Case Title: Hansen v. Mr. D's Food Center

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hansen v. Mr. D's Food Center1992 WY 28827 P.2d 371Case Number: 91-264Decided: 03/04/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the 
Workers' Compensation Claim of Avis M. HANSEN, 

Appellant 
(Employee-Claimant),

v.

MR. D's FOOD 
CENTER,

 Appellee 
(Employer-Respondent).

Appeal from District 
Court, Fremont County, Elizabeth A. Kail, J.

Wesley A. 
Roberts, White, White & Roberts, P.C., Riverton, for 
appellant.

Richard D. Gist, 
Richard D. Gist, P.C., Lander, for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY, and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The basic 
question raised in this appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to 
sustain worker's compensation benefits awarded by the hearing examiner. 
Incidental to the determination of that question is whether the decision of the 
district court which reviewed the order of the hearing examiner and determined 
that a physician's report was not admissible in the worker's compensation 
hearing is correct. Having determined the physician's report was not admissible, 
the district court concluded there was not substantial evidence to sustain the 
award of benefits. We hold there was substantial evidence to sustain the award 
of benefits without the physician's report but, in any event, in this instance, 
the physician's report properly was admitted. We reverse the case and remand it 
to the district court for entry of an order affirming the award of 
benefits.

[¶2]      In her Appeal 
Brief of Appellant, Avis Hansen (Hansen), the injured employee, offers only one 
issue. She states the issue as:

Was there substantial 
evidence to support the administrative law judge's award of workers' 
compensation benefits to the appellant?

In the Appeal 
Brief of Appellee, Mr. D's Food Center (Mr. D's), the single issue is stated in 
this way:

Is the administrative law 
judge's order awarding workers' compensation benefits to appellant supported by 
substantial competent evidence and did the district court err by setting aside 
the administrative law judge's order on hearing?

[¶3]      This case began 
when Hansen reported to the Worker's Compensation Division a work-related back 
injury which occurred on February 27, 1987. She received benefits because of 
that injury. On May 24, 1988, Hansen reported a recurrence of that injury and 
sought further benefits. Mr. D's objected, and Hansen requested a hearing. A 
pre-hearing order was issued to the parties by the hearing examiner, directing 
them to exchange witness and exhibit lists and to file those in the record. If 
this actually was done, it is not reflected in the record. What the record does 
show is that Mr. D's was provided a copy of a letter report prepared by Hansen's 
physician some seven months prior to the hearing. In addition, it was 
established at the hearing that Hansen's claim related back to her original 
injury, rather than constituting a new claim or a claim for an injury that 
occurred over time.

[¶4]      During the 
hearing, Hansen attempted to introduce a letter from Dr. Whipp.1 Mr. D's counsel objected, arguing 
that the letter was not the best evidence and it was not relevant with respect 
to the evidentiary burden of an employee emanating from Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-603 
(1991) (this statute creates a very specific burden of proof for injuries which 
occur over time). It then was decided Dr. Whipp would be available for 
telephonic cross-examination later in the day. He was in surgery at the time of 
the hearing. Neither party had subpoenaed the doctor, and his deposition had not 
been taken. The hearing officer permitted Hansen to identify the letter from Dr. 
Whipp, and the letter was admitted as evidence. The hearing officer explained 
that admission of such a written report was the established policy under Rules 
of the Office of Administrative Hearings, Practices and Procedures in Contested 
Cases, ch. I § 17.2 In the course of argument before 
the hearing examiner, counsel for Mr. D's admitted he had talked with Dr. Whipp 
about his conclusions sometime prior to the hearing, as Dr. Whipp had invited 
the parties to do in his letter. Counsel for Mr. D's also stated he wanted to 
cross-examine the doctor because he felt the doctor was uncertain about whether 
the injury was, in fact, a continuation of the previous injury for which 
worker's compensation benefits had been awarded, or was an entirely new injury, 
the source of which was not known. If Dr. Whipp was ambivalent in this regard, 
there certainly is no hint in his letter.

[¶5]      At the conclusion 
of the presentation of evidence by Mr. D's, counsel for Mr. D's asked to call 
Dr. Whipp. A ten-minute recess was declared and, thereafter, Dr. Whipp was 
expected to be available to testify over the telephone. The record does not 
explain why Dr. Whipp was not called by telephone, but he was not. The parties 
then presented their closing arguments, and counsel for Mr. D's made no further 
argument on his position about inadmissibility of the letter. Rather, they 
argued the letter was not sufficient evidence to fulfill Hansen's burden of 
proof under § 27-14-603, even though it had been established at this juncture 
that the referenced statute had no application to the proceedings.

[¶6]      Hansen contends 
there is substantial evidence to sustain the award by the hearing examiner, even 
if Dr. Whipp's report is not considered. We agree. Our standard of review for 
analysis of such a contention is well-known. Dougherty v. J.W. Williams, Inc., 
820 P.2d 553 (Wyo. 1991). Hansen had already established her initial claim and, 
although she had essentially the same burden of proof in seeking this additional 
award as she did in her initial award, there is no statutory requirement for 
medical testimony under the circumstances of this case. "[W]here injuries are so 
immediately and directly or naturally and probably the result of an accident, 
medical evidence is not essential to find a causal connection." Colorado Fuel 
& Iron Corporation v. Frihauf, 58 Wyo. 479, 135 P.2d 427, 434 (1943); see 
Dougherty; 2B Arthur Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation, §§ 79.51(a) - .51(c) 
(1983).

[¶7]      Hansen was a 64 
year-old woman who worked for a living and supported herself on a fixed income. 
Mr. D's contentions that Hansen had engaged in prohibited job exertion, at-home 
work, and other activities that caused a new injury were issues of fact to be 
determined by weighing the evidence pro and con. The original injury occurred 
when Hansen was carrying a 60 pound box of frozen chickens. After the injury she 
was prohibited, according to Mr. D's, from doing such work again. Hansen 
admitted she had helped a pregnant co-employee carry a box of chickens, but this 
event did not precipitate the recurrence of her injury. Hansen testified there 
were many things she did, or had to do, in the course and scope of her 
employment which required exertion and that no specific incident resulted in the 
recurrence of her back pain. There is substantial evidence to support the 
hearing officer's findings that the claim was grounded in the original injury. 
Moreover, we note in the record that a major goal of the employer was to have 
this employee apply for benefits under an employer-provided health and 
disability policy rather than for worker's compensation benefits. This may have 
served to undermine Mr. D's overall credibility; at least the hearing officer 
would have been justified in that perception.

[¶8]      By itself, 
Hansen's testimony established the connection between her injury and her work, 
and there was no need for corroborative medical testimony. For that reason, we 
are compelled to vacate the district court's order reversing the award of 
benefits by the hearing examiner.

[¶9]      It is appropriate 
for us to address Mr. D's contention the hearing officer erred in admitting Dr. 
Whipp's written report as evidence.

[¶10]   We have held that evidence which 
has the earmarkings of hearsay may be admitted in administrative proceedings if 
it has the characteristics of trustworthiness and credibility, and is the type 
of evidence commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of 
their serious affairs. Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-108(a) (1990); Story v. Wyoming State 
Board of Medical Examiners, 721 P.2d 1013, 59 A.L.R.4th 1089 (Wyo. 1986). We 
have also held that physicians' reports which merely appear in a worker's 
compensation claim file are not evidence: "It is the parties' duty to offer and 
introduce into evidence relevant materials so that they are properly in the case 
and may be considered by the court." Matter of Injury to Loveday, 711 P.2d 396, 
401 (Wyo. 1985); see Matter of Jones, 702 P.2d 1299 (Wyo. 1985); Black Watch 
Farms v. Baldwin, 474 P.2d 297 (Wyo. 1970). These decisions did not consider 
that an administrative agency may take judicial notice of materials contained in 
their files if that is, in fact, done on the record. Application of Campbell 
County, 731 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶11]   In this case, Loveday, Jones, and 
Black Watch Farms are not pertinent because the physician's letter was 
introduced into evidence. The employer's objection based on the best evidence 
rule is not sustainable, and the employer does not attempt to sustain that 
objection in its brief in this court. Concededly, it would be best in the 
context of a contested case hearing to have in-person, physician testimony 
presented in every instance. In many cases, however, that is neither possible 
nor is it necessary. The issue is not really one of "best evidence," but of 
whether an opportunity to confront and/or cross-examine should be available to 
test the meaning and credibility of the information in the letter.

[¶12]   Our statute contemplates the 
admission of this kind of evidence in a hearing. It provides that "testimony may 
be received in written form." Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-108(a) (1990). This statutory 
provision is tempered by Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-108(c), which commands that "a party 
may conduct cross-examinations required for a full and true disclosure of the 
facts and a party is entitled to confront all opposing witnesses." In accordance 
with the former statute, the Worker's Compensation Division's Rules and 
Regulations for Practice and Procedure provide that medical reports may be 
received in evidence, on the condition notice is given to the opposing 
side.

[¶13]   In none of the cases from this 
court, which are cited above, is a rule stated that a report, such as the one in 
question here, is not admissible under any circumstances. This is in consonance 
with the rule followed in a majority of jurisdictions generally holding that 
medical reports in a written form are admissible so long as "the elementary 
fair-play requirements of notice, timely furnishing of copies, and right of 
cross-examination if requested, are observed." 2B Arthur Larson, Law of 
Workmen's Compensation § 79.25(c) (1983). We agree with the general rule, and 
recognize it as precisely that which is required by Wyoming's governing 
statutes, evidentiary rules, and agency regulations.

[¶14]   Our review of the entire record 
compels a conclusion that Mr. D's had notice of Dr. Whipp's report, had a copy 
of that report, and was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine. We also 
conclude Mr. D's, after insisting upon its opportunity to cross-examine, waived 
that opportunity at the close of the hearing by failing to exercise it. Instead, 
Mr. D's simply took the position that the evidence presented by Hansen was not 
sufficient to sustain her burden of proof. This record would be more 
satisfactory if it explained why Dr. Whipp was not called to testify and if 
there was a forthright articulation of the waiver of cross-examination by Mr. 
D's. Even lacking that concrete information in the record, we are satisfied the 
opportunity for cross-examination was afforded, and it was waived. Under these 
circumstances, we find there was no error in the admission of Dr. Whipp's letter 
by the hearing examiner.

[¶15]   The case is reversed, and it is 
remanded to the district court with direction that the order of the district 
court reversing the hearing examiner be vacated and an order be entered 
affirming the order of the hearing examiner.

FOOTNOTE

1           
The letter from Dr. Whipp to the Worker's Compensation Division contained 
this information:

We have been asked by 
Mrs. Hansen to try to clarify her problem with her mid back. Unfortunately, 
although we cannot find it in any diagnosis to Workers' Comp, there was a 
disability form which was appropriately filled out which contained the 
statement, describe any other disease or infirmity affecting the present 
condition, and osteoporosis was placed on this. It is certainly not the primary 
diagnosis nor has it ever been. I think she does have osteoporosis. This is no 
different than many other females in her age group who have not been on 
appropriate treatment for this, but I do not feel that it is related to her 
current condition. She had what I suspected was a disc injury with her previous 
injury to her low back. We felt that this did not need any further diagnostic 
treatment, in other words, we purposely tried to avoid myelograms, etc. on her 
since we were able to treat her conservatively at that time and able to return 
her to work. This took a fair bit of time but I felt it was the appropriate 
treatment, especially in a lady in her age category. Again, we are doing the 
same thing again. If she does not turn the corner, then I suspect it will be 
necessary to obtain some films, etc., however, I think that this is a 
reactivation of her old injury and is related to her original Workers' Comp 
injury, and is not related to her osteoporosis. Again, if I am placed on the 
block and asked what specifically is her diagnosis, I must reiterate that we 
have not yet done the appropriate studies to try to document this. Again, if we 
are able to treat her conservatively, we will not have an unequivocable, 
objective diagnosis. However, I do feel that it related to her previous injury. 
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

2           
Rules of the Office of Administrative Hearings, Practices and Procedures 
in Contested Cases, ch. I, § 17, provides:

Evidence. Subject to the 
provisions of W.S. § 16-3-108, the judge may admit all evidence which possesses 
probative value, including hearsay, if it is the type of evidence upon which 
reasonable, prudent persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of their 
serious affairs. The judge shall give effect to the rules of privilege 
recognized by law. Evidence which is incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, or 
unduly repetitious shall be excluded. Subject to these requirements and if the 
interests of a party will not be substantially prejudiced, medical reports may 
be received in evidence provided that the moving party has, prior to trial, 
advised opposing counsel of its intention to offer said reports.