Case Title: State ex rel. Bishop v. Waterbeds N Stuff, Inc.

Citation: 2002-Ohio-62

Docket Number: 20002235

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Bishop v. Waterbeds ’N’ Stuff, Inc., 94 Ohio St.3d 105, 2002-Ohio-62.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. BISHOP, APPELLEE, v. WATERBEDS ’N’ STUFF, INC., 
APPELLANT; INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Bishop v. Waterbeds ’N’ Stuff, Inc. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 
105.] 
Workers’ compensation — Alleged violation of a specific safety requirement — 
Court of appeals’ judgment that violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-
02(D)(1) occurred reversed, when. 
(No. 00-2235 — Submitted October 2, 2001 — Decided January 16, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 00AP-98. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellee-claimant Steven A. Bishop worked in the 
warehouse of appellant Waterbeds ’N’ Stuff, Inc. (“WBS”).  One of his regular 
tasks was to help unload incoming trucks.  Some days, these trucks contained 
boxes of C-bunks, a metal futon/upper bunk combination.  Each box was 
approximately six and a half feet long, four feet wide, and seven inches deep.  
Each box weighed one hundred thirty-two pounds. 
 
Ideally, a picker forklift was used to transport the boxes from the truck to 
the shelving where they were stored.  The forks of the picker were almost eight 
feet long, enabling it to carry the four-by-eight-foot skid on which the C-bunks 
were placed. 
 
After the skid was loaded, the forklift moved the skid and boxes to a 
storage area.  Sometimes the shelving in this area was elevated.  When that was 
the case, there were apparently only two ways for an employee to reach the 
appropriate shelf—either climb the shelf’s cross-bracing or ride up on the skid as 
it was being elevated.  From that point, the employee would essentially muscle 
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2 
the boxes from the skid to the shelf.  Occasionally, that would force the worker to 
step onto the raised skid. 
 
On September 29, 1997, the picker forklift was needed elsewhere.  
Claimant’s foreman, Lonnie Lawless, instructed claimant and coworker Irvin P. 
“Bo” Diles, Jr., to use the Yale forklift instead.  The Yale forklift had forty-two-
inch-long forks—not even half the size of the C-bunk skid.  Concerned about the 
load’s center of gravity, Lawless instructed the men “not [to] stand any further 
than the forks will support.” 
 
On one of the trips, Diles took his turn operating the forklift.  Claimant 
climbed the cross-bracing to the second shelf, approximately eight feet above the 
ground.  Diles then raised the skid to claimant’s level.  When claimant attempted 
to pull the first box onto the shelf, he stepped on the unsupported end of the skid.  
Claimant’s weight caused the skid to break, sending claimant, the skid, and three 
C-bunk boxes to the floor.  Claimant was severely injured as a result. 
 
After his workers’ compensation claim was allowed, claimant moved the 
Industrial Commission of Ohio for additional compensation, alleging that WBS 
had violated several specific safety requirements (“VSSR”). 
 
A staff hearing officer denied the application: 
 
“[Ohio Adm.Code] 4121:1-5-02(D)(1)(a) provides: 
 
“ ‘(D)  Elevated platforms, runways and walkways. 
 
“ ‘(1)  Guarding. 
 
“ ‘(a)  Elevated platforms * * * six feet or more above floor or ground 
level shall be guarded with standard railings and toeboards. * * *’ 
 
“4121:1-5-01(B)(96) defines platforms as ‘A working space for employees 
elevated above the surrounding floor or ground.’  * * * It is clear that the hazard 
this section guards against has to do with permanent and semi-permanent 
structures used by workers, and does not apply to a temporary pallet or skid on a 
January Term, 2002 
3 
forklift truck.  The Staff Hearing Officer finds that this section does not apply to 
the facts of this case. 
 
“* * * 
 
“4121:1-5-13(F)(4)(a) states: 
 
“ ‘(4)  Lifting of personnel. 
 
“ ‘Lift trucks equipped with vertical only, or vertical and horizontal travel 
controls using a lifting carriage or forks for lifting of personnel shall: 
 
“ ‘(a)  Have a platform with standard guardrails, intermediate rail, and 
toeboards, and a mast guard seventy-two inches in height, all securely fastened to 
the lifting carriage or forks’; 
 
“The purpose of the picker skid or pallet at issue here was not the routine 
lifting of personnel.  In fact, the only evidence available (since claimant was not 
present, and in any event does not remember the day of the injury), is the affidavit 
of Mr. Diles.  Mr. Diles states that before claimant’s injury, he had climbed up the 
side of the shelving unit to meet the raised forklift load.  Thus, there is no 
relationship between this code section and the facts of this claim.  This section 
does not apply.  Claimant was not raised up with the load, he met the load at the 
shelving.  The proximate cause of claimant’s injury is not related to this code 
section.” 
 
Rehearing was denied. 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in denying a 
VSSR.  The court of appeals found that the commission abused its discretion in 
distinguishing between temporary and permanent structures for purposes of Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-5-02(D)(1)(a).  It then determined that the skid was indeed a 
“platform” and ordered the commission to reconsider the claimed violation.  It did 
not mention Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-13(F)(4)(a). 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
The first task in this litigation is to clarify the issues before us.  The parties 
proceed as if both Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-02(D)(1)(a) and 4121:1-5-
13(F)(4)(a) are in contention.  This is not, however, the case. 
 
The commission found that neither specific safety requirement applied.  
Claimant challenged both findings in mandamus in the court of appeals.  The 
magistrate focused almost exclusively on Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-02(D)(1)(a).  
She made a passing reference to Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-13(F)(4)(a), stating, 
“If the employer was actually using the forklift/skid as a personnel-lifting device, 
then it must comply with the safety rules for a personnel-lifting device.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
This statement misses a key fact:  the commission had already determined 
that the forklift/skid was not being used as a personnel-lifting device.  And neither 
the magistrate nor the court of appeals found that conclusion to be an abuse of 
discretion.  The court of appeals issued its mandamus as to Ohio Adm.Code 
4121:1-5-02(D)(1)(a) only, with no mention in either its opinion or judgment 
entry of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-13(F)(4)(a). 
 
Thus, either inadvertently or not, the commission’s finding that Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-5-13(F)(4)(a) is inapplicable has not been disturbed by the 
court of appeals.  Since claimant has not appealed the judgment below, the 
determination of no violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-13(F)(4)(a) is res 
judicata.  Accordingly, the sole issue before us is compliance with Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-5-02(D)(1)(a). 
 
That section provides: 
 
“(D)  Elevated platforms, runways and walkways. 
 
“This rule does not apply to scaffolding. 
 
“(1)  Guarding. 
 
“(a)  Elevated platforms, runways and walkways six feet or more above 
floor or ground level shall be guarded with standard railing and toeboards.” 
January Term, 2002 
5 
 
Controversy centers on whether the skid constituted a platform.  The 
commission never made that determination.  It merely said that the section did not 
apply to temporary apparatuses, such as the skid-forklift setup. 
 
The court of appeals correctly invalidated that reasoning, stressing that 
this specific safety requirement made no distinction between temporary and 
permanent.  This is a sound determination.  An employer cannot evade this 
specific safety requirement by claiming that the equipment was only temporarily 
in use or, as here, temporarily jury-rigged for some purpose. 
 
The court of appeals then went one step further and ruled that the skid was 
indeed a platform as defined by Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-01(B)(96).  WBS 
objects, and we find that objection to be well taken. The interpretation of a 
specific safety requirement or, as here, a definition contained therein, rests 
exclusively with the commission.  State ex rel. Berry v. Indus. Comm. (1983), 4 
Ohio St.3d 193, 4 OBR 513, 448 N.E.2d 134.  WBS, however, in anticipating a 
possible writ to the commission ordering further consideration of this definitional 
question, does not rest.  It challenges the propriety of a writ ordering 
reconsideration, asserting that even if the skid were a platform, there is no 
evidence that guardrails or toeboards would have prevented the accident or 
lessened the injury’s severity. 
 
WBS has a persuasive argument.  The commission found that the accident 
occurred because the elevated skid broke under claimant’s weight.  Claimant’s 
counsel proposes that had there been a guardrail, perhaps claimant could have 
held onto the broken pallet as he fell to the ground.  That speculation does not go 
to the issue of accident prevention and does not explain how that possibility 
would have protected claimant from the impact of the fall or from the pallets that 
crashed down on him thereafter. 
 
The only evidence on point is the testimony of supervisor Lawless: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
“Q.  [WBS Attorney]  There’s evidence in the record indicating that from 
the affidavit of Bo Diles that when Steven Bishop stood on the unsupported part 
of the skid, the skid immediately broke and he fell to the ground.  Assuming that 
is how this accident happened, Lonnie, if this skid had had a toeboard around the 
perimeter of it, would that have kept this accident from happening at all? 
 
“A. [Lawless]  Not at all.  Not at all. 
 
“Q.  If this skid had had guardrails around it, given the way the skid broke 
as you understand this accident, would that have kept this accident from 
happening? 
 
“A.  No.  It would have drug [sic] him right off.” 
 
The absence of any evidence of proximate causation negates the need for 
any further consideration on either the commission’s part or ours.  The 
commission’s denial of an award for violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-
02(D)(1)(a) was correct, albeit for reasons other than those given in its order. 
 
Accordingly, the court of appeals’ judgment that a violation of that 
specific safety requirement occurred and its issuance of a writ are reversed. 
Judgment  reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents. 
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Wiles, Boyle, Burkholder & Bringardner Co., L.P.A., Thomas E. Boyle 
and Mark C. Melko, for appellant. 
 
Stanley R. Jurus Law Office and John R. Workman, for appellee. 
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