Case Title: State ex rel. Smith v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas

Citation: 2005-Ohio-4103

Docket Number: 20050629

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Smith v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 106 Ohio St.3d 151, 
2005-Ohio-4103.] 
 
 
[THE STATE EX REL.] SMITH, ADMR., v. CUYAHOGA 
COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Smith v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
106 Ohio St.3d 151, 2005-Ohio-4103.] 
Mandamus — Forum non conveniens does not apply to intrastate transfers — 
Civ.R. 3(C)(4) — Transfer of venue on fair-trial basis must be to adjoining 
county — Writ will issue to vacate order transferring venue, when. 
(No. 2005-0629 — Submitted June 14, 2005 — Decided August 31, 2005.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is a mandamus action to compel a common pleas court to 
vacate orders to transfer venue, accept venue over a medical-malpractice case, 
and adjudicate the merits of that case. 
{¶ 2} Relator, Carla Smith, is the administrator of the estate of her 
deceased son, Edward Smith II.  Smith is a resident of Ashland County, Ohio, as 
was the decedent. 
{¶ 3} On April 2, 2003, Smith filed a medical-malpractice and wrongful-
death action in respondent Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.  Smith 
named 
respondent 
Cleveland 
Clinic 
Foundation 
(“Cleveland 
Clinic”), 
Rajyalakshmi Rambhatla, M.D., Cleveland Clinic Wooster, Children’s Hospital 
Medical Center of Akron, Albert Miller, M.D., and Wooster Community Hospital 
as defendants.  The Cleveland Clinic maintains its headquarters, owns real estate, 
employs physicians and staff, and provides medical services in Cuyahoga County, 
Ohio. 
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{¶ 4} On June 19, 2003, the defendants moved to transfer the case to the 
Wayne County Court of Common Pleas.  The defendants asserted that Wayne 
County was a more appropriate venue than Cuyahoga County because several 
defendants were located in Wayne County and a substantial portion of the 
treatment provided to the decedent occurred at the Cleveland Clinic facilities in 
Wayne County.  On August 19, 2003, Judge Thomas J. Pokorny of the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas granted the defendants’ motions and transferred 
venue of the case to the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas.  The Cuyahoga 
County Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from the change of venue for lack 
of a final, appealable order, and this court declined further review. 
{¶ 5} The parties to the case reached a partial settlement, and Smith 
voluntarily dismissed without prejudice her remaining claims against the 
Cleveland Clinic and Dr. Rambhatla. 
{¶ 6} On October 29, 2004, Smith refiled her medical-malpractice action 
in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas solely against the Cleveland 
Clinic.  On November 23, 2004, Cleveland Clinic moved to transfer venue to the 
Wayne County Court of Common Pleas.  In December 2004, the Cuyahoga 
County judge who was initially assigned the refiled case denied the motion.  The 
case was then returned to Judge Pokorny, and on December 17, 2004, he 
transferred the case to the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas.  According to 
Judge Pokorny, the case should have been transferred to him initially rather than 
to the other judge because it was a refiled action. 
{¶ 7} Smith moved the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas to reject 
the transfer of venue.  On February 11, 2005, that court granted Smith’s motion 
and returned the medical-malpractice case to the Cuyahoga County Court of 
Common Pleas.  In so holding, the Wayne County court determined that the 
Cuyahoga County court had not properly transferred venue: 
January Term, 2005 
3 
{¶ 8} “[T]he Court finds that because the Plaintiff resides in Cuyahoga 
County and Defendant has its principal place of business in Cuyahoga County the 
suit is properly venued in Cuyahoga County.  And, unless Defendant has a 
reasonable belief that it cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in Cuyahoga 
County then this action should not have been transferred to Wayne County.” 
{¶ 9} On February 22, 2005, the Cleveland Clinic again moved for the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to transfer venue of Smith’s medical-
malpractice action to the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas.  On March 9, 
2005, Judge Pokorny granted the motion and transferred the case back to the 
Wayne County Court of Common Pleas.  Judge Pokorny concluded that Wayne 
County was the more appropriate venue because the medical care at issue was 
rendered in Wayne County and “the only remote connection to Cuyahoga County 
was the fact that [the] treating physician * * *, a Wayne County resident, was 
employed by the Cleveland Clinic, which has its main campus in Cuyahoga 
County.”  On April 1, 2005, Judge Pokorny retired as a judge. 
{¶ 10} On April 8, 2005, Smith, individually and as administrator of her 
decedent son’s estate, filed this action for a writ of mandamus to compel the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to vacate Judge Pokorny’s orders 
transferring venue to the Wayne County court, accept venue of Smith’s medical-
malpractice case, and adjudicate the merits of that case.  On May 4, 2005, the 
Cuyahoga County court answered the complaint.  On May 9, 2005, Cleveland 
Clinic moved to dismiss.  On May 16, 2005, Smith filed a memorandum in 
opposition to Cleveland Clinic’s motion. 
{¶ 11} This cause is now before us for our determination under 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5). 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) Standard of Review 
{¶ 12} We must now determine whether dismissal, an alternative writ, or 
a peremptory writ is appropriate.  S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5); State ex rel. Rodak v. 
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Betleski, 104 Ohio St.3d 345, 2004-Ohio-6567, 819 N.E.2d 703, ¶ 10.  “ ‘[I]f the 
pertinent facts are uncontroverted and it appears beyond doubt that [the relator] is 
entitled to the requested writ, we will issue a peremptory writ of mandamus.’ ”  
(Brackets sic.)  State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Morrow Cty. Prosecutor’s 
Office, 105 Ohio St.3d 172, 2005-Ohio-685, 824 N.E.2d 64, ¶ 4, quoting State ex 
rel. Highlander v. Rudduck, 103 Ohio St.3d 370, 2004-Ohio-4952, 816 N.E.2d 
213, ¶ 8. 
Application of Standard to Mandamus Claim 
{¶ 13} In order to be entitled to the requested writ of mandamus, Smith 
must establish a clear legal right to vacation of the Cuyahoga County court’s 
transfer orders and to an order compelling that court to adjudicate the merits of 
her medical-malpractice case, a clear legal duty on the part of that court to 
perform the requested acts, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of the law.  See State ex rel. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 
105 Ohio St.3d 177, 2005-Ohio-1150, 824 N.E.2d 68, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 14} Regarding the first two requirements, the Cuyahoga County court 
implicitly relied on the doctrine of forum non conveniens to transfer venue of 
Smith’s medical-malpractice case to the Wayne County court.  “ ‘The principle of 
forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its 
jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue 
statute.’ ”  Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1988), 35 Ohio 
St.3d 123, 125-126, 519 N.E.2d 370, quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert (1947), 
330 U.S. 501, 507, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055.  Courts applying forum non 
conveniens consider a variety of private and public interests to determine which 
forum is more appropriate.  Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-509, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 
1055.  Some factors include the ease of access to sources of proof, the availability 
of witnesses, and the local interest in having localized controversies decided at 
home.  Id.; see, also, Restatement of the Law 2d, Conflict of Laws (1971), Section 
January Term, 2005 
5 
84 (“A state will not exercise jurisdiction if it is a seriously inconvenient forum 
for the trial of the action provided that a more appropriate forum is available to 
the plaintiff”). 
{¶ 15} In Chambers, we recognized that forum non conveniens applies to 
cases in which the more convenient forum is in another state or another country.  
Id., 35 Ohio St.3d at 132, 519 N.E.2d 370 (“Civ.R. 3 does not expressly preclude 
the application of the common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens in interstate 
or international situations not covered by subsection (D), whether or not venue is 
‘proper’ in Ohio”).  We rejected its application, however, to intrastate transfers 
from one county to another county.  See State ex rel. Lyons v. Zaleski (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 623, 624, 665 N.E.2d 212, quoting Chambers, 35 Ohio St.3d at 132, 
519 N.E.2d 370 (“forum non conveniens may not be applied to a transfer of a 
properly venued action in an Ohio county to another Ohio county, since Civ.R. 
3(C)(4) limits intrastate transfers to transfers to ‘an adjoining county * * * “when 
it appears that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county in which the 
suit is pending” ’ ”).  Civ.R. 3, governing venue, recognizes that “transfer of a 
case from one proper venue to another proper venue within the state for means of 
convenience is unnecessary in a geographically small state such as Ohio, and that 
any inconvenience to witnesses in such a situation could be remedied by the use 
of depositions.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Chambers, 35 Ohio St.3d at 131, 519 N.E.2d 
370; see, generally, 1 Klein & Darling, Civil Practice (2004) 223-224, Section 
3:68 (“If forum non conveniens were to be held available intrastate, it would 
conflict with * * * fundamental principles of Civ.R. 3(B) * * *”). 
{¶ 16} The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Smith’s medical-
malpractice case was properly venued in Cuyahoga County because Cleveland 
Clinic’s principal place of business is located there.  Civ.R. 3(B)(2).  And because 
the Cleveland Clinic raised no issue and introduced no evidence that it would be 
unable to receive a fair trial in Cuyahoga County, the Cuyahoga County court 
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erred in transferring the medical-malpractice case to Wayne County.  Even if the 
Cleveland Clinic had introduced such evidence, the Cuyahoga County court still 
erred in transferring the case because Wayne County does not adjoin Cuyahoga 
County.  See Civ.R. 3(C)(4) (“Upon motion of any party or upon its own motion 
the court may transfer any action to an adjoining county within this state when it 
appears that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county in which the suit 
is pending”).  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 17} The various cases cited by the Cleveland Clinic do not modify this 
result because they do not apply the controlling precedent of Chambers or the 
plain language of Civ.R. 3.  See McGraw v. Convenient Food Mart (June 18, 
1999), Lake App. No. 97-L-271, 1999 WL 420592; Davis v. Eachus, Pike App. 
No. 04CA725, 2004-Ohio-5720, 2004 WL 2406685; Allin v. Hartzell Propeller, 
Inc., Miami App. No. 02CA57, 2003-Ohio-2827, 2003 WL 21267720. 
{¶ 18} Therefore, Smith has established a clear legal right to vacation of 
the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas’ transfer orders and an order 
compelling that court to adjudicate the merits of Smith’s medical-malpractice case 
and a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of that court to perform these 
acts. 
{¶ 19} Smith has also established the lack of an adequate remedy at law to 
raise her claim challenging the Cuyahoga County court’s transfer orders.  In 
general, relief by extraordinary writ is not available to challenge a court’s 
decision on motion for a change in venue because appeal following a final 
judgment provides an adequate remedy.  Lyons, 75 Ohio St.3d at 625, 665 N.E.2d 
212.  But an extraordinary writ is appropriate when the alternate remedy is not 
complete, beneficial, and speedy.  See State ex rel. Ullmann v. Hayes, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 405, 2004-Ohio-5469, 816 N.E.2d 245, ¶ 8 (“The alternative must be 
complete, beneficial, and speedy in order to constitute an adequate remedy”); see, 
also, State ex rel. Ohio State Racing Comm. v. Walton (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 246, 
January Term, 2005 
7 
525 N.E.2d 756, and State ex rel. Starner v. DeHoff (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 163, 18 
OBR 219, 480 N.E.2d 449, holding that under the unique circumstances in these 
cases, an appeal from an order on a motion to change venue was not an adequate 
legal remedy precluding extraordinary relief in mandamus and prohibition. 
{¶ 20} Appeal following a final judgment is not a complete, beneficial, 
and speedy remedy here.  Both the Cuyahoga County and Wayne County courts 
have in their most recent decisions refused to exercise jurisdiction over Smith’s 
medical-malpractice case.  Although Cleveland Clinic suggests that the Wayne 
County court might exercise jurisdiction over the underlying action this time 
around, there is no evidence to support this suggestion.  Unless the writ issues, 
neither court will necessarily proceed to judgment in the case, and Smith will not 
have any appeal.  See State ex rel. Wallace v. Tyack (1984), 13 Ohio St.3d 4, 6, 13 
OBR 379, 469 N.E.2d 844 (writ of procedendo issued to compel Court of Claims 
and common pleas court to proceed to judgment in wrongful-death actions 
because both courts had erroneously stayed proceedings, thereby precluding the 
plaintiff from litigating his wrongful-death claim). 
{¶ 21} In State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 391, 
396, 678 N.E.2d 549, we rejected a claim that an appeal from a final judgment to 
challenge a change-of-venue order would be inadequate.  We found that the 
relators’ claim that the county courts “could simply transfer venue back and forth 
ad infinitum is not supported by the evidence.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 396, 678 
N.E.2d 549.  Unlike the courts in Dannaher, the Cuyahoga County and Wayne 
County courts have already transferred the medical-malpractice case back and 
forth.  Notwithstanding Cleveland Clinic’s argument to the contrary, Smith need 
not await yet another round of motions to reject and transfer venue to obtain the 
requested relief. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Conclusion 
{¶ 22} Based on the foregoing, Smith has established her entitlement to 
the requested writ.  No further evidence or argument is necessary.  The Cuyahoga 
County court erroneously transferred venue of the medical-malpractice case to the 
Wayne County Court of Common Pleas.  Because the pertinent evidence is 
uncontroverted, a peremptory writ of mandamus is warranted. 
{¶ 23} Therefore, we grant a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to vacate its orders transferring the 
case, to accept venue over the case, and to adjudicate the merits of the case. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
Landskroner, Greico & Madden and Jack Landskroner; Paul W. Flowers 
Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, for relator. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles 
E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Cuyahoga County 
Court of Common Pleas. 
 
Moscarino & Treu, L.L.P., Kris H. Treu, Edward S. Jerse, and Seamus J. 
McMahon, for respondent Cleveland Clinic Foundation. 
______________________