Case Title: Charlotte Motor Speedway v. Cnty. of Cabarrus

Citation: 

Docket Number: 503PA13

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
 
 NO. COA13-470 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 5 November 2013 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
RONDELL SUPREME CHILDRESS, 
 
Defendant. 
Pasquotank County 
Nos. 10CRS051362, 51372 
 
10CRS002126 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from Judgments entered on or about 17 
July 2012 by Judge Jerry R. Tillett in Superior Court, 
Pasquotank County.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 September 
2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper III, by Special Deputy 
Attorney General Melody R. Hairston, for the State. 
 
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate 
Defender 
Charlesena 
Elliott 
Walker, 
for 
defendant-
appellant. 
 
 
STROUD, Judge. 
 
 
 
Rondell S. Childress (“defendant”) appeals from judgments 
entered after a jury in Pasquotank County found him guilty on 
five counts of discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling 
and one count of attempted murder. For the following reasons, we 
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find no error in part, reverse in part, and find no prejudicial 
error at sentencing. 
I. 
Background 
On 13 September 2010, defendant was indicted on six counts 
of discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling and one count 
of attempted murder.  Defendant pled not guilty and was tried by 
jury in Pasquotank County. At trial, the State’s evidence tended 
to show the following: 
In the early morning hours of 12 August 2010, Patrice 
Harney was sitting on her porch with her brother and a couple of 
her cousins. Ms. Harney’s two children were asleep inside the 
house. As they were sitting on the porch, Ms. Harney saw two 
cars drive by slowly, one green and one silver. One of the 
occupants of the silver car yelled out, “What’s popping?” No one 
responded, but Ms. Harney and her cousins laughed about it. Ms. 
Harney testified that the phrase “What’s popping” was associated 
with local gangs, but that she was unconcerned about it because 
she was not in a gang herself. The two cars then drove off and a 
police cruiser drove by. 
After the police cruiser passed Ms. Harney’s house, the 
silver car that had driven by earlier pulled back around.  The 
silver car stopped when it got to her house.  Defendant rolled 
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down the window and pointed a silver gun at Ms. Harney before 
firing several shots. Ms. Harney knew defendant from around the 
neighborhood and identified him as the shooter, but testified 
that there had previously been no problems between the two of 
them.  
Crime Scene Investigator (CSI) Owen examined the damage to 
the house. He recovered three bullet casings from the area in 
front of the house—one 9mm casing and two .380 caliber casings. 
CSI Owen found three bullet holes in the siding of Ms. Harney’s 
house, one bullet lodged in the kitchen door jamb, and one in 
the cinder block foundation.  Ms. Harney also testified that one 
of the bullets destroyed a gumball machine that was in her 
children’s room.  Officer Cogar with the Elizabeth City Police 
Department found two bullet holes in the wall of the children’s 
bedroom. 
At the close of the State’s evidence, defendant moved to 
dismiss all charges against him. The trial court denied the 
motion as to all charges but one of the counts of discharging a 
weapon into occupied property. Defendant elected not to present 
any evidence and then renewed his motion to dismiss. The trial 
court again denied the motion and instructed the jury on five 
counts of discharging a weapon into occupied property and one 
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count of attempted murder. The jury returned verdicts of guilty 
on 
all 
counts. 
The 
trial 
court 
sentenced 
defendant 
to 
consecutive sentences of 36 to 53 months imprisonment for each 
count of discharging a firearm into occupied property and a 
consecutive term of aggravated sentences of 185 to 231 months 
imprisonment for the attempted murder. 
II. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to dismiss the five charges of discharging a 
firearm into an occupied dwelling and the attempted murder 
charge for insufficient evidence.  
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial 
court must consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the State and give 
the State every reasonable inference to be 
drawn therefrom. The State must present 
substantial evidence of each element of the 
offense charged. The trial court should 
consider all evidence actually admitted, 
whether competent or not, that is favorable 
to the State. If there is substantial 
evidence—whether direct, circumstantial, or 
both—to support a finding that the offense 
charged has been committed and that the 
defendant committed it, the case is for the 
jury and the motion to dismiss should be 
denied; 
however, 
if 
the 
evidence 
is 
sufficient only to raise a suspicion or 
conjecture as to either the commission of 
the offense or the identity of the defendant 
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as the perpetrator, the motion to dismiss 
must be allowed. 
 
State v. Nobles, 350 N.C. 483, 504, 515 S.E.2d 885, 898 (1999) 
(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).  
B. 
Discharging a Firearm into an Occupied Dwelling 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in entering 
judgment on five counts of discharging a firearm into an 
occupied dwelling when the evidence failed to show five separate 
acts.1  We disagree. 
This Court very recently addressed a nearly identical 
argument in State v. Kirkwood, ___ N.C. App. ___, 747 S.E.2d 730 
(2013).  In Kirkwood, we reviewed the applicable case law: 
In [State v. Rambert, 341 N.C. 173, 459 
S.E.2d 510 (1995)], [our Supreme] Court 
rejected the defendant’s argument that his 
conviction and sentencing on three counts of 
discharging a firearm into occupied property 
violated double jeopardy principles. Id. at 
177, 459 S.E.2d at 513. There, the State’s 
evidence tended to show that the victim was 
sitting in a parked car in a parking lot 
when the defendant, riding in a car, pulled 
alongside the victim’s car. Id. at 176, 459 
S.E.2d at 512. The defendant produced a gun, 
the victim ducked, and the defendant fired a 
shot into the front windshield of the 
victim’s car. Id. The victim drove forward 
and, when the cars were approximately 10 
yards apart, the defendant fired a second 
                     
1 Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as 
to any element of the crime charged or the sufficiency of the 
evidence identifying him as the perpetrator. 
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shot that struck the passenger’s side door 
of the victim’s car. Id. The defendant then 
“pursued” the victim and fired a third shot, 
which lodged in the rear bumper of the 
victim’s car.  Id., 459 S.E.2d at 512–13. 
 
The Court in Rambert held that this evidence 
“clearly show[ed] that defendant was not 
charged three times with the same offense 
for the same act but was charged for three 
separate and distinct acts.”  Id., 459 
S.E.2d at 512. The Court reasoned:  “Each 
shot, fired from a pistol, as opposed to a 
machine 
gun 
or 
other 
automatic 
weapon, 
required that defendant employ his thought 
processes each time he fired the weapon.”  
Id. at 176–77, 459 S.E.2d at 513. Moreover, 
“[e]ach act was distinct in time, and each 
bullet hit the vehicle in a different 
place.” Id. at 177, 459 S.E.2d at 513. 
 
Similarly, in [State v. Nobles, 350 N.C. 
483, 515 S.E.2d 885 (1999)], [our Supreme] 
Court relied upon Rambert to conclude that 
the 
trial 
court 
properly 
denied 
the 
defendant’s motion to consolidate three of 
his seven charges of discharging a firearm 
into an occupied vehicle. The Court in 
Nobles relied upon evidence that tended to 
show the “defendant’s actions were seven 
distinct and separate events,” including 
evidence that prior to the time of the 
murder, the truck did not have any bullet 
holes or broken glass, but after the murder 
there were seven bullet holes in victim’s 
truck: “[t]here were two bullet holes in the 
windshield, one near the middle of the 
windshield and one near the edge of the 
windshield on the passenger’s side; there 
was a bullet hole below the windshield on 
the driver’s side and one near the headlight 
on the driver’s side; there was a bullet 
hole on the top of the truck’s bed on the 
driver’s side and one in the bed of the 
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truck; and the driver’s side door window was 
burst, which, based on the evidence, was 
caused by the fatal gunshot to the victim.” 
Id., 515 S.E.2d at 898–99. The Court further 
relied on evidence that the defendant’s gun 
had the capacity to hold nine bullets, it 
was empty at the murder scene, and the gun 
was not a machine gun or other automatic 
weapon. Id., 515 S.E.2d at 899. 
 
Kirkwood, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 747 S.E.2d at 737-38. 
 
 
Like the defendant in Kirkwood, defendant here relies on 
State v. Maddox, 159 N.C. App. 127, 583 S.E.2d 601 (2003), for 
the proposition that “where a semi-automatic weapon is used, 
evidence showing only that several shots were fired will not 
support multiple convictions for discharging a weapon into 
occupied property.”  In Kirkwood, we concluded that Maddox was 
not controlling because it was an assault case where we 
specifically distinguished Rambert and Nobles, while Rambert and 
Nobles specifically concerned the discharge of a firearm into 
occupied property.  Kirkwood, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 747 S.E.2d 
at 739; see also Maddox, 159 N.C. App. at 133, 583 S.E.2d at 605 
(distinguishing Rambert and Nobles as inapplicable to the 
assault case at issue). 
 
Here, Ms. Harney testified that when the silver car pulled 
by her house the second time, defendant rolled down the window, 
pointed a silver gun at her and started firing.  She said that 
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he fired “a lot” of shots.  Investigator Owen found three bullet 
holes in the house’s siding, one hole in the kitchen door jamb, 
and one in the cinder block foundation. As in Nobles, taken in 
the light most favorable to the State, the evidence here showed 
that defendant fired five shots into different parts of the 
house. Cf. Nobles, 350 N.C. at 505, 515 S.E.2d at 898-99. 
 
Defendant further argues that we must assume that the 
weapon used was an automatic because there was no evidence 
clearly establishing that it was a semi-automatic and that 
therefore he only had to pull the trigger once to shoot multiple 
bullets. 
Defendant 
cites 
no 
case 
establishing 
such 
an 
presumption. There was no evidence that it was a machine gun or 
automatic weapon which fires multiple shots with one trigger 
pull. The ammunition recovered was 9mm and .380 caliber. 
Taken in the light most favorable to the State, there was 
evidence that defendant fired five distinct shots from a weapon 
that required him to “employ his thought process each time he 
fired the weapon.”  Nobles, 350 N.C. at 505, 515 S.E.2d at 899.  
Moreover, as in Nobles, “[e]ach act was distinct in time, and 
each bullet hit the [dwelling] in a different place.”  Id.  
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying 
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defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges of discharging a 
firearm into an occupied dwelling. 
C. 
Attempted Murder 
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to dismiss the charge of attempted murder.  He 
specifically 
contends 
that 
the 
State 
failed 
to 
provide 
sufficient evidence that defendant acted with premeditation and 
deliberation. We agree. 
The elements of attempted first degree murder are:  “(1) a 
specific intent to kill another person unlawfully; (2) an overt 
act calculated to carry out that intent, going beyond mere 
preparation; (3) the existence of malice, premeditation, and 
deliberation accompanying the act; and (4) a failure to complete 
the intended killing.”  State v. Peoples, 141 N.C. App. 115, 
117, 539 S.E.2d 25, 28 (2000). 
Premeditation means that the act was thought 
out beforehand for some length of time, 
however short, but no particular amount of 
time is necessary for the mental process of 
premeditation; 
it 
is 
sufficient 
if 
the 
process of premeditation occurred at any 
point prior to the killing. Deliberation 
means an intent to kill carried out in a 
cool state of blood, in furtherance of a 
fixed design for revenge or to accomplish an 
unlawful purpose and not under the influence 
of a violent passion, suddenly aroused by 
lawful or just cause or legal provocation. 
 
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State v. McAdoo, 165 N.C. App. 222, 228, 598 S.E.2d 227, 231 
(2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted), app. dismissed, 
359 N.C. 285, 610 S.E.2d 385 (2005). 
In the context of attempted first degree 
murder, an intent to kill and the existence 
of malice, premeditation and deliberation 
may 
be 
inferred 
from 
the 
conduct 
and 
statements of the defendant before and after 
the 
incident, 
ill-will 
or 
previous 
difficulty between the parties, and evidence 
regarding 
the 
manner 
of 
the 
attempted 
killing. 
 
Peoples, 141 N.C. App. at 118, 539 S.E.2d at 28 (citation 
omitted). 
 
Here, the State introduced no evidence about conduct or 
statements of defendant before or after the shooting which might 
demonstrate premeditation and deliberation. Indeed, the only 
evidence regarding conduct prior to the shooting was Ms. 
Harney’s testimony that someone yelled “what’s popping” when the 
two cars drove by initially. Ms. Harney recognized that phrase 
as a gang greeting, but testified that she was not in a gang and 
did not consider it alarming.  There was no evidence of previous 
animosity—or even interaction—between defendant and Ms. Harney. 
Bullet holes were found in various parts of the house and were 
not particularly concentrated near Ms. Harney. 
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To show an attempted murder, the State must prove that the 
defendant specifically intended to kill the victim after 
premeditation and deliberation.  See McAdoo, 165 N.C. App. at 
228, 598 S.E.2d at 231.  Unlike malice, specific intent to kill, 
premeditation, and deliberation will not be presumed from the 
fact that the defendant intentionally discharged a deadly 
weapon.  See State v. Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 71, 161 S.E.2d 560, 
567 (1968).  The State here failed to present any evidence from 
which 
a 
reasonable 
juror 
might 
infer 
that 
defendant 
premeditated, deliberated, and specifically intended to kill Ms. 
Harney. On appeal, the State points to nothing showing such 
intent other than the facts that someone used a gang greeting 
and that defendant shot at Ms. Harney’s front porch when she was 
on it. 
We conclude that there was insufficient evidence of 
premeditation and deliberation to deny defendant’s motion to 
dismiss the charge of attempted first degree murder.  Therefore, 
we hold that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion 
to dismiss the charge of attempted murder and reverse the 
judgment entered upon that conviction. 
III. Sentencing 
 
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Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it 
accepted his admission of aggravating factors at sentencing by 
failing to address him personally and advise him as required by 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022.1(b) (2011). 
To accept a defendant’s admission of aggravating factors 
for sentencing, the trial court must advise the defendant of the 
rights he waives in doing so and follow the procedures for 
accepting a guilty plea under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(a) 
(2011).  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022.1(b). “In order to vacate a 
defendant’s plea, the trial court’s error [in failing to follow 
§ 15A-1022] must have prejudiced the defendant such that there 
exists a reasonable possibility that a different result could 
have or would have been reached had the error not occurred.”  
State v. Salvetti, 202 N.C. App. 18, 27, 687 S.E.2d 698, 704 
(citation and quotation marks omitted), app. dismissed and disc. 
rev. denied, 364 N.C. 246, 699 S.E.2d 919 (2010).  The burden of 
showing prejudice is on the defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1443(a) (2011). 
While we agree that the trial court erred by failing to 
address defendant as required, defendant has not argued or shown 
that he was prejudiced in any way by that failure. Thus, any 
argument to that effect has been abandoned.  N.C.R. App. P. 
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28(a). Accordingly, we hold that defendant has failed to show 
prejudicial error and is not entitled to a new sentencing 
hearing. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did 
not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges of 
discharging a firearm into occupied property, but did err in 
denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the attempted murder 
charge for insufficient evidence.  Therefore, we reverse the 
judgment entered upon the conviction for attempted murder. 
Finally, we hold that the trial court did not commit prejudicial 
error by failing to adhere to the requirements of N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 15A-1022.1 at the sentencing hearing. 
10CRS051372 and 10CRS002126 – NO ERROR. 
10CRS051362 – REVERSED. 
 
 
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge GEER concur. 
 
 
Report per Rule 30(e).