Case Title: State v. Johnson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98812

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 98,812 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT JOHNSON, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Whether reasonable suspicion exists by a law enforcement officer that a person is 
involved in criminal activity is a question of law. An appellate court applies a mixed 
question standard of review:  whether substantial competent evidence supports the district 
court findings, while the legal conclusion is reviewed de novo. 
 
2. 
 
The State bears the burden to demonstrate that a challenged search or seizure was 
lawful. 
 
3. 
 
An appellate court does not reweigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence. 
 
4. 
In reviewing an officer's possession of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 
an appellate court determines whether the totality of the circumstances justifies the 
detention. The court makes its determination with deference to a trained law enforcement 
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officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious circumstances, 
remembering that reasonable suspicion represents a minimum level of objective 
justification which is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of 
the evidence. However, the officer must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed April 3, 2009. 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; ROBERT P. BURNS, judge. Opinion filed September 2, 2011. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is 
reversed. 
 
Ryan Eddinger, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
David H. Matthews, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome A. Gorman, district 
attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by: 
 
SCHMISSEUR, J.: Robert L. Johnson was charged with one felony count of 
possession of cocaine in violation of K.S.A. 65-4160(a), one misdemeanor count of 
possession of marijuana in violation of K.S.A. 65-4162(a), and one felony count of 
possession of a controlled substance without a tax stamp affixed in violation of K.S.A. 
79-5204 and K.S.A. 79-5208. A jury returned a guilty verdict on the possession counts 
and acquitted on the tax stamp charge. The district court sentenced Johnson to 18 months' 
probation, with underlying concurrent sentences of 15 months' imprisonment for the 
cocaine possession and 12 months in county jail for the marijuana conviction. Johnson 
appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court. We 
granted Johnson's petition for review under K.S.A. 20-3018(b), obtaining jurisdiction 
under K.S.A. 60-2101(b).  
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Johnson contends that Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) task-force officers 
lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the district 
court and the Court of Appeals and vacate the defendant's sentences.  
 
FACTS 
 
Officers assigned to an FBI violent crimes task force were looking to execute an 
arrest warrant for Shane Thompson. In order to find Thompson, the task-force officers 
relied on a "face sheet," which is a document issued by the Department of Corrections 
that contains a picture of Thompson as well as his physical description. According to the 
face sheet, Thompson was a black male with short hair and facial hair, who weighed 
about 160 pounds and was 5'2" tall. None of the task-force officers was familiar with 
Thompson.  
 
 The task force received a tip that Thompson was staying with his mother  in 
Kansas City, Kansas. The task-force officers drove to the location. According to their 
testimony, the task-force members spoke with Thompson's mother, who informed them 
that Thompson was not at the residence. The task-force officers then left. An officer 
testified that a resident of the house stated that Thompson slept there. The State presented 
no evidence that Thompson slept there the previous night, nor was there any evidence 
that he recently left the house.  
 
Approximately 5 blocks away from Thompson's mother's residence, Robert 
Johnson and Eugene Brown were walking on a sidewalk. Johnson is approximately 5'11" 
tall, and Brown stands around 5'9". Both men are black and have facial hair. The officers, 
in multiple unmarked squad cars with emergency lights activated, exited their cars, drew 
their weapons, and approached Johnson and Brown and requested identification. Officer 
Michael Blegen of the Missouri Department of Corrections and a member of the FBI task 
force later searched Johnson and discovered marijuana and crack cocaine. Johnson was 
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arrested and later charged with possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine, and 
possession of a controlled substance without a tax stamp. 
 
The officers testified that they stopped Johnson and Brown because of Johnson's 
and Brown's proximity to Thompson's mother's house and their similar appearance to 
Thompson, i.e., they were black males with short hair and facial hair. The officers stated 
that there was nothing suspicious about Johnson's and Brown's actions. Furthermore, the 
officers testified that Johnson looked less like Thompson than Brown. Finally, the 
officers did not consider the physical differences between Thompson and Johnson 
relevant. Officer Blegen dismissed the differences in height by stating, "[S]ometimes on 
our face sheets and the information we receive are not always accurate." To the extent 
Johnson did not look like Thompson, Officer Blegen testified,  "[T]here are times when 
the people don't actually look like the photos."  
 
Johnson filed a motion to suppress arguing there was a lack of reasonable 
suspicion to detain him. At the suppression hearing, the district court denied the motion 
after listening to Officer Blegen's testimony. Shortly before trial, Johnson renewed his 
motion to suppress, and the district court granted Johnson a continuing objection during 
trial. The jury found Johnson guilty on the possession charges but acquitted on the tax 
stamp charge. After trial, Johnson filed a motion for a new trial, essentially renewing the 
motion to suppress. The district court granted Johnson 18 months' probation, suspending 
his underlying 15-month prison sentence for the cocaine possession and his 12-month jail 
time for the marijuana possession. Johnson appealed to the Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed his convictions in an unpublished opinion. State v. Johnson, No. 98,812, 2009 
WL 929062, at *4 (2009).  
 
Additional facts will be added as necessary for the discussion below.  
 
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DISCUSSION 
 
In his brief, Johnson presents multiple arguments stemming from his detention, 
search, and subsequent arrest. Because we conclude that Johnson was illegally seized, we 
address only his first issue: whether the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to detain 
him.  
Standard of Review 
 
"An appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings of a motion to suppress by a 
substantial competent evidence standard and the ultimate legal conclusion by a de novo 
standard with independent judgment. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Ernesti, 291 Kan. 54, 
64,  239 P.3d 40 (2010). "Substantial competent evidence refers to legal and relevant 
evidence that a reasonable person could accept as being adequate to support a 
conclusion." State v. Schultz, 289 Kan. 334, 340, 212 P.3d 150 (2009).  
 
The State bears the burden to demonstrate that a challenged search or seizure was 
lawful. State v. McGinnis, 290 Kan. 547, 551, 233 P.3d 246 (2010). The appellate court 
does not reweigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve 
conflicting evidence. State v. McMullen, 290 Kan. 1, 4, 221 P.3d 92 (2009).  
 
However, because the parties do not dispute the material facts, our suppression 
question is solely one of law. See State v. Thomas, 291 Kan. 676, 682, 246 P.3d 678 
(2011). Consequently, we exercise unlimited review in determining whether Johnson's 
encounter was consensual or, if it was an investigatory detention, whether it was 
supported by reasonable suspicion. 
 
Analysis 
 
Johnson argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He 
contends that the encounter with the FBI task force was an investigatory detention 
unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. As a result, Johnson demands 
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that all evidence obtained be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). In response, the State 
does not deny that the encounter was an investigatory detention but contends that it was 
supported by reasonable suspicion.  
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights 
provides lockstep protection to the Fourth Amendment. State v. Moore, 283 Kan. 344, 
349, 154 P.3d 1 (2007).  
 
"The United States Supreme Court has developed a 'totality of the circumstances' 
test to determine if there is a seizure, or instead a consensual encounter. [Citation 
omitted.] '[U]nder the test, law enforcement interaction with a person is consensual, not a 
seizure if, under the totality of the circumstances, the law enforcement officer's conduct 
conveys to a reasonable person that he or she was free to refuse the requests or otherwise 
end the encounter.' [Citations omitted.]" McGinnis, 290 Kan. at 552. 
 
Johnson was seized the moment the officers exited their unmarked squad cars. The 
task-force officers were wearing FBI insignia on their clothes; their emergency lights 
were activated on their squad cars; and some of the officers had drawn their guns. Under 
the totality of the circumstances test, the officers seized Johnson because a reasonable 
person would not feel free to refuse an officer's request or otherwise end the encounter 
when surrounded by an FBI task force with weapons drawn. See McGinnis, 290 Kan. at 
552.  
 
Thus we must analyze whether there was a reasonable articulable suspicion of 
criminal involvement at the moment Johnson was seized. See State v. DeMarco, 263 
Kan. 727, 734, 952 P.2d 1276 (1998). Seizures are generally permissible if "'an objective 
officer would have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the detainee committed, is 
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about to commit, or is committing a crime.'" Thomas, 291 Kan. at 687 (quoting State v. 
Pollman, 286 Kan. 881, 889, 190 P.3d 234 [2008]). We recently discussed considerations 
for how "reasonable suspicion" are evaluated in Thomas, 291 Kan. at 687-88, where we 
stated: 
 
"'"'What is reasonable is based on the totality of the circumstances and is viewed in terms 
as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.' [Quoting State v. Toney, 
253 Kan. 651, 656, 862 P.2d 350 (1993).] . . .  
"'[W]e judge the officer's conduct in light of common sense and ordinary human 
experience. [Citation omitted.] "Our task . . . is not to pigeonhole each purported fact as 
either consistent with innocen[ce] . . . or manifestly suspicious," [citation omitted], but to 
determine whether the totality of the circumstances justify the detention. [Citation 
omitted.] We make our determination with deference to a trained law enforcement 
officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious circumstances, [citation 
omitted], remembering that reasonable suspicion represents a "minimum level of 
objective justification" which is "considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a 
preponderance of the evidence."'" 263 Kan. at 734-35 (quoting United States v. Mendez, 
118 F.3d 1426, 1431 [10th Cir. 1997]; citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 
S. Ct. 1581, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 [1989]).' 
 
"Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has stated: 
"'"While 'reasonable suspicion' is a less demanding standard than probable cause and 
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth 
Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification. . . . [Citation 
omitted.] The officer must be able to articulate more than an 'inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or "hunch" ' of criminal activity. [Citation omitted.]" Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000).' Moore, 283 Kan. 
at 354-55. 
"Whether reasonable suspicion exists is a question of law. We use a mixed 
question standard of review, determining whether substantial competent evidence 
supports the district court's findings, while the legal conclusion is reviewed de novo. 
Moore, 283 Kan. at 350 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S. Ct. 
1657, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 [1996])."  
 
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The State contends the task force possessed reasonable suspicion to seize Johnson 
because of Johnson's and Brown's similar appearance to Thompson, combined with their 
proximity to Thompson's mother's residence. We disagree. The officers in this case 
lacked reasonable suspicion because: (1) Johnson's location was not related to criminal 
activity; (2) there is no evidence that the officers used reliable information; and (3) the 
physical description of "black man with facial hair" was too broad to be of any assistance 
in formulating reasonable suspicion.  
 
First, Johnson's location was not related to criminal activity. In State v. Baker, 239 
Kan. 403, 720 P.2d 1112 (1986), police officers were approximately 16 blocks from the 
scene of the armed robbery in a familiar area when the robbery report came over the 
radio. The initial broadcast stated the robbery was committed by two black men dressed 
in black jackets and blue jeans. The officers proceeded to the scene in routes they 
believed the robbers may have used to flee the scene. En route to the scene, the officers 
encountered a white Chevy containing three black men dressed in black. The officer 
followed the car and eventually arrested its occupants.  
 
The Baker court concluded that even though dispatch's report stated there were 
only two robbers and provided no information how the robbers made their getaway, it 
was not unreasonable for the officers to anticipate the robbers fleeing in a waiting vehicle 
with a third person acting as the wheelman. In light of all the information available to the 
officers, when coupled with the officers' background, training, and experience, we 
determined that they possessed reasonable suspicion to make the stop. 239 Kan. at 408-
09.  
 
Similarly, in State v. Glass, 40 Kan. App. 2d 379, 192 P.3d 651 (2008), rev. 
denied 288 Kan. 834 (2009), police dispatch described two suspects, within 30 seconds of 
a reported liquor store robbery, as "black males wearing white t-shirts and black hooded 
zip-up jackets, who left westbound on foot around the building." 40 Kan. App. 2d at 380. 
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Within 1 minute of receiving the dispatch, an officer who was just a few blocks away 
from the liquor store noticed a singular vehicle driving away from the crime scene. The 
officer drove past the vehicle, shone a light inside, and noticed "two black males in the 
front seat." 40 Kan. App. 2d at 380. One occupant was wearing a white t-shirt and the 
other was wearing a black outfit. The officer stopped the car and eventually arrested the 
occupants after finding one was stuffing something between seat and console and another 
had a large sum of money fall out of his lap. The court concluded the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to lawfully stop the vehicle. 40 Kan. App. 2d at 385-88. 
 
Finally, in State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1,  251 P.3d 618 (2011), we concluded that 
the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant who semi-fit the 
description of the wanted individual and was within 2 blocks of a current crime scene. In 
Walker, a burglary victim told the officer that "a black male wearing a black shirt and 
black shorts" stole his CD case and vandalized his truck. 292 Kan. at 3. The victim told 
the officer that the individual set off eastbound on foot. The officer drove in the direction 
of the suspect's direction of travel. In less than 5 minutes and within 2 blocks from the 
crime scene, the officer came into contact with Walker, who matched the victim's 
description of the perpetrator.  
 
The officer detained Walker and eventually arrested him. In concluding that the 
officer possessed reasonable suspicion to seize Walker, we noted that (1) the officer 
received information from an identified citizen, (2) Walker was within 2 blocks of the 
crime scene; (3) as indicated by the victim, Walker was east of the crime scene and was 
found within 5 minutes; (4) Walker matched the race, gender, and number of suspects; 
and (5) Walker was wearing a dark shirt and dark shorts. Walker, 292 Kan. at 11-12.  
 
 Unlike the situations in Walker, Baker, and Glass, there was no relationship 
between Johnson's location and criminal activity. Officer Blegen testified at the 
suppression hearing that there was nothing suspicious about the neighborhood or the 
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behavior of Johnson and Brown. There was no evidence that Thompson’s mother told the 
task-force officers anything about Thompson's current location. Instead, the officers 
assumed that Thompson (1) slept at his mother's house the previous night; (2) left 
recently; (3) left on foot; (4) headed southbound; and (5) left with an acquaintance.  
 
Second, the officers either lacked reliable information or chose to ignore the 
available information. The officers possessed a face sheet issued from the Department of 
Corrections that contained a photograph of Thompson as well as provided his physical 
characteristics. According to the face sheet, Johnson is 9 inches taller than Thompson. 
Yet officers ignored the differences in appearances, including the significant disparity in 
height. 
 
Officer Blegen dismissed this variance simply by stating, "[S]ometimes on our 
face sheets and the information we receive are not always accurate." At the suppression 
hearing, Officer Blegen acknowledged that Johnson was not a perfect match and stated 
that "there are times when the people don't actually look like the photo." Later at trial 
when asked if the face sheets are wrong a lot of the time or a small amount of times, 
Blegen replied, "Several times it's been wrong."  
 
The State bears the burden to prove a lawful seizure. See Moore, 283 Kan. at 349. 
Ironically, however, the State attempts to justify the seizure solely based upon the face 
sheet by impeaching its veracity and application. The State presented no evidence that it 
was reliable for the officers to rely on the warrant or the face sheet. See DeMarco, 263 
Kan. at 735. In fact, the only testimony the State presented was just the opposite: The 
face sheet was unreliable.  
 
While reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than 
what is required to show probable cause, the task-force officer's own testimony indicates 
either the face sheet was unreliable or the officers chose to simply ignore it. See 
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DeMarco, 263 Kan. at 735. Either is unreasonable. First, if the officers chose to ignore 
the information, the stop was the result of nothing more than a hunch because, as the 
officers stated, there was nothing suspicious about the behavior of Johnson. See Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000). Second, the State 
may not justify the seizure based solely on a face sheet by presenting testimony that the 
face sheet was unreliable. The State has failed to meet its burden to show that it was 
reasonable for the officers to rely on the face sheet. See State v. Marx, 289 Kan. 657, 675, 
215 P.3d 601 (2009).  
 
Finally, the task force indicated that Johnson was detained because he shared 
common features with Thompson, mainly he was a black male with facial hair. Without 
more, however, such a "description is so nonspecific or generic in nature as to defy 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Anguiano, 37 Kan. App. 2d 202, 207, 
151 P.3d 857 (2007); see also United States v. Hudson, 405 F.3d 425, 438 n.9 (6th Cir. 
2005) ("The existence of an arrest warrant is of no moment on the question whether a 
particular person police officers come across is in fact the subject of the warrant. The 
warrant supplies the officers with probable cause to arrest the person it names and 
describes, not a license to duck the reasonable suspicion requirement and stop someone 
they only have a subjective hunch is that person."); Dennis v. State, 927 So. 2d 173, 175 
(Fla. Dist. App. 2006) (stating officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop an individual 
because similarities in race, gender, hairstyle, and forehead were insufficient to give the 
officers "well-founded suspicion" that the defendant was the individual named in the 
arrest warrant).  
 
We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances the task-force officers 
lacked reasonable suspicion as a matter of law. We reverse the Court of Appeals and the 
district court and vacate the sentences.  
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ROBERT J. SCHMISSEUR, District Judge, assigned. 1 
 
1 REPORTER'S NOTE:  Pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court 
by art. 3, § 6(f) of the Kansas Constitution, Judge Schmisseur was appointed to hear case 
No. 98,812 to fill the vacancy on the court created by the retirement of Chief Justice 
Robert E. Davis.