Case Title: State v. James E. Multaler

Citation: 2002 WI 35

Docket Number: 2000AP001846-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 35 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1846-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
James E. Multaler,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 149 
Reported at:  246 Wis. 2d 752, 632 N.W.2d 89 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 25, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 5, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Wagner   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: Sykes, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Jeffrey W. Jensen and Law offices of Jeffrey W. Jensen, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jeffrey W. Jensen. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sandra 
L. Nowack, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 35 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-1846-CR  
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 002785) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
James E. Multaler,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 25, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
James 
Multaler, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision 
affirming his conviction on a plea to 28 counts of possession of 
child pornography.1  Police found the pornographic materials in 
Multaler's house while executing a search warrant for evidence 
implicating him in a series of homicides.  He asserts that the 
affidavit accompanying the warrant application was insufficient 
to establish probable cause to believe that items relating to 
                                                 
1 See State v. Multaler, 2001 WI App 149, 246 Wis. 2d 752, 
632 N.W.2d 89 (affirming a judgment and an order of the Circuit 
Court for Milwaukee County, Jeffrey A. Wagner, Judge). 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
2 
 
the homicides would be located in his house.  In addition, he 
argues that his plea is invalid because the charges to which he 
pled are multiplicitous as contrary to the legislatively 
intended unit of prosecution.   
¶2 
We determine that the affidavit provided a substantial 
basis to conclude that there was a fair probability that 
evidence relating to the homicides would be found in Multaler's 
house.  In addition, we determine that the 28 charges to which 
Multaler pled were not multiplicitous.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals. 
I 
 
¶3 
This 
case 
arises 
from 
an 
investigation 
of 
the 
disappearance and homicide of four young women from Milwaukee in 
1974 and 1975.  Multaler became a suspect in their homicides.  
On May 18, 1998, more than 20 years after the homicides, police 
obtained a warrant to search his home for evidence of those 
crimes.  In the course of executing the warrant, police 
discovered two computer disks containing images of children 
engaged in sexually explicit activity.2  Based on the contents of 
the disks, Multaler was charged with 79 counts of possession of 
child pornography in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.12 (1997-98).3 
                                                 
2 The disks were labeled "Child Pornography" and "Child 
Pornography II."  After police discovered the disks, they 
obtained another warrant authorizing a search of the disks' 
contents. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
3 
 
 
¶4 
Multaler moved to suppress the disks, arguing that the 
affidavit in support of the warrant to search his house was 
insufficient to establish probable cause.  The circuit court 
denied Multaler's motion, and Multaler subsequently entered an 
Alford plea4 to 28 of the 79 counts.  The remaining 51 counts 
were dismissed.  Multaler appealed, and the court of appeals 
affirmed his conviction.  
 
¶5 
This case presents two issues.  First, we must 
determine whether the affidavit in the application for the 
search warrant for Multaler's residence was sufficient to 
establish probable cause to search his home for items related to 
the homicides.  Second, we must determine whether Multaler's 
plea 
was 
invalid 
because 
he pled 
to 
charges 
that 
were 
multiplicitous.  We address each issue in turn. 
II 
¶6 
Multaler asserts that the affidavit in support of the 
warrant did not establish probable cause to search.  Thus, we 
begin by setting forth the standards implicated in our review of 
probable cause in the search warrant context. 
¶7 
We accord great deference to the warrant-issuing 
judge's determination of probable cause, and that determination 
will stand unless the defendant establishes that the facts are 
clearly insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.   
                                                 
4 An Alford plea is a guilty or no contest plea in which the 
defendant either maintains innocence or does not admit to the 
commission of the crime.  State ex rel. Jacobus v. State, 208 
Wis. 2d 39, 54, 559 N.W.2d 900 (1997); see also North Carolina 
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
4 
 
State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 
(1991).  Thus, "[t]he burden of proof in a challenge to the 
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant 
is clearly with the defendant."  State v. Edwards, 98 Wis. 2d 
367, 376, 297 N.W.2d 12 (1980). 
¶8 
The duty of the court issuing the warrant is to make a 
practical, 
common-sense 
decision 
whether, 
given 
all 
the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before it, there is a 
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place.  Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 990.  
In addition, the warrant judge may draw reasonable inferences 
from the evidence presented in the affidavit.  State v. Benoit, 
83 Wis. 2d 389, 399, 265 N.W.2d 298 (1978). 
¶9 
With these considerations in mind, we turn to examine 
the affidavit in light of Multaler's arguments that it is 
insufficient.  The thrust of the affidavit, submitted by 
Investigator John Hanrahan, was this:  Hanrahan and another 
detective were investigating the disappearance and subsequent 
homicides of four young women, Wendy B., Susan W., Sherry M., 
and Cynthia F., from Milwaukee in 1974 and 1975; Multaler not 
only killed the four young women but also was a serial killer as 
evidenced by his behavior that was consistent with that expected 
of serial homicide offenders; as serial killers are wont to do, 
he collected and retained various mementos to remind him of the 
murders, including items taken from the victims; although it was 
more than 20 years since the time of the murders, these items 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
5 
 
were likely to be found in his house because serial killers 
retain such items indefinitely. 
¶10 In support of his assertion that the affidavit 
submitted to obtain the search warrant was insufficient, 
Multaler first argues that the affidavit fails to establish 
probable cause that he was the killer in the homicides under 
investigation. 
 
He 
also 
disputes 
whether 
the 
affidavit 
establishes that he was a serial killer.  Finally, he contends 
that the affidavit fails to provide probable cause to believe 
that evidence of the murders would remain in his house more than 
20 years later. 
¶11 Considering all the information in the affidavit and 
our standard of review, we are satisfied that the affidavit 
supports a finding of probable cause to search Multaler's house.  
The affidavit leads us to the conclusion that there was a 
substantial basis upon which the warrant judge could determine 
that there was a fair probability that the mementos sought would 
be found in Multaler's residence at the time the warrant was 
executed.  In short, we determine that Multaler has failed to 
establish that the affidavit was clearly insufficient to 
establish probable cause to search. 
¶12 Multaler first contends that the affidavit fails to 
establish probable cause to believe that he was the killer.  He 
deems this necessary to a determination of probable cause to 
believe that his house contained the mementos indicated in the 
search warrant.  The State, in contrast, does not concede that 
probable cause to search in this case depends upon probable 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
6 
 
cause to arrest Multaler for the murders.  We need not determine 
whether separate probable cause to arrest was necessary, but 
disagree with Multaler insofar as we determine that the 
affidavit supports a determination of probable cause to believe 
that Multaler was the killer.  The affidavit connected the 
murders to one another, directly connected Multaler to the 
murders of two of the women, and circumstantially connected him 
to all of the murders. 
¶13 All four victims were white females between the ages 
of 15 and 21 at the time of their disappearance.  They resided 
in Milwaukee and disappeared within a 16-month time frame.  
Three of the victims were found in Racine County, and one was 
found in Milwaukee County. 
¶14 Each of their bodies showed evidence of rape or other 
physical assault.  Two of the victims were found with their 
shirts pulled up over their breasts, and another was found with 
semen in her vagina and blood under her fingernails.  Two were 
strangled to death and another, whose cause of death could not 
be determined due to decomposition of the body, had numerous 
contusions on her head and face. 
¶15 All but one of the victims were missing small personal 
items.  For example, Wendy B. wore a Mickey Mouse watch that was 
never located.  A missing persons report indicated that she was 
also wearing a braided macramé bracelet, but the bracelet was 
never found.  Susan W. was wearing an opal pin on a yellow gold 
necklace when she disappeared, but the pin and chain were not 
located. 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
7 
 
¶16 When Sherry M.'s body was found, she was missing a 
gold ball-type earring and a pair of eyeglasses, neither of 
which were ever found.  Sherry M. always wore a chain necklace 
with a butterfly pendant that also never was located.  Several 
items were missing from her purse, including a hairbrush, a 
bottle of perfume, a picture ID, and photographs of friends. 
¶17 The affidavit directly connected Multaler to two of 
the victims.  He admitted to being with Wendy B. the night she 
disappeared.  On one occasion he stated he could not recall 
whether he killed Wendy B., but on another occasion he stated 
that he felt that he had killed her, that "[i]f she is dead I 
must have killed her."  In addition, when Multaler was asked to 
describe the clothing Wendy B. was wearing, he described Susan 
W.'s clothing instead.  Thus, the affidavit directly linked 
Multaler to both Wendy B. and Susan W. 
¶18 Additionally, the affidavit provided a circumstantial 
connection between Multaler and Susan W.  When her purse was 
located, a bungee cord was found near it.  One of the hooks on 
the bungee cord was pulled and bent in such a way that the hook 
was shaped into the form of the letter "L," and Multaler's ex-
girlfriend identified it as identical to one she had observed in 
Multaler's possession. 
¶19 The affidavit also circumstantially connected Multaler 
to the third victim, Cynthia F., in two ways.  First, a note was 
found in Cynthia F.'s pocket bearing the name "James McDonald," 
and Multaler's ex-girlfriend stated that when she was staying 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
8 
 
with Multaler in 1975, she observed this name on a piece of 
paper near the telephone. 
¶20 Second, the circumstances surrounding Cynthia F.'s 
disappearance were consistent with the circumstances surrounding 
a 
1975 
kidnapping 
for 
which 
Multaler 
was 
convicted.  
Specifically, in June 1975, a woman experienced an incident in 
which she was driving on the freeway when she heard a voice over 
a loudspeaker from a man in the car behind her.  The man said 
that he was a state police officer and ordered her to pull her 
car to the side of the road.  After approaching her, the man 
pulled out a pistol, handcuffed her, and threatened to shoot her 
if she did not comply.  He took her to his vehicle, and she 
asked him to turn off her headlights.  When he got out of the 
car to do so, she drove off in his car.  Multaler was identified 
as a suspect in this incident and subsequently convicted for 
kidnapping.  Similarly, when Cynthia F. disappeared in January 
1974, her car was found parked approximately 12 to 14 feet from 
the curb with its ignition switch in the "accessory" position.   
Although it was a cold and snowy day, her driver's side window 
was down. 
¶21 Finally, 
the 
affidavit 
circumstantially 
connected 
Multaler to the fourth homicide victim, Sherry M., although the 
connection is not as strong as that between Multaler and the 
other victims.  When Sherry M.'s body was found, her wrist bore 
a mark three-eighths of an inch in width that appeared to have 
been made by something that was tightly wrapped around it prior 
to her death, as if she had been handcuffed.  According to the 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
9 
 
affidavit, the width of a pair of handcuffs is three-eighths of 
an inch, and during the kidnapping for which Multaler was 
convicted, he used handcuffs on the victim. 
¶22 Other statements in the affidavit provided further 
strong links between Multaler and the murders.  After a 
newspaper 
article 
appeared 
detailing 
Multaler's 
kidnapping 
arrest, the Milwaukee County District Attorney received a copy 
of the article with the following words written at the top:  
"This man is the South Side Killer . . . He has raped 36 girls."  
A handwriting expert determined that the writing on the article 
was Multaler's. 
¶23 The affidavit also showed that the circumstances of 
some of the murders, which suggested strangulation and violent 
sex crimes, were consistent with Multaler's sexual proclivities.  
Multaler admitted that he had choked several of his girlfriends 
and that after they were weak and helpless, he felt more like a 
man in his sexual relations with them. 
¶24 Further, the affidavit stated that Multaler's ex-
girlfriend told investigators that before every sexual act, 
Multaler would place his fingers on her neck and apply pressure, 
rendering 
her 
unconscious. 
 
During 
this 
state 
of 
unconsciousness, Multaler would undress her and begin to have 
intercourse with her.  On a few occasions, he had difficulty 
reviving her.  Likewise, the affidavit explains that Multaler's 
daughter filed a report detailing years of sexual assaults by 
Multaler, in which he would "choke her out."  
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
10 
 
¶25 Taken together, all of this information directly 
connected Multaler to the murders of two of the women, 
circumstantially connected him to all of the murders, and 
connected the murders to one another.  Thus, we determine that 
the affidavit supported a finding of probable cause to believe 
that Multaler was the killer. 
¶26 Having made this 
determination, we 
next address 
Multaler's argument that the affidavit fails to establish 
sufficiently that he was a serial killer.  In doing so, we turn 
to the portions of the affidavit focusing on the patterns of 
behavior of serial homicide offenders and describing Multaler's 
behavior that was consistent with these patterns. 
¶27 Investigator Hanrahan explained in the affidavit that 
serial homicide offenders often do all of the following: 
take clothing, jewelry and other property such as 
photo's [sic], identification and other personal items 
from their victims. These items are used by the 
offender to relive and recapture the moment of the 
homicide event, where often times the offender feels 
that he now possesses the victim.  These items are 
used by the offender to fuel his fantasies and  
confirm the victim possession until the fantasy is no 
longer enough, such that he has to go out and find 
another victim. 
 . . . keep newspaper clippings about the death and  
subsequent police investigation of his [sic] victims.  
These items also help the offender in his fantasies, 
and act as proof and reminders of his act. 
 . . . keep written documentation such as diaries for 
the reasons detailed above. 
 . . . take photographs, as well as audio and video 
recordings of their victims. 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
11 
 
 . . . keep 
these 
items . . . even 
under 
intense 
police investigation.  The need to keep these items as 
reminders and fantasy tools outweighs the risk of 
being 
caught 
by 
possessing 
such 
incriminating 
evidence. 
 . . . often 
times 
interject 
themselves 
into 
the 
investigation and or taunt investigators. 
¶28 The affidavit also established particular instances in 
which Multaler acted consistent with these traits of serial 
killers. 
 
It 
stated 
that 
Multaler's 
ex-girlfriend 
told 
investigators that he kept an album containing pictures of 
females and newspaper articles about missing and murdered 
females.  She identified an article detailing the discovery of 
Susan W.'s body as possibly being an article in Multaler's 
album.  His ex-girlfriend also stated that when she lived with 
Multaler in 1975, she observed in one of his two scrap books an 
article reporting a fifth strangulation murder in Green Lake to 
which Multaler may have been linked.   
¶29 Further, as already noted, Multaler apparently sent 
the Milwaukee County District Attorney a newspaper clipping 
indicating that he was the "South Side Killer."  He also sent a 
letter to the Channel 6 news department requesting newspaper 
clippings or written articles concerning the murders of Cynthia 
F., Susan W., Wendy B., and Sherry M.  At oral argument before 
this court, Multaler's attorney agreed that the affidavit showed 
that Multaler had a "fairly unusual interest in these cases."   
¶30 Thus, the affidavit documented particular instances in 
which Multaler collected or sought to collect the types of 
mementos serial killers are known to collect and retain, 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
12 
 
including instances in which such items were observed in his 
possession.  The affidavit also showed that, consistent with the 
expected 
behavior 
of serial 
killers, 
Multaler 
interjected 
himself into an investigation of the murders.  The instances of 
his violent sexual behavior with his ex-girlfriend and daughter 
were also consistent with traits described by Investigator 
Hanrahan, in particular that serial homicide offenders need to 
feel a sense of possession over their victims.  All of these 
facts taken together sufficiently establish for purposes of the 
warrant that Multaler was a serial killer. 
¶31 Because the affidavit established particular instances 
in which Multaler exhibited characteristic patterns of behavior 
typical of a serial homicide offender, it was reasonable for the 
warrant judge to infer that Multaler would exhibit other 
characteristics 
that 
Investigator 
Hanrahan 
indicated 
were 
associated with serial homicide offenders.  Thus, the judge 
could reasonably infer that Multaler had taken the missing 
personal items from the victims and would retain these items. 
¶32 Multaler's album and scrap books observed by his ex-
girlfriend indicated specific instances in which he collected 
and retained mementos of killings to which he was linked.  
Tethered to Hanrahan's research and expertise, these facts, 
along 
with 
the 
other 
particular 
instances 
of 
Multaler's 
behaviors, established the reasonable inference that he would be 
likely to retain the mementos more than 20 years after the 
murders. 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
13 
 
¶33 Finally, the affidavit provided reason to believe 
these mementos would be found in Multaler's house.  Investigator 
Hanrahan stated in the affidavit that Milwaukee police records 
indicated that Multaler had the same residence for over 20 
years.  Hanrahan stated that he recently had driven by the house 
and verified that the two cars parked in the driveway were 
registered to Multaler's wife and daughter.  Thus, assuming that 
Multaler retained mementos of his killings, the warrant judge 
had no reason to infer that they would be located anywhere other 
than in Multaler's house.  In sum, considering all of the facts 
and circumstances set forth in the affidavit, we determine that 
it provided a substantial basis from which the warrant judge 
could determine there was a fair probability the items sought in 
the warrant would be found in Multaler's house. 
¶34 We emphasize that every probable cause determination 
must be made on a case-by-case basis, looking at the totality of 
the circumstances.  Even when police suspect an individual is a 
serial killer, that will not always yield probable cause to 
search the individual's home.  Multaler's case presents unusual 
facts, and as we have explained, particular circumstances that 
established probable cause to search his house for specific 
items incriminating him in the homicides that were under 
investigation.  As Judge Fine concluded in his concurring 
opinion in support of the court of appeals majority, "[t]he 
chain of probable cause here is crafted of many sturdy links."  
State v. Multaler, 2001 WI App 149, ¶49, 246 Wis. 2d 752, 632 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
14 
 
N.W.2d 89.  In another case with different facts, the chain may 
not be so sturdy. 
¶35 Multaler nonetheless asserts that the affidavit was 
insufficient to establish that the mementos would remain in his 
residence more than 20 years after the homicides.  In making 
this assertion, he first argues that the information in the 
affidavit was "stale" such that no inference could be drawn that 
the items the police sought would be located in his home more 
than 20 years after the murders.  We disagree and determine that 
the concept of staleness is not a bar to probable cause under 
the unique circumstances of this case. 
¶36 A 
distinction 
must 
be 
maintained 
between 
stale 
information and stale probable cause.  State v. Moley, 171 
Wis. 2d 207, 212, 490 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1992).   
Stale probable cause, so called, is probable cause 
that would have justified a warrant at some earlier 
moment that has already passed by the time the warrant 
is sought. 
There 
is 
not, 
however, 
any 
dispositive 
significance in the mere fact that some information 
offered to demonstrate probable cause may be called 
stale, in the sense that it occurred well before the 
date of the application for the warrant. 
Id. at 213 (citing State v. Valenzuela, 536 A.2d 1252, 1264 
(N.H. 1987)).  If old information in a warrant affidavit 
contributes to an inference that probable cause exists at the 
time of the application for the warrant, the age of the 
information is no taint.  Id. at 210. 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
15 
 
¶37 The probable cause determination in the face of a 
staleness challenge depends upon the nature of the underlying 
circumstances, whether the activity is of a protracted or 
continuous nature, the nature of the criminal activity under 
investigation, and the nature of what is being sought.  State v. 
Ehnert, 160 Wis. 2d 464, 469-70, 466 N.W.2d 237 (Ct. App. 1991).  
A Maryland case has stated the factors similarly: 
The likelihood that the evidence sought is still in 
place is a function not simply of watch and calendar 
but of variables that do not punch a clock: the 
character of the crime (chance encounter in the night 
or regenerating conspiracy?), of the criminal (nomadic 
or entrenched?), of the thing to be seized (perishable 
and easily transferable or of enduring utility to its 
holder?), of the place to be searched (mere criminal 
forum of convenience or secure operational base?), 
etc. 
The 
observation 
of 
a 
halfsmoked 
marijuana 
cigarette in an ashtray at a cocktail party may well 
be stale the day after the cleaning lady has been in; 
the observation of the burial of a corpse in a cellar 
may well not be stale three decades later. 
Andresen v. State, 331 A.2d 78, 106 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975), 
aff'd, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); see also Wayne 
R. LaFave, 2 Search & Seizure § 3.7(a), 341 (3d ed. 1996). 
¶38 These observations illustrate that the concept of 
staleness is not so much an independent bar to a determination 
of probable cause as it is a function of the essence of the 
probable cause determination.  "'[S]taleness' is not a separate 
doctrine in probable cause to search analysis.  It is merely an 
aspect of the Fourth Amendment inquiry."  People v. Russo, 487 
N.W.2d 698, 707 (Mich. 1992).  As with any determination of 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
16 
 
probable cause to search on a warrant, the determination must be 
made on a case-by-case basis.  See Ehnert, 160 Wis. 2d at 469. 
¶39 Multaler's position is that these staleness precepts 
undermine any conclusion that there was a fair probability the 
items sought in the warrant would be found in his house more 
than 20 years after the murders.  To the contrary, we think they 
reinforce such a conclusion.   
¶40 This is a case that depends, in part, upon the unusual 
tendency of serial homicide offenders, as stated in the 
affidavit, to collect and retain items that constitute evidence 
of their crimes.  As already explained, the likelihood that 
Multaler was a serial killer who would retain possession of the 
items sought, even more than 20 years after the murders, is 
established sufficiently by the information in the affidavit. 
 
¶41 At the time the warrant issued and was executed, the 
probable cause to search Multaler's house was not stale.  The 
type of criminal behavior being investigated was recurring, 
entrenched, and continuous.  The nature of the criminal 
activity, serial homicide, and the nature of the items sought, 
the sort of items likely to be retained indefinitely by the 
killer, both lead to the conclusion that probable cause to 
search Multaler's house was not stale.  None of the factors 
outlined in Ehnert or Andresen when applied here leads to a 
conclusion that the evidence sought would not remain in 
Multaler's house. 
¶42 Multaler also advances other arguments in support of 
his assertion that the affidavit was insufficient to establish 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
17 
 
that the mementos would be found in his residence when the 
warrant was executed.  He argues that Investigator Hanrahan's 
opinions cannot be used to support a finding of probable cause 
because Hanrahan had no personal experience investigating serial 
killers and because he did not cite the sources upon which he 
based his opinion.  We disagree. 
¶43 This court has explained on at least one prior 
occasion that both the experience and special knowledge of 
police officers who are applying for search warrants are among 
the facts that the warrant-issuing court may consider.  State v. 
Harris, 256 Wis. 93, 100, 39 N.W.2d 912 (1949).  Similarly, 
other courts have stated that a government agent's expert 
opinion may be considered by the issuing court when making its 
probable cause determination.  See, e.g., United States v. Rabe, 
848 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 1988).  Multaler does not dispute 
these propositions, and he cites no case law holding that in all 
cases a warrant affiant must possess both field experience 
pertaining to the type of crime in question and specialized 
knowledge obtained through other means.  
¶44 The 
affidavit 
shows 
that 
Investigator 
Hanrahan 
exhaustively researched and studied the patterns of serial 
homicide offenders.  His statements regarding the typical 
characteristics of serial killers were based upon a number of 
expert sources, for which he supplied names, authors, and 
credentials.  In addition, Hanrahan stated in the affidavit that 
he attended various training courses or symposia on the subject 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
18 
 
of serial killers, some of which were taught by the experts who 
had written materials Hanrahan studied. 
¶45 There can be no question that Investigator Hanrahan 
possessed specialized knowledge pertaining to traits common to 
serial killers based on his extensive study of the topic.  His 
lack of previous field experience investigating serial homicide 
is not a bar to his qualifications to give opinions about the 
behavior of serial killers for purposes of a warrant. 
¶46 Nonetheless, Multaler contends that it was necessary 
for Investigator Hanrahan to cite the sources upon which he 
relied for the opinions he offered about serial homicide 
offenders.  In Multaler's reply brief, he states, "[i]f 
Hanrahan's affidavit were a research paper it would be graded as 
an F."   
¶47 These 
assertions 
misapprehend 
the 
nature of the 
warrant judge's inquiry.  An affidavit in support of a search 
warrant is not a research paper or legal brief that demands 
citations for every proposition.  For purposes of warrant 
applications, "the evidence thus collected must be seen and 
weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as 
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement."  
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). 
¶48 Investigator 
Hanrahan's 
detailed 
listing 
of 
his 
sources of information and accompanying credentials, combined 
with his indication that his opinion was based upon his 
"training and research" provided a sufficient foundation for the 
opinion he gave about the behavior patterns of serial killers.  
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
19 
 
At oral argument, even Multaler conceded that the affidavit 
might be saved by Hanrahan's opinion regarding the propensity of 
serial killers to keep mementos had it not been rendered infirm 
by Hanrahan's lack of citation to authority.  We see no such 
infirmity.  Rather, we agree with the analysis the State gives 
in its brief: 
The 
affidavit 
might 
have 
been 
flawed 
as 
conclusory if Hanrahan had merely asserted the general 
proposition that he was qualified to offer information 
about serial killers.  That is not what Hanrahan did.  
He identified the authority underlying his statements, 
and established that his reliance on the sources was 
reasonable. 
 
¶49 In sum, the affidavit provided probable cause to 
believe that Multaler was the killer in the homicides under 
investigation.  It also sufficiently supported the conclusion 
that he was a serial killer likely to collect and retain 
mementos of the killings and that those mementos would remain in 
his house at the time the warrant was executed.  Neither 
staleness nor the manner in which Investigator Hanrahan set 
forth 
his 
expertise 
in 
the 
affidavit 
undermines 
these 
conclusions.  The affidavit provided a substantial basis to 
conclude that there was a fair probability that the items the 
police sought would be found in Multaler's house when the 
warrant was executed. 
III 
 
¶50 Next, we turn to Multaler's assertion that he pled to 
multiplicitous charges.  Although the police seized only two 
computer disks containing child pornography, each disk contained 
No. 
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20 
 
multiple images.  Multaler was originally charged with 79 counts 
of possession of child pornography based on the number of images 
contained on the disks.  Ultimately, however, Multaler pled to 
only 28 counts. 
¶51 Multaler 
now 
argues 
that 
the 
charges 
were 
multiplicitous because the legislature did not intend that a 
separate charge could be levied for each separate pornographic 
image.  He asserts that the legislatively intended unit of 
prosecution is determined by the number of disks, not the number 
of images. 
¶52 Whether a multiplicity violation exists in a given 
case is a question of law subject to independent appellate 
review.  State v. Koller, 2001 WI App 253, ¶32, 248 Wis. 2d 259, 
635 N.W.2d 838.  This court analyzes claims of multiplicity 
using a two-part test.  State v. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d 739, 746, 
580 N.W.2d 329 (1998).  First, we apply Blockburger v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), asking whether the offenses 
are identical in law and fact.  State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, 
¶29, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833; Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 
746.  Second, if the offenses are not identical in law and fact, 
we ask whether the legislature intended multiple punishments for 
the offenses in question.  Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 746. 
¶53 The State concedes that the 28 charges of child 
pornography possession for which Multaler was convicted are 
identical in law because they fall under the same statute.  
Turning to the question of whether the offenses are identical in 
fact, we note, as does the State, that Multaler does not appear 
No. 
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21 
 
to take a position on the question.  Rather, he makes his 
arguments only under the second part of the multiplicity test, 
asserting that the legislature intended that the proper unit of 
prosecution was one charge for each disk rather than one charge 
for each image on the disk.5 
¶54 Taking Multaler's position as a concession that the 
charges are different in fact, the State asserts that Multaler 
has waived his multiplicity claim.  Although a guilty or no 
contest plea generally waives all nonjurisdictional defects, 
including constitutional claims, State v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d 
119, 123, 332 N.W.2d 744 (1983), a double jeopardy defect in the 
plea is an exception to the waiver rule, State v. Morris, 108 
Wis. 2d 282, 284 n.2, 322 N.W.2d 264 (1982).  The State refers 
us to State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶22, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 628 
N.W.2d 801, however, in which this court noted that it is only 
the first part of the multiplicity test that involves the 
constitutional double jeopardy provisions.  Thus, the State 
reasons, because Multaler is relying only on the second part of 
the multiplicity test, he is not asserting a constitutional 
claim of 
double jeopardy 
and has 
waived 
his 
claim for 
multiplicity. 
¶55 We appreciate the careful chain of logic the State has 
constructed in support of its position on waiver.  However, we 
                                                 
5 In the conclusion section of his brief in chief, Multaler 
requested that all but one of the charges be dismissed.  
However, at oral argument, he agreed that under his analysis, 
two charges could stand, one for each disk. 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
22 
 
address Multaler's multiplicity claim on its merits because at 
least one of the links in the State's chain may be problematic.  
In particular, although Multaler has not argued that the charges 
are identical in fact, he has not expressly conceded the issue.6  
The State's position on waiver depends on the assumption that 
Multaler has made such a concession.  The court of appeals 
addressed the question of whether the charges were identical in 
fact even though Multaler made multiplicity arguments in his 
court of appeals briefs similar to those he makes before this 
court. 
¶56 Thus, we briefly turn to the question of whether the 
offenses are identical in fact.  The inquiry into whether 
offenses are identical in fact involves a determination of 
whether the charged acts are "separated in time or are of a 
significantly different nature."  State v. Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d 25, 
31, 291 N.W.2d 800 (1980).  The separate in time inquiry is not 
resolved by a stopwatch approach.  Harrell v. State, 88 Wis. 2d 
546, 572, 277 N.W.2d 462 (Ct. App. 1979).  Rather, the court 
asks whether there was sufficient time for reflection between 
the acts such that the defendant re-committed himself to the 
criminal conduct.  State v. Hirsch, 140 Wis. 2d 468, 475, 410 
N.W.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1987). 
                                                 
6 In addition, Multaler disputes other aspects of the 
State's waiver argument.  We need not decide whether the State 
or Multaler is correct since we decide Multaler's multiplicity 
claim on the merits. 
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23 
 
¶57 Similarly, whether the charged acts are significantly 
different in nature is not limited to a straightforward 
determination of whether the acts are of different types.  
Koller, 2001 WI App 253, ¶31.  Acts may be "different in nature" 
even when they are the same types of acts as long as each 
required "a new volitional departure in the defendant's course 
of conduct."  Id. (quoting Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 750). 
 
¶58 Applying these standards, we agree with the court of 
appeals that the 28 counts to which Multaler pled were not 
identical in fact.  Although some of the downloaded image files 
contained multiple images, there were more than 28 separate 
image files.  In a statement given after his arrest, Multaler 
admitted that he "began downloading . . . in the winter of 
1998," thus suggesting that he obtained the image files over a 
period of time.  Even had he downloaded all the image files in a 
very short period of time, the fact that there were more than 28 
separate files supports a conclusion that he made a new decision 
to obtain each one.  Every time he downloaded a new file, he 
recommitted himself to additional criminal conduct.  Each 
decision to download more child pornography represented a new 
volitional departure. 
 
¶59 Having determined that the charges are different in 
fact, we turn to examine the legislature's intent regarding the 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
24 
 
allowable unit of prosecution.7  Where charges are different in 
fact, 
we 
presume 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
multiple 
punishments.  Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 751.  This presumption is 
rebutted only by a clear indication of legislative intent to the 
contrary.  Id.  We use four factors to determine legislative 
intent in a multiplicity analysis:  (1) statutory language; (2) 
legislative 
history 
and 
context; 
(3) 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
proscribed conduct; and (4) the appropriateness of multiple 
punishments for the conduct.  Id. 
¶60 Multaler focuses on the first and fourth factors and 
concludes from his application of these two factors that the 
legislature intended punishment based not upon an image but upon 
the medium, in this case computer disks, on which the images 
were found.  However, we determine that Multaler has failed to 
rebut the presumption that the legislature intended to allow 
punishment for each image on the disks. 
¶61 In applying the first factor, we look at the language 
of the statute.  Section 948.12, provides: 
                                                 
7 Our analysis applies to the version of Wis. Stat. § 948.12 
in effect at the time of Multaler's conduct resulting in the 
charges.  The legislature subsequently amended § 948.12.  See 
2001 Wis. Act 16, § 3983.  Section 948.12(1m) now provides:  
"Whoever possesses any undeveloped film, photographic negative, 
photograph, motion picture, videotape or other recording of a 
child engaged in sexually explicit conduct under all of the 
following circumstances is guilty of a Class E felony . . . ."   
The term "recording" for purposes of Wis. Stat. ch. 948 is now 
defined to include "the creation of a reproduction of an image 
or a sound or the storage of data representing an image or a 
sound."  2001 Wis. Act 16, § 3968. 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
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Whoever 
possesses 
any 
undeveloped 
film, 
photographic negative, photograph, motion picture, 
videotape or other pictorial reproduction or audio 
recording of a child engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct under all of the following circumstances is 
guilty of a Class E felony . . . . 
¶62 We do not agree with Multaler that the plain language 
of the statute allows for prosecution based only upon the medium 
rather than upon the image.8  Multaler's own dictionary-derived 
definitions of "reproduction" undermine his plain language 
argument.  One of the definitions Multaler gives in his brief is 
that a reproduction is "a copy of something printed, scanned, 
photographed, or produced by other means."  This definition 
encompasses 
the 
images 
stored 
on 
Multaler's 
disks 
which 
themselves are copies of something that was once printed, 
scanned, or photographed.9 
                                                 
8 Although neither party cites the case, we note that in 
State v. Whistleman, 2001 WI App 189, ¶1, 247 Wis. 2d 337, 633 
N.W.2d 249, the court of appeals determined that computer disks 
that store images of child pornography are included within the 
meaning of the phrase "or other pictorial reproduction" in 
Wis. Stat. § 948.12.  The court in Whistleman, however, was not 
confronting 
a 
multiplicity 
challenge. 
 
Rather, 
it 
was 
determining whether the possession of child pornography on a 
computer disk was even covered by the language of the statute.   
The 
Whistleman 
court's 
analysis 
does 
not 
preclude 
a 
determination that an image on a disk is itself a "pictorial 
reproduction." 
9 Multaler has not asserted that the images in this case 
originally were created by a means other than photography of 
actual children, and we need not address the legislative intent 
with regard to such "virtual" child pornography.  See Ashcroft 
v. The Free Speech Coalition, No. 00-795, slip op. (U.S. April 
16, 2002), ___ S. Ct. ___, ___ U.S. ___ (holding overbroad and 
unconstitutional a provision of the federal Child Pornography 
Prevention Act that bans virtual child pornography).  The Act 
appears at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq.  See Ashcroft, slip op. at 
1,  ___ S. Ct. at ___, ___ U.S. at ___.  
No. 
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¶63 In State v. A.H., 211 Wis. 2d 561, 567-68, 566 N.W.2d 
858 (Ct. App. 1997), the court of appeals determined that "the 
focus of the inquiry under [§ 948.12] is the content of the 
photograph and how it was produced, not the particular location 
or manner in which it is ultimately stored or kept by the person 
possessing it."  The court in A.H. was not addressing a 
multiplicity claim and thus A.H. is not on all fours with the 
issue before us.  Nonetheless, the A.H. court made this 
determination in the course of discerning the legislative intent 
behind § 948.12, and it is persuasive evidence that Multaler's 
read of the statute is incorrect. 
¶64 Nothing in the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 948.12 
supports Multaler's position that the legislature intended that 
a computer disk, rather than an image, is the intended unit of 
prosecution.  Rather, the plain language of the statute provides 
that a possessor of "any photograph . . . or other pictorial 
reproduction" 
has 
violated 
the 
statute. 
 
Section 
948.12 
(emphasis added).  The singular formulation of these items 
covered under the statute modified by the term "any" is evidence 
that the legislature intended prosecution for each photograph or 
pictorial reproduction.10  In short, the plain language of the 
                                                 
10 In State v. Hamilton, 146 Wis. 2d 426, 438-39, 432 N.W.2d 
108 (Ct. App. 1988), the court of appeals discussed the 
legislative intent component of the multiplicity test in the 
context of Wis. Stat. § 943.37, the statute criminalizing the 
alteration of serial numbers.  The court discussed the singular 
phrasing of a statute as indicative of a legislative intent to 
authorize multiple prosecutions.  Id. 
No. 
00-1846-CR   
 
27 
 
statute leads us to the conclusion that for purposes of the 
second part of the multiplicity analysis each image Multaler 
possessed could be prosecuted separately. 
¶65 Applying the fourth factor, Multaler asserts that it 
is inappropriate to impose separate punishments for each 
separate image possessed.  In support of this assertion, he 
provides a number of hypothetical comparisons.  For example, he 
explains that a legislative intent to charge for each image 
would be devoid of logic in the context of a movie film where 
possession of one movie could result in thousands of charges, 
one charge for each frame of the film. 
¶66 We reject Multaler's assertions that these sorts of 
examples indicate that the legislature could not have intended 
multiple punishments in cases involving pornography downloaded 
from the internet.  If the proper unit of prosecution were 
limited to the disk or other storage device, an individual could 
possess thousands of images depicting children in sexually 
explicit activity and face only once charge under § 948.12.  We 
agree with the State's argument that "[i]t is unreasonable to 
suggest 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
a 
single 
penalty . . . without 
regard 
for 
the 
volume 
of 
child 
pornography, the time over which it was accumulated, the number 
of separate volitional acts required to obtain and store it, or 
the numbers of children victimized."  In Multaler's case, where 
he downloaded, compiled, and stored multiple images over time, 
multiple punishment is appropriate. 
No. 
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28 
 
¶67 In essence, because it appears that the images on the 
disks were photographs of actual children, the disks served as 
electronic photo albums.  The language of § 948.12 shows that 
the legislature would deem it appropriate to bring separate 
charges for separate photographs in a traditional photo album.  
Similarly, 
the legislature 
presumably 
would 
deem separate 
charges appropriate for individual images displayed in an 
electronic photo album. 
¶68 Because the two factors upon which Multaler relies do 
not support his assertion that the proper unit of prosecution in 
his case is determined by the number of disks, he has failed to 
rebut the presumption that the legislature intended multiple 
punishments.  Therefore, we reject his multiplicity claim. 
IV 
 
¶69 In sum, we conclude that the 28 charges to which 
Multaler pled were not multiplicitous.  We further conclude that 
Investigator Hanrahan's affidavit provided a substantial basis 
to determine that there was a fair probability that the evidence 
the police sought in the warrant would be found in Multaler's 
house.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶70 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
  
 
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