Case Title: Metropolitan Mortg. & Securities Co., Inc. v. Belgarde

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Metropolitan Mortg. & Securities Co., Inc. v. Belgarde1991 WY 110816 P.2d 868Case Number: 89-253Decided: 08/27/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
METROPOLITAN MORTGAGE 
& SECURITIES CO., INC., APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

CHARLES P. BELGARDE, 
D/B/A BELGARDE ENTERPRISES, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

Julie Nye Tiedeken, 
McDaniel & Tiedeken Law Offices, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Donald J. Rissler, Brown, 
Raymond & Rissler, P.C., Casper, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, 
C.J.,* and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and 
GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1.]     The problem posed in 
this case is whether the parties to an installment land contract intended to 
enter into a bilateral or a unilateral agreement. The trial court examined the 
instrument, found it to be unambiguous, and concluded that it reflected an offer 
that could be accepted only by making the payments required by the instrument. 
The buyer, Charles P. Belgarde (Belgarde), then was awarded a summary judgment 
because the trial court ruled that the only remedy available to the seller upon 
the failure of the buyer to make payments under the instrument was to retake the 
property. The seller's assignee, Metropolitan Mortgage and Securities Co., Inc., 
(Metropolitan) had sought specific performance of the installment land contract 
as well as damages for past due payments. Given the language of the instrument 
and potential varying interpretations of that language, we conclude that the 
instrument was ambiguous and reverse the summary judgment because a genuine 
issue of material fact exists as to the intention of the parties. We remand the 
case to the trial court to resolve that issue of fact at a trial on the 
merits.

[¶2.]     Metropolitan, in its 
Brief of Appellant, states the issues to be:

"1. Did the trial court 
err in ruling that specific performance was not an appropriate seller's remedy 
in this case?

"2. Did the trial court 
err in ruling that the seller was limited to the remedy of forfeiting the 
contract and taking the property back?"

 

In his Appellee's Brief, 
Belgarde adopts the issues as stated by Metropolitan.

[¶3.]     In May of 1982, Dale 
and Carolyn Schilling entered into an "Agreement for Warranty Deed" to transfer 
ownership of some property in Gillette to Belgarde for $495,000. That instrument 
provides in part:

"IN CONSIDERATION of the 
sum of $5,000.00 paid by Buyers to Sellers, the receipt and sufficiency of which 
is hereby acknowledged as part of the purchase money for the premises 
hereinafter described, the Sellers hereby agree, promise, and covenant to convey 
a fee simple title to Buyers, by a good and sufficient Warranty Deed, the 
following described land situate in Campbell County, State of Wyoming * * * 
under the following terms and conditions:

"I.

"PURCHASE 
PRICE

"The total sale price 
shall be the sum of $495,000.00, including all improvements now on said 
property, and any other such improvements as may hereinafter be placed on said 
premises by Buyers, the latter to be held as additional security in case of 
failure to fulfill the covenants of this contract.

"Buyers shall pay to 
Sellers the sum of $6,041.81 down payment as follows: $5,000.00 presently held 
by Sellers and $1,041.81 to be paid on the signing of this agreement. Buyers 
will assume a note in the amount of $94,000 from Sellers to Herbert R. Stollorz 
and Carol A. Stollorz, * * *. This note shall be assumed and payable prior to 
May 15, 1982.

"The remaining 
$394,958.19 shall be paid as follows: An additional $50,000.00 cash plus 14% 
interest per annum from May 1, 1982, shall be paid on July 1, 1983. The Buyers 
also agree to assume the payments under the existing Agreement for Deed in the 
amount of $144,958.19 payable at the rate of $2,312.71 per month, including 
interest at 10% per annum, with the entire balance due in approximately 7 1/2 
years.

"The balance in the 
amount of $200,000.00 shall be due and payable in monthly payments of $2,500.00 
per month, including interest at 14% per annum from May 1, 1982, with the entire 
balance due in ten (10) years."

[¶4.]     The deed was to be held 
in escrow until Belgarde performed all the conditions of the contract. The 
agreement also listed those occurrences that would constitute a default on the 
buyers' part and stated:

"In the event of such a 
default Sellers, at their option, may declare this agreement null and 
void and may, with or without process of law, take immediate possession of the 
said premises and regard any persons thereon as guilty of forcible detainer; 
hold and retain all monies paid hereunder as liquidated damages, rent, and 
compensation for the use and benefit of the property. Sellers shall be entitled 
to any additional damages incurred as a result of Buyers' holding 
over.

"In the event Sellers 
declare this agreement null and void in accordance with the terms hereof, the 
escrow agent shall deliver all of said instruments to Sellers upon the receipt 
of an affidavit of default for reasons hereinabove provided." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶5.]     The Schillings assigned 
their interests in the land and the "Agreement for Warranty Deed" to 
Metropolitan in 1986. At the time of the assignment, approximately $190,761 
remained due from Belgarde to complete the transaction. In August of 1988, 
Belgarde stopped making the monthly payments. In February of 1989, 
Metropolitan's counsel sent notice to Belgarde that he was in default, owing at 
that time about $18,000 and, in March of 1989, Metropolitan filed suit alleging 
that Belgarde was in default. Metropolitan claimed that it had no speedy and 
adequate remedy at law and was entitled to specific performance of the 
"Agreement for Warranty Deed" as well as damages for past due 
payments.

[¶6.]     Both parties 
subsequently filed motions for summary judgment. Metropolitan argued that 
forfeiture was not its only remedy for default and that it should be able to 
avail itself of specific performance of the contract and seek damages for past 
due payments. Belgarde argued that Metropolitan was limited to pursuing the 
remedy specifically provided in the agreement and that Metropolitan should close 
out the escrow, retain all payments as liquidated damages, and retake the 
land.

[¶7.]     The trial court denied 
Metropolitan's motion on the specific performance issue, but requested 
additional briefing before considering Belgarde's motion and Metropolitan's 
damage claim. Belgarde filed a second motion for summary judgment asking for a 
declaration that Metropolitan's remedies were limited to those under the 
agreement, an action in ejectment, or an action in strict foreclosure. A hearing 
followed in which the court granted Belgarde's motion for summary judgment, 
stating that "taking the property is [Metropolitan's] only remedy." The court 
subsequently issued an order reflecting this determination.

[¶8.]     In announcing his 
decision from the bench, the judge said:

"Having cleared those two 
things up, I want to turn to my analysis. Before I start, I want to tell you 
that, and I guess it's merely pointing out the obvious, I'm not free to do what 
I think is fair and I'm not free to do what I would like. I'm bound to follow 
the law. In this case, I think what the parties intended was that the buyers 
were going to buy this property and they promised to pay the money, and the 
sellers were satisfied with those promises. I think what would be fair under the 
circumstances is to make Belgarde live with what probably everyone thought their 
obligations were at the time. However, I have to deal not with what I think the 
parties probably intended but what they, in fact, said.

"I'm looking at the 
agreement for warranty deed, and what it says is that the buyers - or, I mean, 
the sellers promise to convey the real property under the following terms and 
conditions. Then it goes into the recital of the purchase price and says what 
the buyers' obligations are. What that says to me is that the sellers agree to 
perform if the buyers perform. They - the buyers have not undertaken, at least 
by a plain reading of the language of the statute (sic) [instrument], an 
obligation to do that, to an independent obligation, an independent promise to 
pay. They have an obligation if they want the land conveyed to them, so it's a 
conditional sales contract.

"Looking at the remedies, 
it does provide for default, and it provides a remedy in event of default. Now, 
the sellers, at their option, can declare the agreement null and void. They've 
elected not to do that, and if they elect not to declare it null and void, 
unless there's an independent promise by the buyers to do something, I don't 
know what their remedy is. It's not clear within the terms of the contract, and 
I think under existing law there's no independent obligation on the part of the 
buyers to do anything. They simply don't have the right to have the real 
property conveyed to them if they fail to keep up their end of the bargain. "So 
that is my legal interpretation of that instrument. Necessarily, from that 
interpretation flows the conclusion that the seller's remedy is to take the 
property back, period. So while I'm somewhat dismayed that that's - that's the 
result because I don't think it's a fair one, nevertheless, that is, I think, 
what the parties agreed to and the extent of their obligation."

[¶9.]     The question of the 
intention of the original parties, as in all property disputes involving 
contracts, is critical to the resolution of this dispute. Johnson Storage and 
Moving Co. v. Victory, Inc., 774 P.2d 636 (Wyo. 
1989); True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781 (Wyo. 1989). See 
U.S. through Farmers Home Admin. v. 
Redland, 695 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1985). In considering the issues 
presented by these parties, we recall that we have analyzed the rights of 
parties to transactions involving sales of land in this way:

"A further and more basic 
question, however, is presented by this case. The question, which was neither 
reached by the district court nor directly briefed by the parties, is whether 
the transaction at issue represents an installment land contract or a conveyance 
with a mortgage back. The significance of this determination can readily be 
seen. If the agreement represents a conveyance with a mortgage back, the 
forfeiture provision was unenforceable. See generally E. Rudolph, The Wyoming 
Law of Real Mortgages at 147 (1969) * * *. A mortgagee's only remedy upon 
mortgage default is foreclosure and public sale, either by power of sale 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. §§ 34-4-101 to -113 (1977) or by judicial sale in 
accordance with Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-18-101 to -112 (1977). L Slash X Cattle Company, 
Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 623 P.2d 764 (Wyo. 1981). See also Marple [v. Wyoming 
Production Credit Association], 750 P.2d [1315] at 1318, n. 2 [(Wyo. 1988)] (in case of 
equitable mortgage, foreclosure was the remedy - not quiet title). * * * 
Conversely, when a transaction is accomplished by means of an installment land 
contract, the seller, while often able to enforce a forfeiture provision, is not 
entitled to a deficiency. Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 P. 27 
(1916).

"In an installment land 
contract, the seller agrees to accept payments from the purchaser, generally by 
a series of installments over time, until the purchase price as established by 
the contract has been paid. When the contract price has been paid, the seller 
must deliver a deed to the purchaser. Insurance Company of North America v. 
Ventling, 771 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 1989); E. Rudolph, supra at 147-48. Prior 
to the final installment payment and delivery of the deed, the seller retains 
legal title. Id.; Baldwin, 156 P. 27; 7 R. Powell, The Law 
of Real Property ¶ 938.20[1] (1989). Although the purchaser usually is given the 
right to possession, his interest in an installment land contract is equitable, 
not legal. Insurance Company of North America, 
771 P.2d 388; Baldwin, 156 P. 27.

"The fundamental 
difference distinguishing a mortgage from an installment land contract, at least 
in states applying a lien theory to mortgages, is that, in a mortgage, fee title 
has vested in the purchaser/mortgagor. Marple, 750 P.2d 1315; Baldwin, 156 P. 27. When a question as to the nature of the transaction arises, however, and in 
order for a court to find a mortgage, it must be shown that the parties intended 
a mortgage transaction rather than an installment land contract; i.e., there 
must have been an intent to create a security, as construed from the written 
agreement and the surrounding circumstances. Angus Hunt Ranch, Inc. v. Reb, 
Inc., 577 P.2d 645 (Wyo. 1978); Baldwin, 156 P. 27. See also 7 R. Powell, supra, ¶ 
938.20[3] at 84D-13 (installment land contract not the functional equivalent of 
a mortgage absent clear proof that parties intended to create a 
mortgagor-mortgagee relationship (citing Angus Hunt Ranch, Inc.))." Cliff & 
Co., Ltd. v. Anderson, 777 P.2d 595, 600-601 
(Wyo. 1989) 
(footnote omitted).

[¶10.]  In an early case, this court discussed 
the doctrine of equitable conversion, a principle that is not invoked with 
respect to a unilateral contract, which is how we have characterized an 
installment land contract, and said:

"* * * This rule, for 
many purposes, determines in equity the rights of the parties and others who 
have succeeded to the interest of either party by transfer or otherwise; and the 
rule is itself but the consequence of the familiar doctrine of courts of equity 
that for many purposes things agreed to be done are treated as if they were 
actually done, and necessarily refers to a valid contract - one binding upon 
both parties, containing not only an obligation on the part of the vendor to 
convey upon payment of the purchase price, but an obligation on the part of the 
vendee to purchase and pay the purchase money, and has no reference to a mere 
option to purchase or to complete the purchase. 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. (3rd Ed.) 
§§ 1260, 1261, and note; Lysaght v. Edwards, 2 L.R. Ch. Div. 499; Milwaukee v. MilwaukeeCounty, 95 Wis. 42, 
69 N.W. 796; People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 645, 648. It is evident that, if the 
purchaser is not obligated to pay the purchase money, the vendor cannot be 
treated even in equity as the owner of the money, and therefore, in such case, 
there would be no ground for applying the doctrine of equitable conversion." 
Olds v. Little Horse Creek Cattle Company, 22 Wyo. 336, 346, 140 P. 1004, 1007 
(1914).

[¶11.]  Like the parties in Cliff & Co., 
Ltd., the parties in this case, although implicitly broaching the subject, have 
not sufficiently addressed the language in the "Agreement for Warranty Deed" to 
indicate whether the actual intention of the original parties to the agreement 
was that it establish an installment land contract characterized by an 
obligation unilaterally placed on the seller only upon the occurrence of certain 
non-mandatory acts by the buyer or whether it was to be a bilateral agreement 
equivalent to a mortgage, either in law or equity, resulting in the property 
providing a security interest against a binding debt. See Angus Hunt Ranch, Inc. 
v. Reb, Inc., 577 P.2d 645 (Wyo. 1978). If the latter situation pertained, 
a deficiency judgment could be appropriate if it were justified by the 
circumstances.

[¶12.]  The trial judge's conclusion was that the 
instrument he was construing imposed no duty upon Belgarde to make the payments 
provided for in the instrument. Although admittedly troubled by the result, the 
judge ruled that this left Metropolitan with no remedy other than forfeiture. 
Metropolitan, as others might, reads the contract differently, treating it as a 
bilateral contract with mutual obligations to the end that the seller would have 
available the full panoply of remedies in law and equity.

[¶13.]  These parties chiefly question whether an 
installment land contract is limited entirely to the remedy of forfeiture as a 
matter of law. The arguments presented implicitly assume the existence of a 
bilateral installment land contract. The usual obligations of a bilateral 
contract are different from those generally accepted with respect to a contract 
for deed. While the debated issue is intriguing, the question cannot, and need 
not, be resolved under the circumstances of this case without first determining 
the factual issue involving the intentions of the parties. Cf., Olds (doctrine 
of equitable conversion implies buyer's obligation under contract for deed). 
Consequently, we focus on that single aspect.

[¶14.]  It is apparent from the circumstances 
that the property in dispute no longer is worth what is owed upon it. It follows 
that Metropolitan's claim is the functional equivalent of a demand for a 
deficiency judgment, a remedy normally found only in a mortgage situation. 
Belgarde's stance, on the other hand, hinges on the generally adopted view that 
forfeiture is the sole remedy under the normal construction of an installment 
land contract. Resolution of this divergence requires a factual determination as 
to whether the language of the parties was sufficient to create a contract 
binding on both parties. A bilateral contract is the predicate for any 
conclusion that the real intent, as the trial judge intimated, of the parties 
was to create a security interest in Metropolitan's predecessor that would 
justify a remedy alternative to forfeiture.

[¶15.]  Our rule is that an ambiguity in a 
written instrument precludes the trial court from awarding a summary judgment 
because there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the intent of 
the parties. Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 609 P.2d 984 (Wyo. 1980); Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Canada, 
Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corporation, 590 P.2d 1306 (Wyo. 1979). See Centric Corp. v. Drake Bldg. 
Corporation, 726 P.2d 1047 (Wyo. 1986). It is only when there is no 
ambiguity in the instrument that summary judgment is appropriate in a contract 
case. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission v. Mills 
Co., 701 P.2d 819 (Wyo. 1985); Kuehne v. 
Samedan Oil Corp., 626 P.2d 1035 (Wyo. 1981); 
Madison v. Marlatt, 619 P.2d 708 (Wyo. 1980). Furthermore, 
we have said that the intent of the parties that the property transaction be a 
mortgage rather than an installment land contract is to be shown from their 
written agreement and the surrounding circumstances. Angus; Baldwin v. McDonald, 
24 Wyo. 108, 
156 P. 27 (1916). 

[¶16.]  The parties in this case appear to have 
different perceptions of the decision of the trial court. We are satisfied that 
the trial judge followed the foregoing precepts in concluding that the contract 
was unambiguous and that Belgarde was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The judge simply treated the instrument as an offer subject to acceptance only 
through completion of an act by the purchaser (sometimes called a unilateral 
contract). The court ruled that the buyer's acceptance of the seller's offer 
could be accomplished only by the buyer making the payments provided for in the 
instrument. Since it was not a bilateral contract, however, it imposed no 
obligations upon the buyer.

[¶17.]  What the judge overlooked is that the 
seller presented the instrument as a bilateral contract in this instance by 
seeking remedies different from forfeiture, and the court, as well, did not 
analyze the language of this court that expands the consideration of the 
parties' intent on this issue beyond the written agreement to a consideration of 
the surrounding circumstances. The "Agreement for Warranty Deed" is, therefore, 
subject to a different construction from that adopted by the trial court, and 
the diametrical views that are offered with respect to that instrument lend 
credence to a conclusion that it, in fact, is ambiguous. The trial judge read 
the language as providing only the method for accepting the offer to sell. The 
same language can be read as imposing a duty upon the buyer to make the payments 
that are provided. That duty is the essence of a bilateral contract. 
Olds.

[¶18.]  Metropolitan also relies upon language in 
the contract that provides that in the event of default "Sellers, at their 
option, may declare this agreement null and void and may, with or 
without process of law, take immediate possession" of the property. (Emphasis 
added.) Metropolitan contends that this language recognizes an option to declare 
the agreement null and void and, by implication, provides that it may, in the 
alternative, enforce the contract. Belgarde argues that this language does 
nothing more than provide a right to declare a forfeiture and that is 
Metropolitan's only option. He contends that, in the absence of a declaration of 
forfeiture, the contract remains in effect thus permitting him to cure any 
default. Neither party refers to the language in the instrument providing that 
improvements later made to the premises are "to be held as additional 
security in case of failure to fulfill the covenants of this contract." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶19.]  Belgarde does not account for the 
provision for liquidated damages found in the forfeiture clause. That could be 
perceived as evidencing his recognition that a bilateral contract was entered 
into that created a security interest in the property and established 
obligations on his part. Under a true unilateral contract, the concept normally 
applicable to an installment land contract because it provides for acceptance 
only through performance of the stated conditions, the offeree or buyer would be 
bound to no obligations whatsoever, including any duty to pay liquidated 
damages. Until he had accepted by paying according to the instrument, no 
contract existed. It was only an offer until the buyer had completely performed 
the conditions attached to the offer to sell. Cf., Shellhart v. Axford, 485 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 
1971) (mutuality of obligation is a requirement for a contract). Belgarde's 
reliance on the forfeiture clause is a matter of concern, but that reliance 
avoids the argument that commencing performance might invoke a binding promise 
to completely perform. That question, however, is not before us in this case. We 
do emphasize that the possibility of a bilateral contract should not encourage 
those whose rights under a contract for the sale of land have been forfeited to 
seek the return of moneys paid on the defaulted contract. There are theories 
under which such a forfeiture is clearly justified, See Bentzen v. H.N. Ranch, 
Inc., 78 Wyo. 158, 320 P.2d 440 (1958), and, indeed, the time to raise that 
question must be when the forfeiture is pursued.

[¶20.]  It is obvious that reasonable minds can, 
and do, differ over what the parties intended when entering into the "Agreement 
for Warranty Deed." In a contract case, that difference in interpretation 
constitutes the genuine issue of material fact that forecloses summary judgment. 
Weaver; Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel. See Centric Corp. The concomitance is that the other 
party seeks to enforce a contract that is no less ambiguous, and the factual 
issue of intent must first be submitted to the trier of fact before the 
pertinent rules of law may be applied. In arriving at that determination, the 
surrounding circumstances must be accounted for in a case involving an 
instrument such as this.

[¶21.]  Our cases structure a presumption that an 
instrument such as this is a "unilateral contract" pursuant to which the seller 
is limited to forfeiture as a remedy, but they also recognize that a contrary 
intention can be established by either party. The claim of a contrary contention 
can first be raised by the seller simply by eschewing forfeiture as the remedy 
and seeking the alternative remedy of foreclosure followed by a deficiency. The 
question of the intention of the parties is squarely raised when the seller 
proceeds in that fashion and, in treating with that issue, the court must 
address both the written agreement and the surrounding circumstances. It is 
likely that the issue will require a trial in most cases in the absence of an 
admission by the purchaser that the remedy invoked by the seller is 
correct.

[¶22.]  Conversely, the purchaser can assert this 
issue by bringing an action for relief if the seller proceeds to assert the 
remedy of forfeiture. In the absence of any admission by the seller, the claim 
that a bilateral contract is present would require a trial in most cases because 
of the necessity to consider the written agreement and the surrounding 
circumstances to discern intent. It appears that, once the question is raised, 
any presumption that favors an installment land contract can be rebutted by the 
party asserting a bilateral contract if that party can demonstrate an intent to 
create a mortgage.

[¶23.]  We view our cases as manifesting a strong 
bias in favor of a trial on the issue of the intent of the parties, to be 
determined from their written agreement and the surrounding circumstances. We 
also are satisfied that the parties can draft agreements to settle the question. 
They have the opportunity, and the power, to specify in their agreement whether 
it is an installment land contract limiting the remedy to forfeiture or, in the 
alternative, whether it is intended to be a bilateral agreement invoking the 
doctrine of equitable conversion. If they choose to endeavor to keep their 
options open by not specifying the nature of their agreement, they should have 
no complaint about the necessity of a trial to settle the question of intent in 
accordance with this opinion.

[¶24.]  The summary judgment is reversed and the 
case is remanded to the district court for trial.

URBIGKIT, 
C.J., 
files an opinion concurring in the result.

CARDINE and MACY, JJ., 
file dissenting opinions.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
concurring in the result.

[¶25.]  I remain consistent in conclusion that 
the trial court decision should be reversed and that the agreement was both 
bilateral and unambiguous as stated in dissent by Justice MACY.

[¶26.]  In disposition of the appeal, the trial 
court's decision has to be either affirmed or reversed, and, by concurrence in 
the result, I vote to reverse and remand to the trial court for further 
proceedings.

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶27.]  Metropolitan Mortgage and Securities Co., 
Inc. (Metropolitan), sued the buyer, Charles P. Belgarde, for specific 
performance of an installment land contract and damages for past due payments. 
Belgarde was granted summary judgment which held that Metropolitan's remedy on 
default was limited to retaking the property and retaining payments made as 
liquidated damages.

[¶28.]  I would affirm the judgment of the trial 
court.

[¶29.]  Metropolitan brings these issues: 

"1. Did the trial court 
err in ruling that specific performance was not an appropriate seller's remedy 
in this case?

"2. Did the trial court 
err in ruling that the seller was limited to the remedy of forfeiting the 
contract and taking the property back?"

[¶30.]  In May 1982, Dale and Carolyn Schilling 
entered into an "Agreement for Warranty Deed" to transfer ownership of property 
in Gillette to Belgarde for a total purchase price of $495,000. Belgarde paid 
$6,041.81 at closing and assumed a note for $94,000 that was in the sellers' 
names. An amount of $50,000 plus interest was due July 1983. Additionally, 
Belgarde assumed payments under the existing Agreement for Deed in the amount of 
$144,958.19. The remaining balance in the amount of $200,000 was to be paid in 
installments of $2,500 per month for ten years. A deed was to be held in escrow 
until Belgarde performed all the conditions of the contract. The Schillings 
assigned their interests in the land and the "Agreement for Warranty Deed" to 
Metropolitan in 1986. At the time of the assignment, approximately $190,761 was 
unpaid under the "Agreement for Warranty Deed."

[¶31.]  The agreement provided with respect to 
default on the buyer's part:

"In the event of such a 
default Sellers, at their option, may declare this agreement null and void and 
may, with or without process of law, take immediate possession of the said 
premises and regard any persons thereon as guilty of forcible detainer; hold and 
retain all monies paid hereunder as liquidated damages, rent, and compensation 
for the use and benefit of the property. Sellers shall be entitled to any 
additional damages incurred as a result of Buyers' holding over.

"In the event Sellers 
declare this agreement null and void in accordance with the terms hereof, the 
escrow agent shall deliver all of said instruments to Sellers upon the receipt 
of an affidavit of default for reasons hereinabove provided."

[¶32.]  During August 1988, Belgarde stopped 
making monthly payments. In February 1989, Metropolitan's counsel sent Belgarde 
notice of default claiming an amount then due and unpaid of $17,995.15. In March 
1989, Metropolitan filed suit alleging Belgarde's default; that it had no speedy 
and adequate remedy at law; and was entitled to specific performance of the 
"Agreement for Warranty Deed," as well as damages for past due 
payments.

[¶33.]  Both parties filed motions for summary 
judgment. Metropolitan claimed that forfeiture was not its only remedy for 
default and that it had a right to specific performance of the "Agreement for 
Warranty Deed" and damages for past due payments. Belgarde contended that 
Metropolitan was limited to the remedy specifically provided in the agreement, 
i.e., that of closing the escrow, retaining all payments as liquidated damages, 
and retaking the land.

[¶34.]  The trial court denied Metropolitan's 
motion on the specific performance issue but requested additional briefing 
before considering Belgarde's motion and Metropolitan's damage issue. A hearing 
followed in which the court granted Belgarde summary judgment, stating that 
"taking the property is [Metropolitan's] only remedy."

[¶35.]  A grant of summary judgment is proper 
only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c). Since no issue of 
material fact exists here, we concern ourselves only with the second prong of 
the requirement for a proper grant of summary judgment, i.e., whether Belgarde 
was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Brazelton v. Jackson Drug 
Co., 796 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1990). Resolution of this case is a 
matter of contract interpretation, for which the rules are well 
established:

"`The determination of 
the parties' intent is our prime focus in construing or interpreting a contract. 
"If an agreement is in writing and the language is clear and unambiguous, the 
intention is to be secured from the words of the agreement." [Nelson v. Nelson, 
740 P.2d 939, 940 (Wyo. 1987).] When the language is clear and 
unambiguous, the writing as a whole should be considered, taking into account 
relationships between various parts. Contract construction and interpretation 
are done by the court as a matter of law.'" (citations omitted) Woods Petroleum 
Corp. v. Hummel, 784 P.2d 242, 243 (Wyo. 1989) 
(quoting True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781, 790 (Wyo. 1989)).

[¶36.]  The "Agreement for Warranty Deed" is not 
ambiguous. The trial court correctly determined that the instrument effecting 
sale of this real estate was a contract for deed in its purest form. When 
selling real estate, where the down payment is small when compared to the total 
sale price, a seller will often insist on selling by contract for deed as in 
this case - the reason being that buyer has no real equity in the real estate 
because of the small down payment and seller should not be put to the burden of 
foreclosure, sale at fair market value, right of redemption, dispute over 
possession and rentals and the exposure associated therewith. Thus, where sale 
is by contract for deed, upon default, seller can, by affidavit of default, 
terminate the contract and retake possession of the real estate with no further 
exposure or proceedings of any kind. On the other hand, where buyer makes a 
substantial down payment, buyer may insist upon a deed transferring title with a 
mortgage back to seller to secure rights available in foreclosure and to protect 
his substantial equity. See Cliff & Co., Ltd. v. Anderson, 777 P.2d 595, 601 (Wyo. 1989) (explaining 
the differences between a mortgage and a contract for deed).

[¶37.]  In this case, buyer paid $6,041.81 down 
at the time of purchase upon a total purchase price of $495,000. The contract 
for deed of the parties, rather than providing a "promise to pay," states that 
buyer "shall pay" and "will assume" existing debts. Upon default, sellers may, 
at their option, declare the agreement null and void and retake possession. In 
the circumstances of this case the words "shall pay" express a prerequisite to 
receipt of the warranty deed and "at their option" means seller can declare a 
default or not as it chooses.

[¶38.]  In the absence of a specific provision 
for alternative remedies, where sale is by contract for deed or agreement for 
warranty deed, as in this case, such remedies do not exist. An additional reason 
that such remedies should not exist is that they may be unenforceable. For 
example, enforcement might involve foreclosure and a deficiency judgment, but a 
seller is not entitled to a deficiency when a buyer defaults under a contract 
for deed. Cliff & Co., Ltd., 777 P.2d  at 601. We should not impose a remedy 
we cannot enforce. See Restatement, Second, Contracts § 366 (1981). The 
agreement of the parties describes the remedy available as the trial court 
held.

[¶39.]  I would affirm.

MACY, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶40.]  I agree with Justice Cardine in his 
dissent that the parties entered into an unambiguous bilateral contract. It is 
clear from reading the contract in its entirety that the buyer agreed to pay the 
seller in installments and, upon the buyer's failure to do so, the seller had 
the option to repossess the property. I part company with Justice Cardine, 
however, when he insists:

     In the absence of a 
specific provision for alternative remedies, where sale is by contract for deed 
or agreement for warranty deed, as in this case, such remedies do not 
exist.

At 877 (Cardine, J., 
dissenting). This is contrary to our holding in Walters v. Michel, 745 P.2d 913 
(Wyo. 1987). 
In Walters, the buyers argued the sellers could pursue only those remedies 
enumerated in the contract. We disagreed and ruled the sellers were not limited, 
in the absence of an "exclusive remedy" clause, to those contractual remedies 
enumerated in the real estate purchase agreement.1 The contract at issue in the case 
at bar does not contain an "exclusive remedy" clause.

[¶41.]  For additional support, see Glacier 
Campground v. Wild Rivers, Inc., 182 Mont. 389, 597 P.2d 689 (1978). In Glacier 
Campground, the Montana Supreme Court, quoting an earlier Montana case, stated the 
general rule:

"It is the general rule 
that the clause of forfeiture in a contract of the sale does not operate to make 
the contract void, when there is a default on the part of the vendee, so as to 
terminate the liability of the vendee, but the vendor may elect whether to 
declare a forfeiture or rely upon the liability of the vendee as fixed by the 
contract, and sue for the purchase price." (Emphasis added.)

Id. 597 P.2d  at 696 
(quoting Alexander v. Wingett, 63 Mont. 254, 259, 206 P. 1088, 1089 (1922)). The 
Montana Supreme Court went on to rule, "In the absence of a contractual 
provision expressly limiting the remedy or remedies available, a party may 
pursue any remedy which law or equity affords, as well as the remedy or remedies 
specified in the contract." Id. This Court has ruled, "[F]ailure to make 
payments, while constituting grounds for forfeiture of a conditional 
[installment land] contract, does not operate to terminate the contract absent 
appropriate notice to the nonperforming party." Kost v. First National Bank of 
Greybull, 684 P.2d 819, 823 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶42.]  In this instance, it is the seller who 
must notify the buyer (the nonperforming party) if the contract is being 
forfeited. Instead of declaring a forfeiture, however, the seller has elected to 
keep the contract in force. Through the default notice, the seller informed the 
buyer it was not declaring a forfeiture and it would continue to enforce the 
contract with a lawsuit, if necessary.2 The language, "at their option," 
suggests alternative remedies other than forfeiture were intended upon the 
buyer's default. I reject the notion a buyer can avoid liability by defaulting 
and forcing the seller to declare a forfeiture.

[¶43.]  I would reverse and permit the seller to 
maintain successive actions against the buyer for the amount of unpaid 
installments and attorney fees. Because the contract lacks an acceleration 
clause, the seller is not entitled to sue for the entire balance of the purchase 
price.

FOOTNOTES

1 I recognize real estate 
purchase agreements and contracts for deed are directed at different time 
periods in the transaction. That fact, however, does not necessarily dictate a 
different result.

2 
The contract, in detailing the purchase price, employs mandatory language 
directed at the buyer; e.g., "Buyers shall pay to Sellers." This language 
indicates that, as long as the seller elects to keep the contract in force, the 
buyer has a duty to pay the installments when they are 
due.