Case Title: Robinson v. Bell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-58

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Robinson v. Bell1989 WY 16767 P.2d 177Case Number: 88-58Decided: 01/13/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
RICHARD 
ROBINSON, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
GENE BELL, 
D/B/A BELL TRUCKING, AND GENUINE PARTS COMPANY, 
APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
R.E. 
Rauchfuss of Beech Street Law Offices, Casper, for appellant.

 
 
Dallas J. 
Laird, Casper, 
for appellees.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Richard 
Robinson appeals from an order dismissing his negligence and strict liability 
action against appellees Gene Bell, d/b/a Bell Trucking, (Bell) and Genuine Parts 
Company.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

 
 
     1. Whether employer 
destroyed its immunity from recovery by its employee when it failed to comply 
with worker's compensation statutes;

 
 
     2. Whether employee 
waived all opportunity to recover from employer by accepting worker's 
compensation benefits; and

 
 
     3. Whether Appellant's 
Complaint should have been dismissed with regard to Defendant Genuine Parts 
Company.

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant was a truck 
driver for Bell, who was operating as a contract 
carrier for Genuine Parts Company, apparently a distributor for NAPA.1 On September 20, 1986, appellant 
severely injured his back as he attempted to unload a "cage" of auto parts from 
the back of his truck at a NAPA store in 
Casper.

 
 

[¶5.]     After the injury, 
Bell requested that appellant not file a 
Wyoming worker's compensation claim as 
NAPA had workman's compensation insurance 
coverage in Colorado through Sentry Insurance 
Co. Appellant filed the necessary forms with Sentry Insurance Co. and an 
employee's report of injury with the Workers' Compensation Division in 
Wyoming. The 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division responded with a letter directing 
appellant to file all claims in Colorado with 
Sentry Insurance Co. as requested by that insurance company and advising him 
that there would be no coverage in Wyoming as 
Bell did not have a Wyoming account. A month 
after the injury, appellant was informed by Sentry Insurance Co. that he was not 
covered by that company since he had been living and working exclusively in 
Wyoming. 
During the month of December 1986, Bell applied for and received an account with 
the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division and filed his monthly reports of 
employees and earnings for the period from December 1982 through November 1986. 
Bell then made 
retroactive payments and filed a report of appellant's injury. Appellant began 
receiving Wyoming benefits in January of 
1987.

 
 

[¶6.]     On March 31, 1987, 
appellant filed a negligence and strict liability action against appellees, 
seeking actual and special damages for personal injuries he received during the 
course of his employment involving ultrahazardous activities and at a time when 
appellees failed to maintain worker's compensation coverage for him. Appellant 
also alleged a culpable negligence cause of action against Gene Bell as a 
co-employee. The district court granted appellees' amended motion to dismiss, 
finding that appellant's claim was barred because he had elected to receive 
worker's compensation benefits and that appellant had failed to state a cause of 
action against a co-employee. Since the parties presented, and the district 
court considered, matters outside the pleadings, we will treat appellees' motion 
to dismiss, and the court's order, as one for summary judgment. W.R.C.P. 
12(c).

 
 

[¶7.]     The proper grant of 
summary judgment requires the dual findings that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Teton Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, LaramieCountySchool 
District Number One, 763 P.2d 843 (Wyo. 1988). Appellant has 
not appealed the district court's decision dismissing his culpable negligence 
claim against Gene Bell as an alleged co-employee. The remaining issues concern 
questions strictly of law, and we accord no deference to and are not bound by 
the district court's decision on these issues. Id.

 
 

[¶8.]     To resolve the issues 
in this case, we must refer to the relevant provisions of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act2 and apply our established rules for 
interpretation of these statutes. This Court has consistently held that worker's 
compensation statutes are to be liberally construed so that industry, rather 
than an injured workman, bears the burden of industrial accidents. Lehman v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, 752 P.2d 422 (Wyo. 1988). Conversely, we have held that 
employer immunity provisions in the Act are to be narrowly construed. Stratman 
v. Admiral Beverage Corporation, 760 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1988); Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 742 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 
1987).

 
 

[¶9.]     In determining that 
appellant's claim against appellees was barred by an election to receive 
benefits under the Act, the district court relied upon Llewellyn v. Smith, 593 P.2d 771 (Okla. 1979), and H.L. Hutton & Co. v. District Court of Kay 
County, 398 P.2d 530 (Okla. 1965). These cases, however, were premised on an 
exclusive remedy provision in the Oklahoma 
worker's compensation scheme which was significantly different than its 
Wyoming 
counterpart. The Oklahoma statute, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85, § 
12 (West 1970), provided that worker's compensation was the exclusive remedy to 
an injured employee except when the employer "has failed to secure the payment 
of compensation for his injured employee," in which case an action for damages 
would lie. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in the cited cases, interpreted that 
statute as providing an election of remedies and held that, once benefits were 
awarded under worker's compensation law, the injured employee was precluded from 
maintaining a common-law action for damages.

 
 

[¶10.]  The Wyoming exclusive remedy provision applicable 
to this case was § 27-12-103.3 Subsection (c) of that section 
established the rights of an injured employee as against a noncomplying 
employer:

 
 
     This act does not 
limit or affect any right or action by any employee and his dependents against 
an employer for injuries received while employed by the employer when the employer at the time of the 
injuries has not qualified under this act for the coverage of his eligible 
employees, or having qualified, is either delinquent in the payment of 
premium on an injured employee's earnings for three (3) months immediately prior 
to the date of injury, or one (1) quarterly payroll reporting period when 
privileged to report quarterly. When an employee's employment starts within the 
month or yearly quarter of the date of injury, the status of delinquency or not 
contributing shall not apply until after the regular payroll reporting 
date.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) There is nothing in this statute which requires an employee to make an 
election to either receive benefits under the Act or sue his employer. This 
Court will not read words into a statute which are not there. Wilcoxson v. 
Employment Security Commission of Wyoming, 741 P.2d 611 (Wyo. 1987); Johnston v. 
Board of Trustees, School District # 1 West, Sheridan County, Wyoming, 661 P.2d 1045 (Wyo. 1983). To the contrary, it is clear that the statute does not limit 
or affect any right of action by an employee against an unqualified employer. 
Furthermore, nowhere in this statute, nor elsewhere in the Act, is it remotely 
suggested that an employer can obtain immunity from suit by applying for a 
worker's compensation account after his employee has been injured. Although we 
have said that immunity provisions will be narrowly construed, Stratman, 760 P.2d 974, the conclusion we reach here does not require a narrow construction 
but flows inevitably from the plain wording of the statute. The clear import of 
the statute is that, when an employer was not qualified under the Act at the 
time of injury to an employee, the employer had no immunity.4

 
 

[¶11.]  If an employer were permitted to escape 
liability from suit simply because his employee accepted benefits under the Act 
or if the employer were permitted to qualify an account under the Act after his 
employee was injured, the industrial accident account would never be properly 
funded, as it would often be to the employer's monetary advantage, even 
considering the penalty provisions for noncompliance contained in § 27-12-207, 
to wait until an employee was injured before becoming qualified under the Act. 
Immunity from suit is obviously an intended incentive for employers to qualify 
under the Act. Qualification is the price an employer has to pay to obtain 
immunity from suit by his injured employee regardless of whether or not the 
employee received worker's compensation benefits.

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellant, as mentioned, does not contest 
the district court's dismissal of his cause of action for culpable negligence 
against Gene Bell as an alleged co-employee, and that decision by the district 
court will stand. Regarding appellant's final issue, however, the record readily 
reveals that the amended motion to dismiss and the court's order dismissing the 
action were not directed at, nor did they consider, the claim against Genuine 
Parts Company. Dismissal of the cause of action against that party was therefore 
error.

 
 

[¶13.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 

CARDINE, C.J., 
filed a dissenting opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 The 
relationship between Genuine Parts Company and NAPA is not clearly established in the 
record.

 
 

2 In 1986, 
Chapter 12 of Title 27 (Worker's Compensation, §§ 27-12-101 to -805) was 
repealed and recreated as Chapter 14 (Wyo. Stat. §§ 27-14-101 to -804 (1977)) 
effective July 1, 1987. This case arose under the earlier Act and, unless 
otherwise indicated, reference in this opinion will be to the prior 
Act.

 
 

3 The 
current exclusive remedy statute, Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-104 (1977), is similar to 
repealed § 27-12-103.

 
 

4 This is 
not a case involving an employer with a qualified account who is delinquent in 
his payment of premiums. See Mauler v. Titus, 697 P.2d 303 (Wyo. 
1985).

 
 

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice, dissenting.

 
 

[¶14.]  I dissent.

 
 

[¶15.]  The essence of the majority opinion is 
that

 
 
"[t]here is 
nothing in this statute [W.S. 27-12-103] which requires an employee to make an 
election to either receive benefits under the Act or sue his 
employer."

 
 
There is 
nothing in the act that requires an 
employee to do anything. In this 
case, however, the employee did something: he applied for and elected to receive 
worker's compensation benefits. The question with which we are presented is what 
was the effect of that election.

 
 

[¶16.]  W.S. 27-14-203(a) provides 
that

 
 
"[a]ny employer not applying for coverage 
of eligible employees or, after obtaining 
coverage under this act, any employer failing, neglecting or refusing to make payments required by this act on 
the date due and against whom any injured 
employee is held entitled to worker's compensation benefits is liable to the 
state for an amount equal to all 
awards entered for payment to or for 
the employee under this act. If the employer fails, neglects or refuses to 
satisfy his liability, the amount shall be recovered by civil action in the name 
of the director. The entry of final order by the division or hearing examiner 
approving and allowing an award of compensation is prima facie proof of the 
liability of an employer failing to comply with this act." (emphasis 
added)

 
 
In this 
case the employer had not, at the time of injury, applied for coverage under the 
worker's compensation statute. Appellant was an eligible employee under the act. 
The employer obtained coverage under the act. When appellant applied for 
worker's compensation benefits, the employer became liable to the State to 
continue payments or for all awards entered for payment to the employee under 
the act. The order awarding benefits to the employee resulted in liability of 
the employer, although at the time of the injury he had not complied with the 
worker's compensation act.

 
 

[¶17.]  I have no difficulty concluding that the 
legislature intended that the employee have the right either to sue the employer 
in a civil action to recover his damages or make claim against his employer not 
contributing under the act and thereby secure an award of worker's compensation 
benefits. This choice of remedies is a considerable advantage to the employee 
for often his injury results from his own activity and the employee does not 
have a viable civil case against his employer. (Appellant may have that problem 
in this case.)

 
 

[¶18.]  If the employee chooses to pursue a civil 
case rather than worker's compensation, substantial damages can be recovered. 
The employer who failed to contribute is penalized, for he has exposure to a 
civil action and to strict liability in worker's compensation. That is a just 
result for all parties. This conclusion finds support among authorities which 
have held that an injured employee has "the option of either pursuing a civil 
action against the employer or filing an application for workmen's compensation 
benefits." Shaughnessy v. Bohnet, 303 N.W.2d 337, 341 (N.D. 1981). See also 
Shope v. Don Coe Const. Co., 92 N.M. 508, 590 P.2d 656 (1979). In Llewellyn v. 
Smith, 593 P.2d 771, 773 (Okla. 1979), the court, quoting from H.L. Hutton & 
Co. v. District Court of Kay County, 398 P.2d 530, 531 (Okla. 1965), 
stated:

 
 
"`One 
injured in the course of his employment, who has made application for 
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law and has been awarded 
compensation for his injury, has made his election of remedies and is precluded 
thereby, and he cannot thereafter maintain an action for damages against his 
employer for the same injuries, even though the latter has failed to provide 
compensation insurance under the provisions of that act.'"

 
 

[¶19.]  Our worker's compensation act provides a 
right to compensation for an employee against an employer not contributing under 
the act at the time of the accident. When the employee avails himself of that 
remedy and is awarded worker's compensation under the act, the employer is 
entitled to the immunity afforded by the act from suit in a civil action. 
Reading all sections of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act in pari materia, 
it seems clear the legislature intended to afford to the employee of an employer 
not contributing under the act a choice of remedies, i.e., a recovery under 
worker's compensation or a civil action against the employer. The employee is 
entitled to one remedy or the other but not both.