Case Title: Brenning v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Brenning v. State1994 WY 24870 P.2d 349Case Number: 93-137Decided: 03/11/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Roy 
F. BRENNING III, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court, Lincoln County,

John 
D. Troughton, J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Leonard 
D. Munker, State Public Defender, and Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel, Public 
Defender Program.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., D. Michael Pauling, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Lori L. Gorseth, Asst. Atty. Gen.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ. 

MACY, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Roy F. 
Brenning III pleaded guilty to six counts of grand larceny by bailee and was 
sentenced to incarceration, ordered to pay restitution, and assessed a surcharge 
to be paid to the crime victims' compensation account. He appeals from the terms 
of his sentence.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant poses 
two issues for our review:

Issue 
I

Whether 
W.S. § 7-13-421(c) violates the constitutional requirement of separation of 
powers[.]

Issue 
II

Whether 
the trial court improperly ordered restitution at sentencing[.]

[¶4]      Appellant had 
been the Clerk and Treasurer for the Town of Afton, Wyoming, for approximately 
fourteen years. He and his wife had a comfortable yearly income of approximately 
$55,000. They and their three children lived in a $150,000 house. Appellant was 
active in his church, was liked in the community, and was known to be a caring 
father.

[¶5]      Sometime in 1987, 
Appellant began to sense that his marriage was in trouble, and he began to worry 
about whether he was providing enough material comfort to his family. He began 
to steal cash from the Town and to use it to buy "snow machines, 
four[-]wheelers, motor[]cycles, [and] trips" for his family.

[¶6]      Appellant 
admitted that, between 1987 and 1992, he took cash from the Town's golf course 
revenue and from other enterprises operated by the Town. To conceal his thefts, 
Appellant altered the Town's records and receipts. Although he did not maintain 
accurate records of his thefts, Appellant admitted that he took at least 
$107,218.23.

[¶7]      While Appellant 
was using the Town's money to pay for his family's recreation, the Town 
officials were struggling to overcome budget shortfalls and to maintain basic 
civil services. Because of its budget troubles, the Town was forced to lay off 
at least two employees.

[¶8]      On February 1, 
1993, Appellant was charged with six counts of felony larceny by bailee: one 
count per year for his thefts from 1987 through 1992. He pleaded guilty pursuant 
to a plea agreement in which he agreed to pay restitution to the Town. The 
sentencing court sentenced Appellant to serve not less than one year nor more 
than five years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary and ordered him to pay 
$116,696.671 in restitution to the Town and to 
pay a surcharge to the crime victims' compensation account. The sentencing court 
added $6,980.93 for the cost of the Town's audit and $3,323 for additional 
missing funds to the $107,218.23 which Appellant had agreed to pay. Appellant 
does not challenge the amount of the ordered restitution.

[¶9]      Appellant argues 
that, since it found that he did not have an ability to pay, the sentencing 
court exceeded its sentencing authority by ordering him to make restitution. We 
disagree.

[¶10]   WYO. STAT. § 7-9-102 (Supp. 1993) 
states:

In 
addition to any other punishment prescribed by law the court shall, upon 
conviction for any misdemeanor or felony, order a defendant to pay restitution 
to each victim as determined under W.S. 7-9-103 and 7-9-114 unless the court 
specifically finds that the defendant has no ability to pay and that no 
reasonable probability exists that the defendant will have an ability to 
pay.

Under 
that section and WYO. STAT. § 7-9-103 (Supp. 1993), a sentencing court not only 
has authority to order a defendant to pay restitution but must order the 
defendant to pay restitution unless the sentencing court specifically finds that 
the defendant is unable to pay. Helmlinger v. State, 855 P.2d 363, 365 
(Wyo. 1993) (citing Murray v. State, 855 P.2d 350 (Wyo. 1993), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 693, 126 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1994)). "Although the 
court is not required to specifically find that a defendant has the ability to 
pay, the record must still contain evidence to support the existence of a 
present or future ability to pay." Murray, 855 P.2d  at 359.

[¶11]   Appellant claims that the 
sentencing court found that he was unable to pay when it made the following 
statements:

In 
addition to that, Mr. Brenning, I have a suspicion that the only compensation 
that the City of Afton or Western Surety Company will receive from you 
-

Let's 
put it a different way. That the largest amount of compensation that Western 
Surety and the City of Afton shall receive from you is incarceration. I have a 
strong suspicion, Mr. Brenning, that $116,000 will be beyond your lifetime 
ability to repay. And if there would be any restitution to the - to the people 
who have lost it, it will probably be through the punishment that's imposed. I 
would be reluctant to give you probation with the requirement that you make 
restitution because I think that this Court would be giving to you a built in 
Petition for Revocation of Probation with a long argument concerning whether or 
not it was a willful failure to pay restitution. I can only - I don't think 
that's in the realm of speculation. I think it is in the realm of reasonable 
possibility, Mr. Brenning.

The 
sentencing court's "strong suspicion" that a "reasonable possibility" existed 
that Appellant would not be able to make complete restitution does not rise to 
the level of being the specific finding required under § 7-9-102. The evidence 
submitted regarding Appellant's ability to pay tempered the sentencing court's 
statements. According to Appellant, he owned assets valued at approximately 
$76,000. He also had substantial liabilities, including: a $4,000 outstanding 
automobile loan; a $3,000 outstanding personal loan; a $6,000 credit card debt; 
and a possible judgment in a related civil lawsuit. Appellant thus held net 
assets worth up to $63,000 which, if they were liquidated, would leave only 
approximately $53,000 remaining on the restitution obligation.

[¶12]   Although Appellant also had a 
monthly child support obligation of $400, he repeatedly assured the sentencing 
court that he planned to pay the entire restitution amount. He testified that, 
in order to earn enough money to pay the restitution, he had been working, 
submitting job applications, and taking night classes to earn a master's degree 
in order to improve his job opportunities.

[¶13]   The record contained ample evidence 
to support a finding that Appellant had an ability to pay. We hold that the 
sentencing court had not only the authority but also a duty to order Appellant 
to pay restitution.

[¶14]   Appellant also argues that he was 
sentenced in violation of the Wyoming Constitution's separation of powers 
requirement. WYO. CONST. ART. 2 § 1. He argues that WYO. STAT. § 7-13-421(c)(ii) 
(1987) violates the separation of powers requirement in his case because that 
statute might permit the parole board to perform both legislative and judicial 
functions by allowing the board to extend the period of his possible parole in 
the event he fails to make restitution. WYO. STAT. § 7-13-421 (1987) provides in 
pertinent part:

(b) 
The board shall provide for restitution in the amount determined by the court 
pursuant to W.S. 7-9-103 unless the board finds the parolee is not reasonably 
capable of making the payments, in which case the board may modify the amount of 
restitution to be paid, taking into account the factors enumerated in W.S. 
7-9-106.

(c) 
If the parolee fails to pay the restitution as provided by this section the 
board may:

(i) 
Modify the amount of the restitution;

(ii) 
Extend the parole period to accommodate the parolee's ability to pay 
restitution; or

(iii) 
Revoke the parole.

(d) 
The board may waive the payment of some or all of the restitution as a condition 
of parole if it finds the payment of some or all of the restitution will work an 
undue hardship on the parolee or his family. If the victim can be located 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence, he shall be given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard prior to the board making a decision to waive some or 
all of the restitution under this subsection.

[¶15]   We decline to address this issue 
because it is not ripe for review. Appellant does not claim that his parole 
period has been extended or even that he has been granted parole. Instead, 
Appellant argues that, because the restitution amount which he was ordered to 
pay was so great, the parole board will inevitably need to extend the duration 
of his possible parole in order to enable him to pay the full 
amount.

[¶16]   "We evaluate ripeness in two 
prongs, which include, first, an evaluation of the fitness of the issues 
presented for judicial review and, second, an evaluation of the hardship to the 
parties if judicial review is denied." BHP Petroleum Company, Inc. v. State 
Tax Commission, 766 P.2d 1162, 1165, after remand, 784 P.2d 621 (Wyo. 
1989). The doctrine of ripeness applies to the parole board's decisions. See 
Duffy v. State, 789 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶17]   Here, neither prong of the ripeness 
test has been met. First, because the parole board has not exercised its 
authority under § 7-13-421(c), we have not been presented with a decision to 
review. We prefer not to examine hypothetical decisions which the parole board 
may make. Without the parole board having taken any action, the issue raised by 
Appellant is not ripe for our review.

[¶18]   Second, aside from the hardship his 
lawful sentence caused, we cannot foresee any further hardship being caused to 
Appellant if he is forced to wait and see whether the parole board grants and 
then extends his parole. Appellant may appropriately seek review when he can 
demonstrate that the parole board has made some adverse decision.

[¶19]   We note that the parole board's 
decisions are now exempt from the provisions of the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act, including the provisions for judicial review under WYO. STAT. §§ 
16-3-114 and 16-3-115 (1990). WYO. STAT. § 7-13-402(f) (Supp. 1993). A parolee 
does, nevertheless, have other remedies available to him for adverse decisions 
which may be made by the parole board. See, e.g., Pisano v. Shillinger, 
814 P.2d 274 (Wyo. 1991) (petition for a writ of habeas corpus to determine 
right to bail pending parole revocation hearing).

[¶20]   Because the issue is not ripe for 
review, we decline to decide whether § 7-13-421(c)(ii) violates the separation 
of powers requirement.

[¶21]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 In arriving at this figure, the sentencing court omitted approximately 
$825 which Appellant had agreed to pay. We do not resolve this issue because it 
is not clear from the record whether the omission was intentional. If the 
omission were a mere clerical or mathematical error, the sentencing court would 
have the authority to make a correction. W.R.Cr.P. 
36.