Case Title: Christensen v. Oedekoven

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-14

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Christensen v. Oedekoven1995 WY 5888 P.2d 228Case Number: 94-14Decided: 01/13/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Robert F. CHRISTENSEN, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

John Gilbert OEDEKOVEN, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Campbell County, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

 

Randall T. Cox of Sheehan 
and Cox, Gillette, for 
appellant.

Charles R. Hart, Sheridan, 
for appellee.

 

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Robert 
F. Christensen appeals from a summary judgment which quieted title to certain 
property in Appellee John Gilbert Oedekoven and which awarded damages to 
Oedekoven for the amount he paid to redeem the property.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Christensen 
presents the following issues on appeal:

I. Who has the right to redeem partnership property 
after a foreclosure sale?

A. 
Whether a holder of a judgment against a general partner may redeem partnership 
land after a foreclosure sale; or, stated more narrowly:

B. 
Whether a holder of a judgment against a general partner, on a partnership debt 
but rendered against only the general partner, who has garnished the partnership 
in execution of the judgment, may redeem partnership land after a foreclosure 
sale.

II. Whether the Plaintiff has standing or otherwise 
stated a viable claim for relief in the amended 
complaint[?]

FACTS

[¶4]      Barkley 
Herefords, a general partnership, owned and operated a ranch located in Campbell 
County. Charles Barkley was a general partner in that partnership. The 
partnership acquired considerable debt, including a Wyoming Farm Loan Board loan 
secured by a mortgage on the partnership ranch and a Farmers Co-op Association 
account. Barkley purchased cattle on credit from W. Perry Bolin and gave Bolin a 
promissory note. Eventually, Bolin obtained a money judgment on that promissory 
note. The judgment was against Barkley; the partnership had not been included in 
Bolin's lawsuit.

[¶5]      After the 
partnership defaulted on its secured loan from the Wyoming Farm Loan Board, the 
Board foreclosed on its mortgage. The partnership ranch was sold at a 
foreclosure sale where Oedekoven was the successful 
bidder.

[¶6]      Christensen 
obtained an assignment of Bolin's money judgment against Barkley. When the 
partnership failed to redeem the ranch within the statutory redemption period, 
Christensen, as a judgment creditor, redeemed it. The Campbell County sheriff 
issued a certificate of redemption to Christensen.

[¶7]      Oedekoven filed a 
lawsuit against Christensen and the sheriff. In his complaint, Oedekoven 
requested that title to the ranch be quieted in him. Oedekoven asked the 
district court to declare that Christensen's redemption was null because it had 
not been obtained in compliance with Wyoming law, and he also sought to enjoin 
the sheriff from issuing a deed to anyone but him.1

[¶8]      In order to 
further protect his interests in the ranch, Oedekoven took an assignment of a 
judgment which had been awarded to the Farmers Co-op Association against the 
partnership and, pursuant to that judgment, redeemed the property from 
Christensen. After he redeemed the property, Oedekoven amended his complaint to 
include a prayer for the additional amount of money which he had paid to redeem 
the property from Christensen.

[¶9]      After the 
district court had heard arguments on Oedekoven's motion for a summary judgment, 
it quieted title to the property in Oedekoven. The district court held that 
Christensen's redemption was void and awarded money damages to Oedekoven for the 
additional amount he had paid to redeem the property from 
Christensen.

[¶10]   Christensen appealed to this 
Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

[¶11]   "Summary judgment is appropriate 
when no genuine issue of material fact exists and when the prevailing party is 
entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law." Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 884 P.2d 968, 971 (Wyo. 1994), citing Lyden v. Winer, 878 P.2d 516, 518 (Wyo. 1994). 
No genuine issues of material fact were presented in this case; therefore, we 
must determine whether Oedekoven was entitled to have a judgment as a matter of 
law. 

B. Right of Redemption

[¶12]   Christensen contends that he had a 
right to redeem the ranch because he was a judgment creditor of a general 
partner. WYO. STAT. § 1-18-104 (1988) sets forth the procedure for judgment 
creditors to follow in redeeming property which has been sold at a foreclosure 
sale. Section 1-18-104(a) provides:

(a) If no redemption is made within the redemption 
period provided in W.S. 1-18-103, any 
judgment creditor of the person whose real estate has been sold, or any 
grantee or mortgagee of the real estate or person holding a lien on the real 
estate sold is entitled to redeem the same on or before the thirtieth day after 
the expiration of the applicable redemption period provided in W.S. 1-18-103, by 
complying with subsections (b) and (c) of this section.

(Emphasis added.) 
Christensen alleges that the partnership property was owned by the partners and 
that a judgment creditor of an individual partner could redeem the property 
under § 1-18-104. We disagree.

[¶13]   The resolution of the issue in this 
case turns on our determination as to whether Christensen was a "judgment 
creditor of the person whose real estate has been sold." Section 1-18-104(a). 
Determining the law-makers' intent is our primary focus when we interpret 
statutes. State Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 
1166 (Wyo. 1994). Initially, we make "`an inquiry respecting the ordinary and 
obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and 
connection.'" Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish 
Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 
117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We construe the statute as a whole, giving 
effect to each word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of 
the statute in pari materia. 845 P.2d  
at 1042. When a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court will not apply 
rules of statutory construction. 845 P.2d  at 1043. When a statute is ambiguous, 
we may utilize extrinsic aids to help us determine the Legislature's intent. 
Olheiser v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 866 P.2d 768, 
770 (Wyo. 1994).

"[A] statute is unambiguous if its wording is such 
that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and 
predictability." Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo. 1991). "[A] statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be 
vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations." 813 P.2d  at 219-20. 
"[W]hether an ambiguity exists in a statute is a matter of law to be determined 
by the court." 813 P.2d  at 220.

Padilla v. Lovern's, Inc., 
883 P.2d 351, 353 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶14]   In this case, the interpretation of 
§ 1-18-104 must be consistent with the partnership statutes which were in effect 
in Wyoming at the time that this controversy occurred. See WYO. STAT. §§ 
17-13-101 to -615 (1989).2 Section 17-13-501(a) delineated the 
property rights of individual partners: (1) rights in specific partnership 
property; (2) the partner's interest in the partnership; and (3) the right to 
participate in the partnership's management. Section 17-13-502 described the 
nature of an individual partner's right in specific partnership 
property:

(a) A partner is coowner with his partners of 
specific partnership property holdings as a tenant in 
partnership.

(b) The incidents of this tenancy are such 
that:

(i) A partner, subject to the provisions of this act 
[§§ 17-13-101 to -615] and to any agreement between the partners, has an equal 
right with his partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership 
purposes; but he has no right to possess such property for any other purpose 
without the consent of his partners;

. 
. . . 

(iii) A partner's right in specific partnership 
property is not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim against 
the partnership.

A partner's rights in 
specific partnership property were limited by § 17-13-502. Specific partnership 
property was not available for attachment or execution on a claim against an 
individual partner. Section 17-13-502(b)(iii).

[¶15]   In the context of this case, the 
statutory phrase, "person[3] whose real estate has been sold," 
is unambiguous when it is interpreted together with the partnership statutes. 
When property which is held in a partnership's name is sold at a foreclosure 
sale, the partnership, not an individual partner, is the "person whose real 
estate has been sold." Under the plain language of the statute, only a judgment 
creditor of the partnership can redeem the property.

[¶16]   This interpretation is consistent 
with this Court's decision in Wyoming National Bank of Gillette v. Davis, 770 P.2d 215 (Wyo. 1989). In that case, we held that the district court could not 
enter a nunc pro tunc order to allow 
a judgment creditor of a partnership to proceed against an individual partner's 
assets when the creditor had not sued the partner in his individual capacity. 
Although the creditor could have joined the individual partner as a defendant in 
the lawsuit, she failed to do so, and her failure to secure a judgment against 
the partner prohibited her from reaching the partner's individual assets. 770 P.2d  at 216-17.

[¶17]   Christensen cites L.C. Jones 
Trucking Co., Inc. v. Superior Oil Company, 68 Wyo. 384, 234 P.2d 802 (1951), in 
support of his contention that a judgment creditor of an individual partner may 
proceed to collect against partnership assets. In L.C. Jones Trucking Co., Inc., 
the Court allowed a judgment creditor who had obtained a valid judgment against 
only one of two partners to attach partnership assets for payment of the 
judgment. 68 Wyo. at 409-18, 234 P.2d 802. That case, however, presented a very 
different factual and procedural background than is presented in this case. 
Although the partnership entity was not sued in L.C. Jones Trucking Co., Inc., 
each member of the partnership was originally named as a defendant in the 
lawsuit, and the district court expressly recognized that the debt was a 
partnership debt. 68 Wyo. at 401, 234 P.2d 802. The Court did not analyze the 
wording of the applicable statutes in reaching its 
conclusion.

[¶18]   In the case at bar, Christensen 
asserted his right to redeem pursuant to an assignment of the judgment which had 
been awarded to Bolin. The record clearly shows that Bolin obtained a judgment 
against Barkley but not against the partnership. Bolin's judgment in no way 
indicated that all the members of the partnership had been sued or that the debt 
was a partnership obligation.4

[¶19]   Christensen had a remedy available 
to him in this case. He could have reached Barkley's interest in the partnership 
by obtaining a charging order pursuant to § 17-13-505(a):

(a) On due application to a competent court by any 
judgment creditor of a partner, the court which entered the judgment order, or 
decree, or any other court, may charge the interest of the debtor partner with 
payment of the unsatisfied amount of such judgment debt with interest thereon; 
and may then or later appoint a receiver of his share of the profits, and of any 
other money due or to fall due to him in respect of the partnership, and make 
all other orders, directions, accounts and inquiries which the debtor partner 
might have made, or which the circumstances of the case may 
require.

The Legislature attempted 
"to give a remedy by which the judgment creditor of an individual member of a 
partnership [could] reach the individual's interest in the partnership. This 
remedy [was] called a `charging order.'" Margie Millhone, Notes, Charging Orders Under the Uniform 
Partnership Act, 9 WYO. L.J. 112, 112 (1955). The statutory charging order 
was "virtually the exclusive remedy available to a partner's separate creditor 
who want[ed] to reach the partnership interest." Elliot Axelrod, The Charging 
Order - Rights of a Partner's Creditor, 36 ARK.L.REV. 81, 81 (1982). Charging 
orders could not, however, be obtained against a partner's interest in specific 
partnership property. Axelrod, supra, 
at 96.

[¶20]   Christensen argues that a charging 
order had been obtained because Bolin, Christensen's predecessor in interest, 
secured a writ of garnishment against the partnership. We cannot accept 
Christensen's argument.

[¶21]   We agree with the Colorado Court of 
Appeals which concluded that charging orders are remedies different in character 
from writs of garnishment. Union Colony Bank v. United Bank of Greeley National 
Association, 832 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Colo.Ct.App. 1992). "[T]he charging order, 
unlike garnishment, is a post-judgment remedy specifically tailored for 
partnerships." Id. The charging order procedure protects the interests of the 
nondebtor partners by giving the judge wide latitude to control the creditor's 
actions against the partnership. Id.; see also § 17-13-505(a). Neither 
Christensen nor his predecessor in interest obtained a charging order in 
compliance with the partnership statutes.

C. Standing

[¶22]   Christensen alleges that Oedekoven 
lacked standing to contest his redemption of the property. We 
disagree.

[¶23]   "Standing to sue" is jurisdictional 
in nature. Pinther v. Hiett, 884 P.2d 631, 633 (Wyo. 1994). "[T]he standing 
doctrine requires that the litigants have a tangible interest at stake in the 
subject matter before the court." Reiman Corporation v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 1992).

"At its most elementary level, the standing doctrine 
holds that a decision-making body should refrain from considering issues in 
which the litigants have little or no interest in vigorously advocating. 
Accordingly, the doctrine of standing focuses upon whether a litigant is 
properly situated to assert an issue for judicial or quasi-judicial 
determination. A litigant is said to have standing when he has a `personal stake 
in the outcome of the controversy.' This personal stake requirement has been 
described in Wyoming as a `tangible interest' at stake. The tangible interest 
requirement guarantees that a litigant is sufficiently interested in a case to 
present a justiciable controversy."

Pinther, 884 P.2d  at 634 
(quoting Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 556-57 (Wyo. 1992) (citations 
omitted)).

[¶24]   Oedekoven certainly had a personal 
and tangible interest in the outcome of the litigation. If Christensen had not 
improperly redeemed the property, Oedekoven could have applied to the sheriff 
for a deed to the property after the redemption period had expired. See WYO. 
STAT. §§ 1-18-102, -109 (1988). After Christensen improperly redeemed the 
property, a question existed as to who could apply to the sheriff for a deed. 
Oedekoven, therefore, had standing to bring the quiet title 
action.

[¶25]   Oedekoven suffered a tangible 
injury when he redeemed the property from Christensen. He was required to pay an 
additional amount of money in order to redeem the property. If Christensen had 
not improperly redeemed the property, Oedekoven would not have had to pay that 
additional amount to secure the title. Oedekoven had standing to bring his claim 
for money damages against Christensen.

D. Voluntary Payment

[¶26]   Christensen alleges that Oedekoven 
was not entitled to recover the additional amount of money which he paid to 
redeem the property because Oedekoven had voluntarily made that 
payment.

[¶27]   A person who makes a payment in 
order to protect his own interest will not be regarded as being a volunteer. 
Gaub v. Simpson, 866 P.2d 765, 767-68 (Wyo. 1993). In Gaub, we held that the 
appellee had not acted as a volunteer when he paid off an IRS lien against his 
property. The IRS imposed the lien against the property to secure the payment of 
back taxes which the appellant owed. The Court ruled that the appellee was not a 
volunteer because he had paid the lien under the threat of foreclosure in order 
to protect his interests in the property. 866 P.2d  at 
766-68.

[¶28]   A similar situation was presented 
in this case. Oedekoven was faced with a dilemma as to whether to allow 
Christensen to take over the property and possibly apply for a deed from the 
sheriff or whether to redeem the property and retain that right. He chose to 
protect his interests by redeeming the property. Oedekoven was not acting as a 
volunteer when he paid the additional amount in order to redeem the property 
from Christensen. See Fulton v. Des Jardins, 67 Wyo. 517, 227 P.2d 240 
(1951).

CONCLUSION

[¶29]   We hold that the district court did 
not err by granting a summary judgment in favor of 
Oedekoven.

[¶30]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 The sheriff is not a party to this 
appeal.

2 The partnership statutes which were 
codified at §§ 17-13-101 to -615 were repealed by 1993 WYO. SESS. LAWS ch. 194, 
§ 2 effective January 1, 1994. The Uniform Partnership Act, §§ 17-21-101 to 
-1003, was created by 1993 WYO. SESS. LAWS ch. 194, § 1 and became effective 
January 1, 1994.

3 "`Person' includes individuals, 
partnerships, corporations, and other associations." Section 
17-13-102(a)(iii).

4 We refuse Christensen's invitation to 
reconsider the facts as to whether Bolin's claim involved a partnership debt. 
That issue was necessarily decided in the Bolin-Barkley litigation and, under 
the related doctrines of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel, we will not disturb the earlier decision. See McKee v. 
McKee, 882 P.2d 885, 887 n. 1 (Wyo. 1994), and Livingston v. Vanderiet, 861 P.2d 549, 551-52 (Wyo. 1993).