Case Title: White-Hughley v. State

Citation: 137 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 47

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2021-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
487 Nev, Advance Opinion 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

‘TYERRE LANELL WHITE-HUGHLEY, No. 80549
AIK/A TYERRE LANELL WHITE,

Appellant, FILED
vs.

THE STATE OF NEVADA, SEP 16 2021
Respondent. | eninge )

   

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea,
of home invasion Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; David M.
Jones, Judge.

Vacated and remanded.

Nobles & Yanez Law Firm and Dewayne Nobles, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
Attorney, and Alexander G. Chen, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark
County,

for Respondent.

 

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.
OPINION
By the Court, SILVER, J.

Appellant Tyerre White-Hughley was arrested and booked on
two separate warrants simultaneously. He subsequently pleaded guilty in
both cases. White-Hughley was sentenced in the first case on December 9,
2019, and in the second case on January 7, 2020, by different judges, with

2i-wree

 

 

 
each sentence imposed to run concurrently. ‘The first sentencing judge
applied credit for White-Hughley’s time served to the sentence in the first
case, but the second sentencing judge. voicing concerns about double-
dipping credit for time served, declined to likewise apply credit for time
served to the sentence in the second case.

In this opinion, we reiterate. consistent with NRS 176.055(1),
Poasa v. State, 135 Nev. 426, 453 P.3d 387 (2019), Johnson v. State, 120
Nev. 296, 89 P.3d 669 (2004), and Kuykendall v. State, 112 Nev. 1285, 926
P.2d 781 (1996), that a district court “must give a defendant credit for any
time the defendant has actually spent in presentence confinement absent
le for that

 

an express statutory provision making the defendant inel
credit.” Poasa, 185 Nev. at 426, 453 P.3d at 388, We clarify that where a
defendant simultaneously serves time in presentence confinement for
multiple cases and the resulting sentences are imposed concurrently, credit
for time served must be applied to each corresponding sentence. Because
wwe conclude that White-Hughley is entitled to have 70 days’ credit for time
served applied to his sentence in his second case, we vacate the judgment of
conviction and remand for the district court to enter a judgment of
conviction with the correct amount of presentence credit.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

White-Hughley had outstanding warrants for his arrest in two
felony cases: a child abuse, neglect, or endangerment and battery case (the
child abuse case); and « home invasion case. He was arrested and booked
on both warrants on October 1, 2019. White-Hughley entered into a

 

“packaged deal” plea agreement whereby he pleaded guilty in the child
abuse case on October 28, 2019, and pleaded guilty in the home invasion
case on November 7, 2019. The parties agreed that both sentences were to

run concurrently.

 

 

Aa, gee

 

 

 
on

On December 9, 2019, Judge Tierra Jones sentenced White-
Hughley to 12-36 months with 70 days’ credit for time served in the child
abuse case. On December 11, 2019, Judge Tierra Jones entered a judgment
of conviction in the child abuse case.

On January 7, 2020, Judge David Jones sentenced White-
Hughley to 12-30 months in the home invasion case. Judge David Jones
ordered the sentence in the home invasion case to run concurrently with the
sentence in the child abuse case. White-Hughley requested credit for time
served from the date of his arrest, arguing that because the cases were
concurrent, he was entitled to credit for time served on the home invasion
case as well as the child abuse case, The district attorney opposed, asserting
that credit for time served had already been applied in the child abuse case
and that numerous unpublished dispositions by this court prohibit applying
that credit toward more than one sentence. Judge David Jones agreed “we
don’t double dip” and declined to apply credit for time served in the home
invasion case, noting “that’s how I always rule.” On January 16, 2020,
Judge David Jones entered a judgment of conviction in the home invasion
case.

White-Hughley appealed, arguing that Judge David Jones
should have at least applied credit for time served from the time of his arrest
until the time he was sentenced on the first case—the child abuse case. The
court of appeals affirmed. We granted White-Hughley’s subsequent petition
for review under NRAP 40B, and we now issue this opinion addressing his
arguments.

DISCUSSION

‘The sole issue before us is whether NRS 176.055 required the

district court to give White-Hughley credit for time served in the home

invasion case. We review questions of statutory construction de novo.

 

 

 

 
Jackson v. State, 128 Nev. 598, 603, 291 P.8d 1274, 1277 (2012). While
legislative intent controls our interpretation, we will not look beyond a
statute’s plain language if the statute is clear on its face. State v. Lucero,
127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011).

As we held in Poasa v. State, a district court “must give a
defendant credit for any time the defendant has actually spent in
presentence confinement absent an express statutory provision making the
defendant ineligible for that credit.” 135 Nev. at 426, 453 P.3d at 388. At
issue here is the portion of NRS 176.055(1) that provides for the award of
presentence credit:

{WJhenever a sentence of imprisonment in the
county jail or state prison is imposed, the court may
order that credit be allowed against the duration of
the sentence ... for the amount of time which the
defendant has actually spent in confinement before
conviction, unless the defendant's confinement was
pursuant to a judgment of conviction for another
offense.

(Emphasis added.)

Nothing in this provision expressly makes a defendant
ineligible to have credit for presentence confinement applied to multiple
concurrent sentences where the defendant was in presentence confinement
for those cases simultaneously. Rather, NRS 176.055(1) only precludes this
credit if the presentence confinement was served “pursuant to a judgment

‘In Poasa, our unanimous court expressly rejected the argument,
which the dissent now raises, that NRS 176.055(1) is permissive. 135 Nev.
at 427-29, 453 P.3d at 389. We explained that NRS 176,055(1) uses “may,
which is permissive, but we held that NRS 176.055(1) mandates courts to
award credit for time served in presentence confinement based on the
statute's purpose and decades of well-settled Nevada law, the Legislature's
approval of that construction, and constitutional and fairness
considerations. Id.

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 
of conviction for another offense.” We consider this language in tandem
with NRS 176.335(3), which establishes that a term of imprisonment
imposed by a judgment of conviction begins on the date of the sentence. It
follows that when a defendant is simultaneously serving time before
sentencing in multiple cases, and the sentences are imposed on different
dates, the time served is not “pursuant to a judgment of conviction for
another offense” until a sentence is actually imposed—because serving a
term of imprisonment pursuant to a judgment of conviction begins at
sentencing.

‘This interpretation finds ample support ih our jurisprudence.
In construing the phrase “time which the defendant has actually spent in
confinement before conviction,” this court has recognized the statute's
purpose “is to ensure that all time served is credited towards a defendant's
ultimate sentence.” Pousa, 135 Nev. at 427-28, 453 P.3d at 389 (quoting
NRS 176.055(1) and Kuykendall, 112 Nev. at 1287, 926 P.2d at 783), We
have therefore previously held that NRS 176.055 requires district courts to
award credit for time served in presentence confinement despite the
discretionary ianguage used in the statute. Id. at 428, 453 P.3d at 389. This
construction “comports with notions of fundamental fairness, prevents
arbitrary application of the statute, and avoids constitutional concerns with
discrimination based on indigent status.” Jd. at 429, 453 P.3d at 389-90.

To be sure, before today, we have not had occasion to consider
thié statute's application where the defendant was confined simultaneously
pursuant to charges in more than one case before sentencing. Héwever, in
Johnson v. State, we determined that the defendant was entitled under NRS.
176.055(1) to-have credit for presentence confinement be applied to
concurrent sentences imposed for two counts in a single case. 120 Nev. at

 

 

 

 
299, 89 P.3d at 671. Relying on Kuykendall, we concluded that credit for
time served “may not be denied to a defendant by applying it to only one of
multiple concurrent sentences,” as this “would render such an award a
nullity or little more than a ‘paper’ credit.” Id.

We recognize that Johnson, Poasa, and Kuykendall differ
factually from this case. White-Hughley was arrested and confined on two
warrants, entered guilty pleas in separate cases, was sentenced to
concurrent sentences in each case, and now seeks application of his
presentence confinement credit to both concurrent sentences. In contrast,
Johnson dealt with the application of presentence confinement credit to
multiple counts within a single case, and Poasa and Kuykendall dealt with
presentence confinement credit in a single case. Nevertheless, the
takeaway from Poasa, Kuykendall, and Johnson is uniform and applicable
here: NRS 176,055(1) must: be construed in favor of application of
presentence credit for time served unless there is an express statutory
provision precluding application of such credit.

Here, the district court ordered White-Hughley's sentence on
the home invasion case to run concurrent to his earlier sentence on the child
abuse case but gave him no credit on the home invasion sentence for the
presentence time that he actually served. ‘The court reasoned that White-
Hughley had already been given credit for time served on his child abuse
case—a sentence White-Hughley began serving nearly a month before he
was sentenced on the home invasion case. But because White-Hughley was
sentenced to identical minimum sentences, and nearly identical maximum
sentences, crediting his time served solely to the earlier-imposed sentence
deprives him of the full effect of credit for time he has served prior to his
sentencing. Under these facts, the district court's denial of White-Hughley’s

 

 

 
on

credit neither comports with NRS 176.055(1)'s plain language nor furthers
the statute's purpose of ensuring that credit for time served is reflected in
the defendant's ultimate sentence. Cf. Kuykendall, 112 Nev. at 1287, 926
P.2d at 783 (explaining the statute's purpose).

Furthermore, White-Hughley's presentence confinement was
not “pursuant to a judgment of conviction for another offense” until he was
actually sentenced in the first case. White-Hughley was simultaneously
booked on two warrants and spent 70 days in presentence confinement
awaiting conviction on the home invasion case before being sentenced first
on the child abuse case. Although the remaining 29 days between the time
he was sentenced on the child abuse case and the time he was sentenced on
the home invasion case were days served “pursuant to a judgment of
conviction for another offense,” the initial 70 days were not.* Therefore,
because White-Hughley was in presentence confinement for multiple cases
at the same time and the resulting sentences were imposed concurrently,
he is entitled to receive the 70 days’ credit on both of his concurrent
sentences.

We have long recognized the obligation of the district court to
accurately determine the amount of presentence credits to be applied in a
particular case.’ Griffin, 122 Nev. at 745, 137 P.3d at 1170. In doing s0,

2White-Hughley initially argued that he was entitled to 99 days of
credit for time served but now concedes that under NRS 176.055 he is not,
entitled to credit for time served after December 9, 2019, when he was
sentenced in the child abuse case. See NRS 176.335(8) (recognizing that a
term of imprisonment begins on the date of sentencing).

90f course, the parties are similarly obligated to be prepared to
discuss the issue of credits at sentencing. Griffin v. State, 122 Nev. 737,
745, 187 P.3d 1165, 1170 (2006).

 

 

 

 
 

the court should first consider the time spent in actual confinement prior to
sentencing, and then consider whether any of that time was spent in
confinement pursuant to a judgment of conviction in another case and
subtract those days in order to calculate the amount of presentence credit
to which the defendant is entitled Where a defendant is confined
simultaneously on multiple cases before sentencing, and the district court
runs the sentence in the second case concurrently to that in the first case, a
defendant is entitled to credit for time served on each case up to the date of
sentencing in the first case.

This is not to say that NRS 176.055 provides a defendant with
tool to hamstring the district court's discretion in determining the length
of a term of incarceration so long as the sentence imposed is within the
applicable statutory sentencing range. Within these statutory parameters,
the district court can give a defendant more time in prison if, in its wide
discretion, the court finds that additional prison time is warranted. This
can be accomplished by adding more time to the defendant's minimum or
maximum sentence. Moreover, the decision regarding whether to impoze
consecutive or concurrent sentences is committed to the district court's
sound discretion. In either situation, the district court can accomplish the
same result—namely, a longer term of incarceration—without depriving a

due.

 

defendant of the appropriate credit

 

 

“There may be additional exclusions to applying credit, e
176.055(2), that are not applicable here but should be considered in
accurately determining the amount of credits.

 

 

 

ar
oo

CONCLUSION

NRS 176.055(1) requires courts to apply credit for time served

in presentence confinement to the defendant's sentence, “unless the
defendant's confinement was pursuant to a judgment of conviction for
another offense.” We conclude that where a defendant simultaneously
serves time in presentence confinement for multiple cases and the resulting
sentences are imposed concurrently, credit for time served must be applied
to each case. This ensures that the defendant actually receives credit for
time served in presentence confinement. Therefore, we vacate the judgment
of conviction and remand with instructions for the district court to enter a
judgment of convietion applying 70 days’ credit for time served to White-

Hughley’s sentence for felony home invasion.

 

 
HERNDON, J., dissenting:

I disagree with the majority's interpretation of NRS 176.055(1)
as applied to the facts of this case, and as I would affirm the district court's
judgment of conviction instead, I dissent.

 

‘The majority is venturing into the duties and responsibilities of
the Legislature and rewriting the statute under the guise of compliance
with caselaw. However, this court can apply the statute as written and still
respect stare decisis. While the majority quotes NRS 176.055(1), it
‘emphasizes the wrong portion of the statute. NRS 176.055(1) provides that
“whenever a sentence of imprisonment in the county jail or state prison is
imposed, the court may order that credit be allowed against the duration of
the sentence.” (Emphasis added.) “May,’ as it is used in legislative
enactments, is often construed as a permissive grant of authority.” Butler
v, State, 120 Nev. 879, 893, 102 P.3d 71, 81 (2004). And, as the majority
states, when the statute's plain language is clear on its face, we will not look
beyond that, State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011).
In fact, when construing a statute, this court must not read the statute “in
a way that would render words or phrases superfluous or make a provision

 

nugatory,” and “every word. phrase, and provision of a statute is presumed
to have meaning.” Butler, 120 Nev. at 892-93, 102 P.3d at 81. Thus, this
court must construe NRS 176.055(1) such that it does not render the
Legislature's use of the term “may” meaningless.

‘The majority cites to precedent as requiring the district court to
provide White-Hughley with the same credit for time served in two separate
judgments of conviction arising from two separate cases; however, the
majority fails to acknowledge a critical factor that each of the cited cases
1es those cases from this matter. All

 

has in common and which disting,

 

 

 

 

 
os

three of the cases cited by the majority concern the application of credit for
time served in a situation where the defendant is in pretrial custody on a
single case, not in multiple, separate cases. Further, those cases—Poasa v.
State, 135 Nev. 426, 426-27, 453 P.3d 387, 388 (2019), Johnson v. State, 120
Nev. 296, 297-98, 89 P.3d 669, 670 (2004), and Kuykendall v. State, 112 Nev,
1285, 1286, 926 P.2d 781, 782 (1996)—are concerned with ensuring a
defendant is not deprived of credit for time served, especially when the
defendant served time preconviction as a result of indigency. Poasa, 136
Nev. at 428, 453 P.3d at 389; Kuykendall, 112 Nev. at 1287, 926 P.2d at 783,
However, this concern is misplaced here, as White-Hughley, in a separate
child abuse case, already received credit for all of the pretrial detention time
he served.

In Kuykendall, the defendant was in pretrial custody on a single
case and pleaded guilty to one felony charge. 112 Nev. at 1286, 926 P.2d at
782. The district court declined to award him any credit for his pretrial
detention, and this court appropriately held that it was error for the district
court to refuse to grant him credit for time served in pretrial confinement.
Id. at: 1286-87, 926 P.2d at 782-83. In Johnson, the defendant was similarly
in pretrial custody on a single case and pleaded guilty to three felony
charges, 120 Nev. at 297, 89 P.3d at 669. The district court awarded him
credit for time served in pretrial detention but only applied it to one of the
three charges. Id. at 297, 89 P.3d at 669-70. This court held that the district
court erred by failing to apply his pretrial credit to all of the charges in the
ein which he was sentenced. Id. at 299, 89 P.3d at 671. Lastly, in Poasa,
the defendant had been in pretrial custody on a single case and was being
sentenced on one felony charge. 135 Nev. at 426-27, 453 P.3d at 388. The

 

district court declined to award her credit for her pretrial confinement when

 

 

 

 
it sentenced her to probation. Id. at 427, 453 P.3d at 388. Thereafter, this
court once again held that the district court erred in not awarding her the
credit earned in pretrial detention on her case. Id. at 429, 453 P.3d at 390.
Despite the permissive nature of NRS 176.055(1), the holdings in
Kuykendall, Johnson, and Poasa appropriately recognized that refusing to
award a defendant credit for time served while he or she is in pretrial

 

custody on a single case would fail to give meaning to pretrial confinement
and repudiate the punitive nature of such confinement. See Anglin v. State,
90 Nev. 287, 290, 525 P.2d 34, 36 (1974).

‘The same analysis does not apply when a defendant is in

 

pretrial custody on multiple cases. What is required there is only that the
defendant receives, in at least one case, full credit for the time spent in
pretrial detention. As the Supreme Court of Wyoming recognized in
Hagerman v. State, “{ijn cases where concurrent sentences have been
imposed in a single case, the defendant is entitled to have credit for time
served applied equally against both sentences, but this principle does not
apply where a defendant is serving concurrent sentences imposed in
separate cases.” 264 P.3d 18, 21 (Wyo. 2011). In Hagerman, the defendant
was charged with a second separate crime in a separate case while he was
in jail awaiting sentencing in the first case. Id. at 20. The Supreme Court
of Wyoming concluded that the defendant was not entitled to credit for time
served in the second case because he received that credit in the first case
and his presentence detention was related to the first case, not the second
case, Id. at 22. In fact, other jurisdictions have cautioned against awarding

double credit for time served when a defendant is in jail on two separate

 

cases, even when those states’ statutes require credit for time served,

compared to Nevada's discretionary statutory language. See, e.g., State v.

 

   

 
Barnes, 688 N.W.2d 594, 598-600 (Neb. 2004) (explaining that a defendant
can receive credit for time served only in one case); Gust v. State, 714
N.W.2d 826, 827-28 (N.D. 2006) (holding that granting credit for time
served in more than one case would constitute double credit).

‘Turning back to White-Hughiey, he received credit for all of his
pretrial confinement when he was sentenced in his separate child abuse
case. Thus, there was a recognition of, and application of credit for, the
pretrial confinement that he served. ‘The district court in the underlying
home invasion case was not required to provide him with identical credit
under Poasa, Johnson, or Kuykendali. ‘To give meaning to the word “may”
in NRS 176.055(1) and construe the statute in accordance with the
Legislature’s purpose as recognized in those cases, this court must conclude
that the district court is not mandated to award credit for time served when
the defendant already received credit for that time in another case, but
rather, the district court has discretion to do so. Such discretion is vital
because the district court should not be forced to crédit a defendant twice
for time served without being able. to engage in a case-by-case analysis
where the court evaluates the totality of facts and circumstances
surrounding an individual's sentencing. A district court has always béen
accorded wide discretion in imposing a sentence that fits the crime as well
as the individual defendant, see Martinez v. State, 114 Nev. 735, 737-38, 961
P.24 143, 145 (1998), and the Legislature included the word “may” in NRS
176.055(1) to ensure that discretion is not impinged.

 

Thus, deferring to the district court's discretionary decision
regarding credit for time served in a second, independent case complies with

 

stare decisis and gives meaning to every word in NRS 176.055(1). In

 

contrast, the majority decision today thwarts the district court's sentencing

 

  

 

 
discretion under NRS 176.055(1), improperly rewriting the statute and
overriding the Legislature's authority. Accordingly, because I would affirm

the district court's judgment of conviction, I dissent.