Case Title: White v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR97-955

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Brian John WHITE v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-955                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered December 18, 1997


1.   Criminal procedure -- discovery violation -- remedial options -- showing
     of prejudice required. -- The trial court's choice of remedy for
     a discovery violation under Ark. R. Crim. P. 19.7 will not be
     disturbed absent an abuse of discretion; a failure to disclose
     information will not warrant a reversal of a conviction absent
     a showing of prejudice; when the State fails to provide
     information, the burden is on the appellant to show that the
     omission was sufficient to undermine the confidence in the
     outcome of the trial; prejudice, however, does not exist when
     the defendant already has access to the information that the
     State did not disclose.

2.   Criminal procedure -- discovery violation -- appellant unable to show
     prejudice. -- Appellant was unable to show that a discovery
     delay involving test results on the victim's underwear and
     hairs found in the underwear had resulted in any prejudice
     because he was offered a continuance, which would have had no
     effect on any speedy-trial claims, to correct any potential
     prejudice.  

3.   Trial -- prosecutor's remarks -- trial court in best position to evaluate
     potential for prejudice. -- The trial court is in the best position
     to evaluate the potential for prejudice based on the
     prosecutor's remarks.

4.   Trial -- closing argument -- no misrepresentation by prosecutor  -- no
     abuse of discretion by trial court in refusing to instruct jury about
     discovery delay. -- Where counsel for the defense implied in
     closing argument that the State did not conduct further tests
     because it knew that appellant was innocent or because it did
     not care enough to conduct the tests, the prosecutor's reply
     that appellant could have conducted his own tests was
     warranted and was an accurate statement of the situation;
     there was no misrepresentation by the prosecutor and no abuse
     of discretion by the trial court in refusing to instruct the
     jury about the delay in furnishing the test results.

5.   Evidence -- admissibility -- trial court's discretion -- chain of custody.
     -- Evidentiary matters regarding the admissibility of evidence
     are left to the sound discretion of the trial court and
     rulings in this regard will not be reversed absent an abuse of
     discretion; the purpose of establishing a chain of custody is
     to prevent the introduction of evidence that is not authentic
     or that has been tampered with; however, the trial court must
     be satisfied that, in reasonable probability the evidence has
     not been tampered with; it is not necessary that the State
     eliminate every possibility of tampering.

6.   Evidence -- exclusion of medical record -- no abuse in trial court's
     finding that testimony to establish foundation was inadequate. -- The
     supreme court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion
     in the trial court's finding that the testimony presented to
     establish a foundation for allowing the medical record of
     appellant's independent test was inadequate where neither of
     the witnesses called by the defense could testify as to who
     collected the samples from appellant and whether that person
     actually followed an established protocol; the trial court
     could not be assured of how the samples were collected, when
     they were collected, or even if they were taken from
     appellant; proof of the chain of custody for interchangeable
     items, such as blood or a swabbed sample taken in connection
     with a chlamydia test, must be more conclusive.

7.   Evidence -- any error caused by exclusion of medical record was harmless
     because evidence of independent test was irrelevant. -- The supreme
     court concluded that any error caused by the exclusion of the
     medical record was harmless because the evidence of
     appellant's independent test was irrelevant; the fact that
     appellant did not have chlamydia on the date of the test shed
     no light on whether he had chlamydia on an earlier date when
     he tested positive for a second time.

8.   Evidence -- collateral evidence admissible to show bias of witness. --
     Under Ark. R. Evid. 608(b), extrinsic evidence is not
     admissible to attack the credibility of a witness; if,
     however, collateral evidence is introduced for the purpose of
     showing the bias of a witness, it is admissible.

9.   Evidence -- trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to allow
     testimony concerning efforts to have victim falsify evidence. -- The
     supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its
     discretion in refusing to allow testimony about a concerted
     effort on the part of the victim's grandmother to have the
     victim falsify evidence where defense counsel was allowed to
     question the grandmother about her motives, and it was only
     when the issue of her stealing was raised that the questioning
     was curtailed.

10.  Evidence -- collateral testimony -- trial did not abuse discretion in
     refusing. -- Where appellant's attempt to call two witnesses to
     show that the victim's grandmother had lied in her answers
     about wanting appellant out of a pawn shop and that that was
     a motive for pressuring the victim to accuse appellant falsely
     was not only collateral but also a confusing and convoluted
     area to explore before the jury; the trial court did not abuse
     its discretion in refusing this collateral testimony.

11.  Criminal law -- habitual offender -- trial court's finding of sufficient
     evidence of prior guilt not clearly erroneous. -- Where the trial
     court found that there had been a finding of guilt by the
     original trial court following nine first-offender guilty
     pleas, the supreme court concluded that the trial court's
     finding of sufficient evidence of prior guilt for habitual-
     offender purposes was not clearly erroneous.

12.  Criminal procedure -- speedy trial -- no abuse of discretion in excluding
     time attributed to unavailability of victim. -- Where the trial court
     correctly applied the due diligence standard with respect to
     the State's efforts to obtain the victim as a witness, the
     supreme court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion
     on the part of the trial court in excluding, for speedy-trial
     purposes, the time attributed to the unavailability of the
     victim.

13.  Witnesses -- trial court did not abuse discretion in allowing teenager's
     statement that appellant was "crazy." -- The supreme court concluded
     that there was no indication that allowing the testimony of a
     teenager that she thought appellant was "crazy" without an
     admonition was an abuse of the trial court's discretion; the
     trial court was in the best position to determine the context
     and meaning of the statement, and the supreme court deferred
     to the trial court's ruling.

14.  Motions -- mistrial -- when granted. -- A mistrial is such an
     extreme remedy that it should not be declared unless there has
     been error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by
     continuing the trial or when the fundamental fairness of the
     trial itself has been manifestly affected; a trial court's
     discretion to grant or deny a mistrial will not be disturbed
     absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, and a motion for
     declaration of a mistrial should only be granted when an
     admonition to the jury would be ineffective. 

15.  Trial -- prosecutorial misconduct -- admonition can cure any possible
     prejudice. -- An admonition can cure any possible prejudice
     resulting from prosecutorial misconduct.

16.  Motions -- mistrial -- no abuse of discretion in denial. -- Although it
     concluded that the prosecutor did not ask a question
     concerning a witness's eviction by appellant's father in bad
     faith, the supreme court noted that even if the prosecutor's
     question had been inappropriate, the trial court's
     admonishment cured any semblance of prejudice; there was no
     abuse of discretion in denying the mistrial motion.


     Appeal from Benton Circuit Court; Tom Keith, Judge; affirmed.
     Sam Sexton III, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Sandy Moll, Asst. Att'y Gen.,
for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     This appeal arises out of the conviction of appellant, Brian
White, for the offense of sexual abuse in the first degree.  White
received a sentence of eighteen years.  He raises multiple points
on appeal, none of which has merit.  We affirm.
     On June 29, 1994, White allegedly had sexual intercourse with
a 12-year-old female, NE.  The incident was reported to the police
on July 9, 1994.  At the time, White was on probation due to pleas
of guilty that were deferred under Act 346 of 1975, the First
Offenders Act.
     At trial, the evidence presented by the State consisted
primarily of the testimony of the victim together with medical and
physical evidence.  The victim testified that on the date in
question, White, who was the uncle of the victim, was sent to pick
up the victim and another minor, Rachel White, who was the 12-year-
old aunt of the victim.  According to the testimony, White and his
girlfriend, Barbara Frazee, took the two girls back to his
apartment where they offered the girls alcohol and marijuana, which
the girls accepted.  The victim testified that she went to sleep in
White's bedroom and awoke to find White fondling her.  White, she
stated, eventually had sexual intercourse with her against her
will.  Although neither of them actually witnessed the alleged
rape, the testimony of Rachel White and Barbara Frazee confirmed
certain aspects of the victim's testimony.
     The prosecutor also presented physical evidence of the crime. 
Several items of clothing, including the underwear that the victim
claimed to have been wearing that night, were introduced into
evidence.  These clothing articles were collected by Rogers Police
Detective Gary Armstrong and sent to the State Crime Lab for
testing.  The prosecutor also presented the testimony of two
technologists who conducted tests to determine if White and the
victim suffered from any sexually transmitted diseases.  The tests
showed that both the victim and White had chlamydia on July 11 and
12, 1994, respectively.  A pharmacist also testified that White had
purchased an antibiotic on July 17, 1994, which could be used to
cure chlamydia.

                       I. Discovery Delay
     For his first issue White protests the refusal of the trial
court to allow the jury to be informed or, alternatively, to
instruct the jury that the prosecutor did not turn over the test
results on the victim's underwear and hairs found in the underwear
conducted by the State Crime Lab until the day before the trial. 
The test results had been sent to the Rogers Police Department on
May 26, 1995.  In spite of White's motion to compel discovery filed
on January 23, 1995, White had not been told about the tests.  The
defense moved to exclude the evidence.  Recognizing that a
violation of Ark. R. Crim. P. 17.1 had occurred, the trial court
offered the defense a continuance to allow time to examine the
evidence and to have tests performed pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P.
19.7.  White declined and insisted that the trial proceed.  The
test results were admitted as part of the State's case.
     During the trial, White's counsel first tried to cross-examine
Detective Gary Armstrong on the failure of the prosecutor to make
the Crime Lab report available to him until just before trial.  The
trial court ultimately refused to allow defense counsel to inquire
into the matter and also refused to instruct the jury on when the
defense received the test results.  Then, during closing arguments,
defense counsel argued to the jury that the reason the prosecutor
had not performed DNA tests on hairs found in the victim's
underwear was that the State knew White was innocent.  The
prosecutor responded in his rebuttal argument that White could have
performed his own tests, and White's counsel objected based on the
fact that the defense did not have time to perform any tests.
     The trial court ruled that White had an opportunity to do his
own tests and, in effect waived his right to argue that he did not
have sufficient time to perform tests on the underwear or the
hairs.  We agree.  The trial court's choice of remedy under Ark. R.
Crim. P. 19.7  will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 
Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87,