Case Title: MALGORZATA JUNG-LEONCZYNSKA v. MATTHIAS STEUP

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-11-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
MALGORZATA JUNG-LEONCZYNSKA v. MATTHIAS STEUP1989 WY 198782 P.2d 578Case Number: 89-91Decided: 11/16/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
MALGORZATA 
JUNG-LEONCZYNSKA, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

MATTHIAS STEUP, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Malgorzata 
Jung-Leonczynska, pro 
se.

Steven R. 
Helling of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In this summary 
judgment appeal we hold that the question whether a public employee, who 
allegedly engaged in intentional tortious conduct, was acting within the scope 
of his duties under W.S. 1-39-104(a) (June 1988 Repl.), was a question of fact 
for the trier of fact, not one of law for the court as was determined by the 
trial court. In accordance with our discussion of this primary issue and the 
other issues presented, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

[¶2.]     Malgorzata 
Jung-Leonczynska (Leonczynska) filed an action against Professor Matthias Steup 
(Steup) seeking damages because of an incident which occurred at 1:00 p.m. on 
November 13, 1987, in a University of Wyoming classroom during an independent 
study course class being taught by Steup as a faculty member and attended by 
Leonczynska as a student. According to Leonczynska's complaint, Steup jumped up 
from his seat and ran four to five yards to where she was sitting. As he came 
toward her he was angry and yelling; he shook his fist in front of her face; he 
pounded the table in front of her face; and pounded her belongings on the table, 
which belongings were in her immediate possession and connected with her body. 
In her complaint Leonczynska alleged that Steup's intention was to create in her 
fear and apprehension of imminent bodily contact by him and that as a result of 
Steup's conduct, she had a fear and apprehension of imminent bodily contact by 
him. She sought damages on the alternative theories of assault, battery, 
intentional infliction of emotional harm, and duress and undue influence. Steup 
answered the complaint, generally denying the allegations of wrongdoing and 
asserting several affirmative defenses.

[¶3.]     During the pendency of 
discovery, Steup moved for summary judgment, supporting his motion with an 
affidavit and memorandum of law. In his motion he asserted that: the trial court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Leonczynska failed to allege that she 
had filed a claim under W.S. 1-39-113 (June 1988 Repl.) of the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act; he was immune from tort liability pursuant to the 
provisions of W.S. 1-39-104(a) (June 1988 Repl.); Leonczynska's claims were 
barred by the statute of limitations set forth in W.S. 1-3-105(a)(v); and the 
allegations within the complaint failed to state claims upon which relief could 
be granted.

[¶4.]     The trial court granted 
Steup's motion for summary judgment, finding as a matter of law that Steup was a 
public employee acting within the scope of his duties as defined in W.S. 
1-39-103(a)(v). The trial court concluded that the provisions of the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act applied; no statutory exception to the grant of immunity 
existed; Leonczynska's complaint failed to allege she had filed a claim under 
the act as required, as a result of which the court had no subject matter 
jurisdiction; and Steup was immune from liability for his conduct. The trial 
court found it unnecessary to rule on the statute of limitations issue. 
Following the trial court's adverse decision, Leonczynska filed this 
appeal.

[¶5.]     From our reading of the 
parties' appellate briefs, we identify three issues that involve procedural 
questions; the fourth issue is substantive:

I. Is an appellant's 
notice of appeal deemed filed for purposes of the fifteen day requirement of 
W.R.A.P. 2.01 only upon the appellant's payment to the clerk of the district 
court of the twenty-five dollar transcript fee prescribed by W.S. 5-3-206(a) 
(Cum.Supp. 1988)?

II. Is Leonczynska's 
failure to file a certificate of compliance with her notice of appeal as 
prescribed by W.R.A.P. 2.01 justification to dismiss her 
appeal?

III. Is Leonczynska's 
failure to make appropriate page references to the record on appeal in her 
statement of facts set forth in her appellate brief justification to dismiss her 
appeal?

IV. Did the trial court 
err in granting Professor Steup's motion for summary 
judgment?

I.

Failure to Pay Transcript 
Fee Upon Filing of Appeal

[¶6.]     A civil appeal from a 
district court to this court shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with 
the clerk of the district court within fifteen days from entry of the judgment 
or final order appealed from. W.R.A.P. 2.01.1 Concurrently with this filing, the 
appellant shall order and arrange for the payment of the transcript. Id. For all civil matters 
filed or commenced, the clerk of the district court shall charge the sum of 
twenty-five dollars for all transcripts in cases appealed to this court. W.S. 
5-3-206(a)(vii) (Cum.Supp. 1988).

[¶7.]     On March 15, 1989, two 
days after the trial court entered its summary judgment order against 
Leonczynska, she presented her notice of appeal for filing to the clerk of the 
district court. Leonczynska did not pay the twenty-five dollar transcript fee at 
that time; rather, she filed an affidavit seeking to proceed without payment of 
the fee. After the trial court denied her request to proceed without payment of 
the fee, she paid the fee on April 12, 1989. Steup argues, without citation of 
supporting case law, that Leonczynska's notice of appeal was not deemed filed 
for W.R.A.P. 2.01 purposes until she paid the transcript fee under W.S. 
5-3-206(a)(vii). Under Steup's argument, since Leonczynska did not pay the 
transcript fee until thirty days after the entry of the summary judgment order, 
the notice of appeal was deemed filed then, causing the appeal to be filed 
beyond the fifteen-day period required by W.R.A.P. 2.01. Therefore, Steup 
argues, Leonczynska's appeal must be dismissed.

[¶8.]     We reject Steup's 
argument. The plain language of W.R.A.P. 2.01 does not establish linkage with 
W.S. 5-3-206(a)(vii). The rule speaks only of the filing of the notice of 
appeal; it says nothing about payment of the transcript fee. It establishes no 
requirement that the appellant pay for a transcript when the notice is filed. To 
the contrary, all the appellant need do is arrange for the payment of the 
transcript. The clear import of this language is the recognition of future, not 
immediate, payment. W.R.A.P. 2.02 prescribes the contents of the notice of 
appeal; it likewise says nothing about the payment of the transcript fee. 
W.R.A.P. 3.02 provides that within forty days from the date of the filing of the 
notice of appeal, the appellant shall file the record on appeal and pay the 
docket fee fixed by W.R.A.P. 10.01. We hold that an appellant's notice of appeal 
is deemed filed for purposes of W.R.A.P. 2.01 upon the appellant's presenting 
the notice for filing to the clerk of the district court and not upon the 
appellant's payment to the clerk of the transcript fee prescribed by W.S. 
5-3-206(a)(vii).

II.

Failure to File 
Certificate of Compliance

[¶9.]     W.R.A.P. 2.01, in 
relevant part, states: 

Concurrently with filing 
of the notice of appeal, the appellant shall order and either arrange for the 
payment of a transcript of the portions of the evidence deemed necessary for the 
appeal or make application for payment thereof as provided in Rule 10.06; a 
certificate of compliance therewith shall be filed in the case or endorsed upon 
the notice of appeal * * *.

[¶10.]  Steup alleges that Leonczynska failed to 
file the certificate of compliance evidencing that she ordered and arranged for 
the payment of a transcript of the evidence deemed necessary for the appeal. For 
this failure, he seeks the remedy of the dismissal of the appeal. Although the 
record on appeal does not contain such a certificate, the record clearly shows 
that Leonczynska ordered and arranged for the payment of a transcript. The 
record further shows that Leonczynska caused the record on appeal to be filed 
timely with this court and paid the requisite docket fee fixed by W.R.A.P. 10. 
Under these circumstances we find the absence of the certificate to be harmless 
and the remedy of dismissal too harsh and unjustified.

III.

Failure to Make Page 
References to Record on Appeal

[¶11.]  W.R.A.P. 5.01(3) states that the 
appellant's brief shall contain a statement of the case which shall include, 
among other things, "a statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented 
for review with appropriate page references to the record * * *." Steup points 
out that Leonczynska has failed to provide in her appellate brief appropriate 
page references to the record in her statement of the facts. Steup again seeks 
dismissal for this failure. Recently, in V-1 Oil Company v. The Honorable Robert 
B. Ranck, 767 P.2d 612, 613 (Wyo. 1989), we cautioned litigants practicing 
before this court to comply with W.R.A.P. 5.01(3). We do not retreat from that 
caution. In this case, however, the record is not lengthy and the portions of 
the record relevant to the issues presented for review are easily found. 
Consequently, our review has not been hampered by Leonczynska's failure to make 
appropriate page references to the record. In light of this, we deem the remedy 
of dismissal too harsh and unwarranted.

IV.

Summary 
Judgment

[¶12.]  We review this summary judgment appeal 
under W.R.C.P. 56, in accordance with our well-established, often-stated 
standard of review, recently reiterated in part in Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188, 
190-91 (Wyo. 1989). The moving party, Steup, has the initial burden to show that 
no genuine issue of material fact exists. Stundon v. Sterling, 736 P.2d 317, 318 (Wyo. 1987). "Conclusory 
affidavits are insufficient and specific facts must be shown." Davenport v. Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Wyo. 1987). We examine 
the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Leonczynska here, 
granting her all favorable inferences which can properly be drawn from the 
evidence. Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 752 P.2d 1363, 1367 (Wyo. 1988). If the moving 
party does not support his motion with evidence refuting the nonmoving party's 
allegation, the nonmoving party is entitled to rely upon that unrefuted 
allegation and has no obligation to present any factual support for it. Petersen 
v. Campbell County Memorial Hospital District, 760 P.2d 992, 994 (Wyo. 1988). The nonmoving 
party's unrefuted allegation is sufficient to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. Id. at 995.

[¶13.]  Leonczynska's complaint, alleging 
assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional harm, and duress and undue 
influence, asserted the material allegations that Steup, as a faculty member of 
the University of 
Wyoming, engaged in 
intentional tortious conduct against her, as his student, during class hours of 
the class he was teaching in a classroom at the University. Allegedly, he ran 
toward her in a fit of anger, yelling at her and shaking his fist in her face; 
he pounded the table in front of her as well as her personal belongings on the 
table. She alleges that his intention was to create in her fear and apprehension 
of imminent bodily contact by him and that as a result of his conduct she was in 
fear of and apprehensive about imminent unconsented bodily contact by him. In 
her complaint she did not allege that Steup was acting within the scope of his 
duties as a public employee. She did not bring suit against the University of Wyoming as Steup's employer under a 
respondeat superior theory. Her complaint was solely against Steup individually. 
In her count alleging the intentional infliction of emotional harm, she alleged 
that the extreme and outrageous character of Steup's conduct arose from an 
extreme abuse of his position as a faculty member.

[¶14.]  In his answer to the complaint Steup 
admitted he was a faculty member, but denied he engaged in the alleged tortious 
conduct. His general denial of these allegations placed them in issue. He 
supported his motion for summary judgment with his own affidavit which recited 
in material part that at the time of the alleged incident "I was acting in my 
capacity as her instructor and doing the things that I was requested, required 
and authorized to do by the University of Wyoming, namely teach the independent 
study course entitled PHIL600-03." In granting Steup's motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court evidently concluded as a matter of law, based upon the 
supporting affidavit, that he was acting within the scope of his duties at the 
time of the alleged incident.

[¶15.]  We disagree with that conclusion. Our 
past decisions inform us that the question whether an employee is acting within 
the scope of employment when he commits an intentional tort, for the purposes of 
fixing his employer's vicarious liability, is normally one for the trier of fact 
and becomes one of law when only one reasonable inference can be drawn from the 
evidence. Condict v. Condict, 664 P.2d 131, 135 (Wyo. 1983); Sage Club v. Hunt, 638 P.2d 161, 162-63 
(Wyo. 1981). 
In Milton, 762 P.2d  at 377, we discerned a difference in purpose between the 
term "scope of employment," which concerns the employer's vicarious liability 
for its employee's conduct, and the statutory term "scope of duties," which 
concerns whether the provisions of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act apply and 
afford indemnity protection to the employee by the act's automatic invocation of 
vicarious liability. Our recognition of these different purposes, however, does 
not require that we view the "scope of duties" question any differently from the 
"scope of employment" question. The former question, like the latter one, is 
normally a question for the trier of fact and becomes one of law when only one 
reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence.

[¶16.]  In our judgment, Steup's somewhat 
conclusory affidavit, reciting that he was teaching his course, states nothing 
more than a material fact from which one could infer only that he was acting 
within the scope of his employment by the University, but not that he was acting 
within the scope of his duties. In this regard, we must recall that Milton instructs that an 
actor may well be within the scope of his employment, but still not acting 
within the scope of his duties. It is important to note that Matthews v. Wyoming 
Department of Agriculture, 719 P.2d 216, 220 (Wyo. 1986), assigns to a 
defendant, such as Steup, who is sued in his individual capacity, the obligation 
to establish he was acting within the scope of his duties if he seeks to defend 
the claim against him as an individual on the ground of immunity under the 
Governmental Claims Act. The obligation is to demonstrate in his summary 
judgment materials that the conduct upon which his liability allegedly depends 
consisted of duties which his employing "governmental entity requests, requires 
or authorizes a public employee to perform * * *." W.S. 1-39-103(a)(v). Steup's 
affidavit does not state that the University of Wyoming, as his employing governmental 
entity, requested, required and authorized him as a faculty member employee to 
engage in the particular conduct ascribed to him by Leonczynska in her 
complaint. In fact, as previously noted, Steup's answer denied engaging in that 
particular conduct. 

[¶17.]  Since his affidavit does not state a fact 
from which one could infer that he was acting within the scope of his duties, he 
has failed in his obligation under Matthews to demonstrate no genuine issue of 
material fact existed, that is, his acting within the scope of his duties. We 
hold that questions for the trier of fact exist about whether Steup in fact 
acted in the way Leonczynska alleges, and, if he did, whether he was acting 
within the scope of his duties when so acting.

[¶18.]  In our review of the intentional torts 
pleaded by Leonczynska, we find that the elements of civil assault, as 
recognized in Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 21, 24, 26, 27, 28, 31, 33 and 34 
(1965), are stated, and the technical elements of civil battery, as recognized 
in Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 18-20, are stated. Also stated are the 
elements of intentional infliction of emotional harm, as recognized by this 
court in Leithead v. American Colloid, 721 P.2d 1059, 1064-68 (Wyo. 1986) ("We 
join the vast majority of states and hold that the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, as reflected in § 46 of the Restatement, 
Second, Torts, is a valid cause of action in Wyoming.") Leonczynska's complaint 
has stated at least three claims upon which relief can be granted. With respect 
to the final tort that she pleaded, duress and undue influence, she stated in 
essence that Steup had forced her to submit her final paper regarding the 
subject matter of the class she was attending and to recognize his authority, 
depriving her of the free exercise of her will and her constitutional rights. We 
are unable to decipher what Leonczynska is alleging here; in its present form we 
do not find a legally cognizable claim. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's 
dismissal of this claim.

[¶19.]  In summary, we hold that Leonczynska's 
notice of appeal was timely filed; her failure to file a certificate of 
compliance as prescribed by W.R.A.P. 2.01 and her failure to make appropriate 
page references to the record on appeal in her appellate brief do not warrant 
dismissal of her appeal. We further hold that the trial court erred in granting 
Steup's motion for summary judgment as to the claims of assault, battery, and 
intentional infliction of emotional harm, but not as to the claim of duress and 
undue influence.

[¶20.]  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

CARDINE, C.J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.R.A.P. 2.01 states in 
material part:

             An appeal, civil or criminal, permitted 
by law from a district court to the Supreme Court, shall be taken by filing a 
notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within fifteen (15) days 
from entry of the judgment or final order appealed from and concurrently serving 
the same in accordance with the provisions of Rule 5, W.R.C.P., unless a 
different time is provided by law, except that: (1) upon a showing of excusable 
neglect the district court in any action may extend the time for filing the 
notice of appeal not exceeding fifteen (15) days from the expiration of the 
original time prescribed herein, provided the application for extension of time 
is filed and the order entered prior to the expiration of thirty (30) days from 
entry of judgment or final order appealed from; appellant shall be responsible 
for promptly serving the appellee with a copy of the order extending the time; 
(2) if a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any party may file a 
notice of appeal within fifteen (15) days of the date on which the first notice 
of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed herein, whichever 
period last expires. The running of the time for appeal in a civil case is 
terminated as to all parties by a timely motion made by any party pursuant to 
any of the rules hereinafter enumerated, and the full time for appeal commences 
to run and is to be computed from the entry of any of the following orders made 
upon timely motion under such rules, or when such motions are deemed denied; 
granting or denying a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b), W.R.C.P.; granting 
or denying a motion under Rule 52(b), W.R.C.P., to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required 
if the motion is granted; granting or denying a motion for a new trial under 
Rule 59, W.R.C.P.

* * * * * 
*

Concurrently with filing 
of the notice of appeal, the appellant shall order and either arrange for the 
payment of a transcript of the portions of the evidence deemed necessary for the 
appeal or make application for payment thereof as provided in Rule 10.06; a 
certificate of compliance therewith shall be filed in the case or endorsed upon 
the notice of appeal * * *."

CARDINE, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

[¶21.]  I agree with the majority that appellee's 
affidavit is entirely conclusory and is insufficient to support his motion for 
summary judgment. The affidavit contains no factual statement of what occurred 
in the classroom nor any statement or description of duties and work for which 
he was employed. Our review in such a situation may not reach the confines of 
W.R.C.P. 56 at all.

[¶22.]  W.R.C.P. 56 allows a party to move for 
summary judgment with or without supporting affidavits. W.R.C.P. 56(a) and (b). 
When a motion for summary judgment is based solely on the pleadings, it is 
functionally equivalent to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
under Rule 12(b)(6). Landmark, Inc. v. Stockmen's Bank & Trust Company, 680 P.2d 471, 474 (Wyo. 1984). See 6 Moore's Federal Practice, 
¶ 56.11[2], p. 56-110 (2nd ed. 1988). In other words, the question of whether to 
grant a motion in such a situation is whether the plaintiff has failed to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted if the facts pled are deemed as 
admitted and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Landmark, Inc., 
680 P.2d  at 475. See W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

[¶23.]  The close nexus between the summary 
judgment motion and the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted is evident from our rules of civil procedure and our 
past decisions, i.e., a Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be converted to a motion for 
summary judgment when matters outside the pleadings are presented. W.R.C.P. 
12(b); see Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1096-97 (Wyo. 1987). The 
conversion, however, will not apply when a movant's affidavits contain nothing 
outside the pleading. Sump v. City of Sheridan, 
358 P.2d 637, 640 (Wyo. 1961). In the instant case, movant 
labeled his motion as a summary judgment. Regardless of how the motion is 
labeled, we should treat it as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Treated in this fashion, 
I agree that appellant's complaint states a claim for 
relief.

[¶24.]  I concur in the court's disposition of 
the issues stated in I, II, and III. I am not prepared at this time, however, to 
adopt the Restatement of Torts as the law of this state for claims in civil 
assault and civil battery. I prefer that we await a factual presentation in an 
actual case before deciding those questions.