Case Title: Landeroz v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0052

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
GLORIA LYNN LANDEROZ v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 168Case Number: No. S-11-0052Decided: 12/28/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
GLORIA 
LYNN LANDEROZ,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County
The 
Honorable Nena R. James, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender PDP; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Cathleen D. 
Parker, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Parker.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]  A jury found Gloria Lynn Landeroz guilty 
of aggravated assault and battery.  
The jury found her not guilty of attempted first degree murder, not 
guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder, and not 
guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder.  The jury was unable to reach a verdict 
on the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter.  After the jury’s verdict and the 
sentencing hearing, the State moved for dismissal of the attempted first degree 
murder charge without prejudice.  
The district court granted the motion.   
 
[¶2]  Ms. Landeroz appealed to this Court 
claiming the district court erred in dismissing the attempted first degree 
murder charge without prejudice because in doing so it exposed her to double 
jeopardy.  She also asserts her due 
process rights were violated when the State failed to disclose that a key 
witness against her had an agreement with the State for favorable treatment in 
return for his testimony.  We find 
no due process violation and affirm the judgment on the jury verdict.  However, we remand for entry of an order 
clarifying that the dismissal of the attempted first degree murder charge is 
“with prejudice” as to that offense, but “without prejudice” as to the lesser 
included offense of attempted manslaughter.     
 
 
ISSUES
 
[¶3]  We rephrase the issues Ms. Landeroz 
presents for this Court’s determination as follows:
 
            
I.          
Whether the district court violated her constitutional right not to be 
twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense when it dismissed the first degree 
murder charge without prejudice after the jury acquitted her on that 
charge.
 
            
II.         
Whether the State violated her right to due process when it failed to 
disclose evidence that a key witness against her had an agreement with the State 
to testify in exchange for favorable treatment on the charges against him. 

 
            
The State contends the district court properly dismissed the attempted 
first degree murder charge without prejudice after the jury was unable to reach 
a verdict on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary 
manslaughter.  The State also 
contends Ms. Landeroz’s due process rights were not violated because she had an 
adequate opportunity to cross examine the witness in question.  
 
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]  On May 17, 2009, at approximately 2:40 
a.m., Rock Springs, Wyoming police officers received a report that gun shots had 
been fired at a trailer park in Rock Springs.  Officer William Erspamer arrived at the 
location and noticed two trucks with broken glass and damaged paint parked in 
front of a trailer.  Several people 
were standing on the porch of the trailer.  
The officer spoke to Jose Villegas, who said he had been awakened by the 
sound of breaking glass, looked outside his trailer and saw several people 
breaking the glass out of trucks parked outside.  Mr. Villegas ran to the door and started 
to open it when the window in the door shattered.  Outside he saw three men.  They ran and he chased them.  The men got into three vehicles that 
were parked down the street.  Mr. 
Villegas turned to run back to the trailer court and the vehicles chased after 
him.  He jumped behind a concrete 
block in order to avoid being hit by one of the vehicles, a white Lincoln 
Navigator.  He saw the driver’s face 
and heard him yell, “Let’s get this m….. f…..!”  Mr. Villegas saw the doors of the three 
vehicles open and he began to run again, as the men chased him on foot.  He crossed the street to run to the 
trailer and saw that the white Lincoln Navigator had returned to the trailer 
park and was waiting for him.  The 
white Lincoln Navigator accelerated and someone inside the vehicle fired a gun 
at him.  He made it inside the 
trailer without being hit.
 
[¶5]  Police officers spoke with others at the 
scene who generally confirmed Mr. Villegas’s statements.  Officer Erspamer found two empty .40 
caliber Smith & Wesson pistol casings in the road approximately fifty feet 
from Mr. Villegas’s home, two bullets in the west wall of the home and two 9mm 
bullets lodged in the living room furniture inside the home.    
 
[¶6]  Officer Steve Van Valkenburg was on duty 
that night and was advised to watch for the white Lincoln Navigator that had 
been involved in the shooting.  He 
spotted the vehicle, ran a check on the registration and learned that it was 
registered to a Mr. Valdez.  Officer 
Erspamer advised Officer Van Valkenburg that Valdez was the name of an 
individual believed to have been involved in the shooting and to stop the 
vehicle.  Officer Van Valkenburg 
made the stop and ordered the occupants out of the vehicle.  Joe Valdez was seated in the driver’s 
seat, Ms. Landeroz was in the front passenger seat and Maximillian Furman was in 
the rear seat.  They were taken to 
the Rock Springs police department for questioning.  Detectives found a 9mm shell casing in 
Mr. Furman’s pocket and a small metal pipe in Ms. Landeroz’s purse which tested 
positive for marijuana residue.  During questioning, Mr. Furman stated 
that as the white Lincoln Navigator approached the trailer the second time, Ms. 
Landeroz was hollering for them to shoot Mr. Villegas, grabbed the .40 caliber 
pistol, aimed it out the window and started shooting.
 
[¶7]  Ms. Landeroz was charged with attempted 
first degree murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301(a)(i) and § 
6-2-101(a) (LexisNexis 2011), aggravated assault and battery in  violation of § 6-2-502(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2011) and misdemeanor possession of marijuana in violation of § 
35-7-1031(c)(i)(A) (LexisNexis 2009).  
The State later amended the information to charge Ms. Landeroz with the 
additional count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder in violation of § 
6-1-303(a) (LexisNexis 2011).1  Just before trial, the State orally 
moved to dismiss the misdemeanor possession charge, which motion the district 
court also granted.  The case 
proceeded to trial on the attempted first degree murder, conspiracy to commit 
first degree murder and aggravated assault and battery charges.                  

 
[¶8]  During the trial, defense counsel moved 
for a mistrial on the ground that the State had failed to disclose a proffer Mr. 
Furman had made in exchange for the State’s agreement to take his cooperation 
into account in making any offer to settle the charges filed against him for his 
involvement in the shooting.  The 
district court denied the motion and the trial continued.  At the close of the evidence, defense 
counsel renewed the motion for mistrial and the district court again denied 
it.
 
[¶9]  During the jury instruction conference, 
the State asked the district court to instruct the jury on the lesser included 
offenses to attempted first degree murder, i.e. attempted second degree murder 
and attempted manslaughter.  The 
district court gave the requested instructions.  After deliberating, the jury found Ms. 
Landeroz not guilty of attempted first degree murder, attempted second degree 
murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, did not reach a verdict on 
the attempted manslaughter charge and found her guilty of aggravated assault and 
battery.  
 
[¶10]  The district court convened a sentencing 
hearing at which time it sentenced Ms. Landeroz to serve eight and one-half to 
ten years incarceration.  Three days 
later, the State moved for an order dismissing without prejudice the attempted 
first degree murder charge and the district court granted the motion.  Several days later, the district court 
entered its judgment and sentence consistent with the jury verdict and the 
sentence imposed at the hearing.  
Ms. Landeroz timely appealed. 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶11]  Ms. Landeroz contends that her 
constitutional rights to due process and against being twice placed in jeopardy 
for the same offense were violated.  
We review alleged violations of constitutional rights de novo.  Meyers v. State, 2005 WY 163, ¶ 8, 124 P.3d 710, 712 (Wyo. 2005).    

 
 
 
DISCUSSION
 
 

  Double 
  Jeopardy
 
[¶12]  Ms. Landeroz contends that by dismissing 
without prejudice the attempted first degree murder charge after the jury 
acquitted her on that charge the district court has exposed her to a second 
prosecution for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause of 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The State argues Ms. Landeroz’s claim is 
not ripe for review because no charges have been re-filed against her.  Alternatively, the State contends the 
district court properly dismissed the attempted first degree murder charge in 
order to allow the State to re-charge Ms. Landeroz with attempted manslaughter, 
the charge on which the jury became deadlocked.
 
[¶13]  We begin by considering the State’s 
claim that Ms. Landeroz’s double jeopardy claim is not ripe for review.  The ripeness doctrine is a category of 
justiciability “developed to identify appropriate occasions for judicial 
action.”  Tarraferro v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. 
Comm’n, 2005 WY 155, ¶ 8, 123 P.3d 912, 916 (Wyo. 2005), quoting 13 Wright, 
Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure:  Jurisdiction § 3529, p. 146 (1975).  It is a judicially created limitation on 
the availability of judicial review in administrative law cases.  BHP Petroleum Co. v. State, Wyo. Tax 
Comm’n, 766 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Wyo. 1989).    
 
Its 
basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature 
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over 
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial 
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its 
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.  
 
Id., 
quoting Abbott Laboratories v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681, 691-692 
(1967).  
 
[¶14]  As this precedent demonstrates, the 
ripeness doctrine is generally applied in administrative cases.  We have rarely applied the doctrine in a 
criminal case, and only in the context of challenges to parole board 
decisions.  Brenning v. State, 870 P.2d 349, 352 
(Wyo. 1994); Duffy v. State, 789 P.2d 821, 833 (Wyo. 1990).  The doctrine 
is premised upon jurisprudential principles designed to promote judicial economy 
and the wise exercise of judicial power.  
SNK v. State, Dep’t of Family 
Servs., 2003 WY 141, ¶ 17, 78 P.3d 1032, 1037 (Wyo. 2003).  We evaluate ripeness in two prongs:  first, we evaluate the fitness of the 
issues presented for judicial review and, second, we evaluate the hardship to 
the parties if judicial review is denied.  
State ex rel. Arnold v. Ommen, 
2009 WY 24, ¶ 29, 201 P.3d 1127, 1135 (Wyo. 2009).
 
[¶15]  In the present case, the State seeks to 
have us apply the doctrine to preclude consideration of Ms. Landeroz’s claim 
that, in ordering the attempted first degree murder charge to be dismissed 
without prejudice, the district court has exposed her to re-prosecution on the 
charge in violation of the double jeopardy clause.  The State premises its argument on the 
fact that the alleged double jeopardy violation will occur only if it re-files 
the charge, which it has not done.  
In that sense, the State contends, the issue is not ripe for this Court’s 
review.    

 
[¶16]  Were we to accept the State’s invitation 
to resolve this issue through application of the ripeness doctrine, the issue of 
whether Ms. Landeroz may be re-prosecuted and, if so, for what offense would 
remain unanswered.  We conclude that 
clarifying the issue before any further proceedings are commenced is a wise 
exercise of our judicial power likely to promote judicial economy.    
 
[¶17]  The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution guarantee that a 
person will not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same criminal offense.  Although the two provisions contain 
different language, we have said “they have the same meaning and are 
co-extensive in application.”  Tucker v. State, 2010 WY 162, ¶ 41, 245 P.3d 301, 311 (Wyo. 2010), quoting Vigil 
v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1350 (Wyo. 1977).  Just as the federal courts have said in 
applying the federal provision, we have said the double jeopardy provisions of 
both Constitutions provide an accused three protections:  1) protection against a second 
prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal; 2) protection against a 
second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction; and 3) protection 
against multiple punishments for the same offense.  Vigil, 563 P.2d  at 1350, citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 
717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969).  
In this case, Ms. Landeroz asserts the dismissal of the attempted first 
degree murder charge without prejudice falls under the first category because it 
allows the State to prosecute her again for the same offense following her 
acquittal on that charge. 

[¶18]  The law is clear that when a defendant 
has been acquitted on a charge, the “[Double Jeopardy] Clause guarantees that 
the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict him.”  Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 230, 114 S. Ct. 783, 127 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1994), quoting United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339, 955 S. Ct. 1013, 43 L. Ed. 2d 432 
(1975).  The State may not 
re-prosecute Ms. Landeroz for attempted first degree murder or attempted second 
degree murder.  As to those charges, 
the district court’s order of dismissal must be “with prejudice.” 

 
[¶19] 
The State requested and the district court properly gave instructions on 
attempted second degree murder and attempted manslaughter, the lesser included 
offenses of attempted first degree murder.  
State v. Selig, 635 P.2d 786, 
793 (Wyo. 1981), quoting Brantley v. 
State, 9 Wyo. 102, 61 P. 139, 139-140 (1900), “in charging an intent to 
commit murder in the first degree there is necessarily included a charge of 
intent to commit murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter.”  The jury was unable to reach a verdict 
on the manslaughter charge.  The law 
is clear that a retrial following a deadlocked jury does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324, 104 S. Ct. 3081, 3085, 82 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1984).
 
[Without] 
exception, the courts have held that the trial judge may discharge a genuinely 
deadlocked jury and require the 
defendant to submit to a second trial. This rule accords recognition to 
society’s interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict 
those who have violated its laws.
 
Id., 
quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509, 98 S. Ct. 824, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717  (1978).  The protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if 
there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original 
jeopardy.  Richardson, 468 U.S.  at 325.  The jury’s failure to reach a verdict is 
not an event which terminates jeopardy.  
Id.  Therefore, the State, if it chooses, may 
re-prosecute Ms. Landeroz on the attempted manslaughter charge.  However, the district court’s order of 
dismissal without prejudice refers to the attempted first degree murder charge 
and thereby creates some confusion. While we are confident the district court 
did not intend to suggest the State could re-charge Ms. Landeroz with attempted 
first degree murder, an order clarifying that the dismissal without prejudice 
does not apply to that charge, which must be dismissed with prejudice, is 
appropriate.

 

  Due 
  Process
 
[¶20]  In her second issue, Ms. Landeroz 
contends the State violated her right to due process when it failed to disclose 
prior to trial that Mr. Furman had made a proffer to and signed an agreement 
with the State in which he agreed to cooperate and it agreed to take his 
cooperation into account in reaching a settlement of the charges against 
him.  The State responds that there 
was no due process denial because defense counsel received the evidence during 
trial and was able to use it to cross-examine Mr. Furman and explain its 
significance to the jury during closing argument.
 
[¶21]  Addressing the issue of undisclosed 
evidence in Lawson v. State, 2010 WY 
145, ¶ 20-22, 242 P.3d 993, 1000-1001 (Wyo. 2010) (some citations omitted), we 
said:
 
“The 
right to a fair trial, guaranteed to state criminal defendants by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, imposes on States certain duties 
consistent with their sovereign obligation to ensure 'that justice shall be 
done’ in all criminal prosecutions.”  
Cone v. Bell, 456 U.S. 449, 
129 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 173 L. Ed. 2d 701 (2009), citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 
111, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976).  The suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to a defendant and material to his guilt violates due 
process.  Hicks [v. State, 2008 WY 83, ¶ 31, 187 P.3d 877, 883 (Wyo.2008)], citing Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 
(1963).  This is true irrespective 
of whether the prosecution acted in good or bad faith in suppressing the 
evidence.  Chauncey v. State, 2006 WY 18, ¶ 12, 127 P.3d 18, 21 (Wyo.2006), citing United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 
(1985).  The rule exists to “ensure 
that a miscarriage of justice does not occur.”  Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87, 83 S. Ct.  at 
1196-97.
 
            
In order to establish a Brady 
violation, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecution suppressed 
evidence, the evidence was favorable to the defendant, and the evidence was 
material.  Id.  Favorable evidence includes impeachment 
evidence.   Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 676, 105 S. Ct.  at 
3380; Davis v. State, 2002 WY 88, ¶ 
18, 47 P.3d 981, 986 (Wyo.2002). . . .  
Brady does not “automatically 
require a new trial whenever a combing of the prosecutor’s files after the trial 
discloses evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have changed 
the verdict.”   Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 
154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972).  A finding that the undisclosed evidence 
is material is required.  Id.
 
            
Evidence is material under Brady only when a reasonable probability 
exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the 
evidence been disclosed. Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 682, 105 S. Ct.  at 3383; Thomas v. 
State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 15, 131 P.3d 348, 353 (Wyo.2006).  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.  Id.  When the defense makes a specific 
request and the prosecution fails to respond fully, the reviewing court may 
consider directly any adverse effect the failure to respond might have had on 
the preparation or presentation of the defendant’s case.  Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 683, 105 S. Ct.  at 
3384.  “The reviewing court should 
assess the possibility that such effect might have occurred in light of the 
totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of 
reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the 
trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor’s 
incomplete response.”  Id.  In judging materiality, the focus is on 
the cumulative effect of the withheld evidence, rather than on the impact of 
each piece of evidence in isolation.  

 
[¶22]  At trial in the present case, during the 
direct examination of Mr. Furman, the following exchange 
occurred:
 
Q.  [By the prosecutor]  [Mr. Furman], you are charged in this 
case, correct?
A.  That is correct.
Q.  What is your deal with the county 
attorney’s office?
A.  I have no deal.
Q.  Are you hoping to improve your situation 
by testifying here today?
A.  I would hope to, yes, but 
–
Q.  Certainly would hope to, wouldn’t 
you?
A.  Yes, I would.
 
[¶23]  During cross-examination, Mr. Furman 
again testified that he had no deal with the State, but that he did have a 
discussion with the prosecutor concerning the possibility of improving his 
situation.  He denied having 
received a letter concerning immunity from prosecution.  Defense counsel asked to approach the 
bench and moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the prosecutor had not only 
withheld information but affirmatively acted to create a false impression that 
there were no assurances given to Mr. Furman in exchange for his testimony.  During the ensuing discussion, the 
prosecutor stated that Mr. Furman had come in voluntarily within forty-eight 
hours after the shooting before he had legal representation and admitted to his 
involvement in the shooting.  The 
prosecutor denied, however, that any “deal” was reached with Mr. Furman and 
implied that there was nothing in writing other than his own notes from meeting 
with Mr. Furman.  The district court 
indicated that it could not grant the motion for mistrial solely on the basis of 
defense counsel’s belief that there was an agreement; there must be evidence 
showing the existence of an agreement.  
However, the district court took the motion for mistrial under advisement 
over the noon recess.    

 
[¶24]  After the noon recess, defense counsel 
informed the court that he had just received a copy of a December 1, 2009, 
letter from the prosecuting attorney’s office to Mr. Furman’s attorney.  The letter is on Sweetwater County & 
Prosecuting Attorney’s Office letterhead and, although unsigned, the signature 
line states the name of the deputy county attorney who appeared at Ms. 
Landeroz’s trial with the county attorney.  
The letter stated that Mr. Furman was interested in meeting with 
investigators for an “off the record” proffer and that the prosecuting attorney 
was interested in meeting with him and would consider any information Mr. Furman 
provided “in formulating a case disposition offer.”  The letter further stated the terms and 
conditions of the proffer, including that the State agreed to take into 
consideration the degree of Mr. Furman’s cooperation and the nature and value of 
the information he provided in making any offer to settle the charges against 
him; the State would not make any plea offer unless it determined Mr. Furman had 
fully and truthfully disclosed all information in his possession concerning the 
shooting; and the State would not use the information Mr. Furman provided as a 
basis for filing new charges against him.  
The letter was signed by Mr. Furman and his attorney.    
 
[¶25]  Ms. Landeroz’s counsel informed the 
court that he had not previously seen the letter and had no prior knowledge of 
its existence.  He renewed his 
motion for a mistrial based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose the letter 
in accordance with Brady.  The district court denied the 
motion.  Trial resumed and defense 
counsel continued his cross-examination of Mr. Furman aided by the letter which 
he had just received.  

 
[¶26]  On appeal, the State concedes that it 
had an interview and agreement with Mr. Furman.  The State also concedes that it did not 
disclose the interview or the written agreement prior to trial but offers no 
explanation for why the letter was not disclosed. There is no question that the 
letter was impeachment evidence falling within Brady’s disclosure requirements and the 
State was required to disclose it.  
However, we have consistently held:
 
            
The delayed disclosure of Brady materials is not always grounds 
for reversal.  Whitney, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 58, 99 P.3d  at 
476.   As long as disclosure is 
made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of the evidence, due 
process is satisfied.  Id.  
Brady is not violated when the material is available to the defendant 
during trial.  Id. The essence of Brady is the discovery of information 
after the trial, which was known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense 
during the trial.  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 
103, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976).  
Thus, where exculpatory evidence is discovered during the trial and 
defense counsel has the opportunity to use it in cross-examination, closing 
argument, or other parts of the defense case, courts generally do not find a due 
process violation.  

 
Thomas 
v. State, 
2006 WY 34, ¶ 16, 131 P.3d 348, 353 (Wyo. 2006) (citations 
omitted).
 
[¶27]  The letter setting forth the State’s 
offer to Mr. Furman in exchange for his testimony was disclosed during Ms. 
Landeroz’s trial and defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. 
Furman about it and to impeach his credibility in closing argument.  Under these circumstances there was no 
Brady due process violation.  
 
[¶28]   However, we cannot and do not 
condone the prosecutors’ actions here.  
The county attorney and the deputy whose name appears under the signature 
line of the letter at issue tried this case.  Both were present in the courtroom during 
the lengthy discussion in which defense counsel argued that it was inconceivable 
that there was no agreement and the district court stated it had to have 
proof.  Neither disclosed the 
existence of the letter.  Instead, 
the county attorney implied there was nothing in writing other than his notes 
from the meeting with Mr. Furman.  
Given these circumstances, we hereby refer this matter to the Wyoming 
State Bar for investigation by Bar Counsel.     
 
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶29]  Ms. Landeroz has not met her burden of 
proving a Brady violation occurred 
depriving her of due process.  To 
the extent the district court’s dismissal of the attempted first degree murder 
charge without prejudice suggests she can be re-prosecuted for attempted 
manslaughter, the order did not violate the double jeopardy clause.  To the extent the dismissal without 
prejudice suggests she can be re-prosecuted for attempted first or second degree 
murder, the order violated the double jeopardy clause.  We affirm the judgment on the jury 
verdict and remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion. 

 
FOOTNOTES
 
1The State 
also filed a second amended information charging Ms. Landeroz with conspiracy to 
commit property destruction in violation of § 6-1-303(a) and § 6-3-201(a) 
(LexisNexis 2011).  The district 
court dismissed this charge prior to trial at the State’s request.