Case Title: State ex rel. Fryerson v. Tate

Citation: 1999-Ohio-465

Docket Number: 19972517

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. FRYERSON, APPELLANT, v. TATE, WARDEN, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Fryerson v. Tate (1999), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking release of juvenile petitioner from 
Belmont Correctional Institution – Writ denied, when. 
(No. 97-2517 — Submitted December 1, 1998 — Decided February 17, 
1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Belmont County, No. 97-BA-38. 
 
In January 1996, Cleveland police officers responded to a reported robbery 
of a 1989 Buick Park Avenue automobile owned by Thomas Jones.  Jones 
described one assailant as a male wearing a black leather coat and dark jeans.  
Later that evening in the same area, Lawrence Robinson reported to police that 
two males had robbed him of money and shot him in the leg.  Robinson said that 
one attacker was wearing a waist-length, black-leather coat, dark jeans, and a ski 
mask. 
 
Following the second report, police spotted the stolen Buick, which had two 
occupants.  After a brief chase ending with the stolen car’s crashing into a fence, 
the two occupants got out of the car and ran.  The police caught the driver of the 
stolen car, appellant, Lafette Fryerson.  Appellant, who was then sixteen years old, 
was wearing a black-leather coat and dark jeans. 
 
Shortly thereafter, a Cleveland police officer filed a complaint in the 
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, alleging that appellant 
was a delinquent child for committing acts that would constitute criminal offenses 
if he had been an adult.  Among other things, the police officer alleged that 
appellant had committed kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and felonious assault in 
connection with the attack on Lawrence Robinson and receiving stolen property 
 
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relating to the theft of Jones’s Buick.  The juvenile court denied the prosecutor’s 
motion to amend the receiving stolen property charge to aggravated robbery. 
 
Following a bindover hearing, the juvenile court ordered the mandatory 
bindover of appellant to the general division of the common pleas court pursuant 
to R.C. 2151.26(B) for trial as an adult on the kidnapping and aggravated robbery 
charges, i.e., charges that related to Robinson and not Jones.  The juvenile court 
held in pertinent part that “[u]pon the conclusion of all evidence presented relating 
to the matter herein and the arguments of counsel, the court finds that the child 
was 16 years of age at the time of the conduct charged and that there is probable 
cause to believe that the child committed * * * act[s] that would be the crime[s] of 
kidnapping, in violation of O.R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), and aggravated robbery, in 
violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), if committed by an adult.” 
 
In July 1996, in case No. CR 340376, a grand jury indicted appellant for 
several offenses, including aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and felonious assault 
of Robinson, and aggravated robbery of Jones.  The common pleas court 
subsequently dismissed this indictment. 
 
In case No. CR 344010, the grand jury indicted appellant for the robbery of 
Jones and grand theft of his motor vehicle.  In November 1996, appellant was 
convicted of these charges and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of eight to 
fifteen years, with eight years of actual incarceration. 
 
In 1997, appellant, an inmate at Belmont Correctional Institution, filed a 
petition in the Court of Appeals for Belmont County to compel appellee, his prison 
warden, to release him.  Appellant claimed that his conviction and sentence were 
void because (1) he was convicted of offenses for which he was never bound over, 
and (2) the mandatory bindover provisions of R.C. 2151.26 are unconstitutional.  
 
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Appellee filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the petition, and the court of 
appeals denied the writ. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
James A. Draper, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Jean M. 
Gallagher, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Michele M. Schoepe, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  In his first proposition of law, appellant 
contends that he has stated a viable habeas corpus claim because his sentencing 
court lacked jurisdiction to convict him of offenses different from those for which 
he was bound over by the juvenile court.  Appellant argues that when all aspects of 
this case are considered together, the end result must be that the court of appeals 
erred in denying the writ.  The principal points of appellant’s arguments can be 
distilled into four separate components. 
 
First, appellant asserts that a habeas corpus petition alleging that the 
sentencing court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner due to an improper 
bindover states a potentially good cause of action in habeas corpus.  Gaskins v. 
Shiplevy (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 656 N.E.2d 1282, 1284 (“Gaskins I”); 
State ex rel. Harris v. Anderson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 193, 195, 667 N.E.2d 1, 2.  
Appellant points out that in State v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 652 N.E.2d 
196, paragraph one of the syllabus, this court held that absent a proper bindover 
pursuant to R.C. 2151.26, the juvenile court has exclusive subject-matter 
jurisdiction over any case concerning an alleged delinquent child.  See, also, State 
v. Golphin (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 544-545, 692 N..E.2d 608, 610. 
 
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Second, appellant claims that his petition sufficiently alleges the lack of a 
proper bindover because he was never bound over for the offenses for which he 
was convicted and sentenced.  Appellant further contends that the transfer of a 
case from juvenile court for criminal prosecution pursuant to the mandatory 
bindover provisions of R.C. 2151.26(B) and the discretionary bindover provisions 
of R.C. 2151.26(C) confers jurisdiction of “all further proceedings pertaining to 
the act charged  * * * within the jurisdiction of the court to which it is transferred 
as described in division (H) of 2151.23 of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 2151.26(F).  
Appellant also asserts that under R.C. 2151.23(H)(1), the transferee court has 
jurisdiction to hold further proceedings on the “offense that was the basis of the 
transfer of the case for criminal prosecution.” 
 
Appellant contends that based on the amended version of R.C. 2151.26, in 
effect at the time that he committed the offenses charged, his sentencing court 
lacked jurisdiction to try him on offenses against Jones because these offenses 
were not the basis of the bindover by the juvenile court.  R.C. 2151.26 and 
2151.23(H).  See, generally, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, 146 Ohio Laws, Part I, effective 
January 1, 1996. 
 
Third, appellant alleges that the possibility of an adequate alternative 
remedy is irrelevant to his habeas corpus petition, which allegedly raises a 
jurisdictional claim of an improper bindover.  See Harris, 76 Ohio St.3d at 195, 
667 N.E.2d at 2-3; Gaskins I, 74 Ohio St.3d at 151, 656 N.E.2d at 1284.  See, also, 
Pegan v. Crawmer (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 97, 99-100, 666 N.E.2d 1091, 1094, 
citing In re Lockhart (1952), 157 Ohio St. 192, 195, 47 O.O. 129, 131, 105 N.E.2d 
35, 37, and paragraph three of the syllabus (“where a judgment is void due to lack 
of jurisdiction, habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy despite the availability of 
alternative remedies such as appeal”); Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d at 44-46, 652 N.E.2d 
 
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at 199-200 (When a court lacks jurisdiction to convict a juvenile due to an 
improper bindover, the judgment of conviction it enters is void ab initio, and this 
jurisdictional defect cannot be waived.). 
 
Fourth, appellant urges that this court’s holding in Gaskins v. Shiplevy 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 380, 667 N.E.2d 1194 (“Gaskins II”) is inapplicable to this 
case.  In Gaskins I, this court reversed the summary dismissal of a habeas corpus 
petition that alleged an improper bindover and ordered the court of appeals to 
allow the writ, require the warden to make a return, and determine whether 
bindover was improper.  Gaskins I, 74 Ohio St.3d at 151, 656 N.E.2d at 1284.  The 
warden filed a return that included the juvenile court’s bindover entry, and the 
court of appeals denied the writ.  Gaskins II, 76 Ohio St.3d at 380-381, 667 
N.E.2d at 1195-1196.  On appeal, this court affirmed the denial of the writ because 
the bindover entry established “full compliance with the bindover procedure,” and 
the petitioner had adequate legal remedies to address his contentions assailing the 
accuracy of the bindover entry and seeking correction of the entry.  Gaskins II, 76 
Ohio St.3d at 382-383, 667 N.E.2d at 1196-1197.  Appellant argues that this court 
in Gaskins II did not overrule any previous decisions, and that the discussion in 
Gaskins II concerning the adequacy of an alternative remedy is limited to cases 
where, following allowance of the writ and ordering a return, a bindover entry is 
submitted that is not contradicted by the record and establishes compliance with 
the bindover requirements, and the petitioner challenges the accuracy of the entry. 
 
As a preliminary matter, we acknowledge that this court did hold in Wilson 
that, absent a proper bindover, the juvenile court has exclusive subject-matter 
jurisdiction over an alleged delinquent child.  Furthermore, we acknowledge that a 
majority of this court did hold in Gaskins I and Harris that a habeas corpus 
petition alleging that the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner 
 
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due to an improper bindover states a potentially good cause of action in habeas 
corpus. 
 
Upon initial consideration of the points raised in appellant’s four major 
arguments, there does appear to be some individual merit in some aspects of 
appellant’s position.  However, a thorough examination of the record and a 
consideration of the interplay of the component arguments applied to the 
circumstances of this case compel an opposite result from that sought by appellant. 
 
The general rule is that habeas corpus relief is not available where there is 
an adequate remedy at law.  See Gaskins II, 76 Ohio St.3d at 383, 667 N.E.2d at 
1197; Luchene v. Wagner (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 37, 39, 12 OBR 32, 33-34, 465 
N.E.2d 395, 396; State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 185, 186, 
652 N.E.2d 746, 748.  It is true that in the past this court has carved out a limited 
exception to this general rule, to apply when the habeas petitioner is challenging 
the jurisdiction of the court that sentenced him.  Some of these cases have 
involved an alleged improper bindover.  See, e.g., Gaskins I, 74 Ohio St.3d at 151, 
656 N.E.2d at 1284; Harris, 76 Ohio St.3d at 195, 667 N.E.2d at 2-3.  Other cases 
have involved allegations of various types of jurisdictional defects, in different 
contexts.  See, e.g., In re Lockhart, 157 Ohio St. at 195, 47 O.O. at 131, 105 
N.E.2d at 37, and at paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
However, based upon the specific circumstances of this case, we need not 
revisit the propriety of upholding the continuing validity of this exception in 
bindover cases, nor need we consider whether only certain types of bindover 
challenges should be subject to the exception.  The situation presented here is 
fundamentally distinguishable from cases such as Gaskins I and Harris; hence, the 
exception does not apply. 
 
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The key deficiency in appellant’s position is that in actuality he is not 
challenging the bindover; he is instead challenging the validity of subsequent 
events that took place after a technically correct bindover occurred.  The bindover 
proceedings and entry, relative to the four points discussed above, did comply 
with applicable bindover procedures.  Although the juvenile court may have 
transferred appellant only on the charges involving Robinson, appellant was 
correctly bound over on those charges.  Appellant’s arguments in his first 
proposition of law instead go to the propriety of his subsequent indictment, 
conviction, and sentencing after the bindover occurred. 
 
Once appellant was properly bound over, the common pleas court had 
jurisdiction to proceed.  It was only at the time of the proceedings in the common 
pleas court that possible error occurred, in that appellant had been bound over on 
charges involving Robinson and was prosecuted on the charges involving Jones.  
This consideration does not affect the essential validity of the bindover. 
 
This court has often held that “ ‘[h]abeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy 
and as with every extraordinary remedy is not available as a means of relief where 
there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.’ ”  Luchene, 12 
Ohio St.3d at 39, 12 OBR at 34, 465 N.E.2d at 396, quoting In re Piazza (1966), 7 
Ohio St.2d 102, 103, 36 O.O.2d 84, 85, 218 N.E.2d 459, 459; see In re Hunt 
(1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 378, 75 O.O.2d 450, 348 N.E.2d 727, paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  Hence, we find that in this situation, habeas relief is not available, since 
appellant had a remedy by way of direct appeal of his indictment and conviction.  
Indeed, appellant possesses other alternative remedies that he may pursue to raise 
his claims regarding lack of adherence to the alleged requirements of the version 
of R.C. 2151.26 applicable to him.  See, e.g., Gaskins II, 76 Ohio St.3d at 383, 667 
N.E.2d at 1197. 
 
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.1 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
Because appellant has not raised a viable claim in habeas corpus to 
challenge his conviction, his second proposition, asserting that the court of appeals 
erred in dismissing his constitutional claim, also has no merit.  Likewise, any other 
arguments not discussed in this opinion that appellant wishes to make regarding 
the proceedings below must be raised in the other forms of relief available to him. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the judgment affirming 
the denial of Fryerson’s habeas corpus petition.  Fryerson’s petition stated a 
potentially viable habeas corpus claim that was sufficient to withstand appellee’s 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal motion. 
 
First, contrary to the majority’s rationale, Fryerson is challenging the 
propriety of his bindover, and this challenge is jurisdictional.  R.C. 2151.26 and 
2151.23(H)(1) confer jurisdiction on the bindover transferee court, i.e., the general 
division of the common pleas court, only for the “offense that was the basis of the 
transfer of the case for criminal prosecution.”  (Emphasis added.)  Based on the 
plain language of these provisions, Fryerson’s sentencing court lacked jurisdiction 
to try, convict, and sentence him for the offenses allegedly committed when he 
was a child that were not “the basis of the transfer of the case for criminal 
prosecution.” 
 
In State v. Adams (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 120, 23 O.O.3d 164, 431 N.E.2d 
326, we held that once a child is properly transferred to the general division of a 
 
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common pleas court for one felony, the child is bound over for all felonies, even if 
the other felonies had not been subject to transfer proceedings.  Effective January 
1, 1996, however, the General Assembly amended R.C. 2151.26 by, among other 
things, adding language that superseded, in part, the Adams holding.  See Section 
3(B), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, 146 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 96 2; see, generally, Kurtz & 
Giannelli, Ohio Juvenile Law (1998) 208-209, Section 19.22; cf. Adams at 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  Based on the amended version of R.C. 2151.26, in 
effect at the time that Fryerson committed the offenses charged, Fryerson’s 
sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to try him for offenses against Jones because 
these offenses were not the basis of the bindover by the juvenile court.  R.C. 
2151.26 and 2151.23(H)(1). 
 
Second, contrary to the conclusion of the court of appeals and appellee’s 
contentions, our holding in Gaskins v. Shiplevey (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 380, 667 
N.E.2d 1194 (“Gaskins II”) is inapposite.  Gaskins II’s finding of an adequate 
remedy is restricted to cases in which a bindover entry, submitted following the 
allowance of the writ and uncontroverted by the record, establishes compliance 
with the bindover requirements and the habeas corpus petitioner merely challenges 
the accuracy of the entry.  Unlike Gaskins II, the bindover entry here did not 
establish compliance with the applicable bindover requirements.  This entry, 
which is attached to Fryerson’s petition, instead establishes that the juvenile court 
transferred only the charges involving Robinson, and did not transfer the charges 
involving Jones. 
 
Finally, because Fryerson’s petition alleged a jurisdictional defect, habeas 
corpus is an appropriate remedy.  The “ ‘ “very nature of the writ [of habeas 
corpus] demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential 
to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.” ’ 
 
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”  State ex rel. Pirman v. Money (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 591, 594, 635 N.E.2d 26, 
30.  By far the “most common situation in which the writ of habeas corpus will 
issue is when the petition successfully attacks the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court.”  State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 185, 187, 652 
N.E.2d 746, 748.  No other alternative remedy precludes the writ in these 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 656 
N.E.2d 1282, 1284; State ex rel. Harris v. Anderson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 193, 
195, 667 N.E.2d 1, 2-3; Pegan v. Crawmer (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 97, 99-100, 666 
N.E.2d 1091, 1094; In re Lockhart (1952), 157 Ohio St. 192, 195, 47 O.O. 129, 
131, 105 N.E.2d 35, 37, and paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals erred in denying the writ.  In 
fact, the majority concedes that “there does appear to be some individual merit in 
some aspects of appellant’s position.”  But the majority then attempts to 
distinguish this case from our habeas corpus precedent concerning bindover 
challenges, a purported distinction that appellee does not raise, that the court of 
appeals did not find, and that this court should not find persuasive.  As noted 
previously, the court of appeals and appellee instead relied on a misinterpretation 
of our holding in Gaskins II.  Therefore, Fryerson alleged a potentially viable 
habeas corpus claim, i.e., that under the applicable versions of R.C. 2151.26 and 
2151.23, his sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence him 
on the offenses against Jones, i.e., offenses which were not the basis of his 
bindover.  The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed, the court of 
appeals should allow the writ, and appellee should file a return.  Because the 
majority does not do so, I dissent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
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2. 
Section 3(B) of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1 provides: 
 
“The General Assembly hereby declares that its purpose in enacting the 
language in division (B) of section 2151.011 and divisions (B) and (C) of section 
2151.26 of the Revised Code that exists on and after the effective date of this act 
is to overrule the holding in State v. Adams (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 120 [23 O.O.3d 
164, 431 N.E.2d 326], regarding the effect of binding a child over for trial as an 
adult.”