Case Title: French v. Estate of Gutzan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015 ME 152

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2015-11-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2015 ME 152 
Docket: 
Han-15-40 
Submitted 
On Briefs: October 21, 2015 
Decided: 
November 24, 2015 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
RICHARD P. FRENCH et al. 
 
v. 
 
ESTATE OF MARTHA GUTZAN et al. 
 
 
ALEXANDER, J. 
[¶1]  The Estate of Martha Gutzan appeals from a declaratory judgment 
entered by the District Court (Ellsworth, Mallonee, J.) following a nonjury trial 
determining that Richard P. French owns an access easement across property 
owned by the Estate.  French’s chain of title traces back to an 1880 deed reserving 
the easement in question.  Because the 1880 deed created an easement appurtenant 
benefitting French’s property, and the Estate had notice of the easement, we affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]   In 1993, French purchased from his father’s estate an undeveloped lot 
with no road access.  French’s parents had purchased that property and received a 
deed in 1944 from a couple named Goodell (“the Goodell deed”).  In 1998, French 
purchased property from the heirs of a family named Grindle by quitclaim deed 
 
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(“the Grindle deed”).  French contends that the two deeds convey the same 
property, but the relationship between the two deeds was never clearly established 
at trial. 
 
[¶3]  The chain of title for the property described in the Grindle deed traces 
back to an 1867 conveyance between members of the Hutchings family.  Prior to 
that transaction, French’s property and the Estate’s property were one lot.   
[¶4]  Through a series of intra-family transactions, that property was 
divided, shuffled between family members, recombined, and divided again.1  The 
key transaction occurred in 1880, when Reuben Hutchings transferred a large part 
of the then combined property to his brother Edward.  From the transferred 
property, Reuben Hutchings reserved French’s lot to himself, along with “the right 
of way from said lot East of Meadow Brook to the County road in the way as now 
travelled.” 
 
[¶5]  In 1884, Reuben Hutchings transferred French’s lot to Andrew Grindle 
“with all the privileges and appurtenances thereunto.”  By the Grindle deed, 
Grindle’s heirs transferred the lot to French.  In two transactions in 1884 and 1885, 
the Estate’s lot was transferred from Reuben Hutchings’s brother Edward to an 
owner whose successors in interest transferred the property to the Estate in 1987.  
                                         
1  We commend the trial court for its work creating a detailed chart, included in its judgment, tracking 
this complex series of transactions and transcribing the relevant language of the handwritten deeds. 
 
3 
The Estate’s title history and deed contains language subjecting the property to 
“the right reserved . . . to Reuben H. Hutchings to cross from a lot east of Meadow 
Brook across the northerly part of this lot to the county road.” 
 
[¶6]  After the Estate denied French use of the access easement, French 
brought this action to quiet title.2  The court held a nonjury trial and, in its 
judgment, concluded that French, by virtue of the Grindle deed, owns an access 
easement over the Estate’s property.  The court’s conclusion was based on its 
factual findings that the right of way easement reserved by Reuben Hutchings in 
the 1880 transaction and transferred to Grindle in 1884, was transferred to French 
by the Grindle deed, and that, using the language quoted above, the original 
grantor, Reuben Hutchings, intended to reserve an appurtenant easement.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error.  Weinstein v. 
Hurlbert, 2012 ME 84, ¶ 9, 45 A.3d 743.  “The construction of language creating 
an easement is a question of law, which we review de novo.”  Stickney v. City of 
Saco, 2001 ME 69, ¶ 53, 770 A.2d 592.  When the deed creating an easement is 
ambiguous—for example, when the scope or precise location of the easement is 
not clear from the face of the deed—the court looks to the intent of the parties.  
                                         
2  French brought a number of other claims, and the Estate brought a number of counterclaims.  The 
trial court’s judgment as to these claims is not at issue on appeal. 
 
4 
Anchors v. Manter, 1998 ME 152, ¶ 16, 714 A.2d 134.  A trial court’s 
determination as to the parties’ intent is a question of fact, which we review for 
clear error.  Id. 
A. 
Construction of the Deed 
 
[¶8]  The Estate argues that the easement created in 1880 was an easement in 
gross for the personal benefit of Reuben Hutchings and did not, therefore, pass 
with the land to French.  This is contrary to Maine’s strong preference in favor of 
construing easements to be appurtenant, rather than in gross, see Stickney, 
2001 ME 69, ¶ 33, 770 A.2d 592, and contrary to the intent of the parties to the 
1880 transaction as found by the District Court and supported by the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction. 
 
[¶9]  An easement may be either appurtenant to a dominant estate or in gross 
for the benefit of a particular individual or individuals.  Stickney, 2001 ME 69, 
¶¶ 31-32, 770 A.2d 592.  An easement appurtenant runs with the dominant estate, 
id. ¶ 31, while an easement in gross terminates, at the latest, with the death of the 
benefited individual, id. ¶ 32. 
[¶10]  Maine has recognized a strong preference for construing easements as 
appurtenant rather than in gross.  Id. ¶ 33 (“The traditional rules of construction for 
grants or reservations of easements required that, whenever possible, an easement 
be fairly construed to be appurtenant to the land of the person for whose use the 
 
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easement is created.”).  Under the common law, “to give effect to the intention of 
the parties this court . . . routinely construed a provision in a deed purporting to 
reserve an easement for the benefit of land retained by the grantor as the creation 
of an easement appurtenant.”  O’Neill v. Williams, 527 A.2d 322, 324 (Me. 1987). 
[¶11]  The interpretation of this deed is supported by reference to the Short 
Form Deeds Act, see 33 M.R.S. § 772 (2014); Tarason v. Wesson Realty, LLC, 
2012 ME 47, ¶ 16, 40 A.3d 1005, which requires that an easement be construed as 
appurtenant “unless a different intention is clearly expressed in the instrument . . . 
by an explicit restriction of the interest to the use and benefit only of the person or 
persons to whom it is conveyed or reserved,” 33 M.R.S. § 772(1) (2014); 
see also Tarason, 2012 ME 47, ¶ 18, 40 A.3d 1005. 
 
[¶12]  The 1880 deed between Reuben and Edward Hutchings states that 
Reuben reserves “the right of way from said lot East of Meadow Brook to the 
County road in the way as now travelled.”  The Estate argues that the use of the 
definite article “the” in referring to the reserved easement, rather than the indefinite 
article “a,” is a reference to an earlier easement conveyed to Reuben Hutchings by 
his father in 1867 and that the 1880 deed should be read to convey an identical 
easement.3 
                                         
3  Contrary to the Estate’s assertion, the trial court did not conclude that the 1880 transaction “changed 
the easement from in gross to appurtenant.”  The easement created in 1867 was extinguished when 
Reuben Hutchings later acquired fee simple ownership of both the dominant and servient estates.  
 
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[¶13]  The 1867 conveyance arguably created an easement in gross because 
it specifically granted the right to Reuben Hutchings, who at that time held only a 
life estate in the benefited parcel with the remainder held by the owner of the 
servient estate.  Cf. LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 986-87 (Me. 1979). 
[¶14]  Prior to the 1880 transaction, however, Reuben Hutchings had 
become the fee simple owner of the property that was benefited by the easement 
created in the 1880 transaction.  Given this fact, and in the absence of an explicit 
indication that the right was intended to be in gross, the stronger interpretation is 
that the word “the” was used to define the location of the easement, rather than its 
character as appurtenant or in gross.4  Therefore, the court did not clearly err in 
finding that Reuben Hutchings intended the easement to be appurtenant to his 
landlocked parcel, thereby maintaining a means of access for future owners of the 
property.  See O’Neill, 527 A.2d at 324 (“It is highly unlikely that [the] grantor 
would knowingly have impaired the value of the property he retained by limiting 
the easement to a life interest.”). 
[¶15]  Given the strong preference for easements appurtenant and the facts 
surrounding Reuben Hutchings’s transfer of the property, the record supports the 
                                                                                                                                   
See LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 988 n.3 (Me. 1979).  The trial court correctly concluded that the 
1880 transaction created a new easement. 
4  The original grant from the father to Reuben Hutchings uses the definitive article as well, suggesting 
that this family simply used the phrase “the right of way” to indicate a person’s right to cross another’s 
property for the purpose of obtaining access to property. 
 
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trial court’s finding that the 1880 conveyance created an easement appurtenant, the 
benefit of which passed with the land to French.  See LeMay, 397 A.2d at 989.  The 
benefit of an easement appurtenant passes automatically with the transfer of the 
dominant estate.  Id.  The burden of an easement appurtenant passes so long as the 
holder of the servient estate has “actual, constructive or implied notice of the 
servitude.”  Id.  Explicit reference to “the right granted to Reuben H. Hutchings” in 
the deed conveying the Estate’s lot to the Estate provides constructive notice and, 
therefore, the burden of the easement ran to the Estate.  See id. 
B. 
French’s Ownership of the Dominant Estate 
 
[¶16]  The Estate further argues that even if the 1880 deed created an 
easement appurtenant, French failed to carry his burden to prove that his lot is 
benefited by the easement.  French bore the burden to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that an easement was created and that he now owns the property 
benefitted by the easement.  See LaBelle v. Blake, 1998 ME 165, ¶ 9 n.3, 
714 A.2d 145; Hodgdon v. Campbell, 411 A.2d 667, 670 (Me. 1980).  As 
explained above, the deeds and chains of title were sufficient to prove the creation 
and ongoing existence of the easement.  Proof of ownership required French to 
prove that he owns the dominant estate—the property reserved by Reuben 
Hutchings. 
 
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[¶17]  French did not provide concrete evidence of the relationship between 
the Goodell deed and the Grindle deed or precisely where the property described in 
each of those deeds is located.  Although it would have been preferable for French 
to provide a survey or other evidence to clarify why two deeds and chains of title 
exist and where exactly the property each deed describes is located, it was 
sufficient that French proved he owned the property conveyed by the Grindle deed.  
Because it is clear from the Grindle deed and the Estate’s deed, taken together 
along with their respective chains of title, that French owns the dominant estate 
benefitted by an easement across the Estate’s property, French carried his burden 
of proof. 
[¶18]  The Estate argues that French was required to prove precisely where 
on the face of the earth the easement is located.  There is no support for this 
statement in Maine law.  The Estate points to Stickney, which holds that it was not 
error for a trial court to rely on survey evidence in determining the location of an 
easement.  2001 ME 69, ¶ 24, 770 A.2d 592.  Stickney, however, does not hold that 
proving the precise location of an easement is required for a plaintiff to receive a 
judgment declaring that an easement exists and that the plaintiff owns the 
easement.  See id. 
[¶19]  Proof of the precise location of the easement might be necessary if 
there was a question as to whether the easement crosses the Estate’s property or 
 
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some other property.  Here, that is not the issue.  The parties dispute whether an 
access easement exists, but there is no dispute that, to the extent an easement 
exists, it runs over the Estate’s property.  French was not, therefore, required to 
prove the precise location of the easement for the court to declare that the easement 
exists, that it runs over the Estate’s property, and that French owns it. 
[¶20]  Because the deed at issue is most reasonably interpreted to create an 
easement appurtenant to property French now owns, and the Estate had notice of 
the easement, the trial court did not err in concluding that French owns an access 
easement across the Estate’s property. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Donald Brown, Esq., Brewer, for appellant Estate of Martha 
Gutzan 
 
Valerie Chiasson, Esq., Ellsworth, for appellees Richard P. 
French and Santos French 
 
 
 
Ellsworth District Court docket number RE-2012-50 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY