Case Title: Spicuzza v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13589

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2024-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13589 
 
TRACEY ANNE SPICUZZA & others1  vs.  COMMONWEALTH & another.2 
 
FREEDOM TO PROTEST COALITION & others3  vs.  COMMONWEALTH 
& another.4 
 
 
May 2, 2024. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Constitutional Law, Freedom of speech and press.  Practice, 
Civil, Intervention. 
 
 
 
The petitioners in these consolidated cases appeal from a 
judgment of a single justice of this court denying their 
petitions for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  On April 
26, 2024, we issued an order affirming the judgment.  This 
opinion states the reasons for that order.5 
 
Background.  The petitions stemmed from the ongoing trial, 
in the Superior Court in Norfolk County, in Commonwealth vs. 
Karen Read, No. 2282CR00117.  Read has been indicted for murder, 
 
1 Lorena Jenkinson, Dana Stewart Leonard, and Paul 
Cristoforo. 
 
2 Karen Read. 
 
3 Nicholas Rocco and Jon Silveria. 
 
4 Karen Read. 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts and by Bharani 
Padmanabhan. 
2 
 
among other crimes, and the case has garnered significant public 
interest, including protests and demonstrations in the vicinity 
of the court house complex.  In the course of the trial court 
proceedings, the Commonwealth filed a "Motion for Buffer Zone 
Surrounding Norfolk Superior Court and Request for Order 
Prohibiting Signs or Clothing in Favor of Either Party or Law 
Enforcement," seeking a 500-foot buffer zone around the Norfolk 
County Superior Court House and arguing, essentially, that the 
demonstrations and protests near the court house jeopardized a 
fair trial.  Petitioners Tracey Anne Spicuzza, Lorena Jenkinson, 
Dana Stewart Leonard, and Paul Cristoforo (individual 
petitioners) filed a motion, in the trial court, to intervene 
for the purpose of opposing the Commonwealth's motion.  They 
argued that a buffer zone would infringe on their constitutional 
rights under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 16 of the Declaration of Rights, as 
amended by art. 77 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution.   
 
The trial judge held a hearing on the Commonwealth's motion 
at which she heard from both the Commonwealth and the defendant.  
The defendant specifically took no position on the motion (and 
has not taken part in the proceedings in this court).  The judge 
acknowledged the individual petitioners' motion to intervene, 
noting that she had read the motion papers and was not going to 
hear from counsel in connection with that motion.  Additionally, 
she allowed the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts 
to submit an amicus brief and indicated that she had read the 
amicus brief and did not need to hear from counsel.   
 
The judge issued her decision later the same day, allowing 
the Commonwealth's motion, in part, and ordering that  
 
"no individual may demonstrate in any manner, including 
carrying signs or placards, within 200 feet of the 
courthouse complex during trial of this case, unless 
otherwise ordered by this Court.  This complex includes the 
Norfolk Superior courthouse building and the parking area 
behind the Norfolk County Registry of Deeds building.  
Individuals are also prohibited from using audio enhancing 
devices while protesting."6 
 
6 The trial judge's order also stated that 
 
"no individuals will be permitted to wear or exhibit any 
buttons, photographs, clothing, or insignia, relating to 
 
3 
 
 
In establishing the buffer zone, the judge indicated that she 
was seeking to balance the right to free speech protected by the 
First Amendment and the defendant's right to a fair trial.  The 
judge noted that, in connection with the underlying trial court 
proceedings, protestors have shouted at witnesses, have 
confronted family members of the victim, and have "taken to 
displaying materials which may or may not be introduced into 
evidence during trial."  She also stated that witness 
intimidation has been a "prevalent issue."  On the basis of 
these details, with which the judge has reason to be familiar, 
the judge concluded that a 200-foot buffer zone was warranted to 
help ensure a fair trial, free from outside influence.  The 
judge also denied the individual petitioners' motion to 
intervene. 
 
 
Thereafter, the individual petitioners filed a petition 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court, in which 
they sought relief both from the denial of their motion to 
intervene and from the buffer zone order.  Separately, the 
Freedom to Protest Coalition also filed a petition pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking relief from the buffer zone order.  
The single justice considered the petitions together and denied 
them. 
 
 
Discussion.  As a starting point, we note that the single 
justice declined to reach the merits of the issue whether the 
trial judge erred in denying the individual petitioners' motion 
to intervene.  Rather, the single justice concluded that the 
trial judge made an ordinary procedural ruling and that the 
petitions did not present the type of exceptional matter that 
warrants this court's exercise of its extraordinary power of 
general superintendence.  He did not commit an error of law or 
abuse his discretion in reaching this conclusion.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 454 Mass. 1005, 1006 (2009) (single 
justice properly declined to employ court's extraordinary power 
 
the case pending against the defendant or relating to any 
trial participant, in the courthouse during the trial.  Law 
enforcement officers who are testifying or are members of 
the audience are also prohibited from wearing their 
department issued uniforms or any police emblems in the 
courthouse." 
 
The petitioners have not raised any challenge to this portion of 
the order, and it is not at issue in this appeal. 
 
4 
 
of general superintendence to review relatively routine trial 
court ruling). 
 
As to the buffer zone, and the petitioners' arguments 
regarding their First Amendment rights, there is no question 
that the order establishing the zone does impose some 
restrictions on the petitioners' speech.  As the petitioners 
themselves recognize, however, a restriction on speech is not, 
in and of itself, necessarily problematic or unconstitutional.  
Rather, 
 
"States may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, 
place, or manner of protected speech and assembly provided 
the restrictions are justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and 
that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information" (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
 
Desrosiers v. Governor, 486 Mass. 369, 390-391 (2020), cert. 
denied, 142 S. Ct. 83 (2021).  In the circumstances, the 200-
foot buffer zone meets the "reasonable restriction" 
requirements.   
 
 
First, notwithstanding the petitioners' argument to the 
contrary, the restriction created by the buffer zone is content 
neutral.  "The principal inquiry in determining content 
neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or 
manner cases in particular, is whether the government has 
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the 
message it conveys."  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 
791 (1989), citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 
468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984).  The fact that the protestors who have 
appeared outside the court house in connection with the trial 
have all, according to the petitioners, been in support of the 
defendant in the underlying criminal trial had no bearing on the 
establishment of the buffer zone.  Any protest against the 
defendant, and in support of the Commonwealth, would be equally 
subject to the restrictions of the buffer zone.  "Government 
regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as 
it is 'justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech.'"  Ward, supra, quoting Clark, supra at 293.  
Additionally, and to the petitioners' argument that the buffer 
zone is not content neutral because commercial speech is still 
allowed, the fact that the restriction created by the buffer 
zone "has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but 
5 
 
not others" does not render the buffer zone unconstitutional.  
See Ward, supra ("A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to 
the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an 
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others"). 
 
 
Second, the restriction -- the 200-foot buffer zone -- is 
"narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest."  The buffer zone, which is smaller than the 500-foot 
zone requested by the Commonwealth, will help ensure a fair 
trial -- a significant governmental interest -- by physically 
clearing the path for jurors, witnesses, and other individuals 
to come and go from the court house complex without obstruction 
or interference by protestors or demonstrators, and any 
concomitant intimidation or harassment, within 200 feet of the 
court house complex.  The buffer zone also helps protect the 
jurors, who, as the trial judge noted, must remain fair and 
unbiased, from extraneous influence that might result from, for 
example, viewing pictures of putative evidence directly in their 
path.  The buffer zone does not preclude the petitioners, or 
anyone else, from engaging in the same forms of protest they 
have previously done; it simply constrains them from doing so 
within a limited zone tied to court house property.  In so 
doing, it leaves open "ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information." 
 
Third, we reject the argument that the buffer zone order 
must be analyzed under strict scrutiny as a prior restraint on 
speech.  The term "prior restraint" "describe[s] administrative 
and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when 
issued in advance of the time that such communications are to 
occur."  Commonwealth v. Barnes, 461 Mass. 644, 651 (2012), 
quoting Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993).  
Here, the buffer zone order does not forbid protestors and 
demonstrators from expressing their chosen message; they simply 
must do so outside the buffer zone.  
 
Finally, we note that, notwithstanding assertions in their 
briefing to this court, the petitioners have not provided record 
evidence sufficient to establish that the 200-foot buffer zone 
ordered by the Superior Court extends beyond the court house 
grounds onto public sidewalks or other areas that constitute a 
public forum with respect to which "the government's ability to 
permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited."  
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).  A map 
supplied by the Commonwealth is not sufficiently clear to 
resolve any ambiguity on this score, and does not appear, in any 
event, to have been a part of the record before the single 
6 
 
justice.  Based on the petitioners' failure to establish 
otherwise, the single justice did not err in denying their 
petition on the basis that the establishment of the buffer zone 
did not violate the petitioners' First Amendment rights.  
 
Conclusion.  Ultimately, the trial judge struck a balance 
between the right to protest or demonstrate and the defendant's 
right to a fair trial.  As the Commonwealth notes, it too has 
the right to, and an interest in the defendant receiving, a fair 
trial, see Commonwealth v. Underwood, 358 Mass. 506, 511 (1970), 
which is also supported by the judge's order.  The single 
justice did not commit an error of law or abuse his discretion 
in denying the petitions pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking 
relief from that order, or from the denial of the motion to 
intervene.  For the foregoing reasons, we issued an order on 
April 26, 2024, affirming the judgment. 
 
 
The cases were submitted on the papers filed, accompanied 
by memoranda of law. 
Mark Trammell, of Maryland, Marc J. Randazza, & Jay M. 
Wolman for the petitioners. 
Pamela Alford & Adam C. Lally, Assistant District 
Attorneys, for the Commonwealth. 
Ruth A. Bourquin & Rachel E. Davidson, for American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
Bharani Padmanabhan, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief.