Case Title: Rivera v. Witt

Citation: 

Docket Number: 980712

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
SHERNETTE L. RIVERA 
 
v.  Record No. 980712    OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
February 26, 1999 
JOHNNY LEE WITT 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY 
J. Samuel Johnston, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal involving the uninsured motorist statute, 
we consider whether John Doe and an insured motorist later 
identified as John Doe are considered the same entity for 
purposes of the statute of limitations. 
 
Shernette L. Rivera (Rivera) filed a motion for judgment 
on August 13, 1993 against John Doe, an unknown driver, for 
injuries she sustained in an automobile accident on January 
23, 1992.  Pursuant to Code § 38.2-2206 (the uninsured 
motorist statute), Rivera served a copy of the motion for 
judgment on Colonial Insurance Company of California 
(Colonial), her uninsured motorist insurance carrier.  Rivera 
subsequently learned that the John Doe motorist was "in all 
probability" Johnny Lee Witt, and she filed a motion to join 
Witt as a defendant on January 19, 1996.  The trial court 
entered an order granting Rivera's motion.  The court also 
non-suited Rivera's action against John Doe on the agreement 
of counsel for Rivera and Colonial. 
 
Witt then filed a plea in bar asserting that Rivera's 
cause of action against him was barred because it was filed 
beyond the two-year limitations period established by Code 
§ 8.01-243.  Rivera responded that under this Court's holding 
in Truman v. Spivey, 225 Va. 274, 302 S.E.2d 517 (1983), her 
amended motion for judgment was not time barred.  Following a 
hearing, the trial court determined that Truman was not 
applicable and entered an order granting Witt's plea and 
dismissing Rivera's motion for judgment with prejudice.  
Rivera appealed. 
 
Both parties acknowledge that the issue presented in this 
case was not resolved in Truman.  The Court in Truman held 
that, for statute of limitations purposes, an unidentified 
John Doe motorist and the later-identified uninsured motorist 
are considered the same entity under Code § 38.1-381, the 
predecessor of Code § 38.2-2206.  225 Va. at 279, 302 S.E.2d 
at 519.  Because they were the same entity, the Court 
concluded, an amended motion for judgment adding the 
identified uninsured motorist as a defendant was not barred by 
the limitations period, even though the amendment was filed 
after the expiration of that period.  The Court specifically 
declined to determine whether it would reach the same result 
if the subsequently identified motorist were an insured 
motorist.  Id. at 281, 302 S.E.2d at 520. 
 
Rivera argues we should apply the same analysis the Court 
employed in Truman to the facts of this case.  She contends 
 
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that by applying that analysis we would reach the conclusion 
that John Doe and the later-identified motorist, Witt, should 
be considered the same entity for statute of limitations 
purposes.  We disagree. 
 
Rivera's conclusion is premised on her contention that 
the Court's analysis in Truman was concerned primarily with 
considerations of prejudice.  She argues that in resolving the 
limitations issue, the Court in Truman determined that John 
Doe and the later-identified uninsured motorist, Charles 
Spivey, should be considered the same entity because doing so 
would not offend the purposes of the statute of limitations 
and because the actions of the plaintiff's uninsured motorist 
insurance carrier in defending the John Doe "afforded a 
substantial measure of protection" to Spivey.  Id. at 280, 302 
S.E.2d at 520.  In this case, she asserts, Witt likewise has 
suffered no prejudice and Colonial's actions in defending John 
Doe afforded Witt and his insurer a substantial measure of 
protection. 
 
However, the analysis in Truman was not as limited as 
Rivera characterizes it.  Indeed, such an analysis, as 
described by Rivera, would effectively create an exception to 
the statute of limitations whenever a plaintiff could show 
that a defendant is not prejudiced by permitting suit against 
him after the limitations period has expired.  This would be 
 
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contrary to the established principle that statutes of 
limitations are strictly enforced and must be applied unless 
the General Assembly has clearly created an exception to their 
application.  Arrington v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 250 Va. 
52, 55, 458 S.E.2d 289, 290-91 (1995); see, e.g., Code § 8.01-
6 (providing that addition of new defendant relates back to 
date of original filing under certain conditions).1  While 
prejudice may be a factor to be considered in applying these 
statutory exceptions, a court is not free to generally engage 
in considerations of prejudice to determine whether a statute 
of limitations should be applied. 
 
The Court's analysis in Truman did not focus on 
prejudice, but on whether the uninsured motorist statute 
treated the unidentified uninsured motorist, Doe, and the 
subsequently identified uninsured motorist, Spivey, as the 
same entity.  The statute, as the Court observed, treated Doe 
and Spivey as the same entity in some respects and as 
different entities in other respects.  The Court concluded, 
however, that on the facts of that case, Spivey and Doe should 
be treated as the same entity for statute of limitations 
purposes on two primary grounds:  first, the uninsured 
motorist statute imposed liability on the plaintiff's 
uninsured motorist insurance carrier for any judgment against 
                     
1 Rivera did not claim that she was entitled to relief 
 
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an uninsured motorist, regardless of whether the identity of 
the motorist was known or unknown; and second, the statute 
afforded the uninsured motorist insurance carrier timely 
notice of and the opportunity to defend against the claim in 
which liability was sought to be imposed.  Truman, 225 Va. at 
279, 302 S.E.2d at 519-20.  The Court in Truman then reviewed 
the purposes of the statute of limitations to insure that 
treating John Doe and Spivey as the same entities in that case 
did not offend the traditional goals of such statutes.  Id.  
It was in this context that considerations of prejudice were 
discussed. 
 
If we apply the Truman analysis to resolve the 
limitations questions in this case, our initial inquiry is 
whether the uninsured motorist statute requires or supports 
treating John Doe and Witt as the same entity for statute of 
limitations purposes.  The crucial distinction in our 
consideration of the statute in this case is that, unlike the 
later-identified motorist in Truman, Witt is an insured 
motorist.2
                                                                
under Code § 8.01-6. 
2 Rivera asserts that Witt's insurer is defending the case 
under a reservation of rights and that it may eventually deny 
Witt coverage, thereby making Witt an uninsured motorist under 
the definitions contained in Code § 38.2-2206(B).  We, 
however, must consider this case in the factual posture 
presented and, therefore, do not address the speculative 
factual circumstance suggested by Rivera.  Rivera does not 
assert Witt is an underinsured motorist. 
 
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The uninsured motorist statute addresses the liability of 
a plaintiff's uninsured motorist insurance carrier when an 
uninsured or underinsured motorist as defined in the statute 
is the alleged tortfeasor.  It does not address personal 
injury actions against an insured motorist and, for that 
reason, there is nothing in the statute that imposes liability 
on or provides procedural protections for the insured motorist 
or his automobile liability insurance carrier.  An insured 
motorist may be affected by the provisions in subsection G of 
the statute allowing suit to be filed against a subsequently 
identified John Doe motorist during or after the conclusion of 
the John Doe personal injury action; however, the statute 
neither tolls nor extends the limitations period for bringing 
subsequent suits.  We conclude that there is nothing in the 
uninsured motorist statute which suggests that, under the 
facts of this case, Doe and Witt should be treated as the same 
entity; therefore, the statute of limitations applies to each 
of them individually.  
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court dismissing Rivera's amended motion for judgment against 
Witt because it was filed beyond the limitations period. 
Affirmed.
 
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