Case Title: Sedric Maurice Simpson v. State of Arkansas

Citation: 

Docket Number: cr98-423

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sedric Maurice SIMPSON v. SHERIFF OF 
DALLAS COUNTY, Arkansas

CR 98-423                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered May 14, 1998


1.   Jurisdiction -- Arkansas Constitution confers on supreme court
     authority to entertain and grant petitions for writs of habeas
     corpus. -- Article 7, section 4, of the Arkansas Constitution
     confers on the supreme court the authority to entertain and
     grant petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed originally in
     the supreme court.

2.   Jurisdiction -- habeas corpus statute allows members of
     supreme court to issue writ "upon proper application" -- power
     of court to issue writs is coextensive with state. -- A habeas
     corpus statute, Ark. Code Ann.  16-112-102(a)(1)(1987),
     allows members of the supreme court to issue the writ "upon
     proper application" and further provides that the power of the
     Court "to issue writs of habeas corpus shall be coextensive
     with the state"; although the nature of the court's
     jurisdiction may in form be original, it is in fact appellate.
     

3.   Habeas corpus -- petition for -- when granted -- According to
     Ark. Code Ann.  16-112-103(a)(1987), a writ of habeas corpus
     shall be granted by any of the officers enumerated in  16-
     112-102(a), including members of the supreme court, to any
     person who shall apply for the writ by petition showing, by
     affidavit or other evidence, probable cause to believe he is
     detained without lawful authority or is imprisoned when by law
     he is entitled to bail.

4.   Habeas corpus -- "typical" case -- when petitioner's detention
     not seen as "without lawful authority." -- In the "typical"
     habeas corpus case, the petitioner files his or her request
     for relief after he or she has been tried for an offense,
     convicted, sentenced, and then incarcerated, through a formal
     judgment and commitment order, in a correctional facility; in
     that context, the supreme court invariably declines to view
     the petitioner's detention as one "without lawful authority,"
     and thus denies the habeas petition, unless (1) the commitment
     or judgment of conviction is invalid on its face, or (2) the
     court that committed the petitioner lacked jurisdiction over
     the cause; an application for habeas corpus cannot be made to
     perform the function of an appeal, or writ of error, in
     correcting errors and irregularities at the trial. 

5.   Habeas corpus -- extraordinary remedy -- when invoked. -- The
     writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries esteemed the best
     and only sufficient defense of personal freedom; the
     "extraordinary remedy" of the writ of habeas corpus may be
     invoked when no other effective means of relief is at hand.

6.   Habeas corpus -- detainee held in violation of Ark. Rule Crim.
     P. 28.1(a) -- no way of obtaining appellate review of trial
     judge's adverse ruling on his motion for release unless
     detainee allowed to bring petition for extraordinary writ in
     supreme court. -- A detainee who is held in violation of Ark.
     R. Crim. P. 28.1(a) has no way of obtaining appellate review
     of a trial judge's adverse ruling on his or her motion for
     release unless the detainee is allowed to bring in the supreme
     court a petition for an extraordinary writ; a person held in
     violation of Rule 28.1(a) is only entitled to release on his
     or her own recognizance, not dismissal of the charges or
     absolute discharge.  

7.   Criminal procedure -- trial judge's erroneous denial of
     detainee's request for release under Rule 28.1(a) may become
     moot issue -- alleged violation of Rule 28.1(a) not basis for
     reversal. -- If the trial judge erroneously denies the
     detainee's request for release under Rule 28.1(a), and the
     detainee is then tried and convicted and does not challenge
     the trial judge's release decision until his or her direct
     appeal, the issue would be moot; in that situation, the
     detainee would have no way to enforce the right to release
     guaranteed by Rule 28.1(a); an alleged violation of Rule
     28.1(a) is not a basis for reversal. 

8.   Habeas corpus -- possible availability of mandamus does not
     foreclose availability of habeas corpus writ to pretrial
     datainee in petitioer's situation. -- The possible
     availability of mandamus to a trial judge does not foreclose
     the availability of the writ of habeas corpus to a pretrial
     detainee who claims only that his detention is unlawful
     because he has been held there for more than nine months
     without having been brought to trial. 

9.   Habeas corpus -- pretrial detainee denied motion for release
     under Rule 28.1(a) may file petition for habeas corpus in
     supreme court. -- When a pretrial detainee has moved in the
     trial court for his release under Rule 28.1(a), and that
     motion is denied, the detainee may then file in the supreme
     court a petition for habeas corpus seeking his or her release
     under that rule; a detention in violation of Rule 28.1(a)
     qualifies as detention "without lawful authority" as that
     phrase is used in  16-112-103(a) and as it applies to a judge
     or another person or officer, such as a sheriff.

10.  Criminal procedure -- Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1(a) -- burden on
     State to justify delay in holding petitioner more than nine
     months. -- Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.1(a)
     requires a defendant charged with an offense in circuit court
     and incarcerated in a city or county jail in this state
     pending trial to be released on his or her own recognizance if
     not brought to trial within nine months from the time provided
     in Rule 28.2, excluding only such periods of necessary delay
     as are authorized in Rule 28.3; here, the nine-month period
     commenced on the date of petitioner's arrest and expired on
     March 20, 1998; appellant was still being detained in jail and
     had not been brought to trial; thus, the burden was on the
     State to show that the delay was the result of the
     petitioner's conduct or was otherwise justified.

11.  Criminal procedure -- State met burden of justifying delay --
     time in which pretrial motions filed by petitioner held under
     advisement excludable. -- The State satisfied its burden of
     showing that the delay was the result of the defendant's
     conduct or was otherwise justified where the petitioner had
     filed numerous pretrial motions, many of which were still
     under advisement in the circuit court; Rule 28.3(a) excludes
     the time in which a pretrial motion is held under advisement
     in computing the time for trial.   

12.  Habeas corpus -- petitioner's detention not in violation of
     Rule 28.1(a) -- petition for writ denied. -- The circuit court
     was correct in excluding at least sixty-eight days from the
     detention time for purposes of the rule; petitioner remained
     within the nine-month period that commenced on June 20, 1997,
     and his detention was not in violation of Rule 28.1(a); the
     petition for the writ of habeas corpus was denied.


     Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; denied.
     Robert N. Jeffrey, Public Defender, for appellant.
     Tom Wynne, Prosecuting Att'y, for appellee.


     Per Curiam.
     Sedric Maurice Simpson has petitioned this Court for a writ of
habeas corpus based on his alleged unlawful detention in violation
of Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1(a).  We must decide whether a pretrial
detainee may claim a violation of Rule 28.1(a) through a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus filed in this Court and, if so, whether
Mr. Simpson is in fact being detained in violation of that rule. 
We hold that a pretrial detainee may seek a writ of habeas corpus
in this Court, following an adverse ruling below, for the purpose
of determining whether he or she is being detained in violation of
Rule 28.1(a).  We conclude, however, that Mr. Simpson's detention
does not violate Rule 28.1(a) and that he, therefore, is not
entitled to the writ.  
     Mr. Simpson and Ezekiel Thomas Harrison, Jr., were arrested on
June 20, 1997, in connection with the deaths of Wendy Lynn
Pennington and Lena Sue Garner.  An information was filed in the
Dallas County Circuit Court on September 5, 1997, charging Mr.
Simpson and Mr. Harrison each with two counts of capital murder and
two counts of aggravated robbery.  Since his arrest, Mr. Simpson
has remained in the Dallas County Jail awaiting trial.
     On March 23, 1998, Mr. Simpson filed a motion in the Circuit
Court asserting that, as he had been incarcerated for more than
nine months without having been brought to trial, he was entitled
by Rule 28.1(a) to be released on his own recognizance subject to
an order to appear for trial on May 26, 1998.  Under Rule 28.1(a),
"[a]ny defendant charged with an offense in circuit court and
incarcerated in a city or county jail in this state pending trial
shall be released on his own recognizance if not brought to trial
within nine (9) months from the time provided in Rule 28.2,
excluding only such periods of necessary delay as are authorized in
Rule 28.3."
     The Circuit Court denied the motion at the conclusion of a
hearing held on April 7, 1998.  Mr. Simpson then filed in this
Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus directing the Dallas
County Sheriff to discharge him from custody pursuant to Rule
28.1(a).

                        1.  Habeas corpus
     As a threshold matter, we must determine whether a pretrial
detainee who claims that his detention violates Ark. R. Crim. P.
28.1(a) may raise that claim in this Court through a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus after having pursued the claim in a trial
court unsuccessfully.  We hold that he may.

                        a.  Jurisdiction
     In response to the petition, the Sheriff suggests that we lack
jurisdiction to consider it.  Without citation to authority, the
Sheriff argues that Mr. Simpson's action "is an original proceeding
for a writ of habeas corpus" and that "jurisdiction for an original
proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus lies in Circuit Court."
     Article 7,  4, of the Arkansas Constitution, in the following
passage, confers on this Court the authority to entertain and grant
petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed here originally:

          The Supreme Court . . .  shall have a general
     superintending control over all inferior courts of law
     and equity; and, in aid of its appellate and supervisory
     jurisdiction, it shall have power to issue writs of error
     and supersedeas, certiorari, habeas corpus, prohibition,
     mandamus and quo warranto, and, other remedial writs, and
     to hear and determine the same.  Its judges shall be
     conservators of the peace throughout the State, and shall
     severally have power to issue any of the aforesaid writs.

Ark. Const., Art. 7,  4 (emphasis added).  See also State ex. rel.
Arkansas Industrial Co. v. Neel, 48 Ark. 283, 3 S.W. 631 (1886); In
re Beard, 4 Ark. 9, 4 Pike 9 (1842)("That this court has full power
to issue writs of habeas corpus, and to try and determine the same,
cannot be denied . . . .").
     We note, as well, that a habeas corpus statute allows members
of this Court to issue the writ "upon proper application" and
further provides that the power of this Court "to issue writs of
habeas corpus shall be coextensive with the state."  Ark. Code Ann.
 16-112-102(a)(1)(1987).  Although the nature of our jurisdiction
may "in form" be "original," it is "in fact appellate."  Ark. Sup.
Ct. R. 6-1(a).  See also Bryant v. Ruff, 303 Ark. 330, 798 S.W.2d 417 (1990); Estes v. Masner, 244 Ark. 797,