Case Title: Smith v. Throckmartin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-21

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Smith v. Throckmartin1995 WY 51893 P.2d 712Case Number: 94-21Decided: 04/12/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Jeffrey L. SMITH and Elaine D.R. Smith, Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Paul THROCKMARTIN, Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Fremont County, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

Robert W. Horn of Robert W. 
Horn, P.C., and Steven D. Olmstead, Jackson, for appellants.

Stephenson D. Emery of 
Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, for appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The question here 
is the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to culpable 
negligence on the part of a "co-employee" which would prevent summary judgment 
in favor of the defendant. Jeffrey L. Smith and Elaine D.R. Smith (Smiths) sued 
Paul Throckmartin (Throckmartin), a supervisory co-employee, seeking recovery 
for personal injuries and loss of consortium, contending Throckmartin was 
culpably negligent. The district court ruled the Smiths had failed to 
demonstrate Throckmartin intentionally and unreasonably acted in disregard of a 
known or obvious risk in a way to make it highly probable harm would follow. 
Following Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341 (Wyo. 1989), the court granted a summary 
judgment in favor of Throckmartin. Our examination of the record discloses, 
other than the contention a jury might infer culpable negligence, there is no 
factual demonstration on the part of Smith that satisfies the culpable 
negligence rule. We hold the case is not distinguishable from Baros, and the 
judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

[¶2]      The issue as 
stated by the Smiths in their Brief of Appellant is:

I. Whether there are genuine issues of material fact 
which preclude summary judgment in favor of appellee on the standard of culpable 
negligence.

The Brief of Appellee on 
behalf of Throckmartin sets forth the issue in this way:

Does a genuine issue of material fact exist regarding 
whether Appellant's injuries resulted from an intentional act of unreasonable 
character committed in disregard of a known or obvious 
risk?

[¶3]      We discern no 
dispute about the operative facts. Smith and Throckmartin were loading sand into 
a sanding truck belonging to the City of Riverton. Both were employed by the 
City, Smith as a sanitation equipment operator and Throckmartin as the streets, 
alleys, and sanitation superintendent. Throckmartin was operating a backhoe 
loader, using it to load and tamp sand into the sanding truck. Smith was 
standing on the truck and using a metal bar to break up damp clumps of sand so 
they would not clog the grate, and the sand would flow smoothly out of the 
sander. Throckmartin was Smith's supervisor as well as the equipment operator. 
Throckmartin and Smith had worked together on previous occasions performing the 
tasks in the same manner as they were at the time of the 
accident.

[¶4]      During the 
loading process, the backhoe struck the metal bar Smith was holding, and Smith 
lost his balance and fell from the sanding truck. Smith sustained serious 
injuries including a closed head injury, bruises, scratches, cuts, abrasions to 
the head and neck, and compression fractures of the T5, T6, and T7 vertebrae. 
Smith received the statutory benefits provided by the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act.

[¶5]      The Smiths then 
filed their action against Throckmartin pursuant to the provisions of WYO. STAT. 
§ 27-14-104 (1991), claiming damages for personal injuries and for the loss of 
consortium. The Smiths alleged Throckmartin was culpably negligent and, 
therefore, recovery was permitted despite the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. After Throckmartin answered, discovery was 
pursued, which included written requests for admissions, written 
interrogatories, and oral depositions. Throckmartin then filed a motion for 
summary judgment. Three issues were presented by Throckmartin in his brief in 
support of his motion for summary judgment. Those were a contention the record 
showed no genuine issue of material fact as to culpable negligence as required 
in order to bring an action against a co-employee; a contention the equipment 
was not the type of motor vehicle contemplated in the exceptions to the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act; and a contention of immunity from legal action as an 
employee covered by the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. After a hearing, the 
trial court granted Throckmartin's motion, ruling that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact as to culpable negligence.

[¶6]      In the Order 
Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the court made these pertinent 
statements:

3.         In 
order to recover from his supervisory co-employee, Plaintiff must prove that 
Defendant acted with culpable negligence in causing his injuries on December 1, 
1992. Copp v. Redmond, 858 P.2d 1125 (Wyo. 1993). Plaintiff's cause of action 
premised in ordinary negligence must be dismissed, therefore, for failing to 
state a valid claim. Id.

4.         Based 
on the undisputed facts, this Court concludes that defendant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that 
defendant intentionally and unreasonably acted in disregard of a known or 
obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable the harm would 
follow.

The record does not indicate 
the trial court addressed the second and third arguments posed by 
Throckmartin.

[¶7]      The parties agree 
the applicable standard is culpable negligence. In Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 1992), the court declared unconstitutional the provisions of WYO. STAT. 
§ 27-14-104(a) (Supp. 1987) which granted complete immunity to co-employees, 
including immunity for intentional acts and willful and wanton misconduct. The 
next year, we reinstated the culpable negligence standard, 
saying:

The task of this court is to settle what standard 
applies to such cases between the July 1, 1987 effective date of the repeal of 
the "culpable neglect" language and the most recent amendment which went into 
place on February 18, 1993. * * * The effect of our decision in Mills, was 
simply this: For the purpose of suits, such as the instant case, the language, 
"or his employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the 
employees are culpably negligent," which appeared in § 27-12-103(a) is revived 
and governs all such cases for that time period.

Copp v. Redmond, 858 P.2d 1125, 1126 (Wyo. 1993).

Smith's injuries occurred 
during the period of time described in Copp.

[¶8]      Our focus must be 
upon the demonstration by Throckmartin in the record that he was not culpably 
negligent and the factual materials produced by Smith to establish Throckmartin 
was culpably negligent. Baros, 780 P.2d  at 343, upon which the trial court 
relied, summarized the concept of culpable negligence in this 
way:

In Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349, 1362 
(1981), we defined the term "culpable negligence" as "willful and serious 
misconduct." We defined the term "willful" in this context as "`such as is done 
purposely, with knowledge - or misconduct of such a character as to evince a 
reckless disregard of consequences.'" Id., quoting Hamilton v. Swigart Coal 
Mine, 59 Wyo. 485, 143 P.2d 203, 206, 149 A.L.R. 998 
(1943).

The aggravating factor which distinguishes willful 
misconduct from ordinary negligence is the actor's state of mind. In order to 
prove that an actor has engaged in willful misconduct, one must demonstrate that 
he acted with a state of mind that approaches intent to do harm. State of mind, 
of course, may be difficult to prove. Accordingly, courts allow a party to 
establish that willful misconduct has occurred by demonstrating that an actor 
has intentionally committed an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a 
known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that harm 
will follow.

Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132, 1136 (Wyo. 1986) 
(quoted in Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Company, 779 P.2d 1169, 
1174-75 (Wyo. 1989), and Johnston [v. Conoco], 758 P.2d [556] at 568-69 [(Wyo. 
1988)].

[¶9]      In the same case, 
we also summarized the summary judgment process:

Summary judgment is proper only when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1989); Doud v. First 
Interstate Bank of Gillette, 769 P.2d 927 (Wyo. 1989). We review a summary 
judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same materials and 
following the same standards. Roybal, 778 P.2d 108; Johnston v. Conoco, Inc., 
758 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 1988). We examine the record from the vantage point most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that party the benefit 
of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. Doud, 769 P.2d 927; Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V., 762 P.2d 1174 
(Wyo. 1988).

Baros, 780 P.2d  at 
342.

[¶10]   In prior cases, we have attempted 
to define culpable negligence by stating what it was not. In Barnette v. Doyle, 
622 P.2d 1349, 1362 (Wyo. 1981), we said, "[a] defendant is not culpably 
negligent if his misconduct arose from a `thoughtless, heedless or inadvertent' 
act, or an error in judgment." We relied upon Hamilton v. Swigart Coal Mine, 59 
Wyo. 485, 143 P.2d 203 (1943). In Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188, 191 (Wyo. 1989), 
we said willful misconduct "must be more than mere mistake resulting from 
inexperience, excitement or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or 
inadventure, or simple inattention." We also said culpable negligence is 
recognized as "an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a 
high degree of danger is apparent." In Case, we relied upon Mitchell v. Walters, 
55 Wyo. 317, 100 P.2d 102 (1940). The concept of culpable negligence is not new 
in Wyoming.

[¶11]   It is against these precedents that 
we test this record to determine if it manifests a genuine issue of material 
fact with respect to whether Throckmartin engaged in intentional and 
unreasonable acts in disregard of a known or obvious risk so great as to make it 
highly probable Smith's injury would follow. Smith contends Throckmartin knew of 
the dangers and risks involved in loading sand with a backhoe loader and failed 
to follow established safety rules. Smith also argues the cumulative effect of 
the failure to follow several safety standards is sufficient to demonstrate the 
reckless, willful, and wanton state of mind sufficient to raise the genuine 
issue of material fact.

[¶12]   Throckmartin denied he 
intentionally knocked Smith off the sanding truck, and he also denied the 
loading procedure was unreasonable in character or that he knew of the risk. 
Critical testimony from Smith demonstrated he believed Throckmartin "[p]robably 
just made a simple mistake." He said:

Q.        Do you 
think that Paul [Throckmartin] purposely knocked you off the back of this 
sander?

A.        No. I don't 
think so.

Q.        Did he have 
any ill feelings towards you that you know about?

A.        Not that I 
know of.

Q.        Did he have 
any reason to try to hurt you that you know of?

A.        
No.

Q.        So you 
don't think he did it on purpose?

A.        
No.

[¶13]   The record also discloses 
Throckmartin and other employees, including Smith, had performed this sand 
loading operation numerous times previously without any injury. Both Smith and 
Throckmartin had used the very same procedure for loading sand in the past, and 
it was a "common procedure." Smith conceded he had previous experience in the 
loading operation, having worked on the sanding truck on other occasions and 
having assisted in loading the sand. He had broken clumps of sand in a similar 
manner. The trial court stated it was struck by the "similarities in the facts" 
between this case and Baros, and it found no evidence Throckmartin knew of a 
very high risk because the same operation had been performed many times without 
injury. We have addressed the conclusion to be drawn from conformance with 
previous practices:

We agree with the trial court's determination that 
appellant failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the question of 
culpable negligence. In support of his summary judgment motion, Mr. Hornbuckle 
produced evidence which demonstrated that he was conforming to an industry 
standard, that he himself used the butane torch method for thawing frozen water 
valves, that he was aware of no incidents similar to the one involving 
plaintiff, and that he did not anticipate or expect such an occurrence. This 
evidence constituted a prima facie showing that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact. If unrefuted, it demonstrated that Mr. Hornbuckle did not act 
with a "culpable" or "willful" state of mind. The harmful consequences were 
unknown to him; the risk was not obvious; it was not highly probable that harm 
would follow. Consequently, the burden of establishing a genuine issue of 
material fact shifted to appellant. Harden v. Gregory Motors, Wyo., 697 P.2d 283 
(1985).

Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132, 1136 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶14]   To counter the showing by 
Throckmartin of no culpable negligence, Smith turns to the City of Riverton 
Safety Policy Manual and the Operator's Manual for 410C and 510C Backhoe Loader. 
He contends these demonstrate Throckmartin knew the procedure was inherently 
dangerous, and he argues Throckmartin, in violating these procedures, 
disregarded the high probability of harm. We are satisfied this case matches 
what we said in Poulos v. HPC, Inc., 765 P.2d 364, 366 (Wyo. 1988), about 
invoking safety regulations to show culpable negligence:

Appellant, in attempting to demonstrate [appellee's] 
alleged culpable negligence, relies heavily on violations of OSHA regulations 
concerning safety training and equipment. While these asserted violations may 
constitute evidence of ordinary negligence, they do not demonstrate a state of 
mind consistent with culpable negligence, which requires knowledge or 
obviousness of a high probability of 
harm. (Emphasis in original.)

[¶15]   Smith also asserts culpable 
negligence can be demonstrated by the cumulative effect of the violation of 
several safety rules. The essence of Smith's argument is that it would be 
possible for the jury to draw such an inference and, therefore, he is entitled 
to have his case submitted to the jury. Our rule in this regard is that the 
potential of inferences, in and of itself, raises no genuine issue of material 
fact when posed against uncontroverted testimony to the contrary. Blackmore v. 
Davis Oil Co., 671 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1983). Other than his reliance upon the 
prospect of a drawing of an inference by a jury, Smith presented no facts that 
would raise any genuine issue of material fact with respect to culpable 
negligence. He failed to meet his burden of showing the genuine issue of 
material fact, as that concept is defined in Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867 
(Wyo. 1975).

[¶16]   We agree with the conclusion of the 
trial court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Smith presented 
nothing in this record that suffices, under our precedent, to demonstrate 
Throckmartin, in the language of Baros, 780 P.2d  at 343, "intentionally 
committed an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious 
risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that harm will follow." We 
hold the trial court correctly applied the appropriate rule to the facts. The 
earnest desire on the part of Smith to see if a jury would draw a contrary 
inference does not serve to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact.

[¶17]   We affirm the summary judgment 
entered by the district court in favor of Throckmartin.