Case Title: Sulikowski v. Sulikowski

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 143

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-09-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 143 
Docket: 
Yor-19-57 
Submitted 
On Briefs: June 26, 2019 
Decided: 
September 10, 2019 
Revised: 
March 31, 2020 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
JAMES A. SULIKOWSKI 
 
v. 
 
SANDRA L. SULIKOWSKI 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
 
[¶1]  James A. Sulikowski and Sandra L. Sulikowski each appeal from an 
order modifying child support and spousal support entered in the District Court 
(Biddeford, Cantara, J.), each asserting that the court erred in determining the 
parties’ incomes, modifying the child and spousal support orders, and denying 
his or her request for attorney fees.  We discern no error except in the court’s 
calculation of the child support obligation, vacate and remand the child support 
order to be corrected by the court, and affirm the judgment in all other respects.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  Viewed in the light most favorable to the court’s judgment, the 
record supports the following facts.  McBride v. Worth, 2018 ME 54, ¶ 2, 184 
 
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A.3d 14.  The parties were married in 2000 and divorced in 2014; they have 
three young children.  In the divorce judgment, the court (Biddeford, 
Douglas, J.) found that James’s income was $98,500 and imputed income to 
Sandra of $38,000.  The divorce judgment also established shared parental 
rights and responsibilities and shared primary residence, and ordered James to 
pay child support and spousal support.1   
 
[¶3]  On November 1, 2016, Sandra filed a motion to modify child 
support, alleging that James’s income had increased substantially since the 
divorce.  On February 2, 2018, James filed a motion to terminate spousal 
support, alleging that Sandra had experienced a substantial change in 
circumstances in that (1) her income had increased substantially and (2) she 
had been cohabitating in a mutually supportive relationship functionally 
equivalent to marriage for twelve of the previous eighteen months.  See 19-A 
M.R.S. § 951-A(12)(2018).  The motions were considered at a consolidated 
hearing on December 20 and 21, 2018.   
 
[¶4]  At the hearing on the motions, the court heard testimony from 
Sandra, Sandra’s partner, Sandra’s accountant, James, and James’s expert 
                                         
1  The judgment also required the parties to share certain healthcare expenses, including 
orthodontic expenses, with James paying 72% and Sandra paying 28%.   
 
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witness—a forensic accountant.  Sandra testified that her income in each of the 
prior several years was between $32,483 and $47,713, and that a recent injury 
had diminished her earning capacity.  Applying certain accounting techniques 
and assumptions to various bank statements and profit-loss data from Sandra’s 
businesses, the forensic accountant estimated that Sandra’s annual income 
likely ranged from $113,174 to $144,501 in the same time period.  The court 
also heard testimony from James and the forensic accountant that James’s 
income, which consists of a base salary and additional income from grants and 
consulting services, varies from year to year but averaged $120,247 per year 
from 2014 to 2017.   
 
[¶5]  The court found that Sandra’s gross annual income is $76,000, 
“twice the income imputed to her at the time of the divorce.”  In addition, the 
court found that Sandra “routinely” underreported her overall income, did not 
report income from one of her businesses “with any degree of accounting 
accuracy,” and kept records that were “astonishingly and conspicuously lacking 
in accuracy and reliability.”  The court found that James’s income is $120,247, 
and denied James’s request to terminate spousal support, but reduced his 
obligation by half, finding that the evidence “falls far short of establishing” that 
 
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Sandra was in a relationship similar to marriage and that an equitable need for 
general spousal support persisted.2  See 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A (2018).   
 
[¶6]  Regarding child support, the court mistakenly calculated James’s 
child support obligation using the figures for two children, instead of three, 
from the child support table promulgated by the Department of Health and 
Human Services.  See 10-144 C.M.R. ch. 351, ch. 6, § 2 (effective July 29, 2016).  
Although the court’s child support order correctly indicated that sixty-one 
percent of the children’s medical expenses would be allocated to James and 
thirty-nine percent to Sandra, based on their relative incomes, see 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 2006(4) (2018), the supplemental worksheet attached to that order allocated 
fifty-one percent of these expenses to James and forty-nine percent to Sandra.   
 
[¶7]  From these factual findings, the court (1) modified James’s child 
support obligation; (2) reduced, but did not terminate, James’s spousal support 
obligation and ordered Sandra to repay James $3,750 for his overpayment of 
spousal support; (3) denied attorney fees to each side; and (4) maintained the 
other provisions of the underlying divorce judgment.   
                                         
2  The court found that James’s “gross income is now $120,000,” but also found that “for the 
calculation of child support” James’s gross income is $120,247.  Because the child support worksheet 
included the $120,247 figure, to the extent the court’s use of the $120,000 figure in determining the 
spousal support award was in error, as opposed to merely a rounding of the amount to the nearest 
thousand, that error was in James’s favor and is therefore harmless as to his appeal.  M.R. Civ. P. 61.   
 
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[¶8]  Following the entry of judgment, both parties timely filed motions 
for further findings and reconsideration.  M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), 59(e).  The court 
denied both motions and both parties now appeal.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Motions to Modify  
 
[¶9]  James and Sandra both assert that the court made insufficient 
findings to support its conclusions about their incomes and abused its 
discretion when it modified the spousal support order.  We review 
modifications to spousal support for an abuse of discretion and a trial court’s 
factual findings regarding substantial changes in circumstances and the parties’ 
incomes for clear error.  Ehret v. Ehret, 2016 ME 43, ¶ 14, 135 A.3d 101; Ellis v. 
Ellis, 2008 ME 191, ¶ 15, 962 A.2d 328.  In a clear error review, we will vacate 
a factual finding only if there is no competent evidence in the record to support 
it, Ehret, 2016 ME 43, ¶ 14, 135 A.3d 101, and will not vacate a judgment simply 
because the evidence could have supported an alternative finding, Gordon v. 
Cheskin, 2013 ME 113, ¶ 12, 82 A.3d 1221.   
 
[¶10]  In making factual findings, the court must consider all properly 
admitted evidence and then apply its independent judgment to that evidence in 
reaching its findings and conclusions.  Klein v. Klein, 2019 ME 85, ¶ 6, 208 A.3d 
 
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802 (quotation marks omitted).  In doing so, a court is “free to accept or reject 
the testimony of individual witnesses in whole or in part, and it is free to reject 
testimony that is not contradicted if it finds that testimony incredible.”  Id.; see 
also Theberge v. Theberge, 2010 ME 132, ¶ 18, 9 A.3d 809 (“the trial court is not 
bound to accept any testimony or evidence as fact”).  We do not substitute our 
judgment for that of the trial court as to the weight and credibility of testimony 
so long as there is evidence to rationally support the court’s result.  Cashman v. 
Robertson, 2019 ME 5, ¶ 12, 199 A.3d 1169.   
 
[¶11]  When a party’s motion for further findings, M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), has 
been denied, we cannot infer findings from the evidence in the record.  We 
confine our review to the court’s explicit findings and determine whether those 
findings are supported by the record.  Ehret, 2016 ME 43, ¶ 12, 135 A.3d 101; 
Douglas v. Douglas, 2012 ME 67, ¶¶ 26-27, 43 A.3d 965.  Although the trial 
court’s judgment must be “supported by express factual findings that are based 
on record evidence, are sufficient to support the result, and are sufficient to 
inform the parties and any reviewing court of the basis for the decision,” Mooar 
v. Greenleaf, 2018 ME 23, ¶ 7, 179 A.3d 307 (quotation marks omitted), “there 
is no requirement that a court identify the reasoning it uses to reach each 
finding of fact,” Theberge, 2010 ME 132, ¶ 18, 9 A.3d 809.  Given the nature and 
 
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scope of the Rule 52(b) motions in this case, we take this opportunity to 
reiterate that this rule authorizes the filing of only those post-judgment 
motions that are intended to elicit additional or corrected factual findings that 
were not contained in the court’s initial judgment.  These motions “should not 
be used to attempt to require the court to explain its reasoning in reaching a 
particular result or to reargue points that were contested at trial and have been 
resolved by the court’s decision.”  Wandishin v. Wandishin, 2009 ME 73, ¶ 19, 
976 A.2d 949.   
 
1. 
James’s Income 
 
[¶12]  Sandra argues that the court committed clear error when it 
determined James’s income.  Her argument is unpersuasive because the court’s 
finding is supported by competent record evidence.  Although Sandra 
presented evidence that James’s income may have been higher than what the 
court found it to be, there was competent record evidence that supports the 
court’s determination that James’s income is $120,247.  See Williams v. 
Williams, 645 A.2d 1118, 1119, 1123 (Me. 1994) (accepting an average of 
previous years’ income); Hale v. Hale, 604 A.2d 38, 41-42 (Me. 1992) (applying 
average income from previous years determining spousal support obligations); 
see also Wrenn v. Lewis, 2003 ME 29, ¶ 19, 818 A.2d 1005 (imputing income 
 
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based on a range of potential earnings).  Accordingly, there is no clear error in 
the court’s determination of James’s income.   
 
2. 
Sandra’s Income 
 
[¶13]  Sandra and James both argue that the court committed clear error 
in finding that Sandra’s gross income is $76,000.  The court determined, after 
“[s]orting through the credible testimony offered” by the forensic accountant, 
that Sandra’s income is $76,000.  It also found that Sandra’s income was 
“greater than what [she] would have the court believe,” and that Sandra 
“routinely under-reported . . . income.”   
 
[¶14]  The trial court is the sole arbiter of witness credibility,  Cashman, 
2019 ME 5, ¶ 12, 199 A.3d 1169, and it is therefore free to accept or reject 
portions of the parties’ testimony based on its credibility determinations and 
to give their testimony the weight it deems appropriate.  Klein, 2019 ME 85, ¶ 6, 
208 A.3d 802.  The court was not required to find that Sandra’s income fell 
within the ranges offered by any single witness.  Cf. Starrett v. Starrett, 2014 ME 
112, ¶ 12, 101 A.3d 435; Theberge, 2010 ME 132, ¶¶ 19-20, 9 A.3d 809.  Because 
the court’s determination of Sandra’s income was supported by competent 
record evidence, the court did not clearly err in this determination, nor was it 
 
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required to explain its rationale.3  Miele v. Miele, 2003 ME 113, ¶ 11, 832 A.2d 
760 (“[A] court is not required to detail the rationale it uses to reach each 
finding of fact or conclusion of law.”).   
B. 
Child Support 
 
[¶15]  The parties agree that the court erred in its computations on the 
child support worksheet and supplemental worksheet and agree that, as a 
result of those erroneous calculations, the actual child support obligation 
derived from the worksheets is wrong.  We review child support and 
modification orders for an abuse of discretion and the factual findings used in 
calculating those orders for clear error.  Sullivan v. Tardiff, 2015 ME 121, ¶ 9, 
124 A.3d 652.   
 
[¶16]  As mentioned above, the court erroneously calculated the weekly 
child support obligation using the amount listed in the child support table for 
two children ($243) instead of three children ($187).  10-144 C.M.R. ch. 351, 
ch. 6, § 2.  In addition, although the child support order correctly lists the 
                                         
3  Because both parties’ contentions that the court abused its discretion in modifying the spousal 
support order are predicated on their unpersuasive arguments that the court erred in determining 
their gross incomes, we affirm the court’s modification order.  See Voter v. Voter, 2015 ME 11, 
¶ 18, 109 A.3d 626  James’s further contention that Sandra’s “inequitable conduct” supports 
terminating spousal support was not adopted by the trial court.  It expressly found that both parties 
experienced an increase in income and that an “equitable need” for support continues.  See 19-A 
M.R.S. § 951-A(2)(A), (5)(E) (2018).   
 
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parties’ proportion of income as sixty-one percent for James and thirty-nine 
percent for Sandra, see 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(5)(D-1)(4) (2018), the supplemental 
worksheet mistakenly allocates fifty-one percent of the applicable additional 
medical expenses to James and forty-nine percent to Sandra.  19-A M.R.S. 
§ 2006(4) (2018). 
 
[¶17]  Further, the supplemental worksheet incorrectly allocates James’s 
share of the children’s uninsured orthodontic expenses between the parties, 
rather than allocating the total uninsured orthodontic expenses—as  a result, a 
portion of James’s obligation for those expenses was allocated to Sandra.  19-A 
M.R.S. § 2006(5)(D-1)(4) (2018).  James presented evidence that he was paying 
$172.80 per month—the equivalent of $39.88 per week—as his share of the 
expenses, which is seventy-two percent of the total cost, and that Sandra’s 
share is twenty-eight percent.4  Sandra did not offer any evidence to the 
contrary.  The supplemental worksheet indicates that the total weekly 
uninsured orthodontic obligation is $39.88; however, this amount, which is 
incorporated into the child support order and allocated between the parties, is 
                                         
4  James’s testimony is consistent with the court’s allocation of these expenses in the divorce 
judgment.  By simple calculation, Sandra’s twenty-eight percent share amounted to $67.20 per month 
and thus, the total uninsured orthodontic expense is $240 per month or $55.39 per week.  Sandra 
represented to the court that she has a separate payment plan that deals directly with the provider.  
 
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only James’s share.  From the evidence presented, the correct calculation of the 
total weekly uninsured orthodontic expense is $55.39.  
 
[¶18]  Although these computations and allocations are clearly 
erroneous, they are arithmetic errors that do not require additional evidence 
to correct.  The child support order is vacated and the matter is remanded for 
the court to correct the errors consistent with this opinion.  Foley v. Ziegler, 
2007 ME 127, ¶ 20, 931 A.2d 498 (remanding to correct error and recalculate 
child support); Tardif v. Cutchin, 617 A.2d 1032, 1032 (Me. 1992) (remanding 
to correct computational error in child support order).   
 
[¶19]  Finally, we note that these errors are not solely attributable to the 
court.  The parties were unable to present a clear record or timely identify these 
errors for the court despite their numerous post-judgment filings.   
C. 
Attorney Fees 
 
[¶20]  The court denied all requests for attorney fees, ordering that 
“[e]ach party shall be responsible for his or her own attorney fees and costs 
associated with this litigation.”  We review a trial court’s decision on attorney 
fees for an abuse of discretion.  Urquhart v. Urquhart, 2004 ME 103, ¶ 6, 854 
A.2d 193.  A court “may order a party to pay another party’s attorney fees based 
 
12 
on the parties’ relative financial ability to pay the costs of litigation as long as 
the award is ultimately fair under the totality of the circumstances.”  Id.   
 
[¶21]  Sandra’s motion for further findings did not address or propose 
additional findings related to attorney fees.  Accordingly, we assume that the 
court made sufficient findings to support its denial of her request for fees.  Ellis, 
2008 ME 191, ¶ 19, 962 A.2d 328.  This assumption is confirmed by the court’s 
findings that Sandra’s income is “greater than what [she] would have the court 
believe” and “higher than that [which she] claimed” throughout the litigation.  
The court’s findings on this point more than support the denial of her request 
for fees.  Id. ¶¶ 26-27.   
 
[¶22]  Because James’s timely Rule 52(b) motion expressly requesting 
findings related to attorney fees was denied, our review is limited to the facts 
explicitly found in the court’s order.  McMahon v. McMahon, 2019 ME 11, ¶ 3, 
200 A.3d 789.  That limitation does not, however, prevent us from concluding 
that the trial court’s express finding of the parties’ incomes provided it with a 
sufficient basis to determine that each party could shoulder his or her own costs 
of litigation.  See id. ¶ 14.  Although the court did not explicitly connect its 
findings of the parties’ income to its order that “[e]ach party shall be 
responsible for” his or her own fees, the “court is not required to detail the 
 
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rationale it uses to reach each finding of fact or conclusion of law.”  Berntsen v. 
Berntsen, 2017 ME 111, ¶ 21, 163 A.3d 820.  The court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied James’s request for fees, and it is not required to 
elaborate.  Wandishin, 2009 ME 73, ¶ 19, 976 A.2d 949; Dargie v. Dargie, 
2001 ME 127, ¶ 3, 778 A.2d 353.   
D. 
Self-effectuating Order 
 
[¶23]  Finally, we decline the parties’ invitation to adopt a new rule that 
a trial court abuses its discretion when it declines, upon the request of both 
parties, to issue a self-effectuating child support order.5  We have 
recommended that trial courts, magistrates, counsel, and parties “should focus 
on developing orders that explicitly specify the adjustments to be effectuated 
when support obligations cease for each child,” but only in those cases  “where 
changes should occur without any return to court.”  Higgins v. Wood, 2018 ME 
88, ¶ 41, 189 A.3d 724 (emphasis added).  Self-effectuating orders are not 
                                         
5  We have previously described the term “self-effectuating” as 
a provision in a judgment that explicitly articulates a change in a support obligation 
on an identified date or upon the occurrence of a specific event, such that the new, 
explicitly identified amount takes immediate effect and is enforceable.  In other 
words, we have substituted the term “self-effectuating” for the longer description 
used previously for a “self-executing provision that automatically amends a court 
order” upon the occurrence of a specific event or the arrival of a specific date. 
 
Higgins v. Wood, 2018 ME 88, ¶ 15, 189 A.3d 724. 
 
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appropriate where, as here, there are three children, the oldest of whom is 
thirteen years old, and the parties’ incomes have demonstrated a significant 
degree of fluidity.   
The entry is: 
Child support order vacated.  Remanded for 
recalculation of the child support obligation 
consistent with this opinion.  Judgment affirmed 
in all other respects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gene R. Libby, Esq., and Keith P. Richard, Esq., Libby O’Brien Kingsley & 
Champion, LLC, Kennebunk, for appellant James A. Sulikowski 
 
Janet K. Kantz, Esq., Vincent, Kantz, Pittman & Thompson, LLC, Portland, for 
appellee Sandra L. Sulikowski 
 
 
Biddeford District Court docket number FM-2013-282 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY