Case Title: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Shannon Nichols

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC03-1483

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1483 
____________ 
 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
SHANNON NICHOLS, 
Respondent. 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1653 
____________ 
 
SHANNON NICHOLS, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Respondent. 
 
[June 1, 2006] 
 
CANTERO, J. 
 
In this case, we decide whether, in a suit for benefits under a personal injury 
protection policy, an insurer may ever recover attorney’s fees pursuant to the offer 
of judgment statute.  We review Nichols v. State Farm Mutual, 851 So. 2d 742 
 
 
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(Fla. 5th DCA 2003), which held that an insurer could recover such fees but 
certified to us a question of great public importance.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 913 So. 2d 
598 (Fla. 2005) (granting review).  As we explain below, we agree with the district 
court in this case, as well as the other district courts that have considered this issue, 
and hold that a suit for PIP benefits is a “civil action for damages” to which the 
offer of judgment statute applies.  We also agree with the district court, however, 
that in this case the insurer’s offer did not satisfy the requirements of Florida Rule 
of Civil Procedure 1.442.  We therefore approve the district court’s decision in full. 
I. FACTS 
 
After suffering injuries in a car accident in 1996, Shannon Nichols requested 
personal injury protection benefits from her insurer, State Farm.  While agreeing to 
pay her early medical bills, State Farm requested that Nichols undergo an 
independent medical examination to determine the need for further treatment.  
Despite repeated rescheduling, she ultimately failed to attend the exam.  Under the 
PIP statute, “[i]f a person unreasonably refuses to submit to an examination, the 
personal injury protection carrier is no longer liable for subsequent personal injury 
protection benefits.”  § 627.736(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999).  Relying on the statute, 
State Farm refused to pay any additional benefits. 
 
 
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Nichols filed a complaint against State Farm in county court, alleging breach 
of their insurance contract.  While the PIP suit was pending, State Farm served 
Nichols with a proposal for settlement in the amount of $250.  As a condition of 
the settlement, however, Nichols would have been required to “execute a General 
Release in favor of State Farm, which will be expressly limited to all claims, 
causes of action, etc., that have accrued through the date of Nichols’s acceptance 
of this Proposal.”  At the time, she also had an outstanding uninsured motorist 
(“UM”) claim arising from the same accident, which later settled for $13,000.  
Fearing that the release would extinguish both the PIP claim and the UM claim, 
Nichols rejected the offer.  State Farm later claimed that it did not intend for the 
release to extinguish the UM claim. 
At trial, the jury found that Nichols unreasonably refused to submit to a 
medical examination, which meant she was not entitled to any recovery.  State 
Farm therefore requested attorney’s fees and costs under the offer of judgment 
statute.  See § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (1999).  The county court initially denied the 
request, concluding that the offer of judgment statute does not apply to PIP suits.  
Only days later, however, the Third District held that the offer of judgment statute 
does apply to such suits.  See U.S. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Cahuasqui, 760 So. 2d 1101 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2000), review dismissed, 796 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 2001).  Upon 
reconsideration, the county court awarded $23,199 to State Farm.  It also certified 
 
 
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to the Fifth District a question of great public importance, asking whether the offer 
of judgment statute applies to PIP suits. 
The Fifth District answered yes.  Nichols, 851 So. 2d at 744.  Applying the 
statute’s plain language, which encompasses “any civil action for damages filed in 
the courts of this state,” § 768.79(1), Fla. Stat. (1999), the district court concluded 
that the Legislature “clearly and unambiguously” intended for the statute to cover 
PIP suits.  Nichols, 851 So. 2d at 745.  While acknowledging “thoughtful policy 
arguments” for the opposite result, the district court advised that they would be 
“more appropriately addressed to the Legislature.”  Id. 
Judge Sawaya dissented in part.  He argued that “the Legislature never 
intended a suit to recover PIP benefits to be an action for damages under section 
768.79.”  Id. at 747 (Sawaya, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The 
purpose of the PIP system, he wrote, was to guarantee swift payment to insureds 
without regard to fault.  In his view, “application of section 768.79 to PIP cases, 
with its inherent uncertainties and risks, has completely abrogated the security and 
the assurance that injured insureds were promised by the Legislature through the 
No-Fault Act.”  Id. at 750.  He joined the majority, however, in certifying to us a 
question of great public importance: “May an insurer recover attorney’s fees under 
rule 1.442, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and section 768.79, Florida Statutes, 
 
 
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in an action by its insured to recover under a personal injury protection policy?”  
Id. at 747. 
On appeal, Nichols raised another issue: whether State Farm’s settlement 
proposal satisfied Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, which demands that such 
proposals “state with particularity any relevant conditions” and “state with 
particularity all nonmonetary terms.”  Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(2)(C)-(D).  She 
argued that State Farm’s offer was too ambiguous because it arguably required her 
to release not only her PIP claim, but also her outstanding UM claim.  Nichols, 851 
So. 2d at 745.  At the attorney’s fees hearing, she even accused State Farm of 
attempting in bad faith to kill two claims with one release.  Id.  But State Farm, 
professing to have been “unaware of the existence of the UM claim at the time,” 
testified “that had the proposal for settlement been accepted, [it] would not have 
required that the release include the UM claim.”  Id. at 745-46.  The trial court 
accepted State Farm’s explanation and deemed the settlement proposal valid under 
rule 1.442.  Id. at 746.   
The Fifth District concluded, however, that because the scope of the release 
“could not be determined without resort to clarification or judicial interpretation,” 
id., the settlement proposal was too ambiguous to satisfy rule 1.442.  According to 
the district court, “[t]he terms and conditions of the proposal should be devoid of 
 
 
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ambiguity, patent or latent.”  Id.  It therefore reversed the award of attorney’s fees 
to State Farm. 
Both parties petitioned us for review.  Nichols relied on the certified 
question, whereas State Farm alleged express and direct conflict with other district 
court decisions regarding rule 1.442’s particularity requirement.  We granted 
review based on the certified question and consolidated the cases.  State Farm, 913 
So. 2d at 598.  We now approve the Fifth District’s reasoning on both issues, 
which we analyze separately. 
II. THE CERTIFIED QUESTION 
The certified question asks whether the offer of judgment statute applies to 
PIP suits.  The Fifth District answered yes, Nichols, 851 So. 2d at 745, as have the 
other two district courts to consider the issue.  See Tran v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co., 860 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Cahuasqui, 760 So. 2d at 1101.  Two of 
those cases, however, produced dissents.  See Nichols, 851 So. 2d at 747 (Sawaya, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Cahuasqui, 760 So. 2d at 1107 
(Fletcher, J., dissenting).  We agree with the three district courts and hold that the 
offer of judgment statute applies to PIP suits.  To explain our decision, we discuss 
(A) whether the offer of judgment statute includes PIP suits, (B) whether the 
separate attorney’s fees provision in the PIP statute precludes application of the 
 
 
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offer of judgment statute, and finally (C) whether applying the offer of judgment 
statute to PIP suits would render unconstitutional the entire PIP system. 
A.  The Offer of Judgment Statute 
 
 
The first issue is whether the offer of judgment statute applies to PIP suits.  
The statute provides: 
In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this state, if 
a defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the 
plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred by her or him . . . from 
the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is one of no liability or 
the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than 
such offer, and the court shall set off such costs and attorney’s fees 
against the award. 
§ 768.79(1), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added).  The district courts, emphasizing 
the plain meaning of the statute, have consistently held that a PIP suit is a “civil 
action for damages.”  See Nichols, 851 So. 2d at 745; Cahuasqui, 760 So. 2d at 
1104.  But Nichols maintains that her suit is better characterized as an action for 
“benefits” or “security.” 
We find this characterization to be a distinction without a difference.  The 
purpose of a PIP suit is to recover damages for breach of an insurance contract.  In 
fact, in Nichols’s initial complaint, and again in her amended complaints, she 
expressly referred to her suit as “an action for damages.”  While the contractual 
breach may consist of a failure to pay insurance “benefits” or “security,” the 
 
 
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plaintiff, if successful, nevertheless will receive court-ordered compensation for 
her loss, which is the very definition of damages.  See, e.g., Black’s Law 
Dictionary 416 (8th ed. 2004) (defining damages as “[m]oney claimed by, or 
ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury”).  As one court 
has said, “[t]he right to damages may arise under tort law; it may arise under 
contract law; it may arise under property law.  If the party seeks damages from 
another party, then the claim is covered by section 768.79’s broad phrase, ‘civil 
action for damages.’”  Beyel Bros. Crane & Rigging Co. of S. Fla. v. Ace Transp., 
Inc., 664 So. 2d 62, 64 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).  Nothing in the offer of judgment 
statute exempts claims for contractual damages. 
We have long recognized that, where a statute is free from ambiguity, we 
must follow its plain meaning.  As we have explained, “[w]hen the language of the 
statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is 
no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; 
the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.”  Clines v. State, 912 So. 
2d 550, 555-56 (Fla. 2005) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 
157, 159 (Fla. 1931)).  This is one of those times.  The phrase “any civil action for 
damages” unambiguously includes suits to recover damages for breach of a PIP 
insurance contract.  We therefore conclude that the offer of judgment statute 
encompasses such cases. 
 
 
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B.  The PIP Statute 
 
Having determined that a PIP suit is a “civil action for damages” covered by 
the offer of judgment statute, we now consider whether the separate attorney’s fees 
provision in the PIP statute precludes application of other attorney’s fees 
provisions.  In considering this issue, we note the “long-recognized principle of 
statutory construction that where two statutory provisions are in conflict, the 
specific statute controls over the general statute.”  State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 
112 (Fla. 2002) (citing State ex rel. Johnson v. Vizzini, 227 So. 2d 205, 207 (Fla. 
1969)).  Moreover, the chapter containing the offer of judgment statute expressly 
states that “[i]f a provision of this part is in conflict with any other provision of the 
Florida Statutes, such other provision shall apply.”  § 768.71(3), Fla. Stat. (1999).  
Thus, if the offer of judgment statute conflicts with the attorney’s fees provision in 
the PIP statute, the latter controls.  We conclude, however, that they do not 
conflict. 
 
The attorney’s fees provision in the PIP statute, entitled “Applicability of 
provision regulating attorney’s fees,” states that “[w]ith respect to any dispute 
under the provisions of [the PIP statute] between the insured and the insurer, the 
provisions of s. 627.428 shall apply.”  § 627.736(8), Fla. Stat. (1999).  The cross-
referenced statute, section 627.428, provides: 
Upon the rendition of a judgment or decree by any of the courts 
of this state against an insurer and in favor of any named or omnibus 
 
 
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insured or the named beneficiary under a policy or contract executed 
by the insurer, the trial court or, in the event of an appeal in which the 
insured or beneficiary prevails, the appellate court shall adjudge or 
decree against the insurer and in favor of the insured or beneficiary a 
reasonable sum as fees or compensation for the insured’s or 
beneficiary’s attorney prosecuting the suit in which the recovery is 
had. 
§ 627.428(1), Fla. Stat. (1999).  In other words, a prevailing insured, but not a 
prevailing insurer, is entitled to attorney’s fees. 
Nichols argues that because section 627.428 only authorizes attorney’s fees 
for insureds, and because it is the only attorney’s fees provision incorporated into 
the PIP statute, it implicitly precludes courts from awarding attorney’s fees to PIP 
insurers under any other provision, including the offer of judgment statute.  She 
emphasizes our decision in Danis Industries Corp. v. Ground Improvement 
Techniques, Inc., 645 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1994), which explained that section 627.428 
“is a one-way street offering the potential for attorneys’ fees only to the insured or 
beneficiary” in order “to discourage insurers from contesting valid claims and to 
reimburse successful policy holders forced to sue to enforce their policies.”  Id. at 
421. 
Even Danis recognized, however, that the “one-way street” under section 
627.428 cannot be used as a detour around settlement negotiations.  The specific 
issue in that case was what it meant for an insured to “prevail” under section 
627.428.  We held that an insured prevails only when the insured “obtain[s] a 
 
 
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judgment greater than any offer of settlement previously tendered by the insurer.”  
Id.  In a later case, Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. DeSalvo, 748 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 
1999), we clarified that the “judgment” includes the insured’s damages plus any 
attorney’s fees, taxable costs, and prejudgment interest incurred before the 
insurer’s offer. 
 
Together, Danis and DeSalvo drew a clear line between the pre-offer and 
post-offer periods.  Unless and until the insurer offers to pay the insured’s damages 
plus attorney’s fees, costs, and interest, the “one-way street” under section 627.428 
entitles the insured to attorney’s fees.  But once such an offer is made and rejected, 
the “one-way street” ends.  The insured, having turned down the full amount she is 
owed, cannot claim the protection of section 627.428. 
The question here is whether the insurer, having made an offer that 
eliminates the insured’s entitlement to further attorney’s fees under section 
627.428, can recover its own fees if it meets the conditions of the offer of judgment 
statute.  Neither Danis nor DeSalvo resolved that question.  Recently, however, we 
did clear the way for application of the offer of judgment statute to insurance cases 
by extending a crucial part of the Danis/DeSalvo reasoning to the offer of 
judgment statute.  In White v. Steak & Ale of Florida, Inc., 816 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 
2002), we held that the term “judgment” under the offer of judgment statute must 
be defined—as it is under section 627.428––to include not only the plaintiff’s 
 
 
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damages award, but also any attorney’s fees, taxable costs, and prejudgment 
interest to which the plaintiff would have been entitled when the offer was made.  
Id. at 551.  “It is this judgment to which the offer must be compared in determining 
whether to award fees and costs” under both the offer of judgment statute and 
section 627.428.  Id. (citing DeSalvo, 748 So. 2d at 944 n.3).  We explained that 
“[a]lthough Danis and [DeSalvo] involved an award of attorneys’ fees under 
section 627.428, we see no reason why this rationale should not apply equally to 
offers or demands made under section 768.79(6).”  Id. at 551 n.5. 
 
Because we have uniformly defined the term “judgment” under both section 
627.428 and the offer of judgment statute, the two statutes can be applied 
simultaneously to PIP cases without creating conflict.  The following chart 
illustrates how they interact: 
If the judgment is: 
The insured receives: 
The insurer receives: 
No liability 
No fees 
Post-offer fees under the 
offer of judgment statute 
75 percent or less of 
insurer’s offer 
Pre-offer fees under section 
627.428 
Post-offer fees under the 
offer of judgment statute 
More than 75 percent of 
insurer’s offer, but not 
more than 100 percent 
Pre-offer fees under section 
627.428 
No fees 
More than insurer’s 
offer 
All fees under section 
627.428 
No fees 
 
The most complex situation is where the insured recovers some damages, 
but the judgment is only 75 percent or less of the defendant’s offer.  (This is not 
such a case, because Nichols recovered nothing.)  In that situation, both parties 
 
 
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have a statutory entitlement to attorney’s fees.  Even then, however, the two 
statutes will not conflict: under section 627.428 the insured will be awarded 
attorney’s fees incurred before the offer, and under the offer of judgment statute 
the insurer will be awarded fees incurred after the offer. 
Given the lack of conflict between the statutes, the question becomes 
whether the expression of one thing (i.e., attorney’s fees for insureds under 
sections 627.428 and 627.736) implies the exclusion of another (i.e., attorney’s 
fees under the offer of judgment statute).  As one court noted in holding that the 
offer of judgment statute applied in PIP cases, “[t]his rule that the inclusion of one 
thing means the exclusion of another, however, does not mean that the application 
of one precludes the additional application of another.”  Cahuasqui, 760 So. 2d at 
1105. 
In cases involving other types of insurance, we have not interpreted section 
627.428 as precluding the application of other attorney’s fees provisions.  To the 
contrary, we have authorized the application of the offer of judgment statute in an 
underinsured motorist case, even though it also fell within the scope of section 
627.428.  See Sarkis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 863 So. 2d 210, 223 (Fla. 2003).  The 
district courts, too, have applied the offer of judgment statute to insurance cases, 
including those involving property insurance, see Pa. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Sunrise Club, Inc., 711 So. 2d 593, 594 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), liability insurance, 
 
 
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Rabatie v. U.S. Sec. Ins. Co., 581 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), and uninsured 
motorist benefits.  See Weesner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 711 So. 2d 1192, 
1194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Manasse, 715 So. 2d 1079, 1082 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Silow, 714 So. 2d 647, 651 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1998); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marko, 695 So. 2d 874, 876 (Fla. 
2d DCA 1997).  One court has specifically rejected the argument that in an 
uninsured motorist case section 627.428 precludes an award of attorney’s fees to 
the insurer under the offer of judgment statute.  Weesner, 711 So. 2d at 1194. 
Nichols attempts to distinguish PIP suits from these other insurance cases on 
the ground that section 627.428 applies to PIP suits through a separate provision in 
the PIP statute, which incorporates it by reference.  See § 627.736(8), Fla. Stat. 
(1999).  According to Nichols, the Legislature’s reason for including this separate 
provision must have been to foreclose the application of any other attorney’s fees 
provisions to PIP suits.  Otherwise, she argues, the provision would be redundant 
with section 627.428.   
We find this argument unpersuasive.  If the Legislature had enacted section 
627.736(8) for the sole purpose of excluding all other attorney’s fees provisions in 
PIP suits, then presumably it would have used exclusionary language, rather than 
the inclusive language it used.  The words in the statute are the best guide to 
 
 
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legislative intent.  Here, section 627.736(8) gives no clue that the Legislature 
intended to prohibit application of the offer of judgment statute. 
C.  Access to Courts 
 
 
Nichols argues that applying the offer of judgment statute to PIP suits will 
deny insureds access to courts and thus render the entire PIP system 
unconstitutional.  Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution provides that 
“[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice 
shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”  We hold that even with the 
addition of the offer of judgment statute, the PIP statute withstands constitutional 
scrutiny. 
We first considered the PIP statute’s constitutionality in Kluger v. White, 
281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).  We interpreted the access-to-courts provision to mean 
that the Legislature cannot abolish a traditional common-law right of recovery 
“without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the people of the 
State to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering 
public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of 
meeting such public necessity can be shown.”  Id. at 4.  Applying this standard, we 
held unconstitutional the portion of the PIP statute that provided an exemption 
from tort liability for certain property damage.  Id. at 5.  We cautioned, however, 
 
 
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that if insurance had been made compulsory for property damage, the provision 
might have been upheld.  Id. 
One year after Kluger, we decided that the personal injury portion of the PIP 
statute, which does make insurance compulsory, “provides a reasonable alternative 
to the traditional action in tort” and therefore complies with the access-to-courts 
provision.  See Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 14 (Fla. 1974).  We 
reasoned that, under the PIP system, “[i]n exchange for his previous right to 
damages for pain and suffering . . . with recovery limited to those situations where 
he can prove that the other party was at fault, the injured party is assured of 
recovery of his major and salient economic losses from his own insurer.”  Id.  We 
emphasized that the insured can recover something “even where he himself is at 
fault,” and that normally there will be “speedy payment” rather than prolonged 
litigation.  Id. 
As the PIP statute has been amended over the years, we have considered 
new challenges to its constitutionality.  The most prominent example is Chapman 
v. Dillon, 415 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1982).  In the eight years between Lasky and 
Chapman, the Legislature substantially reduced the percentage of medical 
expenses and lost wages the insured may recover.  Id. at 16.  Deciding that the 
amendments were “reasonable attempts by the legislature to correct some of the 
practical problems which the no-fault law had posed,” we again upheld the statute.  
 
 
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Id.  Although the changes meant that insureds would not necessarily recover all 
their economic losses, we explained that full recovery was not essential to the 
outcome in Lasky; “[i]nstead the crux in Lasky was that all owners of motor 
vehicles were required to purchase insurance which would assure injured parties 
recovery of their major and salient economic losses.”  Id. at 17.  We determined 
that the statutory amendments “have not fundamentally changed this essential 
characteristic of the no-fault law.”  Id. 
The question here is whether allowing PIP insurers to recover attorney’s fees 
under the offer of judgment statute (enacted after Lasky and Chapman, see ch. 86-
160, § 58, Laws of Fla.) would fundamentally change the essential characteristics 
of the PIP system and thereby deny access to courts.  The only case in which we 
have analyzed an attorney’s fees provision under the access-to-courts provision is 
Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).  
There, we considered whether section 768.56, Florida Statutes (1981), which 
provided attorney’s fees for the prevailing party in medical malpractice cases, 
violated the Florida Constitution.  We held it did not, explaining: 
The assessment of attorney fees against an unsuccessful litigant 
imposes no more of a penalty than other costs of proceedings which 
are more commonly assessed. . . .  The statute may encourage an 
initiating party to consider carefully the likelihood of success before 
bringing an action, and similarly encourage a defendant to evaluate 
the same factor in determining how to proceed once an action is filed. 
We reject the argument that section 768.56 so deters the pursuit of 
medical malpractice claims that it effectively denies access to the 
 
 
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courts to either party in malpractice actions.  We find that an award of 
attorneys fees to the prevailing party is “a matter of substantive law 
properly within the aegis of the legislature,” in accordance with the 
long-standing American Rule adopted by this Court.  See Whitten v. 
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501, 504 (Fla. 1982).  As 
difficult as the resulting application of this statute may be in certain 
cases, we conclude that section 768.56 is constitutional. 
Id. at 1149 (citations omitted).  As this passage makes clear, fee-shifting statutes 
generally do not deny access to courts.  Id.   
We recognize that the PIP statute is unique.  It expressly abolished a 
traditional common-law right by limiting the recovery available to car accident 
victims.  In exchange, the statute made PIP insurance compulsory and allowed 
recovery regardless of fault.  As we have noted, “the purpose of the no-fault 
statutory scheme is to ‘provide swift and virtually automatic payment so that the 
injured insured may get on with his life without undue financial interruption.’”  
Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So. 2d 679, 683-84 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Gov’t 
Employees Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 512 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)).  This 
benefit balances the restrictions on recovery, making the PIP statute a reasonable 
alternative to the traditional tort action. 
Applying the offer of judgment statute to PIP suits will not upset this 
balance.  Insurers are entitled to attorney’s fees only in two limited circumstances: 
(1) where the insured recovers nothing at trial, as happened in this case; and (2) 
where the insured rejects an offer that turns out to be at least one-third greater than 
 
 
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the damages awarded at trial, when added to any attorney’s fees, taxable costs, and 
prejudgment interest that the insured accumulated before the offer.  In other words, 
for the offer of judgment statute to apply, the plaintiff either must have a very 
weak case, or must reject a very generous offer.  Encouraging plaintiffs to settle in 
those circumstances, rather than pursue needless litigation, “is entirely consistent 
with the intent of the no-fault legislation of relieving our overburdened court 
system.”  Cahuasqui, 760 So. 2d at 1105.  We therefore hold that application of the 
offer of judgment statute to PIP suits does not render the PIP statute 
constitutionally infirm. 
III. THE PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT 
 
The remaining issue is whether State Farm’s settlement proposal satisfied 
the particularity requirement of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.  The rule 
requires that settlement proposals “state with particularity any relevant conditions” 
and also “state with particularity all nonmonetary terms.”  Fla. R. Civ. P. 
1.442(c)(2)(C)-(D).  As the district court noted below, “[t]his requirement of 
particularity is fundamental to the purpose underlying the statute and rule.  A 
proposal for settlement is intended to end judicial labor, not create more.”  Nichols, 
851 So. 2d at 746. 
The Fifth District decided that the language requiring Nichols to sign a 
general release was too ambiguous to satisfy rule 1.442.  Nichols, 851 So. 2d at 
 
 
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746.  Accordingly, it reversed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees under the 
offer of judgment statute.  State Farm now challenges the Fifth District’s ruling, 
claiming it conflicts with other district court decisions.  We exercise our discretion 
to review the issue.  See Savoie v. State, 422 So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla. 1982) (holding 
that “once this Court has jurisdiction of a cause, it has jurisdiction to consider all 
issues appropriately raised in the appellate process”).  As explained below, we 
conclude that State Farm’s settlement proposal failed to eliminate ambiguity 
regarding Nichols’s outstanding UM claim and thus cannot support an award of 
attorney’s fees. 
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether a general release qualifies 
as one of the “relevant conditions” or “nonmonetary terms” of a settlement 
proposal, which must be described with particularity under rule 1.442.  In this case, 
the Fifth District determined that a release is a condition and a nonmonetary term.  
See Nichols, 851 So. 2d at 746.  Most district courts agree.  See, e.g., 1 Nation 
Tech. Corp. v. A1 Teletronics, Inc., 924 So. 2d 3, 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Dryden v. 
Pedemonti, 910 So. 2d 854, 856 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Palm Beach Polo Holdings, 
Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, 904 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Sink v. 
Emerald Hill Owners Ass’n, 903 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Boyd v. 
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 890 So. 2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); 
 
 
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Swartsel v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 882 So. 2d 449, 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); 
Hales v. Advanced Sys. Design, Inc., 855 So. 2d 1232, 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).   
In an earlier case, however, the Third District held that the releases and 
dismissal required by a settlement proposal “were not ‘conditions’ of the 
settlement, but rather mechanical and legally inconsequential means of effecting it.  
They thus should be regarded as mere surplusage, the existence of which should 
not affect substantial rights.”  Earnest & Stewart, Inc. v. Codina, 732 So. 2d 364, 
366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).  A few decisions, mostly from the Third District, have 
expressed this view.  See Delpa, Inc. v. Martinez, 878 So. 2d 455, 455 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2004); Gulf Coast Transp., Inc. v. Padron, 782 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2001); Kaplan v. Goldfarb, 777 So. 2d 1208, 1208 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). 
Applying the plain meaning of rule 1.442, we agree with those courts that 
have treated releases as conditions or nonmonetary terms that must be described 
with particularity.  A “condition” is traditionally defined as “a stipulation or 
prerequisite in a contract, will, or other instrument, constituting the essence of the 
instrument.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 312 (8th ed. 2004).  A “term” is defined 
more broadly as “a contractual stipulation.”  Id. at 1509.  We think it clear that 
when an offeror insists that an offeree sign a general release, the release becomes a 
stipulation or prerequisite of the contract.  Even if the release does not constitute 
the essence of the settlement proposal––and thus a condition under subdivision 
 
 
- 22 -
(c)(2)(C) of the rule––at the very least it qualifies as a nonmonetary term under 
subdivision (c)(2)(D). 
Next we consider what degree of particularity the rule requires.  Some courts 
have demanded “that an offeror state all the terms of . . . any ‘general release’ or, 
instead, attach a copy of the actual documents themselves to the offer.”  Swartsel, 
882 So. 2d at 453 (emphasis added).  In this case, however, the Fifth District 
interpreted the rule as giving offerors the option of including “either the proposed 
language of the release or a summary of the substance of the release.’”  Nichols, 
851 So. 2d at 746; see also Palm Beach Polo, 904 So. 2d at 653 (following 
Nichols); Boyd, 890 So. 2d at 1242 (requiring only a summary “sufficient to 
apprise [the offeree] of its terms”). 
We agree that a summary of the proposed release can be sufficient to satisfy 
rule 1.442, as long as it eliminates any reasonable ambiguity about its scope.  As 
the Second District recently explained: 
The rule intends for a proposal for judgment to be as specific as 
possible, leaving no ambiguities so that the recipient can fully 
evaluate its terms and conditions.  Furthermore, if accepted, the 
proposal should be capable of execution without the need for judicial 
interpretation.  Proposals for settlement are intended to end judicial 
labor, not create more. 
Lucas v. Calhoun, 813 So. 2d 971, 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (citation omitted).  We 
recognize that, given the nature of language, it may be impossible to eliminate all 
ambiguity.  The rule does not demand the impossible.  It merely requires that the 
 
 
- 23 -
settlement proposal be sufficiently clear and definite to allow the offeree to make 
an informed decision without needing clarification.  If ambiguity within the 
proposal could reasonably affect the offeree’s decision, the proposal will not 
satisfy the particularity requirement.  
We caution that rule 1.442 is not intended to revolutionize the language used 
in general releases.  Traditionally, general releases have included expansive 
language designed to protect the offeror from unforeseen developments or creative 
maneuvering by the other party.  Such language can be sufficiently particular to 
satisfy rule 1.442.  For example, in Board of Trustees of Florida Atlantic 
University v. Bowman, 853 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the Fourth District 
concluded that the language in a general release, “even though expansive, is typical 
of other general releases and is clear and unambiguous.”  Id. at 509.  The rule aims 
to prevent ambiguity, not breadth. 
State Farm’s settlement proposal was too ambiguous to satisfy rule 1.442.  
The proposal stated, at the outset, that it would be “a full and final satisfaction and 
settlement of any and all of Nichols’s claims and causes of action in, or arising out 
of, the above-styled case.”  Then it provided that Nichols would be required to 
“execute a General Release in favor of State Farm, which will be expressly limited 
to all claims, causes of action, etc., that have accrued through the date of Nichols’s 
acceptance of this Proposal.”  At the time of the offer, Nichols not only had a 
 
 
- 24 -
pending PIP claim against State Farm, but also a UM claim arising from the same 
accident and of greater value.  Although that claim was not technically “in . . . the 
above-styled case,” it could have been viewed as a claim “arising out of . . . the 
above-styled case,” because it arose from the same set of facts.  State Farm’s use of 
the broad phrase “all claims, causes of action, etc.” exacerbated this ambiguity. 
The district courts have consistently held, and we agree, that settlement 
proposals must clarify which of an offeree’s outstanding claims against the offeror 
will be extinguished by any proposed release.  See, e.g., Dryden, 910 So. 2d at 
856-57 (holding that the description of a general release was “not as clear and as 
certain as it should be,” because it “could have been found . . . to have 
extinguished” additional claims); Palm Beach Polo, 904 So. 2d at 653 (holding that 
“the offer was legally deficient because plaintiff’s acceptance could have 
extinguished other pending unrelated claims”); Morgan v. Beekie, 879 So. 2d 110, 
111 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (holding that an offer “cannot be a basis for an award of 
attorney’s fees because it was both ambiguous and failed to make it clear that it 
was solely for personal injuries when the settlement of the property damage claim 
had not yet been fully consummated”).  Because State Farm’s offer failed to do so, 
it is invalid under rule 1.442 and cannot support an award of attorney’s fees under 
the offer of judgment statute. 
 
 
- 25 -
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that the offer of judgment statute applies to PIP suits.  In this case, 
however, State Farm’s offer of judgment was too ambiguous to satisfy Florida 
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.  We therefore approve in full the district court’s 
decision reversing the award of attorney’s fees. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which QUINCE, J., 
concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
ANSTEAD, J., concurring in result only. 
 
While I agree with the majority as to the ultimate outcome, I cannot agree 
with the majority’s analysis or conclusion as to the use of the offer of judgment 
statute to circumvent the Legislature’s clear intention to limit the entitlement to 
attorney’s fees in PIP actions to the insured-claimant.  By applying a broader and 
more general statute on fees the majority opinion has essentially eviscerated the 
specific legislative intent on fees, as well as fundamentally undermining the 
legislative scheme to assist Florida citizens in the collection of PIP benefits.  One 
can only hope that the Legislature will recognize that its work has been undone, 
and act promptly to restore the balance of rights of citizen-insureds in their 
 
 
- 26 -
dealings with insurance companies who have now been armed with a powerful 
new economic weapon to discourage insureds from litigating legitimate claims.   
 
Because I agree with the dissenting opinion of Judge Sawaya on this issue, I 
quote that opinion here and endorse its analysis: 
 
I concur with the majority that the order awarding attorney’s 
fees must be reversed.  However, I respectfully disagree that the offer 
of judgment statute found in section 768.79, Florida Statutes, applies 
to PIP cases.  In my view, application of section 768.79 to PIP cases 
would completely thwart and circumvent the purposes of the Florida 
Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law [n.1] (the No-Fault Act) and PIP 
benefits.  Moreover, I believe that the Legislature never intended a 
suit to recover PIP benefits to be an action for damages under section 
768.79.  Although I concur that this issue should be certified to the 
Florida Supreme Court, I believe that the question certified should be 
rephrased as follows to reflect the true nature of a suit to recover PIP 
benefits and answered in the negative: 
May an insurer recover attorney’s fees under rule 1.442, 
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and section 768.79, 
Florida Statutes, in an action brought by its insured to 
recover personal injury protection benefits under the 
insurance policy issued to the insured? 
[n.1] §§ 627.730-.7405, Fla. Stat. (2001). 
Application of the Offer of Judgment Statute Would 
Circumvent the Purposes of the No-Fault Law and Pip Benefits 
 
In order to properly determine whether the offer of judgment 
statute found in section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2001), applies to PIP 
cases, it is necessary to start with the firmly established rule that 
“[l]egislative intent, as always, is the polestar that guides a court’s 
inquiry under the Florida No-Fault Law . . . .”  United Auto Ins. Co. v. 
Rodriguez, 808 So. 2d 82, 85 (Fla. 2001).  In my view, application of 
section 768.79 to PIP cases would completely circumvent and thwart 
the purposes of the No-Fault Act and the specific provisions relating 
to PIP benefits found in section 627.736.  Therefore, it is clear to me 
 
 
- 27 -
that the Legislature certainly did not intend for section 768.79 to apply 
to PIP cases. 
 
The Florida Legislature enacted the No-Fault Act to “provide 
for medical, surgical, funeral, and disability insurance benefits 
without regard to fault” and to limit “the right to claim damages for 
pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience.”  § 627.731, Fla. 
Stat. (2001).  In order to accomplish this objective, section 627.736(1) 
requires that every owner of a motor vehicle obtain motor vehicle 
liability insurance that provides “personal injury protection . . . for 
loss sustained . . . as a result of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or 
death arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor 
vehicle . . . .” (Emphasis added).  In exchange for abrogation of the 
right of the injured party to sue the tortfeasor for damages for pain, 
suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience, the injured party is 
entitled to receive protection in the form of PIP benefits, which are 
limited to the following:  eighty percent of all reasonable medical 
expenses so the insured will have access to necessary medical care 
and his or her medical providers will be assured of prompt payment; 
sixty percent of disability benefits so the insured and his or her family 
will have access to necessary funds for family support to replace the 
income lost as a result of any debilitating injury suffered by the 
insured; and certain death benefits to ensure prompt payment of 
necessary funeral expenses.  § 627.736(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). 
 
Because the injured insured is statutorily prohibited from 
recovering these costs from the tortfeasor whose wrongful conduct 
caused the injury or death, he or she is relegated to payment of these 
necessary costs from his or her insurance carrier unless the statutorily-
imposed threshold of permanency is established.  § 627.737, Fla. Stat. 
(2001).  Thus, the injured insured becomes totally dependent on his or 
her insurance carrier for payment of these necessary costs.  Shortly 
after the Legislature enacted the No-Fault Act in 1973, the Florida 
Supreme Court in Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 296 So. 2d 9 
(Fla. 1974), articulated the specific purposes of the No-Fault Act, 
stating that central to the legislative intent was the desire to enhance 
the public welfare through “an assurance that persons injured in 
vehicular accidents would receive some economic aid in meeting 
medical expenses and the like, in order not to drive them into dire 
financial circumstances with the possibility of swelling the public 
relief rolls.”  Id. at 16 (emphasis added).  In Ivey v. Allstate Insurance 
Co., 774 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2000), the court held that “[w]ithout a 
 
 
- 28 -
doubt, the purpose of the no-fault statutory scheme is to ‘provide swift 
and virtually automatic payment so that the injured insured may get 
on with his life without undue financial interruption.’ ”  Id. at 683-84 
(emphasis added) (quoting Government Employees Ins. Co. v. 
Gonzalez, 512 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)). 
 
The assurance of swift and virtually automatic provision of PIP 
benefits is accomplished through the requirements of section 
627.736(4)(b), which provides that PIP insurance benefits shall be 
overdue if not provided within thirty days after the insurer is furnished 
written notice of a covered loss and of the amount of same.  If the 
insurer allows a claim to become overdue, the insurer is subject to 
specific penalties, which include an award of attorney’s fees to the 
insured. [n.2]  I emphasize that imposition of an award of fees against 
the insurance carrier is a penalty for failing to provide PIP benefits in 
accordance with the time limitations of the No-Fault Act.  The court 
in Ivey explained the significance of the statutory provisions that 
allow for awards of attorney’s fees to the injured insured in achieving 
the purpose of the No-Fault Act: 
Florida law is clear that in “any dispute” which leads to 
judgment against the insurer and in favor of the insured, 
attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the insured.  See §§ 
627.736(8), 627.428(1); see also Dunmore[ v. Interstate 
Fire Ins. Co., 301 So. 2d 502, 503 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)].  
That is, under PIP law, the focus is outcome-oriented.  If 
a dispute arises between an insurer and an insured, and 
judgment is entered in favor of the insured, he or she is 
entitled to attorney’s fees.  It is the incorrect denial of 
benefits, not the presence of some sinister concept of 
“wrongfulness,” that generates the basic entitlement to 
the fees if such denial is incorrect.  It is clear to us that 
the purpose of this provision is to level the playing field 
so that the economic power of insurance companies is not 
so overwhelming that injustice may be encouraged 
because people will not have the necessary means to seek 
redress in the courts. 
Ivey, 774 So. 2d at 684 (emphasis added).   
 
[n.2] United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 808 So. 2d 82, 87 
(Fla. 2001) (“Under the language of the Florida No-Fault Law, an 
 
 
- 29 -
insurer is subject to specific penalties once a payment becomes 
‘overdue’; the penalties include ten percent interest and attorneys’ 
fees.”); January v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 838 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2003). 
In Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Pinnacle Medical, Inc., 
753 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2000), the court, in holding unconstitutional the 
requirement of mandatory arbitration and awards of attorney’s fees to 
the prevailing party under section 627.736(5), again emphasized the 
importance of the provision for fees to the insured under section 
627.428 by explaining: 
An objective of Florida’s Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law 
was to provide persons injured in an accident with 
prompt payment of benefits.  [Lasky v. State Farm Ins. 
Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 16 (Fla. 1974).]  Similarly, the 
legislative objective of section 627.428(1), Florida 
Statutes, which provides for an award of attorney fees 
against insurers who wrongfully deny benefits, was to 
discourage insurance companies from contesting valid 
claims and to reimburse successful insureds for their 
attorney fees when they are compelled to sue to enforce 
their insurance contracts.  See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 
v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830, 833 (Fla. 1993). 
Id. at 59. 
 
There is no provision for an award of attorney’s fees to the 
insurer in any of the provisions of the No-Fault Act and, I believe, for 
good reason.  Such a provision would thwart the purpose of the PIP 
provisions of the statutory no-fault scheme by unleveling the playing 
field by giving the insurance companies far too much leverage over 
the insureds, who are dependent on the fair and speedy payment of 
their necessary medical bills from their insurance carrier so they will 
continue to have access to necessary medical care.  Hence, an award 
of fees to the insurer under section 768.79 would circumvent the 
purposes of assuring swift and virtually automatic payment of benefits 
and, instead of discouraging insurers from contesting valid claims, it 
would have the effect of encouraging the contest of valid claims.  
Furthermore, an award of fees to the insurer under section 768.79 
would completely vitiate the purpose of imposing a penalty on the 
insurer under section 627.428.  Moreover, because section 768.79 is 
 
 
- 30 -
punitive in nature, [n.3] an award of fees to the insurer would actually 
impose a penalty on the insured.  I do not believe that the Legislature 
intended this result in enacting the No-Fault Act or section 768.79. 
 
[n.3] See Hilyer Sod, Inc. v. Willis Shaw Express, Inc., 817 So. 
2d 1050, 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (“Moreover, the offer of judgment 
statute and rule should be strictly construed because the procedure is 
in derogation of the common law and is penal in nature.”), approved, 
849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003); Schussel v. Ladd Hairdressers, Inc., 736 
So. 2d 776, 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (noting that “section 768.79 and 
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 are punitive in nature . . . .”) 
(citing TGI Friday’s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 614 (Fla. 1995); 
Loy v. Leone, 546 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 5th DCA l989)). 
 
I also believe that imposition of attorney’s fees on the insureds 
pursuant to section 768.79 could totally offset the insureds’ benefit 
awards for these essential medical costs and leave the insureds with 
unpaid medical bills that could potentially cause a cessation of their 
medical care.  In addition, imposition of fees against the insureds 
could leave the insureds actually owing money to their insurance 
company.  In essence, the insureds could lose the benefits of the 
coverage for which they paid a premium and be saddled with a debt 
owed to their insurance company.  Surely, the Legislature did not 
intend for such calamities to occur to insureds who were, according to 
the court in Lasky, given “an assurance that [they] would receive 
some economic aid in meeting medical expenses and the like . . . .”  
Imposition of fees pursuant to section 768.79 would, in my view, 
constitute a breach of that assurance and could potentially place many 
injured insureds in “dire financial circumstances with the possibility 
of swelling the public relief rolls”––a circumstance the court in Lasky 
indicated should not occur. 
 
Moreover, the stated purpose of the No-Fault Act is to “provide 
medical, surgical, funeral, and disability insurance benefits without 
regard to fault, and to require motor vehicle insurance securing such 
benefits . . . .”  § 627.731, Fla. Stat. (2001).  This purpose is 
accomplished through the provisions of section 627.733, which 
require that every owner of a motor vehicle “maintain security as 
required by subsection (3) . . . .”  § 627.733(1), Fla. Stat. (2001).  
Subsection (3) provides that “[s]uch security shall be provided:  (a) 
[b]y an insurance policy . . . which provides the benefits and 
exemptions contained in ss. 627.730-627.7405.”  § 627.733(3)(a), Fla. 
Stat. (2001).  Section 627.736 contains the provisions that specify 
 
 
- 31 -
what the security requirements are:  medical, disability and death 
benefits.  As the court explained in Reid v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 352 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 1977): 
The provision of Section 627.733, that every owner or 
registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered and 
licensed in the state shall maintain security, must be read 
in context with the rest of the Florida Automobile 
Reparations Reform Act.  In this context, the purpose of 
the required security is clearly to provide financial 
responsibility to pay any “no-fault” personal injury 
protection benefits due under Section 627.736. 
Id. at 1173 (emphasis added). 
 
The point I am making is that injured insureds are provided 
security for the payment of their benefits.  The dictionary gives the 
plain and ordinary meaning of the term “security”:  “1. Freedom from 
risk or danger; safety.  2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; 
confidence.  3. Something that gives or assures safety.”  The 
American Heritage Dictionary 109 (2d ed.1985).  Injured insureds 
who, according to Lasky, were given “an assurance . . . of economic 
aid” should not be subjected to the uncertainties of the offer of 
judgment statute, which requires the injured party to make a 
calculated guess at the amount of benefits a jury might award and to 
make another calculated guess whether the award will exceed the 
statutory percentage provided in the statute.  Payment of the injured 
insureds' necessarily-incurred medical bills and continuation of their 
medical care is far too important to be subjected to the uncertainties of 
the offer of judgment statute.  In my view, application of section 
768.79 to PIP cases, with its inherent uncertainties and risks, has 
completely abrogated the security and the assurance that injured 
insureds were promised by the Legislature through the No-Fault Act. 
This is not what the Legislature intended. 
 
I further believe that those insureds who file suit to recover 
their benefits in small claims court without the assistance of counsel 
to make this burdensome calculated guess will leave insurance 
companies, which are represented by attorneys, with an unfair 
advantage.  I also believe that this will discourage many insureds from 
attempting to obtain the benefits for which they paid a premium, 
 
 
- 32 -
leaving the insurance companies that collected their premiums with a 
windfall. 
 
The Florida Supreme Court recognized that section 627.428(1) 
is a “one-way street offering the potential for attorneys’ fees only to 
the insured or beneficiary.”  Danis Indus. Corp. v. Ground 
Improvement Techniques, Inc., 645 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 1994).  
Because of the imposition of fees pursuant to section 768.79, instead 
of traveling down an unobstructed one-way street to recovery as 
intended by the Legislature, many injured insureds may find 
themselves stuck in front of a toll booth erected and maintained by 
their insurance companies without sufficient funds for passage 
through.  This certainly is not the intention of the Legislature. 
 
Section 768.79 is part of Chapter 768, Florida Statutes, wherein 
the Legislature included section 768.71(3), which provides that “[i]f a 
provision of this part is in conflict with any other provision of the 
Florida Statutes, such other provision shall apply.”  The PIP statute 
found in section 627.736 specifically provides that in PIP cases, “the 
provisions of s. 627.428 shall apply. . . .”  § 627.736(8), Fla. Stat. 
(2001) (emphasis added).  This provision is significant because 
section 627.428 would apply to PIP cases regardless of the provisions 
of section 627.736(8).  In my view, the Legislature intended that the 
specific provisions of section 627.428 should apply over the general 
provisions of section 768.79.  In other words, specifically including 
section 627.428 in the provisions of section 627.736(8), to the 
exclusion of any other statutory provision for fees, clearly indicates 
the Legislature’s intention that section 627.428 be the exclusive 
authority for an award of fees in PIP cases.  See, e.g., Frazier v. 
Metropolitan Dade County, 701 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) 
(holding that section 768.71(3) applied to a conflict between the 
wrongful death statute (the more specific statute) under which a non-
negligent survivor’s recovery cannot be reduced due to another 
survivor’s negligence, and the comparative negligence statute (the 
more general statute), which dictates that each party’s liability is 
limited to that party’s percentage of fault, so that the comparative fault 
statute had to yield to the wrongful death statute). 
 
I note that the Legislature recently amended section 627.736 by 
adding subsection (11), which requires that the insured provide the 
insurer with written notice of an intent to file a claim for benefits.  Ch. 
2001-271, § 6, at 1759, Laws of Fla.; § 627.736(11)(a), Fla. Stat. 
(2001).  Section 627.736(11)(d) provides that “[t]he insurer shall not 
 
 
- 33 -
be obligated to pay any attorney’s fees if the insurer pays the claim 
within the time prescribed by this subsection.”  In my view, this 
provision reaffirms the Legislature’s intention that an award of fees to 
the insured be a one-way street, especially in light of the fact that the 
Legislature again failed to make provision for fees to the insurer. 
Nichols v. State Farm Mutual, 851 So. 2d 742, 747-51 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) 
(Sawaya, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
QUINCE, J., concurs. 
 
 
Two Cases Consolidated: 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D01-3851 
 
 
(Orange County) 
 
Kenneth P. Hazouri of de Beaubien, Knight, Simmons, Mantzaris and Neel, LLP, 
Orlando, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner/Respondent 
 
Thomas P. Hockman of Law Offices of Hockman and Hockman, Winter Park, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent/Petitioner 
 
Philip D. Parrish, P.A., Miami, Florida on behalf of the Academy of Florida Trial 
Lawyers, 
 
 
as Amicus Curiae