Case Title: Chief of Police v. Holden

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11682

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11682 
 
CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE CITY OF WORCESTER  vs.  RAYMOND J. 
HOLDEN, JR. 
 
 
Worcester.     November 6, 2014. - March 11, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Firearms.  License.  Constitutional Law, Right to bear arms, 
Vagueness of statute.  Due Process of Law, Revocation of 
license, Vagueness of statute.  Words, "Suitable person." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 6, 2011. 
 
 
The case was heard by James R. Lemire, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Mel L. Greenberg for the defendant. 
 
Kevin M. Gould, Assistant City Solicitor (David M. Moore, 
City Solicitor, with him) for the plaintiff. 
 
Julia Kobick, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Commonwealth, amicus curiae. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Jonathan E. Lowy, Kelly Sampson, Elizabeth Burke, Jonathan 
L. Diesenhaus, James W. Clayton, & Anna M. Kelly, of the 
District of Columbia, & Kathy B. Weinman for Brady Center to 
Prevent Gun Violence. 
2 
 
 
Ben T. Clements & Lila E. Slovak for Massachusetts Chiefs 
of Police Association, Inc., & others. 
 
Edward F. George, Jr., & Susan Chu for Gun Owners' Action 
League, Inc. 
 
Karen L. MacNutt for Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  This case mounts a challenge under the Second 
Amendment to the United States Constitution1 to the 
constitutionality of the "suitable person" standard in G. L. 
c. 140, § 131 (d) and (f), as amended through St. 1998, c. 180, 
§ 41, by which licenses to carry firearms were issued, 
suspended, or revoked between 2005 and 2010.2  The chief of 
police of the city of Worcester (chief) determined, based on the 
history of domestic violence of Raymond J. Holden, Jr., against 
his wife, that Holden was not a suitable person to have such a 
license.  Holden sought judicial review of three separate 
adverse decisions of the chief:  suspension of his license, then 
revocation of his license, and finally denial of his application 
for a new license to carry.  After a complex history of District 
Court litigation that was consolidated and resolved largely in 
favor of Holden, the chief sought certiorari review in the 
Superior Court.  On cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, 
                     
 
1 The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states:  "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 
 
 
2 The statute was further amended in 2014.  See notes 5, 6, 
8, and 10, infra. 
3 
 
a judge in the Superior Court ruled in favor of the chief.  
Holden appealed, and we granted his petition for direct 
appellate review.  On appeal, Holden argues that (1) the 
"suitable person" standard violates the Second Amendment, both 
facially and as applied; (2) the statutory scheme as to the 
suspension and revocation of licenses and the denial of license 
applications violates procedural due process because it is 
devoid of any provision for a hearing before the chief, and 
because it makes no provision for an aggrieved person to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses in the District Court; (3) 
the "suitable person" standard is unconstitutional as applied to 
him because it allows the chief to disqualify him permanently 
from licensure as an unsuitable person without current cause; 
and (4) the decisions of the chief were not supported by 
substantial evidence.  We reject Holden's claims, and we affirm 
the judgment of the Superior Court.3 
 
1.  Background.  On the evening of September 10, 2005, 
Holden's daughter telephoned the Shrewsbury police department 
911 dispatch to report that her father had just beaten her 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs of the Attorney General; 
Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence; and Massachusetts Chiefs 
of Police Association, Inc.; Stop Handgun Violence; Educational 
Fund to Stop Gun Violence; and Jewish Alliance for Law & Social 
Action, in support of the chief of police of the city of 
Worcester (chief), and the amicus briefs of Commonwealth Second 
Amendment, Inc., and Gun Owners Action League, Inc., in support 
of Raymond J. Holden, Jr. 
4 
 
mother and thrown her out of his vehicle in front of the 
daughter's house in Shrewsbury.  She reported that her mother 
was crying and that she was requesting police assistance.  
Police arrived at the daughter's home.  Holden's wife prepared 
and signed a written statement, witnessed by her daughter, in 
which she described what occurred.  She indicated that she and 
Holden were at a restaurant that evening.  After consuming a few 
cocktails they began to argue.  She did not want to create a 
scene, so she asked the bartender to arrange for a taxicab to 
take her home.  Eventually she left with Holden, who verbally 
assaulted her and said he was going to leave her at their 
daughter's home.  Upon arrival, Holden punched his wife in the 
face, walked around to the passenger's side door, and pulled her 
out of the vehicle.  He threw her to the pavement and then drove 
away.  She suffered a swollen lip, a scratch over her right eye, 
and scrapes and bruises on her left arm. 
 
On September 12, 2005, Holden was arraigned in the 
Westborough Division of the District Court Department 
(Westborough District Court) on a complaint alleging assault and 
battery on his wife.  On September 14, 2005, the chief, acting 
in his capacity as licensing authority for the city of 
Worcester, suspended Holden's license on the ground that he was 
not suitable to carry firearms.  His decision was based on 
Holden's arraignment on the assault and battery complaint.  The 
5 
 
complaint was dismissed two weeks later at the request of the 
complainant, Holden's wife. 
 
On December 6, 2005, Holden filed a complaint for judicial 
review of his suspension in the Worcester Division of the 
District Court Department (Worcester District Court), pursuant 
to G. L. c. 140, § 131 (f).  After an evidentiary hearing, the 
judge ordered the restoration of Holden's license because the 
sole ground for the suspension was the pending charge of assault 
and battery, which had been dismissed.  The judge ruled that the 
suspension was "arbitrary and capricious in that the withholding 
of the license [was] not predicated upon any factual 
determination by [the licensing authority]."  On January 30, 
2006, the chief reinstated the suspended license. 
 
However, on that same day, immediately after restoring 
Holden's suspended license, the chief revoked the license.  
Instead of relying on Holden's arraignment on the then-dismissed 
complaint for assault and battery, the chief's written decision 
set forth specific findings based on the police incident report 
of September 10, 2005, which contained details of the assault 
and battery as reported by Holden's wife.  The chief explained 
that the credible information in the incident report, and not 
the mere existence of a criminal charge, were the grounds on 
which he determined Holden to be unsuitable.  On March 1, 2006, 
Holden filed a complaint for judicial review in the Worcester 
6 
 
District Court.  A different judge found facts and ruled, 
without an evidentiary hearing, that the subsequent action by 
the chief was based on the same evidence that was presented in 
the earlier action.  He ordered the license reinstated.  The 
chief filed a complaint for certiorari in the Superior Court.  
On May 21, 2007, a judge of the Superior Court determined that 
the failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing was error, and he 
remanded the case to the District Court for an evidentiary 
hearing on the revocation.  Holden sought appellate review, but 
the appeal was dismissed by the Appeals Court on June 30, 2008, 
on the ground that the Superior Court's order of remand was 
interlocutory, from which there was no right of appeal. 
 
The case lay dormant for nearly two years.  On June 17, 
2010, Holden requested a hearing.4  On September 21, 2010, 
Holden's revoked license to carry firearms expired.  On 
October 18, 2010, Holden applied to the Worcester police 
department licensing division for a new license to carry 
firearms.  On November 18, 2010, the chief denied the 
application on the ground that Holden was not a suitable person 
to hold such a license.  The chief relied upon and cited details 
from the police incident report of September 10, 2005; the 
                     
 
4 Although Holden's motion regarding this request does not 
appear on the Worcester District Court docket, the docket states 
that a memorandum and order issued on that motion on August 10, 
2010. 
7 
 
statement signed by Holden's wife on September 10, 2005; and the 
911 dispatch call from Holden's daughter.  On January 6, 2011, 
Holden filed a complaint for judicial review of the denial of 
his application, pursuant to G. L. c. 140, § 131 (f), in 
Worcester District Court.  He also filed a motion to consolidate 
all three cases, which was allowed.  It is not clear why the 
first case was included, as it had been decided and no notice of 
appeal had been filed. 
 
A full evidentiary hearing was held before a third judge of 
the District Court on February 7 and 9, 2011.  On October 21, 
2011, the judge ruled that the chief had a reasonable ground to 
suspend and revoke Holden's license in 2005 and 2006, 
respectively, based upon the reported domestic assault and 
battery by Holden on his wife on September 10, 2005, 
notwithstanding dismissal of the criminal charges in the 
Westborough District Court on October 3, 2005.  The judge 
concluded that the chief had authority to rely on reported 
behavior of a licensee, even if there had not been any criminal 
charges.  However, the judge vacated the November 18, 2010, 
denial of Holden's application for a license to carry a firearm 
and directed that a license to carry be issued to Holden.  The 
judge determined that the chief did not have a reasonable ground 
for denying the 2010 application where there had been a 
significant passage of time with no intervening incidents.  He 
8 
 
further ruled that a 2006 directive of the chief to the effect 
that a revocation of license operated as a "permanent loss" 
constituted an abuse of discretion. 
 
On December 6, 2011, the chief filed a complaint for 
certiorari review in the Superior Court.  The parties filed 
cross motions for judgment on the pleadings.  After a hearing, a 
judge of the Superior Court granted the chief's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, and he denied Holden's motion.  The 
judge reasoned that "[t]he passage of time without interaction 
with the law . . . does not preclude a finding of unsuitability 
. . . [but is a] factor that [a licensing authority] is entitled 
to take into consideration. . . .  [I]t is not appropriate 
grounds for the District Court to overrule [the chief in this 
case]."  The judge also concluded that the District Court judge 
erred in relying on the 2006 directive where there was no 
evidence that the chief had relied on the directive or that a 
revoked license actually would result in a lifetime ban.  
Finally, the judge determined that the "core of the Second 
Amendment, the right of an individual to keep and bear arms in 
the home, was not implicated in [Holden's] case." 
 
2.  As-applied challenge.  Holden argues that the Second 
Amendment secures for him the right to carry a handgun for self-
defense outside the home, and that this right cannot be made 
subject to a determination by the chief that he is a suitable 
9 
 
person to carry a handgun.  He contends that the "suitable 
person" standard in G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) and (f), violates 
the Second Amendment, and that it violates constitutional 
principles of vagueness.  There are several parts to this 
challenge, which we address in turn. 
 
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the 
record is silent as to whether Holden had held a Class A license 
or a Class B license, and whether he applied for a Class A or a 
Class B license after his revoked license expired.  For purposes 
of this appeal the relevant difference between the two types of 
licenses is that a Class A license entitles a holder to possess 
and carry a concealed firearm for all lawful purposes, subject 
to such restrictions as the licensing authority deems proper.  
See G. L. c. 140, § 131 (a).5  A Class B license entitles a 
holder to "possess and carry . . . non-large capacity firearms 
. . . for all lawful purposes, subject to such restrictions 
. . . as the licensing authority deems proper; provided, 
however, that a Class B license shall not entitle the holder 
thereof to carry or possess a loaded firearm in a concealed 
                     
 
5 General Laws c. 140, § 131 (a), was amended by St. 2014, 
c. 284, § 47, effective January 1, 2021.  Under the amended 
statute there will be no Class A and Class B licenses, but a 
unitary license to carry. 
 
10 
 
manner in any public way or place."  G. L. c. 140, § 131 (b).6  
The analysis is somewhat different for each type of license.  We 
begin with the Class A license. 
 
a.  Class A license.  Holden's argument begins with a 
statement from District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(2008), made applicable to the States by McDonald v. Chicago, 
561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010), where the United States Supreme Court 
declared self-defense to be "the central component of the 
[Second Amendment] right itself" (emphasis in original).  
Heller, supra at 599.  The Court was addressing, and rejected, 
Justice Breyer's dissent where he described individual self-
defense as being merely a "subsidiary interest" to the Second 
Amendment's right to keep and bear arms.  Id. at 714 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting).  Holden acknowledges that the Supreme Court 
also said in Heller that the "need for defense of self, family, 
and property is most acute" in the home, id. at 628, but he 
maintains nevertheless that the right of self-defense is the 
core holding of Heller.  He reasons that nothing in Heller 
suggests that the right to bear arms for self-defense is limited 
to the home.  Relying on Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 
(7th Cir. 2013), Holden maintains that the right to keep and 
bear arms to defend oneself is at least as important outside the 
                     
 
6 General Laws c. 140, § 131 (b), was amended by St. 2014, 
c. 284, § 47, effective January 1, 2021.  See note 5, supra. 
11 
 
home as it is inside the home.  His argument culminates in the 
following statement:  "By noting that restrictions on carrying 
firearms 'in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings' . . . were 'presumptively lawful' under the Second 
Amendment . . . the Court at least suggested that restrictions 
on carrying firearms outside the home in less 'sensitive' places 
would violate the right to keep and bear arms," quoting Heller, 
supra at 626, 627 n.26. 
 
In Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, the Court held that the 
District of Columbia's total ban on handgun possession in the 
home violates the Second Amendment.  The Court did not say or 
imply, as Holden argues, that the right of self-defense is as 
great outside the home as it is inside the home.  Indeed, the 
Court expressed something to the contrary.  It said "the need 
for defense of self, family, and property is most acute" in the 
home.  Id. at 628.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit has observed that, with respect to this language 
from Heller, "[c]ourts have consistently recognized that Heller 
established that the possession of operative firearms for use in 
defense of the home constitutes the 'core' of the Second 
Amendment."  Hightower v. Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 
2012). 
 
Moreover, mindful of the problem of handgun violence 
throughout the country, the Supreme Court said that "[t]he 
12 
 
Constitution leaves the District of Columbia a variety of tools 
for combating that problem, including some measures regulating 
handguns, see supra at 624-627, and n.26."  Heller, 554 U.S. at 
636.  As to those measures, the Court observed that "[l]ike most 
rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not 
unlimited.  From Blackstone through the [Nineteenth Century] 
cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the 
right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in 
any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose."  Id. at 626.  
The Court identified a nonexhaustive list of prohibitions and 
restrictions on the Second Amendment right, including 
"prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons[,] . . . 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, . . . laws forbidding the carrying 
of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings, . . . [and] laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms."  Id. at 626-627. 
 
Conspicuously absent from Holden's argument is the Supreme 
Court's inclusion of "prohibitions on carrying concealed 
weapons" among the "tools" available to combat gun violence.  
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 636.  This particular prohibition 
applies to the possession of firearms outside the home.  
Significantly, the Court referred to this tool as a 
"prohibition" on carrying firearms, not merely a restriction.  
13 
 
Moreover, the Court emphasized that prohibitions on carrying 
concealed weapons and other prohibitions specifically mentioned 
(and others not specified) were "presumptively lawful."  Id. at 
626-627 & n.26.  See Hightower, 693 F.3d at 73. 
 
Because a prohibition against carrying concealed weapons is 
presumptively lawful, it follows that licensing the carrying of 
such weapons, a less restrictive measure, also must be 
presumptively lawful.  See id. at 74.  "Presumptively lawful" 
prohibitions and regulations do not burden conduct protected by 
the Second Amendment.  As such, they fall outside the scope of 
the Second Amendment and are not subject to heightened scrutiny.  
See Commonwealth v. McGowan, 464 Mass. 232, 239, 244 (2013).  
For these reasons, we conclude that the denial of a Class A 
license to carry a concealed firearm, or the revocation or 
suspension of a Class A license, falls outside the Second 
Amendment and is subject only to rational basis analysis, as a 
matter of substantive due process.  See id. 
 
i.  Rational basis.  Those who challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute that neither burdens a suspect 
group nor a fundamental constitutional right bear a heavy burden 
in overcoming the presumption of constitutionality in favor of a 
statute's validity.  See English v. New England Med. Ctr., Inc., 
405 Mass. 423, 427 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).  
Under the Federal Constitution, the rational basis test under 
14 
 
principles of due process is "'whether the statute bears a 
reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective' 
. . . and, under the . . . State Constitution [is] whether the 
statute 'bears real and substantial relation to public health, 
safety, morals, or some other phase of the general welfare'" 
(citations omitted).  Id. at 430.  Holden offers nothing to 
overcome the presumption of constitutionality with respect to 
the regulation of concealed weapons.  He relies exclusively on 
the application of strict scrutiny.  Nevertheless, we undertake 
the analysis. 
 
The purpose of G. L. c. 140, § 131, is to "limit access to 
deadly weapons by irresponsible persons."  Ruggerio v. Police 
Comm'r of Boston, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 256, 258 (1984).  "From a 
realization that prevention of harm is often preferable to 
meting out punishment after an unfortunate event, [§ 131] was 
enacted as a first-line measure in the regulatory scheme.  It 
has been said about § 131 that it was intended 'to have local 
licensing authorities employ every conceivable means of 
preventing deadly weapons in the form of firearms [from] coming 
into the hands of evildoers.'"  Id. at 258-259, quoting Rep. 
A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12, at 233-234 (1964).  Section 131, in 
addition to excluding certain classes of persons from licensure, 
requires that the licensing authority ascertain whether an 
applicant is a "suitable person" to carry firearms and has a 
15 
 
proper purpose for carrying a firearm, and that someone who has 
been issued such a license remains suitable.  G. L. c. 140, 
§ 131 (d), (f).  The Supreme Court acknowledged precisely the 
need for such determinations when it said of the Second 
Amendment, "whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it 
surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth 
and home" (emphasis added).  Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.  Although 
the statute has been amended,7 the "suitable person" standard 
still confers upon a licensing authority "'considerable 
latitude' or broad discretion in making a licensing decision."  
Chardin v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 465 Mass. 314, 316, cert. 
denied sub nom. Chardin v. Davis, 134 S. Ct. 525 (2013), quoting 
Ruggiero, supra at 259.  Specifically, it allows licensing 
authorities to keep firearms out of the hands of persons who are 
not categorically disqualified, e.g., convicted felons, but who 
nevertheless pose a palpable risk that they would not use a 
firearm responsibly if allowed to carry in public.  The statute, 
broadly speaking, bears a reasonable, as well as a real and 
substantial, relation to public health and safety.  As such, the 
"suitable person" standard passes muster under the United States 
and the Massachusetts Constitutions under rational basis 
analysis. 
                     
 
7 See note 8, infra. 
16 
 
 
Even if Holden had a Second Amendment interest in carrying 
a concealed weapon, the suspension and revocation of his 
license, and the denial of his application for a new license, 
would survive heightened scrutiny, which we discuss infra. 
 
ii.  Vagueness.  Holden also contends that the "suitable 
person" standard is inherently subjective and unconstitutionally 
vague.  "A law is void for vagueness if persons 'of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as 
to its application,'" Caswell v. Licensing Comm'n for Brockton, 
387 Mass. 864, 873 (1983), quoting Connally v. General Constr. 
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926), or if it "subjects people to an 
unascertainable standard."  Brookline v. Commissioner of the 
Dep't of Envtl. Quality Eng'g, 387 Mass. 372, 378 (1982), S.C., 
398 Mass. 404 (1986).  The degree of vagueness that is 
permissible under principles of due process varies with the 
interests involved.  See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman 
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-499 (1982); Brookline, supra.  
Flexibility in a statute is necessary to respond to individual 
cases.  See Custody of a Minor (No. 2), 378 Mass. 712, 719 
(1979) (to survive vagueness challenge Legislature need not 
"anticipate and codify every parental shortcoming or handicap 
that might place an exposed child in danger").  "Ambiguities 
. . . may be clarified by resort to the administrative process 
so as to cure a vagueness claim."  Brookline, supra. 
17 
 
 
The term "suitable person" is not defined in the statute as 
it existed prior to 2015.8  Nor is it defined by any regulation 
promulgated by the Executive Office of Public Safety and 
Security or its designee, despite the Appeals Court's 
suggestions that guidelines would be beneficial.  See MacNutt v. 
Police Comm'r of Boston, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 636 n.6 (1991); 
Ruggiero, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 261 n.7.  Other States have 
"suitable person" standards in their firearms licensing laws.  
See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-28(b); Hawaii Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 134-9(b)(2); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159:6(I); R.I. Gen. Laws 
§ 11-47-11(a).  Our decisions have served to help clarify the 
meaning of the term and limit the scope of discretion of a 
licensing authority. 
 
For example, in DeLuca v. Chief of Police of Newton, 415 
Mass. 155, 159-160 (1993), this court held that a finding of 
unsuitability properly could be made based on acts underlying 
convictions even after pardon.  The court reasoned that although 
a pardon removed the disqualifying feature of a conviction, 
because "character is a necessary qualification and the 
                     
 
8 General Laws c. 140, § 131 (d), was amended by St. 2014, 
c. 284, § 48, effective January 1, 2015, and now provides in 
relevant part:  "A determination of unsuitability shall be based 
on:  (i) reliable and credible information that the applicant or 
licensee has exhibited or engaged in behavior that suggests 
that, if issued a license, the applicant or licensee may create 
a risk to public safety; or (ii) existing factors that suggest 
that, if issued a license, the applicant or license may create a 
risk to public safety." 
18 
 
commission of a crime would disqualify even though there had 
been no criminal prosecution for the crime, the fact that the 
criminal has been convicted and pardoned does not make him any 
more eligible" (citations omitted).  Id.  In Howard v. Chief of 
Police of Wakefield, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 902 (2003), the 
Appeals Court upheld a finding of unsuitability based on an 
abuse prevention order that had expired.  Moreover, in Godfrey 
v. Chief of Police of Wellesley, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 43, 47-48 
(1993), the Appeals Court upheld a finding of unsuitability 
based on a licensee's refusal to cooperate with a police 
investigation in the face of what the police chief reasonably 
deemed to be a continuing and serious danger to public safety, 
particularly young children, where police had reason to believe 
that a gun used to fire bullets into a school, a private 
residence, and an automobile might have belonged to the 
licensee.  These cases provide adequate guidance to persons of 
common intelligence that conduct which is criminal and violent, 
regardless whether it has resulted in a criminal conviction, is 
grounds for denial, revocation, or suspension of a license to 
carry a firearm on the basis of unsuitability. 
 
Holden's license was revoked, and his application for 
renewal of his license was denied, based not on a generalized, 
subjective determination of unsuitability, but on specific and 
reliable information that he had assaulted and beaten his wife.  
19 
 
The information on which the chief relied was the type of 
information on which judges rely when revoking a criminal 
defendant's probation.  See Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 
108, 120-122 (1990).  The punishment for assault and battery 
includes imprisonment of up to two and one-half years.  See 
G. L. c. 265, § 13A.  Had Holden been convicted of this offense, 
he would have been disqualified from firearm licensure.  See 
G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (i), (f).  The fact that there was no 
conviction removes the incident as a license disqualifier, but 
it does not remove the chief's consideration of the incident on 
the question of Holden's suitability.  Whatever ambiguities may 
be imbedded in the term "suitable person," our jurisprudence 
puts people on notice that uncharged and untried criminal 
conduct amounting to an assault and battery is not among them.  
See Deluca, 415 Mass. at 159-160; Howard, 59 Mass. App. Ct. at 
902.  See also G. L. c. 140, § 121 (definition of "violent 
crime").  A person of common intelligence would understand that 
an assault and battery could render him or her unsuitable for 
purposes of § 131.  As applied to a Class A license holder in 
Holden's situation, his vagueness challenge fails. 
 
b.  Class B license.  Practical wisdom cautions that the 
law of possession of firearms outside of the home is a "vast 
terra incognita that courts should enter only upon necessity and 
only then by small degree."  Hightower, 693 F.3d at 74, quoting 
20 
 
United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011).  After acknowledging that 
the Constitution allows "some measure [for] regulating 
handguns,"9 in one of the few definitive statements in Heller, 
the Supreme Court said "certain policy choices [are] off the 
table.  These include the absolute prohibition of handguns held 
and used for self-defense in the home" (emphasis added).  
Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.  In the instant case we have neither an 
absolute prohibition of handguns in the home nor the regulation 
of handguns in the home.  We also are not faced with an absolute 
ban on carrying ready-to-use firearms in public.  See Moore, 702 
F.3d at 940.  Although the exact parameters of the Second 
Amendment are far from clear with respect to openly carrying 
firearms outside the home, and the law is similarly unsettled as 
to which standard of scrutiny applies, we may nevertheless 
engage in a meaningful analysis based on some assumptions. 
 
To begin, if we assume that Holden had a Class B license or 
that he had applied for a Class B license, and if we further 
assume that he had an interest protected by the Second 
Amendment, in that context that interest would not necessarily 
enjoy the same level of protection as keeping and bearing a 
handgun for self-defense in the home, which has been 
                     
 
9 The prefatory clause of the Second Amendment ("well 
regulated Militia") anticipates some regulation. 
21 
 
increasingly recognized as the "core" of the Second Amendment.  
See Hightower, 693 F.3d at 72.  We said recently that some 
measure of regulation is permissible even in the home "to 
prevent those who are not licensed to possess or carry firearms 
from gaining access to firearms."  McGowan, 464 Mass. at 244.  
In that case, we held that G. L. c. 140, § 131L (a), was 
"consistent with the right of self-defense in the home because 
it does not interfere with the ability of a licensed gun owner 
to carry or keep a loaded firearm under his immediate control 
for self-defense," but requires him to store the firearm in a 
locked container or apply a safety device that renders the 
weapon inoperable by someone who is not lawfully authorized when 
not being carried or kept under the direct personal control of 
the owner or a lawfully authorized user.  Id. at 243.  Where the 
Commonwealth has not totally banned the open carrying of 
firearms in public but has subjected such activity to licensing, 
the question becomes not whether any regulation is permissible 
under the Second Amendment but whether the particular regulation 
is permissible.  See Hightower, 693 F.3d at 73. 
 
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals that have considered the 
question of regulation of firearms in public have observed that 
historically such regulation has been more prevalent than 
regulation of firearms in the home, and that the right to carry 
in public implicates more peripheral Second Amendment concerns 
22 
 
than keeping and bearing arms in the home.  See, e.g., Drake v. 
Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub 
nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014); Kachalsky v. 
County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); 
Hightower, 693 F.3d at 72; Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470.  A 
majority of those courts has applied intermediate scrutiny to 
laws regulating firearms in public because the regulating 
authority did not totally prohibit carrying firearms in public 
and because the right to carry a firearm in public was not at 
the core of the Second Amendment.  See Drake, supra at 436; 
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013); Kachalsky, supra at 93-96.  
Compare Hightower, supra at 74 (plaintiff's "claim fails 
whatever standard of scrutiny is used").  Under intermediate 
scrutiny the question is whether the challenged statute is 
"substantially related to an important governmental objective."  
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).  See Brackett v. Civil 
Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 233, 246 (2006). 
 
The governmental objective here has been stated variously 
as the promotion of public safety by "limit[ing] access to 
deadly weapons by irresponsible persons," Ruggiero, 18 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 258; assuaging "the societal concern with weapons 
reaching the hands of unauthorized users," Jupin v. Kask, 447 
23 
 
Mass. 141, 154 (2006); and "prevent[ing] the temptation and the 
ability to use firearms to inflict harm, be it negligently or 
intentionally, on another or on oneself."  Commonwealth v. Lee, 
10 Mass. App. Ct. 518, 523 (1980).  General Laws c. 140, § 131, 
"was enacted as a first-line measure in the regulatory scheme," 
arising from the obvious and unassailable "realization that 
prevention of harm is often preferable to meting out punishment 
after an unfortunate event."  Ruggiero, supra at 258-259.  The 
Supreme Court has recognized that the government interest in 
public safety is both "compelling," United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), and "significant."  Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997).  The 
Commonwealth's interest in firearms control regulation is of the 
"utmost importance, as the statute governing who may lawfully 
carry a firearm directly affects the physical safety of the 
citizenry."  Dupont v. Chief of Police of Pepperell, 57 Mass. 
App. Ct. 690, 693 (2003). 
 
The suitable person standard in G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) and 
(f), is substantially related to these important governmental 
interests.  As the Attorney General explained in 1926, this 
standard ensures that "the traffic of firearms shall be exposed 
to the scrutiny of the proper authorities and that criminals and 
irresponsible persons shall be unable to obtain firearms 
easily."  Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12, at 160 (1926).  That 
24 
 
purpose remained essentially unchanged nearly forty years later, 
when the Attorney General stated:  "the intent of the General 
Court is to have local licensing authorities employ every 
conceivable means of preventing deadly weapons in the form of 
firearms coming into the hands of evildoers."  Rep. A.G., Pub. 
Doc. No. 12, at 233-234 (1964).  That purpose remains firm 
today.  As one Federal District Court judge observed about the 
Connecticut counterpart to the suitable person standard in G. L. 
c. 140, § 131 (d) and (f):  "it is impossible for the 
[L]egislature to conceive in advance each and every circumstance 
in which a person could pose an unacceptable danger to the 
public if entrusted with a firearm."  Kuck v. Danaher, 822 F. 
Supp. 2d 109, 129 (D. Conn. 2011).  That standard, with 
"circumscribed discretion," was deemed to be constitutional.  
Id. 
 
As discussed above with respect to the discussion of the 
Class A license, there is nothing vague about the application of 
the suitable person standard to Holden's circumstances.  There 
has been no showing that the chief's decision was arbitrary or 
capricious.  And there has been no showing of heavy-handedness 
on the part of the chief.  To the contrary, the District Court 
judge found after an evidentiary hearing that in approximately 
six years since 2006, the chief granted approximately 3,200 
25 
 
applications for licenses to carry and denied or suspended 
approximately 200 such applications and licenses. 
 
As previously discussed, Holden's conduct in punching his 
wife in the face, dragging her out of his vehicle, and throwing 
her to the ground constitutes criminal conduct that would have 
disqualified him from licensure had he been convicted.  The 
absence of a conviction does not prevent such conduct from 
consideration by the chief on the question of Holden's 
suitability.  Holden's acts of domestic violence provide 
precisely the kind and quality of evidence that rationally 
support a finding of unsuitability.  The suitability standard 
works in tandem with the disqualifying provisions of the statute 
to reasonably prevent lethal firearms from falling into the 
hands of persons likely to misuse them.  This standard is 
substantially related to the Commonwealth's important interests 
in promoting public safety and preventing violence.  For these 
reasons Holden's as-applied challenge fails. 
 
3.  Facial challenge.  Holden's facial challenge, on Second 
Amendment grounds, focuses on the discretion conferred by the 
"suitability" requirement.  He contends that G. L. c. 140, § 131 
(d) and (f), is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it 
confers excessive discretion in determinations of suitability.  
Holden maintains that the statute permits determinations of 
unsuitability that are inherently subjective.  For his facial 
26 
 
attack to succeed Holden "would have to establish 'that no set 
of circumstances exists under which [the suitability standard] 
would be valid,' United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, or 
that the statute lacks any 'plainly legitimate sweep,' 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 740 n.7 (1997)."  United 
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010).  Although which of 
these standards controls is a question that is unresolved, see 
id., Holden's challenge fails under both. 
 
A "plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly 
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as 
applied to the conduct of others."  United States v. Williams, 
553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).  "[E]ven when the outer boundaries of 
a law are imprecise, such imprecision does not permit a facial 
attack on the entire law by one whose conduct 'falls squarely 
within the "hard core" of the [law's] proscriptions.'"  
Commonwealth v. Orlando, 371 Mass. 732, 734 (1977), quoting 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973).  As discussed 
supra, people of common intelligence are on notice that 
uncharged and untried criminal conduct amounting to an assault 
and battery may render someone unsuitable for purposes of G. L. 
c. 131, § 131 (d) and (f).  Holden's domestic abuse of his wife 
falls squarely within the hard core of the suitability standard, 
and it renders him unsuitable to carry firearms in public.  
Because Holden's as-applied vagueness challenge fails, his 
27 
 
facial vagueness challenge necessarily fails both standards 
identified in Stevens.  See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497.  
See also Hightower, 693 F.3d at 76-80. 
 
Holden also makes a facial challenge based on the 
overbreadth doctrine.  Under this doctrine a law may be 
invalidated under the First Amendment "as overbroad if 'a 
substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, 
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.'"  
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473, quoting Washington State Grange v. 
Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008).  
We need not dwell on this point because "every court to have 
expressly considered the issue" has rejected the applicability 
of the overbreadth doctrine in the context of the Second 
Amendment (citations omitted).  Hightower, 693 F.3d at 81-83 
(citations omitted).  The reason for this is that the Supreme 
Court has recognized facial attacks alleging overbreadth in 
limited circumstances that do not include the Second Amendment 
context.  See id. at 82.  Holden's facial attack fails. 
 
4.  Due process.  Holden raises a number of procedural due 
process claims that we now address.  First, he claims that G. L. 
c. 140, § 131 (f), is flawed because it does not provide for a 
prerevocation or presuspension hearing before the licensing 
authority.  Generally, such a hearing is required, but not 
always.  The Supreme Court has recognized that "on many 
28 
 
occasions . . . where a State must act quickly, or where it 
would be impractical to provide predeprivation process, 
postdeprivation process satisfies the requirement of the Due 
Process Clause."  Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997).  
"Protection of the health and safety of the public is a 
paramount governmental interest which justifies administrative 
action.  Indeed, deprivation of property to protect the public 
health and safety is '[one] of the oldest examples' of 
permissible summary action."  Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 300 (1981), quoting Ewing v. 
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950).  The 
Court has "traditionally accorded the [S]tates great leeway in 
adopting summary procedures to protect public health and 
safety."  Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979).  In such 
circumstances, full predeprivation process is not required, 
provided "prompt postdeprivation review is available for 
correction of administrative error."  Id. at 13.  We conclude 
that revocation of a license to carry without a predeprivation 
hearing is justified by concerns of public health and safety.  
See Kuck v. Danaher, 600 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010); Rabbitt 
v. Leonard, 36 Conn. Supp. 108, 111, 115-116 (1979). 
 
General Laws c. 140, § 131 (f), provides that an "applicant 
or holder aggrieved by a denial, revocation or suspension of a 
license . . . may, within . . . 90 days after receiving notice 
29 
 
of such denial, revocation or suspension . . . , file a petition 
to obtain judicial review in the district court having 
jurisdiction. . . .  A justice of such court, after a hearing, 
may direct that a license be issued or reinstated to the 
petitioner if such justice finds that there was no reasonable 
ground for denying, suspending or revoking such license and that 
the petitioner is not prohibited by law from possessing same."  
The Appeals Court has interpreted the statute to require an 
evidentiary hearing.  See Godfrey, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 44-45; 
Chief of Police of Shelburne v. Moyer, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 543, 
547 (1983).  Section 131 (f) affords prompt, comprehensive 
postdeprivation review.  Contrary to Holden's assertion, 
unsupported by any authority, a District Court judge is not 
limited to review of an administrative record established by the 
summary action of the licensing authority.  In this respect, 
review under § 131 (f) is broader than review under G. L. 
c. 30A, § 14.  An aggrieved person may present relevant evidence 
tending to show that he or she is a proper person to hold a 
license to carry a firearm, or that the action of the licensing 
authority was arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion.  Moyer, supra at 546.  Indeed, the evidentiary 
hearing in this case was extensive, and new evidence was 
offered. 
30 
 
 
Holden contends that the burden of proof in cases under 
G. L. c. 140, § 131 (f), shifted from the applicant or the 
license holder to the licensing authority as a result of the 
Supreme Court's decision in McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791, which 
made Heller applicable to the States.  His reliance on Highland 
Tap of Boston, Inc. v. Boston, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 239, 244 
(1988), is misplaced.  That was a case involving the First 
Amendment, and we see no reason to extend the holding in the 
Highland Tap decision beyond the facts of that case.  
Significantly, the Supreme Court has said that "[o]utside the 
criminal law area, where special concerns attend, the locus of 
the burden of persuasion is normally not an issue of [F]ederal 
constitutional moment."  Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 
U.S. 49, 58 (2005), quoting Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 
(1976).  As the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit said on precisely this issue, "[t]he Massachusetts 
legislature could have reasonably concluded that, on review in 
the district court, the burden should be placed on the aggrieved 
individual, who would be in the best position to present 
relevant evidence as to the suitability requirement."  
Hightower, 693 F.3d at 87.  For example, Holden could have shown 
(but did not here) that he benefited from any number of 
therapies, such as marital counselling, anger management, or 
psychiatric or psychological counselling, in which he 
31 
 
successfully addressed whatever issues gave rise to the domestic 
abuse that resulted in the finding of his unsuitability.  See, 
e.g., G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (ii), (iii) (allowing persons 
confined for mental illness or treated for substance abuse to 
present affidavit of physician indicating person is no longer 
disabled, or is cured).10 
 
Holden next argues that the chief's reliance on hearsay 
evidence, both in his summary actions and in his testimony at 
the evidentiary hearing, violates due process.  In particular, 
Holden contends he was deprived of the right to be heard "at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."  Armstrong v. 
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).  The hearsay evidence on which 
the chief relied was reliable and relevant, and it was the kind 
and quality of evidence on which judges often rely in probation 
revocation hearings.  See Durling, 407 Mass. at 120-122.  The 
chief testified, and he was subjected to lengthy cross-
examination.  The police officer who responded to the domestic 
abuse call testified to what he observed about the condition of 
Holden's wife, as well as the information he received from 
                     
 
10 General Laws c. 140, § 131 (d) (ii) and (iii), was 
amended by St. 2014, c. 284, § 48, effective January 1, 2015.  
Section (d) (iii) now provides in part that a person committed 
for mental illness or alcohol or substance abuse may, after five 
years from the date of confinement, submit the affidavit of a 
licensed physician or clinical psychologist stating that the 
person is not disabled in a manner that shall prevent the 
applicant from possessing a firearm, rifle, or shotgun.  
Reference to the statute should be had for further details. 
32 
 
Holden's wife and daughter.  He, too, was cross-examined.  "The 
full panoply of procedures usually available at a trial is not 
required in the review by a District Court in a case of this 
nature.  The hearsay rule should not be applied to evidence 
proffered by a chief of police in support of the reasonableness 
of his denial.  The test should be one of relevance."  Moyer, 16 
Mass. App. Ct. at 547.  We discern nothing in the proceedings 
before the District Court to suggest that Holden did not receive 
a hearing conformably within the requirements of due process. 
 
Holden's final claim is a reassertion of the argument that 
the suitability standard permits unbridled discretion.  For 
reasons previously stated, we reject this claim. 
 
5.  Current cause.  Holden argues that, as a matter of 
substantive due process, the chief must show that he is 
currently unsuitable, and that the chief's 2006 policy 
impermissibly transforms the domestic abuse incident in question 
into a permanent disqualification.  Compare Commonwealth v. 
Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 503 (2000) (commitment of person as 
sexually dangerous person turns on his "current mental 
condition"); Acting Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 
Mass. 101, 105 (2000) ("aspect of immediacy of harm [in context 
of civil commitment proceeding] arises from the imminency of 
discharge as well as from the mental illness"); Hill, 
petitioner, 422 Mass. 147, 154, cert. denied sub nom. Hill v. 
33 
 
Massachusetts, 519 U.S. 867 (1996) (continued commitment of 
person as sexually dangerous requires proof that he is "still 
sexually dangerous"). 
 
Although the chief denied Holden's application five years 
after the domestic abuse incident, the basis for denial on the 
ground of unsuitability was Holden's "violent proclivities, 
anger management issues and poor decision-making."  Based on the 
chief's twenty-seven-year career as a police officer as of the 
time he denied Holden's application in 2010, and based on 
published estimates that suggest the recidivism rate among 
domestic abusers ranges from forty per cent to eighty per cent, 
"implying that there are substantial benefits in keeping the 
most deadly weapons out of the hands" of abusers, a period of 
five years following an incident of domestic abuse without 
professional intervention is hardly stale evidence.  United 
States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011).  See United States v. Booker, 
644 F.3d 12, 26 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 
(2012) ("Statistics bear out the Supreme Court's observation 
that '[f]irearms and domestic strife are a potentially deadly 
combination nationwide,'" quoting United States v. Hayes, 555 
U.S. 415, 427 [2009]).  We cannot say that the passage of five 
years from Holden's domestic abuse of his wife, without 
incident, automatically precluded the chief from relying on the 
34 
 
incident of September 10, 2005, when he denied Holden's 
application on November 18, 2010.  Had Holden been convicted of 
assault and battery, that conviction would have disqualified him 
from licensure permanently.  See G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (i).  
We are not prepared to determine, on this record, what period of 
time must pass before the chief may no longer consider that 
event.  We note that it is within Holden's grasp to seek 
appropriate professional evaluation, and, if necessary, 
treatment, and provide the appropriate documentation to the 
chief to alleviate his legitimate concerns about Holden's 
unsuitability. 
 
We offer no opinion about the validity of the chief's 2006 
policy,11 but the issue concerning the application of that policy 
was correctly disposed of by the Superior Court judge when he 
concluded that there was no evidence that the chief relied on it 
in his denial of Holden's application.  We are satisfied that 
the chief's determination of Holden's unsuitability was based on 
current evidence. 
 
6.  Substantial evidence.  We are also satisfied that the 
decisions of the chief were based on substantial evidence.  The 
judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
11 Although not part of the record in this case, the chief 
states in his brief that the 2006 policy is no longer in effect.