Case Title: Commonwealth v. Tavares

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12631

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12631 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DANIEL TAVARES. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     January 6, 2020. - May 6, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Request for jury 
instructions, Motion for a required finding. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 28, 2013. 
 
 
The case was tried before Gary A. Nickerson, J. 
 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan also present) 
for the defendant. 
 
Mary E. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In December 2015, a jury convicted the defendant, 
Daniel Tavares, of murder in the first degree on theories of 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, for 
the 1988 stabbing death of Gayle Botelho.  The judge sentenced 
2 
 
 
the defendant to life in prison.1  On appeal, the defendant seeks 
reversal of his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred 
by denying (1) his requests for a jury instruction pursuant to 
Commonwealth v. Croft, 345 Mass. 143, 145 (1962); and (2) his 
motions for a required finding of not guilty because the evidence 
equally supported two inconsistent propositions, as prohibited 
by Croft.  The defendant also requests that we exercise our 
power pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce his conviction 
to manslaughter.  Finding neither reversible error nor reason to 
exercise our authority under § 33E, we affirm. 
 
Background.  We recite the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for 
later discussion.  See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 456 Mass. 578, 
579 (2010).  The victim went missing on or about October 27, 
1988.  At the time of her disappearance, the victim lived on 
Prospect Street in Fall River with her boyfriend, Carlos 
DaPonte, and his brother, Gil DaPonte.2  The defendant lived 
across the street with his mother, and as relevant here, his 
mother's friend, Richard Pires.  Neither the defendant nor 
                     
 
1 The judge ordered that the defendant serve his sentence 
from and after the sentence imposed by the State of Washington 
in or around 2007, as discussed infra. 
 
 
2 Because they share a last name, we refer to Carlos and Gil 
individually by their first names and collectively as the 
DaPontes. 
3 
 
 
anybody else was arrested in connection with the victim's 
disappearance, until the defendant was charged in 2012. 
 
1.  The defendant's first version of events.  In 1991, the 
defendant killed his mother and pleaded guilty to manslaughter.  
He was sentenced to from seventeen to twenty years in State 
prison.  In September 2000, while incarcerated, the defendant 
wrote to a Bristol County assistant district attorney, claiming 
to know the location of a murder victim's body, which he would 
disclose, along with other relevant information, in exchange for 
a reduced sentence.3  During a series of interviews that took 
place over the subsequent months, the defendant told Detective 
John McDonald the following details about the night the victim 
was murdered:  the victim, Carlos, Gil, and their friend, 
Raymond Paiva, were all at the defendant's house with the 
defendant.  The defendant gave Carlos some cocaine to sell and 
Carlos left.  The defendant then stepped outside to speak to his 
girlfriend, Michelle Cardoza, for about ten to fifteen minutes.  
When the defendant returned to his bedroom, he saw Gil holding a 
knife and the victim on the floor with stab wounds to her back.  
The defendant further stated that he was not present during the 
stabbing. 
                     
 
3 The defendant was not paroled, nor was his sentence 
reduced in exchange for any information given to police.  The 
defendant also told police that he had contacted them because he 
had found God and wanted to clear his conscience. 
4 
 
 
 
When the defendant asked what had happened, Gil confessed 
to stabbing the victim, and the defendant announced he was going 
to call for help.  Gil then pulled out a handgun, put it to the 
defendant's head, and fired a round, which grazed the 
defendant's forehead.  The defendant then said he had to leave 
to pick up Cardoza, and he instructed Gil and Paiva to remove 
the victim's body.  When the defendant returned approximately 
twenty minutes later, he saw Gil and Paiva carrying the victim's 
body, wrapped in a blanket, down the stairs and into the back 
yard.4  Later, Gil and Paiva pointed to an area of the back yard 
and told the defendant that that was where they had buried the 
victim's body.  The defendant had been clearing that area for a 
tomato garden, and he suspected that that was where Gil and 
Paiva buried the body.5 
 
2.  The initial investigation.  After two interviews with 
the defendant, in October 2000, the police went to the 
defendant's former house on June Street.  In the defendant's 
bedroom, they found a bloodstained section of floor.  In the 
back yard, the police recovered a human skeleton and positively 
                     
 
4 The defendant also told police that because Cardoza saw 
Gil and Paiva carrying the victim, the defendant explained to 
her that the victim had been hurt. 
 
 
5 After this meeting with the defendant, Detective McDonald 
met with Cardoza, who confirmed the defendant's version of 
events. 
5 
 
 
identified the remains as those of the victim.  The autopsy 
concluded that the cause of death was homicidal violence 
including stabbing to the victim's back. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Lori Moniz, the defendant's former 
girlfriend, saw a news report that a body had been discovered in 
the defendant's back yard.  She contacted the police.  At a 
subsequent meeting, she reported that, on an evening in late 
October 1988, the defendant had telephoned and told her to come 
to his house because he wanted to show her something.  When 
Moniz arrived, the defendant answered the door, appearing 
nervous and excited.  Moniz followed the defendant upstairs to 
his bedroom and, as she approached, she saw the defendant on his 
hands and knees scrubbing what appeared to be a large pool of 
blood from the rug.  Upon seeing this, Moniz rushed down the 
stairs to leave.  The defendant ran after her, explaining that 
the blood was fake and a joke for Halloween. 
 
3.  The defendant's second version of events.  In 2002, the 
defendant changed his story:  The defendant stated that he 
witnessed Gil stab and murder the victim and that Cardoza was 
not there that night.  In 2002, Cardoza also told Detective 
McDonald that, at the defendant's request, she had lied about 
being with the defendant on the night of the murder.  The 
Commonwealth did not charge the defendant with the victim's 
murder at this point. 
6 
 
 
 
4.  Further investigation.  In 2007, the defendant 
completed his sentence for his mother's homicide, and within 
days of his release from prison, he moved to the State of 
Washington.  Shortly thereafter, the defendant killed two 
people.  While incarcerated in Washington, the defendant learned 
of a book that discussed the victim's murder, including the 
defendant's cooperation with the police.  In 2012, another 
individual incarcerated in the same Washington prison as the 
defendant told the Fall River police department that he had 
discovered an open letter, written on the cover of a book in the 
prison library, in which the author, later confirmed to be the 
defendant, refuted the notion that the defendant had cooperated 
with police and, instead, asserted that he was the only suspect 
in the victim's murder case, not a "rat." 
 
5.  The defendant's 2012 confession.  In November 2012, 
Detective McDonald traveled to Washington to meet with the 
defendant, at which point, the defendant changed his story 
again.  The defendant stated that he alone murdered the victim 
(2012 confession).  In this version, the defendant was angry 
with the victim, the DaPontes, and Paiva for stealing cocaine 
from him, and he planned to kill all of them in retaliation for 
the theft.  On the day of the murder, he walked across the 
street to the victim's house, and the victim answered the door.  
The defendant asked if Carlos was home, but he was not.  The 
7 
 
 
defendant told the victim that he knew all four of them had 
stolen from him and that he wanted them to start selling cocaine 
for him to repay their debt.  The defendant then invited the 
victim across the street to retrieve some cocaine from his 
house.  Upon entering his bedroom, the defendant laid out a line 
of cocaine for the victim.  While the victim bent over to ingest 
the line, the defendant took a handgun and tried to shoot her, 
but the slide on the gun jammed.  The defendant then reached for 
a knife that was on his bureau and stabbed the victim seven or 
eight times.  The victim fell, and her blood soaked the floor.  
The defendant then moved the victim's body to the back yard, 
removed the victim's clothes, and buried the victim's body, face 
down, in the back yard.  The defendant told Detective McDonald 
that he would not have confessed if not for the book that had 
been written, because he refused to be known as a "rat."6 
 
In February 2013, the defendant confessed three more times 
in writing to (1) his former roommate, Richard Pires; 
                     
 
6 The defendant also said that he accused Gil and Paiva of 
the murder because they benefited from the stolen cocaine, so by 
pinning it on them, he could kill two birds with one stone. 
8 
 
 
(2) Detective McDonald;7 and (3) his former false alibi witness,8 
Cardoza. 
 
A grand jury indicted the defendant for the victim's murder 
in 2013, and the jury trial began on November 16, 2015.  At 
trial, the defendant argued that he gave a false confession to 
avoid being labeled a "rat" in prison.  He called an expert 
witness who testified to the dangers of being considered a "rat" 
within the prison system.  The jury convicted the defendant. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Jury instruction.  On appeal, the 
defendant argues the judge erred in denying the defendant's 
requests for a jury instruction pursuant to Croft, 345 Mass. at 
145.9  Because the defendant preserved this issue at trial, we 
                     
 
7 The defendant had kept in contact with Pires while 
incarcerated in Massachusetts and in Washington.  Pires 
testified that the defendant wrote to him on a somewhat regular 
basis. 
 
 
The defendant told Pires that he had to "take them out" 
because "Carlos and his girl stole something from [him] that was 
not [his]" and that he "did [the crime] alone."  The defendant 
also said that he confessed to Lori Moniz and a woman who lived 
across the street.  In the letter to Detective McDonald, the 
defendant wrote, "I acted alone and that's that."  The defendant 
reiterated to both of them that he came clean because the book 
that had been written about the murder made him look like a 
"rat." 
 
 
8 Also in February 2013, the defendant wrote Cardoza, 
admitting that he had asked her to lie for him and told her not 
to lie for him anymore. 
 
 
9 The defendant's requested jury instruction was modified 
from the language in Croft.  The requested instruction stated, 
"Where the evidence tends equally to sustain either of two 
9 
 
 
review for prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 
Mass. 589, 591 (2005). 
 
We have long upheld the principle articulated in Croft that 
"[w]hen the evidence tends equally to sustain either of two 
inconsistent propositions, neither of them can be said to have 
been established by legitimate proof."  Croft, 345 Mass. at 145, 
quoting Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 305 Mass. 393, 400 (1940).  See 
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 693-694 (2015).  Our 
decision in Croft does not provide for a jury instruction, and 
we have never interpreted it as such.10  Indeed, we previously 
held that "a reference to the consequences of an even balance in 
the evidence preferably should not be included in a charge on 
reasonable doubt," Commonwealth v. Hunt, 462 Mass. 807, 825-826 
(2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Beverly, 389 Mass. 866, 872-873 
(1983), because such an instruction may lead the jury to 
improperly infer that if the balance is weighted even slightly 
                     
inconsistent propositions, neither of them can be said to have 
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  In such a case, 
the evidence is insufficient to sustain the burden of proof 
imposed upon the Commonwealth."  See Croft, 345 Mass. at 145. 
 
 
10 Even the cases to which the defendant cites in his brief 
do not mention Croft in the context of a jury instruction.  
Rather, they discuss the circumstances in which the trial judge 
should have granted the defendant's motion for a required 
finding of not guilty.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 460 Mass. 
139, 144 (2011) (judge erred in denying defendant's motion for 
required finding of not guilty); Croft, 345 Mass. at 145 (same).  
See Rodriguez, 456 Mass. at 582-583 (insufficient evidence to 
support convictions). 
10 
 
 
in favor of the defendant's guilt, the jury would be required to 
find the defendant guilty, see Commonwealth v. Saladin, 73 Mass. 
App. Ct. 416, 419 (2008). 
 
Instead, the principle articulated in Croft provides a 
standard for judges to apply when considering a motion for a 
required finding of not guilty and for appellate courts to apply 
when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.  There was no 
error. 
 
3.  Required finding of not guilty under Croft.  The 
defendant also argues that the judge erred in denying his 
motions for a required finding of not guilty both at the close 
of the Commonwealth's case and at the close of all of the 
evidence.  We review to determine "whether, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."  Commonwealth v. Cole, 
473 Mass. 317, 334 (2015), overruled on another ground, 
Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454(2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). 
 
Citing Croft, the defendant argues that because the 
Commonwealth based its entire case on the defendant's 2012 
confession, the whole of the evidence supports two inconsistent 
propositions:  (1) the 2012 confession was truthful and he 
murdered the victim or (2) the 2012 confession was untruthful 
11 
 
 
and was an effort to avoid being labeled a "rat" while serving 
sentences in prison.  The defendant further argues that because 
the evidence equally supports both propositions, the judge erred 
in denying the defendant's motions for a required finding of not 
guilty.  See Croft, 345 Mass. at 145.  The defendant is correct 
that Croft requires a judge to grant a defendant's motion for a 
required finding of not guilty when "the evidence tends equally 
to sustain either of two inconsistent propositions" (citation 
omitted).  Id.  That is not this case. 
 
This principle applies only in circumstances in which, even 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, "choosing among the possible inferences from the 
evidence presented," would require a jury "to employ 
conjecture."  Id. at 145 (evidence equally supported inference 
that defendant possessed heroin with intent to sell it and 
inference that defendant possessed heroin until he was certain 
he had defeated his habit).  See Rodriguez, 456 Mass. at 582-583 
(evidence equally supported inconsistent inferences that buyer 
either obtained cocaine from third person or from defendant); 
Commonwealth v. Eramo, 377 Mass. 912, 913 (1979) (evidence 
equally supported inconsistent inferences that defendant either 
issued prescription due to his independent medical judgment or 
pursuant to request without legitimate medical purpose).  
However, "it is for the jury to determine where the truth lies, 
12 
 
 
for the weight and credibility of the evidence is wholly within 
their province."  Cole, 473 Mass. at 334, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007) 
and 460 Mass. 12 (2011).  See Commonwealth v. Merry, 453 Mass. 
653, 662 (2009) (jury not required to believe testimony of 
defendant's expert); Commonwealth v. Clifford, 374 Mass. 293, 
297 (1978) (jury not required to disbelieve witnesses' testimony 
placing defendant at scene of crime). 
 
The likelihood of the defendant's 2012 confession being 
truthful or being untruthful are not in equipoise.  The weight 
of the Commonwealth's evidence in this case, moreover, was 
overwhelming and, contrary to the defendant's arguments, 
included much more than just the defendant's 2012 confession to 
Detective McDonald.  See Commonwealth v. Weaver, 474 Mass. 787, 
791 (2016), aff'd 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017), citing Commonwealth v. 
Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 458 (1984).  The victim's body was buried 
in the defendant's back yard.  The police found dried blood in 
the defendant's bedroom.  It was reasonable for the jury to 
conclude that, just hours after the murder, the defendant's 
former girlfriend saw the defendant cleaning up a pool of blood 
in the very same bedroom.  One of the defendant's then roommates 
observed blood on the defendant's shirt in the washing machine, 
a pool of blood on the basement floor, and a pitchfork and 
shovel also in the basement near the door leading to the back 
13 
 
 
yard.  The roommate had never seen the pitchfork and shovel in 
that location before.  In addition to the 2012 confession to 
police, the defendant separately confessed to Pires and to 
Cardoza,11 and the Commonwealth put forth ample evidence 
corroborating the defendant's confessions.12  The jury were free, 
but not required, to believe that the defendant truthfully 
confessed to murdering the victim.13  See Merry, 453 Mass. at 
662.  Moreover, even without the defendant's explicit confession 
to the murder, the defendant does not contest the statements he 
made to police in 2000 and 2002.  He also admitted, without 
recantation, that he knew the victim; that he was angry with her 
for stealing cocaine from him; that the victim was murdered in 
his bedroom; and that he knew where the victim's body was 
                     
 
11 The defendant also confessed to Detective McDonald a 
second time in writing. 
 
 
12 The defendant confessed to Pires that the defendant cut 
out a section of his rug, and Pires testified that he had 
observed the same.  The defendant confessed that he stabbed the 
victim seven or eight times, removed the victim's clothes, and 
buried the victim's body face down, three facts that were never 
publicly disclosed. 
 
 
13 The defendant's recitation of facts that contradict his 
confessions are of no moment, as we view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth when reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  See Cole, 473 Mass. at 334 ("Here, 
the defendant has marshaled the evidence, or the purported lack 
thereof, in the light most favorable to himself.  This is not 
the proper lens through which to view the evidence"); Merry, 453 
Mass. at 662 ("That contradictory evidence exists is not a 
sufficient basis for granting a motion for a required finding of 
not guilty"). 
14 
 
 
buried.  We conclude that, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, a rational jury could have 
found that the defendant was guilty of murder in the first 
degree on both the theories of premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty. 
 
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
entire record pursuant to our responsibilities under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  We conclude that there is no basis for reducing 
the defendant's sentence or ordering a new trial.  The 
defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
So ordered.