Case Title: Christiansen v. Christiansen

Citation: 25 N.J. 56

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 1957-10-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
PAULA CHRISTIANSEN v. VICTORIA LEE CHRISTIANSEN2011 WY 90Case Number: No. S-10-0252Decided: 06/06/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 

PAULA 
CHRISTIANSEN,Appellant (Plaintiff),v.VICTORIA LEE 
CHRISTIANSEN,Appellee (Defendant).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Niobrara County

 
 
 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Tracy 
L. Zubrod of Zubrod Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming; Mary Elizabeth Galvan 
of Galvan & Fritzen, Laramie, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

No 
brief filed.

 
 
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

 
 
[¶1]      Paula 
Christiansen and Victoria Lee Christiansen are both residents of Wyoming.  They were legally married in Canada in 
2008.  Paula Christiansen filed an 
action for divorce in Wyoming in February 2010.  The district court determined it did not 
have subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain an action to dissolve a same-sex 
marriage.  Accordingly, the district 
court dismissed the action.  We 
reverse and remand for the reinstatement of the divorce 
proceeding.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The narrow issue 
in this appeal is whether a Wyoming district court has subject-matter 
jurisdiction to entertain a divorce action to dissolve a same-sex marriage 
lawfully performed in Canada.1  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶3]      The facts are 
simple.  Paula and Victoria were 
validly married in Canada and seek a divorce in Wyoming, where they reside.  The district court, after engaging in a 
review of the pertinent statutes, dismissed the action for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  The 
district court reasoned that "the jurisdictional grant to dissolve marriages is 
premised on the definition of marriage."  
Since Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-101 (LexisNexis 2009) defines a marriage, in 
pertinent part, as "a civil contract between a male and a female person," the 
district court determined "the Wyoming Statutes do not grant the Court 
jurisdiction to dissolve a same-sex marriage."

 
 
[¶4]      We disagree with 
the district court's conclusion.  
First, we emphasize that the issue before this Court is limited to 
whether a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction to dissolve a same-sex 
marriage validly solemnized in Canada.  
Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to hear and 
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question 
belong.  Granite Springs Retreat Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Manning, 2006 WY 60, ¶ 5, 133 P.3d 1005, 1009 (Wyo. 2006).  Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential 
to the exercise of judicial power.  
Id. at 1009-10.  If a court does not have subject-matter 
jurisdiction, it lacks any authority to proceed.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kunz, 
2008 WY 71, ¶ 6, 186 P.3d 378, 380 (Wyo. 2008).  The existence of subject-matter 
jurisdiction involves a question of law, and our review is de novo.  Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, ¶ 
8, 248 P.3d 1136, 1139 (Wyo. 2011).

 
 
[¶5]      In determining 
whether the district court has subject-matter jurisdiction in this case, we 
begin by noting that district courts are endowed with broad subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  District courts in 
Wyoming are courts of superior and general jurisdiction. Urbach v. 
Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 224, 73 P.2d 953, 960 (1937).  They derive their judicial powers from 
the Wyoming Constitution:

 
 

The 
judicial power of the state shall be vested in the senate, sitting as a court of 
impeachment, in a supreme court, district courts, and such subordinate courts as 
the legislature may, by general law, establish and ordain from time to 
time.  

 
 
Wyo. 
Const. art. 5, § 1.  They have original jurisdiction over all 
cases, excepting only cases placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of another 
court:

 
 
The 
district court shall have original jurisdiction of all causes both at law and in 
equity and in all criminal cases, of all matters of probate and insolvency and 
of such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for. The 
district court shall also have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all 
proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively 
in some other court[.]  

 
 

Id., 
art. 5, § 10.  Specific to this 
appeal, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-104 (LexisNexis 2009) expressly places 
subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain divorce proceedings with the district 
courts:

 
 
A 
divorce may be decreed by the district court of the county in which either party 
resides on the complaint of the aggrieved party on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences in the marital relationship.  

 
 
Thus, 
we start this discussion with the knowledge that the district court in this case 
has subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the instant divorce proceeding 
unless a contrary showing is made.

 
 
[¶6]      The pivotal 
question is whether the fact that this is a same-sex couple strips the district 
court of the subject-matter jurisdiction it would otherwise enjoy to entertain a 
divorce proceeding.  The district 
court found dispositive § 20-1-101, defining marriage as a contract between a 
man and a woman.  Since a same-sex 
couple is incapable of entering into a marriage as defined by § 20-1-101, the 
district court reasoned there was no marriage to dissolve. 

 
 
[¶7]      In doing so, the 
district court did not give proper respect to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-111 (LexisNexis 2009), which provides 
that "[a]ll marriage contracts which are valid by the laws of the country 
in which contracted are valid in this state."  Obviously, the district court's 
determination that, despite a valid Canadian marriage, no valid marriage exists 
under Wyoming law, runs afoul of this statute.  The district court's ruling thus creates 
a conflict between § 20-1-101 and § 20-1-111.  We do not agree that such a conflict 
exists in the context of a divorce proceeding.  

 
 
[¶8]      When faced with 
statutes that appear to conflict, this Court first attempts "to harmonize them 
so as to give full effect to each."  
Jessen v. Burry, 13 P.3d 1118, 1120 (Wyo. 2000).  This Court must not give a statute a 
meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of another 
construction.  Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 413 (Wyo. 
1990).  In ascertaining the meaning 
of a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same 
general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony.  Mtn. Cement Co. v. South of Laramie Water 
& Sewer Dist., 2011 WY 81, ¶ 13, __ P.3d __, __ (Wyo. 2011); Loberg 
v. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 48, ¶ 5, 88 P.3d 1045, 
1048 (Wyo. 2004); Board of Cty. Comm'rs of Teton Cty. v. Crow, 2003 WY 
40, ¶ 40, 65 P.3d 720, 733 (Wyo. 2003); Shumway v. Worthey, 2001 WY 130, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 361, 365 (Wyo. 2001).  

 
 
[¶9]      We find § 
20-1-101 and § 20-1-111, both relating to the creation of marriage, can coexist 
in harmony in the context of the instant divorce proceeding.  Section 20-1-101 prevents a same-sex 
couple from entering into a marital contract in Wyoming.  It does not speak to recognition of a 
same-sex marriage validly entered into in Canada.  Section 20-1-111, on the other hand, 
expressly allows for the recognition of a valid Canadian marriage in 
Wyoming.  On their face, the two 
sections treat different situations and as such do not 
conflict.

 
 
[¶10]   We recognize that the rule set out 
in § 20-1-111 is not absolute.  "As 
has been the law of this state since 1876, marriages outside the state which are 
valid therein are valid in this state. § 20-1-111, W.S.1977.  This statutory rule has been said to be 
merely declaratory of the rule at common law . . . ."  Bowers v. Wyoming State Treasurer, 593 P.2d 182, 184 (Wyo. 1979) (citing Hoagland v. Hoagland, 27 Wyo. 178, 193 P. 843 (1920)).  Under common law, 
this rule of validation, otherwise known as the rule of lex loci celebrationis,2 is subject to "certain recognized 
exceptions, namely, marriages which are deemed contrary to the law of nature as 
generally recognized in Christian countries, such as polygamous and incestuous 
marriages, and those which the legislature of the state has declared shall not 
be allowed any validity, because contrary to the policy of its laws."  Hoagland, 27 Wyo. at 180-81, 193 P.  at 
843-44 (Wyo. 1920).  

 
 
[¶11]   The policy exception is necessarily 
narrow, lest it swallow the rule.  
It is not enough that a marriage would not be valid if solemnized in 
Wyoming.  Common law marriages 
provide a good example.  Common law 
marriages entered into in this state are invalid.  In re Roberts' Estate, 58 Wyo. 438, 
467-68, 133 P.2d 492, 503 (Wyo. 1943).  
Yet, this Court has recognized the validity of common law marriages 
entered into in foreign jurisdictions for limited purposes.  In Jim's Water Serv. v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346, 1350 (Wyo. 1979), the Court held that "a common-law marriage valid in the 
state in which contracted is valid in Wyoming for purposes of receipt of 
benefits under our Worker's Compensation laws."  This Court explained that recognizing a 
common law marriage validly entered into in a foreign jurisdiction for purposes 
of worker's compensation laws "in no way affects the holding in Roberts or weakens our laws as to 
consummation of marriage in Wyoming."  
Bowers, 593 P.2d  at 
184.

[¶12]   Likewise, recognizing a valid 
foreign same-sex marriage for the limited purpose of entertaining a divorce 
proceeding does not lessen the law or policy in Wyoming against allowing the 
creation of same-sex marriages.  A 
divorce proceeding does not involve recognition of a marriage as an ongoing 
relationship.  Indeed, accepting 
that a valid marriage exists plays no role except as a condition precedent to 
granting a divorce.  After the 
condition precedent is met, the laws regarding divorce apply.  Laws regarding marriage play no 
role.  

 
 
[¶13]   Specifically, Paula and Victoria 
are not seeking to live in Wyoming as a married couple.  They are not seeking to enforce any 
right incident to the status of being married.  In fact, it is quite the opposite.  They are seeking to dissolve a legal 
relationship entered into under the laws of Canada.  Respecting the law of Canada, as allowed 
by § 20-1-111, for the limited purpose of accepting the existence of a condition 
precedent to granting a divorce, is not tantamount to state recognition of an 
ongoing same-sex marriage.  Thus, 
the policy of this state against the creation of same-sex marriages is not 
violated.  

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶14]   Two Wyoming residents are seeking a 
legal remedy to dissolve a legal relationship created under the laws of 
Canada.  We find nothing in Wyoming 
statutes or policy that closes the doors of the district courts to them.  The district court has subject-matter 
jurisdiction to entertain their petition for divorce.  

 
 
[¶15]   Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Our 
analysis is expressly limited to the issue before us.  Nothing in this opinion should be taken 
as applying to the recognition of same-sex marriages legally solemnized in a 
foreign jurisdiction in any context other than divorce.  The question of recognition of such 
same-sex marriages for any other reason, being not properly before us, is left 
for another day.

 
 

2"The law 
of the place where a contract, esp. of marriage, is made."  Black's Law Dictionary 995 (9th ed. 2009).