Case Title: State v. Grooms

Citation: 353 N.C. 50

Docket Number: 39A99

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2000-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TIMMY EUVONNE GROOMS
No. 39A99
Filed 21 December 2000
1.
Constitutional Law--right to speedy trial--failure to raise at trial--
no willful misconduct by State--no significant prejudice
Defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial in
a capital prosecution for first-degree murder, even though the length of
delay from indictment to trial was three years and 326 days, because: (1)
defendant waived appellate review of this issue by failing to properly
raise the constitutional issue in the trial court; and (2) even if this
issue was preserved, the record does not reveal that the delay resulted
from willful misconduct by the State when much of the delay was attributed
to defendant’s unwillingness to cooperate with his attorneys in preparation
for trial, defense counsel never filed any motions asserting defendant’s
right to a speedy trial, and defendant has failed to show that he suffered
significant prejudice as a result of the delay.
2.
Constitutional Law--effective assistance of counsel--failure to assert
right to speedy trial
Defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder even
though defense counsel failed to assert defendant’s constitutional right to
a speedy trial, because defendant cannot show that he suffered any
prejudice when defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not
violated.
3.
Appeal and Error--preservation of issues--DNA evidence--pretrial
motion to suppress--motion in limine--failure to object at trial--no
argument in brief--issue waived
The trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree
murder by denying defendant’s motion to suppress and motion in limine to
exclude DNA evidence, because: (1) defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress
and motion in limine are not sufficient to preserve for appeal the question
of the admissibility of the State’s DNA evidence; (2) defendant waived
appellate review of this issue by failing to object during trial to the
admission of the DNA evidence; and (3) although defendant’s assignment of
error includes plain error as an alternative, defendant does not
specifically argue in his brief that there is plain error.   
4.
Constitutional Law--effective assistance of counsel--testing of DNA
samples--State’s failure to inform defense counsel
Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel in a capital
prosecution for first-degree murder even though the State failed to inform
defense counsel that the SBI had completed DNA testing which precluded
defense counsel from making a timely request to observe the SBI’s remaining
test procedures, because: (1) defendant failed to show that defense
counsel’s performance was deficient by basing his claim on the State’s
failure to inform defense counsel of the SBI’s progress in testing the DNA
samples; (2) defendant does not contend that the SBI employed incorrect
testing procedures or that those procedures were conducted improperly; and
(3) there was no reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial was
affected.
5.
Jury--challenge for cause--ability to render fair and impartial
verdict
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital prosecution
for first-degree murder by denying defendant’s challenge for cause under
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212 of a prospective juror who initially indicated he would
vote for the death penalty if the jury found defendant guilty of the
charges, because: (1) defendant failed to follow the mandatory statutory
procedure under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(h) to preserve this issue for appellate
review; and (2) even if this issue was preserved, the prospective juror
indicated upon further questioning that he could remain a fair and
impartial juror, could follow the law concerning the burden of proof and
presumption of innocence, and could consider both sentencing options.
6.
Jury--challenge for cause--relationship with victim’s family and
State’s witnesses--participated in pretrial protest of case
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital prosecution
for first-degree murder by denying defendant’s challenge for cause under
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212 of a prospective juror who had a relationship with the
victim’s family and two of the State’s witnesses, and who also participated
in a pretrial protest of the delay in bringing this case to trial, because:
(1) defendant failed to follow the mandatory statutory procedure under
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(h) to preserve this issue for appellate review; and (2)
even if this issue was preserved, the prospective juror indicated that his
knowledge of the victim and her family members would not affect his ability
to render a fair and impartial verdict.
7.
Jury--challenge for cause--personal relationship with law enforcement
officers
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital prosecution
for first-degree murder by denying defendant’s challenge for cause under
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212 of a juror on the basis of his personal relationship
with several of the law enforcement officers who were prospective witnesses
for the State because the juror indicated he could remain a fair and
impartial juror, could based his decision on the evidence presented in the
case, and would not give any greater weight to the testimony of these
prospective witnesses.
8.
Evidence--murder weapon--knife--testimony--drawing
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital prosecution
for first-degree murder by overruling defendant’s objections to testimony
and a witness’s drawing of a knife that defendant allegedly possessed and
possibly used as a murder weapon, because: (1) the witnesses’ descriptions
of the approximate size of defendant’s pocketknife overlap with the medical
examiner’s testimony regarding the approximate depth and width of the
victim’s wounds; and (2) the probative value of the evidence substantially
outweighed any prejudicial effect.
9.
Evidence--hacksaw frame--hacksaw blades--relevancy--proximity to
victim--expert’s conclusions
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital prosecution
for first-degree murder by denying defendant’s motion to suppress a hacksaw
frame and three hacksaw blades, because: (1) the proximity of the hacksaw
frame to the location of the victim’s severed hand and the expert witness’s
conclusions that the victim’s right hand was severed by a hacksaw blade
similar to those seized from the residence of defendant’s parents where
defendant often resided made the evidence relevant; (2) the lack of
evidence that the seized blades could fit into the rusty hacksaw frame and
the common availability of hacksaw blades merely affects the weight or
probative value of the evidence rather than its admissibility; and (3) the
probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed any prejudicial
effect.  
10.
Evidence--blood, hair, and saliva samples--motion to suppress
The trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree
murder by failing to suppress evidence of blood, hair, and saliva samples
taken from defendant pursuant to a search warrant authorizing the State to
seize blood, hair, and saliva samples, because: (1) probable cause existed
to support issuance of the search warrant, including evidence of the
victim’s severed hand, a hacksaw frame located near the severed hand,
hacksaw blades consistent in size with the hacksaw frame seized from the
residence of defendant’s parents where defendant occasionally resided, a
medical examiner opined that the victim’s hand was severed by a tool
consistent with a hacksaw, witnesses saw defendant outside the victim’s
home on the night of the murder and later saw him running away from the
area where the severed hand and hacksaw were discovered, a medical examiner
found semen in the victim’s body, there was evidence that the victim had
struggled, defendant had numerous scratches and cuts on his body, and
defendant had a history of committing sexual offenses; and (2) the State
was not required to obtain a nontestimonial identification order or to
provide defendant with the right to counsel during the execution of the
search warrant.
11.
Evidence--motion in limine--DNA testing--other individuals
The trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree
murder by allowing the State’s motion in limine to preclude defendant from
eliciting from the State’s expert witness testimony about DNA testing
performed on other individuals in this case, because: (1) the DNA testing
results excluded the other individuals as perpetrators of the crime; and
(2) the evidence would have only highlighted the DNA match between
defendant and the sample collected from the victim’s body.
12.
Appeal and Error--preservation of issues--no argument in brief--no
objection at trial--issue waived
The trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree
murder by admitting evidence of defendant’s past acts of violence against
five females, because: (1) defendant’s pretrial motion in limine is not
sufficient to preserve for appeal the question of the admissibility of the
State’s Rule 404(b) evidence, and defendant waived appellate review of this
issue by failing to object during trial to the admission of prior bad acts;
and (2) while defendant’s assignment of error includes plain error as an
alternative, there is no explanation, analysis, or specific contention in
his brief to support this assertion.   
13.
Criminal Law--competency to stand trial--failure to order independent
psychiatric evaluation
The trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree
murder by failing to order an independent psychiatric evaluation under
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002 when defendant’s capacity to proceed was raised by
defense counsel at trial, because: (1) defendant points to nothing in the
record to indicate that he was incompetent to proceed with trial; and (2)
the record showed that defendant stated he did not want a mental health
examination, he understood the proceedings and his rights, he assisted in
his own defense throughout trial, and he understood the ramifications of
his decision not to present mitigating evidence during the sentencing
proceeding.
14.
Homicide; Rape; Kidnapping; Robbery--motion to dismiss--sufficiency of
evidence
The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss
the charges of first-degree murder, first-degree rape, first-degree
kidnapping, and robbery with a dangerous weapon, because evidence was
presented that: (1) the victim was last seen alive standing with defendant
on a street corner; (2) defendant was nearly hit by a car while running
away from the location where police later discovered the victim’s severed
hand; (3) defendant returned home with a scratched face, with a bleeding
cut on his arm, and without the jacket that he frequently wore; (4)
defendant gave several inconsistent explanations for the scratches and
bleeding cut on his arm; (5) defendant told his girlfriend that he had
thrown his coat away, he had buried his other clothes, and the police would
never know where the clothes were; (6) defendant’s DNA matched the sperm
found in the victim’s body; (7) the stab wounds on the victim’s body were
consistent in size and shape with a knife that defendant regularly carried;
(8) the victim’s right hand had been severed by a hacksaw with a blade
designed exactly like the hacksaw blades seized from the residence of
defendant’s parents where defendant lived from time to time; (9) defendant
asked a friend for money to get out of town; and (10) the victim’s body was
found in pine straw in the woods, and defendant had on a previous occasion
commented to one of the witnesses whom he had assaulted that he could kill
her and hide her body under the pine straw in the woods.  
15.
Criminal Law--jury instruction--flight
The trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree
murder by instructing the jury that it could consider evidence of flight in
determining defendant’s guilt, because the evidence taken in the light most
favorable to the State permits an inference that defendant had a
consciousness of guilt and took steps, even though unsuccessful, to avoid
apprehension.
16.
Criminal Law--prosecutor’s argument--defendant as “the prince of
darkness” and “the King of Cobra”
The trial court did not commit prejudicial error in a capital
prosecution for first-degree murder by failing to intervene ex mero motu
during the prosecutor’s closing argument that referred to defendant as “the
prince of darkness” and “the King of Cobra,” because: (1) the prosecutor
never improperly compared defendant to an animal; (2) the prosecutor’s
references were connected to the evidence which suggested that defendant
regularly rode his bicycle around during the night, that defendant drank
King Cobra Beer on the night of the victim’s disappearance, and that a King
Cobra beer bottle was found near the victim’s residence after the murder;
and (3) the references were not disparaging and did not amount to satanic
or demonic references as defendant contends. 
17.
Criminal Law--prosecutor’s argument--defendant stalked the innocent
The trial court did not commit prejudicial error in a capital
prosecution for first-degree murder by failing to intervene ex mero motu
during the prosecutor’s closing argument that “defendant stalked the
innocent, some of them children,” because the statement was connected to
evidence that showed defendant had committed acts of sexual violence
against three young girls.
18.
Criminal Law--prosecutor’s argument--victim’s last thoughts
The trial court did not commit prejudicial error in a capital
prosecution for first-degree murder by failing to intervene ex mero motu
during the prosecutor’s closing argument inquiring about what the victim
was thinking as defendant choked, beat, raped, mutilated, and stabbed her,
because: (1) the prosecutor did not improperly characterize defendant as
satanic or demonic as defendant contends; (2) arguments concerning what a
victim may have been thinking as he or she was dying are not grossly
improper; (3) the argument was based upon the evidence presented at trial
and reasonable inferences which could be drawn therefrom; and (4) the
prosecutor did not ask the jurors to put themselves in the position of the
victim.
19.
Criminal Law--prosecutor’s argument--referring to defense counsel’s
trial strategy as “ingenuity of counsel”--contention of creating a
smoke screen
The trial court did not commit prejudicial error in a capital
prosecution for first-degree murder by failing to intervene ex mero motu
during the prosecutor’s closing argument repeatedly referring to defense
counsel’s trial strategy as “ingenuity of counsel” and contending that
defense counsel created a smoke screen to take the focus away from
defendant, because: (1) the prosecutor did not use abusive, vituperative,
or opprobrious language; (2) the prosecutor did not impugn the integrity of
defense counsel or repeatedly attempt to diminish defense counsel before
the jury, but instead stated that both defense counsel were fine lawyers
that he respected and who had done a good job representing defendant; and
(3) the prosecutor never expressed a personal opinion regarding defendant’s
guilt, but merely asked the jury to find facts and draw permissible
inferences based upon the competent evidence introduced during trial.
20.
Criminal Law--prosecutor’s argument--defendant’s pocketknife could
have been murder weapon
The trial court did not commit prejudicial error in a capital
prosecution for first-degree murder by failing to intervene ex mero motu
during the prosecutor’s closing argument that the pocketknife regularly
carried by defendant could have been the murder weapon, because: (1) the
prosecutor made reasonable inferences from the competent evidence
introduced during trial based on the witnesses’ descriptions of the size of
defendant’s pocketknife; and (2) the witnesses’ descriptions overlap with
the medical examiner’s testimony regarding the size and depth of the stab
wounds on the victim’s body.
21.
Constitutional Law--capital sentencing--strategy--defendant’s wishes
The trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree
murder by ordering defense counsel to defer to defendant’s wishes not to
present mitigating evidence, because: (1) the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments do not require a defendant to acquiesce in a trial strategy to
present mitigating evidence where defendant and his counsel reach an
absolute impasse; and (2) defendant was fully informed of and understood
the potential consequences of his decision.
22.
Constitutional Law--effective assistance of counsel--deferring to
defendant’s wishes not to present mitigating evidence
The trial court did not deny defendant his right to effective
assistance of counsel in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by
ordering defense counsel to defer to defendant’s wishes not to present
mitigating evidence, because: (1) defendant concedes in his brief that his
counsel’s performance was not deficient; and (2) defendant cannot show that
the trial court’s ruling prejudiced his defense when the trial court did
not err in precluding defense counsel from presenting mitigating evidence.
23.
Criminal Law--prosecutor’s argument--defendant received sentence of
imprisonment for prior crime
The trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree
murder by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor’s closing
argument urging the jury to recommend the death sentence based on the fact
that defendant already received a sentence of imprisonment for his prior
acts of violence against other women and he was not deterred, because: (1)
the prosecutor never used the word “parole” and never mentioned the
possibility that a life sentence for this crime would mean that defendant
would eventually be released; (2) the prosecutor merely referred to the
fact that defendant committed this crime after serving a prison term for
another similar crime, implying that imprisonment had not deterred
defendant in the past; and (3) the prosecutor’s argument properly focused
on the importance of the jury’s duty and suggested that the death penalty
would specifically deter defendant from committing future crimes. 
24.
Criminal Law--prosecutor’s argument--defendant has opportunity to go
last and argue as many times as he chooses during closing arguments
The trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree
murder by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor’s closing
argument that defendant has the opportunity to go last and to argue as many
times as he chooses during closing arguments, because: (1) the prosecutor’s
argument was a proper statement of the law under N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(a)(4);
and (2) the prosecutor was not improperly implying to the jury that
defendant did not present any mitigating evidence or make a closing
argument based on the fact that defendant did not have any evidence or
argument to present since defense counsel did not announce until after the
prosecutor’s closing argument that defendant refused to present any closing
arguments.
25.
Sentencing--capital--death penalty not disproportionate
The trial court did not err by imposing the death sentence because:
(1) defendant was convicted of first-degree murder based upon premeditation
and deliberation and under the felony murder rule; (2) the jury found the
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3) aggravating circumstance of defendant’s prior
conviction for a violent felony; (3) the jury found the N.C.G.S. § 15A-
2000(e)(5) aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed while
defendant was engaged in the commission of first-degree rape; (4) the jury
found the N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5) aggravating circumstance that the
murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of
first-degree kidnapping; (5) the jury found the N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(6)
aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain;
and (6) the jury found the N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(9) aggravating
circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from a judgment
imposing a sentence of death entered by Ellis (B. Craig), J., on 24 April
1998 in Superior Court, Scotland County, upon a jury verdict finding
defendant guilty of first-degree murder.  On 26 October 1999, the Supreme
Court allowed defendant’s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to his
appeal of additional judgments.  Heard in the Supreme Court 11 September
2000.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Mary D. Winstead, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State.
Leslie Ann Laufer for defendant-appellant.
PARKER, Justice.
Defendant Timmy Euvonne Grooms was indicted on 11 April 1994 for
robbery with a dangerous weapon, first-degree kidnapping, and first-degree
murder in the kidnapping and killing of victim Krista Kay Godwin.  On
31 October 1994 defendant was indicted for first-degree rape.  Defendant
was tried capitally and found guilty of first-degree murder on the basis of
premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule.  He was
also found guilty of first-degree rape, first-degree kidnapping, and
robbery with a dangerous weapon.  Following a capital sentencing
proceeding, the jury recommended a sentence of death for the murder; and
the trial court entered judgment accordingly.  The trial court also
sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences of forty years’ imprisonment
for defendant’s convictions of robbery with a dangerous weapon and first-
degree kidnapping and to life imprisonment for the first-degree rape
conviction.  For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that defendant’s
trial was free from prejudicial error.
The State’s evidence tended to show that defendant and Krista Kay
Godwin were neighbors in Laurel Hill, North Carolina.  On 14 February 1994,
Godwin was planning an intimate Valentine’s Day dinner with her fiancé,
Michael McDaniel.  Godwin spent the afternoon with a friend, Myra Martin. 
Around 6:30 p.m. Godwin spoke on the telephone with her mother and with
McDaniel, who called Godwin from work during his 6:30 break.  Godwin and
Martin then went to Rita Quick’s house for approximately thirty or forty-
five minutes.  While at Quick’s house, Godwin ate some dinner and phoned
her mother.  Godwin and Martin returned to Godwin’s home, and Martin left
around 7:30 p.m.  Godwin called her father between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m.
and told her father that she was waiting for McDaniel to come home from
work.
McDaniel attempted to phone Godwin from work around 10:00 p.m.  When
no one answered his repeated attempts to call Godwin, McDaniel became
concerned and left work early.  McDaniel arrived at Godwin’s home around
10:25 p.m.  The front door was unlocked; the lights were on; the dogs were
in the yard; and Godwin’s shoes, purse, and jacket were in the house, but
Godwin was missing.  McDaniel phoned Martin, Godwin’s father, and the
police.  Martin then phoned the police, the hospital, and Quick.  Godwin’s
father helped McDaniel search the neighborhood for Godwin.
Meanwhile, around 6:00 p.m. Chad Miller noticed defendant straddling
his bike in some bushes near Godwin’s house.  Miller called out to
defendant, and defendant rode away on his bike without answering.  Miller
proceeded to downtown Laurel Hill, where he sat on the steps of an
abandoned building and drank beer with defendant.  Miller walked defendant
home, leaving defendant at the house defendant shared with Hope Norton at
approximately 9:00 p.m.  Around 10:00 or 10:15 p.m. Kenneth Boswell noticed
defendant and Godwin standing together on a street corner.  At
approximately 1:00 a.m. Shirley Johnson nearly hit defendant with her car
as he ran down the street from the direction of Mildred’s Florist Shop. 
Johnson told law enforcement officers that defendant was wearing a blue
jacket, a dark hat, and light-colored jeans.  Defendant then returned home
twice for short periods, both times without the blue jacket that he
frequently wore and that he had been wearing earlier.
When defendant returned home the next morning, his face was scratched;
and he was bleeding from a long cut on his arm.  Defendant told Norton that
two black men had assaulted him, that his dog had scratched his face, that
he had gotten scratched riding his bicycle under a tree, and that he had
gotten scratched in some bushes while breaking into a house.  Defendant
also told Norton that he had thrown away his jacket.  Later, defendant told
Norton that he had buried the other clothing he had worn that night and
that the police would never find this other clothing.
On the morning of 16 February 1994 Marvin Radford, Jr., discovered a
severed human hand when he climbed onto the roof of Mildred’s Florist Shop
to patch some leaks.  On that same day a search team looked for Godwin in a
nearby wooded area.  As he walked through the wooded area, Deputy Thomas
Butler discovered a negligee.  Deputy Butler continued to search the
surrounding area until he saw human toes sticking up from some pine straw. 
Deputy Butler then recognized the outline of a human body, which was later
uncovered and identified as Godwin.
The pathologist who performed the autopsy on Godwin found a total of
twelve stab wounds on Godwin’s body, all of which were inflicted by the
same instrument, possibly a pocketknife.  One stab wound perforated
Godwin’s aorta and would have caused Godwin’s death within minutes;
however, several other wounds that penetrated Godwin’s chest cavity were
potentially fatal.  The pathologist found numerous linear scratches and
scrapes on Godwin’s back and on the back of Godwin’s legs that were
consistent with the dragging of the body.  Additionally, Godwin’s face
exhibited scrapes and extensive bruising around the eyes and nose resulting
from blunt-force trauma inflicted while Godwin was still alive.  Internal
bleeding and hemorrhaging in the tissues of the neck indicated that Godwin
had been choked before she was stabbed.  Vaginal smears revealed the
presence of intact sperm.  Godwin’s right hand had been sawed off at the
forearm; and Godwin’s left hand had been partially sawed off, then the bone
had been forcibly broken or snapped.  The contents of Godwin’s stomach
indicated that Godwin had eaten her last meal within four or five hours of
her death.
Additional facts will be presented as needed to discuss specific
issues.
PRETRIAL ISSUES
[1] In his first assignment of error, defendant contends that he was
denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution.  Defendant also contends
that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel as a result of defense counsel’s failure to assert defendant’s
right to a speedy trial.
Before trial defense counsel filed various motions seeking to compel
discovery from the State; and defendant filed several pro se motions,
including a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  At a pretrial hearing on
26 February 1997, defendant clarified for the trial court that his request
for a writ of habeas corpus was based on his inability to prepare for trial
without discovery from the State; and defendant mentioned that he had been
denied his right to a speedy trial.  However, defense counsel never
demanded a speedy trial, nor did counsel file a motion to dismiss for
failure to provide a speedy trial.
Having elected for representation by appointed defense counsel,
defendant cannot also file motions on his own behalf or attempt to
represent himself.  Defendant has no right to appear both by himself and by
counsel.  See N.C.G.S. § 1-11 (1999); State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 61, 277
S.E.2d 410, 415 (1981), disavowed on other grounds by State v. Freeman, 314
N.C. 432, 437-38, 333 S.E.2d 743, 746-47 (1985); State v. Phillip, 261 N.C.
263, 268, 134 S.E.2d 386, 391, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003, 12 L. Ed. 2d
1052 (1964).  Thus, defendant waived appellate review of this issue by
failing to properly raise the constitutional issue in the trial court.  See
State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 237, 481 S.E.2d 44, 73, cert. denied, 522
U.S. 876, 139 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1997), and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1024, 140 L.
Ed. 2d 473 (1998).
Assuming arguendo that the speedy trial issue was raised in the trial
court, defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.  In Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 117 (1972), the United States
Supreme Court identified four factors “which courts should assess in
determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right”
to a speedy trial under the federal Constitution.  These factors are: 
(i) the length of delay, (ii) the reason for the delay, (iii) the
defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (iv) whether the
defendant has suffered prejudice as a result of the delay.  See id.; see
also State v. Flowers, 347 N.C. 1, 27, 489 S.E.2d 391, 406 (1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1135, 140 L. Ed. 2d 150 (1998).  We follow the same
analysis when reviewing such claims under Article I, Section 18 of the
North Carolina Constitution.  See Flowers, 347 N.C. at 27, 489 S.E.2d at
406; State v. Jones, 310 N.C. 716, 721, 314 S.E.2d 529, 532-33 (1984).
First, the length of the delay is not per se determinative of whether
the defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial.  See State
v. Webster, 337 N.C. 674, 678, 447 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1994).  The United
States Supreme Court has found postaccusation delay “presumptively
prejudicial” as it approaches one year.  Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S.
647, 652 n.1, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520, 528 n.1 (1992).  However, presumptive
prejudice “does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of
prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay
unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.”  Id.  In this case the
length of delay, from indictment to trial, was 3 years and 326 days.  This
delay is clearly enough to trigger examination of the other factors.
Second, defendant has the burden of showing that the delay was caused
by the neglect or willfulness of the prosecution.  See Webster, 337 N.C. at
679, 447 S.E.2d at 351.  Here, defendant contends that the State willfully
refused to comply with discovery despite representations to the trial court
that it would proceed with discovery in a timely manner.  However, the
record does not reveal that the delay resulted from willful misconduct by
the State.  To the contrary, the record shows numerous causes for the
delay, including the appointment of substitute defense counsel in June of
1994 and changes in the prosecutors who were handling the case. 
Additionally, although defense counsel filed numerous discovery requests
and motions contending that the State refused to proceed with discovery in
a timely manner, the record indicates that defendant repeatedly requested
discovery of evidence or information to which he was not statutorily
entitled; and the State expeditiously complied with discovery orders issued
by the trial court.  Finally and most significantly, in 1996, nearly two
years after indictment, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw as a
result of defendant’s continued refusal to cooperate in the preparation of
his defense.  Thus, much of the delay was attributable to defendant’s
unwillingness to cooperate with his attorneys in preparation for trial.  “A
criminal defendant who has caused or acquiesced in a delay will not be
permitted to use it as a vehicle in which to escape justice.”  State v.
Tindall, 294 N.C. 689, 695-96, 242 S.E.2d 806, 810 (1978).
Third, as stated above, defense counsel never filed any motions
asserting defendant’s right to a speedy trial.  On 26 February 1997, nearly
three years after his indictment, defendant himself mentioned the right to
a speedy trial in the context of discussing with the trial court his
request for a writ of habeas corpus.  Defendant’s failure to assert his
right to a speedy trial, or his failure to assert his right sooner in the
process, does not foreclose his speedy trial claim, but does weigh against
his contention that he has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy
trial.  See Webster, 337 N.C. at 680, 447 S.E.2d at 352.
Fourth, in considering whether the defendant has been prejudiced
because of a delay between indictment and trial, this Court noted that a
speedy trial serves “‘(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration;
(ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the
possibility that the defense will be impaired.’”  Id. at 681, 447 S.E.2d at
352 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118).
Defendant has failed to show that he suffered significant prejudice as
a result of the delay.  Defendant contends that two material witnesses,
Shirley Johnson and Tony Mauldin, became unavailable by reason of the
delay.  Defendant contends that he was unable to confront these witnesses,
whose hearsay statements were introduced at trial by the State.  However,
defendant rebutted the State’s hearsay statement from Johnson by
introducing a hearsay statement that Johnson made to defendant’s
investigator; and although defense counsel indicated that defendant would
similarly rebut the State’s hearsay statement from Mauldin, defendant never
actually attempted to introduce any hearsay statements from Mauldin.
Defendant also contends that he was prejudiced by “prolonged and
oppressive pretrial incarceration.”  Defendant argues that he suffered
anxiety and concern as the result of the delay.  Defendant cites his
outbursts during trial and his refusal to allow mitigating evidence at the
capital sentencing proceeding as evidence of his anxiety and concern. 
However, nothing in the record supports defendant’s contention that his
disruptive behavior resulted from his prolonged incarceration; but the
timing of these outbursts permits the inference that defendant’s actions
were calculated to intimidate State’s witnesses as they testified on voir
dire.  Likewise, defendant’s refusal to present mitigating evidence during
the capital sentencing proceeding did not stem from incarceration, as the
record indicates that defendant refused to cooperate with his attorneys
from the outset.
After balancing the four factors set forth above, we hold that
defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has not been violated.
[2] Defendant also contends that he was deprived of his constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel as a result of defense counsel’s
failure to assert defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.  A
defendant’s right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of
counsel.  See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14, 25 L. Ed. 2d
763, 773 n.14 (1970).  When a defendant attacks his conviction on the basis
that counsel was ineffective, he must show that his counsel’s conduct fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.  See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984).  In order
to meet this burden, defendant must satisfy a two-part test:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.  This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.
Id. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693.
In this case, defendant cannot satisfy this two-part test.  Even
assuming arguendo that defense counsel erred by failing to assert
defendant’s right to a speedy trial, defendant cannot show that he suffered
any prejudice.  Defendant argues that defense counsel’s deficient
performance deprived him of the dismissal to which he was entitled. 
However, as explained above, defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy
trial was not violated; and defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of
the charges against him.  Thus, after examining the record we conclude that
there is no reasonable probability that the alleged error of defense
counsel affected the outcome of the trial.  See State v. Braswell, 312 N.C.
553, 563, 324 S.E.2d 241, 249 (1985).  This assignment of error is
overruled.
[3] Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by denying
defendant’s motion to suppress the DNA evidence and motion in limine to
exclude the DNA evidence.  Defendant argues that any probative value of the
State’s DNA evidence was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. 
Defendant also contends that he was deprived of his right to effective
assistance of counsel as a result of defense counsel’s failure to ensure
the reliability of the State’s DNA testing results through observation of
the State’s testing procedures.  We disagree.
In this case the trial court, at a pretrial hearing, denied
defendant’s motion to suppress DNA evidence and motion in limine.  During
trial the State called State Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”) Special Agent
Mark Boodee to testify as an expert witness.  Defendant objected three
times during Special Agent Boodee’s testimony.  The trial court overruled
defendant’s objection to the State’s question concerning the percentage of
cases in which Special Agent Boodee declared a match and to the State’s
question about the percentage of the population excluded by the DNA tests
performed in this case.  The trial court sustained defendant’s objection to
and allowed defendant’s motion to strike Special Agent Boodee’s testimony
that his boss and another analyst reviewed his test results.  However,
defendant never objected to the admissibility of the State’s DNA evidence
or to Special Agent Boodee’s testimony regarding the probability of
selecting someone other than defendant with the same DNA profile as the
sample obtained from the victim’s body.
We have previously stated that a motion in limine is not sufficient to
preserve for appeal the question of admissibility of evidence if the
defendant does not object to that evidence at the time it is offered at
trial.  See State v. Hayes, 350 N.C. 79, 80, 511 S.E.2d 302, 303 (1999)
(per curiam).  We have also held that a pretrial motion to suppress, a type
of motion in limine, is not sufficient to preserve for appeal the issue of
admissibility of evidence.  See State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 405, 533
S.E.2d 168, 198 (2000).  Thus, defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress and
motion in limine are not sufficient to preserve for appeal the question of
the admissibility of the State’s DNA evidence; and defendant waived
appellate review of this issue by failing to object during trial to the
admission of the DNA evidence.  Additionally, while defendant’s assignment
of error includes plain error as an alternative, he does not specifically
argue in his brief that there is plain error in the instant case. 
Accordingly, defendant’s argument is not properly before this Court.  See
N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4); Golphin, 352 N.C. at 405, 533 S.E.2d at 198-99;
State v. McNeil, 350 N.C. 657, 681, 518 S.E.2d 486, 501 (1999), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 146 L. Ed. 2d 321 (2000).
[4] Defendant further contends that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel due to the State’s bad faith conduct, as a result of
which defense counsel failed to ensure the reliability of the State’s DNA
testing results by requesting an opportunity to observe the State’s
procedures.  We disagree.
The SBI began testing the DNA samples from this case on 7 March 1994
and completed the testing procedures on 22 August 1994.  The entire male
DNA sample collected from the victim’s body was consumed during the
extraction process done by the SBI on 7 March 1994.  At a 15 April 1994
pretrial hearing, the trial court entered a verbal order that the DNA
samples for this case should be preserved by the SBI pending trial to
provide defendant with an opportunity for independent testing.  The trial
court declined to order disclosure of the SBI’s DNA testing and
preservation methods.  Instead, the trial court instructed the State to
confer with the SBI about the possibility that the SBI could discuss and
mutually agree upon proper testing and preservation methods with
defendant’s expert witness.  However, the trial court did not order, and
defense counsel did not request, that the SBI provide defendant with the
opportunity to have a defense expert observe the SBI’s testing procedures. 
At a hearing on 8 September 1994 the State informed defense counsel and the
trial court that the entire male DNA sample collected from the victim’s
body was consumed in the SBI’s testing procedure.
Defendant asserts that the State’s failure to inform defense counsel
that the male DNA sample had been consumed until 8 September 1994, after
the SBI had completed the DNA testing, rendered defense counsel ineffective
in that defense counsel was precluded from making a timely request to
observe the SBI’s remaining testing procedures.  As we explained above, to
establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must
show “that counsel’s performance was deficient” and “that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.
Ed. 2d at 693.
In this case, defendant cannot satisfy this two-part test.  First,
defendant has failed to show that defense counsel’s performance was
deficient, instead basing his claim on the State’s failure to apprise
defense counsel of the SBI’s progress in testing the DNA samples.  Further,
although defendant challenges the conclusions reached by Special Agent
Boodee, defendant does not contend that the SBI employed incorrect testing
procedures or that those procedures were conducted improperly.  Therefore,
after examining the record, we conclude that there is no reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial was affected by the State’s
failure to apprise defense counsel of the SBI’s progress or by defense
counsel’s failure to request an opportunity to observe the SBI’s testing
procedures.  See Braswell, 312 N.C. at 563, 324 S.E.2d at 249.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
By assignments of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred
in denying his challenges for cause of prospective jurors John Chavis and
Spencer Jones and juror Donald Dean on the basis of their inability to
render a fair and impartial verdict.  We disagree.
During jury selection the trial court denied defendant’s challenges
for cause as to jurors Chavis and Jones, and defendant used a peremptory
challenge to remove juror Chavis.  Defendant used his final peremptory
challenge to remove juror Jones.  Defendant then made a general renewal of
his objections to the trial court’s rulings excusing jurors.  The trial
court denied defendant’s renewed objections and his request for an
additional peremptory challenge.  As defendant had exhausted his peremptory
challenges, the trial court subsequently seated juror Dean after denying
defendant’s challenge for cause.  Defendant then renewed “each of the
challenges” for cause, and defendant specifically renewed his earlier
challenge for cause to juror Jones.  The trial court again denied
defendant’s renewed objections and his request for an additional peremptory
challenge.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212 sets forth the grounds for challenging a juror,
including the ground that the juror, for any other cause, is unable to
render a fair and impartial verdict.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212(9) (1999). 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214 provides that a defendant may seek reversal of the
trial judge’s refusal to allow a challenge for cause provided the defendant
has exhausted his peremptory challenges, has renewed his challenge, and has
had his renewal motion denied.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(h) (1999).
In this case, defendant complied with the requirements of N.C.G.S. §
15A-1214(h) by specifically renewing his challenge for cause as to juror
Jones.  However, defendant failed to specifically renew his motions for
cause as to jurors Dean and Chavis.  Instead, defendant made a general
renewal of his prior challenges for cause; and defendant’s requests for
additional peremptory challenges do not bolster his general renewal of his
challenges for cause.  See State v. Roseboro, 351 N.C. 536, 544, 528 S.E.2d
1, 7 (2000) (holding that the defendant’s request for an additional
peremptory challenge was insufficient to renew his earlier challenge for
cause).  Thus, defendant failed to follow the mandatory statutory procedure
to preserve for appellate review his exception to the rulings on his
challenges for cause of jurors Dean and Chavis.
Assuming arguendo that defendant’s general renewal of his challenges
for cause preserved for appellate review the trial court’s rulings as to
jurors Dean and Chavis, we find defendant’s assignments of error without
merit.  The determination of whether to grant a challenge for cause rests
in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent
a showing of abuse of that discretion.  See State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428,
441-42, 509 S.E.2d 178, 188 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 145 L. Ed.
2d 80 (1999); State v. Hartman, 344 N.C. 445, 458, 476 S.E.2d 328, 335
(1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1201, 137 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1997).  In addition
to abuse of discretion, defendant must show prejudice to establish
reversible error concerning voir dire.  See Trull, 349 N.C. at 442, 509
S.E.2d at 188.
[5] First, defendant maintains that the trial court should have
excused prospective juror John Chavis on the basis that Chavis would vote
for the death penalty if the jury found defendant guilty of the charges. 
Chavis gave unequivocal responses to the prosecutor’s questions about his
ability to consider both the death penalty and life imprisonment.  However,
defendant then engaged Chavis in a lengthy dialog about whether Chavis
believed that the death penalty would be the only appropriate punishment if
defendant was convicted of all the charges.  Chavis’ answers varied between
a willingness to consider life imprisonment and the belief that the death
penalty was the only appropriate punishment in this case.  Chavis
ultimately agreed that his ability to consider life imprisonment upon a
conviction of first-degree murder would be substantially impaired by the
answers that he had given.  Defendant then challenged Chavis for cause, and
the trial court permitted the prosecutor and defendant to ask Chavis some
additional questions.  In response to the follow-up questions, Chavis
explained that he had been confused by defendant’s earlier questions; and
Chavis unequivocally indicated that he could remain a fair and impartial
juror, could follow the law concerning the burden of proof and presumption
of innocence, and could consider both sentencing options.  On this record
defendant has failed to demonstrate an abuse of the trial court’s
discretion in denying the challenge for cause as to prospective juror
Chavis.
[6] Second, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to
remove prospective juror Spencer Jones for cause based on:  (i) his
relationship with the victim, the victim’s father, and the victim’s uncles;
(ii) his relationship with State witnesses Kevin Blades and Kevin Wallace;
and (iii) his participation in a pretrial protest of the delay in bringing
this case to trial.  The transcript reveals that Jones knew who the victim
was but that they were not friends.  Additionally, Jones knew the victim’s
family through his father, who was a friend of the victim’s father and
uncles.  Jones had no intention of getting involved in the protest of this
case, but he ended up at the protest because he was spending the day with
his father.  Jones unequivocally stated that his knowledge of the victim
and her family members would not affect his ability to render a fair and
impartial verdict and that he had no opinion about defendant’s guilt or
innocence.  Further, Jones explained that he had been a friend of State
witnesses Kevin Blades and Kevin Wallace in the past; that he considered
them to be honest people; and that he would tend to believe their
testimony.  However, Jones also explained that he could fairly and
impartially assess the credibility of a stranger’s testimony.  Thus, Jones’
responses do not demonstrate that he could not return a verdict in
accordance with the law of North Carolina.  The trial court heard
prospective juror Jones’ responses, observed his demeanor, assessed his
credibility, and in its discretion, made the decision to reject defendant’s
for-cause challenge.  Again, on this record, defendant has failed to show
an abuse of discretion.
[7] Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying
his challenge for cause to juror Donald Dean on the basis of his personal
relationship with several of the law enforcement officers who were
prospective witnesses for the State.  Dean was a friend of Scotland County
Sheriff Wayne Bryant and was acquainted with several other law enforcement
officers, mainly through athletic events.  However, Sheriff Bryant did not
testify as a witness in this case; and Dean’s unequivocal responses
indicated that he could remain a fair and impartial juror, could base his
decision only on the evidence presented in this case, and would not give
any greater weight to the testimony of these prospective witnesses.  Thus,
defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the challenge for cause as to juror Dean.  These
assignments of error are overruled.
GUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE
[8] By assignments of error, defendant contends that the trial court
committed reversible error in overruling his objections to testimony about
and to a drawing of a knife that defendant allegedly possessed.  Defendant
also contends that the trial court committed reversible error in denying
his motion to suppress a hacksaw frame and three hacksaw blades.  Defendant
argues that, because the State failed to associate the knife, the hacksaw
frame, or the hacksaw blades with the commission of the offense, the items
bore absolutely no relevance to whether defendant committed the offense and
should have been excluded.  We disagree.
This Court has previously explained the applicable standard of
relevance concerning the admissibility of a possible murder weapon:
Under our rules of evidence, unless otherwise provided, all
relevant evidence is admissible.  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 402
(1988).  “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.”  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401
(1988).  In criminal cases, “‘[e]very circumstance that is
calculated to throw any light upon the supposed crime is
admissible.  The weight of such evidence is for the jury.’” 
State v. Whiteside, 325 N.C. 389, 397, 383 S.E.2d 911, 915 (1989)
(quoting State v. Hamilton, 264 N.C. 277, 286-87, 141 S.E.2d 506,
513 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1020, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1044
(1966)).
State v. Felton, 330 N.C. 619, 638, 412 S.E.2d 344, 356 (1992), quoted in
State v. DeCastro, 342 N.C. 667, 680-81, 467 S.E.2d 653, 659, cert. denied,
519 U.S. 896, 136 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1996).  In DeCastro, this Court held that
the trial court properly admitted into evidence a knife found three months
after the murder in a pond some distance away from the crime scene.  See
DeCastro, 342 N.C. at 682, 467 S.E.2d at 659.  Although the knife had no
bloodstains and was not tested for fingerprints, the medical examiner
opined “that some of the fatal knife wounds found on both victims were
consistent with the length and width of the knife and that the knife could
have been one of the murder weapons.”  Id. at 681, 467 S.E.2d at 660.  We
noted that the lapse in time in finding the knife and the distance of the
knife from the crime scene affected the weight or probative value of the
evidence, not its admissibility.  Id. at 682, 467 S.E.2d at 660; see also
Felton, 330 N.C. at 638, 412 S.E.2d at 356 (failure of State’s expert to
match conclusively four bullets to the gun that fired the fatal bullet
affected the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence).
In this case, State witness Chad Miller described a pocketknife that
defendant frequently carried with him.  Miller described defendant’s knife
as having a blade approximately three and one-half inches in length. 
Miller also identified a drawing that he had made of defendant’s
pocketknife.  State witnesses Hope Norton and Scotland County Deputy
Sheriff Randy Jacobs subsequently testified that defendant possessed a
pocketknife, and both witnesses indicated that defendant’s knife was
similar to the pocketknife drawn by Miller.  Additionally, Deputy Jacobs
testified that the blade of defendant’s knife was approximately one-half
inch to one inch wide and three to four inches long.  Finally, the medical
examiner who conducted the victim’s autopsy testified that the stab wounds
found on the victim’s body measured approximately .3 to .5 inches wide and
were, at most, four to five inches deep.  The medical examiner concluded
that the stab wounds would be consistent with a pocketknife if the
pocketknife was the approximate size and shape of the wounds.
Because the witnesses’ descriptions of the approximate size of
defendant’s pocketknife overlap with the medical examiner’s testimony
regarding the approximate depth and width of the victim’s wounds, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling defendant’s
objections to the drawing of and testimony about the knife.  Defendant’s
argument concerning the slight variance in size between the knife described
by the witnesses and the medical examiner’s description of the victim’s
wounds merely affects the weight or probative value of the evidence, not
its admissibility.
[9] Similarly, defendant’s argument that the hacksaw frame and hacksaw
blades were not relevant in this case is without merit.  At the hearing on
the motion to suppress, Detective Paul Lemmond of the Scotland County
Sheriff’s Department testified that he found an old adjustable hacksaw
frame lying on the ground near the location where the victim’s severed hand
had been discovered.  Detective Lemmond also recovered a package of three
hacksaw blades from a storage building at the residence of defendant’s
parents.  Detective Lemmond never measured the hacksaw frame or tried to
insert the seized hacksaw blades into the recovered frame; instead,
Detective Lemmond submitted the hacksaw frame and blades to the SBI for
testing.  Former SBI Special Agent Mark Gavin, an expert in forensic tool-
mark examination, subsequently examined the seized hacksaw frame and
hacksaw blades.  Although Special Agent Gavin did not find any
fingerprints, blood, or bone fragments on the hacksaw blades seized by
Detective Lemmond, he concluded that the victim’s right hand was severed by
a saw with relatively small teeth, consistent with those found on the
seized hacksaw blades.
Based on the proximity of the hacksaw frame to the location of the
victim’s severed hand and the expert witness’ conclusions that the victim’s
right hand was severed by a hacksaw blade similar to those seized from the
residence of defendant’s parents, we conclude that the trial court did not
err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the hacksaw frame and three
hacksaw blades.  Defendant’s arguments regarding the lack of fingerprints
on the hacksaw frame, the lack of evidence that the seized blades could be
fitted into the rusty hacksaw frame, and the common availability of hacksaw
blades merely affect the weight or probative value of the evidence, not its
admissibility.
Defendant also argues that the prejudicial effect of this evidence
substantially outweighed its probative impact and that the trial court
should have excluded it under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403.  The decision to
exclude relevant evidence under Rule 403 lies within the trial court’s
discretion.  See Felton, 330 N.C. at 638, 412 S.E.2d at 356.  As noted
above, three State witnesses described a pocketknife owned by defendant
that was consistent with the width and depth of the stab wounds found on
the victim’s body; and this pocketknife circumstantially connects defendant
to the murder.  Further, the hacksaw frame was discovered near the victim’s
severed hand; and the expert witness concluded that the victim’s hand was
severed with a hacksaw blade similar to the seized blades.  Thus, we cannot
conclude that there was unfair prejudice to defendant substantially
outweighing the probative value of this evidence, such that the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing its admission.  These assignments of
error are overruled.
[10] By his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the
trial court erred in failing to suppress blood, hair, and saliva samples
taken from him pursuant to a search warrant authorizing the State to seize
blood, hair, and saliva samples.  Defendant argues that the State should
have seized this evidence pursuant to a nontestimonial identification order
obtained under article 14 of chapter 15A of the General Statutes and that
the State should have accorded him the right to counsel as provided by
those statutes.  Defendant further contends that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel as a result of defense counsel’s failure to
object to the procedures by which the State obtained DNA samples from
defendant.  We disagree.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. Const. amend.
IV.  The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See State v. Watkins, 337 N.C.
437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1994).  Similarly, the Constitution of the
State of North Carolina provides that “[g]eneral warrants, whereby any
officer or other person may be commanded to search suspected places without
evidence of the act committed, or to seize any person or persons not named,
whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are
dangerous to liberty and shall not be granted.”  N.C. Const. art. I, § 20.
The invasion of a person’s body to seize blood, saliva, and hair
samples is the most intrusive type of search; and a warrant authorizing the
seizure of such evidence must be based upon probable cause to believe the
blood, hair, and saliva samples constitute evidence of an offense or the
identity of a person who participated in the crime.  See N.C.G.S. §
15A-242(4) (1999); State v. Dickens, 346 N.C. 26, 37, 484 S.E.2d 553,
558-59 (1997).  In contrast, a nontestimonial identification order
authorized by article 14 of chapter 15A of the General Statutes of North
Carolina is an investigative tool requiring a lower standard of suspicion
that is available for the limited purpose of identifying the perpetrator of
a crime.  See State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578, 584, 342 S.E.2d 789, 792
(1986).  Under N.C.G.S. § 15A-273 a judge may issue a nontestimonial
identification order on an affidavit which establishes (i) that there is
probable cause to believe that a felony offense or a class A1 or class 1
misdemeanor has been committed, (ii) that there are reasonable grounds to
suspect that the person named or described in the affidavit committed the
offense, and (iii) that the results will be of material aid in determining
whether that particular person committed the offense.  Additionally,
although the constitutional right to counsel does not apply to Fourth
Amendment searches and seizures, see, e.g., State v. Warren, 348 N.C. 80,
95-97, 499 S.E.2d 431, 439-40 (explaining that an alleged defendant has the
right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment during custodial interrogation
and that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches once adversary
judicial proceedings have been initiated), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 915, 142
L. Ed. 2d 216 (1998), the General Assembly created a statutory right to the
presence of counsel during any nontestimonial identification procedure for
persons subject to a nontestimonial identification order, see N.C.G.S. §
15A-279(d) (1999).
In this case the trial court issued a search warrant on 22 February
1994 authorizing the State to seize blood, hair, and saliva samples from
defendant.  The affidavit signed by Detective Lemmond contained ample
evidence to support issuance of the warrant, inter alia:  (i) that the
victim’s severed hand was discovered on the roof of a store; (ii) that
Detective Lemmond located a hacksaw frame near the location of the severed
hand; (iii) that hacksaw blades consistent in size with the hacksaw frame
were seized from the residence of defendant’s parents, where defendant
occasionally resides; (iv) that, in the medical examiner’s opinion, the
victim’s right hand was severed by a tool consistent with a hacksaw;
(v) that witnesses had seen defendant outside the victim’s home on the
night of her murder and, later, running away from the area where the
severed hand and hacksaw were discovered; (vi) that the medical examiner
found semen in the victim’s vagina; (vii) that evidence at the crime scene
suggested that the victim had struggled; (viii) that defendant had numerous
scratches and cuts on his legs, face, and neck; and (ix) that defendant had
a history of committing sexual offenses.  The cumulative effect of this
information establishes that the blood, hair, and saliva samples seized
from defendant provide evidence of the offense and the identity of the
person participating in the crime.  Accordingly, probable cause existed to
support issuance of the search warrant; and the State was not required to
obtain a nontestimonial identification order or to provide defendant with
the right to counsel during the execution of the search warrant.
Furthermore, defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
must fail.  Defendant cannot show “that counsel’s performance was
deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693.  The State properly
obtained a search warrant, and defendant was not entitled to the presence
of counsel during the execution of that warrant.  Thus, there is no
possibility that the outcome of the trial would have been affected if
defense counsel had objected to the State’s procedures.  See Braswell, 312
N.C. at 563, 324 S.E.2d at 249.  This assignment of error is overruled.
[11] Next, defendant assigns error to the trial court’s ruling
allowing the State’s motion in limine to preclude defendant from eliciting
from the State’s expert witness testimony about DNA testing performed on
other individuals.  Defendant argues that the DNA testing of other
individuals was clearly relevant to a crucial issue in the case, namely,
whether defendant, not some other person, was in fact the perpetrator of
the crime.  Defendant also contends that the excluded evidence casts doubt
upon this fundamental aspect of the State’s case in that continued testing
of other suspects reflected a weakness in the State’s evidence that
defendant was the perpetrator.  Thus, considering that the State’s case
against defendant, other than DNA evidence, was based entirely on
circumstantial evidence, the trial court’s error in allowing the State’s
motion in limine was prejudicial error entitling defendant to a new trial. 
We disagree.
In this case defendant made a motion in limine seeking to exclude the
results of DNA testing performed on Tony Mauldin; Chad Miller; Kevin
Morgan; and the victim’s fiancé, Michael McDaniel.  The trial court allowed
the motion as to Mauldin, Miller, and Morgan on the basis that the evidence
was not relevant.  Defendant then withdrew the motion against the advice of
defense counsel.  Prior to cross-examination of the State’s expert witness,
the State made a motion in limine to exclude the DNA testing results for
Mauldin, Miller, and Morgan on the bases that the evidence was not relevant
and that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial value.  The trial court allowed the State’s motion.
Under Rule 401 evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.”  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (1999).  Relevant evidence is
generally admissible, and in criminal cases “any evidence calculated to
throw any light upon the crime charged” should be admitted by the trial
court.  See State v. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 104, 322 S.E.2d 110, 118
(1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009, 85 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1985).
Even assuming arguendo that the evidence in question was relevant,
defendant cannot show that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the
trial court’s ruling.  The DNA testing results excluded Mauldin, Miller,
and Morgan as perpetrators of the crime.  Given this circumstance, the
evidence would have only highlighted the DNA match between defendant and
the sample collected from the victim’s body.  Accordingly, defendant cannot
demonstrate a reasonable possibility that, absent the trial court’s ruling,
a different result would have been reached at the trial.  See N.C.G.S. §
15A-1443(c) (1999).  This assignment of error is overruled.
[12] In his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the
trial court erred in admitting evidence of past acts of violence against
Judy Caulder, Elizabeth Johnson, Amber Smith, Rose Smith, and Hope Norton. 
Defendant argues that the evidence was inadmissible under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1,
Rule 404(b) and that its probative value, if any, was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to defendant under N.C.G.S. §
8C-1, Rule 403.  The crux of defendant’s argument is that acts of violence
committed against these witnesses have nothing to do with the murder of the
victim.
In this case defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of
past acts of violence against Caulder, Johnson, Amber Smith, Rose Smith,
and Norton.  The trial court, after hearing voir dire testimony from each
of the witnesses, denied defendant’s motion, concluding that the prior acts
were sufficiently similar to this case and not too remote in time so as to
be admissible under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b).  The State then elicited
testimony on direct examination from each of the women about past acts of
violence committed by defendant.  Defendant never objected to the
admissibility of the State’s Rule 404(b) evidence or to the witnesses’
testimony regarding the acts of domestic violence and sexual violence
committed against them by defendant.
As stated earlier, a motion in limine is not sufficient to preserve
for appeal the question of admissibility of evidence if the defendant does
not object to that evidence at the time it is offered at trial.  See Hayes,
350 N.C. at 80, 511 S.E.2d at 303.  Thus, defendant’s pretrial motion in
limine is not sufficient to preserve for appeal the question of the
admissibility of the State’s Rule 404(b) evidence; and defendant waived
appellate review of this issue by failing to object during trial to the
admission of the evidence of prior bad acts.  Additionally, while
defendant’s assignment of error includes plain error as an alternative, he
“provides no explanation, analysis or specific contention in his brief
supporting the bare assertion that the claimed error is so fundamental that
justice could not have been done.”  State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 636,
536 S.E.2d 36, 61 (2000).  Accordingly, defendant’s argument is not
properly before this Court.  See N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4); Cummings, 352
N.C. at 637, 536 S.E.2d at 61; Golphin, 352 N.C. at 405, 533 S.E.2d at
198-99; McNeil, 350 N.C. at 681, 518 S.E.2d at 501.  This assignment of
error is overruled.
[13] Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to
order an independent psychiatric evaluation pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002
when defendant’s capacity to proceed was raised by defense counsel at
trial.  We disagree.
The transcript reveals that defense counsel twice raised the issue of
defendant’s capacity to proceed with trial.  Defense counsel cited
defendant’s refusal to present mitigating evidence during the capital
sentencing proceeding as evidence of defendant’s incapacity.  At an ex
parte hearing on 15 April 1998, defendant explained that he did not need a
psychiatric evaluation and that he had refused to cooperate with defense
counsel in preparing mitigation evidence for the sentencing proceeding
because he was innocent of these charges and, if found guilty, would rather
be dead than spend the rest of his life in prison.  Defendant also
explained his frequent outbursts at trial as his spontaneous reactions when
witnesses lied during their testimony.  The trial court then ruled that
defendant had been fully advised by counsel, that defendant understood his
rights, and that defendant had made a conscious decision not to have an
independent psychiatric evaluation.  At the beginning of the capital
sentencing proceeding, defense counsel again filed an ex parte motion for
an independent competency evaluation.  The trial court concluded that
defendant understood the nature of the proceedings and that defendant had
assisted in and directed his own defense throughout the trial.  Further,
the trial court noted that defendant refused to cooperate with an
independent evaluation; and the trial court denied defense counsel’s motion
for an independent evaluation.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1001 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a)  No person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or
punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect
he is unable to understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation in
reference to the proceedings, or to assist in his defense in a
rational or reasonable manner.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1001(a) (1999).  A trial court may order a mental health
evaluation of a defendant when that defendant’s capacity to proceed is
questioned.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(b)(1) (1999).  The trial court has the
power on its own motion to order such an evaluation as part of an inquiry
into the defendant’s capacity to proceed.  See State v. Rich, 346 N.C. 50,
60-61, 484 S.E.2d 394, 401, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1002, 139 L. Ed. 2d 412
(1997).  Where a defendant demonstrates or where matters before the trial
court indicate that there is a significant possibility that a defendant is
incompetent to proceed with trial, the trial court must appoint an expert
or experts to inquire into the defendant’s mental health in accord with
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1002(b)(1).  See id. at 61, 484 S.E.2d at 401.
Defendant points to nothing in the record in the present case,
however, tending to indicate that he was incompetent to proceed with trial. 
Our review of the record discloses that defendant was adamant and
unequivocal about not wanting a mental-health examination; that defendant
fully understood the proceedings and his rights; that defendant assisted in
his own defense throughout trial by directing the filing of motions, the
questioning of witnesses, and the presentation of evidence; that defendant
fully understood the ramifications of his decision not to present
mitigating evidence during the sentencing proceeding; and that defendant’s
outbursts during trial occurred during the voir dire of the five Rule
404(b) witnesses, suggesting defendant’s deliberate intent to intimidate
these witnesses.  In the absence of any evidence suggesting that defendant
may have been incompetent, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
deciding not to order the evaluation.  This assignment of error is,
therefore, overruled.
[14] Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to dismiss the charges of first-degree murder, first-degree rape,
first-degree kidnapping, and robbery with a dangerous weapon.  Defendant
does not argue that these crimes did not occur; instead, defendant argues
that the State’s evidence was not sufficient to prove that he was the
perpetrator of these crimes.  We disagree.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give the State every
reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.  See State v. Lee, 348 N.C.
474, 488, 501 S.E.2d 334, 343 (1998).  The State must present substantial
evidence of each element of the offense charged.  See id.  “[T]he trial
court should consider all evidence actually admitted, whether competent or
not, that is favorable to the State.”  State v. Jones, 342 N.C. 523, 540,
467 S.E.2d 12, 23 (1996).  “If there is substantial evidence -- whether
direct, circumstantial, or both -- to support a finding that the offense
charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is
for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied,” State v.
Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 383 (1988); however, if the
evidence “is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to
either the commission of the offense or the identity of the defendant as
the perpetrator, the motion to dismiss must be allowed,” State v. Malloy,
309 N.C. 176, 179, 305 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1983).
In this case the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
State, shows that on the evening of the victim’s disappearance, defendant
stood near the victim’s home at a place where he could look into her
window.  The victim was last seen alive around 10:00 p.m. on 14 February
1994 standing with defendant on a street corner.  Around 1:00 a.m.
defendant was nearly hit by a car while running away from the location
where police later discovered the victim’s severed hand.  Defendant
returned home the next morning with a scratched face, with a bleeding cut
on his arm, and without the jacket that he frequently wore.  Defendant then
gave several inconsistent explanations for the scratches and bleeding cut
on his arm.  Defendant further told his girlfriend that he had thrown his
coat away; that he had buried his other clothes which he had taken from his
girlfriend’s house; and that the police would never know where the clothes
were.  The State’s evidence further showed that defendant’s DNA matched the
sperm found inside the victim’s vagina; that the stab wounds on the
victim’s body were consistent in size and shape with a knife that defendant
regularly carried; and that the victim’s right hand had been severed by a
hacksaw with a blade designed exactly like the hacksaw blades seized from
the residence of defendant’s parents where defendant lived from time to
time.  Finally, about one month after the murder, defendant appeared at a
friend’s house wanting to sell the friend a VCR for twenty dollars. 
Although defendant did not have the VCR with him, the friend gave defendant
twenty dollars.  Later that evening defendant called the same friend at
work and asked for money so that he could “get out of town.”  Further,
defendant had on a previous occasion commented to one of the witnesses whom
he had assaulted that he could kill her and hide her body under the pine
straw in the woods, and it would kill the odor of the body or cause the
body to deteriorate.  We hold that this evidence is sufficient to permit a
rational jury to find that defendant was the perpetrator.  This assignment
of error is overruled.
[15] Defendant next assigns error to the trial court’s action in
instructing the jury that it could consider evidence of flight in
determining defendant’s guilt.  The trial court instructed the jury as
follows:
The [S]tate contends that the defendant talked to Johnny Bailey
about assisting him in leaving town.  Evidence of flight may be
considered by you, together with all the other facts and
circumstances in this case, in determining whether the combined
circumstances amount to an admission or show of consciousness of
guilt.  However, proof of this circumstance is not sufficient in
itself to establish the defendant’s guilt.  Further, this
circumstance has no bearing on the question of whether the
defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation.  Therefore
it must not be considered by you as evidence of premeditation or
deliberation.
A flight instruction is proper where “‘some evidence in the record
reasonably support[s] the theory that defendant fled after commission of
the crime charged.’”  State v. Levan, 326 N.C. 155, 164-65, 388 S.E.2d 429,
434 (1990) (quoting State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 494, 231 S.E.2d 833, 842
(1977)).  The relevant inquiry is whether the evidence shows that defendant
left the scene of the crime and took steps to avoid apprehension.  Id. at
165, 388 S.E.2d at 429.
In this case the evidence tended to show that defendant, after killing
the victim, hid the body in pine straw in the woods, left the scene of the
crime, and returned to the home that he shared with his girlfriend, Hope
Norton.  Additionally, several weeks after the killing, defendant called
Johnny Bailey at work and asked Bailey to bring twenty dollars to him at
the bus stop.  According to Bailey, defendant sounded “a little panicked.” 
Defendant told Bailey “that they were after him” and “that he had to get
out of town.”  Bailey refused to meet defendant at the bus stop or to give
defendant any money; instead, Bailey left work and informed a law
enforcement officer about his conversation with defendant.  These facts,
taken in the light most favorable to the State, permit an inference that
defendant had a consciousness of guilt and took steps, albeit unsuccessful,
to avoid apprehension.  Thus, the trial court’s jury instruction on flight
was justified.  See State v. Reeves, 343 N.C. 111, 113, 468 S.E.2d 53, 55
(1996) (holding that the trial court properly instructed the jury on flight
where the defendant ran from the crime scene, got into a car waiting
nearby, and drove away).  Furthermore, the trial court’s instruction
correctly informed the jury that proof of flight was not sufficient by
itself to establish guilt and would not be considered as tending to show
premeditation and deliberation.  See State v. Brewton, 342 N.C. 875, 879,
467 S.E.2d 395, 398 (1996).  This assignment of error is overruled.
[16] In his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the
trial court committed prejudicial constitutional error in failing to
intervene ex mero motu at several points during the prosecution’s closing
argument.  We disagree.
Where a defendant fails to object to the closing arguments at trial,
defendant must establish that the remarks were so grossly improper that the
trial court abused its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero motu. 
“To establish such an abuse, defendant must show that the prosecutor’s
comments so infected the trial with unfairness that they rendered the
conviction fundamentally unfair.”  See State v. Davis, 349 N.C. 1, 23, 506
S.E.2d 455, 467 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1161, 144 L. Ed. 2d 219
(1999).
In this case the prosecutor first argued to the jury that defendant
“stalk[ed] the innocent, some of them children”; and the prosecutor twice
referred to defendant as “the prince of darkness” and “the King of Cobra.” 
Defendant argues that these characterizations constitute abusive and
impermissible references to defendant in that the prosecutor demonized
defendant and created a metaphor in which defendant was Satan.
This Court has stated that it is improper to compare “criminal
defendants to members of the animal kingdom.”  State v. Richardson, 342
N.C. 772, 793, 467 S.E.2d 685, 697, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 890, 136 L. Ed.
2d 160 (1996).  However, in this instance the prosecutor never compared
defendant to an animal.  Instead, the prosecutor’s references to defendant
as “the prince of darkness” and “the King of Cobra” were connected to the
evidence which suggested that defendant regularly rode his bicycle around
Laurel Hill during the night; that defendant drank King Cobra beer on the
night of the victim’s disappearance; and that a King Cobra beer bottle was
found near the victim’s residence after the murder.  In context the use of
the phrases “the prince of darkness” and “the King of Cobra” to describe
defendant was not disparaging and did not amount to satanic or demonic
references.  See State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 203, 531 S.E.2d 428, 455
(2000) (holding that the prosecutor’s description of the defendant as
“cowardly” did not warrant intervention by the trial court ex mero motu
where the evidence showed that the defendant killed a physically smaller
and weaker man).
[17] Likewise, the prosecutor’s comment that defendant “stalk[ed] the
innocent, some of them children,” was connected to the evidence which
showed that defendant had committed acts of sexual violence against three
young girls.  The State’s evidence tended to show that defendant raped Judy
Caulder when she was eleven years old, Amber Smith when she was sixteen or
seventeen years old, and Elizabeth Johnson when she was twelve or thirteen
years old.  Thus, in context, the prosecutor’s reference to defendant as a
stalker of innocent children was not a disparaging remark requiring
intervention by the trial court ex mero motu.
[18] The prosecutor also made a lengthy argument to the jury in which
the prosecutor inquired about what the victim was thinking as defendant
choked, beat, raped, mutilated, and stabbed her.  The prosecutor concluded
this argument as follows:
What was she thinking then?  Did she feel the life itself just
trickle out of her?  We don’t know.  What was she thinking?  No
doubt, if her eyes could even possibly be open at that point, no
doubt there in the pine forest in the domain of this man right
here, all those pine needles, when she looked up, no doubt those
black pine boughs looked like the black gulf into hell and she
was riding in there.
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor’s argument improperly bolstered the
allusion to defendant as demonic or satanic.
As stated above, the prosecutor did not improperly characterize
defendant as satanic or demonic.  Further, we have previously reviewed
closing arguments that suggested what a victim may have been thinking as he
or she was dying and concluded that they were not grossly improper.  See
State v. Jones, 346 N.C. 704, 714, 487 S.E.2d 714, 720 (1997); State v.
Hunt, 339 N.C. 622, 652, 457 S.E.2d 276, 294 (1994); State v. King, 299
N.C. 707, 711-13, 264 S.E.2d 40, 43-44 (1980).  Here, the prosecutor
described what the victim may have been thinking and the pain that she was
experiencing as defendant choked, beat, raped, mutilated, and stabbed her
to death.  This argument was based upon the evidence presented at trial and
reasonable inferences which could be drawn therefrom.  By making this
argument the prosecutor did not ask the jurors to put themselves in the
position of the victim.  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did
not err by failing to intervene ex mero motu.
[19] Further, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to defense counsel’s
trial strategy as “ingenuity of counsel.”  The prosecutor also argued to
the jury as follows:
I want you to think about and consider what is the role of these
two lawyers right over here, Lawyer Diehl and Lawyer Horne?  And
they are fine lawyers.  I’ve got a great deal of respect for both
of them.  They’re fine lawyers and I’m not talking about them
personally, but what is a defense counsel’s role in this case?
. . . Their job, and they’ve done a good job of it, is to take
issue with everything that happens in this courtroom,
everything. . . . Their job, and rightly so and they have done it
well, is to take the focus away from this man right here. 
They’ll talk about everything and anything other than whether or
not [defendant] committed these horrible crimes. . . . Their job
is, and they have done it well, is to create as much smoke and
fog . . . as possible.
Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly impugned the good faith
and credibility of defense counsel and that the prosecutor impermissibly
interjected into the jury argument his personal views and opinions of the
defense.
“[A] trial attorney may not make uncomplimentary comments about
opposing counsel, and should ‘refrain from abusive, vituperative, and
opprobrious language, or from indulging in invectives.’”  State v.
Sanderson, 336 N.C. 1, 10, 442 S.E.2d 33, 39 (1994) (quoting State v.
Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 659, 157 S.E.2d 335, 346 (1967)).  In this case, the
prosecutor did not use abusive, vituperative, or opprobrious language; nor
did the prosecutor impugn the integrity of defense counsel or repeatedly
attempt to diminish defense counsel before the jury.  Instead, the
prosecutor emphasized that both defense counsel were “fine lawyers,” that
he respected defense counsel, and that defense counsel had done a good job
in representing defendant.  The prosecutor never expressed a personal
opinion regarding the guilt of defendant, but merely asked the jury to find
facts and draw permissible inferences based upon the competent evidence
introduced during trial.  After reviewing the prosecutor’s argument in
context, we conclude that the prosecutor’s statements were not so grossly
improper as to require the trial court to intervene ex mero motu.  See
State v. White, 349 N.C. 535, 558, 508 S.E.2d 253, 268 (1998) (holding that
the trial court did not err by failing to intervene ex mero motu where the
prosecutor argued that it was defense counsel’s job to defend the defendant
regardless of the truth and that the lawyers were “honorable men”), cert.
denied, 527 U.S. 1026, 144 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1999); State v. Larrimore, 340
N.C. 119, 160, 456 S.E.2d 789, 811 (1995) (finding no gross impropriety in
the prosecutor’s argument that defense counsel created a smoke screen);
State v. Harris, 338 N.C. 211, 230, 449 S.E.2d 462, 472 (1994) (finding no
gross impropriety in the prosecutor’s reference to the defense strategy as
“ingenuity of counsel”).
[20] Finally, the prosecutor argued to the jury that the pocketknife
regularly carried by defendant could have been the murder weapon. 
Defendant contends that this argument was based on incompetent evidence in
that the dimensions of the knife are not consistent with the wounds on the
victim’s body.  However, as we explained earlier, the witnesses’
descriptions of the size of defendant’s pocketknife overlap with the
medical examiner’s testimony regarding the size and depth of the stab
wounds on the victim’s body.  Thus, the prosecutor made a reasonable
inference based upon the competent evidence introduced during trial; and
the trial court did not err by failing to intervene ex mero motu.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
SENTENCING PROCEEDING
[21] Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in ordering
defense counsel to defer to defendant’s wishes not to present mitigating
evidence.  Defendant also contends that the trial court by its order
deprived defendant of his constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel.  We disagree.
In this case defense counsel twice requested that the trial court
order an independent psychiatric evaluation of defendant based on
defendant’s continued refusal to cooperate with defense counsel in
preparing mitigation evidence for the sentencing proceeding.  The trial
court discussed defense counsel’s position with defendant, and defendant
reiterated that he understood his rights and the consequences of his
decision; but defendant still adamantly refused to present mitigating
evidence at the sentencing proceeding.  The trial court subsequently denied
defense counsel’s motions for an independent evaluation and ordered defense
counsel to comply with defendant’s directive not to present mitigating
evidence.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution mandate that a jury
in a capital case must “not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.”  Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 57 L. Ed.
2d 973, 990 (1978).  However, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not
require a defendant to acquiesce in a trial strategy to present mitigating
evidence where the defendant and his counsel reach an absolute impasse. 
Compare White, 349 N.C. at 567, 508 S.E.2d at 273 (holding that the
defendant was not required to present certain evidence in mitigation where
the defendant and defense counsel had reached an absolute impasse as to the
mitigating value of the evidence), with State v. Wilkinson, 344 N.C. 198,
212, 474 S.E.2d 375, 382 (1996) (holding that the trial court properly
required defense counsel to present mitigating evidence where the defendant
had expressed his desire to simplify the sentencing proceeding but had not
reached an absolute impasse with defense counsel over the presentation of
any mitigating evidence).
In general, the responsibility for tactical decisions, such as the
type of defense to present, “rests ultimately with defense counsel.”  State
v. McDowell, 329 N.C. 363, 384, 407 S.E.2d 200, 211 (1991).  However, “when
counsel and a fully informed criminal defendant client reach an absolute
impasse as to such tactical decisions, the client’s wishes must control;
this rule is in accord with the principal-agent nature of the attorney-
client relationship.”  State v. Ali, 329 N.C. 394, 404, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189
(1991).  Further, when such impasses arise, defense counsel should make a
record of the circumstances, the advice given to the defendant, the reasons
for the advice, the defendant’s decision, and the conclusion reached.  See
id.
After reviewing the transcript in this case of the discussions among
the trial court, defendant, and defense counsel, we conclude that the trial
court properly found that defendant and his counsel had reached an absolute
impasse over the tactical decision of whether to present mitigating
evidence during the capital sentencing proceeding.  Defense counsel made a
proper record of the circumstances, including their advice to defendant and
the reasons for their decision to present mitigating evidence.  From these
statements of defense counsel and defendant’s answers to questions directed
to him by the trial court, we conclude that defendant was fully informed of
and understood the potential consequences of his decision.  Thus, we hold
that the trial court did not err in prohibiting defense counsel from
presenting evidence in mitigation.
[22] Defendant further argues that he was deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel as a result of the trial court’s ruling prohibiting
defense counsel from presenting evidence in mitigation.  To establish a
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show “that
counsel’s performance was deficient” and “that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. 
Here, defendant cannot satisfy this two-part test.  First, defendant
concedes in his brief that defense counsel’s performance was not deficient,
instead basing his claim on the trial court’s ruling.  Second, as we have
concluded that the trial court did not err in precluding defense counsel
from presenting mitigating evidence, defendant cannot show that the trial
court’s ruling prejudiced his defense by rendering trial counsel’s
assistance ineffective.  This assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial
court erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu when the prosecutor made
grossly improper closing arguments.  We disagree.  Defendant did not object
to these arguments at trial.  When a defendant fails to object to an
allegedly improper closing argument, the standard of review is whether the
argument was so grossly improper that the trial court erred in failing to
intervene ex mero motu.  See Trull, 349 N.C. at 451, 509 S.E.2d at 193.  In
a capital trial, the prosecutor is given wide latitude during jury
arguments, see State v. Warren, 348 N.C. 80, 124, 499 S.E.2d 431, 456,
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 915, 142 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1998), and has a duty to
vigorously present arguments for the sentence of death using every
legitimate method, see State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243, 277, 446 S.E.2d 298,
319 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1135, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995).
[23] Defendant first argues that the prosecutor made improper
references to the possibility of parole and that the prosecutor urged the
jury to recommend the death sentence as punishment for defendant’s prior
acts of violence against Amber Smith, Rose Smith, and Hope Norton.  The
prosecutor referred to defendant’s prior conviction for attempted first-
degree rape, then argued to the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:
Lo and behold, same man, [defendant], who has sat before you all
this time, in 1980, pled guilty to the offense of attempted first
degree rape.  It went on to give the judgment in that case.  He
should be imprisoned for a term of not less than 15 years and not
more than 20 years in the custody of the Department of
Corrections.  That is disturbing information when you’re trying
to decide the fate of the man who sits over behind me.  What does
that mean when you think about it in terms of what your
recommendation should be in this case?  Justice, or at least a
judgment produced in the year 1980, and what did it turn out to
be?  That’s temporary justice for this defendant.  Temporary
justice is what that is.  Temporary justice, Ladies and
Gentlemen, will no longer suffice.  Temporary justice will not be
justice for this.  You have seen and you have heard about in
1991, you have heard about the events concerning Amber Smith. 
You’ve heard from Rose Smith and you heard from Hope Norton, and
then you heard about Valentine’s Day of 1994.  You heard all
about [the victim] in this courtroom.  Temporary justice. 
Temporary justice is what led to this.  Hasn’t [defendant] done
enough? . . . No doubt he would like to look ahead.  However long
that road may be, he would like to look ahead to another time and
another place where he can roam and he can lurk and he can prey
upon the innocent.  There’s no doubt.  But let me tell you, it’s
up to you 12 people right here and now in Scotland County to see
that such a thing does not happen again.
Defendant contends that, in this argument, the prosecutor improperly
implied that defendant was released on parole before serving the entire
prison term for his conviction of attempted first-degree rape.
This Court has consistently held that the possibility of parole is not
a proper consideration in a capital sentencing proceeding.  See, e.g.,
Warren, 348 N.C. at 122, 499 S.E.2d at 455; State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487,
520, 453 S.E.2d 824, 845, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884, 133 L. Ed. 2d 153
(1995).  However, we have considered and rejected arguments similar to that
made by defendant in this case.  See State v. Larry, 345 N.C. 497, 527-28,
481 S.E.2d 907, 925, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 917, 139 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1997). 
Here, as in Larry, the prosecutor never used the word “parole” and never
mentioned the possibility that a life sentence for this crime could mean
that defendant would eventually be released.  Instead, the prosecutor
referred to the fact that defendant committed this crime after serving a
prison term for another similar crime, implying that imprisonment had not
deterred defendant in the past.  Thus, when read in context, the
prosecutor’s argument focused on the importance of the jury’s duty and
suggested that the death penalty would specifically deter defendant from
committing future crimes, both permissible lines of argument by the
prosecutor.  See id. at 527, 481 S.E.2d at 925 (holding that the
prosecutor’s argument about the defendant’s prior convictions and terms of
imprisonment properly suggested that only the death sentence would deter
defendant from committing future crimes); see also State v. Williams, 350
N.C. 1, 28, 510 S.E.2d 626, 644 (specific deterrence arguments are proper),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 145 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1999); State v. Jones, 336
N.C. 229, 256, 443 S.E.2d 48, 61 (argument emphasizing the responsibility
and duty of each juror and of the jury as a whole was not improper), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1003, 130 L. Ed. 2d 423 (1994).
[24] Defendant also contends that the prosecutor improperly argued to
the jury that, in making closing arguments, defendant “ha[s] the
opportunity to go last[;] he has the opportunity to argue as often or,
through his counsel, he has the opportunity to argue as many times as he
chooses.”  Defendant contends that, in the context of this capital
sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor improperly implied to the jury that
defendant did not present mitigating evidence or make a closing argument
because he did not have any evidence or argument to present.  However, the
prosecutor’s argument was a proper statement of the law pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(a)(4), which provides that the defendant or defense
counsel shall have the right to the last argument.  Further, defense
counsel did not announce until after the prosecutor’s closing argument that
defendant refused to present any closing arguments.  Thus, at the time of
the prosecutor’s closing argument, the trial court could not have
definitively known that defendant would not present a closing argument; and
the trial court did not err by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the
prosecutor’s proper closing argument.  See Daniels, 337 N.C. at 278, 446
S.E.2d at 320 (holding that the trial court did not err by failing to
intervene ex mero motu where the prosecutor’s closing argument was a
correct statement of the law).  This assignment of error is overruled.
PRESERVATION ISSUES
Defendant raises nine additional issues that have previously been
decided contrary to his position by this Court:  (i) whether the trial
court erred by conducting with defense counsel and the prosecution numerous
unrecorded bench conferences outside defendant’s presence but while
defendant was present in the courtroom; (ii) whether the trial court erred
when it refused to include defendant’s requested instruction regarding
parole eligibility in its final charge to the jury; (iii) whether the trial
court’s capital sentencing jury instructions requiring defendant to prove
mitigating circumstances to the “satisfaction” of each juror adequately
guided the jury’s discretion about the requisite degree of proof;
(iv) whether the aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(9) (1999), is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (v) whether the trial court erred
in instructing the jury that it had a “duty” to impose the death penalty if
the jury failed to find that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the
aggravating circumstances; (vi) whether the trial court’s definition of
mitigating circumstances unconstitutionally limited the mitigating evidence
that the jury could consider; (vii) whether the trial court erred by
allowing the jury to refuse to give effect to mitigating evidence if the
jury deemed the evidence not to have mitigating value; (viii) whether the
trial court erred by instructing the jury that defendant has the burden of
proving the existence of mitigating circumstances; (ix) whether the death
penalty statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
Defendant raises these issues for purposes of urging this Court to
reexamine its prior holdings and also for the purpose of preserving the
issues for any possible further judicial review.  We have considered
defendant’s arguments on these issues and find no compelling reason to
depart from our prior holdings.  These assignments of error are overruled.
PROPORTIONALITY
[25] Defendant argues that the sentence of death in this case was
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary
considerations and that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the
death penalty is disproportionate.  We are required by N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(d)(2) to review the record and determine (i) whether the record
supports the jury’s findings of the aggravating circumstances upon which
the court based its death sentence; (ii) whether the sentence was imposed
under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor;
and (iii) whether the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate to
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the
defendant.  See State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 239, 433 S.E.2d 144, 161
(1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994).
After a thorough review of the transcript, record on appeal, briefs,
and oral arguments of counsel, we are convinced that the jury’s findings of
the five aggravating circumstances submitted were supported by the
evidence.  We also conclude that nothing in the record suggests that
defendant’s death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.
Finally, we must consider whether the imposition of the death penalty
in defendant’s case is proportionate to other cases in which the death
penalty has been affirmed, considering both the crime and the defendant. 
See State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 133, 443 S.E.2d 306, 334 (1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995).  The purpose of
proportionality review is “to eliminate the possibility that a person will
be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury.”  State v. Holden,
321 N.C. 125, 164-65, 362 S.E.2d 513, 537 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1061, 100 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1988).  Proportionality review also acts “[a]s a
check against the capricious or random imposition of the death penalty.” 
State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 354, 259 S.E.2d 510, 544 (1979), cert.
denied, 448 U.S. 907, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1137 (1980).  Our consideration is
limited to those cases which are roughly similar as to the crime and the
defendant, but we are not bound to cite every case used for comparison. 
See State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 400-01, 428 S.E.2d 118, 146, cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 948, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1993).  Whether the death penalty
is disproportionate “ultimately rest[s] upon the ‘experienced judgments’ of
the members of this Court.”  State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 198, 443 S.E.2d
14, 47, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994).
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder based upon
premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule.  Defendant
was also convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree kidnapping, and
robbery with a dangerous weapon.  The jury found the five aggravating
circumstances submitted:  (i) that defendant had been previously convicted
of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to another person,
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3); (ii) that the murder was committed while
defendant was engaged in the commission of first-degree rape, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(5); (iii) that the murder was committed while defendant was
engaged in the commission of first-degree kidnapping, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(5); (iv) that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain,
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(6); and (v) that the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(9).
One statutory mitigating circumstance was submitted for the jury’s
consideration:  the catchall mitigating circumstance that there existed any
circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deemed to have
mitigating value, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(9).  The jury did not find this
statutory mitigating circumstance to exist.  The trial court did not submit
any nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.
We begin our analysis by comparing this case to those cases in which
this Court has determined the sentence of death to be disproportionate. 
This Court has determined the death sentence to be disproportionate on
seven occasions.  State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988);
State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316
N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L.
Ed. 2d 177 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373
(1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill,
311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309
S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983). 
We conclude that this case is not substantially similar to any case in
which this Court has found the death penalty disproportionate.
Several characteristics in this case support the determination that
the imposition of the death penalty was not disproportionate.  First,
defendant was convicted of premeditated and deliberate murder.  We have
noted that “[t]he finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates a
more cold-blooded and calculated crime.”  State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278,
341, 384 S.E.2d 470, 506 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494
U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990).  Further, “[i]n none of the cases in
which the death penalty was found to be disproportionate has the jury found
the (e)(3) aggravating circumstance.”  State v. Peterson, 350 N.C. 518,
538, 516 S.E.2d 131, 143 (1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 145 L. Ed. 2d
1087 (2000).  “The jury’s finding of the prior conviction of a violent
felony aggravating circumstance is significant in finding a death sentence
proportionate.”  State v. Lyons, 343 N.C. 1, 27, 468 S.E.2d 204, 217, cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 894, 136 L. Ed. 2d 167 (1996).  Here, the jury found the
(e)(3) aggravating circumstance based on defendant’s previous conviction of
the violent felony of attempted first-degree rape.
We also consider cases in which this Court has found the death penalty
to be proportionate; however, “we will not undertake to discuss or cite all
of those cases each time we carry out that duty.”  McCollum, 334 N.C. at
244, 433 S.E.2d at 164.  We specifically note that this Court deemed the
death penalty proportionate in a case involving comparable facts.  See
Trull, 349 N.C. at 459, 509 S.E.2d at 198.  In Trull, the defendant
kidnapped, raped, and stabbed the victim to death, then abandoned the
victim’s body in a wooded area; and the jury subsequently found the (e)(3),
(e)(5), and (e)(9) aggravating circumstances in recommending the death
sentence.  See id. at 457-58, 509 S.E.2d at 197.  Similarly, in this case,
defendant kidnapped, raped, choked, beat, mutilated, and stabbed the victim
to death, then abandoned the victim’s body in a wooded area; and the jury
subsequently found the (e)(3), (e)(5), (e)(6), and (e)(9) aggravating
circumstances in recommending the death sentence.
Finally, this Court has deemed four statutory aggravating
circumstances, standing alone, to be sufficient to sustain death sentences;
the (e)(3), (e)(5), and (e)(9) circumstances are among them.  See State v.
Bacon, 337 N.C. 66, 110 n.8, 446 S.E.2d 542, 566 n.8 (1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1159, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1083 (1995).  Therefore, we conclude that the
present case is more similar to certain cases in which we have found the
sentence of death proportionate than to those in which we have found the
sentence disproportionate or to those in which juries have consistently
returned recommendations of life imprisonment.
We conclude that defendant received a fair trial and capital
sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error, and that the death
sentence in this case is not disproportionate.  Accordingly, the judgments
of the trial court are left undisturbed.
NO ERROR.