Case Title: Hicks v. Dir., Dep't of Corr.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 131945

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Millette, and Powell, JJ., and 
Russell and Lacy, S.JJ. 
 
ARSEAN LAMONE HICKS 
 
v.  Record No. 131945 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT  
 
 
    February 26, 2015 
OF CORRECTIONS 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, Arsean Lamone Hicks challenges the trial 
court’s judgment that his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
based on an alleged violation of the prosecution's duty to 
disclose exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963), was untimely filed because it was not filed within 
the one year limitations period provided in Code § 8.01-
654(A)(2). 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
In December of 1999, Hicks, then 16 years old, lived with 
his legal guardian, Haskell Corry, in Norfolk, Virginia.  Hicks 
shared a bedroom with Larry Roscoe.  On December 26, 1999, 
Hicks, Roscoe, and two other persons robbed a pizza delivery 
driver.  During the robbery, Roscoe pointed his gun at the 
driver’s head while Hicks took $50 from the driver’s pocket and 
the other men took the pizzas.  On December 27, 1999, Hicks 
committed a second armed robbery of a pizza delivery driver. 
2 
 
 
Two days later, on December 29, 1999, Hicks, Farrell 
Richardson and Kenny Riddick agreed to rob another pizza 
delivery driver.  Hicks, wearing a mask and armed with Roscoe’s 
gun, took the driver’s money and the pizzas.  Hicks then drove 
away in the delivery driver’s vehicle.  Later that evening, 
Hicks, Richardson and Riddick discussed robbing the Open House 
Diner in Norfolk, Virginia.  Just before 2:00 a.m. on December 
30, 1999, Richardson and Riddick entered the Open House Diner.  
After a few moments, Hicks, again wearing a mask and armed with 
Roscoe’s gun, entered the diner, jumped across the counter, and 
announced the robbery.  He ordered an employee to open the cash 
register.  As Hicks was removing money from the register, Lisa 
Bailey, an off-duty federal police officer, approached him 
displaying her badge in an attempt to prevent the robbery.  
Hicks shot and killed the officer.  Hicks and Richardson fled 
the diner. 
 
Riddick, who had remained in the diner, was questioned by 
the Norfolk Police officers when they arrived on the scene.  
Based on Riddick’s statements, the officers obtained a search 
warrant for Hicks’ residence and yard.  The police recovered a 9 
millimeter handgun from the closet in the bedroom shared by 
Hicks and Roscoe.  The officers also recovered pizza boxes from 
the establishments whose delivery drivers were robbed and items 
3 
 
belonging to the delivery driver whose car was stolen by Hicks.  
Subsequent testing showed that the handgun found in the bedroom 
Hicks shared with Roscoe was the weapon that fired the bullet 
killing Officer Bailey at the Open House Diner. 
 
Hicks confessed to the December 26 and 27 robberies and was 
convicted in two separate jury trials.  Hicks pled guilty to the 
December 29 carjacking, robbery and two counts of using a 
firearm in the commission of those felonies.  Hicks subsequently 
pled not guilty to the Open House Diner crimes and, following a 
jury trial, was convicted of first degree murder, use of a 
firearm in the commission of murder, robbery, use of a firearm 
in the commission of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery.  
Hicks’ appeals of these convictions were unsuccessful and direct 
review concluded on January 9, 2004.  On July 24, 2013, Hicks, 
appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus with regard to his convictions for the 
Open House Diner crimes.  That petition is the subject of this 
appeal. 
 
In his petition, Hicks alleged that on October 12, 2012, he 
received a sworn affidavit executed by Roscoe on November 28, 
2006, stating that Roscoe had “admitted to Detective Ford that 
the gun, shoes, coat and mask were mine when I gave him a 
recorded statement at the [police operations center].  [A]t no 
4 
 
time did anyone touch or use my items which I also stated [there 
was] no way possible any of them could have committed those 
crimes if these items are said to have been used.”  Roscoe had 
given this affidavit to Richardson, who, according to 
Richardson’s affidavit “sat on it” for several years before 
giving it to Hicks’ girlfriend, who, in turn, mailed it to Hicks 
in October of 2012. 
 
Based on this information, Hicks asserted that the Norfolk 
Commonwealth Attorney suppressed or failed to disclose Roscoe’s 
recorded statement referenced in the affidavit and that the 
affidavit contained exculpatory evidence in violation of Hicks’ 
due process rights under the Constitution of the United States 
and Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia, as 
defined in Brady.  In response, the Commonwealth filed a motion 
to dismiss, arguing that Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) requires that a 
petition for habeas corpus be filed within two years from the 
date of final judgment in the trial court or within one year 
from either final disposition of the direct appeal in state 
court or the time for filing such appeal has expired, whichever 
is later.  Because Hicks’ petition was filed more than nine 
years after his conviction was final, the Commonwealth concluded 
the petition was untimely and should be dismissed. 
5 
 
 
Hicks opposed the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss, stating 
that applying the statutory limitations period without exception 
constitutes a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in 
violation of Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of 
Virginia.  Hicks contended that the limitations statute is not 
absolute, arguing that in Hines v. Kuplinski, 267 Va. 1, 591 
S.E.2d 692 (2004) the same issue was raised and, while not 
directly decided because the petitioner in Hines did not meet 
the factual predicate for a late filing based on previously 
unknown information, the Court nevertheless engaged in the 
applicable analysis.  Because the Court engaged in the analysis, 
Hicks contended that the “only logical conclusion therefore is 
that had Hines been able to prove that the basis of his claim 
was not previously available . . . the Court would have held 
that applying the limitations period would be unconstitutional.” 
 
The trial court ultimately dismissed Hicks’ petition, 
holding that it was not timely filed under Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) 
and that the application of the limitations statute to petitions 
for a writ of habeas corpus did not suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus in violation of Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution 
of Virginia.  We awarded Hicks an appeal. 
 
 
6 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Hicks raises three assignments of error.  In his first two 
assignments of error he asserts that the trial court erred in 
ruling that habeas corpus relief was not available to him based 
on a claim of newly discovered withheld exculpatory evidence 
because it was untimely.  His third assignment of error recites 
that applying the limitations period of Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) to 
Hicks’ claim violates the bar against suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus contained in Article I, Section 9 of the 
Constitution of Virginia.  We will consider these claims in 
order. 
 
Hicks first argues that his petition was timely filed under 
Code § 8.01-229(D).  That section provides in pertinent part: 
When the filing of an action is obstructed by a 
defendant’s . . . using any other direct or indirect 
means to obstruct the filing of an action, then the 
time that such obstruction has continued shall not be 
counted as any part of the period within which the 
action must be brought. 
 
This section, Hicks argues, operates as an exception to the 
limitations period established in Code § 8.01-654(A)(2).  Habeas 
corpus is a civil action, and Hicks contends that the 
Commonwealth, as the responding party or defendant, had and 
continued to withhold exculpatory evidence which was unknown to 
Hicks until October 12, 2012.  Hicks argues that the one year 
period for filing his petition for habeas corpus began to run at 
7 
 
that point and his petition filed on July 24, 2013, was filed 
within one year of that date. 
 
The Commonwealth asserts that Supreme Court Rule 5:25 bars 
our consideration of this argument because it was not raised 
before the habeas court.  Hicks acknowledges that, proceeding 
pro se and in forma pauperis, he did not specifically cite Code 
§ 8.01-229(D) to the habeas court, but argues that by asserting 
he filed the petition within one year of learning of the 
withheld exculpatory evidence he “disclosed the foundation for 
statutory tolling” and his argument “functionally mirrored the 
text of the tolling statute.”  Hicks also contends that even if 
his arguments did not preserve the issue for appeal, we should 
apply the ends of justice exception to Rule 5:25 and consider 
application of Code § 8.01-229(D) here. 
 
We disagree with Hicks’ assertion that his arguments were 
sufficient to alert the habeas court to the tolling provisions 
of Code § 8.01-229(D).  As reflected in the record, Hicks’ 
arguments to support timely filing within one year of learning 
of the Roscoe affidavit were directed to the provisions in Code 
§ 8.01-654(B)(2), which addresses the filing of successive 
petitions based on newly acquired information.  There was no 
suggestion that any other statute was the source for tolling the 
limitations period contained in Code § 8.01-654(A)(2).  
8 
 
Accordingly, unless we can determine that the ends of justice 
provision of Rule 5:25 applies here, we must conclude that the 
rule precludes our consideration of Hicks’ argument that Code § 
8.01-229(D) tolled the limitations period for filing his habeas 
corpus petition. 
Ends of Justice Exception 
 
We apply the ends of justice exception to Rule 5:25 in 
limited circumstances.  Gheorghiu v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 678, 
689, 701 S.E.2d 407, 413-14 (2010)(citing Ali v. Commonwealth, 
280 Va. 665, 671, 701 S.E.2d 64, 68 (2010); Charles v. 
Commonwealth, 270 Va. 14, 17, 20, 613 S.E.2d 432, 433, 435 
(2005); Jimenez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 244, 249-50, 402 S.E.2d 
678, 680 (1991); Ball v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 754, 758, 273 
S.E.2d 790, 793 (1981)).  Applying the exception is appropriate 
when there is error as contended by the appellant and when the 
failure to apply the exception would result in a grave 
injustice.  Gheorghiu, 280 Va. at 689, 701 S.E.2d at 413. 
1. Error 
 
The Commonwealth argues that there was no error in the 
trial court’s judgment because Code § 8.01-229(D) does not apply 
to the limitations period established for the filing of 
petitions for habeas corpus relief.  In support of its position, 
the Commonwealth offers a number of arguments.  First, the 
9 
 
Commonwealth contends that statutes of limitations must be 
strictly enforced “unless the General Assembly has clearly 
created an exception to their application,” Casey v. Merck & 
Co., 283 Va. 411, 416, 722 S.E.2d 842, 845 (2012), and Code § 
8.01-654(A)(2) contains no exceptions.  Furthermore, according 
to the Commonwealth, Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) is a specific 
statute, while Code § 8.01-229(D) is a statute of general 
application, and as a result the general statute cannot prevail 
over the provisions of the more specific statute.  Daniels v. 
Warden, 266 Va. 399, 402, 588 S.E.2d 382, 384 (2003). 
 
We do not find this argument persuasive.  The lack of an 
exception to the limitations period within Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) 
does not preclude application of an exception contained in 
another statute.  That is precisely what the General Assembly 
has done in Code § 8.01-229 with regard to many other provisions 
in the Code of Virginia containing specific statutes of 
limitations.  Section 8.01-229, entitled in part as “Suspension 
or tolling of statute of limitations” contains multiple 
subsections identifying instances in which limitations periods 
established in other parts of the Code may be tolled.  See, 
e.g., Code § 8.01-229(A)(providing tolling based on certain 
disabilities, such as infancy or adjudicated incapacitation); 
10 
 
-229(B)(providing tolling when person entitled to file an action 
dies before filing or when person against whom an action may be 
filed dies before the action is filed); -229(C)(providing 
tolling when the commencement of an action is suspended due to 
an injunction); and -229(E)(providing tolling under certain 
circumstances when an action is dismissed without determining 
the merits, abates or is nonsuited).  The Commonwealth’s logic 
would vitiate application of virtually every subsection in the 
statute because they each deal with limitations periods 
established elsewhere. 
 
Next, the Commonwealth asserts, even if Code § 8.01-229(D) 
provided an exception to the more specific habeas limitations 
statute, it is not available in this case because its 
application requires a showing that the defendant’s obstruction 
be in the nature of moral turpitude, relying on Newman v. 
Walker, 270 Va. 291, 296, 618 S.E.2d 336, 340 (2005).  According 
to the Commonwealth, Hicks’ Brady claim arises from an 
inadvertent act of the prosecutor, not from an intentional act 
implicating moral turpitude. 
 
The Commonwealth correctly argues that in previous cases we 
have said that to invoke the tolling provision of Code § 8.01-
229(D), the obstruction by the defendant “‘must consist of 
affirmative acts of misrepresentation’” and that “‘[t]he fraud 
11 
 
which will relieve the bar of the statute must be of that 
character which involves moral turpitude, and must have the 
effect of debarring or deterring the plaintiff from his 
action.’”  Culpeper Nat'l Bank v. Tidewater Improvement Co., 119 
Va. 73, 84, 89 S.E. 118, 121 (1916).  However, none of our cases 
addressing the nature of the obstruction necessary to invoke 
Code § 8.01-229(D) involved a petition for habeas corpus based 
on a Brady violation. 
 
A claim for relief based on an alleged Brady violation is 
unlike any claim addressed in our previous cases involving Code 
§ 8.01-229(D).  The failure to disclose in a Brady claim is more 
than a simple omission or act obstructing the filing of a civil 
action; it is the core element of the claim for relief itself, 
which results in injury to the litigant.  Disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence is an affirmative duty not dependent on a 
request from the accused, applying to impeachment as well as 
affirmative evidence, and this duty is violated whether the 
failure to produce the exculpatory information was intentional 
or inadvertent.  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 
(1999).  Furthermore, as particularly relevant here, the Brady 
doctrine encompasses “evidence ‘known only to police 
investigators and not to the prosecutor,’” id. at 280-81, and 
requires its disclosure. 
12 
 
  
The Commonwealth’s reasoning that the failure to disclose 
in this case was insufficient to invoke the statutory tolling 
provisions would preclude application of Code § 8.01-229(D) in 
every instance in which a government actor other than the 
prosecutor engaged in acts of nondisclosure.  Such an 
interpretation of Code § 8.01-229(D) would afford a safe haven 
for nondisclosure, which is inconsistent with the elements of 
the Brady doctrine and undermines the importance of Brady in our 
criminal justice system.  For these reasons, we conclude that in 
a claim for habeas corpus relief based on a Brady violation, the 
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence qualifies as 
obstruction by the defendant that prevents the filing of the 
claim for purposes of Code § 8.01-229(D). 
 
Finally, the Commonwealth argues that Hicks’ petition is 
untimely even under Code § 8.01-229(D) because Hicks learned of 
Roscoe’s statement no later than March 24, 2009, based on 
statements contained in a motion filed by Hicks for recovery and 
testing of DNA.  The motion to which the Commonwealth refers 
sought DNA testing of a shoe recovered at Hicks’ residence that 
matched the shoe impression left on the counter at the murder 
scene.  In that motion Hicks refers to a “confession” Larry 
Roscoe gave to Hicks.  Nothing in this motion mentions the 
recorded statement allegedly given to the investigating 
13 
 
detective or Roscoe’s exclusive possession of certain items, 
which are the subject of the allegedly withheld evidence.  
Therefore, we reject the Commonwealth’s argument that the 
tolling provision of Code § 8.01-229(D) does not apply because 
Hicks was aware of the evidence allegedly withheld more than one 
year before he filed his habeas corpus petition. 
 
In summary, we conclude that the tolling provision of Code 
§ 8.01-229(D) is applicable to the limitations period of Code  
§ 8.01-654(A)(2) and, therefore, it was error to conclude that 
Hicks’ petition for habeas corpus was untimely. 
2.  Grave Injustice 
 
Before we apply the ends of justice exception of Rule 5:25, 
however, we must determine whether the failure to apply the 
exception would result in a grave injustice.  Gheorghiu, 280 Va. 
at 689, 701 S.E.2d at 413.  Under the facts of this case, Hicks 
would suffer a grave injustice if his Brady claim was 
meritorious but barred from consideration by Rule 5:25.  There 
are three components of a violation of the Brady rule of 
disclosure: 
a) The evidence not disclosed to the accused must 
be favorable to the accused, either because it is 
exculpatory, or because it may be used for 
impeachment; b) the evidence not disclosed must 
have been withheld by the Commonwealth either 
willfully or inadvertently; and c) the accused 
must have been prejudiced. 
 
14 
 
Workman v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 633, 644-45, 636 S.E.2d 368, 
374 (2006)(quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82)(citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  We also have recognized that 
“[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely 
than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, 
but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood 
as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”  Id. 
(quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)).  A 
reviewing court must determine whether the withheld favorable 
evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in 
such a different light as to undermine confidence in the 
verdict,” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); that is, whether such evidence was 
material. 
 
Hicks bases his Brady claim on statements contained in an 
affidavit executed by Roscoe in which Roscoe stated that he gave 
a recorded statement to the investigating detective indicating 
that the gun, shoes, coat and mask were his and that no one else 
touched or used the items and that as a result, it was not 
possible that the items could have been used in the crimes.  
Hicks argues that this statement was exculpatory because it 
“proves that only Larry Roscoe could have committed [the Open 
House Diner crimes]” and “had [the jury] known of Roscoe’s 
15 
 
statement, they would never have found” Hicks guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Taking Hicks’ allegations as true, Morris v. 
Smyth, 202 Va. 832, 833, 120 S.E.2d 465, 466 (1961), we 
acknowledge that the information in Roscoe’s affidavit, on its 
face, is exculpatory.  While the Commonwealth raises some 
question about the existence of a recorded statement, for 
purposes of this analysis we will assume that Roscoe’s recorded 
statement exists, contains the statements alleged by Hicks and 
that the Commonwealth failed to disclose it.  With those 
assumptions, the final question remains whether the allegedly 
nondisclosed evidence was material. 
 
In determining materiality we are guided by the following 
principles: 
[A] showing of materiality does not require 
demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of 
the suppressed evidence would have resulted 
ultimately in the defendant's acquittal (whether 
based on the presence of reasonable doubt or 
acceptance of an explanation for the crime that 
does not inculpate the defendant).  Second, 
materiality is not a sufficiency of the evidence 
test.  A defendant need not demonstrate that after 
discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of 
the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been 
enough left to convict.  Third, a harmless error 
analysis is unnecessary once materiality has been 
determined.  Fourth, suppressed evidence must be 
considered collectively, not item by item. 
 
Workman, 272 Va. at 645, 636 S.E.2d at 375 (internal quotation 
marks, alterations, and citations omitted). 
16 
 
 
Applying these factors to the evidence in this case, which 
includes transcripts from Hicks’ criminal trial, we cannot 
conclude that the suppression of Roscoe’s statement undermines 
confidence in the outcome of Hicks’ trial.  At his jury trial 
for the Open House Diner crimes, Hicks testified that he pled 
guilty to committing the December 29, 1999 pizza delivery 
robbery and carjacking crimes, which occurred only hours before 
the Open House Diner crimes.  Hicks testified that he wore a 
mask and used Roscoe’s gun in the commission of those crimes.   
There was no dispute at Hicks’ trial that the gun recovered at 
Hicks’ residence belonged to Roscoe and that Roscoe’s gun was 
the weapon used to murder Officer Bailey.  Hicks’ trial 
testimony conclusively established that Hicks not only had 
access to the murder weapon – Roscoe’s gun – but also that he 
had actual possession and control of it just hours before the 
murder of Officer Bailey.  Hicks’ own testimony and the forensic 
evidence presented to the jury at trial is inconsistent with 
Roscoe’s statements. 
 
Furthermore, Hicks also testified that Roscoe did not 
commit the Open House Diner crimes because another man, known 
only as “Moe,” committed the crimes. 
The jury also heard Hicks’ recorded confession to the Open 
House Diner crimes, as given to the investigating officers.  
17 
 
Although Hicks argued at trial that the confession was coerced, 
the verdict demonstrates that the jury did not find Hicks’ 
coercion claim credible. 
 
Based on this record, the allegedly withheld evidence could 
not reasonably be taken “to put the whole case in such a 
different light” that confidence in the guilty verdict is 
undermined.  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.  
Therefore, we hold that such evidence was not material.  Because 
the allegedly nondisclosed evidence was not material, Hicks 
fails to establish that he was prejudiced and, therefore, has 
failed to prove a necessary component to his Brady claim.  
Consequently, the failure to apply the ends of justice exception 
would not result in a grave injustice to Hicks, and we will not 
apply the ends of justice exception to Rule 5:25 in this case. 
 
In light of our holding that the tolling provision of Code 
§ 8.01-229(D) is applicable to the limitations period in Code § 
8.01-654(A)(2), we need not address Hicks’ third assignment of 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. 
Affirmed.