Case Title: Robinson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 152, 2016

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2016-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BRANDON ROBINSON, 
  
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
No. 152, 2016 
 
 
Defendant-Below,  
 
§  
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  
Court Below: Superior Court 
§  
of the State of Delaware 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID. No. 1009012821 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
     
Plaintiff-Below,   
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  October 5, 2016 
Decided:  
October 13, 2016 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
 
This 13th day of October, 2016, having considered the briefs and the record 
below, it appears to the Court that:    
 
(1) 
In 2013, a New Castle County grand jury indicted Brandon Robinson 
for First Degree Murder, Attempted First Degree Murder, and two counts of 
Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Felony for the shooting death 
of Cameron Johnson and the shooting injury of Jarren Glandton.  In the middle of 
trial, one witness told the prosecutor for the first time that Glandton, the main eye 
witness to the murder, said he was not sure he saw Robinson shoot the gun.  The 
prosecutor disclosed the information to Robinson’s counsel and the court 
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immediately.  Another trial witness, a police officer, testified for the first time that 
Glandton initially said he did not know who shot him.  The officer’s statement was 
not in her police report.  The jury convicted Robinson of first degree murder and 
one of the weapon possession offenses.  It acquitted him of the other charges.  We 
affirmed Robinson’s conviction on direct appeal. 
 
(2) 
Robinson filed a motion for postconviction relief, claiming the State 
committed Brady1 violations, and his counsel was ineffective for failing to move 
for a mistrial because of those violations.  A Superior Court Commissioner denied 
relief, holding that although the State violated Brady, Robinson suffered no 
prejudice from the timing of the disclosures, counsel was able to exploit the 
disclosed information, and counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to 
request a mistrial.  The Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s findings.  
Robinson raises the same arguments on appeal.  We find Robinson’s arguments to 
be without merit, and affirm. 
 
(3) 
On September 14, 2010, at around 9:00 p.m., Glandton and his friend 
Johnson were standing at the corner of Elm and Van Buren Streets in Wilmington.  
An unidentified male acquaintance of Johnson approached them.  While Glandton 
was on the phone with his cousin, he overheard the man ask Johnson if he could 
buy Percocet from him.  Johnson agreed.  As Johnson was taking the man’s 
                                          
 
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
3 
 
money, Robinson and a man known as “RC”2 approached the group.  Robinson 
walked up to Johnson and shot him from an arm’s length distance.  Glandton ran 
away.  Robinson then shot Glandton in the leg.  Glandton fell into the street and 
watched the three men run away.  Johnson died from his injuries. Glandton 
survived, but required surgery and was immobile for seven months.  
 
(4) 
As first responders arrived, a crowd gathered around Glandton and 
Johnson.  Officer Monet Cummings of the Wilmington Police Department asked 
Glandton who shot him.  Glandton initially said he did not know.  Glandton’s 
initial statement was not in any of the officers’ police reports.3  He then shouted to 
an acquaintance in the crowd, “B4 did this, your peoples did this.”5  Officer 
Cummings also heard Glandton shout “they killed Cam and she6 shot him for some 
pills.”7  Police arrested Robinson and charged him with First Degree Murder, 
Attempted First Degree Murder, and two counts of Possession of a Firearm during 
the Commission of a Felony.    
 
(5) 
On the fifth day of trial, the prosecutor informed Robinson’s counsel 
and the Superior Court that a witness, Keisha Henry, provided her with new 
                                          
 
2 Glandton identified the man as a person he knew as “RC” after viewing pictures on Facebook. 
3 Officer Cummings did not write her own report; her supervisor wrote it. 
4 Glandton knew Robinson as “Brandon” or “B.” 
5 App. to Opening Br. at 23.  Officer Cummings also heard Glandton yell to someone in a crowd 
of spectators, “your boy B shot me.”  App. to Opening Br. at 27. 
6 The word “she” is a typographical error as will be discussed later. 
7 App. to Opening Br. at 23 (emphasis added). 
4 
 
information on the way into court.  Henry told the prosecutor that she and 
Glandton had spoken multiple times about the shooting through e-mail, text, and 
social media.  She said that in those conversations, Glandton expressed uncertainty 
about who shot him.  Robinson’s counsel examined Henry outside the presence of 
the jury.  Henry testified that Glandton had told her that everything “happened so 
fast” and that the “word on the street” was that RC had shot him.8  Henry had 
previously told police that Glandton told her Robinson had shot him.  She could 
only produce one message from Glandton asking her to call him, and a photograph 
he sent her of RC as evidence of their conversations. 
 
(6) 
Following a seven day Superior Court jury trial, a jury convicted 
Robinson of First Degree Murder and one count of Possession of a Firearm during 
the Commission of a Felony.  The jury acquitted him of Attempted First Degree 
Murder and the other weapons offense.  The trial judge sentenced Robinson to life 
in prison for First Degree Murder and eight years for Possession of a Firearm 
during the Commission of a Felony.  This Court affirmed Robinson’s conviction 
on direct appeal.9  
 
(7) 
Robinson moved pro se for postconviction relief on October 2, 2013.  
The Superior Court appointed counsel, and referred the matter to a Commissioner.  
                                          
 
8 Id. 
9 Robinson v. State, 65 A.3d 617 (Del. 2013). 
5 
 
After the court appointed counsel, Robinson filed an amended motion.  The 
Commissioner denied the motion, and the Superior Court affirmed the 
Commissioner’s findings.  This appeal followed.   
 
(8) 
Robinson raises four issues on appeal: (1) the Superior Court erred by 
denying his direct claim of multiple Brady violations; (2) Robinson’s counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial based on the alleged 
Brady violations; (3) the Superior Court erred by denying Robinson’s claim of 
cumulative due process errors; and (4) the Superior Court abused its discretion 
when it refused to grant an evidentiary hearing.  We review the Superior Court’s 
denial of a Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.10  “We 
review ineffective assistance of counsel claims and alleged Brady violations de 
novo.”11 
  
(9) 
Robinson first argues that the State violated Brady by failing to 
provide in advance of trial the two statements Glandton made in front of Officer 
Cummings, and the conversations that Glandton had with Henry.  As with all 
motions for postconviction relief, the Court must determine whether the claims are 
procedurally barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.12  When Robinson 
filed his motion for postconviction relief in 2013, Rule 61(i)(3) provided that 
                                          
 
10 Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935, 941 (Del. 2013).  
11 Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 325 (Del. 2015). 
12 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
6 
 
claims that could have been raised on direct appeal could not be asserted in 
postconviction relief proceedings.13  Here, Robinson’s counsel was aware of the 
alleged Brady violations at trial, and could have raised them in the trial court and 
on direct appeal.  But under former Rule 61(i)(5), if Robinson can show “a 
colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional 
violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness 
of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction,” he is relieved from the 
procedural default.14  This Court has held that viable Brady claims fall within the 
miscarriage of justice exception.15  After our review of Robinson’s Brady claims, 
we find that they are procedurally defaulted and his counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to move for a mistrial.    
 
(10) In Brady v. Maryland the United States Supreme Court held that the 
State’s failure to disclose to the defense material exculpatory evidence violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment.16  A Brady violation can occur “irrespective of the good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”17  A Brady violation occurs when “[t]he 
evidence at issue [was] favorable to the accused, either because it [was] 
                                          
 
13 See Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748, 757 (Del. 2016) (holding that the Court must apply the 
version of the rule governing postconviction proceedings that was in effect at time of filing). 
14 Id (quoting Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5)). 
15 Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 986 (Del. 2014). 
16 373 U.S. at 87. 
17 Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005). 
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exculpatory, or because it [was] impeaching; [the] evidence [was] suppressed by 
the State; either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice . . . ensued.”18 
 
(11) The Commissioner held that “it [was] clear that Glandton’s statements 
to Cummings and Henry were not disclosed prior to trial, despite being within the 
reach of the State to do so,” thus violating Brady.19  Further, the Commissioner 
held that “[t]he State had an obligation to provide the statements and, had the Court 
today found that this resulted in prejudice, the Court would have found in 
Defendant’s favor.”20   
 
(12) After our review of the statements in question, we find that only one 
of them is arguably Brady material.  Henry’s statement was not Brady material 
because it was not suppressed.  It was only during the middle of trial that Henry 
told the prosecutor that Glandton had told her that “the word on the street” was that 
RC had shot him, not Robinson.  The prosecutor disclosed the information to 
Robinson’s counsel and the Superior Court as soon as she received it.  Robinson’s 
counsel was then able to effectively cross examine Henry and Glandton about the 
statement at trial.  Officer Cumming’s testimony that she heard Glandton shout 
“they killed Cam and she shot him for some pills” is nothing more than a 
typographical error.  There was no evidence that a female was present during the 
                                          
 
18 Norman v. State, 968 A.2d 27, 30 (Del. 2009) (citing Atkinson, 778 A.2d at 1063). 
19 Opening Br. Ex. A.  
20 Id. 
8 
 
incident.  Had Officer Cummings actually said “she” rather than “he,” counsel on 
both sides would have explored the statement further.  Throughout the entire case, 
the witnesses consistently testified that three men were involved in the drug 
transaction and shooting.   
 
(13) Thus, the only statement that is arguably Brady material is Officer 
Cumming’s statement that when she first asked Glandton who had shot him, he 
said he did not know.  As the Commissioner found, the State did not suppress 
Officer Cumming’s statement, but delayed disclosure because the information did 
not appear in any police reports.  Where delayed disclosure occurs:  
If the evidence is both favorable and material, a determination must be 
made whether its delayed disclosure precluded effective use of the 
information at trial.  When a defendant is confronted with delayed 
disclosure of Brady material, reversal will be granted only if the 
defendant was denied the opportunity to use the material effectively.21 
 
 
(14) The Commissioner properly found that trial counsel was able to make 
effective use of the disclosure at trial.  Counsel thoroughly cross-examined 
Cummings about the statement and relied on it in his closing argument.  Through 
counsel’s effective cross examination, he elicited testimony from Glandton that he 
had not seen the person who shot him, and that it was possible RC had pulled out a 
gun after he turned and ran.  Trial counsel stated in his affidavit that the additional 
                                          
 
21 White v. State, 816 A.2d 776, 778 (Del. 2003) (internal citations omitted). 
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evidence was a “windfall” and that he was able to use it effectively.22  In fact, the 
jury acquitted Robinson of Attempted First Degree Murder and the related 
weapons offense, indicating that counsel effectively highlighted Glandton’s 
uncertain memory.  Thus, the State’s delayed disclosure is not a Brady violation 
requiring reversal. 
 
(15) Robinson next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
request a mistrial when faced with the State’s Brady violations.  Under Strickland 
v. Washington,23 counsel is constitutionally ineffective if (1) counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) 
defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s error.24  To show prejudice, the defendant 
must demonstrate that it is reasonably likely the outcome of trial would have been 
different had counsel not committed the error.25  A defendant bears a heavy burden 
in establishing counsel was constitutionally ineffective.26  Further, “there is no 
need to examine whether an attorney performed deficiently if the deficiency did 
not prejudice the defendant.”27 
 
(16) Counsel could not be ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial if 
the State did not violate Brady.  Further, trial counsel made a strategic decision not 
                                          
 
22 App. to Opening Br. at 109-11. 
23 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
24 Brooks v. State, 40 A.3d 346, 354 (Del. 2012). 
25 Id. 
26 Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724, 730 (Del. 2014). 
27 Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013). 
10 
 
to request a mistrial.  In trial counsel’s Rule 61 affidavit, counsel explained that he 
did not feel the need to request a mistrial when he heard Officer Cumming’s 
testimony because he was able to use that evidence effectively.28  Robinson also 
cannot establish prejudice from the alleged violation.   
 
(17) Robinson next argues that the cumulative effect of the State’s Brady 
violations together with counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to request a mistrial 
requires this Court to order a new trial.  Because Robinson’s underlying claims are 
without merit or did not prejudice him, he has failed to establish cumulative error.  
 
(18) Finally, Robinson argues that the case should be remanded because 
the Superior Court abused its discretion when it refused to hold an evidentiary 
hearing.  Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(h) provides that the Superior Court may 
order an evidentiary hearing if, after reviewing parties’ submissions, it finds that 
one is desirable.  “Rule 61 does not mandate the scheduling of an evidentiary 
hearing in every case, but, rather, leaves it to the Superior Court to determine 
whether an evidentiary hearing is needed.”29  The record below sufficiently 
informed the court of the nature of Robinson’s claims as evidenced by the 
Commissioner’s decision.  Thus, the Superior Court acted within its broad 
                                          
 
28 App. to Opening Br. at 109-11. 
29 Getz v. State, 77 A.3d 271, 2013 WL 5656208, at *1 (Del. Oct. 15, 2013) (Table). 
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discretion to summarily dispose of Robinson’s motion without holding an 
evidentiary hearing. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Justice