Case Title: People v. Hopkins

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91938

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 91938-Agenda 7-March 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
SCOTT HOPKINS, Appellee.
Opinion filed June 6, 2002.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	The question before us in this case is whether defendant's
extended-term sentence, pursuant to section 5-8-2(a)(1) of the
Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(1) (West
1994)), complies with the rule announced in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
We find that it does.
	Defendant, Scott Hopkins, was convicted of first degree
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1994)), armed robbery (720 ILCS
5/18-2(a) (West 1994)), aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4
(West 1994)), and home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11 (West
1994)). The circuit court of De Kalb County sentenced defendant
to an extended term of 75 years' imprisonment on the first degree
murder conviction and a concurrent 20-year sentence on the armed
robbery and the home invasion convictions. The appellate court
affirmed the convictions, vacated the 75-year sentence, and
remanded the cause with directions. No. 2-99-0678 (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The State filed a petition for
leave to appeal, raising one issue, the propriety of the appellate
court's reversal of defendant's extended-term sentence. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315(a). In responding to the petition for leave to appeal,
defendant requested cross-relief on the question of whether the
appellate court erred in affirming his conviction. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a); 155 Ill. 2d R. 318(a). For the following reasons we affirm
in part and reverse in part.

BACKGROUND
	On July 29, 1995, police found the body of 70-year-old
Burdette Johnson. He had been hit over the head with a frying pan
and stabbed more than 15 times with a screwdriver to the chest
and neck. He remained in a coma for nearly a month before
succumbing to his wounds.
	Defendant was charged with first degree murder, aggravated
battery, armed robbery, and home invasion. On September 20,
1996, after a jury trial, he was found guilty on all counts. On
December 26, 1996, the trial court granted defendant's motion for
a new trial based on the State's failure to disclose to defense
counsel that a witness, Mark Slater, had been promised that he
would not be prosecuted in exchange for his testimony.
	Defendant's second trial began on February 1, 1999. At the
second jury trial, Glen Butler testified that Johnson lived on the
first floor of a two-unit home. Butler rented the second-floor
apartment from Johnson. Mark Slater, his roommate, lived with
him in the upstairs apartment. Slater's friend, June Gibson, often
came to the apartment and kept some of her belongings there. On
July 29, 1995, at approximately 7 p.m., Butler was with Johnson
in the downstairs apartment. Slater and defendant were in the
upstairs apartment drinking beer. After telling Slater and defendant
to keep the noise level down because they were disturbing
Johnson, Butler left to go to work around 8:30 p.m.
	While in the upstairs apartment, defendant asked Slater if
Johnson had any money. Defendant then told Slater that he was
going to get some money from Johnson's apartment. At that point,
Slater testified, he left the apartment and went to visit some
friends, Tim and Mary Cunz. He remained at the Cunz's for
approximately 5 or 10 minutes before walking a few blocks to
Hallgren Park. While at the park, Slater saw Gibson drive by.
After about 15 minutes he returned to his apartment.
	The defendant returned to the apartment approximately 10
minutes after Slater. He asked Slater if he wanted some beer.
Defendant then went downstairs and returned with a six-pack of
beer. After finishing the beer, defendant went downstairs to get
some cigarettes. When he returned the second time, Slater saw that
he was wearing a pair of white surgical gloves. He told Slater not
to go downstairs because "it was not a pretty sight." Slater testified
that defendant told him that he stabbed Johnson in the shoulder,
temple and the neck. Defendant had scratches both on his neck and
his shoulder.
	Defendant and Slater left the apartment together and walked
to Hallgren Park. At the park, Slater saw defendant throw a
washcloth with some stains on it into a garbage can. Slater then
told defendant that he was going to return to the house to check on
Johnson. He found Johnson covered in blood and called 911.
Slater waited at the scene until the ambulance and the police
arrived. The police checked Slater for the presence of blood but
found none. Slater did not tell the police that defendant stabbed
Johnson until he was transported to the police station for further
questioning.
	At the police station, Detective Gary Spangler examined
Slater's clothes and body for the presence of blood. Detective
Spangler found no blood on Slater. Based on Slater's interview,
police officer's located a rag, a piece of cloth, and a screwdriver
in a trash can in Hallgren Park.
	June Gibson, a recovering crack cocaine addict, testified that
during the mid-afternoon of July 29, 1995, she saw Slater and
defendant drinking beer in the backyard of Johnson's house. Later
that evening, she and a friend, Jenny, drove by Hallgren Park and
saw Slater alone. As she drove past him, Slater waved. About 30
to 40 minutes later, Gibson and Jenny stopped at the park and gave
Slater some cigarettes. They then stopped at the Cunz's residence
so that Gibson could drop off a dress before going to the De Kalb
Motel.
	At the motel, Gibson waited until a girlfriend, Brenda Parkins,
arrived. Gibson and Parkins left the motel to buy some beer and
cigarettes and drove past Johnson's house. After noticing that the
lights were off, Gibson decided to check on Johnson. Gibson
testified that she entered the house through Butler's apartment.
When she entered, there were still no lights on in Johnson's
apartment. However, when she looked downstairs two minutes
later, all of the lights and the television were on.
	As she descended the stairs, she called for Johnson and heard
a noise that sounded like someone falling. When she reached
Johnson's apartment, she saw Johnson, lying on the living room
floor, reaching for his cane. She also saw defendant, who was not
wearing a shirt, and was gripping the handle of a screwdriver.
When defendant turned toward her, Gibson ran to the apartment
upstairs and then down the back stairs to the car.
	Gibson did not tell Parkins what she had seen. Instead, they
drove around for a while before returning to Johnson's house. By
that time, the police had arrived and taped off the area around the
house. Gibson did not talk to any of the police officers at the
scene. Instead, she testified, she returned home and called 911.
She asked the 911 operator why the area was roped off. When the
operator told her that she could not provide Gibson with any
information, Gibson responded, "I just want to know if
somebody's dead."
	In response to the 911 call, Officer Johathan Castilow went to
the De Kalb Motel to see June Gibson. He testified that she told
him that "Scott" had hurt Johnson. Gibson refused to go to the
police station with Officer Castilow. Instead, Gibson prepared a
statement for the police two weeks following the incident. She
stated in the statement that she opened the door to Johnson's
apartment, looked in and saw defendant standing in the hallway
leading to Johnson's kitchen or bathroom and that she saw
Johnson sitting in a chair. She further stated that defendant was
wearing shorts and a tank top. In the statement she did not state
that she saw defendant holding a screwdriver in his hand. Gibson
later testified at trial that she did not remember preparing the
statement and that she lied about Johnson's location because she
did not want to cooperate with the police.
	Bonnie Fleicher, defendant's mother, testified that on August
1, 1995, she found defendant lying on the porch of her home. He
told her that he had been sleeping under a bridge. She informed
him that the police were looking for him. Defendant then took a
shower and went to his sister's house in St. Charles. Fleicher did
not see any stains on defendant's shirt, other than sweat stains
under the armpits.
	Detective Spangler obtained a warrant to search Fleischer's
home for the clothes worn by defendant on the night of the
murder. He found the clothes in a laundry basket. The shorts had
a pattern of stains that appeared to be blood similar to the pattern
of stains found on a pillow case collected from Johnson's
apartment.
	Detective Moor interviewed Eric Wilson regarding
defendant's whereabouts on the night of the murder. Wilson held
a party at his house that night. Defendant came to the party with a
bottle of Kesslers whiskey, cigarettes and some rubber gloves.
Wilson saw defendant try on the gloves. He did not, however,
notice any blood on defendant. Darlene McCulloch also saw
defendant at the party. He was holding a bottle of Kessler's
whiskey, as well as Marlboro and Winston cigarettes. He was not
wearing a shirt and she saw that he had some scratches on his am.
Defendant stayed at Wilson's house through the night.
	Several stains collected from the shirt and shorts that
defendant was wearing on the night of the murder tested positive
for the presence of blood. James Bald, a forensic scientist, found
six areas on the shorts contained human blood. Two out of nine
areas on defendant's shirt tested positive for the presence of
human blood. Bald also conducted a preliminary test on the stain
located on defendant's shoe and determined that it tested positive
for the presence of blood. He also found human blood on the
frying pan and the screwdriver.
	Officer James Rhoades collected fingernail scrapings from
Johnson. He testified that the scrapings did not match defendant's
DNA.(1) He further testified that Johnson's DNA, was found on a
small stain located on a turquoise shirt that defendant was wearing
on the night of the incident.(2)
	Tim Cunz, and his daughters Misty and Savanna, testified that
they lived two blocks from Johnson's house. They testified that on
the night of the murder, Slater stopped by the house looking for a
person named Leon Richardson. Misty had never known Slater to
come to the house and thought his visit unusual. Savanna stated
that June Gibson stopped by the house to drop off a dress a couple
of hours after Slater left.
	While incarcerated at the De Kalb County jail, defendant told
Eric Frias that he "stabbed the elder man in the head, neck and
chest area again and again," and that the man fell to the floor.
Frias, who pleaded guilty to four felonies for robbery and theft,
stated that he was not offered any deals or agreements in exchange
for his testimony at defendant's trial. 
	Dr. Larry Blum testified that he performed the autopsy on
Johnson. Johnson suffered from 10 stab wounds to the left upper
region of the chest and an additional five stab wounds to the head.
Dr. Blum also noted defensive wounds on Johnson's arms as well
as a laceration to Johnson's left eye. This laceration was consistent
with blunt trauma, such as being hit with a frying pan. Dr. Blum
did not conduct a test of Johnson's fingernail scrapings and was
unable to testify whether Johnson caused the scratches found on
defendant.
	Defendant testified that a month and a half before the murder,
Slater and Gibson moved into the apartment above Johnson's
apartment. He briefly met Johnson when he helped Slater move in
but otherwise had no contact with Johnson.
	Defendant further testified that at the time of the incident, he
was living in an apartment with his girlfriend and her two small
children. Shortly after noon on July 29, 1997, he left the apartment
after having an argument with his girlfriend. He went to a bar
where he had a few beers. Slater came to the bar and the two of
them stayed there for a couple of more hours before returning to
Slater's apartment. He and Slater then went to visit Tim Gord, a
friend of Slater. They remained there approximately 45 minutes
before returning to Slater's apartment.
	He stated that, at the apartment, Slater went downstairs to talk
to Butler. When he came back, he had a brown paper bag from
which he removed a bottle of whiskey. Slater left again for 20 to
30 minutes. When he returned, defendant testified, he picked up
defendant's shirt, which was draped over a chair, and told him that
they had to leave the apartment because Johnson was going to call
the police and accuse them of trespassing. Slater put the whiskey
bottle back in the bag and handed it to defendant. He then told
defendant that he would wait for the police to arrive in order to get
his belongings out of the apartment. At this point, defendant put
on his shirt and walked to Wilson's house. When he arrived at
Wilson's house, he looked inside the bag and saw the whiskey, a
package of Winston cigarettes, and rubber gloves.
	Defendant left Wilson's house around 1:30 p.m. on July 30,
1995, and decided to walk to his girlfriend's workplace. He
stopped under a bridge located nearby to wait for her and fell
asleep. He did not awaken until early the next morning, at which
point he walked to his mother's house and found out that he was
wanted by the police.
	The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder, armed
robbery, aggravated battery, and home invasion. The aggravated
battery charge merged with the first degree murder charge. The
trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 75 years'
imprisonment for first degree murder and a concurrent 20-year
term for the armed robbery and home invasion convictions.
	The appellate court affirmed defendant's convictions for first
degree murder, armed robbery, and home invasion, vacated the
sentence of 75 years' imprisonment for first degree murder, and
remanded the cause to the trial court. No. 2-99-0678 (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The State appealed.

ANALYSIS
	Initially, we examine whether the appellate court erred in
finding that defendant's extended-term sentence violated the rule
set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). Because this appeal presents a
question of law, we review this issue de novo. People v. Fisher,
184 Ill. 2d 441, 448 (1998).
	 The trial court sentenced defendant to a 75-year extended-term sentence for first degree murder, finding that the victim was
over the age of 60, the crime was exceptionally brutal and heinous,
and the victim was physically handicapped. The appellate court
found that although the victim's age was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, the victim's disability and the exceptionally
brutal and heinous nature of the crime was not. According to the
appellate court, the sentence violated Apprendi.
	In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that
"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490, 147 L .Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct.  at 2362-63. Apprendi, however, "does not proscribe all judicial
fact finding at sentencing, even though it may result in an increase
in a defendant's punishment ***." People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 526 (2001). In fact, the Court in Apprendi explained that
"nothing *** suggests that it is impermissible for judges to
exercise discretion-taking into consideration various factors
relating both to offense and offender-in imposing a judgment
within the range prescribed by statute." (Emphasis in original.)
Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 481, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 449, 120 S. Ct.  at
2358.
	In People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 286-87 (2001), we
recognized that although Apprendi contains "isolated statements
which *** appear to support the conclusion that the jury must find
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every fact which might have
any real-world impact on the length of time the defendant might
spend in prison," these statements "cannot be taken out of
context." In fact, in People v. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d 68, 74 (2001), we
clarified that "Apprendi does not require that every fact related to
sentencing be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis in
original.)
	In Ford, following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted
of first degree murder. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 71. The trial court
found the defendant eligible for the death penalty. It declined,
however, to impose the death penalty and instead imposed an
extended-term sentence of 100 years based upon its finding that
the murder " 'was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.' " Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 71.
The defendant argued that his 100-year extended-term sentence
was unconstitutional under Apprendi because the brutal and
heinous nature of the crime was not proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
	In resolving this issue, we noted that after the trial court
found, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was
eligible for the death penalty, death was the prescribed statutory
maximum sentence. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 73-74. Therefore, "based
exclusively on the facts that were proved beyond a reasonable
doubt" the 100-year extended-term sentence clearly complied with
the rule announced in Apprendi. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 74. In other
words, because the maximum sentence was death and the sentence
actually imposed was 100 years, the extended-term sentence
clearly complied with the rule announced in Apprendi. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 73.
	We further determined that it was immaterial that the
aggravating factor used to impose defendant's 100-year sentence,
that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior, was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 72. Specifically, we noted that "Apprendi
requires that only those facts that increase the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." (Emphasis in original.) Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 74. 	In the present case, defendant was sentenced under section
5-8-2, which provides:
			"(a) A judge shall not sentence an offender to a term of
imprisonment in excess of the maximum sentence
authorized by Section 5-8-1 for the class of the most
serious offense of which the offender was convicted
unless the factors in aggravation set forth in paragraph (b)
of section 5-5-3.2 were found to be present. Where the
judge finds that such factors were present, he may
sentence an offender to the following:
				(1) for first degree murder, a term shall be not less
than 60 years and not more than 100 years[.]"
(Emphases added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(1) (West
1994).
Section 5-5-3.2(b) provides:
			"(2) When a defendant is convicted of any felony and
the court finds that the offense was accompanied by
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of
wanton cruelty; or
			*** 
			(4) When a defendant is convicted of any felony
committed against:
			***
			(ii) a person 60 years of age or older at the time of the
offense ***; or
			(iii) a person physically handicapped at the time of the
offense ***[.]" 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b) (West 1994).
	As a threshold matter, we note that a finding that defendant
was over 60 years of age, standing alone, would permit the trial
court to sentence defendant to an extended-term sentence. A trial
court need find only a single statutory factor in aggravation to
impose an extended sentence.
	 Here, defendant concedes that the age of the victim was an
element which was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury
returned a verdict of guilty on defendant's aggravated battery
charge. This charge included the victim's age as an element of the
offense. The trial court merged the aggravated battery charge with
the first degree murder charge. As such, it is undisputed that the
age of the victim was an element that was proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. He asserts, however, that the trial court's finding
of two additional aggravating factors-that the murder was
accompanied by exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior and
that the victim was disabled-violated Apprendi. 
	As we stated in Ford, the fact that the brutal and heinous
nature of defendant's crime and the victim's disability was not
proved beyond a reasonable doubt is not material. See Ford, 198 Ill. 2d  at 72. We decline to depart from this precedent. Instead, we
look to whether consideration of those additional elements would
have increased defendant's sentence beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum. We answer that question in the negative.
	The maximum sentence in this case was 100 years
imprisonment. Defendant was clearly sentenced within that range.
The additional finding of brutal and heinous behavior and that the
victim was disabled did not increase defendant's sentence beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum. Instead, it aided the trial court
in creating an appropriate sentence based on the facts of the crime.
	We observe that when any statutory enhancing aggravating
factor is proved to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, such as the
age of the victim in this case, the original sentencing range
increases according to the statutory scheme. See 730 ILCS
5/5-5-3.2 (West 1994). Additional aggravating factors can be
considered by the trial judge, including statutorily enhanced
factors not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, to fashion an
appropriate sentence within the new sentencing range. We decline
to eliminate a trial court's discretion in this area. As such, the
principles discussed in Apprendi were not violated in this case.
	We now turn to defendant's request for cross-relief.
Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to prove him guilty of murder. Specifically, he argues
that the testimony of three of the State's witnesses-Mark Slater,
June Gibson and Eric Frias-were inconsistent and not credible. As
such, defendant maintains the appellate court erred in finding that
the State presented sufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
	The relevant inquiry in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain a verdict on appeal is whether any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution. People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419,
431 (2000).
	In the present case, Mark Slater testified that he was with
defendant on the night of the murder. The police interviewed
Slater at the scene of the crime and examined his clothing for the
presence of blood. They found none. Human blood, however, was
found on defendant's clothes, socks, and shoes. A drop of the
victim's blood was found on the shirt that defendant had worn on
the day of the murder. Defendant's shorts also had a pattern of
blood splatters similar to the pattern of splatters found at the scene.
	Slater testified that after defendant returned from the victim's
apartment, he had on surgical gloves and told Slater that he
stabbed the victim in the shoulder, neck and temple. June Gibson
testified that she often cared for the elderly victim and that she
kept surgical gloves in the victim's bathroom. She further testified
that she saw defendant in the victim's apartment on the night of
the murder with a screwdriver in his hand. Finally, Frias testified
that while they were incarcerated together in the De Kalb County
jail, defendant told him that he stabbed the victim several times in
the head, neck, and chest.
	At trial, defendant explained the presence of the bloodstain on
his clothing. His explanation, however, could be rejected or
accepted by the jury. Although, as the appellate court noted, there
were "some problems of credibility and inconsistent statements,"
the jury, nonetheless, found defendant guilty. It is for the fact
finder to resolve conflicts or inconsistencies in the testimony of
witnesses. People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 204-05 (1998). A
reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for the trier of
fact. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d  at 431.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that because the age
of the victim was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial
judge could consider the additional statutorily enhanced
aggravating factors-the brutal and heinous nature of the crime and
the victim's disability-in determining an appropriate sentence
within the prescribed statutory range. This determination did not
violate the rule set forth in Apprendi. Further, we decline to
disturb the appellate court's order affirming defendant's
conviction.
	For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm in part and
reverse in part the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
 



1.      The State and defense stipulated that if called as a witness,
Karen Quandt, a molecular biologist, would testify that defendant
was excluded as the source of the DNA obtained from the
scrapings taken from beneath the victim's fingernails.

2.      The State and the defense stipulated that Quandt would testify
that she performed DNA testing on a material cutting of
defendant's turquoise shirt and the victim's shirt. The results
obtained were that the DNA banding pattern from defendant's
shirt matched the DNA banding pattern obtained from the
bloodstain on Johnson's shirt. The DNA banding pattern
frequency is one in 10 billion for Caucasians.