Case Title: Chapman Nursing Home, Inc. v. Cathy Ann Boddie McDonald

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1060543

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 11/16/07
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1060543
_________________________
Chapman Nursing Home, Inc.
v.
Cathy Ann Boddie McDonald
Appeal from Tallapoosa Circuit Court
(CV-04-9)
SEE, Justice.
Chapman Nursing Home ("CNH") appeals from a summary
judgment entered in favor of Cathy Ann Boddie McDonald.  The
1060543
2
trial court found that CNH's claims of fraud and civil theft
were barred by the affirmative defenses of res judicata and
collateral estoppel.  We affirm on the basis that CNH's claims
are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Facts and Procedural History
In March 2003, CNH terminated the employment of Cathy Ann
Boddie McDonald and James Chapman.  McDonald had been employed
as a bookkeeper, and her job responsibilities included
accepting and depositing the checks of residents at CNH.  CNH
accused both McDonald and Chapman of endorsing and cashing
checks that were payable to CNH.  CNH claims that because of
Chapman and McDonald's actions, CNH has been deprived of over
$1,000,000.
After CNH terminated McDonald's employment, McDonald
applied for unemployment compensation pursuant to § 25-4-1 et
seq., Ala. Code 1975.  A hearing officer of the Department of
Industrial 
Relations, 
the 
administrative 
agency 
that
determines 
unemployment-compensation 
eligibility, 
heard
McDonald's claim.  The hearing officer found that McDonald was
eligible 
to 
receive 
unemployment-compensation 
benefits 
despite
CNH's argument that McDonald was not eligible because, CNH
1060543
Section 25-4-78(3)a, Ala. Code 1975, provides that an
1
individual is disqualified from receiving unemployment-
compensation benefits if that individual "was discharged or
removed from his work for a dishonest or criminal act
committed in connection with his work."
3
argued, she engaged in dishonest and criminal acts.   CNH
1
appealed the hearing officer's decision to the hearings and
appeals division of the Department of Industrial Relations.
CNH and McDonald were represented by counsel on appeal, and
both parties presented testimony and admitted documents into
evidence.  The appeals division affirmed the decision of the
hearing officer and stated that "[t]he evidence does not show
conclusively that the claimant misappropriated company funds
or knowingly aided and abetted others in the theft of funds."
CNH applied for leave to appeal that decision to the board of
appeals pursuant to § 25-4-92(c), Ala. Code 1975.  The board
of appeals denied CNH's application for leave to appeal.  CNH
promptly appealed to the Coosa Circuit Court pursuant to § 25-
4-95, Ala. Code 1975, which provides that the appropriate
circuit court for judicial review of the decision of a hearing
officer of the Department of Industrial Relations is the
circuit court in the county where the claimant resides.  The
statute specifies that the trial in the circuit court is de
1060543
4
novo. 
While the appeal of the hearing officer's decision was
pending in the Coosa Circuit Court, CNH brought a civil action
against McDonald and James Chapman in the Tallapoosa Circuit
Court alleging fraud, negligence/wantonness, conspiracy to
commit fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, suppression, and civil
theft.  McDonald moved to dismiss the civil action or, in the
alternative, to transfer the civil action pursuant to  § 6-5-
440, Ala. Code 1975,  from the Tallapoosa Circuit Court to the
Coosa Circuit Court.  Section 6-5-440 provides:
"No plaintiff is entitled to prosecute two
actions in the courts of this state at the same time
for the same cause and against the same party.  In
such a case, the defendant may require the plaintiff
to elect which he will prosecute, if commenced
simultaneously, and the pendency of the former is a
good defense to the latter if commenced at different
times."  
The Tallapoosa Circuit Court granted McDonald's motion to
transfer.  CNH then petitioned this Court for the writ of
mandamus asking this Court to set aside the transfer order.
We held that the transfer was not authorized by § 6-5-440 and
issued the writ of mandamus.  Ex parte Chapman Nursing Home,
Inc., 903 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2004).  
At the time, CNH's administrative appeal from the
1060543
Section 6-5-440 provides that "the defendant may require
2
the plaintiff to elect which he will prosecute, if [the two
actions are] commenced simultaneously," and if they are "for
the same cause and against the same party."  Whether § 6-5-440
applied to these actions is not a question before us on this
appeal. 
At this stage of the proceedings, McDonald remained the
3
only defendant in CNH's civil action because the trial court
had previously granted CNH's motion to dismiss with prejudice
James Chapman as a defendant in the case.
5
decision of the hearing officer was still pending in the Coosa
Circuit Court.  The civil action in the Tallapoosa Circuit
Court did not immediately go to trial, and the case was twice
set for a docket call.  On December 29, 2005, McDonald moved
the trial court pursuant to § 6-5-440 to require CNH to elect
which action it chose to pursue.   McDonald contended that the
2
Tallapoosa and Coosa County actions required similar factual
resolutions, and, as a result, that CNH was not entitled to
pursue simultaneous actions under the statute.  CNH responded
by notifying the Tallapoosa Circuit Court that "[p]laintiff
elects to prosecute the above styled action in Tallapoosa
County."  Following CNH's election to pursue its civil action
in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court, the Department of Industrial
Relations moved the Coosa Circuit Court to dismiss CNH's
administrative appeal pending in that court.   The Coosa
3
1060543
CNH points out in its brief to this Court that McDonald
4
amended her answer without leave of court as required by Rule
15(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.  However, the record contains no
evidence indicating that CNH objected to McDonald's amended
answer; therefore, any argument that her amendment was
improper has not been properly preserved for appellate review.
See Bechtel v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 451 So. 2d 793,
796 (Ala. 1984) ("'If an affirmative defense is not pleaded it
is waived to the extent that the party who should have pleaded
the affirmative defense may not introduce evidence in support
thereof, unless the adverse party makes no objection in which
case the issues are enlarged ....'") (quoting Smith v.
Combustion Res. Eng'g, Inc., 431 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Ala.
1983)).  
6
Circuit Court granted that motion and dismissed CNH's appeal.
Several months after CNH's administrative appeal in the
Coosa Circuit Court had been dismissed, McDonald amended her
answer to assert that CNH's civil claims were barred by the
affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel.4
McDonald then moved for a summary judgment, arguing that
questions as to her involvement in the alleged fraud and theft
had already been decided in the unemployment-compensation
hearing.  The Tallapoosa Circuit Court agreed with McDonald
and, entered a summary judgment in her favor.  CNH now
appeals.
Standard of Review
"We review the trial court's grant or denial of a summary
judgment motion de novo."  Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
1060543
7
Co., 952 So. 2d 342, 346 (Ala. 2006) (citing Bockman v. WCH,
L.L.C., 943 So. 2d 789 (Ala. 2006)).  A summary judgment is
proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  If the movant meets this
initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
present "substantial evidence" showing that a genuine issue of
material fact exists.  Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen.  Ins. Co., 742
So. 2d 182, 184 (Ala. 1999).  Substantial evidence is
"evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons
in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved."  West v. Founders
Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.
1989).  In determining whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists, this Court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant and resolves all reasonable doubts
in favor of the nonmovant.  Jones v. BP Oil Co., 632 So. 2d
435, 436 (Ala. 1993).  Moreover, "[t]he trial court's ruling
on a question of law carries no presumption of correctness,
and this Court reviews de novo the trial court's conclusion as
to the appropriate legal standard to be applied." Dunlap v.
Regions Fin. Corp., [Ms. 1060384, October 5, 2007] ___ So. 2d
1060543
8
___, ___ (Ala. 2007) (citing Ex parte Graham, 702 So. 2d 1215,
1221 (Ala. 1997)).
Analysis
CNH argues that the Tallapoosa Circuit Court erred by
entering a summary judgment in favor of McDonald on the
grounds of res judicata because, it argues, the requirements
for res judicata are not satisfied.  CNH contends that there
is no final judgment on the merits, that the parties in the
two actions are not the same, and that the administrative
appeal and the civil action are not the same causes of action
because 
different 
standards 
of 
proof 
apply 
in 
the
administrative appeal and the civil action.  CNH also argues
that even if res judicata or collateral estoppel does apply,
McDonald should be estopped from raising those affirmative
defenses because it was she who compelled CNH to elect which
action it would pursue, and it is that election that resulted
in the dismissal of CNH's administrative appeal in the Coosa
Circuit Court.
We initially address whether the affirmative defenses of
res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to procedurally bar
CNH's civil action in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court. 
1060543
9
"Res judicata and collateral estoppel are two
closely related, judicially created doctrines that
preclude the relitigation of matters that have been
previously adjudicated or, in the case of res
judicata, that could have been adjudicated in a
prior action.
"'The doctrine of res judicata, while
actually embodying two basic concepts,
usually refers to what commentators label
"claim 
preclusion," 
while 
collateral
estoppel ... refers to "issue preclusion,"
which is a subset of the broader res
judicata  doctrine.'"
Lee L. Saad Constr. Co. v. DPF Architects, P.C., 851 So. 2d
507, 516 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Little v. Pizza Wagon, Inc., 432
So. 2d 1269, 1272 (Ala. 1983) (Jones, J., concurring
specially)).  Two causes of action are the same for res
judicata purposes when the following four elements are
satisfied: "(1) a prior judgment on the merits, (2) rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) with substantial
identity of the parties, and (4) with the same cause of action
presented in both actions."  Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc. v.
Vinson, 723 So. 2d 634, 636 (Ala. 1998).  "If those four
elements are present, then any claim that was, or that could
have been, adjudicated in the prior action is barred from
further litigation."  Id. (citing Dairyland Ins. Co. v.
Jackson, 566 So. 2d 723, 725-26 (Ala. 1990)).
1060543
Section 25-4-94(d), Ala. Code 1975, provides that, in the
5
absence of an appeal, a decision of the board of appeals
becomes final 10 days after the parties receive notice of the
decision by mail.  Section 25-4-95, Ala. Code 1975, provides
that within 30 days after the decision of the board of appeals
has become final, a party may seek judicial review of the
decision by filing a notice of appeal in the circuit court in
the county where the claimant resides.  
10
CNH denies that the first element of res judicata, a
prior judgment on the merits, is satisfied because the final
judgment McDonald relies upon is the Coosa Circuit Court's
dismissal of its administrative appeal.  CNH contends that the
dismissal was not a prior judgment on the merits because the
dismissal order recognized that CNH had elected to pursue the
action in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court rather than the Coosa
Circuit Court.  McDonald responds that there is a final
judgment on the merits because, she argues, the hearing
officer's findings that McDonald had not engaged in dishonest
or criminal behavior became final by operation of law when CNH
dismissed its appeal and the statutory time allotted for
appeal had elapsed.   
5
We agree with McDonald that CNH's dismissal of its appeal
from the decision of the administrative agency operates as a
final judgment on the merits.  CNH appealed the adverse
decision of the hearing officer to the Coosa Circuit Court
1060543
11
pursuant to § 25-4-95, Ala. Code 1975.  CNH subsequently
dismissed its appeal, and once CNH's time to appeal the
decision of the hearing officer had elapsed, the dismissal of
the appeal was effectively with prejudice.  Ex parte Buffalo
Rock Co., 941 So. 2d 273, 278 (Ala. 2006) ("[An] agreement to
dismiss personal-injury claim without prejudice precluded the
filing of a new claim when plaintiff failed to present
evidence indicating that agreement included waiver of the
statute-of-limitations 
defense." 
(summarizing 
holding 
in 
Jones
v. Phillips, 553 So. 2d 106 (Ala. 1989))).  Once the time for
appeal had expired, the hearing officer's decision that CNH
had failed to adduce sufficient evidence proving that McDonald
had committed fraud became a final judgment on the merits.  We
therefore conclude that the first element of res judicata is
satisfied.
The second element of res judicata is that the final
judgment on the merits must have been rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction.  This second element is satisfied
because this Court has held that an administrative agency is
empowered to issue decisions on matters that fall within the
ambit of its statutory jurisdiction.  "'The rule which forbids
1060543
12
the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-
judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers
and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the
judgments of courts having general judicial powers.'" Limbaugh
v. Board of Managers, City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Sys.,
628 So. 2d 623, 624 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (quoting Mahaffey v.
Board of Managers, 515 So. 2d 1261, 1262 (Ala. Civ. App.
1987)). 
 
Because 
the 
hearing 
officer 
has 
statutory
jurisdiction to render binding decisions on unemployment-
compensation-benefit claims, the decision that McDonald was
entitled to unemployment benefits was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
CNH argues that the third element of res judicata is not
satisfied because, it says, the parties in the unemployment-
compensation dispute differed from the parties in the civil
action.  CNH argues that the parties in the two cases are not
substantially similar because the Department of Industrial
Relations was a defendant in the unemployment-compensation
action, but it is not a party in the civil action.  McDonald
contends that the parties in the two actions are substantially
1060543
13
similar because CNH and McDonald were adverse parties in the
unemployment-compensation dispute and are adverse parties in
the civil action.  We agree with McDonald.  
"'[T]he party identity criterion of res judicata does not
require complete identity, but only that the party against
whom res judicata is asserted was either a party or in privity
with a party to the prior action[.]'" Dairyland Ins. Co. v.
Jackson, 566 So. 2d at 725 (quoting Whisman v. Alabama Power
Co., 512 So. 2d 78, 82 (Ala. 1987)).  Our caselaw requires
that "there is a substantial identity of parties in the two
actions." Ex parte Ford Motor Credit Co., 772 So. 2d 437, 440
(Ala. 2000).  Substantial identity requires that the "'parties
be identical, sometimes referred to as the mutuality of
estoppel requirement.'" Stewart v. Brinley, 902 So. 2d 1, 10
(Ala. 2004) (quoting McMillian v. Johnson, 878 F. Supp. 1473,
1520 (M.D. Ala. 1995)).  CNH is incorrect that the presence of
the Department of Industrial Relations as one of the
defendants in the unemployment-compensation action destroys
the element of substantial identity of the parties in this
case.  CNH was adverse to McDonald in the unemployment-
compensation action and is currently adverse to McDonald in
1060543
14
this civil action.  Therefore, CNH and McDonald satisfy the
mutuality-of-estoppel requirement.
The fourth and final element of res judicata is that the
same cause of action must be present in both actions.
McDonald argues that the two actions are the same for res
judicata purposes because, she says, the conduct CNH claims
was fraudulent and dishonest arises out of the same nucleus of
operative facts.  McDonald asserts that "[b]oth the Coosa case
(along with the administrative hearing) and the Tallapoosa
case share one central issue: the reason for McDonald's
discharge, i.e., the sufficiency of the evidence of her
alleged defalcation."  McDonald's brief at 20.  CNH contends
that the causes of action in the unemployment-compensation
action and the civil action are not the same actions because,
it says, the two actions serve different purposes.  The
purpose of the unemployment-compensation action was to
determine McDonald's eligibility for unemployment benefits,
but in the civil action CNH seeks monetary compensation for
the fraudulent theft that CNH alleges McDonald engaged in
while she was a CNH employee.  We disagree.  
Discussing the same-cause-of-action element of res
1060543
15
judicata, this Court has noted that "'"the principal test for
comparing causes of action [for the application of res
judicata] is whether the primary right and duty or wrong are
the same in each action."'" Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier,
790 So. 2d 922, 928 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Wesch v. Folsom, 6
F.3d 1465, 1471 (11th Cir. 1993)).  This Court further stated:
"'Res judicata applies not only to the exact legal theories
advanced in the prior case, but to all legal theories and
claims arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts.'"
790 So. 2d at 928 (quoting Wesch, 6 F.3d at 1471).  As a
result, two causes of action are the same for res judicata
purposes "'when the same evidence is applicable in both
actions.'"  Old Republic Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d at 928 (quoting
Hughes v. Martin, 533 So. 2d 188, 191 (Ala. 1988)).
In Broughton v. Merchants National Bank, 476 So. 2d 97
(Ala. 1985), this Court held that the same-cause-of-action
requirement was satisfied under circumstances similar to those
here.  In that case, Elliott Broughton, an heir of the
decedent, challenged the settlement of the decedent's estate
because, he alleged, Merchants Bank, the administrator and
executor of the estate, had mismanaged the assets of a living
1060543
16
trust, thereby depriving Broughton of a portion of his
testamentary disposition.  The probate court disagreed and
found 
that 
Merchants 
had 
properly 
administered 
Mrs.
Broughton's estate. 476 So. 2d at 99.  Instead of appealing
the decision of the probate court, Broughton filed a new
complaint in the Mobile Circuit Court alleging negligence,
willful and wanton neglect, reckless mismanagement of the
trust, fraud, and conspiracy to defraud.  Broughton contended
that the doctrine of res judicata did not apply because he had
not raised the tort claims in the contest challenging
Merchants Bank's handling of the estate. 476 So. 2d at 99-100.
The trial court held that Broughton's claims were barred by
the doctrine of res judicata, and this Court affirmed that
decision, stating that "the allegations asserted by Broughton
in the probate court and the claims he now asserts in this
case arose from the same nucleus of circumstances, those being
Merchants' handling of the trust and the estate, as well as
the 
alleged 
conflict 
of 
interest 
or 
fraud 
resulting
therefrom." 476 So. 2d at 102.  This Court also concluded that
the two actions were the same for res judicata purposes
because "Broughton ha[d] not presented in this action any new
or different evidence from that which he presented in the
1060543
17
probate court." 476 So. 2d at 102.
In 
this 
case, 
CNH 
defended 
against 
McDonald's
unemployment-compensation 
action 
by 
arguing 
that 
her 
dishonest
and criminal acts defrauded CNH of over $1,000,000 and
disqualified her for unemployment-compensation benefits.
After the hearing officer determined that McDonald was
eligible to receive unemployment-compensation, CNH brought a
civil action in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court alleging, among
other charges, that McDonald had committed fraud, conspiracy
to commit fraud, and civil theft.  Like the conduct at issue
in Broughton, the conduct that formed the basis of CNH's
defense in the unemployment-compensation action and the
conduct that forms the basis of CNH's claims in the civil
action both arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts.
Moreover, CNH would have to present substantially the same
evidence in its civil action that it presented in its
unemployment-compensation action because both cases require
evidence directed at proving that McDonald defrauded CNH. 
CNH further contends that the unemployment-compensation
action and this civil action are not the same cause of action
for res judicata purposes because the standard of proof
1060543
18
applied in the unemployment-compensation action differs from
that applied in this civil suit.  CNH points to language in
the written decision of the appeals division of the Department
of Industrial Relations that "[t]he evidence does not show
conclusively that the claimant misappropriated company funds
or knowingly aided and abetted others in the theft of funds."
CNH argues that this language illustrates that the appeals
division applied a "conclusive-evidence" standard of proof in
the unemployment proceeding and further contends that this
conclusive-evidence 
standard 
is 
higher 
than 
the 
preponderance-
of-the-evidence standard applied in civil cases.  CNH argues
that res judicata should not preclude it from bringing its
claim against McDonald, because, it argues, CNH may be able to
satisfy 
the 
lower 
preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard. 
 
The
language from the decision of the appeals division, however,
is the only evidence CNH provides to substantiate its claim
that the standard of proof in an unemployment-compensation
proceeding is a conclusive-evidence standard.  CNH does not
cite any statute or caselaw that demonstrates that the
standard of proof in unemployment-compensation proceedings is
higher than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in
1060543
We note that § 25-4-78, Ala. Code 1975, apparently does
6
not specify the standard of proof that applies when an
employer raises a defense to an unemployment-compensation
claim.  We have generally held that "'a claimant has the
burden of proving that he or she is eligible to receive
benefits under Ala. Code 1975, § 25-4-77, and that he or she
is not disqualified from receiving benefits by § 25-4-78.'"
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Hepp, 882 So. 2d 329, 333 (Ala. 2003)
(quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Smitherman, 743 So. 2d 442,
445 (Ala. 1999)). Significantly, the Workers' Compensation
Act, a counterpart statute to the unemployment-compensation
statute, specifies that the general standard of proof to
determine 
eligibility 
or 
disqualification 
for 
workers'
compensation benefits is the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard.  § 25-5-81(c), Ala. Code 1975. 
It is not sufficient to demonstrate that a higher
7
standard 
was 
erroneously 
applied 
in 
this 
particular
unemployment-compensation case, because any such claim of
error 
was 
abandoned 
when 
CNH 
failed 
to 
appeal 
the
administrative decision on that ground. Butler Cotton Oil Co.
v. Brooks, 204 Ala. 195, 197, 85 So. 778, 779 (1920)
19
civil cases.   "'When an appellant fails to cite any authority
6
for an argument on a particular issue, this Court may affirm
the judgment as to that issue, for it is neither this Court's
duty nor its function to perform an appellant's legal
research.'"  Ex parte Showers, 812 So. 2d 277, 281 (Ala. 2001)
(citing City of Birmingham v. Business Realty Inv. Co., 722
So. 2d 747, 752 (Ala. 1998)).  Nor does CNH present an
argument that the standard of proof in unemployment-
compensation 
proceedings 
is 
higher 
than 
the 
general
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.   Therefore, because
7
1060543
("Appellant's motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
the transcript was not filed in the office of the clerk within
60 days after the signing of the bill of exceptions ... is
waived by the failure to submit the motion at the time of
submission on the merits.").
20
CNH has not demonstrated that the standard of proof in an
unemployment-compensation proceeding is higher than that in a
civil action, we are not persuaded that the two proceedings
are different causes of action for res judicata purposes.  
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
four 
requirements 
for 
the
application of res judicata have been satisfied and that CNH's
claims against McDonald are barred.  Because we find that
CNH's civil action is barred by res judicata, we do not
address McDonald's separate collateral estoppel argument.
CNH asserts further that even if the affirmative defenses
of res judicata and collateral estoppel are available to
McDonald, she should be judicially estopped from raising those
defenses because, it says, McDonald's argument that § 6-5-440
required CNH to elect whether to pursue its civil action in
Tallapoosa County or its administrative appeal in Coosa County
is inconsistent with her argument that the civil action is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  CNH contends that
McDonald's maneuver in invoking the election statute forced it
1060543
21
to choose between (1) pursuing the administrative appeal and
attempting 
to 
disqualify 
McDonald 
from 
unemployment-
compensation benefits, and (2) dismissing the administrative
appeal, which permitted McDonald to receive unemployment
benefits but which presumably was going to allow CNH to seek
monetary damages for fraud and other claims in its civil
action.  McDonald, however, argues that she did not change her
position throughout the course of the two proceedings because,
she 
says, 
she 
has 
consistently 
maintained 
that 
the
administrative appeal in the Coosa Circuit Court and the civil
action in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court were the same cause of
action.  McDonald contends that under § 6-5-440, Ala. Code
1975, CNH is not permitted to pursue the same cause of action
in two separate actions, and that she therefore properly
exercised the statutory prerogative to have CNH elect which
action it chose to pursue. 
For judicial estoppel to apply,
"'(1) "a party's later position must be 'clearly
inconsistent' with its earlier position"; (2) the
party must have been successful in the prior
proceeding so that "judicial acceptance of an
inconsistent position in a later proceeding would
create 'the perception that either the first or
second court was misled'" (quoting Edwards v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982));
1060543
22
and (3) the party seeking to assert an inconsistent
position must "derive an unfair advantage or impose
an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not
estopped." 532 U.S. at 750-51, 121 S. Ct. 1808. No
requirement of a showing of privity or reliance
appears in the foregoing statement of factors to
consider in determining the applicability of the
doctrine of judicial estoppel."
Middleton v. Caterpillar Indus. Inc., [Ms. 1050939, August 17,
2007]     So. 2d     (Ala. 2007) (quoting Ex parte First
Alabama Bank, 883 So. 2d 1236, 1246 (Ala. 2003) (citing in
turn New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001)).
We are not persuaded that judicial estoppel applies here.
The procedural history supports McDonald's claim that she has
maintained 
consistent 
positions 
throughout 
the 
two
proceedings.  She initially argued that the civil action
pending in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court should have been
transferred to the Coosa Circuit Court because the civil
action and the administrative appeal were "in fact two civil
actions pending against her for the 'same cause of action.'"
McDonald's brief at 24.  After we held that the transfer was
not authorized by § 6-5-440, Ala. Code 1975, McDonald asserted
that CNH was required to elect which action it wished to
pursue, because CNH was not entitled to pursue the same action
against her in two different courts.  Thus, McDonald never
1060543
23
altered her position that the two cases were the same cause of
action.  After the decision of the hearing officer became
final, McDonald raised the defense of res judicata on the
ground that the Tallapoosa action had already been litigated.
Thus, McDonald has maintained a consistent position, and we
conclude that McDonald is not judicially estopped from raising
the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral
estoppel.  
Conclusion
Because we hold that the doctrine of res judicata applies
to bar this action and that McDonald is not judicially
estopped from raising that defense, we conclude that the trial
court did not err in entering the summary judgment in favor of
McDonald, and we therefore affirm that judgment. 
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.