Case Title: Piscatelli v. Liquor Board

Citation: 378 Md. 623

Docket Number: 85/02

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 85
September Term, 2002
_________________________________________
NICHOLAS PISCAT ELLI, et al.
v.
BOARD OF LIQUOR LICENSE 
COMMISSIONERS
__________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
       * Eldridge
       
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
                                
         JJ.
__________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
_________________________________________
Filed:   December 9, 2003
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
1
The plaintiffs-appellants raise no issues under Articles 24 or 40 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.
Under Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Article 2B, § 11-304(d)(2), the
holder of a class B-D-7 liquor license in Baltimore City must “cease all operations,
including the serving of alcoholic beverages or food and providing entertainment,”
between “2 a.m. and 6 a.m.”  The principal issue raised in this case is whether that
portion of § 11-304(d)(2) relating to ceasing operations, serving food, and providing
entertainment between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m., violates Article XI-A of the Maryland
Constitution, known as the Home Rule Amendment.  The plaintiffs-appellants also
present a statutory interpretation issue concerning the applicability of § 11-304(d)(2)
and a federal constitutional challenge to § 11-304(d)(2) based upon the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
I.
Nicholas Piscatelli is the individual licensee for the Redwood Trust, LLC, both
of whom are the plaintiffs-appellants in this case (hereafter collectively referred to as
“Piscatelli”).   Piscatelli operates a tavern business with live entertainment and dancing
in Baltimore City, located in a zoning district where such use is conditionally
permitted.  A “Conditional Use Approval” by the Baltimore City Board of Municipal
and Zoning Appeals, dated October 26, 2001, and a “Use” permit issued by the
Baltimore City Department of Housing and Comm unity Development on November 2,
-2-
2
All statutory references in this opinion will be to Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.),
Article 2B, unless otherwise specified.
2001, authorize Piscatelli to use the premises as a restaurant, serving food and
providing live entertainment and dancing, “after hours” which means after 2 a.m.
Piscatelli has a class B-D-7 liquor license, which authorizes the licensee “to sell all
alcoholic beverages at retail at the place in the license described, for consumption on
the premises and elsewhere from 6 a.m. to 2 a.m. on the following day, 7 days a week.”
Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol), Art. 2B, §8-203(d)(3). 2
When Piscatelli first opened for business in November 2001, he kept  the
establishment open until 4 a.m. on weekends, relying on the Baltimore City zoning
approval and the use permit.  Piscatelli also requested that the Board of Liquor License
Commissioners for Baltimore City (hereafter referred to as the “Liquor Board”) convert
his liquor license from a class B-D-7 license to a class B license, as a class B license
would allow him to operate and sell food (although not sell alcoholic beverages) after
2 a.m.  At a hearing on December 6, 2001, the Liquor Board denied Piscatelli’s request
to convert his license and informed Piscatelli that it would enforce the 2 a.m. closing
time required by §11-304(d)(2).  The record does not disclose that Piscatelli sought
judicial review of the decision refusing to convert his license.
On December 8, 2001, Liquor Board inspectors arrived at Piscatelli’s business
at about 2:10 a.m. and found approxim ately 250 to 300 people on the premises, dancing
to music supplied by two disc jockeys.  Piscatelli and his employees refused to comply
with the inspectors’ request to cease operations.  The Liquor Board then issued a
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3
Rule 3.02 states:
“Licensees shall cooperate with representatives of the Board,
members of the Police Department,  Health Department, Building
Engineer’s office, Grand Jury and representatives of other
governmental agencies whenever such persons are on official
business.”
“Violation Notice” to Piscatelli for keeping his establishment open in contravention of
§11-304(d)(2) , and for refusing to cooperate with the Liquor Board inspectors, as
required by Liquor Board Rule 3.02.3   At a hearing before the Liquor Board, Piscatelli
conceded that the establishment was open after 2 a.m. on the night in question.  The
Board decided that Piscatelli had violated §11-304(d) and Rule 3.02, rejected
Piscatelli’s legal arguments, and imposed penalties consisting of fines or, in the
alternative, a suspension.
Piscatelli filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City a petition for judicial
review, presenting the same legal argumen ts which were made before the Liquor Board
and which are made before this Court.  The Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the
Liquor Board, stating:
“The Liquor Board . . . correctly interpreted Article 2B § 11-
304(d).
* * *
“Licensee concedes that on its face, the statute requires it to ‘cease
all operations’ after 2:00 a.m. However, Licensee argues that when
read together with § 11-305(d), it is permitted to remain open after
2:00 a.m. because it provided entertainment.
* * *
-4-
4
Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 579 n.15, 702 A.2d 230, 239 n.15 (1997), and cases there
cited.  See also, e.g., Murrell v. Baltimore, 376 Md. 170, 191 n.8, 829 A.2d 548, 560 n.8 (2003);
Jordan v. Hebbville, 369 Md. 439, 461 n.20, 800 A.2d 768, 781 n.20 (2002); McCarter v. State, 363
Md. 705, 712-713, 770 A.2d 195, 199 (2001); Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities, Inc., 360
Md. 438, 461, 758 A.2d 995, 1007 (2000), and cases there cited.
“Nothing in the language of 11-305(d) supports the argument
that it implicitly grants a license, and any such interpretation would
violate all rules of statutory construction . . . .  Section 11-
304(d)(2) was enacted after § 11-305(d). . . . §11-304(d)(2) is the
specific provision and it controls.  The fact that Licensee has a Use
and Occupancy Permit . . . that satisfies the provisions of § 11-
305(d) does not require a different result.
“Section 11-304(d)(2) does not violate the Home Rule
Amendment because it does not regulate zoning.  Thus, Parks v.
Board, 338 Md. 366 (1995) is inapplicable.  Furthermore, it does
not violate the First Amendment and/or Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The
statute does not suppress or greatly restrict access to live
entertainment, which is afforded protection under the First
Amendment, and there is a rational basis that justifies treating live
entertainment places differently than the other businesses
exempted.”
Piscatelli noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Prior to any
proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals, this Court issued a writ of certiorari.
Piscatelli v. Board of Liquor, 371 Md. 613, 810 A.2d 961 (2002).
II.
In accordance with “the established principle that a court will not decide a
constitutional issue when a case can properly be disposed of on a non-constitutional
ground,”4 we shall first address Piscatelli’s statutory interpretation issue.  If Piscatelli’s
“after hours” operation does not violate Article 2B, § 11-304(d)(2), it will not be
-5-
necessary for us to reach the state and federal constitutional issues raised by Piscatelli.
Article 2B, § 11-304, provides in relevant part as follows (emphasis added in
subsection (d)(2)):
“§11-304. Consumption - In general.
“(a) Consumption between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. prohibited;
penalty. — (1) Between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. on any day, a person may
not consume any alcoholic beverages on any premises open to the
general public, any place of public entertainment, or any place at
which setups or other component parts of mixed alcoholic drinks
are sold under any license issued under the provisions of the
Business Regulation Article, and an owner, operator or manager of
the premises or places may not knowingly permit such
consumption.
“(2) Except as provided in this section, any person found
consuming any alcoholic beverage on any premises open to the
general public, and any owner, operator or manager of those
premises or places who knowingly permits consumption between
the hours provided by this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and,
upon conviction, shall be fined not more than $50 and not less than
$5.
* * *
“(d) New Year’s Day exception. — (1) Except as provided in
this subsection, this section does not apply to premises conducted
on New Year’s Day by on-sale licensees in Baltimore City.
“(2) In Baltimore City, a licensed premises shall cease all
operations, including the serving of alcoholic beverages or food
and providing entertainment, at the closing hour for that class of
licensed premises specified in this article. 
“(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, the
Board of Liquor License Commissioners may grant an exemption
for remaining open after hours to: 
“(i) A holder of a Class B restaurant license, only for serving
food to patrons seated for dining; or 
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“(ii) A pharmacy that fills prescriptions. 
“(4) A pharmacy that receives an exemption under
paragraph (3) of this subsection may also sell products other than
alcohol after normal closing hours.
“(5) Notwithstanding the hour restrictions under paragraph (2)
of this subsection, a hotel that holds a Class B license and serves
food to seated customers or to private functions or guest rooms
may continue to provide food service.”
Piscatelli “acknowledges that a plain reading of Article 2B, § 11-304(d), without
reference to any other provisions of the liquor laws, would support the Liquor Board’s
position that Licensee did not come within one of the exemptions specified in that
subsection, and would therefore be required to close all business operations at
2:00 a.m.”  (Appellants’ brief at 5).
Nevertheless, Piscatelli argues that Article 2B, § 11-305(d), “provides a fourth
exemption to the proscription outlined in Article 2B, § 11-304(d).”  (Ibid.).  Section 11-
305(d) states as follows:
“(d) Registration, compliance with other laws. — The owner,
operator, or manager of any premises open to the general public or
of any place of public accomm odation where any form of
entertainment is provided between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. on any day
and where alcoholic beverages are consumed at any hour of the day
shall: 
“(1) Register with the fire department and the Department of
Housing and Comm unity Develop ment; and 
“(2) Comply with all federal, State, and city building, fire,
health, and zoning laws.”
Section 11-305(d), however, does not contain an authorization for any licensee
-7-
5
  House Bill 1154 was cross-filed with an identical Senate Bill (Senate Bill 796) at the same
session.
to operate or provide entertainment between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m.  Rather, the statutory
provision simply imposes certain registration and compliance obligations upon a
licensee which is authorized to, and does, operate and provide entertainment between
2 a.m. and 6 a.m.  The holder of a class B-D-7 license is not so authorized.
Moreover, Piscatelli’s interpretation of § 11-305(d) would render nugatory the
prohibition in § 11-304(d)(2) that a class B-D-7 licensee “cease all operations,
including . . . providing entertainment,” between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m.  As this Court has
often emphasized, “we do not construe enactmen ts so as to render ‘any portion . . .
superfluous or nugatory,’” Atlantic Golf v. Maryland Econom ic Development
Corporation, 377 Md. 115, 125, 832 A.2d 207, 213 (2003), quoting Facon v. State, 375
Md. 435, 446, 825 A.2d 1096, 1102 (2003).
The legislative history of § 11-304(d)(2) confirms the Liquor Board’s
interpretation of the statutory provision.  Section 11-304(d)(2) was added to Article 2B
by House Bill 1154 of the 2000 session of the General Assembly.5  The Floor Report
for House Bill 1154 set forth the Bill’s purpose as follows (emphasis supplied):
“The current [Liquor] Board policy is to require all licensees to
cease all operations, except for the sale of food, at the closing hour
specified for that class of license.  This requirement, however is
not specified in the State law, and certain licensees have
challenged the Board’s authority to adopt and enforce this policy.
This bill addresses this problem by expressly requiring licensees to
cease all operations at the closing hour for that class of license.”
-8-
This language shows the General Assembly’s intent that, under § 11-304(d)(2), a
licensee with a B-D-7 license must cease all operations between 2 a.m and 6 a.m. 
Finally, even if we were to agree with Piscatelli’s interpretation of § 11-305(d),
which would make it inconsistent with § 11-304(d)(2), the language of § 11-304(d)(2)
would be controlling.  Section 11-305(d) was enacted by Ch. 482 of the Acts of 1993,
to be effective October 1, 1993.  Section 11-304(d)(2), as previously pointed out, was
enacted seven years later, by Ch. 461 of the Acts of 2000.  Consequently, as the later
enacted statute, the language of § 11-304(d)(2) would control to the extent of any
inconsistency.  See, e.g., Haub v. Montgomery County, 353 Md. 448, 462, 727 A.2d
369, 376 (1999) (“the later enactment prevails to the extent of any inconsistency”), and
cases there cited.  
III.
Piscatelli’s principal argument is that the General Assembly’s enactment of § 11-
304(d)(2), insofar as the statute prohibits the serving of food and providing
entertainment after 2 a.m., violated the constitutional restrictions upon the General
Assembly’s authority which are set forth in Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution.
Piscatelli chiefly relies upon this Court’s decision in Park v. Board of Liquor License
Commissioners, 338 Md. 366, 658 A.2d 687 (1995).
Baltimore City is a charter home rule jurisdiction under Article XI-A of the
Maryland Constitution.  As we have pointed out on numerous occasions, Article XI-A
enabled Baltimore City and counties “‘which chose to adopt a home rule charter, to
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achieve a significant degree of political self-determination.’”  Holiday Universal v.
Montgomery County, 377 Md. 305, 313, 833 A.2d 518, 523 (2003), quoting Tyma v.
Montgomery County, 369 Md. 497, 504, 801 A.2d 148, 152 (2002).  Article XI-A’s
“purpose was to transfer the General Assembly’s power to enact many types of . . .
public local laws to the Art. XI-A home rule” jurisdictions, McCrory Corp. v. Fowler,
319 Md. 12, 16, 570 A.2d 834, 835-836 (1990).
Article XI-A, § 2, of the Constitution requires the General Assemb ly to enact a
grant of express powers for Baltimore City and the counties which have adopted home
rule charters.  The provision states:
“The General Assemb ly shall by public general law provide a
grant of express powers for such County or Counties as may
thereafter form a charter under the provisions of this Article.  Such
express powers granted to the Counties and the powers heretofore
granted to the City of Baltimore, as set forth in Article 4, Section
6, Public Local Laws of Maryland [now codified as Article II of
the Baltimore City Charter] shall not be enlarged or extended by
any charter formed under the provisions of this Article, but such
powers may be extended, modified, amended or repealed by the
General Assem bly.”
Most of the express powers granted by the General Assemb ly pursuant to Article XI-A,
§ 2, are contained in Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Article 25A for home
rule counties, and in Article II of the Baltimore City Charter for the City of Baltimore.
Some additional express powers are set forth in other public general laws.  For
example, Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol.), Article 66B, §§ 2.01 et seq.,
expressly grants zoning authority to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.  See
-10-
Park v. Board of Liquor License Commissioners, supra, 338 Md. at 379, 658 A.2d at
693.
Article XI-A, § 4, of the Maryland Constitution further provides in pertinent part
as follows:
“From and after the adoption of a charter under the provisions
of this Article by the City of Baltimore or any County of this State,
no public local law shall be enacted by the General Assemb ly for
said City or County on any subject covered by the express powers
granted as above provided. * * *”
In State’s Attorney of Baltimore City v. City of Baltimore, 274 Md. 597, 604-605, 337
A.2d 92, 97 (1975), quoting State v. Stewart, 152 Md. 419, 424, 137 A. 39, 41-42
(1927), we discussed the interplay of Article XI-A, §§ 2 and 4, as follows:
“Under these sections, while the General Assemb ly has the
authority to determine what powers are to be exercised by
Baltimore City or the charter counties, the General Assemb ly may
not enact a public local law for the City or any charter county
which modifies the powers so granted.  If the General Assemb ly
wishes to diminish the powers granted to Baltimore City or a
charter county, it must do so by amending the acts which granted
the powers.  It may not do so by enacting a separate public local
law which is merely inconsistent with the acts granting the express
powers to the City or to the charter counties.  These principles were
explained by Judge [W. Mitchell] Digges for the Court in State v.
Stewart, supra, 152 Md. at 424, as follows:
‘If the General Assembly, in its grant of powers to
Baltimore City, subsequently concludes that the grant of
powers contained a subject upon which the General
Assemb ly should have authority to legislate, and not the city
authorities, it can only accomplish this by amending or
repealing the act granting and delineating the powers.  The
-11-
Legislature has the power to describe the field within which
the local authorities may legislate, but having once done
this, it cannot restrict or limit this field of legislation
without changing its boundaries.  The legislation in respect
to the subjects contained in the granted powers is therefore
committed exclusively to the local authorities and denied to
the General Assembly, so long as the grant of powers
remained unchanged.  Any other interpretation would render
the provisions of article 11A meaningless, and result in
nullifying the purpose sought to be accomplished by its
adoption.  If the Legislature could change the grant of power
by the simple expedient of passing an act in conflict with the
legislation of the local authorities, it would result in the
complete frustration of the object of the amendmen t.’”
As earlier pointed out, the authority to enact local zoning laws is among the
express home rule powers granted to Baltimore City.  In addition, the authority “[t]o
.. . regulate . . . the . . . sale and disposition of food of every kind” is included among
Baltimore City’s express powers.  See Article II, § 8, of the Baltimore City Charter.
On the other hand, the regulation of alcoholic beverages is not within the express
powers granted to Article XI-A home rule jurisdictions.  Instead, the “General
Assemb ly has preempted this area by Art. 2B of the Code,” Coalition v. Annapolis
Lodge, 333 Md. 359, 362 n.1, 635 A.2d 412, 413 n.1 (1994).  See, e.g., Board of Liquor
v. Hollywood, 344 Md. 2, 12-13, 684 A.2d 837, 842-843 (1996) (“The Maryland
General Assembly, under Article 2B, indeed regulates the sale and distribution of
alcoholic beverages with uncommon precision . . . .  Rather than providing broad
general guidelines, the General Assemb ly has chosen to closely control by statute even
the more detailed aspects of the alcoholic beverages industry”); State v. Petrushansky,
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183 Md. 67, 70-71, 36 A.2d 533, 535 (1944) (discussing the history of Article 2B’s
enactment); Montgomery Co. v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 53 Md. App. 123,
127, 451 A.2d 1279, 1281 (1982) (“the Legislature has preempted the field of the
regulation and control of alcoholic beverages”).
Piscatelli argues that Article 2B, § 11-304(d)(2), is not a law regulating alcoholic
beverages.  Instead, he contends (appellants’ brief at 10):
“Article 2B, §11-304(d) for the first time attempts to regulate the
hours of operation for business operations totally unrelated to the
sale or consumption of alcoholic beverages.  It effectively
precludes Licensee’s permitted use as an after hours establishmen t.
Therefore, it has gone beyond a lawful liquor regulation and has
become an unauthorized zoning regulation.”
Piscatelli points out that he was “approved for a conditional use as an after hours
establishment” pursuant to the Baltimore City zoning regulations, that he “was issued
a Use and Occupancy Permit . . . authorizing [him] to ‘use premises as a restaurant
tavern with live entertainment and dancing with after hours establishment,’” and that
the Liquor Board’s enforcement of § 11-304(d)(2) “totally preclud[es Piscatelli] from
using [his] premises” in accordance with the local zoning regulations.  (Id. at 8-10).
According to Piscatelli, the enactment of § 11-304(d)(2) violated Article XI-A, § 4, of
the Constitution because it is a public local zoning law, and zoning is within the
express powers granted to Baltimore City.  Piscatelli claims that our decision in Park
v. Board of Liquor License Commissioners, supra, 338 Md. 366, 658 A.2d 687, “is
controlling.”  (Id. at 9).
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The Park case involved several Baltimore City alcoholic beverage package
goods stores having no facilities for on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages.
They held class B-D-7 liquor licenses which permitted the sale of alcoholic beverages
for consumption on or off the premises from 6 a.m. to 2 a.m. seven days per week.  By
Ch.  24 of the Acts of 1992, the General Assemb ly authorized for Baltimore City a new
class A-2 liquor license, restricted to the sale of alcoholic beverages for off-premises
consumption and restricted to sales between 9 a.m. and midnight, Monday through
Saturday.  Ch. 24 of the Acts of 1992 further provided that the holders of all class B-D-
7 licenses were required either to have on-premises consumption facilities, or to add
on-premises consumption facilities to their operations, or to obtain the new class A-2
licenses which were more restrictive with regard to hours and days of operations.
These new requirements in Ch. 24 of the Acts of 1992, however, presented
zoning problems for many of the package goods stores holding class B-D-7 licenses and
selling alcoholic beverages only for off-premises consumption.  These class B-D-7
licensees were operating under non-conforming use zoning permits and zoning
requirements, and a change either to add on-premises consumption facilities, or to
obtain a new class A-2 license, would arguably violate the non-conforming use permits
and requirements.  Consequently, prior to the General Assembly’s enactment of Ch. 24
of the Acts of 1992, a bill was drafted for introduction in the Baltimore City Council
to give these package goods licensees protection from the local zoning requirements
after they made the changes required by the proposed Ch. 24.  When the zoning bill was
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not enacted by the Baltimore City Council, the bill in the General Assembly, which
became Ch. 24, was amended to grant the zoning protection.  Ch. 24 of the Acts of
1992 enacted a new § 18A(h) to Article 2B, providing that, “for purposes of zoning in
Baltimore City, the operation conducted by a holder of a Class A-2 beer, wine and
liquor off-sale package goods license shall be considered to be that of a tavern.”
This Court in Park held that § 18A(h), despite its codification in Article 2B of
the Maryland Code, was a local zoning statute.  Judge Karwacki for the Court in Park
stated (338 Md. at 376, 658 A.2d at 692):
“It is clear that the intent of the Legislature was to mandate that the
Zoning Administrator of Baltimore City include Class A-2 package
goods stores within the definition of ‘tavern’ for the purpose of
enforcing the Baltimore City Zoning Ordinance.”
* * *
“The clear intent of the Legislature was to address the growing
problems associated with seven-day package goods stores while
protecting the interests of those B-D-7 licensees who had operated
for many years in such a manner with the tacit approval of the
Board.  The Legislature knew that without § 18A(h), the B-D-7
package goods stores could be closed under Baltimore City zoning
regulations.  Section (h) was added so that ‘no rezoning will be
required in changing the license from a B-D-7 license to the A-2
license.’  The intent of the Legislature to make a zoning change is
also plain on the face of the statute, and we must give effect to that
intent as expressed by the Legislature.”
After explaining that § 18A(h) affected only Baltimore City and thus was a public local
law, and that zoning was within the express powers granted to Baltimore City, the
Court in Park concluded (338 Md. at 380, 658 A.2d at 694): “Modifying the definition
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of a ‘tavern’ under the zoning laws, therefore, is a task reserved to the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore.”  As Article XI-A, § 4, of the Constitution prohibited the General
Assemb ly from enacting “a public local law . . . on any subject covered by the express
powers granted,” the Park opinion held that Art. 2B, § 18A(h), was unconstitutional.
Unlike § 18A(h) involved in Park, § 11-304(d)(2) does not in any manner change
Baltimore City zoning law.  It gives no directions to, and imposes no requirements
upon, the Baltimore City zoning authorities.  If Piscatelli were not a liquor licensee, he
could operate the restaurant and provide entertainment after 2 a.m. in accordance with
the applicable zoning.  
Piscatelli’s theory seems to be that, whenever an enactment of the General
Assemb ly has the effect of precluding activity expressly authorized by local zoning
regulations in an Article XI-A jurisdiction, such enactment is a “zoning law.”  This is
not what the Park case held, and the theory is untenable.  The General Assemb ly may
properly enact numerous statutes in many areas of the law, such as environmental
statutes, acts affecting natural resources, public health enactments, etc., which may
happen to have, as consequences, the prohibition of activities permitted by local zoning
regulations or the express authorization of activities prohibited by local zoning
regulations.  See, e.g., Soaring Vista v. Queen Anne’s County, 356 Md. 660, 741 A.2d
1110 (1999); Talbot County v. Skipper, 329 Md. 481, 620 A.2d 880 (1993); Howard
County v. Pepco, 319 Md. 511, 573 A.2d 821 (1990).  Simply because an enactment by
the General Assemb ly affects the activities which are otherwise allowed or disallowed
-16-
under local zoning regulations, does not make the state enactment a “zoning law.”
Article 2B, § 11-204(d)(2), is a statute regulating liquor licensees and not a
zoning law.  The restriction imposed by § 11-304(d)(2) is a direct consequence of
Piscatelli having been granted a liquor license.  A liquor license is privilege, and in
granting the license, the Legislature “‘may annex . . . such conditions as are deemed
necessary to prevent an abuse of the privilege,’” Dundalk Liquor Co. v. Tawes, 201 Md.
58, 65, 92 A.2d 560, 563 (1953).  The requirement that a liquor licensee cease
operations at the same time that liquor sales must cease, clearly helps prevent illegal
after hours sales of alcoholic beverages.  In the instant case, one of the Liquor Board’s
inspectors testified before the Board that, after 2 a.m. on December 8, 2001, he
“observed patrons still seated at [Piscatelli’s] Sushi bar consuming beverages in plastic
cups with ice and some clearly marked bottles . . . .”  Contrary to Piscatelli’s argumen t,
§ 11-304(d)(2) is not “totally unrelated to the sale or consumption of alcoholic
beverages.”  (Appellants’ brief at 10).
The Circuit Court, therefore, correctly held that Article 2B, § 11-304(d)(2), did
not violate Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution.
IV.
Piscatelli asserts that Article 2B, § 11-304(d)(2), “violates both the First
Amendment and [the] Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
[United States] Constitution by improperly singling out liquor license establishments
that provide live entertainment and/or dancing, by requiring those establishments to
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close when alcohol can not be sold, but allowing certain restaurants, pharmacies and
hotels to remain open.  Such a distinction fails even a rational basis standard and the
law must be stricken.”  (Appellants’ brief at 11).
A.
Preliminarily, live entertainment of the sort at issue in the instant case would not
appear to be protected by the First Amendment.   The United States Supreme Court, in
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 104 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989), held
that an ordinance which restricted attendance in some dance-halls to minors between
the ages of 14 and 18 did not violate freedom of expression or association protected by
the First Amendment.  Specifically, the United States Supreme Court stated in City of
Dallas, 490 U.S. at 24-25, 109 S.Ct. at 1595, 104 L.Ed.2d at 25-26, as follows:
“The Texas Court of Appeals . . . thought that such patrons were
engaged in a form of expressive activity that was protected by the
First Amendment.  We disagree.
“The Dallas ordinance restricts attendance at Class E dance
halls to minors between the ages of 14 and 18 and certain excepted
adults.  It thus limits the minors’ ability to dance with adults who
may not attend, and it limits the opportunity of such adults to dance
with minors.  These opportunities might be described as
‘associational’ in common parlance, but they simply to not involve
the sort of expressive association that the First Amendment has
been held to protect.  The hundreds of teenagers who congregate
each night at this particular dance hall are not members of any
organized association; they are patrons of the same business
establishment.  Most are strangers to one another, and the dance
hall admits all who are willing to pay the admission fee.  There is
no suggestion that these patrons ‘take positions on public
questions’ or perform any of the other similar activities described
in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
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Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).
“The cases . . . recognize that ‘freedom of speech’ means more
than simply the right to talk and to write.  It is possible to find
some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person
undertakes – for example, walking down the street or meeting
one’s friends at a shopping mall – but such a kernel is not
sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First
Amendment.  We think the activity of these dance-hall patrons –
coming together to engage in recreational dancing – is not
protected by the First Amendment.  Thus this activity qualifies
neither as a form of ‘intimate association’ nor as a form of
‘expressive association’ as those terms were described in Roberts
[v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)].”
The entertainment offered by Piscatelli at his establishment is dancing to music
provided by disc jockeys, which is indistinguishable from the recreational dancing that
was the subject of the challenged regulation in City of Dallas v. Stanglin, supra.  As
such, it is not activity protected by the First Amendment.
Even assuming, arguendo, that entertainment of the type at issue in the case at
bar were protected by the First Amendment, § 11-304(d)(2) would be subject to
intermediate scrutiny as a “time, place and manner restriction,” because, as Article 2B
makes clear, the purpose of the regulation of liquor sales and consumption in this State
is to “obtain respect and obedience to law and to foster and promote temperance.”
Art. 2B, § 1-101 (a).  As such, it meets the test set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in that such regulations “‘are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a
substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication,’ and provided that the government interest is independent of First
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Amendment concerns.”  See Pack Shack v. Howard County, 377 Md. 55, 67, 832 A.2d
170, 177 (2003), quoting Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 47, 106 S.Ct. 925,
928, 89 L.Ed.2d 29, 37 (1986).  
In Pack Shack v. Howard County, supra, we invalidated an ordinance that
regulated the location of adult entertainment businesses, because, inter alia, it left open
too few locations where such businesses could lawfully operate. This, we held, failed
the requirement articulated by the United States Supreme Court that constitutional
“time, place and manner restrictions” leave open adequate alternative avenues of
communication.  Pack Shack v. Howard County, supra, 377 Md. at 80-84, 832 A.2d at
185-188.  See, e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, supra, 475 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. at
928, 89 L.Ed.2d at 37; Clark v. Comm unity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069, 82 L.Ed.2d 221, 227 (1984); United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1679,  20 L.Ed.2d 672, 680 (1968).  See also, State v.
Sheldon, 332 Md. 45, 54, 629 A.2d 753, 758 (1993).
Article 2B, § 11-304(d)(2), does not relate to the number of establishments.  It
simply concerns the hours of operation. Under § 11-304(d)(2), the licensee is required
to cease operations for four hours out of twenty-four, which does not “unreasonably
limit” available avenues for recreational dancing at either Piscatelli’s establishment or
similar establishments.  Maintaining public order is a substantial government interest.
Furthermore, the State has the authority to regulate the sale and consumption of alcohol
in public places.  See, e.g., Board of Liquor License Commissioners for Charles County
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v. Toye, 354 Md. 116, 125-126, 729 A.2d 407, 412 (1999); State v. Petrushansky,
supra, 183 Md. at 70-71, 36 A.2d at 535.  As such, § 11-304(d)(2), satisfies any
requirements for “time, place and manner restrictions” upon activity arguably protected
by the First Amendment.
B.
Piscatelli also asserts that §11-304(d)(2) violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because it treats liquor licensed establishments that offer
entertainment differently from some other restaurants and hotels.
“‘When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause
allows the States wide latitude.’”  Maryland Aggregates Ass’n v. State, 337 Md. 658,
672, 655 A.2d 886, 893(1995), quoting  Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 440, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 320 (1985).   Furthermore, we
stated in Maryland Aggregates Ass’n v. State, supra, 337 Md. at 673-674, 655 A.2d at
893-894: 
 “‘[E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge the
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social
and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither
proceeds 
along 
suspect 
lines 
nor 
infringes 
fundamental
constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification. . . . This
standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint.’ 
* * *
“While this Court has not hesitated to strike down
discriminatory economic regulation that lacked any reasonable
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justification, e.g., Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 635
A.2d 967 (1994), and Kirsch v. Prince George's County, 331 Md.
89, 626 A.2d 372 (1993), we nevertheless accord to the decisions
of legislative bodies a strong presumption of constitutionality. In
Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 367, 601 A.2d 102, 114 (1992),
we quoted the summary of rational basis review set forth in
Whiting-Turner Contract. Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340, 352, 499
A.2d 178, 185 (1985), which stated that a statute 
‘can be invalidated only if the classification is without any
reasonable basis and is purely arbitrary.  Further, a
classification having some reasonable basis need not be
made with mathematical nicety and may result in some
inequality.  If any state of facts reasonably can be conceived
that would sustain the classification, the existence of that
state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be
assumed.’
“See also Briscoe v. P.G. Health Dep't, 323 Md. 439, 448-449, 593
A.2d 1109, 1113-1114 (1991); Hargrove v. Board of Trustees, 310
Md. 406, 423, 529 A.2d 1372, 1380 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1027, 108 S. Ct. 753, 98 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1988); Broadwater v.
State, 306 Md. 597, 607, 510 A.2d 583, 588 (1986); State v.
Wyand, 304 Md. 721, 726-727, 501 A.2d 43, 46 (1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1095, 106 S. Ct. 1492, 89 L. Ed. 2d 893 (1986);
Department of Transportation v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 409, 474
A.2d 191, 199 (1984); State v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 299 Md.
310, 328, 473 A.2d 892, 901, appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 802, 105
S. Ct. 56, 83 L. Ed. 2d 7 (1984).”
Futhermore, “a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely
because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has
some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the
classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in
some inequality.’ Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78.”   City of
Dallas v. Stanglin, supra, 490 U.S. at 26, 109 S.Ct. at 1596, 104 L.Ed.2d at 26-27
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(some internal quotation marks omitted). 
Thus, a law will survive rational basis scrutiny if there is some reasonable
connection between the law and its stated intent, as there is in this case.  If licensees
were permitted to remain open after 2:00 a.m., patrons could possibly purchase
alcoholic beverages just prior to that time, and continue consumption.  As earlier
mentioned, there is some evidence in the record that patrons in Piscatelli’s
establishment may have, in fact, been consuming alcohol after 2 a.m, in violation of
§ 11-304(d).  Thus, the Liquor Board’s task of enforcing compliance with the law that
alcohol consumption, and not merely sales, in public places of entertainment cease after
2 a.m., is made much easier by a requirement that all operations cease for the four
hours from 2 a.m to 6 a.m. daily, as required by § 11-304(d)(2).  If the establishment
were closed, the Board  could be reasonably certain that no alcohol sales or
consumption would take place after closing time at that establishment.
Moreover, the General Assemb ly could have reasonably concluded that the
patrons of an establishment like Piscatelli’s that offers entertainment might be more
likely to disturb the public in the early morning hours than the patrons of restaurants
and hotels where food is served to persons seated in dining rooms.  There is a rational
basis for the classification contained in § 11-304(d), which is all that is required under
the Fourteenth Amendm ent’s Equal Protection Clause. City of Dallas v. Stanglin,
supra, 490 U.S. at 26-27, 109 S.Ct. at 1596, 104 L.Ed.2d at 26-27. 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
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B A L T I M O R E  
C I T Y  
A F F I R M E D .
APPELLANTS TO PAY COSTS.