Case Title: Michael J.Raspa , Jr. v. Office of the Sheriff of the County of Gloucester

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-53-06

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). On July 9, 1984, plaintiff Michael J. Raspa, Jr., was hired by defendant, the Sheriff of Gloucester County (Sheriff), as a corrections officer. Raspa discharged his employment duties without incident until October 1997, when he was diagnosed with a hyperactive thyroid, or Graves disease. As a corollary, Raspa developed Graves ophthalmopathy, a condition resulting in bulging eyes and possible double vision. Presently, there is no cure for either of these conditions, but they can be managed by medications or surgery. In 1999, Raspa s then treating physician issued a doctor s note stating that she expected that Raspa s eye symptoms would worsen as a result of his daily radiation treatment, and request[ing] he not supervise inmates. Consequently, Raspa was placed on restricted duty status and was reassigned to light duty positions not involving contact with inmates. Four months later, the Sheriff issued a general order, in part limiting to thirty days any light duty assignment for someone who was not injured on the job, and giving preference to and priority for the few available light duty assignments to those who had been injured on the job. Despite the temporal limitation on light duty assignments contained in the general order, Raspa continued in inmate-contact-restricted assignments until January 2002. Following some medical updates, the Sheriff requested that Raspa be placed on disability retirement, reasoning that Raspa could no longer be accommodated and that the Sheriff s Department could not guarantee this type of no contact policy. Raspa was then informed that he was to be placed on disability retirement status effective July 1, 2002. The involuntary application for Raspa s disability retirement ultimately was approved by the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen s Retirement System (PFRS). At the time of his involuntary disability retirement, Raspa had been employed as a corrections officer for eighteen years. Raspa neither participated in the application process for involuntary disability retirement benefits, nor did he grieve that employment action. Instead, he filed suit alleging that the Sheriff had violated the LAD by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability. The jury found in Raspa s favor and awarded economic damages in the amount of $236,000 and future economic damages in an amount to be ascertained by the trial court. The trial court later, among other things, reversed the jury s award of future economic damages, but awarded Raspa his attorney s fees and costs, and entered an aggregate judgment in favor of Raspa in the amount of $273,000. The Sheriff appealed, raising nine separate issues. The Appellate Division, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the trial court in all respects. The panel ultimately concluded that [s]ufficient evidence was presented to the jury for it to reasonably conclude that [plaintiff] adequately performed the essential functions of a Corrections Officer in an existing position, which appropriately accommodated [plaintiff s] handicap, and to find that the proposed accommodation would not be too burdensome to [defendant]. The Supreme Court granted the Sheriff s petition for certification. HELD : An employee must possess the bona fide occupational qualifications for the job position that employee seeks to occupy in order to trigger an employer s obligation to reasonably accommodate the employee to the extent required by the Law Against Discrimination (LAD). An employer may reasonably limit light duty assignments to those employees whose disabilities are temporary, and the availability of light duty assignments for temporarily disabled employees does not give rise to any additional duty on the part of the employer to assign a permanently disabled employee indefinitely to an otherwise restricted light duty assignment. 1. The standard the Court applies to the review of issues of law the de novo review of the trial court s conclusions of law is the standard by which the Court gauges the vitality of Raspa s claim. The Court reaffirms this State s public policy of abolishing discrimination in the work place. The eradication of the cancer of discrimination is the overarching goal of the LAD. That said, the LAD s reach, although broad, is not without limitation. It forbids any unlawful discrimination against any person because such person is or has been at any time disabled or any unlawful employment practice against such person, unless the nature and extent of the disability reasonably precludes the performance of the particular employment. N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1 (emphasis supplied). (Pp. 12-16) 2. The specifications for a county corrections officer have been defined by the New Jersey Department of Personnel (NJDOP). Among the examples of work of a county corrections officer listed by NJDOP are several that require close inmate contact. Tellingly, in the medical examination portion of this job specification, it explains that [a]ny medical or physical condition or defect which would prevent efficient performance of duties of the position, cause the appointee to be a hazard to himself/herself or others, or become aggravated as a result of performance of these duties, will be cause for rejection and that the [f]ailure to demonstrate sufficient capacity to perform duties of this position may be cause for rejection. Raspa admitted that he knew that NJDOP s description of the position of county corrections officer was controlling and that having contact with inmates was an essential function of the job. He also conceded that, given the medical limitations placed on him, he simply was unable to perform any of the essential functions that involved contact with inmates. Further, the proofs demonstrated that no objectively viable and reasonable accommodation would ever make Raspa qualified to perform the functions he admitted were essential to the position of a county corrections officer. The conclusion to which those admissions, concessions and proofs lead is inescapable: plaintiff s disability reasonably preclude[d] the performance of the particular employment [of a county corrections officer], N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1. Thus, plaintiff, as a matter of law, was not qualified as a county corrections officer. Hence, plaintiff s asserted accommodation providing plaintiff an indefinite light duty posting with no inmate contact was not reasonable under the LAD. (Pp. 16-18) 3. The LAD does not require that an employer create an indefinite light duty position for a permanently disabled employee if the employee s disability, absent a reasonable accommodation, renders him otherwise unqualified for a full-time position. Thus, consistent with the LAD, an employer may reasonably limit light duty assignments to those employees whose disabilities are both temporary and not inconsistent with the duties of the light duty assignment, and, conversely, the availability of light duty assignments for temporarily disabled employees does not give rise to any additional obligation on the part of the employer to assign indefinitely a permanently disabled employee to an otherwise restricted light duty assignment. An employer may, consistent with the LAD, terminate the employment of an employee who, after consideration of available reasonable accommodations, nevertheless is no longer able to perform the essential functions of his job. However, the employer is not obliged to do so and the Court lauds efforts by employers to retain disabled employees in either modified or different job postings. Nothing in this opinion should be read to discourage those efforts or to permit them to be turned against an employer. (Pp. 18-21) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division with instructions to enter judgment in favor of defendant. JUSTICE LONG filed a separate, DISSENTING opinion, in which CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI joins, stating, in part, that there was evidence to support the jury s conclusion that inmate contact was not an essential part of the job of a corrections officer. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN and HOENS join in JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO s opinion. JUSTICE LONG filed a separate, dissenting opinion, in which CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI joins. JUSTICE WALLACE did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 53 September Term 2006 MICHAEL J. RASPA, JR., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER, Defendant-Appellant. Argued February 13, 2007 Decided June 12, 2007 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. William M. Tambussi argued the cause for appellant (Brown & Connery, LLP, attorneys). David A. Avedissian argued the cause for respondent (David A. Avedissian, Esq., LLC, attorneys). JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal requires that we address the threshold question of whether, as a matter of law, an employee can prosecute a claim alleging that his employer failed to accommodate the employee s disability in violation of the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49 (LAD), when the employee s permanent disability renders him unable to discharge essential functions of the position in which he was employed. In this case, a county corrections officer developed a disabling disease that, in his doctor s words, required that the corrections officer be in an environment with minimum to no contact with prison inmates to insure minimum risk [to the corrections officer.] After placing the corrections officer in several temporary light duty assignments over a three-year period, the county sheriff s office determined that it could not continue to extend light duty work to the permanently disabled corrections officer and processed his involuntary disability retirement. We hold that an employee must possess the bona fide occupational qualifications for the job position that employee seeks to occupy in order to trigger an employer s obligation to reasonably accommodate the employee to the extent required by the LAD. In that context, we further hold that an employer may reasonably limit light duty assignments to those employees whose disabilities are temporary, and that the availability of light duty assignments for temporarily disabled employees does not give rise to any additional duty on the part of the employer to assign a permanently disabled employee indefinitely to an otherwise restricted light duty assignment. The assignment of light duty in an atmosphere where physical contact and confrontation are always possible must be viewed as detrimental to [plaintiff s] condition and personal safety. I have done all that I can to accommodate [plaintiff], but I have no other options of placing him in a positively safe environment. I can no longer assure him, or the county, that he will not be injured. Therefore, it is necessary at this time that I regret to request that [plaintiff] be placed on disability retirement. The next day, plaintiff secured a second letter from Dr. Nicolaou. Differing from his earlier statement that plaintiff need[ed] to be in a work environment with minimum to no contact with prison inmates to insure minimum risk of eye trauma[,] Dr. Nicolaou now opined as follows: Please continue light duty. [Plaintiff] needs to be in a work environment with limited contact with prison inmates to insure minimum risk of eye trauma due to his Grave s [sic] disease. Thus, once defendant raised the prospect of discontinuing plaintiff s light duty assignments and placing him on disability retirement, plaintiff s job needs changed from one with minimum to no contact with prison inmates to one with limited contact with prison inmates. (Emphasis supplied). Armed with his new doctor s note, on June 19, 2002, plaintiff wrote to Gloucester County s personnel director and advised that he was aware that an application for permanent disability retirement benefits was being processed on his behalf, something plaintiff described as an event I do not wish to take place. He explained that [i]t has been over three years now since my condition was diagnosed and that [i]n this time, during which my symptoms have steadily improved, light duty work that falls within my job description has been made available to me. Underscoring that [t]his work is still available[,] plaintiff asserted that he ha[d] performed [his] job more than satisfactorily while on light duty. Thus, plaintiff request[ed] to remain on light duty status as in the past. By a letter dated June 27, 2002, defendant responded. It reminded plaintiff that, [b]ased on previous discussions, you are well aware that the Gloucester [C]ounty Sheriff s Department can[]not fully comply with your most recent doctor[ s] note. Defendant explained that, after discussions with the County Personnel Director as well as County Legal Counsel . . . regrettably, we must inform you that your disability retirement is to be effective July 1, 2002. The involuntary application for plaintiff s disability retirement ultimately was approved by the Board of Trustees of the PFRS. At the time of his involuntary disability retirement, plaintiff had been employed as a corrections officer in Gloucester County for eighteen years. Plaintiff neither participated in the application process for involuntary disability retirement benefits commenced by defendant, nor did he grieve that employment action. See footnote 3 Instead, he filed suit alleging that defendant had violated the LAD by failing to reasonably accommodate plaintiff s disability. See footnote 4 According to plaintiff, defendant could have accommodated plaintiff by permanently assigning him to existing positions with limited inmate contact and could have insured his safety through the use of protective goggles. Defendant denied those allegations. At trial, plaintiff conceded that the specifications of a county corrections officer issued by the New Jersey Department of Personnel (NJDOP) define the essential functions of a county corrections officer and require contact with inmates. He also admitted that his disability did not allow him to respond to another corrections officer s emergency call for assistance. Plaintiff nonetheless maintained that, although he could not perform all of the duties of a corrections officer, he could have -- and had in fact -- performed some of them without ever receiving an unsatisfactory evaluation. Although plaintiff s doctor testified that plaintiff could have worn protective goggles and that their use would minimize [any additional risk that plaintiff might suffer as a result of eye trauma] as much as the next person[,] plaintiff conceded that he never once brought up this possible accommodation of wearing protective eye goggles with anyone in the sheriff s department[.] The jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded economic damages for the period between the date of plaintiff s involuntary retirement and June 30, 2009 See footnote 5 in the amount of $236,000 and future economic damages in an amount to be ascertained by the trial court. The trial court later reversed the jury s award of future economic damages, but awarded plaintiff his attorney s fees and costs, and entered an aggregate judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $273,000. At the same time, the trial court denied defendant s post-trial motions and plaintiff s motion to enhance his counsel fee award. Defendant appealed, raising nine separate issues: that (1) defendant did not have a legal duty to convert a temporary light duty position into a permanent one; (2) the case should not have proceeded to trial because plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of a corrections officer; (3) plaintiff proffered insufficient expert evidence as to his disability; (4) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff s LAD claim under the doctrine of collateral estoppel; (5) the trial court erred in precluding defendant from cross-examining plaintiff with records from the Division of Pensions in respect of plaintiff s knowledge of his right to appeal an involuntary retirement determination; (6) the trial court improperly submitted to the jury the issue of future damages without a financial or actuarial expert and failed to properly instruct the jury as to that issue; (7) plaintiff did not mitigate his damages; (8) the trial court should have granted defendant s motions in limine to exclude certain evidence; and (9) plaintiff s counsel committed misconduct in his summation. Plaintiff cross-appealed, claiming that the trial court s refusal to enhance his attorney s fee award was error. The Appellate Division, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed in all respects. The panel explained that [w]hen an employer maintains it reasonably concluded the employee s handicap precluded performance of the essential functions of the job even with the reasonable accommodation, . . . and then terminates the employee for that reason, the burden of proof is on the employer. (quoting N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.8(a); citing Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 110 N.J. 363, 383 (1988); Ensslin v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 275 N.J. Super. 352, 363 (App. Div. 1994), certif. denied, 142 N.J. 446 (1995)). Based on that burden allocation, the Appellate Division rejected defendant s reliance on the principle that an employer is not required to transform its temporary light duty jobs into permanent jobs to accommodate [an employee s] disability. (quoting Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 418 (3d Cir. 1997)). The panel ultimately concluded that [s]ufficient evidence was presented to the jury for it to reasonably conclude that [plaintiff] adequately performed the essential functions of a Corrections Officer in an existing position, which appropriately accommodated [plaintiff s] handicap, and to find that the proposed accommodation would not be too burdensome to [defendant]. We granted defendant s petition for certification, 188 N.J. 493 (2006), and, for the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand the cause to the Law Division for entry of a judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE LONG, dissenting. I would affirm the decision of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in the thorough and thoughtful opinion of that court. In this Law Against Discrimination (LAD) case, the panel ruled that [s]ufficient evidence was presented to the jury for it to reasonably conclude that Raspa adequately performed the essential functions of a Corrections Officer in an existing position, which appropriately accommodated Raspa s handicap, and to find that the proposed accommodation would not be too burdensome to the Sheriff. Those conclusions are legally unexceptionable. The jury was presented with a genuine issue of fact regarding whether inmate contact was essential to the function of a corrections officer. The Sheriff s Office relied on the New Jersey Department of Personnel (NJDOP) job specifications that detailed inmate contact responsibilities of a corrections officer to answer that question in the affirmative. Raspa countered that the job description specifically contains the caveat that: Note: The examples of work for this title are for illustrative purposes only. A particular position using this title may not perform all duties listed in this job specification. Conversely, all duties performed on the job may not be listed. Moreover, at trial, Raspa proffered evidence that positions existed within the county jail that did not require inmate contact; that he had served in such positions for three years without complaint; that at least one other corrections officer filled such a position on a permanent basis; that a corrections officer was not to leave those posts even in an emergency; and that, in any event, a corrections officer could perform other functions of the job listed in the NJDOP job specifications, such as observing inmates, if serving exclusively within those positions. Based on the record, there was evidence to support the jury s conclusion that inmate contact was not an essential part of the job of a corrections officer. That finding gave rise to the further issue of whether a reasonable accommodation for Raspa could take place without creating an undue burden for the Sheriff s Office. The Sheriff s Office argued that such an accommodation would be unduly burdensome because the four light duty positions within the institution had to be available for temporarily injured officers. According to the record, those positions were in the main control room which requires two or three officers per shift and in the second, third, and visitors control rooms, each of which requires at least one officer per shift. In the institutional setting, there are three daily shifts, thus requiring fifteen to eighteen officers on light duty over the course of a day. Moreover, the record reveals that the Sheriff s Office was able to assign injured corrections officers to positions outside of the facility, including posts in the records room, the communications department, and the county animal shelter. Thus, the Sheriff s argument that he would have had to create the new permanent light duty assignment for Raspa was simply unavailing. Against that backdrop, the jury could easily have found that the Sheriff s Office, having never even discussed an accommodation with Raspa, failed to fulfill its duty to consider a reasonable accommodation for him. For those reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division and permit the jury verdict to stand. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI joins in this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-53 SEPTEMBER TERM 2006 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court MICHAEL J. RASPA, JR., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED June 12, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Long