Case Title: Canaday v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Canaday v. State1984 WY 99687 P.2d 897Case Number: 83-241, 83-242Decided: 09/17/1984TIM CANADAY, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). 

DON MANNING, JR., APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
TIM CANADAY, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). 

DON MANNING, JR., 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, PlatteCounty, George P. Sawyer, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Appellate Counsel (argued), 
Wyoming Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, for appellants.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Jennifer Hager, Legal Intern (argued), for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ. 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants Canaday and 
Manning were tried and convicted of misdemeanor charges in justice of the peace 
court and appealed from their respective convictions. Both defendants were 
represented by counsel. District court, on appeal, after hearing arguments and 
reviewing a transcript of the proceedings, affirmed the 
convictions.

[¶2.]     Appellants present a 
single issue for review:

"Whether a trial before a 
non-lawyer justice of the peace denies a defendant his 
constitutionally-guaranteed right to due process of law."

Appellants are 
not alleging that specific errors occurred during the trial, but rather contend 
that the trial before a non-attorney judge is, per se, a violation of due 
process.

[¶3.]     The United States 
Supreme Court upheld Kentucky's court system which provided for 
trials before a non-lawyer police court judge with a later trial de novo 
available under the state's two-tier court system. In North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S. Ct. 2709, 49 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1976), they stated:

"Our concern in prior 
cases with judicial functions being performed by nonjudicial officers has also 
been directed at the need for independent, neutral, and detached judgment, not 
at legal training." 96 S. Ct.  at 2713.

The Court also 
noted

"* * * that the 
justifications urged by States for continuing such tribunals are the `increasing 
burdens on state judiciaries' and the `interest of both the defendant and the 
State, to provide speedier and less costly adjudications' than those provided in 
courts `where the full range of constitutional guarantees is available. * * *' 
Moreover, state policy takes into account that it is a convenience to those 
charged to be tried in or near their own community, rather than travel to a 
distant court where a lawyer-trained judge is provided, and to have the option, 
as here, of a trial after regular business hours." (Citation omitted.) 96 S. Ct. 
at 2713.

[¶4.]     Various states have 
held that a violation of due process does not occur when the defendant has a 
right to trial de novo. Young v. 
Konz, 91 Wn.2d 532, 588 P.2d 1360 (1979); Conkling v. Pollock, 27 Ariz. App. 670, 558 P.2d 35 (1976) (there are no transcripts of proceedings in city court); People v. Skrynski, 42 N.Y.2d 218, 397 N.Y.S.2d 707, 366 N.E.2d 797 (1977) (a procedure is available to remove a 
criminal proceeding to a superior court). The Supreme Court has not specifically 
addressed the issue of whether a trial before a non-attorney judge would meet 
constitutional requirements when a trial de novo is 
unavailable.

[¶5.]     In Wyoming the office of the 
justice of the peace is created by statutory authority. The only requirement 
necessary to be a justice of the peace is that the person be a qualified elector 
of the county.1

[¶6.]     If a defendant is 
convicted by a justice of the peace, he has a right to appeal that conviction to 
the district court. All criminal cases tried before a justice of the peace must 
be recorded and a typewritten transcript may be requested.2 Therefore, although a defendant 
does not have a right to a trial de novo before the district court, the 
proceedings in the justice of the peace courts are recorded and the testimony of 
witnesses and the record is available for review upon appeal. The provision for 
appeal upon the record made in justice court is unlike similar proceedings in 
other states which, in the absence of a record, provide for a trial de novo. An 
appeal to a law-trained judge in district court, upon the justice court record, 
is intended to provide the due process safeguards.

[¶7.]     We held in Thomas v. Justice Court of Washakie County, Wyo., 
538 P.2d 42 (1975), that a non-attorney judge at a preliminary hearing was 
adequate to satisfy due process specifications. We, however, did not address the 
question of the constitutionality of having a non-attorney judge preside at 
trial.

[¶8.]     Appellant would have us 
adopt the reasoning of Gordon v. Justice 
Court for Yuba Judicial District of Sutter County, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 525 P.2d 72, 71 A.L.R.3d 551 (1974), which held that a trial must 
be presided over by a lawyer judge and stated that:

"Whatever the 
justification for permitting laymen to preside over criminal trials in the 
1800's, it is a well-recognized principle that even long-standing practices are 
subject to constitutional scrutiny and must meet the advancing standards of due 
process. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 1361, 93 L. Ed. 1782, `Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow 
requirements. It is the compendious expression for all those rights which the 
courts must enforce because they are basic to our free society. But basic rights 
do not become petrified as of any one time, even though, as a matter of human 
experience, some may not too rhetorically be called eternal verities. It is of 
the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what is deemed 
reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living principle, due process is 
not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed 
the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights.'" 525 P.2d  at 
75.

The court also 
stated that:

"The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that the legal and constitutional issues involved 
in a misdemeanor case may be as complex as those involved in a trial for a more 
serious offense. (See Argersinger v. 
Hamlin, supra, 407 U.S. 25, 33, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530.) There is little guarantee that the background of a non-attorney 
judge will have prepared him to recognize these issues and resolve them 
according to established legal principles." (Footnote omitted.) 525 P.2d  at 
76.

[¶9.]     The California court 
relied on Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972)3 for the proposition that there is 
an inherent inconsistency in guaranteeing a defendant an attorney to represent 
him without providing a lawyer judge to preside at those proceedings. At least 
one other jurisdiction has followed this reasoning. State v. Dunkerley, 134 Vt. 523, 365 A.2d 131 
(1976). We note, however, that the proceedings in California are not recorded as they are in Wyoming.

[¶10.]  The other cases which appellant cites as 
support for our adoption of the Gordon rule are easily distinguishable and turn 
on the guarantees of fair trial rather than the fact that the judge is a 
non-attorney. Ward v. Village of 
Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1972) (a mayor 
judge who is responsible for revenue production is not constitutionally 
acceptable since his interest in the finances negates the impartiality required 
even though trial de novo and appeal is available). Even trial de novo does not 
cure a defect at the initial trial when defendant is deprived of a neutral and 
independent judge. Iglesias-Delgado v. 
Rivera-Rivera, 430 F. Supp. 309 (D.C.P.R. 1976) (the judge exercised the 
function of the judge and the prosecutor). One system was overturned because in 
order to get a trial de novo, one had to post a bond and the lower courts were 
not courts of record. This was deemed unconstitutional because indigents did not 
get adequate due process. However, a non-attorney judge was deemed sufficient if 
there were equal access to an attorney judge. LeCates v. Justice of the Peace Court, No. 4 
of State of Delaware, 637 F.2d 898 (3rd Cir. 
1980).

[¶11.]  We find the reasoning of jurisdictions 
which uphold the constitutionality of nonattorney judges persuasive. Arizona held, in Palmer v. Superior Court In 
and For Maricopa County, 114 Ariz. 279, 560 P.2d 797 (1977), that when a 
non-attorney judge is paid a fixed salary and receives no part of the fine, he 
is free to be independent and neutral in his judgment. The court system and 
procedure, therefore, does not violate due process especially where the record 
of the proceeding provides an opportunity for a meaningful and complete judicial 
review by a law-trained judge.

[¶12.]  New Mexico disagreed with the Gordon, supra, 
interpretation of fairness:

"Implicit in this 
interpretation is that the judge is the guardian of the rights of the defendant. 
However, our legal system is primarily of an adversary nature, and the 
guardianship of the defendant's rights lies chiefly with his attorney, not the 
judge. Rights not asserted by the defendant's attorney generally are waived. 
Furthermore, it is not the function of the judge to second guess the tactics or 
strategies of the defendant's attorney at each step of the defense of an 
accused. The judge's major function is to determine which of two espoused 
viewpoints - the attorney's or the prosecutor's - is applicable to the facts of 
the case before him. An unbiased and reasonably intelligent person should be 
able to choose fairly between such espoused viewpoints. Fairness in this context 
is not critically dependent upon the judge being a member of the bar; a judge 
must have wisdom and common sense which are at least as dependable as an 
education in guaranteeing the defendant a fair trial. As with district court 
judges, as a last resort the appellate process is able to correct the mistakes 
of law of a municipal court judge. We therefore hold that fairness is not so 
inextricably tied to the education of an attorney that without such an education 
a municipal court judge cannot be fair." (Footnotes omitted.) Tsiosdia v. Rainaldi, 89 N.M. 70, 547 P.2d 553, 555 (1976).

[¶13.]  Although Utah's system is different from ours in that 
their justices of the peace are constitutionally created rather than 
statutorily, part of their rationale upholding non-attorney judges is 
applicable. Shelmidine v. Jones, 
Utah, 550 P.2d 207 (1976). They stated at p. 211:

"It is thus seen that in 
a considerable portion of our State there are some very practical problems in 
placing restrictions upon justices of the peace and requiring professionalized 
courts to handle minor offenses. If it were not for those justices in our 
sparsely populated rural counties an accused would often encounter inconvenience 
in delay of time and distance of travel before he could have his case disposed 
of. It seems to be a sound observation that our justice of the peace system has 
and continues to serve a useful purpose by providing a readily accessible and 
expeditious means of handling of minor cases; and that it is more of an aid in 
assuring the constitutional guarantees of a speedy disposition of one's case, 
and thus of due process of law, than the contrary." (Footnote 
omitted.)

Other 
jurisdictions have approved non-attorney judges when a record is available for 
review by a lawyer judge. State v. 
Duncan, 269 S.C. 510, 238 S.E.2d 205 (1977); Treiman v. State, ex rel. Miner, 
Fla., 343 So. 2d 819 (1977) (a non-attorney 
judge is acceptable if he has completed the state training program); People v. Sabri, 47 Ill. App.3d 962, 6 
Ill.Dec. 104, 362 N.E.2d 739 (1977); Ex 
parte Ross, Tex.Cr.App., 522 S.W.2d 214, cert. denied 423 U.S. 1018, 96 S. Ct. 454, 46 L. Ed. 2d 390 (1975).

[¶14.]  Justices of the peace in this state are 
paid a fixed salary. They receive no part of fines, nor is their pay dependent 
upon fines collected. Justice of the peace courts are courts of record; and 
appeal to a lawyer judge, upon the record made at trial, is available. We hold, 
therefore, that appellants' due process rights were not violated by a trial 
presided over by a non-attorney judge in these circumstances. The decisions of 
the district court affirming the convictions of the justice of the peace court 
are affirmed.

1 Section 5-4-201(b), W.S. 
1977, Cum.Supp. 1983, provides in part:

"(b) To be eligible for 
election or appointment to the office of justice of the peace, a person shall be 
a qualified elector of the county in which he seeks the office of justice of the 
peace. * * *"

2 Rule 10(k), 
W.R.Cr.P.J.C., provides in part:

"All criminal cases tried 
before a justice or a jury shall be recorded either electronically or 
stenographically. * * *"

3 Argersinger v. Hamlin held that a person 
may not be imprisoned for any offense unless he was represented by counsel at 
trial.

ROSE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶15.]  Nine years ago this court held in Thomas v. Justice Court of Washakie 
County, Wyo., 538 P.2d 42 (1975) that a preliminary hearing conducted by a 
nonlawyer justice of the peace does not abridge a criminal defendant's 
fundamental right to due process of law. I dissented in that case on the ground 
that the defendant's constitutional right to representation by an attorney 
during the preliminary hearing encompasses a right to a judge trained in the law 
and equipped to respond to the attorney's legal arguments. I also dissented in 
that case because of my concern that the majority position portended an 
unacceptable and impermissible erosion of the criminal defendant's rights to 
fair treatment in the courts of this state. I harbored those concerns 
notwithstanding the majority's assurances that a preliminary hearing differs 
significantly from a misdemeanor trial and, therefore, a nonlawyer judge at the 
hearing satisfies due-process demands. The court said:

"* * * We think there is 
an important and obvious distinction [between a misdemeanor trial and a felony 
preliminary hearing]. The finding of 
guilty in the misdemeanor trial (subject only to a right of appeal which is 
specifically rejected by the California court [in Gordon v. Justice Court for the Yuba 
Judicial District, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 525 P.2d 72 (1974)] as 
being a ready source of relief) is a 
final judgment; the finding of probable cause after the preliminary hearing 
determines only the propriety of a trial, complete in every way with every 
protection that the constitution, laws and decisions of this state have been 
able to develop. The problems which the California court lists as presenting 
difficult legal questions in misdemeanor trials necessitating the presence of a 
lawyer-justice * * * are inapplicable to preliminary examinations wherein 
procedures are historically more informal and the only question is whether there 
is probable cause to conclude that a crime has been committed and that the 
accused has committed it." (Emphasis added.) 538 P.2d  at 
47.

[¶16.]  Today a majority of this court hold that 
the protections provided by our Constitution, laws and judicial decisions do not 
include a determination of guilt before a lawyer justice of the peace, even 
though the possibility of a jail sentence would entitle the defendant to 
representation by a lawyer. The majority approve the lay justice system because 
(1) justices of the peace receive a fixed salary, independent of fines 
collected, (2) court proceedings are recorded, and (3) the defendant has a right 
to appellate review of the record. While I agree that these factors contribute 
to a fair trial, I fail to see how they address the crucial matter of the 
inconsistency in affording a defendant an attorney to represent him without 
providing an attorney judge to hear and rule upon counsel's 
arguments.

LEGISLATIVE 
BACKGROUND

[¶17.]  Pursuant to Art. 5, § 1 of the Wyoming 
Constitution,1 § 5-4-101, W.S. 1977 provides for 
justice of the peace courts, and in 1978 the legislature mandated the 
establishment of county courts in counties with populations exceeding 30,000 
inhabitants, § 5-5-102, W.S. 1977, 1984 Cum.Supp.2 Only individuals authorized to 
practice law in Wyoming may preside over county courts, § 
5-5-112, W.S. 1977, 1984 Cum. Supp., whereas nonlawyers are eligible to serve as 
justices of the peace, § 5-4-201, W.S. 1977, 1984 
Cum.Supp.

[¶18.]  Justices of the peace have jurisdiction 
to hear criminal cases resulting in imprisonment of up to six months in jail and 
$750 in fines. Section 7-16-101, W.S. 1977. If convicted before a justice of the 
peace, the defendant has a right to an appeal on the record to the district 
court. Rule 1.03, W.R.A.P.C.L.J.

THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S 
RIGHT TO A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE TRAINED IN THE LAW

[¶19.]  The United States Supreme Court held in 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 
37, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 2012, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972), that, absent proper 
waiver,

"* * * no person may be 
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, 
unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."

In support of 
its holding, the Court observed that the legal and constitutional questions 
raised in a misdemeanor case may be as complex as those involved in a trial for 
a more serious offense. 407 U.S.  at 33, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2010.

[¶20.]  Since, under Argersinger, the accused has 
a Sixth Amendment right to an attorney who can recognize and raise these complex 
issues, it follows that a fair trial must also include a judge learned in the 
law who can understand the attorney. That is the critical issue in this appeal 
as it was in Thomas v. Justice Court of 
Washakie County, supra, 538 P.2d at 54:

"If `erroneous or 
improper prosecution' (Coleman [v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 26 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970)] takes place and 
the lawyer is present to call these intricate matters to the court's attention, 
must not there be someone learned in legal matters present to hear the call? Isn't that the other half of giving the 
defendant the full measure of his due process 
protection?"

[¶21.]  A justice of the peace presiding over a 
criminal trial faces many difficult legal problems. He is expected to conduct 
jury trials since our state Constitution entitles the accused to a trial by 
jury.3 In these cases he must determine 
the proper scope of voir dire, the prejudicial effect of evidence, the propriety 
of the attorneys' arguments, and the adequacy of instructions. In all trials he 
must resolve questions pertaining to tactics, admissibility of evidence and 
procedure.

[¶22.]  In connection with the acceptance of 
guilty pleas, the justice of the peace must extensively examine the defendant to 
insure that the plea is voluntary and supported by facts, and that the defendant 
understands the nature of the charge against him, the possible penalties and the 
waiver of constitutional rights. Rule 9, W.R.Cr.P.J.C. Sentencing decisions made 
by all judges, including justices of the peace, must include consideration of 
probation as an alternative to incarceration, the nature of the offense, and the 
character of the defendant, and should reflect the purposes of punishment. Wright v. State, Wyo., 670 P.2d 1090 (1983); Daniel v. State, Wyo., 644 P.2d 172 
(1982).

[¶23.]  Before we ask the justice of the peace to 
perform these functions with these high human stakes, I feel that he should have 
the advantage of an educational background which would permit him to discharge 
his professional duties confidently, accurately and with full protection to the 
accused. As presiding judge he bears the brunt of the responsibility for 
providing the accused a fair trial. I would hold that it must be presumed that 
he cannot fulfill this responsibility unless he is learned in the law and able 
to provide professional leadership, guidance, and judgment.4 For an excellent analysis of the 
presiding judge's role in insuring a fair trial, see Gordon v. Justice Court for Yuba Judicial 
District of Sutter County, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 525 P.2d 72 
(1974).

[¶24.]  I cannot agree with the majority that the 
right to an appeal on the record from a justice court judgment satisfies the 
requirements of due process. The defendant has a right to a fair and proper 
proceeding in the first instance. I would adopt that said by the California 
Supreme Court in Gordon v. Justice Court 
for Yuba Judicial District of Sutter County, supra, 525 P.2d at 
77:

"* * * `Availability of 
appeal often falls short of sufficient protection [of a defendant's fundamental 
right to a fair trial], since "the burden, expense and delay involved in a trial 
render an appeal from an eventual judgment an inadequate remedy." (Brown v. Superior Court (1949) 34 Cal. 2d 559, 562, 212 P.2d 878.)' * * *" Quoting from Maine v. SuperiorCourtofMendocinoCounty, 68 Cal. 2d 375, 378, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724, 726, 438 P.2d 372, 374 (1968).

[¶25.]  The observations in this dissenting 
opinion may not rightfully be interpreted as a criticism of the work of the lay 
justices of the peace in this state, for I know at first hand their excellent 
efforts in the criminal-justice system. The issue, however, is whether due 
process requires that those presiding over criminal trials possess a background 
in the law. I would repeat in this regard my dissenting remarks in Thomas v. Justice Court of Washakie 
County, supra:

"It would have done 
Einstein no good to have explained his theory of relativity to me. I would not 
have understood it. I am not equipped 
to understand it. The same, I feel, applies to a layman justice of the peace 
in preliminary hearing matters in Wyoming. It is no criticism of the justice of 
the peace - to the contrary - it is a criticism of the system which places such 
a heavy burden of responsibility upon untrained people in an area of human 
relations that demands training and professionalism." 538 P.2d  at 
54.

[¶26.]  I realize that a holding in line with my 
interpretation of the law would upset the justice of the peace program in the 
sparsely populated counties of this state. However, as I observed in Thomas v. Justice Court of Washakie 
County, supra:

"* * * The accused's 
constitutional rights are the paramount issue even though an unsettling of the 
established order of things may be the result." 538 P.2d  at 
56.

Since the right 
of the accused to an attorney by his side encompasses the right to a trial 
conducted by a judge educated and experienced in the law, I would have reversed 
and permitted the legislature to establish a criminal judicial system in line 
with the requirements of due process.

1 Article 5, § 1 of the 
Wyoming Constitution provides:

"The judicial power of 
the state shall be vested in the senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, in a 
supreme court, district courts, and such subordinate courts as the legislature 
may, by general law, establish and ordain from time to 
time."

2 County court systems are 
optional in counties having a population under 30,000. Section 5-5-103, W.S. 
1977, 1984 Cum.Supp.

3 Article 1, § 9, 
Wyoming 
Constitution.

4 The Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Lecates v. Justice of the 
Peace Court No. 4 of the State of Delaware, 637 F.2d 898, 910 (3rd Cir. 
1980), observed:

"* * * A judge devoid of 
training in the complexities of the law, the subtleties of legal reasoning, or 
the methodology of legal research may tend to decide each matter according to 
personal predilection or assumption. The command of statutes and the teachings 
of precedents may well be ignored in such a process."