Case Title: Sundstrom v. Sundstrom

Citation: 177 Vt. 577, 2004 VT 106, 865 A.2d 358

Docket Number: 2003-423

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2004-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sundstrom v. Sundstrom (2003-423); 177 Vt. 577; 865 A.2d 358

2004 VT 106

[Filed 21-Oct-2004]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2004 VT 106

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-423

                              MARCH  TERM, 2004

  Richard Sundstrom	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Addison Family Court
                                       }	
  Bobbi Jo Sundstrom	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 180-9-97 Andm

                                                Trial Judge: Helen M. Toor

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Mother appeals from the family court's order modifying
  parental rights and responsibilities, and awarding custody of the parties'
  two minor children to father.  The court found that mother's "ongoing,
  intentional, mean-spirited violations" of court orders concerning
  parent-child contact constituted a material and substantial change of
  circumstances, and the harm caused by mother's obstruction of visitation
  outweighed the harm that could be caused by a change in custody.  The court
  thus concluded that the children's best interests required that they be
  removed from mother's home and placed with father.  On appeal, mother
  argues that the court abused its discretion in awarding custody to father,
  and committed various procedural mistakes that constitute reversible error. 
  We affirm in part, and reverse in part. 

       ¶  2.  To place the court's June 2003 order in its proper context,
  we first review the procedural history of this case.  Father and mother
  divorced in September 1998.  At the time of their divorce, they agreed that
  mother would have sole parental rights and responsibilities over the
  parties' two children, JoAnn, born in May 1992, and Cameron, born in April
  1994.  They also agreed that father would have contact with the children
  every other weekend, two weeks in the summer, and shared holidays. 
  Pursuant to the final divorce order, father was also awarded "reasonable
  telephone contact" with the children, which "[u]nder normal circumstances .
  . . should be one telephone call per day."

       ¶  3.  Mother and father's relationship deteriorated significantly
  after the divorce, and in 1999, father filed a motion to modify parental
  rights and responsibilities.  Although the court denied the motion, it
  found that mother had been engaging in "a pattern of behavior" that had
  frustrated father's ability to have parent-child contact.  The court found
  the record replete with examples of mother's negative behaviors, including
  her repeated interference with father's attempts to contact the children by
  telephone.  The court explained that, on those occasions when father was
  able to reach the children, mother would typically be in the background
  telling the children what to say and often making snide remarks about
  father or his girlfriend.  The court also found that mother had involved
  the children in adult issues, and she had sabotaged the children's
  relationship with father's new girlfriend.  Mother acknowledged that she
  needed to get better control of her anger.
        
       ¶  4.  The court found that, "remarkably," mother's negative
  behavior had not yet poisoned the children's relationship with father,
  although it found that her behavior had begun to have an adverse impact on
  the children, particularly JoAnn.  The court agreed with expert testimony
  "that a continuation of these unacceptable behaviors by mother could bring
  about significant erosion of father's relationship with the children and
  have negative long-term effects on the children."

       ¶  5.  Based on its findings, the court concluded that mother had
  substantially interfered with father's relationship with the children.  The
  court concluded, however, that it was not in the children's best interests
  to transfer custody to father.  The court explained that the children had
  not yet been alienated from father, although the potential existed. 
  Additionally, the court found that mother had always been the children's
  primary caretaker, and in all other respects was a fit parent.  The court
  indicated its belief that mother was capable of changing her behavior.  The
  court also found it significant that father's job required him to be away
  from home during virtually all of the children's waking hours, and thus, if
  it transferred custody to father, father's girlfriend would effectively
  become the children's primary care giver.  Therefore, on balance, the court
  concluded that it was not in the children's best interest to transfer
  custody to father.
    
       ¶  6.  The court warned mother, however, that it viewed the
  situation as extremely serious, and that if mother persisted in her
  negative behavior, "the court will have no choice but to change custody in
  the children's best interests."  The court ordered mother to stop
  denigrating father and his girlfriend in the children's presence, and stop
  interfering with the children's relationship with father and his
  girlfriend.  The court also ordered mother to participate in counseling to
  address her anger and bitterness resulting from the divorce, and her
  refusal to accept that father's girlfriend was now part of the children's
  lives.

       ¶  7.  Problems between mother and father continued, and both parties
  filed numerous motions with the court.  At father's request, the court
  entered several orders setting forth a more specific telephone contact
  schedule. (FN1)  In 2001, father again moved to modify parental rights and
  responsibilities, complaining that mother continued to interfere with his
  relationship with the children.  In July 2001, after a hearing, the court
  denied father's motion.  The court concluded that all of father's
  complaints of interference arose from mother's refusal to acquiesce to his
  demand for a larger role in the care of the children than was permitted by
  the final divorce order.  The court found no change in circumstances that
  would warrant a change in custody.  We affirmed the family court's order in
  October 2002, although the appeal did not reach the merits. (FN2)  
         
       ¶  8.  After this Court's entry order, and in light of the over
  one-hundred post-judgment motions that the parties had filed, the family
  court asked the parties to indicate which issues remained to be addressed. 
  In letters to the court, both father and the attorney for the children
  indicated that father's motion to modify parental rights and
  responsibilities, which had been filed on March 6, 2002, remained
  outstanding.  Both parties also indicated that a motion for contempt that
  had been filed by guardian ad litem Sandy Hutchins on February 14, 2002,
  remained to be heard as well.  On December 13, 2002, the court issued an
  entry order stating that these motions would be considered at the motions
  hearing.  In a pro se filing dated December 18, 2002, mother asked the
  court to dismiss father's motion to modify.  The court denied mother's
  request on January 13, 2003.  On the same date, the court issued an entry
  order indicating that four new motions that mother had filed on December
  30, 2002 would be heard with the motions that had already been scheduled. 
  In January 2003, mother filed another pro se document asking the court if a
  revision of a family court order required an unanticipated and substantial
  change of circumstances, and if so, what the court believed these changes
  were so that she could prepare for the court hearing.  The court denied
  mother's request, explaining that it did not provide legal advice to the
  parties. 

       ¶  9.  A hearing on the pending motions was held in April 2003, and
  both parties appeared pro se.  The court divided the time allotted for the
  hearing between the parties.  Father went first, and after his direct
  testimony, mother sought to cross-examine him.  The court informed mother
  that it would allow father to present all of his evidence, and then mother
  and the attorney for the children could cross-examine him.  Mother
  cross-examined father after he had presented his case.  Guardian ad litem
  Sandy Hutchins, who had worked extensively with mother and father, but who
  had not met with the children, was present at the hearing.  At the
  hearing's close, the court asked her if she had any comments.  The guardian
  replied that her recommendation "then and now is that [father] have full
  custody of his children."  Mother did not object to the guardian's
  testimony.  

       ¶  10.  In a June 2003 order, the court granted father's motion to
  modify parental rights and responsibilities.  The court found that since
  father's last motion to modify, mother had continued to interfere with
  father's telephone contact with the children.  The court explained that
  when father tried to call the children every day, as permitted by the
  divorce decree, one of several things happened:  there was a busy signal;
  the phone would go unanswered; mother would answer and say the children
  were unavailable; the call would be automatically forwarded to a business;
  or mother would answer and tell father that until he paid her all the money
  she felt she was due, he would never get to talk to the children.  The
  court found that when father had spoken to the children, he heard mother on
  many occasions in the background telling the children what to say.  Mother
  also stated to father, when he asked her when a good time to call would be,
  "There is no good time to call.  Stop calling us and move on with your
  life."
      
       ¶  11.  The court found that in the weeks before the hearing, a new
  development had occurred:  mother would place the children on the phone and
  tell father that he needed to get a job and pay mother.  Father presented
  two tapes of the children making the following statements to him.  "Hi Dad,
  leave us alone.  Pay your child support.  Get a job, OK?"  In March 2003,
  JoAnn stated "Pay your support, Dad."  The court found it beyond doubt that
  mother told the children to make these statements to father, and explained
  that it was "entirely inappropriate for a parent to place a child in the
  middle of the parental dispute over child support or maintenance."  The
  court also found that mother had attempted to keep father from attending
  First Communion for one of the children several months prior to the hearing
  by refusing to tell father when the ceremony was scheduled.  Additionally,
  the court found that mother had filed a form with the children's school
  that listed her boyfriend as the children's stepfather, which meant that
  father was not permitted to obtain information about the children.

       ¶  12.  Based on the evidence presented, the court found it "crystal
  clear" that mother had intentionally and repeatedly sabotaged father's
  ability to have telephone contact with the children.  She had also
  intentionally attempted to interfere with father's ability to obtain school
  information and to participate in their religious upbringing.  The court
  found mother's demeanor in court to be snide and disrespectful to both
  father and the court, and stated that mother clearly had a deep level of
  hostility that had not receded over the five years since the parties'
  divorce.  The court found that mother was unable to place the children's
  needs ahead of her own anger and vindictiveness.
   
       ¶  13.  Based on its findings, the court concluded that father had
  demonstrated a material and substantial change in circumstances.  It
  explained that mother had repeatedly, continuously, and intentionally
  violated prior orders of the court.  Mother had been warned on prior
  occasions that her behavior could lead to a change in custody, yet she
  continued to engage in this behavior.  As the court explained, mother's
  "ongoing, intentional, mean-spirited violations of prior court orders
  concerning parent-child contact" constituted both a contempt of court and a
  material and substantial change in circumstances.

       ¶  14.  The court next addressed whether the harm caused by mother's
  obstruction of visitation outweighed the harm that could be caused by a
  change of custody.  The overriding issue, the court explained, was the best
  interests of the children.  The court concluded that not only had mother
  repeatedly and continuously interfered with father's contact with the
  children, she had also intentionally worked to alienate the children from
  father by telling them that he had not been paying all of his child
  support.  She further alienated them by placing them in the middle of that
  dispute by having them say mean things to father over the phone.  The court
  found that these attempts at parental alienation weighed against mother
  being the children's sole custodian.  The court concluded that the damage
  to the children from mother's involvement of them in her disputes with
  father was extremely harmful to the children, and to the children's
  relationship with father. 

       ¶  15.  The court recognized that the children had resided with
  mother since the divorce, and that the stability this provided was valuable
  to them.  However, the court concluded that the harm caused by mother's
  manipulation and alienation of the children, in pursuit of her desire to
  punish father, outweighed any benefit that would exist from the children
  remaining in her home.  The court found that mother's behavior demonstrated
  that she placed her own emotional needs ahead of the children's needs to
  their significant detriment, and thus, her home could not be considered a
  positive or supportive environment for the children.  
        
       ¶  16.  In contrast to mother, the court found that father had
  maintained a calm and reasonable demeanor in court and with the children,
  in spite of mother's mistreatment of him and his frustration with being
  unable to contact the children.  The court concluded that father showed an
  understanding of the damage that this situation was inflicting on the
  children, and an appropriate concern for their well-being.  He did not
  involve the children in disputes as mother had done.  The court thus
  concluded that father was more capable than mother of providing the
  children with the guidance they needed, meeting their developmental needs,
  and fostering a positive relationship with mother.  The court explained
  that mother had been warned that her ongoing negative behavior was likely
  to lead to a loss of custody, and the court found that, despite these
  warnings, her improper behavior continued, and in fact, had escalated.  The
  court therefore concluded that the best interests of the children required
  that they be removed from such an environment.  

       ¶  17.  In its order, the court also addressed mother's motions to
  enforce prior child support and maintenance orders.  The court found that
  father's financial situation had changed significantly since the prior
  orders were issued.  It explained that father had lost his long-term
  employment in January 2003, and he was currently working part-time in
  anticipation of a full-time position becoming available in his field.  The
  court found that father's income averaged $316.65 per week, and that
  mother's live-in partner now contributed between $500 to $1000 or more per
  month to mother's household.  The court found that these facts constituted
  a substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances justifying
  modification of maintenance and child support.  The court explained that
  father had paid his child support regularly until he lost his job.  Since
  that time, he had made partial payments.  The court found that these
  payments were reasonable, and concluded that father did not owe past child
  support to mother.  For the same reasons, the court found that father could
  not afford to pay mother $141.62 in maintenance, and it reduced his
  payments to $50.00 per week.  The court noted that when father obtained
  full-time employment, he would need to inform mother and the court.  

       ¶  18.  Mother filed a motion for a new hearing, arguing that the
  court erred in evaluating the children's best interests without the input
  of a guardian ad litem who had met with the children.  She asserted that a
  guardian's input was necessary to determine whether her conduct had
  actually been harmful to the children, whether it had actually undermined
  their relationship with father, and whether uprooting the children would be
  harmful to them.  The court denied the motion.  This appeal followed. 

       ¶  19.  We start with mother's arguments that the family court
  committed procedural errors that require us to set aside all or part of its
  decision.  Specifically, mother asserts that the court committed reversible
  error by failing to notify her of the matters to be considered at the
  hearing, failing to afford her a fair opportunity to cross-examine father,
  improperly allowing the guardian ad litem to express an opinion regarding
  the best interests of the children, and retroactively modifying child
  support and maintenance in the absence of a motion to modify.  As discussed
  below, we find all but one of these arguments without merit. 

       ¶  20.  First, we reject mother's assertion that the family court's
  decision should be reversed because she was not provided notice that
  father's motion to modify would be considered at the hearing.  Mother's
  argument is based on two notices of the hearing.  Following the rotation of
  a new judge into the county and this Court's last decision on appeal, the
  family court asked the parties to specify which  motions required a
  hearing. (FN3)  Father and the children's lawyer specified the pending
  motions, including a motion to modify custody based on mother's continuing
  interference with telephone visitation, and the court ordered that these
  motions, and one filed by mother, be set for a hearing. (FN4)  Thereafter,
  mother filed additional motions, and the court issued a further notice of
  the motion hearing, stating that the new motions, which were itemized,
  would "be heard with the currently scheduled hearing."  The hearing had to
  be rescheduled, and a new notice was sent to show the rescheduling of the
  hearing, but it listed only the additional motions filed by mother. (FN5) 
  On that basis, mother argues that she did not receive notice that the
  motion to modify custody would be considered at the hearing.  
                
       ¶  21.  It was apparent from the beginning of the hearing that the
  family court was considering the motion to modify.  Indeed, it was apparent
  that the motion to modify was the central subject of the hearing.  For
  example, in her opening statement, the attorney for the children indicated
  that she would  address the motion to modify custody first.  Mother did not
  claim that she was not provided notice that the motion would be considered,
  nor did she object to the court's consideration of the motion to modify. 
  Mother did not raise this claim of error in her motion for a new hearing. 
  We have consistently held that to preserve an issue for appeal, a party
  must "present the issue with specificity and clarity in a manner which
  gives the trial court a fair opportunity to rule on it."  In re White, 172
  Vt. 335, 343, 779 A.2d 1264, 1270 (2001) (internal quotation marks and
  citation omitted).  Mother waived this claim of error by failing to raise
  it below.  
               
       ¶  22.  Mother also waived her argument that the family court
  committed reversible error by allowing the former guardian ad litem to
  express an opinion regarding the children's best interests.  It appears
  from the record that the former guardian attended the hearing because the
  court was considering a motion for contempt that she had filed. (FN6) 
  Although she was not sworn as a witness and had no recent involvement in
  the case, she was asked by the court for her position; the guardian
  supported modification of custody because of mother's continuous violation
  of the parent-child contact order.  In response to a question from the
  court, the guardian stated that she had never met personally with the
  children.  Following the family court's decision, mother moved for a new
  hearing in part because the "GAL in this case  . . . HAS NEVER met the
  children."  Mother asked that the court hear from a guardian ad litem "on
  how harmful it will be to the children to be uprooted."       

       ¶  23.  Because mother did not object to the guardian's statement at
  the hearing, she cannot raise its propriety on appeal.  Damone v. Damone,
  172 Vt. 504, 514-15, 782 A.2d 1208, 1216-17 (2001) (father's failure to
  object to admission of guardian ad litem's testimony at hearing precluded
  review of claimed error on appeal).  In any event, the court did not err in
  allowing this statement.  Rule 7(d) of the Rules for Family Proceedings
  provides that "[t]he guardian ad litem shall state to the court a position
  and the reasons therefor, which reasons shall be based upon the evidence in
  the record, but shall not testify as a witness."  The guardian's statement
  was entirely consistent with the rule because she did not testify and her
  position was based on evidence in the record.  Indeed, mother's complaint
  that the guardian violated the rule by not meeting with the children, see
  id. ("In fulfilling this function, each guardian ad litem shall meet with
  the child . . . ."), undercuts her argument that the statement was
  improper.  Although the guardian's appointment had been terminated, she was
  properly in court to support a contempt motion that she had filed with
  respect to parent-child contact, and the court properly requested her
  position on it.  We also find the statement harmless.  Although the family
  court refers to the guardian's statement in its order, its findings
  demonstrate that it did not base its decision on that statement.  Instead,
  the record reflects that the court reviewed all of the evidence in arriving
  at its conclusion that a transfer of custody was in the children's best
  interests.
   
       ¶  24.  Mother next argues that the court erred by failing to afford
  her a fair opportunity to cross-examine father.  The record does not
  support this argument.  The trial court is authorized to exercise
  reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses so as
  to make the interrogation and presentation orderly and effective for the
  ascertainment of truth and avoid needless consumption of time.  V.R.E.
  611(a).  Faced with two pro se litigants, the court divided the time
  scheduled for the hearing between the two parties.  The court informed
  mother that she could cross-examine father at the close of his evidence,
  which she did.  Indeed, we note that other than alleging that the family
  court's action was "manifestly unfair," mother does not identify any
  specific harm that resulted from the court's decision to delay the
  cross-examination.  On the contrary, the record shows that mother had a
  fair opportunity to cross-examine father at the close of his case, and we
  find no error. 

       ¶  25.  Finally, mother argues that the court erred by retroactively
  modifying father's child support and maintenance obligations in the absence
  of a motion to modify. (FN7)  The family court may modify a child support
  order on either party's motion, and upon a showing of real, substantial and
  unanticipated change of circumstances.  15 V.S.A. § 660(a).  A child
  support order may be modified only as to installments that accrued after a
  motion to modify has been filed.  15 V.S.A. § 660(e); Towne v. Towne, 150
  Vt. 286, 288,