Case Title: Chrichlow v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 34, 2012

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KEINO CHRICHLOW,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 34, 2012 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0611011396 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted:  June 8, 2012 
Decided:  July 30, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 30th day of July 2012, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Keino Chrichlow, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s December 28, 2011 order denying his first motion 
for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.1  We 
find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
                                                 
1 Because Chrichlow’s first postconviction motion contained allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the Superior Court requested that Chrichlow’s trial counsel file an 
affidavit responding to the allegations.  Horne v. State, 887 A.2d 973, 975 (Del. 2005); 
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g) (1) and (2). 
 
2
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in June 2007, Chrichlow was found 
guilty by a Superior Court jury of sixteen counts of Robbery in the First 
Degree, two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony and one count of Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  In October 
2007, the Superior Court granted Chrichlow’s motion for judgment of 
acquittal, in part, reducing nine of the convictions of Robbery in the First 
Degree to convictions of Aggravated Menacing.2  Following reduction of 
those convictions, the Superior Court sentenced Chrichlow to a total of 
twenty-one years of Level V incarceration. 
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his first 
postconviction motion, Chrichlow asserts three claims, as follows:  a) his 
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request an 
accomplice “level of liability” jury instruction pursuant to Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 11, §274; b) his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by 
failing to raise trial counsel’s failure to request such an instruction as an 
issue on appeal; and c) his constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process 
were violated by trial counsel’s error and the Superior Court’s denial of his 
postconviction motion.  All three of Chrichlow’s claims hinge on his core 
                                                 
2 The State filed an unsuccessful appeal challenging the Superior Court’s reduction of the 
robbery convictions to aggravated menacing convictions.  This Court affirmed the 
Superior Court’s judgment on appeal.  State v. Bridgers, 988 A.2d 939 (Del. Super 2007), 
aff’d 970 A.2d 257 (Del. 2009).   
 
3
contention that he was entitled to, but did not receive, the proper jury 
instruction on accomplice liability.3     
 
(4) 
The record in this case reflects that Chrichlow was prosecuted 
as an accomplice to a bank robbery that took place in November 2006 at the 
PNC Bank located on Basin Road in New Castle County, Delaware.4  The 
State presented evidence at trial that Chrichlow was the designated getaway 
driver for the robbery.  The record also reflects that Chrichlow’s counsel did 
not request, and Chrichlow did not receive, a jury instruction pursuant to 
§274.5  Instead, counsel took the position throughout the trial that 
Chrichlow’s “mere presence” at the scene of the crime was insufficient 
under the accomplice liability statute to support a conviction. 
 
(5) 
 Chrichlow has asserted claims of ineffective assistance against 
both his trial counsel and his appellate counsel.  In order to prevail on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that 
his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is 
                                                 
3 To the extent that Chrichlow presented claims in the Superior Court that he does not 
pursue in this appeal, all such claims are deemed to be waived and will not be considered 
in this proceeding.  Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §271. 
5 Allen v. State, 970 A.2d 203, 210, 213-14 (Del. 2009) (“. . . [w]hen an offense is divided 
into degrees, each participant is only guilty for the degree of a crime that is 
commensurate with their own mental culpability and their own accountability for an 
aggravating circumstance.”) 
 
4
a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have 
been different.6  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is 
highly demanding and leads to a strong presumption that the representation 
was professionally reasonable.7  
 
(6) 
The record before us supports the conclusion that Chrichlow’s 
trial counsel made a conscious, as well as professionally reasonable, 
decision to take an “all or nothing” approach to his defense of Chrichlow, 
arguing for a complete acquittal.  As the Superior Court noted, the State did 
not focus its case on Chrichlow, but concentrated its efforts on Chrichlow’s 
two accomplices.  Chrichlow’s counsel chose to take advantage of that fact.  
Moreover, drawing attention to his client’s level of participation in the crime 
entailed the risk that Chrichlow’s arrest for armed robbery in Maryland 
would become an issue at the trial in Delaware.  As his affidavit reflects, 
Chrichlow’s counsel chose to advance the theory that Chrichlow was present 
at the scene of the crime, but did not participate.  Pursuing an accomplice 
“level of liability” jury instruction would have undermined that approach 
and weakened his case.  Based on all of the above, we conclude that 
Chrichlow has failed to demonstrate either that his counsel erred, much less 
that any action on his counsel’s part prejudiced him. 
                                                 
6 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
7 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
 
5
 
(7) 
Chrichlow also argues that his appellate counsel provided 
ineffective assistance.  While the record reflects that Chrichlow’s appellate 
counsel erred by failing to file a timely direct appeal by means of a cross-
appeal in State v. Bridgers, ultimately that error had no prejudicial effect on 
Chrichlow’s case.  In its decision denying Chrichlow’s postconviction 
claims, the Superior Court concluded that Chrichlow’s one viable claim on 
direct appeal---that the jury should have been given an accomplice “level of 
liability” instruction---was without merit.8  We agree.  Even in situations 
where §274 is triggered, an “all or nothing” approach can be a viable 
defense strategy.9  The situation that presented itself in this case clearly falls 
within that category.  As such, while appellate counsel erred, Chrichlow 
suffered no prejudice as a result.  Therefore, Chrichlow’s claim of 
ineffective assistance on the part of his appellate counsel fails.   
 
(8) 
Chrichlow’s third, and final, claim is that his constitutional 
rights to a fair trial and due process were violated by his trial counsel’s error 
and the Superior Court’s denial of his postconviction motion.  In the absence 
of any support for Chrichlow’s claim of professional error on the part of his 
trial counsel or any basis for his claim of error on the part of the Superior 
                                                 
8 The Superior Court decided, in the interest of efficiency, to simply rule on that claim 
within the context of his postconviction motion rather than re-sentencing him.   
Middlebrook v. State, 815 A.2d 739, 743 (Del. 2003). 
9 Dickinson v. State, 8 A.3d 1166, 1168-69 (Del. 2010).  See also Robertson v. State, Del. 
Supr., No. 602, 2011, Steele, C.J. (Feb. 27, 2012). 
 
6
Court in denying his postconviction motion, we find Chrichlow’s third claim 
to be without merit. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice