Case Title: Mummery v. Polk

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mummery v. Polk1989 WY 64770 P.2d 241Case Number: 88-244Decided: 03/10/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
JEFFREY 
MUMMERY, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
LOUIS F. 
POLK, JR., AND B.P., INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, ParkCounty, John T. Dixon, 
J.

 
 
P. Richard 
Meyer and Robert N. Williams, Jackson, for appellant.

 
 
Tom C. 
Toner of Redle, Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, for appellees.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an order granting appellees' motion to dismiss appellant's causes of action 
alleging abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The 
action was dismissed for failure to state claims upon which relief can be 
granted.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant's issues 
are:

 
 
I.

 
 
DOES A 
COMPLAINT WHICH ALLEGES THAT DEFENDANTS COMMITTED THE TORT OF ABUSE OF PROCESS 
BY PURCHASING AND EXECUTING A JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF IN A MALICIOUS, 
IMPROPER, AND UNLAWFUL FASHION AND FOR AN IMPROPER ULTERIOR PURPOSESTATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE TORT OF 
ABUSE OF PROCESS?

 
 
II.

 
 
DOES A 
COMPLAINT WHICH ALLEGES THAT DEFENDANTS COMMITTED THE TORT OF "OUTRAGE" 
(INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS) BY PURCHASING AND EXECUTING A 
JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF IN A MALICIOUS, IMPROPER, AND UNLAWFUL FASHION AND 
FOR AN IMPROPER ULTERIOR PURPOSESTATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE TORT OF 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS?

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant Jeffrey 
Mummery filed his complaint on July 10, 1986, against appellees Louis F. Polk, 
Jr. and B.P., Inc., a Wyoming corporation, alleging in substance 
that:

 
 
     1. Polk formed B.P., 
Inc. for the sole purpose of purchasing an outstanding judgment against 
Mummery;

 
 
     2. During the time 
Mummery's deposition was being taken in an unrelated lawsuit between Mummery and 
Polk, B.P., Inc. caused execution to be levied upon Mummery and his stock in 
another corporation which is also the subject of still another lawsuit between 
Mummery and Polk; and

 
 
     3. Appellees' actions 
were improper and constituted the torts of abuse of process and 
outrage.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellees filed a 
motion to dismiss on July 28, 1986, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), and Mummery 
responded with an affidavit by his attorney indicating that he had talked to 
another attorney who in turn had "heard one of the attorneys for Mr. Polk say 
words to the effect that Mr. Polk should purchase the judgment against Mr. 
Mummery for the purpose of putting pressure upon Mr. Mummery." Appellees 
requested that their motion to dismiss be converted to a motion for summary 
judgment but the court declined, and only the complaint was considered in 
granting the motion to dismiss. An order was entered on July 18, 1988, and it is 
from this order that this appeal is taken.

 
 

[¶6.]     When considering a 
dismissal under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state claims upon which relief 
can be granted, the court must view the allegations in the complaint in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all facts in the 
complaint which are well pleaded. Champion Well Service, Inc. v. NL Industries, 
769 P.2d 382 (Wyo. 1989); Carbon County School 
District No. 2 v. WyomingStateHospital, 680 P.2d 773 (Wyo. 1984); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 
(Wyo. 1979). 
This liberal rule of pleading, however, does not go so far as to excuse the 
omission of that which is material and necessary to entitle one to relief. Sump 
v. City of Sheridan, 358 P.2d 637, 642 
(Wyo. 1961). 
The complaint must allege "all facts essential to constitute a legal cause of 
action." Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580, 583 (Wyo. 1979). A motion to dismiss, even though 
sparingly granted, is the proper method for testing the legal sufficiency of the 
allegations and will be sustained when the complaint shows on its face that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to relief. Paravecchio v. Memorial Hospital of Laramie 
County, 742 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1987), cert. denied 
___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 1088, 
99 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1988); Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090 
(Wyo. 1987). 
With these standards in mind, we now address the issues raised by 
Mummery.

 
 
ABUSE OF 
PROCESS

 
 

[¶7.]     In Bosler v. Shuck, 714 P.2d 1231, 1234-35 (Wyo. 1986), and Toltec Watershed Improvement District v. 
Johnston, 717 P.2d 808, 810-12 (Wyo. 1986), this Court clearly defined the 
essential elements necessary to state a cause of action for an abuse of process: 
(1) an ulterior purpose; and (2) a willful act in the use of the process which 
is not proper in the regular conduct of the legal proceeding. We also stated in 
Toltec Watershed Improvement District that there can be no action for abuse of 
process for merely carrying out the process and that the motive for doing such 
is immaterial and irrelevant. Id. at 811. We agree with the court below that 
Mummery's complaint lacks an essential allegation to maintain an action in tort 
for abuse of process. B.P., Inc. had the lawful right to use the legal process 
of levying execution on Mummery's stock in another corporation to satisfy the 
judgment against Mummery. Appellees may have had an ulterior motive in mind, but 
there is no allegation in Mummery's complaint that appellees abused the use of 
this process by any affirmative act which the law does not permit, such as 
offering to release the levy on the stock if Mummery would settle his other 
matters in litigation with Polk.

 
 
INTENTIONAL 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

 
 

[¶8.]     Mummery merely 
realleged the allegation contained in his abuse of process claim to state his 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Leithead v. American 
Colloid Company, 721 P.2d 1059 (Wyo. 1986), we held that, to maintain an action 
for such a tort, there must be outrageous conduct which goes beyond all possible 
bounds of decency and which is regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in 
a civilized community. We quoted with approval Restatement, Second, Torts § 46, 
comment g:

 
 
"The actor 
is never liable * * * where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal 
rights in a permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence 
is certain to cause emotional distress."

 
 
Leithead, 
721 P.2d  at 1066.

 
 

[¶9.]     The court below 
properly concluded that there was nothing in Mummery's complaint which alleged 
that appellees did anything which they were not entitled to do under the 
law.

 
 

[¶10.]  AFFIRMED.

 
 

[¶11.]  URBIGKIT, J., dissented without written 
opinion.