Case Title: Lee v. Commonwealth of Virginia

Citation: 

Docket Number: 961029

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 
Koontz, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
HERBERT LEE, ET AL. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.   Record No. 961029 
February 28, 1997 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
 
William R. Shelton, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal of a civil action for forfeiture 
initiated pursuant to Code § 18.2-249, we consider whether 
there is a "substantial connection" between the forfeited 
items and illegal drug activity.   
 
The Commonwealth initiated this proceeding by filing an 
information for forfeiture against Herbert Lee, Pamela 
Denise Montague, $2,881 in United States currency, and a 
1987 Nissan Pathfinder.  The Commonwealth alleged that the 
currency and the vehicle were items "used in substantial 
connection with or exchanged for, or traceable to an 
exchange for . . . cocaine."  Lee and his sister, Montague, 
contested the forfeiture and the trial court, sitting 
without a jury, found that the currency and the vehicle were 
used by Herbert Lee in substantial connection with the 
possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.  The 
court entered a judgment approving forfeiture of the seized 
items.  Lee and Montague appeal. 
 
We will review the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences fairly deduced therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.  
 
On March 15, 1995, Chesterfield County detectives, Will 
 
 
 
 
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Morgan and Graham Powell, were involved in a surveillance 
operation and "an undercover" purchase of cocaine.  About 
9:45 p.m., Powell entered the parking lot of a restaurant in 
Chesterfield County where he met Chance Taylor, who was 
operating a white van.  Powell gave Taylor a quantity of 
cash and asked Taylor for some cocaine.  Taylor stated that 
he "had to go to meet his man and get the drugs and bring 
them back to [Powell]." 
 
Subsequently, Lee, operating the Nissan Pathfinder, 
drove his vehicle into the parking lot and "pulled up nose-
to-nose with the van."  Lee alighted from the Pathfinder and 
met with Taylor.  Then, Lee entered the Pathfinder and drove 
the vehicle from the parking lot to his apartment.  Taylor 
gave the drugs to Powell.  The drugs were tested and 
identified as cocaine.   
 
On March 24, 1995, Powell made another purchase of 
cocaine from Taylor at the same parking lot.  On this 
occasion, however, Powell used a pager to contact Taylor 
before the transaction.  Taylor called Powell by telephone 
and informed him that Taylor would meet Powell in the 
parking lot in 20 minutes because Taylor "had to go to meet 
his man."  When Taylor arrived at the parking lot, Taylor 
had already obtained the cocaine.  Lee's Pathfinder was 
observed near the parking lot.   
 
In May 1995, the police executed a search warrant of 
 
 
 
 
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Lee's apartment.  The police seized a bag containing powder 
residue, the Nissan Pathfinder, a pistol, and $2,881 in 
currency.  Lee admitted to the police officers that he sold 
"about eight to nine ounces a week of cocaine."  The police 
also found records detailing drug transactions.  The records 
of the drug transactions "correlate with the amounts [of 
cocaine] that were sold."  Lee also informed the police 
officers that even though the Nissan Pathfinder was 
registered in Montague's name, "it was his vehicle, [and] he 
had it in her name for insurance purposes only, because the 
insurance was so high with his driving being a young . . . 
unmarried male, under 25."   
 
The defendants argue that the Commonwealth failed to 
present sufficient evidence at trial that the currency and 
Pathfinder were used in substantial connection with, or 
derived from, the illegal sale of the cocaine and, 
therefore, a judgment should not have been entered in favor 
of the Commonwealth.  The Commonwealth asserts that it 
presented evidence sufficient to permit the fact finder to 
find a substantial connection between the Pathfinder, the 
money, and the cocaine.  
 
Code § 18.2-249, which permits the seizure of property 
used in connection with or derived from illegal drug 
transactions, states, in relevant part: 
 
"A.  The following property shall be subject to 
lawful seizure by any officer charged with 
enforcing the provisions of this article:  (i) all 
 
 
 
 
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money . . . motor vehicles, and all other personal 
and real property of any kind or character, used 
in substantial connection with the illegal 
manufacture, sale or distribution of controlled 
substances or possession with intent to sell or 
distribute controlled substances . . . and (iii) 
all moneys or other property, real or personal, 
traceable to such an exchange, together with any 
interest or profits derived from the investment of 
such money or other property." 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Code § 19.2-386.10 provides that the 
Commonwealth has the burden of proving that the property is 
subject to forfeiture and that the "proof of all issues 
shall be by a preponderance of the evidence."   
 
We have not had an occasion to discuss the phrase 
"substantial connection" in the context of Code § 18.2-249. 
 However, federal appellate courts which have applied 21 
U.S.C. § 881, a federal civil forfeiture statute, have held 
that a "substantial connection" must exist between the 
property subject to forfeiture and the illegal drug 
activity.  See United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 
1541-42 (4th Cir. 1989).  These courts have also discussed 
the meaning of the phrase "substantial connection."  For 
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit has stated:   
 
"This standard is a common sense interpretation of 
the statute, which is consonant with the 
congressional intent that the instrumentalities of 
the drug trade be reached, while ensuring that 
property only fortuitously connected with drug 
trafficking be preserved."   
 
Id. at 1542; accord United States v. Two Tracts of Real 
 
 
 
 
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Property, 998 F.2d 204, 211 (4th Cir. 1993); United States 
v. $95,945.18, U.S. Currency, 913 F.2d 1106, 1110 (4th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 990 (4th 
Cir. 1990).  The "substantial connection" test requires that 
the property subject to forfeiture must have more than an 
incidental or fortuitous connection to the criminal 
activity.  Schifferli, 895 F.2d at 990. 
 
We are of opinion that a common sense interpretation of 
the phrase "substantial connection" contained in Code 
§ 18.2-249 is consistent with the General Assembly's intent 
to remove from drug traffickers the instrumentalities 
employed in the furtherance of the drug trade rather than 
property only incidentally or fortuitously associated with 
such criminal activity.  Applying this standard, we hold 
that the Commonwealth established by a preponderance of the 
evidence a substantial connection between Lee's drug 
activity and the Nissan Pathfinder and the cash.   
 
According to Lee's statements to the detectives, he 
considered himself to be the "owner" of the vehicle that was 
registered in his sister's name.  The evidence reveals that 
Lee was a co-owner of the Pathfinder before 1994 and that 
his name appears on the bill of sale.  Lee admitted that he 
sold "eight to nine ounces" of cocaine each week.  On both 
occasions when Powell gave Taylor cash to purchase the 
cocaine, Taylor told Powell that Taylor "had to go to meet 
 
 
 
 
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his man and get the drugs."  The fact finder was entitled to 
infer that Lee was "the man" who provided the drugs to 
Taylor and that, on March 15, 1995, Lee used the Pathfinder 
to transport himself and the drugs to the parking lot where 
the illegal transaction occurred.   
 
As we have already mentioned, Lee admitted that the 
large amount of cash found in the apartment belonged to him 
and that he sold "eight to nine ounces" of cocaine weekly.  
A pistol, baggies, and records of drug transactions, which 
correlate to the quantity of drugs that Lee sold weekly, 
were also found in his apartment.  This evidence is 
sufficient to establish a substantial connection between the 
money and Lee's illegal drug trafficking activities.  
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
 
Affirmed.
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE KEENAN joins, concurring 
in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I concur with the majority's determination that the 
Commonwealth established by a preponderance of the evidence the 
statutorily required substantial connection between Herbert Lee's 
illegal drug activity and his Nissan Pathfinder vehicle, thus 
permitting forfeiture of the vehicle.  In my view, however, the 
Commonwealth failed to carry its burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the $2,881 seized was subject 
to forfeiture.  Code § 19.2-386.10(A).  Accordingly, I 
 
 
 
 
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respectfully dissent. 
 
The material facts are not in dispute.  Lee admittedly sold 
"about eight to nine ounces a week of cocaine" and the records of 
drug transactions found by the police in his apartment are 
consistent with that admission.  These facts provoke an intuitive 
suspicion that the $2,881 also found in Lee's apartment was 
related to Lee's drug dealing.  However, the Commonwealth was 
required to prove that this cash was either actually "used in 
substantial connection with the . . . sale or distribution of 
controlled substances" or "traceable to such an exchange." 
Code § 18.2-249. 
 
During the search of Lee's apartment, the police found $42 
in the top right drawer of the dresser in Lee's bedroom and the 
remaining $2,839 in a lock box above the cabinets in his kitchen. 
 The record does not establish that either location where cash 
was found had any direct relationship to the records of drug 
transactions or the other items frequently associated with drug 
transactions also found inside the apartment.  Nor was any of the 
cash identified as having been used to make the undercover 
purchases of cocaine which led to the subsequent forfeiture 
action.  Thus, the Commonwealth's evidence did not connect or 
trace, in any substantial way, either of the two sums of cash to 
the sale or distribution of controlled substances. 
 
These sums are not so large as to necessarily exclude the 
possibility that Lee obtained them from legal activity.  
 
 
 
 
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Moreover, the Commonwealth produced no evidence to show that 
these sums are inconsistent with Lee's other sources of income as 
established by Lee and his witnesses.  The trial court must 
determine the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the 
witnesses, but it "may not arbitrarily disregard uncontradicted 
evidence of unimpeached witnesses which is not inherently 
incredible and not inconsistent with facts in the record."  
Cheatham v. Gregory, 227 Va. 1, 4, 313 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1984). 
 
The forfeiture of money gained from illegal drug sales is a 
valuable tool in the important and continuing effort to eliminate 
such activity, but the law is not well served if we permit a 
forfeiture of property merely suspected of having a substantial 
connection to the illegal transactions.  See Code § 8.01-680; see 
also Hankerson v. Moody, 229 Va. 270, 274-75, 329 S.E.2d 791, 794 
(1985) ("A court may not base its findings on a suspicion which 
is contrary to the undisputed positive testimony").  For these 
reasons, I would reverse the trial court's judgment of forfeiture 
of the cash seized from Lee.