Case Title: Reznik v. Mendes

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12505

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12505 
 
MARK REZNIK  vs.  JOSEPH P. MENDES & others.1 
 
 
November 15, 2018. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Practice, Civil, Notice of appeal, Attorney's fees, Costs. 
 
 
 
Mark Reznik filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
in the county court seeking, among other things, an order 
requiring the Appeals Court to accept his notice of appeal from 
its award of appellate attorney's fees against him in the 
underlying litigation.2  The single justice denied the petition 
                     
 
1 Michael P. Johnson and the Massachusetts Appeals Court.  
The Appeals Court is a nominal party only.  See S.J.C. Rule 
2:22, 422 Mass. 1302 (1996).  The defendants in the underlying 
litigation, Nicholas Urzia and Miranda Equipment & Contracting, 
Inc., were not named as parties in the petition, although they 
should have been.  See id. 
 
 
2 To the extent Reznik's petition also sought relief from 
the Appeals Court's decision on the substantive merits of his 
appeal, and from a decision of the Appellate Division of the 
District Court dismissing his initial appeal to that court, the 
single justice correctly denied relief.  The power of general 
superintendence "is meant for situations where a litigant has no 
adequate alternative remedy."  McMenimen v. Passatempo, 452 
Mass. 178, 185 (2008).  With respect to the Appellate Division's 
decision, Reznik could have appealed, and in fact did appeal, to 
the Appeals Court.  With respect to the Appeals Court's decision 
on the merits, he could have petitioned for a rehearing in the 
Appeals Court or applied for further appellate review in this 
court. 
2 
 
 
 
 
and the accompanying motions that Reznik had also filed in the 
county court.  We affirm. 
 
 
This case originated in the District Court when Reznik 
filed a civil complaint against Nicholas Urzia and Miranda 
Equipment & Contracting, Inc.  The complaint was eventually 
dismissed because of, among other things, Reznik's multiple 
violations of interim court orders.  Reznik's appeal to the 
Appellate Division of the District Court from the dismissal of 
his case was thereafter dismissed by the Appellate Division for 
failure to comply with the appellate rules.  Reznik then 
appealed to the Appeals Court.  In a memorandum and order 
pursuant to its rule 1:28, the Appeals Court affirmed the 
Appellate Division's decision, concluded that Reznik's appeal 
from that decision was "interposed solely for purposes of 
harassment, wholly lack[ed] legal or factual basis, and 
otherwise [was] frivolous," and granted the appellees' request 
for appellate attorney's fees and double costs pursuant to Mass. 
R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 376 Mass. 949 (1979).  Reznik 
neither petitioned the Appeals Court for a rehearing nor filed 
an application for further review in this court, as he might 
have done at that juncture.  Instead, he filed a notice of 
appeal in the Appeals Court, purporting to appeal as a matter of 
right to this court pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 6G, from the 
Appeals Court's award of fees and double costs. 
 
 
The Appeals Court struck Reznik's notice of appeal from its 
award of fees and double costs.  The court explained that its 
order was not predicated on G. L. c. 231, § 6F, and therefore he 
had no right to appeal pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 6G.  Rather, 
as the Appeals Court explained to him, its award of fees and 
double costs was based on Mass. R. A. P. 25, from which there is 
no appeal to this court as a matter of right.  Reznik's options 
at that point were to petition for rehearing in the Appeals 
Court, Mass. R. A. P. 27, as amended, 410 Mass. 1602 (1991); 
apply for further appellate review in this court, Mass. R. A. P. 
27.1, as amended, 441 Mass. 1601 (2004); or appeal from the 
                     
 
The single justice also correctly denied Reznik's request 
for discipline of the two attorneys who, in the Appeals Court, 
requested attorney's fees and costs on behalf of their clients.  
See Gorbatova v. Semuels, 462 Mass. 1012, 1012 (2012) ("no 
private right to commence a court action to seek disciplinary 
action against an attorney"); Matter of a Request for an 
Investigation of an Attorney, 449 Mass. 1013, 1014 (2008). 
3 
 
 
 
 
striking of his notice of appeal.3  See Fronk v. Fowler, 456 
Mass. 317, 326-327 & n.20 (2010) (describing different routes 
for obtaining appellate review of fee awards under G. L. c. 231, 
§ 6F, on one hand, and awards under Mass. R. A. P. 25 and 
G. L. c. 211A, § 15, on other hand; "Decisions concerning the 
award of litigation costs follow different appellate paths 
depending on their origin"); Masterpiece Kitchen & Bath, Inc. v. 
Gordon, 425 Mass. 325, 330 & n.11 (1997) (G. L. c. 231, § 6G, 
only authorizes appeals "from decisions rendered under G. L. c. 
231, § 6F"; "party aggrieved by the award of costs by the 
Appeals Court under G. L. c. 211A, § 15, and Mass. R. A. P. 25 
may seek review in this court by applying for further appellate 
review"); Avery v. Steele, 414 Mass. 450, 451 (1993) (granting 
further appellate review to consider assessment of double costs 
under Mass. R. A. P. 25 and G. L. c. 211A, § 15). 
 
 
This is not a case where Reznik had a right to appellate 
review that was thwarted by a court.  Contrast Reznik v. 
Garaffo, 466 Mass. 1034, 1035 (2013); Reznik v. District Court 
Dep't of the Trial Court, 456 Mass. 1001, 1001 (2010).  He was 
not entitled to appeal to this court as a matter of right.  He 
had an opportunity to seek discretionary review from this court 
by applying for further appellate review, but failed to avail 
                     
 
3 Striking a notice of appeal on the ground that no right to 
appeal exists, as the Appeals Court did here, does not foreclose 
one's right to appeal altogether, but it limits the scope of 
what may be appealed.  A party who believes that he or she has a 
right to appeal from a challenged order may file a second notice 
of appeal from the order striking the first notice of appeal.  
It would then be incumbent on the lower court to allow an appeal 
to proceed on the limited question whether the party had a right 
to appeal from the challenged order in the first place.  See 
Elles v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Quincy, 450 Mass. 671, 673 
(2008), and cases cited.  See also Skandha v. Clerk of the 
Superior Court for Civil Business in Suffolk County, 472 Mass. 
1017, 1019 (2015); Reznik v. Garaffo, 466 Mass. 1034, 1035 
(2013); Reznik v. District Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 456 
Mass. 1001, 1001 (2010).  The result we reach here -- that 
Reznik had no right to appeal pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 6G, 
because the Appeals Court's award of fees and double costs was 
made under Mass. R. A. P. 25 and not under G. L. c. 231, § 6F -- 
would be the same regardless whether Reznik had filed a second 
notice of appeal in the Appeals Court, and the case had come 
before us in that fashion, instead of petitioning a single 
justice of this court under G. L. c. 211, § 3, as he did. 
4 
 
 
 
 
himself of that opportunity even after the Appeals Court 
directed him in writing to the correct procedure. 
 
 
Because Reznik had no right to appeal pursuant to 
G. L. c. 231, § 6G, and because he could have applied for 
further appellate review in this court, the single justice 
properly declined to exercise this court's extraordinary power 
of general superintendence under G. L. c. 211, § 3.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Mark Reznik, pro se. 
 
Michael P. Johnson, pro se. 
 
Joseph P. Mendes, pro se. 
                     
 
4 Reznik's filings both before the single justice and before 
the full court were replete with vitriolic, unsubstantiated, and 
ultimately irrelevant accusations against the attorneys and 
judges who were involved in this case.  We have previously 
cautioned him against this, and have placed him on notice that 
the inclusion of such material may lead to sanctions.  See 
Reznik v. Garaffo, 466 Mass. at 1035 n.4.  The respondents did 
not include a request for sanctions in their briefs before this 
court, but in the future we will not hesitate to impose 
sanctions with or without a request.  See Avery v. Steele, 414 
Mass. 450 (1993).