Case Title: Ellison v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 172, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MITZI ELLISON,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 172, 2002 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware, 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  ID No.  9908021746 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
 
Submitted:  October 30, 2002 
Decided:  November 27, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 27th day of November, 2002, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1. 
On September 13, 1999, defendant-below, Mitzi Ellison, was indicted 
on various drug charges.  On July 16, 2001, a Superior Court jury convicted 
Ellison of Trafficking in Cocaine, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Delivery of a 
Narcotic Schedule II Controlled Substance (cocaine), and Use of a Dwelling for 
Keeping Controlled Substances.  Ellison has appealed her conviction claiming the 
trial judge erred when he allowed the State to introduce certain evidence. 
 
2
2. 
We conclude that the trial judge properly permitted the State to 
introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts pursuant to D.R.E. 404(b) and 
our case law.  In addition, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he 
permitted the chemist to testify to the combined weight and test results of the two 
bags of cocaine, despite the fact that only one bag was field-tested before 
commingling.  Accordingly, we affirm Ellison’s conviction.  
2. 
Over defense objection before trial, the State proposed to offer 
testimony of the defendant’s employee that, pursuant to the defendant’s directions, 
had wired $2,000 on June 18 and June 29 to individuals for the purchase of drugs.  
The defense argued that the State’s evidence of the July 3 sale of cocaine was 
complete and more than sufficient to prove the alleged offense and that the 
testimony was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.  The State argued that the wire 
transfers showed the identity of the defendant, as well as the modus operandi 
because without the evidence of the wire transfers, the jury would lack sufficient 
information as to the extent the defendant was involved in the transaction with the 
undercover operative.  In addition, the State argued that the wire transfers were 
“inextricably intertwined” with the present charges. 
3. 
The trial judge properly analyzed the six Getz1 factors before 
admitting the evidence.  Excluding the bad act evidence would also have “create[d] 
                                                 
1 Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988). 
 
3
a chronological and conceptual void in the State’s presentation to the jury that 
would likely result in significant confusion.”2  The facts indicate that the defendant 
did not actually transfer the drugs to the undercover operative.  Rather, the 
operative called the defendant and handed the defendant money (which was caught 
on video and recorded by wire) but another associate of the defendant actually 
transferred the drugs to the operative.  The testimony concerning the wire transfers 
was necessary to explain the defendant’s supervisory position in the drug dealing 
hierarchy rather than depicting the defendant as a “runner” or “middle man.”  
Thus, the evidence was “independently relevant to an issue or fact that the State 
must prove as part of its prima facie case.”3      
4. 
Trafficking carries a more severe sentence depending on the weight of 
the cocaine.  The defendant claims that a possibility existed that one of the bags 
did not contain cocaine and therefore the chemist erred by adding the bags together 
before conducting the tests.   
5. 
At trial, the chemist explained that testing a sample from the bag was 
not necessary because: 
 
It’s not a test of everything; it was a test of a portion of it. So it 
doesn’t matter whether the portion came from one bag or ten 
bags.  The mixture is [the] entire substance in all of its 
containers.  It doesn’t require every container to have the drug 
in it. 
                                                 
2 Pope v. State, 632 A.2d 73, 76 (Del. 1993). 
3 Taylor v. State, 777 A.2d 759, 766 (Del. 2001). 
 
4
 
 
6. 
While there are two competing rules concerning random sampling of 
drug contraband,4 the better rule rejects the defendant’s position.  The two bags 
appeared identical in appearance and were delivered together in one larger plastic 
bag.  In addition, drugs are generally marketed in a diluted or impure form.5  
Furthermore, the statute refers specifically to: “5 grams of cocaine or any mixture 
containing cocaine.”6   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_/s/ Myron T. Steele_____________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 See Michael D. Osteen, Annotation, Sufficiency of Random Sampling of Drug Contraband to 
Establish Jurisdictional Amount Required for Conviction, 45 A.L.R. 5th 1.   
5 Id. 
6 16 Del.C. § 4753A(a)(2).