Case Title: Loper v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 608, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MICHAEL LOPER, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No.  608, 2002   
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,   
 
 
§ 
Court Below–Superior Court of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware, in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Kent County in VK01-01- 
§ 
0250-01. 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
§ 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
Def.  ID No.  0101004489 
 
Submitted: April 2, 2003 
Decided: 
June 18, 2003 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 18th day of June 2003, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, 
and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On October 18, 2002, the appellant, Michael Loper, was found 
guilty by the Superior Court of violation of probation (VOP).1  The Superior 
Court sentenced Loper to two years and three months of Level V imprisonment, 
                                                 
1Loper’s original conviction in 2001 was for Driving Under the Influence (DUI).  
Loper was sentenced to three years at Level V, suspended after nine months, followed by 
one year at Level III and one year at Level II.  While at Level V, Loper was ordered to 
complete the Key Program at the Webb Correctional Facility.  State v.  Loper, Del.  Super., 
Cr.  ID No.  0101004489, Vaughn, J.  (June 8, 2001).  
suspended after successful completion of the Level V Greentree Program, for 
one year at Level IV Crest Supervision, suspended after successful completion, 
for one year at Level III probation.  This is Loper’s  appeal. 
(2) 
Loper’s trial counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review is 
twofold.  The Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a 
conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could 
arguably support the appeal.  Second, the Court must conduct its own review of 
the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least 
arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary 
presentation.2 
                                                 
(3) 
Loper’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By letter, 
Loper’s counsel informed Loper of the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 26(c) 
and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the Rule 26(c) 
brief.  Loper was also informed of his right to supplement his attorney’s 
presentation.  Loper responded with a brief that raises three issues for this 
2Penson v.  Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v.  Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 
486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v.  California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
 
 
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Court’s consideration.   The State has responded to the position taken by 
Loper’s counsel as well as to two of the three issues raised by Loper and has 
moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(4) 
Loper identifies three appellate issues for this Court’s 
consideration:  (i) the Department of Correction failed to enroll Loper in the 
Key Program, as the Superior Court had ordered as part of his original 
sentence; (ii) Loper’s VOP conviction was based on reasons other than what 
were alleged in the violation report, and (iii) Loper’s VOP hearing did not 
comply with the procedural requirements of Delaware Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 32.1 (Rule 32.1).3  Loper’s claims are without merit. 
                                                 
3Superior Court Criminal Rule 32.1 provides that a person charged with a violation of 
probation shall be given: 
 
(A) Written notice of the alleged violation; 
(B) Disclosure of the evidence against the person; 
(C) An opportunity to appear and to present evidence in the person’s own 
behalf;  
 
 
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(D) The opportunity to question adverse witnesses; and 
(E) Notice of the person’s right to retain counsel and, in cases in which 
fundamental fairness request, to the assignment of counsel if the person is 
unable to retain counsel. 
 
Del.  Super.  Ct. Crim.  R.  32.1(a). 
 
 
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(5) 
At the VOP hearing, Loper admitted the VOP and presented a 
defense for leniency in sentencing.  Because Loper did not raise any of the three 
claims that he now raises on appeal, he has waived appellate review of the 
claims in the absence of plain error.4 
(6) 
On appeal, Loper complains that the Department of Correction did 
not place him in the Key Program, as the Superior Court had ordered as part of 
his original sentence in 2001.5  Loper’s claim may be true, but it is unavailing.  
                                                 
4See Del. Supr.  Ct.  R.  8. 
5The VOP hearing transcript reflects the following dialogue between the trial judge 
and Loper: 
 
THE COURT: Well, I think you need some treatment at a Level 5 facility.  It’s 
actually rather obvious.  I mean, you did the nine months.  Did they put you in any treatment 
program, or did you just do the nine months. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I did the nine months.  They gave me the Key Program, but 
when they had come up to take me up there, I only had two months on my time left. 
 
VOP Hr’g Tr., Oct. 18, 2002, at 6-7.  
 
 
5 
In view of Loper’s DUI history and his admission to the VOP, the Superior 
Court was well within its discretion when determining at the VOP hearing in 
2002 that the Level V Greentree Program was a suitable level of supervision for 
Loper.  
(7) 
There is no factual or legal basis for Loper’s claim that he did not 
receive proper notice of the reasons for the VOP or that he was convicted of  
VOP for new or different reasons than those that were originally alleged. The 
written violation report alleged that Loper violated Condition 3 (failure to 
report to supervising probation officer) and Condition 9 (failure to comply with 
special probation conditions, including payment of fines, failure to make his 
intake appointment for Work Referral and failure to participate in the DUI 
program).  The specifics of each of the two alleged probation violations were 
set forth in detail in the written report.  At the VOP hearing, the probation 
officer stated the same allegations.  Moreover, Loper admitted that he had 
missed three appointments, failed to pay on his fines, and failed to participate in 
the DUI program. 
(8) 
Finally, there is no basis in the record for Loper’s claim that the 
VOP hearing did not comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 32.1. As 
required by Rule 32.1, there was written notice of the allegations in the 
 
 
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violation report and disclosure of the evidence against Loper.  Moreover, Loper 
had an opportunity to appear through legal counsel, to confront the witnesses 
against him, and to present evidence on his own behalf.  
(9) 
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Loper’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We are also satisfied that Loper’s counsel made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and properly determined that Loper 
could not raise a meritorious issue in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm 
is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The 
motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
Justice 
 
 
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