Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Gerald P. Boyle

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP000482-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 110 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP482-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Gerald P. Boyle, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Gerald P. Boyle, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST BOYLE 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 23, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 12, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., dissents. (Opinion Filed) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs by Gerald 
P. Boyle, and Boyle, Boyle & Boyle, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Gerald P. Boyle. 
 
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief by Robert 
G. Krohn, and Roethe Pope Roeth, LLP, Edgerton, and oral 
argument by Robert G. Krohn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 110
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP482-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Gerald P. Boyle, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Gerald P. Boyle, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 23, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Gerald P. Boyle appeals the 
report of Hannah C. Dugan, referee, who recommended that this 
court suspend Attorney Boyle's Wisconsin law license for 60 
days; require him to complete six continuing legal education 
(CLE) credits in law office management and/or trust account 
practices; require him to provide quarterly trust account 
reports to the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) for one year; 
and require him to pay the full costs of this disciplinary 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
2 
 
proceeding.  The referee found that Attorney Boyle committed all 
six charged counts of misconduct, which included trust account 
violations; a failure to explain in writing the nature of his 
proposed fee and subsequent fee changes, the purpose and effect 
of the advanced fees he accepted, and the scope of the legal 
services he would provide in exchange for those fees; a failure 
to promptly comply with a client's reasonable requests for 
information; and a failure to act with reasonable diligence and 
competence.   
¶2 
We 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law.  We conclude that the referee's reasoning 
with respect to discipline is persuasive.  Accordingly, this 
court concludes that a 60-day suspension of Attorney Boyle's 
license to practice law in Wisconsin is an appropriate sanction 
for his violations. 
 We also agree with the referee's 
recommendations to require Attorney Boyle to provide quarterly 
trust account reports to the OLR for one year; to require him to 
complete six CLE credits in law office management and/or trust 
account practices; and to require him to pay the full costs of 
this disciplinary proceeding, which total $24,917.89 as of 
November 2, 2015. 
¶3 
Attorney Boyle has held a Wisconsin law license since 
1962.  He has been privately reprimanded three times.   
¶4 
In 2002, Attorney Boyle was privately reprimanded for 
violating Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 20:1.3, SCR 20:1.4(b), and 
SCR 20:1.16(d) for failing to act diligently with respect to a 
criminal defendant's request for post-conviction relief, failing 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
3 
 
to explain matters to the client so that the client could make 
informed decisions, and failing to return the client's file.  
See Private Reprimand 2002-09. 
¶5 
In 2009, Attorney Boyle was privately reprimanded for 
violating SCR 20:1.3, SCR 20:1.4(a), SCR 20:1.16(d), and former 
SCR 20:5.1(a) and (b).  The violations involved multiple cases 
assigned to associate attorneys working for Attorney Boyle.  The 
associates failed to take any meaningful action on those cases.  
After Attorney Boyle became aware of significant problems in the 
law firm's representation, he failed to take remedial action on 
the cases.  Attorney Boyle also delayed returning the file and 
unearned fees of one of the clients for more than two years.  
See Private Reprimand 2009-10. 
¶6 
In 2012, Attorney Boyle was privately reprimanded for 
violating SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) and (2) for failing to prepare a 
written fee agreement and failing to explain the purpose and 
effect of any advanced fee received.  See Private Reprimand 
2012-23. 
¶7 
In its underlying complaint in this case, the OLR 
charged Attorney Boyle with six counts of misconduct.  Attorney 
Boyle denied the misconduct charges in his answer. 
¶8 
Counts One through Five arise out of Attorney Boyle's 
representation of D.P. in a consumer law/fraud matter.  D.P. 
collects John Lennon memorabilia.  D.P. paid over $191,000 to a 
gallery in Hawaii for various pieces of John Lennon memorabilia, 
including drawings and a microphone supposedly used by Lennon.  
D.P. paid over $95,000 to a gallery in Florida for various 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
4 
 
drawings by Lennon.  D.P. paid over $21,000 to a gallery in New 
York for a drawing and handwritten letter by Lennon. 
¶9 
D.P. 
came 
to 
suspect 
the 
authenticity 
of 
the 
purchases.  In 2008 and early 2009, D.P. learned that that the 
purchased items were counterfeit and/or not resalable. 
¶10 D.P. 
retained 
a 
Waukesha 
County 
attorney 
who 
successfully recovered the amount paid to the Hawaii gallery for 
the microphone supposedly used by Lennon.  This recovery still 
left over $131,000 in Lennon drawings sold by the Hawaii gallery 
that D.P. suspected were inauthentic. 
¶11 D.P. consulted with an ink specialist to evaluate the 
authenticity of his collection of Lennon drawings.  The ink 
specialist believed that many of the drawings were fraudulent, 
as many of the inks used for the drawings were not commercially 
available on the purported dates of the drawings.  The ink 
specialist referred D.P. to Attorney Boyle, with whom the 
specialist had worked on a different, earlier matter. 
¶12 In November 2009, D.P. sought legal representation 
from Attorney Boyle regarding all of the remaining purchases.  
Attorney Boyle initially told D.P. that he would handle the 
purchases with all three galleries for a flat fee of $25,000.  
Attorney Boyle did not prepare a written fee agreement, nor did 
he communicate in writing the purpose and effect of any advanced 
fees received from D.P. 
¶13 In mid-November 2009, D.P. charged $10,000 to his 
credit card in partial payment of Attorney Boyle's $25,000 
advanced fee.  Attorney Boyle did not deposit the $10,000 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
5 
 
advanced fee payment into his client trust account but instead 
deposited the payment into his law firm's operating account.   
¶14 Not long thereafter, Attorney Boyle told D.P. that he 
would need more money to handle the case(s) against all three 
galleries.  In January 2010, Attorney Boyle asked D.P. to send 
$35,000 immediately, and told D.P. that he would need another 
$35,000 in about six weeks.  D.P. agreed to the proposal and 
promptly gave Attorney Boyle a cashier's check for $35,000.  
Attorney Boyle did not deposit the $35,000 advanced fee payment 
into his client trust account but instead deposited the payment 
into his law firm's operating account.  Attorney Boyle did not 
prepare a written fee agreement modifying his original oral fee 
agreement with D.P., nor did he communicate in writing to D.P. 
any changes in the basis or rate of the fee.  Attorney Boyle 
also did not explain in writing the purpose and effect of the 
$35,000 advanced fee payment. 
¶15 In January 2011, D.P. paid Attorney Boyle another 
$20,000 to continue representation against the three galleries.  
Attorney Boyle did not deposit the $20,000 advanced fee payment 
into his trust account but instead deposited the payment into 
his law firm's operating account.  As with the payments twice 
before, Attorney Boyle did not prepare a written fee agreement, 
nor did he communicate in writing to D.P. any changes in the 
basis or rate of the fee.  Attorney Boyle also did not explain 
in writing the purpose and effect of the $20,000 advanced fee 
payment. 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
6 
 
¶16 In December 2009, Attorney Boyle wrote letters to two 
of the three galleries (the Hawaii and New York galleries), 
alleging that the Lennon sketches that D.P. had purchased were 
forgeries 
and 
stating 
that 
D.P. 
wanted 
to 
recover 
his 
investment.  In January 2010, Attorney Boyle wrote the Hawaii 
and New York galleries again, noting that he had not received 
any response from them.  Attorney Boyle asked for the names of 
their respective law firms and the existence of any insurance 
coverage.  
¶17 In May 2010, D.P. sought to discontinue Attorney 
Boyle's representation due to frustration over the pace at which 
the matters were progressing.  Attorney Boyle ultimately 
convinced D.P. to allow him to stay on the case. 
¶18 In early June 2010, Attorney Boyle arranged for 
another lawyer, outside of his firm, to meet with D.P. and write 
a memo discussing potential lawsuits against one or more of the 
three galleries.  Attorney Boyle also met with the ink 
specialist with whom D.P. had consulted and who had referred 
D.P. to Attorney Boyle.   
¶19 In June 2010, Attorney Boyle informed D.P. that the 
statute of limitations for his claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 
(the "Deceptive Trade Practices Act" or "DTPA") had expired as 
to 10 of the 30 items he had purchased.  The following day, D.P. 
noted in an email to Attorney Boyle that the statute of 
limitations would expire for additional items on July 3, 2010. 
¶20 On July 2, 2010, Attorney Boyle filed a single lawsuit 
against the Hawaii gallery in the United States District Court 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
7 
 
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.  The lawsuit listed six 
causes of action, including the DTPA cause of action.   
¶21 Certain defendants to the Eastern District lawsuit 
filed summary judgment motions that slowed the progress of the 
lawsuit.  D.P. sent Attorney Boyle multiple emails seeking 
information about the case.  Attorney Boyle and/or his firm 
responded minimally to these requests.  Attorney Boyle cancelled 
various meetings D.P. had arranged, and failed to return many of 
D.P.'s phone calls. 
¶22 At Attorney Boyle's request, D.P. began an effort to 
obtain print copies of his phone records for all outgoing and 
incoming long-distance calls since 2007.  Attorney Boyle had 
told D.P. these records were critical to obtain personal 
jurisdiction of the out-of-state galleries.  When the phone 
company informed D.P. that its policy required that the records 
could be obtained only by subpoena, D.P. asked Attorney Boyle in 
a July 2010 email to request a subpoena.  D.P. asked Attorney 
Boyle about the status of the subpoena in two subsequent emails 
sent that same month.  Attorney Boyle did not respond to D.P.'s 
email inquiries.  After continued inquiries from D.P., Attorney 
Boyle's daughter (Attorney Bridget Boyle) stated in an August 
2010 email to D.P. that she was in the process of preparing the 
subpoena, but needed additional information.   
¶23 In March 2011, D.P. renewed his request that Attorney 
Boyle subpoena telephone records from D.P.'s telephone carrier.  
After multiple unfulfilled promises by the Boyle law firm staff, 
D.P. received a copy of an unsigned subpoena that Attorney 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
8 
 
Bridget Boyle intended to file with the court, but never did 
pursuant to Attorney Boyle's instructions.  Attorney Bridget 
Boyle never consulted with or informed D.P. about the fact that 
she would not be filing a subpoena request with the court.   
¶24 In 2011, D.P. tried to resolve his claims with the 
Florida gallery.  D.P. learned that the gallery planned to cease 
operations and had filed a Voluntary Assignment for the Benefit 
of Creditors.  Attorney Boyle referred D.P. to an attorney in 
Florida.  Attorney Boyle forwarded fees to the Florida attorney 
to assist D.P. with his legal claim as a creditor of the Florida 
gallery.  D.P. eventually settled his claims with the gallery, 
with the help of the Florida attorney.   
¶25 In February 2012, D.P. settled his dispute with the 
New York gallery through subsequently-retained counsel and 
without Attorney Boyle's involvement.  Although D.P. recovered 
the cost of his purchases, he did not recover attorney's fees or 
other costs.   
¶26 In April 2012, D.P. filed a grievance with the OLR 
against Attorney Boyle. 
¶27 In May 2012, D.P. hired a different lawyer to complete 
the federal litigation involving the Hawaii gallery.  This 
lawyer settled the case in September 2012.  The settlement 
recouped D.P.'s costs in buying the disputed items from the 
Hawaii gallery but did not recoup any attorney's fees or costs 
incurred by D.P. 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
9 
 
¶28 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct arising out of Attorney Boyle's work on the D.P. 
matter: 
 Count One:  By accepting advanced fee payments in the 
amount 
of 
$10,000, 
$35,000, 
and 
$20,000 
in 
anticipation of providing legal representation to 
D.P., and by failing to deposit those payments into 
his trust account, instead depositing the money into 
his 
law 
firm 
operating 
account, 
Attorney 
Boyle 
violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(4).1 
 Count Two:  By accepting advanced fee payments from 
D.P. in the amount of $10,000, $35,000, and $20,000, 
by failing to communicate in writing the scope of the 
representation, the basis or rate of the fee, and the 
purpose and effect of the advanced fee payments, and, 
in addition, by making changes to the fee agreement on 
multiple occasions without the benefit of a writing, 
Attorney 
Boyle, 
in 
each 
instance, 
violated 
SCR 
20:1.5(b)(1) and (2).2 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) provides: 
Except as provided in par. (4m), unearned fees 
and advanced payments of fees shall be held in trust 
until earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant to 
sub. (g).  Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for 
payment of costs shall be held in trust until the 
costs are incurred. 
2 SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) and (2) provide: 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
10 
 
 Count Three:  By failing to respond to D.P.'s multiple 
requests for information regarding the subpoena for 
telephone 
records, 
Attorney 
Boyle 
violated 
SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).3 
 Count Four:  By failing to file a lawsuit prior to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations under the 
DTPA for multiple fraudulent sketches purchased by 
D.P., and, in addition, by failing to take meaningful 
action on behalf of D.P. to recover from the New York 
gallery, Attorney Boyle violated SCR 20:1.3.4 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) The scope of the representation and the basis 
or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client 
will be responsible shall be communicated to the 
client in writing, before or within a reasonable time 
after commencing the representation, except when the 
lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on 
the same basis or rate as in the past. If it is 
reasonably 
foreseeable 
that 
the 
total 
cost 
of 
representation to the client, including attorney's 
fees, will be $1000 or less, the communication may be 
oral or in writing. Any changes in the basis or rate 
of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated in 
writing to the client.  
(2) If the total cost of representation to the 
client, including attorney's fees, is more than $1000, 
the purpose and effect of any retainer or advance fee 
that is paid to the lawyer shall be communicated in 
writing. 
3 SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) provides that a lawyer shall "promptly 
comply with reasonable requests by the client for information." 
4 SCR 20:1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
11 
 
 Count Five:  By allowing the statute of limitations 
under the DTPA to expire for certain fraudulent 
sketches purchased by D.P., therefore foreclosing the 
possibility 
of 
D.P. 
recovering 
attorney's 
fees 
incurred in recouping his losses for those purchases,5 
Attorney 
Boyle 
failed 
to 
provide 
competent 
representation to D.P., in violation of SCR 20:1.1.6 
¶29 The sixth and last count in the OLR's complaint 
concerns Attorney Boyle's representation of R.G.  Authorities 
charged R.G. with a variety of criminal counts.  R.G. retained 
Attorney Boyle shortly thereafter.  R.G. paid $9,500 to Attorney 
Boyle's law firm in anticipation of Attorney Boyle providing 
legal representation.  Attorney Boyle did not deposit the $9,500 
advanced fee payment into his client trust account but instead 
deposited the payment into his law firm's operating account.  A 
few weeks later, R.G. made a second payment of $9,500 to 
Attorney Boyle's law firm in anticipation of Attorney Boyle's 
future legal representation.  Attorney Boyle again did not 
deposit the $9,500 advanced fee payment into his client trust 
account but instead deposited the payment into his law firm's 
operating account.   
                                                 
5 The DTPA allows a successful plaintiff to recover 
reasonable attorney fees.  See Wis. Stat. § 100.18(11)(b)2. 
6 SCR 20:1.1 provides that "[a] lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client.  Competent representation 
requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
12 
 
¶30 The OLR's complaint alleged the following misconduct 
count arising out of Attorney Boyle's work on the R.G. matter: 
 Count Six:  By failing to deposit in his trust account 
the two $9,500 advanced fee payments from R.G., paid 
in anticipation of Attorney Boyle providing legal 
representation to R.G., and instead depositing the 
payments into his law firm operating account, Attorney 
Boyle violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(4). 
¶31 Following a two-day hearing on the complaint, the 
referee submitted a report containing her findings of fact and 
conclusions 
of 
law, 
as 
well 
as 
her 
recommendations 
for 
discipline.  The referee determined that the OLR had proven 
misconduct in all six counts charged.  The referee found that, 
when Attorney Boyle failed to deposit D.P.'s and R.G.'s advanced 
fee payments into his trust account (see Counts One and Six), he 
knew fee rules existed but simply chose to disregard them.  The 
referee likewise found that, with respect to Count Two, Attorney 
Boyle knew that written fee agreements were necessary but 
nevertheless failed to prepare any writing that explained to 
D.P. the nature of his proposed fee and subsequent fee changes, 
the purpose and effect of the advanced fee payments he accepted, 
and the scope of the legal services he would provide in exchange 
for those fees.  In the referee's view, this absence of a 
written agreement contributed to "wildly differing testimony" by 
Attorney Boyle and D.P. about the nature and goals of Attorney 
Boyle's representation.   
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
13 
 
¶32 Concerning Attorney Boyle's lack of responsiveness to 
D.P.'s inquiries regarding the subpoena for his telephone 
records (see Count Three), the referee described as "[m]ore 
appalling than unpersuasive" Attorney Boyle's explanation that 
he did not believe the subpoena was necessary, and that he and 
his staff members were essentially humoring D.P. into thinking 
that they were addressing the issue, when in fact they were not.   
¶33 Regarding the diligence and competence with which 
Attorney Boyle pursued D.P.'s disputes with the three galleries 
(see Counts Four and Five), the referee observed that Attorney 
Boyle treated the matters as criminal fraud matters and 
conspiracies to be undone instead of as consumer matters.  He 
did not withdraw from the representation despite his apparent 
belief that he could not resolve them through negotiation or 
litigation.  He filed a federal lawsuit against the Hawaii 
gallery after some of the claims had become time-barred.  He did 
not sue the New York gallery or engage in settlement talks.  He 
did not monitor the status of the Florida gallery; it was D.P. 
who discovered the pending bankruptcy and the need to file a 
creditor claim.   
¶34 After determining that the OLR had proven by clear and 
convincing evidence all six counts of misconduct as alleged in 
its complaint, the referee turned to an appropriate sanction to 
be recommended for Attorney Boyle's misconduct.  In reaching her 
sanction recommendation, the referee cited a number of cases, 
two of which she believed were particularly analogous to the 
instant 
matter: 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
14 
 
Anderson, 2010 WI 39, 324 Wis. 2d 627, 782 N.W.2d 100, and In re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Theobald, 
2010 
WI 
102, 
329 Wis. 2d 1, 786 N.W.2d 834.  In Anderson, a lawyer received a 
60-day suspension for a lack of diligence related to his 
handling of his client's criminal defense, failing to respond to 
his 
client's 
reasonable 
requests 
for 
information 
and 
to 
communicate case developments to his client in a timely manner, 
and failing to explain matters to his client.  In Theobald, a 
lawyer received a 60-day suspension for a lack of diligence 
related to her handling of her client's bankruptcy matter, and 
failing to respond to her client's requests for information 
regarding the status of her bankruptcy. 
¶35 The referee noted that a variety of aggravating and 
mitigating factors were relevant to her recommendation on 
discipline.  As aggravating factors, the referee pointed out 
that Attorney Boyle has been disciplined previously; showed a 
pattern of misconduct related to law office mismanagement; 
committed multiple offenses; and refused to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of his conduct——all despite having substantial 
experience in the law.  As mitigating factors, the referee noted 
that Attorney Boyle did not display a dishonest or selfish 
motive; generally cooperated with the disciplinary proceedings; 
and enjoys a good reputation in the profession. 
¶36 The 
referee 
ultimately 
recommended 
a 
60-day 
suspension, as the OLR requested in its complaint and post-
hearing briefing.  The referee also recommended that Attorney 
Boyle be required to complete six CLE credits in law office 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
15 
 
management and/or trust account practices, and to provide 
quarterly trust account reports to the OLR for one year to 
monitor his use of his firm's trust accounts.  Finally, the 
referee recommended the imposition of full costs. 
¶37 Attorney Boyle appeals.  As to Counts One and Six, 
Attorney Boyle conceded the alleged misconduct in his briefing 
and oral argument to this court.  We find that his concessions 
are supported by the record.  Attorney Boyle accepted $65,000 in 
advanced fee payments from D.P. and $19,000 in advanced fee 
payments from R.G., without depositing them in his trust account 
and 
without 
properly 
complying 
with 
the 
alternative 
fee 
placement provisions permitted by SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m).7  These are 
clear rule violations. 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m) (Alternative protection for advanced 
fees) provides: 
A lawyer who accepts advanced payments of fees 
may deposit the funds in the lawyer's business 
account, provided that review of the lawyer’s fee by a 
court of competent jurisdiction is available in the 
proceeding to which the fee relates, or provided that 
the lawyer complies with each of the following 
requirements: 
a. Upon accepting any advanced payment of fees 
pursuant to this subsection, the lawyer shall deliver 
to the client a notice in writing containing all of 
the following information: 
1. the amount of the advanced payment; 
2. the basis or rate of the lawyer's fee; 
3. any expenses for which the client will be 
responsible; 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
16 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
4. that the lawyer has an obligation to refund 
any unearned advanced fee, along with an accounting, 
at the termination of the representation; 
5. that the lawyer is required to submit any 
unresolved 
dispute 
about 
the 
fee 
to 
binding 
arbitration within 30 days of receiving written notice 
of such a dispute; and 
6. the ability of the client to file a claim with 
the Wisconsin lawyers' fund for client protection if 
the lawyer fails to provide a refund of unearned 
advanced fees. 
b. Upon termination of the representation, the 
lawyer shall deliver to the client in writing all of 
the following: 
1. a final accounting, or an accounting from the 
date of the lawyer's most recent statement to the end 
of the representation, regarding the client's advanced 
fee payment with a refund of any unearned advanced 
fees; 
2. notice that, if the client disputes the amount 
of the fee and wants that dispute to be submitted to 
binding arbitration, the client must provide written 
notice of the dispute to the lawyer within 30 days of 
the mailing of the accounting; and 
3. notice that, if the lawyer is unable to 
resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of the client 
within 30 days after receiving notice of the dispute 
from the client, the lawyer shall submit the dispute 
to binding arbitration. 
c. Upon timely receipt of written notice of a 
dispute from the client, the lawyer shall attempt to 
resolve that dispute with the client, and if the 
dispute is not resolved, the lawyer shall submit the 
dispute to binding arbitration with the State Bar Fee 
Arbitration Program or a similar local bar association 
program within 30 days of the lawyer's receipt of the 
written notice of dispute from the client.  
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
17 
 
¶38 Attorney Boyle also conceded in his briefs to this 
court the misconduct alleged in Count Two.  Specifically, he 
conceded that he did not explain in writing to D.P. the scope of 
his representation, the basis or rate of his fee, the changes to 
his fee, or the purpose and effect of the advanced fee payments 
he had received.  As with Counts One and Six, we find that this 
concession is supported by the record.   
¶39 Having conceded Counts One, Two, and Six, Attorney 
Boyle's arguments necessarily focus on the remaining counts——
Counts Three, Four, and Five, all of which concern the D.P. 
matter.  We address each in turn. 
¶40 As explained above, Count Three alleges that Attorney 
Boyle violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) by failing to promptly comply 
with D.P.'s reasonable requests for information regarding the 
subpoena for telephone records.  Attorney Boyle denies any 
misconduct because, he claims, his firm initially told D.P. that 
the subpoena request was being worked on, and later informed him 
that it would be inadvisable to request a subpoena because it 
might encourage opposing counsel to make a venue challenge.  
Attorney Boyle also claims that D.P.'s requests for information 
about the subpoena were infrequent, and their significance was 
diluted by his many inquiries on other subjects.   
                                                                                                                                                             
d. Upon receipt of an arbitration award requiring 
the lawyer to make a payment to the client, the lawyer 
shall pay the arbitration award within 30 days, unless 
the client fails to agree to be bound by the award of 
the arbitrator. 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
18 
 
¶41 The problem with Attorney Boyle's argument is that it 
runs counter to the referee's factual findings.  We may overturn 
the referee's factual findings only if those findings are 
clearly erroneous or, put more colorfully, if they "'strike us 
as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead 
fish.'"  United States v. Di Mucci, 879 F.2d 1488, 1494 
(7th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).  The referee chose to 
believe D.P.'s version of events; i.e., that D.P. made many 
unheeded inquiries regarding the subpoena; that Attorney Boyle 
had a dismissive attitude about D.P. seeking information about 
the subpoena; that D.P. was misled into thinking that Attorney 
Bridget Boyle had filed the subpoena request when in fact she 
had not; and that no one from the Boyle firm informed D.P. that 
Attorney Boyle had determined the subpoena request should not be 
filed.  It is not our place to reappraise the evidence unless it 
plainly fails to support the findings of the referee——and that 
is not the case here.  These findings easily support a violation 
of SCR 20:1.4(a)(4). 
¶42 We turn next to Count Four, which alleges that 
Attorney Boyle violated SCR 20:1.3 by failing to diligently 
pursue D.P.'s claims.  Attorney Boyle asserts that in order for 
the OLR to prevail on Count Four, the court must determine, as 
he writes in his brief, "that D.P. would have prevailed on the 
viable causes of actions against galleries for violations of 
DTPA.  If this is not proven, there can be no violations found 
 . . . ."  Thus, Attorney Boyle writes, the OLR needed to prove 
that the memorabilia in question was fraudulent; that the three 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
19 
 
out-of-state galleries had sufficient contacts with Wisconsin to 
support jurisdiction here in a lawsuit alleging DTPA claims, or 
if not, that the galleries' home states would have allowed 
similar 
claims; 
and 
finally, 
that 
D.P. 
would 
have 
been 
"guaranteed success and full recovery under the DTPA."  Without 
such proof, Attorney Boyle argues, the OLR cannot prevail. 
¶43 But that is not true.  Attorney Boyle confuses the 
standard for a legal malpractice claim with the standard for a 
lawyer misconduct claim.  To prevail on a legal malpractice 
claim, a plaintiff must prove duty, breach, causation, and 
damages.  See Lewandowski v. Continental Cas. Co., 88 Wis. 2d 
271, 277, 276 N.W.2d 284 (1979).  To establish causation and 
damages in a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove 
that, but for the attorney's negligence, the plaintiff would 
have prevailed on the underlying litigation.  Id.  As a 
practical matter, this standard requires the plaintiff to prove 
a case-within-a-case; i.e., that the plaintiff would have 
prevailed on the merits of the underlying litigation.  See 
Glamann v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 144 Wis. 2d 865, 
870, 424 N.W.2d 924 (1988).  That is the standard that Attorney 
Boyle claims must be applied here. 
¶44 The standard of proof in a lawyer disciplinary matter, 
however, is much different.  Whereas the goal of a legal 
malpractice action is to put clients in the position they would 
have occupied had the attorney not been negligent, the goal of a 
disciplinary proceeding is something else entirely:  to protect 
the public, the courts, and the legal profession from attorneys 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
20 
 
who fail to meet minimum standards of conduct.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 137 Wis. 2d 148, 151, 
403 N.W.2d 459 (1987).  "It is not the purpose of lawyer 
discipline," we have noted, "to make whole those harmed by 
attorney misconduct."  Id.  Thus, to prove misconduct, the OLR 
need not prove causation and damages; i.e., to prove a case-
within-a-case.  See id.  Rather, the OLR must show by clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that the respondent 
attorney engaged in the alleged misconduct, see SCR 22.16(5)——
which, according to Count Four, was Attorney Boyle's failure to 
act with reasonable diligence in representing D.P.     
¶45 The referee's findings readily support a determination 
that Attorney Boyle failed to act with reasonable diligence in 
representing D.P.  The duty of diligence requires that the 
lawyer "act with commitment and dedication to the interests of 
the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."  
SCR 20:1.3, ABA Comment 1.  In stark contrast to these 
obligations, the referee found, among other things, that 
Attorney Boyle failed to file suit before many of D.P.'s claims 
became time-barred; failed to advance D.P.'s interests through 
arbitration or settlement; and failed to explain to D.P. the 
rationale (if any) for his lack of action.   
¶46 As a defense, Attorney Boyle argues on appeal that he 
could not have advanced D.P.'s claims more than he did because 
the claims were borderline-frivolous.  If that is so, however, 
then Attorney Boyle had a responsibility to thoroughly explain 
his position to D.P.  The referee found that he did not do so.  
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
21 
 
What Attorney Boyle did, instead, was to continue to nominally 
represent D.P. while allowing certain claims to stagnate and 
others to expire altogether.  That is not "diligence" as our 
rules define it.   
¶47 We move then to Count Five, which alleges that, by 
allowing the statute of limitations under the DTPA to expire for 
certain fraudulent sketches purchased by D.P., Attorney Boyle 
failed to provide competent representation to D.P. in violation 
of SCR 20:1.1.  As he did with Count Four, Attorney Boyle 
defends against Count Five by claiming that the OLR failed to 
prove misconduct because it did not show that D.P. would have 
succeeded on the DTPA claims that Attorney Boyle did not 
litigate.   
¶48 As we discussed above, Attorney Boyle misunderstands 
the applicable standard of proof.  The OLR need not prove that, 
but for Attorney Boyle's misconduct, D.P. would have prevailed 
on the underlying litigation.  This must especially be true when 
the misconduct being alleged is a lack of competence; i.e., a 
claim that the respondent lawyer failed to show the necessary 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness, 
and 
preparation 
reasonably 
necessary for the representation.  See SCR 20:1.1.  It would be 
an odd disciplinary system indeed were this court to place an 
underworked case at the OLR's feet and demand that it prove the 
underlying merits as a prerequisite to misconduct findings.  No 
lawyer should be allowed to transform his or her own failure to 
advance a case into a shield against a misconduct charge.   
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
22 
 
¶49 The referee's findings readily support a determination 
that Attorney Boyle failed to provide competent representation 
to D.P.  Among other things, Attorney Boyle showed a lack of 
knowledge and skill in treating D.P.'s claims as criminal 
matters and conspiracies to be undone instead of as consumer 
matters.  He also showed a lack of thoroughness and preparation 
through his complacency toward protecting the timeliness and 
recoverability of D.P.'s claims; it was D.P., not Attorney 
Boyle, who sounded the alarm on statute of limitations problems 
and the impending bankruptcy of the Florida gallery.  
¶50 Similar to his argument as to Count Four, Attorney 
Boyle argues on appeal that his failure to further advance 
D.P.'s claims cannot be deemed to show a lack of competence 
given that many of D.P.'s claims were borderline-frivolous.  But 
as explained above, this argument carries little weight.  Part 
of being a competent lawyer is letting clients know if, and why, 
certain claims or defenses are unsustainable and should be 
dropped.  There are no factual findings to suggest that Attorney 
Boyle did so here.  Competent lawyering does not include leading 
a client into thinking that their claims or defenses are being 
fully represented when in fact they are not.   
¶51 As for the level of discipline, we agree with the 
referee that a 60-day suspension of Attorney Boyle's law license 
is appropriate.  As stated above, Attorney Boyle concedes the 
misconduct alleged in Counts One, Two, and Six, which generally 
concern his lack of a written fee agreement and his deposit of 
D.P.'s and R.G.'s advanced fee payments into his business 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
23 
 
account without properly using the alternative fee placement 
provisions permitted by SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m).  As also explained 
above, we agree with the referee that Attorney Boyle failed to 
promptly comply with D.P.'s reasonable requests for information, 
and failed to act with reasonable diligence and competence in 
representing D.P.  These six counts of misconduct, when 
considered together with Attorney Boyle's three prior private 
reprimands, easily justify a 60-day suspension.  See, e.g., 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hahnfeld, 2007 WI 123, 
305 Wis. 2d 48, 739 N.W.2d 280 (60-day suspension for attorney's 
misconduct, which included failing to act with reasonable 
diligence in representing clients, failing to keep clients 
informed, and failing to explain the basis or rate of fees); 
see also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kasprowicz, 
2007 WI 67, 301 Wis. 2d 82, 732 N.W.2d 427; (60-day suspension 
for attorney's failure to act with reasonable diligence and to 
communicate with client in one case, failure in another case to 
respond to numerous court orders and directives, failure in both 
cases to deposit advanced fees into his client trust account, 
and failure to cooperate with disciplinary investigation); see 
also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harris, 2010 WI 9, 
322 Wis.2d 364, 778 N.W.2d 154 (60-day suspension for failure to 
keep a client informed as to the status of a matter and failure 
to keep a client informed and respond to a client's request for 
information). 
¶52 We pause to remark briefly on Attorney Boyle's claim 
that the length of his career (he has practiced since 1962) and 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
24 
 
the fact that he is nearing retirement should mitigate against a 
suspension of any length.  We disagree.  Attorney Boyle has been 
privately reprimanded three times, and our policy of progressive 
discipline supports a suspension of his law license for the 
60-day minimum period.  In addition, our precedent shows that 
age is not necessarily a mitigating factor.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Fennig, 227 Wis. 2d 379, 
595 N.W.2d 710 (1999) (60-day suspension, rather than public 
reprimand, imposed for over 70-year-old attorney with no 
disciplinary history).  As we explained in In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Carter, 2014 WI 126, 359 Wis. 2d 70, 
856 N.W.2d 595, "[t]his court cannot countenance a rule that 
would soft-pedal the discipline owed to attorneys" who commit 
misconduct "so long as they do so in the twilight of their 
careers."  Id., ¶ 26. 
¶53 Attorney Boyle does not specifically challenge the 
referee's recommendation that he be required to complete six CLE 
credits in law office management and/or trust account practices 
and to provide quarterly trust account reports to the OLR for 
one year to monitor his use of the law firm's trust accounts.  
This court has imposed similar requirements in the past.  See, 
e.g., 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Steinberg, 
2007 WI 113, 304 Wis. 2d 577, 735 N.W.2d 527.  We do so again 
here. 
¶54 We turn, finally, to the monetary aspects of the 
referee's recommendation.  Attorney Boyle does not raise any 
No. 
2014AP482-D   
 
25 
 
objection to the imposition of costs.  We impose them in full.  
The OLR does not seek restitution.  None is ordered. 
¶55 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Gerald P. Boyle to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 days, 
effective January 22, 2016. 
¶56 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for a period of one year, 
Gerald P. Boyle must file quarterly trust account reports with 
the Office of Lawyer Regulation as a condition of his practice 
of law. 
¶57 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Gerald P. Boyle attend a 
minimum of six hours of continuing legal education in law office 
management and/or trust account practices. 
¶58 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Gerald P. Boyle shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶59 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(2). 
 
 
 
No.  2014AP482-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶60 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  I write in 
dissent in several attorney discipline cases because I have 
concerns about the discipline imposed. 
¶61 In the instant case, the referee found (and the court 
agreed) that the respondent attorney committed all six charged 
offenses 
(including 
two 
trust 
account 
violations). 
 
The 
discipline: 
 
a 
60-day 
suspension 
plus 
conditions. 
 
The 
respondent attorney had received three private reprimands 
between 2002 and 2012.   
¶62 How can this level of discipline be justified in light 
of OLR v. Crandall, 2015 WI 111, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___?  Attorney Crandall is on his fifth brush with the 
OLR in the seven years since 2008.  He has been disciplined four 
times previously:  a three-month suspension, a public reprimand, 
a 30-day suspension, and a five-month suspension.  It does not 
appear that the previous discipline had the impact the court 
intended.  Nevertheless, the court now imposes another public 
reprimand.  Yet Attorney Boyle receives a 60-day suspension, 
even though his disciplinary history is much less serious than 
Attorney Crandall's. 
¶63 I write also to state my difficulty reconciling the 
significantly different levels of discipline imposed in the 
following cases.   
• 
OLR v. Krogman, 2015 WI 113, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___: 
 
Upon 
stipulation 
admitting 
factual 
allegations, the court orders a four-month suspension 
of license and conditions upon reinstatement.  The 
No.  2014AP482-D.ssa 
 
2 
 
complaint alleged 22 counts of professional misconduct 
involving four clients, misconduct relating to license 
suspension, and misconduct relating to trust accounts.  
The four-month suspension seems too light.   
• 
OLR v. Aleman, 2015 WI 112, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___:  Illinois imposed a two-year suspension 
for two counts of misconduct stemming from co-founding 
and working with a national debt settlement firm.  
Upon stipulation of the parties, this court orders 
reciprocal discipline in Wisconsin.  The two-year 
suspension seems too harsh compared to the discipline 
imposed in other cases. 
• 
OLR v. Sayaovong, 2015 WI 100, 365 Wis. 2d 200, 871 
N.W.2d 217:  This per curiam was released November 18, 
2015, imposing suspension for a period of six months.  
Attorney Sayaovong defaulted in the discipline case.  
The complaint alleged six counts of misconduct, four 
counts involving two clients and two counts involving 
another client.  In 2014 Attorney Sayaovong was 
publicly reprimanded for misconduct in two separate 
client matters.  See OLR v. Sayaovong, 2014 WI 94, 357 
Wis. 2d 312, 850 N.W.2d 940.  The discipline does not 
seem consistent with the discipline imposed in other 
cases. 
¶64 For the reasons set forth, I write about each of these 
cases. 
No.  2014AP482-D.ssa 
 
 
 
1