Case Title: Walling v. Brenya

Citation: 2022-Ohio-4265

Docket Number: 2021-0241

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Walling v. Brenya, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4265.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-4265 
WALLING, ADMR., APPELLANT, v. BRENYA ET AL.; TOLEDO HOSPITAL, 
APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Walling v. Brenya, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4265.] 
Negligent credentialing—Negligent credentialing is a claim separate and 
independent from medical negligence, but a negligent-credentialing claim 
cannot proceed without either a simultaneous or a prior adjudication of or 
stipulation to medical negligence—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2021-0241—Submitted March 9, 2022—Decided December 1, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, 
No. L-19-1264, 2021-Ohio-29. 
_______________________ 
DONNELLY, J. 
INTRODUCTION 
{¶ 1} The issue in this case is whether a hospital’s granting staff privileges 
to a physician (i.e., credentialing a physician) confers a duty upon the hospital that 
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is separate from and independent of the duty the physician owes to the hospital’s 
patients, and if so, whether a negligent-credentialing claim brought by a patient can 
proceed in the absence of a prior adjudication or stipulation that the physician was 
negligent in his care of the patient.  We conclude that negligent credentialing is a 
separate and independent claim from medical negligence.  Nevertheless, a 
negligent-credentialing claim cannot proceed without either a simultaneous or prior 
adjudication of or stipulation to medical negligence. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 2} Raeann Walling, the daughter of appellant, Michael Walling, was 
treated by Dr. Ransford Brenya at appellee, Toledo Hospital, where Dr. Brenya, a 
nonemployee of the hospital, held staff privileges.  Raeann had a heart 
arrhythmia—catecholaminergic polymorphic ventricular tachycardia (“CPVT”), 
which Dr. Brenya treated by performing three cardiac ablations, two of which were 
done at Toledo Hospital.  Raeann developed pulmonary-vein stenosis, which was 
undetected. 
{¶ 3} At trial, Dr. Brenya testified on cross-examination that he had failed 
to review Raeann’s chest x-rays, thereby missing the opportunity to detect a 
potential obstruction in her pulmonary veins.  Furthermore, because he had failed 
to review Raeann’s x-rays, Dr. Brenya also did not order a CT scan, which he 
testified would have been the standard of care had he been aware of the potential 
obstruction in Raeann’s pulmonary veins that was revealed in the x-ray records.  
Thus, Raeann’s pulmonary-vein stenosis was not discovered or treated as soon as 
it could have been.  Raeann died on April 26, 2014.  Walling, as administrator of 
Raeann’s estate, filed suit against Dr. Brenya, alleging medical negligence, and 
against Toledo Hospital, alleging negligent credentialing.1  The trial court granted 
Toledo Hospital’s motion to bifurcate the claims.  Four days into the trial, the 
 
1.  Walling’s medical-negligence claims also included Dr. Osama Al-Bawab and the Toledo Clinic, 
Inc., as defendants. 
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parties settled the medical-negligence claims.  The terms of the settlement are 
confidential.  And while the trial court acknowledged “the wishes of the parties to 
preserve the confidentiality of their settlement agreement,” it correctly noted in its 
judgment entry that “the record is devoid of any stipulation or other agreement that 
embodies a concession of liability or malpractice in connection with the care and 
treatment of Raeann Walling.”  The medical-negligence claims were dismissed 
with prejudice. 
{¶ 4} Soon thereafter, Toledo Hospital moved for summary judgment on 
the negligent-credentialing claim.  The trial court granted the motion, and Walling 
appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that summary judgment was 
correctly granted because Walling had “failed to obtain a prior determination, 
whether through adjudication or stipulation, that Brenya’s malpractice proximately 
caused [Raeann’s] injuries.”  2021-Ohio-29, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 5} We accepted Walling’s discretionary appeal.  163 Ohio St.3d 1417, 
2021-Ohio-1606, 167 N.E.3d 982. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 6} Because this case was decided on summary judgment, our review is 
de novo.  State ex rel. Yost v. Burns, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-1326, __ N.E.3d 
__, ¶ 9, citing Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54, 2010-Ohio-4505, 
936 N.E.2d 481, ¶ 29. 
{¶ 7} We addressed a substantially similar issue in Schelling v. Humphrey, 
123 Ohio St.3d 387, 2009-Ohio-4175, 916 N.E.2d 1029, ¶ 1, a case in which a 
doctor who performed foot surgeries was sued for medical negligence and the 
hospital where he had staff privileges was sued for negligent credentialing.  Id. at  
¶ 2, 6.  After the doctor filed a petition in bankruptcy, the plaintiffs dismissed their 
medical-negligence claim against him, and the hospital moved to dismiss the 
negligent-credentialing claim.  Id. at ¶ 3, 8.  The trial court granted the hospital’s 
motion to dismiss, but the Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed, “reject[ing] the 
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hospital’s argument that a finding of the doctor’s negligence is a legal prerequisite 
to a negligent-credentialing claim.”  Id. at ¶ 9-10. 
{¶ 8} On appeal, we determined that the doctor’s “lack of amenability to 
suit [did] not in and of itself extinguish the Schellings’ negligent-credentialing 
claim against the hospital.”  Id. at ¶ 30.  We noted that generally, a hospital “would 
not be required to defend against a negligent-credentialing claim before the 
physician’s malpractice has been determined, either in a prior proceeding or as the 
first part of the case against both the doctor and the hospital.”  Id. at ¶ 26.  Such 
bifurcation, we explained, “allows a negligent-credentialing claim against a 
hospital to be dismissed if the plaintiff does not prevail on the malpractice claim 
against the doctor.”  Id. at ¶ 28.  Nevertheless, we concluded that “[u]nder the 
unusual circumstances of [the] case, where the bankruptcy proceedings impeded 
the Schellings from joining the physician as a party,” the negligent-credentialing 
claim could still be prosecuted, but only after a determination that the doctor had 
been negligent.  Id. at ¶ 30-31. 
{¶ 9} In the case before us, Walling is asking us to revisit the holding in 
Schelling and, at a minimum, to expand it.  Yet, as Walling concedes, the reasoning 
behind Schelling “remains sound,” and therefore, we decline to extend its reach. 
{¶ 10} Hospitals have a duty to “grant and continue staff privileges only to 
competent doctors.”  Schelling, 123 Ohio St.3d 387, 2009-Ohio-4175, 916 N.E.2d 
1029, at ¶ 17, citing Albain v. Flower Hosp., 50 Ohio St.3d 251, 553 N.E.2d 1038 
(1990), paragraph two of the syllabus, overruled in part on other grounds by Clark 
v. Southview Hosp. & Family Ctr., 68 Ohio St.3d 435, 628 N.E.2d 46 (1994).  
Negligent credentialing is not grounded in vicarious liability based on a doctor’s 
liability for malpractice; rather, it is an independent claim that “stems from a 
hospital’s direct duty to grant and continue staff privileges only to competent 
doctors.”  Id. at ¶ 30.  Though a negligent-credentialing claim is independent, our 
caselaw is patently clear: negligent-credentialing claims are not viable in the 
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absence of medical negligence by the treating doctor.  See Schelling at ¶ 19; 
Browning v. Burt, 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 566, 613 N.E.2d 993 (1993) (Moyer, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
{¶ 11} In Schelling, the issue before us was “whether a plaintiff can proceed 
on a negligent-credentialing claim against a hospital without a prior finding, either 
by adjudication or stipulation, that the plaintiff’s injury was caused by the 
physician’s malpractice.”  Id. at ¶ 11.  As noted above, we said that, barring unusual 
circumstances, a plaintiff could not proceed without such a prior determination.  Id. 
at ¶ 32.  The proposition of law in this case posits, to the contrary, that a negligent-
credentialing claim “can exist in the absence of a prior adjudication or stipulation 
that the physician was negligent.” 
{¶ 12} Walling argues that a prior adjudication or stipulation of medical 
negligence is not necessary in this case, because Dr. Brenya conceded the elements 
of negligence under cross-examination in the medical-negligence portion of the 
trial, which justifies an exception.  We noted that Schelling was an exceptional case 
in that the doctor was not amenable to suit because of a bankruptcy stay and 
discharge.  Id., 123 Ohio St.3d 387, 2009-Ohio-4175, 916 N.E.2d 1029, at ¶ 32.  
This case is not exceptional; Walling and Dr. Brenya decided to settle the 
underlying medical-negligence case.  And Walling knew or should have known that 
one of the consequences of settling and dismissing the claim against Dr. Brenya 
without first obtaining a stipulation to negligence was the inability to pursue a 
negligent-credentialing claim against Toledo Hospital.2  The foreclosing of the 
opportunity to pursue a negligent-credentialing claim may appear unduly 
restrictive; however, we made clear in Schelling that any plaintiff who settles a 
medical-negligence claim with a physician without obtaining a stipulation that the 
 
2.  Settling affects many interests.  One of the most important for a doctor is to be done with the 
case.  Being able to drag a doctor who has already settled with a patient back into a negligent-
credentialing case might lead to fewer medical-negligence settlements.  
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physician was negligent is precluded from proceeding on a negligent-credentialing 
claim.  And because negligent credentialing is an independent cause of action, even 
when a physician has stipulated to medical negligence, the plaintiff still has the 
burden of proving all the elements of a negligent-credentialing claim against the 
hospital at trial. 
{¶ 13} For purposes of this opinion, we assume that Dr. Brenya’s testimony 
during trial amounted to an admission that his treatment of Raeann Walling fell 
below the standard of care.  Nonetheless, it should be obvious that an admission of 
this sort is not tantamount to a determination of negligence.  For one thing, the 
admission was limited; as the trial court summarized, it did “not include the 
affirmative expressions of liability required to advance a negligent-credentialing 
claim.” Also, any admission by Dr. Brenya did not address proximate cause.  
Moreover, the admission was not weighed and determined by the jury to be credible 
when balanced against a complete presentation of evidence.  The settlement 
occurred before Walling had concluded his case and before Dr. Brenya had 
presented any of his own evidence.  Nothing here convinces us that whatever 
admission Dr. Brenya made during the trial rises to the level of an adjudication of 
or stipulation to medical negligence. 
{¶ 14} Walling’s reliance on Evans v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 163 Ohio St.3d 
284, 2020-Ohio-5535, 170 N.E.3d 1, to support his argument that Schelling’s 
exception to the prior-determination requirement should be expanded is also 
misplaced.  In Evans, a doctor employed by the defendant hospital was alleged to 
have sexually abused a patient.  Id. at ¶ 2.  We held that “a plaintiff need not show 
that an employee has been adjudicated civilly liable or has been found guilty of a 
crime by a court in order for the plaintiff to maintain a negligent hiring, retention, 
or supervision claim against an employer.”  Id. at ¶ 10.  Though there are some 
similarities between a negligent-credentialing claim and a negligent-hiring claim 
(none of which are relevant to our analysis here), there is at least one critical 
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difference that is dispositive of Walling’s argument: a negligent-credentialing 
claim generally requires a prior finding of medical negligence against the physician, 
whereas a negligent-hiring claim does not require a prior finding of misconduct or 
negligence against the employee.  We decline to expand the exception to 
Schelling’s prior-determination requirement based on a case with such a different 
proof requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 15} The caselaw is clear: a negligent-credentialing claim cannot proceed 
without either a simultaneous or prior adjudication of or stipulation that a doctor 
committed medical malpractice.  Such an adjudication or stipulation was not 
present in this case. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
BRUNNER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by STEWART, J. 
_________________ 
 
BRUNNER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 16} The focus of this case should be whether Dr. Ransford Brenya’s 
testimony during the initial portion of the bifurcated proceedings created a genuine 
issue of material fact such that appellant, Michael Walling, could present the 
medical-malpractice issue during the medical-credentialing portion of the trial.  But 
today’s decision instead raises the threshold for plaintiffs in negligent-credentialing 
cases beyond what is called for in our caselaw or justified by public policy.  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 17} Walling cannot prevail on his negligent-credentialing claim against 
appellee, Toledo Hospital, without showing that Dr. Brenya’s negligence was the 
proximate cause of Raeann Walling’s death.  I agree with the majority that our 
caselaw is “patently clear” as to that question.  See majority opinion, ¶ 10.  But I 
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disagree with the majority as to when and how the medical negligence and 
causation must be proved. 
{¶ 18} In Schelling v. Humphrey, 123 Ohio St.3d 387, 2009-Ohio-4175, 
916 N.E.2d 1029, we concluded that the physician’s “lack of amenability to suit 
[did] not in and of itself extinguish the Schellings’ negligent-credentialing claim 
against the hospital,” id. at ¶ 30.  We held that the Schellings could present their 
medical-malpractice claim against the physician “as an element of their negligent-
credentialing claim against the hospital.”  Id.  And we did so over the the hospital’s 
argument that it would be unfair to require it to defend the  malpractice claim 
against the physician.  Id. at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 19} The only distinction the majority raises between Schelling and this 
case is that that the Schellings were barred by a bankruptcy stay and discharge from 
pursuing their malpractice claim against the physician, id. at ¶ 32, whereas Walling 
had a hand in procuring Dr. Brenya’s absence by entering into a confidential 
settlement and agreeing to dismiss the malpractice claim without obtaining a 
stipulation to Dr. Brenya’s negligence. Majority opinion at ¶ 12.  But the majority 
does not adequately explain why this distinction necessitates the result reached in 
this case.  The cause of a physician’s unavailability does not change the elements 
of the negligent-credentialing claim, the plaintiff’s ultimate burden, or the 
hospital’s obligation to present a defense. 
{¶ 20} There is no explanation in the majority’s opinion, nor support in our 
precedent, for creating the heightened summary-judgment standard that the 
majority endorses today for negligent-credentialing claims to survive.  When ruling 
on a hospital’s summary-judgment motion, the trial court makes a determination as 
to whether a hospital is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Civ.R. 56(C).  If in 
a bifurcated case the plaintiff cannot establish liability against the physician, then 
the plaintiff is bound by that determination and cannot, as a matter of law, establish 
the underlying medical-malpractice element in the negligent-credentialing claim. 
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{¶ 21} If there is no prior determination regarding the physician’s liability, 
that does not mean that medical malpractice cannot be established.  When no prior 
determination has been made with respect to negligence and causation, a summary-
judgment motion tests whether the evidence presents a genuine issue of material 
fact as to the underlying malpractice claim, and in ruling on that motion, the court 
must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Civ.R. 
56(C).  Under the majority’s heightened standard, a plaintiff must now first prove 
the underlying malpractice in order to survive summary judgment on the negligent-
credentialing claim.  This needlessly limits a plaintiff’s ability to pursue claims 
against both the physician and the hospital and in turn may unreasonably limit the 
recovery and accountability objectives behind medical-malpractice and negligent-
credentialing claims. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Johnson Law, P.L.C., and Jeffrey T. Stewart, for appellant. 
 
Robison, Curphey & O’Connell, L.L.C., James E. Brazeau, and Kayla L. 
Henderson, for appellee. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Anne Marie Sferra, and Brodi J. Conover; and 
Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., and Victoria F. McCurdy, urging affirmance for 
amici curiae, Ohio Hospital Association and Ohio Association of Civil Trial 
Attorneys. 
_________________