Case Title: Yamagata v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.

Citation: 107 Haw. 227

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HANAT'I

 

‘o00-

 

DEBRA YAMAGATA and JOSEPH T. TOMA, Individually and as the
Special Administrator for the ESTATE OF ROSS YAMAGATA-TOMA,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, HERB USHIRODA,
JOHN DOES 1-5, JANE DOES 1-5, DOE CORPORATIONS 1-5,

DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-5, DOE ENTITIES 1-5,
and DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-5,

No. 25757

as

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO. 00-1-0530)

 

MAY 26, 2005

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

FEY,

Plaintiffs-appellants Debra Yamagata and Joseph 7. Toma

(individually and as the Special Administrator for the Estate of
Ross Yanagata~Toma) [hereinafter collectively, the plaintiffs)

appeal from the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit’s April 7,

2003 final judgment.! As points of error, the plaintiffs argue
that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in

favor of defendant-appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile

} me Honorable Shackley F, Raffetto presided over this matter.
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Insurance Company (State Farm) and denying the plaintiffs’
cross-motion for summary judgment.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to Accidental Death Benefits for the death of their
teenage son, who died while driving his metorcycle. Based on the
following, we vacate the circuit court’s grant of summary
Judgment in favor of State Farm and remand with instructions to
grant the plaintiffs’ cross-notion for summary judgment as to the
applicability of death benefits coverage.

1. BACKGROUND

 

Factual Backaround

On October 6, 1998, eighteen-year-old Ross Yamagata~
Toma was killed while driving a motorcycle on Ka'ahumanu Avenue
in Wailuku, Maui. The plaintiffs allege that the accident
occurred when the driver of a pickup truck driving in the
opposite direction made a left-hand turn in front of Yamagata~
‘Toma.

At the time of Yamagata~Toma’s death, Yamagata-Toma’s
parents had three automobile insurance policies with State Farm.
Yamagata~Toma lived with his parents and was therefore an
“insured” under these policies; State Farm paid the plaintiffs
underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits but denied the plaintiffs

death benefits coverage.
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State Farm based its rejection of death benefits
coverage on the following policy language:

WERE 18 NO COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY:

5." "fo THE OPERATOR OF A MOTORCYCLE OR MOTOR SCOOTER
INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT.

‘The policy defined “bodily injury” as “bodily injury to a
person and sickness, disease, or death which results from
ite”

‘The plaintiffs argued (and continue to argue) that the
exclusion cited by State Farm is ambiguous and that the exclusion
should therefore be construed against State Farm. Alternatively,
the plaintiffs contend that the exclusion is unambiguous and that
it clearly does not apply to them. The plaintiffs also argue
that, pursuant to Hawaii’s Motor Vehicle Insurance Law, Article
10C of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 431, death benefits
coverage is a remedial, personal, portable coverage that should
be treated in a similar manner as UIM or uninsured motorist (UM)
benefits; because the plaintiffs were entitled to UIM benefits,
‘they argue, they are also entitled to death benefits.

B. Procedural Backaround

on October 6, 2000, the plaintiffs filed a complaint
against State Farm requesting, inter alia, a declaration that the
plaintiffs were entitled to death benefits coverage.’ The

+ In addition to the death benefits coverage issue, the plaintiffs’

fixet anended complaint #iso sought Fesolution of @ dispute over the amount of
™ (Continued. .«)

 
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plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on November 21,
2000. State Farm answered the complaints and, on June 14, 2001,
moved for summary judgment. On the same day, the plaintiffs
filed their cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of
death benefits coverage.

On July 17, 2002, after hearing the parties’ arguments
on their respective motions for summary judgment, the circuit
court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm. The
circuit court entered judgment in favor of State Farm on
September 24, 2002. The plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal
on September 30, 2002; however, this court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ appeal on March 24, 2003 for lack of appellate
jurisdiction because the circuit court’s judgment did not satisfy
the separate document requirement of Hawai'i Rules of Civil

Procedure (HRCP) Rule 58.” On April 7, 2003, the circuit court

 

24. continved)
IM benefits to which the plaintiffs were entitled. The instent appeal,
however, focuses on death Benefits only.

 

O RCP Rule $8, entitled “ERTRY OF JUDGMENT," provides:

unless the court otherwise directs and subject to the

provisions of Rule 54(b), judgeent upon the verdict of «

Sury shail be entered forthwith by the clerk} but the court

shall direct the appropriate judgment to be entered upon a

Special verdict or upon a general verdict accompanied by

Gnewers to interrogatories returned by a jury pursuant ©o

Rule 43, Wmen the court directs that a party recover only

money or costs or that all relief be denied, the clerk shell

fenter judgment forthwith upon receipt by him of the

Gizection; but when the court directs entry of judgment for

other relief, the judge shall promptly settle or approve the

form of the Judgnent and direct that it be entered by the

clerk. The filing of the Judgment in the office of the clerk
(eontinued. «.)

 

     

 
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entered final judgment as to all claims and parties, and the

plaintiffs filed a second notice of appeal the following day.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

‘Summary Judament

We review the circuit court’s grant or denial of

summary Judgment ge nove, await Commun
94 Hawai 233, 221, 11 P.3d 2, 9 (2000)

‘The standard for granting « notion for summary judgnent se
settles:
(s)unmary Judgment, 1s appropriate 4f the

 

Judgment 25 2 matter of law. A fact is material
Ef proof of that fact would have the effect of
establishing or refuting one of the essential
Glenents of 2 cause of action or defense
Ssserted by the parties. The evidence must be
‘Hewed in the Light most favorable to the non=
Roving party. In other words, we mist View all
Df the evidence snd the inferences drawn
Therefron in the light most favorable vo the
party opposing the notion

 

 

Ad, (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Goon vy. City & County of Honolulu, 98 Hawai'i 233, 244-45,

47 P.3d 348,

389-60 (2002) (alteration in original).

Statutory Interpretation

statute denovs.
Pisa 572). S63 (2001)

+ seontinved)
Constitutes the entry of the judgment

ie review the circuit court’s interpretation of a
96 Hawaii 03, 98, 26

‘Dar statutory construction is guided

   

 

 

stabltaned rule
in construing @ statute, cur forenost obligation is

to ascortain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from
the language contained in the statute itself. And we
must read statutory language in the context of the

 

 

and the judgnent is

 

hot effective before such entry. ‘The entry of the judgment
Shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs. Every judgment

shell be eet forth on

parate document.

 
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entire statute and construe it in 2 manner consistent
with its purpose.

 

Ads at 94-95, 26 P.3d at S83
Coon, 98 Hawai's at 245, 47 P.3d at 360. See also HRS 5 1-16

 

(1993) (“Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter,

shall be construed with reference to each other. What is cll

 

in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful
in another.").
TIT. DISCUSSION

‘The circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of State Farm because HRS § 431:10C~302 (Supp. 2004),
entitled “Required optional additional insurance,” required State
Farm to offer death benefits coverage for death arising out of
all motor vehicle accidents, regardless of whether a motorcycle
was involved. Therefore, we vacate the circuit court’s April 7,
2003 final judgment and remand with instructions to grant summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.

HRS § 431:10C-302 provides in relevant part:

(a) In addition to the motor vehicle insurance
coverages described in section 431:10C-301, every snsurer
{Esuing a motor vehicle insurance policy shall make

available fo the insured the following optionsl insurance
Under the following conditions. «=

isi" fin option in writing for minimum coverage for
death benefits for death arising out of a motor
han anount of §25,000, to De
paid-tethe surviving spouse, for the benefit of

The spouse and dependent children, or if there

fare no surviving spouse or dependent children,
then'to the estate. Coverage shal! also be made

 

 

‘This statute was last amended in 1998,

6
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available for increased death benefits in
increments of $25,000 up to $100,000; however,
nothing shall prevent an insurer’ from making
available higher Limits of coverage.

 

 

(Emphasis added.) The term “motor vehicle accident” is defined
in HRS § 431:10C~103 (Supp. 2004) as “an accident: arising out of
the operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, including
an object drawn or propelled by a motor vehicle.”*

Reading these provisions together, State Farm was
required to offer death benefits coverage for any death arising
out of the operation, maintenance, or use of @ motor vehicle.
Although HRS § 431:10C-302(a) (5) would permit State Farm to
exclude death benefits coverage arising out of a “motorcycle
accident,” defined by HRS § 431:10G-101 (1993) as “an accident
arising out of the operation, maintenance, or use of a
motorcycle, but not involving a motor vehicle,” the plain
Language of HRS § 431:10C~302(a) (5) prohibits State Farm from
writing its insurance policies so as to restrict death benefits
coverage to certain types of motor vehicle accidents. See State
ve Richie, 88 Hawai'i 19, 30, 960 P.2d 1227, 1238 (1998) ("YIt

is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that, where the

 

* Although the Legislature anended HRS § 431:20C-103 several times in
the definition of “moter vehicle accident” aid not change
proceedings. gg HAS § 431:10c-103 (1993).

 

 
 

© see algo HRS § 431:10C-103 (excluding “notorcycles and motor scooters”
trom the definition of “motor vehicle” and defining "motor vehicle accident”
fe "an accident arising out of the operation, maintenance, or use of s motor
Yensele")

 

 

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terns of a statute are plain, unambiguous and explicit, we are
not at Liberty to look beyond that language for a different
meaning. Instead, our sole duty is to give effect to the
statute’s plain and obvious meaning." (Quoting Alvarez vs
Liberty House, Inc, 85 Hawai'i 275, 278, 942 P.2d $39, 542
(1997).)). As we have stated, {1}nsurers have the same rights
as individuals to limit their liability( ] and to impose whatever
conditions they please on their obligation, provided they are not

Dairy Rd. Partners v. Island Ins. Cou, Utd., 92 Hawa:

992 P.2d 93, 106 (2000) (emphasis added) (second set of brackets

 

"1 398, 411,

in original) (citations and internal quotation signals omitted) .

In this case, Yamagata~Toma’s death arose out of a
collision between a motor vehicle and a motorcycle. The
collision, by statutory definition, was a motor vehicle accident.
‘The fact that Yamagata-Toma was operating a motorcycle at the
time he was involved in the motor vehicle accident is not
relevant, as State Farm was required by statute to offer death
benefits coverage for death arising out of a motor vehicle
accident. Therefore, the circuit court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of State Farm.

IV. goNcLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we vacate the circuit court's

April 7, 2003 final judgment and remand with instructions to
 

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grant the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment as to the

applicability of death benefits coverage.

On the briefs: Gyro

Matthew S. Kohm

for plaintiffs-appellants Beam BoLernen
Lisa M. Ginoza
(WeCorsiston Miller Resette C1. Naectee paree

Mukai MacKinnon LLP) for
defendant-appellee

State Farm Mutual Automobile ao
Insurance Company

Yanen «. Dict, +