Case Title: FRED McLAUGHLIN v. MICHELIN TIRE CORP., A New York Corporation, and COBRE TIRE, A Division of Fletcher Enterprises, An Arizona Corporation; CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO., A California Corporation; WYOMING MACHINERY COMPANY, A Utah Corporation; LARRY LARGENT; LARRY McNABB; ROBERT DERNOVICH; DENNIS VEEDER; and CRAIG PAISLEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87-61

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
FRED McLAUGHLIN v. MICHELIN TIRE CORP., A New York Corporation, and COBRE TIRE, A Division of Fletcher Enterprises, An Arizona Corporation; CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO., A California Corporation; WYOMING MACHINERY COMPANY, A Utah Corporation; LARRY LARGENT; LARRY McNABB; ROBERT DERNOVICH; DENNIS VEEDER; and CRAIG PAISLEY1989 WY 153778 P.2d 59Case Number: 87-61Decided: 07/12/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
FRED McLAUGHLIN, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

MICHELIN TIRE CORP., A 
NEW YORK CORPORATION, AND COBRE TIRE, A DIVISION OF FLETCHER ENTERPRISES, AN 
ARIZONA CORPORATION, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS),

CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO., 
A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION; WYOMING MACHINERY COMPANY, A UTAH CORPORATION; LARRY 
LARGENT; LARRY McNABB; ROBERT DERNOVICH; DENNIS VEEDER; AND CRAIG PAISLEY, 
DEFENDANTS.

Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, J.

Richard H. 
Honaker, Rock Springs, and W. Keith Goody, 
Jackson, for appellant.

Carl L. Lathrop, 
Lathrop & Uchner, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee, Michelin Tire 
Corp.

William G. 
Walton, Cheyenne, for appellee, Cobre Tire.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, J., Ret. 

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1.]     In this case, the court 
is asked to address the several theories for imposing liability upon a 
manufacturer or seller of heavy equipment tires in the context of summary 
judgment. A critical question is whether there is any difference in the 
application of those several theories in the absence of an actual defect in the 
tires. We also address a collateral theory of independent negligence. The trial 
court entered a summary judgment in favor of Michelin Tire Corp. (Michelin) and 
Cobre Tire (Cobre) on the premise that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact, and these defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 
trial court emphasized the failure of the plaintiff to produce any materials in 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment that raised an issue of fact as to 
whether there was any defect in the tires. We affirm the judgment of the 
district court on the theories of negligent manufacture and design, strict 
liability, breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of an 
express warranty. Because there do exist genuine issues of material fact, we 
reverse the summary judgment as to the theory of an implied warranty of fitness 
and as to the theory of independent negligence of Michelin and Cobre in not 
replacing the tires when they were not performing in a satisfactory 
manner.

[¶2.]     Fred McLaughlin was 
injured on April 5, 1983, when he lost control of a Caterpillar scraper he was 
operating at the Jim Bridger Coal Company mine in SweetwaterCounty. He brought an action to recover 
damages for his injuries in which he named as defendants Caterpillar Tractor 
Co., Wyoming Machinery Company, Michelin Tire Corp., Cobre Tire, Larry Largent, 
Larry McNabb, Robert Dernovich, Dennis Veeder, and Craig Paisley. In his 
complaint, McLaughlin alleged that his injuries resulted from his loss of 
control of the scraper due to severe bouncing and vibration caused by Michelin 
radial tires that had been installed on the machine. As theories of liability of 
the several defendants, McLaughlin alleged negligence, strict products liability 
in tort, breach of the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability, and 
breach of an express warranty. McLaughlin settled his claims against all 
defendants except Michelin and Cobre, and the trial court ultimately entered 
summary judgment against McLaughlin and in favor of Michelin and Cobre. The 
appeal is taken from that summary judgment, which was a final order under the 
circumstances.

[¶3.]     In his brief, 
McLaughlin states the question to be:

"Do material issues of 
fact exist in this case which require reversal of the summary judgment entered 
below with regard to:

"(a) Appellant's 
negligence claim;

"(b) Appellant's strict 
liability claim; and

"(c) Appellant's breach 
of warranty claims?"

Michelin, in its 
Brief of Appellee, expands on those issues and sets them forth in this 
way:

"I. Whether appellants 
have infused new issues for the first time on appeal which were not considered 
by the court below?

"II. Must plaintiff prove 
a defect regardless of the theory, be it negligence, strict liability or implied 
warranty?

"III. Do subjective 
complaints by operators prove a defect?

"IV. Is the 
circumstantial evidence test available?

"V. Does the evidence 
submitted by plaintiff in opposition to the motion for summary judgment invite 
the jury to speculate and thereby fail to raise a triable issue of 
fact?

"VI. Did Michelin have a 
duty to warn?

"VII. Even as to new 
matter not raised below, does a triable issue remain?"

Cobre invokes a 
third version of the issues stated as follows:

"Did the court err in 
determining that there exists no issue of material fact and that defendants 
(appellees) were entitled to judgment as a matter of law?

"1. May appellant raise 
new issues on appeal?

"2. Must appellant prove 
the tires were defective?

"3. Did Cobre have a duty 
to warn appellant?

"4. Was summary judgment 
proper?"

[¶4.]     From the materials in 
the record, most of which were relied upon in connection with the motion for 
summary judgment, the essential facts can be gleaned. In March of 1983, Cobre 
and Jim Bridger Coal Company (Bridger) entered into a contract for goods and 
services pursuant to which Cobre agreed to provide Bridger with eighty percent 
of its requirements for tires and accessories and to furnish on-site tire 
maintenance personnel. In discussing its tire needs, Bridger, through its agent, 
Jack Erickson, mentioned to Cobre's agent, Kenneth Moe, that Bridger was 
interested in trying steel-belted radial tires on their Caterpillar 631-D 
scrapers to see if that would provide a smoother, more comfortable ride for the 
scraper operators. Until that time, the scrapers uniformly had been equipped 
with bias ply tires.

[¶5.]     On March 10, 1983, in 
accordance with the contract, and pursuing Michelin's advice, Cobre delivered to 
Bridger two 33.25 X 35 Michelin XRDN[**] steel-belted radial tires and installed 
them on the front of a Caterpillar 631-D scraper, No. 699. The record discloses 
that Cobre relied almost exclusively on Michelin's recommendations as to the 
suitability of any tires that Michelin manufactured for use on particular pieces 
of equipment and in certain types of terrain. Scraper No. 699 had been equipped 
with bias ply tires manufactured by another tire company prior to the 
installation of the Michelin tires. Immediately after installation of these 
tires, McLaughlin, who usually operated Scraper No. 699, became aware of extreme 
differences in its operation. McLaughlin complained to his supervisor, Jack 
Erickson, that the scraper, now equipped with the new Michelin tires, was racked 
with extreme and violent vibrations, that it would bounce and shake excessively, 
and that the bouncing did not subside as quickly as it had when the scraper had 
been equipped with the bias ply tires. Another operator stated that Scraper No. 
699 "vibrated more with the new Michelin tires," and that the operators were 
"getting beat up in the scraper." Still another operator observed that the ride 
in the scraper was "rough and it vibrated and it wouldn't smooth out." This 
latter operator further observed that the Michelin tires caused the scraper to 
bounce more after an initial bounce than it had with the bias ply tires. A 
fourth operator testified that the Michelin radial tires were "bouncier" than 
the bias ply tires.

[¶6.]     McLaughlin's 
complaints, and those of the other operators of the scraper, were communicated 
to Cobre, which in turn passed them on to Michelin. Despite the voluminous 
complaints that continued over a period of twenty-six days, neither Cobre nor 
Michelin took the tires off the scraper. Instead, an attempt was made to cure 
these problems by varying the air pressure in the tires. This did not provide a 
remedy, and the extreme vibrations and bouncing continued. Late in March of 
1983, Cobre and Michelin decided that on April 10, 1983 they would permanently 
remove the tires. In the intervening period, an experiment was conducted that 
involved taking the tires from Scraper No. 699 and installing them on another 
scraper. The same problems of vibration and bounce occurred with the tires on 
the second scraper. Following the experiment, these tires were re-installed on 
Scraper No. 699.

[¶7.]     In accordance with 
Cobre's and Michelin's decision, the tires were still on Scraper No. 699 on 
April 5, 1983. On that date, McLaughlin, who was an experienced heavy equipment 
operator, was making a dirt haul pass over a ditch. Straddling the ditch while 
making such dirt haul passes to dump overburden, in the manner that McLaughlin 
did on the day of his injuries, was a "very accepted" practice at the coal mine, 
and "[t]here is no risk involved" with such a procedure. During one such pass, 
the scraper suddenly went into a violent series of vibrations in the course of 
which McLaughlin lost control of the scraper and was thrown through the side 
window of the cab. McLaughlin sustained severe lacerations to his face, which 
ultimately cost him his right eye, and compression fractures to the vertebrae in 
his back that resulted in permanent disability.

[¶8.]     The parties dispute 
what actually occurred just prior to the accident to cause the scraper to 
vibrate so severely. McLaughlin's co-workers stated in substance that they 
believed something was wrong with the tires. One related:

"* * * [H]e was bouncing 
* * *. I seen the tires on six-nine-nine going flat. When he was running over 
this dump area, they were going flat, and I was going to catch him. * * * I was 
trying to flash him over. I tried to stop him, but he was ahead of 
me."

The same 
co-worker went on to say that "both wheels were coming off the ground," that the 
tires were flattening to such an extent that the distance from the rim to the 
bottom of the tire was only about six inches, and that when the tires would 
spring back, the distance from the rim to the bottom of the tire would be about 
two and one-half feet. Another co-worker observed the actual injury occur, and 
he reported in his deposition:

"* * * I could see the 
scraper bouncing real hard. I saw it bounce three or four times * * *. I saw him 
go sideways * * *. Then I saw him come back and saw his head come through the 
door, the window, and knock that window clear out."

[¶9.]     After McLaughlin's 
accident, several tests were conducted with the scraper that re-confirmed the 
beliefs of the several operators that the tires caused the accident. Agents of 
Michelin and Cobre also witnessed the tests, but none of them would offer an 
opinion as to what caused the accident. Instead, they reported that it appeared 
that the drivers of the scraper during the course of the tests manifested bad 
attitudes.

[¶10.]  The record also incorporates the opinions 
of experts. One said:

"* * * I am of the 
opinion that there was no defect in either design or manufacture of the Michelin 
tires installed upon Unit 699 upon which Mr. McLaughlin was 
injured."

Another expert 
whose deposition was taken by the plaintiff said he did not know whether there 
was a defect in manufacture of the tires and that it really did not matter. What 
he recognized was that excessive vibration apparently occurred and that it was 
attributable to these tires.

[¶11.]  In his Complaint and Jury Demand, 
McLaughlin asserted, as theories of recovery against the several defendants, 
including Michelin and Cobre, negligence, strict liability in tort, breach of 
the implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose and merchantability, 
and breach of express warranty. The facts set forth above are a product of 
extensive pre-trial discovery. Following that discovery, Michelin and Cobre 
presented motions for summary judgment, together with supporting affidavits, 
deposition excerpts and their memoranda of law. McLaughlin filed a memorandum in 
opposition to those motions together with the deposition excerpts and exhibits 
upon which he relied. The district court then issued its opinion letter granting 
the motions for summary judgment on all issues, and that determination was 
formalized by an Order for Summary Judgment entered on December 8, 1986. This 
appeal is taken from that order.

[¶12.]  The summary judgment granted to Michelin 
and Cobre can be sustained only if there is no genuine issue of material fact, 
and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Matter of 
Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028 (Wyo. 1988). A material fact is one that 
establishes or refutes an essential element of a cause of action or a defense 
asserted by a party. Roosa. If the moving party presents supporting summary 
judgment materials that demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists, the burden is shifted to the non-moving party to present appropriate 
supporting materials that serve to pose a genuine issue of a material fact for 
trial. Roosa. On appeal, this court examines the entire record in the light most 
favorable to the party who opposed the motion, affording to that party all 
favorable inferences that may be drawn from the materials either supporting or 
opposing the motion. Roosa. We have examined this record in that 
light.

[¶13.]  We are unable to support the 
determination of the trial court that summary judgment was proper with respect 
to all of the theories asserted by McLaughlin. It is desirable, although perhaps 
not essential, that we explain the justification for affirming the summary 
judgment as to the theories of negligent manufacture and design, strict 
liability, breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of an 
express warranty. We conclude that genuine issues of material fact are present 
with respect to the theories of negligence in failing to remove the tires after 
their performance had been evaluated, and breach of an implied warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose. We reverse the summary judgment as to those 
theories only.

[¶14.]  In Wyoming, the elements of a negligence claim 
are: (1) a duty; (2) a violation of the duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) 
an injury. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1983), citing McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 
(Wyo. 1983). 
In a products liability action premised on negligence, which is alleged here, 
the plaintiff must prove that the manufacturer, seller, or distributor breached 
a duty of care owed to him and thereby proximately caused him to be injured. 1 
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 10:1 (1987).

[¶15.]  Wyoming also has adopted the doctrine of 
strict liability encompassed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). 
The rule there is stated:

"Special Liability of 
Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer

"(1) One who sells any 
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer 
or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to 
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

"(a) the seller is 
engaged in the business of selling such product, and 

"(b) it is expected to 
and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition 
in which it is sold.

"(2) The rule stated in 
Subsection (1) applies although

"(a) the seller has 
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, 
and

"(b) the user or consumer 
has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with 
the seller."

Ogle v. 
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986). See also Caterpillar Tractor Co. 
v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Prosser, 
The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L.J. 
1099 (1960); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment c; and Sims v. General 
Motors Corp., 751 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶16.]  While the duties that are owed by 
defendants under a negligence theory in a products liability suit may vary, all 
relate to the reasonableness of the defendants' conduct. A "manufacturer * * * 
is required to exercise reasonable care in the planning, designing, and 
manufacturing of a product in order to ensure that it is reasonably safe to 
use." Donahue, 674 P.2d  at 1280 (citing Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 
527 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1974)). The duty of the seller or 
distributor is simply to exercise that care which a reasonably prudent person 
would under the same circumstances. 1 American Law of Products Liability 3d § 
10:14.

[¶17.]  Thus, in pursuing a theory of negligent 
design or manufacture, the conduct of the maker or seller is in question. On the 
other hand, in pursuing a theory of strict liability, the focus is on the 
product itself. Beck, 593 P.2d 871; Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978), on remand 599 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.Civ. 
App. 1980). Pursuant to the theory of strict products liability, a seller or 
distributor can be liable for injury or loss resulting from a defective product 
that entered the stream of commerce in the absence of fault, while, under a 
negligence theory, fault on the part of the manufacturer, designer, or 
distributor is an element that must be established for an injured party to 
recover. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 
377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1963); Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 
485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974). Also see East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica 
Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 106 S. Ct. 2295, 90 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1986). Strict 
products liability is invoked, and is intended to apply, in those instances in 
which traditional theories of negligence are inadequate or where it is 
practicably impossible to prove negligence. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 98 (5th ed. 1984). Moreover, 
strict liability often is a more realistic theory of recovery than that of 
contract-warranty when a person suffers physical harm from a product that is 
dangerous if defective. See Yuba.

[¶18.]  Despite these several distinctions, the 
widely recognized rule is that:

"The requirement of 
showing a defect is one element common to every products liability case, whether 
it is brought on a theory of negligence, breach of an express or implied 
warranty, strict tort liability, or a combination of theories." W. Kimble & 
R. Lesher, Products Liability § 53 at 69 (1979).

The burden under 
this rule is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate a defect in fact, i.e., that the 
product failed. The record in this case does not establish any genuine issue of 
material fact as to product failure. It is silent with respect to any facts, 
introduced by McLaughlin or any other party, that indicate negligent manufacture 
or negligent design resulting in a failure of the tires or that justify an 
inference from any failure that would support strict liability. This case 
readily fits within the theory of Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1095 (Wyo. 1985), in which, citing Baptista v. St. 
Barnabas Medical Center, 109 N.J. Super. 217, 262 A.2d 902 (1970), aff'd 57 N.J. 
167, 270 A.2d 409 (1970), and referring to Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land 
Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983); Montez v. Ford Motor Company, 101 Cal. App. 3d 315, 161 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1980); and Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallis, 
336 Pa. Super. 
22, 485 A.2d 408 (1984), this court articulated the proposition that "a wrong 
product is not a defective product for purposes of strict 
liability."

[¶19.]  In the absence of some evidence to show a 
defect in these tires, the summary judgment in favor of Michelin on the alleged 
theories of negligence in manufacture or design and strict liability must be 
sustained. To the extent that those theories could be asserted against Cobre, 
they fail for the same reason. It is clear that the trial court was correct in 
granting summary judgment as to those theories of liability.

[¶20.]  We also sustain the summary judgment as 
to the alleged theories of breach of an express warranty and an implied warranty 
of merchantability. Section 34-21-230, W.S. 1977, articulates the requirements 
for express warranty. It provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) Express warranties 
by the seller are created as follows:

"(i) Any affirmation of 
fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and 
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the 
goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise; * * *."

Scrutiny of this 
record discloses neither an affirmation of fact nor a promise by Michelin to 
Cobre, Cobre to Bridger, or Michelin to Bridger sufficient to support a factual 
issue as to the existence of an express warranty as defined in the statute. At 
the very most, the record might support an inference that Michelin represented 
that the tires were good and had been used successfully on prior occasions. 
These statements fit within the definition found in § 34-21-230(b), W.S. 1977, 
that "a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation 
of the goods does not create a warranty." See Terry v. Moore, 448 P.2d 601 (Wyo. 1968). The entry of summary judgment on 
the claim of an express warranty must be sustained.

[¶21.]  The implied warranty of merchantability 
is incorporated in § 34-21-231, W.S. 1977, that provides, in pertinent 
part:

"(a) Unless excluded or 
modified (section 2-316 [§ 34-21-233]), a warranty that the goods shall be 
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant 
with respect to goods of that kind. * * *

"(b) Goods to be 
merchantable must be at least such as:

"(i) Pass without 
objection in the trade under the contract description; and

"(ii) In the case of 
fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; 
and

"(iii) Are fit for the 
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and

"(iv) Run, within the 
variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within 
each unit and among all units involved; and

"(v) Are adequately 
contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and

"(vi) Conform to the 
promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if 
any."

While it has 
been held in some jurisdictions that proof of a defect is not required in an 
action premised on express warranty, based upon a rationale that the mere 
failure of the promised performance is sufficient, 2 American Law Products 
Liability 3d, § 19:28, this court has held in Colorado Serum Company v. Arp, 504 P.2d 801 (Wyo. 1972), that proof of a defect is essential under both express and 
implied warranties. This is consistent with the general rule set forth above 
and, because the record does not establish a defect in these tires, the district 
court properly granted summary judgment as to the theory of implied warranty of 
merchantability as well as express warranty.

[¶22.]  The case of Valentine v. Ormsbee 
Exploration Corp., 665 P.2d 452 (Wyo. 1983), serves as an appropriate bridge to 
those theories upon which the court concludes a genuine issue of material fact 
does exist and that result in reversal. This court said in that 
case:

"`Proof of the specific 
defect in construction or design causing a mechanical malfunction is not an 
essential element in establishing breach of warranty. "When machinery 
`malfunctions,' it obviously lacks fitness regardless of the cause of the 
malfunction. Under the theory of warranty, the `sin' is the lack of fitness as 
evidenced by the malfunction itself rather than some specific dereliction by the 
manufacturer in constructing or designing the machinery." [Citations.]' 
MacDougall v. Ford Motor Company, 214 Pa. Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676, 679 (1969)." 
Valentine, 665 P.2d  at 462.

Valentine was a 
contract case that applied traditional concepts of an implied warranty of 
merchantability or an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 
without invoking tort theories of negligence and strict liability. Valentine 
establishes that the actual failure of a product serves to demonstrate a breach 
of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.

[¶23.]  In 1 M. Madden, Products Liability, § 
5.11 at 160 (2d ed. 1988), the following statement is found:

"The warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose may be breached even though the goods sold are not 
`defective' in the usual sense. Although many of the cases which rest recovery 
for the buyer on this warranty do in fact deal with products that are for one 
reason or another `defective,' such a condition is not required. Provided the 
conditions exist which give rise to the warranty, it may be breached when a 
product properly made and merchantable is simply the wrong one for the buyer's 
particular use."

The last 
sentence of this quotation aptly describes this case. While breach of the 
implied warranty of fitness can be established by proof that the product is 
defective in fact, with respect to this theory of liability, the product can be 
one that is defective as a matter of law. The implied warranty of fitness of a 
product for a particular purpose requires only an error in 
merchandising.

[¶24.]  Section 34-21-232, W.S. 1977, is the 
provision in Wyoming's Uniform Commercial Code that adopts 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and it 
provides:

"Where the seller at the 
time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the 
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or 
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or 
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit 
for such purpose."

The elements of 
a cause of action under this theory are: (1) knowledge on the part of the seller 
of the purposes to which the goods will be put; (2) some reason for the seller 
to know that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill and judgment; and (3) 
there must be actual reliance on the part of the buyer on the seller's skill and 
judgment. J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 9-9 at 358 
(1980).

[¶25.]  In cases involving an implied warranty of 
fitness, the proof of a "defect" assumes an entirely different character than 
the proof found under a negligence or strict liability context in which there 
must be proof of a defect in fact. Under the theory of implied warranty of 
fitness, if the product malfunctions when it is being used in the manner in 
which it was intended by the consumer, assuming that the intended use was 
communicated to the seller, there is a breach of implied warranty of fitness for 
a particular purpose that does permit recovery on behalf of the injured party. 
The failure to function satisfactorily coupled with fulfillment of the other 
statutory requirements of the cause of action found in § 34-21-232, W.S. 1977, 
that is, knowledge on the part of the seller and reliance on the part of the 
consumer, results in a "defect" as a matter of law sufficient to justify 
recovery to one who is injured as a result of that malfunction. That defect 
exists not in the product itself but in the conduct of the seller in furnishing 
a product that simply was the wrong one for the buyer's particular use. As 
McLaughlin correctly points out in his reply brief:

"`Under the [statutory] 
theory of [implied] warranty [of fitness for a particular purpose], the "sin" is 
the lack of fitness as evidenced by a malfunction itself rather than some 
specific dereliction by the manufacturer in constructing or designing the 
machinery.'" Valentine, 665 P.2d  at 462.

[¶26.]  The material facts in issue then are 
whether: (1) Bridger communicated to Michelin and Cobre the purpose for which 
the tires were purchased; (2) Michelin and Cobre knew Bridger was relying on the 
particular skill and judgment of Michelin or Cobre when purchasing a tire; and 
(3) the tires, in fact, malfunctioned. Examining the summary judgment materials 
in the light most favorable to McLaughlin, as we are required to do, there are 
genuine issues of material fact as to each of those questions. Cobre and 
Michelin both knew that Bridger intended to use the Michelin steel-belted radial 
tires on their scrapers. In January of 1983, Cobre's division manager, Kenneth 
Moe, went to the Bridger mine to discuss with Jack Erickson, McLaughlin's 
supervisor, a change in the type of tire used on scrapers at the mine site. We 
find the following colloquy in the deposition of Kenneth Moe, relating to a 
conversation that took place at the Bridger mine between Moe and 
Erickson:

"Q. Do you remember who 
first brought up the question of using radial tires at the mine?

"A. Jack [Erickson] 
indicated that they wanted to try them, that they had run radials on all their 
other equipment up to this point but had not tried it on the 
scrapers.

"Q. Did he specifically 
indicate that he wanted to try the radials on the scrapers as opposed to other 
types of equipment?

"A. They were already 
running radials on all the other equipment.

"Q. Did Jack Erickson 
request a particular brand of radials?

"A. He said 
radials.

"Q. And he didn't specify 
either a brand or a model number; is that correct?

"A. That is 
correct.

* * * * * *

"Q. Other than Jack 
Erickson's request for the use of radial tires on scrapers, do you remember any 
other specifics of your conversation with him at that time?

"A. Other than they 
weren't satisfied with the performance that the fabric tires were giving at that 
time, was the only other thing, and that was one of the reasons they wanted to 
try the radials."

[¶27.]  Concerning knowledge of Bridger's 
intended use, Cobre admits in its brief that discussions took place between 
Cobre and Bridger regarding the use of steel-belted radials on the scraper. 
Furthermore, Cobre indicates in its brief that Moe contacted Michelin's district 
earth mover salesman, Gary Workman, and relayed to him the information that 
Cobre had received from Bridger. As to the particular scraper upon which the 
Michelin tires would be installed, Moe said, in his deposition:

"Q. Did you, or to your 
knowledge any other employees at Cobre Tire, including but not limited to Larry 
Farwell, make a determination before the McLaughlin accident as to which 631-D 
scraper to put the Michelin tires on and which 631-D scraper to put the 
Bridgestone tires on?

"A. Under its maintenance 
procedures there, Bridger supplies us with an MR, maintenance request, when a 
machine is ready for tires. In this case I imagine that this machine [Scraper 
No. 699] was the one that was ready for the first tires."

Evidence does 
exist from which a jury could infer that Cobre and Michelin both knew, by virtue 
of information communicated from Bridger, the particular use to which these 
tires would be put.

[¶28.]  It also is possible to infer, favorably 
to McLaughlin, that Bridger relied upon Michelin's and Cobre's skill and 
judgment in selecting the particular tires to use. The evidence shows that 
Bridger merely indicated it wanted to try steel-belted radials on the scrapers. 
It did not indicate a brand or model of tires. Bridger relied on the expertise 
and knowledge of Cobre and Michelin to decide which tires would be appropriate 
for use on the scraper. It was a joint decision by Cobre and Michelin to provide 
and install the particular Michelin tires what were on scraper No. 699 when 
McLaughlin was injured. Bridger Coal, in reliance upon the expertise of Michelin 
and Cobre, acquiesced in the installation of these tires. For example, Cobre 
says in its brief:

"* * * Cobre's division 
manager, Kenneth Moe, consulted Gary Workman, the Michelin district earth mover 
sales manager who was familiar with soil conditions encountered by scrapers at 
the mine. Workman recommended using Michelin XRDNA[**] steel belted radials and 
Moe followed his recommendation."

Workman 
testified, in his deposition, that his knowledge of the conditions of the mine 
site was based on various on-site inspections and also upon inspection of used 
bias ply tires previously installed on the scrapers for the installation of the 
Michelin tires.

[¶29.]  With respect to malfunction, the record 
is replete with information tending to demonstrate that the tires, at the very 
least, functioned in a manner entirely different from other tires used on the 
scraper. Witnesses for both sides testified as to an increase in the bouncing 
and vibration to which the scraper was subjected when equipped with the Michelin 
tires. These witnesses do disagree as to the ultimate effect of the vibrations 
and bouncing on the scraper, but there is, at least, evidence of a change in the 
operational characteristics of the scraper with Michelin tires. The occurrence 
of the accident itself is some evidence that could support an inference by the 
finder of fact that these tires malfunctioned. We also note the following in the 
testimony of Dale Bussman, an expert selected by McLaughlin, with respect to 
whether the tires were fit for the particular purpose intended by 
Bridger:

"Q. So your opinion, 
apparently, is not going to be that the tire was defectively designed or 
manufactured?

"A. That's 
correct.

* * * * * *

"A. Yes, you would have 
vibration regardless of the type of tire. It's just that in this particular case we 
had a defective tire that was on this machine and it gave excessive vibration 
which resulted in a loss of control.

"Q. Are you changing your 
testimony? You told me you didn't have an opinion as to the tires being 
defectively manufactured or designed. Are you now telling me that there's a 
defect in the manufacture or design?

"A. No, what I'm saying is that these particular 
tires were - is was the wrong application for the tire.

"Q. What you're saying is 
it's the wrong choice of tire for this application?

"A. Yes.

"Q. But the design itself 
is not subject to your criticism, it's just what they did with this 
tire?

"A. Yes. Now, relative to 
the question of whether it was a defective manufacture, I mean, maybe - and I 
don't know this, and it really doesn't matter, because we know the tire gave the 
excessive vibration in this particular case - perhaps it was defectively 
manufactured, okay, I don't know that. And I really don't care. All I know is 
that the tire gave excessive vibration which resulted in the loss of control." 
(emphasis added)

[¶30.]  We conclude that this record encompasses 
evidence with respect to every element of a claim for breach of the implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, which structures genuine issues of 
material fact. In the provisions that are incorporated in Wyoming's Uniform 
Commercial Code, particularly in §§ 34-21-232, 34-21-235, and 34-21-294(b), W.S. 
1977, our legislature adopted a remedy which applies in McLaughlin's situation. 
In light of the information found in the summary judgment materials in the 
record in this case, this remedy clearly fits the facts. There are genuine 
issues as to these facts, and summary judgment should not have been granted as 
to this theory of recovery.

[¶31.]  We also are satisfied that there do exist 
genuine issues of material fact with respect to the question of negligent 
failure to remove the tires. Michelin and Cobre assert, as a preliminary matter, 
that this theory should not be considered by this court because McLaughlin 
failed to raise it before the trial court. It is true that this court will not 
consider questions raised for the first time on appeal, Valentine, 665 P.2d  at 
462, but scrutiny of this record discloses that McLaughlin presented the theory 
of negligent failure to remove the tires to the trial court.

[¶32.]  Negligence cases usually involve mixed 
questions of law and fact concerning the existence of a duty, that is the 
standard of care required of a reasonable person, and proximate cause, and such 
cases ordinarily are not susceptible to summary adjudication. Kobielusz v. 
Wilson, 701 P.2d 559 (Wyo. 1985) (citing Keller v. Anderson, 554 P.2d 1253 (Wyo. 1976)). See also O'Donnell v. City of 
Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985). The 
allegation by McLaughlin that Michelin and Cobre were negligent in failing to 
remove the tires presents only a simple claim of negligence, as opposed to a 
products liability claim. The question is whether it was reasonable for Michelin 
and Cobre to fail to remove the tires in light of the information it had about 
their unsatisfactory performance.

[¶33.]  Under this theory of recovery, it would 
be material whether Michelin and Cobre knew of McLaughlin's complaints and 
Bridger's dissatisfaction with these tires. The complaints about the poor 
operational characteristics of the tires spanned a period of twenty-six days, 
and those complaints could persuade a trier of fact that a reasonable person 
would have removed the tires before McLaughlin's injury. That fact finder might 
also conclude that the duty was violated by the failure of Michelin and Cobre to 
remove the tires prior to McLaughlin's injury. McLaughlin certainly could argue 
that a reasonably prudent person, confronted with complaints such as these, 
would have removed the tires from the scraper and that the failure to do so 
constituted a violation of these defendants' duty to act as a reasonably prudent 
person would under the circumstances. A genuine issue of material fact is 
structured by the record that should have been presented to a jury for 
determination in this instance. We, therefore, conclude that the district court 
improperly granted the summary judgment on that theory of negligence, and the 
case also must be reversed for that reason.

[¶34.]  The summary judgment granted by the 
district court is affirmed with respect to McLaughlin's theories of recovery 
founded in negligence in manufacture or design of these tires, strict products 
liability in tort with respect to these tires, and breach of an express warranty 
or an implied warranty of merchantability. The failure of McLaughlin to produce 
evidence of an actual defect prevents recovery under those theories as a matter 
of law. With respect to the theories of negligence for failing to remove the 
tires and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, we do find 
genuine issues of material fact in the record that justify presentation to a 
jury. The case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance 
with the opinion of the court.

URBIGKIT, J., filed a specially 
concurring and dissenting opinion.

URBIGKIT, Justice, specially 
concurring and dissenting.

I. STATUS OF CASE ON 
APPEAL

[¶35.]  Following adverse summary judgment on a 
scraper driver's lawsuit claiming serious physical injuries caused by improperly 
performing equipment tires, this court considers his dismissed claims asserting 
liability for:

1. negligent manufacture 
and design of the tire by the manufacturer (Michelin);1 

2(a). strict liability 
for injury producing performance of a faulty product (Michelin);

2(b). strict liability 
for injury producing performance of a faulty product (dealer/supplier Cobre 
Tire);

3(a). express warranty of 
the product (Michelin);

3(b). express warranty of 
the product (Cobre Tire);

4(a). implied warranty 
violation of fitness for purpose intended (Michelin);

4(b). implied warranty 
violation of fitness for purpose intended (Cobre Tire);

5(a). failure to warn 
(Michelin);

5(b). failure to warn 
(Cobre Tire);

6(a). negligent delayed 
removal (Michelin); and

6(b). negligent delayed 
removal (Cobre Tire).

[¶36.]  The trial court granted summary judgment 
on all eleven claims. The majority affirms the summary judgment injury claim 
denials resulting from the faulty tires for the complaints of negligent 
manufacture and design of Michelin Tire Corporation (Michelin); strict liability 
- Michelin and Cobre Tire; implied warranty of merchantability - Michelin and 
Cobre Tire; and express warranty - Michelin and Cobre Tire and then reverses the 
trial court on implied warranty of fitness for the purpose intended as to both 
the manufacturer and dealer and negligence in delayed removal as to both 
manufacturer and dealer. I concur in reversal of the summary judgment decision 
of the trial court on implied warranty of fitness for the purpose intended and 
negligence in delayed removal. I concur also that facts were lacking as 
sufficient to deny summary judgment for express warranty 
application.

II. ISSUE OF 
DISSENT

[¶37.]  This leaves for my disagreement and 
dissent summary judgment absolution of claims of negligent manufacture and 
design by Michelin and strict liability for furnishing a faulty product - 
Michelin and Cobre Tire.2 

[¶38.]  Within this majority's denial and my 
dissent on issues of negligent manufacture and design and strict liability are 
presented the most fundamental concepts of products liability - negligence, 
strict liability and warranty. It is the reasoning why the majority chooses to 
insulate liability and I select responsibility for bad tires and consequent 
injury in that analysis of theory and concepts of product liability that 
presents our serious differences.

III. RELEVANT FACTS IN 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT REVIEW

[¶39.]  Within this summary judgment appeal, a 
relatively simple course of events is presented; although at trial, the entire 
scenario would likely be factually contested. Management for Bridger Coal 
Company (Bridger), a strip mining coal producer, wondered whether radial tires 
might provide benefit, in part to provide a softer ride for operator and 
equipment, for usage on its large earth mover scrapers, in this case a 
Caterpillar 631D, model unit number 699. Fred McLaughlin, appellant, was the 
normal operator for that unit. Cobre Tire was a tire supplier under contract to 
Bridger on an as needed tire purchase arrangement. Cobre Tire and Bridger first 
discussed the experimentation with radial tires and Cobre Tire then went to 
Michelin to see what product they might have which could be applied to the strip 
mine usage at the Bridger facility. As a result, Michelin tires were provided 
for testing and experimentation for front wheel installation on the Caterpillar 
scraper, as well as another brand of radial tires for other equipment. No 
history of prior use of this brand of Michelin tires on equipment of this type 
and heavy character of strip mining operation existed. It was recognized to be 
an experiment with the tires.

[¶40.]  The tires unquestionably did not perform 
satisfactorily following initial installation and attempts to modify performance 
in a number of ways also failed. In general application, as later indicated in 
the resulting accident and injury, it appeared that the tires lacked sidewall 
stability for the character of usage and ballooned and contracted causing 
forceful vibration and shaking of the equipment during hauling operations. On a 
particularly rough dirt pick up pass, the bouncing and ballooning of the tires 
catapulted appellant, like a rider on a Brahma bull, into the framework and 
glass of the scraper cab resulting in his complex permanent injuries, which 
became the subject of this physical injury lawsuit.

[¶41.]  With factual record including evidence of 
continued notice of disclosed failure of tire performance given to both Cobre 
Tire and Michelin, we are called to test the summary judgment decision that a 
products liability, negligence or warranty claim of the liability of Michelin 
and Cobre Tire to appellant cannot be stated when it is alleged and factually 
supported by evidence that:

1. The purpose for which 
the tires were to be used were known to Michelin and Cobre Tire in advance of 
purchase;

2. The character of the 
work and requirement for tire usage was also known to Cobre Tire and Michelin 
for on-the-job experimental testing without previous use on this kind of 
equipment and operation in the anticipation that if tested favorably, additional 
tires of like character could be marketed to the coal company;

3. The experiment 
continued too long and, in failure of the tires to perform properly, the injury 
to appellant resulted;

4. The tires were not 
suitable for the purpose intended and were faulty when used in that 
circumstance; and 

5. Rather than a 
manufacturing defect encompassing abnormal production characteristics, the 
"defect" was a design result from the performance characteristic of the tires 
which had been untested for use for which they were sold and lacked a 
performance characteristic sufficient to avoid danger and ultimate injury to 
users of the product.

It is within 
this factual framework which is determined for summary judgment status review 
that the majority denies as a matter of law that negligence in design can be 
applied, that strict liability for product causing injury is inapplicable, and 
that the implied warranty of merchantability cannot be impressed.

IV. MAJORITY 
DECISION

[¶42.]  Shorn of facade and covering, the basis 
of the majority's decision is simplistic in separate application to each of the 
denied recovery theories. It is the thesis that if the tires would have 
performed properly somewhere in a different usage, they are without defect in 
this case, even though completely unsuitable here. Defect is defined as a 
general suitability for some use, although completely unsuitable for the purpose 
for which they were actually sold in the case where the injury resulted. Defect, 
the majority apparently opines, requires a denial of any usability standard as a 
mistake in manufacture and ignores either design defects or defects for the 
purpose for which the product was sold. The illogic in this posture and the 
inconclusiveness of its application to cause and effect in injury is absolutely 
astounding. This is apparent in reversal of summary judgment denial of the claim 
of liability for breach of warranty of fitness for the purpose intended while 
affirming dismissal on the issue of defect for strict liability and negligence. 
The observed defect in warranty is consequently excluded as a basis for 
liability as a defect for tort.

[¶43.]  No one is called to question within this 
record that these tires did create danger even though used for the purpose for 
which they were sold. Like dynamite, danger does not exist unless the percussion 
cap is affixed. Unfortunately, danger was created by the sale of the tires for 
use on equipment for which appropriate testing had not been previously made. A 
comparison would be if extra-heavy loaded cartridges designed for special 
weapons were sold to an owner of a Saturday-night special. A properly designed 
product for a very confined use might become extremely dangerous if supplied to 
and sold by the local dealer for use in the inappropriate handgun. Tragic 
results might realistically occur, although the buyer would never be aware that 
the cartridge he purchased had a performance characteristic of great danger for 
his usage.

V. CONFLICTING THESIS OF 
DISSENT

[¶44.]  The improvidence of majority non sequitur 
is in denial that a defect in the Michelin tires occurred with attempted use as 
the specific purpose for which they were acquired. I cannot agree in any concept 
that a wrong product is not a defective product for the purpose of strict 
liability or for negligence in design or manufacture. It is recognized that a 
similar non sequitur was stated by this court in Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089 
(Wyo. 1985) but, as we shall see, the cases cited in support of that proposition 
do not fit the broad statement made here where the tires were sold for a defined 
purpose and, when furnished to the buyer, failed in required performance even 
when regularly used. The fact that a submarine may be properly designed for 
usage in water does not mean that it is without defect for substitution as a 
tank. Most likely, the converse would also be unworkable and dangerous to the 
user. Consequently, the strange conception of the majority only provides half of 
the equation for logical analysis. The denied second half of the equation is 
merchandising for an intended purpose for which use of the product was dangerous 
because of lack of prior testing or improvidence of design.

[¶45.]  Not dissimilar in concept is the infusion 
in litigation recently resulting from major injuries in the use of all-terrain 
vehicles - the ATV catastrophe of disabling injuries. See Antley v. Yamaha Motor 
Corp., U.S.A., 539 So. 2d 696 
(La. App. 
1989). Use of the ATV on level surfaces and with casual speeds in the character 
of chasing golf balls on grassy courses is fairly safe to the user. The 
vehicles, however, are sold for all terrain and to go at significant speeds. It 
is in the expected use and anticipated and designated speeds that the pestilence 
of tens of thousands of serious injuries have pervaded products liability 
litigation. The product is both defective and dangerous in anticipated use, 
although the foreign manufacturer accurately assures the buyer that each unit 
will operate properly to its full capacity at high speed.

[¶46.]  The destroyed straw man of the absence of 
defect is similarly employed fallaciously by the majority to deny statement of a 
claim for recovery on the thesis of both negligence and implied warranty of 
merchantability. Even though purchase for an intended and committed use directly 
applies to warranty for fitness for the purpose intended, wherein the majority 
agrees with me in application of the concept of the sale for a specific use, 
that does not extricate the availability of warranty of merchantability since it 
is within the parameters of that commercial transaction that merchantability is 
defined. There may be purposes for which asbestos may still be merchantable, but 
certainly not as school insulation. Defect for intended use denies the 
explication of general merchantability when that use is known in advance. Is a 
special order product defective if it does not perform? Is a mouse trap 
defective when sold to catch pack rats which are known to be resistent to 
anything but a .22 shot or a .410 blast? Is the fluid pump defective when it 
will suitably work with crude oil but not for molasses for which it had been 
sold? In the nature of logic, every product has some useful function, albeit as 
a doorstop, and every product has uses for which it is inappropriate, like 
gasoline from a can used to start a fireplace fire. It may work, but it may burn 
more than the wood in the fireplace.

VI. WYOMING'S THEORETICAL DEPARTURE BY BUCKLEY V. BELL

[¶47.]  The starting point for analysis requires 
a revisit to Buckley, 703 P.2d 1089 from which this majority extrudes its 
present conclusion that defectiveness is confined to deviation in character and 
not failure in performance in assigned purpose. I would reject Buckley as 
authority for this decision on five bases. First, that three-to-two decision 
lacks logic in applied analysis in any regard. Second, the decision in fact can 
be distinguished in ratio decidendi and the wrong-product concept was only 
dictum in broad analysis. Third, the precedent cited in Buckley to support the 
conclusion will not support the conclusion made in factual analysis. Fourth, 
Wyoming's more 
recent cases in first adopting strict liability in essence supercede Buckley. 
Finally, the special order status of this present case is fundamental in 
differentiating analysis.

[¶48.]  In Buckley, 703 P.2d  at 1090, the issue 
stated by the court was "whether the foreseeability of negligent conduct by a 
plaintiff occurring subsequent to the negligent acts of a defendant is a 
question of law or a question of fact." That portion of the case addressed 
proximate cause. Buyer had ordered gas for his gas motor hay baler and was 
furnished diesel fuel. In purging the diesel fuel from the machine after 
removal, the engine backfired, ignited available gas on the ground and burned up 
the baler. The second issue was contention that the trial court erroneously 
concluded that diesel fuel could not be a defective product under Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). The opinion considered that the restatement had 
not been adopted and the court was foreclosed from adoption because as there 
stated:

First, our conclusion 
that the district court accurately resolved the causation factor prevents any 
application of the concept of strict liability. Second, even in view of the 
appellant's argument that if an adulterated product is to be considered 
defective and lead to liability when unreasonably dangerous then a wrong product 
is one which should be considered as totally adulterated for purposes of 
determining whether it is defective, the authorities we have discovered seem to 
say that a wrong product is not a defective product for purposes of strict 
liability. Baptista v. St. Barnabas Medical Center, 109 N.J. Super. 217, 262 A.2d 902 (1970), affirmed 57 N.J. 167, 270 A.2d 409 (1970). See Berkeley Pump 
Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983); Montez v. 
Ford Motor Company,101 Cal. App. 3d 315, 161 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1980); and Dambacher 
by Dambacher v. Mallis, [336] Pa.Super. [22], 485 A.2d 408 (1984). Finally, it 
does not seem that a strict products liability theory is recognized as an 
appropriate vehicle for recovery of an economic loss, which is the only injury 
in this instance in light of the resolution of the causation factor.Hart 
Engineering Company v. FMC Corporation, 593 F. Supp. 1471 (D.R.I. 1984). 
Singularly or collectively these concepts foreclose any reliance upon the 
doctrine of strict liability as articulated in Restatement (Second) of Tort, § 
402(A), in this case.

Buckley, 703 P.2d  at 1094-95.

[¶49.]  Consequently, the trial court resolution 
came on independent cause proximately causing the damage and failure of proof of 
defective product. The decision in first discussing proximate cause and the 
reasoning and logic employed has no application here. Cf. England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 1986) (Urbigkit, J., 
dissenting). A fair analysis of the case is found in Note, Torts - Should a 
Plaintiff's Intervening Act Be An Absolute Defense Under Comparative Negligence? 
Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089 (Wyo. 1985), XXILand & Water L.Rev. 591 (1986). It is 
the second two-paragraph disposition of the defective product definition under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 402A that Buckley presents relevance 
here. In Buckley, the two dissents analyzed the proximate cause concept to have 
been improperly applied and did not pursue the gratuitous address in the opinion 
regarding the nature of defect and question of economic damage, which peripheral 
problem now also comes to this court in yet another appeal. Continental 
Insurance Company v. Page Engineering, No. 87-295 (Wyo. 1989), now pending 
in this court.

[¶50.]  There are four cases upon which the 
Wyoming law is 
now hung as derived from precedential inclusion in Buckley. In Baptista v. St. 
Barnabas Medical Center, 109 N.J. Super. 217, 262 A.2d 902, aff'd 57 N.J. 167, 
270 A.2d 409 (1970), a blood transfusion operation may have caused the death. Improper 
cross-matching may have caused the 
blood problem. On the record, the blood was wholesome and free from internal 
defects and the hospital followed recognized standard practices and testing. The 
appellate court refused to adopt a rule that would

make a hospital an 
insurer of what are in essence medical services and opinions, * * *. The 
obligation of hospitals in cross-matching and typing blood in cases of blood 
transfusions should continue to be as it is now, grounded and expressed in a 
duty to exercise reasonable competence and care.

Id. 262 A.2d  at 907. The 
factual difference between the reasoning employed and the decision made and any 
principle that defectiveness is not a wrong product is self-evident. The area of 
inquiry was reasonable effort to determine the kind of blood required and 
furnished.

[¶51.]  Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land 
Co., 279 Ark. 
384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983) involved capacity designated irrigation water pumps. 
Performance was not achieved in quantity produced. The user was sued by the 
dealer for purchase price. The user counterclaimed for damages resulting from 
insufficient production and the dealer third-partied in the manufacturer whose 
performance curve statistics had been used to complete the sale. User recovered 
about $680,000 and the dealer was indemnified by the manufacturer and also 
awarded litigative costs. The dealer was given judgment for pump purchase price. 
On appeal, the manufacturer argued that strict liability was not applicable in 
contention: (1) where the product, in spite of any defective condition, does not 
constitute an unreasonable danger to person or property, or (2) in the absence 
of injury to persons, such defect causes purely economic loss. 

[¶52.]  That appellate court found "no evidence 
that the defectiveness of Berkeley's pumps rendered them dangerous - 
inadequate and dysfunctional, to be sure, but not dangerous." Berkeley Pump Co., 
653 S.W.2d  at 132. That decision also has no relevance to the present review 
since the issue considered was unreasonable dangerousness as found not to be 
presented. It was determined on appeal that the pumps were "not dangerous." 
Id. 653 S.W.2d  
at 132. Furthermore, the additional decision of breach of warranty of fitness 
for purpose intended requiring knowledge by the supplier/manufacturer brought 
that case into accord with all positions now advanced by this 
dissent.

[¶53.]  The third case cited is from California, Montez v. 
Ford Motor Co., 101 Cal. App. 3d 315, 161 Cal. Rptr. 578, 579 (1980), where that 
court first said:

A plaintiff in an action 
for personal injuries in a products liability case is not required to elect 
whether to proceed on a theory of strict liability in tort or on a theory of 
negligence where the instructions on the two theories will not be confusing to 
the jury. (Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 379, 387, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769, 482 P.2d 681.) At issue in this appeal is whether the court's 
rejection of plaintiff's negligence instructions and its decision to instruct 
the jury solely on strict liability was prejudicial error.

[¶54.]  Factually, the injury resulted from 
missing a curve in driving at perhaps a 59 mile per hour speed where safe 
operation extended only from 17 to 27 miles per hour and "[p]laintiff's case was 
limited to a manufacturing defect. She did not rely on either a defect in design 
or the failure to warn." Montez, 161 Cal. Rptr.  at 582. An adverse jury verdict was 
sustained, although that appellate court said a definitional instruction for 
defect should have been given but the jury was not confused in its absence since 
"the jury was capable of determining whether a defect in fact existed based upon 
the evidence. Their conclusion that one did not exist is amply supported by the 
record." Id. 
at 583. That case is not relevant for the Buckley citation.

[¶55.]  The last case cited, Dambacher By 
Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa. Super. 22, 485 A.2d 408 (1984), appeal 
dismissed 508 Pa. 643, 500 A.2d 428 (1985), is 
one of a line of Pennsylvania cases providing a comprehensive 
analysis of products liability. Dambacher was a case which interestingly 
involved a radial tire. The simple issue, but very comprehensively pursued, was 
"that the tire was defective because it was not embossed with a warning not to 
mix it with other non-radial tires, and that the accident occurred because the 
tire was mixed with non-radial tires." Id. 485 A.2d  at 411. The decision rested on 
the qualification of expert witnesses which had been used for the successful 
plaintiff's verdict and further analysis considered the proper instruction for 
retrial. The technical question was what happens when a radial tire is mixed 
with non-radial tires on a passenger vehicle as a "mixed fitment." Id. at 414. The appellate 
court in Dambacher first denied the dealer's motion for judgment not 
withstanding the verdict and reversed for retrial instead. That court then 
determined that qualified expert testimony was required that the mixed fitment 
was a proximate cause of the accident.

Suppose, for example, 
that A sells a bottled drink to B, and B pours the drink into a glass filled 
with ice-cubes, becomes ill, and sues A for selling a product defective because 
the bottle's label failed to include a warning not to mix the drink with 
ice-cubes. B will not make out a case for the jury unless he proves that mixing 
ice-cubes with the drink did in fact make him ill. If the mixing did not make B 
ill, there was no need to warn against the mixing, and therefore no defect in 
the bottle's label. Assuming, however, that appellees are able to present 
competent evidence of proximate cause at a new trial, that is, that they do 
offer the testimony of qualified experts, the issue will then arise whether 
appellant's radial tire was defective because it was not embossed with a warning 
not to mix it with non-radial tires. In that event, what will be the trial 
court's responsibility?

Id. at 420.

[¶56.]  Dambacher was an inadequate warning case 
as a concept not presented here, but that court clearly recognized in opinion 
text that intended use was a direct constituent of the zone of responsibility 
within strict liability concepts.

In a products liability 
case, such as this case, in contrast, the defendant - the manufacturer or 
supplier of the product - is not an "insurer" but "effectively the guarantor of 
his product's safety." Salvador v. Atlantic 
Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 32, 319 A.2d 903, 907 (1974). The 
plaintiff must therefore prove that the product that caused his injury was 
defective, or "unsafe for its intended use." Id. If the defendant were the insurer of its 
product, liability would follow upon a finding that the plaintiff was injured 
while using the product: the fact that injury occurred would lead to the 
conclusion that the product was unsafe in some way. But the jury is not to find 
liability when the product is unsafe in some way; liability may be imposed only 
on proof that the product lacked an element necessary to make it safe for its intended use. * * *

* * * * * *

Finally, in a negligence 
case the plaintiff must prove, not only that the product was defective and that 
the defect caused his injury, but in addition, that in manufacturing or 
supplying the product the defendant failed to exercise due care.

Id. at 424 (emphasis in 
original).

[¶57.]  That court then announced as part of the 
proposed instruction:

"This means that you must 
decide whether, as the plaintiffs contend, the radial tire supplied by the 
defendant was unsafe for its intended use because it lacked a warning that it 
should not be mixed with non-radial tires. If you find that because it lacked 
such a warning, the tire was unsafe for its intended use, then you should find 
it defective."

Id. at 430.

[¶58.]  Consequently, Dambacher stands for the 
proposition that defectiveness can be established by being unsafe for its 
intended use and has nothing to do with wrong product absolution which would 
have been directly contrary to its remand result. See also Justice Wieand's 
concurring and dissenting opinion where he stated:

A product may also be 
deemed defective even though it comports in all respects to its intended design. 
It may be defective because of a defect in the design of the product. In 
Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., supra [480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978)], the 
Supreme Court held that a supplier must provide a product "which is designed to 
make it safe for the intended use. Under this standard, the jury may find a 
defect where the product left the supplier's control lacking any element 
necessary to make it safe for its intended use or possessing any feature that 
renders it unsafe for its intended use."

Id. at 433-34.

[¶59.]  This reference brings into focus the 
course of earlier Pennsylvania cases including Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 
Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978) and Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter 
Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). Those cases recognized that defect was 
not limited to a flaw, fault or blemish in manufacture or fabrication, but 
rather addressed status of "danger" in usage. The court in Azzarello, 391 A.2d  
at 1026 further said that "we must look to whether the product is safe for its 
intended use." Intended use is consequently intrinsic in consideration of 
dangerousness and this becomes particularly pertinent as here when we have a 
special order product supplied for a narrowly confined, known, explicit use. See 
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.L.J. 825, 830 
(1973), where Professor Wade stated:

The "something wrong" may 
have come about quite unintentionally because of a miscarriage in the 
manufacturing process, so that the product was not what it was intended to be; 
it may, on the other hand, have come about, even though the product was exactly 
as it was intended to

 

be, because of a 
poor design or the failure to attach a warning or suitable 
instructions.

The author 
further recognized:

[I]t is only when 
something has gone wrong with the manufacturing process and the product is not 
in the condition in which it was intended to be that there is any significant 
difference. In the case of the improper design which makes the product 
dangerous, whatever is enough to show that it is so dangerous that strict 
liability should apply * * * will also be enough to show negligence on the part 
of the manufacturer. Even if the manufacturer is not aware of the danger created 
by the bad design, he is negligent in not learning of it.

Id. at 836-37 (footnote 
omitted).

[¶60.]  The more recent history of Buckley lends 
no strength to its defectiveness definition credibility. Strict liability has 
since been adopted in Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986). The only 
reference to Buckley in that case was:

First, they 
[manufacturer] argue that strict liability in tort is not available as a cause 
of action in Wyoming since this court has declined to adopt 
the doctrine on several occasions. See e.g., Buckley v. Bell, Wyo., 703 P.2d 1089 (1985).

Ogle, 716 P.2d  
at 341. In Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., 735 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1987), the case was 
cited to a proximate cause rule. In a dissent in Mostert v. CBL & 
Associates, 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987), it was cited for an intervening 
cause discussion. In this court's last case, Sims v. General Motors Corp., 751 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988), which was the second case to apply strict liability, no 
Buckley citation was included at all. Furthermore, no other state has found 
cause to cite the opinion as authority.3

VII. EVIDENCE OF 
DEFECTIVENESS

[¶61.]  A product is designed for specific uses, 
and if it is properly made but unsuitable for its intended use, its design is 
faulty. In Smith v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 70 Or. App. 30, 687 P.2d 1128, 1129 
(1984), the court observed:

If a product is 
unsuitable for its intended use, and as a result is unreasonably dangerous, then 
the correct inquiry is whether there is a manufacturing or design defect, not 
whether the manufacturer should have warned of the defect.

This statement 
by the Oregon 
court is consistent with the general standard defining a product to be defective 
when it fails to perform reasonably and safely the function for which it was 
intended. Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration Corp., 665 P.2d 452, 462 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶62.]  It is not necessary to prove a specific 
defect, and while proof of the failure or malfunction of an article standing 
alone is insufficient to prove that a product was defective, it is a strong 
circumstance to consider along with the remaining facts. Valentine, 665 P.2d  at 
462. In Valentine, 665 P.2d  at 462, we quoted with approval the rule enunciated 
in Tweedy v. Wright Ford Sales, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d 570, 2 Ill.Dec. 282, 357 N.E.2d 449, 452 (1976):

"A prima facie case that 
a product was defective and that the defect existed when it left the 
manufacturer's control is made by proof that in the absence of abnormal use or 
reasonable secondary causes the product failed `to perform in the manner 
reasonably to be expected in light of [its] nature and intended 
function.'"

See also Sims, 
751 P.2d 357. To similar effect is the language found at 1 American Law of 
Products Liability 3d § 3:5 at 13 (1987):

For a product to be found 
defective in a products liability action, it is not always necessary that there 
be proof of a specific, particular underlying defect. If the plaintiff has no 
evidence of a specific defect in the design or manufacture of the product, the 
plaintiff may offer evidence of its malfunction as circumstantial proof of the 
product's defect; * * *. [Footnotes omitted.]

In Stewart v. BF 
Goodrich Co., 153 Ill. App.3d 1078, 107 Ill.Dec. 40, 506 N.E.2d 783, 785, appeal denied 116 Ill. 2d 576, 113 Ill.Dec. 318, 515 N.E.2d 127 (1987), 
the court said that "[f]or circumstantial evidence to make out a prima facie 
case, it must tend to negate other reasonable causes, or there must be an expert 
opinion that the product was defective." (Emphasis in original.) It has also 
been held that "[t]estimony of the user or operator of the product as to the 
circumstances of the event is sufficient to establish malfunction." Farmer v. 
International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 553 P.2d 1306, 1312 (1976). See 
Clarke v. Brockway Motor Trucks, 372 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D.Pa. 1974) and Greco v. 
Bucciconi Engineering Co. v. Wean Engineering Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D.Pa. 
1967), aff'd 407 F.2d 87 (3rd Cir. 1969). In Farmer, 553 P.2d  at 1312, the Idaho 
Supreme Court said:

A distinction need not be 
drawn between a "defect" and a "malfunction." Proof of malfunction is 
circumstantial evidence of a defect in a product since a product will not 
ordinarily malfunction within the reasonable contemplation of a consumer in the 
absence of a defect.

VIII. PRESENT EVIDENCE OF 
DEFECT

[¶63.]  In accord with the general authorities, I 
follow the foregoing syllogism that for a product sold for an intended function 
or performance purpose, defect is failure in that performance. In support of 
their motions for summary judgment, Michelin submitted and Cobre Tire relied on 
the affidavit of expert witness Charles Sons, a tire expert who had worked for 
Caterpillar Tractor Company for over 25 years. In his affidavit, Mr. Sons 
stated:

After having examined the 
tires involved in this accident, and having witnessed the various tests 
performed at the scene of the accident and also having examined the Largent 
photographs depicting the scene of the accident, I am of the opinion that there 
was no defect in either design or manufacture of the Michelin tires installed 
upon unit 699 upon which Mr. McLaughlin was injured.

In addition, 
Michelin submitted excerpts from the deposition of James Lipari, a Bridger 
employee, indicating appellant's scraper had hit a rock which precipitated the 
bouncing resulting in the accident. Also, Michelin submitted an excerpt from the 
deposition of appellant's expert, Dale Bussman, in which Bussman indicated that 
he could not identify a specific design or manufacturing defect.

[¶64.]  In opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment, appellant submitted depositions of employees and supervisory personnel 
of Bridger and depositions of representatives of Michelin and Cobre Tire, all 
stating that immediately upon replacing the prior bias tires with the Michelin 
radial tires on scraper 699, problems with performance of the tires were 
experienced and reported. The evidence indicated that no similar complaints were 
reported or problems observed as to the Bridgestone radial tires 
contemporaneously installed on scraper 696. Appellant, in his deposition, 
testified that he immediately noticed a difference in the operation of the 
scraper upon installation of the Michelin tires on March 10, 1983 and that he 
reported the problem to his supervisor at the first opportunity. Appellant 
stated that the new tires caused the machine to vibrate, bounce, and "[t]he 
whole thing would shake."

[¶65.]  The depositions of other Bridger 
employees and supervisors were of similar effect. They indicated that all the 
operators who drove scraper 699 complained about the bounce and vibration after 
installation of the Michelin tires. James Lipari testified that six operators 
had complained of "enhanced bouncing" for weeks prior to the accident. Cobre 
Tire's on-site tire man, Larry Farwell, testified that he received complaints 
about the tires' performance within a few days of their installation and he 
relayed the information to his supervisor, Kenneth Moe, and to Gary Workman of 
Michelin in Salt Lake 
City. Workman recommended varying the tire air pressure, 
which was done with no noticeable curative effect. Farwell testified that he 
rode in the scraper with appellant on March 30 and found the ride to be bumpy, 
with the vibration problem continuing. Farwell reported this information to 
Workman who suggested removing the tires from scraper 699 and trying them on 
another machine. On April 4, 1983, the day before the accident, Moe, Cobre 
Tire's division manager, instructed Farwell to remove the Michelin tires from 
the scraper as soon as some replacement tires were received. Moe, in his 
deposition, stated that he ordered the tires removed for the reason of "customer 
satisfaction." The atmosphere of operational problems is similar to the 
circumstance of combined problems found in Greco, 283 F. Supp. 978.

[¶66.]  On the date of the accident, while 
appellant was doing reclamation work with scraper 699 to remove overburden and 
fill depressions, operator Keith Nichols, from observations of appellant's 
scraper just prior to the accident, stated that every time appellant hit a rock 
or a bump the tires deflected and that the tires were flattening out to the 
extent that the distance from the bottom of the tire to the rim was only about 
six inches, and then they would spring back so that the distance from the rim to 
the bottom of the tire was two and one half feet.

[¶67.]  In describing the accident, Lipari said 
"he came down past me making his cut. * * * Keith [Nichols] came in behind him, 
and the next thing I knew I could see the scraper bouncing real hard. I saw it 
bounce three or four times." Appellant, in his deposition, said that "[t]he 
scraper shook sideways and bounced up and down, and that's really all I can 
describe of it. * * * I feel that on either running over a rock or in a hole, it 
started bouncing sideways."

[¶68.]  Lipari also testified that after the 
accident, he drove scraper 699 back to the shop and "it bounced excessively." 
After the accident, a test was conducted on the tires by removing them from 
scraper 699 and placing them on identical scraper 696. Operator Justin Webster, 
who then drove scraper 696 during that test with the Michelin tires on it, 
testified that "with the Michelin tires on it, they would - it wouldn't smooth 
out near as fast, and it gave me a feeling of losing a bit of control on it, 
especially after a sharp bump or a hole, it would feel like I was losing it a 
little bit." Larry Largent, a supervisor for Bridger, also testified about the 
test, stating that scraper 696 bounced and vibrated more when the Michelin tires 
were put on it than it had before.

[¶69.]  In addition to this testimony, appellant 
submitted the deposition of mechanical engineer, Dale Bussman, as an expert 
witness. Mr. Bussman testified that the tires were defective in that placement 
of these tires on scraper 699 was the wrong application for the tires. Bussman 
also seemed to draw a distinction between the tire being defectively designed as 
opposed to unsuitable for their intended use, a discrepancy noted by Michelin 
and Cobre Tire. Again, I perceive this as a distinction without a difference. In 
any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, I note 
the following observations made by Mr. Bussman in his deposition:

It's just that in this 
particular case we had a defective tire that was on this machine and it gave 
excessive vibration which resulted in a loss of control.

* * * * * *

* * * Now, relative to 
the question of whether it was a defective manufacture, I mean, maybe - and I 
don't know this, and it really doesn't matter, because we know the tire gave the 
excessive vibration in this particular case - perhaps it was defectively 
manufactured, okay, I don't know that. And I really don't care. All I know is 
that the tire gave excessive vibration which resulted in the loss of 
control.

[¶70.]  In presentation where the evidence 
submitted regarding the alleged defectiveness of the Michelin tires was 
conflicting, appellant's materials submitted in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment were surely sufficient to structure a genuine issue of material 
fact as to defectiveness.

IX. DEFECTIVENESS AS A 
STANDARD WHERE INTENDED USE IS SPECIFIC

[¶71.]  Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 899 (1963) presented a shopsmith 
woodworking machine that, without manufacturing defect, was demonstrably 
dangerous when used for its intended purpose as a matter of design:

Plaintiff introduced 
substantial evidence that his injuries were caused by defective design and 
construction of the Shopsmith. His expert witnesses testified that inadequate 
set screws were used to hold parts of the machine together so that normal 
vibration caused the tailstock of the lathe to move away from the piece of wood 
being turned permitting it to fly out of the lathe.

[¶72.]  Whether carriage set screws vibrated 
loose or the tires in this case bounced excessively makes little difference in 
liability theory when the user is injured by the occurrence. An access step for 
the use of the driver in climbing up on a Caterpillar tractor likewise presents 
an opportunity for assessed liability from negligent design when it collected 
mud upon which the user slips and is injured. Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor 
Co., 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978). See affirmed judgment on remand in 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Gonzales, 599 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980). A 
similar result was obtained in Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974), although the case turned on the duty to warn. The operator was 
injured by a fiberboard sander when the machine regurgitated a sheet back out 
into the operator where the operator was manually feeding since the automatic 
feeder attachment had not been purchased. That court considered a 
seller-oriented or use-oriented standard - where strict liability either 
"imposes what amounts to a constructive knowledge of the condition of the 
product," Id. 525 P.2d  at 1036, or the user-oriented standard of danger to the 
user beyond contemplation.

In the case of a product 
which is claimed to be dangerously defective because of misdesign, the process 
is not so easy as in the case of mismanufacture. All the products made to that 
design are the same. The question of whether the design is unreasonably 
dangerous can be determined only by taking into consideration the surrounding 
circumstances and knowledge at the time the article was sold, and determining 
therefrom whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have so designed and 
sold the article in question had he known of the risk involved which injured 
plaintiff.

Id. at 1037. The opinion 
further noted, although the involvement of defectiveness may be the same, that 
the issue has been raised in some courts concerning whether in this context 
there is a distinction between strict liability and negligence. The evidence 
which proves the one will almost always, if not always, prove the 
other.

It is our opinion that 
the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that a reasonably prudent 
manufacturer, knowing that the machine would be fed manually and having the 
constructive knowledge of its propensity to regurgitate thin sheets when it was 
set for thick ones, which the courts via strict liability have imposed upon it, 
would have warned plaintiff's employer either to feed it automatically or to use 
some safety device, and that, in the absence of such a warning, the machine was 
dangerously defective.

Id. at 1038-39. See, 
however, an analysis of the difference in general development in Keefe and 
Henke, Presumed Knowledge of Danger: Legal Fiction Gone Awry?, 19 Seton Hall 
L.Rev. 174 (1989).

[¶73.]  Likewise in this case, appellant could 
have been instructed to slow down his operational speed - undoubtedly 
unacceptable to the mine owner where quantity of material moved is everything. 
See also Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884-85 (Alaska 1979), where the 
court adopted a test from Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 
143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 457 (1978) and stated:

The Barker test 
represents a composite of the most workable features of each of the other tests. 
The first prong of the Barker test - that a product is defectively designed if 
it fails "to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in 
an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner" - incorporates notions of the 
implied warranty of fitness for reasonable use, a primary concept in the 
evolution of strict products liability, * * *.

The second prong of the 
Barker definition encompasses those situations, such as the lack of a safety 
device which is presented here, where the product satisfies ordinary consumer 
expectations as to its general use but is still "defective" in that its design 
exposes the user or bystander to "excessive preventable danger." [Footnotes 
omitted.]

As an instruction, that 
court stated:

Following the guidelines 
set by the Barker court, we hold that the trial court may instruct the jury that 
a product is defectively designed if:

"(1) the plaintiff proves 
that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would 
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) the 
plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused injury and the 
defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that on balance the 
benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such 
design."

Id. at 886 (quoting Barker, 
573 P.2d at 452).

[¶74.]  In case definition, this appeal could be 
confined to the presented facts of special order merchandise which fails in the 
performance in anticipated usage. Generally, however, the unfortunate 
divisiveness of the erroneous theory presented here extrudes into or overlaps 
the entire issue of design defect product liability. It remains in analysis of 
law and fact that every product will have some desired and appropriate use 
(doorstop, perhaps) and other uses for which it would not be provident (killing 
houseflies with dynamite).

[¶75.]  It is in the confluence of design defect 
special order merchandise as relating to strict liability, negligence and 
warranty that this decision crosses an almost unlimited number of products 
liability cases and review authorities; none of which in my analysis would 
justify the majority's decision.4 My only concurrence with the 
majority is that a defect is required to present issues of strict liability, 
negligence or general warranty as well as fitness for the purpose intended. We 
differ in logic and analysis as to the definition of defect and particularly 
here with special order merchandise that fails to perform within anticipated 
usage. Under any theory of products liability, a plaintiff has the burden of 
proving (1) injury; (2) the product causing injury was defective; (3) the defect 
existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (4) the 
defective condition of the product proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. 
Stewart, 107 Ill.Dec. 40, 506 N.E.2d 783; Moslander v. Dayton Tire and Rubber Co., 628 S.W.2d 899 (Mo. App. 1981); Jolley v. 
General Motors Corp., 55 N.C. App. 383, 285 S.E.2d 301 (1982). See summarized 
analysis in 1 American Law of Products Liability 3d, supra, § 1:5.5

[¶76.]  A product may be defective in three ways: 
(1) manufacturing flaw; (2) defective design; or (3) absence or inadequacy of 
warnings regarding the use of the product. Valk Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy, 74 
Md. App. 304, 537 A.2d 622, 626, cert. granted 
313 Md. 9, 542 A.2d 845 (1988); 1 American Law of Products Liability 3d, supra, § 3:7; W. 
Prosser and W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 99 (5th ed. 1984). This court has 
previously quoted with approval the general definition of a defect, which states 
that "[a] product is defective when it fails to perform reasonably and safely 
the function for which it was intended." Valentine, 665 P.2d  at 462 (quoting 
Drier v. Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496, 504 (S.D. 1977)).

[¶77.]  The various definitions of defect 
revealed by present research, however, confirm the following observation that 
"[t]he term `defect' has been defined on a case-by-case basis and has not been 
found to be susceptible of any general definition or of a single definition 
applicable in all contexts." 2 American Law of Products Liability 3d, supra, § 
17:5 at 13-14 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the elements of proof of a defect 
vary depending on which theory of recovery is pursued. Id. at § 3:7. See Keeton, 
Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 St. Mary's L.J. 30 (1973). See 
also Keefe and Henke, supra, 19 Seton Hall L.Rev. 174.

[¶78.]  The defining concept throughout this 
analysis is that intended use is inextricably bound in defect in all cases with 
the possible exception of a malmanufactured product. It is axiomatically 
necessary to address intended use in relation to defect. In Buckley, would the 
court's conclusion have been the same if the tractor was designed for fuel oil 
and high test gasoline was furnished with the result that upon commencement of 
use, the equipment exploded and incinerated the buyer who did not know that the 
dealer's mistake had occurred?

[¶79.]  Unfitness for the purpose intended, which 
is a function of design defect, has been a singular constituent of modern 
products liability litigation.6 Although not directly delineated 
within its true character to be a subset of design defect, special order 
merchandise which fails to function as intended fits immediately within the 
general principles and, specifically, the constituent policy of Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, supra, § 402A. This majority, in creating an illogical 
distinction unfounded in precedent and legal history that what is wrong is not 
defective, chisels out into the law a singular and significant mistake in basic 
analysis.

[¶80.]  In the general history of recent law, 
modern products liability matured from MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 
161 A.2d 69 (1960), as followed by Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., 
76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Suter v. 
San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Greenman, 
377 P.2d 897 and Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963). See products liability symposium including 
articles by Professors John W. Wade, Page Keeton, Dix W. Noel and Robert E. 
Keeton, with introduction by Roy R. Ray to Products Liability - A Symposium, 19 
S.W.L.J. 1 (1965).

[¶81.]  Greenman involved a misdesigned power 
tool and Cepeda involved an industrial machine which "was defectively designed 
from a safety standpoint." Cepeda, 386 A.2d  at 820. The case development in 
Pennsylvania 
provides a similar design defect development in fitness for the purpose 
intended. Berkebile, 337 A.2d 893 addressed a defectively designed helicopter. 
"The seller must provide with the product every element necessary to make it 
safe for use." Id. at 902. It was then recognized in 
Azzarello, 391 A.2d  at 1026, to apply to a bad design, "we must look to whether 
the product is safe for its intended use." See also Dambacher, 485 A.2d 408, 
which completes the concept development by application to radial tires which, as 
an item of commerce, were not defective but misapplied if mixed with non-radial 
tires on the vehicle. It was the intended use, onward in danger, where the 
accident was invited by the "mixed fitment." Dambacher, 485 A.2d  at 414. The 
court specified that as a matter of law and would not rule that the radial tires 
were not defective, even if not defective when used with a full complement of 
other radial tires. It was the mixture of radial tires with non-radial tires 
which created the danger and consequent defect in product application. Intended 
use was the cornerstone of the liability thesis. See likewise Ilosky v. Michelin 
Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1983).

[¶82.]  In direct application, this majority now 
disindigenously ignores as a legal principle the criteria that should have been 
applied:

The same principles 
should apply whether the manufacturing defect is due to error or mischance or 
design. Though the nature of the proof to demonstrate that the product was 
defective may differ, the ultimate jury test is the same. Suitability and safety 
are implicated whether the defect in the product is due to an imperfection in 
the material or improper design.

* * * * * *

Delivery of an improperly 
designed machine constitutes delivery of a defective product. At that point, 
whether the cause of the defect in the product was due to design or otherwise is 
not material. See Pike v. Frank H. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 475, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 636, 467 P.2d 229, 236 (1970). Once the defect is established and the other 
elements shown, a case for strict liability has been made out.

Suter v. San 
Angelo Foundray & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140, 152-53 (1979). The 
trial judge in Suter, 406 A.2d  at 149 said that to hold defendant 
liable,

four elements had to be 
proved: (1) that the product had not been reasonably fit for the ordinary use 
for which it was intended; (2) that the defect arose out of defendant's design 
of the machine; (3) that the defect proximately caused plaintiff's injury or 
damage; and (4) that plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable consumer or user of 
the product.

See likewise 
Birchfield v. International Harvester Co., 726 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1984); 
Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976), non-insulated 
"cherry picker;" Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wn.2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Company, 75 Wn.2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969); and 
Wade, supra, 44 Miss.L.J. 828.

[¶83.]  The exhaustive exposition of strict 
liability in California cases also denies efficacy to what 
this majority does to Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 402A, strict 
liability and general theories of product responsibility of both the 
manufacturer and the seller. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972) developed from the situation which has 
factual similarity as a known intended use. An assembled bread truck as not 
unsafe in itself became faulty and dangerous by a defective hasp that permitted 
a bread tray to slide forward into the cab. When this hasp failed like the 
bouncing Michelin tires, the driver was injured from equipment which lacked 
fitness for the purpose intended, even though external forces in a street 
collision intervened. Both cases present defective equipment as unsuitable for 
the purpose intended. See also Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 34 Cal. 3d 49, 192 Cal. Rptr. 857, 665 P.2d 947 (1983), 
where a misdesigned and mislocated telephone booth, which was only unsafe at a 
car crash exposed location, resulted in injury to the plaintiff; and Barker, 573 P.2d 443, high-lift loader design defect. In similar regard, a fiberglass 
construction of a car roof affords question of design defect in Brandenburger v. 
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973). The sheet 
metal used for duct work construction of a school created a similar fitness for 
intended purpose test in Walters v. Kellam and Foley, 172 Ind. App. 207, 360 N.E.2d 199 (1977). In that case, the sheet metal was not in itself unsafe or 
unsafe after the completion of installation, it was allegedly unsafe within the 
construction process for the activities of installers.

[¶84.]  In Bell Helicopter Co. v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519 (Tex.Civ.App. 1979), there was at issue a crashed helicopter when a 
prior generation "unsafe" rotor blade broke in flight. As a strict liability and 
negligence consideration, duty to update and maintain for safe performance was 
at issue and liability resulted. See likewise Montgomery Elevator Co. v. 
McCullough By McCullough, 676 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1984) and Gonzales, 571 S.W.2d 867.

[¶85.]  Particularization of the individual use 
or lack of warning of product limitation provide similar authority within the 
forests of defective tire cases. In Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968), unwarned overload problems for tires 
when used on a station wagon provided a basis for liability. The buyer bought 
tires to do the job for the identified vehicles. Likewise, speed capacity was at 
issue in Cavallaro v. Michelin Tire Corp., 96 Cal. App. 3d 95, 157 Cal. Rptr. 602 
(1979), although in result, the favorable verdict was reversed for retrial 
because of inconsistency in its turns. In Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals review, 
blowout proof tires that blew out were defective, B.F. Goodrich Company v. 
Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959). A Mercury Cougar operating at a speed above tire 
capacity but within car capacity, afforded a basis for liability up to tire 
blowout in LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 
1980). The tires were safe enough, but not on a Mercury Cougar with a driver who 
tested the capacity of his car.

[¶86.]  A case which is interestingly similar in 
the wrong item versus defect review is Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 
707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986). Proper parts were provided but, 
unfortunately, the activator for the airplane trim tabs for the left and right 
sides were installed on the wrong side with the disastrous result that follows. 
The appellate court adduced that:

The core concern in 
strict tort liability law is safety. See Comments a through i to Section 402A. 
Therefore, the primary inquiry in a design defect case is whether the product - 
because of the way it is designed - creates an unreasonable risk of danger to 
the consumer or user when put to normal use. See generally, Owen and Montgomery, Reflections On 
the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability For Defective Products, 
27 S.C.L.Rev. 804, 812-13 (1976). To establish liability in a design defect 
case, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the product, as 
designed, is unreasonably dangerous and therefore "defective," and that the 
demonstrated defect caused his injuries. Though obviously abbreviated, the 
foregoing explanation describes the heart and soul of a strict tort liability 
design defect case - unreasonable danger and causation.

* * * * * 
*

Throughout the course of 
the entire trial, plaintiffs consistently focused on the existence of an 
industry design criteria standard - which was first brought to the jury's 
attention by mechanics Lane and Adams. The two 
terms used most often during the trial to describe this industry standard were 
"work or no go" and "murphy proof." Stated most simply, this industry standard 
calls for manufacturers like Beech to design critical flight parts in a way 
which makes it physically impossible to install them or assemble them in any way 
but the right way.

Id. at 375-79.

[¶87.]  It is apparent that the synthesis of the 
Missouri Court would not comfortably fit within the wrong product delivery 
concept of Buckley. Likewise, the intervening cause contention might also be 
estranged. Wrong is defective and if damage results, causative. Airplanes 
provided with the wrong fuel is illustrative. For a case involving pickup tires 
for a camper unit, see Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Company, 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64, 
69 (1970), which stated:

A "defect" has been 
defined as any condition not contemplated by the user which makes the product 
unreasonably dangerous to him. A product is not in a defective condition when it 
is safe for normal handling and consumption. Magnuson v. Rupp Manufacturing, 
Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201; Greco v. Bucciconi 
Engineering Co. (W.D.Pa.) 283 F. Supp. 978; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 
Minn.L.Rev. 791, 826; Restatement, Torts 2d § 402 A, comments g, h, and 
i.

This definition of 
defect, appearing in cases involving strict liability in tort, is closely 
related to the concept of defect as it appears in cases dealing with breach of 
implied warranty. As stated in 2 Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability, § 
16A[4][e]:

"A breach of warranty may 
be proved if it is shown, by expert testimony or reasonable inferences from the 
circumstances, that a product is defective or injurious or failed in normal use 
and caused the injury complained of.

"Is a product which 
causes damage under circumstances constituting a breach of warranty `defective' 
for purposes of the rule of strict liability in tort? Would the same proof 
suffice? While not clear-cut, affirmative answers seem to be implicit in the 
cases."

X. VIABILITY OF THE 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM

[¶88.]  In a products-liability action premised 
on negligence, as in any negligence action, the plaintiff must prove the 
defendant breached a duty owed the plaintiff thereby proximately causing injury 
to the plaintiff. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1983); Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726 (Wyo. 1980). This court 
also determined in Donahue that as specific to a negligence products- liability 
action, the plaintiff must prove that the product was defective, that the 
plaintiff's injury was caused by a defect in the product, and that the 
manufacturer or seller failed to exercise due care. 5 F. Harper, F. James and O. 
Gray, The Law of Torts § 28.22 (2d ed. 1986). The existence of a duty is a 
question of law and unless reasonable men could not disagree, the question of 
whether the defendant exercised reasonable care and proximate cause is one for 
the trier of fact. Bettencourt, 735 P.2d 722.

[¶89.]  The threshold inquiry, in a negligence 
context, is the nature of the duty that Michelin, as manufacturer/seller, and 
Cobre Tire, as supplier/seller, may have owed to appellant upon product sale. 
With respect to the duty of a manufacturer:

We have previously 
recognized that a manufacturer owes a duty of care to those who use its product. 
The manufacturer is required to exercise reasonable care in the planning, 
designing, and manufacturing of a product in order to ensure that it is 
reasonably safe to use.

Donahue, 674 P.2d  at 1280. As elaborated in defined duty:

The manufacturer must 
exercise due care in the planning and design of the product, in its selection of 
materials, in the production or assembly process, in making reasonable tests and 
inspections to discover latent hazards involved in the use of its products, in 
preparing a product for the market, and in warning potential users of any 
dangers associated with the product. A manufacturer has a duty to know all of 
the hazardous qualities of its product and is responsible for making those 
hazards known to purchasers even when the product itself is not inherently 
dangerous.

1 American Law 
of Products Liability 3d, supra, § 10:14 at 27-28 (footnotes omitted). 
Further:

A manufacturer has not 
necessarily satisfied its duty of care because its product functions as 
intended, since this would mean that there would be no liability for negligent 
design of a product which functioned as intended but which was designed in a 
fashion more dangerous than acceptable.

Id. at § 10:12 at 
24.

The duty of care of a 
non-manufacturing seller is somewhat different. It is described generally 
as:

Sellers of products of 
all kinds are subject to a duty of ordinary and reasonable care, that is, the 
duty to exercise the care that a prudent person in the same circumstances would 
exercise.

Id. at § 10:40 at 60 
(footnote omitted). More specifically:

Where the seller of an 
article reasonably must know that if it is defective it will be imminently 
dangerous to persons likely to come into contact with the article, the seller 
has a duty to use ordinary care to ascertain the condition of the article and to 
see that it is safe, especially where by representations or warranties that the 
article is safe the seller induces the sale. * * * A seller of a product 
manufactured by another is not presumed to have knowledge of a defect in the 
article sold, and if a product is received from a reputable source of supply the 
retail seller may assume that the manufacturer has done its duty in properly 
constructing the product and in not placing upon the market a product which is 
defective and likely to inflict injury, and is under no affirmative duty to 
inspect or test for a latent defect. * * *

A seller will 
seldom be liable for negligent design, since design in most instances involves 
questions of specialized knowledge which the retailer cannot be expected to 
have.

Id. at § 10:40 at 61 
(footnotes omitted).

[¶90.]  In Controlled Atmosphere, Inc. v. Branom 
Instrument Co., 50 Wn. App. 343, 748 P.2d 686, 690 (1988), that court said: 

A seller of an item which 
was manufactured by a third party is not generally liable for harm caused by the 
dangerous character of the item if the seller did not know or had no reason to 
know the item was, or was likely to be, dangerous.

Pertinent to the 
facts of the instant case, however, is the observation that a higher than 
ordinary degree of care is required of a seller who installs or otherwise 
services a product. See Kitchener v. Williams, 
171 Kan. 540, 
236 P.2d 64 (1951).

[¶91.]  Following discernment of an issue of 
defect, the next inquiry requires analysis whether a congruent factual issue 
exists regarding Michelin's alleged failure to exercise due care in placing 
these tires upon the market. Appellant contends that no evidence was presented 
by Michelin that they had tested these tires on this type of scraper nor was a 
tire history established. This contention has merit because, in a 
products-liability action based on negligence, if a product is shown to be 
defective, it may be inferred that the defect was due to negligence in the 
manufacture or inspection of the product. Morris v. Chrysler Corp., 208 
Neb. 341, 303 N.W.2d 500 (1981) and cases therein cited. Once negligence can be inferred, the 
burden of production of evidence to rebut the presumption shifts to the 
manufacturer. Ballard & Ballard Co. v. Jones, 246 Ala. 478, 21 So. 2d 327 
(1945). See Davies v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 91 Mich. App. 347, 282 N.W.2d 172 (1978) and 1 American Law of Products Liability 3d, supra, § 14:2 at 
13 and § 14:18 at 24.

[¶92.]  In support of its motion for summary 
judgment, Michelin submitted the affidavit of Gary Workman. Workman testified 
that he had never received complaints or criticisms concerning the use of these 
specific Michelin radial tires in connection with earth-moving operations prior 
to the sale of Cobre Tire who, in turn, sold them to Bridger. He further 
testified that other customers had expressed satisfaction with the tires. It is 
observed, however, that evidence of no prior accidents is not admissible to 
prove due care. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. Ferguson, 271 Ala. 120, 
122 So. 2d 356 (1959); Edison v. Lewis Mfg. Co., 
168 Cal. App. 2d 429, 336 P.2d 286 (1959). I conclude that Michelin did not 
present sufficient evidence to exclude the inference of negligence. Summary 
judgment was inappropriate on the issue of Michelin's exercise of reasonable 
care in the design and sale of these tires for this machine as involved in this 
use.

[¶93.]  The third criterion for liability within 
appellant's negligence theory invokes analysis of the nature of proximate cause. 
Proximate cause may be established by circumstantial evidence in conjunction 
with or in the absence of direct evidence. Bettencourt, 735 P.2d 722. This court 
has said that whether a breach of duty is a proximate cause of injury is a 
question of fact by the jury to determine unless the evidence demonstrates that 
reasonable minds could not disagree. England, 728 P.2d  at 1143 (Urbigkit, J., 
dissenting); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983). In Buckley, 
703 P.2d  at 1091-92 (quoting Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791, 794 (1921)), we defined 
proximate or legal causation as:

[T]hat conduct which is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injuries identified in the complaint. * 
* * [I]f the conduct is "that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by a sufficient intervening cause produces the injury without which the 
result would not have occurred," it must be identified as a substantial factor 
in bringing about the harm.

In McClellan, 
666 P.2d  at 414, we observed that:

[T]he ultimate test 
concerning proximate cause will be whether the vendor could foresee injury to a 
third person. * * *

* * * * * *

* * * A defendant is 
usually relieved of liability by an unforeseeable intervening cause. * * * 
However, an intervening cause does not relieve an earlier actor of liability if 
it was reasonably foreseeable.

Finally, we have 
said in regard to the grant of summary judgment upon the issue of causation in a 
negligence case that where 

the discovery 
materials or unrefuted allegations disclose a duty and a breach of that duty, we 
treat the existence of the element of causation as more probable than its 
nonexistence; and we require the issue to be submitted to the trier of 
fact.

Bettencourt, 735 P.2d  at 729.7

[¶94.]  The evidence established that before the 
accident, Michelin and Cobre Tire were aware of and had made unavailing attempts 
to remedy the abnormal bounce and vibration problems associated with the 
dirt-hauling usage of the Michelin radial tires. Clearly, upon the evidence in 
the record, reasonable men could disagree as to whether negligence in sale as 
well as the tires was a proximate cause (related and reasonably related) of 
appellant's injury, and thus the claim of initial negligence in sale was not 
amenable to summary judgment. Cf. England, 728 P.2d 1137.8

XI. VIABILITY OF A STRICT 
LIABILITY CLAIM

[¶95.]  In trial pleading, appellant alleged both 
manufacturing and design defect and failure to warn. Upon appeal, appellant 
asserts Michelin and Cobre Tire are subject to strict liability on the basis 
that the tires were defective because they were unsuitable and unsafe for their 
intended use and defective because of the failure to warn. Again, I perceive the 
claim as presenting a case of design defect of product insufficiency for its 
intended use. Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. App. 
1978).

[¶96.]  In Ogle, 716 P.2d  at 344, we enumerated 
the elements in a products strict liability case that the

(1) * * * sellers were 
engaged in the business of selling the product that caused the harm;

(2) * * * product was 
defective when sold;

(3) * * * product was 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer;

(4) * * * product was 
intended to and did reach the consumer without substantial change in the 
condition in which it was sold; and

(5) * * * product caused 
physical harm to the plaintiff/consumer.

See also 2 
American Law of Products Liability 3d, supra, § 10:40 at 55-56 (citing Ogle). 
The intrinsic elements of that strict liability claim are:

(1) injury resulting from 
a condition or defect of the product;

(2) condition of product 
was an unreasonably dangerous one; and

(3) condition or defect 
existed when product left defendant's control.

 

Ostendorf v. 
Brewer, 51 Ill. App.3d 1009, 9 Ill.Dec. 780, 367 N.E.2d 214, 217 (1977); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 661 P.2d 348, 360 (1983). See also 2 
American Law of Products Liability 3d, supra, § 16:42 at 57. In strict 
liability, the focus is on the nature of the product rather than the conduct of 
the defendant, and fault is not an element of liability proof. 63 Am.Jur.2d 
Products Liability § 532 at 730 (1984). The strict liability claim may be proven 
by circumstantial evidence. Stewart, 107 Ill.Dec. 40, 506 N.E.2d 783; Moslander, 
628 S.W.2d 899. See also Colorado Serum Co. v. Arp, 504 P.2d 801 (Wyo. 1972), 
where this court utilized circumstantial evidence as predating adoption of 
strict liability in the 1986 Ogle case as such evidence is sufficient to make 
out a prima facie case if it tends to negate other reasonable causes or there is 
an expert opinion that the product was defective. Lucas v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., 458 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1972); Stewart, 107 Ill.Dec. 42, 506 N.E.2d  
at 785. Mays, 661 P.2d  at 360 states that:

Because liability in a 
products liability action cannot be based on mere speculation, guess or 
conjecture, the circumstances shown must justify an inference of probability as 
distinguished from mere possibility. While a plaintiff is not normally required 
to prove his case at the summary judgment stage, he must present some facts to 
support the elements of his claim.

[¶97.]  Establishing the defectiveness of a 
product may be less difficult under strict products liability than under 
negligence. Professor Prosser stated:

The bare fact that an 
accident happens to a product, that an automobile goes into a ditch, is usually 
not sufficient proof that it was in any way defective. * * * On the other hand, 
the addition of very little more in the way of other facts, as for example * * 
*, that the defect had given trouble before the accident, * * * or the 
elimination of other causes, or the aid of expert opinion, may be enough to 
support the inference.

Prosser, The 
Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L.Rev. 791, 843-44 
(1966) (footnotes omitted). Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 402A, 
comment g provides:

Defective 
condition. The rule stated in this 
Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's 
hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be 
unreasonably dangerous to him.

Unreasonably 
dangerous is defined as:

Unreasonably 
dangerous. * * * The article sold 
must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the 
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the 
community as to its characteristics.

Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, supra, § 402A, comment i.

[¶98.]  The restatement definition of defect is 
known as the "consumer expectations" test. Fischer, Tort Law: Expanding the 
Scope of Recovery Without Loss of Jury Control, 11 Hofstra L.Rev. 937, 967 
(1983). Under this test, strict liability may be imposed if the product is 
unsafe beyond the extent reasonably contemplated by the ordinary consumer. Sims, 
751 P.2d 357; Gomulka v. Yavapai Mach. and Auto Parts, Inc., 155 Ariz. 239, 745 P.2d 986 
(1987); Controlled Atmosphere, Inc., 748 P.2d 686.9

[¶99.]  The "consumer expectations" test is 
substantially the same as the definition of defectiveness which was applied in 
discussion in appellant's negligence theory. The rule from Valentine, 665 P.2d  
at 462 (quoting Tweedy, 2 Ill.Dec. at 285, 357 N.E.2d at 452), is equally 
applicable under a strict liability theory (and under a warranty theory to be 
discussed infra): 

"A prima facie case that 
a product was defective and that the defect existed when it left the 
manufacturer's control is made by proof that in the absence of abnormal use or 
reasonable secondary causes the product failed `to perform in the manner 
reasonably to be expected in light of [its] nature and intended 
function.'"

[¶100.]            
Additionally, in a strict liability case, proof of causation requires 
proof that the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product must have been a 
producing cause of the harm. Bell Helicopter Co., 594 S.W.2d 519; 63 Am.Jur.2d, 
supra, § 558; Restatement (Second) Torts, supra, § 402A(1). Proof of causation 
may be sufficient where the defect is demonstrated to be only a contributing 
cause and direct or circumstantial evidence which tends to exclude secondary 
causes establishes a prima facie case and a plaintiff need not disprove every 
cause of the injury other than the one alleged. Ostendorf, 9 Ill.Dec. 780, 367 N.E.2d 214.

[¶101.]            
The evidence submitted by appellant indicated that the tires bounced and 
vibrated excessively commencing with first use, and that before the accident, 
Bridger mechanics could not isolate any cause of the abnormal bounce and 
vibration of the scraper other than the claimed defective tires. With other 
evidence of normal use and an intended function of the tires, I conclude that 
under strict liability, appellant has presented a case structuring factual 
issues of the requisite liability elements sufficient to require a jury analysis 
of the contested evidence. Davenport v. Epperly, 
744 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987).10

XII. EXPRESS 
WARRANTY

[¶102.]            
Within my review of the warranty claim, I concur with the majority that a 
warranty of fitness for the purpose intended was properly stated in pleading and 
demonstrated for sufficiency to deter summary judgment. We differ because I also 
perceive that, for this special order merchandise, an implied warranty of 
merchantability is also properly presented. Again, I also agree that in this 
case an express warranty was not developed sufficiently enough to withstand 
summary judgment.

[¶103.]            
I begin by examining appellant's claim of breach of express warranty. 
W.S. 34-21-230 provides in relevant part:

(a) Express warranties by 
the seller are created as follows:

(i) Any affirmation of 
fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and 
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the 
goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise[.]

In a 
products-liability case based on express warranty, the following elements must 
be established:

(1) an affirmation of 
fact or a promise by the seller; (2) the natural tendency of the affirmation or 
promise was to induce the buyer to purchase the goods; (3) such affirmation of 
fact or promise became a part of the basis of the bargain; (4) the buyer 
purchased the goods in reliance thereon; (5) a breach of the express warranty by 
the seller; and (6) the breach proximately caused injury to the 
plaintiff.

2 American Law 
of Products Liability 3d, supra, § 19:3 at 12 (footnotes omitted). Pursuant to 
W.S. 34-21-235, privity is not required in an action on either express or 
implied warranties. Ogle, 716 P.2d 334; Western Equipment Co., Inc. v. Sheridan 
Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806 (Wyo. 1980). W.S. 34-21-235 extends the 
warranties to "any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be 
affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty." The benefit 
of any express warranties, therefore, would flow to appellant as a user/consumer 
of the tires. Within the facts presented, I do not find either an affirmation of 
fact or a promise by either Michelin to Cobre Tire or Cobre Tire to Bridger to 
support a factual issue as to express warranty.

A statement that 
equipment should be able to do a particular task contemplated by the buyer is 
not an express warranty that it will do so but mere[l]y a matter of opinion, as 
long as the circumstances are such that the statement is not regarded as a 
statement of a characteristic of the goods.

63 Am.Jur.2d, 
supra, § 463 at 626. See Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681, 
534 P.2d 377 (1975). We are confined by W.S. 34-21-230(b), which defines that "a 
statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the 
goods does not create a warranty." See Terry v. Moore, 448 P.2d 601 (Wyo. 1968). Entry of summary judgment on 
appellant's express warranty claims was appropriate.

XIII. IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES

[¶104.]            
Appellant additionally contends, however, that Michelin and Cobre Tire 
breached both implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular 
purpose. In part, I agree with the majority but do not exclude merchantability 
for this summary judgment review. W.S. 34-21-231(b)(iii) (U.C.C. § 2-314) 
provides that merchantable goods must be "fit for the ordinary purposes for 
which such goods are used." Goods are not fit for ordinary purposes where they 
are not fit for the expected or obvious purpose or are unsafe for use in a 
normal manner. Huebert v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 208 Kan. 720, 494 P.2d 1210 
(1972); Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161 (1972). 
The elements a plaintiff must prove in a merchantability case pursuant to W.S. 
34-21-231, (U.C.C. § 2-314) are: (1) that a merchant sold the goods; (2) which 
were not merchantable at the time of sale; (3) injury; (4) proximately caused by 
the defective nature of the goods; and (5) notice to the seller of the injury. 
J. White and R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 9-6 at 343 (2d ed. 
1980).

[¶105.]            
The evidence submitted by appellant discussed earlier was clearly 
sufficient to structure a triable controversy. Summary judgment on appellant's 
claims of breach of the implied warranty of merchantability for the intended purpose was 
improvidently granted as to both Michelin and Cobre Tire.

[¶106.]            
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is governed by 
W.S. 34-21-232 (U.C.C. § 2-315), which states:

Where the seller at the 
time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the 
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or 
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or 
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit 
for such purpose.

[¶107.]            
Additional conditions imposed for recovery under the warranty of fitness 
are: (1) the seller must have reason to know the buyer's particular purpose; (2) 
the seller must have reason to know that the buyer is relying on the seller's 
skill or judgment to furnish appropriate goods; and (3) the buyer must in fact 
rely upon the seller's skill or judgment. J. White and R. Summers, supra, § 9-9 
at 358. A product is not fit for a particular purpose if it contains a dangerous 
characteristic that might cause injury when put to normal or foreseeable use or 
is unfit to perform its function safely when used in a normal manner. Larsen v. 
General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962). See also Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wn.2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952), where the question of the housewife using a "cocktail robe" 
while cooking created an issue of fact of normal usage and the court would not 
judicially notice what is normally worn in kitchens. The Larsen rule of 
foreseeability was adopted by this court in Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978). With knowledge of intended special 
order use undisputed as to both Michelin and Cobre Tire, genuine issues of 
material fact exist on the implied warranty claim of fitness for a particular 
purpose as well as the parallel warranty of merchantability. 

XIV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶108.]            
The unnumbered product liability cases involving tires11 encompass the broad perspective of 
one of the more numerous constituents of consumer injury litigation. As an 
integral contributor, theories and standards for liability of the vendor and 
manufacturer for defective tires accurately reflects the general status of 
present law. Factual categories include recapped tire cases12, installation and mounting 
injuries13, road driving blowouts,14 and of particular relevance here, 
insufficiency of the tires for the intended purpose.15 Application of the broad concepts 
of strict liability16, negligence17, express warranty18, implied warranty of 
merchantability19, and implied warranty of fitness 
for the purpose intended20 are generally available through 
these cases to test claimed liability. It is in majority decision that defects 
in design cannot be related to warranty and purpose for which intended that the 
major mistake is now made in this decision by irrational evisceration of 
products liability principles. Whether phrased in consumer expectation[fn21] or 
unjustified risk in damage as an enterprise liability thesis,[fn22] see Keeton, 
Products Liability - Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 
Tex.L.Rev. 855 (1963), any differentiation between design[fn23] and 
manufacturing defect[fn24] as a distinction between wrongness because of 
operational insufficiency versus wrongness because what was needed was not 
provided is both illogically and precedentially unjustified. The court in Coley 
v. Michelin Tire Corp., 99 A.D.2d 795, 472 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (1984) said that 
"[t]he defect may be inferred from proof that the product did not perform as 
intended by the manufacturer."

[¶109.]            
Although this majority now leaves appellant with a viable claim in 
implied warranty of fitness for the purpose intended and negligence of untimely 
removal, evisceration of strict liability, negligence in delivery for an 
intended purpose and implied warranty of merchantability are observedly 
unjustified. The philosophical underpinnings provided by Buckley upon which the 
majority builds its thesis of product liability are unsound. Consequently, the 
resulting structure is systematically misdirected and operationally skewed. The 
result, in function as an attribute of the justice delivery system, fails to get 
from here to there.

[¶110.]            
Consequently, I concur in reversal of the summary judgment on the issues 
granted, but dissent from suffocation of the normative products liability 
theories.

FOOTNOTES

1 A factual issue is 
presented by the record whether specific appellee, Michelin Tire Corporation, 
either manufactured or designed the XRDNA[**] radial tire which is the subject 
of this litigation. In a 1986 supplemental witness designation statement made 
about two years after the litigation started, Michelin advised in regard to the 
prospective testimony of a witness:

In addition, these 
witnesses will testify concerning the classification of the earth mover when 
used in reclamation industry as a work machine as opposed to a transport machine 
and that the choice of tires, for the unit 699 was appropriate. Also that 
Michelin Tire Company was not the manufacturer of this tire. It was designed by 
Manufacture Frances Pneumatiques and manufactured by S.A. Neumaticos 
Michelin.

This affiliate or 
subsidiary manufacturer status was neither addressed by affidavit nor made a 
subject of argument in the motion for summary judgment. Cf. Torres v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 867 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1989).

This record and the scope 
of Michelin Tire Corporation litigation would suggest that this appellee is an 
American tire distributor and that actual manufacture is probably done by 
affiliates or subsidiaries in Europe. The 
special order status of these particular tires makes this case unusual within 
the broad coverage of a considerable number of defective tire cases of which 
Michelin is represented in part to include: Johnson v. Michelin Tire Corp., 812 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1987); Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck and Company, 512 F.2d 276 
(5th Cir. 1975); Rhodes v. Michelin Tire Corp., 542 F. Supp. 60 (E.D.Ky. 1982); 
Cavallaro v. Michelin Tire Corp., 96 Cal. App. 3d 95, 157 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1979); 
Alexander v. Michelin Tire Corp., No. C-325, 979, 5 PLLR 38 (Cal. Los Angeles 
County Super.Ct. 1985); Jensen v. Michelin Tire Co., No. 299048, 3 PLLR 11 (Cal. 
Orange County Super.Ct. 1983); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Crawford, 170 Ga. App. 
359, 317 S.E.2d 336 (1984); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Michelin Tire 
Corp., 12 Ill. App.3d 165, 298 N.E.2d 289 (1973); Vaughn v. Michelin Tire Corp., 
756 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. App. 1988); Coulter v. Michelin Tire Corp., 622 S.W.2d 421 
(Mo. App. 1981), cert. denied 456 U.S. 906, 102 S. Ct. 1752, 72 L. Ed. 2d 162 
(1982); Coley v. Michelin Tire Corp., 99 A.D.2d 795, 472 N YS.2d 125 (1984); and 
Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1983).

Since the differentiated 
relationship between marketer and manufacturer was not pursued in trial court 
process or appellate briefing, it is assumed for purposes of this dissent that a 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 400 (1965) inclusion can be applied as the law 
of the case. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 400, which states that 
"[o]ne who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by another is 
subject to the same liability as though he were its manufacturer." Laaperi v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 787 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1986); Connelly v. 
Uniroyal, Inc., 75 Ill. 2d 393, 27 Ill.Dec. 343, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979), cert. 
denied and appeal dismissed 444 U.S. 1060, 100 S. Ct. 992, 62 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1980).

2              
The distinction between 
manufacturing defects and design defects has been explained by many legal 
scholars as well as in numerous judicial opinions. A clear explanation was given 
by Professor James Henderson, Jr.:

"Manufacturing flaws are 
imperfections that inevitably occur in a typically small percentage of products 
of a given design as a result of the fallibility of the manufacturing process. A 
flawed product does not conform in some significant aspect to the intended 
design, nor does it conform to the great majority of products manufactured in 
accordance with that design. . . . [On the other hand, products with a design 
defect] are unusually dangerous because of the manner in which they are designed 
or marketed. Therefore, [a product defectively designed] conforms to the 
intended design and is substantially identical in relevant aspects to all the 
other unflawed products manufactured according to the same design or marketed in 
the same manner."

Henderson, Judicial Review of 
Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of 

Adjudication, 73 
Colum.L.Rev. 1531, 1543 (1973).

Comment, Product 
Liability: The Problem of the Non-Designing Manufacturer, 9 U. Dayton L.Rev. 81, 81 n. 1 
(1983).

3 None of the four cases 
included in the Buckley opinion as authority were cited by either party in 
appellate briefing for that appeal and the concept that a product unsuitable for 
purpose intended cannot be faulty was not directly argued in appellate 
presentation. Appellee, as distributer, argued only that the product was neither 
dangerous nor defective because plaintiff had come to know that it was fuel oil 
and not gasoline before the injury occurring accident happened. The citation of 
authority of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963) in conjunction with that statement is informative.

4 For tires and wheels 
alone, see 1 American Law of Products Liability 3d, Citator, supra, §§ 208-218 
to which the following specific topics should be added: motor vehicles §§ 
156-207 and construction equipment §§ 352-400. Confinement of the topic to only 
Caterpillar tractors and Michelin tires in itself provides an extended review. 
See also Annotation, Products Liability: Admissibility of Expert or Opinion 
Evidence that Product Is or Is Not Defective, Dangerous, or Unreasonably 
Dangerous, 4 A.L.R.4th 651 (1981); Annotation, Products Liability: Modern Cases 
Determining Whether Product is Defectively Designed, 96 A.L.R.3d 22 (1979); 
Annotation, Products Liability: Liability for Injury or Death Allegedly Caused 
by Defective Tire, 81 A.L.R.3d 318 (1977); Annotation, Products Liability: 
Product as Unreasonably Dangerous or Unsafe Under Doctrine of Strict Liability 
in Tort, 54 A.L.R.3d 352 (1973); Annotation, Products Liability: Proof of Defect 
Under Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, 51 A.L.R.3d 8 (1973); Annotation, 
Products Liability: Strict Liability in Tort, 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1967); 
Annotation, Manufacturer's Duty to Test or Inspect as Affecting His Liability 
for Product-Caused Injury, 6 A.L.R.3d 91 (1966); 39 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 
Defective Tire 209 (1984); 17 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts Automobile Tire Defects and 
Hazards 81 (1966); H. Philo & A. Portner, 170 Million Defective Tires Per 
Year, 12 Trial 50 (November 1976); and Bowman, Design Defect Cases Defense 
Problems, For the Defense 47 (1980).

5 Paul D. Rheingold in 
Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 Tenn.L.Rev. 325 (1971) described 
six types of proof: (a) the nature of the product; (b) the pattern of the 
accident; (c) the life history of the product; (d) similar products and uses; 
(e) elimination of alternative cause; and (f) the happening of the accident. 
This scenario of proof accurately applies to the physical injury to appellant 
considered in this lawsuit. See also Note, Products Liability and the Problem of 
Proof, 21 Stan.L.Rev. 1777 (1969).

6 Singularly attractive to 
the academic inquiry of law school review as well as consideration by 
representatives of the practicing bar, the now 30-year period of the emergence 
of product liability litigation and evaluation has been accompanied by a 
convulcade of law journal reviews. Included in part among the singularly 
recognized analyses in research and scholastic leadership moving from status to 
prognosis would include: Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and 
Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 Stan.L.Rev. 974 (1966); Green, Strict 
Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 Tex.L.Rev. 
1185 (1976); Keeton, supra, 5 St. Mary's L.J. 30; Keeton, Manufacturer's 
Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 
Syracuse L.Rev. 
559 (1969); Keeton, Products Liability - Proof of the Manufacturer's Negligence, 
49 Va.L.Rev. 675 (1963); Peairs, The God in the Machine, 29 B.U.L. Rev. 37 
(1949); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960); Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel 
Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in 
Tort, 19 Rutgers L.Rev. 692 (1965); Wade, 
supra, 44 Miss.L.J. 825; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 
S.W.L.J. 5 (1965); Comment, Tort Defenses to Strict Products Liability, 20 
Syracuse L.Rev. 
924 (1969); and Note, Products Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement of 
Torts, 55 Geo. L.J. 286 (1966).

Added to these single 
author sources are symposiums of significant detail which include: Critical 
Issues in Tort Law Reform: A Search for Principles [Products Liability], XIV J. 
Legal Stud. 459 (1985); James, General Products - Should Manufacturers be Liable 
Without Negligence?, 24 Tenn.L.Rev. 923 (1957); and Symposium, Current 
Developments in the Law of Torts, 33 Vand. L.Rev. 549 (1980).

Additionally, case notes 
and individual state reviews add comprehension to the nationwide products 
liability law developments. Dobbels, Missouri Products Liability Law Revisited: A Look at 
Missouri 
Strict Products Liability Law Before and After the Tort Reform Act, 53 Mo.L. 
Rev. 227 (1988); Noel, Products Liability of Retailers and Manufacturers in 
Tennessee, 32 
Tenn.L.Rev. 207 (1965); Steenson, Products Liability Law in Minnesota: Design Defect 
and Failure to Warn Claims, 14 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 443 (1988); Swartz, The 
Concepts of "Defective Condition" and "Unreasonably Dangerous" in Products 
Liability Law, 66 Marq.L.Rev. 280 (1983); Comment, Relevance of State of the Art 
Evidence in Design Defect Actions Under Section 402A, 56 Miss.L.J. 801 (1986); 
Comment, Products Liability in Oregon: Present 
and Future, 8 Willamette L.Rev. 410 (1972); 
Note, Torts - Wyoming Finds an Appropriate Case to Adopt 
Strict Products Liability. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 
(Wyo. 1986), XXIILand & Water L.Rev. 223 (1987); Note, 
Products Liability - Strict Liability in Tort - State-of-the-Art Defense 
Inapplicable in Design Defect Cases - Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 
90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982), 13 Seton Hall L.Rev. 625 (1983); and Note, 
Proof of Defect in a Strict Products Liability Case, 22 Me.L.Rev. 189 
(1970).

7 In the analysis of 
proximate cause as legal cause by this writer in dissent in England, 728 P.2d  at 1152, Professor Keeton was quoted from Causation, 28 S.Tex.L.J. 231, 
231-32 (1986):

"There are four elements 
in a claimant's prima facie case of negligence. These generally recognized 
elements are: (1) a duty of reasonable care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) 
proximate causation, and (4) damages. An explanation of the terms duty and 
breach of duty is necessary to identify the issues underlying each of the 
elements and the problems arising in connection with proximate 
cause.

* * * * * *

"Generally, two elements 
are required to establish that the negligence of a defendant is the proximate 
cause of a plaintiff's injury: factual causation and legal causation. Factual 
causation refers to the requirement that the act and the injury be related. 
Legal causation refers to the requirement that the act and the injury be reasonably related." [Emphasis in 
original.]

An interesting current 
analysis of the subject of proximate cause in a particularized concept is 
presented in Steinbock, Richman and Ray, Expert Testimony on Proximate Cause, 41 
Vand. L.Rev. 261 (1988).

8 In recent analysis, the 
Michigan court 
differentiated the negligence and warranty theories of recovery:

An implied warranty of 
fitness grounded in tort is a warranty implied in fact or law. Clancy v. 
Oak ParkVillage Athletic Center, 140 Mich. App. 304, 306, 364 N.W.2d 312 (1985). The warranty theory of liability is distinguishable from the 
negligence theory in that negligence generally focuses on a defendant's conduct, 
while warranty focuses on the product itself. Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 
Mich. 670, 692-693, 365 N.W.2d 176 (1984); 
Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 405 Mich. 79, 89, 273 N.W.2d 476 
(1979).

Callesen v. 
Grant Trunk Western R. Co., 175 Mich. App. 252, 437 N.W.2d 372, 378 (1989). 
Compare, however, D. Baker and J. Thompson, Strict Liability Theory v. 
Negligence Reality, 30 For the Defense 17 (Nov. 1988).

9 Some jurisdictions, 
particularly in defective-design cases, have adopted a "risk-utility test" or a 
hybrid of the two tests, the "California Test." Vandall, "Design Defect" in 
Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict Liability, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 
61 (1982); 2 American Law of Products Liability 3d, supra, § 17:24. This court 
has applied the restatement test rather than the risk-benefit theory. Sims, 751 P.2d 357.

10 Down and dirty, as the 
expression goes, the jury will be called to decide constituencies in cause and 
resulting injury of terrain and working circumstance as affected or not affected 
by normal or abnormal tire behavior.

11 Annotation, supra n. 4, 
81 A.L.R.3d 318; Annotation, supra n. 4, 51 A.L.R.3d 8; 39 Am.Jur. Proof of 
Facts 2d, supra n. 4 at 209; 17 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts, supra n. 4 at 81; 1 
American Law of Products Liability 3rd, supra at §§ 208-218.

12 Nebelung v. Norman, 14 Cal. 2d 647, 96 P.2d 327 (1939); Craig v. Burch, 
228 So. 2d 723 (La. 1969); Beasock v. Dioguardi Enterprises, 
Inc., 117 A.D.2d 1015, 499 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1986); Markle v. Mulholland's Inc., 265 
Or. 259, 509 P.2d 529 (1973).

13 Hale v. Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co., 820 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1987); Nielson v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 
570 F.2d 272 (8th Cir. 1978); Belue v. Uniroyal, Inc., 114 Mich. App. 589, 319 N.W.2d 369 (1982); BFGoodrich v. Taylor, 509 So. 2d 895 (Miss. 1987); Coulter, 
622 S.W.2d 421; Ewer v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, 4 Wn. App. 152, 480 P.2d 260 (1971).

14 Gisriel v. Quinn-Moore 
Oil Corp., 517 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1975); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Hughes Supply, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 1978); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. Hall, 152 Ga. App. 560, 263 S.E.2d 449 (1979); Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. King, 145 Ga. App. 840, 244 S.E.2d 905 (1978); Stewart, 107 Ill.Dec. 40, 
506 N.E.2d 783; Dawson v. Mazda Motors of 
America, Inc., 475 So. 2d 372 (La. App. 1985); 
Vaughn, 756 S.W.2d 548; Brissette v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 479 S.W.2d 176 
(Mo. App. 1972); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 
730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972); Rome v. Kelly 
Springfield Tire Company, 217 Va. 943, 234 S.E.2d 277 (1977). Cf. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., Inc. v. Haven Hills Farm, Inc., 395 So. 2d 991 (Ala. 1981).

15 LeBouef, 623 F.2d 985; 
Hammond, 269 F.2d 501; Cavallaro, 157 Cal. Rptr. 602; Barth, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306; Dambacher, 485 A.2d 408.

16 Leonard v. Uniroyal, 
Inc., 765 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1985); Edwards, 512 F.2d 276; Hall, 263 S.E.2d 449; 
Nave v. Rainbo Tire Service, Inc., 123 Ill. App.3d 585, 78 Ill.Dec. 501, 462 N.E.2d 620 (1984); Coulter, 622 S.W.2d 421; Stang, 497 P.2d 732; Markle, 509 P.2d 529.

17 Nielson, 570 F.2d 272; 
Baker v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 Cal. App. 2d 221, 252 P.2d 24 (1953); Bailey v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 635 P.2d 899 (Colo. App. 1981); Bridges v. 
Interstate Truck Leasing, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 361, 319 S.E.2d 531 (1984); Craig, 
228 So. 2d 723; Walters v. Tire Sales & Service, Inc., 51 N.C. App. 378, 276 S.E.2d 729, review denied 303 N.C. 320, 281 S.E.2d 660 (1981); Hewitt v. General 
Tire & Rubber Co., 3 Utah 2d 354, 284 P.2d 471 (1955); Ewer, 480 P.2d 260.

18 Hansen v. Firestone Tire 
and Rubber Company, 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960); McCarty v. E.J. Korvette, 
Inc., 28 Md. 
App. 421, 347 A.2d 253 (1975).

19 Smith v. Uniroyal, Inc., 
420 F.2d 438 (7th Cir. 1970); Nave, 462 N.E.2d 620; Craig, 228 So. 2d 723. Cf. 
Markle, 509 P.2d 529.

20 Lucas, 458 F.2d 495; 
Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965); The Gray Line Co. 
v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 280 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1960); Fruehauf 
Trailer Division v. Thornton, 174 Ind. App. 1, 366 N.E.2d 21 (1977); Davies, 282 N.W.2d 172; Smith v. Frontier, Inc., 53 Wn.2d 805, 337 P.2d 299 
(1959).

[fn21] LeBouef, 
623 F.2d 985; Edwards, 512 F.2d 276 (Michelin Tire); Cavallaro, 157 Cal. Rptr. 602; Barth, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306; Dambacher, 485 A.2d 408.

[fn22] Johnson, 
812 F.2d 200; Leonard, 765 F.2d 560; Smith, 420 F.2d 438; Nebelung, 96 P.2d 327; 
Vaughn, 756 S.W.2d 548; Crawford, 317 S.E.2d 336; Stewart, 506 N.E.2d 783; 
Joshua v. Fulton, 498 So. 2d 1132 (La. App. 1986), writ denied 501 So. 2d 230 (La. 
1987); Taylor, 509 So. 2d 895; Moslander, 628 S.W.2d 899; Coulter, 622 S.W.2d 421; Hewitt, 284 P.2d 471. Cf. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 298 N.E.2d 289.

[fn23] For 
example, see Edwards, 512 F.2d 276; Nesselrode, 707 S.W.2d 371; and Note, Strict 
Products Liability: Missouri Moves Toward Absolute Liability, 55 UMKC L.Rev. 434 
(1987). Cf. Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product 
Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 Minn.L.Rev. 773 
(1979); Comment, supra n. 2, 9 U. Dayton L.Rev. 81; and Note, Failures to Warn 
and the Sophisticated User Defense, 74 Va.L.Rev. 579 (1988).

[fn24] See 
Johnson, 812 F.2d 200. Cf. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 298 N.E.2d 289; 
Price & Roth, Product Liability Defenses, 39 FICC Quarterly 201 (1989); and 
Comment, Tort Defenses to Strict Products Liability, 20 Syracuse L.Rev. 924 
(1969).