Case Title: Russell v. Kellersman

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0128

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
DAVIS RUSSELL AND DANA RUSSELL AND JOHN R. KELLERSMAN, JR., V. LLOYD SULLIVAN2012 WY 20Case Number: S-11-0128Decided: 02/14/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Suprme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
DAVIS 
RUSSELL and DANA RUSSELL,Appellants (Petitioners), and  JOHN H. KELLERSMAN, 
JR.,Appellant (Prosposed Intervenor),v.LLOYD 
SULLIVAN,Appellee (Respondent).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County
The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellants:
M. 
Jalie Meinecke of Meinecke & Sitz, LLC, Cody, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
S. 
Joseph Darrah of Darrah, Darrah & Brown, Powell, 
Wyoming.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
HILL, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      John Kellersman 
Sr., (decedent) died on April 16, 2005 and was survived by a son and a daughter. 
 His home was his only remaining 
asset.  Lloyd Sullivan, a developer 
who claimed to have purchased the property from the decedent’s daughter, filed a 
petition for probate without administration of an alleged will of Mr. 
Kellersman.  The Russells, neighbors 
who lived across the street from the property, filed a petition to revoke the 
probate of the will alleging, among others things, that the will was invalid and 
that the probate court improperly admitted the will to probate without 
sufficient proof of its validity.  
The decedent’s son filed a motion to intervene and join as a petitioner 
seeking to revoke the probate.  The 
probate court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the neighbors’ 
“Petition to Revoke” because they did not have standing and granted the 
developer’s motion to dismiss the petition to revoke the will.  The court found that because the son had 
filed a motion to intervene rather than his own petition challenging the will, 
the court’s jurisdiction was not properly invoked.  We reverse and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 
FACTS
 
[¶2]      On August 23, 
2010, a petition for probate of the decedent’s alleged will was filed by the 
developer claiming he was entitled to the property by virtue of a written 
contract with the decedent’s daughter executed on August 18, 2010.  The day after the petition for probate 
was filed, the probate court ordered the will admitted to probate without 
administration.  The developer 
published notice of the probate for three weeks with the first publication on 
August 31, 2010.  The period for 
challenge ended November 30, 2010.
 
[¶3]      The will was a 
one-page typewritten document dated April 18, 2003, signed by the decedent and 
notarized by a notary public.  In 
its entirety the will provides:
 
I 
John Kellersman give to Joanne Evans my home located at 405 N Bent, Powell, 
Wyoming along with my belongings and my accounts located at Community First Bank 
upon my death.
 
[¶4]      The will 
contained only the signature of the decedent and the notary.  Also attached to the petition was the 
“Testimony of Subscribing Witness on Probate of Will” signed by the notary, 
which provides:
 
I 
reside in the County of Park, State of Wyoming; I met with the testator on the 
18th day  of April, 2003, the date of the 
instrument, the original or exact reproduction of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit “A”, now shown to me, and purporting to be the last will and testament 
of said John H. Kellerman [sic]; I am a subscribing witnesses [sic] to said 
instrument; and on the said date of said instrument, said instrument was 
exhibited to me by the testator as his last will, and was signed by the testator 
at Powell, in the County of Park, State of Wyoming, on the date shown in said 
instrument, in the  presence of 
myself and  I then and there, at the 
request of the testator, in the presence of said testator and in the presence of 
each other, acted thereto as witness to the signing of the will by John H. 
Kellersman.
 
[¶5]      The developer 
claimed to have purchased the property from decedent’s daughter, pursuant to an 
“Agreement to Convey Interest in Real Property” signed by her on August 18, 
2010.  Paragraph 4 of the agreement 
provides:
 
4. 
 Evans irrevocably assigns, 
transfers and coveys [sic] all of her right[,] title and interest, including her 
interest as an heir under the will of John Kellersman and further as an heir of 
her parents in and to the following real estate to and in favor of Lloyd 
Sullivan: Lot 9, Block 26, Original Town (Now City) of Powell, Wyoming according 
to the plat recorded in Book “C” of plats, Page 28, Records of Park County, 
State of Wyoming.
 
[¶6]      The final 
paragraph of the agreement, in pertinent part, provides:
 
I, 
Joanne Evans, specifically authorize the Probate Court to order that the subject 
matter real property be conveyed to Lloyd Sullivan at the conclusion of any 
probate proceeding which arises out of this agreement.  I also specifically waive, disclaim and 
relinquish all right to notice of any proceeding in probate related to the 
subject real property and any such proceedings may proceed without my 
presence.
 
(Emphasis 
in original.)
 
[¶7]      On October 19, 
2010, the neighbors filed a “Petition to Invalidate Decedent’s Will, Revoke 
Probate and Invalidate Affidavit of Survivorship” alleging that the decedent’s 
daughter entered into an oral agreement with them on August 5, 2010, promising 
to sell them the property, and that the will was invalid because it was not 
properly signed by two subscribing witnesses.
 
[¶8]      On November 19, 
2010, the developer answered the neighbors’ petition to revoke the probate and 
filed a motion to dismiss it.  In 
the motion, the developer admitted that “the Wyoming Supreme Court has made it 
clear that this case cannot proceed without [daughter] or her brother,” citing 
Rule 19 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and 
stated,
 
Both 
Joanne and her brother may be necessary and indispensable parties as they are 
heirs.  This case cannot be resolved 
without them.  They certainly have 
rights which need to be protected as it pertains to their interest in the real 
property.  Furthermore, the alleged 
negotiations were with Joanne Evans individually for selling the subject 
property.  The negotiations were not 
made with the personal representative.  
The case needs to be dismissed for that reason.
 
The 
statements in the motion seem to admit that if the decedent’s son and daughter 
were not made parties to this matter, the probate would have to be 
dismissed.
 
[¶9]      On November 23, 
2010, the son filed a motion to intervene and join under W.R.C.P. 24(a) and 
W.R.C.P. 19(a) as a petitioner on the neighbors’ petition to dismiss the 
probate.  He adopted and 
incorporated by reference the claims and allegations in the neighbors’ petition, 
including the assertion that the will was invalid under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-6-112 (LexisNexis 2011) and should not have been admitted to probate because 
it had not been witnessed by the requisite two witnesses.  In addition, his motion to intervene and 
join as petitioner alleges as follows:
 
The 
movant further alleges the decedent’s April 18, 2003 Will should not have been 
admitted to probate because Mary Jane Sees’ August 18, 2010 Testimony of 
Subscribing  Witness on Probate of 
Will does not comply with the statutory requirements in that the Testimony is 
not substantially in the form required by the statute.
 
The 
son also stated that, if the will was declared invalid, he would potentially 
inherit one-half of his father’s estate under the intestacy 
laws.
 
[¶10]   On December 2, 2010, the neighbors 
filed a “Motion for Substitution of Petitioners” under W.R.C.P. 25(c), together 
with affidavits in support of the motion asking to have the son substituted as a 
petitioner to have the probate revoked.
 
The 
District Court Decision
 
[¶11]   The district court granted the 
developer’s motion to dismiss the neighbors’ petition to revoke because they 
conceded they were not “interested parties” and, therefore, lacked 
standing.  The court found that the 
son did have standing to contest the will, but since the neighbors did not, the 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the petition to revoke the 
will.  The court further found that 
the son should have filed a will contest of his own under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2-6-301 (LexisNexis 2011).  
The decedent’s son and the neighbors both appealed from that 
decision.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶12]   Appellants state the issues as 
follows:
 
The 
order does not comport with the standard of applicable law, specifically, 
W.R.C.P Rule 17(a) states that a ratification, joinder, or substitution shall 
have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real 
party in interest, therefore, the Court improperly applied the facts of this 
case to the law as set forth in Merrill 
v. District Court [of Fifth Judicial 
District], 272 P.2d 597, 599 (Wyo. 1954).
 
The 
order does not comport with the standard of applicable law, specifically, the 
Court erred when holding that had the Appellant Mr. Kellersman, Jr. filed a 
petition to revoke the will it would have been untimely.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶13]   Determining whether the son 
properly contested the will and was entitled to intervene raises issues of 
statutory and court rule construction, which we review de novo. J & T Properties, LLC v. Gallagher, 
2011 WY 112, ¶ 8, 256 P.3d 522, 524 (Wyo. 2011).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶14]   “[U]nder our codes probate 
proceedings are entirely separate and distinct from actions either at law or in 
equity.”  Gaunt v. Kansas Univ. Endowment Ass’n, 
379 P.2d 825, 826 (Wyo. 1963).  If, 
as in this case, an interested party claims an invalid will has been admitted to 
probate, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-301 (LexisNexis 2011) provides procedures for 
contesting the will:
 
After 
a will has been admitted to probate, any person interested may, within the time 
designated in the notice provided for in W.S. 2-6-122 or 2-7-201, contest the 
will or the validity of the will.  For that purpose he shall file in the court 
in which the will was proved a petition in writing containing his allegations 
against the validity of the will or against the sufficiency of the proof, and 
praying that the probate be revoked.
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  In 
Wood v. 
Wood, 164 P. 844 (Wyo. 1917) we stated 
that a will contest is “collateral” to the petition to submit the will to 
probate.  We 
explained:
 
Where 
the contest is before probate, and comes on for disposal simultaneously with the 
petition, the hearing of the contest does not dispense with the hearing and 
disposition of the petition.  In such a case the regular and orderly 
method of procedure is for the proponent to first present his preliminary proof 
in support of his petition.  
 These averments, it must be 
remembered, are not controverted by any pleading. The so-called 'written grounds 
of opposition’ provided for in section 1312 * * * is not a response to the 
petition, controverting or avoiding its allegations.  It is a pleading collateral to the 
petition, and related to it only to the extent that it cannot be filed until 
there is a petition filed, and that it is in some sense subordinate to it, so 
that if the petition is dismissed, or if it is denied after the hearing of the 
formal preliminary proof, the contest falls with it.
 
(Emphasis 
added.)
 
[¶15]   Consistent with the notion that a 
will contest is collateral to the probate proceeding, the district court in this 
case relied on Merrill v. District 
Court, 272 P.2d 597, 599 (Wyo. 1954) in concluding that it did not have 
jurisdiction over the petition to revoke probate/will contest.  Wyo. Compiled Statutes, 1945, § 6-4081 governed the petition to revoke 
probate in Merrill and was similar to 
the current version set out in § 2-6-301.  We stated that subject matter 
jurisdiction of the probate court attached when the petition to revoke was 
filed.  Id. at 599.  Applying the Merrill rationale to this case, the 
district court held that, because the neighbors did not have standing, their 
petition to revoke the probate was not valid and the court did not acquire 
jurisdiction over the petition to revoke and/or the will contest.  It also held that the son’s filing of a 
motion to intervene in the neighbors’ ineffectual petition did not resolve the 
standing or jurisdictional issues.
 
[¶16]   The district court’s ruling ignores 
the substance of the son’s filing.  
As noted by the district court, the son titled his filing as a motion to 
intervene and join as a petitioner. It is, however, the substance of a motion 
rather than its title that determines whether it is authorized under the 
law.  See, e.g., Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, ¶ 6, 125 P.3d 1022, 1024 (Wyo. 2006); Mathewson v. 
Estate of Nielsen, 2011 WY 71, ¶ 12, 252 P.3d 958, 961 (Wyo. 2011) 
(remarking that motions for reconsideration are not recognized under the rules 
of procedure and we will look at the substance of the motion instead of its 
title to determine if the motion is proper or not).  In his motion, the son made it clear 
that, like the neighbors, he claimed the will was invalid.  He adopted and incorporated by reference 
the claims and allegations in their petition, including the assertion that the 
will was invalid because it was not properly witnessed.  His motion 
continued:
 
The 
movant further alleges the decedent’s April 18, 2003 Will should not have been 
admitted to probate because Mary Jane Sees’ August 18, 2010 Testimony of 
Subscribing Witness on Probate of Will does not comply with the statutory 
requirements in that the Testimony is not substantially in the form required by 
the statute.
 
The 
son claimed he was entitled to one-half of his father’s estate under the 
intestacy laws.
 
[¶17]   Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 
10(c)2 states, in relevant part:  “Statements 
in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different 
part of the same pleading or in 
another pleading or in any 
motion.”  As such, the son adopted 
the neighbors’ allegations as his own.  There is simply no question that the 
son’s filing complied with § 2-6-301’s requirements that he file “a petition in 
writing containing his allegations against the validity of the will or against 
the sufficiency of the proof, and praying that the probate be 
revoked.”
 
[¶18]   So, while the son’s pleading is not 
entitled “petition to revoke” as provided in § 2-6-301, the substance of his 
pleading is just that and it was timely filed within three months of the date of 
the first publication.  To dismiss 
the son’s pleading and allow an allegedly invalid will to proceed through 
probate would be contrary to the intent of the probate statutes as a whole.  The son timely filed an objection to the 
probate and it should have been treated as such.
 
[¶19]   Moreover, while the motion to 
intervene and join was not the most expeditious means of securing a will contest 
in this case, the district court should have allowed intervention under the 
circumstances presented here.  The 
son argues he was entitled to intervene under W.R.C.P. 19(a) and 24(a).  Rule 19 states in relevant 
part:
 
(a) 
Persons to be joined if feasible. -- 
A 
person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive 
the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined 
as a party in the action if: (1) in the person’s absence complete relief cannot 
be accorded among those already parties; or (2) the person claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of 
the action in the person’s absence may: (i) as a practical matter impair or 
impede the person’s ability to protect that interest; or (ii) leave any of the 
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed 
interest.  If the person has not 
been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a 
party.
 
Rule 
24 provides in relevant part:
 
(a)  Intervention of right. -- Upon 
timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an 
action:
(1)  When 
a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or
(2)  When 
the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which 
is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the 
applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is 
adequately represented by existing parties.
 
[¶20]   Under these rules, the son who is 
one of the father’s legal heirs unquestionably has the right to join and 
intervene in the challenge to the probate of his father’s allegedly invalid 
will.  He claims an interest in the 
subject of the action, i.e., his 
father’s estate, and he is so situated that the disposition of the matter would 
impair his ability to protect that interest.  Indeed, the developer stated in his 
motion to dismiss the neighbors’ petition to revoke the 
probate:
 
Both 
Joanne and her brother may be necessary and indispensable parties as they are 
heirs.  This case cannot be resolved 
without them.  They certainly have 
rights which need to be protected as it pertains to their interest in the real 
property.
 
[¶21]   The son claims that once he is 
allowed to intervene and join under Rules 19 and 24, W.R.C.P 17’s relation-back 
principle applies:
 
(a) 
Real party in interest. 
-- 
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An 
executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party 
with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, 
or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's own name without 
joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute of 
the United States so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall 
be brought in the name of the United States. No action shall be dismissed on the 
ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until 
a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of 
commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in 
interest; and such ratification, 
joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been 
commenced in the name of the real party in interest.3
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Given that the son is one 
of the decedent’s legal heirs under the intestacy statute, there is no question 
that the son is a real party in interest to the will contest.  Under Rule 17, joinder of the son as the 
real party in interest has the same effect as if he had commenced the will 
contest and petition to revoke in the first place.
 
[¶22]   The district court ruled that the 
son was not entitled to intervene in the will contest because the original 
petitioners, the neighbors, did not have standing and, consequently, the action 
was never properly commenced.  There 
is authority to support the position that a party cannot intervene in an action 
where none of the original plaintiffs had standing because the original 
plaintiffs did not commence a valid action in which to intervene.  See, e.g., Sipes v. Bd. of Mun. & Zoning Appeals, 
635 A.2d 86 (Md. Ct. App. 1994).  
However, in Esposito v. United 
States, 368 F.3d 1271, 1277-78 (10th Cir. 2004), the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals stated that authority for the concept that substitution should not be 
allowed in a suit that is a “nullity” is scarce.  Instead, the Tenth Circuit stated that 
F.R.C.P. 17(a) is designed to prevent forfeitures and its relation-back 
principle should be given broad application.  Id.
 
[¶23]   The case at bar presents a unique 
set of facts, including that the son’s motion to intervene was timely and 
functionally equivalent to a petition to revoke the probate and the developer 
conceded that the case could not proceed without the legal heirs of the 
decedent, including the son.  Under 
these circumstances, there is simply no question that intervention and 
substitution of the son as the real party in interest should have been allowed, 
and the joinder “shall have the same effect” as if the petition to revoke 
probate had been commenced in his name.  
Because this case involves a unique set of facts, we want to caution that 
other cases involving intervention and substitution of a real party in interest 
may require more in depth analysis of the legal principles and the result may be 
different.
 
[¶24]   We hereby remand this matter to the 
probate court to hold proceedings to determine whether the will is sufficient 
and was properly admitted to probate.  In order to promote judicial efficiency, 
we offer some guidance to the parties and district court on remand.  The right to make a will did not exist 
at common law, at least with respect to real property; consequently, the right 
to make a will and dispose of real property is a statutory right and is subject 
to the control of the legislature.  
Merrill v. State, 133 P. 134 
(Wyo. 1913).  Before a will may be 
probated, it must comport to the state’s statutory scheme.  In re Estate of Reed, 672 P.2d 829, 831 
(Wyo. 1983).  Neither this Court nor 
the district court can enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a probate statute to 
include a testamentary device not falling within the express provisions of the 
Wyoming statutes.  Id. at 833.  Section 2-6-112, provides in pertinent part, “all wills to be valid shall be in writing, 
or typewritten, witnessed by two (2) competent witnesses and signed by the 
testator or by some person in his presence and by his express direction.”  (Emphasis 
added.)
 
[¶25]   When reviewing the will presented 
here, we note that, on its face, it does not appear to meet the minimum 
standards required for a valid Wyoming will.4  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-6-116 and 
2-6-112 (LexisNexis 2011).  The will 
is a one-page document with one typewritten sentence and the notarized signature 
of the decedent.  The decedent’s signature was notarized, and the notary 
provided written testimony supporting the document as a will.  In the case In re Estate of Zelikovitz, 923 P.2d 740 
744 (Wyo. 1996) we explained that there was no provision of the Wyoming statutes 
nor any precedent that would foreclose a notary from serving as a witness, even 
if she intended to and did sign the document as a notary public.  However, the record presented to this 
Court does not demonstrate or present any evidence that there was a second 
witness to the will as required by § 2-6-112.
 
[¶26]   Long ago, 
in Neer v. Cowhick, 31 P. 862, 864 
(Wyo. 1892), we held that a holographic will was invalid because it was not 
properly witnessed.  We 
stated:
 
We 
are forced to the position that the statute relating to proof of holographic 
wills does not dispense with the necessity of witnesses to them, and that as to 
such wills the former statute, providing that wills must be witnessed by two 
competent witnesses, is still in force.
 
Id. 
at 864.
 
[¶27]   While we offer this guidance, we 
recognize that there may be information that was not provided to this Court on 
appeal.  We, therefore, remand this 
matter to the district court for further proceedings on the petition to revoke 
the probate and contest the will.
FOOTNOTES
  1Wyo. 
Compiled Statutes, § 6-408,  1945, 
provided as follows:
 
After 
a will has been admitted to probate, any person interested may, at any time 
within six (6) months after such probate, contest the same or the validity of 
the will. For that purpose he must file in the court in which the will was 
proved a petition in writing, containing his allegations against the validity of 
the will or against the sufficiency of the proof, and praying that the probate 
may be revoked.
 
  2“Except as otherwise provided in the Probate Code, the provisions of the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to and 
constitute the rules of practice 
for all proceedings, new trials or appeals” of probate matters.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-2-308 (LexisNexis 
2011).
3The developer argues that the son’s Rule 17 argument should not be 
considered on appeal because it was not raised below.  The record reveals, however, that the 
son clearly argued to the district court that Rule 17 applied.  We will, therefore, consider the 
argument on appeal.
4Considering 
the obvious defect in the decedent’s will, an argument could be made that the 
district court should not have admitted the will to probate in the first 
place.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2-6-122(c) (LexisNexis 2011) requires that, “Upon the filing of the 
petition [for probate of a will without administration], proceedings shall be 
had as provided in W.S. 2-6-203 through 2-6-206, and order issue and notices be 
given as provided in W.S. 2-6-209 if the 
will is found entitled to probate[.]”  
(Emphasis added.)  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 2-6-203(a) (LexisNexis 2011) notes:
 
Upon 
the filing of a petition for probate of a will, the court or the clerk may hear 
it forthwith or at such time and place as the court or clerk may direct, with or 
without requiring notice, and upon proof 
of due execution of the will, admit the same to probate.  
(Emphasis added.)
 
Nevertheless, the proceeding on the petition to revoke the probate in 
this case will provide an effective means for testing the validity of the 
will.