Case Title: Garner v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 492, 2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DEVON GARNER, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 492, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 9811012529 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  September 24, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
      Decided: 
  October 9, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, RIDGELY, and VALIHURA, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 9th day of October 2014, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court 
that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Devon Garner, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his second motion for postconviction relief.  The State of 
Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is 
manifest on the face of Garner’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit.1  
We agree and affirm.  
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, on February 9, 2000, a Superior Court jury 
found Garner guilty of Attempted Murder in the First Degree, Conspiracy in the 
First Degree, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Reckless Endangering in the First 
Degree, and two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony.  Garner was sentenced to Level V incarceration for the balance of his 
natural life, plus an additional twenty-two years of Level V incarceration.  This 
Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment on direct appeal.2 
(3) 
Garner filed his first motion for postconviction relief on August 4, 
2004.  The motion included seven ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  The 
record does not reflect that Garner requested appointment of counsel.  After 
receiving an affidavit from Garner’s trial and appellate counsel, the Superior Court 
concluded that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit.  The 
Superior Court summarily dismissed Garner’s remaining claims as procedurally 
barred by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  This Court affirmed the 
Superior Court’s decision.3   
(4) 
On September 19, 2013, Garner filed his second motion for 
postconviction relief.  In this motion, Garner argued that he was deprived of 
counsel in his first postconviction proceeding and was therefore entitled to re-
                                                 
2 Garner v. State, 2001 WL 1006178 (Del. Aug. 7, 2001). 
3 Garner v. State, 2005 WL 3143435 (Del. Nov. 22, 2005). 
3 
 
litigate the ineffective assistance of counsel claims he had raised in 2004, with the 
assistance of counsel.  The Superior Court denied the motion on the grounds that it 
was untimely under Rule 61(i)(1),4 repetitive under Rule 61(i)(2),5 and 
procedurally defaulted under Rule 61(i))(3)6 and that Garner’s lack of counsel in 
his first postconviction proceeding did not constitute a miscarriage of justice under 
Rule 61(i)(5).7  This appeal followed.    
(5) 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for 
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.8  The procedural requirements of 
Rule 61 must be considered before addressing any substantive issues.9  In this 
appeal, Garner argues that he has overcome the procedural bars of Rule 61(i) 
because his lack of counsel in his first postconviction proceeding, which included 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, constituted a miscarriage of justice under 
                                                 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (barring motion filed more than three years after judgment of 
conviction is final) (amended in 2006 to reduce filing period to one year). 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (barring any ground for relief not asserted in prior postconviction 
proceeding). 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) (barring claim not raised in proceedings leading to conviction). 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that barred claims can be reviewed if there is colorable 
claim of miscarriage of justice due to constitutional violation that undermined fairness of 
proceedings). 
8 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
9 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
4 
 
Rule 61(i)(5).  In support of this argument, Garner relies on United States Supreme 
Court cases like Martinez v. Ryan10 and this Court’s decisions in cases like Holmes 
v. State11 to contend that he had a constitutional and statutory right to counsel in his 
first postconviction proceeding.  This reliance is misplaced.   
(6) 
First, none of the United States Supreme Court cases cited by Garner 
hold that indigent defendants have a constitutional right to appointment of counsel 
in postconviction proceedings.  Martinez, for example, holds that a lack of counsel 
or inadequate assistance of counsel during initial postconviction proceedings may 
establish cause for a defendant's procedural default of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel at trial in pursuing federal habeas corpus relief.12  Martinez 
does not hold that there is a federal constitutional right to counsel in first 
postconviction proceedings.13  To the extent Garner claims that he had a right to 
counsel in his first postconviction proceeding under the Delaware Constitution, his 
                                                 
10 ---U.S.---, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 182 L.E.2d 272 (2012). 
11 2013 WL 2297072 (Del. May 23, 2013). 
12 Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320. 
13 Id. at 1315 (“This is not the case, however, to resolve whether [an exception to the 
constitutional rule that there is no right to counsel in collateral proceedings] exists as a matter of 
constitutional law.”). 
5 
 
cursory references to the Delaware Constitution do not properly present that claim 
for review and that claim is therefore waived.14 
(7) 
Second, this Court did not hold in Holmes or subsequent cases that 
amendments to Rule 61(e)(1), which provided for appointment of counsel in an 
indigent defendant’s first postconviction proceeding, created a retroactive right to 
counsel for indigent defendants pursuing subsequent motions for postconviction 
relief.  In Holmes, we held that the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying 
Holmes' motion for the appointment of counsel to assist him in his first 
postconviction proceeding.15  We remanded for the appointment of counsel under 
the recently amended Rule 61(e)(1).16  This Court has held that the amendment to 
Rule 61(e)(1) was not retroactive.17  Given that this is Garner’s second 
postconviction motion, Holmes and the other cases that Garner relies upon are 
simply not applicable here.  We conclude therefore that the Superior Court did not 
                                                 
14 Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285, 290-91 (Del. 2005) (holding that proper presentation of alleged 
violation of Delaware Constitution requires more than conclusory reference to section of 
Delaware Constitution). 
15 2013 WL 2297072, at *1.   
16 Holmes, 2013 WL 2297072, at *1.  See also Stevens v. State, 2013 WL 4858987 (Del. Sept. 
10, 2013) (vacating denial of defendant’s first postconviction motion and remanding for 
appointment of counsel); Howard v. State, 2013 WL 3833335 (Del. July 19, 2013) (remanding 
denial of defendant’s first postconviction motion for appointment of counsel and 
reconsideration); Ayers v. State, 2013 WL 3270894 (Del. June 24, 2013) (same).   
17 Roten v. State, 2013 WL 5808236, at *1 (Del. Oct. 28, 2013). 
6 
 
err in finding that Garner’s second motion for postconviction relief was 
procedurally barred and that Garner failed to overcome the procedural hurdles.     
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice