Case Title: Hanneman Family Funeral Home & Crematorium v. Orians

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3687

Docket Number: 2022-0573

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2023-10-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Hanneman Family Funeral Home & Crematorium v. Orians, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-
3687.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-3687 
HANNEMAN FAMILY FUNERAL HOME AND CREMATORIUM, APPELLANT AND 
CROSS-APPELLEE, v. ORIANS ET AL., APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Hanneman Family Funeral Home & Crematorium v. Orians, 
Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3687.] 
Trade secrets—Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act, R.C. 1333.61 through 1333.69—
Preemption—Information is a trade secret protected by Ohio Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act only if it has independent value because it is not generally 
known to and readily ascertainable by others and the owner has taken 
reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy—Customer information was not 
kept secret because it was accessible to a number of employees, was 
provided to third parties, and was available as a public record—Tort claims 
for tortious interference with business contracts, tortious interference with 
business relationships, and conversion that were based on alleged 
misappropriation of trade secrets were preempted—Court of appeals’ 
judgment affirmed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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(No. 2022-0573—Submitted March 22, 2023—Decided October 12, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Allen County, 
No. 1-21-05, 2022-Ohio-984. 
__________________ 
 
KENNEDY, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Third District 
Court of Appeals, we consider whether information about a funeral home’s 
customers who have preneed funeral contracts with the funeral home is a trade 
secret protected by the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act, R.C. 1333.61 through 
1333.69.  We also consider whether related claims for tortious interference with 
business contracts, tortious interference with business relationships, and conversion 
are preempted by the Act. 
{¶ 2} In this case, appellant and cross-appellee, Hanneman Family Funeral 
Home and Crematorium (“Hanneman Family”), purchased a funeral home but did 
not retain the funeral home’s director, appellee and cross-appellant Patrick Orians.  
Orians copied the funeral home’s customer information before accepting 
employment at another funeral home, appellee and cross-appellant T.R. Chiles & 
Sons-Laman, Inc., d.b.a. Chiles-Laman Funeral & Cremation Services (“Chiles-
Laman”).  Orians then used this customer information to solicit business for Chiles-
Laman.  Hanneman Family sued Orians and Chiles-Laman in the Allen County 
Court of Common Pleas, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious 
interference with business contracts, tortious interference with business 
relationships, and conversion.  The trial court entered summary judgment in favor 
of Orians and Chiles-Laman on those claims, and the Third District Court of 
Appeals affirmed, 2022-Ohio-984, ¶ 4-9, 69. 
{¶ 3} Information is a protected trade secret when (1) it has economic value 
because it is not generally known to and readily ascertainable by proper means by 
others who could obtain economic value from its disclosure or use and (2) the 
January Term, 2023 
 
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owner has taken reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.  R.C. 1333.61(D).  But 
here, the customer information at issue had been provided to a third party, was 
accessible by a number of the funeral home’s employees, and was available as a 
public record upon request.  Therefore, the information was not protected by the 
Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act as a trade secret. 
{¶ 4} Hanneman Family’s tort claims for tortious interference with business 
contracts, tortious interference with business relationships, and conversion are also 
premised on Orians and Chiles-Laman’s alleged misappropriation of Hanneman 
Family’s trade secrets.  However, the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act expressly 
supersedes other civil remedies sounding in tort that are based on the 
misappropriation of a trade secret.  Consequently, Hanneman Family’s tort claims 
are preempted by the Act. 
{¶ 5} The Third District properly affirmed the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Orians and Chiles-Laman on the claims at issue here.  
We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 6} Hanneman Family purchased several funeral homes from Service 
Corporation International, Inc., including Siferd-Orians Funeral Home in Lima.  
Orians, who was the funeral director for Siferd-Orians at the time of the purchase, 
learned that he would not be retained as an employee after Hanneman Family took 
over Siferd-Orians.  Before his employment with Siferd-Orians ended, Orians 
copied files containing the names and addresses of Siferd-Orians’s customers who 
had contracts prearranging their funeral services with the funeral home, which are 
called “preneed funeral contracts,” R.C. 4717.31 et seq.  After he started working 
for Chiles-Laman, Orians contacted approximately 100 of Siferd-Orians’s 
customers with preneed funeral contracts and solicited them to take their business 
to Chiles-Laman.  A large number of these customers transferred their preneed 
funeral contracts to Chiles-Laman. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 7} Hanneman 
Family 
sued 
Orians 
and 
Chiles-Laman 
for 
misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with business contracts, 
tortious interference with business relationships, and conversion, among other 
claims.  The trial court granted summary judgment in Orians and Chiles-Laman’s 
favor, concluding that “the preneed funeral contracts and the information that 
Orians obtained” were not trade secrets, because the information “was not secret 
and was readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons.”  The court 
reasoned that the preneed-funeral-contract information was a public record that had 
been released by the Ohio Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors.  Further, the 
court determined that the related tort claims failed because Hanneman Family had 
not pointed to any evidence of damages that could be established to a reasonable 
degree of certainty. 
{¶ 8} The Third District affirmed.  It explained that summary judgment was 
proper on the misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claim because Siferd-Orians’s 
(now Hanneman Family’s) customer information had been disclosed to the Board 
of Embalmers and Funeral Directors in a report generated by a third party, which 
was available as a public record.  2022-Ohio-984 at ¶ 39-40.  And because it 
determined that the customer information was not a trade secret, the court of 
appeals rejected Orians and Chiles-Laman’s argument that the related claims for 
tortious interference with business contracts, tortious interference with business 
relationships, and conversion were preempted by the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act.  Id. at ¶ 42.  The appellate court held that the tort claims failed because 
Hanneman Family had not satisfied the damages element of those torts, noting that 
Hanneman Family had not presented any evidence of lost profits and that any future 
lost profits were speculative.  Id. at ¶ 49-52.  The court explained that “any damage 
calculation is purely theoretical until the preneed funeral contract is actually 
realized when a preneed customer dies.”  Id. at ¶ 49. 
January Term, 2023 
 
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{¶ 9} We accepted Hanneman Family’s discretionary appeal on the 
following propositions of law: 
 
1. Appellant’s preneed contracts constitute trade secret 
information as the information contained in preneed contracts [is] 
not public information. 
2. Appellant’s preneed contracts do not have speculative 
damages and satisfy tortious interference with business relations and 
tortious interference with business contracts. 
 
See 167 Ohio St.3d 1470, 2022-Ohio-2633, 191 N.E.3d 446. 
{¶ 10} Orians and Chiles-Laman filed a cross-appeal, and we agreed to 
consider  their sole proposition of law: 
 
 
A trade secret claim pursuant to R.C. 1331.61, et seq. 
displaces all common-law tort claims arising from the theft, misuse, 
and misappropriation of any confidential information, even when 
the information does not arise to the level of a “trade secret.” 
 
See id. 
{¶ 11} Because deciding the issues under Hanneman Family’s first 
proposition of law and Orians and Chiles-Laman’s proposition of law suffices to 
resolve this case, we decline to address Hanneman Family’s second proposition of 
law. 
II.  Law and Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
{¶ 12} Analyzing the parties’ propositions of law returns us to a familiar 
place: statutory interpretation.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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review de novo.  State ex rel. Natl. Lime & Stone Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs., 152 Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio-8348, 97 N.E.3d 404, ¶ 14.  As we 
explained long ago, “[t]he question is not what did the general assembly intend to 
enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact.”  Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 
Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus.  “When the 
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite 
meaning, we must rely on what the General Assembly has said.”  Jones v. Action 
Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, 
¶ 12.  For this reason, “[a]n unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted.”  
Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 (1944), paragraph five of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 13} This case was decided on summary judgment, and “[t]his court 
conducts a de novo review of a summary-judgment ruling,” Bohlen v. Anadarko E 
& P Onshore, L.L.C., 150 Ohio St.3d 197, 2017-Ohio-4025, 80 N.E.3d 468, ¶ 10.  
Summary judgment may be granted “when no genuine issues of material fact 
remain to be litigated, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
reasonable minds can reach a conclusion only in favor of the moving party.”  Id. 
B.  The Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
{¶ 14} Although Ohio’s protection of trade secrets arose at common law, Al 
Minor & Assocs., Inc. v. Martin, 117 Ohio St.3d 58, 2008-Ohio-292, 881 N.E.2d 
850, ¶ 10, in 1994, the General Assembly adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, see 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 320, 145 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5403, 5403-5407; see also 
BlueEarth Biofuels, L.L.C. v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., 123 Haw. 314, 317, 235 
P.3d 310 (2010).  The Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines the term “trade 
secret” as 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
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information, including * * * any business information or plans, 
financial information, or listing of names, addresses, or telephone 
numbers, that satisfies both of the following: 
 
(1) It derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use. 
 
(2) It is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
 
R.C. 1333.61(D). 
{¶ 15} This court has established a six-factor test for determining whether 
information constitutes a trade secret under R.C. 1333.61(D), requiring a court to 
consider: 
 
“(1) [t]he extent to which the information is known outside the 
business; (2) the extent to which it is known to those inside the 
business, i.e., by the employees; (3) the precautions taken by the 
holder of the trade secret to guard the secrecy of the information; 
(4) the savings effected and the value to the holder in having the 
information as against competitors; (5) the amount of effort or 
money expended in obtaining and developing the information; and 
(6) the amount of time and expense it would take for others to 
acquire and duplicate the information.” 
 
Al Minor & Assocs. at ¶ 16, quoting State ex rel. The Plain Dealer v. Ohio Dept. of 
Ins., 80 Ohio St.3d 513, 524-525, 687 N.E.2d 661 (1997), superseded by statute on 
other grounds as stated in State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ., 89 Ohio St.3d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8 
396, 732 N.E.2d 373 (2000).  “An entity claiming trade secret status bears the 
burden to identify and demonstrate that the material is included in categories of 
protected information under the statute and additionally must take some active steps 
to maintain its secrecy.”  Besser at 400. 
{¶ 16} The customer information at issue in this case was available outside 
the funeral home.  A seller of preneed funeral contracts is required to file with the 
Board of Embalmers and Directors an annual report regarding existing funded 
preneed funeral contracts.  Ohio Adm.Code 4717-10-01(A).  The report is required 
to disclose the name of each beneficiary of the preneed funeral contract, among 
other information.  See Ohio Adm.Code 4717-10-01(A)(1).  When Siferd-Orians 
was still owned by Service Corporation International, Orians prepared this report 
by contacting a third party—the insurance company underwriting the preneed 
funeral contracts—and requesting a list of all the preneed funeral contracts that had 
been sold through Siferd-Orians.  And when Hanneman Family purchased Siferd-
Orians, it also provided to the board the names of customers in Hanneman Family’s 
application to transfer Siferd-Orians’s funeral-home license.  Prior to the enactment 
of 2021 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 110, effective September 30, 2021, which amended 
Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, information about a funeral home’s 
preneed funeral contracts was available from the board as a public record.  Much 
of the information in the preneed funeral contracts was therefore readily 
ascertainable by the public prior to Orians’s taking it. 
{¶ 17} After viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to 
Hanneman Family, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether its preneed-funeral-contract information was a protected trade 
secret and that Orians and Chiles-Laman are entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  See Bohlen, 150 Ohio St.3d 197, 2017-Ohio-4025, 80 N.E.3d 468, at ¶ 10.  
Hanneman Family failed to carry its burden to submit evidence showing that the 
information was valuable because it was not known to or ascertainable by others.  
January Term, 2023 
 
9 
See R.C. 1333.61(D).  Consequently, the trial court did not err in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Orians and Chiles-Laman on Hanneman Family’s 
misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claim. 
C.  Preemption 
{¶ 18} R.C. 1333.67 preempts tort claims that are based on the 
misappropriation of a trade secret.  That statute provides: 
 
(A) Except as provided in division (B) of this section, 
sections 1333.61 to 1333.69 of the Revised Code displace 
conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other laws of this state providing 
civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret. 
(B) Sections 1333.61 to 1333.69 of the Revised Code do not 
affect any of the following: 
(1) Contractual remedies, whether or not based on 
misappropriation of a trade secret; 
(2) Other 
civil 
remedies 
that 
are 
not 
based 
on 
misappropriation of a trade secret; 
(3) Criminal remedies, including those in other sections of 
[R.C. Chapter 1333], whether or not based on misappropriation of a 
trade secret. 
 
{¶ 19} There is a split of authority regarding whether statutory language 
similar to that used in R.C. 1333.67 preempts all claims based on the unauthorized 
use of information, even when the information is not a trade secret as defined by 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  Compare Mtge. Specialists, Inc. v. Davey, 153 
N.H. 764, 777, 904 A.2d 652 (2006) (“the [New Hampshire Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act] preempts claims that are based upon the unauthorized use of information, 
regardless of whether that information meets the statutory definition of a trade 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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secret”) with Am. Biomedical Group, Inc. v. Techtrol, Inc., 2016 OK 55, 374 P.3d 
820, ¶ 23, quoting Okla.Stat.Ann. 78-92(A) (“the [Oklahoma Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act] displaces conflicting tort claims only for ‘misappropriation of a trade 
secret.’  It does not displace tort claims for information not meeting this 
definition”). 
{¶ 20} It is not necessary to decide this question here.  Statutory language 
like that in R.C. 1333.67 “prevents a plaintiff from merely restating their trade 
secret claims as separate tort claims, ” Weins v. Sporleder, 2000 S.D. 10, 605 
N.W.2d 488, ¶ 13.  Hanneman family’s complaint alleged that Orians and Chiles-
Laman had tortiously interfered with Hanneman Family’s business contracts and 
business relationships by stealing “[Hanneman Family’s preneed funeral] contracts 
including clientele names, contact information and other trade secret information” 
and by “contacting these individuals and working to obtain transfers of [the] 
contracts.”  (Emphasis added.)  As for its conversion claim, Hanneman Family 
alleged that it owned “[preneed funeral contracts] including the trade secret 
information associated with them” and that Orians and Chiles-Laman “stole these 
contracts/property including clientele names, contact information and other trade 
secret information.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 21} These tort claims are based on the same factual allegations that make 
up Hanneman Family’s misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claim.  According to 
Hanneman Family’s complaint, Orians and Chiles-Laman’s actions were tortious 
because Orians and Chiles-Laman stole trade secrets.  The fact that the preneed-
funeral-contract information is “not ultimately found to be [a] trade secret[] under 
the [Uniform Trade Secrets Act does] not make the preemption clause inapplicable.  
Rather, the key inquiry is whether the same factual allegations of misappropriation 
are being used to obtain relief outside the [Uniform Trade Secrets Act],” Robbins 
v. Supermarket Equip. Sales, L.L.C., 290 Ga. 462, 466-467, 722 S.E.2d 55 (2012).  
Because Hanneman Family’s tort claims at issue here are premised on allegations 
January Term, 2023 
 
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of misappropriated trade secrets, they are preempted by the Ohio Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act.  The trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Orians and 
Chiles-Laman on these tort claims was proper, albeit for reasons different from 
those stated by the trial court and the appellate court. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 22} The Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides a civil remedy to 
protect trade secrets and preempts other tort-law remedies that are based on the 
misappropriation of a trade secret.  However, information is a trade secret and 
protected by the Act only if the information has independent value because it is not 
generally known to and readily ascertainable by others and the owner has taken 
reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.  R.C. 1333.61(D). 
{¶ 23} The customer information of Hanneman Family at issue here was 
not kept secret.  Rather, this information was accessible to a number of employees 
and was provided to third parties, and it was available as a public record to anyone 
who requested it from the state.  Therefore, the customer information was not a 
trade secret protected by the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  And because 
Hanneman Family’s tort claims for tortious interference with business contracts, 
tortious interference with business relationships, and conversion were based on the 
alleged misappropriation of a trade secret, they are preempted by the Act. 
{¶ 24} We therefore affirm the judgment of the Third District Court of 
Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
DEWINE, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in part and concurs in the judgment, with an opinion 
joined by DONNELLY and STEWART, JJ. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 25} In this case, we accepted the discretionary appeal of appellant and 
cross-appellee, Hanneman Family Funeral Home and Crematorium (“Hanneman 
Family”), and the cross-appeal of appellees and cross-appellants, Patrick Orians 
and T.R. Chiles & Sons-Laman, Inc., d.b.a. Chiles-Laman Funeral & Cremation 
Services (“Chiles-Laman”).  I agree with the majority’s decisions to resolve 
Hanneman Family’s first proposition of law and to hold that Hanneman Family 
cannot prevail under the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act (or “the Act”), 
R.C. 1333.61 through 1333.69, because the customer information at issue is not a 
trade secret.  Thus, I join that part of the majority opinion. 
{¶ 26} I write separately to address the issue of preemption under the Act.  
The majority opinion concludes that it is not necessary for this court to determine 
whether Ohio will join the majority of other jurisdictions and hold that claims based 
on the unauthorized use of information are preempted by the Act, but the majority 
goes on to find that Hanneman Family’s tort claims are preempted because they 
are premised on allegations of misappropriation of trade secrets.  This implicit 
acceptance of one approach to the preemption analysis without expressly stating 
which approach this court has adopted is confusing.  Additionally, we must answer 
the question whether claims based on the unauthorized use of information are 
preempted by the Act because the answer necessarily determines whether 
Hanneman Family’s tort claims are preempted, since Hanneman Family does not 
have a successful trade-secrets claim under the Act. 
{¶ 27} This court should join the majority of other jurisdictions and hold 
that in Ohio, unauthorized-use-of-information claims that are not otherwise 
preserved by state law are preempted by the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  And 
we should conclude that Hanneman Family’s tort claims are preempted because 
they are based solely on the unauthorized use of its information as alleged in its 
January Term, 2023 
 
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misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claim.  Because the majority opinion reaches the 
right result, I also concur in the judgment. 
This court may address the cross-appeal issue before addressing Hanneman 
Family’s second proposition of law 
{¶ 28} Hanneman Family’s second proposition of law involves the issue of 
damages in relation to its tort claims, which allege tortious interference with 
business relationships, tortious interference with business contracts, and 
conversion.  Hanneman Family maintains that the preneed contracts that were 
transferred to Chiles-Laman “do not have speculative damages” and thus the trial 
court erred in dismissing its tort claims. 
{¶ 29} Orians and Chiles-Laman disagree with Hanneman Family on the 
damages issue and maintain that Hanneman Family’s tort claims fail because they 
are preempted by the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  We accepted the cross-
appeal filed by Orians and Chiles-Laman, in which they argue that tort claims 
arising from the theft, misuse, and misappropriation of any confidential information 
are preempted by the Act, even when such information does not constitute a trade 
secret under the Act. 
{¶ 30} The majority opinion chooses to address the cross-appeal issue, 
because “deciding the issues under Hanneman Family’s first proposition of law and 
[the cross-appeal issue] suffices to resolve this case,” and the majority opinion 
“decline[s] to address Hanneman Family’s second proposition of law.”  Majority 
opinion, ¶ 11.  Generally, we will not consider the appeal of a party who has not 
been aggrieved by the final order, because that party lacks standing.  See State v. 
Bates, 167 Ohio St.3d 197, 2022-Ohio-475, 190 N.E.3d 610, ¶ 20 (“[a] party that 
benefits from an error cannot be the party aggrieved”); Ohio Contract Carriers 
Assn. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 140 Ohio St. 160, 161, 42 N.E.2d 758 (1942).  In this 
case, the appellate court adjudicated Hanneman Family’s tort claims in favor of 
Orians and Chiles-Laman.  2022-Ohio-984, ¶ 44-53.  Thus, under our general rule, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Orians and Chiles-Laman have no standing to appeal the decision on the 
preemption issue. 
{¶ 31} However, for us to reach Hanneman Family’s second proposition of 
law concerning damages related to its tort claims, we need to determine whether 
the tort claims were preempted—a threshold issue that has been briefed by the 
parties.  We have permitted parties to assert by cross-appeal alternative grounds for 
affirmance of the lower court’s decision.  See, e.g., Dana Corp. v. Testa, 145 Ohio 
St.3d 1441, 2016-Ohio-1596, 48 N.E.3d 581.  Therefore, I agree with the majority 
opinion that it is appropriate to first determine whether Hanneman Family’s tort 
claims are preempted by the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  We need only reach 
Hanneman Family’s second proposition of law if its torts claims are not preempted 
by the Act. 
Hanneman Family’s tort claims are preempted by the 
Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
{¶ 32} The General Assembly adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act when 
it enacted R.C. 1333.61 through 1333.69, the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  Al 
Minor & Assocs., Inc. v. Martin, 117 Ohio St.3d 58, 2008-Ohio-292, 881 N.E.2d 
850, ¶ 12; Am.Sub.H.B. No. 320, 145 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5403, 5403-5407.  The 
Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act “displace[s] conflicting tort, restitutionary, and 
other laws of this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade 
secret.”  R.C. 1333.67(A).  However, there are three exceptions to that general rule 
of preemption.  Contractual remedies and criminal remedies, “whether or not based 
on misappropriation of a trade secret,” are not affected by the Act.  R.C. 
1333.67(B)(1) and (3).  Additionally, “[o]ther civil remedies that are not based on 
misappropriation of a trade secret” are not affected by the Act.  R.C. 1333.67(B)(2). 
{¶ 33} In this case, we are presented with the question whether Hanneman 
Family’s tort claims are preempted by the Act for being “[o]ther civil remedies,” 
id.  Therefore, to determine whether Hanneman Family’s tort claims are preempted, 
January Term, 2023 
 
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we must determine what it means for a civil remedy to be based on 
misappropriation of a trade secret.  See id.  To answer this question, we first look 
to the plain language of the Act. 
{¶ 34} R.C. 1333.67 preempts “conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other 
laws of this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret,” 
R.C. 1333.67(A), but it does not preempt “[o]ther civil remedies that are not based 
on misappropriation of a trade secret,” R.C. 1333.67(B)(2).  In other words, the Act 
preempts civil remedies that are based on misappropriation of a trade secret.  
“Misappropriation” under the Act generally requires either the acquisition, 
disclosure, or use of a trade secret.  R.C. 1333.61(B).  And a trade secret is a type 
of information that derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from 
not being generally known to and readily ascertainable by proper means and is 
subject to reasonable efforts to protect its secrecy. R.C. 1333.61(D).  “Based on” is 
a phrasal verb, and the verb “base” means “[t]o use (something) as the thing from 
which something else is developed.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 185 (11th Ed.2019) 
(“their company is based on an abiding respect for the employees” [emphasis 
added]).  Therefore, civil remedies that are developed from trade-secrets-
misappropriation allegations are not excepted from the Act’s preemptive reach. 
{¶ 35} Additionally, the Act instructs that its provisions “shall be applied 
and construed to effectuate [its] general purpose to make uniform the law with 
respect to [its] subject among states enacting [the Uniform Trade Secrets Act].”  
R.C. 1333.68.  “The primary goal in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the 
intent of the legislature.”  Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 
38, 39, 741 N.E.2d 121 (2001).  Thus, the legislature’s mandate requires us to 
consider how our sister states have interpreted the Act. 
{¶ 36} There are two schools of thought concerning the types of claims that 
are preempted by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act: (1) claims based on allegations 
of misappropriation of a trade secret or unauthorized use of information are 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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preempted or (2) claims based only on the actual misappropriation of a trade secret 
are preempted.  See Phoenix Process Equip. Co. v. Capital Equip. & Trading Corp., 
W.D.Ky. No. 3:16-cv-00024-RGJ-RSE, 2019 WL 1748539, *3 (Apr. 18, 2019) 
(collecting cases illustrating the split of authority concerning the reach of the 
Uniform Trade Secret Act’s preemption provision). 
{¶ 37} The majority view is that claims that are based on the unauthorized 
use of information, regardless of whether that information meets the definition of 
“trade secret,” are preempted.  Parker & Justice, The Differing Approaches to 
Preemption Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 49 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac.L.J. 
645, 648 (2014) (the majority view of preemption under the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act is that common-law claims that seek to protect confidential information are 
preempted); Hauck Mfg. Co. v. Astec Industries, Inc., 375 F.Supp.2d 649, 656 
(E.D.Tenn.2004) (“courts unanimously agree that in order for [claims not based on 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act] to survive they must rely on something more than 
allegations of misappropriation of trade secrets, but they appear to disagree as to 
what exactly that ‘something more’ must be” [emphasis added]); see, e.g., Learning 
Curve Toys, L.P. v. Playwood Toys, Inc., N.D.Ill. 94 C 6884, 1999 WL 529572, *3 
(July 20, 1999) (the Uniform Trade Secrets Act eliminated common-law claims 
based on conduct that might support a trade-secrets action); Mtge. Specialists, Inc. 
v. Davey, 153 N.H. 764, 777, 904 A.2d 652 (2006) (state’s version of the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act preempted claims that are based on the unauthorized use of 
information).  The rationale behind the majority view is that the purpose of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act is “ ‘to create a uniform business environment [with] 
more certain standards for protection of commercially valuable information,’ ” 
Mtge. Specialists, Inc. at 775-776, quoting  Auto Channel, Inc. v. Speedvision 
Network, L.L.C., 144 F.Supp.2d 784, 789 (W.D.Ky.2001), and “ ‘to preserve a 
single tort action under state law for misappropriation of a trade secret as defined 
in the statute and thus to eliminate other tort causes of action founded on allegations 
January Term, 2023 
 
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of misappropriation of information,’ ” id., quoting Burbank Grease Servs., L.L.C. 
v. Sokolowki, 278 Wis.2d 698, 693 N.W.2d 89 (2005). 
{¶ 38} The minority view on preemption under the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act is that only claims concerning information that meets the definition of “trade 
secret” are preempted.  See, e.g., Am. Biomedical Group, Inc. v. Techtrol, Inc., 2016 
OK 55, 374 P.3d 820, ¶ 23.  Courts taking the minority view rely primarily on the 
plain language of their state’s enactment of the law and find that there can be a 
misappropriation of trade secrets only when there is actually a trade secret.  See, 
e.g., Stone Castle Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., Inc., 191 
F.Supp.2d 652, 658-659 (E.D.Va.2002) (the plain meaning of the state statute 
demonstrates that unless the information is a trade secret, the court cannot dismiss 
alternative theories of relief as preempted). 
{¶ 39} Courts that have applied the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act have 
generally taken an approach consistent with the broader, majority view on 
preemption.  See, e.g., Sal’s Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. BERS Acquisition Co., 
L.L.C., 2022-Ohio-1756, 192 N.E.3d 537, ¶ 49 (8th Dist.); Stolle Mach. Co., L.L.C. 
v. RAM Precision Industries, 605 Fed.Appx. 473, 484 (6th Cir.2015); Office Depot, 
Inc. v. Impact Office Prods., L.L.C., 821 F.Supp.2d 912, 918-920 (N.D.Ohio 2011); 
Rogers Indus. Prods., Inc. v. HF Rubber Mach., Inc., 188 Ohio App.3d 570, 580-
581, 936 N.E.2d 122 (9th Dist.2010).  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit has determined that the Act “should be understood to preempt not 
only causes of action for misappropriation of trade secrets but also causes of action 
that are based in some way on misappropriation of trade secrets.”  Stolle Mach. Co. 
at 484. 
{¶ 40} There are problems with both the majority and the minority 
approaches.  If we were to adopt the majority view, we would expand the phrase 
“misappropriation of a trade secret,” R.C. 1333.67, to include misappropriation of 
a purported trade secret.  But if we were to adopt the minority view, we would be 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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out of step with the majority of other jurisdictions and would essentially render the 
Act meaningless—there would be no uniformity of the law, and common-law 
claims based on unauthorized use of information would remain viable.  This would 
thwart the General Assembly’s purpose in adopting the Act. 
{¶ 41} In this situation, we should adopt the majority view that the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act should be understood to preempt other causes of action for 
misappropriation of trade secrets and causes of actions that are based in some way 
on misappropriation of trade secrets.  See Stolle Mach. Co. at 484.  This is the only 
interpretation that gives effect to the legislative intent that the Act function 
uniformly with other states that have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and 
this interpretation protects only the information that the General Assembly deemed 
appropriate to protect.  If the General Assembly intended to protect other forms of 
information, then it could have done so, and it can certainly amend the Act to do 
so. 
{¶ 42} The next question is how to determine whether a cause of action is 
based in some way on allegations of trade-secrets misappropriation.  There are two 
schools of thought on how to make that determination: (1) compare the elements of 
the state-law claim to the elements of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act claim or 
(2) determine whether the state-law claim arises out of the same core of facts that 
would underlie a potential Uniform Trade Secrets Act claim.  See Stolle Mach. Co., 
605 Fed.Appx. at 484.  The majority opinion implicitly adopts the second view.  I 
agree that the second view is the most appropriate.  We should explicitly hold that 
the key inquiry in this regard is whether the tort claims contain the same operative 
facts that formed the basis of the misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claim.  See id. 
at 485; see also Robbins v. Supermarket Equip. Sales, L.L.C., 290 Ga. 462, 466-
467, 722 S.E.2d 55 (2012).  When the state-law claim has a factual basis 
independent from the facts establishing the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act claim, 
January Term, 2023 
 
19 
the claim supported by an independent factual basis survives preemption.  Stolle 
Mach. Co. at 485. 
{¶ 43} In this case, we look at Hanneman Family’s amended complaint to 
determine whether the factual basis for its tort claims is independent from the 
factual basis for its misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claim.  As recognized by the 
majority opinion, Hanneman Family’s tort claims all hinge on the taking and use 
of the information in the preneed contracts and plainly arise from the same factual 
allegations as its misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claim.  Therefore, Hanneman 
Family’s tort claims are preempted by R.C. 1333.67, and it is irrelevant that the 
preneed contracts were not found to be a trade secret under the Ohio Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act. 
{¶ 44} Because the tort claims are preempted, it is not necessary to resolve 
Hanneman Family’s second proposition of law concerning damages. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 45} This court should join the majority of other jurisdictions and hold 
that in Ohio, unauthorized-use-of-information claims that are not otherwise 
preserved under the Revised Code are preempted by the Ohio Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act.  Further, I would hold that because Hanneman Family’s tort claims 
were based solely on the unauthorized use of information found in its preneed 
contracts as alleged in its misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claim, its tort claims 
are preempted.  Since the majority opinion correctly determines that Hanneman 
Family’s misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claim is unsuccessful and reaches the 
right result on the preemption issue, I concur in part and in the judgment. 
DONNELLY and STEWART, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Balyeat, Leahy, Daley, Miller & Bensinger, L.L.C., Aaron L. Bensinger, 
and Christopher A. Jackson, for appellant and cross-appellee. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
 
Cory, Meredith, Witter & Smith, L.P.A., J. Alan Smith, and Dalton J. Smith, 
for appellees and cross-appellants. 
_________________