Case Title: MICHAEL LIND V CITY OF BATTLE CREEK

Citation: 

Docket Number: 227874

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JUNE 11, 2004
MICHAEL LIND, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
v 
No. 122054 
CITY OF BATTLE CREEK, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MARKMAN, J.  
Plaintiff, a white police officer, alleges that 
defendant violated the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 
37.2202(1)(a), when it promoted a black officer, rather 
than plaintiff, to the supervisory position of police 
sergeant on the basis of race.1  The issue is whether such a 
claim of "reverse discrimination" must satisfy standards 
different 
from 
those 
required 
of 
other 
claims 
of 
discrimination. 
Having granted leave to appeal and heard 
argument, this Court concludes as follows: 
1 
On the basis of scores on written and oral 
examinations and seniority, plaintiff was rated second 
among the top five eligible officers and the black officer,
who was promoted, was rated fifth. 
Pursuant to a 
collective bargaining agreement, the city was permitted to
select any one of the top five scoring candidates. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
(1) MCL 37.2202(1)(a) provides that “[a]n employer 
shall not . . . discriminate against an individual with 
respect to employment . . . because of . . . race . . . .” 
(2) MCL 37.2202(1)(a) draws no distinctions between 
"individual" plaintiffs on account of race. 
(3) The Court of Appeals, in reliance on Allen v 
Comprehensive Health Services, 222 Mich App 426, 429-433; 
564 NW2d 914 (1997), held that a "majority" plaintiff in a 
"reverse discrimination" case, in order to make a prima 
facie 
showing, 
must, 
in 
addition 
to 
satisfying 
the 
obligations of “minority” plaintiffs in discrimination 
cases, also present "background circumstances supporting 
the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer 
who discriminates against the majority . . . ."2 
(4) Allen draws a distinction between plaintiffs on 
account of race under MCL 37.2202(1)(a), and is thus 
inconsistent with our Civil Rights Act.3  Therefore, Allen 
is overruled.4 
2 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 9, 2002,
p 2 (Docket No. 227874). 
3  While Allen involved a gender discrimination, rather
than a race discrimination, claim, it held broadly that
"reverse discrimination" plaintiffs under the Civil Rights
Act must satisfy the "background circumstances" standard. 
4 Because we overrule Allen, it is unnecessary to
address the additional question posed by this Court’s grant
order, i.e., whether Allen’s “background circumstances” 
standard is consistent with the equal protection clauses of
2 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
In response to Justice Cavanagh’s dissent, we observe 
that this opinion is short, not because we disagree with 
the dissent concerning the significance of this issue, but 
because Allen is so clearly contrary to the language of 
Michigan’s Civil Rights Act. 
We are uncertain how many 
pages the dissent believes are required to explain that 
“individual” means “individual.” 
Further, we note that in 
its much longer opinion, the dissent, unlike the majority, 
never actually bothers to decide the issue before this 
Court—whether Allen’s “background circumstances” standard 
is consistent with Michigan’s Civil Rights Act. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand this case to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.5 
Stephen J. Markman
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 2 ("No
person shall be . . . discriminated against . . . because
of . . . race . . . .") and the United States Constitution,
Am XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any
person . . . the equal protection of the laws."). That is,
because we conclude that applying different standards to 
different racial groups in order to determine whether 
discrimination has been established violates the Michigan
Civil Rights Act, we need not determine whether applying
different 
racial 
standards 
also 
violates 
the 
equal
protection clauses.
5 In response to Justice Kelly’s dissent, we note that
we are not concluding that plaintiff did or did not 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination; rather, we
are simply concluding that the trial court applied the
wrong standard in determining whether plaintiff established
a prima facie case of discrimination. 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHAEL LIND, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
No. 122054 
CITY OF BATTLE CREEK, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
YOUNG, J. (concurring). 
I fully concur in the majority opinion, but write 
separately to note, on this fiftieth anniversary of the 
decision in Brown v Bd of Education,1 how singular and 
troubling is the dissenting view of my two colleagues. 
It is hard to reconcile the logic of the dissenters' 
position when juxtaposed to the language of our Michigan 
Civil Rights Act and our state constitution without recalling 
Orwell's chilling refrain: “all [citizens] are equal, but 
some [citizens] are more equal than others.”2 
Fifty years after the United States Supreme Court 
declared in Brown that the government could no longer use 
1 Brown v Bd of Education, 347 US 483; 74 S Ct 686; 98 L
Ed 873 (1954). 
2 Orwell, Animal Farm (New York: New American Library,
1996), ch 10, p 133. 
 
 
 
 
 
consideration of race to disadvantage any of its citizens, 
our two dissenting colleagues have announced precisely the 
contrary position. 
Our dissenting colleagues have advocated 
that the judicial branch of government require persons of one 
race to bear a higher burden of maintaining an employment 
discrimination case than persons born of another race. 
This is a concept worth repeating for emphasis, for no 
citizen of this state should miss the import of the dissents’ 
view. 
Our dissenting colleagues maintain that, under a 
statute that explicitly prohibits employment discrimination 
"because of" race, some Michigan citizens must bear a higher 
burden to maintain such a lawsuit precisely because of their 
race. 
Not only does the dissents' position constitute an 
offense against the very protections our Civil Rights Act 
provides, our dissenting colleagues are conspicuously silent 
about the constitutional implications of a governmental 
policy that places higher burdens on one set of citizens 
because of their race. The Michigan Equal Protection Clause, 
Const 1963, art 1, § 2, unlike the federal counterpart 
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, explicitly prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race: 
"No 
person 
shall 
be 
denied 
the 
equal
protection of the laws . . . because of . . . race 
. . . ." 
2  
 
 
 
 
I do not challenge the good intentions of my dissenting 
colleagues; I do challenge their Orwellian racial policy 
preferences. 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHAEL LIND, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 122054 
CITY OF BATTLE CREEK, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
I must dissent, not only from the majority’s holding, 
but also from Justice Young’s assertion that we should turn 
a blind eye to racism. 
How I wish we all could live in 
Justice Young’s utopian society where all races are treated 
equally, but I cannot ignore reality. I urge the reader to 
look 
beyond 
the 
surface 
appeal 
of 
Justice 
Young’s 
simplistic argument and examine not only the text, but also 
the context of the Civil Rights Act. 
It is with regret 
that I acknowledge the relevance today of Clarence Darrow’s 
closing argument at the 1926 trial of Detroiter Henry 
Sweet.1
 
In 
discussing 
the 
tragedy, 
injustice, 
and 
1 Mr. Sweet was on trial for firing a fatal shot into a
crowd of white people who were attempting to drive African-
Americans from their homes in “white neighborhoods.” He 
was acquitted. 
 
 
 
 
 
oppression faced by African-Americans, he stated: 
“’The 
law has made him equal, but man has not. 
And, after all, 
the last analysis is what has man done?—and not what has 
the law done?’” 
Peterson, ed, A Treasury of the World’s 
Great Speeches (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc, 1965), p 
740. This still rings true today. 
Without any discussion of the relevant case law, this 
Court 
today 
overrules 
Allen 
v 
Comprehensive 
Health 
Services, 222 Mich App 426; 564 NW2d 914 (1997). 
The 
cursory nature of the majority opinion shows a complete 
lack of respect for the importance of today’s decision and 
the impact it will have on civil rights. 
The majority overrules Allen because that case draws a 
distinction between plaintiffs on the basis of a minority 
class characteristic or trait, while the text of Michigan’s 
Civil Rights Act does not. 
Because today’s decision 
perverts the purpose of the Civil Rights Act and ignores 
precedent from this Court and the United States Supreme 
Court, I must respectfully dissent. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Because the majority opinion omits the relevant facts 
and circumstances, I provide them here. Plaintiff, a white 
male, filed this discrimination complaint following the 
promotion of a minority male to the position of sergeant at 
2  
 
 
 
 
the Battle Creek Police Department. 
The procedure for 
promotions requires candidates to score at least seventy 
percent on a written examination and to successfully 
complete an oral examination. Candidates are ranked on the 
basis of their performance on these examinations and, 
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, defendant 
may choose any of the five top candidates from the list. 
Plaintiff and the minority candidate who was awarded the 
sergeant’s position in question were both in the top five 
on the eligibility list; plaintiff was ranked second at the 
time of the promotion and the minority candidate was ranked 
fifth. 
At the close of discovery, defendant filed a motion 
for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). 
The 
trial court applied the background circumstances test from 
Allen and granted defendant’s motion. 
Plaintiff filed a 
motion for reconsideration after learning of the city’s 
affirmative 
action 
plan. 
The 
trial 
court 
denied 
plaintiff’s 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, 
finding 
the 
affirmative action plan was never implemented by the city, 
and, even if it had been in place, it was not applicable to 
decisions pertaining to promotions. 
3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the trial court’s grant of summary disposition.2  The Court 
of Appeals applied the test from Allen and agreed with the 
trial court that plaintiff failed to provide sufficient 
evidence to create an issue of fact regarding whether 
defendant was the unusual employer who discriminates 
against the majority. 
Plaintiff appealed to this Court and we granted leave, 
directing 
the 
parties 
to 
address 
whether 
the 
Allen 
“background 
circumstances” 
test 
is 
consistent 
with 
Michigan’s Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq., 
and, if so, whether it violates the Equal Protection Clause 
of 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution 
or 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution. 468 Mich 869 (2003). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court stated the applicable standard of review in 
Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 461; 628 NW2d 515 
(2001), in which we applied the test from McDonnell Douglas 
Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 
(1973), to a racial discrimination claim: 
We review de novo a trial court’s decision 
on a motion for summary disposition. 
A motion 
for 
summary 
disposition 
brought 
under 
MCR 
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a 
2 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 9, 2002
(Docket No. 227874). 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
claim. 
After reviewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, a trial 
court may grant summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) 
if 
there 
is 
no 
genuine 
issue 
concerning any material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 453; 597
NW2d 28 (1999). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Michigan’s CRA, at MCL 37.2202(1), provides that “[a]n 
employer shall not . . . (a) discriminate against an 
individual with respect to employment . . . because of 
. . . race . . . .”  This language mirrors Title VII of the 
federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, which reads in pertinent 
part: 
It shall be unlawful employment practices
for an employer . . . (1) . . . to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race 
. . . . [42 USC 2000e-2(a).] 
In some discrimination cases, there is direct evidence 
of racial bias. But in most discrimination cases, there is 
no direct evidence. 
Recognizing this, the United States 
Supreme Court developed the McDonnell Douglas framework for 
examining discrimination claims where direct evidence of 
racial bias is lacking. McDonnell Douglas, supra. 
Under the McDonnell Douglas test, a plaintiff must 
first offer a prima facie case of discrimination. 
To 
create a presumption of discrimination a plaintiff must 
present evidence “(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which 
the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite 
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after 
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s 
qualifications.” 
McDonnell Douglas, supra at 802. 
Once 
the plaintiff has created a presumption of discrimination, 
the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut that 
presumption by showing that there was a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. 
In Hazle, this Court applied the above framework to a 
racial discrimination claim filed pursuant to the CRA. The 
plaintiff in Hazle was required to present evidence that 
(1) she belong[ed] to a protected class, (2) she
suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she
was qualified for the position, and (4) the job
was given to another person under circumstances
giving 
rise 
to 
an 
inference 
of 
unlawful 
discrimination. [Hazle, supra at 463.] 
In applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, this Court 
recognized that varying facts in discrimination cases 
require courts to tailor the McDonnell Douglas framework to 
“fit the factual situation at hand.” Hazle, supra at 463 n 
6. 
Strict application of the McDonnell Douglas framework 
would preclude all reverse discrimination claims without 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
direct 
evidence 
of 
discriminatory 
bias. 
Because 
a 
majority plaintiff cannot prove that he belongs to a 
protected minority and because the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that the federal civil rights act is 
not limited to minorities,3 courts have adapted the first 
prong 
of 
the 
McDonnell 
Douglas 
test 
for 
reverse 
discrimination claims. 
However, the United States Supreme 
Court has not addressed the test to be used for reverse 
discrimination claims and there is no consensus among the 
federal circuit courts of appeals regarding how the 
McDonnell Douglas test should be adapted for reverse 
discrimination claims. 
There are three general approaches followed by the 
federal circuits. 
The approach followed by a majority of 
the circuits is the “background circumstances” test, which 
requires 
a 
majority 
plaintiff 
to 
show 
background 
circumstances that support the suspicion that the defendant 
is the unusual employer who discriminates against the 
majority. 
This approach is followed by the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and the 
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth circuits. 
Parker v Baltimore & 
Ohio R Co, 209 App DC 215; 652 F2d 1012 (1981); Murray v 
3 McDonald v Santa Fe Transp Co, 427 US 273, 278-279;
96 S Ct 2574; 49 L Ed 2d 493 (1976). 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thistledown Racing Club, Inc, 770 F2d 63, 66-68 (CA 6, 
1985); Pierce v Commonwealth Life Ins Co, 40 F3d 796, 801 
(CA 6, 1994); Mills v Health Care Service Corp, 171 F3d 
450, 457 (CA 7, 1999); Duff v Wolle, 123 F3d 1026, 1036­
1037 (CA 8, 1997). 
The second approach only requires a 
majority plaintiff to prove that he is a member of “a 
class.” 
This approach is followed by the Third and 
Eleventh circuits. 
Iadimarco v Runyon, 190 F3d 151, 163 
(CA 3, 1999); Wilson v Bailey, 934 F2d 301, 304 (CA 11, 
1991). 
The third approach allows a majority plaintiff to 
state a prima facie case in one of two ways, by using the 
“background circumstances” test or by showing “indirect 
evidence sufficient to support a reasonable probability, 
that but for the plaintiff’s status [as a member of the 
majority] the challenged action would have favored the 
plaintiff . . . .” 
Notari v Denver Water Dep’t, 971 F2d 
585, 589 (CA 10, 1992). 
This test was developed by the 
Fourth Circuit in a traditional discrimination case and 
applied by the Tenth Circuit in the reverse discrimination 
context. 
Holmes v Bevilacqua, 794 F2d 142, 146 (CA 4, 
1986); Notari, supra. 
A. THE “BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES” TEST 
The “background circumstances” test was created by the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
because the United States Supreme Court noted that the 
McDonnell Douglas factors have to be adjusted to fit 
varying factual scenarios and because strict application of 
the framework would eliminate all reverse discrimination 
claims. 
Parker, 652 F2d 1017. 
Under the “background 
circumstances” test a majority plaintiff claiming reverse 
discrimination can meet the first prong of establishing a 
prima facie case “when background circumstances support the 
suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who 
discriminates 
against 
the 
majority.” 
Id. 
at 
220. 
Generally, “background circumstances” can be shown by 
evidence indicating that the employer has some reason or 
inclination to discriminate against the majority or by 
evidence indicating that there is something suspect about 
the 
particular 
case, 
which 
raises 
an 
inference 
of 
discrimination. 
See Harding v Gray, 9 F3d 150 (DC Cir, 
1993). 
B. THE “MEMBER OF A CLASS” APPROACH 
Some 
courts 
have 
criticized 
the 
“background 
circumstances” test and have applied their own adaptations 
of the McDonnell Douglas framework. 
The adaptation 
followed by the Third Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit 
essentially eliminates the first prong of the McDonnell 
Douglas framework. 
This adaptation was first applied by 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the Eleventh Circuit in Wilson, in which the court altered 
the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test by requiring 
the plaintiff to prove that he belonged to “a class,” not a 
protected class or a minority class, simply a class. 
The 
same 
standard 
was 
applied 
by 
the 
Third 
Circuit 
in 
Iadimarco. The Third Circuit, held that 
a plaintiff who brings a “reverse discrimination”
suit under Title VII should be able to establish 
a prima facie case in the absence of direct
evidence 
of 
discrimination 
by 
presenting
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact 
finder to conclude . . . that the defendant 
treated plaintiff “less favorably than others 
because of [his] race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.” 
Furnco [Constr Co v Waters,
438 US 567, 577; 98 S Ct 2943; 57 L Ed 2d 957
(1978)]. [Iadimarco, supra at 163.] 
C. THE NOTARI ALTERNATIVE 
The Fourth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit apply yet 
another variation of the McDonnell Douglas framework to 
reverse discrimination claims. 
See Holmes, supra at 146; 
Notari, 
supra 
at 
589. 
This 
test 
acknowledges 
the 
presumption 
of 
discrimination 
implicit 
in 
McDonnell 
Douglas, but allows a reverse discrimination plaintiff to 
prove either background circumstances or specific facts 
that 
support 
a 
reasonable 
inference 
that, 
but 
for 
plaintiff’s status as a member of the majority, the 
challenged decision would not have been made. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The diversity of opinion among the federal circuits is 
evidence of the difficulty and complexity of this issue, 
yet the majority feels compelled by the text of Michigan’s 
Civil Rights Act to dismiss this issue with no analysis of 
the relevant case law. 
The text of the act also compels 
Justice Young to assert that viewing things as they 
actually are is tantamount to discrimination. 
Today’s 
majority and Justice Young both fail to acknowledge the 
historical context in which the Civil Rights Act was 
passed, 
as 
well 
as 
the 
pervasive 
and 
continuing 
discrimination rooted in that historical context. 
The 
majority remands this case to the circuit court with no 
guidance 
other 
than 
the 
fact 
that 
the 
“background 
circumstances” test should not be used. 
I respectfully 
dissent. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHAEL LIND, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 122054 
CITY OF BATTLE CREEK, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
I agree fully with Justice Cavanagh’s dissent. 
I 
write separately to state my additional reasons for 
supporting 
an 
affirmance 
of 
summary 
disposition 
for 
defendant. 
Plaintiff Failed to Establish a Prima Facie Case 
Under any employment discrimination test, plaintiff 
failed to establish a prima facie case. 
Defendant had 
discretion to choose one of the candidates on the promotion 
list and had an established practice of not necessarily 
promoting people in the order they appeared on the list. 
Defendant 
was 
not 
required 
to 
consider 
those 
attributes that plaintiff alleges made him a superior 
candidate to the employee who was in fact promoted. 
Plaintiff did not rebut defendant’s asserted reliance on 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
the promoted employee’s maturity and sense of service. 
Defendant was not required to forgo subjective criteria in 
making the employment decision, especially considering the 
critical role that police officers fill in society. 
Plaintiff failed to rebut defendant’s race-neutral reasons 
for its employment decision. 
Plaintiff’s failure to 
sustain 
his 
burden 
entitled 
defendant 
to 
summary 
disposition. 
I disagree with the majority’s rejection of the 
background 
circumstances 
test 
of 
Allen. 
Allen 
Comprehensive Health Services, 222 Mich App 426; 564 NW2d 
914 (1997). 
In addition, I note that, even absent Allen, 
plaintiff’s claim must fall because plaintiff failed to 
refute defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for 
promoting another candidate. 
The Background Circumstances Test
Should Not Be Discarded 
The fact that Michigan’s Civil Rights Act1 creates no 
distinction based on a person's status as a member of the 
"majority" or the "minority" does not justify discarding 
the background circumstances test. 
Because it is entirely 
consistent with the purpose of the act, it should be 
retained. 
1 MCL 37.2101 et seq. 
2  
v 
 
                                                 
 
 
The majority's analysis suggests that this case 
involves a simple issue of the proper interpretation of § 
202 of the civil rights act.2  However, the language of the 
act does not address the question presented here: what 
evidence must be presented to establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination. 
This Court grappled with the question in earlier 
decisions. 
See, e.g., Lytle v Malady  (On Rehearing), 458 
Mich 153, 172-178; 579 NW2d 906 (1998) (opinion by Weaver, 
J.); Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675, 683-684; 385 NW2d 
586 (1986). 
It determined that, where there is no direct 
evidence of impermissible bias, a prima facie case of 
employment discrimination can be established through the 
burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp 
Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973). 
The background circumstances test is a modification of 
the McDonnell Douglas test. The rationale for the test was 
2 That section, MCL 37.2202, provides in relevant part: 
(1) An employer shall not do any of the
following: 
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit,
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an
individual 
with 
respect 
to 
employment,
compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege
of employment, because of religion, race, color,
national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or
marital status. 
3  
v 
 
 
 
first articulated by the District of Columbia Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Parker v Baltimore & Ohio R Co, 209 US App DC 
215; 652 F2d 1012 (1981). 
The Allen Court adopted it as 
its own, concluding that it was an appropriate modification 
of the McDonnell Douglas test. 
The background circumstances test acknowledges that 
reverse discrimination cases involve different factual 
situations and different underlying prejudices than do 
traditional discrimination cases. 
The test recognizes at 
its base that the hostile discrimination present in 
McDonnell Douglas is not typically directed at members of 
the majority. 
Allen, supra at 431-432. 
I agree with the 
following reasoning from Allen that quotes Parker, supra: 
“The original McDonnell Douglas standard 
required the plaintiff to show ‘that he belongs
to a racial minority.’ 
Membership in a socially
disfavored group was the assumption on which the
entire McDonnell Douglas analysis was predicated,
for only in that context can it be stated as a
general 
rule 
that 
the 
‘light 
of 
common 
experience’ would lead a factfinder to infer 
discriminatory motive from the unexplained hiring
of an outsider rather than a group member. 
Whites are also a protected group under Title
VII, but it defies common sense to suggest that
the promotion of a black employee justifies an 
inference of prejudice against white co-workers
in our present society.” [Allen, supra at 431­
432, quoting Parker, supra at 220.] 
The majority's rationale in overruling the background 
circumstances test is not in keeping with the progeny of 
4  
 
 
 
 
McDonnell Douglas. 
In mechanically applying the plain 
language doctrine of statutory interpretation, the majority 
subverts the purpose of the act and the Legislature's 
intent in writing it. 
They were to prevent discrimination 
against a person because of that person's membership in a 
certain class and “to eliminate the effects of offensive or 
demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases.” 
Radtke v 
Everett, 442 Mich 368, 379; 501 NW2d 155 (1993), quoting 
Miller v CA Muer Corp, 420 Mich 355, 363; 362 NW2d 650 
(1984). 
In our society, demeaning acts of prejudice directed 
against 
whites 
because 
of 
their 
race 
are 
uncommon. 
Historically, whites have not suffered from pervasive 
racial oppression, discrimination, and stigmatization as 
have members of minority races. 
A national survey 
conducted in 1990 found that prejudice against whites 
continues to be relatively rare. 
Only seven percent of 
whites interviewed claimed to have experienced any form of 
racial discrimination. 
Schuck, Affirmative action: Past, 
present, and future, 20 Yale L & Pol'y R 1, 67 (2002). 
Conversely, with respect to racial minorities, “race 
unfortunately still matters.” Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 
306; 123 S Ct 2325, 2341; 156 L Ed 2d 304 (2003). 
5  
 
 
 
The existence of this crucial distinction between the 
treatment of the majority and of the minority supported the 
Allen Court's adoption of the background circumstances 
test. 
Common experience in Michigan does not lead to the 
conclusion that, when an adverse employment decision is 
made regarding a white employee, it is based on race. 
As a consequence, I would uphold the background 
circumstances test adopted in Allen and affirm the decision 
of the lower courts. 
Marilyn Kelly 
6