Case Title: Midway Oil Corp. v. Guess

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-192

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Midway Oil Corp. v. Guess1986 WY 32714 P.2d 339Case Number: 85-192Decided: 02/05/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
MIDWAY OIL CORPORATION, A 
WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
ROY H. GUESS AND R.P. 
SWIRCZYNSKI, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant;

James R. McCarty, 
Casper.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

L. Craig Clayton of 
Donald R. Winship Associates, P.C., Casper.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROONEY,* BROWN, CARDINE and URBIGKIT, 
JJ.

* Retired November 30, 
1985.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Default judgment was 
entered upon failure to answer a complaint for specific performance and money 
damages. Appeal is taken from an order denying the motion to set aside the 
judgment made when notice of the suit was first obtained after judgment 
entry.

 
 

[¶2.]     We will 
reverse.

 
 

[¶3.]     The case, by a ten-page 
complaint, involved claimed oil-lease contractual rights for overriding 
royalties and money damages by plaintiff as appellee, as derived from an oral or 
implied agreement as compensation for finding a buyer for oil interests of 
defendant-appellant.

 
 

[¶4.]     Defendant was organized 
as a Wyoming 
corporation in 1933 and listed as its agent for service Gertrude Morrison, 

104 South Center 
Street, Casper, Wyoming
. Nothing in the court file reflects 
whether the address still exists today. By certificate obtained after the 
default judgment had been entered, it was determined that the corporate charter 
was revoked on January 17, 1985, and the last annual report for 1982 listed the 
name and address of the corporation as 
Box 1144, Casper, 
Wyoming82602
.1

 
 

[¶5.]     Suit was filed and 
summons issued April 2, 1985, with the address for the agent of service as given 
on the summons 
P.O. Box 
1144, Casper, Wyoming82602
. The summons return service 
stated:

 
 
"AFTER DUE AND DILIGENT 
SEARCH WE WERE UNABLE TO LOCATE GERTRUDE MORRISON AGENT FOR MIDWAY OIL CORP. IN NATRONA 
COUNTY, WYOMING 4-4-85 * 
* * [Mileage $.69]."2

 
 

[¶6.]     No effort to attempt to 
serve any officer or manager of the corporation or its office is indicated by 
the return.

 
 

[¶7.]     An alias summons was 
issued April 9 and served on the Secretary of State on April 12, with a copy of 
the complaint thereafter mailed by the Secretary of State to 
Box 1144, Casper, WY82601
, and returned with the Post 
Office notation of "Return to sender No forwarding order on file. Unable to 
forward."

 
 

[¶8.]     As addressed by 
plaintiff, correspondence had been sent to defendant on November 1, 1984, 
reflecting knowledge of counsel for plaintiff that the mailing address for the 
corporation was Post Office 
Box 
681, Thayne, Wyoming
. Thayne is a relatively small, 
rural-character community, some 200 miles from Casper.

 
 

[¶9.]     Service having been 
made on the Secretary of State on April 12, 1985, and without actual notice to 
defendant, an application for entry of default was filed May 8, 1985, with a 
default entered on that date. Two days later, an application for entry of a 
default judgment was made, and default judgment was signed and filed on May 10, 
1985, without any hearing or evidentiary presentation.

 
 

[¶10.]  The default judgment 
found:

 
 
(1) service of process 
was duly and rightfully made;

 
 
(2) the claims of 
plaintiffs are in part based upon the obligations of defendant implied or 
imposed by law; plaintiffs set in motion the chain of events which resulted in 
two separate sales of the Midway field; the services rendered by plaintiffs to 
defendant were beneficial to defendant; and plaintiffs were entitled to the 
benefits of their agreement; and

 
 
(3) the court had 
jurisdiction of the parties, the subject matter of the action and the relief 
requested.

 
 

[¶11.]  By the judgment, specific performance was 
ordered, requiring the assignment of four per cent of eight-eighths overriding 
royalty interest in designated acreage, through the base of the Dakota Formation 
and two per cent of eight-eighths below Dakota; if an assignment was not made, 
the judgment would otherwise serve to assign and transfer; and plaintiffs 
additionally have judgment against defendant in the sum of $30,000, "as 
compensation for Defendant's deficiency in the performance due Plaintiffs * * 
*."

 
 

[¶12.]  After entry of the default judgment, 
attempted mailing by the clerk of court addressed to 
P.O. Box 1144, Casper, WY82602
 was also returned 
undelivered.

 
 

[¶13.]  Defendant moved to set aside the default 
judgment with an attached affidavit on June 17, 1985.

 
 

[¶14.]  Plaintiff's response to the motion 
attached the 1982 annual report for the corporation, which showed a corporate 
and officer (Gerald Binks) address of 
Box 1144, Casper, 
Wyoming82602
, with nothing shown on the form 
as to the address of the agent for service.

 
 

[¶15.]  The motion to set aside the default 
judgment was denied by the court on the basis that the service of process on the 
Secretary of State was proper; that Rule 4(d)(4), W.R.C.P., did not require the 
clerk of court to mail copies of the summons and complaint to the defendant 
corporation in advance of default entry; and that defendant had not shown other 
grounds to the court sufficient for the default to be set 
aside.

 
 

[¶16.]  Appeal issues stated by defendant as 
appellant were:3

 
 
"* * * [T]he trial court 
erred in refusing to set aside the default and default judgment upon the ground 
that there was not a presentation of a sufficient factual basis for the relief 
awarded by the judgment.

 
 
"* * * [T]he trial court 
erred in refusing to set aside the default and default judgment since the 
defendant had no actual notice of the suit and since there was a meritorious 
defense to the allegation of the complaint which would justify setting aside the 
default under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(6)."

 
 

[¶17.]  The issues presented by plaintiffs as 
appellees were stated similarly, and further raised an additional issue that the 
defendant corporation failed to maintain the required registered agent.4

 
 

[¶18.]  We will posture the issues 
presented:

 
 
I. Sufficiency of 
attempted service in NatronaCounty to justify attempted service on the 
Secretary of State. II. Sufficiency of service on the Secretary of State when 
plaintiff had actual mailing address for the corporation and the listed mailing 
address was insufficient to effectuate delivery of a copy of the summons and 
complaint to give suit notice.

 
 
III. Answer 
date.

 
 
IV. Inadequacy of proof 
of damages.

 
 
V. Abuse of discretion in 
denying motion to set aside default.

 
 

[¶19.]  The propriety of this court considering 
all issues is justified as a question of initial jurisdiction. Pease Brothers v. American Pipe & Supply 
Co., Wyo., 522 P.2d 996 (1974); Vanover v. Vanover, 77 Wyo. 55, 307 P.2d 117 
(1957).

 
 
I

 
 
Initial 
Service

 
 

[¶20.]  The designated agent for service was 
Gertrude Morrison, with a stated street address and not a post office box 
number. Practical realism teaches us that the inclusion of a box number on a 
summons for the sheriff's process service affords him no assistance (and 
normally no service for plaintiff). The requirement or desirability of a 
deliverable address is the reason that present law requires a street address and 
not a box number for the agent for service of a qualified corporation. Section 
17-1-109, W.S. 1977. Except from the negative implication from the last known 
address in Thayne, there is nothing in the file to show that Midway Oil 
Corporation did not have an office in NatronaCounty. Certainly it is only known that 
the sheriff did not find Gertrude Morrison, Post Office 
Box 1144, Casper, Wyoming
. A more adequate negative return is 
strongly indicated if used for later reliance on substituted service. Bryant v. Wybro Federal Credit Union, 
Wyo., 544 P.2d 1010 (1976); Pease Brothers v. 
American Pipe & Supply Co., supra; 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 1174, p. 
197.

 
 

[¶21.]  Since the last known address of defendant 
as available to plaintiffs was geographically far removed, the inclusion of a 
box number for service by the sheriff in Natrona County was at best misleading. 
Obviously, the service-of-process issue in this fashion would only occur in a 
case of a corporation or a like entity where the attempted local services were 
first utilized as the predicate for service on the Secretary of State or other 
substitute service. Otherwise, the service would be insufficient and a better 
address from counsel to sheriff would be required before jurisdiction was 
claimed or obtained. Rules 4(f), 4(d)(4), and 4(d)(6), W.R.C.P. See Bryant v. Wybro Federal Credit Union, 
supra.

 
 

[¶22.]  We hold that under Rule 4(d)(4), 
W.R.C.P., the attempted local service was not adequate or adequately proved, 
where at a minimum the last known address or the in-county street address was 
not listed for the information of the sheriff. Attempted service at a post 
office box number would hardly be actual service. National Supply Co. v. Chittim, Wyo., 
387 P.2d 1010 (1964); 62 Am.Jur.2d Process § 111, p. 
896.

 
 

[¶23.]  Since the service of process is the basis 
upon which jurisdiction is obtained, this court and current law have frequently 
enunciated the rule that strict compliance with the statute is required. In re Estate of Lonquest, Wyo., 526 P.2d 994 (1974); Pease Brothers v. American 
Pipe & Supply Co., supra; Joseph 
Russell Realty Co. v. Kenneally, 185 Mont. 496, 605 P.2d 1107 (1980); Ratcliff v. Werlein, Tex.Civ.App., 485 S.W.2d 932 (1972); 62 Am.Jur.2d Process § 3, p. 785.

 
 
II

 
 
Service on the Secretary 
of State

 
 

[¶24.]  Plaintiffs received notice from the 
Secretary of State that the attempted mailing to the Casper box number had been 
unsuccessful and the notice consequently returned. Counsel did not request a 
further mailing or advise the Secretary of State of the more current address of 
Thayne, Wyoming, by requesting re-mailing either to the street address in Casper 
as the address of the agent for service, or to the most current address known in 
Thayne.

 
 

[¶25.]  Although we are reluctant in this case to 
postulate a rule in regard to the notice mailing from the Secretary of State to 
the most current known address, which is not specifically required by statute 
(which might be both wiser and safer), as otherwise required of counsel in 
certain substitute-service processes under Rule 4, W.R.C.P., we do find in this 
case that the mailing to an address not listed for the agent for service and 
which also is not the last known address for the corporation is not adequate, Bryant v. Wybro Federal Credit Union, 
supra, and that the duty to show compliance rests with litigants. Crotteau v. Irvine, Wyo., 
656 P.2d 1166 (1983); Southwestern Remodelers of Houston, Inc. v. 
Lumaside, Inc., Tex.Civ. App., 501 S.W.2d 759 (1973).

 
 

[¶26.]  Obviously, the notice document of a copy 
of the summons and complaint as required to be mailed by the Secretary of State 
was sent neither to the listed street address for the agent for service 
(registered office) nor to the last known address for the corporation known to 
counsel for plaintiffs.5 Nondelivery notice was promptly 
furnished by the Secretary of State to the plaintiffs. Consequently, the 
attempted substitute service by service on the Secretary of State was 
insufficient to confer jurisdiction. The matter of proper mailing of the suit 
documents by the Secretary of State is an indispensable adjunct of 
constitutional and statutory compliance to effectuate executed service of 
process if a default judgment consequently results. Pease Brothers v. American Pipe & Supply 
Co., supra; Piggly-Wiggly Georgia Co. 
v. May Investing Corp., 189 Ga. 477, 6 S.E.2d 579, 126 A.L.R. 1465 (1939); 
Southwestern Remodelers of Houston, Inc. 
v. Lumaside, Inc., supra; Whitney v. 
L & L Realty Corporation, Tex., 500 S.W.2d 94 
(1973).

 
 
III

 
 
Answer 
Date

 
 

[¶27.]  Excluding due process and constitutional 
requirements, the applicable law for substituted service on a corporation is § 
17-1-111(b), W.S. 1977:

 
 
"* * * In the event any 
such process, notice or demand is served on the secretary of state, he shall 
immediately cause one (1) of the copies thereof to be forwarded by registered 
mail addressed to the corporation at its registered office. Any service so had on the secretary of state 
shall be returnable in not less than thirty (30) days." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶28.]  The relevant question under this section 
as substitute service is, what is the answer date? The derivation of the section 
is Ch. 85, § 11, S.L. of Wyoming 1961. The provision was taken verbatim from the 
Model Business Corporation Act, § 14. See Model Bus.Corp.Act Ann.2d § 14 
(American Bar Foundation). Wyoming's Rule 4(d)(6), W.R.C.P., 
provides:

 
 
"Upon the secretary of 
state, as agent for a party, when and in the manner authorized by 
statute."

 
 

[¶29.]  Consequently, § 17-1-111(b) is the 
applicable statute by rule reference.

 
 

[¶30.]  Wyoming law includes the identical 
terminology in the limited liability company statutes, § 17-15-114, W.S. 1977, 
as apparently copied from the Wyoming Business Corporation Act, with two 
comparable statutes providing for agency service on nonresident motorists, § 
1-6-301, W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp., and insurance companies, § 26-3-122, W.S. 
1977.

 
 

[¶31.]  No specific dating is provided, but the 
statute for service on a nonresident motorist in order to provide the required 
due process provides in subsection (b):

 
 
"The court in which the 
action is pending shall order such continuance as necessary to afford the 
defendant or his personal representative reasonable opportunity to defend the 
action." (Emphasis added.) § 1-6-301, W.S. 1977, 1985 
Cum.Supp.

 
 
Additionally, the 
requirement for the mailing of the notice of service is invested in plaintiff.6 Similar actual notice protection is 
afforded for insurance company service in § 26-3-122, W.S. 1977, by duplicate 
mailings, by affidavit, and return-receipt proof.

 
 

[¶32.]  There are at least 27 jurisdictions with 
comparable corporate service provisions as taken from the Model Business 
Corporation Act, § 14, see Model Bus.Corp.Act Ann.2d ¶¶ 301-302, p. 345, and 
1973 and 1977 Supps.

 
 

[¶33.]  South Carolina had occasion in a less 
egregious factual situation7 to consider the identical provision 
as found in Wyoming in the case of Newberry County Water and Sewer Authority v. 
Welco Construction and Utilities Co., Inc., 275 S.C. 1, 266 S.E.2d 875, 876 
(1980).

 
 

[¶34.]  The thoughtful discussion of that case is 
adopted:

 
 
"Appellant first argues 
the phrase `returnable in not less than thirty days' * * refers to return of 
proof of service rather than to the corporate defendant's return of responsive 
pleadings to the complaint. We disagree.

 
 
"The interpretation urged 
by appellant finds no support from either this state's legislative history and 
comment or from other jurisdictions which have enacted comparable replicas of 
Section 14 of the Model Business Corporation Act as did South Carolina. As well, 
appellant's interpretation would lead to the absurd result of requiring the 
process server to wait thirty days before filing his proof of service while the 
defendant must answer within twenty days or face default.

 
 
"The obvious reason for 
this legislatively carved exception to the general statutory requirement that 
responsive pleadings be served within twenty days * * * is to allow more time 
for response to a summons and complaint served upon the Secretary of State 
because the corporation's registered agent cannot be found at the location 
established for personal service.

 
 
"We hold [that the 
section] prohibits a plaintiff from requiring responsive pleadings to a summons 
and complaint in less than thirty days from the date of substituted service upon 
the Secretary of State." 266 S.E.2d  at 876.

 
 

[¶35.]  Comparably with the Newberry decision, 
this court consequently recognizes the same time as provided by Rule 12, 
W.R.C.P., for out-of-state service, namely 30 days, as the answer time where 
service is made on the Secretary of State, under the purview of § 17-1-111(b), 
W.S. 1977. We do not find it necessary at this time to determine whether the 
mistaken inclusion of a stated 20-day answer time on the summons will further 
invalidate the summons as jurisdictionally defective. Obviously, careful 
attorneys should modify the printed-form summons to accommodate the proper 
answer time. Likewise, perhaps little reason for objection would exist if an 
opportunity to plead within 30 days did exist. Cf. Newberry County Water and Sewer Authority v. 
Welco Construction and Utilities Co., Inc., supra.

 
 

[¶36.]  In this case, the printed-form alias 
summons as served on the Secretary of State provided:

 
 
"YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED 
and required to file with the Clerk and serve upon the Plaintiff's attorney an 
answer to the Complaint which is herewith served upon you, within 20 days after 
service of this Summons upon you, exclusive of the day of service. (If service 
upon you is made outside of the State of Wyoming, you are required to file and serve 
your answer to the Complaint within 30 days after service of this Summons upon 
you, exclusive of the day of service). If you fail to do so, judgment by default 
will be taken against you for the relief demanded in the 
Complaint."

 
 

[¶37.]  The return of service as filed May 8 
stated that delivery was made on April 12, 1985, on the Secretary of State. 
Twenty-six days thereafter, an application for entry of default and default was 
filed, and the application for entry and entry of the default judgment was 
accomplished and filed on May 10, or 28 days after the service on the Secretary 
of State. It is undisputed that at the time of judgment entry defendant had no 
notice of the existence of the litigation.

 
 

[¶38.]  Since the answer date had not expired at 
the date that the default was entered or the date when the judgment was 
rendered, the judgment as entered is void or at least voidable.8 No denial discretion remained when 
the motion to vacate the default judgment was seasonably made. Vanover v. Vanover, supra. See also Emery v. Emery, Wyo., 404 P.2d 745 
(1965), and National Supply Co. v. 
Chittim, supra.

 
 
IV

 
 
Adequacy of Proof of 
Damages

 
 

[¶39.]  This question was specifically briefed by 
counsel and deserves consideration, although the same issue would be unlikely to 
reoccur at retrial. We address the issue of what evidence is required for entry 
of a judgment in a default damages award.

 
 

[¶40.]  Wyoming law is in accord with general law as 
well established that a hearing is required or evidence necessitated for 
determination of damages that are not liquidated in some fashion sufficient for 
mathematical computation. Adel v. 
Parkhurst, Wyo., 681 P.2d 886 (1984); Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 
Wyo., 519 P.2d 972 (1974); Colorado 
Kenworth, Inc. v. Archie Meek Transportation Co., Wyo., 495 P.2d 1183 
(1972); Morgan v. Compugraphic 
Corporation, Tex., 675 S.W.2d 729 (1984); 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 1186, p. 
205.

 
 

[¶41.]  The defensive posture manifested by 
plaintiffs in support of the default judgment is that the taking of evidence in 
regard to the ascertainment of damages is discretionary with the court. To the 
contrary, we hold that if the damages are unliquidated in amount, discretion to 
determine without evidence does not exist. Compton v. Alton Steamship Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1979); Dundee Cement Co. v. 
Howard Pipe & Concrete Products, Inc., 722 F.2d 1319 (7th Cir. 1983); Stewart v. Hicks, 182 Ind. App. 308, 395 N.E.2d 308 (1979). See Wood v. Detroit Auto. 
Inter-Insurance Insurance Exchange, 413 Mich. 573, 321 N.W.2d 653 
(1982).

 
 

[¶42.]  It is apparent from the scope of present 
case law that the optimistic anticipation of the drafters of the federal rules 
to create a system which was specific, direct, fair and rational, has not 
necessarily been accomplished. Society continues to litigate the rules of the 
game rather than the substance of the contested issues involved in justice 
determination. See Rule 1, F.R.C.P., "They shall be construed to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action."

 
 

[¶43.]  Rule 55(b)(1), W.R.C.P., provides that 
for entry by the clerk the amount must be "for a sum certain, or for a sum which 
can by computation be made certain," as supported by affidavit as to the amount 
due.

 
 

[¶44.]  The specific phraseology, then, for 
consideration by this court is: 

"* * * If, in order to 
enable the court to enter judgment or carry it into effect, it is necessary to 
take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth 
of any averment by evidence or to make any investigation of any other matter, 
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems 
necessary and proper * * *." Rule 55(b)(2), W.R.C.P.

 
 

[¶45.]  Otherwise stated, and as contended by 
plaintiffs, does the language of the rule obviate the general law of Wyoming that damages must 
be demonstrated and proved? State ex rel. 
Scholl v. Anselmi, Wyo., 640 P.2d 746, cert. denied 459 U.S. 805, 103 S. Ct. 28, 74 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1982); Panhandle 
Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, Wyo., 637 P.2d 1020 (1981); Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 
supra.

 
 

[¶46.]  We do not accept the contention, and find 
that the issue was determined in Adel:

"The burden, however, is 
upon those seeking more than mere nominal damages to prove their damages." 681 P.2d  at 892.

 
 
See Albin Elevator Co. v. Pavlica, Wyo., 649 P.2d 187 (1982); Downing v. Stiles, 
Wyo., 635 P.2d 808 (1981); Western National Bank of Lovell v. 
Moncur, Wyo., 
624 P.2d 765 (1981).

 
 
"* * * The requirement of 
Rule 55(b)(2), W.R.C.P., of a hearing with respect to damages which are not 
liquidated is consistent with the rule of those cases. The default permitted by 
a defendant does not concede the amount demanded for unliquidated damages." Adel 
v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d  at 892.

 
 
Further citations there 
noted additionally support the principle. See Pope v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 1, 65 S. Ct. 16, 89 L. Ed. 3, 102 
Ct.Cl. 846 (1944); State ex rel. Yohe v. 
District Court of Eighth Judicial District, 33 Wyo. 281, 238 P. 545 (1925); Purington v. Sound West, 173 Mont. 
106, 566 P.2d 795 (1977).

 
 

[¶47.]  Consequently, the question is not whether 
unliquidated damages have to be proved, but whether the damages awarded in this 
case were liquidated.

 
 

[¶48.]  The question is damage and not liability, 
and consequently the citation Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1070, and like authorities, as 
involving proof of liability are not helpful.

 
 

[¶49.]  Examination of the complaint and judgment 
does not lead to the ascertainment of sum certain or a sum which can by 
computation be made certain. Stewart v. 
Hicks, supra.

 
 

[¶50.]  If the claim was liquidated, a ten-page 
complaint would hardly seem necessary. Not only is the dollar amount included in 
the judgment not ascertainable from the allegations of the complaint, but also 
the question is necessarily posed in regard to the provision of the judgment 
"[t]hat the claims of Plaintiffs are in part based upon the obligations of 
Defendant implied or imposed by operation of law" whether the subject matter is 
one which could providently permit the entry of a default judgment without at 
least a support of affidavit or trial testimony.

 
 

[¶51.]  The complexity of the transaction, 
including first a proposed sale with forfeiture including a fee paid to 
plaintiffs of $10,000, a second sale of the same asset, with a fee paid to 
plaintiffs of $10,000, and now resulting in a specific-performance order and a 
damage award, does not afford specificity. It is not possible to tell whether 
the $30,000 which was "as compensation for Defendant's deficiency in the 
performance due Plaintiffs" is by virtue of the character of the mineral 
interest available, or assessed for another reason.9 

 
 

[¶52.]  The required liquidated-damage status did 
not exist for entry of the default judgment without supporting evidence by 
either affidavit or hearing testimony in order that the notice pleadings of the 
complaint are supported by sworn testimony in some fashion authenticated by 
penalty of perjury for damage determination and computation. 10 Wright, Miller 
& Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2688, p. 450; 25A C.J.S. 
Damages § 163, p. 124.

 
 
V

 
 
Exercise of 
Discretion

 
 

[¶53.]  The most recent pronouncement of this 
court in regard to setting aside a default judgment is Hochhalter v. Great Western Enterprises, 
Wyo., 708 P.2d 666 (1985), which was unanimously determined and a request for rehearing 
denied.10 Application to this case may be in 
question as compared with the general rule which has been variously stated that 
defaults are disfavored. See Klapprott v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 601, 69 S. Ct. 384, 93 L. Ed. 266, 
judgment modified by 336 U.S. 942, 69 S. Ct. 384, 93 L. Ed. 1099 
(1949); Compton v. Alton Steamship 
Co., supra; Gifford v. Casper Neon 
Sign Co., Inc., Wyo., 639 P.2d 1385 (1982); Westring v. Cheyenne National Bank, 
Wyo., 393 P.2d 119 (1964); Lake v. 
Lake, 63 Wyo. 375, 182 P.2d 824 (1947); Giles v. Giles, Ala., 404 So. 2d 649 
(1981).

 
 

[¶54.]  We will not pursue the question of 
exercise of discretion as involved in this case with a motion to set aside a 
default judgment, in view of the disposition otherwise provided that 
jurisdiction to enter the judgment did not exist. Colorado National Bank v. Miles, 
Wyo., 711 P.2d 390 
(1985).

 
 

[¶55.]  To avoid any further retrial 
complexities, we would hold that defendant entered an appearance in this case by 
virtue of filing the motion to vacate the default judgment. Pease Brothers v. American Pipe & Supply 
Co., supra.

 
 

[¶56.]  The order denying the motion is reversed, 
and the case remanded to set aside the default judgment, for responsive 
pleadings and disposition on the merits.

 
 

[¶57.]  Reversed.

 
 

1 The certificate of 
incorporation revocation status was not considered in the proceedings since 
apparently unknown until after the judgment had been entered, and consequently 
will not be further considered in this opinion.

 
 

2 The minimal mileage 
charge suggests "desk" service, wherein the process server looks at a telephone 
book and city directory at his desk and then writes down "Unable to 
find."

3 The case was submitted 
on briefs, without oral argument.

4 Nothing in the record 
reflects that the sheriff tried to serve at or anyone ever wrote to the listed 
address for the agent for service at 104 South Center Street. It is certainly 
possible that the address no longer exists, but that possibility was never made 
a matter of record. What is obvious is that plaintiffs made no effort to give 
notice to defendant at the last-known address at Thayne, Wyoming. In his brief, plaintiff denied the 
statement that "Plaintiffs knew where to locate the Defendant but chose not to 
do so." Actually, the statement in defendant's brief was, "* * * knew where to 
locate the Defendant to provide actual notice." (It was not a matter of record 
in any fashion, but the 1984 and 1985 telephone books, Silver Star Telephone 
Company, list Binks, Gerald, Thayne phone number 
883-2109.)

 
 

5 Section 17-1-110(a)(vi), 
W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum. Supp.:

 
 
"That the address of its 
registered office and the address of the business office of its registered 
agent, as changed, will be identical."

 
 

6"* * * The plaintiff 
shall file with the clerk of the court in which the action is brought an 
affidavit that he has complied with such requirement." Section 1-6-301(a), W.S. 
1977, 1985 Cum.Supp.

7 A factual 
differentiation exists in the South 
Carolina case, in that the plaintiff mailed a courtesy 
copy of the pleadings to counsel for the defendant, which occasioned a special 
appearance to attack the validity of the service. No default judgment entry at a 
time prior to the expiration of 30 days was involved.

8 The cases are not 
consistent when judgments are entered before answer date as to whether the 
judgment is void or voidable. The time-lapse factors in this case are 
sufficiently short from entry to motion to set aside so that we do not feel 
inclined to make the differentiating decision with no difference in result. See 
also English v. Smith, 71 Wyo. 1, 253 P.2d 857, 
reh. denied 71 Wyo. 28, 257 P.2d 365 (1953). Cf. Pickering v. Palmer, 18 N.M. 473, 138 P. 198 (1914), overruled by Field v. Otero, 
35 N.M. 68, 290 P. 1015 (1930), with Flinn v. Blakeman, 254 Ky. 416, 71 S.W.2d 961 (1934), overruled on a different matter by Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Ward, 286 
Ky. 73, 149 S.W.2d 705 (1941). 3 Freeman on Judgments, § 1289, p. 
2678.

9 Accepting generally the 
claim of plaintiffs included in the complaint as true, it is indicated that they 
were the motivating agent to secure a first sale for which they received a 
$10,000 commission and no overriding royalty, the buyer defaulted, and returned 
the lease. Thereafter, they secured a second buyer, for which they also received 
a $10,000 commission, and make claim for a two per cent royalty from the first 
transaction and a two per cent royalty from the second 
transaction.

 
 
The second transaction 
left defendant as assignor a six per cent override to the base of Dakota to be 
replaced by a $500,000 production payout at 12.5 per cent of net production 
revenues after payout. As to production from formation below Dakota, a two per 
cent overriding royalty was retained.

 
 
Consequently, defendant 
had only a two per cent royalty below Dakota for specific performance, and the 
four per cent above Dakota was subject to the payout. Attribution of the $30,000 
to any claimed deficiency and capacity to secure by specific performance is 
impossible of either computation or rationalization without additional facts. 
Credit or noncredit against the claimed deficiency of the $20,000 commission 
paid was also not determinable as a matter of computation.

10 Citation of Hochhalter v. Great Western Enterprises, 
supra, does not indicate this author's concurrence with the result therein 
achieved.

 
 

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶58.]  I agree that this case must be reversed. 
Unfortunately, it does not appear that the appellant perceived the true reason 
that it was entitled to a reversal. While generally I am reluctant to treat with 
different issues from those which the parties present to the court, in this 
instance the problem is one of jurisdiction, and the court is entitled to raise 
that question of its own motion.

 
 

[¶59.]  This case must be reversed because the 
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant 
corporation. The majority opinion notes, and the record is clear, that the 
registered agent of Midway Oil Corporation was Gertrude Morrison and the 
registered office was 104 South Second Street, Casper, Wyoming. The only matter in the record to 
suggest that Gertrude Morrison could not be served is the return on the summons 
which stated: "After due and diligent search we were unable to locate Gertrude 
Morrison, agent for Midway Oil Corp. in Natrona County, Wyoming 4-4-85. (Mileage $.69)" While it is 
understandable that the trial court does not have an obligation to check the 
identity or address of a registered agent for a corporation, yet when the record 
demonstrates that the address of the registered office was not given to the 
sheriff and the diligence of the sheriff's search is dubious, a conclusion that 
the court did not acquire jurisdiction may be required because of a distinct 
difference in the facts from those found in U.S. Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, 
Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 121 (1983).

 
 

[¶60.]  What followed in this instance was 
service upon the secretary of state pursuant to § 17-1-111(b), W.S. 1977 which 
provides in part:

 
 
"Whenever a corporation 
shall fail to appoint or maintain a registered agent in this state, or whenever 
its registered agent cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the registered 
office, then the secretary of state shall be an agent of such corporation upon 
whom any such process, notice or demand may be served. * * 
*"

 
 
This statute, properly 
construed, demands that before service of process can be made upon the secretary 
of state, one of two conditions precedent must be satisfied. Either the 
corporation must have failed to appoint or maintain a registered agent in this 
state, which is not suggested by the record in this instance, or the registered 
agent of the corporation after the exercise of reasonable diligence must not be 
found at the registered office. On the record in this case there is nothing to 
indicate reasonable diligence because the address of the registered office never 
was furnished to the sheriff. Consequently, I would hold that, in the absence of 
the satisfaction of one of the two conditions precedent, the appellees never 
were entitled to use the secretary of state as an agent upon whom process 
directed to Midway Oil Corporation could be served.

 
 

[¶61.]  In the absence of some service on a 
proper agent, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the appellant. The 
absence of proper service results in a void judgment unless the defendant 
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Bryant v. Wybro Federal Credit Union, 
Wyo., 544 P.2d 1010 (1976). If the judgment is void, the trial court does not have discretion 
to refuse relief when it is sought in accordance with Rule 60(b) W.R.C.P. 2-H Ranch Co., Inc. v. Simmons, Wyo., 
658 P.2d 68 (1983). To the same effect is R.L. Manning Co. v. Millsap, Wyo., 687 P.2d 252 
(1984). In this case the default judgment should have been set aside and the 
case should have been dismissed because the court did not have jurisdiction over 
the person of the defendant.

 
 

[¶62.]  Were I to concede that the questionable 
return of the sheriff showing that the registered agent could not be found in 
NatronaCounty was sufficient to 
justify service upon the secretary of state, I still would agree to reverse 
because of an abuse of the discretion of the trial court. Section 17-1-111(b) 
goes on to say:

 
 
"In the event any such 
process, notice or demand is served on the secretary of state, he shall 
immediately cause one (1) of the copies thereof to be forwarded by registered 
mail addressed to the corporation at its registered office. * * 
*"

 
 
This was not done, but 
instead the copy was mailed to the last address shown upon an annual report. The 
registered office is not changed by the filing of an annual report. Section 
17-1-110, W.S. 1977 explains how that is to be accomplished. While the court may 
have acquired jurisdiction because of service upon the secretary of state, the 
failure to comply with the statute would distinctly limit the extent of the 
court's discretion in refusing to grant relief under Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P. I 
would hold if that were the issue that there was an abuse of discretion in 
refusing to set aside the default judgment when it became apparent that the 
office of the secretary of state had not complied with the 
statute.

 
 

[¶63.]  Beyond that it seems to me there is no 
need to address nor justification for addressing the issues relating to damages 
and to the return date in this case. The parties must start over and bring the 
action anew. I do not see that the question of the proper way to address damages 
in a default proceeding would be likely to arise. Presumably, a proper answer 
would be filed on time if service were made on the defendant. 

 
 

ROONEY, Justice, 
concurring.

 
 

[¶64.]  I concur in the majority opinion on the 
basis of that said in Part III thereof.