Case Title: Cleveland v. Washington Mut. Bank

Citation: 2010-Ohio-2219

Docket Number: 20090441

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland v. Washington Mut. Bank, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2219.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2219 
CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLANT, v. WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, A DIVISION 
OF J.P. MORGAN CHASE, N.A., APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cleveland v. Washington Mut. Bank,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2219.] 
Criminal law — R. C. 2941.47 does not authorize a trial of a corporation in 
absentia in a criminal proceeding that is initiated by affidavit or 
complaint in a municipal court. 
(No. 2009-0441 ⎯ Submitted December 2, 2009 ⎯ Decided May 26, 2010.) 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 91379, 2008-Ohio-6956. 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. 2941.47 does not authorize a trial of a corporation in absentia in a criminal 
proceeding that is initiated by affidavit or complaint in a municipal court. 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} The issue in this case is whether R.C. 2941.47 authorizes the trial 
of a corporation in absentia in criminal proceedings in municipal court.  For the 
reasons that follow, we conclude that the statute does not. 
I. Procedural History 
{¶ 2} This appeal arises out of a trial in the Cleveland Municipal Court 
in which appellee, Washington Mutual Bank, was charged by affidavit or 
complaint with building and housing code violations on property that it owned. 
{¶ 3} Following a January 2007 inspection of the property, a city of 
Cleveland housing inspector filed a complaint against the bank in February 2007, 
alleging that the bank had failed to comply with an order of the director of 
building and housing and had violated Cleveland building and housing codes 
pertaining to the exterior maintenance of the property. The certified-mail receipt 
for that summons was accepted by a Deanne Kessler. The bank did not appear at 
the May hearing. 
{¶ 4} In November 2007, a speedy-trial waiver signed by “Romi T. Fox” 
as attorney for Washington Mutual was filed. 
{¶ 5} However, Fox’s motion to withdraw was granted after she 
informed the court that she was unable to contact the bank and that the bank no 
longer owned the property. Attached to the motion were title documents showing 
that the bank had transferred the property to another person on June 25, 2007. The 
municipal court scheduled the matter for trial in absentia. However, the court later 
ordered the clerk to reissue the summons to the bank. The summons was 
addressed to “Washington Mutual Corp. Service” at a Columbus, Ohio address. 
The trial court’s docket indicates that the summons was issued by “regular 
mail/certificate of mail” on February 15, 2008. 
{¶ 6} On April 7, 2008, the bank again failed to appear either through an 
attorney or a corporate representative. The clerk entered a not-guilty plea on 
January Term, 2010 
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behalf of the bank, and the court conducted a trial in absentia. The court found the 
bank guilty as charged and imposed a fine of $100,000. 
{¶ 7} The bank appealed its conviction and sentence, contending that 
R.C. 2941.47 did not authorize a trial in absentia. The court of appeals vacated the 
conviction, concluding that R.C. 2941.47 did not apply to a charge initiated by a 
complaint and did not provide for the trial in absentia conducted in this case. 
Cleveland v. Washington Mut. Bank, 179 Ohio App.3d 692, 2008-Ohio-6956, 903 
N.E.2d 384. The court of appeals denied the city’s motion for reconsideration. 
The appellate court declined to address the question whether R.C. 2941.47 may 
apply to misdemeanor proceedings initiated by indictment because this case was 
not brought by indictment. 
{¶ 8} The city appealed to this court, and we granted discretionary 
review on two of the city’s propositions of law: 1) whether R.C. 2941.35 and the 
rules of statutory construction authorize a misdemeanor trial in absentia when the 
service and pleading requirements of R.C. 2941.47 have been met and 2) whether 
R.C. 2938.12 and Crim.R. 43 apply or whether R.C. 2941.47 is conclusive. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 9} To answer the question whether the trial in absentia of Washington 
Mutual in this case was authorized by Ohio law, we review the language of the 
statutes, including R.C. 2941.47 and statutes concerning misdemeanor charges 
brought in municipal court. 
A. Application of R.C. 2941.47 
{¶ 10} The court of appeals held that Washington Mutual’s conviction 
must be vacated because R.C. 2941.47—the statute the trial court invoked for its 
trial in absentia of the bank—did not authorize such a procedure for criminal 
prosecutions instituted by complaint, as in this case. Washington Mut. Bank, 179 
Ohio App.3d 692, 2008-Ohio-6956, 903 N.E.2d 384, at ¶ 8.  R.C. 2941.47 
provides: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 11} “When an indictment is returned or information filed against a 
corporation, a summons commanding the sheriff to notify the accused thereof, 
returnable on the seventh day after its date, shall issue on praecipe of the 
prosecuting attorney. Such summons with a copy of the indictment shall be served 
and returned in the manner provided for service of summons upon corporations in 
civil actions. If the service cannot be made in the county where the prosecution 
began, the sheriff may make service in any other county of the state, upon the 
president, secretary, superintendent, clerk, treasurer, cashier, managing agent, or 
other chief business officer thereof, or by leaving a copy at a general or branch 
office or usual place of doing business of such corporation, with the person 
having charge thereof. Such corporation shall appear by one of its officers or by 
counsel on or before the return day of the summons served and answer to the 
indictment or information by motion, demurrer, or plea, and upon failure to make 
such appearance and answer, the clerk of the court of common pleas shall enter a 
plea of ‘not guilty.’ Upon such appearance being made or plea entered, the 
corporation is before the court until the case is finally disposed of.  On said 
indictment or information no warrant of arrest may issue except for individuals 
who may be included in such indictment or information.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 12} By its plain language, R.C. 2941.47 applies in criminal cases 
against a corporation that were instituted by indictment or information. The 
statute also provides that “upon failure [of the corporation] to make [an] 
appearance and answer, the clerk of the court of common pleas shall enter a plea 
of ‘not guilty.’ ”  By its terms, R.C. 2941.47 addresses prosecutions instituted by 
indictment or information against corporations in the court of common pleas and 
directs the clerk of that court to enter a “not guilty” plea on behalf of a 
corporation that has failed to appear. 
{¶ 13} In this case, the misdemeanor prosecution against Washington 
Mutual was instituted by complaint or affidavit in the municipal court, not by 
January Term, 2010 
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indictment or information in the common pleas court. The court of appeals was 
mistaken in stating that prosecution by indictment and information is reserved for 
felony prosecutions, because misdemeanors also may be presented in common 
pleas court. Washington Mut. Bank, 179 Ohio App.3d 692, 2008-Ohio-6956, 903 
N.E.2d 384, at ¶ 8.  Crim.R. 7(A) confirms that “[a] misdemeanor may be 
prosecuted by indictment or information in the court of common pleas, or by 
complaint  * * * in courts inferior to the court of common pleas.” (Emphasis 
added.)  
{¶ 14} However, the court of appeals correctly concluded that R.C. 
2941.47 applies to prosecutions against a corporation that were instituted by 
indictment or information.  Because this criminal prosecution was brought by 
affidavit or complaint in municipal court rather than by indictment or information 
in common pleas court, R.C. 2941.47 does not apply. 
{¶ 15} The city argues that by virtue of R.C. 2941.35, the procedure in 
R.C. 2941.47 applies to misdemeanor prosecutions brought by complaint or 
affidavit against a corporation in municipal court as well as to those initiated by 
indictment or information in common pleas court. R.C. 2941.35 provides:  
{¶ 16} “Prosecutions for misdemeanors may be instituted by a prosecuting 
attorney by affidavit or such other method as is provided by law in such courts as 
have original jurisdiction in misdemeanor. Laws as to form, sufficiency, 
amendments, objections, and exceptions to indictments and as to service thereof 
apply to such affidavits and warrants issued thereon.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 17} This court, in Cleveland v. Ely (1963), 174 Ohio St. 403, 404, 23 
O.O.2d 46, 189 N.E.2d 724, held that under R.C. 2941.35 and R.C. 1901.211 
statutory procedures for challenging an indictment apply to criminal charges 
                                                 
1.  The current version of R.C. 1901.21(A) provides: “In a criminal case or proceeding, the 
practice, procedure, and mode of bringing and conducting prosecutions for offenses shall be as 
provided in the Criminal Rules * * *.” 
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instituted by affidavit or complaint. The other appellate court cases on which the 
city relies to argue that R.C. 2941.35 authorizes the procedure in R.C. 2941.47 in 
a prosecution by affidavit or complaint in municipal court pertain to challenges to 
the form or sufficiency of an affidavit or complaint, e.g., Lima v. Ward (1966), 8 
Ohio App.2d 177, 178, 37 O.O.2d 193, 220 N.E.2d 843, reversed on other 
grounds (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 137, 39 O.O.2d 123, 226 N.E.2d 737, and State v. 
Gundlach (1960), 112 Ohio App. 471, 474, 15 O.O.2d 192, 174 N.E.2d 267; or a 
challenge to an amendment to a complaint, Toledo v. Cousino (Nov. 23, 1984), 
6th Dist. No. L-84-103, 1984 WL 14423; or a challenge to a variance between the 
affidavit and the evidence, State v. Ross (1973), 36 Ohio App.2d 185, 205-208, 65 
O.O.2d 316, 304 N.E.2d 396.  R.C. 2941.35 specifically states that “[l]aws as to 
form, sufficiency, [and] amendments * * * to indictments” apply to affidavits or 
complaints in misdemeanor cases.  None of these cases addresses whether the 
trial procedure in R.C. 2941.47 applies to a prosecution of a corporation by 
complaint or affidavit in a municipal court. 
{¶ 18} Neither Ely nor the appellate court cases on which the city relies 
require that the trial procedure set forth in R.C. 2941.47 apply to misdemeanor 
prosecutions instituted by complaint or affidavit in municipal court.  Although 
Washington Mutual challenges the sufficiency of service of the summons in this 
case, the issue before us is whether R.C. 2941.47 permits a criminal trial of a 
corporation in absentia after proper service of process. R.C. 2941.35 specifically 
mentions laws governing the sufficiency of an indictment and the sufficiency of 
service, but it does not mention laws that govern trial procedure.  R.C. 2941.35 
thus does not expressly allow a trial in absentia in municipal court prosecutions of 
a corporation, and the cases construing R.C. 2941.35 on which the city relies do 
not answer the question before us today. 
B. Trial of Corporation in Absentia 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 19} The city argues that the language of R.C. 2941.47 authorizes the 
trial of a corporation in absentia. The city does not contend that other statutes or 
court rules, such as R.C. 2938.12 or 2945.12, or Crim.R. 43, authorize a criminal 
trial of a corporation in absentia such as occurred in this case. The city bases its 
argument that R.C. 2941.47 authorizes a trial of a corporation in absentia on the 
following language of the statute:  
{¶ 20} “Such corporation shall appear by one of its officers or by counsel 
on or before the return day of the summons served and answer to the indictment 
or information by motion, demurrer, or plea, and upon failure to make such 
appearance and answer, the clerk of the court of common pleas shall enter a plea 
of ‘not guilty.’ Upon such appearance being made or plea entered [i.e., an 
appearance by the corporation through one of its officers or its legal counsel, or a 
plea entered by the clerk of the common pleas court], the corporation is before 
the court until the case is finally disposed of.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 21} However, our holding that R.C. 2941.47 does not apply to a 
prosecution instituted by affidavit or complaint against a corporation in municipal 
court is determinative of this case; the prosecution here is one that was instituted 
in such a manner.  Accordingly, we have no occasion to decide whether R.C. 
2941.47 provides for a trial of a corporation in absentia in proceedings other than 
those brought by affidavit or complaint in a municipal court, or how R.C. 2941.47 
may apply in relation to Crim.R. 43 or other statutes such as R.C. 2938.12. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 22} For the above reasons, we hold that R.C. 2941.47 does not 
authorize a trial of a corporation in absentia in a criminal proceeding that is 
initiated by affidavit or complaint in a municipal court.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals and remand for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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and cause remanded. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurs separately. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurring. 
{¶ 23} I join the majority opinion but write separately to urge the General 
Assembly to study the problem that gives rise to cases like this one:  high rates of 
foreclosure in urban neighborhoods dominated by absentee landlords. 
{¶ 24} Cleveland, like other Ohio cities, has witnessed the spread of 
blighted neighborhoods caused by many factors, including absentee landlords 
(corporate and individual) who permit properties to go into ruin and decay.  The 
presence of abandoned or untended buildings “portends and precipitates a 
downward spiral in the quality of life of [a] community.”  Melissa C. King, 
Recouping Costs for Repairing “Broken Windows”:  The Use of Public Nuisance 
by Cities to Hold Banks Liable for the Costs of Mass Foreclosures (2009), 45 Tort 
Trial & Ins. Prac.L.J. 97, 98.  Cities already struggling to address the challenges 
of urban life are now desperate for assistance in their efforts to stop additional 
blight and deterioration. 
{¶ 25} City prosecutors working in municipal and common pleas courts 
must have a mechanism through which they can constitutionally provide notice to 
landlords but proceed with trial in absentia if a landlord fails to respond to defend 
the claim.  Legislative modification of R.C. 2941.47 to permit a municipal court 
to proceed in absentia is one manner in which this goal can be accomplished. 
{¶ 26} In asserting the need for action, I am aware that many lenders are 
now inundated with foreclosed properties.  But that dynamic is not likely to 
change in the foreseeable future, and lenders, as the lawful property owners, must 
now address the problem.  They may choose to do so through cooperative efforts 
January Term, 2010 
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with city leaders. But ignoring the problem will only contribute to it, a result that 
is neither legally, fiscally, nor morally acceptable. 
__________________ 
Robert J. Triozzi, Cleveland Law Director, and Karyn J. Lynn, Assistant 
Law Director, for appellant. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Vladimir P. Belo, and Nelson M. Reid; and 
Shapiro, Van Ess, Phillips & Barragate, L.L.P., and Benjamin D. Carnahan, for 
appellee. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
and Alexandra T. Schimmer, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General. 
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