Case Title: Colen Thomas v. Michael W. Moore

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC93-309

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1999-10-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. 93,309
____________
COLEN THOMAS,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, etc.,
Respondent.
[October 28, 1999]
PER CURIAM
Colen Thomas petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have
jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.  As further discussed below, we hereby
deny the instant petition, finding our recent gain time decision in Lancaster v.
State, 731 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1591 (1999), to be
distinguishable from this case.
In 1989, Thomas began serving a prison sentence for two offenses
committed on December 7, 1988.  During his incarceration, the Florida Department
1   When referring to the ending of Provisional Release supervision, section 944.277(7)(c),
Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), uses the term "terminate," instead of "revoke."  When referring to
the loss of credits, the statute uses the term "cancel" instead of "forfeit." We find the term
"revoke" better describes the situation in which supervision is ended due to misbehavior on the
releasee's part.  Likewise, we find the term "forfeit" to better describe the loss of credits which
occurs when a releasee's supervision is revoked. 
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of Corrections (hereinafter the Department) awarded Thomas 700 days of
Provisional Credits.  Subsequently, the Department canceled Thomas's Provisional
Credits pursuant to the "Safe Streets Initiative."  See § 944.278, Fla. Stat. (1993). 
On March 11, 1997, after the United States Supreme Court's gain time decision in
Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997), the Department restored the previously
canceled 700 days of Provisional Credits.  Due to the restoration of these credits,
Thomas was released and placed on Provisional Release supervision on March 25,
1997.  See § 944.277(5)-(6), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988).  Thomas failed to report to his
supervision officer, and in early 1998, his Provisional Release was revoked. 
Pursuant to the explicit terms of the Provisional Credits statute itself, the
previously awarded Provisional Credits were forfeited and Thomas was returned to
prison.1   While it now appears that Thomas has been released from the
Department's custody, we have decided not to dismiss this case as moot since we
believe this question is important and will likely recur.  See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.
2d 217 (Fla. 1984).
 
In State v. Lancaster, 731 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 1998), this Court recently held
2   Section 944.277(7)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), provides:
If an inmate violates any term or condition of provisional release
supervision, the Department of Corrections may take any of the
following actions:
.  .  .  .
     (c)   Terminate the provisional release supervision and return the inmate
to prison.  If an inmate is returned to prison, credits accumulated as of the
date of release to the provisional release supervision program may be
canceled as prescribed by department rule.  
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that the Department may not forfeit Administrative Gain Time or Provisional
Credits pursuant to section 944.278, Florida Statutes (1993), or sections 944.28(1)
or 948.06(6), Florida Statutes (1989), upon probation revocation, if the inmate's
underlying criminal offense was committed prior to October 1, 1989 (the effective
date of the amendments to sections 944.28(1) and 948.06 providing for gain time
forfeiture due to probation revocation).  Id. 
 However, in the present case, Thomas was not placed on probation when he
was released in 1997.  He was placed on Provisional Release pursuant to the
Provisional Credits statute itself.2  The statute provided both for the award of
Provisional Credits and for the forfeiture of those credits were the inmate to violate
the terms of his Provisional Release supervision.  See § 944.277(7)(c), Fla. Stat.
(Supp. 1988). 
In Lancaster, the petitioner committed his relevant offenses on May 3, 1987. 
The statutory scheme that applied to Lancaster was that in effect on the date of his
3   Section 944.277(7)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), covers only the particular type of
overcrowding gain time known as Provisional Credits.  As discussed in Dowdy v. Singletary, 704
So. 2d 1052, 1054 & n.5 (Fla. 1998), under sections 944.28(1) and 948.06(6), the Department
may only forfeit basic or incentive gain time for a Provisional Release, probation, or community
control revocation if the inmate's underlying criminal offense was committed on or after October
1, 1989.
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offenses.  After his release, he was placed on probation pursuant to his original
sentence.  However, the effective date of the probation gain time forfeiture statute
was October 1, 1989.  See §§ 944.28(1); 948.06(6), Fla. Stat. (1989) (adding
probation to the list of types of release).  Since those statutes went into effect after
Lancaster committed his relevant offenses, neither of those statutes could be
utilized (based on ex post facto principles) to forfeit Lancaster's gain time.  
Thomas, on the other hand, committed his offenses on December 7, 1988; he
was placed on Provisional Release, and the effective date of the Provisional
Release forfeiture statute was July 1, 1988 (before Thomas's offenses).  See §
944.277(7)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988); ch. 88-122, § 92 at 572, Laws of Fla.   As
explained by the United States Supreme Court, the Ex Post Facto Clause is
triggered when a law "increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the
crime was consummated."  Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441(quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450
U.S. 24, 30 (1981) (emphasis added).   Since the relevant forfeiture statute3 was in
effect when Thomas committed his offenses, there is no retroactive application of
this statute to him.  Thus, there is no ex post facto violation.  Accordingly, we deny
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the instant petition.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
PARIENTE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Colen Thomas, pro se, White City, Florida,
for Petitioner
Sheron L. Wells, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Respondent