Case Title: HASBROUCK v KRSUL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12958 IN T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 W. E A R L H A S B R O U C K , d/b/a G R E A T FALLS TERMINAL W A R E H O U S E C O M P A N Y , P l a i n t i f f , -vs - JOHN C. KRSUL, SHERIFF, Defendant and Third Party P l a i n t i f f , -vs - and Appellant DORM WILSON, Third Party Defendant, and E. F. GIANOTTI, Additional t h i r d Party Defendant, and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R. J. Nelson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant: Graybill, Ostrem, Warner and Crotty, Great Falls, Montana Donald Ostrem argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Smith, Emmons and B a i l l i e , Great F a l l s , Montana William L. B a i l l i e argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: September 24, 1975 Decided: NCjV 1975 x , ' > . , Filed : , 5 - 2- 1 ;/3 M r . Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from an order dismissing a third party complaint for failure t o s t a t e a claim upon which r e l i e f may be granted. M.R.Civ.P., Rule 12(b)c6). The order was made i n an action brought t o recover certain storage fees in the d i s t r i c t court, Cascade County, Judge R. J. Nelson presiding. Appellant, third party p l a i n t i f f , Sheriff John C. Krsul was defendant i n an action brought by one Hasbrouck for the stor- age of goods i n the amount of $775.50. Appellant Sheriff had levied on the goods pursuant t o a w r i t of execution issuing upon a c i v i l judgment obtained by respondent's c l i e n t , Dorla Wilson. MIS, Wilson, who i s admittedly judgment proof, was made a third party defendant i n t h i s action by appellant. Subsequently a motion for summary judgment was granted Hasbrouck against appellant Krsul for $775.50. The appellant next joined respondent attorney E. I ? . Gianotti a s another third party defendant. Respondent then moved t o dismiss the third party complaint for failure t o s t a t e a claim. The d i s t r i c t court granted the motion t o dismiss from which appellant has appealed. I n i t i a l l y we consider whether such motion t o dismiss i s appealable. While t h i s issue was not briefed nor argued by counsel, past decisions of t h i s Court can be found both denying and allowing appeals from the granting of motions dismissing complaints for failure t o s t a t e a claim. Payne v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 142 Mont. 406, 385 P.2d 100; Rambur v. Diehl Lumber Co., 143 Mont. 432, 391 P.2d 1; Prentice Lumber Co. v. Hukill, 161 Mont. 8, 504 P.2d 277. W e think the view expressed i n Prentice Lumber Co. t o be applicable here, because the practical effect of the d i s t r i c t court's order is t o leave appellant without opportunity for further judicial r e l i e f , just a s i f judgment had been rendered against him. Therefore, the order of Judge Nelson i s properly before t h i s Court on appeal. In judging the correctness of that order we apply the s t r i c t standard for Federal Rule 12, a f t e r which ~ o n t a n a ' s Rule 12, M.R.Civ.P., was patterned. In Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, "* * * a complaint should not be dismissed for failure t o s t a t e a claim unless it appears be- yond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts i n support of h i s claim which would e n t i t l e him t o relief." See also discussion of Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., i n Duffy v. Butte ~ e a c h e r s ' Union, No. 332, e t a l . , our cause No. 13938, handed down October 31, 1975, M o n t . 9 P.2d Appellant argues that a specific Montana s t a t u t e section 2-212(1), R.C.M. 1947, authorizes a claim against an agent of a disclosed principal i n certain limited circumstances. W e agree. Specifically, section 2-212(1) provides: 1 I One who assumes t o a c t as an agent i s responsible t o third persons a s a principal for h i s a c t s i n the course of h i s agency, in any of the following cases, and i n no other: "1. When, with h i s . consent, - credit is given t o him personally i n a transaction". (Emphasis added. ) In the face of t h i s specific statute, the amended com- plaint of Sheriff Krsul, a s third party p l a i n t i f f , against attorney Gianotti, as third party defendant, makes it clear that the Sheriff knew that attorney Gianotti was an agent and that credit was not extended t o him personally. That complaint, i n each instance, recites both the principal and her attorney, but nowhere alleges that personal c r e d i t was given independent of the principal. Under these circumstances the s t a t u t e controls and the t r i a l court was correct i n dismissing the complaint for failure t o s t a t e a claim. W e affirm the order of dismissal. We concur: 8 . , . " e m 4 ' ,,- - ..- % , ? c , - . ... -- d Ch' f Justice R F -- A d d Justices;