Case Title: Roosevelt v. Corapcioglu

Citation: 415 Md. 434

Docket Number: 156/08

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
HEADNOTE:   Roosevelt v. Corapcioglu, No. 156, September Term, 2008
                                                                                                                                                
DOMESTIC RELATIONS; ENTITLEMENT TO A QDRO:   Maryland law, not
federal law, must be applied to the issue of whether a party is entitled to a QDRO.
Because a judgment awarding costs and counsel fees pursuant to FL 12-103(a)(2)(iii)
does not constitute “child support” under Maryland law, a party is not entitled to a QDRO
to enforce such a judgment.  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 156
September Term, 2008  
                                                                                
SHARON ROOSEVELT 
v.
MEHMET YAVUZ CORAPCIOGLU
                                                                                
Bell, C.J.
Harrell  
Battaglia 
Greene
Murphy
Adkins   
Eldridge, John C., (Retired, 
Specially Assigned), 
JJ.
                                                                                
Opinion by Murphy, J.
                                                                                 
Filed:   August 25, 2010
1 Because no prior appellate decision has been rendered in the case at bar, the
designation of the parties is controlled by Md. Rule 8-111(a)(1).
In the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Sharon Roosevelt, Appellant, sought
a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) to enforce a judgment of attorney’s fees
and costs that had been entered in her favor and against Mehmet Corapcioglu, Appellee.1  
The Circuit Court denied that request, and Appellant noted an appeal to the Court of
Special Appeals, presenting a single issue for review:
Whether the state law definition of “child support” as an
ongoing obligation pursuant to [Sections] 12-200 et seq. [of the
Family Law Article (FL)] is appropriately used to determine
whether an entitlement or right awarded to a dependent of a
participant, pursuant to a domestic relations order,
impermissibly frustrates the preemption provision and the
limited exception to the anti-alienation clause provided for by
[ERISA].
Prior to argument before a panel of the Court of Special Appeals, this Court issued
a writ of certiorari on its own initiative. 406 Md. 744, 962 A.2d 371 (2008). For the
reasons that follow, we hold that the Maryland definition of child support is applicable to
the determination of whether Appellant was entitled to a QDRO.  We shall therefore
affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.
Background
The parties are the parents of a son who was abducted and taken to Turkey by
Appellee.  Appellant's request for a QDRO stems from a judgment that she obtained
against Appellee for attorney's fees and costs that she incurred in her successful effort to
have the child returned to her custody.  That judgment was affirmed by the Court of
2
Special Appeals in Corapcioglu v. Roosevelt, 170 Md. App. 572, 907 A.2d 885 (2006)
(“Corapcioglu 1").  While affirming the judgment, the Court of Special Appeals stated:
In the case at bar, notwithstanding that the expenses incurred by
Mother to return [the child] to her custody might have benefited
him, the expenses were not child support under Maryland law;
rather, they were costs incurred by Mother in prosecuting the
child support action by seeking enforcement of the court's
custody order, including by pursuing Hague Convention
litigation in Turkey and by retaining experts in foreign
abductions to locate [the child] and attempt to gain his release.
The hearing court did not err by ruling that its award of fees and
costs incurred by Mother in rescuing [the child] from Turkey
was not child support, or in the nature of child support, under
Maryland law.
Id. at 592, 907 A.2d at 897.  
In her “Motion for Qualified Domestic Relations Order,” Appellant included the
following assertions:
3.  The outstanding Judgments in this matter are issued
pursuant to a domestic relations order as defined by 29 U.S.C.
1056(d)(3)(B) et seq.  [Appellant] requests that the
Judgments, issued pursuant to Maryland Domestic Relations
Law, be qualified in the form of a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order. []   
4.  For the reasons explained in the attached Memorandum,
federal law controls the determination as to whether fees
qualify as child support, and therefore are collectible from an
ERISA qualified pension plan through a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order (QDRO). [] In the instant case, federal law
supports the issuance of a QDRO.
5.  The [Appellee] has a retirement pension and other
retirement benefits through TIAA-CREF.  The [Appellee] has
reached his earliest retirement age and is eligible to receive
3
funds from his pension plan.  ERISA allows child support to
be paid through a pension and retirement benefits.  Child
support may be paid through a Qualified Domestic Relations
Order pursuant to IRC § 414(p) and 29 U.S.C. 1056(d).
On March 28, 2008, a Circuit Court Domestic Relations Master held a hearing on
the motion, at the conclusion of which the Master stated:
I don’t think the Federal Bankruptcy Court cases apply[] here. 
The Bankruptcy Courts have their own purposes within the
meaning of the Federal Bankruptcy Statute and Regulations. 
What is child support or in the nature of child support within
the meaning of the Federal Bankruptcy Statute and
Regulations, is different than what the Maryland Courts
determine is child support, as far as attorney’s fees.
*     *     *
Well, I don’t find that these meet the exception to allow the
establishment of a qualified domestic relations order, and I
recommend that the motion for qualified domestic relations
order . . . be denied.
Appellant filed “Exceptions to Master’s Findings and Recommendations,” in
which she argued as follows:
3.  The Master erred and was otherwise clearly erroneous
when he concluded that the Qualified Domestic Relations
Order requested was not available.  The Master found that
Maryland’s definition of child support was the basis upon
which the issuance of a QDRO should be determined. 
Whether a QDRO should issue is properly a matter of federal
law, not state law.  To allow the Maryland definition of child
support to control will result in unequal application of federal
law from state to state.
4.  [].  ERISA has an express preemption clause that is 
4
intended to protect the stated purpose of uniform application
from state to state.
*     *     *
6.  For the reasons explained in the Memorandum that will be
filed forthwith, federal law controls the determination as to
whether fees qualify as child support in this matter, and
therefore are collectible from an ERISA qualified pension
plan through a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO).
[] In the instant case, federal law supports the issuance of a
QDRO.
7.  The [Appellee] has a retirement pension and other 
retirement benefits through TIAA-CREF.  The [Appellee] has
reached his earliest retirement age and is eligible to receive
funds from his pension plan.  ERISA allows child support to
be paid through a pension and retirement benefits.  Child
support may be paid through a Qualified Domestic Relations
Order pursuant to IRC § 414(p) and 29 U.S.C. 1056(d).
On June 3, 2008, the Circuit Court held a hearing on Appellant’s exceptions. In a
Memorandum Opinion and Order filed on June 11, 2008, while denying Appellant’s
request for a QDRO, the Circuit Court stated: 
State law, not federal bankruptcy guidelines, defines “child
support” in Maryland.  The Court of Appeals in Goldberg [v.
Miller, 371 Md. 591, 810 A.2d 947 (2002)], clearly stated that
“[f]ederal bankruptcy law does not, in any way, bind this
Court in making decisions regarding matters of state law.”
371 Md. at 610[ n.8, 810 A.2d at 958 n.8]. The Goldberg
Court explained that the policy considerations of bankruptcy
law are unique to the interpretations of the bankruptcy code
and are not necessarily analogous to state policy concerns. 
See id. 
*     *     *
5
 
. . . . The Goldberg Court concluded that the General
Assembly, not federal law, was left as the “guiding authority
for matters of child support in Maryland.”  Id. at 612[, 810
A.2d at 959]. Therefore, it follows that federal bankruptcy law
does not define what constitutes child support in the state of
Maryland.  Attorney’s fees and costs are not among the
enumerated factors of the Maryland child support guidelines,
and this Court will not create such a factor in the absence of
legislative authority.
As stated above, after Appellant noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, 
this Court issued a writ of certiorari on its own initiative.  
Discussion
Appellant argues (in the words of her brief):
Child support is not defined [in ERISA], and therefore must
be given its plain meaning.  ERISA preempts state law,
therefore, the meaning of child support that must be used is
the meaning used in federal law.  A review of federal
bankruptcy case law clearly establishes that child support
includes costs and fees incurred enforcing a child custody
order.  Silverman v. Spiro[, 438 Mass. 725, 784 N.E.2d 1
(2003)], holds that “child support” includes costs incurred
pursuing custody of a child.  For purposes of determining
whether an entitlement awarded to Appellant is enforceable
through a QDRO, it must be determined whether the
“entitlement” “relates to” child support, as intended within
ERISA.
We disagree with that argument.  FL § 12-103, in pertinent part provides:  
(a) In general.  -- The court may award to either party the costs
and counsel fees that are just and proper under all the 
circumstances in any case in which a person: 
6
(1) applies for a decree or modification of a
decree concerning the custody, support, or
visitation of a child of the parties; or
(2) files any form of proceeding:
(i) to recover arrearages of child support;
     
(ii) to enforce a decree of child support; or
(iii) to enforce a decree of custody or visitation.
ERISA, (the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974), in pertinent part,
provides:  
(i) the term "qualified domestic relations order" means a
domestic relations order-
            (I) which creates or recognizes the existence of an
alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the
right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with
respect to a participant under a plan, and
            (II) with respect to which the requirements of
subparagraphs (C) and (D) are met, and
(ii) the term "domestic relations order" means any judgment,
decree, or order (including approval of a property settlement
agreement) which--
           (I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony
payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former
spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant, and
            (II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations
law (including a community property law).
29 U.S.C. §1056(D)(3)(B) (emphasis added).  “The term ‘alternate payee’ means any
spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant who is recognized by a
domestic relations order as having a right to receive all, or a portion of, the benefits
payable under a plan with respect to such participant.” §1056(K).
QDROs are exempted from ERISA’s preemption provisions.  29 U.S.C.S. § 1144, 
in pertinent part, provides:
7
(a) Supersedure; effective date. Except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this title and
title IV shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 4(a) [29 USCS § 1003(a)] and not exempt
under section 4(b) [29 USCS § 1003(b)]. This section shall
take effect on January 1, 1975.
(b) Construction and application.
(7) Subsection (a) shall not apply to qualified
domestic relations orders (within the meaning of
section 206(d)(3)(B)(i) [29 USCS §
1056(d)(3)(B)(i)]), qualified medical child
support orders (within the meaning of section
609(a)(2)(A)) [29 USCS § 1169(a)(2)(A)], and
the provisions of law referred to in section
609(a)(2)(B)(ii) [29 USCS § 1169(a)(2)(B)(ii)]
to the extent they apply to qualified medical
child support orders.
29 U.S.C.S. § 1144.
In Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 566 A.2d 767 (1989), this Court included
the following analysis from both the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance
Committee Reports:  
Under the bill, if a domestic relations order requires the
distribution of all or a part of a participant's benefits under a 
qualified plan to an alternate payee, then the creation,
recognition, or assignment of the alternate payee's right to the
benefits is not considered an assignment or alienation of
benefits under the plan if and only if the order is a qualified
domestic relations order. Because rights created, recognized,
or assigned by a qualified domestic relations order, and
benefit payments pursuant to such an order, are specifically
permitted under the bill, State law providing for these rights
and payments under a qualified domestic relations order will
continue to be exempt from Federal preemption under
ERISA."
8
H.Rep. No. 655 at 18; S.Rep. No. 575 at 19, U.S.Code Cong.
& Admin.News 1984, pp. 2547, 2565 (emphasis added).
Id. at 33, 566 A.2d at 769-70.  
In Goldberg v. Miller, 371 Md. 591, 810 A.2d 947 (2002), while holding that the
Circuit Court did not have authority to characterize guardian ad litem fees as child
support, this Court stated: 
One provision under Title 12 of the Family Law
Article provides for an award that may not be treated as child
support, however. Section 12-103(a) allows the court, at its
discretion, to award counsel fees to "either party" of a
domestic case where issues of child support, custody, or
visitation are involved. Code, § 12-103(a) of the Family Law
Article. Section 12-103(a), though, does not concern
attorney's fees that a court may award to a guardian ad litem.
See Petrini [v.  Petrini], 336 Md.[453] at 467-68, 648 A.2d
[1015]at 1022-23 [(1994)]. Rather, it refers to any counsel
fees accrued by one party in applying for or defending a
matter involving child support, child custody, or visitation.
Code, § 12-103(a) of the Family Law Article. The party,
therefore, rather than the child, receives the immediate benefit
from an award under this section, unlike the expenses the
Legislature addressed under Section 12-101(d)(ii), which
governs medical support and neonatal expenses, and Section
12-102(b), which governs orders to required health insurance
coverage for a child. Thus, courts may not treat an award
under Section 12-103(a) as child support.
* * *
Goldberg relies heavily on the bankruptcy court's
determination that, for purposes of bankruptcy law, attorney's
fees are "in the nature of child support" and, therefore, not
dischargeable debts. In Re Blaemire, 229 B.R. 665 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1999). He argues:
9
It would seem incongruous to suggest
that a judgment for the fees of a guardian ad
litem will not be discharged in Bankruptcy
because they are in the nature of child support,
but, at the same time, may not be collected from
the judgment debtor because under state
decisional authority they are not in the nature of
child support.
[]. We reject this argument because it fails to consider
the consequences of allowing guardian ad litem fees to be
treated as child support under Maryland law. The policy
consequence that we find most persuasive is that such a
characterization could subject an obligated parent to potential
imprisonment under the court's contempt powers.
Id. at 606-609, 810 A.2d at 956-58. 
In Silverman v. Sprio, 784 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 2003), the father of three children sought
a QDRO to recover counsel fees incurred in his efforts to (1) obtain custody of the
children after their mother took them from Massachusetts to Texas, and (2) obtain back
child support owed by the mother, who opposed the father’s request on the ground that
the “attorney’s fees were incurred ‘not to facilitate the collection of child support, but
essentially as a sanction . . . for her actions in the course of the [change of custody]
litigation,’ and as such fall outside of the QDRO exception to ERISA.”  Id. at 7.  While
holding that the father’s entitlement to a QDRO was limited to counsel fees incurred in
obtaining child support, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated:
The father is entitled to the benefit of a QDRO to recover
attorney’s fees in connection with his work related to the order
establishing back child support owed by the mother because that
order collects arrearages. . . . The father’s attorney’s time spent
on other aspects of the case (obtaining custody . . . ) cannot be
10
included in the QDRO because they do not relate to the
“provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital
property rights.” 
Id. at 9.  We agree with that analysis, which is consistent with our holdings in Rohrbeck 
and Goldberg.  Under Maryland law, Appellant is not entitled to a QDRO to enforce the
judgment entered for counsel fees and costs that she incurred in obtaining the child’s
return from Turkey.  
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED;
APPELLANT TO PAY THE COSTS.