Case Title: CITY OF LARAMIE v. FREDDIE COWDEN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-329

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
CITY OF LARAMIE v. FREDDIE COWDEN1989 WY 154777 P.2d 1089Case Number: 88-329Decided: 07/12/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
CITY OF LARAMIE, 
PETITIONER,

v.

FREDDIE COWDEN, 
RESPONDENT.

Philip Nicholas, 
John M. Burman and Jane H. Juve of Corthell and King, Laramie, for petitioner.

Tony S. Lopez of 
Zimmers and Lopez, Laramie, for respondent.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY, 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This court granted a 
writ of certiorari to the Second Judicial District Court, Albany County, Wyoming, to consider issues raised by its 
reversal of a municipal court mandatory jail sentence for driving while under 
the influence with enhancement from a prior conviction. The specific issues 
presented in the Order Granting Writ of Certiorari 
include:

1. Whether the trial 
court erred in imposing a mandatory jail term pursuant to Laramie Ordinance 
10.24.030(A) and Wyo. Stat. § 31-7-102(a)(i) when there was no evidence that the 
defendant's prior conviction was counseled.

2. Whether the district 
court erred in failing to conclude that defendant failed to timely file a motion 
stating with specificity the defendant's basis for claiming that he was deprived 
of his constitutional rights at the time of the prior conviction and that 
defendant waived his right to object to the constitutionality of the prior 
conviction by failing to timely raise the issue pursuant to Laramie City 
Ordinance 10.24.030(E).

3. Whether the district 
court erred in presuming that the prior conviction was constitutionally 
deficient, rather than presuming that the conviction was 
proper.

[¶2.]     On March 7, 1987, in 
Eagle County, Colorado, respondent Freddie Cowden (Cowden) was charged 
with a Colorado state offense of driving while under 
the influence. What court records exist for this appeal show no appearance for 
his advisement of constitutional rights since disposition of the offense 
occurred by his $600 commercial bond forfeiture upon non-appearance. On March 
19, 1988, or about one year after the Colorado offense, Cowden was again 
arrested for driving while under the influence in Laramie, Albany County, 
Wyoming. He entered a plea of guilty following an earlier plea of innocence, and 
the municipal judge found that his current offense should be enhanced by the 
prior Colorado 
offense with assessed punishment to include a ten-day jail sentence. The 
propriety of the enhancement was contested in municipal court since the 
Colorado court 
record did not demonstrate that Cowden, after his citation, was counseled to 
forfeit the bond instead of appearing for arraignment or trial. As a matter of 
fact, it does not appear as to exactly how the $600 appearance bond was 
physically posted except that he had been arrested and then did not appear for 
"First Appearance/Advisement." His Colorado driving record reveals that this was 
not his only offense in that state.

[¶3.]     Appeal was taken from 
the municipal court in Laramie to the district court where, with a comprehensive 
opinion decision, the district court reversed the municipal court on the basis 
that the Colorado records were silent as to counseled entry of a plea as 
constitutionally required for enhancement of a second offense under dictation of 
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S. Ct. 1585, 64 L. Ed. 2d 169, reh'g denied 
447 U.S. 930, 100 S. Ct. 3030, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1125 (1980). See J. Hingson, How to 
Defend a Drunk Driving Case ch. 3 at 79 (3d ed. 1988).

[¶4.]     We reverse and 
reinstate the conviction and sentence of the municipal 
court.

[¶5.]     Under Wyoming law and the Laramie city ordinance, it is clear that a 
driving while under the influence bond forfeiture if uncorrected will serve as a 
prior conviction for enhancement purposes upon conviction of a second driving 
while under the influence offense.1 See likewise Matter of Kovalsky, 
195 N.J. Super. 91, 477 A.2d 1295 (1984) and 1 D. Nichols, Drinking/Driving 
Litigation § 2:21 at 38 (1985). This case questions fitting the well-accepted 
standard of counseled plea requirement of Baldasar into these non-appearance 
bond forfeiture facts. Presented is the dilemma of the "don't appear/cannot be 
advised" observance.

[¶6.]     In resolving this 
potential dilemma or arguable incongruity, the City of Laramie now argues that 
the constitutional right defense was waived by a notice requirement of the city 
ordinances. That provision delineates a ten-day notice before trial obligation 
as a prerequisite to raise any defense against any prior conviction to be used 
for sentence enhancement. The City of Laramie further argues that the burden of proof 
of counseled status of prior offense is on the accused, and finally that the 
bond forfeiture status differentiates this case from cases of a guilty plea or 
trial conviction where court appearance could and did occur. Cf. Jones v. State, 
771 P.2d 154 (Nev. 1989), determining no difference between 
a conviction entered upon a plea of not guilty or a plea of nolo 
contendere.

[¶7.]     We will not consider 
the first contention with the complexities it would engender of mandatory notice 
before trial to antedating any constitutional challenge to the prior conviction. 
Carson v. State, 751 P.2d 1317 (Wyo. 1988); People v. Pronovost, 773 P.2d 555 (Colo. 1989); People v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 765 (Colo. 1985); W.R.Cr.P. 16.1. See also Parham 
v. State, 79 Md. App. 152, 556 A.2d 280 (1989). The 
decision we make is dispositive and establishes a general principle of 
Wyoming law. 

[¶8.]     Since the burden of 
proof is directly contested, we will adopt for these driving while under the 
influence cases the standard which is well-established and presently 
enunciated:

When a defendant 
challenges a conviction underlying a finding that he is a habitual traffic 
offender, he must make a prima facie showing that one or more of the underlying 
convictions was constitutionally invalid. People v. Shaver, 630 P.2d 600, 605 
(Colo. 1981). 
A prima facie showing is one which would permit the court to find that one or 
more of the traffic offense convictions essential to the order of revocation was 
not obtained in accordance with the defendant's constitutional rights. See id. 
at 605. Once the defendant makes this showing, the prosecution must establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the conviction was constitutionally 
obtained. Id. 
at 605-06.

People v. Swann, 
770 P.2d 411, 412 (Colo. 1989).

[¶9.]     Recitation of this 
general rule does not satisfy the bond forfeiture case where judicial 
informational source is unavailable about what advice, if any, was used by the 
charged driver when that person sacrificed the posted bond and chose not to 
appear, plead or contest.

[¶10.]  Again, another well-established principle 
of non-appearance is available for application. It is a well-defined rule of 
appellate practice that if the defendant escapes confinement during the process 
of his appeal, he has waived further consideration and the appeal can properly 
be dismissed. Harris v. State, 34 Wyo. 175, 242 P. 411 (1926); Estelle v. 
Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 95 S. Ct. 1173, 43 L. Ed. 2d 377, reh'g denied 421 U.S. 921, 95 S. Ct. 1589, 43 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1975); United States v. Dorsey, 819 F.2d 1055 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 2002, 100 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1988); People v. Anderson, 39 Colo. App. 497, 566 P.2d 1369 (1977). 
Applying a synonymous thesis of waiver, which in actuality approaches a concept 
of impossibility, we discern that the judiciary cannot have a responsibility for 
notice to the defendant of his right to counsel unless the defendant appears and 
presents himself to receive the advice. Consequently, in cases where the 
defendant might meet his initial prima facie burden of showing that the 
underlying conviction may have been constitutionally invalid since his conduct 
was non-counseled, failure to appear to receive the advice constitutes a waiver 
of the right of advice and satisfies the burden that the conviction was 
constitutionally obtained.

[¶11.]  We reverse and remand for reinstatement 
of the sentence entered by the Municipal Court of the City of Laramie.

FOOTNOTES

1 The present Wyoming statute provides 
in part:

"Conviction" 
means a final conviction and shall include an unvacated forfeiture of bail or 
collateral deposited to secure a defendant's appearance in court, a plea of nolo 
contendere accepted by the court, the payment of a fine, a plea of guilty or a 
finding of guilt for a traffic violation charge.

W.S. 
31-7-102(a)(iv).