Case Title: State v. Underwood

Citation: 2010-Ohio-1

Docket Number: 20082133 and 20082228

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Underwood, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. UNDERWOOD, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Underwood, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1.] 
Criminal law — Sentencing — “Authorized by” or “contrary to” law — Allied 
offenses of similar import — R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) does not bar appellate 
review of a sentence imposed in violation of R.C. 2941.25(A) even though 
it was jointly recommended by the parties — Judgment affirmed. 
(Nos. 2008-2133 and 2008-2228 — Submitted September 1, 2009 — Decided 
January 5, 2010.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, 
No. 22454, 2008-Ohio-4748. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
When a sentence is imposed for multiple convictions on offenses 
that are allied offenses of similar import in violation of R.C. 
2941.25(A), R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) does not bar appellate review of 
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that sentence even though it was jointly recommended by the 
parties and imposed by the court. 
2. 
A sentence is “authorized by law” and is not appealable within the 
meaning of R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) only if it comports with all 
mandatory sentencing provisions. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This case presents us with the question of whether R.C. 
2953.08(D)(1)1 precludes an appeal of a jointly recommended sentence when that 
sentence includes multiple counts of allied offenses of similar import.  Because 
we conclude that such a sentence is not authorized by law, and is therefore 
appealable, we affirm. 
Case Background 
{¶ 2} Richard Underwood, the appellee, was originally indicted on 
August 1, 2006, on one count of aggravated theft, a felony of the third degree, and 
two counts of theft, felonies of the fifth degree.  A supplemental indictment, 
identified as the “B” indictment, was returned on January 16, 2007, for another 
count of aggravated theft, also a felony of the third degree.  Underwood, 
therefore, faced a total of four counts. 
{¶ 3} The third-degree felony charges in count one and the “B” 
indictment cover events occurring in 2005 when Underwood did not fulfill his 
agreements to build or remodel homes and retained the victims’ downpayments 
                                                 
1.  The version of R.C. 2953.08(D) in effect at the time Underwood committed his offenses stated: 
“A sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review under this section if the sentence is 
authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the 
case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.  A sentence imposed for aggravated murder or murder 
pursuant to sections 2929.02 to 2929.06 of the Revised Code is not subject to review under this 
section.”  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 473, 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5707, 5813.  The first sentence, which 
is at issue in this case, was redesignated as (D)(1) by Am.Sub.H.B. 95 of the 126th General 
Assembly, effective August 3, 2006.  For ease of discussion, we will refer to the current version of 
R.C. 2953.08. 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
totaling more than $100,000.  Count one alleged aggravated theft by deception, a 
violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(3).  The “B” indictment charged aggravated theft by 
exerting control over the property beyond the scope of the victims’ consent, a 
violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(2).  Similarly, counts two and three of the August 
2006 indictment charged Underwood with theft from his employer of more than 
$500 on March 3, 2003.  As with the third-degree felony counts, one fifth-degree 
felony theft count alleged theft beyond the scope of the owner’s consent, while 
the other alleged theft by deception.  Thus, although Underwood faced four 
separate counts, they relate to only two acts: theft of over $100,000 from the same 
victims and theft of over $500 from his employer. 
{¶ 4} On the day of trial, Underwood entered pleas of no contest to the 
four counts.  Although the plea documents did not reference any sentencing 
agreement, Underwood acknowledged that he had agreed to a sentencing bargain: 
If he paid $40,000 in restitution before his sentencing, he would either serve local 
incarceration as part of a term of community control or serve a prison term of no 
more than two years, with the state not opposing judicial release.  If he failed to 
pay $40,000 in restitution before sentencing, he would lose the option of 
community control and would be sentenced to a prison term not to exceed two 
years. 
{¶ 5} Before the sentencing hearing was held, the state filed a sentencing 
recommendation asking that Underwood be ordered to pay $112,488.34 in 
restitution and be sentenced to serve a minimum of two years in prison.2  The 
state also noted, “The two counts in each of the different categories of thefts 
would be considered allied offenses of similar import and would require the Court 
to sentence the defendant to only one of the thefts.” 
                                                 
2.  The state’s sentencing recommendation of “a minimum of two years’ incarceration” appears to 
violate the terms of the plea agreement, in which the state agreed to a sentence “not to exceed two 
years” if Underwood failed to pay any restitution before sentencing.  Underwood did not raise this 
issue on appeal. 
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{¶ 6} Underwood admitted at his sentencing hearing that he had not paid 
any restitution.  The trial court then sentenced him to a prison term of one year on 
count one, six months each on counts two and three, and two years on the sole 
count in the “B” indictment.  The court ordered all sentences to be served 
concurrently for an aggregate sentence of two years.3  Although the sentencing 
recommendation had referred to them, there was no discussion of allied offenses 
at the hearing. 
{¶ 7} On appeal, appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 
California (1967), 386 U.S. 738, 744-745, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, 
asserting that there were no meritorious issues to argue.  The Second District 
Court of Appeals, in its independent review, identified and ordered briefing on 
whether the trial court had violated R.C. 2941.25(A) by imposing a sentence on 
each of the four counts for which Underwood was found guilty.  In his 
supplementary brief, Underwood argued that the trial court had committed plain 
error by imposing multiple sentences for allied offenses of similar import and that 
he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney had failed 
to object to a sentence that contained multiple sentences for allied offenses of 
similar import.  The state responded that Underwood had waived any claim of 
error with regard to allied offenses and that his sentence was not reviewable on 
appeal because it was imposed pursuant to a plea agreement, which included a 
sentence jointly recommended by the parties.  The state also argued that 
Underwood did not suffer any prejudice because the trial court had imposed 
concurrent sentences and did not, therefore, commit plain error. 
{¶ 8} The court of appeals determined that R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) did not 
bar review of Underwood’s sentence.  State v. Underwood, 2nd Dist. No. 22454, 
2008-Ohio-4748, ¶ 26.  The court reasoned, “Because the required merger of 
                                                 
3.  The court, however, ordered the aggregate sentence to be served consecutively to a sentence 
from another case, which is not part of this appeal. 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
convictions must precede any sentence the court imposes upon a conviction, 
[Underwood’s] agreement to the multiple sentences the court imposed could not 
waive his right to the prior merger that R.C. 2941.25 requires.  Neither could his 
no contest pleas waive his right to challenge his multiple convictions on double 
jeopardy grounds.”  Id. at ¶ 23.  The court of appeals concluded that, in light of 
the state’s concession that the offenses were allied offenses of similar import, 
Underwood’s multiple sentences were not authorized by law.  It therefore vacated 
the convictions for counts one and three.  Id. at ¶ 30. 
{¶ 9} Upon the state’s motion, the Second District Court of Appeals 
certified its decision as being in conflict with decisions from the Third, Eighth, 
Tenth, and Twelfth District Courts of Appeals on the following issue: “Is an 
agreed and jointly recommended sentence ‘authorized by law’ under R.C. 
2953.08(D)(1), and thus not reviewable, when the agreed sentence includes 
convictions for offenses that are allied offenses of similar import?”  We accepted 
the conflict and the state’s discretionary appeal.  State v. Underwood, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 1484, 2009-Ohio-278, 900 N.E.2d 196, and 120 Ohio St.3d 1486, 2009-
Ohio-278, 900 N.E.2d 197. 
Legal Analysis 
Appellate Rights — R.C. 2953.08 
{¶ 10} A defendant’s right to appeal a sentence is based on specific 
grounds stated in R.C. 2953.08(A): 
{¶ 11} “In addition to any other right to appeal and except as provided in 
division (D) of this section, a defendant who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a 
felony may appeal as a matter of right the sentence imposed upon the defendant 
on one of the following grounds: 
{¶ 12} “* * * 
{¶ 13} “(4) The sentence is contrary to law.”  
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{¶ 14} Subsection (D)(1) provides an exception to the defendant’s ability 
to appeal:  
{¶ 15} “(D)(1) A sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to 
review under this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been 
recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is 
imposed by a sentencing judge.” 
{¶ 16} In other words, a sentence that is “contrary to law” is appealable 
by a defendant; however, an agreed-upon sentence may not be if (1) both the 
defendant and the state agree to the sentence, (2) the trial court imposes the 
agreed sentence, and (3) the sentence is authorized by law.  R.C. 2953.08(D)(1).  
If all three conditions are met, the defendant may not appeal the sentence. 
{¶ 17} The parties do not contest the first two conditions but contest the 
third.  Underwood acknowledges that his plea agreement provided that if he did 
not pay $40,000 in restitution before sentencing, he would not receive community 
control and instead would be sentenced to no more than two years in prison.4  At 
the sentencing hearing, the trial court confirmed that Underwood had not paid 
restitution and therefore did impose an aggregate two-year prison term. 
{¶ 18} The state argues that R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) bars appellate review of 
sentences jointly recommended by the state and defendant even if the agreed 
sentence includes convictions for offenses that are allied offenses of similar 
import.  The issue is whether Underwood’s sentence is “authorized by law.”  If it 
is not, then R.C. 2953.08(D)(1)’s exception to appealability does not apply. 
Authorized by Law — R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) 
{¶ 19} We begin with the meaning of “authorized by law.”  The term is 
not defined in R.C. 2953.08.  Several courts of appeals have held that a sentence 
                                                 
4.  At least one court of appeals has held that a plea agreement in which a defendant has agreed to 
be sentenced within a certain range, but not to a specific prison term, is not an agreed sentence for 
purposes of R.C. 2953.08(D).  See State v. Gray, 1st Dist. No. C-030132, 2003-Ohio-5837, ¶ 9.  
That issue has not been raised in this case. 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
is authorized by law within the meaning of the statute simply if the sentence falls 
within the statutory range for the offense.  State v. Sawyer, 183 Ohio App.3d 65, 
2009-Ohio-3097, 915 N.E.2d 715, ¶ 70; State v. Bristow (Jan. 29, 1999), 3d Dist. 
No. 3-98-21, 1999 WL 84868, *3; State v. Jackson, 8th Dist. No. 86506, 2006-
Ohio-3165, ¶ 49; State v. Henderson (Sept. 27, 1999), 12th Dist. No. CA99-01-
002, 1999 WL 761002, *2. 
{¶ 20} We do not agree with such a narrow interpretation of “authorized 
by law.”  Adopting this reasoning would mean that jointly recommended 
sentences imposed within the statutory range but missing mandatory provisions, 
such as postrelease control (R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c)) or consecutive sentences 
(R.C. 2929.14(D) and (E)), would be unreviewable.  Our recent cases illustrate 
that sentences that do not comport with mandatory provisions are subject to total 
resentencing.  See, e.g., State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 
N.E.2d 961, ¶ 11.  Nor can agreement to such sentences insulate them from 
appellate review, for they are not authorized by law.  We hold that a sentence is 
“authorized by law” and is not appealable within the meaning of R.C. 
2953.08(D)(1) only if it comports with all mandatory sentencing provisions.  A 
trial court does not have the discretion to exercise its jurisdiction in a manner that 
ignores mandatory statutory provisions.  See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 
420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 27 (“Every judge has a duty to impose 
lawful sentences”). 
{¶ 21} Underwood argues that the term “authorized by law” is simply the 
inverse of “contrary to law.”  We do not agree because the structure of R.C. 
2953.08 distinguishes between these terms.  Both the state and the defendant have 
an appeal of right if a sentence is “contrary to law.”  R.C. 2953.08(B)(2); R.C. 
2953.08(A)(4).  But a defendant has no right to appeal an agreed-upon sentence 
unless the sentence is not “authorized by law.” R.C. 2953.08(D)(1).  We conclude 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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that when a sentence fails to include a mandatory provision, it may be appealed 
because such a sentence is “contrary to law” and is also not “authorized by law.” 
{¶ 22} Our holding does not prevent R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) from barring 
appeals that would otherwise challenge the court’s discretion in imposing a 
sentence, such as whether the trial court complied with statutory provisions like 
R.C. 2929.11 (the overriding purposes of felony sentencing), 2929.12 (the 
seriousness and recidivism factors), and/or 2929.13(A) through (D) (the sanctions 
relevant to the felony degree) or whether consecutive or maximum sentences were 
appropriate under certain circumstances. 
Allied Offenses — R.C. 2941.25 
{¶ 23} Because a sentence is authorized by law only if it comports with all 
mandatory sentencing provisions, we must now determine whether the directive 
in R.C. 2941.25 contains such a provision.  R.C. 2941.25 codifies the protections 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits 
multiple punishments for the same offense.  The statute states: “(A) Where the 
same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied 
offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain counts for 
all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one. 
{¶ 24} “(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more 
offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses 
of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to 
each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and 
the defendant may be convicted of all of them.” 
{¶ 25} R.C. 2941.25(A) clearly provides that there may be only one 
conviction for allied offenses of similar import.  Because a defendant may be 
convicted of only one offense for such conduct, the defendant may be sentenced 
for only one offense.  This court has previously said that allied offenses of similar 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
import are to be merged at sentencing.  See State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 
2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 43; State v. McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St. 3d 
390, 399, 686 N.E.2d 1112.  Thus, a trial court is prohibited from imposing 
individual sentences for counts that constitute allied offenses of similar import.  A 
defendant’s plea to multiple counts does not affect the court’s duty to merge those 
allied counts at sentencing.  This duty is mandatory, not discretionary.  Therefore, 
we conclude that when a sentence is imposed on multiple counts that are allied 
offenses of similar import in violation of R.C. 2941.25(A), R.C. 2953.08(D) does 
not bar appellate review of that sentence even though it was jointly recommended 
by the parties and imposed by the court. 
{¶ 26} We have acknowledged that “[t]he General Assembly intended a 
jointly agreed-upon sentence to be protected from review precisely because the 
parties agreed that the sentence is appropriate.  Once a defendant stipulates that a 
particular sentence is justified, the sentencing judge no longer needs to 
independently justify the sentence.”  State v. Porterfield, 106 Ohio St.3d 5, 2005-
Ohio-3095, 829 N.E.2d 690, ¶ 25.  However, Porterfield did not involve a 
mandatory sentencing provision, but merely the discretionary decision to impose 
consecutive sentences.  Both R.C. 2941.25 and the Double Jeopardy Clause 
prohibit multiple convictions for the same conduct.  For this reason, a trial court is 
required to merge allied offenses of similar import at sentencing.  Thus, when the 
issue of allied offenses is before the court, the question is not whether a particular 
sentence is justified, but whether the defendant may be sentenced upon all the 
offenses. 
{¶ 27} The state complains that allowing a defendant to appeal in this 
situation will stifle the practice of plea bargaining and will threaten the finality 
and reliability of plea agreements.  This concern appears overstated.  It should be 
noted that currently, trial courts may reject plea agreements and that they are not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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bound by a jointly recommended sentence.  See State ex rel. Duran v. Kelsey, 106 
Ohio St.3d 58, 2005-Ohio-3674, 831 N.E.2d 430, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 28} With respect to the argument that the merger of allied offenses will 
allow defendants to manipulate plea agreements for a more beneficial result than 
they bargained for, we note that nothing in this decision precludes the state and a 
defendant from stipulating in the plea agreement that the offenses were committed 
with separate animus, thus subjecting the defendant to more than one conviction 
and sentence.  When the plea agreement is silent on the issue of allied offenses of 
similar import, however, the trial court is obligated under R.C. 2941.25 to 
determine whether the offenses are allied, and if they are, to convict the defendant 
of only one offense.  Nevertheless, if a trial court fails to merge allied offenses of 
similar import, the defendant merely has the right to appeal the sentence. 
{¶ 29} In this case, the state acknowledged that count one of the August 
2006 indictment and the sole count in indictment “B” were allied offenses of 
similar import and that counts two and three of the August 2006 indictment were 
also allied.  Therefore, the trial court was required under R.C. 2941.25 to merge 
the sentences for convictions of only one count of aggravated theft and one count 
of theft. 
Plain Error 
{¶ 30} Finally, the state argues that where a defendant is sentenced to a 
jointly recommended sentence pursuant to a plea agreement, the failure to merge 
convictions on allied offenses cannot be said to constitute plain error.  We 
disagree.  Under Crim.R. 52(B), “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial 
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the 
court.”  We have previously held that imposition of multiple sentences for allied 
offenses of similar import is plain error.  State v. Yarbrough, 104 Ohio St.3d 1, 
2004-Ohio-6087, 817 N.E.2d 845, ¶ 96-102.  Justice O’Donnell’s dissent focuses 
on the fact that Underwood received the benefit for which he bargained.  It is 
January Term, 2010 
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argued that the court’s sentencing on each count had no practical or prejudicial 
effect on Underwood.  After all, two years is two years.  However, even when the 
sentences are to be served concurrently, a defendant is prejudiced by having more 
convictions than are authorized by law.  State v. Gibson, Cuyahoga App. No. 
92275, 2009-Ohio-4984, ¶ 29; State v. Coffey, Miami App. No. 2006 CA 6, 2007-
Ohio-21, ¶ 14; State v. Thompson (July 23, 1999), Washington App. No 98 
CA,10, 1999 WL 552646, *7; State v. Gilmore, Hamilton App. Nos. C-070521 
and C-070522, 2008-Ohio-3475, ¶ 17. 
{¶ 31} Justice Cupp’s dissent asserts that “Underwood’s agreement to the 
sentence here should be characterized as a specific waiver of the ability to 
challenge the sentence.”  We have held that “ ‘courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and that we ‘do 
not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’  A waiver is 
ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
privilege.”  (Emphasis added.)  State v. Adams (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 69, 538 
N.E.2d 1025 quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 
82 L.Ed. 1461, quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy (1937), 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 
S.Ct. 809, 81 L.Ed. 1177, and Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Co. of Ohio (1937), 
301 U.S. 292, 307, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. 1093.  There is nothing in the record 
that demonstrates that Underwood was informed that he was agreeing to be 
convicted of allied offenses, thereby waiving his constitutional right to be free 
from double jeopardy. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 32} We hold that R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) does not bar appellate review of 
a sentence that has been jointly recommended by the parties and imposed by the 
court when the sentence includes convictions for offenses that are allied offenses 
of similar import.  We, therefore, answer the certified question in the negative and 
affirm the judgment of Court of Appeals for Montgomery County. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurring. 
{¶ 33} I concur in the conclusion that R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) does not bar 
appellate review of a sentence that has been jointly recommended by the parties 
and imposed by the court when the sentence includes convictions for offenses that 
are allied offenses of similar import. 
{¶ 34} I write separately, however, to emphasize my view that allied 
offenses are merged at sentencing solely for the purpose of sentencing. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 35} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 36} The Second District Court of Appeals agreed with the state of Ohio 
that its decision in this case conflicted with judgments of the Third, Eighth, Tenth, 
and Twelfth District Courts of Appeals, and it certified the following question to 
the Supreme Court for resolution: 
{¶ 37} “Is an agreed and jointly recommended sentence ‘authorized by 
law’ under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), and thus not reviewable, when the agreed 
sentence includes convictions for offenses that are allied offenses of similar 
import?” 
Appealability of a Felony Sentence 
{¶ 38} R.C. 2953.08(A) provides: “In addition to any other right to appeal 
and except as provided in division (D) of this section, a defendant who is 
convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony may appeal as a matter of right the 
sentence imposed upon the defendant on one of the following grounds: 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
{¶ 39} “(1) The sentence consisted of or included the maximum prison 
term allowed for the offense by division (A) of section 2929.14 or section 
2929.142 of the Revised Code, the sentence was not imposed pursuant to division 
(D)(3)(b) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, the maximum prison term was 
not required for the offense pursuant to Chapter 2925. or any other provision of 
the Revised Code, and the court imposed the sentence under one of the following 
circumstances: 
{¶ 40} “(a) The sentence was imposed for only one offense. 
{¶ 41} “(b) The sentence was imposed for two or more offenses arising 
out of a single incident, and the court imposed the maximum prison term for the 
offense of the highest degree. 
{¶ 42} “(2) The sentence consisted of or included a prison term, the 
offense for which it was imposed is a felony of the fourth or fifth degree or is a 
felony drug offense that is a violation of a provision of Chapter 2925. of the 
Revised Code and that is specified as being subject to division (B) of section 
2929.13 of the Revised Code for purposes of sentencing, and the court did not 
specify at sentencing that it found one or more factors specified in divisions 
(B)(1)(a) to (i) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code to apply relative to the 
defendant. If the court specifies that it found one or more of those factors to apply 
relative to the defendant, the defendant is not entitled under this division to appeal 
as a matter of right the sentence imposed upon the offender. 
{¶ 43} “(3) The person was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violent sex 
offense or a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense, was adjudicated 
a sexually violent predator in relation to that offense, and was sentenced pursuant 
to division (A)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code, if the minimum term of 
the indefinite term imposed pursuant to division (A)(3) of section 2971.03 of the 
Revised Code is the longest term available for the offense from among the range 
of terms listed in section 2929.14 of the Revised Code. As used in this division, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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‘designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense’ and ‘violent sex offense’ 
have the same meanings as in section 2971.01 of the Revised Code. As used in 
this division, ‘adjudicated a sexually violent predator’ has the same meaning as in 
section 2929.01 of the Revised Code, and a person is ‘adjudicated a sexually 
violent predator’ in the same manner and the same circumstances as are described 
in that section. 
{¶ 44} “(4) The sentence is contrary to law. 
{¶ 45} “(5) The sentence consisted of an additional prison term of ten 
years imposed pursuant to division (D)(2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised 
Code. 
{¶ 46} “(6) The sentence consisted of an additional prison term of ten 
years imposed pursuant to division (D)(3)(b) of section 2929.14 of the Revised 
Code.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 47} Importantly, for purposes of review here, the statute carves out an 
all-inclusive exception in R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), which states: “A sentence imposed 
upon a defendant is not subject to review under this section if the sentence is 
authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the 
prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.” 
{¶ 48} The 2953.08(D)(1) exception applies if three conditions are 
satisfied: the sentence is authorized by law, it has been jointly recommended by 
the parties, and it is imposed by the court. 
{¶ 49} As we explained in State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-
Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 37, “[a] cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is 
that ‘[a] court must look to the language and purpose of the statute in order to 
determine legislative intent.’ State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 416, 700 
N.E.2d 570. ‘[W]hen the General Assembly has plainly and unambiguously 
conveyed its legislative intent, there is nothing for a court to interpret or construe, 
and therefore, the court applies the law as written.’ State v. Kreischer, 109 Ohio 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
St.3d 391, 2006-Ohio-2706, 848 N.E.2d 496, syllabus.”  Further, as the court 
noted in State v. Hull, 110 Ohio St.3d 183, 2006-Ohio-4252, 852 N.E.2d 706, ¶ 
18, “courts are not free to delete or insert other words.” 
{¶ 50} Notably, the exception to the appealability of sentences provided in 
R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) does not contain an exclusion for allied offenses.  The 
General Assembly could have created such an exclusion, but it did not.  Our duty 
is to apply the statute as written, not to read words into it that are not there.  See 
Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 37; Hull, 110 
Ohio St.3d 183, 2006-Ohio-4252, 852 N.E.2d 706, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 51} In State v. Porterfield, 106 Ohio St.3d 5, 2005-Ohio-3095, 829 
N.E.2d 690,  we addressed the appealability of a jointly recommended sentence in 
the context of a trial court that failed to make findings in connection with 
imposing a consecutive sentence.  Justice O’Connor, writing for the court, there 
stated:  
{¶ 52} “Porterfield's sentence was authorized by law, was recommended 
jointly by him and the prosecution, and was imposed by a sentencing judge.  
Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D), Porterfield's sentence is not subject to review.  * * *  
The General Assembly intended a jointly agreed-upon sentence to be protected 
from review precisely because the parties agreed that the sentence is appropriate.”  
Id. at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 53} The parties here do not dispute that the prosecuting attorney 
prepared and filed a written sentencing recommendation seeking a two-year term 
of incarceration, or that Underwood and his attorney agreed to that sentence.  
Also, there is no dispute that the trial court imposed that sentence.  At issue here 
is whether a recommended and agreed-upon sentence is authorized by law when it 
includes convictions for allied offenses. 
Authorized by Law 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
{¶ 54} The phrase “authorized by law” refers to the punishment for an 
offense that the General Assembly has authorized a trial court to impose.  For the 
offenses at issue in this case, the General Assembly has authorized in R.C. 
2929.14(A)(3) a penalty for aggravated theft, a felony of the third degree, of one, 
two, three, four, or five years, and in R.C. 2929.14(A)(5) a penalty for theft, a 
felony of the fifth degree, of six, seven, eight, nine, ten, 11, or 12 months. 
{¶ 55} The sentence imposed by the trial court in this case conforms to 
those statutes and has therefore been authorized by the legislature.  The court 
imposed concurrent terms of incarceration of two years for aggravated theft in 
violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(2) for an amount over $100,000, one year for 
aggravated theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(3) involving theft of the same 
amount, and 6 months for each of the two theft counts in violation of R.C. 
2913.02(A)(2) and (3), each involving an amount over $500. 
{¶ 56} Notably, every appellate district in Ohio – but for the Second 
District in this case – has similarly concluded that a sentence is authorized by law 
if it is within the statutory range of possible sentences established by the 
legislature.  See State v. Royles, 1st Dist. Nos. C-060875 and C-060876, 2007-
Ohio-5348, ¶ 8; State v. Giesey, 3rd Dist. No. 5-06-31, 2006-Ohio-6851, at ¶ 9; 
State v. Duran, 4th Dist. No. 06CA2919, 2007-Ohio-2743, at ¶ 11; State v. 
Starner, 5th Dist. No. CT2006-0038, 2007-Ohio-1219, at ¶ 9-13; State v. 
Eskridge, 6th Dist. No. L-06-1013, 2007-Ohio-4712, at ¶ 15; State v. Smith, 7th 
Dist. No. 06-BE-64, 2007-Ohio-5244, at ¶ 43; State v. Montgomery, 8th Dist. No. 
83914, 2008-Ohio-443, at ¶ 8; State v. Mangus, 9th Dist. No. 23666, 2007-Ohio-
5033, at ¶ 10; State v. Billups, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-853, 2007-Ohio-1298, at ¶ 6; 
State v. Owens, 11th Dist. No. 06 JE 50, 2008-Ohio-3071, at ¶ 7; State v. Miniard, 
12th Dist. No. CA2006-03-074, 2007-Ohio-458, at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 57} The majority opinion cleverly conflates the phrase “authorized by 
law” with the phrase “contrary to law.”  While the former references what the 
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
General Assembly of this state has provided as a punishment for an offense, the 
latter is a description of an act taken by a court that imposes punishment that does 
not conform with what the legislature has prescribed.  See, e.g., State v. Lodge, 
Montgomery App. No. 2004 CA 43, 2005-Ohio-1908, ¶ 64.  See also Griffin and 
Katz, Ohio Felony Sentencing Law (2008) 1211, Section 10:8 (“Ignoring an issue 
or factors which a statute requires a court to consider renders the resulting 
judgment ‘contrary to law’ ”). 
{¶ 58} It is almost as if the majority seeks to challenge past decisions of 
this court holding that a contrary-to-law judgment is void and to propose that it 
should be voidable.  Using examples of postrelease control and imposition of 
consecutive sentences – not at issue here – the majority has managed to go far 
afield of the narrow issue in this case: whether R.C. 2953.09(D)(1), the exception 
to the right of a defendant to appeal a felony sentence, itself contains an exclusion 
for allied offenses.  Even a cursory review reveals that it does not.  And for good 
reason.  Underwood entered into a plea-bargained arrangement with the state and 
received exactly what he bargained for.  Furthermore, he neither asked the court 
to merge the sentences as allied offenses nor objected at the time of sentencing on 
that basis and has now forfeited that right. 
Enforceability of a Plea Bargain 
{¶ 59} The record reveals that Underwood agreed to plead no contest to 
four charges in exchange for the state’s recommendation that he serve a maximum 
of two years’ incarceration.  A plea bargain is a contract (see State v. Bethel, 110 
Ohio St.3d 416, 2006-Ohio-4853, 854 N.E.2d 150, ¶ 50), subject to contract-law 
standards (see Baker v. United States (C.A.6, 1986), 781 F.2d 85, 90), and 
enforceable by specific performance (see Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 
U.S. 257, 263, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427).  He bargained with the state to 
achieve a desired outcome, avoided a potentially longer term of imprisonment, 
and is now precluded from challenging his convictions for allied offenses.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
Having accepted and received the benefit of the recommended sentence, the plea 
agreement “is sufficient to withstand any later attack even when the attack 
involves a plea to allied offenses.” State v. Styles (Oct. 9, 1997), Cuyahoga App. 
No. 71052, 1997 WL 626058, *3.  A defendant is “prohibited from appealing the 
trial court’s acceptance of the agreed sentence in an attempt to circumvent the 
terms of the plea agreement at the expense of the interests of the state.”  State v. 
Graham (Sept. 30, 1998), 10th Dist. No. 97APA11-1524, 1998 WL 680968, * 3. 
Forfeiture 
{¶ 60} Underwood neither asked the court at the time of sentencing to 
merge the allied offenses nor objected to the failure of the court to do so, and 
pursuant to State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, 
¶ 23, his failure to preserve an objection forfeits the ability to claim error on 
appeal absent a showing of plain error.  In State v. Gardner, 118 Ohio St.3d 420, 
2008-Ohio-2787, 889 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 78, we explained, “Plain error is not present 
unless but for the error complained of, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different.” 
{¶ 61} Here, Underwood has failed to demonstrate plain error because he 
has not shown that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.  At 
the time he entered pleas of no contest to the four counts in the indictment, the 
court could have imposed a potential maximum sentence of 12 years’ 
incarceration.  R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) and (5).  Moreover, even if the trial court had 
applied R.C. 2941.25(A) and merged the allied offenses, the applicable sentencing 
statute authorized a potential maximum term of incarceration of up to six years.  
Id.  However, because of the plea-bargained agreement, where the state exacted 
no-contest pleas to four counts, Underwood received a recommended two-year 
sentence, which the court imposed.  Accordingly, Underwood cannot demonstrate 
that the court would have imposed a lesser sentence if it had merged the allied 
January Term, 2010 
19 
 
offenses, and he cannot demonstrate that the proceeding would have had a 
different outcome. 
{¶ 62} A sentence involving allied offenses that is authorized by law, 
jointly recommended by the parties, and imposed by the trial court is not subject 
to review because R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) contains no exclusion for allied offenses. 
{¶ 63} This conclusion is further fortified by the decisions in six appellate 
districts holding that R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) precludes appellate review of jointly 
recommended sentences imposed for convictions of allied offenses.  See State v. 
Sawyer, 183 Ohio App.3d 65, 2009-Ohio-3097, 915 N.E.2d 715, ¶ 69-71 (First 
District) (agreed sentence of three years upheld despite claims that two counts of 
aggravated assault were allied offenses); State v. Turrentine, 3rd Dist. No. 1-08-
18, 2008-Ohio-3231, ¶ 12-13 (agreed sentence of 15 years upheld despite claims 
that convictions for two counts of rape and one count of gross sexual imposition 
included convictions for allied offenses); State v. Baird, 7th Dist. No. 06-CO-4, 
2007-Ohio-3400, ¶ 16 (agreed sentence of 11 years not subject to appellate review 
despite claims that convictions for rape and gross sexual imposition were allied 
offenses); State v. Jackson, 8th Dist. No. 86506, 2006-Ohio-3165, ¶ 13 (agreed 
sentence of 13 years upheld despite claims that convictions for voluntary 
manslaughter and felonious assault were allied offenses); State v. Henderson 
(Sept. 27, 1999), 12th Dist. No. CA99-01-002, 1999 WL 761002, * 2 (agreed 
sentence of 12 years upheld, including conviction for escape, despite claims that 
convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery were allied offenses); State v. 
Graham (Sept. 30, 1998), 10th Dist. No. 97APA11-1524, 1998 WL 680968, * 3 
(agreed sentence of 16 years upheld, including convictions for specifications, 
despite claim that convictions for involuntary manslaughter and aggravated 
robbery were allied offenses). 
Conclusion 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
{¶ 64} A sentence in a criminal case that has been authorized by law, 
agreed to and jointly recommended by the parties, and imposed by a trial court in 
conformity with a plea-bargained agreement and applicable statutes is not subject 
to review even if that sentence includes convictions for allied offenses of similar 
import. 
{¶ 65} Accordingly, the certified question should be answered in the 
affirmative, and the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals should be 
reversed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and CUPP, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 66} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision. 
{¶ 67} The punishment to which Underwood agreed and that the trial 
court imposed—two years’ imprisonment—was within the statutory range of 
permissible sentences for Underwood’s crime.  Thus, his two-year sentence was 
“authorized by law” within the meaning of R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), precluding his 
appeal of it.  The majority is incorrect in asserting that to so conclude means that 
“jointly recommended sentences imposed within the statutory range but missing 
mandatory provisions, such as postrelease control * * * would be unreviewable” 
under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1).  Our decisions have made abundantly clear that a 
sentence without mandatory postrelease control is not “authorized by law.”  See, 
e.g., State ex rel Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 
N.E.2d 263, ¶ 21.  The state and the defendant cannot agree to a sentence that 
lacks mandatory postrelease control and thereby insulate it from appellate review 
under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). 
{¶ 68} By contrast, merger of allied offenses of similar import, while 
required by R.C. 2941.25(A), is not of such fundamental importance that it may 
not be waived or forfeited by a defendant.  See, e.g., State v. Comen (1990), 50 
January Term, 2010 
21 
 
Ohio St.3d 206, 211, 553 N.E.2d 640 (declining to consider defendant’s allied-
offenses argument because he did not object in the trial court to the failure to 
merge the offenses). 
{¶ 69} I therefore agree with Justice O’Donnell’s view expressed in his 
dissenting opinion that the sentence involved here was “authorized by law” for 
purposes of R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) and is not subject to appeal. 
{¶ 70} In addition, apart from any R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) concerns, 
principles of waiver are potentially applicable to the situation of this case.  
Although the state argued in the court of appeals that Underwood had “waived” 
any claim of error by agreeing to the sentence, the state did not make a specific 
waiver argument for the appellate court’s consideration.  It therefore is not 
surprising that the court of appeals did not address this point, and it is debatable 
whether the state can now rely on a waiver argument that it did not specifically 
make below.  Nevertheless, as the state points out in its reply brief, waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a right, as opposed to forfeiture, 
which is a failure to preserve an objection.  See State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 
502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 71} Underwood’s agreement to the sentence here should be 
characterized as a specific waiver of the ability to challenge the sentence.  See 
State v. McCausland, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2009-Ohio-5933, ___ N.E.2d ___, 
syllabus (a defendant waives the right to present a closing argument when he or 
she neither requests a closing argument nor objects to its omission); State v. 
Pasqualone, 121 Ohio St.3d 186, 2009-Ohio-315, 903 N.E.2d 270, ¶ 13-21 (a 
defendant who does not exercise the opportunity to demand the testimony of a 
laboratory analyst under R.C. 2925.51 waives his right to cross-examine the 
analyst). 
{¶ 72} A defendant who specifically bargains for and agrees to a sentence 
does more than fail to preserve an objection to the sentence, and therefore rather 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
than forfeiting any objection, he affirmatively waives it.  See State v. Hooper, 7th 
Dist. No. 03 CO 30, 2005-Ohio-7084, ¶ 18, a case not involving an agreed 
sentence, in which the Seventh District Court of Appeals held that sentencing 
issues related to allied offenses of similar import are waived if not timely raised 
with the trial court.  The court in that case noted the incongruity of a defendant’s 
position in agreeing to a plea bargain but arguing on appeal “that he cannot be 
sentenced for the additional charge that was part of the plea bargain.”  Id. at ¶ 20.  
See also State v. Antenori, 8th Dist. No. 90580, 2008-Ohio-5987, ¶ 6 (“by 
voluntarily entering his guilty pleas to two separate offenses, defendant waived 
any argument that the same constituted allied offenses of similar import”).5  If a 
defendant who pleads guilty to allied offenses when there is not an agreed 
sentence waives the right to make an allied-offenses argument on appeal, a 
defendant who agrees to accept a sentence as part of a plea bargain certainly 
waives the right to argue allied offenses in challenging his sentence. 
{¶ 73} Moreover, if this process is viewed as a waiver, then a plain-error 
analysis is unwarranted.  See Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 
N.E.2d 306, at ¶ 23 (a waived right cannot be the basis for a claim of plain error 
under Crim.R. 52(B)); State v. Swanson, 7th Dist. No. 05 MA 79, 2006-Ohio-
4957, ¶ 17 (although appellant urged that plain-error analysis should apply, 
appellant’s failure to raise his allied-offenses argument at trial when pleading 
guilty meant “that the alleged error is not the type to which the plain error rule 
applies”).  Although it would have been helpful for the issue of waiver to be more 
cleanly presented in this case, waiver is an additional reason that the judgment of 
the court of appeals should be reversed. 
{¶ 74} For these reasons, I dissent. 
                                                 
5.  This court accepted the defendant’s discretionary appeal on the proposition of law addressing 
the waiver issue in State v. Antenori (case No. 2009-0290), stayed briefing, and held it for decision 
in this case.  See 121 Ohio St.3d 1499, 2009-Ohio-2511, 907 N.E.2d 323. 
January Term, 2010 
23 
 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Kelly D. Madzey, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Claire R. Cahoon, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellee. 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
Alexandra T. Schimmer, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Robert Kenneth 
James, Assistant Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae Attorney General of 
Ohio. 
_____________________