Case Title: Randy A. J. v. Norma I. J.

Citation: 2004 WI 41

Docket Number: 2002AP000469

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 41 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0469 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Randy A. J.,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Norma I. J.,  
          Respondent-Co-Appellant- 
          Petitioner, 
Brendan B.,  
          Intervening-Respondent- 
          Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 307 
Reported at:  259 Wis. 2d. 120, 655 N.W.2d 195 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 7, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 16, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Lee S. Dreyfus   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
respondent-co-appellant-petitioner 
there 
were 
briefs by Robert J. Welcenbach and Welcenbach & Widmann, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Robert J. Welcenbach 
 
For the intervening-respondent-appellant-petitioner there 
were briefs by Vicki Zick and Zick & Weber Law Offices, LLP, 
Johnson Creek, and oral argument by Jennifer L. Weber. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief by Matthew 
J. Price, Loeb & Herman, S.C., Milwaukee, Virginia M. Stuller, 
Carr, Kulkoski & Stuller, S.C., New Berlin, and oral argument by 
Matthew J. Price. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by D. Byron Goltz, Peter 
M. Koneazny, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Legal Aid Society of 
Milwaukee, Inc. 
 
 
 
 
2004 WI 41 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0469  
(L.C. No. 
99 FA 1120) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Randy A. J.,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Norma I. J.,  
 
          Respondent-Co-Appellant- 
          Petitioner, 
 
Brendan B.,  
 
          Intervening-Respondent- 
          Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 7, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals that affirmed the 
judgment of the Circuit Court for Waukesha County, Lee S. 
Dreyfus, Jr., Judge, confirming Randy A.J. as the father of 
Selena J.   
¶2 
Norma I.J. and Brendan B. contend that the previous 
court 
decisions 
were 
erroneous 
because 
Brendan 
has 
a 
constitutionally protected interest in asserting his paternity 
No. 
02-0469   
 
2 
 
of Selena based on genetic tests that show a probability of 
99.99% that he is her biological father.  They assert the 
circuit court erred in applying the best interest of the child 
test under Wis. Stat. § 767.463 (1999-2000)1 to override his 
interest as the putative father and the court of appeals erred 
in using the equitable parent doctrine to affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court.  We conclude that any interest Brendan has in 
asserting his paternity is not a constitutionally protected 
interest because he has failed to establish a substantial 
relationship with Selena.  We also conclude that § 767.463 
cannot be employed once genetic tests have been completed and 
that the equitable parent doctrine should not be used in 
paternity determinations.  However, because we also conclude 
that Norma and Brendan are equitably estopped from asserting the 
genetic test results as proof to rebut the marital child 
presumption found in Wis. Stat. § 891.41, that presumption 
remains intact.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment insofar as 
it concludes that Selena is Randy's child and he is her father.  
We also affirm the dismissal of Norma and Brendan's claims in 
regard to Selena's paternity.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Randy A.J. and Norma I.J. were married on May 11, 
1990.  On January 24, 1998, Norma gave birth to a daughter, 
Selena J.  Randy paid all of Selena's birthing expenses and is 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
02-0469   
 
3 
 
listed as Selena's father on her birth certificate.  However, 
during 
the 
conceptive 
period, 
Norma 
was 
involved 
in 
an 
adulterous relationship with Brendan B., of which Randy had no 
knowledge.   
¶4 
Both before and after Selena's birth, Norma saw 
Brendan several weekends a month when she traveled to Chicago, 
Illinois, for what she told Randy were modeling jobs for Saks 
Fifth Avenue.  After Selena's birth, Randy continued to pay all 
of her expenses and to provide a home for her and Norma in 
Wisconsin.  Notwithstanding Norma's reliance on Randy, she did 
have discussions with Brendan during the pregnancy and after 
Selena's birth that Brendan might be Selena's biological father.   
¶5 
In 1999, Norma was convicted of embezzlement, and on 
May 10, 1999, she was sentenced to eight years in prison.  It 
was only then that she told Randy that he might not be Selena's 
biological father.  Until that time, Randy had no thought that 
he had not fathered Selena. 
¶6 
On August 25, 1999, Brendan filed a paternity action 
in Illinois, seeking to have an Illinois court declare him to be 
Selena's father.  Randy, who was living in Wisconsin with 
Selena, was served with a copy of that action. 
¶7 
On September 23, 1999, Randy filed for divorce in 
Wisconsin, wherein he requested sole legal custody and physical 
placement of Selena.  On October 14, 1999, a temporary custody 
hearing was held, and although Brendan had been provided with 
notice, he did not appear.  At that hearing, the court 
commissioner ordered Brendan to have no contact with Selena and 
No. 
02-0469   
 
4 
 
granted temporary sole custody to Randy.  On December 6, 1999, 
Norma counterclaimed, asserting that Selena was not Randy's 
child and requesting genetic testing.  Randy opposed genetic 
tests.  He claimed that he is presumed to be Selena's father and 
that it is not in her best interest to have a genetic 
determination of paternity.   
¶8 
On September 22, 2000, for reasons that are not 
reflected in the record before us, Randy stipulated to an order 
for genetic tests of Selena, Norma and Brendan, conditioned upon 
"reserving his right to contest final adjudication of the legal 
father."  On September 26, 2000, the circuit court ordered tests 
that established a probability of 99.99% that Brendan is 
Selena's biological father.2 
¶9 
On March 5, 2001, again upon a stipulation of the 
parties, Brendan was permitted to intervene in the divorce 
action.  He asserted that he had tried to have his paternity 
determined in Illinois, but that the action was dismissed on 
March 20, 2000, for lack of personal jurisdiction.  He asked to 
have Selena declared his child.  
¶10 The issue of paternity was tried to the court.  It 
concluded that:  (1) Norma was equitably estopped from raising 
                                                 
2 While the genetic tests show a high probability that 
Brendan is Selena's father, they do not conclusively prove that 
Randy is not her father, as he was never tested.  Paternity 
tests are able only to conclusively exclude a man as a potential 
father of a child.  All other paternity test results must be 
stated in various degrees of probability of parenthood.  State 
v. Michael J.W., 210 Wis. 2d 132, 138 n.3, 565 N.W.2d 179 (Ct. 
App. 1997); see also, Wis. Stat. §§ 891.41 and 767.48(1m). 
No. 
02-0469   
 
5 
 
Selena's paternity; (2) Brendan was not equitably estopped; (3) 
Brendan failed to rebut the marital presumption of Wis. Stat. 
§ 891.41; (4) Wis. Stat. § 767.463 applies to this case; and (5) 
it is in the best interest of Selena to adjudicate Randy as her 
legal father.  Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed Brendan 
from the divorce action and dismissed Norma's counterclaim 
insofar as it related to paternity.   
¶11 On appeal, the court upheld the circuit court's 
decision adjudicating Randy as Selena's father, but it did so on 
different grounds.  First, it agreed that Norma was equitably 
estopped from asserting Brendan's paternity.  Second, it 
concluded that neither Wis. Stat. § 767.458(1m) nor Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.463 was applicable because the genetic tests had already 
been completed and those statutes may be employed only when 
genetic tests have not been done.  Third, it concluded that the 
genetic 
tests 
had 
enabled 
Brendan 
to 
rebut 
the 
marital 
presumption set out in Wis. Stat. § 891.41.  However, the court 
also concluded that rebutting the marital presumption merely 
entitled Brendan to a rebuttal presumption of paternity pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 767.48(1m) that the equitable parent doctrine 
overcame under the facts of this case.  Fourth, it concluded 
that it was in Selena's best interest to adjudicate Randy as her 
father, and it affirmed the circuit court's judgment.  Brendan 
and Norma petitioned this court for review, which we granted. 
No. 
02-0469   
 
6 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶12 This case presents questions of constitutional and 
statutory interpretation.  When we review the constitutional 
protections that Brendan claims apply to his putative parental 
status, we do so as a question of law.  See W.W.W. v. M.C.S., 
161 
Wis. 2d 
1015, 
1026, 
468 
N.W.2d 
719 
(1991). 
 
The 
interpretation of statutes and their applications to uncontested 
facts are questions of law that we review independent of the 
court of appeals.  See VanCleve v. City of Marinette, 2003 WI 2, 
¶17, 258 Wis. 2d 80, 655 N.W.2d 113.  And finally, where the 
material facts are uncontested, we review whether equitable 
estoppel lies de novo.  Milas v. Labor Ass'n of Wisconsin, Inc., 
214 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 571 N.W.2d 656 (1997). 
B. 
The Parties' Positions 
 
¶13 Norma does not dispute the court of appeals conclusion 
that 
she 
is 
equitably 
estopped 
from 
asserting 
Brendan's 
paternity.  Instead, she focuses on its use of the equitable 
parent doctrine, as does Brendan, arguing that it was erroneous 
because the genetic tests overcame the marital presumption of 
Wis. Stat. § 891.41.  Both she and Brendan also argue that the 
equitable parent doctrine should not be used to overturn what 
they assert are parental rights of a constitutional dimension. 
¶14 On the other hand, Randy and Selena argue that 
portions of both the circuit court and the court of appeals 
decisions were correct.  They contend that Brendan has no 
constitutionally protected interest at issue.  They also contend 
No. 
02-0469   
 
7 
 
that the circuit court was correct in concluding that even when 
genetic tests have been completed, Wis. Stat. § 767.463 may be 
used to dismiss a paternity action, if the circuit court 
determines that to do so is in the child's best interest.  And 
finally, they contend that the court of appeals was correct in 
its use of estoppel3 and the equitable parent doctrine.   
C. 
Constitutional Underpinnings of Parental Rights 
¶15 Brendan has asserted that the genetic test results, 
when combined with his visits with Selena until she was fifteen 
months old, give him a substantive due process liberty interest 
in his putative status as Selena's father.  The circuit court 
found that Brendan did not support Selena emotionally or 
financially; that occasionally buying formula and diapers was 
insufficient to show his assumption of parental responsibility, 
as was his failure to assert parental rights either at her birth 
or at the court hearing in October of 1999 when all of this 
could have been addressed.  Based on these findings, the circuit 
court 
concluded 
Brendan 
did 
not 
have 
a 
constitutionally 
protected interest in his putative paternity.  Accordingly, we 
                                                 
3 Brendan asks us to ignore this argument because Randy and 
Selena did not argue equitable estoppel to the court of appeals.  
However, whether we review an issue is a matter of judicial 
administration.  Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 444, 287 N.W.2d 
140 (1980).  Here, the estoppel issue presents as a question of 
law and was briefed by the parties.  Additionally, Randy's 
consent to the blood tests was conditioned upon his continuing 
"to contest his parent [sic], custodial and placement rights 
under applicable case law and statutes, including, but not 
limited to all aspects of equitable estoppel, and Wis. Stats. 
767.485, and 767.24." Accordingly, we do consider equitable 
estoppel. 
No. 
02-0469   
 
8 
 
begin with a review of the jurisprudence bearing on the 
protections that may be afforded Brendan's putative parental 
rights. 
¶16 A parent has a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in the "companionship, care, custody, and management of 
his or her children."  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 
(1972).  However, parental status that rises to the level of a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest does not rest solely 
on biological factors, but rather, is dependant upon an actual 
relationship 
with 
the 
child 
where 
the 
parent 
assumes 
responsibility for the child's emotional and financial needs.  
See W.W.W., 161 Wis. 2d at 1031-32.  As the Supreme Court has 
explained, the "paramount interest" is in the welfare of 
children so that the "rights of the parents are a counterpart of 
the responsibilities they have assumed."  Lehr v. Robertson, 463 
U.S. 248, 257 (1983).  As Justice Stewart observed in Caban v. 
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979): "Parental rights do not spring 
full-blown from the biological connection between parent and 
child.  They require relationships more enduring."  Id. at 397 
(J. Stewart, dissenting).4 
¶17 In W.W.W., in addition to the requisite parental 
relationship, we also examined the principles of Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), as they relate to the status of 
                                                 
4 Even though this quote is from the dissent in Caban v. 
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), it is a principle we have 
adopted.  See W.W.W. v. M.C.S., 161 Wis. 2d 1015, 1031-32 
(1991). 
No. 
02-0469   
 
9 
 
a child born during a lawful marriage when a man who is not the 
husband of the mother claims paternity.  W.W.W., 161 Wis. 2d at 
1029-30.  Michael H.'s plurality explained that an important 
factor in assessing the strength of the putative father's claim 
to parental rights was whether his relationship to the child was 
historically protected.  Michael H. 491 U.S. at 123.5  In 
recognition of the separate interest of the child that was at 
issue, Michael H. explained that a child's position in a lawful 
marriage warranted protection because it rests upon "the 
historic respect——indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a 
term——traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop 
within the unitary family."  Id.  Additionally, the presumption 
of legitimacy is a fundamental principle of common law that 
courts are reluctant to overturn.  Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124.  
In this case, as Brendan seeks to establish rights for himself, 
his efforts could change Selena's status as a marital child 
thereby undermining that principle.6   
                                                 
5 As the Supreme Court plurality explained,  
Thus, the legal issue in the present case reduces 
to whether the relationship between persons in the 
situation of Michael and Victoria has been treated as 
a protected family unit under the historic practices 
of our society . . . .  [However], quite to the 
contrary, our traditions have protected the marital 
family . . . against 
the 
sort 
of 
claim 
Michael 
asserts. 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989). 
6 As the Supreme Court plurality explained: 
No. 
02-0469   
 
10 
 
¶18 While we did not adopt the plurality's position in 
regard to the necessity of showing that the relationship between 
the child and the putative father is one that has had historic 
protection, we examined it carefully.  W.W.W., 161 Wis. 2d at 
1027-29.  We chose not to decide whether that second factor must 
be 
fulfilled 
because 
W.W.W. 
did 
not 
have 
a 
significant 
relationship with the children, C.A.S. and C.D.S., making it 
unnecessary to reach all of the principles of Michael H.'s 
plurality opinion.7  W.W.W., 161 Wis. 2d at 1031 n.14.  However, 
we did conclude that W.W.W.'s relationship to C.A.S. and C.D.S. 
was not historically protected.  Id. at 1029-30.  Furthermore, 
when determining the level of relationship that is necessary 
before a putative father may assert parental rights of a 
constitutional dimension, we returned to the direction given by 
                                                                                                                                                             
The primary policy rationale underlying the common 
law's 
severe 
restrictions 
on 
rebuttal 
of 
the 
presumption [of legitimacy] appears to have been an 
aversion to declaring children illegitimate  . . . .  
A secondary policy concern was the interest in 
promoting the "peace and tranquility of States and 
families," . . . a goal that is obviously impaired by 
facilitating suits against [a] husband . . . asserting 
that [his] children are illegitimate. 
Id. at 125.   
7 As we explain below, our decision here is driven by 
Brendan’s lack of a substantial relationship with Selena. 
No. 
02-0469   
 
11 
 
the Supreme Court in Stanley8 and Caban,9 where the Supreme 
Court's decisions were driven by the actual responsibility for 
the child the father had assumed.  W.W.W., 161 Wis. 2d at 1031 
n.14. 
¶19 Therefore, in order for Brendan to have the necessary 
foundation for a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
his putative paternity, he would have to have taken affirmative 
steps to assume his parental responsibilities for Selena.  In 
regard to his relationship with Selena, the circuit court found 
that Brendan had no substantial relationship with Selena, who is 
six years old and has lived with Randy as her father all her 
life.  Brendan is not listed as her father on her birth 
certificate; he was not present at her birth;10 he did not pay 
for her birthing expenses; he took no legal steps to assert his 
                                                 
8 In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), one of the 
earlier Supreme Court cases dealing with whether an unmarried 
biological 
father 
has 
parental 
rights 
that 
rise 
to 
a 
constitutionally protected level, the court held for Stanley, 
who lived with his children and their mother, because "nothing 
in this record indicates that Stanley is or has been a 
neglectful father who has not cared for his children."  Id. at 
655. 
9 In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), where the 
Supreme Court again concluded that the equal protection clause 
was violated by sex-based distinctions relating to unwed mothers 
and unwed fathers, the relationship of Caban to his children was 
critical.  Caban's two children were born while he lived with 
their mother; he was identified as their father on their birth 
certificates and he contributed to their support.  After Caban 
separated from the children's mother, he continued to see them 
on a regular basis.  Id. at 382-83. 
10 He did give Norma a ride to the hospital when she went 
into premature labor while visiting him. 
No. 
02-0469   
 
12 
 
paternity until she was fifteen months old when he filed a 
paternity action in Illinois.  When that action was dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction, he chose not to proceed in this 
Wisconsin court action until it had been ongoing for more than 
two years. And finally, he did not provide for Selena's 
emotional and financial support, either before or after the 
genetic tests were performed.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
record fully supports the circuit court's finding. 
¶20 In many ways, Brendan's position is similar to the man 
who was admitted to be the natural father in Lehr.  There, the 
significance of the biological connection was not sufficient to 
accord a constitutional dimension to Lehr's claim of parenthood 
because Lehr had not assumed parental responsibility for the 
child and he was attempting to obtain an opportunity for 
parentage that conflicted with a similar opportunity for the 
husband of the child's mother.  Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.  
Additionally, as the Supreme Court further explained in Michael 
H., a limit is imposed when the mother "is, at the time of the 
child's conception and birth, married to, and cohabitating with, 
another man, both of whom wish to raise the child as the 
offspring of their union."  Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129.  Here, 
Randy and Norma lived together as husband and wife when Selena 
was born.  Randy has provided for Selena since her birth, 
emotionally and financially.  He has made a home for her and 
provided her with the status of a marital child for six years, 
while Brendan has been uninvolved in providing for her daily 
needs. 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Brendan 
has 
not 
No. 
02-0469   
 
13 
 
demonstrated a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
his putative paternity because he has failed to establish a 
substantial relationship with Selena. 
D. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.46311 
 
¶21 The circuit court concluded that Wis. Stat. § 767.463 
could be employed to dismiss a proceeding involving a child's 
paternity, even after genetic tests had been performed, if to do 
so was in the child's best interest.  The court of appeals 
disagreed, concluding that the statute did not apply once blood 
tests were completed.  We agree with the court of appeals. 
 
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.463 states: 
Except as provided in s. 767.458(1m), at any time in 
an action to establish the paternity of a child, upon 
the motion of a party or guardian ad litem, the court 
or court commissioner under s. 757.69(3)(g) may, with 
respect to a man, refuse to order genetic tests, if 
genetic tests have not yet been taken, and dismiss the 
action if the court or court commissioner determines 
that a judicial determination of whether the man is 
the father of the child is not in the best interest of 
the child. 
When we construe a statute, we attempt to ascertain the intent 
of the legislature.  State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 209 
                                                 
11 All parties concede that Wis. Stat. § 767.458(1m) cannot 
be employed here because the genetic tests were completed before 
the circuit court decided whether it was in Selena's best 
interest to proceed to determine paternity contrary to the 
marital presumption.  We agree with this assessment of the 
statute's applicability.  However, we note that when the 
paternity of a child born during a lawful marriage is contested 
by a man who is not the husband of the mother, and the husband 
of the mother is willing to affirm his status as father of the 
child, this statute provides safeguards for the child that 
normally should not be relinquished voluntarily. 
No. 
02-0469   
 
14 
 
Wis. 2d 112, 121, 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997); Ball v. District No. 4, 
Area Bd. of Vocational, Technical & Adult Educ., 117 Wis. 2d 
529, 537-38, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984).  We begin with the language 
the legislature chose to use.  Angela M.W., 209 Wis. 2d at 121.  
We give that language its plain and ordinary meaning.  Bruno v. 
Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 
656.  If the language is clear on its face, we need go no 
further and we simply apply it.  Id.  We also construe a statute 
so that no part of it is surplusage, giving effect to all the 
words that are used.  Donaldson v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 
286 N.W.2d 817 (1980). 
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.463 permits a circuit court to 
dismiss a paternity action to protect the best interest of a 
child.  It provides that a court may refuse to order genetic 
tests of "a man."  "A man" is a very general designation that 
could include the husband of the child's mother or a man to whom 
she was never married.  Therefore, we conclude it may be 
employed when the paternity of a marital or a nonmarital child 
is at issue.  Additionally, the statute provides that it may be 
employed "at any time," while Wis. Stat. § 767.458(1m) appears 
to apply at the first court appearance.  Both of these 
provisions support Selena and Randy's interpretation.  However, 
the balance of the statute does not.   
¶24 For example, Wis. Stat. § 767.463 appears to state the 
obvious when it provides that a court may refuse to order 
requested genetic tests "if genetic tests have not yet been 
taken."  However, we note that the phrase, "if genetic tests 
No. 
02-0469   
 
15 
 
have not yet been taken," is set out in the conjunctive with the 
clause, "dismiss the action," such that grammatically they 
cannot be read as describing independent tasks that have no 
necessary link.  Stated another way, if each statutory directive 
could stand alone, there would be no need for the phrase, "if 
genetic tests have not been taken," as the concept of precluding 
genetic tests is adequately addressed in the clause empowering a 
court to refuse to order them.  Instead, § 767.463 appears to be 
patterned on Wis. Stat. § 767.458(1m) that applies only to 
marital children and permits the dismissal of an action only 
before the completion of genetic tests. 
¶25 Furthermore, it makes sense that the legislature would 
choose to require a best interest hearing before genetic tests 
are completed, as it permits the child to be the focus of the 
hearing, without concern about the putative father's rights.  
That is, the legal issue of the child's best interest may be 
clouded by facts that could form part of a constitutional claim 
of paternity when a best interest hearing is held after genetic 
tests are completed.  Use of the best interest hearing in Wis. 
Stat. § 767.463 prior to genetic testing can avoid that type of 
problem, a result the plain meaning of the statute supports.  
And finally, conducting a best interest of the child hearing 
first could render the taking of blood tests unnecessary.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals correctly 
interpreted § 767.463.  A dismissal of a paternity proceeding 
based on that statute may not be ordered after genetic tests 
have been completed. 
No. 
02-0469   
 
16 
 
E. 
The Equitable Doctrines 
 
1. 
Equitable estoppel 
 
¶26 Randy and Selena argue that Norma and Brendan are 
equitably estopped from asserting that Randy is not Selena's 
father.  Equitable estoppel requires proof of three elements:  
(1) an action or an inaction that induces; (2) reliance by 
another; and (3) to his or her detriment.  Harms v. Harms, 174 
Wis. 2d 780, 785, 498 N.W.2d 229 (1993).  Equitable estoppel has 
been applied in family law contexts.  Id. (concluding that 
equitable estoppel could be applied in a contempt proceeding to 
show why child support was not in arrears); J.J. v. R.J., 162 
Wis. 2d 420, 429, 469 N.W.2d 877 (Ct. App. 1991) (applying 
equitable estoppel to a mother's action to have the court 
declare that her husband is not the father of a child born 
during their marriage); L.H. v. D.H., 142 Wis. 2d 606, 614-15, 
419 N.W.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that equitable 
estoppel may be available as a defense to a mother's institution 
of paternity proceedings).  Equitable estoppel has also been 
used to prevent raising a statutory defense in other types of 
actions.  See Fritsch v. St. Croix Cent. Sch. Dist., 183 Wis. 2d 
336, 345-46, 515 N.W.2d 328 (Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that a 
school district was equitably estopped from raising a teacher's 
failure to comply with the notice of claim requirements of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) because of the conduct of the school 
district's agents).  
¶27 Here, two statutes address a presumption of paternity 
grounded in the results of genetic tests:  Wis. Stat. § 891.41 
No. 
02-0469   
 
17 
 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 767.48(1m). 
 
Section 
891.41, 
which 
also 
contains a presumption of paternity based on marriage, states in 
relevant part: 
(1) A man is presumed to be the natural father 
of a child if any of the following applies: 
(a) He and the child's natural mother are or 
have been married to each other and the child is 
conceived or born after marriage and before the 
granting of a decree of legal separation, annulment or 
divorce between the parties. 
. . . . 
(2) In 
a 
legal 
action 
or 
proceeding, 
a 
presumption under sub. (1) is rebutted by results of a 
genetic test . . . that show that a man other than the 
man presumed to be the father under sub. (1) is not 
excluded as the father of the child and that the 
statistical probability of the man's parentage is 
99.0% or higher . . . . 
And § 767.48(1m) states: 
If genetic tests ordered under this section or s. 
49.225 show that the alleged father is not excluded 
and that the statistical probability of the alleged 
father's parentage is 99.0% or higher, the alleged 
father shall be rebuttably presumed to be the child's 
parent. 
¶28 Although we have not employed equitable estoppel to 
preclude rebutting the statutory presumption set out in Wis. 
Stat. § 891.41 or in Wis. Stat. § 767.48(1m), we have applied it 
in the past to prevent a party from raising a statutory defense 
to paternity.  For example, in State ex rel. Susedik v. Knutson, 
52 Wis. 2d 593, 191 N.W.2d 23 (1971), we utilized equitable 
estoppel to prevent Knutson from raising the five-year statute 
of limitations then set out in Wis. Stat. § 893.195 (1969-70), 
No. 
02-0469   
 
18 
 
for determinations of paternity.  We explained that the issue 
was whether Knutson's acts were so "unfair and misleading as to 
outbalance the public's interest in setting a limitation on 
bringing [paternity] actions."  Id. at 598.  In concluding that 
they were, we used our equitable powers to prevent unfairness to 
the child and the mother that would have occurred because of 
their reliance on Knutson's actions that caused them to delay in 
bringing a paternity action.12   
¶29 In the case before us, the issue is whether the 
actions and inactions of Norma and Brendan were so unfair as to 
preclude them from overcoming the public's interest in the 
marital presumption of Wis. Stat. § 891.41(1) based on the 
results of the genetic tests that Brendan took.    
¶30 Randy and Selena assert they have proved all three 
elements by uncontradicted evidence, as to both Norma and 
Brendan.  They argue that Norma and Brendan's deceit and lack of 
action to assert Brendan's putative paternity, which was ongoing 
all through Norma's pregnancy and until Selena was fifteen 
                                                 
12 Many other Wisconsin decisions have applied equitable 
estoppel to prevent the effect that a statute of limitations 
would have absent estoppel's use.  See, e.g., Hester v. 
Williams, 
117 
Wis. 2d 
634, 
645, 
345 
N.W.2d 
426 
(1984); 
Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund of the City of Milwaukee v. 
City of Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 144, ¶18, 246 Wis. 2d 196, 630 
N.W.2d 236.  And Fritsch v. St. Croix Central School District, 
183 Wis. 2d 336, 344, 515 N.W.2d 328 (Ct. App. 1994), applied it 
to prevent use of the notice of claim statute to bar a personal 
injury claim.  Courts in other jurisdictions have applied it to 
a putative father seeking to assert his paternity based on 
genetic tests.  See, e.g., Richard "W" v. Roberta "Y", 658 
N.Y.S.2d 506 (1997).  
No. 
02-0469   
 
19 
 
months old, caused them to believe Randy is Selena's father and 
to develop deep emotional ties with each other.  They assert 
that breaking those ties would be very harmful to Selena, as 
Randy is the only father she has ever known.13  Additionally, 
Brendan and Norma stood silent when Randy paid all of Selena's 
birthing expenses and met all her financial needs both before 
and after the genetic tests were performed.  Furthermore, Randy 
has been fully committed to acting as Selena's father.  He has 
organized his life around providing for her care for six years 
and has provided for her needs, emotionally and financially.  
And finally, as Randy's daughter, Selena has the status of a 
marital child.   
¶31 In contrast, Norma and Brendan have asserted nothing 
to counter the findings of the circuit court or Selena and 
Randy's arguments, except for the presumption under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.48(1m) that Brendan is Selena's biological father based on 
genetic tests.  However, in addition to the reliance that Selena 
and Randy have shown on the actions and inactions of Norma and 
Brendan and the unfairness that Norma and Brendan are seeking to 
repeat here, the circuit court determined that it is in Selena's 
best interest to adjudicate Randy as Selena's father.  We deem 
the circuit court's determination very significant, and we note 
that 
neither 
Norma 
nor 
Brendan 
contests 
its 
accuracy.  
                                                 
13 During an interview arranged by a psychologist, where 
Brendan attempted to interact with Selena, she began to cry and 
asked for her "daddy."  When Randy was brought into the room, 
she continued to cry and repeatedly told Randy she wanted "to go 
home."  
No. 
02-0469   
 
20 
 
Furthermore, Wisconsin favors preserving the status of marital 
children, even when it can be positively shown that the husband 
of the mother could not have been the father of the child.14  
Therefore, we conclude that Norma and Brendan's actions and lack 
of action, which were relied on by both Selena and Randy, are so 
unfair, that when combined with the state's interest in 
preserving Selena's status as a marital child, they outbalance 
the public's interest in a purely biological approach to 
parenthood.  Accordingly, we conclude that Norma and Brendan are 
equitably estopped from rebutting the marital presumption of 
Wis. Stat. § 891.41 in regard to Randy's paternity of Selena.15   
                                                 
14 See Wis. Stat. §§ 767.47(9) and 891.40 (unqualifiedly 
according the status of "natural father" to the husband of the 
mother when children are conceived by artificial insemination).   
15 We permit Selena to assert an estoppel defense to the 
availability of genetic test results to rebut the presumption of 
Wis. Stat. § 891.41, as well as Wis. Stat. § 767.48(1m), which 
the court of appeals used.  We do so because applying estoppel 
to § 891.41(1) maintains Selena's status as a marital child.  We 
note that in his brief Randy follows the lead of the court of 
appeals and presumes that genetic tests that show a 99.99% 
probability 
of 
paternity 
must 
always 
rebut 
the 
marital 
presumption of § 891.41(1).  However, the arguments of counsel, 
while very helpful to us, do not restrict our analysis of the 
legal issues presented on appeal.  See Waushara County v. Graf, 
166 Wis. 2d 442, 453, 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992).   
No. 
02-0469   
 
21 
 
2. 
Equitable parent doctrine 
¶32 Randy and Selena also request us to affirm the 
equitable parent doctrine utilized by the court of appeals.  The 
equitable parent doctrine is generally described as originating 
in Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516 (Mich. App. 1987), where 
it was employed when equitable estoppel could not be used to 
prevent the court from ordering a husband to submit to blood 
tests.  Id. at 518-19.  An "equitable parent" is described as 
one who through judicial determination is able to exercise all 
the rights and responsibilities of a natural parent.  Id. at 
520.  To support the application of the equitable parent 
doctrine, Atkinson required only a person:  (1) who wants to be 
recognized as the child's parent; (2) who is willing to support 
the child; (3) who wants the rights of custody or visitation in 
regard to the child; and (4) who raises "certain circumstances," 
that were otherwise undefined by Atkinson.  Id. at 519. 
¶33 We do not employ the equitable parent doctrine because 
its parameters are too indistinct, permitting its use to create 
uncertainties in the law.  We also do not approve its use 
because equitable estoppel is a well-established legal principal 
with definite elements that will address those instances where 
unfairness in a proceeding would harm children and adults, 
absent the intervention of the court's equitable powers.  See, 
David M. Cotter, Putting Family Ties First [and] Science Second, 
25 Fam. Advoc. 22 (Fall 2002).  And finally, to the extent the 
equitable parent doctrine has been employed in the past, we 
No. 
02-0469   
 
22 
 
preclude its application in the future.  See J.J., 162 Wis. 2d 
at 430. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶34 We conclude that any interest Brendan has in asserting 
his paternity is not a constitutionally protected interest 
because he has failed to establish a substantial relationship 
with Selena.  We also conclude that Wis. Stat. § 767.463 cannot 
be employed once genetic tests have been completed and that the 
equitable parent doctrine should not be used in paternity 
determinations.  However, because we also conclude that Norma 
and Brendan are equitably estopped from asserting the genetic 
test results as proof to rebut the marital child presumption 
found in Wis. Stat. § 891.41, that presumption remains intact.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment insofar as it concludes that 
Selena is Randy's child and he is her father.  We also affirm 
the dismissal of Norma and Brendan's claims in regard to 
Selena's paternity.  
By the Court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  02-0469.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶35 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority opinion's conclusion that the court of appeals' 
decision, which upheld Selena as the legitimate child of Randy, 
should be affirmed.  However, I write separately because I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority's 
conclusion 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 767.463 may not be applied after genetic tests have 
been performed.  Instead, I would apply § 767.463, and consider 
the best interest of the child, in order to resolve the present 
case.  While I do not disagree with the majority's use of 
equitable estoppel to arrive at its conclusion, I am satisfied 
that applying § 767.463 and considering the best interest of 
Selena is preferable to the majority's approach. 
¶36 The 
majority 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 767.463 is patterned after Wis. Stat. § 767.458 
(1m), which applies only to marital children and states that a 
paternity action may not be dismissed once genetic tests have 
been performed.  See majority op., ¶24.  The majority further 
contends that, in enacting § 767.463, the legislature intended 
that a best interest hearing be conducted before genetic tests 
have been performed, so as to avoid potential constitutional 
implications that may arise after testing.  Id.  In addition, 
the majority notes that the need for genetic tests may be 
obviated if a best interest determination is made first.  Id. 
¶37 I would interpret Wis. Stat. § 767.463 as permitting 
the dismissal of a paternity action when in the best interest of 
No.  02-0469.npc 
 
2 
 
the child, even after genetic tests have been performed.16  The 
clause "if genetic tests have not yet been taken" solely 
modifies the language preceding it.  Because no such modifier is 
included regarding the dismissal of a paternity action, it 
appears that a court has discretion to dismiss a case, 
regardless of whether genetic tests have already been performed.  
Given the positioning of the modifying clause in the sentence, I 
would allow a court to dismiss the action even if genetic tests 
have already been performed.  To interpret this language any 
other way would render the "best interest of the child" 
provision, under the circumstances here, superfluous.  This 
court has previously stated that each word in a statute must be 
given effect, so as not to render any part of the statute 
superfluous.  Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 86, ¶16, 
245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893. 
¶38 Moreover, if Wis. Stat. § 767.463 is interpreted to 
permit dismissal of a paternity action only if genetic tests 
have not yet been performed, then § 767.463 would essentially 
serve the same function as Wis. Stat. § 767.458(1m).  The 
inclusion of the modifying clause with respect to the first half 
                                                 
16 In 
relevant 
part, 
Wis. Stat. § 767.463 
states 
the 
following: 
(T)he 
court 
or 
circuit 
or 
supplemental 
court 
commissioner under s. 757.675(2)(g) may, with respect 
to a man, refuse to order genetic tests, if genetic 
tests have not yet been taken, and dismiss the action 
if 
the 
court 
or 
circuit 
or 
supplemental 
court 
commissioner determines that a judicial determination 
of whether the man is the father of the child is not 
in the best interest of the child. 
No.  02-0469.npc 
 
3 
 
of the sentence demonstrates the legislature's intent to achieve 
an outcome different from that provided for in § 767.458(1m).   
¶39 I agree with the circuit court's conclusion that 
Wis. Stat. § 767.463 has a different application than does 
Wis. Stat. § 767.458(1m).  The circuit court aptly noted that 
the language of § 767.463 does not limit its application to the 
beginning of an action or prior to genetic testing.  Section 
767.463 simply grants courts discretion in that they may refuse 
to order genetic tests if they have not, thus far, been 
performed. 
¶40 To read Wis. Stat. § 767.463 as allowing for dismissal 
only if genetic tests have not been performed is to remove 
effectively any best interest of the child considerations from 
the process.  This cannot have been the legislature's intent.  
The best interest of the child is a significant consideration 
throughout Wisconsin's family law, including paternity matters.  
See In re Paternity of R.W.L., 116 Wis. 2d 150, 158, 341 
N.W.2d 682 (1984) ("(T)he primary interest in the paternity 
action is that of the child.").  In In re Paternity of C.A.S., 
161 Wis. 2d 1015, 1036, 468 N.W.2d 719 (1991), we further noted 
that considering the best interest of the child "reflect(s) a 
strong public policy of this state."  The majority opinion's 
conclusion that § 767.463 must be read so as to preclude a best 
interest determination, after genetic tests have been performed, 
goes against Wisconsin's emphasis on the best interest of the 
child, and appears to be contrary to the intent of the 
legislature.    
No.  02-0469.npc 
 
4 
 
¶41 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.  
 
No.  02-0469.npc 
 
 
 
1