Case Title: The People v. Steven Scott

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2011-05-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 70  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Steven Scott,
            Appellant.
Paul J. Connolly, for appellant.
Nicholas E. Tishler, for respondent.
JONES, J.:
This appeal requires the Court to resolve whether the
trial court erred (1) in precluding evidence of a victim's sexual
conduct around the time of the incident pursuant to New York's
rape shield law (Criminal Procedure Law § 60.42) and (2) in
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No. 70
disqualifying one juror and failing to discharge another.      
In March 2007, three eighth-grade girls, K.D., A.B. and
R.S., left a slumber party and went to the home of Steven A., a
16 year old friend of theirs.  Defendant, a 23-year-old man, and
another adult were also there.  While at Steven A.'s home, the
girls drank alcohol and smoked marijuana with Steven A. and his
friends, and also engaged in sexual activity.  Two days later,
K.D. informed the police that she had intercourse with Steven A.
at his party, but did not accuse defendant.  K.D. gave a second
statement to the police a few days later, stating she had
intercourse with the defendant that night against her will. 
Defendant was charged with rape in the first degree (forcible),
rape in the second degree (statutory) and three counts of
endangering the welfare of a child.   
During jury selection, the People asked the prospective
jurors whether the lack of DNA evidence would "affect anybody's
decision in this matter?"  After being sworn, a juror asked to
approach the bench and informed the court: "I guess I think there
should be DNA evidence."  County Court made a limited inquiry
about the juror's statement.  It then granted the People's
request to remove the juror over defendant's objection.  The
court found him to be "unqualified to serve as a juror."  As to
another prospective juror, that juror advised the court, when
asked whether any of the jurors knew the prosecutor, that the
prosecutor "took a case for me for my son," about 13 or 14 years
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earlier.  County Court denied defendant's challenge for cause.   
Prior to trial, defendant moved for an order allowing
him to introduce evidence at trial of K.D.'s sexual conduct at
the party, specifically her involvement with Steven A.  County
Court held a hearing pursuant to CPL 60.42 (5).*  The court
initially granted the motion, but subsequently granted the
People's motion to reargue this issue.  The court then ruled that
the defense was "prohibited from eliciting testimony relative to
any prior sexual conduct of the victim with any of the other
individuals who were present" unless the People introduced
evidence attributing K.D.'s bruises to sexual activity.       
At trial, K.D. testified that she was raped by
defendant.  A.B. testified that K.D. had been alone with
defendant in a bedroom and when she emerged, wearing only a
sheet, she was crying and saying, "I didn't want to do it."  
Because of County Court's rape shield law determination,
defendant was prohibited from introducing, among other things,
R.S.'s statement to the police that K.D. was crying because she
was upset that she had sex with Steven A.  
*  CPL 60.42 states: "Evidence of a victim's sexual conduct
shall not be admissible in a prosecution for an offense or an
attempt to commit an offense defined in article one hundred
thirty of the penal law [sex offenses]."  Subdivision (5) permits
such evidence if a court determines "after an offer of proof by
the accused outside the hearing of the jury, or such hearing as
the court may require, and a statement by the court of its
findings of fact essential to its determination, to be relevant
and admissible in the interests of justice."  
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No. 70
The jury acquitted defendant of rape in the first
degree, but convicted him of rape in the second degree and three
counts of endangering the welfare of a child.  Defendant
appealed, contesting, inter alia, County Court's rape shield and
jury selection rulings.  The Appellate Division affirmed, finding
no error or abuse of discretion by County Court in its discharge
of one juror and failure to disqualify another and rejecting
defendant's rape shield law argument.  This Court now affirms.  
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by
rejecting evidence of K.D.'s sexual activity with another person
around the time of the incident pursuant to CPL 60.42 (5).  CPL
60.42 declares "[e]vidence of a victim's sexual conduct"
inadmissible in a prosecution for a sex offense under article 130
of the penal law, except in certain circumstances.  CPL 60.42
provides five statutory exceptions.  "The first four allow
evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct in narrowly
defined factual circumstances," and the fifth, the subdivision at
issue here, "vest[s] discretion in the trial court" (People v
Williams, 81 NY2d 303, 311 [1993]).  Pursuant to subdivision (5),
evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct may be introduced
upon a determination by the court that such evidence is "relevant
and admissible in the interests of justice" (CPL 60.42 [5]
[emphasis added]).
The Legislature specifically intended the rape shield
law to limit the inquiry into "a victim's past sex life in
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prosecutions for sex offenses" because it found that such
evidence, in forcible rape cases, rarely "elicits testimony
relevant to the issues of the victim's consent on credibility,
but serves only to harass the alleged victim and confuse the
jurors" (Mem of Assembly Fink, 1975 NY Legis Ann, at 47-48).  
We recognize that, "in the interests of justice,"
evidence of a complainant's sexual conduct may be admissible if
it is relevant to a defense (see generally People v Jovanovic,
263 AD2d 182 [1st Dept 1999] [application of section 60.42(5) to
redacted e-mails -- containing evidence to which the rape shield
law would have applied -- because they were "highly relevant to
establishing the defense"]).  In contrast, such evidence must be
precluded if it does not tend to establish a defense to the crime
because it will only harass the victim and possibly confuse the
jurors.    
In this case, County Court appropriately accepted the
defendant's argument that evidence of the complainant's sexual
conduct that evening would be relevant to his defense if the
People introduced evidence of her bruising caused by sexual
contact and attributed such evidence to him.  Such evidence would
have been relevant to both charges of rape, but the People
decided not to offer evidence of bruising.  Defendant argues that
R.S.'s statement to the police -- that K.D. told her that she was
crying because she had sex with Steven A. -- should have been
admitted pursuant to CPLR 60.42(5) because it raised an
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No. 70
alternative basis for admissibility since the People presented
proof that the victim was crying when she emerged from the
bedroom with defendant to buttress their proof of forcible
compulsion.  Since it would have been probative, if at all, of
only the forcible rape charge and defendant was acquitted of that
count, we need not resolve whether the trial court abused its
discretion in declining to admit that evidence.
Defendant also assigns error to the trial court's
rulings regarding whether to exclude two jurors for cause. 
However, no abuse of discretion is apparent (see CPL 270.15 [4];
CPL 270.20).  
Pursuant to CPL 270.15 (4), a court may allow a
challenge of a sworn juror for cause, prior to the time a witness
is sworn at the trial, where the challenge is made upon a ground
that was not known to the challenging party before the trial
juror was sworn (see also People v Harris, 57 NY2d 335, 449
[1982]).  Additionally, CPL 270.20 (1) specifically enumerates
the grounds upon which a prospective juror may be challenged for
cause.  CPL 270.20 (1)(b) focuses on the prospective juror's
state of mind to render an impartial verdict, and subdivision
(1)(c) addresses any relationship between the juror and a person
involved in the criminal action which could affect the juror's
impartiality.  
Although County Court failed to make a probing inquiry
regarding the sworn juror's ability to render an impartial
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No. 70
verdict, its discharge was not error as such action is authorized
by CPL 270.15 (4).  Furthermore, this Court has noted that a
"trial court should lean toward disqualifying a prospective juror
of dubious impartiality, rather than testing the bounds of
discretion by permitting such a juror to serve" (People v Branch,
46 NY2d 645 [1979]; see also People v Blyden, 55 NY2d 73 [1982]
["The costs to society and the criminal justice system of
discharging the juror are comparatively slight, while the costs
in fairness to the defendant and the general perception of
fairness of not discharging such a juror are great."]).
Likewise, there was no error in refusing to disqualify
a prospective juror due to a former professional relationship
(see People v Provenzano, 50 NY2d 420 [1980] [trial court did not
abuse its discretion in permitting an acquaintance and supporter
of the District Attorney to serve as a juror]).  Because the
relationship between the prosecutor and prospective juror was
distant in time and limited in nature, County Court did not abuse
its discretion by permitting this juror to serve.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.  
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Jones.  Chief Judge Lippman and
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith and Pigott concur.
Decided May 3, 2011
        
     
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