Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V GREGORY M RICE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 125101

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
FILED JULY 21, 2005 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 124996 
JEROME L. KNIGHT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
______________________________ 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 125101 
GREGORY M. RICE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, J.  
In these consolidated appeals, we are called upon to 
clarify our Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 
L Ed 2d 69 (1986), jurisprudence and provide guidance to 
our lower courts. 
Specifically, this Court must decide 
whether the trial court in these cases determined that 
Batson had been violated; namely, we must discern whether 
 
 
 
the trial court concluded that the prosecutor exercised 
peremptory challenges to exclude certain prospective jurors 
from the jury pool on the basis of race.  On the basis of 
our reading of the voir dire transcripts, we hold that no 
Batson violation existed in this case and the trial judge 
neither explicitly nor implicitly found that the prosecutor 
purposefully 
discriminated 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
three 
peremptory challenges. 
Having reviewed the whole record 
and the fair inferences to be drawn from it, we cannot 
conclude that the trial judge implicitly found that the 
prosecutor purposefully discriminated. 
Instead, the trial 
judge’s ambiguous statements were driven by her goal of 
ensuring 
a 
racially 
mixed 
jury, 
not 
concern 
with 
determining whether the prosecutor’s asserted reasons for 
exercising peremptory challenges were a pretext. 
Indeed, 
the trial judge’s only clear statement reflected her 
finding that neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel had 
engaged in racially discriminatory behavior. 
Accordingly, 
we affirm defendants’ convictions. 
I. Factual Background 
Defendant Knight and codefendant Rice were charged 
with first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, stemming from the 
shooting death of defendant Knight’s former girlfriend. 
Codefendant Rice was also charged with one count of 
2  
 
 
 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, 
MCL 750.227b. 
The prosecutor’s theory was that defendant 
Knight had unsuccessfully tried to hire someone to kill his 
former girlfriend. 
After his initial efforts failed, 
according to the prosecutor, defendant Knight bailed 
codefendant Rice out of jail in exchange for codefendant 
Rice’s killing the former girlfriend. Defendant Knight and 
codefendant Rice were tried jointly before the same jury. 
During the third day of jury selection, defense 
counsel initially objected to the prosecutor’s use of 
peremptory challenges, claiming that the prosecutor was 
attempting 
to 
exclude 
African-American 
veniremembers. 
Defense counsel expressed particular dissatisfaction with 
the prosecutor’s reason for dismissing veniremember nine, 
which was that a member of veniremember nine’s family had 
been convicted of rape. 
Defense counsel then demonstrated 
his misunderstanding of Batson by responding, “I don’t 
believe that whether or not there is assaultive [sic] and 
battery involved in that particular person’s family is a 
basis on which to exclude someone when you already have a 
pattern. 
I have noticed this pattern since day one of the 
jury trial. 
That’s why seventy-five percent of the 
exclusions have been black.” 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
The prosecutor immediately interjected that she had 
excluded three African-American veniremembers and four 
Caucasian veniremembers and offered race-neutral reasons 
for excluding the African-American veniremembers. 
The 
trial judge stated, “There have been four whites excluded, 
exempted by the prosecution and three blacks. 
So just 
based on that I don’t see a Batson problem.” 
Defense 
counsel then commented on the racial composition of the 
jury pool, stating, “If you have seventy-five percent white 
prospective jurors, Your Honor, and twenty-five percent 
black prospective jurors, now the schedule has turned and 
that’s exactly what we’ve had in three days of jury 
selection.” Defense counsel appeared to argue here not for 
the racially neutral exercise of peremptory challenges, but 
for the exercise of challenges in proportion to the overall 
racial division of the array. 
The trial judge then found 
no Batson violation, stating: 
But that’s not the prosecution or the 
defense’s fault that we are getting largely white
jurors. 
If that’s an issue, that’s another 
issue, and that can be dealt with another way. 
But 
in 
this 
particular 
case 
and 
this 
particular matter, I do not see a pattern of the
prosecution improperly excluding African American 
males, because they’ve only excluded one, or 
African American females where two have been 
excluded. 
I think the reasons are acceptable. 
So I 
don’t see a problem there. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
There’s still right now, I don’t know if
this is going to end up being our jurors, but
there are quite a few–I don’t know who’s left up
there. 
But the fact that the composition of the
jury panel is largely white, it’s like I said,
another issue. 
And that can be dealt with in 
another way. 
I deny the motion that the prosecution has
improperly excluding [sic] minorities from the
jury panel. [Emphasis added.] 
The court then recessed for lunch. 
After lunch, the 
prosecutor 
dismissed 
three 
African-American 
women, 
veniremembers Bonner, Johnson, and Jones. 
Defense counsel 
did not contemporaneously object to the exercise of 
peremptory challenges against veniremembers Bonner and 
Johnson. Defense counsel objected only to the dismissal of 
veniremember Jones, contending that the prosecutor was 
attempting to exclude black females in violation of Batson.1 
He pointed out that the prosecutor had exercised three 
consecutive 
challenges 
against 
African-American 
women. 
Without waiting for the trial judge’s ruling regarding 
whether a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination 
had been made, the prosecutor immediately provided race­
neutral reasons for the three exclusions, although defense 
1 Veniremember Jones, believing that she was dismissed,
left the courthouse before the trial judge ruled on defense
counsel’s Batson objection. 
5  
 
counsel had not objected to the challenges regarding 
veniremembers Bonner and Johnson. 
The prosecutor stated 
that she dismissed veniremember Bonner because Bonner was a 
close relative of two persons convicted of first-degree 
murder. 
She dismissed veniremember Johnson because of 
Johnson’s body language, the tone of her voice, and the 
hesitant look she gave when she stated that she could be 
fair. 
Finally, she dismissed veniremember Jones because 
Jones was a professional woman who had a daughter close in 
age to the victim. 
The prosecutor noted that Jones’s 
daughter was not “similarly situated” to the victim and 
that Jones might compare and contrast the lifestyles of the 
victim and her daughter. 
The trial judge responded by stating, “Just before we 
recessed for lunch, I thought that it was very clear that 
we didn’t have a problem here. 
But now I think we are 
getting very close to a sensitive issue.” 
The trial judge 
rejected 
the 
prosecutor’s 
reasons 
for 
dismissing 
veniremember Johnson, but stated that she had not objected 
to Johnson’s dismissal because defense counsel had not 
objected. 
The trial judge did not accept the prosecutor’s 
reasons for dismissing veniremember Jones: 
The same thing with Miss Jones. 
I do not 
see a reason other 
than–I mean, it seems to me
for the prosecution to say, she has a daughter
the same age as the victim, that would seem to 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
work in the prosecution’s favor, just in terms of
thinking in the jury selection. 
So I don’t 
accept that. 
* 
* 
* 
I do see that we are getting close, and 
there are, I don’t know[,] two or three minority
jurors left on this panel. 
So I think we are 
getting close to a serious issue here. 
I wish that somebody had said something
about keeping Miss Jones and Miss Johnson. 
And 
then we address this matter because I probably 
would not have excused either one of them. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Defense counsel interrupted the trial judge at that 
point to clarify that Jones was the last veniremember 
struck and that he objected to the exclusion of Jones. 
Despite defense counsel’s comment, the trial judge stated, 
“[I]f an objection had been made as far as Miss Johnson and 
Miss Jones[,] I probably would have addressed it. 
And I 
tend to think I probably would have kept them on the jury.”2 
The 
prosecutor 
then 
stated 
that 
dismissal 
was 
appropriate as long as she advanced race-neutral reasons 
for the dismissal. The trial judge replied that she had to 
either accept or reject the prosecutor’s “neutral” reasons. 
She further stated, “And I’m not, I’m saying that I think 
2 It is not clear from the record whether the trial 
judge 
mistakenly 
referred 
to 
veniremember 
Bonner 
as 
veniremember Jones, or truly believed that an objection had
not been made regarding veniremember Jones’s dismissal. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
we’re getting close to a sensitive issue here on Jones and 
Johnson. 
That’s all I’m saying.
 I’m making my record 
too.” 
The trial judge twice referred to getting close to a 
“sensitive issue.” 
We do not think this language reflects 
that the sensitive issue was purposeful discrimination. 
Instead, we believe the sensitive issue was the looming 
absence of minorities in the array and on the petit jury. 
The 
prosecutor 
acknowledged 
the 
trial 
judge’s 
comments. 
She 
immediately 
raised 
a 
reverse-Batson 
challenge to defense counsel’s exercise of peremptory 
challenges to exclude five female Caucasian veniremembers 
and one male Caucasian veniremember. Defense counsel again 
demonstrated his misunderstanding of Batson by stating: 
I would indicate to the Court, Your Honor,
that sister counsel fails to recognize that there
are at least four white women that are on the 
jury. 
* * * 
I don’t believe with regards to the fact
that they happen to be white women, I think the
Court also has to recognize that the greatest
number of people that have come through that
jury, as potential jurors, have been in fact
white people.[3] 
3 Justice Cavanagh claims that defense counsel’s 
objections did not demonstrate his misunderstanding of 
Batson. 
Rather, he states that defense counsel’s comments
amount to an attempt to establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination by asserting that the prosecutor
(continued…) 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Defense counsel then requested that the trial judge 
first make a ruling regarding his Batson objection. 
The 
following colloquy ensued: 
[Defense Counsel]: But, I don’t think the
Court ruled on whether or not you’re going to
allow Miss Jones to be struck. 
She’s still 
downstairs, I’m sure. 
[The Trial Judge]: I don’t know if she is 
or not. 
[The Prosecutor]: 
I thought she was held. 
[The Trial Judge]: If she is still here,
I’m going to keep her. 
[Defense counsel]: Thank you. 
[The Deputy]: Miss Jones, she has already
gone. 
The trial judge then allowed defense counsel to make a 
record regarding the prosecutor’s reverse-Batson challenge, 
but never ruled on the challenge. 
Defense counsel 
responded by stating, “I believe the answer lies in the 
panel that’s left. 
There is no pattern . . . .” 
After 
further discussion, the trial judge concluded that any 
(…continued)
had engaged in a pattern of systematically excluding 
African-American veniremembers. 
We disagree. 
The record,
when read as a whole, clearly demonstrates that defense
counsel’s Batson objections were made to prevent the 
prosecutor 
from 
excluding 
any 
African-American 
veniremembers, even if the prosecutor provided race-neutral
reasons 
for 
doing 
so, 
because 
the 
majority 
of 
the 
veniremembers, by chance, was Caucasian. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Batson problems that may have occurred were cured because 
African-American women were fairly represented on the jury 
panel. She stated: 
I’m not satisfied with the prosecutor’s
response as to potential juror Jones and Johnson.
But I think they’ve already left. 
So I’m going to say from this point on let’s
be very careful about the selection. 
If you
think that you, if the defense is not satisfied
with me just giving a cautionary instruction to
the prosecution, then I’ll address any other 
remedy. 
But, realistically I think all of us are 
being, trying to be conscientious about the 
selection of these jurors because of the racial
makeup of the jury panels, which we don’t have 
any control over. 
I’m just saying, I let Jones and Johnson go
without holding them, especially Jones. 
I guess
I should have held her and I didn’t do that. 
I’ll take the fault for that. 
But from this 
point on let’s try to be careful with this jury
selection. We are to [sic] close to getting this
jury selected. [Emphasis added.] 
After sending the deputy to search for veniremember 
Jones again with no success, the trial judge stated, “I 
don’t think it is serious enough at this point. We do have 
some minorities left on the jury panel and I’ll be watching 
this closely.” 
Finally, at the end of jury selection, the 
trial judge commented: 
With the panel we ended up with, I think
that any Batson problems that may have been there
have been cured. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
We have the same number if not more jurors,
African American female jurors on the panel as if 
we 
had 
kept 
[veniremember] 
Johnson 
and 
[veniremember] Jones. 
I don’t think either side ended up selecting
this panel for any other reason other than I 
think that these are the ones who will be the 
fair and impartial persons to hear and try this 
case.  [Emphasis added.] 
In the end, the jury convicted defendant Knight of 
first-degree murder and codefendant Rice of first-degree 
murder and felony-firearm. 
Both defendants appealed as of right, and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed.4  In defendant Knight’s case, the Court of 
Appeals found that the prosecutor presented adequate race­
neutral reasons for excusing the prospective jurors and, 
thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
rejecting defendant’s Batson challenge. 
While codefendant 
Rice’s counsel joined in the Batson challenge at trial, 
codefendant Rice did not raise the Batson issue in the 
Court of Appeals. 
Both defendants sought leave to appeal 
in this Court. 
4 People v Knight, unpublished opinion per curiam of
the Court of Appeals, issued October 15, 2002 (Docket No.
231845); People v Rice, unpublished opinion per curiam of
the Court of Appeals, issued October 15, 2002 (Docket No.
225865). 
Both defendants assigned numerous claims of 
error, but only the Batson issue is relevant for purposes
of these appeals. 
11  
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacated the 
judgments of the Court of Appeals and remanded for 
reconsideration in light of Batson, supra, and Miller-El v 
Cockrell, 537 US 322, 340; 123 S Ct 1029; 154 L Ed 2d 931 
(2003) (Miller-El I).5
 On remand, the Court of Appeals 
again affirmed the convictions, finding no evidence of 
purposeful discrimination.6  We granted leave to appeal and 
further ordered these cases to be argued and submitted 
together.7 
II. Legal Background 
A. The Batson Procedure 
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,8 a party may not exercise a peremptory challenge 
to remove a prospective juror solely on the basis of the 
person’s race. 
Swain v Alabama, 380 US 202, 203-204; 85 S 
Ct 824; 13 L Ed 2d 759 (1965); see also Georgia v McCollum, 
5 People v Knight, 468 Mich 922 (2003); People v Rice,
468 Mich 922 (2003). 
6 People v Knight (On Remand), unpublished opinion per
curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 7, 2003
(Docket No. 231845); People v Rice (On Remand), unpublished
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October
7, 2003 (Docket No. 225865). 
7 470 Mich 869 (2004). 
8 US Const, Am XIV, § 1 provides in relevant part: “No 
State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
12  
 
 
                                                 
 
505 US 42; 112 S Ct 2348; 120 L Ed 2d 33 (1992); Edmonson v 
Leesville Concrete Co, Inc, 500 US 614; 111 S Ct 2077; 114 
L Ed 2d 660 (1991). In Batson, supra at 96-98, the United 
States Supreme Court announced a three-step process for 
determining the constitutional propriety of a peremptory 
challenge. 
First, the opponent of the peremptory challenge must 
make a prima facie showing of discrimination. 
Id. at 96. 
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on 
race, the opponent must show that: (1) he is a member of a 
cognizable racial group; (2) the proponent has exercised a 
peremptory challenge to exclude a member of a certain 
racial group from the jury pool; and (3) all the relevant 
circumstances raise an inference that the proponent of the 
challenge excluded the prospective juror on the basis of 
race. 
Id.9
 The United States Supreme Court has made it 
9 In Swain, supra at 223-224, the United States Supreme
Court required the defendant to show that the prosecution
had a practice or pattern of using peremptory challenges in
“case after case.” In Batson, supra at 92-93, however, the
Court sought to alleviate Swain’s “crippling burden of
proof” and eliminated the requirement that the defendant 
make a prima facie showing by reference to other cases.
Further, it must be observed that the striking of even a
single 
juror 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
race 
violates 
the 
Constitution. 
See, e.g., J E B v Alabama ex rel T B, 511
US 127, 142 n 13; 114 S Ct 1419; 128 L Ed 2d 89 (1994)
(“The exclusion of even one juror for impermissible reasons
harms that juror and undermines public confidence in the
(continued…) 
13  
 
 
                                                 
     
 
clear that the opponent of the challenge is not required at 
Batson’s first step to actually prove discrimination. 
Johnson v California, __ US __; 125 S Ct 2410; 162 L Ed 2d 
129 (2005).10  Indeed, “so long as the sum of the proffered 
facts gives ‘rise to an inference of discriminatory 
purpose,’” Batson’s first step is satisfied. Id. at ___ US 
(…continued) 
fairness of the system.”). 
See also United States v  
Clemons, 843 F2d 741, 747 (CA 3, 1988), cert den 488 US 835  
(1988); United States v Lane, 866 F2d 103, 105 (CA 4, 
1989); United States v Battle, 836 F2d 1084, 1086 (CA 8, 
1987); United States v Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F3d 900, 902 (CA 
9, 1994); United States v David, 803 F2d 1567, 1571 (CA 11, 
1986).  
10 
In 
Johnson, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
addressed California’s approach to examining Batson’s first 
step. While the Court recognized that the states have some
degree of flexibility in formulating appropriate procedures
to 
comply 
with 
Batson, 
the 
Court 
concluded 
that 
California’s approach was inappropriate. 
Id., ___ US ___;
125 S Ct 2416; 162 L Ed 2d 138. 
The California Supreme
Court had concluded that at Batson’s first step, the 
opponent of the challenge must present strong evidence that
makes discriminatory intent more likely than not. 
The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
rejected 
this 
approach,
observing: 
We did not intend [Batson’s] first step to
be so onerous that a defendant would have to 
persuade the judge--on the basis of all the 
facts, some of which are impossible for the 
defendant 
to 
know 
with 
certainty--that 
the 
challenge was more likely than not the product of
purposeful discrimination. 
Instead, a defendant
satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step
by producing evidence sufficient to permit the
trial 
judge 
to 
draw 
an 
inference 
that 
discrimination has occurred. 
[Id., ___ US ___;
125 S Ct 2417; 162 L Ed 2d 139.] 
14  
 
 
 
 
___; 125 S Ct 2416; 162 L Ed 2d 138 (internal citation 
omitted; emphasis added). 
Second, if the trial court determines that a prima 
facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the 
proponent of the peremptory challenge to articulate a race­
neutral explanation for the strike. 
Batson, supra at 97. 
Batson’s second step “does not demand an explanation that 
is persuasive, or even plausible.” 
Purkett v Elem, 514 US 
765, 768; 115 S Ct 1769; 131 L Ed 2d 834 (1995). 
Rather, 
the issue is whether the proponent’s explanation is 
facially valid as a matter of law. 
Id.; Hernandez v New 
York, 500 US 352, 360; 111 S Ct 1859; 114 L Ed 2d 395 
(1991) (plurality opinion). 
“A neutral explanation in the 
context of our analysis here means an explanation based on 
something other than the race of the juror. . . . Unless a 
discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s 
explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race 
neutral.” Id. 
Finally, if the proponent provides a race-neutral 
explanation as a matter of law, the trial court must then 
determine whether the race-neutral explanation is a pretext 
and whether the opponent of the challenge has proved 
purposeful discrimination. 
Batson, supra at 98. 
It must 
be noted, however, that if the proponent of the challenge 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
offers a race-neutral explanation and the trial court rules 
on the ultimate question of purposeful discrimination, the 
first Batson step (whether the opponent of the challenge 
made a prima facie showing) becomes moot. Hernandez, supra 
at 359. 
B. Reviewing Batson Claims 
Generally, we review a trial court’s factual findings 
for clear error. 
MCR 2.613(C). 
Further, we review 
questions of law de novo. 
People v Nickens, 470 Mich 622, 
626; 685 NW2d 657 (2004). 
As a practical matter, however, 
appellate 
courts 
sometimes 
struggle 
with 
determining 
whether a particular issue presents a question of law or 
fact. 
In some instances, the line can become quite 
blurred. 
Batson error claims frequently appear to fall 
into the blurred category, and courts have labored to 
formulate a generally accepted standard of review for 
Batson cases that applies to all levels of the Batson 
inquiry. 
The cases at hand give us the opportunity to 
clarify our own standard for reviewing Batson errors. 
We 
conclude that the applicable standard of review depends on 
which Batson step is at issue before the appellate court. 
1. 
Determining What the Trial Court Has Ruled 
Before a reviewing court can determine which standard 
of review applies for purposes of Batson’s three steps, the 
16  
 
court must first ascertain what the trial court actually 
ruled. When a trial court methodically adheres to Batson’s 
three-step test and clearly articulates its findings on the 
record, issues concerning what the trial court has ruled 
are significantly ameliorated. 
See, e.g., United States v 
Castorena-Jaime, 285 F3d 916, 929 (CA 10, 2002). 
Not only 
does faithful adherence to the Batson procedures greatly 
assist appellate court review, but the parties, the trial 
court, and the jurors are well-served by thoughtful 
consideration of each of Batson’s steps as well. 
Thus, we 
observe that Batson, as a constitutional decision, is not 
discretionary. 
Our trial courts must meticulously follow 
Batson’s three-step test, and we strongly urge our courts 
to clearly articulate their findings and conclusions on the 
record. 
In the event a trial court fails to clearly state its 
findings and conclusion on the record, an appellate court 
must determine on the basis of a fair reading of the record 
what the trial court has found and ruled. 
See, e.g., 
Mahaffey v Page, 162 F3d 481, 482-483 (CA 7, 1998). 
This 
is not the preferred route. 
Because of the importance of 
the right at stake, as well as the societal and judicial 
interests implicated, we again direct our trial courts to 
carefully follow each of Batson’s three steps, and we 
17  
 
 
 
 
further urge the courts to clearly articulate their 
findings and conclusions with respect to each step on the 
record. 
Once it is determined what the trial court has 
found and ruled, the reviewing court must decide what 
Batson step is at issue in the particular case and how the 
claim of error should be reviewed. 
2. Standard of Review for Batson’s First Step 
While there is somewhat of a consensus on the 
standards of review applicable to Batson’s second step, and 
the scope of review for the third step is well-settled, 
courts appear to be split with regard to the proper 
standard of review when examining Batson’s first step. For 
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals en banc 
concluded that a trial court’s determination whether the 
opponent of the peremptory challenge made out a prima facie 
case of discrimination should be reviewed for clear error. 
Tolbert v Page, 182 F3d 677 (CA 9, 1999). In Tolbert, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that Batson’s first step presented 
a mixed question of law and fact; however, the Tolbert 
court reasoned: 
At the Batson prima facie showing step, the
concerns of judicial administration tip in favor
of the trial court and, therefore, a deferential
standard of review prevails. Our conclusion is
based on the language of Batson itself, which
describes the prima facie analysis as a “factual
inquiry,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 95, and makes clear
that the trial court is to be the primary 
18  
 
 
  
 
 
 
adjudicator of that analysis: “We have confidence
that trial judges, experienced in supervising
voir dire, will be able to decide if the 
circumstances concerning the prosecutor’s use of
peremptory challenges create[] a prima facie case
of discrimination.” Id. at 97 (emphasis added). 
Our holding is also consistent with more
recent teachings of the Supreme Court, which 
counsel in favor of applying a deferential 
standard of review to certain mixed questions.
See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S.
225, 233, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 113 L Ed 2d 190
(1991). 
Deferential review is appropriate either 
“when it appears that the district court is 
‘better positioned’ than the appellate court to
decide the issue in question,” or when “probing
appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the
clarity of legal doctrine.” Id.  [Tolbert, supra
at 682.] 
When faced with the same question, however, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a de novo 
standard applies to a trial court’s determination whether a 
prima facie showing of discrimination has been made. 
Mahaffey, supra at 484. 
The Seventh Circuit likewise 
observed that whether the facts alleged by the opponent of 
the peremptory challenge satisfied the opponent’s burden 
under Batson’s first step is a mixed question of law and 
fact. 
Id.
 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit opined that 
“[t]he question of whether an inference of discrimination 
may be drawn from a set of undisputed facts relating to the 
racial makeup of the jury venire and the prosecutor’s 
exercise of peremptory challenges is . . . one over which 
the appellate courts should exercise a degree of control 
19  
 
 
that a clear error standard would not afford.” 
Id. 
Moreover, in light of the importance of the constitutional 
right implicated, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the de 
novo standard “would allow for a measure of consistency in 
the treatment of similar factual settings, rather than 
permitting different trial judges to reach inconsistent 
conclusions about the prima facie case on the same or 
similar facts.” 
Id. 
Thus, the Mahaffey Court concluded 
that the de novo standard of review applies to the prima 
facie showing of discrimination prong. 
Similar to the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court of 
Colorado has also concluded that Batson’s first step is 
subject to review de novo. 
Valdez v People, 966 P2d 587, 
591 (Colo, 1998). 
The Valdez court noted that the First, 
Eighth, and Ninth circuits adhere to a clear error standard 
when reviewing the prima facie determination under the 
Batson framework. However, the Colorado Supreme Court also 
observed that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, as well 
as appellate courts in Kansas, Tennessee, and Utah, have 
concluded that Batson’s first step is subject to review de 
novo. 
Weighing the aforementioned cases and turning to 
Title VII case law for additional guidance, the Valdez 
court concluded: 
Therefore, although we afford deference to
the trial court's ultimate determination of a 
20  
 
Batson challenge in step three, we believe that
the first step involves a question of legal
sufficiency over which the appellate court must
have plenary review. We continue to defer to the 
underlying 
factual 
findings, 
including 
any
predicate credibility determinations of the trial
court upon which its prima facie determination
under Batson is based. However, we hold that the
question of whether the defendant has established
a prima facie case under Batson is a matter of 
law, and we apply a de novo standard of review to 
a trial court’s prima facie determination of the
Batson analysis. [Valdez, supra at 591.] 
We agree with those jurisdictions that have concluded 
that Batson’s first step is appropriately categorized as a 
mixed question of law and fact. 
We, however, chose to 
follow Michigan’s well-established procedure of reviewing 
questions of law de novo and factual findings for clear 
error. 
People v McRae, 469 Mich 704, 710; 678 NW2d 425 
(2004). 
We thus conclude that the first Batson step is a 
mixed question of fact and law that is subject to both a 
clear error (factual) and a de novo (legal) standard of 
review. 
A trial judge must first find the facts and then 
must decide whether those facts constitute a prima facie 
case of discrimination under Batson and its progeny. 
We acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court 
has emphasized that the focus of Batson is not merely on 
the individual criminal defendant. 
See, e.g., Powers v 
Ohio, 499 US 400, 405-410; 111 S Ct 1364; 113 L Ed 2d 411 
(1991). 
Rather, the focus is also on the integrity of the 
21  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
judicial system, as well as the rights of the prospective 
jurors. 
Id. at 410-414.11
 Unquestionably, ensuring the 
integrity of the judicial process and maintaining fair jury 
selection procedures are paramount concerns. 
However, 
these concerns do not persuade us that Batson’s first step 
should 
be 
treated 
any 
differently 
than 
other 
mixed 
questions of law and fact. 
Indeed, we believe that these 
paramount concerns can be effectuated under our established 
rules for appellate review. 
Thus, until the United States 
Supreme Court holds otherwise, under Batson’s first step, 
we will review the questions of law de novo and the factual 
findings for clear error. 
3. Standard of Review for Batson’s Second Step 
While there appears to be some disagreement about the 
standard of review for Batson’s second step, we believe 
that those jurisdictions that have concluded that the 
second step is subject to review de novo have the better 
view. 
See, e.g., United States v Bishop, 959 F2d 820, 821 
n 1 (CA 9, 1992); Hurd v Pittsburg State Univ, 109 F3d 
1540, 1546 (CA 10, 1997); Valdez, supra at 590.  We believe 
11 See also Herman, Why the court loves Batson: 
Representation-Reinforcement, colorblindness, and the jury,
67 Tul L R 1807, 1814-1815 (1993) (“A criminal defendant is
permitted to raise Batson challenges not on the theory that
his or her own rights have been violated, but rather on the
theory that he or she is being afforded standing to raise
the rights of a third party—the prospective juror.”). 
22  
 
                                                 
that such an approach is consistent with controlling United 
States Supreme Court precedent. 
See, e.g., Hernandez, 
supra at 359(“In evaluating the race neutrality of an 
attorney’s explanation, a court must determine whether, 
assuming 
the 
proffered 
reasons 
for 
the 
peremptory 
challenges are true, the challenges violate the Equal 
Protection Clause as a matter of law.”)(emphasis added). 
It is important to bear in mind that it is not until 
Batson’s 
third 
step 
that 
the 
persuasiveness 
of 
the 
proffered explanation for the peremptory challenge becomes 
relevant. 
Purkett, supra at 768.12
 Accordingly, at 
Batson’s second step, a court is only concerned with 
whether the proffered reason violates the Equal Protection 
Clause as a matter of law. 
See, e.g., United States v 
Uwaezhoke, 995 F2d 388, 392 (CA 3, 1993) (“Thus, if the 
government’s 
explanation 
does 
not, 
on 
its 
face, 
discriminate on the basis of race, then we must find that 
the explanation passes Batson muster as a matter of law, 
12 See also Johnson, supra, ___ US ___; 125 S Ct 2417­
2418; 162 L Ed 2d 140, quoting Purkett, supra at 768 (“The
first two Batson steps govern the production of evidence
that allows the trial court to determine the persuasiveness
of the defendant’s constitutional claim. ‘It is not until 
the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification
becomes relevant--the step in which the trial court 
determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried
his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.’”). 
23  
 
        
 
 
 
and we pass to the third step of Batson analysis to 
determine whether the race-neutral and facially valid 
reason was, as a matter of fact, a mere pretext for actual 
discriminatory intent.”). 
It is also important to bear in 
mind that only in rare cases is the proffered explanation 
facially invalid because such direct evidence is equally 
rare. 
We thus conclude that the de novo standard governs 
appellate review of Batson’s second step. 
4. Standard of Review for Batson’s Third Step 
It is well-settled that a trial court’s determination 
concerning whether the opponent of the peremptory challenge 
has satisfied the ultimate burden of proving purposeful 
discrimination is a question of fact that is reviewed for 
clear error. 
Hernandez, supra at 364-365; United States v 
Hill, 146 F3d 337, 341 (CA 6, 1998). 
Moreover, the trial 
court’s 
ultimate 
factual 
finding 
is 
accorded 
great 
deference. 
Miller-El I, supra at 340. 
The United States 
Supreme Court has observed that “[d]eference to trial court 
findings on the issue of discriminatory intent makes 
particular sense in this context because . . . the finding 
‘largely 
will 
turn 
on 
evaluation 
of 
credibility.’” 
Hernandez, supra at 365, quoting Batson, supra at 98 n 21. 
Accordingly, the “clear error” standard comports with the 
concept that assessment of credibility lies within the 
24  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
trial court’s province.13
 In accordance with well-settled 
law, we thus conclude that the clear error standard governs 
appellate review of a trial court’s resolution of Batson’s 
third step. 
5. Summary of Batson Standard of Review 
In sum, we conclude that the proper standard of review 
depends on which Batson step is before us. 
If the first 
step is at issue (whether the opponent of the challenge has 
satisfied his burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of 
13 See, e.g., Miller-El I, supra at 339-340 (internal
citations omitted): 
Credibility can be measured by, among other
factors, . . . demeanor; by how reasonable, or
how improbable, the explanations are; and by
whether the proffered rationale has some basis in
accepted trial strategy. 
* * * 
“Deference to trial court findings on the
issue of discriminatory intent makes particular
sense in this context because, as we noted in
Batson, 
the 
finding 
‘largely 
will 
turn 
on 
evaluation of credibility.’ 
In the typical
peremptory 
challenge 
inquiry, 
the 
decisive 
question will be whether counsel's race-neutral
explanation for a peremptory challenge should be
believed. 
There will seldom be much evidence 
bearing on that issue, and the best evidence
often will be the demeanor of the attorney who
exercises the challenge. 
As with the state of 
mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor's
state of mind based on demeanor and credibility
lies 
‘peculiarly 
within 
a 
trial 
judge’s
province.’” 
25  
 
 
 
 
discrimination), we review the trial court’s underlying 
factual findings for clear error, and we review questions 
of law de novo. 
If Batson’s second step is implicated 
(whether 
the 
proponent 
of 
the 
peremptory 
challenge 
articulates a race-neutral explanation as a matter of law), 
we review the proffered explanation de novo. 
Finally, if 
the 
third 
step 
is 
at 
issue 
(the 
trial 
court’s 
determinations whether the race-neutral explanation is a 
pretext and whether the opponent of the challenge has 
proved purposeful discrimination), we review the trial 
court’s ruling for clear error. 
C. Remedies for Batson Violations 
In the present case, defense counsel did not object to 
the 
dismissal 
of 
veniremembers 
Bonner 
and 
Johnson. 
Although he referred to Bonner and Johnson during his 
Batson objection, he only objected to the dismissal of 
veniremember Jones. 
Therefore, in this case, the Batson 
objection only pertains to the dismissal of veniremember 
Jones. 
In order to ensure that a trial court remedies all 
purposeful discrimination, however, courts should apply the 
Batson objection to all strikes in an alleged pattern. 
In order for a pattern of strikes to develop, several 
jurors might be struck without objection until a pattern 
begins to emerge. If a trial court allowed earlier strikes 
26  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
in a pattern to stand without taking remedial action, the 
court 
would 
potentially 
be 
allowing 
purposeful 
discrimination. 
Therefore, most jurisdictions do not 
consider a Batson objection waived if the prosecution fails 
to raise it immediately following the strike. 
The case of State v Ford, 306 Mont 517, 523; 39 P3d 
108 (2001), provided a thorough discussion of the rulings 
in 
different 
jurisdictions 
regarding 
Batson 
error 
preservation. Several jurisdictions held that a Batson 
challenge must be made before the jury is sworn, or else 
the issue is waived.14
 Additionally, numerous courts take 
the stance that a Batson challenge must also be raised 
before the court dismisses the venire.15  One case held that 
Batson 
objections 
were 
waived 
once 
the 
stricken 
veniremembers 
left 
the 
courthouse, 
but 
the 
court 
14 See State v Wilson, 117 NM 11; 868 P2d 656 (NM App,
1993); United States v Cashwell, 950 F2d 699, 704 (CA 11,
1992); United States v Dobynes, 905 F2d 1192, 1196 (CA 8,
1990). See also People v Hudson, 157 Ill 2d 401; 626 NE2d
161 (1993). 
15 See United States v Biaggi, 909 F2d 662, 679 (CA 2,
1990); Government of Virgin Islands v Forte, 806 F2d 73, 76
(CA 3, 1986); Morning v Zapata Protein (USA), Inc, 128 F3d
213, 216 (CA 4, 1997); United States v Abou-Kassem, 78 F3d
161, 167 (CA 5, 1996); United States v Rodriguez, 917 F2d
1286, 1288 (CA 11, 1990); State v Cummings, 838 SW2d 4 (Mo
App, 1992); Sorensen v State, 6 P3d 657, 662 (Wy, 2000);
State v Harris, 157 Ariz 35, 36; 754 P2d 1139 (1988). 
27  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  
nonetheless underwent a Batson analysis for each of the 
discharged veniremembers in the pattern.16 
There are several reasons why courts require a party 
to raise a Batson challenge before the venire is dismissed. 
First, the Batson objection warns the prosecutor, or the 
person peremptorily striking a juror, that he might be 
required to provide race-neutral explanations for the 
strike. 
United States v Erwin, 793 F2d 656 (CA 5, 1986). 
Furthermore, if a court finds a Batson violation after the 
venire is dismissed, then there must be a new jury­
selection process and a new venire called. State v 
Cummings, 838 SW2d 4, 6 (Mo App, 1992). If a Batson 
challenge is made before the venire is discharged, however, 
the trial court can immediately correct the error and 
disallow the strike. See State v Parker, 836 SW2d 930 (Mo, 
1992). 
16 In State v Jacobs, 803 So 2d 933 (La, 2001), the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the objections to the
first three jurors were untimely, and thus waived, because
“the jurors were no longer ‘under any instructions’ in the
case.” Id. at 939. The reason why Jacobs might not be
easily applicable to other cases, however, is that the
judge “effectively collapse[d] the first two stages of the
Batson procedure . . . [and performed] the crucial third
step of weighing the defendant’s proof and the prosecutor’s
race-neutral reasons to determine discriminatory intent.”
Id. at 941. Therefore, although the judge claimed that the
objection was untimely, he nonetheless undertook a Batson 
analysis and determined that there were race-neutral 
reasons for the jurors’ dismissals. 
28  
 
 
 
 
   
Therefore, 
in 
order 
to 
preserve 
the 
option 
of 
reseating improperly stricken jurors, the court in Parker 
suggested 
that 
“[t]rial 
courts 
should 
refrain 
from 
releasing venirepersons who have been peremptorily struck 
until the venire is excused.” Id. at 936 n 3. 
Requiring courts to retain stricken jurors until the 
end of jury selection, however, could potentially burden 
trial courts and citizens called in for jury service if the 
selection process lasts several days. 
Because of the 
difficulties in retaining stricken jurors, this Court 
concludes that a Batson challenge is timely if it is made 
before the jury is sworn. It must be noted, however, that 
if stricken veniremembers are dismissed and later found to 
be part of a pattern of discriminatory strikes, the only 
remaining remedy for the Batson violation would be to 
discharge the entire venire and start the process anew. A 
court may not ignore or fail to remedy the prior improper 
strikes simply because the court already dismissed the 
veniremembers. 
In the present case, the prosecutor provided race­
neutral explanations for her exclusion of veniremembers 
Bonner and Johnson, even though defense counsel did not 
specifically object to their dismissals. 
The trial judge 
stated that she was not “satisfied with the prosecutor’s 
29  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
response as to potential juror Jones and Johnson,” but 
because they already left, she did not rule on whether the 
prosecutor engaged in purposeful discrimination. 
Instead, 
she instructed the attorneys to be careful “from this point 
on” with their selections. If the judge had found a Batson 
error, however, her only remedial option would have been to 
dismiss the entire venire and select the jury from a new 
panel because 
veniremembers. 
she had already dismissed the stricken 
The record 
III. Analys
reflects that 
is 
the trial judge never 
explicitly found that the prosecutor violated Batson. 
Nor 
can we infer such a finding on this record. 
Instead, the 
record is susceptible to the fair inference that the trial 
judge acted to preserve the presence of minority jurors on 
the panel, knowing that the jury pool, as a matter of 
chance, was largely Caucasian. 
Protecting a defendant’s 
right to a fair and impartial jury does not entail ensuring 
any particular racial composition of the jury.17  The goal 
17 See, for example, a recent proposal to amend MCR
6.412. 
This proposed court rule would expressly prohibit
the use of peremptory challenges to achieve a racially
proportionate jury. It states: 
(F) DISCRIMINATION IN THE SELECTION PROCESS. 
(continued…) 
30  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
of Batson and its progeny is to promote racial neutrality 
in the selection of a jury and to avoid the systematic and 
intentional exclusion of any racial group. 
Taylor v 
Louisiana, 419 US 522, 538; 95 S Ct 692; 42 L Ed 2d 690 
(1975); Holland v Illinois, 493 US 474, 476-480; 110 S Ct 
803; 107 L Ed 2d 905 (1990). 
As a threshold matter, we must note that our task in 
resolving these cases is difficult, in large part, because 
of the trial judge’s failure to rigorously follow the 
Batson 
procedures 
and, 
more 
importantly, 
to 
clearly 
articulate her findings and conclusions on the record. 
Therefore, under these circumstances, we must fairly read 
the record to determine exactly what the trial judge found 
and concluded in light of defendants’ Batson objections. 
On the basis of our reading of the voir dire 
transcripts, we conclude that the trial court did not, in 
(…continued) 
(1) 
No 
person 
shall 
be 
subjected 
to 
discrimination during voir dire on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. 
(2) Discrimination during voir dire on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin,
or sex for the purpose of achieving what the
court believes to be a balanced, proportionate,
or 
representative 
jury 
in 
terms 
of 
these 
characteristics shall not constitute an excuse or 
justification for a violation of this subsection.
[See Michigan Bar Journal, June 2005, p 64.] 
31  
 
    
                                                 
fact, find a Batson violation and, thus, there is no error 
to complain of in these cases. 
The trial judge’s initial 
expression of dissatisfaction with the prosecutor’s race­
neutral reasons, when considered in context with her 
subsequent remarks that “we are getting close to a 
sensitive issue,” related to her concern about the number 
of minority veniremembers left on the panel. 
The judge 
further articulated her actual motivation in the following 
excerpt: “I think all of us are being, trying to be 
conscientious about the selection of these jurors because 
of the racial makeup of the jury panels, which we don’t 
have any control over.” 
The trial judge’s remarks do not 
reflect a finding that the prosecutor engaged in purposeful 
discrimination. 
Rather, the comments demonstrate that her 
true motivation was to ensure some modicum of racial 
balance in the jury panel. 
Use of peremptory challenges, 
however, to ensure racial proportionality in the jury is 
prohibited by Batson and will be prohibited by proposed MCR 
6.412(F) if adopted.18 
18 Justice Cavanagh states that we rely on the above
proposed court rule to support the proposition that the use
of peremptory challenges to ensure racial proportionality
in the jury is prohibited. We do not rely on the proposal
to support this proposition. Rather, we cite to it to show
that this Court is considering steps to prevent such 
problems from occurring in the future. 
32  
 
 
 
 
The trial judge never expressly found that the 
prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges for a racially 
discriminatory reason. In fact, her comments at the end of 
jury selection suggest a contrary conclusion. 
The trial 
judge was more concerned with achieving a proportionate 
racial composition on the jury than with the exclusion of 
veniremember Jones. 
She ultimately concluded that no 
Batson violation existed because a satisfactory number of 
African-American females were still present on the jury. 
We reject Justice Cavanagh’s conclusion that the trial 
judge ever found that defense counsel met his burden of 
proving purposeful discrimination. 
Rather, the trial 
judge’s focus, as her comments reflect, was to ensure that 
the racial composition of the jury remained proportionate. 
The purpose of Batson is to prevent discriminatory 
exclusions of veniremembers on the basis of race or gender. 
Here, the jury pool, by chance, contained a greater number 
of Caucasians than African-Americans. 
The trial judge was 
preoccupied with this fact. 
Her Batson analysis seemed to 
be infused with and confused by the erroneous belief that 
Batson is violated if the challenge resulted in too few 
minority jurors. 
The trial judge’s statements did not 
imply that she would have kept Jones and Johnson on the 
jury because she thought they had been wrongfully excluded 
33  
 
 
                                                 
on the basis of race. 
Rather, her statements implied that 
she would have kept them on the jury to ensure that the 
number of African-American jurors remained proportionate to 
the number of Caucasian jurors. 
The trial judge failed to recognize that a defendant 
is not entitled to a jury of a particular racial 
composition as long as no racial group is systematically 
and intentionally excluded. Taylor, supra at 538; Holland, 
supra at 476-480.19  Defendants’ jury was drawn from a fair 
cross section of the community. 
Nor was any racial group 
systematically excluded. 
IV. Conclusion 
On the basis of our reading of the voir dire 
transcripts, we hold no Batson violation occurred in this 
case and the trial judge neither explicitly nor implicitly 
found such a violation. 
Giving the appropriate degree of 
deference to the trial judge’s ultimate finding that the 
19 See also United States v Ovalle, 136 F3d 1092, 1107
(CA 6, 1998), in which the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit struck down the Eastern District of 
Michigan’s 
jury 
selection 
plan, 
which 
utilized 
the 
“subtraction” method of balancing the jury pool to ensure
proportional representation of various racial groups within
the community. 
It held, “The selection of the grand and
petit juries from a qualified jury wheel that was derived
through racially discriminatory means, and the fact that 
the Jury Selection Plan was not narrowly tailored to meet
any compelling governmental interest, constitute grounds
for reversal of the defendants’ convictions.” 
34  
 
prosecutor did not engage in purposeful discrimination, we 
affirm defendants’ convictions. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
35  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 124996 
JEROME L. KNIGHT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 125101 
GREGORY M. RICE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that, on a fair 
reading of the record, the trial court did not find that 
prospective jurors were excluded on the basis of race in 
violation of Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 
90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986). 
During jury selection, the 
prosecutor 
exercised 
peremptory 
challenges 
to 
excuse 
prospective jurors Johnson and Bonner. Defense counsel did 
not object. 
A short time later, after the prosecution 
exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse prospective 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
juror Jones, defense counsel asked to approach the bench. 
Defense counsel objected to excusing Jones, asserting that 
she was being excused because she was black. 
In response 
to 
defense 
counsel’s 
assertion, 
the 
prosecutor 
then 
explained her reasons for excusing Jones, as well as 
Johnson and Bonner. 
Throughout the discussion, the trial 
court stated that “we are getting close to a serious issue 
here.” And after noting that the trial court has to accept 
or reject the prosecutor’s reasons, determining whether 
they are race-neutral or not, the trial court stated: “And 
I’m not, I’m saying that I think we’re getting close to a 
sensitive issue here on Jones and Johnson. 
That’s all I’m 
saying. 
I’m making my record too.” 
When this entire 
response is considered, it suggests that the trial court 
was not finding that a Batson violation had occurred, but 
was simply cautioning the parties that they may be getting 
“close” to a sensitive issue. 
Getting “close to a 
sensitive issue” is not the same thing as finding that a 
Batson violation has occurred and a prospective juror has 
been improperly excused on the basis of race.1 
1 Unlike the majority, I do not speculate with regard
to the reasons for the trial court’s statements. 
I simply
conclude that after a fair reading of the record, the trial
court did not find that a Batson violation had occurred. 
2  
 
 
Because I conclude that the trial court did not find 
that a Batson violation occurred, I express no opinion 
concerning the standard of review for Batson violations 
under steps two and three of the test or the appropriate 
remedies for Batson violations. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 124996 
JEROME L. KNIGHT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 125101 
GREGORY M. RICE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I agree with the legal principles announced in parts 
II(A) and II(B) of the majority’s opinion.1
 I write 
1 I do not join part II(C) of the majority opinion
because I do not believe that these cases are the proper
vehicle to explore when a Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106
S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986), objection must be raised.
In these cases, the Batson objections were made in a
relatively timely manner. 
In this regard, these cases do
not present a situation where a party is raising the Batson 
objection for the first time on appeal. Further, these are
not cases where a party waited until the end of trial to
make a Batson objection. 
While I applaud the majority’s
(continued…) 
 
                                                 
 
separately because I disagree with the majority’s reading 
of the record. I believe that an evenhanded reading of the 
record demonstrates that the trial court found that 
prospective jurors were excluded on the basis of race in 
violation of Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 
90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986), and its progeny. 
Further, I would 
hold that the trial court correctly made this determination 
under 
Batson’s 
three-step 
test.2
 
Upon 
making 
this 
determination, however, the trial court reasoned that any 
Batson violation was cured by the eventual makeup of the 
jury because “the same number if not more” unchallenged 
African-American 
jurors 
remained 
on 
the 
panel 
that 
ultimately decided these cases. 
I would hold that the 
(…continued)
efforts to clarify our Batson jurisprudence and provide our
lower courts guidance, I must nonetheless refrain from
joining part II(C) of the majority opinion. 
Because the 
timeliness of the Batson objections in these cases is not
at issue, I would prefer to decide the larger issue of when
a Batson objection must be lodged in a more suitable case. 
2 Batson’s three-step process is as follows: (1) the
opponent of the peremptory challenge must make a prima
facie showing of discrimination; (2) if the trial court
determines that a prima facie showing has been made, the
burden shifts to the proponent of the peremptory challenge
to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the strike; 
and 
(3) 
if 
the 
proponent 
provides 
a 
race-neutral 
explanation, the trial court must then determine whether 
the race-neutral explanation is a pretext and whether the
opponent 
of 
the 
challenge 
has 
proved 
purposeful
discrimination. Batson, supra at 96-98. 
2  
 
initial Batson violation was not cured by the eventual 
makeup of the jury and, thus, the trial court erred by 
continuing the proceedings in this manner. 
Accordingly, I 
would reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and 
remand these cases for new trials. 
I. Factual Background 
During jury selection, defendants raised objections to 
the prosecutor’s use of her peremptory challenges. 
On the 
first and second days of jury selection, the prosecutor 
exercised a total of four peremptory challenges. 
On the 
third day, the prosecutor exercised three more peremptory 
challenges. 
Of the seven challenges the prosecutor had 
exercised at that point, three were against African-
American veniremembers, one male and two females. 
After 
the prosecutor exercised her third challenge on day three, 
and after the court recessed for lunch, defense counsel 
raised a Batson objection. 
Defense 
counsel 
argued 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
was 
excluding African-American veniremembers on the basis of 
race, specifically African-American males. 
The prosecutor 
responded by arguing that a pattern of discrimination was 
not present, noting that she struck four Caucasians and 
only three African-Americans. 
Moreover, the prosecutor 
argued, only one of the excluded African-Americans was 
3  
 
 
male. 
While continuing to assert that the first step of 
Batson was not satisfied, the prosecutor also explained her 
reasons for excluding the African-Americans. 
The trial 
court found that Batson had not been violated at that 
point, stating: 
But 
in 
this 
particular 
case 
and 
this 
particular matter, I do not see a pattern of the
prosecution improperly excluding African American
males, because they’ve only excluded one, or 
African American females where two have been 
excluded. 
I think the reasons are acceptable. 
So I 
don’t see a problem there. 
The 
trial 
court 
then 
recessed 
for 
lunch, 
and 
the 
veniremembers returned to the courtroom after the break. 
When jury selection resumed, the prosecutor exercised 
peremptory challenges to exclude veniremembers Johnson, 
Bonner, and Jones. 
After the prosecutor sought to exclude 
veniremember Jones, defense counsel asked to approach the 
bench, and the trial court directed the veniremembers to 
leave the courtroom for a few minutes. 
Defense counsel 
objected to the exclusion of these three African-American 
females on Batson grounds. 
The trial court did not make 
any findings at this time; rather, the prosecutor argued 
that veniremember Bonner was excluded because she was 
closely related to two people who have been convicted of 
first-degree murder, not because she was African-American. 
4  
 
 
 
 
The prosecutor further asserted that veniremember Johnson 
was excluded because she had a close relative convicted of 
a drug charge and she was “hesitant in her demeanor.” 
Finally, 
the 
prosecutor 
explained 
that 
she 
excluded 
veniremember Jones because Jones had a child close to the 
age of the victim and Jones was a professional working 
person. The trial court then noted that veniremember Berg, 
a Caucasian female who was also a professional working 
person, was not challenged and excluded from service. 
The 
following exchange then occurred: 
The Court: Just before we recessed for 
lunch, I thought that it was very clear that we
didn’t have a problem here. 
But now I think we 
are getting very close to a sensitive issue. 
I didn’t see a problem with--
[Counsel 
for 
Defendant 
Knight]: 
Miss 
Johnson, Your Honor. 
The Court: 
--Christine Johnson. 
She was,
actually her demeanor was soft and she seemed
very forthright and honest. 
And I understand 
with Miss Bonner, I didn’t see any problems with
that. 
But I was very surprised about Miss 
Johnson. 
I didn’t say anything because the 
defense didn’t object. So I didn’t object. 
The same thing with Miss Jones. 
I do not 
see a reason other than--I mean, it seems to me
for the prosecution to say, she has a daughter
the same age as the victim, that would seem to
work in the prosecution’s favor, just in terms of
thinking in the jury selection. 
So I don’t 
accept that. 
[The Prosecutor]: Your Honor,--
5  
 
 
 
 
The Court: I do see that we are getting
close, and there are, I don’t know two or three
minority jurors left in this panel. 
So I think 
we are getting close to a serious issue here. 
I wish that somebody had said something
about keeping Miss Jones and Miss Johnson. 
And 
then we address this matter because I probably 
would not have excused either one of them. 
* * * 
[The Prosecutor]: Under Batson . . ., [a]
prosecutor has to explain peremptory challenges
with a neutral reason. 
As long as I come up with a neutral reason
for their dismissal, I believe that that’s 
appropriate. And I given--
The Court: But the Court has to accept or
reject whether the reason is neutral or not. 
[The Prosecutor]: I understand. 
The Court: And I’m not, I’m saying that I
think we’re getting close to a sensitive issue 
here on Jones and Johnson. 
That’s all I’m 
saying. I’m making my record too. 
* * * 
The Court: We have to [be] realistic here.
I really don’t want any problems with this case,
especially along these lines. 
I’m not satisfied with the prosecutor’s
response as to potential juror Jones and Johnson. 
But I think they’ve already left. 
* * * 
I’m just saying, I let Jones and Johnson go
without holding them, especially Jones. 
I guess
I should have held her and I didn’t do that. 
I’ll take the fault for that. 
But from this 
point on let’s try to be careful with this jury
selection. 
We are close to getting this jury
selected. [Emphasis added.] 
6  
 
 
Defense counsel inquired whether Johnson and Jones 
could be located; however, these veniremembers had already 
left the building. The panel was then called back into the 
courtroom, and jury selection was completed. At the end of 
selection, the trial court observed: 
With the panel that we ended up with, I
think that any Batson problems that may have been
there have been cured. 
We have the same number if not more jurors,
African American female jurors on the panel as if
we had kept Miss Christina Johnson and Miss Ruby
Jones. 
I don’t think either side ended up selecting
this panel for any reason other than I think that
these are the ones who will be the fair and 
impartial persons to hear and try this case. 
In the end, the jury convicted defendant Knight of first­
degree murder and codefendant Rice of first-degree murder 
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a 
felony. 
II. Analysis 
I agree with the majority that this Court’s “task in 
resolving these cases is difficult, in large part, because 
of the trial judge’s failure to rigorously follow the 
Batson 
procedures 
and, 
more 
importantly, 
to 
clearly 
articulate her findings and conclusions on the record.” 
Ante at 31. 
On the basis of its reading of the voir dire 
transcripts, the majority concludes that the trial court 
7  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
did not, in fact, find a Batson violation and, thus, there 
is no error to complain of in these cases. With respect to 
veniremembers Johnson and Jones, I respectfully disagree 
and would conclude that the trial court believed that these 
veniremembers were excluded on the basis of race in 
violation of Batson. 
I am simply hard pressed to find 
anything in the record from which it can be fairly said 
that the trial court did not conclude that Johnson and 
Jones were excluded on the basis of race. 
On the third day of jury selection, and after the 
lunch recess, defense counsel raised a Batson challenge to 
the exclusion of veniremembers Johnson, Bonner, and Jones.3 
3 This Batson challenge should not be confused with a
similar objection defense counsel raised earlier that day.
While the earlier objection provides some context for the
later objection, I am concerned with the trial court’s
treatment of the later Batson objection—i.e., the objection
to the exclusion of veniremembers Johnson and Jones. 
Moreover, the majority posits that defense counsel’s 
initial objection, as well as counsel’s other objections,
demonstrates counsel’s misunderstanding of Batson. 
I 
disagree. 
Defense counsel initially asserted that the
prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of systematically
excluding African-American veniremembers. 
To establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination based on race under
Batson’s first step, the opponent must show that (1) he or
she is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) the
proponent has exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude a
member of a certain racial group from the jury pool; and
(3) all the relevant circumstances raise an inference that 
the proponent of the challenge excluded the prospective
(continued…) 
8  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
The trial court did not decide whether defendants satisfied 
Batson’s first step by making a prima facie showing of 
racial discrimination. Instead, the prosecutor volunteered 
her reasons for the exclusions and attempted to proffer 
race-neutral explanations for the peremptory challenges. 
After considering the proffered explanations, the trial 
court rejected them, stating “I don’t accept that,” and 
“I’m not satisfied with the prosecutor’s response as to 
potential juror Jones and Johnson.” 
I find the following 
exchange particularly illustrative: 
[The Prosecutor]: Under Batson . . . , [a]
prosecutor has to explain peremptory challenges
with a neutral reason. 
As long as I come up with a neutral reason
for their dismissal, I believe that that’s 
appropriate. And I given--
(…continued)
juror on the basis of race. 
Batson, supra at 96. 
A 
pattern of strikes against members of a certain racial
group 
certainly 
constitutes 
a 
relevant 
circumstance. 
Indeed, as the Batson Court itself noted, “a ‘pattern’ of
strikes against black jurors included in the particular
venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination.”
Id. at 97. Batson and its progeny do not require a pattern
to be shown because the striking of even a single juror on
the basis of race violates the Constitution. 
See, e.g., J 
E B v Alabama ex rel TB, 511 US 127, 142 n 13; 114 S Ct
1419; 128 L Ed 2d 89 (1994). However, a pattern of strikes
against a particular racial group is still significant
because it may give rise to an inference of discrimination.
Thus, defense counsel’s remarks do not demonstrate his
misunderstanding of Batson. 
9  
 
 
                                                 
 
The Court: But the Court has to accept or
reject whether the reason is neutral or not. 
The Prosecutor: I understand. 
The Court: And I’m not . . . . 
On the basis of my review of the record, the only 
conclusion that can be fairly drawn is that the trial court 
believed 
that 
veniremembers 
Johnson 
and 
Jones 
were 
improperly excluded from the jury pool on the basis of 
race. 
In my view, the trial court effectively saw itself 
deciding Batson’s third prong, and concluded that the 
prosecutor’s 
explanations 
were 
a 
pretext 
and, 
thus, 
purposeful discrimination had been demonstrated. 
This 
conclusion also finds record support where the trial court 
expressed regret for dismissing Johnson and Jones and not 
being able to reseat these prospective jurors. 
Nor am I persuaded by the prosecutor’s argument that 
the trial court preliminarily concluded that Batson may 
have been violated, but ultimately concluded that no 
violation occurred.4  While this argument may be plausible 
4 The prosecutor directs this Court’s attention to the
following comments by the trial court: 
With the panel that we ended up with, I
think that any Batson problems that may have been
there have been cured. 
(continued…) 
10  
 
                                                 
in some instances, this is not one of them. I believe that 
the trial court’s comments noting that any Batson violation 
had been cured, and that “this panel” was not selected on 
racial grounds, did not alter the trial court’s conclusion 
that veniremembers Johnson and Jones were excluded on the 
basis of race. 
Stated differently, nothing in the record 
suggests that the trial court retracted its finding that 
Johnson and Jones were excluded in violation of Batson. 
While the record demonstrates that the trial court may have 
believed that “this panel” (the jury actually empaneled) 
was not subjected to discrimination and the trial court may 
have been concerned with the racial composition of the 
jury, the record clearly shows that the trial court also 
believed that excluded veniremembers Johnson and Jones were 
subjected to discrimination. 
(…continued)
We have the same number if not more jurors,
African American female jurors on the panel as if
we had kept Miss Christina Johnson and Miss Ruby
Jones. 
I don’t think either side ended up selecting
this panel for any reason other than I think that
these are the ones who will be the fair and 
impartial persons to hear and try this case. 
Notably, the majority relies heavily on this same passage
for the proposition that no Batson error occurred at all. 
11  
 
 
                                                 
In sum, I would conclude that the record fairly 
reveals that the trial court found a Batson violation 
because it rejected the prosecutor’s proffered explanations 
and would have recalled Johnson and Jones to sit on the 
jury if they could have been located. 
An evenhanded 
reading of the record shows that the trial court never 
retreated from its finding that these veniremembers were 
excluded on the basis of race. 
I tend to agree with the 
majority and suspect that some of the trial court’s 
statements arguably stemmed from its desire to ensure a 
racially mixed jury and that such a desire is prohibited by 
Batson and its progeny.5  Motivations aside, however, that 
does not change the fact that the trial court concluded 
that Johnson and Jones were excluded on the basis of race. 
In other words, regardless of the trial court’s main goal, 
or the goal ascribed to it by the majority, the record 
clearly demonstrates that the trial court along the way 
also found that purposeful discrimination occurred in 
5 I disagree, however, with the majority’s reliance on
a proposed court rule that may be adopted sometime in the
future. 
See ante at 31 n 17, 32. 
Instead, I prefer to
simply examine this case under the constitutional concerns
set forth in Batson and its progeny rather than rely on a
proposed court rule that has not even taken effect. 
12  
 
 
                                                 
violation of Batson.6
 Because I conclude that the trial 
court found that Batson had been violated, the question 
becomes whether this determination was proper. 
The prosecution argues that even if the trial court 
found a Batson violation, the proffered explanations were 
race-neutral and the trial court erred when it concluded 
that the reasons were a pretext. 
Accordingly, the 
prosecution is questioning the trial court’s resolution of 
Batson’s second and third steps.7  Thus, I would, consistent 
with this Court’s stated approach, review de novo whether 
the prosecutor articulated a race-neutral explanation for 
the strike as a matter of law. 
United States v Uwaezhoke, 
6 We should be mindful that our role is not to search 
for any plausible reason to avoid concluding that a trial
court found that discrimination indeed occurred. 
See, 
e.g., Miller-El v Dretke, __ US __; __ S Ct __; __ L Ed 2d
__; 2005 US LEXIS 4658 *39 (2005) (Miller-El II) (If a
prosecutor’s proffered reason for a peremptory challenge
“does not hold up, its pretextual significance does not
fade because a trial judge, or an appeals court, can
imagine a reason that might not have been shown up as
false.”). 
Like the majority, I could imagine many reasons
to explain away the lower court proceedings. 
But this 
would not change the fact that the trial court concluded
that discrimination occurred in violation of 
Batson. 
Again, while the record is not a model of clarity, I simply
cannot ignore or explain away the trial court’s conclusion. 
7 Appellate review of Batson’s first step is not
implicated in these cases. 
See Hernandez v New York, 500
US 352, 359; 111 S Ct 1859; 114 L Ed 2d 395 (1991)
(plurality opinion). 
13  
 
 
v 
995 F2d 388, 392 (CA 3, 1993). Further, I would review for 
clear error the trial court’s determinations whether the 
race-neutral explanations were a pretext and whether 
defendants proved purposeful discrimination, according the 
trial court’s findings high deference. 
Miller-El 
Cockrell, 537 US 322, 340; 123 S Ct 1029; 154 L Ed 2d 931 
(2003) (Miller-El I). 
I agree with the prosecution that the proffered 
explanations for the peremptory challenges were facially 
valid under the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law. 
The proponent of the peremptory challenge cannot satisfy 
his or her burden under Batson’s second step “by merely 
denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely 
affirming his good faith.” 
Purkett v Elem, 514 US 765, 
769; 115 S Ct 1769; 131 L Ed 2d 834 (1995). 
Rather, the 
proponent of a strike “must give a ‘clear and reasonably 
specific’ explanation of his ‘legitimate reasons’ for 
exercising the challenges,” and the explanation must be 
“related to the particular case to be tried.” 
Batson, 
supra at 98 & n 20, quoting Texas Dep’t of Community 
Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 258; 101 S Ct 1089; 67 L Ed 
2d 207 (1981). “What it means by a ‘legitimate reason’ is 
not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not 
deny equal protection.” 
Purkett, supra at 769. 
In other 
14  
 
 
words, the proffered reason does not always have to make 
perfect sense as long as the reason does not deny equal 
protection of the law. Here, the prosecutor’s explanations 
for excluding veniremembers Johnson and Jones were based on 
something other than their race. 
See Hernandez, supra at 
360. Further, discriminatory intent was not necessarily 
inherent in the prosecutor’s explanations. 
Id. 
Thus, I 
believe that the prosecutor’s explanations were race­
neutral as a matter of law, and the trial court properly 
proceeded to the third step of the Batson inquiry. 
According 
high 
deference 
to 
the 
trial 
court’s 
findings, I cannot say under these circumstances that the 
trial court clearly erred under Batson’s third step when it 
concluded that veniremembers Johnson and Jones had been 
excluded on the basis of race. 
Resolution of Batson’s 
third step largely hinges on the evaluation of credibility, 
and “evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on 
demeanor and credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a trial 
judge’s province.’” 
Miller-El I, supra at 339 (citation 
omitted). 
Here, the trial court rejected defendants’ 
Batson challenge that was lodged earlier in the day. After 
the lunch recess, however, the record reveals that the 
trial court became suspicious of the prosecutor’s method of 
exercising peremptory challenges. 
In light of defendants’ 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
objection to the exclusion of veniremembers Johnson and 
Jones, and after observing the prosecutor’s demeanor and 
listening to the proffered reasons for the peremptory 
challenges, 
the 
trial 
court 
concluded 
that 
these 
veniremembers were excluded on the basis of race. 
The trial court noted that one of the proffered 
reasons for excluding Jones (that she was a professional 
working person) applied with equal force to a Caucasian 
woman who the prosecutor did not attempt to peremptorily 
challenge. 
The prosecutor explained that she excluded 
veniremember Jones because Jones had a child close to the 
age of the victim and Jones was a professional working 
person. The trial court then noted that veniremember Berg, 
a Caucasian female who was also a professional working 
person, was not challenged and excluded from service. See, 
e.g., Miller-El II, supra at *21 (“If a prosecutor’s 
proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just 
as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted 
to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful 
discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.”). 
Further, all three challenges exercised by the prosecutor 
after the recess were made against African-Americans. 
Thus, out of the ten peremptory challenges exercised by the 
prosecutor, six were against African-Americans. 
While 
16  
 
  
                                                 
 
these facts alone certainly may not always justify a 
conclusion of purposeful discrimination in every case, the 
prosecutor’s rationales, coupled with her demeanor, could 
have affected the trial court’s credibility determination.8 
In light of the high degree of deference accorded to a 
trial court’s credibility assessment in the Batson arena, I 
cannot say the trial court clearly erred when it found that 
the 
prosecutor’s 
reasons 
for 
excluding 
veniremembers 
Johnson and Jones were a pretext. 
Thus, I would conclude 
that the trial court properly found that the prosecutor 
violated Batson when she excluded Johnson and Jones on the 
basis of their race. 
In light of this conclusion, it must be determined 
whether, upon learning that Johnson and Jones could not be 
located, the trial court erred in proceeding in the manner 
that it did; namely, deciding that any Batson violation had 
8 For example, in Miller-El I, supra at 342-343, the
United States Supreme Court noted that the prosecution’s 
reasons for striking African-American members of the venire
appeared race-neutral in that case. However, the fact that
the prosecutor used ten of the fourteen challenges to
exclude African-Americans, and three of the prosecution’s
race-neutral 
rationales 
for 
striking 
African-American 
veniremembers pertained just as well to some Caucasian
veniremembers who were not challenged and who did serve on
the jury, might suggest that the challenges were selective
and based on racial considerations. See also Miller-El II, 
supra at *21. 
17  
 
 
   
                                                 
I 
been “cured” because the “same number if not more” of 
African-American jurors sat on defendants’ jury. 
conclude that the trial court erred in proceeding in this 
fashion. 
Such an approach not only ignores the structural 
nature of a Batson violation, but directly conflicts with 
the propositions on which Batson and its progeny are based. 
“Jury 
service 
is 
an 
exercise 
of 
responsible 
citizenship by all members of the community, including 
those who otherwise might not have the opportunity to 
contribute to our civic life.” 
Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400, 
402; 111 S Ct 1364; 113 L Ed 2d 411 (1991). 
Allowing 
racial discrimination in the jury-selection process to go 
unremedied 
“offends 
the 
dignity 
of 
persons 
and 
the 
integrity of the courts.” 
Id. 
Doing nothing is not an 
available remedy when a trial court is confronted with a 
recognizable Batson violation.9 
9 The Batson Court made it clear that state courts are 
to be accorded wide latitude in fashioning a remedy in
light of a violation. Batson, supra at 99 n 24. There are 
two well-accepted remedies available to a trial court in
the event a Batson violation occurs. 
I believe that these 
remedies are worth mentioning. 
First, if a trial court
determines that a party exercised a peremptory challenge on
the basis of race in violation of Batson, the trial court 
can 
disallow 
the 
challenge 
and 
seat 
the 
challenged
veniremember. 
Batson, supra at 99 n 24 (concluding that a
trial court should “disallow the discriminatory challenges
and resume selection with the improperly challenged jurors
reinstated on the venire”). 
See also State v Grim, 854
(continued…) 
18  
 
                                                 
 
Here, the trial court’s “same number if not more” or, 
stated differently, “no harm, no foul” approach does not 
comport with the principles of Batson and its progeny. Not 
only does such an approach suggest that jurors are racially 
fungible, but it ignores the fact that veniremembers 
Johnson and Jones were excluded from the judicial process 
on the basis of race. 
When faced with an argument similar 
to the one advanced by the trial court to support its 
approach, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this 
(…continued)
SW2d 403, 416 (Mo, 1993) (“[T]he proper remedy for 
discriminatory use of peremptory strikes is to quash the
strikes and permit those members of the venire stricken for
discriminatory reasons to sit on the jury if they otherwise
would.”). 
Second, 
if 
a 
trial 
court 
determines 
that 
the 
discrimination in the selection process is more pervasive,
the court may discharge the entire venire and start the
process anew. 
Batson, supra at 99 n 24 (concluding that
the trial court may “discharge the venire and select a new
jury from a panel not previously associated with the 
case”). 
See also State v McCollum, 334 NC 208, 236; 433
SE2d 144 (1993) (“As Batson violations will always occur at
an early stage in the trial before any evidence has been
introduced, the simpler, and we think clearly fairer, 
approach is to begin the jury selection anew with a new
panel of prospective jurors who cannot have been affected
by any prior Batson violation.”) 
In sum, a trial court is under an affirmative duty to
ensure that the constitutional mandates of Batson are 
respected. While there may be other options available to a
trial court to remedy a Batson violation, permitting 
purposeful discrimination to stand without crafting a 
remedy is not an acceptable option. 
19  
 
argument 
and 
reasoned 
that 
“[w]here 
purposeful 
discrimination 
has 
occurred, 
to 
conclude 
that 
the 
subsequent selection of an African-American juror can 
somehow purge the taint of a prosecutor’s impermissible use 
of a peremptory strike to exclude a veniremember on the 
basis of race confounds the central teachings of Batson.” 
Lancaster v Adams, 324 F3d 423, 434 (CA 6, 2003). See also 
United States v Harris, 192 F3d 580, 587 (CA 6, 1999) 
(rejecting the proposition that the failure to exclude one 
member of a protected class is sufficient to insulate the 
unlawful exclusion of others.); United States v Battle, 836 
F2d 1084, 1086 (CA 8, 1987) (“We emphasize that under 
Batson, the striking of a single black juror for racial 
reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though 
other black jurors are seated, and even when there are 
valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors.”); 
United States v David, 803 F2d 1567, 1571 (CA 11, 1986). 
While a defendant does not have a right to a jury composed 
in whole or in part of persons of the defendant’s own race, 
the defendant “does have the right to be tried by a jury 
whose members are selected pursuant to non-discriminatory 
criteria.” 
Batson, supra at 85-86. 
In light of these 
principles, as well as more recent United States Supreme 
Court precedent, I believe that the trial court’s rationale 
20  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
was fundamentally defective. 
See, e.g., Powers, supra at 
410-414. 
Granted, the trial court was placed in a precarious 
situation because Johnson and Jones could not be located. 
Accordingly, the trial court could not have disallowed the 
prosecutor’s challenges and resumed selection with Johnson 
and Jones reinstated on the venire.10 
Batson, supra at 99 n 
24. 
However, the trial court could have discharged the 
venire and selected a new jury from a panel not associated 
with the case. 
Id.; see also ante at 30. 
Although 
inaction is not an option, the trial court failed to take 
any remedial action after finding a Batson violation. 
It 
was only by chance that the “same number if not more” of 
African-Americans ultimately served on defendants’ jury. 
But Batson is principally concerned with why certain 
veniremembers are excluded and requires remedial action if 
those veniremembers are excused on the basis of race. 
I 
reject the trial court’s rationale that the discrimination 
10 In this regard, the trial court observed that the
veniremembers could not be located because they left the
building. 
The record is unclear exactly what steps the
trial court took to find Johnson and Jones. 
The trial 
court possibly could have done more to locate these 
veniremembers. 
And if these veniremembers were located, 
the trial court would have then had the option to reinstate
Johnson and Jones on the venire. 
21  
 
 
                                                 
against veniremembers Johnson and Jones was somehow “cured” 
by the eventual makeup of the jury. 
Therefore, I would 
hold that the trial court erred when it did not take any 
action to remedy the Batson violation. 
Because the trial court concluded that Johnson and 
Jones were purposefully excluded from the jury pool on the 
basis of race and the trial court erred by failing to 
remedy these Batson violations, I would conclude that this 
error is subject to automatic reversal. This Court has yet 
to formally decide the issue whether a Batson violation is 
structural error that defies harmless error analysis. 
Structural 
errors 
“are 
intrinsically 
harmful, 
without 
regard to their effect on the outcome, so as to require 
automatic reversal.” People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47, 51; 610 
NW2d 551 (2000). 
In other words, structural errors affect 
the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end, and 
these errors alter the framework within which the trial 
proceeds. Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 309-310; 111 S 
Ct 1246; 113 L Ed 2d 302 (1991).11  In this regard, it must 
11 In Fulminante, supra at 310, the Court noted that
some examples of structural defects involve the right to
self-representation at trial, McKaskle v Wiggins, 465 US
168, 177 n 8; 104 S Ct 944; 79 L Ed 2d 122 (1984), and the
right to a public trial, Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39, 49 n
9; 104 S Ct 2210; 81 L Ed 2d 31 (1984).  Notably, the
(continued…) 
22  
 
 
                                                 
 
be observed that the United States Supreme Court has never 
suggested that the discriminatory exclusion of prospective 
jurors is subject to harmless error review. 
Indeed, my 
review of the Court’s precedent, as well as the decisions 
from the federal Courts of Appeals, compels the conclusion 
that the purposeful exclusion of a prospective juror on the 
basis of race is considered structural error and, thus, it 
defies harmless error analysis. 
The United States Supreme Court has stressed that 
unlawful exclusions in violation of Batson taint the entire 
conduct of the trial. 
Indeed, “the effects of racial 
discrimination during voir dire ‘may persist through the 
whole course of the trial proceedings.’” 
Tankleff v 
Senkowski, 135 F3d 235, 248 (CA 2, 1998), quoting Powers, 
(…continued)
United States Supreme Court also observed that the unlawful
exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from a grand
jury was a structural defect not subject to harmless error
analysis. 
Fulminante, supra at 310, citing Vasquez v 
Hillery, 474 US 254; 106 S Ct 617; 88 L Ed 2d 598 (1986). 
More recently, in Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 8; 119 S
Ct 1827; 144 L Ed 2d 35 (1999), the Court again cited
Vasquez for the proposition that racial discrimination in
the selection of grand jurors is structural error subject
to automatic reversal. 
While the precedential value of
this proposition has been questioned because Justice White
did not join this portion of the Vasquez opinion, the
United States Supreme Court itself has cited Vasquez with 
approval on this proposition. 
23  
 
 
supra at 412. To this end, the United States Supreme Court 
has stated: 
A prosecutor’s wrongful exclusion of a juror
by 
a 
race-based 
peremptory 
challenge 
is 
a 
constitutional violation committed in open court
at the outset of the proceedings. 
The overt 
wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel,
casts doubt over the obligation of the parties,
the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the
law throughout the trial of the cause. 
[Powers, 
supra at 412.] 
On the basis of this language, the Eight Circuit Court of 
Appeals has concluded that Powers “is a strong indication 
that the Supreme Court would hold that a constitutional 
error involving race-based exclusion of jurors infects the 
entire trial process itself and is hence a structural 
error.” 
Ford v Norris, 67 F3d 162, 171 (CA 8, 1995). 
Stated differently, unlawful exclusions on the basis of 
race are intrinsically harmful. 
Further, the United States Supreme Court has also 
stressed the impact these exclusions have on the whole 
system. 
For example, the Court has observed that “[t]he 
exclusion of even one juror for impermissible reasons harms 
that juror and undermines public confidence in the fairness 
of the system.” J E B v Alabama, 511 US 127, 142 n 13; 114 
S Ct 1419; 128 L Ed 2d 89 (1994). Accordingly, the United 
States Supreme Court has consistently reversed convictions 
without first determining whether the unlawful exclusion of 
24  
 
 
 
potential jurors affected the trial’s outcome. 
See, e.g., 
Powers, supra at 416. 
The Court has also required 
automatic reversal where unlawful discrimination was shown 
in the selection of grand jurors. Vasquez, supra at 263­
264; Rose v Mitchell, 443 US 545, 556; 99 S Ct 2993; 61 L 
Ed 2d 739 (1979). 
Because the Court emphasizes the impact 
these exclusions have on the judicial system and regularly 
subjects such error to automatic reversal, I believe that 
the Court would hold that a race-based exclusion of a 
prospective juror is structural error. 
The majority of federal Courts of Appeals that have 
examined this issue generally have reached the same result 
and 
have 
concluded 
that 
race-based 
exclusions 
are 
structural error not subject to harmless error analysis. 
See, e.g., Tankleff, supra at 248; Rosa v Peters, 36 F3d 
625, 635 n 17 (CA 7, 1994); Davis v Secretary for Dep’t of 
Corrections, 341 F3d 1310, 1316-1317 (CA 11, 2003); United 
States v Angel, 355 F3d 462, 470-471 (CA 6, 2004); Williams 
v Woodford, 396 F3d 1059, 1069 (CA 9, 2005). I would join 
those 
jurisdictions 
and 
likewise 
conclude 
that 
the 
purposeful exclusion of a prospective juror on the basis of 
race is structural error. 
The United States Supreme Court 
has made it clear that the purposeful exclusion of a 
veniremember on the basis of race defies “harmless error” 
25  
 
 
 
analysis and merits automatic reversal. 
Johnson v United 
States, 520 US 461, 468-469; 117 S Ct 1544; 137 L Ed 2d 718 
(1997); J E B, supra at 142 n 13. 
Therefore, until the 
United States Supreme Court holds otherwise, if a reviewing 
court determines that a prospective juror was excluded from 
the jury pool on the basis of race, this is structural 
error subject to automatic reversal. 
Accordingly, because 
the trial court found that Batson had been violated but 
erred in not remedying the discrimination, defendant Knight 
and codefendant Rice are entitled to new trials. 
III. Conclusion 
A fair reading of the voir dire transcripts indicates 
the trial court found that veniremembers Johnson and Jones 
were excluded on the basis of race in violation of Batson 
and its progeny. 
I would hold that the trial court 
correctly determined that the principles of Batson had been 
violated. 
The prosecutor’s proffered explanations for the 
exclusions were race-neutral as a matter of law, and the 
trial court did not clearly err when it rejected these 
explanations and determined that defendants had proved 
purposeful discrimination. 
However, I would hold that the 
purposeful exclusion of veniremembers Johnson and Jones on 
the basis of race was not cured by the eventual makeup of 
the jury and, thus, the trial court erred by continuing the 
26  
 
 
 
proceedings without remedying the Batson violations. Thus, 
I would reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and 
remand these cases for new trials. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Clifford W. Taylor
Marilyn Kelly 
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