Case Title: Montez v. Czerniak

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2011-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed: March 20, 2014 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
 
MARCO ANTONIO MONTEZ, 
Petitioner on Review, 
 
v. 
 
STANLEY CZERNIAK, Superintendent,  
Oregon State Penitentiary, 
Respondent on Review. 
 
(CC 97C12376; CA A130258; SC S059138) 
 
 
On review from the Court of Appeals.* 
 
 
Argued and submitted September 17, 2012; resubmitted January 7, 2013. 
 
 
Daniel J. Casey, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on 
review. 
 
 
Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the 
brief for respondent on review.  With him on the brief were Mary H. Williams, Deputy 
Attorney General, Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, Kathleen Cegla, Assistant Attorney 
General, and Pamela Walsh, Assistant Attorney General. 
 
 
Before Balmer, Chief Justice, Walters and Baldwin, Justices, and Riggs and 
Durham, Senior Judges, Justices pro tempore.** 
 
 
BALMER, C. J. 
 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the post-conviction 
court are affirmed. 
 
 
*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Don Dickey, Judge. 237 Or App 276, 
239 P3d 1023 (2010). 
 
 
**De Muniz, Kistler, Linder, Landau, and Brewer, JJ., did not participate in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
BALMER, C.J. 
1 
 
 
Petitioner was convicted of aggravated murder in 1988 and, following a 
2 
1992 penalty-phase retrial, was sentenced to death for that crime.  Petitioner now seeks 
3 
post-conviction relief, arguing that he received constitutionally inadequate assistance of 
4 
counsel during that 1992 penalty-phase proceeding.  The post-conviction court denied 
5 
relief and the Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.  For the reasons set out below, we 
6 
also affirm. 
7 
I.  HISTORY AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
8 
 
 
In 1987, petitioner and another man beat, raped, and sodomized a female 
9 
victim in a Portland motel room.  When the victim resisted, petitioner responded by 
10 
forcing his fist into her anus, causing her to bleed profusely.  The two men then tied the 
11 
victim's arms behind her back and strangled her to death with a fabric noose that they had 
12 
fashioned.  After carrying her body to the bed, the pair doused her corpse in flammable 
13 
liquid and ignited it.  Firefighters discovered the body shortly thereafter when they 
14 
responded to the resulting fire. 
15 
 
 
In 1988, a jury convicted petitioner of first-degree arson, abuse of a corpse, 
16 
and three counts of aggravated murder.  At the time of the penalty-phase proceedings that 
17 
followed, ORS 163.150 (1987) required juries in aggravated murder cases to consider 
18 
only three penalty-related issues:  (1) whether the conduct that had killed the victim was 
19 
undertaken deliberately and with a reasonable expectation that death would result; (2) 
20 
whether there was a probability that the defendant would commit further acts of criminal 
21 
violence so as to constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) if warranted by the 
22 
 
 
 2 
evidence, whether the conduct that had killed the victim was an unreasonable response to 
1 
provocation on the victim's part.  Following the presentation of evidence by the parties, 
2 
the jury answered the applicable questions1 in the affirmative, and the trial court 
3 
sentenced petitioner to death. 
4 
 
 
On automatic and direct review, this court affirmed petitioner's convictions 
5 
but reversed and remanded his death sentence.  State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 789 P2d 
6 
1352 (1990) (Montez I).  Citing its then-recent decision in State v. Wagner, 309 Or 5, 786 
7 
P2d 93, cert den, 498 US 879 (1990) (Wagner II),2 the court held that the trial court had 
8 
improperly denied petitioner's request for a jury instruction that would have allowed the 
9 
jury to find that mitigating evidence justified imposition of a life sentence for petitioner 
10 
rather than death.  Montez I, 309 Or at 609-10. 
11 
 
 
On remand in 1992, a newly empanelled penalty-phase jury was instructed 
12 
to answer the following questions: 
13 
                                              
 
1  
Petitioner did not raise any provocation claims at his trial.  Therefore, that 
issue was not submitted to the jury during the initial penalty phase of his trial or during 
the second penalty-phrase proceeding following remand from this court. 
 
2  
In Wagner, this court held that mitigation evidence in aggravated murder 
cases must allow for "the jury's exercise of a reasoned moral response to the question 
'should defendant receive a death sentence?'"  309 Or at 19.  The court went on to explain 
that, in so holding, 
"we are asking the jury, in making its finding, to consider any mitigating 
aspect of defendant's life, alone or in combination, not necessarily related 
causally to the offense.  This does no more than to provide the sentencing 
jury with the data traditionally available to the sentencing judge under the 
discretionary sentencing model for criminal cases." 
Id. at 20. 
 
 
 3 
 
"Was the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the 
1 
deceased committed deliberately and with a reasonable expectation that 
2 
death would result? 
3 
 
"Is there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal 
4 
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society? 
5 
 
"Should the defendant receive the death sentence[?]" 
6 
State v. Montez, 324 Or 343, 345-46, 927 P2d 64 (1996), cert den, 520 US 1233 (1997) 
7 
(Montez II) (setting out penalty-phase jury instructions on retrial).  As to the last question, 
8 
the jury was instructed that 
9 
"you should answer this question no if you find that there is any aspect of 
10 
the defendant's character or background or any circumstances of the offense 
11 
that you believe would justify a sentence less than death." 
12 
Id at 346. 
13 
 
 
The jury was presented with extensive evidence regarding aggravating and 
14 
mitigating factors related to petitioner's background, his character, and his crime.  As 
15 
petitioner summarizes in his brief, the state's case for demonstrating that petitioner should 
16 
be sentenced to death focused on (1) the brutality exhibited by petitioner in his sexual 
17 
assault, torture, and murder of the victim; (2) the fact that petitioner was on temporary 
18 
release from prison when he committed those crimes; (3) the aggression petitioner 
19 
demonstrated toward his peers as a child and the belligerent, deceitful, and manipulative 
20 
behaviors he exhibited toward adults during that same period; (4) petitioner's lifetime of 
21 
drug and alcohol abuse that was never successfully treated; (5) petitioner's criminal 
22 
history, marked by numerous assaults in different states and his failure to comply with 
23 
conditions of probation; (6) petitioner's altercations with various prison inmates; (7) 
24 
petitioner's alleged threats against his co-defendant; and (8) the fact that petitioner had 
25 
 
 
 4 
been diagnosed with an anti-social personality disorder, a condition that increased the 
1 
likelihood of his future dangerousness. 
2 
 
 
The mitigation case that petitioner's counsel presented in response focused 
3 
on (1) the childhood neglect and abuse petitioner had endured at the hands of his natural 
4 
and foster parents; (2) the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) he suffered as a result, a 
5 
condition that would be treatable in prison; (3) the absence of any counseling component 
6 
in the substance abuse treatment programs made available to and used by petitioner; (4) 
7 
the remorse petitioner expressed to others for his crime; (5) the difficult conditions of 
8 
petitioner's confinement that, in turn, led to altercations with other prison inmates; (6) 
9 
testimony from several inmates who indicated that they had instigated those altercations 
10 
with petitioner; and (7) evidence of petitioner's efforts to better himself in prison and help 
11 
others to do the same. 
12 
 
 
Following presentation of evidence at the penalty-phrase retrial, the jury 
13 
answered the required questions in the affirmative and the trial court again imposed a 
14 
death sentence.  In 1996, this court affirmed that judgment in Montez II, 324 Or 343. 
15 
 
 
In 1997, petitioner filed his first petition for post-conviction relief.  Over 
16 
the next seven years, the parties presented and litigated a plethora of pre-hearing issues 
17 
and motions.  During that period, petitioner amended his initial post-conviction petition 
18 
nine times and ultimately raised numerous claims regarding the allegedly ineffective 
19 
assistance of counsel he received during his 1992 penalty-phase retrial.  Petitioner's 
20 
hearing, in which he bore the burden of proving the facts alleged in his petition by a 
21 
preponderance of the evidence, ORS 138.620(2), began in April 2004 and encompassed 
22 
 
 
 5 
four days of testimony over a three-month period.  The post-conviction court 
1 
subsequently entered a judgment denying relief in October 2005. 
2 
 
 
Petitioner appealed that judgment.  Following extensive briefing and oral 
3 
argument, the Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court's judgment in 
4 
September 2010.  This court allowed petitioner's subsequent petition for review. 
5 
II. INADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:  LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND 
6 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
7 
 
8 
 
 
Criminal defendants in aggravated murder cases have a constitutional right 
9 
to counsel under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and under the Sixth 
10 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Under both constitutions, "the defendant's 
11 
right is not just to a lawyer in name only, but to a lawyer who provides adequate 
12 
assistance."  State v. Smith, 339 Or 515, 526, 123 P3d 261 (2005).  Those constitutional 
13 
provisions require "adequate performance by counsel" concerning the "functions of 
14 
professional assistance which an accused person relies upon counsel to perform on his 
15 
behalf."  Krummacher v. Gierloff, 290 Or 867, 872, 627 P2d 458 (1981); see also 
16 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 686, 104 S Ct 2052, 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984) (Sixth 
17 
Amendment right to counsel requires not just counsel, but "effective" counsel).  This 
18 
court, while interpreting and applying Article I, section 11, independently of the United 
19 
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, has nevertheless 
20 
recognized that the standards for determining the adequacy of legal counsel under the 
21 
state constitution are functionally equivalent to those for determining the effectiveness of 
22 
counsel under the federal constitution.  See State v. Davis, 345 Or 551, 579, 201 P3d 185 
23 
 
 
 6 
(2008) (equating "effective" assistance with "adequate" assistance).3 
1 
 
 
In evaluating whether a defendant's lawyer has rendered inadequate 
2 
assistance under the Oregon Constitution, our analysis ordinarily proceeds in two steps: 
3 
"First, we must determine whether petitioner demonstrated by a 
4 
preponderance of the evidence that [his lawyer] failed to exercise 
5 
reasonable professional skill and judgment.  Second, if we conclude that 
6 
petitioner met that burden, we further must determine whether he proved 
7 
that counsel's failure had a tendency to affect the result of his trial." 
8 
Lichau v. Baldwin, 333 Or 350, 359, 39 P3d 851 (2002) (internal citations omitted).  In 
9 
doing so, we "make every effort to evaluate a lawyer's conduct from the lawyer's 
10 
perspective at the time, without the distorting effects of hindsight." Id. at 360.  We will 
11 
not "second-guess a lawyer's tactical decisions in the name of the constitution unless 
12 
those decisions reflect an absence or suspension of professional skill and judgment."  
13 
Gorham v. Thompson, 332 Or 560, 567, 34 P3d 161 (2001).  As this court's case law has 
14 
made clear, 
15 
"[t]he constitution gives no defendant the right to a perfect defense -- 
16 
seldom does a lawyer walk away from a trial without thinking of something 
17 
that might have been done differently or that he would have preferred to 
18 
have avoided." 
19 
Krummacher, 290 Or at 875. 
20 
 
 
As noted, the United States Supreme Court has articulated the standard that 
21 
we employ under the United States Constitution.  To prevail on a Sixth Amendment 
22 
                                              
 
3  
In evaluating whether a petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding was 
denied his right to adequate counsel, we first consider his claims under Article I, section 
11, of the Oregon Constitution.  Lichau v. Baldwin, 333 Or 350, 358-59, 39 P3d 851 
(2002).  If the petitioner prevails under Article I, section 11, we do not consider his 
claims under the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 365 n 3. 
 
 
 7 
claim regarding the ineffectiveness of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate that his or 
1 
her trial counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."  
2 
Strickland, 466 US at 688.  Appellate courts reviewing Sixth Amendment claims "must 
3 
consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury."  Id. at 695.  At the end of 
4 
the day, the court must evaluate the reasonableness of counsel's representation "from 
5 
counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, 
6 
and the standard of review is highly deferential."  Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 US 365, 
7 
381, 106 S Ct 2574, 91 L Ed 2d 305 (1986).  In doing so, we do not inquire into counsel's 
8 
subjective state of mind; instead, we inquire into the objective reasonableness of 
9 
counsel's performance.  Harrington v. Richter, 562 US ___, ___, 131 S Ct 770, 790, 178 
10 
L Ed 2d 624 (2011). 
11 
 
 
With regard to prejudice, petitioners  
12 
"must demonstrate 'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
13 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
14 
different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
15 
confidence in the outcome.'  It is not enough 'to show that the errors had 
16 
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.'  Counsel's 
17 
errors must be 'so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
18 
whose result is reliable.'" 
19 
 
20 
Richter, 562 US at ___, 131 S Ct at 787-88 (quoting Strickland; internal citations 
21 
omitted). 
22 
 
 
This court's review of a post-conviction court's determinations is not open-
23 
ended.  We review such proceedings for errors of law.  Peiffer v. Hoyt, 339 Or 649, 660, 
24 
125 P3d 734 (2005).  A post-conviction court's findings of historical fact are binding on 
25 
 
 
 8 
this court if there is evidence in the record to support them.  Lichau, 333 Or at 359.  If the 
1 
post-conviction court failed to make findings of fact on all the issues -- and there is 
2 
evidence from which such facts could be decided more than one way -- we will presume 
3 
that the facts were decided consistent with the post-conviction court's conclusions of law.  
4 
Id.  
5 
III. PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ON REVIEW 
6 
 
 
On review, petitioner raises a number of different claims related to his 
7 
inadequate assistance of counsel allegations.  We address those claims below, grouped 
8 
into five broad categories:  (1) claims related to omitted mitigation evidence, (2) claims 
9 
related to trial counsels' disclosure of petitioner's previous death sentence, (3) claims 
10 
related to trial counsels' use of inmate witnesses, (4) claims related to omitted evidence 
11 
regarding petitioner's future dangerousness, and (5) claims related to trial counsel and the 
12 
jury. 
13 
A. 
Claims Related to Omitted Mitigation Evidence 
14 
 
 
We begin by setting out the mitigation-related steps taken by petitioner's 
15 
lawyers in preparation for petitioner's penalty-phase retrial, and the strategy that evolved 
16 
as a result.  Counsel initially had engaged the trial court in an effort to secure funds for a 
17 
specialized "mitigation expert" in addition to the defense team's regular investigator.  
18 
Those requests were denied.  Counsel subsequently dispatched their investigator to 
19 
petitioner's childhood home in Minnesota to gather facts concerning his formative years.  
20 
Counsel also retained licensed clinical psychologist Dr. Walker, a recognized expert in 
21 
battered-child syndrome and PTSD to examine petitioner.  Dr. Walker, in turn, referred 
22 
 
 
 9 
counsel to Dr. Appel, a neuropsychologist who, after reviewing data generated by Dr. 
1 
Walker, opined that a neuropsychological assessment of petitioner would not provide 
2 
useful mitigation evidence. 
3 
 
 
Defense counsel nevertheless engaged a second neuropsychologist, Dr. 
4 
Goldmann, to evaluate petitioner.  Dr. Goldmann indicated that he would conduct a 
5 
screening examination of petitioner and, should that examination reveal signs of brain 
6 
injury, would continue his evaluation.  Absent indications of brain injury at the screening, 
7 
he stated, a full assessment would be unnecessary.  Dr. Goldmann went on to evaluate 
8 
petitioner over a two-day period, administering tests that were "particularly sensitive to 
9 
deficits seen in brain-injured individuals;" he found none.  In an affidavit submitted 
10 
during defendant's post-conviction proceedings, Dr. Goldmann observed: 
11 
"In my experience, it is not only unlikely but improbable that deficits will 
12 
be found on a full neuropsychological evaluation when the results of the 
13 
screening battery were normal.  If one conducts enough tests, however, one 
14 
can usually find an anomaly, simply because the statistical chance of 
15 
finding a significant result increases with the number of tests administered." 
16 
Ultimately, he concluded that "[i]t was my opinion in 1992 that Mr. Montez did not 
17 
suffer from brain injury in any form." 
18 
 
 
Finally, counsel retained Dr. Jacobsen, a medical doctor who was an expert 
19 
in addiction, to determine whether petitioner suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome and 
20 
would be amenable to treatment in prison.  Dr. Jacobsen's examination also failed to find 
21 
any evidence of brain damage. 
22 
 
 
The centerpiece of the mitigation strategy that resulted from the input of 
23 
those experts focused largely on the harsh upbringing and physical abuse that petitioner 
24 
 
 
 
10 
had suffered as a child, factors that had caused him to be diagnosed with acute PTSD.  
1 
Defense counsels' mitigation case encompassed nine days of testimony, beginning with 
2 
petitioner's father and siblings, various foster parents, and mental health care 
3 
professionals and social workers who had interacted with petitioner when he was a child. 
4 
 
 
The picture painted by their testimony was of an early childhood that was 
5 
beyond bleak.  It was dominated by an alcoholic mother who had utterly failed to care for 
6 
her children, frequently leaving petitioner and his two siblings alone for days to fend for 
7 
themselves.  Mother had, on at least two occasions, tried to kill the children and herself; 
8 
once using gas from the oven, and once by setting the family house on fire after igniting 
9 
the bed of petitioner's sister while the child slept in it. 
10 
 
 
An early foster care placement aggravated rather than alleviated the level of 
11 
childhood abuse petitioner suffered.  Petitioner's younger brother described how their 
12 
placement together in one foster home was marked by frequent punishments in the form 
13 
of beatings with belts or fists, daily verbal abuse, and withheld food.  The brother 
14 
recounted one incident in which petitioner was kicked against the foster family's 
15 
automobile and another in which petitioner was accidently knocked unconscious. 
16 
 
 
Subsequent foster care providers described petitioner as a "very damaged" 
17 
and "angry" child tormented by night terrors and given to seizure-like episodes during 
18 
which his body would become rigid and he would hyperventilate -- sometimes for hours -
19 
- while remaining unresponsive to external stimuli.  Medication eventually controlled the 
20 
seizures but, as social workers and counselors who worked with petitioner during that 
21 
time explained, nothing seemed to diminish petitioner's anger at his mother, nor his 
22 
 
 
 
11 
propensity to react violently if physically hurt while playing with others. 
1 
 
 
Petitioner's counsel followed that block of testimony with three days of 
2 
testimony from licensed clinical psychologist Dr. Walker.  Dr. Walker had been given all 
3 
the mitigation-related information defense counsel had gathered regarding petitioner's 
4 
case.  She reviewed various agency and treatment center reports concerning petitioner, 
5 
his family history, educational records, medical records, drug treatment records, and 
6 
police reports.  She also conducted a complete assessment of petitioner's childhood 
7 
history and scrutinized prior psychological test results showing his early cognitive 
8 
abilities, brain function, and personality.  Finally, Dr. Walker evaluated petitioner in 
9 
person for two days, administering a variety of tests designed to determine present 
10 
cognitive abilities, neuropsychological problems, and personality characteristics. 
11 
 
 
Ultimately, Dr. Walker testified that she had diagnosed petitioner with 
12 
PTSD and battered child syndrome.  She described how petitioner had been severely 
13 
battered from early childhood through adolescence, noting the abuse petitioner had 
14 
suffered with his natural parents, his abusive foster-home placements, his experiences in 
15 
residential treatment, and his history of head injuries, seizures, and night terrors.  Dr. 
16 
Walker also provided a provisional diagnosis of substance-abuse personality disorder, 
17 
noting mother's alcoholism and the difficulties created by fetal exposure to drugs and 
18 
alcohol, as well as petitioner's own drug- and alcohol-abuse problems.  Walker testified 
19 
that petitioner's pattern of substance abuse was an attempt to alleviate the pain of his 
20 
childhood trauma, trauma that had contributed, in Dr. Walker's opinion, to a "Dr. Jekyll 
21 
and Mr. Hyde personality" marked by periods of depression, irritability, anxiety, and 
22 
 
 
 
12 
explosiveness.  Petitioner's traumatic childhood and the PTSD he suffered as a result, Dr. 
1 
Walker opined, accounted for the extreme violence petitioner had exhibited in murdering 
2 
the victim because, at the time, petitioner's condition had left him unable to differentiate 
3 
between the actions that were occurring around him and the childhood trauma he was 
4 
reliving in his mind. 
5 
 
 
In Dr. Walker's expert opinion, however, petitioner's PTSD and his 
6 
tendency toward antisocial conduct were treatable in a closely controlled environment 
7 
such as prison.  That opinion was echoed by Dr. Colistro, a prison staff psychologist who 
8 
specialized in treating violent offenders incarcerated in Oregon correctional institutions.  
9 
Dr. Colistro testified that (1) petitioner was amenable to treatment, (2) treatment was 
10 
available for him in prison, and (3) treatment would lessen the risk that petitioner would 
11 
commit future acts of violence. 
12 
 
 
On review, petitioner acknowledges the breadth of the mitigation case made 
13 
on his behalf.  Drawing generally, however, on mitigation-related ineffective-assistance- 
14 
of-counsel decisions from the United States Supreme Court -- including Sears v. Upton, 
15 
561 US ___, 130 S Ct 3259, 177 L Ed 2d 1025 (2010), Porter v. McCollum, 558 US 30, 
16 
130 S Ct 447, 175 L Ed 2d 398 (2009), and Rompilla v. Beard, 545 US 374, 125 S Ct 
17 
2456, 162 L Ed 2d 360 (2005) -- petitioner nevertheless contends that the fact that some 
18 
mitigation evidence was presented did not satisfy his trial counsel's duty of reasonable 
19 
representation when other significant mitigating evidence was ignored, or left 
20 
undiscovered.  Moreover, petitioner continues, he suffered prejudice as a result under 
21 
State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 34, 77 P3d 1111 (2003), because the omitted evidence was 
22 
 
 
 
13 
"qualitatively different" from the evidence presented to the jury.  We turn to the specific 
1 
instances of omitted evidence cited by petitioner. 
2 
 
1. 
Evidence that Petitioner had Been Molested by his Mother 
3 
 
 
At his post-conviction relief hearing, petitioner argued that his trial counsel 
4 
had been ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of his past traumatic 
5 
sexual experiences.  In particular, petitioner asserted that his mother had sexually abused 
6 
him when he was a child and later, while he was undergoing residential alcohol treatment 
7 
as an adolescent, threatened to harm him if he disclosed that abuse.  According to 
8 
petitioner, information about his sexual abuse had been available to counsel as they 
9 
prepared for the 1992 penalty-phase retrial and that counsel’s failure to investigate, 
10 
develop, and use that evidence as part of the mitigation case was unreasonable. 
11 
 
 
The post-conviction court, however, rejected those arguments.  It found, 
12 
among other things, that trial counsel had 
13 
"constructed a reasonable theory of mitigation based on petitioner's history 
14 
of childhood abuse and Dr. Walker's undisputed expertise in the area of 
15 
post-traumatic stress disorder, after a thorough investigation of petitioner's 
16 
family history." 
17 
The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that 
18 
"[t]he record is clear that, at the time counsel were preparing their case, 
19 
there were few clues as to petitioner's childhood sexual abuse, and those 
20 
clues were vague.  The record supports the post-conviction court's finding 
21 
that counsel 'provided Dr. Walker with all available and reliable 
22 
information about petitioner's mental health and family history.'" 
23 
Montez v. Czerniak, 237 Or App 276, 290, 239 P 3d 1023 (2010). 
24 
 
 
On review, petitioner now argues that materials in trial counsel's possession 
25 
 
 
 
14 
prior to petitioner's 1992 penalty-phase retrial contained the following "leads or red flags" 
1 
suggesting that petitioner's mother had sexually abused him as a child: 
2 
 Chart notes from the drug and alcohol treatment program petitioner attended as a 
3 
teenager in which staff members recorded petitioner's disclosures that his mother 
4 
had "been sexually abusing him since he was a child." 
5 
 
6 
 Petitioner's recorded confession to police detectives in which he asserted that his 
7 
mother had lost custody of her children in part because of "me and my other 
8 
brother's sexual abuse." 
9 
 
10 
 A statement from petitioner's mother-in-law in which she indicated that she 
11 
thought petitioner had been sexually abused as a child. 
12 
 
13 
 
 
In depositions taken for petitioner's post-conviction hearing, both defense 
14 
counsel acknowledged that they had been aware of that information, but had not followed 
15 
up or developed it, a fact they characterized as "something that was missed."  Petitioner, 
16 
for his part, concedes that he did not disclose any instances of sexual abuse to Dr. Walker 
17 
during their sessions together.  He nevertheless argues that, under the Supreme Court's 
18 
decision in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 Or 510, 123 S Ct 2527, 156 L Ed 2d 471 (2003), 
19 
evidence that a capital defendant was sexually abused as a child is the type of mitigation 
20 
evidence that counsel has a duty to investigate and present to a penalty-phase jury. 
21 
 
 
Petitioner, however, misapprehends Wiggins's scope and its applicability to 
22 
the facts of this case.  Contrary to the inference that petitioner would have us draw, the 
23 
decision in Wiggins did not turn on an isolated failure to present evidence concerning a 
24 
defendant's sexual abuse as one part of a comprehensive mitigation case.  It turned, 
25 
rather, on the fact the defendant's trial counsel had "abandoned their investigation of 
26 
petitioner's background after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his history 
27 
 
 
 
15 
from a narrow set of sources."  Id. at 524.  The result was a mitigation case in which the 
1 
only factor of note presented to the jury was the defendant's lack of a prior criminal 
2 
record.  Id. at 537.  What the trial counsel in Wiggins had failed to discover or present to 
3 
the jury were the extensive and well-documented details of a troubled life history so 
4 
marked by unrelenting hardship and abuse that the Court described it as "excruciating."  
5 
Id.4  Wiggins, in short, does not create a per se rule requiring evidence of sexual abuse to 
6 
be made part of a defendant's mitigation case.  Rather, that case stands for the 
7 
unremarkable proposition that a narrowly conceived and executed investigation will 
8 
always be inadequate when it fails to uncover the depth and breadth of mitigating 
9 
evidence that was otherwise readily at hand. 
10 
 
 
That, however, is not the situation here.  As set out above, the extensive 
11 
mitigation case prepared and presented by defense counsel in this matter --focusing, as it 
12 
did, on petitioner’s extremely difficult childhood and his well-documented PTSD, 
13 
substance abuse, and related problems-- could hardly have been more different than that 
14 
                                              
 
4 
According to the Court, the mitigating evidence that trial counsel had not 
discovered and presented in Wiggins was powerful.  Wiggins, 539 US at 534.  
Summarizing a licensed social worker's report, the Court wrote that  
"Wiggins experienced severe privation and abuse in the first six years of his 
life while in the custody of his alcoholic, absentee mother. He suffered 
physical torment, sexual molestation, and repeated rape during his 
subsequent years in foster care. The time Wiggins spent homeless, along 
with his diminished mental capacities, further augment his mitigation case. 
Petitioner thus has the kind of troubled history we have declared relevant to 
assessing a defendant's moral culpability." 
Id. at 535. 
 
 
 
16 
presented in Wiggins.  Petitioner's claim, however, is that the failure to develop and 
1 
present additional evidence of childhood trauma -- the possible sexual abuse of petitioner 
2 
by his mother -- demonstrated that counsel had acted unreasonably.  That is simply not 
3 
the case.  As noted, counsel turned over to Dr. Walker all the available and reliable 
4 
evidence about petitioner's mental health and his family, including the available notes and 
5 
information regarding sexual abuse.  Dr. Walker conducted various psychological tests 
6 
and personally interviewed and evaluated petitioner over two days in preparation for 
7 
testifying about his PTSD and related topics.  As noted, petitioner admitted at his 
8 
deposition that, during his interviews with Dr. Walker, he did not disclose the alleged 
9 
sexual abuse by his mother that he now argues should have been part of the mitigation 
10 
case. 
11 
 
 
Petitioner has the burden of proving the facts alleged in the post-conviction 
12 
petition, ORS 138.620(2), which, as applied here, means demonstrating, by a 
13 
preponderance of the evidence, that his counsel "failed to exercise reasonable 
14 
professional skill and judgment."  Burdge v. Palmateer, 338 Or 490, 492, 112 P3d 320 
15 
(2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Trujillo v. Maass, 312 Or 431, 435, 822 
16 
P2d 703 (1991) (same).  Here, counsel retained and worked with multiple experts with 
17 
different specialties to present a detailed mitigation case, including extensive evidence of 
18 
petitioner's traumatic childhood.  Counsel provided the documentary evidence in their 
19 
possession to retained experts, documents that included references to alleged sexual 
20 
abuse by petitioner's mother, and they arranged for the experts to personally interview 
21 
and evaluate petitioner. 
22 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
Nothing in the record suggests that petitioner's counsel acted unreasonably 
1 
in relying on the experts to present the experts' assessment of petitioner's abusive 
2 
childhood and its impact on his later conduct and personality.  In this, as in virtually 
3 
every complex post-conviction matter, there is always other evidence that could have 
4 
been investigated or introduced.  The standard, however, is not whether counsel 
5 
investigated or introduced every shred of evidence regarding petitioner's background, 
6 
psychological makeup, or other factors that the jury might possibly have found to be 
7 
mitigating; rather, the standard under Oregon law is whether petitioner proved by a 
8 
preponderance of the evidence that his defense counsel failed to exercise reasonable 
9 
professional skill and judgment.  Burdge, 338 Or at 492.  The record supports the post-
10 
conviction court's conclusion that petitioner did not make that showing with respect to 
11 
counsel's alleged failure to inform the retained experts of evidence available to them in 
12 
the record that suggested that petitioner had been sexually abused by his mother. 
13 
 
 
As noted earlier, petitioner does not argue that the Sixth Amendment 
14 
standard regarding the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel differs from the Oregon 
15 
standard that we have discussed.  Under that standard, a petitioner must show that 
16 
counsel's conduct fell outside "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.]"  
17 
Strickland, 466 Or at 689.  For the reasons discussed above, the post-conviction did not 
18 
err in concluding that petitioner had failed to prove that his counsels’ conduct fell outside 
19 
that range. 
20 
 
2. 
Evidence of Petitioner's Brain Injuries and Neurological Issues 
21 
 
 
During his post-conviction hearing, petitioner asserted that his trial counsel 
22 
 
 
 
18 
had unreasonably failed to investigate, prepare, and present evidence regarding 
1 
petitioner's neurological history, a history that, according to petitioner, included multiple 
2 
head traumas, a seizure disorder, and organic brain impairment.  Petitioner also claimed 
3 
that, because his counsel had been unaware of that history, they had failed to provide that 
4 
information to the experts they had retained.  As a result, he asserted, the tests conducted 
5 
by the experts in preparation for the penalty-phase retrial were insufficiently 
6 
comprehensive to ascertain the brain damage that he allegedly suffered from at the time 
7 
of his crimes.  In support of that claim, petitioner submitted evidence from three 
8 
additional neurological experts suggesting that petitioner possessed some degree of 
9 
trauma or drug-related brain damage when he murdered the victim.  The upshot of that 
10 
condition, the experts opined, was a tendency toward episodic rages or acts of aggression 
11 
-- often in response to minor provocations -- over which petitioner had no control. 
12 
 
 
The post-conviction court rejected those claims.  It made factual findings 
13 
that petitioner's counsel had adequately investigated the possibility of brain damage and 
14 
other psychological factors in building their mitigation case.  It also found that the 
15 
experts who examined petitioner in preparation for his 1992 retrial had been unable to 
16 
detect any evidence of organic brain damage in petitioner. 
17 
 
 
On appeal, petitioner contended that an examination of the records and 
18 
witnesses otherwise available to counsel would have revealed petitioner's seizure disorder 
19 
and an extensive history of head injury that signaled potential brain damage.  Given that 
20 
information, petitioner argued, his defense counsel should have obtained a complete and 
21 
comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation of petitioner.  The Court of Appeals, 
22 
 
 
 
19 
however, disagreed, holding that 
1 
"the issue on appeal in this post-conviction proceeding is not whether 
2 
petitioner actually had suffered brain damage or even whether he 
3 
introduced evidence of brain damage in the post-conviction court.  Rather, 
4 
it is whether the post-conviction court's findings are supported by the 
5 
record and whether those findings support the court's conclusion that 
6 
counsel were not deficient in their performance.  Here, counsel investigated 
7 
the possibility that petitioner suffered from brain damage, and they 
8 
employed experts to determine whether that was the case.  Petitioner did 
9 
not prove that counsel failed to exercise reasonable professional skill in 
10 
their treatment of the possibility of brain damage." 
11 
Montez, 237 Or App at 304. 
12 
 
 
On review, petitioner focuses on a narrower aspect of the 
13 
neurological/organic brain damage issue.  He contends that, had trial counsel properly 
14 
investigated and informed their experts of petitioner's neurological history, those experts 
15 
would have conducted more extensive tests and determined that petitioner suffered from 
16 
brain damage or a neuropsychological condition that would have, in turn, provided 
17 
additional mitigation evidence for petitioner.5  He argues that trial counsel provided 
18 
inadequate assistance of counsel by failing to supply the defense's neurological experts 
19 
with that neurological history.  According to petitioner, available records contained 
20 
information suggesting that he may have sustained organic brain damage at some point in 
21 
                                              
 
5  
Of course, to prevail in his post-conviction proceeding, petitioner also 
would have to show that the use of this additional mitigation evidence would "have a 
tendency to affect the result."  Stevens v. State, 322 Or 101, 110 n 5, 902 P2d 1137 
(1995); see also Strickland, 466 US at 694 (to prove prejudice for Sixth Amendment 
purposes, petitioner "must show * * * a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ").  Because 
we conclude that trial counsel was not inadequate or unreasonable, we do not reach the 
"prejudice" question. 
 
 
 
20 
his life.  In support of that proposition, petitioner relies, in particular, on the Supreme 
1 
Court's decision in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 US 374. 
2 
 
 
As with Wiggins, however, petitioner’s reliance on Rompilla fails to focus 
3 
on the applicable post-conviction standard -- i.e., whether counsel failed to exercise 
4 
reasonable professional skill and judgment -- and instead seeks to bring petitioner within 
5 
the scope of a case-specific decision of the Supreme Court -- a decision that instead 
6 
illustrates the thoroughness and reasonableness of his own counsel's work.  The 
7 
defendant in Rompilla had been found guilty of murder by torture and was sentenced to 
8 
death.  His counsel had consulted family members and several mental health 
9 
professionals in developing a mitigation case.  Based on counsel's limited investigation, 
10 
that case had consisted solely of pleas for mercy by five of the defendant's family 
11 
members.  In his post-conviction proceeding, however, the defendant showed that, if his 
12 
trial counsel had examined the defendant's readily available criminal records, they would 
13 
have discovered a range of mitigation leads that included evidence of  the defendant's 
14 
intensely abusive childhood, schizophrenia, alcoholism, and school records that placed 
15 
the his IQ in the mentally retarded range.  545 US at 392-93.  Had counsel followed those 
16 
leads, the Court opined, they likely would have found evidence, as post-conviction 
17 
counsel later did, of organic brain damage that impaired defendant's cognitive functions 
18 
and his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.  Id. 
19 
 
 
Again, the mitigation case here was completely different.  In contrast to the 
20 
lawyers in Rompilla, petitioner's defense counsel engaged in a prodigious effort to 
21 
formulate and execute a comprehensive mitigation strategy by conducting detailed 
22 
 
 
 
21 
investigations into all aspects of petitioner's life.  Among those investigations were 
1 
multiple assessments conducted by mental health experts intent on discovering any 
2 
evidence suggesting that petitioner might suffer from some form of organic brain disease 
3 
or damage.  As discussed above, Dr. Walker, the clinical psychologist retained by trial 
4 
counsel, recommended that petitioner be examined by a neuropsychologist to determine 
5 
whether petitioner suffered from any kind of neurological or organic brain disorder that 
6 
might provide useful mitigation evidence.  Trial counsel consulted two 
7 
neuropsychologists, Dr. Appell and Dr. Goldmann, arranged for a battery of tests 
8 
designed to identify neuropsychological problems, and set up interviews.  Dr. Goldmann 
9 
examined petitioner over two days, administered various tests that were "particularly 
10 
sensitive to deficits seen in brain-injured individuals," and questioned petitioner at length.  
11 
Dr. Goldmann stated that, as part of his regular professional practice, he would have 
12 
asked petitioner about "any history of head injury and substance abuse," as well as about 
13 
"symptoms such as headaches, visual disturbances, and attentional problems."  Trial 
14 
counsel provided Dr. Goldmann with various documents in their possession regarding 
15 
petitioner's history and with information prepared by Dr. Walker regarding petitioner’s 
16 
seizures and other medical problems.  Dr. Goldmann stated that his tests showed 
17 
defendant's results to be "within the normal range" and to reveal "no evidence of brain 
18 
injury."  Another psychologist, Dr. Jacobsen, who examined petitioner prior to the 
19 
penalty-phase proceeding, similarly stated that petitioner was not "mentally retarded" and 
20 
that there was no evidence that a high fever petitioner had suffered as a child had caused 
21 
any brain damage.  The other neuropsychologist that trial counsel consulted, Dr. Appell, 
22 
 
 
 
22 
concluded that a neuropsychological evaluation was unnecessary.  Additionally, a 
1 
medical doctor evaluated petitioner for signs of brain damage and found none. 
2 
 
 
The record here demonstrates that counsel actively investigated the 
3 
potential for putting on mitigation-related evidence that petitioner suffered from organic 
4 
brain damage or some other neuropsychological condition.  Counsel consulted with and 
5 
retained experts in the field.  Those experts, in turn, conducted evaluations and tests that 
6 
they determined were appropriate.  Counsel provided the experts with documents 
7 
concerning petitioner that counsel had obtained in their investigation, along with 
8 
information Dr. Walker had developed in her interviews with petitioner.  It may be true, 
9 
as petitioner now argues, that counsel did not themselves provide the neurological experts 
10 
with some of the extensive background information that they or their investigator had 
11 
developed, or specific information about his life history.  However, nothing in the record 
12 
suggests that Dr. Goldmann or Dr. Appell did not have access to similar information, or 
13 
that they requested additional information from trial counsel that trial counsel failed to 
14 
provide.  Rather, those experts apparently felt that they had sufficient information from 
15 
data provided to them by counsel, as well as interviews and other tests results obtained 
16 
from petitioner.  Moreover, nothing in the record demonstrates that having any of the 
17 
allegedly missing information before them would have changed the opinions that those 
18 
experts reached regarding petitioner’s brain damage. 
19 
 
 
For those reasons, we conclude that petitioner failed to show that counsel 
20 
acted unreasonably in not providing additional information to the experts they consulted, 
21 
or in their general handling of petitioner's neurological and brain damage issues.  
22 
 
 
 
23 
Petitioner's counsel acted reasonably in relying upon qualified experts to assist in 
1 
determining whether, in conjunction with showing petitioner's longstanding and severe 
2 
psychological problems, they also could argue that he suffered from organic brain 
3 
damage.  Those experts concluded that there was no evidence to that effect.  Under both 
4 
the Oregon and federal constitutional standards for assistance of counsel, discussed 
5 
above, the post-conviction court did not err in concluding that petitioner failed to prove 
6 
that his lawyers had not exercised reasonable skill and judgment in their handling of that 
7 
issue.  The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's holding. 
8 
 
3. 
Evidence of Petitioner's Request for a Mitigation Specialist 
9 
 
 
As we have already noted, petitioner's lawyers sought the trial court’s 
10 
authorization -- without success -- to add a "mitigation expert" to their defense team.  In 
11 
his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner alleged that his lawyers were ineffective 
12 
because they had "failed to make a record objecting to the trial court's refusal to grant 
13 
petitioner's motion for appointment of a mitigation expert and showing the prejudice to 
14 
petitioner caused by the trial court's action."  The post-conviction court, however, found 
15 
that 
16 
 Trial counsel had, as a matter of fact, moved for appointment of a mitigation 
17 
specialist. 
18 
 
19 
 Petitioner had failed to prove that counsel had acted unreasonably in not making 
20 
more of a record concerning denial of that motion. 
21 
 
22 
 Petitioner had failed to prove that the trial court should have or would have 
23 
granted that motion, had it been provided with additional facts. 
24 
 
25 
 
 
The Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed those findings, relying 
26 
 
 
 
24 
primarily on the following colloquy between trial counsel and the trial court judge, an 
1 
exchange that took place some time after petitioner's initial request for a mitigation 
2 
specialist had been denied: 
3 
 
"[TRIAL COUNSEL]:  * * * I had submitted a request for a 
4 
different type of investigation services through this court, and I'm gingerly 
5 
stepping around this, but I submitted additional affidavits to the court after 
6 
the court rendered its decision.  Have those affidavits changed [the court's 
7 
mind?] 
8 
 
"[TRIAL COURT]:  Everything that has been requested, denied, is 
9 
filed. 
10 
 
"[TRIAL COUNSEL]:  The court has not changed its mind given the 
11 
new affidavits? 
12 
 
"[TRIAL COURT]:  Right." 
13 
Montez, 237 Or App at 286-87. 
14 
 
 
Based on that evidence, the Court of Appeals concluded that (1) counsel 
15 
had, in fact, made an adequate record supporting appointment of a mitigation specialist; 
16 
and (2) petitioner had failed to carry his burden of proving that counsel performed 
17 
deficiently in that regard. 
18 
 
 
On review, petitioner again asserts that a mitigation expert was critical to 
19 
his defense because the expertise in question involves the ability to:  identify mitigation 
20 
issues from a defendant's social history, document that history, evaluate background 
21 
materials, identify and locate witnesses, and provide general support to the defendant and 
22 
the defendant's family.  Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US 
23 
68, 105 S Ct 1087, 84 L Ed 2d 53 (1985), petitioner argues that a defendant in a capital 
24 
case has a "due-process right to appointment of an expert whose services are necessary to 
25 
 
 
 
25 
prevent an adequate defense."6  Consequently, he argues that his trial counsel provided 
1 
inadequate assistance of counsel by (1) failing to demonstrate that a "mitigation expert" 
2 
was, in fact, a vital component of an adequate defense in his case, and (2) failing to ask 
3 
for a hearing or otherwise demonstrate on the record the importance of his request for 
4 
such an expert. 
5 
 
 
Here, none of the parties dispute the fact that petitioner's bid for a 
6 
"mitigation expert" was made -- and denied -- or that the issue was adequately preserved 
7 
in the post-conviction proceedings below for purposes of this court's review.  Instead, 
8 
petitioner's primary concern appears to focus on the fact that, from a due process 
9 
perspective, a sufficiently detailed record was not made at trial concerning the underlying 
10 
rationale for the request.  That is, petitioner does not appear to argue that he had a 
11 
constitutional right to have a "mitigation expert" appointed below, but rather that he has a 
12 
constitutional right to the basic tools necessary to prepare an adequate defense -- and that 
13 
his trial counsel's failure to detail sufficiently the necessity for a mitigation expert in this 
14 
case itself raises due process problems. 
15 
 
 
Even if we accept petitioner's assertions that (1) a mitigation expert could 
16 
                                              
 
6 
Petitioner does not argue that due process requires courts always to grant a 
defendant’s request to appoint a "mitigation expert" and we are not aware of any case that 
so holds.  In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US 68, 105 S Ct 1087, 84 L Ed 2d 53 (1985), the 
Court held that a mentally-ill capital defendant was entitled to a court-appointed 
psychiatrist to aid him in presenting an insanity defense, because the testimony of such an 
expert is often "a virtual necessity if any insanity plea is to have any chance of success."  
Id. at 81.  Petitioner did not make such a showing here, and, as discussed in the text, did 
not show that defense counsel failed to demonstrate reasonable skill and judgment in 
presenting the mitigation case that they did. 
 
 
 
26 
have played a useful role in working with defense counsel in the penalty-phase retrial, 
1 
and (2) defense counsel could have made a more detailed showing to the trial court 
2 
regarding the value of such assistance, petitioner's claim is nevertheless unavailing: he 
3 
has not shown that defense counsel failed to exercise reasonable professional skill and 
4 
judgment in presenting the mitigation evidence that they did.  As discussed above, 
5 
defense counsel set out a lengthy and robust mitigation case that they developed with the 
6 
assistance of multiple mental health professionals, petitioner and his family members, 
7 
former counselors, foster parents, an investigator who traveled to petitioner's childhood 
8 
home in Minnesota to do additional research, and prison inmates and administrative staff.  
9 
The resulting mitigation arguments covered a wide range of topics, from petitioner's 
10 
childhood abuse and deprivation to his psychological profile, his drug and alcohol abuse, 
11 
and his efforts to control his behavior.  Because petitioner did not prove that his defense 
12 
counsel -- aided by experts, an investigator, and petitioner's friends and family -- failed to 
13 
exercise reasonable skill and judgment in developing and presenting a mitigation case, 
14 
the trial court did not err in rejecting his claim of inadequate assistance of counsel with 
15 
regard to a mitigation expert. 
16 
 
4. 
Additional Mitigating Evidence 
17 
 
 
Finally, petitioner argues on review that trial counsel provided inadequate 
18 
assistance of counsel by failing to investigate and present a long list of other kinds of 
19 
evidence that the jury should have been able to consider.  According to petitioner, that 
20 
evidence included specific examples of petitioner's personal history of substance abuse 
21 
and mental illness; his family's history of substance abuse and mental illness; his cultural 
22 
 
 
 
27 
background; his abusive marriage; his alcohol consumption on the night of the murder; 
1 
and positive evidence concerning his character. 
2 
 
 
Petitioner may be correct that the specific examples or facts cited in his 
3 
brief were not individually investigated and presented to the jury as part of his mitigation 
4 
case.  However, the broad themes represented by that evidence -- petitioner's struggles 
5 
with drugs and alcohol, his dysfunctional family relationships, and a lifetime of abuse -- 
6 
were all presented, albeit in different forms and with some different details.  Taken all 
7 
together, that evidence provided a foundation for the expert opinion that petitioner was, at 
8 
the time of his crimes, unable to differentiate between his actions and the childhood 
9 
traumas that he was mentally reliving.  Again, the issue is not whether the evidence could 
10 
have been presented in a different way, or whether additional facts could have been 
11 
included, or facts that were included omitted.  Under our cases, the applicable standard is 
12 
whether trial counsel exercised reasonable skill and judgment.  In assessing the 
13 
reasonableness of counsel's actions under the Oregon Constitution, we "must make every 
14 
effort to evaluate [the] lawyer's conduct from the lawyer's perspective at the time, without 
15 
the distorting effects of hindsight."  Lichau, 333 Or at 360.  The fact that petitioner 
16 
would, in retrospect, have implemented his mitigation defense in one or more different 
17 
ways is not a ground for post-conviction relief if counsel acted reasonably in presenting 
18 
the defense that they did.   That is the case here. 
19 
 
 
The federal standard is similar.  There are "countless ways to provide 
20 
effective assistance in any given case.  Even the best criminal defense attorneys would 
21 
not defend a particular client the same way."  Strickland, 466 US at 689.  Petitioner's 
22 
 
 
 
28 
defense team was entitled to formulate the mitigation strategy that was reasonable at the 
1 
time of its conception.  See Richter, 562 US at ___, 131 S Ct at 789 (articulating 
2 
applicable test).  Although petitioner's post-conviction counsel identified numerous 
3 
details that could have been handled differently, emphasized or de-emphasized, included 
4 
or excluded during his penalty-phase retrial, those details do not demonstrate that defense 
5 
counsel failed to exercise reasonable skill and judgment in their representation of 
6 
petitioner.  The trial court did not err in so concluding, and the Court of Appeals correctly 
7 
affirmed. 
8 
B. 
Claims Concerning Disclosure of Petitioner's Previous Death Sentence 
9 
 
 
The record makes clear that, at the beginning of petitioner's penalty-phase 
10 
retrial, petitioner's defense counsel were reticent about allowing the jury to learn that 
11 
petitioner previously had been sentenced to death.  After consulting with petitioner, 
12 
however, trial counsel nevertheless decided to disclose that information and sought a 
13 
limiting instruction from the trial court:  
14 
 
"Your Honor, I think the defense team with a great deal of 
15 
reservation feels that it is necessary at this point for the jury also to be 
16 
informed [petitioner] was sentenced to death by the first jury, but in some 
17 
fashion told that they are not to consider that as part of their deliberation, 
18 
because the evidence presented may or may not be the same as what was 
19 
presented then. 
20 
 
" * * * * * 
21 
 
 
"We're asking for that instruction simply because it will become very 
22 
clear that [petitioner] was on death row as we go through the rest of this 
23 
trial." 
24 
 
 (brackets in original).  Although the trial court attempted to persuade defense counsel to 
25 
 
 
 
29 
substitute a label such as "administrative segregation" for the term "death row," counsel 
1 
nevertheless chose the latter, reasoning that 
2 
 
"it is our understanding that the state intends to bring in acts 
3 
allegedly or committed by [petitioner] while in the penitentiary system, part 
4 
of that time while he was on death row, and the defense needs to and will 
5 
offer some sort of explanation for that activity in that specific area of the 
6 
penitentiary." 
7 
Id.  (brackets in original).  To do otherwise, defense counsel continued, "just raises more 
8 
questions by having it left unsaid," and further indicated that "it is the desires [sic] of 
9 
[petitioner] that the jury be told about the prior death sentence." Id.  Petitioner twice 
10 
confirmed that those were, indeed, his wishes, once in an informal exchange with the trial 
11 
court, and again -- at the prosecutor's request -- by executing a formal waiver of any 
12 
objection to the mention of his prior death sentence.  As a result, the trial court gave the 
13 
following explanation and limiting instruction to the jury: 
14 
 
"Before we proceed to the next witness, I want to explain something 
15 
to you in an effort to remove the mystery or any speculation from this 
16 
matter:  As you're all now probably aware, [petitioner] was convicted of 
17 
Aggravated Murder, as we've discussed here, by a jury after a trial in 1988.  
18 
A death sentence was imposed.  An appeal was taken, as required by law, 
19 
and a new sentencing hearing was ordered.  You've been impaneled to 
20 
decide the sentence. 
21 
 
"Now as to your role as the trier of facts, this is a new proceeding, 
22 
and you will decide the weight to be given the evidence presented here, 
23 
which may be different than the evidence presented before. 
24 
 
"Now, what happened previously, with the exception of the guilty 
25 
finding, is not a consideration in this case.  I tell you this because I don't 
26 
want you wondering, and I don't want you speculating, and I don't want you 
27 
to misuse the information before you." 
28 
(Emphasis added.) 
29 
 
 
In seeking post-conviction relief below, petitioner asserted that trial counsel 
30 
 
 
 
30 
had unreasonably "introduced evidence that petitioner previously had been sentenced to 
1 
death and had been on death row and advised petitioner to waive any objections to the 
2 
introduction of such evidence."  The post-conviction court rejected that claim, finding, 
3 
among other things, that petitioner had wanted his 1992 jury to learn that he had been on 
4 
death row and had fared well with the other inmates there and in the general population. 
5 
 
 
The Court of Appeals held that the post-conviction court did not err in so 
6 
finding.  In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeals noted that 
7 
 
"counsel reasonably could have believed that it would benefit 
8 
petitioner if the jury knew not only that another jury had sentenced him to 
9 
death, but that the death sentence had been determined by a court to be 
10 
improper.  Moreover, a jury could believe that a death row inmate might 
11 
have nothing to gain from pretending, such that his exemplary behavior is 
12 
more likely to be heartfelt than is the case with other inmates." 
13 
Montez, 237 Or App at 304. 
14 
 
 
On review, petitioner focuses on that excerpt from the Court of Appeals' 
15 
opinion.  He argues that under both Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and 
16 
the Sixth Amendment, the Court of Appeals was precluded from focusing on strategies 
17 
that defense counsel could reasonably have had in mind in deciding to reveal petitioner's 
18 
prior death sentence.7  Instead, petitioner asserts that Oregon courts must focus on 
19 
counsel's actual strategic reasoning.  To do anything less, petitioner continues, is simply a 
20 
"post hoc rationalization of counsel's conduct, rather than an accurate description of their 
21 
                                              
 
7  
Petitioner does not distinguish between the standards that apply to this 
argument under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution; consequently, we discuss his state and 
federal constitutional arguments together. 
 
 
 
31 
deliberations." 
1 
 
 
Petitioner's argument is not well-taken.  As set out above, defense counsel 
2 
discussed with the trial court the strategic reasons for disclosing petitioner's previous 
3 
death sentence, and petitioner himself agreed with their reasoning.  Other lawyers might 
4 
disagree with that strategic choice, but the choice itself was made with appropriate 
5 
consideration of the risks and benefits, and we cannot say that it was unreasonable. 
6 
 
 
We agree, of course, that courts may not indulge in post hoc 
7 
rationalizations of trial counsel's decisions that contradict the evidence derived from their 
8 
actions, Richter, 562 US at ___, 131 S Ct at 790.  That evidence, taken from the record as 
9 
a whole, may demonstrate the absence of strategic thought or direction on the part of a 
10 
defense team.  For example, in Wiggins v. Smith, discussed above, the Supreme Court 
11 
concluded that the sentencing record underscored the unreasonableness of the counsel's 
12 
conduct because it tended to show "that their failure to investigate thoroughly resulted 
13 
from inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment."  539 US at 526.  In Stevens v. State, 
14 
322 Or 101, 109-10, 902 P 2d 1137 (1995), this court engaged in a similar assessment 
15 
when it concluded that a lawyer's decision not to interview potential witnesses at a school 
16 
had not been a strategic choice, but rather one driven by the lawyer's decision to simply 
17 
rely on police reports to identify and develop a roster of material witnesses. 
18 
 
 
In both Wiggins and Stevens, the record revealed the absence of 
19 
strategically-based action; that, however, is not the case in this matter.  Here, even as 
20 
articulated by petitioner, the record amply supports the conclusion that defense counsel 
21 
reasonably believed that revealing petitioner's prior death sentence would inure to his 
22 
 
 
 
32 
benefit.  Petitioner sought to present a human face to jurors by emphasizing the stressful 
1 
environment of death row and the strides he had made while incarcerated there.  That 
2 
strategy would have been difficult to implement without establishing the predicate fact of 
3 
his prior death sentence.  Moreover, as noted, the trial court took pains to confirm that 
4 
petitioner himself agreed with the decision to disclose his prior death sentence and had 
5 
executed a written waiver of any objection to references regarding that sentence.  We 
6 
cannot say that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that petitioner had failed to 
7 
prove that his lawyers provided inadequate assistance of counsel by revealing petitioner's 
8 
prior death sentence to the jury. 
9 
C. 
Claims Concerning Defense Counsels' Use of Inmate Witnesses 
10 
 
 
During opening arguments at petitioner's penalty-phase retrial, the 
11 
prosecutor had asserted that petitioner remained dangerous even while in prison.  In 
12 
support of that statement, the prosecutor went on to present evidence of numerous fights 
13 
that petitioner had with other inmates while incarcerated -- at least one with another death 
14 
row inmate.  The reason for that evidence, the prosecutor had explained in his opening 
15 
remarks, was to provide a foundation from which the jury could, in part, evaluate the 
16 
likelihood of petitioner's future dangerousness, a factor that the jury was required to 
17 
consider in deciding whether or not to sentence petitioner to death.8 
18 
 
 
The record demonstrates that petitioner and his defense counsel together 
19 
                                              
 
8  
See ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B) (requiring jury to determine "[w]hether there is 
a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing threat to society"). 
 
 
 
33 
developed their own responsive strategy to address the state's evidence, a strategy that 
1 
was built around the testimony of particular inmates with whom petitioner had been 
2 
incarcerated.  As the post-conviction deposition given by one of petitioner's defense 
3 
counsel made clear: 
4 
 
"It's my recollection -- whether it's right or wrong -- that [petitioner] 
5 
very much wanted the jury to learn what the [prison] environment was like.  
6 
[He wanted the jury to be] introduced to some of the other long-term guests 
7 
there, and be told of the type of situation it was there." 
8 
The evidence, in short, showed that petitioner wanted the jury to learn about the death 
9 
row environment in which he lived by hearing testimony from a select group of inmates 
10 
that he personally had chosen.  The goal, petitioner himself acknowledged, was to expose 
11 
the jury to evidence that his behavior had improved while in prison, and to highlight 
12 
some of his positive personal attributes.  When asked whether she had tried to dissuade 
13 
petitioner from that particular course of action, defense counsel indicated that "I don't 
14 
think I tried to dissuade him.  I think I did tell him I didn't like the idea."  At the same 
15 
time, however, she conceded that there was "some advantage" in exposing a jury to 
16 
individuals who had done similar things as defendant, but had not been sentenced to 
17 
death. 
18 
 
 
To that end, the jury was transported to the Oregon State Penitentiary to 
19 
hear testimony from the inmates assembled by petitioner,9 all of whom had been 
20 
incarcerated with petitioner in various special housing units within the prison, either 
21 
                                              
 
9  
Eight inmates testified for petitioner and all did so at the penitentiary except 
for Kenneth McPhail, whose testimony was taken at the Multnomah County Circuit 
Court. 
 
 
 
34 
death row, administrative segregation, or disciplinary segregation.  Defense counsel had 
1 
gathered a diverse mix of prisoners to serve as character witnesses for petitioner:  other 
2 
death row residents; inmates who, like petitioner, had Native American ancestry; and 
3 
inmates who had been participants in, or witnessed, fights in which petitioner had been 
4 
involved.  Counsel would later testify that she knew beforehand the substance of the 
5 
testimony the inmates intended to give and their criminal records.  She also indicated that 
6 
petitioner had assured her that he was very familiar with the inmates that he had chosen 
7 
and knew that they would speak favorably on his behalf. 
8 
 
 
As it turned out, the inmates' testimony relating to petitioner was, indeed, 
9 
highly favorable.  Essentially, the inmates told the jury that, despite the harsh conditions 
10 
of death row and the special difficulties facing mixed-race inmates like petitioner, 
11 
petitioner nevertheless had grown spiritually while incarcerated, learned to remain calm 
12 
in the face of provocation, and had himself become a peacekeeper of sorts, exerting a 
13 
calming influence on those around him.  Several inmates who had fought with petitioner 
14 
on different occasions testified that they had initiated the respective confrontations in 
15 
which they had been involved and that petitioner had either not fought back or had 
16 
refrained from injuring the other combatant. 
17 
 
 
The prosecutor, however, also elicited testimony from those inmates.  On 
18 
both direct and cross-examination, some of the inmates confirmed that they were slated 
19 
for early release on parole, some acknowledged their own multiple escapes and escape 
20 
attempts while incarcerated, and some described the lengthy appeals that had been, or 
21 
were being, litigated on their behalf while they remained on death row.  Defense counsel 
22 
 
 
 
35 
objected to some, but not all, of that testimony.  When asked during the post-conviction 
1 
deposition about the limited objections she had made during that testimony, one of 
2 
petitioner's lawyers testified that 
3 
"there's always a weighing that occurs when you're examining or cross-
4 
examining or objecting to witnesses, and you have to decide if it's going to 
5 
make the unwanted statement more important to the jury if you object and 
6 
bring attention to it or if you don't." 
7 
 
 
In seeking post-conviction relief, petitioner asserted that his counsel had 
8 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel by calling 
9 
"character witnesses from death row, administrative segregation, and 
10 
disciplinary segregation, at the Oregon State Penitentiary without 
11 
conducting interviews, or meeting with the witnesses prior to trial and then 
12 
failing to object to irrelevant and prejudicial questions about the lengths of 
13 
their sentences and scheduled parole release dates or about escapes and 
14 
attempted escapes from prison." 
15 
The post-conviction court, however, rejected those claims, finding that it had been 
16 
petitioner's decision to call his fellow inmates as character witnesses, and that the inmates 
17 
had been personally selected by petitioner for the purpose of demonstrating that he was 
18 
neither dangerous nor violent in a prison setting. 
19 
 
 
The Court of Appeals agreed.  It wrote: 
20 
"Even assuming that counsel's choices regarding use of the inmate 
21 
testimony and whether to object to some of it were not, in hindsight, the 
22 
best choices, that is not the test.  Even effective counsel may make 'tactical 
23 
choices that backfire, because, by their nature, trials often involve risk.  
24 
Krummacher, 290 Or at 875, 627 P2d 458.  The post-conviction court's 
25 
findings are supported by evidence in the record and dispose of petitioner's 
26 
arguments about the inmate testimony." 
27 
Montez, 237 Or App at 307. 
28 
 
 
On review, petitioner now argues that his trial counsel was deficient for (1) 
29 
 
 
 
36 
calling prison inmates as witnesses, (2) taking their testimony at the prison itself, (3) 
1 
failing to adequately prepare for that testimony, and (4) failing to object to questions 
2 
concerning the inmates' sentences and escape attempts.  After reviewing those arguments, 
3 
however, we conclude that they do not warrant detailed discussion.  Both this court and 
4 
the Supreme Court, applying Article I, section 11, and the Sixth Amendment 
5 
respectively, have emphasized the many choices counsel must make in litigation and the 
6 
difficulty of predicting the consequences of those choices.10  See Krummacher, 290 Or at 
7 
875 (consideration of adequacy of counsel "allows for tactical choices that backfire").  
8 
Moreover, mitigation evidence, by nature, often is a "two-edged sword" that, with respect 
9 
to a jury, may be as capable of damaging a case as it is of aiding it.  See, e.g., Atkins v. 
10 
Virginia, 536 US 304, 321, 122 S Ct 2242, 153 L Ed 2d 335 (2002) (recognizing that 
11 
mitigating evidence can be a "two-edged sword" regarding jury assessments of future 
12 
dangerousness).  For that reason, in assessing the adequacy of defense counsel, we focus 
13 
on the reasonableness of counsel's decisions at the time they were made and whether 
14 
counsel actively and capably advocated on behalf of the defendant, rather than on 
15 
whether counsel was successful. 
16 
 
 
The Supreme Court has observed that "it is difficult to establish ineffective 
17 
assistance [in a post-conviction proceeding] when counsel's overall performance indicates 
18 
active and capable advocacy."  Richter, 562 US at ___, 131 S Ct at 791.  In our view, the 
19 
                                              
 
10  
Again, petitioner does not assert that the applicable state and federal 
constitutional provisions call for different analysis, and we therefore discuss those 
provisions together. 
 
 
 
37 
efforts of defense counsel with respect to the use of inmate witnesses, as set out above, 
1 
are examples of "active and capable advocacy."  The fact that those efforts were 
2 
ultimately unavailing does not render them constitutionally deficient.  Defense counsel 
3 
cannot be faulted for lacking a crystal ball with which to predict how the jury would react 
4 
to the mitigation evidence they were presented with.  Trials, by nature, frequently involve 
5 
risk, and a "risk which is foolish in a close case may be sound where the prosecution is 
6 
strong and the defense weak."  Krummacher, 290 Or at 875.  Given the particularly grim 
7 
facts surrounding petitioner's aggravated murder conviction, defense counsel's tactical 
8 
use and treatment of the inmates hand-picked by petitioner to provide evidence of his 
9 
improved and positive character was not so foolish as to constitute an unsound strategy.  
10 
The post-conviction court did not err in concluding that petitioner had failed to prove that 
11 
his lawyers provided inadequate assistance of counsel by having prison inmates picked 
12 
by petitioner testify on his behalf. 
13 
D. 
Claims Concerning Actuarial Evidence Regarding Future Dangerousness 
14 
 
 
In addition to the evidence provided by petitioner's fellow inmates at his 
15 
penalty-phase retrial, petitioner also called other witnesses whose testimony was 
16 
similarly intended to counter the state's evidence of petitioner's future dangerousness.  As 
17 
noted above, one of those witnesses was psychologist Dr. Colistro, an expert in 
18 
psychological issues related to prisoners.  Dr. Colistro discussed Dr. Walker's diagnosis 
19 
of petitioner's condition, explaining to the jury that, as diagnosed, petitioner was certainly 
20 
treatable within the prison system, and that treatment could lessen the risk of petitioner's 
21 
future dangerousness.  He further testified that an antisocial personality disorder such as 
22 
 
 
 
38 
petitioner's was not a significant clinical factor in assessing an inmate's risk for violence, 
1 
and that the risk level, in any event, decreased with age.  Finally, Dr. Colistro told the 
2 
jury that it was significant when an individual's assaultive behavior decreased -- as 
3 
petitioner's had -- once confined in a secure setting. 
4 
 
 
Defense counsel also presented testimony from assistant prison 
5 
superintendent Armenakis and from Hande, prison supervisor for the Cell Study Projects, 
6 
a program that aided inmates in furthering their education.  Armenakis described how 
7 
petitioner had obtained early release from the Disciplinary Segregation Unit -- a sanction 
8 
that had been imposed for fighting with another inmate -- in part because of his 
9 
adjustment and positive attitude.  Hande testified regarding petitioner's efforts to take 
10 
advantage of educational opportunities offered within the prison. 
11 
 
 
In the course of seeking post-conviction relief, however, petitioner argued 
12 
that his lawyers had failed to investigate and present additional evidence that could have 
13 
rebutted the state's evidence of petitioner's future dangerousness.  Those omissions, 
14 
petitioner continued, had prejudiced his mitigation case.  Among them, petitioner argued, 
15 
was counsel's failure to investigate and present evidence of actuarial studies showing that 
16 
capital offenders generally presented a low risk for violent action in prison and on old-
17 
age parole.  As noted, defense counsel did present expert testimony from psychologists 
18 
and testimony from prison officials as to the risk of future violence of petitioner himself 
19 
and of different groups, such as defendants who are incarcerated, have particular mental 
20 
illnesses, or are in certain age categories.  Petitioner's argument, advanced in the post-
21 
conviction proceeding by forensic psychologist Dr. Cunningham, was that defense 
22 
 
 
 
39 
counsel was inadequate in failing also to introduce actuarial evidence of the risk of future 
1 
dangerousness posed by different groups in prison. 
2 
 
 
Dr. Cunningham's 130-page affidavit contained multiple observations 
3 
regarding the efficacy of the 1992 mitigation case that counsel had mounted on 
4 
petitioner's behalf, among them a critique of the failure of trial counsel and trial counsels' 
5 
experts to use actuarial data to assess petitioner's future dangerousness.  In his affidavit, 
6 
Dr. Cunningham stated that he had first begun providing expert testimony on future 
7 
dangerousness utilizing a statistics-driven actuarial methodology in 1995.  His affidavit 
8 
also showed that, in 1998, he had published a paper in which he prepared actuarial 
9 
analyses from the raw data that he had gathered; his stated purpose in doing so was to 
10 
make assessments concerning the future dangerousness of capital inmates more 
11 
empirically driven.  In the article described in his affidavit, which provided the basis for 
12 
his expert opinion, Cunningham stated: 
13 
"Actuarial follow-up data on the violent recidivism outcome of capital 
14 
murderers in prison and post-release has been compiled and synthesized in 
15 
this paper with the hope that capital sentencing risk assessment testimony 
16 
will be more empirically based and thus will more closely reflect the 
17 
probabilities demonstrated by this group of offenders." 
18 
M. D. Cunningham and T. J. Reidy, Integrating Base Rate Data in Violence Risk 
19 
Assessments at Capital Sentencing, 16 Behavioral Sciences & the Law 71, 92 (1998). 
20 
 
 
As noted, defense counsel had presented evidence through the expert 
21 
testimony of Dr. Colistro that the risk of future dangerousness declines with age and that 
22 
the programs available to petitioner in prison also could reduce that risk.  Dr. 
23 
Cunningham's affidavit, however, criticized the lack of actuarial data employed by 
24 
 
 
 
40 
defense counsel in presenting their case on petitioner's future dangerousness.  Predictions 
1 
regarding an inmate's risk of future violence while incarcerated, Dr. Cunningham 
2 
maintained, were most reliable when based on actuarial data; such data, he continued, 
3 
could have been presented at petitioner's 1992 sentencing retrial: 
4 
 
"Important perspectives regarding [petitioner's] risk of violence in 
5 
prison could have been presented at his capital sentencing trial.  
6 
Specifically, risk assessment of the probability of future violence is most 
7 
reliably based on actuarial data which is then conservatively individualized 
8 
to the particular defendant.  Actuarial data indicates that capital offenders 
9 
as a class have a low rate of institutional violence.  Individualizing this base 
10 
rate to [petitioner] indicates that his likelihood of serious violence in prison 
11 
would be below the base rate of violence in capital offenders.  It is 
12 
anticipated that this risk would further decline as [petitioner] ages across a 
13 
capital life term.  Should he be identified as a disproportionate risk of 
14 
institutional violence, segregation mechanisms including IMU confinement 
15 
existed in the Oregon Department of Corrections to substantially negate any 
16 
opportunity he would have to perpetrate violence in prison.  This 
17 
information could have been of mitigating significance in assisting the jury 
18 
to come to a more accurate understanding of his low likelihood of violence 
19 
in prison.  This data was also of critical significance in rebutting State's 
20 
indirect allegation of his incorrigibility through its emphasis on the 
21 
heinousness of the offense." 
22 
According to Dr. Cunningham, without that kind of statistical data, sentencing juries 
23 
were likely to be biased toward overestimating an inmate's risk of future violence.  
24 
 
 
The state responded by presenting an affidavit from its own expert, attorney 
25 
and forensic psychologist Dr. Hulteng.  After reviewing Dr. Cunningham's affidavit, Dr. 
26 
Hulteng had stated: 
27 
"In his affidavit, Dr. Cunningham argues that the 'conceptual and research 
28 
literature' supporting his position was 'easily available to experts or counsel 
29 
in 1992.'  That is true only in the broadest sense.  Certainly, experts should 
30 
have been aware at that point of concepts such as base rates and false 
31 
positives.  The debate over actuarial vs. clinical prediction was already well 
32 
underway.  
33 
 
 
 
41 
"* * * 
1 
"[However,] Dr. Cunningham’s interpretation of how actuarial principles 
2 
should be applied in a capital sentencing context * * * was not articulated 
3 
by him until many years after the petitioner was sentenced." 
4 
Dr. Hulteng, in short, disagreed with Dr. Cunningham's view regarding of the availability 
5 
-- in 1992 -- of completed actuarial studies and established base rates for capital 
6 
sentencing purposes.  Petitioner's trial counsel, moreover, stated in 2001 that there were 
7 
no experts in 1992 testifying about actuarial studies on future dangerousness. 
8 
 
 
The post-conviction court rejected petitioner' claims regarding actuarial 
9 
assessments.  It found, among other things, that Dr. Hulteng had presented credible 
10 
evidence demonstrating that, in 1992, expert testimony describing the existence of 
11 
actuarial studies that could predict future dangerousness in capital inmates was non-
12 
existent.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that 
13 
petitioner's counsel were not ineffective for failing to present actuarial evidence as part of 
14 
their mitigation case.  As that court stated:  "Although both petitioner and the state 
15 
presented additional information on the nature of risk assessment and prediction of future 
16 
dangerousness -- and on the state of the art in 1992 -- suffice it to say that each side had 
17 
its expert, and the experts disagreed."  237 Or App at 310. 
18 
 
 
On review, petitioner does not dispute the post-conviction court's finding 
19 
that actuarially-based expert testimony on the future dangerousness of capital inmates 
20 
was unavailable in 1992.  Instead, his primary argument at this point is that the research 
21 
and data capable of supporting such testimony existed prior to 1992, and that counsel 
22 
unreasonably failed to investigate and present evidence of that information as part of 
23 
 
 
 
42 
petitioner's mitigation case. 
1 
 
 
Petitioner's argument is unavailing.  His defense counsel relied upon 
2 
multiple experts to assist them in presenting evidence of petitioner's lack of future 
3 
dangerousness.  Their evidence included specific clinical assessments of petitioner's risk 
4 
of future dangerousness, his behavior in prison, and other statistically predictive factors 
5 
such as his age.  Defense counsel worked with the experts and appropriately relied on 
6 
them to present the best evidence that they believed was accurate and persuasive.  
7 
Petitioner has not shown that his defense counsel failed to exercise reasonable skill or 
8 
judgment in retaining and relying upon the experts they selected. 
9 
 
 
Moreover, although Dr. Cunningham's affidavit indicates that raw "data" 
10 
was available in 1992 that could have provided a basis for the actuarial studies that he 
11 
discusses, nothing in the record indicates that experts on dangerousness were using the 
12 
data in that way in 1992.  Indeed, on this record, it appears that the first expert witness to 
13 
compile and use actuarial evidence of future dangerousness in a capital case was Dr. 
14 
Cunningham himself in 1995, three years after petitioner's penalty-phase retrial.  
15 
Furthermore Dr. Cunningham's paper presenting that actuarial data did not appear until 
16 
1998. 
17 
 
 
The trial court did not err in concluding that petitioner failed to prove that 
18 
his defense counsel did not exercise reasonable skill and judgment in their presentation of 
19 
evidence regarding his future dangerousness. 
 
20 
E. 
Claims Concerning Jury Instructions 
 
21 
 
 
Prior to voir dire in petitioner's penalty-phase retrial, the trial court 
22 
 
 
 
43 
instructed potential jurors on the three statutory questions -- previously set out above -- 
1 
that they would be required to answer as part of the sentencing process.  Regarding the 
2 
third question in particular -- "Should the defendant receive the death sentence?" -- the 
3 
court expressly told the potential jurors that "you should answer this question 'no' if you 
4 
find that there is any aspect of the defendant's character or background or any other 
5 
circumstance of the offense that you believe would justify a sentence less than death."  
6 
The court went on to explain the effect that a "yes" or "no" determination of those 
7 
statutory questions would have on petitioner's sentence: 
8 
 
"If you find that the state has proven the affirmative of the three 
9 
questions beyond a reasonable doubt, you answer each question yes.  
10 
Before any question can be answered yes, all 12 jurors must agree on that 
11 
answer. 
12 
 
"If you decide that the state has failed to prove the affirmative on 
13 
any one or more of the questions beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
14 
answer that question no.  If all 12 jurors cannot agree that a particular 
15 
question should be answered yes, then the answer must be no. 
16 
 
"Now, if your answer to all three questions is yes, the law requires 
17 
that the penalty shall be death.  If your answer to one or more of the 
18 
questions is no, the law requires that the penalty shall be life 
19 
imprisonment." 
20 
 
 
Following closing arguments at the conclusion of petitioner's retrial, the 
21 
court again instructed the jury on how to address the three questions: 
22 
 
"Now, in determining the issues raised in these questions before you, 
23 
you may consider any evidence which you consider to be mitigating.  This 
24 
includes, but is not limited to, the defendant's age, the extent and severity of 
25 
the defendant's prior criminal conduct, and the extent of the mental and 
26 
emotional pressure under which the defendant was acting at the time the 
27 
offense was committed. 
28 
 
" * * * * * 
29 
 
 
 
44 
 
"Now as a reminder, in order to answer yes to any of the questions, 
1 
12 of you, all of your number must agree on that answer.  If upon any 
2 
question all of your number, 12 of you cannot agree that the question is 
3 
should be answered yes, then your answer to that question must be no." 
4 
 
 
The jury deliberated for over four days, during which time it submitted 
5 
several written questions to the trial judge.  One of the questions posed was, "Do all 12 
6 
jurors have to agree on question # 3," a reference to the general mitigation inquiry into 
7 
whether petitioner should be sentenced to death.  The trial judge wrote back, "In order to 
8 
answer 'yes' to any question, 12 of you must agree on that answer."  When the jury 
9 
returned a verdict of death for petitioner, counsel asked that the jury be polled.  The court 
10 
declined to conduct an oral poll and instead administered a written poll in the jury room. 
11 
 
 
In seeking post-conviction relief, petitioner argued generally that his trial 
12 
counsel had unreasonably failed to: 
13 
 Educate the jury to the fact that a single "no" vote from among its 12 members 
14 
was enough to return a verdict of life imprisonment for petitioner. 
15 
 
 Seek an instruction from the trial court to that effect, either at the time that jury 
16 
instructions were being given, or in response to the jury's written question to the 
17 
trial court.  
18 
 
 Inform the jury that each of its members was required to give individualized 
19 
consideration to the mitigating evidence offered by the defense 
20 
 
 Object to denial of the oral jury poll requested by petitioner. 
21 
 
In addition, petitioner asserted that, on the second or third day of jury deliberations, trial 
22 
counsel had learned, off the record, that the jury had been sent home early because one of 
23 
the jurors had left the jury room in tears and did not want to continue deliberating.  
24 
Petitioner argued that, upon learning of that development, trial counsel had unreasonably 
25 
 
 
 
45 
failed to inquire as to whether a verdict of life imprisonment had been reached and failed 
1 
to object when the trial court required jury deliberations to continue. 
2 
 
 
The post-conviction court, however, found that petitioner had generally 
3 
failed to produce evidence sufficient to prove those allegations.  It also found that the trial 
4 
court had clearly instructed the jury that, if its 12 members could not agree that a question 
5 
should be answered "yes," then the answer to that question had to be "no."  The Court of 
6 
Appeals agreed, holding that (1) because the trial court's jury instructions had been 
7 
correct, the decision by petitioner's counsel to devote themselves to other matters had not 
8 
been unreasonable; (2) because the trial court's answer to the written question proffered 
9 
by the jury had been legally sound, the decision by petitioner's counsel not to object to it 
10 
had not been unreasonable; and (3) petitioner had failed to prove that objecting to the 
11 
written jury poll would have had a tendency to affect the jury's verdict.  The Court of 
12 
Appeals did not address trial counsel's alleged failure to inquire as to whether a life 
13 
imprisonment verdict had been reached following the unrecorded events that had 
14 
supposedly caused the jury to be sent home early during its deliberations.  
15 
 
 
On review, petitioner first contends that trial counsel wrongly failed to 
16 
ensure that each juror understood his or her individual role in giving effect to mitigating 
17 
evidence.  Specifically, he argues that reasonable counsel would have approached voir 
18 
dire, argument, and jury instructions with the goal of informing jurors of the effect that a 
19 
single "no" vote would have on petitioner's sentence, while directing them to give full 
20 
consideration and effect to the mitigation evidence offered by the defense. 
21 
 
 
Petitioner's argument is unavailing.  Under ORCP 59 B -- made applicable 
22 
 
 
 
46 
to criminal trials pursuant to ORS 136.330 -- the responsibility for explaining the legal 
1 
standards rests with the trial court: 
2 
 
"In charging the jury, the court shall state to the jury all matters of 
3 
law necessary for its information in giving its verdict." 
4 
As set out above -- and undisputed here -- the trial court correctly instructed the jury 
5 
regarding the unanimity requirement in answering the three questions.  The jury, 
6 
moreover, operates under an oath that  
7 
 
"they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in issue 
8 
between the plaintiff and defendant, and a true verdict give according to the 
9 
law and evidence as given them on the trial." 
10 
ORCP 59 E (made applicable to criminal trials by ORS 136.210(1)).  Under Oregon law, 
11 
we presume that a jury has honored its oath and followed the court's instructions, State v. 
12 
Elkins, 248 Or 322, 327, 432 P2d 794 (1967), unless there is "an overwhelming 
13 
probability that they would be unable to do so."  State v. Barone, 329 Or 210, 225, 986 
14 
P2d 5 (1999). 
15 
 
 
Here, there is little probability that the jury was unable to understand and 
16 
follow the trial court's jury instructions.  Those instructions clearly communicated to jury 
17 
members that they were free to consider any evidence that they viewed as mitigating.  
18 
The instructions also made clear that if all 12 jurors could not unanimously agree to 
19 
answer a question in the affirmative, "then your answer to that question must be no."11  
20 
As noted above, we presume that the jury followed those instructions in reaching its 
21 
                                              
 
11  
Petitioner has not collaterally challenged the jury instructions themselves in 
these proceedings. 
 
 
 
47 
sentencing verdict.  Consequently, we conclude that the jury was adequately instructed 
1 
concerning the law governing the three questions that had to be answered in the 
2 
affirmative for defendant to be sentenced to death, including the mitigation and other 
3 
evidence that the jury could use in answering those questions.  Viewed in that light, there 
4 
was neither a duty nor a need for trial counsel to:  (1) further inform jurors of the effect 
5 
that a single "no" vote would have on petitioner's sentence, or (2) direct them to give full 
6 
consideration and effect to the mitigation evidence offered by the defense.  Petitioner's 
7 
argument reduces to the assertion that defense counsel should have emphasized different 
8 
aspects of the mitigation case during closing argument.  It does not, however, 
9 
demonstrate that defense counsel acted unreasonably in failing to make the arguments 
10 
that petitioner identifies. 
11 
 
 
Petitioner also asserts that trial counsel unreasonably failed to object to the 
12 
trial court's answer to the jury's mitigation-related question, "Do all 12 jurors have to 
13 
agree on question # 3?"  Petitioner contends that the trial court's response --"In order to 
14 
answer 'yes' to any question, 12 of you must agree on that answer" -- warranted an 
15 
objection because, although correct, it was incomplete and therefore misleading.  
16 
According to petitioner, the trial court's answer improperly focused on the jury as a 
17 
whole, rather than on individual jurors and the power each possessed, standing alone, to 
18 
prevent a death sentence from issuing.  Without that emphasis, petitioner argues, jurors 
19 
could have interpreted the trial court's answer to mean that they had to reach a unanimous 
20 
verdict, even for a life sentence. 
21 
 
 
We disagree.  In determining whether a particular instruction -- in this case, 
22 
 
 
 
48 
a clarifying instruction -- was erroneous and therefore objectionable, we read the jury 
1 
instructions as a whole to ascertain whether they together articulate the law accurately.  
2 
See State v. Woodman, 341 Or 105, 118, 138 P3d 1 (2006) (so stating).  Although the trial 
3 
court's response to the jury's query only addressed the unanimity required to answer "yes" 
4 
to the statutory questions at issue in petitioner's sentencing, the instructions previously 
5 
provided to the jury clearly set out the prerequisites for both a "yes" and "no" outcome:  
6 
answering "yes" to any particular question required unanimous agreement among all 12 
7 
jurors; absent unanimous agreement, however, that question was required to be answered 
8 
"no."  Those instructions were, and remained, unambiguous; consequently there was no 
9 
basis for counsel to object to the trial court's clarifying instruction. 
10 
 
 
Finally, petitioner reiterates his argument that, upon learning of the off-the-
11 
record jury room incident that occurred on the second or third day of deliberations, trial 
12 
counsel unreasonably failed to inquire into the matter.  Specifically, petitioner contends 
13 
that the incident suggested that at least one juror was answering "no" to one of the 
14 
questions before the jury, a situation that, according to petitioner, amounted to a "red 
15 
flag" that should have prompted counsel to ask the trial court to inquire whether the jury 
16 
was deadlocked and to have it re-instructed.  The same incident underlies the related 
17 
argument that trial counsel improperly failed to object to the trial court's refusal to 
18 
conduct an oral jury poll in open court.  Again arguing that distress in the jury room 
19 
demonstrated a likelihood that at least one juror was favoring a verdict of life 
20 
imprisonment, petitioner contends that polling the jury in open court would have given 
21 
the supposedly-dissenting juror enough confidence to tender a "no" answer regarding 
22 
 
 
 
49 
imposition of a death sentence. 
1 
 
 
We decline to take up either argument here.  To the extent that jury 
2 
deliberations may have been adjourned early on one particular day, there is no evidence 
3 
in the record of the trial court proceeding or the post-conviction proceeding as to what 
4 
that issue was.  The scenario advanced by petitioner is purely conjecture as to what might 
5 
have been in the mind of at least one juror.  To speculate, however, "concerning the 
6 
mental processes of juries is forbidden the courts."  DeMaris v. Whittier, 280 Or 25, 31, 
7 
569 P2d 605 (1977).  In the absence of any evidence of misconduct, consideration of 
8 
what may or may not have occurred in the jury room or what any individual juror's views 
9 
might have been before the verdict was rendered is beyond the purview of this court.  
10 
Petitioner failed to prove that his lawyers were unreasonable for not having inquired into 
11 
the jury's deliberations, or for not having objected to a closed jury poll.12 
12 
 
 
We have considered the issues that petitioner raises on review, and, for the 
13 
reasons discussed above, conclude that the trial court did not err in denying petitioner 
14 
post-conviction relief. 
15 
 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the post-
16 
conviction court are affirmed. 
17 
                                              
 
12 
Petitioner argues that other aspects of his trial counsel's representation 
during the penalty-phase retrial were inadequate and prejudicial to him.  The trial court 
rejected those arguments and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  We reject those arguments 
without discussion.