Case Title: Tonti v. Akbari

Citation: 

Docket Number: 002770

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
KAREN A. TONTI 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 002770 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
November 2, 2001 
ASSADULLAH AKBARI 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Henry E. Hudson, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court1 erred 
in awarding attorney’s fees against a party after denying the 
party’s motions to quash subpoenas duces tecum issued to non-
parties. 
BACKGROUND 
Assadullah Akbari and Karen A. Tonti were involved in an 
automobile accident on November 13, 1997.  Akbari filed a 
warrant in debt against Tonti in the Fairfax County General 
District Court seeking $10,000 in damages for his alleged 
personal injuries and lost wages arising from the accident.  
Asserting various substantial defenses, Tonti had the case 
removed to the Circuit Court of Fairfax County (the trial 
court).  Code § 16.1-92. 
On June 2, 2000, Tonti filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 
4:10, for an independent medical examination of Akbari by Dr. 
                     
1Judge Kathleen H. MacKay entered the discovery orders that 
are under consideration in this appeal.  Judge Henry E. Hudson, 
however, entered the final order in the underlying jury trial. 
John A. Bruno.  On June 3, 2000, Akbari requested subpoenas 
duces tecum, pursuant to Rule 4:9(c), to be served on Bruno and 
USAA Casualty Insurance Company (USAA), Tonti’s automobile 
liability insurance carrier, requiring each to produce certain 
tax and other business records related to the employment or 
consulting relationship between Bruno and USAA. 
On June 9, 2000, Tonti filed motions to quash the subpoenas 
duces tecum, asserting that they were overbroad, unduly 
burdensome, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence, and invaded the privacy of other 
persons.  In a brief opposing Tonti’s motions, Akbari contended, 
among other things, that the motions were not made in good 
faith, and that the production of the requested documents was 
not unduly burdensome.  Akbari requested an award of attorney’s 
fees and costs incurred in opposing Tonti’s motions.  Akbari 
also filed a motion to compel Bruno and USAA to comply with the 
subpoenas duces tecum.  He further requested the trial court to 
issue show cause orders against Bruno and USAA and to impose “a 
fine or other sanction for contempt,” if appropriate. 
In an order dated July 14, 2000, the trial court denied 
Tonti’s motions to quash and ordered Bruno and USAA to comply 
with the subpoenas duces tecum.  The trial court further ordered 
Tonti to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of $600 to Akbari’s 
 
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counsel.  The order made no reference to the source of the trial 
court’s authority to impose this sanction. 
On July 19, 2000, Tonti filed a motion for reconsideration 
of the July 14, 2000 order.  Relevant to the issue raised in 
this appeal, Tonti contended that the award of attorney’s fees 
was improper.  Apparently assuming that this award was entered 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1, Tonti contended that her motions 
to quash were well grounded in fact and law and, thus, were not 
sanctionable under that statute.  Akbari filed a brief opposing 
Tonti’s motion for reconsideration.  He contended that Rule 
4:12(a)(4) was dispositive of the issue regarding the award of 
attorney’s fees rather than Code § 8.01-271.1.  Akbari asserted 
that the award of attorney’s fees was justified because Tonti’s 
motions to quash “were akin to a Rule 4:1(c) motion for a 
protective order” and, thus, under an express provision of that 
rule, “[t]he provisions of Rule 4:12(a)(4) apply to the award of 
expenses incurred in relation to the motion,” unless the trial 
court expressly finds that the motions to quash were 
“substantially justified.”  By an order dated August 3, 2000, 
the trial court denied Tonti’s motion for reconsideration. 
In response to Tonti’s notification of an intent to appeal 
the award of attorney’s fees after the case concluded, the trial 
court, by a letter to counsel dated August 8, 2000, stated that 
it wanted to “make [its] position clear and articulate [the] 
 
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reasons for . . . awarding attorney[’s] fees.”  The trial court 
stated that it agreed with the contentions made by Akbari in his 
brief opposing the motion for reconsideration.  The trial court 
further stated that the award of attorney’s fees was “not 
pursuant to Va. Code § 8.01-271.1 but rather pursuant to Rule 
4:12(a)(4).  In so doing [the trial court] regarded the award of 
fees as a routine matter.” 
Tonti filed a motion to stay enforcement of the sanction 
pending resolution of the underlying cause of action and appeal.  
By order dated August 18, 2000, the trial court denied the 
motion to stay.  Tonti avers on brief that the sanction was duly 
paid. 
In a subsequent jury trial, Akbari was awarded a judgment 
in the amount of $5,000.  Tonti timely filed a petition for 
appeal in this Court limited to the issue whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in awarding an attorney’s fee 
sanction in this case pursuant to Rule 4:12(a)(4).  By order 
dated March 5, 2001, we awarded Tonti an appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
An award of attorney’s fees as a sanction should never be 
“a routine matter.”  The general rule in this Commonwealth is 
that, in the absence of a provision in a statute, rule, or 
contract to the contrary, a trial court may not award attorney’s 
fees to a party merely on the basis of that party’s having 
 
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prevailed upon an issue or cause.  See Prospect Development Co. 
v. Bershader, 258 Va. 75, 92, 515 S.E.2d 291, 300 (1999); 
Gilmore v. Basic Industries, Inc., 233 Va. 485, 490, 357 S.E.2d 
514, 517 (1987).  This is the so-called “American Rule,” and its 
purpose is to avoid stifling legitimate litigation by the threat 
of the specter of burdensome expenses being imposed on an 
unsuccessful party. 
Where a rule or statute authorizes the trial court to 
impose the costs of litigation in the form of attorney’s fees as 
a sanction against a party, such sanction is intended, in part, 
to protect litigants from the expense of frivolous claims, 
unfounded in fact or law.  Gilmore v. Finn, 259 Va. 448, 466, 
527 S.E.2d 426, 435 (2000).  “ ‘Yet the threat of a sanction 
should not be used to stifle counsel in advancing novel legal 
theories or asserting a client’s rights in a doubtful case.’ ”  
Id. (quoting Oxenham v. Johnson, 241 Va. 281, 286, 402 S.E.2d 1, 
3 (1991)).  In short, far from being “a routine matter,” an 
award of attorney’s fees as a sanction is a matter that must be 
made under proper authority and with due exercise of the trial 
court’s sound judicial discretion. 
Akbari has not participated in this appeal.  However, as we 
have noted above, the trial court agreed with Akbari’s 
contentions that Tonti’s motions to quash “were akin to a Rule 
4:1(c) motion for a protective order” and that this rule 
 
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provides that when a motion for a protective order is denied 
“[t]he provisions of Rule 4:12(a)(4) apply to the award of 
expenses incurred in relation to the motion.”  We disagree. 
Akbari requested that subpoenas duces tecum be issued to 
non-parties pursuant to Rule 4:9(c).  This rule provides that in 
such cases “the person so required to produce, or . . . the 
party against whom such production is sought” may file a written 
motion requesting that the trial court quash or modify the 
subpoena.2  (Emphasis added).  Tonti was “the party against whom 
such production [was] sought” contemplated by Rule 4:9(c) and 
authorized by that rule to seek to quash the subpoenas duces 
tecum issued to the non-parties in question.  Accordingly, while 
Tonti’s motions to quash might be facially “akin to a Rule 
4:1(c) motion for a protective order,” the provisions of Rule 
4:1(c) do not apply to her motions because they were not filed 
pursuant to that rule. 
We turn then to consider the interplay of the provisions of 
Rule 4:12 and those of Rule 4:9 under the circumstances of this 
case.  In that context, Rule 4:12(a)(2) expressly limits its 
application with respect to discovery requests submitted under 
                     
2Rule 4:9 was amended effective July 1, 2000.  Accordingly, 
the subpoenas duces tecum and the motions to quash were filed 
under the former version of the rule.  However, the portions of 
the rule relevant to this case are substantially unchanged by 
the amendment and now appear in Rule 4:9(c)(1). 
 
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Rule 4:9 to instances in which “a party, in response to a 
request for inspection . . ., fails to respond that inspection 
will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as 
requested.”  (Emphasis added).  In such instances, the party 
requesting the inspection may seek an order compelling the 
inspection, and, if that order is granted, the trial court may 
award attorney’s fees as a sanction under Rule 4:12(a)(4).  
Similarly, Rule 4:9(d) provides that “[i]f a party fails or 
refuses to obey an order made under subsection (b) of this Rule, 
the court may proceed as provided by Rule 4:12(b)(2).”  In 
contrast, Rule 4:9(d) also provides that “[i]f a non-party . . . 
fails or refuses to comply” with a subpoena duces tecum issued 
under Rule 4:9(c), “he may be proceeded against as for contempt 
of court as provided in [Code] § 18.2-456.”  (Emphasis added).   
The express distinction made between a party and a 
non-party under Rule 4:9(d) with regard to a discovery violation 
is significant and, indeed, dispositive of the issue in this 
appeal.  Unlike a case involving a party, under this rule the 
failure or refusal of a non-party to comply with a properly 
issued and served subpoena duces tecum under Rule 4:9(c) is 
subject to a contempt sanction as provided in Code § 18.2-456.  
This express provision for the application of Code § 18.2-456 
excludes the conduct of the non-party from the scope of Rule 
 
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4:12(a)(2) and, by necessary extension, from the sanctions 
provided under Rule 4:12(a)(4). 
In the present case, Akbari sought to compel Bruno and 
USAA, non-parties, to comply with subpoenas duces tecum issued 
and served on them pursuant to Rule 4:9(c).  Their failure or 
refusal to comply with these subpoenas would have subjected them 
to contempt sanctions under Code § 18.2-456 and not Rule 
4:12(a)(4).  It then necessarily follows that Rule 4:12(a)(4) 
does not provide authority for the imposition of attorney’s fees 
as a sanction against Tonti for filing motions to quash 
subpoenas duces tecum issued to these non-parties.  Accordingly, 
we hold that the trial court erred in relying upon Rule 
4:12(a)(4) as its authority for awarding attorney’s fees against 
Tonti.3  In the absence of such authority, the award of that 
sanction “as a routine matter” was clearly an abuse of 
discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
trial court with respect to the award of $600 in attorney’s fees 
                     
3Because the trial court expressly stated that it was not 
relying on the authority of Code § 8.01-271.1, we need not 
address whether the sanction would have been appropriate under 
that statute under the specific circumstances of this case.   
 
 
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and remand the case to the trial court for entry of an order 
directing return of the funds paid pursuant to that judgment. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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