Case Title: In re ZKP

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-97-6

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re ZKP1999 WY 57979 P.2d 953Case Number: C-97-6Decided: 05/14/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE INTEREST OF: ZKP, BNR, BLR, and WHR:

LDC, Appellant 
(Respondent),

 

v.

 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT 
OF

FAMILY SERVICES, LARAMIE PEAK DISTRICT, CONVERSE 
COUNTY BRANCH, Appellee(Petitioner).

 

                                

 

Appeal from the District Court 
of Converse County, The Honorable

Barton R. Voigt, Judge.

 

Corinne A. Miller, Casper, WY. Argument by Ms. 
Miller, representing appellant.

 William U. Hill, Attorney General; Michael L. 
Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and Dan S. Wilde, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Mr. Wilde, 
representing appellee.

   

     Before LEHMAN, 
C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* JJ.

    * 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument; retired November 2, 
1998.

 

     LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

     
[¶1]     After six years of rehabilitative 
efforts, including lengthy periods of foster care, the Department of Family 
Services petitioned for termination of LDC's parental rights to her four 
children. Finding that the children had been abused and neglected, the district 
court terminated LDC's parental rights.  
She appeals, claiming the termination was not supported by clear and 
convincing evidence.

 

   [¶2]     We affirm.

 

                   
             ISSUES

 

    [¶3]  LDC (appellant) identifies one issue for 
our review:

 

I. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support 
the decision to terminate parental rights.

 

   Appellee, Department of Family 
Services, (DFS) restates the issue as:

 

I. Whether the District Court's finding that 
Appellant's Parental Rights to ZKP, BNR, WHR, and BLR should be terminated was 
established by clear and convincing evidence?

 

                                 
FACTS

 

   [¶4]     Appellant is the natural mother of four 
children. ZKP was born February 27, 1986, when appellant was 17 years old. ZKP's 
father is unknown. Appellant's three other children are the issue of her first 
marriage. BNR was born August 22, 1988, WHR was born January 28, 1990, and BLR 
was born March 30, 1992.1

 

   [¶5]     The family's first contact with DFS came 
in September of 1990, when WHR, who was born prematurely, was diagnosed with 
what the attending physician described as a "very serious case of failure to 
thrive." He was malnourished and required a three-week stay in the hospital. DFS 
organized a team of caregivers to help the young couple. Besides instruction on 
how to properly feed WHR, the parents were instructed about proper nutrition and 
how to organize meals for the entire family. The couple was also provided mental 
health counseling.

 

   [¶6]     After a number of disturbing reports, 
ZKP, BNR, and WHR were taken into protective custody by DFS in December of 1990. 
One report indicated that the children had been left alone for three to four 
hours while their parents were in a bar.  
A babysitter reported seeing the father using a belt on ZKP because the 
child had wet his pants. Another report described bruises on ZKP's 
legs.

 

   [¶7]     The children were placed in foster care, 
and the parents entered into a case plan with DFS, with a goal of reunification. 
While the children remained in foster care, DFS and other agencies continued to 
provide services for appellant and her family. The services included a DFS 
homemaker visiting the home as many as five days a week to help the family with 
budgeting and organization of the household. Parenting classes, nutrition 
classes and mental health counseling were also provided.

 

   [¶8]     Pursuant to court approval, the two 
older children were returned to appellant's physical custody in June of 1991. 
Due to continued feeding difficulties, WHR was not returned until October of 
1991.  DFS retained protective 
custody of the children and continued to provide services for the 
family.

 

   [¶9]     The children, including new sibling BNR, 
were again removed from appellant's home in June of 1993. At this time, DFS 
discovered appellant's four children, along with three other children, in the 
care of a young babysitter in appellant's home. The children were dirty and had 
dried feces on their bodies. The floors were covered with piles of dirty 
clothes. The children had nowhere to sleep, as the beds were wet with urine. The 
toilet would not flush. The only food in the home was a nearly empty box of 
Malto Meal. There was, however, alcohol in the refrigerator. The steps to the 
trailer home were unsafe, and there was broken glass in the 
yard.

 

   [¶10]  Shortly after the children were removed, 
the parents divorced.  All four 
children were placed with the same foster family but proved too difficult to 
manage in one home, as they all have special needs. ZKP has been diagnosed with 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Both ZKP and BNR suffer from Reactive 
Attachment Disorder, meaning they have difficulty bonding with and trusting 
adults. BNR and WHR both display speech and language disabilities. WHR also 
requires physical therapy and has a visual problem. BLR has been diagnosed with 
a motor disability. The children were split up, with ZKP and BNR placed together 
in a different foster home.

 

   [¶11]  Another plan for reunification was 
established. The plan was to return the two older children to appellant's home 
first, and eventually the two younger children would follow. The plan also 
permitted appellant supervised visitation. In May of 1995, the two older 
children were placed in appellant's home. In June of 1995, ZKP proved too difficult for appellant to 
control, and appellant turned him over to DFS. DFS returned him to appellant a 
week later. In July of 1995, DFS learned that the gas in appellant's home had 
been turned off because the bill had not been paid. Also, appellant was living 
with a man addicted to  methamphetamine. On July 14, 1995, ZKP 
and BNR were removed from appellant's home for the final 
time.

 

   [¶12]  Except for short periods of visitation, 
the two younger children have remained with the same foster family since June of 
1993.  They have bonded with their 
foster family; and the family, if permitted, plans to adopt them. The two older 
children have lived together with the same foster parents since July of 1995, 
and the foster parents intend to provide long-term care. At the time of the 
termination hearing, appellant was awaiting sentencing in Natrona County on 
charges of burglary and delivery of a controlled substance. She had previously 
pled guilty to these charges.

 

   [¶13]  DFS petitioned for termination of 
parental rights in September of 1996, alleging that the children had been abused 
and neglected.  The district court 
appointed counsel to represent appellant, and the children were represented 
separately by a guardian ad litem.  
After a two-day bench trial, the district court terminated appellant's 
parental rights to all four children. She timely appeals.

 

                          
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

   [¶14]  Due to the tension between the 
fundamental liberty of familial association and the compelling state interest in 
protecting the welfare of children, application of statutes for termination of 
parental rights is a matter for strict scrutiny. TR v. Washakie County Dep't of 
Pub. Assistance & Soc. Servs., 736 P.2d 712, 715 (Wyo. 
1987). As part of this strict scrutiny standard, a case for termination of 
parental rights must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-309(a) (Michie 1997); In Interest of JG, 742 P.2d 770, 773 (Wyo. 
1987); D. S. v. Dep't of Pub. Assistance & Soc. Servs., 607 P.2d 911, 919 
(Wyo. 1980). Clear and convincing 
evidence is that kind of proof that would persuade a trier of fact that the 
truth of the contention is highly probable. Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 982 
(Wyo. 1984).  Rigorous though this 
standard may be, we apply our traditional principles of evidentiary review when 
a party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination. 
Matter of SYM, 924 P.2d 985, 987 (Wyo. 1996). Thus, we examine the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, assuming all favorable 
evidence to be true while discounting conflicting evidence presented by the 
unsuccessful party. Id.; D. S. v. Dep't of Pub. Assistance & Soc. Servs., 
607 P.2d at 919-20; In Interest of JG, 742 P.2d  at 773.

 

                              
DISCUSSION

 

   [¶15]  Termination of parental rights pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) was ably summarized in Matter of SYM, 924 
P.2d at 987:

 

Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-309(a)(i) through (iv) affords four 
independent bases for the termination of parental rights.  Termination actions taken pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) focus upon the unfitness of the parent, requiring 
the petitioner to establish three elements:

 

"(1) [A] busive treatment or neglect by the parent; 
(2) unsuccessful efforts to rehabilitate the family (i. e. termination of 
parental rights is the least intrusive means to satisfy the State's interest); 
and (3) the child's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by 
remaining with or returning to the parent."

 

(Citations omitted.) Abuse 
and neglect are defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(Michie 
1997):

 

(ii) . . . "Abuse" with respect to a child means 
inflicting or causing physical or mental injury, harm or imminent danger to the 
physical or mental health or welfare of a child other than by accidental means, 
including abandonment, excessive or unreasonable corporal punishment, 
malnutrition or substantial risk thereof by reason of intentional or 
unintentional neglect, and the commission or allowing the commission of a sexual 
offense against a child as defined by law:

 

(A) 
"Mental injury" means an injury to the psychological capacity or emotional 
stability of a child as evidenced by an observable or substantial impairment in 
his ability to function within a normal 
range of performance and behavior with due regard to his 
culture.

 

                        
. . . 

(vii) . . . "Neglect" with respect to a child means a 
failure or refusal by those responsible for the child's welfare to provide 
adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education or medical, surgical or any 
other care necessary for the child's well being.

 

                           
Neglect and Abuse

 

   [¶16]  Because the evidence of neglect is most 
prevalent, our discussion begins there. Neglect was established at the 
termination hearing by evidence of inadequate care, maintenance, and 
supervision. The children were poorly supervised, when supervised at all. DFS 
workers reported that the children would run wildly about the home while the 
parents slept. On one occasion, the children were left alone while the parents 
were in a bar. Another time, the children were left unattended at a park. When 
the children were removed in June of 1993, they had been left in the care of a 
young babysitter, along with three other children.

 

   [¶17]  The record also establishes inadequate 
maintenance and care. The home was filthy and disorganized. Dirty clothes, beer 
cans, feces, knives, forks and broken glass all cluttered the floors.  The children were often dirty and 
improperly clothed. There was a general lack of attention to bedtimes and 
feeding times. Frequent disreputable house guests added to the disharmony. 
Appellant's method of organization ensured a place for nothing and that nothing 
was in its place. The last time the children were removed, the gas in the home 
had been shut off. The outside of appellant's home was also unkempt. In June of 
1993, the steps leading up to the trailer home were treacherous, and there was 
broken glass in the yard.

 

   [¶18]  Despite this evidence, appellant argues 
that DFS did not establish that the health and safety of the children were in 
jeopardy. In D. S. v. Dep't of Pub. Assistance & Soc. Servs., 607 P.2d  at 
919, we said, "[S]lovenliness in keeping a young child clean or his home in good 
order may offend many of us and may, by some, be characterized as neglect, but is not such 
neglect - assuming no serious health effect or risk - as will justify 
termination of parental rights." The evidence here shows that the home, both 
inside and out, was dangerous for these children.  "A child has a fundamental right to live 
in an environment free from filth, health hazards and danger." Matter of MLM, 
682 P.2d 982, 990 (Wyo. 1984). Neglect was established by clear and convincing 
evidence.

 

    [¶19] Abuse was also clearly 
established by evidence of malnutrition and mental injury. At the time of their 
removal in 1993, the children were malnourished, and there was almost no food in 
the home. Malnutrition is further evidenced by WHR's failure to thrive and ZKP's 
hoarding of food. More evidence of abuse came when a psychologist testified that 
ZKP and BNR display behaviors consistent with having been sexually abused. ZKP 
complained that he had been molested by a cousin and that he witnessed his 
mother having sex with a boyfriend in the living room. He has threatened suicide 
and molested other children. The psychologist confirmed that BNR is a victim of 
sexual abuse. BNR mutilates herself, chewing her lips until they bleed. She will 
scream for hours at a time. She also inserts objects into her vagina, in one 
instance requiring a trip to the hospital for removal of the object. The 
evidence presented at the termination hearing was sufficient to show that the 
children have been abused.

 

                        
Rehabilitative Efforts

 

   [¶20]  Having found the threshold of abuse and 
neglect to be established, we must next examine whether means less intrusive 
than termination were attempted without success. The record reveals repeated 
attempts to equip appellant with homemaking and parenting skills to enable her 
to effectively raise her children.  
A teaching homemaker was sent to appellant's home, sometimes as many as 
five days a week, to help her organize the housework and child care. Nutrition 
education, parenting programs, and mental health counseling were all provided 
for appellant.

 

   [¶21]  Appellant argues that she has cooperated 
with all DFS requests and programs. However, problems arose because appellant 
would not follow through with the programs. Worse, appellant sometimes resisted 
the rehabilitative efforts, one time ordering BNR to hide under her bed and 
remain quiet so a DFS homemaker would think they were not home. Appellant also 
failed to attend numerous appointments and failed to get the children to their 
appointments. During one period, ZKP was absent from 70 of 104 head start 
classes. DFS warned appellant that she needed to improve the filthy and unsafe 
conditions in her home or her children would be taken away. Despite these 
warnings, the situation did not improve.

 

   [¶22]  The record demonstrates repeated 
rehabilitative efforts and plans for reunification. One DFS agent calculated 
that DFS had spent $147,000 on various plans, programs, and foster care for 
appellant and her family. DFS never refused appellant any services. The guardian 
ad litem testified that DFS had gone above and beyond its call of duty in this case. All efforts 
to rehabilitate appellant and reunite the family have failed. The evidence was 
sufficient to establish this element.

 

         
Children's Health and Safety if Returned to 
Appellant

 

   [¶23]  The final element to consider under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) is whether the children's health and safety would 
be seriously jeopardized should they be returned to appellant's custody. Despite 
a variety of intensive rehabilitative efforts, appellant has proved herself 
incapable of properly caring for her children. Visits between appellant and her 
children proved counterproductive, damaging the already fragile emotions of the 
children. Around the time of these visits, the children would revert to abnormal 
behaviors. BNR would throw tantrums, at times screaming for hours. She would 
also resort to self mutilation. ZKP would hoard food and act out by hiding or 
running away. WHR would throw tantrums more frequently after visits with 
appellant. When ZKP and BNR were removed from appellant's home in 1995, their 
foster mother reported that they were like wild animals. Afraid of going hungry, 
the two would gorge themselves. ZKP would hoard food. BNR would scream for 
hours.

 

   [¶24]  The record reveals that the children are 
slowly progressing toward emotional stability while in foster care. The 
children's psychologist, DFS caseworkers, and the guardian ad litem all opined 
that the children's health and welfare would be seriously jeopardized if the 
children were returned to appellant. The psychologist 
testified:

 

I 
believe that these children cannot be expected to protect themselves. My opinion 
is that they would be in severe jeopardy. . . These children show all the signs 
of maltreatment and mental injury. They are terrorized; they're fearful . . . I 
believe it would be very, very damaging for these children to be taken from 
where they are presently and returned to the care and custody of the 
mother.

 

   
We must agree. There was sufficient evidence to establish this final 
element.

   

[¶25]   We hold there was sufficient 
evidence to establish that appellant's children have been neglected and abused, 
that efforts to rehabilitate the family have been unsuccessful, and that the 
children's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized if they were 
returned to appellant.

 

                              
CONCLUSION

 

   [¶26]  "Where is there a more sensitive place 
in the law than that area where courts must undertake to decide whether or not a 
child will be taken from its mother? We know of none." D. S. v. Dep't of Pub. 
Assistance & Soc. Servs., 607 P.2d  at 913. After a careful review of the 
tragic evidence in this case, we conclude it was more than sufficient to permit 
the district court terminate appellant's parental rights to ZKP, BNR, WHR, and 
BLR.

 

   [¶27]  Affirmed.

        

 

FOOTNOTES

   
1At the time of the termination 
hearing, the father of the three younger children voluntarily relinquished his 
parental rights, conditioned on appellant's parental rights being terminated at 
the hearing.