Case Title: STATE v STEWART

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1973-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12382 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1973 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS - DAVID LEE STEWART, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of t h e Fourteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : James Reno argued, Billings, Montana Joseph E. Mudd argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. C. Weingartner, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Roy C. Rodeghiero argued, Roundup, Montana - Submitted: February 28, 1973 Decided: MAR 1 6 1 9 n Filed : MAR 1 6 1973 M r . Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from the district court of the fourteenth judicial district in Musselshell County with the Honorable Nat Allen presiding. The defendant i s appealing from a jury verdict finding him guilty of the crime of burglary in the second degree and a denial of the defendant's motion for a new t r i a l . From the record i t appears that John W. O w e n resided on a ranch in Musselshell County, and arrived home from work about 6:30 p.m. on July 6 , 1972 and remained there unxil 7:OC p.m. A t this time his home was in order, n o t h i n g was missing. O w e n then went to his uncle's house and returned to his home a t approximately 9:45 p.m. O w e n testified that he was going to l i e down and watch television before going to bed, and a t this point he realized that his television was missing. O w e n changed clothes and was preparing to go to Roundup to report the theft when he heard a knock a t his back door. O w e n answered the knock; how- ever, no one was there. Another knock was heard a t the front door which, when answered, produced the defendant David Lee Stewart. Stewart, according t o Owen's testimony, was "standing there with long straggly hair and a shirt with red and white stripes on i t and he had a knife in his hands, or i t was mostly concealed by the palms of his hands, over the sheath of the knife which the blade was in, and the other palm of his hand had the handle of it and i t seemed to be predominantly leveled to me." Stewart told O w e n that Stewart's friend had stolen Owen's television and stereo and had lost the keys t o his car. Stewart promised O w e n that if he could help locate the keys that he would return the stolen articles. Stewart, with the aid of Owen's flashlight, began looking for the keys i n the house--directing his investigation to those areas where the television and stereo were formerly located, O w e n went t o his uncle's house to obtain another flashlight, however, he also borrowed his uncle's shotgun. O w e n then returned t o Stewart, who was waiting by his automobile several hundred yards from Owen's house. Stewart had s t i l l not located the keys to his automobile. Holding the shotgun in his hand, O w e n stated that he did not believe Stewart's story, and O w e n wanted t o know who Stewart's friend was that took his stereo and television. Stewart refused to identify his friend. Owen, to demonstrate his sincerity in getting to the basis of the robbery, fired one barrel of his shotgun, the volley of pellets being directed a t the defendant's side. Stewart s t i l l was unwilling to volunteer any information in regard to the details of the robbery. O w e n fired another shotgun blast, b u t the pel lets were directed a t the other side of Stewart. Stewart s t i l l refused to give any information in regard t o the robbery. O w e n procured the local law en- forcement personnel who, with the help of O w e n and his friend, apprehended the defendant and recovered the television and stereo from the vicinity of Stewart 's automobi 1 e. Four issues are presented to this Court for review. First, did the district court err in granting the state's motion to amend the charge in the information from burglary in the f i r s t degree to burglary? Second, did the district court err in proceeding with the t r i a l ? Third, did the district court err i n denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict? Fourth, did the district court err in refusing to give defendant's offered instructions Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and l l ? First, the district court did not err in granting the prosecution's motion to amend the charges in the information from burglary in the f i r s t degree to burglary. A s the record indicates, the defendant was charged with burglary in the f i r s t degree. On the day set for trial the prosecution amended the charge to burglary. The defendant objected t o this, claiming that the substance of the charge was substantially changed. This objection was overruled. Defendant n o w contends that the court erred in permitting the information to be amended. This Court has just recently held t h a t an information may charge a defendant w i t h the crime of burglary. State ex rel. Wilson v. District Court, 159 Mont. 439, 498 P.2d 1217, 29 St.Rep. 523. In the instant case the prosecution did just that, leaving the question of the degree of bur- glary to the jury. The question to be decided by this Court i s whether the amended information charged a crime different i n nature from that previously charged, and if such amendment sufficiently apprised the defend- ant of the charges against him. The crime charged i s the same, i,e., burglary. The elements of the crime are the same. The proof to the crime would remain the same. The only difference between the two charges would be the degree of the crime, which must be determined by the jury. The amendment of the information did not surprise the defendant and did not prohibit him from preparing his de- fense against the crime. Defendant claims he was prejudiced by the district court's holding, b u t he has failed to show h o w this alleged error affected any of his substan- tial rights. The prosecution and defense both thoroughly investigated the incident. A s the transcript shows, a1 1 the evidence presented firmly shows h o w and when the burglary transpired. All the evidence and testimony support the prosecution Is case. The original information charged the defendant with burglary i n the f i r s t degree: that i s , during the nighttime. If this charge had been allowed t o stand the prosecution would have had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant comitted the burglary during the nighttime. If the prose- cution could not do this, or the jury believed that the defendant did commit the burglary b u t that he did the act during the daytime, then the defendant would have to be acquitted of the charge against him. On a specific charge of f i r s t degree burglary there may not be a conviction for second degree burglary. State ex rel. Wilson v. District Court, supra. Second degree burglary is not a lesser included offense of f i r s t degree burglary. Section 95-1 505(b), R.C .M. 1947, permits the charge against the accused to be amended a t any time provided " * * * no additional or different offense i s charged and if the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." N o additional or different offense was charged by allowing the amendment; the crime was the same, the offense was the same, and only the degree of the crime was altered. The defendant has not shown h o w any of his substantial rights were prejudiced, nor has he shown any surprise or inabil i ty to prepare a defense because of the district court's holding. A point was brought out in oral argument before this Court that i s worthy of note. On the Friday before the t r i a l , the county attorney of Musselshell County informed the defense counsel that the charge would be amended from f i r s t degree burglary to burglary. The second issue raised on the appeal i s , did the trial court err i n proceeding with the t r i a l ? The defendant maintains that the district court erred in a1 lowing the information to be amended and further erred when the district court proceeded with the trial without giving the defend- a n t the chance t o enter a plea t o the amended information. Defendant did not enter a plea to the charge of burglary, although he had entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of f i r s t degree burglary. The defendant did not request the court to allow him to enter a plea to the amended charge. If the defendant believed that he could have properly en- tered a plea to the charge of burglary, and if he further believed that the failure of the court t o have him enter a plea violated his substantial rights, Stewart should have brought this matter t o the attention of the district court. An elementary principle of law exists that states if a plea i s not entered by the defendant the court will enter a plea of not guilty for him. Section 95-1606(e), R.C.M. 1947. The defendant, if he desired to plead guilty, could have pled guilty a t any time. Section 95-1902, R.C.M. 1947. N o error was committed in not allowing the defendant to enter a plea to the amended i n - formation. The third issue presented to this Court i s whether or not the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The rule with regard to the granting of motions for directed ver- dicts was stated by this Court in State v. Yoss, 146 Mont. 508, 514, 409 "A directed verdict in a criminal case in this juris- diction is given only where the State fails to prove its case and there is no evidence upon which a jury could base its verdict." In considering whether the district court erred in refusing to grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Peschon, 131 Mont. 330, 310 P.2d 591. Here witnesses testified as to the incidents that followed the dis- covery of the missing articles. The district court was correct in submitting the case to the jury. This Court also notes that when substantial evidence in the district court record supports the verdict we will not disturb the district court's findings on appeal. State v. Walker, 1 4 8 Mont. 216, 419 P.2d 300, The fourth issue raised by the defendant is that the district court erred in refusing to give defendant's offered instructions Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 1 0 and 11. Proposed instruction No. 6 would have instructed the jury that de- fendant was charged with burglary in the first degree. This is not true. Defendant was charged with burglary and the degree of the crime was left for the jury to determine, Proposed instruction No. 7 would have instructed the jury that, as a matter of law, they cannot find the defendant guilty of first degree burglary but that they could find him guilty of second degree burglary. This is not true. Defendant was charged with burglary--the jury had the duty to assess the degree of the crime. Proposed instruction No. 8 was an instruction regarding intent to commi t a felony. This instruction was previously covered by instructions numbered 7, 8, 9 and 10. Proposed instruction No. 9 was given. Defendant cannot claim error when one of his offered instructions is given, Proposed instruction No. 10 would have instructed the jury that even if they did find that defendant committed the burglary, they must return a verdict of not guilty if they believed the burglary was committed in the day- time. This i s not true. Defendant was charged with burglary. The degree of burglary had to be decided by the jury. Proposed instruction No. 11 would have instructed the jury that de- fendant was charged with f i r s t degree burglary and in order t o find him guilty they must find that the burglary was committed during the nighttime. This was not true and i t was proper to return a verdict of second degree burglary. The Court finds t h a t the district court did not err i n refusing to give these instructions. The judgment is affirmed. M e concur: Asso iate Justices \ Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell and Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly dissenting: W e respectfully dissent to the view of the majority. While the majority seem to tacitly recognize that Montana statutes prohibit an amendment of the charge i n a matter of substance after defend- ant enters his plea, they reason that the difference between a charge of f i r s t degree burglary and second degree burglary i s simply a matter of form. The difficulty with this approach i s that i t does n o t square w i t h Montana statutes which treat the two as separate, independent and distinct crimes. The essential elements of the two crimes are different, f i r s t degree burglary requiring commission in the nighttime, while second degree burglary requires comi ssion in the daytime. Section 94-902, R.C.M. 1947. A person cannot be convicted of second degree burglary under a charge of f i r s t degree burglary, the former not being a lesser included offense in the latter. State v. Copenhaver, 35 Mont. 342, 89 P. 61, cited with approval in State v. Board, 135 Mont. 139, 337 P.2d 924; State ex rel. Wilson v. Dist. C t . , 159 Mont. 439, 498 P.2d 1217. The punishment for the two crimes is different, one to fifteen years imprisonment in the state prison for f i r s t degree burglary as compared with not more than five years imprisonment for second degree burglary. Section 94-903, R.C.M. 1947. Are these differences simply matters of form without substance? Additionally, the majori ty hold that the defendant was not prejudiced by what was done here because no substantial right of his was violated. In our view, this rationale ignores the who1 e constitutional and statutory frame- work of f a i r trial guarantees on which our system of criminal justice i s bottomed. To p u t the matter in perspective, the issue for review in this case is not the ultimate guilt or innocence of the defendant, b u t whether he had a f a i r t r i a l . Here on the day of trial the defendant was stripped of a clear and absolute defense t o the original charge by reason of the amendment, and denied a continuance t o prepare a defense to the amended charge. In our view, fair trial guarantees were sacrificed on the altar of trial convenience and expediency in this case. For these reasons, w e would grant the defendant a new t r i a l .