Case Title: Garlach v. Tuttle

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-6

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Garlach v. Tuttle1985 WY 121705 P.2d 828Case Number: 85-6Decided: 08/23/1985KAREN M. GARLACH, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

T. MICHAEL TUTTLE, J. PATRICK TUTTLE, AND MARY L. TUTTLE, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
KAREN M. GARLACH, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

T. MICHAEL TUTTLE, J. 
PATRICK TUTTLE, AND MARY L. TUTTLE, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

 
 
William A. 
Riner, Cheyenne, 
for appellant.

James W. Gusea 
of Vines, Rideout, Gusea and White, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a judgment, after trial to the court, on a contract action. The court found in 
favor of the plaintiff, but allowed a setoff based on the defendants' 
counter-claim.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     In December of 1982, 
plaintiff decided to sell her business which was known as The Lighting Gallery. 
The defendants were interested in buying said business, and negotiations began. 
An inventory and pricing of the inventory were completed around February 3, 
1983. The defendants submitted an acceptable offer on February 7, 1983. On 
February 17, 1983, certain funds and a promissory note were escrowed at The 
Title Guarantee Company of Wyoming. The transaction was closed on 
February 22, 1983, with the funds being disbursed and the promissory note being 
delivered to the plaintiff.

[¶4.]     Thereafter, the 
bookkeeper for the defendants began a detailed comparison of the inventory 
pricing. In April 1984 the bookkeeper sent a detailed letter to the plaintiff 
indicating inventory that she felt had been overpriced, and asking to meet with 
the plaintiff to discuss the discrepancies. There was no reply to the letter. 
The defendants eventually discontinued payment on the note due to these 
discrepancies, some of which were the result of inventory overpricing and others 
which represented goods sold after inventory and before closing and not 
replaced.

[¶5.]     The plaintiff then 
filed suit on the note, and the defendants answered and counterclaimed. At trial 
the parties stipulated that the actual inventory was $5,019.63 less than the 
minimum requirement of $75,000.00 in the contract; it was also stipulated that 
$2,839.57 worth of inventory was sold after the inventory was taken but prior to 
closing and not replaced as required by the contract.

[¶6.]     The trial court 
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, but offset the two stipulated 
amounts referred to above in favor of the defendants. Thus the plaintiff's award 
amounted to $36.58 plus interest totaling $2.56, reasonable attorney's fees 
totaling $50.00 and costs totaling $43.90. The plaintiff then 
appealed.

[¶7.]     The plaintiff 
(hereinafter appellant) indicates that the issue in this case is the viability 
of the defendants' (hereinafter appellees) counter-claim. The appellant argues 
that the appellees' counter-claim is irrelevant because on February 22 the 
appellees signed a letter to the escrow agent which said in part, "[w]e, the 
undersigned, hereby agree that Karen M. Garlach has satisfied all terms of the 
Purchase Contract dated February 3, 1983." The letter signed by the appellees 
was for the purpose of releasing the funds and note held by the escrow 
agent.

[¶8.]     The purchase contract, 
or its addendum, contained the requirements that the inventory "must show 
$75,000.00 or better"; that

"Notwithstanding the 
provisions as set forth above with respect to the purchase price, in the event 
the actual wholesale value of the current saleable inventory is less than 
[Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00)], the purchase price offered 
hereunder shall be the value of the inventory and the amounts listed in 
sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) above shall be reduced 
accordingly;"

and 
that

"the gross amount of any 
and all sales of goods by the Seller following inspection and determination of 
the value of the inventory and prior to possession of premises by Purchasers 
shall be deducted from the purchase price herein or credited to an account in 
the name of the Purchasers."

[¶9.]     The appellant seems to 
be claiming that the appellees' counter-claim is somehow irrelevant because of 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The appellant urges this because the 
appellees could have checked the inventory pricing for accuracy prior to 
releasing the escrow.

[¶10.]  Equitable estoppel is applied to prevent 
fraud, actual or constructive, and it should always be applied to promote the 
ends of justice. 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 28.

"Equitable estoppel 
precludes a party who knows the truth from denying the assertion of any material 
fact with which he induced another to change his position where such other 
person is ignorant of the facts, had a right to rely upon the assertions, and 
suffers an injury. 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 27. Estoppel arises only 
when a party, by acts, conduct, or acquiescence causes another to change his 
position. Boise Cascade Corp. v. First 
Security Bank of Anaconda, 183 Mont. 378, 600 P.2d 173 (1979). * * *" Roth v. First Security Bank of Rock Springs, Wyo., 
684 P.2d 93, 96 (1984).

[¶11.]  Equitable estoppel is clearly not 
applicable here. The appellant was the person who took the original inventory 
and priced it, so she certainly was not ignorant of the facts. There is no 
evidence that she relied on any assertions made by the appellees, nor is there 
evidence that she changed her position or was in any way injured because of 
anything the appellees did. If anything, the appellant, herself, ought to be 
estopped from denying the appellees' claims; the equities lie with the 
appellees.

[¶12.]  The appellant, in her brief, also raises 
an issue under the Uniform Commercial Code, § 34-21-101 et seq., W.S. 1977. This 
issue was not raised at the trial level.

"Except for appeals which 
involve issues of jurisdiction or fundamental rights, we will not ordinarily 
consider contentions of error unless the trial court has first been apprised 
thereof and given an opportunity to rule upon the alleged error. Matter of Parental Rights of PP, 
Wyo., 648 P.2d 512 (1982). The trial court is usually apprised of the error by means of 
objection together with reasons in support of the objection. Matter of Parental Rights of PP, supra. 
* * *" Dennis v. Dennis, Wyo., 
675 P.2d 265, 266 (1984).

[¶13.]  Essentially this case consists of a 
breach of contract. Even the U.C.C. allows for a "reasonable time" for the buyer 
to discover any breach and notify the seller before he is barred. Section 
34-21-270(c), W.S. 1977. However, we need not reach the U.C.C. issue inasmuch as 
the contract made express provision for the exact situation which arose here. 
The contract provides that:

"The purchase price 
offered hereunder shall be based upon the value of inventory only and 
specifically shall not include amounts for goodwill, going concern value or 
trade name."

[¶14.]  The contract also expressly provides that 
"in the event the actual wholesale value of the current saleable inventory" is 
less than the agreed upon $75,000.00, the purchase price shall be "reduced 
accordingly."

[¶15.]  We agree with the trial court's findings 
that:

"3. The actual inventory 
was Five Thousand Nineteen Dollars and 63/100 ($5,019.63) less than the minimum 
inventory required under the contract.

"4. Merchandise of a 
value of Two Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Nine Dollars and 57/100 ($2,839.57) 
was sold following completion of inventory and prior to the business changing 
hands that was not replaced as agreed.

"5. The two figures 
referenced in paragraphs 3 and 4 above should be deducted from the principal 
amount due and owing on the note from the Defendants to the Plaintiff and such 
deduction should be made as of the date of the making of said 
note."

[¶16.]  The parties agreed that the purchase 
price should be reduced if the inventory was less than that agreed to, or if 
inventory was sold and not replaced. This is what happened; therefore, the 
purchase price should have been reduced accordingly.

[¶17.]  The appellees request us to assess costs 
against the appellant. They contend that we should refuse to consider the 
contentions of the appellant, pursuant to Rule 1.02, W.R.A.P., for failure to 
comply with Rule 5.01, W.R.A.P. Rule 1.02, W.R.A.P., 
provides:

"The timely filing of a 
notice of appeal is jurisdictional. The failure to comply with any other of 
these rules or any order of court does not affect the validity of the appeal, 
but is ground only for such action as the reviewing court deems appropriate, 
including but not limited to citation of counsel or a party for contempt, 
refusal to consider the offending party's contentions, assessment of costs, or 
dismissal or affirmance."

[¶18.]  Rule 5.01, W.R.A.P., provides in part: 

"The brief of the 
appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order here 
indicated:

* * * * * 
*

"(2) A statement of the 
issues presented for review;

* * * * * 
*

"(4) An argument. The 
argument may be preceded by a summary. The argument shall contain the 
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the 
reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the 
record relied on."

[¶19.]  The appellees then 
argue:

"* * * Preparing a brief 
and argument before the Supreme Court is a difficult, time consuming and 
expensive proposition. Paradoxically, this task is made much more difficult, 
time consuming and expensive when responding to a brief which contains neither 
definitive issues nor authority. For that reason, the Appellees would 
respectfully request that this Court not only affirm the order of the trial 
court, but that it also award attorneys' fees and costs necessarily incurred by 
Appellees in responding to the Appellant's brief."

[¶20.]  It is true that the appellant presented 
no statement of the issues in her brief. It is also true that the appellant did 
not support her position with cogent arguments or 
authority.

"* * * An appellant is 
required to present this court with relevant authority and cogent argument. It 
is not enough to identify a potential issue with the expectation that this court 
will flesh out the matter from there. The appellant, at a minimum, must attempt 
to relate the rule of law he depends upon to the facts of his case. * * *" Elder 
v. Jones, Wyo., 608 P.2d 654, 660 
(1980).

The appellees 
herein were forced to frame the issues for the appellant, argue them, and then 
refute them. Accordingly, we will assess costs in this case against the 
appellant.

[¶21.]  Affirmed.