Case Title: Newman v. Fjelstad

Citation: 137 N.W.2d 181

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1965-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
137 N.W.2d 181 (1965) Shirley NEWMAN, substituted in place of Shirley Kaiser, a minor, by Herbert Kaiser, as father and natural guardian, Respondent, v. Orren C. FJELSTAD, Appellant. No. 39535. Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 9, 1965. *182 Hoppe & Healy, Minneapolis, for appellant. Sigal, Savelkoul, Cohen & Sween, and Raul O. Salazar, Minneapolis, for respondent. NELSON, Justice. This appeal by defendant, Orren C. Fjelstad, is taken from a district court order which annulled, vacated, and set aside a prior order approving a minor settlement on September 30, 1946. This case arose out of an automobile accident occurring on July 20, 1945. Shirley Kaiser, then a minor 7 years of age, was struck by an automobile owned and driven by defendant. The accident happened at the intersection of 37th Street and Lyndale Avenue South in Minneapolis while said minor was crossing 37th Street as a pedestrian. The action was commenced by Shirley Kaiser, a minor, by Herbert Kaiser as father and natural guardian, a summons and complaint and note of issue being filed therein on September 24, 1945. A petition for approval of minor's settlement was filed September 30, 1946, together with a medical affidavit by Dr. Lloyd A. Whitesell, which read as follows: The order approving settlement for minor's personal injuries, dated September 30, 1946, included the following: This was accompanied by a stipulation of dismissal also dated September 30, 1946, and signed by attorneys for both parties. *183 Plaintiff suffered no repercussions from the injury until 1953, seven years after the settlement was effected. She was then 14 years of age. Surgery was performed on her left thigh and plaintiff was relieved of further difficulty until 1962. She married Frank Newman on September 6, 1958, and became 21 years of age on April 23, 1959. In 1962 plaintiff began to notice pains in her left leg. X rays were taken but these revealed nothing. In April 1963 plaintiff again encountered pain in her left leg but this again vanished. Later, in July and August 1963 plaintiff encountered sharp pains in her left leg and upon advice of her doctor entered the hospital. Her difficulty was then diagnosed as chronic osteomyelitis. Plaintiff was released August 17, 1963, but on October 18, 1963, she entered another hospital and underwent an operation for chronic osteomyelitis. On March 19, 1964, Herbert Kaiser, as father and guardian of Shirley Kaiser, now Mrs. Newman, moved the court for an order vacating and setting aside the order approving the minor settlement. It should be pointed out that this motion was made some 18 years after the settlement was effected. It will also be noted that at the time the parties moved for vacation of the order Mrs. Newman was about to reach the age of 26 years. Thus the motion was not made until approximately 5 years after she reached the age of 21. The motion was supported by two affidavits by doctors, one by Dr. Whitesell, which states: The other affidavit was by Dr. Kenath H. Sponsel, an orthopedic surgeon. It refers to his having twice performed surgery on Mrs. Newman for her osteomyelitis condition in her left thigh on August 14, 1963, at Swedish Hospital and on October 18, 1963, at St. Barnabas Hospital, and of his having continued periodic observation and treatment until the date of his affidavit, March 18, 1964. He expresses the opinion that the osteomyelitis condition was directly related to the accident occurring on July 20, 1945. Dr. Sponsel also stated that The motion to set aside and vacate the order approving the minor settlement was also supported by an affidavit by Mrs. Newman and one by her attorney. The order of the district court granting the motion also reinstated the action upon the trial calendar for trial by jury. The question involved on this appeal is whether a court order approving a minor settlement can be annulled, vacated, and set aside on the grounds of claimed mutual mistake 18 years after the order of approval and 5 years after the statute of limitations would have ordinarily run against the minor. Was the motion timely when brought 11 years after the actual condition had been discovered? Another question seems to arise as to whether the osteomyelitis was a consequence of a known injury to the left thigh occurring July 20, 1945. 1. It is recognized that this court on many occasions has approved vacation of settlements of claims entered into on behalf of minors. A recent case is Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 263 Minn. 346, 352, 116 N.W.2d 704, 709, where this court said: We have in certain cases approved orders vacating settlement when separate and distinct injuries were overlooked at the time of compromise on the theory that a mutual mistake induced such settlement. McGovern v. Lutz, 242 Minn. 397, 65 N.W.2d 637; Larson v. Stowe, 228 Minn. 216, 36 N.W.2d 601, 8 A.L.R.2d 455; Richardson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 157 Minn. 474, 196 N.W. 643. 2. In Richardson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. supra, this court held that a release of damages for injuries sustained in an accident may be set aside on the ground of mutual mistake where it clearly appears that a substantial injury, not discovered until after the settlement, had in fact been sustained in the accident and existed at the time of settlement. But the court also held in that case that such a release cannot be set aside on the ground that known injuries resulted in consequences not known and not expected when it was made and that the parties are presumed to have intended to settle all claims growing out of the injuries whether the aftereffects proved to be more or less serious than anticipated. In the Richardson case it was contended that the shock from the accident involved was a contributing cause in bringing on a disease called chronic interstitial nephritis and that this aftereffect of the injuries was not known when a settlement was made. This court said (157 Minn. 478, 196 N.W. 644): The rule that a release of all claims for known injuries bars recovery for the unknown consequences of known injuries was *185 reiterated by this court in Doud v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 259 Minn. 341, 107 N.W.2d 521. Based upon the record in the instant case we think it clear that the condition of osteomyelitis was at best an unknown consequence of a known injury at the time the minor settlement was entered into on September 30, 1946, and as such that development is not sufficient to warrant setting aside the settlement on the ground of mutual mistake. See, Aronovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 56 N.W.2d 570, 34 A.L.R.2d 1306. The court indicated in the Doud case, where vacation of a settlement was affirmed, that the injury which was not discovered until after the settlement must in fact have been sustained at the time of the accident and have existed at the time of the settlement. In the instant case we think it clear that osteomyelitis did not actually develop until after the settlement. In fact there were no signs of its development until 7 years later according to the record. In the case of Spaulding v. Zimmerman, supra, a 20-year-old minor was injured in an accident and commenced an action to recover for injuries sustained, which action was settled and a release executed. About 2 years later it was discovered that an aneurysm was present requiring surgery. Plaintiff, being then in his majority, brought an action to vacate the settlement. This was granted by the trial court and upon appeal this court affirmed. However, it appears that in that case the defense was aware at the time of the settlement that plaintiff had an aneurysm and that this awareness was kept from plaintiff and his attorney. In the instant case, on the other hand, there is no indication that osteomyelitis was present either shortly after the accident or at the time of settlement. 3. Rule 60.02, Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: Mr. Chief Justice Dell in the case of Sommers v. Thomas, 251 Minn. 461, 466, 88 N.W.2d 191, 195, involving the vacation of a default judgment under this rule, said: This court stated in Spaulding v. Zimmerman, supra, that in that case the trial court did not abuse its discretion in vacating its order for settlement under Rule 60.02(6). We have already referred to the situation in the Spaulding case as one where concealment of certain facts rendered the stipulation of settlement vulnerable, the plaintiff and his counsel having been denied knowledge of certain facts that they were entitled to consider at the time of settlement. This court in the Spaulding case *186 did not attempt to explain why clause (1) was not applicable. It merely said that under the circumstances the trial court had not abused its discretion when it vacated the stipulation under clause (6). It is defendant's contention herein that the vacation of the settlement is based on mistake and therefore comes within clause (1) and must be brought within one year from time of settlement. The trial court, however, indicated in its memorandum that clause (6) was applicable and therefore the one-year limitation did not apply. The interpretation given by this court to Rule 60.02 in the Sommers case is in line with that given to Federal Rule 60(b), which is almost identical to our rule. In 7 Moore, Federal Practice (2 ed.) par. 60.27, pp. 300, 301, 306, it is stated: Counsel for defendant does not assert that this case possesses extraordinary circumstances which might take it out of clause (1) to bring it within clause (6). We are not aware of any such circumstances. Assuming that for some reason the instant case were to be taken out from under clause (1) and placed within clause (6), we would then be confronted with the question of whether the motion was made within a reasonable time. In making that determination Professor Moore states (7 Moore, Federal Practice [2 ed.] par. 60.27, p. 312): In the instant case surgery was performed on plaintiff's left leg when she was 14 years of age7 years after the settlement was effected. This was the first time that the existence of osteomyelitis had become known. It is fair to assume that at that time plaintiff's parents were fully informed by their doctor that osteomyelitis was then found to be present in their daughter's leg. It must have been plain to them that it had developed in the same area as the fractured femur. They appear to indicate that they did not realize that the settlement could be vacated. Under all the circumstances it would strongly appear that defendant is justified in claiming that plaintiff is prevented from vacating the settlement and reviving the action. Her father and natural guardian made no attempt to vacate the settlement during a 7-year yeriod following the operation of 1953 which disclosed the existence of osteomyelitis. Certainly any motion under Rule 60.02(6) is subject to the requirement that it must be made within a "reasonable time." *187 We must therefore conclude from the record presented that the right to move for a vacation of the minor's settlement is barred on both grounds set forth herein. Reversed.