Case Title: Carpetland U.S.A. Inc., v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91564

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 91564-Agenda 23-January 2002.
CARPETLAND U.S.A., INC., Appellee, v. THE ILLINOIS 

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al.,
								Appellants.
Opinion filed June 20, 2002.
 
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. (Carpetland), sought administrative
review in the circuit court of Cook County of a decision by Lynn
Quigley Doherty, Director of Employment Security, which
adopted the report and proposed decision of a representative of the
Department of Employment Security (Department) before whom
a hearing had been held. The Director determined that floor
measurers and floor-covering installers whose services were
utilized by Carpetland were employees rather than independent
contractors and, therefore, were not exempt under section 212 of
the Unemployment Insurance Act (Act) (820 ILCS 405/212 (West
2000)). The Director further found that Carpetland owed
$38,977.17, plus interest and penalties, in unpaid unemployment
insurance contributions for 1991. The circuit court confirmed the
Director's decision. On appeal, a divided court reversed, finding
the Director's decision clearly erroneous. We granted the
Department's petition for leave to appeal (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 315).
We agree with the appellate court that the agency decision as to
the installers was clearly erroneous and, therefore, affirm in part.
Because we do not find clear error in the agency decision as to the
measurers, we reverse in part.
	Under the Act, an employer's liability for making
contributions and an employee's eligibility for benefits are
dependent, in part, on the existence of an employment relationship
between them. The statutory definition of employment, rather than
common law principles of master and servant or independent
contractor, governs this determination. AFM Messenger Service,
Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 396-97 (2001). The Act defines "employment," in relevant part, as
"any service *** performed by an individual for an employing
unit." 820 ILCS 405/206 (West 2000). Carpetland, a corporation
"which has or *** had in its employ one or more individuals
performing services for it within this State" (820 ILCS 405/204
(West 2000)), is an employing unit. At issue is whether 12
measurers and 259 installers whose services were utilized by
Carpetland during the relevant time period were employees, on
whose behalf Carpetland was required to make unemployment
insurance contributions, or independent contractors, for whom the
Act carves out an exemption:
			"Service performed by an individual for an employing
unit, whether or not such individual employs others in
connection with the performance of such services, shall be
deemed to be employment unless and until it is proven in
any proceeding where such issue is involved that-
			A. Such individual has been and will continue to be free
from control or direction over the performance of such
services, both under his contract of service and in fact;
and
			B. Such service is either outside the usual course of the
business for which such service is performed or that such
service is performed outside of all the places of business
of the enterprise for which such service is performed; and
			C. Such individual is engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, profession, or business."
820 ILCS 405/212 (West 2000).
	Because these conditions are stated in the conjunctive, all
three must be satisfied for the independent contractor exception to
apply. Jack Bradley, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security,
146 Ill. 2d 61, 75 (1991). The burden of proof is on the
presumptive employer, who is claiming the benefit of the
exemption. Thus, the terminology used by the parties to describe
their relationship is not controlling. The determination must be
made, instead, based on the facts relevant to the three conditions.
Jack Bradley, 146 Ill. 2d  at 75-76. In addition, because the Act
was passed with the public welfare in mind, its terms should be
liberally construed in favor of inclusion. Jack Bradley, 146 Ill. 2d 
at 75.
	The Director and the circuit court concluded that none of the
three conditions of section 212 were met. The appellate court
reached the opposite conclusion. 319 Ill. App. 3d 1068.

BACKGROUND
	Carpetland is a retailer of floor coverings, primarily carpeting.
During 1991, Carpetland operated 17 stores in Illinois.
Carpetland's retail price for its products does not include
measuring the customer's floor to determine the dimensions
needed or installation of the floor covering. However, the majority
of Carpetland's sales, approximately 75%, are to customers who
request that Carpetland arrange for installation of the floor
covering by signing a sales agreement containing the following
provision:
		"INSTALLATION BY SUBCONTRACTOR
			It is understood that Carpetland will not install said
materials but that by the acceptance of this proposal you
authorize Carpetland to contract with a subcontractor on
[your] behalf to make the installation. You authorize
Carpetland to issue to said subcontractor on [your] behalf
an installation work order with these specifications. You
agree to pay to Carpetland the amount specified herein
which shall include the price of all materials and the
installation charges which are payable to the
subcontractor on your behalf."
	At the agency hearing, Carpetland's vice president of
operations, three installers, one measurer, and an employment
consultant testified before the Department's representative.

Installers
	Joseph H. Smith testified that he had been in the business of
carpet installation for 27 to 28 years. He is now self-employed
with a company known as J. Smith Floors, Inc. During 1991, he
was the self-employed president of an Indiana corporation known
as Tile Works, Inc., which sold and installed floor coverings.
Smith estimated that about 75% of Tile Works' business consisted
of performing installations for retail or commercial customers of
Carpetland and other companies. About 25% consisted of in-house
sales and installations. Of the portion of his business that involved
installations for other companies, about 30% of the work was for
Carpetland; the rest was for Builder's Square, Colortile, and other
retailers who were competitors of Carpetland. At the time of the
hearing, Smith continued to do work for Carpetland, under the
same arrangement that existed in 1991.
	When Carpetland has a job for Smith in Illinois, he is
contacted directly by the salesperson and, after accepting the job,
receives a work order via fax. The work order contains the name
and contact information for the customer and a description of the
work to be done, including a diagram for placement of the floor
covering. Depending on the job, he might have to visit the site to
evaluate it. He occasionally declines jobs if his schedule is full, the
job is "too big or too small," or the job will not pay well.
	Smith has a basic price for various types of jobs, which he
adjusts up or down depending on the size and complexity of the
job. He quotes a price to Carpetland and, if they reach an
agreement, he takes the job. If not, the job will go to someone else.
He includes in his quoted price any anticipated incidental expenses
such as parking. If his costs are less than his original estimate, he
retains the extra profit. If the job costs him more than his estimate,
he suffers the loss.
	The actual installation work is performed by Smith's
employees. In general, he has 10 to 12 employees but increases
that number to 25 or 30 during busy seasons. He uses
subcontractors when he is short-handed. Carpetland is not
involved in his staffing decisions, does not suggest or recommend
that he increase or decrease staff, and does not refer potential
employees to him. Any training needed is provided by Smith.
	One of his employees picks up the carpeting or other material
at Carpetland and transports it to the customer's site. Smith
supervises the actual installation. Only rarely will someone from
Carpetland be present during the installation.
	Smith provides any materials or supplies needed for
installation, such as adhesives for vinyl or tile, mortars and grouts
for ceramic and marble, and seam tape, tack strips, and other
materials for carpeting. When purchasing these supplies, Smith
determines which suppliers he will use and deals directly with
suppliers who sell only "to the trade." Smith also provides all of
the necessary tools, in which he estimated he has invested $15,000
to $18,000. In addition, Smith owns three delivery trucks and
maintains a 3,500 square foot warehouse and an office with a staff
of four.
	After completing a job for Carpetland, Smith submits an
invoice on his company stationery, accompanied by a copy of the
work order. Usually, he does this by mail. Carpetland pays him
twice a month, with a check made out to his company. He
estimated that his company does about one job per month for
Carpetland.
	Smith guarantees his work for one year from the date of
installation. If the customer complains to Carpetland, the matter is
referred to him for resolution. He does not receive complaints
directly from Carpetland customers once his installers have left the
customer's premises.
	Smith testified that in 1991, he had an Illinois Department of
Employment Security account number and a federal employer
identification number. Tile Works filed a corporate tax return in
1991. Smith uses his own business cards, containing the name of
his company and his own telephone number. He advertises his
business in local newspapers and in the yellow pages.
	James Lawson testified that he had been the sole proprietor of
Lawson's Carpet Service in Decatur, Illinois, for 20 years. In 1991,
approximately 75% of his business consisted of carpet installations
for customers of the Carpetland store in Decatur and occasionally
for the stores in Champaign and Bloomington. He continues to do
business with Carpetland under the same arrangement that existed
in 1991. Lawson calls the store to advise the manager that he is
available for work. Sometimes, he is given work immediately. At
other times, the store will call him back with assignments. He
occasionally turns down work. Lawson takes vacation or holiday
time as it suits him and informs Carpetland that he will not be
available.
	Lawson's Carpet Service generally employs Lawson, one full-time employee, and one part-time employee. He pays his
employees by the hour and pays withholding taxes and FICA on
their behalf. He also makes unemployment compensation
contributions for them. He hires by word of mouth or by placing
newspaper ads and trains his own employees. Carpetland has never
referred a potential employee to him, nor has Carpetland
recommended that he hire or terminate any employee. Lawson
estimated that five years of training and experience are necessary
to become a fully qualified installer. The products are constantly
changing and he must keep up-to-date. He communicates directly
with carpet manufacturers regarding recommended installation
procedures, such as which type of adhesive to use with a particular
product.
	After accepting a job, Lawson calls the customer directly to
discuss details such as whether existing carpeting must be
removed. They also set up a time for the installation. He then
obtains the roll of carpeting from the store and transports it in his
company's van to the customer's home or business, where he cuts
it to fit.
	The installer must also be able to properly prepare the floor to
which the carpeting is being applied. On some jobs, he must lay a
new floor or patch the existing floor before he can install the floor
covering. When he finds such a situation, he explains it to the
customer, quotes a price, and gets the customer's permission to do
the work. Because he gives a one-year warranty, he will not do the
job if the customer declines to allow him to properly prepare the
floor. He also works with the customer to determine where seams
will be placed. Considerations include the traffic pattern in the
room and the arrangement of furniture. If the customer authorizes
additional services that were not included in the original estimate,
Lawson will negotiate a price directly with the customer. The
customer may pay him directly, or they will agree to pass the
charge through Carpetland. This is likely to occur when a
customer is using a credit card and wants the carpet purchase and
installation to be treated as one credit transaction.
	Lawson and his employees use tools owned by Lawson Carpet
Service, including power tools such as stretchers, tackers, and
trimmers. He purchases tools directly from suppliers. Carpetland
does not lend him tools or help him acquire tools. He estimated his
total investment in tools at $5,000. All supplies used in the
installation process are also provided by Lawson, including tape,
metal trim, staples, and knife blades.
	Advertising for Lawson Carpet Service includes yellow pages
ads, ads in school and church bulletins, and business cards. In
addition to using the Lawson Carpet Service name, these ads
include his logo. These materials do not mention Carpetland.
	Lawson negotiates with Carpetland and his other clients for
the cost of each job. He sets his price based on the size and
complexity of the job. He charges more for carpeting a stairway,
for example, than for a floor. He quotes his price to the
salesperson, who might make a counteroffer. Lawson also does
"contract jobs" for builders or commercial customers. He bids on
a job and negotiates directly with the customer, who then
purchases floor covering from Carpetland or another supplier. In
these cases, he bills the customer directly for his installation
services.
	Only rarely does a representatives from Carpetland visit a
work site. This might occur if Lawson discovered a flaw in the
carpeting and Carpetland was going to have to replace it, or if the
quantity of carpeting provided by Carpetland was insufficient.
	Lawson guarantees his work for one year. He provides one of
his business cards to the customer, who may call him directly if a
problem arises with the installation. The customer might also
contact Carpetland and the problem would be referred to him.
Lawson would make the repair, incurring the cost of new carpet if
necessary. Carpetland does not reimburse him. If he determines
that the problem was not his responsibility, he will charge the
customer or Carpetland for the repair, as appropriate.
	Lawson submits a bill to Carpetland twice a month and
receives a check for the billed amount several days later. He does
not participate in any employee benefit programs.
	Craig Panozzo testified that he incorporated his business,
Craig's Custom Tile, in 1989. In 1991, approximately 25% of the
work done by his company was for the Carpetland store in
Matteson, Illinois. At the time of the hearing, he continued to do
ceramic and marble tile installation for retailers and builders and
does remodeling work on his own.
	A Carpetland employee calls Panozzo when a job comes up,
usually giving him 10 to 14 days' notice. He will turn the job
down if he does not have the time to do it or if the job is too big
for him to do alone. If he accepts the job, he picks up a work sheet
from Carpetland and the tile from the distributor in Crestwood,
Illinois. All of the work he does for Carpetland is on new
construction, so he does not have to visit the site before agreeing
to a price per square foot, as he would have to do for a remodeling
job. Panozzo provides the necessary supplies such as pads,
adhesives, cement, grout, and caulk. The cost of supplies is built
into his price. He also provides his own tools, such as saws, in
which he has invested approximately $5,000.
	Periodically, Panozzo turns in a "recap sheet" to Carpetland,
along with the worksheet for each job. He stops by Carpetland
several days later to pick up a check made out to Craig's Custom
Tile. When he takes a vacation, he notifies Carpetland that he will
be gone. Panozzo also acknowledged that he did not have an
account with the Department or a federal employer identification
number.

Measurers
	Kenneth W. Weiss testified that from January to June 1991,
he worked as a measurer, doing jobs subcontracted to him by GW
Carpet Service (GW), a sole proprietorship of his father, Gary
Weiss. The business was operated out of the elder Weiss' home.
Several secretaries were employed by GW, but the measurers were
"subcontractors."
	Weiss estimated that 10% of the jobs he did for GW were for
Carpetland and the remainder were for other floor-covering
businesses. Each morning, he would call GW to pick up job
assignments for that day. He was given the customers' names,
addresses, and telephone numbers, the account or store that had
requested each measuring job, and perhaps the name of the
salesperson. Weiss would contact the customers to arrange a time
to make the measurements.
	After making the measurements, Weiss returned to his
"personal office" in his home to make a diagram of each job.
Some accounts supplied their own forms; Carpetland did not. In
addition to showing the measured area to scale, the diagram noted
any additional information that might be needed to calculate the
cost of the floor covering or installation, such as heavy furniture
that would have to be moved, or old carpeting to be taken up.
Weiss placed the forms in his mailbox, where they were picked up
by a messenger service for GW. GW then had the reports delivered
to the stores that had ordered the work. Weiss rarely went into a
Carpetland store. Occasionally, he would do so if a customer had
a special need such as a rush order that he might decide to hand-deliver as a service to the customer.
	No one from Carpetland checked his work. If a mistake
occurred, he remeasured. He would be paid for the additional work
if the mistake turned out not to be his responsibility. If he had
made the mistake, he would not be paid for the second trip.
	Weiss and other measurers charged GW on a per-job basis,
with additional charges for distance and particularly large jobs. He
would submit daily and weekly tallies of jobs done. His check
from GW was delivered each week by the same messenger who
picked up his measurements. GW, in turn, billed Carpetland and
the other stores. GW negotiated its fees with each of the stores and
the rates were slightly different as a result.
	Weiss was trained on the job by his father. Later, Weiss
trained other measurers. Carpetland was not involved in any of this
training. Weiss testified that he considered himself to be self-employed and that he filed a Schedule C federal tax return in 1991.
GW was his only customer and he earned $7.50 per job, unless
there was some adjustment for distance or size of the job. On
average, Weiss would do 17 jobs per day, six days per week. He
did not have his own business cards and did not do any
advertising. GW had business cards and called on stores to solicit
business.
	When GW went out of business in June 1991, the younger
Weiss and two other measurers each took over a portion of the
business. Each of them paid Gary Weiss "a commission" on the
accounts that they took over from GW. Several of the Carpetland
stores became Weiss' accounts under this arrangement.

Carpetland
	John L. Booth, Carpetland's vice president of operations,
explained that a Carpetland salesperson calculates the cost of a
floor covering based on dimensions provided by the customer.
However, if the customer does not know the dimensions or wants
to arrange for installation, an actual measurement is required. The
salesperson has the option of doing the measuring himself or
referring the job to a measuring service. If a measuring service is
used, half the cost is deducted from the salesperson's commission.
The salesperson explains to the customer that the measuring
service is an independent business, over which Carpetland has no
control, but that the salesperson will relay the customer's request
as to a convenient time for the measuring to occur. After the
results of the measuring are communicated to the salesperson, he
recalculates the price and informs the customer of any adjustment.
	Booth further testified that measurers are not Carpetland
employees. They do not participate in any Carpetland employee
benefit program such as insurance or paid vacation. Measurers
may take vacation time or other time off without clearing it with
Carpetland. Carpetland does not provide them with vehicles or
reimburse them for mileage. Carpetland does not require that the
measurers work only for Carpetland. Carpetland neither trains the
employees of the measuring services nor instructs the measurers
on the performance of their work. Measurers are not required to
come to a Carpetland store for any purpose and representatives of
Carpetland do not go to customer's locations to review or
supervise the work of measurers. If a measuring service makes an
error that results in extra cost, such as a need for additional
carpeting, Carpetland holds the measurer responsible for the
expense. 	Carpetland pays the measuring services on a per-measure basis at a rate that is negotiated individually. Different
stores have different arrangements with the measuring services as
to how often they are paid, usually weekly or biweekly. The
measuring service submits invoices to Carpetland, on the service's
own bill or letterhead. Carpetland pays the amount of the invoice,
without deductions for payroll taxes.
	Carpetland does not enter into written contracts with the
various measuring services, but does require that each service
provide certificates of automobile and liability insurance as a
condition of doing business.
	Carpetland specifically informs its customers that it does not
provide installation services. If the customer wants to have the
floor covering installed, Carpetland will subcontract the work to
an installer. Booth identified a form that was used in all
Carpetland stores as an "installation subcontract." The form
contains the customer's name and address, the material to be
installed, the areas to be covered, and the installation price. The
price of installation is negotiated between the store and the
installer and is based on a base price per square yard, plus any
"add-ons" such as preparation of the floor. The base price varies
from store to store and, within a single store, from installer to
installer. Installers are free to decline jobs and do so on occasion.
Once the installer accepts the job, this document is signed by the
store manager and the installation subcontractor. The installer then
contacts the customer to arrange a time for installation, picks up
the materials from Carpetland, and completes the installation.
	If the installer encounters unanticipated problems, such as the
need to move heavy furniture or remove old flooring, he attempts
to negotiate payment with the customer. The installer is free to do
such additional work without charging the customer, but may
insist on additional payment. If the installer and the customer do
not reach an agreement, Carpetland might elect to absorb the cost.
It is possible that the job would not go forward at all. Carpetland
could not compel the installer to do the additional work without
additional payment.
	Carpetland does not provide any on-site supervision to the
installers. When using a new installation service, a Carpetland
representative may visit the work site to observe the quality of the
work, until the company is satisfied that the installer's work is up
to its standards.
	Carpetland does not limit the installers' other employment.
They are free to accept contracts from others, including
Carpetland's competitors. Carpetland provides no training and is
not involved in the hiring, firing, or disciplining of the installers'
employees. Carpetland does not control their days or hours of
work or their vacation schedules. The installers provide their own
tools and supplies; Carpetland provides only the carpeting and
padding or other floor covering it has sold to the customer.
	Checks are issued on a biweekly basis after the installer
submits an invoice showing that the work was done. The amount
is calculated on the fee per square yard that was negotiated
between Carpetland and the individual installer. In 1991, the range
was from $2.20 to $2.75 per square yard, with the average around
$2.50. Carpetland charges the customers $3.00 per square yard for
installation and makes a profit on each installation contract. No
taxes are withheld. The installers are required to carry liability
insurance and Carpetland demands documentation of coverage.
	If a customer calls the Carpetland store with a complaint, the
person who takes the call fills out a complaint form. The store first
determines whether the complaint is related to the product it sold
or to the installation. Installation problems might include a seam
that is coming apart or a ripple in the carpeting. Carpetland
determines which installer did the work and contacts him to make
the necessary repair. A copy of the complaint form is provided to
the installer, who sends it back to Carpetland with the customer's
signature to document that the problem has been resolved to the
customer's satisfaction.
	Carpetland requires its installers to guarantee their work for
one year, so if such a problem occurs within one year of the
original installation, the installer bears the expense of the repair.
In the unusual circumstance that an installation problem appears
later, Carpetland would pay an installer to make the repair.
	Booth testified regarding written "retainage agreements"
under which Carpetland retains a portion of the fees due to the
installer until a fund of $1,000 is created. This money is used to
defray the costs of repairs necessitated by improper installation. If
an installer ceases doing business with Carpetland, the fund,
including interest, is paid out in thirds, in 30-day increments, to
allow for the possibility that a complaint may arise regarding one
of the installer's last jobs. Not all installers agree, but Carpetland
does prefer to have such an arrangement.
	Booth explained that Carpetland also solicits work on a
contract basis, in addition to its retail sales. Such a contract might
involve floor coverings for a commercial building or new housing
construction. When the bids on such a project include both
materials and labor, the Carpetland salesperson solicits bids from
several installers so that he may make his bid as low as possible.
Thus, installers who regularly do work for Carpetland may bid
against each other for these jobs.
	According to Booth, neither measurers nor installers are
identified in any way as Carpetland employees. They do not wear
uniforms or other apparel with a Carpetland name or logo. They
are not given Carpetland business cards to use. They use their own
vehicles, which do not carry the Carpetland name.

Contract for Installation Services
	Carpetland uses two forms of standard contract. The first is a
"Customer Sales Contract," which contains the "Installation by
Subcontractor" provision quoted above. The second is an
"Installation Subcontract," by which the customer authorizes
Carpetland to arrange for installation of the floor covering. This
document also contains a "Contract for Installation Services" that
is signed by the installer and an authorized representative of
Carpetland. 	The Contract for Installation Services identifies
Carpetland as contractor and the installer as subcontractor. The
installer agrees to perform the services called for by the contract
at the time and place designated, in a "neat, workmanlike manner
in accordance with the job specifications applicable to this
Contract and established trade practices." Carpetland agrees to
furnish the carpeting or floor covering; the installer agrees to
provide all other necessary tools and supplies. The installer
guarantees his work for one year and agrees to remedy any defect
in installation. Further, the contract states that Carpetland will not
pay for any additional services requested by the customer unless
Carpetland agrees in advance to do so. The installer also agrees to
obtain and maintain liability insurance and to furnish certificates
of insurance to Carpetland. In addition to paying his own state,
federal, and local taxes, the "Subcontractor" also agrees to "elect
coverage under any applicable workmen's compensation laws
which provide for coverage pursuant to election" and to "elect to
operate or become subject to any applicable unemployment
compensation act which permits such election." Finally, the
contract is "personal" to Carpetland and the installer, "and may not
be assigned or transferred by either party."
	The parties agree that the appropriate standard of review in
this case is the "clearly erroneous" standard. Nevertheless, the
question arose at oral argument whether, because the facts in this
case are essentially undisputed, the de novo standard should apply.
	The Department states that in City of Belvidere v. Illinois
State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998), this
court departed from its prior holdings that administrative rulings
based on the application of law to undisputed facts would be
reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Chicago Patrolmen's Ass'n v.
Department of Revenue, 171 Ill. 2d 263, 271 (1996) (where facts
are undisputed, an administrative determination of whether certain
property is tax exempt answers a question of law, subject to de
novo review). However, in City of Belvidere, we did not entirely
abandon the de novo standard in administrative review cases.
	"The standard of review applicable to an agency's decision
depends upon whether the question presented is one of fact or
law." City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d  at 204. When the decision
involves a pure question of law, we will review it de novo. City of
Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d  at 205. When reviewing purely factual
findings, the agency's findings and conclusions are deemed to be
prima facie true and correct and, thus, are reviewed under a
manifest weight of the evidence standard. 735 ILCS 5/3-110
(West 2000); City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d  at 204.
	Under some circumstances, however, the issue presented
cannot be accurately characterized as either a pure question of fact
or a pure question of law and, therefore, will be treated as a mixed
question, subject to an intermediate standard of review. City of
Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d  at 205. In AFM, we determined that whether
certain workers are independent contractors under section 212 of
the Act is such a mixed question of law and fact, subject to review
for clear error. AFM, 198 Ill. 2d  at 396. Under the clearly
erroneous standard, we give somewhat less deference to the
agency than we would if the decision related solely to a question
of fact, because the decision is based on fact-finding that is
inseparable from the application of law to fact. We will reverse
only if, after review of the entire record, we are " 'left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' "
AFM, 198 Ill. 2d  at 395, quoting United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 92 L. Ed. 746, 766, 68 S. Ct. 525,
542 (1948).
	We note at the outset Carpetland's suggestion that the
Department's summary of facts is "incomplete" and "misleading."
	The Director's representative had at her disposal Carpetland's
answers to Department questionnaires, the results of a Department
audit of Carpetland, numerous documents, and the testimony
summarized above. She prepared a detailed report, which
contained findings of fact, analysis, and conclusions. She did not
suggest that any of the witnesses were less than entirely credible.
Carpetland filed objections to the report. Finding the objections
untimely, the Director adopted the report as her decision. Upon
remand from the circuit court, the Director responded to the
objections and again affirmed the report and recommended
decision of the representative.
	A thorough review of the record reveals several misstatements
of fact in the report. For example, the representative found that
when Carpetland bid on commercial contracts, "installation was
included." The record, however, shows that if a commercial job
was to include installation, the Carpetland salesperson solicited
bids from installers so that he could submit a bid covering both
materials and labor.
	The report also makes several references to individual
mailboxes assigned to the installers and to the fact that installers
would visit the Carpetland store to retrieve job assignments from
the mailboxes. The testimony was clear, however, that only the
Munster, Indiana, store utilized the mailbox system to
communicate with installers. Thus, this practice is irrelevant to the
present case.
	The report also found that when a Carpetland store began to
utilize the services of a new installer, the "work was checked
closely" for the first several installations. In the testimony,
however, the word "closely" was never used. The witnesses
indicated that it was rare for someone from Carpetland to visit an
installation site. They might do so in the beginning of a working
relationship with an installer, to observe the finished installation
to see that it was up to standard.
	The report states that "[w]hen work was unavailable from
Carpetland[,] the installers worked for other carpet sales stores,"
creating the impression that their first duty was to Carpetland and
that their willingness or ability to work for other stores was
contingent on Carpetland's not having any work for them. The
record discloses, however, that at least for some installers,
Carpetland represented a small portion of their workload and that
they had several clients who, in effect, competed for their time.
	Similarly, the report states that all complaints about
installation "flow through" Carpetland. Lawson, however, testified
that he would leave one of his business cards with the customer,
so that he could be contacted directly about any problems with the
installation. Thus, communication through Carpetland was only
one means by which a customer could make a complaint regarding
installation.
	The report also states that each installer was "required" to sign
a written retainage agreement. However, the Carpetland executive
who testified regarding these agreements said that Carpetland
preferred to have this sort of arrangement with an installer, but did
not necessarily refuse to do business with an installer who
declined to participate in the retainage arrangement.
	Finally, this section of the report contains legal conclusions,
without reference to any supporting authority, in addition to
findings of fact. For example, the report lists as a finding of fact
the legal conclusion there was no privity of contract between the
customer and the installer.
	Because the report does not contain a complete and reliable
summary of the facts adduced at the hearing, we shall look to the
record, as well as to the report, for the relevant underlying facts.
	 
APPLICATION OF SECTION 212
	Carpetland clearly intended to deal with measurers and
installers as independent contractors rather than employees, and
organized its working relationships accordingly. However, our
inquiry is not controlled by the designations or description used by
the parties. 56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(b) (2001). Rather, we
must examine their actual relationship, considering the incidents
and circumstances surrounding the job classification. Jack
Bradley, 146 Ill. 2d  at 75-76. Thus, although the Carpetland sales
contract and the installation contract are clear as to this intent, the
contract language is informative, but not dispositive of the issue.

Section 212(A)-Direction or Control
	Under the Act, an independent contractor must be "free from
control or direction over the performance" of the services he
provides. 820 ILCS 405/212(A) (West 2000). " 'Direction or
control' within the meaning of Section 212(A) of the Act means
that an employing unit has the right to control and direct the
worker, not only as to the work to be done but also how it should
be done, whether or not that control is exercised." 56 Ill. Adm.
Code §2732.200(g) (2001).
	In Griffitts Construction Co. v. Department of Labor, 76 Ill. 2d 99 (1979), we agreed with the Director that the construction
company had not met its burden of demonstrating that a vice
president and shareholder was an "outside salesman." Prior to that
case, we last considered this issue in Myers v. Cummins, 9 Ill. 2d 582 (1956), in which we noted that the Act "does not contemplate
that any control, however slight, will satisfy" this test. "The
question is one of degree." Myers, 9 Ill. 2d  at 588. Myers involved
taxi drivers. Beth Weber, Inc. v. Murphy, 389 Ill. 60 (1945),
involved a seamstress who made alterations in a dress shop.
Although the alteration work was a "necessary adjunct" (Beth
Weber, 389 Ill. at 66) of the shop owner's business, the only
control she exerted over the seamstress was a no smoking policy
and the imposition of "certain standards of conduct" (Beth Weber,
389 Ill. at 63-64). Because the shop owner "was interested only in
the result of the work accomplished" by the seamstress, and "not
the means selected by her," we concluded that the seamstress was
an independent contractor. Beth Weber, 389 Ill.  at 66. None of the
prior decisions in which this court has considered this issue is
particularly illuminating of the facts in the present case.
	The appellate court has considered the direction and control
issue in a case with facts quite similar to the present one. In Cohen
Furniture Co. v. Department of Employment Security, 307 Ill.
App. 3d 978 (1999), the appellate court agreed with the Director's
determination that carpet installers were not independent
contractors, based on the direction and control test of section
212(A).
	Carpetland argues that this case is factually distinguishable
from Cohen Furniture. First, Cohen Furniture advertised price for
carpeting sometimes included the cost of installation (Cohen
Furniture, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 980), while Carpetland was careful
to inform its customers that it did not provide installation. As in
the present case, however, when a customer wanted installation
services, Cohen Furniture would contact an installer about
performing the work and might arrange a convenient time. The
installer would pick up the carpeting and padding from the
warehouse and take it to the customer's location for installation.
After completing the work, the installer would return the work
order, "itemizing the labor and material charges according to
Cohen's standard fee list." Cohen Furniture, 307 Ill. App. 3d at
983. Carpetland, in contrast, negotiated a rate with each installer,
which was not necessarily the same for each job, and did not
impose a standard fee scale for labor and materials.
	In addition, Cohen Furniture's installers worked "three to four
days per week" and were paid on a weekly basis (Cohen
Furniture, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 983), while the installers and
measurers in the present case may do work for Carpetland as
frequently as every day or as infrequently as once a month. They
are not on a regular pay cycle, but are paid upon submission of
invoices.
	In Cohen Furniture, the installers were permanent employees,
based on the fact that they signed a single contract at the beginning
of the working relationship. Cohen Furniture, 307 Ill. App. 3d at
983. The installers in the present case sign a contract for each
individual job that they accept from Carpetland.
	As in the present case, Cohen Furniture demanded a one-year
guarantee from its installers and handled customer complaints, but
Cohen would "decide[ ] if the problem [was to] be remedied by
repair or reinstallation and if the original installer [was] obligated
to pay for the corrections." Cohen Furniture, 307 Ill. App. 3d at
983. This demonstrates slightly more control over the complaint
process than Carpetland exercises.
	Because the facts of the present case are unlike those in
Cohen Furniture in significant respects, we are not persuaded by
the holding in that case. Thus, we will examine the report and the
Director's decision in light of the relevant factors.
	The Administrative Code contains a list of 25 factors that the
Department "will examine" to determine whether direction or
control exist. 56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g) (2001). These
factors will be considered in light of the "type of business subject
to review and the relationship being examined" (56 Ill. Adm. Code
§2732.200(g) (2001)). Thus, not all factors will be relevant in
every case. In addition, the result will be determined by "the
business reality or totality of circumstances," not by the answer to
any particular question or group of questions. 56 Ill. Adm. Code
§2732.200(g) (2001).
	Carpetland successfully argued to the appellate court that the
representative, the Director, and the trial court had ignored the 25
factors. The report did not specifically refer to the section
2732.200(g) factors, but the Director noted in her decision that all
of the factors used by her representative were relevant and are
found in section 2732.200(g), although no attempt was made to
examine the 25 factors one by one. The appellate court did
consider each of the 25 factors individually and concluded: "By
our count, no less than 24 of the 25 factors set out by the
Department in its regulations suggest that Carpetland does not
'control' the installers and measurers." Carpetland, 319 Ill. App.
3d at 1077.
	The first factor is whether the employing unit issues
assignments, schedules work, and sets quotas or time
requirements. 56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(1) (2001). The
report stated that Carpetland "provided assignments, [and]
established dates for installation." Further, Carpetland,
"established with the customer the day and approximate time at
which the installer had to report to the customer's home, while
allowing the installer to determine the exact time with the
customer." The measurers "received the assignment on one day,
did the measuring the next, and by the morning of the third day,
had to have the diagram with the measurements at Carpetland's
store." Based on these findings, the Director concluded that
Carpetland "had the ultimate authority in deciding which installer
or measurer would perform which job."
	We agree with the appellate court that the record does not
support a finding that Carpetland issued assignments, scheduled
work, or set quotas or time requirements for the installers or
measurers. Carpetland, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 1077. Carpetland did
not issue assignments; rather, it contacted the installers and
measurers to offer them assignments on a job-by-job basis. The
installers and measurers were free to decline any job, for any
reason, and the record shows that it was not unusual for them to do
so. An employee, on the other hand, who was assigned a specific
task and refused to perform that task would most likely be
discharged for cause. An installer who repeatedly declined work
for Carpetland customers might, over time, receive fewer calls
from Carpetland. This is not tantamount to firing. It is a function
of supply and demand. Similarly, Carpetland did not "schedule
work"; rather, it contacted installers or measurers with a request
for their services on a particular day, because that was when the
services were needed. No quotas were imposed by Carpetland and
no time requirements set. The more efficiently the installers and
measurers worked, the greater their earnings.
	The second factor, whether the employing unit may change
the methods used by the worker in performing his services, also
favors a finding that these workers were independent contractors.
56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(2) (2001). Neither the report nor
the Director's decision suggested otherwise.
	The only "routine or schedule" set by Carpetland (56 Ill. Adm.
Code §2732.200(g)(3) (2001)) involved the turning in of
completed work orders in advance of payment. The workers were
not required to "report to a specific location," such as a Carpetland
store, or to report at "regular intervals." 56 Ill. Adm. Code
§2732.200(g)(4) (2001). The mailboxes referred to in the report,
from which some installers picked up paperwork, are irrelevant.
None of the Carpetland stores in Illinois utilized this system of
communicating with installers. Installers did pick up the carpeting
or other floor covering at Carpetland stores or directly from a
supplier, but this does not constitute "reporting" to the employing
unit. "Reporting" implies that one's presence is required. The
record reveals that an installer could have sent anyone to pick up
a roll of carpeting; and a measurer need never set foot in a
Carpetland store.
	Factors five and six are not met. Carpetland did not require
measurers and installers to furnish a record of their time (56 Ill.
Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(5) (2001)), and did not require them to
work a specific number of hours per day or per week (56 Ill. Adm.
Code §2732.200(g)(6) (2001)). These workers reported to
Carpetland the fact that a job was done, not the time it took to
complete it. When Carpetland had work to offer, they could work
as many or as few hours as they were willing. The fact that they
might, in the words of the report, "strive to make themselves
available for any and all work assignments" does not indicate
direction or control. It indicates ambition.
	Notwithstanding the report's observation that one of the
installers had been doing work for Carpetland for over 20 years,
none of the workers were engaged by Carpetland "on a permanent
basis." 56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(7) (2001). Even after a 20-year working relationship, Lawson would contact Carpetland when
he had time available to see if there were any jobs coming up. At
other times, a Carpetland salesperson would contact him. This
relationship, although long-term, was not permanent. Carpetland's
arrangement with the measurers was no more permanent.
	Carpetland did not reimburse the installers or measurers for
expenses incurred (56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(8) (2001)),
such as mileage, parking, stationery and office supplies, tools, or
materials. If a job required additional travel, the installer or
measurer could impose an additional charge to recoup the expense.
When a job required paying for parking, the installer could build
this expense into his bid. While an employee might submit
receipts to be reimbursed for such expenses, these workers were
able to pass these costs through to Carpetland to recover their
costs and guard their profits.
	Factors 9 through 13 are not met. These workers were not
eligible for pensions or other benefits given to Carpetland
employees (56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(9) (2001));
Carpetland did not carry workers' compensation insurance on
them (56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(10) (2001)); Carpetland did
not make social security or other tax deductions from their
compensation (56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(11) (2001));
Carpetland did not report the workers' income to the IRS on Form
W-2 (56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(12) (2001)); and Carpetland
did not bond the installers or measurers (56 Ill. Adm. Code
§2732.200(g)(13) (2001)).
	Factor 14 deals with whether the employing unit furnishes the
worker with materials and supplies, tools or equipment. 56 Ill.
Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(14) (2001). The report states that
Carpetland furnished the materials to be installed, while the
installers provided only "minor materials." Even if Carpetland is
furnishing "materials" to the installers, it is not furnishing
"supplies, tools, or equipment." Thus this factor does not
necessarily weigh in favor of finding the installers to be under the
direction or control of Carpetland. Because the measurers' work
does not require "materials," and because their supplies, tools, and
equipment are not provided by Carpetland, this factor does not
apply to them either. By the same token, factor 15, whether the
employing unit furnishes "transportation, samples, a drawing
account, business cards, an expense account, or order blanks" (56
Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(15) (2001)), does not apply to
installers or measurers.
	Both installers and measurers are free to engage in other
employment, including work for competing floor-covering
retailers, and several testified that they did so on a regular basis. 56
Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(16) (2001). Carpetland did not
restrict these workers in terms and conditions of sale or choice of
customers. 56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(17) (2001). Indeed, if
an installer determined that additional work would be required to
prepare the subsurface prior to installation, he would quote the
additional price to the customer and reach an agreement. Thus, the
installers were able to alter the terms and conditions of the
installation agreement arranged by Carpetland. The record
indicates that such additional charges might be paid directly to the
installer or remitted through Carpetland.
	Carpetland did not "assign or limit" the territory in which the
installers or measurers worked. 56 Ill. Adm. Code
§2732.200(g)(18) (2001). In fact, an installer or measurer might
decline a particular job if it was outside of the area in which he
wished to work, or he might demand payment for additional travel
time.
	Factor 19 involves the setting of prices and credit terms for
the product or service. 56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(19)
(2001). The report states that "Carpetland set all prices" and that
the installers "were in no position to bargain." Despite testimony
that the installers negotiated their rates with Carpetland, the report
concluded that:
		"If Carpetland offered $2.20 per square yard for starters,
the individual installer either accepted or kept beating the
pavement going to other carpet stores, which, aware of the
market conditions, would either have no work or make
him a similar offer. Meanwhile[,] Carpetland kept
charging its customers an installation fee of $3.00 per
yard."
	Carpetland did set a ceiling on the price it was willing to pay
installers. Presumably, the price to the customer of $3 per yard for
installation was consistent with the prevailing market. Carpetland
was entitled to recover from the customer not only the amount it
actually paid the installers, but also to recover any transaction
costs. Carpetland was also within its rights to try to keep its costs
as far below $3 as possible, and to make a profit on the difference.
	Carpetland, however, did not "set" the price it paid installers.
The installers were paid between $2.20 and $2.75 per square yard.
The exact amount was the result of negotiation between
Carpetland and the individual installer. An installer with more
experience and a good track record, who was responsive to
Carpetland's offers of jobs, was likely to negotiate a rate at the
upper end of this range. In addition, the installers who testified did
not suggest that they ever had to "beat the pavement" looking for
work. In fact, they described occasionally having to decline jobs
because their schedules were full. Although these witnesses were
likely among the most successful installers, their experience with
Carpetland suggests two business entities negotiating a deal that
was beneficial and profitable to both, rather than the "adhesion
contract" alluded to in the report.
	The report also finds it significant that the installer might
collect C.O.D. payable amounts from the customer and concludes
that "[i]f the installer had been functioning as an independent
business, it is unlikely that he would accept a check made out to
an [sic] different business as payment for services he, himself,
performed." It was clearly erroneous to attach such significance to
the installer's receipt of a C.O.D. payment on Carpetland's behalf.
An installer could be doing jobs for Carpetland and another store
on the same day, have materials from both retailers in his truck,
and receive C.O.D. payments for both. His doing so merely
facilitated his own prompt payment.
	The measurers were paid a flat rate per measure. The record
does not reveal what amount Carpetland charged its customers for
this service, but the measurers had no role in setting this price.
This factor, therefore, may weigh slightly in favor of the measurers
being seen as employees.
	Carpetland did not "reserve the right to approve orders or
contracts." 56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(20) (2001). Both
measurers and installers were free to accept additional business
directly from customers, without seeking approval from
Carpetland. For example, if a customer wanted an additional room
measured, perhaps anticipating another carpet purchase,
Carpetland had no interest in whether a measurer accepted
payment for providing the additional service. Similarly, if a
customer purchased tile or carpeting from a discount store or
directly from a mill and offered the installer additional work,
Carpetland had no right to approve, or even to be informed of,
such an arrangement.
	Factors 22 through 24 do not evince an employment
relationship. The installers and measurers were not required to
attend meetings or training (56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(22)
(2001)); Carpetland did not appoint their supervisors, if indeed
they were supervised by anyone else (56 Ill. Adm. Code
§2732.200(g)(23) (2001)); and Carpetland did not have the right
to set rules and regulations (56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(24)
(2001)). The report attaches some significance to the fact that
Carpetland prohibited the installers from disconnecting or
connecting any gas or water lines. This, however, is merely a
sensible attempt by a business to limit the likelihood that a
customer may suffer some harm due to negligence and seek
redress. In other words, a contractor who limits the work that it is
subcontracting to certain tasks, so as to exclude tasks that might
give rise to liability, is not making rules or imposing regulations
on the work that is the subject of the contract.
	Factors 21 and 25 are the most contested issues. Factor 21
asks if the employing unit has the right to discharge the worker. 56
Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)(21) (2001). The report states that if
Carpetland "chose not to call a certain installer or measurer for a
job, that installer or measurer did not work." The report also states
that the "right to discharge is the ultimate right to control" and
then concludes that Carpetland's decision to discontinue
"assigning jobs" to a worker who "has been regularly receiving
and accepting assignments" is "tantamount to a discharge."
Carpetland, in contrast, argues that ceasing to do business with an
installer or any other business entity is not a discharge.
	We agree with Carpetland. Although an installer or measurer
might find himself out of business if Carpetland terminates their
business arrangement, this does not constitute a discharge. It is a
result of becoming too dependent on one customer. The measurers
and installers who maintain working relationships with other
retailers and who solicit business on their own are more likely to
survive if Carpetland takes its business elsewhere.
	The final factor is whether the employing unit purports to
guarantee the product or service performed. 56 Ill. Adm. Code
§2732.200(g)(25) (2001). As the Director noted in her decision,
"Carpetland guaranteed the workmanship of the installation. ***
[T]he customer would look to Carpetland to rectify any problems
with the floor covering or installation. *** Carpetland remained
ultimately responsible for the satisfaction of the customer." This
conclusion is supported, according to the decision, by Carpetland's 
requirement that installers remedy problems or reimburse
Carpetland for repairs that it had to provide.
	On the other hand, each installer was required by Carpetland
to guarantee his work for one year. That guarantee could be
enforced by the customer's contacting the installer directly (one
installer testified that he left his business card for this purpose), or
by contacting the installer through Carpetland. The appellate court
noted that "[t]his factor favors finding that Carpetland was not, in
reality, the guarantor of the work performed by the installers
because *** the installers were fully underwriting the guarantees
made to the customer. *** The primary risk that a customer might
be unhappy with the installation was therefore borne by the
installer, not Carpetland." 319 Ill. App. 3d at 1077. The "business
reality" of this arrangement (56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(g)
(2001)) is that Carpetland simply wanted to insure that its
customers were well-served and that if a customer did have a
complaint about installation, it was resolved without additional
expense to Carpetland.
	As for the measurers, the record does not suggest that
Carpetland in any way guaranteed to the customer that the
measurer's work was accurate. Rather, the measurer guaranteed
the accuracy of his work to Carpetland. If a measurer made an
error, he would remeasure for no additional cost. If the error
resulted in a loss to Carpetland, as, for example, when a piece of
carpet was cut to the wrong size and could not be used on the
particular job, the measurer was held responsible for the loss.
	After examination of the 25 factors and the record, we are left
with the " 'definite and firm conviction' " (AFM, 198 Ill. 2d  at
395, quoting United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.  at 395, 92 L. Ed. 
at 766, 68 S. Ct. at 542) that the Director's conclusion on this
factor, as to both measurers and installers, was incorrect.

Section 212(B)-Outside the Usual Course of Business or Place
of Business
	"The two factors in Section 212(b) are in the alternative.
Section 212(B) is satisfied if the service is either outside the usual
course of business of the employing unit or performed outside of
all the places of business of the employing unit." 56 Ill. Adm.
Code §2732.200(f) (2001).
	With regard to carpet installation and the "usual course of
business" factor, the report states:
			"The business of the petitioner is to sell floor coverings
with installation. The installers services are an integral
part of the petitioner's business. But for the services
provided by the installers and[,] to [a] great extent, by the
measurers, petitioner would have difficulty attracting
customers and ultimately would have no business."
	The Director's decision notes testimony that 75% of
Carpetland's sales involved installation and concludes that
because "it is apparent that the majority of petitioner's business
involves the sale of carpeting which is installed *** installation is
in the petitioner's usual course of business." The appellate court
did not address this factor.
	This court has rarely addressed the "usual course of business"
provision of section 212(B). In Toplis & Harding, Inc. v. Murphy,
384 Ill. 463, 477 (1943), we concluded that an insurance claims
adjuster was performing services in the usual course of business
for an insurance company when he performed tasks identical to
those performed by full-time employees. In Murphy v. Daumit,
387 Ill. 406, 417 (1944), we determined that the services of door-to-door vacuum cleaner salesmen were in the usual course of
business for the distributor of the machines, based on two key
facts: the distributor's "profits were almost entirely from the sales
made" by the salesmen, and the "entire office staff consisted of
persons whose employment stemmed out of the services of the
salesmen." Later, in Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. Rauch, 1 Ill. 2d 328 (1953), we determined that the services of "field
engineers" who called on metal fabricators to take orders for a
company that manufactured and sold welding rods and fluxes were
part of the company's usual course of business. In none of these
cases has this court sought to formulate any sort of rule or
principle to be applied to determine whether services are provided
in the usual course of the employing unit's business.
	The appellate court has addressed this issue more recently.
Hart v. Johnson, 68 Ill. App. 3d 968, 976 (1979), also involved
dealers who sold vacuum cleaners for a distributor. Richardson
Brothers v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment
Security, 198 Ill. App. 3d 422, 430 (1990), involved workers who
sold and distributed bedding and garden plants for a grower and
distributor. O'Hare-Midway Limousine Service, Inc. v. Baker, 232
Ill. App. 3d 108, 113 (1992), involved chauffeurs who performed
driving services for a dispatching service. Finally, United Delivery
Service, Ltd. v Didrickson, 276 Ill. App. 3d 584, 588-89 (1995),
involved drivers for a package delivery service. In all four cases,
the appellate court found that the worker was engaging in the usual
course of business of the employing unit. None of these cases
offers a rule or principle for discerning the "usual course of
business."
	Carpetland suggests that these cases, taken together, stand for
the proposition that an individual is providing services in the usual
course of business only when "the sole business of the alleged
employer is the same" as the services provided by the worker. This
goes too far. Not only can one easily imagine a service provided
in the usual course of business that is not the "sole" or even the
major business of the alleged employer, the Act must also be read
liberally in favor of inclusion of workers. Jack Bradley, 146 Ill. 2d 
at 75.
	Many years ago, however, this court did offer some guidance
on this issue. In Schatz, Pollack Woolen Co. v. Murphy, 384 Ill. 218, 221 (1943), we found that the washing of windows "was not
within the usual course of appellee's business in selling woolens
to the tailoring trade. His services may have rendered the place of
business more pleasant but they did not enter into any of the many
activities necessary to the purchase of woolens and the resale of
them to tailors." (Emphasis added.) Thus, when considering the
usual course of the business of the employing unit, the focus
should not be on whether the services are provided habitually,
customarily, or routinely. Rather, the key to this inquiry is whether
the services are necessary to the business of the employing unit or
merely incidental. This is consistent with the guidance given in the
Administrative Code that services "not necessary to the employing
unit's business" are outside the usual course of business. 56 Ill.
Adm. Code §2732.200(f)(1) (2001).
	The washing of windows or mowing of grass for a business
is incidental. But when one is in the business of selling a product,
sales calls made by sales representatives are in the usual course of
business because sales calls are necessary. See Murphy, 387 Ill.  at
417. When one is in the business of dispatching limousines, the
services of chauffeurs are provided in the usual course of business
because the act of driving is necessary to the business. See
O'Hare-Midway Limousine Service, Inc., 232 Ill. App. 3d at 113.
	The report concluded that installation is necessary to
Carpetland's continued survival, yet the testimony indicated that
a customer could locate a carpet installer in the yellow pages to
install carpeting purchased from a business that does not provide
installation services, such as a discount home improvement store
or a carpet mill that sells directly to the public. There is no basis
in the record for the report's conclusion that "but for" the
availability of installation services, Carpetland would have gone
out of business.
	Carpetland has chosen to expressly limit its business to the
retail sale of floor coverings. Its prices do not include installation.
The sales agreement clearly states that installation must be
arranged separately. Carpetland's willingness to accommodate the
customer by arranging for installation with an installer that
Carpetland can vouch for is a convenience to the customer. That
Carpetland may enjoy a competitive advantage because of its
ability to arrange for installation by independent installers does not
make installation a part of its usual course of business. That three-quarters of Carpetland's customers opt for this service is evidence
that this is a successful business strategy.
	We are, thus, left with the " 'definite and firm conviction' "
(AFM, 198 Ill. 2d  at 395, quoting United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.  at 395, 92 L. Ed.  at 766, 68 S. Ct. at 542) that the conclusions
regarding carpet installation and Carpetland's usual course of
business in the report and the Director's decision are erroneous. As
to the installers, Carpetland has met its burden under section
212(B).
	The situation with the measurers is not as clear cut. The report
concludes that:
		"Without accurate measurements, petitioner would have
a difficult time finalizing its sales to the customers. The
sales persons could and were encouraged to do the
measurement, by making them pay half of the measurer's
fees, but such demands on their time would reduce the
volume of their sales. *** Thus, the measurer's services
were integrated into the petitioner's business and
therefore were clearly within the usual course of, and in
furtherance of the petitioner's business."
The Director concurred, noting that "the petitioner's salespeople,
who are employees, can and often do the measuring themselves."
The appellate court did not consider this factor.
	Calculating the price of goods is necessary to Carpetland's
business. The salesperson cannot close the deal until he can
multiply the square yardage of carpeting required by the price per
square yard. The customer may provide the dimensions, in which
case no measurement is needed. If not, it is the salesperson's
responsibility to obtain the needed information. When one's
employee is assigned the responsibility for a certain task, and has
the choice between performing that task himself or delegating it to
another, that task is clearly within the course of business for the
employer. Thus, the measurers do perform a service within
Carpetland's usual course of business.
	Because the section 212(b) factors are in the alternative, the
measurers do not meet this section unless their services are
performed outside all of Carpetland's places of business. The
determinative issue is whether the location being measured is a
place of business for Carpetland.
	As to this issue, the report stated that measuring "could be
performed nowhere else but at the customer's premises." The
report also notes that "where an employer assigns a specific area
for the purpose of selling its product or representing its interest,
that area is the place of business of the enterprise," quoting
Richardson Brothers v. Board of Review of the Department of
Employment Security, 198 Ill. App. 3d 422, 430 (1990), and also
citing Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. Rauch, 1 Ill. 2d 328
(1953), and O'Hare-Midway Limousine Service, Inc. v. Baker, 232
Ill. App. 3d 108 (1992). The Director's decision states that the
measurers "were assigned to a specific area[,] i.e., the customer's
home. They represented the petitioner's interest in that customer's
home. The customer's home was the place of business of the
petitioner." The Director concluded that Carpetland's interest did
not end when it gave the job to the measurer because, if the
measurer made an error, Carpetland would bear the cost, which it
would attempt to recover from the measurer.
	The appellate court disagreed, finding that the measurers were
not representing Carpetland while at the customer's premises,
based primarily on the language of the sales agreement. However,
although the sales agreement does inform the customer that
installation is available through a "subcontractor," it does not
mention the measuring service. Thus, we must look further than
the sales agreement to determine whether a customer's premises
is "outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which
such service is performed." 820 ILCS 405/212(B) (West 2000).
	The Department offers three rationales for finding that the
customer's premises should be considered Carpetland's place of
business. First, the Department asserts that the place of business
extends to "any place where a worker performs agreed-upon
services" for an employing unit. Second, the Department claims
that "even brief appearances by a worker at an employer's office
are sufficient to establish that the worker performs services at the
employer's place of business." And third, the Department asserts
that the place of business extends to "any location where workers
regularly represent an employer's interest."
	We reject the first two rationales, but accept the third. As for
the first, if this were the test for place of business, the exception
for independent contractors would cease to have any meaning
because any place in which a worker performed an agreed-upon
service, even his own home or office, would become the place of
business of the party who hired him.
	As for the second rationale, the cases cited by the Department
do not support its contention that "even brief appearances" at the
employer's office are sufficient, standing alone, to establish that
services are provided at the employing unit's place of business. In
Rozran v. Durkin, 381 Ill. 97, 104-05 (1942), the delivery driver
made more than "brief appearances" at the delivery service. He
reported there "each and every day, received his instructions from
the dispatcher, secured the load for his truck on the premises,
[and] returned his collections and his moneys on C.O.D. packages
to the office." In any event, the place of business in this case
would also have included the delivery route itself (see United
Delivery Service, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 588-89). This case, thus, does
not stand for the proposition that "even brief appearances" at the
employer's offices, by themselves, are sufficient to defeat this
factor.
	The Department's reliance on Toplis is similarly flawed. We
concluded in that case that "[t]he record conclusively show[ed]
that the services performed were all within the usual course of
business of appellant and that some of them were performed in
appellant's regular place of business." Toplis, 384 Ill.  at 477-78.
We did not attach the significance to "brief appearances" that the
Department now urges; rather, this case was decided primarily on
the basis of the "usual course of business" provision of section
212(B).
	Finally, the Department states that in Hart the employer could
not satisfy this condition "despite the fact that the workers there
only reported to the employer's office to pick up contract forms
and receive phone messages." This is a significant misstatement
of the facts. The appellate court said in Hart that the services of
the vacuum cleaner salesmen were not performed outside Hart's
place of business because "[d]ealers can attend morning sales
meetings at Hart's office and can obtain leads, door hangers,
installment contract forms and credit applications there. More
importantly, the dealers use the staff of Hart's office to assist in
the performance of their duties by relaying phone messages from
the public to the dealers." Hart, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 976. Thus,
despite the brevity of the salesmen's appearances at the office, the
work-related nature of these appearances defeated the employing
unit's claim that the salesmen's work was conducted outside the
usual place of business.
	In its reply brief, the Department offers a third rationale, that
the employing unit's place of business extends to any location
where workers regularly represent its interest. We applied this
reasoning in Eutectic Welding Alloys, 1 Ill. 2d  at 341, in which we
held that "[w]here the employing unit assigns a specific area to an
individual for the purpose of selling its product or representing its
interest, that area is the place of business of the enterprise." The
Administrative Code echoes this point: "Any territory in which a
salesman represents his employing unit's interests is the
employing unit's place of business." 56 Ill. Adm. Code
§2732.200(f)(2)(B) (2001).
	In past cases, this rationale has been utilized when a worker
is assigned to a specific geographic area, such as a sales territory
or delivery route. Carpetland does not assign a specific territory to
its salespeople or to individual measurers. Nevertheless, when a
Carpetland salesperson visits a customer's premises to obtain
measurements necessary for the quoting of a price and the closing
of a sale, he is "representing his employing unit's interest." So,
too, is a measurer to whom the salesperson might delegate this
task. As a result, the premises being measured are Carpetland's
place of business for purposes of section 212(B). We, therefore,
conclude that because the measurers are representing Carpetland's
interest when they visit a customer's premises to take
measurements, they are providing services at Carpetland's place
of business. Because section 212(B) is not met, the measurers are
not independent contractors. We, thus, reverse the appellate court
and affirm the decision of the Director as to the status of
measurers.

Section 212(C)-Independently Established Trade, Profession, or
Business
	Noting that the parties' characterization of their relationship
does not control, the report of the Director's representative states
three bases for its conclusion that the installers were not engaged
in an independently established trade, profession, or business.
First, the report concludes that "the installers had no financial
interest in any business, and if denied assignments by the
petitioner they would be unemployed." They were "dependent
upon Carpetland getting the customers." Second, the report
attaches great significance to the fact that 22 of 259 installers filed
claims for unemployment benefits during the relevant time period.
"An individual who files a claim for unemployment is usually not
an individual engaged in an independently established business,
and is usually not an individual who believes himself to be an
independently established business person." Third, the report
states that the fact that some of the installers worked for others as
employees "is indicative that they were looking for regular
employment, and were not independent contractors as the
petitioner claims."
	The Director affirmed these conclusions, adding that no
evidence showed "that the installers found employment through
their own efforts. If the petitioner did not sell the carpet and
arrange for the worker to install it, the worker would have been
unemployed or found employment with another carpet retailer
under the same circumstances. Thus, though the installers may
have had tools and business listings, they had no proprietary
interest in a business to sell or give away." The Director also
stated that, although not a deciding factor, the facts that some of
the installers filed claims for unemployment benefits and some
worked for others as employees were indications that the installers
were not engaged in independently established trades, occupations,
or businesses.
	We first address the notion, suggested by the Director and
argued by the Department in its brief, that the fact that 22 installers
have filed claims for unemployment benefits supports a finding
that they were not independent contractors. While a number of
claims is certainly cause for the Department to initiate an audit of
an employing unit, this fact is irrelevant to the section 212 inquiry.
We, therefore, find any reliance on this fact to constitute clear
error.
	Turning to the question of whether an installer is engaged in
an independently established trade, occupation, or business, we
consider the guidance offered by the Administrative Code, which
states that a worker is independently established if he or she "has
a proprietary interest in the business which he can sell, give away
or operate without hindrance from any other party." 56 Ill. Adm.
Code §2732.200(e) (2001). As we have noted before, this requires
that the individual's "entrepreneurial enterprise must enjoy a
'degree of economic independence such that the enterprise could
survive any relationship with the particular person contracting for
services.' " AFM, 198 Ill. 2d  at 401, quoting Jack Bradley, 146 Ill. 2d  at 78. The Administrative Code suggests 13 factors, no one of
which is dispositive, for consideration. The inquiry focuses on "the
business reality or totality of circumstances." 56 Ill. Adm. Code
§2732.200(e) (2001). The appellate court considered these factors
and found the evidence "overwhelming" that the installers met the
requirement of section 212(C). Carpetland, 319 Ill. App. 3d at
1079.
	The witnesses stated that Carpetland provided between 25%
and 75% of their workload. They also testified that they, at times,
declined Carpetland jobs because they were too busy. The
Department argues that the installers could not have survived the
termination of their working relationship with Carpetland. Losing
three-quarters, or even one-quarter, of one's business would likely
threaten the survival of any business. Indeed, some of the
installers' businesses apparently did not survive as independent
entities without having Carpetland as a client. The inquiry,
however, is not whether the purported independently operated
business did survive. The question is whether it could have
survived. Just because a business relies too heavily on one
customer, to the point that its survival is threatened if it loses that
account, does not mean that it is not independently established.
Thus, we will look to the factors listed in the Administrative Code
to determine whether an installer doing work for Carpetland under
the terms of their written agreement had a business that he could
"sell, give away, or operate without hindrance." 56 Ill. Adm. Code
§2732.200(e) (2001).
	We have already alluded to the first factor. The installer's
interest in his business "is not subject to cancellation or
destruction upon severance of the relationship" with Carpetland.
56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(e)(1) (2001). He might be under
increased pressure to find other clients or to advertise his business
to the general public, but Carpetland's severance of their
relationship would not necessarily destroy his business. The
installers invested substantial amounts in equipment and in
maintaining an inventory of supplies. The installers who testified
each owned one or more vehicles dedicated to the business. Every
installer must own or have access to at least one vehicle, for they
must haul and deliver carpeting and other materials. 56 Ill. Adm.
Code §2732.200(e)(2) (2001). The installers stood to make a profit
or suffer a loss based on the efficiency and quality of their work.
56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(e)(3) (2001). They made their
"services available to the general public or the business
community on a continuing basis"  (56 Ill. Adm. Code
§§2732.200(e)(4), (e)(12) (2001)) and by the use of business cards,
yellow pages advertising, ads in church and school bulletins and
programs, and through word of mouth. The witnesses testified to
doing business with Carpetland under an assumed business name.
Others may have used their individual names as sole proprietors
of their carpet installation business. This factor does not weigh
against finding them independent contractors. 56 Ill. Adm. Code
§2732.200(e)(6) (2001). The installers who testified not only had
shops or offices of their own, one had his own warehouse facility.
56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(e)(7) (2001). Even installers whose
businesses were much smaller than these witnesses had, at the very
least, some free-standing location for the storage of a vehicle and
supplies. Carpetland not only did not represent the installers as its
employees, it actively endeavored to inform customers that the
installers were not employees. 56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(e)(8)
(2001). The installers could, and did, hire additional workers,
without notice to Carpetland, and were responsible for reporting
and paying taxes on their wages. 56 Ill. Adm. Code
§2732.200(e)(11) (2001). The installers also had the right to work
for others, including Carpetland's competitors, whenever and on
whatever basis they chose. 56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(e)(12)
(2001). The three who testified exercised this right frequently.
That others may not have done so does not diminish the right they
retained. Similarly, some installers maintained business listings;
others apparently did not. 56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(e)(12)
(2001). (Factor 13, which relates to professional licensure, is not
applicable. 56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(e)(13) (2001).)
	Factors 5 and 10 are not as clear cut. It was undoubtedly
Carpetland's intention that the installers file tax returns as
independent business entities (56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(e)(5)
(2001)) and otherwise be responsible for other expenses such as
unemployment insurance (56 Ill. Adm. Code §2732.200(e)(10)
(2001)), but as the report noted, not all installers complied with
these business formalities. The appellate court concluded that the
fact that some installers:
		"failed to keep accurate records and diligently report to
the Department is manifestly insufficient to make them
employees of Carpetland. Poor record keeping and
negligent reporting, in and of themselves, are inadequate
to transform employment status from that of an
independent contractor to an employee." 319 Ill. App. 3d
at 1079.
	We agree. The installers were engaged in an independently
established business or trade. Carpetland, thus, meets the
requirement of section 212(C) with regard to the installers.
	In sum, the Director's determination that the installers are not
independent contractors is clearly erroneous. The Director's
determination regarding measurers is affirmed.

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
	Carpetland argued before the circuit court and the appellate
court that the actions of the Director violated the due process
clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S.
Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2), because the
Director had "a direct, proximate, and definite pecuniary interest
in the outcome of the proceeding." The Department claims that
this issue is waived for failure to raise it in the administrative
proceeding. Carpetland responds that questions of law, in general,
and questions of constitutionality, in particular, will not be
considered waived if raised for the first time before the circuit
court. In any event, Carpetland asserts, this court may exercise its
discretion and choose to address the constitutional question
notwithstanding any waiver.
	As a general rule, issues or defenses not raised before the
administrative agency will not be considered for the first time on
administrative review. See 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2000);
Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 278
(1998). A party's right to question the validity of a statute is,
therefore, subject to waiver. It is also true, however, that an
administrative agency lacks the authority to invalidate a statute on
constitutional grounds or to question its validity. Texaco-Cities
Service, 182 Ill. 2d  at 278. "Nonetheless, it is advisable to assert
a constitutional challenge on the record before the administrative
tribunal, because administrative review is confined to the proof
offered before the agency. Such a practice serves the purpose of
avoiding piecemeal litigation and, more importantly, allowing
opposing parties a full opportunity to present evidence to refute
the constitutional challenge." Texaco-Cities Service, 182 Ill. 2d  at
278-79.
	Although we recognize that waiver is a limitation on the
parties rather than on this court's jurisdiction, and that the doctrine
of waiver may be relaxed when necessary to maintain a uniform
body of precedent, or where this interests of justice so require
(American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees,
Council 31 v. County of Cook, 145 Ill. 2d 475, 480 (1991)), this is
not such a case. If this court is to consider any possible conflict of
interest that might render the Director's actions in such cases
constitutionally suspect, the Director should first be given the
opportunity to build a record in response to the constitutional
challenge.
	Carpetland's constitutional claim is waived for failure to raise
it at the first opportunity, during the agency proceeding, and we
decline to reach it.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is affirmed in part and reversed in part, the judgment of the circuit
court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the decision of
the Department is confirmed in part and set aside in part.



Appellate court judgment affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
Department decision confirmed
in part and set aside in part.
	I agree with the court that the Department's determination that
the carpet measurers are not independent contractors must be
affirmed (slip op. at 37). However, I disagree with the court's
conclusion that the Department's determination concerning the
carpet installers is clearly erroneous (slip op. at 37), and therefore
must respectfully dissent from that portion of today's opinion.
	The Illinois Unemployment Compensation Act (Act) requires
all employers to make contributions to a fund based upon "wages
payable for employment." 820 ILCS 405/1400 (West 2000). The
fund is used to provide money to involuntarily unemployed
workers to help ease the financial hardships caused by
unemployment. This court has consistently viewed the Act not as
a taxing act, but rather as legislation designed to relieve the
burdens of unemployment by utilizing the state's police powers.
Jack Bradley, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 146 Ill. 2d 61, 73 (1991) (and cases cited therein). Given the legislative
purpose of the Act, we have construed its provisions liberally and
given them expansive breadth.
	The Act defines "employment" as any service performed by
an individual for an employing unit. 820 ILCS 405/206 (West
2000). This court has acknowledged that the fact that the Act's
specifications and definitions may embrace "employment" as it is
customarily understood " ' "does not prevent its including within
the statutory terms" ' " those who before its enactment bore
" ' "the relation of independent contractors, or other relations
different from that strictly of employee at common law." ' " Jack
Bradley, 146 Ill. 2d  at 74, quoting Beth Weber, Inc. v. Murphy,
389 Ill. 60, 65 (1945), quoting New York Life Insurance Co. v.
Murphy, 388 Ill. 316, 319 (1944). The Act contains various
exemptions to the employment definition. Because the Act was
enacted with the public welfare in mind, our construction of the
Act's provisions "should favor inclusion," and the entity seeking
the exemption bears a strict burden of proof. Jack Bradley, 146 Ill. 2d  at 75.
	In this case, Carpetland seeks to avail itself of the exemption
for independent contractors contained in section 212 of the Act.
The court correctly notes that the three requirements of this
exemption are conjunctive, and that Carpetland must prove all
three to exempt itself from the applicability of the Act. Slip op. at
2. The court, however, considers the Director's decision, that
Carpetland did not establish all three requirements with respect to
the carpet installers, clearly erroneous. See slip op. at 37. In so
doing, the court holds, inter alia, that Carpetland established the
second requirement of section 212, i.e., that the "service is either
outside the usual course of the business for which such service is
performed or that such service is performed outside of all the
places of business of the enterprise for which such service is
performed." Slip op. at 26-29;  820 ILCS 405/212(B) (West 2000).
I disagree.
	The Director's report found that approximately 75% of
Carpetland's floor-covering sales included the cost of installation.
In other words, the customer paid installation costs to Carpetland
in the great majority of its sales. The remaining percentage of
Carpetland's sales consisted of carpeting or carpet pieces that did
not require installation services. I note that this finding of fact was
not disputed by the parties. Moreover, no contrary evidence
appears of record that would cast doubt as to its accuracy. In light
of this, I see no reason to disregard the Director's finding that
installation "is in the petitioner's usual course of business" as
clearly erroneous. The evidence adduced certainly supports the
view that carpet installation went hand-in-hand with wall-to-wall
carpeting purchases at Carpetland, purchases which the record
shows constituted the majority of Carpetland's sales.
	Schatz, Pollack Woolen Co. v. Murphy, 384 Ill. 218 (1943),
cited by the court in support of its conclusion that the Director
erred in this respect, provides little reason for this court to
disregard the Director's finding. In Schatz, the employer was
engaged in the business of selling woolen goods to the tailoring
trade. The company maintained an office and sample room in
Chicago. The employee for whom the exemption was sought was
a window washer who worked part-time at the office. This court
held that, with respect to section 212(B), "[t]he washing of
windows was not within the usual course of appellee's business in
selling woolens to the tailoring trade. His services may have
rendered the place of business more pleasant but they did not enter
into any of the many activities necessary to the purchase of
woolens and the resale of them to tailors." Schatz, 384 Ill.  at 221.
I have difficulty equating the service provided by the installers
here with the services rendered by the window washer in Schatz.
The installation of carpet, in my view, entails more than a mere
pleasantry for the customers of Carpetland. Generally speaking,
those who purchase carpeting do so with an expectation that it will
be installed. Indeed, the installation of floor covering in the home
or business of the purchaser is but one of "the many activities
necessary" to the over-all purchase of carpeting. For this reason,
I do not believe that carpet installation can be deemed incidental
to the sale in the same way that the window washing in Schatz was
found to be incidental to the sale of woolens.
	The court also puts great weight on the fact that the sales
agreements between Carpetland and its customers expressly
excluded installation and that the practice merely constituted good
business sense. I do not believe the sales contract alone is
determinative of the question. If it were, employers would too
easily be able to cloak their employees with the mantle of
independent contractor in order to avoid making unemployment
contributions under the Act. Notwithstanding that, however,
Carpetland's willingness to "accommodate" the customer by
arranging for installation services brought it more than just the
good will alluded to by the court in its opinion. Slip op. at 29. I
note that the record reveals that Carpetland charged its customers
a flat rate of $3 per yard for carpet installation. Carpetland,
however, paid its installers a lesser amount, which ranged down to
as low as $2.20 per yard. Thus, while the contract between
Carpetland and its customers specifically excluded installation, the
bottom-line price paid by the customer to Carpetland included the
cost of installation and Carpetland profited from it directly. This
is not a case, therefore, where the supplier gives its customer a list
of installers and the customer is left to negotiate the price of
installation directly with the installer as a separate financial
transaction, with no profit returning to the supplier. It was
Carpetland that selected the installer for the customer and set up
the date of installation. If the selected installer declined the job,
Carpetland would select another installer from its list of installers.
Carpetland acted as a middleman between the customer and the
installer and realized a monetary gain for doing so. This supports
the view that carpet installation was part of Carpetland's usual
course of business, especially when 75% of all of its sales were
conducted in this manner. The profits received from the
installation and Carpetland's "hands-on" involvement bespeak
more than a mere incidental convenience extended to customers.
	The foregoing facts, in my view, adequately support a finding
that the services provided by the installers were part of the usual
course of Carpetland's business. Therefore, unlike my colleagues
in the majority, I am not "left with the ' "definite and firm
conviction" ' (AFM, 198 Ill. 2d  at 395, quoting United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.  at 395, 92 L. Ed.  at 766, 68 S. Ct. at 542)
that the conclusions regarding carpet installation and Carpetland's
usual course of business in the report and the Director's decision
are erroneous." Slip op. at 29.(1) Based upon this record, I believe
that Carpetland failed to carry its strict burden of proof in
demonstrating that its carpet installers were independent
contractors. The Director, therefore, had substantial basis to
conclude that the requirements of section 212(B) had not been met
and that their services were employment subject to contributions
under the Act.

	JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this partial concurrence and
partial dissent.
1.      1I realize that the two factors of section 212(B) are in the alternative,
and that the installers might still fall within the ambit of subsection (B)
if their services are performed outside all of Carpetland's places of
business. Given the court's resolution of the "usual course of business"
issue, it did not address the places of business factor vis   vis the
installers. I would find, however, that Carpetland does not meet this
factor. Illinois courts have recognized that any location where workers
regularly represent an employer's interest will be considered a usual
place of business for purposes of section 212(B). See Ross v. Cummins,
7 Ill. 2d 595 (1956); Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. Rauch, 1 Ill. 2d 328 (1953). In my view, the installers represented Carpetland's
interests. Customer complaints were directed to Carpetland and not to
the individual installers. It was Carpetland who worked to resolve any
problems arising from poor or substandard installation. Carpetland's
attention to problem resolution indicates that it considered it in its best
interests to work with customers when installation work was poorly
performed. If Carpetland's interests were not implicated by the
installation, then Carpetland would have let the customer deal directly
with the installer in the event of problems. This was not the case and
therefore supports a finding that the installers represented Carpetland's
interests.