Case Title: Wyoming Dept. of Transp. v. Haglund

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wyoming Dept. of Transp. v. Haglund1999 WY 80982 P.2d 699Case Number: 98-303Decided: 06/09/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant 
(Respondent),

v.

JULIE HAGLUND, Appellee 
(Petitioner).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Park County, H. Hunter Patrick, Judge.

Gay Woodhouse, 
Attorney General; Ron Arnold, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Clinton D. 
Beaver, Special Assistant Attorney General, Representing 
Appellant.

George L. 
Simonton and Marcia Peterson of Simonton and Simonton, Cody, Wyoming, 
Representing Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & HILL, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellee Julie 
Haglund sought review in the district court of the hearing officer's order which 
upheld the decision by Appellant Wyoming Department of Transportation (the 
department) to suspend her driver's license. The district court reversed and 
remanded the matter to the hearing officer, instructing him to order the 
department to return the driver's license to Haglund.

[¶2]      We affirm the 
district court's decision.

ISSUE

[¶3]      The department 
presents a single issue for our review:

Does WYO. STAT. 
§ 31-7-138(e)(i)(A) require the Department of Transportation to return 
Appellee's driver's license upon her acquittal on the DWUI charge, irrespective 
of a pending administrative suspension of the license?

FACTS

[¶4]      On February 19, 
1997, Haglund was involved in an automobile accident. When the patrolman arrived 
at the accident scene, he arrested Haglund and charged her with driving while 
under the influence of alcohol. Haglund submitted to a chemical test to 
determine the concentration of alcohol in her blood, and the test revealed that 
she had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.21 percent.

[¶5]      The department 
suspended Haglund's driver's license for ninety days. It did, however, issue a 
temporary driver's license to her. Haglund requested a hearing to challenge the 
suspension of her driver's license, and the department transferred the case to 
the Office of Administrative Hearings. A hearing officer held a contested case 
hearing on June 24, 1997. On August 15, 1997, the hearing officer upheld the 
suspension of Haglund's driver's license.

[¶6]      In the meantime, 
Haglund pleaded not guilty to the criminal charge. The county court held a bench 
trial on May 27, 1997. Haglund maintained that she was not intoxicated while she 
was driving her vehicle but that, after the accident occurred, she consumed a 
large quantity of alcohol during the time she was waiting for the patrolman to 
arrive. The county court judge ruled that the state did not prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Haglund was intoxicated while she was driving her vehicle, 
and he entered an order on July 18, 1997, acquitting Haglund of the charge of 
driving while under the influence of alcohol.

[¶7]      On August 22, 
1997, Haglund notified the department that she had been acquitted of the 
criminal charge and asked for her driver's license to be returned to her. The 
department responded, stating that dismissal of the criminal action did not 
entitle Haglund to have her driver's license returned to her and informing her 
that, if she felt the administrative suspension of her license "should be 
dismissed for the same reason the criminal action was dismissed," she could 
appeal from the hearing officer's order.

[¶8]      Haglund filed a 
petition for review with the district court. The district court held a hearing 
and determined that Haglund was entitled to have her driver's license returned 
to her pursuant to the relevant statutes. The department appealed to this 
Court.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c) (Michie 1997) governs judicial review of administrative decisions. 
W. R. A. P. 12.09(a); Everheart v. S & L Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 851 (Wyo. 
1998). The issues presented in this case require us to interpret various 
statutes. Statutory interpretation is a question of law. Newton v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 922 P.2d 863, 864 (Wyo. 1996); Trefren 
v. Lewis, 852 P.2d 323, 325 (Wyo. 1993). We affirm an agency's conclusions of 
law when they are in accordance with the law. Corman v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1996). When an agency 
has not invoked and properly applied the correct rule of law, we correct the 
agency's errors. Weaver v. Cost Cutters, 953 P.2d 851, 855 (Wyo. 1998); Gneiting 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 897 P.2d 1306, 1308 
(Wyo. 1995).

DISCUSSION

[¶10]   The department contends that the 
district court erred when it concluded that Haglund was entitled to have her 
driver's license returned to her. It argues that the district court 
misinterpreted the relevant statutes in reaching its conclusion. Haglund asserts 
that the district court's interpretation of the statutes and its ultimate 
decision that she was entitled to have her driver's license returned to her were 
correct. We agree with Haglund.

[¶11]   Our rules of statutory 
interpretation are well established. We decide initially whether the statute is 
clear or ambiguous. Lyles v. State ex rel. Division of Workers' Compensation, 
957 P.2d 843, 845 (Wyo. 1998). This Court makes that determination as a matter 
of law. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo. 1991); see also Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game 
and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Wyo. 1993). If we determine that a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the 
statute. Lyles, 957 P.2d  at 846; Gunderson v. State, 925 P.2d 1300, 1304 (Wyo. 
1996). In effectuating the plain language of the statute,

[w]e begin by 
making an "`inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words 
employed according to their arrangement and connection.'" Parker Land and Cattle 
Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) 
(quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We 
construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari 
materia.

State Department 
of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994). If, on 
the other hand, we determine that the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general 
principles of statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent. 
Parker Land and Cattle Company, 845 P.2d  at 1044.

[¶12]   The department suspended Haglund's 
driver's license pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 31-6-102(e) (Michie 1997). That 
provision states in relevant part:

(e) If a person 
submits to chemical testing and the test result indicates the person has an 
alcohol concentration of ten one-hundredths of one percent (0.10%) or more, the 
peace officer shall submit his signed statement to the department. Based upon 
the statement the department shall suspend the person's Wyoming driver's license 
or his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this state for ninety (90) days. 
If a criminal conviction results from the same incident on which a suspension 
under this subsection is based, the suspension under W.S. 31-7-128(b) or 
revocation under W.S. 31-7-127(a)(ii) shall be reduced by ninety (90) 
days.

Section 
31-6-102(e). After the department suspended Haglund's license, it issued a 
temporary license to her in accordance with the relevant provisions of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(f) (Michie 1997). That subsection states in pertinent 
part:

(f) In addition 
to the signed statement submitted under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, 
the peace officer shall issue the person a temporary license similar to but in 
lieu of the license authorized under W.S. 31-7-138. This temporary license shall 
be valid for thirty (30) days, shall not be renewed, shall contain a notice that 
the person has twenty (20) days from the date of issuance within which to 
request a hearing from the department and that failure to timely request a 
hearing will result in the suspension automatically commencing upon expiration 
of the temporary license or upon expiration of any existing suspension or 
revocation if the person's license or privilege is suspended or revoked at the 
time the temporary license is issued. W. S. 31-7-138(d) and (e) apply to a 
license under this section.

Section 
31-6-102(f) (emphasis added).

[¶13]   The county court acquitted Haglund 
of the criminal charge, and she asked the department to return her license to 
her pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-138(e) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1998). 
That provision states in pertinent part:

(e) Upon receipt 
of a record indicating the disposition of the arrest or citation which required 
surrender of the license:

(i) Each Wyoming 
license surrendered under this section or pursuant to W.S. 31-5-1205(k) shall 
be:

(A) Returned, if 
the licensee is not convicted and is otherwise entitled to receive the license . 
. . .

Section 
31-7-138(e)(i)(A). The department refused to return Haglund's license to her, 
stating:

Since an alcohol 
related offense in Wyoming involves both the administrative and the criminal 
actions, dismissal of only the criminal action would not qualify licensee to 
receive the license back. The ninety (90) day administrative suspension action 
upheld by the Hearing Examiner, disqualifies Ms. Haglund from receiving her 
license back. She will not be "entitled" to receive the license until she has 
served the mandatory suspension and met the Department's requirements for 
reinstatement.

[¶14]   Section 31-6-102(f) provides for 
the issuance of a temporary license after a driver's license has been suspended 
under § 31-6-102(e). It specifically refers to § 31-7-138(e). Section 
31-7-138(e) sets out two conditions which must be satisfied before a driver's 
license may be returned to the licensee: (1) The person must not be convicted of 
the criminal charge which led to the suspension of her license; and (2) she must 
be "otherwise entitled to receive the license." Section 
31-7-138(e)(i)(A).

[¶15]   Haglund was acquitted of the charge 
of driving while under the influence and, consequently, satisfied the first 
condition of § 31-7-138(e)(i)(A). The parties disagree, however, as to whether 
she was "otherwise entitled to receive the license." Section 31-7-138(e)(i)(A). 
The meaning of that statutory language is, therefore, the crux of this 
case.

[¶16]   The department maintains that the 
administrative suspension of Haglund's license under § 31-6-102(e) prohibited 
her from being "otherwise entitled" to receive her license. Haglund argues that 
the "otherwise entitled" language applies to situations where the driver is not 
entitled to have her license returned to her for "some reason other than its 
confiscation under W. S. § 31-6-102(e)."

[¶17]   We conclude that the "otherwise 
entitled" language of § 31-7-138(e)(i)(A) is clear and unambiguous when it is 
read together with the other relevant statutory provisions. The legislature 
specifically incorporated § 31-7-138(e) into § 31-6-102(f) and made the return 
of a license to a licensee under § 31-7-138(e) dependent upon the disposition of 
the criminal charge. By cross-referencing these statutory provisions, the 
legislature obviously intended that a driver is "otherwise entitled" to have her 
license returned to her once she has been acquitted of the criminal charge 
unless there is a reason, other than the suspension under § 31-6-102(e), to 
retain the license. See Nowack v. State, 774 P.2d 561, 568 n. 10 (Wyo. 1989). If 
we were to interpret the statutory language as the department suggests, § 
31-7-138(e)(i)(A) and the sentence in § 31-6-102(f) which refers to § 
31-7-138(e) would be rendered virtually meaningless because very few acquitted 
drivers would be entitled to have their licenses returned to them. We do not 
believe that such an interpretation would be consistent with the legislature's 
intent.

[¶18]   There are instances, under our 
interpretation of § 31-7-138(e)(i)(A), in which an acquitted driver would not be 
"otherwise entitled" to have her license returned to her. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-6-102(d) (Michie 1997) applies to persons who are arrested for driving while 
under the influence but refuse to submit to chemical testing. That statutory 
section does not state the penalty for refusing to submit to chemical testing. 
Instead, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-107 (Michie 1997) provides that the department 
will suspend a driver's license upon receipt of the officer's statement that he 
had probable cause to believe the person was driving while under the influence 
and the person refused to submit to chemical testing. Unlike § 31-6-102(f), § 
31-6-107 does not refer to § 31-7-138(e). Consequently, a driver who refused to 
submit to chemical testing and had her driver's license suspended under § 
31-6-107 would not be "otherwise entitled" to have her license returned to her 
even if she were acquitted of the criminal charge of driving while under the 
influence. This result is consistent with the legislature's intent that drivers 
who refuse to submit to chemical testing should suffer different consequences 
than drivers who do allow the testing suffer. Compare § 31-6-102(e) with § 
31-6-107; see generally Glasrud v. City of Laramie, 934 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (Wyo. 
1997). 

[¶19]   There are other situations in which 
an acquitted driver would not be "otherwise entitled" to have her license 
returned to her. A person who does not qualify to hold a Wyoming driver's 
license under the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-108 (Michie 1997)1 would not be entitled to have her 
license reinstated. Similarly, a person would not be "otherwise entitled" to 
have her driver's license returned to her if her license had previously been 
revoked or suspended under other statutory provisions; e. g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-7-127 (Michie 1997) (mandatory revocation of license for certain violations) 
or Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-234 (Michie Supp. 1998) (unlawful operation of vehicle 
by youthful driver with detectable alcohol concentration).

[¶20]   The department claims that its 
refusal to return Haglund's license to her was appropriate because an 
intoxicated driver may be subject to administrative sanctions, as well as to 
criminal penalties, for driving while she is intoxicated. This Court has 
declared that administrative suspensions are civil in nature and that an 
intoxicated driver may be subject to criminal punishment and to suspension of 
her driver's license. Glasrud, 934 P.2d at 1245-46; see also State Department of 
Revenue and Taxation v. Hull, 751 P.2d 351, 356 (Wyo. 1988). Nevertheless, in § 
31-7-138(e)(i)(A), the legislature specifically linked a person's right to have 
her driver's license reinstated to the disposition of her criminal prosecution. 
Accordingly, although the criminal and the administrative procedures are 
separate and distinct, the legislature directed in § 31-7-138(e)(i)(A) that the 
outcome of the criminal prosecution would affect the drivers' right to have her 
license returned to her. We refuse to disregard the legislature's clear 
directive.

[¶21]   The legislature has passed numerous 
laws in its bid to remove drunk drivers from our roadways. See Glasrud, 934 P.2d 
at 1245-46; Nowack, 774 P.2d  at 567. Our decision in this case does not hinder 
that effort. The county court acquitted Haglund of driving while under the 
influence of alcohol because it accepted her defense that she did not become 
intoxicated until after the accident had occurred. Haglund was not, therefore, a 
drunk driver, and there is no need to prohibit her from 
driving.

[¶22]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Section 
31-7-108 provides:

(a) 
No driver's license shall be issued to any person who is under the age of 
sixteen (16) years, except as provided in W.S. 31-7-110 and 
31-7-117(c).

(b) 
The division shall not issue or renew any driver's license to any 
person:

(i) 
Whose license or nonresident operating privilege is currently under suspension 
or revocation in this or any other state except as otherwise provided in this 
act;

(ii) Who is [a] habitual user of alcohol or any controlled substance to a 
degree rendering him incapable of safely driving a motor 
vehicle;

(iii) Who has previously been adjudged by a court of law to be mentally 
incompetent and who has not at the time of application been restored to 
competency by the methods provided by law;

(iv) Who has failed to successfully pass an examination required this 
act;

(v) 
When the division has good cause from the examination administered to the person 
under W.S. 31-7-114, 31-7-121 or 31-7-122 to believe that the person by reason 
of physical or mental disability would not be able to safely operate a motor 
vehicle upon the highways;

(vi) Who is in violation of the immigration laws of the United 
States[;]

(vii) Who is under nineteen (19) years of age and who has been convicted 
of any offense regarding the possession, delivery, manufacture or use of a 
controlled substance or alcohol within the preceding twelve (12) 
months.

(c) 
The division shall not issue a new license to a person who has had his Wyoming 
license revoked or restore a person's revoked nonresident operating privilege 
until the division determines after investigation of the character, habits and 
driving ability of the person that the person has met the requirements adopted 
by the division by rule and demonstrated his ability to drive a motor vehicle 
safely and it is appropriate to restore the person's privilege to drive a motor 
vehicle.

(d) 
Subject to W.S. 31-7-313, a commercial driver's license or commercial driver 
instruction permit shall not be issued to a person while the person is subject 
to a cancellation, revocation, suspension or disqualification from driving a 
commercial motor vehicle.