Case Title: Aha Hui Malama O Kaniakapupu v. Land Use Commission, State of Hawaii. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba, with whom J. Duffy, joins [pdf].

Citation: 111 Haw. 124

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

000-

 

—_—
ANA HUI MALAMA © KANIAKAPUPU, Appellant-Appellant, :

LAND USE CONMISSION, STATE OF HAWAI'I; ELIZABETH
MIDKIFF MYERS fka ELIZABETH MIDKIFF MORRISS;
and OFFICE OF PLANNING, Appellees-Appellees,

 

and

ROBERT H. MIDKIFF; JOAN H. SHIGEKANE, as Trustee
of the Joanne H. Shigekane Revocable Living
‘Trust, Appellees.

SSS

No. 26964

   

APPEAL PROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO, 04-1-0276-02 (BEH))

avk 1 YHUDN

JULY 24, 2006

eb:2 Rd 42 TO 9002

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, AND NAKAYAMA, JJ.; ACOBA, J.,
DISSENTING, WITH WHOM DUFFY, J., JOINS
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.
In thie secondary appeal, appellant-appellant Aha Hui
Malana © Kaniakapupu (the Hui) appeals from the Circuit Court of

the First Circuit’s November 5, 2004 judgnent* in favor of

 

‘The Honorable Eden Elizabeth Hifo presi
proceedings

 

over the underlying

 

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appellees-appellees state of Hawai'i (State) Land Use Commission

 

(LUC), Elizabeth Midkiff Myers fka Elizabeth M. Morris (Myers),

Robert R. Midkiff, Joanne H. Shigekane as trustee of the Joanne

 

H, Shigekane Revocable Living Trust, and State Office of Planning
(hereinafter, collectively, Appellees]. Therein, the circuit
court dismissed the Hui‘s agency appeal from the LUC’s March 25,
2004 order that denied the Huis motion for an order to show
cause, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In
upholding the LUC’s determination, the circuit court concluded
that, inasmich as Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14(a)
(1993), quoted infra, requires that a contested case occur before
appellate jurisdiction may be exercised and a contested case
hearing did not occur in the instant case, the Hui could not seek
judicial review of the LUC’s decision.

on appeal, the Hui essentially claims that the circuit
court erred in dismissing its agency appeal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed below, we hold
that the Hui's contention lacks merit inasmuch as a contested
case hearing did not occur in the instant case, thereby
precluding judicial review pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a)
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s November 5, 2004

judgment

 
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1. BACKG!

Factual Backaround
on February 1, 1989, the Henry H. Shigekane Revocable

 

Living Truet and the Joanne H. Shigekane Revocable Living Trust
Ihereinafter, collectively, the Shigekanes], Midkiff, and Myers
petitioned the LUC to amend the land use district boundary for
approximately 9.917 acres situated in an area known as Nu'uanu,
in Honolulu, Hawai'i (the 1989 boundary amendment petition). The
Shigekanes, Midkiff, and Myers sought to anend the land use
district boundary from "Conservation Land Use District Boundary"
(conservation district) to “Urban Land Use District Soundary*
(urban district). ‘The approximately 9.917 acres consist of two
adjoining homesteads assigned tax map key (TMK) numbers: (2) 2-
2-88:02; and (2) 2-2-55:04. TMK #2-2-55:02 is owed by the
Shigekanes and their family (the Shigekane Parcel) .* Midkiff and
Myers, who are brother and sister, each hold an undivided one-

half interest in TMK #2-2-55:04 (the Midkiff /Myers Parcel)

 

thereinafter, the shigekane Parcel and the Midkift/Myers Parcel

 

are collectively referred to as the Property]. The Shigekane

Parcel consists of approximately 5.104 acres, and the

Midkiff/Myers Parcel consiate of the remaining 4.613 acres

> Inassuch as the Shigekanes were excused from the LUC proceeding
underlying the instant secondary appeal and there were no objections from any
SEthe’pecties, the Shigekane Parcel is not at issue in this case. The

Sf Sbeahes elica a tatenent of nonparticipation with the circuit court on May
5, 2004.

 
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Reclassification of the Property was sought to enable
the Shigekanes, Midkiff, and Myers “to subdivide the Property,

construct both replacement and new hou

 

on the Property, and
make such other repair and inprovenents of the existing units in
a manner ordinarily and customarily allowed for urban residential
uses and thereby provide house lots or hones for their children.”
‘The LUC conducted a hearing on the 1989 boundary amendment
petition on July 27, and 28, 1989.

on Novenber 9, 1989, the LUC entered ite findings of
fact (FOFs), conclusions of law (Cols), decision, ‘and order,
approving the reclassification of the Property from conservation
district to urban district (the November 1989 order). The LUC

found that,

[in order to provide reasonable assurance to the [LUC] that
the proposed development is a family enterprise to provide
housing for the family members and nota comercial
enterprise for speculation, (che Shigekanes, Midkiff, and
fyere) have represented that they are willing to be
Subjected to a condition that mesbers of the fanii[ies] of
{the shigekanes, Midkite, and Myerel, respectively, would
have a right of first refusal to purchase if any interest in
the Property were sought to be sold.

 

 

Indeed, the LUC imposed the following relevant conditions on

Midkiff and Myers:

4, That [hidkiff and Myers] shall agree to a
covenant, said covenant to run with the land and in a form
Sgreeable to the office of State Planning that. with respect
£0 the Midkitt/Myers (Plarcel (TMK: 2-2-85:04), for a period
fof 20 years after the date of this (olrder, if (Midkiff] or
(tyers) desires to sell or convey all or portions of thelr
in saic parcel, he or she shall tizer
Senvey such interest to any of his of her children as the
and if any of the children #0 acquiring said
interest desires to sell or convey all or portion(el of
their interest in saa parcel, they ehall first offer such
interest in the parcel to their eiblings and/or [idkit#]

 

 

 

 

 

 
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land [Myers], as the case may be, however, provided, that the

folder of interest in the Midkit#/myers (Plarcel may
mortgage the interest at any time. (/]

 

 

8." ithe shige
the Property in aubstaneial compliance with
ade to the (Lic) in obtaining the reclassific
Property

(emphasis added.)

 

wnee, Midkiff, and Myers] shall develop
presentations

    

Sometime in 2000 -- approximately eleven years after
the Novenber 1989 order -- the Hui was formed in order to ‘care
for and serve as a steward of Kaniakapupu, the historic ruins of
the royal summer cottage of Kamehameha III." . Kaniakapupu is
located on property owned by the State that shares common
boundary with, and ie situated, approximately 200 to 300 feet
from, the Midkiff/Myers Parcel.

on August 21, 2002, Myere listed 2.32 acres of the
Midkiff/Myers Parcel for sale to the public with the Multiple
Listing Service (MLS) for $12,000,000. On January 20, 2003,
Myers listed an additional 20,001 square feet of the
Midkif£/Myers Parcel for sale to the public with the MLS.

1. ‘The LUC Proceeding

on April 21, 2003, the Hui filed a “Motion for an Order
to Show Cause Regarding Enforcement of Conditions,
Representations, or Commitments” (motion for an order to show
cause) pursuant to Hawai'i Administrative Rules (HAR)

2g wimilar condition vai
to the shigexane Parcel

iso imposed on the Shigekanes with respect

 

 
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§§ 15-15-70" and 15-15-93, The Hui sought to have the LUC
ieeue an order to show cause as to why the classification of the
Midkif£/Myers Parcel should not be reverted to conservation

district. Generally, the Hui contended that Myers! failed to

 

“RAR § 15-15-70, entitled "Motions," provides in pertinent part:

(a) Any party may make motions before, during, oF
after the close of @ hearing:

(b) “All motions, other than those made during a
hearing, shall:

ti) be in writings

(2) State the grounde for the motion;

(3) Set forth the relief or order sollght; and

(4) Be accompanied by @ menorandun in support of the

notion, if the motion involves a question of
Taw.

(c) Every notion, except one entitled to be heard ox
parte, shall indicate whether « hearing 1s requested on the
Roticn.” If a sotion requires the consideration of facts not
fppearing of record, ir shall be supported by an affidavit
or aftidavite:

 

is)” it a nearing ta requested, the executive officer
ehall get a date and tine for hearing 'on the notion.

(G) Tf a bearing on the motion ie not requested, the
[uuc) may decide the matter upon the pleadings, menoranda,
and other docunents filed with the [0c]

 

 

5 HAR § 15-15-93, entitled *Rnforcenent of conditions, repre
or commitments," provides in relevant pare

 

(a) Any party or interested person my file a notion
with the (LUC) ‘requesting an issuance of an order fo show
Cause upon a showing that chere has been a failure to
perform a condition, representation, cr comitsent on the
part of the petitioner. The party or person shall sleo
Berve a copy of the motion for an order to show cause upon
any person bound by the condition, representation, or
Commicnent. The notion for an order to show cm
state:
(2) The interest of the movant:
(2) The ressons for filing the motion;
(3) A description and a map of the property affected
bythe condition;
(4) The condition ordered by the [UUC] which has not
been performed or eatistied;
(5) Coneisely and with particularity the facts,
supported by an affidavit, giving tive to
Belief that a condition ordered by the LUC) has
not been performed oF satisfied: and
(6) The specific relief requested.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
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perform her representations and commitments and the conditions of
the Novenber 1989 order by Listing portions of the Midkift/Myers
parcel for sale to the public with the MLS. The Hui apparently
believed that Myers violated Condition No. 4 of the Novenber 1989
order. Ta addition, ‘the Hui alleged that Midkiff and Myers
srepiestnted and made commitments that their property was not
going to be used for conmercial venture, but rather{,] they
sought reclassification for ‘family use purposes|:]'*
Furthermore, the Hui expressed concerns that selling portions of
the Midkiff/Myers Parcel ‘will result in the influx of many new
people to the Kaniakapupu site and further endanger the
preservation efforts carried out to date.” The Hui requested a
hearing on its otion for an order to show cause pursuant to HAR
§ 15-15-70(c)

In a faceimile dated April 24, 2003 and sent on April
28, 2003 from Myers to her listing agent, Myers withdrew her
Listings with the MLS. On January 7, 2004, Myere submitted her
memorandum in opposition to the Hui’s motion for an order to show
cause, which Midkiff joined on the same day. Myers stated that
she had complied with Condition No. 4 by first offering the MLS-
Listed portion of the Midkif£/Myers Parcel to Midkiff. Moreover,
wyers contended that, inasmuch as the purpose of the instant
proceeding was to consider the Hui's motion for an order to show

cause, *[alny evidence or issues presented to the [LUC] about

 
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Kaniakapupu . . . is irrelevant to the purpose of [the]

proceeding.”

‘The LUC held a'hearing on the #ui's motion for an order
£0 show cause on January 15, 2004 (the January 2004 hearing). At
the conclusion of the January 2004 hearing, the LUC orally voted”
to deny the Hui'e motion on the basis chat the Hui had not net
its burden of denonstrating a failure to perform a condition,
representation, or commitment on the part of Myers. On March 25,
2004, the LUC entered its written order denying the Huis motion
for an order to show cause. The LUC surmarized the argunents

advanced by the Hui and Myers as follows:

[The Mui) argued chat an [older to [e)how (clause
should be {asued because Ridkit£/myere failed to comply with
Fepresentations and comitnents made to the [Le] curses the
original proceedings (iua., the proceedings relating tothe
3588 boundary amendment petition) Ie argued that the (LUC)
granted a “conditional” reclassification of the (property!
from the (clonservation (glistrict to ehe (ulean (@) istrict
because [Midkiff and Myers) represented that they vere
seeking the reclassification for continued family
Fesidential use through existing and new structures. (Th
ial] further argued ehat the listing of the Midkift Myers
(Blarcel() for sale showed that Midkift/Myere had failed the
commitment to keep the (Midkiff/Myers Parcel] in family
Feuldential use. The renedy that (the Mul] seeks ia the
reversion of the Midkitf/myers [Parcel] of the [Property]
from the (u)xban (a) ietrict to the [elonservation
(alistrict.

{The Mui} acknowledged that condition No{]. 4. . . of
the (ovenner 1989 order] restricted the eale of the
[idkite/myers Parcel] for twenty (20) years from the
issuance of the [Novenber 1965 order], Unless 2 right of
first retusal amongst [Midkiff/myers] ‘and their successor
are offered prior to any sale of the (P]roperty outalde the
families.

 

 

 

  

   

 

 

 

 

{rie'mut] acknowledged that Midkiff /Myers complied
with the Fight of fire: refusal requirenents, But it argued
That despite the compliance of Midkitf/myere with this
requirenent, they failed in their representations to the

 
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[uue} by listing the (Mdki¢f/myers Parcel) for sale
pursuant to Condition ilo. 6.4)

iisdkiei/myere . . . opposed the {mui's motion for an
order to show cause) on the following bas(ele: (1) (the
Rail dove not have standing to file the (notion for an order
fo show cause) because it 12 not an adjacent ‘landomer: (2)
{ene fui) has not alleged any injury; and (3) the "[2C’s]
jurisdiction da in the area of the Property] and not off-
ite at Keniakapups. ‘aleo, MiGkifE/Myere stated chat |,
Tehey] withdrew the isting(.]

 

 

The LUC then stated:

‘The (Luc) discussed
compliance with Condition lo. hse the
ferent of the condition was Co enforce the representations
Of [iiidkite and Myers) to Keep the [Mickift/Myers Parcel]
for family use purposes. It determined that the offer of
firet refusal cequirenent wae satisfied, but it raised the
Concerns that the $12,000,000 listed sales price in relation
Eovcurrent infrastructure conte and tax assessment of che
[uiGkift/Myere Parcel] called into question the sincerity of
the offer and refusal on. the Price between Myers and
Midkiee; and if the [Midkiff /myers Parcel) were sold for

hear the list price the significant financial gain would be
Contrary to. [Midkit#'e and Myera'] representations.

ations of

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ghioigh the evidence and arguments provided by (the
ui) and the parties, the [WUC] was concerned that the [Huil
id not meet ite burden() in demonstrating chat
Midkift/Myere had not satiefles Condition Nos. 4 and 8. The
{Luc} ackzowledged that the (elotion (for an order to show
Cause] vas not Fipe because of the withdrawal of the
Nsakite/uyers (P]arcel from the listing.

Finally, the LUC stated that it was denying the Hui's motion for
an order to show cause pursuant to HAR § 15-15-93, gee supra note
5
2. Appeal to the Circuit Court
on February 12, 2004, before the LUC entered its
weitten order denying the Hui’s motion for an order to show

cause, the Hui filed a notice of appeal with the circuit court.

 

«As previously indicated, condition No. 8 provided that the
Shigekanes, Woakitf, and Myere “shell develop the Property in substantial
Compliance with representations nade to the [LUC] in obtaining the
feclaselfication of the Property.”

 

 
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on March 29, 2004, the circuit court, dismi:

 

sd the appeal for
non-compliance with Hawai'l Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP)

Rule 72 (2004) (xelating to appeals to a circuit court) inasmuch
as the Hui failed to timely file the designation ct the record on
appeal and the statement of the case. On April 5, 2004, the Hui
filed another notice of appeal with the circuit court pursuant to

HRS §§ 91-14,’ 205-4 (2001),* HAR § 15-15-93, and HRCP Rule 72.

 

RS § 91-14, entitled “Judicial review of contested cases,” provides
Am relevant parts

na contented case oF Dy a preliminary ruling of the nature:
Ehat deferral of review pending entry of a subsequent final
Geciaion vould deprive appellant of adequate relief ta

ed-to-iudietal revi but
fothing tn This section shall be Geoned to prevent Feaort to
Other beans of review, redress, relief, or trial de nova,
Sncluding the right of trial by jury, provided by law.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the
contrary, for the purposes of this section, the term “person
Sogrieved" shall include an agency that ie a party to =
contested case proceeding before that agency Or another
agency.

 

 

 

(Bnphasie added.)

 

(a) Any department or agency of the state, any
department oF agency of the county in which the’ land is
Situates, oF any person with « property interest in the land
Sought to be reclassified, may petition the (LUC] for =
change in the boundary of a district.

 

isi Patties to proceedings to amend land use district
boundaries may obtain judicial review thereof in the manner
bet forth in section Si-lé, provided that the court may also
‘or modify a finding Of the [LUC] if such finding
te be contrary to the clear preponderance of the

 

 

  

the Mul maintained that ite notion for an order to
constitutes a "petition for reclassification,” i,e., a petition for
Boundary anendnent, However, the Hul now concedes that its notion for an
order to sho cause “ie not @ petition for boundary anendnent." Ac such, the
Mai could not file ite notice of appesl pursuant to HRs § 205-4

 

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on April 27, 2004, the circuit court entered an order withdrawing
its notice of dismissal of the Hui’s appeal.

on July 21, 2004, the Hui filed its opening brief with
the circuit court. The Hui contended that it had standing to
bring the appeal inasmich ae “the rights of native Hawaiians are’
a matter of great public concern in Hawai'." Specifically, the
Hui argued that development of the Midkiff/Myers Parcel would
endanger Kaniakapupu and ancient burial mounds that lie across &
stream to the south of the Midkiff/myers Parcel. The Hui also
contended that the LUC erred in concluding that its motion for an
order to show cause was not ripe because (1) the doctrines of
ripeness and mootness apply only to Article III courts and not to
state courts or administrative agencies and (2) Myers ‘definitely
and concretely intend{ed] to place her property on the market.”
tn addition, the Hui argued that the LUC erred in concluding that
Ae did not meet ite burden of demonstrating that Myers failed to
perform a condition, representation, or commitment. The Hui
contended that it “presented more than sufficient facts to give
rise to a xeason to believe that [Myers] ha(d] failed to perform
a condition, representation, or commitment.”

on August 30, 2004, the LUC filed its answering brief
with the circuit court in which the Office of Planning joined on
che sane day. The LUC argued that the circuit court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the Hui’s appeal
inasmuch as the Hui was not “aggrieved by a final decision and

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order in a contested case’ as required by HRS § 51-14.
specifically, the LUC contended that the Hui was not an
saggrieved person’ because: (1) the Hui was not a. party to the
proceeding that resulted in the Novenber 1969 orde#; (2) the
proceeding that considered the Hui's motion for an order to show
cause was not a “contested case’ as defined in HRS § 91-14; and
(3) the Hui did not have standing to prosecute the motion for an
order to show cause. The LUC further contended that, even

assuming arguendo that the instant case is a contested case, the

Hui's motion for an order to show cause is moot because “the
record shows that Myera complied with the requirenents of
Condition [No.] 4 prior to listing" the property at issue.
According to the LUC, *[t}here is in the record an offer to sell
the property to. . . Midkiff and his refusal to buy it." As
such, the LUC maintained that it did not have reason to believe
that there had been a failure to perform a condition,
representation, or commitment on the part of Myers. Finally, the
WC argued that the Hui’s native Hawaiian practices and rights

are not implicated because

tthe record ie bare of any evidence that Midkif£/ (Myers)
Enrough the actions of myera have prevented. [the Hii] from
exercising customary rights over the property that is
Subject to che LUc's jurisdiction, i.e., the Shigekane
[Parcel] and [the Midkiff/Myers Parcel. The LUC has no
Juriediceion over Fantakapupu ie te State land chat
Se within the conservation aie: tthe subject
of @ past or pending land use proceeding under HRS chapter
os. “Jurisdiction over conservation district lands are
wiehin the purview of the Depertnent of Land and Natural
Resources. ‘Furthermore, (the Hul’s) action ie not in the
ature of a boundary reclassification petition. (See supra
Bote 6]. The LUC's obligation to consider Hative Hawaiian

 

  

 

 

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rights ie in petitions for boundary amendnente, Thus, (the
folvs] attempe to inject a Native Hawaiian rights issue into
thie proceeding 1s inappropriate.

 

Myers filed her answering brief with the circuit: court
on August 30, 2004, which Midkiff joined on September 2, 2004.

Myers contended that’ the appeal should be dismissed becau

 

(1) the cd#cuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the
ui lacked standing; and/or (2) the Hui failed to meet ita burden
of making a showing that the 1UC’s valid decision to deny the
fui's motion for an order to show cause was clearly erroneous.
speéitically, Myers argued that the circuit court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction’ inasmich as there was no contested case
hearing from which an appeal could be taken. Moreover, Myers
contended that the Hui

nisinterpreted Condition No. 4, stating that condition No. 4
Goes not promibit, (her) from listing ber [property] for

SS oGorobo. fa fact, nothing in Condition Ino.) 4 prevents
the gale of the Midkift/Myers Parcel. Condition (No.1 4
Gely requires that Midkiff and Myers agree to offer their
Shegrest in the property to each cther if either desires to
sell ail or a portion of the property within 20 years of the
Tlovenber 1989 order]

 

 

 

on September 9, 2004, the Hui filed its reply brief
with the circuit court. The Hui contended that the circuit court
did not lack subject matter jurisdiction inasmuch as the January
2004 hearing was a contested case hearing.

court heard oral

 

on September 22, 2004, the circ
argument on the Hui’s appeal at which time the parties

essentially reiterated the argunents made in their briefings to

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the circuit court. At the conclusion of the partie

 

arguments,

the circuit court stated:

X need to look wore closely again at the single ‘eae that
was in sy mind before I cane in and that is voether on the
fotion for the (order to show cause] that ie a required
Contested case hearing, and definitely agree that it is
not required co be a contested case hearing unless thst is .
fo say by statute or rule and, therefore, the only basis for

it having to be {a} contested case is the conetitutional

Fights watch (ehe Mui's counsel) hag argued. And 07 need

fo think about that's bit more.

 

 

 

   

The circuit court, therefore, requested additional briefing on
the issue whether there was a constitutional right to a due
process hearing on the Hui’s motion for an order to show cause.

on October 6, 2004, the LUC filed its supplenental
menorandum, joined in by the Office of Planning, as requested by
the circuit court. The LUC argued that the issue before the
circuit court “does not involve the exercise of traditional or
customary rights by native Hawaiians on land that is subject to
the jurisdiction of the LUC." Rather, the LUC maintained that
the “only matter before [the circuit] court is the Luc’s ruling
that it did not believe there was sufficient information to
justify the issuance of an order to show cause that a violation
of conditions or representations in the original 1989 proceeding
had occurred justifying a reversion of the land (the
Midkite/Myere and Shigekane Parcels) to the prior conservation
classification.”

Also on October 6, 2004, the Hui filed its supplemental

memorandum as requested by the circuit court. The Hui argued
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that it ‘voice[d] its concerns regarding the effects of (Myers’]
failure to perform a condition, representation, or commitment
relat [ing] to the [Novenber 1989 order) grant [ing] her petition
for reclassification on native Hawaiian’s constituticnally-
protected customary and traditional rights[] practiced on the
property abutting [Myers’] property.“

Aso on the same day, Myers filed her supplemental
memorandum as requested by the circuit court.’ Myers maintained
that “[a] contested case hearing . . . is only constitutionally
required if there may be 2 ‘governmental deprivation of =
specific property interest.’* “Myers argued that the Hui “is not
threatened with any governmental deprivation of any specific
benefit that it already possesses. In fact, at oral argument,
[the Hui] claimed that the ‘governmental deprivation’ at issue
was the threat to Myers of reclassification of her land from
urban to conservation. [The Hui,] however, cannot assert an
alleged deprivation of Myers’ interests.” Moreover, Myers
contended that the fact “[t]hat an individual or group has
standing as an aggrieved party under HRS § 91-14 does not mean
that he, she, or it has a property interest under the due process
clause of the [clonstitution.” Stated differently, Myers

essentially contended that the Hui w.

 

impermissibly equating

+ the record does not indicate that Midkiff Joined in Myers’
supplemental nemoranéun.

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wstanding” with ‘a property inti

 

‘est under the due process clause
of the constitution.”

on Novenber 5, 2004, the circuit court entered its
order dismissing the Hui's appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The circuit court stated!

‘The (clourt finds that the [LUC) did not hold a
contested case hearing. The hearing that vas held was an
gency hearing consistent with {HAR] § 15-15-70 governing
Sotions practice and does not mean that a motion filed
ureuant to (HAR) § 15-15-93(a) by [the Wui} as an
“interested party” or by any party requesting an order to

‘ov cause if a contested case hearing. if the notion for
an order to show cause had been granted, then a contested
Gaze Hearing wold nave been requires. The court reject:
{the Mui's} attenpe to characterize the motion for an order
£0 show cause as petition for boundary anendeent or the
equivalent of a petition for boundary amendnent, requiring a
Contested case hearing, (See gupra note 8)

 

 

   

‘The court concludes that the requirement in (HRs)
5 91-14 that the order appealed from arise from a contested
Zate hearing, hae not been met. As such, this court. lacks
Suriediceion to reach the Leeue of whether a contested case
hearing wae required. fee Pele Defense Fund v. puna

‘venture, 77 Hawai 64, 69 0-10, 881 P-28 1210,
$215 a10 (ise), Tale court can only dismiss the appeal
and therefore doce 0

 

 

Also on Novenber 5, 2004, the circuit court entered final
judgment in favor of Appellees. The Hui timely appealed to this
court on December 3, 2004.
IT. STANDARD OF REVIEW

~The existence of subject matter jurisdiction ie a
question of law that is reviewable de novo under the right/wrong
standard.” Aanes Funding Corp. v. Mores, 107 Hawai'i 95, 98, 110
P.34 1042, 1045 (2005) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and
citations omitted). *If a court lacks jurisdiction over the

subject matter of a proceeding, any judgment rendered in that

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proceeding is invalid, Therefore, such a question is valid at
any stage of the case, and though a [circuit] court is found to
have lacked jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction here on appeal,
not of the merits, but for the purpose of correcting an error in
jurisdiction." Bush v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 76 Hawai'i 128,
133, 870 P.24 1272, 1277 (1994) (internal quotation marks,
brackets, and citation omitted)

III. DISCUSSION
Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Hui contends that the circuit court erred in

 

concluding that the January 2004 hearing was not a contested case
hearing, The Hui argues that the January 2004 hearing met all
the requisite elenents in order to constitute a contested case
hearing pursuant to HRS § 91-14, and, thus, the Hui was entitled
to judicial review of the LUC's decision denying the Hui’s motion
for an order to show cause. Myers contends that the circuit
court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. Myers argues that the January 2004 hearing did
not constitute a contested case and that, therefore, the Hui has
no right to judicial review. similarly, the LUC contends that

its order “denying [the Hui‘s] motion for an order to show cause

he record does not indicate that Midkiff filed a
or joined in wyers’ answering brief.

 

answering brief

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was not a final decision and order in a ‘contested case:

 

required by HRS § 91-14
CHRS § 91-14(a) provides the means by which judicial

review of administrative conti

 

ted cases can be obtained. Among
its prerequisites, the section requires that a contested case
must have occurred before appellate jurisdictign may be
exercised." pele Defense Fund v, Puna Geothermal Venture, 77
Hawai'i 64, 67, 681 P.2d 1210, 1213 (1994) (citation omitted).
HRS § 91-1(5) (1993) defines a “contested case” as "a proceeding
in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific
parties are required by law to be determined after an opportunity
for agency hearing." HRS § 91-1(6) (1993), in turn, defines an
“agency hearing" as “such hearing held by an agency inmediately
prior to @ judicial review of = contested case as provided in
section 91-14." Thus, “[a] contested case is an agency hearing
that 1) is required by law and 2) determines the rights, duties,
or privileges of specific parties." Bub, Access Shoreline

Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 79 Hawai'i 425, 431,
903 P.2d 1246, 1252 (1995) (internal quotation marke and citation

omitted) (emphasis added) [hereinafter, PASH] .

2% the Office of Planning filed a joinder in the Wc
fon June 2, 2008.

anevering brief

 

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Required by Law"

 

In order for an agency hearing to be "required by law,"
it may be required by (1) agency rule, (2) statute, ‘or
(3) constitutional due process. Id. Accordingly, we first
address whether the January 2004 hearing was required by agency
rule, statute, or constitutional due process.

‘The Hui contends that the January 2004 hearing was
required by the HAR. Specifically, the Hui argues that HAR § 15-
15-70 mandated the January 2004 hearing. Myers contends that. HAR
§ 15-15-70 “does not authorize a contested case hedring on a
motion for an order to show cause.” Moreover, Myers argues that
sa] hearing is required only if the order to show cause is
granted, see [HAR] § 15-15-93(c), (*] but there is no statutory
or administrative rule requiring a hearing on the motion for an
iseuance of an order to show cause."

‘his court has stated that, *{iJf the .. . rule
governing the activity in question does not mandate a hearing
prior to the administrative agency's decision-making, the actions
of the administrative agency are not ‘required by law’ and do not

amount to “final decision or order in a contested case’ from

 

2 HAR § 15-15-93 (6) provi

‘The [LUC] shall conduct & hearing on an order to show
je in accordance with che requirenents of subchapter 7,
wore applicatle. Any procedure in an order to show cause
saring may be modified or waived by stipulation of the
Bereics and informal disposition may be made in any case by
GElpulation, agreed settlenent, consent order, oF default

 

 

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which a direct appeal to circuit court is possible.” Bush, 76
Hawai'i at 134, 870 P.2d at 1278 (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original). As previously stated, the Hui brought: its motion for
an order to show cause pursuant to, inter alia, HAR § 15-15-70.
HAR § 15-15-70, dealing with motions in‘general, provides in
relevant part:

(c) Every motion, except one entitled to be heard ex

arte, shall indicate vhether a hearing ie requested on the

motion. Tf a motion requires the consideration of facts net

appearing of record, it shall be supported by an affidavit,
oF atfidavice.

 

a)” it 4 nearing te requested, the executive officer shall
fet a date and tine for hearing on the motion.

G) Tf @ hearing on the motion ie not requested, the {LX}
say decide the matter upon the pleadiags, memoranda, and
other documents filed with the (ise).

 

(Bold emphases added.) HAR § 15-15-70(4) plainly states that,
once a hearing is requested, the executive officer mst set a

date and time for the hearing on the motion. In other words, if
a motion is accompanied by a request for a hearing, the tC must

the LUC does not

 

conduct a hearing on the motion. Inasmuch
have any discretion to determine whether to hold a hearing once a
hearing is requested and the Hui did request a hearing on its
motion, the January 2004 hearing was required by HAR § 15-15-70.
CL. Lingle v. Hawai'i Gov't Employees Ass'n, APSCME, Local 152,
107 Hawai'i 178, 184, 111 P.3d $87, 593 (2005) (stating that
“discretionary hearings are not contested cases because they are

not required by law*). Thus, the January 2004 hearing was

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srequired by law." However, as previously stated, ‘to
constitute a contested case, an agency hearing must be required
by law and determine the rights, duties, or privileges of
specific parties. PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 431, 903 Pi2d at 1252.
Accordingly, we next address whether the January 2004 hearing
determined the rights, duties, or privileges of specific
parties.

Determination of the Rights, Duties, or Privileges of
Specific Partie

 

‘The Hui contends that “the January 2004 hearing
determined the righta, duties, and privileges of specific
parties. (Capital letters altered.) Specifically, the Hui
argues that the January 2004 hearing “determined the Huis
members’ right and privilege to protect their [nJative Hawaiian
cultural and traditional practices from the activities on
IMidkiff’s and Myers’] neighboring property, and their right and
privilege to protect the historical ruins of Kaniakapupu.” The
Hui also argues that the January 2004 hearing determined
[widkife’s and Myers’) duty to use their property consistent with

their representations and conmitments made in 1989 with the

although Myers Je correct that HAR § 15~15-93(c) mandates = hearing
on an order to show cause, WA § 15-15-93 is eilent on whether a_motion for an
sem oe eehu cause requires « hearing. However, a6 discussed gupra, HAR

PF oeliscre, governing the general practice of motions, is applicable in
S.ch:2hiing Gkceher the Lue ie required to hold « hearing on a motion.

M secause the Mul's motion for an order to show cause requested
pearing ani there is @ regulatory mandate that the UC hold @

pearing $24 tquested, we feed not address whether the January 2004 hearing was
Ridacza by statute or constitutional due process,

 

 

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conditions the LUC imposed on [Midkiff and Myers] in 1989."
Furthermore, the Hui Claims that the January 2004 hearing
“determined (Midkiff’s and Myers’) right to maintain their
property as an (urban district], rather than having it revert to
[conservation district.]* Myers contends that, *[cJontrary to
[the Hui’s] bald assertion(,]* the January 2004 hearing did not
determine the rights, duties, and privileges of ‘specific parties.
Instead, Myers asserts that “(alt issue at the January [2004]
hearing on [the Hui's motion for an order to show cause] was
whether [the Hui] had met its burden of demonstrating that

- [Myers] failed to perform a condition, representation, or
commitment. Even if the [LUC] had found that [the Hui] had made
a sufficient showing, the [LUC], at most, could have issued an
order to show cause.”

In the instant case, the subject matter of the January

2004 hearing was Myers’ compliance or non-compliance with her
representations or commitments made during the proceeding
involving the 1989 boundary amendment petition and the condition
imposed by the November 1989 order. If the LUC had determined
that it *ha[d] reason to believe that there had been a failure to
perform according to the conditions imposed, or the
representations and commitments made by (Myers]," then the LUC
would have issued an "order to show cause why the property should
not revert to its former land use classification or be changed to

@ more appropriate classification[]* to Myers. HAR

 

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§ 15-15-93(b). In other words, the only determination the LUC

was required to make when hearing the instant motion for an order
to show cause was whether it had reason to believe that Myers had
failed to perform (1) according to the conditions ‘imposed by the
Novenber 1989 order or (2) any representations or commitments
made that led to the Novenber 1989 order. As such, the LUC was
not. required to -- and, therefore, did not -- determine the Hui’s
rights and privileges to protect their native Hawaiian cultural
and traditional practices at Kaniakapupu

Moreover, the possible reversion of Myers’ property to
conservation district was not at stake in the instant motion for
an order to show cause inasmuch as the LUC could not revert
Myers’ property to its former land use classification; ices,
conservation district, on a motion for an order to show cause.
only if the LUC had granted the motion would the LUC have issued
to Myers “an order to show cause why the property should not

revert to ite former land use cl.

 

ification or be changed to a
more appropriate classification.” HAR § 15-15-93(b). Stated
differently, the Hui’s motion for an order to show cause was
essentially a threshold motion or procedural vehicle to obtain a
show cause hearing in order for the LUC to determine the rights,
duties, or privileges of specific parties. Furthermore, the LUC

did not determine Myers’ and Midkiff’s “duty to use their

 

property consistent with their representations and commitments
nade in 1989" at the January 2004 hearing on the motion for order

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to show cause. Rather, the November 1989 order, wherein the LUC
granted the 1989 boundary amendment petition, “determined” myers’

and Midkiff’s “duty” to use their property consistent with the
representations and commitments that they made during the hearing

on the 1989 boundary amendment petition. In other words, the

most the LUC determined at the January 2004 hearing was that

Myers and Midkiff did not breach their duties set forth in the
November 1989 order. Consequently, the purpose of the January

2004 hearing was clearly not to determine the rights, duties, or
privileges of specific parties. Cf. Ko'olau Agric. Co. v. Comm'n
on Water Res, Mamt,., 83 Hawai'i 484, 493 & 496, 927 P.2d 1367,

1376 & 1379 (1996) (holding that, designation of water management
area, unlike water use permitting, does not determine the legal
rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties because, inter

alia, respective rights of water users are not required to be
determined). Thus, the January 2004 hearing did not constitute a
contested case for the purposes of obtaining judicial review

pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a). Accordingly, we hold that the

circuit court did not err in dismissing the Hui's appeal for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction."

® The Hui also raises on appeal that the circuit court erred in
concluding that it has jurisdiction only over orders arising from a “cont:
Gaze hearing.” The sui apparently argues that jurisdiction ie Limited to
final orders issued in contested gages, not contested case hearings. However,
ae discussed supra, “{al contested case is an agency hearing that 2) is
Fequired by law and 2) devernines the rights, duties, oF privileges of
specific partion." BAG. 79 Hawaii at 423, 903 Pad at 1082, (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted) (enphases added). As euch, the Huis
contention is without merit

 

ot

 

   

 

 

(continued...)

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B. The Huis Rema: nti
1. ‘The Circuit Court’s Conclusion that it Lacked Subject

Matter Jurisdiction to Determine Whether the Hui was

Entitled to a Contested Case Hearing

‘The Hui maintains that the circuit court erred in
concluding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to
determine whether the Hui was entitled to a contested case
hearing. ‘The Hui argues that, “inasmuch as no contested case
hearing was held, it mst be decided whether a contested case
hearing should have been held." (Citation omitted.) In support
of its foregoing contention, the Hui relies on International
Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades v, Befitel, 104 Hawai'i
275, 88 P.3d 647 (2004) [hereinafter, International Brotherhood]

 

the Hui asserts that a contested case hearing should have been

held because the Hui ‘met its burden of showing that there [wals
a reason to believe that . . . Myers failed to perform according
to the conditions the LUC imposed and failed to perform the

representations or commitments she made to the Luc[.]* Stated

29(. continued)

pudisfaore, the ui contends that, inasmuch as its sotion for an order
to show cause vis'a part of” the 2989 boundary amendment petition, the LUC's
SoniROMEMES notion tor ga order to show cause "is a final decision and order
Se Alogteated case." (Citing HRS § $1-14(a).)_ For purposes of HRS
EPL SOUS Ehis"coure has defines “final order” to mean van order ending the
f22it4itgs, leaving nothing further to be accomplished. Consequently, an
proceedings: final Te che righta of a party involved remain undetermined or if
order fer is retained fer further action.” Gealon v. Keala, 60 Haw. £13,
eRe "EEC 20 Gli, e2e (2979) (citations omitted). in this case, the “final
$20; .288 Ena order inva contested case" is the Novenber 1989 order that
seeitifraeterained the 1989 boundary snenénent petition, not the Lic’s denial
Einady eit Tnotion fer an ofder to ehow cause, inasmuch as the Novenber 2989
of se Bet fothing further to be accomplished with respect to the 1589
Crder lett dcdment petitions The Hovenber 1909 order, however, is not at
boundary ‘Mevinstacr case. Consequently, the Hui's argument ie without merit.

 

 

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differently, the Hui e

 

ntially argues that its motion for an

order to show cause should have been granted, and, thus, a

 

contested case hearing should have been held thereon.

Myers asserts that “lalppellate courts, upon
determining that they lack jurisdiction'-- or that any other
courts previously considering the case lacked jurisdiction -.
shall not require anything other than a dismissal of the appeal
or action. (Citation omitted.) In support of her foregoing
contention, Myers relies on Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal
Venture, 77 Hawai'i 64, 69 n.10, 881 P.2d 1210, 1215 n.10 (1994).
Myers argued that Pele Defense Fund had criticized an earlier
decision by the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), Simpson v.

Natural Resources, 8 Haw. App. 16, 791

P.2d 1267 (1990), that had remanded a case to an agency with
@irections to hold a contested case hearing when there was no
appellate jurisdiction in the first instance.

In Simpson, the ICA held that a public hearing required
by law is not a contested case where (1) the agency has properly
promilgated specific procedures for a contested case hearing and

(2) a party he

 

failed to follow such procedures. Id, at 24-25,

 

791 P.2d at 1273, The petitioner had applied for a mooring
permit from the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR)
and participated in a public hearing required by law. Id, at 18,
791 P.2d at 1270. The petitioner, however, did not request a
contested case hearing. Id. at 19, 791 P.2d at 1271. After the

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Board of Land and Natural Resources denied the petitioner's
application for a mooring permit, the petitioner tiled a notice
of appeal to the circuit court. Id. The circuit court dismissed
the appeal on the ground that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction inasmuch as there was no final decision from a
contested case. Id, at 19-20, 791 P.2d at 1271.

on appeal, the ICA agreed with the circuit court that
the petitioner's appeal was not fron a contested case. Id. at
3a, 791 P.2d at 1270. However, the ICA reversed and remanded to
the circuit court with a direction to remand to the DLNR for a>
contested case hearing because “the minimun requirenents of
fairness required the DLNR to inform [the petitioner] that

| he had a right to request 2 ‘contested case hearing.‘* Id.

Four years later, this court in Bele Defense Fund
criticized the decision of the court in Simpson to reverse and
remand to the circuit court. This court stated in a footnote:

Although the TCA found that the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction because (the petitioner] did not participate in
2'fontested case, it nonetheless reversed the dismissal of
{che petitioner's) claim and remanded with direction to
fener the matter to the DuNR for a contested case hearing.

 

  

IGkise the -sepesl. “Requiring a remand to the DUNE with
{netractions £0 provide a contested case hearing directly
contradicts the proper finding of a lack of Juriediction in
Simson. Jurisdiction is the base requirenent for any court
‘Soubigering and resolving an appeal or original action.

our cer they 1ack

‘Suriediction =- Gr that_amy ether courte previously
oteidering the esse Iacked iurisdiction =~ shall not

Eeduire anythine other than dismissal of the appeal or
ERR Sitthour surisdiceion a court Ts not Ina position
Eo-coniider the case turther.

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77 Hawai"i at 69 n.10, 661 P.2d at 1215 n.10 (citation and
internal quotation marks onitted) (emphases added); see Bush, 76
Hawai'i at 136, 670 P.2d at 1280 (holding that judicial review by
the circuit court of the agency's denial of the appellants’
request for a contested case hearing as well as review of the
merits of the agency's decision "is unattainable due to a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction").

in the instant case, the #ui essentially argues that it
is entitled to a contested case hearing because its motion for an
order to show cause should have been granted, not denied. As
euch, the Hui essentially requests this court to review the LuC’s
order denying the Hui's motion for an order to show cause and
determine that the LUC erred in denying the Hui's motion. Such a
request, however, “is unattainable due to a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction." Bush, 76 Hawai'i at 136, 870 P.2d at 1280.
As discussed gupra, the January 2004 hearing was not a contested
case hearing for the purpose of obtaining judicial review
pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a) because it did not determine the

rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties. Consequently,

 

the circuit court correctly dismi

 

ed the Hui’s appeal for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, and, “[1lacking jurisdiction, the

circuit court could do nothing but dismiss the appeal.” Pele

4 the WUC concedes that, *(olnly {f the LUC grante « motion and is
an order to show cause would s contested case be conducted." See Lanai Co. ¥.
[and Use Somn'n, 105 Hawai'i 296, 97 P.3d 372 (2004). (reviewing an agency
sane sron an ue decision arising from an order to show cause)

 

 

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Defense Fund, 77 Hawai'i at 69 n.10, 861 P.2d at 1215 n.10
Accordingly, we overrule Simpson to the extent that it required a
remand to the DINR with instructions to provide a contested case

hearing when it lacked jurisdiction to do so.

Moreover, the Hui’s reliance on International
Brotherhood is misplaced. In International Brotherhood, this

court held that the circuit court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction inasmich as a contested case hearing was not
required in the determination by the director of the Department
of Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR) to register an
apprenticeship program pursuant to HRS § 272-4 (1993) (relating
to the establishnent of an apprenticeship counsel which shall sit
in an advisory capacity to the director on matters within the
jurisdiction of the DLIR dealing with apprenticeship programs) .
od Hawai'i at 276, 88 P.3d at 648, This court determined that a
contested case hearing was not required because, inter alia,
approval of the registration request by the director did not
require a constitutionally mandated due process hearing. Id. at
284, 98 P.34 at 656. Inasmuch as thie court concluded that the
circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal, this court did not review the merits of the director's
decision approving the registration request. Id, at 260-82, 88
p.ad at 652-52 (stating that the appellants’ first point of error
that “the circuit court erred in concluding that it had subject
matter jurisdiction pureuant to HRS chapter 91 when the agency

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did not hold a contested case hearing and where none was
required” was dispositive). Ae auch, 2 1004
is consistent with this court's prior holdings in.Pele Defense
Bund and Bush relating to subject matter jurisdiction and,
therefore, does not support the Hui’s contention that the circuit
court erred in concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to
determine whether the Hui was entitled to a contested case
hearing. In other words, International Brotherhood does not
support the proposition that a circuit court may review the
merits of the agency's decision when the circuit court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to HRS

 

§ 91-14(a).*” Thus, we hold that the circuit court did not err
in concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to determine

whether the Hui was entitled to a contested case hearing.

 

wy ime Hui alo cites to Mortensen v. Board of Trustees of Emplovess’
Retirement System, 52 Haw. 212, 473 P-24-B66 (1970), apparently Tn support of
its argunent that the circuit court erred in concluding that it aid net have
Juriediction £0 determine whether it was entitied to a contested case hearing
Im Mortensen, this court held that applicants for accidental disability
Fetirenent Denefits from the Baployees’ Retiresent sytem of the state of
Hawai'i (285) were entitled to trisl-type bearinge at some point an the
administrative process. Although not clearly stated in Mostansan, thie court
Tater noted that

 

 

t ce wi eras
ce conn apilis fits
“contested caseg" within the weaning of the Naval T

Hdministrative Procedure Act, HRS ch. 92" (985). gee
generally (, 52 Haw, at 212, 473 7.24 at 806). As
such, an aggrieved ERS menber has a right to judicis! review
by the circuic court of a final decielen and order of tne
Bis. id. at 215, 473 .2d at #69; gee algo MRS 8 91-18
(2385)

Sitsaalos v. Bd. of Levees" » 74 Maw. 161, 186-87 2.4, 840
P.ad 369 2.4 (1992), Thaemuch ae the January 2004 hearing did gat constituee
2 Contested case, Mortensen is distinguishable from thie cas

 

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2. Alleged Lack of Judicial Review

Lastly, the Hui argues that, *[i]f the [e]ircuit
[clourt has no jurisdiction to determine if an appellant were
entitled to @ contested case hearing after having requested one,
any agency could arbitrarily and capriciously deny anyone a
hearing at any time, regardless of whether such hearing were
required by law, and the aggrieved party could never obtain
judicial review of such denial.” However, in this case, the Hui
did not request a contested case hearing, Indeed, the Hut
concedes that “there is no procedural vehicle for ‘[a]ny party or
interested person’ to obtain a contested case hearing on whether
a petitioner has failed to perform according to the conditions
imposed or has failed to perform according to the representations
or commitments she made[.]" Consequently, the Hui'e assertion is
without merit.

TV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's

Novenber 5, 2004 judgment

on the brief

 

Gerard A. Jervis and
Lissa D. shulte (and
Michael R. Cruise, with
them on the reply briefs),
for appellant-appellant

 

Diane Brickson and
Russell A. Suzuki,
Deputy Attorneys General,
for appellee-appellee

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Comm'n, State
of Hawai'i

Deborah Day Bmerson and
John W. K. Chang,

Deputy Attorneys General,
for appellee-appellee
office of Planning

Donna Y.-L. Leong and
Stacey Kawasaki Djou
(of Cades Schutte LLP) ,
for appellee-appellee
Elizabeth Midkiff myers

No, 26964 Aha Hui Malama © Kaniakapupu v, Land Use
Commission -- Opinion of the Court by Moon, C.J.

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