Case Title: Gantner v. PG&E Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S273340

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
ANTHONY GANTNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
PG&E CORPORATION et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S273340 
 
Ninth Circuit  
21-15571 
 
Northern District of California 
4:20-cv-02584-HSG 
 
 
November 20, 2023 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Groban, Jenkins, 
Evans, and O’Rourke* concurred.  
 
 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 
District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
S273340 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) conducted a 
series of emergency power shutoffs, called Public Safety Power 
Shutoffs (PSPS), throughout the fall of 2019 to reduce the risk 
that its utility infrastructure would ignite a wildfire during 
extreme weather conditions.  Plaintiff Anthony Gantner alleges 
that these power shutoffs were necessitated by PG&E’s 
negligence in maintaining its power grid over multiple decades 
and that Californians harmed by these shutoffs are entitled to 
$2.5 billion in damages. 
While Public Utilities Code section 2106 provides a private 
right of action against utilities, section 1759 of the same code 
bars actions that would interfere with the California Public 
Utilities Commission (PUC) in the performance of its official 
duties.  (All undesignated statutory references are to the Public 
Utilities Code.)  We consider here, in response to a request by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
whether section 1759 bars a lawsuit that seeks damages 
resulting from PSPS events where the suit alleges that a 
utility’s negligence in maintaining its grid necessitated the 
shutoffs but does not allege that the shutoffs were unnecessary 
or violated PUC regulations.  We hold that allowing suit here 
would interfere with the PUC’s comprehensive regulatory and 
supervisory authority over PSPS.  Section 1759 therefore bars 
Gantner’s suit.  The Ninth Circuit also asked us to decide 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
2 
whether PG&E Electric Rule No. 14 (Tariff Rule 14) shields 
PG&E from liability, but we do not reach that issue. 
I. 
Gantner filed a class action complaint against PG&E in 
2019 in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of 
California as part of PG&E’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
 
Gantner 
alleges that 
PG&E 
negligently 
maintained its power grid and electrical equipment for decades 
and that this negligence forced the utility to implement a series 
of PSPS in 2019 to reduce the risk of wildfires.  The PSPS events 
in question led to “many days” without power for Gantner and 
other California residents and business owners, who requested 
class damages of $2.5 billion to compensate for the “loss of 
habitability of their dwellings, loss of food items in their 
refrigerators, expenses for alternative means of lighting and 
power, . . . loss of cell phone connectivity, dangerous dark 
conditions, lack of running water, and loss of productivity and 
business.”  Gantner does not allege that the 2019 PSPS were 
unnecessary or that they were implemented in contravention of 
PUC regulations or policies. 
PG&E moved to dismiss Gantner’s complaint, arguing 
that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
under section 1759 because Gantner’s suit would interfere with 
the PUC’s supervision and regulation of the PSPS scheme.  (See 
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 
893, 918 (Covalt).)  Alternatively, PG&E argued that its own 
“Tariff Rule 14 provides that the decision to shut off a customer’s 
power cannot trigger liability when, in PG&E’s ‘sole opinion’, it 
is necessary for public safety.”  The bankruptcy court concluded 
that section 1759 bars Gantner’s action and dismissed the 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
3 
complaint without leave to amend and without addressing 
PG&E’s Tariff Rule 14 argument.  On appeal, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California affirmed 
the dismissal based on section 1759 preemption.  Gantner 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which issued an order requesting 
that this court answer two questions concerning California law. 
We granted the Ninth Circuit’s request to consider two 
questions:  “(1) Does California Public Utilities Code [section] 
1759 preempt a plaintiff’s claim of negligence brought against a 
utility if the alleged negligent acts were not approved by the 
California Public Utilities Commission, but those acts 
foreseeably resulted in the utility having to take subsequent 
action (here, a Public Safety Power Shutoff), pursuant to CPUC 
guidelines, and that subsequent action caused the plaintiff’s 
alleged injury?  (2) Does PG&E’s Electric Rule Number 14 shield 
PG&E from liability for an interruption in its services that 
PG&E determines is necessary for the safety of the public at 
large, even if the need for that interruption arises from PG&E’s 
own negligence?”  
II. 
“ ‘The [Public Utilities] [C]ommission is a state agency of 
constitutional origin with far-reaching duties, functions and 
powers.  (Cal. Const., art. XII, §§ 1–6.)  The Constitution confers 
broad authority on the commission to regulate utilities, 
including the power to fix rates, establish rules, hold various 
types of hearings, award reparation, and establish its own 
procedures.  (Id., §§ 2, 4, 6.)’ ”  (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at 
pp. 914–915.)  “The Constitution also confers plenary power on 
the Legislature to ‘establish the manner and scope of review of 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
4 
commission action in a court of record’ (Cal. Const., art. XII, 
§ 5).”  (Id. at p. 915.) 
A. 
We start by examining the background of PSPS, along 
with the PUC’s supervision and regulation of those procedures.  
“Over the last decade, California has experienced increased, 
intense, and record-breaking wildfires . . . .  These fires have 
resulted in devastating loss of life and damage to property and 
infrastructure.”  (Decision Adopting De-Energization (Public 
Safety Power Shut-Off) Guidelines (Phase 1 Guidelines) (May 30, 
2019) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 19-05-042 [2019 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 
270, *2].)  While the underlying causes of wildfires are complex 
and varied, failure of electric utility infrastructure can ignite 
fires.  (Id. at pp. *2–*3.)  The risks of infrastructure failure and 
wildfire ignition increase in conjunction with certain conditions 
such as low humidity, high winds, and dry vegetation.  (Id. at 
pp. *3–*4.)  Conversely, proper maintenance of utility 
infrastructure can reduce these risks and increase safety.  (Id. 
at p. *105.) 
Electric utilities are required to operate their grids in 
ways that “promote the safety [and] health” of the public.  (§ 451; 
see also § 399.2, subd. (a)(1) [requiring electrical utilities to 
operate their grids safely].)  The PUC has determined that these 
statutory provisions provide authority for utilities “to shut off 
power in emergency situations when necessary to protect public 
safety.”  (Decision Denying Without Prejudice San Diego Gas & 
Electric Company’s Application to Shut Off Power During 
Periods of High Fire Danger (Sept. 10, 2009) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. 
No. 09-09-030 [2009 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 437, *98].)  Nevertheless, 
when San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) sought approval of a 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
5 
proposed PSPS program in 2009, the PUC denied its request and 
encouraged SDG&E to continue considering options to reduce 
the risk of catastrophic wildfires, reminding the utility that any 
proposals must employ a cost-benefit analysis that weighs the 
benefits of reduced wildfire risk against the costs to customers 
and communities.  (Id. at p. *1.) 
In 2012, the PUC provided PSPS guidelines applicable 
only to SDG&E, explaining what actions a utility must take 
before and after shutting off power, the factors the PUC would 
consider in assessing the reasonableness of an emergency power 
shutoff, and how shutoffs would be reviewed and evaluated by 
regulators.  (Decision Granting Petition to Modify Decision 09-
09-030 and Adopting Fire Safety Requirements for San Diego 
Gas & Electric Company (Apr. 19, 2012) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 12-
04-024 [2012 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 165, *48–*52].)  In 2018, following 
what was then “the most destructive wildfire season on record,” 
the PUC extended de-energization policies and procedures to all 
investor-owned electric utilities, including PG&E.  (Resolution 
Extending 
De-Energization 
Reasonableness, 
Notification, 
Mitigation and Reporting Requirements in Decision 12-04-024 to 
All Electric Investor Owned Utilities (July 12, 2018) Cal.P.U.C. 
Res. No. ESRB-8 [2018 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 330, *4].) 
In 2019, the PUC promulgated a set of formal PSPS 
guidelines, acknowledging that “[w]ith the growing threat of 
wildfire, utilities will proactively cut power to lines that may fail 
in certain weather conditions in order to reduce the likelihood 
that their infrastructure could cause or contribute to a wildfire.”  
(Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 19-05-042, supra, 2019 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 
270 at p. *3.)  These binding guidelines, along with those 
adopted in Resolution ESRB-8, “remain in effect unless and 
until they are superseded by another Commission decision or 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
6 
resolution.”  (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 19-05-042, supra, 2019 
Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 270 at p. *202.) 
The PUC’s guidelines require utilities to undertake a 
public notice and community engagement process, to notify 
customers affected by de-energization as soon as practicable, to 
create plans for mitigating harm from de-energization, and to 
promptly submit a report to the PUC following each de-
energization event.  (Cal.P.U.C. Res. No. ESRB-8, supra, 2018 
Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 330 at pp. *10–*16.)  The PUC also may 
conduct post hoc reasonableness reviews of de-energization 
events “to ensure that the power shut off is executed only as a 
last resort and for good reason.”  (Id. at p. *8; see ibid. [listing 
factors identified by PUC as pertinent to its reasonableness 
review, including the utility’s de-energization alternatives, 
reasonable belief in “an imminent and significant” fire risk, and 
“efforts to mitigate the adverse impacts” of a power shutoff].)  
Before implementing a shutoff, utilities must conduct a cost-
benefit analysis to “determine[] that the benefit of de-
energization 
outweigh[s] 
potential 
public 
safety 
risks.”  
(Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 19-05-042, supra, 2019 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 
270 at p. *237.)  
Meanwhile, the Legislature in 2016 passed Senate Bill 
No. 1028, which added section 8386 requiring electric utilities 
to submit annual wildfire mitigation plans to the PUC for 
review.  (Stats. 2016, ch. 598, § 1; see § 8386, subd. (b).)  In 2018, 
the Legislature expanded section 8386 to specify that wildfire 
mitigation plans shall include “[p]rotocols for . . . deenergizing 
portions of the electrical distribution system that consider the 
associated impacts on public safety.”  (Stats. 2018, ch. 626, § 38; 
see § 8386, subd. (c)(6).)  Effective July 1, 2021, the Legislature 
transferred the responsibility to “oversee and enforce electrical 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
7 
corporations’ compliance with wildfire safety” to the Office of 
Energy Infrastructure Safety (OEIS).  (Stats. 2019, ch. 81, § 7; 
see § 326, subds. (a)(1), (b).)  At the same time, the Legislature 
clarified that “[n]othing in this chapter [describing the power of 
OEIS] affects the commission’s authority or jurisdiction over an 
electrical corporation, electrical cooperative, or local publicly 
owned electric utility.”  (§ 8385, subd. (b).)  The PUC thus 
continues to have responsibility for ratifying PSPS plans 
approved by the Wildfire Safety Division of OEIS (§ 8386.3, 
subd. (a)), evaluating utilities’ pre-season and post-season 
reports on PSPS (Decision Adopting Phase 3 Revised and 
Additional Guidelines and Rules for Public Safety Power 
Shutoffs (Proactive De-Energizations) of Electric Facilities to 
Mitigate Wildfire Risk Caused by Utility Infrastructure (June 
24, 2021) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-034 [2021 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 
305, *167–*173]), and conducting investigations and levying 
penalties against utilities for noncompliance with PSPS rules 
and 
regulations 
(see, 
e.g., 
[Proposed] 
Administrative 
Enforcement Order in the matter of Pacific Gas & Electric 
Company’s Execution of 2020 Public Safety Power Shutoff 
Events (June 15, 2022) available at  [as of Nov. 14, 2023] (brackets in original) [proposing 
to fine PG&E $12 million and implement corrective action for 
regulatory violations during 2020 PSPS events]; all Internet 
citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket number, 
and case name at http://www.courts.ca.gov/38324.htm). 
In February 2019, PG&E submitted its annual wildfire 
mitigation plan to the PUC.  This plan contained PG&E’s 
proposed PSPS program, including: “(1) PSPS decision factors; 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
8 
(2) strategies to enhance PSPS efficiency while reducing 
associated impacts; (3) PSPS notification strategy; and (4) re-
energization strategy.”  The PUC approved PG&E’s plan as 
compliant with the requirements of section 8386, subdivision (c), 
while also noting that “several aspects of the company’s planned 
mitigation . . . require improvement or other follow-up activity.” 
After the fall 2019 PSPS events that form the basis of this 
action, PG&E submitted reports on the power shutoffs to the 
PUC.  The PUC found that during the PSPS events, PG&E 
violated the Public Utilities Code and PUC guidelines due to 
“the unavailability and non-functionality of [PG&E’s] website,” 
“the inaccuracy of its online outage maps” showing affected 
areas, the “constructive[] inaccessib[ility]” of its secure data 
transfer portals, and its “failure to provide advanced notification 
to approximately 50,000 customers,” including “approximately 
1,100 Medical Baseline customers.”  (Decision on Alleged 
Violations of Pacific Gas and Electric Company with Respect to 
its Implementation of the Fall 2019 Public Safety Power Shutoff 
Events (Sept. 23, 2021) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-09-026 [2021 
Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 480, *110].)  For these violations, the PUC 
fined PG&E over $106 million.  (Id. at p. *112.)  In a separate 
investigation into the same PSPS events, the PUC concluded 
that among other violations of the Public Utilities Code, PG&E 
“failed to identify the possible safety risks resulting from an 
electric power shutoff” and “failed to evaluate these safety risks 
as part of the analysis of weighing the benefits and risks.”  
(Decision Addressing the Late 2019 Public Safety Power Shutoffs 
by Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Southern California 
Edison Company, and San Diego Gas & Electric Company to 
Mitigate the Risk of Wildfire Caused by Utility Infrastructure 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
9 
(June 3, 2021) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-014 [2021 Cal.P.U.C. 
Lexis 278, *312–*313].)   
B. 
This case concerns the bounds of section 1759 preemption.  
By statute, public utilities remain liable for “any act, matter, or 
thing prohibited or declared unlawful,” as well as for omissions 
of “any act, matter, or thing required to be done.”  (§ 2106.)  This 
private right of action is limited by section 1759, which divests 
all courts except this court and the Court of Appeal of 
jurisdiction “to review, reverse, correct, or annul any order or 
decision of the commission or to . . . enjoin, restrain, or interfere 
with the commission in the performance of its official duties.”  
(§ 1759, subd. (a).) 
“[I]n order to resolve the potential conflict between 
sections 1759 and 2106, the latter section must be construed as 
limited to those situations in which an award of damages would 
not hinder or frustrate the commission’s declared supervisory 
and regulatory policies.”  (Waters v. Pacific Telephone Co. (1974) 
12 Cal.3d 1, 4 (Waters).)  Preemption under section 1759 is not 
limited to actions that “would directly contravene a specific 
order or decision of the commission.”  (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th 
at p. 918.)  An action is also barred if it “would simply have the 
effect of undermining a general supervisory or regulatory policy 
of the commission, i.e., when it would ‘hinder’ or ‘frustrate’ or 
‘interfere with’ or ‘obstruct’ that policy.”  (Ibid., fn. omitted.)  
Section 1759 bars an action when three requirements are met:  
(1) the PUC had the authority to adopt certain regulations or 
policies; (2) the PUC actually exercised that authority; and (3) 
the action would interfere with the PUC’s exercise of that 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
10 
authority.  (Hartwell Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 
256, 266 (Hartwell).)   
Where “the relief sought would . . . interfere[] with a broad 
and continuing supervisory or regulatory program of the 
commission,” section 1759 bars the action.  (Covalt, supra, 13 
Cal.4th at p. 919.)  In Waters, a customer sought damages from 
her telephone company for its alleged failure to provide 
adequate phone service.  (Waters, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 4.)  We 
explained that because the PUC “ha[d] adopted a policy of 
limiting the liability of telephone utilities . . . for acts of ordinary 
negligence to a specified credit allowance,” allowing a suit for 
damages “would be contrary to the policy adopted by the 
commission and would interfere with the commission’s 
regulation of telephone utilities.”  (Ibid.)  Section 1759 therefore 
barred the customer’s action.  (Ibid.)   
Similarly, in Covalt, homeowners sued an electric utility, 
arguing that by increasing the number of power lines near the 
plaintiffs’ home, the utility had “ ‘dramatically increased the 
dangerous levels of electromagnetic radiation flowing onto 
plaintiffs’ property.’ ”  (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 911.)  Over 
the previous decade, the PUC had undertaken a lengthy and 
thorough review of the available scientific evidence, had 
determined that the evidence did not establish that electric and 
magnetic fields (EMF) were dangerous, and had issued a seven-
point EMF policy.  (Id. at pp. 926–934.)  We held that because 
the suit sought a court determination that EMF “are in fact 
dangerous,” a determination that “would plainly undermine and 
interfere with [PUC] policy” (id. at p. 947), section 1759 barred 
the action (id. at p. 903). 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
11 
And in Hartwell, plaintiffs sued water utilities for 
providing allegedly contaminated drinking water, regardless of 
whether the contaminants exceeded the levels allowed by the 
PUC.  (Hartwell, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 275–276.)  Section 
1759 barred the subset of claims based “on the theory that the 
public utilities provided unhealthy water, even if that water 
actually met [Department of Health Services] and PUC 
standards.”  (Hartwell, at p. 276.)  At the same time, “damage 
claims based on the theory that the water failed to meet federal 
and state drinking water standards [were] not preempted by 
section 1759.”  (Ibid.)  “A jury award based on a finding that a 
public water utility violated [state] standards would not 
interfere with the PUC regulatory policy requiring water utility 
compliance with those standards.”  (Ibid.) 
III. 
With this background in mind, we turn to the present case.  
The parties agree that the PUC has the authority to regulate 
PSPS and that it has exercised that authority.  Gantner does not 
challenge the PUC’s general PSPS regulations or policies, nor 
does he challenge the procedures undertaken by the PUC to 
create those policies.  He does not allege that PG&E’s 2019 
shutoff events were unnecessary or that they were conducted in 
violation of PUC regulations or requirements, and we have no 
occasion to consider how section 1759 might apply to a suit 
predicated on PUC findings that a utility violated PUC 
guidelines by or while implementing a PSPS event.  Further, 
Gantner does not seek damages or injunctive relief based on 
harms 
resulting 
directly 
from 
PG&E’s 
negligent 
grid 
maintenance.  Rather, he alleges that PG&E’s negligent 
maintenance caused the need for the 2019 PSPS events, which 
in turn led directly to the alleged damages.  The question is 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
12 
whether Gantner’s action would interfere with the PUC’s 
exercise of its authority to regulate PSPS.  
A. 
Gantner alleges that the fall 2019 PSPS events “were a 
direct and legal result of the negligence” of PG&E in 
maintaining its grid and that “PG&E breached its duty of care 
to millions of its customers by shutting off their power . . . .”  
(Italics added.)  Gantner’s suit, while alleging negligence by 
PG&E in grid maintenance only, claims that all of the alleged 
harm — and all damages sought — flow directly from PG&E’s 
fall 2019 PSPS events.  To award damages on this theory, a 
court would have to find that PG&E breached its duty by 
negligently maintaining its grid and that this negligence 
foreseeably caused the PSPS events and resulting harms.  But 
the PUC has already instituted procedures for evaluating PSPS 
before and after a power shutoff, along with its own criteria for 
examining the propriety of each PSPS decision.  Although the 
PUC has conducted extensive investigation into the fall 2019 
PSPS events, Gantner’s suit does not adopt any of the PUC’s 
findings or conclusions.  Rather, by claiming damages for PSPS 
events without regard to whether those events were necessary 
or properly executed under PUC guidelines, Gantner’s suit 
impermissibly interferes with the PUC’s supervisory policies 
regarding 
both 
PSPS 
implementation 
and 
post 
hoc 
reasonableness review. 
First, Gantner’s suit would interfere with the PUC’s 
“broad and continuing supervisory . . . program” over the 
implementation of PSPS events.  (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at 
p. 919.)  For over a decade, the PUC has emphasized that a 
utility’s decision to shut off power must stem from its 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
13 
overarching duty to protect public safety.  (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. 
No. 09-09-030, supra, 2009 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 437 at p. *98.)  PUC 
guidelines provide that before deciding to implement a PSPS 
event, “a utility must first engage in a critical analysis.”  
(Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-014, supra, 2021 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 
278 at p. *54.)  The utility must “identify and consider the safety 
risks to the public from shutting off electric power,” and “then 
the utility must weigh the risks of a PSPS event against the 
benefits of initiating a PSPS event.”  (Ibid.)  The PUC has 
“explained, in detail, the potential for ‘significant’ adverse 
impacts on the general public as a result of power shutoffs due 
to wildfire concerns.”  (Id. at p. *13; see id. at pp. *13–*14 
[describing 15 categories of harm that may result from power 
shutoffs].)  Nevertheless, the PUC has authorized the regulated 
use of PSPS events as a “last resort,” endorsing the practice 
where the public safety benefits of a reduced risk of wildfire 
ignition outweigh the harms of lost power.  (Cal.P.U.C. Res. 
No. ESRB-8, supra, 2018 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 330 at p. *8.) 
By seeking billions of dollars in alleged damages resulting 
directly from power shutoffs, Gantner’s suit would “ ‘hinder’ or 
‘frustrate’ ” the PUC’s carefully designed implementation 
calculus.  (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 918.)  In Hartwell, 
section 1759 barred suit against regulated water providers 
where water contaminant levels remained below maximum 
limits allowed by the PUC.  (Hartwell, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
p. 276.)  Where the PUC has decided that a certain level of 
contamination is acceptable, an action seeking damages for 
contamination below that threshold “ ‘would plainly undermine 
the commission’s policy.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Nothing in Hartwell suggests 
that a plaintiff can avoid section 1759 preemption simply by 
alleging that a permissible level of contamination occurred as a 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
14 
result of a water provider’s impermissible negligence.  This is 
for good reason:  section 1759 preemption turns on the 
constitutional and statutory authority of the PUC rather than 
simply the underlying behavior of the utility.  (See Waters, 
supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 10 [“general principles which might 
govern disputes between private parties are not necessarily 
applicable to disputes with regulated utilities”].) 
It is true that in Hartwell the PUC concluded that water 
complying with permissible contamination levels was “ ‘ “in no 
way harmful or dangerous to health” ’ ” (Hartwell, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 263), whereas here the PUC acknowledged the 
harms caused by PSPS.  But the PUC approved a system of 
PSPS decision-making based on the conclusion that in certain 
conditions, the harms of PSPS are outweighed by the benefits of 
wildfire prevention.  Gantner seeks damages resulting from 
PSPS events without alleging negligence in the decision to shut 
off power or in PSPS implementation.  Hartwell held that a 
utility could not be liable for contamination levels that fell 
within PUC-approved levels; here, PG&E cannot be liable for 
implementing PSPS events that, as far as the complaint alleges, 
fully complied with PUC guidelines.  To hold otherwise would 
be to invite interference with a “ ‘broad and continuing 
supervisory or regulatory program’ of the PUC.”  (Id. at p. 276.)  
A suit alleging that a utility implemented PSPS events in 
violation 
of 
PUC 
guidelines 
might 
present 
different 
considerations under Hartwell.  But we decline to speculate on 
section 1759’s application to such a case. 
Gantner contends that PUC guidelines do not permit a 
utility to consider its risk of liability to customers affected by 
PSPS events as part of the balancing necessary to justify PSPS 
implementation.  Thus, he argues, a damage award for the 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
15 
harms caused by PSPS events would fall outside of, and 
therefore would not frustrate, the PUC’s regulatory framework.  
Assuming without deciding that Gantner is correct that PUC 
guidelines bar utilities from considering the liability risk from a 
power shutoff, this argument is not persuasive. 
First, Gantner’s argument fails to account for the fact that 
any prohibition on a utility’s consideration of liability derives 
from PUC guidelines and supervision.  If utilities cannot 
consider liability as a factor in implementing PSPS events, it is 
because the PUC has determined that as a matter of policy 
utilities ought not consider liability in these decisions.  The PUC 
has emphasized that utilities should instead consider only the 
public safety implications through a careful cost-benefit 
analysis.  (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-014, supra, 2021 
Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 278 at p. *54.)  By seeking damages resulting 
directly from PSPS events, Gantner’s suit heightens the risk 
that potential tort liability will factor into a utility’s shutoff 
decision-making.  This puts Gantner’s suit at cross-purposes 
with the PUC’s carefully designed scheme.  (Gantner v. PG&E 
Corporation (N.D.Cal. 2021) 629 B.R. 60, 67; see also Southern 
California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 401 [“exposure 
to liability often provides an important incentive for parties to 
internalize the social costs of their actions”].) 
Furthermore, the PUC’s supervision over PSPS extends 
far beyond regulating the implementation of power shutoffs.  
Recognizing “the growing threat of wildfire” (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. 
No. 19-05-042, supra, 2019 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 270 at p. *3), the 
PUC determined that “proactively de-energizing power lines can 
save lives” (id. at p. *4).  The PUC’s carefully calibrated PSPS 
guidelines “build[] on new weather tracking and modeling 
technology” and add to “tougher regulations for removing 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
16 
vegetation” (ibid.) while acknowledging that power shutoffs can 
cause real harm to affected individuals and businesses (id. at 
pp. *4–*5).  By seeking liability for PSPS events regardless of 
whether the shutoff decision or implementation was negligent, 
Gantner’s suit interferes with the PUC’s broad supervisory 
power over how utilities can and should respond to the present 
threat of catastrophic wildfires.  Gantner’s suit also risks 
interfering with the PUC’s careful ratemaking decisions, either 
by increasing utility costs directly through extensive litigation 
or by incentivizing the acceleration of grid maintenance and 
improvement beyond the levels accounted for by the PUC.  (See 
Hartwell, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 276 [section 1759 bars action 
that could interfere with PUC ratemaking]; Waters, supra, 12 
Cal.3d at p. 10 [same].) 
Second, Gantner’s suit would interfere with the PUC’s 
post hoc review of PSPS events.  The PUC has implemented its 
own process for evaluating the reasonableness of PSPS events 
and maintains the authority to issue penalties and orders to 
utilities based on noncompliance with existing PSPS guidelines.  
(See, e.g., Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-09-026, supra, 2021 Cal.P.U.C. 
Lexis 480 at p. *1 [finding that PG&E violated PUC guidelines 
in implementing fall 2019 PSPS events and assessing a 
penalty]; see also Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-014, supra, 2021 
Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 278 at pp. *335–*351 [identifying numerous 
violations by PG&E related to the fall 2019 PSPS events].)  The 
PUC’s reasonableness review focuses on the environmental and 
grid conditions at the moment a utility decides to implement a 
PSPS event, as well as the utility’s actions subsequent to that 
decision.  (See Cal.P.U.C. Res. No. ESRB-8, supra, 2018 
Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 330 at p. *9 [a utility “must reasonably believe 
that there is an imminent and significant risk that strong winds 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
17 
will topple its power lines onto tinder dry vegetation or will 
cause major vegetation-related impacts on its facilities during 
periods of extreme fire hazard” in order to implement a PSPS 
event], underscoring omitted.) 
Gantner’s suit would require a court to hold a parallel 
review process, adding the judgment of a jury to that of the PUC 
in assessing the causes and propriety of PG&E’s PSPS 
implementation.  Gantner’s inquiry focuses on PG&E’s grid 
maintenance going back decades, even though PUC guidelines 
do not indicate that prior grid management or mismanagement 
is an appropriate factor for a utility to consider in implementing 
a PSPS event.  Rather, the PUC’s extensive guidance is focused 
on 
the 
conditions 
as 
they 
exist 
at 
the 
moment 
of 
implementation, based on a holistic assessment of weather 
conditions, ground conditions, and, inevitably, a utility’s 
understanding of the strength and reliability of its grid 
infrastructure.  (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 12-04-024, supra, 2012 
Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 165 at p. *40 [the utility “will be in the best 
position to determine when power should be shut off to protect 
public safety” because only the utility “has the detailed 
knowledge of its facilities that is needed to make this decision in 
real time based on contemporaneous local weather conditions”].)  
The PUC has made clear that a utility may decide to de-energize 
only when, in the moment, it believes the wildfire prevention 
benefits of such action outweigh the costs to residents and 
communities of de-energization.  Assessment of a utility’s 
compliance with these standards in deciding to implement a 
PSPS event “is a factual issue that is within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the [PUC] to decide.”  (Sarale v. Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 225, 243 (Sarale).) 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
18 
Indeed, following the fall 2019 PSPS events at issue here, 
the PUC thoroughly reviewed PG&E’s actions.  The PUC found 
that PG&E violated its guidelines in numerous ways and 
assessed fines totaling $106 million, the majority of which 
resulted from inadequate notification to customers.  (Cal.P.U.C. 
Dec. No. 21-09-026, supra, 2021 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 480 at 
pp. *112–*114.)  In a separate investigation, the PUC further 
determined that PG&E “failed to identify the possible safety 
risks resulting from an electric power shutoff” and “failed to 
evaluate these safety risks as part of the analysis of weighing 
the benefits and risks.”  (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-014, supra, 
2021 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 278 at pp. *312–*313.)  Although finding 
that “a monetary remedy [was] appropriate” for these violations 
(id. at p. *67), the PUC was “reluctant to impose monetary 
penalties,” instead applying a ratemaking remedy (id. at p. *69).  
In choosing this remedy, the PUC intended to “strik[e] a balance 
between the need in 2019 for utilities to initiate PSPS events . . . 
against the equally compelling need to conduct PSPS events in 
a safe manner.”  (Ibid.) 
Gantner’s suit does not adopt any of the findings of fact or 
conclusions of law from either of these post-PSPS reviews.  
Rather, the complaint makes clear that Gantner seeks a parallel 
review process that if successful would require findings in 
tension with PUC guidelines.  For example, while the complaint 
alleges underlying negligence in part because the wind gusts at 
the time of one PSPS event “[n]ever came close to the [PUC’s] 92 
miles per hour threshold,” the PUC says it has “declined to use 
wind speed as a determinative factor for when a utility can or 
may not implement a PSPS event.”  Similarly, while the 
complaint alleges that PG&E failed to properly manage 
vegetation that “posed a foreseeable hazard to power lines,” the 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
19 
PUC considered and approved PG&E’s proposed vegetation 
management as part of the utility’s 2019 Wildfire Mitigation 
Plan (see Decision on Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s 2019 
Wildfire Mitigation Plan Pursuant to Senate Bill 901 (May 30, 
2019) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 19-05-037 [2019 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 272, 
*1, *29–*42]). 
The current action thus seeks damages for the effects of 
PSPS events without any allegation that those events were 
executed in violation of PUC guidelines.  Gantner’s argument 
instead turns entirely on whether PG&E breached its duty of 
care and whether any breach caused the alleged damages.  
Because all alleged damages stem from the PSPS events 
themselves, the adjudication of breach, causation, and damages 
will inevitably involve an assessment of why the PSPS events 
were implemented and whether they could or should have been 
avoided.  But the questions of PSPS implementation and 
execution — along with the policy choice to use PSPS to mitigate 
wildfire risk and protect public safety — are reserved to the 
PUC, which has exercised its authority to delineate the factors 
relevant to these inquiries.  Section 1759 bars Gantner from 
seeking a parallel review of PG&E’s PSPS decision-making and 
implementation through his suit.  (See Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th 
at p. 939 [section 1759 bars an action seeking findings 
“inconsistent with the [PUC]’s conclusion”].) 
 
B. 
Gantner argues that if this suit is barred, utilities like 
PG&E will “get a free pass for their own negligence.”  But 
“section 1759 does not leave plaintiffs without a remedy” for 
utility negligence.  (Sarale, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 244.)  It 
simply means that the “remedy lies before the commission 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
20 
rather than in . . . court.”  (Ibid.)  As the PUC notes in its amicus 
curiae brief, “The Legislature has . . . provided a statutory 
scheme that includes formal complaint procedures before the 
Commission.” 
 
Customers 
concerned 
that 
PG&E 
may 
improperly implement PSPS could also “seek injunctive relief 
from the Commission” and could intervene in PSPS rulemaking.  
Moreover, the PUC notes that a utility’s annual wildfire 
mitigation plan must “address all the actions a utility commits 
to take in the coming year to reduce wildfire risk — including 
system hardening, undergrounding lines, inspections, and 
vegetation management.”  (See § 8386, subd. (c)(3), (c)(8)–(10), 
(c)(12), (c)(14)–(15) [listing requirements of wildfire mitigation 
plans].)  These plans are approved by OEIS and ratified by the 
PUC, and members of the public may comment on the proposed 
plans prior to approval.  (§ 8386, subd. (d).)  Similarly, the PUC’s 
post hoc reasonableness review includes an assessment of why 
the utility implemented a PSPS event (Cal.P.U.C. Res. 
No. ESRB-8, supra, 2018 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 330 at p. *8), and 
where a utility fails to provide a sound basis for PSPS 
implementation, the PUC can assess penalties and apply other 
remedial measures (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-014, supra, 2021 
Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 278 at pp. *67–*69 [assessing ratemaking 
remedy in lieu of penalties for PG&E’s failure to consider the 
public risks of shutoffs before implementing its 2019 PSPS 
events]). 
Gantner next argues that because the PUC cannot award 
damages to customers, this suit does not interfere with its 
authority over PSPS.  Gantner is correct that the PUC does not 
and cannot award tort damages to customers affected by the 
negligence of utilities.  (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-014, supra, 
2021 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 278 at p. *68 [PUC “does not have 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
21 
jurisdiction to award damages to utility customers”].)  Gantner 
is also correct that our proposed holding might limit the ability 
of some customers harmed by PSPS events to seek 
compensation.  But the possibility that some customers might 
not receive compensation for harms resulting from PSPS events 
is a result of the Legislature’s decision to adopt section 1759, 
which limits actions that interfere with PUC supervision despite 
the PUC’s inability to offer compensatory relief for utility 
negligence.  Gantner’s argument that no claim seeking damages 
based on past negligence could ever be barred by section 1759 is 
unsupported by our precedent.  (See, e.g., Waters, supra, 12 
Cal.3d at p. 10 [§ 1759 barred claim seeking damages for 
telephone utility’s past negligence]; Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at 
p. 950 [damages based on negligence of electric utility “would 
plainly undermine” the PUC’s policies]; Hartwell, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 276 [§ 1759 barred claim for damages based on 
utilities’ past provision of allegedly unhealthy drinking water].)  
To the extent that customers are left without recourse to seek 
compensation for the alleged negligence of utilities or the loss of 
power during PSPS events, such concerns are properly directed 
to the Legislature. 
Because his suit is based on allegations of negligent grid 
management prohibited by PUC regulations, Gantner contends 
that this action supports rather than hinders PUC authority.  
But even if the current action might support the PUC’s 
supervisory role over grid maintenance, the authority it 
interferes with relates to the PUC’s supervision of PSPS.  
Gantner is correct that imposing liability can alter a defendant’s 
behavior, and if this suit were allowed to proceed, Gantner may 
be right that it would “incentivize[] PG&E to provide safe and 
reliable electricity to its customers.”  But Gantner did not file 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
22 
suit based on harm resulting directly from underlying 
negligence in grid maintenance, and he did not seek an 
administrative remedy through the PUC to compel PG&E’s 
compliance with maintenance regulations.  Rather, Gantner 
filed suit for alleged harms that resulted directly and exclusively 
from PSPS events.  As noted, because the action heightens the 
risk that a utility’s PSPS decision-making may be influenced by 
considerations outside the scope of the cost-benefit analysis set 
forth by the PUC, it works at cross-purposes with the PUC’s 
regulation, supervision, and guidelines, and thus section 1759 
bars this suit. 
As noted, today’s decision does not foreclose the possibility 
of a narrowly tailored suit based on allegations that a utility 
acted negligently and in violation of PUC guidelines in its 
decision to implement PSPS events or the implementation of 
those events.  We also decline to address whether a negligent 
grid maintenance suit could proceed on a narrow claim for 
damages or injunctive relief that is properly tailored to avoid 
conflict with any Commission regulations over PSPS and 
wildfire safety.  Because Gantner’s complaint does not raise 
such claims, we need not decide whether they would be barred 
by section 1759. 
Gantner also argues that regardless of the PUC’s 
regulation of PSPS at the time of the fall 2019 PSPS events, 
subsequent legislation transferring PSPS supervisory authority 
to OEIS means the PUC no longer possesses any authority with 
which his suit could interfere.  It is true that OEIS now has “all 
functions” of the PUC’s former Wildfire Safety Division.  (§ 326, 
subd. (b).)  But PG&E notes that the statutory transfer of 
authority to OEIS occurred “well after the filing of this lawsuit 
and the 2019 PSPS events.”  The parties thus appear to disagree 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
23 
on whether section 1759 preemption can occur where a 
supervisory program was “broad and continuing” or whether it 
requires a program that is “broad and continuing.” 
We need not resolve this disagreement because in any 
event, the PUC retains a supervisory and regulatory role over 
PSPS such that section 1759 bars the current action.  The 
statute transferring authority to OEIS noted that “[n]othing in 
this chapter affects the commission’s authority or jurisdiction 
over an electrical corporation, electrical cooperative, or local 
publicly owned electric utility.”  (§ 8385, subd. (b).)  And the 
PUC has continued to exercise control over various aspects of 
PSPS regulation and supervision.  The PUC ratifies wildfire 
safety plans approved by OEIS (§ 8386.3, subd. (a)), conducts 
investigations and levies penalties following PSPS events (see, 
e.g., Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-09-026, supra, 2021 Cal.P.U.C. 
Lexis 480 at pp. *115–*116), and continues to enforce its 
existing PSPS guidelines and resolutions (id. at pp. *109–*110).  
The statute vesting supervisory powers over PSPS in OEIS 
repeatedly refers to the ongoing legal obligation of utilities to 
comply with PUC orders, rules, and requirements.  (See, e.g., 
§ 8386, subd. (c)(11) [utilities’ de-energization protocols “shall 
comply 
with 
any 
order 
of 
the 
commission 
regarding 
deenergization events”]; see also id., subd. (c)(7) [mandating 
compliance 
with 
“orders 
of 
the 
commission 
regarding 
notifications of deenergization events”]; id., subd. (c)(12), (c)(15), 
(c)(16), (c)(18), (c)(19)(B), (c)(21), (c)(22)(C) [all referencing PUC 
rules, regulations, or decisions in establishing utilities’ ongoing 
obligations].)  Moreover, section 1759 preemption can occur 
where the PUC shares supervisory or regulatory authority with 
another agency.  (See Hartwell, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 274 [PUC 
“continue[d] to exercise its jurisdiction to regulate drinking 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
24 
water quality” despite relying on contamination standards set 
by the Department of Health Services].)  
Finally, we note that the PUC has submitted an amicus 
brief asserting that allowing Gantner’s suit would “interfere 
with 
the 
Commission’s 
broad, 
general, 
and 
ongoing 
administration of PSPS policies.”  We have previously given 
weight to the PUC’s views regarding section 1759 preemption.  
(See People ex rel. Orloff v. Pacific Bell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1132, 
1153 [“Indeed, the PUC itself, in an amicus curiae brief filed in 
this court in support of the People, agrees that nothing in the 
present action undermines or hinders any ongoing policy, 
program, or other aspect of its authority.”].)  At the same time, 
“ ‘the PUC’s interpretation is not controlling but . . . is one of 
“among several tools available to the court.” ’ ”  (Wilson v. 
Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 
147, fn. 23; see also id. at pp. 147–151 [declining to adopt the 
PUC’s view that § 1759 barred the action].)  We have no need 
here to consider as a general matter how much weight is 
properly accorded to the PUC’s view.  We simply note that the 
PUC’s position, which is supported by the facts and our section 
1759 precedent, further bolsters our holding. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We hold that section 1759 bars Gantner’s action against 
PG&E because the suit would interfere with the PUC’s broad 
and 
continuing 
supervision 
and 
regulation 
of 
PSPS 
implementation and review.  We express no view on whether 
Tariff Rule 14 would also prohibit Gantner’s suit. 
 
 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.  
 
25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
O’ROURKE, J.* 
 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 
District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Gantner v. PG&E Corporation 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding  XX on request by 9th Circuit (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 8.548) 
Review Granted (published) 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S273340 
Date Filed:  November 20, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:   
County:   
Judge:   
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin, Nicholas A. Carlin, Brian S. 
Conlon, Kyle P. O'Malley; Hausfeld, Bonny E. Sweeney, Seth R. 
Gassman and Tae H. Kim for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Glancy Prongay & Murray and Jonathan M. Rotter for Former 
President of the Public Utilities Commission Loretta Lynch, Former 
Administrative Law Judge Steven Weissman and Professor Seth Davis 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, Omid H. Nasab; Horvitz & Levy, Robert H. 
Wright and Jeremy B. Rosen for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Munger, Tolles & Olson, J. Kain Day and Henry Weissmann for 
Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas & Electric as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
Vinson & Elkins, Mortimer H. Hartwell, Jeremy C. Marwell, Matthew 
X. Etchemendy and Nathan T. Campbell for Edison Electric Institute 
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Christine Jun Hammond, Candace J. Morey and Mary McKenzie for 
the California Public Utilities Commission as Amicus Curiae. 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Nicholas A. Carlin 
Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin LLP 
39 Mesa Street, Suite 201  
San Francisco, CA 94129 
(415) 398-0900 
 
Omid H. Nasab 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP 
Worldwide Plaza 
825 8th Avenue 
New York, NY 10019 
(212) 474-1972 
 
Candace J. Morey 
California Public Utilities Commission 
505 Van Ness Avenue 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 703-3211