Case Title: ORLAN O. GARWOOD and CAROL A. JONES as Trustees of the W.J. GARWOOD and MILDRED E. GARWOOD FAMILY TRUST V. WILLIAM J. GARWOOD

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0092

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
ORLAN O. GARWOOD and CAROL A. JONES as Trustees of the W.J. GARWOOD and MILDRED E. GARWOOD FAMILY TRUST V. WILLIAM J. GARWOOD2010 WY 91Case Number: S-09-0092Decided: 06/29/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
ORLAN 
O. GARWOOD and CAROL A. JONES as Trustees of the W.J. GARWOOD and MILDRED E. 
GARWOOD FAMILY 
TRUST,Appellants(Defendants),v.WILLIAM J. 
GARWOOD,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Platte County

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Scott 
W. Meier and Lucas E. Buckley, Hathaway & Kunz, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

No 
appearance

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      On May 2, 2006, 
Appellee, William J. Garwood (Mr. Garwood), filed a lawsuit seeking an order 
directing the Appellants (Trustees), who are two of Appellee's three children 
and two of the three designated Trustees of the W.J. Garwood and Mildred E. 
Garwood Trust (Family Trust), to pay to him a sum of money from the Family Trust 
sufficient to provide for his support, as provided by the terms of the 
Trust.  The district court issued an 
order allocating trust assets and directing payments to Mr. Garwood, the 
Trustees appealed, and on October 22, 2008, this Court issued its decision 
affirming that district court order.  
See Garwood v. Garwood, 2008 WY 129, 194 P.3d 319 (Wyo. 2008) (Garwood 
I).  

 
 
[¶2]      This matter is 
again before this Court, this time on the Trustees' appeal from a subsequent 
order of the district court directing the Trustees to reimburse the Family Trust 
for amounts the Trustees withdrew from the trust for payment of their attorneys' 
fees and costs.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      The Trustees 
present the following issues on appeal:

 
 

1.         
Is it contrary to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and Wyoming law 
for the District Court to issue a Supplemental Order purporting to expand 
the judgment in the underlying matter nearly two years after the District Court 
entered its judgment and more than five months after this Court affirmed the 
District Court's judgment?

 
 
2.         
Did the District Court's Supplemental Order erroneously award a 
judgment against individuals that were not parties to Appellee's underlying Complaint?

 
 
3.         
Did the District Court's Supplemental Order violate the rights of 
Orlan O. Garwood and Carol A. Jones individually by levying a judgment against 
them without notice of the claim or a meaningful opportunity to be heard 
opposing such claim?

 
 
4.         
Is the District Court's Supplemental Order contrary to Wyoming's 
Uniform Trust Code?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      The facts 
underlying the original dispute between these parties over the Family Trust 
assets and Mr. Garwood's entitlement to subsistence payments from that trust are 
set forth in our opinion in Garwood I, 2008 WY 
129, 194 P.3d 319, and we will not restate that detailed recitation of facts 
here, except as necessary to frame the current 
issues.

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Garwood and 
his wife, Mildred Garwood, were married in 1951.  The Appellant Trustees in this matter, 
Orlan O. Garwood and Carol A. Jones, are the natural children of Mrs. Garwood 
from a prior marriage.  Mr. Garwood 
adopted them shortly after he married Mrs. Garwood in 1951.  A third child, Judy K. Kechter, was born 
of Mr. Garwood's marriage to Mrs. Garwood.  
Judy Kechter is named in the district court proceedings as a party to 
this litigation in alignment with her father, but she has had limited 
involvement in the proceedings and is not represented by 
counsel.

 
 
[¶6]      In 1992, Mr. and 
Mrs. Garwood purchased a Revocable Living Trust "kit" from a door-to-door 
salesman representing Somerset Group of Salt Lake City, Utah.  The district court found, and we agreed 
in our Garwood I decision, that the 
trust was of no earthly use to the Garwoods.  Garwood I, ¶ 5, 194 P.3d  at 321.  As we noted, at its peak, the Garwoods' 
estate was valued at about $400,000, and at that time, adverse estate tax 
consequences did not arise until the estate was over $1,200,000 (if both were 
living) and $600,000 (if only one of the two were living).  Nonetheless, on April 21, 1992, Mr. and 
Mrs. Garwood executed the trust documents and transferred some of their assets, 
including their home in Wheatland, into a trust.  

 
 
[¶7]      After executing 
the trust documents, Mr. and Mrs. Garwood ignored the terms and requirements of 
the trust and largely used their assets as though the trust did not exist.  In 2005, Mrs. Garwood passed away, and 
that event caused the trust to divide into two separate trusts: the Marital 
Trust and the Family Trust.  Mr. 
Garwood was the trustee of the Marital Trust, and the Garwoods' three children 
were the trustees of the Family Trust.  
Even after Mrs. Garwood's death and the division of the trust, all of the 
parties to this litigation continued to ignore the Trusts.  

 
 
[¶8]      The disregard of 
the Trusts and neglect by all Trustees to follow the terms of the Trusts 
continued until a dispute arose in 2006.  
In 2006, Mr. Garwood needed money to live on because the Marital Trust's 
cash assets had been expended and his income was not sufficient to cover his 
on-going expenses.  Mr. Garwood, who 
had in 2006 moved from Wheatland to Cheyenne, therefore desired to sell his 
Wheatland home.  Title to the 
Wheatland home was, however, in the Family Trust, and a majority of the Trustees 
of the Family Trust would not approve the home's sale.  Specifically, Orlan Garwood and Carol 
Jones objected to the sale of the Wheatland home, while Judy Kechter did not 
object to the home's sale.

 
 
[¶9]      Because the 
Trustees refused to approve the sale of Mr. Garwood's Wheatland home, Mr. 
Garwood filed a complaint in district court.  Through that action, Mr. Garwood sought 
an order directing the Trustees of the Family Trust to liquidate the Wheatland 
home and pay Mr. Garwood subsistence payments from the proceeds.  The Trustees, Orlan Garwood and Carol 
Jones, filed an answer and counterclaim seeking an order directing Mr. Garwood 
to repay to the Trusts sums of money that they contended he had expended in 
violation of the terms of the Trusts.

 
 
[¶10]   On June 11, 2007, the district 
court issued a decision letter that, although it ordered Mr. Garwood to repay 
roughly $21,000 to the Family Trust, generally ruled in Mr. Garwood's favor and 
directed the Trustees to liquidate the Wheatland home and ensure that Mr. 
Garwood's monthly income from the Trusts and any other sources totaled at least 
$3,200 per month.  On July 2, 2007, 
the district court entered its judgment in Garwood I, and on July 30, 2007, the 
Trustees filed their notice of appeal. We issued our decision affirming the 
district court's judgment on October 22, 2008.

 
 
[¶11]   After the district court entered 
its judgment in Garwood I, and while 
the Trustees' appeal was pending, motions and applications continued to be filed 
with the district court. The first was Mr. Garwood's application for attorneys' 
fees and costs in the amount of $20,559.85, which was filed on July 3, 2007, the 
day after the district court entered its judgment in Garwood I.  Mr. Garwood's application was made 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-1004, the Uniform Trust Code provision 
governing attorneys' fees and costs, and included an itemized statement of the 
services and fees of Mr. Garwood's attorney.  On July 13, 2007, the Trustees filed 
their response objecting to Mr. Garwood's application for fees and costs.  The Trustees argued that attorneys' fees 
and expenses are not automatically paid under the Uniform Trust Code and that 
Mr. Garwood had failed to show that justice and equity required payment of his 
fees from the Trust or that the fees applied for were reasonable and 
customary.  

 
 
[¶12]   On August 2, 2007, Mr. Garwood 
filed another application with the district court, this one seeking an order 
directing the Trustees to make payments to Mr. Garwood totaling $58,300 to allow 
him to purchase a wheel chair, hearing aids and a wheel chair accessible van. 
 On August 24, 2007, the Trustees 
responded and requested that the district court deny Mr. Garwood's 
application.  The Trustees pointed 
out that payment of the current application, together with payment of Mr. 
Garwood's attorneys' fees, would use all of the trust funds, which they argued 
was contrary to the stated purpose of the Trust.  The Trustees further argued that the 
application should be denied because Mr. Garwood had "failed to set priorities 
which expenditures he deems more important to him.  In a situation where limited resources 
exist, setting priorities what is important and what is unimportant is 
imperative."  The Trustees also 
argued that the payment should be rejected because "payment to Plaintiff of the 
remaining trust assets before final resolution of this matter will negate the 
appeal of this matter and irreparably prejudice Defendants in this matter."  

 
 
[¶13]   On October 23, 2007, Mr. Garwood 
filed an application with the district court for payment of attorneys' fees to 
respond to the Trustees' Supreme Court appeal.  The application requested between $5,000 
and $7,000 in anticipated attorneys' fees for the appeal.  

 
 
[¶14]   On November 6, 2007, the district 
court issued an Order on Applications for Disbursement of Funds.  The district court granted Mr. Garwood's 
July 3, 2007, application for attorneys' fees and costs and ordered the Trustees 
to issue payment to Mr. Garwood of attorneys' fees in the amount of $23,200 and 
costs in the amount of $1,020.35, for a total payment of $24,220.35.  The district court denied the other 
application for payment of expenses from the Family Trust.1  

 
 
[¶15]   On November 15, 2007, the Trustees 
filed a motion to stay the district court's order awarding attorneys' fees and 
costs to Mr. Garwood.  In that 
motion, the Trustees informed the district court that only $17,666 remained in 
the Family Trust, and that payment of the ordered attorneys' fees and costs 
would consume the fund.  The 
Trustees did not disclose amounts expended but did inform the district court for 
the first time that the Trustees had expended funds from the Family Trust to pay 
costs of their litigation and appeal and for anticipated accounting and tax 
costs.  The Trustees further argued 
that should Mr. Garwood require funds for litigation costs, he should be 
required to use funds from the Marital Trust, not the Family Trust.  They stated:

 
 
The 
nature of the underlying matter was such that Plaintiff elected to bring suit in 
this matter, not the Trustees.  The 
use of the Marital Trust funds for the cost of the underlying suit is certainly 
within the realm of discretionary uses left the Plaintiff by the language of the 
Marital Trust.  The provision of 
Family Trust funds for such payments, when such funds are stated by the trust 
agreement to be for the support of the Plaintiff is not in keeping with the 
tenor of the trust agreement. 

 
 
[¶16]   Subsequent submissions by the 
parties showed that at some point after the district court entered its judgment 
on July 2, 2007, and after the subsequent sale of the Wheatland home, the 
Trustees transferred $29,320.85 from the Family Trust to pay attorneys' fees and 
costs and another $20,000 from the Family Trust to the law firm of Hickey & 
Evans, LLP, as a retainer for costs and fees associated with the Trustees' 
Supreme Court appeal and for anticipated accounting and tax costs.  

 
 
[¶17]   The record is unclear as to the 
sequence of hearings that followed the Trustees' motion for a stay.  At some point during an unrecorded 
telephone hearing with the district court, Mr. Garwood withdrew his request to 
have his attorneys' fees and costs paid from the Family Trust, and Mr. Garwood's 
requested fees and costs were never paid from the Family Trust.  

  

[¶18]   On January 2, 2008, Mr. Garwood 
filed a motion seeking recovery of the funds the Trustees had withdrawn from the 
Family Trust for attorneys' fees and costs.  Mr. Garwood's motion also requested 
removal of Orlan Garwood and Carol Jones as Trustees, alleging they had breached 
their trust and fiduciary duties.  
The Trustees filed an opposition to that motion, and on April 29, 2008, 
the district court issued an order stating, "The court shall withhold any ruling 
on pending matters until such time as the Wyoming Supreme Court renders an 
opinion in the appeal currently pending."  

 
 
[¶19]   On January 5, 2009, following this 
Court's decision in Garwood I, the 
district court held a hearing on the pending motions.  During that hearing, Mr. Garwood made no 
request for payment of his own attorneys' fees and costs and instead argued his 
request that the Trustees be removed and be required to reimburse the Family 
Trust for amounts the Trustees used to pay their own attorneys' fees and 
costs.  Mr. Garwood argued the 
Trustees' payment of attorneys' fees and costs without an order of the court 
approving such payment was improper.  
The Trustees maintained the payment of attorneys' fees and costs was 
within their authority to pay expenses of the Family Trust, and they were under 
no obligation to seek a court order allowing those 
payments:

 
 
My 
client shouldn't have to justify to Mr. Garwood or to anybody else, other than 
through an accounting, but they don't petition the courts to make sure they can 
pay the ordinary business expenses, whether it's accounting fees or attorney's 
fees.  Those things are not done on 
behalf of their own benefit.  They 
have trust administration expenses, and I think somewhere counsel has gotten off 
on the wrong side of thinking, Jeez, with a trust, every time you have some kind 
of trust expense it has to be approved by the court.  

 
 
[¶20]   On April 7, 2009, the district 
court issued its order on the issue of the Trustees' use of Family Trust funds 
for their attorneys' fees and costs.  
The court ordered the Trustees to reimburse the Family Trust all but 
$10,000 of the fees and costs the Trustees had expended from the Trust.  In support of its order, the district 
court made the following findings:

a.         
The principal interest of Orlan O. Garwood and Carol A. Jones was in 
protecting their own potential inheritance.  They, Orlan O. Garwood and Carol Jones, 
obviously accepted, as did Ms. Kechter, large gifts that probably should have 
been part of the trust.

 
 
b.         
The Court's sense always was that the trustees did not really do their 
job in this matter, and this whole thing came to a head when Mr. Orlan O. 
Garwood and Ms. Carol A. Jones would not agree to sell the house where Plaintiff 
resided.  As a result, the trustees 
ended up spending a huge amount of money in attorney's 
fees.

 
 
c.         
Plaintiff sued and brought this matter to a head.  Defendants Orlan O. Garwood and Carol A. 
Jones defended Plaintiff's action.

 
 
d.         
Because there was a suit, the trustees named in their official capacities 
had some right to defend themselves and use trust assets to do 
that.

 
 
e.         
Such a defense, however, had to be done and accomplished with the idea 
that the main goal here of the trust needed to be kept in mind, which is  the 
overriding goal was that Mr. William Garwood, for the duration of his life, 
would have money available to him.

 
 
f.          
Therefore, the expenditure of this huge amount in attorney's fees by the 
trustees, Orlan O. Garwood and Carol A. Jones, while it began as a defense of 
themselves, ultimately ended up as a fight to protect their own 
inheritance.

 
 
g.         
The trustees Orlan O. Garwood and Carol A. Jones paid the sum of 
$49,320.85 as attorney fees and costs from the assets of the trust to counsel 
for representation in these proceedings, including representation in the appeal 
to the Wyoming Supreme Court of the earlier judgment of this 
court.

 
 
h.         
Using the Court's discretion here, it was appropriate for the Trustees to 
spend up to $10,000.00, and after that, the whole purpose of the trust became 
undermined by what should have been done, which would have been to assure that 
the great majority of this money go to Mr. William 
Garwood.

 
 
i.          
The remaining $39,320.85 were fees incurred by the trustees for 
representation of their personal interests, were fashioned to undermine the 
purpose of the trust and are not fees to be cha[r]geable to the trust.  

 
 
[¶21]   On April 23, 2009, the Trustees 
filed their Notice of Appeal.  The 
Trustees filed their brief on July 29, 2009, and no brief was filed on behalf of 
Mr. Garwood by the filing deadline of September 16, 2009.  On December 4, 2009, counsel for Mr. 
Garwood filed notice that Mr. Garwood died on September 6, 2009.  No personal representative has entered 
an appearance on behalf of Mr. Garwood, and no brief has been filed on behalf of 
Mr. Garwood.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶22]   The Trustees' appeal presents 
arguments that the district court acted contrary to law and abused its 
discretion.  This Court reviews 
conclusions of law de novo.  Piroschak v. Whelan, 2005 WY 26, ¶ 7, 
106 P.3d 887, 890 (Wyo. 2005).  We 
have defined our abuse of discretion inquiry as follows:

 
 

The 
core of our inquiry must reach the question of the reasonableness of the choice 
made by the trial court. Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, 
among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising 
sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without 
doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. FML 
v. TW, 
2007 WY 73, ¶ 8, 157 P.3d 455, 459 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

Garwood 
I, 
¶ 17, 194 P.3d  at 325.

 
 
Jurisdiction

 
 
[¶23]   The Trustees contend first that the 
district court was without jurisdiction to enter its order directing the 
Trustees to reimburse the Family Trust.  
Specifically, the Trustees argue that once they filed their notice of 
appeal in Garwood I, the district 
court was without jurisdiction to rule on Mr. Garwood's motion for removal of 
Trustees and recovery of attorneys' fees expenditures by the Trustees.  We disagree.

[¶24]   District courts are entitled to a 
presumption of regularity when exercising their general jurisdiction.  KC v. KM, 941 P.2d 46, 50 (Wyo. 1997); 
First 
Wyoming Bank, N.A. Cheyenne v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 
628 P.2d 1355, 1362 (Wyo. 1981).  The question of attorneys' fees and 
costs in a given civil action is a common issue that a trial court may address, 
and it does not, as suggested by the Trustees, require the filing of a separate 
action or a motion to amend a judgment.  
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126 
(LexisNexis 2009) (discretion of court in awarding costs and attorneys' fees); 
W.R.C.P. 54(d) (procedures for post-judgment cost and fee applications).  The issue may be addressed as an element 
of damages, or it may be addressed, as it was in this case, through the filing 
of a post-judgment motion, as described in Rule 54.  See W.R.C.P. 
54.

 
 
[¶25]   The issue of attorneys' fees and 
costs was properly placed before the district court by Mr. Garwood's timely 
filing of a post-judgment application for fees and costs, and the court thus had 
authority to address the issue in the action before it.  The question remains, then, whether the 
district court lost its jurisdiction to address the issue once the Trustees 
filed their notice of appeal from its original judgment. We conclude that it did 
not. 

 
 
[¶26]   Rule 6.01 of the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure governs jurisdiction after an appeal is docketed.  It provides:

 
 
The 
appellate court shall acquire jurisdiction over the matters appealed when the 
case is docketed.  In all cases, the 
trial court retains jurisdiction over all matters and proceedings not the 
subject of the appeal, including all matters covered by Rules 4 and 5, unless 
otherwise ordered by the appellate court.

 
 

W.R.A.P. 
6.01(b).  Consistent with Rule 6.01, 
we have held that during the pendency of an appeal, the district court has the 
right and power to enforce its decrees and orders and to protect the parties as 
to any rights they acquired in the district court proceedings.  KC, 941 P.2d at 50-51; Moore 
v. Moore, 
809 P.2d 255, 258 (Wyo. 1991); Coones v. 
F.D.I.C., 848 P.2d 783, 796 n.18 (Wyo. 1993). 

 
 
[¶27]   The district court's judgment did 
not address attorneys' fees and costs.  
Because those issues were not the subject of the Trustees' appeal, the 
district court did not lose jurisdiction to address them.  

 
 
[¶28]   Additionally, we find no inordinate 
delay in the district court's handling of the attorneys' fees and costs 
issue.   Mr. Garwood filed his 
application for fees and costs the day after the district court entered its 
judgment, well within the fourteen days permitted by W.R.C.P. 54.  It was only through addressing Mr. 
Garwood's fee and cost application that the district court learned that the 
Trustees had, without application to the court for an award of fees and costs, 
withdrawn funds from the Family Trust to pay their own fees and costs.  The Trustees' attempt to bypass the fee 
application process did not deprive the trial court of its authority to address 
the Trustees' entitlement to fees and costs.

 
 
[¶29]   Nor do we accept the Trustees' 
suggestion that the district court's delay in deciding the issue until after 
this Court's decision in Garwood I is 
indicia that the district court was acting outside its authority.  As we will discuss below, the Uniform 
Trust Code requires that an award of fees and costs from a trust fund be 
premised on a finding that the action benefitted the trust.  The district court thus acted prudently 
in delaying its consideration of the issue until this Court had ruled on the Garwood I appeal.

 
 
[¶30]   The district court had jurisdiction 
to address the attorneys' fees and costs issues presented to it, and it acted 
reasonably in delaying its decision on the issues until this Court had decided 
the appeal from the district court's original decision.  

 
 
Abuse 
of Discretion

 
 
[¶31]   The Trustees contend that even if 
the district court had jurisdiction to enter its order on the Trustees' fees and 
costs, the court abused its discretion in allowing the Trustees only $10,000 in 
fees and costs.  We find no abuse of 
discretion.

 
 

[¶32]   Generally, Wyoming subscribes to 
the American rule regarding recovery of attorneys' fees, making each party 
responsible for its own attorneys' fees, unless an award of fees is permitted by 
contract or statute.  Morrison v. Clay, 2006 WY 161, ¶ 16, 149 P.3d 696, 701-02 (Wyo. 2006); Schlesinger 
v. Woodcock, 
2001 WY 120, ¶ 21, 35 P.3d 1232, 1239 (Wyo. 2001).  Wyoming has 
adopted the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), which authorizes an award of fees and 
costs as follows: 

 
 
In 
a judicial proceeding involving the administration of a trust, the court, as 
justice and equity may require, may award costs and expenses, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, to any party, to be paid by another party or from 
the trust that is the subject of the controversy.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 4-10-1004 (LexisNexis 2009).  

 
 
[¶33]   The Trustees take issue with the 
applicability of this provision to the question of a trustee's fees and costs, 
contending that a trustee involved in a legal proceeding over a trust may simply 
pay the costs of litigation as an ordinary expenditure in the course of 
administering the trust.  In support 
of this argument, the Trustees cite to our holding in another case wherein we 
observed that it would be "inconsistent to recognize a trustee has standing in 
its official capacity to defend a trust, but to then make the trustee personally 
bear the expense of defending the trust."  
See American Nat'l Bank of Cheyenne v. 
Miller, 899 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Wyo. 1995).  The Trustees also rely on the UTC 
provisions requiring a trustee to defend and prosecute claims on behalf of the 
trust, and authorizing a trustee to pay expenses incurred in the administration 
of the trust.

 
 
[¶34]   We do not take issue with the 
premise that a trustee should not be personally responsible for litigation 
expenses associated with the proper exercise of its official duties.  We also, however, do not believe that 
the only way to honor a trustee's ability to defend or prosecute appropriate 
legal actions is to allow the trustee unfettered discretion over payment of 
litigation expenses.  It is for the 
trial court to determine whether fees and costs were properly incurred in a 
trustee's official capacity and, if so, what constitutes a reasonable amount for 
those fees and costs.

 
 
[¶35]   This interpretation of the UTC 
attorneys' fees provision is consistent with our rules of statutory construction 
and the interpretations other courts have given that same provision.  We interpret statutes using the 
following guidelines:

 
 
When 
interpreting statutes, we follow an established set of guidelines. First, we 
determine if the statute is ambiguous or unambiguous. A statute is unambiguous 
if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its 
meaning with consistency and predictability. Unless another meaning is clearly 
intended, words and phrases shall be taken in their ordinary and usual sense. 
Conversely, a statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain 
and subject to varying interpretations.  If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we 
give effect to the plain language of the statute.  To determine whether a statute is 
ambiguous, we are not limited to the words found in that single statutory 
provision, but may consider all parts of the statutes on the same 
subject.

 
 

Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue, 
2009 WY 139, ¶ 11, 219 P.3d 128, 134 (Wyo. 2009) (internal citations 
omitted).  We have also held that a specific statutory 
provision controls over a general provision on the same subject.  Cotton v. McCulloh, 2005 WY 159, ¶ 14, 
125 P.3d 252, 258 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

[¶36]   There 
can be no reasonable dispute that the litigation at issue was a judicial 
proceeding involving the administration of a trust.  The issues of asset allocation and 
required payments under a trust's terms are clear issues of trust 
administration.  Additionally, the 
UTC provision governing an award of fees and costs is more specific to the 
question of litigation expenses and therefore controls over the general UTC 
provisions authorizing a trustee to defend claims and pay expenses related to 
trust administration.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-1004 and § 
4-10-816 (LexisNexis 2009); see also 
Klinkerfuss v. Cronin, 289 S.W.3d 607, 617-18 (Mo. App. 2009) (Missouri UTC provision identical to Wyoming's § 
1004 provides basis for award of fees and costs to trustee); Calvert v. Estate of Calvert, 259 S.W.3d 456, 459-60 (Ark. App. 2007) (action challenging conveyance of real property to 
beneficiary trustee was a judicial proceeding involving trust administration and 
provision allowing court to award fees and costs governed payment of litigation 
expenses); Atwood v. Atwood, 25 P.3d 936, 946-47 (Okla. App. 2001) (Oklahoma UTC provision identical to Wyoming's § 
1004 governs litigation expenses, not more general provision that allows trustee 
to hire attorneys to assist with trust administration); Nickas v. Capadalis, 954 S.W.2d 735, 741 
(Tenn. App. 1997) ("[u]nless some benefit is contributed to the preservation of 
the trust estate, however, an 
award of attorney's fees is not permitted from the trust fund, notwithstanding the rule 
that a trust estate should bear 
the expense of the administration of the trust").

 
 
[¶37]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-1004 thus 
governs the Trustees' entitlement to Family Trust funds to cover their 
litigation expenses, and it was for the district court to determine, based on a 
fees application from the Trustees, the amount of fees and costs, if any, the 
Trustees should be awarded.  Our 
next determination then is whether the district court abused its discretion in 
ruling on the fees and costs the Trustees should have been awarded from the 
Family Trust. 

 
 

[¶38]   Once it has been determined that 
authority exists to award fees and costs, a trial court has extremely broad 
discretion to rule on the amount of such an award.  KC, 941 P.2d  at 53; Haltom 
v. Haltom, 
755 P.2d 876, 879-80 (Wyo. 1988).  In reviewing the district court's 
determination of the amount, if any, to award the Trustees in this case, we are 
mindful that we have held that we will not interfere with the trial court's 
exercise of discretion in making such an award except upon proof that such 
discretion was gravely abused.  See KC, 941 P.2d  at 53; Haltom, 755 P.2d  at 879-80.  

 
 
[¶39]   Courts interpreting provisions 
identical or similar to § 4-10-1004 have observed that the provision's use of 
the phrase "justice and equity" must guide a trial court's discretion in 
determining whether to award fees from a trust and the amount of any fees 
awarded.  See, e.g., Atwood, 25 P.3d  at 947.  The Oklahoma court in Atwood described the inquiry as 
follows:

 
 
The 
highly subjective phrase "justice and equity" does not state specific 
guidelines or criteria for use by a trial court or for use by a reviewing court. The phrase connotes fairness 
and invites flexibility in order to arrive at what is fair on a case by case 
basis. Hence, general criteria drawn from other types of cases provide 
nonexclusive guides. These include (a) reasonableness of the 
parties' claims, contentions, or 
defenses; (b) unnecessarily prolonging litigation; (c) relative ability to bear 
the financial burden; (d) result obtained by the litigation and prevailing party concepts; and (e) whether a 
party has acted in bad faith, 
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons in the bringing or conduct of 
the litigation.

 
 
The 
role of "justice and equity" in this phase of the inquiry 
before the trial court is 
distinct from their role in determining what amount of costs, fees, and expenses should be allowed. For 
example, the fact that the nature of the case was difficult and required a great deal of effort goes 
to the amount of the award 
rather than whether an award 
should be granted. 

 
 

Atwood, 
25 P.3d  at 947; see also Whittlesey v. Aiello, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 742, 748 (Cal. App. 2002) (no basis for trustee to recover litigation expenses 
if litigation does not benefit trust); Nickas, 954 S.W.2d  at 741 (award of 
litigation expenses authorized only to the extent litigation found beneficial to 
trust).

 
 
[¶40]   At the outset of our review of the 
district court's exercise of discretion, it is important to take into 
consideration the findings of the district court in Garwood I.  The district court found it unfortunate 
that Mr. and Mrs. Garwood were persuaded to execute trust instruments that 
clearly were of no use to them in protecting their assets from estate taxes, 
that it was the intention of both Mr. and Mrs. Garwood that their estate would 
be available in its entirety to the surviving spouse until death, and that the 
focus of Trustees Orlan Garwood and Carol Jones was wholly on their own 
financial interests rather than on fulfilling the clear intentions of their 
parents as reflected in the trust documents.  Garwood I, ¶ 18, 194 P.3d  at 
325-26.  This Court agreed with the 
district court in its findings and upheld the district court's 
decision:

 
 
We 
conclude that the district court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous 
and its application of the law to these circumstances is likewise not erroneous. 
The Garwoods had the misfortune to fall victim to an itinerate hawker of 
"fill-in-the-blank," "one-size-fits-all," trust forms. The materials were 
ill-suited to the Garwoods' needs and have served to squander a significant 
portion of their hard-earned life savings on legal proceedings and attorney's 
fees (we are given to understand from the briefs that the Trusts have paid over 
$49,000.00 in attorney's fees incurred by Orlan Garwood and Carol Jones, and 
that there is only slightly more than $16,000.00 left in the Family Trust). 
Clearly there is no pot of gold at the end of the rainbow for anyone involved in 
this litigation, most certainly not for the 84-year-old Mr. Garwood who is 
dependent on the income from the Trust to eke out his subsistence standard of 
living for the remainder of his days.

 
 

Garwood 
I, 
¶ 22, 194 P.3d  at 327.

 
 
[¶41]   Given the findings of the district 
court, which were affirmed by this Court, that not only did the trust not 
benefit Mr. and Mrs. Garwood, the litigation made necessary by the Trustees' 
refusal to sell the Wheatland property likewise did little to benefit the Family 
Trust, we cannot find that the district court abused its discretion in limiting 
the amount of fees to the percentage it did.  

 
 
[¶42]   The Trustees argue that even if the 
district court were permitted to limit the Trustees' litigation expenses based 
on the extent to which the Trust was benefitted by the litigation, the district 
court abused its discretion in limiting the attorney fees and costs to 
$10,000.  Specifically, the Trustees 
contend the district court should have reviewed the billing statements of the 
Trustees' attorneys to ascertain what fees benefitted the Trust, and in the 
absence of that review, the $10,000 limit was arbitrary.

 
 
[¶43]   Although we agree that the proper 
approach in making an award of attorneys' fees and costs is to review billing 
statements, we do not agree with the Trustees that this is a basis for 
overturning the district court's ruling.  
The Trustees did not submit their billing statements to the district 
court, and under those circumstances, the district court would have been well 
within its authority to require reimbursement of all amounts the Trustees 
withdrew for their litigation expenses.  
Under these unique circumstances, however, where the party opposing fees 
has not appealed or even argued against the amount the district court allowed 
the Trustees for fees and costs, we will not disturb the trial court's exercise 
of discretion.  

 
 
[¶44]   Likewise, where the onus was on the 
party seeking fees, in the first instance, to submit an application for fees, 
complete with supporting billing statements, that party cannot be heard to 
complain on appeal that a review of those statements was not done.  The Trustees had an opportunity after 
entry of the district court's initial judgment to submit an application for an 
award of fees and costs, supported by the required billing statements.  Indeed, it seems likely the district 
court may have allowed the Trustees to submit that same evidence, although it 
would not have been timely, at the hearing on the propriety of the Trustees' 
withdrawal of funds to pay their litigation costs.  The Trustees did not make an offer of 
the evidence at that hearing.  The 
Trustees had opportunities to submit the required billing statements and did not 
do so.  Under these circumstances, 
we will not remand for a review of those statements.  See Pekas v. Thompson, 903 P.2d 532, 537 
(Wyo. 1995) ("[a] remand to allow additional proof on attorney fees will be 
allowed only in those instances where a party was denied an opportunity to make 
proof in the proceeding below").

 
 
[¶45]   Based on the foregoing, we also 
reject the Trustees' contention that the district court was required to find a 
breach of trust or fiduciary duty to enter its order on attorneys' fees and 
costs.  The order was not based on a 
separate claim for damages.  The 
district court's jurisdiction over the original action extended to the question 
of attorneys' fees and costs, and the Trustees' failure to submit the 
statutorily required application for fees and costs did not deprive the district 
court of that jurisdiction.  The 
district court properly addressed the issue by ordering the required 
reimbursement.

 
 
[¶46]   As a final matter, we address the 
Trustees' contention that the Trustees have been exposed to an award of damages 
in their personal capacities without notice and in violation of their due 
process rights.  We again disagree. 

 
 
[¶47]   As discussed above, the district 
court's order directing the Trustees to reimburse the Family Trust was not a 
damages award, and as such was not required to be pled as a separate element of 
damages.  Additionally, we again 
refer back to the district court's findings, upheld by this Court, that the 
Trustees, Orlan Garwood and Carol Jones, have acted primarily in their personal 
interests in this litigation.  That 
this is the case is further confirmed by the Trustees' pleadings and 
filings.  In their original answer 
and counterclaim, the Trustees' submitted their counterclaims in their 
capacities as trustees and individually, and in later pleadings, such as the 
above-described request for a stay of any orders for disbursements from the 
trust, the Trustees objected to disbursements from the trust because of the 
irreparable harm it would do to them.  
The district court's finding that the Trustees used the litigation to 
further their interests as beneficiaries is supported by the record, and the 
Trustees had ample notice and opportunity to defend their decision to 
unilaterally withdraw funds from the Family Trust for their litigation 
expenses.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶48]   The district court had jurisdiction 
to address issues relating to an award of attorneys' fees and costs.   The district court did so in a 
proper manner, and we find no abuse of discretion in the court's 
decision.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The court identified the denied application as bearing the date July 3, 
2007, and because that was the date of the application for attorney's fees and 
costs that the court did grant, that appears to be a typographical error.  It is thus unclear from the district 
court's order which application the court was referencing when it denied payment 
of an application.