Case Title: State v. McKeen

Citation: 165 Vt 469, 685 A.2d 1090

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. McKeen  (94-260); 165 Vt 469; 685 A.2d 1090

[Opinion Filed 30-Aug-1996]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 25-Sep-1996]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 94-260


State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

David P. McKeen                                   April Term, 1996


Alden T. Bryan, J.

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

       Robert Appel, Defender General, Henry Hinton, Appellate Attorney,
  Montpelier, and David P. McKeen, pro se, Swanton, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



       DOOLEY, J.   Defendant David McKeen appeals his convictions for sexual
  assault, 13 V.S.A. § 3252, and kidnapping, 13 V.S.A. § 2405, following a
  jury trial.  He argues that a new trial should have been ordered because of
  the misconduct of a juror.  We conclude that the decision to deny a new
  trial was within the discretion of the trial court and affirm.

       On the night of July 11, 1992, defendant met the complainant at Eddy's
  Pub in Burlington.  The two left the pub together and entered defendant's
  automobile.  The complainant testified that defendant then hit her on the
  head and drove her to his home in Starksboro, where he tied her and forced
  her to engage in multiple sexual acts.  Afterwards, he drove her, naked and
  bound, to an isolated dirt road and pushed her out, along with her clothes.

       Defendant testified during trial and provided a different version of
  the events.  He testified that he had agreed, prior to the trip to his
  home, to purchase an "eight ball" of cocaine for the complainant in
  exchange for sex.  He claimed the sexual contact had been consensual and

 

  that when he refused to buy the cocaine as promised, the complainant became
  violent, requiring him to restrain her with ropes.

       Defendant's jury trial began on October 26, 1993.  Throughout the
  proceedings, the trial court cautioned the jurors not to discuss the case
  with anyone and not to read newspaper accounts or watch television
  newscasts about the trial.  At the end of the trial, before dismissing the
  alternates, the court asked the jurors whether any of them had discussed
  the case with third parties or had received any outside information about
  the trial.  No juror answered affirmatively. On November 2, 1993, after a
  day of deliberations, the jury returned its verdict, finding defendant
  guilty of sexual assault and kidnapping.

       The next day an anonymous caller reported to defendant's attorney that
  a juror, later identified as Jeffrey Prior, had discussed the case with a
  friend at the Daily Planet, a Burlington restaurant.  After the defense
  filed a motion for a new trial on grounds of juror misconduct, the trial
  court held a hearing on November 5 and December 1, 1993 to investigate the
  possible juror taint.

       During the hearing, the friend testified that on Friday evening,
  October 29, 1993, he saw Prior at the restaurant and struck up a
  conversation, out of the hearing of others.  When it was disclosed that
  Prior was serving as a juror in defendant's trial, the friend exclaimed,
  "Guilty, guilty, guilty."  Prior replied that defendant was not necessarily
  guilty.  He said he was impressed with defendant's testimony as well as
  with his defense lawyer, was not convinced of defendant's guilt, and was
  uncertain how he would vote.

       Prior then discussed some of the testimony he had heard that day. 
  Specifically, he said he heard that defendant, a construction worker, had
  gone out on the town to a bar he had never visited before with a lot of
  money; that defendant testified he was repelled by the smell of the
  complainant when she was undressed at his Starksboro home; and that
  defendant and complainant were driving around, looking to buy drugs.

       Lastly, Prior and his friend talked about the reasonable-doubt
  standard.  The friend said

 

  that the standard is met only when a jury is convinced without a reasonable
  doubt that the defendant is completely guilty.  During the conversation,
  the friend also related information about Eddy's Pub -- he lived in the
  neighborhood; the pub was a site of drug dealing; two female prostitutes
  who used to live on his street used the pub to pick up customers and take
  them to a nearby apartment.

       On the second day of the hearing, Prior assured the trial court he had
  not brought any of the conversation with his friend into the jury room. 
  The jury foreperson also testified and supported Prior's claim, but
  revealed in addition that Prior had mentioned to other jurors the price of
  an eight ball of cocaine, which he had learned from someone.  Recalled to
  the stand, Prior admitted he had had a second conversation with a person
  named Nelson, probably at the same bar, and learned from it that the
  current market price of an eight ball of cocaine was $300. He told other
  jurors this price.  Prior denied having any other conversations and again
  denied that he imparted any other information to the other jurors.

       At the end of the hearing, the trial court determined that Prior's
  misconduct had not influenced the jury deliberations or tainted the
  verdict.  The court applied a two-part analysis: (1) whether defendant
  showed an irregularity capable of influencing the jurors; and (2) if so,
  whether the State showed that the irregularity did not in fact prejudice
  the jurors against defendant.  See State v. Corey, 151 Vt. 325, 328, 561 A.2d 87, 88 (1989); see also State v. Woodard, 134 Vt. 154, 157,