Case Title: Matter of the Adoption of BGH

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-95-14

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of the Adoption of BGH1996 WY 172930 P.2d 371Case Number: C-95-14Decided: 12/23/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF BGH, a Minor: GWJ,

Appellant,

 v. 

MH 
and MWH and MDH and BGH,

 Appellees. 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Lincoln County. The Honorable John D. Troughton, 
Judge. 

Representing 
Appellant: LaVoy O. Taylor, Cokeville, Wyoming.   
Representing Appellee MH: James E. Phillips of Phillips & 
Lancaster, P.C., Evanston, Wyoming.   Representing Appellees MWH 
and MDH: F.L. Thomas, Jr., Kemmerer, Wyoming.   Guardian ad 
Litem for BGH: Gerald L. Goulding, Afton, Wyoming. Before TAYLOR, 
C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN *, and LEHMAN, JJ.   * Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument THOMAS, Justice. 
[¶1] The focal question in this 
case is whether the statutes relating to the termination of parental rights, 
WYO. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120 (1994), must be invoked in order to terminate the 
rights of a biological father instead of the statutory grounds provided in an 
adoption proceeding brought pursuant to WYO. STAT. §§ 1-22-101 to -116 (1988). 
There are two collateral issues relating to the trial court's application of 
WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108(c): First, whether the trial court committed an abuse of 
discretion when it found that the biological father "evidenced an interest in," 
but failed  to evidence "responsibility for the child" within the requisite 
statutory time frame; and second, whether the trial court applied the "best 
interests * * * of the child" factor to the exclusion of other statutory 
factors. The final claim of error asserts gender bias in the trial court's 
decision that violated the rights of the biological father and his child to 
equal protection of the law afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. We hold the trial court correctly invoked the 
adoption statutes in this instance, and no other error, as claimed by the 
biological father, is present in the record. The Final Decree of Adoption is 
affirmed. [¶2] In his Brief of 
Appellant, GWJ, the biological father, states the issues as 
follows:

Did 
the Court abuse its discretion when it held the Appellant did assert an interest 
in, but did not assert responsibility for Baby Girl [H] within 
thirty (30) days after Baby Girl [H]'s birth? Did the Court error in 
applying W.S. Ann. § 1-22-108, by giving it preference over W.S. Ann. § 14-2-401 
[sic] thru § 14-2-120? Did the Court error in applying the "best 
interest" test in this case in deciding to grant the adoption and terminating 
the Appellant's parental rights? Did the District Court violate the 
Appellant, [GWJ]'s and the Appellee, Baby Girl [H]'s equal protection clause of 
the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution when it terminated the Appellant's 
parental rights by granting the adoption of Baby Girl [H]?

 
The Brief of Appellees, MWH and MDH (Petitioners to adopt), in which the 
natural mother MH, joins, frames the issues before the court in this way: 

 
I. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it held that within 30 
days after receiving notice of the birth of BGH, the putative father, GWJ, 
evidenced an interest in, but did not evidence responsibility for the child? 
  II. Did the District Court err in applying the adoption statutes 
(W.S. 1-22-101 thru 1-22-116) rather than the paternity statutes (W.S. 14-2-101 
thru 14-2-120)?   III. Did the District Court err in applying the 
"best interest of the child" test?    IV. Did the District 
Court violate GWJ's and BGH's right to the equal protection of the laws under 
the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

 
In the Brief of Baby Girl [H], Filing by Her Guardian Ad Litem, a 
third version of the issues is stated: 

(1) 
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in making its factual conclusion 
that [GWJ] did not "evidence... responsibility for the child within thirty (30) 
days after receiving notice of the pending birth or birth of the child...." 
under W.S. 1-22-108(c)(ii)? (Unless otherwise cited all statutory references are 
to the Wyoming Statutes. (2) Did the District Court err in determining 
that 1-22-108 should be applied in this case? (3) Did the District Court 
err in determining that it should consider the "best interests and welfare of 
the child" (1-22-108(c)(iv)) in deciding whether to grant the adoption? 
(4) In granting the adoption, did the District Court violate [GWJ]'s and 
Baby Girl [H]'s right to equal protection under the laws pursuant to the 14th 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Wyoming 
Constitution?

[¶3] GWJ and MH met when they were both seventeen, and they soon 
became sexually intimate. In late June or early July 1994, MH informed GWJ she 
was pregnant. GWJ indicated his preference that MH give birth to, and care for, 
the baby. He did not want anyone else raising his child and preferred that MH 
have an abortion rather than give the baby up for adoption. 
 [¶4]   At about the 
third month of her pregnancy, GWJ proposed marriage to MH, and later, gave her 
an engagement ring. During their engagement, MH furnished money to GWJ, but he 
did not give her any money. GWJ did not assume any financial responsibility for 
MH or offer any support. Once, GWJ did take MH to the doctor, and he gave her a 
baby seat and clothes for the baby. In all other instances, MH's foster mother 
took her to medical appointments and generally provided all other care and 
assistance. When she was approximately five months pregnant, MH was seriously 
injured in a one-car accident in which GWJ was the driver. She was hospitalized 
for two weeks, and during that period, the engagement was terminated. GWJ and MH 
never married, and the State of Utah paid for prenatal care for MH. Even though 
GWJ was employed, he did not contribute to the care or support of MH or the 
unborn child. [¶5]   MH 
chose to deliver the baby in Wyoming because she believed an adoption could be 
accomplished here without the consent of GWJ. MH had decided to give the baby to 
MWH and MDH for adoption. GWJ learned of the birth of BGH from the attorney for 
MWH and MDH when he received a letter requesting his consent for adoption. 
Subsequently, GWJ employed an attorney and filed a paternity action pursuant to 
WYO. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120. GWJ also contested the adoption. He participated 
in a DNA test, for which he paid the expense of $ 575. The result of the test 
demonstrated he was the biological father at a 99.999% probability level. GWJ 
also furnished his bedroom in his parent's home with a crib, and he provided 
toys, clothes, and pictures. Hearings in the matter were conducted by the 
district court on May 1, 1995 and July 10, 1995, during which evidence was 
presented in accordance with WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108(c). Later, the court entered 
a Final Decree of Adoption terminating the parental rights of MH and GWJ and 
granted the petition for adoption filed by MWH and MDH. GWJ has appealed from 
that Final Decree of Adoption. 

[¶6]   The threshold claim of error 
asserted by GWJ is that the district court erred in invoking the adoption 
statutes, WYO. STAT. §§ 1-22-101 to -116, and failed to apply the provisions of 
the paternity statutes, WYO. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120. GWJ contends, once he 
filed an action to establish his paternity, his parental rights could be 
terminated only by  proceeding under WYO. STAT. § 14-2-309 (1994)1 n1 and could not be terminated as 
provided in WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108. In arguing this point, GWJ relies upon 
language from Matter of Adoption of 
GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 987 (Wyo. 1986), where we said: "But the more 
liberal adoption test of § 1-22-108 applies to only those adoptions contested by 
putative fathers who have already shown their lack of concern for their children 
by failing to establish legal paternity." GWJ contends he has shown concern for 
his baby daughter by endeavoring to establish his paternity, and for that 
reason, the paternity statutes must govern over the adoption statutes.   
    [¶7]   The resolution of this question 
flows by analogy from GSD. There, we considered an assertion by a 
father seeking adoption of a stepdaughter that a putative father had no standing 
because he had failed to establish his paternity as required by WYO. STAT. § 
14-2-105. We held the special legislation represented by the adoption statute 
controlled over the general rules relating to establishment of paternity, and 
the putative father had standing in the adoption proceeding. The conclusion that 
must be drawn from GSD is that the adoption statutes control over the 
more general provisions found in the paternity statutes. In addition to 
providing for the termination of parental rights for the reasons articulated in 
WYO. STAT. § 14-2-309, the legislature has provided for the termination of 
parental rights through the adoption procedure. [¶8]   There was no necessity to establish 
GWJ's paternity because all parties agreed that he was the natural father, 
therefore, the question of paternity was not an issue in the case. Had paternity 
been contested, GWJ would have met the definition of a putative father 
articulated in WYO. STAT. § 1-22-101(a)(iv), as "the alleged or reputed father 
of a child born out of wedlock, whether or not the paternity rights and 
obligations of the father have been judicially determined * * *." Reliance upon 
GSD by GWJ is misplaced. [¶9]   In his first and third issues, GWJ 
contends the district court did not properly apply WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108(c). He 
argues the district court committed an abuse of discretion in its application of 
sub-paragraph (ii) when it found he had asserted an interest in the child, but 
he had not accepted responsibility for the child. GWJ contends his acceptance of 
responsibility for BGH was demonstrated by filing his Petition to Establish 
Paternity. He notes the language of WYO. STAT. § 14-2-113(c) that "the judgment 
or order may direct the father to pay the reasonable expenses of the mother's 
pregnancy and confinement", and he asserts that made him a responsible party as 
a matter of law. [¶10]            
Our holding, that this case is controlled by the adoption statutes and is 
not impacted by the statutes relating to paternity, causes GWJ's analysis of 
WYO. STAT. § 14-2-113(c) to be inapt. The applicable statute is WYO. STAT. § 
1-22-108(c) (emphasis added), which requires that: 

(c) 
If the putative father files and serves his objections to the petition to adopt 
as provided in subsection (b) of this section, and appears at the hearing to 
acknowledge his paternity of the child, the court shall hear the evidence in 
support of the petition to adopt and in support of the objection to the petition 
and shall then determine whether: 

 (i) 
The putative father's claim to paternity of the child is 
established;

 (ii) 
The putative father having knowledge of the birth or pending birth of the child 
has evidenced an interest in and responsibility for the child within thirty (30) 
days after receiving notice of the pending birth or birth of the 
child; 
(iii) The putative father's objections to the petition to adopt are 
valid; and (iv) The best interests and welfare of the child will be 
served by granting the putative father's claim to paternity or by allowing the 
petition to adopt. [¶11]          
The unanimous decision in GSD, 
716 P.2d  at 987, confirms the requirement that the district court must "base its 
decision on the manner in which the [four] factors balance." Because the 
decision must be the product of a balancing of these factors, none is entitled 
to more weight than any other. Our decision regarding GWJ's claims  that the trial court abused its 
discretion in applying WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108(c) and in turning only to the "best 
interests test" must be premised on our review of the manner in which the 
district court weighed those four factors. [¶12]          
First, there is no question with respect to the establishment of GWJ's 
claim to paternity. When MH identified GWJ as the biological father, and when 
the appellant acknowledged BGH to be his child, a prima facie case of 
his claim to paternity was established. As articulated in WYO. STAT. § 
1-22-108(d), he had a right to assert his paternity in the adoption proceeding 
because he was known and identified by MH as the natural father, and he 
acknowledged the child as his by affirmatively asserting paternity. Going even 
further, the district court proceeded to obtain DNA testing that established the 
probability of GWJ's paternity at a level of 99.999%. The district court 
recognized GWJ had established his paternity of the child for purposes of the 
proceeding, and that factor weighed in his favor. [¶13]          
Turning to the second factor, the argument of GWJ rests upon application 
of the phrase "has evidenced an interest in and responsibility for the child." 
His position    is that he had evidenced an interest in his daughter, 
as the trial court found, but he also evidenced responsibility for her. The 
relevant findings articulated by the court in its decision letter (emphasis 
added) are: 

 
1. [MH] is not only the most sensible and mature of the two biological 
parents, but in addition she is the most credible. All conflicts between her 
testimony and the testimony of [GWJ] are resolved in favor of [MH]. The Court 
believes her testimony and finds the conflicting testimony of [GWJ] to be 
self-serving.   * * *   3. [GWJ] learned of the 
pending birth of the child in late June or early July, 1994. ***   
* * *   In October, 1994, [GWJ] gave [MH] an [engagement] ring; 
but [GWJ] did not assume financial responsibility for either [MH] or his 
child. To the contrary, [MH] gave [GWJ] money.   In 
October, 1994, [GWJ] took [MH] to the doctor; and just prior to their break-up, 
he gave [MH] a babyseat and some clothes for the child. The foster mother [of 
MH] transported [MH] to all other doctor appointments; and in general, provided 
all other care, aid and assistance.   * * *   The 
parties never married; the State of Utah paid for the prenatal care of 
[MH] and her child; and, although gainfully employed, [GWJ] did not contribute 
to the care or support of either [MH] or his unborn child.   
From these facts, the Court finds and concludes that within 30 days after 
receiving notice of the pending birth of the child, [GWJ] "evidenced an interest 
in" the mother; and collaterally, the child; and although he acknowledged that 
he was the father, he did not "evidence ... responsibility for the child". 
  4. * * *   After the baby was born, [GWJ] learned 
from the attorney for the adoptive parents of the birth of the child as well as 
the pending adoption.   As a consequence, [GWJ] hired an attorney, 
commenced a paternity action and contested the adoption. In addition, he paid 
for DNA testing, visited the child and prepared living quarters for the child in 
his home, including the installation of a crib. However, [GWJ] has not 
contributed to the support of the child and he has not paid, nor arranged to 
pay, for the delivery and postnatal medical care of the child. 
  From these facts, the Court finds and concludes that within 30 
days after receiving notice of the birth of the child, [GWJ] "evidenced an 
interest in ... the child".   By demanding custody of the 
child, he has demonstrated that he is willing to assume "responsibility" for the 
child; but he has not yet "evidenced" such responsibility by the payment of 
current medical bills, support and maintenance.   * * 
*  6. * * *   Although [GWJ] acknowledges his legal 
responsibility for the child he has not yet discharged this responsibility in 
any meaningful fashion. For example, he acknowledges that he is legally 
responsible for support but he has paid none. He acknowledges he is responsible 
for medical care but he has not provided any. He installs a crib in his bedroom, 
together with children's pictures, but he provided no home for the child when it 
was being carried by its mother. [GWJ] hires a lawyer to file a paternity action 
and to contest adoption, but he has nothing to spare for the support and 
maintenance of the child.   In short, [GWJ] has evidenced his 
interest in protecting his status as a father, but he has not evidenced his 
responsibility as a father. The Court finds and concludes that [GWJ] has 
carefully done those things which protected his own rights and interest but he 
has not yet assumed or discharged the correlative responsibilities to the child 
which accompanies those rights.

 
In summary, the factors listed in W.S. 1-22-108 to be balanced by the Court 
weigh heavily in favor of the adoptive parents. [GWJ] is the biological father 
of Baby Girl [H]; he has evidenced an interest in the child; and he has made 
himself legally responsible for the child; but all other factors weigh in favor 
of the adoption. [GWJ] has not yet discharged his legal responsibility in any 
significant or material respect, he has no valid objections to the adoption and 
the best interest and welfare of the child will be served by the adoption. 
[¶14]          
These findings are supported by GWJ's testimony in the record. He agreed 
he had not paid for any health care for MH, and he had made no offer of support 
or actual payment of support to MWH and MDH, the adoptive parents. He did assert 
a willingness to pay the medical expenses for BGH's birth if the adoption were 
unsuccessful. [¶15]          
In GSD, 716 P.2d  at 988 (emphasis added), we articulated principles 
applicable to contested adoptions saying: 

Several 
principles which we have applied to contested adoptions under § 1-22-110 should 
apply equally under § 1-22-108. First, 

 
"'Adoption statutes are strictly construed when the proceeding is 
against a nonconsenting parent and every reasonable intendment is made in favor 
of that parent's claims.'   "Such strict construction is 
mandated by the fact that parental rights are fundamental rights." (Citations 
omitted.) Matter of Adoption of CCT, [ Wyo., 640 P.2d 73], supra, at 
74-75 [(1982)], quoting Matter of Adoption of 
Voss, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481, 485 (1976).

Second, 
a district court's factual determinations in a contested adoption can be 
reversed only if the court has abused its discretion. 

 
"'A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which 
exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining 
whether there has been an abuse of discretion,  the ultimate issue is 
whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse 
of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under 
the circumstances.'" Matter of Adoption of 
CCT, supra, 640 P.2d  at 76, quoting Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980).

 
Our determination of whether the district court construed WYO. STAT. § 
1-22-108, relating to whether GWJ evidenced responsibility for BGH within thirty 
days after he received notice of her pending birth or of her birth, must comport 
with these principles. [¶16]          
GWJ relied upon some nine pages from the trial transcript which are 
advanced to show he loves his child and has accepted responsibility commensurate 
with his obligation owed to the child even before her birth. GWJ states he has 
made monthly payments to the State of Utah for MH's medical bills for the injury 
she sustained in the car accident in which he was the driver. He provided baby 
clothes and a car seat for BGH. He furnished his bedroom with a crib, a baby 
bath, and pictures, including a picture of Jesus. He also obtained baby clothes 
and stuffed animals. He testified he paid $ 575 for the DNA testing. He made 
arrangements for child care for BGH while he was at work, and he filed an 
acknowledgment of paternity in Utah and a paternity action in Wyoming. 
[¶17]          
GWJ quotes Matter of Adoption of 
BBC, 831 P.2d 197 (Wyo. 1992), for the proposition that an adoption 
cannot proceed when a father who does not consent to the adoption shows 
"interest in and  responsibility for" the child. We distinguish 
BBC on its facts. There the father and mother lived together for a 
period of time, and the mother was supported, during her pregnancy, by the 
payment of $ 200 per week into a joint checking account from which she paid some 
of the doctor bills for prenatal care. Even though BBC's mother did not want to 
resume the relationship with the father after it was terminated, the father 
agreed to pay for the birth and provide child support if she kept the baby. The 
instant case is in contrast because GWJ did not pay for any prenatal bills or 
provide any meaningful support. [¶18]          
Our examination of this record leads to an ineluctable conclusion, and we 
so hold, that the district court reasonably could conclude, as it did, that GWJ 
evidenced an interest in BGH and manifested a willingness to assume 
responsibility for BGH. This record is equally clear GWJ did not "evidence * * * 
responsibility * * *" for BGH either by providing support and payment of medical 
bills for MH during her pregnancy and delivery, or the support and payment of 
any bills for BGH within thirty days after he received notice of the pending 
birth or within thirty days after her birth.  The district court aptly 
stated, "[GWJ] protected his own rights and interests [as a father] but he has 
not yet assumed or discharged the correlative responsibilities to BGH which 
accompanies those rights." We hold the statutory language, "evidenced an 
interest in and responsibility for the child" is a unitary concept encompassing 
both factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion because it 
reasonably could conclude GWJ did not evidence responsibility for BGH. The 
second factor is to be weighed in favor of MWH and MDH. [¶19]          
Pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108(c)(iii), the district court was 
required to determine whether GWJ's objections to the Petition to Adopt were 
valid and to then weigh such objections. The only factual objection asserted by 
GWJ, not discussed elsewhere in this opinion, is his objection to the fitness of 
the adoptive mother, MDH. In its opinion letter, the district court addressed 
that objection and said: 

 
b. [GWJ] objects to the fitness of [MDH] as a parent. The Court adopts the 
response of the guardian ad litem: 

 
[Counsel for GWJ] argues that "the IQ of [MDH] was about 70. With this in 
mind it is probable that the child will be much more intelligent than the 
adoptive mother and able to maneuver the mother at will in later years. Further, 
putting the child in the care of a person with an IQ of 70 could be dangerous to 
the child".   This is [GWJ]'s only factual objection to the 
adoption. [Counsel for GWJ] examined [MDH] at some length about her capabilities 
and handicaps during the hearing on July 10, 1995. That testimony in and of 
itself proves by a preponderance of the evidence that this objection is not 
valid. [MDH]'s measured and clear responses demonstrated her considerable mental 
ability regardless of her tested IQ. Even [Counsel for GWJ] could not "maneuver 
[this] mother at will". . . . [The baby] is thriving under [MDH]'s care. She is 
not in danger. In fact, the testimony is that other families in Kemmerer have 
hired [MDH] to care for their children.   In future years when the 
child is beset with problems at school or with friends or with any of the other 
seemingly insurmountable obstacles of childhood, she will go to [MDH] for 
comfort and counsel. [MDH] will take the child in her arms and explain, like all 
mother's do, that problems can be overcome; that we can become better and 
stronger from our challenges. There will be no doubt in this child's mind that 
her mother knows whereof she speaks.

[¶20]          
A review of the testimony in the record from MDH, both on direct 
examination and cross-examination, discloses she could hold her own and 
possessed parenting skills. She testified she had worked for a computer company, 
but she lost her job when the company went out of business. Then she began to 
care for two little boys, ages three and six, whose parents were going through a 
divorce. She stated she went through a lot with them, listening to their 
problems and dealing with them as a caretaker. She did that part-time at first, 
caring for them between the time the mother went to work and the father came 
home. She was the caretaker on a full-time basis when the mother went to work 
full time after the divorce. She did that for about three and one-half years, 
until the mother remarried. In other testimony on the record, MDH exhibited the 
ability to reason, was contemplative, responsive, and logical. On 
cross-examination, she admitted she was nervous, but counsel for GWJ could not 
manipulate her. The record justifies the conclusion that the trial court 
reasonably could  conclude as it did that GWJ's objection to the fitness of 
MDH as a parent was not valid. Since no valid objections existed for the 
district court to weigh in reaching its decision as to the adoption, factor 
three weighed in favor of MWH and MDH. [¶21]          
A separate objection to the analysis by the district court of the 
evidence in light of WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108(c) invokes the fourth factor. GWJ 
argues the district court erred because it determined the "best interests" of 
the child would be served by the adoption. The essence of this argument is that 
the district court considered only "the best interests" of the child in its 
determination and ignored the other factors. In making this argument, GWJ cites 
BBC; John and Jane Doe v. Otakar Kirchner [Doe v. Kirchner], 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995),2  citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972); and John Doe and 
Jane Doe [Petition of Doe], 159 Ill. 2d 347, 638 N.E.2d 181, 202 
Ill. Dec. 535 (Ill. 1994).    [¶22]          
Each of the cases invoked by GWJ is distinguishable. In BBC, we 
held that the first three factors-paternity, evidence of "interest in and 
responsibility for" the child, and the validity of the biological father's 
objections-weighed in favor of the biological father. Our holding was that the 
"best interests of the child" factor was outweighed by the other three factors. 
On the contrary, three factors-evidence of "interest in and responsibility for" 
the child, validity of the biological father's objections, and "best interests 
of the child"-all weigh in favor of MWH and MDH in this case. No abuse of 
discretion can be found in the trial court's conclusion that these three factors 
suffice to outweigh the biological father's claim to paternity of the child. 
[¶23]          
Petition of Doe, relied upon by GWJ, comes from the Supreme 
Court of Illinois. Doe v. Kirchner (O'Connell v. Kirchner) is a 
dissenting opinion by Justice O'Connor to a denial of an application for stay. 
GWJ quotes from both to support his assertion that the child's "best interest" 
cannot justify termination of parental rights when the parent has not been found 
unfit. We are not persuaded by this argument since both quotations are found in 
a concurring or dissenting opinion, and as such, afford no precedential value. 
The facts are also vastly different. In Petition of Doe, the Supreme 
Court of Illinois held there was insufficient evidence that the father had not 
shown a reasonable degree of interest in the child within the first thirty days 
of the child's birth because he was told the child had died subsequent to birth. 
His attempts to locate the child were blocked by the mother, and the adoptive 
parents failed to make an appropriate effort to ascertain the name or address of 
the biological father even though the mother knew his identity. The court 
properly held that, in such an instance, the father's parental interest was 
improperly terminated, and there was no occasion to rely upon the best interest 
of the child. [¶24]          
In the case before us, the district court also addressed the best 
interests of BGH in its decision letter: 

 
[MR] testified she believed it would be better for her child to be with [MWH 
and MDH] than to be with either the father or her. However, she also testified 
that she believed that she would be a better parent than [GWJ].   A 
best interest of the child contest between [MH] and [GWJ] is easily won by [MH]. 
A best interest of the child contest between [GWJ] and [MWH and MDH] is easily 
won by the adoptive parents [MWH and MDH].   The Court finds and 
concludes that it is in the best interests of the child to be adopted by [MWH 
and MDH].

 
In its conclusion, the trial court not only ruled that the factors to be 
balanced weighed heavily in favor of the adoptive parents, as quoted above, but 
it also stated: 

 
[GWJ] has castigated [MH] for surrendering her child for adoption; but it 
has been [GWJ], not [MH], who has wavered with respect to the child. For her 
abortion was never an option; and she has always wanted her child but has 
recognized her own inability to provide all that she believes her child 
deserves. She is willing to endure the pain in order that her child should not 
suffer. If the decision of the Court is reversed, [MH] will be awarded 
custody.

[¶25]          
We hold the district court afforded appropriate strict construction to 
WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108. The trial court did not premise its decision entirely on 
the "best interests of the child" test, and it appropriately balanced the four 
factors as it was required to do. We can find no abuse of discretion and must 
recognize the district court reasonably could conclude as it did. 
[¶26]          
The final issue brought before us by GWJ is the contention that there 
occurred a violation of his and BGH's rights to equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States3  when it terminated parental rights and 
granted the adoption. GWJ states: 

 
These decisions have their origin based on sex discrimination, inferring 
that a young man cannot take care of his child, while a young woman who does not 
want her child, can and is fit because she is a woman. * * * If he was a woman, 
the Court would very likely give the child to him. (See Stanley vs. Illinois, 
405 U.S. 645, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208.)

 
GWJ, of course, has no authority to assert BGH's right to equal protection. 
His standing does not permit him to assert the rights of another. BGH's guardian 
ad litem represents her interest, and the guardian ad litem 
stated: 

As 
the child's guardian ad litem, the undersigned asserts that her right to equal 
protection under the laws has not been violated in any way, but has, on the 
contrary, been zealously protected by the District Court in these 
proceedings.

[¶27]          
As to his own right, GWJ's argument is at best obscure. We understand the 
gist to be that, because the court did not rule in his favor, he was denied his 
right to equal protection.4 GWJ does not attack the Wyoming 
adoption statute or WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108 as being facially unconstitutional or 
encompassing a discriminatory motive. We are not able to discern any 
discrimination.  Recently, we summarized the constitutional requirement for 
equal protection: 

Equal 
protection "mandates that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike, 
both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed." Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 425 (Wyo.1984) 
(quoting State v. Freitas, 61 Haw. 
262, 602 P.2d 914, 922 (1979)). In this regard, we have held the Wyoming 
Constitution offers more robust protection against legal discrimination than the 
federal constitution. Wilson v. State ex rel. 
Office of Hearing Examiner, 841 P.2d 90 (Wyo.1992); Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1992); Washakie County Sch. Dist. 
No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.1980), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980); Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 
(Wyo.1978).

 
Allhusen v. State Mental Health Professions 
Licensing Bd., 898 P.2d 878, 884 (Wyo. 1995).    

[¶28]   The adoption statute, WYO. STAT. § 
1-22-108, does not favor one class over another, and it does not endorse mothers 
over fathers or women over men or adoptive parents over birth parents. There can 
be no valid argument that the statute is facially unconstitutional or 
encompasses a discriminatory motive. It appears GWJ's objection is that 
the district court discriminated against him in its application of the adoption 
statute because the court was biased and prejudiced against him due to his 
gender. GWJ fails to make any logical argument in support of this claim of 
error.5 GWJ quotes two cases, but they do 
not support his argument. One emphasizes the importance of family association. 
The other holds the Illinois dependency law was unconstitutional, depriving an 
unwed father of due process and equal protection, because of its failure to 
afford him a hearing on his fitness before his children could be taken away from 
him. We have no occasion to disagree, but in this context, these cases are not 
appropriate authority.   [¶29]   GWJ failed to point to any portion 
of the record evidencing a denial of his right to equal protection. We have 
reviewed that record carefully, and we cannot identify any such evidence. There 
is no justification for the conclusion that GWJ was denied the custody of BGH 
based on his gender. The district court appropriately identified characteristics 
important in raising a child. In its decision letter, the court stated MH is 
"the most sensible and mature of the two biological parents, but in addition she 
is the most credible." In considering the factor of the best interest of the 
child, the district court ruled both MH and the adoptive parents, MWH and MDH, 
"easily won" over GWJ. The court was sufficiently concerned that it also stated: 
"If the decision of the Court is reversed, [MH] will be awarded custody." Our 
examination of the record does not permit us to conclude the district court was 
biased or prejudiced against GWJ on gender grounds in this case. His right to 
equal protection of the law was not violated, and his argument must fail. 
[¶30]   We reaffirm our 
rule that the adoption statutes, WYO. STAT. §§ 1-22-101 to -116 are applicable 
in a contested adoption case without regard to the Wyoming paternity statute. 
The district court committed no abuse of discretion when it ruled three of the 
four factors articulated in WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108(c)-evidence of "interest in 
and responsibility for" the child, validity of the putative father's objections, 
and the best interests of the child-weigh against GWJ and in favor of MWH and 
MDH. There is nothing to justify the claim of a violation of the constitutional 
right to equal protection. The Final Decree of Adoption is affirmed. 

 





FOOTNOTES

 

1 WYO. STAT. § 14-2-309 (1994) provides: 

(a) The parent-child legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) 
or more of the following facts is established by clear and convincing evidence: 

(i) The child has been left in the care of another person without 
provision for the child's support and without communication from the absent 
parent for a period of at least one (1) year. In making the above determination, 
the court may disregard occasional contributions, or incidental contacts and 
communications; (ii) The child has been abandoned with no means of 
identification for at least three (3) months and efforts to locate the parent 
have been unsuccessful;   (iii) The child has been abused or 
neglected by the parent and efforts by an authorized agency or mental health 
professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the family 
has refused rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown that the child's health 
and safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the 
parent; (iv) The parent is incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony 
and a showing that the parent is unfit to have the custody and control of the 
child.

 

2 The case cited, properly styled O'Connell 
v. Kirchner,    U.S.    , 115 S. Ct. 1084, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1054 (1995), has utterly no precedential value because it is 
a dissenting opinion by Justice O'Connor to the denial of an application for 
stay entered without any majority opinion. Reliance upon such a citation is 
really worse than citing no authority at all.

3 The Fourteen Amendment provides, in pertinent part: 

 Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

 GWJ does not invoke the Wyoming Constitution. The following 
provisions are relevant: 

 WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 2 states:

In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, 
all members of the human race are equal. WYO. CONST. art. 1 § 34 
provides: All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform 
operation.

 

4 We partially base this statement on the following language found in 
GWJ's brief: 

This Appellant loves his child even if she is stolen from him by so 
called lawful means. He will visit the child at play wherever she is. He will 
visit the child on her way to school, and he will visit the child at places and 
times this attorney can not think of, for it is his God given right and duty as 
a responsible father to do so.

Not only does this confirm our belief that GWJ's equal protection 
argument is based strictly on the fact he did not receive custody of his child, 
but GWJ's threats are not to be taken lightly. We caution GWJ that WYO. STAT. § 
6-2-506 (1996) prohibits the conduct he proposes in his 
brief.

 

5 We prefer to decide issues on their merits and remind the Appellant: 

 We will not consider issues which are not supported by proper 
citation of authority and cogent argument or which are not clearly defined. 
Young v. Hawks, Wyo., 624 P.2d 235 
(1981); Elder v. Jones, Wyo., 608 P.2d 654 (1980); and Rule 5.01(2), W.R.A.P. (Replaced by WYO. R. App. P. 
7.01(f).]

 Knadler v. Adams, 661 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Wyo. 1983).