Case Title: Klimek v. Perisich

Citation: 231 Or. 71, 371 P.2d 956

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1962-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Affirmed May 31, 1962.
*72 Morton A. Winkel and Justin N. Reinhardt, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With them on the brief were Reinhardt, Coblens & Stoll, Portland.
F. Leo Smith, Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, PERRY, GOODWIN and LUSK, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
PERRY, J.
This is an action brought by the plaintiff to recover damages from the defendant for breach of contract to remodel an old dwelling house into a rooming house.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff which was set aside and judgment entered notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff has appealed.
The sole question presented is, was a contract entered into between the defendant and plaintiff whereby defendant contracted to fully remodel an old residence into a suitable rooming house for plaintiff at a sum not to exceed $10,000?
*73 Both plaintiff and defendant were born in Yugoslavia, and while they now speak and understand English, the record discloses limitations in this regard. The record discloses that plaintiff's husband, who had been a building contractor for some twenty years in this country, died. Subsequent to his death the plaintiff left her home in Newberg and sought employment in Portland.
Through a Portland real estate dealer, who had been instrumental in selling a farm owned by the plaintiff, the plaintiff purchased an old residence in Portland with the thought of remodeling it into a rooming house. This real estate dealer, knowing of her Yugoslavian background, introduced her to the defendant, a builder in Portland. The plaintiff and defendant went to look at the premises, and this conversation took place:
Plaintiff also testified as follows:
Blueprints for the remodeling were obtained but no specifications covering materials to be used were ever drafted by anyone.
As to the time the blueprints arrived, plaintiff testified as follows:
*75 The plaintiff introduced numerous checks to various workmen and lumber dealers showing she paid directly some of the workmen and suppliers. She paid defendant carpenters wages, as she did two other carpenters who worked with him on an hourly basis. With reference to one of the workmen plaintiff herself hired, she testified as follows:
Again, as to the agreement, plaintiff testified as follows:
As to the bills, she stated:
*77 The bills for material came direct to plaintiff, not through the defendant, and she paid the defendant his wages weekly.
The plaintiff also testified that after she discovered what remodeling of the building was costing she asked the defendant where she might obtain sufficient moneys to complete the project, and he gave her the names of several of his friends, but she was unsuccessful in this attempt. She then abandoned the project.
Again, as to the purported contract, the plaintiff testified:
*78 The plaintiff also testified no arrangements were made between the parties as to who would do the required plumbing, heating or electrical wiring of the structure, but as these items became necessary they would each try to have these items contracted for at the most reasonable price. Any discounts for materials the defendant could receive by reason of his vocation were passed on to plaintiff by defendant. The plaintiff also introduced into evidence an estimate of the cost of remodeling the house which defendant furnished to plaintiff before entering into work upon the house, which, including new furnace, labor, materials, etc., was of the sum of $18,284.00.
1. We have set forth only the evidence of the plaintiff, as this is an action at law, and if there is substantial evidence of the formation of a contract, as sued upon, the finding of the jury must be sustained. Clemens v. Smith, 170 Or 400, 402, 134 P2d 424.
2. The intention of the parties to enter into a contract and the construction of their language to express their intentions and agreement must be construed in the light of the circumstances which then existed. Erickson v. Grande Ronde Lbr. Co., 162 Or 556, 92 P2d 170, 94 P2d 139.
3. To constitute a contract such as here present, there must be an offer and an acceptance. Courteen Seed Co. v. Abraham, 129 Or 427, 275 P 684; Maeder Steel Products Co. v. Zanello, 109 Or 562, 220 P 155; Mendelsohn v. Mendelsohn, 104 Or 281, 207 P 158; C.R. Shaw Wholesale Co. v. Hackbarth, 102 Or 80, 201 P 1066, reversing 102 Or 80, 198 P 908.
4-6. An offer must be certain so that upon an unqualified acceptance the nature and extent of the obligations of each party are fixed and may be determined *79 with reasonable certainty. Medford Furniture etc. Co. v. Hanley, 120 Or 229, 250 P 876.
As to an acceptance of an offer:
See, also, Ellingsworth v. Shannon, 161 Or 106, 110, 88 P2d 293; Jackman v. Jones et al, 191 Or 356, 229 P2d 963. In other words, there must be a meeting of the minds as to the obligations each assumes under the contract before it can be said that a contract exists.
In the matter before us the plaintiff agreed to pay money and the defendant agreed to render services, therefore both the amount to be paid and the services to be rendered must be reasonably certain.
As stated by Williston in his work on Contracts, 3d ed, § 42, p 135:
By Corbin on Contracts, § 100, p 315:
7. Neither party to a contract may assume that a contract exists if he knows that the other party does not intend what his words or actions may seem to express.
With these general rules of law in mind, we will now consider the contentions of the parties in the light of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff.
8. The trial court, in granting judgment for the defendant, notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, based its opinion upon the indefiniteness of the subject matter of the offer. The plaintiff contends that the subject matter of the offer is sufficiently definite in *81 that the parties agreed upon a maximum amount to be paid by the plaintiff for the remodeling of a certain building; that the extent and requirements for remodeling were certain, although no specifications were agreed upon; that the minimum requirements of the building code of the city of Portland required certain materials to be used, and this supplied the lack of specifications as to the work to be done and the material to be used by the defendant. Defendant contends that no agreement existed other than to perform labor at an hourly rate and there was no agreement as to the extent of remodeling or the materials to be used, and therefore no contract existed between the parties.
The difficulty with plaintiff's contentions that the minimal requirements of the city building code are sufficiently definite as a substitute for specifications is that there is no evidence that the parties agreed that compliance with the minimal requirements of the building code would constitute a satisfactory execution of the purported contract, and also there is no evidence that the building code specifies the extent of the remodeling, or the kinds or types of materials that could be satisfactorily used in the remodeling of this particular. Also there is no evidence of what the parties agreed was necessary to constitute a remodeling of the structure.
The building code of the city of Portland was not introduced into evidence, and therefore the jury could not determine whether the building code covered these requirements. There is in fact no evidence as to the manner or extent to which the building was to be remodeled other than that it should be partitioned to accommodate a certain number of rooms; whether the remodeling required the replacement of floors and *82 stairways; the rooms to be finished of lath and plaster or "dry wall" painted or papered; whether the wiring was to be replaced, or used or new plumbing fixtures installed.
The indefiniteness in these respects is much like a purported contract to rehabilitate land for the sum of $4000 or $5000 where there was no certainty of agreement as to just what must necessarily be done to rehabilitate the land (Mosteller v. Mashburn, 64 GA 92, 12 SE2d 142) or like an agreement to tailor a suit or overcoat for $50 where the materials and pattern were not selected or agreed upon (Factor v. Peabody Tailoring System, 177 Wis 238, 187 NW 984). In both of these cases the court found that there was not sufficient definiteness to constitute a contract.
The plaintiff cites and relies upon a number of cases, such as Helm v. Speith, 298 Ky 225, 182 SW2d 635. In this case the parties agreed that the building should be contracted to comply with the minimal requirements of the Federal Housing Administration, and the Federal Housing Administration requirements were introduced into evidence. It appears from the case that, having agreed to the FHA requirements, which contain detailed specifications, the agreement, by referring to the FHA requirements, made the subject matter sufficiently definite for enforcement, but, as previously stated, there is no evidence that the parties agreed that the minimal requirements of the Portland building code were agreed upon as a basis of their negotiations, nor was it introduced into evidence.
The trial court correctly held that there was no contract.
*83 There is additional reason why the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. An examination of the evidence of the plaintiff, in our opinion, is such that reasonable minds could reach only the conclusion that at all times the plaintiff knew that the statements made by the defendant with relation to the cost of remodeling of the structure were only estimates and that the plaintiff knew this to be such, therefore the words and actions of the defendant could only be construed as not an offer to remodel the building to the satisfaction of the plaintiff at a fixed maximum amount, nor as an acceptance of such an offer.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.