Case Title: Gardner v. Phipps

Citation: 

Docket Number: 942047

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1995-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Whiting,
1 Lacy, 
Hassell, and Keenan, JJ.  
 
 
EMORY STEVE GARDNER 
 
v.  Record No. 942047 
OPINION BY JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
                                        September 15, 1995 
KEVIN MICHAEL PHIPPS, et al. 
 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WISE COUNTY 
 
J. Robert Stump, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we deal with issues of contributory 
negligence, sudden emergency, and unavoidable accident arising 
from a vehicular collision.  Conforming to established appellate 
principles, we state the facts in the light most favorable to the 
defendant, the prevailing party in the trial court. 
 
On the night of February 15, 1991, Emory Steve Gardner and 
his friend Tim Crawford were unable to drive to their own homes 
because of snowy weather.  Hence, they spent the night at the 
home of another friend, Mitchell Chester.  The next morning, the 
snow stopped around 9:00 a.m. and Gardner and Crawford travelled 
on the "main road"
2 to Pound to buy food for breakfast.  Although 
the road was "slippery and wet" from the snow, Gardner had no 
accident on the way to Pound. 
 
Crawford suggested that they return to Chester's house by 
State Route 632, a shorter, but less travelled route than the  
main road.  The temperature was "about twenty degrees" and Route 
                     
    
1Justice Whiting prepared the opinion in this case prior to the 
effective date of his retirement on August 12, 1995, and the Court 
subsequently adopted the opinion. 
    
2The record fails to disclose any other designation or 
description of the "main road." 
 
 
 
 
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632 was still "[s]now covered and icy."  Around 12:00 noon, 
Gardner was approaching a sharp curve on Route 632 in Wise 
County, driving his pickup truck between five and ten miles an 
hour on his side of the two-lane secondary road.  
 
At the same time, Kevin Michael Phipps was approaching the 
curve in the opposite direction, driving a pickup truck.  For the 
preceding three to four hours, Phipps had been delivering 
newspapers published by Bristol Newspapers, Inc. over what Phipps 
described as roads "completely covered" with snow.  Although the 
Phipps truck was equipped with new snow tires and was loaded with 
bags of salt in the rear for traction, "plus some other 
newspapers," it had "skidded other times that morning."   
 
As Phipps drove down what he described as "a medium grade," 
at a speed of "between five and ten miles an hour," he "lost 
control of [the truck]" before entering the curve when the truck 
"started . . . fishtailing or whatever."  Phipps tried to regain 
control by steering the truck, but was unsuccessful.     
 
However, Phipps's truck remained on its right side of the 
road until it reached the curve, where it entered Gardner's 
traffic lane.  The left front of Phipps's truck struck the left 
front side of Gardner's truck in Gardner's traffic lane, pushing 
Gardner's truck off the road, over an embankment into a creek, 
injuring Gardner. 
 
Gardner sued Phipps and Bristol Newspapers.  Without 
objection, the court instructed the jury that Phipps and Gardner 
 
 
 
 
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had the duty to use  
 
 
that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person 
would have exercised having regard to the duty of a 
driver to exercise increased caution in the face of 
known and obvious dangerous condition[s] of the 
roadway.   
 
Over Gardner's objection, the trial court also instructed the 
jury on issues of contributory negligence, sudden emergency, and 
unavoidable accident.  After the jury returned a verdict in favor 
of the defendants, the court entered judgment upon that verdict. 
 Gardner appeals. 
 
Noting that the evidence fails to show that he lost control 
of his vehicle or did anything to contribute to the accident, 
Gardner contends that the court erred in submitting the issue of 
contributory negligence to the jury.  The defendants respond that 
Gardner's choice of Route 632, which was covered with snow and 
ice, rather than the "main road," which "was perfectly clear," 
was a "particular type of contributory negligence . . . known as 
the 'choice of paths' rule."  The defendants argue that this 
issue was properly submitted to the jury on that theory. 
 
According to the defendants, Virginia adopted the choice of 
paths doctrine in Ward v. Clark, 163 Va. 770, 776, 177 S.E. 212, 
214 (1934).  However, since the evidence in this case fails to 
show a choice between an obviously safe road and an obviously 
dangerous one, we need not decide whether and under what 
circumstances the so-called "choice of paths doctrine" will be 
 
 
 
 
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applied to the choice of roads open for travel to the public, as 
they were in this case.  
 
Ward and the two cases that preceded Ward involved choices 
between obviously safe and obviously dangerous ways for a 
plaintiff to perform an act.  Id. (choice between descending icy 
steps in front of apartment or covered steps at rear); Riverside 
& Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Carter, 113 Va. 346, 351, 74 
S.E. 183, 185 (1912) (choice between servicing dangerous machine 
in inadequately lighted room at night or adequately lighted room 
in daylight); Street v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 101 Va. 746, 750, 45 
S.E. 284, 285 (1903) (choice between working on railroad car from 
position on railroad tracks with other cars in vicinity and from 
position off tracks where no danger of being struck by other 
rolling cars). 
 
In contrast, Gardner's actual or constructive knowledge that 
Route 632, a "curvy, narrow mountain" road, was not as well 
travelled as the main road and might be covered with snow and 
patches of ice did not present him with a choice between an 
obviously safe route and an obviously dangerous one to return to 
Chester's house.  The main road itself was "slippery and wet" 
from the snow.  And Gardner had negotiated both roads without  
incident until Phipps lost control of his truck and struck 
Gardner.  Accordingly, the court erred in instructing the jury on 
the issue of contributory negligence based on the choice of paths 
doctrine. 
 
 
 
 
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Since we cannot determine upon what basis the jury returned 
its verdict for the defendants, and it may have been upon that of 
contributory negligence, we conclude that Gardner was prejudiced 
by this instruction.  Ring v. Poelman, 240 Va. 323, 328, 397 
S.E.2d 824, 827 (1990).  If the evidence is substantially the 
same as that in the first trial, the trial court should not grant 
contributory negligence instructions. 
 
Next, we consider whether the court erred in granting a 
sudden emergency instruction at Phipps's request.  Gardner 
asserts that since Phipps's truck had skidded on the snowy road 
several times earlier that morning, he should have anticipated 
that his vehicle might skid or "fishtail" again; hence, he was 
not faced with a sudden emergency.  Ordinarily, we would not 
consider this contention since it is asserted for the first time 
on this appeal.  Rule 5:25.  However, because the case will be 
remanded for a new trial and the same issue may arise on retrial, 
we will consider the contention. 
 
 
The word "emergency" is defined as "[a] sudden 
unexpected happening; an unforeseen occurrence or 
condition; . . . an unforeseen combination of 
circumstances that calls for immediate action."  
Black's Law Dictionary 469 (5th ed. 1979).  See also 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 741 
(1981); Portsmouth v. Chesapeake, 205 Va. 259, 266, 136 
S.E.2d 817, 823 (1964). 
 
Garnot v. Johnson, 239 Va. 81, 86, 387 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1990).  
Here, the fact that Phipps's truck "fishtailed" or skidded was 
not an unexpected happening as claimed; the truck skidded several 
times earlier that morning as Phipps drove over the snowy roads 
 
 
 
 
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delivering newspapers.  Thus, no reasonable inferences could be 
drawn that Phipps was faced with an "emergency" as that term is 
defined and applied in the sudden emergency doctrine.  Id.  
Accordingly, this instruction should not be granted on retrial if 
the evidence is substantially the same. 
 
Next, we decide whether the court erred in instructing the 
jury that "an unavoidable accident is one which ordinary care and 
diligence could not have prevented or one which occurred in the 
absence of negligence by any party to this action."  We have 
stated the controlling rule as follows: 
 
[I]t is rarely permissible to give an unavoidable 
accident instruction in automobile accident cases 
. . . .  This follows because we have recognized that 
few automobile accidents occur without fault [and] we 
have recognized that such an instruction is apt to give 
a jury "an easy way of avoiding instead of deciding the 
issue made by the evidence."   
 
Chodorov v. Eley, 239 Va. 528, 531, 391 S.E.2d 68, 70 (1990) 
(citations omitted).   
 
In our opinion, this is not one of those rare cases in which 
"there is a reasonable theory of the evidence under which the 
parties involved may be held to have exercised due care, 
notwithstanding that the accident occurred."  Id. at 531-32, 391 
S.E.2d at 70 (quoting Bickley v. Farmer, 215 Va. 484, 488, 211 
S.E.2d 66, 69-70 (1975) and Batts v. Capps, 213 Va. 174, 175-76, 
191 S.E.2d 227, 228 (1972)).  Although Phipps saw no other 
vehicles on Route 632, he noticed the tracks of other vehicles 
that had preceded him and had apparently negotiated the curve 
 
 
 
 
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without incident.  This indicates that Phipps also could have 
descended the hill without losing control of his vehicle.  
Accordingly, it was error to grant the instruction. 
 
Finally, we reject the defendants' argument that even if the 
instructions were erroneously granted, "such errors were harmless 
because it plainly appears from the record that they could not 
have affected the verdict."  This argument is based on the 
premise that "the evidence failed to establish negligence on the 
part of Phipps."  In our opinion, there was sufficient evidence 
to submit the issue of Phipps's negligence to the jury and we 
also note that the defendants did not assign cross error to that 
action of the court.  Thus, we cannot say that the errors were 
harmless. 
 
Because of the trial court's error in granting the 
contributory negligence and unavoidable accident instructions, we 
will reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial. 
 
Reversed and remanded.