Case Title: Bragg v. Marion

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5754

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bragg v. Marion1983 WY 51663 P.2d 505Case Number: 5754Case Number: 5754Decided: 05/16/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
LOVEY K. BRAGG AND ELBERT HENRY BRAGG, APPELLANTS 
(PLAINTIFFS),

v.

ROY E. MARION, ET AL., 
APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS). No. 5754

Appeal from the District Court,CarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

Robert A. 
Monteith of Russell, Greenhawt & Rummel, P.C., Rawlins, for appellants.

Michael M. Hoch, 
Laramie, for appellees.

Before ROONEY, 
C.J.,* and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE** and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

** Chief Justice 
at time of oral argument.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The trial court found 
against appellants in their quiet title action, which appellants were claiming 
through a quitclaim deed. The court found, among other things, that appellants 
failed to show "a connected chain of title vesting a legal estate in them," and 
failed to show possession. After the trial court's letter opinion, appellants 
moved to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence by asking to be allowed 
to plead ejectment. The trial court refused to allow the amendment, apparently 
considering it to be untimely. On appeal, appellants ask this court to notice 
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. § 1-37-101, et seq., W.S. 
1977.

[¶2.]     Appellants raise 
several issues on appeal. They contend that it is not necessary to show a 
connected chain of title beyond the common grantor to adverse parties in a quiet 
title or ejectment action. They also contend that the trial court erred in 
finding that appellants received no estate in real property by virtue of their 
quitclaim deed. They finally contend that the trial court erred when it denied 
their motion to amend the complaint to conform to the proof and request 
ejectment.

[¶3.]     We will reverse and 
remand.

[¶4.]     Appellants' initial 
pleadings followed Form 16 set out in Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 
"complaint in action to quiet title." Appellants apparently pursued a quiet 
title action through trial. The issues upon which the case was to be tried were 
set out in the pretrial order:

"A. The parties agree 
that the issues to this litigation should be framed as 
follows:

"1. Is the Heath-Bragg 
quitclaim deed sufficient in properly describing the premises intended to be 
conveyed?

"2. Is a quitclaim deed 
void for lack of delivery and consideration?"

[¶5.]     We do not know what 
theory was contemplated by these issues, nor do we know that any cause of action 
could be determined by a resolution of them. Appellants, in their post trial 
motions conceded that they failed to prove a traditional quiet title action. A 
quiet title action requires proof of possession, while an ejectment action 
requires proof that the complainant is illegally being kept from possession.1

[¶6.]     The principal thrust of 
this appeal, then, is the court's denial of appellants' motion to amend. We now 
consider the effect of Rule 15(b), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure:

"When issues not raised 
by pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues. * * *"

Rule 15(b), 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, contains language identical to that portion of 
Rule 15(b), W.R.C.P., set out above.

[¶7.]     When a motion is made 
to amend or conform to the proof, the court must determine if an issue not 
within the scope of the pleadings was tried with the express or implied consent 
of the parties. Knudson v. Boren, 261 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1958).

"* * * Express consent 
may be given by stipulation, or may be incorporated in a pretrial order and 
rarely raises any serious fact questions. Implied consent, however, is much more 
difficult to establish and seems to depend on whether the parties recognized 
that an issue not presented by the pleadings entered the case at trial. A party 
who knowingly acquiesces in the introduction of evidence relating to issues that 
are beyond the pleadings is in no position to contest a motion to conform. Thus, 
consent generally is found when evidence is introduced without objection, or 
when the party opposing the motion to amend produced evidence bearing on the new 
issue. Other factors may lead to a contrary conclusion, however. * * * [W]hen 
the evidence that is claimed to show that issue was tried by consent is relevant 
to an issue already in the case, as well as to the one that is the subject 
matter of the amendment, and there was no indication at trial that the party who 
introduced the evidence was seeking to raise a new issue, the pleadings will not 
be deemed amended under the first portion of Rule 15(b).

* * * * * 
*

"Courts occasionally 
refuse to permit amendments on the ground that to do so would be prejudicial to 
the opposing party. * * * When a party does not recognize the significance of 
the introduction of certain evidence at trial and therefore neglects to contest 
it, a motion to amend could be denied either because the party would be 
prejudiced in the presentation of his case or because he could not realistically 
be said to have given his implied consent. Of course, the litigant's failure to 
comprehend the purpose of the deviating evidence must be reasonable." Wright 
& Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1493, pp. 461-469 (1971).2

[¶8.]     If the court determines 
that an issue was tried with the express or implied consent of the parties it 
has no discretion to refuse to allow the amendment. In this event the amendment 
is mandatory. Wallin v. Fuller, 476 F.2d 1204, 1210 (5th Cir. 
1973).

[¶9.]     Federal Procedure, 
L.Ed. § 62:289 (1981), says:

"In keeping with its 
purpose to insure that the parties prevail or fail on the merits rather than on 
the technical niceties of the pleadings, the first sentence of FRCP 15(b) 
envisions and allows liberal allowance of amendments to conform the pleadings to 
the evidence. Such a policy necessarily entails the exercise of discretion by 
the trial court. Thus, the question whether an issue was tried with the express 
or implied consent of the parties is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and its finding in this regard will not be disturbed on 
appeal in the absence of an abuse of such discretion. However, the court's 
discretion is limited to finding whether the issue was tried with the express or 
implied consent of the parties. If it was, the court has no discretion to refuse 
to allow the amendment; in such a case, the amendment is 
mandatory."

[¶10.]  The trial court here made no findings 
whether the issue of ejectment was tried by implied consent. Neither did it make 
any finding whether appellants might be entitled to relief on their quiet title 
claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act under the evidence presented, 
understandably so, since appellants did not mention the Declaratory Judgment Act 
in their motion to amend.3 

[¶11.]  In Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, 63 
Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773, 780 (1947), we said:

"* * * An action to quiet 
title is essentially an action for declaratory relief. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 
Wyo. 446, 462, 
296 P. 206; Borchard on Declaratory Judgments (2d ed.) 139. It has been said 
that the act provides for `a kind of expanded bill quia timet, meant to do in 
general what that suit did in its limited field.' Judge L. Hand in Meeker v. Baxter, 2 Cir., 83 F.2d 183, 
187. That the purpose of the act `to 
settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to 
rights' (Sec. 3-5812) may be carried out in actions not expressly based on the 
act, is shown by many cases. [Emphasis added.] Hasselbring v. Koepke, 263 
Mich. 466, 248 N.W. 869, 93 A.L.R. 1170 (action 
to enjoin interference with a claimed easement) * * * Teal v. Maxon, 233 
Ala. 23, 169 So. 477 (action to quiet title to land not in plaintiff's possession). In 
Renwick v. Hay, 90 N.J. Eq. 148, 106 A. 547 (noticed in Holly Sugar Corp. v. 
Fritzler, 42 Wyo. at , 296 P. at ), a suit to determine rights in private ways, 
it was held that relief might be granted by considering the case either as one 
in equity or as one under the declaratory judgment act. In Faulkner v. Keene, 85 
N.H. 147, 156, 155 A. 195, 201, it is stated that `The cause being plainly 
presented to the court, the appropriate remedy will be granted, however 
erroneously the proceeding be entitled.' See, also, Borchard on Declaratory 
Judgments, pp. 427, 741."

Anderson on declaratory judgments 
says:

"A declaratory action is 
an appropriate remedy for the construction and interpretation of a deed or other 
muniment of title. This is true only if a justiciable controversy is present in 
the action. The action has been invoked to determine kaleidoscopic complicated 
questions arising from contentions and controversies with respect to the 
interpretation of deeds * * *." 2 Anderson, Declaratory Judgments, § 608, 
Construction of Deeds, pp. 1359-1360 (1951).

[¶12.]  In Ohio Oil v. Wyoming Agency, supra, 
plaintiff-appellee sued to quiet title. The trial court quieted title in 
plaintiff-appellee. We noted that plaintiff had not been in actual possession, 
but that the evidence was sufficient to prove title to a "mineral fee." We 
stated that the trial issues raised by pleadings showed a dispute over title, 
and that we would not reverse a judgment which might be sustained under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act then in effect, even though appellant had not asked us 
to notice the Declaratory Judgment Act.

[¶13.]  In Morad v. Brown, Wyo., 549 P.2d 312 
(1976), cross-appellant Brown, plaintiff below, had filed to quiet title against 
Morad to a tract of land which Brown did not possess. Brown moved for relief 
under Rule 15(b), W.R.C.P., which motion was denied. Brown admitted that under 
his original pleadings, the trial court should not have quieted the title in him 
against Morad because Brown was not in possession. It is not clear from the case 
whether Brown's motion for relief under Rule 15(b) mentioned the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. The trial court had used the Declaratory Judgment Act to hold for 
Brown against defendants other than Morad in the action. This court decided that 
the trial court had correctly disposed of the two main issues before it, which 
were that Morad's tax-based title was void and that Brown's legal title was 
proved. We noted that, in effect, the trial court had quieted title in Brown, 
even though Brown was not in possession and Morad was. We also noted that the 
trial court fell short of giving Brown possession or a decree to that effect. We 
reversed, indirectly ordering the trial court to enter an order quieting title 
in Brown, under the Declaratory Judgment Act. We did allow further proceedings 
concerning the value of any claim Morad might have against Brown for 
improvements Morad had placed on the property.

[¶14.]  This court has cited Rule 15(b), 
W.R.C.P., as a basis for conforming the pleadings to the proof on appeal, even 
though the Rules of Civil Procedure are not the rules under which this court 
proceeds. In Lore v. Town of 
Douglas, Wyo., 
355 P.2d 367 (1960), we stated that we were cognizant of appellate courts' 
reluctance to assume or permit an amendment to conform the pleadings to the 
proof to reverse an otherwise correct judgment. We went on to use Rule 15(b), 
W.R.C.P. to decide that the issue of negligence by a municipality had been tried 
with the implied consent of the parties. We then reversed and remanded, saying 
that testimony showing negligence was unrebutted. The case was resubmitted to 
the trial court so that it would have "an opportunity to determine, according to 
definite standards, the care which was requisite under the circumstances." 
Lore v. Town of Douglas, supra, at 371.

[¶15.]  This court, then, has used the 
Declaratory Judgment Act to uphold a decision to quiet title, even though the 
decision to quiet title was technically incorrect on the question of possession, 
and even though appellant did not raise the Declaratory Judgment Act below or on 
appeal. Ohio Oil v. Wyoming Agency, 
supra. It has also used the Declaratory Judgment Act to reverse and direct the 
trial court to quiet title in an appellant. Morad v. Brown, supra. It has also 
assumed or permitted an amendment to allow the pleadings to conform to the 
proof, and then reversed the judgment based on uncontradicted evidence in the 
record. Lore v. Town of Douglas, 
supra.

[¶16.]  We are going to take none of these 
courses of action here. The courts which affirm or reverse judgments on theories 
other than those used by the lower courts should do so only if the 
record

"* * * clearly indicates 
that the issue on which the case is to be affirmed actually was tried with the 
knowing consent of the parties. However, if the record is incomplete or if it is 
uncertain whether the party opposing the motion to amend had notice of the 
unpleaded issue at the trial stage, the appellate court should render its 
decision in conformity with the issues relied upon by the lower court in 
reaching its judgment." Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 
1494, p. 478 (1971).

[¶17.]  In this case, the record is not clear 
whether appellees had notice of the possible unpleaded issues of ejectment and 
of validity of title under the Declaratory Judgment Act. We could, then, merely 
address the question whether the trial court was correct in its decision under 
the quiet title statute; if it was, we could affirm. However, we do not want to 
affirm, because the trial court did not determine if the issues of ejectment or 
of validity of title under the Declaratory Judgment Act were impliedly tried. 
Although we have ruled before that issues have been impliedly tried when such 
question has not been presented to the trial court first, we think we have been 
too eager in the past in these types of cases to perform a task which is best 
left to the trial court's discretion.

[¶18.]  We therefore hold that the trial court 
should determine if the issue of ejectment was tried by the implied consent of 
the parties or if the issue of the validity of title was impliedly tried under 
the Declaratory Judgment Act. If it decides that either of these issues was 
impliedly tried, then it must allow the amendment and make a determination 
whether appellants were entitled to prevail under either of these theories. It 
may be necessary for the court to take additional evidence or to have a new 
trial to properly resolve the issues we have addressed.

[¶19.]  Reversed and remanded for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 1-32-201, W.S. 
1977:

"An action may be brought 
by a person in possession of real property against any person who claims an 
estate or interest therein adverse to him, for the purpose of determining the 
adverse estate or interest. The person bringing the action may hold possession 
himself or by his tenant."

Section 
1-32-202, W.S. 1977:

"In an action to recover 
real property it is sufficient if the plaintiff's petition states that he has a 
legal estate in and is entitled to possession of the real property, describing 
the same with sufficient certainty as to enable an officer holding an execution 
to identify it, and that the defendant unlawfully keeps him out of possession. 
It is not necessary to state how the plaintiff's estate or ownership is 
derived."

2 The following is an 
example of how a court uses its discretion to decide whether an issue could 
fairly be said to have been tried by express or implied 
consent.

"Although leave to amend 
pleadings should be freely given when justice requires, the trial judge's 
discretion is broad and its sound exercise usually depends on the presence or 
absence of such factors as `undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the 
part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance 
of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.' [Citations.] In a motion under 
rule 15(b) to amend the complaint to conform to the proof, the most important 
question is whether the new issues were tried by the parties' express or implied 
consent and whether the defendant `would be prejudiced by the implied amendment, 
i.e., whether he had a fair opportunity to defend and whether he could offer any 
additional evidence if the case were to be retried on a different theory.' 3 
Moore's Federal Practice para 15.13[2], at 993 (2d ed. 1966) [Citations.]. The 
purpose of Rule 15(b) is to allow the pleadings to conform to issues actually 
tried, not to extend the pleadings to introduce issues inferentially suggested 
by incidental evidence in the record. [Citations.] * * *" Browning Debenture 
Holders' Committee v. Dasa Corporation, 560 F.2d 1078, 1086 (2nd Cir. 
1977).

3 "Any person interested 
under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, 
or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by the Wyoming 
constitution or by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may 
have any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument 
determined and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations." 
Section 1-37-103, W.S. 1977.

RAPER, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶20.]  I concur with the majority opinion only 
to the extent of reversing the district judge on the grounds that the case 
should be treated as one for declaratory judgment. 

[¶21.]  I am convinced that it is a question of 
law as to whether or not the case was tried in such a fashion that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to amend their complaint to the extent of asking for 
the relief of ejectment to which they have shown themselves entitled. The same 
basic premise exists in an ejectment action and a quiet title action. If the 
plaintiffs establish title in themselves and are otherwise entitled to 
possession, then they are entitled to have the trespasser ejected, even though 
they may have initially prayed for a decree quieting title, particularly under 
the circumstances of this case.

[¶22.]  In going through the district court file, 
it should be noted that plaintiffs joined as defendants many persons and 
entities practically all of whom were in default at the time of trial. The only 
answering defendants were Helen B. Heath, Dolly Irene Hunter, Roy and Zadabeth 
Marion and Leona Fern Ellison. The first time this case was appealed, we 
dismissed it because of Rule 54(b), W.R.C.P. in that all of the many other 
persons named as defendants had not been closed out by a default judgment. 
Eventually a default judgment quieting title in the plaintiffs as against its 
non-answering defendants was entered and the appeal to this court finally 
perfected. There was a quiet title aspect to the case as to those many other 
defendants.

[¶23.]  At a point prior to trial, the district 
court entered summary judgment in favor of the Braggs on the issue of adequate 
and sufficient consideration for the Heath-Bragg quitclaim deed but at the same 
time denied summary judgment on the issue of delivery and on the issue of 
adequacy of the quitclaim deed from Mrs. Heath to the plaintiffs because of 
issues of fact as to those matters. The outcome of the case as to proper relief 
would, therefore, depend upon who appeared. While the plaintiffs were perhaps 
careless in not seeking an amendment sooner, still the title status of the 
parties would not be established until all of the evidence was in. Rule 15(b), 
W.R.C.P. is not so inflexible that appropriate amendments cannot be made at 
almost any time. It is also interesting and pertinent that in their complaint, 
the plaintiffs prayed that not only title be quieted and that the defendants be 
adjudged to have no right, title, or interest but also "that Plaintiffs have 
such other and further relief as is proper in the premises." I would hold that 
the plaintiffs are entitled to amend as a matter of law, and there is no need to 
remand the case for the district judge to make any findings or decisions in that 
regard.

[¶24.]  In reversing the district court, I would 
direct entry of a judgment ejecting the defendants, if they are in fact in 
possession of the eighty acres. Apparently some of the defendants have been 
doing road construction work on the premises. On the basis that the plaintiffs 
have, as a matter of law, shown an uninterrupted chain of good title, the 
defendants should be ejected. The documentary evidence alone establishes such a 
title. The Producers Gold and Copper Mining and Milling Company filed on the 
Clara B., Emma G., Gold Coin, and Olney lode mining claims which were described 
in Survey Number 423, in a described portion of Section 34, Township 18 North of 
Range 78 West of the 6th p.m. in Carbon County, Wyoming. Thereafter, the United 
States issued a patent to those claims and incorporated into the patent the same 
description as disclosed by Survey Number 423.

[¶25.]  Thereafter Sol R. Teague acquired title 
somehow from the mining company. No one challenges any mesne conveyances between 
the patent and Teague's title. Both sides depend on Teague's title. By a 
regularly recorded deed made on May 6, 1971, recorded May 11, 1971, Teague 
conveyed to one of his daughters, Helen B. Heath, all of his interest in the 
above described claims embraced by Survey Number 423. On November 1, 1977, by a 
quitclaim deed, recorded November 7, 1977, Helen B. Heath conveyed all of her 
interest to the plaintiffs in this action, describing the property only by 
references to the claim names, covered by Government Survey Number 423, 
excepting only a two-acre tract. Thereafter, on October 19, 1978, the district 
court for Carbon County entered a decree determining the heirship of Sol Rogers 
Teague and named four daughters, the defendants and appellees in this action, 
and held that each was entitled to an undivided one-quarter interest in the real 
property owned by the decedent, Sol Rogers Teague and described the claims 
embraced by the United States patent.

[¶26.]  The trial judge in this case entered a 
judgment. The court's substantive holding was that plaintiffs failed to show a 
connected chain of title vesting a legal estate in them and that the deed which 
the plaintiffs had, which referred only to a survey describing various mining 
claims, was extinguished upon the issuance of a fee patent. Perhaps the mining 
claims were superseded by a patent, but that makes no difference. The patent in 
evidence does not extinguish the mining claims. It continues to identify the 
premises as the Clara B., Emma G., Gold Coin, and Olney parcels as described by 
Survey No. 423 and only perpetuates the rights thereto.1 It is noted that the decree 
determining heirship also describes the property owned by Sol Rogers Teague as 
"Those certain patented mining claims (Patent, the United States of 
America, No. 91959, issued November 29, 1909, 
General Land Office No. Cheyenne 06) known as the Clara B., Emma G., Gold Coin, 
and Olney lode mining claims, designated by the Surveyor General as Survey No. 
423 * * *." The only purpose in the deed for referring to the mining claims was 
to describe the land conveyed in that the patent had already issued. If that is 
not so, then Mrs. Heath defrauded the plaintiff; but I do not think the latter 
to be the case.

[¶27.]  I am satisfied with the law set out in 
the plaintiffs' brief to the extent that what can be made certain, is certain. 
The reference to land made in the quitclaim deed to the plaintiffs was to land 
as embraced by Survey Number 423. Survey Number 423 does embrace the land 
conveyed as appears more fully in the patent. It should be noted that in the 
Heath-Bragg deed, there is a reference made to "less Tracts in Clara B. 2 A. 
more or less." That tract appears to have been a two-acre tract divided into 
twelve lots, each of which varies in size from 100 X 100 feet to 75 X 125 feet, 
as cabin sites. Cabin No. 1, on the excepted two acres, was owned by someone 
else for some thirty years.

[¶28.]  It seems to me that the only question in 
this case is whether the plaintiffs' title is better than that of the 
defendants. It was acquired by plaintiffs prior in time by valid deed from Sol 
R. Teague before his death. The determination of heirship was subsequent but 
there was then no land of Teague left for the named heirs. It had 
been transferred to his daughter who sold to plaintiffs. The defendants produced 
no muniments of title other than the determination of heirship which is late in 
point of time. Heirs cannot establish title by such a proceeding in land which 
the decedent did not own.

[¶29.]  I am convinced that the plaintiffs proved 
their title clearly and unquestionably and are entitled to a decree ejecting the 
defendants. The only question I can see involves location of the cabins. It is 
not as clear as perhaps it could be whether cabins are located on the 
eighty-acre tract covered by the Heath-Bragg deed or whether they are in the 
subdivided two acres which were excepted by Mrs. Heath. The transcript of 
testimony tells me they are not on the eighty acres. There might be some 
question about an occupying claimant's right under § 1-32-206, et seq., W.S. 
1977. There was no alternative counterclaim count by defendants asking for value 
of any cabin.

[¶30.]  I cannot figure out really what would be 
accomplished by remanding and directing the district judge to make certain 
findings, which he will do and the case may end up in exactly the same posture 
as at the present time. So, as I see it we will probably have another appeal 
back in our laps in which exactly the same issues as we have before us will be 
presented. It is suggested they should and can be settled 
now.

[¶31.]  I would, therefore, reverse the district 
court in all respects accordingly.

FOOTNOTES

1 The metes and bounds 
description of each parcel begins with the language: "Beginning, for the 
description of the Clara B. lode claim, at corner No. 1, * * *"; "Beginning, for 
the description of the Emma G. lode claim, at corner No. 1, * * *"; "Beginning, 
for the description of the Gold Coin lode claim, at corner No. 1, * * *"; and 
"Beginning, for the description of the Olney lode claim, at corner No. 1, * * 
*."

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶32.]  I am in accord with both the majority of 
the court and Justice Raper that this case should be reversed. It is clear to me 
that the district court erred in refusing to permit the amendment by the 
plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 15(b), W.R.C.P. The evidence that was submitted was 
sufficient to try title under either § 1-32-201, W.S. 1977, or § 1-32-202, W.S. 
1977, including the question of whether the plaintiffs were or were not in 
possession of the real property in issue. In accordance, then, with the 
authorities cited in the majority opinion, the amendment which was sought 
pursuant to Rule 15(b), W.R.C.P., should have been permitted. It does not seem 
to me that it is material whether the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act was 
presented as a part of the appellants' motion in the district court because in 
this instance the relief would be identical.

[¶33.]  I find that I am satisfied as well that 
the district court erred in its Finding No. 1, which 
reads:

"Plaintiffs have failed 
to show in their presentation of evidence, a connected chain of title vesting a 
legal estate in them to certain real property described in their complaint as 
follows: (Cabin # 1) Lode Claims, Sur. # 423 Olney, Gold Coin, Emma G. & 
Clara B.S. 34-18-78 82.282 A. less Tracts in Clara B. (2 A. more or less 
80A.)"

As Justice Raper 
points out, the law does not require the appellants to establish a chain of 
title beyond the common grantor, in this instance Sol Rogers Teague. Torgeson v. Connelly, Wyo., 348 P.2d 63 (1959); Dame v. Mileski, 80 
Wyo. 156, 340 P.2d 205 (1959); and York v. James, 62 Wyo. 184, 165 P.2d 109, 
162 A.L.R. 831 (1946). I, therefore, agree with Justice Raper's disposition of 
this particular issue.

[¶34.]  I also am satisfied, as is Justice Raper, 
that the issuance of the patent to the mining claims did not have any impact 
upon the title which is in issue. The real property in question retained the 
same legal description after the patent as it had before. The difference simply 
is that prior to the patent the right of ownership was limited to a right to 
receive a patent upon compliance with the statutory conditions. After the patent 
the patentee owned the property in fee simple, and a conclusion that the 
issuance of the patent required the appellants to prove their chain of title 
beyond ownership by the common grantor is erroneous.

[¶35.]  At this juncture I arrive at concerns 
which are somewhat different from either the majority opinion or Justice Raper's 
position. These relate to the second issue as stated by the appellants in their 
brief as follows:

"Did the Court err in 
finding that Appellants received no estate in real property by virtue of the 
Heath-Bragg quitclaim deed?"

My perceptions 
of this case leave me with the conclusion that the deed from Helen B. Heath to 
the appellants is ambiguous so far as the description of the property conveyed 
is concerned. While the position of the appellants is that the deed is not 
ambiguous, they do contend that ambiguity would not cause the deed to fail. With 
this latter contention I am in accord.

[¶36.]  The deed to Helen B. Heath from Teague 
describes the property as follows:

"Lode Claims, Sur # 423, 
S. 34-18-78 Olney, Gold Coin, Emma G. & Clara B. 82.282 A. Less tracts sold 
out of Clara B. (2A. M or L) 80 A."

The description 
in the deed from Helen B. Heath to the Braggs reads as 
follows:

"(Cabin # 1) Lode Claims, 
Sur. # 423 Olney, Gold Coin, Emma G. & Clara B S. 34-18-78 82.282 A. less 
Tracts in Clara B. 2 A. more or less 80A. Book 559/354."

The thrust of 
appellants' position is that they received by virtue of this conveyance all of 
the described lode claims less certain tracts located in the Clara B. claim 
consisting of 2 acres more or less. My concern arises out of the necessity for 
ascribing some significance to the phrase "(Cabin # 1)," and I conclude that the 
deed is susceptible to the construction that there was conveyed to the Braggs a 
tract identifiable from the parenthetical phrase "(Cabin # 1)" within these 
several lode claims, but which tract could only be ascertained by the assistance 
of extrinsic evidence.

[¶37.]  It is elementary that the Braggs are 
called upon to establish their claim by demonstrating the strength of their own 
title, and cannot simply rely upon any weakness in the defendant's title. Allen v. Houn, 30 Wyo. 186, 219 P. 573 (1923); Lee v. Cook, 2 Wyo. 312 (1880); 25 
Am.Jur.2d Ejectment § 19, p. 553; and 28 C.J.S. Ejectment § 10, p. 856. This 
proposition, of course, calls upon the Braggs to demonstrate the extent of their 
ownership in or title to the tract in question, whether only part of the tract 
or all of the tract.

[¶38.]  I, therefore, would reverse and remand 
this case to the district court. I would require the district court to allow the 
amendment under Rule 15(b), W.R.C.P., but I would direct the district court to 
resolve the ambiguity in the deed. If additional evidence were required in order 
to resolve that ambiguity the district court should proceed with a further 
hearing to develop such evidence. In this disposition I then agree with Justice 
Raper that the only question is whether the appellants' title is better than 
that of the appellees, but I would require in addition the resolution of the 
question of the extent of appellants' ownership in the 
tract.