Case Title: State v. John T. Trochinski, Jr.

Citation: 2002 WI 56

Docket Number: 2000AP002545-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 56 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-2545-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
John T. Trochinski, Jr.  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  243 Wis. 2d 116, 627 N.W.2d 548 
(Ct. App. 2001-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 30, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 6, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waushara   
 
JUDGE: 
Lewis Murach   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. dissents (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by James L. Fullin, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Daniel 
J. O'Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 56 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-2545-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99-CF-11) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John T. Trochinski, Jr.  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 30, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J. 
John 
T. 
Trochinski, 
Jr. 
(Trochinski) seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals' 
decision 
affirming 
the circuit court's 
decision 
rejecting 
Trochinski's argument that Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a)(1997-98)1 is 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
98 version unless otherwise noted. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) states in full:   
(2)  CRIMINAL PENALTIES.  (a) Whoever, with knowledge of 
the nature of the material, sells, rents, exhibits, transfers or 
loans to a child any harmful material, with or without monetary 
consideration, is guilty of a Class E felony. 
 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
2 
 
unconstitutional, 
and 
rejecting 
Trochinski's 
postconviction 
motion seeking to withdraw his no contest plea.  Based on 
allegations that Trochinski gave nude pictures of himself to a 
fifteen-year-old girl and a seventeen-year-old girl, Trochinski 
was originally charged in Waushara County Circuit Court with two 
counts of exposing minors to harmful materials, contrary to 
§ 948.11(2).  Trochinski challenged the constitutionality of 
§ 948.11(2), but the circuit court denied the motion.  Pursuant 
to a plea agreement, Trochinski then entered a no contest plea 
to one count of exposing a minor to harmful materials in 
violation of § 948.11(2).  After sentencing, Trochinski filed a 
postconviction motion seeking to withdraw his plea, alleging 
that at the time he entered his plea he did not understand the 
definition of an element of the offense——"harmful to children."  
The circuit court denied Trochinski's motion and the court of 
appeals subsequently affirmed.  The court of appeals also 
rejected Trochinski's constitutional challenge to § 948.11(2). 
¶2 
Trochinski is now before this court with the same 
arguments.  Trochinski contends that he should be able to 
withdraw his no contest plea because he did not understand the 
meaning of "harmful to children" under Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2).  
He further argues that neither the written plea questionnaire 
nor the plea colloquy establish that he understood the elements 
of the offense to which he was pleading.  Lastly, Trochinski 
renews his constitutional argument, claiming that § 948.11(2) is 
facially unconstitutional because it imposes strict liability 
for constitutionally protected expression. 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
3 
 
¶3 
We reject both of Trochinski's arguments and affirm 
the court of appeals' decision.  First, we conclude that 
Trochinski has failed to establish a prima facie case that his 
plea was involuntary.  Based on the standard set forth in State 
v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), we conclude 
that the signed plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form, 
together with the plea colloquy, establish that Trochinski knew 
and understood the elements of the offense to which he was 
pleading. 
¶4 
We 
similarly 
reject 
Trochinski's 
constitutional 
challenge to Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2).  Based on this court's 
previous decisions, we conclude that the scope of conduct 
criminalized in § 948.11(2) anticipates face-to-face contact 
between the defendant and the child.  Accordingly, because this 
personal 
interaction 
allows 
the 
defendant 
reasonably 
to 
ascertain the victim's age, the State can impose on the 
defendant the risk that the victim is a child. 
I 
¶5 
The facts, as stated in the probable cause portion of 
the complaint and relied on by the circuit court, are not in 
dispute.  On December 18, 1998, John T. Trochinski, Jr. entered 
the Amoco station in PoySippi, Wisconsin, and had a conversation 
with Jill L., an employee of the gas station.  At this time, 
Jill was seventeen years, three months old.  During their 
conversation, Trochinski gave Jill an envelope containing a set 
of ten nude photos of himself, with his penis exposed.  In 
addition, Trochinski gave her a copy of a letter from Playgirl, 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
4 
 
indicating that the nude photos of Trochinski would be published 
in the magazine,2 and a personal letter that he wrote to Jill 
"inviting her to review the photographs."   
¶6 
In the two-page personal letter, which the circuit 
court relied on at sentencing, Trochinski wrote, among other 
things, 
If you decide to keep these photos then please keep 
them in a safe place out of reach of children——If you 
decide not to keep them then just wait 'til you see me 
again okay——In all honesty I do hope you'll keep them 
'cause they mean alot to me and as long as you keep 
these photos I'll make sure I get you a copy of the 
professional ones which I am waiting on getting 
back[.] 
 . . .  
Well, I guess I'll close for now in the hopes that you 
will keep these photos. If at all possible would you 
please write back and let me know what you think of 
these photos and also let me know if you would like a 
copy of the professional photos as well! 
The letter also included Trochinski's address and phone number, 
with the note, "Call Anytime."   
¶7 
Trochinski was subsequently charged with two counts of 
exposing 
minors 
to 
harmful 
materials, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a).  One count involved seventeen-year-
old Jill L., and the other count involved a fifteen-year-old 
girl.3  Trochinski filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the 
                                                 
2 Although not relevant to the outcome of this case, we 
question the authenticity of the alleged letter from Playgirl. 
3 We do not discuss the facts relating to the charge 
involving the fifteen-year-old girl because that charge was 
eventually dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
5 
 
charges, alleging that under State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 
589 N.W.2d 370 (1999), § 948.11(2) is unconstitutional.  The 
circuit court held a hearing on the motion on June 7, 1999,4 and 
at the conclusion of the hearing the court denied Trochinski's 
motion. 
¶8 
On June 9, 1999, an information charged Trochinski 
with the same two counts of exposing minors to harmful 
materials, as alleged in the complaint, but also charged 
Trochinski as a repeat offender under Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2)5.  
Trochinski entered a not guilty plea to both counts. 
¶9 
On November 15, 1999, pursuant to a plea agreement 
with the State, Trochinski entered a no contest plea to one 
count of exposing a minor to harmful materials, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2).  The terms of the plea agreement were as 
follows:  (1) Trochinski would plead guilty to Count 2 of the 
                                                 
4 The hearing was originally scheduled for April 30, 1999, 
but the court adjourned the hearing to notify the Attorney 
General of the constitutional challenge to the statute. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62(2) states:   
(2)  The actor is a repeater if the actor was convicted of 
a felony during the 5-year period immediately preceding the 
commission of the crime for which the actor presently is being 
sentenced, or if the actor was convicted of a misdemeanor on 3 
separate occasions during that same period, which convictions 
remain of record and unreversed.  It is immaterial that sentence 
was stayed, withheld or suspended, or that the actor was 
pardoned, unless such pardon was granted on the ground of 
innocence.  In computing the preceding 5-year period, time which 
the actor spent in actual confinement serving a criminal 
sentence shall be excluded. 
 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
6 
 
information (relating to Jill L.) and the State would dismiss 
Count 1 (relating to the fifteen-year-old girl) but have it read 
into the record for purposes of sentencing; and (2) Trochinski 
would be free to argue for whatever sentence he deemed 
appropriate, including probation, and the State would recommend 
a six-year prison sentence for Count 2, as enhanced by the 
repeater allegation.  By entering into the plea agreement, 
Trochinski reduced his total incarceration exposure from sixteen 
to eight years. 
¶10 At the plea hearing, Trochinski and his attorney 
submitted a signed plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form.  
On the plea form, Trochinski indicated, by signing his initials, 
that he understood the plea agreement and the constitutional 
rights he was waiving by entering into the plea agreement.  The 
form also indicated that Trochinski knew the elements of the 
offense to which he was pleading no contest.  The form listed 
the elements of Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) as follows: 
(1) You exhibited harmful material to a child.  (2) 
You had knowledge of the nature of the material.  (3)  
The child had not attained the age of 18 at the time 
of the alleged offense.  (4) That you were previously 
convicted of a felony during the 5-year period 
preceding this offense excluding the time you were 
incarcerated. 
On the plea form, Trochinski also indicated that he was giving 
up his right to present any defense to the charge, and that he 
was satisfied with the legal advice and assistance he received 
from his attorney. 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
7 
 
¶11 After receiving the written plea questionnaire and 
waiver form, Judge Lewis R. Murach engaged Trochinski in a 
personal plea colloquy on the record.6  In response to questions 
                                                 
6 Because we rely on the personal plea colloquy to determine 
whether Trochinski knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
entered into the plea agreement, we lay out the relevant 
portions of the colloquy. 
THE COURT:  All right.  Mr. Trochinski, I have before 
me the plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form 
that would appear to have your signature on it.  Did 
you sign the form? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I did. 
THE COURT:  And before signing it, did you go over all 
of the matters on that form with your attorney? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I did. 
THE COURT:  Did you understand all of the matters on 
the form? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  Now, the information contained on the form 
by the boxes checked, the things initialed, the 
information 
communicated 
by 
this 
form, 
is 
that 
information truthful? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  And I can rely upon it to be so? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  Now, I'm not going to go over all of the 
things on the form with you.  That's the purpose of 
having the form so that you can meet with your 
attorney; that you can go over all of the matters on 
the form; that you can discuss all of the matters and 
be sure that nothing is left out; and that you can do 
that outside of the pressures that are sometimes 
present in courtrooms. 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
8 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
I 
do 
want 
to 
touch 
bases 
though 
with 
certain 
constitutional rights.  You understand that if you 
plead no contest to a charge, I'm going to find that 
you are guilty of this charge? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I understand that. 
THE COURT:  And the format is that if the State claims 
that you engaged in particular criminal acts on a 
particular date, time, and place and that if your 
official plea is that you are not contesting or 
disputing that claim, then the Court would take the 
claim as so looking just to be sure that there is a 
factual basis for it.  You understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do. 
THE COURT:  And you appreciate that looking for a 
factual basis to support a plea is something a great 
deal different than hearing and evaluating evidence at 
a trial and deciding elements of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  You understand that difference? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do. 
THE COURT:  Now, if you enter a no contest plea, then 
you will be waiving and giving up your right to remain 
silent, your right to testify, your right to a 12 
person jury trial, your right to have a unanimous 
verdict, your right to confront your accuser in court, 
cross-examine that person under oath, right to call 
witnesses on your own behalf, and the right to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense 
to which you are charged.  You understand that that 
would be the case? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do. 
THE COURT:  And by elements of the offense, the Court 
is talking about the things that has [sic] to be 
proven in order to obtain a conviction.  We've already 
addressed the repeater aspect, so I'm not going to 
repeat that, but Count 2 says that on or about 
December 18th of 1998, that you transferred material 
to a child, that you had knowledge of the nature of 
the material, that the material was harmful material, 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
9 
 
from the court, Trochinski indicated that he understood all of 
the matters on the form, including the elements of the offense, 
that the information communicated by the form was truthful, and 
that he understood the various rights he was waiving.  The court 
relied on the facts alleged in the complaint as the factual 
basis for the plea,7 and then stated that it was satisfied that 
Trochinski understood his rights and that he was acting 
                                                                                                                                                             
that being a picture of yourself depicting nudity.  
You understand all of those elements? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do. 
THE COURT:  And by child, a child is referencing 
someone who had not as yet reached the age of 18 
years.  You understand that's what we mean by child? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do. 
THE COURT:  All right.  Then to the charge contained 
in Count 2 of the information, the count that says 
that on or about December 18th of 1998 unlawfully with 
knowledge of the nature of the material, that you 
transferred to a child, that being J.A.L., a female 
white child with a birth date of September 30, 1981, 
harmful materials, to wit a picture of yourself 
depicting nudity contrary to "948.11(2)(a)" of the 
Wisconsin Statutes, a Class E Felony crime, that with 
the enhancement would subject you to a fine not to 
exceed $10,000, imprisonment not to exceed eight 
years, or both.  To that charge, what is your plea. 
THE DEFENDANT:  No contest.  (Emphasis added.) 
 
7 Specifically, the court stated:  "The Court is satisfied 
that the record, especially the probable cause basis of the 
complaint, does set forth a factual basis sufficient to support 
the plea that is offered."  We note that the facts stated in the 
probable cause portion of the complaint, encompass those facts 
stated here in paragraph five. 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
10 
 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.  Finally, the court 
accepted Trochinski's no contest plea and entered a judgment of 
conviction for the crime of exposing a child to harmful 
materials. 
¶12 After accepting Trochinski's plea, the circuit court 
immediately proceeded to sentencing.  The court heard testimony, 
and then sentenced Trochinski to six years in prison. 
¶13 Trochinski subsequently filed a postconviction motion 
seeking to withdraw his no contest plea on grounds that he did 
not 
understand 
the 
"harmful 
to 
children" 
element 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a).  Trochinski also renewed his facial 
constitutional challenge to the statute.  On September 6, 2000, 
the court held a postconviction hearing.  During the hearing, 
Trochinski testified that he understood the elements of the 
offense, but did not understand what was going to have to be 
proven to be convicted.8  He further testified about several 
                                                 
8 Specifically, after his defense attorney read the elements 
of Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a) as listed on the plea waiver form, 
Trochinski testified as follows: 
Q: 
And did you understand at the time you signed 
[the plea waiver form] that those were the matters 
that you were admitting, that these were the elements 
of the offense? 
A: 
I understood that they were the elements.  I 
didn't understand what was going to have to be proven 
to be convicted. 
Q: 
Okay.  That's pretty close to the same thing.  An 
element is something that has to be proven for you to 
be convicted.  Now, when you initialed the box that 
says you exhibited harmful material to a child, what 
was your understanding of what harmful material meant? 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
11 
 
discussions with his trial attorney, including the fact that 
there would be jury instructions if the case were taken to 
trial.9  On cross examination, Trochinski admitted that at the 
                                                                                                                                                             
A: 
Exactly what I was told by my attorney, that it 
was harmful material and in photos. 
Q: 
It was a photograph.  It was a photograph of 
yourself without any clothes on; is that right? 
A: 
Correct. 
Q: 
And did you and your attorney ever discuss 
whether a mere picture of a nude was harmful to 
children? 
A: 
No.  I recall it being discussed that it wasn't 
considered harmful material because I wasn't erect and 
I was not touching myself. 
Q: 
You talked about that with Mr. Haase? 
A: 
Yes, I did. 
Q: 
And his explanation to you was you have to be 
erect or touching yourself in order for it to be 
harmful? 
A: 
If I recall, his explanation was, I can't believe 
they even got it in court.  I talked to other 
attorneys in other counties, and they could not see 
any point in this. 
Q: 
All right.  So in your personal opinion mere 
nudity was not sufficient for a prosecution; is that 
right? 
A: 
From what was in the photos, I do not believe 
that was harmful material.  It was also published as 
art.  (Emphasis added.) 
9 Q: Okay.  Did [your trial attorney] explain to you 
that if you had a trial, the Court would instruct the 
jury about the things they would have to find in order 
to convict you; that there would be jury instructions 
from Judge Murach to the jury? 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
12 
 
time he pled no contest he had knowledge of the nature of the 
material, that it was harmful, and that the photos are totally 
inappropriate for children.10  After hearing arguments by 
                                                                                                                                                             
A: 
He did say there would be jury instructions.  I 
don't recall hearing what the instructions were. 
10 Q: 
And would you agree with me that as your attorney 
was placing his motion in front of you, as you were 
trying to answer my question, I explained that Judge 
Murach qualified his question to you by way of the 
sexually explicit question by asking if you understand 
that the State has to prove you exhibited harmful 
material, that you were in fact showing the pictures 
of yourself, showing pictures of yourself in the nude 
to a child? 
A: 
As it was said in court, I was asked a question 
of if I had knowledge of the nature of the material, 
that it was harmful material.  I agreed that it was.  
I was not given an opportunity to express if it was 
art or in an art form.  To me harmful material would 
be if I was erect or if I was touching myself or if 
someone else was in that photo. 
Q: 
Are you telling us, sir, that it would have been 
your understanding that it would have been acceptable 
for you to display pictures of yourself with your 
penis hanging out to children irrespective of whether 
you were erect or not? 
A: 
No. 
Q: 
What are you telling us then? 
A: 
I'm saying that for one, she was inside the 60 
days from turning 18.  After I was arrested I found 
that out.  I had every reason to believe she was over 
18.  She was the one that questioned me why I don't 
get into porn films, why I ain't going for calendars, 
and everything else.  I had every reason to believe 
she was over 18.  When she asked me for pictures, yes, 
I did give them to her. 
Q: 
Would you agree with me, sir, that the pictures 
that we are discussing, which are in the record having 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
13 
 
counsel, the court concluded that Trochinski had not met his 
burden of proving a prima facie case that his plea was not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  The court also rejected 
Trochinski's constitutional challenge, and accordingly, denied 
his postconviction motion. 
¶14 Trochinski appealed both the judgment of conviction 
and the order denying his postconviction motion.  The Court of 
Appeals, District IV, affirmed the decisions of the circuit 
court in 
an 
unpublished 
per curiam 
opinion. 
 
State v. 
Trochinski, No. 00-2545-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Mar. 29, 2001).  The court concluded that Trochinski's plea was 
knowing, 
intelligent 
and 
voluntary 
because 
"the 
plea 
questionnaire and the plea colloquy both indicated that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
been introduced at the time of the sentencing hearing, 
are totally inappropriate for children? 
A: 
Yes, for children. 
Q: 
And that was your understanding at the time that 
you entered the plea, correct, that these would have 
been totally inappropriate for children? 
A: 
Yes, for children.  I also— 
Q: 
And in fact, sir, that is exactly what the 
element of the offense you are saying you don't 
understand is, correct, that the State would have to 
prove what you just said you understood? 
A: 
From what I was understanding, I wasn't dealing 
with children.  I was dealing with somebody presenting 
herself as an adult.  And as far as the sentencing 
part, all of the material was not used as exhibits.  
There were three pieces out of ten.  And I'm guessing 
that those three were probably the worst three to make 
it look harmful in that manner. 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
14 
 
State would need to prove that Trochinski exhibited harmful 
material to a child."  Id. at ¶6.  The court further held that a 
circuit court is not required to explain the elements of the 
offense beyond naming them and asking whether the defendant had 
any questions.  Finally, the court held that Trochinski's facial 
constitutional 
challenge 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) 
was 
specifically rejected in State v. Kevin L.C., 216 Wis. 2d 166, 
186, 576 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1997), and that this court's 
subsequent decision in State v. Weidner, 2000 WI 52, 235 
Wis. 2d 306, 611 N.W.2d 684, does not disturb the holding in 
Kevin L.C., or require this court to reexamine that decision. 
II 
¶15 To withdraw his plea after sentencing, Trochinski 
needed to establish by clear and convincing evidence, that 
failure to allow a withdrawal would result in a manifest 
injustice.  State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 
605 N.W.2d 836.  In other words, Trochinski was required "to 
show 'a serious flaw in the fundamental integrity of the plea.'" 
Id. (quoting State v. Nawrocke, 193 Wis. 2d 373, 379, 534 
N.W.2d 624 (Ct. App. 1995).  One of the situations where plea 
withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice is when 
"the plea was involuntary, or was entered without knowledge of 
the charge . . . ."  State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 385, 151 
N.W.2d 9 (1967) (citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Part 
II, 2.1(a)(ii)(3)); State v. Giebel, 198 Wis. 2d 207, 212, 541 
N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1995)("A plea which is not knowingly, 
voluntarily or intelligently entered is a manifest injustice."). 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
15 
 
¶16 Trochinski contends that his plea was entered without 
knowledge of the "harmful to children" element.  We, therefore, 
review 
whether 
his 
plea 
was 
knowingly, 
voluntarily 
and 
intelligently entered as a question of constitutional fact.  
State v. 
Bollig, 
2000 WI 
6, ¶13, 
232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 
N.W.2d 199.  "We will not upset the circuit court's findings of 
historical 
or 
evidentiary 
facts 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous."  Id.  However, whether Trochinski's plea was knowing 
and intelligent poses a constitutional fact question, which we 
independently review, benefiting from the analyses of the 
circuit court and the court of appeals.  See id. at ¶47 ("A plea 
violates 
due 
process 
unless 
the 
defendant 
has 
a 
full 
understanding of the nature of the charges against him."); see 
also State v. Brandt, 226 Wis. 2d 610, 618, 594 N.W.2d 759 
(1999) (application of a set of facts to the appropriate legal 
standard is a question of law we review independently). 
¶17 The standard and procedure for determining whether a 
plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary are laid out in 
Wis. Stat. § 971.0811 and State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 274, 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08 states in relevant part:   
971.08  Pleas of guilty and no contest; withdrawal thereof.  
(1)  Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no contest, it 
shall do all of the following: 
(a) Address the defendant personally and determine that 
the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of 
the charge and the potential punishment if convicted. 
(b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant 
in fact committed the crime charged. 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
16 
 
389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  To withdraw his plea successfully, 
Trochinski must first establish a prima facie case that the 
circuit court violated § 971.08 and allege that he did not know 
or understand the information that the court should have 
provided at the plea hearing.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274; see 
also Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶48; Brandt 226 Wis. 2d at 618;  State 
v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 140-141, 569 N.W.2d 577 (1997).  
Even after establishing a prima facie case, however, Trochinski 
would not automatically be allowed to withdraw his plea.  The 
burden then shifts to the State "to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant's plea was knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently entered."  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274; see 
also Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶49; Brandt 226 Wis. 2d at 618;  Van 
Camp, 213 Wis. 2d at 141. 
¶18 Trochinski contends that he established a prima facie 
case in that he did not understand an element of the charge to 
which he pled.  Specifically, Trochinski argues that he did not 
understand the meaning of "harmful to children."  Trochinski 
contends that his trial counsel did not advise him about this 
element and what the State must show in order to convict him.  
Trochinski alleges he did not understand that the State must 
prove that the nude photographs were patently offensive to 
prevailing community standards regarding what is suitable for 
children——specifically, a child of like age——and lacked serious 
value when taken as a whole.  He further contends that trial 
counsel erroneously failed to show him the jury instruction that 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
17 
 
would have been given if he went to trial.12  Essentially, 
Trochinski argues that because he did not understand how 
"harmful to children" would be judged by the jury with respect 
to Jill, being seventeen years and three months old, he did not 
understand the meaning of that element when he entered his plea.  
To further support his position, Trochinski relies on State v. 
Nichelson, 220 Wis. 2d 214, 225, 582 N.W.2d 460 (Ct. App. 1998), 
where the defendant was permitted to withdraw his plea because 
the record failed to demonstrate that he understood that "for 
the purpose of sexual gratification" was an element of sexual 
assault.  Trochinski contends his situation was similar because 
he did not understand "harmful to children" and, therefore, he 
should be allowed to withdraw his no contest plea. 
¶19 Trochinski also contends that the plea colloquy is 
insufficient to establish that the court inquired and determined 
his knowledge of the "harmful to children" element.  He also 
argues that the plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form, 
which he initialed and signed, provides no evidence that he 
understood that not every photo depicting nudity is harmful to 
children.  Based on this evidence, Trochinski contends that he 
has established the prima facie showing that his plea was not 
knowing and voluntary, and, therefore, the burden shifts to the 
State to establish by clear and convincing evidence that his 
plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary.  Trochinski argues 
                                                 
12 Trochinski refers to Wisconsin Jury Instruction——Criminal 
2142. 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
18 
 
that the State failed to meet this burden and, therefore, he is 
entitled to withdraw his plea as a matter of right.   
¶20 We first turn to Bangert, to determine whether the 
Trochinski's plea is knowing, intelligent and voluntary.  The 
language used in Bangert is instructive here because the circuit 
court's only duty is to "inform the defendant of the charge's 
nature or, instead, to ascertain that the defendant in fact 
possesses such information."  131 Wis. 2d at 269.  Contrary to 
Trochinski's argument, Bangert and subsequent cases do not 
require a court thoroughly to explain or define every element of 
the offense to the defendant. 
¶21 In Bangert, the State and the defendant both admitted 
that the circuit court "neither recited the elements [of the 
offense] nor characterized the nature of the crime in a general 
manner."  Id. at 265.  This court, therefore, held that in order 
to find that a plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the 
circuit court must ensure the defendant understands, or is aware 
of, the essential elements of the crime.13  Using this court's 
superintending and administrative authority, this court required 
circuit courts to determine a defendant's understanding of the 
nature of the charge at the plea hearing.  Id. at 267. 
We characterize this obligation as a duty to first 
inform a defendant of the nature of the charge or, 
                                                 
13 Specifically, this court stated, "the time has arrived to 
require a trial court to do more than merely record the 
defendant's affirmation of 
understanding pursuant to 
sec. 
971.08(1)(a)."  State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 267, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
19 
 
alternatively, to first ascertain that the defendant 
possesses accurate information about the nature of the 
charge.  The court must then ascertain the defendant's 
understanding of the nature of the charge as expressly 
required by sec. 971.08(1)(a). 
Id.  To aid circuit court judges in fulfilling this requirement, 
this court laid out a non-exhaustive list of methods by which a 
circuit 
court 
judge 
could 
determine 
the 
defendant's 
understanding.  We listed the following methods:  (1) summarize 
the elements 
of the crime 
charged 
by reading 
from the 
appropriate jury instruction or from the applicable statute; (2) 
ask defendant's counsel whether he explained the nature of the 
charge to the defendant and request him to summarize the extent 
of the explanation, including a reiteration of the elements, at 
the plea hearing; or (3) expressly refer to the record or other 
evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the nature of the 
charge 
established 
prior 
to 
the 
plea 
hearing 
(e.g., 
"specifically refer to and summarize any signed statement of the 
defendant which might demonstrate that the defendant has notice 
of the nature of the charge").  Id. at 268. 
¶22 Wisconsin's courts have been relying on Bangert since 
it was written in 1986, and nothing in that case suggests that a 
circuit court is required to do as Trochinski suggests here——
describe the elements of the offense and ensure the defendant 
specifically understands how the State must prove each element.  
Trochinski alleges that he did not understand that every nude 
photo of him is not necessarily harmful to children.  However, 
this is not required.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08 and Bangert 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
20 
 
require that Trochinski knew and understood the elements of the 
offense.   
¶23 Applying the Bangert standard and procedure to the 
facts presented here, and upon review of the record, we conclude 
that Trochinski has failed to meet his burden to establish a 
prima facie case.  Trochinski's knowledge of the elements of the 
offense 
is 
clearly 
established 
by 
both 
the 
signed 
plea 
questionnaire 
and 
the 
plea 
colloquy. 
 
The 
elements 
of 
§ 948.11(2) are clearly laid out on the plea questionnaire, 
including "[y]ou exhibited harmful material to a child" and 
"[y]ou 
had 
knowledge 
of 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
material."  
Furthermore, during the plea colloquy Trochinski acknowledged he 
understood the plea form, the information in the form was 
truthful, and again the court summarized the elements of the 
crime as applied to the offense to which Trochinski was pleading 
no contest.  Moreover, at the postconviction hearing, Trochinski 
testified that he understood the elements of the offense, and 
that he knew the photos were harmful and were "totally 
inappropriate" for children. 
¶24 We specifically reject Trochinski's argument that he 
did not understand the meaning of "harmful to children" because 
he did not understand that the jury would decide whether the 
photos were inappropriate for Jill L., who was seventeen years 
and three months old.  Under the laws of Wisconsin, Jill L. was 
still a child because she had not yet attained the age of 
eighteen. 
 See Wis. Stat. § 948.01(1). 
 By 
distinguishing 
between seventeen and eighteen year-olds, the legislature has 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
21 
 
decided that Jill L., at seventeen years and three months old, 
was a child.  As previously stated, the record clearly 
demonstrates that Trochinski knew, understood and acknowledged 
that the photos were harmful to children.  For his plea to be a 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary one, it was therefore not 
necessary that Trochinski be informed by the circuit court judge 
that the photos had to be harmful specifically to Jill.  It was 
his responsibility to determine whether she was a child. 
¶25 Trochinski also relies on State v. Nichelson, 220 
Wis. 2d 214, 582 N.W.2d 460 (Ct. App. 1998) to support his 
position.  However, the facts of Nichelson are not analogous to 
the facts present here.  Among other things, Nichelson involved 
a defendant with a mental handicap and the record was silent 
with respect to the defendant's understanding of at least one 
element 
of 
the 
offense 
charged. 
 
220 
Wis. 2d at 
225.  
Furthermore, the State tried to rely on the defendant's 
testimony at the postconviction hearing, which the circuit court 
found incredible.  Id. at 221-222.  Based on all of these 
circumstances, the court of appeals concluded that "[t]his 
summary is too ambiguous to establish that Nichelson knew or 
understood the State's duty."  Id. at 225.  In contrast, 
Trochinski does not claim to have a mental handicap and, as 
previously demonstrated, the record is not silent on any element 
of the offense. 
¶26 In contrast to Nichelson, this court's decisions in 
State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, and 
State v. Brandt, 226 Wis. 2d 610, 594 N.W.2d 759 (1999), support 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
22 
 
our decision.  In Bollig, the State conceded that the circuit 
court did not inform the defendant of one of the essential 
elements of the offense.  2000 WI 6, ¶51.  Accordingly, the 
court concluded that the defendant made a prima facie showing 
that his plea did not conform to the Bangert requirements.  Id.  
However, this court then relied on the entire record to 
determine that the defendant was aware of all of the elements of 
the crime charged.  Id., ¶53.  Specifically, this court looked 
to 
the 
signed 
plea 
questionnaire, 
containing 
a 
specific 
reference to the elements of the offense, followed by the 
defendant's signature, and the defendant's presence at a pre-
trial hearing.  Id., ¶¶54-55.  "Viewed together, the plea 
questionnaire and Bollig's presence at the pre-trial hearing 
satisfied the State's burden to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that Bollig was aware of the nature of his offense, 
despite the inadequacy of the plea colloquy."  Id., ¶55. 
¶27 Similarly, 
in Brandt, this 
court 
concluded 
that 
despite an incorrect plea questionnaire, the plea colloquy 
established that the defendant was aware of and understood the 
elements of the crime charged.  226 Wis. 2d at 622.  The plea 
questionnaire was admittedly unreliable because the elements set 
forth in the plea questionnaire failed to advise the defendant 
of the nature of the crimes to which he was pleading guilty.  
Id. at 620.  However, this court concluded that since the 
circuit court did not rely on the plea questionnaire in 
accepting the defendant's plea, the deficient plea questionnaire 
does not automatically make the plea itself deficient.  Id. at 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
23 
 
622.  The court then considered the adequacy of the plea 
colloquy, concluding that "the circuit court's plea colloquy 
easily satisfied the constitutional and statutory requirements."  
Id. 
¶28 Brandt and Bollig are persuasive here because in those 
cases this court relied on either the plea questionnaire or the 
plea colloquy to conclude that the defendant understood the 
elements of the offense.  See also, State v. Duychak, 133 
Wis. 2d 307, 314, 395 N.W.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1986) (concluding 
that trial court's compliance with one of the alternative 
methods 
mandated 
in 
Bangert 
reflects 
the 
defendant's 
understanding of the offense).   Here, we have both a complete 
and accurate plea waiver questionnaire and a complete and 
accurate plea colloquy establishing that Trochinski knew and 
understood the elements of the offense to which he was pleading. 
¶29 Furthermore, 
like 
the 
language 
in 
Bangert, 
the 
language in Brandt and Bollig supports our conclusion that a 
valid plea requires only knowledge of the elements of the 
offense, not a knowledge of the nuances and descriptions of the 
elements.  See also State v. McKee, 212 Wis. 2d 488, 494, 569 
N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App 1997) (rejecting argument that additional 
steps beyond Bangert are required for a valid plea).  In Brandt, 
this court quotes with approval from Bangert, "A defendant's 
understanding of the nature of the charge must 'include an 
awareness of the essential elements of the crime.'"  226 
Wis. 2d 610 at 619 (emphasis added).  In Bollig, we also cited 
the Bangert standard, concluding that the State must prove that 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
24 
 
Bollig "was aware of all three elements of his offense, despite 
the inadequacy of the plea colloquy."  2000 WI 6, ¶52 (emphasis 
added).  We further cited Brandt, stating, "The information 
contained in the questionnaire may be used to demonstrate 
Bollig's awareness of the nature of his offense."  Id., ¶54 
(emphasis added). 
¶30 Our previous decisions make it clear that in order for 
Trochinski's plea to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, he 
needed to be aware of the nature of the offense to which he was 
pleading.  Based on the record, including both the signed plea 
questionnaire and the plea colloquy, we, therefore, conclude 
that Trochinski was aware and understood the elements of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) to which he pled.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Trochinski has failed to establish a prima facie 
case that his plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, 
and we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶31 Before 
we 
address 
Trochinski's 
constitutional 
challenge, 
we 
note 
that 
we 
disagree 
with 
the 
dissent's 
characterization of the issue as "whether the totality of the 
facts in the record is sufficient to support the crime to which 
the defendant pleaded."  Dissent at ¶47.  Specifically, the 
dissent contends that Trochinski "did not realize that his 
conduct did not fall within the scope of the conduct prohibited 
under the statute charged."  Id.  The dissent then concludes 
that the circuit court's decision that a sufficient factual 
basis existed to support the plea was an error of law.  Id. at 
¶62.  We respectfully disagree.  When accepting the plea, the 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
25 
 
circuit court explicitly relied on the probable cause portion of 
the complaint as setting forth a factual basis sufficient to 
support the plea.  See note 6, supra.  The facts stated in the 
record, and specifically in the probable cause portion of the 
complaint, are sufficient to uphold the circuit court's decision 
that there is a sufficient factual basis to support the plea.  
The trial court knew, based on the record, that Trochinski 
intentionally gave Jill L., a child, nude photos of himself——
photos which Trochinski himself admits are harmful to children.  
See note 10, supra.  The trial court also knew, based on the 
record, that in addition to the nude photos, Trochinski gave 
Jill L. the alleged Playgirl letter and a personal letter 
inviting her to review the nude photographs.  Accordingly, even 
if we were to frame the issue as whether there was a sufficient 
factual basis to support the plea, we would conclude that the 
circuit court's denial of Trochinski's motion to withdraw his 
plea was not erroneous.  The circuit court's decision that a 
sufficient factual basis existed to support the plea was not an 
error of law. 
¶32 We further disagree with the dissent's conclusion that 
the nude photographs are not "harmful material" and therefore do 
not supply a factual basis for the offense charged.  Dissent at 
¶62.  The dissent concludes that the photos of the defendant 
standing naked in front of a curtain, displaying a non-erect 
penis do not satisfy the three-part variable obscenity test in 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(1)(b).  By applying contemporary community 
standards, we conclude that the nude photos appeal to the 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
26 
 
prurient interest of children, see § 948.11(1)(b)1., and are 
patently offensive with respect to what is suitable for 
children, see § 948.11(1)(b)2.  Further, we conclude that the 
nude photos "lack[] serious literary, artistic, political, 
scientific or educational value for children, when taken as a 
whole."  See § 948.11(1)(b)3.  A reasonable minor of like age of 
Jill 
L., 
seventeen, 
would 
not 
find 
literary, 
artistic, 
political, scientific, or educational value in the photos.  See 
State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 536, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994).  
We, therefore, conclude, as the circuit court did impliedly, 
that the nude photographs are harmful material, and that there 
was a sufficient basis to support Trochinski's plea.  There was 
no error of law.  Further, the circuit court's denial of the 
motion to withdraw the plea was not an erroneous exercise of the 
judge's discretion, and we conclude that the court was correct 
that there was no manifest injustice. 
III 
¶33 We now turn to Trochinski's facial constitutional 
challenge to Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2).  The constitutionality of a 
statute presents a question of law that we review independently, 
benefiting from the analyses of the circuit court and the court 
of appeals.  State v. Weidner, 2000 WI 52, ¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 306, 
611 N.W.2d 684.  "Statutes generally enjoy a presumption of 
constitutionality that the challenger must refute."  Id. (citing 
Wis. Retired Teacher's Ass'n v. Employe Trust Funds Bd., 207 
Wis. 2d 1, 18, 558 N.W.2d 83 (1997).  When a statute infringes 
on First Amendment rights, however, the State bears the burden 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
27 
 
of proving the statute constitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Weidner, 2000 WI 52, ¶7; City of Madison v. Baumann, 162 
Wis. 2d 660, 669, 470 N.W.2d 296 (1991). 
¶34 Before 
addressing 
the 
merits 
of 
Trochinski's 
constitutional 
challenge, 
we 
begin 
by 
examining 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) 
and 
the 
scope 
of 
Trochinski's 
constitutional 
challenge. 
 
Wisconsin 
 Stat. § 948.11(2) 
provides: 
(2)  CRIMINAL PENALTIES.  (a) Whoever, with knowledge 
of the nature of the material, sells, rents, exhibits, 
transfers or loans to a child any harmful material, 
with or without monetary consideration, is guilty of a 
Class E felony.14 
                                                 
14 We note that Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) was substantially 
amended by 2001 Wisconsin Act 16, effective September 1, 2001.  
Section 948.11(2) now reads: 
(a) 
Whoever, with knowledge of the character and 
content of the material, sells, rents, exhibits, 
plays, distributes, or loans to a child any 
harmful material, with or without monetary 
consideration, is guilty of a Class E felony if 
any of the following applies: 
1. 
The person knows or reasonably should know 
that the child has not attained the age of 
18 years. 
2. 
The person has face-to-face contact with the 
child before or during the sale, rental, 
exhibit, playing, distribution, or loan. 
While we note this statutory amendment, we clarify that this 
revised statute was not applicable at the time of Trochinski's 
offense.  Therefore, we base our analysis on Trochinski's 
challenge to the 1997-1998 version, and we do not address a 
constitutional challenge under this revised statute.   
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
28 
 
We note that Trochinski is not challenging the statute as 
applied to this specific set of circumstances.15  Instead, he 
asserts 
a 
facial 
constitutional 
challenge, 
alleging 
that 
§ 948.11(2), on its face, is unconstitutional because he claims 
it imposes strict liability for constitutionally protected 
expression.  
¶35 Trochinski 
claims 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) 
is 
unconstitutional because it does not require proof that the 
offender knew the age of the person to whom the materials were 
displayed.  As a variable obscenity statute, Trochinski argues 
that age is the element that takes conduct out of First 
Amendment protection and makes it criminal.  If the person 
viewing the pictures is eighteen years old, the conduct involves 
protected speech.  If the viewer is not eighteen, however, the 
conduct is criminal.  Trochinski claims that because § 948.11(2) 
does not require proof of a scienter requirement as to the sole 
deciding 
factor 
differentiating 
protected 
expression 
from 
criminal 
conduct——the 
victim's 
age——the 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional. 
                                                 
15 Trochinski 
has 
waived 
his 
right 
to 
challenge 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) as applied, because of his plea.  State 
v. Molitor, 210 Wis. 2d 415, 419, 565 N.W.2d 248 (Ct. App. 
1997).  "A plea of no contest waives all non-jurisdictional 
defects in the proceedings." Id. (citing State v. Princess 
Cinema of Milwaukee, Inc. 96 Wis. 2d 646, 651, 292 N.W.2d 807 
(1980)). 
 
In 
contrast, 
a 
facial 
challenge 
to 
the 
constitutionality of a statute is a matter of subject matter 
jurisdiction and cannot be waived.  Molitor, 210 Wis. 2d 415 at 
419; State ex rel. Skinkis v. Treffert, 90 Wis. 2d 528, 538-539, 
280 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1979). 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
29 
 
¶36 Furthermore, Trochinski adds 
that 
the 
result of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) is self-censorship.  He contends that 
even if a person believes he is communicating with an adult, he 
must nevertheless limit communications to those appropriate for 
children because otherwise he risks absolute liability under the 
variable obscenity statute.  Specifically, Trochinski argues 
that he believed Jill L. was eighteen because Jill L. sold him 
beer, an activity prohibited to minors in Wisconsin.  According 
to Trochinski, because she sold him beer, he was unable to 
ascertain Jill L.'s age, and, therefore, essentially there was 
no personal meeting.16 
                                                 
16 Trochinski's 
"personal 
meeting" 
argument, 
although 
creative, is better characterized as an affirmative defense 
rather than part of a constitutional challenge.  Trochinski 
could have made this argument under § 948.11(2)(c) which states: 
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for a 
violation of this section if the defendant had 
reasonable cause to believe that the child had 
attained the age of 18 years, and the child exhibited 
to the defendant a draft card, driver's license, birth 
certificate or other official or apparently official 
document purporting to establish that the child had 
attained the age of 18 years.  A defendant who raises 
this affirmative defense has the burden of proving 
this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Trochinski perhaps could have utilized this affirmative defense 
in the statute if he showed reasonable cause to believe that 
Jill L. was eighteen (the sale of beer) and that Jill L. had 
exhibited some sort of official proof that she had attained 
eighteen.  As the statute suggests, Trochinski should have acted 
on his purported belief that Jill L. was eighteen by asking her 
age and for official proof that she was indeed eighteen.  
Regardless, Trochinski cannot rely on this defense now because, 
pursuant to his no contest plea, Trochinski waived his right to 
present any such defense.  
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
30 
 
¶37 Trochinski's 
constitutional 
arguments, 
however, 
overlook the holdings of Wisconsin appellate court decisions 
discussing constitutional challenges to statutes that do not 
require the State to prove the offender had knowledge of the 
victim's age.  In State v. Kevin L.C., 216 Wis. 2d 166, 576 
N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1997), the court of appeals specifically 
rejected 
a 
facial 
constitutional 
challenge 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2).  The court concluded that the statute is 
constitutional 
because 
it 
criminalizes 
conduct 
where 
the 
offender has an opportunity to confront personally the child to 
ascertain the child's age.  216 Wis. 2d at 188.  The court of 
appeals specifically relied on this court's holding in State v. 
Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 522, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994), concluding 
that § 948.11(2) is not unconstitutionally overbroad because 
each of the terms——sell, loan, exhibit, and transfer——represent 
a knowing and affirmative act of an individual toward a minor.  
Kevin L.C., 216 Wis. 2d at 185.  The court of appeals then 
looked at United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 
78 (1994), where the United States Supreme Court held that a 
child pornography distribution statute required proof that the 
distributor knew the age of the performers depicted in the 
materials.  In addition, however, the court of appeals noted 
that the Supreme Court discussed an exception to the presumption 
of a scienter requirement where "the perpetrator confronts the 
underage victim personally and may reasonably be required to 
ascertain that victim's age."  X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72 
n.2.  Comparing the type of conduct prohibited in § 948.11(2) to 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
31 
 
statutes prohibiting sexual contact with minors and production 
of child pornography, the court of appeals concluded that all of 
the statutes, including § 948.11(2), criminalize conduct in 
situations involving personal contact between the perpetrator 
and the child-victim.  Kevin L.C., 216 Wis. 2d at 187.  The 
court stated: 
Because 
§ 948.11(2)(a), 
STATS., 
criminalizes 
acts 
where an individual personally confronts, or has the 
opportunity to personally confront, a specific child, 
thereby allowing the individual to easily ascertain 
the child's age, we conclude the statute does not 
create an unreasonable burden on the individual's 
First Amendment rights. 
Id. at 188. 
¶38 This court relied on the same personal contact 
distinction in both State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 589 
N.W.2d 370 (1999), and State v. Weidner, 2000 WI 52, 235 
Wis. 2d 306, 611 N.W.2d 684.17  In Zarnke, we concluded that a 
distribution of child pornography statute was unconstitutional 
as applied to distributors (as opposed to producers), because 
distributors are not in a position for face-to-face contact with 
the child.  224 Wis. 2d at 132 ("[W]e hold that the statute is 
unconstitutional as it applies to those activities which do not 
include some interaction between the accused and the child-
                                                 
17 We 
acknowledge 
that 
both 
State 
v. 
Zarnke, 
224 
Wis. 2d 116, 132, 589 N.W.2d 370 (1999), and State v. Weidner, 
2000 WI 52, ¶37, 235 Wis. 2d 306, 611 N.W.2d 684, involved "as 
applied" 
challenges 
to 
statutes 
rather 
than 
facial 
constitutional challenges.  The substance of the challenges, 
however, related to the scienter requirement and therefore, 
those decisions are instructive here. 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
32 
 
victim.").  In Weidner, this court similarly concluded that 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) is unconstitutional "in the context of 
the internet and other situations that do not involve face-to-
face contact."  2000 WI 52, ¶37.  We specifically distinguished 
the holding in Weidner from Kevin L.C. indicating that Weidner 
"do[es] not disturb [Kevin L.C.'s] holding because that case 
essentially addressed only face-to-face interaction."  Id. 
¶39 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) is already a matter of settled law.  In 
both Thiel and Kevin L.C., this court and the court of appeals, 
respectively, previously addressed the constitutionality of 
§ 948.11(2), and we decline Trochinski's invitation to reverse 
those decisions based on recent cases, which are distinguishable 
on the basis of personal contact.  The scope of § 948.11(2) is 
fundamentally different than the situations in Zarnke and 
Weidner, because under the statute there is a reasonable 
expectation of face-to-face contact.  As we stated in Thiel: 
[T]he language of sec. 948.11 focuses upon the 
affirmative conduct of an individual toward a specific 
minor or minors.  Therefore, an individual violates 
the statute if he or she, aware of the nature of the 
material, knowingly offers or presents for inspection 
to a specific minor or minors material defined as 
harmful to children in sec. 948.11(1)(b). 
183 Wis. 2d at 535.  We reiterate that the personal contact 
between the perpetrator and the child-victim is what allows the 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
33 
 
State to impose on the defendant the risk that the victim is a 
minor.18 
¶40 Here, the personal contact between Trochinski and Jill 
L. is what allows the State to impose on Trochinski the risk 
that Jill L. is a minor.  Trochinski had face-to-face contact 
with Jill L. when he gave her the photos and the letter.  During 
this time, Trochinski had the opportunity to ascertain her age, 
and could have done so by questioning her, and requesting an 
official document verifying that she was eighteen.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(c). 
¶41 Based on this court's previous decisions, concluding 
that Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) is constitutional because the scope 
of conduct criminalized anticipates face-to-face contact between 
the perpetrator and the child-victim, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals.  We specifically reject Trochinski's 
arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it does 
not require the State to prove the defendant knew the victim was 
a minor. 
IV 
¶42 In summary, we affirm the court of appeals' decision 
on both issues.  First, Trochinski has failed to establish a 
                                                 
18 Since 
we 
base 
our 
conclusion 
on 
previous 
cases, 
specifically State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 515 N.W.2d 847 
(1994), and State v. Kevin L.C., 216 Wis. 2d 166, 576 N.W.2d 62 
(Ct. App. 1997), we do not find it necessary to review the 
entire overbreadth analysis here.  See Thiel, 184 Wis. 2d at 523 
(concluding that the statute is rationally related to its 
compelling state interest to protect the well-being of youth). 
No. 
00-2545-CR   
 
34 
 
prima facie case that his no contest plea was not a knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary one.  Both the plea questionnaire and 
the plea colloquy indicate that Trochinski knew and understood 
the elements of the offense to which he was pleading.  Second, 
we reject 
Trochinski's facial constitutional 
challenge to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2).  We conclude, based on this court's 
previous decisions, that the scope of conduct criminalized in 
§ 948.11(2) 
anticipates 
face-to-face 
contact 
between 
the 
perpetrator and the child-victim.  This personal contact allows 
the perpetrator to ascertain reasonably the age of the child-
victim. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  00-2545-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶43 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
Because a sufficient factual basis does not support the 
defendant's no contest plea to the crime charged, I conclude 
that the defendant must be permitted to withdraw his plea.  
Accordingly, I dissent.  
¶44 Before accepting a defendant's plea of no contest, a 
circuit court must satisfy itself that a sufficient factual 
basis exists that the defendant committed the crime to which the 
defendant entered the plea.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1)(b) 
(1999-2000)19 explicitly provides that "[b]efore the court 
accepts 
a 
plea 
of 
guilty 
or 
no 
contest, . . . it 
shall . . . [m]ake such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged."20  When no 
evidence exists as to one of the elements of the crime charged, 
                                                 
19 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 1999-2000 version, unless otherwise indicated. 
20 See State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶23, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 
605 N.W.2d 836; State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 262, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986); White v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 485, 490, 271 
N.W.2d 97 (1978). 
When there is a negotiated plea, as in the present case, 
the circuit court need not go to the same length to determine 
whether the facts would sustain the charge as it would when 
there is no negotiated plea.  Broadie v. State, 68 Wis. 2d 420, 
423-24, 228 N.W.2d 687 (1975); Wilson v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 508, 
513, 204 N.W.2d 508 (1973).   
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a circuit court cannot accept a defendant's plea of guilty or no 
contest.21   
¶45 This court reviews a circuit court's decision denying 
a defendant's motion to withdraw a plea of no contest to 
determine whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in denying the motion.22  "Failure by the circuit 
court judge to ascertain that 'the defendant in fact committed 
the crime charged' is an erroneous exercise of discretion."23  
Thus, when a circuit court erroneously determines that the facts 
are sufficient to constitute the crime charged, the circuit 
court has committed an error of law, and the circuit court has 
erroneously exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's 
motion to withdraw the plea.24  This court must determine in the 
present case whether, as a matter of law, the facts are 
sufficient to constitute the crime charged to which the 
defendant pled no contest.   
                                                 
21 A circuit court does not participate in a plea agreement 
and is not bound by a plea agreement between the State and a 
defendant.  Young v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 361, 367, 182 N.W.2d 262 
(1971); State v. Wolfe, 46 Wis. 2d 478, 488, 175 N.W.2d 216 
(1970). 
22 State v. Smith, 202 Wis. 2d 21, 25, 549 N.W.2d 232 
(1996); White, 85 Wis. 2d at 491. 
23 State v. Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d 239, 244, 558 N.W.2d 375 
(1997).   
A postconviction motion for the withdrawal of a guilty plea 
is granted to correct a manifest injustice.  One type of 
manifest injustice is the failure to establish a sufficient 
factual basis that the defendant committed the offense to which 
he pleads.  Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d at 244.  
24 See White, 85 Wis. 2d at 490-92. 
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¶46 At the hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea, the 
defendant testified that he did not believe that the photographs 
were sufficient to support a conviction for the crime.  The 
circuit court made no finding at that hearing that the facts 
were sufficient to establish the crime.  But the defendant did 
not 
directly 
argue 
that 
no 
factual 
basis 
supported 
his 
conviction.  Rather, both in the circuit court and here, the 
defendant primarily argued that his plea was not voluntary 
because he did not understand the "harmful material" element of 
the offense.  I agree with the circuit court and the majority 
opinion that the plea was voluntary in that the defendant 
understood the nature of the charge. 
¶47 The underlying issue in the case is not, in my view, 
whether the defendant's plea was voluntary, but whether the 
totality of the facts in the record is sufficient to support the 
crime to which the defendant pled.  A circuit court must 
determine whether a factual basis for the crime exists when 
there is a plea of no contest.  The factual basis for a crime 
charged when receiving a no contest plea "is distinct from 
the . . . voluntariness requirement."25  A factual basis must be 
established to "protect a defendant who is in the position of 
pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the 
charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually 
fall within the charge."26  The defendant claims that he did not 
                                                 
25 Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶14, citing White, 85 Wis. 2d at 491. 
26 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969) 
(quoted in White, 85 Wis. 2d at 491). 
No.  00-2545-CR.ssa 
 
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realize that his conduct did not fall within the scope of the 
conduct prohibited under the statute charged. 
¶48 So what is the factual basis for the charge?  The 
complaint in the present case alleges that the defendant 
"unlawfully with knowledge of the nature of the material [did] 
transfer to a child, to-wit: J.A.L., F/W dob: 09-30-81, harmful 
material, to-wit: a picture of himself depicting nudity, 
contrary to Section 948.11(2)(a) Wis. Stats. (Class E Felony)."  
The Statement of Probable Cause describes the photographs as of 
the defendant "standing nude and in a manner displaying his 
penis."  The Statement of Probable Cause also refers to a letter 
the defendant gave the victim "inviting her [the victim] to 
review the photographs and conveying information regarding his 
achievement of being accepted to display himself in Playgirl 
Magazine."  The Statement of Probable Cause also refers to a 
letter from Playgirl Magazine (known to the officer "to be a 
periodical which includes publication of nude photographs of 
male individuals") advising the defendant that he was being 
selected as a subject for entry into the magazine.  
¶49 The photographs were not attached to the complaint or 
Statement of Probable Cause.  The letters were not attached to 
the complaint or the Statement of Probable Cause.  The complaint 
does not allege that the printed materials are harmful material 
under the statute.  Moreover, the printed materials do not fit 
the statutory description of harmful material. 
¶50 At the plea hearing in the present case, the circuit 
court accepted the plea without examining the photographs 
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depicting nudity that the complaint alleges to be the harmful 
material.  The circuit court simply concluded that the record, 
"especially the probable cause section of the complaint," set 
forth a factual basis sufficient to support the plea.  The 
defendant was thereafter sentenced to six years in prison, as 
recommended by the State.27   
¶51 If our examination of the record ended here, it is 
obvious that a sufficient factual basis does not exist to 
support the circuit court's legal conclusion that the facts were 
sufficient to support the defendant's plea to the crime charged.  
The complaint and Statement of Probable Cause simply state that 
the defendant showed photographs of himself nude to a young 
woman who was then seventeen years and three months of age.  
That's it.   
¶52 Not all nude photos shown to a person over the age of 
seventeen but below the age of eighteen violate the statute.  
Although the statute defines "harmful material" to mean a visual 
representation "that depicts nudity,"28 the statute requires that 
the visual representation of nudity be "harmful to children."29  
(Emphasis added.) 
                                                 
27 The defendant was sentenced as a repeater.  He had two 
prior convictions for battery, one that involved violence to a 
child and one that involved intoxication and violence to a 
woman.  In addition, his parole had been revoked twice.   
28 Nudity is defined as the showing of the human male or 
female genitals.  Wis. Stat. § 948.11(1)(d). 
29 Wis. Stat. § 948.11(1)(ar)1.  
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¶53 The statute defines "harmful to children" by setting 
forth a three-part test that must be satisfied in order for a 
visual depiction of nudity to be harmful to children.  The 
three-part test is as follows: 
"Harmful to children" means that quality of any 
description, narrative account or representation, in 
whatever form, of nudity, sexually explicit conduct, 
sexual excitement,30 sadomasochistic abuse, physical 
torture or brutality, when it:   
1. Predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or 
morbid interest of children;  
2. Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in 
the adult community as a whole with respect to what is 
suitable for children; and  
 
3. 
Lacks 
serious 
literary, 
artistic, 
political, 
scientific or educational value for children, when 
taken as a whole.31   
Without examining the photographs, a court cannot determine 
whether the photographs satisfy this three-part test.   
                                                                                                                                                             
The defendant also gave the young woman a copy of a letter 
allegedly from Playgirl and a letter from himself, the contents 
of which are not described in the Statement of Probable Cause.  
The complaint does not allege that these letters are harmful 
materials 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11.  
Section 948.11(1)(ar)2. defines harmful material as printed 
matter that contains a photograph or other visual representation 
violating § 948.11(1)(ar)1. or "explicit and detailed verbal 
descriptions 
or 
narrative 
accounts 
of 
sexual 
excitement, 
sexually 
explicit 
conduct, 
sadomasochistic 
abuse, 
physical 
torture or brutality and that, taken as a whole, is harmful to 
children." 
30 Sexual excitement means the condition of human male or 
female genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or 
arousal.  Wis. Stat. § 948.11(1)(f). 
31 Wis. Stat. § 948.11(1)(b). 
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¶54 Nudity seems to be the least offensive type of visual 
representation listed in the statute.  The other visual 
representations 
falling 
within 
the 
statute 
are 
"sexually 
explicit conduct, sexual excitement, sadomasochistic abuse, 
physical torture or brutality."  Furthermore, the victim here is 
seventeen years and three months of age, nine months short of 
being beyond the age the statute covers.  If the victim were 
eighteen years of age, the defendant could not be charged under 
this statute for displaying the photograph to the young woman. 
¶55 The Wisconsin legislature created a variable obscenity 
statute in Wis. Stat. § 948.11, apparently adapting the Miller32 
obscenity test to proscribe conduct relating to children.  A 
variable obscenity statute delineates what is obscene for 
children; what is obscene for children may very well not be 
obscene for adults.33   
¶56 A problem with § 948.11 is that it does not tell us 
whether the statute is variable within itself regarding the age 
of the children viewing the materials.  This court stated in 
State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 536, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994), 
that 
whether 
any 
given 
material 
lacks 
serious 
literary, 
artistic, 
political, scientific, or 
educational 
value for 
children (§ 948.11(1)(b)3.), when taken as a whole, should be 
                                                 
32 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
33 State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 525 n.13, 515 N.W.2d 847 
(1994). 
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"assessed by a reasonable minor of like age to the minor to whom 
the material is exhibited."34  (Emphasis in original.)   
¶57 If we are to consider the age of the minor victim in 
interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(1)(b)3., 
should 
we 
also 
consider 
the 
age 
of 
the 
minor 
victim 
in 
interpreting 
§ 948.11(1)(b)1. and (1)(b)2.?  If we do not consider the age of 
the minor victim in interpreting what is harmful to children 
under § 948.11(1)(b)1. and (1)(b)2., what age child do we use in 
interpreting the statute?  Five-year-olds are different from 
children who are between seventeen and eighteen years of age.35   
¶58 Thus, a simple review of the facts of the complaint 
and Statement of Probable Cause puts a court on notice that the 
facts stated are not sufficient to constitute the crime to which 
the defendant pled.  However, in other cases involving a review 
of the factual basis of a plea (cases that are not entirely 
similar to the present case), this court has examined the whole 
record.36  I therefore examine the entire record to determine if 
                                                 
34 The supreme court of Virginia concluded that "if a work 
is found to have a serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value for a legitimate minority of normal, older 
adolescents, then it cannot be said to lack such value for the 
entire class of juveniles taken as a whole."  American 
Booksellers Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 882 F.2d 125, 127 (4th Cir. 
1989) (quoting Commonwealth v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 372 
S.E.2d 618, 624 (Va. 1988)). 
35 In Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, ___ U.S. 
___, 2002 WL 970708, *20 (May 13, 2002), Justices Kennedy, 
Souter, and Ginsburg concurring in the judgment stated that the 
court fails to reach the issue "whether the statute's failure to 
distinguish between material that is harmful to a six year old 
versus a sixteen year old is problematic." 
36 See Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶23, citing White, 85 Wis. 2d at 
491. 
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a sufficient factual basis exists to support the defendant's 
plea. 
¶59 Two of the ten photographs referred to in the 
Statement of Probable Cause were offered and received in 
evidence at the sentencing hearing.  The photographs show the 
defendant standing naked in front of a curtain, displaying a 
non-erect penis.   
¶60 Many would probably agree that the defendant's conduct 
is distasteful and even possibly predatory.37  The issue before 
us, however, is not the character of the defendant, or whether 
he engaged in conduct of which we disapprove, or whether he 
engaged in some sort of anti-social or criminal conduct.  The 
issue here is whether the defendant's conduct in displaying the 
photos to a young woman over the age of seventeen years 
constituted, as a matter of law, the offense to which the 
                                                 
37 The 
defendant's 
parole 
officer 
testified 
that 
the 
defendant's conduct was "sexually inappropriate" and "very 
typical of grooming behavior in which the person is trying to 
get the child to have an interest and to manipulate them to have 
sex with them." 
In the sentencing hearing the prosecutor stressed that the 
case was about a man in his late twenties who displayed photos 
of himself and a soliciting type of letter.  "What 29-year-old 
or 28-year-old self-respecting male is going to run around the 
countryside taking pictures of himself standing in the nude 
displaying his male organ, showing them to anybody . . . ?  We 
are talking about someone who is using pictures of himself in 
all likelihood to solicit candidates for his ongoing quest to 
father 12 children . . . ." 
This argument may be valid in a sentencing hearing but this 
argument does not assist in determining whether a factual basis 
exists for the crime charged. 
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defendant pled no contest.  The facts in the entire record raise 
significant doubts.   
¶61 The weakness of the State's decision to prosecute the 
offense charged is clearly demonstrated in the prosecutor's 
argument at sentencing.  At the sentencing hearing the State 
argued that the pictures in and of themselves were not the "sort 
of the thing that would cause the concern that is before [the 
court]."  The State emphasized that the crux of the offense in 
the present case 
was 
that 
the defendant 
was 
using the 
photographs in an attempt to seduce the seventeen-year-old and 
that the defendant should be punished for this predatory 
conduct.   
¶62 After examining the entire record, I am compelled to 
conclude that the circuit court's decision that a sufficient 
factual basis exists to support the plea of no contest was an 
error of law.  The circuit court never analyzed the statutory 
standard 
of 
"harmful 
material" 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 948.11(1)(ar)1. and (1)(b).  The circuit court also 
failed 
to 
apply 
the 
"harmful 
material" 
standard 
to 
the 
photographs in the record and to the circumstances of the case, 
including the age of the victim.  The circuit court concluded 
without explanation and before examining the photographs that 
there was "a factual basis sufficient to support the plea that 
is offered."  The photographs do not supply a factual basis for 
the offense charged. 
¶63 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the 
defendant has raised a serious question as to whether displaying 
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the photographs to the seventeen-year-old plus in the present 
case violates the statutory standard.  I therefore further 
conclude that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in 
refusing to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of no 
contest and that the parties should be returned to their 
respective positions before they entered the plea agreement.  
¶64 One final point.  At least as to a seventeen-year-old 
victim, the statutes seem to punish persons who are less 
culpable more severely than they punish more culpable persons.  
For example, had the defendant had sexual intercourse with the 
victim, a minor over the age of sixteen, he would be guilty of a 
Class A misdemeanor, with a maximum punishment of imprisonment 
not to exceed nine months.38  However, the maximum penalty for 
the felony charged in the present case, displaying a photograph 
of a nude male to a minor who is seventeen years old, is two 
years in prison.  I suggest that the legislature might want to 
review these statutes.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 13.83(1)(c)1 and 
13.93(2)(d). 
¶65 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶66 I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH joins this opinion. 
 
                                                 
38 Wis. Stat. § 948.09. 
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