Case Title: State v. Patrick

Citation: 2020-Ohio-6803

Docket Number: 2019-0655

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Patrick, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6803.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-6803 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. PATRICK, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Patrick, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6803.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) does not preclude an appellate court from 
reviewing a sentence imposed by a trial court for aggravated murder when 
a defendant raises a constitutional claim regarding that sentence on 
appeal—A trial court must separately consider the youth of a juvenile 
offender as a mitigating factor before imposing a life sentence under R.C. 
2929.03—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause remanded. 
(No. 2019-0655—Submitted July 8, 2020—Decided December 22, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, 
No. 17 MA 0091, 2019-Ohio-1189. 
_________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal, we consider whether R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) 
precludes an appellate court from reviewing a sentence imposed by a trial court for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
aggravated murder when a defendant raises a constitutional claim regarding that 
sentence on appeal.  We hold that R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) does not preclude an 
appellate court from doing so. 
{¶ 2} Because we conclude that the statute does not preclude an appeal of a 
sentence on constitutional grounds, we must also determine whether a trial court’s 
imposition of a life-imprisonment sentence with parole eligibility upon a juvenile 
offender, without consideration of the offender’s youth as a mitigating factor, 
violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution.  We hold that, consistent with our 
decision in State v. Long, 138 Ohio St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 890, a trial 
court must separately consider the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating factor 
before imposing a life sentence under R.C. 2929.03, even if that sentence includes 
eligibility for parole. 
I.  RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} Appellant, Kyle Patrick, was charged in the Mahoning County 
Juvenile Court with offenses stemming from the fatal shooting of Michael 
Abinghanem that occurred in April 2012, when Patrick was 17 years old.  The facts 
of Patrick’s offenses are not relevant for the purposes of resolving this appeal but 
are set forth in the decision of the Seventh District Court of Appeals below, 2019-
Ohio-1189, ¶ 6, 29-36. 
{¶ 4} Patrick was bound over to be tried as an adult in the Mahoning County 
Court of Common Pleas.  He was indicted on one count of aggravated murder in 
violation of R.C. 2903.01(B), one count of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 
2911.01(A)(1), one count of tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 
2921.12(A)(1), and two firearm specifications pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A).  On 
February 10, 2014, Patrick pleaded guilty to one count of murder with a one-year 
firearm specification, one count of aggravated robbery with a one-year firearm 
specification, and tampering with evidence. 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
3
{¶ 5} Prior to sentencing, Patrick moved to withdraw his guilty plea.  The 
trial court denied the motion and on June 19, 2014, the court sentenced Patrick to 
an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 16 years.  
His sentence consisted of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 15 years 
for the murder offense, to be served consecutively to the 1-year prison sentence for 
the firearm specifications, and 11 years in prison for the aggravated-robbery offense 
and 3 years in prison for the tampering-with-evidence offense, to be served 
concurrently with the other sentences. 
{¶ 6} Patrick appealed the trial court’s judgment denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea to the Seventh District, which reversed the trial court’s 
judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings.  State v. Patrick, 2016-
Ohio-3283, 66 N.E.3d 169 (7th Dist.).  Following a jury trial on the original 
charges, the jury found Patrick guilty on all counts: aggravated murder, aggravated 
robbery, tampering with evidence, and the firearm specifications. 
{¶ 7} The trial court merged the aggravated-robbery conviction and its 
accompanying firearm specification with the aggravated-murder conviction and its 
accompanying firearm specification.  The trial court then sentenced Patrick to life 
imprisonment with parole eligibility after 30 years for the aggravated-murder 
offense, plus a consecutive, mandatory 3-year prison term for the firearm 
specification.  The court also sentenced Patrick to 3 years in prison for the 
tampering-with-evidence offense, to run concurrently with the other sentences.  
Thus, the trial court ordered Patrick to serve life in prison with parole eligibility 
after 33 years.  The court stated in its sentencing entry that it had “considered the 
record, oral statements, as well as the principles and purposes of sentencing under 
Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.11, and ha[d] balanced the seriousness and 
recidivism factors of Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.12.” 
{¶ 8} On appeal to the Seventh District, Patrick argued that the trial court 
had failed to consider his youth when it imposed a life sentence and therefore his 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution.  The court of appeals 
rejected this argument, concluding that Patrick’s sentence was distinguishable from 
those at issue in decisions of the United States Supreme Court considering Eighth 
Amendment challenges by juvenile offenders, because Patrick would be eligible 
for parole after 33 years.  2019-Ohio-1189 at ¶ 15.  The Seventh District also 
concluded, “Pursuant to R.C. 2929.12, a trial court is not required to consider the 
age of a defendant when issuing a felony sentence.  While R.C. 2929.12(C) and (E) 
provide that ‘any other relevant factors’ should be considered, the statute itself does 
not mandate the sentencing court to consider the defendant’s age.”  Id. at ¶ 16.  As 
a result, the Seventh District affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  Id. at ¶ 13, 15-19. 
{¶ 9} This court accepted discretionary review of Patrick’s first proposition 
of law: 
 
Imposition of any life imprisonment sentence upon a 
juvenile offender without taking into consideration factors 
commanded by the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the 
Constitution of Ohio violates those provisions. 
 
See 156 Ohio St.3d 1463, 2019-Ohio-2892, 126 N.E.3d 1167. 
{¶ 10} This court held oral argument on April 28, 2020.  On May 1, 2020, 
we sua sponte ordered supplemental briefing on the following issues: “The effect, 
if any, of R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) on this court’s and the court of appeals’ ability to 
review appellant’s sentence.  The parties should address whether that provision 
denies either court subject-matter jurisdiction and, if not, whether it otherwise limits 
the scope of the appeal here or in the court of appeals.”  158 Ohio St.3d 1494, 2020-
Ohio-2746, 144 N.E.3d 428. 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
5
II.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 11} We first address the subject of our supplemental-briefing order.  
Because we conclude that Patrick’s constitutional challenge to his sentence is not 
barred by R.C. 2953.08(D)(3), we then address the issue raised in Patrick’s 
proposition of law. 
A.  R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) does not preclude an appellate court from considering 
the constitutionality of an aggravated-murder sentence imposed on a juvenile 
offender tried as an adult 
{¶ 12} R.C. 2953.08 was enacted in 1996 as part of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 
Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, and its companion legislation, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 269, 
146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10752 (collectively referred to as “S.B. 2”).  R.C. 
2953.08(A) states, “In addition to any other right to appeal and except as provided 
in division (D) of this section, a defendant who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a 
felony may appeal as a matter of right the sentence imposed upon the defendant 
* * *.”  R.C. 2953.08(D)(3), however, states that “a sentence imposed for 
aggravated murder or murder pursuant to sections 2929.02 to 2929.06 of the 
Revised Code is not subject to review under this section.”  Patrick was sentenced 
pursuant to R.C. 2929.03. 
{¶ 13} Patrick argues that R.C. 2953.08 created a new right to appeal a 
felony sentence in addition to any other right to appeal.  He argues that the statutory 
preclusion against review of aggravated-murder sentences contained in R.C. 
2953.08(D)(3) does not apply to his appeal, because he did not invoke appellate 
jurisdiction under R.C. 2953.08.  In fact, Patrick concedes that if an appellant seeks 
review of an aggravated-murder sentence under R.C. 2953.08, the appellate court 
would be precluded from conducting that review by R.C. 2953.08(D)(3).  But 
Patrick distinguishes his appeal as a constitutional challenge to the sentencing 
process and, he argues, this court can review such challenges under R.C. 2505.03 
and 2953.02.  Finally, Patrick argues that if we accept the state’s argument that R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
2953.08(D)(3) precludes any appellate review of aggravated-murder sentences, 
then the provision is unconstitutional. 
{¶ 14} The state argues that R.C. 2953.08 is the exclusive route to appeal a 
felony sentence, unless a more specific statute applies.  It argues that no more 
specific statute provides a basis for Patrick to appeal his aggravated-murder 
sentence and that neither R.C. 2505.03 nor R.C. 2953.02 applies to Patrick’s appeal. 
1.  R.C. 2953.08 is not the exclusive basis for appealing a sentence 
{¶ 15} It is clear from the language in R.C. 2953.08 that the statute does not 
establish the only basis by which a party may appeal a sentence.  R.C. 2953.08(A) 
begins by stating, “In addition to any other right to appeal * * *, a defendant who 
is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony may appeal as a matter of right the 
sentence imposed upon the defendant on one of the following grounds * * *.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The language “[in] addition to any other right to appeal” 
appears again in R.C. 2953.08(B) regarding appeals by the prosecution.  Also, R.C. 
2953.08(E) states, “A sentence appeal under this section shall be consolidated with 
any other appeal in the case.  If no other appeal is filed, the court of appeals may 
review only the portions of the trial record that pertain to sentencing.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  These provisions referring to other methods of appeal make clear that R.C. 
2953.08 does not prescribe the sole right to appeal a criminal sentence. 
{¶ 16} Indeed, R.C. 2953.02 also provides a right to appeal a judgment or 
final order to the court of appeals “[i]n a capital case in which a sentence of death 
is imposed for an offense committed before January 1, 1995, and in any other 
criminal case * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2953.02 also provides, “A judgment 
or final order of the court of appeals involving a question arising under the 
Constitution of the United States or of this state may be appealed to the supreme 
court as a matter of right.”  The final judgment for purposes of appeal under R.C. 
2953.02 is the sentence.  See, e.g., State v. Danison, 105 Ohio St.3d 127, 2005-
Ohio-781, 823 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 6 (“Generally, in a criminal case, the final judgment 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
7
is the sentence”); Columbus v. Taylor, 39 Ohio St.3d 162, 165, 529 N.E.2d 1382 
(1988) (the final judgment in a criminal case is the sentence and the sentence is the 
judgment); State v. Hunt, 47 Ohio St.2d 170, 174, 351 N.E.2d 106 (1976) 
(“Generally, the sentence in a criminal case is the judgment”); State v. 
Chamberlain, 177 Ohio St. 104, 106, 202 N.E.2d 695 (1964) (same); State v. 
Thomas, 175 Ohio St. 563, 564, 197 N.E.2d 197 (1964) (“the sentence is the 
judgment from which an appeal lies”); see also Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 
211, 212, 58 S.Ct. 164, 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937) (“Final judgment in a criminal case 
means sentence.  The sentence is the judgment”).  Thus, R.C. 2953.02 also provides 
a statutory right to appeal a criminal sentence. 
{¶ 17} Moreover, the preclusive language in R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) 
demonstrates that its scope is limited to the bases of appeal described in R.C. 
2953.08.  It states that “[a] sentence imposed for aggravated murder or murder 
pursuant to sections 2929.02 to 2929.06 of the Revised Code is not subject to 
review under this section.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id.  In other words, R.C. 
2953.08(D)(3) does not determine whether a sentence imposed for aggravated 
murder is subject to review under any other statutory provision.  In that way, R.C. 
2953.08(D)(3)’s statutory language makes clear that it does not preclude other 
potential avenues of appellate review.  Thus, contrary to the state’s argument, there 
is no indication in the language of R.C. 2953.02 and 2953.08 that the rights to 
appeal described in the statutes conflict with each other. 
{¶ 18} In order to determine whether R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) precludes 
Patrick’s appeal, we must look to the scope of the right to appeal provided in R.C. 
2953.08 to see if Patrick’s appeal—a constitutional challenge—is permitted under 
that statute. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
2.  R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) does not preclude an appellate court’s review of a 
constitutional challenge to a sentence for aggravated murder or murder 
{¶ 19} In his appeal to the Seventh District, Patrick challenged the 
constitutionality of his sentence under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution.  
That is also the basis of the proposition of law that this court accepted for 
discretionary review.  Thus, it is clear that Patrick has raised a constitutional 
challenge to his aggravated-murder sentence. 
{¶ 20} Next, we look to the bases of appeal described in R.C. 2953.08 to 
determine if they permit a constitutional challenge to a felony sentence.  R.C. 
2953.08(A)(1) and (5) describe the grounds for appeal if certain sentences are 
imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.14 or 2929.142.  R.C. 2953.08(A)(2) applies to 
sentences including a prison term imposed for a fourth- or fifth-degree felony or a 
felony drug offense that could be subject to only a community-control sanction 
under R.C. 2929.13(B).  R.C. 2953.08(A)(3) applies to sentences imposed pursuant 
to R.C. 2971.03.  R.C. 2953.08(C) applies to consecutive sentences imposed under 
R.C. 2929.14(C)(3) and certain additional sentences imposed under R.C. 2929.14. 
{¶ 21} Patrick was sentenced under R.C. 2929.03, so none of the above-
mentioned provisions describe a basis for an appeal of his sentence.  And, of course, 
none describe a constitutional challenge to a sentence. 
{¶ 22} R.C. 2953.08(A)(4) provides that a defendant may appeal a felony 
sentence on the basis that the sentence “is contrary to law.”  The term “contrary to 
law appeared in R.C. 2953.08(A)(4) when R.C. 2953.08 was enacted through S.B. 
2 in 1996.  By that time, “contrary to law” had been defined as “in violation of 
statute or legal regulations at a given time.”  See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 328 
(6th Ed.1990).  Also, we “consider the statutory language in context, construing 
words and phrases in accordance with rules of grammar and common usage.”  State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grace, 123 Ohio St.3d 471, 2009-Ohio-5934, 918 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
9
N.E.2d 135, ¶ 25.  All the other bases of appeal described in R.C. 2953.08(A) relate 
to whether the trial court followed statutory sentencing requirements.  Reading R.C. 
2953.08(A)(4) in that context, it follows that the “contrary to law” basis of appeal 
is of a similar nature.  Thus, we conclude that R.C. 2953.08(A)(4) does not describe 
an appeal taken on constitutional grounds and that such an appeal is not an appeal 
“under this section,” as described in R.C. 2953.08(D)(3).  Accordingly, R.C. 
2953.08(D)(3) does not preclude an appeal of a sentence for aggravated murder or 
murder that is based on constitutional grounds. 
{¶ 23} We now proceed to the merits of Patrick’s appeal. 
B.  A trial court must articulate its consideration of the youth of a juvenile 
offender as a mitigating factor before imposing a life sentence under R.C. 
2929.03, even if that sentence includes eligibility for parole 
{¶ 24} Patrick argues that based on the significant body of caselaw 
explaining the differences between juveniles and adults for sentencing purposes, 
“there is nothing constitutionally distinguishable about this case that warrants a 
court in failing to account for youth as a mitigating factor in its sentencing 
decision.” 
{¶ 25} The state argues that a trial court is required to consider a juvenile 
offender’s youth and to articulate that consideration in its sentencing decision only 
before imposing life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  The state also 
argues that when an offender is afforded the possibility of parole, the concerns 
about a juvenile offender’s culpability and the possibility of rehabilitation 
addressed by this court in Long, 138 Ohio St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 890, 
do not exist.  Finally, the state argues that a sentencing court need not explicitly 
articulate its consideration of the offender’s youth on the record and that an 
appellate court may presume it was considered. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
1.  Age is a relevant sentencing factor under R.C. 2929.12 when a trial court 
sentences an offender who was a juvenile when he or she committed the offense 
{¶ 26} At the outset, we must address the Seventh District’s conclusion 
below that “[p]ursuant to R.C. 2929.12, a trial court is not required to consider the 
age of a defendant when issuing a felony sentence.  While R.C. 2929.12(C) and (E) 
provide that ‘any other relevant factors’ should be considered, the statute itself does 
not mandate the sentencing court to consider the defendant’s age.”  2019-Ohio-
1189 at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 27} The United States Supreme Court “has repeatedly noted to us that 
minors are less mature and responsible than adults, that they are lacking in 
experience, perspective, and judgment, and that they are more vulnerable and 
susceptible to the pressures of peers than are adults.”  Long at ¶ 33 (O’Connor, C.J., 
concurring), citing J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273-276, 131 S.Ct. 
2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011).  And in Long, we expressly held that “youth is a 
mitigating factor for a court to consider when sentencing a juvenile.”  Id. at ¶ 19.  
The fact that these statements about youth and its attendant characteristics were 
made in cases addressing constitutional questions does not mean those 
characteristics are present only in such cases.  They are characteristics inherent to 
juveniles in all cases.  See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473, 132 S.Ct 2455, 
183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (“[N]one of what [Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 
S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010)] said about children—about their distinctive 
and (transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime specific.  
Those features are evident in the same way, and to the same degree, when * * * a 
botched robbery turns into a killing”).  Thus, contrary to the Seventh District’s 
conclusion, age is undoubtedly a relevant factor that should be considered when a 
trial court sentences an offender who was a juvenile when he or she committed the 
offense, and therefore, youth is a relevant sentencing consideration under R.C. 
2929.12(C) and (E). 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
11 
{¶ 28} Of course, consideration of an offender’s youth and its attendant 
characteristics does not demand a certain result.  See Long, 138 Ohio St.3d 478, 
2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 890, at ¶ 37 (O’Connor, C.J., concurring) (“I caution that 
our law requires only that youth be considered as a factor.  It does not mandate any 
particular result from that consideration”).  And the scope of a trial court’s 
consideration of youth must depend on the constitutional concerns present.  “The 
constitutional question, then, is how much to consider an offender’s youth, and how 
much to consider his crime.”  Id. at ¶ 35 (O’Connor, C.J., concurring). 
2.  A sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility triggers the same scope 
of Eighth Amendment concern and need for consideration of youth during 
sentencing that we recognized in Long 
{¶ 29} Here, we are asked to determine whether a sentence of life in prison 
with parole eligibility after 33 years imposed on a juvenile offender triggers the 
same scope of Eighth Amendment concern and sentencing consideration that we 
recognized in Long.  We conclude that it does. 
{¶ 30} In Long, we held that consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Miller, 567 U.S. at 473, 132 S.Ct 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407, “[a] 
court, in exercising its discretion under R.C. 2929.03(A), must separately consider 
the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating factor before imposing a sentence 
of life without parole.”  Long at paragraph one of the syllabus.  We also held that 
“[t]he record must reflect that the court specifically considered the juvenile 
offender’s youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing when a prison term of life 
without parole is imposed.”  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 31} We recognize that, unlike the defendant in Long, Patrick was not 
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  But under R.C. 
2929.03(A)(1), the relevant sentencing statute in both this case and Long, life 
without parole was a potential sentence for Patrick.  The trial court’s discretionary-
sentencing task required it to choose from a number of life-sentencing options, with 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
or without parole.  In that way, the court’s individualized sentencing consideration 
here differed little from the sentencing court’s individualized sentencing 
consideration in Long. 
{¶ 32} R.C. 2929.03(A)(1) gives a sentencing court a range of life-term 
options: life without parole, life with parole eligibility after serving 20 years in 
prison, life with parole eligibility after serving 25 years in prison, and life with 
parole eligibility after serving 30 years in prison.  Even when the state recommends 
against a sentence of life without parole, as it did here, that sentence remains an 
option under the trial court’s discretion.  If, as Miller instructs, youth and its 
attendant characteristics must be considered when a court imposes its harshest 
penalties, see Miller at 477-478, then youth is also a necessary consideration when 
a sentencing court determines at what point parole eligibility should be available 
during a life sentence. 
{¶ 33} Additionally, we conclude that the difference between a sentence of 
life in prison with parole eligibility after a term of years and a sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole is not material for purposes of an Eighth 
Amendment challenge by an offender who was a juvenile when he or she 
committed the offense.  The state and the Seventh District have failed to recognize 
that spending one’s life in prison is a real possibility under all the life-sentencing 
options in R.C. 2929.03(A)(1).  Parole eligibility does not guarantee a defendant’s 
release from prison.  As noted in the brief of amici curiae Office of the Ohio Public 
Defender et al., Ohio’s parole-release rate was only 10.2 percent between 2011 and 
2018.  Bischoff, Ohio Parole Board Under Fire from Victims, Inmates, and 
Lawmakers, 
Dayton 
Daily 
News 
(Apr. 
7, 
2019), 
available 
at 
https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/ohio-
parole-board-under-fire-from-victims-inmates-and-lawmakers/v3iPhe6kmV9w 
Tm8SOxCpzO/ (accessed Nov. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/E4P3-HZRY].  In this 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
13 
way, Patrick’s sentence varies little from the state’s harshest punishment for a 
juvenile offender who is tried as an adult. 
{¶ 34} We also note a relevant distinction between Patrick’s sentence and 
the sentence at issue in State v. Moore, 149 Ohio St.3d 557, 2016-Ohio-8288, 76 
N.E.3d 1127.  That case involved a juvenile who committed nonhomicide offenses 
and received a 112-year aggregate prison sentence.  Id. at ¶ 12-13, 16.  This court 
considered the impact of the Supreme Court’s categorical prohibition on the 
imposition of life-without-parole sentences on juveniles for nonhomicide offenses 
announced in Graham, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825, and 
concluded that Moore’s sentence was unconstitutional because he would not be 
eligible for judicial release until he was 92 years old.  Moore at ¶ 30, 64. 
{¶ 35} To be sure, Patrick was sentenced to life in prison with parole 
eligibility after 33 years.  Any suggestion that Patrick’s eligibility for parole in his 
50s gives him a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release,” Moore at ¶ 47, is 
misplaced.  Parole eligibility for the first time in one’s 50s while under a life 
sentence should not be confused with the opportunity for judicial release, which is 
what was at issue in Moore, id. at ¶ 52. 
{¶ 36} A decision whether to grant or deny parole lies with the parole board, 
which is a part of the executive branch of our government.  It is the judiciary, 
however, that is primarily charged with safeguarding the constitutional guarantees 
of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  For that reason, we 
should not lightly draw distinctions among life sentences for purposes of 
determining whether a life sentence violates constitutional protections.  And it is 
contrary to this court’s juvenile-sentencing decisions to suggest that there is no 
constitutional remedy when a sentencing court fails to consider a juvenile 
offender’s youth when imposing a life sentence.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
severity of a sentence of life in prison on a juvenile offender, even if parole 
eligibility is part of the life sentence, is analogous to a sentence of life in prison 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
without the possibility of parole for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment.  
Accordingly, such a sentence should be treated consistently with that imposed in 
Long, as instructed by Miller.  Given the high likelihood of the juvenile offender 
spending his or her life in prison, the need for an individualized sentencing decision 
that considers the offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics is critical when 
life without parole is a potential sentence. 
{¶ 37} We also note that the state argues for a sort of categorical exception 
that a sentencing court’s consideration of youth is not required under the Eighth 
Amendment unless a life-without-parole sentence is actually imposed on a juvenile 
offender.  But the decisions in Miller and Long do not absolve sentencing courts 
from considering a defendant’s youth during sentencing simply because parole 
eligibility is ultimately included in the sentence.  It is because a court must consider 
youth and its attendant characteristics in its individualized sentencing decision that 
the court may impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a 
homicide offense committed when the offender was a juvenile.  See Long, 138 Ohio 
St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 890, at ¶ 19 (explaining that consideration of 
youth as a mitigating factor “does not mean that a juvenile may be sentenced only 
to the minimum term.  The offender’s youth at the time of the offense must still be 
weighed against any statutory consideration that might make an offense more 
serious or an offender more likely to recidivate”); Miller, 567 U.S. at 480, 132 S.Ct 
2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (“Although we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to 
make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how 
children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably 
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison”). 
{¶ 38} Additionally, under Ohio’s statutory sentencing scheme, the 
sentence ultimately imposed by a trial court does not determine what factors it must 
consider under R.C. 2929.12.  The factors in R.C. 2929.12 must be considered in 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
15 
order to determine the proper sentence—and here the youth of the offender and 
youth’s attendant characteristics are relevant. 
{¶ 39} We know that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole 
“forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 74, 130 S.Ct. 
2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825.  We also know that the characteristics of youth include 
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change.  This brings to mind an 
illustration. 
{¶ 40} In the movie The Shawshank Redemption, the character “Red,” 
portrayed by Morgan Freeman, faces the parole board after having served 40 years 
of a life sentence and having been previously denied parole twice after serving 20 
and 30 years of his sentence.  In response to a member of the parole board’s 
question about whether he has been rehabilitated, he responds: “Rehabilitated?  
Well, now, let me see.  * * * What do you really want to know?  Am I sorry for 
what I did?”  Then, he explains: 
 
There’s not a day goes by I don’t feel regret.  Not because 
I’m in here, or because you think I should.  I look back on the way 
I was then, a young, stupid kid who committed that terrible crime.  I 
want to talk to him.  I want to try to talk some sense to him, tell him 
the way things are, but I can’t.  That kid’s long gone, and this old 
man is all that’s left.  I got to live with that. 
 
The Shawshank Redemption (Castle Rock Entertainment 1994). 
{¶ 41} Certainly, before imposing a life sentence on a juvenile offender, 
there is room in our justice system for a trial court to make an individualized 
sentencing determination that articulates its consideration of the offender’s youth, 
and all that comes with it, before an old man is all that is left. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
3.  The record in this case does not demonstrate that the trial court considered 
Patrick’s youth as a mitigating factor 
{¶ 42} As we stated in Long, Miller mandates that “a trial court consider as 
mitigating the offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics before imposing a 
sentence of life without parole” (emphasis sic), Long at ¶ 27, and the “record must 
reflect that the court specifically considered the juvenile offender’s youth as a 
mitigating factor at sentencing when a prison term of life without parole is 
imposed,” id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Because we extend our application 
in Long to Patrick’s sentence, we must determine whether the sentencing record 
here reflects that the trial court specifically considered his youth as a mitigating 
factor.  We conclude that the sentencing court failed to articulate on the record 
whether, and how, it considered Patrick’s youth in sentencing. 
{¶ 43} At the sentencing hearing, Patrick’s youth was addressed by the state 
and Patrick’s counsel.  The prosecutor said, “I’m not going to recommend life 
without parole on the aggravated murder because the Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court have said that we should give them—juveniles—some chance at 
having a life somewhere out there.”  The state therefore recommended a sentence 
on the aggravated-murder offense of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 
30 years. 
{¶ 44} Patrick’s counsel also made a statement that referred to Patrick’s 
youth in regard to sentencing: 
 
[J]udge, if ever there was a case that was appropriate for mercy, I 
think this is it.  We’re talking about a young man who at the time of 
this offense was 17 years old.  Certainly that should be taken into 
consideration when we sentence. 
* * * 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
17 
* * * [T]he idea of a murder was not really contemplated inside the 
brain of Kyle Patrick that day.  There was certainly some reckless 
behavior and foolish behavior, and it was in fact intended to be a 
robbery, and then ill-prepared group to commit this robbery which 
then gave rise to the shooting death. 
For what it’s worth, Judge, today Kyle Patrick denies that he 
was the shooter.  So he does acknowledge the idea of a robbery.  He 
does acknowledge that it was his weapon.  Certainly acknowledges, 
and he did from the beginning, that he tried to clean up the situation 
when he went back, got the bag with whatever it was. 
We had a deal worked out years ago in this case which I 
thought was appropriate under the circumstances.  However, I could 
not convince Kyle,  I could not explain to him—I wish I could do a 
better job in my job, in my work—the idea of the felony murder or 
the accomplice liability.  Because he was adamant that he did not 
shoot Big Mike, because he was adamant that he did not mean to 
shoot Big Mike, he had a very difficult time understanding how our 
system of justice could convict him of the murder of Big Mike under 
the circumstances. So our deal that we had prior to trial I thought 
was appropriate.  And I think that, Judge, on the issue as far as how 
you want to start this sentence, I do think that this is a case that 
would be appropriate for mercy for a chance for life. 
 
{¶ 45} Patrick’s mother said the following at the sentencing hearing 
regarding Patrick’s youth: 
 
Kyle wasn’t the ringleader.  He’s not a street kid with no 
family or no home and bouncing from place to place.  When this 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
began, he was a sheltered 17-year-old boy.  He was a wannabe 
gangster who thought * * * hanging around these 20-year-old street 
thugs would make him cool, and he made a bad decision.  I’m not 
saying he shouldn’t be punished.  I’m sorry. 
* * * 
Kyle isn’t a monster.  He’s a human being capable of 
remorse.  He smiles when he’s anxious and nervous.  He wears his 
heart on his sleeve.  He’s too trusting of the wrong people, and he’s 
loyal to a fault.  He wasn’t the ringleader.  Those boys came back to 
my house because I thought in a controlled environment we could 
monitor the situation.  There was always someone home. 
* * * 
Kyle was never a leader.  He was a follower of the wrong 
people, and he’s my son, and he’s a grandson, and he’s a brother, 
and he’s a nephew, and no matter how strong we are as a family, we 
are going to get through this. 
 
{¶ 46} After hearing these statements, the trial court made no mention of 
how its consideration of Patrick’s youth factored into its decision to impose the 
second harshest penalty available for the aggravated-murder offense and 
accompanying firearm specification—life with parole eligibility after 33 years—
even though parole eligibility after 23 or 28 years was also a possible sentence for 
aggravated murder with a firearm specification, R.C. 2929.03(A)(1).  In 
announcing its sentence, the trial court stated: 
 
 
I was trying to think in all of the years that I have done this 
if there has ever been a case that to me seemed as senseless as this 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
19 
one. And we’ve had, of course, our share, but I can’t think of many.  
To me this is a senseless loss of life. 
 
* * * 
Actually this is an easy call for me given what I know from 
the evidence introduced at trial and given the verdict of the jury. 
Considering the factors contained in section 2929 of the 
revised code, of course you are not eligible for community control.  
It’s going to be the sentence of this court that you * * * serve a 
sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving 30 
full years.  As to the firearm specification, a definite sentence of 
three years that must be served prior to and consecutive to the 
sentence imposed in Count One.  I agree that Count Two and the 
specification merges with Count One.  I’m going to impose a 
definite sentence of three years on Count Three. 
 
{¶ 47} We note that at Patrick’s first sentencing hearing, after he had 
pleaded guilty and before he appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to 
withdraw that plea, the trial court sentenced him to life in prison with parole 
eligibility after 16 years.  At Patrick’s subsequent sentencing hearing, after hearing 
statements about Patrick’s youth from the prosecution, Patrick’s counsel, and 
Patrick’s mother, the trial court imposed a more severe sentence than it had 
previously imposed.  Thus, it is unclear from the record whether, and if so, how, 
the trial court considered Patrick’s youth. 
{¶ 48} It is not enough to assume that the trial court must have considered 
Patrick’s youth in determining the sentence because the prosecution and defense 
counsel addressed his youth in their statements to the court during the sentencing 
hearing.  The same thing occurred in Long and we held otherwise.  See Long, 138 
Ohio St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 890, at ¶ 20-28.  The fact that the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
prosecution here—unlike the prosecution in Long—properly asserted that youth 
should be a mitigating factor also does not materially distinguish the sentencing 
record in this case.  Here, as in Long, it cannot be determined from the record 
whether, and if so, how, the trial court considered Patrick’s youth because the trial 
court failed to articulate any such consideration in the sentencing record. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 49} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Seventh 
District Court of Appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for resentencing. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
FRENCH and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
DONNELLY, J., concurs, with an opinion. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 
DEWINE, J. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in part II(A) and dissents from parts II(B) and III. 
_________________ 
 
DONNELLY, J., concurring. 
{¶ 50} I agree with the conclusion of the majority in Part II(A) of its opinion 
that R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) does not preclude an appellate court from considering the 
constitutionality of an aggravated-murder sentence imposed upon a juvenile 
offender tried as an adult.  I write separately because I arrive at that same conclusion 
by somewhat different means and because I disagree with some of the analysis 
applied by the majority to reach its conclusion. 
{¶ 51} I further agree with the majority that a trial court must articulate its 
consideration of the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating factor before 
imposing a life sentence under R.C. 2929.03, even if that sentence includes 
eligibility for parole, and I accordingly join in full Part II(B) of the majority 
opinion. 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
21 
{¶ 52} I therefore concur in the court’s judgment. 
R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) does not foreclose appellate review of an aggravated-
murder sentence 
{¶ 53} I agree with the majority that R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) does not preclude 
an appellate court from considering the constitutionality of a noncapital aggravated-
murder or murder sentence.  For the reasons that I will explain, I question whether 
R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) was truly intended to bar any appellate review of a noncapital 
aggravated-murder sentence.  Taking the text of R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) at face value, 
I agree with the majority that R.C. 2953.08 does not extinguish other statutory 
rights of appeal which, in my view, include but are not necessarily limited to 
appeals challenging the constitutionality of a noncapital aggravated-murder 
sentence. 
{¶ 54} R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) was first enacted as a part of the 1996 criminal-
sentencing reforms, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, and its 
companion legislation, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 269, 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10752 
(collectively, “S.B. 2”).  Before S.B. 2 was enacted, Ohio law accorded trial courts 
broad discretion in imposing a criminal sentence and appellate courts generally 
would not review a sentence that was authorized by law and within the applicable 
statutory limits.  See State v. Hill, 70 Ohio St.3d 25, 29, 635 N.E.2d 1248 (1994); 
Toledo v. Reasonover, 5 Ohio St.2d 22, 213 N.E.2d 179 (1965), paragraph one of 
the syllabus.  A sentence so imposed would not be disturbed on appeal absent an 
abuse of discretion.  See State v. Grigsby, 80 Ohio App.3d 291, 302, 609 N.E.2d 
183 (8th Dist.1992); State v. Cassidy, 21 Ohio App.3d 100, 102, 487 N.E.2d 322 
(9th Dist.1984); State v. Longo, 4 Ohio App.3d 136, 141, 446 N.E.2d 1145 (8th 
Dist.1982). 
{¶ 55} After the passage of S.B. 2, “R.C. 2953.08 specifically and 
comprehensively defines the parameters and standards—including the standard of 
review—for felony-sentencing appeals.”  State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 21.  And although R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) states 
that “a sentence imposed for aggravated murder or murder pursuant to sections 
2929.02 to 2929.06 of the Revised Code is not subject to review under this section,” 
a review of the statutory history and a close examination of the statutory text 
confirms for me that R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) does not foreclose appellate review of 
Patrick’s sentence. 
It is unclear whether R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) was intended to bar appellate review of 
a noncapital aggravated-murder sentence 
{¶ 56} When R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) became law on July 1, 1996, it was 
codified with R.C. 2953.08(D)(1).  See S.B. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7564.  At 
that time, there was only one possible sentence for a noncapital-aggravated-murder 
conviction: life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving 20 years.  See 
former R.C. 2929.03(A), S.B. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7453-7454.  Because 
there was only one possible sentence for such a conviction, the apparent bar to 
appellate review of such a sentence under R.C. 2953.08(D) made logical sense. 
{¶ 57} Effective March 23, 2005, however, additional sentences for a 
noncapital aggravated-murder conviction were added in Sub.H.B. No. 184, 150 
Ohio Laws, Part III, 5043 (“H.B. 184”).  As amended, R.C. 2929.03 allows a trial 
court to impose one of four sentences once a defendant is convicted of noncapital 
aggravated murder: life imprisonment without parole, R.C. 2929.03(A)(1)(a); life 
imprisonment with parole eligibility after 20 years of imprisonment, R.C. 
2929.03(A)(1)(b); life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 25 years of 
imprisonment, R.C. 2929.03(A)(1)(c); or life imprisonment with parole eligibility 
after 30 years of imprisonment, R.C. 2929.03(A)(1)(d). 
{¶ 58} “The legislative history plainly shows that the General Assembly’s 
intent in enacting the current version of R.C. 2929.03(A) was to ensure that trial-
court judges had discretion to choose among the four options listed above when 
sentencing those convicted of aggravated murder.”  State v. Phillips, 3d Dist. No. 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
23 
15-12-02, 2012-Ohio-5950, ¶ 16.  Despite having given trial courts discretion to 
select from a range of possible sentences under R.C. 2929.03, the General 
Assembly made no change to the terms of R.C. 2953.08(D).  See State v. Smith, 1st 
Dist. No. C-180227, 2020-Ohio-649, ¶ 39.  It is instructive to note, however, that 
when amending R.C. 2929.03(A) to provide four sentencing options for noncapital 
aggravated murder, the General Assembly did not then or thereafter enact any 
provision stating that a sentence so imposed under R.C. 2929.03(A) was not subject 
to any appellate review under that or any other section of the Revised Code. 
{¶ 59} From my review of the statutory history, it is not clear whether the 
seemingly anomalous preclusion of appeals for aggravated-murder and murder 
sentences truly reflects a deliberate and conscious legislative-policy decision to 
single out these specific crimes for differential adverse treatment or whether this is 
simply the result of an unfortunate legislative oversight.  If original intent is any 
indication, then the basis for seemingly barring appellate review would appear to 
have been based on the fact that there was only one sentence available at the time.  
If that is in fact the case, then R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) would now appear to have 
become quite literally a law of unintended consequences. 
{¶ 60} I acknowledge that in State v. Porterfield, 106 Ohio St.3d 5, 2005-
Ohio-3095, 829 N.E.2d 690, ¶ 17, this court found that R.C. 2953.08(D) was 
unambiguous and “clearly means what it says: * * * a sentence [imposed for 
aggravated murder or murder pursuant to R.C. 2929.02 to 2929.06] cannot be 
reviewed.”  But Porterfield, which was decided on July 6, 2005, involved 
aggravated-murder sentences that were imposed prior to the March 2005 sentence-
changing amendments effected by H.B. 184.  Under that prior sentencing scheme, 
Porterfield in fact received the only sentence authorized by that prior law: 20 years 
to life on each of his aggravated-murder convictions.  Id. at ¶ 2.  Porterfield does 
not speak to whether the bar to appeal in R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) was intended to bar 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
all appeals pertaining to sentences once the former mandatory sentence was 
replaced by four discretionary sentencing options.1 
{¶ 61} While one may question whether R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) now really 
means what it says, there is no denying that it says what it says.  The text of R.C. 
2953.08(D)(3) is still unambiguous: a sentence imposed for aggravated murder 
pursuant to R.C. 2929.02 to 2929.06 “is not subject to review under this section,” 
i.e., R.C. 2953.08.  But as discussed hereafter, that does not mean that the sentence 
is not subject to any appellate review. 
The plain language of R.C. 2953.08 indicates that it is not the exclusive method to 
appealing a noncapital aggravated-murder sentence 
{¶ 62} By its terms, R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) states that only a noncapital 
aggravated-murder sentence is not subject to review under R.C. 2953.08.  As the 
majority opinion recognizes, the introductory text of R.C. 2953.08(A) indicates that 
the appeal rights established by R.C. 2953.08 are “ ‘[i]n addition to any other right 
of appeal,’ ” majority opinion at ¶ 15, quoting R.C. 2953.08(A), but R.C. 2953.08 
“does not establish the only basis by which a party may appeal a sentence” 
[emphasis sic],  id. at ¶ 15.  The majority opinion correctly recognizes that in any 
criminal case, the court of appeals may review the judgment or final order of a court 
of record inferior to the court of appeals pursuant to R.C. 2953.02.  See also R.C. 
2505.03(A) (“Every final order, judgment, or decree of a court * * * may be 
reviewed on appeal by a court of common pleas, a court of appeals, or the supreme 
court, whichever has jurisdiction”). 
                                                          
 
1.  I would respectfully encourage the General Assembly to re-examine whether it intended to 
foreclose all appeals of sentences for noncapital aggravated murder and murder, giving particular 
consideration to whether there is any rational basis—in ordinary parlance or in the more 
particularized equal-protection sense—to deny such appeals to this particular class of offenders. 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
25 
{¶ 63} In addition to these independent statutory rights to appeal, R.C. 
2953.07 separately authorizes Ohio’s courts of appeals to review criminal sentences 
that are claimed to be “contrary to law.”  It specifically provides as follows: 
 
Upon the hearing of an appeal other than an appeal from a 
mayor’s court, the appellate court may affirm the judgment or 
reverse it, in whole or in part, or modify it, and order the accused to 
be discharged or grant a new trial.  The appellate court may remand 
the accused for the sole purpose of correcting a sentence imposed 
contrary to law, provided that, on an appeal of a sentence imposed 
upon a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony that 
is brought under section 2953.08 of the Revised Code, division (G) 
of that section applies to the court. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2953.07(A).  S.B. 2 added this emphasized language to 
the statute.  146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, 7562.  Thus, before and after the passage 
of S.B. 2, R.C. 2953.07 generally authorized—and authorizes—Ohio’s appellate 
courts to review criminal sentences that were or are claimed to be “contrary to law.” 
{¶ 64} From the foregoing, I can conclude only that R.C. 2953.08 does not 
control, much less foreclose, an appeal of a criminal sentence that contests the 
discretionary sentence imposed under R.C. 2929.03(A) following a conviction for 
noncapital aggravated murder.  Had the General Assembly intended to prohibit an 
appeal of a sentence for noncapital aggravated murder or murder, it could have said 
somewhere that such sentences “are not subject to appellate review.”  But stating 
that such sentences “are not subject to review” under R.C. 2953.08 does not mean 
that they are not subject to any appellate review at all.  I therefore agree that R.C. 
2953.08(D)(3) does not foreclose appellate review of an aggravated-murder 
sentence. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
The statutory rights to appeal a noncapital aggravated-murder sentence include 
but are not necessarily limited to appeals challenging the constitutionality of the 
sentence 
{¶ 65} I agree with the majority that the statutory right to appeal permits an 
appellate court to consider the constitutionality of an aggravated-murder sentence.  
To be clear, however, I believe that the statutory right to appeal under R.C. 2953.02 
and 2953.07 include, but are not necessarily limited to, appeals challenging the 
constitutionality of an aggravated-murder sentence. 
{¶ 66} For its part, the majority opinion appears to draw a distinction 
between constitutional  and statutory appeals when it looks “to the scope of the 
right to appeal provided in R.C. 2953.08 to see if Patrick’s appeal—a constitutional 
challenge—is permitted under that statute.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 18.  I respectfully 
disagree with this portion of the majority opinion’s analysis.  Because R.C. 
2953.08(A) and (D)(3) expressly except noncapital aggravated-murder and murder 
sentences from being subject to appellate review under R.C. 2953.08, it is illogical 
for the majority to look to the scope of the appeal rights provided by R.C. 2953.08 
to ascertain whether Patrick’s constitutional challenge to his noncapital aggravated-
murder sentence is within the scope of that statute.  R.C. 2953.08 tells us twice that 
it is not. 
{¶ 67} The majority nevertheless proceeds to note that the appeals allowed 
by R.C. 2953.08(A)(1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) all expressly concern statutory 
sentencing requirements.  Majority opinion at ¶ 19-22.2  According to the majority, 
                                                          
 
2.  Acknowledging here that a trial court’s failure to comply with statutory sentencing requirements 
can be appealed for being “contrary to law” under R.C. 2953.08(A)(4) is inconsistent with this 
court’s decision in State v. Jones, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-6729, ___ N.E.3d ___, in which 
the court concluded that although R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are statutory sentencing requirements 
mandated by the General Assembly for every felony sentence, the failure to comply with those 
statutory sentencing requirements is not subject to appeal pursuant to R.C. 2953.08.  I remain of the 
view that the failure to observe those statutory sentencing requirements can be reviewed on appeal 
for being “contrary to law.” See State v. Gwynne, 158 Ohio St.3d 279, 2019-Ohio-4761, 141 N.E.3d 
169, ¶ 45 (Donnelly, J., dissenting). 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
27 
R.C. 2953.08 controls appeals that challenge the trial court’s compliance with 
statutory sentencing requirements but does not control appeals that challenge the 
constitutionality of the trial court’s sentence. 
{¶ 68} To the extent the majority opinion purports to draw a distinction 
between constitutional-based and statutory-based appeals, I am not aware of any 
law that limits or otherwise qualifies the grounds upon which a criminal sentence 
can be challenged on appeal.  As I have previously indicated, the General Assembly 
did not proscribe appeals of noncapital aggravated-murder sentences.  Nor did it 
qualify appeals depending on whether the challenge is based on a constitutional 
argument.  I therefore do not believe that we have the authority to allow appeals on 
certain grounds and disallow appeals on other grounds. 
{¶ 69} In my view, R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) does not foreclose appellate review 
of an aggravated-murder sentence, and the statutory rights to appeal under R.C. 
2953.02 and 2953.07 include, but are not necessarily limited to, appeals challenging 
the constitutionality of a sentence.  For instance, an appeal could encompass an 
argument that a discretionary sentence was  based on an illegal consideration such 
as the offender’s race, ethnic background, gender, or religion.  See R.C. 2929.11(C) 
(expressly forbidding a sentence based on the offender’s race, ethnic background, 
gender, or religion).  It is unfathomable to think that an offender’s sentence based 
on such odious considerations could escape any appellate review just because the 
underlying crime was aggravated murder.  What rational basis could justify that 
invidious discriminatory  treatment? 
{¶ 70} An appeal could likewise encompass—consistent with the law 
before the enactment of S.B. 2—a challenge to a sentence that was authorized by 
law and within the statutory range but was nevertheless an abuse of the sentencing 
court’s discretion.  What rational basis could justify a demonstrable abuse of 
judicial discretion? 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
{¶ 71} And an appeal could encompass a claim alleging that a discretionary 
sentence was imposed vindictively to punish the defendant for exercising his or her 
constitutional right to a trial.  See State v. O’Dell, 45 Ohio St.3d 140, 543 N.E.2d 
1220 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus.  On that point, the facts of this case are 
a source of particular concern for me.  Appellant, Kyle Patrick, originally pleaded 
guilty and was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment with parole 
eligibility after 16 years.  However, after Patrick’s guilty plea was reversed, see 
State v. Patrick, 2016-Ohio-3283, 66 N.E.3d 169 (7th Dist.), his case proceeded to 
trial and Patrick, who was 17 years old at the time of his offenses, was thereafter 
given a far more severe penalty—life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 33 
years.3   And that sentence was imposed after the trial court had recognized that 
Patrick might not have been the shooter. 
{¶ 72} Nevertheless, whether Patrick was forced to pay a trial tax4 for 
exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial is an issue that cannot be explored 
further here, because Patrick did not raise that issue in the court of appeals or in this 
court. 
{¶ 73} While my reservations with the majority opinion may be more with 
what is not said than with what is said, I agree with its conclusion here that R.C. 
2953.08(D)(3) does not preclude an appellate court from considering the 
constitutionality of an aggravated-murder sentence.  I accordingly concur with the 
court’s judgment. 
_________________ 
                                                          
 
3.  The aggregate sentence was 33 years to life based on the aggravated-murder sentence of 30 years 
to life, the consecutive 3-year firearm-specification sentence, and the concurrent 3-year tampering-
with-evidence sentence.   
 
4.  See State v. Rahab, 150 Ohio St.3d 152, 2017-Ohio-1401, 80 N.E.3d 431, ¶ 8 (“a sentence 
vindictively imposed on a defendant for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial is contrary 
to law”). 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
29 
 
 
KENNEDY, J.,  concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 74} I agree with the majority that R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) does not preclude 
an appellate court from reviewing the constitutionality of a sentence for murder or 
aggravated murder.  I dissent, however, from the majority’s holding that the Eighth 
Amendment to the United State Constitution demands that a trial court must 
separately consider—on the record—the youth of a juvenile offender as a 
mitigating factor prior to imposing a sentence for life with the possibility of parole. 
R.C. 2953.08 does not preclude an appellate court from reviewing a 
murder or aggravated-murder sentence when a defendant raises a 
constitutional claim regarding that sentence on appeal 
{¶ 75} R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) precludes a defendant from seeking review of a 
murder sentence pursuant only to an appeal brought under R.C. 2953.08.  There are 
other ways to appeal a murder or aggravated-murder sentence—R.C. 2953.02 
provides a general right to appeal and R.C. 2505.03(A) provides that “[e]very final 
order, judgment, or decree of a court * * * may be reviewed on appeal by a court 
of common pleas, a court of appeals, or the supreme court, whichever has 
jurisdiction.”  In State v. Matthews, 81 Ohio St.3d 375, 691 N.E.2d 1041 (1998), 
syllabus, this court held that R.C. 2505.03 applies to appeals in criminal cases. 
{¶ 76} This court has explained that there are limits to sentencing review: 
“[T]he Court of Appeals cannot hold that a trial court abused its discretion by 
imposing too severe a sentence on a defendant convicted of violating an ordinance, 
where the sentence imposed is within the limits authorized by the applicable 
ordinance and statutes.”  Toledo v. Reasonover, 5 Ohio St.2d 22, 213 N.E.2d 179 
(1965), paragraph one of the syllabus.  However, there are exceptions to the general 
premise that once a defendant has been proved guilty of an offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt he is eligible for any statutory penalty associated with that 
offense.  The discretion of the court does not extend to unconstitutional sentences: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
 
Every person has a fundamental right to liberty in the sense 
that the Government may not punish him unless and until it proves 
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a criminal trial conducted in 
accordance with the relevant constitutional guarantees.  But a person 
who has been so convicted is eligible for, and the court may impose, 
whatever punishment is authorized by statute for his offense, so long 
as that penalty is not cruel and unusual, and so long as the penalty 
is not based on an arbitrary distinction that would violate the Due 
Process Clause * * *. 
 
(Citations omitted, first emphasis sic, and second emphasis added.)  Chapman v. 
United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991). 
{¶ 77} In reviewing a defendant’s sentence under an Eighth Amendment 
claim in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), 
the United States Supreme Court stated, “Reviewing courts * * * should grant 
substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in 
determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the 
discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted criminals.  But no 
penalty is per se constitutional.”  A review of a sentence under the Eighth 
Amendment is not a review of the trial court’s discretion: 
 
Absent specific authority, it is not the role of an appellate court to 
substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the 
appropriateness of a particular sentence; rather, in applying the 
Eighth Amendment the appellate court decides only whether the 
sentence under review is within constitutional limits. 
 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
31 
Id. at fn. 16. 
{¶ 78} R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) does not preclude appellate review of a murder 
or aggravated-murder sentence, and an appellate court need not defer to the trial 
court’s imposed sentence if that sentence is unconstitutional.  Therefore, the appeal 
of appellant, Kyle Patrick, is properly before us. 
The constitutionality of Patrick’s sentence 
{¶ 79} I dissent from the majority’s holding regarding the substance of 
Patrick’s appeal.  Patrick relies exclusively on the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution in appealing his sentence, arguing that his sentence violates that 
amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment because the trial 
court failed to take into consideration on the record Patrick’s youth before imposing 
a sentence of life with parole eligibility after 33 years.  The majority agrees, despite  
the lack of legal authority in support of that proposition.  Today’s holding is without 
precedent in the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence of this court or of the United 
States Supreme Court.  And that is no surprise, given that the majority holds that a 
sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole is the equivalent of a sentence 
of life without the possibility of parole for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.  To 
the contrary, the two types of punishment are not equivalent.  Pursuant to the Eighth 
Amendment, there is a categorical ban against the imposition of a life-without-
parole sentences on all but the most incorrigible juveniles, and certain procedural 
protections have arisen—including a consideration of the youth of the offender 
before sentencing that person to life without parole—to ensure that the penalty is 
imposed on only those rarest of juveniles, those whose crimes reflect irreparable 
corruption.  There is no Eighth Amendment categorical ban against the imposition 
of sentences of life with the possibility of parole, and therefore there is no Eighth 
Amendment-based procedure necessary to winnow the imposition of that sentence 
to only incorrigible defendants.  The majority applies protections designed to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32 
further categorical restrictions to a punishment against which there is no categorical 
ban. 
{¶ 80} The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which 
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides, “Excessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”  This court has stated: 
 
Historically, the Eighth Amendment has been invoked in extremely 
rare cases, where it has been necessary to protect individuals from 
inhumane punishment such as torture or other barbarous acts.  
Robinson v. California (1962), 370 U.S. 660, 676, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 
1425, 8 L.Ed.2d 758, 768.  Over the years, it has also been used to 
prohibit punishments that were found to be disproportionate to the 
crimes committed.  In McDougle v. Maxwell (1964), 1 Ohio St.2d 
68, 30 O.O.2d 38, 203 N.E.2d 334, this court stressed that Eighth 
Amendment violations are rare.  We stated that “[c]ases in which 
cruel and unusual punishments have been found are limited to those 
involving sanctions which under the circumstances would be 
considered shocking to any reasonable person.”  Id. at 70, 30 O.O.2d 
at 39, 203 N.E.2d at 336.  Furthermore, “the penalty must be so 
greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of 
justice of the community.”  Id.  See also State v. Chaffin (1972), 30 
Ohio St.2d 13, 59 O.O.2d 51, 282 N.E.2d 46, paragraph three of the 
syllabus. 
 
State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 370-371, 715 N.E.2d 167 (1999). 
{¶ 81} The original understanding of the Eighth Amendment, at least in the 
case of juveniles, has expanded from a consideration of merely the nature of the 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
33 
punishment to how the punishment is procedurally imposed.  Certain punishments 
have been found to be categorically unconstitutional for crimes that have been 
committed by juveniles, including the death penalty, see Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 568, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), and a sentence of life without 
the possibility of parole for a juvenile who committed a nonhomicide offense, see 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74-75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010).  
But in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479-480, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 
(2012), the court began to focus on the procedural considerations that should be 
addressed before a court imposes certain punishments against a juvenile.  In Miller, 
the court held that under the Eighth Amendment, trial courts cannot impose 
mandatory life-without-parole sentences—even on juvenile homicide offenders—
because the automatic imposition of that penalty “runs afoul of [its] cases’ 
requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious 
penalties,” id. at 465.  The court wrote that its “decision does not categorically bar 
a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime—as, for example, [the court] did 
in Roper or Graham.  Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain 
process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before 
imposing a particular penalty.” Id. at 483.  In Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. 
__, 136 S.Ct. 718, 734, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the court clarified that Miller had 
“rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class of defendants 
because of their status’—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the 
transient immaturity of youth.” Id. at 734, citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 
330, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002).  Therefore, the sentencing judge 
must “take into account ‘how children are different, and how those differences 
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.’ ” Montgomery 
at 733, quoting Miller at 480.  The court in Montgomery recognized that “a 
sentencer might encounter the rare juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
34 
depravity that rehabilitation is impossible and life without parole is justified.” Id. 
at 733.  But the court also acknowledged that Miller contained no requirement that 
trial courts make a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility.  Id. at 735. 
{¶ 82} In State v. Long, 138 Ohio St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 890, 
which was decided before Montgomery, this court went beyond the holding in 
Miller and held that a trial court must make some statement on the record taking 
into account an offender’s youth before imposing a sentence of life in prison 
without the possibility of parole. 
{¶ 83} Even with this shift to process from the core protection of the Eighth 
Amendment, the nature of the punishment has continued to be at the forefront.  That 
is, there are procedural implications for courts because of the gravity of the 
punishment.  The overriding concern is that the court not impose the punishment 
on someone undeserving.  Today, relying on the Eighth Amendment, the majority 
imposes procedural requirements protecting against the imposition of punishments 
that have never been found to violate the Eighth Amendment for any class of 
people—sentences of life with the possibility of parole. 
{¶ 84} In Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment precludes the mandatory 
imposition of a life sentence that does not include the possibility of parole for a 
person who committed murder before the age of 18.  And this court held in Long 
that a trial court must make some statement on the record that the court had taken 
into account an offender’s youth before imposing a sentence of life in prison 
without the possibility of parole.  But neither this court nor the United States 
Supreme Court has ever held that the Eighth Amendment requires a trial court to 
state at the time of sentencing that it has considered the youth of an offender before 
imposing a sentence that provides an opportunity for parole.  Because a trial court 
that sentences a juvenile offender to a sentence of life with the possibility of parole 
after 33 years is not subject to the requirements of Miller or Long, I would hold that 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
35 
the trial court’s failure to specifically note on the record that it had considered 
Patrick’s youth did not render the sentence unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment.  Whether Ohio’s sentencing statutes require a trial court to consider 
an offender’s youth in a case not involving a life-without-parole sentence is not 
before us.  The only issue before us is whether the Eighth Amendment requires a 
trial court to consider the youth of an offender before imposing a life sentence that 
includes the possibility of parole after 33 years.  The Eighth Amendment does not 
so require. 
{¶ 85} At the center of the jurisprudence regarding juveniles and life-
without-parole sentences is the nature of the sentence.  Graham, 560 U.S. 48, 130 
S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825, is the seminal case in which the court considered the 
constitutionality of life-without-parole sentences for juveniles.  In Graham, the 
court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the imposition of a 
life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit a homicide.  
A fundamental aspect of the court’s holding in Graham was its comparison of the 
characteristics of a life-without-parole sentence and a death sentence.  Life-without-
parole terms, the court wrote, “share some characteristics with death sentences that 
are shared by no other sentences.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 69.  Although the state 
does not execute a defendant who has been sentenced to life without parole, “the 
sentence alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.”  Id.  A life-
without-parole sentence takes everything from the defendant; “[i]t deprives the 
convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration, except 
perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility of which does not mitigate 
the harshness of the sentence.”  Id. at 69-70, citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 300-301, 103 
S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637.  A life-without-parole sentence “ ‘means denial of 
hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it 
means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the 
convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.’ ”  (Brackets added in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
36 
Graham.)  Id. at 70, quoting Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525, 526, 779 P.2d 944 
(1989).  The court wrote that a life-without-parole sentence “gives no chance for 
fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no 
hope.”  Id. at 79.  A life sentence with the possibility of parole, on the other hand, 
does not carry the weight of a life-without-parole sentence.  A juvenile sentenced 
to life with the possibility of parole does have a chance for fulfillment outside 
prison walls.  He is not destined to remain in prison until death.  Hope is not denied.  
Good behavior and character improvement are not immaterial. A sentence with the 
possibility of parole offers “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based 
on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” id. at 75, while a sentence of life 
without parole does not. 
{¶ 86} In Long, 138 Ohio St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 890, at ¶ 27, 
this court pointed to the unique harshness of a life without parole sentence: “For 
juveniles, like Long, a sentence of life without parole is the equivalent of a death 
penalty.  * * * As such, it is not to be imposed lightly, for as the juvenile matures 
into adulthood and may become amenable to rehabilitation, the sentence 
completely forecloses that possibility.”  This court also stated that while Miller did 
not bar a court from imposing life without parole, it is “because of the severity of 
that penalty, and because youth and its attendant circumstances are strong 
mitigating factors, that sentence should rarely be imposed on juveniles,” (emphasis 
added) id. at ¶ 29. We further held that a trial court has a duty to clarify its reasoning 
before imposing life without parole “because a life-without-parole sentence implies 
that rehabilitation is impossible, when the court selects this most serious sanction, 
its reasoning for the choice ought to be clear on the record.”  Id. at ¶ 19.  Because 
the trial court did not separately mention that Long had been a juvenile when he 
committed the offense, this court determined that it could not be sure how the court 
had applied that factor and therefore vacated the sentence and remanded the cause 
for resentencing.  Id. at ¶ 27, 29. 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
37 
{¶ 87} Again in Long, it was the seriousness of the sanction that gave rise 
to the procedural protection for the juvenile.  Because the life-without-parole 
sentence is so grave and categorically banned except for only the worst offenders, 
a court must determine that a person who receives that sentence is properly within 
the small group of juveniles to whom it may apply.  To ensure that this sentence is 
appropriate before a trial court imposes it, this court required an on-the-record 
finding of the trial court’s reasoning. 
{¶ 88} The protections afforded in Graham, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 
176 L.Ed.2d 825, Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407, and Long 
all inure for persons for whom a life-without-parole sentence is imposed.  Certainly, 
the lessened culpability associated with youth is also an important factor.  But a 
sentence of life in prison without the eligibility for parole is the sentence by which 
the United States Supreme Court and this court have drawn the line for Eighth 
Amendment juvenile-offender-sentencing purposes.  The Eighth Amendment’s 
requirement that a trial court consider the youth of the defendant and the attendant 
characteristics of youth does not extend to Patrick’s sentence of life imprisonment 
with parole eligibility after 33 years.  Patrick asserts that for the purposes of 
requiring a court to consider the youth of a defendant before imposing a sentence, 
there “is no reason to distinguish a homicide case with a life sentence that is not life 
without parole * * * from a homicide case where [life without parole] is imposed.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  But that difference between penalties is vital—it is the lack of an 
opportunity for release that is the catalyst for the Eighth Amendment’s 
requirements.  When courts consider Eighth Amendment cruel-and-unusual-
punishment issues, the punishment involved necessarily forms the basis of the 
analysis.  It is the unique severity of and hopelessness engendered by a life-without-
parole sentence imposed on a juvenile defendant—under which the defendant will 
never have the chance to prove himself worthy of release for a crime committed 
before full transition into adulthood—that impels the court’s requirement to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
38 
consider youth under Miller and Long.  When a juvenile offender faces a sentence 
that includes the prospect of parole eligibility during middle adulthood, the same 
concerns do not arise. 
{¶ 89} Patrick can point to no pronouncement that there is an Eighth 
Amendment-based categorical restriction against a sentence of life with possibility 
of parole.  A sentence of 33 years to life in prison comports with “Miller’s central 
intuition—that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change,” 
Montgomery, ___ U.S. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 736, 193 L.Ed.2d 599.  This is in contrast 
to the sentences that have been held to violate the Eighth Amendment when 
imposed on juvenile offenders, which include a death sentence, a life-without-
parole sentence for a nonhomicide, and a life-without-parole sentence imposed 
without consideration of the youth of the offender.  Each of those sentences 
forecloses a juvenile offender from the opportunity to re-enter society without first 
considering whether he is amenable to rehabilitation, and that is why they have 
been held to violate the Eighth Amendment.  A life sentence with the possibility of 
parole is different and is therefore not subject to the same mandates to comply with 
the Eighth Amendment.  Therefore, although Patrick points out that his case 
involves the same “features of youth—delayed development, lessened moral 
culpability, all the things addressed in the cases” and that those features “are not 
ameliorated because a trial judge decides to select a life sentence that [allows for 
parole],” his sentence does not involve the same constitutional problems as the 
sentences involved in Miller and Long.  Youth does not require dispensation from 
extended punishment; it guarantees only a meaningful chance to one day reenter 
society.  Patrick’s sentence gives him that. 
{¶ 90} Pursuant to this court’s and United States Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, the features of a juvenile defendant’s youth are almost always 
incompatible with a life-without-parole sentence, and therefore a sentencing court 
must consider a juvenile defendant’s youth and the characteristics attendant to 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
39 
youth before imposing that sentence.  But when a sentence does not foreclose 
redemption and re-entry into society, as is the case here, the Eighth Amendment 
does not require a consideration of the juvenile defendant’s youth and does not 
require that the record reflect that the court specifically considered the juvenile’s 
youth at sentencing.  So although Patrick’s youth makes him comparable to the 
defendants in Miller and Long, 138 Ohio St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 890, 
his sentence sets him apart from them. 
{¶ 91} Patrick’s sentence in this case grants him the opportunity for parole 
after he has served 33 years in prison.  The possibility of parole exists for Patrick; 
he has the “hope for some years of life outside prison walls.”  Montgomery, ___ 
U.S. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 737.  And that hope is not illusory. 
{¶ 92} But the majority suggests that that eventual release is a hopeless 
dream.  It does so by impugning Ohio’s parole system, citing to a context-free 
statistic that Ohio’s parole rate was only 10.2 percent from 2011 to 2018, majority 
opinion at ¶ 33.  The majority does not say how many of the persons seeking parole 
during those years were juveniles when they committed their crimes, how many 
had shown personal growth, or how many had already served 30 years.  Here, the 
majority suggests that a life sentence with the possibility of parole is essentially a 
life sentence without the possibility of parole since achieving a positive result from 
the Parole Board is a long shot. 
{¶ 93} The majority makes an important point that I agree with: “Certainly, 
before imposing a life sentence on a juvenile offender, there is room in our justice 
system for a trial court to make an individualized sentencing determination that 
articulates its consideration of the offender’s youth, and all that comes with it 
* * *.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 41.  Trial judges should endeavor to proceed that way.  
But the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment does 
not demand it.  And that is all we are considering in this case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
40 
{¶ 94} The majority makes a point to state that pursuant to Long, 138 Ohio 
St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 890, a trial court must consider the youth of 
the offender as a mitigating factor in every sentencing situation, pursuant to R.C. 
2929.12(C) and (E).  However, Patrick does not argue about what R.C. 2929.12 
requires, he argues about what the Eighth Amendment requires.  The trial court was 
under no constitutional obligation to enunciate on the record its findings about the 
impact of Patrick’s youth in sentencing him. 
{¶ 95} Here, although the trial court did not specifically state on the record 
that it had considered Patrick’s youth before imposing its sentence, the record 
reflects that the trial court did consider Patrick’s youth and its attendant 
characteristics before it imposed its sentence.  In the sentencing entry, the trial court 
stated that it had “considered the record, oral statements, as well as the principles 
and purposes of sentencing under Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.11, and ha[d] 
balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors of Ohio Revised Code Section 
2929.12.”  The statements made during the sentencing hearing by the state, 
Patrick’s counsel, and Patrick’s mother all called attention to Patrick’s youth.  The 
issue of Patrick’s youth was squarely before the trial court at the time of sentencing. 
{¶ 96} Despite the fact that the trial court had determined that the 
aggravated murder that Patrick committed was among the most senseless offenses 
it had ever seen, the court did not impose the harshest possible penalty.  Based on 
that fact and the statements made during the sentencing hearing, I conclude that 
Patrick’s youth factored into the trial court’s sentencing decision. 
{¶ 97} The Supreme Court in Miller sets forth five considerations that a 
court imposing a mandatory life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile offender 
who is tried as an adult is precluded from considering, therefore making such a 
sentence unconstitutional:  
 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
41 
[First,] [m]andatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes 
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—
among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks 
and consequences.  [Second,] [i]t prevents taking into account the 
family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which 
he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or 
dysfunctional.  [Third,] [i]t neglects the circumstances of the 
homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the 
conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected 
him.  [Fourth,] * * * it ignores that he might have been charged and 
convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated 
with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers 
or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to 
assist his own attorneys.  See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 78, [130 
S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825] (“[T]he features that distinguish 
juveniles from adults also put them at a significant disadvantage in 
criminal proceedings”); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 
269, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) (discussing children’s 
responses to interrogation).  And finally, this mandatory punishment 
disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the 
circumstances most suggest it. 
 
(Ninth brackets added in Miller.)  Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-478, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 
L.Ed.2d 407. 
{¶ 98} Each of those considerations was addressed in some way during 
Patrick’s sentencing hearing.  Patrick’s counsel’s statement was relevant to the 
court’s consideration of Patrick’s “chronological age and its hallmark features—
among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
42 
consequences,” id. at 477.  Counsel stated that the idea of murder had not been 
contemplated by Patrick, that Patrick had acted recklessly and foolishly, and that 
an ill-prepared robbery led to a shooting death.  He also spoke to another factor—
the “incompetencies associated with youth,” id., including Patrick’s inability to 
assist his counsel.  Patrick’s counsel explained that he could not convince Patrick 
to maintain the plea agreement that would have resulted in a murder conviction 
with a sentence of 16 years to life rather than an aggravated-murder conviction with 
a more severe sentence. 
{¶ 99} Patrick’s mother discussed in her statement the circumstances of the 
offense and how Patrick was susceptible to peer pressure; she said he was a 
wannabe gangster who hung around with 20-year-old street thugs.  She mentioned 
his family life, which was by no means “brutal or dysfunctional,” id.; instead, it 
could be considered to be a support system for an eventual reentry into life outside 
of prison.  Her statement also reflected on another factor discussed in Miller—the 
possibility for rehabilitation; she talked about Patrick’s capability of remorse and 
his loyalty and said that “he wears his heart on his sleeve.” 
{¶ 100} Finally, the prosecutor discussed the possibility of Patrick’s 
rehabilitation.  He recognized that courts have determined that juveniles should be 
given “some chance of having a life somewhere out there.”  This contrasts with the 
statement of the prosecutor in Long, 138 Ohio St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 
890, at ¶ 22, who used the defendant’s youth against him, arguing that the defendant 
and his codefendants were so young that even if they served 30 years in prison they 
would prove a danger to society upon release. 
{¶ 101} It is evident from the record—especially the trial court’s reliance 
on the oral statements made during the sentencing hearing, which repeatedly 
referred to Patrick’s youth and the attendant characteristics of his youth—that the 
trial court considered Patrick’s youth before declining to enter the lengthiest 
sentence available and instead imposing the 33-years-to-life sentence. 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
 
43 
{¶ 102} Although I would find the trial court did not violate Patrick’s 
Eighth Amendment rights in this case, I do believe that it is time for Ohio 
lawmakers to undertake a meaningful study and review of the sentencing of 
juveniles tried as adults.  But ours is not the power to rewrite sentencing laws. 
Whether the brain science cited by the court in Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S.Ct. 
2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (recognizing that “parts of the brain involved in behavior 
control continue to mature through late adolescence”) and the penological 
considerations relating to that science might support a modernized sentencing 
scheme for juvenile offenders tried in adult court—e.g., amici curiae in support of 
Patrick suggest that juvenile offenders should become eligible for parole after 
serving 15 years of incarceration—establishing such a structure is not within the 
province of this court.  “The power to define and classify and prescribe punishment 
for felonies committed within the state is lodged in the General Assembly * * *.”  
State v. O’Mara, 105 Ohio St. 94, 136 N.E. 885 (1922), paragraph one of the 
syllabus, overruled in part on other grounds, Steele v. State, 121 Ohio St. 332, 168 
N.E. 846 (1929).  Other states have responded to the decisions in Graham and 
Miller by amending their sentencing statutes for juveniles tried as adults.  See 
Contreras, 4 Cal.5th at 370, 411 P.3d 445, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 249 (collecting 
statutes). 
{¶ 103} “It is a fundamental precept of our tripartite form of state 
government that the General Assembly is the ultimate arbiter of public policy.”  
Cleveland v. State, 157 Ohio St.3d 330, 2019-Ohio-3820, 136 N.E.3d 466, ¶ 40.  
The General Assembly established the juvenile-bindover scheme contained in R.C. 
2152.12, which allows the transfer of juvenile cases to adult court and allows 
juveniles to be tried as adults.  It follows that it is within the General Assembly’s 
authority to evaluate the body of science regarding the differences between 
juveniles and adults and the penological justifications for punishment of juveniles 
as adults and to modify Ohio’s sentencing scheme accordingly. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
44 
{¶ 104} There is much in the majority opinion that I agree with.  But this 
case is here because Patrick argues that the sentence imposed on him by the trial 
court violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the 
trial court failed to consider on the record Patrick’s youth as mitigation.  The Eighth 
Amendment simply has no such requirement regarding a juvenile homicide 
offender whose sentence includes the meaningful opportunity for parole.  Neither 
this court nor the United States Supreme Court has ever said otherwise.  Therefore, 
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ralph M. 
Rivera, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
John B. Juhasz, for appellant. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and 
Diane R. Brey, Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio 
Attorney General Dave Yost. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Brooke M. Burns, Assistant 
Public Defender; and Juvenile Law Center, Marsha L. Levick, and Andrew R. 
Keats, urging reversal for amici curiae, Office of the Ohio Public Defender, 
Juvenile Law Center, Inc., Central Juvenile Defender Center, Children’s Law 
Center, Cuyahoga County Public Defender’s Office, National Juvenile Defender 
Center, and Schubert Center for Child Studies. 
_________________