Case Title: State v. Green

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020AP000298-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2022-05-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
2022 WI 30 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP298-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Joseph G. Green, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 396 Wis. 2d 658,957 N.W.2d 583 
PDC No: 2021 WI App 18 - Published  (2021) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 13, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 13, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Valerie Bailey-Rihn   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined, and in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined 
with respect to Part II.D., and in which DALLET, J., joined with 
respect to Part II.D. and ¶¶3 and 53.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., 
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in 
which DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Kara L. Janson, assistant attorney general; with whom on 
the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Kara L. Janson. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Kathilynne A. Grotelueschen, assistant state public defender. 
There was an oral argument by Kathilynne A. Grotelueschen. 
 
 
      2022 WI 30 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP298-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2019CF3109) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph G. Green, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 13, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined, and in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined 
with respect to Part II.D., and in which DALLET, J., joined with 
respect to Part II.D. and ¶¶3 and 53.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed 
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which 
DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Limited in 
part; affirmed in part.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   Joseph G. Green was 
charged with first-degree intentional homicide, and was determined 
to be incompetent to stand trial.  He was committed pursuant to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.14 
(2017-18)1 
to 
administer 
involuntary 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
2 
 
medication.  Green appealed the order, and according to our 
decision in State v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, 382 Wis. 2d 476, 914 N.W.2d 
141, 
the 
order 
for 
involuntary 
medication 
was 
stayed 
automatically.  We review the court of appeals' opinion2 that 
reversed the circuit court's3 decision granting the State's 
involuntary medication order, lifting the stay of involuntary 
medication, and tolling the statutory time limit to bring a 
defendant to competence.   
¶2 
We conclude that because the State's significant 
pretrial interests in bringing a defendant who meets each one of 
the factors set out in Sell v. United States4 to competency for 
trial and providing timely justice to victims outweigh upholding 
a defendant's liberty interest in refusing involuntary medication 
at the pretrial stage of criminal proceedings, Scott's automatic 
stay of involuntary medication orders pending appeal does not apply 
to pretrial proceedings.  Therefore, we employ our supervisory 
authority to limit our decision in Scott on which the court of 
appeals relied.5   
                                                 
2018 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 State v. Green, 2021 WI App 18, 396 Wis. 2d 658, 957 N.W.2d 
583. 
3 The Honorable Valerie Bailey-Rihn of Dane County Circuit 
Court presided. 
4 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003). 
5 The court of appeals concluded that the State did not meet 
its burden in regard to the second and fourth Sell factors that we 
adopted and required in State v. Fitzgerald, 2019 WI 69, ¶2, 387 
Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165, unless dangerousness to self or others 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
3 
 
¶3 
We also conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5)(a)1. is not 
subject to tolling in a pretrial context.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals decision in part.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The facts in this case are undisputed.  On December 27, 
2019, the State filed a criminal complaint charging Green with 
first-degree intentional homicide with use of a dangerous weapon.  
Pretrial, defense counsel raised reason to doubt Green's 
competency to proceed.  The circuit court ordered a competency 
examination, which was completed by Dr. Craig Schoenecker and 
filed with the court.  At the competency hearing, Dr. Schoenecker 
testified that Green was not competent but could be restored to 
competency through anti-psychotic-type medication within the 12-
month statutory timeframe.  Dr. Schoenecker also testified that 
the medication was medically appropriate, substantially unlikely 
to have side effects that would undermine a fair trial, and that 
other, less intrusive, treatments were unlikely to restore Green 
to competency.   
¶5 
After the hearing, the circuit court found Green 
incompetent.  Accordingly, the court entered an order of commitment 
for treatment with the involuntary administration of medication.  
                                                 
is at issue.   
Because Green received alternate treatment; pled guilty to a 
lesser charge; was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or 
defect and is receiving care appropriate to his condition, these 
concerns are no longer relevant to this review.  No party raised 
mootness in their briefs to us, therefore, we do not address the 
mootness doctrine.   
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
4 
 
Following this determination, Green appealed and filed an 
emergency motion for stay of the involuntary medication order 
pending appeal, which was automatically granted by the circuit 
court pursuant to our decision in Scott.   
¶6 
The State responded with motions to lift the automatic 
stay and to toll the statutory time period to bring a defendant to 
competence, both of which were granted by the circuit court.  Green 
appealed.  He moved for relief pending appeal, which included 
reinstatement of the temporary stay.  The court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court's involuntary medication order and its order 
lifting the automatic stay of involuntary medication.  State v. 
Green, 2021 WI App 18, ¶2, 396 Wis. 2d 658, 957 N.W.2d 583.  In 
addition, the court of appeals determined that the circuit court 
lacked authority to toll the statutory time period to bring Green 
to competency.  Id., ¶58.  We granted the State's petition for 
review.   
¶7 
Upon granting review, the parties submitted briefs 
addressing the circuit court's ability to toll the limits on the 
maximum length of commitment for competency restoration.  However, 
following oral argument, additional briefing was ordered to answer 
whether the automatic stay required by Scott applied to pretrial 
proceedings.  We determine:  (1) whether Scott's automatic stay 
applies to pretrial competency proceedings and (2) whether Wis. 
Stat. § 971.14(5)(a)1. permits tolling the 12-month limitation 
provided to restore a defendant to competency.  
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
5 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶8 
In the matter before us, we review the exercise of our 
superintending and administrative authority over Wisconsin courts 
as reasoned in Scott.  Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶43.  In so doing, 
we review our discretionary exercise of a constitutionally granted 
power.  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3.  This review involves not just 
the declared source of that power, but also the rationale we 
employed for exercising it.   
¶9 
We also review the court of appeals' interpretation and 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.14(5)(a)1. 
 
Statutory 
interpretation and application present questions of law for our 
independent review.  Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, 
¶14, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900.   
B.  Competency Proceedings 
¶10 This case arises out of an order of commitment for the 
provision of involuntary medication.  Therefore, some background 
about 
the 
statutory 
foundation 
for 
and 
the 
judicial 
interpretations of such orders may be helpful to the reader.  
¶11 We begin with the statutory foundation for commitment 
proceedings in criminal prosecutions, Wis. Stat. § 971.13(1), 
which provides: 
No person who lacks substantial mental capacity to 
understand the proceedings or assist in his or her own 
defense may be tried, convicted or sentenced for the 
commission of an offense so long as the incapacity 
endures.   
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
6 
 
§ 971.13(1).  Section 971.13(1) is a codification of the due 
process requirement that a defendant be able to "understand" and 
"assist" when evaluating a defendant's competency to stand trial.  
It "considers whether the defendant:  (1) 'has sufficient present 
ability to consult' with his or her lawyer 'with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding;' and (2) 'has a rational as well 
as factual understanding of the proceedings.'"  State v. Smith, 
2016 WI 23, ¶35, 367 Wis. 2d 483, 878 N.W.2d 135 (quoting State v. 
Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶27, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477).  "This 
two-part 'understand-and-assist' test constitutes the core of the 
competency-to-stand-trial analysis."  Id., ¶28.   
¶12 Furthermore, "[w]henever there is a reason to doubt the 
competency of a defendant to proceed," the circuit court is 
directed to order an examination of the defendant under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14(1r)(a) and (2).  State v. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 214, 221, 
558 N.W.2d 626 (1997).  Upon completion of the examination, the 
examiner submits a report "'regarding the defendant's present 
mental capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in his or 
her defense.'"  Id. (quoting § 971.14(3)(c)).  Importantly, the 
inquiry whether a defendant is competent to stand trial is a 
judicial, not a medical, determination.  Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 
¶31.  "Although a defendant may have a history of psychiatric 
illness, a medical condition does not necessarily render the 
defendant incompetent to stand trial."  Id. (quoting State ex rel. 
Haskins v. Cnty. Ct. of Dodge Cnty., 62 Wis. 2d 250, 264-65, 214 
N.W.2d 575 (1974)). 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
7 
 
¶13 When a defendant's competency is contested, the court 
shall hold an evidentiary hearing.  Wis. Stat. § 971.14(4)(b).  
The circuit court should not make a competency determination simply 
"on the basis of rubber stamping the report of a psychiatrist."  
Haskins, 62 Wis. 2d at 264.  Rather, the circuit court must "weigh 
evidence that the defendant is competent against evidence that he 
or she is not."  Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 222.   
¶14 If a defendant is found to be incompetent, a court may 
allow the government to confine and involuntarily medicate the 
defendant if certain criteria are met.  In Sell v. United States, 
the United States Supreme Court reasoned that:   
[T]he Constitution permits the Government involuntarily 
to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill 
defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to 
render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only 
if 
the 
treatment 
is 
medically 
appropriate, 
is 
substantially unlikely to have side effects that may 
undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account 
of 
less 
intrusive 
alternatives, 
is 
necessary 
significantly to further important governmental trial-
related interests. 
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003); see also Riggins 
v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139 (1992) (citing Washington v. Harper, 
494 U.S. 210 (1990)).  Although permitted, the Supreme Court in 
Sell explained that administration of drugs solely to return 
competence may be rare.  Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.  
¶15 The Supreme Court set out four factors, often referred 
to as the "Sell factors," as the standard for determining whether 
involuntary medication is constitutionally permissible.6  First, 
                                                 
6 Two years ago, in Fitzgerald, we adopted the Sell factors 
and concluded that ordering involuntary medication without first 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
8 
 
"a court must find that important governmental interests are at 
stake.  The Government's interest in bringing to trial an 
individual accused of a serious crime is important.  That is so 
whether the offense is a serious crime against the person or a 
serious crime against property."  Id. at 180 (emphasis in 
original).  Second, the court must conclude that "involuntary 
medication will significantly further those concomitant state 
interests.  It must find that administration of the drugs is 
substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand 
trial."  Id. at 181 (emphasis in original).  Yet, "[a]t the same 
time, it must find that administration of the drugs is 
substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere 
significantly with the defendant's ability to assist counsel in 
conducting a trial defense, thereby rendering the trial unfair."  
Id.  
¶16 Third, "the court must conclude that involuntary 
medication is necessary to further those interests.  The court 
must find that any alternative, less intrusive treatments are 
unlikely to achieve substantially the same results."  Id. (emphasis 
in original).  And finally, fourth, "the court must conclude that 
administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the 
patient's best medical interest in light of his medical condition."  
Id. (emphasis in original).   
                                                 
complying with the Sell factors was unconstitutional.  See 
Fitzgerald, 387 Wis. 2d 384, ¶32 (holding that Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14(3)(dm) and (4)(b) are unconstitutional unless the circuit 
court applies the Sell factors).  
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
9 
 
¶17 These 
factors 
encapsulate 
competing 
policy 
and 
constitutional considerations at play when a court analyzes 
whether the government shall be permitted to involuntarily 
medicate a defendant in order to bring the defendant to competency 
to stand trial.  Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, "individuals have 'a 
significant 
liberty 
interest 
in 
avoiding 
the 
unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs.'"  State v. Fitzgerald, 
2019 WI 69, ¶13, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165 (quoting Harper, 
494 U.S. at 221).  Alternately, the State has an important interest 
in bringing an individual accused of a serious crime to trial.  
Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.  It was against the interplay of these 
important, competing interests that we decided State v. Scott.  
C.  State v. Scott 
1.  Postconviction 
¶18 Several years after being convicted, Andre Scott sought 
to pursue postconviction relief.  Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶5.  
Defense counsel requested a competency evaluation, and the circuit 
court held a competency hearing.  Thereafter, the court ordered 
that the defendant be involuntarily medicated to competency for 
purposes of participating in postconviction proceedings.  Id., ¶6.  
We reviewed the circuit court's order for involuntary medication 
to enable participation in postconviction proceedings.  The 
circuit court had found that Scott was not competent to proceed 
with his postconviction motion for relief and was not competent to 
refuse medication and treatment.  Id. 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
10 
 
¶19 We granted bypass and reversed the circuit court's 
involuntary medication order because it had not followed the 
procedures we set forth in State v. Debra A.E.7  Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 
476, ¶8.  Although the circuit court's decision in Scott was 
reversed based on its failure to follow those procedures, we posed 
and 
answered 
an 
additional 
question:  "Should 
involuntary 
medication or treatment orders be automatically stayed pending 
appeal?"  Id., ¶10.   
¶20 In invoking our constitutional superintending authority, 
we concluded that "involuntary medication orders are subject to an 
automatic stay pending appeal."  Id., ¶43.  Our reasoning for the 
decision was simple, "if involuntary medication orders are not 
automatically stayed pending appeal, the defendant's 'significant' 
constitutionally protected 'liberty interest' in 'avoiding the 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs' is rendered a 
nullity."  Id., ¶44 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 177).   
¶21 Furthermore, in order to give the State the opportunity 
to lift the stay, we modified the legal standard set forth in State 
v. Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d 431, 529 N.W.2d 225 (1995).  Scott, 
382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶45.  On a motion to lift an automatic stay 
pending appeal of an involuntary medication order, we concluded 
that the State:   
(1) make a strong showing that it is likely to succeed 
on the merits of the appeal; 
(2) show that the defendant will not suffer irreparable 
harm if the stay is lifted; 
                                                 
7 State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994). 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
11 
 
(3) show that no substantial harm will come to other 
interested parties if the stay is lifted; and 
(4) show that lifting the stay will do no harm to the 
public interest. 
Id., ¶47.  This presents a discretionary decision for the court of 
appeals; therefore, we concluded that the court of appeals was 
required to explain the reasoning underlying its decision.  Id., 
¶48.  
¶22 In 
the 
years 
following 
our 
decision 
in 
Scott, 
experiences with its employment at differing points in criminal 
proceedings require that we revisit our exercise of discretion in 
regard to automatically staying involuntary medication orders 
during an appeal of such orders.  In our further discussion, we 
examine whether our reasoning that supported Scott's automatic 
stay pending appeal applies to appeals of involuntary medication 
orders issued in a pretrial context.   
¶23 We begin with Debra A.E. where we set out procedures for 
managing 
postconviction 
relief 
of 
allegedly 
incompetent 
defendants.8  The process established by Debra A.E. requires:   
[D]efense counsel should proceed with postconviction 
relief on a defendant's behalf, even if the defendant 
is incompetent, when issues rest on the trial court 
record and involve no risk to the defendant.[9] 
                                                 
8 In Debra A.E., we concluded that Wis. Stat. § 971.14(1)(a) 
(1991-92) did not apply to post-sentencing proceedings.  Debra 
A.E., 188 Wis. 2d at 128 n.14.  We note that § 971.14(1)(a) has 
been repealed and replaced with § 971.14(1r).  The parties do not 
challenge 
whether 
competency 
determinations 
apply 
to 
postconviction proceedings.  Accordingly, we do not address the 
statutory change further.   
9 Id. at 130. 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
12 
 
[A]fter sentencing, if state or defense counsel has a 
good faith doubt about a defendant's competency to 
seek postconviction relief, counsel should advise the 
appropriate court of this doubt on the record and move 
for a ruling on competency.[10] 
Based on the tasks that may be required of defendants 
seeking postconviction relief, we conclude that a 
defendant is incompetent to pursue postconviction 
relief under sec 809.30 . . . when he or she is unable 
to assist counsel or to make decisions committed by 
law to the defendant with a reasonable degree of 
understanding.[11] 
[If the defendant's assistance is needed for decision-
making,] defense counsel can seek appointment of a 
temporary guardian when an incompetent defendant is 
incapable of making a decision that the law requires 
the defendant to make.[12]   
In Scott, we endorsed those procedures set out in Debra A.E.  
Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶25.   
¶24 We explained that our purpose in creating those 
procedures was to "fashion a process through which circuit courts 
and counsel can manage the postconviction relief of alleged 
incompetent defendants" while effectively administering the 
judicial system.  State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 129, 523 
N.W.2d 727 (1994).  Further, because many postconviction 
defendant-opportunities can be proceeded upon independently by 
counsel, we concluded that postconviction proceedings do not 
ordinarily need to "include a court order for treatment to restore 
                                                 
10 Id. at 131. 
11 Id. at 126. 
12 Id. at 130. 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
13 
 
competency.  Meaningful postconviction relief can be provided even 
though a defendant is incompetent."  Id. at 130. 
¶25 When taken together, Debra A.E.'s procedures, affirmed 
in Scott, show that competence has a different effect on a 
defendant's interests at the postconviction stage of criminal 
proceedings than competence has pretrial.  Postconviction, a 
defendant's liberty interest in refusing involuntary medication 
remains high.  Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶44.  However, the State's 
interest in involuntarily medicating a defendant is significantly 
less at the postconviction stage when compared to pretrial.  This 
is so, in part, because, although victim and community interests 
remain considerable at the postconviction stage, the State has 
already employed a significant portion of the criminal justice 
process to try to achieve justice for victims and the community as 
a whole.  Furthermore, the State's dual interest in protecting a 
defendant's right to appeal and promoting the finality of the 
conviction can be accomplished despite an incompetent defendant.  
Id.  
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
14 
 
2.  Pretrial  
¶26 Pretrial, the effects of a defendant's lack of 
competence are quite different.  Under our common law system, it 
has long been accepted that "[u]nless a defendant is competent, 
the State cannot put him on trial."  Riggins, 504 U.S. at 139 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); see also State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 
207, 223, 395 N.W.2d 176, 184 (1986) ("We start with the 
proposition that an incompetent [defendant] may not be subjected 
to a trial.").   
¶27 The 
prohibition 
against 
"trying 
the 
incompetent 
defendant was well established by the time Hale and Blackstone 
wrote their famous commentaries."  Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 
348, 356 (1996) (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *24 ("If a 
man in his sound memory commits a capital offence . . . and if, 
after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be 
tried:  for how can he make his defence?")).  In short, the 
requirement that the defendant be competent to stand trial is 
"rudimentary," Riggins, 504 U.S. at 139 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 
and "fundamental to an adversary system of justice."  Drope v. 
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). 
¶28 Regarding involuntary medication administered solely to 
bring a defendant to competency for trial, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that a defendant "charged by a State with 
a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his 
incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the 
reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
15 
 
a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the 
foreseeable future."  Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).   
¶29 In Sell, the Supreme Court set forth criteria for 
determining when the government may be allowed to involuntarily 
medicate a defendant for the purpose of making the defendant 
competent to stand trial.  Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81.  In short 
summation, a court must find that:  (1) there are important 
government interests at stake, including bringing a defendant to 
trial for a serious crime; (2) involuntary medication will 
significantly further those state interests; (3) involuntary 
medication is substantially likely to render the defendant 
competent to stand trial; and (4) administration of the drugs is 
in the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical 
condition.  Id.  However, postconviction circumstances that call 
for governmental involuntary medication are "rare."  Id. at 180. 
¶30 As with Debra A.E.'s concerns in a postconviction 
context, 
significant, 
competing 
interests 
underlie 
our 
consideration of the involuntary administration of medication in 
a pretrial context.  The defendant holds the same substantial 
liberty interest in refusing involuntary medication, regardless of 
the stage of proceedings.  Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶44.  Once a 
defendant is subject to involuntary medication, irreparable harm 
could be done.  Sell, 539 U.S. at 177.   
¶31 On the other hand, the State has a significant interest 
in bringing a defendant to trial.  Id. at 180.  The State's power 
"to bring an accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of 
'ordered liberty' and prerequisite to social justice and peace."  
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
16 
 
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., 
concurring).  Further, unlike postconviction proceedings, in 
pretrial proceedings, the State has yet to employ a significant 
portion of the criminal justice process to try to achieve justice 
and uphold the considerable victim and community interests at 
stake.  For example, victims are guaranteed a right to "justice 
and due process," as well as a "timely disposition of the case, 
free from unreasonable delay."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m(2)(d).  
And while treatment to competency is not always necessary for 
postconviction proceedings, see Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d at 131, 
the State is required to bring a defendant to competency before a 
defendant can be tried.  Wis. Stat. § 971.13(1).   
¶32 Pretrial proceedings fall under the auspice of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 971.13 and 971.14.  The terms of § 971.14(5)(a)1. limit 
the treatment time for an incompetent defendant to "a period not 
to exceed 12 months, or the maximum sentence specified for the 
most serious offense with which the defendant is charged, whichever 
is less."  As soon as a defendant is in custody for treatment, the 
statutory time during which he or she may be held before trial 
begins.  § 971.14(5)(a)1.; see also Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738 
(explaining due process concerns).   
¶33 Stated otherwise, while Debra A.E. allows defense 
counsel to enlarge time periods for continuances in postconviction 
competency proceedings, Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d at 134, statutory 
and constitutional law principles reject unlimited continuances in 
pretrial proceedings.  If the State is unsuccessful at restoring 
competency for trial, the likelihood of which is increased if 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
17 
 
treatment is prevented by the automatic stay of Scott, a defendant 
must be discharged from commitment and released unless civil 
commitment proceedings are commenced pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 
51.  See Wis. Stat. § 971.14(6)(a)−(b). 
¶34 Since our decision in Scott, the State has been trapped 
on both ends of the pretrial competency process.  On one hand, 
Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5)(a)1. permits a defendant to be held for 12 
months to be brought to competence.  On the other hand, Scott's 
automatic stay of the involuntary medication order keeps the State 
from starting the treatment that has been ordered by a court.  
While the State was given some leeway in the form of a modified 
Gudenschwager test, see Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶47, this is a 
high burden, and when employed, can use up the entire 12-month 
maximum commitment period that is permitted for treatment.  And, 
if the State is not able to satisfy this Gudenschwager test and 
the time during which treatment can be required expires, the State 
is without recourse for prosecution.  This is an unexpected 
consequence of the automatic stay that we created in Scott.   
¶35 Accordingly, even though the defendant has a constant 
liberty interest in refusing involuntary medication, the State 
cannot 
prosecute 
an 
incompetent 
defendant. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.13(1).  The State also has a constitutional duty to provide 
timely justice to crime victims by bringing competent defendants 
to trial.  Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m(2)(d).  Those State interests 
currently are being frustrated by Scott's requirement to impose an 
automatic stay on treatment during appeals of treatment orders.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the balance of interests weighs in 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
18 
 
favor of concluding that Scott's automatic stay of involuntary 
medication orders does not apply to pretrial proceedings.   
¶36 We so conclude because in pretrial proceedings, Scott's 
automatic stay of involuntary medication orders pending appeal is 
unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.  Johnson Controls, 
Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶99, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 
665 N.W.2d 257 (citing Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 
504 U.S. 768, 783 (1992)).  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
automatic stay created in Scott shall not be applied during 
pretrial proceedings.13   
D.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.14(5)(a)1. 
¶37 By its terms, Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5)(a)1. limits 
commitment to restore competency to "a period not to exceed 12 
months, or the maximum sentence specified for the most serious 
offense with which the defendant is charged, whichever is less."  
The State requested tolling of the statutory 12-month limitation 
for achieving competency based on the stay of Green's medication 
order under Scott.  
¶38 In answering the question of whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14(5)(a)1. permits tolling, we begin with the plain words of 
the statute to determine what the legislature meant by the words 
it chose.  Townsend v. ChartSwap, LLC, 2021 WI 86, ¶12, 399 Wis. 2d 
599, 967 N.W.2d 21 (citing State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for 
                                                 
13 Going forward, in pretrial proceedings, a defendant seeking 
to stay an involuntary medication order pending appeal is able to 
apply for a stay and the court of appeals, in the exercise of its 
discretion, shall explain its rationale for granting or denying 
the defendant's motion after considering our rationale herein. 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
19 
 
Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).  If 
the meaning is plain and unambiguous, our inquiry usually ends 
without consulting extrinsic sources of interpretation, such as 
legislative history.  Townsend, 399 Wis. 2d 599, ¶12.  In addition 
to the words that the legislature chose, context and the structure 
of the statute are important to a plain meaning interpretation.  
Id., ¶13.   
¶39 The words of Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5)(a)1. say nothing 
about tolling, one way or the other.  This is not unusual.  However, 
there have been times when tolling was accorded based on the manner 
in which two relevant statutes fit together.  Donaldson v. West 
Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI App. 134, ¶13, 321 Wis. 2d 244, 773 
N.W.2d 470 (explaining how the period during which a cause of 
action may be used as a counterclaim is tolled by the date on which 
plaintiff files the action).  The State referenced no such 
statutory linkage in this matter.  
¶40 Statutory tolling as a court remedy also has been 
equitably based on promised action that harms a party who 
reasonably relied on the promise and is injured when the promised 
act does not occur.  State ex rel. Griffin v. Smith, 2004 WI 36, 
¶3, 270 Wis. 2d 235, 677 N.W.2d 259 (describing counsel's promise 
to act as Griffin requested, we equitably tolled the time for 
filing certiorari review of his parole revocation).  No such 
promised action is present here.   
¶41 However, while the words of Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5)(a)1. 
do not say anything about tolling, they do contextually inform our 
analysis.  See Townsend, 399 Wis. 2d 599, ¶13.  Section 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
20 
 
971.14(5)(a)1. provides that if the court determines that a 
defendant is not competent but is likely to become competent within 
the statutory timeframe, "[it] shall suspend the proceedings and 
commit the defendant to the custody of the department for treatment 
for a period not to exceed 12 months . . . ."  § 971.14(5)(a)1.  
As the court of appeals noted, the legislature describes 
§ 971.14(5)(a)1.'s 12-month time period in terms of commitment 
rather than treatment.  See Green, 396 Wis. 2d 658, ¶61 ("Although 
the custody under § 971.14 must be for purposes of treatment, it 
is the custody, not the treatment, that may not exceed twelve 
months."). 
¶42 In examining Wis. Stat. § 971.14's other subsections, 
the same 12-month time period is repeatedly described as the 
"commitment period."  See § 971.14(5)(b) ("Each report shall 
indicate either that the defendant has become competent, that the 
defendant remains incompetent but that attainment of competency is 
likely within the remaining commitment period, or that the 
defendant has not made such progress that attainment of competency 
is likely within the remaining commitment period."); § 971.14 
(6)(a) ("If the court determines that it is unlikely that the 
defendant will become competent within the remaining commitment 
period, it shall discharge the defendant from the commitment and 
release him or her, except as provided in par. (b).").   
¶43 The legislature's use of a firm 12-month period as a 
"commitment" period, rather than employing a more flexible 
"treatment" period as the term during which competency could be 
restored, supports the conclusion that the legislature set a firm 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
21 
 
limit on the term of an involuntary commitment to restore 
competency for trial.  
¶44 Furthermore, the statutory history underlying other 
amendments 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.14(5)(a) 
confirms 
this 
interpretation through the legislature's repeated attention to due 
process concerns as instructed by us and by the United States 
Supreme Court.  See County of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶27, 315 
Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571 (quoting Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581) ("'A review 
of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis' because 
it is part of the context in which we interpret statutory terms.").   
¶45 Early provisions of Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5) had no 
definite time limit during which a defendant could be committed 
when competency was sought for trial.  The commitment could proceed 
"for so long as such condition endures."  Wis. Stat. ch. 191, 
§ 4700 (1878).  In 1969, the legislature amended § 971.14(5) to 
provide that persons committed as incompetent to stand trial should 
be confined for treatment for competency no longer than they could 
be confined if convicted of the crime charged.   
¶46 Then in 1975 in response to our decision in Haskins, the 
legislature repealed the Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5) requirement that 
a defendant could not be committed for longer than the defendant 
could have been confined if convicted.  A legislative note to 
Assembly Bill 257, which was enacted as ch. 153, Laws of 1975, 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
22 
 
explained that "[t]he changes in sub. (5), relating to length of 
commitment to determine competency, are a result of Haskins."14 
¶47 In State ex rel. Deisinger v. Treffert, 85 Wis. 2d 257, 
270 N.W.2d 402 (1978), we judicially replaced the time limit on 
confinements to achieve competency that the legislature had 
removed based on its misunderstanding of our Haskins decision.  We 
concluded that "[t]he most basic notions of due process fairness 
require that one found incompetent to stand trial is entitled to 
release when observatory confinement reaches the length of the 
potential maximum sentence for the underlying criminal offense."  
Id. at 268.  Shortly after Deisinger, the legislature once again 
responded by amending Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5)(a) to legislatively 
require the limitation we set out judicially in Deisinger.  Ch. 
367, Laws of 1981.  
¶48 In 1979, the legislature required that a defendant who 
was committed to be treated to competence be examined at "6-month 
intervals following commitment[, and] if the defendant has not 
regained competency within 24 months of commitment" the defendant 
should be discharged from commitment with a ch. 51 commitment 
remaining a possibility.  In 1981, the legislature again amended 
Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5)(a) to provide that the period during which 
treatment would be accorded was "18 months, or the maximum 
sentence . . . whichever is less."  § 971.14(5)(a) (1981-82). 
                                                 
14 This legislative history confirms our understanding derived 
from the statutory history, which is explained further below, that 
the legislature's changes were responsive to its understanding of 
our directives.  Westmas v. Creekside Tree Serv., Inc., 2018 WI 
12, ¶20, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68. 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
23 
 
¶49 Then in 1989 Wis. Act 31, § 2850, effective January 1, 
1990, the legislature once again amended Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5)(a) 
to reduce the maximum confinement time for treatment to competence 
from 18 months to 12 months.  That was the last substantive change.    
¶50 Those statutory revisions do not decide whether the 12-
month provision found in Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5)(a)1. to bring a 
defendant to competence should be tolled in the case before us, 
but they show that the legislature was coordinating its revisions 
with due process concerns that we raised and that the United States 
Supreme Court raised in Jackson.  State v. Moore, 167 Wis. 2d 491, 
500, 481 N.W.2d 633 (1992).  As the United States Supreme Court 
has carefully explained, "a person charged by a State with a 
criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his 
incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the 
reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is 
a substantial probability that he will attain [trial competency] 
in the foreseeable future."  Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.15   
¶51 In the matter before us, the legislature has decided 
that 12 months is the maximum time during which to "determine 
whether there is a substantial probability that [a defendant] will 
attain competency in the foreseeable future."  Id. at 716.  Jackson 
limited such confinement based on due process concerns.  Given the 
past due process consideration that the legislature has afforded 
                                                 
15 The presumption of innocence is overturned at conviction 
and therefore, it is not a consideration postconviction.  State v. 
Allen, 2010 WI 89, ¶17, 328 Wis. 2d 1, 786 N.W.2d 124 ("Upon 
appeal, however, the defendant is no longer protected by the 
presumption of innocence."). 
No. 
2020AP298-CR   
 
24 
 
in its amendments to Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5)(a)1., we conclude that 
the plain meaning of the 12-month treatment limit does not permit 
tolling of its limit on confinement for pretrial treatment to 
achieve competency.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals 
decision in that regard.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶52 We conclude that because the State's significant 
pretrial interests in bringing a defendant who meets each one of 
the factors set out in Sell v. United States to competency for 
trial and providing timely justice to victims outweigh upholding 
a defendant's liberty interest in refusing involuntary medication 
at the pretrial stage of criminal proceedings, Scott's automatic 
stay of involuntary medication orders pending appeal does not apply 
to pretrial proceedings.  Therefore, we employ our supervisory 
authority to so limit our decision in Scott on which the court of 
appeals relied.  
¶53 We also conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5)(a)1. is not 
subject to tolling in a pretrial context.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals decision in part.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is limited 
in part and affirmed in part. 
 
 
No.  2020AP298-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶54 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  The involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs 
is "no small matter."  Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶43 
n.7, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.  Such drugs are "powerful 
enough 
to 
immobilize 
mind 
and 
body," 
have 
a 
"profound 
effect . . . on the thought processes of an individual," and come 
with a "well-established likelihood of severe and irreversible 
adverse side effects."  In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 
53 (Mass. 1981); see also United States v. Watson, 793 F.3d 416, 
419 (4th Cir. 2015).   
¶55 Accordingly, both this court and the United States 
Supreme Court have recognized that individuals have a significant 
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of 
antipsychotic drugs.  State v. Fitzgerald, 2019 WI 69, ¶13, 387 
Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210, 221 (1990)).   
¶56 Just four years ago in State v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, ¶43, 
382 Wis. 2d 476, 914 N.W.2d 141, this court unanimously again 
affirmed the need to protect that liberty interest.  We established 
a new rule affecting criminal defendants declared not competent:  
"involuntary medication orders are subject to an automatic stay 
pending appeal."  Id.   
¶57 Our rationale for that rule was likewise unanimous and 
succinctly stated:  "The reasoning for our decision is simple——if 
involuntary medication orders are not automatically stayed pending 
appeal, the defendant's 'significant' constitutionally protected 
'liberty interest' in 'avoiding the unwanted administration of 
No.  2020AP298-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
antipsychotic drugs' is rendered a nullity."  Id., ¶44 (citations 
omitted). 
¶58 Despite no party initially raising the issue,1 the 
majority now backtracks on this rule, declaring that our 
determination in Scott does not apply to pre-trial proceedings.  
In doing so, it accomplishes just the result that Scott was 
intended to prevent, i.e., that the defendant's liberty interest 
in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medication is rendered a 
nullity.   
¶59 I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.14(5)(a)1. is not subject to tolling.2  However, I part ways 
with the majority because I determine that the reasoning behind 
the automatic stay in Scott applies equally to pre-trial 
proceedings and postconviction proceedings.  Rather than limit 
Scott, I would uphold it along with the vitality of the 
constitutionally protected right on which it is premised.   
¶60 Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part. 
I 
¶61 Joseph Green was charged with first-degree intentional 
homicide, and his counsel raised concerns regarding his competency 
to proceed.  Majority op., ¶4.  After a hearing, the circuit court 
found Green not competent, but that competency could be restored 
                                                 
1 In neither the State's initial brief nor its reply brief 
did it argue to limit Scott in the way the majority now 
accomplishes.  The issue of whether Scott should be limited was 
first raised by the court at oral argument, after which we ordered 
supplemental briefing. 
2 Accordingly, I join part II.D of the majority opinion. 
No.  2020AP298-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
with medication.  Id., ¶5.  It thus entered an involuntary 
medication order.  Id.  Green appealed and sought a stay of the 
involuntary medication order pending appeal, which the circuit 
court granted pursuant to Scott.  Id. 
¶62 The State moved to lift the automatic stay and to toll 
the statutory time period to bring Green to competency.  Id., ¶6.  
Both motions were granted by the circuit court and Green appealed.  
Id.  As relevant here, the court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court's tolling order, determining that the circuit court lacked 
authority to toll the statutory time period to bring Green to 
competency.  State v. Green, 2021 WI App 18, ¶2, 396 Wis. 2d 658, 
957 N.W.2d 583. 
¶63 After the State petitioned for review, the majority now 
affirms the court of appeals' conclusion on tolling, determining 
that "Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5)(a)1. is not subject to tolling in a 
pretrial context."  Majority op., ¶3.  However, after ordering 
supplemental briefing on the issue, the majority also concludes 
that Scott's automatic stay "does not apply to pretrial 
proceedings."  Id., ¶2.  It reaches this result because, in its 
view:  
[T]he State's significant pretrial interests in bringing 
a defendant who meets each one of the factors set out in 
Sell v. United States to competency for trial and 
providing timely justice to victims outweigh upholding 
a defendant's liberty interest in refusing involuntary 
medication 
at 
the 
pretrial 
stage 
of 
criminal 
proceedings . . . .   
Majority op., ¶2 (footnote omitted).  
No.  2020AP298-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
II 
¶64 Adherence to the well-established liberty interest in 
avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs 
compelled our decision in Scott.  Among the several issues we 
decided was "whether involuntary medication orders should be 
stayed automatically pending appeal as suggested by Scott."  Scott, 
382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶42. 
¶65 Answering 
this 
question 
in 
the 
affirmative, 
we 
unanimously employed our superintending authority to "order that 
involuntary medication orders are subject to an automatic stay 
pending appeal."  Id., ¶43.  Explaining our rationale, we stated:  
"The reasoning for our decision is simple——if involuntary 
medication orders are not automatically stayed pending appeal, the 
defendant's 'significant' constitutionally protected 'liberty 
interest' 
in 
'avoiding 
the 
unwanted 
administration 
of 
antipsychotic drugs' is rendered a nullity."  Id., ¶44 (citations 
omitted). 
¶66 Nothing about this holding in Scott indicated that it 
was limited to postconviction proceedings.  If we had wanted to so 
limit it, we certainly could have, as we explicitly did with regard 
to another of the issues we addressed in Scott.  Namely, in 
addition to the question of an automatic stay, another question 
presented in Scott was as follows:  "May a circuit court require 
a non-dangerous but incompetent defendant to be involuntarily 
treated 
to 
competency 
in 
the 
context 
of 
postconviction 
proceedings . . . ?"  Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶10 (emphasis 
added).  We answered this question with specific reference to 
No.  2020AP298-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
postconviction proceedings only:  "Before a circuit court can 
require 
a 
non-dangerous 
but 
incompetent 
defendant 
to 
be 
involuntarily 
treated 
to 
competency 
in 
the 
context 
of 
postconviction proceedings, the circuit court must follow the 
procedure this court established in State v. Debra A.E., 188 
Wis. 2d 111, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994)."  Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶11 
(emphasis added). 
¶67 In contrast, our holding with regard to the automatic 
stay contained no such caveat.  Indeed, Scott includes not even a 
hint that such a limitation was desirable or necessary.3 
¶68 More importantly, the reasoning behind the automatic 
stay in Scott applies equally to pre-trial proceedings and 
postconviction proceedings.  Again, the Scott court stated that 
its rationale "is simple——if involuntary medication orders are not 
automatically stayed pending appeal, the defendant's 'significant' 
constitutionally protected 'liberty interest' in 'avoiding the 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs' is rendered a 
nullity."  Id., ¶44 (citations omitted). 
                                                 
3 The majority fosters confusion in its analysis with its 
statement that in pre-trial proceedings "Scott's automatic stay of 
involuntary medication orders pending appeal is unsound in 
principle and unworkable in practice" and its accompanying 
citation to Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Insurance of 
Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶99, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.  Majority 
op., ¶36.  Johnson Controls presents the framework for when this 
court should depart from stare decisis by overruling past 
precedents.  See Johnson Controls, Inc., 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶¶94-100.  
I question whether this analysis has any application to the present 
case——the majority does not overrule Scott nor does any party 
advocate for such a result. 
No.  2020AP298-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
¶69 I acknowledge that the State's interests in bringing a 
defendant to competency may vary based on the procedural posture 
of a case.  But the defendant's liberty interest in avoiding 
unwanted medication is a constant.  As Green argues, such an 
interest "would be rendered just as much a nullity without an 
automatic stay pre-trial as it would postconviction."  In either 
situation, when the defendant is forcibly medicated, the damage is 
done.  See United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (referring to an "order compelling a person to take 
antipsychotic medication" as "an especially grave infringement of 
liberty"). 
¶70 While removing the automatic stay pre-trial has a 
drastic effect on the interests of the defendant, leaving it in 
place would have little effect on those of the State.  Indeed, 
under Scott the State retains the ability to move to lift the stay, 
which it can do in short order.  Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶45.   
¶71 The majority correctly identifies the State's interest 
in bringing a defendant to trial and achieving timely justice on 
behalf of the victims.  Majority op., ¶¶31, 35.  These are of 
course strong interests.  However, in the name of these interests 
the majority tramples a defendant's constitutional rights rooted 
in bodily autonomy.   
¶72 Once a defendant is forcibly medicated, it is impossible 
to undo such an intrusion.  We should be mindful to avoid ringing 
a bell that cannot be unrung, especially where there exists a 
process to lift the stay in the case where the State's interests 
are as weighty as the majority claims. 
No.  2020AP298-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
¶73 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in part 
and dissent in part. 
¶74 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this separate writing. 
 
No.  2020AP298-CR.awb 
 
1