Case Title: Tate v. Wyoming Livestock Bd.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-138

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Tate v. Wyoming Livestock Bd.1997 WY 24932 P.2d 746Case Number: 96-138Decided: 02/13/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

Susan 
Davies TATE, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

WYOMING LIVESTOCK BOARD, Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

 

Appeal from District Court, 
Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

 

Hardy H. Tate, Sheridan, for 
Appellant. 

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Thomas J. Davidson, Deputy Attorney General; Thomas A. Roan, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Lynda G. Cook, Assistant Attorney General, 
for Appellee. 

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

MACY, 
Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellee Wyoming 
Livestock Board denied Appellant Susan Davies Tate's request to have her Wyoming 
livestock brand renewed, declaring that the brand had been abandoned. The board 
also denied Tate's application to have the brand reissued. Tate filed a petition 
for review with the district court, and that court certified the case to the 
Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

 

[¶2]      We affirm the 
board's decision.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Tate offers the 
following issues for our review:

 

A. Is a Wyoming livestock brand property for purposes 
of Article I, Section 3 of the Wyoming State Constitution and the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution that prohibit the taking 
of property without due process?

 

B. Is the rigid application of the forfeiture 
provision of Wyoming Statute § 11-20-115 to nonresident brand owners without 
actual notice to them of the proposed forfeiture, a taking, in violation of 
Article I, Section 3 of the Wyoming State Constitution and the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Donn T. Davies 
conveyed the Spear D (-  D) brand to 
Tate in 1976, using a bill of sale. Davies recorded this bill of sale with the 
board. The bill of sale listed Tate's address as being Box 277, Ashland, Montana 
59003. Tate thereafter notified the board on three occasions of changes in her 
address.

 

[¶5]      Tate rerecorded 
her brand in August of 1985. The rerecording receipt indicated that the brand 
had been renewed on January 13, 1986, and that it had to be rerecorded in 1995. 
During the 1994 legislative session, the Wyoming legislature amended § 
11-20-115, changing the date by which Tate was required to rerecord her brand.1

 

[¶6]      On October 11, 
1994, the board mailed a notice to Tate, informing her that her brand would 
expire on January 1, 1995, and that the renewal fee for her brand was due by 
that date. The board sent the notice to Tate's most recent address which was 
shown on the brand records. Tate had moved, and the post office did not have a 
forwarding order on file for her; therefore, the notice was returned to the 
board. The board mailed another notice to the same address, and, again, the 
notice was returned because the forwarding order had expired.

 

[¶7]      Sometime after 
the sixty-day grace period which was allowed in § 11-20-115(a) for rerecording 
brands had expired, Tate contacted the board, seeking to renew her brand. The 
board informed her that she had missed the deadline and that she had thereby 
abandoned her brand. Tate sent a letter to the board on June 12, 1995, 
explaining that she was living in Nevada, that she did not know that the law had 
been changed, and that she did not receive any notice of her obligation to renew 
her brand by January 1, 1995.  Tate 
sent a later letter in which she informed the board that she had been advised 
that she could not simply renew her brand and that she had to apply to have the 
brand reissued. She informed the board that it was her desire to have the brand 
renewed but that, in the event that the brand was not renewed, she was applying 
to have the brand reissued. The board refused to reissue the brand because the 
brand would conflict with existing brands.

 

[¶8]      Tate asked the 
board to reconsider its ruling that the brand had been abandoned and its refusal 
to grant her application for the reissuance of the brand. The board affirmed its 
original decision, pointing out that it was the brand owner's responsibility to 
update her address and that the brand conflicted with other brands. Tate again 
asked the board to reconsider its decision, and the board again affirmed its 
prior decision, electing to follow its policy not to permit renewals after the 
statutorily imposed deadline. Tate filed a petition for review of that 
administrative action with the district court, and the district court certified 
the case directly to this Court.

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶9]      When a case has 
been certified to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b), we apply the 
appellate standards which are applicable to a reviewing court of the first 
instance. Pfeil v. Amax Coal West, Inc., 908 P.2d 956, 959 (Wyo. 1995). "The 
scope of review of administrative actions is defined in WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) 
(1990)." Id.

 

DISCUSSION

 

A. Property Interest

 

[¶10]   In Tate's first issue, she claims 
that Wyoming recognizes brands as being property. The board agrees that a 
properly recorded brand gives its owner a constitutionally protected property 
interest in that brand.

 

The relevant statute provided:

 

Any brand recorded as required by law is the property 
of the person in whose name it is recorded, and is subject to sale, assignment, 
transfer, devise and descent as personal property. Instruments of writing 
evidencing sale, assignment or transfer shall be acknowledged and recorded in 
the office of the board in a book kept and indexed for that purpose. 
Acknowledgment and recording of such instruments have the same effect as to 
third parties as the acknowledgment and recording of instruments affecting real 
estate.

 

WYO. STAT. § 11-20-109 
(Supp. 1995) (amended 1996). Pursuant to this statute, a brand owner has a 
property interest in his brand as long as the brand remains properly 
recorded.

 

B. Due Process

 

[¶11]   Although it is somewhat difficult 
to define Tate's constitutional challenge with precision, it appears that she is 
claiming that, because of the amended notice provision contained in § 11-20-115, 
she was deprived of her brand without being given due process of law and that § 
11-20-115 is unconstitutional because it does not contain a provision which 
defines what type of notice is required. The board responds by arguing that Tate 
failed to satisfy her burden of proving that the statute is 
unconstitutional.

 

[¶12]   We have said the following with 
regard to procedural due process protections:

 

Procedural due process principles require reasonable 
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before government action may 
substantially affect a significant property interest. Due process considerations 
are invoked in administrative proceedings. A party claiming infringement has the 
burden of demonstrating that infringement by first showing the existence of a 
protected property interest and then showing the interest has been affected in 
an impermissible way.

 

Pfeil, 908 P.2d  at 961 
(citations omitted). "Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. Challengers 
bear the burden of proving that a statute is unconstitutional." 
Id.

 

[¶13]   The statute at issue provides in 
pertinent part: 

 

At least sixty (60) days preceding the expiration 
date of the brand, the board shall notify by mail, at the address shown on 
the brand records, the party owning the brand that the brand must be 
rerecorded and if the brand has not been rerecorded within sixty (60) days from 
the expiration date . . . the brand will be declared abandoned and will be 
allowed to other applicants.

 

WYO. STAT. § 11-20-115(a) 
(Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). The board has interpreted this provision as 
implicitly imposing a duty on the brand owner to inform the board of any address 
changes to ensure that its records are current.

 

[¶14]   We agree that an implicit 
requirement is present within the statute which requires a brand owner to inform 
the board of her whereabouts. The brand owner is in the best position to know 
her current address, and it is a simple matter for her to notify the board of 
any changes in her address. In 1995, the board rerecorded over 26,000 brands. It 
would be unreasonable to require the board to verify the current address for 
each brand owner. We are convinced that the legislature would not impose such an 
onerous burden on the board and that it intended for the brand owners to notify 
the board of address changes so that the board could satisfy its statutory duty 
to notify the brand owners. We are satisfied that even Tate interpreted this 
statute as charging her with the duty to notify the board of any changes in her 
address because she did inform the board of at least three address 
changes.

 

[¶15]   Given this interpretation of the 
statute, we must decide whether the statute measures up to the due process 
standards. The United States Supreme Court carefully considered procedural due 
process notice requirements in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust 
Company, 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950), which case we have 
cited with approval on many occasions. See, e.g., Gookin v. State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Insurance Company, 826 P.2d 229, 232-33 (Wyo. 1992); Colley v. Dyer, 
821 P.2d 565, 567 (Wyo. 1991); Hanesworth v. Johnke, 783 P.2d 173, 175 (Wyo. 
1989). Although the specific notice provision involved in Mullane was 
notification by publication, the analysis as it pertains to missing or unknown 
persons is relevant:

 

Personal service of written notice within the 
jurisdiction is the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of 
proceeding. But the vital interest of the state in bringing any issues as to its 
fiduciaries to a final settlement can be served only if interests or claims of 
individuals who are outside of the State can somehow be determined. A 
construction of the Due Process Clause which would place impossible or 
impractical obstacles in the way could not be justified.

 

Against this interest of the State we must balance 
the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . 
.

 

The Court has not committed itself to any formula 
achieving a balance between these interests in a particular proceeding or 
determining when constructive notice may be utilized or what test it must meet. 
Personal service has not in all circumstances been regarded as indispensable to 
the process due to residents, and it has more often been held unnecessary as to 
nonresidents. . . .

 

An elementary and fundamental requirement of due 
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections. . . .

 

But when notice is a person's due, process which is a 
mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous 
of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The 
reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be 
defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those 
affected. . . .

 

. 
. . .

 

. 
. . A state may indulge the assumption that one who has left tangible property 
in the state either has abandoned it, . . . or that he has left some caretaker 
under a duty to let him know that it is being jeopardized. As phrased long ago 
by Chief Justice Marshall in The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144, 3 L. Ed. 678, "It is 
the part of common prudence for all those who have any interest in [a thing], to 
guard that interest by persons who are in a situation to protect 
it."

 

. 
. . .

 

. 
. . [I]t has been recognized that in the case of persons missing or unknown 
employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is 
all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final 
decree foreclosing their rights.

 

. 
. . .

 

. 
. . We recognize the practical difficulties and costs that would be attendant on 
frequent investigations into the status of great numbers of beneficiaries, many 
of whose interests in the common fund are so remote as to be ephemeral; and we 
have no doubt that such impracticable and extended searches are not required in 
the name of due process.

 

Mullane, 339 U.S.  at 313-18, 70 S. Ct.  at 656-59 
(citations omitted).

 

[¶16]   In order to determine whether the 
board's effort to notify Tate was sufficient enough to satisfy the due process 
requirements, we must balance the state's interests against Tate's interests. 
Colley, 821 P.2d  at 567 (citing Mullane). Tate's property interest in her brand 
gave her a significant interest in receiving notice. However, this interest 
cannot justify the extreme burden which would be placed on the board if the 
board were required to locate the current address for each brand owner who moved 
without giving the board a change of address. In the case at bar, Tate lived in 
Montana, New Mexico, and Nevada after receiving the brand. We agree with the 
statement made by the board in its brief that, given the board's limited 
resources, its duty to use its resources prudently, and its duty to administer 
over 26,000 brands, it would be unreasonable to require the board to undertake 
an investigation to determine the location of a brand owner who could live 
virtually anywhere.

 

[¶17]   Tate argues that she was not given 
a meaningful opportunity to renew her brand because she was not notified that 
the brand would be declared abandoned if she did not renew it. The fact that she 
did not receive the notice which was sent to her last known address does not 
make the statute unconstitutional. Mullane does not require that Tate 
necessarily receive notice; rather, it requires that the notice must be 
reasonably calculated to reach her. The procedure which the board followed 
satisfied this requirement. It was Tate's failure to notify the board of her new 
address which made actual notice infeasible.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶18]   The board satisfied Tate's due 
process rights when it sent the notice to her last known address. The board, 
therefore, acted properly in declaring that Tate's brand was abandoned because 
she had failed to renew it by the statutory deadline.

 

[¶19]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1 Prior 
to the 1994 amendment, § 11-20-115 provided:

 

Every 
tenth year after 1935, every owner of a brand or mark shall rerecord the same, 
and failure to do so is an abandonment of the brand or mark. At the expiration 
of each rerecording period, the executive officer of the board shall notify by 
mail, at the address shown on the brand records, the party owning the brand or 
mark that the brand or mark has not been rerecorded and unless rerecorded within 
ninety (90) days from the date of notice the brand or mark will be declared 
abandoned and will be allowed to other applicants.

 

WYO. 
STAT. § 11-20-115 (1989) (amended 1994). Section 11-20-115 now provides in 
pertinent part:

 

(a) 
Every tenth year after recording a brand, every owner of a brand shall rerecord 
the brand, and failure to do so is an abandonment of the brand. At least sixty 
(60) days preceding the expiration date of the brand, the board shall notify by 
mail, at the address shown on the brand records, the party owning the brand that 
the brand must be rerecorded and if the brand has not been rerecorded within 
sixty 
(60) days from the expiration date . . . the brand will be declared abandoned 
and will be allowed to other applicants.

 

(b) 
Effective January 1, 1995, every owner of a brand shall rerecord the brand. The 
term of the rerecording period and the renewal fee shall be established by the 
board but shall not exceed the fee established by W.S. 11-20-116 and the term 
shall not exceed the term established by this section.

 

WYO. 
STAT. § 11-20-115 (Supp. 1996).