Case Title: State v. Camper

Citation: 415 Md. 44

Docket Number: 82/08

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Camper, September Term 2008, No. 82
CRIMINAL LAW - MARYLAND RULE 4-215 - The harmless error doctrine does not apply
to violations of Maryland Rule 4-215(a)(3).  Consequently, a trial court’s failure to inform
the defendant of enhanced or mandatory penalties for a subsequent offense is reversible error
notwithstanding the defendant’s actual notice of those mandatory penalties.
In the Circuit Court for Talbot County,
Criminal Case No.: 20-K-06-008495
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 82
September Term, 2008
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
JERMAINE CARROLL CAMPER
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, J.
Murphy and Adkins, JJ., Concur and
Dissent.
Filed:  July 15, 2010
1  That section of the Criminal Law Article provides, in relevant part:
(b) Second time offender. — (1) A person who is convicted under subsection
(a) of this section or of conspiracy to commit a crime included in subsection
(a) of this section shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 10 years
and is subject to a fine not exceeding $100,000 if the person previously has
been convicted once:    
(i) under subsection (a) of this section or § 5-608 of this subtitle;
(ii) of conspiracy to commit a crime included in subsection (a) of this
section or § 5-608 of this subtitle;
(iii) of a crime under the laws of another state or the United States that
would be a crime included in subsection (a) of this section or § 5-608 of this
subtitle if committed in this State; or
(iv) of any combination of these crimes.
Respondent Jermaine Carroll Camper was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for
Talbot County and convicted of the charges of attempted distribution of cocaine and
conspiracy to distribute cocaine.  Respondent represented himself at trial, following the
court’s pretrial ruling, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-215(d), that he had waived his right to
counsel by inaction.  Because Respondent had a prior conviction of a drug offense, the trial
court sentenced him to a mandatory ten years’ imprisonment without the possibility of parole,
pursuant to Maryland Code (2002, 2008 Cum. Supp.), § 5-609 of the Criminal Law Article.1
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Respondent argued, among other claims,
that, before ruling that he had waived his right to counsel, the Circuit Court did not comply
with the requirement of Rule 4-215(d) that the court first ensure the defendant has been
informed of, among other matters, “the nature of the charges in the charging document, and
2  The applicable provisions of Maryland Rule 4-215 state:
   (a) First appearance in court without counsel. At the
defendant’s first appearance in court without counsel, or when
the defendant appears in the District Court without counsel,
demands a jury trial, and the record does not disclose prior
compliance with this section by a judge, the court shall:
   (1) Make certain that the defendant has received a copy of the
charging document containing notice as to the right to counsel.
   (2) Inform the defendant of the right to counsel and of the
importance of assistance of counsel.
   (3) Advise the defendant of the nature of the charges in the
charging document, and the allowable penalties, including
mandatory penalties, if any.
   (4) Conduct a waiver inquiry pursuant to section (b) of this
Rule if the defendant indicates a desire to waive counsel.
   (5) If trial is to be conducted on a subsequent date, advise the
defendant that if the defendant appears for trial without counsel,
the court could determine that the defendant waived counsel and
proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel.
The clerk shall note compliance with this section in the file or
on the docket.
   (d) Waiver by inaction – Circuit court. If a defendant
appears in circuit court without counsel on the date set for
hearing or trial, indicates a desire to have counsel, and the
record shows compliance with section (a) of this Rule, either in
a previous appearance in the circuit court or in an appearance in
the District Court in a case in which the defendant demanded a
jury trial, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the
appearance without counsel. If the court finds that there is a
meritorious reason for the defendant’s appearance without
counsel, the court shall continue the action to a later time and
advise the defendant that if counsel does not enter an appearance
by that time, the action will proceed to trial with the defendant
unrepresented by counsel. If the court finds that there is no
meritorious reason for the defendant’s appearance without
(continued...)
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the allowable penalties, including mandatory penalties, if any.”2  See Rule 4-215(d);
2(...continued)
counsel, the court may determine that the defendant has waived
counsel by failing or refusing to obtain counsel and may proceed
with the hearing or trial.
-3-
(a)(3).  Respondent argued in particular that the Circuit Court was required but failed to
inform him that, if he were a subsequent offender, and if he were convicted of either pending
drug charge, then he might face a mandatory ten-year sentence without possibility of parole.
The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, agreed with Respondent.
That court, applying Knox v. State, 404 Md. 76, 78, 945 A.2d 638, 639 (2008), concluded
that the Circuit Court was required to, but did not, inform Respondent as part of the Rule 4-
215(a) colloquy that he might face subsequent offender penalties.  The Court of Special
Appeals held that a trial court’s failure to comply strictly with the Rule 4-215(a)
requirements “can never be deemed harmless error.”  Consequently, the court reversed the
convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. 
We granted the State’s petition for certiorari to consider whether the trial court’s error
in failing to advise Respondent under Rule 4-215(a)(3) was harmless error because
Respondent had actual knowledge of the information that must be disclosed pursuant to that
provision of the Rule.  Like the Court of Special Appeals, we reject the State’s harmless error
argument.  We therefore affirm the judgment of that court.
I.
Respondent was charged on March 29, 2006, in the District Court of Maryland sitting
in Talbot County, with one count each of attempted distribution of cocaine and conspiracy
3  The State does not contend that Respondent was provided with any information in
the District Court that bears on the Rule 4-215 issue that we address here.
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to distribute cocaine.  Respondent demanded a jury trial, and the case was transferred to the
Circuit Court for Talbot County.3 
Respondent first appeared in the Circuit Court on June 7, 2006, without an attorney.
At that time, the court ascertained that Respondent had a copy of the charging document.
The court explained the charges, stating: “[T]hese are serious charges as you can see, 20
years and $25,000.”  The court did not inform Respondent that he could be subject to a
mandatory minimum sentence if he were convicted of either charge and the State were to
seek an enhanced sentence.  The court, however, informed Respondent of his right to
representation by an attorney and the benefits of retaining one.  In addition, the court stated:
“[I]f you appear for the hearing, the next hearing or trial without a lawyer I can determine
that you have waived your right to a lawyer.”  The court further informed Respondent that,
if he could not afford an attorney, he could apply for representation through the Office of the
Public Defender.
On July 28, 2006, at another pretrial hearing, Respondent appeared without counsel
and acknowledged that he had not contacted an attorney to represent him.  The prosecutor
informed the court that Respondent was due in court the following week in a different matter,
in which he was represented by a public defender.  The prosecutor suggested postponing the
case to give Respondent a chance to confer with that public defender regarding the present
case.  The court agreed to reschedule the hearing and again advised Respondent that he
4  The same judge conducted all of the Circuit Court proceedings in this case, save for
the October 6, 2006 proceeding.
-5-
should obtain a lawyer to represent him in the present case.
The court reset the pretrial hearing for August 11, 2006.  Respondent did not appear
at that hearing.  The court then reset the hearing for September 15, 2006.
Respondent appeared without counsel at the September 15 hearing, evidently pursuant
to a bench warrant.  He informed the court that he had spoken with the attorney who was
representing him in the other matter.  According to Respondent, that attorney suggested the
possibility of a plea bargain in the present case, which Respondent was not willing to accept.
The court re-advised Respondent of the maximum penalties he faced on the charges, but, as
before, did not inform him of the sentence enhancement he might face upon conviction.  The
court again encouraged Respondent to obtain counsel, directed him to the Office of the
Public Defender, and admonished him that, “if you come in at that trial without a lawyer, I’m
going to determine that you waived your right to a lawyer and we’re going to go forward
with the trial.”  The court released Respondent from custody on the requirement that he go
to the Office of the Public Defender and make an appointment to obtain counsel.
 A fourth hearing was held on October 6, 2006.4  At that time, the court asked
Respondent about his efforts to obtain counsel.  Respondent explained that he had sustained
a foot injury that made it difficult for him to get around but he had seen a private attorney
whom he hoped to retain to handle the case.  Respondent added that, although he had not
seen the public defender, he definitely wanted an attorney to represent him in this case.
5  See State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979) (construing the predecessors
to Maryland Code (2008 Repl. Vol.), § 6-103 of the Criminal Procedure Article and
Maryland Rule 4-271).
-6-
Evidently referring to Maryland’s so-called Hicks rule,5 the State noted that the case
must be tried by early December.  The State agreed to one more postponement of the pretrial
hearing.  The court warned Respondent that, if he appeared at the next hearing without an
attorney, he might well be given a trial date.  The court then informed Respondent that, under
those circumstances, he would be going to trial with or without a lawyer.  The court further
informed Respondent that, if he went immediately to the Office of the Public Defender, he
could probably obtain an attorney to represent him at trial.  The court reset the pretrial
hearing for October 13, 2006.
On that date, Respondent appeared without counsel.  The court asked Respondent why
he was not represented.  Respondent explained that he did not have an attorney but was ready
to go forward with trial because he had been given ample time to get one.  Respondent
added:  “I know the serious double charges and you have definitely been fair with me and
gave me ample time to get” an attorney.  The court referred Respondent to the telephone
book to find a private attorney, or to the Public Defender’s office if he could not afford one.
As was done in the past, the court gave Respondent an advice form, which included advice
to retain a lawyer and the address of the Office of the Public Defender.  The court set the trial
date for November 13, 2006, and advised Respondent that, if he came to court without a
lawyer on the trial date, the court could find that he had waived his right to counsel.
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For some reason not made clear in the record, the trial date was moved to November
20, 2006.  Respondent appeared in court on that date, without counsel.  In response to the
court’s inquiry, Respondent stated that he could not afford an attorney, and that the public
defender had urged him to plead guilty.  Respondent explained that he originally turned down
the services of a public defender because he “didn’t think that the public defender was going
to represent [him] at his best ability.”  He changed his mind, however, and returned to the
Office of the Public Defender two weeks before trial.  By that time, however, it was too late
to obtain representation.  
After listening to Respondent, the court stated:  “And I take it you’re prepared to go
forward with a jury trial today?”  To that, Respondent answered, “Well, I have no choice,
because you told me, you know, when I came back, you know, I have no choice but to go
with it cause you told me when I came back that I needed to be prepared to go forward.”  The
court then reviewed for the record all of Respondent’s appearances without counsel and the
advice the court had given Respondent at each of those appearances concerning the
importance of obtaining an attorney.  The court found that Respondent did not have a
meritorious reason for appearing without a lawyer, and that he therefore had waived his right
to counsel by inaction. 
Trial commenced soon thereafter.  Trial concluded later that day, upon the jury’s
return of a verdict finding Respondent guilty of the charged offenses.
Respondent was represented by a public defender at sentencing, which occurred on
January 19, 2007.  The State directed the court to the presentence investigation reflecting that
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Respondent had a prior distribution conviction from Queen Anne’s County.  The parties and
the court then discussed the State’s intention to seek an enhanced sentence.  The State
recalled that, just before the start of trial, and after the court found that Respondent had
waived his right to counsel by inaction, the State and Respondent had discussed a plea.  The
State recounted that discussion for the court: 
We went into the petit jury room and discussed [a possible plea] at that point[.]
I verbally talked to him about what risk he was running and he told me that he
knew that he was a subsequent offender and that he’d be subject to enhanced
punishment and specifically ten years without parole if convicted, but
nonetheless, he wanted to go to trial and take that chance.  
After hearing the State’s recitation, the court found that Respondent “was certainly aware
that he was a second time offender prior to and during the trial.”  The court thereafter
determined that Respondent had received notice of the State’s intention to seek an enhanced
sentence and that, in any event, Respondent had waived his right to have the sentencing
deferred for fifteen days.  See Md. Rule 4-245(b), (c).  The court then sentenced Respondent
as a subsequent offender, pursuant to Criminal Law Article, § 5-609(b), to ten years’
imprisonment for attempted distribution of cocaine, with a concurrent ten-year term of
imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute cocaine.  
Respondent appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals.  As we noted
at the outset of this opinion, the intermediate appellate court held that the trial court
committed reversible error by ruling that Respondent waived his right to counsel by inaction
without first informing him that he faced possible mandatory sentence enhancements, if
convicted.  The Court of Special Appeals added:
-9-
[O]ur holding in no way reflects any criticism that the circuit court did not
make extensive efforts to encourage [Respondent] to seek counsel and warn
him of the dangers of failing to do so.  Indeed, we would characterize [the
judge’s] painstaking and patient efforts in this regard as nothing less than
valiant.  Yet the Court of Appeals has made clear that “substantial compliance
with Md. Rule 4-215(a)(1)-(5) is not sufficient,” and that failure to comply can
never be deemed harmless error.  We therefore must vacate the judgment of
the circuit court and remand the case for a new trial.  
(Quoting Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 464, 735 A.2d 1003, 1027 (1999)) (internal
citations omitted).
We granted the State’s petition for writ of certiorari, 406 Md. 112, 956 A.2d 201
(2008), to address the following question:
Where the record shows that the prosecutor provided notice to [Respondent]
before trial that he was subject to mandatory penalties as a subsequent
offender, and [Respondent] acknowledged that he was aware of those
penalties, did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that reversal was
required under Knox v. State, 404 Md. 76 (2008), which held that notice
regarding mandatory penalties for a subsequent offender is required before a
trial court may find that a defendant waives the right to be represented by
counsel?
II.
“The right of a defendant in a criminal case to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, and by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.”  Brye v.
State, 410 Md. 623, 634, 980 A.2d 435, 441 (2009) (citations omitted).  “The right to counsel
seeks to protect a defendant from the complexities of the legal system and his or her lack of
understanding of the law.”  Id. (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-72, 53 S. Ct. 55,
63-65, 77 L. Ed. 158, 170-73 (1932)).  Although a defendant has “the corresponding right
-10-
to proceed without the assistance of counsel,” he or she “‘relinquishes . . . many of the
traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel.’” Brye, 410 Md. at 634, 980 A.2d at
441 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L. Ed. 2d
562, 581 (1975)).  Accordingly, “for a defendant’s waiver of counsel to be effective, ‘the
accused must “knowingly and intelligently” forgo those relinquished benefits.’”  Brye, 410
Md. at 634, 980 A.2d at 441 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541, 45 L. Ed.
2d at 581).  A knowing and intelligent relinquishment of the benefits associated with the right
to counsel requires that the defendant “be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open.’”  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541, 45 L. Ed. 2d
at 582 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S. Ct. 236,
242, 87 L. Ed. 268, 279 (1942)).
“As part of the implementation and protection of this fundamental right to counsel,
the Court adopted Rule 4-215.”  Knox, 404 Md. at 87, 945 A.2d at 645.  “The Rule ‘provides
an orderly procedure to insure that each criminal defendant appearing before the court be
represented by counsel, or, if he is not, that he be advised of his Sixth Amendment
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, as well as his correlative constitutional right
to self-representation.’” Id., 945 A.2d at 645 (quoting Broadwater v. State, 401 Md. 175,180-
81, 931 A.2d 1098, 1100-01 (2007)).  “The Rule exists as a ‘checklist’ that a judge must
complete before a defendant’s waiver can be considered valid; as such, it mandates strict
compliance.” Id., 945 A.2d at 645 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
-11-
Rule 4-215 is a “precise rubric.”  Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 280, 523 A.2d 597,
606 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “The requirements of Rule 4-215
‘are mandatory and must be complied with, irrespective of the gravity of the crime charged,
the type of plea entered, or the lack of an affirmative showing of prejudice to the accused[.]’”
Knox, 404 Md. at 87, 945 A.2d at 645 (quoting Broadwater, 401 Md. at 182, 931 A.2d at
1102).  We repeatedly have said that a court’s failure to comply strictly with the Rule
constitutes reversible error.  See, e.g.,  Brye, 410 Md. at 637, 980 A.2d at 443; Knox, 404
Md. at 87, 945 A.2d at 645; Broadwater, 401 Md. at 182, 931 A.2d at 1102; Richardson v.
State, 381 Md. 348, 367, 849 A.2d 487, 499 (2004); Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 449, 735
A.2d 1003, 1018 (1999); Moten v. State, 339 Md. 407, 409, 663 A.2d 593, 595 (1995);
Parren, 309 Md. at 281-82, 523 A.2d at 607-08.
In the present case, the trial court ruled pursuant to Rule 4-215(d) that Respondent
waived his right to counsel by inaction.  Rule 4-215(d) provides that such a waiver can be
found, 
[i]f a defendant appears in circuit court without counsel on the date set for
hearing or trial, indicates a desire to have counsel, and the record shows
compliance with section (a) of this Rule, either in a previous appearance in the
circuit court or in an appearance in the District Court in a case in which the
defendant demanded a jury trial[.]    
Rule 4-215(a), in turn, requires the court, inter alia, to “[a]dvise the defendant of the nature
of the charges in the charging document, and the allowable penalties, including mandatory
penalties, if any.”  Rule 4-215(a)(3).
Our decision in Knox leaves no doubt that the Rule 4-215(a)(3) advisement includes
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notice of subsequent offender penalties.  404 Md. at 88, 945 A.2d at 645.  Consequently,
even if the trial court is unaware that a defendant is a subsequent offender when giving the
requisite Rule 4-215(a)(3) advisement, the court nevertheless must advise the defendant of
the potential for sentencing enhancement.  On that point, we said in Knox:
To satisfy Rule 4-215, the court need only advise a defendant of the mandatory
penalties set out in the statute under the offense charged, or, advise the
defendant that if the defendant is a subsequent offender, that there may be
enhanced penalties, and to recite the possible enhanced penalties.  The court
does not need actual knowledge of the defendant’s status in order to give the
advice.
Id. at 89, 945 A.2d at 646.  We emphasized that, without advisement of the more severe
potential penalties resulting from prior convictions, a defendant cannot effectively “evaluate
the risks of forgoing the assistance of counsel,” id. at 91, 945 A.2d at 647, and therefore
“cannot have full understanding of the consequences of the waiver of counsel,” id., 945 A.2d
at 647.  Consequently, it is error for the court not to inform the defendant of the penalties to
which he or she may be subject as a subsequent offender.
There is no dispute that Respondent was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence
of ten years’ incarceration, without the possibility of parole, if convicted of either of the two
drug charges.  See Criminal Law Article § 5-609(b).  There is also no dispute that the Circuit
Court, at some point before finding that Respondent had waived his right to counsel by
inaction, was required to ensure that he was advised of that potential mandatory penalty,
pursuant to Rule 4-215(a)(3) and Knox.  Finally, it is undisputed that the record fails to show
compliance with that requirement.
6  Respondent challenges the State’s premise, asserting the following: “The record
affords no basis from which to conclude that the State’s Attorney’s recollection on January
19, 2007 [the sentencing proceeding] of what he told Mr. Camper on November 20, 2006 [the
date on which the court found the waiver by inaction and Respondent went to trial] was
accurate.”  Respondent argues, in effect, that the Circuit Court was clearly erroneous in
crediting the State’s Attorney’s recitation of the facts and finding, based on that credibility
determination, that Respondent “was certainly aware that he was a second time offender prior
to and during the trial.” We need not address that argument because it is unnecessary to our
disposition of the case.
-13-
The State acknowledges that the trial court violated Rule 4-215 by ruling, without first
informing Respondent that he faced a mandatory enhancement of his sentence, that
Respondent had waived his right to counsel by inaction.  The State argues that reversal of
Respondent’s conviction is unnecessary, however, because the court’s failure to inform
Respondent of the possibility of mandatory enhancement was harmless because he had actual
knowledge of that fact.  The Court of Special Appeals disagreed.  So do we.
We shall assume, for purposes of addressing the State’s contention, its premise that
Respondent, at the time that he was found to have waived his right to counsel by inaction,
had actual knowledge of the mandatory penalty he faced upon conviction of either of the
drug charges.6  To hold as the State would have us do, however, we would have to overrule
Moten, 339 Md. at  409, 663 A.2d at 595, in which we expressly held that, under Parren,
“harmless error analysis is inapplicable to a violation of Maryland Rule 4-215(a)(3).”  See
also Brye, 410 Md. at 643-44, 980 A.2d at 596 (rejecting the State’s “quasi-harmless error
analysis” because it “conflicts directly with our clear mandate in Moten that ‘harmless error
analysis is inapplicable to a violation of Maryland Rule 4-215(a)(3)’” (quoting Moten, 339
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Md. at 409, 663 A.2d at 595)). 
We looked in Moten to Parren because in both cases the trial courts failed to inform
the defendants of the full range of penalties available for the pending charges before finding
that the defendants had waived their right to counsel.  Moten, 339 Md. at 412, 663 A.2d at
596; Parren, 309 Md. at 282, 523 A.2d at 608.  In both cases, evidence in the record
indicated that the defendants had actual knowledge of the information omitted by the court
during the Rule 4-215(a) inquiry.   See Moten, 339 Md. at 409, 663 A.2d at 594; Parren, 309
Md. at 266-77, 523 A.2d at 604-05.  We quoted in Moten the following passage from Parren:
[W]e would be reluctant indeed to conclude that noncompliance with such an
essential part of our Waiver Rule [the requirement of advice of penalties] be
determined on an ad hoc basis.  We think that to do so would erode Rule 4-215
and seriously encroach upon its purpose to protect the constitutional right to
counsel.  We believe that such a holding would enhance complexity rather than
secure simplicity in procedure, tend to unfairness rather than fairness in
administration, and, in the long run, promote rather than eliminate unjustifiable
expense and delay.   
339 Md. at 412, 663 A.2d at 596 (quoting Parren, 309 Md. at 282, 523 A.2d at 608). 
We refuse to depart from the rule established in Moten and applied in Brye that a Rule
4-215(a)(3) violation is not subject to harmless error analysis.  To do so would undermine
the strong policy reasons, set forth in Parren and reflected in our subsequent decisions, that
strict compliance with the requirements of the Rule protects the defendant’s constitutional
right to counsel and best serves the administration of justice.
We therefore hold that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to ensure
that Respondent was informed, pursuant to Rule 4-215(a)(3), of the mandatory penalty to
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which he was subject upon conviction of either of the charged crimes.  Respondent is entitled
to a new trial.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY TALBOT
COUNTY.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 82
September Term, 2008
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
JERMAINE CARROLL CAMPER
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
Concurring & Dissenting Opinion by 
Murphy, J. in which Adkins, J., joins.
Filed:   July 15, 2010
-1-
I agree that a “harmless error analysis is inapplicable to [the] violation of Maryland
Rule 4-215(a)(3) [that occurred in the case at bar].” In my opinion, when no defense counsel
has ever entered an appearance on behalf of the defendant, (1)  the trial court should not hold
a post-sentence evidentiary hearing to determine whether that defendant had actual
knowledge of the information that should have been provided pursuant to the rule, and (2)
the record must show that the trial court has “advise[d] the defendant that if the defendant is
a subsequent offender, that there may be enhanced penalties, and [has recited] the possible
enhanced penalties.” Knox v. State, 404 Md. 76, 89, 945 A.2d 638, 646 (2008).  Unlike the
majority, however, I would apply a harmless error analysis in a “discharge of counsel” case
where the defendant -- having been permitted to discharge counsel -- seeks a new trial on the
ground that the trial judge failed to comply with the requirements of Md. Rule 4-215(e). 
I would also hold that  when the failure to advise about the possibility of an enhanced
penalty is the only violation of Md. Rule 4-215(a), the appropriate remedy is a new
sentencing proceeding at which the State is prohibited from seeking an enhanced penalty.
I therefore dissent from the holding that the Respondent is entitled to a new trial rather than
a new sentencing proceeding.
Judge Adkins has authorized me to state that she joins this concurring and dissenting
opinion.