Case Title: Dawson v. BEASLEY, SHERIFF

Citation: 180 N.E.2d 367, 242 Ind. 536

Docket Number: 30,064

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1962-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
242 Ind. 536 (1962)
180 N.E.2d 367
DAWSON
v.
BEASLEY, SHERIFF OF VIGO COUNTY.
No. 30,064.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed February 26, 1962.
*537 Edward L. Hamilton, of Terre Haute, for appellant.
Leonard P. Kincade, of Terre Haute, for appellee.
LANDIS, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment denying appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Appellant filed petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging (1) he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty by appellee-sheriff and also (2) that appellee-sheriff unlawfully held appellant upon an illegal fugitive warrant issued by a Justice of the Peace of Vigo County, Indiana, to which appellee-sheriff filed a return alleging appellant was a fugitive from the State of Massachusetts where appellant was charged with a felony, that appellee arrested and detained appellant upon an extradition warrant executed by the Governor of Indiana, that said extradition warrant was duly approved by the Governor of Indiana upon the request of the Governor of Massachusetts, and *538 that a copy of said extradition warrant issued by the Governor of Indiana was attached thereto.
Appellant states in his brief that he undertakes the Court's determination of only one asserted error, namely the sufficiency of the Governor's warrant issued by the Governor of Indiana, and to determine whether such Governor's warrant issued in this case substantially recites the facts necessary to sustain the validity of its issue.
Appellant cites the following portions of the Uniform Extradition Act. Burns' § 9-421 (1956 Repl.), is cited providing:
Burns' § 9-423 (1956 Repl.), is cited providing:
Appellant contends that the foregoing statutes contemplate that the person charged with crime in the demanding state has been lawfully charged by indictment, information, or by affidavit made before a magistrate in the demanding state with having committed a crime under the laws of that state.
The warrant of the Governor of Indiana is in part as follows:
Appellant argues that in the case at bar, the Governor's warrant is obviously based solely upon a complaint which appellant states does not come within the requirements of the above statutes which provide the extradition warrant shall not be issued unless the documents show appellant is lawfully charged by indictment, information, or affidavit made before a magistrate in the demanding state.
As stated by appellant in his brief, it is necessary for the return of the sheriff to show either by the *541 warrant of the Governor, or by documents accompanying it, that the requisition of the Governor of the demanding state is based on either a copy of the indictment, information, or affidavit made before a magistrate, certified as authentic by the Governor of the demanding state.
The rule is stated in the annotation appearing in 89 A.L.R. 599, as follows:
We believe the Indiana case of Rice v. Magenheimer (1947), 225 Ind. 441, 447, 75 N.E.2d 906, 909, is in accord with this rule. The Court, however, reversed the judgment and awarded a new trial because of the defective rendition warrant and stated:
In Rice v. Magenheimer, supra, had there been evidence such as supporting papers before the court upon which the warrant was issued to show the affidavit charging a crime was made before a magistrate in the demanding state, it is logical to assume the defective warrant would have been considered cured. See also: The People ex rel. v. Lohman (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 78, 160 N.E.2d 792, cert. den. (1960), 361 U.S. 963, 80 S. Ct. 591, 4 L. Ed. 2d 544; Harris v. State (1952), 257 Ala. 3, 60 S.2d 266.
To ascertain if the defective Governor's warrant was cured by the supporting papers it is necessary for us to consider what the supporting papers in the record in the instant case were, and whether there appeared among them an affidavit made before a magistrate in the demanding state.
Among such papers we note is the complaint made on July 1, 1958, before the Third District Court of Eastern Middlesex, charging appellant with automobile larceny of a value of more than $100.00, naming the owner of the property, and at the bottom containing the Massachusetts provision making this conduct a crime. The complaint further states it was "Received and sworn to, on said day, before said Court." The assistant clerk of the court attested to this transaction.
An affidavit is defined as a written statement under oath taken before an authorized officer. 1 I.L.E., *543 Affidavits, § 1, p. 296; 2 C.J.S., Affidavits, § 1, p. 922. Many cases construing complaints to meet the affidavit requirement in extradition statutes are set forth in the previously cited annotation of 89 A.L.R. 599, supra. We believe any reasonable construction of the complaint in the instant case which was "received and sworn to, on said day, before said Court" and attested to by the assistant clerk of the court constituted it an affidavit within the meaning of our extradition statute.
It is further our opinion that the complaint in the instant case was an affidavit before a magistrate, as required by the extradition act. The warrant (among the supporting papers in this cause) issued in the demanding state on the filing of the complaint, recites it was witnessed by District Judge Haven Parker. Judge Parker also certified as to the authority of the assistant clerk of the court who attested to the complaint. We do not see how there can be any question but that the affidavit was made before a magistrate as required by the extradition act. See: Definition of magistrate in Ballentine's Law Dictionary. It is our view that the defects raised by appellant to the Governor's extradition warrant were cured by the supporting papers appearing in the record of this cause, and it follows that no reversible error has been shown.
Judgment affirmed.
Achor, C.J., and Arterburn, J., concur; Bobbitt, J., concurs in result; Jackson, J., dissents without opinion.
NOTE.  Reported in 180 N.E.2d 367.
[1]  Burns' § 9-425 (1956 Repl.), provides:

"If the governor shall decide that the demand should be complied with, he shall sign a warrant of arrest, which shall be sealed with the state seal, and be directed to a sheriff, marshal, coroner, or other person whom he may think fit to entrust with the execution thereof; and the warrant must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issue." (Emphasis added.) Acts 1935, ch. 49, § 7, p. 134.