Case Title: Village of Winfield v. ISLRB

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80322

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the filing of the opinion 
to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at 
anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the 
following slip opinion is being made available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, 
it cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following 
opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official 
Reports advance sheets following final action by the Court. 
 
               Docket No. 80322--Agenda 11--November 1996. 
     THE VILLAGE OF WINFIELD, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS STATE LABOR 
                   RELATIONS BOARD et al., Appellees. 
                      Opinion filed March 20, 1997. 
 
     JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court: 
     The Village of Winfield (the Village) appeals from a decision 
of the appellate court confirming the decision and order of the 
Illinois State Labor Relations Board (the Board) certifying the 
Metropolitan Alliance of Police, Winfield Chapter No. 138 (the 
union), as the duly elected collective-bargaining representative of 
certain employees of the Village police department. The Village 
contended that the Board did not have jurisdiction to consider the 
union's representation petition, pursuant to section 20(b) of the 
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (the Act) (5 ILCS 315/20(b) 
(West 1992)), because the Village employs fewer than 35 employees. 
The appellate court held that the Village employed 35 or more 
employees and was therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Board. Nos. 2--95--0042, 2--95--0335 cons. (unpublished order under 
Supreme Court Rule 23). We accepted the Village's petition for 
leave to appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 315. We now reverse the decision of 
the appellate court. 
 
                                   FACTS 
     On December 6, 1993, the union filed a representation petition 
with the Board seeking to serve as the exclusive collective- 
bargaining agent for all full-time sworn patrol officers at or 
below the rank of sergeant and all records clerks employed by the 
Village of Winfield. The Village challenged the jurisdiction of the 
Board, arguing that it was exempt from the Act because it did not 
employ 35 or more employees, as required by section 20(b) of the 
Act (5 ILCS 315/20(b) (West 1992)). 
     The parties stipulated that, if the Village should be found to 
employ 35 or more employees, the bargaining unit proposed in the 
petition would be appropriate. A hearing was held before an 
administrative law judge to determine whether the Village employed 
35 employees. The Village conceded that it employed 22 individuals. 
The union contended that the Village should also be found to be the 
employer of nine employees of the Winfield Public Library and of 
six "summer staffers" in the Village public works department. The 
Village asserted that it was not the employer of the library 
employees and that the summer staffers could not be counted for 
section 20(b) purposes because they were "short-term employees," as 
defined in section 3(q) of the Act (5 ILCS 315/3(q) (West 1992)). 
     At the hearing, the Village presented the testimony of Village 
Manager Bryon Vana. Vana is responsible for the day-to-day 
administration of the Village. Vana testified that the Winfield 
Public Library has its own board of trustees, which is elected by 
the public. No library trustees are also Village trustees. No 
library employees are also Village employees. Vana further 
testified that the library prepares its own budget, which is 
separate from the Village's budget. The library board provides a 
copy of its budget to the Village. The library board also passes a 
resolution requesting a specific tax levy, which is then forwarded 
to the Village. The Village's tax levy ordinance includes a 
separate levy request for the library budget. The library pays its 
employees' salaries, which are an item in the library's budget. As 
a courtesy, the Village processes payroll checks for the library's 
employees. The Village provides no benefits to library employees. 
The Village pays the bill for the library employees' health 
insurance, but is reimbursed by the library for those payments. The 
library has its own employment policies and the Village has no 
involvement in the hiring, firing or discipline of library 
employees. Vana also testified that the Village does not review or 
approve library expenditures. The library pays its own bills. 
     Exhibits were also presented in connection with the hearing. 
The Village submitted answers to questions propounded by the 
administrative law judge in which the Village stated that it has 
the discretion to disapprove the library's appropriation request, 
subject to court review. The Village also stated that it had never 
disapproved the library's appropriation request and it had never 
supplemented the library's budget with a Village appropriation. 
     The administrative law judge issued a recommended decision and 
order finding that the Village was a joint employer of the nine 
library employees and that the summer staffers were not short-term 
employees and could be counted for section 20(b) purposes. 
Accordingly, the administrative law judge found that the Village 
employed a total of 37 employees and was therefore subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Board. The Board issued an order adopting the 
recommendation of the administrative law judge and directing a 
representation election. The Board subsequently entered an order 
certifying the union as the duly elected collective-bargaining 
representative of the proposed bargaining unit. The Village 
appealed directly to the appellate court. 155 Ill. 2d R. 335. The 
appellate court confirmed the decision of the Board. 
 
                                 ANALYSIS 
     The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. 
(West 1992)) provides a comprehensive system of collective 
bargaining for certain public employers and their employees. 
Section 20(b) of the Act exempts certain employers from its scope. 
Section 20(b) provides: 
               "This Act shall not be applicable to units of local 
          government employing less than 35 employees, except with 
          respect to bargaining units in existence on the effective 
          date of this Act and fire protection districts required 
          by the Fire Protection District Act to appoint a Board of 
          Fire Commissioners." 5 ILCS 315/20(b) (West 1992). 
There is no dispute that the Village of Winfield is a unit of local 
government. Accordingly, if the Village employs fewer than 35 
employees, it is exempt from the Labor Relations Act, and the Board 
has no jurisdiction to consider the Union's petition. 
     As noted, the Village concedes that it employs 22 individuals. 
The Village argues that it has no additional employees, and that it 
is therefore exempt from the Labor Relations Act under section 
20(b). The union and the Board (hereinafter referred to jointly as 
appellees) contend that the Village is also the joint employer of 
nine employees of the Winfield Public Library, and that the six 
summer staffers in the Village's public works department should be 
counted as Village employees. Thus, the appellees argue, the 
Village employs 37 employees and is not exempt under section 20(b). 
We note that both of the appellees' contentions must be accepted in 
order for the Board to have jurisdiction in this case: if either 
the library employees or the summer staffers are not employees of 
the Village, the Village is exempt under section 20(b). 
     This appeal comes to us on review of an order of an 
administrative agency. Accordingly, reversal of the Board's 
decision is warranted only if it is against the manifest weight of 
the evidence. City of Freeport v. Illinois State Labor Relations 
Board,  135 Ill. 2d 499 , 507 (1990). 
     We first address whether the Village was properly found to be 
a joint employer of the employees of the Winfield Public Library. 
     The test for the existence of joint employers is whether 
" `two or more employers exert significant control over the same 
employees--where from the evidence it can be shown that they share 
or co-determine those matters governing essential terms and 
conditions of employment.' " Orenic v. Illinois State Labor 
Relations Board,  127 Ill. 2d 453 , 474 (1989), quoting National 
Labor Relations Board v. Browning-Ferris Industries of 
Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1124 (3d Cir. 1982). Relevant 
factors to consider in making this determination include the 
"putative joint employer's role in `hiring and firing; promotions 
and demotions; setting wages, work hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment; discipline; and actual day-to-day 
supervision and direction of employees on the job.' " Orenic, 127 Ill. 2d  at 475, quoting J. Jansonius, Use and Misuse of Employee 
Leasing, 36 Lab. L.J. 35, 36 (1985). An important consideration in 
determining whether a particular entity is an employer is the 
extent to which that entity is necessary to create an effective 
bargaining relationship. County of Will v. Illinois State Labor 
Relations Board, 220 Ill. App. 3d 62 (1991). 
     With these principles in mind, we examine the relationship 
between the Village and the Winfield Public Library employees to 
determine whether the Village is a joint employer of the library 
employees. We conclude that the Village is not a joint employer of 
the library employees. Rather, the library, through the library 
board of trustees, possesses exclusive authority over the terms and 
conditions of the library employees' employment. 
     The Winfield Public Library was established pursuant to the 
Illinois Local Library Act (75 ILCS 5/1--.01 et seq. (West 1992)) 
by the vote of the citizens of the Village. See 75 ILCS 5/2--2 
(West 1992). Where the public votes to establish a library in a 
village such as the Village of Winfield, the Local Library Act 
provides that a seven-member board of library trustees (the library 
board) shall be elected at the same time as the library 
establishment election. 75 ILCS 5/4--3 (West 1992). The trustees' 
terms are to be staggered, and their successors elected in 
accordance with the general election law. 75 ILCS 5/4--3.1 (West 
1992). Vacancies in the office of trustee are filled by the 
remaining trustees until the next regular library election is held. 
75 ILCS 5/4--4 (West 1992). 
     The Local Library Act vests the library board with broad 
powers to control and govern the library. See 75 ILCS 5/4--7, 4-- 
7.1 (West 1992). Among other things, the board is given the 
following powers: (1) to make and adopt bylaws, rules and 
regulations for the government of the library; (2) to have 
exclusive control of the construction of any library buildings; (3) 
to have exclusive control over the supervision, care and custody of 
library grounds, rooms or buildings; (4) to purchase or lease real 
or personal property; (5) to sell or otherwise dispose of any real 
or personal property; (6) to enter into contracts and take title to 
property acquired by it for library purposes; (7) to sue and be 
sued; (8) to invest funds; and (9) to accumulate and set apart 
unexpended funds as reserve funds. 75 ILCS 5/4--7 (West 1992). In 
particular, with regard to library personnel, the library board is 
granted the exclusive authority to appoint and fix the compensation 
of a qualified librarian, who in turn shall have the authority to 
hire such other employees as may be necessary, to fix their 
compensation, and to remove such employees, subject to the approval 
of the library board. 75 ILCS 5/4--7(7) (West 1992). The Local 
Library Act also gives the library board the "exclusive control of 
the expenditure of all moneys collected for the library." 75 ILCS 
5/4--7(2) (West 1992). 
     The testimony of Bryon Vana, the Village manager, further 
demonstrates the autonomy enjoyed by the Winfield Public Library. 
Vana testified that the library has its own board of trustees, 
which is elected by the public. No library trustees are also 
Village trustees, and no library employees are also Village 
employees. The library pays all of its employees' salaries and 
benefits. The Village provides no benefits to library employees. 
The library has its own employment policies and the Village is not 
involved in the hiring, firing or discipline of library employees. 
Vana also testified that the Village does not review or approve 
library expenditures. 
     The provisions of the Local Library Act and the testimony of 
Bryon Vana demonstrate that the Village has no involvement 
whatsoever in the " `hiring and firing; promotions and demotions; 
setting wages, work hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment; discipline; and actual day-to-day supervision and 
direction of' " the library employees. Orenic, 127 Ill. 2d  at 475, 
quoting 36 Lab. L.J. at 36. Rather, the library board, which is 
elected by the public and operates wholly independently of the 
Village, has exclusive authority in each of these areas. Applying 
our test for joint employer status, we conclude that the Village 
may not be considered a joint employer of the library employees. 
     The appellees nonetheless contend that the Village is a joint 
employer of the library employees because of the Village's 
"significant ability to affect library funding." We disagree. It is 
true, as the appellees assert, that the library does not have the 
power to levy taxes on its own behalf, but must rely on the Village 
to levy a tax to fund the library's budget. The library board, 
however, prepares the library's budget, and the Village's duty to 
levy a tax to fund that budget is merely ministerial. 
     Bryon Vana testified that the library board prepares its own 
budget and passes a resolution for a specific tax levy, which is 
forwarded to the Village for inclusion in the Village's 
appropriation. This procedure is consistent with the Local Library 
Act. The Act clearly contemplates that the library board will 
determine its own budget. The Act specifically provides that the 
library board shall have "exclusive control of the expenditure" of 
library funds. 75 ILCS 5/3--5, 4--7(2) (West 1992). The Act also 
directs the library board to prepare a statement of the library's 
financial requirements for the upcoming year and the amount of 
money which it will be necessary to levy for library purposes, "for 
inclusion in the appropriation of the [Village]." 75 ILCS 5/4--10 
(West 1992). The Act then directs the Village to levy a tax for the 
library in the amounts determined by the library board. 75 ILCS 
5/3--5 (West 1992). Vana's testimony and the Act's provisions 
demonstrate that the library board alone determines the library's 
budget. The library's budget encompasses those funds which will pay 
for the library employees' wages and benefits. The library board 
therefore has exclusive control over determining the amount of 
funding required for its personnel needs. 
     The fact that the Village must levy a tax to fund the 
library's budget does not diminish the library board's control over 
the library budget. The pertinent sections of the Local Library Act 
provide that the Village's role in levying the tax to fund that 
budget is simply a ministerial duty imposed by statute. Section 3-- 
4 of the Local Library Act provides, in pertinent part: 
               "When the electors of [a] *** village *** have voted 
          to establish and maintain a public library as provided in 
          Section 2--2, the corporate authorities of such *** 
          village *** shall levy an annual tax for the 
          establishment and maintenance of such library, not 
          exceeding .15% of the value as equalized or assessed by 
          the Department of Revenue." (Emphasis added.) 75 ILCS 
          5/3--4 (West 1992). 
In addition, section 3--5 provides, in relevant part: 
               "The library taxes provided for in this Act shall be 
          levied by the corporate authorities in the amounts 
          determined by the [library] board and collected in like 
          manner with other general taxes of the *** village *** 
          and the proceeds shall be deposited in a special fund, 
          which shall be known as the library fund. *** [T]he 
          proceeds of any such tax shall be paid over by the 
          officer charged with the collection thereof to the board 
          of trustees of the library. Expenditures from the library 
          fund shall be under the direction of the board of library 
          trustees." (Emphasis added.) 75 ILCS 5/3--5 (West 1992). 
     This court has held that the use of the word "shall" in a 
statute generally indicates a mandatory obligation. People v. 
Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d 207, 222 (1996). Thus, under sections 3--4 and 
3--5 of the Local Library Act, the Village is under a mandatory 
duty to levy a tax for the establishment and maintenance of the 
library in the amount determined by the library board. See Painter 
v. Board of Trustees, 161 Ill. App. 3d 26, 32 (1987) (noting that 
the Local Library Act clearly indicates that a village is under a 
duty to pass the appropriation and tax levy exactly as requested by 
the library board); cf. Chicago School Finance Authority v. City 
Council,  104 Ill. 2d 437 , 443-44 (1984) (under the School Finance 
Authority Act, the Chicago city council is under a duty to pass a 
tax levy ordinance as demanded by the Chicago School Finance 
Authority). Pursuant to section 4--10 of the Local Library Act, the 
library must send a copy of its budget and the necessary tax levy 
to the Village. 75 ILCS 5/4--10 (West 1992). The Act, however, does 
not grant the Village the power to reject the library's budget or 
tax levy request. Thus, the Village's role in levying a tax to fund 
the library's budget is simply a ministerial duty imposed by 
statute. This ministerial task is not sufficient to render the 
Village a joint employer of the library employees. 
     Parenthetically, we note that the record contains a statement 
by the Village that it possesses the discretion to disapprove the 
library's appropriation request. The Village's statement is 
accompanied by a citation to the appellate court's decision in 
People ex rel. Effertz v. Brzezinski, 91 Ill. App. 2d 202 (1968). 
Brzezinski interpreted the 1965 version of the Local Library Act 
and held that, under that Act, the corporate authority, and not the 
library board, had the final approval over the amount of taxes to 
be levied for the library. The version of section 3--4 interpreted 
in Brzezinski, however, stated that the corporate authorities "may" 
levy an annual tax for the establishment and maintenance of the 
library. See Brzezinski, 91 Ill. App. 2d at 203-04, citing Ill. 
Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 81, par. 3--4. In 1967, the legislature 
amended section 3--4 to read, as it does presently, that the 
corporate authorities "shall" levy an annual tax for the 
establishment and maintenance of the library. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, 
ch. 81, par. 3--4. Moreover, after the Brzezinski decision was 
handed down in 1968, the legislature in 1969 amended section 3--5 
to add the express language that the corporate authorities shall 
levy a tax for the library "in the amounts determined by the 
[library] board." (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 81, 
pars. 3--4, 3--5. Thus, under the version of sections 3--4 and 3--5 
applicable here, the Village's duty to levy a tax to fund the 
library's budget is ministerial rather than discretionary. 
     The Board concedes in its brief before this court that the 
library budget does not need Village approval under the Local 
Library Act. The appellees nonetheless assert that the Village has 
the ability to affect the library's funding pursuant to two other 
provisions of the Local Library Act. The appellees cite to a 
portion of section 3--4 which states that, in addition to the 
Village's mandatory duty to levy a tax for the establishment and 
maintenance of the library, the Village: 
               "may also levy an additional tax of .02% of the 
          value of all the taxable property in the *** village *** 
          for the purchase of sites and buildings, for the 
          construction and equipment of buildings, for the rental 
          of buildings required for library purposes, and for 
          maintenance, repairs and alterations of library buildings 
          and equipment." 75 ILCS 5/3--4 (West 1992). 
The appellees also cite section 3--9, which states, in pertinent 
part: 
               "For the purpose of providing money to establish and 
          replenish a local library working cash fund authorized by 
          Section 4--13, corporate authorities shall have the power 
          to levy, upon all the taxable property of a *** village 
          *** a tax not to exceed .05% of the value, as equalized 
          or assessed by the Department of Revenue for the year in 
          which the levy is made." 75 ILCS 5/3--9 (West 1992). 
The working cash fund referred to by this provision is defined in 
section 4--13, which provides that a library board may create and 
maintain a fund for the sole purpose of enabling the library board 
to have in its funds, at all times, sufficient money to meet 
demands for ordinary and necessary and committed expenditures. 75 
ILCS 5/4--13 (West 1992). 
     The appellees argue that the Village has discretion over 
whether to levy the additional taxes provided for in these 
sections. They assert that the Village therefore has control over 
the amount of funding the library will receive. On this basis, the 
appellees argue, the Village should be found to be a joint employer 
of the library employees. The appellees' reliance on these 
provisions is misplaced. The taxes provided for in these two 
sections are expressly designated for the specific purposes 
described therein, and do not provide the library with the funding 
it requires to meet its general budgetary or personnel needs. 
Accordingly, neither of these provisions are relevant to the 
critical issue in this case, i.e., whether the Village possesses 
sufficient control over the library's personnel that it may be 
considered to be their joint employer. 
     The appellees also rely on the appellate court's decision in 
City of Rockford v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 158 Ill. 
App. 3d 166 (1987). That case is clearly distinguishable. In City 
of Rockford, the appellate court held that the City of Rockford was 
a joint employer of employees of the Rockford library. Although the 
library in that case was established under the Local Library Act, 
different provisions of the Act applied because the library was 
established in a city rather than a village, as here. In contrast 
to a village library, a city library is governed by a nine-member 
board of trustees, all of whom are appointed by the mayor with the 
advice and consent of the city council. 75 ILCS 5/4--1 (West 1992). 
The mayor also is granted the power to remove any trustee of a city 
library. 75 ILCS 5/4--1.1 (West 1992). The court in City of 
Rockford found these considerations to be significant in reaching 
its holding that the city possessed sufficient control over the 
library to be considered a joint employer of the library employees. 
The court observed that the library's board of trustees, which had 
the final approval over who was hired and discharged and total 
discretion over an employee's hours, wages and working conditions, 
was appointed by, and could be removed by, the mayor and the city 
council. City of Rockford, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 173. Further, there 
was evidence in that case that the city's personnel office 
advertised for, screened and conducted the initial interview of 
applicants for nonprofessional library positions. Also, the record 
demonstrated that the city had, in the past, aided the library when 
it was in financial straits, paying the balance on a mortgage 
obtained by the library. City of Rockford, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 170- 
71. We thus do not find the decision in City of Rockford to be 
persuasive authority in this case. 
     Accordingly, we hold that the Village is not a joint employer 
of the employees of the Winfield Public Library. The Board's 
finding to the contrary is against the manifest weight of the 
evidence. The Village is therefore exempt from the Illinois Public 
Labor Relations Act because it employs fewer than 35 employees and 
the Board has no jurisdiction to consider the union's petition. 
Given this holding, we need not consider the additional argument 
raised by the Village, that the library is a "unit of local 
government" such that its employees may not be aggregated with 
those of the Village. We also do not reach the issue of whether the 
six summer staffers should be counted as Village employees for 
section 20(b) purposes. 
 
                                CONCLUSION 
     For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the 
appellate court which confirmed the decision and order of the 
Illinois State Labor Relations Board. Pursuant to section 20(b) of 
the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, the Board lacks 
jurisdiction to consider the union's representation petition, and 
the Board's order must therefore be set aside. 
 
Appellate court judgment reversed; 
                                                     Board order set aside.