Case Title: Nevada Bd. of Parole Comm'rs v. Morrow

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 21

Docket Number: 53436

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
4127 Nev., Advance Opinion 2.1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA, EX REL. BOARD No, 53436
OF PAROLE COMMISSIONERS; AND
MS. DORLA M. SALLING,

CHAIRWOMAN, FI LED

Appellants,

 

 

vs. |

RICHARD DAVID MORROW, | Mar 28 20

Respondent. BET
— Seu ay

 

  

BRIAN KAMEDULA,
Appellant,

No, 54173

vs.
‘THE STATE OF NEVADA BOARD OF
PAROLE COMMISSIONERS,

Respondent.

Appeal from a district court order clarifying a judgment
granting a writ of mandamus (Docket No. 53436), and proper person
appeal from a district court order granting a motion to dismiss (Docket No.
54178). Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; James M. Bixler,
Judge (Docket No. 53436); First Judicial District Court, Carson City;
James E. Wilson, Judge (Docket No. 54173).
Reversed (Docket No. 53436); affirmed (Docket No. 54173).

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Cynthia R. Hoover and
Binu G. Palal, Deputy Attorneys General, Carson City,

for the State of Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners and Dorla M.
Salling.

Richard David Morrow, Lovelock,
in Proper Person.

 
Brian Kamedula, Carson City,
in Proper Person.

BEFORE DOUGLAS, C.J., PICKERING and HARDESTY, JJ.

PIN]

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.

In the two cases below, the district courts reached different
conclusions regarding whether inmates are entitled to due process
protections related to their parole release hearings. In considering that
issue on appeal, we recognize that no statutory due process protections
applied in these particular cases, and we conclude that, because the
possibility of release on parole is not a protectable liberty interest, inmates
are not entitled to constitutional or inherent due process rights regarding
discretionary parole release. We clarify that Stockmeier v. State,
Department of Corrections, 122 Nev. 385, 135 P.3d 220 (2006), abrogated
‘on_other grounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v, City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev.
224, 228 n6, 181 P.3d 670, 672 n.6 (2008), does not create due process

rights related to parole release hearings, and as a result of the confusion

 

stemming from that case, we explicitly adopt and further explain the
judicial function test for determining whether a proceeding is quasi-
judicial.

FACTS

Morrow appeal
Proper person respondent Richard David Morrow pleaded
guilty to several sex offenses in 1990 and was sentenced to life in prison

 

 
one

with the possibility of parole. In October 2006, Morrow was certified as
not being at high risk to reoffend by the Psychological Review Panel! and
granted parole, effective in February 2007. Before being released,
however, the Psychological Review Panel assessed him as a Tier III sex
offender. This reclassification precluded Morrow from being released
pursuant to NRS 213.1214(1). Due to the new assessment and other
expressed concerns, in April 2007, the Nevada Board of Parole
Commissioners (the Parole Board) reconsidered its decision to release
Morrow on parole, The Parole Board ultimately decided to defer his parole
for two years,

In June 2007, Morrow challenged the Parole Board's
procedure by filing a writ of mandamus in the district court seeking a new
parole hearing, with proper notice, and a directive that the Parole Board
provide to him copies of all of the documents in his parole file and all of
the documents the Parole Board considered when it denied his parole. In
his petition, Morrow argued that the Parole Board violated his due process
rights because it did not notify him of the reconsideration hearing until
five minutes before it began and denied his access to the documents it
relied on in deferring parole.

‘The district court granted the writ and directed that (1)
Morrow receive a new parole hearing; (2) the Parole Board provide him
with proper notice of the hearing and the opportunity to speak or have a
representative speak on his behalf; and (8) the Parole Board provide him

*Pursuant to NRS 213.1214(1), an inmate convicted of certain sex
offenses shall not be released on parole until the Psychological Review
Panel determines that he “does not represent a high risk to reoffend,”

 

 
with a copy of his risk assessment file, excluding confidential information
relating to the victim, Following the court's directive, the Parole Board
delivered Morrow's risk assessment file to him and held a new hearing in
November 2008, resulting in another denial of parole, Morrow then
sought in the district court an order to show cause why the Parole Board
should not be held in contempt, arguing that the Parole Board did not
comply with the district court's writ because it failed to provide Morrow
with proper notice of the November 2008 parole hearing and copies of all
of the documents that the Parole Board considered in denying him parole.
The district court denied Morrow's request for an order to show cause but
subsequently issued an order clarifying its original writ and directing the
Parole Board to turn over every document it considered when it denied
Morrow parole, including his parole file, Without citing any authority, the
district court reasoned that due process required that Morrow receive all
‘the documents and the exact information that the Parole Board considered
when it denied him parole, The Parole Board now appeals.

Kamedula appeal

Kamedula was convicted of sexual assault in 1987 and
sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. In September
2008, the Parole Board held a hearing and denied Kamedula parole.
Kamedula subsequently filed a complaint in the district court, arguing
that the Parole Board violated the Open Meeting Law, and later amended
the complaint to add claims that the Parole Board denied him certain due
process rights, including the ability to present certain evidence and the

ability to cross-examine witnesses during the hearing, and it also failed to
provide him with a written decision or the ability to appeal. He further
claimed that the Parole Board violated former NRS 213.130, as amended
in 2007, by failing to afford him the due process protections set forth

 

 
therein? The Parole Board moved to dismiss the complaint under NRCP
12()(6), arguing that the Open Meeting Law did not apply to parole
rings pursuant to Witherow v, State, Board of Parole
Commissioners, 123 Nev. 305, 167 P.9d 408 (2007), and that the asserted
procedural protections of former NRS 213.130 did not apply at the time of

release h

 

 

Kamedula’s parole hearing. The district court concluded that neither the
Open Meeting Law nor the statutory due process protections of former
NRS 213.180 applied to Kamedula’s Parole Board hearing and dismissed
the complaint. Kamedula now appeals.

‘These appeals raise solely legal questions, which we review de
novo. Buzz Stew, LLC v, City of N, Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181
P.84 670, 672 (2008).

DISCUSSION

Although inmates in Nevada are currently afforded statutory
due process protections related to parole release hearings, those
protections did not apply to Morrow's and Kamedula’s parole hearings. In
[June 2007, the Legislature amended NRS 213.130 to provide minimum
procedural due process protections related to those proceedings, 2007 Nev.
Stat., ch. 528, § 10.5, at 3261-62; SB. 471, 74th Leg. (Nev. 2007), but
suspended those protections in June 2008. 2008 Nev. Stat. ch. 6, § 1, at 5-
7; SB. 4, 24th Special Sess. (Nev. 2008). For reasons unrelated to the due
process protections, on October 7, 2008, the United States District Court

"The protections Kamedula claims he was not given include: notice
of the Parole Board hearing, an opportunity to attend the hearing or have
a representative speak at the hearing on his behalf, and timely notice of
the decision or “any specific recommendations for improvement.”

 

 
0 non

for the District of Nevada permanently enjoined enforcement of the
provisions included in A.B. 579 and S.B. 471, passed during the 2007
legislative session, which included the amendments made to NRS 213.130,
jatutes, Am, Civil Liberties Union v.
Cortez Masto, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1260 (D, Nev. 2008). During the 2011
legislative session, the Logislature reenacted the due process protections
of NRS 213.190 enjoined by Cortez Masto. 2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 23, § 3, at
—. Assembly Bill 18, section 3(@)-(10) amended NRS Chapter 219 such

as well as changes to several other

 

that inmates must now be provided with notice and the right to attend the
hearing, have representation, and speak on his or her behalf, Id,

Because Morrow's hearing occurred in April 2007, before the
Legislature amended former NRS 213.180, and Kamedula’s hearing
cccurred in September 2008, during the Legislature's temporary
suspension of the statute’s due process protections, those statutory due
process protections did not apply to their respective hearings. Therefore,
our analysis is limited to whether Morrow and Kamedula should have
been afforded constitutional or inherent due process protections during
their parole release hearings.

Morrow and Kamedula argue that such protections exist,

 

particularly in light of prior de:
Board is a quasi-judicial body, Witherow v, State, Bd. of Parole Comm'rs,
123 Nev. 305, 311-12, 167 P.3d 408, 412 (2007), and discussing the due
process protections afforded in quasi-judicial proceedings, Stockmeier_v.
State, Dep't of Corrections, 122 Nev. 385, 135 P.3d 220 (2006), abrogated
on other grounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev.
224, 228 n.6, 181 P.3d 270, 672 n.6 (2008). We acknowledge that, in
Nevada, constitutional due process rights do not attach to parole release

jonal law concluding that the Parole

 
hearings because no liberty interest is at stake, and we take this
opportunity to clarify that our analysis of quasi-judicial proceedings in
Stockmeier did not create due process rights where no liberty interest
exists, In doing s0, we also expressly adopt, and clarify the proper
application of, the judicial function test for determining whether a
proceeding is quasi-judicial.
Due proce: to parole rel
Constitutional due process

Both “{t}he United States and Nevada Constitutions provide
that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law.”
Scarbo v, Dist. Ct, 125 Nev. 118, 124, 206 P.3d 975, 979 (2009); see also
Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8. However, those due process protections apply only
“when government action deprives a person of liberty or property.”
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Therefore,
for Morrow and Kamedula to be entitled to constitutional due process
protections during their parole release hearings, they must have a
protectable liberty interest at stake in those proceedings.

In Greenholtz, the United States Supreme Court held that
“{tJhere is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be
conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence... . [T]he
conviction, with all its procedural safeguards, has extinguished that
liberty right.” Id, However, the Supreme Court noted that a state may
create an “expectancy of release...entitled to some measure of
constitutional protection” by the language used in its statutory scheme.
Id. at 12.

 

This court has recognized on several occasions that Nevada's
parole statute is purely discretionary and thus creates no expectation of
release. NRS 213.1099(1) states, “Except as otherwise provided in this

 

 
section ..., the Board may release on parole a prisoner who is otherwise
eligible for parole pursuant to NRS 218.107 to 213.157, inclusive, and
section 3 of [Assembly Bill 18.” (Emphasis added.) We have consistently
pointed out that this discretionary language does not create a protectable
liberty interest sufficient to invoke the Due Process Clause. See Weakland
xv. Bd, of Parole Comm'rs, 100 Nev. 218, 220, 678 P.2d 1158, 1160 (1984)
(recognizing Greenholtz and holding that because “NRS 213.1099 does not
create a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to invoke the
protections of the Due Process Clause, it follows that the Board is not
constitutionally required to render any statement of reasons why parole is
denied”); Severance v. Armstrong, 96 Nev. 836, 839, 620 P.2d 369, 370
(1980) (recognizing Greenholtz and rejecting appellant's argument that
the Parole Board violated his due process rights in denying his parole
application; holding that “NRS 213.1099 does not confer a legitimate
expectation of parole release and therefore does not create a
constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to invoke due
process”), reh’g denied, 97 Nev. 95, 96, 624 P.2d 1004, 1005 (1981)
(recognizing that the statement in Goldsworthy v. Hannifin, 86 Nev. 252,
468 P.2d 350 (1970), that legislative acts of grace, such as the right to
apply for parole, must be administered in accordance with due process,
does not “mean that due process rights attach to all parole statutes”).

“The Legislature amended NRS 213.1099(1) during the 2011
legislative session to include the amendments made by Assembly Bill 18,
section 3, which reenacted statutory due process protections related to
Parole Board hearings. 2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 23, § 5, at__.

 
ss

 

Instead, Nevada's parole statute “only gives rise to a ‘hope’ of

release on parole.” Weakland, 100 Nev. at 219-20, 678 P.2d at 1160. As

 

 

the Legislature has provided, release on parole is “an act of grace of the
State,” and “it is not intended that the establishment of standards relating
[to parole] create any such right or interest in liberty or property or
establish a basis for any cause of action against the State, its political
subdivisions, agencies, boards, commissions, departments, officers or
employees.” NRS 213.10705. Accordingly, because Nevada's parole

 

release statute does not create a liberty interest, we reiterate that inmates
are not entitled to constitutional due process protections with respect to
parole release hearings. While it is clear that Nevada's statutes do not
create a liberty interest sufficient to afford any guaranteed due process
protections during a parole release proceeding, we next examine Morrow's
and Kamedula's argument that recent casclaw affords such guaranteed
protections,
tockmeier v. State, Department of Corrections

Morrow and Kamedula argue on appeal that our holding in
Stockmeier v. State, Department of Corrections, 122 Nev. 385, 135 P.3d
+220 (2006), abrogated on other grounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N.
Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228 n.6, 181 P.3d 270, 672 n.6 (2008), recognizes
due process protections necessary or inherent in quasi-judicial proceedings

like parole release hearings.‘ In Stockmeier, we examined whether

 

“In Witherow v. State, Board of Parole Commissioners, 123 Nev.

805, 811-12, 167 P.3d 408, 412 (2007), we held that because the Parole
Board performs a judicial function when determining parole status and
because the Legislature so intended, parole release hearings are quasi-
judicial. See also Raggio v, Campbell, 80 Nev. 418, 423, 396 P.2d 626, 627
continued on next page...

 
08 >

 

Peychological Review Panel hearings are exempt from Nevada's Open
Meeting Law pursuant to the judicial proceeding exception in NRS
241.030(4)(a).° 122 Nev, at 390, 135 P.3d at 223. To resolve this

 

ue, we

first determined that the judicial proceeding exemption extended to quat

 

judicial proceedings and then explained that quasi-judicial proceedings
‘are those having a judicial character that are performed by
Id In di
proceedings have a “judicial character,” we focused on whether the

 

administrative agencies. sussing whether administrative

  

proceedings maintained trial-like attributes. In so doing, we inextricably
linked quasi-judicial proceedings to four due process rights:

Ata minimum, a quasi-judicial proceeding must
afford each party (1) the ability to present and
object to evidence, (2) the ability to cross-examine
witnesses, (3) a written decision from the public
body, and (4) an opportunity to appeal to a higher
authority.

Id, at 391-92, 135 P.3d at 224. Based on those due process considerations,
we held that Psychological Review Panel hearings did not afford each of

 

those due process rights and were therefore not quasi-judicial. Id, at 392,
136 P.3d at 224-25,

2. continued

(1964), We also noted that when the Legislature amended NRS 213.130(3)
in 2007, it specifically confirmed that Parole Board hearings are quasi-
judicial. See Witherow, 123 Nev. at 310, 167 P.3d at 410-11; 2007 Nev.
Stat., ch. 528, § 10.5, at 3261, When the Legislature reenacted the
provisions of former NRS 213.130 in 2011, it again maintained that Parole
Board hearings are quasi-judicial. 2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 23, § 8, at__.

SNRS 241.030(4)(a) states that the Open Meeting Law does not
“[alpply to judicial proceedings.”

10

 
Referring to that holding, Morrow and Kamedula argue that
the converse must also be true: if a proceeding is quasi-judicial, it must
provide due process protections, Thus, they assert, beca
hearings are quasi-judicial, those hearings must necessarily afford the due
protections enumerated in Stockmeier. We disagree,

Because the issue in Stockmeier concerned whether an
exception to the Open Meeting Law applied, our opinion in that case

¢ parole release

 

 

proce

 

highlighted the similarities between the Open Meeting Law and the due
process protections afforded in judicial proceedings as a means of
differentiating proceedings subject to the Open Meeting Law from those
‘quasi-judicial proceedings that are exempt from those laws because the
protections that they afford serve a similar purpose. Id, at 391, 135 P.3d
at 224. Inasmuch as Stockmeier implies that inmates have inherent due
process protections arising from the quasi-judicial status of parole release
hearings, we reject that implication. Stockmeier did not create due
process rights where no liberty interest exists. Nonetheless, as the quoted
language in Stockmeier has caused some confusion about the nature of
quasi-judicial proceedings in Nevada, we take this opportunity to
expressly adopt and clarify the application of the judicial function test in
this state,
‘The judicial function test

‘The judicial function test is a means of determining whether

an administrative proceeding is quasi-judicial by examining the hearing

 

 
entity's function. See Witherow, 123 Nev. at 312, 167 P.3d at 412; id. at
914, 167 P.3d at 412-14 (Hardesty, J., concurring and dissenting), If the

quasi

  

hearing entity’s function is judicial in nature, its acts qualify
judicial. Id, In determining whether a hearing entity's function is
judicial, other jurisdictions consider whether the hearing entity has
authority to: “(1) exercise judgment and discretion; (2) hear and determine
or to ascertain facts and decide; (3) make binding orders and judgments;
(4) affect the personal property rights of private persons; (5) examine
witnesses and hear the litigation of the issues on a hearing; and (6)
enforce decisions or impose penalties.” Craig v, Stafford Const., Inc., 856
A.2d 372, 377 (Conn, 2004) (quoting Kelley v, Bonney, 606 A.2d 693, 703,
(Conn, 1992), and considering, also, whether a sound policy basis exists for
protecting the hearing entity from suit).’ These factors are not exclusive,
and determining whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial is an imprecise
exercise because many different types of entities perform judicial
functions. Id, at 377. We have previously used the judicial function test
in this state to determine whether entities act in a quasi-judicial manner

The same judicial function test is also used to determine quasi-
judicial immunity from liability. See Witherow, 123 Nev. at 311-12, 167
P.3d at 412.

"See also Ascherman v, Natanson, 100 Cal. Rptr. 656, 659 (Ct. App.
1972) (“The primary factors which determine the nature of the proceedings
are: (1) whether the administrative body is vested with discretion based
upon investigation and consideration of evidentiary facts, (2) whether it is
entitled to hold hearings and decide the issue by the application of rules of
law to the ascertained facts and, more importantly (3) whether its power
affects the personal or property rights of private persons.”

 

 
when performing their administrative duties,* and we now expressly adopt
the judicial function test for doing so in the future,

When considering whether Peychological Review Panel
hearings are quasi-judicial and thus exempt from the Open Meeting Law
in Stockmeier, this court signaled that it was applying the judicial
function test, stating that “[qjuasijudicial proceedings are those
proceedings having a judicial character.” 122 Nev. at 390, 185 P.3d at 223,

  

We then indicated that a quasi-judicial proceeding is one that provides
minimum due process protections, implying that this was necessary
regardless of any other considerations of judicial character. Id, at 391-92,
136 P.3d at 224, We now clarify that when utilizing the judicial function
test, the due process protections afforded during a proceeding do not,
alone, determine whether it is quasi-judicial; instead, whether procedural
protections are afforded during the proceeding goes to the ability of the
hearing entity to hear witnesses and make a decision affecting property
rights and is but one consideration in determining whether the hearing
entity is performing a judicial function. See Raggio, 80 Nev. at 423, 395
P.2d at 627.

To hold that any proceeding that provides minimum due
process protections is quasi-judicial and that, therefore, any quasi-judicial

proceeding must afford certain specified due process protections, as

"See, eg. Marvin v. Fitch, 126 Nev. __, 232 P.8d 425 (2010)
(determining that the State Board of Equalization performed quasi-
judicial functions and thus was entitled to immunity); Witherow, 123 Nev.
at 312, 167 P.8d at 412; Raggio v. Campbell, 80 Nev. 418, 423, 895 P.2d
625, 627 (1964) (holding that parole boards perform a quasi-judicial
function when releasing prisoners on parole).

13

 

 
 

Morrow and Kamedula ask us to do, would render all proceedings in which
the participants are given notice and an opportunity to be heard quasi-
judicial, oven if the supervising official can undertake no judicial function.
For example, county boards of commissioners, the Public Utilities
Commission, the Board of Architecture, and other entities could claim that
they are quasi-judicial simply by affording the protections enumerated in
Stockmeier. See Witherow, 123 Nev. at 314, 167 P.3d at 418 Hardesty, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (stating that “defining quasi-judicial
proceedings as any that provide due process protections... creates an
absurd result by permitting public bodies to easily circumvent the Open
Meeting Law”). We decline to adopt this approach, as this would be an
improper application of the judicial function test and would create an
absurd result with significant implications beyond Parole Board hearings.
Accordingly, Stockmeier neither created any new nor recognized any
inherent due process rights, and Morrow's and Kamedula's arguments in
that regard fal
CONCLUSION

No statutory due process protections applied during Morrow's
and Kamedula’s parole hearings, and because Nevada's parole release
statute does not create a liberty interest sufficient to invoke due process
protections, we conclude that inmates are not entitled to constitutional
due process protections regarding discretionary parole release. We clarify
that Stockmeier did not create or recognize due process rights where no
liberty interest exists, and thus, the Parole Board is not required to afford
inmates the due process protections enumerated in Stockmeier.
‘Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that in the
Morrow appeal, the district court abused its discretion in requiring the
State to provide Morrow with a copy of every document the Parole Board

4

 
considered when it denied him parole, We further conclude that the
district court properly dismissed Kamedula’s complaint because he failed
to state a claim against the Parole Board upon which relief may be
granted. See Buzz Stew, 124 Nev. at 227-28, 181 P.3d at 672.

Accordingly, we reverse the clarification order of the district
court in the Morrow appeal, Docket No. 63436, and we affirm the order of
the district court in the Kamedul

 

ippeal, Docket No. 54173.

theweee,

Hardesty

We concur: