Case Title: Ex parte Earl R. Cleghorn. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Tina M. Bledsoe v. Earl R. Cleghorn)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1061014

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 2/8/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1061014
_________________________
Ex parte Earl R. Cleghorn
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  Tina M. Bledsoe
v.
Earl R. Cleghorn)
(Covington Circuit Court, DR-00-277.02;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2050153)
SEE, Justice.
Earl R. Cleghorn petitioned this Court for the writ of
certiorari after the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the
1061014
2
decision of the trial court, which had modified a previous
custody order and awarded Cleghorn custody of Cleghorn and
Tina M. Bledsoe's minor daughter.  We granted certiorari
review to determine whether the Court of Civil Appeals'
decision conflicts with our decision in Ex parte McLendon, 455
So. 2d 863 (Ala. 1984), and to decide whether we should
overrule portions of our decisions in Ex parte Martin, 961 So.
2d 83 (Ala. 2006), and Ex parte Peppers, 703 So. 2d 299 (Ala.
1997), because those cases ostensibly impose an additional
requirement on the McLendon standard for the modification of
a custody order.  We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
Bledsoe and Cleghorn were divorced on October 11, 2001.
The divorce judgment awarded Bledsoe custody of Bledsoe and
Cleghorn's minor daughter, who was adopted; the judgment
allowed Cleghorn scheduled visitation with the child.  Bledsoe
married 
her 
current 
husband, 
Steven 
Bledsoe 
("the
stepfather"), approximately three months after Bledsoe and
Cleghorn were divorced.  Shortly after Bledsoe married the
stepfather, problems arose when Cleghorn would pick up the
child for scheduled visitations.  Cleghorn alleges that
1061014
3
Bledsoe and the stepfather would force Cleghorn, who is
paraplegic, to get out of his truck and go to Bledsoe's
vehicle to get the child.  These problems led the trial court
to order, among other things, that the visitation exchanges
take place in the parking lot of the Evergreen Police
Department, that Bledsoe shall take the child to and from
Cleghorn's vehicle, and that the parties not harass one
another.
In spite of the court order, problems persisted, and the
parties returned to court.  Cleghorn testified that Bledsoe
and the stepfather were trying to cut him off from his
daughter or to force him out of his daughter's life.  He
alleges that Bledsoe and the stepfather tried to intimidate
him and that the stepfather threatened him.  Cleghorn also
alleges that Bledsoe and the stepfather would try to demean
him in front of the child and would spank the child for
talking to him on the telephone.  He testified that the
stepfather hit him when he was waiting for the child in his
truck during one of the visitation exchanges.  Cleghorn also
alleges that Bledsoe did not keep the child clean and that she
refused to give Cleghorn information concerning the child's
1061014
4
grades in school and activities or ceremonies in which the
child was involved.  Also, according to Cleghorn, Bledsoe and
the stepfather told the child to call Cleghorn by his first
name and to call the stepfather "Daddy."
Bledsoe disputes most of Cleghorn's allegations.  She
admits that she violated a court order by telling the child,
when Cleghorn was not present, that she was adopted.  She also
admits that at the child's kindergarten graduation, when the
child had a poem and a rose to give to each of her parents,
Bledsoe took both and would not let the child give a poem and
a rose to Cleghorn until after the ceremony when Cleghorn had
returned to his truck.  Bledsoe also admits that she did not
let Cleghorn kiss the child on the mouth, but she insists that
this was for health reasons and that no one kisses the child
on the mouth in her presence.
Cleghorn argues that there was evidence before the trial
court indicating that Cleghorn's schedule was better for
taking care of the child.  Bledsoe's work schedule requires
that the child be dropped off at school 45 minutes before
school starts and then taken to the stepfather's restaurant
for a few hours each day after school.  Cleghorn's schedule
1061014
5
would allow him to drop the child off closer to the time
school actually starts and to pick her up at the end of her
school day.  Cleghorn also argues that when the child is with
him, she is taught to respect her mother and stepfather but
that when she is with Bledsoe and the stepfather, the child is
not encouraged to respect Cleghorn.  In fact, Cleghorn argues,
there was ample evidence from which the trial court could
determine that Bledsoe and the stepfather actively set out to
harm 
Cleghorn's 
relationship 
with 
the 
child, 
thereby
subjecting her to emotional abuse and acting in a manner that
is dangerous and harmful to the child's well-being.
The trial court entered a judgment awarding custody to
Cleghorn.  Bledsoe appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals
reversed the trial court's judgment, stating that the evidence
before the trial court "did not reveal a material change
affecting the welfare of the child, focus on how a change in
custody would materially benefit the child, or demonstrate an
overwhelming and obvious need for a change in custody."
Bledsoe v. Cleghorn, [Ms. 2050153, March 30, 2007] ___ So. 2d
___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2007).  Cleghorn then petitioned this
Court for certiorari review, and we granted the petition to
1061014
6
determine whether the Court of Civil Appeals' decision
conflicts with our decision in Ex parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d
863 (Ala. 1984), and whether we should overrule the portions
of our decisions in Ex parte Martin, 961 So. 2d 83 (Ala.
2006), and Ex parte Peppers, 703 So. 2d 299 (Ala. 1997), that
appear to imply that the party seeking modification of a
custody order must demonstrate an obvious and overwhelming
need for the change, which appears to be an additional element
to the standard established in Ex parte McLendon for the
modification of a custody award.
Standard of Review 
"When this Court reviews a trial court's child-
custody determination that was based upon evidence
presented ore tenus, we presume that the trial
court's 
decision 
is 
correct: 
'"A 
custody
determination of the trial court entered upon oral
testimony is accorded a presumption of correctness
on appeal, and we will not reverse unless the
evidence so fails to support the determination that
it is plainly and palpably wrong...."'"
 
Ex parte Fann, 810 So. 2d 631, 633 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Ex
parte Perkins, 646 So. 2d 46, 47 (Ala. 1994), quoting in turn
Phillips v. Phillips, 622 So. 2d 410, 412 (Ala. Civ. App.
1993)).  "This Court reviews questions of law de novo."
Alabama State Bar v. Caffey, 938 So. 2d 942, 945 (Ala. 2006)
1061014
Rule 28(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., provides that a
1
petitioner's 
brief 
shall 
contain 
"[a] 
statement 
of
jurisdiction including (i) the basis for the jurisdiction of
the court to which the appeal is taken (with citations to the
applicable statutory provisions and stating relevant facts
establishing 
jurisdiction), and (ii) the filing dates
establishing the timeliness of the appeal."
Rule 28(a)(8), Ala. R. App. P., provides that a
2
petitioner's brief shall contain "[a] concise statement of the
standard of review applicable to each issue."
7
(quoting Tipler v. Alabama State Bar, 866 So. 2d 1126, 1137
(Ala. 2003)).
Analysis
I
We first address whether we should dismiss Cleghorn's
petition for the writ of certiorari for failure to comply with
Rule 28(a)(3)  and (a)(8),  Ala. R. App. P., because his brief
1
2
does not include the statement of jurisdiction or a standard
of review.  Turning first to Bledsoe's argument that Cleghorn
fails to supply a statement of jurisdiction, we conclude that
this argument is without merit because Rule 28(a)(3), Ala. R.
App. P., has eliminated the obligation to include a statement
of jurisdiction in briefs "in cases on certiorari review."
Cleghorn's brief, however, does not contain a standard of
review.  Cleghorn admits in his reply brief "that the
1061014
8
conclusory 
statement 
of 
the 
standard 
of 
review 
was
inadvertently omitted" from his brief.  Cleghorn's reply brief
at 10.  Nevertheless, Cleghorn contends that the omission from
his brief of the standard of review is not a "fatal
deficiency" because, he says, the applicable standard of
review was incorporated in the argument section of his brief
and Bledsoe therefore was not prejudiced by the omission of
the standard of review at the beginning of his brief.  Our
review of Cleghorn's brief reveals that he is partially
correct that the standard of review is incorporated into the
argument section of his brief.  The argument section states
the correct standard of review when evidence is presented ore
tenus in a child-custody dispute; however, he makes no mention
of the standard of review this Court should apply when the
question presented is a pure question of law.  Cleghorn's
brief, thus, does not comply with Rule 28(a)(8), Ala. R. App.
P., and we must decide whether this noncompliance alone
warrants the dismissal of his petition.  
When we have dismissed an action for noncompliance with
Rule 28, Ala. R. App. P., we have done so because of the
party's failure to support his argument with citations to
1061014
9
caselaw, statutes, or the relevant portions of the record.
See Ex parte Borden, [Ms. 1050042, August 17, 2007] ___ So. 2d
___, ___ (Ala. 2007) (a party fails to comply with Rule 28(a),
Ala. R. App. P., when "there is no argument presented in the
brief and there are few, if any, citations to relevant legal
authority, resulting in an argument consisting of undelineated
general propositions");  Jacobs v. Jacobs, 583 So. 2d 1337,
1338 (Ala. 1991) ("Appellants who fail to comply with A[la].
R. App. P. 28(a) place themselves in a perilous position.
While we attempt to avoid dismissing appeals ... on what may
be seen as technicalities, we are sometimes unable to address
the merits of an appellant's claim when the appellant fails to
articulate that claim and presents no authorities in support
of that claim."); and Shows v. Freedlander, Inc., 523 So. 2d
376, 376 (Ala. 1988) (granting motion to dismiss because the
appellant "substantially failed to comply with Rule 28(a),
Ala. R. App. P.").  
In certain circumstances, Alabama courts have analyzed
the merits of a claim despite a party's noncompliance with
Rule 28(a), Ala. R. App. P.  Kirksey v. Roberts, 613 So. 2d
352, 353 (Ala. 1993) (when "we are able to adequately discern
1061014
10
the issue [the appellant] presents, in spite of his failure to
present authorities in support of his claim, we will not
affirm merely because of a technicality"); Cloud v. Cloud, 833
So. 2d 649, 650 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (concluding that
dismissal 
was 
not 
warranted 
when 
the 
party 
did 
not
"substantially fail[] to comply with the requirements of Rule
28, [Ala. R. App. P.]").  With the exception of Cleghorn's
omission of a standard of review, his brief complies with the
requirements of Rule 28(a), Ala. R. App. P.  The issues on
appeal are clearly discernible, the argument section of
Cleghorn's 
brief 
contains numerous citations to legal
authority to support his arguments, and his brief cites the
portions of the record he relies upon.  Therefore, we will
exercise our discretion and consider his petition. Dubose v.
Dubose, 964 So. 2d 42, 46 n.5 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) ("[T]his
court may choose to affirm a case on the basis of Rule 28[,
Ala. R. App. P.,] when an appellant's brief fails to comply
with the rule, but this court is by no means required to do
so." (emphasis omitted) (citing Kirksey, 613 So. 2d at 353)).
II
We next address the substantive issue -- whether the
1061014
Ex parte Snider, 929 So. 2d 447, 450 (Ala. 2005) (the
3
party seeking a change in custody "must show that the change
of custody will materially promote the child's welfare"); Ex
parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1194 (Ala. 1998) ("It is, of
course, well established that a noncustodial parent seeking a
change of custody must show not only that he or she is fit to
have custody, but that the change would materially promote the
child's best interests.  This requires a showing that the
positive good brought about by the modification would more
than offset the inherently disruptive effect caused by
uprooting the child." (citations omitted)); Ex parte Johnson,
673 So. 2d 410, 413 (Ala. 1994) ("[A]n existing custody
11
decision of the Court of Civil Appeals, which reversed the
trial court's judgment awarding Cleghorn custody of the child,
conflicts with Ex parte McLendon.  In Ex parte McLendon, we
held that the trial court cannot order a change of custody
"'unless [the parent] can show that a change of the custody
will materially promote [the] child's welfare.'" 455 So. 2d at
865 (quoting Greene v. Greene, 249 Ala. 155, 157, 308 So. 2d
444, 445 (1947)).  We noted in Ex parte McLendon that "[i]t is
important that [the parent] show that the child's interests
are promoted by the change, i.e., that [the parent seeking the
change in custody]  produce evidence to overcome the
'inherently disruptive effect caused by uprooting the child.'"
455 So. 2d at 866.  Since Ex parte McLendon, we have
repeatedly affirmed that standard as the one that should
govern in deciding whether a change in custody is warranted.3
1061014
arrangement will be modified only if the modification
materially promotes the best interests and welfare of the
child."); and Ex parte P.G.B., 600 So. 2d 259, 261 (Ala. 1992)
("The father bore the burden of proving that the change of
custody 'materially promoted the welfare and best interest of
[the child]' in a manner sufficient to more than offset the
effects caused by removing [the child] from his mother.").
12
Cleghorn argues that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision
here conflicts with Ex parte McLendon because, he says, the
Court of Civil Appeals did not adhere to the McLendon standard
in reaching its decision; instead, he says, it applied a
different standard, one that required him to demonstrate an
"overwhelming necessity" for the change in custody.  Cleghorn
argues 
that 
the 
overwhelming-necessity 
requirement 
is
inconsistent with the McLendon standard because "[t]o require
that a parent seeking a change in custody after a prior
custody award provide proof of an overwhelming necessity for
the change is too great a burden, one almost impossible to
meet." Cleghorn's brief at 21.  
Bledsoe contends that the Court of Civil Appeals'
decision does not conflict with Ex parte McLendon because "the
court of civil appeals expressly stated that, applying the Ex
parte McLendon standard only, the trial court's change in
custody did not comply with that standard." Bledsoe's brief at
1061014
13
15.  Bledsoe maintains that the Court of Civil Appeals applied
the 
McLendon 
and 
the 
overwhelming-necessity 
standards
separately and concluded that Cleghorn did not satisfy the
overwhelming-necessity standard only after it had already
determined that he had failed to demonstrate that the change
in custody materially promoted the child's welfare and thus
had not satisfied the McLendon standard.
After reviewing the Court of Civil Appeals' decision, we
agree with Cleghorn that the Court of Civil Appeals deviated
from the strict McLendon standard.  The Court of Civil
Appeals' opinion states that "the McLendon burden [is] a heavy
burden" and "'that the evidence in support of a modification
of custody "must be so substantial as to disclose an obvious
and overwhelming necessity for a change."'" Bledsoe, ___ So.
2d at ___ (quoting Ex parte Martin, 961 So. 2d at 87).  This
statement combines the McLendon standard and the overwhelming-
necessity standard.  In fact, the Court of Civil Appeals
explicitly stated that the overwhelming-necessity standard is
one that a party seeking a custody modification must satisfy
"[i]n addition" to the McLendon standard. ___ So. 2d at ___
("In addition [to the McLendon standard], a noncustodial
1061014
The Court of Civil Appeals stated that the evidence
4
provided by Cleghorn "did not reveal a material change
affecting the welfare of the child, focus on how a change in
custody would materially benefit the child, or demonstrate an
overwhelming and obvious need for a change in custody." ___
So. 2d at ___.    In light, however, of the conflating of the
McLendon standard and the overwhelming-necessity standard, it
is far from clear that the Court of Civil Appeals meant by
this statement that, notwithstanding the fact that it was
combining the standards, the Court of Civil Appeals had, in
fact, applied them separately.
14
parent must prove an obvious and overwhelming necessity for
the change of custody.").  By requiring Cleghorn to prove an
overwhelming necessity for a modification of custody, the
Court of Civil Appeals imposed a burden beyond the standard
established by Ex parte McLendon.4
The Court of Civil Appeals relied on our recent decision
in Ex parte Martin, supra.  In Ex parte Martin, we referred to
the overwhelming-necessity standard, stating:
"Subsequent cases have made the burden of the
noncustodial parent even heavier. Rich v. Rich, 887
So. 2d 289 (Ala.Civ.App. 2004), applied the McLendon
burden to temporary changes of custody as well as
permanent changes. Sexton v. Lambert, 611 So. 2d 385
(Ala.Civ.App. 1992), noted that the McLendon burden
is 'a very heavy burden.' 611 So. 2d at 387. Klapal
v. Brannon, 610 So. 2d 1167 (Ala.Civ.App. 1992),
also described the McLendon burden as a 'heavy
burden' and added that the evidence in support of a
modification of custody 'must be so substantial as
to disclose an obvious and overwhelming necessity
for a change.'"
1061014
15
961 So. 2d at 88.  We also referred to the overwhelming-
necessity standard in Ex parte Peppers, 703 So. 2d 299 (Ala.
1997):
"The courts of Alabama have emphasized that a
change of custody from one parent to another is not
a decision to be made lightly; on the contrary, it
may be made only where the evidence discloses an
obvious and overwhelming necessity for change.
Glover v. Singleton, 598 So. 2d 995 (Ala.Civ.App.
1992)." 
703 So. 2d at 302 (emphasis omitted).  Cleghorn invites this
Court to overrule those portions of Ex parte Martin and Ex
parte Peppers that can be read to imply that a party seeking
a change in custody must show, in addition to showing that a
change in custody comports with the McLendon standard, an
overwhelming necessity for the change.
Our decision in Ex parte McLendon provides that a party
seeking a change in custody must show that the change "will
materially promote [the] child's welfare." 455 So. 2d at 865.
The McLendon standard is a "rule of repose," meant to minimize
disruptive changes of custody because this Court presumes that
stability is inherently more beneficial to a child than
disruption.  Ex parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d at 865.  It is
founded on the longstanding principle that "[i]t is the
1061014
The McLendon standard
5
 
"'is a rule of repose, allowing the child, whose
welfare is paramount, the valuable benefit of
stability and the right to put down into its
environment those roots necessary for the child's
healthy growth into adolescence and adulthood. The
doctrine 
requires 
that 
the 
party 
seeking
modification prove to the court's satisfaction that
material changes affecting the child's welfare since
the most recent decree demonstrate that custody
should be disturbed to promote the child's best
interests. The positive good brought about by the
modification must more than offset the inherently
disruptive effect caused by uprooting the child.
Frequent disruptions are to be condemned.'"
 
Ex parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d at 865-66 (quoting Wood v. Wood,
333 So. 2d 826, 828 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976)).
16
court's duty to scrupulously guard and protect the interests
of children.  And in the context of child-custody proceedings,
the dominant consideration is always the best interest of the
child."  Ex parte Fann, 810 So. 2d 631, 638 (Ala. 2001).  See
also McCartney v. McCartney, [Ms. 2041048, July 27, 2007] ___
So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) ("'The controlling
consideration in child-custody matters is always the best
interests of the child.'" (quoting Patrick v. Williams, 952
So. 2d 1131, 1140 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006))).  The burden imposed
by the McLendon standard is typically a heavy one, recognizing
the importance of stability,  but the overwhelming-necessity
5
1061014
In his special writing in Smith v. Smith, 865 So. 2d
6
1207, 1211 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (Murdock, J., concurring
specially), Justice Murdock, then serving as a judge on the
Court of Civil Appeals, discussed how the overwhelming-
necessity standard began in the Court of Civil Appeals "merely
as the appellate-review standard that must be met to overcome
the 'ore tenus presumption' in favor of a trial court's
judgment where the evidence is presented orally."  Justice
Murdock further explained that in Braswell v. Braswell, 460
So. 2d 1339 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984), the Court of Civil Appeals
"for the first time incorrectly treated the overwhelming-
necessity 
standard 
as 
a 
substantive 
legal 
standard,
incorrectly characterized it as synonymous with the Ex parte
McLendon standard, and laid the foundation for its misuse in
future cases as an extra-Ex parte McLendon gloss on the Ex
parte McLendon standard."  Smith, 865 So. 2d at 1213 n.1.
17
requirement places a nearly insurmountable burden on the party
seeking a modification of custody, and in doing so, elevates
stability above the best interests of the child.    
6
We reaffirm the McLendon standard as the standard to be
applied when a party seeks a modification of custody, and we
hold that the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals here
conflicts with Ex parte McLendon.   Moreover, insofar as they
suggest that a party seeking a modification of a custody order
must prove an overwhelming necessity for the change in
custody, we hereby overrule Ex parte Martin and Ex parte
Peppers.
Conclusion
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and
1061014
18
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and
Murdock, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.