Case Title: O CONNELL v HEISDORF

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82-072

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1982-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 82-72 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1982 BRIAN O'CONNELL, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, VS . JOSEPH HEISDOFF, e t a l , Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Powell Honorable Robert Boyd, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For P l a i n t i f f : Harrison, Loendorf and Poston; Jerome T. Loendorf, EIelena, Montana For Defendant: Poore, Rot11 & Robinson; James A. Poore, Butte, Montana Submitted on b r i e f s : August 19, 1982 Decided: December 29, 1982 M r . Justice Daniel J . Shea delivered the Opinion o f the Court. The plaintiff, Brian J. O'Connell appeals fran a Powell County District Court judgment quieting title to certain mining properties i n favor of the defendants, Joseph Heisdorf, et a l . and declaring OIConnell's mining clajms to be v o i d . OfConnell has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. We dismiss the appeal because the notice of appeal was filed too late, thereby depriving this court of jurisdiction. Our discussion is limited to the procedural defects upon which we base the dismissal. There are three defects, any one of which requires a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The original judgment was entered on October 8, 1981 and notice of entry of judqment was given on the same d a y . The next day, October 9, 1981, the plaintiff filed a motion objecting to defemdants' mrandum of costs and noticed it up for a hearing on October 22, 1981. It does not appear that a hearing was held on October 22, nor is there any indication +bat the trial court entered an order for a different hearing date. For reasons not disclosed by the record, the court did not rule on the objection to the costs. Rather on October 26, 1981, the parties stipulated to the costs. A motion objecting to costs does not, however, stop the judgment from running. Only certain motions will suspend the running of the judgment for the purpose of filing a notice of appeal. Rule 5, M . R . A p p . C i v . P . lists those motions a n d includes a Rule 59, M . R . C i v . P . motion to alter or amend judgment. A motion objecting to costs is provided for b y section 25-10-502, K!A and is outside the scope of a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend judgment. We find authority for this view i n the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 5 9 (e) , F . R . C i v . P . provides that a motion to alter or amend judgment must be served not later than ten days after entry of the judgment. A comnent t o that rule sta-tes that "[wlhere costs are part of the judgment, an a m e n b n t of the bill of costs is not governed by Rule 59(e)." 6A Moore's Federal Practice $ 59.12 (1) , n. 34. W e also note that the last sentence of our o w n Rule 58, M.R.Civ.P. expressly provides that, "[tlhe entry of the judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs." This rule clearly implies that rn 0-t, taxing of costs isAto be considered as part of the judgment insofar as the running of the for the notice of appeal after the entry of judgment. Once notice of entry of judgwnt is served by the clerk of court under Rule 77(d), M.R.Civ.P., the clock starts running regardless of what later takes place coi~ceming the separate item of costs. The clock began t o run on the judgmnt on October 8, 1981, and Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P. provides that an appeal from a judgment must be taken within 30 days from the entry thereof. Including 3 days for service by mil (Rule 6 (e) , M.R.Civ.P.) the latest date for the filing of this appeal would have been November 8, 1981. The plaintiff did not f i l e the notice of appeal until January 26, 1982, long after the time had lapsed. The time limits for filing an appeal are mandatory and jurisdictional. Absent compliance, w e do not acquire jurisdiction t o determine an appeal on the merits. Price v. Zunchich (1980), Mont. , 612 P.2d On October 29, 1981, an amended judgment was entered t o reflect the amount of costs as stipulated by the parties, and on that s m date the clerk of court mailed another notice of entry of judgment t o the plaintiff. On November 13, 1981, 15 days after this notice of entry of judgment, the plaintiff filed a motion t o amend the judgment, supported by a brief. The plaintiff did not notice up thj-s motion for a hearing. Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P. provides that a motion t o amend a judqme-nt must be filed within ten days of the notice of entry of jud-t. If w e include three additional days permitted by Rule 6 (e) , M. R. Civ. P . for service of the notice of entry of judgment by mail, the motion t o amend judgment was still late. Counting from the October 2 9 notice of entry of judgment, plus tea days, plus the three days allowed for mailing, the motion t o amend judgment should have been filed a t least by IVovember 1 1 , 1981. Because it was filed too late, the t r i a l court had no jurisdiction to hear or determine the motion t o amend the judgrent. This Court w i l l not disregard the ten day time limitation of h l e 59(g). Matter of Estxte of Cardon (1981), Mont . , 628 P.2d 1117, 38 St.Rep. 887. In addition, because the motion t o amend j u d p n t was filed too late, the time for filing the notice of appeal was not suspended. Assuming that the clock began running on the date of the amended judgment, October 29, 1981, the notice of appeal w a s filed January 26, 1982, a h s t three months later and w e l l beyond the 30 day time limit. A second defect exists which denies us jurisdiction t o hear the appeal. Assuming now that the plaintiff's motion t o amend the October 29, 1-981 judgment was filed in time, Rule 59 (dl , M.R.Civ.P. provides that i f a party files a motion t o amend a judgment without noticing it up for a hearing, the t r i a l court must rule on that motion within 15 days of the filing date, or the motion is autamatical-ly d e e d denied. Winn v. Winn (1982) , Mont . P.2d , 39 St.Rep. 1831; O s t e r v. O s t e r - (1980) , - Mont. - , 606 P.2d 1075, 37 %.Rep. 264. Here plaintiff did not notice up the motion t o amend judgment for a hearing. The defendants filed a memorandum in opposition and the motion w a s deemed submitted on November 17, 1981. The txial court did not rule on the motion until December 24, 1981, more than a month after it hFd been deaned submitted. The mtion was automatically deemed denied after 15 days and it was error for the t r i a l court t o rule after the expiration of the time period measured from the date of submission of the motion. See Kelly v. Sell and Sell Paint Contractors (1978), 175 Mont. 440, 574 P.2d 1002. The motion was d e a d denied on December 2, 1981 and the 30 day time for entering a notice of a p a l would have started running on that date. Again the plaintiffs did not f i l e their notice of appeal until January 26, 1982, well beyond the allowable 30 days. For these reasons, this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The appeal is dismissed. We Concur: I Justices