Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. John Kenyatta Riley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2010AP002942-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2016-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
2016 WI 70 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP2942-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against  
John Kenyatta Riley, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
John Kenyatta Riley, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST RILEY 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 23, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
Abrahamson, J. and Bradley, A.W., J. (Part I of 
concurrence only) 
 
DISSENTED: 
Prosser, J.  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: Bradley, R.G., J.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Stacie H. Rosenzweig, Halling & Cayo, Milwaukee and Paul R. 
Erickson, Gutglass, Erickson, Bonville & Larson, SC, Milwaukee.  
Oral argument by Paul R. Erickson.    
 
For the Office of Lawyer Regulation, there was a brief 
filed by Matthew J. Price, Foley & Lardner, LLP, Milwaukee and 
oral argument by Matthew J. Price. 
 
 
2016 WI 70
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP2942-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John Kenyatta Riley, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John Kenyatta Riley, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J., 
ZIEGLER, 
J., 
AND 
GABLEMAN, 
J.   Attorney John Kenyatta Riley appeals from the report of the 
referee, Attorney Hannah C. Dugan, who concluded that Attorney 
Riley had violated three Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys and recommended that he be publicly reprimanded and 
that he be required to pay the full costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding.   
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
After our careful review of this matter and the legal 
issues it presents, a majority of the court has agreed that 
Attorney Riley committed professional misconduct, that he should 
be publicly reprimanded, and that he should be required to pay 
the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding, which were 
$16,961.70 as of November 6, 2012.  This is, therefore, the 
mandate of the court.  A majority of the court, however, does 
not agree as to a single rationale for reaching that result.  
Three justices, Chief Justice Roggensack, Justice Ziegler, and 
Justice Gableman, agree with the reasoning set forth in this 
lead opinion.  Justice Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley 
concur in the mandate, but do not join this opinion.1  Each of 
them sets forth her views in a concurring opinion.  Justice 
Prosser dissents.2 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Attorney Riley was admitted to the practice of law in 
Wisconsin in May 1996.  He has been the subject of professional 
discipline on one prior occasion.  In 2009 Attorney Riley 
consented to the imposition of a private reprimand for violating 
SCRs 20:1.3 (lack of diligence) and 20:1.4(b) (failure to 
                                                 
1 The mandate that follows this lead opinion is the mandate 
of the court as agreed upon by all of the participating justices 
except Justice Prosser. 
2 Justice N. Patrick Crooks participated in the oral 
argument of this matter, but he passed away while the matter was 
pending.  Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate in this 
matter. 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
3 
 
explain a legal matter to a client).  He currently practices in 
Milwaukee with the law firm of Eisenberg, Riley and Zimmerman, 
S.C. 
¶4 
This case involves the intersection of the careers of 
two attorneys, Attorney Riley and Attorney Brian K. Polk.  An 
understanding of Attorney Polk's employment history is necessary 
to an understanding of the charges of professional misconduct 
against Attorney Riley. 
A. Attorney Polk's Employment History and Reinstatement 
Proceeding 
¶5 
From July 1997 until June 2000, Attorney Polk worked 
as an associate attorney for the law firm of Eisenberg, Weigel, 
Carlson, Blau, Reitz & Clemens, S.C. (Eisenberg, Weigel)3 doing 
"intake" work for personal injury cases.  He ended his 
employment 
with 
that 
firm 
because 
he 
claims 
he 
became 
disillusioned with the lack of opportunities to do more 
substantive legal work.  After leaving the Eisenberg, Weigel 
firm, Attorney Polk was unemployed for a while and failed to 
comply with his continuing legal education (CLE) reporting 
requirement.  His license was administratively suspended for 
that reason in June 2001. 
¶6 
Over the next several years, Attorney Polk held a 
number of different non-legal jobs.  Although his license to 
practice law in Wisconsin remained administratively suspended, 
                                                 
3 One of the named partners of the Eisenberg, Weigel firm 
was Attorney Alvin H. Eisenberg. 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
4 
 
at some point in the fall of 2005 Attorney Polk began to work 
for a new law firm4 that Attorney Alvin Eisenberg had founded 
after the breakup of the Eisenberg, Weigel firm.5  Attorney Polk 
was made part of the personal injury "team" that was led by 
Attorney Eisenberg.  He solicited individuals to become personal 
injury clients of the firm, he met with and gave legal advice to 
clients about their claims, he did property damage settlements, 
and he corresponded with third parties using firm letterhead and 
identifying himself in the signature block as an "attorney at 
law."  During the time that Attorney Polk worked for the new 
Eisenberg firm, he spent approximately 50 hours per week or more 
in the firm's offices.  Attorney Polk was given his own office 
and telephone extension, and his extension was listed on the 
firm's telephone extension list.  Because the firm was reluctant 
to use Attorney Polk's real name over its intercom system, for a 
                                                 
4 The initial name of the new firm founded by Attorney 
Eisenberg is not clear from the record of this matter.  Thus, 
for purposes of this opinion, the firm will be referenced as 
"the new Eisenberg firm."  At some point after Attorney Riley 
joined the new Eisenberg firm, the name of the firm was changed 
to Eisenberg & Riley.  The record does not disclose exactly when 
this occurred, but it apparently occurred prior to September 6, 
2006, the date of the hearing that is at issue in this matter, 
because Attorney Riley identified himself at that hearing as 
"Attorney Kenyatta Riley [of] the Law Offices of Eisenberg and 
Riley."  
5 There were ongoing disputes, civil actions and attorney 
regulatory complaints between Attorney Eisenberg and Attorney 
Joseph Weigel in connection with the breakup of the Eisenberg, 
Weigel firm.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weigel, 
2012 WI 124, 345 Wis. 2d 7, 823 N.W.2d 798, cert. denied, 
___U.S.___, 135 S. Ct. 375 (2014). 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
5 
 
while the firm used the pseudonym "James Pearson" for Attorney 
Polk when paging him over the firm's intercom system.  Attorney 
Polk testified in this proceeding that he stopped working for 
the new Eisenberg firm in the first half of 2006.6 
¶7 
Attorney Riley was familiar with Attorney Polk because 
Attorney Riley also had been an associate attorney at the 
Eisenberg, Weigel firm during the same time period as Attorney 
Polk.  Attorney Riley moved to a different law firm and then 
opened his own solo practice.  It appears that Attorney Riley 
also began working as an associate attorney at the new Eisenberg 
firm in the middle part of 2005, shortly before Attorney Polk 
began his employment with that firm.  During the time when 
Attorney Polk was also employed by the new Eisenberg firm, 
Attorney Riley did not have any management responsibilities in 
that firm.  At a later date, he did begin to take on management 
responsibilities. 
¶8 
In February 2006, while Attorney Polk was still 
working as an attorney at the new Eisenberg firm, he filed a 
petition for the reinstatement of his license to practice law in 
this state.  After conducting an investigation, the Office of 
Lawyer 
Regulation 
(OLR) 
filed 
a 
response 
opposing 
the 
                                                 
6 Attorney Eisenberg received a consensual public reprimand 
in connection with hiring Attorney Polk to engage in law-related 
work and allowing him to hold himself out as an attorney while 
his license to practice law was administratively suspended.  
Public Reprimand of Alvin H. Eisenberg, No. 2012-8 (electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/002479.html). 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
6 
 
reinstatement petition due to a number of concerns about 
Attorney Polk's character and fitness to practice law, including 
his receipt of a citation for loitering-illegal drug activity, 
his multiple citations and convictions for operating after 
revocation of his driver's license and for other traffic 
offenses, and his failure to pay multiple civil judgments.  The 
OLR's response did not mention any concerns regarding Attorney 
Polk's employment history or his unauthorized practice of law 
during his administrative suspension, presumably because it was 
not aware of Attorney Polk's employment at the new Eisenberg 
firm. 
¶9 
Because there appeared to be a number of disputed 
factual issues regarding the concerns raised by the OLR, on June 
23, 2006, this court referred the matter to a referee, Reserve 
Judge Dennis Flynn, to receive evidence and make factual 
determinations 
regarding 
(1) 
the 
number 
and 
type 
of 
citations/convictions 
that 
Attorney 
Polk 
had 
received 
in 
connection with his operation of a motor vehicle, (2) the facts 
surrounding the incident for which Attorney Polk had received 
the citation for loitering-illegal drug activity and whether he 
had misrepresented those facts to the OLR in its investigation, 
and (3) the facts concerning the nature and status of the 
outstanding civil judgments against Attorney Polk.  The court's 
order further provided that the referee "may also consider any 
other matter that the referee deems helpful to this court's 
decision of the reinstatement petition." 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
7 
 
¶10 Attorney 
Riley 
did 
not 
have 
any 
role 
in 
the 
preparation or filing of Attorney Polk's reinstatement petition.  
Attorney 
Polk 
represented 
himself 
during 
most 
of 
the 
reinstatement proceeding.  Prior to the evidentiary hearing 
scheduled by Judge Flynn, however, Attorney Polk spoke with 
Attorney Eisenberg about concerns he had with the upcoming 
hearing.  Attorney Eisenberg then spoke with Attorney Riley and 
directed him to assist Attorney Polk with the reinstatement 
hearing.  The initial understanding among the three lawyers was 
that Attorney Riley would act as "second chair" for the hearing, 
meaning that Attorney Polk would still be primarily responsible 
for 
presenting 
evidence, 
examining 
witnesses, 
and 
making 
argument.   
¶11 According to Attorney Riley, prior to the hearing he 
did not draft any legal documents and did not solicit witnesses 
to testify on Attorney Polk's behalf or prepare any witnesses to 
testify.  The referee found, however, that prior to the hearing, 
Attorney Polk had specifically discussed with Attorney Riley 
that Attorney Polk was concerned about not having disclosed his 
employment with the new Eisenberg firm to the OLR in the 
reinstatement investigation. 
¶12 The evidentiary hearing before Judge Flynn took place 
on September 6, 2006.  Despite the initial understanding that 
Attorney Riley would act as only a "second chair," he took the 
lead role in presenting Attorney Polk's case at the hearing.  He 
handled the direct and cross-examination of all witnesses, made 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
8 
 
and responded to objections, argued legal issues, and presented 
closing argument in favor of Attorney Polk's reinstatement. 
¶13 Some understanding of the flow of the hearing is 
necessary to understand the charges against Attorney Riley and 
his arguments against those charges.  Although Attorney Polk, as 
the petitioner for reinstatement, bore the burden of proof, the 
parties and the referee agreed to hear first the testimony of a 
police officer who had been involved in issuing the citation for 
loitering-illegal drug activity to Attorney Polk so that the 
officer would not need to wait through other testimony and could 
return to his police duties.  The OLR's attorney conducted the 
direct examination of the officer, and Attorney Riley cross-
examined the officer on behalf of Attorney Polk. 
¶14 After the completion of the officer's testimony, the 
hearing returned to the standard procedure, and Attorney Riley 
proceeded to present evidence on Attorney Polk's behalf.  The 
first witness he called was Attorney Polk.  Presumably because 
the referee had just heard the testimony of the police officer 
regarding the events that led to the issuance of the citation 
for loitering-illegal drug activity, Attorney Riley began 
Attorney 
Polk's 
direct 
examination 
not 
with 
the 
normal 
background questions, but rather with a substantial number of 
substantive questions regarding those same events.  Attorney 
Riley's questions and Attorney Polk's responses on this subject 
occupied approximately ten pages of the hearing transcript. 
¶15 The next topic on which Attorney Riley questioned 
Attorney Polk was the various traffic citations he had received, 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
9 
 
including the multiple offenses for having driven with a 
suspended or revoked driver's license.  This also was a 
substantial discussion, occupying approximately 12 pages of 
transcript. 
¶16 Attorney Riley then turned the questioning to the 
topic of the civil judgments that had been entered against 
Attorney Polk.  After eliciting some information about the 
status of those judgments, Attorney Riley asked Attorney Polk a 
series of questions regarding his ability or inability to have 
satisfied those judgments over the preceding years.  Attorney 
Polk 
testified 
generally 
that 
during 
the 
period 
of 
the 
suspension of his law license, the jobs he had held were non-
professional jobs with limited rates of compensation.  Attorney 
Polk further testified that he had used the money he had earned 
to provide for his family rather than to satisfy the judgments 
that had been entered against him.  Attorney Riley asked two 
more questions that were clearly intended to allow Attorney Polk 
to repeat and emphasize that his lack of income had been the 
reason for not paying the judgments.  It was after these two 
questions that Attorney Riley asked Attorney Polk to summarize 
his employment history in the following exchange, which is the 
basis for the charges in this disciplinary proceeding: 
Q. 
And I know you touched on it earlier, but can you 
tell the Court what kind of jobs you've had since 
the loss of your [law] license.  What have you 
done? 
A. 
Worked 
as——worked 
for 
7-Up 
Bottling 
loading 
trucks, riding a forklift.  Worked at a video 
distribution 
center, 
doing 
everything 
from 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
10 
 
sweeping the floors to loading trucks.  At one 
point in time, for a period of time, I worked for 
Progressive Training Consultants.  During that 
period 
I 
did 
some 
consulting 
work 
on 
the 
Marquette Interchange.  But for the most part, 
I've had labor related, you know, jobs, warehouse 
type of work.   
¶17 Importantly, Attorney Polk's answer did not make any 
mention of his employment with the new Eisenberg firm.  Attorney 
Riley did not ask any follow-up questions to bring out that fact 
or to clarify that Attorney Polk's answer was not complete.  
Attorney Riley stayed with the same subject matter regarding the 
unpaid judgments, but he moved on to asking about specific 
judgments and whether they had been satisfied. 
¶18 On cross-examination, the OLR's counsel asked Attorney 
Polk a lengthy series of questions concerning whether during the 
suspension of his license to practice law (1) he had attempted 
to practice law, (2) he had held himself out as an attorney, (3) 
he had provided legal advice to anyone, (4) he had done any 
legal research, or (5) he had engaged in any "law work activity" 
or 
"any 
work 
normally 
performed 
by 
clerks 
or 
paralegal 
personnel."  Attorney Polk responded negatively to each of these 
questions.  He again did not mention his work for the new 
Eisenberg firm.   
¶19 Attorney Riley's redirect examination of Attorney Polk 
did not did not include any questions regarding Attorney Polk's 
employment history.  It focused solely on why Attorney Polk had 
not contested the loitering citation. 
¶20 Following the hearing, Judge Flynn issued a report and 
recommendation, as requested in this court's June 23, 2006 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
11 
 
order.  Because Attorney Polk did not disclose his employment 
with the new Eisenberg firm, Judge Flynn's report did not 
discuss the impact of Attorney Polk's work on legal matters 
while suspended on his suitability for reinstatement.  Judge 
Flynn, however, did comment in several parts of his report on 
Attorney Polk's employment history generally when discussing 
Attorney Polk's claim that he lacked funds to satisfy the 
judgments that had been entered against him.  Specifically, 
Judge Flynn stated that, given Attorney Polk's testimony at the 
hearing, the jobs he had held during his suspension "had been 
for low wages" and that Attorney Polk had used the money he had 
earned to support his family.  In addition, Judge Flynn accepted 
Attorney Polk's testimony that he had not been employed or 
sought employment for the last six months because he had been 
waiting for his license to practice law to be reinstated.  
Although 
the 
referee 
generally 
accepted 
Attorney 
Polk's 
testimony regarding his employment history and the low wages he 
had earned, the referee nonetheless rejected Attorney Polk's 
claim that he had been financially unable either to pay the 
debts in full or to work out a payment plan.  The referee's 
findings and comments regarding Attorney Polk's job history and 
ability to make payments demonstrate that these subjects were a 
relevant factor in the referee's ultimate legal conclusion that 
Attorney Polk did not have a proper understanding of and 
attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon Wisconsin 
attorneys. 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
12 
 
¶21 Ultimately, given the referee's findings, this court 
denied 
Attorney 
Polk's 
reinstatement 
petition. 
 
In 
re 
Reinstatement of Polk, 2007 WI 51, 300 Wis. 2d 280, 732 N.W.2d 
419.   
B. Procedural History of Current Disciplinary Proceeding Against 
Attorney Riley 
¶22 In the course of an investigation in 2008, the OLR 
learned that Attorney Polk had been employed by the new 
Eisenberg firm in 2005-06 while Attorney Riley had also worked 
there.  When the OLR asked Attorney Riley about that fact, he 
indicated that he had not known that.  Attorney Riley claims 
that he then investigated whether Attorney Polk had been 
employed by the new Eisenberg firm.  Although he asserts that 
this was the first time he learned of Attorney Polk's work at 
the law firm, he never advised the OLR, Judge Flynn, or this 
court at that time that Attorney Polk's testimony at the 
September 6, 2006 hearing had been false or misleading because 
of the omission of his employment at the new Eisenberg firm. 
¶23 The OLR subsequently filed a formal complaint against 
Attorney Riley regarding his actions in representing Attorney 
Polk at the September 6, 2006 evidentiary hearing.  Although the 
complaint was framed as a single count, it alleged that Attorney 
Riley's actions at the hearing and thereafter had violated three 
separate Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys.  First, it 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
13 
 
alleged that Attorney Riley had violated former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4)7 
by offering material evidence that he knew to be false and 
failing to take reasonable remedial measures.  Second, it 
accused Attorney Riley of violating SCR 20:3.4(b)8 by either 
falsifying evidence or counseling or assisting a witness to 
testify falsely.  Third, it alleged that Attorney Riley's 
questioning of Attorney Polk and his failure to disclose 
Attorney Polk's omission of his employment at the new Eisenberg 
firm from his response regarding his employment history had 
constituted conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).9   
¶24 As noted above, Attorney Hannah Dugan was appointed as 
referee.  After the OLR took depositions of Attorney Riley and 
Attorney Polk, Attorney Riley filed a motion for summary 
judgment.  He argued that he could not have violated the three 
identified rules because he had no knowledge of Attorney Polk's 
employment at the new Eisenberg firm until the OLR notified him 
                                                 
7 Former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4) (effective through June 30, 2007) 
provided that a lawyer shall not knowingly "offer evidence that 
the lawyer knows to be false.  If a lawyer has offered material 
evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take 
reasonable remedial measures." 
8 SCR 20:3.4(b) states that a lawyer shall not "falsify 
evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or 
offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by 
law; . . . ." 
9 SCR 20:8.4(c) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation; . . . ." 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
14 
 
of that fact in 2008 and because Attorney Polk's testimony about 
his employment was not material to the reinstatement proceeding 
before Judge Flynn. 
¶25 Referee Dugan denied Attorney Riley's summary judgment 
motion.  She concluded that there was a genuine dispute of 
material fact regarding whether Attorney Riley had known about 
Attorney Polk's employment at the new Eisenberg firm and had 
failed to remedy Attorney Polk's false testimony.  Given the 
presence of a dispute of material fact, the referee indicated at 
that stage in the proceeding she did not believe that whether 
there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Attorney 
Polk's employment in the Polk reinstatement proceeding was 
relevant to whether there was a genuine issue of material fact 
in the current disciplinary proceeding against Attorney Riley. 
¶26 After the summary judgment motion was denied, the 
parties proceeded to a full evidentiary hearing.  The primary 
focus of that hearing was whether Attorney Riley had known at 
the time of the September 6, 2006 hearing that Attorney Polk had 
been employed by and had performed law-related work for the new 
Eisenberg firm, which would have determined whether he knew of 
the falsity of Attorney Polk's testimony. 
¶27 Attorney Riley denied that he had been aware that 
Attorney Polk had been employed by the new Eisenberg firm in 
late 2005 and early 2006.  He acknowledged that he had seen 
Attorney Polk in the firm's offices in that timeframe, but 
claimed he had believed that Attorney Polk was merely a guest 
using the firm's resources either to work on his petition for 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
15 
 
reinstatement or to do his own consulting work.  Attorney Riley 
explained that the environment at the new Eisenberg firm at that 
time was "free-wheeling," with numerous people coming and going 
through the firm's offices.   
C. Referee's Report and Recommendation 
¶28 The referee did not accept Attorney Riley's denials.  
In her report the referee pointed out that multiple witnesses 
had testified that during the relevant months of 2005-2006, 
Attorney Polk had been at the offices of the new Eisenberg firm 
for many hours each week, that he had attended regular firm 
meetings of the personal injury team, that Attorney Riley had 
seen him at those meetings, that Attorney Polk had met with 
clients and had performed other normal law-office activities, 
and that the offices of Attorney Riley and Attorney Polk at the 
law firm were in close proximity.  While stating that in light 
of this evidence it would seem incredible for Attorney Riley not 
to have known of Attorney Polk's employment and practice of law 
with the new Eisenberg firm, the referee nonetheless believed 
that this evidence, by itself, was not sufficient to constitute 
the required clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence the 
OLR needed to meet its burden of proof that Attorney Riley knew 
Attorney Polk's response at the hearing was false by omission.10  
                                                 
10 In an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the OLR must 
prove any violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.  SCR 
22.16(5). 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
16 
 
¶29 The referee also found Attorney Riley's claims that he 
had agreed to act only as a second chair and that he had not 
prepared for the September 6, 2006 hearing were not as credible 
as Attorney Polk's testimony.  In particular, the referee 
credited Attorney Polk's statement that prior to the September 
6, 2006 hearing, he had specifically discussed with Attorney 
Riley his concern that he had not disclosed his employment with 
the new Eisenberg firm.11  The referee stated that Attorney Riley 
had never directly refuted this statement in his testimony at 
the hearing.  Consequently, the referee further found that 
Attorney Riley had known that Attorney Polk's failure to 
disclose his employment with the new Eisenberg firm in his 
answer to Attorney Riley's question at the September 6, 2006 
hearing had made Attorney Polk's testimony false by omission. 
¶30 The referee next addressed Attorney Riley's argument 
that Attorney Polk's testimony about his employment history was 
not material to the issues in Attorney Polk's reinstatement 
proceeding. 
¶31 The referee believed that this court's June 23, 2006 
order 
had 
created 
a 
"hybrid" 
standard 
for 
obtaining 
reinstatement 
after 
a 
more-than-three-year 
administrative 
suspension.  She was unsure whether Attorney Polk's employment 
                                                 
11 The referee included the following statement in her 
report: 
 
"Brian 
Polk's 
statements 
that 
prior 
to 
the 
[reinstatement] hearing that he raised with Attorney Riley 
concerns about not disclosing that he was working at the [new 
Eisenberg] firm are forthright, clear and convincing."   
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
17 
 
history would have been material under only this court's 
reinstatement rules for administrative suspensions and this 
"hybrid" standard.   
¶32 She therefore turned to whether the information about 
Attorney Polk's employment at the new Eisenberg firm had been 
material to the issues identified in this court's June 23, 2006 
order.  The referee did not expressly conclude whether Attorney 
Polk's employment history was material to the three specific 
subjects set forth in that order (i.e., loitering citation, 
traffic violations, and unpaid civil judgments).  She concluded, 
however, that his law firm employment had been material to Judge 
Flynn's analysis of the "catch-all" provision in the order ("any 
other matter that the referee deems helpful to this court's 
decision 
of 
the 
reinstatement 
petition"). 
 
Specifically, 
although the June 23, 2006 order did not expressly direct Judge 
Flynn to make findings regarding Attorney Polk's employment 
history during his suspension, Referee Dugan believed that 
information about Attorney Polk's having engaged in law-related 
work for a law firm would have been material to the referee's 
determination of Attorney Polk's fitness to return to the 
practice of law.   
¶33 The referee also discussed that there was no dispute 
that in 2008, after having been advised by the OLR that it had 
learned of Attorney Polk's employment at the new Eisenberg firm, 
Attorney 
Riley 
testified 
that 
he 
had 
conducted 
his 
own 
investigation and clearly knew at that point that Attorney 
Polk's testimony had been false by omission.  The referee noted 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
18 
 
that, despite being aware of this false testimony, Attorney 
Riley did not attempt to remedy the prior false evidence by 
advising Judge Flynn, the OLR, or this court. 
¶34 Having found that Attorney Polk had given false 
testimony in response to Attorney Riley's question and that 
Attorney Riley was aware of the falsity, and having determined 
that Attorney Polk's testimony was material to Judge Flynn's 
task in Attorney Polk's reinstatement proceeding, Referee Dugan 
concluded that the OLR had met its burden of proof by clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence on each of the three rule 
violations alleged in this case.  First, the referee determined 
that Attorney Riley had offered false material evidence at the 
reinstatement hearing and, after having learned of the falsity, 
had failed to take reasonable remedial measures, in violation of 
former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4).  Second, the referee concluded that 
Attorney Riley had violated SCR 20:3.4(b) by having assisted a 
witness to testify falsely.  Third, the referee determined that 
Attorney 
Riley's 
involvement 
with 
Attorney 
Polk's 
false 
testimony 
constituted 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).12 
                                                 
12 The referee noted that this court has held that omissions 
that cause a statement to be false can constitute unethical 
conduct in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  See, e.g., In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Knickmeier, 2004 WI 115, 275 
Wis. 2d 69, 683 N.W.2d 445, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1041 (2005); 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Urban, 2002 WI 63, 253 
Wis. 2d 194, 645 N.W.2d 612. 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
19 
 
¶35 Having found violations of all three rules as charged 
in the OLR's complaint, the referee recommended that the court 
publicly reprimand Attorney Riley, as requested by the OLR.   
¶36 The referee relied on several cases cited by the OLR 
as support for a public reprimand.  She asserted that some of 
those cases involved omissions by counsel that constituted false 
evidence in violation of SCR 20:3.3.  See, e.g., In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against McNeely, 2008 WI 91, 313 
Wis. 2d 283, 752 N.W.2d 857 (60-day suspension imposed for three 
ethical violations, including violations of SCRs 20:3.3(a)(1) 
and 20:8.4(c)); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lister, 
2007 
WI 
55, 
300 
Wis. 2d 326, 
731 
N.W.2d 254 
(five-month 
suspension imposed for 17 proven counts of misconduct).13  The 
referee also pointed to several cases in which attorneys had 
been disciplined for having made false statements to tribunals, 
in 
violation 
of 
SCRs 
20:3.3 
and/or 
20:8.4(c). 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Alia, 
2006 
WI 
12, 
288 
Wis. 2d 299, 709 N.W.2d 399 (90-day suspension where attorney 
altered exhibit and used it to elicit false testimony at trial); 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kalal, 2002 WI 45, 252 
                                                 
13 Although this court spoke of the fact in the Lister 
opinion that Attorney Lister had not indicated to the circuit 
court that he was unsure of a fact stated in an argument, that 
was not really an omission case because Attorney Lister made an 
affirmative representation to the circuit court that was simply 
contrary to fact.  His statement was not false or misleading 
because of an omission of another fact.  300 Wis. 2d 326, ¶¶9, 
64. 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
20 
 
Wis. 2d 261, 643 N.W.2d 466 (attorney publicly reprimanded for 
making false statement during appellate oral argument); Public 
Reprimand of Holly L. Bunch, No. 2009-12 (consensual public 
reprimand imposed on prosecutor for misrepresenting to a jury 
that the defendant had never previously denied committing the 
crime when prosecutor knew of police reports that referenced 
such 
denials)(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/002196.html). 
¶37 In addition, the referee noted two aggravating factors 
identified by the OLR:  (1) Attorney Riley's refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, and (2) his 
prior private reprimand for a lack of diligence and a failure to 
explain the legal options to clients.  Although the OLR had 
asserted that there were no mitigating factors, the referee 
concluded that Attorney Riley's full cooperation with the OLR in 
the present disciplinary process should be acknowledged. 
II. ANALYSIS OF ATTORNEY RILEY'S APPEAL 
A. Appeal of Summary Judgment Denial 
¶38  Attorney Riley appealed from both the referee's order 
denying his motion for summary judgment and the referee's final 
report and recommendation.  He challenges a number of the 
referee's findings of fact and raises a host of arguments as to 
why he should not be found to have violated any of the three 
ethical rules cited in the OLR's complaint. 
¶39 Several of the legal issues identified by Attorney 
Riley in connection with the summary judgment decision also 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
21 
 
apply to the referee's final report.  We will address them in 
this portion of our opinion. 
¶40 The first subject we address is the standard by which 
we review the referee's denial of Attorney Riley's motion for 
summary judgment.  The parties agree that the court should use 
the same methodology and standard for reviewing grants or 
denials of summary judgment as are used in civil actions.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08 (setting forth standard for granting a 
summary 
judgment 
motion); 
see, 
e.g., 
Beidel 
v. 
Sideline 
Software, Inc., 2013 WI 56, ¶33, 348 Wis. 2d 360, 842 N.W.2d 240 
(appellate court reviewing civil cases applies same standard and 
methodology used by circuit court); Green Spring Farms v. 
Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987). 
¶41 The court has referenced motions for summary judgment 
and referee decisions on such motions in prior disciplinary 
cases and has implied that such decisions should be reviewed 
using the same standard applied by circuit courts and appellate 
courts in "normal" civil actions.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Humphrey, 
2012 
WI 
32, 
¶¶60-62, 
339 
Wis. 2d 531, 811 N.W.2d 363 (dismissing charge for which the 
referee granted the OLR summary judgment because the admitted 
allegations of the complaint were an insufficient basis to find 
a violation).  We therefore will utilize that methodology and 
standard of review in reviewing the referee's summary judgment 
decision in this case. 
¶42 Attorney Riley makes a number of arguments that 
challenge the legal sufficiency of the OLR's claims and the 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
22 
 
referee's legal analysis of those claims.  Two of his arguments 
are related and concern the materiality of Attorney Polk's 
testimony 
about 
his 
employment 
during 
his 
administrative 
suspension.  Attorney Riley asserts that, regardless of whether 
Attorney Polk's answer about his employment was false and 
whether Attorney Riley knew of the falsity of that answer, there 
can be no violation of the three ethical rules cited by the OLR 
because Attorney Polk's statement was not material to the issues 
before Judge Flynn in the reinstatement proceeding, and only 
material falsehoods give rise to ethical violations.   
¶43 Attorney 
Riley 
contends 
that 
because 
the 
rules 
regarding 
reinstatement 
petitions 
following 
administrative 
suspensions of more than three years do not require a 
description of the petitioning attorney's business activities 
during the suspension, such information was not required in 
Attorney Polk's reinstatement proceeding and the information he 
did provide about his employment was therefore not material or 
relevant to that proceeding.   
¶44 Attorney Riley acknowledges, however, that this court 
in its June 23, 2006 order identified three subjects on which 
the referee was to receive evidence and about which he was to 
make factual findings: (1) the number and type of citations or 
convictions 
for 
motor 
vehicle 
offenses, 
(2) 
the 
facts 
surrounding the incident for which Attorney Polk received a 
citation for loitering-illegal drug activity, and (3) the facts 
concerning the nature and status of any outstanding civil 
judgments against Attorney Polk.  Attorney Riley contends these 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
23 
 
were the only matters at issue during the reinstatement hearing 
and that Attorney Polk's testimony regarding what jobs he had 
held during his administrative suspension was not material to 
any of these three subjects.  He repeatedly describes Attorney 
Polk's employment testimony and the question he asked that 
elicited this testimony as merely "boilerplate" or "background," 
implying that it was mere context or pleasantry that had no 
effect on the substantive issues that Judge Flynn was to 
consider.  According to Attorney Riley, since Attorney Polk's 
testimony about his employment was not material to the three 
subjects identified in our referral order, he had no duty under 
former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4) to remediate and cannot be found to have 
violated that rule. 
¶45 To the extent the OLR argued before the referee that 
Attorney Polk's testimony was material because it fell under the 
"catch-all" language in the court's June 23, 2006 order,14 
Attorney Riley contends that relying on such a catch-all 
provision would have made everything Attorney Polk uttered 
material.  He asserts that this would make him and all other 
Wisconsin attorneys liable for any false or misleading statement 
made by their clients at any stage in a lawsuit.  He argues that 
a litigator would need to analyze every statement made by the 
litigator's client or witness in order to determine whether 
                                                 
14 On appeal the OLR disclaimed any intention to use the 
catch-all provision in the court's June 23, 2006 order as the 
basis for the materiality of Attorney Polk's omission. 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
24 
 
there was a potential discrepancy that needed to be remediated.  
Moreover, 
since 
the 
duty 
to 
remediate 
under 
former 
SCR 20:3.3(a)(4) did not terminate at the end of the case or 
representation, the lawyer would continue to have an obligation 
to explore facts and issues and potentially to notify the court 
long after the lawyer no longer represented the client.  
Moreover, he asserts that this ongoing duty would apply even 
when the client lost in the litigation and correcting the false 
or misleading statement could therefore have no potential impact 
on the case.  He contends that this is an impossible standard 
for any litigator in this state to satisfy, and that nearly 
every litigator in practice in this state would have violated 
that standard at some point in his/her practice. 
¶46 In a related vein, Attorney Riley criticizes Referee 
Dugan for stating that Judge Flynn and this court had created a 
"hybrid" reinstatement standard in the Polk reinstatement 
proceeding so that she could find Attorney Polk's testimony to 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
25 
 
be material to that proceeding.15  According to Attorney Riley, 
if this court did, in fact, create a "hybrid" standard in its 
subsequent decision denying Attorney Polk's petition, as Referee 
Dugan believes, he cannot be sanctioned for being ignorant of a 
materiality standard that had not been established at the time 
of the September 2006 hearing before Judge Flynn.   
¶47 We conclude that the omitted information regarding 
Attorney Polk's employment with the new Eisenberg firm was 
material to the task this court gave to Judge Flynn and to this 
court's consideration of Attorney Polk's reinstatement petition.  
                                                 
15 Referee Dugan believed that there was a gap in this 
court's 
rules 
regarding 
what 
standard 
to 
apply 
to 
a 
reinstatement petition following an administrative suspension of 
more than three years.  She indicated that it was not initially 
clear in the Polk reinstatement matter whether to apply the 
standards that govern reinstatement petitions following a 
disciplinary suspension of more than six months, see SCRs 22.29-
22.33, or the standards that govern reinstatement petitions 
following an administrative suspension of less than three years, 
see, e.g., SCR 31.11(1).  In a formal reinstatement proceeding 
following a disciplinary suspension of more than six months, the 
lawyer's employment during his/her suspension is explicitly a 
matter 
of 
concern. 
 
See 
SCR 
22.29(4)(k) 
(petition 
for 
reinstatement shall contain "[a] full description of all the 
petitioner's business activities during the period of suspension 
or revocation").  A description of the petitioner's business 
activities, however, is not explicitly mentioned in the rules 
that relate to reinstatement from an administrative suspension, 
whether the suspension is less than or more than three years in 
duration.  She believes that since this court ultimately 
indicated that an attorney seeking reinstatement from an 
administrative 
suspension 
of 
more 
than 
three 
years 
must 
demonstrate good moral character and fitness to practice law, 
this court created a "hybrid" standard, which made evidence 
regarding his employment activities during the period of 
suspension material to his fitness to resume the practice of 
law. 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
26 
 
We do not, however, base this determination on a belief that 
every subject was material under the catch-all provision in our 
June 23, 2006 order.  We agree with Attorney Riley that the 
rules of professional conduct do not make an attorney a 
guarantor of the accuracy of each statement in a client's 
testimony, nor do we believe that the rules require an attorney 
to interrupt depositions or court hearings repeatedly if the 
attorney thinks there might be some trivial discrepancy between 
what a witness said under oath and what the attorney understood 
to be the truth.  We also do not find this omitted information 
to be material only because Attorney Polk subsequently admitted 
years later that he had practiced law at the new Eisenberg firm.  
In other words, it is not necessary that Attorney Riley knew 
that Attorney Polk was practicing law (as opposed to simply 
working) at the new Eisenberg firm, in order for Attorney Riley 
to have violated former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4). 
¶48 Our determination that the omitted information was 
material rests on the language of the order we issued to Judge 
Flynn.  One of the topics on which Judge Flynn was to receive 
testimony and for which he was to make recommendations to this 
court was Attorney Polk's nonpayment of a number of civil 
judgments.  Judge Flynn was to determine the status of those 
judgments.  This obviously included why a number of those 
judgments had not been satisfied and were still outstanding.  
¶49 Attorney Polk's defense on this issue was that the 
judgments had not been paid due to his lack of financial 
resources.  Whether he had been employed and what types of jobs 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
27 
 
he had held during the period of his administrative suspension 
(whether 
minimum-wage, 
menial 
positions 
or 
higher-wage, 
professional positions) were therefore matters of central 
importance to the task given to Judge Flynn.  If Attorney Polk 
had been able to obtain only minimum wage or part-time jobs, 
that fact would have bolstered his argument that he had been 
financially unable to pay his legal debts.  On the other hand, 
if he had held a position with a law firm, even a non-attorney 
position, that would have implied that he was earning a somewhat 
higher wage and could have made at least some payments of some 
amount toward his past debts.  A deliberate choice not to pay 
one's legal obligations reflects far differently on one's 
respect for the law and the legal system than a financial 
inability to pay one's debts. 
¶50 Attorney Riley's own questioning of Attorney Polk at 
the September 2006 hearing and his closing argument at the end 
of that hearing demonstrate the materiality of Attorney Polk's 
employment to one of the subjects that Judge Flynn was to 
consider.   
¶51 First, to the extent that Attorney Riley characterizes 
Attorney Polk's testimony regarding the jobs he held as merely 
"background" 
information 
in 
response 
to 
a 
"boilerplate" 
question, the transcript of the reinstatement hearing undercuts 
this characterization.  As described above, Attorney Riley did 
not begin his direct examination of Attorney Polk by asking a 
series of general background questions regarding Attorney Polk's 
address, education, employment history, etc.  Rather, he 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
28 
 
immediately proceeded to a series of substantive questions 
regarding the circumstances surrounding Attorney Polk's receipt 
of the citation for loitering-illegal drug activity and his 
multiple violations of the traffic laws.  Only after exhausting 
his questioning on those two substantive topics, which take up 
approximately 22 pages of transcript, did Attorney Riley ask a 
series of questions that were clearly designed to allow Attorney 
Polk to testify that he could not have paid the several civil 
judgments that remained outstanding because the types of non-
legal jobs he had taken during his suspension had provided 
insufficient income to cover his family's living expenses.  The 
question from Attorney Riley that elicited Attorney Polk's false 
response was a part of that series of questions regarding the 
reasons why the judgments had remained unsatisfied.  Moreover, 
it was not even the first question in that series.  The question 
therefore was clearly not a boilerplate question that lawyers 
often ask merely to make a witness comfortable and to provide 
some general background at the start of a witness's testimony.  
It 
was 
a 
substantive 
part 
of 
an 
intentionally 
crafted 
presentation to explain Attorney Polk's nonpayment of the 
multiple civil judgments against him. 
¶52 Further, asking this question was not the only time 
that Attorney Riley brought Attorney Polk's employment history 
to the referee's attention.  Indeed, in his closing argument at 
the hearing, Attorney Riley argued that Attorney Polk had always 
intended to pay off all of the outstanding judgments, but that 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
29 
 
he had been unable to do so because of the type of jobs he had 
been able to find.16   
¶53 Because we determine that the omission of any mention 
of having worked for the new Eisenberg firm in Attorney Polk's 
testimony regarding his employment was material to his ability 
to pay the civil judgments that were outstanding against him, we 
need not address whether there is a difference under the rules 
of professional conduct regarding the scope of permissible work 
for an attorney subject to a disciplinary suspension versus an 
attorney subject only to an administrative suspension.  We also 
do not need to address the referee's contention that the court 
created a "hybrid" standard for obtaining reinstatement after 
lengthy administrative suspensions or Attorney Riley's criticism 
of the idea of a hybrid standard.  Contrary to Attorney Riley's 
claim, Attorney Polk's false testimony did not become material 
only because of this court's subsequent decision denying 
Attorney Polk's reinstatement petition; it was material from the 
beginning. 
                                                 
16 Attorney Riley's closing argument included the following 
explicit reference to Attorney Polk's inability to pay the 
judgments because of the low-paying jobs he had taken during his 
suspension: 
It 
has 
been 
his 
intent, 
even 
from 
the 
Ford 
satisfaction, to get these judgments paid off.  He has 
the mindset that he wants to work out payment 
arrangements with them.  But so far, it's just been 
difficult for him because of his employment type 
situation. 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
30 
 
¶54 Moreover, the fact that this court ultimately denied 
Attorney Polk's petition does not erase the materiality of the 
testimony.  A false statement made to influence a tribunal does 
not become less false or less harmful to the adjudicative 
process because the tribunal ultimately decides against the 
person giving the false testimony on other grounds.  See Douglas 
R. 
Richmond, 
Brian 
S. 
Faughnan, 
and 
Michael 
L. 
Matula, 
Professional Responsibility in Litigation 523 (2011) ("A lawyer 
may be found to have violated either rule [current ABA Model 
Rule 3.3 or 3.4(b)] even where the false testimony did not 
affect the outcome of the proceedings.").  It is not acceptable 
to lie to a court or to a referee if your lie does not cause you 
to win. 
¶55 Attorney Riley makes another legal argument about the 
scope of former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4), although he frames it as a 
factual argument.  Specifically, he asserts that he did not 
"offer" false evidence to the referee because he simply asked 
what he calls "an open-ended question about [Attorney Polk's] 
employment," 
to 
which 
Attorney 
Polk 
gave 
a 
"narrative" 
description of his jobs.  Attorney Riley implies that there can 
be a violation of former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4) only if an attorney 
actively elicits false testimony, for example, by asking a 
witness leading questions designed to lead the witness to 
present the false statement.  He offers no legal authority for 
this position, other than that the rule speaks in terms of 
"offering" false evidence. 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
31 
 
¶56 We acknowledge that the term "offer" in former 
SCR 20:3.3(a)(4) has not been interpreted in prior Wisconsin 
disciplinary decisions.  Indeed, it does not appear that the 
term 
"offer" 
in 
the 
1983 
version 
of 
the 
American 
Bar 
Association's (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, 
on which former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4) was based, has been the 
explicit 
focus 
of 
a 
disciplinary 
decision 
in 
other 
jurisdictions. 
¶57 It is equally true, however, that the comments to the 
rule and court decisions from other states have provided notice 
that a lawyer has a duty to remediate false testimony given by a 
client, regardless of the manner in which the false testimony 
was given.  The ABA comment to 1983 Model Rule 3.3 states that a 
lawyer must take remedial measures "[w]hen false evidence is 
offered by the client."  ABA Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 33 
cmt. (1983). 
¶58 We conclude that under the facts of this case, 
Attorney Riley "offered" false material testimony for which he 
had a duty to take reasonable remedial measures under former 
SCR 20:3.3(a)(4) when his client omitted an important fact from 
his answers on a subject that was clearly material to the 
hearing conducted by Judge Flynn. 
¶59 We note that the current version of the Wisconsin 
rule, which has been renumbered as SCR 20:3.3(a)(3), makes clear 
that a lawyer has a duty to take remedial measures whenever (1) 
false testimony or evidence is presented (i.e., "offered") by 
the lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
32 
 
lawyer, (2) the false testimony is material to the proceeding in 
which it is presented, and (3) the lawyer knows of the falsity.17  
The duty to take remedial measures does not arise only when the 
lawyer has affirmatively elicited the false testimony through 
pointed questions. 
¶60 Attorney Riley also argues that he should have been 
granted summary judgment because there was insufficient evidence 
to create a genuine issue regarding his knowledge of Attorney 
Polk's employment at the new Eisenberg firm and thus, of the 
falsity of Attorney Polk's answers at the reinstatement hearing.   
¶61 The first question that must be answered here is what 
level or type of knowledge is required.  Was the OLR obligated 
to provide evidence that Attorney Riley should have known of the 
omission in Attorney Polk's answer or was it required to provide 
evidence and reasonable inferences that Attorney Riley actually 
knew of Attorney Polk's employment at the new Eisenberg firm and 
                                                 
17 The current version of SCR 20:3.3(a)(3) provides as 
follows: 
A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
. . .  
 
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be 
false.  If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness 
called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence 
and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the 
lawyer 
shall 
take 
reasonable 
remedial 
measures, 
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.  
A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the 
testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is false. 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
33 
 
of the omission of that information from Attorney Polk's answer?  
Attorney Riley argues that the OLR was required to show his 
"actual knowledge" of the falsity of Attorney Polk's response.  
The OLR agrees that "actual knowledge" is the appropriate 
standard under former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4), although it notes that 
such actual knowledge can be inferred from the surrounding 
circumstances.  We concur that the applicable standard under 
former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4) is actual knowledge by the attorney.  
The ABA's preamble to the 1983 Model Rules, upon which former 
SCR 20:3.3(a)(4) was based, states that the various forms of the 
word "know" usually denote actual knowledge of the fact in 
question.18  ABA Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct, pmbl. (1983).  
There is no reason to use a different standard of knowledge in 
this context.  The OLR is also correct, however, that knowledge 
can be inferred from the circumstances.  Moreover, since we are 
addressing this in the context of a summary judgment motion, the 
OLR correctly points out that the evidence presented and the 
inferences to be drawn from that evidence were to be viewed most 
favorably to the OLR as the non-moving party.  See, e.g., 
Affeldt v. Green Lake Cnty., 2011 WI 56, ¶59, 335 Wis. 2d 104, 
803 N.W.2d 56. 
¶62 We turn now to Attorney Riley's claim that the 
evidence 
presented 
at 
the 
summary 
judgment 
stage 
was 
                                                 
18 In the current version of the Wisconsin Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, this definition is now 
codified in a specific rule, SCR 20:1.0(g). 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
34 
 
insufficient under former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4) to show his actual 
knowledge of Attorney Polk's employment at the new Eisenberg 
firm.  Attorney Riley asserts that the OLR presented only 
Attorney Polk's speculation as to what Attorney Riley actually 
knew and that any opinions offered by Attorney Polk on this 
issue were inadmissible as lay opinions.   
¶63 We conclude that there was a genuine issue of material 
fact on the issue of Attorney Riley's knowledge, and his summary 
judgment motion was therefore properly denied.  Attorney Polk 
gave the opinion in his deposition testimony that Attorney Riley 
knew that he was employed by the new Eisenberg firm.  Attorney 
Polk was competent to give such a lay opinion because he 
explained that it was based on his personal perceptions of the 
daily activities at the firm.  He said that during the relevant 
time period, he was at the firm 50-60 hours per week, working in 
an office assigned to him, walking around with client intake 
packets, making telephone calls, and going back and forth to and 
from the copier.  Moreover, he specifically testified that 
Attorney Riley "absolutely" saw him doing all of these things.  
Attorney Polk's personal observations of Attorney Riley seeing 
him do all of these tasks that correspond with working in a law 
firm provided Attorney Polk with a proper basis for opining that 
Attorney Riley knew he was working for the firm in at least some 
capacity.  Indeed, Attorney Polk's daily experiences in the firm 
during the period of his employment led to him to state that it 
was common knowledge among all individuals connected with the 
firm at that time that Attorney Polk was employed by the firm 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
35 
 
and indeed was representing himself as an attorney to people 
outside the firm.  
¶64 In addition, although Attorney Riley attempts to 
attack Attorney Polk's credibility, Attorney Polk did explicitly 
testify at his deposition that he had at least one discussion 
with Attorney Riley prior to the reinstatement hearing regarding 
his concern about having held himself out as an attorney while 
he had been employed by the new Eisenberg firm.  Contrary to 
Attorney Riley's arguments, the referee was not free to ignore 
or discount this statement when determining whether there was a 
genuine dispute of material fact in the summary judgment 
context. 
¶65 These statements by Attorney Polk and the reasonable 
inferences that could be drawn from them were sufficient to 
establish clearly and convincingly that Attorney Riley knew 
before the September 6, 2006 reinstatement hearing that Attorney 
Polk had been employed by the new Eisenberg firm during the 
period of his administrative suspension. 
¶66 Attorney Riley also argues that he should have been 
granted summary judgment with respect to the OLR's claim that he 
had violated SCR 20:3.4(b), which provides that a lawyer "shall 
not falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify 
falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited 
by law."  SCR 20:3.4(b).  In this case, there is no evidence 
that Attorney Riley personally falsified any evidence or offered 
a prohibited inducement to Attorney Polk for his testimony at 
the reinstatement hearing.  The question in this instance is 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
36 
 
whether Attorney Riley's conduct at the reinstatement hearing 
constitutes counseling or assisting a witness to testify 
falsely. 
¶67 Attorney Riley asserts that the Wisconsin disciplinary 
decisions that have found a violation of SCR 20:3.4(b) have 
involved situations where the lawyer either actively instructed 
or coached a witness to lie or personally falsified evidence.  
See, e.g., Alia, 288 Wis. 2d 299 (altering expert report without 
expert's permission); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Arthur, 2005 WI 40, 279 Wis. 2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910 (instructing 
client to lie); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Salmen, 
187 Wis. 2d 318, 522 N.W.2d 779 (1994) (attorney testifying that 
letter he back-dated was genuine).  Attorney Riley contends that 
the court's previous application of the rule to these situations 
means that the rule is limited to such instances.  Because there 
is no evidence that he instructed Attorney Polk to omit any 
mention of his employment at the reinstatement hearing, Attorney 
Riley argues that this charge should have been dismissed. 
¶68 We acknowledge that this court has not previously 
decided whether SCR 20:3.4(b) applies to situations where a 
lawyer's client testifies falsely, but there is no evidence of 
prior coaching by the lawyer or other assistance by the lawyer 
to permit the false testimony.   
¶69 We agree with Attorney Riley that the language of the 
rule ("counsel or assist a witness") indicates that some action 
by the lawyer prior to or at the time of the witness's false 
testimony is required.  In our view, failing to take action in 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
37 
 
the face of another's decision to give false testimony is 
different 
from 
"assisting" 
another 
person 
to 
give 
false 
testimony.  If SCR 20:3.4(b) is interpreted broadly to cover all 
situations where a witness has testified falsely and the lawyer 
fails to take remedial measures, then it would appear to cover 
the same ground as former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4), and there would be 
no need to have two separate rules. 
¶70 We 
believe 
that 
SCR 
20:3.4(b) 
should 
not 
be 
interpreted to reach the conduct that is shown on this record.  
There was no evidence in the summary judgment materials (or even 
in the evidence presented at the subsequent disciplinary 
hearing) that Attorney Riley advised Attorney Polk not to 
mention his work at the new Eisenberg firm, planned a way in 
which Attorney Polk could omit that information in his testimony 
at the reinstatement hearing, or even knew that Attorney Polk 
intended to provide a list of his employers during his 
suspension that would omit the new Eisenberg firm.  Attorney 
Polk stated that although he did at some point prior to his 
reinstatement hearing discuss with Attorney Riley his concern 
about having represented himself as an attorney employed by the 
new Eisenberg firm, there is no indication in the summary 
judgment record here that the two of them took the step of 
discussing how Attorney Polk should address that concern in his 
reinstatement 
hearing 
testimony. 
 
Indeed, 
Attorney 
Polk 
testified that he and Attorney Riley never had a preparation 
session to discuss his upcoming testimony at the reinstatement 
hearing.  The most the record in this disciplinary proceeding 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
38 
 
discloses is that Attorney Polk gave false testimony at the 
reinstatement hearing and that Attorney Riley knew of the 
omission.  While Attorney Riley's knowledge of the falsity of 
Attorney Polk's answer at the time the answer was given was 
sufficient to require him to take reasonable steps to remediate 
the false testimony and to support a violation of former 
SCR 20:3.3(a)(4) for not doing so, we do not believe that 
Attorney Riley's knowledge, by itself, constitutes counseling or 
assisting Attorney Polk's false testimony in violation of 
SCR 20:3.4(b).  Consequently, we conclude that the OLR's charge 
of a violation of SCR 20:3.4(b) must be dismissed. 
¶71 Attorney Riley's final argument regarding summary 
judgment is comprised of merely four sentences claiming that 
there was simply no evidence of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation, 
such 
that 
he 
could 
not 
have 
violated 
SCR 20:8.4(c).  As an initial matter, this claim is not 
sufficiently developed and could be rejected on just that basis 
alone.  
¶72 Even reaching the merits, we conclude that there was 
sufficient evidence of a violation of this rule to warrant an 
evidentiary hearing.  The language of SCR 20:8.4(c) is broad, 
covering 
"conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation."  SCR 20:8.4(c) (emphasis added).  In 
addition, it should be noted that, like former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4), 
this rule covers not only affirmative misrepresentations, but 
also deceitful omissions.  See Knickmeier, 275 Wis. 2d 69, ¶93.  
While in this case the primary deceitful words came out of the 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
39 
 
mouth of Attorney Polk and not the mouth of Attorney Riley, as 
discussed above in connection with the evidence to support a 
prima facie case of a violation of former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4), 
there was evidence at the summary judgment stage that Attorney 
Riley knew of the deceitful omissions but did nothing to remedy 
the falsehood.  To the contrary, the transcript shows that he 
pushed on with the reinstatement hearing and even argued in 
closing argument to Judge Flynn that Attorney Polk had always 
intended to pay off the outstanding judgments, but had been 
unable to do so because of the types of jobs he had been able to 
find during his administrative suspension, thereby taking 
advantage of the omission in Attorney Polk's testimony.  In our 
view, that evidence is sufficient to qualify as engaging in 
conduct involving deceit or misrepresentation. 
B. Appeal of Referee's Final Report and Recommendation 
¶73 Attorney Riley also raises several challenges to the 
referee's final report.  When the court reviews a referee's 
final report, it affirms a referee's findings of fact unless 
they are found to be clearly erroneous, but it reviews the 
referee's conclusions of law on a de novo basis.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 
Wis. 2d 71, 
740 N.W.2d 125. 
 
Although 
a 
referee 
makes 
a 
recommendation regarding an appropriate sanction, which the 
court takes into account, it is this court which ultimately 
makes an independent determination of the appropriate level of 
discipline given the particular facts of each case.  Alia, 288 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
40 
 
Wis. 2d 299, ¶88; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 
2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶74 Attorney 
Riley's 
initial 
argument 
regarding 
the 
referee's final report is that the referee's credibility finding 
regarding Attorney Polk's testimony was clearly erroneous, 
particularly 
the 
referee's 
acceptance 
of 
Attorney 
Polk's 
testimony that he and Attorney Riley had spoken before his 
reinstatement hearing about Attorney Polk's concern over having 
represented himself as an attorney during his employment with 
the new Eisenberg firm.  Attorney Riley characterizes Attorney 
Polk's testimony as "all over the place" and contends that there 
was a discrepancy between Attorney Polk's deposition testimony 
and his testimony at the disciplinary hearing.  Attorney Riley 
contrasts Attorney Polk's testimony with his own testimony, 
which he characterizes as consistent as well as "firm and 
forthright."   
¶75 We find no legal basis to overturn the referee's 
credibility determinations with respect to either Attorney Polk 
or Attorney Riley.  While all factual findings are subject to 
the clearly erroneous standard, credibility assessments are 
among the most difficult for a party to overturn because, where 
there is conflicting testimony, the referee is the ultimate 
arbiter of witness credibility.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against 
Riordan, 
2012 
WI 
125, 
¶28, 
345 
Wis. 2d 42, 
824 
N.W.2d 441; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pump, 120 
Wis. 2d 422, 426, 355 N.W.2d 248 (1984).  Although Attorney 
Riley points to what he perceives as discrepancies in Attorney 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
41 
 
Polk's testimony, Attorney Polk explained at the disciplinary 
hearing that he was confused to some extent by the manner in 
which the time period had been framed in certain questions.  
While Attorney Polk in his hearing testimony indicated that he 
did not recall discussing with Attorney Riley his law firm 
employment and his resulting concerns during the time he was 
actually employed by the new Eisenberg firm, at two separate 
junctures in his hearing testimony in this proceeding he clearly 
and unequivocally testified that he did have such discussions 
with 
Attorney 
Riley 
prior 
to 
his 
reinstatement 
hearing.  
Moreover, as the referee pointed out, Attorney Polk's testimony 
was against his own interest because he had to admit that he had 
lied at the reinstatement hearing after having thought about the 
issue and after having discussed his concerns with another 
attorney, all of which is detrimental to any future attempt at 
reinstatement by Attorney Polk.  The referee was entitled to 
accept Attorney Polk's testimony on this point and to reject 
Attorney Riley's claims to the contrary.  The applicable 
standard of review requires that we accept those credibility 
findings. 
¶76 Based in large part on Attorney Polk's testimony, the 
referee therefore found that Attorney Riley had discussed 
Attorney Polk's law firm employment with him prior to the 
September 2006 reinstatement hearing.  Because this rests on a 
credibility determination that the referee was entitled to make, 
this finding is not clearly erroneous.  This finding also 
supports the further finding that Attorney Riley knew of 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
42 
 
Attorney Polk's employment with the new Eisenberg firm at the 
time of the 2006 reinstatement hearing, at which Attorney Polk 
gave a misleading answer to a question posed by Attorney Riley, 
as well as multiple cross-examination questions posed by counsel 
for the OLR.  Attorney Riley does not claim that he ever 
attempted to persuade Attorney Polk to disclose his law firm 
employment to Judge Flynn or to take any other measures to 
remediate Attorney Polk's misleading testimony.  We conclude 
that none of the referee's factual findings on these matters are 
clearly erroneous, and we therefore rely on them for our legal 
analysis. 
¶77 Attorney 
Riley 
also 
criticizes 
the 
referee's 
conclusions of law and her discussion of how she analyzed the 
evidence presented to her in light of the charged rule 
violations.  We need not dwell on the referee's extended 
discussion of the complicating factors present in this case or 
the interplay between the standards for reinstatements from 
disciplinary and administrative suspensions.  The bottom line in 
our view is that the facts as found by the referee demonstrate 
clearly and convincingly that Attorney Riley violated former SCR 
20:3.3(a)(4) by offering material testimony from Attorney Polk 
regarding his employment history that Attorney Riley knew to be 
false by omission at the time it was given and then failing to 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
43 
 
take reasonable measures to remediate that false testimony.19  We 
therefore agree with the referee's conclusion that Attorney 
Riley violated former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4). 
¶78 Attorney Riley also makes a brief argument that the 
referee's conclusion and discussion of a violation of SCR 
20:8.4(c) lack factual and legal support.  Like his argument 
regarding the referee's summary judgment ruling on this charge, 
his argument regarding the referee's ultimate conclusion of a 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) is not well developed.  For the 
reasons set forth above in connection with the referee's summary 
judgment decision, we conclude that the facts as found by the 
referee regarding Attorney Riley's knowledge of Attorney Polk's 
misleading testimony and Attorney Riley's continuing to advocate 
for 
Attorney 
Polk's 
reinstatement 
also 
support 
a 
legal 
                                                 
19 One of Attorney Riley's criticisms is directed toward the 
referee's observation that after the OLR in 2008 told Attorney 
Riley that it had learned of Attorney Polk's employment with the 
new Eisenberg firm, Attorney Riley did not take remedial 
measures at that time by notifying Judge Flynn, this court, or 
the OLR that Attorney Polk's 2006 testimony had been false by 
omission.  Attorney Riley argues that he had no duty to take 
remedial measures at that point because this court had by that 
time already denied Attorney Polk's reinstatement petition and 
the OLR already knew the relevant facts.  Again, we need not 
address whether the rule required additional action by Attorney 
Riley in 2008.  It is clear from the facts found by the referee 
that Attorney Riley knew of the falsity in Attorney Polk's 
testimony at the time it was given.  He had a duty to take 
remedial measures at that time.  His failure to take proper 
actions at that time is sufficient to support a conclusion of a 
violation of former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4). 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
44 
 
conclusion that Attorney Riley engaged in conduct involving 
deceit and misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶79 Finally, Attorney Riley attacks the OLR's process for 
investigating and litigating this case, arguing that he never 
should have been charged with ethical violations in the first 
place because the OLR's investigation was flawed and there was 
no cause to proceed.  We need not address these claims in any 
detail.  Many of Attorney Riley's claims in this regard, such as 
a lack of materiality of Attorney Polk's false testimony, have 
already been considered and rejected above.  To the extent 
Attorney Riley challenges the Preliminary Review Committee's 
finding of cause to proceed, we believe it is sufficient to note 
that the subsequent complaint filed by the OLR survived summary 
judgment and is ultimately resulting in a conclusion by a 
majority of the court that Attorney Riley committed two 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys.  
C. Level of Discipline 
¶80 We now turn to the matter of the proper level of 
discipline that we believe should be imposed for the two ethical 
violations we have found.  The referee has recommended that 
Attorney Riley be publicly reprimanded for his professional 
misconduct.  In addition to considering prior disciplinary 
decisions cited by the OLR, the referee also noted three 
aggravating factors and one mitigating factor.  The three 
aggravating 
factors 
were 
Attorney 
Riley's 
prior 
private 
reprimand, his refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his 
conduct, and the harm to the judicial system caused by his 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
45 
 
misconduct.20  Although the OLR alleged that there were no 
mitigating factors, the referee found that Attorney Riley had 
fully cooperated with the OLR's investigation and the litigation 
of the disciplinary case, which should be acknowledged. 
¶81 Attorney Riley does not challenge the referee's 
recommendation regarding the appropriate level of discipline, 
other than to argue that he committed no misconduct.  Whether or 
not a respondent attorney specifically challenges a discipline 
recommendation, however, the court is obligated to conduct its 
own analysis of the proper level of discipline. 
¶82 In our view, a public reprimand is an appropriate 
sanction for Attorney Riley's professional misconduct.  We 
believe that a public sanction is necessary to impress upon 
Attorney Riley the wrongfulness of his conduct, as well as to 
deter both him and other attorneys from engaging in similar 
conduct in the future.  Allowing false evidence to be presented 
to a tribunal when the attorney knows it is false is a serious 
                                                 
20 Specifically, the referee asserted that Attorney Riley 
had "misused the justice system" by participating in the 
offering 
of 
false 
evidence 
in 
an 
optional 
reinstatement 
proceeding 
that 
needlessly 
resulted 
in 
review 
and 
the 
preparation of a split decision by this court.  Attorney Riley 
objects to this assertion, stating that this court's rules 
required it to review and issue a decision on Attorney Polk's 
reinstatement petition regardless of whether Attorney Polk made 
a false statement at the reinstatement hearing.  Attorney Riley 
is correct regarding this court's review, but his failure to 
take remedial measures harmed the judicial process of reviewing 
the petition because this court was forced to review a false 
account of the facts. 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
46 
 
ethical violation that undermines the truth-seeking function of 
the entire judicial system and contradicts the ideal of an 
attorney being an officer of the court as well as an advocate 
for a particular client.   
¶83 We consider a consensual public reprimand accepted by 
an assistant district attorney for similar conduct.  Public 
Reprimand of Holly L. Bunch, No. 2009-12 )(electronic copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/002196.html).  Although 
Attorney Bunch was aware of two police reports stating that a 
defendant had expressly denied committing the charged crimes, 
she made multiple false statements to the jury that the 
defendant had never denied committing the crime until he had 
been on the witness stand at trial because those reports had not 
been entered into evidence.   
¶84 Although 
Attorney 
Riley's 
misconduct 
is 
clearly 
serious because it undermined a tribunal's ability to decide a 
pending matter based on true and complete information, it is not 
more serious than the misconduct committed by Attorney Bunch.  
There is no evidence in this record that he conspired with 
Attorney Polk prior to the reinstatement hearing to omit any 
reference to Attorney Polk's employment with the new Eisenberg 
firm or that he even knew prior to the reinstatement hearing 
that Attorney Polk was planning to omit that information from 
his testimony.  Attorney Riley's misconduct here was failing to 
take any reasonable measures to remediate the false testimony 
given by Attorney Polk, his client.  Consequently, we conclude 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
47 
 
that a public reprimand is the most appropriate disciplinary 
sanction, given the particular facts of this case.  
¶85 Finally, we address the issue of costs.  Attorney 
Riley did not object to the OLR's statement of costs.  We see no 
reason in this case to depart from the court's general practice 
of imposing full costs against an attorney who is found to have 
committed professional misconduct.  See SCR 22.24(1m).  Because 
two concurring justices also agree with this conclusion, 
Attorney Riley will be obligated to pay the full costs of this 
proceeding. 
¶86 In summary, we conclude that Attorney Riley "offered" 
false testimony to the reinstatement referee under former SCR 
20:3.3(a)(4) when his client gave false and misleading answers 
to a question that he posed and to questions posed by opposing 
counsel.  We further conclude, based on the referee's factual 
findings, that Attorney Riley knew this testimony was false at 
the time it was given.  Attorney Polk's false testimony was 
material to the reinstatement proceeding in which it was given 
because it related to his claimed inability to pay the 
outstanding civil judgments against him, which was one of the 
topics 
expressly 
identified 
in 
our 
order 
referring 
the 
reinstatement matter to the referee.  Because Attorney Riley did 
not take any reasonable measures to remediate the false 
testimony given by Attorney Polk and therefore offered by 
Attorney Riley, he violated former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4).  Given his 
failure to take remedial measures and his continuing to argue in 
the reinstatement proceeding that the jobs Attorney Polk had 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
48 
 
held during his administrative suspension did not provide enough 
income for him to have made payments toward the outstanding 
civil judgments, Attorney Riley also violated SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶87 While two of our colleagues who concur in the mandate 
of the court are not willing to sign on to this opinion, the 
outcome of this case should still serve as a reminder to 
attorneys in this state that under the current version of the 
rule, SCR 20:3.3(a)(3), they have a duty to take reasonable 
remedial measures whenever they have actual knowledge that 
material testimony given by a client or another witness called 
by the attorney is false, either because of an affirmatively 
untrue statement or an omission that makes the statement false, 
regardless of whether the attorney asked the question that led 
to the false testimony.  That standard was met by the particular 
facts of this case with respect to false testimony given by 
Attorney Riley's client.  This rule, in either its former or 
current form, however, does not make an attorney the guarantor 
of the factual accuracy of everything that is said by a client 
or other witness called by the attorney.  The attorney's 
obligation arises only when the attorney has actual knowledge of 
the falsity and only when the false testimony is material to the 
proceeding.  When those conditions are present, however, the 
lawyer may not just sit silently and allow the false testimony 
to mislead the opposing party and the tribunal.  The lawyer is 
not just a zealous advocate on behalf of a client, but also an 
officer of the court, who bears obligations to assist the court 
in its search for the truth. 
No. 
2010AP2942-D   
 
49 
 
¶88 IT IS ORDERED that John Kenyatta Riley is publicly 
reprimanded for his professional misconduct. 
¶89 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, John Kenyatta Riley shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.   
¶90 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation shall advise the court if there has not 
been full compliance with all conditions of this order.   
¶91 REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2010AP2942-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶92 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  I agree 
that a public reprimand and full costs should be imposed.  I do 
not, however, join the opinion of three justices of this court.  
The opinion of the three justices is not a majority opinion.  It 
is, in the terminology of the court, a "lead opinion." 
¶93 The phrase "lead opinion" is not, as far as I am 
aware, defined in our Internal Operating Procedures or elsewhere 
in the case law.  Our Internal Operating Procedures (IOP) refer 
to "lead opinions," but only in stating that if, during the 
process of circulating and revising opinions, "the opinion 
originally circulated as the majority opinion does not garner 
the vote of a majority of the court, it shall be referred to in 
separate writings as the 'lead opinion.'"  Wis. S. Ct. IOP 
II.G.4.1    
¶94 I would describe a lead opinion as one that states 
(and agrees with) the mandate of a majority of the justices, but 
represents the reasoning of less than a majority of the 
participating justices.  So, for example, in a case with six 
justices participating, if three justices join one opinion, two 
justices join the same mandate only or join a different opinion 
reaching the same mandate, and one justice dissents, there is a 
single mandate, but no majority opinion.  See Hoffer Props. LLC 
v. DOT, 2016 WI 5, 366 Wis. 2d 372, 874 N.W.2d 533.  Rather, one 
                                                 
1 Our internal operating procedures are contained in volume 
6 of the Wisconsin Statutes.   
No.  2010AP2942-D.ssa 
 
2 
 
of the opinions agreeing with the mandate will be designated the 
lead opinion.  
¶95 The use of the term "lead opinion" without an agreed-
upon definition has the potential to cause confusion among the 
bench, the bar, and the public.  Also, the precedential effect 
(or lack thereof) of a "lead opinion" is uncertain.  Are lead 
opinions in this court comparable to plurality opinions in the 
United States Supreme Court?2  Apparently, the court of appeals 
considers a plurality decision of this court persuasive but does 
not always consider it binding.  See, e.g., State v. King, 205 
Wis. 2d 81, 88-89, 555 N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing State 
v. Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d 192, 194, 352 N.W.2d 660 (1984)). 
¶96 I write separately to express several concerns. 
I 
¶97 The lead opinion is overly lengthy, and gratuitously 
addresses too many issues that have not been fully briefed or 
carefully studied.  The issues are difficult and of the utmost 
                                                 
2 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) 
("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest 
grounds . . . .'") (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 
n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).   
For discussions by this court of the precedential effect of 
plurality opinions in the United States Supreme Court, see, for 
example, State v. Griep, 2015 WI 40, ¶36, 361 Wis. 2d 657, 863 
N.W.2d 567; 
State 
v. 
Deadwiller, 
2013 
WI 
75, 
¶30, 
350 
Wis. 2d 138, 834 N.W.2d 362.   
No.  2010AP2942-D.ssa 
 
3 
 
importance to attorneys and disciplinary proceedings.  The 
issues need more consideration.   
¶98 The issues might be better left for future study by a 
committee this court should create to review the entire Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, as I proposed in Rule 
Petition 15-01. Instead, the court dismissed the petition.  The 
ruse for dismissal was that the creation of a committee is not a 
proper subject for a rule petition.  For a discussion of the 
need for a committee, see my dissent to the order dismissing 
Rule 
Petitions 
15-01, 
available 
at 
https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=
pdf&seqNo=158416; 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Templin, 2016 WI 18, ¶¶55-60, 367 Wis. 2d 351, 877 N.W.2d 107 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring); In the Petition for Reinstatement 
of Attorney Jeffrey P. Neterval, unpublished order, ¶¶2-9 (Mar. 
22, 2016) (Abrahamson, J., concurring); In the matter of the 
Reactivation of David W. Klaudt's License to Practice Law in 
Wisconsin, 
unpublished 
order, 
¶¶3-11 
(Mar. 
22, 
2016) 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring).      
II 
¶99 This is a landmark case in attorney discipline, as 
Justice Prosser has pronounced.  But its landmark status, from 
my perspective, is the length of time the instant case has 
lingered in this court.  I think it wins the prize for taking 
longer to decide than any other OLR proceeding I can remember or 
find.  It is a prime example of significant, unnecessary delays 
in completing a disciplinary matter.   Delay appears to exist at 
No.  2010AP2942-D.ssa 
 
4 
 
every level of the disciplinary proceedings, but the final delay 
at this court in releasing the lead opinion is outrageous.   
¶100 The attorney's conduct that is the subject of this 
proceeding dates back to 2006.  The OLR complaint was filed on 
December 1, 2010.  The referee held hearings in February 2012 
and issued her report on April 18, 2012. 
¶101 On October 23, 2012, this court held oral argument in 
the instant case.  More than 10 months elapsed before staff 
circulated a draft per curiam opinion.  Justice David T. Prosser 
circulated the first draft of his dissent to the court on July 
31, 2015, almost three years after oral argument and almost two 
years after the per curiam was circulated.  The first draft of 
my concurrence was circulated on September 14, 2015, almost two 
months after the dissent was circulated.  The writings have been 
subject to discussion and revision, and this opinion is being 
released almost four years after oral argument, almost six years 
after the complaint was filed, and almost 10 years after the 
conduct at issue.    
¶102 I favor the court's spending the time needed for each 
matter and giving utmost care to each matter.  Opinions and 
orders in cases, rule matters, and disciplinary proceedings are 
important to the people directly involved in each case and to 
the public.   
¶103 I strongly support the court's longstanding practice 
of honoring a justice's hold and giving a justice time to study 
and write separately, but I disfavor the court's inconsistent 
treatment of requests to hold.  Consistency in the court's 
No.  2010AP2942-D.ssa 
 
5 
 
practice of allowing, disallowing, and limiting holds is 
important for collegiality and fairness to the litigants and 
public.  For a discussions of the court's failure to follow 
procedures it adopts, see State v. Finley, No. 2014AP2488-CR, 
unpublished order (Jan. 11, 2016) (Abrahamson, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); Wis. Carry, Inc. v. City of 
Madison, No. 2015AP146, unpublished order (Jan. 11, 2016) 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Regency West Apartments LLC v. City of Racine, No. 2014AP2947, 
unpublished order (Jan. 11, 2016) (Abrahamson, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
¶104 Although I favor the practice of permitting holds, I 
also strongly favor giving litigants and the public prompt 
decisions.  Thus I again urge the court to create uniform time 
limits for court staff and for justices to study the matter and 
write.  For my repeated requests, see, for example, my 
concurrences in State ex rel. Nelson v. Wis. Supreme Court, No. 
2013AP153-W, unpublished order (Aug. 19, 2015), and Koll v. 
Department of Justice, No. 2008AP2027, unpublished order (Oct. 
14, 2011). 
¶105 Neither 
the 
public, 
the 
respondent 
lawyer, 
the 
component parts of the disciplinary proceedings, nor the other 
lawyers of the state are well served by the long delay in the 
instant case and in too many other cases.  
¶106 The court is considering (in closed conference rather 
than in open conference) appointing a committee to review the 
procedures of the component parts of the OLR and to make 
No.  2010AP2942-D.ssa 
 
6 
 
recommendations for change.  See Rule Order 15-01, available at 
https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=
pdf&seqNo=158416 (stating that dismissal of petition does not 
preclude the court from appointing a committee to study the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation or the Wisconsin Judicial Code).  
Although no committee has been formed as of this date, exploring 
ways to avoid unnecessary delay and accelerate the process of 
attorney discipline will be an important aspect of any study.  
III 
¶107 To foster transparency and fairness, as well as to 
encourage promptness and uniformity in the court's decisions in 
discipline cases, I renew my request that the court require the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court to make available on the court's 
website information about the dates of the relevant steps in 
each disciplinary matter, from the filing of the complaint, to 
its passage through the component parts of the lawyer regulatory 
proceeding, assignment to a court commissioner, assignment for 
oral argument or on-brief consideration, and the court's 
ultimate decision.   
¶108 The United States Supreme Court has similar helpful 
information 
available 
on 
its 
website 
for 
litigants 
and 
interested 
persons 
about 
the 
progress 
of 
petitions 
for 
certiorari in the Supreme Court.3  See my concurrence in State ex 
                                                 
3 I have also suggested that similar information be provided 
online for petitions for review, petitions for bypass, and 
original actions filed in this court.   
No.  2010AP2942-D.ssa 
 
7 
 
rel. Nelson v. Wis. Supreme Court, No. 2013AP153-W, unpublished 
order (Aug. 19, 2015). 
¶109 For the reasons set forth, I do not join the opinion 
of the three justices and write separately to set forth my 
concerns.  
¶110 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins Part I of this opinion. 
 
No.  2010AP2942-D.awb 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶111 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  Although I 
agree with the imposition of a public reprimand and full costs, 
I do not join the lead opinion.  Instead, I join Part I of the 
above concurrence. 
No.  2010AP2942-D.dtp 
1 
 
 
 
¶112 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  This is a 
landmark case in attorney discipline.  It addresses the issue of 
an attorney's ethical responsibilities when the attorney's 
client——or a witness called by the attorney——provides false 
testimony that the attorney knows is false at the time of the 
testimony or learns is false sometime after the testimony. 
¶113 It is hard for a judge not to sound the trumpet and 
wave the flag for "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth" in judicial proceedings.  No one in the judiciary is 
"for" false testimony.  Yet the court's lead opinion, which 
emphatically embraces the necessity for "truth" in judicial 
proceedings, leaves me quite uncomfortable for a number of 
reasons. 
¶114 First, this notable case will be associated with an 
attorney who was caught in the middle of a mess he did not 
create, whereas the two attorneys who are responsible for the 
mess have been able to walk away with inadequate discipline or 
no discipline. 
¶115 Second, I do not perceive that the respondent attorney 
set out to misrepresent critical facts to a referee.  This is a 
case in which the attorney was "directed" by his senior partner 
to represent another attorney, without pay.  When the attorney 
asked the "client" attorney questions on direct examination, the 
"client" 
attorney 
omitted 
important 
information 
from 
his 
answers, and when the "client" attorney answered questions on 
cross examination, he lied.  This court determines that the 
No.  2010AP2942-D.dtp 
2 
 
respondent attorney assigned to represent the "client" attorney 
had an obligation "to take reasonable remedial measures" to 
correct his client's false testimony——even if the attorney did 
not learn of the falsity until sometime after the testimony was 
given——and that all attorneys have such a duty.  However, the 
opinion does not say much about how this duty should be 
discharged. 
¶116 Third, 
the 
lead 
opinion 
is 
a 
little 
light 
in 
discussion 
about 
the 
serious 
tension 
between 
privileged 
information, confidentiality, and loyalty to a client, on the 
one hand, and an attorney's obligation to the court, on the 
other. 
¶117 Finally, the lead opinion is almost 50 pages in length 
because the court finds it necessary to resolve several close 
questions against the respondent attorney, but it reads as 
though the respondent attorney should have resolved all these 
subtle questions the same way the lead opinion has resolved 
them . . . without much difficulty.  We ought to ask: Has the 
court provided sufficient guidance for the Wisconsin bar to 
avoid in the future the same pitfalls that the attorney faced in 
this case? 
I 
¶118 The background facts in this case are complicated and 
murky.  Several important facts are omitted from the lead 
opinion in an effort to eliminate uncertainty by simply ignoring 
it. 
¶119 At one point, about 2000, Attorneys Alvin Eisenberg, 
Brian K. Polk, and the respondent, John Kenyatta Riley, all 
No.  2010AP2942-D.dtp 
3 
 
worked at the firm of Eisenberg, Weigel, Carlson, Blau, Reitz & 
Clemens, S.C. in Milwaukee. 
¶120 Attorney Polk left the firm in June 2000 and permitted 
his license to be suspended in 2001 because of noncompliance 
with CLE. 
¶121 Attorney Riley left the firm sometime in 2000-2001 to 
join another firm.  He started his own law firm in Milwaukee in 
2003. 
¶122 In 1990 six attorneys acquired shares in the firm that 
Attorney Eisenberg had founded in 1958.  In 1999 Joseph Weigel 
became president of that firm and engineered the redemption of 
all stock owned by Eisenberg.  Thereafter: 
In January 2005 the Firm, without giving prior notice 
to Attorney Eisenberg, moved its law office to a new 
location.  A letter was left for Attorney Eisenberg 
saying there was no office space for him at the new 
location, that he should go home, and that his 
paychecks would be sent to him. 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weigel, 2012 WI 71, ¶¶8, 
9, 12, 342 Wis. 2d 129, 817 N.W.2d 835. 
¶123 Ugly 
litigation 
followed 
Attorney 
Eisenberg's 
departure from his old law firm, and soon, he started a new 
firm.  He brought Brian Polk into the new firm no later than 
October 10, 2005, even though Polk's law license was suspended. 
¶124 Eisenberg also brought Attorney Riley into the new 
firm sometime in 2005.  The referee found as fact that, 
"[b]etween October 2005 and September of 2006, Attorney Riley 
was an associate at the Eisenberg law firm.  Attorney Riley 
maintained his solo practice offices on Water Street for a short 
No.  2010AP2942-D.dtp 
4 
 
while after re-joining Attorney Eisenberg in practice.  His work 
time was spent between both offices."   
¶125 The referee also found that, "[Riley] practiced solo 
until early 2006 when he joined Eisenberg Law Office, which 
later came to be Eisenberg & Riley then Eisenberg, Riley & 
Muwonge, and in 2011 was Eisenberg, Riley & Zimmerman."  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶126 Attorney Riley was not part of the new Eisenberg 
firm's personal injury group in which Polk worked.  Rather, he 
had a general practice, which included bankruptcy, criminal, and 
real estate law.  He often was in court when the personal injury 
group met. 
¶127 These facts suggest that it is not entirely clear 
whether Attorney Riley knew the full story about Polk's role at 
the new Eisenberg firm.  What is undisputed is that Polk filed a 
pro se petition for readmission to the bar on February 22, 2006; 
and because of opposition to reinstatement by the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation (OLR), this court appointed a referee, who 
conducted a hearing on September 6, 2006. 
¶128 Attorney 
Eisenberg 
"directed" 
Attorney 
Riley 
to 
represent Polk at that hearing.  The referee in this case found 
that "[t]he reinstatement hearing [in 2006] was pending at the 
same time law firm disputes and other practice concerns were in 
play."  The referee in this case also found: 
The attorney-client relationship between Attorney 
Riley and Brian Polk was limited to Attorney Riley 
appearing at the reinstatement trial in a "second-
chair" capacity.  The representation did not include 
Attorney 
Riley's 
preparation 
of 
the 
witnesses, 
drafting of the petition, prior review of the record, 
No.  2010AP2942-D.dtp 
5 
 
strategy sessions or consultation, solicitation of 
testimony based on this reinstatement trial's court-
ordered standards, attention to or analysis of answers 
to questions.  [Attorney Riley] had not previously 
represented 
any 
clients 
in 
Reinstatement 
[and] 
disciplinary proceedings were not within Attorney 
Riley's usual area of practice. 
(Citations omitted.) 
¶129 The critical question is when Attorney Riley actually 
knew that Polk was improperly employed by the Eisenberg law 
firm.  Did he know it on September 6, 2006, or did he learn it 
later? 
¶130 The referee found that "Attorney Riley and Brian Polk 
spoke about his law firm employment during 2006 when he was 
serving as counsel for Brian Polk." 
¶131 Attorney Riley disputes this finding.  The lead 
opinion asserts that it was "not necessary that Attorney Riley 
knew that Attorney Polk was practicing law (as opposed to simply 
working) at the new Eisenberg firm, in order for Attorney Riley 
to have violated former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4)," lead op., ¶47 
(emphasis omitted), because "a lawyer has a duty to remediate 
false testimony given by a client, regardless of the manner in 
which the false testimony was given," id., ¶57.  The lead 
opinion states that a lawyer had a duty to take reasonable 
remedial measures under former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4) when his client 
omitted an "important fact" from his answers on a subject that 
was "material."  Id., ¶58. 
¶132 What should be evident to everyone is that Alvin 
Eisenberg is the person responsible for employing Brian Polk, an 
attorney with a deeply troubled past, including a felony 
conviction and a citation for loitering-illegal drug activity, 
No.  2010AP2942-D.dtp 
6 
 
while Polk was suspended from the practice of law.  Eisenberg 
tried hard to hide Polk's role in the firm.  Eisenberg was 
purportedly paranoid that his rivals at the Weigel law firm 
would discover and disclose Polk's employment, discrediting 
Eisenberg and discrediting the firm.  Eisenberg "directed" 
Attorney Riley to assist Polk at the reinstatement hearing.  He 
knew he could not do it himself. 
¶133 Eisenberg eventually was disciplined by OLR with a 
public reprimand.   Public Reprimand of Alvin H. Eisenberg, 
2012-8.  However, his "public reprimand" is not published in the 
Wisconsin Reports, and it takes a little detective work even to 
find it online.  Moreover, the reprimand reads in part: 
In a May 10, 2008 response to this matter, 
Eisenberg stated that, in March of 2006, he discovered 
Mr. X's license to practice law was suspended, causing 
Eisenberg to terminate Mr. X and tell him he could not 
return until his license was reinstated.  Eisenberg 
further stated that, "[Mr. X] has not returned to this 
date." 
This matter was referred to a district committee 
for investigation.  Eisenberg denied to committee 
investigators that Mr. X had returned to work at the 
firm after being terminated in March of 2006 and 
denied that Mr. X used an assumed name.  Eisenberg 
could give no explanation for letters that were 
produced that had been signed using the assumed name, 
and he denied authorizing or having knowledge of 
anyone in the firm using that name. 
In response to the committee report Eisenberg 
stated that, after reviewing records, he found that 
Mr. X worked for the firm for six days in July and 
August 2006.  Eisenberg admitted that the firm's 
receptionist "keeps a detailed daily record of the 
employees' attendance as employees come and go from 
the office."  Eisenberg should have consulted these 
records 
before 
responding 
negatively 
to 
previous 
questions about whether Mr. X returned to work at the 
firm after he was terminated in March 2006. 
No.  2010AP2942-D.dtp 
7 
 
See https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/002479.html. 
¶134 These three bland paragraphs should be compared to the 
extensive negative discussion of Attorney Riley in the lead 
opinion. 
¶135 As for Brian Polk (a/k/a "Mr. X"), he was not 
readmitted to the bar.  He did not appeal the referee's ruling 
not to reinstate him and——to the best of my knowledge——he has 
not reapplied.  But OLR never went after Polk for practicing law 
without a license or lying to a referee.  Consequently, there is 
no OLR "discipline" on his record. 
II 
¶136 Attorney Riley was charged with violating three 
Supreme Court rules: former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4); current SCR 
20:3.4(b); and current SCR 20:8.4(c).  The text of the rules is 
significant. 
¶137 In 2006 SCR 20:3.3(a)(4) read: 
A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
. . . .  
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be 
false.  If a lawyer has offered material evidence and 
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take 
reasonable remedial measures. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶138 SCR 20:3.4(b) reads: 
A lawyer shall not: 
. . . .  
(b) falsify 
evidence, 
counsel 
or 
assist 
a 
witness to testify falsely or offer an inducement to a 
witness that is prohibited by law. 
No.  2010AP2942-D.dtp 
8 
 
¶139 SCR 20:8.4(c) reads: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
 . . . . 
(c) engage 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 
¶140 OLR's complaint asserted: 
By eliciting and allowing Polk's testimony at 
Polk's reinstatement hearing regarding Polk's work 
history during the suspension of Polk's license that 
omitted 
Polk's 
employment 
at 
Riley's 
law 
firm, 
Eisenberg & Riley, S.C., when Riley knew of that 
employment at the time he elicited and allowed that 
testimony, and his failure to remedy that omission at 
any 
time 
thereafter, 
Riley 
violated 
former 
SCR 
20:3.3(a)(4), SCR 20:3.4(b), and SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶141 Attorney Riley was put in a very difficult situation.  
He either knew the full story about Polk's employment at the 
time Polk testified, or he didn't.  In either event, if he 
"offered" the information and if the information was "material" 
at the reinstatement hearing, the lead opinion asserts that he 
had a duty to take "reasonable remedial measures."  Arguably, if 
he did not "offer" the information or if the information was not 
"material," he did not have a duty to take "reasonable remedial 
measures." 
¶142 Assuming the existence of a duty, reasonable remedial 
measures could be interpreted to mean informing the referee that 
Polk's testimony was false, which would have had consequences.  
First, it would have destroyed any chance that Polk would win 
readmission to the bar.  Second, it would almost certainly lead 
to OLR prosecution of Riley's boss, Alvin Eisenberg.  Third, it 
could seriously affect Riley's relationship with Eisenberg and 
the law firm, leading to Riley's possible resignation or 
No.  2010AP2942-D.dtp 
9 
 
termination.1  Fourth, it could damage the law firm.  Fifth, it 
could lead to a suit that Attorney Riley had breached the 
attorney-client privilege to Polk's detriment.  If Attorney 
Riley knew all the facts about Polk's employment, he may have 
calculated that he would inform the referee if the referee 
decided in favor of reinstatement.  Of course, the referee 
decided against reinstatement.  The lead opinion has no room for 
"no harm, no foul." 
¶143 It may well be that the legal profession must set high 
standards of candor and integrity, regardless of the cost to an 
individual 
attorney. 
 
But 
shouldn't 
the 
court 
at 
least 
acknowledge the heavy stakes in this case and the potential 
heavy stakes in future cases that will be affected by this 
decision? 
¶144 To illustrate, the rules cited do not exempt attorneys 
who practice criminal law.  What are the practical effects of 
this case on criminal defense attorneys?  What are "reasonable 
remedial" steps for a criminal defense attorney who knows or 
learns after his client has testified that his client has lied?  
I do not sense that the court's decision permits attorneys to 
look the other way when they know their client has testified 
falsely or omitted "important facts," even in a criminal case.  
Clearly, the court does not believe it was enough for Attorney 
Riley to withdraw as counsel after the hearing, as he did. 
                                                 
1 OLR's reference to "Riley's law firm" is a bit of an 
exaggeration. 
No.  2010AP2942-D.dtp 
10 
 
¶145 Inasmuch as the referee found that Attorney Riley knew 
about Polk's employment with Eisenberg at the time of the 
reinstatement hearing, it may seem unnecessary to discuss what 
should have happened if he didn't know until later.  Notably, 
however, the court dismisses the alleged violation of SCR 
20:3.4(b) of having assisted a witness to testify falsely: A 
lawyer "shall not . . . counsel or assist a witness to testify 
falsely . . . ." 
¶146 The court says: 
We agree with Attorney Riley that the language of 
the rule ("counsel or assist a witness") indicates 
that some action by the lawyer prior to or at the time 
of the witness's false testimony is required. . . . We 
believe that SCR 20:3.4(b) should not be interpreted 
to reach the conduct that is shown on this record.  
There 
was 
no 
evidence 
in 
the 
summary 
judgment 
[record] . . . that Attorney Riley advised Attorney 
Polk not to mention his work at the new Eisenberg 
firm, planned a way in which Attorney Polk could omit 
that information in his testimony . . . , or even knew 
that Attorney Polk intended to provide a list of his 
employers during his suspension that would omit the 
new 
Eisenberg 
firm. . . . 
 
[T]here 
is 
no 
indication . . . that the two of them took the step of 
discussing how Attorney Polk should address that 
concern 
in 
his 
reinstatement 
hearing 
testimony.  
Indeed, Attorney Polk testified that he and Attorney 
Riley never had a preparation session to discuss his 
upcoming testimony at the reinstatement hearing. 
Lead op., ¶¶69-70. 
¶147 Nonetheless, the referee found that "Attorney Riley 
and Brian Polk spoke about [Polk's] law firm employment during 
2006 when [Riley] was serving as counsel for Brian Polk." 
¶148 Asking 
questions 
at 
the 
hearing 
about 
Polk's 
employment history could be viewed as "assisting" a witness to 
testify falsely.  The court declines to take that position.  On 
No.  2010AP2942-D.dtp 
11 
 
the other hand, the referee insisted that Attorney Riley 
knowingly "offered" evidence that he knew to be false.  The 
distinction between knowingly "offering" evidence but not 
"assisting" is not clear to me in this case. 
¶149 If Attorney Riley reasonably believed he did not 
assist Polk in giving false testimony, it is difficult to 
understand why he could not reasonably believe that he did not 
knowingly offer false evidence at the hearing. 
¶150 Ethics scholars might wish to compare the word "offer" 
in former SCR 20:3.3(a)(4) with the word "offer" in SCR 
20:3.4(b).  How does an attorney "offer an inducement to a 
witness" if he never mentions an inducement? 
¶151 There is another problem inherent in the former rule.  
It reads in essence that a lawyer shall not knowingly "offer 
evidence" that the lawyer knows to be false.  But then, in the 
second sentence, the rule provides, "If a lawyer has offered 
material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer 
shall take reasonable remedial measures."  (Emphasis added.)  
The second sentence establishes a duty to remediate any 
"material evidence" that is false, irrespective of prior 
knowledge, but it does not appear to require remediation of 
false evidence if the false evidence is not "material." 
¶152 "Knowingly offer" and "material evidence" thus are 
terms that raise serious issues for an attorney in ambiguous 
situations. 
¶153 These concerns go beyond the question of how to 
discharge an attorney's clear duty to the more fundamental 
question of whether this attorney had a duty. 
No.  2010AP2942-D.dtp 
12 
 
III 
¶154 My other concern relates to the tension between an 
attorney's duties to his client and his duties to the court. 
¶155 Wisconsin Stat. § 905.03(2), entitled "GENERAL RULE OF 
PRIVILEGE," reads: 
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose 
and to prevent any other person from disclosing 
confidential communications made for the purpose of 
facilitating 
the 
rendition 
of 
professional 
legal 
services to the client: between the client or the 
client's representative and the client's lawyer or the 
lawyer's 
representative; 
or 
between 
the 
client's 
lawyer and the lawyer's representative; or by the 
client or the client's lawyer to a lawyer representing 
another in a matter of common interest; or between 
representatives of the client or between the client 
and a representative of the client; or between lawyers 
representing the client. 
¶156 There are exceptions to this statute in subsection 
(4).  It would have been useful for the court to discuss the 
applicable exceptions, if any, in this case. 
¶157 The same is true with respect to SCR 20:1.6 related to 
confidentiality: "(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information 
relating to the representation of a client unless the client 
gives 
informed 
consent, 
except 
for 
disclosures 
that 
are 
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, 
and except as stated in paras. (b) and (c)."  (Emphasis added.)  
What are the applicable exceptions to this rule for Attorney 
Riley? 
¶158 SCR 20:3.3, Candor toward the tribunal, reads in part: 
"A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of 
fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement 
of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the 
No.  2010AP2942-D.dtp 
13 
 
lawyer."  This rule about false statements "by the lawyer" 
strikes me as much clearer and much easier to apply than former 
SCR 20:3.3(a)(4). 
IV 
¶159 To me the lead opinion raises sufficient questions 
about its impact on the law and its fairness to the respondent 
that I feel bound to respectfully dissent.  It should be noted 
that the court has not been able to muster a majority of 
justices for the lead opinion.  It should also be noted that the 
rule of lenity seems to be missing from the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys. 
 
 
No.  2010AP2942-D.dtp 
 
 
1