Case Title: State v. Pegeese

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP000741-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 WI 60 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP741-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Javien Cajujuan Pegeese, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 383 Wis. 2d 601,918 N.W.2d 127 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 31, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 10, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard T. Werner & John M. Wood 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
DALLET, J. concurs, joined by A.W. BRADLEY, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, J. did not participate.     
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Thomas B. Aquino, assistant state public defender. 
There was an oral argument by Thomas B. Aquino. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Aaron R. O’neil, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general of Wisconsin. There 
was an oral argument by Aaron R. O’neil. 
 
 
2019 WI 60
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP741-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF1244) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Javien Cajujuan Pegeese, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 31, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished, per curiam decision of the court of appeals, State 
v. Pegeese, No. 2017AP741–CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. Jun. 21, 2018), affirming the circuit court's1 order denying 
Javien Cajujuan Pegeese's ("Pegeese") postconviction motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  Pegeese claims that the circuit 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Richard T. Werner initially presided, 
accepting Pegeese's guilty plea and sentencing him.  On 
November 17, 2016, the matter was transferred to the Honorable 
John M. Wood, who presided over proceedings regarding Pegeese's 
postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
2 
 
court's plea colloquy was defective under Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
(2015–16)2 and State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986), because the circuit court failed to sufficiently 
explain, and Pegeese did not understand, the constitutional 
rights he would be waiving by entering a plea.  As a result of 
the claimed defects, Pegeese argues that he did not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily enter his plea.  Pegeese seeks to 
withdraw his plea and asks that this court remand to the circuit 
court for an evidentiary hearing under Bangert.  Pegeese also 
requests that this court exercise its superintending authority 
to require circuit courts to, at every plea colloquy, verbally 
advise a defendant of each individual constitutional right being 
waived and verify that a defendant understands the waiver of 
each right.   
¶2 
The State asserts that the circuit court's plea 
colloquy was not defective because a "Plea Questionnaire/Waiver 
of Rights" form ("Form CR-227"), completed by Pegeese with 
counsel 
prior 
to 
the 
colloquy, 
expressly 
listed 
each 
constitutional right Pegeese waived and required Pegeese to 
indicate next to each right that he knew and understood the 
right he was waiving.  The State asserts that the in-court 
colloquy 
otherwise 
ensured 
that 
Pegeese 
was 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily 
waiving 
his 
constitutional 
rights.  The State therefore argues that Pegeese has not met his 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015–16 version, unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
3 
 
burden to show that he is entitled to a Bangert hearing, and 
that 
this 
court 
should 
not 
exercise 
its 
superintending 
authority, as Pegeese proposes, that circuit courts be required 
to personally advise defendants of each constitutional right 
being waived.  
¶3 
The circuit court's colloquy with Pegeese verified 
that the constitutional rights at issue were contained in 
Form CR-227, that Pegeese completed and signed the form with 
counsel, and that he wanted no further time to discuss matters 
with his lawyer.  The colloquy further verified that Pegeese 
comprehended the contents of the form, and he and his lawyer 
acknowledged that he understood each constitutional right he was 
waiving by pleading guilty.  The circuit court concluded that 
Pegeese was "freely, knowingly[,] and intelligently" entering 
his plea.3 
¶4 
We conclude that Pegeese has not met his burden to 
demonstrate that the plea colloquy was defective so as to 
                                                 
3 We note that the transcript from the plea hearing reflects 
that the circuit court used the phrase "freely, knowingly[,] and 
intelligently" in describing Pegeese's plea.  Form CR-227 uses a 
slightly different phrase in the section titled "Attorney's 
Statement," where the defendant's attorney states that the 
defendant 
"is 
making 
this 
plea 
freely, 
voluntarily, 
and 
intelligently."  Neither phrase is inconsistent with the 
"knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently" language this court 
used in State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 251–52, 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986), and this court has more recently used the phrase 
"knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" in numerous cases.  
See, e.g., State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 880 
N.W.2d 659; State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 
N.W.2d 482. 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
4 
 
entitle him to the relief requested.  We further decline to 
exercise our superintending authority to impose a specific 
requirement 
that 
at 
a 
plea 
hearing 
circuit 
courts 
must 
individually recite and specifically address each constitutional 
right being waived and then otherwise verify the defendant's 
understanding 
of 
each 
constitutional 
right 
being 
waived.  
Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶5 
On June 24, 2015, the State filed a criminal complaint 
charging then-16-year-old Pegeese with armed robbery as a party 
to a crime in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 943.32(2) and 939.05.  
The criminal complaint alleged that on April 24, 2015, three 
individuals with their faces covered approached a pizza delivery 
driver, who was making a delivery to a home.  It further alleged 
that one of the individuals ordered the delivery driver on the 
ground, that another individual brandished a pistol and struck 
the delivery driver in the head with the pistol, and that one of 
the three stole $168 in cash and a key fob from the delivery 
driver's pockets.  According to the criminal complaint, police 
learned from the owner of the phone that was used to place the 
order for the pizza delivery that she overheard Pegeese and 
another person talking the next day about how one of them had 
"pistol whipped" the delivery driver. 
¶6 
On August 13, 2015, Pegeese pled guilty to robbery 
with threat of force as a party to a crime, in violation of Wis. 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
5 
 
Stat. §§ 943.32(1)(b) and 939.05.  Prior to the plea hearing, 
Pegeese 
completed 
Form 
CR-227.4 
 
Specifically, 
the 
"Constitutional Rights" section of Form CR-227 states as 
follows:   
I understand that by entering this plea, I give up the 
following constitutional rights: 
I give up my right to a trial. 
I give up my right to remain silent and I 
understand that my silence could not be used 
against me at trial. 
I give up my right to testify and present 
evidence at trial. 
I give up my right to use subpoenas to require 
witnesses to come to court and testify for me at 
trial. 
I give up my right to a jury trial, where all 12 
jurors would have to agree that I am either 
guilty or not guilty. 
I give up my right to confront in court the 
people who testify against me and cross-examine 
them. 
I give up my right to make the State prove me 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
I understand the rights that have been checked and 
give them up of my own free will. 
Waiver of each of these constitutional rights is acknowledged by 
marking the box next to each with an "X." 
                                                 
4 Form CR-227 is a single page, two-sided document.  Circuit 
courts will often attach other documents to the form.  The 
circuit court here attached a document titled "Elements of 
Common Criminal Offenses," which included the elements of the 
offense to which Pegeese pled guilty. 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
6 
 
¶7 
In the form, Pegeese confirmed his understanding of 
his plea agreement with the State:  a joint recommendation of 
three years of probation.  Pegeese acknowledged that he 
understood "the judge is not bound by any plea agreement or 
recommendations and may impose the maximum penalty," and that he 
understood the maximum penalty he faced was 15 years in prison, 
a $50,000 fine, or both.  In the "Voluntary Plea" section of the 
form, Pegeese acknowledged, "I have decided to enter this plea 
of my own free will.  I have not been threatened or forced to 
enter this plea.  No promises have been made to me other than 
those contained in the plea agreement."  
¶8 
Pegeese signed and dated the form, which stated by the 
signature block:  
I have reviewed and understand this entire document 
and any attachments.  I have reviewed it with my 
attorney (if represented).  I have answered all 
questions truthfully and either I or my attorney have 
checked the boxes.  I am asking the court to accept my 
plea and find me guilty.   
Pegeese's attorney also signed the form, acknowledging that he 
discussed the form with Pegeese, believed Pegeese understood the 
form and the plea agreement, and that Pegeese was pleading 
"freely, voluntarily, and intelligently." 
¶9 
During the August 13 plea hearing, the circuit court 
conducted the following plea colloquy with Pegeese: 
THE COURT:  Have you had enough time to talk to 
[your attorney] Mr. Hoag about your cases? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
7 
 
THE COURT:  Has he answered all the questions 
you've had? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  Do you need more time to talk with 
him today? 
THE DEFENDANT:  No, sir. 
THE 
COURT:  Are 
you 
satisfied 
with 
his 
representation? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  You have provided me today with a 
Plea Agreement and Waiver of Rights document; correct? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  That's your signature on the back 
side? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  Did you read that document before you 
signed it? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  Do you understand all the statements 
made in that document? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  Any questions about anything in that 
document? 
THE DEFENDANT:  No, sir. 
THE COURT:  Mr. Hoag, you reviewed the Plea 
Questionnaire with him? 
MR. HOAG:  I read it to him, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  Do you believe he understands it? 
MR. HOAG:  I do. 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
8 
 
THE COURT:  Mr. Pageese [sic], do you understand 
the Constitutional Rights you give up when you enter a 
plea today? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  Any questions about those rights? 
THE DEFENDANT:  No sir. 
¶10 After confirming again with Pegeese's attorney that 
Pegeese's 
plea 
was 
given 
"freely, 
knowingly[,] 
and 
intelligently," 
the 
circuit 
court 
accepted 
the 
plea 
and 
specifically found that Pegeese's plea was "freely, knowingly[,] 
and intelligently made."  The circuit court withheld sentence, 
and instead put Pegeese on probation for three years consistent 
with the parties' joint recommendation. 
¶11 On December 12, 2016, Pegeese filed a motion for 
postconviction 
relief 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
809.30(2)(h), seeking withdrawal of his guilty plea.  Pegeese 
argued 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
plea 
colloquy 
was 
constitutionally deficient because the circuit court failed to 
properly ensure on the record that Pegeese fully understood all 
of the constitutional rights he was waiving when he entered his 
guilty plea.  Specifically, Pegeese asserted that despite 
completing Form CR-227, consulting with counsel, and engaging in 
the plea colloquy with the circuit court, he did not understand 
his constitutional rights to "(1) remain silent or testify, (2) 
use subpoenas to require witnesses to testify, (3) have a jury 
trial where all 12 jurors have to agree on guilt, (4) confront 
and cross-examine people who testify against him, and (5) make 
the [S]tate prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."  As a 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
9 
 
result, Pegeese sought to withdraw his plea and requested an 
evidentiary hearing pursuant to Bangert. 
¶12 On March 31, 2017, the circuit court denied Pegeese's 
motion for postconviction relief.  The circuit court noted that 
the plea colloquy in Pegeese's case was "almost identical" to 
the plea colloquy that occurred in State v. Moederndorfer, 141 
Wis. 2d 823, 416 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1987), where the court of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
plea 
colloquy 
was 
not 
constitutionally defective.  The circuit court determined that a 
hearing was not necessary as both Pegeese and his counsel stated 
at 
the 
plea 
hearing 
that 
they 
went 
through 
the 
plea 
questionnaire, and Pegeese stated that he did not need more time 
to talk with his attorney.  The circuit court noted that Pegeese 
had not attached an affidavit to support his assertions.  The 
circuit court concluded that based on the record, which included 
both the plea colloquy and Form CR-227, Pegeese had not met his 
burden to establish there was a deficiency in the plea hearing 
so as to entitle him to a Bangert hearing.  The circuit court 
noted that it specifically asked Pegeese on the record if he 
read Form CR-227 and understood it, and further ensured that 
Pegeese understood the constitutional rights he was waiving by 
pleading guilty.  The reviewing circuit court further explained 
as follows: 
The Plea Questionnaire, Waiver of Rights form is 
not . . . a substitute for sufficient and adequate 
plea colloquy.  It is a tool to be used to ascertain 
whether or not the defendant understands what he is 
doing by entering a plea.  And I believe that's 
exactly what [the judge who took the plea] did in this 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
10 
 
particular case.  He used that plea colloquy as a tool 
to have this conversation on the record with the 
defendant.  [The judge who took the plea] asked, Did 
you have any questions about those Constitutional 
Rights?  And the defendant said, No, he had no 
questions. 
As a result, the circuit court denied Pegeese's motion for 
postconviction relief and concluded that no Bangert hearing was 
necessary. 
¶13 Pegeese appealed the circuit court's denial of his 
motion to withdraw his plea, asserting the same arguments he 
made before the circuit court.  On June 21, 2018, the court of 
appeals issued an unpublished, per curiam decision affirming the 
circuit court.  Pegeese, No. 2017AP741-CR, unpublished slip op., 
¶1.  Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that "the plea 
colloquy here was adequate as to the constitutional rights.  The 
[circuit] court properly used the plea questionnaire form to 
establish context about those rights, and then asked Pegeese 
directly whether he understood the rights that he was waiving by 
pleading guilty."  Id., ¶17. 
¶14 Pegeese petitioned this court for review, and we 
granted his petition. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 We must determine whether the circuit court's plea 
colloquy was sufficient and whether an evidentiary hearing is 
required.  "'When a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea 
after sentencing, he must prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that a refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea would 
result in "manifest injustice."'"  State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
11 
 
¶24, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482 (quoting State v. Brown, 
2006 WI 100, ¶18, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906).  A defendant 
may show manifest injustice by proving "that his plea was not 
entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily."  Id. (citing 
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 30, ¶18). 
¶16 Where a defendant does not enter his plea knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily, his fundamental due process 
rights are violated such that the defendant is entitled to 
withdraw his plea.  Id., ¶25 (citing State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, 
¶14, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64).  Whether a defendant 
entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is a 
question of constitutional fact that this court reviews de novo.  
Id. (citing Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶14).  "In making this 
determination, this court accepts the circuit court's findings 
of historical or evidentiary facts unless they are clearly 
erroneous."  Id. (quoting Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶14). 
¶17 Whether Pegeese has shown that the plea colloquy was 
deficient such that Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or another mandatory 
plea hearing requirement was violated is a question of law that 
this court reviews independently.  Id., ¶26 (citing Brown, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶21). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶18 Pegeese contends that he should be allowed to withdraw 
his plea because he did not understand the constitutional rights 
he was waiving when he entered his plea.  He argues that the 
circuit court did not sufficiently explain or verify that he 
understood——and 
in 
fact 
he 
did 
not 
understand——the 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
12 
 
constitutional rights he waived by entering a plea.  Pegeese 
asserts that the plea questionnaire alone is insufficient, and 
that the plea colloquy here was deficient because the circuit 
court failed to individually review and specifically address 
each constitutional right and verify that he knew he would be 
waiving each right.  Pegeese argues that he is thus entitled to 
a remand for a Bangert hearing.  In addition, Pegeese asserts 
that this court should exercise its superintending authority to 
"adopt a clear rule that the plea judge has a duty to inform and 
verify that the defendant understands each constitutional right 
waived by the plea."   
¶19 The State argues that the plea colloquy with Pegeese 
was 
sufficient 
and 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
appropriately 
incorporated Form CR-227 into the colloquy.  The State asserts 
that Pegeese has not met his burden, and that his plea was 
entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  The State 
urges this court to decline Pegeese's invitation to impose on 
circuit courts the additional duty when taking a plea, to 
independently review and specifically address the constitutional 
rights being waived.  Alternatively, the State avers that even 
if the circuit court's plea colloquy was deficient, the circuit 
court's error was harmless such that Pegeese still would not be 
entitled to a Bangert hearing.   
¶20 We conclude that Pegeese has not demonstrated the 
right to a Bangert hearing as the circuit court's plea colloquy 
and use of the plea questionnaire sufficiently explained and 
verified that Pegeese did understand the constitutional rights 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
13 
 
he was waiving so as to fulfill the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08 and Bangert.  Accordingly, we need not reach the issue 
of harmless error.  We further decline to exercise our 
superintending authority to impose a specific requirement that 
circuit courts individually recite each constitutional right and 
then otherwise verify the defendant's understanding that those 
rights are waived.  
A.  Plea Colloquy Requirements 
¶21 It has long been recognized that under the Due Process 
Clause, a defendant's guilty or no contest plea must be 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.  State v. 
Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶15, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199 (citing 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)); Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 257.  Wisconsin imposes certain statutory and common 
law duties on circuit courts to ensure that a defendant's plea 
is given knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  See Taylor, 
347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶¶30–31.   
¶22 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 971.08 
sets 
forth 
mandatory 
requirements that must be met before the circuit court may 
accept a defendant's guilty or no contest plea.  Section 971.08 
"is not a constitutional imperative," but rather is a procedural 
statute "designed to assist the trial court in making the 
constitutionally required determination that a defendant's plea 
is voluntary."  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 261.  Among other 
things, circuit courts must "[a]ddress the defendant personally 
and 
determine 
that 
the 
plea 
is 
made 
voluntarily 
with 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
14 
 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the potential 
punishment if convicted."5  § 971.08(1)(a). 
¶23 This court has recognized that circuit courts have a 
number of duties at a plea hearing to ensure that a defendant's 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08 states in full as follows: 
(1)  Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or 
no contest, it shall do all of the following: 
(a)  Address 
the 
defendant 
personally 
and 
determine that the plea is made voluntarily with 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the 
potential punishment if convicted. 
(b)  Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged. 
(c)  Address the defendant personally and advise 
the defendant as follows: "If you are not a citizen of 
the United States of America, you are advised that a 
plea of guilty or no contest for the offense with 
which you are charged may result in deportation, the 
exclusion from admission to this country or the denial 
of naturalization, under federal law." 
(d)  Inquire of the district attorney whether he 
or she has complied with s. 971.095 (2). 
(2)  If a court fails to advise a defendant as 
required by sub. (1)(c) and a defendant later shows 
that the plea is likely to result in the defendant's 
deportation, exclusion from admission to this country 
or 
denial 
of 
naturalization, 
the 
court 
on 
the 
defendant's 
motion 
shall 
vacate 
any 
applicable 
judgment 
against 
the 
defendant 
and 
permit 
the 
defendant to withdraw the plea and enter another plea. 
This subsection does not limit the ability to withdraw 
a plea of guilty or no contest on any other grounds. 
(3)  Any plea of guilty which is not accepted by 
the court or which is subsequently permitted to be 
withdrawn shall not be used against the defendant in a 
subsequent action. 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
15 
 
guilty 
or 
no 
contest 
plea 
is 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary, which include conducting a colloquy to: 
(1)  Determine the extent of the defendant's 
education and general comprehension so as to assess 
the defendant's capacity to understand the issues at 
the hearing; 
(2)  Ascertain whether any promises, agreements, 
or 
threats 
were 
made 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
defendant's anticipated plea, his appearance at the 
hearing, or any decision to forgo an attorney; 
(3)  Alert the defendant to the possibility that 
an attorney may discover defenses or mitigating 
circumstances that would not be apparent to a layman 
such as the defendant; 
(4)  Ensure the defendant understands that if he 
is indigent and cannot afford an attorney, an attorney 
will be provided at no expense to him; 
(5)  Establish the defendant's understanding of 
the nature of the crime with which he is charged and 
the range of punishments to which he is subjecting 
himself by entering a plea; 
(6)  Ascertain personally whether a factual basis 
exists to support the plea; 
(7)  Inform the defendant of the constitutional 
rights he waives by entering a plea and verify that 
the defendant understands he is giving up these 
rights; 
(8)  Establish 
personally 
that 
the 
defendant 
understands that the court is not bound by the terms 
of any plea agreement, including recommendations from 
the district attorney, in every case where there has 
been a plea agreement; 
(9)  Notify 
the 
defendant 
of 
the 
direct 
consequences of his plea; and 
(10)  Advise the defendant that "If you are not a 
citizen of the United States of America, you are 
advised that a plea of guilty or no contest for the 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
16 
 
offense [or offenses] with which you are charged may 
result in deportation, the exclusion from admission to 
this country or the denial of naturalization, under 
federal 
law," 
as 
provided 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(c). 
Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶31 (quoting Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 
¶35). 
B.  Standards For Plea Withdrawal Post-Sentencing 
¶24 Here, Pegeese brings a post-sentencing challenge to 
his guilty plea.  See State v. Booth, 142 Wis. 2d 232, 237, 418 
N.W.2d 20 (Ct. App. 1987) ("[W]e conclude that the withholding 
of 
sentence 
and 
the 
imposition 
of 
probation . . . are 
functionally equivalent to sentencing for determining the 
appropriateness of plea withdrawal.").  As noted previously, to 
withdraw a plea after sentencing, the defendant must show by 
clear and convincing evidence that refusing to allow him to 
withdraw his plea would result in a "manifest injustice."  
Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶24.  Wisconsin courts have delineated 
the following circumstances where a manifest injustice occurs 
such that a plea may be withdrawn post-sentencing: 
(1) 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel; 
(2) 
the 
defendant did not personally enter or ratify the plea; 
(3) the plea was involuntary; (4) the prosecutor 
failed 
to 
fulfill 
the 
plea 
agreement; 
(5) 
the 
defendant did not receive the concessions tentatively 
or fully concurred in by the court, and the defendant 
did not reaffirm the plea after being told that the 
court no longer concurred in the agreement; and, (6) 
the court had agreed that the defendant could withdraw 
the 
plea 
if 
the 
court 
deviated 
from 
the 
plea 
agreement. 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
17 
 
State v. Daley, 2006 WI App 81, ¶20 n.3, 292 Wis. 2d 517, 716 
N.W.2d 146 (quoting State v. Krieger, 163 Wis. 2d 241, 251 n.6, 
471 N.W.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
¶25 In support of his claim for plea withdrawal, Pegeese 
asserts that manifest injustice resulted because he did not 
understand the constitutional rights he waived and his plea was 
unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary.  Where a defendant 
seeks to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea post-sentencing 
due to a claimed error in the plea colloquy, the proper analysis 
has two steps.  Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶27.  We first 
"determine if the defendant should be allowed to withdraw the 
plea because the circuit court violated its duty under Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08 or other court-mandated duty."  Id.  Second, we 
"determine, if necessary, whether the failure to withdraw the 
plea would otherwise result in a manifest injustice."  Id. 
¶26 Defendants such as Pegeese who move to withdraw a plea 
based on a defective plea colloquy have the initial burden to 
meet a two-prong test:  (1) the defendant must "make a prima 
facie showing of a violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or other 
court-mandated duty"; and (2) the defendant must "allege that 
the defendant did not, in fact, know or understand the 
information that should have been provided during the plea 
colloquy."  Id., ¶32 (citing Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274).  In 
order to make a prima facie showing, the defendant may not rely 
on conclusory allegations.  Id.  The defendant "must point to 
deficiencies in the plea hearing transcript" to meet his initial 
burden.  Id.  If the defendant fails to meet his initial burden, 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
18 
 
then the circuit court must deny the defendant's plea withdrawal 
motion.  See id. 
¶27 When a defendant successfully meets both prongs, then 
that defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, also known 
as a "Bangert hearing."  Id.  If a Bangert hearing occurs, the 
burden of proof shifts to the State to show "by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant's plea, despite the 
inadequacy of the plea colloquy, was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary."  Id. (citing Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274).  In 
attempting to meet its burden, "[t]he State may use 'any 
evidence' to prove that the defendant's plea was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary, including any documents in the 
record and testimony of the defendant or defendant's counsel."  
Id. (citing Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274–75).  If the State fails 
to meet its burden at the Bangert hearing, then the defendant is 
entitled to withdraw his guilty or no contest plea.  See id. 
C.  Application Of Legal Principles 
¶28 We now analyze whether Pegeese has made a prima facie 
showing that the circuit court violated a statutory or common 
law duty in conducting the plea colloquy.6  We begin with the 
plea colloquy itself.  Pegeese claims that the plea colloquy was 
deficient because the circuit court violated its duty to "inform 
                                                 
6 Neither party disputes that Pegeese meets his burden as to 
the second prong under Bangert, as he alleges that he failed to 
know or understand the constitutional rights he was waiving by 
entering a guilty plea.  Accordingly, the focus of our analysis 
is on the first prong. 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
19 
 
the defendant of the constitutional rights he waives by entering 
a plea and verify that the defendant understands he is giving up 
these rights".  See Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶31.   
¶29 However, the issue Pegeese raises is not necessarily a 
novel one.  Wisconsin courts have considered the extent to which 
a circuit court may rely on a plea questionnaire.  We now 
examine those cases.  
¶30 In Moederndorfer the court of appeals concluded that 
Moederndorfer was not entitled to a Bangert hearing even though 
the circuit court relied in part on a form instead of 
specifically addressing each constitutional right individually.  
Moederndorfer, 141 Wis. 2d at 831.  Shortly before the plea 
hearing, Moederndorfer completed a three-page "waiver of rights" 
form 
with 
his 
lawyer. 
 
Id. 
 
The 
form 
detailed 
each 
constitutional right being waived, and Moederndorfer initialed 
next to each.  Id. at 827.  At the plea hearing, the State 
entered the form as an exhibit, and the circuit court 
specifically referred to the form during the plea colloquy with 
Moederndorfer.  Id.  The following exchange occurred during the 
plea colloquy: 
THE COURT:  By entering that plea of guilty, 
Mr. Moederndorfer, you give up rights, and these 
rights have been detailed in this three-page waiver of 
rights form.  Your attorney has filed this on your 
behalf.  Have you read this three-page form?  You will 
have to answer out loud, sir. 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  Have you read it this morning? 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
20 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  In fact, you have read it within the 
last 15 minutes, I understand? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  Do you understand what is in these 
three pages, Mr. Moederndorfer? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  Has [your attorney] assisted you in 
understanding what is in these three pages? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  Do you have any questions of me as to 
what is in these three pages? 
THE DEFENDANT:  No. 
THE 
COURT:  Mr. 
Moederndorfer, 
is 
this 
your 
signature on Page 3 of this form? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  Are these your initials in the 
columns of each of these three pages? 
THE DEFENDANT:  That's correct. 
THE COURT:  And these initials signify that you 
have read each of the paragraphs and that you 
understand them before you placed your initials on 
them, is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, Your Honor, on each and 
every one. 
Id. at 828 n.1.  The circuit court accepted the guilty plea and 
sentenced Moederndorfer.  Id. at 825–26.   
¶31 Moederndorfer subsequently moved to withdraw his plea, 
and the circuit court denied Moederndorfer's motion.  Id. at 
826.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, holding 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
21 
 
that [Moederndorfer] did not meet his prima facie 
burden [under Bangert] of showing that the plea 
hearing 
record 
was 
defective. 
 
The 
record 
affirmatively 
demonstrates 
that 
[Moederndorfer] 
understood the constitutional rights he waived and 
understood the nature of the charge of burglary when 
he entered the plea of guilty. 
Id. at 831–32.   
¶32 The court of appeals rejected Moederndorfer's argument 
that the circuit court improperly relied upon the waiver of 
rights form and noted that in fact, defendants may be more 
likely to understand the rights being waived by reading a form 
"in an unhurried atmosphere, as opposed to reliance upon oral 
colloquy in a supercharged courtroom setting."  Id. at 828.  The 
court of appeals further explained: 
A trial court can accurately assess a defendant's 
understanding of what he or she has read by making a 
record that the defendant had sufficient time prior to 
the hearing to review the form, had an opportunity to 
discuss 
the 
form 
with 
counsel, 
had 
read 
each 
paragraph, and had understood each one. 
Id.  The court of appeals reasoned that the circuit court 
expressly referenced the form on the record and inquired 
specifically as to whether Moederndorfer completed the form, 
whether Moederndorfer's attorney assisted him in completing the 
form, 
and 
whether 
Moederndorfer 
understood 
each 
of 
the 
paragraphs in the form.  Id. at 828–30.  The court of appeals 
therefore concluded that the plea colloquy satisfied the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and Bangert. 
¶33 While a waiver of rights form may be used, circuit 
courts are not to rely entirely on the form in a plea colloquy.  
Nearly five years after Moederndorfer, in State v. Hansen, 168 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
22 
 
Wis. 2d 749, 755–56, 485 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1992), the court of 
appeals concluded that the circuit court's complete reliance on 
a plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form rendered the plea 
colloquy defective.  In Hansen the circuit court only asked 
Hansen if he went over the form with his attorney and understood 
the form when he signed it, unlike in Moederndorfer where the 
circuit 
court 
specifically 
asked 
whether 
Moederndorfer 
understood the constitutional rights he was waiving.  Id. at 
752, 755–56.  The court of appeals thus clarified as follows: 
Here, [the circuit court's] personal colloquy with 
Hansen did not include any discussion as to the 
constitutional 
rights 
which 
Hansen 
was 
waiving.  
Instead, the colloquy was limited to whether Hansen 
had gone over the Moederndorfer form with his attorney 
before he signed it and whether Hansen understood the 
form.  We conclude that such limited personal colloquy 
is not the substantive kind of personal exchange 
between the trial court and the defendant which 
Bangert, [Wis. Stat. § 971.08], and Moederndorfer 
require. 
Hansen, 168 Wis. 2d at 755.   
¶34 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
explained 
that 
while 
Moederndorfer's approval of the form "certainly lessened the 
extent and degree of the colloquy otherwise required between the 
trial court and the defendant, it was not intended to eliminate 
the need for the court to make a record demonstrating the 
defendant's understanding that the plea results in the waiver of 
the applicable constitutional rights."  Id. at 755–56.  The 
court of appeals concluded that Hansen's plea colloquy was 
defective because it established only that Hansen had read and 
understood the form, but failed to establish that Hansen 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
23 
 
"understood that by entering his no contest plea he was waiving 
his applicable constitutional rights."  Id. at 756; see also 
State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, ¶¶14–17, 66–73, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 
683 N.W.2d 14 (holding that circuit courts must specifically 
inquire as to whether defendants understand the circuit court is 
not bound by a plea agreement sentence recommendation, and that 
simply asking defendants whether they understand a waiver of 
rights form is not sufficient). 
¶35 Since 
Moederndorfer 
and 
Hansen, 
this 
court 
has 
examined both cases and concluded that they exist in harmony, 
stating as follows: 
Moederndorfer does not support the position that 
so long as the circuit court ascertains that the 
defendant 
generally 
understands 
the 
Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form, the contents of 
that Form may be viewed as intrinsic to the plea 
colloquy.  The circuit court in Moederndorfer used 
substantive colloquy during the plea hearing to 
establish 
Moederndorfer's 
understanding 
of 
the 
information that Moederndorfer claimed on appeal not 
to understand.  As the court of appeals explained in 
Hansen, 
the 
Moederndorfer 
decision 
is 
properly 
interpreted to mean that although use of the Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form "lessen[s] the 
extent and degree of the colloquy otherwise required 
between the trial court and the defendant," the Form 
is "not intended to eliminate the need for the court 
to 
make 
a 
record 
demonstrating 
the 
defendant's 
understanding" of the particular information contained 
therein. 
State v. Hoppe, 2009 WI 41, ¶¶42, 317 Wis. 2d 161, 765 
N.W.2d 794.   
¶36 A plea questionnaire is indeed a useful tool to 
supplement a plea colloquy, but it alone does not replace a plea 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
24 
 
colloquy during which the circuit court must determine whether a 
plea is being made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  
¶37 Contrary to Pegeese's position, we conclude that 
Moederndorfer informs our analysis and that the colloquy that 
occurred here is not defective.  Like the circuit court in 
Moederndorfer, the circuit court here specifically asked Pegeese 
if he read and completed a waiver of rights form——in this case, 
Form CR-227——and also asked Pegeese if he understood the 
entirety of the form and if he had any questions about the form.  
Pegeese responded that he read and completed the form, that he 
understood all of it, and that he had no questions.  The circuit 
court then asked Pegeese's counsel if he reviewed the form with 
Pegeese and if he believed Pegeese understood the form's 
contents.  Pegeese's counsel responded affirmatively to both 
questions.  Somewhat like Moederndorfer but unlike the circuit 
court in Hansen, after addressing Pegeese's attorney, the 
circuit court here directly asked Pegeese, "[D]o you understand 
the [c]onstitutional [r]ights you give up when you enter a plea 
today?"  Pegeese responded affirmatively, and the circuit court 
followed up by asking if he had "[a]ny questions about those 
rights."  Pegeese stated that he had no questions.  This is 
similar to the circuit court asking Moederndorfer whether he 
read and understood each paragraph on the waiver of rights form, 
to which Moederndorfer responded that he had read and understood 
"each and every one."  Moederndorfer, 141 Wis. 2d at 828 n.1.  
If anything, the circuit court here went further than the 
circuit court did in Moederndorfer, by expressly referencing the 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
25 
 
"constitutional rights" in the form and asking Pegeese if he 
understood them.  The circuit court in Moederndorfer referenced 
the waiver of rights form in more general terms. 
¶38 Pegeese 
further 
asserts 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
addressed his attorney and not him, when the circuit court asked 
of Pegeese's understanding of Form CR-227.  He argues that the 
circuit court somehow disconnected the discussion of the form 
from the circuit court's follow-up questions regarding Pegeese's 
constitutional rights such that the colloquy was rendered 
defective.  Pegeese specifically claims that "[a]ny person in 
Pegeese's shoes would have thought that by asking Pegeese's 
attorney about Pegeese's understanding of the questionnaire 
after asking Pegeese about the questionnaire, the circuit court 
was signaling that it was concluding its questions about the 
questionnaire and moving on to a new topic."  We are 
unpersuaded.  The circuit court's questions were intended to 
ascertain 
Pegeese's 
understanding 
of 
the 
contents 
of  
Form CR—227.  That form lists each of the constitutional rights 
Pegeese waived and an "X" was placed next to each right so as to 
indicate his understanding.  The circuit court then specifically 
asked Pegeese about whether he understood that he was waiving 
those constitutional rights.  While circuit courts are to ensure 
that a plea is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
entered, there is no specific formula required to do so.  
Circuit courts are vested with the responsibility to communicate 
with the defendant and counsel to effectuate that purpose and if 
done, to then make the finding that a plea is indeed knowing, 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
26 
 
intelligent, and voluntary.  Plea forms such as Form CR-227 are 
tools to be utilized in that process.  
¶39 We therefore reaffirm that the circuit court may 
utilize a waiver of rights form such as Form CR-227, but the use 
of that form does not otherwise eliminate the circuit court's 
plea colloquy duties.  While the circuit court must exercise 
great care when conducting a plea colloquy so as to best ensure 
that a defendant is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
entering a plea, a formalistic recitation of the constitutional 
rights being waived is not required.  State v. Imani, 2010 WI 
66, ¶26, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40 (concluding that the 
circuit court's colloquy regarding a defendant's waiver of right 
to counsel was sufficient, and declining to "impose on circuit 
courts the requirement of placing form over substance and using 
'magic words' when the reality of the circumstances dictate the 
answer").   
¶40 To the extent Pegeese asserts that circuit courts must 
verify on the record that defendants understand each of the 
constitutional rights they waive when they enter a guilty or no 
contest plea, the record reflects that the circuit court here 
did so.  As noted previously, the circuit court utilized a plea 
questionnaire form that specifically listed each constitutional 
right being waived.  Pegeese stated that he understood each 
right and did not wish to further discuss the matter with his 
lawyer, and he indicated his understanding by checking off each 
right listed on the form.  His counsel verified that he had 
consulted with Pegeese and that they went through the form 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
27 
 
together.  Although the circuit court did not individually 
recite and specifically address each constitutional right on the 
record, the plea colloquy proceedings as a whole reflect that 
Pegeese understood the constitutional rights he was waiving. 
¶41 Perhaps 
Pegeese's 
argument 
is 
more 
appropriately 
construed as seeking a formalistic requirement that circuit 
courts read, verbatim and on the record, each constitutional 
right defendants waive by entering a guilty or no contest plea.  
We 
decline 
to 
use 
our 
superintending 
and 
administrative 
authority under Article VII, section 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, placing form over substance, in order to reach 
such a holding.7  Pegeese presents no authority, and indeed there 
is no indication that requiring the recitation of "magic words" 
already contained on a plea questionnaire form, on the record, 
would advance a defendant's understanding of the constitutional 
rights waived by pleading guilty or no contest.  We instead look 
to the substance of the record as a whole to determine whether 
the circuit court sufficiently ensured that the defendant 
                                                 
7 Article VII, section 3(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states, "The supreme court shall have superintending and 
administrative authority over all courts."  While this court's 
superintending and administrative authority is "indefinite in 
character, unsupplied with means and instrumentalities, and 
limited only by the necessities of justice," this court does not 
use such power lightly.  Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 
225–26, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996). 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
28 
 
understood the constitutional rights waived by entering a guilty 
or no contest plea.8 
¶42 Accordingly, we conclude that Pegeese has failed to 
meet his initial burden to show that the circuit court violated 
the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or Bangert.  Therefore, 
Pegeese is not entitled to a Bangert hearing.  As a result, 
Pegeese is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶43 The circuit court's colloquy with Pegeese verified 
that the constitutional rights at issue were contained in 
Form CR-227, that Pegeese completed and signed the form with 
counsel and that he wanted no further time to discuss matters 
with his lawyer.  The colloquy further verified that Pegeese 
comprehended the contents of the form, and he and his lawyer 
acknowledged that he understood each constitutional right he was 
waiving by pleading guilty.  The circuit court concluded that 
Pegeese was "freely, knowingly[,] and intelligently" entering 
his plea. 
¶44 We conclude that Pegeese has not met his burden to 
demonstrate that the plea colloquy was defective so as to 
entitle him to the relief requested.  We further decline to 
                                                 
8 Though today we do not require circuit courts to recite 
any particular magic words when conducting a plea colloquy, 
circuit courts should be mindful of the suggested plea colloquy 
in Wis JI–Criminal SM-32 (2007).  See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
268 (stating that circuit courts can use Wis JI–Criminal SM-32 
(1985) as one method of fulfilling the requirements under 
Bangert). 
No. 
2017AP741-CR   
 
29 
 
exercise our superintending authority to impose a specific 
requirement 
that 
at 
a 
plea 
hearing 
circuit 
courts 
must 
individually recite and specifically address each constitutional 
right being waived and then otherwise verify the defendant's 
understanding 
of 
each 
constitutional 
right 
being 
waived.  
Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶45 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J., 
withdrew 
from 
participation. 
 
No.  2017AP741-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶46 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority opinion that Javien Pegeese failed to demonstrate 
that the circuit court's plea colloquy was defective.  However, 
I write separately because I urge this court to exercise its 
superintending authority, pursuant to Article VII, Section 3(1) 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, and prospectively require circuit 
courts to advise a defendant of each constitutional right being 
waived 
by 
pleading 
guilty. 
 
This 
court's 
superintending 
authority "endows this court with a power that is indefinite in 
character . . . and limited only by the necessities of justice."  
Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 225, 556 N.W.2d 721 
(1996).  It is in the interest of justice that a circuit court 
advise a defendant of each constitutional right being waived to 
ensure that his or her guilty plea is being entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.   
¶47 When 
a 
defendant 
pleads 
guilty, 
he 
or 
she 
"simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including 
[the] privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, [the] 
right to trial by jury, and [the] right to confront [his or her] 
accusers."  McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).  
Even 
if 
defense 
counsel 
diligently 
reviews 
the 
Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form1 with a defendant, a 
defendant may not understand each right.  It is the duty of the 
circuit court, not defense counsel, to ascertain whether a 
defendant is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving 
                                                 
1 See Form CR-227.  This form was adopted by the Judicial 
Conference pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 971.025 and 758.18(1). 
No.  2017AP741-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
each right.  As explained by this court in State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 272, 389 N.W. 12 (1986), "[i]t is incumbent upon 
the trial court to inform the defendant of his rights and 
ascertain that he understands they are being waived."   
¶48 In Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 270-71, we exercised our 
supervisory powers to require circuit courts to "follow the 
provisions set forth in Wis. JI——Criminal SM-32 (1985), Part V, 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights, or specifically refer to some 
portion of the record or communication between defense counsel 
and defendant which affirmatively exhibits defendant's knowledge 
of the constitutional rights he will be waiving."  As in 
Bangert, I reaffirm Special Materials 32 as the gold standard 
for conducting a plea colloquy.   
¶49 Special Materials 32 illustrates a thorough plea 
colloquy.2  The "Waiver of Constitutional Rights" portion reads 
as follows: 
By pleading guilty, you admit that you committed the 
crime and, thus, you relieve the state of proving at a 
trial that you committed the crime, and by pleading 
guilty you also waive——that is, you give up——important 
constitutional rights. 
First, you give up your right to have the state prove 
that you committed each element of the crime. The 
state must convince each member of the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt that you committed the crime. Do you 
understand that? 
                                                 
2 The current section of Special Materials 32 addressing a 
defendant's waiver of constitutional rights is nearly identical 
to the version referenced in State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 
271 n.5, 389 N.W. 12 (1986). 
No.  2017AP741-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
You have a constitutional right not to incriminate 
yourself, which means, you have a right not to admit 
to a crime, not to say anything that will subject you 
to a criminal penalty. By pleading guilty, you give up 
this privilege not to incriminate yourself, and if the 
court accepts your plea of guilty, you will be 
convicted, and the court can impose sentence against 
you. Do you understand that? 
You have a constitutional right to confront your 
accusers, which means you have the right to face the 
witnesses against you, to hear their sworn testimony 
against you, and to cross-examine them by asking them 
questions to test the truth and accuracy of their 
testimony. If the court accepts your plea of guilty, 
you give up your right to confront your accusers. Do 
you understand that? 
You have the right to present evidence in your own 
behalf and to require witnesses to come to court and 
testify for you. Do you understand that? 
Knowing that by pleading guilty, you give up your 
constitutional 
right 
to 
a 
trial 
by 
jury, 
your 
constitutional right not to incriminate yourself, and 
your constitutional right to confront the witnesses 
against you and to subpoena witnesses, do you still 
wish to plead guilty?" 
Wis JI——Criminal SM-32 (2007). 
¶50 A requirement that a circuit court inform a defendant 
of each constitutional right being waived by pleading guilty 
does not put form over substance or require "magic words," as 
the majority opinion suggests.  Majority op., ¶41.  The Special 
Materials do not need to be read verbatim;3 instead, a circuit 
court should verify that the defendant understands and agrees to 
waive each constitutional right implicated in entering a guilty 
                                                 
3 The Special Materials note that the questions and 
statements 
are 
merely 
suggestions 
and 
that 
"judges 
will 
undoubtedly want to tailor them to the case at hand and develop 
others of their own."  Wis JI——Criminal SM-32 (2007). 
No.  2017AP741-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
plea, as the Bangert court intended.  The circuit court must be 
more than just "mindful" of the suggested plea colloquy in 
Special Materials 32, majority op., ¶41 n.8, it should attempt 
to encapsulate its thorough explanation of the waiver of rights.   
¶51 The vast majority of states and the federal courts 
have recognized the importance of requiring a circuit court to 
advise a defendant of the constitutional rights being waived by 
pleading guilty to a felony.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(B)-
(F).  Some states implement this requirement pursuant to 
statute.  See, e.g., Alaska R. Crim. P. 11; Ark. R. Crim. P. 
24.4; Colo. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(2) & 11; Conn. Practice Book 
§ 39-19; Del. Super. Ct. R. Crim. 11; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172; 
Il. S. Ct. Rule 402; Ind. Code Ann. § 35-35-1-2; I. C. A. Rule 
2.8; La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 556.1; Me. R. U. Crim. P. 
11; Mass. R. Crim. P. 12; Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01; Miss. R. 
Crim. P. 15.3(d)(3); Mo. R. Crim. P. 24.02; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 15A-1022; N.D. R. Crim. P. 11; Ohio R. Crim. P. 11; O.R.S. 
§ 135.385 (Oregon); S.D.C.L. § 23A-7-4; Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11; 
Vt. R. Crim. P. 11; W. Va. R. Crim. P. 11; Wyo. R. Crim. P. 11.   
¶52 Other states implement this requirement pursuant to 
case law.  See, e.g., People v. Cross, 347 P.3d 1130, 1132 (Cal. 
2015) ("As a prophylactic measure, the court must inform the 
defendant of three constitutional rights——the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and 
the right to confront one's accusers——and solicit a personal 
waiver of each"); Edmonds v. Commonwealth of Ky., 189 S.W.3d 
558, 565 (Ky. 2006); State v. Solomon, 111 P.3d 12 (Haw. 2005); 
No.  2017AP741-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
State ex rel. T.M., 765 A.2d 735, 739-740, 744 (N.J. 2001); 
State v. Garcia, 915 P.2d 300, 303 (N.M. 1996); State v. 
Anziana, 840 P.2d 550, 552 (Ct. App. Kan. 1992) (reading 
specific constitutional rights into statutory "consequences of 
[] plea" language); State v. Irish, 394 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Neb. 
1986); State v. Levario, 577 P.2d 712, 713 (Ariz. 1978) (partly 
defining "constitutional rights" language in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 
17.2); Commonwealth of Pa. v. Willis, 369 A.2d 1189 (Pa. 1977); 
King v. State, 553 P.2d 529, 534–35 (Okla. 1976) (requiring an 
advisement by the court as to the list of constitutional rights 
being waived).   
¶53 A requirement that a circuit court advise a defendant 
of each constitutional right being waived by pleading guilty 
would respect the gravity of a defendant's decision to plead 
guilty and ensure that the decision is being made knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.  Wisconsin should join the 
majority of jurisdictions from around the country and adopt this 
requirement.   
¶54 Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
¶55 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
No.  2017AP741-CR.rfd 
 
 
 
1