Case Title: Commonwealth v. Terrell

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12915, SJC-12916

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12915 
SJC-12916 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JORDEN TERRELL 
(and a companion case1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 9, 2020. - January 19, 2021. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.2 
 
 
Youthful Offender Act.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence.  
Department of Youth Services.  Constitutional Law, 
Sentence, Equal protection of laws.  Due Process of Law, 
Sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Civil actions commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on December 23, 2019. 
 
 
The cases were reported by Gaziano, J. 
 
 
 
Katherine W. Briggs for Department of Youth Services. 
 
Melissa Allen Celli for Gabriel Lopez. 
 
Eva G. Jellison for Jorden Terrell. 
 
Meredith Shih & Audrey Murillo, for Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Commonwealth vs. Gabriel Lopez. 
 
 
2 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
BUDD, J.  A Juvenile Court judge committed the defendants, 
both youthful offenders, to the custody of the Department of 
Youth Services (DYS or department) until the age of twenty-one.  
The judge additionally ordered DYS to "credit" the time that the 
two defendants spent detained in DYS custody prior to being 
adjudicated against their postadjudication confinement.  The 
department sought relief from the orders pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, and a single justice reserved and reported the 
cases to the full court.  For the reasons that follow, we vacate 
those portions of the orders requiring DYS to credit the 
youthful offenders' preadjudication detention.3 
 
Background.  As a result of events occurring in November 
2017, Gabriel Lopez was indicted as a youthful offender for 
carrying a firearm without a license in violation of G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (a).4  A separate incident involving Jorden Terrell 
                                                          
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
4 General Laws c. 119, § 52, defines a youthful offender as 
"a person who is subject to an adult or juvenile sentence 
for having committed, while between the ages of fourteen 
and [eighteen], an offense against a law of the 
commonwealth which, if he were an adult, would be 
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, and (a) has 
previously been committed to the department of youth 
services, or (b) has committed an offense which involves 
the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm in 
violation of law, or (c) has committed a violation of 
[G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), (c), or (d), or G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10E] . . . ." 
3 
 
led to his indictment as a youthful offender on a violation of 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), as well as other charges.  After being 
found dangerous pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A, both defendants 
were held without bail in DYS custody in hardware-secure (i.e., 
locked) residential facilities. 
 
Each defendant admitted to sufficient facts, and each was 
committed to DYS custody until the age of twenty-one as a 
youthful offender pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 58, third par.  
The judge further ordered DYS to credit the time each spent 
detained in DYS custody prior to being adjudicated.5  
 
After its motions to reconsider had been denied, the 
department filed petitions in the county court pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, seeking to vacate the orders requiring 
preadjudication credit.  The single justice reserved and 
reported the cases to this court. 
 
Discussion.  The defendants maintain that the judge had 
statutory authority to order the department to reduce the length 
of their confinement by the number of days that they had been in 
custody prior to disposition, and that, at any rate, they were 
entitled to such credit on constitutional grounds.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 453 Mass. 158, 161 (2009) (judges 
authorized to oversee constitutionality of actions by executive 
                                                          
 
 
5 Lopez had been detained for 239 days and Terrell for 197 
days. 
4 
 
branch).  The defendants also argue that the failure to award 
preadjudication credit is fundamentally unfair. 
 
The department argues that the language of the relevant 
statutes makes plain that a judge's authority is limited to the 
adjudication and sentencing of a youthful offender.  If the 
judge orders the juvenile committed to DYS custody, it is the 
department, not the judge, that decides whether the juvenile is 
to be placed in confinement and, if so, for how long.6  The 
department further contends that declining to award credit for 
time spent detained prior to adjudication is not a 
constitutional violation, nor is it fundamentally unfair.  We 
agree with the department. 
                                                          
 
 
6 When juveniles have been adjudicated and committed to the 
custody of the Department of Youth Services (DYS or department), 
DYS may exercise its custody in a variety of ways, ranging from 
granting committed juveniles conditional liberty to placing them 
in confinement.  G. L. c. 120, § 6.  The department defines 
conditional liberty (also referred to as conditional or 
supervised release) as "[t]he placement of a youth in any 
community-based setting (including [a juvenile's] home), 
contingent upon the youth's agreement to abide by certain 
predetermined rules."  109 Code Mass. Regs. § 8.03 (2016).  At 
the other end of the spectrum, the department may place 
committed juveniles fourteen years of age or older in 
residential facilities that are either "hardware-secure" or 
"staff-secure."  See 109 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.02 (2016); 109 
Code Mass. Regs. § 4.06(4) (2017). 
 
 
Treatment settings may change over the course of a 
juvenile's commitment depending on his or her needs.  See, e.g., 
109 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.06(3). 
5 
 
 
1.  Statutory analysis.  The defendants argue that, 
although there is no specific statute that provides for the 
awarding of credit to youthful offenders for time served in 
confinement prior to adjudication, G. L. c. 218, § 59, vests 
Juvenile Court judges with the ability to order such credit.  
The provision states: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, the divisions of the 
juvenile court department shall have and exercise, within 
their respective jurisdictions, the same powers, duties, 
and procedure as the divisions of the district court 
department; and all laws relating to district courts or 
municipal courts in their respective counties or officials 
thereof or proceedings therein, shall, so far as 
applicable, apply to said divisions of the juvenile court 
department. 
 
"The divisions of the juvenile court department shall also 
have jurisdiction in equity concurrent with the supreme 
judicial court and with the superior court department in 
all cases and matters arising under the provisions of 
[G. L. cc.] 119 and 210." 
 
G. L. c. 218, § 59.  The defendants argue that because G. L. 
c. 279, § 33A,7 requires judges to award pretrial credit to 
criminal defendants, judges in the Juvenile Court have the power 
to do so as well.  We are not convinced. 
                                                          
 
 
7 General Laws c. 279, § 33A, provides: 
 
"The court on imposing a sentence of commitment to a 
correctional institution of the commonwealth, a house of 
correction, or a jail, shall order that the prisoner be 
deemed to have served a portion of said sentence, such 
portion to be the number of days spent by the prisoner in 
confinement prior to such sentence awaiting and during 
trial." 
6 
 
 
To understand why, it is instructive to review certain 
statutes governing the juvenile justice system.  General Laws 
c. 119, § 53, states that the statutory provisions governing the 
adjudication of children "shall be liberally construed so that 
the care, custody and discipline of the children brought before 
the court shall approximate as nearly as possible that which 
they should receive from their parents, and that, as far as 
practicable, they shall be treated, not as criminals, but as 
children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance."  We 
repeatedly have emphasized this long-standing principle.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 476 Mass. 497, 510–511 (2017); 
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, 630, cert. denied, 568 
U.S. 946 (2012); Commonwealth v. Connor C., 432 Mass. 635, 646 
(2000); Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 384 Mass. 784, 
786 (1981); Police Comm'r of Boston v. Municipal Court of the 
Dorchester Dist., 374 Mass. 640, 666-668 (1978).  See generally 
R.L. Ireland, Juvenile Law § 1.3, at 18 (2d ed. 2006).  This is 
true even for youthful offenders, who are considered to be more 
dangerous than delinquent juveniles.  See Connor C., supra at 
641-642. 
 
One of the ways the Legislature has endeavored to 
accomplish this goal is by clearly establishing the roles to be 
played by a judge and the department.  It is for a judge to 
adjudicate and sentence juvenile offenders.  G. L. c. 119, § 58.  
7 
 
In the case of youthful offenders, judges have the discretion to 
choose one of three dispositions:  (1) an adult sentence as 
provided by law; (2) a combination sentence consisting of 
commitment to DYS until the age of twenty-one together with a 
suspended adult sentence; or (3) commitment to DYS until the age 
of twenty-one.8  G. L. c. 119, § 58, third par. 
 
In choosing the appropriate sentence, the judge is to 
consider the nature of the offense or offenses, the attendant 
circumstances, and a number of other factors to "determine the 
sentence by which the present and long-term public safety would 
be best protected."  G. L. c. 119, § 58, fourth par.  Here, the 
judge committed both defendants to DYS custody for an 
indeterminate period of time until they reach twenty-one years 
of age.  See G. L. c. 119, § 58, third par. 
 
After adjudication, if a judge places a juvenile in DYS 
custody, it is for the department to determine the proper course 
of treatment.  See G. L. c. 18A, § 2; G. L. c. 120, § 4.  See 
also Samuel S., 476 Mass. at 504 ("once a judge commits a 
youthful offender . . . to DYS, the actual terms of that 
commitment, as a general matter, are wholly within the 
discretion of DYS, an executive agency").  General Laws c. 120, 
                                                          
 
 
8 In contrast, the harshest consequence that a juvenile 
adjudicated delinquent may receive is commitment to DYS until 
twenty years of age.  G. L. c. 119, § 58, second par. 
 
8 
 
§ 6, provides the department with wide discretion with regard to 
placement and treatment options, which may or may not involve 
confinement.9 
 
The defendants argue that the judge's orders for DYS to 
credit their preadjudication detention does not interfere with 
the department's ability to treat.  However, placement, 
including placement in confinement, and treatment cannot be 
separated; the Legislature conferred both duties to DYS.  G. L. 
c. 120, §§ 4-6.  If a judge had the power to credit a youthful 
offender for the time he or she spent in preadjudication 
detention, it would interfere with the department's statutory 
                                                          
 
 
9 General Laws c. 120, § 6, provides in pertinent part: 
 
"When a person has been committed to [DYS], it may after an 
objective consideration of all available information -- 
 
"(a) Permit him his liberty under supervision and upon such 
conditions as it believes conducive to law–abiding conduct; 
or -- 
 
"(b) Order his confinement under such conditions as it 
believes best designed for the protection of the public; 
or -- 
 
"(c) Order reconfinement or renewed release as often as 
conditions indicate to be desirable; or -- 
 
"(d) Revoke or modify any order, except an order of final 
discharge, as often as conditions indicate to be desirable; 
or -- 
 
"(e) Discharge him from control with notice to the court, 
except as provided in [G. L. c. 120, § 12], when it is 
satisfied that such discharge is consistent with the 
protection of the public." 
9 
 
authority to place, and therefore to treat, the juvenile as it 
saw fit.  The department is tasked with determining whether the 
treatment prescribed is successful, which necessarily includes a 
determination of the point at which any such confinement should 
end.  See id.; 109 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.06(3) (2017). 
 
Returning to G. L. c. 218, § 59, importantly, the statute 
vests Juvenile Court judges with the same powers as District 
Court judges "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law."  The 
Legislature has been unequivocal that children in the juvenile 
justice system should be treated "not as criminals, but as 
children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance."  G. L. 
c. 119, § 53.  Further, the Legislature carefully has 
circumscribed a judge's responsibilities as they pertain to 
juvenile adjudications.  G. L. c. 119, § 58, second and third 
pars.  For these reasons, G. L. c. 218, § 59, does not authorize 
a Juvenile Court judge to order preadjudication detention credit 
for youthful offenders pursuant to G. L. c. 279, § 33A, which 
applies to criminal defendants.  Just as a judge has no power to 
determine whether a juvenile is to be confined once he or she is 
committed to DYS custody, a judge similarly has no power to 
determine the length of any such confinement by ordering credit 
for preadjudication confinement.  See Samuel S., 476 Mass. at 
504 ("We have located no part of the law . . . giving a judge 
the power to order DYS to place the juvenile in . . . a secure 
10 
 
facility as opposed to placing him or her on supervised release, 
or vice versa").10 
 
2.  Constitutional analysis.  The defendants argue that the 
judge properly ordered credit for the time spent detained prior 
to adjudication because a denial of such credit violates their 
constitutional rights to substantive due process and equal 
protection.  See Commonwealth v. Weston W., 455 Mass. 24, 30 & 
n.9 (2009); Dutil, petitioner, 437 Mass. 9, 13 (2002); Boston v. 
Keene Corp., 406 Mass. 301, 308 n.8 (1989). 
 
Taking the latter claim first, the defendants assert they 
are treated differently from two similarly situated groups -- 
incarcerated adults who received credit for pretrial detention, 
and juveniles committed to DYS who were not subject to 
preadjudication detention.  We are not convinced.  The 
defendants were committed to DYS; they were not incarcerated.  
Nor are the defendants similarly situated to juveniles who were 
not detained prior to adjudication.  Both Terrell and Lopez were 
held prior to adjudication on dangerousness grounds, a finding 
that sets them apart from juveniles not so found.  "The 
dissimilar treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not 
                                                          
 
 
10 The defendants contend that, to the extent that the 
relevant statutes are ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies.  
However, as discussed supra, the statutory scheme is clear with 
regard to a judge's authority to order credit for confinement 
prior to adjudication -- in short, it does not exist. 
11 
 
violate equal protection" (quotation and citation omitted).  
DuPont v. Commissioner of Correction, 448 Mass. 389, 400 (2007). 
 
The defendants also argue that the failure to receive 
credit for time spent in confinement prior to adjudication 
violates their right to substantive due process.  They contend 
that the denial of such credit significantly burdens their 
fundamental right to be free from physical restraint, and thus 
requires a strict scrutiny analysis.  This argument misses the 
mark because it is not the right to be free from physical 
restraint that is at issue.  The defendants do not argue the 
constitutionality of G. L. c. 276, § 58A, the dangerousness 
statute, pursuant to which they were held prior to adjudication, 
nor do they contest the judge's findings of dangerousness.  
Instead, it is the denial of credit for preadjudication 
detention to which the defendants object on constitutional 
grounds. 
 
We never have held that credit for pretrial detention is a 
fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny analysis.  Chalifoux 
v. Commissioner of Correction, 375 Mass. 424, 427-428 (1978) 
(where no statute controls, "our decisions in this area [of 
credit and adult sentencing] have not rested on constitutional 
requirements" but on considerations of fairness).  We therefore 
review the claim under the rational basis test.  See Goodridge 
v. Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 330 (2003). 
12 
 
 
A "rational basis analysis requires that statutes bear[] a 
real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or some other phase of the general welfare" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Id.  For the reasons explained supra, 
there is a rational basis for the juvenile justice statutory 
scheme generally, and a rational basis for not providing credit 
for preadjudication confinement.  The defendants' constitutional 
claims therefore fail. 
 
3.  Fundamental fairness.  Finally, the defendants allege 
that the way in which DYS exercises its discretion with regard 
to placement decisions for juveniles in its custody routinely 
violates its statutory mandate and principles of fundamental 
fairness.  The department is required by statute to make 
individualized determinations regarding placement and treatment 
of committed youthful offenders "after an objective 
consideration of all available information."  G. L. c. 120, § 6.  
See G. L. c. 18A, § 2; G. L. c. 120, §§ 4-5.11  However, the 
defendants assert that the department's policies and practices 
have resulted in the de facto imposition of mandatory minimum 
periods of confinement.  More specifically, the defendants 
                                                          
 
 
11 We note, however, that the Legislature has made an 
exception for juveniles adjudicated delinquent on complaints for 
certain firearm offenses.  DYS must place those juveniles in 
confinement for prescribed periods.  G. L. c. 119, § 58, seventh 
& eighth pars. 
13 
 
allege that the department makes confinement decisions based 
entirely on the offense committed, without a meaningful 
consideration of other relevant factors.12 
 
The defendants contend that, because the length of 
confinement does not reflect treatment needs, DYS confinement is 
essentially punishment.  Thus, they argue that they are entitled 
to credit for their preadjudication detention, just as 
prisoners, and that denial of such credit fundamentally is 
unfair.  See, e.g., Matter of the Personal Restraint of 
Trambitas, 96 Wash. 2d 329, 332-333 (1981). 
 
The defendants' allegations are concerning; however, the 
question whether DYS properly is assessing and providing 
treatment and rehabilitative services to those committed to its 
care is not directly before us.  These cases came to the full 
court following the department's challenge of the Juvenile Court 
judge's orders.  Given the procedural posture and the record 
provided, we assume without deciding that the department is 
meeting its statutory obligations.  We therefore cannot conclude 
that, as a matter of fairness, the defendants are entitled to 
                                                          
 
 
12 In making placement decisions, the department uses a 
"Classification Grid," which recommends periods of confinement 
based on a juvenile's most serious commitment offense.  109 Code 
Mass. Regs. §§ 4.03, 4.06(1) (2017).  The defendants contend 
that rather than the department using the grid as one of a 
number of factors, in practice the grid is the sole determinant 
of a juvenile's length of confinement. 
14 
 
preadjudication detention credit like prisoners.  By statute and 
regulation, as far as practicable, DYS is required to treat 
youthful offenders like juveniles, not prisoners.13  See, e.g., 
G. L. c. 18A, § 2; G. L. c. 120, §§ 4-6; 109 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 4.01 (2017).  If DYS is failing to discharge its 
rehabilitative duty, that matter must be put squarely before the 
court. 
 
Conclusion.  The cases are remanded to the Juvenile Court 
for entry of orders consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
13 It is true that DYS commitment and possible confinement 
"necessarily include[] an element of punishment."  Lazlo L. v. 
Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 325, 330 (2019).  And the department 
must concern itself with not only rehabilitation but also public 
safety.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 120, § 6 (b).  Nonetheless, the 
juvenile justice system "is primarily rehabilitative, cognizant 
of the inherent differences between juvenile and adult 
offenders, and geared toward the correction and redemption to 
society of delinquent children" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 461 (2012).