Case Title: People v. Padilla

Citation: 

Docket Number: S263375

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2022-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
MARIO SALVADOR PADILLA, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S263375 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Four 
B297213 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
TA051184 
 
 
May 26, 2022 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Justices Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
Justice Corrigan filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justice Perren* concurred. 
 
 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
S263375 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
    
 
In 2016, the voters of California enacted Proposition 57, a 
measure that amended the law governing the punishment of 
juvenile offenses in adult criminal court by requiring hearings 
to determine whether the offenses should instead be heard in 
juvenile court.  Adjudicating these offenses in juvenile court 
typically results in less severe punishment for the juvenile 
offender.  (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 
299, 306–307 (Lara).)  
Our precedent holds that “new laws that reduce the 
punishment for a crime are presumptively to be applied to 
defendants whose judgments are not yet final.”  (People v. 
Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656 (Conley), citing In re Estrada 
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada).)  When that presumption 
applies, its retroactivity rule extends to all “nonfinal 
judgments.”  (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 677 
(Esquivel).)  Applying that rule, we unanimously concluded two 
years after Proposition 57 passed that the initiative 
“ameliorated the possible punishment for a class of persons, 
namely juveniles.”  (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 308.)  We held 
that “Estrada’s inference of retroactivity applies” to the 
proposition’s juvenile provisions, making those provisions 
applicable to all cases in which the judgment was not final when 
the proposition went into effect.  (Lara, at p. 309.) 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
The question here is whether Proposition 57 applies 
during resentencing when a criminal court sentence imposed on 
a juvenile offender before the initiative’s passage has since been 
vacated.  Defendant Mario Salvador Padilla was originally 
sentenced before Proposition 57 was enacted, but his judgment 
later became nonfinal when his sentence was vacated on habeas 
corpus and the case was returned to the trial court for 
imposition of a new sentence.  Consistent with our decisions 
articulating the scope of the Estrada presumption, we hold that 
Proposition 57 applies to his resentencing. 
I. 
When Padilla was 16 years old, he stabbed his mother to 
death and conspired with a cousin to kill his stepfather.  
Following a hearing “at which he was determined not fit to be 
dealt with under juvenile court law,” Padilla was convicted in 
adult criminal court and was sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole.  (People v. Padilla (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 
244, 248 (Padilla); see Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 707 [fitness 
hearing procedure].)  After the United States Supreme Court 
held in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller) that 
mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles violate the 
federal Constitution, he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus 
seeking resentencing in light of the high court’s holding.  
(Padilla, at p. 248.)  The trial court vacated his sentence, 
reconsidered it in light of Miller, and again imposed life without 
the possibility of parole.  (Padilla, at p. 248.)  While Padilla’s 
appeal from his new sentence was pending, the United States 
Supreme Court decided Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 
U.S. 190 (Montgomery), which clarified the analysis that must 
precede a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a 
juvenile defendant.  (See id. at pp. 208–210.)  The Court of 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
Appeal vacated Padilla’s second sentence in light of Montgomery 
and again remanded his case to the trial court for resentencing.  
(Padilla, at p. 248.) 
About two weeks after Padilla’s second sentence was 
vacated, California voters approved Proposition 57.  As relevant 
here, Proposition 57 requires all criminal charges against 
minors to be filed in juvenile courts.  Under the proposition, 
minors may be tried and sentenced in criminal courts “ ‘only 
after a juvenile court judge conducts a transfer hearing to 
consider various factors such as the minor’s maturity, degree of 
criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and whether 
the minor can be rehabilitated.’ ”  (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 
p. 305, quoting People v. Vela (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 68, 72.)  As 
discussed below, this transfer hearing differs in significant ways 
from the fitness hearing Padilla received. 
The trial court again imposed life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole (LWOP).  Padilla appealed, arguing that 
he was entitled to a transfer hearing under Proposition 57 
because his case became nonfinal once his sentence was vacated.  
(Padilla, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 248.)  The Court of Appeal 
agreed and remanded Padilla’s case once more to the trial court 
with directions to refer the matter to juvenile court for a transfer 
hearing.  (Id. at p. 256.)  We granted the Attorney General’s 
petition for review and now affirm.  
II. 
 
Section 3 of the Penal Code instructs that no part of that 
code applies retroactively, which we have taken to mean that 
new criminal laws do not govern prosecutions initiated before 
the law went into effect.  (See Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at 
pp. 746–748.)  But we have recognized an exception to this rule 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
for new laws that mitigate punishment; in Estrada, we held that 
such laws are presumed to apply to cases charged before the 
law’s enactment but not yet final.  (Id. at p. 745.)  Absent 
evidence to the contrary, we presume that when the Legislature 
“amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment,” it “must have 
intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty 
now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which 
it constitutionally could apply.”  (Ibid.)  Because the Legislature 
has “determined that its former penalty was too severe,” the 
only reason to apply that penalty in pending cases would be “a 
desire for vengeance,” a motivation we decline to attribute to our 
lawmakers.  (Ibid.)  This presumption applies to ameliorative 
laws enacted by ballot proposition as well.  (See Conley, supra, 
63 Cal.4th at p. 656.) 
We recently held that the Estrada presumption applies to 
the juvenile provisions of Proposition 57.  (Lara, supra, 4 
Cal.5th at p. 309; see id. at p. 303 [explaining that although 
“Estrada is not directly on point[,] . . . its rationale does apply”].)  
Before the proposition passed, “prosecutors were permitted, and 
sometimes required, to file charges against a juvenile directly in 
criminal court, where the juvenile would be treated as an adult.”  
(Id. at p. 305.)  Proposition 57 eliminated that direct filing 
procedure, reestablishing the historical rule that charges 
against juveniles must be brought in juvenile court.  (Lara, at 
p. 305.)  If the case is retained by the juvenile court after a 
transfer hearing, and if the court finds that the minor 
committed the charged offense, the court then conducts a 
dispositional hearing, where potential custody commitments are 
less lengthy than in criminal court.  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 607; see also id., § 730, subd. (a)(2).)  Because Proposition 57 
reduced “the possible punishment for a class of persons, namely 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
juveniles,” we determined that it made “an ‘ameliorative 
change[] to the criminal law’ that we infer the legislative body 
intended ‘to extend as broadly as possible.’ ”  (Lara, at 
pp. 308, 309, quoting Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 657.)  We 
accordingly held that “this part of Proposition 57 applies to all 
juveniles charged directly in adult court whose judgment was 
not final at the time it was enacted.”  (Lara, at p. 304.) 
III. 
 
Our cases indicate that the range of judgments affected by 
Estrada is delimited by constitutional constraints; as we said in 
Estrada itself, a law lessening punishment is understood to 
apply “to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.”  
(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.)  We have not had occasion 
to delineate the parameters of “the Legislature’s power to 
intervene in judicial decisionmaking.”  (Esquivel, supra, 
11 Cal.5th at p. 678.)  But we have indicated that any 
restrictions on that power would attach at “the conclusion of a 
criminal proceeding as a whole” — i.e., when “ ‘the last word of 
the judicial department with regard to a particular case or 
controversy’ ” has issued.  (Ibid., quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211, 227 (Plaut).) 
On this question, we have consulted high court precedent 
interpreting the principle of separation of powers to provide that 
when the judicial department has concluded its judgment in a 
particular case, “Congress may not declare by retroactive 
legislation that the law applicable to that very case was 
something other than what the courts said it was.”  (Plaut, 
supra, 514 U.S. at p. 227.)  Congress may not direct “findings or 
results under old law,” but it may “compel[] changes in law.”  
(Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc. (1992) 503 U.S. 429, 438.)  
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
Consistent with this view, we have approved laws that alter 
indisputably final cases when they create new rules or 
procedures by which a defendant may seek relief.  (See Esquivel, 
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 677.) 
No similar constitutional concern arises when the 
Legislature or electorate enacts new laws altering nonfinal 
judgments.  (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 678–679.)  As a 
result, Padilla’s case does not come near whatever limits there 
may be on the power of lawmakers to impose their commands 
retroactively.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole before the United States Supreme Court 
held in Miller and Montgomery that such a sentence is 
unconstitutional when imposed on a juvenile unless the court 
has considered whether the sentence is appropriate in light of 
the minor’s age and potential for rehabilitation.  After 
petitioning for habeas relief on that basis, his sentence was 
vacated, a new term was imposed, and then that sentence was 
vacated too.  The decision below followed Padilla’s appeal from 
his second resentencing.  (See Padilla, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 253–254.) 
The Attorney General concedes that the vacatur of 
Padilla’s sentence made the judgment in his case nonfinal.  We 
agree.  A case is final when “the criminal proceeding as a whole” 
has ended (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 678) and “the courts 
can no longer provide a remedy to a defendant on direct review” 
(In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 405 (Spencer)).  When 
Padilla’s sentence was vacated, the trial court regained the 
jurisdiction and duty to consider what punishment was 
appropriate for him, and Padilla regained the right to appeal 
whatever new sentence was imposed.  His judgment thus 
became nonfinal, and it remains nonfinal in its present posture 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
because the Court of Appeal ordered a second resentencing, from 
which the Attorney General now appeals.  There is no 
“constitutional obstacle” to applying the Estrada presumption to 
his case.  (Esquivel, at p. 679.) 
The Attorney General nonetheless asks us to distinguish 
for Estrada purposes between cases that are nonfinal because 
the defendant is undergoing retrial or resentencing and those in 
a newly coined procedural stance — cases “not yet final on initial 
review.”  But Estrada made no such distinction.  The Estrada 
presumption stems from our understanding that when the 
Legislature determines a lesser punishment is appropriate for a 
particular offense or class of people, it generally does not wish 
the previous, greater punishment — which it now deems “too 
severe” — to apply going forward.  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at 
p. 745.)  We presume the Legislature intends the reduced 
penalty to be used instead in all cases in which there is no 
judgment or a nonfinal one, and in which it is constitutionally 
permissible for the new law to control.  (See ibid.; Esquivel, 
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 677.) 
The Legislature may write statutes that provide for a 
different or more limited form of retroactivity, or for no 
retroactivity at all.  This includes the prerogative to disclaim the 
application of a new ameliorative law to proceedings that occur 
after a defendant’s conviction or sentence has been vacated.  But 
we have not presumed from statutory silence any retroactive 
intent less than that described in Estrada — i.e., absent a 
discernable intent to the contrary, ameliorative criminal laws 
apply to all nonfinal cases.  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.)  
Proposition 57 reflects a decision by California’s voters that the 
range of punishments meted out in criminal court is too severe 
for most juvenile offenders.  In accord with Estrada, our 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
presumption is that the voters wanted that reduction in 
punishment to stretch “ ‘as broadly as possible, distinguishing 
only as necessary between sentences that are final and 
sentences that are not.’ ”  (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 308, 
quoting Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 657.)  Nothing about this 
presumption is undermined when a case is nonfinal because the 
defendant’s sentence has been vacated rather than because the 
initial review of the sentence has not yet concluded. 
 
Under our precedent and the high court’s, a judgment 
becomes final “ ‘where the judgment of conviction was rendered, 
the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition 
for certiorari ha[s] elapsed.’ ”  (Spencer, supra, 63 Cal.2d at 
p. 405, quoting Linkletter v. Walker (1965) 381 U.S. 618, 622, 
fn. 5, disapproved on another ground in Teague v. Lane (1989) 
489 U.S. 288.)  Once that process ends, the judgment may be 
challenged on collateral review.  Merely filing a collateral attack 
does not make the judgment nonfinal.  As the high court has 
explained, collateral review is distinct from direct review in that 
it seeks to unwind a judgment that has been affirmed on appeal.  
(Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993) 507 U.S. 619, 634.)  For that 
reason, “ ‘ “an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal 
will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final 
judgment.” ’ ”  (Ibid., quoting United States v. Frady (1982) 456 
U.S. 152, 165.)  But once a court has determined that a 
defendant is entitled to resentencing, the result is vacatur of the 
original sentence, whereupon the trial court may impose any 
appropriate sentence.    
It is clear that Padilla’s present appeal from his 
resentencing is part of direct review of a nonfinal judgment, not 
collateral review of a final judgment.  The court had the power 
to impose any sentence available for his crime, including life 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
without the possibility of parole if it found that sentence 
appropriate in light of Padilla’s “ ‘youth and its attendant 
characteristics.’ ”  (Jones v. Mississippi (2021) ___ U.S. ___ [141 
S.Ct. 1307, 1317].)  Indeed, while collateral review is an attack 
on a final judgment, that is plainly not the posture here.  When 
Padilla’s new sentence was imposed, there was no final 
judgment to attack because his prior sentence had been vacated. 
IV. 
 
Our dissenting colleagues have filed a lengthy opinion 
objecting to today’s holding.  The dissent repeatedly asserts that 
the Estrada presumption applies only to nonfinal judgments.  
(Dis. opn., post, at pp. 4‒8, 16–17.)  No one disagrees.  The 
question here is whether Estrada’s applicability to nonfinal 
judgments means it applies to a resentencing that occurs after 
a defendant’s original sentence is vacated in a habeas corpus 
proceeding.  The dissent also devotes several pages to showing 
that our past cases have not addressed whether a judgment like 
the one before us is nonfinal.  (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 20‒24.)  No 
one disagrees with that either; we granted review to decide a 
question that our cases have not had occasion to address. 
On the question presented, the dissent declares without 
citation to authority that “a case has either become final on 
direct appeal or it has not.”  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 5.)  Once a 
judgment has become final on direct appeal, the dissent says, 
that finality cannot be “ignored because of a later-brought 
collateral attack.”  (Ibid.) 
As an initial matter, we note that the dissent’s thesis has 
not been urged by any party in this case.  The Attorney General 
concedes the judgment before us is nonfinal — his briefing says 
he “does not challenge the Court of Appeal’s observation that the 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
judgment in this case became nonfinal when appellant was 
resentenced” — and instead argues that Estrada does not reach 
all nonfinal judgments.  The dissent, by contrast, acknowledges 
that Estrada reaches all nonfinal judgments and — directly 
contrary to the Attorney General’s position — argues that 
Padilla’s judgment remains final.  This is not a difference in 
“nomenclature.”  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 12, fn. 8.) 
Novelty aside, the dissent’s approach fails to persuade 
because the notion that a criminal judgment’s finality may be 
interrupted by a subsequent habeas action is unexceptional.  
When a habeas court vacates a prior judgment and orders a new 
trial or new sentencing hearing, the prior judgment — now 
ineffective — can no longer be a final one.  The high court has 
indicated that when a “new trial proceeding” is conducted after 
a collateral attack vacates a defendant’s judgment, an appeal 
from that new proceeding is part of direct rather than collateral 
review.  (McKinney v. Arizona (2020) 589 U.S. __, __, fn. * [140 
S.Ct. 702, 709, fn. *] (McKinney).)  That is exactly what 
happened here:  Padilla’s sentence was vacated, a new 
sentencing hearing occurred, and he took the present appeal 
from that resentencing. 
The dissent says McKinney supports its position that 
Padilla’s initial judgment remains final because “[t]he 
procedural posture of McKinney and Padilla’s case seem the 
same.”  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 15.)  In the dissent’s view, Padilla’s 
resentencing in light of Miller and Montgomery is no different 
from a reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
under Clemons v. Mississippi (1990) 494 U.S. 738 (Clemons) 
when a capital jury has relied on an invalid aggravating 
circumstance or, as in McKinney, when a capital jury has failed 
to properly consider relevant mitigating evidence.  (Dis. opn., 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
post, at p. 15 [characterizing Padilla’s resentencing as 
“reweigh[ing] 
the 
Miller/Montgomery 
considerations 
to 
determine whether an LWOP sentence was appropriate”].)  The 
dissent suggests that Padilla’s resentencing, like a Clemons 
reweighing, “ ‘is akin to harmless-error review’ that is ‘routinely 
conduct[ed] . . . in collateral proceedings.’ ”  (Dis. opn., post, at 
p. 15, quoting McKinney, supra, 589 U.S. at p. __ [140 S.Ct. at 
p. 709].)  This understanding of Miller and Montgomery leads 
the dissent to assert that no proceeding in this case “constituted 
a determination that Padilla’s LWOP sentence was illegal” and 
that “[i]n reality, the [trial] court concluded that the LWOP term 
was properly imposed.”  (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 10, 12.) 
As the dissent acknowledges, however, “ ‘Clemons itself 
. . . stated that an appellate reweighing is not a sentencing 
proceeding . . . .’ ”  (Dis. opn, post, at p. 15, quoting McKinney, 
supra, 589 U.S. at p. __ [140 S.Ct. at p. 708].)  Clemons made 
clear that “the invalidation of one aggravating circumstance 
does not necessarily require an appellate court to vacate a death 
sentence and remand to a jury.”  (Clemons, supra, 494 U.S. at 
p. 745.)  Indeed, McKinney’s sentence was never vacated 
(McKinney, at p. __ [140 S.Ct. at p. 706]), unlike Padilla’s.  And 
Padilla’s sentence was vacated because, contrary to what the 
dissent says, it had been improperly imposed and was illegal 
under Miller and Montgomery. 
In Miller, the high court held that “the Eighth 
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in 
prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”  
(Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 479.)  In addition, before issuing 
an LWOP sentence to a juvenile offender, a sentencing court is 
“require[d] . . . to take into account how children are different, 
and how those differences counsel against irrevocably 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”  (Id. at p. 480.)  In 
Montgomery, the high court held that Miller announced a 
substantive principle of constitutional law — a rule that 
“place[d] certain . . . punishments altogether beyond the State’s 
power to impose.”  (Montgomery, supra, 577 U.S. at p. 201.)  “It 
follows that when a State enforces a proscription or penalty 
barred by the Constitution, the resulting conviction or sentence 
is, by definition, unlawful.”  (Ibid.)  The court explained that 
Miller “bar[red] life without parole . . . for all but the rarest of 
juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent 
incorrigibility.”  (Montgomery, at p. 209.)  To separate out those 
juveniles who may constitutionally be sentenced to LWOP from 
those who may not, “Miller requires a sentencer to consider a 
juvenile offender’s youth and attendant characteristics before 
determining that life without parole is a proportionate 
sentence.”  (Montgomery, at pp. 209–210.) 
Miller and Montgomery do not contemplate a harmless 
error-type assessment of a defendant’s youth on collateral 
review and affirmance of an existing LWOP sentence in the 
manner envisioned by the dissent.  The cases instruct that an 
LWOP sentence cannot be imposed except in a sentencing 
hearing in which the defendant’s “ ‘youth and its attendant 
characteristics’ are considered as sentencing factors,” and they 
declare that an LWOP sentence imposed on a juvenile without 
prior consideration of these factors is “not just erroneous but 
contrary to law and, as a result, void.”  (Montgomery, supra, 577 
U.S. at pp. 210, 203.)  Moreover, Montgomery gave only two 
options for states to remedy a Miller violation:  “permitting 
juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole” or 
“resentencing them.”  (Montgomery, at p. 212.) 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
As Montgomery requires, and contrary to how the dissent 
characterizes the procedure for remedying Miller error, courts 
faced with Miller violations routinely vacate the unlawful 
sentence and order resentencings that comply with the high 
court’s instructions.  (See, e.g., People v. Watson (2017) 8 
Cal.App.5th 496, 503; In re Berg (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 418, 
425; People v. Blackwell (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 166, 173–174; 
People v. Lozano (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1129–1130; U.S. 
v. Delgado (2d Cir. 2020) 971 F.3d 144, 159–160; U.S. v. Friend 
(4th Cir. 2021) 2 F.4th 369, 374; Jackson v. Vannoy (5th Cir. 
2020) 981 F.3d 408, 411–412; U.S. v. Sparks (5th Cir. 2019) 941 
F.3d 748, 752–753; Wright v. U.S. (8th Cir. 2018) 902 F.3d 868, 
871; U.S. v. Pete (9th Cir. 2016) 819 F.3d 1121, 1126; State v. 
Montgomery (La. 2016) 194 So.3d 606, 606–607 [on remand from 
Montgomery].)  Indeed, this court in In re Kirchner (2017) 2 
Cal.5th 1040 affirmed an order granting a new sentencing 
hearing when the juvenile’s original LWOP sentence was 
imposed in violation of Miller.  We held that “the possibility that 
a resentencing that accounts for the Miller factors will occur” 
under a pre-Miller statute allowing juvenile LWOP sentences to 
be recalled in certain circumstances “does not represent an 
adequate substitute for the timely and certain resentencing 
hearings that Miller and Montgomery require.”  (In re Kirchner, 
at p. 1056, citations omitted.)  Against this uniform body of case 
law, we are not aware of any authority — and the dissent cites 
none — suggesting that a Miller violation can be remedied by a 
reweighing process akin to harmless error review. 
In sum, because a resentencing to remedy a Miller 
violation bears no resemblance procedurally to a Clemons 
reweighing, the dissent’s analogy to McKinney fails.  Indeed, the 
dissent tellingly minimizes a fact that readily distinguishes 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
McKinney:  Padilla’s sentence, unlike McKinney’s, was vacated.  
Indeed, it was vacated twice:  first by the trial court when it 
resentenced him after Miller, then by the Court of Appeal when 
it ordered a second resentencing after Montgomery.  It was 
vacated because both the original sentence and the sentence 
that replaced it were invalid — not because LWOP was 
categorically out of bounds for his offense, but because his 
sentence had not been lawfully imposed in light of Miller and 
Montgomery.  To suggest there is any ambiguity as to whether 
Padilla’s sentence was vacated (see dis. opn., post, at p. 10 
[“Even assuming the trial court vacated defendant’s LWOP 
sentence . . . .”]) “simply ignores the facts and the procedural 
posture of the case” (id. at p. 8). 
 
In addition, the dissent notes that Padilla was originally 
tried before the enactment of the direct filing regime that 
preceded Proposition 57 and argues that this is a “crucial 
distinction” between his case and those to which Proposition 57 
retroactively applies.  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 20.)  Padilla’s case 
was initially brought in juvenile court and removed to criminal 
court after a “fitness hearing.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, former 
§ 707.)  But, as the Court of Appeal explained, there are 
significant differences between the fitness hearing envisioned 
by the prior law and the transfer hearing provided by 
Proposition 57.  “Notably, under prior law, juveniles age 16 or 
older who were accused of certain offenses, including murder, 
were subject to a rebuttable presumption that they were unfit 
for juvenile court treatment.  [Citation.]  No such presumption 
applies in transfer hearings under Proposition 57, and the 
People have the burden to show that the juvenile should be 
treated as an adult.”  (Padilla, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 249.)  
Furthermore, the prior law permitted the juvenile court to 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
retain jurisdiction only if it found the minor suitable for juvenile 
court adjudication under each of five statutory criteria.  (Id. at 
pp. 249–250.)  Those criteria are now merely factors for the 
juvenile court to consider in exercising “broad discretion” as to 
whether to retain jurisdiction.  (Id. at p. 250; see Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)  In short, Proposition 57 is 
ameliorative within the meaning of Estrada, whether compared 
to the direct filing regime or the fitness hearing scheme that 
preceded it. 
 
Moreover, the law under which Padilla was originally 
tried does not change how the presumption we recognized in 
Estrada applies to Proposition 57.  Under our precedent, we 
presume the electorate intended the proposition to apply to all 
nonfinal cases — that is, “to every case to which it 
constitutionally could apply.”  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at 
p. 745.)  We have never suggested that limits on a new law’s 
application may flow from the legal regime under which a 
defendant whose judgment is nonfinal was originally tried.  And 
we have applied new, ameliorative laws where the initial 
disposition took place under a version of the law several 
iterations back.  (See People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 
305.)  We take the same approach here. 
The dissent also complains that our decision “means that 
a man who is now 40 years of age will be given a new juvenile 
transfer hearing” under Proposition 57.  (Dis. opn., post, at 
p. 15.)  It objects that “the juvenile court would be forced to 
determine, over 20 years after the fact, whether Padilla should 
have been treated as a juvenile in 1999.”  (Id. at p. 17.)  The 
Attorney General similarly argues that a transfer hearing in 
Padilla’s case will likely “present challenges given the passage 
of time” because some of the criteria that juvenile courts assess 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
during those hearings may be difficult to apply to a defendant 
who is “past the age of juvenile court jurisdiction.” 
Whatever concern our dissenting colleagues may have 
about the result in this case, it must be observed that the 
dissent’s proposed rule is not limited to defendants beyond a 
certain age.  The dissent does not dispute that under its view 
Padilla could not receive a transfer hearing even if he had been 
17 years old when his original sentence was vacated, so long as 
direct review of that initial sentence had concluded before 
Proposition 57 became effective.  By calling attention to 
Padilla’s age, the dissent obscures the fact that its categorical 
rule would apply equally to individuals within or near the age of 
juvenile court jurisdiction. 
More generally, we do not doubt that “the appropriate 
remedy can be somewhat complex” when new laws are applied 
retroactively in the juvenile context because of the consequences 
for those proceedings of the passage of time.  (Lara, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at p. 313.)  But Lara considered those complexities 
and determined they do not bar retroactive application of 
Proposition 57 to nonfinal cases.  Because of our decision in 
Lara, the law already requires some defendants who exceed the 
age of juvenile court jurisdiction to have their amenability to 
juvenile adjudication considered retrospectively under the new 
standards of Proposition 57.  (See People v. Ramirez (2019) 35 
Cal.App.5th 55, 59–60 [affirming order for transfer hearing for 
defendant over the age of 25].) 
Under Lara, such defendants must receive a transfer 
hearing; their sentence will be reinstated if the court finds 
criminal adjudication appropriate, or else their convictions will 
be “ ‘treat[ed] . . . as juvenile adjudications.’ ”  (Lara, supra, 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
4 Cal.5th at p. 310.)  For a defendant over the age of 25, a 
juvenile court generally will not be able to retain continuing 
jurisdiction if it finds juvenile adjudication proper.  (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 607, subds. (c), (h)(2).)  We made clear in Lara that 
the complexity and possible outcomes of this remedial approach 
are “no reason to deny the [transfer] hearing.”  (Lara, at p. 313.) 
We note that some odd results are inevitable with any rule 
of retroactivity.  (Cf. Dorsey v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. 260, 
280–281.)  As the Attorney General argues, applying 
ameliorative laws to proceedings like Padilla’s resentencing may 
yield different outcomes in certain instances for defendants 
whose cases were initially similar.  But the decision we reach 
today “properly rests on considerations of finality in the judicial 
process.”  (Shea v. Louisiana (1985) 470 U.S. 51, 59–60.)  When 
a defendant’s sentence has been vacated, the parties’ interests 
in repose and finality are necessarily diminished; at that point, 
the countervailing interest in effectuating current legislative 
policy decisions may appropriately control.  The dissent’s and 
the Attorney General’s positions, by contrast, would require 
sentencing courts in such cases to apply statutes that the 
Legislature or electorate has changed upon finding them “too 
severe” — excessively punitive, unwise, or even constitutionally 
infirm.  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.) 
Of course, courts may assess the practical operation of an 
ameliorative law in determining whether it was intended to 
apply retroactively to all nonfinal cases, as Estrada presumes.  
Having undertaken such an assessment in Lara, we concluded 
that Estrada’s “inference of retroactivity should apply” to 
Proposition 57.  (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 308.)  We might 
have drawn a different conclusion in a case involving a different 
statutory scheme.  But the dissent’s view that “once final” means 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
“final forever” is not specific to Proposition 57 or to juvenile 
laws; it would apply to any offender, at any age, regardless of 
the nature of the ameliorative change at issue.  The dissent 
underscores that “Padilla received a juvenile fitness hearing 
under prior law” and suggests that Proposition 57 may not be 
sufficiently ameliorative in his case to trigger the Estrada 
presumption.  (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 19–20.)  But under the 
dissent’s approach to finality, Estrada would be inapplicable 
even if Proposition 57 had capped the punishment for Padilla’s 
offense at 25 years of imprisonment; despite such an 
ameliorative change, he could still be resentenced to LWOP.  
This cannot be squared with the “inevitable inference that the 
Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing 
the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should 
apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.”  
(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.) 
The dissent further contends that the Proposition 57 
ballot materials told voters “the changes enacted by Prop. 57 
would be prospectively applied.”  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 16.)  But 
we reviewed those ballot materials in Lara and unanimously 
found they were “inconclusive” and “silent on the question” of 
retroactivity.  (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 309.)  In the face of 
such silence, we followed Estrada’s instruction to “infer the 
legislative body intended [the ameliorative change] ‘to extend as 
broadly as possible.’ ”  (Lara, at p. 309.)  The dissent offers no 
reason why we should reconsider Lara’s analysis. 
Finally, we find unpersuasive two arguments made by the 
Attorney General.  He points to a recent amendment to the 
firearm enhancement statutes providing that the new discretion 
courts have to dismiss these enhancements “applies to any 
resentencing that may occur pursuant to any other law.”  (Pen. 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
Code, § 12022.5, subd. (c).)  The Attorney General says this 
supports the view that the Legislature does not generally intend 
ameliorative laws to apply when a defendant’s sentence has 
been vacated.  But the Legislature was entitled to take a 
belt-and-suspenders approach to ensuring that the firearm 
enhancement reform it passed would apply broadly.  Relying on 
legislative silence to infer an intent to limit the retroactive 
application of ameliorative laws would invert Estrada’s basic 
principle that we presume from legislative silence an intent to 
apply new laws as broadly as constitutional boundaries permit.  
(Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 677.) 
 
The Attorney General also contends that applying 
Proposition 57 to defendants whose sentences are vacated would 
be inconsistent with “principles that generally limit the scope of 
subsequent modification of a judgment after initial finality.”  In 
support, the Attorney General argues that vacatur of a 
defendant’s sentence “does not allow a resentencing court to 
consider new claims or affect any part of the judgment other 
than the sentence.”  But the right and remedy we recognize 
today does not allow Padilla to raise claims unrelated to his 
sentence.  The relief that applies to him is the same as what we 
approved in Lara for juveniles whose cases were pending when 
that measure passed:  He must receive a transfer hearing in a 
juvenile court, where the court will decide whether criminal 
adjudication is appropriate for the murder of his mother and 
conspiracy to kill his stepfather.  Whatever potential that 
hearing may have for reducing his punishment (the nonfinal 
part of his judgment), it does not authorize or constitute 
relitigation of guilt. 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
CONCLUSION 
Because the judgment in Padilla’s case became nonfinal 
when his sentence was vacated on habeas corpus, Proposition 57 
applies to his resentencing.  We affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeal and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
1 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
S263375 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Corrigan 
 
In 1998, when he was 16 years old, defendant Mario 
Salvador Padilla and his cousin devised a plan to kill his mother 
and stepfather and steal money from them.  With his cousin’s 
assistance, Padilla stabbed his mother 45 times while she sat in 
the family living room, took money intended for his newborn 
stepsister, and fled.  Padilla’s mother identified her son as her 
attacker before she died from her wounds.  Padilla was arrested 
the same day.  Also in 1998, Padilla was charged “as an adult, 
following a hearing at which he was determined not fit to be 
dealt with under juvenile court law.”  (People v. Padilla (2020) 
50 Cal.App.5th 244, 248.)  The following year, he was convicted 
of the first degree murder of his mother and conspiracy to kill 
his stepfather.1  A robbery-murder special circumstance was 
found true,2 and he was sentenced to life without the possibility 
of parole (LWOP).  His case became final in 2001 when we 
denied his petition for review of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, 
and he did not petition the United States Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari.   
Eleven years later, Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 
held “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 
18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
 
1  
Penal Code sections 187, subdivision (a), 189, subdivision 
(a); 182, subdivision (a)(1).   
2  
Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(A).   
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
2 
prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ ” (id. at p. 465), 
and concluded that “[a]lthough we do not foreclose a sentencer’s 
ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it 
to take into account how children are different, and how those 
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a 
lifetime in prison” (id. at p. 480).  In 2014, 13 years after 
Padilla’s case had become final, he filed a habeas corpus petition 
seeking relief under Miller.  His habeas petition did not 
challenge the adjudication of his guilt, nor the determination 
that he should be tried as an adult.  The trial court held a 
hearing in compliance with Miller and concluded an LWOP term 
was appropriate.  Defendant appealed.   
While that appeal was pending, the high court returned to 
the subject in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190 and 
clarified:  “Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional 
law” that was fully retroactive.  (Id. at p. 212.)  Montgomery held 
that Miller “did more than require a sentencer to consider a 
juvenile offender’s youth before imposing life without parole.”  
(Id. at p. 208.)  “Because Miller determined that sentencing a 
child to life without parole is excessive for all but ‘ “the rare 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,” ’ 
[citation], it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional 
penalty for ‘a class of defendants because of their status’ — that 
is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient, 
immaturity of youth.”  (Ibid.)  In light of this development, the 
Court of Appeal remanded for a second hearing to comply with 
Montgomery.  (See People v. Padilla (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 656, 
673–674.)  The trial court again concluded that LWOP was an 
appropriate sentence because Padilla’s crimes did not stem from 
transient youthful immaturity.   
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
3 
Under this procedural posture, the majority concludes 
Padilla should receive the retroactive benefit of Proposition 57 
(Prop. 57).  That initiative contained no expression of intent for 
retroactive application and was passed 15 years after Padilla’s 
direct appeal became final.  Yet, under the majority’s reasoning, 
Padilla, now 40 years old, is entitled to a new juvenile transfer 
hearing under Prop. 57, even though he had already received a 
fitness hearing under existing law and the trial court, after a 
habeas collateral attack, had twice concluded that an LWOP 
sentence was appropriate under the guidance of Miller and 
Montgomery.  The majority’s application of In re Estrada (1965) 
63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada) to these facts announces an expanded 
and unsound rule.  It fails to honor the distinction between a 
judgment that has become final on appeal and a new remedy 
sought by collateral attack.  The distinction is important.  
Estrada created an exception to the statutory presumption that 
a new statute is presumed to apply prospectively absent an 
express declaration to the contrary.   
When our Penal Code was enacted in 1872, it provided 
that it would take effect on January 1, 1873 (Pen. Code, § 2) and 
that “[n]o part of it is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.”  
(Pen. Code, § 3, italics added.)  This direct limitation on 
retroactivity remains a part of the code to this day.  “We have 
previously construed the statute to mean ‘[a] new statute is 
generally presumed to operate prospectively absent an express 
declaration of retroactivity or a clear and compelling implication 
that the Legislature intended otherwise.’ ”  (People v. Alford 
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 753, quoting People v. Hayes (1989) 49 
Cal.3d 1260, 1274.)  There is a general presumption that if a 
new law is silent as to retroactively, it was intended to apply 
prospectively only.  Estrada recognized an exception to this 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
4 
general rule when a new law reduces the punishment for a 
crime.  But in doing so it repeatedly limited the exception to 
cases that had yet to become final on direct appeal.   
Estrada’s opening passage presented the issue:  “A 
criminal statute is amended after the prohibited act is 
committed, but before final judgment, by mitigating the 
punishment.  What statute prevails as to the punishment — the 
one in effect when the act was committed or the amendatory act?  
That is the question presented by this petition.”  (Estrada, 
supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 742, italics added.)  In answering that 
question, Estrada explained:  “When the Legislature amends a 
statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly 
determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a 
lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission 
of the prohibited act.  It is an inevitable inference that the 
Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing 
the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should 
apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.  The 
amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied 
constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided 
the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final.”  (Id. 
at p. 745, italics added.)  This court held that Estrada was 
entitled to retroactive application of the new rule precisely 
because his case was not yet final.   
The Estrada holding created an exception to the statutory 
requirement that a retroactive intent be “expressly so declared.”  
(Pen. Code, § 3.)  However, the Estrada court explicitly cabined 
the exception it created.  Estrada emphasized:  “The key date is 
the date of final judgment.  If the amendatory statute lessening 
punishment becomes effective prior to the date the judgment of 
conviction becomes final then, in our opinion, it, and not the old 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
5 
statute in effect when the prohibited act was committed, 
applies.”  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744, italics added.)  In 
addressing the application of Penal Code section 3, Estrada 
reasoned that “[i]n the instant case there are . . . other factors 
that indicate the Legislature must have intended that the 
amendatory statute should operate in all cases not reduced to 
final judgment at the time of its passage.”  (Estrada, at p. 746, 
italics added.)   
It is important to note that Estrada recognizes a 
presumption about legislative or electoral intent regarding 
retroactivity in the face of silence.  Estrada could not have been 
more explicit:  When a new law is enacted that reduces 
punishment, courts will presume that the Legislature or the 
electorate intended the new provision should apply not only to 
all future cases, but also to all pending cases before finality of 
judgment.  However, once a case does become final, we can no 
longer infer from silence that the Legislature or electorate 
intended the new law should apply.  “The key date is the date of 
final judgment.”  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.)  There is 
simply no suggestion in Estrada that, for purposes of applying 
its presumption about legislative or electoral intent, there could 
be multiple relevant dates of finality or that finality may be 
ignored because of a later-brought collateral attack.  Estrada 
makes no provision for the reopening of a judgment that has 
become final after direct review.  In other words, a case has 
either become final on direct appeal or it has not.  As we have 
previously recognized, the Legislature or electorate may 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
6 
expressly enact laws that apply even to final judgments.3  But 
the courts may not infer from their silence an intent to do so.   
Until this case, we have consistently understood Estrada’s 
rule to apply to a case that had not been reduced to a final 
judgment.  People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 675 
(Esquivel) observed that the Estrada presumption “has been a 
fixture of our criminal law for more than 50 years.”  In People v. 
McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40 (McKenzie), we recently concluded 
that the defendant’s case was not yet final for Estrada purposes 
when he was placed on probation with imposition of sentence 
suspended and an ameliorative law was later enacted during his 
appeal from a sentence imposed following a probation 
revocation.  We rejected the People’s argument that the 
defendant’s case became final when he failed to appeal from the 
initial grant of probation.   
We observed that a criminal action “ ‘continues into and 
throughout the period of probation’ and expires only ‘when th[e] 
[probation] period ends.’ ”  (McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 47.)  
McKenzie’s case was not final and had never become so.  By 
virtue of its grant of probation, the sentencing court retained 
jurisdiction, which included the authority to impose a sentence 
should defendant violate probation.  His exposure to a state 
 
3  
See, e.g., People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 851–859 
(Gentile) (Pen. Code, § 1170.95 [petition procedure for 
resentencing of homicide conviction based on the natural and 
probable consequences doctrine]); People v. DeHoyos (2018) 
4 Cal.5th 594, 600–606 (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, added by Prop. 
47, § 14, as approved by voters (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014))); 
People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656–662 (Conley) (Pen. 
Code, § 1170.126, added by Prop. 36, § 6, as approved by voters 
(Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012))).   
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
7 
prison sentence remained active during the period of his 
probation.  When his probation was revoked and he was 
sentenced to prison, he took a direct appeal from the judgment 
ordering that sentence, which was imposed under the 
jurisdiction the court retained.  That direct appeal was pending 
when the new provision at issue went into effect.   
McKenzie repeated the Estrada rule:  “[I]n Estrada, we 
also referred to the cutoff point for application of ameliorative 
amendments as the date when the ‘case[]’ [citation] or 
‘prosecution[]’ is ‘reduced to final judgment’ [citation].  And in 
[People v.] Rossi [(1976)]18 Cal.3d [295,] 304, we stated that an 
amendatory statute applies in ‘ “any [criminal] proceeding 
[that], at the time of the supervening legislation, has not yet 
reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to 
review it.” ’  It cannot be said that this criminal prosecution or 
proceeding concluded before the ameliorative legislation took 
effect.”  (McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 46.)  After McKenzie, 
we recently repeated that Estrada “continues to stand for the 
proposition that (i) in the absence of a contrary indication of 
legislative intent, (ii) legislation that ameliorates punishment 
(iii) applies to all cases that are not yet final as of the legislation’s 
effective date.”  (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 675, italics 
added.)4   
Numerous other cases have made similar statements 
regarding Estrada’s application to cases not yet reduced to final 
 
4  
Esquivel applied an identical analysis as to finality for a 
defendant placed on probation with execution of a specific state 
prison sentence suspended.  (See Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 
pp. 677–680.)   
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
8 
judgment.5  None of these cases support the proposition that, 
once a case becomes final for Estrada purposes, the finality of 
that case may be later revisited as the result of collateral attack.  
As McKenzie reasoned, “the cutoff point for application of 
ameliorative amendments” under Estrada is “the date when the 
‘case[]’ . . . is ‘reduced to final judgment.’ ”  (McKenzie, supra, 9 
Cal.5th at p. 46, citation omitted.)  Padilla’s case reached that 
cutoff point in 2001.   
In the face of clear precedent, the majority struggles to 
find a way to say that this long-final judgment has somehow 
been rendered not final.  The majority suggests that “Padilla’s 
present appeal from his resentencing is part of direct review of 
a nonfinal judgment, not collateral review” because the trial 
court “had the power to impose any sentence available for his 
crime,” and “while collateral review is an attack on a final 
judgment, that is plainly not the posture here.  When Padilla’s 
new sentence was imposed, there was no final judgment to 
attack because his prior sentence had been vacated.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 8–9.)  That assertion simply ignores the facts and 
the procedural posture of the case.   
The only reason defendant received a new sentencing 
hearing for consideration of the Miller/Montgomery factors was 
because defendant collaterally challenged his long-final 
judgment through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  His 
 
5  
(See, e.g., Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 852; People v. 
Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 699; People v. Frahs (2020) 9 
Cal.5th 618, 624–625; People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 
424; People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1134; People v. Buycks 
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 888; People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 
184–185; People v. Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 304; People v. 
Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 75–76.)   
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
9 
appeal from the sentence imposed after such hearing did not 
transform a collateral attack on a final judgment into what the 
majority characterizes as a new “direct review of a nonfinal 
judgment . . . .”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)  Brecht v. Abrahamson 
(1993) 507 U.S. 619 (Brecht), cited by the majority, does not 
suggest otherwise.  That case addressed the question of what 
harmless error standard should apply to a claim on habeas that 
the prosecution had committed error under Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 
426 U.S. 610.6  The high court concluded the harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 
U.S. 18, applicable on direct review, did not apply.  Rather, the 
court applied “a less onerous harmless-error standard on 
habeas.”  (Brecht, at p. 623.)  That standard asks whether the 
error “ ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury’s verdict.’ ”  (Ibid.)  In Brecht, the high 
court firmly maintained the distinction between direct and 
collateral review:  “The principle that collateral review is 
different from direct review resounds throughout our habeas 
jurisprudence.  [Citations.]  Direct review is the principal 
avenue for challenging a conviction.  ‘When the process of direct 
review . . . comes to an end, a presumption of finality and 
legality attaches to the conviction and sentence.  The role of 
federal habeas proceedings, while important in assuring that 
constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and limited.  
Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials.’  
[Citation.]  [¶]  In keeping with this distinction, the writ of 
 
6  
Doyle held “that the use for impeachment purposes of 
petitioners’ silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving 
Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”  (Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. at p. 
619; see Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.)   
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
10 
habeas 
corpus 
has 
historically 
been 
regarded 
as 
an 
extraordinary remedy, ‘a bulwark against convictions that 
violate “fundamental fairness.” ’ ”  (Brecht, at pp. 633−634.)   
Under a Brecht analysis, defendant’s full, direct review 
ended in 2001 when we denied his petition for review, and he 
did not seek a writ of certiorari before the United States 
Supreme Court.  Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the 
purpose of the 2014 habeas proceeding was limited:  to ensure 
that 
defendant’s 
sentence 
complied 
with 
Miller 
and 
Montgomery.  Even assuming the trial court vacated defendant’s 
LWOP sentence before then reimposing that same term after 
consideration of the factors outlined by the high court, no 
portion of Padilla’s sentence or conviction was overturned or 
rendered invalid.  Indeed, the majority acknowledges that an 
LWOP term was not “categorically out of bounds for his offense” 
(maj. opn., ante, at p. 14) and makes no suggestion the court 
improperly reimposed an LWOP term after consideration of the 
Miller/Montgomery factors.  Despite this circumstance, the 
majority asserts the court’s act of vacating Padilla’s sentence 
alone rendered his case “nonfinal” for Estrada purposes.  (See 
maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13–14.)  The majority’s attempt to focus 
on how the issue came before the court ignores the substance of 
the proceedings.  In reality, the court concluded that the LWOP 
term was properly imposed.  Padilla received the remedy his 
writ sought:  consideration by the court of the youth factors 
outlined in Miller and, later, in Montgomery.  As the high court 
has observed, “habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable 
remedy.”  (Schlup v. Delo (1995) 513 U.S. 298, 319; see Brecht, 
supra, 507 U.S. at p. 633.)  The court’s consideration of the 
Miller/Montgomery factors on habeas did not serve to reopen 
direct review regardless of whether or not the court first vacated 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
11 
defendant’s sentence.  The juvenile court initially determined 
that defendant was unfit for juvenile treatment under the 
existing law.  Prop. 57, as a matter of policy, operated to change 
how such a determination is to be made.  There is no indication, 
however, that the original legal determination which defendant 
received violated fundamental fairness.  (See Brecht, at p. 633.)  
There has been no suggestion that the “historical rule” 
permitting trial of a minor in adult court after a judicial 
determination of unfitness was or is constitutionally infirm.7  
(People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 305 
(Lara).)   
Brecht helpfully serves to clarify the difference between 
direct and collateral review.  Its further utility is somewhat 
limited here because, as we have recognized, “the Estrada rule 
reflects a presumption about legislative intent, rather than a 
constitutional command . . . .”  (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 
656.)  However, it is worth noting that Estrada did not involve 
a new constitutional rule.  Instead, it focused on discerning the 
enactors’ intent as to retroactivity in the face of their silence on 
that matter.  For the reasons discussed, Estrada did not 
contemplate a rule where we may infer from silence a legislative 
or electoral intent to apply new laws enacted long after a case is 
final or that a case may be rendered “not final” for these 
purposes.   
 
7  
Indeed, this court in Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 537 rejected constitutional challenges even to an 
approach, now modified by Prop. 57, that allowed some juveniles 
to be tried directly in adult court without judicial review.  
(Manduley, at pp. 551–573; see discussion post, at pp. 18–19.)   
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
12 
The majority’s suggestion that a long-final case can 
subsequently become “nonfinal” under Estrada essentially 
treats “finality” like a switch that can be toggled on and off.8  
This conclusion is contrary to Estrada’s reasoning and our 
decades of subsequent Estrada jurisprudence.  Under the 
majority’s approach, no criminal judgment could ever truly be 
considered final, because some future collateral habeas attack 
might arise.  Indeed, such collateral attack need not even 
establish the illegality of a defendant’s sentence before 
rendering a judgment “nonfinal.”  It would only require that “the 
trial court regained the jurisdiction and duty to consider what 
punishment was appropriate” and that defendant “regained the 
right to appeal whatever new sentence was imposed.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 6.)  Here, neither the trial court’s initial 
resentencing in light of Miller nor consideration after the 
Montgomery remand constituted a determination that Padilla’s 
LWOP sentence was illegal.  Instead, those two hearings 
 
8  
The majority suggests the People have conceded Padilla’s 
sentence had been rendered “nonfinal” because the court had 
vacated his sentence and that “the dissent’s thesis has not been 
urged by any party in this case.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.)  That 
assertion mischaracterizes the People’s position.  It is true the 
People have apparently adopted the Court of Appeal’s analysis 
that defendant’s collateral attack had reopened the finality of 
Padilla’s sentence.  (See People v. Padilla, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th 
at pp. 253–254.)  However, the Attorney General very much has 
not conceded that the Estrada rule should apply to the present 
case and, instead, has consistently argued that rule should 
apply only before a case has become final on an initial direct 
appeal.  We ultimately share the People’s view of Estrada’s 
scope notwithstanding their use of different nomenclature.   
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
13 
involved reconsideration of the LWOP sentence in light of the 
standards set out in Miller and Montgomery.9   
Under the majority’s reasoning, any collateral attack on a 
conviction that simply results in a new sentencing proceeding, 
without any prior determination that the sentence or underlying 
conviction was illegal would be enough to render a long-final 
case “nonfinal” for purposes of applying the presumption of 
Estrada.  Further, although the majority only discusses the 
application of Prop. 57 to Padilla’s case, nothing in its reasoning 
would limit the application of any and all statutory amendments 
reducing punishment enacted in the 18 years between the 
finality of Padilla’s sentence in 2001 and his second 
Miller/Montgomery hearing in 2019.  And, as noted, this 
outcome would be embraced in the face of legislative and 
electoral silence regarding retroactivity.  This clear expansion of 
the Estrada doctrine is both unwarranted and unworkable.   
The majority maintains “the notion that a criminal 
judgment’s finality may be interrupted by a subsequent habeas 
action is unexceptional,” and “[t]he high court has indicated that 
when a ‘new trial proceeding’ is conducted after a collateral 
attack vacates a defendant’s judgment, an appeal from that new 
proceeding is part of direct rather than collateral review,” citing 
McKinney v. Arizona (2020) 589 U.S. __ [140 S.Ct. 702] 
(McKinney).  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.)  In fact, McKinney 
illustrates just why Padilla’s case does not involve a renewed 
direct review.  A jury convicted McKinney of two murders in 
 
9  
It is also important to recall here that neither Miller nor 
Montgomery forbade an LWOP sentence for a defendant like 
Padilla.  They only require that the court consider the 
defendant’s youth before imposing such a sentence.   
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
14 
1992.  The trial court found aggravating circumstances for both 
murders and imposed the death penalty.  The Arizona Supreme 
Court affirmed the judgment in 1996.  (McKinney, at p. __ [140 
S.Ct. at p. 706].)  Twenty years later, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals granted habeas relief on the ground that “the Arizona 
courts had failed to properly consider McKinney’s posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD)” as a relevant mitigating circumstance.  
(Ibid.)  On remand, the Arizona Supreme Court reweighed the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including the PTSD 
evidence, under the procedure allowed in Clemons v. Mississippi 
(1989) 494 U.S. 738, 744–750, and affirmed the death sentence.   
As relevant here, McKinney argued his death sentence ran 
afoul of Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 and Hurst v. Florida 
(2016) 577 U.S. 92 because the trial court, and not the jury, 
found true the aggravating circumstances before imposing a 
death judgment.  The high court observed “[t]he hurdle is that 
McKinney’s case became final on direct review in 1996, long 
before Ring and Hurst.  Ring and Hurst do not apply 
retroactively on collateral review.  [Citation.]  Because this case 
comes to us on state collateral review, Ring and Hurst do not 
apply.”  (McKinney, supra, 589 U.S. at p. __ [140 S.Ct. at p. 708].)  
Similarly to the majority’s reasoning here, McKinney argued 
that “the Arizona Supreme Court’s 2018 decision reweighing the 
aggravators and mitigators constituted a reopening of direct 
review” to which Ring and Hurst should apply.  (Ibid.)  The high 
court rejected the claim, reasoning that “the premise of that 
argument is wrong because the Arizona Supreme Court’s 
reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
occurred on collateral review, not direct review.”  (Ibid.)  
Although the defendant protested that “the state label of 
collateral review cannot control the finality question,” McKinney 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
15 
observed that “Clemons itself . . . stated that an appellate 
reweighing is not a sentencing proceeding that must be 
conducted by a jury,” such a reweighing “is akin to harmless-
error review” that is “routinely conduct[ed] . . . in collateral 
proceedings.  [Citation.]  There is no good reason — and 
McKinney supplies none — why state courts may not likewise 
conduct a Clemons reweighing on collateral review.”  (Id. at pp. 
708–709, fn. omitted.)   
The procedural posture of McKinney and Padilla’s case 
seem the same.  In McKinney, the court reviewed aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances to determine whether the death 
penalty was appropriate.  Here the court reweighed the 
Miller/Montgomery considerations to determine whether an 
LWOP sentence was appropriate.   Thus, McKinney does not 
support the conclusion the majority draws from it.  As discussed, 
no case applying Estrada has suggested that a once-final case 
may be reopened for purposes of applying its exception to the 
general rule that new laws apply only prospectively.   
The majority’s holding means that a man who is now 40 
years of age will be given a new juvenile transfer hearing under 
Prop. 57.  It infers from silence the electorate’s intent to permit 
such a result.  Yet that inference would be inconsistent with the 
legislative analyst’s description of the new transfer hearing 
procedure in the voter information guide.  The description is 
worded prospectively and nowhere suggests that adults would 
receive such hearings after the fact:  “The measure changes 
state law to require that, before youths can be transferred to 
adult court, they must have a hearing in juvenile court to 
determine whether they should be transferred.  As a result, the 
only way a youth could be tried in adult court is if the juvenile 
court judge in the hearing decides to transfer the youth to adult 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
16 
court.  Youths accused of committing certain severe crimes 
would no longer automatically be tried in adult court and no 
youth could be tried in adult court based only on the decision of 
a prosecutor.  In addition, the measure specifies that 
prosecutors can only seek transfer hearings for youths accused 
of (1) committing certain significant crimes listed in state law 
(such as murder, robbery, and certain sex offenses) when they 
were age 14 or 15 or (2) committing a felony when they were 16 
or 17.  As a result of these provisions, there would be fewer 
youths tried in adult court.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. 
Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) analysis of Prop. 57 by Legis. Analyst, p. 56, 
italics added.)  It is dubious at best to argue that a voter who 
read that description would assume the new procedure would be 
applied to a case involving an adult like Padilla.10  Instead, the 
clear implication, based upon what the voters were told, was 
that the changes enacted by Prop. 57 would be prospectively 
applied such that there would be fewer youths tried in adult 
court.   
We should recall that, when interpreting their intent, the 
enactors are presumed to know the state of the law.  (See People 
v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 65, fn. 8; Anderson v. Superior 
Court (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1152, 1161.)  The clear and settled state 
of the law was that, even when a retroactive intent is judicially 
inferred, that inference will not apply to judgments that are 
final.  Again, it is the final judgment rule of Estrada that lies at 
 
10  
As noted, Padilla was not “automatically” tried in adult 
court.  His case was presented to a juvenile court judge who, 
applying the existing law, determined he should be tried as an 
adult.  This decision was made under the historical rule which, 
with some modification, Prop. 57 was enacted to restore.  (See 
Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 305.)   
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
17 
the heart of this case.  Only by devising a way around that 
longstanding safeguard can the majority’s outcome stand.   
Further, it should be noted that the Legislature has 
provided specific procedures for relief to minors receiving LWOP 
terms.  For example, Padilla is eligible for a youth offender 
parole hearing during his “25th year of incarceration.”  (Pen. 
Code, § 3051, subd. (b)(4).)  Such a hearing “shall provide for a 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release” (Pen. Code, § 3051, 
subd. (e)) but would also include considerations of public safety.  
(See Pen. Code, §§ 3041, subd. (b)(1), 3051, subd. (d).)  In 
addition, a defendant who received an LWOP term and 
committed his offense when under 18 may, upon serving 15 
years, file a petition to recall the sentence wherein he describes 
his “remorse and work towards rehabilitation. . . .”  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1170, subd. (d)(2).)   
The majority’s retroactive application of Prop. 57 here 
would short circuit procedures intended to evaluate whether a 
defendant in Padilla’s circumstance has successfully been 
rehabilitated or still presents a danger to public safety if 
released.  Instead, these balanced procedures would be replaced 
by a new juvenile transfer hearing wherein the juvenile court 
would be forced to determine, over 20 years after the fact, 
whether Padilla should have been treated as a juvenile in 1999.  
If it were to so conclude, the juvenile court could no longer assert 
jurisdiction over him.  His immediate release would be required, 
regardless of any sign of rehabilitation or consideration of public 
safety.  It seems highly unlikely that voters intended, by silence, 
to dispense with these carefully crafted procedures for the 
treatment of youth offenders facing LWOP terms.   
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
18 
On its face, Estrada’s exception to the general rule does 
not apply here.  Padilla’s case was long final, and the change 
enacted in Prop. 57 did not reduce punishment for a prohibited 
act.  (See Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 308.)  For Padilla, finality 
occurred in 2001.  Proposition 57 was enacted in 2016, 15 years 
later.  The majority avoids this conclusion, however, by 
reasoning that Padilla’s 2014 habeas petition seeking relief and 
the trial court’s decision to maintain his LWOP sentence 
reopened his case and transformed a final case to one that 
“became nonfinal.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.)  According to the 
majority, Padilla’s subsequent appeal from that sentencing, and 
the Court of Appeal’s later remand for a new hearing under 
Montgomery, constituted a new “direct review of a nonfinal 
judgment” to which the Estrada rule applied.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 8.)  Such an analysis ignores the fact that Padilla had 
already received direct appellate review and that his current 
petition is a collateral attack on a judgment using the 
extraordinary equitable remedy of habeas corpus.  That 
approach was rejected by the high court in McKinney.   
To defend its extension of Estrada, the majority switches 
the focus away from Estrada’s finality doctrine to a broader 
consideration of the concept of amelioration.  Under Estrada, 
amelioration of punishment is a threshold criterion.  But it only 
comes into play to support an unspoken retroactive intent for 
cases not final on appeal.  To bolster its position, the majority 
points to Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th 299.  The reliance is misplaced.  
Lara noted that “ ‘[h]istorically, a child could be tried in criminal 
court only after a judicial determination, before jeopardy 
attached, that he or she was unfit to be dealt with under juvenile 
court law.’ ”  (Id. at p. 305.)  That changed between 1999 and 
2000, when new laws permitted, and sometimes required, 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
19 
prosecutors in specified circumstances “to file charges against a 
juvenile directly in criminal court, where the juvenile would be 
treated as an adult.”  (Ibid.)  In 2016, under these provisions, 
Lara, who committed his offenses at ages 14 and 15, was 
charged directly in adult court.  But Lara’s case did not involve 
the finality of direct review principle.  Before he was tried, the 
electorate enacted Prop. 57, which “largely returned California 
to the historical rule” requiring a judicial juvenile transfer 
hearing and eliminating the direct filing of criminal cases 
involving minors.  (Lara, at p. 305.)  In this context, we 
concluded the rationale of Estrada applied.  While Prop. 57 did 
not reduce punishment (see Lara, at p. 308), the changes it 
enacted were sufficiently ameliorative to permit application of 
Estrada’s presumption as to the voters’ unspoken retroactive 
intent.  The conclusion extended the inference about reduction 
of punishment that Estrada relied upon.  “The possibility of 
being treated as a juvenile in juvenile court — where 
rehabilitation is the goal — rather than being tried and 
sentenced as an adult can result in dramatically different and 
more lenient treatment.  Therefore, Proposition 57 reduces the 
possible punishment for a class of persons, namely juveniles.”  
(Lara, at p. 303, italics added.)  In other words, Lara reasoned 
that Prop. 57 constituted a reduction in punishment for minors 
subject to direct filing of charges in adult court because the new 
law granted them a juvenile transfer hearing and, thus, the 
possibility of juvenile treatment that they did not have.  Lara, 
by its facts, applied Prop. 57 to juveniles whose cases were still 
pending in adult court.  Lara does not resolve this case.   
Here, Padilla’s case is so old that it predated the direct 
filing scheme that Prop. 57 sought to overturn.  Padilla received 
a juvenile fitness hearing under prior law.  He suggests that 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
20 
Lara is dispositive with respect to whether Prop. 57 ameliorated 
punishment under Estrada.  However, Lara did not consider the 
pre-direct filing scheme at issue in Padilla’s case.  Its reasoning 
depended upon minors being granted the chance for juvenile 
treatment that had previously been unavailable.  That 
circumstance does not obtain here.  Padilla’s case began in 
juvenile court and was only transferred to adult court after a 
judge determined that Padilla was not a fit candidate for 
juvenile treatment.  The majority suggests that although 
Prop.  57 does not reduce punishment, it was nevertheless 
sufficiently ameliorative of punishment to fall under Estrada’s 
rationale.  It reasons that the transfer hearing prescribed under 
Prop. 57 is qualitatively different from the fitness hearing 
Padilla received under prior law because the new law generally 
made it harder to transfer a case to adult court.  (See maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 14–15; People v. Padilla, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 249–250.)  The analysis overlooks a crucial distinction.  Lara 
got his previously denied chance at juvenile treatment because 
his case had not been adjudicated before Prop. 57’s passage.  In 
Lara there was no final judgment.  In fact, there was no 
judgment at all.  Conversely, Padilla got his chance at juvenile 
treatment.  There was no direct adult court filing by the 
prosecution.  The juvenile court determined he was not a fit 
candidate and ordered his transfer.   
Regardless of whether Prop. 57 would constitute an 
amelioration of Padilla’s punishment, Lara does not support the 
majority’s conclusion that a case that has become final may 
become un-finalized for Estrada purposes.  There was no 
question there that Lara’s case was not yet final and the court 
had no occasion to comment on the finality issue here.   
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
21 
The same was true in Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th 646, on 
which the majority relies.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1, 4–5, 8.)  
In that case, the law changed after Conley, an adult, committed 
his drunk driving offense.  It was also alleged that he had four 
similar prior convictions, as well as two strike offenses (Pen. 
Code, §§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) for a residential 
burglary and stabbing a victim multiple times.  Conley was 
sentenced to a third strike term of 25 years to life based on his 
new drunk driving conviction.  While his appeal from that 
sentence was pending, voters passed Proposition 36, the Three 
Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Reform Act), which reduced “the 
punishment prescribed for certain third strike defendants.”  
(Conley, at p. 651.)  Conley did not involve Prop. 57, but, more 
importantly, the case was indisputably not yet final when the 
Reform Act was passed.11  Conley did not involve the question of 
retroactivity at issue here, and it certainly says nothing about 
the majority’s expansion of Estrada.   
Similarly, the majority’s reliance on People v. Vieira (2005) 
35 Cal.4th 264 is misplaced.  The majority cites that case for the 
proposition that “we have applied new, ameliorative laws where 
the initial disposition took place under a version of the law 
several iterations back.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15, citing Vieira, 
at p. 305.)  That observation is true, but it overlooks the key fact 
that Vieira’s case was not yet final.  Vieira, a capital defendant, 
claimed on appeal that he should receive the benefit of a 1992 
statutory amendment requiring consideration of an ability to 
pay before imposing a restitution fine.  Vieira observed that 
 
11  
In fact, Conley held the Estrada presumption did not apply 
because “the Reform Act is not silent on the question of 
retroactivity.”  (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 657, 658.)   
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
22 
“[d]efendant is not entitled to benefit from the 1992 amendment; 
it was repealed in 1994.”  (Vieira, at p. 305.)  However, Vieira 
reasoned that the defendant should receive the benefit of the 
then-current version of the statute, “which provide[d] detailed 
guidance to the trial court in setting a restitution fine, including 
consideration of a defendant’s ability to pay.  ‘The key date is 
the date of final judgment.  If the amendatory statute lessening 
punishment becomes effective prior to the date the judgment of 
conviction becomes final then, in our opinion, it, and not the old 
statute in effect when the prohibited act was committed, 
applies.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.)  
Vieira concluded that the case was not yet final because it was 
still pending on direct appeal.  (Vieira, at p. 306.)   
Although it is true that Vieira applied a new law 
ameliorating punishment to a defendant subject to a version of 
the law that had been amended several times, it still involved a 
case not yet final on direct appeal.  Vieira quoted Estrada’s 
observation that the key date is that of final judgment.  At no 
time did Vieira suggest that finality may be reopened once that 
date has passed.   
The Court of Appeal below suggested that “a collateral 
proceeding may reopen the finality of a sentence for retroactivity 
purposes, even while the conviction remains final” (People v. 
Padilla, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 253), ascribing this rule to 
People v. Jackson (1967) 67 Cal.2d 96.  Its reading of Jackson is 
overbroad and does not assist Padilla.  Jackson was convicted of 
special circumstances murder and sentenced to death.  He 
successfully filed a habeas petition, which ultimately led to the 
reversal of the death sentence but not to the judgment of guilt.  
(See In re Jackson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 500, 501–508.)  After a 
penalty phase retrial, Jackson again received the death penalty.  
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
23 
On appeal from that second death sentence, Jackson argued 
that a new constitutional rule announced12 after his initial 
conviction became final should retroactively apply to him and 
result in reversal of both the guilt and penalty judgments.  
Jackson rejected the defendant’s argument as to the guilt phase 
judgment:  “The scope of this retrial is a matter of state 
procedure under which the original judgment on the issue of 
guilt remains final during the retrial of the penalty issue and 
during all appellate proceedings reviewing the trial court’s 
decision on that issue.”  (People v. Jackson, at p. 99, italics 
added.)  However, Jackson observed as to the penalty phase 
retrial that “[a]lthough defendant’s conviction was final before 
June 22, 1964, when Escobedo was decided, his retrial on the 
issue of penalty occurred after that date.”  (Id. at p. 100.)  Thus, 
Jackson applied Escobedo only to the penalty phase retrial but 
not to the judgment of guilt.  (Ibid.)   
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s suggestion, Jackson was 
not an example of a case where finality of judgment was 
“reopened.”  Rather, that case involved a reversal of the penalty 
judgment, resulting in a later retrial of that phase.  To the 
extent the defendant argued for retroactive application of 
Escobedo, Jackson rejected that argument because his judgment 
of guilt was already final at the time Escobedo was decided.  
Jackson applied Escobedo to the penalty phase retrial 
prospectively because Escobedo predated that new penalty trial.  
Thus, Jackson’s sentence was not merely vacated, but the 
 
12  
The case in question, Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 
478, predated Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436 and 
involved the admissibility of a defendant’s custodial statement 
made during a police interrogation.   
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
24 
penalty judgment was reversed, rendering it invalid.  Thereafter 
the penalty phase was retried.  No analogous proceedings 
occurred in Padilla’s case.  Further, it should be noted that 
Jackson did not involve an interpretation of Estrada and 
provides little guidance on the limits of Estrada’s presumption 
regarding legislative or electoral intent.   
Here we find ourselves in new territory.  Estrada and 
Lara do not squarely dispose of the case.  The question for us 
here is whether we can say that the facts are sufficient for us 
to discern that the voters intended to have Prop. 57 apply 
retroactively, not to cases not yet final, but to grant relief to a 
40-year-old whose case is long final.  The ballot materials run 
counter to such a conclusion.  They speak repeatedly in the 
future tense and repeatedly refer to juveniles, a status Padilla 
left long ago.   
At bottom the “not really final” analysis begs the 
question:  What kind of review can the collateral habeas corpus 
attack be said to reopen?  It did not reopen the verdict of guilt, 
the finding of special circumstances, nor, critically, the finding 
of unfitness/transfer.  All the two habeas corpus hearings 
considered was whether an LWOP should have been 
mandatory for Padilla following his adult conviction.  It is 
important to remember that, even before Miller/Montgomery, 
Penal Code section 190.5, subdivision (b) gave the trial court 
discretion to impose a 25 years to life sentence to a minor, 
rather than LWOP.   
The two Miller/Montgomery hearings took place, the 
trial court applied their standards, now as a matter of 
constitutional mandate, and still determined, exercising its 
discretion, that LWOP was appropriate.  Even if the majority’s 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
25 
notion of a renewed direct review is well founded, which it is 
not, the court never reconsidered the juvenile fitness question, 
which was not an issue raised by the collateral attack.  The 
majority does not acknowledge that procedural posture.  Even 
if Padilla had won at the Miller/Montgomery hearing, the 
remedy to which he was entitled was a sentence of 25 years to 
life, instead of LWOP.  The habeas corpus proceedings never 
encompassed whether he was entitled, as a 40 year old, to go 
back and be treated as a juvenile, which was jurisdictionally 
impossible.  The LWOP sentencing question and the juvenile 
treatment question are, and always were, distinct.  The 
majority blurs their distinction to create a bridge to their 
proposed rule.   
In sum, Estrada stated an exception to the general rule 
that a new law which is silent as to retroactivity was intended 
to apply prospectively only.  Estrada reasoned that, despite 
silence on the matter, a court may presume the enactor’s intent 
for retroactive application under the limited circumstances that 
a new law reduces punishment and a final judgment has not 
been rendered.  The majority now expands this presumption to 
cases that have already become final because, following a 
collateral attack by way of habeas corpus, the court engages in 
proceedings that touch upon a defendant’s potential sentence.  
In such a posture, the majority holds the original case has been 
reopened, even if those habeas proceedings ultimately do not 
invalidate any aspect of the prior sentence or conviction.  The 
majority’s expansion of Estrada has no support in the language 
or reasoning of that case or its progeny.  The majority’s 
reasoning also improperly ascribes to the voters who enacted 
Prop. 57 an intent, through silence, to apply its provisions to 
long-final cases, resulting in juvenile transfer hearings for 
PEOPLE v. PADILLA 
Corrigan, J., dissenting 
26 
adults who are well past the age at which they can be treated 
under juvenile law.  The majority’s holding significantly 
undermines the finality rule which all prior cases relied upon as 
a safeguard and which “has been a fixture of our criminal law 
for more than 50 years.”  (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 675.)  
We should not, on the basis of unsound analysis, drag this 
Trojan Horse within Estrada’s carefully crafted walls. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
PERREN, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Padilla 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 50 Cal.App.5th 244 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S263375 
Date Filed:  May 26, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Ricardo R. Ocampo 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Cyn Yamashiro, Markéta Sims; Susan Lynn Burrell and L. Richard 
Braucher for Independent Juvenile Defender Program and Pacific 
Juvenile Defender Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Matthew 
Rodriquez, Acting Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, 
Michael R. Johnsen, David E. Madeo, Lindsay Boyd and Daniel J. 
Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Jonathan E. Demson 
Attorney at Law 
1158 26th Street #291 
Santa Monica, CA 90403 
(310) 405-0332 
  
Daniel J. Hilton 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101-3375 
(619) 738-9073