Case Title: State v. Davis

Citation: 2012-Ohio-1654

Docket Number: 2011-0685

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Davis, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1654.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-1654 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. DAVIS, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Davis, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1654.] 
Criminal law—Witness intimidation—R.C. 2921.04—Police investigation is not a 
proceeding in a court of justice for purposes of the witness-intimidation 
statute. 
(No. 2011-0685—Submitted January 17, 2012—Decided April 17, 2012.) 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 23858, 
193 Ohio App.3d 130, 2011-Ohio-1280. 
__________________ 
 
MCGEE BROWN, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal addresses when a person who has knowledge of a 
crime is a witness under R.C. 2921.04(B), which prohibits witness intimidation. 
{¶ 2} The Second District Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of 
appellee, Tracy Davis, for violating R.C. 2921.04(B).  Davis was indicted for 
witness intimidation based on a threat he made to his ex-wife after police began 
investigating the underlying crime but before any charges had been filed.  Under 
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these facts, the appellate court found that no “action or proceeding” existed at the 
time of the threat.  Therefore, the victim of the threat was not a witness under 
R.C. 2921.04(B). 
{¶ 3} As we recently explained, R.C. 2921.04(B) does not apply “when 
the intimidation occurred after the criminal act but prior to any proceedings 
flowing from the criminal act in a court of justice.”  State v. Malone, 121 Ohio 
St.3d 244, 2009-Ohio-310, 903 N.E.2d 614, ¶ 10.  A police investigation, without 
more, is not a “proceeding[] flowing from the criminal act in a court of justice.”  
Therefore, Davis’s ex-wife was not a witness pursuant to R.C. 2921.04(B) at the 
time of the threat.1  Accordingly, we affirm. 
Background 
{¶ 4} This case stems from an extended chase and altercation involving 
Davis and a deputy sheriff that ended when Davis drove his ex-wife’s minivan 
within feet of the deputy sheriff, who was on foot.  The deputy fired at Davis, and 
was injured, while dodging the vehicle. 
{¶ 5} Davis fled the scene.  He traveled to the home of his ex-wife, 
where he changed out of bloodstained clothes and tried to conceal damage to the 
minivan from the altercation.  Davis warned his ex-wife that she should lie about 
the incident or he would kill her and blow up her apartment. 
{¶ 6} Davis was later apprehended and indicted on four counts: one 
count of felonious assault of a peace officer under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); two 
counts of tampering with evidence under R.C. 2921.12(A)(1); and one count of 
intimidation of a witness under R.C. 2921.04(B).  After a trial, a jury found Davis 
guilty of one count of tampering with evidence (relating to taping over bullet 
                                                 
1  The General Assembly recently amended R.C. 2921.04 and eliminated its “action or 
proceeding” language.  Effective June 4, 2012, R.C. 2921.04(E) will define “witness” to “mean[] 
any person who has or claims to have knowledge concerning a fact or facts concerning a criminal 
or delinquent act, whether or not criminal or delinquent child charges are actually filed.”  2011 
Sub.H.B. No. 20. 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
holes in the minivan) and one count of intimidation of a witness, and it found 
Davis not guilty of the second count of tampering with evidence (relating to 
efforts to conceal bloodstains on his clothing).  However, a mistrial was declared 
with respect to the assault charge after the jury failed to reach a verdict. 
{¶ 7} The trial court sentenced Davis to two years on the tampering-
with-evidence conviction and four years on the intimidation-of-a-witness 
conviction, to be served concurrently.  The trial court also imposed three years of 
postrelease control. 
{¶ 8} On appeal, Davis argued that the conviction of witness 
intimidation was not supported by sufficient evidence and that it was against the 
manifest weight of the evidence.  He also claimed that the conviction of 
tampering with evidence was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
{¶ 9} The Second District affirmed Davis’s conviction of tampering with 
evidence.  State v. Davis, 193 Ohio App.3d 130, 2011-Ohio-1280, 951 N.E.2d 
138, ¶ 46 (2nd Dist.).  The appellate court, however, vacated Davis’s conviction 
of witness intimidation.  Because “there had only been an offense reported and a 
police investigation initiated, there was insufficient evidence of a criminal action 
or proceeding to sustain a conviction for witness intimidation in violation of R.C. 
2921.04(B).”  Id. at ¶ 29.  In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court relied on 
our decision in Malone, 121 Ohio St.3d 244, 2009-Ohio-310, 903 N.E.2d 614, 
interpreting “criminal action or proceedings” in R.C. 2921.04(B) to require 
“ ‘proceedings flowing from the criminal act in a court of justice’ ” in order to 
convict a defendant of witness intimidation.  (Emphasis omitted.)  Davis at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 10} The state appealed, raising one proposition of law: “A conviction 
for intimidation of a witness under R.C. 2921.04(B) is sustainable when the 
witness is threatened after law enforcement officers have commenced 
investigation in a case.”  We accepted review.  129 Ohio St.3d 1449, 2011-Ohio-
4217, 951 N.E.2d 1046. 
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Analysis of R.C. 2921.04(B) 
{¶ 11} R.C. 2921.04(B) provides:  
 
No person, knowingly and by force or by unlawful threat of 
harm to any person or property, shall attempt to influence, 
intimidate, or hinder the victim of a crime in the filing or 
prosecution of criminal charges or an attorney or witness involved 
in a criminal action or proceeding in the discharge of the duties of 
the attorney or witness. 
 
Under R.C. 2921.04(D), the offense is a third-degree felony. 
{¶ 12} For the purpose of this appeal, the critical language of R.C. 
2921.04(B) is “involved in a criminal action or proceeding.”  We recently 
reviewed this language.  In Malone, 121 Ohio St.3d 244, 2009-Ohio-310, 903 
N.E.2d 614, we addressed a conflict in the appellate courts regarding the 
requirements for qualifying as a witness under the statute. 
{¶ 13} Shortly after committing a rape, Malone threatened a person who 
observed the crime as it occurred.  The victim had not yet reported the crime at 
the time of the threat.  Because “[t]he statute requires a witness’s involvement in a 
criminal action or proceeding, not his or her potential involvement,” we held that 
the person who observed the crime was not yet a witness when she was 
threatened.  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 21.  Thus, we affirmed the decision reversing 
Malone’s conviction. 
{¶ 14} In the instant appeal, the state seizes upon our remark in Malone 
that “when no crime has been reported and no investigation or prosecution has 
been initiated, a witness is not ‘involved in a criminal action or proceeding’ for 
purposes of R.C. 2921.04(B).”  Id. at ¶ 30.  That statement, which appears in the 
conclusion of the Malone opinion, applied the holding of the decision to the 
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specific facts of the case.  It did not alter our clear holding that “a conviction for 
intimidation of a witness under R.C. 2921.04(B) is not sustainable when the 
intimidation occurred after the criminal act but prior to any proceedings flowing 
from the criminal act in a court of justice.”  Malone at ¶ 10.  Instead, the remark 
emphasized that Malone’s threat occurred long before the threat victim qualified 
as a witness under the statute, so the statute did not apply.  Malone stands for the 
proposition that a “criminal action or proceeding” under R.C. 2921.04(B) requires 
the formal initiation of proceedings such as criminal charges or grand jury 
proceedings, not merely the investigation of the crime. 
{¶ 15} In the present case, a police investigation had begun before Davis 
threatened his ex-wife; indeed, police awareness of the acts leading to Davis’s 
felonious-assault charge was immediate because the victim was a deputy.  But no 
“criminal action or proceeding” was initiated until later, when the state filed 
charges against Davis.  Therefore, no “criminal action or proceeding” was 
underway at the time of the threat, and R.C. 2921.04(B) does not apply. 
{¶ 16} Moreover, R.C. 2921.04(B) has not changed since we issued our 
decision in Malone; our holding in that decision remains sound.  Throughout the 
Revised Code, “ ‘criminal action or proceeding’ * * * indicates the involvement 
of a court.”  Malone, 121 Ohio St.3d 244, 2009-Ohio-310, 903 N.E.2d 614, at 
¶ 15; see also id. at ¶ 18 (“As demonstrated in Ohio’s statutory scheme and in this 
court’s case law, a ‘criminal action or proceeding’ implies a formal process 
involving a court”). 
{¶ 17} In this statute, the General Assembly has not only employed 
language indicating the need for court involvement, it has provided a stark 
contrast by pairing the witness-protection language with language explicitly 
protecting crime victims from intimidation immediately after a criminal act.  
Compare R.C. 2921.04(A) with (B).  “A key to our analysis is the clear-cut 
difference between the protections afforded victims and witnesses under the 
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statute.  * * *  The General Assembly in R.C. 2921.04(B) could have protected 
witnesses from intimidation immediately upon their witnessing a criminal act, but 
it did not.”  Malone at ¶ 19, 20. 
{¶ 18} We do not arrive at this conclusion lightly.  Threats to prospective 
witnesses cause real harm to the administration of justice, as we recognized in 
Malone.  But we are limited by the language chosen by the General Assembly to 
define the crime of witness intimidation, and we cannot apply that language to 
conduct outside the statute. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 19} R.C. 2921.04(B) prohibits the intimidation of a person who 
observes a crime after the initiation of proceedings flowing from the criminal act 
in a court of justice.  A police investigation of a crime, without more, is not a 
proceeding in a court of justice, and it does not invoke the protection of R.C. 
2921.04(B) for a person who observes the crime.  Therefore, the Second District 
Court of Appeals correctly determined that insufficient evidence exists to convict 
Davis for witness intimidation based on his threat to his ex-wife.  We affirm the 
decision reversing Davis’s conviction under R.C. 2921.04(B). 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 20} Although I concurred in the predecessor case, State v. Malone, 121 
Ohio St.3d 244, 2009-Ohio-310, 903 N.E.2d 614, I believe that this case is 
different, and therefore I dissent.  However, since the General Assembly has 
chosen to amend the statute to cover these situations, 2011 Sub.H.B. No. 20, this 
January Term, 2012 
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case will have limited impact.  Potential and real witnesses to a crime will now be 
protected despite the status of any legal proceedings. 
__________________ 
 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and R. 
Lynn Nothstine, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Marlow & Neuherz, L.L.C., and Brandin D. Marlow, for appellee. 
______________________