Case Title: Hatch v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92-22

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hatch v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.1997 WY 6930 P.2d 382Case Number: 95-78Decided: 01/13/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

Frank J. HATCH, III; Wendy 
Hatch; Frank J. Hatch, IV; and by Frank J. Hatch, III and Wendy Hatch as next 
friend for their minor children Anna Corinna Hatch; Matthew Hatch; and Michael 
Hatch, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, a corporation; 
Garry Kitchens; and Dennis Murphy, Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal from District Court, Albany County, Barton R. 
Voight, J.

John E. Stanfield of Smith, Stanfield & 
Scott, Laramie, John B. "Jack" Speight and Dominique D.Y. Cone of Hathaway, 
Speight & Kunz, Cheyenne (Speight and Cone participated in the appeal only), 
representing appellant.

W.W. Reeves and Timothy W. Miller, of Reeves 
& Murdock, Casper, representing appellee.

Before TAYLOR, C.J.,* and THOMAS, MACY and LEHMAN, JJ., and O'BRIEN, 
District Judge.

* Chief Justice as of July 1, 
1996.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The theme of this 
case is that Frank J. Hatch, III (Mr. Hatch), Wendy Hatch (Mrs. Hatch), Frank J. 
Hatch, IV, Anna Corinna Hatch (Corinna), Robert Matthew Hatch and Michael Logan 
Hatch, (the Hatches or Hatch family) were deprived of their collective right to 
a fair trial on their claims for benefits under a home fire insurance policy; a 
duty of good faith and fair dealing in resolving their policy claim; and were 
subjected to intentional infliction of emotional distress. After this court 
remanded the Hatches' first appeal, Hatch v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 842 P.2d 1089 (Wyo. 1992) (Hatch I), they lost the jury trial. The Hatches now 
present a litany of issues all designed to establish some error that deprived 
them of a fair trial. We hold that there is no merit in any of their claims of 
error. The directed verdicts for agents Garry Kitchens (Kitchens) and Dennis 
Murphy (Murphy), and for State Farm) Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm) on 
the issue of punitive damages are affirmed. The judgment in favor of State Farm, 
entered upon the jury verdict, is affirmed.

[¶2]      The Hatches set 
out eleven issues in their Appellants' Brief on Appeal to Wyoming Supreme Court 
as follows:

I. Was it proper 
for the trial court to instruct the jury on a defense that was not contained or 
defined in the insurance contract between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant State 
Farm?

II. Did the trial 
court properly instruct the jury not to consider the fact that Mr. Hatch was 
acquitted on criminal arson charges even though State Farm's role in Mr. Hatch's 
arson prosecution formed part of Mr. Hatch's bad faith claim, even though 
evidence regarding the criminal trial had been admitted throughout the trial, 
and even though the court referred to the criminal trial in other 
instructions?

III. Was it error 
for the trial court to instruct the jury not to consider the Hatches' damages 
resulting from State Farm's denial of coverage when the Hatches asserted a cause 
of action for coverage?

IV. Was it 
inconsistent with the principles established in Hatch I for the trial court to 
instruct the jury that it must not award damages resulting from the denial of 
coverage?

V. When the 
evidence is presumed to be true and construed in favor of the Hatches, was it 
proper and consistent with principles established in Hatch I for the trial court 
to direct a verdict in favor of Defendant Kitchens? Defendant Murphy? Defendant 
State Farm as to punitive damages?

VI. Is it proper 
under Rule 32 to edit and re-arrange and revise the deposition of an 
"unavailable" deponent - as was done in this case - and to eliminate testimony 
even though no valid objections were made at the time of the deposition and 
where objections might have been obviated or cured if an appropriate objection 
had been made when the deposition was taken?

VII. In a case 
involving bad faith and unfair dealing, was it error for the trial court to 
eliminate from a 1991 deposition all questions in which the term "good neighbor" 
was used where no objections on that ground were asserted and where that issue 
was never raised at the time the deposition was taken and where the deponent is 
"unavailable" within Rule 32?

VIII. Was it error 
for the trial court to refuse to admit the Hatches' application for insurance 
coverage even though the application was relevant to issues of coverage, bad 
faith, and State Farm's conduct vis-a-vis the Hatches?

IX. In an insurance 
bad faith case, was it error for the trial court to admit confidential and 
legally protected evidence of the Hatches' daughter's juvenile record and 
counseling concerning an event when [sic] occurred three years prior to the fire 
at issue in this case?

X. Was it error for 
the trial court to reject the Hatches' claim for attorney fees under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 26-15-124, which was enacted to protect policyholders from expensive 
litigation when insurance companies engage in unreasonable conduct and deny 
their claims. [sic]

XI. In view of all 
the erroneous or unfair rulings in this case, is it reasonable to conclude that 
those errors or unfair rulings are harmless when viewed from the standpoint of 
their cumulative effect?

[¶3]      In the Brief of 
Appellees, State Farm, Garry Kitchens and Dennis Murphy reframe the issues as 
follows:

1. Whether the 
district court should be reversed based on objections waived at 
trial.

2. Whether 
Appellants have failed to establish prejudicial error.

3. Whether 
Appellants' arguments regarding damages are moot in light of the jury's findings 
against them as to liability.

4. Whether the 
district court properly instructed the jury on State Farm's arson 
defenses.

5. Whether the 
district court correctly directed a verdict on Appellants' intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claims.

6. Whether the 
district court abused its discretion in making the three evidentiary rulings 
challenged on appeal.

7. Whether the 
district court properly denied Appellants' request for attorneys' 
fees.

[¶4]      In Hatch I, we 
summarized the underlying facts in the case in this way:

A fire was 
discovered in the basement of appellants' house about 2:00 a.m. on August 4, 
1987. The fire started in the southwest corner of the house. Gasoline was found 
in carpet samples after the fire. The nearest source of ignition was a 
woodburning stove fifteen feet away which had a hot fire box twelve inches off 
the floor. Firemen found a gasoline container in the garage, lying on its edge 
under a chair, with the broad side against the garage wall. An explanation for 
how gasoline was detected in the basement was that the family dog knocked the 
gas can over and the contents ran through a crack in the garage floor, down the 
outside of the basement wall, then under the wall and into the 
basement.

Appellees' [State 
Farm's] claims specialist, appellee Garry Kitchens responded to notice of the 
fire; he was replaced five days later. He made no estimates, and did not review 
any work produced by State Farm's investigation nor participate in any 
decisions. Kitchen's replacement, appellee Dennis Murphy, continued the 
investigation of appellants' claim. He stated that his work represented his 
"best and most conscientious effort" and that his recommendations represented 
his "honest belief that Mr. Hatch started the fire in his house." Appellant 
Frank J. Hatch, III was charged with arson. An Albany County jury returned a not 
guilty verdict.

Hatch I, 842 P.2d  at 1091. We considered the 
summary judgment entered by the trial court in Hatch I, and our dispositive 
paragraph reads:

Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and remanded for trial on the claim for benefits under the 
policy and the cause of action for violation of a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.

Hatch I, 842 P.2d  at 1099 (emphasis 
added).

[¶5]      The case then was 
tried to a jury on the three remaining claims asserted by the Hatch family. 
These included a claim to recover the policy benefits, a claim for bad faith in 
the claims handling practices of State Farm, and a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The district court directed verdicts for 
Kitchens and Murphy, and also directed a verdict for State Farm on the claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and the issue of punitive damages. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of State Farm on the remaining claims 
against it for recovery of the policy benefits and bad faith in the handling of 
the claim.

[¶6]      In the course of 
their case in chief, the Hatches offered the discovery deposition testimony of 
an expert witness, Carrol M. Cloyd (Cloyd), into evidence pursuant to WYO. R. 
CIV. P. 32 because Cloyd had died before the trial. At the deposition, Cloyd had 
been qualified as an expert on insurance industry standards for good faith and 
fair dealing in the investigation and handling of insurance claims. Cloyd then 
had identified thirteen areas in which, in his opinion, State Farm failed to 
meet the industry standards for investigation and handling of the Hatches' 
claim. His testimony was relied upon to demonstrate that State Farm's 
investigation and handling of the Hatches' claim did not comply with industry 
standards. After a very deliberate consideration, the court summarized and then 
excluded ten of the thirteen areas of Cloyd's testimony. The court ruled that 
the testimony was beyond Cloyd's area of expertise because he had not been 
qualified to testify on the severity of emotional distress and no foundation had 
been laid to demonstrate that he was an expert in arson, nor had there been 
available to him the opinions of other experts in that area when he 
testified.

[¶7]      Prior to trial 
and during trial, a major problem arose with respect to the preparation of jury 
instructions. In a letter sent during the pre-trial period, the district court 
anticipated problems with the jury instructions because of the extreme acrimony 
between counsel. The court directed counsel to meet on a particular date to 
resolve as many jury instructions as possible and produce a joint draft of a 
verdict form. On the date of the court directed meeting, counsel advised the 
court by correspondence that they could not agree on anything. Instead, the 
respective parties separately submitted their proposed instructions, and the 
court then compiled a set of instructions to be used by counsel as a starting 
point to end the impasse. Even after these efforts, the jury had to wait for 
instructions before beginning its deliberations because a final instruction 
conference had to be conducted.

[¶8]      The court 
ultimately composed a set of thirty-one instructions and gave those to the jury. 
The jury returned a verdict in which it stated that State Farm did "establish by 
the preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the fire in the Hatch 
residence on August 4, 1987 was the intentional setting of the fire by Francis 
J. Hatch, III." Recovery of the policy benefits was denied, and in addition, the 
jury found against the Hatches with respect to all of their causes of action for 
bad faith in the handling of the claims. The Hatches appeal from the Order on 
Directed Verdict Motion and Judgment on Jury Verdict.

[¶9]      We consider first 
the claims of error relating to the evidence. These are captured in Issues VI, 
VII, VIII, and IX set forth by the Hatches. Error on the part of the trial court 
is charged in the redaction of certain testimony from the Cloyd deposition; in 
the refusal to admit into evidence the application for insurance that the 
Hatches submitted to State Farm; and in admitting testimony and evidence 
relating to the daughter's juvenile record and psychological testing and 
counseling.

[¶10]   The Hatches assert an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court in the redaction of portions of the 
Cloyd deposition. They argue that the court refused to comply with WYO. R. CIV. 
P. 32,1 when it allowed State Farm to object at trial to a 
matter that was not objected to at the time of the deposition. The Hatches' 
position is that the failure to object eliminated any opportunity of obviating 
or removing the problems at the time of the deposition. Furthermore, they assert 
error in permitting State Farm to object to its own questions and answers 
included in the deposition. Rule 32, WYO. R. CIV. P. alludes to the rules of 
evidence which are applicable in all actions and proceedings in the courts of 
this state with limited exceptions, none of which are applicable in this case. 
WYO. R. EVID. 1101.

[¶11]   In addition to the rules of 
relevancy, WYO. R. EVID. 401, 402, and 403, WYO. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added) 
is pertinent to resolution of the redaction issue:

If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified 
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

We have held that it is not the purpose of 
WYO. R. EVID. 702 to provide blanket admissibility of expert testimony, but 
instead, to vest the trial court with the discretion to determine whether to 
exclude testimony deemed unnecessary or not helpful to the trier of fact. 
Anderson v. Louisiana-Pacific, 859 P.2d 85, 87 (Wyo. 1993). See Reed v. Hunter, 
663 P.2d 513 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶12]   A major issue about Cloyd's 
testimony concerned questions he was asked about State Farm complying with the 
standard it had established by its advertising. According to the Hatches' 
theory, State Farm had engaged in an advertising campaign that features the 
slogan, "Like a good neighbor, State Farm is there." Seven of the ten areas, 
which were excluded by the trial court, elicited testimony from Cloyd as to 
whether, in his opinion, State Farm's actions complied with the standard 
expected of good faith and fair dealing and "a good neighbor." The trial judge 
pointed out:

* * * I think using 
good neighbor as part of the standard changes the standard and I don't think 
that is appropriate. The legal standard of good faith and fair dealing is not 
the same as whatever the standard may be for being a good 
neighbor.

[¶13]   The questions and answers in 
Cloyd's deposition went beyond the industry standard for good faith and fair 
dealing in the investigation and handling of insurance claims. They purported to 
provide his opinion with respect to an extraneous and non-legal standard. The 
provision in WYO. R. EVID. 702, concerning opinions of experts offering 
"specialized knowledge" that "will assist the trier of fact," does not justify 
such testimony. Cloyd's opinion, as to whether the advertising established a 
standard and on how a "good neighbor" would act, required no specialized 
knowledge, nor could it have assisted the jury in understanding the evidence or 
determining any of the facts in issue. It properly was excluded. His opinion as 
to how a "good neighbor" would act was beyond the realm of his 
expertise.

[¶14]   The ruling of the trial court was 
apt and precise. The district court appropriately redacted testimony by Cloyd in 
which he was not a qualified expert. Furthermore, through the testimony of 
Robert C. Haberkorn and John W. Crowe, the Hatches ultimately did get in 
evidence regarding the industry standard for good faith and fair dealing in 
investigation and handling of insurance claims and bad faith in the handling of 
Hatches' claims. This evidence made the deposition testimony of Cloyd 
repetitious and cumulative.

[¶15]   The other three areas excluded by 
the trial court from Cloyd's deposition were beyond his expertise; not directed 
to the industry standard; cumulative; irrelevant; or consisted of information 
that did not require an opinion of an expert. He had testified at the deposition 
with respect to reviewing the carrier's operating procedure manual. He stated an 
opinion about a warning from the State Farm sales agent regarding the difference 
between actual cash value coverage and replacement cost coverage. He also 
testified that the process invoked to establish the explanation by the Hatches 
of how the fire started was not correct. All of this testimony properly was 
excluded by the trial court in the exercise of its 
discretion.

[¶16]   Relying upon language found in WYO. 
R. CIV. P. 32(d)(3)(A) and (B), the Hatches also argue that State Farm waived 
its right to object because the objections might have been obviated or removed 
if made at the deposition. Parties cannot be deemed to have waived an objection 
to relevance at the time of the deposition. The district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it refused to honor this justification for the utilization of 
Cloyd's deposition testimony.

[¶17]   The Hatches also claim error 
because the trial court refused to admit into evidence their application for 
insurance from State Farm. They contend language in that application is relevant 
to coverage under the policy; relevant to their expectations; and relevant to 
bad faith. Our rule is that, if an insurance policy is unambiguous, the court's 
examination is confined to the four corners of the integrated contract, and 
extrinsic evidence is not admitted to contradict the plain meaning. Doctors' Co. 
v. Ins. Corp. of America, 864 P.2d 1018 (Wyo. 1993). Furthermore, the agreement 
cannot be contradicted or construed contrary to the clear language encompassed 
in the agreement simply on the basis of asserted extrinsic evidence of the 
subjective intent of parties to the contract. Hayes v. American Nat. Bank of 
Powell, 784 P.2d 599 (Wyo. 1989). We agree with the holding of the South Dakota 
court that the standard for construing a fire insurance policy evidences an 
intent to put the entire insurance contract into the hands of the insured in one 
instrument. Orr v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 50 S.D. 519, 210 N.W. 744, aff'd, 52 S.D. 513, 219 N.W. 119 (1928). A Georgia court of appeals 
has held specifically that an application for a fire insurance policy is not 
part of the contract. United Ins. Co. of America v. Hadden, 126 Ga. App. 362, 
190 S.E.2d 638 (1972). We hold that the trial court correctly ruled in excluding 
the application for the insurance policy from evidence because it was not part 
of the contract.

[¶18]   The last claim of error with 
respect to the evidence relates to the assertion that the court erroneously 
admitted into evidence the report of Corinna's juvenile court record along with 
a report of a psychologist who examined her. The Hatches argue that these 
records, made three years prior to the fire, were irrelevant, unfairly 
prejudicial, and subject to Wyoming's confidentiality statutes. The trial court 
admitted into evidence copies of documents that were in Mr. Hatch's briefcase at 
the time of the fire, including the reports relating to Corinna about which 
complaint is made; Mr. Hatch's military records; a report of a 
twenty-five-year-old psychiatric examination of Mr. Hatch; a love poem written 
by Hatch to his wife twenty-five years previously; miscellaneous old financial 
records; insurance coverage; an insurance renewal notice; letters; a book Mr. 
Hatch was authoring; and information on the purchase of the Hatch 
home.

[¶19]   In Furman v. Rural Elec. Co., 869 P.2d 136, 145 (Wyo. 1994) (citations omitted), we captured the rule relating to 
decisions as to the admissibility of evidence in this way:

A trial court's 
decision on the admissibility of evidence will be affirmed by this court unless 
it is demonstrated that there has been a clear abuse of discretion. This 
standard applies to trial court decisions concerning the "adequacy of 
foundation" and relevancy. Furman [the appellant] bears the burden of proving 
that the trial court acted unreasonably in admitting this 
evidence.

The court admitted the records relating to 
Corinna into evidence, but limited their purpose pursuant to WYO. R. EVID. 105 
as follows:

THE COURT: Ladies 
and gentlemen of the jury, [defense exhibit] Q is being admitted for the sole 
purpose of showing what Mr. Murphy had available to him during his investigation 
and what items are available to him as part of that investigation. You may also 
consider them in regard to any motive that Mr. Hatch may have had for starting 
the fire in as much as there has been an inference or implication at least, that 
what someone tries to save from fire may reflect that.

You're not to 
consider any of the documents in Q for any other reason. You're not to consider 
them for the truth of the matter asserted in any of those 
documents.

Corinna's records were included within the 
limited purpose and were appropriately admitted.

[¶20]   The Hatches argue that the 
probative value of these records was outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. They speculate that these records induced the jury to consider 
Corinna's history as a reflection on the character of her parents and as a 
determining factor of the likelihood that Mr. Hatch started the fire. They point 
to nothing in the record to justify this other than speculation, and it clearly 
is beyond the limited purpose for which the records were admitted. We find no 
error based upon that argument.

[¶21]   In addition, the Hatches profess 
the admission of these records violated Wyoming statutes. They rely upon the 
provisions of Wyoming's Juvenile Court Act, WYO. STAT. §§ 14-6-201 to -243 
(1994), and WYO. STAT. § 6-3-110 (1988) which provides:

An authorized 
agency or insurance company which receives information pursuant to W.S. 6-3-108 
through 6-3-110 shall hold the information in confidence except when release is 
authorized by the source of the information, by W.S. 6-3-108 through 6-3-110 or 
by a court of competent jurisdiction.

The Hatches concede the trial court may have 
been a court of competent jurisdiction under this latter statute, but they argue 
the court failed to account for pertinent language in WYO. STAT. § 14-6-203, 
which reads:

(g) All records 
made, received or kept by any municipal, county or state officer or employee 
evidencing any legal process resulting from allegations of a minor's misconduct 
other than violation of a municipal ordinance are confidential and subject to 
the provisions of this act. The existence of the records or contents thereof 
shall not be disclosed by any person unless:

* * * * * *

(ii) The person the 
records concern is under eighteen (18) years of age and, in conjunction with one 
(1) of his parents or with the ratification of the court, authorizes the 
disclosure; or

(iii) The person 
the records concern is eighteen (18) years of age or older and authorizes the 
disclosure.

This statute, which is addressed to a state 
agency, had no application to the court's ruling.

[¶22]   We turn to the claims of error 
regarding the jury instructions. In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 
882 P.2d 813, 831-32 (Wyo. 1994), we explained that in reviewing for error with 
respect to jury instructions, we address the claimed error in both a procedural 
and substantive context. From the procedural perspective, substantive review 
will depend upon an appropriate objection, which is required by WYO. R. CIV. P. 
51. The purpose is to advise the trial court of the precise nature of the claim 
so the judicial discretion is appropriately exercised. We consider the charge as 
a whole and in the light of the entire record from pleadings through argument to 
the jury. Our goal is to identify any prejudice, and the standard is whether the 
charge is a comprehensive, balanced and essentially accurate statement of the 
law that is not likely to confuse or mislead the jury.

[¶23]   In the absence of an objection, we 
apply the doctrine of plain error as set forth in Hampton v. State, 558 P.2d 504, 507 (Wyo. 1977) (citations omitted):

[T]his Court must 
be able to discern from the record, without resort to speculation or equivocal 
inference, what occurred at trial, * * *. Further, the proponent * * * must 
demonstrate the existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law which the 
particular facts transgress in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way. * 
* * [T]he error or defect must adversely affect some substantial right of the 
accused in order to avoid the application of the harmless error concept * * 
*.

In Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1291 
(Wyo. 1985), we quoted from Gore v. State, 627 P.2d 1384, 1388-89 (Wyo. 1981), 
the ultimate consideration:

Thus, unless an 
instruction can be said to have plainly caused a fundamental prejudice to the * 
* * [party's] legal rights, we will not overturn it on appeal unless it was 
objected to during the trial and a proper instruction was offered in its 
place.

[¶24]   The Hatches' first claim of error 
regarding the jury instructions, attacks the instructions relating to the arson 
defense asserted by State Farm.2 In briefing 
their objection to these instructions, the Hatches argue that the insurance 
policy from State Farm provided only two defenses. They contend that State Farm 
advanced a third defense called the "arson defense," and the district court 
erroneously allowed the jury to be instructed on this third, nonexistent 
defense.

[¶25]   The insurance policy discloses that 
it can be voided under the following circumstances:

Intentional 
Acts. If you or any person insured 
under this policy causes or procures a loss to property covered under this 
policy for the purpose of obtaining insurance benefits, then this policy is void 
and we will not pay you or any other insured for this 
loss.

* * * * * *

Concealment or 
Fraud. This policy is void as to you 
and any other insured, if you or any other insured under this 
policy has intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or 
circumstance relating to this insurance, whether before or after a 
loss.

The Hatches argue that the instructions are 
erroneous because the language of the insurance policy neither actually nor 
impliedly provides an arson defense. They contend that the instructions on arson 
are erroneous as a matter of law because the district court failed to instruct 
on the crime of second degree arson and eliminated the issues of motive and 
intent contrary to the provisions of the policy. The Hatches also assert that 
the term "arson" is extremely prejudicial and should not have been used without 
a definition in instructing the jury. They also claim that the court erroneously 
implied in these instructions that the Hatches had the burden of proving the 
fire was accidental in order to overcome the arson defense of State 
Farm.

[¶26]   State Farm's response is that the 
Hatches are not entitled to raise objections on appeal to Instructions 7 and 28 
since they did not object at the instruction conference. State Farm points out 
that Instruction 28 was a version of the Hatches' proffered Instruction No. 74. 
State Farm argues the Hatches did not object to the use of the term "arson" 
during the trial and even submitted some eleven instructions that incorporated 
the term "arson," and they are prohibited from complaining about the term at 
this time.

[¶27]   Examination of the record discloses 
an objection to Instruction No. 8 at the conference by counsel for the Hatches 
stating, "it says here intentionally started [by Frank J. Hatch, III]. It 
doesn't say deliberately, I suppose intentionally if you dump a can of gasoline, 
it's intentional. If you intend to dump it, whether you intend to start the 
house or not I think its terribly, terribly prejudicial and clear error." We 
understand this comment to be a statement that one may intentionally dump a can 
of gasoline without intending to start a fire. The Hatches did not present that 
theory at the trial, and the facts do not support such an interpretation. The 
Hatches' contention throughout the trial was that the dog tipped the gas can 
over, not that Frank J. Hatch, III intended to dump the gasoline but did not 
intend to start a fire. The objection was not pertinent in the context of the 
issues tried.

[¶28]   While the policy does not 
specifically allude to an arson defense, it does state that coverage is provided 
only for "accidental direct physical loss to property." (Emphasis added). Arson 
is not accidental, but instead, is an intentional act or conversely a 
nonaccidental direct physical loss to property. The policy also provides that it 
is voided when "you [the insured] or any person insured under this policy causes 
or procures a loss to property covered under this policy for the purpose of 
obtaining insurance benefits * * *." In their complaint the Hatches sued State 
Farm for "the sum of at least $93,525.00 under the said policy coverage * * *." 
In the language of the policy, the action was brought "for the purpose of 
obtaining insurance benefits." Instruction No. 8 accurately states that State 
Farm was required to prove the fire was started intentionally by Frank J. Hatch, 
III in order to establish its defense of an intentional act. That instruction 
does not require that State Farm prove the crime or elements of the crime of 
arson. Neither does the policy require any element of motive other than the 
purpose of obtaining insurance benefits. We are satisfied that Instruction No. 8 
does not erroneously state the law in this case.

[¶29]   The Hatches raised no proper 
objection to Instructions 7 and 28, and in fact, an instruction similar to 
Instruction No. 28 was offered by the Hatches. As to these instructions, plain 
error must be established. Giving full scope to the arguments of the Hatches, 
they fail to demonstrate a record that clearly and unequivocally reflects the 
facts complained of, a transgression of a clear rule of law, or 
prejudice.

[¶30]   State Farm was not required in this 
civil trial to establish the elements of second degree arson. The court 
instructed that the Hatches could not recover if State Farm established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the fire was intentionally started. The only 
obligation on State Farm was to establish that the fire was intentionally set 
and not that it constituted arson under the criminal code. The jury also was 
advised there could be no recovery if State Farm established that fact, and in 
the alternative, State Farm would be liable under the policy if the cause of the 
fire was accidental. Instruction 28, read in conjunction with Instructions 7 and 
8, accurately and clearly instructed the jury with respect to the burden of 
State Farm to establish the "arson defense." The "arson defense" was implicitly 
and mutually agreed upon by the parties as disclosed by the record and the 
proposed jury instructions. There is no reference to the "nonaccidental direct 
physical loss to property," which the Hatches now claim should have been 
invoked. While the Hatches claim prejudice from the use of the term arson, they 
have not been successful in demonstrating actual prejudice. There was no error 
with respect to Instructions No. 7, 8, and 28.

[¶31]   Hatches also assert error in the 
giving of Instruction No. 22 which reads:

INSTRUCTION NO. 22

[¶32]   During the course of this trial, 
you have learned that Frank J. Hatch, III, was charged with arson, and was 
acquitted after a criminal trial. You may not consider these facts in your 
deliberations and may make no inferences therefrom. A different burden of proof 
applies in criminal cases than in civil cases.

The Hatches assert this instruction unfairly 
and erroneously removed the truth from the jury's consideration of State Farm's 
bad faith in dealing with the county attorney, and eliminated Hatch's acquittal 
as a factor in the jury's mind. The objection lodged at trial was, "I think the 
fact that he was acquitted minimizes damages from that point on. Are we 
prohibited from mentioning that?"

[¶33]   Evidence of an acquittal of 
criminal charges is not relevant in a subsequent civil trial relating to the 
same incident. Shatz v. American Surety Company of New York, 295 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 
1955); State v. Desirey, 909 S.W.2d 20 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). See Greenberg v. 
Aetna Insurance Company, 427 Pa. 494, 235 A.2d 582 (1967). This rule is 
applicable because the burden of proof is different in the criminal case, and a 
jury might conclude that innocence had been established by a preponderance of 
the evidence, even though the correct proposition is that guilt had not been 
established beyond a reasonable doubt. The rule is applicable to cases involving 
a civil action following an acquittal on a charge of arson. Bobereski v. 
Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 105 Pa. Super. 585, 161 A. 412 (1932); Wheat v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 652 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. 1983); Tennessee Odin Inc. Co. v. 
Dickey, 190 Tenn. 96, 228 S.W.2d 73 (1950). See Girard v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., 103 Vt. 330, 154 A. 666 (1931) (record of conviction is not 
admissible).

[¶34]   The jury instruction regarding 
Hatch's acquittal in this case became essential because incorporated in the 
Hatches' theory of bad faith was a claim that State Farm improperly participated 
in Mr. Hatch's criminal prosecution. The task of the jury in the civil trial was 
to address the allegation of bad faith not the result of the criminal trial. 
Drawing inferences in favor of or against either party because of the result of 
the criminal case would not be appropriate. We perceive Instruction No. 22 as 
adeptly handling the delicate circumstance of the criminal trial which had been 
injected in the evidence without tilting the balance in favor of the Hatches or 
State Farm. A further instruction upon the difference of the burden of proof in 
a civil trial, which the Hatches suggest would have been proper, would simply 
have added unnecessary language and confusion to this instruction. Jury 
Instruction 22 correctly stated the law in the circumstances of this case, and 
the Hatches have demonstrated no prejudice. There is no error to be found in the 
giving of this instruction.

[¶35]   The last asserted error with 
respect to instructions attacks Instruction No. 30 which 
reads:

INSTRUCTION NO. 30

[¶36]   Plaintiffs may not recover damages 
for any injury they would have sustained as a result of the fire or the criminal 
prosecution even in the absence of State Farm's alleged bad faith claims 
handling.

According to the Hatches, this instruction 
was erroneous because when combined with Instruction No. 22, it instructed the 
jury to ignore all damages that the Hatches might have sustained even in the 
absence of State Farm's bad faith. The Hatches did not object to this 
instruction at trial, and the plain error doctrine again must be invoked. 
Perhaps Instruction No. 30 could have been drawn more artfully, but it is an 
accurate statement of the law. We held in Hatch I, 842 P.2d  at 1096, that State 
Farm "demonstrated that appellants' [Hatches'] claim was `fairly debatable' and 
that no liability resulted from the denial of this claim." Hatch I also held, as 
a matter of law, that State Farm was not liable for Hatch's criminal 
prosecution. This last instruction simply required a causal connection between 
injuries and the conduct of State Farm, without regard to injuries that would 
have been sustained as a result of the fire or the criminal prosecution in the 
absence of bad faith on the part of State Farm in handling the 
claims.

[¶37]   In Triton Coal Co. Inc., v. Mobil 
Coal Producing, Inc., 800 P.2d 505, 511 (Wyo. 1990) we 
said:

"* * * Parties have 
not only the right but the duty to offer instructions. In the absence of 
submission of a proper written instruction, any claimed error is deemed to have 
been waived."

Counsel for the Hatches ultimately submitted 
105 jury instructions, made unclear objections, and generally were antagonistic 
toward the entire process. While the jury was waiting for instructions, counsel 
for the Hatches participated in the process by submitting 80 instructions 
"covering every issue imaginable, and without any semblance of order." This does 
not manifest the professional practice we expect from attorneys in Wyoming. Our 
examination of the record and the proposed jury instructions demonstrates that 
counsel for the Hatches went beyond the duty to serve as advocates. We detect a 
loss of objectivity and conduct that borders upon unprofessional in burdening 
the jury instruction process. It is difficult to give credence to the complaints 
of error now asserted.

[¶38]   We hold that in the absence of the 
submission of some proper written instruction, appellants have waived any claim 
of error. We further hold that upon proper analysis, the jury instructions, when 
taken as a whole, fairly and accurately state the law in this case. The district 
judge was patient but resolute in his effort to provide the jury with accurate 
instructions. The district court committed no error in instructing the jury with 
respect to arson as a defense, Mr. Hatch's acquittal on the criminal charge of 
arson, or the damages.

[¶39]   This brings us to the point of 
error in which the Hatches attack the granting of State Farm's motion for 
directed verdict on the issues of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and its damages. The motion was improperly styled because since 1993, WYO. R. 
CIV. P. 50(a)(1) has identified a directed verdict as a judgment as a matter of 
law. It provides that the court may determine an issue against a party when 
"there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have 
found for that party with respect to that issue," and can grant a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law on a claim that cannot be maintained without a 
favorable finding on that issue.

[¶40]   Upon review of the judgment as a 
matter of law, as we did in reviewing directed verdicts, we consider the 
evidence favorable to the party against whom the motion was directed, affording 
it all favorable inferences. See Coulthard v. Cossairt, 803 P.2d 86, 91 (Wyo. 
1990). The granting of the motion is proper when only one conclusion could be 
reached by reasonable jurors without weighing the evidence or considering 
credibility. Coulthard, 803 P.2d  at 91. We afford no deference to the decision 
of the trial court, and such motions should be cautiously and sparingly granted. 
Coulthard, 803 P.2d  at 91.

[¶41]   The Hatches invoke our decision in 
Hatch I in which we reversed the grant of summary judgment by the district court 
with respect to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We 
said, "material factual disputes [exist] and that it was improper to grant a 
summary judgment * * *." Hatch I, 842 P.2d  at 1099. The conclusion drawn by the 
Hatches is that it is the law of this case that the jury should determine 
whether State Farm and its employees intentionally inflicted emotion distress on 
the Hatches. They also contend that when the evidence is viewed in the light 
most favorable to the Hatches, particularly the evidence relating to the conduct 
of the claims agents for State Farm, it is apparent that Kitchens and Murphy 
committed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.

[¶42]   In Leithead v. American Colloid 
Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1065-67 (Wyo. 1986), we joined a majority of jurisdictions 
when we adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) as defining the tort 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Wyoming. The comments to 
Section 46 advise that whether the conduct is so extreme and outrageous as to 
justify recovery is committed to the court in the first instance. Further, 
whether severe emotional distress can be found from the evidence is committed to 
the court.

[¶43]   These are the principles that we 
invoke in this case, and we first address the Hatches' argument that Hatch I 
required the submission to the jury of the claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The Hatches have disregarded three safeguards which prevent 
issues being submitted to a jury when the evidence is insufficient. The first of 
those is found in Comment "h" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) where it 
is said, "[i]t is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the 
defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as 
to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so." The next safeguard is set 
forth in Comment "j" which provides for "the court to determine whether on the 
evidence severe emotional distress can be found * * *." The third is set forth 
in WYO. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1) which states, "[i]f during a trial by jury a party 
has been fully heard with respect to an issue and there is no legally sufficient 
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for that party with 
respect to that issue, the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of 
law * * *." The purpose of the latter rule is to permit the trial court to take 
from the consideration of the jury, cases in which the facts are sufficiently 
clear to lead to a particular result under the law. Carey v. Jackson, 603 P.2d 868 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶44]   In Hatch I, the record in the 
district court and this court consisted of the materials which had been produced 
in connection with the summary judgment and was limited to deposition testimony. 
We stated, "appellants demonstrated that there were material factual disputes 
and that it was improper to grant a summary judgment on appellants' cause of 
action for violation of a duty of good faith and fair dealing." Hatch I, 842 P.2d  at 1099. In the trial of these claims, the district court had the benefit 
of the complete testimony of the Hatch family, insurance experts, and the entire 
case in chief. We hold that the district court not only had the authority but 
the duty to make the threshold determination in this case pursuant to Comments 
"h" and "j" to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) and WYO. R. CIV. P. 50. 
The court was not required by our decision in Hatch I to send the claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress to the jury.

[¶45]   We next address the propriety of 
the action of the district court in granting judgment as a matter of law. 
According to WYO. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1), we must determine that there was "no 
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for 
that party with respect to that issue * * *." The first consideration is whether 
the conduct was extreme and outrageous. We look to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 46 cmt. d, p. 73 (1965), which states:

Liability has been 
found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme 
in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case 
is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the 
community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to 
exclaim, "Outrageous!"

[¶46]   The Hatches testified, with respect 
to the conduct of State Farm, that Kitchens had stated "you're not going to get 
what you think you're going to get." They stated Kitchens required the Hatch 
family to fill out a detailed inventory of every item in their house on their 
claims forms because the value of their personal property exceeded the limits of 
their coverage. The Hatches asserted that this detail produced 272 pages and the 
60 day time constraint required them to take sick leave, vacation, weekends, and 
evenings to complete it. They testified they worked in the cold and dark using 
flashlights to complete the claims form. Mrs. Hatch testified that people were 
at the house without permission and without notice on several occasions. The 
Hatches claim that State Farm conducted an excessive number of interviews of 
family members.

[¶47]   In addition, the Hatches point out 
that although the fire occurred in August of 1987, State Farm had not paid their 
claim by the end of October 1987. Mrs. Hatch testified State Farm implied they 
would cancel the insurance policy if she did not comply with the "cooperation 
clause" of the insurance contract. She also testified that the State Farm 
attorney who interviewed her under oath was "sarcastic," "aggressive," and 
"hostile." The Hatches also asserted that they complied with State Farm's 
requests, but State Farm failed to give them copies of some reports they had 
requested, and in fact, State Farm provided copies of some reports and 
investigation materials to the county attorney for the arson prosecution of Mr. 
Hatch. They also stated that State Farm withheld a report from Northern Gas 
which contained exculpatory information.

[¶48]   Additional evidence of emotional 
distress was claimed with respect to an interview by an attorney of Mrs. Hatch, 
who said Murphy, present at the interview, intimidated her by staring at her the 
entire time. She asserted that Murphy "stared up and down her [daughter's] body" 
when Corinna's statement was taken, causing both her and her daughter to feel 
terribly uncomfortable. Mrs. Hatch testified in this way about her emotional 
distress:

It upset me quite a 
bit to think that a man that I didn't know had gone through my drawers, my 
personal things, my personal clothing, my daughter's personal things, her 
clothing. I know Mr. Reeves made light of feeling like a rape victim, but when 
somebody who has power forces intimacy you would never allow if you had the 
choice, I don't know how else to describe it. It was just devastating to me and 
it was devastating to my daughter to think that a strange man had sat in our 
rooms and gone through our things. And they had a woman agent in the basement 
who could just as easily have done it while Mr. Murphy did the downstairs. I 
think they would realize that any woman would feel that way about having someone 
she didn't know go through her underwear. It still makes me feel 
terrible.

She went on to state this was a "rough 
time," "an ordeal," they were "still under stress," "snapping at each other," 
and the fact that it had been "a really difficult seven 
years."

[¶49]   Mr. Hatch testified he did not 
recall any of the family seeking counseling as a result of severe emotional 
distress. Corrina, the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Hatch, testified her mother "was 
really upset and crying and disgusted again," "crying again," "[crying] quite 
frequently," and was "under a lot of stress." Corinna testified that she was 
"pretty repulsed [by Murphy going through her dresser drawers]." Robert, a son 
of Mr. and Mrs. Hatch, who was ten years old when the fire occurred, testified 
that his mother was upset and "a lot of times she cried." He heard Corinna and 
his mother talking about the fire and knew that "was upsetting them." Michael, 
Robert's twin brother, testified members of the family were having some tough 
times after the fire. He stated, "my mom, she was emotional, she cried every 
once in a while. And my dad, he wouldn't express his feelings like my mom, he 
would usually isolate himself." Michael also testified to the "family being 
stressed."

[¶50]   In resolving the issue of entry of 
judgment as a matter of law, we turn to the principles articulated in Svalina v. 
Big Horn Nat. Life Ins. Co., 466 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Wyo. 1970), that the evidence 
of the plaintiff will be taken as true with all reasonable inferences and 
intendments that can be drawn from it. If we accept the evidence offered by the 
Hatches as true with all reasonable inferences and intendments that can be 
drawn, there is insufficient evidence of the requisite misconduct by State Farm. 
Certainly State Farm's conduct may be characterized as insensitive or 
inappropriate at times, but the district court could reasonably find that 
conduct was not so outrageous in character or extreme in degree to reach the 
level of being beyond all possible bounds of decency. Neither was it atrocious 
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Proof of outrageous conduct 
essential for the separate tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional 
distress is inadequate in this record. These facts do not lead a reasonable 
member of the community to exclaim "outrageous!"

[¶51]   We conclude that evidence of 
crying, being upset and uncomfortable is insufficient to demonstrate severe 
emotional distress that attains a level no reasonable person could be expected 
to endure. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965). While the stress 
the Hatches experienced is not to be minimized, it is typical of the stress all 
people are expected to endure under the circumstances. The district court 
properly granted State Farm's motion for directed verdict or judgment as a 
matter of law relating to the charges of intentional infliction of extreme 
emotional distress.

[¶52]   The Hatches also assert error in 
the granting of State Farm's motion for a directed verdict with respect to 
punitive damages. Their argument is that if the evidence is viewed in a light 
most favorable to them, State Farm's conduct was willful and wanton and subject 
to punitive damages. They argue that the district court erred in finding that no 
reasonable jury could find willful and wanton misconduct in this instance. The 
Hatches assert that a number of other courts have considered similar issues as 
are presented in this case and have concluded that the issue of punitive damages 
should be resolved by a jury. We are satisfied that each one of those cases is 
distinguishable on its facts. In each instance, evidence was found to be 
sufficient either to support the claim of bad faith or sufficient to submit the 
bad faith question to the jury. Given our holding that the district court 
reasonably could find first, that the conduct by State Farm did not reach the 
requisite heights to be described as outrageous, extreme, atrocious, utterly 
intolerable, nor beyond all possible bounds of decency, and second, the Hatches 
did not suffer the requisite emotional distress for a successful claim of 
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, the issue of damages 
including punitive damages becomes moot in this case.

[¶53]   Hatches also contend that they are 
entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 26-15-124 (1991), if they 
prevail on the merits. They have failed to prevail on the merits, and 
consequently we will not consider the entitlement to attorneys fees further. We 
affirm the judgment of the district court denying such 
fees.

[¶54]   The Hatches rely upon cumulative 
error as a final contention. In the absence of any prejudicial error, a claim of 
cumulative error does not lie. Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953 (Wyo. 
1996).

[¶55]   We find no error in this record. 
The Order on Directed Verdict Motion and the Judgment on Jury Verdict is 
affirmed.

Footnotes

1 WYO. R. CIV. P. 32 (emphasis added) provides in 
pertinent part:

(a) Use of depositions. - At the trial * * 
*, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of 
evidence applied as though the witness were then present and testifying, may be 
used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the 
deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with any of the 
following provisions:

* * * * * *

(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or 
not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court 
finds:

(A) That the witness is 
dead;

* * * * * *

(b) Objections to admissibility. - Subject 
to the provisions of Rule 28(b) and subdivision (d)(3) of this rule, objection 
may be made at the trial or hearing to receiving in evidence any deposition or 
part thereof for any reason which would require the exclusion of the evidence if 
the witness were then present and testifying.

* * * * * *

(d) Effect of errors and irregularities in 
depositions.

* * * * * *

(3) As to Taking of 
Deposition.

(A) Objections to the competency of a 
witness or to the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not 
waived by failure to make them before or during the taking of the deposition, 
unless the ground of the objection is one which might have been obviated or 
removed if presented at that time.

(B) Errors and irregularities occurring at 
the oral examination in the manner of taking the deposition, in the form of the 
questions or answers, in the oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of parties, 
and errors of any kind which might be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly 
presented, are waived unless seasonable objection thereto is made at the taking 
of the deposition.

2 Those instructions are:

INSTRUCTION NO. 7

* * * * * *

You are, therefore, instructed that the 
plaintiffs are entitled to recover $33,275.00 from defendant State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Company, unless State Farm has proven its arson defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence. If State Farm proves that defense, as defined in 
other Instructions, your verdict must be for the defendant and against all 
plaintiffs on the claim for policy benefits for damage to personal 
property.

* * * * * *

INSTRUCTION NO. 8

In order to establish its defense of arson 
to the policy benefits claim, the defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the fire was intentionally 
started by Frank J. Hatch, III.

INSTRUCTION NO. 28

Defendant, State Farm, raises an arson 
defense to the Plaintiffs' action to recover for a fire loss under their policy. 
Plaintiffs are entitled to prevail on the arson defense if you find that the 
cause of the fire was accidental and thus not incendiary.

O'BRIEN, District Judge, concurs specially, with whom 
LEHMAN, Justice, joins.

[¶56]   I agree with the majority and 
concur in the opinion of the court. I write specially only to underscore that 
part of the majority opinion dealing with the behavior of 
counsel.

[¶57]   This case calls to mind the story 
of the senior attorney advising a new associate: "When you have compelling 
facts, pound on those facts. When the law is agreeable to your position, pound 
on the law. When you have neither favorable facts nor law, pound the table." It 
is less amusing than unsettling.

[¶58]   The trial judge had considerable 
difficulty in keeping this case on track and the attorneys focused. The judge, 
who has a reputation for being patient and accommodating, revealed his 
frustration in an opinion letter where he observed:

It is true that the 
attitude and conduct of counsel throughout the pretrial proceedings and the 
trial made the job of the Court extremely difficult. And it is also true that 
the difficulties were chiefly the fault of the Plaintiffs' lead counsel. All 
attorneys participated to one degree or another in this unprofessional strife, 
and there was little attempt by anyone to calm the waters. But it was the 
Plaintiffs' lead counsel who constantly saturated every motion, every argument 
and every hearing with personal attacks on opposing 
counsel.

Accompanying this 
extreme personal animosity was a near religious fervor that manifested itself as 
a belief in the moral superiority of the Plaintiffs' cause, and the moral 
depravity of the Defendants and their attorneys. This blinded Plaintiffs' 
counsel to the realities of the case, and prevented a realistic appraisal of the 
evidence.

[¶59]   In spite of considerable rhetoric 
to the contrary, trials, particularly jury trials, are imperfect engines of 
justice. For routine cases the trial process works reasonably well; it yields 
rough justice within such practical and financial constraints as we are willing 
to abide. However, experience teaches that as cases approach the margins the 
trial machinery frequently sputters and oftentimes fails. Marginal cases include 
those with highly technical, complex or convoluted facts. A trial is not a 
didactic paradigm and, given the limits of time, resources and procedure, 
extremely intricate matters are sometimes beyond the ken of a judge or jury. 
Other cases are on the margin because they involve celebrity participants, 
severe consequences, extreme or peculiar circumstances, inordinate media 
attention or highly emotional issues. As to the latter the magnifying glass of 
close scrutiny and the attendant hype are simply inevitable consequences of a 
free society with open institutions. Without radical change in our approach to 
the trial process we have no choice but to accept imperfections, 
inconsistencies, and even occasional injustice. But an ominous problem emerges, 
one that is not the necessary product of confounding facts or unveiled 
process.

[¶60]   A trial should be a rational 
exercise, not an emotional experience. When counsel intentionally drive an 
otherwise routine case to the margins by infecting the trial with personal 
issues or by purposefully seeking to supercharge emotions, alert observers 
quickly recognize that the object is not justice, but victory. The ethical 
obligation to zealously serve client interests is tempered by the opposing, but 
no less imposing, obligation to act within the limits of the law - not merely 
the letter, but also the spirit, of the law. Any failure to appropriately and 
consistently measure duty to clients against duty to the profession perpetuates 
the "hired gun" image some lawyers cultivate and we all must live with. Worse, 
it sustains a popularly held conception that our professional ethic accepts the 
notions that success justifies, and occasionally necessitates, excessive zeal 
and that the cost of victory is irrelevant. Finally, such conduct reinforces the 
stereotype of the avaricious plaintiff spurred to trial by even more venal 
attorneys. When a case is measured, not by the merit of the cause, the quality 
of the evidence, or the logic of the arguments, but by the level of invective, 
something is amiss. A trial then becomes an ordeal which is neither dignified 
nor appropriate and, predictably, the result reflects the performance; the 
process is demeaned, as are the participants.