Case Title: Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Sheridan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5724

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Sheridan1983 WY 23660 P.2d 785Case Number: 5724, 5725Case Number: 5724, 5725Decided: 03/11/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
SHERIDAN NEWSPAPERS, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

CITY 
OFSHERIDAN, AND ROGER F. 
KROUT, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

CITY OF SHERIDAN, AND ROGER F. 
KROUT, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

SHERIDAN NEWSPAPERS, 
INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). 

Appeal from the District 
Court,    
Sheridan   
County, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

ARE NOT AN 
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] 

Lawrence A. 
Yonkee of Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for appellant in Case No. 5724 and appellee 
in Case No. 5725.

Duane C. 
Buchholz, Asst. City Atty., Sheridan, for appellees in Case No. 5724 and 
appellants in Case No. 5725.

Before ROONEY, C.J.,* and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE** and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

** Chief Justice 
at time of oral argument.

ROSE, Justice.

[¶1.]     The appellant Sheridan 
Newspapers, Inc., publisher of the Sheridan Press newspaper, brought this action 
to gain access to certain categories of records maintained by the   
           
               
           Sheridan police 
department. The trial judge entered an order from which Sheridan Newspapers, 
Inc. appeals in Case No. 5724, and from which the City of Sheridan appeals in 
Case No. 5725. We will reverse in 5724 and affirm in 5725.

[¶2.]     Since July 31, 1981, 
the chief of police of Sheridan has denied the 
Sheridan Press and other news-disseminating agencies the right to inspect 
certain kinds of records maintained by the Sheridan police department, and particularly 
the "rolling log" and "case reports." In lieu of press inspection, members of 
the police department have held press conferences and furnished representatives 
of the press with news releases prepared by the detectives.1 This method of news dissemination 
is unacceptable to the press.

[¶3.]     In this appeal the 
newspaper contends that it has a statutory right2 and constitutional rights3 of routine access to the rolling 
log and police case reports. The appellant newspaper concedes that these rights 
are qualified by the discretion authority of the chief of police, as custodian 
of the controversial records, to deny disclosure of particular documents or 
information contained within given records or categories of records on a 
case-by-case or document-by-document basis when disclosure of such information 
would be in violation of the statute4 and therefore contrary to the 
public interest.5 The Wyoming Public Records Act 
provides that the custodian must, if requested by the applicant, furnish a 
statement containing grounds for denial of access,6 and any person denied the right of 
access may apply to the district court for an order directing the custodian of 
the record to show cause why inspection should not be permitted.7 In this case, the chief of police 
did not furnish any factual basis or reasons for closing the records when 
responding to the appellant newspaper's request for explanation for 
closure.

ROLLING LOG

[¶4.]     The rolling log, which 
is also referred to as the "daily log," is prepared by the police dispatchers 
and can be described as a chronological index of all reports and complaints 
received by the department; in other words, it is any information that callers 
report to the dispatcher over the telephone. The rolling log typically contains 
one line of information concerning each subject reported to the department. The 
dispatcher receiving a call records a case number, type of case, a brief 
description of the event, the name of the person reporting the matter and the 
name of the officer assigned to the case. These entries are not verified and are 
used by the department as an index.

[¶5.]     In testifying about the 
rolling log, the chief of police acknowledged that this form of document 
contained no information obtained as a result of investigation.8

CASE REPORT

[¶6.]     The term "case report" 
speaks of information recorded on a form on which is entered data relating to 
various sorts of police activity. A case report may detail a matter from 
complaint, through investigation, to arrest. It may, on the other hand, record a 
situation in which police have checked out a tip from an anonymous caller to 
which no further attention is given, no culpable party discovered, no arrest 
made, and with no further communications from the initial complainant.9

[¶7.]     It is conceded by the 
newspaper that the case reports may contain material obtained as a result of 
investigation. It is the press' contention that even if this is so, the 
custodian has no resulting authority to invoke a blanket withdrawal of this 
class of record without exercising his discretion on a case-by-case or 
document-by-document basis within the parameters of his statutory 
limitations.

TRIAL COURT'S 
HOLDING

[¶8.]     The trial court found 
that the rolling log and case reports are public records. The court further 
decided that members of the public (which of course includes the press)10 have a right to inspect "jail 
logs," traffic accident reports, and complaints and citations issued. The trial 
judge went on to hold, however, that the custodian of the police records may 
properly deny public access to the police rolling log and case reports and that 
plaintiff newspaper and the public do not have a constitutional or statutory 
right of access to inspect these categories of police records.

CONTENTION OF THE 
PARTIES

[¶9.]     Both parties have 
appealed. In Case No. 5724, Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. contends that blanket 
closure of the rolling-log and case-report categories of police records is 
unlawful in that appellant has a statutory and constitutional right to routinely 
inspect those records, subject to the police chief's right of withdrawal in 
instances where the inspection is prohibited by court rule or order (e.g., § 
9-9-103(a)(iii), supra) - or where it can be shown that disclosure of the 
disputed record is investigatory in character as contemplated by § 
9-9-103(b)(i), supra,11 and that disclosure would 
therefore be contrary to the public interest. The press goes on to contend that 
in this case the records custodian did not show any valid and legally acceptable 
reasons why the questioned categories of records should or could be 
withdrawn.

[¶10.]  In Case No. 5725, the City of     
             
               
           
              
               
          
      Sheridan appeals from the 
part of the judgment which, it alleges, restricts the closure authority of the 
chief of police. The aspects of the judgment to which it objects are those which 
it says engraft upon the Wyoming Public Records Act additional requirements 
which must be met by the record custodian before he may exercise his discretion 
to deny the plaintiff or the public the right to inspect these records. In the 
City's language, objections are made to these following alleged additional 
requirements which are contained in the judgment:

"(1) any exclusion must 
be on a `case-by-case basis', and

"(2) `such exclusion 
shall be only on a very limited basis', and

"(3) `only upon 
extraordinary circumstances', and

"(4) `for good cause 
shown', and

"(5) `then only for such 
limited time as may be necessary.'"12

ISSUES FOR DECISION IN 
CASE NO. 5724

[¶11.]  Summarized, the main questions in this 
appeal where Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. is appellant may be said to be these: 

1. How is the Public 
Records Act to be construed with respect to police records?

2. What, if any, 
authority do the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution and 
Article 1, Sections 20 and 6 of the Wyoming Constitution give the press to have 
access to the records of law enforcement agencies?

The Law

The Court's Historical 
Disclosure Position

[¶12.]  In Laramie River Conservation Council v. 
Dinger, Wyo., 567 P.2d 731, 733 (1977), we 
compared        
     Wyoming's Public Records Act with the Federal 
Freedom of Information Act and said:

"The policy and dominant 
object of the Freedom of Information Act is on disclosure, not 
secrecy."

We went on to 
say:

"* * * We hold that 
analysis to be applicable to    Wyoming's Public Records Act."

[¶13.]  This holding is but another pronouncement 
from this court having to do with making the public's business available to the 
public whenever that is possible. The courts, legislature, administrative 
agencies, and the state, county and municipal governments should be ever mindful 
that theirs is public business and the public has a right to know how its 
servants are conducting its business. Furthermore, it is for government to 
remember that the written, viewing and broadcasting press are the eyes and ears 
of the people. The citizenry must be permitted to hear and see what public 
officers and their employees say and do whenever the imparting of this knowledge 
does not run contrary to the rights of those otherwise protected in a way that 
would result in disclosure having the effect of inflicting such irreparable harm 
as is recognized at law.

[¶14.]  It was in this vein that we addressed a 
court-closure issue in Williams v. 
Stafford, Wyo., 589 P.2d 322, 325 (1979), when we said:

"There is almost 
universal agreement among the courts, which have considered the right-of-access 
issue, that access to court proceedings should be limited only in exceptional 
circumstances. See Gannett Pacific Corp. 
v. Richardson, supra; Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome 
[478 Pa. 484, 
387 A.2d 425 (1978)], supra; and Keene 
Publishing v. Keene District Court, [117] N.H. [959], 380 A.2d 261 (1977). 
The reason for requiring all court proceedings to be open, except where 
extraordinary reasons for closure are present, is to enhance the public trust 
and confidence in the judicial process, and to insulate the process against 
attempts to use the courts as tools for persecution. Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 
supra."

[¶15.]  The justices of this court, in line with 
the concept of maximum disclosure, have recently opened the Wyoming Supreme 
Court to television coverage so that the people may better see and understand 
the judicial system.

[¶16.]  In Record-Times, Inc. v. Town of Wheatland, 
Wyo., 650 P.2d 297 (1982), when addressing the meaning of a statute which speaks 
to the municipalities' obligation to publish the towns' bills, this court 
concerned itself with the subject of public disclosure of the people's business 
when we held that the intent of the legislature was - and the applicable statute 
required - that the town publish the individual salaries of its employees.13 In the Record-Times opinion we 
said:

"* * * [U]nderlying the 
main issue in this case is the question of public access to public information. 
* * * [W]e are certain that the intent of the legislature in enacting § 15-1-110 
was to insure that the business of each municipality in Wyoming would be subject 
to public scrutiny with respect to the expenditure of funds for all acquired 
debts. The legislature has on several 
occasions expressed the need for maintaining an open and accountable government. 
Examples of this intention are the enactment of the Public Records Act (§§ 
9-9-101 to 9-9-105, W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum.Supp.) and the open meetings statutes 
(§§ 9-11-101 to 9-11-107, W.S. 1977). We said in Laramie River Conservation Council v. 
Dinger, Wyo., 567 P.2d 731, 734 (1977):

"`* * * Confrontation has 
a salutary effect and causes those in positions of public responsibility to 
practice thoughtfulness and wisdom in their utterances and carefully weigh their 
decisions. Paraphrased from Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, [410 U.S. 73, 93 S. Ct. 827, 35 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1973)] supra, such disclosure acts are broadly 
conceived to permit access to information long shielded unnecessarily from 
public view and create judicially enforceable rights to secure information from 
possibly unwilling hands. The disclosure acts promote within the agencies 
affected a sensitiveness to the needs of the public and make democratic 
government function in a modern society. With some necessary exceptions, 
recognized by       
              
   Wyoming's records and meetings acts, state 
agencies must act in a fishbowl. * * *'" (Emphasis and bracketed matter added.) 
650 P.2d  at 300-301.

In the Record-Times, Inc. opinion we went on to 
say:

"* * * The reason for 
openness and accountability in all phases of government cannot be stated any 
better than it was in Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973 
(1980):

"`People in an open society do not demand infallibility 
from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are 
prohibited from observing.' 448 U.S.  at 572, 100 S. Ct.  at 2825.'" 650 P.2d  at 301.

The 
Issues of This Case

[¶17.]  
We come then to the question which asks whether the trial court acted 
properly when it decided that the press has no statutory or constitutional right 
to routinely inspect the City of Sheridan's police rolling log and case 
reports.

[¶18.]  
Where the Wyoming Public Records Act statutes restrict (for purposes of 
the facts of this case) withdrawal to those circumstances where disclosure of 
investigatory documents would not be in the public interest under § 
9-9-103(b)(i), it seems that the triggering of the custodian's withdrawal of the 
rolling log and case reports had little if anything to do with investigatory 
considerations. The record would suggest that the reason for withdrawal of the 
two questioned categories of police records from press inquiry found its origin 
in reaction to public and reporter irritation rather than investigatory 
concerns. Public criticism, together with the violation by the reporters of some 
of the police department's news-gathering rules, bothered the chief of police, 
and the result was his withdrawal of such police records as are at issue here. 
The chief gave the following as an example of news items with respect to which 
he has objection:

"Sharon Busby, 458 Park, had a shocking experience instead 
of an intended nap late Wednesday afternoon. She had been resting when she heard 
a noise outside her home. She ran to her front porch, and was greeted by a man 
who stood yelling obscenities at her while he relieved himself on her front 
steps. He zipped up and drove off with a male companion in a Sheridan pickup while Busby called the police. 
Neither of the men were found."

The 
city attorney disapproved of an item appearing in the Sheridan Press which was 
referred to in the evidence as the "Capillupo Story." It read:

"Connie Capillupo must not have been pleased when she 
returned to her home at 556 N. Gould Saturday afternoon. She had left for a few 
hours, and returned to find someone had made himself at home, apparently fixing 
something to eat and napping on the couch before sleeping - and wetting - in her 
bed. The culprit left behind a pair of boots."

[¶19.]  
Chief of Police Krout was offended by stories appearing in the press 
concerning a Mr. Showers and a Mr. Washut. The Showers item read as 
follows:

"Paul J. Showers, Jr., was jailed late Sunday night on 
disorderly conduct and open container charges. Reportedly, Showers fell asleep 
in the Centennial Theater, 36 E. Alger, during a movie, and could not be roused 
until police were called. A half-full bottle of beer was reportedly found in the 
seat with Showers."

[¶20.]  
The chief objected to the Washut story because the Sheridan Press 
reporter had authored a story from the jail log which contained information that 
had not been disclosed through the news release prepared by the department 
detectives. The department news release read as follows:

"A 
vehicle driven by Stephen Washut, Sheridan, struck a parked vehicle belonging to 
Richard Loeber in the 1600 block of DeSmet at 11:08 p.m. on Saturday. One 
citation issued."

[¶21.]  
The incident was reported in the Sheridan Press as follows:

"Stephen T. Washut was arrested for driving while under the 
influence of intoxicating beverages at 11:23 Saturday night after Washut 
reportedly struck a parked vehicle belonging to Richard Loeber in the 1600 block 
of DeSmet."

The 
Washut incident provided the incentive for the chief's denial of access to the 
jail log, even though he was forced to admit that the news report was accurate. 
However, he closed the jail log because the news report was at variance with the 
prepared news release. His further reason for invoking his closure policy was 
that he wanted to protect the privacy of individuals who are arrested by the 
police department. He pointed out as an example of his concern the fact that Mr. 
Washut was never convicted of the charge of driving while under the 
influence.

[¶22.]  
These news stories and an incident involving another reporter provided 
the impetus for blanket closure of the Sheridan police records. Krout 
explained:

"One 
reporter was caught several times in the detectives office when no one was 
present or after closing hours and was reading cases."

He 
went on to say that one of the reasons for closing all records was to prevent 
the offending reporter from breaking the rules and procedures of the 
department.

Statutory Construction

[¶23.]  
In interpreting statutes relating to public access to public records 
generally - including police records - the applicable rule is that these 
statutes should be construed liberally. It is said in Annot., 82 A.L.R.3d 19, 
42, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutory Provisions Relating to 
Public Access to Police Records:

"Referring to a statute providing that public records 
should be open for inspection at all reasonable times, it was held that doubt 
should be resolved in favor of disclosure of records held by governmental units, 
in Dayton 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Dayton (1976) 45 Ohio St.2d 107, 74 Ohio Ops 2d 209, 341 N.E.2d 576. The court said that, aside from the exceptions to disclosure 
mentioned in the statute, records should be available to the public unless [emphasis in 
text] the custodian 
of such records can show a legal prohibition to disclosure. [Emphasis 
added.]"

[¶24.]  
As noted above, in assigning the same legislative intent to the Wyoming 
Public Records Act as is found characteristic of the Federal Freedom of 
Information Act, we said in Laramie River Conservation Council v. Dinger, 
supra:

"The 
policy and dominant object of the Freedom of Information Act is on disclosure, 
not secrecy. Exemptions, therefore, are to be construed narrowly. Department of Air Force 
v. Rose, 1976, 425 U.S. 352, 96 S. Ct. 1592, 1599, 48 L. Ed. 2d 11; National Labor 
Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1975, 421 U.S. 132, 95 S. Ct. 1504, 44 L. Ed. 2d 29; Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Engineering 
Corporation, 1975, 421 U.S. 168, 95 S. Ct. 1491, 44 L. Ed. 2d 57; and Environmental 
Protection Agency v. Mink, 1973, 410 U.S. 73, 93 S. Ct. 827, 35 L. Ed. 2d 119. 
We hold that analysis to be applicable to Wyoming's Public Records Act." 
(Emphasis added.) 567 P.2d  at 733.

In 
this appeal, the Wyoming Public Records Act will, in accord with our holding in 
the Laramie River Conservation Council case, receive a liberal construction in 
favor of disclosure and against withholding, and "exemptions" will be "construed 
narrowly." Additionally, we recognize the appropriate rule of law to be that 
police records should be available to the public except in those instances where 
the custodian "can show a legal prohibition to disclosure," Dayton Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Dayton, 45 Ohio St.2d 107, 74 Op.2d 209, 341 N.E.2d 576 (1976), and see § 
9-9-103(a)(iii) and (b)(i), supra n. 5.

Constitutional Rights

[¶25.]  
The Sheridan Press has a constitutional right to the disputed material 
under the applicable freedom-of-the-press and due-process provisions of the 
federal and state constitutions. (See n. 3, supra.) This right is qualified by 
the Wyoming statutes which provide that the records, or portions thereof, may be 
withdrawn when the statute or a court directs withdrawal or where the disputed 
materials are investigatory as described by statute and the custodian finds 
withdrawal to be in the public interest. (See nn. 4 and 5, supra.)

[¶26.]  
In Branzburg 
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 2692, 33 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1972), the 
Supreme Court said:

"The 
press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it to 
make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring 
fulfillment to the public's right to know. The right to know is crucial to the 
governing powers of the people * * *."

[¶27.]  
In Procunier 
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 429, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1819, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1974), 
Justice Douglas concurring said:

"Free speech and press, within the meaning of the First 
Amendment, are, in my judgment, among the pre-eminent privileges and immunities 
of all citizens."

[¶28.]  
In Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2809, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1974), 
the Supreme Court acknowledged

"* * 
* that `news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,' * * for 
`without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be 
eviscerated,' * * *." (Quoting from Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, 408 U.S.  at 707 and 681, 92 S. Ct.  at 2670 and 2656.) 417 U.S.  at 833, 94 S. Ct.  at 2809.

[¶29.]  
Again in Pell 
v. Procunier, supra, the Court said:

"The 
constitutional guarantee of a free press `assures the maintenance of our 
political system and an open society,' Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 [87 S. Ct. 534, 
543, 17 L. Ed. 2d 456] (1967), and secures `the paramount public interest in a 
free flow of information to the people concerning public officials,' Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 [85 S. Ct. 209, 217, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125] (1964). See 
also New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 [84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686] (1964). By the 
same token, `"[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court 
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."' New York Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 [91 S. Ct. 2140, 2141, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822] 
(1971); Organization 
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 [91 S. Ct. 1575, 29 L. Ed. 2d 1] 
(1971); Bantam 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 [83 S. Ct. 631, 639, 9 L. Ed. 2d 584] 
(1963); Near v. 
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 [51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357] (1931). 
Correlatively, the First and Fourteenth Amendments also protect the right of the 
public to receive such information and ideas as are published. Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. [753], at 762-763 [92 S. Ct. 2576 at 2581-82, 33 L. Ed. 2d 683]; Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 [89 S. Ct. 1243, 1247, 22 L. Ed. 2d 542] (1969)." 
417 U.S.  at 832, 94 S. Ct.  at 2809.

[¶30.]  
In Houston 
Chronicle Publishing Company v. City of Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 531 S.W.2d 177, 82 A.L.R.3d 1 (1975), where the right of police record availability was 
denied as it has been here, the Texas court, in supporting the Chronicle's right 
of access, said:

"We 
hold that the press and the public have a constitutional right of access to 
information concerning crime in the community, and to information relating to 
activities of law enforcement agencies. In determining the reach of this 
constitutional right of access, it is necessary to weigh and evaluate legitimate 
competing interests."

[¶31.]  
According to the Houston Chronicle court, the "competing interests" 
which the custodian must take into account when exercising discretion are 
discussed as follows:

"As 
applied to this case, the competing legitimate interests are clear and 
important. The first legitimate interest to be considered is the people's right 
to know. This interest is particularly sensitive and important as applied to 
police activity. The increasing crime rate is a subject of paramount importance 
to the public. We have, on the one hand, those who fear that the activities of 
the police will lead to impositions on the individual in the form of wire 
tapping or police brutality. Their focus of concern is on the creation of a 
police state. On the other hand, we have those with a legitimate fear of ever 
increasing criminal activity, violence, and unsafe streets.

"The 
City and State have a legitimate interest in preserving the secrecy of their 
records from the eyes of defendants and their counsel in criminal actions. The 
trial of a criminal case is an adversary proceeding. Whatever we hold to be 
available to the press must also be available to the public. At the present time 
the records contained in the offense report are not available to criminal 
defense counsel except in cases where good cause is shown in a motion under the 
discovery provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. * * * Discovery of such 
reports has been denied. * * *.

"Furthermore, the state has a legitimate interest in 
preventing excess publicity which might lead to a denial of due process and 
endanger the prosecution. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S. Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966)." 531 S.W.2d  at 186.

[¶32.]  
We confirm that First and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights of 
access to the police records may be and in Wyoming are conditioned by statutory 
restrictions and balanced with relevant competing-interest considerations. The 
Public Records Act does not make all records available for public inspection in 
all circumstances. The legislature does indeed have authority to promulgate and 
has imposed such statutory restraints upon the news-gathering business as will 
best serve the public good. These restraints may not, however, unlawfully deny 
the people's right to be kept informed. A restriction having this effect would 
run the risk of a First or Fourteenth Amendment violation.

[¶33.]  
Given the policy of the state as announced through the Public Records 
Act,14 the custodian, in any exercise of his right to 
withdraw, must confine his withdrawal discretion to those areas and 
circumstances prescribed by this Act. Having taken this restriction into 
account, the custodian must then employ his discretion on a selective basis 
rather than through the withdrawal of entire categories of public records - as 
was done by the chief of police in this case. Since the public policy which 
pertains to the Public Records Act speaks to the philosophy of disclosure, it is 
therefore contrary to that philosophy for the police chief to withdraw entire 
categories of public records - or any public records - without first addressing 
the issue which asks whether or not the withdrawal of individual records, 
documents, or portions thereof violates provisions of the Act. In other words, 
the language of the statute imposes a legislative presumption which says that, 
where public records are involved, the denial of inspection is contrary to the 
public policy, the public interest and the competing interests of those 
involved. This, then, places the burden of proof upon the custodian to show that 
the exercise of his discretion does not run afoul of statutory limitations in 
any particular instance where custodial withdrawal is effected.

[¶34.]  
Consistent with the thought that the blanket withdrawal of the rolling 
log and case reports are violative of the statutory and constitutional rights of 
the appellant, we hold that the appellee cannot sustain a denial of access to 
the rolling log and case reports on the ground that the records may, from time 
to time - or occasionally - or sometimes - contain exempt investigatory 
material. See: Northern California Police Practices Project v. Craig, 
90 Cal. App. 3d 116, 153 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1979); Johnson v. Winter, 
127 Cal. App. 3d 435, 179 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1982); State ex rel. Stephan 
v. Harder, 230 Kan. 573, 641 P.2d 366 (1982); Department of the Air 
Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 96 S. Ct. 1592, 48 L. Ed. 2d 11 (1976); Mead Data Central, Inc. v. 
United States Department of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Environmental 
Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 S. Ct. 827, 35 L. Ed. 2d 119 
(1973).

[¶35.]  
Northern 
California Police Practices Project v. Craig, supra, was an action brought 
by a civil liberties organization and others against the State Highway Patrol, 
seeking disclosure under the Public Records Act of material utilized by the 
patrol training officers. The court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to 
nonsensitive materials contained in documents otherwise exempt from disclosure. 
The Court of Appeals said:

"The 
PRA is modeled upon the Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (Cook v. Craig, 
supra, 55 Cal.App.3d [773] at p. 781, 127 Cal.Rptr. 712). Like the PRA `The 
focus of the FOIA is information, not documents, and an agency cannot justify 
withholding an entire document simply by showing that it contains some exempt 
material.' * * * While it is true that Congress amended the FOIA in 1974 
expressly to require disclosure of `[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a 
[public] record' (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)), the amendment only codified the 
interpretation theretofore accorded the Act by the federal courts. * * * 
Similarly, the PRA has been judicially interpreted to require segregation of 
exempt from nonexempt materials contained in a single document. (American Federation of 
State, etc. Employees v. Regents of University of California (1978) 80 Cal. App. 3d 913, 919, 146 Cal.Rptr. 42)." 153 Cal.Rptr., at 178.

[¶36.]  
The California Court of Appeals also said in Johnson v. Winter, 
supra:

"* * 
* The PRA has been judicially construed to require that where nonexempt 
materials are not inextricably intertwined with exempt materials and are 
reasonably segregable, segregation and disclosure of the nonexempt materials is 
required to satisfy the objectives of the act. (Northern Cal. Police 
Practices Project v. Craig (1979) 90 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123-124, 153 Cal.Rptr. 
173). We also note that the PRA has recently been amended to provide that when a 
request is received for a copy of records, any `reasonably segregable portion of 
a record' is to be provided after deletion of the portions which are exempt by 
law. (Stats. 1981, ch. 968, § 3.5.)" 179 Cal. Rptr.  at 588-589.

[¶37.]  
State ex rel. 
Stephan v. Harder, supra, was a declaratory-judgment action which sought 
disclosure of names of physicians and the amount of public funds paid to each 
for abortions performed during a particular time period. The public records 
involved contained both confidential and nonexempt information. In this regard, 
the Kansas court said:

"We 
have seen that the information requested exists as a part of official public 
records which are by law required to be kept and maintained. The same records, 
however, contain information which is by law confidential and may not be 
released. We think it is far more consistent with the purpose of the Kansas 
public records inspection act to interpret that act as we now do. We hold that 
the act implies a duty upon the agency to delete confidential and nondisclosable 
information from that which may be disclosed, and thus to carry out the act's 
purpose of making available for public inspection all disclosable parts of the 
public record. Were this not so, any record which an agency is required by law 
to keep could be rendered inaccessible to public scrutiny by including 
confidential material therein." 641 P.2d  at 374.

[¶38.]  
In Mead Data 
Central, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Air Force, supra, the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia holds as follows:

"The 
focus of the FOIA is information, not documents, and an agency cannot justify 
withholding an entire document simply by showing that it contains some exempt 
material. It has long been a rule in this Circuit that nonexempt portions of a 
document must be disclosed unless they are inextricably intertwined with exempt 
portions. In 1974, Congress expressly incorporated that requirement into the 
FOIA, which now states that `[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record 
shall be provided * * * after deletion of the portions which are exempt.' 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp.V 1975)." 566 F.2d  at 260.

[¶39.]  
Provisions of the Freedom of Information Act were construed in Environmental 
Protection Agency v. Mink, supra. Regarding the mixture of exempt and 
disclosable material in the same documents, the Supreme Court said:

"* * 
* Congress sensibly discarded a wooden exemption that could have meant 
disclosure of manifestly private and confidential policy recommendations simply 
because the document containing them also happened to contain factual data. That 
decision should not be taken, however, to embrace an equally wooden exemption 
permitting the withholding of factual material otherwise available on discovery 
merely because it was placed in a memorandum with matters of law, policy, or 
opinion. It appears to us that Exemption 5 contemplates that the public's access 
to internal memoranda will be governed by the same flexible, commonsense 
approach that has long governed private parties' discovery of such documents 
involved in litigation with Government agencies. And, as noted, that approach 
extended and continues to extend to the discovery of purely factual material 
appearing in those documents in a form that is severable without compromising 
the private remainder of the documents." 410 U.S.  at 91, 93 S. Ct.  at 
838.

[¶40.]  
From these authorities, it can be concluded that the City of Sheridan and 
its chief of police may not deny inspection of individual or classes of 
documents, including rolling logs and case reports, simply because some exempt 
material may be contained in those records. Neither can a particular police 
record - again including a rolling log or case report - be withdrawn where it is 
possible for the sensitive information to be excised and the balance of the 
record made available to public inspection. Exempt material can be segregated. 
The records may be structured to provide the information the public is entitled 
to have. Houston 
Chronicle Publishing Company v. City of Houston, supra. The chief of police 
must exercise discretion to deny inspection of case reports where disclosure 
would impair an investigation or compromise the prosecution of a case, or where 
the custodian is otherwise exercising his discretion within the authority of the 
Wyoming Public Records Act. The judgment of the trial court, as it now stands, 
provides for blanket exemption of these categories of records, absent a showing 
that the documents qualify for lawful withdrawal. This is not permissible under 
the Public Records Act. The appellant has both a statutory and constitutional 
right of access to the rolling log and the case reports. 

[¶41.]  
For the custodian to identify a document or portions thereof as falling 
within a category which statutorily qualifies for withdrawal is not to say that 
the document or piece of information may in fact be withdrawn. Where 
police-record information is identified as being qualified for withdrawal, the 
custodian must still exercise his discretion within the parameters of statutory 
restrictions. He must next test any contemplated withholding decision by asking 
whether withdrawal will be in the public interest. The issue of custodial 
withdrawal procedure and the standards for the exercise of discretion was 
addressed in Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis.2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179, 184 (1979), where the court said:

"To 
implement this presumption [that withdrawal is contrary to the public interest], 
our opinions have set out procedure and legal standards for determining whether 
inspection of records is mandated by the statute. In the first instance, when a 
demand to inspect public records is made, the custodian of the records must 
weigh the competing interests involved and determine whether permitting 
inspection would result in harm to the public interest which outweighs the 
legislative policy recognizing the public interest in allowing inspection. Beckon v. Emery, 
[36 Wis.2d 510, 153 N.W.2d 501, 503 (1967).] If the custodian decides not to 
allow inspection, he must state specific public-policy reasons for the refusal. 
These reasons provide a basis for review in the event of court action. * * * The 
custodian of the records must satisfy the court that the public policy 
presumption in favor of disclosure is outweighed by even more important 
public-policy considerations.

"Whether harm to the public interest from inspection 
outweighs the public interest in inspection is a question of law. The duty of 
the custodian is to specify reasons for nondisclosure and the court's role is to 
decide whether the reasons asserted are sufficient. It is not the trial court's 
or this court's role to hypothesize reasons or to consider reasons for not 
allowing inspection which were not asserted by the custodian. If the custodian 
gives no reasons or gives insufficient reasons for withholding a public record, 
a writ of mandamus compelling the production of the records must issue. Beckon, supra, 36 
Wis.2d at 518, 153 N.W.2d  at 504 states, `[T]here is an absolute right to 
inspect a public document in the absence of specifically stated 
sufficient 
reasons to the contrary.' (Emphasis supplied.)" (Bracketed material 
added.)

[¶42.]  
We agree that the procedure outlined in Newspapers, Inc., 
supra, and Beckon v. 
Emery, 36 Wis.2d 510, 153 N.W.2d 501 (1967), for the exercise of the 
custodian's discretion is sound. The kinds of factors which he must consider in 
contemplating nondisclosure of public information are recognized competing 
legitimate interests - such as the public's right to know - the crime rate, as a 
factor of importance to the public - the concern of those who fear that police 
activity will interfere with their individual rights as those fears are balanced 
against the concerns of those who perceive law enforcement to be too lax and 
inadequate. The custodian must protect the prosecutorial and investigatory 
process but, in doing this, may not carelessly withhold public information under 
the guise that it has prosecutorial or investigatory value when such is not the 
case. There may be other public-interest concerns which the law recognizes and 
which may properly be ground into the discretion-exercising process, but they 
must be real and not fancied, and they must contain public and/or private 
welfare considerations which will have a lawful counterbalancing effect when 
placed on the scales in the public-interest weighing process.

[¶43.]  
Given the provisions of our Public Records Act, § 9-9-101 through § 
9-9-105, we find the contemplation of the great issues as discussed in Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Breier, supra, Beckon v. Emery, supra, and Houston Chronicle 
Publishing Company v. City of Houston, supra, to be sound. In Wyoming, 
public records (including police records) are to be open to the public unless 
the custodian - after restricting his decision-making to areas authorized by 
statute and after weighing the competing interests involving the public's right 
to know against specific statutory mandate and perceived harm to the public 
interest through disclosure - decides to withdraw the record or a part thereof. 
When he does withdraw records, reasons therefor must be given so that these 
reasons may provide grounds for review should court action result (see nn. 6 and 
7, supra). In that event, the custodian must be able to satisfy the court that, 
in the balancing process, statutory withdrawal, when viewed in the spotlight of 
public-interest protections, outweighs the public policy which emphasizes 
disclosure. If, however, the custodian gives either no reasons or inadequate 
reasons for withdrawal, appropriate legal action is available to force an 
automatic disclosure of the records. Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, supra.

[¶44.]  
As we have noted, the Wyoming statutes provide that the custodian may 
withdraw from inspection only such records as may be described as investigatory 
or intelligence, or those compiled for prosecution purposes. See § 
9-9-103(b)(i), W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum. Supp., supra n. 5. It is for us, then, to 
decide whether "rolling logs" and "case reports" are investigatory or 
intelligence records, or records compiled for prosecution purposes. If these 
categories of records do fall within these statutory classifications, we must 
then resolve the question which asks whether or not the public interest required 
their withdrawal. Ancillary to these main issues is the question which wants to 
know whether the custodian furnished adequate reason for withdrawing these 
categories of public records even if they do fall within the statutory 
categories which qualify them for withdrawal, and even if public-interest 
considerations weigh in favor of nondisclosure.

[¶45.]  
We therefore address the first question, which is: Are the rolling logs 
and case reports investigatory and/or intelligence records within the meaning of 
the statute, or are they records compiled for such prosecution or 
law-enforcement purposes as are contemplated by statute? It is clear to us that 
all information 
in these categories of public police records does not fall within the statutory 
investigatory or prosecutorial exemptions of the statute. As a matter of fact, 
the chief of police testified that the rolling-log information is not acquired 
as a result of investigatory activity (supra, n. 8) We do not, however, doubt 
that some 
information in these records (particularly the case reports) may well fall 
within these statutorily authorized withdrawal categories. We have, however, no 
way of knowing what public-interest considerations the custodian took into 
account which he perceived would outweigh the state's policy of nondisclosure. 
Given the condition of the record, we are unable to ascertain whether the 
records were investigatory in character - and, if they were, what competing 
interests the chief was balancing which would permit him to come to the 
conclusion that the public good required the press be denied their access. There 
is no disclosure of this information in the record, unless it can be said that, 
with reference to the rolling log, the custodian wanted to protect those who 
called in with initial complaints and information. We consider this explanation 
given for withdrawal to be insufficient in that the relevant provisions of the 
Public Records Act did not give the chief of police of Sheridan blanket 
authority to withdraw the rolling log and case reports from public inspection 
out of any such inadequate considerations. These categories of public records 
may not be carte blanche described as the kinds of records that the statutes 
permit the custodian to withdraw from press and public inquiry. There may be 
some investigatory or prosecutorial information or records within these 
categories of police documents, but such information has not been sorted out for 
selective withdrawal and the action of the chief of police in invoking blanket 
withholding instead of withdrawal on a case-by-case or record-by-record basis, 
according to statutory authority, is not shown to be justified.

[¶46.]  
Having said this about the first query (i.e., Do the rolling logs and 
case reports fall into the categories of information with respect to which the 
custodian may exercise his right of withdrawal?), the second and third questions 
seem to answer themselves. Since there is no showing whether the two categories 
of withdrawn records contain investigatory or prosecutorial material, or are 
otherwise statutorily qualified for withdrawal, we are only able to say that the 
record at least is such that it must be concluded that these records as a class 
could not be withdrawn, but we cannot say - because of lack of proof - whether 
or not the public's interest would require any particular records or portions of 
records to be withdrawn. Lastly, it follows from what we have said that the 
custodian has failed to show adequate reason for record-withdrawal. 
Nondisclosure cannot rest upon the chief's decision to exclude public records 
from inspection just because the people whose names have appeared in the 
newspaper have become irate; nor will nondisclosure be permitted to rest upon 
the pique that the chief of police has with the way the newspaper gathers its 
news.

[¶47.]  
It was said in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 
613, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1976):

"* * 
* [T]he press may be arrogant, tyrannical, abusive and sensationalist, just as 
it may be incisive, probing and informative. But at least in the context of 
prior restraints on publication, the decision of what, when, and how to publish 
is for editors not judges * * *" -

or - 
we might add - the keepers of public records.

[¶48.]  
Case No. 5724 is reversed.

DECISION IN CASE NO. 5725

[¶49.]  
In Case No. 5725, it is the City of Sheridan that seeks relief from the 
judgment of the court. The trial court ordered that the public be permitted to 
inspect the "jail log," "reports of the investigation of vehicular and traffic 
accidents" and "complaints and citations issued." The court further ordered that 
there was nothing to preclude the chief of police from excluding any of those 
records from public scrutiny providing he did so

"on 
a case by case basis * * * it being understood that such exclusion shall be only 
on a very limited basis and only upon extraordinary circumstances and for good 
cause shown and then only for such limited time as may be 
necessary."

[¶50.]  
The appellant frames the statement of the issues as follows:

"(1) 
Assuming that a jail log, reports of investigations of vehicular and traffic 
accidents and complaints and citations prepared and maintained by a police 
department are `public records' within the context of the Wyoming Public Records 
Act, has the District Court imposed additional requirements not included in or 
contemplated by the Statute upon the Custodian when he considers denying the 
right of inspection of such records and thereby, in effect, granted a permanent 
injunction preventing the Custodian of those records from carrying out his 
statutory duty by:

(a) 
imposing upon him a requirement that any restriction of such records be on a 
`case-by-case basis'?, and

"(b) 
by imposing upon him a requirement that any restriction upon access to such 
records `shall be only on a very limited basis and only upon extraordinary 
circumstances and for good cause shown and then only for such limited time as 
may be necessary'?"

[¶51.]  
We will affirm the trial court and hold that the court's order does not 
impose any restrictions upon the custodian of police records which is not 
authorized by statute.

[¶52.]  
We do this on the theory that we perceive the trial court to be carrying 
out the law pertaining to the Wyoming Public Records Act as we have described 
our understanding of the law in the foregoing opinion in Case No. 5724, where 
Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. is the appellant.

[¶53.]  
By his order, the judge has simply said that the documents in question 
may be withdrawn from public view when, in the discretion of the custodian, the 
statutorily authorized conditions exist. (See n. 5, where the withdrawal 
conditions under § 9-9-103 are set out.) We understand the judge's order to hold 
that the documents in question are public records and that they must stand for 
public inspection unless inspection is foreclosed by order or rule of the 
Supreme Court (§ 9-9-103(a)(iii)), or the custodian finds the public interest to 
require withdrawal of any of the records or portions thereof as contemplated by 
§ 9-9-103(b)(i).

[¶54.]  
According to our interpretation of the court's order, instead of 
restricting the custodian's authority under the statute, the court was 
attempting to specify the conditions for withdrawal that were contemplated by 
the statute where it is provided that the custodian may exercise his discretion 
to withdraw the questioned document when it is in the public interest, as 
contemplated by § 9-9-103(b)(i). Thus, the trial judge has said that the "jail 
log," "reports of the investigation of vehicular and traffic accidents" and 
"complaints and citations" could be withdrawn by the custodian "on a case by 
case basis" for a "very limited" time under "extraordinary circumstances" for 
"good cause shown." We interpret the "cause" mentioned in the phrase "good cause 
shown" to be the cause contemplated by § 9-9-103(a)(iii) or (b)(i). Of course, 
if the court in fact sought to permit the custodian to withdraw public records 
for some cause which was not contemplated by the Public Records Act, then such 
withdrawal would be in violation of the statute and the public policy of the 
state which recognizes disclosure and rejects public-record withholding except 
where authorized by statute. Laramie Rivers Conservation Council v. Dinger, 
supra.

[¶55.]  
But this is not the way we understand the court's order. We understand it 
to be an attempt to define the authority of the records custodian within the 
parameters of the statute and the law pertaining to the subject of 
public-records withdrawal as discussed in our opinion in Case No. 5724, and it 
is with this understanding that we affirm the judgment.

[¶56.]  
Case No. 5725 is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 
This denial of access was outlined in a letter from the chief of police, 
custodian of police records, in the following form:

"July 31, 1981

"TO: 
All News Media Stations

"FROM: Roger F. Krout, Chief of Police "The purpose of this 
letter is to advise all news media and their representatives of the policy which 
will be followed by the Sheridan Police Department in any future releases of 
information from department records, reports, and logs.

"Effective immediately, all news releases from the Sheridan 
Police Department will be in the form of a written statement prepared by the 
Department and disseminated uniformly to all news media.

"Once each week at a time to be fixed, a news conference 
will be held by the Police Department and conducted by a representative of the 
Detective's Office, the Assistant Chief, or the Chief of Police.

"Effective immediately, no information concerning an 
ongoing investigator or a report of crime will be disseminated without the 
personal approval of the Chief of Police, or in his absence the Assistant Chief, 
the senior Detective, or the City Attorney.

"All 
records of investigation transferred to the office of County Attorney and 
information contained therein, will be released only upon the specific approval 
of the County Attorney.

"Following the arrest of any individual or individuals for 
the commission of a crime, information concerning those persons and the specific 
crime for which arrested will be made available to news media unless to do so 
would not serve a legitimate law enforcement function such as compromising a 
continuing investigation.

"No 
media representative will be permitted individual access to reports, case files, 
or logs' of cases in progress.

"/s/ 
Roger F. Krout 

Chief of Police

"RFK: 11w 

"CC: 
Sheridan Press 

KWYO 
Radio 

KROE 
Radio

Billings Gazette 

Casper Star Tribune 

KSGW 
TV"

2 
Under the Wyoming Public Records Act, § 9-9-101 through § 9-9-105, W.S. 1977, 
enacted by Ch. 145, S.L. of Wyoming 1969, as amended. See nn. 4 and 5, 
infra.

3 
Under Art. 1, § 20 freedom-of-speech-and-press, and Art. 1, § 6 due-process 
clauses of the Wyoming Constitution, and the First (freedom-of-speech-and-press) 
and Fourteenth (due-process) Amendments to the Federal Constitution. In Stromberg v. 
California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 2d 1117 (1931), Mr. Justice 
Hughes said that the First Amendment was applicable to the states by reason of 
the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution.

4 
Public records are defined at § 9-9-101(a)(i), W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum.Supp., as 
follows:

"(i) 
`Public records' when not otherwise specified shall include any paper, 
correspondence, form, book, photograph, photostat, film, microfilm, sound 
recording, map drawing, or other document, regardless of physical form or 
characteristics, and including all copies thereof, that have been made by the 
state of Wyoming and any * * * municipalities * * * or received by them in 
connection with the transaction of public business, except those privileged or 
confidential by law;" Section 9-9-102(a), W.S. 1977 requires:

"All 
public records shall be open for inspection by any person at reasonable times, 
except as provided in this act [§§ 9-9-101 to 9-9-105] or as otherwise provided 
by law, but the official custodian of any public records may make such rules and 
regulations with reference to the inspection of such records as shall be 
reasonably necessary for the protection of such records and the prevention of 
unnecessary interference with the regular discharge of the duties of the 
custodian or his office."

5 The 
Act makes provision for denying the right to inspect a public record or portions 
thereof and the sections of the statute which, for purposes of this appeal, 
address denial, are found in § 9-9-103, W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum.Supp. where it is 
provided:

"(a) 
The custodian of any public records shall allow any person the right of 
inspection of such records or any portion thereof except on one (1) or more of 
the following grounds or as provided in subsection (b) or (d) of this 
section:

* * 
* * * *

"(iii) Such inspection is prohibited by rules promulgated 
by the supreme court, or by the order of any court of record.

"(b) 
The custodian may deny the right of inspection of the following records, unless 
otherwise provided by law, on the ground that disclosure to the applicant would 
be contrary to the public interest:

"(i) 
Records of investigations conducted by, or of intelligence information or 
security procedures of, any sheriff, county attorney, district attorney, city 
attorney, the attorney general, police department or any investigatory files 
compiled for any other law enforcement or prosecution purposes;

* * 
* * * *

"(v) 
Interagency or intraagency memorandums or letters which would not be available 
by law to a private party in litigation with the agency."

6 
Section 9-9-103(e), W.S. 1977 reads:

"If 
the custodian denies access to any public record, the applicant may request a 
written statement of the grounds for the denial, which statement shall cite the 
law or regulation under which access is denied, and it shall be furnished 
forthwith to the applicant."

7 
Section 9-9-103(f), W.S. 1977 reads:

"Any 
person denied the right to inspect any record covered by this act may apply to 
the district court of the district wherein the record is found for any order 
directing the custodian of such record to show cause why he should not permit 
the inspection of such record."

8 
When the chief of police was being questioned, this exchange took 
place:

"Q. 
But, the record [rolling log] doesn't reflect any of the materials or 
information obtained as a result of an investigation.

"A. 
No, sir."

9 The 
description of the case report is substantially from the City of Sheridan's 
brief.

10 We 
said in Williams v. 
Stafford, Wyo., 589 P.2d 322, 325 (1979):

"* * 
* Their [the press'] right to be present [at a bail-bond hearing] derives from 
their status as members of the public." Citing Gannett Pacific 
Corporation v. Richardson, 59 Haw. 224, 580 P.2d 49, 55 (1978).

The 
court said in Houston Chronicle Publishing Company v. City of 
Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 531 S.W.2d 177, 82 A.L.R.3d 1 (1975):

"However, it has often been said that the first amendment 
does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to 
information not available to the public generally. Pell v. Procunier, 
417 U.S. 817, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington 
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 94 S. Ct. 2811, 41 L. Ed. 2d 514 (1974)."

11 
Appellee cites as authority for custodial withdrawal, subsection (v) of § 
9-9-103(b), W.S. 1977, but the City does not cite one single authority for the 
proposition that the rolling logs or case reports are interagency or intraagency 
memorandums within the contemplation of the Act. We will therefore not consider 
the issue. This court will not consider appellate contentions that are supported 
with perfunctory argument and no authority. Barnette v. Doyle, 
Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349 
(1982).

12 
From the appellant City's brief in case No. 5725.

13 
Section 15-1-110, W.S. 1977 provides:

"The 
governing body of each city and town shall designate a legal newspaper and 
publish once the minutes of all its regular and special meetings and the titles 
of all ordinances passed. If no newspaper is published in the city or town the 
proceedings or ordinances need not be published. The clerk of each city or town, 
within forty-eight (48) hours after adjournment of every meeting, shall furnish 
the newspaper a copy of the proceedings of the meeting. The copy shall include 
every bill presented to the governing body showing the amount of the bill, the 
amount allowed, the purpose of the bill and the claimant."

14 The 
policy of the state is on disclosure - not secrecy. Laramie River 
Conservation Council v. Dinger, supra.

ROONEY, 
Chief Justice, concurring in Case No. 5724 and dissenting in Case No. 5725, with 
whom RAPER, 
Justice, joins.

[¶57.]  
At the outset, I want to emphasize that I believe the City1 acted improperly in denying to the Newspaper2 access to general information contained in its 
records. This right to access is specifically and positively set forth in the 
Wyoming Public Records Act, §§ 9-9-101 through 9-9-105, W.S. 1977 (now §§ 
16-4-201 through 16-4-205, W.S. 1977, 1982 Replacement). I disagree with the 
dicta in the majority opinion which would extend by judicial fiat the perimeters 
of the right of access beyond that specifically set forth in such 
act.

[¶58.]  
I agree that access cannot be denied to entire categories of records 
simply because one or more of the items therein may be that to which access can 
properly be denied. However, if the category includes only that to which access 
can properly be denied, access to the category itself can properly be denied, 
e.g. a category of pending investigative matters. In this instance the "rolling 
log" record and "case report" record were categorized types of records 
containing information other than that excepted by statute from public access, 
and the City could not properly deny access to them.

[¶59.]  
If the City first recorded incoming calls and complaints on index cards 
which were directed into an area of specific action whereby the investigative or 
intelligence information was immediately separated, there could be a different 
result. Today, the initial information can be computerized to obtain the same 
end. Investigative and intelligence information can be immediately segregated, 
and access to the specifically segregated information can properly be denied. 
Such was not done in this instance, and the City's action was contrary to that 
required by the Wyoming Public Records Act.

[¶60.]  
My basic disagreement with the majority opinion is the establishment by 
it of a requirement over and beyond the statutory requirement for denying access 
to police investigative reports3, intelligence information4, and security 
procedures. The statutory language with reference to police records is plain and 
unambiguous:

"(b) 
The custodian may deny the right of inspection of the following records, unless 
otherwise provided by law, on the ground that disclosure to the applicant would 
be contrary to the public interest;

"(i) 
Records of investigations conducted by, or of intelligence information or 
security procedures of, any sheriff, county attorney, city attorney, the 
attorney general, police department or any investigatory files compiled for any 
other law enforcement or prosecution purposes." Section 9-9-103(b)(i), W.S. 1977 
(now § 16-4-203, W.S. 1977, 1982 Replacement).

[¶61.]  
In construing a statute, its words must be given their plain and ordinary 
meanings, Jahn v. 
Burns, Wyo., 593 P.2d 828 (1979); Schwager v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1303 (1979); Belco Petroleum 
Corporation v. State Board of Equalization, Wyo., 587 P.2d 204 (1978). When 
a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of 
construction and the court may not look for or impose another meaning. Board of County 
Commissioners of County of Campbell v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174, reh. denied 
627 P.2d 163 (1981); State v. Sinclair 
Pipeline Company, Wyo., 605 P.2d 377 (1980); and Hayes v. State, Wyo., 599 P.2d 558 
(1979).

[¶62.]  
The statute provides in plain, simple language that the custodian may 
deny the right to inspect police (1) records of investigation, (2) intelligence 
information, or (3) security procedures on the ground that disclosure would be 
contrary to the public interest. In other words, once inspection of the specific 
type of record is requested, denial to do so can be made on the ground that such 
would be contrary to the public interest. The custodian need not exercise 
additional discretion. The legislature has decided that these types of records 
fall into the status whereby inspection would be contrary to the public 
interest, and that inspection of them may be denied for that reason. The 
majority opinion would require the custodian to decide whether or not these 
records are such that inspection would be contrary to the public interest. The 
legislature has already made this decision. In the absence of statute, police 
records are generally held to be confidential, Whittle v. Munshower, 221 Md. 
258, 155 A.2d 670 (1959), cert. denied 362 U.S. 981, 80 S. Ct. 1069, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1016 (1960). Our statute relaxes this confidentiality, but only to the extent 
set forth in the statute. It specifies that only information from investigative 
reports, intelligence information and security procedures is to be in the realm 
of that which disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. Therefore, 
disclosure to such information may be denied on that basis without 
more.

[¶63.]  
Of course, labeling information as "investigative" or "intelligence" or 
"security procedure" does not make it so. One seeking information is entitled to 
a court determination of the propriety of such labeling. This determination can 
be made in camera or otherwise. Conway v. United States Internal Revenue Service, 447 F. Supp. 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) specifically permits in 
camera examination under the federal act at the discretion of the court. In this 
instance, the records in question may have contained some investigative or 
intelligence matters, but that fact would not prevent access by the Newspaper to 
the records. If City wanted to prevent disclosure of such investigative and 
intelligence matter, it should not have been included in the broad category with 
many other types of information. For this reason, I concur in the result reached 
by the majority opinion in Case No. 5724.

[¶64.]  
I dissent from the result reached by the majority opinion in Case No. 
5725 because I believe the trial court added requirements to those set forth by 
statute for denying access to police investigative reports, intelligence 
information and security procedures. The statute does not require "extraordinary 
circumstances," "good cause shown" or a limitation on time for denial of access. 
As already noted, the statute is plain in setting forth the requirements. They 
are not to be enlarged by judicial legislation.

[¶65.]  
Take an example. Information is requested concerning security procedures 
taken by the police acting in cooperation with the secret service for protection 
of the president on a visit to the city. All the custodian of the records need 
write in refusing such access is that the disclosure would be contrary to public 
interest. On challenge in court pursuant to statute and with reference to 
statutory requirements, the court need only satisfy itself that the information 
was of security procedures. It would be unnecessary to decide whether or not the 
placing of guards at specific points was in the public interest; whether or not 
back-up personnel was being strategically placed in the public interest; whether 
or not crowd infiltration was needed and in the public interest; whether or not 
dog-assisted inspection of a meeting place was in the public interest, and so 
on.

[¶66.]  
With the requirements added by the majority opinion, the custodian would 
also have to show "good cause" to place personnel on roof tops and other places, 
to infiltrate the crowd, to search the meeting place, etc. He would have to show 
extraordinary circumstances in protecting this visit as distinguished from other 
presidential visits. He could limit access for only a limited time even though 
the same procedures are used for other visits and lose much of their efficacy if 
they become well known.

[¶67.]  
I believe the plain words of the statute set forth the requirements for 
refusing disclosure and an effort to enlarge or embellish such is improper. For 
this reason, I dissent from the majority opinion in Case No. 5725.

FOOTNOTES

1 
Appellee in Case No. 5724 - appellant in Case No. 5725 is referred to herein as 
"City."

2 
Appellant in Case No. 5724 - appellee in Case No. 5725 is referred to herein as 
"Newspaper."

3 
Investigative records are those compiled for law enforcement purposes through 
inquiry, information or observation. See Williams v. Internal Revenue Service, 345 F. Supp. 591 
(D.C. Del. 1972), aff'd 479 F.2d 317, cert. denied 414 U.S. 1024, 94 S. Ct. 448, 38 L. Ed. 2d 315 (1973); and Stein v. Department of Justice and FBI, 662 F.2d 1245 
(7th Cir. 1981).

4 
Intelligence information is that obtained from sources which would provide 
information only on a confidential basis or that pertaining to matters or 
persons believed to be furnished only if kept confidential to such matters or 
persons. See Alfred 
A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 421 U.S. 992, 95 S. Ct. 1999, 44 L. Ed. 2d 482, reh. denied 422 U.S. 1049, 95 S. Ct. 2669, 45 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1975); Sims v. 
Central Intelligence Agency, 642 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1980).