Case Title: Lake County Council v. Honorable John R. Pera

Citation: 

Docket Number: 18S-CB-442

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 18S-CB-442 
In the Matter of Mandate of Funds for the  
Lake Superior Court;  
Lake County Council and Lake County Auditor, 
Appellants/Cross-Appellees,  
–v–
The Hon. John R. Pera, et al., 
Appellees/Cross-Appellants.  
Decided: May 16, 2019 
Review from the Lake Superior Court, No. 45D10-1702-CB-3 
The Honorable W. Tobin McClamroch, Special Judge  
On Automatic Review under Trial Rule 60.5(B) and Appellate Rule 61 
Per Curiam Opinion 
All Justices concur.   
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
May 16 2019, 12:18 pm
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Per curiam  
In this mandate-of-funds action, the parties’ only remaining dispute is 
over what attorney’s fees and expenses the Judges of the Lake Superior 
Court should recover. The parties put this question to the Special Judge, 
who ruled that the Judges are entitled to recover $176,467.17. Having 
reviewed each side’s challenge to that award, we affirm.  
Facts and Procedural History 
Early in 2017, fourteen Judges of the Lake Superior Court issued an 
Order for Mandate of Funds under Indiana Trial Rule 60.5. The order found 
that valuable court employees are underpaid, endangering the court’s 
ability to continue operating in an efficient manner. The order required the 
Lake County Council and the Lake County Auditor (collectively, “the 
Council”) to provide funding, including scheduled raises, for court 
employees. The order covered over 170 court employees in twelve job 
classifications. According to the Council, complying with the order would 
cost the County between $1.5 and $2.3 million.   
We appointed attorney W. Tobin McClamroch as Special Judge to hear 
the case. Each side retained counsel. Discovery ensued: multiple requests 
for production and interrogatories were used, and two dozen depositions 
were taken. Salary information was compiled. Mediation occurred but was 
unsuccessful in resolving the case. The parties prepared for trial and filed 
pretrial briefs and multi-page lists of witnesses and exhibits.  
A few days before the three-day bench trial was set to start, the parties 
announced they agreed to settle the dispute. At the parties’ request, the trial 
was vacated. The parties then negotiated the specifics of their settlement. 
Their Settlement Agreement and Release is not in the record, but the parties 
agree it includes the following paragraph:     
The County will pay the reasonable legal fees and expenses 
incurred by the Superior Court in prosecuting the Mandate 
Action prior to the dismissal of the Mandate Action. In the 
event the parties are unable to agree to this amount, the parties 
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agree to submit the issue to the Special Judge for a decision. 
Either party may seek review of that decision before the 
Indiana Supreme Court. The Superior Court[ ] agree[s] that the 
Council has no further obligation for attorney fees in this 
matter. 
Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 17.  
The Judges requested $223,234.17 in legal fees and expenses. That 
amount consisted of 237.2 billed hours of attorney Jeffrey C. McDermott at 
$430/hr.; 309.4 billed hours of attorney William J. Barkimer at $245/hr.; 30.4 
billed hours of attorney Matthew C. Branic at $245/hr.; 133.6 billed hours of 
a paralegal at $195/hr.; and expenses totaling $11,935.17. The Council 
opposed the Judges’ request as excessive.  
The parties submitted their dispute over fees and expenses to the Special 
Judge by filing briefs and documentary evidence. In his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, the Special Judge concluded the Judges’ 
expenses and attorneys’ time entries were all reasonable in light of the 
case’s complexity. He found, however, that the Judges should recover no 
more than the reasonable and customary hourly rate for an attorney in Lake 
County, and so he limited the hourly rate to $240/hr. for each of the Judges’ 
attorneys. Id. at 18-19. He accordingly ordered the Council to pay the Judges 
$176,467.17 for their fees and expenses.  
Review has not been waived under T.R. 60.5(B). Therefore, we address 
the Council’s appeal and the Judges’ cross-appeal.    
Discussion and Decision  
We recognize the necessity of proper compensation for attorneys who 
represent courts in mandate cases. Montgomery Cty. Council v. Milligan, 873 
N.E.2d 1043, 1049 (Ind. 2007). The “principal considerations in determining 
the appropriate amount of attorney fees in T.R. 60.5 proceedings” are “the 
logistics problems faced by attorneys who have the burden of proof as to 
the number of employees involved in court processes, the salaries paid 
therefor, the volume of work required to be done by those personnel, and 
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the necessity for the increase in salaries in order to facilitate the work of the 
court.” Id.  
The factors listed in Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a) also 
provide general guidance for determining reasonableness of attorney’s fees. 
Id. Those factors include, among others, “(1) the time and labor required, 
the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite 
to perform the legal service properly; … (3) the fee customarily charged in 
the locality for similar legal services; [and] (4) the amount involved and the 
results obtained[.]” Id. (quoting Prof. Cond. R. 1.5(a)). In any event, a trial 
court’s order in a mandate action shall not “direct that attorney fees be paid 
at a rate greater than the reasonable and customary hourly rate for an 
attorney in the county.” T.R. 60.5(B). 
Generally, we will affirm the action of the special judge in a mandate 
action if there is substantial evidence of probative value to sustain it. 
Schiralli v. Lake Cty. Council, 504 N.E.2d 1020, 1021-22 (Ind. 1987). Where 
reasonableness of attorney’s fees is at issue, we have affirmed absent an 
abuse of discretion. In re Mandate of Funds in the Harrison Super. Ct., 674 
N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ind. 1996). Also, we recognize that a trial judge “possesses 
personal expertise that he or she may use when determining reasonable 
attorney’s fees.” Masters v. Masters, 43 N.E.3d 570, 576 (Ind. 2015). 
I. The Council’s Appeal 
We disagree with the Council’s first argument that $176,467.17 is 
excessive due to the lack of results obtained by the Judges. “Entitlement to 
attorney fees is not contingent on success on the merits.” St. Joseph Cty. 
Comm’rs v. Nemeth, 929 N.E.2d 703, 721 (Ind. 2010). And even if we consider 
the “results obtained” under Prof. Cond. R. 1.5(a)(4), the Council’s 
argument fails because it has not included in the record a copy of the entire 
Settlement Agreement and Release clearly showing what promises, 
arrangements, and concessions each side made in the agreement. Without 
the text of the agreement or an agreed statement of its contents, the Council 
fails to demonstrate that the Judges obtained no results.  
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Moreover, the Council acknowledges the agreement provided for 
employee pay increases in 2018 and included a promise by the Council to 
fund a “supplemental pay” arrangement. Appellants’ Br. at 13-14. For their 
part, the Judges report the agreement also guaranteed that the court’s 
employees would not be evaluated by an outside consultant hired by the 
Council; the Council does not deny it made such a promise. See Appellants’ 
Br. at 22; Appellees’ Br. at 15-16 n.6. As it appears the agreement required 
salary increases for 2018, a “supplemental pay” arrangement, and a promise 
not to use an outside evaluator to review employees, we conclude the 
Judges achieved substantial employee-related results, even if those results 
do not match the precise relief sought when the mandate order was issued.  
Likewise, we find no merit in the Council’s argument that the award 
should be reduced because the case was not complex and the Judges’ 
attorneys overstaffed it and incurred unnecessary expenses. The Council’s 
own submission of approximately sixty pages of appellate briefing indicates 
the case was complex. And while the Special Judge acknowledged the 
Council’s objections, he found “the Judges’ counsel’s time entries and 
expenses are reasonable in light of the complexity of the Mandate Matter.” 
App. Vol. II at 18.  
The record supports the Special Judge’s findings. This case involved over 
170 employees in twelve employment positions, two experts retained by the 
Council, two dozen depositions, multiple witnesses and exhibits, the 
parties’ preparation for both mediation and trial, negotiation of an 
agreement, and briefing of the fees and expenses issue. The evidence 
included the affidavit of McDermott, who stated he has practiced law in 
Indiana since 1986 and served on Krieg DeVault LLP’s Executive 
Committee for twelve years, as the Executive Partner of Krieg DeVault’s 
Hamilton County office for fifteen years, and as chair of Krieg DeVault’s 
litigation practice group for five years. App. Vol. II at 103. The affidavit 
shows McDermott reviewed the billing records and concluded the fees 
reflected in those records were “necessary to properly represent the Judges 
in this matter and are reasonable in light of the time and labor involved, the 
complexity and novelty of the questions presented, the significant 
challenges encountered by this particular case, and the skills required.” Id. 
at 105. McDermott’s affidavit, alone or in conjunction with the Special 
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Judge’s own personal expertise, supports the Special Judge’s finding of 
reasonableness in the Judges’ attorneys’ time entries and expenses.    
II. The Judges’ Cross-Appeal 
The record also supports the Special Judge’s decision that the Judges are 
entitled to recover only $240/hr. for the legal services of McDermott. In 
awarding $240/hr. for McDermott’s services, the Special Judge found “that 
the evidence presented and cases the Council cited are more compelling for 
determining the standard hourly rates in Lake County.” App. Vol. II at 18. 
The Special Judge cited two decisions from the Hammond Division of the 
United States District Court for the Northern Division of Indiana finding 
$240/hr. to be a reasonable hourly fee for an attorney based in Merrillville, 
which is in Lake County. See id. (citing Shabaz v. Senior Care Ins. Servs., No. 
2:16-CV-222-JEM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121151 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 2, 2017); 
McNamee v. Family Focus, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-260, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119606 
(N.D. Ind. July 31, 2017)).  
In their cross-appeal, the Judges note that neither federal decision 
involved a mandate. The Judges also point to an affidavit of attorney Robert 
A. Anderson, which they offered to support their request for $430/hr. for 
McDermott’s services. But the Special Judge did not rely solely on the 
federal decisions. And the Council’s evidence included an affidavit of John 
S. Dull, attorney for the Lake County Commissioners. Dull’s affidavit states 
that for decades he has hired attorneys to provide legal services on behalf of 
the Commissioners. It states that the hourly rates for attorneys hired to 
provide “litigation work,” including some attorneys with decades of 
experience, range from $150/hr. to $200/hr. App. Vol. III at 118. Thus, a 
finding that the Judges should recover $240/hr. for McDermott’s services 
was within the range of the evidence presented. 
Finally, we deny the Judges’ request for an opportunity to submit 
evidence of their appellate legal fees and expenses. The agreement does not 
explicitly provide for payment of appellate fees and expenses. And, in any 
event, we conclude that an additional award for such expenses is 
unwarranted here. The amount already awarded—$176,467.17—is  
substantial. The Judges have not incurred any appellate filing fee or costs 
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for a transcript. Their appellate briefs largely repackaged the written 
arguments made to the Special Judge, and those briefs contain a cross-
appeal that lacks merit. And the case has been pending for two years; 
further litigation over fees and expenses would increase the case’s costs to 
taxpayers and delay final resolution. 
Conclusion  
We affirm, concluding that substantial evidence supports the $176,467.17 
award to the Judges and that the Special Judge did not abuse his discretion.       
All Justices concur.  
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L A N TS/ C R OSS -A P PE LL EES  
Anthony W. Overholt 
Maggie L. Smith 
Frost Brown Todd LLC 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L E ES/ C R OSS - AP P EL LA N TS  
Jeffrey C. McDermott 
William J. Barkimer 
Krieg DeVault LLP 
Carmel, Indiana