Case Title: Ex Parte Dison

Citation: 469 So. 2d 662

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1984-11-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
469 So. 2d 662 (1984)
Ex parte Elmore N. DISON III.
(Re: Elmore N. DISON III v. STATE.)
83-836.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 16, 1984.
Rehearing Denied February 8, 1985.
*663 Arthur Parker, Birmingham, for petitioner.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Richard L. Owens, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
BEATTY, Justice.
This Court granted certiorari in order to respond to the following legal question: Whether an appeal from a conviction of a misdemeanor in district court upon an unsworn DUI ticket and complaint gives the circuit court jurisdiction in a trial de novo and allows the circuit court to verify the complaint, or whether a subsequent judgment of conviction in circuit court is void.
Appellant Dison was arrested by a state trooper on December 24, 1982, and given a ticket for driving under the influence of alcohol. The arresting officer signed the ticket and complaint, but it was not sworn to and acknowledged by a judge or magistrate prior to or during the district court proceedings. Dison was tried in the district court of Jefferson County on February 22, 1983, and found guilty and fined $200. He appealed to the circuit court, where the district attorney filed a separate complaint.
Dison moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the district court judgment was void as based on a complaint without the affidavit. The circuit court judge denied the motion, and then the judge signed the verification portion of the original ticket after having the arresting officer take the stand and swear to the charge. Dison was found guilty and again fined $200.
On March 20, 1984, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Dison's conviction, and, on April 24, 1984, overruled his application for rehearing. 469 So. 2d 661. That court also overruled his Rule 39(k), A.R.A.P., motion directed to what he contends was the misconstruction of the facts by the Court of Criminal Appeals in that the language in that court's opinion seemed to imply that the state trooper failed to sign the ticket, when, in fact, the ticket was signed, but not verified by the district court. The record supports the allegations of petitioner's motion.
A perusal of the authorities leads to the conclusion that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in affirming petitioner's conviction under these facts.
The manner of a court's obtaining jurisdiction was discussed in Kyser v. State, 22 Ala.App. 431, 432, 117 So. 157, 158 (1928):
In Slater v. State, 230 Ala. 320, 162 So. 130 (1935), a misdemeanor complaint lacking specificity in the affidavit as to the violation charged was attacked. The accused appealed a county court conviction to circuit court, where the accused was again convicted. This Court held on appeal that the affidavit and warrant were void for failing to allege an offense, and added:
Leonard v. State, 52 Ala.App. 212, 290 So. 2d 673 (1974), is to the same effect. In Leonard, the accused was charged under an unverified complaint filed in the county court. After his conviction in the county court, he appealed to the circuit court, where he was again convicted. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed his conviction, stating at 52 Ala.App. at 213, 290 So.2d at 674:
"We held in Hawkins v. State, 20 Ala. App. 285, 101 So. 514 [1924], as follows:
"We also held in Wetzel v. State, 27 Ala.App. 517, 176 So. 224(3) [1937], cert. den. 234 Ala. 610, 176 So. 226, as follows:
And, in Sparks v. State, 39 Ala.App. 517, 104 So. 2d 764 (1958), the Court of Appeals held that a form which purported to be an affidavit, but which lacked the name of an affiant and a subscription, was no affidavit *665 at all, and there being no affidavit, the charge against the accused was unsupported. "Being still-born," that court remarked, "amendment cannot breathe life into it." See also Dennis v. State, 40 Ala. App. 480, 115 So. 2d 125 (1959).
The respondent cites us to Pierce v. State, 38 Ala.App. 97, 77 So. 2d 507 (1954). It is true that the language of Pierce made the affidavit no substantial part of the solicitor's complaint, therefore holding that its absence did not render the complaint void or deprive the court of jurisdiction. Moreover, the respondent argues that the petitioner here waived the defect complained of by failing to object thereto in district court, citing Pierce, supra, and Nicholas v. State, 32 Ala.App. 574, 28 So. 2d 422 (1946). Nicholas, however, was based upon two bastardy prosecutions in which written complaints were not required, the duty of the inferior court having been limited to finding probable cause and certifying the case to circuit court. Cf. Laney v. State, 109 Ala. 34,19 So. 531 (1896). Nicholas, in addition, relied on Title 13, § 346, Code of 1940, which regarded as amended on appeal any amendable imperfections or inaccuracies in inferior proceedings. This section was repealed by Acts of Ala. 1975, No. 1205, § 4-134.
Cf. also Temporary Rule 16.2(d)., A.R. Crim.P.:
Respondent also argues that petitioner's appeal to the circuit court was via a trial de novo: It cites Yarbrough v. City of Birmingham, 353 So. 2d 75, 78 (Ala. Crim.App.1977), for the proposition that:
Yarbrough itself, however, recognized that the inferior court's judgment was "a step toward the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court." Although the slate is wiped clean, in a sense, our decisions have not allowed a subsequent district attorney's complaint to be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the circuit court without resting upon a charge supported by affidavit. Horn v. State, 22 Ala.App. 459, 117 So. 283 (1928). Indeed,
And, when the initial affidavit in a misdemeanor case is not merely irregular, but void, it will not support the filing of a sufficient information or complaint by the district attorney for a trial de novo in circuit court. Sellers v. State, 55 Ala.App. 114, 313 So. 2d 542 (1975); Slater, supra.
We observe that our judicial decisions on the question before and since Pierce v. State, supra, i.e., Sparks, supra; Dennis, supra; and Leonard, supra, have applied the correct principle. To the extent that Pierce, supra, is contrary to those decisions, it is expressly overruled.
It follows from the authorities cited above that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction in petitioner's trial de novo because the district court judgment was void as being based upon an unverified complaint. Hence, petitioner's conviction in circuit court was itself void. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this cause is remanded to *666 that court for an order consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
BEATTY, Justice.
APPLICATION FOR REHEARING OVERRULED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., dissents.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
I did not participate in the opinion of the Court on original deliverance, because I did not sit during the oral arguments, but in view of the gravity of the majority's opinion, I now take this opportunity, on the State's application for rehearing, to register my dissent and express why the overruling of Pierce v. State, 38 Ala.App. 97, 77 So. 2d 507 (1954), cert. den., 262 Ala. 702, 77 So. 2d 512 (1955), is not required. In Pierce, then-Judge Harwood opined:
In Champion v. State, 39 Ala.App. 10, 95 So. 2d 803 (1957), cert. den., 266 Ala. 696, 95 So. 2d 804 (1957), Judge Harwood wrote:
*667 "It is to be noted that the name of the complainant is left blank in the face of the complaint, though it is signed by L.C. Marshall. We pretermit discussion of the validity of the complaint in this form, for it is clear that the doctrine stated in Nicholas v. State, 32 Ala.App. 574, 28 So. 2d 422, 424 [1946], necessitates a denial of appellant's motion for a rehearing, said doctrine being set forth as follows:
Although Title 13, § 346, Code of 1940, which regarded as amended on appeal any amendable imperfections or inaccuracies in inferior proceedings, was repealed by Acts of Ala.1975, No. 1205, § 4-134, I do not believe the absence of a verification of the traffic ticket rendered it void. As Judge Harwood, who later served on this Court, stated in Pierce, supra:
Temporary Rule 16.2(d), Ala.R.Crim.P., which provides that a question of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, does not apply. The majority quotes the substance of this rule in its opinion and states: "See Comment which explains that subject matter jurisdiction, such as a sworn complaint, cannot be waived; however, personal jurisdiction may be waived." The Comment to Temp. Rule 16.2(d), Ala.R. Crim.P., does not make any reference to the words "such as a sworn complaint," which appear in the majority opinion, so I interpret the majority's reference to be an interpretation of the words "subject matter jurisdiction." A district court has jurisdiction to try traffic offenses such as the one involved here; therefore, I disagree with the majority's interpretation of the words "subject matter jurisdiction."
I am mindful of our state's constitutional provision that the accused is entitled "to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; and to have a copy thereof." Sec. 6, Ala. Const., 1901. Here, the defendant had a statement of "the nature and cause of the accusation"; it just was not verified. The lack of a verification, in my opinion, was an amendable defect, and did not make the accusation void, nor deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, I respectfully dissent.