Case Title: State ex rel. Rogers v. McGee Brown

Citation: 1997-Ohio-334

Docket Number: 19970547

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. ROGERS, APPELLANT, v. MCGEE BROWN, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Rogers v. McGee Brown (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 408.] 
Prohibition action not rendered moot when trial court exercises its jurisdiction by 
journalizing its judgment entry before the court of appeals acts on the 
requested writ. 
(No. 97-547 — Submitted September 23, 1997 — Decided December 10, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 96APD12-1628. 
 
In September 1996, appellee, Judge Yvette McGee Brown of the Franklin 
County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, entered a final 
divorce decree in a case involving appellant, James A. Rogers, and Susan R. 
Rogers.  The divorce decree included a division and disposition of the Rogerses’ 
property.  Both parties appealed the divorce decree to the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, and the appeal was assigned case No. 96APF10-1333. 
 
In October 1996, Susan R. Rogers filed a postdecree motion with the trial 
court for interest under R.C. 1343.03 on her share of marital assets awarded by 
Judge McGee Brown in the divorce decree.  In November 1996, Judge McGee 
Brown held a hearing on the motion at which she rejected appellant’s argument 
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion and determined that 
Susan R. Rogers was entitled to interest on her property division award. 
 
Appellant then filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Franklin 
County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge McGee Brown from exercising 
jurisdiction on Susan R. Rogers’s postdecree motion for interest and to vacate any 
entry by Judge McGee Brown on the motion.  In December 1996, Judge McGee 
Brown entered a judgment granting Susan R. Rogers’s motion for interest.  After 
the parties filed motions for summary judgment in the prohibition action, the court 
of appeals denied the writ by holding: 
 
2
 
“Given that on December 23, 1996, respondent [Judge McGee] Brown 
journalized the entry from the motion and subsequent hearing held on November 
27, 1996, there exists no justiciable controversy over which this court can prohibit 
the trial court from exercising jurisdiction.  Accordingly, the entire action is 
rendered moot.  Relator’s motion for a partial stay is denied.  The parties’ motions 
for summary judgment are denied, and relator’s motion for a writ of prohibition is 
denied.  The issues concerning the award of interest raised in relator’s complaint 
shall be addressed on the appeal in case No. 96APF10-1333.” 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Bradley Frick, for appellant. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, Michael C. McPhillips 
and Harland H. Hale, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  Appellant asserts in his sole proposition of 
law that a prohibition action is not rendered moot when a trial court exercises its 
jurisdiction by journalizing its judgment entry before the court of appeals acts on 
the requested writ.  The court of appeals held that Judge McGee Brown’s 
journalization of an entry granting a postdecree motion for interest rendered moot 
appellant’s complaint for a writ of prohibition because the action sought to be 
prevented had occurred.  We disagree with this determination. 
 
As Judge McGee Brown concedes, the court of appeals erred in so holding.  
In rejecting a similar contention that a writ of prohibition will not issue where the 
respondent judge already exercised the judicial act sought to be prevented, we held 
that “where an inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over 
the cause, prohibition will lie both to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of 
 
3
jurisdiction and to correct the results of previous jurisdictionally unauthorized 
actions.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Litty v. Leskovyansky (1996), 77 Ohio 
St.3d 97, 98, 671 N.E.2d 236, 238.  Appeal is immaterial where the court patently 
and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to act.  State ex rel. Willacy v. Smith (1997), 
78 Ohio St.3d 47, 51, 676 N.E.2d 109, 113.  Appellant’s prohibition complaint 
specifically alleged that Judge McGee Brown patently and unambiguously lacked 
jurisdiction and requested the vacation of any journalized entry on the motion for 
interest.  Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in holding that the prohibition 
action was moot because of the trial court’s entry awarding interest. 
 
Nevertheless, Judge McGee Brown contends that the judgment of the court 
of appeals denying the writ should be affirmed because by stating that the issues 
concerning interest would be addressed in the pending appeal from the divorce 
decree, the court of appeals “found that [Judge McGee Brown] had jurisdiction to 
determine the jurisdictional issue * * * and that Appellant had an adequate remedy 
at law through appealing the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction.”  Judge McGee 
Brown further asserts that the court of appeals thus implicitly found that she did 
not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction. 
 
Judge McGee Brown’s contentions, however, are meritless.  A review of the 
court of appeals’ entry manifestly indicates that it did not rule on the merits of 
appellant’s prohibition action and that it never determined whether appeal 
constituted an adequate remedy at law.  The court of appeals instead based its 
denial of the writ of prohibition solely, and erroneously, on mootness.  If it had 
not, it would not have overruled both parties’ motions for summary judgment.  In 
addition, while we possess plenary authority in extraordinary actions that vests us 
with discretion to consider an appeal as of right as if it had been originally filed in 
this court, we will not exercise that authority here, since neither party requests it, 
 
4
the parties have not fully briefed the merits in this appeal, and the court of appeals 
should have the opportunity to consider the merits of the prohibition action, which 
it failed to address because of its erroneous ruling on mootness.  Cf. State ex rel. 
Fogle v. Steiner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 163, 656 N.E.2d 1288, 1293 
(“Generally, reversal of a court of appeals’ erroneous dismissal of a complaint 
based upon failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted requires a 
remand for further proceedings.”). 
 
Based on the foregoing, we sustain appellant’s sole proposition of law, 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and remand the cause to the court of 
appeals for further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents.