Case Title: Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. Elmore Livestock Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5829

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. Elmore Livestock Co.1983 WY 87669 P.2d 505Case Number: 5829Case Number: 5829Decided: 08/30/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
BELLE FOURCHE PIPELINE 
COMPANY, A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

ELMORE LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
A WYOMING CORPORATION, AND MIKE ELMORE AND RITA ELMORE, D/B/A ELMORE LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS). No. 5829

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

Richard E. Day 
and Patricia M. Baird of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., and Robert 
Stanley Lowe, Casper, for appellant.

Kim D. Cannon 
and Rebecca W. Thomson of Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, for appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER*, THOMAS, ROSE and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Retired June 13, 1983, 
but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case pursuant 
to order of the court entered June 13, 1983.

RAPER, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     In this case, the 
Elmores (appellees) filed suit against Belle Fourche Pipeline Company 
(appellant) for the damage done to their land and the groundwater beneath it 
when appellant's high pressure crude oil pipeline ruptured and spilled oil on 
appellees' land. After a jury trial, appellees were awarded $40,000 for the 
damage done to their land. Additionally, appellant was required to pay $57,250 
into the court registry to restore the groundwater to its prior condition, to be 
expended subject to stipulation or order of the court. Appellant questions both 
the amount of damages awarded for appellees' land and the propriety of 
appellees' suit to restore the condition of the groundwater. Appellant phrases 
the issues raised as follows:

"1. Pollution of Ground 
Water.

"A. Did Appellees have 
sufficient compensable interest in the ground water to permit an award of 
damages for costs of cleanup?

"B. Did the trial court 
have jurisdiction in this action to instruct the jury on awarding damages based 
upon the cost of restoration of the ground water?

"C. Did the trial court 
err in permitting testimony concerning cost of restoration which exceeded value 
of the land and which was remote, uncertain, conjectural and 
speculative?

"2. Was the award of 
forty thousand dollars for damages to Appellees' land unsupported by competent 
evidence with the result that the damages assessed were irrational, speculative 
and contrary to law?"

We will reverse 
as to the $57,250 and reverse and remand for new trial as to the 
$40,000.

[¶2.]     On October 8, 1976, a 
high pressure crude oil pipeline owned and operated by appellant ruptured 
spilling approximately 300 to 500 barrels of crude oil onto appellees' land. The 
area covered by the spilled oil amounted to approximately three acres. The oil 
flowed downhill from the point of the rupture over moderately sloping range land 
and into a gently sloping alfalfa field. The oil followed a natural drainage 
way. The size of the oil spill ranged from 20 to 150 feet wide by approximately 
6/10ths of a mile long. The oil penetrated the soil from a depth of six inches 
at the top of the slope to seven feet at the bottom.

[¶3.]     Although appellant 
attempted to clean up the site immediately after the spill, its efforts were 
neither completely successful nor satisfactory to appellees. Appellant has never 
contested the fact that it was liable for the damage to appellees' land and that 
the damage was permanent. The only dispute in that regard is to the amount owed 
by appellant and how that figure is to be reached. Additional facts regarding 
that issue will be addressed later in this opinion.

[¶4.]     In May 1980, three and 
one-half years after the spill, appellees obtained the services of a consulting 
engineering firm to determine what could be done to restore the land within the 
oil spill site. In the course of their efforts, the consultants took various 
soil samples and groundwater samples. Their water samples were obtained from a 
pit dug to a depth of seven feet near the terminus of the oil's travel. The 
sampling pit cut into a shallow groundwater acquifer. In September 1980, when 
the water samples were analyzed, analysis revealed that the water samples 
contained more than acceptable amounts of oil. Later tests on water samples 
taken from the same location also revealed unacceptably high amounts of oil in 
the water. The conclusions concerning water quality were reached by using state 
water quality standards found in the rules and regulations of the Wyoming 
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), Water Quality Division.1 The water analysis indicating 
possible groundwater pollution caused by the spill became known to appellees in 
November 1980 when the consulting firm submitted a report of its findings to 
them.

[¶5.]     In appellees' original 
complaint, filed in September 1980, no claim for relief was based on pollution 
of the groundwater. After the consultant's report was submitted to appellees, an 
amended complaint was filed in September 1981. That amended complaint formed the 
basis for trial in this case. In it, appellees, in addition to complaining about 
the damage done to the surface of the land, alleged that appellant had polluted 
the groundwater beneath the land thereby damaging the land 
itself.

[¶6.]     Since the oil spill, 
appellees have not suffered any harmful effects from alleged oil pollution of 
the water upon or underlying their land. Appellees admitted that at trial. In 
fact prior to late 1980, appellees could not have been affected by polluted 
underground water since they had yet to seek permits from the state engineer to 
drill and appropriate the water underlying their land. In August 1980 and in 
April 1981, appellees sought and were granted permits to drill a total of three 
irrigation wells within the general area of the spill site. At the time of 
trial, the three irrigation wells were in the process of being completed. Where 
water had been produced, no oil pollution was apparent; therefore, no harm 
resulting from oil pollution had occurred. The water from these wells, at the 
time of trial, had yet to be put to any beneficial use.

[¶7.]     The case was tried 
before a jury on the issues of (1) the amount of damages appellees were entitled 
to for injury to their land; (2) whether the oil spill polluted the surface or 
groundwater; and (3) if the waters were polluted by the oil spill, what damages 
appellees were entitled to for that pollution. After the presentation of 
evidence, the jury was instructed on the law as the trial judge visualized it 
and at appellant's request, made pursuant to Rule 49, W.R.C.P., the jury was 
required to complete a special verdict form which contained several 
interrogatories. The jury found that appellees' lands were damaged by the spill 
and that the amount owed by appellant was the difference in values before and 
after the spill which amounted to $40,000. The jury further found that the oil 
spill had polluted the groundwater and that appellant should pay $57,250 to 
restore it to its prior condition.

[¶8.]     Appellant, after entry 
of judgment, filed a timely motion for new trial or in the alternative for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, complaining primarily about the assessment 
of $57,250 to restore the groundwater.2 After hearing arguments on the 
motions, the trial court entered an order denying the motions and amending the 
judgment. The judgment was amended to the extent that the $57,250 awarded for 
restoration of the water was to be paid into the registry of the court subject 
to disbursement only upon stipulation of the parties or order of the court. This 
appeal followed.

I

[¶9.]     Since appellees 
suffered no harmful effects from alleged water pollution, their theory for 
recovery of damages is based on the mere fact that the underground water is 
polluted. Appellant argues essentially that any cause of action appellees may 
have had based on pollution of the underground water underlying their land was 
improperly brought. We agree.

[¶10.]  The groundwater at issue is water of the 
state as defined in § 35-11-103(c)(vi), W.S. 1977. That statute defines waters 
of the state to mean "all surface and ground water within Wyoming." Section 
35-11-301(a)(i), W.S. 1977, prohibits, except when authorized by permit, the 
discharge of pollution into the waters of the state. We have previously held 
that crude oil entering the waters of the state from a ruptured pipeline is a 
discharge of pollution prohibited by § 35-11-301(a)(i), supra. People v. Platte Pipe Line Company, 
Wyo., 649 P.2d 208 (1982). We further held in People v. Platte Pipe Line Company, supra, that 
owners of pipelines which discharge oil into waters of the state are liable to 
the state regardless of fault for damages and the civil penalties set out in § 
35-11-901, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1983. Id., 649 P.2d  at 214. Therefore, if in fact 
oil from appellant's ruptured pipeline did enter the groundwater, appellant is 
strictly liable to the state for any damages it caused and the civil penalties 
set out in § 35-11-901, supra.

Section 
35-11-901, supra, provides for penalties for the violation of the Wyoming 
Environmental Quality Act, § 35-11-101 et seq., W.S. 1977, of which § 35-11-301, 
supra, is a part. It provides the means by which the DEQ proceeds against 
violators of the act after investigations of alleged violations have been 
conducted pursuant to § 35-11-701, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 
1983.

Although § 
35-11-901, supra, deals with the state's action against violators of the act, 
individual citizens are not prevented from seeking redress in the courts for 
violations or for damages resulting from violations of the act or rules, 
regulations, etc. promulgated thereunder. Section 35-11-902, W.S. 1977, 
Cum.Supp. 1983, provides both for suits by interested citizens acting as private 
attorneys general and for existing personal claims resulting from violations of 
the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act; it provides in pertinent 
part:

"(a) Except as 
provided in subsection (c) of this section, any person having an interest which 
is or may be adversely affected, may commence a civil action on his own behalf 
to compel compliance with this act only to the extent that such action could 
have been brought in federal district court under Section 520 of P.L. 95-87 [30 
U.S.C. § 1270], as that law is worded on August 3, 1977:

"(i) Against any 
governmental entity, for alleged violations of any provisions of this act or of 
any rule, regulation, order or permit issued pursuant thereto, or against any 
other person for alleged violations of any rule, regulation, order or permit 
issued pursuant to this act; * * *

* * * * * 
*

"(c) No action 
pursuant to this section may be commenced:

"(i) Prior to 
sixty (60) days after the plaintiff has given notice in writing of the violation 
and of his intent to commence the civil action to the department and the alleged 
violator, except that such action may be brought immediately after such 
notification if the violation complained of constitutes an imminent threat to 
the health or safety of the plaintiff or would immediately affect a legal 
interest of the plaintiff; or

"(ii) If the 
department, through the attorney general, has commenced a civil action to 
require compliance with the provisions of this act, or any rule, regulation, 
order or permit issued pursuant to this act, but in any such action any person 
may intervene as a matter of right.

"(d) The state 
of Wyoming, 
department of environmental quality, may intervene as a matter of right in any 
action filed pursuant to this section.

* * * * * 
*

"(g) Nothing in 
this act shall in any way limit any existing civil or criminal remedy for any 
wrongful action arising out of a violation of any provision of this act or any 
rule, regulation, standard, permit, license, or variance or order adopted 
hereunder." (Emphasis added.)

That statutory 
provision would allow a suit such as the one brought by appellees, as interested 
parties who may be adversely affected, in which no actual personal harm is 
complained of but merely the violation of the rules and regulations issued 
pursuant to the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act. However, to do so requires 
adherence to certain procedural requirements including the 60-day notice 
requirement found in § 35-11-902(c), supra. Notice to the State and the alleged 
violator is required prior to the initiation of court proceedings by a private 
person in the absence of the exceptional circumstances described in § 
35-11-902(c), supra. Appellees neither alleged nor proved any such damages as 
might be recovered under those theories.

Appellees' claim 
and the evidence they produced at trial can only be construed as going to show 
that appellant polluted the groundwater in the vicinity of the oil spill. 
Appellees were not appropriators or beneficial users of water they complain was 
polluted. Appellees failed to show any damages they suffered as a result of the 
alleged violation of the act which would entitle them to relief under § 
35-11-902(g), supra. They had no water right which was harmed since they had yet 
to apply any of the groundwater to a beneficial use. It is elementary water law 
that in Wyoming beneficial use is the basis, measure 
and limit of a water right. Section 41-3-101, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1983; John 
Meier & Son, Inc. v. Horse Creek Conservation District of Goshen County, Wyo., 603 P.2d 1283 (1979). See also, Green 
River Development Company v. FMC Corporation, Wyo., 660 P.2d 339 (1983). Water 
is the property of the state. Section 41-3-101, supra. Rights to underground 
water are subject to the same preferences as those provided by law for surface 
waters. Section 41-3-906, W.S. 1977.

Although 
recovery for damages resulting from pollution of the groundwater in violation of 
the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act could be had under existing remedies such 
as trespass or nuisance actions, § 35-11-902(g), supra, those damages must be 
proven. Appellees neither alleged nor proved any such 
damages.

Therefore, since 
appellees' action can only be construed to have been brought as a private 
attorney general under § 35-11-902(a)(i), supra, such action was procedurally 
defective for failure to provide both DEQ and appellant with proper notice 
required in § 35-11-902(c)(i), supra - the notice required by the statute to 
allow the State to enter the action if appropriate.3 That procedural defect requires 
reversal of that portion of the judgment dealing with restoration of the 
underground water to its prior condition. In reversing that portion of the 
judgment, we do not reach the merits of the claim nor the manner in which the 
amount required for restoration was reached. Accordingly, we must reverse and 
set aside that portion of the judgment requiring payment of $57,250 to restore 
the water. The district court had no jurisdiction to enter such a judgment. Only 
the State of Wyoming may initiate and pursue such remedy.

II

In its second 
issue, appellant calls into question the competence of appellees' evidence upon 
which the jury relied in awarding $40,000 for the damage to appellees' land. The 
law is well settled in Wyoming that the measure of damages for injury to real 
property where that injury is of a permanent nature - i.e., where it cannot be 
repaired except at great expense - is the difference between the value of the 
property immediately before and the value immediately after the injury. North 
Central Gas Company v. Bloem, Wyo., 376 P.2d 382 (1962); Town Council of Town of 
Hudson v. Ladd, 37 Wyo. 419, 263 P. 703 (1928). See also, 2 Land and Water 
L.Rev. 235 (1967). In several recent, analogous condemnation cases dealing with 
the measure of damages for easements, this court has again held that before and 
after values must be used to determine damages to realty. Energy Transportation 
Systems, Inc. v. Mackey, Wyo., 650 P.2d 1152 (1982); Coronado Oil Company v. 
Grieves, Wyo., 642 P.2d 423 (1982). In those decisions, we made it clear that in 
order to reach damages, the fair market value of the entire parcel immediately 
before and immediately after the easement is granted must be proven by competent 
evidence.

Here, where 
appellees complained of the loss in value to their ranch caused by the oil 
spill, it is only proper to require proof of the fair market values of their 
entire ranch before and after the spill in order to prove damages. Frankfort Oil 
Company v. Abrams, 159 Colo. 535, 413 P.2d 190 (1966); Town Council of Town of 
Hudson v. Ladd, supra. In determining damages to the entire parcel, 
consideration may be given to every lawful use the land may be put to. That 
consideration is not limited to the use the land was being put to at the time of 
the injury. Coronado Oil Company v. Grieves, supra (citing Canyon View Ranch v. 
Basin Electric Power Corporation, Wyo., 628 P.2d 530 
(1981)).

Proof of before 
and after fair market values must be by competent and permissible evidence. 
Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. v. Mackey, supra; Coronado Oil Company v. 
Grieves, supra. In both of those cases, no competent evidence of before and 
after values was presented by the landowners. In Energy Transportation Systems, 
Inc. v. Mackey, supra, there was no testimony presented by the landowners as to 
the before and after values of their property. In Coronado Oil Company v. 
Grieves, supra, not only was impermissible testimony as to damages admitted over 
objection, but the only before and after value figures admitted were shown to be 
incompetent by opposing counsel. There the trial court erred in refusing to 
strike that incompetent testimony as requested by opposing 
counsel.

At the trial of 
the case now on appeal before us, appellant elected not to challenge the 
competency of the appellees' expert witness, and no motion was made to strike 
the expert's testimony. Instead, upon cross-examination, appellant's counsel 
caused appellees' proof to fail when the appellees' expert witness in his 
testimony agreed with the position which the appellant had held from the time of 
the pretrial conference on. At the close of appellees' case in chief, the 
appellant then moved for a directed verdict on the ground that appellees had 
failed to sustain their burden of proof and had failed to demonstrate a prima 
facie case of damages concerning the land. The motion was renewed at the close 
of all the evidence, and both motions were overruled.

In this case the 
facts created a requirement for a particular result, as a matter of law. The 
motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. The rule is that the 
test to determine if a motion for directed verdict should be granted is whether 
the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or 
otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one 
conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable men could have reached. 9 Wright 
& Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 
2524.

This court has 
more often been confronted with error in the granting of motions for directed 
verdicts than in denying them - Vassos v. Roussalis, Wyo., 658 P.2d 1284 (1983), 
for example. The trial judge here did follow a preferable practice of letting 
the case go to the jury and letting some of the questions of law be settled 
later, rather than undergoing the risk of new trial if the evidence was properly 
present. It is thoroughly established with some limited exceptions that the 
sufficiency of the evidence is not reviewable on appeal unless a motion for a 
directed verdict was made in the trial court. Curtis v. Center Realty Company, 
Wyo., 502 P.2d 365 (1972); Warner v. Kewanee Machinery & Conveyor Company, 
411 F.2d 1060 (6th Cir. 1969). See also, 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: § 2536.4 We therefore have an appeal in 
which the appellees' evidence may be reviewed to determine if it will support a 
$40,000 verdict for damage to the land. It will not.

Appellees' ranch 
is a 7,800-acre unit. Appellees' expert appraiser testified that the highest and 
best use of the land was division into 40-acre tracts as ranchettes. For this 
purpose he only used the 1,760 acres of the Elmore home ranch. It was his view 
that the oil spill affected the value of three 40-acre tracts to the point that 
they would, in his opinion, not be saleable or if saleable be sold last because 
of decreased desirability. The ranch had never by survey been actually divided 
into 40-acre tracts, including any network of roads so he estimated a location 
for the three 40-acre mini-ranchette tracts by using sections and dividing them 
into quarter-quarter sections (1/16th of 640 acres).

Appellees' 
appraiser estimated the before value of the 1,760 acres at $1,056,000 with an 
after value of $996,000 immediately afterwards. In 40-acre tracts, he opined the 
ranchettes would sell at $600 an acre, average. He based this on comparable 
sales in the area in which some ranchettes sold for a little less than that 
amount and others sold for up to $1,000 an acre. The witness allocated $600 an 
acre for the 44 individual tracts which could be carved out of the 1,760 acres. 
His value per tract was therefore $24,000.

In his estimate 
of the value, he arbitrarily took into consideration the contamination of 
underground water and the presence of the oil spill would reduce the value by 
$500 per acre or $20,000 for each of the 40-acre tracts, leaving each 40-acre 
ranchette worth $4,000 or $100 per acre. The witness made no estimate of the 
land value for any other use.

On 
cross-examination, it was developed that his appraisal was based upon the 
property being free and clear of any encumbrances, any liens, "or anything 
else," including "special or unusual deed conditions or restrictions." It was 
further discovered that the witness had not checked the public records. He knew, 
however, that appellees had prior to the oil spill purchased for coal 
development the Springen Ranch which adjoins the Elmore home 
ranch.

It was further 
brought out on cross-examination that had the witness checked the records, he 
would have found that at the time of the oil spill there was a coal lease 
between appellees and Old Ben Coal Company, admitted in evidence at a pretrial 
proceeding as Defendant's Exhibit C-2. The lease terms gave to the Old Ben Coal 
Company an exclusive right to the use of the surface of all of Section 28 upon 
which the oil spill was located. The witness was not aware of the lease terms 
until the trial at which time he read the lease and agreed that was true. The 
pertinent lease terms allowed appellees use of the surface as long as not 
inconsistent with the lease.5

On 
cross-examination, appellees' expert valuation witness, as questioned, 
answered:

"A Oh, I have no 
doubt in my mind that I could have found a willing buyer to buy that property 
for $600 an acre, subject to that lease.

"Q With the 
right of Old Ben Coal Company to come in and do whatever they wanted with the 
surface of that property?

"A 
Right.

"Q At any 
time?

"A Now, that's - 
again, that's taking in a whole different market that we're talking about 
there.

"Q You're 
talking about for ranchettes. 

"A Okay. Yeah, 
but you asked the question could I find a willing buyer to buy that property 
subject to that and, yes, I could.

"Q Could you 
find a willing buyer under your highest and best use to purchase a ranchette 
-

"A 
No.

"Q - subject to 
the terms of that lease?

"A No, I could 
not."

With that last 
answer, appellees' whole valuation, based solely on a highest and best use for 
ranchettes, evaporated.

This left the 
appellees with no other evidence other than cost of restoration of the less than 
three acres of land which, according to appellees' offer of proof, ran over 
$150,000. The trial judge did properly reject that evidence on objection by 
appellant. The appellees were stopped in that regard by the established rule 
that the cost of restoration cannot exceed the fair market value of the land. 
Town Council of Town of Hudson v. Ladd, supra. The ultimate question is the 
depreciation in the fair market value. Wheatland Irrigation District v. McGuire, 
Wyo., 562 P.2d 287 (1977). Cost of restoration is not based on fair market 
value. No instruction was given to the jury to find damage to the ranch of 
appellees other than upon a basis of difference in fair market values before and 
after. The appellant provided the only valid evidence of the depreciated market 
value in the sum of $2,000. Cost of restoration as a basis of damages could not 
therefore exceed that amount.

Appellant's 
expert appraiser witness in his testimony disclosed a thorough investigation of 
comparable sales and the highest and best use of such land, following accepted 
appraisal practices. His opinion was that the total value of the ranch - 7,800 
acres - was not affected by the oil spill. He compared the oil spill to other 
problems found on his comparables: for example, power lines, pipelines, closed 
paved roads, etc. He pointed out that the three acres damaged constituted less 
than 1/20th of one percent of the total ranch spread,6 so it could have little effect. 
However, he found that the productivity of the three acres was lost to raising 
hay, so he capitalized it on the basis of production of one ton of hay per year 
at $100. Capitalization is a method of appraisal which can be used when 
comparable values do not show a depreciation in value but there is known damage. 
Appellees are entitled to something.

In the face of 
the presence of the Old Ben Coal lease, appellant's expert appraiser found the 
highest and best use to be sale of surface over minerals for coal mining, with 
an interim use of farming or ranching, which was actually taking place. He found 
the value of the ranch immediately before the oil spill to be $4,935,000 and the 
value of the ranch immediately after the oil spill to be $4,933,000 or a 
difference of $2,000, attributable to loss of hay production on the three 
acres.

We do not 
examine the credibility of appellant's witness. We only hold that his testimony 
was the only legally acceptable testimony of land values. That is why we must 
remand for a new trial and do not direct entry of judgment in the sum of 
$2,000.

Since there must 
be a new trial on the question of damages to the land by reason of the spill, 
there are other errors of such a serious nature that they may constitute plain 
error, though we do not decide the case on that basis. We can find no objection 
by counsel for appellant to some errors we consider of a fundamental nature 
which may have confused the jury into reaching the erroneous verdict of $40,000 
as the difference between the immediately before and immediately after fair 
market values.

Ordinarily, the 
supreme court refrains from inquiring into questions not raised by the parties, 
Pritchard v. State, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Department of Health 
and Social Services, Wyo., 540 P.2d 523 (1975). However, on appeal in which the 
judgment is reversed, it is also proper for this court to decide incidental 
questions which are bound to arise again in the case at a new trial. Rocky 
Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. State, Wyo., 645 P.2d 1163 (1982); Madison 
v. Marlatt, Wyo., 619 P.2d 708 (1980); McGuire v. McGuire, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1278 
(1980); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. City of Riverton, 70 Wyo. 119, 247 P.2d 660 (1952). As said in Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. City of Riverton, supra, it 
is this court's duty to do so.

From the time of 
the oil spill until suit was filed by appellees, a period of one month less than 
the four-year statute of limitations, § 1-3-105(a)(iv), W.S. 1977,7 had elapsed. The case was not tried 
until six years after the oil spill. After the trial started and the appellees 
had produced evidence gathered shortly before trial and caught appellant by 
surprise, the trial was continued for two weeks to afford appellant an 
opportunity to investigate the matter. The expert witness of appellees on 
valuations was not employed until a month before trial. The trial judge was 
justifiably provoked by these delays and such last minute trial preparations. 
What this delay led to was an attempt to introduce into evidence material 
improper for the determination of damages in this case and disposition of the 
case impeded.

The appellees 
argued but were not allowed to present evidence of enhanced damages because of 
not having an earlier award which could have been earning interest or otherwise 
been productive through capital investment.8 Evidence was produced which was the 
result of occurrences taking place long after the spill such as the opinion of 
Elmore that there was no coal under the land because of some exploration holes 
dug which indicated to him that the land was in a clinker area caused by the 
coal burning out and evidence that the Old Ben Coal lease had expired. At the 
same time, appellant was not permitted to introduce into evidence a new coal 
lease - the so-called Delzer lease - entered into by appellees. The appellees 
got into evidence the fact that subsequent to the oil spills, water well permits 
had been obtained, though the water of the wells had never been put to 
beneficial use.

The foregoing is 
only set out as introductory to the proposition that the court's instruction for 
determination of damages was not correct. Instruction 4, in part, 
follows:

"* * * The 
measure of damage you must use for the land is the fair market value of the 
damaged lands before the spills, less the fair market value of those lands after 
the spills. You will determine the amount of land damaged by the 
spills."

The measure of 
damage is not "the fair market value of the damaged lands." There were only 
three acres damaged. The measure of damage is one that goes to the entire ranch 
of appellees, owned at the time of the spill. The damage is the difference in 
value of the whole ranch immediately prior to the damage and the value of the 
whole ranch immediately after the damage. Town Council of Town of Hudson v. 
Ladd, supra. The determination must be the difference in value immediately 
before and value immediately after the occurrence. Town Council of Town of 
Hudson v. Ladd, supra.

While the amount 
of land actually damaged by the spills is an important fact, there is no need 
for a jury to make that finding because whether it was three or ten or whatever 
acres, the damage must be related to the whole ranch as an operating unit. This 
court has clearly enunciated that principle in the analogous situation of land 
condemnation. Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. v. Mackey, supra; Coronado Oil 
Company v. Grieves, supra. The strange part of it is that both parties 
understood that the measure was the damage to the whole ranch except that 
appellees' appraiser related the damage only to the 1,760 acres of the Elmore 
home ranch whereas appellant's appraiser properly related the damage to the 
whole ranch consisting of the Elmore home ranch and the adjoining Springen Ranch 
acquired by appellees prior to the oil spill - 7,800 acres. The appellant 
understood the immediately before and immediately after requirement because its 
counsel filed a motion in limine granted by the trial judge barring any 
evidence, oral or written, from "plaintiffs' appraisers, unless such appraisals 
are for the period immediately before and immediately after the date of the oil 
spill, October 8, 1976."

The foregoing 
leads us into the special verdict form. We cannot tell from the record who 
submitted it - the appellant or the court. The appellant submitted a form of 
verdict but we find it was not attached to the written offer. Perhaps it was 
detached and was the one used or it was detached by the court, modified by 
interlineation and retyped.9 The pertinent part of the verdict 
submitted and signed by the jury foreman is:

"SPECIAL 
VERDICT

"1) Did 
plaintiffs suffer damage to their lands as a result of the oil 
spills?

Yes X No 
____

If yes, answer 2 
- 5. If no, skip to 6.

"2) How much 
land was damaged by the spills?

A. 80 
acres

"3) What was the 
fair market value of the damaged lands before the spills?

A. $ 
48,000.00

"4) What was the 
fair market value of the damaged lands after the spills?

A. $ 
8,000.00

"5) What is the 
difference between 3 and 4?

A. $ 
40,000.00

"6) Was the 
ground water or surface water in the area of Section 28 
contaminated?

Yes X No 
____

If yes, answer 
7. If no, sign the verdict.

"7) Was the 
water contamination caused by the oil spills?

Yes X No 
____

If yes, answer 8 
and 9. If no, sign the verdict.

"8) What sum of 
money has been or reasonably will be expended in restoring contaminated water to 
its condition prior to the spills?

A. $ 
57,250.00

"9) Apart from 
the cost of restoration of contaminated water, were plaintiffs damaged because 
of water contamination?

Yes ____ No X 

If yes, how 
much?

A. $ 
____"

Appellees' 
counsel at least in part understood the verdict form was improper and 
objected:

"* * * Your 
Honor, I'd like to enter an objection to the special verdict form, calling the 
record's attention particularly to paragraphs three and four. We would ask that 
the phrase `damaged lands' be changed to `the property, plaintiffs' property.' 
We feel that this is in accord with Wyoming law. It is in accord with the 
testimony that has been offered, that the damage to the property - damage to the 
entire ranch unit. It takes into account the severance damages to other lands, 
and this instruction improperly calls the jury's attention only to certain 
specific damaged lands."

Appellees were 
correct. Appellant's counsel sat quiet as to that objection but did object to 
those parts relating to contamination of the underground water and the cost of 
cleaning it up.

Even though the 
appellees' objection was well taken, appellees' expert valuation testimony was 
that three 40-acre tracts were damaged. Appellees' witness did not testify as to 
the whole ranch but only 1,760 acres of a 7,800-acre spread. The jury must have 
been thoroughly confused. The verdict, however, indicates that it must have 
decided only two 40-acre imaginary potential ranchettes were affected. Question 
2 was, from the evidence, capable of one of four answers: three acres, 120 or 80 
acres, 1,760 acres or 7,800 acres. Questions 3 and 4 were not proper in that 
they not only created confusion but did not go to immediately before and 
immediately after valuations of the whole ranch unit.

There are 
reasons for fixing a time for valuation. The value of real estate is by no means 
constant and in order to intelligently assess damages, a point in time must be 
fixed at which the valuation takes place and it is the value as of that time the 
owner is entitled to receive even if values rise or fall before he eventually 
receives his money. It would be unreasonable to speculate on what could be done 
to the land to make it more valuable and then seek evidence on what it might be 
worth. To do so would lead to speculation and conjecture that would convert a 
valuation trial into a guessing contest.

Theoretically in 
this case, since the oil spill occurred on October 8, 1976, the land would be 
valued the moment before the oil spill occurred and then valued the moment after 
the oil spill ended. However, appraisal is not an exact science so in seeking 
comparable sales to find value, sales may and probably were not taking place at 
that precise time, but they should be as close in time as reasonably possible. 
In any event, changes in the condition of the property taking place after 
October 8, 1976, cannot affect the amount of compensation to be 
paid.

Finally, it was 
brought out in the direct examination of appellant's appraiser and 
cross-examination by appellees that land bought for potential development of 
ranchettes has a value of less than land actually developed by dividing into 
ranchettes and being sold as ranchettes. Appellees' land had no roads to the 
potential acreages. Appellees' witness based his appraisal on land already 
developed for ranchettes whereas the land of the appellees was only raw land. On 
redirect, it was brought out that there must be roads built at great expense so 
that ranchettes have access. Salesmen must be paid commissions to sell the 
ranchettes. There is the expense of surveys, fixing values for each tract, 
promoting their sale, etc.

The raw land in 
question may not be valued as though already cut up into ranchettes, as was done 
by appellees' appraiser, even if not subject to an exclusive coal lease whereby 
the surface may be taken over at will by a mining operation at any place, dug 
into, covered with over burden, used for mining operations by building 
construction, tipples, machinery parking, roads and every other use related to 
mining coal.

4 Nichols on 
Eminent Domain, § 12.3142[1][a] (Third Edition 1981), explains imaginary 
subdividing, a much abused concept:

"In some cases, 
however, condemnees have attempted to go so far as to show the number of lots 
into which a tract is divisible, estimate sales prices per lot and sales prices 
of comparable sales in the vicinity. In such cases, however, the courts have 
uniformly adopted the approach that raw land as such, with little or no 
improvements or preparation for subdivision may not be valued as if the land 
were in fact a subdivision. Thus the `lot method' approach to valuation may not 
be used. The measure of compensation is not the aggregate of the prices of the 
lots into which the tract could be best divided, since the expense of clearing 
off and improving the land, laying out streets, dividing it into lots, 
advertising and selling the same, holding it and paying taxes and interest until 
all the lots are disposed of cannot be ignored, and is too uncertain and 
conjectural to be computed. In any event, if evidence is offered as to developed 
value consideration must be given to the cost of developing that value. For 
example, a landowner's preliminary planning and development expense has been 
held to be a proper element in determining the value of land 
taken.

"The accepted 
rule for the evaluation of such land, therefore, is that the land will be 
considered in its present condition as a whole, with consideration given to any 
increment or enhancement in value due to the property's present adaptability to 
subdivision development." (Footnotes omitted.)

While the 
supreme court is reluctant to set aside a jury verdict and a trial court 
judgment, that reluctance does not prevent such action if we find no evidence to 
support the verdict or judgment. Plains Tire and Battery Company v. Plains A to 
Z Tire Co., Inc., Wyo., 622 P.2d 917 (1981). We do not upset a judgment unless 
clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of evidence. If obviously 
erroneous and against the evidence, a judgment cannot stand. Kvenild v. Taylor, 
Wyo., 594 P.2d 972 (1979).

The judgment for 
$57,250 to be held in the registry of the court for disbursement by stipulation 
or order of the district court is reversed and vacated. The judgment for $40,000 
is reversed and remanded for a new trial consistent with the law enunciated in 
this opinion.

1 Chapter VIII of DEQ's 
rules and regulations entitled "Quality Standards for Wyoming Groundwater" 
provided the applicable standards upon which the conclusion was made that the 
groundwater sampled was polluted.

2 Appellant had at trial 
made timely motions for directed verdict on all issues.

3 Prior to trial in this 
case, the record indicates that DEQ had issued a cease and desist order pursuant 
to § 35-11-901, supra, and had begun proceedings against appellant for polluting 
the groundwater.

4 A motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict permitted by Rule 50, W.R.C.P., is not a condition 
precedent to an appeal from a final judgment. Simmons v. City of Bluefield, W. 
Va., 225 S.E.2d 202 (1975); Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 
429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970), on retrial, 456 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 407 U.S. 921, 92 S. Ct. 2463, 32 L. Ed. 2d 807, reh. denied, 409 U.S. 899, 
93 S. Ct. 108, 34 L. Ed. 2d 159 (1972); United States v. Mountain State Fabricating 
Company, 282 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1960); Hansen v. Vidal, 237 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 
1956). The appellant filed such a motion but its thrust was primarily toward the 
lack of the court's jurisdiction with respect to damage to underground water. In 
any event, the motion extended the time for appeal before the court entered its 
amended order and judgment.

5 The terms of paragraph 
1.5, Article I, of the lease are:

"Subject to 
proof of title as provided in paragraphs 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 hereof, Lessor, in 
consideration of the payment of the royalties hereinafter provided, and of the 
agreements of Lessee herein contained, hereby grants, leases and assigns 
exclusively unto Lessee the lands described in Exhibit `A', together with all 
contracts and leases affecting said lands for the purpose of investigating, 
exploring, drilling, extracting, mining through augering, stripping, or other 
methods, operating, removing, preparing, marketing and transporting all of the 
economically mineable coal lying in, on or under the coal lands and further 
grants, leases and lets exclusively unto Lessee the surface acreage for any 
purposes or uses consistent with the mining of coal from the coal lands, 
including not by way of limitation, location of overburden, machinery, 
buildings, tipples, plants, roads, tracks, power stations, power lines, 
equipment, facilities, structures, and supplies, to the end that Lessee shall, 
as to the coal lands and surface acreage have and hold all such lands with all 
such appurtenances, hereditaments, rights and easements, as may be necessary to 
the implementation of this Agreement." (Emphasis added.)

6 The 1,760 acres in the 
Elmore home ranch plus 6,066 acres in the Springen spread total 7,826 acres, 
rounded to 7,800 acres. The three acres amounted to 1/2600th of the 
ranch.

7 Section 1-3-105(a)(iv), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) Civil 
actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within 
the following periods after the cause of action accrues:

* * * * * 
*

"(iv) Within 
four (4) years, an action for:

"(A) Trespass 
upon real property;

"(B) The 
recovery of personal property or for taking, detaining or injuring personal 
property;

"(C) An injury 
to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein 
enumerated; and

"(D) For relief 
on the ground of fraud; * *"

8 Appellees' claim was for 
unliquidated damages so would draw interest only from the date of the judgment. 
Section 1-16-102(a), W.S. 1977. Prejudgment interest is recoverable on 
liquidated but not unliquidated claims. A liquidated claim is one readily 
computable by simple mathematical computation. Zitterkopf v. Roussalis, Wyo., 
546 P.2d 436 (1976). See also, Rissler & McMurry Company v. Atlantic 
Richfield Company, Wyo., 559 P.2d 25 (1977). The damages awarded here require 
more than simple computation.

9 We would like to suggest 
that when forms of instruction and verdict are submitted that they be in 
duplicate, the original for use or marked refused, the copy to be annotated for 
source and remain in place in the file as part of the 
offer.

BROWN, Justice, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in Part 
I of the majority opinion; I dissent from Part II.

I agree with the 
majority's decision to reverse the award of $57,250 to appellees in order to 
restore the groundwater to its condition before the oil spill. Section 
35-11-902(a), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1982, authorizes "any person having an 
interest which is or may be adversely affected" to initiate an action in order 
to force compliance with the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act, § 35-11-101 et 
seq., W.S. 1977. Section 35-11-902(c), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1982, requires a 
party suing under the act to give 60 days' written notice to the Department of 
Environmental Quality, as well as the alleged violator, before commencing the 
suit.

Here, appellees 
had not perfected any right to appropriate the groundwater affected by the oil 
spill. Accordingly, they were not persons having "an interest adversely 
affected" by the oil spill. As a result, they did not come within the scope of § 
35-11-902(a), supra, and could not institute an action under that subsection.1 I see no need to address appellees' 
failure to comply with the notice provisions of § 35-11-902(c), supra, since it 
only amounts to dicta in light of the failure to satisfy subsection 
(a).

I would further 
note that § 35-11-902(g), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1982, which provides that the act 
in no way limits any previously existing cause of action, is not involved here. 
Again, appellees had no interest in the groundwater at the time of the spill. 
Accordingly, any damage to the water could not have created a cause of action in 
their behalf.

Where I differ 
is with the majority's decision to reverse the judgment as to the $40,000 
awarded in compensation for damage to the land. The issue on appeal concerns the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the $40,000 award made by the jury. 
Though I do understand the majority's surprise at such a large award for three 
acres in rural Campbell County, I believe the basis upon which it reverses sets 
bad precedent for the future. This court should be more concerned about the 
precedent it sets than the result in a particular case.

Here, the 
majority finds insufficient evidence to support the verdict only after 
determining that the opinion of appellees' expert was incompetent. This 
conclusion is reached because the expert on cross-examination said at one point 
he could not find a buyer for a ranchette subject to the terms of an existing 
lease. First, I would note that during the exchange in the transcript the expert 
also said he could find a buyer. The transcript is very confusing there, and it 
is hard to know what the witness meant to say when all we have is the cold 
transcript. Besides, where conflicts exist in testimony this court must resolve 
those conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. Farella v. Rumney, Wyo., 649 P.2d 185 (1982). The majority here ignores that maxim.

Second, no 
objection was made at any time to the expert's testimony. On appeal, appellant 
has challenged the competency of the evidence, but I believe it is too late to 
make such an attack. In Coronado Oil Company v. Grieves, Wyo., 642 P.2d 423 
(1982), we reversed because of the admission of incompetent expert testimony; 
but there the majority opinion noted that the appellant had "vigorously objected 
throughout the trial to such testimony." 642 P.2d  at 438. Here, that simply is 
not the case.

By its failure 
to object to the competency of the testimony, the appellant waived its claim of 
error in that regard. The reason for this rule is to require the parties to give 
the trial judge a chance to remove the error at trial and to avoid protracted 
litigation. By its decision the majority is undermining that policy. The door is 
now open to all future litigants who fail to timely object to expert testimony 
to raise a sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue challenging the competency of 
experts. This court in the future will be deluged by such claims, not only in 
civil cases, but criminal cases as well. I am certain that the court will not be 
sympathetic to those future litigants unless it is dissatisfied with the jury 
verdict and searching for a way to reverse.

I believe that 
since there was no objection to the competency of the expert's testimony, the 
disclosures on cross-examination must be held as going only to the weight to be 
given the testimony. The expert's opinion concerning the before and after values 
was given credence by the jurors who awarded damages in the amount he 
prescribed. In these circumstances we must find sufficient evidence was present 
to support the jury's verdict.

Finally, I wish 
to take issue with the majority's assertion that "there are other errors of such 
a serious nature that they may constitute plain error." The doctrine of plain 
error encompasses those errors which are obvious, and which, if uncorrected, 
would be an affront to the integrity and reputation of the judicial proceedings 
and result in a miscarriage of justice. In the Matter of C.L.T., Alaska, 597 P.2d 518 (1979); and City of Nome v. Ailak, Alaska, 570 P.2d 162 
(1977).

Where no 
objection is made at the time error occurred, a new trial may be ordered only if 
that error arises to the level of plain or fundamental error. To constitute such 
error, it must possess a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result which 
goes to the very heart of a party's case. United Farm Bureau Family Life 
Insurance Company v. Fultz, 176 Ind. App. 217, 375 N.E.2d 601 (1978); and Croy 
v. Bacon Transport Company, Okla., 604 P.2d 136 (1979).

The plain error 
doctrine error is almost exclusively a criminal concept and is used sparingly in 
civil cases. Croy v. Bacon Transport Company, supra. Plain error and harmless 
error are defined in Rule 49(b), Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure: "Plain 
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were 
not brought to the attention of the court." Rule 7.05, Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, using Rule 49(b), W.R. Cr.P., as the source also defines 
plain error in an identical fashion. Rule 61, Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 
defines harmless error for civil cases; however, the rule does not address plain 
error. In fact, plain error is mentioned nowhere in the Rules of Civil 
Procedure.

This difference 
is also found between the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and it was noted in Wright and Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2883 (1973). There it was observed that, despite 
the omission from the civil rules, plain error was occasionally held available 
in civil cases. However, the indication was that the standard for plain error in 
civil cases is much more stringent than in criminal cases.

Generally, plain 
error has not been applied in civil matters. However, the failure of subject 
matter jurisdiction receives plain error treatment in that no objection is 
necessary to preserve it. Also, the deprivation of property without due process 
of law may on occasion be treated as plain error; but, generally it must be an 
extreme case.

In the present 
case, the trial court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction. Further, no 
obvious violations of appellant's constitutional nor statutory rights occurred. 
Under the most liberal view of the plain error doctrine I cannot see its 
applicability to the case here.

I do not believe 
it is proper for this court to address "incidental questions which are found 
[likely] to arise again in the case at a new trial" when no one has raised the 
"questions" in the first place. I believe the majority, when it addresses those 
"incidental questions," is subverting the most basic appellate rules against 
giving advisory opinions. I cannot agree with such a 
practice.

For these 
reasons I would have affirmed in part and reversed in part and only addressed 
the issues actually raised by the parties.

1 I am satisfied that the 
attorney general, as the representative for the people of the State of 
Wyoming, is 
the proper party to maintain this action. This is particularly so in light of 
the unusual order entered by the district court requiring the $57,250 to be paid 
into the registry of the court, so that the court could ensure the money 
actually was spent on the clean-up of the groundwater. It makes so much more 
sense for the money to be paid to the State, and for the State, through the 
Department of Environmental Quality, to administer the funds, than for the 
district court to be concerned with such matters.