Case Title: Capelety v. Estes

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2023 ME 50

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2023-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2023 ME 50 
Docket: 
Oxf-22-138 
Submitted 
On Briefs: October 19, 2022 
Decided: 
August 15, 2023 
 
Panel: 
STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.* 
 
 
NICHOLAS J. CAPELETY 
 
v. 
 
KYLA R. ESTES 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  Nicholas J. Capelety appeals from a judgment entered by the District 
Court (South Paris, Ham-Thompson, J.), in which the court allocated parental 
rights regarding the parties’ child and granted primary residence to Kyla R. 
Estes and defined rights of contact to Capelety.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1901 (2023); 
19-A M.R.S. § 104(2023); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(2).  Capelety contends on appeal 
that the court improperly restricted his ability to present his case by 
(1) imposing a time limit on his trial presentation that resulted in his being 
unable to cross-examine the guardian ad litem (GAL), (2) excluding certain of 
 
*  Although Justice Douglas was not available at the first conference at which the Court considered 
the case on the briefs, he was a sitting Justice qualified to act during the development of this opinion 
and participated in subsequent conferencing and the development of this opinion.  See M.R. 
App. P. 12(a). 
 
 
2 
his proposed exhibits, (3) permitting certain testimony from the GAL, and 
(4) denying his request to present a closing argument.  He also challenges 
portions of the court’s judgment as unsupported by the evidence.  We conclude 
that any error was harmless and affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  Capelety and Estes have a child who was born in 2015.  Capelety 
filed a complaint for determination of parentage, parental rights and 
responsibilities, and child support in the District Court on September 9, 2020.  
On Capelety’s motion, a Family Law Magistrate (Spooner, M.) appointed a GAL.  
The GAL provided recommendations to the parties in January 2021 and 
submitted a final report in July 2021.  On May 28, 2021, the same Family Law 
Magistrate issued a pretrial order indicating that the final hearing of the case 
would take one day.1  Neither party objected to the pretrial order.  The court 
(Rumford, Ham-Thompson, J.) held the final hearing on November 16, 2021.  
The hearing occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, and therefore, some of 
the parties and witnesses appeared by video or phone.   
 
1  The pretrial order scheduled the final hearing for one day and indicated that Capelety had “+5” 
witnesses, Estes had “+4” witnesses, and the GAL had “+1” witness.  The pretrial order listed the 
following issues for hearing: (1) parental rights and responsibilities, (2) uninsured medical expenses, 
(3) primary residence, (4) tax benefits, (5) medical insurance, (6) rights of contact, 
(7) actual/imputed income, (8) child support, and (9) attorney fees. 
 
 
3 
[¶3]  Although the final hearing was scheduled to begin at 8:30 a.m., it did 
not start until 9:26 a.m. because the parties, with the trial court’s approval, 
chose to engage in a last-minute settlement discussion that proved 
unproductive.   
[¶4]  At the beginning of the evidentiary portion of the hearing, the court 
explained, “The time will be equally divided between the parties, with the Court 
reserving one hour for the [GAL].  So that’s time equally divided for direct and 
cross, so use your time wisely.”  Neither party lodged an objection or asked how 
many hours and minutes they would be allotted.   
 
[¶5]  Capelety presented four witnesses who were acquaintances or 
friends.  Estes, who was representing herself, and the GAL were given the 
opportunity to cross-examine the first four witnesses; Estes cross-examined 
three of the witnesses, and the GAL cross-examined one witness.   
[¶6]  After Capelety had presented the testimony of his third witness, 
Estes asked the court, “How much time with the witnesses do they get, and then 
do I get . . . ?”  The court responded, “[I]t’s evenly divided between the two of 
you—I’m keeping track of the time right now.  And when we resume at 1:00, I’ll 
break it down and let you know how much time everyone has.  But clearly, at 
this time, [Capelety] is using the bulk of the time.”   
 
 
4 
[¶7]  The trial court then heard testimony from Capelety, whose 
testimony ended just before the noon break.  At this point in the proceedings, 
the trial court indicated to Capelety that he had used up all his time and would 
not be able to cross-examine Estes or the GAL.  During Capelety’s direct 
testimony, the court broke in to note for his attorney, 
And then just so you’re aware, . . . for the first four witnesses, you 
used 46 minutes.  You’re now an hour seven minutes into 
Mr. Capelety.  And so you’re closely running out of time.  I’m not 
sure how long the lunch break is going to be, but you’re almost out 
of all of your time, if I include [Estes’s] time and [the GAL’s] time. 
 
Capelety’s attorney responded, “Thank you, Your Honor.”  After more of 
Capelety’s direct testimony, the court stated, “We need to wrap this up.  You 
have used all of your time.”  Capelety’s attorney finished her remaining 
questions and made no objection.   
[¶8]  The court then explained that the proceeding would break for lunch 
and reiterated that Capelety had used all his time and would not have time for 
additional direct or cross-examination unless extra time remained after Estes 
and the GAL completed their presentations.  Capelety’s attorney asked, “to 
clarify, do you mean that there’s no time for cross-examination?”  The court 
explained, 
That’s correct.  You’ve used all of your time.  So your abilities to 
cross-examine Ms. Estes, call any additional witnesses, or 
 
 
5 
cross-examine any of her witnesses is over.  It’s a . . . one-day trial.  
And theoretically, both sides get approximately three hours by the 
time everything starts and finishes.  We took time to have 
settlement discussions.  And then you factor in the recess, you 
factor in the other cross-examination.  Ms. Estes used six minutes.  
[The GAL] used four.  You’ve had the bulk of the time here.  And 
Ms. Estes has an opportunity to cross-examine your client, call her 
own witnesses to testify, and so does [the GAL].  So time is equally 
divided.  So at this time, you have run out of time, depending on 
how the rest of the day goes. 
 
Capelety’s attorney thanked the court and made no objection.  Following the 
noon time break, Capelety was cross-examined by Estes and the GAL.   
 
[¶9]  Next, Estes testified and was cross-examined by the GAL only.  
During her testimony, Estes testified, in part, that Capelety was “combative” 
and “aggressive” and that he had perpetrated “emotional, physical, financial, 
[and] sexual abuse” against her.  After Estes finished testifying and made clear 
that she did not plan to present any witnesses other than herself, the court 
again addressed the timing of the proceedings.  The court explained that Estes 
had thirty-nine minutes left and stated, “[T]hat also breaks into [the GAL’s] 
time, so I’m going to give [the GAL] as much time as she needs, and then 
Ms. Estes, I will give you the opportunity to cross-examine [the GAL] if you 
want.  Then I may have questions for [the GAL].  And after all that, [Capelety’s 
attorney], if there is any time available before 4, I will give you an opportunity 
to cross-examine.”  Capelety did not object. 
 
 
6 
[¶10]  At the beginning of the GAL’s testimony, the GAL moved to admit 
her final report in evidence.  Capelety objected “to the extent that some of the 
[GAL]’s recommendations” were based on the report or communications with 
Estes’s proposed expert witness, whose testimony and report the court had 
excluded before trial.  Capelety also objected to the admission of the report on 
the ground that he would not be able to cross-examine the GAL.  The GAL 
explained that the proposed expert had been identified as someone Estes 
wanted the GAL to speak with as part of her investigation.  The GAL noted that 
she had received and reviewed the proposed expert’s report—an analysis of 
the parties’ text messages to one another—after completing her own report, 
and that it had not affected her recommendations.  Over Capelety’s objection, 
the trial court admitted in evidence the GAL’s report, as well as several 
printouts of text messages between the parties.   
[¶11]  With the court’s permission, the GAL initially testified in narrative 
fashion and thereafter responded to questions from the trial court.  In total, the 
GAL testified for nearly forty minutes.  She testified, in part, about her 
observations of an unhealthy dynamic of power and control between the 
parties.  She stated that Estes had “gone into detail about . . . the dynamics of 
physical, sexual, and emotional violence that was perpetrated on her during 
 
 
7 
their relationship.”  The GAL also indicated that her investigation had not led 
her to believe that Capelety or the child were victims of domestic violence and 
that Capelety’s testimony to that effect during the hearing was the first time she 
had heard that allegation.  She explained that she believed that Capelety’s 
testimony demonstrated that he had not “made much progress” despite his 
completion of a four-hour domestic violence course and that perpetrators of 
domestic violence “typically . . . deflect onto their victims when they are at . . . a 
very early stage in—in not addressing—or taking accountability for their 
actions.”  After Estes began cross-examining the GAL, Capelety raised an 
objection to the GAL’s testimony about domestic violence on the ground that 
there was “nothing in . . . evidence . . . to support . . . these broad-stroke 
allegations” and that Estes did not testify regarding any domestic violence.  The 
court overruled the objection as untimely because Capelety did not object when 
the court asked the GAL questions about domestic violence between the parties.   
[¶12]  The court then indicated that it was concluding the hearing 
because it was 4:00 p.m.  Capelety’s attorney “put an objection on the record to 
not being able to cross-examine witnesses.”  His attorney also requested that 
the court “reschedule [the matter] for even just an hour to finalize” it, and she 
 
 
8 
requested that the court permit the parties to submit written closing 
arguments.  The court responded, 
With respect to your request for rescheduling this case for an hour, 
that request is denied.  The Court was clear at the beginning that 
the time would be equally divided between the parties.  How the 
parties chose to use their time was up to them.  The Court further 
cautioned you as well as Ms. Estes as to the remaining time and 
gave you a warning as to running out of time, so no.  In terms of 
closing argument, the Court doesn’t need that. . . .  With respect to 
your objection about not having the ability to cross-examine 
witnesses, again, you put on your case . . . and chose to present it in 
a manner that you did, and I don’t know what witnesses are going 
to say or what information is going to be provided, but the Court 
doesn’t have unlimited time.  The pre-trial order said one hour [sic].  
The parties wanted to engage in some discussions initially, and this 
is what we have.  And as it worked out, [Capelety’s attorney], you 
still had more time than Ms. Estes. 
 
Ultimately, the hearing—excluding recesses—was five and a half hours long.  
Thus, setting aside one hour of time for the GAL, Estes and Capelety were to 
evenly split four and a half hours.  Capelety used roughly two hours and twenty 
minutes, Estes used roughly one hour and forty minutes, and the GAL used 
roughly one hour and fifteen minutes.   
 
[¶13]  In March 2022, the court (South Paris, Ham-Thompson, J.) issued a 
judgment determining parental rights and responsibilities.  The court found the 
following facts, which are supported by competent evidence admitted during 
the hearing, see Hatch v. Anderson, 2010 ME 94, ¶ 12, 4 A.3d 904: 
 
 
9 
• Capelety and Estes were in a relationship from 2014 to 2017.  They have 
one child together, who was born in May 2015 and was six years old at 
the time of the hearing.  The child has lived with Estes since birth.  The 
child is in school and is generally healthy.   
• Both parties have difficulty communicating effectively.  Estes has a 
greater capacity to co-parent, but by the time of the hearing, the parties 
had shown no ability to co-parent successfully together.  Estes frequently 
makes last-minute logistical changes to the visiting schedule; Capelety 
constantly and subtly derides Estes, cancels scheduled visitation 
frequently, and makes communication choices that indicate a greater 
concern for “maintaining control of the family dynamic” than for the 
child’s emotional well-being.   
• The parties’ difficulty communicating and high level of conflict places 
strain on the child.  The child’s interests would be served best by one 
parent having most of the decision-making power.   
 
 
[¶14]  The court determined that “[t]he evidence compel[led it] to choose 
a parent in whom to vest most of the decision-making power, in order to reduce 
conflict.”  The court order allocated parental rights and responsibilities, with 
both parties having the right to make decisions when the child is in that parent’s 
care but with Estes having the right to make final decisions in the event of a 
disagreement.  The court order awarded to Estes primary residence of the child 
and awarded to Capelety rights of in-person contact on one evening per week 
and every other weekend from Saturday morning until Sunday evening, 
telephone contact “at all reasonable times,” and video chats as often as twice 
per week.  The court also made findings regarding the parties’ incomes, 
completed a child support worksheet, and entered a child support order 
 
 
10 
requiring Capelety to pay Estes $714 per month in child support until the child 
turns eighteen.   
 
[¶15]  Capelety timely filed a motion to reconsider, a motion for a new 
trial, and a motion to amend findings.  See M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(5), 52(b), 59.  The 
court denied his motions to reconsider and for a new trial and, in large part, his 
motion for amended findings.2  Capelety filed a timely notice of appeal.  See 
14 M.R.S. § 1901; 19-A M.R.S. § 104; M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(2).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶16]  The four issues that Capelety lists in his brief fall into two 
categories.  First, Capelety contends that the court abused its discretion by 
(1) improperly imposing a time limit on his trial presentation that prevented 
him from cross-examining Estes and the GAL, (2) excluding his proposed 
exhibits, (3) permitting the GAL to testify about domestic violence in the 
parties’ relationship, and (4) denying his request to present a closing 
argument.3  Second, Capelety contends that the court made insufficient factual 
 
2  The court granted Capelety’s request to amend the contact schedule to expressly state that both 
parties could attend the child’s school, sports, and extracurricular activities and events.  Estes had 
also filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied as untimely.   
3  Estes asserts that Capelety failed to preserve his arguments regarding the court’s time limitation 
and decision to admit evidence from the GAL regarding domestic violence.  “An issue raised for the 
first time on appeal is not properly preserved for appellate review.”  Foster v. Oral Surgery Assocs., 
P.A., 2008 ME 21, ¶ 22, 940 A.2d 1102.  To preserve an issue for appellate review, there must be “a 
 
 
 
11 
findings to support its ultimate conclusions and abused its discretion in 
determining parental rights and responsibilities, primary residence, and 
parent-child contact.  We address only the time limitation placed upon Capelety 
and the effect it had on denying his opportunity to cross-examine the GAL, as 
we are unpersuaded by Capelety’s additional contentions.4  See Richter v. 
Ercolini, 2010 ME 38, ¶ 7 n.1, 994 A.2d 404. 
A. 
Standard of Review 
[¶17]  We review a court’s management of a trial for an abuse of 
discretion.  See Seabury-Peterson v. Jhamb, 2011 ME 35, ¶ 14, 15 A.3d 746 
 
sufficient basis in the record to alert the trial court and the opposing party to the existence of the 
issue.”  State v. Reeves, 2022 ME 10, ¶ 35, 268 A.3d 281.  In this case, Capelety created a sufficient 
basis in the record to alert the trial court and Estes that he took issue with the court’s time limitation 
and decision to admit evidence from the GAL regarding domestic violence.  Capelety expressly 
objected to the court’s time limitation when he requested that the court set aside additional time to 
“finalize” the hearing and objected to the court’s ruling that he could not cross-examine Estes and the 
GAL because he had run out of time.  He also expressly requested that the court accept written closing 
arguments.  Further, Capelety expressly objected to the GAL’s testimony about domestic violence on 
the basis that the testimony assumed facts not in evidence.  Although the court deemed this objection 
untimely and overruled it, the issue of whether that ruling at the time constitutes an abuse of 
discretion is nonetheless preserved for our review. 
 
4  Capelety makes two other arguments that we decline to address.  First, he posits that the court 
erred when it stated that the GAL had a right to cross-examine witnesses and testify during the 
hearing.  We decline to review this argument because Capelety is raising it for the first time on appeal.  
See Foster, 2008 ME 21, ¶ 22, 940 A.2d 1102 (“An issue raised for the first time on appeal is not 
properly preserved for appellate review.”).  Second, Capelety devotes a single sentence towards the 
end of his brief to an argument that the court’s determinations regarding child support and tax 
exemptions were unsupported by the record.  We deem that argument waived.  See, e.g., Mehlhorn v. 
Derby, 2006 ME 110, ¶ 11, 905 A.2d 290 (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, 
unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.” (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 
 
12 
(explaining that we “review a court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for a 
clear and manifest abuse of discretion” (quotation marks omitted)); State v. 
Wyman, 2015 ME 1, ¶ 16, 107 A.3d 641 (explaining that we will uphold a trial 
court decision regarding the scope and manner of witness examination unless 
we identify an abuse of discretion); Moody v. Haymarket Assocs., 1999 ME 17, 
¶ 4, 723 A.2d 874 (explaining that we review evidentiary rulings for an abuse 
of discretion).   
[¶18]  A court abuses its discretion if it “exceed[s] the bounds of the 
reasonable choices available to it.”  Sager v. Town of Bowdoinham, 2004 ME 40, 
¶ 11, 845 A.2d 567.  We note that a determination of an abuse of discretion 
“does not equate to a finding of bad faith, intentional wrongdoing, or 
misconduct by the judge.”  State v. Hussein, 2019 ME 74, ¶ 17, 208 A.3d 752.  
“Trial judges are called upon to make multiple, swift decisions—in ‘real’ time—
during the course of trials and hearings.”  Id. 
[¶19]  Nonetheless, “[a] trial court ruling, even if in error, will not result 
in vacating the judgment if the error was ‘harmless’—that is, if the error did not 
result in substantial injustice or affect substantial rights.”  Guardianship of 
David P., 2018 ME 151, ¶ 12, 196 A.3d 896 (quotation marks omitted).  “The 
erroneous admission of evidence that affects a party’s constitutional interests 
 
 
13 
is harmless if it is highly probable that admission of the evidence did not affect 
the judgment.”  Banks v. Leary, 2019 ME 89, ¶ 19, 209 A.3d 109 (quotation 
marks omitted).  An error is harmless if competent evidence other than the 
challenged evidence supports the court’s findings.  See In re Sarah C., 2004 ME 
152, ¶ 14, 864 A.2d 162 (concluding that the error in admitting a witness’s 
testimony was harmless because the trial court’s conclusion relied on other 
facts not based on that testimony). 
B. 
Review of the Court’s Management of the Trial 
 
[¶20]  “A trial court has broad discretion to control the order and timing 
of presentation of evidence and to set and enforce reasonable time limits on 
testimonial hearings.”  Dolliver v. Dolliver, 2001 ME 144, ¶ 10, 782 A.2d 316.  
Indeed, pursuant to Maine Rule of Evidence 611(a), “The court must exercise 
reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and 
presenting evidence . . . .”  However, Rule 611(a)(1) simultaneously mandates 
that the court exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of 
presenting evidence and witnesses to “[m]ake those procedures effective for 
determining the truth.”  The truth-seeking function of the court carries special 
weight in a matter involving a child’s best interest because the court has an 
obligation to “discern as a wise, affectionate and careful parent what custody 
 
 
14 
arrangements will further the child’s best interest.”  Cloutier v. Lear, 1997 ME 
35, ¶ 8, 691 A.2d 660 (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶21]  Here, Capelety argues that he should have been allowed to 
cross-examine the GAL about her testimony and her report, to which he 
objected, and that the court’s failure to allow him to do so was an abuse of 
discretion.  By statute and by rule, a GAL’s final written report is admissible in 
evidence and the GAL is subject to cross-examination regarding the report.  See 
19-A M.R.S. § 1507(5) (2023); M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(7).5  These provisions are 
premised on the notion that “the most effective challenge to the quality, 
completeness, or competence of a guardian ad litem’s work will be 
accomplished through cross-examination of the GAL at trial.”  Banks, 2019 ME 
89, ¶ 12, 209 A.3d 109 (quotation marks omitted).  Further, “the right to 
cross-examine the GAL about the report has constitutional significance because 
it is part of the process that serves to protect parents’ fundamental liberty 
interest to direct the care, custody, and control of their children.”  Id. ¶ 13 
 
5  Title 19-A M.R.S. § 1507(5) (2023) provides, “A guardian ad litem shall make a final written 
report to the parties and the court reasonably in advance of the hearing.  The report is admissible as 
evidence and subject to cross-examination and rebuttal, whether or not objected to by a party.”   
Rule 4(b)(7) of the Maine Rules for Guardians Ad Litem provides, “A guardian ad litem shall 
provide a copy of any required final written report to the parties and the court at least 14 days in 
advance of the final hearing.  The report is admissible as evidence and subject to cross-examination 
and rebuttal, whether or not objected to by a party.” 
 
 
15 
(quotation marks omitted).  In the context of the statutory admissibility of a 
GAL’s report, due process requires “the right to introduce evidence and present 
witnesses, and the right to respond to claims and evidence.”  Id. (alteration and 
quotation marks omitted).   
[¶22]  We thus are faced with a close question in this matter about how a 
court may balance the need to manage a trial by enforcing time limits for 
presenting evidence against a party’s claimed need to present potentially 
relevant testimony from a GAL to aid in the court in its truth-seeking function.  
There is nothing wrong with time limits generally.  See Dolliver, 2001 ME 144 
¶ 10, 782 A.2d 316 (“We have previously approved judicial application of 
evidence time limits . . . .”)  Time limits are often based, as they were here, on 
the litigants’ estimate of the time necessary to present their cases, and it is not 
uncommon for an attorney’s estimate to be inaccurate.  It can be challenging for 
a trial judge to keep attorneys within their estimated time and maintain an 
orderly court schedule while preserving each litigant’s right to present a case 
that will allow the court to hear all evidence needed to help the court determine 
the facts.  It is equally difficult for a trial attorney to anticipate how long a 
witness’s direct testimony and cross-examination will take. 
 
 
16 
[¶23]  Here, the parties raised no objection to the one-day limit set by the 
court in its pretrial order, and once set, such time limits should be fairly 
enforced.  See id. ¶ 12 (holding that the trial court “did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to . . . extend the agreed upon time limit” because the plaintiff had 
“ample opportunity” to present his case).  The court here repeatedly reminded 
the parties of the time constraints throughout the trial and made a concerted 
effort to move the case forward within the time limits.6   
[¶24]  If time limits prove to be inaccurate or unreasonable, 
notwithstanding a court’s effort to move the case along, counsel have an 
obligation to object in a timely fashion and to allow the court to exercise its 
discretion.  See Maloney v. Brassfield, 251 P.3d 1097, 1105 (Colo. App. 2010) 
(deeming time constraints harmless where an appellant made no offer of proof 
of how excluding certain evidence would cause prejudice).  Despite multiple 
opportunities, Capelety did not object at the outset of or during the trial, 
including when the court initially informed him that he would not be able to 
cross-examine the GAL; and he never made an offer of proof about what 
evidence he would offer through cross-examination.   
 
6  Although a hearing of this nature, with the number of potential witnesses indicated in the 
pretrial order, would be difficult to complete in five hours and thirty minutes, the parties and the GAL 
called far fewer witnesses than anticipated in that order.   
 
 
17 
[¶25]  At the same time, litigants should have a reasonable opportunity 
to present a sufficient case, both to allow the court to effectively determine the 
facts and to protect the interests of the litigants.  In this case, the court could 
have considered making other adjustments that might have afforded time for 
Capelety to cross-examine the GAL or rebut her testimony.  For instance, once 
it was apparent that Capelety had used up all of his allotted time by the lunch 
break, and Capelety had not yet cross-examined the GAL, the court could have 
curtailed the GAL’s forty-minute testimony or even admitted the GAL report in 
in lieu of direct testimony and immediately moved to cross-examination rather 
than allowing lengthy and substantially duplicative narrative testimony from 
the GAL.  Capelety did not propose such adjustments, however, and, as noted, 
by the time he raised an objection to the constraint on his capacity to 
cross-examine the GAL, his time limit had expired.  However, with forty-three 
minutes remaining until the 4:00 deadline, as the court informed Capelety, 
there was still the possibility that he would have time to cross-examine the GAL.  
The court explained to Capelety’s attorney that it would give the GAL all the 
time she needed, and “after all that, . . . if there is any time available before 4, I 
will give you an opportunity to cross-examine.”  
 
 
18 
[¶26]  Thus, this case could have been handled differently to avoid the 
issue now before us.  We need not determine, however, whether enforcement 
of the time limits in this case rose to level of an abuse of discretion because even 
if we were to accept Capelety’s argument that it did, any such error would be 
harmless. 
[¶27]  In reviewing the whole record in this case, we conclude that it is 
highly probable that any error in the court’s admission of the GAL report 
without allowing Capelety to cross-examine the GAL did not affect the trial 
court’s judgment.  See Banks, 2019 ME 89, ¶ 19, 209 A.3d 109; see also In re 
Sarah C., 2004 ME 152, ¶ 14, 864 A.2d 162.  The trial court decided to vest most 
of the decision-making power in one parent to reduce conflict.  The trial court 
made this determination from its findings that the parents have no ability to 
co-parent due to their communication problems.  Even without the GAL’s 
report or her testimony, the record contains overwhelming evidence of the 
parents’ communication problems and how it has made them unable to 
co-parent their child.   
[¶28]  In choosing one parent to make most of the decisions for the child, 
the trial court found that vesting decision-making power in the mother was in 
the best interest of the child.  In its findings, the trial court articulated its 
 
 
19 
concerns about the father’s difficulty with processing information, noting his 
“very convenient lapses of memory when questioned about statements, 
behaviors, or incidents that would be unfavorable to him,” while having a clear 
memory concerning actions and statements by the mother.  The trial court also 
noted its concern that the father had engaged in multiple parenting classes and 
individual counseling yet still could not communicate effectively with the 
mother.   
[¶29]  Given the weight of the evidence beyond the GAL’s testimony 
supporting the judgment, we conclude that it is highly probable that the court’s 
enforcement of the time limits it established before the trial began did not affect 
the judgment.  See Banks, 2019 ME 89, ¶ 19, 209 A.3d 109. 
The entry is:  
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ashley T. Perry, Esq., Sanders, Hanstein & Carey, P.A., Farmington, for appellant 
Nicholas J. Capelety 
 
Kyla R. Estes, appellee pro se 
 
 
South Paris District Court docket number FM-2020-117 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY