Case Title: Lii v. Sida of Hawaii, Inc.

Citation: 493 P.2d 1032

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 1972-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
493 P.2d 1032 (1972) Lawrence LII, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SIDA OF HAWAII, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees. No. 5106. Supreme Court of Hawaii. February 4, 1972. Rehearing Denied February 25, 1972. Joseph A. Ryan, Honolulu (Ryan & Ryan, Honolulu, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant. Norman H. Suzuki, Honolulu, for defendants-appellees. Before RICHARDSON, C.J., and MARUMOTO, ABE, LEVINSON and KOBAYASHI, JJ. PER CURIAM. Appellant in this case made an untimely demand for jury trial in that the applicable rule provides for the demand to be made within ten days and appellant did not make such demand until nearly thirty days had *1033 elapsed. The case was heard without a jury and appellant appeals, asserting that his right to a jury trial is constitutionally absolute. The Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides that: Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii provides: Our State statutes provide in HRS § 635-14 that: The applicable rules of the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure provide: We have in the past addressed ourselves to the relation between the Seventh Amendment and the above sections of the Hawaii Constitution and Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure. Harada v. Burns, 50 Haw. 528, 532, 445 P.2d 376, 380 (1968). It was early held by the United States Supreme Court that the right of jury trial may be waived. Kearney v. Case, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 275, 281, 20 L. Ed. 395 (1870). Speaking of this same principle, this court in Seong v. Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 41 Haw. 231, 240 (1955), has held that: *1034 We consider the right to a jury trial to be inviolate in the absence of an unequivocal and clear showing of a waiver of such right either by express or implied conduct. This court will indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of such right. Seong, supra, 41 Haw. at 243. However, the mechanics constituting a reasonable regulation of the manner of exercising that right must be complied with for the right to be preserved. (See 5 Moore's Federal Practice, § 38.43 at 336.3 (1971) for similar interpretations of other states.) As stated in our statute and rules of procedure, supra, a demand for jury trial must be made within ten days after the service of the last pleading. This requirement was not met in this case. Such a failure in and of itself constitutes a waiver. See Johnson v. Gardner, 179 F.2d 114, 117 (9th Cir.1949). Pursuant to Rule 39(b)[1] of the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court in its discretion may order a trial by jury where a party has failed to make a timely demand. Clearly, however, in the light of the record before us there is no abuse of discretion when, as in this case, the court denies a plaintiff's motion for a trial by jury, made subsequent to a failure to demand a jury within the time period prescribed by the applicable rule. See Wilson v. Corning Glass Works, 195 F.2d 825, 826-827 (9th Cir.1952). The other issues raised by appellant are without merit. Judgment affirmed. [1] In construing the federal counterpart of Rule 39(b), Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure, it has been held that mere inadvertence or bare oversight in failing to make a demand for jury trial within the time allowed by the applicable rule for making such demand as of right are insufficient grounds upon which the court may exercise its discretion to grant a jury trial. E.g., Krussman v. Omaha Woodmen Life Ins. Soc., 2 F.R.D. 3, 4 (E.D.Idaho 1941).