Case Title: OLSON v KAYSER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1973-01-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12069 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 19 72 B E V E R L Y J , OLSON, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant a s t o Defendant Shaefer Plumbing and Heating, JAMES K A Y S E R and SHAEFER P L U M B I N G AND HEATING, Defendants, James Kayser t h e Appellant a s t o P l a i n t i f f Beverly J. Olson. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Frank E. Blair, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Bolinger and Wellcome, Bozeman, Montana. G. Page Wellcome argued, Bozeman, Montana. Brown and Gilbert, Bozeman, Montana. Gene I. Brown argued, Bozeman, Montana, For Respondent: Berg, ~ ' C o n n e l l , Angel and Andriolo, Bozeman, Montana, Charles I ? . Angel argued, Bozeman, Montana. Submitted: September 18, 1972 Decided : JAN 1 8 1 9 n - M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from the d i s t r i c t court of the f i f t h judicial d i s t r i c t , county of Madison. Plaintiff, Beverly J. Olson (hereinafter called p l a i n t i f f ) brought s u i t against defendants James Kayser (hereinafter called Kayser) the property owner, and Shaef er Plumbing and Heating (hereinafter called Shaefer) the contractor. Plaintiff alleged she was injured i n a f a l l on August 29, 1969, occasioned by stepping into a hole which appeared on Kayser's property as the result of e i t h e r negligent excavation, construction o r maintenance of a ditch, o r the negligent backfilling and compaction of the s o i l i n the ditch, which allowed the hole t o appear a s s o i l settled i n the ditch. The case was t r i e d t o a jury and a t the close of a l l the evidence the t r i a l court directed a verdict i n favor of Shaefer on February 4, 1971. Thereafter, the case was submitted t o the jury on the question of the l i a b i l i t y of the property owner Kayser, and on the same day the jury returned a verdict against the p l a i n t i f f and i n favor of Kayser. Upon motion of p l a i n t i f f , the t r i a l court on March 1, 1971, entered an order granting p l a i n t i f f a new t r i a l a s t o Kayser, but denied p l a i n t i f f ' s motion for a new t r i a l against Shaefer. Kayser appeals from the court's order granting a new t r i a l t o p l a i n t i f f . Plaintiff appeals the court's order denying plain- t i f f ' s motion for a new t r i a l against Shaefer. Kayser purchased the property i n question on April 1, 1969, The property is located i n Ennis, Montana, and consists of two buildings with four units, two of which were occupied by renters, One of the renters a t the time Kayser bought the property was Deborah Herman, daughter of plaintiff. Due t o septic tanks which would not drain and water con- tamination, Kayser decided t o have the units connected with the c i t y water and sewer. The plumbing work was contracted t o Shaefer, The work required a trench be dug from the buildings, through a driveway and parking area, t o the c i t y s t r e e t t o connect the c i t y services. After the pipes were installed, the trench was r e f i l l e d and tamped i n the area where p l a i n t i f f claims to have fallen. The agreement between Kayser and Shaefer was described a s a cost plus job or on a time and material basis. Shaefer started t o work on the project around July 1, 1969, and completed i t on July 9, 1969, a f t e r which Shaefer moved h i s equipment and men off the premises. O n the date of completion the front part of the property, which was a parking area adjacent t o the s t r e e t , was f i l l e d i n and made level. In addition t o the expected normal f i l l settlement i n the ditch, Kayser wanted t o r a i s e the parking area with gravel, due t o the m u d condition that followed rainy periods caused by the parking area being lower than the s t r e e t . Kayser f i r s t attempted t o obtain gravel for h i s premises sometime around August 1, 1969, by contacting Shaefer again but was notified by Shaefer that i t could not do the job because it did not have the equipment nor a gravel p i t , Thereafter, Kayser contacted a Steve Hubner who owned a gravel p i t and asked him i f he could bring i n the gravel. Hubner agreed t o bring i n the gravel and spread it i n the parking area and by subsequent contacts with Shaefer, Shaefer was t o help spread the gravel t o f i l l other holes on the property. However, before the gravel was brought t o the property, plaintiff f e l l and sustained the injuries which a r e the basis of t h i s action. On the night of August 29, 1969, approximately two days be- fore the gravel was spread on the property, plaintiff while going t o v i s i t her daughter, Deborah Herman, stepped i n a hole i n the driveway, pitched forward, and struck her face on the edge of a cement sidewalk. The area of the f a l l was unlighted, except for a c i t y s t r e e t l i g h t which was obstructed by a large t r e e i n full summer foliage . Varying descriptions of the hole a r e found i n the testimony. Plaintiff described the hole as being the depth of the length of her leg, or a t l e a s t past her knee, and somewhat larger than the diameter of her leg. Kayser t e s t i f i e d he was on the property a week before the accident and there was no such hole. Steve Hubner, who delivered gravel to the premises two days a f t e r the f a l l , t e s t i f i e d that he'*not see any such hole. Marilyn Olson, another daughter of p l a i n t i f f , t e s t i f i e d she observed a hole approximately eighteen inches deep i n the area. The Ennis night marshal1 Fred Rankin, who investigated the area a f t e r the accident, t e s t i f i e d t o seeing a hole and described i t as being eight and possibly ten inches deep. From a l l indications, the hole appeared from three t o four days or possibly a week before p l a i n t i f f ' s f a l l . Fred Rankin t e s t i f i e d as t o the apparent cause of the hole. H e statedthere was a period of heavy rain several days before p l a i n t i f f ' s f a l l , and it was h i s opinion the hole was caused by the rain. H i s explanation i s not i n conflict with Kayser's testimony--that he was l a s t on the property a week before the accident and a t that time there was no hole. Additionally, an kin's explanation is given further credence by the testimony of Marilyn Olson, who was living with her s i s t e r Deborah a t the time, and who did observe the hole but t e s t i f i e d that two weeks prior to the accident there was no hole. The t r i a l court's order granting a new t r i a l against Kayser stated: "The motion of the plaintiff for a new t r i a l a s t o the defendant James Kayser is granted. "The basis for granting t h i s motion i n the opinion of the Court i s that: "1. The evidence is insufficient t o justify the verdict. "2. The verdict is against the law of the case. I f The t r i a l court's order denying p l a i n t i f f ' s motion for a new t r i a l against Shaefer stated: "The motion of the plaintiff for a new t r i a l i s denied as t o the defendant Shaefer Plumbing and Heating . "The reasons for the ruling are a s follows: "On July 9, 1969, defendant Shaefer Plumbing and Heating Company had completed the work for M r . Kayser and on that day removed h i s men, materials and equipment from the job. Said defendant had r e f i l l e d the trench he had dug completely from the front line of the property of M r . Kayser back t o the second septic tank using a l l the materials excavated from the trench i n doing so. The front portion of the trench where the accident occurred was by him completely f i l l e d and compacted. Both M r . Kayser and M r . Shaefer realized the trench ground 'would s e t t l e , 1 "Mr. Kayser accepted the Shaefer Plumbing and Heating Company work completed on July 9, 1969, and upon presentation of a b i l l paid him for h i s work, machine use and materials. " ~ i f t y days l a t e r the accident t o the p l a i n t i f f occurred on August 28, 1969, There i s no evidence that Shaefer Plumbing and Heating incurred any l i a b i l i t y between July 9, 1969, and August 28, 1969, the date of the p l a i n t i f f ' s accident. There was therefore no issue for the jury. Moreover there was no conflicting evidence and there was but one conclusion t o be drawn from the evidence. 11 In the f i r s t appeal, plaintiff seeking a new t r i a l against Shaefer, the law on the subject of control of premises was stated by t h i s Court i n Ulmen v. Schwieger, 92 Mont. 331, 354, 12 P.2d 856, and most recently reaffirmed i n Hannifin v. Cahill- Mooney Construction Co., M o n t . 9 - P. 2d , 29 St. Rep. 493, 496. In Ulmen, p l a i n t i f f drove an automobile into an open excavation and against a concrete culvert, which plaintiff supposed was a regularly established and used highway. There were two defendantq the general contractor and a subcontractor for the concrete work. A t the time of the accident the concrete work was complete, but had not been accepted by the general contractor or the s t a t e highway commission. A judgment of $10,000 was entered against both defendants and they appealed. This Court i n affirming as t o the general contractor, but reversing a s t o the subcontractor, Roscoe, held: "It is also unimportant that Roscoe's work had not been 'accepted'. It was completed and he had with- drawn a l l control over it, so that it was a t the time of the accident but an integral part of the unfinished highway, no part of which would be accepted u n t i l ~chwieger's [general contractor] e n t i r e contract had been fully executed. "'The general r u l e i s w e l l established that an independent contractor i s not l i a b l e for injuries t o third persons, occurring a f t e r the contractor has completed the work and turned it over t o the owner or employer and the same has been accepted by him * * * the l a t t e r is substituted a s the responsible party. The reason for the substitu- tion of l i a b i l i t y i s found i n the general doctrine that an action for negligence w i l l not l i e unless the defendant was under some duty t o the injured party a t the t i m e and place where the injury oc- curred which he omitted t o perform.' (14 R.C.L. 107)". Ulmen contains an i n depth discussion with citations i n support of the holding which was reiterated verbatim i n Hannifin, decided by t h i s Court June 30, 1972. I n Hannifin, the defendant, Cahill-Mooney Construction Company, was given a contract by the Stauffer Chemical Company t o remove certain equipment from a building a t i t s plant near Butte, Montana. Following termination of the work and approxi- mately two months following Cahill-~ooney's departure from the premises, plaintiff Hannifin, an employee of Stauffer Chemical Company, f e l l through a hole in flooring which had been created as the result of the removal of equipment. This Court held, c i t i n g Ulmen, that the duty t o protect third persons attaches t o independent contractors "only when he has such control over the property as the master or contractee would otherwise have. I I In the instant case, the t r i a l court's order of March 1, 1971, made the clear observation that the accident occurred f i f t y days a f t e r defendant Shaefer surrendered care of the premises t o Kayser. Shaefer incurred no l i a b i l i t y following i t s departure from the premises and there was no issue for the jury. Accordingly, the t r i a l court properly denied p l a i n t i f f ' s motion for a new t r i a l against Shaefer. The court's order granting a new t r i a l as t o defendant Kayser i s very brief and assigns two grounds: "1. The evidence i s insufficient t o justify the verdict . "2. The verdict i s against the law of the case. I I After briefs and argument, i t can only be concluded that the t r i a l court considered i t s e l f i n error when i t instructed the jury as t o the duty the defendant landowner owed the p l a i n t i f f . There were four rental units and one driveway and parking area for the use of the tenants. The fact that only two tenants were i n residence, and one did not use the f a c i l i t y available t o the tenants, does not a l t e r the situation that there was a common area for the use of the tenants. The alleged injury occurred i n t h i s area and the arguments concerning the lack of proof of common usage or that pedestrian travel was allowed i n the area does not resolve the question, a s there was likewise no proof t o the contrary. Instruction No. 14 properly instructed the jury i n regard t o an invitee without using the term i t s e l f : 11 A n owner who leases or rents a portion of h i s property and retains control of another part which a tenant i s entitled t o use i n connection with the portion leased or rented t o him, is subject t o l i a b i l i t y t o others lawfully on the premises with the consent of the tenant for in- juries caused by a dangerous condition existing on the part of the premises under the owner's control i f , by the exercise of reasonable care, he could have discovered the condition and made it safe. "An owner i s not l i a b l e t o others lawfully on the premises with the consent of the tenant for in- juries resulting from a condition of the premises the danger of which i s known t o the person lawfully on the premises or i s obvious, unless the owner should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obvious danger. 11 See Lake v. Emigh, 121 Mont. 87, 190 P.2d 550; Callahan v. Buttrey, 186 F.Supp. 715 (D.C.Mont. 1960). Instructions No. 26 and No. 27 were i n error: "INSTRUCTION NO. 26. One of the issues t o be deter- mined by you i n t h i s case i s the duty of care owed t o Plaintiff a t the time and place the accident oc- curred. Determination of t h i s issue depends upon whether plaintiff was a licensee or an invitee. I I A licensee i s a person who, for h i s own pleasure, convenience, or benefit, enters or remains upon premises i n the possession of another with express or implied permission of the possessor. I f A n invitee i s a person who enters upon land i n the possession of another a t the invitation of the possessor o r for the common interest or mutual advantage of both the possessor and the person entering. I t "INSTRUCTION NO, 27. If you find that plaintiff was a licensee, then I instruct you that the only duty owed t o her was to refrain from willful or wanton a c t s of misconduct, or active negligence as distinguished from passive negligence, o r t o warn plaintiff of any hidden o r concealed dangers, i f any. I f I f you find that p l a i n t i f f was an invitee, then the duty owed t o her was that of ordinary care. 11 Duty i s a legal question t o be determined by the t r i a l court and submitted t o the jury, under proper instructions, I f there i s a conflict i n the facts that would change or a l t e r the duty owed t o the p l a i n t i f f , depending on which facts the jury accepts, then the court must instruct the jury i n the alternative t o make a fact determination and then apply the correct duty or standard furnished by the court. That was not done i n t h i s case, W e do not r e j e c t defendant Kayser's argument based on Berthelote v. Loy O i l Co,, 95 Mont. 434, 28 P.2d 187, however, the error here does affect the substantial rights of the moving party. Tigh v. College Park Realty Co., 149 Mont. 358, 427 P.2d The determination by the t r i a l court on a motion for a new t r i a l involves the exercise of judicial discretion and may not be disturbed on review, unless it i s clearly shown that the t r i a l court manifestly abused i t s discretion. This has not been shown here. Accordingly, the orders of the t r i a l court appealed from are affirmed. / Associate Justice 4 ................................ Associate Justices.