Case Title: North Dakota  v. Scheett

Citation: 

Docket Number: 20130363

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 2014-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA 2014 ND 91State of North
Dakota, Plaintiff and Appelleev. Rodney Simeon
Scheett, Jr., Defendant and AppellantNo. 20130363Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh
County, South Central Judicial District, the Honorable Gail Hagerty, Judge.AFFIRMED.Opinion of the Court by Kapsner, Justice.Dawn M. Deitz, Assistant State's Attorney, 514 East
Thayer Avenue, Bismarck, N.D. 58501, for plaintiff and appellee; submitted on brief.Kent M. Morrow, P.O. Box 2155, Bismarck, N.D.
58502-2155, for defendant and appellant; submitted on brief.State v. ScheettNo. 20130363Kapsner, Justice.[¶1] Rodney Simeon Scheett, Jr., appeals from a criminal judgment entered on a
jury verdict finding him guilty of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and
possession of drug paraphernalia, and challenges the district court's denial of a motion to suppress
evidence used against him. Because the search of Scheett's vehicle was justified under the officer
safety exception to the warrant requirement, we affirm.I[¶2] On November 7, 2012, two Bismarck police detectives were in an unmarked
vehicle traveling east on Main Street in Mandan when they observed a vehicle revving its engine
and exceeding the speed limit. After confirming that the license plates did not match the
registration for the vehicle, they radioed for a marked Bismarck Police Department unit to stop
the vehicle. The vehicle, driven by Scheett, was pulled over in Bismarck by two officers. One of
the officers radioed other officers that the driver was making furtive movements and reaching into
the center console of the vehicle, and he believed the driver might be reaching for a weapon. The
officers conducted a "felony traffic stop." Officers, with guns drawn, ordered Scheett out of the
vehicle, handcuffed him, patted him down for weapons, and placed him in the back seat of a squad
car. Officers searched the center console of the vehicle where they found two bags of
methamphetamine and marijuana paraphernalia, and Scheett was charged with possession of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia.[¶3] Scheett moved to suppress the evidence, arguing it was obtained as the result
of an unconstitutional warrantless search. The district court denied the motion, concluding the
search was justified by the officer safety exception to the warrant requirement. The court
reasoned:The officers had observed some erratic driving which would
have been of concern to them. There was clearly a registration violation. They stopped the
vehicle. I am convinced by the testimony presented that they were legitimately and reasonably
concerned for officer safety. That had they just cited the defendant and allowed him to return to
the vehicle, they would have had concerns that there was a weapon there. They took a very
reasonable step in making certain that there was no weapon, that the officers' safety wouldn't be
compromised, and the action was limited in scope to just an area where they could see furtive
movements. A jury convicted Scheett of the crimes charged.II[¶4] Scheett argues the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the evidence because the search of the vehicle console was
unconstitutional.[¶5] A warrantless search or seizure is
constitutionally impermissible unless it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. State v. Nickel, 2013 ND
155, ¶ 22, 836 N.W.2d 405. The
State has the burden of showing a warrantless search or seizure falls within a recognized
exception, and if no exception is established, the exclusionary rule requires suppression of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's protections against warrantless
searches or seizures. Id. This Court
will reverse a district court's decision on a motion to suppress only if, after resolving any conflicts
in the testimony in favor of affirmance, there is insufficient competent evidence fairly capable of
supporting the court's determination and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence. State v. Webster, 2013 ND 119,
¶ 7, 834 N.W.2d 283; State v. Johnson, 531 N.W.2d 275, 279 (N.D. 1995).[¶6] Scheett's argument is based entirely on the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). In Gant, the defendant was
arrested on an outstanding warrant for driving with a suspended license. Id. at 336. The
defendant was immediately handcuffed and locked in the back of a patrol car, after which police
officers searched his vehicle and discovered cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the back seat.
Id. at 335-36. The defendant was charged with and convicted of possession of a narcotic
drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. at 336-37. The trial court had
denied the defendant's motion to suppress, concluding the search was permissible as a search
incident to arrest. Id. at 337. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, concluding the
search was unreasonable. Id. The Supreme Court agreed with the Arizona Supreme
Court that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the
search because the defendant could not have accessed his car to retrieve weapons or evidence at
the time of the search. Id. at 335. Gant held:Police may
search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of
an arrestee's vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another
exception to the warrant requirement applies. Id. at
351.[¶7] The Supreme Court's decision in Gant clarified
and limited New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981), in which the Court held
"that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he
may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that
automobile." (footnotes omitted). The Gant Court noted that Belton "has been
widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if
there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search." 556 U.S.  at 341. The Court rejected the suggestion that this broad reading of Belton was
necessary to protect law enforcement safety and evidentiary interests because "[o]ther established
exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search under additional circumstances
when safety or evidentiary concerns demand." Id. at 346. Other exceptions to the
warrant requirement, the Court reasoned, "ensure that officers may search a vehicle when genuine
safety or evidentiary concerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle's recent occupant justify
a search." Id. at 347.[¶8] Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion in Gant emphasized:It must be borne in mind that we are
speaking here only of a rule automatically permitting a search when the driver or an occupant is
arrested. Where no arrest is made, we have held that officers may search the car if they reasonably
believe "the suspect is dangerous and . . . may gain immediate control of
weapons." Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). In the no-arrest case, the
possibility of access to weapons in the vehicle always exists, since the driver or passenger will be
allowed to return to the vehicle when the interrogation is completed. The rule of Michigan v.
Long is not at issue here. 556 U.S.  at 352 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).[¶9] This Court has recognized that officer safety is an
exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Anderson, 2006 ND 44, ¶ 34, 710 N.W.2d 392. State v. Haverluk, 2000 ND 178, 617 N.W.2d 652, illustrates the principle. In Haverluk,
a belligerent defendant was ordered at gunpoint by two officers to step out of his vehicle after
they noticed the defendant place his right hand between the driver's seat and console. Id. at ¶¶ 2-3. The defendant's
actions placed the officers in fear for their safety. Id. at ¶ 23. An officer searched between
the driver's seat and console, found incriminating evidence, and the defendant was placed under
arrest. Id. at ¶ 4. As an alternative to its holding
that the search was a valid search incident to arrest, this Court ruled the search was also valid as
an "officer-safety measure" because "[i]f a person is outside a vehicle, a search of the vehicle is
valid if the officer possesses a reasonable belief that a person poses a danger if allowed to reenter
the vehicle." Id. at ¶¶ 20, 22 (citing Long, 463 U.S. at
1050).[¶10] There are no factual disputes in this case. The
detectives had Bismarck police officers pull over Scheett's vehicle because the registration did not
match the license plate of his vehicle and he had been speeding. After being pulled over around 2
p.m., the officers noticed Scheett "making furtive [and exaggerated] movements to the right down
towards the center console of the vehicle," which made them think "he was going for a weapon."
They conducted a "felony traffic stop," handcuffed Scheett, placed him in the back of a patrol car,
searched the console, and found the drugs and paraphernalia. The search was confined to the
immediate area where Scheett made the furtive movements. An officer testified that, before the
search of the console area was conducted, Scheett would have been charged with "unlawful
registration, no insurance, and I think careless driving." The officer further testified that Scheett
"would have been cited and released, as long as there weren't outstanding warrants or something
else," and added:At this point we didn't know what—I mean, we were
detaining him and what the traffic violations were for, we didn't know if we were going to be
releasing him at that point. If we were, we wanted to make sure there was no weapons in the
vehicle that would harm anyone else after this point.[¶11] This was not a search incident to arrest prohibited by Gant. Unlike
the situation in Gant where an officer testified the vehicle search was conducted
"[b]ecause the law says we can do it," 556 U.S.  at 337, officers here feared for their safety and
Scheett most likely would have been cited for traffic violations and been allowed to return to his
vehicle. We agree with the district court that the search in this case was justified under the officer
safety exception to the warrant requirement.III[¶12] The district court did not err in denying Scheett's motion to suppress. The
criminal judgment is affirmed.[¶13] Carol Ronning KapsnerLisa
Fair McEversDaniel J. CrothersWilliam F. Hodny, S.J.Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.
[¶14] The Honorable William F. Hodny,
S.J., sitting in place of Sandstrom, J.,
disqualified.