Case Title: Juanita Lynch, individually and through Buddy Lynch, as her attorney-in-fact v. Rebecca Lynch Hamrick

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1051820

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 04/13/2007
Lynch v. Hamrick
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1051820
____________________
Juanita Lynch, individually and through Buddy Lynch, as her
attorney-in-fact
v.
Rebecca Lynch Hamrick
Appeal from DeKalb Circuit Court 
(CV-04-356)
SEE, Justice.
Juanita Lynch ("Juanita"), individually and through her
son 
Buddy 
Lynch 
("Buddy"), 
as 
her 
attorney-in-fact
(collectively "the Lynches"), appeal the trial court's ruling
1051820
2
allowing an attorney who had previously represented Juanita to
testify in an action seeking to set aside a deed regarding
allegedly confidential communications.  We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
On August 30, 2004, Juanita executed a deed conveying a
40-acre tract of land to her daughter, Rebecca Lynch Hamrick,
the defendant below.  According to Hamrick's testimony,
Juanita asked Hamrick to take her to an attorney in Huntsville
so she could execute a new will and convey the land to
Hamrick.  Hamrick chose Julie Wills from a listing of
attorneys in the telephone book because the advertisement said
that Wills specialized in elder law.  
Wills met with Juanita and Hamrick together in her
office.  Wills, who testified at trial over the Lynches'
assertion of the attorney-client privilege, could not remember
whether she had spoken to Juanita alone at any point during
their meeting.  Hamrick, however, testified that Wills asked
her to leave the room during part of the consultation.  On the
stand, Wills explained that she was cautious in approaching
the representation because a potential beneficiary had brought
Juanita in to have a will drafted and to convey real property.
1051820
3
Wills testified that she believed that Juanita was competent
to execute the will and the deed, and she noted that Juanita's
testamentary scheme, including the deed, divided her estate
evenly between Hamrick and her brother, Buddy.  Further,
Hamrick gave Wills a document entitled "Chronology of Events,"
drafted by Hamrick, that showed that the rest of the real
property that Juanita had owned had previously been conveyed
to Buddy.  Wills later telephoned Juanita at her home, "so
[she] could talk to her when her daughter was nowhere around,
because [Wills] wanted to verify her desires and what she
wanted to do ... and that she wasn't being influenced by her
daughter or anyone else."  Satisfied that the disposition of
the estate and the real property was in accord with Juanita's
wishes, Wills prepared the instruments and scheduled a second
appointment.  
At the second meeting, Wills spoke with Juanita alone,
where "[she] confirmed again that she wanted to deed the
property to her daughter. [Juanita said that she had] given
other property to her son, and this is what she want[ed]."
Juanita executed and Wills notarized the warranty deed Wills
had prepared, and Hamrick's husband recorded it the next day.
1051820
Section 8-9-12, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
1
"Any conveyance of realty wherein a material
part of the consideration is the agreement of the
grantee to support the grantor during life is void
at the option of the grantor, except as to bona fide
purchasers for value, lienees, and mortgagees
without notice, if, during the life of the grantor,
he takes proceedings to annul such conveyance."
4
A few days later, Buddy learned that Juanita had conveyed
the 40-acre parcel of property to Hamrick.  Buddy testified
that, when he asked his mother about giving the land to
Hamrick, "[s]he told [him] that she didn't know that she had
done anything, that she didn't realize [she had done] that."
Buddy, as his mother's attorney-in-fact by virtue of a power
of attorney previously executed by his mother, sued to set
aside the deed, alleging that Hamrick "deceived and tricked"
his mother into executing the deed.  Juanita intervened in the
action in her own right.  Through her own attorney, Juanita
requested that the trial court set aside the deed pursuant to
§ 8-9-12, Ala. Code 1975, alleging that she was induced to
execute the deed based upon Hamrick's representations and
promises that she would care for Juanita during her lifetime.1
Juanita explained that Hamrick could not afford to care for
1051820
5
her and that she wanted the deed set aside so that she could
use the real property to support herself. 
Hamrick gave notice that she intended to depose Wills,
and the Lynches and Wills moved to quash the deposition on the
basis of the attorney-client privilege.  The trial court ruled
that the events surrounding the preparation and execution of
the deed were not privileged.  Although Wills's deposition was
never taken, she testified at trial, over the Lynches'
objection, to the conversations she had had with Juanita and
Hamrick in her office and with Juanita by telephone.  On
direct examination by Hamrick, Wills's testimony was limited
to her perceptions regarding Juanita's capacity to convey the
real property and whether the conveyance was voluntary. 
The Lynches' attorneys then cross-examined Wills.  The
Lynches had Wills read from her notes regarding the two
meetings and her telephone call to Juanita, and they
questioned Wills regarding Juanita's capacity to convey the
property and to execute the will.  They also asked Wills to
testify about the types of questions Wills had asked Juanita
and the advice Wills had given her.  At the Lynches' request,
Wills testified about communications she had had in private
1051820
Counsel filed a notice of appearance to represent Wills
2
in regard to the invocation of the attorney-client privilege.
6
with Juanita.  When the Lynches asked to see the "Chronology
of Events" Hamrick had prepared, Wills's counsel objected,2
and the Lynches' attorney stated: "We waive her privilege at
this point."  Later, the Lynches asked Wills about a
communication she had had with Juanita after the attorney then
representing Juanita contacted her requesting copies of the
instruments Juanita had signed.  Again, Wills asserted the
attorney-client privilege, and the Lynches' attorney said:
"We're still waiving."
The trial court declined to set aside the deed,
concluding that "the plaintiffs have failed to show that part
of the consideration for the conveyance was a promise of
support."  It also denied the Lynches' postjudgment motions.
The Lynches appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in
allowing Wills to testify.
Standard of Review
"'Whether a communication is privileged is a question of
fact to be determined by the trial court from the evidence
presented ....'"  Exxon Corp. v. Department of Conservation &
Natural Res., 859 So. 2d 1096, 1103 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex
1051820
7
parte DCH Reg'l Med. Ctr., 683 So. 2d 409, 412 (Ala. 1996)).
The burden is on the party asserting the attorney-client
privilege to establish the existence of an attorney-client
relationship as well as other facts demonstrating the claim of
privileged information.  Ex parte DCH Reg'l Med. Ctr., 683 So.
2d at 412.  We review a trial court's ruling on whether a
privilege exists to determine whether the trial court, in so
ruling, exceeded its discretion.  Exxon, 859 So. 2d at 1103.
Analysis
Hamrick argues that any communications Juanita had with
Wills in Hamrick's presence were not privileged and that
Juanita waived the privilege as it pertained to communications
between Juanita and Wills when Hamrick was not present.  We
agree.
Rule 502(b), Ala. R. Evid., provides, in pertinent part:
"A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent any other person from disclosing a
confidential communication made for the purpose of
facilitating the rendition of professional legal
services to the client, (1) between the client or a
representative of the client and the client's
attorney or a representative of the attorney ...."
The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, but it
may be asserted by the client's attorney on the client's
1051820
8
behalf.  Rule 502(c), Ala. R. Evid.  Further, Rule 1.6, Ala.
R. Prof. Cond., requires the attorney to assert the privilege
on the client's behalf, except (1) when the client gives his
or her consent to the disclosure, (2) to prevent the client
from committing a criminal act the attorney believes will
likely result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm, or
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the attorney
in certain circumstances.  Rule 510, Ala. R. Evid, provides
that the client may waive the privilege: "A person upon whom
these rules confer a privilege against disclosure waives the
privilege if the person ... voluntarily discloses or consents
to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged
matter."  See also Ex parte Great American Surplus Lines Ins.
Co., 540 So. 2d 1357, 1359 (Ala. 1989) (recognizing that the
attorney-client privilege may 
be 
waived 
by 
the client directly
or constructively and that waiver may be accomplished by
disclosing part of the communication). 
The Lynches first argue that, because "[Hamrick] was
interested 
in 
the 
subject 
matter 
of 
Ms. 
Wills'[s]
representation, i.e., the deed," the communications remained
privileged even when Hamrick was present.  The Lynches' brief
1051820
9
at 12.  The Lynches cite the following statement from
International 
Brotherhood 
of 
Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Hatas, 287 Ala. 344, 367,
252 So. 2d 7, 28 (1971):
"'[W]here two or more persons interested in the
same subject matter are present at a conference with
an attorney who represents only one of those
present, it has been held that matters discussed at
such conference are confidential as to strangers to
the conference and accordingly they constitute
privileged communications as to such strangers.'"
(Quoting 141 A.L.R. at 562.) In Hatas, the plaintiff in a
wrongful-death action attempted to question Partin, a named
defendant, about a conversation Partin had had with an
attorney named Beddow in the presence of a third party, Miss
Kelly, who accompanied Partin.  The Teamsters Union, another
named defendant, argued that Beddow was not Partin's attorney
and, therefore, that any statements Partin made to Beddow were
not protected by the attorney-client privilege.  The Court
held, however, that "Partin and Miss Kelly were both
interested in a legal sense in the subject matter discussed at
the conference with Mr. Beddow, Jr."  Hatas, 287 Ala. at 367,
252 So. 2d at 28.  It is not clear from the opinion what
interest Partin and Kelly shared.
1051820
10
In Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 646 So. 2d 661 (Ala. 1994),
however, 
this 
Court 
discussed the application of the 
exception
stated in Hatas to facts similar to this case.  F.W. Crenshaw
was in the hospital when his attorney, Elisha C. Poole, and
Poole's secretary, Barbara Ellison, visited him so he could
execute three real-estate deeds.  F.W.'s son, Fred Crenshaw,
and daughter, Betty Crenshaw Henricks, were also present.
Fred alleged that F.W. said at this meeting that he was giving
his house and all the property inside it to Fred.  F.W. deeded
the house to Fred, but F.W.'s will divided all of his personal
property equally among his three children.  When the executor
attempted to divide the personal property that was inside the
house, Fred claimed it all as part of the gift from his
father.  The trial court did not allow the attorney or his
secretary 
to 
testify, 
citing 
attorney-client 
privilege. 
 
After
first noting that there was no indication that Poole
represented either Fred or Betty, this Court held:
"Betty and Fred did not have a sufficient common
legal interest in the subject matter discussed in
the 
decedent's 
hospital 
room 
to 
make 
the
attorney-client privilege applicable. In fact, the
interests of Betty and Fred could be considered
adverse to each other, or to those of the decedent."
1051820
11
Crenshaw, 646 So. 2d at 663.  The presence of F.W.'s two
children served to waive the attorney-client privilege because
"'the presence of such third party defeats the confidential
nature of the conference and thereby the privilege.'"
Crenshaw, 646 So. 2d at 662 (quoting Hatas, 287 Ala. at 366,
252 So. 2d at 27).   
Similarly, in this case, Hamrick did not have "a
sufficient common legal interest in the subject matter" of the
representation. Crenshaw, 646 So. 2d at 663.  The Lynches
claimed that Juanita gave Hamrick the property in exchange for
a promise to support her, a promise Hamrick denies having
made.  The Lynches also argued to the trial court that one of
the reasons they wanted the deed set aside was that
transferring the property had consequences on Juanita's
eligibility for Medicaid benefits.  The Lynches pointed out
that the value of the property could be considered in
calculating Juanita's assets if she applied for benefits
within a certain time after such a transfer. These allegations
demonstrate that Juanita's and Hamrick's interests were not
sufficiently 
aligned 
to 
preserve 
the 
attorney-client 
privilege
because Hamrick's interests in having her mother transfer the
1051820
12
property were adverse to her mother's interests in retaining
it.   
Next, the Lynches argue that Hamrick's "presence was
necessary at the meeting because [Hamrick] set the meeting and
drove plaintiff Juanita Lynch there."  The Lynches' brief at
12.  However, there is no evidence indicating that Hamrick's
presence in the meeting was necessary for Wills to prepare
Juanita's will and the deed.  Wills testified that she
addressed her questions to Juanita and that "[she] got
[Juanita] to explain things to [her] and talk to [her]."
Wills stated that "[w]hen [she] deals with older people [she]
gets them to give [her] the information."  Wills explained
that Juanita appeared competent and appeared to know what she
wanted to have done in regard to the disposition of her
property.  Further, after the will and the deed had been
drafted, Juanita drove herself to Huntsville to execute those
instruments.  The burden is on the party asserting the
attorney-client privilege to show that the presence of a third
party did not destroy the privilege.  Ex parte DCH Reg'l Med.
Ctr., 683 So. 2d at 412.  The record demonstrates that the
evidence regarding Juanita's mental and physical capacities
1051820
13
was in conflict.  Therefore, the trial court was within its
discretion in concluding that Hamrick was an unnecessary third
party at the meeting between Juanita and Wills.
Further, we may affirm the judgment of the trial court if
it is right for any reason, and there is an alternative ground
on which the trial court could have allowed Wills to testify.
Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Milam & Co. Constr., Inc., 901 So. 2d
84, 104 (Ala. 2004) ("[A]n appellate court [may] affirm a
summary judgment on the basis of a law or legal principle not
invoked by the moving party or the trial court ....").
Wills's testimony on direct examination was limited to the
facts that Juanita signed the deed voluntarily, that there was
no trickery or deceit used to obtain her signature, and that
Juanita appeared coherent and able to understand the contents
and the effect of the instrument.  Hamrick correctly points
out that, under Rule 502(d)(4), Ala. R. Evid., there is no
privilege "[a]s to a communication relevant to an issue
concerning the intention or competence of a client executing
an attested document to which the attorney is an attesting
witness, or concerning the execution or attestation of such a
document."  Wills was the attesting witness to the deed, and
1051820
14
she could thus "divulge information received in the attorney's
capacity as an attesting witness."  Advisory Committee's Note
to Rule 502, Ala. R. Evid.  Wills's testimony on direct
examination was largely limited to information regarding
Juanita's intentions and information that Wills had gained in
her capacity as the attesting witness, and it did not contain
privileged information.
It was only in response to the cross-examination by the
Lynches 
that 
Wills 
produced information regarding the
representation that could be regarded as learned in her
capacity as an attorney.  Further, although the Lynches now
argue that the trial court erred in allowing Wills to testify
regarding private conversations between Wills and Juanita, it
was the Lynches, not Hamrick, who elicited such testimony
regarding these private conversations.  The Lynches asked
Wills to read the notes she took at each of her meetings with
Juanita.  The attorney representing Juanita in this action
asked Wills: "Since [the first consultation] was a thirty-
minute meeting, why don't you just shortly, briefly, go over
your notes for us.  Why don't you just read from them."  The
Lynches also asked Wills to read her notes from the private
1051820
15
telephone call Wills made to Juanita after the first meeting,
as well as her notes made after the second meeting.  According
to the Lynches, each of these consultations contained
privileged communications.
Further, the Lynches asked Wills about her conclusions
regarding Juanita's competency and how she came to those
conclusions.  The Lynches asked Wills: "[W]hat kind of
questions did you ask Mrs. Lynch? ... Did you ever ask her
about her memory?"  The Lynches then questioned Wills about
how she concluded that Juanita was of "sound mind."  They also
asked Wills: "Ms. Wills, was there anything to suggest that
Mrs. Lynch was either under duress or that she was somehow
coerced into making this deed or meeting with you?"  The
Lynches thus elicited the same information regarding Juanita's
competency with greater detail than had Hamrick in her direct
examination of Wills. 
By inquiring into the substance of what were otherwise
confidential 
and 
privileged 
communications 
between 
Juanita 
and
Wills, Juanita waived the attorney-client privilege.  See Rule
510, Ala. R. Evid ("A person upon whom these rules confer a
privilege against disclosure waives the privilege if the
1051820
16
person ... voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of
any significant part of the privileged matter."); Ex parte
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 794 So. 2d 368,  374 (Ala. 2001)
("'The principle that the attorney-client privilege is
implicitly waived when a party puts an attorney-client
communication at issue in a case is well accepted in American
jurisprudence.'" (quoting Mortgage Guar. 
& 
Title 
Co. v. Cunha,
745 A.2d 156, 159 (R.I. 2000))); Ex parte Great American
Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 540 So. 2d at 1359 (holding that the
partial disclosure of a privileged communication waives the
attorney-client privilege); Free v. State, 455 So. 2d 137, 142
(Ala. Crim. App. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by McKinney
v. State, 511 So. 2d 220 (Ala. 1987) ("Since the appellant's
counsel initiated the inquiry into the appellant's sanity,
appellant waived any privilege of confidentiality he may
otherwise have had.").
Finally, the Lynches, in separate instances, expressly
waived the protections of the attorney-client privilege.  When
she was asked to present the "Chronology of Events," Wills's
counsel objected, and the Lynches stated: "We waive her
privilege at this point."  Later, the Lynches asked Wills
1051820
17
about a communication Wills had had with Juanita after she was
contacted by the attorney then representing Juanita.  Again,
Wills asserted the attorney-client privilege, and the Lynches
said: "We're still waiving."  
For these reasons, it does not appear that the trial
court exceeded its discretion in allowing Wills to testify
regarding her representation of Juanita. 
Conclusion
The Lynches have failed to establish that the protections
of the attorney-client privilege apply in this case.  The
trial court acted within its discretion when it allowed Wills
to testify regarding Juanita's intentions and her capacity to
execute the warranty deed in Hamrick's favor.  Further, by
their cross-examination of Wills regarding the confidential
communications she had had with Juanita, the Lynches waived
any error the trial court may have otherwise committed in
permitting Wills to testify.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.