Case Title: Oker v. Ameritech Corp.

Citation: 2000-Ohio-139

Docket Number: 19990270

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Oker v. Ameritech Corp., 89 Ohio St.3d 223, 2000-Ohio-139.] 
 
 
 
OKER, APPELLANT, v. AMERITECH CORPORATION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Oker v. Ameritech Corp. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 223.] 
Discrimination — Age-discrimination claim premised on violation described in 
R.C. Chapter 4112 — Statute of limitations period begins to run on date of 
employee-plaintiff’s termination from defendant-employer. 
The statute of limitations period applicable to age-discrimination claims brought 
under R.C. Chapter 4112 begins to run on the date of the employee-
plaintiff’s termination from the defendant-employer. 
(No. 99-270 — Submitted February 9, 2000 — Decided June 28, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 72556. 
 
Appellant, Michael R. Oker (“Oker”), appeals from the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, affirming the grant of summary judgment 
by the trial court in favor of appellees, the Ameritech Corporation and Ameritech 
Ohio (“Ameritech”). 
 
Oker was employed as an attorney for Ohio Bell Telephone Company and 
later Ameritech Ohio, a wholly owned subsidiary of Ameritech Corporation, for 
nearly seventeen years.  In 1994, Oker was serving in the litigation subsection of 
the legal department of Ameritech Ohio.  In the fall of that year, Ameritech 
announced that it was reorganizing its legal department by disbanding the legal 
departments of its subsidiaries. 
 
When Ameritech announced the reorganization of the company, it invited 
attorneys employed by Ameritech Ohio, who were interested in joining the 
Ameritech Law Department, to submit their resumes for consideration.  Pursuant 
to this process, Oker submitted his resume to Susan R. Lichtenstein, Assistant 
General Counsel-Litigation for Ameritech Corporation. 
 
 
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On November 9, 1994, Oker was informed that his application to join the 
reorganized Ameritech Law Department had been rejected.  At the same time, 
Ameritech informed Oker that he could remain in his position with the company 
until January 1995.  Because Oker’s termination date was in the middle of a pay 
period, he remained on payroll of the Ameritech Law Department through 
January 7, 1995. 
 
Although Oker was employed only as an attorney through January 7, 
1995, he remained with the company through approximately April 15, 1995.  
During this time, Oker served in a non-managerial capacity as a customer service 
representative.  At this same time, Oker searched for another job as an attorney. 
 
On April 10, 1995, Ameritech hired Cynthia C. Schafer, an attorney 
younger in age than Oker, to specialize in litigation. 
 
On June 29, 1995, Oker filed an action against Ameritech, claiming age 
discrimination pursuant to R.C. 4112.02(N) and 4112.99.  The trial court granted 
summary judgment for Ameritech, finding that Oker had failed to timely file his 
claim within the applicable one-hundred-eighty-day statute of limitations period.  
The court of appeals affirmed.  The cause is now before this court upon the 
allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Gold & Schwartz Co., L.P.A., Orville E. Stiffel II and Niki Z. Schwartz, for 
appellant. 
 
Duvin, Cahn & Hutton, Robert M. Wolff, Martin S. List and Janette M. 
Louard, for appellees. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  In Bellian v. Bicron Corp. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 517, 634 
N.E.2d 608, we held that an age-discrimination claim brought pursuant to R.C. 
Chapter 4112 must be initiated within the one-hundred-eighty-day statute of 
limitations period set forth in former R.C. 4112.02(N).  Here, all parties agree that 
 
 
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the claims asserted by Oker are governed by the one-hundred-eighty-day statute 
of limitations period provided in R.C. 4112.02(N).  Therefore, the issue before the 
court is when the applicable statute of limitations period for an age-discrimination 
claim brought under R.C. Chapter 4112 begins to run. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we hold that the statute of limitations period 
applicable to age-discrimination claims brought under R.C. Chapter 4112 begins 
to run on the date of the employee-plaintiff’s termination from the defendant-
employer. 
 
In State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union 377 v. Youngstown (1977), 50 Ohio 
St.2d 200, 4 O.O.3d 387, 364 N.E.2d 18, this court addressed the issue of when 
the statute of limitations period for a specific cause of action commences.  We 
held that “[n]ormally, a cause of action does not accrue until such time as the 
infringement of a right arises.  It is at this point that the time within which a cause 
of action is to be commenced begins to run.” Id. at 203-204, 4 O.O.3d at 389, 364 
N.E.2d at 20.  Hence, we must determine the point in time at which the actions of 
Ameritech became a possible infringement of the rights afforded Oker under R.C. 
Chapter 4112. 
 
Ameritech contends that any possible infringement of Oker’s right 
occurred on November 9, 1994, when he was informed that he would not be 
offered a position in the reorganized Ameritech Law Department. 
 
In support of its position, Ameritech cites the United States Supreme 
Court opinion in Delaware State College v. Ricks (1980), 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 
498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431.  In Ricks, the court decided the Title VII claim of a non-
tenured professor, finding that the plaintiff did not file his claim within the 
applicable federal statute of limitations.  The Supreme Court held that the 
timeliness of such a complaint should be measured from the date the tenure 
decision was made and communicated to the employee, despite the fact that the 
 
 
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eventual loss of the teaching position did not occur until later. Id. at 258, 101 
S.Ct. at 504, 66 L.Ed.2d at 439-440. 
 
Ameritech contends that this case is indistinguishable from Ricks, and that 
the principles established in that case should govern our interpretation of the 
statute of limitations provided for in former R.C. 4112.02(N).  However, 
Ameritech ignores several differences between Ricks and this case. 
 
First, the plaintiff in Ricks initiated his suit under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.  Although Title VII and R.C. Chapter 4112 are similar in 
some respects, R.C. Chapter 4112.08 specifically provides for liberal construction 
of its provisions.  Here, our interpretation of the statute of limitations applicable 
to discrimination claims, such as those advanced by Oker, is consistent with the 
plain and ordinary meaning of R.C. 4112.08. 
 
In Lordstown Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. 
(1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 252, 20 O.O.3d 240, 421 N.E.2d 511, this court considered 
the statute of limitations applicable to a suit charging sexual discrimination 
pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4112.  The Lordstown case involved two teachers who 
were working for the school district under one-year limited contracts.  When the 
school district refused to renew the teachers’ contracts after their first year of 
employment, both teachers filed claims alleging that the board of education 
refused to renew the contracts after learning that they were pregnant. 
 
The school district argued that the complaints were not timely filed 
because the statute of limitations period had begun to run at the time the teachers 
were informed that their contracts would not be renewed.  However, in holding 
that the claims were timely filed, we determined that the statute of limitations 
period began to run, not when the teachers were served notice of the non-renewal, 
but on the date the teachers’ contracts expired. 
 
Our decision in Lordstown explained the difference between the facts of 
that case and those in Ricks.  In Ricks, the professor was denied tenure.  The 
 
 
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Supreme Court reasoned that the discrimination occurred at the time the plaintiff 
was informed by the college that he would not be offered tenure.  In Lordstown, 
we concluded that the final discriminatory act of the school board occurred upon 
the termination of the annual employment contracts.  We find that the principles 
inherent in our Lordstown decision afford us the proper guidance to determine the 
limitations period to be applied to the claims asserted by Oker. 
 
Like the teachers in Lordstown, Oker was terminated from his position 
with the company.  Ameritech would have us look at its decision not as a 
termination of Oker but as a failure to hire him, thus assimilating the facts with 
those in Ricks.  We do not accept this interpretation.  Instead, we concur that the 
decision made by Ameritech was a termination of Oker’s employment.  
Therefore, following the principles established in Lordstown, we hold that the 
statute of limitations period began to run on the date of Oker’s termination from 
Ameritech, January 7, 1995. 
 
The plain language of R.C. Chapter 4112, and the reasoning applied by 
this court in our Lordstown decision, support our conclusion that the statute of 
limitations period for an age-discrimination claim brought pursuant to R.C. 
Chapter 4112 begins to run on the date of the employee-plaintiff’s termination 
from the defendant-employer.  Oker commenced his suit on June 29, 1995, within 
one hundred eighty days of his termination from Ameritech.  Therefore, his 
claims against Ameritech were timely filed. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is, 
therefore, reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with the 
opinion of this court. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
CHRISTLEY and COOK, JJ., dissent. 
 
 
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JUDITH A. CHRISTLEY, J., of the Eleventh Appellate District, sitting for 
RESNICK, J. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent.  The majority analyzes the 
statute of limitations issue as if this case were based on an allegation of  
discriminatory discharge.  I agree, instead, with the court of appeals’ conclusion 
that this case involves, not an allegedly discriminatory discharge, but an allegedly 
discriminatory failure to hire: 
 
“In this case, appellant was informed in the fall of 1994, that all the 
positions in Ameritech Ohio’s legal department were being eliminated and that 
the attorneys would have to apply for positions with Ameritech.  Accordingly, if 
Ameritech illegally discriminated against appellant based upon his age, the 
discriminatory act suffered by appellant would not be the termination from 
employment as an attorney, but rather would be the failure of Ameritech to hire 
him based upon his age.” 
 
According to his deposition, Oker believed that he had been rejected for a 
position with the Ameritech centralized law department on November 9, 1994 on 
the basis of his age, having observed since 1990 a phenomenon he described as 
“the complete purge of all older officers in [the company].”  He also conceded 
during his deposition that Ameritech’s reorganization was “absolutely * * * a real 
reorganization,” and “not a sham reorganization.”  The appellate court opinion 
notes that Oker’s allegation was that Ameritech discriminated against him when it 
failed to hire him to work in its centralized law department—not that the 
Ameritech reorganization was based on age discrimination.  Thus the date on 
which his original position was eliminated as a result of that reorganization is not 
the date to which a court should look for the commencement of the limitations 
period. 
 
 
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Here the alleged discriminatory act—the decision not to hire—occurred on 
November 9, 1994.  It follows that Oker had one hundred eighty days from that 
date to file this action under R.C. 4112.02(N).  He did not file this action until 
after the limitations period had run.  Consequently, this action is time-barred. 
 
I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
CHRISTLEY, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.