Case Title: Morris v. Diers

Citation: 298 P.2d 957

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1956-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
298 P.2d 957 (1956) Luther D. MORRIS and Iva Morris, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Henry A. DIERS and Don R. Diers, Defendants in Error. No. 17732. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. July 2, 1956. Rehearing Denied July 23, 1956. *958 Thomas E. Creighton, Flagler, for plaintiff in error. Wormwood, O'Dell & Wolvington, Denver, for defendant in error. BRADFIELD, Justice. The plaintiffs in error, hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs, complain of the action of the district court of Lincoln county in dismissing their complaint. We refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court or by name. The case grows out of an automobile accident involving two moving cars, one of which struck the second, which in turn struck and damaged a third car occupied by plaintiff Iva Morris while parked at a filling station at Arriba, Colorado, near a travelled highway. The plaintiffs, owner and injured occupant of the parked car, sued the owners and drivers of the other two cars "jointly and severally," alleging substantial damages to plaintiff Iva Morris and to the Morris car due to negligence on the part of the defendants. After the defendants Diers had filed their answer and before trial, plaintiffs dismissed the case as against defendants Shulls, the owner and driver of one of the cars, pursuant to a written stipulation. Defendants Diers, owner and driver of the other car, thereupon moved to dismiss as to them on the ground that the stipulation was of such nature that it released plaintiffs' cause of action as against all the defendants. The motion was granted; the court's order for dismissal contains no findings of facts. The pertinent parts of the stipulation for dismissal of the action are: Then follows a paragraph containing conditions on which the promissory note would be cancelled, which are not here material. The stipulation is signed by the plaintiffs Morris and their attorney and by the Shulls and their attorney and was filed February 3, 1955. Thereafter defendants Diers filed an amendment to their answer, alleging a fourth defense: On hearing the motion to dismiss, the trial court entered judgment ordering the dismissal of plaintiffs' claim against the Diers, the remaining defendants, with prejudice. *959 The questions presented are: 1. Did the stipulation, that the action "be dismissed with prejudice as against said undersigned defendants only," (the Shulls) for a consideration, constitute a release of the remaining defendants? 2. Is the release of joint tort-feasors modified where the stipulation discloses that plaintiffs did not intend to release the remaining joint tort-feasors? Colorado has long recognized the majority rule in force in most other jurisdictions that the release of one joint tort feasor, for a consideration, releases all the joint tort feasors. In Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Sullivan, 21 Colo. 302, 307, 41 P. 501, 503, the following cited from Leddy v. Barney, 139 Mass. 394, 2 N.E. 107, is approved: Ducey v. Patterson, 37 Colo. 216, 224, 86 P. 109, 111, 9 L.R.A.,N.S., 1066, citing with approval Abb v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 28 Wash. 428, 68 P. 954, 58 L.R.A. 293: Sams v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017, cites with approval Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 A. 107, 109, 112 A.L.R. 550, which states the rule to be as follows: The stipulation involved here authorized an unqualified dismissal with prejudice, for a consideration, of plaintiffs' claim against defendants (Shulls) who had been sued, releasing them from further liability. Under long accepted Colorado decisions such a stipulation or release, in law, operates to release all the tort-feasors jointly and severally sued, whether for joint, concurrent or successive torts. The trial court's order of dismissal of the remaining tort-feasors (the Diers) was proper. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.