Case Title: People v. Wright

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87116

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 87116-Agenda 11-November 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								JOHNNIE WRIGHT, Appellant.
Modified upon Denial of Rehearing, 2 October 2000
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Johnnie Wright, was the owner of J&J Scrap Auto
Wrecking Company, an auto parts recycling business. On January
25, 1996, auditors from the Secretary of State's office arrived at
defendant's business, reviewed documents in his business office,
and took an inventory of the vehicles in the lot surrounding the
office. As a result of this audit, defendant was placed under arrest
and charged with two counts of possession of a stolen motor
vehicle (see 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 1996)), 27 counts of
failure to keep records (see 625 ILCS 5/5-401.2(a), (i) (West
1996)), and 25 counts of possession of title without complete
assignment (see 625 ILCS 5/4-104(a)(2) (West 1996)).
	Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Cook County
found defendant not guilty of the possession of a stolen motor
vehicle charges and not guilty of two of the counts of failure to
keep records. The circuit court found defendant guilty of the
remaining charges of failure to keep records and possession of title
without complete assignment.
	On appeal, the appellate court reversed defendant's
convictions because it found that the circuit court had failed to
consider the mental state required to establish the offenses of
failure to keep records and possession of title without complete
assignment. The appellate court ordered the cause remanded for a
limited nonevidentiary hearing for the circuit court to apply the
appropriate mental state to the existing record. 302 Ill. App. 3d
128. We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.
2d R. 315(a).
	We hold that defendant's convictions for possession of title
without complete assignment must be reversed because the
evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the mental state
required for a violation of section 4-104(a)(2). We also reverse
defendant's convictions for failure to keep records because we find
that section 5-401.2 of the Illinois Vehicle Code is
unconstitutional on due process grounds.
BACKGROUND
	At defendant's trial, Russell Hoekstra, an auditor for the
Special Audit Team of the Secretary of State's office, testified
that, on January 25, 1996, he and two other auditors conducted an
audit at J&J Scrap Auto Wrecking Company (J&J) in Blue Island,
Illinois. When the auditors arrived at the J&J office at about 9
a.m., they spoke to defendant, who identified himself as the owner
of the business. Hoekstra informed defendant that they were there
to conduct an inspection of his business. He asked defendant for
his license, his police book, and any other records. Defendant
provided Hoekstra with his police book. He told Hoekstra that he
could not find the titles for his vehicles but that his secretary
would be able to find them when she returned from an errand.
Defendant also gave Hoekstra a 1995 license, which listed him as
the only owner of J&J. When asked about his 1996 license,
defendant stated that he had applied for it but that he had not
received it or could not find it.
	Hoekstra then informed defendant that an inventory would be
taken of all of the vehicles in the J&J lot and that the vehicles
would be matched to the paperwork defendant provided.
According to Hoekstra, the south and north boundaries of the J&J
lot were each marked by a row of truck trailers. These boundaries
were approximately 225 feet apart. The office was near the front
of the lot and the rear of the lot was marked by railroad tracks
about 600 or 700 feet behind the office. Hoekstra acknowledged
that defendant's 1995 license indicated that the lot size was only
50 feet by 250 feet, but he stated that defendant had told him that
the trailers were the north boundary of the J&J lot. An inspection
by the Secretary of State's office and defendant's 1996 license
described the property size as four acres.
	During the course of their inventory and inspection of
defendant's records, the auditors discovered several irregularities.
Hoekstra testified that they learned that two of the vehicles
included in their inventory had been reported stolen. One of these
vehicles, a 1987 blue Ford Taurus station wagon, was located
approximately 150 yards behind the J&J office and 20 feet from
the trailers marking the south boundary of the lot. The other car,
a white 1987 Ford Escort, was located approximately 20 yards
behind and 40 to 50 feet north of the Taurus.
	Hoekstra asked defendant whether all of the vehicles in the
J&J lot were his. Defendant responded that one car, his
employee's car, did not belong to him. According to Hoekstra,
defendant did not tell him that any of the vehicles in his lot
belonged to James Crumb. When Hoekstra specifically inquired
about the stolen vehicles, defendant told Hoekstra that a towing
company had brought the Taurus and the Escort to the lot.
Defendant gave Hoekstra a name of the towing company, but
Hoekstra did not try to contact the company. Hoekstra did not
remember defendant calling someone named Jim from Night and
Day Towing.
	At approximately 11:30 a.m., defendant's secretary gave
Hoekstra 217 vehicle titles. After comparing the titles to the
vehicles in the J&J lot, Hoekstra found that only 18 of the titles
matched the 101 vehicles in the lot. He asked defendant whether
he had any documentation for the other vehicles. Defendant
responded that he did not. The assignment portion of 173 of the
217 titles Hoekstra examined was not completed. In addition, the
auditors observed that defendant's police book failed to indicate
the disposition of 189 vehicles. That is, there were 290 entries in
the book showing the acquisition but no disposition of a vehicle,
yet there were only 101 vehicles in the J&J lot. In addition,
defendant did not have a parts book to record the parts that he
sold.
	According to Hoekstra, if defendant scrapped or crushed a car,
he was required to record this disposition in his police book.
Hoekstra testified that defendant's police book indicated that a few
of the vehicles he had acquired had been scrapped or crushed.
Defendant, did not, however, have documents, such as a uniform
invoice or junk certificate, showing that he had disposed of the
vehicles this way.
	Based on the discovery of the stolen vehicles on the J&J lot,
Hoekstra contacted the Illinois State Police. During the afternoon
of January 25, 1996, Special Agent Lemming, Sergeant Jeffrey
Blair, and other Illinois State Police officers arrived with a warrant
to search defendant's business. Defendant told the officers that the
Taurus had been in the J&J lot since December 1995, and the
Escort had been in the lot for about six months. Like Hoekstra,
Blair testified that the north and south boundaries of the J&J lot
were each marked by a row of truck trailers. According to Blair,
the boundaries were approximately 100 feet apart.
	Lemming testified that, when he arrived at J&J, he spoke to
Hoekstra, and Hoekstra gave him the police book and 199 of the
titles he had received from defendant's secretary. Lemming and
the other State Police officers searched the J&J office. They found
defendant's 1996 license application, which had not been sent to
the Secretary of State's office.
	Lemming also spoke to defendant. When Lemming informed
defendant that two stolen vehicles had been found in the J&J lot,
defendant replied that a man named Jim from Night and Day
Towing had towed both vehicles into the lot. Defendant called Jim
from the office and handed the receiver to Lemming, but Lemming
heard no one on the line. Lemming recalled seeing a card for Night
and Day Towing with a telephone number and the name Jim on it.
Several days later Lemming attempted to get the telephone number
for Night and Day Towing. The telephone company had no listing
for this business, and Lemming was unsuccessful in his attempt to
get the number from one of defendant's employees.
	Lemming arrested defendant late in the day on January 25,
1996. Following the arrest, Lemming questioned defendant
further. Defendant explained his auto recycling business to
Lemming. He stated that he placed advertisements in the Chicago
Sun-Times offering to buy junk vehicles from people. Defendant
used his tow truck to tow these vehicles to the J&J lot. Defendant
told Lemming that he had a partner named James Crumb but that
defendant handled the day-to-day operations of the business, and
defendant was the only J&J employee who purchased vehicles and
received titles for J&J. According to Lemming, defendant also said
that he sold auto parts from the J&J lot.
	Defendant told Lemming that he had heard that the Escort and
the Taurus were in his yard, but he had only seen the Escort.
Defendant stated that he did not know these cars were stolen.
Defendant said that he also knew that these cars were not in his
police book, but this was because his secretary had probably
forgotten to enter them into the book. With respect to the number
of titles found in his office, defendant stated that, if he had a title
without a vehicle, it meant that he had sent the vehicle to the
"shredder."
	According to Lemming, in order for title to a vehicle to be
properly transferred, the seller must sign the back of his or her
title, then the space for the buyer's name and address must be
completed. Lemming testified that, with respect to nine of the
vehicle titles recovered from defendant's office, there had been no
assignment on the back of the titles to defendant or J&J. On the
back of three of these titles, the spaces for assignment had been
completed, but the assignment was to an entity or individual other
than J&J or defendant. The spaces for assignment on the back of
the other six titles were blank. None of these nine vehicles were in
the J&J lot. With respect to 16 of the other vehicle titles found in
defendant's office, some of the sellers of the vehicles had signed
the back of the titles, but the spaces for assignment to the buyer
were incomplete. On the back of one of the16 titles, J&J was listed
as the buyer, but there was no address for J&J or date of
assignment. On the remaining 15, neither J&J nor defendant were
listed as a buyer. None of these 25 titles had been entered into
defendant's police book.
	Detective Paul Bernatek testified that in October 1988, he had
a conversation with defendant during which he told defendant that,
when defendant received the title for a vehicle, he was required to
have the seller write his or her name and address on the title, after
which defendant was to sign it, date it, and write the odometer
reading on the title. He also told defendant that auto parts recyclers
were required to maintain a book with records of their acquisitions
of vehicles, including the identity of the seller, the date, the year,
the make and the body style. Bernatek also informed defendant
that, when a recycler disposed of a vehicle, he was required to list
the date of disposition and the destination of the vehicle. In
January 1989, Bernatek had another conversation with defendant,
during which he again informed defendant of these record-keeping
requirements for auto parts recyclers. Bernatek acknowledged that
these conversations were not recorded in the reports he prepared.
	Defendant and his employee, Jesse Dawkins, presented a
completely different version of the events of January 25, 1996. In
addition, their description of the dimensions of the J&J lot differed
significantly from that of the State's witnesses.
	According to Dawkins, when the auditors arrived at 9 a.m.,
Dawkins told them that only defendant's secretary was in the
office, and defendant was not there. Defendant and Dawkins
testified that defendant did not arrive at the J&J lot until 11 or
11:30 a.m. on January 25, 1996. At that time, Hoekstra told
defendant that they were there to investigate his lot but did not ask
for his police book. Hoekstra also did not ask defendant for any
vehicle titles, and defendant did not give him any titles or records.
	As the auditors performed their inventory, defendant and
Dawkins saw them record the serial numbers of cars in the J&J lot,
as well as in the two lots north of defendant's. These two lots were
owned by James Crumb and Charles Dixon, who, like defendant,
were in the auto wrecking business. Although defendant told
Hoekstra that the vehicles on those lots were not his, Hoekstra told
him that the vehicles would be considered his because he was the
only one with a license.
	Dawkins and defendant testified that the south boundary of
the J&J lot was marked by truck trailers, but there were no trailers
along the north boundary of the lot. According to defendant, the
dimensions of the J&J lot were 51½ feet by 887 feet. There was a
private residence on the front half of the property. The property
extended behind the office to the railroad tracks.
	Defendant testified that he began operating J&J in January
1995. Prior to that time, the J&J lot was used as an auto wrecking
yard by Dixon and Crumb. According to defendant, he and Crumb
were partners, and the purpose of their partnership was to split
rent. He acknowledged, however, that the 1995 license for J&J
listed only defendant as the proprietor of J&J. Defendant and
Dixon had a bad relationship and did not associate at all.
	According to defendant, when he began operating J&J,
vehicle titles belonging to Dixon and Crumb remained in the
office in a file cabinet. Defendant never looked in the file cabinet
and, after January 1995, Crumb and Dixon continued to use the
cabinet. Defendant and Crumb also shared the desk in the office
and the police book. Defendant had two drawers in the desk, and
Crumb had two drawers in the desk. Defendant stated that, when
he purchased a vehicle, he would place the title for the vehicle on
the desk in his office, and his secretary would enter it into the
police book. Crumb was supposed to enter his own vehicles into
the police book, and defendant knew that Crumb had been doing
so with respect to some of the vehicles he purchased. Under their
partnership arrangement, defendant was the only one who could
purchase a car and accept a title on behalf of J&J. Likewise,
Crumb bought vehicles on his own, and defendant had no control
over the vehicles Crumb purchased. With respect to the vehicles
listed in the police book, defendant said that some of them had
been taken to a scrap processor and others were in the J&J lot. He
did not know whether any of the vehicles that the police book
indicated had been taken to a scrap processor were his vehicles.
	Defendant and Dawkins testified that not all of the titles in the
office belonged to defendant. Defendant did not know how many
of his titles were in the office, but he had 50 or 60 in the desk
drawer that belonged to him. As the police searched his office,
defendant saw them removing items from the file cabinet. When
he told the police that the cabinet was not his, the police responded
that everything in the cabinet was considered his. He had never
seen the 25 titles on which the possession of title without complete
assignment charges were based. According to defendant, only the
titles with his name on them belonged to him; the titles assigned
to J&J were Crumb's.
	Similarly, Dawkins and defendant testified that not all of the
cars on the J&J lot belonged to defendant. Defendant stated that,
at the time of the audit, he had only seven or eight cars and three
trucks. The other vehicles on his lot belonged to Crumb, who had
failed to move these cars to his own lot.
	Defendant testified the he told Lemming that he did not know
anything about the Escort and the Taurus, except that they had
been towed into the area by Jim Stroud from Night and Day
Towing. Dawkins testified that he had seen Jim tow cars into the
J&J lot before, but did not see him tow the Escort and the Taurus.
Defendant testified that Dawkins had told him that Jim had towed
these cars to the J&J lot. Defendant also stated that Jim was
planning to sell the Taurus to him.
	Dawkins and defendant testified that, while the State Police
were in the J&J office, defendant placed a call to Jim of Night and
Day Towing and broadcast the call on the speaker telephone in the
office. Jim identified himself on the telephone, and defendant
asked him to bring the paperwork for the cars to J&J. When the
police attempted to talk to Jim, he ended the call. According to
defendant, he gave Lemming a card from Night and Day.
	Dawkins testified that the Escort was a few feet on one side
or the other of the property line between defendant's lot and the lot
north of defendant's. Defendant testified that he told Lemming
that the Escort was on Dixon's lot. At one point he testified that he
did not know where the Taurus was because he never saw it. He
later testified, however, that the Taurus was on his property.
	Defendant did not remember whether Detective Bernatek
informed him in 1989 about the necessity of completing the
assignments on the back of titles or about the record-keeping
requirements. Defendant denied that Bernatek told him that, as an
auto parts recycler, he had to keep records of the acquisition and
disposition of vehicles.
	In rebuttal, the State offered two certified copies of
conviction. These documents showed that defendant had been
convicted in March 1990 of possession of title with incomplete
assignment. In addition, he was convicted in February 1990 of
possession of a stolen motor vehicle and possession of a vehicle
with its identification number removed.
	At the conclusion of the presentation of this evidence, the
circuit court found defendant not guilty of the charges of
possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The court stated that there
was conflicting testimony as to whether the Escort was on
defendant's lot. With respect to possession of the Taurus, the court
also found defendant not guilty because it found defendant's
explanation that he did not see this car credible. The court also
found defendant not guilty of the charges of failure to keep records
related to these two vehicles. The circuit court found defendant
guilty of the other charges of failure to keep records and
possession of title with incomplete assignment. The circuit court
sentenced defendant to three years' imprisonment based on the
convictions for failure to keep records and one year of
imprisonment for possession of titles with incomplete assignment,
to run concurrently.
	The appellate court reversed defendant's convictions. 302 Ill.
App. 3d 128. In that court, defendant argued that (1) he was denied
the effective assistance of counsel by his counsel's failure to file
a motion to suppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of failure to keep records; and
(3) his convictions for possession of titles without complete
assignment must be overturned because the circuit court failed to
find that he acted with the mental state required for that offense.
The appellate court rejected defendant's ineffective assistance of
counsel argument. 302 Ill. App. 3d at 132-35. The court reversed
defendant's convictions for failure to keep records and possession
of title without complete assignment, however, because it agreed
with defendant that the circuit court had failed to find that
defendant possessed the mental state necessary for these offenses.
302 Ill. App. 3d at 135-40.
	The appellate court noted that, in People v. Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d 397 (1992), this court held that a finding of knowledge plus
criminal intent is required for a defendant to be found guilty of
possession of title without complete assignment under section
4-104(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/4-104(a)(2)
(West 1996)). After reviewing the circuit court's comments at
defendant's trial, the appellate court concluded that the circuit
court had based its finding of guilt of this offense "simply on the
possession of the open titles" and had made no finding that
defendant had the requisite mental state. Accordingly, the
appellate court decided that defendant's convictions for possession
of title without complete assignment should be reversed. The
appellate court chose not to remand the cause for a new trial,
however. According to the appellate court, no evidentiary hearing
was necessary because defense counsel had demonstrated an
awareness of the Tolliver decision. The appellate court, therefore,
remanded the cause for the circuit court to review the existing
record in light of the Tolliver decision. 302 Ill. App. 3d at 137-38.
	For the same reason, the appellate court reversed defendant's
convictions for failure to keep records. It rejected defendant's
argument that the circuit court's finding of guilt with respect to
these offenses was inconsistent with its decision to acquit
defendant on other charges. 302 Ill. App. 3d at 140. However, the
appellate court determined that the circuit court had failed to find
the existence of the mental state required for the offense of failure
to keep records. Based on Tolliver and other decisions discussing
the mental state required for violations of other sections of the
Vehicle Code, the appellate court concluded that knowledge with
criminal purpose is an element of a violation of section 5-401.2 of
the Vehicle Code. The appellate court held that, on remand, the
circuit court should also reconsider its findings with respect to the
charge of failure to keep records in light of Tolliver. 302 Ill. App.
at 139-40.


ANALYSIS


	In the briefs defendant filed with this court, defendant argued
only that the appellate court erred in ordering a limited
nonevidentiary hearing rather than a new trial because of the
circuit court's error in applying the mental state required for the
offenses of possession of title without complete assignment and
failure to keep records. In his petition for rehearing, defendant
raises a new argument with respect to his convictions for failure to
keep records. According to defendant's petition, section 5-401.2
violates due process because it permits individuals subject to its
terms to be convicted of a felony absent culpable intent. We have
decided to modify our original opinion in this case to address
defendant's constitutional challenge.
	We begin, however, with a discussion of the defendant's
arguments concerning the charges of possession of title without
complete assignment. Defendant argues that the appellate court
erred in ordering a limited nonevidentiary hearing rather than a
new trial after reversing his convictions. According to defendant,
a new trial is required when a defendant is tried under an incorrect
theory of law. He asserts that, by failing to require the State to
prove that he acted with knowledge plus criminal purpose, the
circuit court tried him under an incorrect theory of law. Defendant
contends that the limited hearing ordered by the appellate court is
unfair because it would require the circuit court to perform a new
credibility assessment "on a cold record and distant memory" and
because the circuit court's error may have affected the defense
strategy.
	The State has filed a request for cross-relief, in which it
contends that the appellate court should have affirmed defendant's
convictions because (1) the circuit court's comments indicate that
it found defendant possessed the necessary mental state under
section 4-104(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code, and (2) even if the circuit
court failed to apply the correct mental state, the evidence
established beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated this
provision. In the alternative, the State argues that a limited hearing
rather than a new trial was the appropriate relief for the circuit
court's application of an incorrect mental state at defendant's trial.
	Before considering the issues raised by defendant's appeal, it
is necessary to address the State's argument that defendant's
convictions should be affirmed, regardless of any erroneous
application of the necessary mental state by the circuit court. If the
appellate court erred in reversing defendant's convictions, we need
not decide the propriety of its decision to remand his case for a
limited nonevidentiary hearing.
	The State argues that, even if the circuit court erred by failing
to find the existence of the mental state required to establish a
violation of section 4-104(a)(2), we should affirm defendant's
convictions because the evidence established his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and a reviewing court may affirm a circuit court
on any basis in the record, even if the circuit court did not rely on
those grounds. See People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 211
(1997). Defendant replies that we cannot affirm his convictions
because there was insufficient evidence at trial of the mental state
required under section 4-104(a)(2).
	Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of
violating section 4-104(a)(2) depends on the elements of the
offense under that provision. Section 4-104 states in pertinent
part:
"(a) It is a violation of this Chapter for:
				***
				2. A person to possess any manufacturers certificate
of origin, salvage certificate, junking certificate,
certificate of title, display certificate without complete
assignment[.]
* * *
			(b) Sentence:
				1. A person convicted of a violation of subsection 1
or 2 of paragraph (a) of this Section is guilty of a Class
4 felony." 625 ILCS 5/4-104 (West 1996).
	Although the statutory provision describing the offense of
possession of title without complete assignment contains no
mental state, this court has supplied a mental state in previous
cases involving this statute. In People v. Gean, 143 Ill. 2d 281
(1991), this court held that the mental state of knowledge is an
element of offenses under section 4-104. In Gean, the defendant
had argued that section 4-104 violated due process protections
because it created a felony offense with no mental state. This court
rejected the defendant's constitutional challenge. The court
explained that, under section 4-9 of the Criminal Code of 1961, a
mental state requirement should be implied unless it is clear that
the legislature intended an absolute liability offense. Gean, 143 Ill. 2d  at 285-86. This court supplied a mental state for violations of
sections 4-104(a)(1) and 4-104(a)(2) because there was no
indication that the legislature intended absolute liability under
these provisions. The court found that "knowledge" was the
appropriate mental state. Thus, this court held that, to prove a
violation of section 4-104(a)(2), the State was required to show
that a defendant possessed a certificate of title "knowing that he
did not have authority or knowing it was without complete
assignment." Gean, 143 Ill. 2d  at 287-89.
	In People v. Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d 397 (1992), this court
modified the holding in Gean with respect to the mental state
requirement under section 4-104(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code. The
defendant in Tolliver had filed a motion to dismiss the charge
against him on the basis that section 4-104(a)(2) is
unconstitutional. The circuit court denied his motion and found
him guilty of violating this provision. The appellate court reversed
after concluding that section 4-104(a)(2) was unconstitutional
because it required no mental state and would punish innocent
behavior. Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d  at 399.
	This court upheld the constitutionality of section 4-104(a)(2).
The Tolliver court observed that, under Gean, the State was
required to prove knowledge as an element of a violation of
section 4-104(a)(2). It found, however, that, under Gean, section
4-104(a)(2) could be used to punish innocent behavior. For
example, if a husband and wife jointly owned a car, the wife
signed the title as a seller, and the husband took the title to the
buyer or dealer, the husband would be considered to have
knowingly possessed an incomplete title. Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d  at
400-02. According to the Tolliver court, under this and other
scenarios, offenders could be found guilty of a felony even though
they lacked any criminal intent. The court stated, "[s]uch innocent
but knowing conduct, which is wholly devoid of criminal or
devious intent, should not render a person guilty of a felony."
Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d  at 402. Therefore, the Tolliver court decided
that the Gean holding should be expanded such that, to establish
a violation of section 4-104(a)(2), the State must prove "criminal
knowledge or knowledge with an intent to defraud or commit a
crime." Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d  at 400-01. This court also described
the mental state requirement under section 4-104(a)(2) as
"knowledge plus criminal purpose." Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d  at 403.
With this modification, the Tolliver court found section
4-104(a)(2) constitutional. Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d  at 403. See also
People v. Johns, 153 Ill. 2d 436, 446 (1992) (reiterating the
Tolliver holding that the required mental state for section
4-104(a)(2) is criminal knowledge or criminal purpose); but see
Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d  at 403-06 (Freeman, J., concurring, joined by
Miller, C.J.) (finding the majority's modification of the knowledge
requirement unnecessary).
	An examination of the evidence presented at trial, in light of
the necessary elements of an offense under section 4-104(a)(2),
leads us to the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence
presented at trial to find defendant guilty of possession of title with
incomplete assignment.
	In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, the proper inquiry is " 'whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " (Emphasis omitted.) People
v. Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1, 38 (1997), quoting Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781,
2788-89 (1979). After carefully considering the evidence
presented at defendant's trial in the light most favorable to the
State, we cannot conclude that a rational trier of fact could have
found that there was a criminal purpose associated with
defendant's possession of title without complete assignment.
	Our conclusion is supported by Tolliver. In Tolliver, this court
reversed the defendant's conviction under section 4-104(a)(2)
after finding no evidence of criminal purpose. Like the defendant
in the case before us, the Tolliver defendant was charged under
section 4-104(a)(2) with possession of title without complete
assignment. The charge resulted from defendant's sale of a vehicle
to Thomas Murphy. Murphy noticed that the title to the vehicle
that he had received from defendant was signed by an individual
named David Hayes rather than defendant. When Murphy asked
defendant to sign the title, defendant told him to just sign it
himself. Murphy contacted the Secretary of State's office, and
defendant was subsequently charged with possession of title
without complete assignment. Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d  at 399.
	The circuit court found defendant guilty of violating section
4-104(a)(2) because, in the court's view, "there was no valid
lawful reason for not completing the title and the only reason an
individual would not complete it was to avoid sales tax." Tolliver,
147 Ill. 2d  at 399. This court reversed the Tolliver defendant's
conviction, however, because we concluded that there was no
evidence that the defendant had a criminal purpose and no
allegations that he had stolen a car or attempted to perpetrate a
fraud. Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d  at 403.
	Likewise, in this case, there was no evidence that defendant
possessed title without complete assignment for a criminal
purpose. As in Tolliver, no facts were presented that demonstrated
that defendant stole any of the vehicles for which he possessed an
incomplete title, or that he was using these titles to perpetrate a
fraud. In fact, defendant was acquitted of the charges that he
possessed stolen vehicles.
	The State fails to identify any other type of criminal activity
that might have motivated defendant's possession of incomplete
titles. The State merely asserts that some general criminal purpose
may be inferred from the evidence presented at trial. In support of
this argument, the State observes that the circuit court did not give
credence to defendant's argument that some of the titles and
vehicles examined by the auditors were owned by Crumb. The
rejection of this defense, however, does not suffice as proof of
criminal purpose. The State also argues that a criminal purpose
may be inferred from defendant's experience as an auto parts
recycler and his awareness of the requirements of section
4-104(a)(2). While these facts indicate that defendant's possession
of title without complete assignment was knowing, they do not
show that defendant acted with a criminal purpose. For similar
reasons, we disagree with the State's assertion that the number of
titles defendant possessed without complete assignment and the
number of titles he possessed without cars on his lot is
circumstantial evidence of a criminal purpose. While the number
of irregularities in defendant's record keeping may prove his
knowledge of a violation, it does not prove the reason for the
violation. To conclude that these violations were the result of a
criminal scheme rather than poor or disorganized record keeping
by defendant would be pure speculation. Given the insufficient
evidence of a criminal purpose behind defendant's possession of
title without complete assignment, we hold, as we did in Tolliver,
that defendant's convictions under section 4-104(a)(2) must be
reversed. See also People v. DePalma, 256 Ill. App. 3d 206, 214
(1994) (finding insufficient evidence of criminal purpose); People
v. Jones, 227 Ill. App. 3d 917, 919-20 (1992) (same).
	We now turn to defendant's challenge to the constitutionality
of his convictions for failure to keep records under section
5-401.2 of the Vehicle Code. Section 5-401.2 requires certain
individuals licensed under the Vehicle Code to maintain records
relating to the acquisition and disposition of vehicle and parts for
three years at their place of business. 625 ILCS 5/5-401.2(a)
(West 1996). Section 5-401.2 further provides that "[a]ny person
who knowingly fails to keep the records required by this Section
or who knowingly violates this Section shall be guilty of a Class
2 felony" (625 ILCS 5/5-401.2(i) (West 1996)).
	Despite the language in section 5-401.2 describing knowledge
as the mental state for the offense of failure to keep records, the
appellate court held, sua sponte, that the mental state prescribed in
Tolliver for violations of section 4-104(a)(2) also applies to the
offense of failure to keep records under section 5-401.2. Based on
the circuit court's comments at the conclusion of defendant's trial,
the appellate court found that the circuit court had failed to find
the existence of this mental state. It, therefore, reversed
defendant's convictions under section 5-401.2 and remanded the
cause for the circuit court to apply the proper mental state in
assessing the evidence that had been presented at defendant's trial.
	In the opinion originally filed by this court in this case, we
affirmed defendant's convictions under section 5-401.2. We held
that, according to the express terms of section 5-401.2, the mental
state required for a violation of this provision is knowledge. We
found that the circuit court applied the proper mental state, and the
evidence supported its decision that defendant was guilty of failure
to keep records.
	In his petition for rehearing, however, defendant argues for
the first time that section 5-401.2 is unconstitutional on its face
and as applied to him. Defendant contends that section 5-401.2
violates due process because it permits a conviction of failure to
keep records to be based on mere knowledge, thereby potentially
punishing innocent behavior. In addition, he asserts that imposing
a felony penalty for such behavior is not a reasonable means of
accomplishing the purpose of section 5-401.2. Further, defendant
argues that application of section 5-401.2 to him violates due
process because the evidence demonstrates no criminal purpose
associated with his failure to keep records. Instead, defendant
testified that he did not know how to keep the required records and
relied on his secretary to do so.
	We ordered the State to answer defendant's petition (see 155
Ill. 2d R. 367(d)) and directed it to respond to defendant's
arguments that (1) we should address his constitutional challenge
despite his failure to raise it prior to filing his petition for
rehearing, and (2) section 5-401.2 is unconstitutional on its face
and as applied to defendant. The State did not discuss waiver in its
answer. With respect to defendant's constitutional challenge, the
State argues that section 5-401.2 does not violate due process.
According to the State, the legislature could have reasonably
determined that failure to keep the records required by section
5-401.2 was so important to control auto-related offenses that a
felony penalty was necessary to punish vehicle dealers and
recyclers, even those without a criminal purpose. After reviewing
defendant's petition and the State's answer, we have decided to
modify the opinion filed in this case. We now reverse defendant's
convictions for failure to keep records because we find that section
5-401.2 is invalid on due process grounds.
	Generally, parties may not argue new points in a petition for
rehearing. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); 155 Ill. 2d R. 367(b); Dow
v. Columbus-Cabrini Medical Center, 274 Ill. App. 3d 653, 659
(1995). Nevertheless, we find it appropriate in this case to address
the merits of defendant's due process challenge to section 5-401.2
despite his failure to raise it until filing his petition for rehearing
in this court. In its answer to defendant's petition for rehearing, the
State did not argue that defendant is precluded from making a
constitutional challenge to section 5-401.2 because of his failure
to raise this issue previously. In addition, this court has held that
a challenge to the constitutionality of a criminal statute may be
raised at any time. See, e.g., People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500,
510 (1999) (considering constitutionality of statute raised for the
first time in appellate briefs); People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448,
454 (1989) (same); People v. Sarelli, 55 Ill. 2d 169, 171 (1973)
(considering constitutionality of statute raised for the first time in
a post-conviction petition). Indeed, if, as defendant argues, section
5-401.2 is unconstitutional, it would be fundamentally unfair to
uphold his convictions. See People v. Zeisler, 125 Ill. 2d 42, 46
(1988) (if a statute creating an offense is unconstitutional, it is
considered void ab initio).
	Our review of the merits of defendant's constitutional
challenge is guided by the following familiar principles. Statutes
are presumed constitutional, and a party challenging the
constitutionality of a statute has the burden of establishing its
invalidity. People v. Lantz, 186 Ill. 2d 243, 254 (1999). Pursuant
to its police power, the legislature has wide discretion to establish
penalties for criminal offenses, but this discretion is limited by the
constitutional guarantee that a person may not be deprived of
liberty without due process of law. In re K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542, 550
(1999). When legislation does not affect a fundamental
constitutional right, the test for determining whether it complies
with substantive due process requirements is the rational basis test.
People v. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d 201, 216 (1992). Under this test, a
statute will be upheld if it "bears a reasonable relationship to a
public interest to be served, and the means adopted are a
reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective."
People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1991).
	The legislature's purpose in enacting section 5-401.2 can be
found in section 5-100-1 of the Vehicle Code. In this provision,
the legislature expressed its findings, inter alia, that "essential to
the criminal enterprise of vehicle theft operations is the ability of
thieves to transfer or sell stolen vehicles or their parts through
legitimate commercial channels, making them available for sale to
the automotive industry" and "vehicle dealers, scrap processors,
automotive parts recyclers, repairers and rebuilders who comprise
the vast majority of the persons engaged in the automotive
business in this State are frequently exposed to pressures and
influences from motor vehicle thieves." 625 ILCS 5/5-100-1
(West 1996). In addition, section 5-100-1 contains a statement
that, in enacting section 5-401.2 and related provisions, the
legislature intended "to establish a system of mandatory licensing
and record keeping which will prevent or reduce the transfer or
sale of stolen vehicles or their parts within this State." 625 ILCS
5/5-100-1 (West 1996).
	To achieve this purpose, section 5-401.2(a) requires certain
individuals licensed under the Vehicle Code to keep records,
including the year, make, and model of a part or vehicle; the style
and color of a vehicle; the date of acquisition of a part or vehicle;
the name and address of the person from whom the part or vehicle
was acquired; the date of disposition of the part or vehicle; the
name and address of the person with whom the part or vehicle was
disposed; and the number of the uniform invoice reflecting the
disposition of the part or vehicle, if applicable. 625 ILCS
5/5-401.2(a) (West 1996). The failure to record any of this
specific information constitutes a failure to keep records. 625
ILCS 5/5-401.2(b) (West 1996).
	We agree with defendant that section 5-401.2 cannot
withstand scrutiny under the rational basis test. In analogous cases,
this court and courts in other jurisdictions have held that criminal
statutes that potentially punish innocent conduct violate due
process principles because they are not reasonably designed to
achieve their purposes. In People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62 (1985),
for example, this court held that the aggravated arson statute was
not rationally related to its purpose because it could be applied to
innocent activities. Under that statute, a person could be convicted
of aggravated arson, a Class X felony, for knowingly damaging a
building if a fireman or policeman on the scene was injured.
Unlike the arson statute, the aggravated arson statute did not
require that the damaged property belong to another or that the
damage occur with the intent to defraud an insurer. This court
found that, because the aggravated arson statute did not require
proof of an unlawful purpose, it could potentially punish innocent
conduct. For example, if a policeman or fireman were injured as
a result of a farmer setting fire to his own deteriorated barn, the
farmer would be subject to a Class X felony conviction under the
aggravated arson statute. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d  at 66.
	This court concluded that, if the purpose of the aggravated
arson statute was to impose a severe punishment for arsonists
whose acts injured a policeman or fireman, it was not reasonably
related to its purpose because it was not limited to arsonists. In
addition, imposing a Class X penalty for individuals with no
culpable intent is not a reasonable means of punishing arsonists
who injure firemen or policemen. Similarly, if the purpose of the
statute was to discourage laymen from setting fire to structures,
"imposing a Class X penalty in case of injury but no penalty
otherwise would not be a reasonable method of ensuring
compliance with such a ban." Wick, 107 Ill. 2d  at 67. Thus, this
court held that the aggravated arson statute violated due process.
	Similarly, in People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36 (1994), this
court held that a portion of the theft statute failed the rational basis
test because it could be used to punish innocent conduct. The
statute made it a crime for an individual to knowingly exert control
over property " 'in the custody of any law enforcement agency
which is explicitly represented to him by any law enforcement
officer or any individual acting in behalf of a law enforcement
agency as being stolen.' " (Emphasis omitted.) Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d  at 39-40, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 16-1(a)(5).
If the property involved was valued at more than $300, a violation
of this statute was a felony offense.
	This court found that section 16-1(a)(1) was not reasonably
related to its purpose, which was to enable police officers to break
up fencing enterprises through undercover operations. This court
explained that, because section 16-1(a)(1) contained no culpable
mental state, it could potentially subject innocent conduct, such as
an evidence technician's legitimate custody of stolen property, to
a felony penalty. Accordingly, this court held that the statute
violated due process principles. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d  at 42-43.
	In State v. Saiez, 489 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 1986), the Florida
Supreme Court held that a statute making it a crime to knowingly
possess a credit card embossing machine violated due process
because it could potentially punish innocent activities. In support
of its decision, the court reasoned:
			" 'In order to meet constitutional limitations on police
regulation, this prohibition, i.e. against possession of
objects having a common and widespread lawful use,
must under our previous decisions be reasonably
"required as incidental to the accomplishment of the
primary purpose of the Act." There is little doubt that the
penalty against possession of such equipment will
simplify the problem of enforcing the primary prohibition
***. Expediency, however, is not the test, and we
conclude that convenience of enforcement does not
warrant the broad restriction imposed by [the statute].' "
Saiez, 489 So. 2d  at 1128, quoting Delmonico v. State,
155 So. 2d 368, 369-70 (Fla. 1963).
According to the Saiez court, the statute at issue was not
reasonably related to its purpose of preventing credit card fraud
because it interfered with the rights of individuals who used the
machines for noncriminal activities. The Saiez court concluded
that the broad scope of the statute was not necessary and held it
invalid on due process grounds. Saiez, 489 So. 2d  at 1129; see also
Akron v. Rasdan, 105 Ohio App. 3d 164, 663 N.E.2d 947 (1995)
(statute prohibiting possession of knife more than 2½ inches long
was not reasonably related to its purpose because it criminalized
inherently innocent, harmless, and useful conduct); W. LaFave &
A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §2.12, at 211-15 (1986)
(observing that, unlike the United States Supreme Court, state
courts will invalidate statutes on due process grounds if the
legislature could have provided an equally effective but less severe
means of addressing a particular evil).
	We find that section 5-401.2 is not reasonably designed to
achieve its purpose. Under section 5-401.2, even a slight lapse in
record keeping by an individual with no criminal purpose may be
punished as a Class 2 felony. For example, an individual who
knowingly fails to record the color of a single vehicle could be
convicted of failure to keep records, even if that failure were
caused by a disability, family crisis, or incompetence. Because
section 5-401.2 potentially subjects such innocent conduct to such
a severe penalty, we find that it does not contain a reasonable
means of preventing the trafficking of stolen vehicles and parts.
See Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 42-43; Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d  at 218
(holding that imposing "a Class 3 felony for a person otherwise
legally commercially fishing and taking over $300 worth of fish,
but who fails to have a tag on his net as proof that the net is
licensed, or fails to have in his immediate possession his fishing
license to prove he is licensed, is not reasonably designed to
protect the citizens of Illinois from depleting our natural
resources"); Wick, 107 Ill. 2d at 66-67; cf. Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d  at
402. Accordingly, we hold that section 5-401.2 violates due
process protections.
	To avoid this constitutional problem, defendant asserts that
we should read the mental state of knowledge plus criminal
purpose into section 5-401.2, as we did in Tolliver for section
4-104(a)(2). According to defendant, if knowledge plus criminal
purpose is the applicable mental state under section 5-401.2, his
convictions for failure to keep records must be reversed because
the evidence is insufficient to establish that he acted with a
criminal purpose. The State responds that we may not read the
Tolliver mental state into section 5-401.2 because, unlike section
4-104(a), the failure-to-keep-records provision unambiguously
provides that the applicable mental state is knowledge.
	As the State observes, we may not read a mental state of
knowledge plus criminal purpose into section 5-401.2. In Tolliver,
we were able to imply the mental state of knowledge plus criminal
purpose as an element of section 4-104(a)(2) because that
provision contained no mental state. After determining that the
legislature did not intend to create an absolute liability offense,
therefore, this court was free to choose an appropriate mental state
and to imply this mental state as an element of the statute. See 720
ILCS 5/4-9 (West 1996); People v. Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d 15, 23-24 (1992).
	Unlike section 4-104, section 5-401.2 does not lack a mental
state element. Section 5-401.2(i) expressly provides that the
mental state for the offense of failure to keep records is
knowledge. When a statute is unambiguous, it must be enforced as
enacted, and a court may not depart from its plain language by
reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed
by the legislature. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997).
The responsibility for the wisdom or justice of legislation rests
with the legislature, and courts may not rewrite statutes to make
them consistent with the court's idea of orderliness and public
policy. Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity &
Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1983). Consistent with these
principles, in Zaremba, Wick, and Hamm, we did not read the
mental state of knowledge plus criminal purpose into the statutes
at issue because they expressly provided knowledge as the mental
state. Instead, we held that these statutes were invalid. We must do
the same in this case.
	We hold that defendant has met his burden of establishing that
section 5-401.2 is unconstitutional and reverse his convictions for
failure to keep records. Because providing an effective system of
mandatory record keeping to prevent or reduce the transfer or sale
of stolen vehicles and parts is a laudatory goal, we encourage the
legislature to remedy this constitutional defect at the earliest
possible time.
	Because we hold that section 5-401.2 is facially invalid on
due process grounds, we need not address defendant's claim that
this statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. In addition, we
need not address the parties' arguments regarding the propriety of
the appellate court's decision to remand the cause for a limited
nonevidentiary hearing. No remand is necessary for the circuit
court to reevaluate the evidence of defendant's possession of title
without complete assignment in light of Tolliver because, as
stated, the evidence is insufficient to permit a conclusion that
defendant acted with the Tolliver mental state. Our holding that
defendant's convictions under section 5-401.2 must be reversed
because this statute is unconstitutional also obviates the need for
a remand. Accordingly, we need not decide whether the appellate
court should have ordered a new trial rather than a limited hearing.
CONCLUSION
	For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate
court remanding this cause for a limited evidentiary hearing. We
reverse defendant's convictions for possession of title without
complete assignment under section 4-104(a)(2) of the Vehicle
Code and failure to keep records under section 5-401.2(a).
Defendant's sentences are vacated.
Judgments reversed.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
	I agree with the majority's disposition of this case. I write
separately merely to note that defendant's prior convictions could
have been offered as substantive evidence of his intent on the
charges of possession of title without complete assignment. See
People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 454 (1996) ("[e]vidence of other
crimes is admissible if it tends to prove modus operandi, design,
motive or knowledge"). However, the record reveals that at trial
the State offered defendant's prior convictions only for
impeachment purposes, not as direct evidence of guilt.
Accordingly, in this case defendant's prior convictions cannot be
considered as direct evidence of intent. See People v. Hope, 184 Ill. 2d 39, 44 (1998) (arguments not raised by State at trial may not
be raised on appeal); People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 395 (1989)
(refusing to allow State, as appellee, to argue a theory on appeal
for admissibility of evidence which was not raised in trial court).
It is thus unnecessary to speculate whether the prior convictions
could have constituted sufficient evidence of intent to uphold
defendant's convictions for possession of title without complete
assignment in the instant case.
	I agree with the majority that the defendant's convictions for
the offense of possession of title without complete assignment, in
violation of section 4-104(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625
ILCS 5/4-104(a)(2) (West 1996)), cannot stand. I do not agree,
however, with the majority's further conclusion, in response to the
defendant's petition for rehearing, that the defendant's convictions
for failure to keep records, in violation of section 5-401.2(a) of the
Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/5-401.2(a) (West 1996)), must also be
reversed. The defendant now argues, and the majority now agrees,
that the statute defining that offense might punish innocent
conduct and is therefore unconstitutional. I believe that section
5-401.2(a) is valid; accordingly, I dissent from that portion of the
majority opinion, as modified on denial of rehearing, and I would
instead adhere to the conclusion found in our original opinion in
this case, filed February 17, 2000, that the trial judge properly
found the defendant guilty of those charges.
	The record-keeping requirements of section 5-401.2 are part
of a group of statutes found in chapter V of the Vehicle Code that
regulate licensed automobile dealers, transporters, wreckers, and
rebuilders. As a dealer in used auto parts, the defendant was
licensed under article III of that chapter, which is applicable to
automotive parts recyclers, scrap processors, repairers, and
rebuilders. Pursuant to section 5-401.2, the defendant was
required to maintain extensive and detailed records regarding the
acquisition and disposition of automobiles and automobile parts
in the course of his business. In addition, the defendant's
operations were subject to periodic inspections by the Secretary of
State, whose office is authorized to ensure compliance with the
record-keeping requirements of the Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS
5/5-403 (West 1996).
	As the majority recognizes, the legislative purposes for this
statutory scheme are expressed in section 5-100-1 of the Vehicle
Code. 625 ILCS 5/5-100-1 (West 1996). After stating a number
of findings by the legislature regarding the problems of motor
vehicle theft and the business of motor vehicle sales and repairs,
section 5-100-1 concludes, "It is, therefore, the intent of the
General Assembly to establish a system of mandatory licensing
and record keeping which will prevent or reduce the transfer or
sale of stolen vehicles or their parts within this State."
	It is readily apparent that the records that scrap yard operators
and licensees like the defendant are required to keep under section
5-401.2 represent an integral part of this statutory scheme. The
defendant, as a licensee under the Vehicle Code, is a participant in
a highly regulated industry, and the legislature has reasonably
determined that extensive record keeping is a responsibility of
licensees under the Code. Despite the legislature's clear findings
and statement of intent, the majority concludes that the offense
found in section 5-401.2 does not bear a rational relationship to
the evil it is designed to address. Specifically, the majority
concludes that the statute might punish what, in the majority's
view, is wholly innocent conduct. I disagree.
	The record-keeping requirements of section 5-401.2 apply
only to persons licensed under the provisions of chapter V of the
Vehicle Code. I believe that the legislature may define offenses in
this manner and impose on persons who engage in certain trades
and occupations the duty to compile and maintain records of their
business. The pertinent constitutional question in these
circumstances is not whether there might be an innocent
explanation for a licensee's knowing failure to keep certain
records, as the majority suggests, but whether the record-keeping
requirements imposed by the legislature are rationally related to
the evils the legislation is designed to remedy. The second
question must be answered in the affirmative, in light of the
obvious relationship between the record-keeping requirements of
section 5-401.2 and the legislature's goal of reducing the traffic in
stolen automobiles and automobile parts.
	Given the state's significant interest in regulating the business
of automobile recyclers and parts dealers, and the corresponding
necessity for extensive record keeping by licensed operators, I
believe that the present case is much different from the cases cited
by the majority, in which challenged offenses might irrationally
criminalize conduct legitimately performed without a criminal
purpose (see People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36 (1994); People v.
Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62 (1985); see also State v. Saiez, 489 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 1986) (possession of credit card embossing machine);
Akron v. Rasdan, 105 Ohio App. 3d 164, 663 N.E.2d 947 (1995)
(possession of knife more than 2½ inches long)), or in which the
penalty for a challenged offense is not rationally related to the
goals of the underlying legislation (People v. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d 201 (1992)).
	The present appeal does not involve circumstances remotely
similar to those cases. The defendant is licensed under chapter V
of the Vehicle Code, and pursuant to section 5-401.2 he is
required to keep certain records regarding his business. The duty
imposed on the defendant as a licensee under the Code is
rationally related to the goals of the legislation, and I would
therefore conclude that section 5-401.2 is constitutional.


	JUSTICE BILANDIC, also concurring in part and dissenting
in part:


	I agree with the majority that defendant's convictions for
possession of title without complete assignment under section
4-104(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/4-104(a)(2) (West
1996)) must be reversed. However, I agree with Justice Miller's
partial dissent that defendant's convictions for failure to keep
records under sections 5-401.2(a) and (i) of the Vehicle Code (625
ILCS 5/5-401.2(a), (i) (West 1996)) should be affirmed. I write
separately to express my rationale for finding section 5-401.2
constitutional.
	The legislature is empowered to declare and define conduct
constituting a crime, and to determine the nature and extent of the
punishment. People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 319 (1985). To
satisfy due process, a criminal statute must be reasonably designed
to remedy the evils that the legislature has determined constitute
a threat to the public health, safety and general welfare. In re K.C.,
186 Ill. 2d 542, 550-51 (1999). Chapter V of the Vehicle Code
(625 ILCS 5/5-100 et seq. (West 1996)), which regulates
automotive dealers, transporters, wreckers and rebuilders, and
under which defendant is licensed, sets forth in considerable detail
the findings and purpose underlying its mandatory licensing and
record-keeping provisions:
			"The General Assembly finds that: (1) crimes involving
the theft of vehicles and their parts have risen steadily
over the past years, with a resulting loss of millions of
dollars to the residents of this State; (2) essential to the
criminal enterprise of vehicle theft operations is the
ability of thieves to transfer or sell stolen vehicles or their
parts through legitimate commercial channels, making
them available for sale to the automotive industry; (3)
vehicle dealers, scrap processors, automotive parts
recyclers, repairers and rebuilders who comprise the vast
majority of the persons engaged in the automotive
business in this State are frequently exposed to pressures
and influences from motor vehicle thieves; (4) elements
of organized crime are constantly attempting to influence
businessmen engaged in the sale and repair of motor
vehicles so as to further their own criminal interests; and
(5) close and strict government regulation of vehicle
dealers, scrap processors, automotive parts recyclers,
repairers and rebuilders will provide a system of tracking
the flow of vehicles and their essential parts and therefore
significantly reduce the numbers of vehicle-related thefts
in this State. It is, therefore, the intent of the General
Assembly to establish a system of mandatory licensing
and record keeping which will prevent or reduce the
transfer or sale of stolen vehicles or their parts within this
State." 625 ILCS 5/5-100-1 (West 1996).
	The record-keeping requirements of section 5-401.2(a) are
inextricably linked and rationally related to the evils sought to be
remedied by the statute, i.e., "the transfer or sale of stolen vehicles
or their parts." The failure to maintain the required records
facilitates the easy disposal of stolen vehicles, thereby thwarting
the clear purpose of the statute. Consistent with this purpose, the
record-keeping and penalty provisions of section 5-401.2 are
expressly applicable only to certain persons required to be licensed
under chapter V: new and used vehicle dealers (625 ILCS
5/5-101, 5-102 (West 1996)); automotive parts recyclers (like
defendant), repairers and rebuilders (625 ILCS 5/5-301 (West
1996)); and out-of-state salvage vehicle buyers (625 ILCS 5/5-302
(West 1996)). 625 ILCS 5-401.2(a), (i) (West 1996).
	Significantly, the application for a license as an automotive
parts dealer must include a statement that the applicant
understands chapters I through V of the Vehicle Code. See 625
ILCS 5/5-301(b)(7) (West 1996). The applicant must also supply
detailed information on the ownership of the business. 625 ILCS
5/5-301(b)(3) (West 1996). The applicant must aver under oath
that the principals in the business have not committed in the past
three years any one violation of any one of the following acts: the
anti-theft laws of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/4-101 et seq.
(West 1998)); the "Certificates of Title" laws of the Vehicle Code
(625 ILCS 5/3-100 et seq. (West 1998)); the "Offenses Against
Registration and Certificates of Title Laws" of the Vehicle Code
(625 ILCS 5/3-701 et seq. (West 1998)); the "Dealers,
Transporters, Wreckers and Rebuilders" laws of the Vehicle Code
(625 ILCS 5/5-100 et seq. (West 1998)); section 21-2 of the
Criminal Code of 1961, entitled "Criminal trespass to vehicles"
(720 ILCS 5/21-2 (West 1998)); or the Retailers' Occupation Tax
Act (35 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 1998)). 625 ILCS 5/5-301(b)(4)
(West 1996). The applicant must further aver under oath that the
principals in the business have not committed in any calendar year
three or more violations of any one or more of the following acts:
the Consumer Finance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 17, par. 5601
et seq., repealed by Pub. Act 84-1004, §9, eff. November 1,
1985); the Consumer Installment Loan Act (205 ILCS 670/1 et
seq. (West 1998)); the Retail Installment Sales Act (815 ILCS
405/1 et seq. (West 1998)); the Motor Vehicle Retail Installment
Sales Act (815 ILCS 375/1 et seq. (West 1998)); the Interest Act
(815 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)); the Illinois Wage
Assignment Act (740 ILCS 170/.01 et seq. (West 1998)); part 8 of
article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled "Wage
Deductions" (735 ILCS 5/12-801 et seq. (West 1998)); or the
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS
505/1 et seq. (West 1998)). 625 ILCS 5/5-301(b)(5) (West 1996).
Finally, as part of the application process, the applicant
"authorizes an investigation to determine if the applicant has ever
been convicted of a crime and if so, the disposition of those
convictions." 625 ILCS 5/5-105 (West 1996).
	The statutory scheme set forth above provides licensees with
notice that the industry into which they are entering is subject to
close scrutiny and regulation. This is not a recent and unexpected
development in the law. The automobile and automotive parts
industry in Illinois has long been the subject of extensive
regulation. See People v. Krull, 126 Ill. 2d 235, 246 (1989), citing
Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 721 F.2d 1072, 1079
(7th Cir. 1983). Since 1934, the state has required licensure of
automotive parts dealers (see Krull, 126 Ill. 2d at 246), and, since
1956, has imposed record-keeping requirements (see Bionic Auto
Parts & Sales, Inc., 721 F.2d at 1079). In 1985, the legislature
adopted measures to provide criminal sanctions for the failure to
maintain adequate records. See Krull, 126 Ill. 2d  at 246.
	The legislature's extensive findings and stated purpose in
enacting chapter V of the Vehicle Code, and the obvious and
intrinsic link between the record-keeping requirements and the
statute's purpose, along with the industry's long history of
regulation, compel a finding that section 5-401.2 is constitutional.
The majority, however, concludes that the knowing failure to keep
the required records may constitute innocent conduct, and that
section 5-401.2 thus suffers from the same defect as the statutes
at issue in People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36 (1994), and People
v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62 (1985). I disagree because the
circumstances in Zaremba and Wick are distinguishable from this
case.
	In Zaremba, we held that the following provision of the theft
statute offends due process:
			"A person commits theft when he knowingly:
* * *
			(5) Obtains or exerts control over property in the
custody of any law enforcement agency which is
explicitly represented to him by any law enforcement
officer or any individual acting in behalf of a law
enforcement agency as being stolen." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989,
ch. 38, par. 16-1(a)(5).
A violation of section 16-1(a)(5) involving property valued in
excess of $300 was a felony offense. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch.
38, par. 16-1(b)(4).
	Unlike other provisions of the theft statute, section 16-1(a)(5)
required neither that the control over the property was
unauthorized, nor that there was an intent to permanently deprive
the rightful owner of the subject property. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989,
ch. 38, pars. 16-1(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4). Section 16-1(a)(5)
could thus have been applied to conduct that was unrelated to the
purpose of this statutory section, that being to provide an effective
method of breaking up fencing operations. For example, section
16-1(a)(5) could have been applied to the wholly authorized and
innocent conduct of an evidence technician who lawfully obtained
possession of stolen goods from an arresting officer. In these
circumstances, the absence of a culpable mental state rendered
section 16-1(a)(5) of the theft statute unconstitutional. Zaremba,
158 Ill. 2d  at 38-39, 42.
	Our decision in Zaremba was guided by this court's decision
in People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62 (1985). In Wick, we held that the
aggravated arson statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par.
20-1.1(a)(3)) was unconstitutional because it did not bear a
reasonable relationship to its purpose, i.e., to punish more severely
the conduct of arsonists that results in personal injury to police
officers and firefighters. The aggravated arson statute did not
incorporate the elements of simple arson and did not otherwise
provide for a culpable mental state. Rather than applying to
arsonists, the aggravated arson statute applied to anyone who
knowingly damaged any structure by fire or explosive where a
police officer or firefighter is injured. Accordingly, a farmer who
lawfully demolished a deteriorated barn by fire, resulting in injury
to a firefighter, would have been liable for aggravated arson, a
Class X felony. Thus, we held that the aggravated arson statute
swept too broadly by punishing innocent as well as culpable
conduct in setting fires. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d  at 66.
	In Zaremba and Wick, the subject statutes irrationally
criminalized lawful conduct of innocent parties not intended to fall
within the scope of the statutes. In contrast, section 5-401.2 of the
Vehicle Code rationally criminalizes only the conduct of licensees
participating in the automotive industry, and only that conduct
which is obviously and closely linked to the state's legitimate
interest in preventing the transfer and sale of stolen vehicles and
their parts. There is no potential that the statute will reach beyond
its intended target. Thus, a knowing violation of the record-keeping requirements of section 5-401.2(a) is not the type of
innocent conduct that was at issue in Zaremba and Wick.
	In light of the foregoing, I would hold that section 5-401.2 of
the Vehicle Code is reasonably designed to achieve its purpose,
and that defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that the
statute is constitutional. I would thus affirm defendant's
convictions for failure to keep records.