Case Title: James G. Schwab v. Helen Timmons

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1997AP001997

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1997 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
James G. Schwab and Katherine Schwab,  
 
Plaintiffs-Co-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Dorice McCormick,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Helen Timmons, Carl D. Lenz Trust, Robert B. 
Bruce, Henry & Phyllis Pelletier, Robert W. 
Beart, Helen E. Beart, Robert W. Beart, Jr., 
Beth A. Drost, Stanford & Susan Sholem, Oscar C. 
& Patricia F. Boldt, John Zimdars, Jr., John C. 
Zimdars, Jr. Trust, Nan M. Zimdars Trust, Warren  
T. Davis, Jr., R. Garret & Marjorie M. Phillips, 
Anne M. West, Robert C. Davis, James M. Rock, 
Barbara S. Monroe, James S. & Ann W. Reeve and 
Anne S. Hobler,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(No Cite) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 12, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 12, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Door 
 
JUDGE: 
Peter C. Diltz 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-co-appellants-petitioners and 
plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Thomas P. 
Lyons, Jennifer L. Sielaff and Cunningham & Lyons, S.C., 
Milwaukee and Charles D. Koehler and Herrling, Clark, Hartzheim & 
Siddall, LTD., Appleton and oral argument by Thomas P. Lyons & 
Richard T. Elrod of Herrling, Clark, Hartzheim & Siddal. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Carl D. Lenz Trust, 
there was a brief by John F. Scanlan and Reetz & Scanlan, S.C., 
Fish Creek and oral argument by Brett Eric Reetz. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents, Beart, Drost, 
Sholem, Boldt, Zimdars Trust, Phillips & Davis, there was a brief 
by Robert A. Ross and Ross Law Office, Sturgeon Bay and oral 
argument by Robert A. Ross. 
 
No. 
97-1997 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1997 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
James G. Schwab and Katherine Schwab,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Co-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Dorice McCormick,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Helen Timmons, Carl D. Lenz Trust, Robert  
B. Bruce, Henry & Phyllis Pelletier,  
Robert W. Beart, Helen E. Beart, Robert  
W. Beart, Jr., Beth A. Drost, Stanford &  
Susan Sholem, Oscar C. & Patricia F.  
Boldt, John Zimdars, Jr., John C. Zimdars  
Jr. Trust, Nan M. Zimdars Trust, Warren  
T. Davis, Jr., R. Garret & Marjorie M.  
Phillips, Anne M. West, Robert C. Davis,  
James M. Rock, Barbara S. Monroe, James  
S. & Ann W. Reeve and Anne S. Hobler,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents.  
FILED 
 
FEB 12, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JON 
P. 
WILCOX, 
J.  The 
petitioners, 
James 
and 
Katherine Schwab and Dorice McCormick (“petitioners”), seek 
review of a decision affirming the circuit court’s dismissal of 
their declaratory judgment action requesting an easement by 
necessity or by implication for both ingress and egress and 
utilities over the properties owned by the respondents in order 
to gain access to their landlocked parcels located in Door 
No. 
97-1997 
 
2 
County.  The circuit court, as affirmed by the court of appeals, 
concluded that the historical circumstances in this case do not 
fit the typical situation from which ways of necessity are 
implied and that even if they did, the easement would not have 
survived because it was not recorded.   
¶2 
On appeal, the petitioners claim they are entitled to 
an easement by necessity or by implication over the respondents’ 
properties; or in the alternative, they seek an expansion of the 
common law in this state to recognize an easement by necessity 
where property is landlocked due to geographical barriers and 
due to the actions of the common owner and grantor, in this case 
the United States.  We conclude that the petitioners have failed 
to establish entitlement to an easement by implication or by 
necessity either because of actions by the federal government or 
by geographical barriers.  Not only were the parcels at issue 
not landlocked at the time of conveyance, but the petitioners 
themselves created their landlocked parcels when they conveyed 
away their highway access.  We refuse to turn 100-plus years of 
Wisconsin common law on its head to accommodate such actions.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.  
I. 
¶3 
The facts are not in dispute.  The petitioners and the 
respondents all own property that is located on Green Bay in the 
Village of Ephraim in Door County.  The properties are situated 
between the waters of Green Bay on the west and a bluff ranging 
in height from 37 to 60 feet on the east.  The following is a 
diagram of the properties (lots and parcels) involved.   
No. 
97-1997 
 
3 
 
 
This diagram can be found in the record and is designated as 
Exhibit A attached to the petitioners’ original complaint with 
additions and deletions for illustrative purposes.  Thomas v. 
No. 
97-1997 
 
4 
Ashland, Siskiwit & Iron River Logging R.R., 122 Wis. 519, 520, 
100 N.W. 993 (1904); Northern Pine Land Co. v. Bigelow, 84 Wis. 
157, 162, 54 N.W. 496 (1893). 
¶4 
Prior to 1854, the property involved was owned by the 
United States and was divided into three lots: Lot 2, the 
northernmost lot; Lot 3; and Lot 4, the southernmost lot. In 
1854, the United States granted by patent Lot 4 to Ingebret 
Torgerson, but retained Lots 2 and 3.  At the time that Lot 4 
was severed from Lots 2 and 3, the United States did not retain 
a right-of-way through Lot 4 to get to Lots 2 and 3.  At oral 
argument, it was explained that at the time of this conveyance 
by the United States, the eastern boundary of the lots extended 
to the east to what is now a public roadway.  The lots were 
comprised of property both above and below the bluff with access 
to a public roadway from above.  In 1882, the United States 
granted Lots 2 and 3 to Halvor Anderson.  
¶5 
At some point after the United States granted the 
lots, they were further subdivided into parcels.1  After 1854, 
Lots 2, 3, and 4 were never fully owned by one person or entity, 
except that some unspecified parcels within Lots 2, 3, and 4 
were owned by Malcolm and Margaret Vail during the years 1950 to 
1963. 
 
                     
1 Throughout this decision, our use of “lots” pertains to 
Lots 2, 3, and 4 which were originally conveyed by the United 
States to Torgerson and Anderson.  We shall designate the 
subdivided land from Lots 2, 3, and 4, which is now owned by 
McCormick, the Schwabs, and the respondents, as “parcels.” 
No. 
97-1997 
 
5 
¶6 
The petitioners’ parcels are located in Lot 2, the 
northernmost lot.  McCormick owns the northernmost parcel and 
the 
Schwabs 
own 
two 
adjacent 
parcels 
directly 
south 
of 
McCormick.  Together the properties comprise over 1200 feet of 
frontage and over nine acres of property.  Directly south of the 
Schwabs’ parcels is a parcel owned by the Timmons within Lot 2, 
followed to the south by a parcel owned by the Lenzes, also in 
Lot 2; all of the remaining respondents’ parcels follow 
sequentially to the south, located in Lots 3 and 4, with the 
parcel owned by Hobler being the southernmost parcel located at 
the southern boundary of Lot 4.   
¶7 
It was indicated at oral argument that the current 
eastern boundary line, the bluff line—which produced parcels 
above and below the bluff—was created at various unknown times.2 
 The Schwabs’ parcels were originally purchased by James’ 
parents in the 1940s and were later gifted to James in 1965 and 
1974.  At purchase, the Schwabs’ parcels extended east from the 
waters of Green Bay to property above the bluff where there was 
access to a public roadway and a house.  Some time after the 
1974 inheritance, the Schwabs conveyed the property above the 
bluff to James’ relatives and retained the parcel below.  
McCormick also inherited her parcel which originally included 
land above and below the bluff with highway access from above, 
                     
2 According to the survey map contained in the record, it is 
apparent 
that 
some 
landowners, 
including 
at 
least 
one 
respondent, have retained property both above and below the 
bluff line.   
No. 
97-1997 
 
6 
and she conveyed the property above the bluff to a third party, 
retaining the parcel below. 
¶8 
As they currently stand, both of the petitioners’ 
parcels are bordered by water on the east and the bluff on the 
west.  Because their properties are between the lake and the 
bluff, the petitioners claim their only access is over the land 
to the south, owned by the respondents, for which they do not 
have a right-of-way. 
¶9 
A private road runs north from Hobler’s parcel across 
all of the respondents’ properties terminating on the Lenz 
parcel.  Timmons also has the right to use the private road.  
This is the road that the petitioners are seeking to extend for 
their use.  Negotiations for an agreement to extend the road 
have failed. 
¶10 In 1988, the petitioners petitioned the Village of 
Ephraim, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 80.13 (1985-86), to extend a 
public road—North Shore Drive—to the private road beginning at 
the Hobler property northward over all of the respondents’ 
properties to McCormick’s property.  Section 80.13 allows a 
landowner to request the local government, in its discretion, to 
construct a public roadway at the petitioning landowners’ 
expense.  Id.  The Village of Ephraim board, however, declined 
the request finding that extending the road was not in the 
public’s interest.   
¶11 Consequently, the petitioners brought this declaratory 
judgment 
action 
seeking 
an 
easement 
by 
necessity 
or 
by 
implication to gain access to their land.  The easement would 
No. 
97-1997 
 
7 
include the perpetual right to travel, including the right for 
ingress, egress and for public utilities, over the now private 
road, which stretches over 15 of the respondents’ parcels to the 
Lenz property, as well as the right to build a road over the 
Lenz and Timmons properties up to the McCormick property.  The 
respondents filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint.3   
¶12 The circuit court granted the motions to dismiss, 
concluding that the historical circumstances in this case do not 
fit the typical situation from which easements of necessity are 
implied.  The court further stated that even if it found an 
implied retention of an easement over Lot 4 by the United States 
as of 1854, the respondents did not have actual or constructive 
notice of the existence of an easement and therefore, they took 
title to the land relieved of the burden or charge of the 
easement.  The court of appeals summarily affirmed the circuit 
court’s grant of the respondents’ motions to dismiss.  
II. 
¶13 Under Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2) (1995-96), a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim shall be treated as a 
motion for summary judgment under Wis. Stat. § 802.08 (1995-96), 
if matters outside the pleadings are presented to the court.  M 
& I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Town of Somers, 141 Wis. 2d 271, 
285 n.9, 414 N.W.2d 824 (1987).  In this case, matters outside 
                     
3 Petitioners filed their initial complaint in May 1996.  
They then filed an amended complaint in August 1996.  The 
respondents filed motions to dismiss against both complaints.  
Petitioners’ brief and affidavit in opposition to the motions to 
dismiss were accepted by the circuit court. 
No. 
97-1997 
 
8 
of the pleadings were presented to the court which converted the 
motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment.  Radlein v. 
Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605, 608-09, 345 
N.W.2d 874 (1984).  A motion for summary judgment must be 
granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Grams 
v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980); 
§ 802.08(2).  We review summary judgment rulings independent of 
the circuit court.  Grams, 97 Wis. 2d at 338-39. 
III. 
¶14 The petitioners claim an easement by implication or by 
necessity over the respondents’ properties.  An easement is a 
“liberty, privilege, or advantage in lands, without profit, and 
existing distinct from the ownership of the land.”  Stoesser v. 
Shore Drive Partnership, 172 Wis. 2d 660, 667, 494 N.W.2d 204 
(1993).  With an easement, there are two distinct property 
interests—the dominant estate, which enjoys the privileges 
granted by an easement and the servient estate, which permits 
the exercise of those privileges.  Krepel v. Darnell, 165 Wis. 
2d 235, 244, 477 N.W.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1991).  An easement can be 
used only in connection with the real estate to which it 
belongs.  S. S. Kresge Co. v. Winkelman Realty Co., 260 Wis. 
372, 376, 50 N.W.2d 920 (1952). 
¶15 Easements by implication and by necessity are similar, 
but legally distinguishable concepts.  Since the early 1900s, 
the public policy in Wisconsin has strongly opposed the 
implication 
of 
covenants 
of 
conveyance, 
i.e., 
easements.  
No. 
97-1997 
 
9 
Backhausen v. Mayer, 204 Wis. 286, 288, 234 N.W. 904 (1931); 
Miller v. Hoeschler, 126 Wis. 263, 269-70, 105 N.W. 790 (1905); 
see also Scheeler v. Dewerd, 256 Wis. 428, 431, 41 N.W.2d 635 
(1950) (easements can be acquired only by grant or prescription, 
and not by implication, but a grant may be subject to 
construction where its terms are ambiguous). 
¶16 An easement by implication arises when there has been 
a “separation of title, a use before separation took place which 
continued so long and was so obvious or manifest as to show that 
it was meant to be permanent, and it must appear that the 
easement is necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the land 
granted or retained.”  Bullis v. Schmidt, 5 Wis.2d 457, 460-61, 
93 N.W.2d 476 (1958) (quoting 1 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 390 at 630 
(perm. ed.)).4  Implied easements may only be created when the 
necessity for the easement is “so clear and absolute that 
without the easement the grantee cannot enjoy the use of the 
property granted to him for the purposes to which similar 
                     
4 The traditional elements of an implied easement are: 
(1) common ownership followed by conveyance separating 
the unified ownership; 
(2) before severance, the common owner used part of 
the property for the benefit of the other part, a use 
that was apparent, obvious, continuous and apparent; 
(3) 
and 
the 
claimed 
easement 
is 
necessary 
and 
beneficial to the enjoyment of the parcel previously 
benefitted. 
 
7 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 60.03(b)(4)(i) at 426 (Thompson ed. 
1994).  Wisconsin courts have not specifically adopted these 
elements as the law of this state and we do not do so here. 
No. 
97-1997 
 
10
property is customarily devoted.”  Bullis, 5 Wis. 2d at 462 
(quoting Miller, 126 Wis. at 270). 
¶17 The petitioners have failed to establish a claim for 
an easement by implication.  While a landlocked parcel may 
satisfy the necessity element, it is apparent from the amended 
complaint that the private road the petitioners seek to extend 
does not and has never extended to the petitioners’ properties. 
 They have failed to allege that any use by the United States 
was so obvious, manifest or continuous as to show that it was 
meant to be permanent.  
¶18 Instead, the petitioners claim their parcels are 
landlocked and the use and enjoyment of their property is 
permanently and substantially impaired without having access to 
their property.  This claim is more akin to an easement by 
necessity.   
¶19 An easement of necessity “arises where an owner severs 
a landlocked portion of his [or her] property by conveying such 
parcel to another.”  Ludke v. Egan, 87 Wis. 2d 221, 229-30, 274 
N.W.2d 641 (1979).  To establish an easement by necessity, a 
party must show common ownership of the two parcels prior to 
severance of the landlocked parcel, Ruchti v. Monroe, 83 Wis. 2d 
551, 556, 266 N.W.2d 309 (1978), and that the owner of the now 
landlocked parcel cannot access a public roadway from his or her 
own property, Ludke, 87 Wis. 2d at 230.  If this can be 
demonstrated, an easement by necessity will be implied over the 
land retained by the grantor.  Id.  
No. 
97-1997 
 
11
¶20 The petitioners argue that the United States ownership 
of all three lots prior to 1854 satisfies the common ownership 
requirement—a question never before addressed by this court.  We 
conclude that we need not reach that issue because even if the 
United States’ possession of the three lots could constitute 
common ownership, the petitioners have conceded that neither Lot 
2, nor Lot 3 were landlocked when the United States conveyed Lot 
4.  Rather, at the time of conveyance, the eastern boundary of 
the lots was above and east of the bluff (the current boundary 
line).  Access to a public roadway was possible above the bluff. 
 A party may only avail himself or herself of an easement by 
necessity when the common owner severs a landlocked portion of 
the property and the owner of the landlocked portion cannot 
access a public roadway.  Id. at 229-30.  Because the United 
States never severed a landlocked portion of its property that 
was inaccessible from a public roadway, the petitioners have 
failed to establish the elements for an easement by necessity. 
¶21 Nevertheless, petitioners insist that the property was 
effectively landlocked because of the geographical barriers 
inhibiting access.  As the petitioners see it, their land was 
landlocked because the land to the south was owned by an 
individual, the land to the east and north was bordered by a 
cliff and rocky terrain, and the land to the west was bordered 
by the waters of Green Bay.  They cite to Sorenson v. Czinger, 
852 P.2d 1124 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) and Teich v. Haby, 408 
S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1966), in support of their 
position. 
No. 
97-1997 
 
12
¶22 Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
never 
before 
recognized 
geographical barriers alone as circumstances warranting an 
easement by necessity.5  In fact, case law suggests otherwise.  
This court stated in Backhausen that a way of necessity is not 
merely one of convenience, and “the law will not imply such a 
way where it has provided another method for obtaining the same 
at a reasonable expense to the landowner.”  Backhausen, 204 Wis. 
at 289. 
¶23 While the petitioners have provided evidence that the 
cost of building a road over the bluff would cost approximately 
$700,000—an unreasonable expense, it is apparent that they 
consider other methods of access—a stairway, an elevator—
unacceptable.  Petitioners narrowly focus on vehicular access to 
the lake itself as the only possible way to enjoy this property. 
 Certainly it may be more convenient for the petitioners to seek 
an extension of the private road to their parcels rather than 
travel across the property above the bluff and navigate the 
bluff, but that in itself does not create the right to an 
                     
5 The cases cited by the petitioners are distinguishable.  
In Sorenson v. Czinger, 852 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1992), the easement was authorized under a state statute which 
allowed for private condemnation of land for a right of way for 
the construction of roads.  Wisconsin does not provide for 
private condemnation and easements are viewed with disfavor.  
Backhausen v. Mayer, 204 Wis. 286, 288, 234 N.W. 904 (1931).   
The question in Teich v. Haby, 408 S.W.2d 562, 564 (Tex. 
Civ. Ct. App. 1966), was whether the owner of the servient 
parcel had notice that the owner of the dominant parcel used an 
existing private roadway to access a public roadway.  Teich 
involved the continued use of a private roadway, not the 
creation of an easement for use of a private roadway.   
No. 
97-1997 
 
13
easement by necessity.  A grantor is not landlocked when he or 
she has difficulty getting from his or her land to a public road 
as long as he or she can get from his or her land to a public 
road.  See Ludke, 87 Wis. 2d at 230.  See also Sicchio v. Alvey, 
10 Wis. 2d 528, 538, 103 N.W.2d 544 (1960) (Access to building 
at front, even though rear entry was used, does not allow for 
right-of-way by necessity to rear entry of store).   
¶24 In this case, the petitioners had access to a public 
road, albeit not ideal or the most convenient access, which they 
sold 
off. 
 
Thus, 
the 
petitioners’ 
current 
ownership 
of 
landlocked property resulted not from a grant of property to 
them but by their own acts in conveying away their highway 
access.  They were not unwitting purchasers of landlocked 
property (stemming from the United States 1854 sale).   
¶25 An easement by necessity only exists where an owner 
sells a landlocked parcel to another, in which case the law will 
recognize a way of necessity in the grantee over the land 
retained by the grantor.  Rock Lake Estates Unit Owners Ass’n v. 
Township of Lake Mills, 195 Wis. 2d 348, 372, 536 N.W.2d 415 
(Ct. App. 1995) (citing Ludke, 87 Wis. 2d at 229-30).  The 
petitioners in this case are the grantors, not the grantees, and 
as in Rock Lake Estates, the conveyances which resulted in their 
landlocked property were made by the petitioners when they sold 
off the property above the bluff.  We conclude that it would be 
contrary to this state’s policy against encumbrances for this 
court to award an easement to the petitioners over parcels of 
unrelated third parties under these circumstances.  
No. 
97-1997 
 
14
¶26 Finally, 
the petitioners 
assert that 
without an 
easement their property will be virtually useless because they 
will have no way to get to it.  Thus, the petitioners renew 
their request for a “drastic” expansion of the law arguing that 
there is no rational basis for landlocked property.  The 
petitioners suggest that this court set forth a “reasonable use” 
test that balances the equities by weighing the competing 
interests of the need and benefit to allow access by easement to 
develop otherwise useless land versus the detriment such a 
burden may place on other property to use an existing road.  The 
petitioners 
insist 
that 
the 
benefit 
and 
policy 
towards 
development far outweigh any anticipated costs to the burdened 
property. 
¶27 In order to adopt the petitioners’ proposal, we would 
have to ignore not only long-standing precedent in this state, 
but also well-established public policy as illustrated in our 
recording and conveyance statutes.  Long ago this court 
recognized: 
  It is so easy, in conveying a defined piece of land, 
to express either any limitations intended to be 
reserved over it, or to be conveyed with it over other 
land, that the necessity of raising any such grant or 
reservation by implication is hardly apparent.  Courts 
of equity can afford relief where the grant is not of 
that understood by both parties to be conveyed, or so 
understood by one by inducement of the other.  Such 
rights outside the limits of one’s proper title 
seriously derogate from the policy of both our 
registry statutes and our statute against implication 
of convenants in conveyances.  That policy is that a 
buyer of land may rely on the public records as 
information of all the conveyances, and upon the words 
of the instruments for all rights thereunder.   
No. 
97-1997 
 
15
Miller, 126 Wis. at 268-69.   
¶28 More recently in Kordecki v. Rizzo, 106 Wis. 2d 713, 
719 n.5, 317 N.W.2d 479 (1982), this court reiterated that a 
purchaser of real estate has three sources of information from 
which to learn of rights to the land he or she is about to 
purchase:  (1) reviewing the chain of title; (2) searching other 
public records that may reveal other non-recorded rights, such 
as judgments or liens; and (3) inspecting the land itself.  
These sources may be irrelevant under the petitioners’ proposal 
if someone with a landlocked piece of property desired a right-
of-way through another person’s property “in the interest of 
development.”   
¶29 The petitioners are effectively asking this court to 
sanction hidden easements.  An easement which in this case was 
not created by, but was, according to petitioners, clearly 
intended by the United States at conveyance. 
¶30 This court in Backhausen rejected such a position as 
unsupported and unreasonable.  In Backhausen, the owner of the 
dominant estate suggested that when a record reveals former co-
ownership of the dominant and servient estate, the purchaser of 
the servient estate should ascertain whether the servient of the 
two estates was of such a nature as to give the owner of the 
dominant estate a way of necessity over the servient estate 
which he was then purchasing.  Backhausen, 204 Wis. at 291.  
This court held that a “purchaser of land without knowledge or 
actual or constructive notice of the existence of an easement 
takes title to the same relieved of the burden or charge of the 
No. 
97-1997 
 
16
easement.”  Backhausen, 204 Wis. at 289-90.  See also Schmidt v. 
Hilty-Forster Lumber Co., 239 Wis. 514, 522, 1 N.W.2d 154 
(1941).  The petitioners have not alleged that the respondents 
knew or had actual or constructive notice that the United States 
created a way of necessity over their parcels by its 1854 
conveyance.  Because the respondents had no knowledge or notice, 
actual or constructive, that a way of necessity may have been 
created in 1854, we conclude that if any such burden existed, it 
was extinguished by later conveyances.   
¶31 In sum, we conclude that the petitioners have failed 
to establish entitlement to an easement by implication or by 
necessity either because of actions by the United States or by 
geographical barriers.  We further reject the petitioners’ 
public policy arguments for placing development of landlocked 
parcels above all other interests.  For these reasons, we 
conclude that the petitioners have failed to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.  Accordingly, we affirm the court 
of appeals’ decision dismissing the petitioners’ declaratory 
judgment action.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
   
 
 
1