Case Title: Renfro v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR97-547

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ray RENFRO v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-547                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered January 29, 1998


1.   Indictment & information -- trial court erred in instructing jury that
     appellant could be found guilty under two statutory subsections not
     included in unamended criminal information. -- Where appellant was
     charged, under Ark. Code Ann.  8-6-205(a)(4) (Supp. 1995),
     with illegally disposing of solid waste on property owned by
     another person without the written permission of the owner or
     occupant of the property; where, although the prosecutor never
     amended the criminal information to include other prohibited
     conduct under Ark. Code Ann.  8-6-205, the jury was
     instructed that it could find appellant guilty of illegal
     disposal of waste if it found him guilty under any one of
     three subsections, which included, in addition to (a)(4),
     (a)(3) (disposal without a permit) and (a)(5) (creating a
     public nuisance, hazard, or polluted condition); and where the
     jury returned a verdict of guilty without specifying which
     category of conduct amounted to a violation, the supreme court
     concluded that this was error; the court had no way of knowing
     under which subsection the jury found appellant guilty.

2.   Appeal & error -- failure to object to evidence on uncharged crimes not
     pivotal point. -- Where appellant did not object to testimony
     that the dumping of solid waste occurred without a permit, and
     where there apparently was no opportunity to object to
     evidence that the dumping constituted a public nuisance
     because no one specifically testified to that fact, the
     supreme court did not view the failure to object as the
     pivotal point; it was, rather, the instruction by the trial
     court on uncharged crimes that was the fatal error, and
     objections were mounted by the defendants at the instruction
     stage.

3.   Evidence -- testimony insufficient to alert appellant that jury would be
     instructed on two additional offenses. -- Testimony in which a
     witness failed to use the term "public nuisance" and mentioned
     only once the requirement that a person obtain a permit to
     operate a dump site was not sufficient to alert appellant to
     the fact that the jury would be instructed on two additional
     offenses.

4.   Jury -- proffered instruction not required where appellant did not want
     additional instruction or instruction with certain elements. -- Where
     appellant did not want an additional instruction or an
     instruction with certain elements, there was no need for him
     to proffer an instruction; he objected only because he wanted
     the jury instructed on the crime charged and not on separate
     offenses, which did not warrant the proffer of a separate
     instruction.

5.   Indictment & information -- trial court's effective amendment of
     information in jury instruction was fatal -- reversed and remanded for new
     trial. -- It is the prosecutors who can bring or amend a
     criminal charge and not the trial courts; where the prosecutor
     made no attempt to amend the criminal information, but the
     trial court did so, in effect, by means of its instruction to
     the jury on offenses not charged, the supreme court held that
     this could not be harmless error but was fatal to the
     conviction; the court, therefore, reversed and remanded for a
     new trial.

6.   Criminal law -- defense -- written permission to dump waste -- appellant's
     burden. -- Whether appellant had received written permission
     under Ark. Code Ann.  8-6-205(a)(4) (Supp. 1995), to dump
     waste was a defense that was appellant's burden to prove; in
     this respect, a defense is defined as any matter involving an
     excuse or justification peculiarly within the knowledge of the
     defendant on which he can fairly be required to introduce
     supporting evidence; the "written permission" required in  8-
     6-205(a)(4) created a defense under  5-1-111(c)(3) because
     such a matter was peculiarly within appellant's knowledge.


     Appeal from Craighead Circuit Court; John Fogleman, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     William L. Howard, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kelly Terry, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     Appellant Ray Renfro was charged with the illegal disposal of
waste under Ark. Code Ann.  8-6-205 (Supp. 1995), after he was
observed with other men dumping rotten potatoes at a site near
connecting waterways in Craighead County.  After a jury trial,
Renfro was found guilty and fined $2,000.00.  He brings this
appeal, asserting three points for reversal.  We hold that one
point raised has merit, and we reverse and remand for a new trial.
     In its criminal information, the State specifically charged
that on June 19, 1996, Renfro illegally disposed of solid waste on
property owned by another person without the written permission of
the owner or occupant of the property.  The State's charge tracked
the language set out in  8-6-205(a)(4).
     The operative criminal statute for the illegal disposal of
waste can be violated in alternative ways in addition to that
specified under subsection (a)(4).  It is a violation of the
statute, for example, to dispose of solid waste at a site for which
a permit has not been issued by the Arkansas Department of
Pollution Control and Ecology.  Ark. Code Ann.  8-6-205(a)(3)
(Supp. 1995).  The criminal statute can also be violated if the
disposal of solid waste creates a public nuisance or health hazard
or constitutes water or air pollution.  Ark. Code Ann.  8-6-
205(a)(5) (Supp. 1995).
     Renfro was not charged with the illegal conduct set out under
subsections (a)(3) or (a)(5), although the State submitted an
instruction that included alternative violations under subsections
(a)(3), (a)(4), and (a)(5).  Renfro objected to the inclusion of
subsections (a)(3) and (a)(5) in the instruction but the trial
court overruled the objection on the basis that the alternative
violations were not separate offenses but alternative means of
committing one offense.  The jury was then instructed that if it
found Renfro guilty of conduct under any one of the three
subsections, it could find him guilty of the crime of illegal
disposal of waste.
     We conclude that this was error.  The jury was so instructed
by the trial court even though the prosecutor never amended the
criminal information to include other prohibited conduct under  8-
6-205.  The jury returned a verdict of guilty without specifying
which category of conduct amounted to a violation.  Thus, we have
no way of knowing whether the jury found Renfro guilty of disposal
of waste on another's property [(a)(4)], or disposal without a
permit [(a)(3)], or creating a public nuisance, hazard, or polluted
condition [(a)(5)].
     In Williams v. State, 302 Ark. 234, 788 S.W.2d 241 (1990),
this court emphasized that a criminal information must contain the
elements of the crime so that a defendant can adequately prepare
the case against him or her.  We held, as a result, that the
language of the information in that case limited the State to proof
of those specific elements set out in the information and that
proof of other elements constituting separate crimes constituted a
fatal variance.  The facts in Williams are somewhat different from
the facts in the instant case in that no proof of the charged
offense under subsection (a)(4) was forthcoming in that case, while
in the instant case proof of the charged offense was presented by
the State.  Nevertheless, the Williams decision relied in part on
Stirone v. United States,