Case Title: Burl. Public Emp. Union v. Champlain Water Dist.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1989-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-016


Burlington Area Public Employees             Supreme Court
Union, Local 1343, AFSCME, AFL-CIO
                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      Labor Relations Board

Champlain Water District                     April Term, 1989


Charles H. McHugh, Chairman

Blais, Cain, Keller & Fowler, Inc., Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee

Dennis W. Wells of Downs Rachlin & Martin, Burlington, for defendant-
  appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, (FN1) Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     ALLEN, C.J.    The Champlain Water District appeals from an order of
the Vermont Labor Relations Board ordering it generally to refrain from
conducting Step III grievance hearings without the presence of grievants and
their union representatives during management's presentation, and ordering
it to offer to grievant George Hedenberg and the Burlington Area Public
Employees Union in the instant case the opportunity to attend a grievance
meeting so conducted.  We reverse and remand with direction for the Board to
defer to the arbitration provided for in the collective bargaining agreement
(agreement).
     Grievant was dismissed from employment by the District, and the Union
filed a grievance on his behalf.  The matter progressed to Step III of the
grievance process, which required the District's Board of Commissioners to
hear the grievance at a regularly scheduled meeting.  After hearing from
the Union on grievant's claim that his dismissal violated the agreement, the
Commissioners sought to hear management's explanation of the dismissal
without grievant's presence.  Section 14.7 of the agreement does not specify
whether a grievant has a right to be present at the Step III hearing, either
personally or through a Union representative.  The provisions for the Step
III hearing stand in contrast to the provisions for Steps I and II of the
grievance process, which do specifically address the employee's right to be
present.  The Union objected to this procedure, and grievant and his Union
representative left the meeting.  The Board of Commissioners denied the
grievance, and the Union appealed that decision to binding arbitration.
     The Union did not file a separate grievance concerning the grievant's
exclusion from the Step III hearing, but it filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the Board, alleging that the District had violated 21 V.S.A. {
1726(a)(1) (FN2) of the Municipal Employee Relations Act (MERA) by making it
impossible for the Union to represent grievant adequately.
     The District moved for summary judgment before the Board on the ground
that the Union should have filed a second grievance on this issue rather
than an unfair labor practice charge.  The Board considered the summary
judgment motion with the merits of the unfair labor practice charge.
     The Board noted that Section 14.1 of the agreement defines a grievance
as "a dispute as to the meaning or application of a specific written
provision of the Agreement" and concluded that the grievant's right to be
present at the Step III hearing did not "involve the interpretation of
contractual language."  The Board also found that the past practice of the
District had been to allow grievants and their Union representatives to be
present during the management portion of Step III grievance hearings
involving suspension.  Even though there had not been previous Step III
grievance hearings involving dismissal, the Board concluded that the
exclusion of the grievant and Union representative from this Step III
dismissal hearing was a unilateral change in a mandatory subject of
bargaining and hence was an unfair labor practice.  The Board concluded
that it should not defer its decision on the unfair labor practice charge
until after the conclusion of the grievance process.  We disagree, and
remand for deferral to the grievance process provided in the agreement.
     Parties to a collective bargaining agreement are required to exhaust
available contractual remedies before a statutory unfair labor practice
charge will lie under 21 V.S.A. { 1726(a).  See AFSCME, Local 490,
Bennington Dep't of Public Works & Police Units v. Town of Bennington, 9
VLRB 195 (1986); Burlington Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. Burlington Bd. of School
Comm'rs, 1 VLRB 335, 340 (1978).  The Board should begin its analysis by
considering if the issue contained in the complaint is subject to
arbitration, irrespective of whether or not it might also be an unfair labor
practice under MERA.  If the issue is subject to arbitration, the contract
grievance procedure should be applied, barring an overriding statute or
deferral policy.  As the Board said in Burlington Educ. Ass'n:
         If this board hears as an unfair labor practice a
         complaint which is a grievance without first requiring
         the resolution procedures agreed to in the Collective
         Bargaining agreement, the collective bargaining process
         would be undermined. . . . [A]n exhaustion of contract
         remedies doctrine . . . insures the integrity of the
         collective bargaining process by requiring the parties
         to collective bargain agreements to follow the
         procedures they have negotiated to resolve contract
         disputes.  This policy also encourages the parties to
         negotiate grievance procedures to resolve contract
         disputes which is sound labor relations policy.  Labor
         relations stability depends on the parties working
         together to resolve disputes which directly affect them.

The NLRB stated the same proposition very clearly in National Radio Co., 198
NLRB 527, 531 (1972) (discussing Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837
(1971):
         Here, as [in Collyer], an asserted wrong is remediable
         in both a statutory and a contractual forum.  Both
         jurisdictions exist by virtue of congressional action,
         and our duty to serve the objectives of Congress
         requires that we seek a rational accommodation within
         that duality.  We may not abdicate our statutory duty to
         prevent and remedy unfair labor practices.  Yet, once an
         exclusive agent has been chosen by employees to repre-
         sent them, we are charged with a duty fully to protect
         the structure of collective representation and the
         freedom of the parties to establish and maintain an
         effective and productive relationship.

           In this context, abstention simply cannot be equated
         with abdication. We are, instead, adjuring the parties
         to seek resolution of their dispute under the provisions
         of their own contract and thus fostering both the
         collective relationship and the Federal policy favoring
         voluntary arbitration and dispute settlement.

The exhaustion doctrine does not bind the parties in this case if the issue
raised before the Board does not qualify as a matter of contract inter-
pretation, if an overriding statute negates deferral, or if the Board's own
deferral guidelines indicate that deferral would not serve the purposes of
the statute.  As none of these contingencies are present here, exhaustion is
required.
                         I.  Contract Interpretation.
     The Board, distinguishing AFSCME, Local 490 and Burlington Educ. Ass'n,
Inc., analyzed the central issue as follows:
         At issue is the procedure adopted by the Employer during
         a grievance meeting on an employee's dismissal of having
         the Union present its case on behalf of the dismissed
         employee to the Board of Commissioners and then the
         Union and involved employee being absent when management
         presents its case.  The procedure to be used by the
         Board of Commissioners during grievance meetings is
         nowhere addressed in the Contract and the Contract
         limits the definition of grievance to "a dispute . . .
         as to the meaning or application of a specific written
         provision of the Agreement."  Thus, the contractual
         grievance procedure does not provide adequate redress
         for the alleged wrongs.

It begs the issue to state that the contract does not expressly state that
employees may or may not be present at Step III hearings.  Interpretation of
an agreement may involve interpolating from a written text solutions not
expressly spelled out in the text.  Clearly, Step III hearings are creatures
of contract and not required by statute.  The Step III grievance process was
an integral part of the agreement, and the question of what constitutes a
valid, bona fide Step III hearing is an issue of contract interpretation.
The issue of who may be in the room during such a proceeding is but one
example of an incident or element of such a proceeding.  Similar questions
might conceivably arise as to the length of the proceeding, whether
recording devices are allowed, and the order of presentation.  The answers
to all of these issues might be found by interpreting the text of the
agreement or, as the Board points out, in blending textual interpretations
and the "contracts implied in fact" in the form of established past
practices.  An arbitrator is ideally poised to consider and resolve such
issues; they are issues concerning the "law of the shop" as opposed to the
"law of the land," see Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,