Case Title: Frank Musa v. Jefferson County Bank

Citation: 2001 WI 2

Docket Number: 1998AP002738

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 2 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2738 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Frank Musa,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Jefferson County Bank,  
 
Defendant, 
James V. Buelow,  
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
Intervenor.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 33 
Reported at:  233 Wis. 2d 241, 607 N.W.2d 349 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
January 17, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
October 31, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
James R. Kieffer 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Sean N. Duffey, Richard H. Schulz and  Schulz & Duffey, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Sean N. Duffey. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by 
J. Paul Neumeier, Jr., Raymond E. Krek and Krek & Associates, 
S.C., Jefferson, and oral argument by J. Paul Neumeier, Jr. 
 
2001 WI 2 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2738 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Frank Musa,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jefferson County Bank,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
James V. Buelow,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
          Intervenor. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Frank Musa 
(Musa), seeks review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals affirming the circuit court's order to set aside a 
jury's award of damages against the respondent, James V. Buelow 
FILED 
 
JAN 17, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Buelow).1  The jury awarded Musa $4,000 in compensatory damages 
for mental health treatment expenses and $50,000 in punitive 
damages.   
¶2 
Musa asserts that the court of appeals improperly 
extended the substantial other damages requirement of Anderson 
v. Continental Insurance Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 
(1978), to recovery of mental health care expenses in an action 
for intentional interference with a contractual relationship.  
Buelow advances that even if the court of appeals erred by such 
an extension, the circuit court's decision must be upheld 
because the jury's award of special damages is not supported by 
an award of general damages and because the mental health 
treatment 
expenses 
are 
subject 
to 
a 
requirement 
of 
foreseeability.  We decline here to extend the substantial other 
damages requirement and we reject Buelow's arguments requiring 
general damages and foreseeability.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
court of appeals and remand to the circuit court.   
¶3 
This case presents us with questions of law regarding 
a jury's award of compensatory and punitive damages.  The 
relevant facts are undisputed.  Musa formerly owned the 
Jefferson House hotel in Jefferson, Wisconsin.  He mortgaged the 
property through the Jefferson County Bank (bank), which had the 
right to approve any sale under the mortgage.  Buelow was the 
bank officer responsible for Musa's account. 
                     
1 Musa v. Jefferson County Bank, 2000 WI App 33, 233 Wis. 2d 
241, 607 N.W.2d 349 (affirming the order and judgment of the 
Circuit Court for Jefferson County, James R. Kieffer, Judge).   
 
 
¶4 
In the early 1980s, Musa attempted to sell the hotel. 
In the process he engaged in discussions and negotiations with 
numerous prospective sellers, including Tzelal Aliu.  No sale 
was completed, and Musa eventually lost the Jefferson House to 
the bank through foreclosure.   
¶5 
In 1989 Musa sued Buelow and the bank, alleging 
numerous causes of action.  Through motions to dismiss, summary 
judgment, appeal, and remand, Musa's case was winnowed to the 
theories of liability that were tried to the jury.  Musa 
proceeded to trial on the claims that both the bank and Buelow, 
personally, were liable for intentional interference with the 
contractual relationship between Musa and several potential 
buyers, including Aliu,2 and that the bank had breached its duty 
of good faith.  Because the factual basis of Musa's claims is 
not relevant to this opinion, it suffices to say that at trial 
Musa presented evidence sufficient to convince the jury of both 
Buelow's and the bank's liability.   
¶6 
This appeal concerns only the damages awarded by the 
jury on the claim that Buelow tortiously interfered with Musa's 
                     
2  Wisconsin courts recognize a cause of action for 
intentional interference with a contractual relationship and 
intentional 
interference 
with 
a 
prospective 
contractual 
relationship.  Cudd v. Crownhart, 122 Wis. 2d 656, 658-59, 364 
N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1985); see also Wis JI—Civil 2780.  In this 
case, the special verdict asked the jury whether Musa had either 
a contract or a 
prospective contract 
with 
each of the 
prospective buyers.  The jury was not required to specify which 
it found.  For simplicity's sake, throughout the opinion we will 
simply refer to Musa's cause of action as one for intentional 
interference with a contractual relationship.   
 
 
contractual relationship with Aliu.  As damages for Buelow's 
tortious 
interference, 
the 
jury 
awarded 
Musa 
$4,000 
in 
compensatory damages for mental health treatment expenses and 
$50,000 in punitive damages.  In answering the special verdict, 
the jury did not award Musa any damages for his pecuniary loss 
of benefits on the contract or for his emotional distress.   
¶7 
On the claim that the bank breached its duty of good 
faith, the jury assessed $385,200 for Musa's pecuniary loss of 
benefit on the Aliu contract.  However, the bank is not a party 
to this appeal.  Neither the claims against it nor the damages 
for which it is liable are at issue.   
¶8 
Upon Buelow's post-verdict motion, the circuit court 
set aside the damages assessed against Buelow on the Aliu claim. 
The court offered two justifications for vacating the $4,000 
compensatory damage award.  First, the court applied the 
foreseeability requirement for consequential damages arising 
from a breach of contract and concluded that the mental health 
care expenses were not foreseeable.  Second, the court stated 
that it could not find authority for awarding consequential 
damages in the absence of damages for a pecuniary loss of 
benefits 
on 
the 
Aliu 
contract. 
 
Having 
set 
aside 
the 
compensatory award, the court concluded that the punitive 
damages must likewise be set aside.   
¶9 
Musa appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. 
Initially the court of appeals affirmed on the grounds that the 
mental health treatment expenses were not foreseeable.  However, 
 
 
the court withdrew that opinion and affirmed on alternative 
grounds.   
¶10 In its published opinion, the court of appeals 
concluded that the compensatory damage award failed because the 
"substantial 
other 
damages" 
requirement 
of 
Anderson 
v. 
Continental Insurance Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 
(1978), for recovery of emotional distress damages in the 
intentional tort context applies with equal force to damages for 
mental health care treatment expenses.  The court extended the 
Anderson requirement because it concluded that a plaintiff must 
necessarily establish "severe emotional distress" in order to 
recover mental health treatment costs.  Thus, the court 
reasoned, 
the 
award 
implicates 
the 
same 
policy 
concerns 
underlying the Anderson substantial other damages requirement. 
¶11 Because the jury awarded Musa no other compensatory 
damages with regard to Buelow, the court of appeals concluded 
that the Anderson requirement was not met.  The court's decision 
to vacate the $4,000 award left Musa with no compensatory damage 
award against Buelow, and thus the punitive damages were 
invalid.3   
¶12 Musa asserts that the court of appeals improperly 
extended the substantial other damages requirement of Anderson 
to recovery of mental health care expenses.  In response, Buelow 
                     
3 The court also rejected Musa's argument that certain 
damages awarded to him vis à vis the bank should be used to 
support the damages awarded against Buelow.  Musa has raised 
this argument before this court as well.  However, because we 
reverse on different grounds, we need not decide the issue.  
 
 
argues that the substantial other damages requirement is 
applicable and also asks us to uphold the decision to set aside 
the compensatory damage award on two other grounds.  First, he 
argues that the mental health treatment expenses, as special 
damages, are not recoverable in the absence of an award of 
general damages.  Second, he argues that the court should employ 
a foreseeability requirement found in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 774A to the mental health care treatment expenses.  
The fate of the punitive damage award hinges on the validity of 
the compensatory damage award.   
¶13 Each of the issues raised by the parties presents us 
with a question of law.  We review such questions independently 
of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and the 
court of appeals.  Miller v. Thomack, 210 Wis. 2d 650, 658, 563 
N.W.2d 891 (1997).  
¶14 The first question we address is whether recovery of 
damages for mental health care treatment expenses under a theory 
of intentional interference with contract is subject to a 
requirement of substantial other damages.  We conclude that 
recovery of these expenses is not contingent upon recovery of 
such other damages.   
¶15 In Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co., this court 
explained that for an insured to recover emotional distress 
damages in a bad faith action against an insurer, the plaintiff 
must "plead and prove substantial damages aside and apart from 
the emotional distress itself and the damages occasioned by the 
simple breach of contract."  85 Wis. 2d at 695-96.  While the 
 
 
focus of Anderson was on the bad faith cause of action, the 
court also stated that for intentional torts, in general, 
recovery of emotional distress requires "substantial other 
damages in addition to damages for emotional distress."  Id. at 
694. 
¶16 In Bauer v. Murphy, the court of appeals applied the 
substantial 
other 
damages 
requirement 
to 
an 
action 
for 
intentional interference with a contractual relationship.  191 
Wis. 2d 517, 534-35, 530 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1995).  Thus, 
pursuant to Bauer, an award of emotional distress damages in a 
tortious interference case will not survive in the absence of 
substantial other damages.   
¶17 In the case at hand, however, the jury did not award 
Musa emotional distress damages.  It awarded him damages for 
mental health treatment expenses.  Musa argues that this 
distinction renders the rule of Anderson inapplicable.  Buelow, 
echoing the court of appeals' reasoning, argues that the policy 
reasons underlying 
the Anderson substantial 
other damages 
requirement apply equally to mental health treatment expenses 
and emotional distress damages.  We agree with Musa and refuse 
to extend the substantial other damages requirement to the 
recovery of mental health care treatment costs. 
¶18 Requiring substantial other damages as a prerequisite 
to the recovery of mental health treatment expenses would 
require us to treat such expenses as a class apart from other 
medical, hospital, and related expenses.  While we have never 
specifically held that recovery of mental health treatment costs 
 
 
is subject to the same standards as recovery of other health 
care expenses, Wisconsin courts have never treated mental health 
treatment expenses differently than other health care costs.4   
¶19 In order to recover mental health care expenses, or 
any health care expenses for that matter, a plaintiff must bring 
forth evidence that the charges were reasonably and necessarily 
incurred for treatment of injuries or conditions arising from 
the occurrence which is the subject of the action.  See 
Lautenschlager v. Hamburg, 41 Wis. 2d 623, 630, 165 N.W.2d 129 
(1969); see also Wis JI—Civil 1756.  Thus, while Buelow contends 
that there is a "qualitative difference" between mental health 
treatment and other forms of medical care, we find no legally 
significant differences in the context of recovery of medical 
expenses.   
                     
4  One authoritative text on Wisconsin's law of damages 
explains the scope of recoverable medical, hospital, and related 
expenses:  
Recoverable items 
of 
damages include 
charges by 
medical 
doctors, 
osteopaths, 
chiropractors, 
psychologists, psychiatrists, and consultants whose 
services 
are 
requested 
by 
treating 
physicians.  
Recoverable 
items 
further 
include 
charges 
for 
hospitalization, 
nursing 
care, 
diagnostic 
tests, 
medications, therapy, medical appliances, domestic 
help, and transportation to and from health care 
providers. 
 
Russell M. Ware, ed., The Law of Damages in Wisconsin § 9.5 (2d 
ed. 1994-95) (emphasis added).  Nothing in this text suggests 
that recovery of mental health treatment costs in a tort action 
is or should be treated any differently than recovery of other 
health care costs.   
 
 
¶20 Moreover, mental health treatment expenses do not 
implicate the policy concerns that have caused courts to 
exercise reserve in the context of emotional distress damages 
and which justify the substantial other damages requirement.  
The difficulty in establishing the authenticity of a claim of 
emotional distress and the fear of unlimited liability on the 
part of the tortfeasor have historically led courts to place 
impediments in the way of a plaintiff's access to emotional 
distress damages.  Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 
Wis. 2d 627, 639, 655, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994).   
¶21 We have no reason to believe that the authenticity of 
mental health treatment expenses poses a problem given the 
likely existence of documentation of those expenses.  Likewise, 
we note that a tortfeasor's liability for mental health 
treatment expenses is not without limits.  Such expenses are 
submitted in a specific dollar amount and must be established to 
be both reasonable in amount and necessary.   
¶22 While the court of appeals concluded that the policy 
concerns underlying the substantial other damages requirement 
were implicated in this case, it did so only because it 
misconstrued what is needed to prove mental health treatment 
costs in an action for tortious interference with contract.  The 
court injected a requirement that the plaintiff establish 
"severe emotional distress" into the tried and true formula for 
recovery of medical expenses. 
¶23 While severe emotional distress is required to recover 
emotional distress damages in some contexts, e.g., Anderson, 85 
 
 
Wis. 2d at 696, no Wisconsin court has ever held that emotional 
distress is a prerequisite to recovery of mental health care 
expenses.  Indeed, requiring proof of emotional distress to 
recover mental health care treatment costs would be akin to 
requiring a plaintiff to prove pain and suffering in order to 
recover other medical expenses to treat a physical injury.  
However, we long ago rejected the notion that the law required 
such proof.  Dickman v. Schaeffer, 10 Wis. 2d 610, 616, 103 
N.W.2d 922 (1960).   
¶24 Additionally, the parties engage in an ancillary 
debate over whether an award of mental health care costs might 
itself constitute substantial other damages supporting an award 
of emotional distress damages.  Buelow argues that if an award 
of mental health care expenses can itself constitute substantial 
other damages, fraudulent claims of emotional distress damages 
will become more common.  He argues that in the absence of a 
substantial 
other 
damages 
requirement 
for 
those 
costs, 
fraudulent plaintiffs will pursue intentional tort actions in 
which the only damages are mental health care expenses and 
emotional distress damages. 
¶25 However, no Wisconsin case has held that mental health 
treatment expenses can satisfy the substantial other damages 
requirement.  Indeed, the phrase "substantial other damages" has 
remained largely undefined and the few attempts to define the 
term have led to inconsistent results.  See, e.g., Bauer, 191 
Wis. 2d at 535 ("special damages"); Estate of Plautz v. Time 
 
 
Ins. Co., 189 Wis. 2d 136, 159, 525 N.W.2d 342 (Ct. App. 1994) 
("something more than 'nominal damages'"). 
¶26 Thus, 
the 
premise 
remains 
unproven, 
and because 
defining the scope of the substantial other damages requirement 
would require us to travel far afield from the determinative 
issues of this appeal, we leave the question for another day.  
Rather than altering the principles underlying recovery of 
medical expenses to address Buelow's hypothetical concerns, we 
will wait for a case in which emotional distress damages are 
actually awarded to address those concerns. 
¶27 In sum, we disagree with the court of appeals' 
conclusion that recovery of mental health treatment expenses in 
an action for intentional interference with a contractual 
relationship requires an award of substantial other damages.  
Having so concluded, we next turn to Buelow's alternative 
challenges to the award of compensatory damages.   
¶28 Buelow 
argues 
that 
the 
award 
of 
mental 
health 
treatment costs is invalid because it violates the "general 
rule" that "a verdict for special damages without an allowance 
for general damages is improper."  22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 42 
(1988).  Although the terms are rather common in the parlance of 
attorneys, in recent decades this court has not placed much 
importance on the generic labels "general" and "special" 
 
 
damages.5  However, to address Buelow's argument, we will apply 
those terms to the present context. 
¶29 The classification of compensatory damages as either 
general or special damages is specific to the cause of action 
being discussed.  General damages are broadly defined as 
 
those losses which naturally, or necessarily, result 
from the defendant's wrongful conduct and the type of 
injury 
the 
plaintiff 
sustained. . . .  
Stated 
otherwise, general damages are those damages which 
usually accompany the kind of wrongdoing alleged in 
the complaint . . . . 
1 Jerome H. Nates, et al., Damages in Tort Actions § 3.01[3][a] 
(2000).  In a personal injury action, for example, this would 
describe pain and suffering.  In the tortious interference with 
contract context, this most accurately describes the pecuniary 
loss of the benefits of the contract or prospective contract.  
The jury awarded Musa no such damages.   
                     
5  In recent years the distinction has been discussed in a 
line of cases concerning victim restitution under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20.  E.g., State v. Holmgren, 229 Wis. 2d 358, 365, 599 
N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1999).   
In one such case, the court of appeals explained the rather 
limited significance of the distinction in the tort context: 
In tort law . . . concepts of general and special 
damages have meaning primarily at the pleading stage 
of the action, where the question usually is one of 
"fair notice from the pleadings."  As a result, the 
discussions in cases and texts generally focus on the 
need for specific allegations of injury in the 
complaint.  2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts sec. 
25.5, at 1309 (1956).   
 
State v. Stowers, 177 Wis. 2d 798, 804, 503 N.W.2d 8 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
 
 
¶30 However, the jury did award Musa special damages.  
Such damages are generally defined as those that are the  
 
natural, but not the necessary result of an alleged 
wrong . . . .  Special damages are those damages, the 
amount and nature of which are peculiar to each 
individual 
plaintiff. . . . Among 
the 
items 
often 
classified as special damages are: the cost of medical 
care, the amount of lost wages or impairment of 
earning capacity. . . . 
 
Id.  Thus, Buelow correctly characterizes the mental health care 
bills for which the jury awarded Musa $4,000 as special damages. 
 See also State v. Stowers, 177 Wis. 2d 798, 805, 503 N.W.2d 8 
(Ct. App. 1993).   
¶31 While some authorities may consider it a general rule 
that general damages are a prerequisite to an award of special 
damages, this is not the law of Wisconsin and has not been for 
some time.  In Dickman, 10 Wis. 2d at 616, this court upheld a 
jury verdict in a personal injury action awarding both medical 
expenses and lost wages without an award for pain and suffering. 
 Likewise, in Jahnke v. Smith, 56 Wis. 2d 642, 653, 203 N.W.2d 
67 (1973), this court upheld a similar verdict awarding medical 
expenses without an award for pain and suffering.  See also 
Staehler v. Beuthin, 206 Wis. 2d 610, 623, 557 N.W.2d 487 (Ct. 
App. 1996) (concluding that verdict awarding damages for medical 
expenses, 
but 
not 
for 
pain 
and 
suffering, 
was 
neither 
inconsistent nor perverse).  Although we did not use the 
nomenclature of "general" or "special" damages, we rejected in 
each of these cases a challenge to a verdict awarding special 
 
 
damages, namely medical expenses and lost wages, in the absence 
of general damages, i.e., pain and suffering.  
¶32 Our precedent thus clearly allows for the award of 
special damages in the absence of general damages.  Accordingly, 
we find no reason to uphold the circuit court's decision to 
vacate the award of compensatory damages on this basis. 
¶33 Buelow's other challenge to the compensatory damage 
award is that the award of mental health treatment expenses is 
subject to a foreseeability requirement, which cannot be 
satisfied in this case.  Buelow directs us to the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 774A, which imposes a foreseeability 
requirement on damages for "emotional distress or actual harm to 
reputation."6  For the same reasons that he offers in support of 
the substantial other damages requirement, he argues that we 
should apply principles of emotional distress damages to mental 
health treatment costs.   
                     
6 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A states, in pertinent 
part: 
(1) One who is liable to another for interference with 
a  contract or prospective contractual relation is 
liable for damages for 
 
(a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of 
the contract or the prospective relation; 
 
(b) consequential damages for which the 
interference is a legal cause; and 
 
(c) emotional distress or actual harm to 
reputation, if they are reasonably to be 
expected to result from the interference.   
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A (1979).   
 
 
¶34 As we explained above, however, we refuse to treat the 
requirements for emotional distress damages as necessarily 
applicable to mental health treatment expenses.  Therefore, even 
if we were to adopt and follow lockstep the Restatement section, 
we would reject the notion that the foreseeability provision is 
necessarily applicable to mental health treatment expenses.  
Accordingly, we do not subject the award of mental health 
treatment expenses to a foreseeability requirement grounded in 
the authority offered by Buelow.7  
¶35 We next turn to the matter of punitive damages.  Our 
determination with respect to the compensatory damage dictates 
our punitive damage determination.  Punitive damages cannot be 
awarded in the absence of other damages.  Tucker v. Marcus, 142 
Wis. 2d 425, 442-46, 418 N.W.2d 818 (1988).  The circuit court 
and the court of appeals determined that the perceived failings 
of the compensatory damage award doomed the award of punitive 
damages, and Buelow suggests no other basis for the invalidity 
of the punitive damages.  Because we have determined that the 
jury's award of compensatory damages is valid, the punitive 
                     
7  Buelow has cited only the Restatement provision in 
support of his argument that a foreseeability requirement 
applies to the award of damages for mental health treatment 
expenses.  We recognize that there is a line of argument 
suggesting 
that 
a 
foreseeability 
requirement 
grounded 
in 
contract law applies to all consequential damages for which 
recovery is sought in an intentional interference with a 
contract claim.  Indeed, this was the basis for the circuit 
court's decision and the court of appeals' withdrawn opinion.  
However, Buelow neither briefed nor argued the issue of 
foreseeability in such a manner, and therefore we do not address 
that line of reasoning.   
 
 
damage award's sole deficiency has been cured.  We therefore 
conclude that the $50,000 punitive damage award assessed by the 
jury must be reinstated.  
¶36 Finally, we note that the dissent arrives at the wrong 
answer because it responds to the wrong question.  We reiterate 
that the jury did not award Musa damages for emotional distress. 
 It awarded him damages in this tort action for mental health 
care expenses.  Yet the dissent frames the question and analyzes 
this case as though it were a claim for emotional distress.   
¶37 No Wisconsin court has held that an award of mental 
health care expenses is the same as damages for emotional 
distress.  Indeed, no Wisconsin court has ever held that 
recovery of damages for emotional distress is a prerequisite to 
recovery of mental health care expenses, and we decline to do so 
today.   
¶38 In conclusion, we do not extend the substantial other 
damages requirement of Anderson to recovery of mental health 
treatment expenses in an action for intentional interference 
with a contract.  We also reject the contentions that such an 
award is invalid in the absence of an award of general damages 
or that the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A necessitates 
that the mental health treatment expenses be foreseeable.  The 
$4,000 compensatory damage award is valid, and as such there is 
no basis for striking the $50,000 punitive damage award. 
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and remand the 
cause for entry of judgment in accordance with this decision. 
 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
 
 
¶39 DIANE 
S. 
SYKES, 
J. (dissenting). 
I 
respectfully 
dissent.  The majority opinion broadly authorizes recovery of 
mental health treatment expenses in a claim for tortious 
interference with contract.  It does so in a case in which no 
damages for mental distress were proven, and, indeed, no other 
compensatory damages of any kind were awarded against the 
defendant.  This is contrary to the law governing recovery of 
emotional distress damages in the intentional tort context, as 
outlined in Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co., 85 Wis. 2d 
675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978). 
¶40 The jury in this case found that defendant Buelow 
tortiously interfered with plaintiff Musa's prospective contract 
regarding the sale of a hotel.  The jury did not, however, award 
any pecuniary (loss of contract benefits) or emotional distress 
damages 
against 
Buelow. 
 
Instead, 
it 
awarded 
an 
amount 
corresponding to Musa's mental health treatment expenses—$4,000—
as consequential damages, plus $50,000 in punitive damages.  The 
circuit court set aside the mental health treatment damages as 
unforeseeable and unsupported by any pecuniary damages.  The 
circuit court then eliminated the punitive damages award since 
there were no longer any compensatory damages to support it.  
The court of appeals affirmed based upon Anderson. 
¶41 In Anderson, this court recognized the tort of bad 
faith refusal to honor an insurance claim.  In doing so, the 
court acknowledged the risks associated with the creation of a 
tort in the contract context, in particular, the danger of 
expanding the categories of allowable damages, since tort law is 
 
 
more liberal than contract as far as the types of recoverable 
damages are concerned.  As a result, the court took pains to 
specify the rules of limitation applicable to recovery of 
damages for emotional injury in tort: 
 
It is apparent . . . that another aspect of the 
in terrorem nature of an action for bad faith arises 
because it is an intentional tort.  Intentional torts 
may 
in 
some 
circumstances 
result 
in 
not 
only 
compensatory damages, but also punitive damages and 
damages for emotional injury. . . .  
 
Some generalities in respect to damages for mental 
distress . . . are . . . [therefore] appropriate. 
 
 
In 
negligent 
torts, 
mental 
distress 
is 
compensable only when there is an accompanying or 
resulting physical injury.  Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 47 
Wis. 2d 220, 177 N.W.2d 83 (1970).  In intentional 
torts, substantial other 
damages 
in addition to 
damages for emotional distress are required.   D.R.W. 
Corp. v. Cordes, 65 Wis. 2d 303, 222 N.W.2d 671 
(1974).  Where the tort is specifically that of the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, no other 
damages 
need 
be 
alleged 
or 
proved. 
 
However, 
additional limitations are imposed on a cause of 
action for the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  A plaintiff must prove that the purpose of 
the conduct was to cause emotional distress, that the 
conduct was extreme and outrageous, that it was the 
cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury, and that the 
plaintiff suffered an extreme disabling emotional 
response.  McKissick v. Schroeder, 70 Wis. 2d 825, 
832, 235 N.W.2d 686 (1975); Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 
Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963). 
 
. . . . 
 
[T]he tort of bad faith falls within the second 
category described above, where substantial other 
damages in addition to the emotional distress are 
required if there is to be recovery for damages 
resulting from the infliction of emotional distress.  
In the bad faith cause of action against an insurance 
 
 
company, we therefore conclude that to recover for 
emotional distress . . . the plaintiff must plead and 
prove substantial damages aside and apart from the 
emotional distress itself and the damages occasioned 
by the simple breach of contract.   
 
. . . .  
 
 
We 
[further] 
conclude . . . consistent 
with . . .  McKissick and Alsteen, supra, that in no 
circumstances may a plaintiff recover for emotional 
distress, even when there are other accompanying 
damages, unless the emotional distress is severe.  A 
recovery for emotional distress caused by an insurer's 
bad faith refusal to pay an insured's claim should be 
allowed 
only 
when 
the 
distress 
is 
severe 
and 
substantial other damage is suffered apart from the 
loss of the contract benefits and the emotional 
distress. 
Anderson, 85 Wis. 2d at 694-96 (emphasis supplied). 
¶42 I have quoted at some length from the Anderson opinion 
because I think the majority has strayed far from the rules it 
established for recovery of damages for emotional injury in an 
intentional 
tort 
claim. 
 
The 
substantial 
other 
damages 
requirement, and the requirement that the emotional injury be 
severe in order to be recoverable, exist to preclude recovery 
for insignificant, questionable, or feigned emotional injuries 
associated with intentional torts that otherwise have nothing to 
do with emotional distress or injury.  Where the tort arises in 
the contract setting, the substantial other damages requirement 
is also a necessary bulwark against the wholesale erosion of the 
border between contract and tort law remedies.  
¶43 The majority acknowledges that Anderson's substantial 
other damages rule was extended to tortious interference with 
contract claims in Bauer v. Murphy, 191 Wis. 2d 517, 534-35, 530 
 
 
N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1995).  The majority does not overrule 
Anderson or Bauer, or otherwise circumscribe their application. 
 Rather, the majority simply treats the mental health expenses 
award in this case as a routine medical and hospital special 
damages award, as if this were a garden-variety personal injury 
case instead of a tortious interference with contract claim.  In 
other words, the majority characterizes the $4,000 mental health 
treatment award against Buelow as something somehow unconnected 
to an award for emotional injury.  This characterization takes 
the award outside the confines of Anderson and Bauer altogether, 
thus avoiding the requirement of substantial other damages to 
support it. 
¶44 This cuts the heart out of the substantial other 
damages 
requirement, 
clearing 
the 
way 
for 
the 
sorts 
of 
questionable 
emotional 
injury 
claims 
in 
intentional 
tort 
lawsuits that Anderson specifically sought to avoid.  The 
majority states that "no Wisconsin court has ever held that 
emotional distress is a prerequisite to recovery of mental 
health care expenses."  Majority op. at ¶23.  Perhaps this is 
because the premise seems fairly self-evident.  How can mental 
health treatment expenses be legally recoverable if there is no 
compensable mental distress in the first place?  This is not 
comparable to recovery of medical and hospital expenses in the 
absence of an award for pain and suffering in a personal injury 
action, for the simple reason that this is not a personal injury 
action.  This is an economic tort, and the law specifies some 
 
 
limits on the recovery of damages for emotional injuries in this 
context. 
¶45 The important prerequisite here is that set forth in 
Anderson: before any damages for emotional injury can be 
recovered in an intentional tort that does not have the 
infliction of emotional distress as its gravamen, there must be 
substantial other damage, proof of some significant harm 
stemming from the tort that is separate and apart from any 
claimed emotional injury.  If there is such harm, then the law 
will recognize a collateral, causal emotional injury, assuming 
it is severe, as legitimate and compensable.  If there is not, 
then the law will not allow recovery of damages related to 
emotional distress, on the theory that if the tortious conduct 
has caused no (or insubstantial) damage, then any emotional 
reaction to it does not deserve to be compensated. 
¶46 And clearly, any expense incurred to treat emotional 
distress cannot itself satisfy the substantial other damages 
requirement.  Anderson requires that the substantial other 
damages must be separate and apart from any damage attributable 
to emotional distress. 
¶47 The court of appeals' decision in this case was not so 
much an extension of Anderson as a straightforward application 
of its principles.  I agree with its analysis.  The $4,000 
consequential damages award against Buelow was properly set 
aside as unsupported by substantial other damages.  This leaves 
the punitive damages award unanchored to any compensatory 
damages, and it too was properly set aside. See Tucker v. 
 
 
Marcus, 
142 
Wis. 
2d 
425, 
431, 
418 
N.W.2d 
818 
(1988).8  
Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals. 
¶48 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this dissenting opinion.   
 
                     
8 Musa argues in the alternative that the pecuniary damages 
award against Jefferson County Bank, Buelow's employer, should 
be sufficient to sustain the punitive damages award against 
Buelow.  There is no authority for permitting a compensatory 
damages award against one defendant to support a punitive 
damages award against another.