Case Title: DZIKOWSKI v JACOBS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 1.3160 I N THE SUPKhNE SOUKT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1976 A L E X A N D B K I)Z LKOWSKI , Plaintiff and Appellant, PAUL L1. JACOBS, ROBi2KT WILLIAMS AND S A M M O P S - TRUCKING C O M P A N Y , Defendants and Respondents. ~ p p e a l from: !]is t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert J. Boyd, Judge presiding. Courrsel of Record : For Appellant: James J. Masar argued, - - y , Deer T,odge, Montana Olson, White and Olson, Bozeman, Montana For Kespondents: Corette, Smith and Dean, Butte, Montana R. D. Corette, Jr. argued, Butte, Montana John Larson appeared, Butte, Montana Submitted: May 25, 1976 Decided : &U(; 1 1 5911 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment e n t e r e d i n a personal i n j u r y a c t i o n t r i e d before t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Powell County, Hon. Robert J. Boyd p r e s i d i n g . Judgment was e n t e r e d on a j u r y v e r d i c t absolving defendants of l i a b i l i t y i n connection w i t h a c a r - t r u c k c o l l i s i o n . The personal i n j u r y a c t i o n a r o s e from t h e s e f a c t s : O n February 19, 1973, Alexander Dzikowski, while d r i v i n g a 1962 Pontiac n o r t h on U.S. Highway 1 0 between Warm Springs S t a t e H o s p i t a l and Galen S t a t e H o s p i t a l , was involved i n a c o l l i s i o n w i t h a s e m i t r u c k and t r a i l e r . The s e m i w a s d r i v e n by Paul Jacobs, owned by Robert D. W i l l i a m s , and under lease t o Sammons Trucking Company. The c o l l i s i o n occurred approximately one m i l e south of t h e main turnoff t o Galen S t a t e Hospital a t an i n t e r s e c t i o n where a county g r a v e l road j o i n s U.S. Highway 10. The record r e v e a l s t h e s e p e r t i n e n t f a c t s concerning t h i s i n t e r s e c t i o n and t h e immediate v i c i n i t y : U.S. Highway 10 i n t h i s a r e a i s s t r a i g h t . There a r e no highway department markings o r s i g n s i n d i c a t i n g an i n t e r s e c t i o n with a g r a v e l road. I n t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n i t s e l f and f o r approximately a m i l e i n e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n , t h e highway c o n t a i n s a broken yellow median l i n e . Also, t h a t on t h e day of t h e a c c i d e n t t h e highway was b a r e and d r y . The c o l l i s i o n occurred a s Jacobs, who had been following Dzikowski's c a r f o r some t i m e , attempted t o p a s s a t t h e same t i m e Dzikowski began executing a l e f t t u r n onto t h e g r a v e l road. Jacobs' s e m i h i t t h e d r i v e r ' s s i d e of Dzikowski's c a r with both v e h i c l e s proceeding o f f t h e highway i n t o t h e barrow p i t . When t h e two v e h i c l e s came t o rest, a load of steel I-beams f e l l o f f t h e t r a i l e r onto t h e car causing s e r i o u s i n j u r i e s t o Dzikowski. A s a r e s u l t of t h e a c c i d e n t , Dzikowski brought a n a c t i o n a g a i n s t Paul Jacobs, Robert W i l l i a m s and Sammons Trucking Company f o r medical expenses, property damage, l o s s of earnings, and general damages. The b a s i s of Dzikowski's complaint was t h e alleged negligence of Jacobs i n attempting t o pass within a public i n t e r s e c t i o n . Following t h e dismissal of Sammons ~ r u c k i n g Company as a p a r t y defendant, t h e case was t r i e d before a jury. The jury returned a v e r d i c t i n favor of defendants. Dzikowski's motion f o r a new t r i a l was denied, and t h i s appeal followed. Two i s s u e s a r e presented f o r review: (1) Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t commit r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by refusing p l a i n t i f f ' s offered i n s t r u c t i o n s No. 1 1 and No. 12 on passing a t a public i n t e r s e c t i o n ? ( 2 ) Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t commit r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury on t h e i s s u e of contributory negligence? P l a i n t i f f contends t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t erred i n not giving p l a i n t i f f ' s offered i n s t r u c t i o n s Nos. 1 1 and 12 which read: " I n s t r u c t i o n No. 11. You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t no v e h i c l e s h a l l a t any t i m e be driven t o t h e l e f t s i d e of t h e roadway under t h e following conditions : " ( 2 ) when approaching within one hundred (100) f e e t of o r t r a v e r s i n g any i n t e r s e c t i o n o r r a i l - road grade crossing." " I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 2 . You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t an i n t e r s e c t i o n within t h e meaning of Section 32-2156, R.C.M. 1947, is formed by t h e joining of two ways p u b l i c l y maintained, which a r e open t o vehicular t r a f f i c . " S p e c i f i c a l l y c i t i n g s e c t i o n 32-2156 ( a ) ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947, and Leach v. Great Northern Railway Co., 139 Mont. 84, 94, 360 P.2d 94, p l a i n t i f f argues t h a t t h e s e w e r e proper i n s t r u c t i o n s given t h e f a c t t h a t defendant Jacobs attempted t o pass within t h e i n t e r s e c - t i o n of two publicly maintained vehicular ways. A s a d d i t i o n a l support f o r h i s p o s i t i o n , p l a i n t i f f relies p r i n c i p a l l y on Rader v. Nicholls, 1 4 0 Mont. 459, 373 P.2d 312, and Gammel v. Dees, 159 Mont. 461, 498 P.2d 1204. This Court f i n d s no m e r i t i n p l a i n t i f f ' s contention and f i n d s Rader and Gamrnel, c i t e d by p l a i n t i f f , t o be d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e i n s t a n t case. Section 32-2156 ( a ) ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s : "No v e h i c l e s h a l l a t any t i m e be d r i v e n t o t h e l e f t s i d e of t h e roadway under t h e following conditions: " (2) When approaching within one hundred (100) f e e t of o r t r a v e r s i n g any i n t e r s e c t i o n o r r a i l - road grade crossing * * *." I n Leach t h i s Court defined an i n t e r s e c t i o n : "An i n t e r s e c t i o n , within t h e meaning of sec- t i o n 32-2156, R.C.M. 1947, i s formed by t h e joining of two ways p u b l i c l y maintained which a r e open t o t h e public f o r vehicular t r a v e l . " However p l a i n t i f f ' s exclusive r e l i a n c e on s e c t i o n 32- 2156(a) ( 2 ) , and its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n Leach is misplaced, i n l i g h t of two a d d i t i o n a l f a c t s p r e s e n t i n t h i s case. The record r e v e a l s t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n i n question had no s i g n s marking it as such t o warn a g a i n s t passing. Additionally, within t h e i n t e r - s e c t i o n and f o r some d i s t a n c e on e i t h e r s i d e , U.S. Highway 1 0 displayed a broken yellow median l i n e , i n d i c a t i n g a passing zone. ~ h u s t h e d i r e c t i v e of s e c t i o n 32-2156(a)(2), and t h e markings on U.S. Highway 1 0 a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n a r e i n d i r e c t c o n f l i c t . The question becomes, which t a k e s precedence. This Court answered t h i s very question i n Faucette v. Christensen, 145 Mont. 28, 36, 37, 400 P.2d 883, where, i n a s i m i l a r f a c t s i t u a t i o n , a c a r attempting t o pass within an i n t e r s e c t i o n marked f o r passing, s t r u c k t h e l e f t turning c a r i n f r o n t of it. I n Faucette t h e Court noted t h a t s e c t i o n s 32-2133 and 32-2134, R.C.M. 1947, vested i n t h e Montana Department of Highways t h e a u t h o r i t y t o adopt a system of t r a f f i c c o n t r o l devices and t o d i s c r e t i o n a r i l y place them on s t a t e highways a s a means of r e g u l a t i n g , warning and guiding t r a f f i c thereon. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e Court recognized t h e obedience which such t r a f f i c c o n t r o l devices commanded by v i r t u e of s e c t i o n 32-2136, R.C.M. 1947. In Faucette w e harmonized t h e c o n f l i c t i n g s t a t - utory sections: " * * * w e hold t h a t t h e prohibited i n t e r s e c t i o n f o r passing under s e c t i o n 32-2156, is t h a t i n t e r - s e c t i o n marked by t h e highway commission as authorized and adopted a s h e r e t o f o r e described. Such reasoning g i v e s meaning t o a l l of t h e s t a t - u t e s heretofore c i t e d and t o r e g u l a t i o n s adopted thereunder. " I n t h e i n s t a n t s i t u a t i o n , a d r i v e r can follow t h e d i r e c t i o n s of markings and s i g n s , and i n doing so is not i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 32-2156." The Court affirmed t h i s p o s i t i o n i n Graveley v. Springer, 145 Mont. 486, 402 P.2d 4 1 . P l a i n t i f f c i t e s Rader and Gamrnel i n an apparent e f f o r t t o place t h e Faucette r u l e i n doubt. W e f i n d both of t h e s e c a s e s t o be d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from Faucette and thus from t h e i n s t a n t case. Rader involved t h i s Court's affirmance of a nonsuit granted by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t where t h e p l a i n t i f f c o l l i d e d with t h e defendant's c a r while attempting t o pass, and defendant w a s s i g n a l i n g and attempting t o execute a left-hand t u r n onto an i n t e r s e c t i n g county road. To d i s t i n g u i s h Rader, w e need merely note t h a t it was decided p r i o r t o Faucette. I n Gammel, decided subsequent t o Faucette, t h e defend- a n t was found t o be negligent i n attempting t o pass within an unmarked i n t e r s e c t i o n traversed by a broken yellow c e n t e r l i n e . However t h e b a s i s of l i a b i l i t y i n Gammel was not t h e f a c t t h a t t h e defendant attempted t o pass within t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n but t h a t he f a i l e d t o e x e r c i s e due care i n doing s o i n view of h i s high r a t e of speed, l a c k of a u d i b l e s i g n a l , and ignorance of f a c t s which would have l e d a reasonable man t o proceed w i t h c a u t i o n . Since Rader and Gamrnel a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e , t h e r u l e e s t a b l i s h e d i n F a u c e t t e and r e i t e r a t e d i n Graveley is c o n t r o l l i n g i n t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e i s s u e before us. Therefore o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n s No. 1 1 and No. 12 were p r o p e r l y refused by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . P l a i n t i f f n e x t contends t h e r e w a s no evidence of any negligence on p l a i n t i f f ' s p a r t which might have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e proximate cause of t h e a c c i d e n t and consequently, t h e in- s t r u c t i o n given t o t h e jury on c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence was n o t proper. S p e c i f i c a l l y , p l a i n t i f f claimed he d i d everything nec- e s s a r y t o make a l e g a l and s a f e t u r n a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n , in- c l u d i n g t u r n i n g on h i s l e f t t u r n s i g n a l . From examination o f t h e r e c o r d w e do n o t a g r e e with p l a i n t i f f ' s contention. The b a s i c d i s p u t e here, a s it concerns c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence, c e n t e r s around whether p l a i n t i f f ' s l e f t t u r n s i g n a l was i n f a c t on immediately p r i o r t o t h e a c c i d e n t . I f it was n o t , t h e i s s u e of c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence was properly r a i s e d . S e c t i o n 32-2167, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r e s a t u r n s i g n a l t o be given f o r a t l e a s t 100 f e e t immediately p r i o r t o t u r n i n g a t a n i n t e r - s e c t i o n . Under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h t h i s s t a t u t o r y s e c t i o n could properly be considered i n determin- ing t h e proximate cause of t h e a c c i d e n t . On t h e o t h e r hand, i f t h e t u r n s i g n a l was on, an i n s t r u c t i o n on c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence would n o t be proper s i n c e under t h a t f a c t s i t u a t i o n , defendant Jacobs would be charged w i t h seeing t h a t which he should have seen, had he looked. See: O'Brien v. Great Northern Railroad Company, 148 Mont. 429, 421 P.2d 710; Jimison v. United S t a t e s , 267 F.Supp. 674; Monforton v. Northern P a c i f i c Ry., 138 Mont. 191, 355 P.2d 501. Thus, i f p l a i n t i f f d i d i n f a c t s i g n a l f o r a l e f t t u r n , defendant's a c t of passing could properly be held t o be t h e proximate cause of t h e accident under t h e Faucette r u l e , a s i n t e r p r e t e d i n Gammel heretofore discussed. The record r e v e a l s t h a t p l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d he began s i g n a l i n g f o r a l e f t t u r n approximately 4 0 0 yards before t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n . Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t no t i m e d i d he see a t u r n s i g n a l on p l a i n t i f f ' s c a r p r i o r t o t h e accident. Patrolman Bernard Barton, t h e highway patrolman who i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e a c c i - dent, s t a t e d he saw t h e l e f t blinker on and t e s t i f i e d t h e wrecker d r i v e r eventually shut it o f f . O n t h e b a s i s of such testimony, t h e weight of t h e evidence would tend t o l e a n heavily i n plain- t i f f ' s favor. However, a c l o s e r examination of Patrolman Barton's testimony c a s t s some doubt. F i r s t on cross-examination, t h i s exchange occurred: "Q. With regard t o t h e scene of t h e accident, you t e s t i f i e d with regard t o t u r n s i g n a . 1 ~ on M r . Dzikowski car-- A. Yes. "Q. --I t h i n k t h a t you s a i d t h a t they were on a t some point? A. A t t h e time I seen them they w e r e on and t h i s was l i k e I s a i d a f t e r t h e victim had been removed and s t a r t e d i n t o t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . " (Emphasis supplied.) This testimony was repeated s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r : "Q. When you g o t o u t of t h e p a t r o l c a r you d i d then see t h e c a r ? A. Y e s , a f t e r I advanced a l i t t l e b i t and more o r less headed f o r t h e u n i t I seen it then. "Q. When you f i r s t observed t h e c a r and walking up t o it you d i d n ' t s e e any blinking l i g h t s on a t t h a t time? A. I d o n ' t r e c a l l seeing them, I may-- t h e f i r s t r e c o l l e c t i o n I have is l a t e r on." (Emphasis supplied. ) O n r e d i r e c t , t h e following questions and answers a r e noted: "Q. And, I b e l i e v e you t e s t i f i e d t h a t when you f i r s t observed t h e accident d i d you observe t h e c a r when you f i r s t a r r i v e d t h e r e ? A. N o I d i d not. "Q. And why was that? A. It was on account of the truck of the side from where I had stopped my car. "Q. And, how did you approach the automobile from where you stopped? A. From the rear in a direct line from the patrol car. "Q. From the rear of the automobile? A. Yes." (Emphasis supplied. ) - The fact that patrolman Barton walked right past the rear of plaintiff's car immediately after arriving at the accident scene and yet did not see any flashing of the rear left turn signal, coupled with the fact that a flashing turn signal was noticed after the somewhat prolonged efforts to extricate the plaintiff could lead a jury to believe the left turn signal was not in fact functioning until after the accident. Such a determination would not be unreasonable in view of the possibility the very act of removing plaintiff could have activated the turn signal. Our duty here is not to determine whether the turn signal was in fact on but rather, we may only determine whether sufficient evidence existed to warrant an instruction to the jury on contribu- tory negligence. We have held in the past that where inferences to be drawn from evidence as to whether the plaintiff exercised due care are open to different conclusions by reasonable men, the issue of contributory negligence is one for the jury. Dahlin v. Rice Truck Lines, 137 Mont. 430, 352 P.2d 801; Shields v. Murray, 156 Mont. 493, 481 P.2d 680; Allen v. Moore, Mont. , 538 P.2d 1352, 32 St.Rep. 478. The judgment of the Justice We concur: Hon. Gordon Bennett, ~istrict Judge, sitting in place of Mr. Justice James T. Harrison. - 8 - Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison dissenting: I dissent. Justice