Case Title: Harshfield v. Harshfield

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Harshfield v. Harshfield1992 WY 158842 P.2d 535Case Number: 92-100Decided: 11/30/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Beverly 
C. HARSHFIELD, Appellant (Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
Gale L. 
HARSHFIELD, Appellee (Defendant).

 
 
Stephenson 
D. Emery of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, for appellant.

 
 
Richard 
H. Peek, Casper, 
for appellee.

 
 
Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 
CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Beverly 
Harshfield brought this action to modify a divorce decree to provide for 
division of appellee's military retirement benefits contending that she should 
be allowed to present evidence upon *536 the modification question. She appeals 
the district court's order dismissing her petition to modify the divorce 
decree.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant states the 
issues as follows:

 
 
I.  After entry of a divorce decree, which 
is silent as to the issue, are military retirement benefits subject to 
allocation or division by the district

court?

 
 
II.  Does the omission of allocation of 
military retirement benefits from a divorce decree constitute grounds within the 
scope of W.S. 1-16-401 or Rule60(b), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure?

 
 
III.  Does a petition which asks for 
allocation of military retirement benefits omitted in a divorce decree 
constitute a request for revision of alimony within the scope of W.S. 
20-2-116?

 
 

[¶4.]     Because the district 
court dismissed the petition based on W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6),our sole concern is 
whether the district court erred when it granted appellee's motion to dismiss. 
The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction because of the bar of the time limitations in W.R.C.P. 60(b), and 
W.S. 1-16-401, et seq. (1977), and 
because of res judicata of the 
divorce decree. Therefore, we are concerned only with the jurisdictional 
issues.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶5.]     On August 17, 1977, 
appellant filed an action for divorce from appellee Gale L. Harshfield. On 
December 21, 1978, the district court entered a decree of divorce. Neither party 
appealed. The divorce decree divided the parties' property, established alimony 
and provided for child support and custody of two minor children. Appellee was 
ordered to pay alimony at a fixed monthly rate for a period of two years. 
Alimony payments were timely paid in accordance with the 
decree.

 
 

[¶6.]     In appellant's original 
divorce complaint she alleged that appellee received $536.00 per month in Air 
Force retirement benefits. In his answer, appellee admitted to receiving the 
retirement benefits. The district court, however, did not make reference to or 
divide the retirement benefits in the final divorce 
decree.

 
 

[¶7.]     Thirteen years after 
entry of the divorce decree and eleven years after alimony payments had ceased, 
appellant filed a petition for modification of the decree. She alleged that she 
is entitled to one-half of appellee's Air Force retirement benefits. Appellant 
brought the action to modify under W.R.C.P. 60 and W.S. 1-16-401, or, in the 
alternative, W.S. 20-2-116.  
Appellee responded with a motion to dismiss, claiming the district court 
did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the decree. Appellee argued 
that the statutory time limits for the W.R.C.P. 60 and W.S. 1-16-401 action had 
run and that the divorce decree was res 
judicata.

 
 

[¶8.]     After hearing oral 
arguments, the district court entered an order granting appellee's motion to 
dismiss. The district court found that it did not have subject-matter 
jurisdiction to modify the decree because the time had run under W.R.C.P. 60(b) 
and W.S. 1-16-401 and because the alimony payments were completed before the 
petition was filed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶9.]     When a district court 
grants a motion to dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, our standard of review is as 
follows:

 
 
"[W]e 
will sustain a dismissal of a complaint only if it shows on its face that the 
plaintiff was not entitled to relief under any set of facts.  Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 
of Hartford, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1299 (1980). In considering such a motion, 
the 'facts alleged in the complaint are admitted and the allegations must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. 'Moxley v. Laramie 
Builders, Inc., Wyo., 600 P.2d 733, 734 (1979). Dismissal is a 
drastic remedy, and is sparingly granted.  
Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 599 P.2d 580 
(1979)."

 
 

Matter 
of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Wyo.1991), quoting, 
Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1092 
(Wyo.1987).

 
 
ANALYSIS

 
 
RES 
JUDICATA

 
 

[¶10.]  "A divorce decree is a final judgment and 
res judicata on all issues decided. 
"Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d  
at 1265, citing Warren v. Hart, 747 P.2d 511, 512 (Wyo.1987); Mentock v. 
Mentock, 638 P.2d 156, 158 (Wyo.1981); Heyl v. Heyl, 518 P.2d 28, 30 
(Wyo.1974). We apply a four-part test to determine if res judicata will bar a subsequent 
action:  First, are the parties 
identical? Second, is the subject-matter identical? Third, were the issues the 
same and related to the subject-matter? Fourth, were the capacities of the 
parties, in reference to both the subject-matter and the issues between them, 
identical? Moore v. Moore, 835 P.2d 1148, 1151(Wyo.1992); see also Matter of 
Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d  at 1265; Matter of Estate of Newell, 765 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Wyo.1988); Matter of 
Swasso, 751 P.2d 887, 890 (Wyo.1988).

 
 

[¶11.]  The four-part test is satisfied in this 
case. First, appellant and appellee were the same parties as in the divorce 
action. Second, property division was decided in the divorce action, and both 
the appellant and appellee acknowledged the Air Force retirement benefits as 
marital property in their pleadings. Third, the issues of property division and 
alimony were related to the subject matter of the action for divorce and 
resolved in the final divorce decree. Fourth, the interests and capacities of 
the two parties in reference to both the subject matter and issues between them 
remain unchanged, the retirement benefit being property disclosed and considered 
in the final disposition.

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellant argues against application of 
res judicata because the divorce 
decree did not allocate the Air Force retirement benefits. However, in Ebeling v. Ebeling, 782 P.2d 584, 586 
(Wyo.1989), this court stated, "retirement benefits earned during a marriage are 
property to be considered by the court in determining property disposition, but the court is not required to divide that 
particular property." (emphasis added)  
Appellee's Air Force retirement benefits were clearly presented in the 
original divorce pleadings, and there is no evidence that the district court 
neglected to consider them. Hence, the retirement benefits were put in issue, 
and the district court was aware of them when it fashioned the divorce 
decree.

 
 

[¶13.]  The paramount policy reason for applying 
res judicata to divorce decrees is 
magnified by the facts of this case. As was stated in Heyl v. Heyl, 518 P.2d at 
30:

 
 
This 
court has heretofore recognized the importance of the finality of a divorce 
judgment, Rubeling v. Rubeling, Wyo., 
406 P.2d 283, 284 [1965]. Especially is this true in divorce cases when the 
emotional involvement of the parties tends to magnify the importance of all 
matters in connection therewith.

 
 

See also 
Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo.1984) and Broadhead v. 
Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 737 (Wyo.1987) (the State has a strong interest in 
providing "clear and timely finalization and severance of the marriage ties" in 
divorce actions). If the district court were to have jurisdiction to modify a 
thirteen-year-old divorce decree simply upon a showing that the decree did not 
divide every piece of marital property, this would severely diminish the 
assurance of finality. Therefore, on the issue of division of appellee's Air 
Force retirement benefits, we hold that the 1978 divorce decree is res judicata and bars subsequent 
litigation.

 
 
RULE 
60(b) & W.S. 1-16-401, et seq.

 
 

[¶14.]  Where res judicata bars reopening a divorce 
decree, a district court retains jurisdiction to modify the decree under 
particular circumstances. Barnett v. 
Barnett, 704 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Wyo.1985); see also Lawrence J. Golden, Equitable Distribution of Property § 
8.03A (1992 Cum. Supp.). In divorce cases, a district court has continuing 
jurisdiction over child custody, child support, and alimony based upon a showing 
of change in circumstances. However, the district court does not retain 
jurisdiction to modify marital property divisions based upon change of 
circumstances.  Barnett, 704 P.2d  at 
1309.

 
 

[¶15.]  In very limited situations a property 
division may be reopened and modified or vacated contrary to the bar of res judicata. Subject to specific time 
limitations, W.R.C.P. 60(b) and W.S. 1-16-401, et seq. authorize district courts 
to modify or vacate a judgment for fraud, mistake, inadvertence or 
irregularity.

 
 

[¶16.]  Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 60 
provides:

 
 
(b) Other Reasons-On motion, and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons:  (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect * * *.  
The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after 
the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. [emphasis 
added]

 
 
Wyoming 
Statute 1-16-401 (1977) provides:

 
 
(a) A 
district court may vacate or modify its own judgment or order after the term at 
which it was made:

 
 
******

 
 
(iii) 
For mistake, neglect or omission of the clerk or irregularity in obtaining a 
judgment or order[.]

 
 
However, 
W.S. 1-16-408 (1977) requires:

 
 
Proceedings 
for the causes mentioned in W.S. 1-16-401(a)(iii) and (vi) shall be commenced within three (3) years * 
* * after the defendant has notice of the judgment. [emphasis 
added]

 
 

[¶17.]  Appellant failed to meet the requisite 
time limitations set by W.R.C.P. 60(b) and W.S. 1-16-401, et seq. (1977).She filed her petition to 
modify the divorce decree in December of 1991, thirteen years after the divorce 
decree was entered.  Rule 60(b), 
specifically limits motions based upon mistake, inadvertence or neglect to one 
year after entry of final judgment.  
Wyoming Statute 1-16-408 sets a time limit of one to three years after 
notice of the final judgment, depending upon the reason for reopening. Thirteen 
years is well beyond the statutory limits set in the 
statutes.

 
 

[¶18.]  We also have recognized that a district 
court has inherent equitable powers to modify a final judgment, based on mistake 
or fraud, without regard to statutory time limits.  Barnett, 704 P.2d  at 1310; Matter of Estate of Kimball, 583 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Wyo.1978); Holmes v. 
Holmes, 66 Wyo. 317, 211 P.2d 946, 953 (1949). Appellant 
argues that our holding in Barnett 
controls our disposition of this issue, but we cannot agree with that 
conclusion.

 
 

[¶19.]  In Barnett, the petitioner was successful 
in having a divorce decree modified three years after entry of the divorce 
because the parties had mutually omitted a marital debt in the property 
division.  704 P.2d  at 1310. We 
affirmed the district court's order, modifying the decree under its general 
equitable powers.

 
 

[¶20.]  Barnett is easily distinguished from the 
facts of this case. First, in Barnett 
the parties stipulated that a mistake had been made in the original property 
division. Second, the action to modify was made less than three years after the 
final divorce decree had been entered. Distinguishing this case, it is 
uncontroverted that the retirement benefits appeared on the face of the 
pleadings, there was no stipulation of the parties that there had been a 
mistake, and this action was brought more than three years, to wit, thirteen years after the final 
divorce decree. Because we do not find these facts sufficient to warrant 
invoking the equitable power to re-open a final decree, we hold that the 
district court did not err in dismissing for lack of 
jurisdiction.

 
 
W.S. 
20-2-116

 
 

[¶21.]  Finally, appellant contends that the 
district court erred by refusing to invoke jurisdiction under W.S. 20-2-116 to 
modify the 1978 divorce decree's alimony provision so as to include the Air 
Force retirement benefits.  
Generally, a district court has continuing jurisdiction to modify a 
divorce decree's alimony award.

 
 

[¶22.]  Wyoming Statute 20-2-116 (1977) 
provides:

 
 
After a 
decree for alimony or other allowance for a party * * * the court may from time 
to time, on the petition of either of the parties, revise and alter the decree 
respecting the amount of the alimony or allowance or the payment thereof * * 
*.

 
 

See also 
Dorr v. Newman, 785 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Wyo.1990).

 
 

[¶23.]  Appellant argues that the court's 
jurisdiction to modify an alimony award continues beyond the duration of the 
time alimony is to be paid as provided in the original decree. We have not 
specifically addressed this issue but note that the weight of authority is 
contrary to appellant's position. These courts hold that the court's 
jurisdiction to modify alimony payments ends when the alimony award terminates, 
unless otherwise directed by the initial decree. Brown v. Brown, 8 Wash. App. 528, 507 P.2d 157 (1973); Mercer v. Mercer, 
102 Idaho 816, 641 P.2d 1003 (1982); Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Power to Modify Spousal Support Award for a 
Limited Term, Issued in Conjunction with Divorce, so as to Extend the Term or 
make the Award Permanent, 62 A.L.R.4th 180 §§ 11, 15 
(1988).

 
 

[¶24.]  In Mercer, a divorce decree provided 
alimony payments to one spouse for a limited time period. All the payments were 
timely paid as required. After the payments had been completed, the payee spouse 
moved the court for modification of the completed alimony award. The district 
court denied the wife's motion, and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, 
stating:

 
 
A trial 
court ordinarily, and absent conditions not alleged here, is without power to 
modify an alimony award beyond the duration of the time fixed by the original 
decree for payment of alimony, provided that those payments have been made and 
there has been no appeal from the final decree which declared the obligation, 
and fixed its limited duration.

 
 

Id. 641 P.2d  at 1005.

 
 

[¶25.]  We adopt the view that a district court 
may not modify, under W.S. 20-2-116 (1977), a durational award of alimony after 
full payment is completed unless the divorce decree specifies otherwise. Were we 
to hold otherwise, the finality of divorce would be 
illusory.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶26.]  We affirm the district court's order of 
dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the divorce decree. 
We find that the original divorce decree of 1978 is res judicata on the issue of the 
appellee's retirement benefit and that appellant failed to timely file for 
modification under W.R.C.P. 60(b), W.S. 1-16-401, et seq. (1977), and W.S. 20-2-116 
(1977).