Case Title: Com. v. Beavers

Citation: 424 A.2d 1313, 492 Pa. 522

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1981-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
492 Pa. 522 (1981) 424 A.2d 1313 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Willie James BEAVERS, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued October 2, 1980. Decided February 4, 1981. *523 *524 Leonard G. Ambrose, III, Philip B. Friedman, Ambrose & Friedman, Erie, Edward A. McQuoid, Pittsburgh, for appellant. Michael J. Veshecco, Dist. Atty., Paul J. Susko, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee. Before O'BRIEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY and KAUFFMAN, JJ. O'BRIEN, Chief Justice. Appellant, Willie James Beavers, was convicted by a jury of murder of the third degree for the shotgun slaying of Earl Denard. Post-verdict motions were denied and appellant *525 was sentenced to a prison term of eight-to-sixteen years. This direct appeal followed. Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for a mistrial following certain cross-examination of the appellant by the prosecutor. During cross-examination of appellant, the following exchange occurred: We have, on numerous past occasions, held improper any remarks by a prosecutor concerning the "testimony" a homicide victim would have given had he or she not been slain. For instance, in Commonwealth v. Lipscomb, 455 Pa. 525, 526-27, 317 A.2d 205, 206 (1974), we granted a new trial where the prosecutor argued during closing remarks that: Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Harvell, 458 Pa. 406, 409, 327 A.2d 27, 29 (1974), we reversed because of the following remarks: Finally, in Commonwealth v. Mikesell, 475 Pa. 589, 592, 381 A.2d 430, 432 (1977), we granted a new trial where the prosecutor's closing remarks contained, inter alia, the following:[1] We believe, however, that none of the above cited cases are controlling in the instant matter. In Commonwealth v. Stolzfus, 462 Pa. 43, 61, 337 A.2d 873, 882 (1975), we stated: In Mikesell, Harvell and Lipscomb, the remarks were flagrant appeals to the sympathy of the jury. Further, no cautionary instructions were given. Instantly, while the questioning was improper, we do not believe said questioning rises to the level of reversible error, especially since the trial court immediately cautioned the jury to disregard the remarks. Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to impeach appellant's trial testimony by using his silence at the time of arrest. If appellant's characterization of what occurred was correct, we would grant a new trial, as it is well-settled that a defendant's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege may not be used against him in any fashion at trial. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976); Commonwealth v. White, 482 Pa. 197, 393 A.2d 447 (1978); Commonwealth v. Haideman, 449 Pa. 367, 296 A.2d 765 (1972). The facts of the instant case, however, do not justify invocation of the aforementioned principal. Shortly after the shooting in this case, the police contacted appellant. After being given his required Miranda warnings, which he waived, appellant gave a statement in which he admitted going to his car and getting a shotgun when the victim became verbally abusive. Upon reentering his establishment, according to the statement, appellant and the victim began wrestling for the gun when it went off, killing the victim. At no time did appellant invoke his Fifth *529 Amendment privilege. At trial, appellant offered similar testimony but he added one crucial fact, i.e., he was unaware that the shotgun was loaded. On cross-examination of appellant by the prosecutor, the following exchange occurred: Appellant believes that the above-quoted cross-examination amounted to an impermissible reference to an exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. In Commonwealth v. Haideman, supra, 449 Pa. at 370, 296 A.2d at 766-67, we stated: Further, in Doyle v. Ohio, supra, the defendant therein did not make any statement following his arrest. At trial, the defendant gave an exculpatory explanation of the events which led to his arrest. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the defendant why he had not told the exculpatory version of the events at the time of his arrest. As the court stated: We believe that neither Haideman and its progeny nor Doyle are controlling in the instant matter because of one very important distinction. In this case, appellant never attempted to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege; to the contrary, appellant instantly freely spoke with the police after waiving his Miranda rights. The prosecutor in this case was merely attempting to impeach appellant's credibility by pointing out an inconsistency between appellant's post-arrest statement and his trial testimony. The prosecutor was not using an exercise of a constitutional right by appellant as evidence of his guilt. In his brief, appellant states: We must first note that this record contains no indication that appellant ever failed to respond to a question propounded by the police. Where a defendant, having been advised of his Miranda rights, freely speaks to authorities and never fails to respond to a question, we fail to see how any claim of privilege can be asserted. Appellant relies heavily on Charles v. Anderson, 6 Cir., 610 F.2d 417, which held that on facts identical to the instant case, said questioning was improper. With all due respect to that court, we believe Charles is incorrect for the reasons previously set forth; i.e. the defendant there neither explicitly exercised the privilege nor impliedly did so by failing to respond to a question of the police. Appellant's argument is thus without merit. Appellant finally argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to a certain portion of the prosecutor's closing argument. As part of appellant's testimony, he told the jury he had purchased the shotgun on the day of the killing from a truck driver named "Jim". Commenting on appellant's assertion that he didn't know the gun was loaded, the prosecutor remarked: Defense counsel objected, arguing that the appellant had no burden to produce any evidence. The court overruled the objection and later charged the jury as follows: In light of the court's instructions to the jury about the Commonwealth's never shifting burden of proof, we find no merit to appellant's argument. Appellant also believes the above-quoted portion of the closing arguments was an improper comment on appellant's exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. As previously explained, appellant never attempted to exercise said privilege and that analysis is equally apt to this argument. Judgment of sentence affirmed. NIX, J., joins in the opinion of the court and files a separate concurring opinion, which FLAHERTY, J., joins. ROBERTS, J., files a dissenting opinion. NIX, Justice, concurring. I join the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice O'Brien and now write to explain my difference with the reasoning of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts. The majority conceded the impropriety of the questioning of appellant on cross-examination. Nonetheless, it distinguished the facts *534 of this case from those presented in Commonwealth v. Harvell, 458 Pa. 406, 327 A.2d 27 (1974) and Commonwealth v. Lipscomb, 455 Pa. 525, 317 A.2d 205 (1974). The first basis for distinction is that the prosecutorial misconduct in this case was clearly not as egregious as that occurring in Harvell and Lipscomb. This difference is not disputed by Mr. Justice Roberts in his dissent. The second basis for distinction was that in the instant case the defense's objection was sustained, thereby immediately informing the jury of the impropriety, and cautionary instructions were given. Mr. Justice Roberts' quarrel focuses upon the legal accuracy of those cautionary instructions. While in that regard there may be merit, what is critical is that the jury was clearly and immediately advised that the improper question was to be disregarded. This prompt response, in my judgment, was sufficient to overcome any taint that may otherwise have flowed from the question. The explanation as to why the remark was improper may have been erroneous but the objective (advising the jury of that impropriety) was accomplished. Because all of the niceties and the refinements of the law are not met, does not warrant the disturbing of a verdict where the trial was essentially fair and no prejudice has been demonstrated. FLAHERTY, J., joined in this opinion. ROBERTS, Justice, dissenting. In the presence of the jury, the prosecuting attorney asked appellant, "[the victim] can't be here to tell these people what took place, can he?" Mr. Chief Justice O'Brien correctly concludes that this questioning was improper. Cf. Commonwealth v. Black, 480 Pa. 394, 390 A.2d 750 (1978) (condemning prosecutorial tactic of directing jurors' attention to rear of courtroom to wait for deceased to walk through door). Yet he concludes that the improper questioning does not constitute reversible error, "especially since *535 the trial court immediately cautioned the jury to disregard the remarks." I must dissent. On no reading of the record can it be said that the court adequately cautioned the jury. The court told the jury, "it's more a matter for argument than anything else." Contrary to the assertion of the trial court, the prosecuting attorney's remark that the victim "can't be here to tell these people what took place" is not a matter for argument, or any other aspect of the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court of the United States often has repeated that Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 384 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 2908 n.12, 61 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1979), quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633, 79 L. Ed. 1314 (1935). So too, this Court has stated: "In advocating the cause for this Commonwealth, prosecutors are to seek justice, not only convictions." Commonwealth v. Cherry, 474 Pa. 295, 301, 378 A.2d 800, 803 (1977). The American Bar Association's Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function provide: ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, § 5.8(c) (Approved Draft, 1971). And we held that "[t]he determination of guilt must not be the product of fear or vengeance, but rather intellectually compelled after a disinterested, impartial and fair assessment of the testimony that had been presented." Commonwealth v. Harvell, 458 Pa. 406, 411, 327 A.2d 27, 30 (1974). Because the prosecuting attorney's improper remark frustrated a disinterested, impartial and fair assessment, appellant must be awarded a new trial. [1] The prosecutor also argued at great length about the orphaned son of one of the victims.