Case Title: Puccio v. State

Citation: 701 So. 2d 858

Docket Number: 86242

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1997-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
701 So. 2d 858 (1997)
Martin PUCCIO, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 86242.

Supreme Court of Florida.
November 20, 1997.
*859 Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender and Paul E. Petillo, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Sara D. Baggett, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty on Martin Puccio. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
Martin Puccio and Bobby Kent had known each other since third grade, had lived on the same block in Broward County since that time, and were good friends as adults. Bad blood, however, existed between the two. Puccio felt "ill-will and hatred" towards Kent because Kent would bully and pummel him. For a few weeks prior to the murder, Kent dated Alice Willis, best friend of Puccio's girlfriend, Lisa Connelly, and when Willis moved back with her parents in Palm Bay, Florida, Kent said he was going to murder her and smother her baby unless she returned to Broward County to date him. Willis returned and she and Connelly concocted a plan to kill Kent. The women obtained a gun and lured Kent to a rock pit in west Broward but backed out at the last minute. Later that night, Kent and Willis were seen holding hands but then, according to Willis, Kent raped her at her house. The next day, July 15, 1993, a wider circle of friends conspired to kill Kent and again lured him to the rock pit. The following were present: Alice Willis, Donald Semenec, Heather Swallers, Lisa Connelly, Martin Puccio, Derek Dzvirko, and Derek Kaufman. While Willis and Swallers distracted Kent, Semenec stabbed him from behind. Puccio then stabbed him in the abdomen, and when Kent tried to flee, Semenec, Kaufman, and Puccio tackled him and stabbed and beat him. Kaufman delivered the final blow with a weighted baseball bat, and he and Puccio threw the body into a canal.
Puccio was charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder and was found guilty as charged.[1] During the penalty phase, relatives, friends, acquaintances, and a mental health expert testified in mitigation. (Puccio's mother testified inter alia that he was a loving child, affectionately called "our little Lover Bug.") The jury recommended death by an eight-to-four vote, and the judge imposed a sentence of death based on two aggravating circumstances,[2] two statutory mitigating circumstances,[3] and several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.[4]
*860 Puccio raises twenty issues on appeal,[5] but we find a single claim dispositive. Puccio claims that the trial court erred in imposing death when other equally culpable co-perpetrators were sentenced to lesser punishments. We agree. A trial court's determination concerning the relative culpability of the co-perpetrators in a first-degree murder case is a finding of fact and will be sustained on review if supported by competent substantial evidence. See generally Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465 (Fla.1992) (relying on the factual statements of the trial judge concerning the relative culpability of the co-perpetrators). Our review of the present record, however, shows that the trial court's determination is not supported by competent substantial evidence.
The trial court noted at various points in its sentencing order that Puccio was more culpable than the other co-perpetrators:
The above statements were based entirely on the trial court's findings of fact. Our reading of the sentencing order, however, reveals that Puccio played no greater a role in the planning and killing of Kent than several of the other co-perpetrators and, in fact, a lesser role than some. The trial court made the following findings of fact in its sentencing order:
In short, the plot to kill Kent was hatched by Alice Willis and Lisa Connelly, and their first recruit was gang leader Derek Kaufman, who had a reputation for violence. Willis and Connelly ignored Kaufman's advice to wait for a carefully constructed plot, and the two women concocted a scheme wherein they would kill Kent that night. The plan flopped, and the next day Derek Dzvirko was enlisted. Prior to the murder that night, Connelly, Willis, Donald Semenec, Dzvirko, Heather Swallers, and Kaufman all discussed various ways to kill Kent as they drove to Puccio's house, where they continued the discussion. When the group proceeded to the rock pit that night with Kent, Puccio carried a knife and a pipe; others carried a second knife and a weighted baseball bat. Semenec struck the initial blow, a knife-wound to Kent's neck. From that point onward, Semenec, Kaufman, and Puccio all participated in the stabbing and beating of Kent. In conclusion, Kaufman bludgeoned Kent with the baseball bat, and then he and Puccio threw the body into the canal.
Nothing in the trial court's findings above indicates that Puccio played a greater role in the planning and killing of Kent than any of the others. In fact, he played a lesser role than others in the planning since he was not present during the initial formulation of the *863 plan or when the group discussed ways to kill Kent on their way to Puccio's house. Puccio also played no greater a role in the actual killing than either Semenec or Kaufmanit was Semenec who initiated the melee with the stab wound to the neck and Kaufman who finished it with the coup de grace with the bat.
The State conceded at trial that Puccio was not a ringleader in the crime. The State's theory was that although Puccio might not have been a leader, he nevertheless was a participant:
We conclude that the trial court's determination that Puccio was more culpable than the others is not supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and is contrary to the State's own theory at trial. Accordingly, we find that Puccio's sentence of death is disproportionate when compared to the sentences of the other equally culpable participants in this crime.[6]See Hazen v. State, 700 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 1997) (reversing death sentence where "two non-triggermen are involved if one of the defendants is a prime instigator and the other is not"); Curtis v. State, 685 So. 2d 1234 (Fla.1996) (reversing death sentence where "the actual killer was sentenced to life"); Scott, 604 So. 2d  at 468-69 (reversing death sentence where the co-perpetrators "were equally culpable participants in the crime"); Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla.1975) (reversing death sentence where "the court that tried the appellant also permitted the `triggerman'... to enter a plea of nolo contendere"). We find the remainder of Puccio's claims to be either moot,[7] not preserved,[8] or without merit.[9]
Based on the foregoing we affirm the convictions and sentences except for the death sentence, which we vacate. We remand for imposition of a life sentence without possibility of parole for twenty-five years on the first degree murder conviction.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.
WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
WELLS, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority's affirmance of Puccio's conviction of first-degree murder.
I dissent because the record evidence fails to support the majority's assertion that the trial judge's order is not based upon competent, substantial evidence. There is ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion. The trial judge merely drew a conclusion from that evidence which is different from that which the majority draws.
The majority does exactly what this Court said in Hudson v. State, 538 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1989), this Court could not do:
The sentences of other defendants to a criminal episode are mitigating circumstances which the present majority reweighs and reevaluates and then places greater emphasis on than did the trial judge. This clearly exceeds this Court's province. The majority claims that what it does is a proportionality review, but it is actually a reweighing.
I conclude that the majority settles upon proportionality as a basis for reversal, because no other basis exists to reverse the trial judge. However, a review of the cases cited by the majority in support of its proportionality reversal only leads to the conclusion that proportionality is not a justifiable basis either.
There can be no question from the record that the evidence supports the conclusion that appellant did the actual killing of the victim. Thus, the majority is obviously wrong in using Hazen v. State, 700 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 1997), as support for a reversal on the basis of proportionality since the majority in Hazen specifically relied upon Hazen not doing the actual killing. Curtis v. State, 685 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla.1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 2521, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (1997), is likewise different, in that Curtis was only seventeen years old and did not do the actual killing. Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465 (Fla.1992), is patently distinguishable because in that case it was the finding of the trial judge that both defendants were equally culpable, whereas here the trial judge found appellant more culpable. Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1975), is factually inapposite, in that this Court's opinion specifically points out that "[t]he record clearly reflects that the defendant-appellant, Slater, was an accomplice and did not have the murder weapon in his hand." Moreover, in Slater, eleven members of the jury recommended a life sentence.
The case which is comparable and which affirmed the trial court's sentence of death against a similar proportionality challenge is Garcia v. State, 492 So. 2d 360 (Fla.1986). The majority unfortunately chooses to omit any reference to Garcia.
[1]  The co-perpetrators were convicted and sentenced as follows: (1) Heather Swallers, second degree murder and conspiracy (seven years imprisonment); (2) Derek Dzvirko, second-degree murder and conspiracy (eleven years imprisonment); (3) Alice Willis, second-degree murder and conspiracy (forty years imprisonment); (4) Donald Semenec, second-degree murder and conspiracy (life and fifteen years imprisonment); (5) Derek Kaufman, first-degree murder and conspiracy (the jury recommended life and he was sentenced to life and thirty years imprisonment); (6) Lisa Connelly, second-degree murder and conspiracy (life and five years imprisonment, which was reversed on appeal and remanded for imposition of a guidelines sentence).
[2]  The court found the following aggravating circumstances to be established: The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner (CCP).
[3]  The court found the following statutory mitigating circumstances to be established: Puccio had no significant prior criminal history; and he was of a young age (twenty years old) at the time of the crime. The court gave each factor little weight.
[4]  The court found the following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances to be established: Puccio used drugs and alcohol during his youth; Puccio has some potential for rehabilitation; Puccio was subjected to stress in his life caused by the victim; Puccio is unlikely to endanger others. The court gave each factor little weight.
[5]  Puccio claims that the court erred on the following points: (1) equally culpable codefendants; (2) CCP; (3) HAC; (4) proportionality; (5) DOC recommended life; (6) CCP instruction; (7) refusing to instruct on extreme duress or substantial domination; (8) allowing the prosecutor to question Dr. Day about Puccio's statements; (9) failing to consider life as an option; (10) allowing Puccio to call a witness without a Faretta hearing; (11) presumption of death; (12) HAC instruction; (13) requirement of "extreme" mental disturbance; (14) defining nonstatutory mitigating circumstances; (15) hearsay statements of Kaufman; (16) Kaufman's statements to Colletti; (17) comment on post-arrest silence; (18) Lemke's testimony concerning "Marty"; (19) reasonable doubt instruction; (20) newly discovered evidence.
[6]  See supra note 1.
[7]  Issues 2, 3, and 5-14 are moot.
[8]  Issues 15 and 19 were not preserved.
[9]  Issues 16, 17, 18 and 20 are without merit.