Case Title: Wilson v. State

Citation: 451 So. 2d 718

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1984-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
451 So. 2d 718 (1984) Eddie Lee WILSON v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 54826. Supreme Court of Mississippi. May 9, 1984. *719 Carroll Rhodes, Hazlehurst, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Frankie Walton White, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and BOWLING and DAN M. LEE, JJ. PATTERSON, Chief Justice for the Court: Eddie Lee Wilson was tried in the Circuit Court of Copiah County on a charge of attempted rape. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the court imposed a sentence of ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Wilson appeals, assigning as error that the trial court: I. Overruled defendant's motion to suppress his statement. II. Refused to admit the entire medical record of the defendant. III. Overruled defendant's motion to suppress identification testimony. IV. Denied defendant's motion for mistrial when the state allegedly buttressed the in-court identification testimony of the prosecutrix. V. Denied defendant's requested instructions. VI. Granted the state's requested instructions. Further, Wilson argues the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and was the result of bias, prejudice and passion. On December 30, 1977, two men entered a grocery store owned by the prosecutrix and her husband. The prosecutrix was alone in the store. Suddenly one of the men darted behind the counter where the prosecutrix was standing and grasped her arms from the back while his accomplice stood in front of the counter and pointed a gun at her. The assailant who was standing behind her then took the money from the cash register and put it into his pockets. He again seized the back of the prosecutrix's arms and led her to the back door of the store. She complied with his order to remove the bolt, and he forced her outside. She testified that at that point Wilson and Wells were arrested in Claiborne County on Saturday, January 7, 1978. Confined in the Copiah County Jail on charges of robbery and attempted rape, Wilson notified Sheriff Earl Guess on January 8 that he wished to give a statement. Wilson was then brought into the sheriff's office where Guess advised him of his Miranda rights. Having stated that he understood these rights, Wilson gave an oral statement in the presence of Guess and his secretary, Janice Pitts. Deputy Sheriff Thomas Way made intermittent appearances during the taking of the statement. After Wilson concluded, Ms. Pitts typed the statement from her shorthand notes. Since Wilson professed difficulty reading, Guess read the statement to him. Wilson then signed the statement. After a hearing on the issue, the court ruled the statement was freely and voluntarily given after the defendant had been advised of his constitutional rights and had made an effective waiver thereof. The motion to suppress was therefore overruled and the statement was admitted into evidence as set out below: Wilson now argues the court's ruling was error. *721 The record shows Ms. Pitts, Deputy Way and Sheriff Guess testified that Wilson was not induced to make the statement by any threats, promises, coercion or abuse. Further, Deputy Sheriff Onnie Bell Sellers, who was called in to witness Wilson's signature, testified that no threats, promises, coercion or abuse were used to induce Wilson to sign the statement. To rebut this evidence Wilson relies on the testimony of Dr. John Long, who stated Wilson came into his office on January 12 complaining of dizziness and headache. Dr. Long testified that Wilson told him he (Wilson) had been beaten at the jail the previous Sunday evening. Long admitted Wilson to the hospital and treated him for a contusion to the head and suspected skull fracture. By the time Wilson was discharged on January 19, Long's diagnosis had changed to "probable cerebral concussion but no skull fracture." While this testimony may arouse some suspicion as to the cause of the injury, we emphasize there is absolutely no evidence connecting it with the statement given on January 8. Wilson had the opportunity to take the stand outside the presence of the jury and make that connection, yet he declined to do so. At the hearing on the motion to suppress the statement, the defense called only Dr. Long and therefore proved only that Wilson did sustain a head injury. To the contrary, Sheriff Guess testified a woman claiming to be Wilson's mother had come to the jail after Wilson's arrest and informed Guess that Wilson had suffered a head injury inflicted by a falling tree. We are of the opinion there is insufficient testimony to bridge the gap between the injury and the statement and to thereby rebut the testimony of the law enforcement officers and Ms. Pitts that Wilson was not coerced into making the statement. Any other holding would be rooted in mere conjecture in our opinion. Wilson next argues the trial court improperly excluded from evidence those portions of his medical record which contained Wilson's assertions that his injuries were the result of a beating sustained at the jail. In Shorter v. State, 257 So. 2d 236, 240 (Miss. 1972), we held, "It is a general rule that declarations of a party in his own favor are not admissible in his behalf." The reason for this exclusion is stated in 2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 303 (13th ed. 1972): We are of the opinion the statement by Wilson to Dr. Long that Wilson's injury was the result of a beating at the jail was a self-serving declaration and therefore properly excluded. In reaching this conclusion we are mindful of Cone v. State, 271 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1973), wherein we held the trial court improperly excluded certain statements made by the defendant before his arrest. However, that case turned on facts which are not present here. In Cone, defendant was convicted for possession of marijuana after officers found contraband in the dormitory room defendant shared with Christopher Linkenhoker. At Cone's trial, the jury was not allowed to hear the following testimony of the dormitory proctor: We reversed, stating, "We do not feel that the statement of Cone to McKay, the proctor of the second floor of Scott Hall, was a self-serving declaration within the usual and real meaning of that term. It was not a statement of Cone about himself or in his own interest." 271 So. 2d at 455. We based this holding in part on the fact that at the time they were made, Cone's statements were not self-serving: we could not conceive that Cone would invite a search of his room while he prepared to deal in drugs from that room. In short, Cone's statements were made well before his arrest, well before he could have foreseen a need to fabricate evidence favorable to him. Therefore the "testimonial trustworthiness" rationale did not apply. To the contrary, Wilson's statement to the doctor was made after Wilson's arrest, after he had made a confession. Unlike Cone's statement, Wilson's declaration was self-serving at the time it was made. We are therefore of the opinion it was properly excluded. We next consider the overruling of Wilson's motion to suppress the lineup identification of Wilson by the prosecutrix. Wilson contends this was error for two reasons. He first argues he was improperly denied counsel during the proceedings. We are of the opinion the following language from Bankston v. State, 391 So. 2d 1005 (Miss. 1980), disposes of this contention: Therefore the first prong of Wilson's argument is without merit. Secondly, Wilson asserts the lineup procedure was suggestive and therefore led to an irreparably mistaken identification. He bases this argument on the fact that he (Wilson) was taller and darker complexioned than anyone else in the lineup and further, that he was the only man with a beard. Again, we find the appropriate analysis in Bankston v. State: Directing these factors to the facts in this case, we conclude: (1) The prosecutrix had ample opportunity to view Wilson for 20 to 25 minutes during the commission of the crime. She testified she looked at his face while he was taking the money and again while they were standing outside the store in the sunlight. (2) The prosecutrix testified that she purposefully scrutinized Wilson because she wanted to be able to remember his face. (3) The prosecutrix described the man who attempted to rape her as being about 5 feet, 6 1/2 inches tall with a small beard. (4) The prosecutrix positively identified Wilson at the lineup. (5) While testimony was equivocal as to the exact date of the lineup, it occurred no more than nine days after the crime. Considering the foregoing facts, we are of the opinion there was no substantial likelihood that Wilson would be misidentified. Therefore the trial court properly overruled the motion to suppress the lineup identification. Wilson next contends the allegedly unreliable pre-trial identification tainted the prosecutrix's in-court identification of him. In view of our holding the pre-trial identification was properly admitted, we find this argument meritless. We note further the prosecutrix made a positive in-court identification of Wilson as the man who came into her store on December 30, 1977, and attempted to rape her. We are therefore of the opinion the state established an independent source for the in-court identification notwithstanding the lineup identification. Wilson's fifth proposition is that the trial court erred in refusing three instructions offered by the defense. The first such instruction was peremptory and properly refused in our opinion. We have held that while the jury determines the weight and worth of a statement, its admissibility is a question of law for the court. Craft v. State, 380 So. 2d 251, 255 (Miss. 1980). In view of this ruling, Instruction D-8 sets forth an incorrect principle of law and was therefore correctly refused. Finally, Instruction D-3 would have informed the jury the following: The court properly refused this instruction as being abstract. Callahan v. State, 419 So. 2d 165 (Miss. 1982). Further, the court had already instructed the jury on the element of intent to do an act forbidden by law. The court was not required to grant repetitive instructions. Anderson v. State, 413 So. 2d 725 (Miss. 1982). We find no basis in the record for Wilson's sixth assignment of error, that the court erred in granting each instruction granted by the state. Wilson's seventh assignment of error, that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, is in our opinion meritless in view of the facts already discussed in this opinion. Finally, Wilson argues the verdict was the result of bias, prejudice and passion. We find in the record no evidence in support of this contention, nor do we find that Wilson's attorney made any objection to the jury panel or any member of it. This proposition is without merit. Having carefully reviewed the record, we are of the opinion the trial court committed no reversible error and the case should be affirmed. We observe further that Wilson received a fair trial. AFFIRMED. *724 WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and BOWLING, HAWKINS, PRATHER, ROBERTSON and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, J., concurs in result only.