Case Title: Pacher v. Fairdale Farms

Citation: 166 Vt. 626, 699 A.2d 43

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Pacher v. Fairdale Farms (96-434); 166 Vt. 626; 699 A.2d 43

[Filed 2-Jun-1997]

                          ENTRY ORDER

                 SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 96-434

                        MARCH TERM, 1997

Joseph Pacher                   }     APPEALED FROM:
                                }
                                }
     v.                         }     Department of Labor & Industry
                                }
Fairdale Farms & Eveready       }
Battery Company                 }     DOCKET NO. F-3487

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Appellant Fairdale Farms appeals a decision by the Commissioner of the
  Vermont Department of Labor and Industry ordering Fairdale to resume
  payment of workers' compensation benefits once appellee Eveready Battery
  Company's responsibility for a subsequent injury ends.  We affirm.

       In November 1977, claimant Joseph Pacher fell off a roof while working
  for Fairdale, rupturing his spleen and fracturing several vertebrae and two
  left ribs.  Fairdale paid workers' compensation benefits during claimant's
  convalescence and following his employment with Eveready Battery Company in
  1978.  In August 1992, claimant injured his right-side lower back while
  attempting to push a clip into a machine at Eveready.

       In the ensuing dispute between Fairdale and Eveready, Fairdale argued
  that claimant's work at Eveready had begun aggravating the first injury in
  March 1990, and therefore Eveready was liable for all workers' compensation
  payments after that date.  Eveready argued that the 1992 injury was a
  recurrence of the original injury and that Fairdale continued to be liable
  for all workers' compensation payments.  The Commissioner rejected both of
  these arguments,(FN1) finding that claimant's medical problems until the 1992
  injury were recurrences of his original injury, while the 1992 injury was a
  new, distinct injury for which Eveready was responsible. Accordingly, the
  Commissioner ordered Eveready to pay temporary total disability benefits
  until claimant reached "medical end result with regard to the August 11,
  1992 new injury; i.e., until [claimant's] condition return[ed] to his
  pre-August 11, 1992 baseline," with a similar provision for psychological
  counseling, after which Fairdale would resume responsibility.

       Both employers appealed the Commissioner's order to Bennington
  Superior Court pursuant to 21 V.S.A. § 670.  To the first question
  certified by the Commissioner, "Did [claimant's] work at Eveready aggravate
  his preexisting condition or result in a new injury such that it relieved
  Fairdale Farms of responsibility for any workers' compensation liability as
  of March 23, 1990?" the jury answered, "No."  To the second certified
  question, "Was the event [claimant] experienced on August 11, 1992 while
  employed at Eveready a recurrence of the condition caused by his original
  work injury at Fairdale Farms such that Fairdale Farms is liable for any
  workers' compensation owed [claimant] because of that event?" the jury also
  answered,

 

  "No."  Based on these answers, the trial court entered judgment that
  claimant's work at Eveready did not aggravate his preexisting condition or
  result in a new injury that would relieve Fairdale of responsibility as of
  1990 and that the 1992 injury was not a recurrence of the original injury. 
  After the Commissioner concluded that the trial court's judgment was
  consistent with the original findings and conclusions, the original order
  was reissued in April 1996, with the added provision that Eveready and
  Fairdale would be responsible for reasonable and necessary medical expenses
  under the same conditions as temporary disability payments.  This appeal
  followed.

       We will affirm the Commissioner's order if her conclusions are
  rationally derived from the findings and based on a correct interpretation
  of the law.  See In re Southview Assocs., 153 Vt. 171, 178, 569 A.2d 501,
  504 (1989).  Fairdale first asserts that the Commissioner's order requiring
  it to resume workers' compensation liability once claimant recovers from
  the 1992 injury is contrary to the jury's finding that the 1992 injury was
  not a recurrence.  In effect, Fairdale appears to argue that because the
  jury found that the 1992 injury was not a recurrence of the original
  injury, it must have decided that the 1992 accident aggravated claimant's
  prior condition -- and that the Commissioner's order conflicts with such a
  finding.

       In workers' compensation cases involving successive injuries during
  different employments, the first employer remains liable for the full
  extent of benefits if the second injury is solely a "recurrence" of the
  first injury -- i.e., if the second accident did not causally contribute to
  the claimant's disability.  Mendoza v. Omaha Meat Processors,