Case Title: In re Disqualification of Aubry

Citation: 2006-Ohio-7231

Docket Number: 06AP080

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Aubry, 117 Ohio St.3d 1245, 2006-Ohio-7231.] 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF AUBRY. 
THE STATE OF OHIO v. HERBERT. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Aubry,  
117 Ohio St.3d 1245, 2006-Ohio-7231.] 
Judges – Affidavit of disqualification – Disqualification denied. 
(No. 06-AP-080—Decided August 21, 2006.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Wyandot County  
Court of Common Pleas, No. 05-CR-21. 
__________________ 
Reporter's Note:  The previously published version of this opinion omitted a 
complete citation that has been added to this version of the opinion.  This version 
of the opinion supersedes the version that appears at 113 Ohio St.3d 1225, 863 
N.E.2d 628. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Joseph E. Scott – counsel for the defendant – has filed an affidavit 
with the clerk of this court under R.C. 2701.03 seeking the disqualification of 
Judge Kathleen A. Aubry from acting on any further proceedings in case No. 05-
CR-21 in the Court of Common Pleas of Wyandot County. 
{¶ 2} Scott alleges that the judge has shown bias against the defendant 
by scheduling a resentencing hearing for the defendant on the same day as a 
hearing on the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  This demonstrates, 
according to Scott, that the judge has already decided to deny the motion to 
withdraw, and it reflects improper prejudice on the part of the judge.  Scott also 
faults the judge for saying at the defendant’s initial sentencing hearing that the 
defendant had shown little remorse for his crimes and had taken advantage of a 
family relationship.  Those remarks demonstrate hostility toward the defendant, 
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he contends.  Finally, Scott criticizes the judge for preventing the defendant from 
accessing proceeds from the sale of the defendant’s home.  The judge’s rulings, 
according to Scott, reflect hostility toward the defendant’s efforts to hire criminal 
defense attorneys and investigators. 
{¶ 3} I find no basis for ordering the disqualification of Judge Aubry.  
None of the allegations in the affidavit demonstrates conclusively that the judge is 
unable to serve fairly and impartially in this case. 
{¶ 4} Trial courts are entitled to exercise their discretion when 
scheduling hearings.  The fact that Judge Aubry has scheduled the defendant’s 
resentencing hearing immediately after the hearing on the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea does not provide compelling proof that the judge has formed a fixed 
judgment about the proper outcome of the first hearing or that she is biased 
against the defendant.  The judge may simply believe that the back-to-back 
hearings will be more convenient for the parties, or she may feel that her own 
preparations for the hearings will be more efficient if both are held on the same 
day.  In any event, the affiant does not cite any language in the scheduling orders 
that suggests judicial bias, and I will not infer bias simply because the defendant 
would prefer that the hearings be held on different days. 
{¶ 5} Even if Judge Aubry – having reviewed the parties’ legal 
memoranda and perhaps having researched and reviewed the legal issues and the 
factual record – has now reached some preliminary conclusions about the 
defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, I certainly cannot say that her 
doing so would create a disqualifying bias or prejudice that would compel her 
removal from the case.  Judges are not required to wait until the eleventh hour to 
begin forming preconceptions about the proper resolution of the legal questions 
presented to them.  In the absence of any evidence that the judge is likely to 
resolve the motion on grounds other than the relevant facts and the relevant law, 
her decision to schedule a sentencing hearing right after the motion hearing does 
January Term, 2006 
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not demonstrate that she lacks the requisite impartiality to decide fairly the issues 
presented to her at both of those hearings. 
{¶ 6} Nor do the judge’s comments at the defendant’s first sentencing 
hearing prevent her from remaining on the case now.  The judge’s comments cited 
in the affidavit simply suggest that the judge appropriately sought to explain at the 
first sentencing hearing her rationale for imposing consecutive sentences in the 
defendant’s case.  The fact that the case is again before her for resentencing in the 
wake of this court’s decision in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 
845 N.E.2d 470, does not compel the judge to step aside. 
{¶ 7} State and federal courts have been virtually unanimous in holding 
that – absent a showing of actual bias – a judge who presided over prior 
proceedings involving one or more parties presently before the court is not 
thereby disqualified from presiding over later proceedings involving the same 
parties.  Flamm, Judicial Disqualification (1996) 345, Section 12.3.1.  See, e.g., In 
re Disqualification of Basinger (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 1237, 674 N.E.2d 351 (“a 
judge who presided at trial is not disqualified from ruling on a subsequent petition 
for post-conviction relief,” and “a judge who presided in a criminal trial is not 
precluded from considering the defendant’s motion to vacate the sentence 
imposed”); State v. D’Ambrosio (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 185, 188, 616 N.E.2d 909 
(“A judge need not recuse himself simply because he acquired knowledge of the 
facts during a prior proceeding”); United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers & 
Allied Workers, Union No. 33 v. Meese (C.A.1, 1987), 823 F.2d 652, 659 (“It is 
well established * * * that participation in prior proceedings involving the same or 
similar facts or parties does not in itself constitute grounds for disqualification”). 
{¶ 8} We expect judges to be familiar with the facts when they impose 
sentences in criminal cases.  Sometimes those facts militate in favor of leniency at 
sentencing, and sometimes they do not.  Judge Aubry’s familiarity with the facts 
of this defendant’s case and her prior discussion of those facts on the record do 
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not provide compelling proof that she holds an improper bias or prejudice that 
will prevent her from treating the defendant fairly at any new sentencing hearing 
in his case. 
{¶ 9} Finally, attorney Scott’s dissatisfaction with the timeliness or the 
outcome of the judge’s ruling on the disposition of the defendant’s assets does not 
convince me that the judge is biased against the defendant.  A party’s 
disagreement or dissatisfaction with a court’s rulings of law, without more, does 
not constitute bias or prejudice.  In re Disqualification of Murphy (1988), 36 Ohio 
St.3d 605, 606, 522 N.E.2d 459.  An affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle 
to contest matters of substantive or procedural law.”  In re Disqualification of 
Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4. 
{¶ 10} Judge Aubry was entitled to issue rulings that she felt were correct 
on the civil foreclosure matter involving the defendant’s property, and while some 
of those rulings can be challenged on appeal, nothing about the decision described 
in the affidavit points toward bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.  Indeed, 
the judgment entry attached to the affidavit indicates that the judge is willing to 
allow the defendant to use the proceeds from the sale of his home to pay his 
criminal defense attorneys.  That ruling does not provide a sound basis for me to 
conclude that the judge is biased against the defendant in this case. 
{¶ 11} As I have said, “[a] judge is presumed to follow the law and not to 
be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to 
overcome these presumptions.”  In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 
1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5.  Those presumptions have not been 
overcome in this case. 
{¶ 12} For the reasons stated above, the affidavit of disqualification is 
denied.  The case may proceed before Judge Aubry. 
______________________