Case Title: State ex rel. Spann v. Mitchell

Citation: 1998-Ohio-217

Docket Number: 19980058

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. SPANN, APPELLANT, v. MITCHELL, WARDEN, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Spann v. Mitchell (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Habeas corpus to compel relator’s release from prison — Petition dismissed, 
when. 
(No. 98-58 — Submitted June 24, 1998 — Decided July 29, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County, No. 97-T-0102. 
 
In 1995, following a hearing, appellee Ohio Adult Parole Authority 
(“APA”), revoked the parole of appellant, Albert Spann. 
 
In 1997, Spann filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County 
for a writ of habeas corpus to compel his release from prison.  Spann claimed that 
under Kellogg v. Shoemaker (C.A.6, 1995), 46 F.3d 503, the APA had improperly 
applied newly enacted administrative rules concerning parole revocation.  Spann 
further contended that the APA had failed to comply with the minimum due 
process requirements for parole-revocation proceedings set forth in Morrissey v. 
Brewer (1972), 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484.  Appellees, the APA 
and Spann’s prison warden, filed a motion to dismiss, and Spann filed a motion for 
leave to amend his petition.  In his motion for leave to amend, Spann asserted in a 
conclusory fashion that he was prejudiced by the APA’s failure to conduct a 
proper parole revocation hearing within a reasonable time because “[t]he 
following witness[es] are no longer available to give testimony in defense, or 
mitigation.”  Spann, however, did not indicate the witnesses’ names, the nature of 
their testimony, or the parole violation charges they would have allegedly refuted. 
 
The court of appeals granted appellees’ motion and dismissed the petition. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Albert Spann, pro se. 
 
2
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Spann asserts in his propositions of law that the court of 
appeals erred in dismissing his habeas corpus petition. 
 
For the reasons that follow, however, we reject Spann’s assertions and 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.  First, as the court of appeals held, 
Kellogg is inapplicable here because Spann received a revocation hearing.  See 
Kellogg, 46 F.3d at 509.  Second, there is no ten-day or sixty-day rule entitling 
parolees to habeas corpus relief upon expiration of such period; instead, the 
applicable test is whether there has been an unreasonable delay in holding a 
parole-revocation hearing.  See Seebeck v. Zent (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 109, 111, 
623 N.E.2d 1195, 1197.  Finally, “[a]s long as an unreasonable delay has not 
occurred, the remedy for noncompliance with the Morrissey parole-revocation due 
process requirements is a new hearing, not outright release from prison.”  State ex 
rel. Jackson v. McFaul (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 185, 188, 652 N.E.2d 746, 749.  
Spann failed to allege sufficient facts establishing prejudice.  He alleged neither 
the nature of his witnesses’ testimony, the reasons why this testimony was no 
longer available to him, nor the parole violation charges they would have refuted. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly dismissed Spann’s 
petition.  Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.