Case Title: Commonwealth v. Walters

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11799

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11799 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL WALTERS. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     May 4, 2015. - September 18, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Stalking.  Criminal Harassment.  Abuse Prevention.  Perjury. 
  Threatening.  Evidence, Threat, Intent, 
Photograph, Relevancy and materiality, Argument by 
prosecutor, Disclosure of evidence.  Constitutional Law, 
Freedom of speech and press.  Intent.  Practice, Criminal, 
Instructions to jury, Argument by prosecutor, Disclosure of 
evidence, Impeachment by prior conviction.  Due Process of 
Law, Disclosure of evidence.  Witness, Impeachment. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 28, 2011. 
 
 
The cases were tried before E. Susan Garsh, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Ethan C. Stiles for the defendant. 
 
David B. Mark, Assistant District Attorney (Shoshana Stern, 
Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Claire Laporte, Marco J. Quina, Rebecca M. Cazabon, Stephen 
T. Bychowski, & Bendan T. Jarboe for Domestic & Sexual Violence 
Council, Inc., & others. 
2 
 
 
Helen Gerostathos Guyton, Sandra J. Badin, Lyzzette M. 
Bullock, & John Nucci for Jane Doe Inc. & others. 
 
Steven M. Freeman, Lauren A. Jones, & Melissa Garlick, of 
New York, & Joseph Berman for Anti-Defamation League. 
 
Kirsten V. Mayer, Kavitha A. Mecozzi, Jennifer S. Pantina, 
Alexandra L. Roth, Matthew R. Segal, Jessie J. Rossman, & Mason 
Kortz for American Liberties Union of Massachusetts. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  This case raises the question whether a 
posting to the Web site Facebook may constitute a threat within 
the meaning of the stalking statute, G. L. c. 265, § 43 (a) 
(§ 43 [a]).  We conclude that although content posted to 
Facebook may qualify as a threat as defined in the statute, in 
this particular case, a reasonable jury could not have found 
that the defendant's Facebook profile page constituted such a 
threat.  We therefore vacate the defendant's conviction of 
stalking.  The defendant's remaining convictions of criminal 
harassment, criminal violation of a restraining order pursuant 
to G. L. c. 209A, § 7 (two counts), and perjury (two counts) are 
affirmed.1 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Domestic 
& Sexual Violence Council, Inc., Foley Hoag Domestic Violence 
and Sexual Assault Prevention Project, Massachusetts Law Reform 
Institute, Victim Rights Law Center, Community Legal Services 
and Counseling Center, Greater Boston Legal Services, Domestic 
Violence Institute at Northeastern University School of Law, 
Family Advocacy Clinic of Suffolk University Law School, Justice 
Center of Southeast Massachusetts, and Community Legal Aid; Jane 
Doe Inc., the Women's Bar Association of Massachusetts, the 
Women's Bar Foundation, the National Network to End Domestic 
Violence, and the National Center for Victims of Crime; the 
 
3 
 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  Because the defendant challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence presented with respect to the 
charges of stalking and criminal harassment, we summarize the 
facts the jury could have found in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 
677 (1979).  We reserve certain facts for further discussion in 
connection with other issues raised. 
 
The defendant met the victim,2 an elementary school teacher 
in Rhode Island, in the late 1990s or early 2000s.  They began 
dating and later bought a house together in Rhode Island where 
they lived for about three years.  During that time, the 
defendant asked the victim multiple times to marry him; she 
initially refused but eventually agreed to become engaged.  
However, they made no wedding plans and never married.  
 
In May, 2006, the defendant and the victim jointly 
purchased a new home in Seekonk, Massachusetts (Seekonk house). 
The Seekonk house had four bedrooms and a finished basement, and 
was located on one and one-half acres of land.  There were two 
sheds on the property as well as a driveway and a garage.    
                                                                  
Anti-Defamation League; and the American Civil Liberties Union 
of Massachusetts. 
 
2 In accordance with G. L. c. 265, § 24C, we omit the 
victim's name from this opinion.  
  
4 
 
 
On July 4, 2007, the defendant and the victim had a 
barbecue and invited members of each of their families.3  During 
the party, the defendant became involved in a physical 
altercation with the victim's son, who had been living with 
them.4  The victim, seeing this, was concerned for her son's 
safety, and shouted at the defendant to leave her son alone.  
After the incident, the victim told the defendant that she could 
no longer be involved with him romantically, and returned the 
engagement ring he had given her.  However, the victim continued 
to live in the Seekonk house because she did not know where else 
to go, her dog and all of her belongings were there, and her 
personal finances were comingled with the defendant's.5   
 
a.  Pattern of harassment following the breakup.  The 
defendant refused to accept the breakup.  Although around the 
beginning of August, 2007, he agreed to sell the Seekonk house, 
he repeatedly told the victim that there would be 
"repercussions" if she left him, such as that he would take 
                     
3 By this point, the victim was generally unhappy in the 
relationship with the defendant, at least in part as a result of 
the defendant's attitude toward her friends and family and 
controlling behavior.   
  
 
4 The victim's daughter also lived at the Seekonk house for 
at least a few months in 2007.   
 
 
5 The victim's son moved out of the Seekonk house after the 
incident on July 4, 2007, but her daughter continued living in 
the house until September, 2007.   
 
5 
 
their dog and she would never see it again.  He also told her 
that he was "keeping a file" on her, and would often go into 
their computer room, say that he was "adding to the file," and 
shut the door.  In addition, the victim began to notice more 
often that the defendant was appearing unexpectedly in places 
outside the home that she went on her own, such as a craft store 
and a work-related conference.  The defendant also insisted on 
accompanying the victim to a gymnasium, and when she told him 
she did not want him to come, he would wait near or in her 
vehicle when she came home from work.  During this period, the 
victim slept with a cellular telephone under her pillow, so that 
she could make a call immediately if she had to, and to prevent 
the defendant from gaining access to her telephone in order to 
see to whom she had been talking.   
 
The defendant told the victim that he had been a sniper in 
the military, and he kept guns in the home.  Prior to July 4, 
2007, the victim rarely saw the defendant's guns, but after that 
date, she began to see them more often.  Sometimes, she saw the 
defendant sitting on a stump in the backyard with a rifle.  In 
November, 2007, the victim came home and saw the defendant 
cleaning a gun on the coffee table in the living room.  At least 
three times, the victim also heard the defendant say, "[O]ne 
shot, one kill," although he did not say it directly to her.  
6 
 
Seeing the defendant's guns made the victim feel scared and 
threatened.   
 
On Christmas Day, 2007, the victim went home briefly from 
her father's house, where she had been spending the holiday, to 
retrieve some forgotten presents.  The defendant was sitting at 
the coffee table with a gun, and there was another gun on the 
stairs.  The victim felt afraid; she retrieved the presents and 
left without speaking to the defendant.  When she returned home 
later that evening, the defendant yelled at her for not having 
spent Christmas with him.  The victim said that she was leaving, 
ran out of the house, and drove less than one mile to a corner 
store, where she sat in her automobile and telephoned her 
father.  While on the telephone, she saw the defendant pull up 
near her in his truck.  She tried to lock her vehicle's doors, 
but the defendant jumped into her vehicle and tried to wrestle 
her telephone away while shouting and cursing at her.  Another 
vehicle pulled up next to her's; the defendant got out and 
seemed to drive away.  When the victim ultimately drove home to 
the Seekonk house, she discovered that she had been locked out.  
She then telephoned the police, who escorted her into her house 
to get some of her belongings; she spent that night at her 
father's home.  Two days later, on December 27, 2007, the victim 
obtained an abuse prevention order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A 
(restraining order), requiring the defendant immediately to 
7 
 
leave and stay away from the Seekonk house, and to remain at 
least one hundred yards away from her.  The restraining order 
was served on the defendant, the defendant left the house, and 
the victim moved back in.   
 
The defendant had a construction business and kept 
equipment related to this business on the Seekonk property.  
This equipment included a number of large items, including a 
trailer and an excavator.  In order for the defendant to access 
his equipment, on December 31, 2007, at the defendant's request 
and with the victim's assent, a District Court judge modified 
the restraining order to allow the defendant "access to the 
garage area between 7:45 A.M. and 4:00 P.M.[,] Monday through 
Friday."6   
 
Around December, 2007, the victim began dating a sergeant 
in a Rhode Island police department whom we shall call 
"Stephen."7  The victim and Stephen had been friends for 
approximately four years prior to that point, but the 
relationship did not become romantic until then.  Nevertheless, 
from July 4, 2007, onward, the defendant frequently accused the 
victim of having an affair with Stephen.  On the evening of 
                     
 
6 The restraining order remained in effect, with other 
modifications to be discussed infra, until April 9, 2009.   
 
 
7 The victim married Stephen in November, 2008.   
 
8 
 
January 14, 2008, the victim and Stephen were sitting in the 
victim's father's house, when the victim saw the defendant in 
her father's front yard.  The victim and Stephen got into a 
vehicle and drove away from the house looking for him.  When 
they caught up to him, Stephen and the defendant shouted at each 
other, and the defendant accused Stephen of "tagging" the victim 
for years.    
 
In February, 2008, the victim came home one day and 
discovered that the defendant's excavator, which previously had 
been parked on land to the right of the Seekonk house, had been 
moved so that it was now blocking access to one of the two 
sheds, and the victim was unable to move it.  Around the same 
time, she also discovered that the doors to the other shed had 
been screwed and hammered shut, which had never been the case 
before.8  Around the end of February, the victim found the 
defendant's trailer at the end of her driveway.  The trailer was 
blocking the entrance to the driveway, and was inoperable.  For 
a time, she could still access the garage by driving to another 
part of the property and then across the lawn.9  However, shortly 
                     
 
8 The first shed contained some of the victim's gardening 
tools and other items, while the second shed contained the 
house's recycling bins.   
 
 
9 Before the trailer was left in the driveway, the Seekonk 
property had cement blocks on either side of the driveway, as 
well as a row of taller blocks along the front of the property.  
 
9 
 
after the trailer began blocking the driveway, several boulders 
that were too large to have been placed by hand appeared on the 
property, preventing her access to the garage even by driving 
across the lawn.10  A sign that read "Michael J. Walters Inc., 
General Excavation Contracting," and that had never been on the 
property before, also appeared.  After that, around March, 2008, 
the victim found another piece of the defendant's heavy 
equipment in the garage, blocking the space where she would 
normally park her vehicle.  Throughout this time, the 
restraining order remained in effect.    
 
On another night in March, 2008, the victim discovered that 
the light bulbs had been removed from all of the lights on the 
outside of the Seekonk house.  There were no other lights 
illuminating the path from the driveway to the door of the 
house, nor were there any streetlights, causing the area to be 
dark at night and stress for the victim.  The defendant admitted 
to a Seekonk police officer that he had unscrewed the light 
bulbs because the lights were being left on twenty-four hours 
                                                                  
These blocks prevented the victim from simply driving around the 
side of the trailer and back onto the driveway.   
 
 
10 The defendant's placement of these boulders on the 
Seekonk property was the basis for one of the two convictions of 
violating the restraining order.  
10 
 
per day, the electricity bill was still in his name, and he did 
not want to have to pay for unnecessary electricity.11,12     
 
A real estate agent had created a page on a Web site, 
called Zillow, to advertise that the Seekonk house was for sale.  
The victim visited the page and discovered that the defendant 
had posted a copy of her affidavit in support of her request for 
the restraining order, but the affidavit contained additional 
information that she had not included in the original, such as 
that the victim had "mixed thyroid medication and wine."  The 
affidavit was posted immediately after the victim obtained the 
restraining order, in December, 2007.  In the months that 
followed, the victim saw other posts on Zillow that disparaged 
her or Stephen.13  Other posts referenced subject matter that the 
                     
 
11 The defendant's removal of the light bulbs from the 
exterior of the house was the subject of the other restraining 
order violation.   
 
 
12 From December 27, 2007, until approximately June, 2008, 
the victim was not receiving mail at the Seekonk house, 
including household bills.  At least some of these bills 
remained in the defendant's name; however, the victim attempted 
to have the bills changed to her name.  She also contacted the 
post office regarding the problem with her mail but received no 
explanation for it and eventually arranged to have her mail 
delivered to her father's house.   
 
 
13 For example, at least one post referred to her as an 
"adulteress," and another suggested that she had "[b]ipolar 
[e]pisodes."  Another post referred to observations that 
Stephen's vehicle had been driven across the lawn and parked in 
the garage at the Seekonk house multiple times over the weekend 
 
11 
 
victim and Stephen had discussed in private electronic mail 
messages (e-mails) to one another.14  The defendant had access to 
the Zillow page and admitted to having made the posts.15  
Although the posts do not indicate the date that they were 
uploaded to the Web site, they appear to have been posted no 
later than April 6, 2008.  
 
On March 4, 2008, following a hearing at which the 
defendant did not appear, a District Court judge reinstated in 
its entirety the original restraining order requiring the 
defendant to leave and stay away from the Seekonk house.  On 
March 10, the victim and Stephen went to the court for a follow-
up hearing regarding the order.  As they pulled into the court 
parking lot, the defendant got out of a large vehicle with a 
camera in his hand.  Other people also got out of the vehicle, 
including a woman named Cynthia Dugas and two of the defendant's 
sons.  The defendant handed the camera to one of his sons, who 
                                                                  
of February 29 to March 2, 2008, and suggested that art was 
missing from the home.   
    
 
14 The victim had not shared her electronic mail (e-mail) 
password with the defendant or otherwise permitted him to access 
her e-mail account.   
 
 
15 There also were several posts pertaining to the victim or 
to Stephen on another Web site, called MySpace, which is used 
for social networking.  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Mass. 
857, 867 (2010).  The last of these posts that were admitted as 
evidence at trial were posted no later than April 2, 2008.   
 
12 
 
began to chase the vehicle that the victim and Stephen were in.16  
The victim was so nervous during this incident that she 
initially did not get out of her vehicle at the court, but 
instead drove away from the location.  Ultimately, however, a 
hearing was held that day at which both the victim and the 
defendant appeared.  The restraining order was extended until 
April 10, 2008, and the defendant was given five days to pick up 
his construction equipment, but was not permitted to enter the 
house.   
 
Around the same time,17 the defendant arranged for Dugas to 
view the inside of the house, supposedly so that Dugas could 
determine whether it was handicap-accessible and would be 
suitable to purchase for her mother, who was ill.  The defendant 
drove Dugas to the property and waited for her while she was 
inside.     
 
On June 6, 2008, the defendant was granted seven business 
days, beginning on June 9, to enter the Seekonk house, in the 
presence of police, in order to remove his personal possessions.  
                     
 
16 The jury were instructed that they were to consider only 
the defendant's actions in relation to this incident, and not 
the actions of the defendant's sons.   
 
 
17 Although the record is unclear as to whether Cynthia 
Dugas viewed the inside of the Seekonk house before or after 
March 4, 2008, when the original restraining order was 
reinstated in its entirety, her testimony suggests that she 
viewed the property at some point close to this date.   
13 
 
The defendant made at least three trips to the property to do 
this.  On June 10, police observed a woman who was with the 
defendant taking pillows and blankets from the house that 
appeared to have been just removed from a bed; they were not in 
a box or otherwise packed.  On June 11, the defendant removed 
other belongings, including a television and chairs.  Finally, 
on June 17, police observed the defendant entering and leaving 
the house five to eight times, and eventually removing large 
pieces of furniture and appliances.  When the victim returned 
home that day, she discovered that the refrigerator, stove, and 
bed had been removed, and the water for the whole house had been 
shut off.  Urine and feces had been left in the toilets, which 
could not be flushed because the water was off.  When the water 
was turned on, water began shooting out of a pipe where the 
refrigerator had been, requiring the victim to turn it off again 
until that problem could be fixed.  There was also food from the 
refrigerator placed in the sink and on the counters, items on 
the floor, and no towels with which to clean up the mess.18   
 
Shortly thereafter, the victim moved out of the Seekonk 
house.  Accordingly, in November, 2008, the restraining order 
was again modified to allow the defendant to return to the 
                     
 
18 Within approximately one month, the refrigerator and the 
stove were left in the victim's attorney's parking lot.   
 
14 
 
property.  On April 9, 2009, the order was vacated because the 
victim had moved to Rhode Island.   
 
b.  Defendant's Facebook profile.  No evidence was admitted 
regarding the defendant's conduct toward the victim from June, 
2008, until January, 2011.  On January 13, 2011, Stephen, 
against whom the defendant previously had filed a number of 
complaints with the police department where he worked, learned 
that the defendant had sent e-mails to a member of the city 
council asking that Stephen be investigated.  This made Stephen 
concerned that the defendant might resume posting material 
related to the victim on Web sites, so Stephen searched for and 
viewed the defendant's Facebook profile.19  The profile page 
featured a photograph of the defendant, seated in a room, with a 
                     
 
19 Facebook is also a social networking Web site.  See 
Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 450 (2011); In re Zynga 
Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2014).  The site 
allows members to "develop personalized web profiles to interact 
and share information with other members."  Lane v. Facebook, 
Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. 
Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013).  "The type of information 
members share varies considerably, and it can include news 
headlines, photographs, videos, personal stories, and activity 
updates.  Members generally publish information they want to 
share to their personal profile, and the information is thereby 
broadcasted to the members' online 'friends' (i.e., other 
members in their online network)."  Id.  "Users can make their 
profiles available to the public generally, or limit access to 
specified categories of family, friends, and acquaintances."  In 
re Zynga Privacy Litig., supra at 1101.  The defendant's 
Facebook profile was apparently public, because Stephen was able 
to view it after searching for it.   
 
15 
 
slight smile on his face, holding a large gun across his lap.  
On a separate part of the page, next to an information box 
marked "Favorite Quotations," was the following statement:  
"Make no mistake of my will to succeed in bringing you two 
idiots to justice."  The page also indicated that the defendant 
was a committee member of the "Governors [sic] Task Force on 
Police Corruption" and included images of the singer Rihanna and 
of a St. Louis Rams helmet.  The photograph of the defendant 
holding a gun appeared to have been uploaded to the page on 
January 13, the same day that Stephen searched for and found the 
page,20 but it was unclear when the other items were added.  When 
the victim saw the Facebook page, it made her feel terrified.21   
 
2.  Procedural history.  On March 28, 2011, a grand jury 
indicted the defendant for stalking, in violation of § 43 (a); 
criminal harassment, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 43A; 
criminal violation of an order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, § 7 
(two counts); and perjury, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 1 
                     
 
20 The trial record is ambiguous as to the specific year 
that the photograph was added to the defendant's Facebook page.  
However, the Commonwealth asserted at oral argument that the 
evidence suggested the photograph was uploaded on January 13, 
2011, and the defendant agreed.    
 
 
21 In early 2011, the defendant filed civil lawsuits in 
Rhode Island, one against the victim and one against Stephen. 
 
16 
 
(two counts).22  The charges of stalking, criminal harassment, 
and violations of the restraining order identified the victim as 
the sole target of these crimes.   
 
The defendant was tried before a jury in 2012.  At the 
close of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, the defendant moved 
for a required finding of not guilty on all charges except one 
of the charges of violating the restraining order; these motions 
were denied.  The jury convicted him of the stalking, criminal 
harassment, restraining order violations, and perjury charges.  
The defendant appealed.  We transferred the appeal to this court 
on our own motion.23   
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Stalking.  A person is guilty of stalking 
if he or she " (1) willfully and maliciously engages in a 
knowing pattern of conduct or series of acts over a period of 
time directed at a specific person which seriously alarms or 
annoys that person and would cause a reasonable person to suffer 
substantial emotional distress, and (2) makes a threat with the 
intent to place the person in imminent fear of death or bodily 
injury"; the conduct, acts, or threats may be accomplished by 
                     
 
22 The defendant also was indicted for rape and indecent 
assault and battery of the victim.  The jury found him not 
guilty of these charges. 
 
 
23 The defendant represented himself at trial, with the 
assistance of stand-by counsel.  On appeal, he is represented by 
counsel. 
 
17 
 
means of electronic communication.24  G. L. c. 265, § 43 (a).  
The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
presented with respect to both the "threat" and "pattern of 
conduct or series of acts" components of stalking.  We focus on 
the threat component.  
 
The Commonwealth contends that the defendant's Facebook 
page containing the photograph of himself holding a gun, and, in 
a space labeled "[f]avorite [q]uotations," the words, "Make no 
mistake of my will to succeed in bringing you two idiots to 
justice," satisfied the threat element set out in § 43 (a) (2).25  
                     
 
24 General Laws c. 265, § 43 (a), as amended through St. 
2010, c. 92, § 9 (§ 43 [a]), provides in relevant part:  
 
"Whoever (1) willfully and maliciously engages in a knowing 
pattern of conduct or series of acts over a period of time 
directed at a specific person which seriously alarms or 
annoys that person and would cause a reasonable person to 
suffer substantial emotional distress, and (2) makes a 
threat with the intent to place the person in imminent fear 
of death or bodily injury, shall be guilty of the crime of 
stalking and shall be punished . . . .  The conduct, acts 
or threats described in this subsection shall include, but 
not be limited to, conduct, acts or threats conducted by 
mail or by use of a telephonic or telecommunication device 
or electronic communication device including, but not 
limited to, any device that transfers signs, signals, 
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any 
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, 
electromagnetic, photo-electronic or photo-optical system, 
including, but not limited to, electronic mail, internet 
communications, instant messages or facsimile 
communications."   
 
 
25 During the trial, the jury were instructed to consider 
only the Facebook profile page in determining whether the 
 
18 
 
The defendant disagrees, arguing that because the Facebook page 
was ambiguous and temporally remote from the alleged harassment, 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution dictates 
that the page could not qualify as a "threat" under 
§ 43 (a) (2), but was instead protected speech.  We agree with 
the defendant's contention that there was insufficient evidence 
for a rational jury to find that the defendant made such a 
threat.  See Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677-678.  
 
We begin with the requirements of the First Amendment.26  
Generally speaking, laws that proscribe speech based on its 
content are presumptively invalid.  R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 382 (1992).  Nevertheless, "certain well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech," O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 
Mass. 415, 422 (2012), quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 571, 572 (1942), do not receive constitutional 
protection, including "true threats."  O'Brien v. Borowski, 
supra.  See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Watts 
                                                                  
defendant had made a "threat" against the victim under 
§ 43 (a) (2).   
 
 
26 Both the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, as amended by art. 77 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution, generally protect speech from 
government regulation.  See O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 
422 (2012).  Neither party suggests that a separate analysis of 
this issue is necessary under each of these constitutional 
provisions.   
19 
 
v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).  See also United 
States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality 
opinion) (listing "true threats" as among "historic and 
traditional" categories of unprotected speech [citations 
omitted]).      
 
The United States Supreme Court has defined "true 
threats" as  
"those statements where the speaker means to communicate a 
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals. . . .  The speaker need not actually intend to 
carry out the threat.  Rather, a prohibition on true 
threats 'protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence' 
and 'from the disruption that fear engenders,' in addition 
to protecting people 'from the possibility that the 
threatened violence will occur.'" (Citation omitted.) 
 
Black, 538 U.S. at 359-360, quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
at 388.  A "true threat" need not take the form of an explicit 
statement that the speaker intends to cause imminent, physical 
harm to the victim, but may comprise "words or actions that -- 
taking into account the context in which they arise -- cause the 
victim to fear such harm now or in the future."  O'Brien v. 
Borowski, 461 Mass. at 425.  See Black, supra at 362-363 (State 
may prohibit cross burnings committed with intent to 
intimidate); Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229, 234-235 (2001) 
("sexually explicit and aggressive language" targeting 
individual victim may constitute threat absent explicit 
statement of intention to harm victim as long as circumstances 
20 
 
reasonably support victim's fearful response); Commonwealth v. 
Robicheau, 421 Mass. 176, 179, 182-183 (1995) (defendant's 
verbal threats not protected under First Amendment).  
Conversely, speech that has an expressive purpose other than to 
instill fear in another may be explicitly threatening, but may 
nevertheless fail to rise to the level of a true threat.  Watts, 
394 U.S. at 706, 708 (statement at political rally was, given 
its context, "political hyperbole" and not "true threat"); Chou, 
supra at 237.  
 
Comparing the definition of "true threat" to the threat 
component of the stalking statute, we conclude that any verbal 
or written communication that qualifies as a threat as defined 
in the statute is also a "true threat," and therefore is not 
entitled to protection under the First Amendment.27  To convict a 
defendant of stalking, the Commonwealth must show that he or she 
                     
 
27 Other categories of unprotected speech may encompass acts 
of speech that are punished under the other component of 
stalking, namely, the "pattern of conduct or series of acts" 
directed at another.  G. L. c. 265, § 43 (a) (1).  See 
Commonwealth v. Welch, 444 Mass. 80, 87-88, 98-99 (2005), 
abrogated on another ground by O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. at 
425 & n.7 (criminal harassment statute, G. L. c. 265, § 43A, is 
"closely related" to criminal stalking statute; where harassment 
includes "fighting words" not protected by First Amendment, 
statute may penalize this conduct).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 470 Mass. 300, 310 (2014) (where defendant's speech was 
"integral to criminal conduct" of harassing and causing 
substantial emotional distress to victims, speech could be 
penalized as criminal harassment in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 43A [a] [citation omitted]).   
 
21 
 
"[made] a threat with the intent to place the [stalking target] 
in imminent fear of death or bodily injury."  G. L. c. 265, 
§ 43 (a) (2).  Thus, like "true threats," see Black, 538 U.S. at 
359-360, the threat component of the stalking statute 
specifically targets communications by the defendant that are 
aimed at placing the victim in fear of physical violence, 
whether or not the defendant actually intends to commit the 
threatened act of violence.  See Commonwealth v. Matsos, 421 
Mass. 391, 395 (1995) (to prove threat in furtherance of 
stalking, "Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant 
actually intended to harm the victim . . . [;] it need only 
prove that the defendant's threats were reasonably calculated to 
place the victim in imminent fear of bodily injury" [citation 
omitted]).  See also Commonwealth v. Gupta, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 
682, 687 (2014) (stalking statute "aims to protect victims of 
stalking from fear itself, and not merely ultimate physical 
harm").  In addition, the threat component of stalking has been 
likened to assault, see Matsos, supra at 394-395; clearly, 
speech that constitutes an assault or that similarly threatens 
another does not enjoy First Amendment protection.  See 
Robicheau, 421 Mass. at 183 (denying First Amendment protection 
to verbal threats that placed victim in "reasonable apprehension 
of imminent serious physical harm").     
22 
 
 
As with an assault, for a defendant to make a threat that 
meets the requirements of § 43 (a) (2), both the defendant must 
intend to place the victim in immediate fear that physical harm 
is likely to occur and the victim's fear must be reasonable.28  
See Matsos, 421 Mass. at 394-395.  See also Commonwealth v. 
Gorassi, 432 Mass. 244, 248 (2000) (to commit assault, defendant 
must engage in "objectively menacing" conduct with intent to 
place victim in fear [citation omitted]).  The reasonableness of 
the victim's fear depends in part on "the actions and words of 
the defendant in light of the attendant circumstances" (citation 
omitted).  Matsos, supra at 395.  See Gupta, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 684, 688 (victim's "imminent fear" based on defendant's long-
distance telephone calls reasonable in light of defendant's 
"mobility, history of abusive conduct, motivation," and 
knowledge of victim's whereabouts).  Similarly, "[i]ntent is a 
factual matter that may be proved by circumstantial 
                     
 
28 We note that the threat element of the crime of stalking 
differs from the common-law crime of assault in one important 
respect:  unlike assault, which requires that the defendant act 
"with the intent to put the victim in fear of immediate bodily 
harm," Commonwealth v. Gorassi, 432 Mass. 244, 248 (2000), for a 
threat to meet the requirements of the stalking statute, it need 
not necessarily cause the victim to fear that physical harm will 
come to him or her immediately.  See Commonwealth v. Gupta, 84 
Mass. App. Ct. 682, 685, 686-687 (2014) (observing that G. L. 
c. 265, § 43 [a] [2], requires threat that places victim in 
"imminent fear of death or bodily injury," rather than in fear 
of "imminent death or bodily injury," and that prior cases have 
been consistent with this reading). 
 
23 
 
evidence."29  Commonwealth v. LaPerle, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 424, 427 
(1985), quoting Commonwealth v. Ellis, 356 Mass. 574, 578-579 
(1970). 
   
 
Finally, although communication of a threat to its intended 
victim is not expressly required under § 43 (a) (2), we agree 
with the Appeals Court that evidence of the defendant's intent 
to communicate the threat through direct or indirect means is 
necessary.  See Commonwealth v. Hughes, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 280, 
281-282 (2003).  Where communication of the threat is 
indirect -- for example, through an intermediary -- the 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant intended the threat to reach the victim.  See id. at 
                     
 
29 Where a defendant has been charged with threatening to 
commit a crime, see G. L. c. 275, § 2, based on an ambiguous 
statement or writing, we have similarly analyzed the substance 
of the communication as well as the surrounding context to 
determine whether the communication expressed an intent to harm 
the recipient and caused that person reasonable fear.  See 
Commonwealth v. Milo M., 433 Mass. 149, 154-155 (2001) (two 
drawings depicting defendant pointing gun at his teacher 
constituted expression of intent to harm teacher, where drawings 
contained other references to violence and defendant presented 
drawings to teacher in angry and defiant manner); Commonwealth 
v. Sholley, 432 Mass. 721, 725-726 (2000), cert. denied, 532 
U.S. 980 (2001) (defendant's rage at court system, recent 
predictions of "war" and "bloodshed," angry tone, and position 
only inches from prosecutor when pointing his finger in her face 
and telling her to "watch out" permitted jury to conclude 
statement intended as threat); Commonwealth v. Elliffe, 47 Mass. 
App. Ct. 580, 582-583 (1999) (words "drop the charges," uttered 
while defendant was physically assaulting and battering victim, 
permitted jury to infer that if victim did not "drop the 
charges," additional violence would follow).   
24 
 
283 (jury could have found that defendant intended his brother 
to convey threat to victim).  Compare Commonwealth v. Meier, 56 
Mass. App. Ct. 278, 279-282 (2002) (defendant's letter to victim 
indicating belief that victim was responsible for recent 
collection efforts against defendant, combined with threatening 
statement to collection attorney regarding victim, supported 
inference that defendant intended statement to reach victim), 
with Commonwealth v. Troy T., 54 Mass. App. Ct. 520, 527-528 
(2002) (where third party overheard putative threat, but there 
was no evidence of defendant's intent that third party would 
hear threat, jury could not infer intent to communicate threat 
to target).   
 
Applying these principles to the defendant's Facebook 
profile page, although the victim testified that she was 
terrified when she viewed the page, her subjective reaction is 
not the crux of the inquiry.  Rather, it is necessary to focus 
on the content of the page in the context of the past and 
present relationship between the defendant and the victim to 
determine whether there was sufficient evidence of the 
defendant's intent to threaten the victim and whether the 
victim's fear was reasonable. 
 
We begin by considering the photograph of the defendant 
holding a gun.  The photograph itself contains no evidence of 
the defendant's intent to commit violence -- there is nothing 
25 
 
obviously menacing about his facial expression in the photograph 
or the way in which he is depicted holding the gun across his 
lap, nor is there a caption of any kind that might suggest the 
photograph was intended to evoke violence.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Milo M., 433 Mass. 149, 154-155 (2001) 
(threatening drawings portrayed violent acts directed at 
defendant's teacher).  Even considering the photograph in light 
of the defendant's previous behavior around the victim involving 
guns, although his past actions might imply an intent to use 
guns to intimidate the victim, there was no evidence that the 
defendant had ever used a gun for a violent purpose in her 
presence, pointed a gun at her, or otherwise threatened physical 
violence toward her.30  Moreover, because the photograph was 
uploaded to the Facebook page in 2011, approximately three years 
after the last time that the victim saw the defendant with a 
gun, the relationship between the defendant's past behavior and 
the photograph is tenuous, especially considering that, given 
the defendant's status as a military veteran and apparently 
long-standing interest in guns, he could have intended the 
photograph to serve as an expressive statement regarding this 
                     
 
30 The victim did testify that the defendant raped and 
committed an indecent assault and battery on her; however, the 
jury apparently did not credit this testimony, because they 
found the defendant not guilty of the charges stemming from 
these incidents.   
26 
 
status and interest.  Contrast Chou, 433 Mass. at 235-237 
(threatening poster identified victim, contained sexually 
aggressive language directed at her, and had no expressive 
purpose other than to place victim in fear); Commonwealth v. 
Sholley, 432 Mass. 721, 724, 726 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 
980 (2001) (defendant's actions that contributed to finding 
intent to threaten took place within two- to three-minute span).   
 
Turning to the quotation on the page, "[m]ake no mistake of 
my will to succeed in bringing you two idiots to justice," in 
the circumstances of this case, it is reasonable to interpret 
the "two idiots" as referring to the victim and Stephen.  But 
even if one reads the sentence in combination with the 
photograph of the defendant, any particular violent message that 
might be attributed to the defendant from the presence of these 
two elements on the same page is speculative.  Although the 
photograph depicts the defendant holding a gun, nothing else 
about that image suggests a clear intent to commit violence.  
Furthermore, like the photograph, the word "justice" is amenable 
to a reasonable, nonviolent interpretation, namely, that the 
defendant intended to pursue whatever legal means might be 
available to right wrongs he perceived the victim and Stephen 
had inflicted on him.  See note 21, supra.   
 
Finally, the Commonwealth asserted during oral argument 
that, given the limited total number of items on the defendant's 
27 
 
Facebook profile page, the combined presence of (1) the 
photograph of the defendant with a gun, (2) the quotation about 
justice, (3) the reference to Rihanna,31 and (4) the reference to 
the "Governors [sic] Task Force on Police Corruption,"32 
suggested that the page could have had little meaning except to 
project the appearance of a threat against the victim and 
Stephen.  We agree that the page as a whole could have come 
across as vaguely ominous or disturbing.  However, because no 
evidence was introduced at trial regarding the defendant's 
opinion of or even knowledge about Rihanna, or about whether the 
defendant did or did not participate in a task force on police 
corruption, we question whether it is reasonable to ascribe to 
these items the meaning that the Commonwealth suggests, and to 
then infer that the defendant in fact created and intended to 
use the page to place the victim in imminent fear of bodily 
                     
 
31 Rihanna is a well-known singer and is a survivor of 
domestic violence, a fact that at least some members of the jury 
may have known.  See Sisario, Stormy Relationship, Forgiving 
Followers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 2013.  In addition, it appears 
that the copy of the Facebook page that was submitted to the 
jury as an exhibit contained a handwritten note that identified 
Rihanna as a survivor of domestic violence.  The defendant did 
not object to admission of the copy of the page as an exhibit, 
and he does not raise the handwritten note as an issue on 
appeal.   
 
 
32 The Commonwealth argued that the reference to the 
defendant's participation in a task force on police corruption 
should be interpreted as invoking the defendant's history of 
filing complaints against Stephen with the police department.   
 
28 
 
harm.  Ultimately, based on the trial record, we conclude that 
the evidence of the defendant's intent concerning the creation 
of the Facebook profile was insufficient with respect both to 
whether the page constituted a threat within the scope of 
§ 43 (a) (2), and to the reasonableness of the victim's fear.33    
 
   
 
There is no question that new technology has created 
increasing opportunities for stalkers to monitor, harass, and 
instill fear in their victims, including through use of Web 
sites.  See Fraser, Olsen, Lee, Southworth, & Tucker, The New 
                     
 
33 We comment briefly on whether there was sufficient 
evidence that the defendant intended to communicate the contents 
of this page to the victim.  No evidence was presented at trial 
that the defendant had used the Internet to harass or disparage 
the victim from April, 2008, to January 13, 2011; that either 
the victim or Stephen previously had communicated with the 
defendant via Facebook or viewed his page; or that the defendant 
and the victim had an overlapping network of Facebook "friends," 
such that information the defendant posted to his own Facebook 
page would have been visible to the victim's friends.  At the 
same time, however, the page apparently was accessible to the 
public, and there was substantial evidence that the defendant 
had used other Web sites, namely, Zillow and MySpace, to 
disparage the victim in the past.  We do not need to decide this 
issue regarding intent to communicate in the present case.  But 
given the relative ease with which material on the Internet can 
be broadcast to a wide audience, including not only to the 
victim but also to the victim's family, friends, coworkers, and 
acquaintances, the factors just mentioned -- whether the threat 
was conveyed in a public or private Internet space, whether the 
victim or others in his or her social circle was likely to see 
the threat, and whether the victim and the defendant had 
communicated online before -- will likely be important in future 
cases involving alleged Internet-based threats. 
 
29 
 
Age of Stalking:  Technological Implications for Stalking, 61 
Juv. & Fam. Ct. J. 39, 41, 46-48 (Fall 2010) (discussing uses of 
Internet to cause physical harm, threaten, or post damaging 
information about a victim).  Where a defendant has posted a 
threat to a Facebook page that meets the requirements of 
§ 43 (a) (2), and has engaged in a series of acts or pattern of 
conduct described in § 43 (a) (1), the fact that the threat 
appears on the Internet is not a barrier to prosecution for 
stalking.  See G. L. c. 265, § 43 (a) (2) ("conduct, acts, or 
threats" related to stalking may be accomplished by means of 
electronic communication, including Internet communications).  
Cf. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2016-2017 (2015) 
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (applying 
"true threats" exception to First Amendment to violent 
statements made on social media that are pointedly directed at 
victims, whether made recklessly or with intent to threaten); 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 470 Mass. 300, 312-313 (2014) (where 
defendants used Web site to recruit others to harass victims, 
defendants could not "launder their harassment of the [victims] 
through the Internet to escape liability" for criminal 
harassment under G. L. c. 265, § 43A).  Here, however, there was 
30 
 
insufficient evidence that the defendant intended to make such a 
threat, and thus his conviction of stalking cannot stand.34,35   
                     
 
34 Because the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient 
evidence to prove that the defendant threatened the victim 
within the meaning of § 43 (a) (2), ordinarily, we would next 
consider whether the stalking conviction could be reduced to 
criminal harassment.  See O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. at 420 
n.5 (criminal harassment, as defined in G. L. c. 265, § 43A [a], 
is a lesser included offense of criminal stalking); Commonwealth 
v. Kulesa, 455 Mass. 447, 451 n.6 (2009), citing Welch, 444 
Mass. at 87, 88 (criminal harassment is "closely related" to 
criminal stalking, "employing nearly identical language but 
eliminating the threat requirement").  However, we also agree 
with the defendant that there was insufficient evidence to 
support all the specific acts on which the Commonwealth relied 
to prove the "pattern of conduct or series of acts" component of 
the stalking charge, which, like criminal harassment, requires 
proof of three or more incidents to support a conviction.  See 
Welch, supra at 89-90; Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. 
543, 548 (1994).  See also G. L. c. 265, § 43 (a) (1); G. L. 
c. 265, § 43A (a).  In particular, under the judge's 
instructions, the jury were permitted to consider, as one of the 
incidents of stalking, whether the defendant (and not one of his 
sons, see note 16, supra) "approached" the victim with a camera 
outside of court; the testimony, however, was only that the 
defendant "got out of the car, the vehicle, and he had a camera 
in his hand," not that he approached the victim.  Because there 
was insufficient evidence of this act, and we have no way of 
knowing whether or not the jury relied on this act in finding 
the defendant guilty of stalking, the defendant's stalking 
conviction cannot be reduced to criminal harassment and must 
instead be set aside.  See Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 427 
Mass. 392, 398 (1998), S.C., 431 Mass. 360 (2000).   
 
 
 
In addition, because we are affirming the defendant's 
conviction of criminal harassment, and the acts that supported 
the criminal harassment conviction were part of the same over-
all "pattern of conduct" that supported the stalking charge, we 
have concerns that reducing the defendant's stalking conviction 
to a second conviction of criminal harassment -- or allowing the 
defendant to be retried on a second charge of criminal 
harassment based on the acts that supported the stalking charge 
in this trial -- would violate double jeopardy principles.   
 
31 
 
 
2.  Criminal harassment.  The defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence presented in support of his criminal 
harassment charge.  Criminal harassment is defined as "willfully 
and maliciously engag[ing] in a knowing pattern of conduct or 
series of acts over a period of time directed at a specific 
person, which seriously alarms that person and would cause a 
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional 
distress."  See G. L. c. 265, § 43A (a).  As with stalking, for 
a defendant to be convicted of criminal harassment, the 
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant engaged in at least 
three harassing incidents directed at the victim.  See 
Commonwealth v. Welch, 444 Mass. 80, 89 (2005), abrogated on 
another ground by O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. at 425 & n.7.  
See also G. L. c. 265, § 43 (a) (1); G. L. c. 265, § 43A (a).   
 
In her instructions to the jury on criminal harassment, the 
judge identified four alleged acts that the jury could consider 
in determining whether the defendant's conduct met the 
requirements for that offense:  (1) bringing Cynthia Dugas to 
                                                                  
 
 
35 The defendant also challenged the ability of 
Massachusetts courts to exercise jurisdiction over him for 
purposes of the stalking charge, because by the time the victim 
and Stephen viewed the defendant's Facebook profile, they were 
living in Rhode Island, and they viewed the Facebook page there.  
The defendant appears to have been living in Rhode Island at 
that time as well.  Given our conclusion, we do not address the 
jurisdictional issue. 
32 
 
the Seekonk house and waiting for her "while she viewed the 
residence with the purpose of having her check the contents of 
the home and check up on [the victim]"; (2) placing a sign on 
the Seekonk house lawn; (3) turning off the water and defecating 
and urinating in the toilets; and (4) leaving firearms around 
the house and cleaning them in the victim's presence in an 
intimidating manner.36  The defendant challenges the sufficiency 
of the evidence of the first two of these incidents.  His 
challenge fails.   
 
With respect to the sign that was placed on the Seekonk 
house lawn, the defendant argues that he was entitled, under the 
First Amendment, to advertise his construction business on his 
property.  See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (First 
Amendment protection of commercial speech).  The general 
principle he states is correct, but here, the defendant placed 
the sign alongside one of the cement blocks that was on the 
property, so that it also impeded vehicle access.37  Based on the 
                     
 
36 The jury were instructed to consider a different eight of 
the defendant's other alleged acts of harassment directed toward 
the victim as part of the stalking charge.  
 
 
37 The defendant argues that the sign was "small" and did 
not block the victim's access to the property or could have been 
moved.  However, the victim testified that it did impede her 
access, and we evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth.   
 
33 
 
location of the sign and the fact that it never had been 
displayed on the property before, the jury reasonably could have 
inferred that the purpose of the sign was to harass the victim 
and to remind her of the defendant's presence, rather than to 
engage in commercial speech.  See Johnson, 470 Mass. at 309 
(where sole purpose of defendants' speech was to harass victims, 
speech was not protected by First Amendment).   
 
With respect to the alleged act of harassment involving 
Dugas, the defendant argues that there was no evidence he 
brought Dugas to the Seekonk house for the purpose of having her 
check on the victim.  Although there was no express testimony on 
this point, considering the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth, the jury reasonably could have inferred 
from the testimony of Dugas, the victim, and Stephen that 
Dugas's purpose was to make observations not just of the house 
but of the victim's presence in it.  Dugas accompanied the 
defendant during other incidents in which the defendant or one 
of his sons harassed the victim or interfered with her enjoyment 
of the Seekonk house.38  The jury reasonably could infer based on 
                                                                  
 
 
38 Dugas was with the defendant outside the District Court 
on March 10, 2008, when one of the defendant's sons chased the 
victim with a camera; was with him when he removed the light 
bulbs from the outside of the Seekonk house; and later helped 
the defendant remove the refrigerator and stove from the house.  
The victim and Stephen also saw Dugas one night driving back and 
 
34 
 
these incidents that Dugas knew the defendant was trying to 
monitor and harass the victim, and was assisting him in doing 
so.  As for Dugas's visit to the Seekonk house in particular, 
Dugas's testimony that she was thinking of buying the house for 
her disabled, sick mother was at best improbable given that the 
house was large and had at least one staircase, and that Dugas's 
mother eventually went to live in a nursing home.  In these 
circumstances, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the 
defendant brought her to view the inside as a way of 
investigating the contents of the home and what the victim was 
doing there while the restraining order barred the defendant 
himself from entering.   
 
Although these two incidents, taken alone, might seem 
somewhat innocuous, the Commonwealth was required to prove only 
that the cumulative effect of the defendant's pattern of conduct 
"seriously alarm[ed]" the victim, not that each individual 
incident was alarming.  See Johnson, 470 Mass. at 314.  
Moreover, the victim testified that seeing the defendant's 
firearms around their house made her feel "afraid" and 
"threatened," and that the mess the defendant left when he 
                                                                  
forth in front of the victim's father's house, and eventually 
parking in front of the home.  Dugas's explanation of what she 
was doing there on that occasion -- looking for the father of an 
arborist she needed to hire to trim a tree in her yard -- was 
implausible, given, among other reasons, that it was evening and 
already getting dark outside.   
35 
 
turned off the water and left urine and feces in the toilets was 
part of the "most horrible time in [her] life" and was "very, 
very stressful."  A reasonable jury could have found on this 
record that the defendant committed each incident alleged in 
support of the criminal harassment charge, as well as that the 
combined effect of these acts seriously alarmed the victim.      
 
3.  Violations of the restraining order.  The defendant 
also challenges his two convictions of violating the restraining 
order.  He argues that during the period when the order was 
modified to permit the defendant "access to the garage area 
between 7:45 A.M. and 4:00 P.M.[,] Monday through Friday only," 
the order ceased to be a true order to vacate and stay away 
during those hours and, therefore, violation of the order at 
those times was not a criminal offense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Finase, 435 Mass. 310, 313-314 (2001) (G. L. c. 209A, § 7, 
criminalizes only three kinds of violations of an order:  
failures to vacate, to refrain from abusing plaintiff, or to 
have no contact with plaintiff or her minor child).39  This 
argument, however, ignores the most natural reading of the 
order, which is that the defendant remained obligated to vacate 
                     
 
39 General laws c. 209A, § 7, has been amended several times 
since the decision in Commonwealth v. Finase, 435 Mass. 310 
(2001).  See G. L. c. 209A, § 7, amended by St. 2002, c. 184, 
§§ 113-114; St. 2003, c. 26, § 448; St. 2006, c. 418, § 1; and 
St. 2014, c. 260, §§ 14, 15.  However, Finase, supra at 313-314, 
accurately described the offense in 2007 and 2008.  
36 
 
and stay away from the Seekonk house, with the exception that he 
was permitted to access the garage during the hours provided.  
The fact that the defendant needed to drive or walk up the 
driveway to reach the garage does not change the import of the 
order, which is properly understood to mean that the defendant 
was allowed to traverse the driveway to access the garage, but 
not otherwise to interfere with the property in ways that were 
not related to gaining such access.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Silva, 
431 Mass. 194, 198-199 (2000) (incidental contact required in 
order to effectuate father's right to speak to children by 
telephone did not permit father to violate terms of protective 
order by using abusive and threatening language toward father's 
former wife).       
 
The defendant further argues that the trial judge committed 
error in her jury charge by equating the defendant's acts of 
placing the boulders on the Seekonk property and removing the 
light bulbs from outside of the house with violations of the 
restraining order.40  We disagree.  Given that the defendant was 
                     
 
40 The judge instructed the jury that in order to find the 
defendant guilty of the restraining order violations, they were 
required to find:  (1) that a court had issued a restraining 
order requiring the defendant to vacate and stay away from the 
Seekonk property, "except as may have been permitted by the 
court in the order"; (2) that the order was in effect on the 
date of the alleged violation; (3) that the defendant knew that 
the pertinent terms of the order were in effect; and (4) that 
the defendant "violated the stay away order by removing light 
 
37 
 
charged with two violations of a restraining order based on two 
specific acts, the judge's instructions were a practical and 
appropriate way of communicating the two charges to the jury.  
Considering the instruction as a whole, the judge's references 
to removing the light bulbs and placing the boulders did not 
inherently equate these actions with violations of the order, 
but brought home to the jury that to find the defendant guilty, 
they had to conclude (among other things) that the defendant 
"violated the stay away order" by taking those actions.  There 
was no error. 
 
4.  Perjury.  On June 20, 2008, a hearing was held at the 
Taunton Division of the District Court Department regarding the 
restraining order.  The judge began the hearing by asking what 
items were taken from the Seekonk house when the defendant was 
given seven business days to remove his property from the 
premises.   In response to allegations that the items taken 
included linen, towels, pillows, a refrigerator, a gas stove, 
and the victim's bed, the defendant stated,  
"Your Honor, you are being lied to like you wouldn't 
believe.  Everything that is being mentioned to you right 
now I have witnessed the fact that that didn't occur 
because I stayed in the garage while other people went into 
the home and got these items."   
                                                                  
bulbs from the perimeter" of the Seekonk property (first 
indictment) or "by placing boulders on the property" (second 
indictment).   
 
38 
 
 
Later at the hearing, the defendant said,  
 
"Everything that she has mentioned that was taken is a lie, 
everything is a lie.  I have got photographs.  I have sent 
people in in front of me to see what was in the house.  The 
house was stripped bare of every possible item that was in 
the home, stripped bare.  The only thing left in the house 
when I got there was a television set and a bedroom set 
which . . ." (sentence interrupted).  
 
These comments formed the basis for the defendant's second 
perjury conviction.  He challenges this conviction on the 
grounds that these statements were immaterial and that, taken in 
context, they were not false.  We disagree.  
 
"The crime of perjury in a judicial proceeding occurs 
whenever one 'willfully swears or affirms falsely in a matter 
material to the issue or point in question.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Geromini, 357 Mass. 61, 63 (1970), quoting G. L. c. 268, § 1.  
The question whether a statement is false is subjective, "i.e., 
what the defendant in good faith and in fact did mean," and it 
is up to the jury to determine what the defendant meant when a 
statement alleged to be false is open to multiple 
interpretations.  Geromini, supra at 64.  Materiality with 
respect to perjury "means relevance in the sense that the answer 
might tend in reasonable degree to affect some aspect or result 
of the inquiry," Commonwealth v. Borans, 379 Mass. 117, 135 
(1979), quoting Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 373 Mass. 345, 352 
39 
 
(1977), and is also a question of fact for the jury to decide. 
Commonwealth v. McDuffee, 379 Mass. 353, 365 (1979). 
 
The jury in this case easily could have found that the 
defendant denied removing a refrigerator, linen, towels, a 
pillow, a gas stove, and a bed from the house, and that this 
statement was both false and material to the judge's inquiry at 
the June 20, 2008, hearing.  On the materiality question, it is 
clear that the judge's focus at the start of the hearing was on 
the items the victim claimed the defendant had taken from the 
house, and that the defendant's statements were in response to 
the victim's allegations.  Regarding the falsity of the 
defendant's statements, although the defendant did, at first, 
say that he waited in the garage while other people went into 
the home "and got these items," the second statement that 
"[e]verything that she has mentioned that was taken is a lie, 
everything is a lie" and that the house was "stripped bare of 
every possible item that was in the home" is most naturally 
interpreted as clarifying that the defendant denied having taken 
any of the items alleged.41  The jury could have found that this 
                     
41 We reject the defendant's suggestion that the second 
statement refers only to the victim's allegation that the 
defendant took her winter shoes.  The defendant's use of the 
language, "[e]verything that she has mentioned that was taken is 
a lie, everything is a lie," and "the house was stripped bare," 
are more reasonably interpreted as a denial that he took any of 
the items mentioned, rather than one specific item.    
 
40 
 
denial was a false statement in light of the testimony that the 
defendant and his companions removed the refrigerator, the 
stove, pillows, blankets, and a bed.42  We therefore affirm the 
defendant's second perjury conviction.  
 
5.  Prosecutorial errors.  The defendant also claims that 
the prosecutors committed two errors that warrant a new trial:  
(1) referring to a fact not in evidence during closing argument, 
and (2) failing to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence 
prior to trial.  Although we agree that these were errors, a new 
trial is not warranted.  
 
a.  Reference to fact not in evidence.  "In closing 
argument, a prosecutor may not 'misstate the evidence or refer 
to facts not in evidence.'"  Commonwealth v. Joyner, 467 Mass. 
176, 188-189 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 
119, 129 (2013).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 1113(b)(3)(A) (2015).  
One of the prosecutors said during closing argument that the 
police officer who was present on the last day that the 
defendant removed property from the house had testified to 
having seen that the water was shut off and that someone had 
                                                                  
  
42 The defendant also challenges his conviction on the 
grounds that because his second statement was cut off, he was 
not given a full opportunity to explain his position as to which 
items he took from the home.  However, we conclude that the 
defendant’s words before he was cut off are sufficiently 
unambiguous that additional explanation is unnecessary in order 
to understand his meaning.  
41 
 
defecated in the toilets.  The defendant correctly asserts that 
the police officer did not testify to this; instead, all he said 
regarding the condition in which the defendant left the house 
was that the garage and the front door were left open.  Because 
the defendant did not object to this statement during trial, "we 
review to determine whether any error created a substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice."  Joyner, supra at 188.  
 
The prosecutor's statement clearly attributed testimony to 
the officer that he did not say and was therefore improper.  
However, "[r]emarks made during closing arguments are considered 
in the context of the whole argument, the evidence admitted at 
trial, and the judge's instructions to the jury."  Commonwealth 
v. Gonzalez, 465 Mass. 672, 680 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Whitman, 453 Mass. 331, 343 (2009).  Here, the judge instructed 
the jury both before and after closing arguments that the 
arguments of counsel are not evidence, and that, if either party 
referred to facts not in evidence during closing, the jury 
should disregard them.  The jury are presumed to have followed 
these instructions.  Gonzalez, supra at 681.  In addition, 
although the offending remark did tend to corroborate the 
victim's testimony regarding a particularly unpleasant fact, the 
comment was relatively brief, the prosecutor did not belabor the 
point, and other aspects of the victim's testimony, such as the 
removal of the refrigerator and the stove from the house, were 
42 
 
corroborated.  The prosecutor's misstatement was not so 
significant that it created a substantial risk of a miscarriage 
of justice.  
 
b.  Disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence.  Prior 
to trial, the defendant moved for discovery of "[a]ny and all 
inconsistent statements made by the complainant or any other 
witness for the Commonwealth," as well as other exculpatory 
evidence.  The motion was allowed in part, with the caveat that 
the form in which the Commonwealth disclosed the information was 
left to the Commonwealth's discretion.  On the fourth day of 
trial, during the defendant's cross-examination of the victim, 
she testified that she had created a journal in which she wrote 
down some of the things that had happened to her, and that she 
had given the journal to an investigator on the staff of the 
district attorney.  The defendant immediately requested a copy 
of the journal.43  After contacting the investigator, the 
prosecutors concluded that the victim had never given the 
Commonwealth any physical journal but that the victim had shared 
with the investigator via e-mail parts of what the victim had 
written in her journal.  Later that day, while the victim was 
still on the witness stand, the Commonwealth gave the defendant 
                     
 
43 The defendant also requested a mistrial.  The judge did 
not rule on the motion.   
 
43 
 
two pages of e-mail communications from the victim to the 
investigator, which the victim confirmed were part of her 
journal.  That same day, the defendant also stated that he had 
received in the mail, the day before, a packet of materials from 
an anonymous source containing e-mails between the victim, the 
investigator, and an assistant district attorney who was not one 
of the prosecutors trying the case.44  When the prosecutors 
reviewed those materials, they asserted that the substance of 
what was contained in those e-mails had already been provided to 
the defendant by way of a police report, grand jury minutes, or 
otherwise.  The judge permitted the defendant to cross-examine 
the victim on both the fourth and fifth days of trial (a Friday 
and a Monday) concerning the e-mails.  
 
The defendant now argues that the Commonwealth's delayed 
disclosure of the e-mails containing the victim's journal 
entries and other writings about the alleged incidents violated 
his right to due process by denying him exculpatory evidence 
until the middle of trial.  See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 445 
Mass. 392, 401 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 
Mass. 401, 404–405, (1992) ("Due process of law requires that 
the government disclose to a criminal defendant favorable 
                     
 
44 The source of this packet of materials was not determined 
during the course of the trial and is not provided in the 
record.   
44 
 
evidence in its possession that could materially aid the defense 
against the pending charges").  Although we have concerns 
regarding the timing and manner of disclosure of the e-mails, 
any error here does not warrant a new trial, because an 
examination of e-mails reveals that they are substantially more 
inculpatory than exculpatory.  See Commonwealth v. Healy, 438 
Mass. 672, 679 (2003) (claim of failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence requires proof "that the evidence was, in fact, 
exculpatory").  While some specific dates and details referenced 
in the e-mails may have conflicted with parts of the victim's 
testimony, and therefore may have had some minimal impeachment 
value, in general, the e-mails corroborate the victim's account 
of the defendant's treatment of her after July 4, 2007, 
including her accusations of rape, of which the defendant was 
found not guilty.  Furthermore, the defendant had time to and 
did incorporate questions regarding the e-mails into his 
extensive cross-examination of the victim.  The defendant 
therefore is not entitled to a new trial as a result of the 
delayed disclosure of the e-mails.45 
 
                     
 
45 The defendant also briefly mentions a number of other 
alleged instances of prosecutorial delay.  These alleged 
instances, if they in fact involved delay, do not entitle the 
defendant to relief. 
 
45 
 
 
6.  Impeachment of Commonwealth's witness without proof of 
conviction.  The defendant argues that the trial judge committed 
error by declining to allow him to impeach the credibility of 
one of the Commonwealth's witnesses with evidence of her 
criminal conviction but without a certified copy of the 
conviction.  There was no error.  "In order to impeach a witness 
by a criminal conviction, the conviction must be proved by a 
court record or a certified copy."  Commonwealth v. Puleio, 394 
Mass. 101, 104 (1985).  See G. L. c. 233, § 21; Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 609 (2015).  The defendant's status as a self-represented 
litigant (with standby counsel) did not exempt him from being 
required to comply with governing statutes and our procedural 
rules.  See Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30, 35 (2000), 
quoting Mmoe v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 617, 620 (1985) 
(procedural "rules bind a pro se litigant as they bind other 
litigants").  
 
Conclusion.  The defendant's conviction of stalking is 
vacated.  His convictions of criminal harassment, violation of 
an order issued pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, and perjury are 
affirmed.  The case is remanded to the Superior Court for 
resentencing consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.