Case Title: Minie v. Hudson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86211

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Minie v. Hudson  Minie v. Hudson 1997 OK 26 934 P.2d 1082 68 OBJ 909 Case Number: 86211 Decided: 03/11/1997 Mandate Issued: 04/10/1997 Supreme Court of Oklahoma THERIN EDWARD MINIE and DIANE MINIE, husband and wife, Plaintiffs, v. RAY E. HUDSON and CORRINE DEAN, Appellants/Third Party Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF OKMULGEE and COUNTY OFOKMULGEE, Appellees/Third Party Defendants. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I Honorable Charles M. Humphrey, Trial Judge ¶0 After being sued in a quiet title/adverse possession action, the appellants, Ray E. Hudson and Corrine Dean (collectively, Hudson), filed a third-party petition against the appellees, City and County of Okmulgee. Hudson alleged that the appellees' negligence worsened flooding on his property and it created a nuisance. He asserted that the City discharged sewage which flowed onto his land and that the County failed to maintain a drainage ditch on the property. Hudson sought damages and injunctive relief. The City filed a motion to dismiss based on Hudson's failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims Act, COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED. Samuel J. Schiller, Tulsa, Oklahoma, For Appellants. C. Bart Fite, Muskogee, Oklahoma, For Appellee, City of Okmulgee. Thomas C. Guilioli, Okmulgee, Oklahoma, For Appellee, County of Okmulgee. KAUGER, C.J.: [934 P.2d 1083] ¶1 Two questions are presented on certiorari: 1) whether the verbal notice of claim communicated to the City was valid under the Tort Claims Act; and 2) whether, once the County began to clear Hudson's drainage system, it had a duty to complete the job with due care. We find that: 1) the clear and mandatory language of FACTS ¶2 The appellant, Ray E. Hudson (Hudson/land owner), owns property in Okmulgee, Oklahoma, a portion of which contains a drainage channel to which Hudson asserts the appellee, County of Okmulgee (County), holds an easement. ¶3 After repeated requests for assistance to correct the flooding problems, ¶4 On May 10, 1994, Hudson filed a third-party petition I. ¶5 PURSUANT TO THE CLEAR MANDATORY LANGUAGE OF ¶6 Hudson asserts that a verbal communication to the City may be sufficient notice under the Governmental Tort Claims Act. He relies upon: 1) our decision in Duesterhaus v. City of Edmond, 634 P.2d 720 , 722 (Okla. 1981) in which we specifically held that written notice was not mandatory to satisfy the notice provisions of 51 O.S. Supp. 1978 §156(B);11 and 2) upon the line of cases in which this Court has consistently held that substantial compliance with the notice provisions of the Tort Claims Act is sufficient when the governmental entity is not prejudiced, and the information provided satisfies the purposes of the statutory notice provisions.12 The City argues that Duesterhaus and the cases in which the doctrine of substantial compliance developed have no application to the current version of 51 O.S. Supp. 1992 §156(D) which provides that a claim against a political subdivision "shall be in writing."13 [934 P.2d 1082] ¶7 Duesterhaus was promulgated in 1981. The language relied upon by the City first appeared in §156 in an amendment effective October 1, 1985. The issue of whether written notice is necessary to invoke the protections of the Tort Claims Act has not been presented to this Court since §156(D) was amended. The statute now provides: "A claim against a political subdivision shall be in writing and filed with the office of the clerk of the governing body." It is presumed that the Legislature has expressed its intent in a statute and that it intended what it so expressed. ¶8 The statutory language leaves no doubt that the Legislature intended that claims against a political subdivision be submitted in writing. The statute specifically provides that a claim "shall be in writing." The use of "shall" by the Legislature is normally considered as a legislative mandate equivalent to the term "must", requiring interpretation as a command. II. ¶9 ACTIONS IN IMPROVING THE DRAINAGE DITCH WERE OPERATIONAL AND IMPOSED A DUTY TO COMPLETE THE WORK, UNDERTAKEN PURSUANT TO CONTRACT, WITH REASONABLE CARE AND IN A NON-NEGLIGENT MANNER. ¶10 Hudson contends that although the County may have been under no duty to clear the drainage ditch on his property, once it undertook the job pursuant to its written contract, it was required to complete it with due care. Although the County concedes that it attempted to assist landowners with recurring water problems by obtaining agreements to work on private property, ¶11 We agree with the County that it was under no duty to make public improvements to the landowners' drainage system. CONCLUSION ¶12 This Court may not, through the use of statutory construction, change, modify or amend the expressed intent of the Legislature. ¶13 To support an actionable claim for negligence, a plaintiff must establish the concurrent existence of: a duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury; a failure of the defendant to perform that duty; and an injury to the plaintiff resulting from the failure of the defendant. COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED. ¶14 KAUGER, C.J., SUMMERS, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, OPALA, WATT, JJ. concur. ¶15 SIMMS, J. concurs in Part I, Dissents from Part II. ¶16 HARGRAVE, WILSON, JJ. concur in part and dissent in part. FOOT