Case Title: VLAHOS v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-154

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING 
 
2022 WY 129 
 
              
  OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2022 
 
October 19, 2022 
 
EDUARDO VLAHOS, 
 
Appellant 
(Defendant), 
 
v. 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
 
Appellee 
(Plaintiff). 
S-21-0290 
 
Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County 
The Honorable John R. Perry, Judge 
 
Representing Appellant: 
Office of Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; Francis H. McVay, Senior Assistant Appellate 
Counsel.  Argument by Mr. McVay. 
 
Representing Appellee: 
Bridget L. Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Joshua 
C. Eames*, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Timothy P. Zintak*, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. Zintak. 
 
 
Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY and FENN, JJ. 
  * An Order Allowing Withdrawal of Counsel was entered on August 1, 2022. 
 
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are 
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of 
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the 
permanent volume. 
 
 
1 
FENN, Justice. 
 
[¶1] 
A jury convicted Eduardo Vlahos of felony shoplifting.  He appeals claiming his 
right to a speedy trial was violated.  He further claims the district court abused its discretion 
by allowing a juror to remain on the jury after he inadvertently saw a video about the trial 
on social media.  We affirm. 
 
ISSUES 
 
[¶2] 
Mr. Vlahos raises two issues, which we rephrase as follows: 
 
I. Was Mr. Vlahos deprived of his right to a speedy trial? 
 
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by not replacing a 
juror who inadvertently saw a video about the trial on social 
media? 
 
FACTS 
 
[¶3] 
The underlying facts of this case are not directly relevant to the issues on appeal.  In 
summary, Mr. Vlahos was accused of shoplifting items from Walmart by scanning lower-
cost items and placing more-expensive items in his cart.  Walmart employees identified 16 
instances where Mr. Vlahos had engaged in this type of conduct.  Walmart employees 
provided the Gillette Police Department with surveillance videos and associated receipts 
for these incidents. 
 
[¶4] 
On October 30, 2019, the State filed a Felony Information, alleging that between 
October 4, 2019, and October 19, 2019, Mr. Vlahos engaged in “ticket switching” in 
violation of Wyoming Statute § 6-3-404(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2019),1 and the total value of 
the property he took was $4,462.98.  On October 31, 2019, the State filed an Amended 
Felony Information, changing the date range to between September 3, 2019, and October 
 
1 This statute provided: 
(b) A person who alters, defaces, changes or removes a price tag or marker 
on or about property offered for sale by a wholesale or retail store with 
intent to obtain the property at less than the marked or listed price is guilty 
of: 
(i) A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten 
(10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars 
($10,000.00), or both, if the difference between the marked or 
listed price and the amount actually paid is one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00) or more;  
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-404(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2019), repealed by 2020 Session Laws, ch. 90, § 3. 
 
 
2 
19, 2019.  Mr. Vlahos was arrested on this charge on October 31, 2019.  His case was 
bound over to district court on November 6, 2019. 
 
[¶5] 
On November 13, 2019, Mr. Vlahos’s public defender filed a demand for a speedy 
trial.  Mr. Vlahos was arraigned on November 15, 2019.  On November 19, 2019, the 
district court issued a case management order, setting Mr. Vlahos’s trial for “the week of 
April 6, 2020.”  On December 5, 2019, a second public defender entered an appearance on 
behalf of Mr. Vlahos after his first attorney resigned from the Public Defender’s Office.   
 
[¶6] 
At the pretrial conference held on March 6, 2020, the district court and parties 
discussed subpoenaing witnesses, some logistical issues with viewing the surveillance 
videos, whether the defense had received copies of the exhibits, whether the parties 
anticipated filing any motions, and Mr. Vlahos’s concerns about the evidence the State 
intended to use against him.  Neither party raised any issue that would have precluded the 
case from proceeding to trial as scheduled.  However, Mr. Vlahos’s trial did not commence 
as scheduled on April 6, 2020, and on April 8, 2020, the district court continued the trial to 
June 1, 2020.  The order resetting the trial did not state any reason for the continuance. 
 
[¶7] 
On May 22, 2020, Mr. Vlahos filed a pro se pleading captioned as a motion for an 
evidentiary hearing.  In this pleading, Mr. Vlahos claimed the officers could not testify 
about events that happened before October 19, 2019, because they had not been called to 
the scene.  He also claimed the video evidence did not support the charges, and he asked 
the district court to preclude the officers and a Walmart employee from testifying at his 
trial.  On May 27, 2020, the district court emailed the attorneys indicating it was not sure 
how to interpret the pro se motion and asking them how they wished to proceed.  Although 
the district court’s email was made of record, the attorneys’ responses to that email were 
not. 
 
[¶8] 
Mr. Vlahos’s trial did not begin on June 1, 2020, and the record does not contain an 
official order continuing the trial.  On June 3, 2020, the State filed a motion to suspend the 
proceedings pending an evaluation of Mr. Vlahos’s competency.  The motion raised 
concerns that Mr. Vlahos’s obsession with certain evidence was precluding him from 
interacting and communicating with defense counsel.  The motion also alleged Mr. Vlahos 
had engaged in other types of obsessive behavior, which resulted in him being charged 
with stalking.  The State was concerned Mr. Vlahos might have a condition that impacted 
the way he experienced reality, and he was unable to be an accurate historian to help his 
attorney prepare for trial.  The district court entered an order requiring a psychological 
evaluation for fitness to proceed on June 8, 2020. 
 
[¶9] 
On June 15, 2020, Mr. Vlahos filed a pro se motion indicating his relationship with 
his second attorney had deteriorated and requested to have new counsel appointed from 
outside the Public Defender’s Office.  Mr. Vlahos also sent a letter to the district court 
asking the court to deny the request for a mental health evaluation.  Later that same day, 
 
 
3 
the district court sent Mr. Vlahos and the attorneys a letter indicating it would not appoint 
a lawyer from outside the Public Defender’s Office at taxpayer expense.  On June 16, 2020, 
Mr. Vlahos sent the district court another letter alleging the prosecution was using “false 
evidence” and asserting he could not cooperate with his appointed counsel.  On June 16, 
2020, Mr. Vlahos filed a pro se motion to fire his second attorney.  This motion indicated 
Mr. Vlahos had fired his second attorney for a “personal reason” and was in the process of 
finding another attorney. 
 
[¶10] On August 26, 2020, the State Hospital filed the competency evaluation.  In the 
evaluation, Mr. Vlahos indicated he would cooperate “if appointed a different attorney.”  
The evaluation stated: “Mr. Vlahos does have sufficient present capacity to comprehend 
his position, to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct 
his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate if appointed with different counsel . . . .”  
The evaluation concluded Mr. Vlahos was competent to proceed. 
 
[¶11] On August 31, 2020, a third public defender (defense counsel) entered an 
appearance as counsel for Mr. Vlahos.  The district court held a competency hearing on 
September 8, 2020.  At that hearing, defense counsel indicated he would not be seeking a 
second evaluation.  The parties agreed the case could be placed back on the trial docket.  
Mr. Vlahos’s trial was set for February 8, 2021. 
 
[¶12] On February 2, 2021, the State filed a second Amended Information, changing the 
charge from ticket switching to shoplifting.2  The dates of the offenses and the amount of 
merchandise Mr. Vlahos allegedly took remained the same. 
 
[¶13] Mr. Vlahos’s trial did not commence on February 8, 2021.  The district court held a 
video hearing on that date, where it informed the parties the court reporter had become ill 
the previous Friday.  The court reporter had been tested for COVID-19, and although the 
test came back negative, the district court was concerned it might be a false negative.  The 
 
2 The Amended Information still cited to Wyoming Statute § 6-3-404(b)(i).  This appears to be a 
typographical error.  The language in the Amended Information comes from Wyoming Statute § 6-3-
404(a)(i), which stated:  
 
(a) A person who willfully conceals or takes possession of property offered 
for sale by a wholesale or retail store without the knowledge or consent of 
the owner and with intent to convert the property to his own use without 
paying the purchase price is guilty of: 
(i) A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten 
(10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars 
($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is one thousand 
dollars ($1,000.00) or more;  
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-404 (LexisNexis 2019), repealed by 2020 Session Laws, ch. 90, § 3. 
 
 
 
4 
district court also stated public health officials were advising people to stay home if they 
were sick.  The district court considered having the court reporter transcribe the trial 
remotely by video.  However, due to her illness, she would have to take frequent breaks, 
and the district court was concerned that would be a distraction.  The district court 
attempted to find a substitute reporter, but it was unable to do so.  The district court 
indicated it would reschedule Mr. Vlahos’s trial for March 8, 2021, which was “as quickly 
as we can possibly get this done.”  In response to the proposed continuance defense counsel 
stated: 
 
Your Honor, I guess the only thing that I would say is we don’t 
have any objection to this continuance, I mean, obviously, 
everybody wanted to get this over with, but we understand the 
circumstances, and -- and the defense will not be presenting 
any -- any objections to it. 
 
[¶14] On February 22, 2021, defense counsel filed a request for a second competency 
evaluation.  Defense counsel believed Mr. Vlahos was incapable of rationally assisting in 
his own defense or cooperating with counsel.  The request also indicated Mr. Vlahos 
believed he was competent and did not want another evaluation.  The district court ordered 
the second competency evaluation that same day. 
 
[¶15] On February 22, 2021, Mr. Vlahos filed a pro se motion to fire his third attorney.  
Mr. Vlahos alleged defense counsel refused to call certain witnesses, raise and argue 
various motions, or address his concerns about prosecutorial misconduct.  He also alleged 
defense counsel was trying to “force” him to accept a plea deal.  He renewed his request to 
be appointed an attorney from outside the Public Defender’s Office.  The district court 
denied the motion on February 25, 2021. 
 
[¶16] The State Hospital filed the second competency evaluation on April 23, 2021.  The 
evaluation indicated Mr. Vlahos did not trust his attorney or the Campbell County court.  
The evaluator diagnosed Mr. Vlahos with antisocial personality disorder.  The evaluation 
stated: “Per the Defendant, if he were to be granted the ability to move his case out of 
Campbell [C]ounty, he would be amenable to cooperate with defense [counsel] and not 
engage in disrespectful communication.”  The evaluation concluded Mr. Vlahos was 
competent to proceed. 
 
[¶17] On May 11, 2021, the district court informed the parties Mr. Vlahos’s trial would 
be reset for June 14, 2021.  On May 12, 2021, defense counsel filed a motion to continue 
the trial because he was not available on that date.  On May 13, 2021, the district court 
granted defense counsel’s motion to continue and indicated the trial would be reset by a 
separate notice. 
 
 
 
5 
[¶18] The district court held a hearing on the second competency evaluation on May 13, 
2021.  Defense counsel indicated he was not going to object to the evaluator’s findings, but 
both parties had questions they wanted to ask the evaluator.  The State was concerned about 
the first competency evaluation being conditioned on Mr. Vlahos being appointed different 
counsel and the second evaluation being conditioned on moving the trial to another venue.  
Defense counsel was worried the evaluator had not addressed his concerns that Mr. Vlahos 
truly believed the court and defense counsel were working with the State to convict him. 
 
[¶19] In her testimony, the evaluator noted Mr. Vlahos was “steadfast that he [would] not 
cooperate with his current counsel.”  Mr. Vlahos told her he would be willing to cooperate 
with another attorney.  She opined his antisocial personality disorder did not impact Mr. 
Vlahos’s ability to think rationally and factually, but it could make him a very difficult 
client to represent.  Mr. Vlahos did not tell the evaluator he believed defense counsel was 
trying to convict him.  Defense counsel asked the evaluator if another evaluation should be 
done to address that belief, and she indicated she was not opposed to completing an 
additional evaluation.  After hearing the testimony of the evaluator, the district court gave 
the parties the opportunity to submit written responses to the evaluation. 
 
[¶20] Defense counsel filed his written response to the second competency evaluation on 
May 17, 2021.  He indicated he was still concerned about Mr. Vlahos’s competency, and 
the evaluator had not adequately responded to his concerns.  However, Mr. Vlahos believed 
the evaluations had been requested as part of a plan to convince him not to have a trial.  As 
such, defense counsel felt it would be imprudent to request further evaluations.  Defense 
counsel indicated he would neither accept the conclusions of the evaluation nor request 
another evaluation, and he would leave it to the district court to make a competency 
determination. 
 
[¶21] The State filed its written response to the second competency evaluation on May 
20, 2021.  The State indicated the evaluator’s finding that Mr. Vlahos could rationally 
cooperate with counsel was against the weight of the evidence.  The State believed Mr. 
Vlahos’s antisocial personality disorder was impacting his ability to cooperate with counsel 
and conduct his defense in a rational manner.  Despite these concerns, the State did not 
request an additional evaluation.  On June 14, 2021, the district court reset his trial for July 
12, 2021, even though it had not made an official finding about Mr. Vlahos’s competency.  
 
[¶22] On July 2, 2021, defense counsel filed a motion to relieve the Public Defender from 
representing Mr. Vlahos.  This motion indicated Mr. Vlahos was asking defense counsel 
to present evidence at the trial that had no relevance or merit, which would violate the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  In addition, Mr. Vlahos had indicated he did not want 
defense counsel to represent him if this evidence would not be presented at trial.  Defense 
counsel believed he was required to withdraw.  The district court set a hearing on this 
motion for July 9, 2021. 
 
 
 
6 
[¶23] On July 8, 2021, Mr. Vlahos filed a pro se notice of exhibits he intended to use at 
trial and a motion to subpoena various witnesses.  On July 9, 2021, Mr. Vlahos filed a letter 
indicating he did not want defense counsel to represent him.  That same day, Mr. Vlahos 
also filed a pro se motion to continue the trial, which stated he needed more time to prepare 
for trial now that he was representing himself. 
 
[¶24] The district court held a hearing on the motion to relieve the Public Defender and a 
Faretta hearing3 on July 9, 2021.  At this hearing, defense counsel indicated he had been 
given some receipts that Mr. Vlahos wanted to introduce at trial.  Defense counsel had his 
investigator compare those receipts to the videos and documents the State provided in 
discovery.  Her investigation revealed Mr. Vlahos’s receipts did not match the videos or 
the receipts the State provided.  Defense counsel concluded the receipts were not relevant.  
When defense counsel informed Mr. Vlahos of this conclusion, Mr. Vlahos claimed 
defense counsel was crazy and a liar, and the receipts were exact matches that proved his 
innocence.  Mr. Vlahos demanded defense counsel place those receipts into evidence, and 
defense counsel told Mr. Vlahos he would not do that.  Defense counsel felt he was 
ethically required to withdraw.  Mr. Vlahos indicated he did not want defense counsel to 
represent him. 
 
[¶25] The district court advised Mr. Vlahos about the dangers of representing himself.  
Mr. Vlahos indicated he did not trust Public Defenders, and he wanted to represent himself.  
The district court found Mr. Vlahos was competent to proceed.  The district court then took 
the motion to withdraw and the motion to proceed pro se under advisement, and it told the 
parties it would announce its decision by noon that day.  Later that day, the district court 
granted defense counsel’s motion to relieve the Public Defender’s Office, and it found Mr. 
Vlahos had waived his right to counsel, and this waiver was voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent.  The district court denied the pro se motion for a continuance and found Mr. 
Vlahos would appear pro se at the trial set for July 12, 2021. 
 
[¶26] Mr. Vlahos’s trial began on July 12, 2021.  On the morning of the second day of 
trial, the State informed the district court about an issue that had arisen: 
 
Apparently, there was a video, a 40-minute video, that was 
posted on Facebook last night on Mr. Vlahos’s page.  I’m 
concerned that it may have caused a mistrial.  When my 
witness[] became aware of it, because she is specifically named 
in it, and I don’t know if the jury, of their own volition or 
because someone else knew that they were on the jury, 
 
3 This hearing was intended to ensure Mr. Vlahos was intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily waiving 
his right to counsel, and to advise him “of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the 
record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Reifer v. State, 
2014 WY 139, ¶¶ 15–16, 336 P.3d 1214, 1217 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975)).  
 
 
7 
provided the information to them.  So, I -- I think we need to 
inquire with regard to each juror if they’ve been aware -- 
become aware of Mr. Vlahos’s 40-minute diatribe regarding 
the process of this case. 
 
Mr. Vlahos admitted he had made the video, but he claimed it was his brother who posted 
it on Facebook.  The State found Mr. Vlahos’s explanation to be suspect, and it asserted 
Mr. Vlahos had intentionally posted the video.  The district court did not believe Mr. 
Vlahos’s explanation, and it decided it would bring the jury in and ask them in a general 
way if they had seen anything pertaining to the trial. 
 
[¶27] The jury was brought in, and the district court asked them to raise their hands if they 
had seen any type of publication, broadcasts, or social media postings pertaining to the trial 
anywhere, including newspapers, television, radio, or the internet.  Only one juror, O.H., 
raised his hand.  The rest of the jurors were then sent to the jury room while the court 
questioned O.H.  The district court asked O.H. to describe what he saw.  O.H. stated: 
 
Just the description of the receipts and that, just a description 
of what was going on a little bit. I didn’t watch the whole thing. 
I mean, I didn’t -- it just popped up on my web thing. I’m 
usually on there looking for car parts and stuff like that to buy, 
and it just popped up. 
 
[¶28] O.H. then clarified the video had been posted to Gillette Classified’s Facebook page.  
When asked to further describe what he had seen, O.H. stated: 
 
It was the defendant on there. He’s just describing his receipts 
and that, just saying he was innocent all that, is what he was 
saying on that. I didn’t -- it didn’t bother me, I didn’t watch the 
whole thing. . . . 
 
O.H. explained he had only watched a couple of minutes of the video and then he shut it 
off. 
 
[¶29] The State asked O.H. if he could set what he had seen in the video aside and only 
consider what had been presented in the courtroom.  O.H. indicated that he could do so.  
The district court gave Mr. Vlahos the opportunity to question O.H., but he did not ask the 
juror any questions.  The district court then asked O.H. if he could set aside what he had 
seen and decide the case solely on the facts he saw and heard in the courtroom.  O.H. again 
affirmed that he could do so.  Neither the State nor Mr. Vlahos moved to have O.H. 
removed from the jury and replaced with an alternate.  The rest of the jury was then brought 
back, and the trial resumed. 
 
 
 
8 
[¶30] On July 13, 2021, the jury found Mr. Vlahos guilty of shoplifting.  The district court 
sentenced Mr. Vlahos to imprisonment for not less than five years nor more than ten years.  
This appeal timely followed. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
I. 
Did Mr. Vlahos Receive a Speedy Trial? 
 
[¶31] Mr. Vlahos asserts his right to a speedy trial under Rule 48 of the Wyoming Rules 
of Criminal Procedure (W.R.Cr.P.) and the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution was violated.  “We review Rule 48 and constitutional speedy trial claims de 
novo.” Rogers v. State, 2021 WY 123, ¶ 17, 498 P.3d 66, 71 (Wyo. 2021) (citing 
Castellanos v. State, 2016 WY 11, ¶ 48, 366 P.3d 1279, 1294 (Wyo. 2016)). 
 
A. Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 48 
 
[¶32] We first address Mr. Vlahos’s claim that his trial date violated his right to a speedy 
trial under Rule 48.  Rule 48(b)(2) states: “A criminal charge shall be brought to trial within 
180 days following arraignment unless continued as provided in this rule.”  Rule 48(b)(5) 
states: “Any criminal case not tried or continued as provided in this rule shall be dismissed 
180 days after arraignment.”  Compliance with Rule 48 is mandatory. Castellanos, 2016 
WY 11, ¶ 49, 366 P.3d at 1294–95 (citing Dean v. State, 2003 WY 128, ¶¶ 50–52, 77 P.3d 
692, 706 (Wyo. 2003); Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 8, 17 P.3d 715, 718 (Wyo. 2001)).  
“Calculating the 180–day provision of Rule 48 is a simple matter of arithmetic, beginning 
with arraignment and ending with commencement of trial, excluding any time periods 
specified in the rule.” Id., 366 P.3d at 1295 (quoting Ortiz v. State, 2014 WY 60, ¶ 33, 326 
P.3d 883, 892 (Wyo. 2014)). 
 
[¶33] Rule 48 specifically exempts certain periods from the speedy trial calculation: 
 
(3) The following periods shall be excluded in computing the 
time for trial: 
(A) All proceedings related to the mental illness or 
deficiency of the defendant;  
(B) Proceedings on another charge;  
(C) The time between the dismissal and the refiling of 
the same charge; and  
(D) Delay occasioned by defendant’s change of counsel 
or application therefor. 
 
W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2021).  Rule 48 also allows the district court to continue 
a trial beyond the 180-day period under certain circumstances: 
 
 
 
9 
(4) Continuances exceeding 180 days from the date of 
arraignment may be granted by the trial court as follows:  
(A) On motion of defendant; or  
(B) On motion of the attorney for the state or the court 
if:  
(i) The defendant expressly consents;  
(ii) The state’s evidence is unavailable and the 
prosecution has exercised due diligence; or 
(iii) Required in the due administration of justice 
and the defendant will not be substantially 
prejudiced; and 
(C) If a continuance is proposed by the state or the court, 
the defendant shall be notified. If the defendant objects, 
the defendant must show in writing how the delay may 
prejudice the defense. 
 
W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2021). 
 
[¶34] The district court arraigned Mr. Vlahos on November 15, 2019.  His Rule 48 speedy 
trial clock began on that date and was set to expire on May 13, 2020.  Without question, 
his July 12, 2021, trial began after the trial clock had run if no exceptions applied. Rogers, 
2021 WY 123, ¶ 18, 498 P.3d at 71.  We analyze each delay to determine whether Rule 48 
was violated. 
 
1. First Delay: From April 6, 2020, to June 1, 2020 
 
[¶35] Mr. Vlahos’s trial was originally set to begin the week of April 6, 2020.  Had his 
trial occurred on April 6, 2020, it would have been 143 days after his arraignment.  This 
setting complied with Rule 48’s 180-day time limit.  The trial did not begin on April 6, 
2020, and on April 8, 2020, the district court reset Mr. Vlahos’s trial to June 1, 2020.  The 
order continuing the trial did not set forth any reason for the continuance.  The State asserts 
this delay was caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
[¶36] On March 18, 2020, this Court entered the Order Adopting Temporary Plan to 
Address Health Risks Posed by the COVID-19 Pandemic (First Pandemic Order).4  With 
some limited exceptions, this order required in-person proceedings to be suspended from 
March 18, 2020, to April 10, 2020.  On March 19, 2020, the Campbell County district court 
entered a General Order Vacating all Jury Trials set to Begin Before May 1, 2020 (General 
 
4 Order Adopting Temporary Plan to Address Health Risks Posed by the COVID-19 Pandemic, 
https://www.courts.state.wy.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/COVID-19-Order.pdf. 
 
 
10 
Order).5  The General Order indicated the district court “received a request by the Office 
of the Wyoming State Public Defender that the [c]ourt suspend all jury trials scheduled to 
begin during March and April 2020.”  The district court found “the current global pandemic 
constitutes extraordinary circumstances that justifies cancelling all jury trials until May 1, 
2020.” 
 
[¶37] These orders do not appear in the record, but they are publicly available on the 
Wyoming Judicial Branch website.  The State asked us to take judicial notice of these 
orders.  At oral argument, Mr. Vlahos conceded it would be appropriate for us to take 
judicial notice of these orders, although he did not advocate that approach.  “To have a 
court take judicial notice of a document, the proponent must provide written notice to the 
court and the ‘judicially noticed documents must be physically included as part of the 
record filed on appeal[] or must be on file at the Supreme Court as the result of a different 
proceeding.” Gaston v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc.,  2021 WY 74, ¶ 11 n.1, 488 P.3d 929, 
935 n.1 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Cockreham v. Wyo. Prod. Credit Ass’n, 743 P.2d 869, 872-
73 (Wyo. 1987)).  The State referenced the COVID-19 orders in its brief, and those orders 
are on file with this Court.  It would have been preferable for the district court to make a 
clear record about why this continuance was granted.6  However, given the extraordinary 
and unprecedented circumstances created by the pandemic, we find it is appropriate to take 
judicial notice of the COVID-19 orders that were issued by this Court and the Campbell 
County court. 
 
[¶38] The General Order was entered at least in part due to the Public Defender’s request 
to continue all jury trials set during the months of March and April.  This could be 
considered as a continuance on the motion of the defendant under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4)(A).  
It could also be viewed as a continuance on the motion of the court to which the defendant 
expressly consented under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4)(B)(i).  Under either of these provisions, the 
56-day delay is excluded from Rule 48’s 180-day period. 
 
2. Second Delay: From June 1, 2020, to June 8, 2020 
 
[¶39] Mr. Vlahos’s trial did not begin on June 1, 2020, and there is no order in the record 
vacating or resetting this trial.  The State asserts this delay should be attributed to the 
 
5 
General 
Order 
Vacating 
All 
Jury 
Trials 
Set 
to 
Begin 
Before 
May 
1, 
2020,  
https://www.courts.state.wy.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/General-Order-2020-04.pdf. 
6 In Ballard v. State, the defendant’s waiver of a jury trial was done through emails that were not originally 
made part of the record. 2022 WY 7, ¶ 8, 501 P.3d 1269, 1270 (Wyo. 2022).  At the district court’s 
prompting, the State eventually supplemented the record with the emails. Id. at ¶ 8, 501 P.3d at 1270–71.  
Justice Davis wrote a concurring opinion to “encourage that such waivers be handled with greater attention 
to ensuring a clear record.” Id. at ¶ 24, 501 P.3d at 1273 (Davis, J. concurring).  Having a clear record is 
often critical when reviewing a speedy trial claim, and the district court and the parties should be cognizant 
of their responsibly to make a clear record.  Although it was more convenient, and possibly sometimes 
necessary, for district courts to communicate with counsel via email during the pandemic, all emails 
pertaining to substantive matters, including continuances under Rule 48, should be made part of the record. 
 
 
11 
COVID-19 pandemic, and it should be considered a continuance under the due 
administration of justice pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4)(B)(iii).7  On May 15, 2020, this 
Court entered the Third Order Amending March 18, 2020, Temporary Plan to Address 
Health Risks Posed by the COVID-19 Pandemic (Third Pandemic Order).8  The Third 
Pandemic Order extended “the moratorium on jury trials until August 3, 2020.” 
 
[¶40] We have not yet squarely addressed whether delays caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic fall under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4)(B)(iii), although we have held that COVID-19 
delays should be weighed neutrally under a constitutional speedy trial analysis. Cotney v. 
State, 2022 WY 17, ¶ 24, 503 P.3d 58, 67 (Wyo. 2022).  Other jurisdictions have held 
COVID-19 provided sufficient cause to continue jury trials under similar speedy trial 
statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Leveke, 38 F.4th 662, 670–72 (8th Cir. 2022) (affirming 
the district court’s decision to continue a trial under the “ends of justice” exception to the 
federal Speedy Trial Act when the trial could not have taken place sooner due to the safety 
hazards posed by the COVID-19 pandemic); United States v. Olsen, 21 F.4th 1036, 1040–
41, 1046–49 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding continuances due to the COVID-19 pandemic fell 
within the “ends of justice” exception under the federal Speedy Trial Act); State v. Brown, 
310 Neb. 224, 230–38, 964 N.W.2d 682, 688–92 (Neb. 2021) (finding continuances due to 
COVID-19 constituted “good cause” under Nebraska’s speedy trial statute). 
 
[¶41] The COVID-19 pandemic presented courts with “unprecedented challenges” 
including “when and how to conduct jury trials without endangering public health and 
safety and without undermining the constitutional right to a jury trial.” Olsen, 21 F.4th at 
1040.  The “extraordinarily serious and deadly” nature of the pandemic created “exigent 
circumstances” that led federal and state officials to declare emergencies and issue 
emergency orders. Id. at 1041.  The stated purpose of our First Pandemic Order was “to 
protect the health and safety of court employees, elected officials, and the general public[.]”  
In our Third Pandemic Order, we specifically found the “current health emergency” 
constituted “good cause” to continue most proceedings.  Given the extreme dangers posed 
by the COVID-19 pandemic during the spring and summer of 2020, we find continuing 
Mr. Vlahos’s jury trial at the beginning of June was required in the due administration of 
justice, and the continuance falls under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4)(B)(iii). Under W.R.Cr.P. 
 
7 Alternatively, the State asked us to “infer” the district court did not hold a trial on June 1, 2020, because 
it expected to receive and grant a motion to evaluate Mr. Vlahos’s competency.  The district court emailed 
counsel on May 27, 2020, asking them how they wished to proceed after Mr. Vlahos filed his pro se motion 
for an evidentiary hearing.  However, counsels’ responses to that email were not made of record by the 
district court, and the State chose not to supplement the record to include them.  Trying to determine if the 
trial was continued because the court expected to receive a competency motion “would be an exercise in 
speculation, because the record tells us nothing.” McEwan v. State, 2013 WY 158, ¶ 26, 314 P.3d 1160, 
1167–68 (Wyo. 2013).  We will not engage in such an exercise, and we decline to address the State’s 
alternative theoretical reason for the delay. 
8Third Order Amending March 18, 2020 Temporary Plan to Address Health Risks Posed by the COVID-19 
Pandemic, https://www.courts.state.wy.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/COVID-19-OrderThird 
Amend05.15.2020.pdf. 
 
 
12 
48(b)(4)(C), a defendant must be notified of a continuance that has been proposed by the 
court, and [i]f the defendant objects, the defendant must show in writing how the delay 
may prejudice the defense.”  In this case, the district court did not issue a specific notice 
informing Mr. Vlahos it intended to continue the trial due to the pandemic.  However, the 
pandemic created extraordinary circumstances causing this Court to enter the Pandemic 
Orders, and everyone was aware those Pandemic Orders had been issued and published.  
Absent such extraordinary circumstances, we expect and require district courts to comply 
with the requirements of Rule 48.  After the Third Pandemic Order was issued on May 15, 
2020, neither Mr. Vlahos nor his counsel filed a written objection pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
48(b)(4)(C), nor did he make any attempt to show he would be prejudiced by this delay. 
This eight-day delay is excluded from Rule 48’s 180-day period. 
 
3. Third Delay: from June 8, 2020, to September 8, 2020 
 
[¶42] The district court entered an order staying the proceedings pending a competency 
evaluation on June 8, 2020.  The first competency evaluation was filed on August 26, 2020.  
At the hearing on September 8, 2020, neither party requested a second evaluation, and the 
district court found the case could be placed back on the trial docket.  Rule 48(b)(3)(A) 
specifically excludes “[a]ll proceedings related to the mental illness or deficiency of the 
defendant.”  Both parties agree this 92-day delay is excluded from Rule 48’s speedy trial 
calculation. 
 
4. Fourth Delay: from September 8, 2020, to February 8, 2021 
 
[¶43] Once the district court determined Mr. Vlahos was competent to proceed, it reset 
his trial to February 8, 2021.  “As a practical matter, a trial cannot be set to begin the 
moment a suspension of proceedings is lifted.” Castellanos, 2016 WY 11, ¶ 65, 366 P.3d 
at 1298.  Rule 48 “anticipates such a situation” and “allows for a continuance of the 180-
day limit if required [in] the due administration of justice and there is no resulting prejudice 
to the defendant.” Id. (quoting Rodgers v. State, 2011 WY 158, ¶ 30, 265 P.3d 235, 243 
(Wyo. 2011)). 
 
[¶44] Although Rule 48 anticipates that a trial cannot be held immediately after 
competency is established, it does not create a blanket exception that allows trial courts to 
delay a trial indefinitely.  Trial courts should be cognizant of their responsibility to set the 
trial as soon as possible and to articulate a specific reason for every delay. 
 
[¶45] The delay in this case exceeded the delay in Castellanos. Id. at ¶ 35, 366 P.3d at 
1291.  The district court did not specifically articulate a reason for setting the trial five 
months out.  However, it is apparent this delay was necessitated by the pandemic.  Mr. 
Vlahos did not object to this setting, and he has not shown he suffered substantial prejudice 
as a result of the district court setting his trial for February 8, 2021. See id. at ¶ 66, 366 
P.3d at 1298.  We find the trial setting was made in accordance with Rule 48, and that the 
 
 
13 
153-day delay from September 8, 2020, when the suspension of the proceedings was lifted, 
to February 8, 2021, does not count against the 180-day deadline. Id. 
 
5. Fifth Delay: from February 8, 2021, to February 22, 2021 
 
[¶46] Mr. Vlahos’s trial did not commence on February 8, 2021, because the court reporter 
was ill, and there were no substitute reporters available.  Defense counsel expressly 
consented to the trial being continued.  The district court reset Mr. Vlahos’s trial for the 
first available date.  This constituted a continuance with the Defendant’s express consent 
under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4)(B)(i).  This 14-day delay does not count against the 180-day 
deadline. 
 
6. Sixth Delay: from February 22, 2021, to July 9, 2021 
 
[¶47] Mr. Vlahos and the State asserted this sixth period of delay ran from February 22, 
2021, through May 13, 2021, and they agree 80 days should be excluded from the speedy 
trial calculation under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(3)(A).  However, a review of the record shows the 
period relating to the second competency evaluation actually ended on July 9, 2021, when 
the district court found Mr. Vlahos competent to stand trial. 
 
[¶48] Defense counsel filed a request for a second competency evaluation on February 22, 
2021, and the district court ordered the evaluation that same day.  The second competency 
evaluation was filed with the district court on April 23, 2021.  On May 11, 2021, two days 
before the hearing on the second competency evaluation, the district court placed Mr. 
Vlahos’s case back on the trial docket.  The district court held a hearing on the second 
competency evaluation on May 13, 2021.  Both the State and defense counsel expressed 
concerns about the evaluation, and they each questioned the examiner about her findings 
at the hearing.  At one point, defense counsel questioned the evaluator about whether an 
additional evaluation should be completed to address some of his concerns.  Given both 
parties’ concerns, the district court did not make a finding about Mr. Vlahos’s competency 
at that hearing.  Instead, the district court allowed the parties to file written responses to 
the second competency evaluation.  Those written responses were filed on May 17, 2021, 
and May 20, 2021.  The district court did not make a determination about Mr. Vlahos’s 
competency until the Faretta hearing on July 9, 2021. 
 
[¶49] “If it appears at any stage of a criminal proceeding, by motion or upon the court’s 
own motion, that there is reasonable cause to believe the accused has a mental illness or 
deficiency making him unfit to proceed, all further proceedings shall be suspended.” 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (emphasis added); see also W.R.Cr.P. 
12(c) (requiring the suspension of “all further proceedings” once there is reasonable cause 
to believe the defendant is unfit to proceed).  Once Mr. Vlahos’s mental competency to 
stand trial was at issue, “Wyoming law, as well as the due process protections of the United 
States and Wyoming constitutions, required the district court to suspend the criminal 
 
 
14 
proceeding pending a determination that [Mr. Vlahos] was, indeed, competent to stand 
trial.” Rodgers, 2011 WY 158, ¶ 30, 265 P.3d at 243 (citing Hauck v. State, 2001 WY 119, 
¶ 14, 36 P.3d 597, 601, (Wyo. 2001); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303 (LexisNexis 2011)). 
“The determination of whether a defendant is mentally fit to proceed must be made by the 
trial court.” Snyder v. State, 2021 WY 108, ¶ 25, 496 P.3d 1239, 1247 (Wyo. 2021) 
(quoting Follett v. State, 2006 WY 47, ¶ 8, 132 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Wyo. 2006)).  Under 
Rule 48, the speedy trial clock is tolled from the day the evaluation is ordered until the day 
the trial court makes a final determination about the defendant’s competency. See Potter v. 
State, 2007 WY 83, ¶ 30, 158 P.3d 656, 664 (Wyo. 2007); Hauck, 2001 WY 119, ¶ 14, 36 
P.3d at 601.  Mr. Vlahos’s competency to stand trial remained pending until the district 
court determined he was competent. Castellanos, 2016 WY 11, ¶ 56, 366 P.3d at 1296.  
The 137 days that passed between the day the evaluation was ordered and the day the 
district court made a competency determination are excluded from the speedy trial 
calculation under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(3)(A). Id. 
 
[¶50] Mr. Vlahos was tried on the first business day after the final competency 
determination had been made.9  His original trial date of April 6, 2020, was 143 days after 
his arraignment and complied with Rule 48’s 180-day limit.  All the delays that occurred 
after that setting are excluded from the 180-day limit.  Therefore, Mr. Vlahos was brought 
to trial within the time specified in the rule, and we find no Rule 48(b) violation. 
 
B. Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial 
 
[¶51] “The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 10 of the 
Wyoming Constitution guarantee every criminal defendant a speedy trial.” Cotney, 2022 
WY 17, ¶ 19, 503 P.3d at 65–66 (citing Humphrey v. State, 2008 WY 67, ¶ 20, 185 P.3d 
1236, 1243 (Wyo. 2008)).  The standard of review for a constitutional speedy trial claim is 
well established: 
 
To determine whether a defendant has been deprived of his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial, we look to the four factors 
set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 
L.Ed.2d 101 (1972): “‘(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason 
for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) 
the prejudice to the defendant.’” Crebs [v. State], [2020 WY 
136] ¶ 14, 474 P.3d [1136,] 1142 [(Wyo. 2020)] (quoting Webb 
v. State, 2017 WY 108, ¶ 15, 401 P.3d 914, 921-22 (Wyo. 
2017), and Rhodes v. State, 2015 WY 60, ¶ 17, 348 P.3d 404, 
410 (Wyo. 2015)). 
 
9 Defense counsel filed a motion to continue the trial that was set for June 14, 2021.  Thus, July 10, 2021, 
and July 11, 2021, were part of a continuance on the motion of the defendant under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4)(A), 
and these two days are excluded from the 180-day period. 
 
 
15 
“We conduct this analysis to determine whether the 
delay in bringing the accused to trial was unreasonable, 
that is, whether it substantially impaired the right of the 
accused to a fair trial. No single factor is dispositive. 
Instead, we consider the factors together and balanced 
in relation to all relevant circumstances. The State has 
the burden to prove delays in bringing the defendant to 
trial are reasonable and necessary.” 
 
Fairbourn v. State, 2020 WY 73, ¶ 42, 465 P.3d 413, 424-25 
(Wyo. 2020) (quoting Mathewson v. State, 2019 WY 36, ¶ 57, 
438 P.3d 189, 209 (Wyo. 2019)). 
 
Cotney, ¶ 19, 503 P.3d at 66. 
 
1. Length of the Delay 
 
[¶52] “The constitutional ‘speedy trial clock begins to run at the time of arrest, 
information, or indictment, whichever occurs first.’” Cotney, ¶ 20, 503 P.3d at 66 (quoting 
Fairbourn, 2020 WY 73, ¶ 43, 465 P.3d at 425).  The speedy trial clock ends when the 
defendant is convicted, acquitted, or is no longer under indictment. Id.  The State filed these 
charges against Mr. Vlahos on October 30, 2019.  He was convicted on July 13, 2021.  A 
period of 622 days elapsed between the day the charges were filed and his conviction.  No 
precise length of delay constitutes an automatic violation of a constitutional right to a 
speedy trial, but a delay of over 365 days presumptively triggers review of the other Barker 
factors. Id. (quoting Mathewson, 2019 WY 36, ¶ 58, 438 P.3d at 210). 
 
2. Reason for the Delay 
 
[¶53] The second Barker factor requires us to examine who was responsible for the delays. 
Cotney, 2022 WY 17, ¶ 21, 503 P.3d at 66 (quoting Tate v. State, 2016 WY 102, ¶ 32, 382 
P.3d 762, 769 (Wyo. 2016)).  “We weigh the delays caused by the State against those 
caused by the defendant, keeping in mind it is the State’s burden to bring a defendant to 
trial in a timely manner and it must show that the delays were reasonable and necessary.” 
Id. (quoting Webb, 2017 WY 108, ¶ 17, 401 P.3d at 922).  “Delays caused by a defendant, 
such as requests for continuances, changes in defense counsel, and defendant filed pre-trial 
motions, may disentitle a defendant to speedy trial safeguards.” Id.  Delays caused by 
defense counsel are charged against the defendant. Id. (quoting Mathewson, 2019 WY 36, 
¶ 59, 438 P.3d at 210).  Delays caused by “circumstances such as overcrowded courts and 
their schedules are more neutral . . . and should not be weighed heavily against the State.” 
Id. (quoting Webb, 2017 WY 108, ¶ 17, 401 P.3d at 922). 
 
 
 
16 
[¶54] The first and second delays from April 6, 2020, to June 8, 2020, were caused by the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  Delays due to COVID-19 pandemic are neutral because the 
pandemic “was an extraordinary circumstance not attributable to either the State” or Mr. 
Vlahos. Cotney, 2022 WY 17, ¶ 24, 503 P.3d at 67. 
 
[¶55] The delays from June 8, 2020, to September 8, 2020, and February 22, 2021, through 
July 9, 2021, were due to competency evaluations.  Delays due to competency evaluations 
are considered neutral. Castellanos, 2016 WY 11, ¶ 81, 366 P.3d at 1301–02 (citing Miller 
v. State, 2009 WY 125, ¶ 41, 217 P.3d 793, 805 (Wyo. 2009)). 
 
[¶56] The delay from September 8, 2020, to February 8, 2021, was caused by having to 
put the case back on the docket after the first competency evaluation.  Delays due to 
crowded dockets and court schedules are neutral and are not weighed heavily against the 
State. Cotney, 2022 WY 17, ¶ 21, 503 P.3d at 66 (quoting Webb, 2017 WY 108, ¶ 17, 401 
P.3d at 922). 
 
[¶57] The delay from February 8, 2021, to February 22, 2021, was due to the court 
reporter’s illness and COVID-19 restrictions.  This falls into the neutral category. Cotney, 
¶ 24, 503 P.3d at 67. 
 
[¶58] Because all these delays fall into a neutral category, this factor “cannot be weighed 
heavily for or against either party.” Cotney, ¶ 24, 503 P.3d at 67. 
 
3. Defendant’s Assertion of His Right to Speedy Trial 
 
[¶59] “Although a defendant is not required to assert his right to a speedy trial, the vigor 
with which the defendant asserted his right is an important consideration in determining 
the reasonableness of any delay.” Id. at ¶ 26, 503 P.3d at 67 (quoting Mathewson, 2019 
WY 36, ¶ 63, 438 P.3d at 211)).  “A defendant’s consistent assertion of his right weighs 
heavily in favor of the defendant, whereas less than vigorous assertions are given little 
weight.” Id.  Although Mr. Vlahos filed an initial demand for speedy trial on November 
13, 2019, he never objected to any of the continuances, filed renewed demands for speedy 
trial, or moved to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.  In addition, he expressly consented to 
at least one of the continuances, and he requested an additional continuance on July 9, 
2021.  Because Mr. Vlahos’s assertion of his right was “less than vigorous,” this factor is 
given little weight. Id. 
 
4. Prejudice 
 
[¶60] To determine if Mr. Vlahos was prejudiced by the delay, “we consider: ‘(1) lengthy 
pretrial incarceration; (2) pretrial anxiety; and (3) impairment of the defense.’” Cotney, 
2022 WY 17, ¶ 27, 503 P.3d at 67 (quoting Ortiz, 2014 WY 60, ¶ 59, 326 P.3d at 896).  
 
 
17 
Mr. Vlahos “has the burden to demonstrate and substantiate [] prejudice.” Id. (quoting 
Mathewson, 2019 WY 36, ¶ 65, 438 P.3d at 211). 
 
[¶61] Mr. Vlahos argues he was prejudiced because the ongoing trial continuances were 
outside his control, and the competency evaluations were a “pervasive waste of time” 
because he strongly believed he was competent.  He also asserts he suffered anxiety 
because of this case “as it was a continuation of the hassles he relayed to his evaluator 
twice over,” he had restrictions on his travel, and he was facing prosecution for other 
alleged crimes.  He also claims he was the sole provider for his household, and he and his 
fiancée were expecting a second child, which contributed to his pretrial anxiety. 
 
[¶62] Mr. Vlahos does not cite to any case law to support his assertion that a defendant’s 
personal belief a competency evaluation is unnecessary constitutes prejudice.  The 
language in Wyoming Statute § 7-11-303(a) is mandatory, and it requires a court to order 
a competency evaluation whenever there is reasonable cause to believe the accused has a 
mental illness or deficiency making him unfit to proceed.  Mr. Vlahos’s behavior towards 
his attorneys, his numerous pro se pleadings, and his obsession with presenting irrelevant 
evidence gave the district court reasonable cause to believe competency evaluations were 
necessary. 
 
[¶63] The remaining assertions of prejudice could possibly fall under pretrial anxiety.  We 
have held: “Pretrial anxiety ‘is the least significant’ factor and because a ‘certain amount 
of pretrial anxiety naturally exists,’ an appellant must demonstrate that he suffered 
‘extraordinary or unusual’ pretrial anxiety.” Cotney, 2022 WY 17, ¶ 28, 503 P.3d at 67 
(quoting Mathewson, 2019 WY 36, ¶ 65, 438 P.3d at 211).  “‘A bare assertion of anxiety 
will not suffice’ to show prejudice.” Id. (citing Ortiz, 2014 WY 60, ¶ 61, 326 P.3d at 896).  
Mr. Vlahos may have had anxiety about supporting his family and expecting a second 
child.  However, Mr. Vlahos has not shown his anxiety was the result of the delays in this 
case.  In fact, he admits he was facing prosecution for other crimes during this same period.  
Concerns about other pending charges do not constitute extraordinary or unusual pretrial 
anxiety. See Crebs, 2020 WY 136, ¶ 48, 474 P.3d at 1149.  Mr. Vlahos has not shown his 
anxiety was extraordinary or unusual.  Because Mr. Vlahos has not shown prejudice, “the 
fourth Barker factor weighs ‘heavily against him.’” Cotney, ¶ 30, 503 P.3d at 68 (quoting 
Mathewson, ¶ 67, 438 P.3d at 212). 
 
5. Balancing the Factors 
 
[¶64] Because Mr. Vlahos “failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the delay, ‘the 
other three Barker factors must weigh heavily in his favor to establish a speedy trial 
violation.’” Id. at ¶ 31, 503 P.3d at 68 (quoting Mathewson, ¶ 67, 438 P.3d at 212).  The 
622-day delay between when the charges were filed and Mr. Vlahos’s conviction weighs 
in his favor. Mathewson, 2019 WY 36, ¶ 68, 438 P.3d at 212.  The second and third Barker 
factors are neutral, and the fourth factor weighs heavily against Mr. Vlahos. “[O]n balance, 
 
 
18 
we cannot say the delay in bringing [Mr. Vlahos] to trial was unreasonable under the 
circumstances of this case.” Id. (citing Ortiz, 2014 WY 60, ¶ 39, 326 P.3d at 893).  
“Because the delay in bringing [Mr. Vlahos] to trial was not unreasonable, he was not 
denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Cotney, ¶ 31, 503 P.3d at 68. 
 
II. 
Should Juror O.H. have been Removed? 
 
[¶65] Mr. Vlahos asserts juror O.H. “stepped outside of the court’s clear directions and 
investigated facts and evidence outside the court’s oversight.”  Mr. Vlahos asserts that by 
directing O.H. to ignore what he had seen in the video and decide the case based only on 
the evidence presented in the courtroom, the State and the district court asked a juror “to 
ignore Mr. Vlahos’[s] innocence, and his theory of defense[.]”  The State asserts Mr. 
Vlahos waived this issue by not objecting to the juror remaining on the panel during the 
trial. 
 
[¶66] We agree with the State.  “If the defendant knows of possible juror misconduct 
during trial but does not bring it to the attention of the trial court before the verdict is 
returned, he waives the right to a new trial on that ground.” Pena v. State, 2013 WY 4, 
¶ 49, 294 P.3d 13, 23 (Wyo. 2013).  This same rule applies to juror misconduct and 
inadvertent exposure to material that could potentially improperly influence a juror. Id. at 
¶ 50, 294 P.3d at 23 (applying the rule to any “potential impropriety”).  O.H. was not 
intentionally conducting an outside investigation.  Instead, O.H. was exposed to the video 
while browsing the Gillette Classified’s Facebook page.  The State alerted the district court 
to this potential impropriety.  The district court gave Mr. Vlahos the opportunity to question 
the juror, which he declined.  Mr. Vlahos never objected to O.H. remaining on the jury, 
and he never asked to have O.H. replaced with an alternate.  Because he did not object 
prior to the return of the verdict, he has waived this issue on appeal. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
[¶67] Mr. Vlahos was not denied his right to a speedy trial under W.R.Cr.P. 48 or the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Mr. Vlahos waived any claim related 
to alleged juror impropriety by not objecting before the return of the verdict.  His conviction 
is affirmed.