Case Title: Kuhn v. Kuhn

Citation: 2015-Ohio-2806

Docket Number: 2014-0601

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Kuhn v. Kuhn, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2806.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-2806 
KUHN, APPELLANT, v. KUHN, N.K.A. COTTLE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Kuhn v. Kuhn, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2806.] 
Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
 (No. 2014-0601—Submitted May 5, 2015—Decided July 14, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Guernsey County, No. 13 CA 24,  
2014-Ohio-126. 
_______________________ 
{¶ 1} The cause is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been improvidently 
accepted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY J., dissents. 
FRENCH, J., dissents without opinion. 
___________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 1} Respectfully, I dissent from the decision to dismiss this case as 
having been improvidently accepted.  Doing so leaves unanswered important 
questions about classifying property upon divorce.  I would retain jurisdiction and 
address appellant James Kuhn’s four proposition of law:  
 
I.  Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Sections 3105.171(A)(4) 
and 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(iii) passive appreciation and income is [sic] 
not marital property subject to division by the parties. 
II. Where one spouse owns real property in an area 
experiencing a high volume of oil and gas exploration and leasing, 
the acquisition and execution of a lease by the property owner is 
[sic] not the result of contribution of labor, money or in-kind 
contribution such that any income generated from said lease could 
be considered “active income” pursuant to Ohio Revised Code 
Section 3105.171 but is instead “passive income” generated from 
the separate property and therefore is not subject to division 
between the spouses in an action for divorce. 
III.  The signature of a spouse upon a document regarding 
real estate, which signature is procured solely for the purpose of 
acknowledging the spouse’s dower interest does not create in the 
non-owner spouse an ownership interest in the subject real estate 
or any proceeds and/or benefits obtained from said real estate. 
IV.  Where no abuse of discretion is shown, a reviewing 
court may not modify or reverse a trial court’s decision regarding 
property division. 
 
January Term, 2015 
3 
 
{¶ 2} At issue here is the classification of a $121,285 signing bonus that 
Gulfport Energy Corporation issued to James Kuhn and appellee, Kelly Kuhn, 
n.k.a. Cottle, after they and Gulfport Energy agreed to lease oil and gas rights on 
property owned solely by James.  James filed for divorce, and classification of the 
bonus was contested. The trial court determined that the signing bonus was 
James’s separate, nonmarital property.  Kelly appealed.  After invoking manifest-
weight-of-the-evidence review, the lead appellate opinion found that the $121,285 
signing bonus was marital property.  2014-Ohio-126, ¶ 27.  That conclusion, 
which was joined by one judge in judgment only, was reached without any 
discussion of the findings of the trial court or its classification of the lease, the 
signing bonus, and the future royalties as passive appreciation of the mineral 
rights owned by James before the marriage. 
{¶ 3} I would adopt James’s first, second, and fourth propositions of law.  
Marital property subject to division in a divorce proceeding includes “all income 
and appreciation on separate property, due to the labor, monetary, or in-kind 
contribution of either or both of the spouses that occurred during the marriage.”  
R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(iii).  Marital property does not include separate property.  
R.C. 3105.171(A)(4).  Separate property is defined in R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a) as 
follows: 
 
[A]ll real and personal property and any interest in real or personal 
property that is found by the court to be any of the following: 
* * * 
(iii) Passive income and appreciation acquired from 
separate property by one spouse during the marriage. 
 
{¶ 4} Because proposition of law I correctly summarizes R.C. 
3105.171(A)(3), (4), and (6) , I would adopt it.  Regarding proposition of law II, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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after a hearing in which Kelly presented evidence that she helped effectuate the 
bonus, the magistrate classified the signing bonus as “passive appreciation of the 
mineral rights owned by [James] prior to the marriage” and therefore his separate 
property under the statutes.  The judge agreed after independent consideration, 
and the record supports the judgment.  The proposition states a straightforward 
application of R.C. 3105.171’s characterization of “separate property,” and 
therefore, I would also adopt this proposition.  Proposition of law III asks us to 
consider a company’s motive (extinguishing a dower interest) in procuring a 
spouse’s signature on a document when classifying the value of the asset that 
document generated, like the signing bonus here.  Because under the statute the 
motive is irrelevant, I would reject this proposition of law. 
{¶ 5} Finally, I would adopt the fourth proposition of law and develop it 
fully.  The Revised Code gives guidance on the classification of property in 
divorce but leaves much room for judges to make case-by-case determinations on 
whether property is separate or marital.  The standard for appellate review is 
abuse of discretion.  Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St.2d 348, 421 N.E.2d 1293 
(1981), paragraph two of the syllabus.  “[T]rial courts are vested with broad 
powers in determining the appropriate scope of property awards in divorce 
actions.”  Berish v. Berish, 69 Ohio St.2d 318, 319, 432 N.E.2d 183 (1982).  “If 
there is some competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s decision, 
there is no abuse of discretion.”  Middendorf v. Middendorf, 82 Ohio St.3d 397, 
401, 696 N.E.2d 575 (1998), citing Ross v. Ross, 64 Ohio St.2d 203, 414 N.E.2d 
426 (1980).  Here, the lead opinion of the court of appeals reviewed the trial 
court’s decision under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review 
rather than the abuse-of-discretion standard.  This was error. 
{¶ 6} For the aforementioned reasons, I would maintain jurisdiction and 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2015 
5 
 
Tribbie, Scott, Plummer & Padden and Stephanie L. Mitchell, for 
appellant. 
Towne, Evanchan, Palmisano & Hobson, L.L.C., Robert Roe Fox, and 
Leiby Hanna Rasnick, for appellee. 
______________________