Case Title: State v. William L. Morford

Citation: 2004 WI 5

Docket Number: 2001AP002461

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 5 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2461 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of William L. Morford: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
William L. Morford,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
259 Wis 2d. 480, 655 N.W.2d 546 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 3, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel L. Konkol   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and ROGGENSACK, J.J., join concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Lynn E. Hackbarth and Law Offices of Lynn Ellen Hackbarth, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Lynn E. Hackbarth. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2004 WI 5 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  01-2461  
(L.C. No. 
 96 CF 966242) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of William L.  
Morford: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
William L. Morford,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 3, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Declaration 
of rights.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 affirming orders of 
the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Daniel L. Konkol, Judge.  
The circuit court granted the district attorney's motion to 
reconsider its decision placing William L. Morford on supervised 
release 
and 
denied 
William 
L. 
Morford's 
motion 
for 
                                                 
1 State v. Morford, No. 01-2461, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2002). 
No. 
01-2461   
 
2 
 
reconsideration.  The circuit court concluded that Morford was 
still a 
sexually 
violent 
person 
and 
that 
it 
was 
still 
substantially probable that he would engage in acts of sexual 
violence if not placed in institutional care.  The circuit court 
therefore granted the State relief from Morford's supervised 
release and ordered Morford committed to the custody of the 
Department of Health and Family Services (the department) for 
control, care, and treatment in an institutional setting.   
¶2 
Morford then moved the circuit court to reconsider its 
order of institutionalization for several reasons, including 
that the circuit court used statutorily improper proceedings to 
give the State relief from his supervised release. The circuit 
court denied Morford's motion, and Morford appealed from this 
order of denial.   
¶3 
The court of appeals affirmed the order of the circuit 
court, concluding that Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 806.07(1)(h) (1999-
2000)2 governs reconsideration of the circuit court's original 
decision to place Morford on supervised release and that the 
requirements of § 806.07(1)(h) were satisfied. 
¶4 
The sole issue we address in this case is whether 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) or 980.08(6m) is the vehicle for 
changing the supervised release status of an individual who, 
like Morford, has been determined to be appropriate for 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-2461   
 
3 
 
supervised release but who remains institutionalized awaiting 
placement.3 
¶5 
We hold that Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m), rather than 
§ 806.07(1)(h), governs granting relief to the State from a 
chapter 980 committee's supervised release when the committee is 
confined in an institution awaiting placement on supervised 
release.  Any language or inference in State v. Castillo, 205 
Wis. 2d 599, 556 N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1996), State v. Williams, 
2001 WI App 155, 246 Wis. 2d 722, 631 N.W.2d 623, or State v. 
Sprosty, 2001 WI App 231, ¶16, 248 Wis. 2d 480, 636 N.W.2d 213, 
limiting the application of § 980.08(6m) to a chapter 980 
committee who has actually been released under supervised 
release into the community is withdrawn. 
I 
¶6 
Morford is now on supervised release, and the issues 
he raised in order to obtain his supervised release are moot.  A 
                                                 
3 Morford 
argues, 
in 
part, 
that 
neither 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) nor § 806.07(1) provides a procedure for 
granting the State relief from a supervised release for which 
placement has not been made.  We are not convinced by this 
argument.  The legislature could not have intended that the 
State be able to get relief from the supervised release of a 
chapter 980 committee in the community under supervised release 
but not from the supervised release of an individual who is 
awaiting release.  Such an interpretation of the statutes 
produces an absurd result that is contrary to the purposes of 
chapter 980.  
No. 
01-2461   
 
4 
 
determination of these issues will have no practical effect on 
Morford.4  
¶7 
Reviewing courts generally decline to decide moot 
issues but may do so under certain circumstances.  This court 
has held that it may decide an otherwise moot issue if it: (1) 
is of great public importance; (2) occurs so frequently that a 
definitive decision is necessary to guide circuit courts; (3) is 
likely to arise again and a decision of the court would 
alleviate uncertainty; or (4) will likely be repeated, but 
evades appellate review because the appellate review process 
cannot be completed or even undertaken in time to have a 
practical effect on the parties.5   
¶8 
We conclude that the sole issue proposed to be 
addressed, that is, the appropriate mechanism for changing the 
supervised release status of a chapter 980 committee who has 
been determined to be appropriate for supervised release but who 
remains institutionalized and awaiting placement, satisfies 
several exceptions to the mootness rule.   
¶9 
The release of a chapter 980 committee is an issue of 
great public importance because it implicates both the safety of 
the public and the rights of the detained individual.   
                                                 
4 We granted the petition for review in this case on March 
13, 2003.  On April 28, 2003, the defendant was placed on 
supervised release pursuant to a subsequent periodic review.  On 
September 9, 2003, we heard oral argument in the case. 
5 In re John Doe Proceeding, 2003 WI 30, ¶19, 260 
Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260. 
No. 
01-2461   
 
5 
 
¶10 The issue presented recurs with some frequency.  This 
is the fourth time since 1996, in a published case, that the 
appropriate 
procedure 
for 
reconsidering 
a 
chapter 
980 
committee's supervised release has arisen, and a decision from 
this court will provide guidance to the circuit courts.   
¶11 This issue is likely to arise again and may evade 
review.  The time between a circuit court's determination that a 
person is eligible for supervised release and the person's being 
placed on supervised release may be substantial, as in the 
present case.6  Indeed, the statute contemplates a time lag 
between a circuit court's finding a person eligible for 
supervised release and the actual placement on supervised 
release.  The Department of Health and Family Services prepares 
a plan for supervised release that the circuit court must review 
and approve.7  Furthermore, while a chapter 980 committee 
litigates a denial of supervised relief, he or she may in the 
interim——as occurred in this case——be placed on supervised 
release, making the cases moot and tending to evade review. 
¶12 We conclude that the issue raised by this case that we 
address satisfies exceptions to the mootness rule, and we 
therefore address it. 
II 
                                                 
6 See In re Commitment of Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶¶76-80, 254 
Wis. 2d 215, 
647 
N.W.2d 762 
(Bradley, 
J., 
concurring) 
(discussing the difficulty of finding appropriate placement 
facilities for sexually violent persons and the concomitant 
delay). 
7 Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5). 
No. 
01-2461   
 
6 
 
¶13 This case is procedurally convoluted, and we set forth 
an abbreviated version of the facts relevant to render a 
decision on the sole issue we address. 
¶14 On July 31, 1997, Morford was committed as a sexually 
violent person under Wis. Stat. chapter 980.  Pursuant to the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(a)(1) (1993-94)8 at the time 
of his commitment, the circuit court determined that he be 
placed on supervised release.  Because no halfway house was 
available, Morford remained at the Wisconsin Resource Center 
(WRC), a secure facility.  Morford appealed, arguing that he was 
entitled to be held in a less restrictive facility.  The court 
of appeals agreed and directed the circuit court to oversee the 
search for an appropriate placement. 
¶15 While the Department of Health and Family Services 
searched for a supervised release placement for Morford the 
circuit court repeatedly reviewed the status of the search, and 
Morford's case came up for two periodic reviews.  The medical 
and psychological 
reports 
submitted 
during 
these periodic 
reviews suggested that Morford might not be appropriate for 
supervised release.   
¶16 At a March 15, 2000, proceeding on the supervised 
release plan, the circuit court expressed concern that Morford 
was not an appropriate candidate for supervised release.     
                                                 
8 The legislature removed the supervised release option for 
the initial commitment in 1999.  See 1999 Wis. Act 9, § 3223(h). 
No. 
01-2461   
 
7 
 
¶17 On May 4, 2000, the district attorney filed a document 
entitled "motion for reconsideration of supervised release."  
The motion cited no statutory authority as a basis for the 
motion.  
¶18 The circuit court held evidentiary proceedings on the 
district attorney's motion on March 8, May 7, and May 8, 2001, 
and heard testimony from experts who evaluated Morford's 
suitability for supervised release.  At the close of the 
proceedings, the circuit court granted the district attorney's 
motion for reconsideration.  Although the circuit court never 
used the words "revocation of supervised release," the effect of 
the circuit court's order was to revoke Morford's supervised 
release.  Morford sought reconsideration of the circuit court's 
order.  The court of appeals affirmed the orders of the circuit 
court granting the district attorney's motion and denying 
Morford's motion for reconsideration. 
III 
¶19 The 
question 
whether 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) 
or 
980.08(6m) is the vehicle for changing the supervised release 
status of a chapter 980 committee who has not yet been released 
requires 
interpretation 
of 
two 
statutes, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 806.07(1)(h) and 980.08(6m).  The interpretation 
of statutes is a question of law that this court decides 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals, but 
benefiting from the analysis of both.9   
                                                 
9 See State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶12, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 
N.W.2d 700. 
No. 
01-2461   
 
8 
 
¶20 To decide the issue presented, we examine both 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) and § 980.08(6m), as well as three cases of the court of 
appeals that have touched upon the interplay between these two statutes. 
¶21 Our goal in interpreting statutes is to discern and 
give effect to the intent of the legislature.10  Statutory 
interpretation begins with the language of the statute.  Each 
word should be looked at so as not to render any portion of the 
statute superfluous.11  But "courts must not look at a single, 
isolated sentence or portion of a sentence" instead of the 
relevant language of the entire statute.12  Furthermore, a 
statutory provision must be read in the context of the whole 
statute to avoid an unreasonable or absurd interpretation.13 
Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read 
together and harmonized when possible.14  A cardinal rule in 
interpreting statutes is to favor an interpretation that will 
fulfill the purpose of a statute over an interpretation that 
defeats the manifest objective of an act.15  Thus a court must 
                                                 
10 Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶13 (citing State v. Szulczewski, 
216 Wis. 2d 495, 504, 574 N.W.2d 660 (1998)). 
11 Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2001 WI 86, ¶16, 
245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893; Alberte v. Anew Health Care 
Servs., 2000 WI 7, ¶10, 232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515. 
12 Landis, 245 Wis. 2d 1, ¶16 (quoting Alberte, 232 Wis. 2d 
587, ¶10). 
13 Alberte, 232 Wis. 2d 587 ¶10. 
14 Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶13 (citing State v. Leitner, 2002 
WI 77, ¶30, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341). 
15 State v. Davis, 2001 WI 136, ¶13, 248 Wis. 2d 986, 637 
N.W.2d 62. 
No. 
01-2461   
 
9 
 
ascertain the legislative intent from the language of the 
statute in relation to its context, history, scope, and 
objective, 
including 
the 
consequences 
of 
alternative 
interpretations.16 
IV 
¶22 
We first consider the language of the statutes in question.  Section 806.07(1)(h), 
which is part of chapter 806 entitled "Civil Procedure—Judgment," provides for relief from a 
judgment or order for any reasons justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.17  
Section 806.07 applies to all civil actions and special 
proceedings, "except where different procedure is prescribed by 
statute or rule."18  A chapter 980 proceeding is a civil action19 
                                                 
16 Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶13 (citing State v. Davis, 2001 
WI 136, ¶13, 248 Wis. 2d 986, 637 N.W.2d 62). 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07(1) reads as follows: 
Relief from judgment or order. (1) On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court, subject to subs. (2) and (3), may relieve a party or legal representative 
from a judgment, order or stipulation for the following reasons: 
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(b) Newly-discovered evidence which entitles a party to a new trial under s. 
805.15(3); 
(c) Fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(d) The judgment is void; 
(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; 
(f) A prior judgment upon which the judgment is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated; 
(g) It is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or 
(h) Any other reasons justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
18 Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2). 
No. 
01-2461   
 
10 
 
and § 806.07 may, by its terms, apply to a chapter 980 
proceeding unless a different procedure is prescribed by statute 
or rule.20  We therefore must determine whether a different 
procedure is prescribed by chapter 980 with respect to the 
reconsideration of determinations of supervised release. 
¶23 Section 980.08 governs the procedure for supervised 
release of a person committed under chapter 980.  Section 
980.08(1) provides who may petition for the release of a 
sexually violent person and when they may do so.21  Section 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 In re Commitment of Lombard, 2003 WI App 163, ¶26, 266 
Wis. 2d 887, 669 N.W.2d 157 (chapter 980 proceedings are civil, 
not criminal, in nature); In re Commitment of Thiel, 2001 WI App 
52, ¶9, 241 Wis. 2d 439, 625 N.W.2d 321 (refusing to follow rule 
of retroactive application of changes in the criminal law 
because chapter 980 proceedings are civil, not criminal). 
20 See, e.g., In re Commitment of Treadway, 2002 WI App 195, 
¶22, 257 Wis. 2d 467, 651 N.W.2d 334 (number of peremptory 
challenges available in chapter 980 proceedings governed by 
civil procedure rules); In re Commitment of Wolfe, 2001 WI App 
136, ¶48, 246 Wis. 2d 233, 631 N.W.2d 240 (general provisions of 
civil procedure inapplicable with respect to commencing chapter 
980 proceedings because chapter 980 provides its own mechanism 
for commencing an action); State v. Brown, 215 Wis. 2d 716, 718-
21, 573 N.W.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1997) (individuals subject to 
chapter 980 proceedings have a right to judicial substitution 
because Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2) states that the procedures of 
Wis. Stat. chs. 801-847 apply to all civil proceedings except 
where different procedure is prescribed by statute or rule). 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.08(1) states that: 
(1) Any person who is committed under s. 980.06 may 
petition the committing court to modify its order by 
authorizing supervised release if at least 18 months 
have elapsed since the initial commitment order was 
entered or at least 6 months have elapsed since the 
mose recent release petition was denied or the most 
recent order for supervised release was revoked.  The 
director of the facility at which the person is placed 
No. 
01-2461   
 
11 
 
980.08(4) concerns the factors a court may consider in deciding 
whether to release an individual and the burden of proof 
required to prevent a sexually violent person from being 
released.22  Section 980.08(5) governs the placement process.23  
Finally, § 980.08(6m) controls the circumstances under which an 
                                                                                                                                                             
may file a petition under this subsection on the 
person's behalf at any time. 
22 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.08(4) provides, in part, that: 
The court shall grant the petition unless the state 
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the 
person is still a sexually violent person and that it 
is still substantially probable that the person will 
engage in acts of sexual violence if the person is not 
continued in institutional care.  In making a decision 
under this subsection, the court may consider, without 
limitation because of enumeration, the nature and 
circumstances of the behavior that was the basis of 
the allegation in the petition under s. 980.02(2)(a), 
the 
person's 
mental 
history 
and 
present 
mental 
condition, where the person will live, how the person 
will support himself or herself and what arrangements 
are available to ensure that the person has access to 
and will participate in necessary treatment, including 
pharmacological treatment using an antiandrogen or the 
chemical equivalent of an antiandrogen if the person 
is a serious child sex offender. 
23 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.08(5) provides, in part, that: 
If the court finds that the person is appropriate for 
supervised 
release, 
the 
court 
shall 
notify 
the 
department.  The department and the county department 
under s. 51.42 in the county of residence of the 
person, as determined under s. 980.105, shall prepare 
a plan that identifies the treatment and services, if 
any, that the person will receive in the community.  
The plan shall address the person's need, if any, for 
supervision, counseling, medication, community support 
services, residential services, vocational services, 
and alcohol or other drug abuse treatment. 
No. 
01-2461   
 
12 
 
individual's supervised release may be revoked and who may 
initiate such revocation proceedings. 
¶24 The key sentences in Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m),24 for 
purposes of the present case, governing revocation of supervised 
release read as follows:  
                                                 
24 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.08(6m) reads in its entirety as 
follows: 
980.08(6m) An order for supervised release places the 
person in the custody and control of the department.  
The department shall arrange for control, care and 
treatment of the person in the least restrictive 
manner consistent with the requirements of the person 
and in accordance with the plan for supervised release 
approved by the court under sub. (5).  A person on 
supervised release is subject to the conditions set by 
the court and to the rules of the department.  Before 
a person is placed on supervised release by the court 
under this section, the court shall so notify the 
municipal police department and county sheriff . . . .  
If the department alleges that a released person has 
violated any condition or rule, or that the safety of 
others requires that supervised release be revoked, he 
or she may be taken into custody under the rules of 
the department.  The department shall submit a 
statement showing probable cause of the detention and 
a petition to revoke the order for supervised release 
to the committing court and the regional office of the 
state public defender responsible for handling cases 
in the county where the committing court is located 
within 
72 
hours 
after 
the 
detention, 
excluding 
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays.  The court 
shall hear the petition within 30 days, unless the 
hearing or time deadline is waived by the detained 
person. 
 
Pending 
the 
revocation 
hearing, 
the 
department may detain the person in a jail or in a 
hospital, center or facility specified by s. 51.15(2).  
The state has the burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that any rule or condition of 
release has been violated, or that the safety of 
others requires that supervised release be revoked.  
If the court determines after hearing that any rule or 
No. 
01-2461   
 
13 
 
If the department alleges that a released person has 
violated any condition or rule, or that the safety of 
others requires that supervised release be revoked, he 
or she may be taken into custody under the rules of 
the department. . . . The state has the burden of 
proving by clear and convincing evidence that any rule 
or condition of release has been violated, or that the 
safety of others requires that supervised release be 
revoked.  If the court determines after hearing that 
any rule or condition of release has been violated, or 
that the safety of others requires that supervised 
release be revoked, it may revoke the order for 
supervised release and order that the released person 
be placed in an appropriate institution until the 
person is discharged from the commitment under s. 
980.09 or until again placed on supervised release 
under this section. (emphasis added).  
¶25 These key sentences of § 980.08(6m) are susceptible to 
at least two readings.  If we read the first sentence 
grammatically, the adjective "released" modifiying the noun 
"person" applies only to the first clause of the sentence and 
not to the second clause of the sentence, which is logically 
separated by the disjunctive "or."  In other words, the 
department must allege and prove either (1) that a released 
person has violated any condition or rule, or (2) that the 
safety of others requires that supervised release be revoked.  
The second sentence quoted above supports this grammatical 
reading.  Under this reading, Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) governs 
                                                                                                                                                             
condition of release has been violated, or that the 
safety of others requires that supervised release be 
revoked, it may revoke the order for supervised 
release and order that the released person be placed 
in an appropriate institution until the person is 
discharged from the commitment under s. 980.09 or 
until again placed on supervised release under this 
section. (emphasis added). 
No. 
01-2461   
 
14 
 
not only those chapter 980 committees who are actually released 
but also those who are awaiting placement on supervised release.  
The last sentence uses the phrase "released person" and 
therefore can be read, as the court of appeals did in this case, 
to mean that a circuit court may revoke supervised release if 
the department alleges and proves either (1) that a released 
person has violated any condition or rule, or (2) that a 
released person jeopardizes the safety of others.  Under this 
reading, Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) governs only those chapter 980 
committees who are actually released on supervised release.   
¶26 This seeming ambiguity in the key sentences of 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) is not resolved by looking at the 
subsection as a whole or the subsection in the context of 
chapter 980.  Indeed chapter 980 has other conflicting language.  
For instance, Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) and other provisions in 
chapter 980 use the word "custody" inconsistently.  
¶27 The use of the word "custody" in Wis. Stat. chapter 
980 is particularly problematic.  In § 980.06, a person who is 
deemed sexually violent "shall be committed to the custody of 
the department for control, care and treatment."  After a 
committed individual is found to be appropriate for supervised 
release, 
an 
order 
for 
supervised 
release, 
according 
to 
§ 980.08(6m), "places the person in the custody and control of 
the 
department." 
 
Further, 
under 
§ 980.08(6m), 
if 
the 
"department alleges that a released person has violated any 
condition or rule, or that the safety of others requires that 
supervised release be revoked, he or she may be taken into 
No. 
01-2461   
 
15 
 
custody under the rules of the department."  Read literally, 
these provisions make little sense, since they thrice place the 
committed individual in the custody of the department without 
ever having actually removed him from the department's custody.  
This is just one example in which chapter 980 is less than clear 
on its face. 
¶28 Keeping 
in 
mind 
the 
linguistic 
shortfalls 
of 
§ 980.08(6m), 
we 
examine 
how 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
has 
interpreted § 980.08(6m) to aid our own interpretive process.   
¶29 Three court of appeals cases are relevant.  In State 
v. Castillo, 205 Wis. 2d 599, 556 N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1996), 
the court of appeals declared that Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d) 
(1993-94), the precursor to § 980.08(6m),25 did not provide a 
statutory basis for courts to revoke the supervised release 
order of a sexually violent person who had not, as yet, been 
physically released from a secure facility.  Section 980.08(6m), 
according to Castillo, "pertains only to released persons who 
are already under the custody and control of DHSS."26 
¶30 In Castillo, the 14-year-old defendant was found 
delinquent on two counts of first-degree sexual assault.27  
Before Castillo's release, the State filed a petition under 
                                                 
25 The legislature renumbered Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d) to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) 
in 
1999. 
 
See 
1999 
Wis. 
Act 
9, 
§ 3223(l). 
26 State v. Castillo, 205 Wis. 2d 599, 609, 556 N.W.2d 425 
(Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis in original). 
27 Id. at 603. 
No. 
01-2461   
 
16 
 
Wis. Stat. chapter 980 to commit him as a sexually violent 
person.28  Castillo offered to acknowledge that the allegations 
contained within the petition were true and to waive his right 
to a trial if the department placed him in a community-based 
facility.29 
¶31 The 
department 
experienced 
difficulty 
in 
placing 
Castillo and moved to reopen the order and modify it to allow 
Castillo to be placed in a secure facility.30  The circuit court 
granted the State's motion and placed Castillo at the WRC.31  The 
court of appeals reversed the circuit court and concluded that 
the 
State 
breached 
its 
plea 
agreement 
with 
Castillo 
by 
requesting the modification32 and allowed Castillo to withdraw 
his plea.33   
¶32 The 
precursor 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) 
was 
not 
directly at issue before the court of appeals in Castillo and 
§ 806.07(1) is not mentioned in the opinion.  The issue before 
the court of appeals was whether the State had breached the plea 
agreement and whether Castillo should have been allowed to 
withdraw his plea admitting the allegations supporting the 
petition to commit him as a sexually violent person.  The 
                                                 
28 Id. at 604-05. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 605-06. 
31 Id. at 606. 
32 Id. at 608. 
33 Id. at 611. 
No. 
01-2461   
 
17 
 
question of what statutory authority the State could use to 
initiate revocation proceedings with regard to an individual who 
had not yet been released was a secondary issue to be reached 
only if Castillo were not allowed to withdraw his plea. 
¶33 The court of appeals concluded in Castillo that the 
State was not relieved of its burden to comply with the plea 
agreement merely because finding an appropriate placement proved 
difficult.  The court of appeals' language dealing with the key 
sentences 
we 
address 
was 
brief, 
conclusory, 
and 
without 
explanation or full analysis of the statutory language.  The 
parties' briefs in Castillo expended little effort on this 
issue, and the court of appeals followed suit.  The court of 
appeals' 
language 
relating 
to 
the 
applicability 
of 
No. 
01-2461   
 
18 
 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) was dicta not necessary to the decision 
in the case.34 
¶34 Although this court granted a petition for review in 
Castillo, 
none 
of 
the 
parties 
briefed 
the 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) issue in this court.  The petition for 
review was ultimately dismissed as improvidently granted, and 
this court made no mention of § 980.08(6m) in disposing of the 
case.35 
¶35 Castillo does not provide much of a foundation for 
concluding that Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) applies to the present 
case.  The court of appeals has seemingly followed the Castillo 
                                                 
34 For discussions of Wisconsin's views on dictum, see, 
e.g., State v. Picotte, 
2003 
WI 
42, 
¶¶60-61 
n.16, 261 
Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381 (reviewing two lines of cases on 
dictum); 
State 
v. 
Leitner, 
2002 
WI 
77, 
¶22 
n.16, 
253 
Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341 (same); State v. Sartin, 200 
Wis. 2d 47, 60 n.7, 546 N.W.2d 449 (1996) ("dictum is a 
statement in a court's opinion that goes beyond the facts in the 
case and is broader than necessary and not essential to the 
determination 
of 
the 
issues 
before 
it"; 
dictum 
is 
not 
controlling); State v. Koput, 142 Wis. 2d 370, 386 n.12, 418 
N.W.2d 804 (1988) (it is not inappropriate for a court to 
evaluate statements in Supreme Court opinions on the basis of 
whether they constitute dicta); Nicholson v. Home Ins. Cos., 137 
Wis. 2d 581, 
602, 
405 
N.W.2d 327 
(1987) 
(disapproving 
of 
discussion of reducing clause in Radlein v. Indus. Fire & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605, 345 N.W.2d 874 (1984), as dicta); Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 120 Wis. 2d 560, 565, 356 
N.W.2d 175 (1984) (adopting the generally accepted doctrine that 
"a statement not addressed to the question before the court or 
necessary for its decision" is dictum, and not binding on the 
court); Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 474, 290 N.W.2d 510 
(1980) (same). 
35 State v. Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 570 N.W.2d 44 (1997). 
No. 
01-2461   
 
19 
 
dicta 
three 
times, 
but 
its 
subsequent 
cases 
have 
not 
strengthened or built upon Castillo's weak foundation. 
¶36 In 
State 
v. 
Williams, 
2001 
WI 
App 
155, 
246 
Wis. 2d 722, 631 N.W.2d 623, a chapter 980 committee challenged 
a circuit court's order granting the State's motion for relief 
from a prior order granting the committee's petition for 
supervised release.  Without addressing the underlying question 
whether § 806.07(1) was an appropriate mechanism to grant relief 
from the supervised release of a sex offender, the court of 
appeals concluded that the "new evidence" that the State 
provided to justify the relief was not new under § 806.07(1).  
In making its decision, the court of appeals did not cite 
Castillo, much less justify or explain its reliance on § 806.07 
for a chapter 980 case.   
¶37 After the Williams case came State v. Sprosty, 2001 WI 
App 231, ¶16, 248 Wis. 2d 480, 636 N.W.2d 213, in which the 
court 
of 
appeals 
assumed, 
without 
discussion, 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1) could be used to grant the State relief 
from a supervised release.  The court of appeals focused on 
whether "extraordinary circumstances" were present to justify 
the statute's use in that particular case.  Again, the court of 
appeals did not cite Castillo or Williams for the proposition at 
issue.36  It did not explain or justify its reliance on § 806.07 
in a chapter 980 case. 
                                                 
36 The Sprosty court did cite State v. Williams, 2001 WI App 
155, 246 Wis. 2d 722, 631 N.W.2d 623, for the standard of 
review, however.  State v. Sprosty, 2001 WI App 231, ¶18, 248 
Wis. 2d 480, 636 N.W.2d 213. 
No. 
01-2461   
 
20 
 
¶38 In the present case, the court of appeals determined 
that Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1) applied to the facts of the case, 
but again its opinion provides no further assistance in 
analyzing whether § 806.07(1) should apply at all.  Again the 
court of appeals cited no case in support of its conclusion.  
Its opinion on this issue is, like the opinions in the other 
three cases, brief and conclusory, without any citation to prior 
cases.   
¶39 The court of appeals' reasoning is somewhat different 
in 
the 
present 
case, 
however, 
and 
requires 
additional 
consideration.  In this case, the court of appeals relied on the 
label the district attorney and circuit court placed on the 
proceeding to conclude that Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) applied.  
The court of appeals stated that the proceeding was titled a 
motion for reconsideration of supervised release rather than a 
motion to revoke Morford's supervised release, even though 
neither the district attorney nor the circuit court cited any 
statutory 
authority, 
including 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) 
or 
§ 980.08(6m), justifying the proceeding.  The court of appeals 
reasoned that § 980.08(6m) could not govern such a proceeding 
because a § 980.08(6m) proceeding would have to have been 
brought by the Department of Health and Family Services.  The 
court of appeals recognized that the motion in this case was 
brought by the district attorney.  It therefore looked at the 
label the district attorney and the circuit court placed on the 
motion, namely "reconsideration," and concluded without further 
No. 
01-2461   
 
21 
 
explanation that "the proceedings in question were held in 
accordance with § 806.07 rather than § 980.08(6m)."37  
¶40 The State urges us to withdraw the dicta in Castillo 
(and any reliance thereon in Williams and Sprosty) that the 
appropriate vehicle for the State to seek relief from a chapter 
980 
committee's 
pending 
supervised 
release 
is 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07.38  The State reminds us that circuit courts 
and the court of appeals have no power to disavow Castillo's 
                                                 
37 The relevant portion of the court of appeals' decision 
states as follows: 
Morford mischaracterizes 
the hearing below 
as 
a 
revocation proceeding, held pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08, rather than a hearing on the State's motion 
for reconsideration, held pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07.  First, as admitted by Morford, DHFS did not 
file a petition to revoke his supervised release, a 
procedure 
required by 
both § 980.08(6m) 
and due 
process.  See State v. VanBronkhorst, 2001 WI App 190, 
¶¶7-8, 247 Wis. 2d 247, 633 N.W.2d 236.  Second, on 
May 4, 2000, the State filed a motion entitled, 
"motion for reconsideration of supervised release."  
Third, and finally, at the outset of the evidentiary 
hearing held on this matter, the trial court informed 
the parties that they were proceeding on the "State's 
motion [ ] for reconsideration of the supervised 
release."  Thus, we conclude that the proceedings in 
question were held in accordance with § 806.07 rather 
than § 980.08(6m).  Accordingly, the trial court was 
statutorily authorized to review the order granting 
Morford's supervised release. 
State v. Morford, No. 01-2461, unpublished slip op., ¶9 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2002).  
38 The State nevertheless argues that § 806.07(1)(h) should 
be available one last time in this case because Castillo 
dictated its use.  We need not decide this issue because it is 
moot. 
No. 
01-2461   
 
22 
 
reliance on Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h).39  Only this court may do 
so.40   
¶41 The 
State 
urges 
us 
to 
hold 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m), not § 806.07(1)(h), applies and the 
State seeks relief from a chapter 980 committee's status of 
supervised release when the committee has not yet been released 
on supervised release.  The State asks this court to hold that 
the Department of Health and Family Services may petition for 
revocation of supervised release under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) 
whenever it believes that a person who is the subject of a 
supervised release decision (whether or not the individual is 
released on supervised release) violates any condition or rule 
or threatens the safety of others. 
¶42 We agree with the State.  Wisconsin Stat. § 980.08(6m) 
is better suited for granting the State relief from a chapter 
980 
committee's 
supervised 
release 
than 
§ 806.07(1)(h), 
regardless of whether the chapter 980 committee has actually 
been placed on supervised release.  We conclude that the court 
                                                 
39 Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) 
("If the court of appeals is to be a unitary court, it must 
speak with a unified voice.  If the constitution and statutes 
were interpreted to allow it to overrule, modify or withdraw 
language from its prior published decisions, its unified voice 
would 
become 
fractured, 
threatening 
the 
principles 
of 
predictability, certainty and finality relied upon by litigants, 
counsel and the circuit courts."). 
40 Id. ("[O]nly the supreme court, the highest court in the 
state, has the power to overrule, modify or withdraw language 
from a published opinion of the court of appeals."). 
No. 
01-2461   
 
23 
 
of appeals erred in its interpretation of § 980.08(6m).  We 
reach this conclusion for several reasons. 
¶43 First, as we explained previously, the text of 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) can be read to support the notion that 
if a chapter 980 committee is awaiting placement on supervised 
release and continues to be held in a secure facility, the 
department may petition for revocation of a determination of 
supervised release. 
¶44 Second, 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) 
provides 
a 
comprehensive scheme for releasing chapter 980 committees on 
supervised release and for revoking supervised release.  By 
effectively occupying the field on the subject, the legislature 
implicitly sought to preclude procedural short-cuts like the one 
provided 
by 
§ 806.07(1)(h). 
 
Interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) as governing chapter 980 committees 
pending 
placement 
on 
supervised 
release 
supports 
the 
legislature's intent to establish a comprehensive, uniform, and 
fair procedure for supervised release.  "The spirit or intention 
of the statute should govern over the literal or technical 
meaning of the language used."41   
¶45 Third, using Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) to grant the 
State relief from supervised release presents far more tortuous 
interpretive issues than reading § 980.08(6m) as governing the 
present case.  Individuals committed under chapter 980 are 
                                                 
41 City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224, 
236, 332 N.W.2d 782 (1983). 
No. 
01-2461   
 
24 
 
entitled to due process protections such as reasonable notice, 
the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to 
present and cross-examine witnesses, and the use of the 
heightened burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence.  
Section 806.07(1)(h) does not provide these protections. 
¶46 To assure due process, the concurrence reads into 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) 
the 
constitutional 
protections 
provided under chapter 980.     
¶47 This 
court 
would 
have 
to 
perform 
interpretive 
backbends 
to 
retrofit 
the 
protections 
afforded 
by 
Wis. Stat. chapter 980 onto § 806.07(1)(h).  If we must choose 
between applying the due process protections under chapter 980 
to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) or interpreting § 980.08(6m) as 
applying to chapter 980 committees awaiting placement under 
supervised release, it is not a difficult choice.  We see no 
reason to tack the protections afforded by chapter 980 onto 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) when § 980.08(6m) is readily available 
to apply to the present case.  Using § 806.07(1)(h) needlessly 
complicates granting the State relief from a chapter 980 
committee's supervised release.   
¶48 Fourth, 
attempting 
to 
engraft 
chapter 
980 
onto 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1) 
would 
pose 
legal 
problems 
requiring 
future litigation.  For example, a circuit court makes different 
findings 
under 
§§ 806.07(1)(h) 
and 
980.08(6m). 
 
Under 
§ 806.07(1)(h), 
a 
circuit 
court 
must 
find 
extraordinary 
circumstances in order to relieve a party from an order or 
judgment.  Under § 980.08(6m), a circuit court must find that a 
No. 
01-2461   
 
25 
 
released person has violated any condition or rule or that the 
safety of others requires that supervised release be revoked. 
¶49 Furthermore, different standards of appellate review 
may be implicated under the two sections.  The standard of 
review under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) is erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  The standard for review under § 980.08(6m), 
however, is, according to the State's brief, more complex 
depending on whether a request for revocation alleges a 
violation of a rule or condition of supervised release or 
alleges that the safety of others requires revocation. 
¶50 The State asserts that the clearly erroneous standard 
of review applies to the factual determination of whether a rule 
or condition was violated.  When revocation is initiated on 
grounds 
of 
public 
safety, 
unresolved 
questions 
of 
the 
appropriate standard of appellate review and the powers of a 
circuit court are presented, according to the State: For 
purposes of appellate review, is a circuit court's determination 
about the safety of others a question of fact or law or a mixed 
question of fact and law?  After finding that the safety of 
others requires revocation of supervised release, does a circuit 
court have discretion to modify the supervised release rather 
than revoke it?42 
¶51 These and other problems can be avoided entirely by 
applying 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) 
to 
chapter 
980 
committees 
                                                 
42 For 
a 
discussion 
of 
these 
issues, 
see 
Brief 
of 
Petitioner-Respondent at 16-30. 
No. 
01-2461   
 
26 
 
awaiting 
placement 
under 
supervised 
release. 
 
Applying 
§ 980.08(6m) favors judicial economy and lends clarity to this 
body of law. 
¶52 Fifth, allowing a circuit court or district attorney 
to 
initiate 
proceedings 
on 
their 
own 
motion 
using 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) 
to 
grant 
the 
State 
relief 
from 
supervised release is inappropriate because it circumvents the 
important gate-keeping function of the Department of Health and 
Family Services.43  In Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m), the legislature 
placed the initial decision to seek revocation solely in the 
hands of the department. 
¶53 The department is an integral part of the procedural 
protections provided to a chapter 980 committee in Wis. Stat. 
chapter 980.  The department is charged with the "custody and 
control" of a sexually violent person, whether the chapter 980 
committee is institutionalized or on supervised release.44  The 
legislature thus views the department as being in the best 
position to evaluate the various risks and benefits of placing a 
committed 
individual 
on 
supervised 
release 
or 
revoking 
supervised release. 
                                                 
43 The court of appeals in this case recognized that who 
initiates "revocation" proceedings is important because it may 
implicate due process rights.  State v. Morford, No. 01-2461, 
unpublished slip op. at ¶9 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2002) ("DHFS 
did not file a petition to revoke his supervised release, a 
procedure required by both § 980.08(6m) and due process.").  See 
also State v. VanBronkhorst, 2001 WI App 190, ¶¶7-8, 247 
Wis. 2d 247, 633 N.W.2d 236. 
44 Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m). 
No. 
01-2461   
 
27 
 
¶54 It is the department that has sufficient experience 
dealing with sexually violent persons, as well as experience 
with the particular individual who has been committed, to make a 
sound, 
dispassionate, 
and 
unbiased 
decision 
regarding 
a 
committed person's condition.  Wisconsin Stat. § 980.08(6m) 
provides no procedure for initiating revocation other than by 
the department, and nothing in chapter 980 suggests that the 
legislature envisioned another method for doing so. 
¶55 Allowing a circuit court to initiate proceedings on 
its own motion,45 as it in effect did here, or allowing a 
district attorney to initiate proceedings, as happened here, is 
contrary to the intent of the legislature, subjugates the 
authority of the department to the will of a circuit court or 
district attorney and vitiates an important safeguard the 
legislature provided for sex offenders.  
¶56 For 
all 
of 
these 
reasons, 
we 
hold 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m), rather than § 806.07(1)(h), governs 
granting relief to the State from a chapter 980 committee's 
supervised release when the committee is confined in an 
institution awaiting placement on supervised release.  Any 
language or inference in State v. Castillo, 205 Wis. 2d 599, 556 
N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1996), State v. Williams, 2001 WI App 155, 
246 Wis. 2d 722, 631 N.W.2d 623, or State v. Sprosty, 2001 WI 
                                                 
45 A circuit court apparently has authority to rescind at 
least 
part 
of 
its 
order 
and 
decision 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) as long as both parties have adequate 
notice.  Gittel v. Abram, 2002 WI App 113, ¶2, 255 Wis. 2d 767, 
649 N.W.2d 661 (will contest case).    
No. 
01-2461   
 
28 
 
App 231, ¶16, 248 Wis. 2d 480, 636 N.W.2d 213, limiting the 
application of § 980.08(6m) to situations in which a chapter 980 
committee has actually been released into the community under 
supervised release, is withdrawn.  
By the Court.—Rights declared. 
 
No.  01-2461.npc 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶57 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I concur with 
the majority only because I agree that the issue before us is 
moot.  I write separately, however, because I conclude that 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) 
was 
used 
appropriately 
here 
to 
consider a person's supervised release status when that person 
has not as yet been released.  I would not overrule or 
distinguish State v. Sprosty (Sprosty III), 2001 WI App 231, 248 
Wis. 2d 480, 636 N.W.2d 213, State v. Brown, 215 Wis. 2d 716, 
573 N.W.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1997), and State v. Castillo, 205 
Wis. 2d 599, 556 N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1996).  Rather, I would 
follow and apply such precedent in this case. 
 
¶58 I am persuaded that the protections for such persons 
that are contained within Wis. Stat. ch. 980 are applicable when 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) is used.  Here, however, the majority 
robs local district attorneys and circuit judges of a necessary 
tool 
for 
review 
of 
a 
supervised 
release 
order 
where 
extraordinary circumstances exist and protection of the public 
requires swift action. 
¶59 Although the majority overrules Castillo, I would not 
do 
so, 
since 
Castillo 
accurately 
points 
out 
that 
Wis. Stat. §  980.08(6m) 
refers 
only 
to 
released 
persons.  
Castillo, 205 Wis. 2d at 609.  To hold that sec. 980.08(6m) is 
applicable to persons who have not yet been released ignores the 
plain language of the statute.  Thus, sec. 980.08(6m) cannot be 
used where a supervised release order is reviewed in regard to a 
person who continues to be institutionalized, nor can it be used 
No.  01-2461.npc 
 
2 
 
by a district attorney or a judge who is concerned for the 
public's safety. 
¶60 The reasoning in Brown is also applicable to this 
case. 
 
In 
Brown, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
observed 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2) provided that Wis. Stat. chs. 801-847 
apply to all civil proceedings, unless otherwise indicated by 
statute.   Brown, 215 Wis. 2d at 721.  Wisconsin Stat. ch. 980 
does not contain statutory language mandating that a procedure 
other than Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) be used in circumstances 
such as those presented here.  A proceeding under ch. 980 is a 
civil proceeding and does not contain language to the contrary.  
Thus, I am satisfied that sec. 806.07(1)(h) may be used in 
proceedings such as the one we are reviewing here.     
¶61 Moreover, in Sprosty III, the court of appeals 
determined that Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) could be used in 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980 proceedings. Sprosty III, 248 Wis. 2d 480, 
¶2.  I agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that the 
requirement that extraordinary circumstances be present before 
relief is granted under sec. 806.07(1)(h) sufficiently guards 
against the haphazard use of this provision.  Id., ¶16.   
¶62 With 
respect 
to 
Morford's 
proceedings, 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) was used appropriately to review and 
grant 
relief 
from 
the 
supervised 
release 
order. 
 
After 
conducting the evidentiary hearings, the circuit court found 
that the State presented new evidence that demonstrated that 
Morford was still a sexually violent person.  The circuit court 
applied Wis. Stat. ch. 980 standards in rendering its decision 
No.  01-2461.npc 
 
3 
 
as to whether the State's motion, pursuant to sec. 806.07(1)(h), 
should be granted.       
¶63 Further, according to Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m), the 
appropriate burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence.  
Where Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) is used to review and grant 
relief from an order granting supervised release, I conclude 
that, consistent with sec. 980.08(6m), the State must prove "by 
clear and convincing evidence that any rule or condition of 
release has been violated, or that the safety of others requires 
that supervised release be revoked." Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m).  
The circuit court applied the clear and convincing evidence 
burden in deciding the State's motion here.  
¶64 In 
the 
past, 
this 
court 
has 
concluded 
that 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980 provides sufficient safeguards for committing 
sexually violent persons and does not violate due process 
rights.  In State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 293-94, 541 
N.W.2d 115 (1995), we held that ch. 980 did not violate the 
substantive due process guarantees of the United States and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions.46 
 
We 
rejected 
the 
respondents' 
arguments that a finding of a mental disorder, as required by 
ch. 980, was not narrowly tailored to comply with strict 
scrutiny.  Id. at 307.  We concluded that ch. 980, as drafted, 
ensures 
that 
only 
dangerous 
sexual 
predators 
with 
predispositions to reoffend are committed as sexually violent 
                                                 
46 In State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 293-94, 541 N.W.2d 115 
(1995), we also held that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 did not violate the 
equal protection guarantees of the United States and Wisconsin 
Constitutions. 
No.  01-2461.npc 
 
4 
 
persons.  Id.  Moreover, we concluded that treatment was a 
legitimate goal under ch. 980.  Id. at 311.  We also rejected 
the 
respondents' 
arguments 
that 
ch. 
980's 
definition 
of 
dangerousness was unconstitutional.  Id. at 312.  We stated that 
the Wisconsin Legislature's framework for discerning whether a 
person was predisposed to commit sexually violent acts was 
constitutionally sound.  Id. at 312-13.  Finally, we concluded 
that ch. 980 comported with due process regarding concerns of 
nature and duration of commitment.  Id. at 316. 
¶65 In State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶68, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 
647 N.W.2d 762, we held that, as amended, Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
continued to comport with substantive due process requirements.  
We noted that, simply because a sexually violent person's access 
to supervised release was curtailed, ch. 980 did not violate due 
process.  Id., ¶66.  We concluded that the intent of ch. 980 was 
satisfied where proceedings could be initiated to determine 
whether the dangerousness of the individual was commensurate 
with the level of physical confinement imposed.  Id. 
¶66 In State v. Laxton, 2002 WI 82, ¶23, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 
647 N.W.2d 784, we held that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 satisfied the 
requirements of due process because, implicit in the finding 
that an individual should be committed as a sexually violent 
person because he or she has a mental disorder and is dangerous, 
is the presumption that the individual has difficulty in 
controlling his or her behavior.  Because ch. 980 distinguishes 
between recidivists, in general, and individuals whose mental 
disorder makes it substantially probable that the person will 
No.  01-2461.npc 
 
5 
 
engage in sexually violent behavior, we concluded that ch. 980 
is narrowly tailored and, thus, comports with due process.  Id. 
¶67 I am satisfied that due process requires that the 
protections embodied in Wis. Stat. ch. 980 remain applicable 
when Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) is used to review and, perhaps, 
provide relief from an order granting supervised release.  State 
v. VanBronkhorst, 2001 WI App 190, ¶7, 247 Wis. 2d 247, 633 
N.W.2d 236.  Sexually violent persons have a right to due 
process protections in ch. 980 revocation proceedings.  Id.    
The court of appeals in VanBronkhorst stated that, in revocation 
proceedings under ch. 980, sexually violent persons are entitled 
to the same due process protections as those afforded to 
parolees 
and 
probationers. 
 
Id., 
¶9. 
 
Simply 
because 
sec. 806.07(1)(h) is used to review and grant relief from an 
order for supervised release, it does not follow that sexually 
violent persons should be without the protections afforded by 
ch. 980.   
¶68 Applying the protections of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 to 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) provides appropriate protection to the 
public and to a sexually violent person as well.  With respect 
to public safety, Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) allows the court to 
consider the safety of others when determining whether a 
person's supervised release should be revoked.  Those same 
safety considerations should not be discarded simply because 
sec. 806.07(1)(h) is used to review a supervised release order. 
¶69 Sexually violent persons are also protected under this 
framework.  Wisconsin Stat. ch. 980 affords multiple protections 
No.  01-2461.npc 
 
6 
 
to sexually violent persons, which will remain applicable when 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) is used.  Wisconsin Stat. § 980.03 
outlines the rights persons have when the State files a ch. 980 
petition against them.  For example, under sec. 980.03(1), the 
person is guaranteed reasonable notice of the hearing.  Further, 
the court of appeals has held that when a court acts on its own 
motion pursuant to sec. 806.07(1), parties must be given notice 
and be afforded the opportunity to be heard.  In Gittel v. 
Abram, 2002 WI App 113, ¶27, 255 Wis. 2d 767, 649 N.W.2d 661, 
the court of appeals allowed a court, sua sponte, to initiate 
consideration under § 806.07(1).  Id.  In Morford's case, a 
motion was brought by the State, after the circuit court seemed 
to suggest that a review was necessary.   
¶70 Under Wis. Stat. § 980.03(2), a person has the right 
to counsel,47 the right to remain silent,48 the right to present 
and cross-examine witnesses,49 and the right to have the hearing 
recorded by a court reporter.50  Section 980.03(4) provides that 
when a person is required to undergo an examination under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980, he or she is allowed to hire his or her own 
expert to conduct an examination.  Section 980.03(4) further 
provides that the county will pay for a court appointed expert 
for indigent persons. 
                                                 
47  Wis. Stat. §  980.08(2)(a). 
48  Wis. Stat. §  980.08(2)(b). 
49  Wis. Stat. §  980.08(2)(c). 
50  Wis. Stat. §  980.08(2)(d). 
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¶71 Considerations of due process require that sexually 
violent persons must be afforded the same protections when 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) is used, as would be applicable when 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980 is used for a review of a supervised release 
order or status. 
¶72 The majority needlessly binds the hands of district 
attorneys and circuit judges, and vests all of the power in the 
hands of the Department of Health and Family Services.  Both 
district attorneys and circuit judges should be permitted to use 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h), when necessary where extraordinary 
circumstances 
exist, 
to 
consider 
prior 
supervised release 
orders.  By placing the burden on DHFS entirely, the majority 
accepts the risk that sexually violent persons, who still pose a 
danger to others, will be released because DHFS did not move for 
review of the person's continuing violent tendencies, as 
occurred here.   
¶73 In summary, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) 
provided authority for the circuit court's consideration of its 
prior supervised release order.  Here, sec. 806.07(1)(h) was 
used appropriately to review Morford's supervised release status 
and to grant relief from the circuit court's previous order.  
Where such statutory section is used, however, the protections 
afforded by Wis. Stat. ch. 980 to a person previously found to 
be sexually violent are still applicable, in order to satisfy 
the requirements of due process.  Such protections were afforded 
to Morford in this case.  These protections include the right to 
have reasonable notice of the hearing, the right to counsel, the 
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right to remain silent, the right to present and cross-examine 
witnesses, the right to have the hearing recorded by a court 
reporter, and the use of the heightened burden of proof of clear 
and convincing evidence. 
¶74  Rather 
than 
follow 
established 
precedent, 
the 
majority, in this case, tosses it out and, in doing so, robs 
local district attorneys and circuit judges of a necessary tool 
for review of a supervised release order where extraordinary 
circumstances exist, and protection of the public requires swift 
action. 
¶75 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.   
¶76 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK join this concurrence. 
 
 
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