Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Brockler

Citation: 2016-Ohio-657

Docket Number: 2015-0280

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Brockler, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-657.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-657 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BROCKLER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Brockler, Slip Opinion No.  
2016-Ohio-657.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—One-
year suspension, stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2015-0280—Submitted May 6, 2015—Decided February 25, 2015.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2014-030. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Aaron James Brockler of Lakewood, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0078205, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2004.  In 
an April 7, 2014 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Brockler with 
engaging in professional misconduct while he served as the assistant Cuyahoga 
County prosecutor assigned to a murder case.  Specifically, relator alleged that 
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while investigating the shooting death of Kenneth “Blue” Adams, Brockler created 
a fictitious Facebook account and used it to contact the alibi witnesses of Damon 
Dunn, who had been indicted for the murder. 
{¶ 2} The parties entered into stipulations of fact and submitted 15 
stipulated exhibits.  After a two-day hearing, a panel of the Board of Professional 
Conduct issued a report finding that Brockler’s use of the fictitious Facebook 
account to contact the alibi witnesses involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation, and that it prejudiced the administration of justice.  It 
recommended, however, that we dismiss an alleged violation arising from certain 
statements that Brockler made to the media. 
{¶ 3} Citing substantial mitigating evidence and finding that Brockler’s 
misconduct was an isolated incident in an otherwise notable legal career, the panel 
recommended that he be suspended for one year, fully stayed on conditions.  The 
board adopted the panel’s report in its entirety, and neither party has filed 
objections.  We adopt the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
suspend Brockler from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, fully stayed on 
conditions. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} Before he was indicted, Dunn denied any involvement in Adams’s 
death and told Cleveland police that at the time of the murder, he was with his 
girlfriend, Sarah Mossor, and her friend Marquita Lewis.  Brockler did not believe 
Dunn’s alibi was true, but Mossor and Lewis refused to talk with him on numerous 
occasions when he identified himself as the assistant prosecutor assigned to the 
case. 
{¶ 5} As part of his investigation, Brockler listened to recordings of 
telephone calls that Dunn had made from the Cuyahoga County Jail.  On the 
morning of December 14, 2012, he listened to a recording of a heated conversation 
in which Dunn and Mossor argued over Dunn’s fear that Mossor would not be a 
January Term, 2016 
 
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reliable witness and Mossor’s belief that Dunn had not been faithful to her.  Mossor 
suspected that Dunn had had a romantic relationship with a woman named “Taisha” 
and indicated that if her suspicion was true, she would end her relationship with 
Dunn.  Believing that Mossor’s relationship with Dunn was near a breaking point, 
Brockler saw an opportunity to exploit her feelings of distrust and get her to recant 
her support for Dunn. 
{¶ 6} Recalling a Facebook ruse he had used in a prior case, Brockler 
planned to create a fictitious Facebook identity to contact Mossor.  He attempted to 
obtain assistance from several Cleveland police detectives and the chief 
investigator in the prosecutor’s office, but they were not available.  Believing that 
time was of the essence, Brockler decided to proceed with the Facebook ruse on his 
own approximately one hour after he heard the recording of Mossor and Dunn’s 
conversation.  He created a Facebook account using the pseudonym “Taisha Little,” 
a photograph of an African-American female that he downloaded from the Internet, 
and information that he gleaned from Dunn’s jailhouse telephone calls.  He also 
added pictures, group affiliations, and “friends” he selected based on Dunn’s 
telephone calls and Facebook page. 
{¶ 7} Posing as Little, Brockler simultaneously contacted Mossor and 
Lewis in separate Facebook chats.  He falsely represented that Little had been 
involved with Dunn, that she had an 18-month-old child with him, and that she 
needed him to be released from jail so that he could provide child support.  He also 
discussed Dunn’s alibi as though it were false in an attempt to get Mossor and Lewis 
to admit that they were lying for Dunn (or would lie for him in the future) and to 
convince them to speak with the prosecutor. 
{¶ 8} After chatting for several hours, Brockler sensed that Mossor and 
Lewis were suspicious, so he shut down the chat and deleted the fictitious account.  
He testified that he printed copies of the chats and placed them in a file—with the 
intent to provide copies to defense counsel—before he deleted the account, but 
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those copies were never found.  He attended five pretrial conferences from January 
through April 2013 but did not disclose the circumstances or content of his 
conversations with Mossor or Lewis. 
{¶ 9} Brockler was scheduled to take an extended medical leave beginning 
April 16, 2013, and assistant prosecutor Kevin Filiatraut was assigned to handle the 
Dunn case in his absence.  Brockler gave his file to Filiatraut, reviewed the case 
with him, and attended a pretrial conference with him.  Brockler also disclosed that 
he might need to be a witness at trial because both Mossor and Lewis had told him 
they would not support Dunn’s alibi, although they were afraid to say so in court.  
Brockler did not disclose how he obtained that information. 
{¶ 10} On the second day of Brockler’s leave and less than one week before 
Dunn’s trial, a police detective gave Filiatraut several documents, including a 
transcript of Lewis’s chat with “Taisha Little” (obtained from Lewis) and Lewis’s 
written statement about the chat.  Filiatraut immediately made the documents 
available to defense counsel and began to investigate Little. 
{¶ 11} Although Filiatraut quickly informed Brockler about this new 
information, Brockler waited nearly three weeks to disclose that he was “Taisha 
Little.”  Upon learning of Brockler’s ruse, Filiatraut reported this information to his 
superiors.  The prosecutor’s office withdrew from the case and the court appointed 
the attorney general to serve as a special prosecutor.  Shortly after Brockler returned 
from his medical leave in June 2013, his employment was terminated. 
{¶ 12} Soon thereafter, Brockler spoke with reporters from the Cleveland 
Plain Dealer and a local television affiliate in response to Cuyahoga County 
Prosecuting Attorney Timothy McGinty’s statements that Brockler was fired for 
his unethical conduct in creating false evidence, lying to witnesses and another 
prosecutor, and damaging the prosecution’s chances in a murder case in which an 
innocent man was killed at work. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 13} The subsequently published article and broadcasted interview 
included statements by Brockler—which he does not dispute—to the effect that (1) 
prosecutors have long engaged in ruses to obtain the truth, (2) his firing was an 
overreaction because he only did what the police should have done, (3) he engaged 
in an investigative ruse to uncover the truth and keep a murderer behind bars, (4) 
the public was better off because of his actions, (5) if he had not taken these actions, 
a murderer might be walking the streets, (6) he promised the victim’s mother that 
he would not let a horrible killer walk out of the courthouse to kill someone else, 
and (7) McGinty chose to follow the technical rules of ethics, while he chose to 
protect the public. 
{¶ 14} Approximately one year after Brockler’s termination, Dunn was 
convicted of aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, and having weapons 
while under disability.  The parties stipulated in January 2015 that his conviction 
was on appeal, but it has since been affirmed, see State v. Dunn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 
No. CR-12-568849-A, 2015-Ohio-3138. 
{¶ 15} Brockler admitted that the Facebook ruse violated the plain language 
of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), but he urged the board to carve out 
an exception for “prosecutorial investigation deception.” 
{¶ 16} Noting that a comment to Prof.Cond.R. 8.4 already recognizes an 
exception for lawyers who supervise or advise nonlawyers about lawful covert 
investigative activities, and that this court has found in two cases that lawyers in 
private practice violated the analogous provisions of DR 1-102(A)(4) by personally 
engaging in investigatory deceptions, the board refused to carve out a broader 
exception to the rule.  See Prof.Cond.R. 8.4, Comment 2A; Columbus Bar Assn. v. 
King, 84 Ohio St.3d 174, 702 N.E.2d 862 (1998) (finding that two attorneys 
engaged in dishonest conduct by conspiring for one of them to place a phone call 
while posing as someone else in order to generate evidence in furtherance of a 
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client’s case); Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 
800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 17 (finding that an attorney engaged in dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation when she intimidated a deposition witness by creating 
the false impression that she possessed compromising personal information that 
could be offered as evidence). 
{¶ 17} Instead, the board found that Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) requires an 
assistant prosecutor to refrain from dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
when personally engaging in investigatory activity and that Brockler’s Facebook 
ruse therefore violated the rule. 
{¶ 18} Brockler argued that his conduct did not violate Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice) as charged in the complaint because it encouraged 
witnesses to come forward and tell the truth.  But the board found that his subterfuge 
prejudiced the administration of justice because it had the potential to induce false 
testimony, injected significant new issues into the case shortly before trial, and 
materially delayed the resolution of the case by requiring further investigation and 
the appointment of a special prosecutor. 
{¶ 19} Relator’s complaint also alleged that Brockler’s statements to the 
media violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.6(a) (prohibiting a lawyer who has participated in 
the investigation or litigation of a matter from making extrajudicial statements that 
he knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public 
communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an 
adjudicative proceeding in the matter).  While the board did not condone Brockler’s 
statements, it found that relator failed to carry his burden of proving not only that 
the statements were made but that Brockler knew or reasonably should have known 
that his statements would have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing 
Dunn’s trial.  Therefore, the board recommended that we dismiss the alleged 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.6(a). 
January Term, 2016 
 
7
Sanction 
{¶ 20} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final determination, 
we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar 
R. V(13). 
{¶ 21} As an aggravating factor, the board found that Brockler’s deceptions 
and misrepresentations in his contacts with Mossor and Lewis resulted in multiple 
violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and (d), though it treated them as a single instance 
of misconduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(4).  The board also found that his 
extrajudicial statements to the media, deflecting blame for his own misconduct to 
the police department and the prosecutor’s office, undermined the public’s 
confidence in the criminal-justice process.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(A) (requiring the 
board to consider all relevant factors in determining the appropriate sanction for a 
lawyer’s misconduct). 
{¶ 22} In mitigation, the board found that Brockler did not have a prior 
disciplinary record, made a full and free disclosure and cooperated in the 
disciplinary process, submitted numerous letters attesting to his good character and 
reputation for honesty, and acknowledged that the loss of his “dream job” was a 
form of penalty.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (4), (5), (6).  Although Brockler’s 
use of deception violated core ethical values, the board also found he was not 
motivated by self-interest, because he honestly—albeit erroneously—believed that 
his covert use of Facebook was an effective and acceptable tactic akin to more 
traditional investigative tactics such as staged drug buys and the use of undercover 
informants.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(2). 
{¶ 23} Despite advocating for a public-policy exception for deceptive 
prosecutorial investigation tactics, Brockler admitted that his conduct violated the 
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plain language of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and argued for no more than a stayed six-
month suspension.  Relator, in contrast, argued that Brockler should serve an actual 
suspension from the practice of law, though he did not suggest any specific 
duration. 
{¶ 24} The board acknowledged that misconduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation generally warrants an actual suspension from the 
practice of law.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Karris, 129 Ohio St.3d 499, 
2011-Ohio-4243, 954 N.E.2d 118, ¶ 16; Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 
Ohio St.3d 187, 658 N.E.2d 237 (1995), syllabus. 
{¶ 25} But the board also recognized that we may deviate from that rule in 
the presence of significant mitigating evidence.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Potter, 
126 Ohio St.3d 50, 2010-Ohio-2521, 930 N.E.2d 307 (absence of a prior 
disciplinary record, efforts to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, full 
cooperation in the investigation, self-reporting, and evidence of good character and 
reputation apart from the charged misconduct sufficient to stay 12-month 
suspension for violating fiduciary duty as the executor of an estate); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Niermeyer, 119 Ohio St.3d 99, 2008-Ohio-3824, 892 N.E.2d 434,  
¶ 12-13 (absence of prior misconduct, self-reporting, cooperation in the disciplinary 
process, acceptance of responsibility for misconduct, and evidence of good 
character and reputation sufficient to stay 12-month suspension for altering a 
document to make it appear that it had been timely filed).  See also King, 84 Ohio 
St.3d 174, 702 N.E.2d 862 (imposing a fully stayed one-year suspension based 
upon the presence of significant mitigating evidence); Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 
2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117 (imposing a fully stayed six-month suspension 
based upon the presence of significant mitigating evidence). 
{¶ 26} Noting the substantial mitigating factors present in this case—
including the board’s finding that the misconduct was an isolated incident in an 
otherwise notable legal career—the board recommends that we suspend Brockler 
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for one year, fully stayed on the conditions that he engage in no further misconduct 
and that he pay the costs of this action. 
{¶ 27} Having determined that the board’s findings of fact and conclusions 
of law are supported by the record and the law, we adopt the board’s report, find 
that Brockler’s use of a deceptive investigative technique to contact Dunn’s alibi 
witnesses violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and (d), and dismiss the alleged violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 3.6(a).  We also find that a one-year suspension, fully stayed on the 
conditions recommended by the board, is the appropriate sanction for Brockler’s 
misconduct. 
{¶ 28} Accordingly, Aaron James Brockler is suspended from the practice 
of law in Ohio for one year, fully stayed on the conditions that he engage in no 
further misconduct and pay the costs of this proceeding.  If he fails to comply with 
the conditions of the stay, the stay will be lifted, and he shall serve the full one-year 
suspension.  Costs are taxed to Brockler. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents with an opinion in which LANZINGER, J., joins. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents, with opinion. 
_________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 29} The preamble to the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, entitled “A 
Lawyer’s Responsibilities,” lays out broad obligations, recognizing that “a lawyer 
not only represents clients but has a special responsibility for the quality of justice” 
and that that responsibility extends “to practicing lawyers even when they are acting 
in a nonprofessional capacity.”  Prof.Cond.R., Preamble [1], [3].  By imposing a 
marginal sanction—a fully stayed one-year suspension—on respondent, Aaron 
Brockler, the majority minimizes his significant ethical violations and does so 
based upon a myopic view of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  The men and 
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women who serve as prosecutors in this state are authorized to enforce the law and 
administer justice, one of the noblest pursuits an attorney can enjoy.  Accordingly, 
they must meet or exceed the highest ethical standards imposed on our profession.  
Given the significant ethical violations Brockler committed, I cannot implicitly 
condone the imposition of a negligible sanction for his egregious misconduct. 
{¶ 30} The substantial evidence of wrongdoing and the aggravating factors 
in this case prove that Brockler committed significant violations of the Ohio Rules 
of Professional Conduct.  Yet faced with Brockler’s glaring disdain for the ethical 
responsibilities this court imposes on all attorneys in this state, a majority of this 
court imposes only a one-year suspension, fully stayed. 
{¶ 31} In the past, our punishment for lawyers’ conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation has been significantly harsher.  We 
indefinitely suspended an attorney who had lied to the disciplinary counsel’s 
investigator.  Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Gruttadaurio, 136 Ohio St.3d 283, 
2013-Ohio-3662, 995 N.E.2d 190, ¶ 2-4.  We imposed a one-year suspension, with 
six months stayed on conditions, on an attorney who had falsely advised that her 
client’s case was being settled.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 122 Ohio St.3d 
293, 2009-Ohio-3501, 910 N.E.2d 1034, ¶ 7, 14.  We suspended a lawyer for six 
months for attempting to advance his client’s interests with evidence that the lawyer 
knowingly fabricated.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. McMahon, 114 Ohio St.3d 331, 
2007-Ohio-3673, 872 N.E.2d 261, ¶ 25, 30. 
{¶ 32} The disciplined attorneys in those cases were ordered to serve actual 
suspensions, and none of them was a prosecutor.  Instead, those cases all involved 
civil matters, in which the worst outcome risked by the lawyer’s deception was the 
loss of money by a party. 
{¶ 33} In contrast, the stakes in this case involved imprisonment for up to a 
life term.  Brockler actively hindered the pursuit of justice in a criminal proceeding 
on multiple occasions, by lying to alibi witnesses in an effort to make them change 
January Term, 2016 
 
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their statements.  He made every effort to hide his deceptive activities until they 
were uncovered, and then he refused to admit that his actions were wrong. 
{¶ 34} Failing to require Brockler to serve even a single day of his 
suspension does little to establish that this court will ensure the integrity of 
prosecutors and the ethical administration of justice.  Indeed, none of the cases upon 
which the majority opinion relies to support a fully stayed sentence involves a 
lawyer lying in a criminal case to the detriment of a criminal defendant and, 
ultimately, to the detriment of the public’s faith in our courts and in justice.1 
{¶ 35} The stakes in this case are significantly higher than those in the cases 
cited in the majority opinion.  The courts are the bulwark of justice, and we must 
prove that government is trustworthy and working tirelessly but fairly, ethically, 
and honestly in support of justice.  To do that, we must require the offices of Ohio’s 
prosecuting attorneys to strive for flawless obedience to the ethical rules governing 
all lawyers practicing in the state. 
{¶ 36} Despite Brockler’s claims about his training in the prosecutor’s 
office, Brockler admits that his actions at issue in this case were not directed by a 
supervisor and that whatever a supervisor may have told him in the past does not 
                                                 
1 In Columbus Bar Assn. v. King, the attorney lied to a landlord in a slip-and-fall case in order to 
add a slander claim to the complaint of his client, the landlord’s former tenant.  84 Ohio St.3d 174, 
175-177, 702 N.E.2d 862.  The opinion does not disclose if the landlord ever had to defend the false 
slander claim in court or if the deception came out prior to trial.  In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 
this court found that a lawyer engaged in subterfuge that intimidated a witness during a deposition 
related to a disciplinary investigation for failing to provide a file to a former client.  101 Ohio St.3d 
14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 2, 16.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Niermeyer concerned an 
attorney who lied when he backdated a workers’ compensation claim in order to cover up the fact 
that he missed a filing deadline. 119 Ohio St.3d 99, 2008-Ohio-3824, 892 N.E.2d 434, ¶ 4.  In that 
case, the attorney was “almost immediately * * * struck with regret and overwhelmed with guilt” 
over his deception.  Id. at ¶ 5.  In contrast, Brockler steadfastly denied that his actions were unethical.  
The deceit in Disciplinary Counsel v. Potter, 126 Ohio St.3d 50, 2010-Ohio-2521, 930 N.E.2d 307, 
bears even less resemblance to Brockler’s case.  There, Potter’s deception involved giving money 
to a friend to purchase, at the fairly appraised value, property from an estate of which Potter was the 
executor, with the plan calling for Potter to ultimately become owner of the land.  Id. at ¶ 6.  While 
recognizing that each of these cases involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that 
was wholly inappropriate for a lawyer and was a discredit to our honorable profession, the stakes at 
issue in these cases were, at most, monetary and wholly inapposite to the circumstances here. 
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excuse his conduct.  It is the responsibility of every Ohio lawyer to know and follow 
the Rules of Professional Conduct.  There is no separate code of conduct that 
prosecutors alone get to play by. 
{¶ 37} I am cognizant of Brockler’s desire to serve the public and to do what 
is “right” by protecting society from dangerous criminal defendants, just as I am 
aware of the intensely difficult nature of such work, which often involves tragic 
circumstances, elicits visceral reactions, and presents great risks for both the 
accuser and the accused.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. LoDico, 106 Ohio St.3d 229, 
2005-Ohio-4630, 833 N.E.2d 1235, ¶ 30.  Although criminal cases “bring the 
responsibility and necessity” of zealous representation, a prosecuting attorney “is 
not endowed with a concomitant right to denigrate the court in discharging that 
responsibility.”  Id. 
{¶ 38} In light of the series of lies and misrepresentations here and the 
impact they have on the profession and our communities, I would indefinitely 
suspend Brockler’s license to practice law in this state. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 39} Because I believe that the court’s sanction in this case is entirely 
incongruous with Brockler’s behavior, I cannot subscribe to it.  For his ethical 
misdeeds, I would indefinitely suspend Brockler’s license to practice law in the 
state of Ohio.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 40} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 41} Respondent engaged in unacceptable dishonest conduct that 
materially affected the administration of justice, and I would impose an indefinite 
suspension. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2016 
 
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Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Donald M. Scheetz, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, George D. Jonson, and Kimberly Vanover 
Riley, for respondent. 
_________________