Case Title: In the Matter of the Honorable James P. Gilpatric, a Judge of the Kingston City Court, Ulster County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 196  
In the Matter of the Honorable 
James P. Gilpatric, a Judge of 
the Kingston City Court, Ulster 
County,
            Petitioner,
For Review of a Determination of 
State Commission on Judicial 
Conduct, 
            Respondent.
James E. Long, for petitioner.
Robert H. Tembeckjian, for respondent.
PER CURIAM:
On summary determination, the State Commission on
Judicial Conduct sustained one charge of misconduct against
petitioner, a City Court Judge, for his failure to render timely
decisions in 47 cases over a period of three and a half years and
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No. 196
1  The letter dismissed the complaint against him, but
cautioned that he must "dispose of all judicial matters promptly,
efficiently and fairly" and "submit complete and accurate
quarterly reports of pending cases to [his] administrative
judge."  The Commission further advised that the letter "may be
used in a future disciplinary proceeding based on failure to
adhere to [its] terms."  
2    Pursuant to Uniform City Court Act § 1304, a "court must
render judgment within thirty days from the time when the case is
submitted for that purpose."  A court shall render a decision on
a motion within 60 days (see Uniform City Court Act § 1001; CPLR
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concluded that his conduct constituted a pattern of "persistent
or deliberate neglect of his judicial duties" (Matter of
Greenfield, 76 NY2d 293, 295 [1990]).  We modify the
determination and conclude that this matter should be remitted to
the Commission for a hearing before a referee.  
I. 
From 1994 to 2007, petitioner served as a part-time
Judge of the Kingston City Court and maintained a private law
practice.  In February 2004, the Commission issued a confidential
letter of dismissal and caution to him for failing to render
timely decisions in two cases and failing to report one delayed
case to his administrative judge as required by the Rules of the
Chief Judge, 22 NYCRR 4.1.1  In April 2007, he became a full-time
judge of that court.  
In August 2008, the Commission filed a formal written
complaint against petitioner, alleging that from July 2004 to
February 2008 petitioner delayed in rendering decisions in 43
cases and 4 motions.2  The allegations are undisputed.  In 24 of
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No. 196
4213[c]).
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the cases, the delays ranged between two months and six months
after final submission; in 17 cases, the delays ranged between
seven months to one year and two months; and, in one case,
petitioner delayed the decision more than two and a half years. 
The delayed decisions on motions ranged between four and eleven
months.  No more than 13 decisions were pending at any given
time.  As required by 22 NYCRR 4.1, petitioner reported the
delayed matters in quarterly reports to his administrative judge
and cited "insufficient time" as a cause for many of the delays.  
In several cases, the litigants or their attorneys wrote to
petitioner or petitioner's administrative judge inquiring about
the delayed decisions in their respective cases. 
Petitioner moved to dismiss the formal written
complaint, arguing that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to
intrude into matters of internal court administration. 
Petitioner admitted to the backlog and informed the Commission
that, after becoming a full-time judge, he cleared his backlog
and has remained current.  The administrator of the Commission
opposed petitioner's motion and cross-moved for summary
determination, sustaining the formal written complaint.  The
Commission denied the motion to dismiss and granted the cross
motion for summary determination.  After arguments on the issue
of sanctions, the Commission determined that admonition was
appropriate.  Petitioner now asks the Court to review this matter
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No. 196
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pursuant to NY Constitution, article VI, § 22(d) and Judiciary
Law § 44(9), which confer on this Court plenary power to review
the legal and factual findings of the Commission as well as the
sanction.  
II. 
A judge has an ethical obligation to "dispose of all
judicial matters promptly, efficiently and fairly" (22 NYCRR
100.3[B][7]).  In Greenfield, this Court held that the Commission
generally lacks jurisdiction to discipline a judge for a failure
to timely dispose of pending matters (76 NY2d at 298).  In that
case, the Commission sustained one charge of misconduct against a
Supreme Court justice, for his failure to render decisions
promptly in eight cases.  The delayed decisions ranged from seven
months to over nine years in those cases, and the petitioner
conceded that the delays were inexcusable.  We concluded that the
delays disclosed "serious administrative failings in [the]
petitioner's handling of the cases," but that there was  "no
persistent or deliberate neglect of his judicial duties rising to
the level of misconduct" (id. at 294-295).  The petitioner's
hearing revealed that, during his judicial career, he had
disposed of approximately 25,000 cases and often worked evening,
weekends and holidays.  Unique to that case, the petitioner's
administrative judge explained that most of the delays occurred
at the infancy of reporting rules, which had not been
consistently applied and enforced, and that, prior to the
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No. 196
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disciplinary hearing, administrative action had been firmly
interposed (see id. at 299).  At that time, this Court concluded
that it was important to draw a line "between the role of the
Commission and court administrators in order to avoid confusion
and provide adequate notice to members of the judiciary as to
when and under what circumstances delays in disposing of pending
matters ceases to be a purely administrative concern and becomes
a matter warranting punitive sanctions" (id. at 298). 
It still remains true that a judge's failure to
promptly dispose of pending matters is primarily a matter for
administrative correction.  But after nearly twenty years of
experience with Greenfield, we think it is not workable to
exclude completely the possibility of more formal discipline for
such behavior, in cases where the delays are lengthy and without
valid excuse.  In Greenfield itself, we recognized that when a
judge "has defied administrative directives or has attempted to
subvert the system by, for instance, falsifying, concealing or
persistently refusing to file records indicating delays," the
Commission has the authority to sanction a judge (id. at 297;
Matter of Washington, 100 NY2d 873, 875 [2003]).  We now hold
that lengthy, inexcusable delays may also be the subject of
disciplinary action, particularly when a judge fails to perform
judicial duties despite repeated administrative efforts to assist
the judge and his or her conduct demonstrates an unwillingness or
inability to discharge those duties.   
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No. 196
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Because not every case involving caseload delays will
rise to the level of misconduct, it is imperative that the
context in which the delays occurred be fully explored.  The
number of cases and the length of the delays should be assessed
in light of the total number and complexity of cases that the
judge presided over during the relevant time period, as well as
the jurist's other judicial obligations.  The extent and nature
of efforts taken by an administrative judge or other
administrative personnel, as well as the judge's response to
those efforts, should also be considered.  Statistics alone are
insufficient to support a finding of misconduct; disciplinary
action must be based on a record demonstrating a judge's
persistent lack of action in response to administrative
recommendations or warnings.
Here, although petitioner had numerous lengthy delayed
decisions and a prior letter from the Commission cautioning him
to promptly dispose of pending matters, misconduct was
established on summary determination without a hearing.  While we
conclude that petitioner's motion to dismiss was properly denied
because the Commission has jurisdiction to investigate complaints
involving delay and, where appropriate, pursue further
proceedings, we are unpersuaded that the prior warning in this
case was sufficient to render these delays misconduct as a matter
of law, without the development of a record addressing the
context in which they occurred.  On the record presented, it 
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No. 196
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is not clear whether these delayed decisions were inexcusable and
whether the problem could have been, or was, adequately dealt
with administratively.  Indeed, we do not know the extent to
which petitioner's administrative judge intervened.  Given the
Commission must establish that the delayed decisions were the
product of misconduct, whether disciplinary action was warranted
is not discernable from the existing record. 
Accordingly, the determination of the State Commission
on Judicial Conduct should be modified, without costs, by denying
the administrator's cross motion for summary determination and
remitting to the Commission for a hearing on the charge contained
in the formal written complaint, and as so modified, accepted. 
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Determination of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct
modified, without costs, by denying the administrator's cross
motion for summary determination and remitting to the Commission
for a hearing on the charge contained in the formal written
complaint and, as so modified, accepted.  Opinion Per Curiam.  
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Chief Judge Lippman took no part.
Decided December 15, 2009