Case Title: RAYMOND E. ROBISON, III v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0050

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
RAYMOND E. ROBISON, III v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 4Case Number: No. S-10-0050Decided: 01/19/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

RAYMOND 
E. ROBISON, III,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Paul S. 
Rehurek, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Rehurek.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      On October 5, 
2009, Appellant, Raymond E. Robison, III (Robison), was found guilty, after a 
jury trial, of driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b)(ii)(A) (LexisNexis 2007).  He committed that offense on November 2, 
2008.  Robison appeared before the 
district court on November 9, 2009, for a Sentencing Enhancement Hearing 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e) (fourth or subsequent offense).  On January 21, 2010, the district court 
entered its Sentence and Probation Order.  
Robison contends that the district court imposed an illegal sentence by 
considering a prior conviction that occurred outside the five-year time limit 
set by the governing statute.  He 
also contends that trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress evidence 
obtained in connection with an illegal traffic stop constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel and denied him due process of law.  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Robison raises 
these issues:

 
 

I.              
Did 
the trial court impose an illegal sentence by considering a conviction outside 
of the five-year time limit delineated by W.S. § 31-5-233(e) as a fourth or 
subsequent conviction so as to sentence [Robison] to a 
felony?

 
 

II.            
Did 
the failure of [Robison's] trial counsel to file a motion to suppress evidence 
based upon an illegal traffic stop constitute ineffective assistance of counsel 
and deny [him] due process of law?

 
 
The 
State's statement of the issues conforms to that set forth by 
Robison.

 
 
Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel

 
 
[¶3]      Under the 
circumstances of this case, the second issue raised by Robison is a threshold 
issue.  If this Court were to 
conclude that Robison's counsel's assistance was ineffective, then it would 
require this Court to reverse that conviction.  Such a conclusion would then require us 
to vacate the sentence imposed as well.

 
 
[¶4]      Robison's arrest 
was facilitated by a Report Every Drunk Driver Immediately (REDDI) alert that 
was called into the Gillette Police Department by an employee of the Lariat Caf© 
and Sundance Lounge on November 2, 2008.  
The report was to the effect that a very drunk patron had left that 
establishment after he was refused service.  Police were provided a description of 
the vehicle Robison was driving.  
That report was forwarded via dispatch to Gillette Police Officer Mark 
Kelso.  He was near the Sundance 
Lounge and arrived on the scene as Robison was driving away in the vehicle 
described in the REDDI report.  
Officer Kelso stopped Robison.  
He ascertained that Robison did not have a driver's license (it was 
suspended).  He also ascertained 
that Robison was intoxicated and he was placed under arrest for that 
reason.  Officer Kelso did not 
observe Robison driving in a manner that would have suggested he was an impaired 
driver.  The stop and subsequent 
arrest was based solely on the REDDI report.

 
 
[¶5]      Robison's 
contentions with respect to this issue are based on our decision in McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 
1076-77 (Wyo. 1999), wherein we held:

 
 
Here, 
we have the classic anonymous tip--an unidentified voice on the telephone.  Because an anonymous tipster's basis of 
knowledge and veracity are typically unknown, anonymous tips are considered less 
reliable.  Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 
235-36 (Utah App.1997).  The tip of 
an anonymous informant is unlike that of an identified citizen-informant.  The latter tips are higher on the 
reliability scale because an identified informant exposes himself to possible 
criminal and civil prosecution if the report is false.  Id.; see Borgwardt v. State, 946 P.2d 805, 807 
(Wyo.1997) (citizen informants are presumptively reliable sources of 
information).  Because the anonymous 
tip in this case is on the low end of the reliability scale, more information is 
required to raise a reasonable suspicion.  
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.  at 
330-31, 110 S. Ct.  at 2416.

 
 
The 
REDDI tip in the instant case merely recited the color, make, and direction of 
travel of the McChesney vehicle.  
These are facts that were available to anyone traveling on I-90 west of 
Gillette that July morning.  
Corroboration of this type of information does not increase the 
reliability of the tip.  State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 642 
(N.D.1994); Pinkney v. State, 666 So. 2d 590, 592 (Fla.App.1996); Commonwealth v. Lyons, 409 Mass. 16, 564 N.E.2d 390, 393 (1990); Campbell v. State 
of Wash. Dept. of Licensing, 31 Wash. App. 833, 644 P.2d 1219, 1221 (1982); 
see 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 9.4(h), at 222, n. 391-99.  
Where, as here, the informant makes no prediction of future behavior 
indicating "inside information," the investigating officer is required to 
corroborate the tip in some other fashion, usually by observing either a traffic 
violation or driving indicative of impairment.  Pinkney v. State, 666 So. 2d  at 
592.

                        

This 
enhanced corroboration requirement stems from a number of legitimate 
concerns.  An anonymous tip, without 
more, may be no more than a citizen's hunch or merely an assertion based on 
rumor.  In addition, the potential 
for citizen abuse is readily apparent.  
Anybody with enough knowledge about a given person to make that person 
the target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge against that person, will certainly 
be able to formulate a REDDI tip.  
See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 
at 333, 110 S. Ct.  at 2418 (Stevens, J. dissenting).  In the law enforcement context, there is 
the danger that "an officer prompted not by a tip at all, but only by a hunch, 
could relay a description and license number through the dispatcher and thereby 
effectuate a lawful stop."  Mix v. State, 893 P.2d 1270, 1272-73 
(Alaska App.1995).

 
 
In 
the instant case, any traveler on the highway that morning could have 
"predicted" the facts contained in the REDDI tip.  The tip did not provide a description of 
the driver, the passengers, or any of their future activities.  As such, the tip did not provide any 
"inside information" that would indicate that the tip was reliable.  Even Alabama v. White was referred to as a 
"close case" on its facts.  496 U.S. 
at 332, 110 S. Ct.  at 2417.  The 
facts of this case are far less compelling.  Under these circumstances, we hold that 
the anonymous REDDI report was not sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion 
to justify an investigatory stop.

 
 
Officer 
Will properly investigated the REDDI report when he followed McChesney as he 
exited the interstate, made several turns, and traveled a substantial 
distance.  Officer Will did not 
observe any erratic or illegal driving.  
He merely observed the passengers looking back at him and the driver 
looking into his mirrors.  Although 
we have adopted the doctrine that "even conduct which is wholly lawful and 
seemingly innocent may form the basis for a reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot," State v. Welch, 
873 P.2d 601, 604 (Wyo.1994), we conclude that this conduct did not provide a 
reasonable suspicion in this case.  
First, we dismiss the driver's glances in his mirrors as inconsequential; 
such action is undeniably the sign of a safe driver.  Likewise, the glances of the passengers 
are not sufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion.  The district court did not find these 
glances particularly significant, nor do we.  See State v. Kupihea, 59 Haw. 386, 581 P.2d 765, 766 (1978) (two passengers in vehicle looked back in direction of police 
and crouched down, not grounds for stop); Thomas v. State, 297 So. 2d 850, 852 
(Fla.App.1974); Parker v. State, 363 So. 2d 383, 386 (Fla.App.1978); Rodriguez 
v. State, 578 S.W.2d 419 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).  Under these circumstances, we hold that 
the officer's observations did not provide a reasonable suspicion for an 
investigatory stop.

 
 
Finally, 
our decision to require independent police corroboration of an anonymous REDDI 
report appears to be consistent with the practice of law enforcement in this 
state, which will not make a stop unless police observation confirms either the 
reported or some other illegal or suspicious activity.

 
 
Also 
see 1 Donald H. Nichols and Flem K. Whited III, Drinking/Driving Litigation, Criminal and 
Civil, § 4:2, pp. 4-142- 4-200 (The anonymous tip) (wherein this subject is 
discussed and cases annotated at length) (2nd ed. 2006).

 
 
[¶6]      Robison asserts 
that his defense attorney was ineffective in not filing a motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained by Officer Kelso during that stop and arrest, on the basis 
that Kelso was acting on an anonymous tip.  
As set out more fully above, the tip was not anonymous.  The police department received detailed 
information from a Sundance Lounge employee, who was identified as such to 
dispatch.  Moreover, the vehicle 
described in that report was observed within minutes, if not seconds, driving 
away from the Sundance Lounge.  The 
limitations on stops such as those described in McChesney are not at issue 
here.

 
 
[¶7]      The standard of 
review we apply to an effective assistance of counsel issue is 
this:

 
 
[An 
appellant] bears the burden of proving that his trial counsel was 
ineffective.  Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, pp 22-23, 
100 P.3d 394, 405 (Wyo.2004).  In 
addition, he must demonstrate the existence of a reasonable probability that, 
absent the deficiency in counsel's performance, the result of the proceedings 
would have been different.  Id.  Failure to make the required showing of 
either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an ineffectiveness 
claim.  Id.  See also, Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 17, 152 P.3d 376, 382 (Wyo.2007);  Hirsch v. State, 2006 WY 66, ¶ 15, 135 P.3d 586, 594 (Wyo.2006), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  These inquiries involve mixed questions 
of law and fact.  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 698, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2068.  Our review, therefore, is 
de novo.  Dettloff, ¶ 17, 152 P.3d  at 382.  

 
 
      When reviewing a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount determination is 
whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's acts or omissions 
were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.  We indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 
exercise of reasonable professional judgment.  Under the two-prong standard articulated 
in Strickland, to warrant reversal on 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that 
his counsel failed to render such assistance as would have been offered by a 
reasonably competent attorney and that counsel's deficiency prejudiced the 
defense of the case.  "The benchmark 
for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."

 
 

Id., 
¶ 18, 152 P.3d  at 382 (internal citations omitted).

 
 
We 
do not evaluate counsel's efforts in hindsight, but attempt to "reconstruct the 
circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct and evaluate the professional 
efforts from the perspective of counsel at the time."  Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, ¶ 35, 76 P.3d 323, 336 (Wyo.2003).  In 
evaluating counsel's performance, we determine whether his actions could be 
considered sound trial strategy.  Id.

 
 

Luftig 
v. State, 
2010 WY 43, ¶¶ 17-18, 228 P.3d 857, 864-65 (Wyo. 2010).

 
 
[¶8]      We conclude that 
Robison's defense attorney was not ineffective under the standard articulated 
above.  Defense counsel's failure to 
file a motion to suppress, given the facts and circumstances detailed above, 
does not suggest that counsel was unaware of a potential defense for his 
client.  Rather, it suggests counsel 
was aware of REDDI report jurisprudence and recognized that his client did not 
have such a potential defense.

 
 
Illegal 
Sentence

 
 
[¶9]      Robison asserts 
that his sentence is illegal because one of the convictions used by the State to 
prove up four convictions included a "conviction" from the state of Missouri 
that the State contended became a "conviction" on December 15, 2004, when 
sentence was finally imposed after his probation, imposed after imposition of 
sentence was suspended, was revoked on December 15, 2004.  The unlawful act of driving under the 
influence actually occurred on June 16, 2002, and Robison entered a guilty plea 
based on that act on August 6, 2003.  
In exchange for his plea, the record reflects that sentencing was 
suspended pending successful completion of probation.  The State's theory is that the guilty 
plea was not the event that triggered the "conviction," rather it was the 
sentence imposed after revocation of probation as contemplated by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-7-102(a)(xi)(E) (LexisNexis 2007).

 
 
[¶10]   We apply the following standard of 
review to the issue at hand:

 
 
            
Sentencing decisions are normally within the discretion of the trial 
court.  Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 257, 259 (Wyo.2003).  "Such 
discretion is limited, however, inasmuch as a court may not enter an illegal 
sentence.  A sentence is illegal if 
it violates the constitution or other law."  In re CT, 2006 WY 101, ¶ 8, 140 P.3d 643, 646 (Wyo.2006) (internal case citation omitted).  Whether a sentence is illegal is a 
question of law, which we review de novo.  
Manes v. State, 2007 WY 6, ¶ 
7, 150 P.3d 179, 181 (Wyo.2007).

 
 

Jackson 
v. State, 
2009 WY 82, ¶ 6, 209 P.3d 897, 898-99 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶11]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e) 
(LexisNexis 2007)1 provides:

 
 
            
(e) Except as otherwise provided, a person convicted of violating this 
section shall be ordered to or shall receive a substance abuse assessment 
conducted by a substance abuse provider certified by the department of health 
pursuant to W.S. 9-2-2701(c) at or before sentencing.  The cost of the substance abuse 
assessment shall be assessed to and paid by the offender.  Except as otherwise provided in this 
subsection or subsection (h) or (m) of this section, a person convicted of 
violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for 
not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty 
dollars ($750.00), or both.  On a 
second offense conviction within five (5) years after a conviction for a 
violation of this section or other law prohibiting driving while under the 
influence, he shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than seven (7) days 
nor more than six (6) months, he shall be ordered to or shall receive a 
substance abuse assessment conducted by a substance abuse provider certified by 
the department of health pursuant to W.S. 9-2-2701(c) before sentencing and 
shall not be eligible for probation or suspension of sentence or release on any 
other basis until he has served at least seven (7) days in jail.  In addition, the person may be fined not 
less than two hundred dollars ($200.00) nor more than seven hundred fifty 
dollars ($750.00).  On a third 
offense conviction within five (5) years after a conviction for a violation of 
this section or other law prohibiting driving while under the influence, he 
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than thirty (30) days nor more 
than six (6) months, shall receive a substance abuse assessment pursuant to W.S. 
7-13-1302 and shall not be eligible for probation or suspension of sentence or 
release on any other basis until he has served at least thirty (30) days in jail 
except that the court shall consider the substance abuse assessment and may 
order the person to undergo outpatient alcohol or substance abuse treatment 
during any mandatory period of incarceration.  The minimum period of imprisonment for a 
third violation shall be mandatory, but the court, having considered the 
substance abuse assessment and the availability of public and private resources, 
may suspend up to fifteen (15) days of the mandatory period of imprisonment if, 
subsequent to the date of the current violation, the offender completes an 
inpatient treatment program approved by the court.  In addition, the person may be fined not 
less than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) nor more than three thousand 
dollars ($3,000.00).  The judge may 
suspend part or all of the discretionary portion of an imprisonment sentence 
under this subsection and place the defendant on probation on condition that the 
defendant pursues and completes an alcohol education or treatment program as 
prescribed by the judge.  
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the term of probation imposed 
by a judge under this section may exceed the maximum term of imprisonment 
established for the offense under this subsection provided the term of probation 
together with any extension thereof, shall not exceed three (3) years for up to 
and including a third conviction.  
On a fourth or subsequent conviction within five (5) years for a 
violation of this section or other law prohibiting driving while under the 
influence, he shall be guilty of a felony and fined not more than ten thousand 
dollars ($10,000.00), punished by imprisonment for not more than two (2) years, 
or both.

 
 
[¶12]   As used in that statute the term 
"conviction" means:

 
 
            
(xi)  "Conviction" means a final conviction and shall 
include:

                        
(A)  An unvacated adjudication of guilt or a determination of a 
violation in a court of original jurisdiction or an administrative 
proceeding;

                        
(B)  An unvacated forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to 
secure the person's appearance in court;

                        
(C)  A plea of guilty or nolo contendere accepted by the 
court;

                        
(D)  The payment of a fine or court cost; 
or

                        
(E)  Violation of a condition of release without bail, 
regardless of whether the penalty is rebated, suspended or probated.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-7-102(a)(xi) (LexisNexis 2007).

 
 
[¶13]   It can be distilled from the 
foregoing statute that the actual date of the unlawful conduct to be punished, 
where multiple offenses are being considered, may have nothing to do with 
determining the five-year period that applies.  It is the State's position that Robison 
was convicted for the instant DUI in violation of § 31-5-233(b)(ii)(A) on 
October 5, 2009, because that is the only event that is included in the statute 
that describes the "conviction" that occurred in the immediate case.  § 31-7-102(a)(xi)(A).  In a Judgment of Conviction entered of 
record on November 12, 2009, it was determined that Robison had been arrested 
for driving under the influence, in the state of Missouri, on June 16, 
2002.  A waiver, plea and judgment 
were entered on May 22, 2003, but sentence was deferred until December 15, 2004, 
when Robison's probation was revoked.  
Hence the five-year counting period began on December 14, 2004.  That date of "conviction" is the 
centerpiece of this case, and the State contends that it is the proper date 
under the terms of § 31-5-233(b)(ii)(E) (i.e., is the first qualifying 
conviction).  The next occurrences 
were two DUIs that occurred at 0219 hours on July 7, 2007 and 2345 hours on July 
7, 2007.  Judgment in those two 
cases was entered on November 1, 2007 (they constituted the second and third 
qualifying convictions).  The fourth 
"conviction" occurred on October 5, 2009.  Judgment of conviction for the fourth DUI 
charge occurred on November 12, 2009.  
The counting period for that charge was December 14, 2004, until October 
5, 2009, a period of less than five years.

 
 
[¶14]   The district court gave close 
attention to this issue and after its review of the documentation introduced as 
evidence by the State, at Robison's sentencing hearing, it issued its decision 
letter concluding that December 14, 2004, was the correct date to begin 
measuring the five-year period at issue here.  After careful review of the record on 
appeal, we hold that the district court's sentence did not constitute an illegal 
sentence or a sentence that was otherwise erroneous as a matter of law.  In this regard, we note that Robison, 
and all potential defendants in circumstances such as this, are forewarned that 
the definitive event constituting a conviction may be any one of the events 
described in § 31-7-102(a)(xi) (A-E).  
The statute provides fair warning to those who violate the driving while 
intoxicated or impaired statutes that such is the case.  Seteren v. State, 2007 WY 144, ¶¶ 6-8, 
167 P.3d 20, 22 (Wyo. 2007); also see McGuire v. Department of Revenue and 
Taxation, 809 P.2d 271, 273-75 (Wyo. 1991).

 
 
[¶15]   The record on appeal adequately 
establishes that Robison was given "a break" with respect to his June 16, 2002 
arrest.  Missouri has a sentencing 
provision that is similar to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 (LexisNexis 2009).  See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 557-011 (West 
1999).  Had Robison successfully 
fulfilled the terms of his probation, then he might not have been "convicted" as 
contemplated by § 31-7-102(A)(xi).  
See Yale v. City of 
Independence, 846 S.W.2d 193, 194-96 (Mo.banc 1993).  However, on December 15, 2004, Robison's 
probation was revoked and sentence was imposed.  On that date he was burdened by a 
"conviction" for the 2002 DUI as the term "conviction" is contemplated by the 
Wyoming statute.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   The sentence imposed by the 
district court is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 
   1This statute was 
amended effective July 1, 2010, but those amendments do not apply to this 
case.  The amendments changed the 
five-year time frames to ten-year time frames.