Case Title: Commonwealth v. Okoro

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11659

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11659 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EMMANUEL OKORO. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     September 3, 2014. - March 23, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Sentence, Cruel and unusual 
punishment, Parole, Separation of powers.  Due Process of 
Law, Sentence, Parole.  Parole.  Witness, Expert.  
Evidence, Expert opinion.  Defense of Others.  Practice, 
Criminal, Sentence, Parole, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 29, 2008. 
 
 
The case was tried before Paul E. Troy, J.; a motion for a 
new trial, filed on January 7, 2011, was considered by him; a 
motion for a new trial, a reduction in verdict, and 
resentencing, filed on September 13, 2012, was heard by him; and 
a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Ruth Greenberg for the defendant. 
 
Matthew Libby, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Jeanne M. Kepthorne for Markeese Mitchell. 
2 
 
 
 
Barbara Kaban, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Youth Advocacy Division, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
& others. 
 
Laura M. Banwarth for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers. 
 
Richard L. Goldman for Terrance Pabon. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  The defendant, Emmanuel Okoro, appeals from 
his conviction of murder in the second degree.  He was fifteen 
years old at the time of the offense, January 1, 2008.  Pursuant 
to the sentencing statutes then in effect, the defendant 
received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with 
eligibility for parole after fifteen years.  The defendant 
argues that in light of the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 2469 
(2012), and this court's decision in Diatchenko v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 658 (2013) 
(Diatchenko I), the defendant's mandatory life sentence 
constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of both 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 
26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and also violates 
constitutional guarantees of due process and separation of 
powers.  The defendant further argues that his conviction should 
be overturned because (1) the trial judge erroneously prevented 
him from introducing expert testimony and arguing that the way 
the brain develops in children and adolescents makes the 
condition of being a youth itself a mitigating factor to be 
3 
 
 
considered in determining whether the defendant was capable of 
forming the requisite mental state for murder; and (2) the judge 
erred in declining to instruct the jury on defense of another.  
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the 
defendant's sentence does meet the requirements of the Eighth 
Amendment and art. 26, as well as other constitutional rights, 
and we reject the defendant's challenges to his underlying 
conviction. 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  Although witnesses' accounts 
differed substantially and included contradictory testimony as 
to the exact events on the night of the killing, the jury could 
have found the following.  On December 31, 2007, the defendant, 
aged fifteen, had been drinking and smoking marijuana with 
friends and family and was very drunk.  Eventually, the 
defendant and his companions, including his sister, Iesha 
Strickland, attempted to go to a nearby New Year's Eve party, 
but they were turned away at the door by the victim, Markeen 
Starks, and another young man.  The victim was known to the 
defendant and his sister, and had been involved in a series of 
violent incidents that appeared to constitute retaliation 
against Strickland after she had spoken to the police regarding 
an earlier killing. 
 
At some point before midnight, the defendant and his 
companions left the site of the New Year's Eve party and went 
4 
 
 
home.  After the party ended, a crowd gathered outside the party 
site and a fight broke out.  The defendant and his companions 
saw this crowd and went toward it, and this time, the defendant 
was carrying a knife.  The defendant and the victim confronted 
one another, and although it is unclear who started the physical 
fight between them, the defendant stabbed the victim multiple 
times.1  The victim ultimately died from these wounds. 
 
The defendant presented evidence at trial concerning the 
level of his cognitive functioning, as well as concerning his 
psychological profile and family background.  In particular, the 
defendant was tested shortly after the stabbing incident and 
found to have an intelligence quotient (IQ) score of 75 or 76, 
which placed him in the fifth percentile for youths his age in 
terms of cognitive functioning.  This level of cognitive 
functioning has been characterized as "borderline deficient," 
and is associated with difficulties in problem solving, flexible 
thinking, and detection of options.  In addition, psychological 
testing indicated that although the defendant was not severely 
mentally ill and was able to perceive reality accurately, he was 
vulnerable to "emotional disregulation," meaning that under 
stressful conditions he had a tendency toward simplified 
approaches to problem solving and being primarily influenced by 
                     
 
1 We discuss these events in further detail infra, as they 
relate to the defendant's claim of error regarding the trial 
judge's decision not to instruct the jury on defense of another. 
5 
 
 
emotions.  The defendant also previously had been diagnosed with 
oppositional defiant disorder, which is typically associated 
with rule breaking and "profoundly annoying" behaviors, although 
not typically with violence. 
 
A forensic psychologist who examined the defendant opined 
that much of the defendant's personality presentation could have 
been related to the combination of his cognitive limitations and 
his history of "exposure to chronic and severe domestic 
violence."  In particular, the defendant suffered abuse at the 
hands of his father for approximately two years, including 
punishments such as being forced to stand with his hands in the 
air for hours at a time or to kneel on hard, uncooked rice and 
salt.  At around age ten, the defendant was removed from his 
parents' home and placed in foster care, where he remained for 
three and one-half years.  During that time, he went through 
seven different foster homes due to behavioral problems, and he 
eventually went to live at a group residential home for youth.  
By the time the defendant was about thirteen years old, his 
father had been deported to Nigeria, and the defendant was 
allowed to return to live with his mother, but by then he was 
struggling with poor anger management, disruptive behavior, and 
alcohol abuse problems.  Although he was taking several types of 
prescribed medications to help with his behavior when he 
returned to his mother, his mother decided to "wean him off" 
6 
 
 
these medications, and instead allowed him to drink alcohol and 
smoke marijuana, because it kept him "more calm." 
 
2.  Procedural history.  In February, 2008, the defendant 
was indicted on a charge of murder in the first degree, and he 
was tried in December, 2010.  The jury found the defendant 
guilty of murder in the second degree,2 and he was sentenced to 
life imprisonment with parole eligibility after fifteen years.  
See G. L. c. 265, § 2, as amended through St. 1982, c. 554, § 3; 
G. L. c. 127, § 133A, as amended through St. 2000, c. 159, 
§ 230.  See also G. L. c. 119, § 72B, inserted by St. 1996, 
c. 200, § 14.  On January 7, 2011, the defendant moved for a new 
trial or, alternatively, for a reduction of the verdict to 
manslaughter pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), as 
amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995).  He also filed a notice of 
appeal from his conviction on January 13, 2011.  The trial judge 
denied the defendant's motion without a hearing.  Thereafter, 
the defendant's new appellate counsel filed on the defendant's 
behalf a renewed motion for a new trial and a request for 
resentencing. 
 
In the renewed motion, the defendant argued that due to his 
young age, he should be entitled to individualized resentencing 
                     
 
2 The judge had instructed the jury on the crimes of murder 
in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, murder in the second degree, and 
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. 
7 
 
 
at which his age could be taken into account.  The trial judge 
denied the motion.  The defendant later requested 
reconsideration of the denial in light of this court's recent 
decisions in Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. 655, and Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 466 Mass. 676 (2013).  In denying the defendant's 
request, the trial judge stated that although he was "no[t] 
unsympathetic to the defendant's plight," "[a]ge, remorse and 
abusive upbringing and rehabilitation" were not grounds to allow 
the request under rule 25 (b) (2). 
 
The defendant filed an appeal in the Appeals Court from the 
denials of his motion for a new trial and his request for 
reconsideration, which was consolidated with the pending appeal 
from his conviction.  This court granted the defendant's 
application for direct appellate review.3 
 
Discussion.  1.  Constitutionality of the defendant's 
sentence.  a.  Eighth Amendment and art. 26.  At the time of the 
defendant's offense, every conviction of murder in the second 
degree, regardless of a defendant's age at the time the offense 
was committed, required a mandatory sentence of life 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of 
the defendant by the Youth Advocacy Division, Committee for 
Public Counsel Services; American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts; Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth; 
Citizens for Juvenile Justice; End Mass Incarceration Together; 
and Hon. Gail Garinger (ret.); by the Massachusetts Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers; by Markeese Mitchell; and by 
Terrance Pabon. 
8 
 
 
imprisonment with eligibility for parole after fifteen years.4  
The defendant argues that because he was a juvenile at the time 
of the offense, this mandatory life sentence, despite his 
                     
 
4 In particular, G. L. c. 265, § 2, as amended through St. 
1982, c. 554, § 3, provided in relevant part:  "Whoever is 
guilty of murder in the second degree shall be punished by 
imprisonment in state prison for life. . . ."  General Laws 
c. 127, § 133A, as amended by St. 2000, c. 159, § 230, provided 
in part:  "Every prisoner who is serving a sentence for life . . 
. shall be eligible for parole . . . [at] the expiration of 
fifteen years of such sentence."  In addition, G. L. c. 119, 
§ 72B, inserted by St. 1996, c. 200, § 14, provided:  "If a 
person is found guilty of murder in the second degree committed 
on or after his fourteenth birthday and before his seventeenth 
birthday . . . , the superior court shall commit the person to 
such punishment as is provided by law.  Said person shall be 
eligible for parole under [G. L. c. 127, § 133A,] when such 
person has served fifteen years of said confinement." 
 
 
The Legislature amended this punishment scheme in 2012, 
such that a conviction of murder in the second degree for an 
adult offender now carries a mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment with the sentencing judge to set the date of parole 
eligibility to begin no earlier than after fifteen years and no 
later than after twenty-five years.  G. L. c. 127, § 133A, as 
amended through St. 2012, c. 192, §§ 37-39 (providing that 
minimum parole term is now set according to G. L. c. 279, § 24); 
G. L. c. 279, § 24, as amended through St. 2012, c. 192, § 46.  
The statutes were amended again in 2014, but the mandatory life 
sentence with parole eligibility after fifteen to twenty-five 
years for murder in the second degree remains the same.  See 
G. L. c. 265, § 2, as amended through St. 2014, c. 189, § 5; 
G. L. c. 279, § 24, as amended through St. 2014, c. 189, § 6.  
Of more direct relevance here, with respect to defendants 
between fourteen and eighteen who are convicted of murder in the 
second degree and are subject to sentencing under G. L. c. 119, 
§ 72B, although § 72B was amended in 2013 and again in 2014, the 
Legislature did not change the fifteen-year parole eligibility 
date for this cohort.  See G. L. c. 119, § 72B, as amended by 
St. 2013, c. 84, §§ 24, 24A; G. L. c. 119, § 72B, as amended by 
St. 2014, c. 189, § 2.  The 2013 amendments expanded the class 
of persons covered by § 72B to include seventeen year old 
defendants.  St. 2013, c. 84, §§ 24, 24A. 
9 
 
 
eligibility for future parole, is unconstitutional.  Although 
the defendant grounds his claim in both the Eighth Amendment and 
art. 26, the thrust of his argument is essentially that the 
Eighth Amendment, as explicated in the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455, requires 
individualized sentencing by the "sentencer" -- the judge -- in 
every case in which a juvenile homicide offender5 receives a life 
sentence.6 
 
We agree with the defendant that certain language in Miller 
can be read to suggest that individualized sentencing is 
required whenever juvenile homicide offenders are facing a 
sentence of life in prison.  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 
("mandatory penalties [such as life in prison without parole] 
preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender's age 
and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to 
                     
 
5 The term "juvenile homicide offender" refers in this 
opinion to a person who has been convicted of murder in the 
first or second degree and was under the age of eighteen at the 
time that he or she committed the murder. 
 
 
6 The defendant does not argue that even if the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution does not demand 
individualized sentencing by a judge in his case, art. 26 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights contains an independent 
requirement for an individualized, judicially determined 
sentence. 
 
In addition to his argument about the constitutionality of 
his punishment, the defendant claims that the sentence violates 
his due process rights and also art. 30 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  We address these claims in part 1.b, 
infra. 
10 
 
 
it"); id. at 2468 ("in imposing a State's harshest penalties, a 
sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an 
adult").  See also id. at 2466 n.6 ("Graham [v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48 (2010),] established one rule . . . for nonhomicide 
offenses, while we set out a different one [individualized 
sentencing] for homicide offenses").  However, Miller's actual 
holding was narrow and specifically tailored to the cases before 
the Court:  presented with two juvenile defendants convicted of 
murder in the first degree, the Court concluded that a mandatory 
sentence of life in prison without parole violated the Eighth 
Amendment.  Miller, supra at 2469.7 
 
This court has construed Miller and its consideration of 
individualized sentencing to be limited to the question whether 
a juvenile homicide offender can be subjected to a mandatory 
sentence of life in prison without parole eligibility.  See 
Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 668 ("the Supreme Court said in 
Miller that on those occasions when a State seeks to impose life 
in prison without parole on a juvenile homicide offender, there 
                     
 
7 The Court stated:  "We therefore hold that the Eighth 
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in 
prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.  
Cf. Graham [v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010)] ('A State is not 
required to guarantee eventual freedom,' but must provide 'some 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation').  By making youth (and all that 
accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison 
sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of 
disproportionate punishment."  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 
2455, 2469 (2012). 
11 
 
 
must be an individualized hearing to evaluate the unique 
characteristics of the offender and assess whether this 
punishment is appropriate in the circumstances").  See also 
Brown, 466 Mass. at 686-688.  Accordingly, Diatchenko I and 
Brown, which both involved juvenile homicide offenders convicted 
of murder in the first degree, left in place the mandatory life 
sentence imposed by the murder sentencing statute, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 2, but declared invalid, as applied to the two defendants and 
similarly situated juvenile homicide offenders, the portion of 
that statute that rendered persons convicted of murder in the 
first degree ineligible for parole.  The result for both 
defendants was a sentence of life imprisonment with parole 
eligibility after fifteen years.  See Diatchenko I, supra at 
674; Brown, supra at 688-689 & n.10. 
 
As this court's decision in Diatchenko I makes clear, we 
fully accept the critical tenet of Miller that "children are 
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing," Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464, with "diminished 
culpability and greater prospects for reform."  Id.  See 
Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 669-671.  See also id. at 675 (Lenk, 
J., concurring).  But as just stated, to date we have determined 
that a mandatory life sentence with the possibility of parole 
satisfies the constitutional requirements for juveniles 
convicted of murder in the first degree, on the understanding 
12 
 
 
that it will be for the parole board (board) to take into 
account "the unique characteristics" of such offenders that make 
them constitutionally distinct from adults, and to ensure that 
such offenders are afforded a "meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."  
Diatchenko I, supra at 674, quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.  
Nevertheless, as we indicated in Brown, we have left open for 
future consideration "the broader question whether discretion is 
constitutionally required in all instances of juvenile 
sentencing."  Brown, 466 Mass. at 688. 
 
In this case, in contrast to the offenders in Diatchenko I 
and Brown, the defendant has been convicted of murder in the 
second degree.  Although this offense does not include acts of 
deliberate premeditation or extreme atrocity or cruelty, murder 
in the second degree is an intentional crime involving the 
killing of another person; the severity of the offense, even 
when committed by a juvenile offender, goes without saying.  See 
Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 674.  The Legislature has determined 
that every defendant convicted of murder in the second degree 
must serve a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of 
parole after fifteen years.  See G. L. c. 265, § 2; G. L. 
c. 119, § 72B.  While recognizing that "[art.] 26, like the 
Eighth Amendment, bars punishments which are unacceptable under 
contemporary moral standards" (citation and quotation omitted), 
13 
 
 
Libby v. Commissioner of Correction, 385 Mass. 421, 435 (1982), 
neither Miller nor Diatchenko I persuades us at the present time 
that such a mandatory sentence, imposed on a juvenile offender 
who commits murder in the second degree, violates the Eighth 
Amendment or art. 26.  For the reasons we next discuss, we 
continue to think it sensible to leave for a later day the 
question whether juvenile homicide offenders require 
individualized sentencing. 
 
First, the defendant's argument that he is constitutionally 
entitled to an individualized, judicially determined, sentence 
is premised on Miller,8 but as noted, Miller's requirement of 
individualized sentencing was limited to instances where a State 
seeks to impose life in prison without parole eligibility on a 
juvenile.  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474-2475.9  It is true that 
the defendant here was convicted of a less serious degree of 
murder than the juvenile defendants in Miller.  Nevertheless, 
even though Miller contains language suggesting that the 
requirement of individualized sentences for juveniles may extend 
                     
 
8 As previously stated, the defendant does not suggest that 
even if Miller does not require individualized sentencing in his 
case under the Eighth Amendment, art. 26 does so.  See note 6, 
supra. 
 
 
9 Our decision in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the 
Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 671 (2013) (Diatchenko I), that 
art. 26 prohibits not only mandatory but judicially set 
discretionary sentences of life without parole for juvenile 
homicide offenders provides even broader protection for these 
offenders than Miller did. 
14 
 
 
beyond sentences of life without parole, we do not read Miller 
as a whole to indicate that the proportionality principle at the 
core of the Eighth Amendment10 would bar a mandatory sentence of 
life with parole eligibility after fifteen years for a juvenile 
convicted of murder in the second degree. 
 
Second, the Supreme Court's determination that youth are 
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing is of fairly recent origin.  Miller was decided in 
2012, and its reasoning principally builds on cases that were 
decided in the last ten years -- in particular, Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463-2469.  Although in some areas, 
this court has recognized for many years that youth are 
constitutionally different from adults,11 until Miller was 
decided, we did not embrace the view that a constitutional 
distinction exists between juveniles and adults in relation to 
sentencing.  See Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 659-661, 664, 667.12 
                     
 
10 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463, citing Graham, 560 U.S. 
at 59. 
 
 
11 See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 389 Mass. 128, 
134 (1983) (knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights by 
juvenile generally requires presence of parent or interested 
adult who understands Miranda warnings and can explain them to 
juvenile; for juveniles younger than fourteen years of age, no 
waiver is effective without this protection). 
 
 
12 Compare this court's decision in Diatchenko's direct 
appeal from his conviction, Commonwealth v. Diatchenko, 387 
15 
 
 
 
It is significant that judicial recognition of this 
principle is so recent.  As noted in Diatchenko I, the 
determination that youth are constitutionally distinct from 
adults for sentencing purposes has strong roots in recent 
developments in the fields of science and social science.13  
Scientific and social science research on adolescent brain 
development and related issues continues.14  At this point, we 
                                                                  
Mass. 718 (1982), where we rejected the substance of the 
argument that youth are constitutionally different from adults 
for sentencing purposes.  See id. at 721-722, 725. 
 
 
13 As discussed in Miller and Diatchenko I, research in this 
area thus far has been important in confirming what "any parent 
knows" about adolescents -- that many who exhibit "transient 
rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess 
consequences" will grow out of these traits, because the 
adolescent brain, particularly in areas related to behavior 
control, is still developing.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-2465 & 
n.5.  See Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 669-670 & n.14.  These 
observations were particularly important to our conclusion in 
Diatchenko I that juvenile homicide offenders can never be 
sentenced to life in prison without parole, because such a 
sentence requires a determination that the offender is 
"irretrievably depraved," a finding that is at odds with the 
fact that "the brain of a juvenile is not fully developed, 
either structurally or functionally."  Id. at 670. 
 
 
14 For example, researchers continue to study the age range 
at which most individuals reach adult neurobiological maturity, 
with evidence that although some brain systems have fully 
matured in most individuals by around age fifteen, other brain 
functions are not likely to be fully matured until around age 
twenty-two.  See Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent 
Brain Development Inform Public Policy? 50 Ct. Rev. 70, 74 
(2014), reprinted from 28[3] Issues in Sci. & Tech. 67 (2012).  
Studies are also continuing into the various ways that 
environmental factors, such as chronic or extreme stress, 
trauma, or neglect can impact brain development and adolescent 
behavior.  See id. at 76; L. Steinberg, Age of Opportunity:  
16 
 
 
cannot predict what the ultimate results of this research will 
be, or more importantly, how it will inform our understanding of 
constitutional sentencing as applied to youth.  In short, we 
appear to deal here with a rapidly changing field of study and 
knowledge, and there is value in awaiting further developments. 
 
Moreover, as is true of the science, the law relating to 
juveniles and sentencing continues to change and develop at this 
time.  State courts have disagreed as to whether Miller's 
holding applies retroactively,15 and the Supreme Court has 
indicated that it may again take up the issue of juvenile 
sentencing in order to resolve this discrepancy.16  Although 
                                                                  
Lessons from the New Science of Adolescence 22-23, 165-167 
(2014); Environmental Influence on the Developing Brain:  A 
Report from the Fifth Annual Aspen Brain Forum, The Dana 
Foundation, Nov. 26, 2014, available at http://dana.org/News/ 
Environmental_Influence_on_the_Developing_Brain 
[http://perma.cc/VJ8B-757P]; Inside Neuroscience:  Scientists 
Examine How Brain Structure and Function Change During 
Adolescence, Society For Neuroscience, Sept. 18, 2013, available 
at http://www.sfn.org/news-and-calendar/news-and-
calendar/news/middle-spotlight/inside-neuroscience-changes-
during-adolescence [http://perma.cc/Z9P3-5R2U].  New knowledge 
in these areas may have important implications for law and 
social policy decisions, including decisions that affect 
juvenile sentencing. 
 
 
15 Compare, e.g., Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 666, and State 
v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320, 342, cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 67 
(2014), with State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 831 (La.), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2663 (2014), and People v. Carp, 496 Mich. 
440, 451 (2014). 
 
 
16 The Supreme Court had recently granted certiorari in a 
case that concerned the retroactivity of Miller.  See Toca v. 
Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 781 (mem.) (2014).  However, prior to oral 
17 
 
 
there does not appear to be any case currently before the Court 
concerning this issue, the Toca case (see note 16, supra) 
indicates a reasonable possibility that the Court may shed 
additional light on Miller's full implications and on the 
constitutional requirements for juvenile sentencing generally 
before too long.  Meanwhile, some States, either judicially or 
legislatively, have provided additional sentencing protections 
for juveniles beyond the minimum requirements articulated in 
Miller.17  Although the rights guaranteed under art. 26 may be 
broader than those guaranteed under the Eighth Amendment, art. 
26 nevertheless "draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," such 
that developments in the area of juvenile justice in judicial 
                                                                  
argument in that case, the petitioner's murder conviction was 
vacated, resulting in his release, and the Court dismissed the 
certiorari petition. 
 
 
17 See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 400 (Iowa 2014) 
(holding unconstitutional under Iowa Constitution all mandatory 
minimum prison sentences for youthful offenders).  See also Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 636, 4204A, 4209, 4209A (permitting 
sentences of from twenty-five years to life in prison without 
parole for juveniles convicted of murder in first degree in 
Delaware, and permitting such offenders to petition for sentence 
modification after having served thirty years of their original 
sentences and every five years thereafter); W. Va. Code § 61-11-
23 (effective June 6, 2014) (eliminating life sentences without 
parole for West Virginia offenders who were under age of 
eighteen at time of crime, identifying mitigating circumstances 
that must be taken into consideration when sentencing juvenile 
offenders, and requiring parole board to take into consideration 
diminished culpability of youth during parole hearings for 
juvenile offenders). 
18 
 
 
opinions and legislative actions at the State, Federal, and 
international levels help to inform our understanding of what 
art. 26 protects (citation omitted).  See Michaud v. Sheriff of 
Essex County, 390 Mass. 523, 533-534 (1983).  Given the 
unsettled nature of the law in this area and the indication that 
it is still evolving, we think it prudent to allow this process 
to continue before we decide whether to revisit our 
interpretation of Miller and the scope of its holding. 
 
Finally, although both juvenile and adult homicide 
offenders remain subject to a mandatory life sentence, it is 
important to note that there are a number of ways that the 
constitutional differences between juvenile and adult homicide 
offenders currently are reflected in our sentencing laws.  Thus, 
while the mandatory punishment for murder in the first degree 
for an adult remains life in prison without parole, a juvenile 
convicted of this crime is now guaranteed to become eligible for 
parole at some point in his or her life.  See Diatchenko I, 466 
Mass. at 671.  See also G. L. c. 265, § 2, as amended through 
St. 2014, c. 189, § 5; G. L. c. 279, § 24, as amended through 
St. 2014, c. 189, § 6.  For murder in the second degree, adult 
offenders may be imprisoned for up to twenty-five years before 
they become eligible for parole, but juvenile offenders must 
become eligible for parole after fifteen years.  See G. L. 
c. 279, § 24, as amended through St. 2014, c. 189, § 6; G. L. 
19 
 
 
c. 119, § 72B, as amended through St. 2014, c. 189, § 2.  In 
addition, the Legislature has ensured that youthful offenders18 
who are incarcerated are not restricted in their ability to take 
part in educational and treatment programs, or to be placed in a 
minimum security facility, solely because of the nature of their 
criminal convictions or the length of their sentences; these are 
protections not afforded to adult offenders.  G. L. c. 119, 
§ 72B, as amended by St. 2014, c. 189, § 2.  And finally, as 
discussed infra, juvenile homicide offenders, including those 
convicted of murder in the second degree, at their parole 
hearings will have access to due process rights. 
 
In sum, we conclude that at present, a mandatory life 
sentence with parole eligibility after fifteen years for a 
juvenile homicide offender convicted of murder in the second 
degree does not offend the Eighth Amendment or art. 26. 
 
b.  Due process and art. 30.  The defendant advances two 
other constitutional arguments in favor of individualized 
sentencing.  First, he asserts that the parole process lacks 
significant due process protections such as access to counsel, 
and includes no guarantees that the board will take into 
                     
 
18 The statute defines this term as including, inter alia, 
individuals who have been convicted of crimes committed when 
they were between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, if such 
crimes are punishable by imprisonment in the State prison and 
involve the threat or infliction of serious bodily harm.  G. L. 
c. 119, § 52. 
20 
 
 
consideration any of the attributes of youth identified in 
Miller as relevant to the issue of sentencing.  See Miller, 132 
S. Ct. at 2468.  Recognizing these issues and how fundamental 
they are to ensuring that parole eligibility provides a 
"meaningful opportunity to obtain release" for juveniles 
sentenced to life in prison, see Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 674 
(citation omitted), we have today concluded, in Diatchenko v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., ante    ,     (2015) 
(Diatchenko II), that certain due process protections not 
available to adult offenders in their parole hearings must be 
made available to juvenile offenders convicted of murder in the 
first degree.  For the reasons discussed in that case, we 
conclude here that the same procedural protections in the parole 
process must be provided to juveniles convicted of murder in the 
second degree. 
 
Finally, the defendant argues that a mandatory sentence of 
life in prison with eligibility for parole for juvenile homicide 
offenders impermissibly vests in the executive branch of 
government the power to determine whether juveniles serve their 
entire lives in prison, in violation of art. 30's requirement of 
separation of powers.  It is true that the grant or denial of 
parole is a discretionary act of the board and therefore an 
executive -- not judicial -- function.  See Commonwealth v. 
Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 302 (2014).  However, as discussed, we have 
21 
 
 
thus far concluded that, following Miller, the Eighth Amendment 
does not require individualized, discretionary judicial 
sentencing of juvenile homicide offenders before these offenders 
may be sentenced to life in prison with eligibility for parole.19  
Accordingly, the fact that the executive branch, through the 
board, is charged with making parole decisions for juvenile 
homicide offenders does not violate the principle of separation 
of powers, because neither the Eighth Amendment nor art. 26 
requires parole decisions to be vested in the judicial branch.20 
 
It remains for us to address the defendant's claims that 
the trial judge erred in two ways:  by prohibiting the 
                     
 
19 As stated previously, the defendant appears to restrict 
his argument about individualized sentencing to the Eighth 
Amendment, and does not involve art. 26.  It is clear from the 
court's decisions in Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. 655, and 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676 (2013), however, that we 
have not concluded that art. 26 requires this result. 
 
 
20 The defendant raises two additional arguments, one based 
on this court's decision in Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 
808 (2012), and the other on the court's power under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, as to why he should have the opportunity to argue 
before a court for a sentence to a term of years less than life.  
However, Walczak concerned the requirements that apply before a 
juvenile may be indicted by a grand jury for the crime of murder 
when there is evidence of mitigating circumstances, see Walczak, 
supra at 810, and G. L. c. 278, § 33E, applies uniquely to 
review of all convictions of murder in the first degree, whether 
of adult or juvenile offenders.  Thus, neither of these claims 
relates to the constitutional requirements for sentencing 
juvenile homicide offenders, the fundamental issue here.  
Accordingly, we see no reason to exercise this court's power of 
superintendence over the courts in order to create an 
opportunity for the defendant to argue for a lesser sentence on 
either of these bases. 
22 
 
 
defendant's expert witness from testifying as to how youth may 
limit a defendant's ability to formulate malice, and by refusing 
to provide a jury instruction on defense of another.  Neither of 
these claims is persuasive.  We address the expert testimony 
issue first. 
 
2.  Expert testimony regarding defendant's age.  Prior to 
trial, the defendant notified the court and the Commonwealth 
that Dr. Robert Kinscherff, a psychologist who serves as the 
director of forensic studies at the Massachusetts School of 
Professional Psychology, was expected to testify on the 
defendant's behalf regarding the "effect of the defendant's age 
and his life experience on his actions in the alleged incident."  
The Commonwealth sought to exclude this testimony on the ground 
that an expert is not permitted to render an opinion that a 
juvenile is unable to form the specific intent required for a 
murder conviction. 
 
The trial judge held a hearing on the issue and concluded 
that although an expert witness could not base an opinion on 
adolescent brain development generally and conclude from it that 
a fifteen year old by definition (i.e., always) is unable to 
form the specific intent required for murder, Kinscherff would 
be allowed to testify as to this particular defendant's "mental 
impairment or condition on the night in question."  The issue 
was then revisited at length in a sidebar discussion between 
23 
 
 
counsel and the judge during Kinscherff's trial testimony.  The 
defendant's trial counsel assured the judge at that time that 
any testimony of Kinscherff regarding the neurological 
development of a teenager's brain would be tied directly to this 
defendant's capacity for impulse control, his response to 
threats, and his ability to make decisions, and would relate to 
the defendant's intent only in this way.  The judge then 
permitted the expert to testify at length regarding the 
biological aspects of teenage brain development and how these 
aspects may be related to adolescent behavior generally and to 
the defendant's behavior specifically.21 
 
Despite the significant testimony that Kinscherff presented 
regarding teenage brain development and the defendant's 
                     
 
21 For example, Dr. Robert Kinscherff described some of the 
current science regarding child and adolescent brain development 
and then connected this information to research findings that 
people who may have been more impulsive during their teenage 
years "tend over time to become less impulsive, more capable of 
making considered judgments, more capable of reflecting on 
options that they have and plausible consequences to the 
decisions that they make."  He also testified that 
"[a]dolescents are more stress responsive than most adults."  
With regard to the defendant specifically, Kinscherff opined 
that even as compared to other adolescents generally, the 
defendant appeared to be more vulnerable in areas such as 
emotional regulation, impulse control, and balanced decision-
making.  He also had more difficulty controlling his temper. His 
ability to process threats and control his behavior were likely 
further affected by his cognitive disabilities, which may have 
caused him to see the world in a "fairly simplistic way"; his 
history of exposure to violence and resulting hypervigilance; 
his violent social environment; and his intoxication on the 
night of the incident. 
24 
 
 
individual mental capacity, on appeal the defendant argues that 
he was nevertheless denied the right to present a full defense 
because Kinscherff was not permitted to testify as to how the 
incomplete developmental maturity of the adolescent brain 
relates to the ability of a teenager to form the required intent 
for malice.  For its part, the Commonwealth asserts that as a 
matter of law, youth generally, including those who are fifteen, 
have been determined to have the capacity to form the intent 
required for murder in the first or second degree, and that 
Kinscherff was precluded only from giving expert testimony that 
would have touched on this legislatively resolved issue.22  We 
conclude there was no error. 
 
This court previously has acknowledged that, although 
children may have not have the maturity fully to appreciate the 
consequences of wrongful actions, "that does not mean that a 
delinquent child lacks the ability to formulate the specific 
intent to commit particular wrongful acts."  Commonwealth v. 
Ogden O., 448 Mass. 798, 804 (2007).  Where the Legislature has 
determined that a youth is capable of committing certain crimes, 
we have noted that "respect for the legislative process means 
that it is not the province of the court to sit and weigh 
                     
 
22 The Commonwealth also notes that the defendant did not 
actually seek to have Kinscherff testify during the trial 
regarding the general inability of a teenager to form the intent 
for malice.  The procedural history on this point is not fully 
clear.  We choose to address the defendant's claim. 
25 
 
 
conflicting evidence supporting or opposing a legislative 
enactment."  Id. at 805 n.6, quoting Massachusetts Fed'n of 
Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Board of Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 772 
(2002).  Here, the Legislature has enacted G. L. c. 119, § 72B, 
which, as it applied to the defendant, directs the Superior 
Court to punish individuals who are found to have committed 
murder in the first or second degree on or after their 
fourteenth birthday and before their eighteenth birthday "as is 
provided by law."  Thus, the Legislature has clearly indicated 
that youth in the defendant's age group are considered capable 
of committing murder, and the trial judge was correct to 
preclude the defendant from putting forward evidence that would 
have suggested it was impossible for anyone the defendant's age 
to formulate the necessary intent to commit this crime. 
 
However, we also have noted that "[e]xpert testimony 'is 
admissible whenever it will aid the jury in reaching a decision, 
even if the expert's opinion touches on the ultimate issues that 
the jury must decide.'"  Commonwealth v. Federico, 425 Mass. 
844, 847 (1997), quoting Commonwealth v. Dockham, 405 Mass. 618, 
628 (1989).  Thus, we have long held that expert opinion 
evidence pertaining to a defendant's intoxication or mental 
impairment is appropriate for a jury to consider when a 
defendant is charged with a crime requiring specific intent.  
See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 413 Mass. 686, 690-691 (1992) 
26 
 
 
(defendant charged with and convicted of murder in first degree; 
expert testimony concerning effects of defendant's blood alcohol 
level at time of alleged offense should not have been excluded).  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Grey, 399 Mass. 469, 469-470, 473-474 (1987) 
(defendant charged with murder in first degree and convicted of 
murder in second degree; error for judge not to instruct on 
manslaughter in light of expert testimony regarding defendant's 
cognitive impairment and its effect on his capacity to form 
specific intent necessary for malice); Commonwealth v. Gould, 
380 Mass. 672, 680-686 (1980) (defendant charged with and 
convicted of murder in first degree; error for judge not to 
instruct jury that they could consider expert testimony 
regarding defendant's psychiatric illness on issue of 
defendant's ability to act with deliberate premeditation or 
extreme atrocity or cruelty).  This evidence is admissible 
because a defendant charged with a specific intent crime may 
have been so impaired by intoxication or mental illness that a 
jury could find him or her incapable of having had the level of 
intent necessary to commit the crime at the time of the 
incident.  See, e.g., Cruz, supra at 689-690. 
 
In light of these principles, the trial judge was correct 
in allowing Kinscherff to testify regarding the development of 
adolescent brains and how this could inform an understanding of 
this particular juvenile's capacity for impulse control and 
27 
 
 
reasoned decision-making on the night of the victim's death.  
This information was beyond the jury's common knowledge, it 
offered assistance to the jury in determining whether the 
defendant was able to form the intent required for deliberate 
premeditation or malice generally at the time of the incident, 
and it did not amount to an opinion that the defendant (or any 
other fifteen year old) was incapable of forming the intent 
required for murder in the first or second degree simply by 
virtue of being fifteen.  In this way, Kinscherff's permitted 
testimony aided the jury in reaching a decision by helping them 
to understand "both the nature of [the] defendant's mental 
condition and its effect on his state of mind at the relevant 
time."  Cruz, 413 Mass. at 690-691.23,24 
                     
 
23 In drawing the analogy between Kinscherff's opinion 
testimony here and cases in which expert evidence is presented 
relating to the impact of alcohol consumption or mental illness 
on the defendant's ability to form the intent necessary for the 
crime, we do not suggest, as the defendant argues, that youth 
itself "is a disorder."  Rather, a defendant's young age can be 
a factor in evaluating the defendant's mental state or in 
determining whether the defendant's capacity for self-control 
may have been affected at the time of the incident.  However, 
the mere fact that the defendant was fifteen years old when the 
events occurred cannot be the basis in and of itself for a 
finding that the defendant lacked the necessary mental state to 
commit the crime. 
 
 
24 During oral argument the Commonwealth asserted that 
Kinscherff's trial testimony went too far into a discussion of 
adolescent brain development research and the scientific bases 
for impulsivity and other common traits of teenagers, and that 
this testimony impermissibly intruded upon the jurors' ability 
to use their common knowledge of teenage behavior in order to 
28 
 
 
3.  Defense of another.  Finally, the defendant argues that 
the trial judge committed reversible error in declining to 
instruct the jury that the defendant's actions may have been 
excused, or that he may have been guilty only of manslaughter, 
rather than murder, because he was acting in defense of another 
when he stabbed the victim.  The defendant requested such an 
instruction, and objected when it was not given.25  The 
prejudicial error standard therefore applies on appeal, see 
Commonwealth v. Burgos, 462 Mass. 53, 66-67, cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 796 (2012), but there was no error. 
 
An actor (defendant) may use force against another in order 
to protect a third person when "(a) a reasonable person in the 
[defendant's] position would believe his intervention to be 
necessary for the protection of the third person, and (b) in the 
circumstances as that reasonable person would believe them to 
                                                                  
form an opinion about this defendant's mental state at the time 
of the incident.  However, just as increasingly sophisticated 
scientific knowledge of adolescent brain functioning has 
assisted in informing our understanding of what punishments may 
constitutionally be imposed on juvenile offenders, so, too, do 
we believe that this scientific knowledge could assist a jury to 
form an opinion as to a defendant's mental state at the time of 
his alleged crime.  See Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 667-668, 669-
670. 
 
 
25 The Commonwealth argues that defense counsel's objection 
to the lack of instruction on defense of another was untimely.  
However, as the Commonwealth acknowledges, the trial judge 
accepted defense counsel's objection, even though it was late.  
In addition, the judge noted on the record that defense counsel 
had clearly indicated during the charge conference that he was 
seeking an instruction on defense of another. 
29 
 
 
be, the third person would be justified in using such force to 
protect himself."  Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 208 
(2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. 640, 649 
(1976).  It is not necessary for the jury to find that the third 
person in fact would have been entitled to use force in self-
defense at the time of the incident in order for the defendant 
to invoke this defense; however, the intervening defendant must 
have had a reasonable belief that the third person was being 
unlawfully attacked.  Young, supra at 209.  "The reasonableness 
of the belief may depend in part on the relationships among the 
persons involved," but if the defendant uses deadly force in 
order to protect another where that amount of force was 
unwarranted, the defendant's conduct will not be fully excused 
and he or she may still be found guilty of manslaughter.  
Martin, supra at 649.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 412 Mass. 
368, 372 (1992).  A judge must instruct the jury on defense of 
another where the evidence when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the defendant could support a finding that the use 
of force was justified on this basis.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. McClendon, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 122, 125 (1995). 
 
The defendant argues that he was entitled to a jury 
instruction on defense of another on the theory that he was 
defending his older sister, Strickland, when the offense was 
committed.  There was evidence presented at trial that the 
30 
 
 
victim and the victim's friend, Elijah Finch, had been involved 
in acts of violence directed toward Strickland for some time 
before the victim's death.  Specifically, the jury could have 
found the following.  Up until the summer of 2007, the defendant 
and the victim were friendly with one another, but in July, 
2007, Strickland attended a party where she saw Finch waving a 
gun in the air, shots were then fired, and a man fell to the 
ground.  After Strickland spoke to the police about the 
incident, she developed a reputation for having implicated Finch 
in the shooting, and she experienced retaliation:  her friends 
were physically beaten on two separate occasions, and shots were 
fired at the house where the defendant and Strickland both lived 
several weeks later.  The victim was present when all three of 
these incidents occurred, and he verbally encouraged at least 
one of the beatings.  The defendant had been home when the shots 
were fired, and he could have been aware of the other incidents 
as well due to his relationship with Strickland.  Thus, the jury 
could have found that Strickland had a legitimate fear of the 
victim and Finch, and that the defendant was aware of this fear. 
 
Turning to December 31, 2007, the night of the killing, the 
jury could have found that Strickland was standing near the 
defendant at the moment that the defendant and the victim began 
to fight, that the victim was armed with a knife at some point 
that night, and that Finch or another friend of the victim's was 
31 
 
 
armed with a gun.  Considering this evidence in the light most 
favorable to the defendant, the jury could have reasonably 
concluded that the defendant was concerned for his sister's 
safety that evening, and that there was a general atmosphere of 
animosity and fear present.  However, despite this atmosphere of 
animosity and the presence of the victim, Finch, and Strickland, 
there was no evidence presented that suggested the victim or 
Finch directed any immediate, physical threat toward Strickland 
that night during or prior to the fight between the defendant 
and the victim.  None of the witnesses, including those 
favorable to the defendant, testified that the victim or anyone 
else appeared to be on the verge of striking or otherwise 
harming Strickland at the moment that the defendant and the 
victim began fighting.  Strickland herself testified for the 
defense that as she and the defendant were walking toward the 
location where the defendant and the victim ultimately fought, 
Strickland paused to tie her sneaker; while doing so, she heard 
someone yell out a warning to the defendant; she then ran 
through a crowd of people to where her brother was already 
engaged in the fight with the victim; and she stood there 
watching the fight.  She also stated that the gun did not appear 
at the scene until after the victim and the defendant had begun 
to fight,26 and that she herself pushed the defendant out of the 
                     
 
26 Although witness accounts differed as to from where Finch 
32 
 
 
way of the gun.27  In these circumstances, even when considered 
in the light most favorable to the defendant, the evidence does 
not support a finding that a reasonable person in the 
defendant's position at the time of the fight with the victim 
would have felt it necessary to defend his sister against the 
victim, much less to do so using violent force.  See Martin, 369 
Mass at 649; McClendon, 39 Mass. App. Ct. at 125. 
 
In sum, we agree with the trial judge that a jury 
instruction on defense of another was not warranted on the 
evidence presented at trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Orders denying motions for  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  new trial, for reduction of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  verdict, for resentencing,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  and for reconsideration  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  affirmed. 
                                                                  
had come -- assuming it was Finch who had the gun, which was 
uncertain -- and when Finch had arrived at the scene of the 
fight, the testimony of the various witnesses who mentioned the 
gun generally accorded with Iesha Strickland's account that the 
gun appeared after the victim and the defendant had begun to 
fight. 
 
 
27 These aspects of Strickland's testimony did not change 
substantially on cross-examination. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part, with 
whom Cordy, J., joins).  I agree with the opinion of the court 
except for part 1.b, "Due process and art. 30," ante at    .  As 
to that section, I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent 
in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., ante    
,    (2015).