Case Title: Cash v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 950720

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1996-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 
 Keenan, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
CAROLYN T. CASH 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 950720                  January 12, 1996 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF BUENA VISTA 
 
Thomas H. Wood, Judge 
 
 
On September 9, 1994, about 1:00 a.m., defendant Carolyn T. 
Cash was arrested and charged with driving a vehicle in the City 
of Buena Vista while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in 
violation of Code § 18.2-266.  On the same day, defendant also 
was charged in a warrant under Code § 18.2-268.2, a part of 
Virginia's implied consent law, with refusing to submit to a 
blood or breath test to determine the alcohol content of her 
blood. 
 
Subsequently, defendant was tried on both charges in the 
local general district court.  She was acquitted of DUI and 
convicted of the refusal charge.  She appealed the conviction to 
the circuit court. 
 
Pretrial, the circuit court granted the prosecutor's motion 
to exclude certain evidence proffered by the defendant on the 
reasonableness of her refusal to submit to the blood or breath 
test.  The prosecutor asked the court to prohibit, for example, 
any evidence regarding defendant's sobriety at the time of arrest 
and evidence of the outcome of the DUI charge on the ground that 
such evidence is irrelevant to the charge of unreasonable refusal 
to submit to such test. 
 
 
 
 
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Following a jury trial, at which only the arresting police 
officer testified, defendant was found guilty of the refusal 
charge.  She was sentenced to revocation of her driving 
privileges for one year, in accord with the verdict, and ordered 
to pay court costs.  The defendant appeals from the January 1995 
judgment order, which has been suspended during the appeal. 
 
The central question on appeal is whether the trial court 
erred in granting the prosecutor's pretrial motion limiting the 
evidence defendant could present to the jury. 
 
Initially, the relevant law should be reviewed.  Under the 
implied consent law, any person who operates a motor vehicle upon 
a highway in the Commonwealth is deemed, as a condition of such 
operation, to have consented to have samples of blood, breath, or 
both, taken for a chemical test to determine alcohol content of 
the person's blood, if that person is arrested for DUI in 
violation of the applicable statutes or of a similar local 
ordinance.  Code § 18.2-268.2(A). 
 
A person so arrested must be advised by the arresting 
officer of the implied consent condition and that "the 
unreasonable refusal" to submit to a test constitutes grounds for 
revocation of driving privileges.  If the person refuses to 
permit the testing, the person shall be taken before a 
magistrate, who must advise the person again of the implied 
consent law's requirements.  If the person declares the refusal 
in writing on a prescribed form, or refuses to so declare, then 
 
 
 
 
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no samples shall be taken.  Code § 18.2-268.3(A). 
 
Upon such refusal, the magistrate shall certify to such fact 
and that the person was advised of the law's requirements, and 
shall charge the person with a violation of Code § 18.2-268.2 for 
refusing the test.  Code § 18.2-268.3(B). 
 
At trial of the refusal charge, the declaration of refusal 
or the magistrate's certificate is prima facie evidence that the 
defendant refused to submit to the testing.  "However, this shall 
not prohibit the defendant from introducing on his behalf 
evidence of the basis for his refusal.  The court shall determine 
the reasonableness of such refusal."  Code § 18.2-268.3(E). 
 
In construing the foregoing statutes and their predecessors, 
this Court has decided that operation of a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs may give rise to two 
separate and distinct proceedings -- one a criminal action for 
DUI and the other a civil, administrative proceeding on the 
refusal charge.  "Each action proceeds independently of the other 
and the outcome of one is of no consequence to the other."  
Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 289, 170 S.E.2d 199, 201 
(1969).  See Commonwealth v. Rafferty, 241 Va. 319, 321-23, 402 
S.E.2d 17, 18-19 (1991).  Cf. Code § 18.2-268.4 (if defendant 
pleads guilty to DUI, court may dismiss refusal charge). 
 
The consent to submit to a blood or breath test, granted 
when a person operates a motor vehicle upon the highways, "is not 
a qualified consent and it is not a conditional consent, and 
 
 
 
 
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therefore there can be no qualified refusal or conditional 
refusal to take the test."  Deaner, 210 Va. at 292, 170 S.E.2d at 
 204.  The mere fact that under the statute "an accused is 
afforded an opportunity to establish the reasonableness of his 
refusal does not operate to dilute the consent previously given, 
or convert that consent into a qualified or conditional one."  
Id. at 292-93, 170 S.E.2d at 204.  Illustrative of a refusal that 
would be deemed reasonable is when "a person's health would be 
endangered by the withdrawal of blood."  Id. at 293, 170 S.E.2d 
at 204. 
 
The Court has held that a person's unwillingness to take the 
test without prior consultation with counsel does not constitute 
a reasonable basis for the refusal.  Coleman v. Commonwealth, 212 
Va. 684, 685, 187 S.E.2d 172, 174 (1972); Deaner, 210 Va. at 293, 
170 S.E.2d at 204.  In another case, we held it was not 
reasonable to refuse a blood analysis solely because counsel 
advised the defendant against taking the test.  Bailey v. 
Commonwealth, 215 Va. 130, 131, 207 S.E.2d 828, 829 (1974).  
There, the Court reiterated "there must be some reasonable 
factual basis for the refusal, for example, endangerment of the 
health of the accused by the withdrawal of blood."  Id., 207 
S.E.2d at 829. 
 
Interpreting the implied consent law, our Court of Appeals 
has held "that a driver's subjective belief that he was not under 
the influence of alcohol is not a reasonable basis for refusing 
 
 
 
 
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the test, nor is the fact that he could and did operate his 
vehicle in a proficient manner.  Thus, evidence of his state of 
sobriety or proficiency in operating the vehicle is not 
admissible in a case involving refusal to take a blood or breath 
test."  Quinn v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 321, 324, 388 S.E.2d 
268, 270 (1990). 
 
Against this background, we examine defendant's proffer, 
submitted to the trial court by an informal oral statement of 
counsel, to determine whether any of the proffered evidence 
should have been admitted. 
 
According to counsel, defendant's evidence "would be" that 
she and her husband "went to a place . . . in Buena Vista . . . 
shortly before eleven o'clock that evening [and] that they'd had 
nothing to drink before that."  While at the "place," they 
consumed "less than one beer . . . and at eleven-thirty [when] 
the last call was made. . . , there was one pitcher served at the 
table."  Three persons "were at that table and each had less than 
one mug."  Two witnesses would testify that defendant "was not 
under the influence, in any way." 
 
When defendant and her husband left "the place" in a car, 
"there was no erratic operation of the vehicle" by defendant.  
The police stopped the vehicle on a city street although 
defendant was "sober" and "she had done absolutely nothing to 
justify the police to stop her."  After the stop, the couple was 
"treated abusively" by the arresting officer, and both were 
 
 
 
 
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"ordered to take field sobriety tests."  Defendant "did well" on 
the test. 
 
Following defendant's refusal to take a blood or breath 
test, as the officer was taking defendant to a magistrate, she 
"kept telling the officer" that she wished to consult counsel; 
the officer made no response to the request.  She told the 
officer and the magistrate "she was concerned that she was being 
framed," that any test "would be manipulated, and she wanted to 
consult counsel to see what she could do to protect her interest 
from being framed." 
 
Defendant's perception she was being "framed" stemmed from a 
separate criminal case in which she was not a party.  She was 
scheduled to testify later in the day of her arrest in a criminal 
matter pending on a post-trial motion regarding juror misconduct. 
 Defendant "believed" the police "were trying to harass her and 
frame her . . . as punishment for her having volunteered to the 
defense in that case that she had information regarding the 
misconduct and bias of the jury."  Defendant, a school bus 
driver, also proffered evidence of events relating to her job 
occurring later in the day of her arrest, which she asserted 
corroborated her "framing" charge. 
 
Responding to defendant's "framing" allegation, the 
prosecutor represented to the trial court he was prepared to 
establish that the officers who were involved in defendant's 
arrest had no knowledge at the time that defendant was to be a 
 
 
 
 
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witness, or otherwise involved, in any court proceeding. 
 
On appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial court's 
granting of the prosecutor's pretrial motion prohibiting her 
"from introducing evidence of her fear of being framed and 
excluding any evidence of the reason the police stopped her."  In 
support of that assignment of error, defendant argues that the 
"reasonable fear of entrapment by the police coupled with the 
denial of an opportunity to consult counsel constitutes a factual 
basis for a reasonable refusal to submit to a blood or breath 
test."  Additionally, she argues the Commonwealth had to prove 
the reasonableness of the stop at the time of arrest for DUI to 
support the charge of unreasonable refusal to submit to the 
testing.  We do not agree. 
 
The precedent established in the cases we have just 
discussed dictates the result in the present case.  Manifestly, 
the evidence about defendant's sobriety, about her driving 
proficiency, and about her subjective belief that she was not 
under the influence of alcohol, while admissible in the DUI 
trial, was utterly inadmissible in the refusal trial. 
 
Moreover, her desire to consult counsel "to see what she 
could do to protect her interest from being framed" furnishes no 
legal basis for refusal to submit to testing.  As the trial judge 
observed, this contention "just puts a different spin" on the 
facts in Deaner and its progeny. 
 
By operating a motor vehicle on the highways of the 
 
 
 
 
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Commonwealth the night in question, defendant consented, as a 
condition of that operation, to have tests made to determine the 
alcohol content of her blood.  The chemical analysis of one's 
blood provides a scientifically accurate method of determining 
whether a person is intoxicated; it protects one who may appear 
to be intoxicated when, in fact, the individual is sober.  Walton 
v. City of Roanoke, 204 Va. 678, 683, 133 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1963). 
 
The defendant may not unilaterally abrogate that agreement 
or withdraw that consent by refusing the test unless there is a 
reasonable basis for the refusal.  A fear of being "framed" is 
not such a basis; it is not "reasonable" in the sense that 
evidence of endangerment of the health of the accused by 
withdrawal of blood furnishes a "reasonable" basis for refusal.  
That type of evidence should have been offered in the trial of 
the DUI charge because it may relate to the question whether the 
police officer's stop of the accused was lawful; certainly such 
evidence is not probative in the trial of the refusal charge. 
 
We note, however, that we are not presented in this case 
with the effect on the refusal charge of a dismissal of the DUI 
charge on constitutional grounds.  There is nothing in this 
record to suggest that the DUI charge was dismissed because 
defendant's constitutional rights were violated, and we will not 
presume such was the case in order to address that issue. 
 
Consequently, we hold that the trial court correctly refused 
to permit defendant to present the proffered evidence.  And, we 
 
 
 
 
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reject other errors assigned by defendant dealing with the 
sufficiency of the evidence to prove the refusal charge and with 
denial of an instruction she offered. 
 
Thus, the judgment of conviction will be 
 
Affirmed.