Case Title: In re Children of Danielle H.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 134

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 134 
Docket: 
Aro-19-74 
Submitted 
On Briefs: July 18, 2019 
Decided: 
August 15, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILDREN OF DANIELLE H. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Danielle H. and Matthew T. appeal from a judgment entered by the 
District Court (Houlton, Larson, J.) finding by clear and convincing evidence that 
their four children were in circumstances of jeopardy as to each parent and that 
continued custody of the children by either parent was likely to cause them 
serious emotional or physical damage.  Each parent contends that (1) the court 
abused its discretion in relying on out-of-court statements made by the 
children; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s required 
factual findings under state and federal law; and (3) the evidence did not 
support the court’s dispositional order.  We address the parents’ contentions in 
turn and affirm the judgment. 
A. 
Indian Child Welfare Act 
 
[¶2]  As an initial matter, we note that the children, affiliated through 
their mother with the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians, are Indian children 
 
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within the meaning of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).  See 
25 U.S.C.S. § 1903(4) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-39); In re Child of 
Radience K., 2019 ME 73, ¶ 3 n.1, 208 A.3d 380.  Accordingly, the Department 
was required as a matter of Maine law to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the children were in circumstances of jeopardy as to each parent, 
22 M.R.S. § 4035(2) (2018), and required as a matter of federal law to further 
prove by clear and convincing evidence “that the continued custody of the 
child[ren] by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to the child[ren],” 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(e) 
(LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-39).  See In re Child of Radience K., 2019 ME 73, 
¶ 22, 208 A.3d 380; In re Denice F., 658 A.2d 1070, 1072 (Me. 1995) 
(recognizing that in a child protection case, “The state grounds . . . [are] 
unaffected by the ICWA [and] provide a supplemental degree of protection to 
parents facing a [child protection] petition . . . . A dual burden of proof—one 
federal, one state—thus exists in cases involving . . . an Indian child.”). 
 
[¶3]  Here the District Court made all of its factual findings by the higher 
standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence.  Furthermore, the court 
found, and the record demonstrates, that the Department and the Band worked 
together in a cooperative and collaborative way throughout this case, and that 
 
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the Band participated fully in the court proceedings.  Specifically, the Band’s 
ICWA director was involved in the Department’s management of the case from 
the outset; the court promptly granted the Band’s motion to intervene after the 
Department filed a child protection petition; the Band was represented by its 
independent counsel at the jeopardy hearing; and the children were placed 
with appropriate ICWA-compliant custodians.  Indicative of the Band’s integral 
role, we note that it joined in the Department’s written closing argument in the 
trial court and has adopted the brief filed by the Department in this appeal. 
B. 
Children’s Out-of-Court Statements 
 
[¶4]  Prior to the jeopardy hearing, the mother, joined by the father, 
moved in limine to exclude from evidence any hearsay statements by the 
children.  The court denied the motion and the children did not testify at the 
hearing.  As set out in section (C) of this opinion, the court relied on their 
out-of-court statements in making the factual findings that ultimately resulted 
in its jeopardy determination.  Each parent contends that the court’s reliance 
on the children’s hearsay statements violated their fundamental constitutional 
rights, including their right to due process.  See In re Child of Radience K., 
2019 ME 73, ¶ 20, 208 A.3d 380. 
 
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[¶5]  In child protection cases the Legislature has abrogated the rule of 
evidence that ordinarily renders hearsay inadmissible.  See M.R. Evid. 802 
(“Hearsay is not admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: . . . 
[a] statute.”).  By statute, “The court may admit and consider oral or written 
evidence of out-of-court statements made by a child, and may rely on that 
evidence to the extent of its probative value.”  22 M.R.S. § 4007(2) (2018).  See 
In re Paige L., 2017 ME 97, ¶ 30, 162 A.3d 217 (“Title 22 allows a court to admit 
child hearsay evidence in a jeopardy hearing . . . .”); In re Kayla S., 2001 ME 79, 
¶¶ 7-8, 772 A.2d 858 (“Section 4007 . . . abrogates the hearsay rule as it applies 
to out-of-court statements made by children . . . [and] provides for the 
admissibility of a child’s statement made outside of the court without the 
necessity of forcing the child to testify in the stressful environment of a 
contested hearing.”). 
 
[¶6]  Contrary to the parents’ assertions, although we recognize their 
“fundamental liberty interest to direct the care, custody, and control of their 
children,” Banks v. Leary, 2019 ME 89, ¶ 13, 209 A.3d 109 (quotation marks 
omitted), “[w]e have held that the introduction of evidence pursuant to 
22 M.R.S. § 4007(2) . . . does not violate due process,” In re M.B., 2013 ME 46, 
¶ 32, 65 A.3d 1260; see In re Robin T., 651 A.2d 337, 338 (Me. 1994). 
 
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[¶7]  Accordingly, whether to admit a child’s out-of-court statement lies 
within the trial court’s discretion.  See In re Kayla S., 2001 ME 79, ¶ 7, 
772 A.2d 858; In re Morris D., 2000 ME 122, ¶ 6, 754 A.2d 993.  We discern no 
abuse of that discretion on this record, where the parents had a full opportunity 
at the hearing to examine other witnesses concerning the children’s statements 
and corroborating evidence, in addition to testifying themselves concerning the 
events at issue—testimony that the court found was not credible. 
C. 
Sufficiency 
 
[¶8]  We next consider the parents’ contention that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the court’s findings by clear and convincing evidence 
that “[t]he children[] are in circumstances of jeopardy with respect to each 
parent,” and that “returning the children home is likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage.”  See supra section (A).  We review the court’s 
factual findings for clear error.  In re Children of Travis G., 2019 ME 20, ¶ 5, 
201 A.3d 1224.  “[A] court’s finding is clearly erroneous when there is no 
competent evidence in the record to support it.”  McMahon v. McMahon, 
2019 ME 11, ¶ 8, 200 A.3d 789 (quotation marks omitted).  “Additionally, when 
reviewing on appeal findings of fact that must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence, we determine whether the factfinder could reasonably 
 
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have been persuaded that the required factual finding was or was not proved 
to be highly probable.”  State v. Cookson, 2019 ME 30, ¶ 8, 204 A.3d 125 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶9]  The trial court’s factual findings, which are supported by the record, 
included the following: 
[T]he children were exposed to increased threats of physical harm 
and emotional maltreatment beginning in late February 2018. 
 
 
Based on the evidence presented, the court finds that on or 
about the evening of February 28, 2018, [the father] and [the 
mother] were home with all four (4) children and got into an 
argument.  [The father] called his mother . . . and asked her to come 
get him.  When [she] arrived, [the father] did not want her to enter 
the home.  [She] observed a broken window in the front door and 
noticed two (2) of the children crying.  [She] eventually left without 
her son.  Later that same evening, [the mother]’s mother . . . came 
to the house and took [the mother] and [the] children to her 
residence.  The next day, two (2) of the children reported this 
incident to school officials.  [The second-oldest child] told her 
teacher . . . that she was not going home today because mom and 
dad got into a fight and dad broke the windows in the home.  [The 
oldest child] told her teacher . . . that the previous evening her 
parents got into a fight and her father broke windows with a 
broom.  [She] also said that at one point her mother was on the floor 
and her father was on top choking her.  [She] was very scared and 
crying when she spoke to [her teacher] and thought her father 
might kill her mother.  [She] also said all of her siblings were 
present during the incident.  Later that week, [the Band’s ICWA 
director] met with [the mother] . . . to talk about available services.  
During the meeting, [she] observed [the mother] to be crying, red 
faced and overwhelmed.  [The mother] advised [the ICWA director] 
she would contact . . . the Band’s domestic violence program for 
assistance.  [The mother] also stated she would apply for a 
 
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protection order from the court.  [The mother] failed to follow 
through on any of these plans and soon thereafter reunited with 
[the father].  Both parents deny the February 28th incident 
involved domestic violence. . . . Based on the evidence presented 
and the parents’ presentation while testifying, the court does not 
find their versions credible. 
 
 
The court further finds that on or about May 8, 2018, [the 
oldest child] went to school with a bruise on her cheek.  [She] 
advised her teacher . . . that the previous day she had accidently hit 
[her sister] in the cheek while they were playing near a stake for 
their pool.  [She] went on to say that her mother accused her of 
hitting [her sister] on purpose and that her mother punched her on 
the cheek with a closed fist on behalf of [her sister].  [She] said her 
mother told her that if she told anyone, she would be in trouble.  
[She] was later interviewed by the Department’s caseworker . . . . 
This interview was recorded and in the presence of law 
enforcement.  [Her] statement to [the caseworker] was consistent 
with her statement to [her teacher].  Based on this evidence, the 
court finds [the oldest child]’s report of this incident credible.  [The 
mother] denied hitting the child and said [the oldest child] told her 
the injury occurred when she hit her head on a pool stake. . . . [The 
mother] was subsequently arrested and bailed on conditions she 
have no contact with all four of the children.  This bail remained in 
effect until August 31, 2018[,] when the criminal matter was 
resolved. 
 
 
The court further finds that prior to August 22, 2018, [the 
mother] had contact with [the third-oldest child] in violation of her 
bail conditions. . . . On August 22, 2018, [the child] was interviewed 
by [the] Department’s caseworker . . . and [the ICWA director].  
During this interview, [the child] stated his parents were arguing 
and his mother grabbed his father’s shirt.  [The child] went on to 
state that his father pushed him out of the way as mom tried to run 
over his father with a 4-wheeler . . . .  [The father] denied the 
incident when asked by [the caseworker].  [The mother] also 
denied the incident.  The court does not find the parents’ version of 
the incident to be credible. 
 
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The court further finds that while the aforementioned bail 
conditions were in effect, [the mother] had contact with the 
children on numerous occasions with the assistance and consent of 
[the father].  [The father]’s sister[, who was] the resource caregiver 
for [two of the children,] testified credibly that she saw [the 
mother] with the children on numerous occasions while the bail 
conditions [were] in effect.  [The father’s sister] testified this 
occurred at both [the father]’s trailer and the residence of [the 
father’s] uncle who lived a short distance from [the father’s 
mother].  Furthermore, on August 22, 2018, [the ICWA director] 
and [the caseworker] went to [the father’s mother]’s house to 
speak with the children about the 4-wheeler incident.  When they 
arrived, three (3) of the children . . . were present.  [The second-
oldest child] advised [the caseworker] and [the ICWA director] that 
[the youngest child] was visiting with their mother at [the father’s 
uncle’s residence].  [The oldest child] immediately denied such 
contact was occurring and put her hand over [her sister]’s mouth.  
[The father] then went to [his uncle]’s home and returned with [the 
youngest child].  Both parents acknowledged the children had 
incidental contact . . . while in the community, but denied any direct 
contact . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
[B]ased on the credible evidence presented in this matter, the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that returning the children 
to the custody of either parent most likely would cause them 
serious emotional or physical damage.  The children have been 
exposed to acts of violence by both parents which places them at 
risk of serious injury.  Furthermore, [the father] has deliberately 
disregarded court orders designed to prevent [the mother] from 
having contact with the children which on at least one (1) occasion 
placed [the third-oldest child] in direct significant risk of serious 
harm.  Additionally, neither parent has worked in cooperation with 
the Department or the Band to alleviate this risk and refuse to 
acknowledge the potential of serious consequences of their actions 
and inactions.  Based upon this record, the court finds the 
 
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Department and the Band would be unable to adequately supervise 
this family if custody of the children was returned to either 
parent[]. 
 
 
[¶10]  Based on these supported findings, the court “could reasonably 
have been persuaded that . . . [it] was . . . highly probable,” Cookson, 2019 ME 30, 
¶ 8, 204 A.3d 125 (quotation marks omitted), that the children were subject to 
“[s]erious harm or [a] threat of serious harm,” 22 M.R.S. § 4002(6)(A) (2018), 
and “serious emotional or physical damage,” 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(e), absent a 
child protection order.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4035(2). 
D. 
Dispositional Order 
 
[¶11]  Based on its jeopardy determination, the court entered a 
dispositional order pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4036 (2018) that, inter alia, granted 
custody of the children to the Department of Health and Human Services; 
continued the children’s ICWA-compliant kinship placements; and required the 
parents to comply with substance abuse conditions.  The parents’ challenge to 
the section 4036 dispositional order is interlocutory and not cognizable here.  
22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2018); In re Kaliyah B., 2017 ME 134, ¶ 1 & n.2, 166 A.3d 117. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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James M. Dunleavy, Esq., Currier & Trask, P.A., Presque Isle, for appellant 
mother 
 
Michele D.L. Kenney, Esq., Bloomer Russell Beaupain, Houlton, for appellant 
father 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Houlton District Court docket number PC-2018-7 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY