Case Title: State v. Loveland

Citation: 165 Vt 418, 684 A.2d 272

Docket Number: 95-136

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Loveland  (95-136); 165 Vt 418; 684 A.2d 272

[Opinion Filed 9-Aug-1996]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 95-136


State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 1, Bennington Circuit

Michael Loveland                                  January Term, 1996


Robert Grussing III, J.

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
  Attorney, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       DOOLEY, J.   Defendant appeals his conviction for sexual assault on a
  minor in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3252(a)(3).  He contends that the trial
  court: (1) committed plain error by instructing the jurors that he had
  stipulated to the facts that he was not married to the victim and that the
  victim was under the age of sixteen; and (2) impermissibly enhanced his
  sentence because he invoked his privilege against self incrimination.  We
  affirm the conviction, but reverse the court's sentence.

       Defendant was charged with committing sexual assault on his minor
  stepdaughter. Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial, denying that
  the sexual assault ever occurred.  The jury rendered a guilty verdict.

       A presentence investigation was ordered, and the report showed that
  defendant, who was out on bail prior to his trial, had a good work history
  and had been employed at his current job for ten months.  Except for a
  technical violation of the bail release conditions, he had complied

 

  with the conditions of release.  At sentencing, although he informed his
  counsel that he was willing to undertake sex offender therapy as a
  condition of his probation, defendant continued to maintain his innocence. 
  When the court asked defendant if he had anything to say, defendant
  replied, "No."

       In determining defendant's sentence, the court found that he had no
  prior history of sexually abusing children, and that this fact would be a
  mitigating factor at sentencing. Nevertheless, the court concluded that
  defendant had committed "serious misconduct that deserves punishment," and
  that a period of incarceration was necessary to protect the public. The
  court then considered but rejected a proposed sentence that would include
  probation, concluding that defendant's refusal to acknowledge any
  responsibility for the crime would make it difficult for him to
  successfully complete the sexual offender treatment program.  The court
  sentenced defendant to six to twelve years in prison, with no conditions of
  probation.  Defendant appeals both the conviction and the sentence.

       Defendant first argues that it was error for the court to direct the
  jury to consider two elements of the offense as proven: that (1) the victim
  was under the age of sixteen, and (2) defendant and the victim were not
  married.  The issue arose at the charge conference, which was held in open
  court with defendant present.  The court asked defendant's counsel whether
  he could "tell the jury that the elements that the other person was under
  the age of sixteen has been established, and the element that the other
  person, namely K.P., and the defendant were not married, have been
  established?"  Defendant's counsel replied, "Yes, that's fine, sir."
  Defendant registered no objection to this action.

       Following the charge conference, the court instructed the jury as
  follows:

     The third element is that the defendant engaged in the sexual act
     with a person who was under the age of sixteen.  Here, it's alleged
     that K.P. was under the age of sixteen, and the parties have
     stipulated that you may consider that -- you may consider as
     established that she was under the age of sixteen and you should,
     therefore, consider that element has been proven.  That is, that at
     the time alleged, K.P. was under the age of sixteen.

 

     The fourth element is one -- is that the persons who engaged in the
     sexual act, that is the defendant and K.P. were not married to each
     other and, again, the parties have stipulated that is a fact and you
     should consider, therefore, that element has been established.

  It is undisputed that the victim was six years old when the sexual assault
  occurred.  Defendant also does not dispute the fact that he was not married
  to the victim, who in fact was his stepdaughter at the time.  On appeal,
  the only claim is that the court committed error by depriving defendant of
  his right to a jury trial on all essential elements of the crime, without
  his express waiver of that right.

       Defendant has framed his claim as one of an invalid jury trial waiver
  in order to avoid the consequences of nonpreservation.  In a series of
  cases, we have allowed defendants to attack the validity of jury trial
  waivers in this Court without any preservation below.  See, e.g., State v.
  West, 6 Vt. L.W. 241, 243-45 (Sep. 1, 1995); State v. Coita, 153 Vt. 18,
  21, 568 A.2d 424, 426 (1989).  All of these cases, however, involve waiver
  of a jury trial on all issues in favor of a bench trial.  Defendant argues
  that stipulation to the presence of an element of the offense is a waiver
  of jury trial on that element, and that waiver as to an element of the
  offense must be treated the same as a waiver with respect to all elements. 
  To reach this conclusion, he relies mainly on the reasoning of this Court
  in State v. Machia, 155 Vt. 192, 583 A.2d 556 (1990), where we concluded
  that consent to an eleven-person jury did not have to meet the procedural
  requirements of a jury trial waiver.  Id. at 195-96, 583 A.2d  at 558.

       Machia is of little help to defendant's position.  We summarized the
  reasoning as follows:

       [W]e believe that the decision to stipulate to an eleven-person jury
       is a "tactical" or "strategic" one that can be made by counsel with
       the defendant's implied consent.  Here, defense counsel's on-the-
       record oral stipulation to an eleven-member jury, confirmed in
       defendant's presence, did not deprive defendant of his
       constitutional right to trial by jury.

  Id. at 199, 583 A.2d  at 560.  Nothing in the opinion suggests that because
  a decision to stipulate to an eleven-person jury was a tactical decision, a
  decision not to contest an element of an offense is necessarily a waiver of
  trial by jury.

 

       We thus decline to adopt defendant's position.  All issues contested
  by defendant were determined by the jury, and it ultimately determined
  defendant's guilt or innocence.  Moreover, acceptance of defendant's
  argument would put us on a very slippery slope where any defect in the
  jury's consideration would be considered a waiver of a jury trial, valid
  only if expressly agreed to by the defendant.

       Even if we were inclined to accept defendant's argument that some kind
  of personal waiver by defendant is required, we would accept the kind of
  implied waiver we found effective in Machia, where defense counsel
  stipulated to an eleven-person jury on the record in the defendant's
  presence.  The waiver involved is that of the right to participate in
  specific trial events, and not a waiver of the right to trial by jury.  See
  In re Cardinal, 162 Vt. 418, 419,