremptory c h a l l e n g e s d u r i n g t h e selection of t h e j u r y and a l l o w i n g a p p e l l a n t s o n l y f o u r c h a l l e n g e s ? A p p e l l a n t s f i r s t contend t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by n o t g i v i n g any i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e Maases' a l l e g e d breach of t h e September agreement. S p e c i f i c a l l y , a p p e l l a n t s a s s e r t t h a t it was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o r e f u s e proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 25. T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s t a t e s : "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i f you f i n d t h a t t h e Maases r e f u s e d t o s i g n t h e c o n t r a c t f o r t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y s e c u r e d by t h e Cheneys and submitted t o t h e Maases f o r s i g n a t u r e and r e f u s e d t o send $500.00 i n e a r n e s t money t o h o l d t h e A r i z o n a p r o p e r t y , t h e n you must conclude t h a t t h e Maases breached t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e i r September 2 7 , 1979, c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e Cheneys. " According t o t h e t a x f r e e c l a u s e i n t h e September agreement, t h e IJlaases were t o make an o f f e r on p r o p e r t y s e l e c t e d by t h e Cheneys. Maases would t h e n exchange such p r o p e r t y f o r t h e Cheneys' p r o p e r t y t o e f f e c t an a l l e g e d t a x s a v i n g s . However, paragraph t h r e e of t h e c o n t r a c t r e l i e v e d t h e Maases of t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s i f t h e sellers' t i t l e is n o t merchantable and c a n n o t be made s o w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e p e r i o d o f t i m e a f t e r w r i t t e n n o t i c e o f such d e f e c t s is d e l i v e r e d t o t h e s e l l e r . T h i s , i n e s s e n c e , is t h e b u y e r s ' e s c a p e c l a u s e , p r o t e c t i n g them from i n c u r r i n g an o b l i g a t i o n t o p u r c h a s e p r o p e r t y w i t h a d e f e c t i v e t i t l e . Upon d i s c o v e r y of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t Cheneys' t i t l e d i d n o t i n c l u d e t h e s t r i p of l a n d b o r d e r i n g t h e county r o a d , land-locking t h e Cheney p r o p e r t y , Maases were r e l u c t a n t t o make t h e o f f e r on t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y . I n t h e meantime, t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y was s o l d t o a t h i r d p a r t y and t h e Cheneys cross-claimed a g a i n s t Maases f o r breach of t h e September agreement. They c l a i m t h a t Maases' f a i l u r e t o make t h e o f f e r on t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y c o n s t i t u t e d a b r e a c h of t h e September agreement and t h e j u r y should have been i n s t r u c t e d on such breach. W e b e l i e v e t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t abuse its d i s c r e t i o n by r e f u s i n g a p p e l l a n t s ' proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 25. T h i s p a r t i c u l a r i n s t r u c t i o n is n o t o n l y m i s l e a d i n g , b u t it is an i n c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t of t h e law. The i n s t r u c t i o n r e q u i r e s t h e j u r y t o f i n d a breach i f t h e y determine t h a t Maases d i d n o t o f f e r t o buy t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y . I t makes no p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e escape c l a u s e t h a t a l l o w s t h e Maases t o avoid making t h e o f f e r i f t i t l e is unmerchantable and c a n n o t be made s o w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e p e r i o d of time. Moreover, w e h o l d t h e c o u r t was c o r r e c t i n n o t i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y on t h e breach of t h e September agree- ment. The t a x f r e e c l a u s e o u t l i n e d on t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n s h e e t p l a c e d an unreasonable burden on t h e Maases. When t h e s e l l e r s e l e c t s p r o p e r t y , t h e buyer must make an o f f e r on such p r o p e r t y o r he h a s breached t h e c o n t r a c t . H e can avoid making t h e o f f e r i f , i n accordance w i t h t h e escape c l a u s e , he can immediately a s c e r t a i n t h a t t i t l e t o t h e s e l l e r s ' p r o p e r t y is unmerchantable and cannot be c o r r e c t e d w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e p e r i o d of t i m e . This d e t e r m i n a t i o n is s p e c u l a t i v e and t h e buyer should n o t be d e a l t such a burden. The buyer may be f o r c e d t o exchange f o r unmerchantable p r o p e r t y o r , i n t h e w o r s t s i t u a t i o n , wind up w i t h p r o p e r t y t h a t t h e s e l l e r h a s s e l e c t e d f o r h i m s e l f . I n t h e t y p i c a l s i t u a t i o n , w i t h o u t t h e t a x f r e e c l a u s e , i f t h e buyer f i n d s t i t l e t o be unmer- c h a n t a b l e and cannot be made s o w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e p e r i o d of time, t h e c o n t r a c t can be r e s c i n d e d and any payments w i l l be r e t u r n e d t o hlm. A s i n t h i s c a s e , t h e t a x f r e e c l a u s e f o r c e s t h e buyer t o a c c e p t d o u b t f u l t i t l e . T h i s Court h a s held t h a t b u y e r s of r e a l e s t a t e should n o t be r e q u i r e d t o do s o . S i l f v a s t v. Asplund ( l 9 3 3 ) , 93 Mont. 584, 20 P.2d 6 1 ; Bozdech v. Montana Ranches Co. ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 67 Mont. 366, 216 P. 319. Thus, w e h o l d t h a t , i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t , t h e t a x f r e e c l a u s e was i n v a l i d and t h e buyer was j u s t i f i e d i n n o t o f f e r i n g t o buy t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y . Hence, no b r e a c h o c c u r r e d and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n r e g a r d i n g such breach was p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d . W e a r e n o t r e j e c t i n g t h e u s e of r e a l p r o p e r t y exchange c l a u s e s i n r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t s . They can be v a l u a b l e t o o l s t o e f f e c t u a t e t h e p a r t i e s t o j e c t i v e s . However, p a r t i e s should be c a r e f u l i n u s i n g them and s p e c i f i c a l l y p l a c e a c o n d i t i o n i n such a c o n t r a c t t h a t r e q u i r e s merchant- a b i l i t y t o be proven b e f o r e t h e buyer must o b l i g a t e h i m s e l f t o p u r c h a s e exchange p r o p e r t y . Secondly, a p p e l l a n t s contend t h e District C o u r t abused its d i s c r e t i o n be r e f u s i n g t o a l l o w i n t o e v i d e n c e documents e s t a b l i s h i n g m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y a n d t h a t a p p e l l a n t s t t i t l e could have been made m e r c h a n t a b l e w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e p e r i o d of t i m e . Also, a p p e l l a n t s a s s e r t t h e y were p r e v e n t e d from being h e a r d on whether such e v i d e n c e s h o u l d be a d m i t t e d . W e n o t e t h a t t h i s o f f e r of proof was made t o show t h a t Maases v i o l a t e d t h e t a x f r e e c l a u s e , n o t t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t Maases d i d n o t p u r c h a s e the Cheney ranch because of t i t l e problems. On t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e Maases d i d e v e n t u a l l y p u r c h a s e t h e Cheney p r o p e r t y and t h e Cheneys purchased l a n d i n Arizona. Consequently, s i n c e w e have determined t h e t a x f r e e c l a u s e t o be i n v a l i d and t h a t Maases d i d n o t b r e a c h t h e agreement, w e hold t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t made c o r r e c t r u l i n g s on t h e s e e v i d e n t i a r y q u e s t i o n s . Evidence of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y , i n t h e c o n t e x t p r e s e n t e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t s , was i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e s of t h e a c t i o n . F u r t h e r , t h e c o u r t was c o r r e c t i n d e c l i n i n g t o admit t h e evidence i n q u e s t i o n i n o r d e r t o p r e v e n t t h e s u i t from becoming a q u i e t t i t l e a c t i o n . A p p e l l a n t s a l s o contend a f u r t h e r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n r e f u s i n g t h e i r proposed i n s t r u c - t i o n s on whether t i t l e could be made merchantable w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e p e r i o d of t i m e . Here a g a i n , a p p e l l a n t s were proposing t h e i r i n s t r u c t i o n s s o t h e j u r y would f i n d t h a t t i t l e could have been made merchantable w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e p e r i o d of t i m e , o b l i g a t i n g Maases t o purchase t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y . T h e i r f a i l u r e t o do s o would have c o n s t i t u t e d t h e breach. However, s i n c e w e have h e l d t h e t a x f r e e c l a u s e t o be i n v a l i d , Maases were n o t o b l i g a t e d t o p u r c h a s e t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y . Thus, t h e proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e q u e s t i o n of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y were i r r e l e v a n t . T h i r d , a p p e l l a n t s a s s e r t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n by i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y t h a t a r e a l e s t a t e broker is o n l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r b r i n g i n g t h e p a r t i e s t o g e t h e r . T h i s was o u t l i n e d i n i n s t r u c t i o n no. 5: "A r e a l e s t a t e broker e a r n s h i s commis- s i o n when he p r o c u r e s a buyer who is ready, w i l l i n g and a b l e t o purchase r e a l p r o p e r t y on such terms a s t h e s e l l e r s may a g r e e . The u l t i m a t e s a l e terms need n o t be what t h e b r o k e r ' s c o n t r a c t c o n t a i n s . A broker is n o t r e q u i r e d t o do e v e r y t h i n g t o complete t h e s a l e , b u t is o n l y respon- s i b l e f o r b r i n g i n g t h e p a r t i e s t o g e t h e r . " The law is c l e a r i n Montana. I n B a r r e t t v. B a l l a r d (1980) I Mon t . , 622 P.2d 180, 37 St.Rep. 2038, w e said: "The law i n t h i s s t a t e is we11 s e t t l e d . The broker need n o t do e v e r y t h i n g t o complete t h e s a l e b u t o n l y be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r b r i n g i n g t h e p a r t i e s t o g e t h e r . I n Shober v. Dean ( 1 9 0 9 ) , 39 Mont. 255, 102 P. 323, t h i s Court set t h e s t a n d a r d which should judge broker c a u s a t i o n : 11 1 . . . I t a p p e a r s t o us t h a t t h e r e can be b u t one answer: I t was intended t h a t , i f t h e e f f o r t s of Shober set i n motion a c h a i n of e v e n t s which f i n a l l y culminated i n a s a l e of t h e p r o p e r t y , t h e n he should recover t h e maximum f e e ; . . . I I f 622 P.2d a t 186. (Emphasis added.) Hence, a b s e n t c o n t r a r y terms i n t h e brokerage c o n t r a c t , when a broker b r i n g s a s e l l e r t o g e t h e r w i t h a buyer who is ready, w i l l i n g and a b l e t o purchase and a s a l e t a k e s p l a c e a t terms s a t i s f a c t o r y t o t h e s e l l e r , t h e broker h a s earned h i s com- m i s s i o n . There were no terms i l l t h e c o n t r a c t t h a t would o b l i - g a t e t h e broker t o complete t h e s a l e . Thus, i n s t r u c t i o n no. 5 was a c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t of t h e law, and t h e r e was no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i n g i v i n g it t o t h e jury. F o u r t h , a p p e l l a n t s a r g u e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused its d i s c r e t i o n by r e f u s i n g t h e i r i n s t r u c t i o n s regard- i n g d u t i e s owed by t h e r e a l t o r s t o t h e a p p e l l a n t s and t h e breach of such d u t i e s . A p p e l l a n t s a s s e r t t h a t t h r e e s p e c i f i c d u t i e s a r o s e based on t h e f a c t s of t h e c a s e . The a l l e g e d d u t i e s a r e : (1) The d u t y t o convey t o t h e Maases t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Cheneys could e a s i l y c o r r e c t any d e f e c t i n m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y of t i t l e a s t o t h e s t r i p of land f r o n t i n g on t h e county road; ( 2 ) 'The d u t y t o b r i n g t h e Cheneys and t h e Maases t o g e t h e r s o t h a t t h e Maases would have no f e a r s a s t o t h e m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y of t i t l e r a t h e r t h a n keeping t h e two p a r t i e s s e p a r a t e d ; and, ( 3 ) The d u t y n o t t o change t h e terms and c o n d i t i o n s of R e a l E s t a t e P u r c h a s e C o n t r a c t and R e c e i p t f o r D e p o s i t r e g a r d i n g t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y w i t h o u t t h e e x p r e s s a p p r o v a l of t h e i r p r i n c i p a l s , t h e Cheneys. A p p e l l a n t s t r a n s l a t e d t h e s e d u t i e s i n t o p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n nos. 8, 1 0 , 11, 12, 1 3 , and 1 4 . W e b e l i e v e t h e c o u r t p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s . A s p r e v i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d , a r e a l t o r ' s p r i m a r y d u t y is t o b r i n g p a r t i e s t o g e t h e r , u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e s t a t e d i n t h e l l s t i n g agreement. Furthermore, i n a c c o m p l i s h i n g t h i s a c 1" , , 0 LC- r e a l t o r h a s a f i d u c i a r y d u t y t o h i s c l i e n t . " v. Watson ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 344, 578 P.2d 308. F i d u c i a r y d u t i e s encompass f u l l d i s c l o s u r e , F i r s t T r u s t v. McKenna (19801, Nont . , 614 P.2d 1027, 37 St.Rep. 1026; Lyle v. Moore ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 183 Mont. 274, 599 P.2d 336; good f a i t h , F r i s e l l v. Newman ( 1 9 6 7 ) , ' 7 1 Wash.2d 520, 429 P.2d 864; and a c t i n g i n t h e c l i e n t ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t s . Once a b r o k e r i n v o l v e s h i m s e l f w i t h t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f a t r a n s a c t i o n , he must c o n t i n u e t o act i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e above f i d u c i a r y d u t i e s . I n t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n it a p p e a r s t h a t a l l t h e r e a l t o r s assumed a r o l e i n t h e comple- t i o n o f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n s . The j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d on t h e f i d u c i a r y d u t i e s owed t o t h e p a r t i e s by t h e r e a l t o r s when t h e y assumed t h i s r o l e . These d u t i e s a r e embodied i n i n s t r u c t i o n nos. 7, 8 , 9 and 10. The j u r y determined t h a t t h e s e d u t i e s were n o t breached. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t was c o r r e c t i n r e f u s i n g a p p e l l a n t s ' proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s based on t h e t h r e e a l l e g e d d u t i e s o u t l i n e d above b e c a u s e t h e r e was no f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r s u c h i n s t r u c t i o n s . T h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t it is n o t e r r o r t o r e f u s e i n s t r u c t i o n s n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e . Penn v. B u r l i n g t o n Northern, I n c . ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 605 P.2d 600, 37 St.Rep. 93; P o r t e r v. Crum-McRinnon B u i l d i n g Co. ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 142 Mont. 7 4 , 381 P.2d 794. The s p e c i f i c d u t i e s expressed by t h e a p p e l l a n t s e i t h e r d i d n o t e x i s t o r were n o t breached. The b r o k e r s had no d u t y t o convey t o Maases t h a t t i t l e d e f e c t s could be c o r r e c t e d immediately. T h i s would f o r c e t h e r e a l t o r s t o make a d i f f i c u l t l e g a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n which they a r e n o t r e q u i r e d t o do. Secondly, t h e r e a l t o r s d i d n o t breach t h e d u t y t o b r i n g t h e p a r t i e s t o g e t h e r t o a l l e v i a t e t h e t i t l e problem. Each p a r t y was c o n t a c t e d immediately through t h e i r a g e n t s . F u r t h e r , t h e a g e n t s were a c t i n g i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of a l l p a r t i e s a s t n e y were ac.cively t r y i n g t o s o l v e t h e t i t l e problem. T h i r d l y , w e b e l i e v e t h e d u t y n o t t o change t h e Arizona o f f e r w i t h o u t Cheneys' approval is i l l u s o r y . I n i t i a l l y , w e n o t e t h a t Adams was n o t involved i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e addendum. P f u t z e n r e u t e r and Wastcoat were t h e p e r s o n s involved. However, i f such a d u t y e x i s t e d , t h e breach t h e r e o f is immaterial and d i d n o t p r e j u d i c e Cheneys because it was i n e f f e c t u a l ; Maases would s t i l l n o t s i g n t h e o f f e r . F i f t h , t h e a p p e l l a n t s a s s e r t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by r e c e i v i n g i n t o e v i d e n c e a n u n s i g n e d d e p o s i t i o n . The b a s i s of t h e a p p e l l a n t s ' o b j e c t i o n is t h a t t n e y had n o t waived t h e l a c k of s i g n a t u r e i n accordance w i t h Rule 3 0 ( e ) , M.R.Civ.P. On A p r i l 23, 1982, t h e d e p o s i t i o n of Fran N i e l s e n , t h e owner of t h e Arizona p r o p e r t y , was taken i n Arizona. A t t h e d e p o s i t i o n , both Cheneys and Maases were r e p r e s e n t e d by counsel. A t t h e d e p o s i t i o n , N i e l s e n was asked i f s h e wanted t o review t h e deposition when completed and t h e n s i g n it. She i n d i c a t e d t h a t s h e d i d . However, on t h e s i g n a t u r e l i n e a t t n e end of t h e d e p o s i t i o n , t h e words " s i g n a t u r e waived" a r e typed. Nothing i n t h e d e p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t e d t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o t t h e waiver. I n t h e morning of t h e day t h e d e p o s i t i o n was t o be i n - troduced, counsel r e c e i v e d c o p i e s of t h e d e p o s i t i o n . Af t e r t h e reading of t h e deposition was underway, c o u n s e l f o r Cheneys o b j e c t e d t o it a s it was unsigned. H e p r e s e n t e d no evldence of p r e j u d i c e due t o t h i s p r o c e d u r a l i r r e g u l a r i t y . W e r e j e c t a p p e l l a n t s ' c o n t e n t i o n because no motion t o s u p p r e s s t h e d e p o s i t i o n was made a t t h e o u t s e t . Rule 3 2 ( d ) ( 4 ) , M.R.Civ.P., p r e s c r i b e s t h a t any i r r e g u l a r i t i e s of t h e form of t h e d e p o s i t i o n a r e waived u n l e s s a motion t o s u p p r e s s t h e d e p o s i t i o n is made w i t h r e a s o n a b l e promptness a f t e r such d e f e c t is, o r w i t h due d i l i g e n c e might have been, a s c e r t a i n e d . i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n a p p e l l a n t s d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e i r r e g u l a r i t y u n t i l a f t e r t h e r e a d i n g of t h e d e p o s i t i o n i n t o evidence had commenced. Counsel f o r a p p e l l a n t s had r e c e i v e d t h e d e p o s i t i o n i n t h e morning p r i o r t o t r i a l ; t h u s , t h e irregularity should have been d i s c o v e r e d t h e n and a motion t o s u p p r e s s made a c c o r d i n g l y . F u r t h e r m o r e , s i n c e no evldence r e g a r d i n g t h e waived s i g n a t u r e was p r e s e n t e d , w e cannot a s c e r t a i n a b a s i s from which t o conclude a p p e l l a n t s were p r e j u d i c e d by t h e i r r e g u l a r i t y i n t h e d e p o s i t i o n . S i x t h , t h e a p p e l l a n t s c o n t e n d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused its d i s c r e t i o n by g i v i n g t h e Maases four peremptory c h a l l e n g e s , t h e r e a l t o r s a s a g r o u p f o u r p e r e m p t o r y c n a l l e n g e s , and f o u r peremptory c h a l l e n g e s t o a p p e l l a n t s . E s s e n t i a l l y , a p p e l l a n t s urge t h e c o u r t t o view t h e Maases and t h e r e a l t o r s as one group and c o n s e q u e n t l y a l l o c a t e them o n l y f o u r peremptory c h a l l e n g e s . S e c t i o n 25-7-224, MCA, e n t i t l e s each p a r t y t o f o u r c h a l l e n g e s . Lauman v. Lee ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont . , 626 P.2d 830, 38 St.Rep. 499, approves t h e g r a n t i n g of s e p a r a t e peremptory c h a l l e n g e s t o c o d e f e n d a n t s who occupy h o s t i l e p o s i t i o n s . The a p p e l l a n t s a s s e r t t h a t t h e Maases and t h e r e a l t o r s do n o t occupy h o s t i l e p o s i t i o n s . On t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e Maases and two of t h e r e a l t o r s are r e p r e s e n t e d by i d e n t i c a l c o u n s e l . I n reviewing t h e lower c o u r t ' s g r a n t i n g of a d d i t i o n a l peremptory c h a l l e n g e s , w e have h e l d t h a t t h e complaining p a r t y must show he was p r e j u d i c e d by s u c h a c t i o n . Leary v. K e l l y P i p e Co. ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 511, 549 P.2d 813; Ashley v. Safeway S t o r e s , I n c . , e t a l . ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 100 Mont. 312, 47 P.2d 53. I n Leary we determined t h a t t o e s t a b l i s h r e v e r s i - b l e e r r o r , t h e complaining p a r t y must show: (1) t h a t h e e x h a u s t e d h i s peremptory c h a l l e n g e s ; ( 2 ) t h a t he h a s s u f - f e r e d m a t e r i a l i n j u r y from t h e a c t i o n of t h e c o u r t ; and ( 3 ) t h a t a s a r e s u l t t h e r e o f one o r more o b j e c t i o n a b l e j u r o r s s a t on t h e case. 169 Mont. a t 516, 549 P.2d a t 816. These r e q u i s i t e f i n d i n g s were t a k e n from a n a n n o t a t i o n on t h e e f f e c t s o f a l l o w i n g e x c e s s i v e peremptory c h a l l e n g e s . Annot., 95 ALR2d 957, 963 ( 1 9 6 4 ) . It s t a t e s , " [ t l h e numer- i c a l weight of a u t h o r i t y i n c i v i l c a s e s s u p p o r t s a r u l e t h a t a judgment w i l l n o t be r e v e r s e d f o r e r r o r i n a l l o w i n g one o r more peremptory c h a l l e n g e s i n e x c e s s of t h a t p r o v i d e d by s t a t u t e , u n l e s s t h e complaining p a r t y shows t h a t he has. . . s u f f e r e d m a t e r i a l i n j u r y from t h e a c t i o n of t h e c o u r t . " Numerous c a s e s from f i t t e e n jurisdictions were c i t e d sup- p o r t i n g t h i s r u l e . The Washington Supreme Court h a s a l s o a r t i c u l a t e d t h a t p r e j u d i c e must be shown t o cause r e v e r s a l . I n S t a t e v. Evans ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 26 Wash.App. 251, 612 P.2d 442, t h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t p a r t i e s a r e n o t e n t i t l e d t o have any p a r t i c u l a r j u r o r s e r v e . Unless p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t s from a l l o w i n g an e x c e s s i v e number of peremptory c h a l l e n g e s , r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r h a s n o t been committed. See a l s o , Creech v. C i t y of Aberdeen ( 1 9 0 6 ) , 4 4 Wash. 72, 87 P. 44; Trautman, S e r v i n g S u b s t a n t i a l Justice --A D i l e m m a , 40 Wash. L. Rev. 270, 278 ( 1 9 6 5 ) . The underlying r a t i o n a l e of v o i r d i r e , and s p e c i f i - c a l l y peremptory c h a l l e n g e s , is t o i n s u r e t h a t l i t i g a n t s r e c e i v e a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y . I t is n o t t o p r o v i d e p a r t i e s w i t h j u r o r s who a r e f a v o r a b l e t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n , even though t h i s is o f t e n t h e o b j e c t i v e and r e s u l t . Conse- q u e n t l y , i f t h e c o u r t ' s a c t i o n a l l o w i n g a d d i t i o n a l c h a l - l e n g e s does n o t p r e j u d i c e t h e complaining p a r t y , he h a s r e c e i v e d a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y . I n e s s e n c e , t h e end h a s been accomplished and an i r r e g u l a r i t y i n t h e means s h o u l d n o t c a u s e r e v e r s a l . On t h e o t h e r hand, i n Hunsaker v. Sozeman Deaconess Foundation ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 179 Mont. 305, 588 P.2d 493, t h i s Court recognized t h a t proving p r e j u d i c e may be p r a c t i c a l l y impos- s i b l e . W e h e l d i n Hunsaker t h a t t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g peremptory c h a l l e n g e s , when it was a c t u a l l y made, s h o u l d be p a r t of t h e review p r o c e s s on a p p e a l . However, t h i s would r e q u i r e a n a d e q u a t e r e c o r d of t h e lower c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n . Thus, t h e f o l l o w i n g sugges- t i o n was made: "The D i s t r i c t C o u r t s s h o u l d s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r t h e use of t h e p r e t r i a l c o n f e r - ence a s t h e b e s t procedure t o be used i n r e s o l v i n g q u e s t i o n s such a s t h e number o f peremptory c h a l l e n g e s t o be allowed each s i d e . I f f o r some r a r e r e a s o n t h e D i s - t r i c t Court h o l d s no p r e t r i a l c o n f e r e n c e , t h e q u e s t i o n o f p e r e m p t o r y c h a l l e n g e s should be r a i s e d by a p p r o p r i a t e w r i t t e n motion f i l e d b e f o r e t h e commencement o f j u r y s e l e c t i o n , and it s h o u l d s e t f o r t h a l l f a c t s and r e f e r e n c e s t e n d i n g t o s u p p o r t h i s c l a i m of h o s t i l i t y . In any c a s e , t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y o r p a r t i e s s h o u l d be g i v e n a d e q u a t e time t o respond t o t h e c l a i m s of h o s t i l i t y . "The t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d , a s a b a r e mini- mum, r u l e on t h e peremptory c h a l l e n g e i s s u e b e f o r e t h e q u e s t i o n i n g of j u r o r s begins. To a f f o r d a b a s i s f o r review, it should e x p r e s s l y set f o r t h i n t h e r e c o r d t h e r e a s o n s f o r its r u l i n g and t h e f a c t s on which it relies i n making its d e c i - s i o n . " 179 Mont. a t 318, 588 P.2d a t 501. I f t h e r e is n o t a s u f f i c i e n t r e c o r d by which t h e Court can review t h e District Court r u l i n g , t h e n t h e conduct of t h e j u r y must be examined i n accordance w i t h Leary. I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h e p r e t r i a l c o n f e r e n c e d i d n o t d e t e r m i n e t h e a l l o c a t i o n of peremptory c h a l l e n g e s . F u r t h e r - more, c o u n s e l d i s p e n s e d w i t h t h e r e c o r d i n g of v o i r d i r e and t h e a p p e l l a n t s o b j e c t e d t o t h e a l l o c a t i o n of t h e c h a l l e n g e s a f t e r t h e q u e s t i o n i n g of t h e j u r o r s was complete and w h i l e t h e c h a l l e n g e s were being e x e r c i s e d . The b a s i s of t h e a p p e l l a n t s ' o b j e c t i o n was t h a t two o f t h e r e a l t o r s and t h e Maases were r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e same law firm. The c o u r t o v e r r u l e d t h e o b j e c t i o n and s t a t e d , " t o s a y t h e r e is no a d v e r s i t y because of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e f i r m r e p r e s e n t s two groups of p e o p l e is n o t c o g e n t a s f a r a s t h i s Court is concerned. " Bunsaker i n d i c a t e s t h a t a s a b a r e minimum, t o a f f o r d a b a s i s f o r review, t h e t r i a l c o u r t should e x p r e s s l y s e t f o r t h in the record the reasons for its ruling and the facts on which it relies in making its decision. The brief inter- change between the court and appellants' counsel does not meet this minimum requirement. We do not have a sufficient record to determine the correctness of the District Court's ruling when it was actually made. Thus, as determined by Hunsaker, we must examine the conduct of the jury in light of the Leary decision. Presently, the appellants have not convinced this Court that the realtors and the Maases were not entitled to separate peremptory challenges. Most importantly, the appellants have not shown any material injury suffered from the court's action or that any objectionable jurors sat on the case as a result of the court's action. Finally, even though not raised by any of the parties, we note an apparent typographical error in the judgment. The jury verdict lists the damages at $9,229.25 but the judgment lists them at $9,299.25. The jury verdict as approved by the foreperson is controlling and damages are $9,229.25. The judgment is ordered amended accordingly. A£ f irmed. 2 ~ & & ~ ! & , Chief Justice We concur: