Case Title: State v. Jess. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakayama [pdf]. Dissenting opinion by J. Acoba [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Accepting Reserved Question, filed 04/26/2007 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 04/04/2008 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 04/18/2008 [pdf], 117 Haw. 335. J. Acoba Dissenting.

Citation: 117 Haw. 381

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2008-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW UsRaRy

‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION TH WEST’ HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +4

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

000 =-~

STATE OF HAWAT'L, Plaintif£-Appellant,

He aeM ane

BRIAN JESS, Defendant-Appellee.

oats

 

No. 26483

RESERVED QUESTION FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CR. NO. 0-1-0422)

MARCH 31, 2008

MOON, C.J.; LEVINSON, AND DUFFY, JJ., NAKAYAMA, J., CONCURRING
AND DISSENTING SEPARATELY, AND ACOBA, J., DISSENTING SEPARATELY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J.

On October 6, 2004, the defendant-appellee Brian Jess
filed 2 26 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996)! petition for @ writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the District of
Hawai'i. In his petition, Jess alleged that the extended tern
sentence that the circuit court of the first circuit, the
Honorable Victoria S. Marks presiding, imposed upon him on May 7,
2001,* pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 706-661

28 0.8.0, $ 2254 provides in relevent part thet “a district court shall

jcstion for s writ of habeas corpus in behalf of » pereen in
gustody pursuant to the judgsent of » State court only on the goeurd hee he
is in custody in vielation of the Constitution or aus or teeatieg ae mae
United states.”

 

   

* The sentence was imposed in Criminal No. 00-01-0422.
 

4168 POR PUBLICATION IN’ WEST'S KAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER

(supp. 1999),? 706-662(1), 706-662(4) (a) (Supp. 1996) ,*

> an 2000, HRS § 706-661 provided:

In the cases designated in [HRS §] 706-662 (see infra
note 41, a person who has been convicted of a felony nay be
Sentenced toon extended indeterminate term of imprisonment. When
Stdering such sentence, the court shall impose the maxinun
Sength of imprisonment which shall be as follows:

 

 

 

(i) ror murder in the second degree = life without the
poteibility of parole:

(2) For'a clase A felony “- indeterninate life term of
imprisonment

(3) Fora clase B felony -- indeterminate twenty-year term of
imprisonment; and

(4) Fora class ¢ felony ~- indeterminate ten-year term of

  

impriscoment

‘The minimum length of imprisonment for sections 2, 3, and 4
shalt be determined by the Hawai [i paroling authority ‘in
accordance with (HRS 5) 706-669,

 

Effective June 22, 2006, the legislature anended HRS $6 706-661 and -662, set
2006 Haws Seas. L. Act 230, $6 23, 24, and S¢ at 1012-13, 1028, to address
ethceras raised by the Hawai Judicial Council that Hawaii's extended term
neencing schene faced challenges in federal court that it violated a
Sefendent's right to a Jury trial, protected under the sixth amendnent to the
Osited States Constitution, as articulated in spgrendi e, New Jersey, 530 U.S.

tes (2000), and ts progeny. See Report of the Committes to Conduct a
‘at Zii-2iq 12005); Sen. Stand.

ESRRISRERSANE gals, in 2000 Senate Journal, at 1557; Hse. Stand. Conn, Rep.
Now G65-06, ih 2006’ House Journsl, at 1358." The amended version of BRS
$ 06-661 provided in relevant part

 

 

 

‘The court may sentence s person who satisfies the criteria
for any of the categories set forth in [HRS] 706-662 to an
Extended term of inprisossent, which shell have maximum length
as fellows

 

(2)! for murder in the second degree -- Life without the
possibility of paroles
(2) Fora clase A felony “- indeterminate life term of
imprisonsent,
(3) Fora class B felony -- indeterminate twenty-year term
of Imprisonment; and
(4) For a claaa € felony = indeterminate ten-year term of
Enprisonsent.
2 ere nent ether ave. Labi
becessaty (or the Br: oe a ne
he pees Snr or the other factors set forth

‘When ordering an extended term sentence, the court shell
impose the moximon length of imprisonment... «

(continved...)
+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

   

 

2. seontinues)
(Emphasis added.) Eftective June 30, 2007, the amended version of HRS
§ 706-661 expired and the Supp. 2003 version, gupca this note, was reenacted
Hee 2006 Hau. Seas. L. Act 290, § 54 at 1025

Finally, ‘effective cetober 31, 2007, the legislature anended HRS
$706~661 8 part of its reform of the state's extended term sentencing laws to
bring them into compliance with the requirenents of Aperendi and ite progeny.
NRS'§ 606-661 was snended to reed

 

 

Extended terms of imprisonsent. The court may sentence » person
ho satisfies the criteris fer ony of the categorses set forth in
{its $) 706-6621, intra note ¢,) to an extended term of
imprisonment, which shall have the maximum length es follows
U1)” For murder in the second degree —- life withoue the
possibility of parole;
(2) Por'a class & felony

 

indaterminate Life term of

 

 

inprisonnent:

(3) For a class B felony -- indeterminate twenty-year tere
of inpriscnment; snd

(4) For a class C felony ~- indeterminate ten-year term of
inprisonnent.

nen ordering an extended term sentence, the court shell inpost
the maximun length of imprisonment. The minimum length of
imprisonment for an extended term sentence under paragraphs (21,
(3), ane (4) shall be determined by the Hewai ("|i parcling
authority in accordance with (HRS §) 706-669)

 

H.B. 2, 24th Leg., Second Spec. Sess. (2007), av a
hitp://eapitol .Rawail. gov/splseessen2007B/bii1¢/HB2_ htm enacted as Act 1 en
October 31, 2007), see. http: //eapitel.hanail.gov/sitel /archives/200%/
getstatus? asp7bilino=KB2.

 

‘tn 2000, HRS § 706-662 provided in relevant part:

A convicted defendant may be subject to an extended term of
seprisonment under [HRS $] 706-661 (, gee aubra note 3), if the
convicted defendant satisfies one of more of the following
eriteria

1) "The defendant is a persistent offender shose inorisconent

hewcat ot make tht less the
Sefendant has previously been convicted of two felenies,
Connitted at different times when the defendant was eighteen
years of age or older,

\4) | The defendant is a multiple offender whose criminal actions
cere for th The .
= shi :
{a} The Gefendant is being Tentenced for two or more

 

felonies or is already under sentence cf inprisonnent,
for felony(.]

(continved. ..)
 

FOR PUBLICATION 18 WEST’ § HAWAL'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

+1. continued)
(Emphases ded.) Effective June 13, 2001 and Aprii 23, 2003, the legislature
amended HAS § 106-662 in ways immaterial to the present matter. See 2003 Haw.
Seea, L. Ret 33, 582 and € at Adds; 2001 Haw. Sess, L. Act 240, 88 3 and 6
at 630-31

Tn dection 24 of Act 250, effective June 22, 2006, the legislature
anended HES § 106-662 to address the sane alleged constitutional infirmities
Siscussed gupca in note 1, Act 230 amended HRS § 706°662 to provide in
relevant parts

 

 

A defendant who haz been convicted of felony qualifies for
fan extended tere of imprisonment under [HRS §) 706-661 if the
Gonvicted defendant satisfies one oF more of the following
criteria:

1) ""the defendant is 0 persistent offender in that the defendant
has previously been convicted of two felonies committed at
different tines when the defendant was eighteen years of age
or oleer

 

ia "tre degendant is a multiple offender in that:
a) The defendant is being sentenced for two or nore
‘or is already under sentence of imprisonment

 
  

|b) The maximum terns of imprisonment authorized for each
Of the defendant’ s crimes, sf made to Fun
Conseeutively, would equal or exceed in length the
Raxinum of the extended term imposed oF would equal or
Cheeed forty years sf the extensed term inposed is for
a'class A felonyl.)

 

Effective June 20, 2007, the amended version of HAS § 706-662 expired and the
Sopp, 2003 version, gupra this note, was reenactes. See 2006 Haw. Sess. L.
Ret 230, § $4 at 1025.

Effective October 31, 2007, the legislature again anended HRS § 706-662
as part of ite reform of the state's extended sentencing schene to bring it
eS ’Soupliance with Apprendi anc Cunsingham ve California, 563 U.S.) 127
Bret, B56 (2007). The amended version of HRs § 70e-6e2 provides in Felevant
part:

criteria for extended tera of imprisonsent: A defendant who hi
Seen convicted of a felony sey be cubject to an extended term of
imprisonment Under (HRS §) 706-€61(, gee aumza note 3,) if it Ss
proven beyond 2 reasonable doubt thst an extended term of
Unprisonment ie necessary for the protection of the public and
thet the convicted defendant setisfies one er more of the
following eriteri
(2) “the defendant is a persistent offender in that the

Gefendant hes previously been convicted of two or more

felonies conaitted st different times when the

SSfendact wos eigntesn yeare of age or older:

 

 

 

 

Jai" fhe defendant iso multiple offender in that.
(continued...)
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ 8 HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++#

and 706-664 (1993)* was, in light of Apprendi v, New Jersey, 530

“(.-seontinued)

(a) The defendant is being sentenced for two or nore
felonies or is already ander sentence oF
imprisonment for auy felony; oF

(b) The maximum term Of impriscement authorizes for
each of the defendant's crimes, if nade te con
Consecutively, would equal or exceed in length
the maximum of the extended term inposed oF
would equal or exceed forty years If the
extended term inposed is for's class A feleny(.)

 

iB. 2 24th Leg., Second Spec. Sess. (2007), available at.
http://capitol hawaii gov/spisessicnZ007b/bille/He2--hts Tenacted os Act 1 on
October 31, 2007), gee http://capitel .hawais.gev/sitel /erchives 200%)
getstetuez asproilinosibe

    

e smptn, 2000s HRS $ 706-664, entitled “Procedure for isposing extended terns
of imprisonment” provide

 

Hearings to determine the arounde for imposing extended terns of
imprisonment may be initiated by the prosecutor oF by the cours on
its ow motion. The court shall not impese sn extended cere
Unless the ground therefor has been established at a hearing after
She conviction of the defendant and on written netice to cha
Getendant of the ground proposed. Subject to the provisions of
(RS $}"706~604, the defendant shall have the Fash te neces eee
controvert the evidence against the defendant and £0 offer
evidence upon the issue.

 

Effective October 31, 2007, the legislature anended HRS $ 706-664 ax part of
the overhaul of the Extended sentencing schene, in order to oring ic bets

compliance with Apprendi and Cuoninahanl. The anerided version of MRS $ 106-664
provides

 

 

(2), Hearings to determine the grounds for imposing extended
terms of imprisonsent may be initiates by the prosecutor or by che
Gourt on its own motion. The court shall not Impose an excenced
term unless the ground therefor hes been established s© 2 heosieg
after the conviction of the defendant and written notice of the
found proposed was given to the defendant pursuane £0 sussect ion
(2). Subject to the provisions of [HRS §] 506-604. the defoncare
shail have the right to hear and controvert the evidence sseica
the defendant and to offer evidence upon the issue before s Jory
Provided that the defendant may waive the fight te «Jory
Setermination under this subsection, in which case the
Geternination shall be made by the court.

(2) “Notice of intention to seek a extended term of
imprisonment under [HRS §) 706-6621, gee auna note a.) shall be
given to the cefendant within thirty days'ef the Sefensant:s
signnent. However, the thirty-day peried mey be weived By the
defendant, modified by stipulation of the parties, or extensed
pon 2 showing of good cause by the prosecutor. A Gefendsns

(continued, .

 
‘46 FOR PUBLICATION IN wes:

 

WOWAY'T REFORTS 28D PACIFIC REPORTER *

 

0.8. 466 (2000), and its progeny, in violation of his right to a
jury trial as provided by the sixth amendnent to the United
States Constitution. See Jess v. Peyton, No. Civ.
04-006010NS/mK, 2007 WL 1041737, at *1-+2 (D. Haw. April 18,
2006) (dess 11). On April 18, 2006, the United States District
Court granted Jess's petition, concluding that the finding made
by the circuit court, ues, that an extended term was necessary
for the protection of the public [hereinafter, “the necessity
finding’, violated his aixth amendment right to a trial by jury
as articulated in Anprendi. Id, at *4, ‘The district court
ordered the circuit court to resentence Jess in a manner
consistent with tht conclusion. Id, at *6. The reserved
question before this court stens, ultimately, from that order,
and reads as follows:

Pe eee ereaee Le yury te sakes factual. finding

Gniextended tern of incarceration is necessary for the
Protection of the public?

 

So, seontsinued)
Previously sentenced to an extended term under = prior version of
Eile chapter shell be deened to have receives notice of en
Intention te seek an extended term of impriscament..
1S) “i the jury, oF the court if the cefendant has weived
the right toa jury determination, finds that the facts necessary
for ine inpesiticn of en extended term of impriscnnent uncer [HRS
4) 706-662 have Been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the court
fay impose on indeterminate term of imprisonment as provided in
{hRs §) 706-c61{, see gunca note 3).

 

 

 

BB. 2, 24th Leg., Second Spec. Sess. (2007), available at
Mep://eepitol,nawall.gov/spisession2007b/bii1s/HB2_.htm (enacted a8 Act 1 on
Geteber 3, 20071, see netps //eapitel .nawsii.gov/sitel/archives/2007b/
getstatue2 -asp?bilinonie2..

 
‘+4 FOR-PUBLICATION IW WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
‘The issue raised by the reserved question was addressed
in part in our recent decision in State v, Maugactega, 115
Hawai'i 432, 168 P.3d 562 (2007), (hereinafter, “Maugaotega 11”).
Based upon Maugaoteca II and the analysis infra, we answer the

reserved question as follow:

 

Although the two-count complaint filed by the
Prosecution on March 2, 2000 against the defendant
appellee Brian Jess did not charge the “aggravated
crines” described in HRS § 706-662, gee Cannin

549° U.S. 1278. Cha 856, 864 12007,
the circuit court ‘nevértheless has authority te impose
extended terms of inprisonsent upon Jers pursuant to
the provisions of HRS § 106-662, because our decision
ko reguire the allegation of aggravating extrinsic
facts in a charging instrument applies peoupectively
only. Furthermore, insofar as the circait court

 

Possesses the inherent judicial suthority "es provide
process where none exists,” State -v. Moriuake, 6S. Haw:

47, 55, 647 P.28 105, 111-12" (1362]7 and the
Legislature, by amending Hawaii's extended term
sentencing lens to include jury fact~finding, hes
clearly expressed its approval of « jury aysten for
aking the requires finainge in order t0 bring the
extended sentencing procedures into compliance with
han, the circuit court would act within ics

 

 

« oy tf noted gupta in notes 3-5, effective October 31, 2007, Act 1 of the

2007 Second Special Session amended Hawsii's extenced term sentencing laws to
Brovide for jury fact-finding in the imposition of extended term senvences
The measure, moreover, provides inpartent statements of legislerive intent and
Provisions for the retroactive application of the new sentencing leus

 

SECTION 1. The purpose of this Act is to amend Haweii’s extended
term sentencing law to address issues raised in recent federal
court opinions and rulings en the right tea jury triel. These
opinions, Apprendi v. Nex Jersey, $30 U.S. ¢6€ 2000), Blakely v,
Mashington, $420.5. 256 (2008), United States ¥, Booker See's.
220 (200s), end Cunninahen v. Calsfornia, 9¢90.5. —, 127

5. ()¢8. €56 (20071, nave held that any fact, cther han prior or
concurrent convictions, that increases the penalty for a crine
beyond the ordinary statutory maximum must be subeitted to a Jury
and proven beyond @ reasonable doubt

 

‘The purpose of this Act is to amend Hawals's extended tem
sentencing statutes to ensure that the procedures uses to inpese
extended terns of imprisonment comply with the requirenents bee
forth by the United States Supreme Court end Hawss("]! suprene
court. The legislature intends that these amendments apply to any
cese that requires resentencing because of the decisions in the

(wont inved. «-}
‘ies OR PUBLICATION 11 WEST'S KAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +

 

discretion ££, pursuant to HRS $5 706-662(1) ane
Joeeeets) (Supp. 1996), it empaneled a jury to make a
factual finding as to whether the prosecution has
Proved beyond s reasonable doubt that a defendant's
Eoanitrent for en extended term or terms of
Snpeiscnment is necessary for the protection of the
public. Finally, ia light of the plain language of
Ret 1y nee gupta notes 3-6, and the remedial nature of
Ste amendments, the cizcuit court can elso empanel
jury to make the see factual finding with respect to
a'Getendant pursuant to HRS §§ 106-662, a8 onended by

 

Ret te
I. BACKGROUND
A, Initial Proceedings In The Circuit Court And
‘This Court

on March 2, 2000, the plaintiff-eppellant State of
Howaiti (hereinafter, “the prosecution”) charged Jess by
complaint with robbery in the first degree, in violation of HRS
§ 708-840(1) (b) (44) (Supp. 1988) (Count I), and unauthorized
control of a propelled vehicle, in violation of HRS § 708-836
(Supp. 1999) {hereinafter, “UCPv"] (Count II), both charges

arising out of an incident wherein Jess robbed @ taxi driver at

"1s seontinued
Gouandi, Blakely, Booker, Cunninahan, ard Meucsotegs cases.
othe extent that this Act applies retroactively, the legislature
Hinge thet it does not subject’ any offencer to additional
ponishments or ether disadvantage.

 

SnttioN 5. This Act shell apply to all sentencing or resentencing
proceedings pending on or commenced after the effective dave of
Ente act. whether the offense was conaitted prior to, on, or after
the effective dete of this Act. A defendant whose extended term
Gf'atprisonment is set acide of invalidated shall be resentenced
pursuant to this Act upen request of the prosecutor.

 

Seériow @. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

4.8.2, 24th Leg., Second Spec. Sess. (2007), available at
hitpi//eapitel hawesi.gov/epleesason2007b /ei11s/HBZ_.ptm enacted as Act 1 on
Oetocer 31, 2007), ee https / /eapitol .hawait .gov/sitel /archives/2007b/

{Sone internal citations omitted.)

 

 

e
‘#8 FOR PUBLICATION INV WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

 

knifepoint and took the vehicle. The complaint specifically
alleged:

COUNT I: on or sbout the 230 day of February,
2000, in the City and County of Honolulu, state of
Hawaif']i, BRIAN JESS, while in the course of
committing a theft and while armed with s dangerous
instrunent, to wit, 4 knife, dig threaten the smminent
use of force against Canh Tran, a person who was
Present with intent to compel scquiescence tothe
Eating of or escaping with the property, thereby
committing the offense of Robbery in the First Degree,
in violation of Section 108-840 (2) (B) (13) of the
Hawai ("Ii Revised statutes

on or about the 28th day of February,

2000, in the City and County of Honoluls, state of
Hawai ‘TL, BRIAN JESS, aid intentionally or knowsngly
exert unauthorized cantrol over a propelled vehicie,
By operating the vesicle without the consent of can
Ten, ower of aia venscle, thereby committing the
offense of Unauthorized Control of Fropelles Vehicle,
in violation of Section 108-636 of the Bawai('ls
Revises Statutes.

 

 

 

 

 

On December 4, 2000, @ jury found Jess guilty of both
counts. On January 10, 2001, the prosecution filed motions (1)
to sentence Jess as a repeat offender, pursuant to HRS
§ 706-606.5 (Supp. 1999), to @ mandatory minimum sentence of six
years and eight months imprisonment, (2) for an extended term of
imprisonment of life with the possibility of parole as to
Count 1, pursuant to HRS §$ 706-661, 706-662(1), and
706-662(4) (a) (Supp. 1996), and (3) for the sentences on the two
counts to be served consecutively, pursuant to HRS § 706-668.5
(1993). On May 7, 2001, the cirevit court, the Honorable
Victoria S. Marks presiding, entered 2 judgnent of conviction and
sentenced Jess to an extended tem of life imprisonment with a
mandatory minimum term of one year and eight months as to Count 1

and an extended term of ten years with a mandatory minimum term
   

[FoR PUBLICATION IN WESTY § HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
of one year and eight months as to Count II, the two sentences to
run concurrently.”

on July 9, 2001, Jess filed a motion for
reconsideration of sentence, which the circuit court denied on
July 31, 2001. Jess had previously filed a notice of appeal to
this court on June 6, 2001, and, on September 26, 2003, this
court filed a summary disposition order affirming the circuit
court’s judgment and sentence, concluding, inter alia, that
Jess's extended term sentences were not unconstitutional under
Apprendi (citing State v. Kava, 102 Hawai'i 1, 12-13, 72 P.3d
473, 484-85 (2003)). See State v. Jess, No. 24339 (Haw. Sept.
26, 2003) (Jess 1).

B. Habeas Corpus Proceedinas In Federa] Court

on October 6, 2004, Jess filed the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court, seeking to
vacate the extended term sentences. Jess II, 2007 WL 1041737, at
*2, In granting the petition, the United States District Court
concluded that it was bound by the holding of the United states
court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Kaua v. Frank, 436 F.3d
1057 (9th, Cir. 2006), that Hawaii's extended term sentencing
schene violated Apprendi and that, in the instant matter, the
violation did not constitute harmless error. Jess 1, 2007 WL

1041737, at *1.

 

In dts June §, 2001 findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order
granting the prosecution's motion for extendes term sentencing, the circuit
Ziert found that Jess had four previous felony convictions, qualifying him for
Gn extended term pursuant to HRS § 706-662(2), and was Being presently
Sentenced for two felony counts, qualifying him for an extendea term pursuant
to"hRs 6 706-662 (4) (als and further found chat Jess's extendes incarceration
vas necessary for the protection of the public.

10
‘44 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *+#
¢. Proceedings On Remand From Federal Court

On July 31, 2006, the prosecution filed its second
motion in the first circuit court to resentence Jess to an
extended term of imprisonment on Count I in @ manner consistent
with the order of the United States District Court by empaneling
@ jury to make the necessity findings required by HRS
§§ 706-662 (1) and 706-662(4) (a). In the declaration of counsel
submitted in support of the motion for an extended term of
imprisonment, after reciting Jess’s prior convictions, counsel
averred:

30. [Jess] is 2 “persistent offender” and a
smultiple offender” whose commitment for an extended

term is necessary for the protection of the public
because of the following facte

 

2 (Jess) uss on probation in [another
criminal matter] when he committed the instant
offenses.

B. [dees] has on extensive criminal
history:

E.— (uess]"s criminality has continued

criminal

 

despite his pricr contacts with t
Sustice systen

. (Jess) has felled to benefit from
the criminal justice system.

(Jess) hes demonstrated 2 total
disregard for the rights of ethers and « poor
attitude towara the lo}.

f. “"[Jess] has demonstrated = pattern of
criminality which ingicstes that he ie likely £0
be 3 reciaivist in that he cennot conform hie
Behavior to the requirenents of the Jaw.

g. | Due to the quantity and seriousness
of [sess)'s past convictions and the seriovsn
of the instant offenses, [Jess] poses a serious
threat to the community and his long term
incarceration is necessary for the provection of
the public.

 

 

 

 

 

On October 5, 2006, Jess filed an amended motion to
preclude empaneling a jury, arguing, inter alia, that extended
term sentencing was “wholly @ statutory creature in Hawai'i” and

that HRS § 706-662 “expressly entrusts the requisite fact-finding

n
FoR PUBLICATION 18 WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

to ‘the court,’ not a jury." A hearing on the motion was
scheduled for Novenber 10, 2006, but, on Novenber 6, 2006, the
prosecution filed an alternative motion to reserve consideration
of the jury-empanelment question to this court. Jess filed a
memorandum in opposition on December 26, 2006. On February 21,
2007, the circuit court, the Honorable Virginia Lea Crandali
presiding, determined that enpaneling @ jury for the purpose of
making the necessity finding raised a novel question of law and,
therefore, reserved the question, see supra, to this court,
pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 15.°
The prosecuting attorney for the County of Kaua'i filed an anicus
brief on July 11, 2007, and the attorney general filed en anicus
brief on September 18, 2007.

on April 26, 2007, this court entered an order
accepting the reserved question, and, on November 26, 2007, this
court requested supplemental briefing addressing the following

question:

 

* the dissent aaserte that this opinion is advisory" to the extent thet,
we construe Act i, age gupea notes 4-5, as it pertains to Jess. Dissenting
Spinion et 26-29.’ HRAE Rule 25 provides in relevant part that “[s] circale
Court... may reserve for the consideration of the supreme court 2 guesticn
of law arising in any proceedings before it.” The plain language of this rule
Suthorizes the cirevit court to seek advice fron ur ae to a question of law.
In order adequately to give the circuit court that advice, we must address 612
Televant issues, In the present matter, the prosecution has moved for
Sxtenced term sentencing ond hes represented that it intends to pursue thot
course of action on renane. het 1 speaks directly to extended term sentencing
Frocesures. Accordingly, an assessment of whether Act 1 can be applied to
Sess's resentencing dees net constitute an advisory opinion on an abstract
Proporition that cannot affect the matter at isaue in the present case.” Seg
Wales 115 Nawai's 149, 169 0-35, 166 F.3d 322, 362 9,2: state y,
Eitsinser, “no. 28203, 2006 mi. 257175, ar 6 (Haw. Ce. App. Jan. 30, 200
Thoiding that the Ich's decision to addrers whether Act 1 could be’ applied
retroactively to the defencant was not an edvisory opinion on an abstract
Steve, becsure the case hod to be remanded for resentencing and the
prosecution had stated with certainty that it would seek an extended term of
Expeisonnent pursvant to the procedures set forth in Act 1 oh remand).

 

 

 

 

 

 

12
 

[FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § WANAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

In light of Cunningham v California, 127 $. ce. #56,
Bee (2007), anc State w. Bering, €1 Hawai'i 198, 212,
915 F.2d 672, 686 (1896), what is the significence, if
any, of the fact that the Maren 2, 2000 complasnt
Falls to allege that Jess, in connieting the offences
of rebbery inthe first degree and uneuthorizes
Control cf 2 propelled vehicle, was 0 persistent
and/or multipie offender such that. imposing upen him
5 extended term of imprisonment, pursvant £0 HSS

85 706-661 and 106-662, wos necessary for the
protection of the public?

Jess filed his supplement brief on December 26, 2007, the
prosecution filed its supplemental brief on December 31, 2007,
and the attorney general filed an amicus brief December 31, 2007.

IT. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Enpaneling A Jury

‘The issue presented by the reserved question -- whether

 

2 cizcuit court may empanel a jury for the purpose of considering
the requisite necessity finding -- is @ question of law.
“*Questions of law are reviewable de novo under the right/wrong
standard of review.’" Roes v. FHP, Inc., 91 Hawai'l 470, 473,
985 P.2d 661, 664 (1999) (quoting Francis v, Lee Enters., Inc.,
89 Hawai'i 234, 236, 971 P.2d 707, 709 (1999)).
8. Sufficiency Of A Charge
“whether an indictment (or complaint) sete

forth all the essential elenents of [a charged)

offence Ss"s' question of Law,’ which we review

Under the de "novo, of “right/wrong,’ standard.”

* ering, "sl Hewai's (ae) 212, 918 F.20

sth be (quoting state z hells, 76 Hawes's
375, 598, 834"P.2a 70, 76 (1998) (erations omitted) )

State v. Cordeiro, 99 Hawai'i 390, 403, 56 P.3d 692, 705 (2002)
(brackets and ellipsis points in original).

 

 

313
e+ FoR PUBLICATION IN WEST”

   

WWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +

IT. Discussion

Complaine That Jess Was A Persistent And/Or
Extended Term Was Necessary For The Protection

Extended Term Sentencina Pursuant To HAS
706-1 106-662

2. Introduetion

‘The prosecution and the attorney general concede that,
under the fifth amendnent’s grand jury clause” and the sixth
amendment’s notice clause," except for a past conviction, any
fact that increases the maximum penalty for an offense must be
alleged in a federal indictment, because such facts are elemental
to the offense for constitutional purposes. See Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S, 227, 243 n.6 (1999) ("(U]nder the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for 2 crime must
be charced in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven
beyond @ reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.)); id. at 232 (“[A]
fact is an elenent of an offense rather than @ sentencing
consideration, given that elements must be charged in the
Ddictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the Government
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Enphasis added.)). They correctly

 

* See U.S. Const. amend. v ("Mo person shall be held to answer for
capital, or otherwise infanous crine, unless on a presentment oF indictment of
Grand’ gary"

 

Soe U.S. Const. amend. VI ("in ail criminal prosecutions, the accused
stant Snoy she Fight "eel be inscenea of the satite and chute of the

4
 

FOR PUBLICATION 16 WEST’ HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +#
observe, however, that the indictment rule has not been held to
apply beyond federal prosecutions, because it is grounded in the
fifth amendment’ grand jury clause, which has not been applied
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See United

States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 (2002) (explaining that,

 

“[iJn federal prosecutions,” other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum “must be charged in the
indictment” (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (quoting Jones, 526
+ Williams v, Haviland, 467 F.3d $27, 533 (6th
Cir. 2006) (“By explicitly referring to federal prosecutions and
Gistinguishing state prosecutions, Cotton makes clear that
Roprendi did not revisit the well-established rule that the

U.S. at 243 n.6))

 

states are not bound by the Fifth Anendnent grand jury right.”
(Emphasis in original.)); United states v. Harris, 536 U.S. 545,
549 (2002) (plurality opinion) ("In federal prosecutions, ‘no
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise

infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand

 

Jury’ alleging all the elements of the crime.” (Quoting U.S
Const. amend. V.)); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n.3 (declining te
address the question whether 2 defendant in a state prosecution
could challenge, under the federsl constitution, the absence of
aggravating factors in his indictment and noting that “the “due
process of law’ that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the States
to provide to persons accused of crime . . . has not. . . been
construed to include” the fifth amendment’s grand jury clause);

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S, 584, 597 n.4 (2002) (citing Apprendi,

15
 

 

530 U.S. at 477 n.3)s Alexander v, Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633
(2972) ("Although the Due Process Clause guarantees petitioner a
fair trial, it does not require the States to observe the Fifth
Anendment’s provision for presentment or indictment by a grand

jury."). Accordingly, in this case, the federal indictment rule

 

does not govern the sufficiency of the allegations in the
complaint against Jess. We therefore turn our attention to
Hawas't law.

Pursuant to the due process and “grand jury” clauses of
the Hawai'i Constitution, which reside respectively in article I,
sections 5! and 10," the prosecution must allege all essential
elements of an offense in the charging instrument. See State ve
Israel, 78 Hawai'i 66, 73, 890 P.2d 303, 310 (1995) (explaining
that “the requirement thet an accusation must sufficiently allege
all of the essential elements of the offense charged derived”

from the grand jury clause and the due process clause). In

 

gee Haw. Const. art. 1, $5.(°
Liberty er property wehowt due proce

 

Person shalt be deprives of 2ife,
of laws

 

 

See Haw. Const. art. 1, § 10 ("No person shail be held to answer for a
cepitel or otherwise infanous crine, unless on presentment or incictnent of
a grand Jory or upon @ finding of probable cause after a preliminary hearing
held ss provided by ew or upen information in weiting signed by 2 Legal
prosecuting officer under conditions and in accordance with procedures that
fhe legislature may provige

 

 

1 the attorney general argues that extended term sentencing facts need not
be alleges in the charging instrunent under the notice clause of arzacle Ty

 

 

 

fection 14. Gag How, Const. ort. 1, § 14 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the
Sccused shall'enjoy the Tigst'- . -'te be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation». "), Under oor precedents, however, the right to notice

of ell ef the eoeential elements of the offense in the charging instrument is
hot grounded in the notice clause but, sther, the due process and grane Jory
cla erael, 16 Hawai at 73, 600 P24 at 3107 Seacev, ciliate, 77
Hawai'i 303, Sil, 864 P.26 372, 374 (1994) ("*[The] requirement Obtains
Whether an accusation ie in the nature of an oral charge, infornation,
Undictnent, ‘or complaint, and the omission of en essential clement of the
continued...)

 

 

 

 

16
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ § WAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
contrast to the federal indictment rule, see Jones, 526 U.S.

at 243 n.6, this court has held that not all facts that increase
the maximum penalty for a crime must be pled in the charging
instrument. See State v. Tafova, 81 Hawai'i 261, 270, 982 P.24
890, 899 (1999). We have adhered to the view that sentencing
factors involving facts that are extrinsic to the offense need
not be alleged in the charging instrument, but that sentencing
factors concerning facts that are intrinsic to the offense must
be alleged. Id. Thus, our cases suggest that the procedural
safeguards guaranteed by sections § and 10 of article I attach to
intrinsic, but not extrinsic, facts relating to enhanced
sentencing considerations. See id. The issue is whether this
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, a distinction that we were
compelled to abandon in Maugaotecs II insofar as it applied to
sentencing procedure, see 115 Hawai'i at 442-43, 445, 168 P.3¢

at 572-73, $75, remains viable insofar as it governs charaing
Sf. ids at 4497.19, 168 P.3d at $79 0.19.

> Estrada, and the intrinsic/extrinsic
‘sistinction

In State v. Apao, 59 Haw. 625, 634, $86 P.2d 250, 257

procedurt

 

(1978), this court observed that “due process requires that an

indictment contain al) of the essential elements of the offense

 

%(. .continued)
erine charged is 8 defect in substance rather than of form. A charge

defective in this regara ancunts toa failure to state en offense, and
Conviction based upon it cannot be sustained, for that would consticute a

 

genial of due process.'* (Quoting State v. Jendruch, 58 Haw. 273, 281, $67
Pied 1242, 1244 (1577).) (Emphasis edded.]37

ro
+04 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ § HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

 

charged." Consistent with this requirement, we held that the
“better rule is to include in the indictment the allegations,
which if proved, would result in application of a statute
enhancing the penalty for the crime committed.” Id. at 636, 586
P.2d at 258 (footnote and emphasis omitted); see aleo id. ("The
common law required that ‘every wrongful act which [was] to be
taken into account in determining the punishment be alleged in
the indictment.’” (Quoting State v. Blacker, 280 P.2d 789, 792
(Or, 1963).))+ Apprendi, 530 U.S. at $10 (Thomas, J., concurring)
("The indictment must contain an allegation of every fact which

is legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted.’”

(Quoting 1 J. Bishop, Law of Criminal Procedure § 81, at 51 (24
ed. 1872).)). It follows that, because such allegations must be

alleged in the indictment, they comprise “essential elezents” of
the offense. See Apao, $9 Haw. at 634, $86 P.2d at 257. In
State v. Estrada, 69 Haw. 204, 230, 738 P.24 812, 829 (1987), we
“transformed ‘the better rule’ as articulated in Apao into...
lan] ‘unequivocal’ rule," State v, Schroeder, 76 Haw. 517, 527,
880 P.2d 192, 202 (1994) (citation omitted), that “[t]he
aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the indictment and
found by the jury,” Estrada, 69 Haw, at 230, 738 P.2d at 829
(emphasis omitted) (citing Apac, 59 Hav. at 635-36, 586 P.2d at
258).

 

M The Spas proposition was implicitly grounded in article 1, section 10 of
the Hawai’ Constitution, insofar as we relied on & federel decisien
interpreting the fifth amendnent's grand jury clause. apac, 23 How. at 635 6
orb, 287 4 0-8 (quoting United seanas e. Eadatshy, 335 F.2a $86, $62, lon
Giz! 197}, "oversuled on other areongs by United Stares v. daily, #21 F.2d
984, 100¢ § n11 (20th Cir. 19901)

 

 

18
   

+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

We have, however, qualified the rule of Apao and
Estrada, holding that “*historical facts,’ the proof of which
exposes the defendant to punishment by extended term sentence,”
State v. Huelsman, 60 Haw. 71, 79, $88 P.2d 394, 400 (1978), need
not be alleged in the indictment or submitted to the jury, see
Schroeder, 76 Hawai'i at 528, 880 P.2d at 203 (1994), because
such facts “are wholly extrinsic to the specific circumstances of
the defendant's offenses and therefore have no bearing on the
issue of guilt per se,” id. at 528, 980 P.2d at 203 (emphasis in
original). For example, the former version of HRS § 706-662
provided, inter alia, that the court was to determine whether the
defendant was a dangerous person whose imprisonment for an
extended term was necessary for the protection of the public.
See supra note 4. We have interpreted this determination to
implicate an extrinsic fact, because it does not directly relate
to the specific elenents of the underlying offense giving rise to
extended term sentencing under the statute. See Zafova, 91
Hawai'i at 270-71, 982 P.2d at 899-900, We have also explained
that extrinsic facts should not be submitted to the jury, because
having the jury find such facts “would require the admission of
potentially irrelevant and prejudicial evidence and contaminate
the jury's required focus of the elements of the offense
charged.” See id. Beyond extrinsic facts, however, we have held
that the Estrada rule remained applicable to “*aggravating
circumstances’ justifying the imposition of an enhanced sentence”
if they involved factual questions that were “‘enmeshed in’™ or
“intrinsic to ‘the commission of the crime charged,’” Schroeder,

19
‘104 FOR PUBLICATION I WEST’ § HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **4
76 Hawai'i at 528, 880 P.2d at 203 (quoting Apac, 59 Haw. at 634,
586 P.2d at 257) (emphasis in original), such as whether the

defendant possessed a shotgun or used a semiautomatic weapon

 

during the commission of the offense, see Tafova, 91 Hawai'i
at 270, 982 P.2d at 899, or whether the defendant wes convicted
of attempted murder of a police officer who was “acting in the
line of duty,” see Estrada, 69 Haw, at 212-13, 738 P.2d at 819.
The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction has been part of our case law
since 1976, see Huelsman, 60 Haw. 71, $88 P.2d 394, and, as the
attorney general observes, we indeed reiterated its principles as
recently as July 2007, see State v. Kekuewa, 114 Hawai'i 411,
421-22, 163 P.3d 1148, 1158-59 (2007).

3 i insic/exte:

distinction is no longer viable,
a. Sentencing procedure
Everything changed three months later. As Jess

observes, in Maugaoteca II, pursuant to the United States Supreme
Court's mandate and judgment vacating our prior decision in State
vs Mauggoteca, 107 Hawai'i 399, 114 P.3d 905 (2005)
(Maugactegs I), we reconsidered the defendant's appeal in light
of Cunningham. Maugactegs II, 115 Hawai'i at 433, 168 P.3d
at 563, We explained that, because the Cunningham majority
flatly rejected the bifurcated approach proposed by Justice
Kennedy in his dissenting opinion for sixth amendment purposes,
Cunningham, 549 U.S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 869 n.14; id
at 872-73 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), it would likewise reject the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction that we have long followed. See

Maucaotegs I, 115 Hawai'i at 442-43, 445, 168 P.3d at 572-73,

20
 

"+ FOR PUBLICATION IN| WEST’ § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

575; see also id. at 453, 168 P.3d at 583 (Acoba, J.,
dissenting). We thus acknowledged that, in light of Cunningham,
except for prior convictions, multiple convictions, and
admissions, “any fact, however labeled, that serves as a basis
for an extended term sentence must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt to the trier of fact.” Maugaoteca I1, 116 Hawai'i at 447 6
n.15, 168 P.3d at $77 & n.15 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) .
Before Mauggoteca II, we viewed aggravating intrinsic,
but not extrinsic, facts as “elemental” to the offense for
constitutional purposes. See State v, Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1,
11-12, 72 P.3d 473, 483-84 (2003); see also Tafova, 91 Hawai'i
at 271-72, 982 P.2d at 900-01; cf. Apao, 59 Haw. at 634, 586 P.2d
at 257. The elimination of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction
dictates that aggravating extrinsic facts are now likewise
elemental. To illustrate this paradigm, extrinsic facts that
give rise to enhanced sentencing comprise an element of what
amounts to the “enhanced” version of the offense. Indeed, in
explicating the Apprendi rule, the six-member Cunningham majority
quoted with approval the observation, expressed in Harris, 536
U.S. at 557 (plurality opinion), that “Apprendi said that any
fact extending the defendant's sentence beyond the maximun
uthori ze urv's verdict would have been consider
amen avated crime ~~ and thus the domain of the

jury -- the Bil) of Riohts.’"* 549 U.S. at

Given the Cunoincham analysis, extrinsic enhancers effectively become,
for constitutional purposes, atvencant circumstance: of the “aggravates”
offense. CE. HRS § 702-205 (1953) ("The elenente of an offense are such (1)
Gonduet, (Z) attendant circumstances, end (3) results of conduct, as +
icontinved

 

   

21
 

FOR PUBLICATION 1M WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS 20D PACIFIC REPORTER ++
1 127.8. Ct. at 864 (emphases added); gee also Harris, 536
U.S. at $57-58 (plurality opinion) ("Congress may not manipulate
the definition of @ crime ina way that relieves the Government
of its constitutional obligations to charge each elenent in the
indictment, submit each element to the jury, and prove each
element beyond a reasonable doubt. Mcitillan{ v. Bennsvivania,
477 U.S. 79 (1986),] and Apprendi asked whether certain types of
facts, though labeled sentencing factors by the legislature, were
nevertheless ‘traditional elenents’ to which these constitutional
safeguards were intended to apply.” (Quoting Patterson v, New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 n. 12. (1977).) (Citations omitted.)
Harris, $360.5. at 567 ("Read together, McMillan and Apprendi
mean that those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, and
of the judicial pover to impose it, are the elements of the crime
of the constitutional analvsie.” (Emphases
added.)): Apprendi, $30 U.S. at 476 ("Any possible distinction
between an ‘element’ of a felony offense and » ‘sentencing
factor’ was unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial
by jury, and judgment by court as it existed during the years
surrounding our Nation’s founding.” (Footnote omitted.)).
Correlatively, and by virtue of Cunninsham, the
offenses of first degree robbery and unauthorized control of a

propelled vehicle, with which the complaint charged Jess in the

(., seontinued)
(ajze specified by the definition of the offense .. . ."); State vs Aivchi,
109 Nana's 25, 227, 123 P.3d 1210, 1222 (2008) (**[A)ny ckreumatance:

Gefined in an offense that are neither conduct nor the results of candy
would, by default, constitute attendant circumstances elements of the
defense.’ (Quoting State v Moser, 107 Hawet't 159, 172, 121 P36 58, 67
(pp. 2005).1)

 

22
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'E REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

 

present matter, are transformed into lesser included offenses of
“aggravated crimes” because, in the words of the Hawai'i Penal
code, the “simple” offense will always be “established by proof
of the sane or less than all the facts required to establish the
conmission of the [enhanced or ‘aggravated’) offense.” See HRS
§ 701-109(4) (a) (1993) ("A defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in an offense charged in the indictment or the
information. An offense is so included when... (i)t is

established by proof of the same or less than all the facts

 

required to establish the commission of the offense charge
State v. Jumila, 87 Hawai'i 1, 3, 950 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1998)

(holding that second degree murder was, as a matter of law, an

vs

included offense of carrying or use of a firearm in the
commission of a separate felony, because the felony underlying
the firearm statute “will always be ‘established by proof of the
sane or less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the’ [firearm] offense” (quoting HRS

§ 701-109(4) (a))), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Brantley, 99 Havei'i 463, 469, 56 P.3d 1252, 1258 (2002); State
vs Van den Berg, 101 Hawai'i 187, 191, 65 P.3d 134, 138 (2003)
("[T]he core legal analysis in . . . Jumila is still good
Apprendi, §30 U.S. at 506 (Thomas, J., concurring)

 

(observing that, “if a statute increased the punishment of
common-law cxime, whether felony or misdemeanor, based on some
fact,” then that “fact was an elenent of a new, aggravated grade
of the common-law crime simply because it increased the

punishment of the common-law crime” and that “the common-law

23
‘94 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER ++*
crime was, in relation to the statutory one, essentially just
like any other lesser included offense”), The “aggravated
crimes” at issue in this case, to wit, robbery in the first
degree and UCPV committed by a persistent and/or multiple
offender as to whom “an extended term of imprisonment is
necessary for the protection of the public,” Act 1, section 3,
are “aggravated” versions of “simple” first degree robbery and
“simple” UCPV, because the necessity finding is the additional
“element of [the] aggravated crime.” See Cunningham, $49 U.S. at
1 127.8. Ct. at 864, Conversely, “simple” robbery and
“simple” UCPV are lesser included offenses of their “aggravated”
versions. See id.; HRS § 701-109(4) (2); Apprendi, 530 u.s.
at 506 (Thomas, J., concurring).
b. Charging procedure

‘The prosecution and the attorney general argue that,
although this court has abandoned the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction with respect to sentencing procedure, we should
retain the distinction with respect to charging procedure. They
urge, in substance, that extrinsic enhancers need not, for
purposes of article I, sections 5 and 10 of the Hawai'i
Constitution, be viewed as elements of an aggravated crime. The
attorney general contends that this court need not fully abandon
its intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, especially because the
distinction does not require extrinsic facts to be alleged in the
charging instrument, precisely because those facts “are wholly
extrinsic to the specific circumstances of the defendant's

offenses and therefore have no bearing on the issue of guilt per
‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

sg." Schroeder, 76 Hawai'i at 528, 680 P.2d at 203 (emphasis
omitted). It is clear, however, that Cunningham is unwavering in
its insistence that the determinative issue in deciding whether a
given fact is elemental is not whether the fact is enmeshed in,
or intrinsic to, the elements of the underlying offense, see 549
U.S. at __n.14, 127 S. Ct. at 869 n.14, but, rather, whether it
simply increases the standard maximum punishment for the offense,
see id at __, 1278. Ct. at 860.

The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is also rooted in
the belief that having the jury find extrinsic facts “would
require admission of potentially irrelevant and prejudicial
evidence and contaminate the jury's required focus on the
specific elements of the offense charged.” Tafoya, 91 Hawai'i
at 271, 982 P.2d at 9007 see also id. at 273 n.15, 274 & n.17,
902 n.15, 903 4 n.17. After Cunnincham and Mauazoteca 12,

however, the jury is constitutionally required to be the fact-

 

finder with respect to extrinsic enhancers, because such facts
are indeed elements of the offense for sentencing purposes.
Nevertheless, the prosecution contends that, while this court’s
concern in Tafoya was directed at preventing the contamination of

ate

 

 

“jury's required focus,” see 91 Hawai'i at 271, 982 P.2d
at 900, the same concern would arise if a grand jury were faced
with extrinsically aggravating factual allegations. The
prosecution concedes that 2 grand juzy proceeding could
potentially be bifurcated to prevent such contamination but,
nonetheless, asserts that such a procedure would unnecessarily

complicate the proceeding and be at odds with ite purposes, which

25
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +++

is not “‘an adversary h

 

ring in which guilt or innocence of the
accused is adjudicated’ but, rather, “an ex parte investigation
to determine whether 2 crime has been committed and whether
criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person.'”
State v. Bell, 60 Haw. 241, 243-44, $89 P.2d $17, 519 (2978)
(quoting United states v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974).
We observe, as a preliminary matter, that the jury
contamination issues that the prosecution identifies would not
arise in instances, such as the present case, where the defendant
is charged by complaint or upon information, both of which are
permitted by article I, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution.
See supra note 12. When the prosecution does opt to charge by
indictment, article I, section 10 requires that the grand jury
find probable cause as to every element of the offense of which
the defendant may later be convicted at trial. See Israel, 78
Hawai'i at 73, 690 P.2d at 310

 

[g}ust as the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the
offense charged, the State is also required to sufficiently
allege them . (Quoting State v. Tuya, 3 Haw. App. 287,
293, 649 P.2d 1180, 1184-85 (1982).)); State v. Stan's Contr,
Anc., 111 Hawai'i 17, 32, 137 P.3d 331, 346 (2006) (“AN
indictment must enable a grand jury to determine that probable

 

cause exists that the accused committed a violation of the

charged offense . . . as to the elements of the
offense . . . ."); Apao, $9 Haw. at 635 & n.5, 586 P.2d at 257 &

n.S (observing that the fifth amendnent’s grand jury clause

requires that an indictment “‘make clear the charges so as...

26
 

+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWA2"Z REPORTS AMO PACIFIC REPORTER
to avoid [the defendant’ s] conviction on facts not found, or
Perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury that indicted him'”
(quoting Radetsky, 535 F.2d at 562)). Because the petit jury
must find certain extrinsic elemental facts as 2 prerequisite to
convicting a defendant of the enhanced (i.e., “aggravated”)
version of an offense, see Maugactegs II, 115 Hawai'i at 447, 168
P.3d at $77, it necessarily follows that, during the grand jury
Proceeding, the jury should likewise be required to find probable
cause with respect to such elemental facts. See Stirone v
United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960) (observing that the
defendant has “substantial right to be tried only on charges
Presented in an indictment returned by @ grand jury”). By
ensuring that every element of an offense is supported by a
finding of probable cause, the grand jury performs its
“historical role of being a safeguard to protect citizens against
unfounded criminal prosecutions.” See State v. 0’Daniel, 62 Haw.
518, 520, 616 P.2d 1383, 1386 (1980); see also Bell, 60 Haw.
at 243, 589 P.2d at 519 ("[T]he grand jury's responaibilitis

 

include both the determination of whether there is probable cause
to believe that 2 crime has been committed and the protection of

citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.”). To carry

 

out its function, we believe that the grand jury must review the
evidence supporting all elements of an offense, including
extrinsic enhancers, logistically problematic as the process may

be. United States v, Italiano, 837 F.2d 1480, 1462 (11th Cir.

 

Of course, as we have noted, consistent with erticle 2, section 10 of
‘the Hawe'l Constitution, the prosecution i free, as in the present matter,
(continued...)

 

2
 

‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION TN MEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
1988) ("*{A] grand jury can perform its function of determining
probable cause and returning a true bill only if all elements of
the offense are contained in the indictment.’” (Quoting United
States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 1981), overruled
on other grounds by United states v, Steele, 147 F.3¢ 1316, 1317
(ith cir. 1998).)).

In this connection, we note that the United States
Supreme Court declared in Jones that “*any fact (other than prior
conviction) that increases the maximm penalty for a crime must
be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.'” Tafoya, 91 Hawai'i at 273 n.15, 982
P.2d at 902 n.15 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6). Although
the indictment rule in Jones is grounded in the fifth anendnent’s
grand jury clause, see Haviland, 467 F.3d at $33, which has not
been applied to state prosecutions, see Alexander, 405 U.S.
at 633, article I, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution was
patterned after its federal counterpart, see 1 Constitutional,
Convention of Hawaii 164, 243, 420 (1960) (explaining that
article I, section 9, which was ultimately codified as section 8
(the predecessor to article 1, section 10), “incorporates the
first three clauses of the Sth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution”). To be sure, article I, section 10 of the Hawai'i
Constitution affords the prosecution more charging mechanisms

than ite federal analogue, insofar as article 1, section 10

M¢. .,continued)
to circumvent the grand Jury altogether by charging a defendant via complain’
Ye adaiticn, whan the prosecution decides to go forware by way of indictment,
a’biturcated grand jury proceeding is possible.

 

28
   

"+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
permits the prosecution to charge by indictment, complaint, or
information, see supra note 12, whereas the fifth amendment only
allows charging by indictment, see supra note 9. Nevertheless,
we do not (and very likely may not, cf. State v, Texeira, 50 Haw.
138, 142 0.2, 433 P.2d 593, 997 n.2 (1967) (recognizing that the
courts of this state must “afford defendants the minimum
protection required by federal interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution”)) interpret the plain
language of article I, section 10 to require the inclusion of any
less notice in a charging instrument than that which is
guaranteed by the fifth amendment. Consequently, the fact that
the federal courts do not recognize any distinction between
intrinsic and extrinsic enhancers under the federal grand jury
clause, see Cotton, 535 U.S. at 627 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 490) (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6))7 ef. Cunningham,
549 U.S. at __n.14, 127 8, Ct, at 869 n.14, is “highly

  

persuasive” in shaping our interpretation of article I,
section 10 of the Hawai‘i Constitution. See Harada v. Burne, 50
Haw. 528, 532, 445 P.2¢ 376, 380 (1968) (holding that, although
the seventh amendment’s civil jury trial right does not apply to
the states, the Hawai'i counterpart in article I, section 10 of
the Hawai'i Constitution was patterned after the federal
provision and, therefore, “the interpretation of [that]
provision{] by the federal courts are deemed to be highly

persuasive in the reasoning of this court”).

29
+44 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAS'T REPORTS 2D PACIFIC REPORTER +#*
Given the Cunningham imperative regarding the elenental
character of Apprendi enhancers, the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction has lost its viability to the extent that it governs
charging procedure and, therefore, we decline to follow it any
further. Because the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction no longer
serves to quality the rule of Apao and Estrada, it follows that
the rule now applies across the board both te intrinsic and
extrinsic enhancers. In short, it {s now clear that extrinsic
enhancers, like intrinsic enhancers, are “essential elements” of
the “aggravated” version of the offense. Sea Apao, 59 Haw.
at 634, S86 P.2d at 257; Cunningham, $49 U.S. at __n.14, 1278
Ct. at 864 (quoting Harris, 536 U.S. at 556-87 (plurality
opinion) }; Mausacteaa Ii, 115 Hawai'i at 450, 168 P.3d at 580
(explaining that Cunningham, “by rejecting the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, essentially reinstates the rule
asserted in Estrada for both intrinsic and extrinsic facts”
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we hold
that a charging instrument, be it an indictment, complaint, or
information, must include all “allegations, which if proved,
would result in the application of a statute enhancing the
penalty of the crime committed.” pac, 59 Haw. at 636, S86 P.2d
at 258 (footnote and emphasis omitted); accord Estrada, 69 Haw.
at 230, 738 P.2d at 629.""

 

the prosecution and the attorney general do not challenge the validity
of the rule of Apso and Estrads but, instead, cite cases fron jurisdictions
that have interpreted their respective "grand jury" provisions as not
Fequiring the inclusion of facts giving rise to enhanced sentencing in the
charging instrument. These courts reason that the disclosure requirenents
lnder their rules of criminal procedure supply sufficient notice to the
(eontdnved...)

 

30
+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

4. our d
‘sonal 706~ or HREP

Rule 7d) into question.

The attorney general argues that a holding that
extrinsic facts foundational to enhanced sentencing must be
alleged in the indictment would require us to rule HRS § 706-664,

as amended by Act 1, to be unconstitutional. Although we are

 

(, scontsnued)
defendant of the prosecution's intention to rely on those facts. See, e.g
McKansy vw, Foreman, 100 P.34 16, 22 (Ariz. 2004) ("It thus becenes ferefenact
that eggravators are not specified in the indictment or infermetion based en
evidence of probable cause presented to a grand jury oF magistrate because the
defendant will have been given anpie notice under the Arizona Rules of
Criminal Procedure "); Beans vs State, 66 A.2d $62, 575 (We. 2005)
{holding that aggravating factors ate not required to be alleged in the
Andictaent under the indictment provision of ‘the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, because “[t]he point ef that provision is to give fair and sdequate
notice, ana that notice may come from statutory: [n]otice,” which ta
Fequired thirty days before trial) 141. 8.W.36 589, 561-62
(Tenn. 2004) (holding that the defendant Te not entitled te notice’ in the
indictaent, under the Tennessee inaicteent clause, because the notice
Fequirenents are satisfied by the state's rules of criminal procedure). Th
courts acknowledge that aggravating factors may be the elenentel vo an offense
for purposes of sentencing, but explain that their case law does not require
that. sentence-enhancing facts be alleged in the indictment, and they
consequently decline to inpose such 3 requirenent. See Uskaney, 100 P.3¢

at 21) Evang, 666 2.26 at 575, 515-76 e238 SH, 38.725, 722 &
1.21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). ‘Unlike the foregoing illustrative jurisdictions,
we have interpreted the Howoi's Constitution a requiring that the charging
Instrument include a1l'“allegations, which if proved, would resuit in the
application of a statute enhancing the penslty of the crime committed.” Ansa,
5S aw. at 636, S66 F.26 at 256 (footncte nd emphasis emitted); gecoid
Estrada, 69 Haw. at 230, 738 F.20 st 629. ‘Recordingly, the cases cited by the
Prosecution and the attorney general are inconsistent with ovr precedents’ end
Ne therefore decline to follow then.

Yn an WRAP 26(3) citation of supplemental authority, the attorney
general cites the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ recent decision in cutsingex,
2008 wy 257175, at *1, 17-°18, in which the Ica concluded, inter gliar thee
fenkancing facts need hot be alieged in the charging instruments The ica
Feasoned that, “[a]ithough Apprendi and its progeny require that sentencing
Gihancing facts be treated as the functional equivalent of elements of an
offense for purposes of the Sixth Anencment jury-trisl right, . such facts
are not elenents for purposes cf what must be pied in en indictment oF
complaint.” 16. at *16; gee algo ig. st “17-18 (auggesting ther extrinsic
enhancers are not elenentai).. AS we heve explaines supra, however, extrinsic
‘enhancers must be alleged in the charging instrument, because they’ ere indeed
elenental for charging purposes under article 1, sections 5 and 10 of the
Hawai'i Constitution. we therefore overrule Cutsinger to the extent thee its
ansiysis is inconsistent with our om.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

31
 

'+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
unable to discern from the attorney general's brief the specific
language of HRS § 706-664 to which he is referring, see Hawaii
Ventures, LIC v. Otaka, Inc., 114 Hawai'i 438, 478, 164 P.3d 696,
736 (2007) (*[Aln appellate court is net cbliged to address
matters for which the appellant has failed to present discernible
arguments."), we presume that he is alluding to paragraph (2),
which provides in relevant part that “{nJotice of intention to
seek an extended term of imprisonment under section 706-662 shall
be given to the defendant within thirty days of the defendant's
arraignment.” See supra note $. This provision is not
incompatible with our decision today because there is no mutual
exclusivity between the necessity of alleging extrinsic elemental
enhancers in the charging instrument and the subsequent statutory
notice provision set forth in HRS § 706-664(2). Merely charging
the “aggravated” offense does not obligate the prosecution to
prove it to the contrary, the prosecution can always opt to
prove the lesser included, unenhanced version of the offense.
Cf. Whiting v. State, 88 Hawai'i 356, 362, 966 P.2¢ 1082, 1088
(1998) ("Since recklessness will be satisfied by proof that the
defendant acted intentionally or knowingly, a charge of
manslaughter could be employed where a prosecutor, in the
prosecutor’s discretion, did not wish to push for a murder
conviction.” (Quoting commentary to HRS § 707-702.) (Emphasis
omitted.)); State v, Holbron, 80 Hawai'i 27, 44, 904 P.2d 912,
929 (1995) (“Within constitutional limits, it is alwavs the
prosecution's prerogative to undercharge any offense for whatever

reason it deems appropriate . . . .” (Emphasis added.)).

32
 

[FOR PUBLICATION 8 WEST’ S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Moreover, the plain language of HRS § 706-664(2) simply does not
say that notice of intention to seek an extended term of
imprisonment under HRS § 706-662 “shall not be included in the
charging instrument.” Indeed, this provision is directed
exclusively to sentencing procedure; it is completely silent with
respect to charging procedure.

In the next section of the attorney general’s brief, he
asserts that a rule requiring that extrinsic enhancers be alleged
in the charging instrument would render HRS § 706-664(2), as
amended, unconstitutional to the extent that it provides that
“[a] defendant previously sentenced to an extended term under 2
prior version of this chapter shall be deened to have received
notice of an intention to seek an extended term of imprisonment.”
See supra note 5. That provision also requires that the
defendant receive notice within thirty days of his arraignment.
See id. However, notice, constructive or otherwise, of the
prosecution's intention to seek an extended term of imprisonment
within thirty days of his arraignment is not a substitute for the
constitutional requirement that an indictment, complaint, or
information allege the elements of the “aggravated crime”
justifying the imposition of an extended term of imprisonment.
‘The latter derives from article I, sections 5 and 10; the former
simply satisfies the statute. Thus, we do not read the statute’s
constructive notice provision as undertaking to cure the (as of
then unknown) constitutional defects in the charging instruments

of defendants who were previously sentenced to extended terms but

33
‘44 FOR PUBLICATION I WEST”

 

HAGAI'S REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#¢
not charged with the “aggravated crimes” to which the extended
terms pertain.

In any event, such a reading would contravene the
doctrine of “constitutional doubt,” which dictates that, “‘where
a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which
grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the
other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is adopt the
latter,’” In the Interest of Doe, 96 Hawai'i 73, 81, 26 P.3d 562,
570 (2001) (quoting Jones, 529 U.S. at 857). Pursuant to
article I, sections § and 10, all of the elements of an offense
must be alleged in the charging instrument, and the prosecution’ s
failure to do so is not cured or otherwise excused by the fact
that the accused was actually or constructively aware of the
circumstances that might give rise to an omitted elenent. See
Israel, 78 Hawai'i at 73, 890 P.3d at 310 (observing that the
requirement that the instrument must allege all of the essential
elements of the offense “*is not satisfied by the fact that the
accused actually knew them and was not misled by the failure to
sufficiently allege all of them’” (quoting Zuua, 3 Haw. App.
at 293, 649 P.2d at 1184-85). Interpreting HRS § 706-664(2) as
purporting to charge an element of an “aggravated crime” by
constructive notice would cause the statute to run afoul of the
guarantee, embedded in article I, sections 5 and 10, of actual
notice in the charging instrument. We therefore decline to read
HRS § 706-664(2) as attempting to charge defendants by

constructive notice.

34
+18 POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REDORTER *++

Finally, the attorney general maintains thet the
elimination of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction would render
HREP Rule 7(d), entitled “[nJature and contents [of an
indictment, information or complaint],” invalid in many cases
because, according to the attorney general, the rule does not
require allegations that support an extended term to be pled in
the charging instrument. HRPP Rule 7(d) provides in relevant
part that “(t]he charge shall be a plain, concise and definite
written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged,” but “need not contain a formal conclusion or any other
matter not necessary to such statement.” Like HRS § 706-664(2),
as amended, the rule is perfectly compatible with the proposition
‘that enhancing elements of an “aggravated crime,” giving rise to
an extended prison term, must be pled in the charging instrument.
Precisely because Cunningham decrees that factual enhancers that
support an extended term of inprisonnent are elements of an
“aggravated crime,” see supra section II1.A.3, we construe HRPP
Rule 7(d) to require the allegation of such elements if the
prosecution decides to seek a conviction of that offense.

In short, we disagree with the attorney general that
our decision calls the constitutionality of HRS § 706-662(2) or
HRPP Rule 7(b) into question.

5. 4 ith respec: nstrument

‘and, ther ‘appl.
wesg.

The attorney general argues that any decision mandating

that all Apprendi /Cunningham enhancers -- whether intrinsic or

extrinsic -~ be alleged in all charging instruments seeking an
‘s+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
extended prison term pursuant to HRS § 706-662, as amended, see
supra section III.A.3.b, should be limited to purely prospective
application.

‘The question of prospective application arises when
this court announces @ nev rule. See State v. Ketchum, 97
Hawai'i 107, 123 n.26, 34 P.3d 1006, 1022 n.26 (2001) (“IE . . -
a judicial decision announces a ‘new rule,’ then this court may,
An its digeretion, determine that the interests of fairness
preclude retroactive application of the new rule.”); James B
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georaia, 501 U.S. 529, 534 (1991) (“It is
only when the law changes in some respect that an assertion of
nonretroactivity may be entertained, the paradigm case arising
when a court expressly overrules a precedent upon which the
contest would otherwise be decided differently and by which the
parties may previously have regulated their conduct."). In the
present matter, the rule of Apao and Estrada was previously
qualified by the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, which did not
require, and indeed counseled against, the inclusion of extrinsic
facts in the charging instrument. See Tafoya, 91 Hawai"i at 271,
962 P.2d at 900; see also supra section III.A.3.b. In light of
Cunningham, however, we have recognized today that the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is no longer viable for charging
purposes. See supra section III-A.3.b. Aside from footnote 19
of our Maugaotega If opinion, see 115 Hawas't at 449 n.19, 168
P.3d at 579 n,19, this case represents the first instance in
which we have questioned the ongoing viability of the

intrinsic/extrinsic distinction in the context of charging

36
 

$+ FOR PUBLICATION ZN WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACTFZC REPORTER
procedure. See supra section I11.A.3.a, Indeed, even the
dissenting opinions that previously challenged the validity of
the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction attacked the distinction from
the standpoint of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial
regarding extended term sentencing and not from the standpoint of
proper charging procedure sufficient to satisfy article 1,
sections 5 and 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution. See state

Rivera, 106 Hawai'i 146, 167, 102 P.3d 1044, 1065 (2004) (Acoba,

 

J., dissenting) (asserting that “‘the State's sentencing
procedure [in this case] did not comply with the Sixth
Amendment,’ and, thus, the sentence imposed on [the defendant]
‘is invalid’ (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 942 U.S. 296, 305
(2004)) (brackets in original)); Maugaotesa 1, 107 Hawai'i

at 410-11, 114 P.3d at 916-17 (Acoba, J., dissenting); State v
White, 110 Hawai'i 79, 97, 129 P.3d 1107, 1125 (2006) (Acobs, J.,
dissenting). Accordingly, the rule we announce today, which
liberates the rule of Apao and Estrada from the gloss imposed by
Huelsman, Schroeder, and Tafova, constitutes a new rule.’

Because we are announcing a new rule, we must decide

 

whether the rule should be given retroactive effect. “Although
judicial decisions are assumed to apply retroactively, such

application is not automatic,” because “‘the Constitution neither
prohibits nor requires retrospective effect.’" state v. Peralto,

the dissent asserts that “it would be inaccurate to characterize the new

      

role here as being grounded solely in our state law,” because the
role ‘cusly articulated in Jones. Olesenting opinion et 34 ne2S; ef.
Ag. at (4-45, Rs we explained gupra in section I11.A.1, however, the rule it
otiea 1s limited to federal prosecutions. Therefore, the new tule we announce

 

1 Sections 8 snd 10 of the

 

tcasy 8 bases solely sn article
Const tution

3
‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S KAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER ++

95 Hawai's 1, 6, 18 P.3d 203, 208 (2001) (quoting State vw
Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 268, 492 P.2d 687, 665 (1971)). We are
therefore “[f]ree to apply decisions with or without
retroactivity,” Santiago, $3 Haw. at 268, 492 P.2d at 665, and
may give a new rule (1) purely prospective effect, which means
that the “'rule is applied neither to the parties in the
law-making decision nor to those others against or by whom it
might be applied to conduct or events occurring before that
decision,’ State v, Garcia, 96 Hawai'i 200, 208, 29 P.3d 919,
927 (2001) (quoting James B, Beam Distilling, 501 U.S. at 536);
(2) limited or “pipeline” retroactive effect, under which the
rule applies to the parties in the decision and all cases that
are on direct review or not yet final as of the date of the
decision, see State v. Colbert, 918 A.2d 14, 20 (N.J. 2007);
State v. Fortin, 843 A.2d 974, 1036 n.18, motion for
clarification granted by 643 A.2d 974 (NW.J. 2004); cf. Garcia, 96
Hawai" at 214, 29 P.3d at 933 (giving a rule limited prospective
application, because the rule had previously been applied in the
decision that originally announced the rule); State v. Hanaoka,
97 Haw. 17, 20, 32 P.3d 663, 666 (2001); or (3) full retroactive
effect, under which the rule applies “*both to the parties before
the court and to all others by and against whom claims may be
pressed,’” Garcia, 96 Hawai'i at 208, 29 P.3d at 927 (quoting
Janes B. Beam Distilling, 501 U.S. at 535)." In deciding which

A fourth alternative ie to accord # new rule selective retroactive
effect. which neans that the court nay apply the “role in the case in which it
Te pronounced, then return to the old one with respect to all others arising
on facts predating the proncuncenent."" Garis, 96 Sawai at 208, 23 F.3d
foont ined...)

 

38
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN ws

 

NAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +++
option is appropriate, we “‘weigh{] the merits and demerits of
retroactive application of the particular rule,’” Beralto, 95
Hawai'i at 6, 18 F.3d at 208 (quoting Santiago, 53 Haw. at 268,
492 P.2d at 665, in light of “*(e) the purpose of the newly
announced rule, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new
standards," id. at 7, 18 P.3d at 209 (quoting Santiago, $3
Haw. at 268-67, 492 P.2d at 665-66).

“Primary consideration is given to the purpose for
which the new standards are adopted.” Santiage, 53 Haw. at 269,
492 P.2d at 666. Retrospective application is generally provided

to “[r]ules designed to protect “the very integrity of the fact-

%(.. .continued)
at $27 (quoting James B. Beam Distilling, $01 U.S. at 537), We have, however,
Geclines te follow this approach, because “ ‘selective application of new rules
Violates the principles of treating similarly situated sefendants the same.’=
Ja, at 214, 25 Prse at 933 (queting State v. Jackson, @) Hawai"! 39, 51,912

Piza7, 83 (1998))

 

 

% tn a BRAP 28(5) citation of supplemental authority, Jess refers us to

No. 06-8273, 2008 U.s. LEXIS 2012, at #8, #33 (Uses
Feb. 20, 2006), in which the United States Suprene Court held that, when
federal court announces a new rule of criminal procedure, although’ the
retroactive effect of that new rule is Limited to those cases that are not yet
final in the federal courts, gee Teague t. lane, 489 U.S. 268, 204-05 (1969),
state courts are nonetheless free to give the new federai rule broader
retroactive effect. We do not believe that either Danforth of Jesque se
perticularly germane to our analysis regarding wether the new charging rule
Thet we announce today shovld apply retroactively, because the rule is
Grounded not in the United States Constseution but, rather, in article t,
Sections 5 and 10 of the Hawai'l Constitution. Se@ supra section T1I-A
Therefore, we are guides by ovr cun sndependent state law jurisprudence Sn
determining whether the rule applies retvosctively. See State v. Nsuata, 76
Hawai'l 360, 378, 678 P.24 €99, 717 (1994) [acknowledging thet the doctrinal
basis of this court's retroactivity Jurisprudence, Limmetter v. Walker, 38)
U:s. 618 (1965), has bean overruled by the United’ States Supreme Court but,
nevertheless, continuing to follow Linkletter’s vnore flexible test.» . when
Getermining whether to retrosctively apply Gecieions of state law made by this
court"); aga also Garcia, 96 Hawai at 212, 29 F.3d at 931.

39

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWA'T REPORTS AND FACITIC REPORTER *+4
finding process,’ id. (quoting Linkletter v, Walker, 361 U.S.
618, 639 (1965), overruled by Griffith v, Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314
(1987), as where the “major purpose” of the rule “is to overcone
an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its
truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the
accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials,” Williams v. United
States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971), cited in Santiage, 53 Haw.

at 665-66, 492 P.2d at 268-29. For present purposes, the
intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy, which was the law in this
jurisdiction until Maugaoteaa II, did not require the inclusion
of extrinsic enhancing facts in the charging instrument. see
Tafova, 91 Hawai'i at 271, 982 F.2d at 900. The defendant was,
however, provided by statute with written notice and the right to
hear and controvert the evidence against him and to offer
evidence on his behalf with respect to the imposition of extended
prison terms, See HRS § 706-664 (1993), supra note $. The
extrinsic enhancers were found by the court, see ids, and were
subject to the “procedural standards . . . applicable to ordinary
sentencing,” see Huelsman, 60 Haw. at 80, 588 P.2d at 400. In
Light of these provisions, we do not believe that the
Antrinsic/extrinsic distinction substantially impaired the
criminal trial’s truth-finding function, so as to raise serious
questions about the accuracy of findings made by judges with
respect to extrinsic enhancers. See Williams, 401 U.S. at 653;
cf. Schriro v, Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 356 (2004) (concluding
that the holding in Bing, $36 U.S. 584, that the statutory

aggravators were effectively elements for federal constitutional

40
 

+ TOR PUOLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAE'T REPORTS AAD PACIFIC REPORTER
purposes and thus had to be submitted to the jury as the trier of
fact and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, did not apply
retroactively, because Ring did not announce one of the
“watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding,’”
such that the Schriro Court could not “confidently say that

judicial factfinding seriously diminishes accuracy” (quoting

 

saffie ks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)) (emphasis omitted) ).
‘Thus, the purpose of the “new rule” announced today is not to
remediate an aspect of the criminal process that substantiaily
impairs its truth-finding function. Consequently, the purpose of
the new rule does not counsel that we should accord our decision
retrospective effect.

Furthermore, the prosecution has long relied on the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction in charging defendants. In this
case, for example, the prosecution's failure to allege extrinsic
enhancers in its complaint against Jess fully conported with
Tafoya, which counseled that such facts should not be included in
the complaint, see 91 Hawai'i at 271, 982 P.2d at 900; see also
supra section II1.A.3.b. Obviously, the same holds true in
countless other cases. E.g., Maugaotecs Il, 125 Hawai'i at 435
1.3, 168 P.3d at S65 n.3 (observing that the indictments against
the defendant did not allege “that, if convicted, [the defendant]
could be subject to extended sentencing as a multiple offender
for whom extended terms of imprisonment were necessary for the
protection of the public”). Accordingly, the extent of law

enforcement’s reliance on the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction

a
 

POR PUBLICATION IH WEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +

 

counsels in favor of limiting our decision to purely prospective
application. See Fortin, 843 A.2d at 1037 (concluding that the
court’s holding, which required that aggravating facts in capital
cases be alleged in the indictment, was limited to purely
prospective application, in light of the prosecution's reliance
on the court's previous ruling that such facts did not have to be
alleged).

Finally, the burden on the administration of justice
would be significant if our “new rule” applied retrospectively,
because our courts would be inundated with HRPP Rule 40 (2006)
petitions filed by defendants who were sentenced to extended
terms from as long ago as 1978, see Huelsman, 60 Haw. 71, SE8
P.2d 394, alleging that, because the extrinsic enhancers
foundational to their extended term sentences were not alleged in
their charging instrument, their extended sentences are therefore
invalid. See State v. Cummings, 101 Hawai'i 139, 143, 63 P.3d
1109, 1244 (2003) (holding that, aside from technical errors, the
omission of an essential element in the charging instrument is a
defect that is not one of mere form but is instead one of
substantive subject matter jurisdiction, which renders any
subsequent trial, judgment of conviction, or sentence a nullity,
and which is per se prejudicial); Russell v, Blackwell, 53 Haw.
274, 277-19, 492 P.2d 953, 956-57 (1972) (holding that @ rule

 

2 Seg BRPP Rule 40(a) (1) (2006) ("AE any tine but not prior to final
Judgment, any perecn may seek relief under the procedure set forth in this
Eula from the judgment of conviction, on the following grounds: (4) that. the
Judgment was cbteined ef sentence imposed in vsolation of the constitution of
ine United stetes or of the State of Hawai; [or] (11) thet the court wich
Fendeved the Judgment was without Jurisdiction over the person or the subject
matter... "(Spacing altered.i)

 

a2
‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST! § HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

 

requiring the court to follow certain procedures in accepting a
defendant’s guilty plea did not apply retroactively, because such
application “would impose an awesome burden on the administration
of justice,” insofar as it would require that all guilty pleas
that were previously accepted in a manner that did not comply
with the new procedure be set aside)

In light of these considerations, we believe that the
Prosecution and the courts would be substantially prejudiced by
the retrospective application of the new rule we announce today,
and, therefore, we accord it purely prospective application. see
Garcia, 96 Hawai'i at 211, 29 P.3d at 930 ("*{w]here substantial
Prejudice results from the retrospective application of new legal
principles to 2 given set of facts, the inequity may be avoided
by giving the guiding principles prospective application only.‘”
(Quoting State v. Ikezawa, 75 Haw. 210, 220-21, 857 P.2d 593, 598
(1993).))7 State v, Tachibana, 79 Hawai'i 226, 238, 900 P.2d
1293, 1305 (1995) (holding that the new rule, which required that
the court conduct @ colloquy with a defendant to determine if the
defendant is freely and voluntarily waiving his right to testify,
only applied “prospectively to cases in which trial is not
completed until after the date of [the] decision”); Fortin, 843

A.2d at 1037; see also State v. Haanio, 94 Hawai‘ 405, 407, 16
P.3d 246, 248 (2001) (partially overruling State v. Kupau, 76

Hawai'i 387, 879 P.2d 492 (1994), and holding that, “in jury
trials beginning after the filing date of this opinion, the trial
courts shall instruct juries as to any included offenses having a

rational basis in the evidence without regard to whether the

a3
#4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +4
prosecution requests, or the defense objects to, such an
instruction”); State v, Stanley, 60 Haw. 527, 533, 592 P.2d 422,
426 (1979) (holding that the new rule, which required that “a
family court order waiving jurisdiction must be appealed from
prior to the commencement of the criminal trial on the offenses
charged,” would apply “only prospectively,” in light of the
“absence of clear direction in (this court's} previous cases
regarding the proper time for challenging @ waiver order”); State
YeWarner, 58 Haw. 492, 501, 573 P.2d 959, 965 (1977) (holding
that a new jury instruction rule was “for prospective application
only”), overruled on other grounds by State v, Sawyer, 68 Hawai'i
325, 327, 966 P.2d 637, €39 (1998). Accordingly, all charging
instruments filed after the date of this decision, in which the
prosecution seeks enhanced sentencing, must include “allegations,
which if proved, would result in the application of a statute
enhancing the penalty of the crime committed.” Apao, 59 Haw.

at 636, 586 P.2d at 258 (footnote and emphasis omitted); accord
Estrada, 69 Haw. at 230, 736 P.2d at 829.

Because the new rule that we announce today is purely
prospective, it does not apply in this case. See Garcia, 96
Hawai'i at 208, 29 P.3d at 927. Therefore, the remaining
question is whether the complaint against Jess is defective under
the construction of the intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy that was
the prevailing law when Jess was charged on March 2, 2000,

Jess challenges Count I of the complaint, which charged
him with first degree robbery as follows:

(on oF about the 23rd day of February, 2000, in the

Ciey and County of Noneluls, State of Hawais, BRIAN

JESS, while in the course of comnitting a theft and

“4
‘448 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
while azned with a dangerous instrument, to wit, a
knife, dia threaten the imminent use of force against
Canh fran, 3 person who war present with the intent to
conpel acquiescence to the taking ef or escaping with
the property, thereby committing the offense of
Rotpery in the First Degree, in violation of [HRS
$) 08-840 2) (8) (12)

Jess asserts that the prosecution omitted certain intrinsic facts
from the complaint that the circuit court found in imposing an
extended term prison sentence. That sentence was, however,
vacated by the federal district court in the habeas proceeding.

See Jess 11, 2007 WL 1041737. Neverthe!

 

the prosecution
filed a second motion for extended term sentencing on remand.
Giving Jess the benefit of the doubt, we construe his argument as
attacking the allegations set forth in the declaration of counsel
filed in support of the second motion, to the extent that those
allegations are identical to the findings that Jess references in
his brief.??

In the declaration, the prosecution alleged in relevant

 

part:
30. _ [Jess] is 2 “persistent offender” and a
multiple offender” whose commitnent fer an extended
4 gage takes issue with the circuit court’s finding that his “behavior nas
‘eecalated as evidenced by his possession and threat to use ® knife suring the

 

‘Commission of the instant ropbery.” Jess asserts that this is an intrinsic
Allegation that was required to be plea in the complaint. The prosecution did
hot, however, rely op this allegation in its second motion for extended term
Sentencing. Furthermore, even assuming that the prosecution dis rely on
Jess's possession of and threat to use a knife, we believe that the complaint,
hen feed. in a connonsensicsl fashion, sufficiently slleged that fact, because
Itassereed that Jess, “while in the course of committing a theft and while
‘armed with 2 dangerous instrument, to wit, @ knife, did threaten the imminent
Use of force against Canh Tran.” ‘See Garkinaer ¥. State, @0 Hewai's 327, 330,
505 P.2d 1142, 1145 (1596) (explaining that the charging instrument "must be
Pead in # coniicn-sensical fashion in order to ascertain whether the material
aggravating circumstance has been sufficiently alleged therein to support the
imposition of enhanced sentencing’ (queting Schroeder, 76 Haw. at $20, 860
pita at 205)).

 

 

 

 

 

 

4s
‘+44 TOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

 

term is necessary for the protection of the public
because Of the following fect,

 

 

4.” jgess) bas failed to benefit from
the criminal justice systen.
fe: [Jess] has demonstrated @ total

disregaid for the rights of others and s poor
attitude toxard the law.

f. .. (Jess) has desonstrated = pattern of
criminality which indicates that he is likely to
be a recidivist in that he cannot conform hie
behavior £0 che requirenents of the law

9. Due to the quantity and seriousness
of [Jeae]"s past convictions and the serieusness
of the instant offences, (Jess) poser a serious

 

 

threat to the comunity and his long term
incerceration is necessary for the protection of
the public.

(Formatting altered.) ‘The allegations of paragraphs (d) through

(g) were not “‘enmeshed in'” the underiying elements of Jess's
first degree robbery and unauthorized control of a propelled
vehicle convictions, see Zafova, 91 Hawai‘i at 270, 982 P.2d

at 899 (quoting Schroeder, 76 Hawai'i at 528, 860 P.2d at 203);
to the contrary, they spoke to whether Jess's commitment for an
extended tern is necessary for the protection of the public based
upon Jess's behavior exhibited over time -- a subject that this
court had (until Maugactega i) held to be extrinsic to the
charged offenses and therefore extraneous to the allegations
necessary to the charging instrument, gee Rivera, 106 Hawai'i

at 152-54, 160, 102 P.3d at 1050-52, 1058 (holding that the
circuit court properly found, as an extrinsic fact, that the
defendant's “commitment for an extended term wes necessary for
the protection of the public"); Tafova, 91 Hawai'i at 275 n.19,
982 P.2d at 904 n.19 (“The finding whether an extended term of
imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the public, also

necessary for imposition of an extended term of imprisonnent

46
‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +#+
Pursuant to HRS § 706-662(5), is not @ factual finding
susceptible to jury determination.” (Emphasis in original.)).
Accordingly, Jess’s argument is without merit.

Jess next claims that his enhanced sentence was sought
by the prosecution, and imposed by circuit court, in retaliation
for Jess's exercise of his constitutional right to a jury trial.
He asks us to adopt a rule imposing a presumption of
vindictiveness on the part of the prosecution and the circuit
court by analogizing to  nunber of United States Supreme Court
decisions that mandate a presumption of prejudice and
vindictiveness when a harsher sentence is imposed following
appellate remand or a defendant's exercise of his right to a
trial de nove. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v, Smith, 490 U.S.
794, 794 (1989)); Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).

The Pearce Court explained that “*{dlue process of

 

law. . . requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no
part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.” smith, 490
U.S. at 798 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725); see also
McCullogh, 475 U.S. at 137-38. “*In order to assure the absence
of such @ motivation,” the Bearce Court held that, “‘whenever 2
judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new
trial, the reasons for him doing so must affirmatively appear.'”
Smith, 490 U.S. at 798 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726).

“tOtherwise, @ presumption arises that a greater sentence hes

7
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **¢

been imposed for a vindictive purpose... ./” Ids at 798-99
(quoting McCullough, 475 U.S. at 142 (quoting United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374 (1982))). The United States Supreme

Court adopted a similer rule in Blackledge “to guard against
vindictiveness by the prosecutor at the postconviction stage,”
Saith, 490 U.S. at 800 n.3, where an inmate who, after being
convicted of a misdemeanor charge of assault with @ deadly weapon
in state district court and exercising his statutory right to a
trial de novo in the superior court, was charged in the superior
court with felony assault with a deadly weapon. Elackledae, 417
U.S. at 22-23.

Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has
observed that, under the foregoing line of cases, “a mere
opportunity for vindictiveness is insufficient to justify the
Amposition of a prophylactic rule.” Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384.
“*(T]he Due Process Clause is not offended by ali possibilities
of increased punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only by
those that pose a realistic likelihood of “vindictiveness.”"”
Smith, 490 U.S. at 800 n.3 (quoting Blackledce, 417 U.S. at 27);
see also id. at 799 (quoting Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373). The
Goodwin Court held that “[t]he possibility that a prosecutor
would respond to a defendant’s pretrial demand for a jury trial
by bringing charges not in the public interest that could be
explained only as a penalty imposed on the defendant is so
unlikely that a presumption of vindictiveness certainly is not
warranted.” 457 U.S. at 384

 

mphasis in original). We believe

it is equally unlikely, as a universal matter, that 2 prosecutor

4a
 

{199 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS 200 PACIFIC REPORTER

 

would respond to a defendant's exercise of his right to a jury
trial by filing 2 posttrial motion for extended term sentencing
that was both contrary to the public interest and explainable
only as an exercise in vindictiveness. We therefore decline to
create a prophylactic presumption that the prosecution and the
circuit court are retaliating against a defendant for exercising
his right toa jury trial whenever the prosecution seeks, and the
circuit court imposes, an extended term sentence.
8. “ 1

Bnd Ex Post Facto Issues

1. The prosecution

The prosecution argues that empaneling @ jury in the
present matter would be a proper exercise of the circuit court's
inherent power because the state has an interest in deterring
crime and the legislature, by enacting the original extended term
scheme, evinced its intent to protect the public from
particularly dangerous individuals. (Citing, inter alia,
Conmentary to HRS §§ 706-661 and 706-662; State v. Alvey, 67 Hew.
49, 97, 678 P.2d 5, 10 (1984).) It asserts that concluding that
the trier of fact may, under HRS § 706-662, be a jury rather then
the sentencing judge comports with this court’s precedent in
Tafoya, 91 Hawai'i at 271, 982 P.2d at 900, and that this court
has, in the past, concluded -- despite the plain language of the
statute assigning fact-finding responsibility to the court --
that a circuit court possesses the inherent power to conduct @
bifurcated trial in order to afford a jury the opportunity to
find facts necessary for the imposition of an extended term
sentence, citing State v. Janto, 92 Hawai'i 19, 34-35, 986 P.2¢

49
 

“FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER #*+
306, 321-22 (1999). Indeed, the prosecution urges, this court
went further in Beralto when it concluded that, upon remand, the
trial court could empanel a new jury to make extended sentencing
findings pursuant to new procedural safeguards announced in State
vs Young, 93 Hawai'i 224, 999 P.2d 230 (2000). (Citing Peralte,
95 Hawai'i at 7-8, 18 P.3¢ at 208-10.) Similarly, the
prosecution maintains, the failure at Jess's first trial to
assign to the jury the task of considering the necessity finding
was a procedural error, correctable under Peralto by the trial
court’s empanelment of a new jury upon remand.

2. des

Jess argues that this court should not rewrite the
plain language of HRS $§ 706-661 and 706-662 to construe “the
court” to mean “the trier of fact” absent “compelling and
conclusive justification” which, he contends, is absent in the
present matter. He insists that consecutive term sentencing,
available pursuant to HRS § 706-668.5 (1993), provides an

 

adequate renedy for particularly dangerous defendants and is free
from constitutional infirmities.

Jess also asserts that precedent weighs against
assigning the prerogative of making the necessity finding to a
jury. He notes that this court has concluded in the past that

 

“extrinsic” facts -- such as the necessity finding -~ must be
found by the sentencing judge, not the jury, because extrinsic
facts are not, by their nature, part of the elements of the
charged offense and, hence, assigning their determination to the

jury would contaminate a jury’s proper focus. (Citing, inter

50
+6 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’

 

HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
alia, White, 110 Hawai'i at 84-85, 129 P.3d at 1112-13;
Maugaotega I, 107 Hawaii at 402, 114 P.3d at 908; Kaua, 102
Hawai'i at 12-13, 72 P.3d at 484-48; Tafoya, 91 Hawai'i at 271,
278 n.19, 962 P.2d at 900, 904 n.19.) He argues that rewriting
the statute to assign the necessity finding to the jury (1) could
“create due process and evidentiary problens for the defendant
that only a considered and integrated legislative statutory
overhaul may anticipate and solve” and (2) would conflict with
the legislative intent expressed through Act 230, see supra notes
3 and 4, and the analysis of the Judicial Council upon which Act
230 was grounded -- analysis that did not touch upon the jury
solution at all. (Citing Report of the Comittee to Conduct a
Comprehensive Review of the Hawai'i Penal Code at 271-27q (2005);
2006 Haw. Sess. L. Act 230, passim at 1012-13.) Rather, he
urges, this court should exercise restraint and await action by
the legisiature.

Finally, Jess asserts that this court cannot announce a
judicial reformation of the extended sentencing laws and then
apply that judicial decision to his case without violating his
rights to due process and protections against ex post facto
measures.* (Citing, inter alia, Haw. Const. art. I, $§ 5 and

 

3% agticle I, section 10 of the United States Constitution provides in
relevant part that “(no State shall... pags anys. . ax post facta Law
~ - -" (Underscoring added.) “This court hee previously neved that the
Hawai'i’ Constitution does not contain @ similar section, gee State v. Guidry,
208 Hawai'i 222, 235, 96 P.sa 242, 256" (2008) (notang thet HS $173. which

provides thet legisiation is presumed to have a prospective effect cnly,
Gxtends sinilar protection), although article 112, section 1 of the Hawes"t
Constitution woule iso srcusbly bar 2x post facto measures ty virtue of ite
Limitation of "It}he legislative poner of the State ss. te all rightful,
subjects of legislation not inconsistent with... the Constitution of the
United states.”

 

 

 

 

51
‘+*4-FOR-PUBLIEATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER #+#

14; Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Hicks vi
Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980); United States v. Newnan, 203
F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d
1489, 1511-12 (10th Cir. 1992); Rubino v. Lynauah, 845 F.2d 1266,
1274 (Sth Cir. 1988).)

C, The Circuit Court possesses The Inherent

gudicial Authority To fmpanel A Jury For
Consideration Of The Necessity Finding Pursuant
706=5 706
‘and 106-664 (1993) Without Often

‘Bight To Due Process Or The Separation Of Powers

 

 

Doctrine.

1. Reform by the circuit court of HRS § 706-662
Sump. 1996) and inmediate application of the
reformed statute would not offend a defendant's
xight_to due process.

We begin as a threshold matter with Jess's last
argument, to wit, that judicial reformation of HRS § 706-662
(Supp. 1996) to allow jury consideration of the necessity finding
at his resentencing hearing would violate his right to due
process and prohibitions against ex post facto measures. Jess's

argument is meritless.

toa defendant is constraines by the
requirements of due process, grounded in ex
post facto concerns.

The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that

the constitutional prohibition against |x post facto measures

applies only to legislative enactments. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532
U.S. 451, 456 (200) ("As the text of the Clause makes clear, it

 

‘is a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature, and does not

of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of government.‘

82
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'S REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER #+*

(Quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977))). The
Rogers Court, nonetheless, observed “that limitations on ex post
facto judicial decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due
process," id. at 457, citing Bouie as an instructive example. In
Bowie, the Court held that a judicial interpretation of 2
criminal trespassing statute, when applied retroactively to the
defendants -- African-Americans wishing to patronize a department

store restaurant -- to expand criminal lability violated “*the

 

basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning of
the conduct that it makes a crime,’” id. (quoting Bowie, 378 U.S.
at 350). The Rogers Court made it equally clear, however, that,
“[t]o the extent that [a} petitioner argues that the Due Process
Clause incorporates the specific prohibitions of the Ex Post
Facto Clause as identified in Calderiv, Bull, 3 U.S. 366

(2798)*), [a] petitioner misreads Bovie.” Id. at 450-59
(characterizing any language implying that due process analysis
must wholly incorporate ex post facto precedent as “dicta”).
Rather, the Rogers Court clarified that the appropriate test for

 

analyzing whether a newly announced judicial doctrine can apply

 

sn Calder, the Court set forth four types of laws to which the x post
Laste prohibition extends

lst. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of
the lan, and which was innocent when done, criminal; snd punishes
such action, “2d, Every law that aggravates a crine, or makes. it
Greater tha it was, when committed. 3d.” Every law thar changes
the punishment, and inflicts s greater punishment, than the law
annexed to the crime, when committed. (th. Every law that alters
the legal rules of evidence, and receives lees, or cifferent,
testimony, then the law required at the tine of the comission of
the offense, in order to convict the offencer

 

 

3 U.S. et 390-91, quoted in Rovers, $32 U.S. at 455,

53
 

+ FOR PUBLTEATION IN WEST'S WOIAL'T REPORTS AXD PACIFIC REPORTER +++
to the instant defendant is grounded in “core due process
concepts of notice, foreseeability, and, in particular, the right
to fair warning as those concepts bear on the constitutionality
of attaching crimina) penalties to what previously had been
nnocent conduct." Id. at 459 (citing Bouie, 378 U.S. at 351,
352, 354-55; United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 256, 266 (1997);
Marks, 430 U.S. at 191-92 ; Bose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 53
(1975) Douglas vy, Buder, 612 U.S, 430, 432 (2973); Rabe v
Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 316 (1972)) (emphasis added). The
Rogers Court refused to import ex post facts protections
wholesale into judicial decision-making because (1) “[a] court’s

 

‘opportunity for discrimination . . . is more limited than [a]
legislature's, in that [it] can only act in construing laws in
actual Litigation,’" id. at 460-61 (quoting Janes v. united

States, 366 U.S. 213, 247 n.3 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in

 

part and dissenting in part)) (some brackets added and some in
original), and (2) “incorporation of the Calder categories(, see
supra note 24,] into due process limitations on judicial
decisionmaking would place an unworkable and unacceptable
restraint on normal judicial processes and would be incompatible
with the resolution of uncertainty that marks any evolving legal
systen,” id. Instead, the Rogers Court concluded that judicial
reformation of the law “violates the principle of fair warning,
and hence must not be given retroactive effect, only where it is
‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had
been expressed prior to the conduct in issue,’" id. at 462
(quoting Bouie, 378 U.S, at 354), circumstances that would

54
‘149 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S WANAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

generate “unfair and arbitrary judicial action against which the
Due Process Clause aims to protect,” id, at 467.
>. i ion

fora _iudicial decision to implicate due
process concerns, the change wrought upen the
defendant's interests must be substantive, as

opposed to procedural, and detrimental, as
opposed to renedial.

In practice, when considering whether application of 2
judicial decision to @ particular defendant is “unexpected and
indefensible,” Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354, courts have focused on two
intertwined distinctions: (1) whether the change wrought by the
Judicial decision is detrimental or remedial to the defendant's
interests; and (2) whether the change is substantive or
procedural in nature. Without question, substantive changes to
the legal landscape that increase a defendant's criminal
Liability for acts committed prior to the judicial decision
violate the right to due process of law. See Boule, 378 U.S. at
350, 353-55 (“[A]n unforeseeable judicial enlargenent of a
criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like
an 2x post facto law such as Artlicle] I, s{ection] 10, of the
Constitution forbids,” an action which “vielate[s] the
requirement of the Due Process Clause that @ criminal statute
give fair warning of the conduct which it prohibite”); Rubino,
845 F.2d at 1274 (relying on Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423
(1987), to conclude that due process concerns are implicated in
the context of judicial statutory reformation only when the
judicial modification operates “to the detriment of @ criminal
defendant” and holding, after analyzing the judicial elimination

of a Texas doctrine governing the manner in which erimes composed

58
$44 POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++*
of overlapping elenents were charged, that, “[ilf the . .
doctrine would have barred [the defendant]’s second prosecution
and conviction, the State deprived him of due process in
affirming his conviction in reliance on the abandonment of 2
protective rule in force at the time of his offenses”).

on the other hand, procedural changes, those that

 

alter the process by which guilt is adjudicated or sentence
imposed, without modifying the degree, of criminal liability or
the length of the sentence imposed, do not implicate due process
concerns. See, e.g., Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45
(1990) (defining procedural changes as “changes in the procedures
by which a criminal case is adjudicated, as opposed to changes in
the substantive lew of crimes” and further defining matters of
substance as those thet “deprivie] a defendant of ‘substantial
protections with which the existing law surrounds the person
accused of crime’ or arbitrarily infring{e] upon ‘substantial
Personal rights’”) (quoting Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S.
180, 183 (1915); Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382-63
(2894).

Hankerson v. State, 723 N.W.2¢ 232 (Minn. 2006), is an
apt illustration of the foregoing principle. In Hankerson, the
Minnesota Supreme Court -- albeit in the context of analyzing
whether ex post facto principles were violated by retroactive
application of a legislative reform of the state’s extended
instigated by Apprendi, $30 U.S. 466, and
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) ~~ relied on Collins,
497 U.S. at 51 and Dobbert v, Florida, 432 U.S. 262, 287-88,

sentencing statut

 

 

56
 

‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
292-94 (1977), to conclude that “a change affecting the identity
of the fact finder is procedural and thus is not burdened by ex
post facto restrictions.” Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 242
(underscoring added). The court distinguished substantive from
procedural changes by concisely defining procedural modifications
as those that “d{o] not add aggravating factors, eliminate
elements of aggravating factors, or increase the duration of the
sentence authorized by a finding of aggravating factors.” id.
Equally clear is the proposition that, if a judicial
reformation of @ statute works to the defendant's advantage, due
Process is not offended. See Morehead, 959 F.2d at 1511-12
(noting that United States Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit
Precedent distinguished allowable retroactive application where

Judicially-wrought changes expanded the rights of criminal

defendants (citing Batson v, Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)) from
judicial decision-making that constricted the rights of criminal

defendants, which, to be applied retroactively, had to pass
additional due process muster as articulated in Bowie (citing

Marks, 430 U.S. 188; Bowie, 378 U.S. 347)); State v. Sandoval,
161 P.3d 1146, 1167 (Cal. 2007) (noting that federal courts have

 

unanimously concluded that the “remedial interpretation” of
federal sentencing guidelines in Booker, $43 U.S. at 268,
instigated by the requirements of Aporendi, conports with due
process).

87
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c. The circuit court would not offend the right
‘to due process by reforming HRS § 706-662
(Supp. 1996) s0 as to allow for jury

a Finding and
applying that reformat ior

hand.

In the present matter, invocation of a court’s inherent
power “to provide process where none exists,” Moriwake, 65 Haw
at 58, 647 P.2d at 711-12, by reforming HRS § 706-662 (Supp.
1996) to allow for jury fact-finding would not violate Jess's
right to due process of law. Assigning the fact-finding role to
the jury would be a procedural, as opposed to a substantive,
change that would not expand the scope of criminal liability,
increase punishment, or alter any evidentiary burdens to Jess’s
detriment, see Rubino, @45 F.2d at 1274, but, rather, would
“simply chang[e) the course to a result,” id. See Washington v.
Recuenco, __ U.S. _, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 2549, 2553 (2006)
(sherein the United States Supreme Court ruled that Apprendi
errors were procedural and subject to harmless error analysis)
(abrogating State v. Hughes, 110 P.3d 192, 196 (Wash. 2005)
(holding that an error under Blakely, 542 U.S. 296, was
structural and could never be harmless); Collins, 497 U.S. at SI

 

("The right to jury trial provided by the Sixth Amendment is
obviously a ‘substantial’ one, but it is not @ right that has
anything to do with the definition of crimes, defenses, or
punishments, which is the concern of the Ex Post Facto Clause.”)
jess I1, 2007 WL 1041737, at *4 (applying harmless error analysis
to Jess's habeas petition); Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 242

(construing Collins, 497 U.S. at 51, and Dobbert, 432 U.S. at

58
“++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
287-88, 292-94, to “make clear that @ change affecting the
identity of the fact{-)finder is procedural”).

Moreover, the judicial reformation of the statute to
allow for the enpanelment of @ jury, by being more protective of
Jess's constitutional right to a jury, would work to his
advantage and not to his detriment. See Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at
241-43 (the amendments to Minnesota’s sentencing scheme, by
requiring a higher quantum of proof upon resentencing,
“vindicate, not violate, Hankerson’s constitutional rights”).

2.
court we nd the separat. ers

PF crea re iaberest Tec
necessity finding under HRS $ 706-662 (Supp.
996).
In Maugacteaa II, this court held that HRS § 706-662
(Supp. 1996) was, in light of Cunningham v. California, $49 U.S.
1 127 5. Ct. 856 (2007), unconstitutional on its face, insofar
as every subsection “authorize(d] the sentencing court to extend
a defendant's sentence beyond the ‘standard term’ authorized
solely by the jury's verdict . . . by requiring the sentencing
court, rather than the trier of fact, to make an additional
necessity finding that . . . does not fall under Apprendi’s
prior-or-concurrent-convictions exception... .”
Maugaotegs II, 115 Hawai'l at 446, 168 P.3d at 576 (footnote
omitted) «
We recognized that our courts possess the inherent
authority to reform the law to preserve its constitutionality by
ordering the empanelment of juries to consider the factual

findings requisite to the imposition of an extended term sentence

59
4104 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAWAI'T REPORTS XN0 PACIFIC REPORTER +++
pursuant to HRS §§ 706-661 and 706-662 as they existed at the
time. Maugactega II, 115 Hawai'i at 448-49, 168 P.3d at 578-79
(citing, inter alia, Feralto, 95 Hawai'i at 6, 18 P.3d at 208;

Aragon v. Wilkinson ex rel, County of Maricopa, 97 P.3d 86, 891
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); Galinder v, State, 985 So. 2d $17, 527

(Fla. 2007); State v. Schofield, 895 A.2d 927, 937 (Me. 2008);
see also Maugacteca I, 115 Hawai'i at 458, 168 P.3d at S88
(coba, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by Duffy, J.)
Nevertheless, in light of the legislature's expressed intent in
Act 230 of the 2006 legislative session, sce sunxa notes 3 and 4,
and the legislature's then-current failure to reach agreement on
the creation of @ jury-based system,“ we concluded that it would
hot... Be appropriate for this court to assert sts

Inherent authority to empanel a jury on remand
because, as a rule,

 

[plrudential rules of judicial
self-governance properly init the role of
the courts in a semocratsc wociety. hy
Srustess of OHA) Yanasski, 69 Haw. 154,
Tit, 137 P.2e 406, 456 (1907); Lite of the
Land v. Land vse Comission, 63 aw. 166,
372, 623 b.2a 431, 456 {198i} (citing
Mapin'y: Selgin, 422°0.8. 490, 498

(S751); - + + {One} such role is that,
‘ven in the absence of constitutional
restrictions, [courts] must still
Earefully weigh the wisdom, efficacy, and
ElneLinezs ofan exercise Of their power
before acting, especially where there may
bs-an- intrusion inte arses commited te
Sther branches of government.

(enphasis added) (citation onittedl

 

 

 

as noted in Mauagoteaa IZ, 115 Hawai'i at 450 1.20, 168 P.3d at S60
1.20, House Bill No. 1i82 was introduced on January Z4, "2007 and sought to
fanend HRS $5 106-662 ang 706-664 to assign to the jury'the fact-finding role
Wien respect to extended term sentences. See H-B. No. 1152, 24th Leg., Reg.
Sees." (2007), available at netp://capitol .hewali.gov/sessich2007/bil1s/
lisiis2 S02 hem. The Senate and the House of Representatives were unable to
Teach agresment on 2 final draft of the bill, however, and the measure was put

 

60
 

POR PUBLICATION IN WES!

 

WAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

. Although judicial review
serves'as 4 check on the unconstitutional
exercise of power by the executive and
Legislative branches of government, “the
only check upen [the judicial branch's}
exercise of poner is [its] own sense of
Selfsrestraine.” Us. v. Butler, 297 U.S.

 

ty 76-78 (3936) (stone, Oe
Giesenting)
In ce Attorney's Fees of Mohr, 97 Hawai'i 1, 9-10, 32

B.3a 647, 25-56 (2001) {sone brackets added and some
i originel) (sone ellipses added and some in
original) (emphasis in original). See alse Rose v,

4 76 owas 454, 467, 879 P.2e
3057, 1050 (1884) iKlein, J-, concurring and
dissenting) ("*[T)he (clourt’s function in the
application and interpretation of - laus mst be
Carefully limited to aveid encroaching on the power of
[the legislature] to determine policies and make los
to carry them out.'"}. (quoting Bove Markets, Ine. v.
Retail Clerks Union, Local 210, 398 U.S. 298, 256-57
(1570) (Bleck, J-y dissenting! ); Bremner v, Civ &
Gounty of Henoluis, 96 await 134, 135, 26 P30 350,
385 (App. 2001). (quoting Lite of the Land, 63 Haw. ot
171-92)" 623 P28! at 438)

 

 

Maugacteas Ii, 115 Hawai'i at 450, 168 P.36 at 580 (sone ellipses
added and sone-in original).

Although Hauggotecs II focused on the inherent power of
this court to order, on remand, the empanelment of a jury to
consider the requisite findings, such inherent judicial authority
resides equally in a circuit court, be it in an original
proceeding or in a sentencing proceeding on remand. See HRS

§ 603-21.9 (1993); Richardson v. Sports Shinko (Waikiki Corp),

 

BRS § 603-21.9 provices in re

   

ant par
The several circuit courts shall have power:
isi” orders, . . . issue such executions
and do. such Sther acts and take. such
Other steps as nay be necessary to carry into full effect

the powers which are or shall be given to then by law or for
the promotion ef justice in matters pending before tren,

 

a
99 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAMAS REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
16 Hawai'i 494, 507, 980 P.2d 169, 182 (1994) ("[CJourts have
inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers as vell
as inherent power to control the litigation process before
them[,] . . . powers . . . derived from the state Constitution
and... not confined by or dependent on statute,” and “[a]mong
courts’ inherent powers are the powers to ‘create a remedy for 2
wrong even in the absence of specific statutory renedies'” and
the “inherent power to . . . promote a fair process.” (Quoting
Peat, Marvick, witche Superior Court, 245 Cal Rptr. 873, 883,
(Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (citing, inter alia, Morivake, 65 Haw. at
55, 647 P.2d at 711-12).) (Citing State v. Alvey, 67 Haw. 49,
57, 678 P.2d 5, 10 (1984) (noting that a trial court, in invoking
its inherent powers, must “*balancle] the interests of the
(s]tate against fundamental fairness to a defendant with the
added ingredient of the orderly functioning of the court system’”
(quoting Morivake, 65 Haw. at $6, 647 P.2d at 712).)7 Moriwake,
65 Haw. at $5, 647 P,2d at 711-12 (defining the inherent power of
all courts, including the trial court, as “the power to protect,
itself; the power to administer justice whether any previous form
of remedy has been granted or not; . . . and the power to provide
Process where none exists"), quoted in Farmer v. Admin, Dir, of
the Courts, 94 Hawai'i 232, 241, 11 P.3d 457, 466 (2000).

This court has concluded that the extended term
sentencing scheme “should be construed in harmony with the
requirements of due process,” State v, Kamae, 56 Haw. 628, 625,
S48 P.2d 632, 637 (1976) (speaking specifically of HRS § 706-664

but addressing as a whole the due process requirements of the

62
‘*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +*#
extended sentencing scheme), which includes the need, in light of
Cunningham, to address shortcomings in the fact-finding structure
of HRS § 706-662. Moreover, the matter of extended term
sentencing is of sufficient public concern to justify invocation
of a circuit court's inherent power to reform the statute so as
to preserve its constitutionality provided that, by invoking that
authority, the circuit court could “conclude with confidence that
(4) it [was] possible to [do so) in a manner that closely
effectuate|d) policy judgments clearly articulated by the
enacting body, and (ii) the enacting body vould have preferred
such 2 reforned version of the statute to invalidation of the
statute.” Sandoval, 161 P.3d at 1159 (some brackets added and
some in original). And, as noted in Maugacteea Ii, jury
consideration of the necessity finding could be structured so as
to avoid “contamination” of the impartiality of the jury by
Postponing introduction of evidence pertaining to extended term
sentencing until after the guilt phase of the trial has
concluded. 115 Hawaiti at 449-50 n.19, 168 P.3d at 579-80 n.19
(citing Jante, 92 Hawai'i at 34-35, 986 P.2d at 321-22), Nor is
@ properly timed determination of the necessity finding any less
suited to a jury than the finding that a murder wes carried out
in a manner “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” as
required by HRS § 706-657 and assigned to the jury in Peralte, 95
Hawai'i at 7, 18 P.3d at 209, and Jante, 92 Hawai'i at 33, 986
P.2d at 320, The United States District Court for the District
of Hawai'i, in fact, implicitly concluded that the ni

 

ssity
finding was suitable for jury determination. See Jess 11, 2007

6
 

[FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER #+#
WL 1041737, at *6 (in articulating its harmless error analysis
comparing the likelihood that jury and judge findings would agree
on the necessity finding in any given case).

To be sure, the circuit court, in exercising its
discretion to invoke its inherent authority “to provide process
where none exists,” Morivake, 65 Haw. at 55, 647 P.2d at 712,
must be similarly aware of the necessity of tempering the
exercise of that power in light of the expressed intent of the
legislature on the subject under consideration. See
Maugactega II, 115 Hawai'i at 450, 168 F.3d at $60 (citing, inter
alia, Mohr, 97 Hawai'i at 9-10, 32 P.3d at 655-56, for the
Proposition that “*the only check upon [the judicial branch's)
exercise of power is [its] own sense of self restraint’” (quoting
Butler, 297 U.S. at 76-79)), The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in
Barland v, Eau Claire County, $75 N.W.2d 691 (Wis. 1996), in
describing the separation of powers amongst the three branches of
government, noted that “*[t)he separation of powers doctrine
states the principle of shared, rather than completely separated
Powers,’" which “‘envisions 2 government of separate branches
sharing certain powers./” Id. st 696 (quoting State v, Holmes,
315 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Wis. 1962)). The Barland court concluded
that, “*[1Jn these areas of “shared power,” one branch of
government may exercise power conferred on another only to an
extent that does not unduly burden or substantially interfere
with the other branch's exercise of its power.’" Id. (quoting In
xe Complaint Against Grady, 348 N.W.2d 559, 566 (Wis. 1984)).
Similarly, the highest court in Maryland, in Wynn v, State, 679

64
 

"+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S NAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

A.2d 1087 (Md, 2005), recently comnented that “[clourts across
the country . . . have maintained that inherent authority should
be recognized and yet employed rarely,” id. at 1104, noting that
“the need for a narrow application of inherent authority is
greater when the power claimed as deriving from inherent
authority overlaps and conflicts with a power of the legislative
OF executive branch,” id. at 1105. Therefore, “*[i]n exercising
its power to do what is reasonably necessary for the proper
administration of justice . . . [,] @ court must proceed with a
cautious and cooperative spirit into those areas where its

constitutional powers overlap with those of other branches.‘”

Ad. (quoting In _re Alamance County Court Facilities, 405 $.£.2¢
125, 133 (N.C. 1991)). Concerns such as these led us, in
Maw Ja LL, to decline to exercise this court’s inherent

authority to empanel a jury, in light of, at that time, the most
Fecent and most explicit expressions of legislative intent
Pertaining to the wisdom of 2 jury-based necessity finding, 115
Hawai'i at 449-50, 168 P.3d at 579-80.

There has, however, been recent seachange in the
legislature’s clearly expressed intent regarding the wisdom of
employing juries in the context of extended term sentencing. the
enactment of H.B. No. 2, se¢ supra notes 3-6, during the recent
special session provides this court with a fresh, conclusive
expression of legislative support for the use of juries as the
trier of fact with respect to extended term sentencing fact-
finding and allows us to “conclude with confidence,” Sandoval,
161 P.3d at 1159, that empaneling a jury would “closely

6
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

effectuate] policy judgments clearly articulated by the
[legislature},” id., and that the legislature “would

prefer{] such a reformed version of the statute to invalidation
of the statute,” id.; see also State v. Cutsinger, No. 28203,
2008 WL 257175, at *1, *14 (Haw. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2008) ("The
Legislature’s enactment of Act 1. . . eliminates any doubt about
the Legislature's intent with respect to extended term
sentencing. The Legislature has plainly expressed its desire for
@ sentencing scheme in which extended terms of imprisonment may
continue to be imposed.”). In light of the recent legislation,
invocation of the court's inherent authority in the instant
matter would “‘not unduly burden or substantially interfere with
the other branch's exercise of its power.’” Earland, 575 N.W.2d
at 696 (quoting Grady, 348 N.W.2d at 566).

© the dissent argues that, “bly answering the [reserved [q]uestion in
the affirmative, and allowing’ for the application of (Nawail’s extended term
sentencing] statute, ( HRS § 706-662 (Supp. 1996),] the majority violates
Precedent,” namely faugactega 2. Dissenting opinion at 13. The dissent
overlooks’ the cbvioue, namely, that the Legislsture enacted Act 1 giter we
Secided Wauagcteas II. ‘he we have caic, our decision in ae
guided by the iatest expression of legislative intent, specifically Act 230,
which vested the power to nake the necessity finding not with the Jury, but
With the court. fea 115 Hawas's at 449-80, 166 Pod at $7980. Act
Provices the evidence of conclusive legislstive support for the circuit court
fo enpanel a Jury pursuant to its inherent authority thet was previously
locking, Girecting that the Jury, end not the sentencing court, meke the
necessity finding. See gupta notes (-5. Accoraingly, cur conclussen that the
circuit court may empenel a jury to make the necessity finding under ARS

§ 706-662 is conssstent with principles of stare

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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‘04 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ WAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

D. The Circuit Court May, With Respect To A

for retroactive application upon resentencing
In the interests of judicial economy, we construe

Jess's constitutional ergunents broadly to include the question
whether the prohibition against ex post facto measures prevents
the circuit court from applying Act 1 of the 2007 Second special
Session, see supra notes 3-6, to his resentencing. The measure
provides in relevant part that “[t]his Act shall apply to all
sentencing or resentencing proceedings pending on or commenced
after the effective date of this Act, whether the offense was
committed prior to, on, or after the effective date of this Act.”
See supra note 6. It specifically addresses defendants in Jess’s
position by providing that “[a] defendant whose extended term of
imprisonment is set aside or invalidated shall be resentenced

pursuant to this Act upon request of the prosecutor.” Id,
2. “

application of Act 1 to Jess's case would not
violate the conststutional bition soainst ex
post facto measures,

Ex post facto protections are not implicated unless,
without notice, they effect a substantive change to the
defendant's interests that operates to his or her detriment. See
Cutsinger, 2008 WL 257175, at *8 ("Under the Supreme Court’s test
for determining whether @ criminal law falls within the ex post
facto prohibition, two critical elements must be present:

‘first, the law must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to

o
(84 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
events occurring before its enactment: and second, it must
Sisadvantage the offender affected by it.’” (Quoting Miller, 482
U-S. at 430.))+ Landorat v, USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,
269-10, 275 n.28 (1994) (noting that “[w]hile we have strictly
construed the Ex Post Facto Clause to prohibit application of new
statutes creating or increasing punishments after the fact, we
have upheld intervening procedural changes even if application of
the new rule operated to a defendant's disadvantage in the
Particular case,” and concluding that “[a} statute does not
operate ‘retrospectively merely because it is applied in a case
arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment or upsets
expectations based on prior law(; rJather the court must ask
whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to
events completed before its enactment”); Sandoval, 161 P.3d at
1159 ("A retroactive law does not violate the ex post facto

clause if it does not alt

 

‘substantial personal rights’ but

merely changes ‘modes of procedure which do not affect matters of

substance.’” (Quoting Millex, 482 U.S. at 430.) (Underscoring
added.)); Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 241-42 (concluding (1) that,
in order “*(tjo fell within the ex post facto prohibition, a law
must be [a] retrospective -~ that is, “it must apply to events
occurring before its enactment” -~ and [b] it “must disadvantage
the offender effected by it"’" (quoting Lynce vy, Mathis, 519 U.S.
433, 441 (1997) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29
(1982))), (2) that Apprendi-nandated anendnents introducing jury

fact-finding “are not prohibited as ex post facto laws because

they do not work to [the defendant]’s disadvantage” but, rather,

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“vindicate, not violate, [her] constitutional rights,” and (3)
that “a change affecting the identity of the fact (-]finder is
procedural and thus is not burdened by ex post facto
restrictions”); State v, Upton, 125 P.3d 713, 719-20 (Or. 2005)
(analyzing Oregon's reformed extended term sentencing statute,
instigated in response to Apprendi and Blakely, wherein the fact~
finding function was assigned to the jury and concluding: (1)
that assigning facts to the jury “changes only the method for
determining the available punishment; it does not . . . increase
that punishment”; (2) that, to the extent that the new jury fact
finding responsibilities “change{] the quantum of proof required
under the sentencing guidelines, it inures to the defendant's
advantage to require the state to prove any enhancing factors
beyond @ reasonable doubt,” a procedural change which “does not
prejudice defendant; indeed, it vindicates his constitutional
rights”: and (3) that the prohibition against ex post facto
measures was not, therefore, violated because “[f]or @ statute to
violate state or federal ex post facto clauses, the statute mist
at least effect some kind of disadvantageous change upon the
defendant” (emphasis added) (citing State v. Mcliab, 51 P.3d 1249,
1252 (Or. 2002)); Mashington v. Pillatos, 150 F.3d 1130, 1195,
1137-38 (Wash. 2007) (reasoning that “if the changes to the
statute de not alter the consequences of the crime[,) then there
is likely no relevant lack of notice” and concluding that
retroactive application of amendments to Washington's penal code
driven by Blakely did not violate ex post facto prohibitions
because “the|] defendants had warning of the risk of an

69
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WAWAI'S REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +**
exceptional sentence” and “at the time . . . thel] defendants
committed the crimes . . . , (the state) had a seemingly valid
exceptional sentencing system which gave fair notice of the risk
of receiving such a sentence”).

As noted supra in section III.C.1.c, the United States
Suprene Court, in Recuenco, ruled that Avprendi errors are
procedural in nature, 126 5. Ct. at 2553; see also Cutsinger,
2008 WL 257175, at *8 ("Phe pivotal change made by Act 1 --

 

Providing the defendant with the right to have a jury determine
the facts necessary to impose an extended term -- is a procedural
change to Hawai‘i's extended term sentencing statutes. It
therefore falls within the procedural-change exception to the ex
post facto prohibition.”]. Moreover, prescribing @ jury as the
trier of fact during the extended term sentencing phase, pursuant
to Act 1, is remedial in nature and “does not prejudice [the]
defendant; indeed it vindicates his constitutional rights,”
Upton, 125 P.3d at 719; see also Cutsinger, 2008 WL 257175, at +8
("Act 1 provides [the defendant] with additional benefits not
contained in the prior law. Act 1 gives [the defendant] the
right and option to have a jury (instead of only the sentencing
court) determine the facts necessary to impose an extended term
of imprisonment. It also requires that such facts be proven
beyond @ reasonable doubt.” (Citation and footnote omitted.)).
Applying the Calder test, see supra note 24, it is clear that the
new jury provisions do not (1) increase criminal liability for
conduct previously innocent, (2) aggravate the degree of Jess's

crimes, (3) increase the punishment available at the time Jess

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WATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
committed his crimes, or (4) alter evidentiary standards to
Jess's detriment. See Calder, 3 U.S. at 390-91, quoted in
Rocers, $32 U.S. at 455; see also Cutsinger, 2008 wi, 257175,

at *8 (concluding that “the retroactive application of Act 1 does
not disadvantage (the defendant] because it does not subject him
to “increase{d] punishment beyond what was prescribed’ when his
burglary offense was committed” (quoting Miller, 482 U.S. at 430)
(brackets in original).

We therefore hold that the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto measures is not offended by the plain
language of the new law. See Cutsinaer, 2008 WL 257175, at +8
(holding that “Act 1's retroactive application to (the defendant)

does not violate the Bx Post Facto Clause of Article I, § 10”)

 

Iv. concLusion
For the foregoing reasons, we remand this matter to the

circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.
BOP nn
ae

% although the dissent asserts that Act 1 should not be construed or

applied with respect to Jess, see dissenting opinion at 1-3, $23, it aves not
ke issue with the actus) sibetance of cur due process or £x post facte
alyeis

   

 

n
19 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++

Mark J. Bennett
Attorney General
(Dorothy Sellers
Solicitor General,
Girard D. tau,

First Deputy Solicitor
General, and Kimberly
‘Tsunote’ Guidry, Deputy
Solicitor General,

on the briefs),

for amicus curiae State
of Hawai'i

David Glenn Bettencourt,
for the defendant-appellee
Brian Jess

on the briefs:

Daniel H. Shimizu,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
for the plaintiff-appellant
State of Hawai'i

‘Tracy Murakami
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
for amicus curiae Prosecuting Attorney,
County of Kaua'i

2