Case Title: Commonwealth v. Dayton

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12213

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12213 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  TIMOTHY O. DAYTON. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     January 9, 2017. - June 1, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence.  Constitutional 
Law, Preventive detention.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 5, 2015. 
 
 
A motion for pretrial detention was heard by John A. 
Agostini, J., and a question of law was reported by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Ryan D. Smith, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
Joseph G.A. Coliflores, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  A Superior Court judge reported the question 
whether G. L. c. 276, § 58A, permits the Commonwealth to seek 
pretrial detention without bail when a defendant has two prior 
convictions of operating a motor vehicle while under the 
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influence of alcohol (OUI), G. L. c. 90, § 24, and is charged 
with OUI, third offense.  Because § 58A requires three OUI 
convictions before a defendant can be so detained, we answer the 
question in the negative. 
 
Background.  In October, 2015, the defendant, Timothy O. 
Dayton, was charged in the Superior Court with eight motor 
vehicle violations, including two indictments for OUI, third 
offense, in relation to two separate incidents pending in the 
District Court.  Each OUI indictment alleged that Dayton had 
been convicted of OUI twice before -- in 1988 and in 1989. 
 
The Commonwealth moved for a dangerousness hearing pursuant 
to § 58A.  The defendant opposed the motion, arguing that § 58A 
permits a dangerousness hearing only after three prior OUI 
convictions, not two. 
 
A Superior Court judge initially agreed with the defendant, 
and denied the Commonwealth's motion and its motion for 
reconsideration.  However, the Commonwealth sought review by a 
single justice of this court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  
The single justice ordered the judge to hold the dangerousness 
hearing, at the same time acknowledging that the language of 
§ 58A was "unclear" and noting that the judge was "not precluded 
from reporting the question to the [Appeals Court]." 
 
After hearing, the judge determined that the defendant was 
dangerous within the meaning of § 58A and ordered him held 
3 
 
 
without bail pending trial.  On the defendant's motion, the 
judge reported the following question to the Appeals Court: 
"Whether a defendant with two prior convictions for [OUI], 
pursuant to G. L. c. 90, [§ 24 (1) (a) (1)], who is 
arrested and charged with [OUI], [t]hird [o]ffense, may be 
held without the right to bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, 
[§ 58A (1)]." 
 
Before the question was resolved, the defendant pleaded guilty 
to the eight pending charges.1  We subsequently transferred the 
reported question to this court on our motion. 
 
Discussion.  Primarily, the Commonwealth argues that the 
OUI clause of § 58A, and our cases discussing it, permit 
pretrial detention when a defendant has only two prior OUI 
convictions.  The OUI clause of § 58A provides, in relevant 
part, that the Commonwealth may seek detention based on 
dangerousness when a defendant is "arrested and charged with 
. . . a third or subsequent conviction for a violation of [G. L. 
c. 90, § 24]."  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1). 
 
We begin with the language of the statute itself, and 
"presume, as we must, that the Legislature intended what the 
words of the statute say."  Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 
Mass. 676, 679 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 
 
1 Of course, the defendant's plea rendered the reported 
question moot because it ended his period of pretrial detention.  
Regardless, we will answer the question because it is important 
to the administration of G. L. c. 276, § 58A, and is likely to 
recur, yet evade appellate review.  See Commonwealth v. 
Murchison, 428 Mass. 303, 305 (1998). 
                                                 
4 
 
 
707, 713 (2009).  "[C]lear and unambiguous" statutory language 
must be given its ordinary meaning (citation 
omitted).  Williamson, supra.  However, when the language of a 
criminal statute plausibly can be found ambiguous, the rule of 
lenity requires that the defendant receive the benefit of the 
ambiguity.2  Commonwealth v. Constantino, 443 Mass. 521, 525 
(2005). 
 
The OUI clause of § 58A is ambiguous.  Even setting aside 
the significant syntactical defects that arise when the OUI 
clause is read in the entire context of § 58A (1), we do not 
know what it means to be "arrested and charged with" a 
"conviction."  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1).  This formulation is at 
war with itself.  Although it hardly needs explication, being 
"arrested" and "charged" with a crime is wholly distinct from a 
"conviction" for that crime.  See Black's Law Dictionary 130 
(10th ed. 2014) ("arrest" is "the apprehension of someone for 
the purpose of securing the administration of the law, esp. of 
bringing that person before a court"); id. at 282 ("charge" is 
"[a] formal accusation of an offense as a preliminary step to 
 
2 We recognize that § 58A is not a "criminal" statute in the 
sense of enumerating the elements of a particular crime.  
However, it applies only when someone has been charged with a 
crime, and it opens the door to a potentially severe curtailment 
of a defendant's liberty pending trial.  See generally G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A.  See also Commonwealth v. Madden, 458 Mass. 607, 
610 (2010) (§ 58A contemplates "increasingly graduated levels of 
restraint").  Therefore, the rule of lenity applies. 
                                                 
5 
 
 
prosecution"); id. at 408 ("conviction" contemplates "the state 
of having been proved guilty").  Given this ambiguity, we 
interpret § 58A as requiring three, not two, prior OUI 
convictions.3 
 
In essence, the Commonwealth asks the court to avoid this 
ambiguity by performing surgery on the OUI clause -- removing 
the words "conviction for a" and leaving behind "arrested and 
charged with . . . a third or subsequent . . . [OUI] violation."  
This we cannot do.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Daley, 463 Mass. 
620, 623 (2012) (when interpreting statute, no words are to be 
regarded as superfluous).  The defendant, on the other hand, 
proposes that the plain language of the OUI clause contemplates 
a situation where an indictment for OUI, fourth offense, 
"charges" a defendant with his three prior OUI convictions.  
Although that suggestion seems plausible based on the 
indictments in this case, the language of § 58A leaves us unsure 
whether this is really what the Legislature had in mind.  In any 
event, it comports with our conclusion under lenity principles. 
 
The Commonwealth also argues that its interpretation finds 
support from a comparative reading alongside the other predicate 
offenses in § 58A, as well as alongside the "escalating penalty 
 
3 Of course, the Legislature is free to change § 58A if it 
disagrees with our interpretation, and, indeed, revisions for 
the sake of clarity would be welcome.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
LeBlanc, 475 Mass. 820, 825 (2016) (Gants, C.J., concurring). 
                                                 
6 
 
 
structure" for OUI, third offense, in G. L. c. 90, § 24.  
However, these provisions deepen, rather than resolve, the 
ambiguity.  For instance, the increasing penalties for OUI 
offenses can just as easily be read as support for the 
defendant's position -- that only when a defendant 
reoffends after facing the more severe penalties attached to a 
third OUI conviction is the defendant dangerous enough to 
potentially merit pretrial detention.  This argument also 
mistakenly assumes that § 58A is punitive in nature, when 
instead it presumes a defendant's innocence and focuses on 
protecting the public and ensuring the defendant's appearance at 
trial.  See Commonwealth v. Madden, 458 Mass. 607, 610 (2010). 
 
Notwithstanding this ambiguity, the Commonwealth points out 
that this court has, on two prior occasions, appeared to endorse 
the Commonwealth's reading of § 58A.  See Commonwealth v. Young, 
453 Mass. 707, 715-716 (2009) (pretrial detention possible when 
individual is arrested and charged with violation "that could 
result in a third or subsequent [OUI] conviction"); Commonwealth 
v. Dodge, 428 Mass. 860, 864 n.7 (1999) (§ 58A "specifically 
includes charges that could result in a third or subsequent 
[OUI] conviction").  The Commonwealth concedes that this 
language in Young and Dodge was "initially dicta."  However, it 
argues that the Legislature, by readopting § 58A in the wake of 
7 
 
 
those cases -- and without changing the OUI clause -- has 
adopted our dicta. 
 
This argument fails.  The Commonwealth is correct that we 
"presume that when the Legislature amends a statute it is 'aware 
of the prior state of the law as explicated by the decisions of 
this court,' . . . and where it has reenacted statutory language 
without material change, [the Legislature is] 'presumed to have 
adopted the judicial construction put upon it'" (citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 812 (2007).  
However, where the Commonwealth agrees that this court has 
discussed the relevant language of the statute only in 
nonbinding dicta, it can hardly be said that we have 
"explicated" the statute or put our "judicial construction" on 
it -- quite the opposite, at least until today.  It is one thing 
to infer the Legislature's intent based on an implied awareness 
of our express holdings; it is quite another to infer it based 
on dictum in our opinions. 
 
Alternatively, the Commonwealth points us toward the 
residual clause of § 58A.  This clause provides, in relevant 
part, that the Commonwealth "may move, based on dangerousness, 
for an order of pretrial detention or release on conditions for 
. . . any other felony that, by its nature, involves a 
substantial risk that physical force against the person of 
another may result" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1).  
8 
 
 
The Commonwealth argues that even if OUI, third offense, does 
not trigger § 58A under the OUI clause, it does so as an "other 
felony" under the residual clause. 
 
We are not persuaded by this argument.  We have already 
concluded that the OUI clause of § 58A is ambiguous such that 
the rule of lenity necessitates an interpretation requiring 
three, and not two, prior OUI convictions.  To then interpret 
the residual clause as permitting the application of § 58A based 
on just two prior OUI convictions would defeat the application 
of the rule of lenity in this case, and we decline to do so.  
Relatedly, the Commonwealth's reading of the residual clause 
conflicts with the principle of statutory construction that 
where the Legislature used specific language in one part of an 
enactment (here, the OUI clause), but not in another (here, the 
residual clause), the language should not be implied where it is 
not present.  See Dodge, 428 Mass. at 865.  In other words, it 
would make little sense for the Legislature to adopt a statute 
that in one clause specifically requires three prior OUI 
convictions as a prerequisite, but then, via a residual clause, 
requires only two prior OUI convictions as a prerequisite.  
Because "we shall not construe a statute . . . to produce absurd 
results" (citation omitted), Commonwealth v. Raposo, 453 Mass. 
739, 745 (2009), we decline to adopt the Commonwealth's 
alternative argument. 
9 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed, the reported 
question is answered in the negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J. (dissenting).  I disagree with the court's reading 
of G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1).  As indicated by our prior 
interpretations of this provision, I do not believe that the 
statutory language presents the degree of ambiguity suggested by 
the court. 
 
The relevant portion of the statute provides, "The 
commonwealth may move, based on dangerousness, for an order of 
pretrial detention or release on conditions for . . . arrested 
and charged with . . . a third or subsequent conviction for a 
violation of [G. L. c. 90, § 24]."  Although it is true that a 
person cannot be "arrested and charged with" a conviction, I 
disagree with the court that the language is so ambiguous that 
the provision "is at war with itself."  Ante at    .  Rather, I 
believe it is apparent that the Legislature intended to enable 
the Commonwealth to seek pretrial detention for individuals who 
were "arrested and charged with" what could be their third OUI 
conviction. 
 
Indeed, this is precisely how this court has interpreted 
the provision in the past, albeit in dicta.  In Commonwealth 
v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 715 (2009), we wrote that pretrial 
detention is available when the individual has committed an 
offense that "evinces a disregard for the safety and well-being 
of others."  As an example, we stated that "the Commonwealth may 
2 
 
 
seek pretrial detention if an individual has been arrested and 
charged with a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24, that could result 
in a third or subsequent conviction of operating while under the 
influence" (emphasis added).  Id. at 715-716.  See Commonwealth 
v. Dodge, 428 Mass. 860, 864 n.7 (1999) (grounds for pretrial 
detention "specifically include[] charges that could result in a 
third or subsequent conviction for operating [a motor vehicle] 
while under the influence of liquor" [emphasis added]).  I 
believe that we made these observations in dicta because they 
reflect a commonsense understanding of the statute. 
 
Because I interpret § 58A (1) to allow for the Commonwealth 
to seek pretrial detention for individuals arrested and charged 
with what could be the third or subsequent OUI conviction, I 
respectfully dissent.