Case Title: Commonwealth v. Navarro

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11878

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11878 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SANTIAGO NAVARRO. 
 
 
 
Essex.     October 5, 2015. - May 5, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Identification.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, 
Assistance of counsel.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of 
counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 2, 2010. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Douglas H. Wilkins, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth A. Billowitz for the defendant. 
 
Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Karen A. Newirth, Kevin Puvalowski, Shin Hahn, & Jean 
Ripley, of New York, & Matthew Nickell, for The Innocence 
Network & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In January, 2012, a Superior Court jury 
convicted the defendant, Santiago Navarro, on thirty 
2 
 
indictments, ten each charging armed robbery while masked, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 17; home invasion, in violation of 
G. L. c. 265, § 18C; and kidnapping, in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 26.  The indictments stemmed from an incident during 
which the defendant and an accomplice invaded a home in North 
Andover and robbed the players in a high stakes poker game.  The 
defendant appealed, asserting various claims of error.  The 
Appeals Court affirmed the convictions.  Commonwealth v. 
Navarro, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 780 (2014).  We granted the 
defendant's application for further appellate review to consider 
the sole issue of the propriety of the judge's eyewitness 
identification instructions.  More specifically, we decide 
whether the judge's failure to instruct the jury in accordance 
with Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296 (1979) 
(Rodriguez), S.C., 419 Mass. 1006 (1995), may be reviewed under 
the prejudicial error standard where the defendant neither 
requested the instruction nor objected to its omission.1  For the 
                     
 
1 The defendant frames the issue as judicial error, arguing 
that the judge was required to provide an instruction pursuant 
to Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296 (1979), S.C., 419 
Mass. 1006 (1995), sua sponte.  We regard this as a strategic 
gambit that the defendant appears to believe would call for 
review under the more favorable "prejudicial error" standard 
rather than the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice 
standard applicable to the defendant's alternative ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  The gambit fails, however, because 
even if we were to conclude that the judge was required to give 
such an instruction sua sponte, the issue was not preserved and 
we would still determine whether the omission created a 
3 
 
reasons set forth below, we conclude that in the absence of a 
request, the defendant may not attribute the omission of a 
Rodriguez eyewitness identification instruction to judicial 
error and, as a consequence, he is not entitled to review on 
that ground.  Instead, we review the issue under the rubric of 
the defendant's alternative claim that counsel's failure to 
request a Rodriguez instruction was constitutionally 
ineffective.  We agree that counsel's performance in this 
respect fell "measurably below that which might be expected from 
an ordinary fallible lawyer," Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 
Mass. 89, 96 (1974), but we conclude that the lapse was not so 
prejudicial as to result in a substantial risk of a miscarriage 
of justice. 
 
Background.  From the evidence admitted at trial, the jury 
could have found the following facts.  On June 13, 2010, two 
roommates hosted a high stakes poker game at their apartment in 
North Andover.  The apartment was on the second floor of a two-
family home.  The poker room was in the rear of the apartment 
and was accessible by a rear door.  The poker game was a regular 
event that attracted eight to ten friends on average.  Each card 
player entered the game with one hundred dollars or more, with 
                                                                  
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth 
v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 13 (1999). 
4 
 
the option to reenter the game with more cash if he lost his 
initial stake. 
 
On the night in question, the poker game started sometime 
after 9 P.M. with a small group that, around 10:30 P.M., had 
grown to eleven card players.  Among this group was Christopher 
Maldonado, known as "Shorty."  After losing his money, Maldonado 
stayed in the apartment, where the victims observed him sending 
text messages on his cellular telephone.  Sometime after 
Maldonado was out of the game, two masked men entered the 
apartment.  One of the men was armed with a gun and demanded the 
card players to empty their pockets and place their cellular 
telephones on the table.  After collecting the items, the 
assailants bound the victims' hands.  Initially, Maldonado 
pretended to be a victim and, as with the others, the robbers 
bound his hands and demanded his cash.  Later as events 
progressed, Maldonado announced that he "set [the robbery] up" 
and that he was "hungry [for money]."  Maldonado then assisted in 
collecting the victims' property and escaped with the robbers.  
After the robbers escaped, two of the victims freed themselves 
and, from a window in the apartment, observed the robbers 
getting into a dark blue Mitsubishi Galant automobile bearing 
Massachusetts license plate number 777-MF or 7777-MF.  The 
victims got into a vehicle and pursued the robbers until they 
reached an entrance to Route 495.  At that point, they abandoned 
5 
 
the chase and returned to the apartment, where they were met by 
Detective Daniel G. Cronin of the North Andover police 
department.  Detective Cronin commenced his investigation based 
on the victims' descriptions of the suspects and the getaway 
vehicle. 
 
The defendant came to Detective Cronin's attention as a 
suspect the day after the robbery when he and a woman appeared 
at the North Andover police station in a vehicle fitting the 
description of the vehicle that the victims had observed leaving 
the scene of the crime.  The defendant identified himself to 
Detective Cronin as Santiago Navarro, and the woman produced a 
driver's license identifying herself as Milagros Fernandez.  The 
defendant told Detective Cronin that Fernandez, "his girl," had 
a question about her vehicle.2  Detective Cronin spoke to them 
and observed them as they entered the vehicle and drove away. 
 
Four days after the robbery, Detective Cronin prepared and 
showed an array containing the defendant's photograph to some of 
the victims.  Of the six victims who viewed the array, only two 
identified the defendant as one of the masked perpetrators, 
specifying that he was the assailant with the gun. 
                     
 
2 The judge excluded Milagros Fernandez's statement that she 
had come to the police in response to news reports that her 
automobile, the Galant, had been used as the getaway vehicle in 
the robbery. 
6 
 
 
Nine days after the robbery, the police arrested Maldonado, 
who immediately began cooperating in exchange for concessions in 
a plea agreement.  Maldonado testified at trial that he and the 
defendant, who was known to him as "Raw," discussed a plan to 
rob the victims.  About one week before the robbery, Maldonado 
and the defendant drove to the victim's apartment in a blue 
Mitsubishi Galant (described by Maldonado as having a license 
plate with "a few 7's, M-F") and conducted their surveillance of 
the area.  Maldonado and the defendant agreed on a plan for the 
defendant to enter the apartment during the game and commit the 
robbery.  According to the plan, Maldonado would send text messages 
to the defendant to indicate when all of the players would be in 
one room and the defendant would then enter the apartment.  The 
robbery occurred as planned, and Maldonado fled the scene with the 
defendant in the same Galant used to conduct their surveillance a 
week earlier. 
 
To corroborate Maldonado's testimony regarding his contacts 
with the defendant on the evening of the robbery, the prosecutor 
introduced Fernandez's cellular telephone records.  Those records 
established thirty to forty calls and text messages between 
Maldonado and the defendant beginning on the day of the robbery and 
ending in the early morning hours of the day after the robbery.  At 
least twenty-five of those contacts occurred between the late 
evening on the day of the robbery and the early morning hours of 
7 
 
\ 
the next day.  Maldonado testified that the defendant used the 
telephone number associated with Fernandez's telephone and that he 
was corresponding with the defendant during those contacts. 
 
Maldonado acknowledged that he expected to receive a reduced 
sentence for his role in the robbery in exchange for truthful 
testimony about the crime.  Defense counsel vigorously cross-
examined him about his agreement with the Commonwealth and argued 
to the jury that Maldonado was not credible because his testimony 
was entirely self-serving. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Necessity of a request for Rodriguez 
eyewitness identification instructions.  The defendant argues 
that the judge was required, sua sponte, to charge the jury in 
accordance with Rodriguez and that the failure to do so was 
error.3  The argument lacks merit because the law as it existed 
                     
 
3 We note that this case was tried before our most recent 
eyewitness identification cases, which altered our jurisprudence 
so as to give effect to certain generally accepted scientific 
advances in the understanding of the reliability of eyewitness 
identification.  See Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 23-
30 (2015) (holding that instructions on cross-racial 
identification required prospectively unless parties agree there 
was no cross-racial identification); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 
Mass. 352, 361-378 (2015) (augmenting and supplementing 
Rodriguez to include five specific principles shown to be 
generally accepted in relevant scientific community); 
Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 259-267 (2014) 
(precluding in-court identification where witness made less than 
positive pretrial identification, except on showing of "good 
reason"); Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 238-244 (2014) 
(precluding in-court identification where witness made no 
pretrial identification, except on showing of "good reason"). 
 
8 
 
at the time of the trial did not require a sua sponte Rodriguez 
eyewitness identification instruction.4 
 
As a threshold matter, we note that despite basing his 
appeal in substantial part on the contention that a defendant is  
entitled as a matter of right to a sua sponte Rodriguez 
instruction, the defendant has failed to direct us to a single 
case explicitly compelling, or even marginally supporting, this 
position.  Instead, he points only to the observation in 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 236, 240 (2002), 
that a Rodriguez instruction is proper "whenever identification 
is an issue raised by the evidence."  This statement, of course, 
affirms a basic principle of our eyewitness identification 
jurisprudence.  It does not, however, stand for the proposition 
that counsel is relieved of the burden to request an eyewitness 
identification instruction when it is appropriate to do so. 
 
In Rodriguez, the seminal case in our law on eyewitness 
identification instructions, we linked entitlement to the 
                     
 
4 The defendant also claims that omission of the Rodriguez 
instruction violated his constitutional right to a fair trial.  
However, he presents this claim in summary fashion only, 
omitting any reference to the constitutional provisions 
underlying this claim and making no attempt to explain how the 
application of these provisions compels the result he seeks.  
Because we deem the argument insufficient to meet the 
requirements of Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367 Mass. 
921 (1975), we decline to consider whether the omission of an 
eyewitness instruction in accordance with Rodriguez is a 
violation of the defendant's constitutional right to a fair 
trial. 
9 
 
instruction to a specific request from the defendant.  The 
necessity of a request is implicit in our statement that "a 
defendant who fairly raises the issue of mistaken identification 
might well be entitled to instructions" alerting the jury to the 
risk of misidentification and suggesting factors that might 
mitigate that risk in evaluating eyewitness identification 
testimony (emphasis added).  Rodriguez, 378 Mass. at 302.  The 
myriad post-Rodriguez cases,5 reflecting the state of the law at 
the time of the trial in this case, have reiterated that counsel 
should request a Rodriguez instruction when eyewitness 
identification is a live issue in the case.  More recently in 
Commonwealth v. Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 912 (2013), we 
underscored the point, noting that "where requested by the 
defendant, . . . a judge should provide specific guidance to the 
jury regarding evaluation of such eyewitness testimony" 
(emphasis added).  This court's reference in Franklin to "where 
requested" follows the path charted by Rodriguez and its progeny 
                     
 
5 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Watson, 455 Mass. 246, 259-260 
(2009) (judge's eyewitness instructions in accordance with 
Rodriguez and Commonwealth v. Pressley, 390 Mass. 617, 619 
[1983], given at defendant's request, sufficient without 
"cautionary" instructions); Commonwealth v. Pires, 453 Mass. 66, 
72 (2009) ("when the evidence so warrants and when a defendant 
requests the instruction," no harm in giving "honest but 
mistaken" language from Pressley with Rodriguez instruction). 
 
10 
 
in presuming the necessity of a request by the defendant.6  
Therefore, we reject the defendant's contention that at the time 
of the trial in this case a sua sponte Rodriguez instruction was 
required and that the failure to provide it sua sponte was 
error. 
We address briefly the defendant's reliance on the Supreme 
Judicial Court Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence:  Report and 
Recommendations to the Justices (July 25, 2013), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/eyewitness-evidence-
report-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/WY4M-YNZN] (Study Group 
Report), to support the argument that at the time of the trial 
in this case the judge was obliged to instruct the jury sua 
sponte in accordance with Rodriguez.  This reliance is 
misplaced.  The Study Group Report is the product of this 
court's charge to the study group to offer guidance as to how 
                     
 
6 Because the issue in this appeal involves the law at the 
time of the trial, we caution against any implication that a 
judge should not give an eyewitness identification instruction 
unless the defendant requests it.  Before the adoption of the 
Model Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification, 473 Mass. 
1051 (2015), ambiguity may well have clouded the boundaries of 
the judge's discretion to provide eyewitness identification 
instructions.  The newly adopted model instructions seek 
prospectively to resolve that ambiguity by stressing the 
necessity of appropriate instructions tailored to the particular 
identification issues in the case.  See id. at 1053 n.1 ("This 
instruction should be given in any case in which the jury heard 
eyewitness evidence that positively identified the defendant and 
in which the identification of the defendant as the person who 
committed or participated in the alleged crime[s] is 
contested"). 
11 
 
our courts can most effectively "deter unnecessarily suggestive 
[identification] procedures and whether existing model jury 
instructions provide adequate guidance to juries in evaluating 
eyewitness testimony."  Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 
604 n.16 (2011).  Consistent with this charge, the Study Group 
Report marshals the current science underlying the reliability 
of eyewitness identifications, offers a blueprint for changes in 
our eyewitness identification jurisprudence, and documents with 
some urgency the need for specific reforms to mitigate the 
possibility of wrongful convictions based on mistaken 
identifications.  It does not purport to be, nor is it, an 
authoritative statement of the law governing a judge's 
obligation to provide a Rodriguez instruction in the absence of 
a request by the defendant.  Thus, we reject the defendant's 
suggestion that the Study Group Report should inform our review 
of the judge's instructions in this case. 
 
2.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  In view of our 
determination that the judge's failure to provide a Rodriguez 
instruction sua sponte was not error, we consider the 
defendant's alternative argument that, in failing to request a 
Rodriguez instruction, counsel rendered constitutionally 
ineffective assistance to the defendant.  "[W]hen [a] claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is predicated . . . on 
12 
 
counsel's failure to object to something that occurred at trial, 
the standard for evaluating the ineffectiveness claim is not 
significantly different from the substantial risk standard that 
is applicable to our review of the underlying, unpreserved 
error."  Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 686 (2002).  A 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice exists if "we have 
a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been 
different" if the Rodriguez instruction had not been omitted.  
Id. at 687, quoting Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 174 
(1999).  "We review the evidence and the case as a whole.  We 
consider the strength of the Commonwealth's case, the nature of 
the error, the significance of the error in the context of the 
trial, and the possibility that the absence of an objection was 
the result of a reasonable tactical decision."7  Azar, supra. 
 
At the charge conference, the judge solicited proposed 
instructions from counsel.  The defendant's counsel did not 
request a Rodriguez instruction.  The judge, however, instructed 
the jury generally on the issue, highlighting the importance of 
the eyewitness identifications in the case and the 
                     
 
7 Although "our courts strongly disfavor raising claims of 
ineffective assistance on direct appeal," we may resolve the 
defendant's claim because it fits within the narrow exception to 
the rule requiring such claims to be raised in a motion for a 
new trial where the "factual basis of the claim appears 
indisputably on the trial record."  Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 
Mass. 807, 811 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Adamides, 37 
Mass. App. Ct. 339, 344 (1994). 
13 
 
Commonwealth's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
identity of the perpetrators.  In the only specific reference to 
the eyewitness identification issue, the judge instructed the 
jury on the possibility of an honest but mistaken identification 
in accordance with Commonwealth v. Pressley, 390 Mass. 617, 619-
620 (1983).  At the end of the judge's charge, defense counsel 
offered no objection to the omission of the Rodriguez 
instruction. 
 
The need for a Rodriguez instruction in the circumstances 
of this case, however, was apparent.  Because the robbers were 
masked and otherwise unknown to the victims, the identification 
of the defendant was highly vulnerable to attack on grounds that 
would have been highlighted in a Rodriguez instruction.  For 
example, one victim identified the defendant at trial but 
acknowledged that he was able to do so by "his eyes" only 
because no other part of the defendant's face was visible during 
the robbery.  A Rodriguez instruction would have highlighted for 
the jury the importance of "the capacity and an adequate 
opportunity to observe" the perpetrator.  Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 
at 310 (Appendix).  Thus, it is inconceivable that, in the 
circumstances of this case involving unknown masked 
perpetrators, counsel's failure to request a Rodriguez 
instruction could be justified on strategic grounds.  In our 
14 
 
view, therefore, the failure to request a Rodriguez instruction 
was conduct that fell "measurably below that which might be 
expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer."  Saferian, 366 Mass. 
at 96.  We turn now to a determination whether counsel's error 
"has likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, 
substantial ground of defence," id. at 96, where we effectively 
determine whether the error resulted in a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Azar, 435 Mass. at 686.  In assessing 
the prejudicial effect of the Rodriguez omissions from the 
charge, we evaluate the impact of the claimed error in the 
context of the entire charge.  See Commonwealth v. Nadworny, 396 
Mass. 342, 360 (1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986). 
 
3.  Prejudicial effect of the Rodriguez omissions.  
Although we reject certain of the defendant's claims regarding 
the prejudicial effect of the Rodriguez omissions, we are 
persuaded that, considered in their totality, the instructions 
given were inadequate to assist the jury in assessing the 
reliability and accuracy of the victims' eyewitness 
identifications.  In relevant part, the judge instructed the 
jury as follows: 
 
"Now, one of the most important issues in this case is 
the identification of the defendant as the alleged 
perpetrator of the crime.  Now, in addition in deciding 
whether or not to believe a witness who identifies the 
defendant as the perpetrator, remember that you must 
consider not only whether the witness is trying to tell the 
15 
 
truth or is lying, you must also consider whether that 
witness's testimony is accurate or instead is an honest 
mistake.  Sometimes people perceive an event erroneously or 
forget things or become confused. 
 
 
"In deciding whether a witness is trying to be 
truthful is only the first step.  You must then go on to 
decide whether the witness's testimony on this issue is 
accurate in fact. 
 
 
"Now, I once again emphasize that the burden of proof 
that's on the prosecutor extends to every element of the 
crimes charged, and this specifically includes the burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the 
defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes for which he 
stands charged. 
 
 
"If, after examining the testimony, you have a 
reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identification, 
you must find the defendant not guilty.  In deciding 
whether or not to believe a witness who identifies the 
defendant as the perpetrator, remember that you must not 
only consider whether the witness is trying to tell you the 
truth or is lying, you must also decide whether that 
witness's identification is accurate or instead may well 
have been an honest good-faith identification that 
nonetheless may have been mistaken." 
 
As given, the judge's instructions appropriately focused on the 
risk of an honest but mistaken eyewitness identification where, 
as here, the perpetrators were masked and unknown to the 
victims.  The judge's strong caution as to this risk, together 
with his reiteration of the prosecutor's burden to prove 
identification beyond a reasonable doubt, provided some of the 
information necessary to assist the jury in deciding the 
credibility of the eyewitness identifications.  "Although the 
charge touched on the thrust of Rodriguez by instructing the 
16 
 
jury to consider the possibility of an honest mistake, [the 
instructions] did not equip the jury with the proper tools to 
help them recognize the circumstances that might lead a witness 
to make such a mistake."  Commonwealth v. Monteiro, 51 Mass. 
App. Ct. 552, 562 (2001). 
 
The defendant characterizes the judge's charge as a 
"complete failure" to provide guidance to the jury on the 
evaluation of the eyewitness identification evidence presented 
at trial, and argues that the particular omissions from the 
Rodriguez instruction constitute reversible error.  More 
specifically, he claims prejudice from the omission of the 
following Rodriguez factors:  (i) capacity and opportunity of 
the eyewitnesses to observe the perpetrators; (ii) failed or 
inconclusive identifications; (iii) influence or suggestiveness 
in the identifications; and (iv) length of time between the 
event and the identifications.  We consider each of the 
Rodriguez omissions as a factor in the determination whether 
counsel's lapse resulted in a substantial risk of a miscarriage 
of justice. 
a.  The Rodriguez factor relating to a witness's capacity 
and opportunity to observe was essential in this case, where the 
robbery was perpetrated by three individuals, two of whom were 
masked and unknown to the victims, and the defendant was 
identified as one of the masked robbers.  Here, the judge 
17 
 
instructed the jury generally on the importance of a witness's 
"opportunity or lack of opportunity" to observe and an 
eyewitness's "ability" to understand, to recall, and to 
accurately describe what he or she observed during the event.  
This instruction, however, was an inadequate substitute8 for what 
the jury should have been told in accordance with Rodriguez.9  As 
is plain, the Rodriguez language apprises the jury in a more 
detailed fashion of the factors that bear on their assessment of 
the opportunity and ability to observe the perpetrator.  In 
addition, it is important for the jury's consideration of the 
                     
 
8 This portion of the judge's instruction provided as 
follows: 
 
 
"Did the witness appear to know what the witness was 
talking about, what was the opportunity or lack of 
opportunity that the witness had to see and learn the facts 
about which he or she was testifying? 
 
 
"What was the ability of the witness to understand, to 
recall and to accurately describe those things that a 
witness was testifying to?" 
 
 
9 The portion of the Rodriguez instruction on this point 
provides as follows: 
 
 
"Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity 
and an adequate opportunity to observe the offender? 
 
 
"Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to 
observe the offender at the time of the offense will be 
affected by such matters as how long or short a time was 
available, how far or close the witness was, how good were 
lighting conditions, and whether the witness had had 
occasion to see or know the person in the past." 
 
Rodriguez, 378 Mass. at 310 (Appendix). 
18 
 
accuracy and reliability of the identification to hear that 
instruction in the context of other factors bearing on that 
issue.  We are persuaded on the basis of this omission alone 
that the eyewitness instructions to the jury were inadequate. 
b.  The defendant argues that the lack of the Rodriguez 
instruction on the effect of failed or inconclusive 
identifications10 was inadequate where some of the witnesses in 
this case were unable to make any identification from the 
photographic array, and those who did make an identification 
were inconsistent in their level of certainty.  It is doubtful 
that the omission of this Rodriguez factor was problematic on 
either ground. 
None of the witnesses who were unable to identify the 
defendant from the photographic arrays made an in-court 
identification at trial.  As to these witnesses at least, there 
was no necessity for a Rodriguez instruction.  See Commonwealth 
v. Johnson, 470 Mass. 389, 390 (2015) (declining to find abuse 
of discretion in judge's denial of request for eyewitness 
identification instruction where there was no positive 
eyewitness identification and "no other eyewitness testimony 
that significantly incriminated the defendant").  Two of the 
                     
 
10 "You may take into account any occasions in which the 
witness failed to make an identification of defendant, or made 
an identification that was inconsistent with [the] 
identification at trial."  Rodriguez, 378 Mass. at 311. 
19 
 
victims made what they described as positive identifications but 
neither failed to make an identification of the defendant when 
presented with the opportunity to do so. 
The defendant's claim that the eyewitnesses contradicted 
their level of certainty does not, in any event, require an 
instruction on this factor.  Both eyewitnesses testified to 
being one hundred per cent certain of their identifications.  
Although neither wavered from his claim to be one hundred per 
cent certain of their identifications, Detective Cronin 
testified that they expressed less than one hundred per cent 
certainty, an eight on the scale of one to ten.  Even assuming a 
contradiction in the witnesses' level of certainty, this 
instruction is not intended to address that issue directly.  
Rather, it relates primarily to the situation where a witness 
has failed to make an identification or identified a person 
other than the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Bol Choeurn, 446 
Mass. 510, 518 (2006) (inconsistent identification portion of 
Rodriguez instruction properly given to jury on factors 
considered where witness identified photograph of someone other 
than defendant).  Where neither scenario occurred here, this 
instruction would not necessarily have been helpful or required 
to assist the jury in assessing the eyewitness identifications.  
In these circumstances, the judge properly could have exercised 
20 
 
the discretion to omit this factor, and no prejudice resulted 
from its omission. 
c.  Next, the defendant contends that the jury should have 
been apprised of the Rodriguez factor relating to the possible 
role of influence or suggestion in the identifications.11  More 
specifically, he argues that the jury should have been 
instructed that the identification procedures used by Detective 
Cronin did not comport with the protocol suggested in 
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 797-798 (2009).  
He points out that there was no double-blind array; the 
photographs were shown to the victims simultaneously rather than 
sequentially; and the procedure was not recorded or otherwise 
documented. 
As a threshold matter, it does not appear that the 
defendant ever requested an instruction regarding the failure to 
comply with the Silva-Santiago protocol.  Also, the defendant 
incorrectly posits that the suggested Silva-Santiago protocol 
                     
 
11 Rodriguez, 378 Mass. at 311 (Appendix), instructs that a 
jury may consider the following circumstances: 
 
 
"If the identification by the witness may have been 
influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant 
was presented to him for identification, you should 
scrutinize the identification with great care.  You may 
also consider the length of time that lapsed between the 
occurrence of the crime and the next opportunity of the 
witness to see the defendant, as a factor bearing on the 
reliability of the identification." 
 
21 
 
includes a double-blind procedure, a sequential array, and a 
recording of the procedure.  Although we noted the efficacy of 
these procedures in minimizing the risks of misidentification,12 
the protocol relates only to the content of the police officer's 
dialogue with the identifying witness.  Furthermore, we 
pointedly declined to require a double-blind procedure where it 
might not be practicable, or either a sequential array or 
recording.  Id. at 797-798. 
d.  As to the instruction on the length of time between the 
robbery and the identification,13 we agree that the lapse of time 
is a factor that may impair the reliability of an identification 
and that the four-day delay in this case is a factor that the 
jury should have considered.  While appropriate, the omission of 
this factor did not seriously compromise the adequacy of the 
judge's charge or otherwise result in prejudice to the 
defendant. 
                     
 
12 In Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 797-798 
(2009), we declined, based on concerns of practicality, to 
require a double-blind procedure.  At the same time, we noted 
that "it is the better practice because it eliminates the risk 
of conscious or unconscious suggestion."  Id. at 797. 
 
 
13 In Commonwealth v. Cuffie, 414 Mass. 632, 641 (1993) 
(Appendix), we revised the Rodriguez language on this point as 
follows:  "You may also consider the length of time that lapsed 
between the occurrence of the crime and the opportunity of the 
witness, some time after the occurrence of the crime, to see and 
identify the defendant as the offender, as a factor bearing on 
the reliability of the identification." 
22 
 
 
Although we conclude that the Rodriguez instructions should 
have been given, especially in the circumstances of this case 
where the sole issue was the identity of a masked perpetrator, 
we are not persuaded that the defendant has met his burden to 
show that the result of the trial would have been different if 
those instructions had not been omitted.  First, we reject out 
of hand the defendant's contention that the evidence was "less 
than overwhelming."  To the contrary, the evidence of the 
defendant's identity as one of the perpetrators was strong.  See 
Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 650 (1997) ("Where 
evidence of guilt is strong and one-sided, it is generally 
concluded that no substantial risk . . . of a miscarriage of 
justice" occurred [citation omitted]).  While it may be 
reasonable to discount the victims' identifications because the 
robbers were masked, the defendant's identity as a perpetrator 
of the crime did not rest solely, or even largely, on those 
identifications.  The most potent evidence of the defendant's 
identity as the perpetrator came from Maldonado, his coventurer 
in the crimes.  Maldonado admitted his role as an accomplice and 
testified that he and the defendant planned and executed the 
robbery and shared the proceeds. 
 
We have taken due notice of the defendant's attack on the 
probative force of Maldonado's testimony, characterizing it as a 
23 
 
self-serving ploy to secure sentencing concessions on the 
indictments for his participation in the crimes.  Maldonado's 
self-interest notwithstanding, the defendant made no headway in 
impeaching the credibility of Maldonado's testimony, a task made 
all the more difficult by the telephone records that 
substantially corroborated that testimony. 
 
Beyond the damaging identification by Maldonado and the 
corroborating telephone records, the jury were presented with 
unimpeached testimony from the victims who identified the 
getaway vehicle that the police later discovered to belong to 
the defendant's girl friend.  The defendant's connection to the 
vehicle was confirmed when he and his girl friend appeared at 
the police station the day after the robbery in the same vehicle 
asking questions about her vehicle.14 
 
Conclusion.  Because the defendant has not met his burden 
to establish a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice from 
the omission of the Rodriguez instruction, we affirm the 
convictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
14 See note 2, supra.