Case Title: State v. Johnell Sartin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1994AP000037-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-0037-CR 
 
State OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Johnell Sartin, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 APR 11, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case is before the court on petition 
for review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, 
State v. Johnell Sartin, No. 94-0037-CR (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 
1995).  The appellate court affirmed a judgment of conviction 
entered by the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, John A. Franke, 
Circuit Judge, after a jury found the defendant-appellant-
petitioner, Johnell Sartin (Sartin), guilty of one count of 
possession of cocaine base with intent to deliver within 1,000 
feet of a pool, party to a crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 161.14(7)(a), 161.41(1m)(cm)3, 161.49, and 939.05 (1991-92), 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
2 
and one count of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver 
within 1,000 feet of a pool, party to a crime, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 161.16(2)(b)1, 161.41(1m)(c)2, 161.49, and 939.05 (1991-
92).  Two issues have been presented for our review: (1) In order 
to convict Sartin of possession of cocaine and cocaine base with 
intent to deliver, was the State required to prove that the 
defendant knew the identity of the particular substance, or is 
proof of knowledge that the substance was controlled or illegal 
sufficient?  We hold that in order to convict a defendant of 
possession of a controlled substance, the State was required to 
prove only that the defendant knew or believed that the substances 
which he possessed were illegal or controlled.  The State is not 
required to prove the defendant's knowledge as to the exact nature 
or chemical name of the controlled substance; (2) Did the party to 
a conspiracy instruction erroneously deny Sartin due process of 
law by improperly relieving the State of its obligation, under 
State v. Smallwood, 97 Wis. 2d 673, 294 N.W.2d 51 (Ct. App. 1980), 
to prove his specific knowledge of the exact controlled substance 
involved?  In accord with our holding as to the first issue, we 
find that Sartin's constitutional rights of due process have not 
been violated.  The State is required only to prove that the 
defendant knew or believed that he possessed a controlled 
substance, and therefore, providing the jury with the party to a 
conspiracy instruction was not in error.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
3 
 
The relevant facts of this case are undisputed.  On 
January 28, 1993, Sartin's brother, Allan Mabra, called the local 
police and informed them that Sartin and three others were in the 
process of driving Mabra's car to Milwaukee to pick up a half kilo 
of cocaine.  Mabra described the vehicle and provided the officer 
with the license number.  Shortly thereafter, police officers 
spotted the vehicle parked in front of Sartin's residence at 3071 
North 19th Street.  Sartin was observed walking down the sidewalk 
and returning to the vehicle.  The police pulled in front of the 
vehicle, and as they approached on foot, a passenger in the rear 
of the vehicle threw down a clear, knotted, plastic sandwich bag 
containing material that resembled cocaine.  The police also 
witnessed Trunail B., a juvenile positioned in the front passenger 
seat, 
hurriedly 
stuff 
something 
into 
the 
vehicle's 
glove 
compartment. 
 
Sartin and the three others were ordered from the vehicle, 
and a subsequent police search produced the contraband which 
formed the basis for the ensuing prosecution.  A clear plastic bag 
was found on the floor near the rear passenger door, which held 20 
Ziploc baggies containing crack cocaine rocks.  A black and white 
bag with the brand name "Fila" was found in the glove compartment. 
 The contents of the bag included small knotted plastic bags of 
cocaine base rocks, an electronic scale, and a bag of powder 
cocaine.  When the defendant was arrested, the police discovered 
$300 in cash on him as well as a beeper.  Subsequent investigation 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
4 
revealed that the beeper had received more than 400 calls in the 
past month. 
 
After Sartin's arrest, he made a series of custodial 
statements in response to police questioning over the course of 
the next day.  At trial, a Milwaukee detective testified that 
Sartin had told police that he had been given $270 to transport 
the Fila bag to a location in Milwaukee.  Detective Jones stated 
that Sartin had admitted that he "thought that what he was given 
was probably illegal, that he suspect[ed] that the plastic bag 
contained either marijuana or cocaine."  However, he denied any 
knowledge of the drugs found in the rear of the vehicle.    
 
At the close of trial, the circuit court instructed the jury 
on the elements of the two drug charges.  The court articulated 
that the first element of the possession charges was that the 
defendant possess cocaine base; second, the defendant knew or 
believed that the substance he possessed was cocaine base; third, 
the defendant possessed cocaine base with intent to deliver it.
1 
The jury was provided with similar instructions with regard to the 
second count of possession of cocaine. 
The 
circuit 
court 
proceeded to give the standard jury instruction regarding party to 
a crime, as well as "aiding and abetting" and "conspiracy."  The 
jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts, and the defendant 
received a seven-year sentence. 
                     
     
1  See WIS JI-CRIMINAL 6035 Possession of a Controlled 
Substance With Intent to Deliver (1990). 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
5 
 
On appeal, Sartin claimed that the party to the crime 
instruction improperly relieved the State of its burden under 
Smallwood to prove that he knew the exact nature or chemical name 
of the controlled substance he possessed as party to a crime.  The 
appellate court rejected this contention, stating: 
We find this position to be without merit on the record 
before us. The trial court expressly instructed the jury 
that it could find Sartin guilty of possessing cocaine 
base with intent to deliver as a party to a crime only 
if the jury first found that the State proved by 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that `the defendant 
knew or believed that the substance he possessed was 
cocaine base.' The trial court used equally direct 
language to instruct the jury on count two, cautioning 
the jury that before it could return a guilty verdict, 
the jury had to find that the State proved by evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Sartin `knew or believed 
that 
the 
substance 
he 
possessed 
was 
cocaine.' 
Accordingly, we conclude that these instructions were 
legally sufficient and that Sartin's argument to the 
contrary is contradicted by the record. 
Sartin, No. 94-0037-CR unpublished slip op. at 6.  Having ruled 
that application of the jury instructions was appropriate, the 
court thereafter declined to address Sartin's ex post facto 
argument.  Id.
2  The judgment of conviction was affirmed. 
                     
     
2  A concurring opinion was authored by Judge Schudson, in 
which he suggested that the majority of the court had missed the 
issue in this case. Judge Schudson stated that the focus of the 
decision should have been centered upon Sartin's challenge under 
Smallwood, that the State was required to prove his specific 
knowledge of the exact substance which he possessed. Judge 
Schudson stated that "the Smallwood dictum on which Sartin relies 
is at odds with the rationale Smallwood offers for its holding." 
Sartin, slip op. at 2 (Schudson, J., concurring). Moreover, 
prevailing authority has rejected the notion that the government 
must prove a defendant's specific knowledge of the exact 
substance. Id.; see United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 725 F.2d 471, 
474-75 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
I. 
 
A trial judge may exercise wide discretion in selecting jury 
instructions based on the facts and circumstances of the case.  
This discretion extends to both choice of language and emphasis.  
State v. McCoy, 143 Wis. 2d 274, 289, 421 N.W.2d 107 (1988).  "The 
 court's discretion should be exercised to `fully and fairly 
inform the jury of the rules of law applicable to the case and to 
assist the jury in making a reasonable analysis of the evidence.'" 
 Id. (citing State v. Dix, 86 Wis. 2d 474, 486, 273 N.W.2d 250 
(1979)).  Although the judge is granted such broad discretion, the 
question of whether the circuit court correctly instructed the 
jury is one of law which this court reviews de novo, without 
deference to the lower courts.  State v. Wilson, 149 Wis. 2d 878, 
898, 440 N.W.2d 534 (1989).  The State bears the burden of proving 
all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358 (1970).  "Language in a jury instruction that 
relieves the State of its duty to prove the element of intent 
beyond a reasonable doubt denies the defendant due process."  
Barrera v. State, 109 Wis. 2d 324, 329, 325 N.W.2d 722 (1982).   
 
The determinative question in the present case is whether the 
circuit court's instruction to the jury on party to a conspiracy 
improperly relieved the State of its obligation under Smallwood to 
prove Sartin's knowledge as to the exact nature or chemical name 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
7 
of the substance which he possessed.  In addressing this question, 
we first consider to what extent the accused must be aware of the 
precise nature of the substance he or she possesses or delivers, 
in order to be prosecuted under Wis. Stat. ch. 161 (1993-94), the 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA).  This requires an 
analysis of the knowledge requirement as provided under the act. 
 
Our decision in State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 451 
N.W.2d 752 (1990) represents the latest expression by this court 
of the knowledge requirement in a drug possession case.  In 
Poellinger, we stated: "[T]o convict an individual of possession 
of a controlled substance, the State must prove not only that the 
defendant was in possession of a dangerous drug but also that the 
defendant knew or believed that he or she was."  Id. at 508.  In 
reviewing Wisconsin precedent, the Criminal Jury Instructions 
Committee has recognized that there appears to be two fundamental 
aspects to the knowledge requirement: (1) knowing, conscious 
possession as opposed to accidental, unknowing possession; and, 
(2) knowing the nature of the substance knowingly possessed or 
delivered. (Emphasis added.)
3  The focus of our present review is 
on the secondary prong, the extent of the defendant's knowledge as 
to the exact nature of the substance possessed. 
 
Sartin's primary argument before this court is that the UCSA 
is correctly interpreted as requiring proof that a criminal 
                     
     
3  See WIS JI-CRIMINAL 6000, Note on the Knowledge 
Requirement in Controlled Substance Cases, at 2-3 (1981). 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
8 
defendant know the exact nature or precise chemical name of the 
controlled substance he or she is accused of possessing or 
delivering.  Sartin relies upon the following passage from the 
appellate court's decision in Smallwood to provide the basis for 
his present challenge: 
In 
conclusion, 
those 
cases 
dealing 
with 
the 
Uniform 
Controlled Substances Act have recognized that the 
essential element for proving an offense of delivery is 
that the defendant knew or believed the substance was a 
controlled substance.  Knowledge as to the exact nature 
or chemical name of the controlled substance is 
necessary only when the evidence points to substances of 
different schedules and different penalties. 
Smallwood, 97 Wis. 2d at 678 (emphasis added). 
 
Relying on the fact that marijuana is a Schedule I controlled 
substance,
4 while cocaine is a Schedule II controlled substance,
5 
Sartin maintains that the underlined portion from Smallwood 
establishes the cornerstone for his appeal.  He argues that where 
evidence exists that a defendant thought he possessed a different 
controlled substance from a different schedule than the one for 
which he is prosecuted, the State is then required to prove the 
defendant's "[k]nowledge as to the exact nature or chemical name 
of the controlled substance."  Id. at 678.  
 
The State objects to Sartin's reliance on what it considers 
to be simply dictum from Smallwood to support his interpretation 
of the knowledge requirement in the UCSA.  The State asserts that 
                     
     
4  See Wis. Stat. § 161.14(4)(t) (1993-94). 
     
5  See Wis. Stat. § 161.16(2)(b)1 (1993-94). 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
9 
such a reading of the act is contrary to established Wisconsin 
precedent and public policy.  Moreover, it lacks a reasoned 
support in precedent from other jurisdictions.  The State 
maintains that the well-established law in this state only 
requires proof that the defendant knew the substances he possessed 
were controlled or illegal.  Proof of knowledge of the exact 
nature or particular controlled substance possessed is not 
required.  We agree. 
 
The knowledge requirement in a drug possession case under the 
UCSA finds its origin in this court's decision in State v. 
Christel, 61 Wis. 2d 143, 211 N.W.2d 801 (1973).  The defendants 
in Christel had challenged their convictions for possession of 
marijuana (hashish) with intent to sell on the grounds of 
insufficiency of evidence to support the knowledge requirement.  
This court reviewed the evidence that the defendants had acted in 
a clandestine manner, had signed for a package not addressed to 
either one of them at a home at which neither resided, and had 
proceeded to leave the home with the wrapped brick of hashish 
which had just recently been delivered, and concluded that the 
jury was entitled to infer knowing possession on the basis of this 
evidence.  Id. at 159.  Affirming the judgment of conviction, this 
court stated that "[u]nder sec. 161.30(2)(d), Stats. 1969, the 
prosecution must prove not only that the defendant is in 
possession of a dangerous drug but also that he knows or believes 
that he is."  Id. at 159 (citing WIS JI-CRIMINAL 6030 and cases 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
10 
cited therein); and Wright v. Edwards, 470 F.2d 980, 981 (5th Cir. 
1972) (concluding that "due process demands that the State show a 
specific intent to possess the prohibited substance, that is, that 
the act was purposely, not accidentally done"). 
 
Four years later, this court revisited the knowledge required 
to support proof of possession of a controlled substance in Kabat 
v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 224, 251 N.W.2d 38 (1977).  In Kabat, a tiny 
amount of residue scraped from the bottom of a pipe in the 
defendant's apartment had formed the basis for his conviction of 
possession of marijuana in Manitowoc County.  The issue in this 
case was not whether the defendant possessed a controlled 
substance, but whether he knew he did.  Id. at 227.  Although we 
held that the amount and form of the substance found in the pipe 
was not sufficient to impute to the defendant knowledge that the 
substance contained ingredients of marijuana, we articulated the 
appropriate test to be employed to determine knowledge, as 
provided in Christel: "To convict an individual of possession of a 
controlled substance, the prosecution must prove not only that the 
defendant was in possession of a dangerous drug but also that he 
knew or believed he was."  Kabat, 76 Wis. 2d at 227 (citing 
Christel, 61 Wis. 2d at 159). 
 
Following Kabat, we were presented with a defendant's 
challenge to jury instructions following a conviction for delivery 
of Phencyclidine (PCP), in the case of Lunde v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 
80, 270 N.W.2d 180 (1978).  In accordance with Christel, the 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
11 
circuit court judge had instructed the jury that "in order to 
return a verdict of guilty, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant delivered a controlled substance and that he 
knew it was a controlled substance."  Lunde, 85 Wis. 2d at 86.  
After failing to make a timely objection at trial, the defendant 
argued on appeal that the instructions were insufficient and 
fatally defective, claiming that the judge should have instructed 
the jury that the State was required to prove that the defendant 
knew the substance which he delivered was PCP, the particular 
controlled substance at issue in the case.  Id.   
 
We distinguished our holding in Christel by recognizing that 
the question before the jury in Christel was whether the 
defendants knew the substance in their possession was marijuana, 
as opposed to some completely innocuous or uncontrolled substance. 
 There was not the slightest doubt in Lunde regarding the actual 
nature and identity of the substance delivered by the defendant.  
Id. at 89.   
After reviewing the instructions as provided to the 
jury, we found that there was no suggestion that the delivery of 
the controlled substance was innocent, accidental or inadvertent, 
and thus, there was no infringement upon the defendant's due 
process rights, as the instructions were not erroneous.  Id. at 
90.  In our analysis, we recounted the very purpose of the 
Christel rule: "that is, to make sure that there be a specific 
intent to possess or deliver a prohibited substance."  Id.; see 
also Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 508.  The defendant's knowledge of 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
12 
the controlled nature of the substance, as well as its chemical 
identity, PCP, was clear from the evidence in the record.  The 
State, however, was only required to demonstrate the defendant's 
knowledge as to the controlled nature of the substance.  We 
therefore concluded that the jury was adequately instructed as to 
the State's burden of proof in order to convict the defendant. 
 
We now turn to the appellate court's decision in Smallwood, 
central to Sartin's challenge on this review.  In Smallwood, the 
defendant 
appealed 
a 
conviction 
for 
delivery 
of 
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), claiming that the State had failed to 
produce evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew the 
substance he delivered was THC.
6  Recapitulating the knowledge 
requirement as provided by this court, the appellate court 
summarized Lunde as clarifying the Christel holding: "[t]he 
purpose of the rule is to make sure that there be a specific 
intent to possess or deliver a prohibited substance, not a 
particular prohibited substance."  Smallwood, 97 Wis. 2d at 676. 
 
Finding Wisconsin precedent inapplicable to the precise facts 
before it, the court of appeals sought guidance from another 
jurisdiction, looking to a decision of the Georgia appellate 
court, Weaver v. State, 145 Ga.App. 194, 243 S.E.2d 560 (1978), 
which had addressed similar provisions in the UCSA.  In Weaver, 
                     
     
6  Although the facts as presented are sparse, the defendant 
apparently claimed that he thought that the substance which he 
possessed was another controlled substance, possibly marijuana. 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
13 
the defendant was the target of a controlled drug buy for the sale 
of THC, a Schedule I controlled substance under Georgia law.  Id. 
at 562.  However, a subsequent chemical analysis determined it to 
be heroin, also a Schedule I substance.  The defendant argued that 
there was therefore insufficient evidence of intent to sell 
heroin.  Holding to the contrary, the Georgia appellate court 
stated: 
The appellant's misapprehension of this fact does not relieve 
him of criminal responsibility.  The elements of the 
crime are the same, and the prescribed punishment is the 
same, for selling any Schedule I substance.  An intent 
unlawfully to sell a controlled substance is all that is 
required, and this intent was properly inferable from 
the evidence. 
Id.  Following the Georgia court's lead in Weaver, but without any 
further analysis of the issue, the Smallwood court relied on the 
fact that THC and the substance the defendant claimed to have 
possessed (marijuana) were both Schedule I controlled substances 
in Wisconsin, stating: 
The elements of the crime are the same, and the prescribed 
punishment is the same.  As long as these facts are 
present, we believe it is unreasonable to assume that 
the legislature intended that the State prove that the 
accused knew the exact nature or chemical name of the 
controlled substance.  The only knowledge required is 
the knowledge of the controlled nature of the substance. 
Smallwood, 97 Wis. 2d at 677-78.   
 
The Smallwood court clearly limited its decision to the facts 
before it, analogizing the defendant's claimed ignorance of the 
actual substance possessed with that of the defendant in Weaver, 
producing an identical result.  However, rather than ceasing its 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
14 
discussion, the appellate court proceeded to surmise that perhaps 
the result would be different in a case where the charged 
substance and the substance the defendant thought he possessed 
were placed in different schedules, stating: "[k]nowledge as to 
the exact nature or chemical name of the controlled substance is 
necessary only when the evidence points to substances of different 
schedules and different penalties."  Id. at 678.  It is this 
passage that Sartin clings to in the present case. 
 
The State suggests to this court that the above-quoted 
passage from Smallwood is merely dicta, and therefore is not 
controlling.
7  We agree.  The question presented to the appellate 
court in Smallwood was limited to whether the State was required 
to prove that the defendant knew the substance possessed was THC, 
where THC and marijuana shared placement in Schedule I, and 
furnished the same penalty.  In response, the court specifically 
articulated that the State need not prove the defendant knew the 
exact nature or chemical name of the controlled substance he 
delivered in order to be convicted.  Id. at 677-78.   
 
We find the court's suggestion that a different rule might 
apply where the perceived and actual substances are dissimilarly 
placed in the statutory drug schedules was unnecessary to the 
                     
     
7  Dicta is a statement or language expressed in a court's 
opinion which extends beyond the facts in the case and is broader 
than necessary and not essential to the determination of the 
issues before it. State ex rel. Schultz v. Bruendl, 168 Wis. 2d 
101, 112, 483 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1992); see also State v. Koput, 
142 Wis. 2d 370, 386 n.12, 418 N.W.2d 804 (1988).  
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
15 
resolution of the issue before it, and therefore is not binding in 
subsequent cases as legal precedent.  The primary decision relied 
upon by the court of appeals, Weaver v. State, did not hold that 
in some instances the State would be required to prove the 
defendant's knowledge of the particular controlled substance which 
he possessed.  Weaver, 243 S.E.2d at 562.  Rather, the Weaver 
court simply stated that an intent unlawfully to sell a controlled 
substance is all that is required; the State need not prove a 
defendant's specific knowledge where the elements of the crime and 
the penalty are matching.  Id.   
 
We seek to reaffirm the law in Wisconsin as expressed in 
Christel, Kabat, Lunde, that portion of Smallwood not overruled by 
this opinion, and Poellinger: the only knowledge that the State 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a possession of a 
controlled substance case is the defendant's knowledge or belief 
that the substance was a controlled or prohibited substance.  The 
State is not required to prove the defendant knew the exact nature 
or precise chemical name of the substance.  We expressly overrule 
any language in Smallwood which suggests that a different rule 
might apply where the actual and perceived substances are placed 
in different schedules and wield dissimilar penalties.  The proof 
of the nature of the controlled substance is, in the statutory 
scheme, only material to the determination of the penalty to be 
applied upon conviction.  See, e.g., People v. James, 348 N.E.2d 
295, 298 (Ill. App. 1976).  We find that it would be unreasonable 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
16 
to assume that the legislature intended that the State prove that 
the accused knew the exact nature or chemical name of the 
controlled substance. 
 
Moreover, our decision today comports with precedent from 
other jurisdictions confronting similar public policy concerns.  
The majority of courts that have addressed this issue agree that 
in drug possession or delivery cases, the defendant's knowledge 
that he had a controlled or illegal substance is all that the 
State need prove; there is no requirement to prove the defendant 
knew the exact nature of the substance, or its chemical 
designation.
8  The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 725 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1984) 
demonstrates the similarity that our holding shares with decisions 
at the federal level.   
 
The defendant in Lopez-Martinez asserted that the State was 
required to prove that he knowingly possessed and imported heroin, 
the controlled substance recovered by Border Patrol agents at the 
time of his arrest.  He claimed, however, that he thought the 
substance was probably marijuana, not heroin, as eight years 
                     
     
8  See United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 57 F.3d 836, 843 
(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Cartwright, 6 F.3d 294, 303 (5th 
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 671 (1994); United States v. 
Berick, 710 F.2d 1035, 1040 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 
(1983); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 614 N.E.2d 649, 653 (Mass. 
1993); Carter v. United States, 591 A.2d 233, 234-35 (D.C. App. 
1991); United States v. Zandi, 769 F.2d 229, 234 (4th Cir. 1985); 
People v. Guy, 107 Cal. App. 3d 593, 600-01, 165 Cal. Rptr. 463, 
467-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Garringer, 48 Cal. App. 3d 
827, 835, 121 Cal. Rptr. 922, 927 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
17 
earlier, he had made a similar importation attempt involving a 
large quantity of marijuana.  Id. at 472.  The penalty scheme for 
the two substances was significantly different, as heroin was a 
narcotic drug carrying a more severe punishment.  See 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841(b)(1)(A) 
and 
960(b)(1). 
 
Rejecting 
the 
defendant's 
contentions that he lacked the necessary intent to possess and 
import heroin and that this was not the offense charged by the 
grand jury, the court relied upon a number of prior cases in which 
similar positions had proven equally unsuccessful.
9  Reviewing the 
content of the drug statutes involved, the court explained that 
they were primarily intended to prohibit importing or possessing a 
controlled substance.  The subsequent penalty phase, an entirely 
separate component, only thereafter assigns the length of 
incarceration dependent upon the particular substance implicated. 
 Id. at 475.  This characterization is consistent with the holding 
of other courts that the government is not required to prove the 
defendant's knowledge as to the specific amount of the substance 
possessed, despite the tremendous effect such amount can have on 
                     
     
9  See United States v. Davis, 501 F.2d 1344, 1346 (9th Cir. 
1974) (holding that "[t]he government is not required to prove 
that the defendant actually knew the exact nature of the substance 
with which he was dealing"); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 
697, 698, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976) 
(announcing that "[w]e restrict Davis to the principle that a 
defendant who has knowledge that he possesses a controlled 
substance may have the state of mind necessary for conviction even 
if he does not know which controlled substance he possesses"); and 
United States v. Rea, 532 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 837 (1976). 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
18 
the penalty assessed.  See United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 
605-06 (7th Cir. 1990); Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 508. 
 
The statutory design of the Wisconsin UCSA, Wis. Stat. ch. 
161 (1993-94), parallels the federal statutes discussed in Lopez-
Martinez.  See State v. Hecht, 116 Wis. 2d 605, 615-16, 342 N.W.2d 
721 (1984).
10  The knowledge requirement is designed to remove from 
the prosecution pool one who accidentally, innocently, or 
inadvertently possesses a controlled substance.  To adopt Sartin's 
position that the State must prove the defendant's knowledge of 
the particular substance does not further this policy.  As the 
State 
suggests, 
insulating 
from 
criminal 
liability 
those 
defendants who knowingly deal in prohibited controlled substances, 
but are ignorant, mistaken, or willing to misrepresent the exact 
nature or chemical name of the substance which they traffic, is 
contrary to public policy.  Expressing discontentment for the 
position advocated by the defendant in James, and Sartin in this 
case, the Illinois appellate court stated:  
This would lead to an absurd result, as the State suggests, 
that drug dealers would only be liable for selling the 
drug they thought they were selling. This approach would 
make the statute inapplicable to one who had not 
personally 
performed 
a 
chemical 
analysis 
of 
the 
substance containing the controlled substance. 
James, 348 N.E.2d at 298. 
                     
     
10  The Uniform Controlled Substances Act was approved by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 
1970. This act replaced the 1933 Uniform Narcotic Drug Act and the 
1966 Model State Drug Abuse Control Act.  Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act, 9 U.L.A. 188 (1979). 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
19 
 
Our decision today facilitates the intent of the statute to 
curb the dangerous proliferation of the drug trade, which has 
infiltrated the very fabric of our society.  The requirement that 
a defendant "knowingly" distribute or possess a controlled 
substance adequately protects those individuals who may innocently 
become involved in a drug transaction by inadvertence or accident. 
 However, one who knowingly engages in the trade of controlled 
substances 
should 
not 
profit 
by 
feigning 
ignorance, 
and 
subsequently relying on the State's potential inability to prove 
knowledge of the exact substance involved.   
 
II. 
 
Finally, we address Sartin's claim that the jury instructions 
in this case improperly relieved the State of the burden of 
proving his specific knowledge of the particular substances found 
in the vehicle.  Sartin maintains that refusing to follow his 
interpretation of Smallwood would deprive him of a constitutional 
right to due process of law by violating ex post facto principles. 
 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; WIS CONST. art. I, § 8; State v. 
Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 511, 509 N.W.2d 712, cert. denied, 114 
S.Ct. 2712 (1994).  Sartin theorizes that refusing to follow the 
dicta in Smallwood would effectively be removing a defense that 
was available at the time that the act was committed.  We find 
this argument to be without merit.  The law in Wisconsin is clear 
that the State is required only to prove that the defendant knew 
or believed that he possessed a controlled or prohibited 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
20 
substance.  The Smallwood decision did not change the law, despite 
the erroneous suggestion that perhaps a dissimilar result would 
occur in a different case.  This dicta does not amount to legal 
precedent upon which the defendant was entitled to rely for his 
defense, and therefore, we find that no ex post facto violation 
occurred here. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 94-0037-CR 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-0037-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Johnell Sartin, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  191 Wis. 2d 826, 532 N.W.2d 145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
April 11, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 10, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
JOHN A. FRANKE 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Ellen Henak, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Maureen 
McGlynn Flanagan, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general.