Case Title: Styller v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Lynnfield

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12901

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12901 
 
ALEXANDER STYLLER  vs.  ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF LYNNFIELD 
& another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 9, 2020. - June 7, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Real Property, Lease.  Zoning, By-law, Permitted use, Lodging 
house, Person aggrieved.  Jurisdiction, Justiciable 
question, Land Court.  Land Court, Jurisdiction.  Practice, 
Civil, Standing, Substitution, Moot case.  Moot Question.  
Words, "Tourist home." 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
December 23, 2016. 
 
The case was heard by Keith C. Long, J., and a motion to 
amend the findings was considered by him. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Lester E. Riordan, III, for the plaintiff. 
Thomas A. Mullen for the defendants. 
 
 
 
 
1 Building inspector of Lynnfield. 
2 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  General Laws c. 40A, § 6, generally protects 
property uses that were lawfully in existence prior to newly 
adopted restrictive zoning regulations.2  In this case, the 
plaintiff, Alexander Styller,3 contends that use of his family 
home for short-term rentals constituted a prior nonconforming 
use that is exempt from a zoning bylaw of the town of Lynnfield 
(town) that, as amended in 2016, expressly forbids such rentals 
in single-residence zoning districts.  He asks the court to 
overturn the Land Court judge's decision and rule that short-
term rentals were permissible prior to the bylaw amendments.  We 
decline to do so. 
 
1.  Overview of town bylaw governing single-residence 
district uses.  Section 4 of the town's zoning bylaw prohibits 
any property use that is not specifically authorized..  During 
the relevant period, section 4.1 of the bylaw laid out 
permissible principal, additional, and accessory uses of 
property located in single-residence districts.  Insofar as are 
relevant here, principal uses included use as a "[o]ne family 
 
 
2 "[A] zoning ordinance or by-law shall not apply to 
structures or uses lawfully in existence or lawfully begun . . . 
before the first publication of notice of the public hearing on 
such ordinance or by-law required by [§ 5]."  G. L. c. 40A, § 6. 
 
 
3 The plaintiff sold the property after the trial in the 
Land Court, but before judgment entered.  We address the 
appeal's justiciability infra.  For convenience, we continue to 
refer to the plaintiff as the owner of the property. 
3 
 
detached house, with not more than one such house located on any 
lot."  With the approval of the zoning board of appeals of 
Lynnfield (board), certain "additional uses" were permitted, 
including use as a "[t]ourist home, boarding or lodging house," 
pursuant to section 4.1.1(3) of the bylaw.  Finally, section 5 
of the bylaw permitted "accessory use[s]" of the property, as of 
right, defined as "subordinate" uses: 
"1.  Whose use is customary in connection with the 
principal building,[4] . . . and 
 
"2.  Whose use is clearly incidental to the use of the 
principal building, . . . and 
 
"3.  Which is located on the same lot with the principal 
building . . . or on a lot adjacent to such lot, if in the 
same ownership, and 
 
"4.  Which does not constitute, in effect a conversion of 
the principal use of the premises to one not permitted." 
 
Effective October 17, 2016, the bylaw was amended to prohibit 
explicitly any short-term rentals of homes.5 
 
4 Section 5.1(5) of the bylaw "specifically declared" the 
"regular renting of rooms or the furnishing of table board in a 
dwelling by prearrangement to not more than five . . . persons" 
to be a customary accessory use.. 
 
 
5 The bylaw was amended as follows:  additional language was 
added to section 4.1(1) to allow residential use as a one family 
detached house "provided that no such property shall be leased 
or rented for a period of thirty (30) days or less unless 
specifically authorized by the Board of Appeals"; section 
4.1.1(3) deleted language that had allowed "additional" use as a 
"[t]ourist home, boarding or lodging house" with authorization 
by the board; and section 5.1(5) was amended to define 
"customary" use to include "[t]he regular renting of rooms or 
the furnishing of table board in a dwelling by prearrangement to 
4 
 
 
2.  Factual and procedural history.  The material facts are 
largely undisputed.6  The property at issue consists of a five-
bedroom single-family house, on three acres of land, in a 
single-residence zoning district.  The Styller family lived on 
the premises.  Beginning in July 2015, the plaintiff offered the 
premises for short-term rentals through various Internet-based 
platforms.  Between July 16, 2015, and May 21, 2017, he rented 
the premises thirteen times, for a total of sixty-five days:  
four times in 2015, seven times in 2016, and two times in 2017.  
Each rental was between two and fifteen days in duration; most 
were for five days or less. 
 
Most frequently, the rented premises were used for family 
reunions, but they also were used for a college reunion, a 
corporate board meeting, business retreats, and "photo shoots."  
Renters were given exclusive possession of the property during 
 
not more than five . . . persons, provided that no such renting 
shall be for a period of thirty (30) days or less" (emphasis 
added).  The amended sections of the bylaw are not at issue in 
this appeal. 
 
6 The plaintiff also has appealed from the denial of his 
motion to amend certain language contained in the Land Court 
judge's findings.  That language does not, however, factor into 
our analysis.  We therefore observe only that, regardless of how 
the Land Court judge characterized the plaintiff's rental 
activity, the parties' stipulation of facts states that, as of 
the date of the building inspector's order, the plaintiff had 
rented the property a total of eight times, for forty-four days 
in total.  Whether the rentals were "frequent" or "occasional," 
as those words may be used in other contexts, was not at issue 
either before the Land Court or this court. 
5 
 
the applicable rental period; the Styller family stayed 
elsewhere.  Although each rental was arranged by a single 
booking guest, ten of the plaintiff's thirteen rentals had a 
group of six or more guests (including the booking guest). 
 
In May 2016, a shooting incident during a weekend rental 
left an individual dead at the plaintiff's property.7  Shortly 
thereafter, the building inspector of Lynnfield (building 
inspector) notified the plaintiff that use of his home for 
short-term rentals violated the town's zoning bylaw.  More 
specifically, according to the building inspector, the 
plaintiff's short-term rentals of his property constituted 
either use as a hotel (an impermissible "additional" use in a 
single-residence district), or use as a lodging or rooming8 house 
without the necessary prior authorization, pursuant to section 
4.1.1(3) of the bylaw.  The building inspector therefore ordered 
the plaintiff to cease and desist offering the premises for 
rent. 
 
7 As described in more detail in Heath-Latson v. Styller, 
487 Mass.    ,     (2021), Styller rented the premises to an 
individual who was part of a group of six overnight guests, 
purportedly for the purpose of hosting a college reunion.  More 
than one hundred people came to the premises for the event, and 
one person was shot and killed.  See id. at    .  In that case, 
we considered Styller's alleged duty to the victim. 
 
 
8 The town's bylaw does not reference "rooming house" use; 
rather, it refers to "boarding or lodging" house use, in section 
4.1.1. 
6 
 
The plaintiff appealed from the building inspector's order 
to the board.  See G. L. c. 40A, § 8.  He requested that the 
board make specific factual findings that the short-term rentals 
did not constitute use of the premises either as a hotel or as a 
lodging or rooming house.  While the plaintiff's appeal was 
pending, the town amended its bylaw expressly to prohibit short-
term rentals in single-resident zoning districts, without prior 
authorization.  See note 5, supra.  After a public hearing, the 
board voted to "uphold the decision of the [b]uilding 
[i]nspector to prohibit rentals of [thirty] days or less in any 
Single Residence District."9  The board did not, however, address 
the building inspector's characterization of the plaintiff's use 
of the property as a "hotel" or "lodging or rooming house." 
 
The plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint in the Land 
Court, seeking review of the board's ruling.  See G. L. c. 40A, 
§ 17.  After a jury-waived trial on stipulated facts and certain 
additional evidence, the Land Court judge concluded that the 
plaintiff's short-term rental use of the property constituted an 
additional use because it was functionally equivalent to use as 
 
9 Although the building inspector's order barred all rental 
use, at the hearing, the town suggested that it was the 
"transient" use of the property (defined in the International 
Building Code as rentals of thirty days or less) that was 
prohibited.  The board thereafter voted to "uphold the decision 
of the [b]uilding [i]nspector to prohibit rentals of [thirty] 
days or less in any Single Residence District." 
7 
 
a "tourist home" or "lodging house" under section 4.1.1(3) of 
the bylaw.  Because the plaintiff did not have the board's 
authorization for that use, however, the judge concluded that 
the plaintiff's short-term rental use of the premises violated 
the bylaw as it existed when the plaintiff began such rentals.  
He thus affirmed the board's decision.10 
The plaintiff appealed, and we transferred the appeal to 
this court on our own motion.  We now affirm the Land Court's 
decision, albeit on different grounds. 
3.  Discussion.  a.  Justiciability.  As stated supra, the 
plaintiff sold the property after the trial in the Land Court, 
but before judgment entered.  We therefore begin with the 
question whether the sale of the property affects the 
justiciability of the action where neither intervention, 
joinder, nor substitution of the transferee as a party was 
sought.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 24, 365 Mass. 769 (1974); Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 25 (c), 365 Mass. 771 (1974). 
 
10 The judge additionally determined that the plaintiff's 
short-term rental use did not meet the definition of "accessory" 
use, see note 16, infra, and, further, that short-term rentals 
arranged by means of Internet platforms do not constitute a 
preexisting nonconforming use, because the "ever-changing 
technologies" used to effectuate the rentals produce 
"materially-different uses" over time.  Although the later point 
is not pressed on appeal, we observe that the means by which the 
short-term rentals were effectuated is immaterial from a zoning 
perspective. 
8 
 
i.  Standing.  Standing to challenge a decision of the 
board, pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17, is a prerequisite to the 
Land Court's exercise of jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Marotta v. 
Board of Appeals of Revere, 336 Mass. 199, 202-203 (1957) (trial 
court "had no jurisdiction to consider the case unless an appeal 
. . . was taken by an aggrieved person"); Southwick v. Planning 
Bd. of Plymouth, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 266, 268 (2008) ("standing is 
an issue of subject matter jurisdiction only in the sense that 
it is a criterion that must be met in order for the court to 
exercise jurisdiction, when the court otherwise is competent to 
decide the case").  The town now posits, however, that the 
plaintiff lacks standing to maintain the appeal because, having 
sold the property, he no longer has an interest within the area 
of concern protected under the zoning laws, G. L. c. 40A, §§ 1-
17. 
 
The argument is misplaced.  Standing, for jurisdictional 
purposes, is tested at the time an action commences.  See Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570 n.5 (1992) 
(plurality opinion) ("standing is to be determined as of the 
commencement of suit").  There is no dispute that, at the time 
the litigation commenced in the Land Court, the plaintiff was 
the owner of the property and that he was "a person aggrieved" 
by the board's decision.  See Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719, 721 (1996) ("Only a 
9 
 
'person aggrieved' may challenge a decision of a zoning board of 
appeals").  Once jurisdiction attached, the Land Court retained 
jurisdiction over the matter despite the sale of the property.  
See O'Dea v. J.A.L., Inc., 30 Mass. App. Ct. 449, 453 (1991) 
("court is not ousted of jurisdiction by subsequent events -- 
jurisdiction once attached is not impaired by what happens 
later").  See also Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 
303 U.S. 283, 293 (1938) (same); Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824) (same). 
 
Where, as here, an interest has transferred during the 
pendency of an action, the rules of civil procedure provide: 
"In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be 
continued by or against the original party, unless the 
court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest 
is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined 
with the original party." 
 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 25 (c).11,12  See Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 
478 (1996) (where plaintiff's claim was assigned during pendency 
 
11 Rule 30 of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1661 (2019), governs the 
substitution of parties in the appellate courts.  "Given their 
identity of subject matter and similarity in language, [Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 25] and [Mass. R. A. P. 30] should be read in concert."  
Lee v. Mt. Ivy Press, L.P., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 538, 556 n.35 
(2005).  See Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 
1137-1138 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 
12 Rule 25 (c) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure 
applies where, as here, the original party had standing to 
pursue the litigation.  Contrast Phone Recovery Servs., LLC v. 
Verizon of New England, Inc., 480 Mass. 224, 230 n.8 (2018) 
(where original party did not have standing, complaint must be 
10 
 
of litigation, no error in failing to add assignee as plaintiff; 
judgment binding on original party's successor in interest); Lee 
v. Mt. Ivy Press, L.P., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 538, 557-558 (2005).  
The "rule expressly permits parties to continue in an action, 
even if they do not remain the real party in interest, as long 
as the cause of action itself survives the transfer to the new 
party."  ELCA Enters., Inc. v. Sisco Equip. Rental & Sales, 
Inc., 53 F.3d 186, 191 (9th Cir. 1995) (interpreting Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 25[c], which is substantially identical to Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 25 [c]).  See In re Covington Grain Co., 638 F.2d 1362, 1364 
(5th Cir. 1981) ("Rule 25[c] is not designed to create new 
relationships among parties to a suit but is designed to allow 
the [original] action to continue unabated when an interest in 
the lawsuit changes hands").  See also Shapiro v. McCarthy, 279 
Mass. 425, 428, 430 (1932) ("The cause of action exists in legal 
contemplation apart from those persons who may be parties to 
it"). 
 
Under the rule, the original party may continue the action 
unless the transferee is substituted, on motion.  Hilbrands v. 
Far East Trading Co., 509 F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1975).  
Indeed, 
 
dismissed; new complaint from party with standing would not be 
problematic); Rafferty v. Sancta Maria Hosp., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 
624, 626-627 (1977) (substitution or joinder of party with 
standing prior to judgment permissible). 
11 
 
"[t]he most significant feature of Rule 25(c) is that it 
does not require that anything be done after an interest 
has been transferred.  The action may be continued by or 
against the original party, and the judgment will be 
binding on his successor in interest even though the 
successor is not named.  An order of joinder is merely a 
discretionary determination by the trial court that the 
transferee's presence would facilitate the conduct of the 
litigation."  (Footnotes omitted.) 
 
7C C.A. Wright, A.R. Miller & M.K. Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1958 (3d ed. 2021).  See Williams, 423 Mass. at 478, 
citing Luxliner P.L. Export Co. v. RDI/Luxliner, Inc., 13 F.3d 
69, 71 (3d Cir. 1993) (rule 25 [c] does not require court or 
party to take any action after interest transferred).  In this 
case, the Land Court's docket indicates that no motion was filed 
to join or substitute the current owner of the premises.  The 
Land Court judge retained jurisdiction, after being advised of 
the transfer. 
 
Although rule 25 (c) is a procedural rule, we recognize 
that survival of a right of action after a property transfer is 
a matter of substantive law.  See Citibank v. Grupo Cupey, Inc., 
382 F.3d 29, 32-33 (1st Cir. 2004); Hilbrands, 509 F.2d at 1323.  
There is no doubt that a right of action challenging the 
legality of the property's prior use as a short-term rental 
survives the sale of property.  See Revere v. Rowe Contr. Co., 
362 Mass. 884, 885 (1972); Shapiro, 279 Mass. at 430.  Because 
such use of land is not "indissolubly linked with a particular" 
party, Shapiro, supra, the lawsuit challenging that use may 
12 
 
continue unabated when the property changes hands,13 see In re 
Bernal, 207 F.3d 595, 598 (9th Cir. 2000).  See also Burka v. 
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 478, 480, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(property purchaser properly substituted as defendant on 
remand). 
 
ii.  Mootness.  Although the plaintiff's ownership of the 
premises accorded him standing as an aggrieved person to 
commence suit in the Land Court, his subsequent transfer of the 
property raises a separate issue as to whether the case has 
become moot, on the ground that he lost a personal stake in its 
outcome.  See Taylor v. Board of Appeals of Lexington, 451 Mass. 
270, 274 (2008), quoting Attorney Gen. v. Commissioner of Ins., 
442 Mass. 793, 810 (2004) ("Litigation ordinarily is considered 
moot when the party claiming to be aggrieved ceases to have a 
personal stake in its outcome").  See also Uzuegbunam v. 
Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 796 (2021) ("doctrine of standing 
generally assesses whether that [personal] interest exists at 
the outset, while the doctrine of mootness considers whether it 
exists throughout the proceedings"); Davis v. Federal Election 
Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 732-734 (2008); Slice of Life, LLC v. 
 
13 This is, of course, not true of all type of actions.  
See, e.g., Billings v. GTFM, LLC, 449 Mass. 281, 291 & n.21 
(2007) (with certain exceptions, company merger destroys 
derivative standing of former shareholders to institute or 
continue to pursue derivative claims on behalf of former 
company; referring to "continuing ownership requirement"). 
13 
 
Hamilton Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 652 Pa. 224, 242 (2019) 
(following property sale, declining to dismiss as moot appeal 
challenging zoning ordinance's application to short-term 
rentals). 
 
Unlike standing, "mootness [is] a factor affecting [the 
court's] discretion, not its power," to decide a case.  Rosado 
v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403 (1970).  See Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 
409 Mass. 116, 121 (1991) ("general rule is that courts 
ordinarily will not decide moot questions").  We have exercised 
our discretion to answer moot questions in circumstances 
"where the issue was one of public importance, where it was 
fully argued on both sides, where the question was certain, 
or at least very likely, to arise again in similar factual 
circumstances, and especially where appellate review could 
not be obtained before the recurring question would again 
be moot." 
 
Id., quoting Lockhart v. Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 780, 783 
(1984). 
 
Here, the plaintiff argues that the appeal is not moot 
because he continues to have a personal stake in its outcome.  
In particular, he contends that whether his prior use of the 
property violated the town's bylaw affects his legal rights in 
connection with the companion case, Heath-Latson v. Styller, 487 
Mass.     (2021), as well as with respect to various insurance 
coverage issues, see, e.g., Springfield Preservation Trust, Inc. 
v. Springfield Library & Museums Ass'n, Inc., 447 Mass. 408, 
14 
 
417-418 (2006) (demolition of structure did not eliminate 
controversy between parties because dispute as to validity of 
ordinance and its application to other, after-acquired property 
remained).  Because the right to continue a lawful nonconforming 
use runs with the land, Rowe Contr. Co., 362 Mass. at 885, he 
also argues that the issues raised in the appeal remain live, 
see Hubrite Informal Frocks, Inc. v. Kramer, 297 Mass. 530, 535-
536 (1937) (where "whole case" may not have become moot, case 
remanded to trial court for further proceedings). 
 
Regardless of the strength of the plaintiff's continuing 
personal interest in the case, we view the viability of short-
term rental use of property in the context of existing zoning 
regulations as one of public importance, in the sense that it 
raises "an important public question whose resolution will 
affect more persons than the parties to the case" and that "is 
primarily a matter of statutory [or, in this case, zoning bylaw] 
interpretation, not dependent on the facts of the particular 
case."  Lahey Clinic Found., Inc. v. Health Facilities Appeals 
Bd., 376 Mass. 359, 372 (1978).  See Slice of Life, LLC, 652 Pa. 
at 242.  The property sale occurred after trial in the Land 
Court, the Land Court entered judgment after being informed of 
the sale, and the appeal has been fully briefed and argued to 
us.  Because we transferred this case to consider the issue, in 
the circumstances, we think it appropriate to express our 
15 
 
opinion on the merits.14  See Grace v. Brookline, 379 Mass. 43, 
48 n.11 (1979); Karchmar v. Worcester, 364 Mass. 124, 136 
(1973). 
b.  Analysis.  The plaintiff principally argues that his 
use of the property for occasional short-term rentals15 was not 
an unauthorized "additional use," as the Land Court judge 
reasoned, but was instead a permissible principal use as a one 
family detached house, under section 4.1(1) of the bylaw.  He 
emphasizes that the town's bylaw, prior to its amendment in 
2016, did not prohibit homes in single-residence districts from 
being rented (regardless of duration).  For its part, the town 
contends that its bylaw did not expressly authorize short-term 
rentals in a single-family district and, therefore, the 
plaintiff's use of the property in that manner violated section 
4 of the bylaw, as amended through October 19, 2015 ("no land, 
building, structure or part thereof shall be used for any 
 
 
14 Courts decline to decide moot cases for reasons including 
that "(a) only factually concrete disputes are capable of 
resolution through the adversary process, (b) it is feared that 
the parties will not adequately represent positions in which 
they no longer have a personal stake, (c) the adjudication of 
hypothetical disputes would encroach on the legislative domain, 
and (d) judicial economy requires that insubstantial 
controversies not be litigated."  Wolf v. Commissioner of Pub. 
Welfare, 367 Mass. 293, 298 (1975).  For the reasons stated, 
those concerns are not at issue here. 
 
 
15 See note 6, supra. 
16 
 
purpose or in any manner other than for one or more of the uses 
specifically permitted"). 
We "accord deference to a local board's reasonable 
interpretation of its own zoning bylaw," Shirley Wayside Ltd. 
Partnership v. Board of Appeals of Shirley, 461 Mass. 469, 475 
(2012), adhering to the traditional canons of statutory 
construction, Doherty v. Planning Bd. of Scituate, 467 Mass. 
560, 567 (2014), quoting Shirley Wayside Ltd. Partnership, supra 
(reviewing "judge's determinations of law, including 
interpretations of zoning bylaws, de novo").  Although we agree 
with the plaintiff that the short-term rental use was not an 
unauthorized "additional" use, because the plaintiff's use of 
his property for short-term rentals was not specifically 
permitted under the bylaw, we conclude that it was not a 
specifically permitted principal use either.16 
 
16 The plaintiff does not argue on appeal that his short-
term rental use qualified as a lawful "accessory use" under 
section 5 of the bylaw, quoted supra.  We do not, therefore, 
address the accessory use provision, except to observe that the 
plaintiff's use would appear to fail three of the four 
conditions precedent.  He did not, for example, show that short-
term rental use was customary in the zoning district, nor did he 
demonstrate that the use qualified as the "regular renting of 
rooms or the furnishing of table board in a dwelling by 
prearrangement to not more than five . . . persons" under 
section 5.1(5).  As the Land Court judge observed, the short-
term rental use was not "incidental" to the use of the principal 
building, under section 5(2).  See Henry v. Board of Appeals of 
Dunstable, 418 Mass. 841, 845 (1994).  Finally, the plaintiff's 
rental of the property for event use (rather than for 
residential purposes) effectively converted the principal use of 
17 
 
i.  Additional use.  Because the Land Court judge focused 
on "additional" uses, that is where we begin.  The judge 
concluded that the plaintiff's use of the property was an 
unauthorized "additional" use.  As stated previously, prior to 
its amendment, section 4.1.1(3) of the town's bylaw allowed 
certain "additional" uses of property in single-residence zoning 
districts, including as a "[t]ourist home, boarding or lodging 
house," but only with the board's authorization.  Referencing 
the State building code, see G. L. c. 140, § 22, and a 
dictionary definition, respectively, the Land Court judge 
reasoned that when the plaintiff's property was rented to four 
or more people, it was used as a "lodging house," and when it 
was rented to "persons who travel for pleasure," it was used as 
a "tourist home."  The judge went on to conclude that, either 
way, the short-term rental use violated the bylaw, because such 
use required a permit that the plaintiff admittedly did not 
have.  We agree with the judge's conclusion that the plaintiff 
did not have authorization for an "additional use"; we take a 
different view, however, whether that use qualified as an 
additional use in any case. 
 
A.  Lodging house.  Regardless of the number of persons to 
whom the plaintiff's property was let, its use cannot be 
 
the premises during the rental period to one not permitted, 
i.e., a commercial use, as prohibited by section 5(4). 
18 
 
categorized as lodging house use.  A "lodging house" is a "house 
where lodgings are let to four or more persons not within second 
degree of kindred to the person conducting it."  G. L. c. 140, 
§ 22.  See Worcester v. Bonaventura, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 169 
(2002).  In a lodging house operation, "[a] lodger occupies only 
a specific room or rooms within a house or apartment that is 
itself owned or rented by someone else, where the owner, or 
another leasing from the owner, is the primary occupant of the 
property."  Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 
134, 140 (2013).  A degree of permanence is implied in the 
arrangement, "as distinguished form the transiency of hotel and 
motel accommodations."  Selvetti v. Building Inspector of 
Revere, 353 Mass. 645, 647 (1968), S.C., 356 Mass. 720 (1969).  
Where, as here, the renters were given exclusive possession of 
the entire premises, and the rental periods were short in 
duration, there is no basis to conclude that the plaintiff was 
operating a lodging house. 
 
B.  Tourist home.  The Land Court judge additionally 
determined that the plaintiff operated an unpermitted "tourist 
home" when he rented to "persons who travel for pleasure."  
Although few cases reference a "tourist home," see Haverhill v. 
DiBurro, 337 Mass. 230, 231, 236-237 (1958), such accommodations 
have been described as "a house in which rooms are available for 
19 
 
rent to transients"17 (citation omitted), Solem vs. Curry, Mass. 
Land Ct., No. 236244 (July 25, 2000).  Like a "lodging house," a 
"tourist home" contemplates renting of rooms rather than of an 
entire house, and both terms imply that the owner or operator 
remains on the premises.  See DiBurro, supra at 232 (describing 
tourist home as "offering three or four 'bedrooms or small 
suites' for rental and using the fourth for the manager's 
home").  Applying that analysis here, the plaintiff's short-term 
rentals of his home did not constitute operation of a "tourist 
home." 
ii.  One family detached house use.  We agree with the 
plaintiff that the short-term rentals were not, as the Land 
Court judge reasoned, unauthorized additional uses, for purposes 
of section 4.1.1(3) of the bylaw.  Nonetheless, we reject the 
plaintiff's claim that his "occasional" use of the property for 
short-term rentals18 constituted a permissible primary use as a 
one family detached house under section 4.1(1) of the bylaw. 
 
The plaintiff's argument is fundamentally flawed because it 
fails to recognize that short-term rental use of a one family 
 
 
17 "We derive the words' usual and accepted meanings from 
sources presumably known to the [bylaw's] enactors, such as 
their use in other legal contexts and dictionary definitions" 
(citation omitted).  Framingham Clinic, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals of Framingham, 382 Mass. 283, 290 (1981). 
 
 
18 See note 6, supra. 
20 
 
home is inconsistent with the zoning purpose of the single-
residence zoning district in which it is situated, i.e., to 
preserve the residential character of the neighborhood.  See, 
e.g., Rogers v. Norfolk, 432 Mass. 374, 380 (2000) 
("preservation of the residential character of neighborhoods is 
a legitimate municipal purpose to be achieved by local zoning 
control").  Indeed, courts have long recognized that 
municipalities may regulate in order to protect communities' 
"residential character," Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 
365, 394 (1926), and to make neighborhoods "a sanctuary for 
people," Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974). 
 
Use of zoning regulation to foster stability and permanence 
is compatible with long-term property rentals because long-term 
inhabitants have the opportunity to "develop a sense of 
community and a shared commitment to the common good of that 
community" (citation omitted).  Slice of Life, LLC, 652 Pa. at 
232.  Where short-term rentals are at issue, however, there is 
an "absence of stability and permanence of the individuals 
residing in those districts, [and] the goal is necessarily 
subverted" (quotations and citation omitted).  Id. 
 
Giving deference to the board's interpretation of the 
town's bylaw, see Shirley Wayside Ltd. Partnership, 461 Mass. at 
475 (reviewing court "accord[s] deference to a local board's 
reasonable interpretation of its own zoning bylaw"), we conclude 
21 
 
that the board reasonably could determine that use of a "one 
family detached house" in a "single residence district," as 
defined in section 4.1(1) of the bylaw, connotes a measure of 
permanency that is inconsistent with more "transient" uses, cf. 
Commonwealth v. Jaffe, 398 Mass. 50, 57 (1986) ("permanency and 
cohesiveness" are "inherent in the notion of a single 
housekeeping unit").  A "[r]esidence" is commonly understood to 
mean "the place where one actually lives as distinguished from 
his domicile or a place of temporary sojourn."  Webster's Ninth 
New Collegiate Dictionary 1003 (1985).  A similar concept of 
permanency also is incorporated in the town's definition of 
"family," under section 2.12 of the bylaw, to include "[a]ny 
number of persons living and cooking together on the premises as 
a single housekeeping unit, as distinguished from a group 
occupying a boarding house, lodging house, or hotel." 
 
Reading the two terms in context, and giving them a 
sensible meaning, see Selectmen of Hatfield v. Garvey, 362 Mass. 
821, 826 (1973), the town "clearly and unambiguously excluded, 
in pertinent part, purely transient uses of property in [a 
residential zoning district]," Slice of Life, LLC, 652 Pa. at 
891, 899.  Both "family" and "residence" imply "a certain 
expectation of relative stability and permanence."  Id., quoting 
Albert v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of N. Abington Township, 578 Pa. 
439, 452 (2004).  See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 
22 
 
515-519 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring), and cases cited (State 
courts generally require "that a single-family home be occupied 
only by a 'single housekeeping unit,'" and for "such households 
to remain nontransient"). 
 
4.  Conclusion.  For the above reasons, we conclude that 
the plaintiff's use of the property for short-term rentals was 
not a permissible use under the town's zoning bylaw, as it 
existed prior to its amendment in 2016.19  Because, however, the 
current property owner may have an interest in this case, if 
within thirty days after the rescript is issued, the current 
owner files a motion in the Land Court to intervene or join as a 
plaintiff, and if such a motion is allowed, the final judgment 
will be vacated and further proceedings may follow.  Otherwise, 
the Land Court's judgment, affirming the board's decision, shall 
be affirmed as to the result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
19 We hasten to add, however, that a different result may 
obtain in other circumstances, depending upon, for example, the 
specifics of the zoning bylaw of the city or town, including 
what types of additional uses are permitted (if any), as well as 
what is considered a customary accessory use in a particular 
community.