Case Title: FOXLEY & CO., a Delaware Corporation V. JOHN R. ELLIS and PATRICIA A. ELLIS

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0256

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
FOXLEY & CO., a Delaware Corporation V. JOHN R. ELLIS and PATRICIA A. ELLIS2009 WY 16201 P.3d 425Case Number: S-07-0256Decided: 02/11/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
FOXLEY 
& CO., a Delaware 
Corporation,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.JOHN R. ELLIS and 
PATRICIA A. ELLIS,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Stephen 
H. Kline of Kline Law Office, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Paul 
J. Hickey, Roger C. Fransen, and O'Kelley H. Pearson of Hickey & Evans, LLP, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Foxley & Co. 
(hereinafter referred to as "Foxley") is a corporation involved in cattle 
ranching operations.  John R. and 
Patricia A. Ellis are husband and wife.  
They were the owners of a ranch near Medicine Bow, Wyoming, commonly 
known as the Difficulty Creek Ranch, which they sold to Foxley.  Foxley claims the Ellises never informed 
it of a common use agreement with a neighboring ranch that applied to grazing on 
a portion of the Difficulty Creek Ranch.  
Foxley sued the Ellises for, among other things, breach of contract and 
breach of warranty deed.  The 
district court granted summary judgment to the Ellises on both counts.  Finding that genuine issues of material 
fact exist, we reverse.

 
 
[¶2]      On a further 
issue, Foxley attempted to amend its complaint for a second time six months 
after it filed its initial complaint.  
In the interim, extensive discovery had been conducted.  The district court determined that 
allowing the amendment would unduly prejudice the Ellises and denied the motion 
to amend.  Finding no abuse of 
discretion under the circumstances, we affirm this ruling.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Foxley presents 
three issues for our consideration:

 
 
1.         
Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Appellees on 
Appellant's breach of contract claim and in denying Appellant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the same issue?

 
 
2.         
Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Appellees on 
Appellant's breach of warranty claim and in denying Appellant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the same issue?

 
 
3.         
Did the District Court err in denying Appellant's Motion to File a Second 
Amended Complaint?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      The Difficulty 
Creek Ranch has been in the Ellis family since 1899.  It is comprised almost equally of deeded 
and leased lands, for a total of around 24,600 acres.  The majority of the leased lands are 
owned by the federal government and administered by the Department of the 
Interior through the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).  The BLM lands integrate with the private 
lands in a checkerboard pattern.1 

 
 
[¶5]      One such 
checkerboard area is known as the "West Pasture," comprising just under 4,500 
acres.  It contains two full private 
sections plus a private lease section.  
It also contains three full federal sections plus parts of two other 
federal sections.  

 
 
[¶6]      In 1941, West 
Pasture lands became subject to a Memorandum of Understanding (the "Agreement") 
entered into by John Ellis's father and neighboring ranchers.  Otherwise known as a range line 
agreement, the Agreement allotted grazing priorities amongst the neighbors on 
lands controlled by each neighbor.  
The sole remaining successor in interest to this Agreement is the 9V 
Ranch, which, pursuant to the Agreement, enjoys grazing rights in the West 
Pasture in common with Foxley.

 
 
[¶7]      Exactly which 
West Pasture lands are covered by the Agreement  federal and/or private lands  
is disputed.  At the very least the 
currently accepted application of the Agreement is to allot 9V common use rights 
to graze on the federal sections of land in the West Pasture.  For the 2002 grazing season, the BLM 
allotted 9V 314 AUMs2 for federal land in the West 
Pasture. The West Pasture, however, has historically been operated as a single 
integrated unit.  There is no 
internal fencing.  As a practical 
matter, therefore, 9V cattle are free to range all lands within the West 
Pasture.

 
 
[¶8]      In 2004, the 
Ellises entered into extensive negotiations with Foxley for the sale of 
Difficulty Creek Ranch.  Ultimately, 
in October 2004, Foxley purchased the Difficulty Creek Ranch.  It is undisputed that Foxley was never 
expressly informed of 9V's common use rights to lands in the West Pasture before 
the purchase of the Difficulty Creek Ranch.  

 
 
[¶9]      Foxley did not 
discover the common use rights until the spring of 2005. After discovering the 
common use, Foxley brought suit against the Ellises and their brokers, alleging 
many different causes of action.  
All causes of action were either dismissed or summarily adjudicated.  The causes of action at issue in this 
appeal are breach of contract and breach of warranty deed against the 
Ellises.  Further facts will be 
developed in the discussion below as necessary.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   We review de novo a grant of 
summary judgment.  Summary judgment 
is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A genuine issue of material fact is a 
disputed fact that, if proven, would establish or refute an essential element of 
a cause of action or a defense that the parties have asserted.  Jacobs Ranch Coal Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal 
Co., LLC, 2008 WY 101, ¶ 8, 191 P.3d 125, 128-29 (Wyo. 2008); Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002).   We review the facts in the record 
in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, affording to that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the 
record.  Any doubt regarding the 
existence of an issue of material fact must be resolved against the party 
seeking summary judgment.  Wyoming Bd. of Land Comm'rs v. Antelope Coal 
Co., 2008 WY 60, ¶ 7, 185 P.3d 666, 668 (Wyo. 2008); Linton v. E.C. Cates Agency, Inc., 2005 
WY 63, ¶ 7, 113 P.3d 26, 28 (Wyo. 2005).   

 
 
 
 
Application 
of the Agreement to Private Lands

 
 
[¶11]   The district court found the 
Agreement created common use rights to the BLM lands only, leaving the private 
lands unencumbered.  The district 
court reasoned that, since the actual sale was for private lands only and the 
private lands were unencumbered, there could be no breach of contract or breach 
of warranty deed.  The Ellises, of 
course, strongly rely upon this reasoning on appeal.  As a result, we find it expedient to 
analyze the area of geographical coverage of the Agreement as a preliminary 
matter.  

 
 
[¶12]   Contrary to the finding of the 
district court, we find the Agreement ambiguous as to its coverage in the West 
Pasture.  This Court construes 
contractual language as a matter of law.  
Its goal is to determine the intent and understanding of the 
parties.  It begins the inquiry by 
determining whether the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous.  Reed v. Miles Land and Livestock Co., 
2001 WY 16, ¶ 10, 18 P.3d 1161, 1163 (Wyo. 2001).  If the language is clear and 
unambiguous, the parties' intent is to be secured from the four corners of the 
contract.  Id.; Cliff & Co., Ltd. v. Anderson, 
777 P.2d 595, 598 (Wyo. 1989).  

 
 
[¶13]   The language of a contract is to be 
construed within the context in which it was written, and this Court may look to 
the surrounding circumstances, the subject matter, and the purpose of the 
contract to ascertain the intent of the parties at the time the agreement was 
made.  Carlson v. Flocchini Invs., 2005 WY 19, 
¶ 15, 106 P.3d 847, 854 (Wyo. 2005); Polo 
Ranch Company v. City of Cheyenne, 969 P.2d 132, 136 (Wyo. 1998).  The language is also to be considered as 
a whole, taking into consideration the relationship between the various 
parts.  Collins v. Finnell, 2001 WY 74, ¶ 15, 29 P.3d 93, 99 (Wyo. 2001).  This Court 
attempts to avoid a construction which renders a provision meaningless by 
striving to reconcile any provisions which apparently conflict before adopting a 
construction which would nullify any provision.  Stone v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., 
2008 WY 49, ¶ 18, 181 P.3d 936, 942 (Wyo. 2008). 

 
 
[¶14]   As applied to the Agreement, 
reading the Agreement as a whole, we find it does affect private lands.  On the one hand, the original parties to 
the Agreement were neighboring ranchers who were "the users of the federal range 
in T. 24 N., R. 79 and 80 and T. 23 N., R. 79 and 80."  However, the priorities are set within 
what the parties termed "blocks" of land such as the "Ellis Block" and the 
"Chace Block."  These Blocks are 
undefined in the Agreement.  

 
 
[¶15]   The language of the Agreement 
indicates the blocks included both federal lands and private lands.  For instance, the Agreement provides 
"the users will determine at this meeting the priority of these [sic] using the 
federal range in this area together with a rating of the federal range and their 
privately owned property" and later "the users set the rating on the federal 
range as six acres per cow per month and on the unfenced private owned land at 5 
acres per cow per month."  In 
allocating grazing priorities within each block, the Agreement divides the stock 
among "the area being worked."  The 
fact that the "area being worked" is more than just the federal lands is 
demonstrated by the individual allocations.  For each block, the parties listed stock 
that would be allowed on federal range lands and stock that would be allowed 
"elsewhere."  

 
 
[¶16]   These references reflect a direct 
impact of the Agreement on private lands.  
How the Agreement impacts the lands within the West Pasture, however, is 
unclear.  9V's predecessor in 
interest was Gust Nelson.  In the 
Agreement, Nelson was given priority for 111 stock in the Ellis Block  52 on 
federal range and 59 "elsewhere."  
This certainly suggests Nelson's allotment included Ellis private 
lands.  Ambiguity exists, however, 
because of the lack of a more precise definition of the Ellis Block and 
"elsewhere."  This ambiguity 
prevents the Agreement from being used as unambiguous support for the Ellises' 
argument that private lands are unaffected.3  Because we are reviewing the grant of 
summary judgment and Foxley therefore is entitled to receive the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences, we will proceed with our discussion operating under the 
assumption that common use rights exist on private lands as well as federal 
lease lands in the West Pasture.

 
 
Breach 
of Sales Contract

 
 
[¶17]   The sales contract in this case 
consists of multiple documents.  
First is the initial offer to purchase by Foxley.  This document contains most of the 
standard provisions for the sale.  
The Ellises counteroffered, with the only change being the price.  Attached to this counteroffer were 
multiple exhibits including the BLM lease and grazing allotments.  Foxley replied with another counteroffer 
to purchase at a slightly higher price than initially offered, although below 
the Ellises' requested price.  
Again, no basic provisions other than the purchase price were 
altered.  The Ellises accepted this 
counteroffer.   Finally, there 
is an addendum, offered by Foxley and accepted by the Ellises, giving Foxley 
time to conduct a due diligence investigation into the property, specifically 
including leased lands and ranching operations.  All documents are expressly incorporated 
to collectively form the sales contract.  

 
 
[¶18]   Foxley points to several different 
provisions in the sales contract that it alleges were breached by the existence 
of common use in the West Pasture.  
For instance, Foxley alleges the common use agreement violates a 
contractual provision stating: "Title shall be merchantable in Seller. . . 
.  Title shall be subject to . . . 
easements, restrictive covenants, and reservations of record and the following 
additional encumbrances which shall NOT be released or discharged at closing: 
 none."  

 
 
[¶19]   There is some discussion on appeal 
as to whether grazing rights amount to an encumbrance on the private lands.   Grazing rights constitute a profit 
a prendre, otherwise known simply as a profit.  Denver Joint Stock Land Bank of Denver v. 
Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, 538, 122 P.2d 842, 847 (1942) (profits include the right 
"to feed beasts"). Profits fit within the general legal category of servitudes: 

 
 
A 
"servitude" is a general category that includes a variety of non-possessory 
interests in land, including easements and profits.  Id. [Restatement (Third) of Prop.: 
Servitudes] § 1.1(2) [(2000 & Cum.Supp. 2006)].  "An easement is defined as an interest 
in land which entitles the easement holder to a limited use or enjoyment over 
another person's property.'"  Hasvold v. Park County Sch. Dist. No. 6, 
2002 WY 65, ¶ 13, 45 P.3d 635, 638 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 504 
(Wyo. 1994)).  Profits have been 
referred to as "easements plus.'"  
Restatement (Third) of Prop.:  
Servitudes § 1.2 cmt. e. The Restatement explains that "[p]rofits are 
easements (rights to enter and use land in the possession of another) plus the 
right to remove something from the land." Id. Similarly, 28A C.J.S. Easements § 9 (1996) notes that "[t]he 
[profit] right is in the nature of an easement, and it is often called an 
easement; but it is more than an easement.  
It is an interest or an estate in the land itself as distinguished from a 
mere personal obligation of the owner of realty."  Cf. 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 3 (2004) ("[A] 
profit a prendre is a liberty in one person to enter another's soil and take 
from it the fruits not yet carried away.  
A profit a prendre is therefore distinguishable from an easement, since 
one of the features of an easement is the absence of all right to participate in 
the profits of the soil charged with it.")   In agreement with these general 
rules, we have said that a "profit a prendre is . . . a right to take a certain 
thing or things from the land of another.  
If, accordingly, the right to take does not exist, the right cannot, at 
least strictly, be called a profit a prendre."  Denver Joint Stock Land Bank of Denver v. 
Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, [538,] 122 P.2d 842, 847 (1942).  

 
 

Seven 
Lakes Development Co., L.L.C. v. Maxson, 
2006 WY 136, ¶ 12, 144 P.3d 1239, 1245-46 (Wyo. 2006).  

 
 
[¶20]   From the above, it is clear that a 
profit is an encumbrance, which is defined simply as "any property right that is 
not an ownership interest."  Black's 
Law Dictionary 568  (8th ed. 2004).4  This leads us back to the original 
question of whether the Agreement affects private lands.  We have already determined the answer to 
this question is dependent upon unanswered questions of material fact.  Summary judgment on this ground is thus 
inappropriate under these circumstances.

 
 
[¶21]   The Ellises present three more 
defenses to the breach of contract claim.  
First, they argue, as a matter of law, the contractual language shifted 
the risk of nondisclosure of the common use rights to Foxley.  They are partially correct.  For instance, Foxley consistently 
references all the opportunities the Ellises had to disclose the common use 
during the negotiations for the sale of the ranch.  The contract, however, provides that 
Foxley, in making its decision to enter into the sales contract, was not relying 
on any representations by the Ellises "as to any condition which Buyer deems to 
be material."  The risk of 
nondisclosure before the entry of the sales contract is placed accordingly on 
Foxley.  See generally Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079 
(Wyo. 1999).

 
 
[¶22]   As for any potential failure to 
disclose the common use in the contract itself, the Ellises argue Foxley 
voluntarily accepted the attendant risks by proposing and entering into the 
Addendum to the Contract.  The 
Addendum gave Foxley time to conduct a due diligence investigation into "the 
leased land" and "ranch operations."  
In continuation, the Addendum provides that if Foxley did not inform the 
Ellises of any problems by the end of the due diligence investigation period, 
"then the condition and characteristics of the Property shall be deemed 
satisfactory to the Buyer." 

 
 
[¶23]   We agree that, as written, the 
Addendum shifts the risk of loss from lack of disclosure of the common use 
rights to Foxley, but it is not a blanket risk.  By the terms of the Agreement, it is 
limited to facts that reasonably could be discovered in a "due diligence" 
investigation.  How extensively 
Foxley should have searched, and what information could have been discovered as 
a result of such search, are issues of material fact that have yet to be 
resolved.  

 
 
[¶24]   Second, the Ellises claim they did 
disclose the common use rights.  It 
is unrefuted Mr. Ellis instructed his real estate broker to inform Foxley's real 
estate broker of the common use rights.  
Foxley's real estate broker, however, testified at deposition that he was 
never informed of such rights, creating an issue of material 
fact.

 
 
[¶25]   Additionally, the Ellises claim 
they expressly informed Foxley of the common use rights in the exhibits attached 
to their counter-offer.   The 
exhibits included a BLM grazing allotment of 314 AUMs in the West Pasture for 
2002.  Handwritten on top of the 
page is "9V."  Foxley saw this 
document, but since it expired in 2002, it discerned no significance in it.  The Ellises argue the document disclosed 
common use by 9V irrelevant of the date.  
We find, given the circumstances of this case, whether this document 
constitutes a definitive disclosure of common use in the West Pasture by 9V is 
an issue of material fact. 

 
 
[¶26]   Third, the Ellises argue the 2002 
grazing allotment at least should be accepted as having put Foxley on notice of 
the possibility of common use rights.  
They point again to Foxley's opportunity to conduct a due diligence 
investigation.  The Ellises argue 
Foxley should be charged with the responsibility for following up on the 
document, thus relieving them of any further duty to disclose.  This argument is of no avail against the 
grant of summary judgment.  As 
already noted, how extensive Foxley's due diligence investigation should have 
been under these circumstances is a question of material fact.  The existence of the 2002 grazing 
allotment is simply one fact to be considered.  We do not find it to be dispositive as a 
matter of law.

 
 
Breach 
of Warranty Deed

 
 
[¶27]   A warranty deed is a contract.  Thus:

 
 
[w]e 
interpret a warranty deed like a contract "from specific language of the deed," 
and "begin by looking at the instrument itself."  We must first examine the terms of the 
deed and give them their plain and ordinary meaning. Plain meaning is that 
"meaning which [the] language would convey to reasonable persons at the time and 
place of its use."  When the 
provisions in the contract are clear and unambiguous, the court looks only to 
the "four corners" of the document in arriving at the intent of the parties. 
Determining the parties' intent is our prime focus in interpreting or construing 
a contract. 

 
 

Gilstrap 
v. June Eisele Warren Trust, 
2005 WY 21, ¶ 12 106 P.3d 858, 862 (Wyo. 2005) (internal citations 
omitted).  See also Boley v. Greenough, 2001 WY 47, 
¶ 11, 22 P.3d 854, 858 (Wyo. 2001).  

 
 
[¶28]   When a person conveys property by 
warranty deed, generally the property is conveyed free of all encumbrances.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-103(b) 
(LexisNexis 2007).  Consequently, 
any encumbrances on the seller's title needs to be specifically listed and 
excluded from the warranty.  
Otherwise, the seller will be in breach of the warranty.  

 
 
[¶29]   In this case, the Ellises conveyed 
their property "subject only to . . . easements, restrictive covenants, and 
reservations of record."  The common 
use rights are not expressly excepted.  
Questions of material fact exist as to whether the common grazing rights 
are of record.  Questions of 
material fact also exist as to the extent the Agreement encumbers Foxley's 
private land.  The breach of 
warranty claim cannot be decided without first answering these questions of 
material fact.

 
 
[¶30]   The Ellises, relying on Gilstrap v. June Eisele Warren Trust, 
2005 WY 21, 106 P.3d 858 (Wyo. 2005), argue a breach of warranty can only occur 
when the buyer suffers an actual or constructive eviction.  This would be true if Foxley was 
claiming a breach of the warranty of quiet and peaceful possession.  The issue in Gilstrap involved the consequences of an 
attempt to grant more property than one owns.  As the opinion unfolded, the breach of 
warranty issue under the circumstances in Gilstrap would have been for a breach of 
quiet and peaceful possession.  It 
was in this context that this Court noted, to prove breach of warranty, it would 
be necessary to show actual or constructive eviction.  Id. at ¶ 27, 106 P.3d  at 866. 

 
 
[¶31]   Foxley, on the other hand, is 
alleging a breach of the warranty against encumbrances.

 
 
            
A covenant of title which warrants that the premises are free from 
encumbrances is an agreement to indemnify the covenantee in the event that he or 
she suffers any loss to the value of the premises due to the existence of an 
encumbrance.  An "encumbrance" is 
any right or interest existing in a third person which diminishes the value of 
the estate to the grantee, but which is consistent with the passage of the 
estate to the grantee.  

 
 
* 
* * * 

 
 
            
Encumbrances can usually be classified as one of three types: (1) 
servitudes, (2) encumbrances, as that term is used in its more technical 
sense--i.e., liens or charges on the land, and (3) present or future estates 
which may be carved out of the estate conveyed.

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
            
A servitude generally affects the land or its use and enjoyment 
physically. It reduces the value of the land because a purchaser will not pay as 
much for a parcel of land which is limited in its usage as he or she would for 
an unencumbered one.

 
 
14 
Richard R. Powell, The Law of Real 
Property § 81A.06[2][c][i] and [ii], at 117-18 (Michael Allan Wolf, ed., 
1997).  As we have already 
discussed, common grazing rights, a profit, fit within the general category of a 
servitude. The warranty is against the diminution in value of the land caused by 
the servitude, not total loss of land. Whether the Ellises breached this 
warranty is dependent on all the issues of material fact we have previously 
noted.

 
 

Denial 
of Foxley's Motion to Amend Complaint

 
 
[¶32]   The decision to allow amendment to 
pleadings is vested within the sound discretion of the district court and 
subject to reversal on appeal only for an abuse of that discretion.  Askvig v. Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, 
N.A., 2005 WY 138, ¶ 18, 121 P.3d 783, 788 (Wyo. 2005); Johnson v. Sikorski, 2004 WY 137, ¶ 12, 
100 P.3d 420, 423 (Wyo. 2004); Breazeale 
v. Radich, 500 P.2d 74 (Wyo. 1972).  
Leave to amend pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so 
requires."  W.R.C.P. 15(a).  In determining whether to allow 
amendment, this Court has suggested the following test be 
followed:

 
 
"If 
the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper 
subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on 
the merits.  In the absence of any 
apparent or declared reason--such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive 
on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance 
of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.--the leave sought should, as the 
rules require, be freely given.'"

 
 

Beaudoin 
v. Taylor, 
492 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1972) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d (1962)).  
See Armstrong v. Hrabal, 2004 WY 39, ¶ 11, 
87 P.3d 1226, 1230-31 (Wyo. 2004). 

 
 
[¶33]   The district court denied Foxley's 
motion to amend, finding, among other grounds, the amendment would be unduly 
prejudicial to the Ellises.  
Procedurally, the initial complaint was filed November 27, 2006.  The initial complaint was amended for 
the first time on January 2, 2007.  
Extensive discovery ensued.  
On June 25, 2007, the Ellises filed their motion for summary 
judgment.  The motion to file a 
second amended complaint was filed thereafter on July 30, 2007.  Foxley proposed two new causes of action 
in this amendment.  Under these 
particular procedural circumstances, we cannot say it was unreasonable for the 
district court to determine that "at some point in time the Defendants should 
not be required to hit a moving target."  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶34]   Summary judgment was 
inappropriately granted in this case.  
The sales contract required the Ellises convey title to the property free 
from all encumbrances, and the warranty deed they gave 
Foxley stated that they delivered the property free from all encumbrances.  
There are common grazing rights enforceable against Foxley.  Along with other material facts, the 
extent to which those rights encumber the property is a question of material 
fact yet to be determined.  

 
 
[¶35]   We cannot say the district court 
abused its discretion in refusing to allow them to amend their complaint.  We reverse in part and affirm in part, 
and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1A checkerboard pattern is a land pattern where alternate sections are 
federal land with intervening sections of private land.  Consequently, federal lands, as well as 
private lands, adjoin only at their corners.

 
 

2Animal Unit Months, or AUMs, is the productivity measurement used for 
valuing rangeland.  The term "AUM" 
is defined as the amount of forage required to sustain a 1,000 pound cow, with 
or without a calf, for one month.  
Http://webgate.co.laramie.wy.us/_departments/_county_assessor/ag_info.asp.  

 
 

3There is also a theoretical possibility that, even if the Agreement does 
not directly affect the private lands in the West Pasture, Foxley may still be 
required to allow 9V an easement or other access rights to move its stock 
through the private lands.  
Otherwise, because of the checkerboard pattern, 9V will have no direct 
access between the BLM sections.  
The reciprocal is also true  if Foxley fences its private lands it will 
not have direct access between its sections.

 
 

4"Encumbrance" is also defined in more detail as any right or interest in 
land subsisting in a third person, to the diminution of the value of the land, 
not inconsistent with the passing of private simple title.  Black's Law Dictionary 473 (5th ed. 1999); 9 
G. Thompson, Law of Real 
Property § 82.10(c)(3), at 612 (David A. Thomas, ed., 1999).  Profits are so named because they 
involve the sharing of the "profits" of the land.  This is by definition an interest in 
land devaluing the land.