Case Title: Va. Commonwealth Univ. v. Su

Citation: 

Docket Number: 110348

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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PRESENT:  Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, McClanahan, and 
Powell, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 110348 
 
   JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         March 2, 2012 
ZHUO CHENG SU 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Margaret P. Spencer, Judge 
 
 
In this case, we must decide whether the circuit court 
erred by reversing the Virginia Commonwealth University's (VCU) 
decision denying Zhuo Cheng Su's application for in-state 
tuition benefits.  We hold that it did. 
I. 
A. 
 
Su, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of 
China, came to the United States in 2007 to attend high school 
in St. Paul, Minnesota.  In June 2009, he was accepted by VCU 
and, shortly thereafter, moved to Midlothian, Virginia, to live 
with his uncle.  In the weeks following his relocation, Su got 
a part-time job, obtained a Virginia driver's license, and 
titled and registered his car in Virginia. 
 
Su matriculated at VCU in August 2009.  At the time, he 
was classified as an out-of-state student for tuition purposes.  
In May 2010, Su sought to change his classification to in-state 
status.  To that end, he filed an "Application for Change of 
Domicile for Virginia In-State Tuition Rates" form with VCU's 
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Residency Appeals Officer (Officer).  Su provided some, but not 
all, of the information requested in the application.  The 
Officer denied Su's application, and in a letter, explained 
that Su was "ineligible to receive in-state tuition status" 
because "[f]ederal law prohibits an F-1 visa holder to 
establish Virginia domicile." 
B. 
 
Su appealed the Officer's decision to VCU's Residency 
Appeals Committee (Committee), and an evidentiary hearing was 
held.  Su began his testimony by clarifying his immigration 
status; he stated that, although he did not submit the 
supporting documentation with his application, he became a 
permanent resident in March 2009 — roughly five months before 
he matriculated at VCU.  The Committee then proceeded to ask Su 
a series of questions to fill in gaps in his application.  It 
first questioned him about when he applied to VCU and whether 
he applied to other universities as well.  Su said that he 
applied to VCU in November 2008 and that he also applied to 
Cornell University, the University of Minnesota, the University 
of Virginia, and "some small college that [he could not] quite 
remember."  When the Committee asked Su why he applied to these 
other universities, he answered that he was "hoping" that one 
of them would give him a full scholarship and that, had one of 
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them done so, he would have attended that university instead of 
VCU. 
 
Next, the Committee questioned Su about his family members 
and their living situations.  He responded that he and his 
sister live with their uncle in Midlothian year round and that 
their parents, who are also permanent residents, live with them 
about "half of [the] year"; they spend "the rest of the year in 
China," where they have a food business.  While his parents own 
a home in Midlothian, Su said that "they rent it out 12 months 
out of the year." 
 
The Committee also asked Su how he was paying for his 
tuition.  He replied that, although he does receive "some cash" 
from his uncle and "[a]bout $1,000 or $2,000" a year from his 
parents, he pays for most of it himself or with financial aid.  
Su explained that he works at two Chinese restaurants 
throughout the year to earn money. 
 
Finally, the Committee questioned Su about where he spent 
his winter and summer school breaks and whether he intended to 
stay in Virginia indefinitely.  Su said that he spent his 
winter break at his uncle's home in Midlothian and that he 
spent half of his three-month summer break in China "for 
visiting."  As for whether he intended to stay in Virginia 
indefinitely, Su first replied, "So after I graduate, which [I] 
mean after I graduate from VCU, [I will] probably still stay in 
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this state"; but he later said, "Yes, I am going to stay in 
Virginia." 
 
The Committee denied Su's appeal, finding that he "did not 
present clear and convincing evidence to rebut the [statutory] 
presumption that he is residing in the State primarily for 
educational purposes."  It provided the following reasons for 
its decision:  that Su "[c]ame to the U.S. for purposes of 
getting an education"; that he "has not totally abandoned 
China, returns on breaks"; that his "application was incomplete 
and there were inconsistencies"; that he provided "no 
documentation to clearly show that he is independent"; and that 
his "parents still own a business in China." 
C. 
 
Su appealed the Committee's decision to the circuit court, 
which reversed.  The circuit court found that the decision was 
"arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law" because VCU was 
incorrect in asserting that Su "had no domicile or was 
domiciled in 'no-state'" and that he was an F-1 visa holder, 
rather than a permanent resident, when he matriculated.  The 
circuit court further found that "by the overwhelming evidence 
presented by documents and testimony in the record, [Su] 
established by clear and convincing evidence that he was 
domiciled in Virginia and had abandoned any previous domicile 
for at least one year prior to the date of the entitlement."  
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The circuit court accordingly granted Su "leave to apply for 
in-state tuition benefits." 
 
We awarded VCU this appeal. 
II. 
 
Before addressing the merits, we think it necessary to 
discuss the applicable standard of review.  This Court has 
twice before reviewed a circuit court's judgment on a student's 
appeal from an in-state tuition eligibility decision by an 
institution of higher education.  George Mason University v. 
Floyd, 275 Va. 32, 654 S.E.2d 556 (2008); Ravindranathan v. 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 258 Va. 269, 519 S.E.2d 618 
(1999).  In both cases, we used language in our opinions 
indicating that we review such a judgment under the highly 
deferential "plainly wrong" standard.  Floyd, 275 Va. at 39, 
654 S.E.2d at 559 ("[W]e hold that the circuit court was 
plainly wrong in finding that the decision made by GMU was 
arbitrary, capricious or otherwise contrary to law." (emphasis 
added)); Ravindranathan, 258 Va. at 275, 519 S.E.2d at 620 ("On 
appeal, the sole issue that we may consider is whether the 
circuit court was plainly wrong when it held that the Residency 
Appeals Committee's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or 
otherwise contrary to the law." (emphasis added)).  We now 
clarify that we apply the de novo standard of review. 
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When reviewing an in-state tuition eligibility decision by 
an institution of higher education, a circuit court's sole 
"function [is] to determine whether the decision reached by the 
institution could reasonably be said, on the basis of the 
record, not to be arbitrary, capricious or otherwise contrary 
to law."  Code § 23-7.4:3(A).  Whether an administrative 
decision is "arbitrary, capricious or otherwise contrary to 
law" presents a question not of fact but of law.  We therefore 
review a circuit court's judgment on a student's appeal from an 
in-state tuition eligibility decision by an institution of 
higher education under the de novo — not the "plainly wrong" — 
standard.  See Dykes v. Friends of the C.C.C. Rd., 283 Va. 306, 
308, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2012). 
III. 
 
We now turn to consider whether the circuit court erred by 
reversing VCU's decision denying Su's application for in-state 
tuition benefits. 
A. 
 
To be eligible for in-state tuition benefits at a public 
institution of higher education, a student must "establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that for a period of at least one 
year immediately prior to the date of the alleged entitlement 
[to those benefits], he was domiciled in Virginia and had 
abandoned any previous domicile, if such existed."  Code § 23-
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7.4(B).  In determining a student's domiciliary intent, an 
institution of higher education must consider the following 
applicable factors: 
continuous residence for at least one year prior to 
the date of alleged entitlement . . . ; state to which 
income taxes are filed or paid; driver's license; 
motor vehicle registration; voter registration; 
employment; property ownership; sources of financial 
support; military records; a written offer and 
acceptance of employment following graduation; and any 
other social or economic relationships with the 
Commonwealth and other jurisdictions. 
 
Id. 
 
A student will not, however, ordinarily gain 
"[d]omiciliary status . . . by the performance of acts which 
are auxiliary to fulfilling educational objectives or are 
required or routinely performed by temporary residents of the 
Commonwealth."  Id.  Indeed, the "[m]ere physical presence or 
residence primarily for educational purposes shall not confer 
domiciliary status."  Id.  Moreover, "[a] matriculating student 
who has entered an institution and is classified as an out-of-
state student shall be required to rebut by clear and 
convincing evidence the presumption that he is in the 
Commonwealth for the purpose of attending school and not as a 
bona fide domiciliary."  Id. 
 
A student who is aggrieved by an institution of higher 
education's "final administrative decision" on his eligibility 
for in-state tuition benefits has "the right to review in the 
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circuit court for the jurisdiction in which the relevant 
institution is located."  Code § 23-7.4:3(A).  "In any such 
action, the institution shall forward the record to the court, 
whose function shall be only to determine whether the decision 
reached by the institution could reasonably be said, on the 
basis of the record, not to be arbitrary, capricious or 
otherwise contrary to law."  Id. 
B. 
 
After reviewing the administrative record, we conclude 
that VCU's decision denying Su's application for in-state 
tuition benefits cannot "reasonably be said . . . to be 
arbitrary, capricious or otherwise contrary to law."  Id.  A 
decision is "arbitrary and capricious," we have said, when it 
is " 'willful and unreasonable' " and taken " 'without 
consideration or in disregard of facts or law or without 
determining principle.' "  School Bd. of the City of Norfolk v. 
Wescott, 254 Va. 218, 224, 492 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1997) (quoting 
Black's Law Dictionary 105 (6th ed. 1990)).  Here, the record 
reflects that VCU gave careful consideration to the facts of 
Su's case and that it applied the proper principles. 
 
As a student who was classified as out of state when he 
matriculated at VCU, Su bore a heavy burden to establish his 
eligibility for in-state tuition benefits:  He had to "rebut by 
clear and convincing evidence the presumption that he is in the 
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Commonwealth for the purpose of attending school and not as a 
bona fide domiciliary."  Code § 23-7.4(B).  There is more than 
sufficient evidence in the record to support VCU's conclusion 
that Su did not meet this burden.  Significantly, he applied to 
several universities outside of Virginia and moved to Virginia 
only after being accepted by VCU.  He also gave inconsistent 
answers when asked whether he intended to stay in Virginia 
indefinitely.  Additionally, he returned to his native country 
of China for more than a month during the year in which he was 
supposedly establishing his Virginia domicile. 
 
Further, many of the facts Su relies on "to support his 
purported Virginia domicile could likewise be deemed auxiliary 
to fulfilling his educational objectives."  Floyd, 275 Va. at 
39-40, 654 S.E.2d at 559; see also Code § 23-7.4(B).  For 
example, titling and registering a car, obtaining a driver's 
license, and securing part-time employment are all actions that 
"are required or routinely performed by temporary residents of 
this Commonwealth."  Code § 23-7.4(B); see also Ravindranathan, 
258 Va. at 274-75, 519 S.E.2d at 620-21. 
C. 
 
In reversing VCU's decision denying Su's application for 
in-state tuition benefits, the circuit court erred.  First, it 
reviewed the wrong decision.  Under Code § 23-7.4:3(A), a 
circuit court is to review an institution of higher education's 
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"final administrative decision," not its "initial 
determination."  Instead of reviewing the Committee's "final 
administrative decision," which was based on several valid 
grounds, the circuit court here reviewed the Officer's "initial 
determination," which was based on one erroneous ground:  that 
Su held an F-1 visa when he matriculated at VCU.  Since the 
Committee did not rely on the Officer's decision in denying 
Su's application, that decision should not have been a factor 
in the circuit court's review. 
 
Second, the circuit court did not limit its review to the 
administrative record.  According to Code § 23-7.4:3(A), a 
circuit court's review of an institution of higher education's 
decision on a student's eligibility for in-state tuition 
benefits is to be based solely on the record forwarded by the 
institution.  Here, the circuit court went beyond the record it 
was forwarded in reviewing VCU's decision denying Su's 
application for in-state tuition benefits.  For instance, the 
circuit court states in its order that 
[Su] testified that he would not have gone to an out-
of-state school if he had been accepted so that he 
could be close and help his newly immigrated family, 
but applied to out-of-state schools to see if his 
academic record was strong enough to get into 
competitive schools.  He states that it was common 
procedure for high school students to apply to in and 
out of state colleges, but his parents wanted him to 
attend school in Virginia. 
 
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These statements, however, appear nowhere in the record that 
was forwarded to the circuit court and therefore should have 
played no part in its review. 
 
Third, the circuit court did not adhere to the applicable 
standard of review.  As noted earlier, when reviewing an in-
state tuition eligibility decision by an institution of higher 
education under Code § 23-7.4:3(A), a circuit court's only 
"function [is] to determine whether the decision reached by the 
institution could reasonably be said, on the basis of the 
record, not to be arbitrary, capricious or otherwise contrary 
to law."  The circuit court, however, did not so limit its 
review in this case.  Rather, it reweighed the evidence and 
found that Su "established by clear and convincing evidence 
that he was domiciled in Virginia and had abandoned any 
previous domicile for at least one year prior to the date of 
the entitlement."  It was not for the circuit court to 
substitute its judgment for that of VCU. 
IV. 
 
Because it cannot be reasonably said on the administrative 
record that VCU's decision denying Su's application for in-
state tuition benefits was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise 
contrary to law, we reverse the circuit court's judgment and 
enter final judgment for VCU. 
Reversed and final judgment.