Case Title: Ex parte Governor Bob Riley and Robert L. Childree, comptroller of the State of Alabama. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Joint Fiscal Committee of the Alabama Legislature et al. v. Governor Bob Riley and Comptroller Robert Childree)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1071702

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel 12/17/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1071702
_________________________
Ex parte Governor Bob Riley and Robert L. Childree,
comptroller of the State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Joint Fiscal Committee of the Alabama Legislature
et al.
v.
Governor Bob Riley and Comptroller Robert Childree)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-08-900752)
PER CURIAM.
1071702
2
Bob Riley, Governor of the State of Alabama, and Robert
L. Childree, comptroller of the State of Alabama (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "the Riley defendants"), have
petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
trial court to dismiss the complaint in the underlying case
against 
them 
for 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Pursuant to this Court's order of September 23, 2008, the
plaintiffs in the underlying case, Hank Sanders and Roger
Bedford, members of the Alabama Senate; John Knight, a member
of the Alabama House of Representatives; and the Joint Fiscal
Committee of the Alabama Legislature (of which Sanders,
Bedford, and Knight are members)(hereinafter referred to
collectively as "the legislators"), were directed to file an
answer and briefs addressing the issue whether the underlying
case was ripe for judicial review, and all proceedings in the
trial court were ordered to be  stayed during the pendency of
this Court's consideration of that issue.   On November 18,
2008, the parties presented oral arguments to this Court on
that issue.
The underlying action arises from Governor Riley's veto
of § 4 of House Bill 328 ("H.B. 328"), the general-fund
1071702
3
appropriations bill for fiscal year 2009, enacted during the
2008 Regular Session of the Alabama Legislature.  That section
provides, in pertinent part:
"Of the amounts appropriated in this act from
the State General Fund for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2009, 17.75% of each appropriation is
conditioned upon the availability of funds in the
State General Fund, the recommendation of the
Director of Finance, and the approval of the
Governor with the exception of the following
appropriations from the State General Fund to the
following agencies:
"Alabama Medicaid 
Agency
$622,478,155
"Alabama Department 
of Public Health
 $84,641,324
"Alabama Department 
of Senior Services
 $17,554,599
"Alabama Department 
of Human Resources
$112,881,321
"Alabama Department of 
Mental Health and
Mental Retardation
$143,258,026
"Department of Child Abuse
and Neglect Prevention   $1,011,610
"The 
above-listed 
appropriations 
shall 
be 
funded
in their entirety from the State General Fund in
[fiscal year] 2009.  In the event funds are not
available 
to 
fully 
fund 
the 
conditional
appropriations from the State General Fund made in
this section to other agencies, the Governor shall
apportion available funds in the General Fund
proportionately across-the-board to those agencies
for the fiscal year that ends September 30, 2009.
In the event revenue is not available to fund all of
these conditional appropriations, earmarked items
and line-item appropriations shall be released
1071702
The disparity in the October 30, 2008, date in a
1
preceding sentence and the October 15, 2008, date as the date
that Governor Riley certifies the amount  of funds  available
for conditional appropriations is not explained.
4
proportionately.  On October 30, 2008, the Governor
shall certify to the Director of Finance and notify
the Chair of the Senate Finance and Taxation-General
Fund Committee, the Chair of the House Government
Appropriations Committee, and the Legislative Fiscal
Officer the amount of projected available revenue in
the State General Fund and the source of the
additional revenue available to fund all or any
portion of the conditional appropriations made in
this section.  The conditional appropriations made
in this section from the State General Fund are
first priority conditional appropriations and  shall
be released in their entirety before any other
conditional appropriations from the State General
Fund may be released.  The amount of revenue
certified by the Governor on October 15, 2008
[sic],
 to be available for the conditional State
[1]
General Fund appropriations made in this section
shall 
be 
the 
amount 
of 
funds 
allocated
proportionately to each agency for its operation
plan for [fiscal year] 2009."
1071702
Section 126 provides:
2
"The governor shall have power to approve or
disapprove any item or items of any appropriation
bill embracing distinct items, and the part or parts
of the bill approved shall be the law, and the item
or items disapproved shall be void, unless repassed
according to the rule and limitations prescribed for
the passage of bills over the executive veto; and he
shall in writing state specifically the item or
items he disapproves, setting the same out in full
in his message, but in such case the enrolled bill
shall 
not 
be 
returned 
with 
the 
governor's
objection."
5
On May 19, 2008, pursuant to Ala. Const. 1901, Art. V, §
126,  Governor Riley sent a message to the legislature that he
2
was disapproving § 4 of H.B. 328:
"Beginning on page 128, line 10, by striking
through line 10 and each subsequent line, through
line 20, on page 128, and resuming on page 129, line
1, and striking through that line 1 and each
subsequent line on page 129, through line 23, and
resuming on page 130, line 1, strike through said
line and each succeeding line through line 7, thus
striking and deleting the entire section 4 of said
bill.  This item, or these items, are both illegal
under the laws of the State of Alabama and
unconstitutional under the Constitution of the State
of Alabama.  In the Alabama Constitution of 1901, as
amended, in Article XI, Section 213, there is a
specific constitutional requirement that the state
comptroller shall issue warrants for that proportion
of each claim which the money available for payment
of all claims bears to the whole, and such warrants
for such prorated sums shall thereupon be paid by
the state treasurer.  This provision clearly imposes
a constitutional obligation on the state comptroller
to prorate, both across the board, proportionately
1071702
6
to all departments and agencies.  Similarly, under
state law, Code of Alabama, § 41-4-90, requires the
governor, 
in 
the 
event 
the 
estimated 
budget
resources during the budget year are not sufficient
to pay all appropriations in full, to restrict
allotments to prevent an overdraft or deficit in any
fiscal year for which appropriations are made, by
prorating, 
without 
discrimination 
against 
any
department, 
board, 
bureau, 
commission, 
agency,
office, or institution of the state, the available
revenues among the various departments, boards,
bureaus, 
commissions, 
agencies, 
offices, 
and
institutions of the state.  The law goes further to
more specifically state, 'in other words, said
appropriations shall be payable in such proportion
as the total sum of all appropriations bears to the
total revenues estimate by the Department of Finance
as available in each of said fiscal years.'
"The Legislature, in its appropriation bill,
House Bill 328, cannot supersede, change, alter, or
amend either this constitutional amendment or this
statutory 
provision, 
both 
of 
which 
require
proportional proration among all recipients of state
funds in said appropriations bill.
"Although well intended, in the unfortunate
event 
that 
proration 
becomes 
necessary, 
the
Legislature cannot provide, either constitutionally
or legally, special protection for any individual
agencies or departments of state government.
"For these reasons I have found it necessary to
line item veto said bill.  I most sincerely
encourage you to agree with my disapproval of said
item, or items.  Done this 19th day of May, 2008."
Section 126, Ala. Const. 1901, does provide that the
legislature may "repass" the vetoed item; however, Governor
Riley's message was delivered to the legislature on the last
1071702
7
day of the 2008 Regular Session of the Alabama Legislature. In
an affidavit filed with the trial court, Greg Pappas, the
clerk of the Alabama House of Representatives, testified that
at 11:54 p.m. on May 19, 2008, as a motion for adjournment
sine die was being made, he was given Governor Riley's message
vetoing § 4 of H.B. 328.  The motion to adjourn was passed at
11:55 p.m.  Thus, the legislature had no opportunity to
address Governor Riley's action while it was in session.
On July 21, 2008, the legislators sued the Riley
defendants in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief.  The complaint alleged, among other
things:
"The entire section vetoed by the Governor does
not 
constitute 
an 
'item 
or 
items 
of 
any
appropriation bill embracing distinct items' as
required by Art. V, § 126, of the Constitution.
"The Governor does not have the power under §
126 or otherwise under the laws of Alabama to reduce
or increase particular items in the Bill, remove
substantive legislative policy or conditions from
the Bill, or add to the Bill.
"Governor Riley's message, in which he conveyed
his attempted item veto of Section 4 of HB 328 to
the Alabama House of Representatives, failed to set
out 'in full' the portion of HB 328 which he
attempted 
to 
veto, 
contrary 
to 
the 
express
provisions of § 126.
1071702
8
"The Governor otherwise violated §§ 42, 43, and
126 of the Constitution, as well as other applicable
provisions of law.
"Plaintiffs contend the action of the Governor,
allegedly taken pursuant to § 126, to veto Section
4 of HB 328 in its entirety, is unconstitutional,
null, void, and of no force or effect, and that
Section 4 is therefore due to be restored to the
Act.
"An actual, justiciable controversy exists
between the parties by virtue of the action of the
Governor allegedly made pursuant to § 126, in
vetoing Section 4 of HB 328 in its entirety.
"A declaratory judgment and other equitable
relief are appropriate under the circumstances to
declare the respective rights, liabilities, and
obligations 
of 
the 
parties 
and 
to 
protect
Plaintiffs' interests."
Based on these allegations, the complaint sought the following
relief:
"A.  That [the Riley defendants] be made parties
to this action by appropriate legal process and be
required to answer or otherwise respond hereto in
the manner prescribed by the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure.
"B.  That the court will require a copy of this
complaint to be personally served upon the Honorable
Troy King, Attorney General of the State of Alabama,
pursuant to § 6-6-227.
"C.  That this court will set this matter for an
early hearing on [the legislators'] request for
Declaratory and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive
Relief.
1071702
9
"D.  That, upon such hearing, the court will
enter a declaratory judgment or decree determining
and directing the rights of the parties hereto with
respect to the matters set forth in this complaint,
and that in said judgment or decree this court will
declare that the attempted veto of Section 4 of HB
328 is unconstitutional, and otherwise null, void,
and of no force or effect, and will declare that the
appropriation of funds made by the legislature
pursuant to HB 328 is lawful and of full effect,
including Section 4, which was struck by the
Governor 
in 
his 
unlawful and unconstitutional
attempt to exercise a veto pursuant to § 126 of the
Alabama Constitution of 1901.
"E.  That, upon a hearing of this cause, [the
Riley defendants] and those acting in concert with
them be preliminarily and permanently enjoined and
restrained from acting inconsistently with HB 328 as
it was enacted by the legislature."
On August 25, the Riley defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint on grounds that the legislators lacked standing,
that the case was not ripe for review, that the case was not
justiciable, and that the legislators had failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.  On September 2,
2008, the legislators moved for a summary judgment.  The trial
court denied the Riley defendants' motion to dismiss and set
a hearing for the legislators' summary-judgment motion on
September 24, 2008. The Riley defendants moved, pursuant to
Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., for a certification to perfect a
permissive appeal to this Court and, alternatively, moved for
1071702
10
a stay of the hearing on the legislators' summary-judgment
motion pending review of a petition to this Court for a writ
of mandamus.  The trial court denied both motions on September
19, 2008, and the Riley defendants filed this petition for the
writ of mandamus.  This Court stayed all proceedings in the
trial court pending disposition of the Riley defendants'
petition.
Our standard for the appellate review of a petition for
a writ of mandamus is well settled:
"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy,
and it will be 'issued only when there is: 1) a
clear legal right in the petitioner to the order
sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the
lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.' Ex parte United
Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala.
1993). A writ of mandamus will issue only in
situations where other relief is unavailable or is
inadequate, and it cannot be used as a substitute
for appeal. Ex parte Drill Parts & Serv. Co., 590
So. 2d 252 (Ala. 1991). It is well settled that 'a
writ of mandamus will not issue to review the merits
of an order denying a motion for a summary
judgment.' Ex parte Central Bank of the South, 675
So. 2d 403, 406 (Ala. 1996)."
Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 720 So. 2d 893, 894
(Ala. 1998).  The sole issue before this Court is whether,
under the circumstances alleged in this petition, the
1071702
11
underlying case is ripe for review.  The Riley defendants
asserted that because the underlying controversy is not ripe
for judicial review, they have a clear legal right to a writ
of mandamus from this Court  directing the trial court to
dismiss the underlying case.
In a legal context,
"'[r]ipeness is defined as "[t]he circumstance
existing when a case has reached, but has not
passed, the point when the facts have developed
sufficiently to permit an intelligent and useful
decision to be made."' Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co. of
Alabama, Inc., [Ms. 1061613, February 29, 2008] ___
So. 2d ___, ___ n. 5 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Black's
Law Dictionary 1353 (8th ed. 2004))."
Martin v. Battistella, [Ms. 1070394, Nov. 26, 2008] ___ So. 2d
___, ___ (Ala. 2008).  Courts generally restrain themselves
from addressing cases that have not reached the point of
ripeness.  The United States Supreme Court has stated that the
basic rationale of the ripeness doctrine is "to prevent the
courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements ...."  Abbott
Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).  See also National
Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Department of the Interior, 538 U.S.
803, 807 (2003).  Alabama cases often address ripeness in the
context of whether a case is justiciable, or appropriate for
1071702
12
judicial review.  That is, the case must concern a dispute
that is "'"a real and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a [judgment]."'"  Ex parte Bridges,
925 So. 2d 189, 193 (Ala. 2005)(holding that declaratory
relief is not available for an "anticipated controversy"
(quoting Baldwin County v. Bay Minette, 854 So. 2d 42, 45
(Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Copeland v. Jefferson County, 284
Ala. 558, 561, 226 So. 2d 385, 387 (1969))). 
In order to properly assess whether this case is ripe for
review, this Court must begin with two assumptions.  First, we
assume that the legislative enactment of § 4 of H.B. 328 is
valid, and second, we assume that Governor Riley's veto of §
4 is invalid.  In the context of a determination of ripeness,
and only in that context, we must determine whether, assuming
that the allegations in the legislators' complaint are true,
an actual, as opposed to an "anticipated," dispute has arisen
such that the trial court can meaningfully adjudicate claims
concerning the legislators' alleged claims of injury.  Bridges
and Baldwin County, supra.  The Riley defendants assert that
this case is not ripe for review because, they argue, the
conditions imposed by § 4 of H.B. 328 are triggered only if
1071702
13
general-fund revenues are insufficient to fully fund the
conditional appropriations.  The Riley defendants assert that
Governor Riley's veto has not created an actual controversy
that is ripe for adjudication because, they say, nothing will
occur until the State allocates funds to sources that would
not have otherwise received such funds had § 4 survived.
Because, the Riley defendants contend, § 4 has effect only if
"funds are not available to fully fund the conditional
appropriations from the State General Fund" and that
determination has not been made, there is no actual dispute,
and the legislators' complaint is thus not ripe for review. 
Although the legislators have advanced a number of
arguments as to why their case is ripe for review, we focus on
their assertion that a dispute presently exists because
budgetary planning for State agencies for fiscal year 2009 has
already begun, and State agencies have already calculated
budgets based on the amount of allocations they are to receive
pursuant to the redacted version of H.B. 328, i.e., the
version without § 4.  The legislators note that because an
agency's allocations are made on the basis of that agency's
absolute 
appropriation, 
those 
agencies 
that 
were 
not
1071702
14
"protected" from proration under § 4 have already calculated
budgets based on the receipt of funds that exceeds what they
would receive if Governor Riley's veto is determined to be
unconstitutional.  The legislators presented this argument to
the trial court and supported it with the affidavit of Joyce
Bigbee, the director of the Legislative Fiscal Office of the
Alabama Legislature.  Bigbee, stated, in pertinent part:
"The fiscal year 2009 budget process is
underway. State agencies were required to submit an
operations plan to the Department of Finance by
August 1, 2008 detailing the proposed expenditure of
funds for the fiscal year. The effect of the
Governor's line-item veto of Section 4 of House Bill
328 
is 
to 
increase 
absolute 
General 
Fund
appropriations by a total of approximately $180
million. Agencies were instructed by the Department
of Finance to include this additional $180 million
in the operations plans they have submitted.
Expenditure of [fiscal year] 2009 appropriations by
state agencies will begin October 1, 2008. Indeed,
a 
percentage 
of 
the 
entire 
(now 
absolute)
appropriation will be allotted to the agencies on
October 1, 2008, and for most of the agencies, the
allotment will be at least 25% of the total
appropriation. For all of the agencies, the
allotment will be more than it would have been
without the Governor's veto."
Also before the trial court was the affidavit of William
D. Newton, assistant finance director for the State of
Alabama.  He stated, in pertinent part:
1071702
15
"After the Legislature adjourned in May 2008,
state agencies were instructed to include in their
operating budgets the appropriations purportedly
made conditional by Section 4.  These agencies and
departments relied on Governor Riley's veto of
Section 4 in planning their expenditures for Fiscal
Year 2009."
The legislators note examples of agency operational
funding showing that if an agency conducts its operations
based on a larger budget than will actually be available in
the 
event 
that 
Governor 
Riley's 
veto 
is 
found
unconstitutional, the effect of the revival of § 4 later in
the fiscal year would have a significant impact on the
agency's ability to operate.  This evidence supports the
conclusion that, if the legislators' claims are correct, State
agencies are presently spending funds for operations that are
not properly available for expenditure.  The present
expenditure of agency operational funds means that those
agencies will not have those funds available for operations
later in the year.  In most instances this will result in a
significant impairment of an affected agency's ability to
provide citizens those services the agency is obligated to
supply.  In some instances, this present inability to
accurately determine operational budgets will result in the
1071702
16
cessation of important services later in the fiscal year.  We
conclude that the legislators provided evidence to the trial
court that Governor Riley's veto created an actionable
dispute, i.e., evidence indicating that Governor Riley's
action required the legislature to fund State agencies as
though the appropriations affected by his veto were valid,
even though the legislators contend that H.B. 328 was
unconstitutionally limited by Governor Riley's veto.
For the purpose of assessing whether this case is ripe
for review, the legislators have shown that the Governor
Riley's veto of § 4 required State agencies to calculate their
operating budgets based on inaccurate funding information,
information that requires agencies to allocate for their
operations money that will not be available.  Moreover, State
agencies are presently allocating and spending operating
expenses according to that inaccurate information.  This is
not merely an "anticipated controversy." Bridges and Baldwin
County, supra.  In the context of a ripeness determination,
Governor Riley's veto of § 4 immediately raises a dispute as
to whether those State agencies that are not protected under
§ 4 are presently operating on budgets that, if Governor
1071702
17
Riley's veto is held to be invalid, will exhaust their
available 
funds 
before 
the 
end 
of 
the 
fiscal 
year.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly denied the
Riley 
defendants' 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
the 
legislators'
complaint.  Because the Riley defendants have no clear legal
right to such relief, the Riley defendants' petition for a
writ of mandamus is due to be denied.
PETITION DENIED.
Lyons, Woodall, Smith, Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., concurs specially.
See, Stuart, and Bolin, JJ., concur in the result. 
1071702
18
Cobb, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion.  I write specially to note
that I also believe that this case became ripe for judicial
review on separate bases that are resolved on a purely legal,
as opposed to factual, analysis.  Although these points of
legal analysis represent issues of first impression of the
jurisprudence of this State, they find strong support in the
majority of American jurisdictions. 
First, I believe that the legislators suffered a legally
cognizable injury the moment  Governor Riley vetoed § 4 of
House Bill 328 ("H.B. 328").  Assuming, only for the purpose
of analyzing the ripeness issue, that Governor Riley's veto
was 
constitutionally 
invalid, 
that 
veto 
invalidated 
the 
lawful
votes of the legislators the moment it was entered.  A similar
situation was addressed in Silver v. Pataki, 96 N.Y.2d 532,
755 N.E.2d 842, 730 N.Y.S.2d 482 (2001).  In that case, the
speaker of the State Assembly for the State of New York
brought an action in his official capacity seeking a judgment
declaring that the governor's exercise of his line-item veto
1071702
The 
Silver 
court 
noted 
that 
"[t]he 
term
3
'non-appropriation' bill is not found in the [New York]
Constitution. These bills contain programmatic provisions and
commonly include sources, schedules and sub-allocations for
funding provided by appropriation bills, along with provisions
authorizing the disbursement of certain budgeted funds
pursuant to subsequent legislative enactment."   96 N.Y.2d at
535 n.1, 755 N.E.2d at 845 n.1, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 485 n.1.
19
power 
with 
respect 
to 
"non-appropriation"  
bills
3
constitutionally invalid.  Although couched in terms of
challenging the speaker's standing or "capacity to sue," the
governor's motion to dismiss asserted that the speaker lacked
the legal capacity to bring the action because the speaker had
suffered no injury, i.e., the speaker's case was not ripe for
judicial review because the speaker had suffered no legally
cognizable injury.  The court's analysis makes this point as
follows:
"A plaintiff has standing to maintain an action upon
alleging an injury in fact that falls within his or
her zone of interest. 'The existence of an injury in
fact--an actual legal stake in the matter being
adjudicated--ensures that the party seeking review
has some concrete interest in prosecuting the action
which casts the dispute "in a form traditionally
capable of judicial resolution"'  (Society of
Plastics Indus. v. County of Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d
[761,] 772[, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778
(1991)] [citation omitted]).
"Cases 
considering 
legislator 
standing 
generally
fall into one of three categories: lost political
1071702
20
battles, nullification of votes and usurpation of
power. Only circumstances presented by the latter
two categories confer legislator standing (see,
e.g.,  Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [(1939)]
[vote nullification];   Dodak v. State Admin. Bd.,
441 Mich. 547, 495 N.W.2d 539 [(1993)] [usurpation
of power belonging to legislative body]; cf.,
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 [(1997)] [no standing
to challenge lost vote];   Matter of Posner v.
Rockefeller, 26 N.Y.2d 970[, 311 N.Y.S.2d 15, 259
N.E.2d 484 (1970)] [same])."
96 N.Y.2d at 539, 755 N.E.2d at 847, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 487.  In
considering 
whether the 
speaker had 
suffered 
an 
actual injury,
the Silver court then noted:
"Here, plaintiff as a Member of the Assembly won
the legislative battle and now seeks to uphold that
legislative 
victory 
against 
a 
claimed
unconstitutional use of the veto power nullifying
his vote. If plaintiff's allegations are correct,
and at this point in the litigation we must assume
they are, the vetoed provisions were improperly
invalidated and should be in effect. Such a direct
and personal injury is clearly within a legislator's
zone of interest and unquestionably represents a
'"concrete and particularized"' harm (Raines [v.
Byrd],  521 U.S. [811], at 819 [(1997)] [citation
omitted]; accord,  Dennis v. Luis, 741 F.2d 628,
630-631 [3d Cir. (1984)]; Fordice v. Bryan, 651 So.
2d 998, 1003 [Miss. (1995)]; Hendrick v. Walters,
865 P.2d 1232, 1236-1238 [Okla. (1993)]).   As [the]
Supreme Court noted, plaintiff is not 'seeking to
obtain a result in a courtroom which he failed to
gain in the halls of the Legislature'  (179 Misc.2d
315, 322, 684 N.Y.S.2d 858 [(1999)])."
96 N.Y.2d at 540, 755 N.E.2d at 848, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
With respect to the idea of "capacity to sue," the Silver
1071702
21
court noted that "[n]o other jurisdiction in the nation has
held that an individual legislator lacks capacity to sue."  96
N.Y.2d at 539 n.4, 755 N.E.2d at 847 n.4, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 487
n.4.  
Thus, in a situation precisely like the situation in
this case, where the legislators assert that  the Riley
defendants injured them when Governor Riley entered his veto
by nullifying their votes on a bill that had passed, the
Silver court held that such a veto by a governor was an
actionable injury.  Moreover, the court in Silver relied upon
precedent from the United States Supreme Court:
"As a Member of the Assembly who voted with the
majority in favor of the budget legislation,
plaintiff undoubtedly has suffered an injury in fact
with 
respect 
to 
the 
alleged 
unconstitutional
nullification of his vote sufficient to confer
standing. The circumstances here are analogous to
those present in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
[(1939)].   In Coleman, the United States Supreme
Court recognized the standing of 20 members of the
Kansas 
State 
Senate 
challenging 
that 
body's
ratification of an amendment to the Federal
Constitution when a 20-20 deadlock was broken by the
vote of the State's Lieutenant Governor. The Supreme
Court determined that the Senators had 'a plain,
direct and adequate interest in maintaining the
effectiveness of their votes' (id., at 438;   see
also,  Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 436 [D.C.
Cir. (1974)] [no more essential interest could be
asserted by a legislator than to vindicate the
effectiveness of his vote].  The Court explained
that the Senators' votes had been held for naught
because, if their allegations were correct, the
1071702
22
amendment would not have been ratified. Thus, the
legislators were sufficiently aggrieved--suffering
an injury in fact--to allow them to maintain the
action."
96 N.Y.2d at 540-41, 755 N.E.2d at 848-49, 730 N.Y.S.2d at
488-89 (footnote omitted).
I find the analysis in Silver persuasive.   In light of
that analysis I conclude that the legislators here suffered a
legally significant injury that gave rise to a definite and
concrete controversy sufficient to ensure both that they had
standing to sue and that the issue they presented was ripe for
review under Alabama law at the time Governor Riley vetoed §
4.  See Ex parte Bridges, 925 So. 2d 189 (Ala. 2005); Baldwin
County v. Bay Minette, 854 So. 2d 42 (Ala. 2003).  At the time
Governor Riley exercised that veto, its effect was to
invalidate votes the legislators had cast on a bill that had
been passed by the Alabama Legislature.  Because the
legislators have "'a plain, direct and adequate interest in
maintaining the effectiveness of their votes'" and because
Governor Riley's veto impaired that interest, this case is
ripe for judicial review in our courts.
In addition to Silver and the various state and federal
cases it discusses for the proposition that this case is ripe
1071702
23
for our review because the legislators' otherwise valid votes
were invalidated by Governor Riley's veto, other cases have
adopted a similar rationale for holding that judicial review
of a governor's use of a line-item veto is appropriate.  For
example, in State ex rel. Ohio General Assembly v. Brunner,
114 Ohio St. 3d 386, 872 N.E.2d 912 (2007), the Supreme Court
of Ohio considered a case in which the Ohio General Assembly,
the president of the Senate, and the speaker of the House of
Representatives petitioned for a writ of mandamus to order the
Ohio Secretary of State to treat a bill that had passed the
legislature as a duly enacted law for purposes of her
statutory duties, when a successor governor attempted to veto
the bill after his predecessor had filed the bill in the
office of the Secretary of State.  As did the New York court
in Silver, the Ohio court in Brunner cited Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 (1939), to determine that the attempted
nullification 
of 
the 
legislators' 
votes 
by 
the 
governor's 
veto
was a legally cognizable injury that established their
standing to sue and, based on law analogous to that of this
State, see Bridges and Baldwin County, supra, caused their
legal action to be ripe for judicial review.  More
1071702
24
significantly, the court in Brunner discussed the application
of Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997):
"The secretary of state cites Raines v. Byrd
(1997), 521 U.S. 811, 830, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138
L.Ed.2d 849, in support of her request that this
court hold that the Senate president and Speaker of
the House lack standing. In Raines, the United
States Supreme Court held that individual members of
Congress 
lacked 
standing 
to 
challenge 
the
constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act because
they 'do not have a sufficient "personal stake" in
this dispute and have not alleged a sufficiently
concrete injury to have established Article III
standing.'    Id.
"Raines, however, is not controlling. The
congressional members in Raines challenged the
constitutionality of legislation that had been
passed by Congress, which they had merely voted
against.   Raines, 521 U.S. at 814, 117 S.Ct. 2312,
138 L.Ed.2d 849.
"Instead, this matter is akin to Coleman [v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)], which has been
interpreted as standing 'for the proposition that
legislators whose votes would have been sufficient
to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have
standing to sue if that legislative action goes into
effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground
that their votes have been completely nullified.'
Raines, 521 U.S. at 823, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d
849.   In this case, the Senate president and the
Speaker of the House voted for the bill at issue,
there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, and
their votes would in effect be nullified by the
governor's veto and the secretary of state's refusal
to treat the bill as a validly enacted law.
Therefore, we hold that the Senate president and the
Speaker of the House, as legislators who voted for
the bill, have the requisite standing to bring this
1071702
In Bennett, four legislators, the president of the
4
Senate, the speaker of the House, and the majority leaders of
both chambers, brought an action to the Arizona Supreme Court
challenging the governor's certain line-item vetoes of
provisions from four bills that constituted the state's
operating budget.  The challenged veto struck certain budget
reductions that would have otherwise been required of
particular state agencies in their operations. In Bennett, the
court held that the legislators lacked standing to sue based
on reliance on Raines, supra, after concluding that the
legislators in their case were more akin to the legislators in
Raines. 
 
The 
court 
in 
Bennett 
determined 
that 
the
effectiveness of the legislators' votes in their case was not
affected by the governor's vetoes and stated: "[T]here is a
vast difference between the level of vote nullification at
issue in Coleman and the abstract dilution of institutional
legislative power that is alleged here."  206 Ariz. at 526, 81
P.3d at 317.  Under those circumstances the court in Bennett
found no particularized injury sufficient to vest standing in
the legislators.
25
mandamus action to prevent their votes from being
nullified."
114 Ohio St. 3d 390-91, 872 N.E.2d 918.
Brunner further supports the conclusion that this case is
ripe for review.  Brunner makes clear that Raines is also
supportive of this conclusion in that Raines establishes that
had the members of Congress had their votes nullified as to a
bill that had passed, i.e., had they voted in favor of the
bill, they would have had the requisite standing, and their
cause would have been ripe for review.  Cf. Bennett v.
Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520, 81 P.3d 311 (2003).   
4
1071702
26
Also supporting the conclusion that the legislators' case
is ripe for review are the cases of South Carolina Coin
Operators Ass'n v. Beasley, 320 S.C. 183, 464 S.E.2d 103
(1995), and State ex rel. Sundby v. Adamany, 71 Wis.2d 118,
237 N.W.2d 910 (1976).  In Beasley, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina considered a challenge by the petitioner Coin
Operator's Association of the governor's line-item veto
striking parts of a section of an appropriations bill relating
to the regulation of video slot machines.  The court held,
among other things, that the petitioner's challenge presented
a justiciable controversy that was ripe for judicial
determination even though the South Carolina General Assembly
had not yet attempted to override the veto.  
In Sundby, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered a
taxpayer's action seeking a judgment declaring that the
governor's veto of portions of an appropriations bill was
unconstitutional.  The court in Sundby held that the taxpayer
had standing, and the case was therefore justiciable and ripe
for review, because "the respondent secretary of the
department 
of 
revenue 
is 
administering 
the 
challenged 
sections
of the appropriation bill as if the partial vetoes of the
1071702
27
governor are valid and effective."  71 Wis. 2d at 124, 237
N.W.2d at 913.  Thus, the governor's veto, if exercised in
violation of the state 
constitution, 
would 
directly 
affect the
taxpayer's pecuniary interests. The rationale of Sundby also
provides additional support.
As discussed in the main opinion,  a dispositive factor
for concluding that this case is ripe for adjudication is the
fact that State agencies have already begun to calculate their
budgets as if Governor Riley's veto of § 4 was valid.
Assuming, only for the purposes of the ripeness analysis, that
Governor Riley's veto was no valid, the effect of ignoring
this present issue until a shortfall, which is already
extremely probable, becomes a certainty will result in a
catastrophic reduction in the operating budgets of non-
protected State agencies with 
the 
likely result that essential
State services will be impaired or halted completely.  The
effect on the pecuniary interests of the legislators as
individual taxpayers is at least as profound as the effect on
the taxpayer's pecuniary interests in Sundby.  I believe that
the courts of this State can and should address this issue as
expeditiously as possible.