Case Title: Advisory Opinion to Governor re Implementation of Amendment 4, The Voting Restoration Amendment

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC19-1341

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1341 
____________ 
 
 
ADVISORY OPINION TO THE GOVERNOR RE: IMPLEMENTATION 
OF AMENDMENT 4, THE VOTING RESTORATION AMENDMENT. 
 
January 16, 2020 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
By letter dated August 9, 2019, Governor Ron DeSantis requested the 
opinion of the justices of this Court as to the interpretation of a portion of the 
Florida Constitution upon a question affecting his executive powers and duties.  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. IV, § 1(c), Fla. Const.   
Specifically, the Governor requests advice regarding the meaning of certain 
language that was added to article VI, section 4 of the Florida Constitution by the 
approval on November 6, 2018, of an initiative petition—commonly referred to as 
“Amendment 4”—that restores the voting rights of certain convicted felons “upon 
completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation.”  Art. VI, § 4(a), 
Fla. Const.  The Governor asks whether the phrase “all terms of sentence” 
encompasses legal financial obligations (LFOs)—fines, restitution, costs, and 
 
- 2 - 
fees—ordered by the sentencing court.  We answer in the affirmative, concluding 
that “all terms of sentence” encompasses not just durational periods but also all 
LFOs imposed in conjunction with an adjudication of guilt. 
The Governor’s letter in relevant part states: 
I request your interpretation of whether “completion of all terms of 
sentence” encompasses financial obligations, such as fines, fees and 
restitution (“legal financial obligations” or “LFOs”) imposed by the 
court in the sentencing order. 
Prior to Amendment 4’s placement on the ballot, this Court was 
asked to determine whether the amendment met the legal 
requirements under Florida’s Constitution.  On March 6, 2017, during 
a colloquy between the justices and Amendment 4’s sponsor, 
Floridians for a Fair Democracy (“Sponsor”), this Court was assured 
the Amendment presented a “fair question” and “clear explanation” to 
voters.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 2, Advisory Op. to the 
Attorney General Re: Voting Restoration Amend., 215 So. 3d 1202 
(Fla. 2017) (Nos. SC16-1785 and SC16-1981).  Addressing a question 
posed by Justice Polston as to whether “completion of [all] terms” 
included “full payment of any fines,” the Sponsor responded, “Yes, 
sir . . . All terms means all terms within the four corners.”  Id. at 4.  
Justice Lawson similarly asked, “You said that terms of sentence 
includes fines and costs . . . that’s the way it’s generally pronounced 
in criminal court, would it also include restitution when it was ordered 
to the victim as part of the sentence?”  Id. at 10.  The Sponsor 
answered, “Yes.”  Id.  Justice Pariente posited the inclusion of fees, 
fines, and restitution as part of the completion of sentence “would 
actually help the state because if fines, costs and restitution are a 
requirement . . . for those that want to vote, there’s a big motivation to 
pay unpaid costs, fines and restitution.”  Id. at 11.  Ultimately, the 
Court found Amendment 4 clearly and unambiguously informed 
voters the chief purpose of the proposed amendment was to 
“automatically restore voting rights to felony offenders, except those 
convicted of murder or felony sexual offenses, upon completion of all 
terms of their sentence.”  Advisory Op., 215 So. 3d at 1208 (emphasis 
added). 
 
- 3 - 
In alignment with the colloquy with the Florida Supreme Court, 
after Amendment 4 was approved by voters, the ACLU of Florida, 
League of Women Voters of Florida, LatinoJustice, and the Florida 
Rights Restoration Coalition delivered a letter to former Secretary of 
State Ken Detzner regarding implementation of Amendment 4.  
Exhibit 1, December 13, 2018 Letter.  In part, the letter explained, 
 
The phrase “completion of all terms of sentence” 
includes any period of incarceration, probation, parole 
and financial obligations imposed as part of an 
individual’s sentence.  The financial obligations may 
include restitution and fines, imposed as part of a 
sentence or a condition of probation under existing 
Florida statute.  Fees not specifically identified as part of 
a sentence or a condition of probation are therefore not 
necessary for ‘completion of sentence’ and thus, do not 
need to be paid before an individual may register.  We 
urge the Department to take this view in reviewing 
eligibility of individuals registered to vote as outlined in 
Chapter 98, Florida Statutes. 
 
Ex. 1, p. 3 (emphasis added). 
During the 2019 Legislative Session, legislators in both 
chambers debated legislative implementation of Amendment 4.  
Ultimately, both chambers passed CS/SB 7066 and, on June 28, 2019, 
I signed it into law.  See Ch. 2019-162, Laws of Fla.  In relevant part, 
chapter 2019-162, section 25, Laws of Florida, creating section 
98.0751, Florida Statutes, provided guidance on restoration of voting 
rights and determination of ineligibility pursuant to the amendment of 
Article VI, section 4 of the Florida Constitution.  Section 98.0751, 
Florida Statutes, defines “[c]ompletion of all terms of sentence” as 
“any portion of a sentence that is contained in the four corners of the 
sentencing document.”  § 98.0751(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2019).  The 
Legislature provided five categories of terms included in the 
sentencing document: . . . (5) full payment of LFOs ordered by the 
court as part of the sentence.  See § 98.0751(2)(a)l.-5., Fla. Stat. 
(2019). 
On June 15, 2019, Luis Mendez filed a complaint in the 
Northern District of Florida seeking injunctive and declaratory relief 
and mandamus challenging chapter 2019-162, Laws of Florida.  In 
 
- 4 - 
part, Mendez alleges chapter 2019-162, Laws of Florida, violates 
Article VI, section 4 of the Florida Constitution because it adds 
requirements for the restoration of voting rights above what was 
prescribed in the Florida Constitution.  Additional complaints were 
filed by numerous plaintiffs, including organizations referenced 
above, alleging provisions of chapter 2019-162, Laws of Florida 
violate the First, Eighth, Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution.  These challenges are only directed 
at chapter 2019-162, Laws of Florida, and do not question the 
constitutionality of Article VI, section 4 of the Florida Constitution. 
Article IV, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution prescribes 
the supreme executive power shall be vested in the Governor, that he 
“shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed” and “transact all 
necessary business with the officers of government.”  Article IV, 
section 6 of the Florida Constitution places direct administration and 
supervision of all functions of the executive branch, including the 
Department of State, under the constitutional authority of the 
Governor.  See also § 20.02(3), Fla. Stat. (the administration of any 
executive branch entity shall at all times be [“]under the constitutional 
executive authority of the Governor”); § 20.10, Fla. Stat. (creating the 
Department of State, headed by the Secretary of State who is 
appointed by the Governor).  Furthermore, the Secretary of State is 
the chief elections officer with the responsibility to maintain 
uniformity in the interpretation and implementation of voter 
registration and election laws.  See § 97.012, Fla. Stat. 
. . . . 
I, as Governor of Florida, . . . want to ensure the proper 
implementation of Article VI, section 4 of the Florida Constitution 
and, if applicable, chapter 2019-162, Laws of Florida.  This includes 
the ability to direct the Department of State to fully implement Article 
VI, section 4 of the Florida Constitution by determining whether a 
convicted felon has completed all terms of their sentence, including 
the satisfaction of LFOs.  I will not infringe on the proper restoration 
of an individual’s right to vote under the Florida Constitution. 
Understanding there is ongoing litigation in federal court 
challenging chapter 2019-162, Laws of Florida under the First, 
Eighth, Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution, I do not ask this Court to address any issues 
regarding chapter 2019-162, Laws of Florida or the United States 
Constitution.  
 
- 5 - 
Therefore, I respectfully request an opinion of the Justices of 
the Supreme Court of Florida as to the question of whether 
“completion of all terms of sentence” under Article VI, section 4 of 
the Florida Constitution includes the satisfaction of all legal financial 
obligations—namely fees, fines and restitution ordered by the court as 
part of a felony sentence that would otherwise render a convicted 
felon ineligible to vote. 
 
Letter from Governor Ron DeSantis to Chief Justice Charles T. Canady dated 
August 9, 2019, at 1-4 (some alterations in original) (footnote omitted). 
After concluding that the Governor’s request was within the purview of 
article IV, section 1(c) of the Florida Constitution, we agreed to exercise our 
discretion to provide an advisory opinion.  We also permitted interested parties to 
file briefs and to present oral argument before the Court.  See art. IV, § 1(c), Fla. 
Const.1  During oral argument, counsel for the Governor made clear that the 
Governor requests advice solely as to the narrow question of whether the phrase 
                                          
 
 
1.  Timely initial briefs were submitted by the following: (1) Governor Ron 
DeSantis; (2) The Florida Senate; and Bill Galvano, in his official capacity as 
President of the Florida Senate; (3) The Florida House of Representatives; (4) 
Secretary of State, Laurel M. Lee; (5) Adam Richardson; (6) Mark R. Schlakman, 
joined by The Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; (7) Fair Elections 
Center; (8) The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, American 
Civil Liberties Union Foundation, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 
Inc., Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, Florida State Conference 
of Branches and Youth Units of the NAACP, Orange County Branch of the 
NAACP, and League of Women Voters of Florida; (9) Jennifer LaVia and Carla 
Laroche; and (10) Bonnie Raysor, Diane Sherrill, and Lee Hoffman. 
 
- 6 - 
“all terms of sentence” includes LFOs ordered by the sentencing court.  We answer 
only that question. 
The arguments presented by the interested parties generally fall into one of 
two categories.  On the one hand, the Governor, the Florida Senate, the Florida 
House of Representatives, and the Secretary of State (collectively, the State 
Parties) all argue that “all terms of sentence” includes all LFOs ordered by the 
sentencing judge.  They largely rely on plain language, case law, and the common 
understanding of penalties imposed for criminal acts.  On the other hand, the 
remaining interested parties (collectively, the Non-State Parties) present varying 
arguments against some or all LFOs being included within the scope of “all terms 
of sentence.”  Some Non-State Parties argue that “all terms of sentence” refers to 
durational periods rather than to obligations and thus contemplates only periods of 
imprisonment and supervised release.  Others assume that “all terms of sentence” 
refers to obligations including some LFOs, but they argue for the exclusion of 
certain LFOs.  These latter Non-State Parties focus on what they label as punitive 
aspects of a sentence and on what they consider to be the technical components of 
a criminal sentence. 
The answer to the Governor’s question largely turns on whether “all terms of 
sentence” encompasses all obligations or only durational periods.  We conclude 
that the phrase, when read and understood in context, plainly refers to obligations 
 
- 7 - 
and includes “all”—not some—LFOs imposed in conjunction with an adjudication 
of guilt.  Before explaining our opinion, we briefly address our jurisdiction as well 
as the Secretary of State’s concerns that the events leading up to the adoption of 
Amendment 4 and the subsequent legal challenges to chapter 2019-162 amount to 
a “bait and switch” attempt to amend our State’s governing document. 
JURISDICTION 
Article IV, section 1(c) of the Florida Constitution authorizes the Governor 
to “request in writing the opinion of the justices of the supreme court as to the 
interpretation of any portion of this constitution upon any question affecting the 
governor’s executive powers and duties.”  Upon receiving such a request, “the 
justices shall determine whether the request is within the purview of article IV, 
section 1(c).”  Fla. R. App. P. 9.500(b).  Here, we readily concluded that the 
Governor’s question is answerable.  In particular, the question affects the 
Governor’s constitutional responsibility to “take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed,” art. IV, § 1(a), Fla. Const., and the exercise of his clemency powers, art. 
IV, § 8(a), Fla. Const. 
Certain Non-State Parties nevertheless question our jurisdiction, but their 
arguments are meritless.  These Non-State Parties argue, for example, that it is 
inappropriate for this Court to issue an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of 
a statute and that the Governor in effect impermissibly seeks advice regarding the 
 
- 8 - 
necessity or validity of chapter 2019-162 and the interpretation of its provisions.  
But neither the existence of chapter 2019-162 nor the possibility that our advice 
may touch upon that legislation precludes us from answering the Governor’s 
question.  Indeed, though the Governor’s request does not ask us directly to 
address the constitutionality of chapter 2019-162, we note that this Court since 
19682 has issued advisory opinions to the Governor addressing the validity of 
legislation that affected his executive powers and duties.  E.g., In re Advisory 
Opinion of Governor Civil Rights, 306 So. 2d 520, 521-22 (Fla. 1975) (concluding 
that the Florida Correctional Reform Act of 1974—an act that had already been 
signed into law and that purported to reinstate the civil rights of convicted felons 
under certain circumstances—“constitute[d] a clear infringement upon the 
constitutional power of the Governor to restore civil rights”).3  In any event, given 
the narrow question presented here, we need not address chapter 2019-162.  
                                          
 
 
2.  The 1968 Constitution for the first time permitted interested parties to be 
heard in advisory opinion cases.  See In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 243 So. 
2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1971) (examining the constitutionality of a proposed corporate 
income tax and recognizing that “Section 1(c), Article IV, Constitution of 1968, 
enlarged to some extent the power of this Court to be of assistance”); Opinion to 
the Governor, 239 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1970) (examining the constitutionality of the 
1970 General Appropriations Act and recognizing that it was “noteworthy that in 
the 1968 constitutional revision, authority and direction were given this Court to 
permit interested persons to be heard”). 
 
3.  Civil Rights reiterated this Court’s long-held view “that the power of 
pardon is reposed exclusively in the . . . executive” and is not to be infringed upon 
by the other branches.  306 So. 2d at 522; see also Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 
 
- 9 - 
These Non-State Parties additionally argue among other things that the 
Governor’s request impermissibly concerns the duties of his subordinates rather 
than his sole authority.  But in Advisory Opinion to Governor—1996 Amendment 5 
(Everglades), 706 So. 2d 278, 280-81 (Fla. 1997), this Court’s conclusion that the 
question there fell “within the purview of article IV, section 1(c)” was based in part 
on the fact that the constitutional amendment at issue directly affected the 
Governor’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws, including the duty to 
provide certain agencies “with direction as to their enforcement responsibilities.”  
Here, the Governor’s question about the meaning of Amendment 4 similarly 
affects among other things his general constitutional duties, including the duty to 
provide the Department of State with necessary direction regarding the 
implementation of voter registration laws. 
The Governor’s request satisfies the requirements of article IV, section 1(c).   
AMENDMENT 4—BACKGROUND 
Prior to Amendment 4’s adoption, article VI, section 4(a) of the Florida 
Constitution permanently disenfranchised all felons absent a grant of executive 
clemency.  See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (“[T]he exclusion 
                                          
 
312, 315 (Fla. 1977) (noting that article IV, section 8 of the Florida Constitution 
“vest[ed] sole, unrestricted, unlimited discretion exclusively in the executive” in 
restoring civil rights).   
 
- 10 - 
of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . .”).  The text of Amendment 4, which amended article VI, section 
4, provided in pertinent part: 
Article VI, Section 4. Disqualifications.— 
 
(a) No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or any other 
state to be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold 
office until restoration of civil rights or removal of disability.  Except 
as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any disqualification from 
voting arising from a felony conviction shall terminate and voting 
rights shall be restored upon completion of all terms of sentence 
including parole or probation. 
 
(b) No person convicted of murder or a felony sexual offense shall be 
qualified to vote until restoration of civil rights. 
 
In 2016—two years before the voters approved Amendment 4—this Court 
was asked by the Attorney General whether Amendment 4 met the legal 
requirements for placement on the ballot.  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Voting 
Restoration Amendment, 215 So. 3d 1202 (Fla. 2017).  This Court unanimously 
answered in the affirmative.  Id. at 1209.  In its brief to this Court arguing in 
support of Amendment 4 being placed on the ballot, Amendment 4’s sponsor, 
Floridians for a Fair Democracy (the Sponsor), asserted: “Specifically, the drafters 
intend that individuals with felony convictions, excluding those convicted of 
murder or a felony sexual offense, will automatically regain their right to vote 
upon fulfillment of all obligations imposed under their criminal sentence.”  Initial 
Brief of Sponsor at 2, Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Voting Restoration 
 
- 11 - 
Amendment, 215 So. 3d 1202 (Fla. 2017) (Nos. SC16-1785 & SC16-1981) 
(emphasis added).  In other words, the Sponsor intended that “all terms” refer to 
obligations, not durational periods.  No briefs were submitted in opposition to 
Amendment 4. 
Oral argument in that case took place on March 6, 2017.  During the oral 
argument, counsel for the Sponsor stated—consistent with the Sponsor’s brief—
that the operative language in Amendment 4 “means all matters—anything that a 
judge puts into a sentence.”  As noted in the Governor’s letter, that oral argument 
involved discussion of LFOs—including fines, costs, and restitution—as well as 
the process for confirming payment of LFOs.  Counsel for the Sponsor summed up 
by reiterating that Amendment 4 was intended to be “a restoration of voting rights 
under these specific conditions.”  It is beyond dispute that the Sponsor expressed 
the intention that “all terms of sentence” include all LFOs ordered by the 
sentencing judge. 
As the Secretary notes here, the Sponsor advertised a similar message to the 
voting public via its “Paid Political Advertisement” website.  See Initial Brief of 
Secretary of State at 7, and App. at 33-68.  Among other things, the website states 
in bold-italicized text that “Amendment 4 restores the eligibility to vote to people 
with past felony convictions who fully complete their entire sentence – including 
any probation, parole, and restitution – before earning back the eligibility to vote.” 
 
- 12 - 
As the Secretary also notes, similar messages were disseminated by some of 
the very same nonprofit organizations that are currently involved in the lawsuits 
challenging chapter 2019-162 and that now argue to this Court that “all terms of 
sentence” simply refers to durational periods.  See Initial Brief of Secretary at 9.  
For example, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida (ACLU of 
Florida) in its 2018 voter guide informed voters that Amendment 4 “includ[ed] any 
probation, parole, fines, or restitution.”  See id. at 7, and App. at 69.  Indeed, the 
ACLU of Florida and other organizations along with the Sponsor spread a 
consistent message before and after Amendment 4’s adoption.  As noted in the 
Governor’s letter, the signatories of the December 2018 letter to then-Secretary 
Detzner asserting in part that Amendment 4 required payment of “financial 
obligations imposed as part of an individual’s sentence” included the ACLU of 
Florida as well as Florida Rights Restoration Coalition, the organization that, 
according to the Secretary, created the Sponsor.4 
Although the representations to this Court and to the public close the door on 
any credible suggestion that “all terms of sentence” was intended by the Sponsor to 
refer only to durational periods, we need not address whether Amendment 4 
                                          
 
 
4.  In a subsequent March 2019 letter to current Secretary Lee, those same 
organizations and others identified themselves as the “organizations that led the 
effort to pass Amendment 4.”  See Initial Brief of Governor at 5, and App. at 8, 12. 
 
- 13 - 
involved a “bait and switch” attempt to amend our State’s constitution.  Indeed, our 
opinion is based not on the Sponsor’s subjective intent or campaign statements, but 
rather on the objective meaning of the constitutional text.  The language at issue, 
read in context, has an unambiguous “ordinary meaning” that the voters “would 
most likely understand,” Everglades, 706 So. 2d at 283, to encompass obligations 
including LFOs.  The Sponsor’s expressed intent and campaign statements simply 
are consistent with that ordinary meaning that would have been understood by the 
voters. 
ANALYSIS 
The Governor asks whether the phrase “all terms of sentence,” as used in 
article VI, section 4, encompasses LFOs imposed by the sentencing court.  The 
interpretation of a constitutional provision involves “a question of law.”  Crist v. 
Fla. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Inc. (FACDL), 978 So. 2d 134, 139 (Fla. 
2008).  In interpreting constitutional language, “this Court follows principles 
parallel to those of statutory interpretation.  First and foremost, this Court must 
examine the actual language used in the Constitution.  If that language is clear, 
unambiguous, and addresses the matter in issue,” then our task is at an end.  
Graham v. Haridopolos, 108 So. 3d 597, 603 (Fla. 2013) (quoting FACDL, 978 
So. 2d at 139-40). 
 
- 14 - 
But this Court has sometimes suggested that the first step in construing a 
constitutional provision may involve something other than determining the 
objective meaning of the text.  See, e.g., Williams v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 417, 419 
(Fla. 1978) (“In construing the Constitution, we first seek to ascertain the intent of 
the framers and voters, and to interpret the provision before us in the way that will 
best fulfill that intent.”).  We believe that such statements can be misleading 
because they may be understood to shift the focus of interpretation from the text 
and its context to extraneous considerations.  And such extraneous considerations 
can result in the judicial imposition of meaning that the text cannot bear, either 
through expansion or contraction of the meaning carried by the text.  We therefore 
adhere to the “supremacy-of-text principle”: “The words of a governing text are of 
paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text 
means.”  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts 56 (2012). 
We also adhere to the view expressed long ago by Justice Joseph Story 
concerning the interpretation of constitutional texts (a view equally applicable to 
other texts): “[E]very word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its 
plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to 
control, qualify, or enlarge it.”  Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of 
the United States 157-58 (1833), quoted in Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 69. 
 
- 15 - 
This Court in construing constitutional language approved by the voters 
often “looks to dictionary definitions of the terms because we recognize that, ‘in 
general, a dictionary may provide the popular and common-sense meaning of 
terms presented to the voters.’ ”  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Use of Marijuana 
for Certain Med. Conditions, 132 So. 3d 786, 800 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Everglades, 
706 So. 2d at 282).  The dictionary meaning of the word “terms,” when viewed in 
isolation, can refer either to multiple durational periods or to multiple obligations 
or conditions.  See The American Heritage Dictionary 1796 (5th ed. 2011) 
(defining “term” as “[a] limited or established period of time that something is 
supposed to last, as . . . a prison sentence”; and as “a condition”). 
But the fact that the word “terms” itself can carry different meanings does 
not render the phrase “all terms of sentence,” as used in Amendment 4, susceptible 
to more than one natural reading.  See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 233 
(1993) (“[A] single word cannot be read in isolation . . . .”).  As the Supreme Court 
has explained, “[I]t is a ‘fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, 
indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in 
isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.’ ”  Textron 
Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., Avco Corp. v. United Auto., Aerospace, 
Agric. Implement Workers of Am., Int’l Union, 523 U.S. 653, 657 (1998) (quoting 
Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993)).  And when viewed in context, 
 
- 16 - 
“all terms of sentence” has only one natural reading—one that refers to all 
obligations, not just durational periods. 
As the Governor and others correctly note, Amendment 4 refers to the voting 
disqualification arising from “a felony conviction” and later refers to “all terms of” 
the singular “sentence” resulting from that singular conviction.  See art. VI, § 4(a), 
Fla. Const.  We know from its explicit reference to “parole or probation” that 
Amendment 4 uses the term “sentence” to designate more than just imprisonment.  
And an overall “sentence”—as that word is used in Amendment 4—is naturally 
viewed as having only one durational term rather than multiple durational terms. 
For example, in Ramirez, in which the Supreme Court concluded that the 
Fourteenth Amendment affirmatively authorizes felon disenfranchisement, the 
Court despite referring collectively to the respondents’ “terms of incarceration and 
parole,” 418 U.S. at 34, referred in the singular to an individual felon having 
“completed the serving of his term,” 418 U.S. at 55; see also id. at 56-57 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Each of the respondents . . . had fully served his term of 
incarceration and parole.”).  It would be entirely unnatural, of course, to say that a 
felon convicted of a singular felony had “completed the serving of his terms” when 
the time of his incarceration and parole had been completed.  Although a singular, 
overall “sentence” naturally has only one durational term (albeit sometimes with 
 
- 17 - 
distinct components), it can have multiple conditions or obligations—i.e., “terms.”  
Indeed, that is the only natural reading of “all terms of sentence.” 
Certain Non-State Parties advance various arguments for why we should in 
fact read the words “all terms” to refer solely to durational periods.  We are not 
persuaded by their arguments. 
At first blush, the strongest argument advanced by these Non-State Parties is 
a contextual one.  They note that Amendment 4 does not expressly mention LFOs 
but does mention “parole or probation,” which are forms of supervised release that, 
like incarceration, can each be said to have a durational “term.”  They thus argue 
that those two forms of supervised release provide an “illustrative list” to guide this 
Court “in [its] interpretation of” Amendment 4.  White v. Mederi Caretenders 
Visiting Servs. of Se. Fla., LLC, 226 So. 3d 774, 784 (Fla. 2017).  This line of 
reasoning, however, is ultimately premised upon two canons of construction that 
do not apply in this context. 
First, under the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon, “the mention of 
one thing implies the exclusion of another.”  Id. at 781.  But this Court has noted 
that “[g]enerally, it is improper to apply expressio unius to a statute in which the 
Legislature used the word ‘include,’ ” as that is “a word of expansion, not one of 
limitation.”  Id.  Here, the phrase “parole or probation” comes immediately after 
the word “including.” 
 
- 18 - 
Second, under the ejusdem generis canon, “where general words or phrases 
follow an enumeration of specific words or phrases, ‘the general words are 
construed as applying to the same kind or class as those that are specifically 
mentioned.’ ”  Marijuana for Certain Med. Conditions, 132 So. 3d at 801 (quoting 
Fayad v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 1082, 1088-89 (Fla. 2005)).  
Application of the canon thus requires that the enumeration of specifics precede 
the general words.  But Amendment 4 involves the exact opposite: the specific 
words (“parole or probation”) follow the general words (“all terms”). 
A glaring problem with the arguments advanced by these Non-State Parties 
is that their preferred reading of Amendment 4 effectively renders superfluous the 
words “all terms of” in the constitutional text.  These Non-State Parties interpret 
Amendment 4 as if it had omitted the words “all terms of” and simply read: “upon 
completion of sentence including parole or probation.”  The words “all terms of” 
serve no meaningful purpose under the reading advanced by these Non-State 
Parties.  This Court, of course, ordinarily avoids interpretations that “render any 
language superfluous.”  Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Millender, 666 So. 2d 882, 886 
(Fla. 1996).  Indeed, just as we do not “add words” to a constitutional provision, 
we are similarly “not at liberty to . . . ignore words that were expressly placed there 
at the time of adoption of the provision.”  Pleus v. Crist, 14 So. 3d 941, 945 (Fla. 
2009). 
 
- 19 - 
In the end, Amendment 4 was not drafted to require completion of “the term 
of sentence including parole or probation.”  Nor was it drafted to require 
completion of “all terms of . . . incarceration, probation, and parole.”  Johnson v. 
Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1216 (11th Cir. 2005) (describing the 
status of members of plaintiff class in that case).  Amendment 4 was drafted to 
require completion of “all terms of sentence.”  Art. VI, § 4(a), Fla. Const.  That 
language—which appears to be new to Florida jurisprudence—has only one 
natural reading. 
Perhaps not coincidentally, certain courts—in the specific context of 
rejecting various challenges to re-enfranchisement schemes that require payment of 
certain LFOs—have used language similar to “all terms of sentence” to refer to 
obligations.  These cases further undercut the argument that Amendment 4 refers 
only to durational periods.  They demonstrate that phrases such as “all terms of 
sentence” are naturally understood to encompass more than durational periods.  
Most notably, the Supreme Court of Washington used nearly identical 
language to that at issue here in upholding against certain attacks a re-
enfranchisement scheme that required a felon to complete “all requirements of the 
sentence, including any and all legal financial obligations.”  Madison v. 
Washington, 163 P.3d 757, 763 (Wash. 2007) (quoting Wash. Rev. Code 
9.94A.637(1)(a) (2004)).  The LFO requirement there specifically included costs 
 
- 20 - 
and fees.  Id. at 761 n.1.  In describing the respondents who were suing to have 
their voting rights restored, the court noted that each “has satisfied all of the terms 
of his sentence, with the exception of full payment of his LFOs.”  Id. at 762 
(emphasis added); see also State v. Donaghe, 256 P.3d 1171, 1178 (Wash. 2011) 
(“In Madison . . . , we upheld the disenfranchisement of felons who have satisfied 
the terms of their sentences, except for paying legal financial obligations.”).  
Madison’s reference to “all of the terms of” a singular, overall “sentence” refers to 
requirements or obligations in addition to durational periods.  163 P.3d at 762. 
Two Circuit Courts of Appeals have used somewhat similar language in a 
related context.  See Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 745, 749 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(rejecting certain challenges to Tennessee’s re-enfranchisement scheme that 
required felons to among other things have paid all restitution, and describing 
Madison as having upheld “a statute conditioning re-enfranchisement on 
completion of all terms of felons’ sentences, including full payment of their 
financial legal obligations”); Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1070, 1079 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (rejecting certain challenges to Arizona’s re-enfranchisement scheme 
that required felons to among other things have paid all fines and restitution, and 
concluding that the state had “a rational basis for restoring voting rights only to 
those felons who have completed the terms of their sentences, which includes the 
 
- 21 - 
payment of any fines or restitution orders”—that is, “only those who have satisfied 
their debts to society through fulfilling the terms of a criminal sentence”). 
The similar language used by these courts—all in the specific context of 
felon re-enfranchisement—underscores that the phrase “all terms of sentence” 
naturally encompasses obligations.  Indeed, in the unrelated context of lawyer 
discipline, the Supreme Court of South Carolina used a similar phrase in a similar 
manner.  See In re Allmon, 753 S.E.2d 544, 545 (S.C. 2014) (“Respondent shall 
complete all terms of his criminal sentence, including payment of restitution and 
completion of probation, prior to filing a Petition for Reinstatement.”). 
We conclude that “all terms of sentence” plainly encompasses not only 
durational terms but also obligations and therefore includes all LFOs imposed in 
conjunction with an adjudication of guilt.  As explained next, we reject as overly 
technical the arguments advanced by certain Non-State Parties that Amendment 4 
encompasses only some LFOs. 
One Non-State Party argues that costs and fees are categorically excluded 
from “all terms of sentence” because those LFOs do not bear any of the hallmarks 
of a “sentence.”  Another Non-State Party argues that Amendment 4 includes only 
those LFOs mentioned in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(d) (Form for 
Sentencing) and excludes all LFOs listed in any of rule 3.986’s other forms (e.g., 
Form for Restitution Order (rule 3.986(g)).  But these Non-State Parties improperly 
 
- 22 - 
view the phrase “all terms of sentence” as a term of art that turns on a nuanced 
legal analysis of the word “sentence.”  Indeed, their attempts to isolate and parse 
the word “sentence” to carve out certain LFOs improperly interprets that word “in 
a technical sense” absent any “suggest[ion]” in the text of Amendment 4 that the 
word was to be given something other than its “most usual and obvious meaning.”  
Wilson v. Crews, 34 So. 2d 114, 118 (Fla. 1948) (quoting City of Jacksonville v. 
Glidden Co., 169 So. 216, 217 (Fla. 1936)).  These opponents also implausibly 
suggest that the voters who adopted Amendment 4 would have understood the 
comprehensive phrase “all terms” to include only those terms that courts deem 
“punitive.”  Here, “the natural and popular meaning in which,” id., the voters 
would understand the broad phrase “all terms of sentence” is that it includes all 
obligations imposed in conjunction with an adjudication of guilt. 
The word “sentence” is not defined in the Florida Constitution or seemingly 
anywhere in the Florida Statutes.  But the word is defined in various dictionaries.  
See, e.g., Sentence, Black’s Law Dictionary 1569 (10th ed. 2014) (“The judgment 
that a court formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty; the 
punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer”).  The word is also defined in 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700(a) to mean “the pronouncement by the 
court of the penalty imposed on a defendant for the offense of which the defendant 
has been adjudged guilty.”  Rule 3.701(b)(2) later explains that punishment is the 
 
- 23 - 
“primary” but not the sole “purpose of sentencing.”  That rule also uses the words 
“penalty” and “sanction.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.701(b)(3)-(4). 
As one example of why the word “sentence” cannot be construed in an 
overly technical fashion here, Amendment 4 expressly includes “parole” within its 
scope, and yet courts have explicitly or implicitly distinguished parole from a 
“sentence.”  E.g., Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 26 (noting that the respondents had 
“completed the service of their respective sentences and paroles”).  It is for a 
similar reason—among many others—that the answer to the Governor’s question 
cannot be limited to any one form set forth in rule 3.986.  Indeed, parole cannot be 
captured by any of those forms.  Parole, of course, is granted, and its terms set, by 
the Florida Commission on Offender Review, not by a sentencing judge.  See 
generally chs. 947-49, Fla. Stat. (2019).  In other words, parole is not 
“pronounce[d] by the court.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.700(a). 
Amendment 4 thus uses the word “sentence” in its plain, common sense.  
And it does so in the context of the broad phrase “all terms of sentence.”  Absent 
any suggestion in the context of Amendment 4 that the word “sentence” carries a 
technical meaning restricting its scope, there is no basis to conclude that “all terms 
of sentence” excludes any LFOs ordered by the sentencing judge.  Indeed, an 
abundance of statutory and case law supports the conclusion that fines, restitution, 
 
- 24 - 
and fees and costs all comfortably fit within the ordinary meaning of “all terms of 
sentence.” 
Beginning with restitution, this Court has referred to that obligation as part 
of a “sentence,” and even as “punishment.”  See, e.g., Noel v. State, 191 So. 3d 
370, 375 (Fla. 2016) (“The ‘purpose of restitution is not only to compensate the 
victim, but also to serve the rehabilitative, deterrent, and retributive goals of the 
criminal justice system.’ ” (quoting State v. Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 
1991))); Kirby v. State, 863 So. 2d 238, 244 (Fla. 2003) (recognizing “the trial 
court’s statutory obligation to impose restitution as part of the criminal sanction”); 
Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913, 914 (Fla. 1997) (“As part of his sentence, he 
was also ordered to pay restitution to Beall’s.”); State v. Champe, 373 So. 2d 874, 
880 (Fla. 1978) (“Punishment in the form of restitution is not a novel 
concept . . . .”).  Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has noted that “[s]entencing 
courts are required to impose restitution as part of the sentence for specified 
crimes.”  Manrique v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1266, 1270 (2017).  Certain 
legislative enactments also support including restitution within the meaning of “all 
terms of sentence.”  See, e.g., § 812.15(7), Fla. Stat. (2019) (“The court shall, in 
addition to any other sentence authorized by law, sentence a person convicted of 
violating this section to make restitution as authorized by law.”); § 921.0026(2)(e), 
 
- 25 - 
Fla. Stat. (2019) (authorizing downward departure sentences if “[t]he need for 
payment of restitution to the victim outweighs the need for a prison sentence”).   
An analysis of fines looks remarkably similar.  Indeed, this Court has 
referred to fines as part of a “sentence.”  E.g., Morganti v. State, 573 So. 2d 820, 
821 (Fla. 1991) (“A lawful sentence may comprise several penalties, such as 
incarceration, probation, and a fine.”); see id. (“[A] sentence of five and one-half 
years’ incarceration, eighteen months’ probation, and a $10,000 fine is clearly not 
a more severe sentence than fifteen years’ incarceration.”).  So, too, has the 
Supreme Court.  See S. Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 349-50 (2012) 
(observing that criminal fines “undeniably” fall within the purview of a 
“sentence”).  And, again, certain legislative enactments support including fines 
within the ordinary meaning of “all terms of sentence.”  See, e.g., § 775.083(1), 
Fla. Stat. (2019) (“A person who has been convicted of an offense other than a 
capital felony may be sentenced to pay a fine in addition to any punishment 
described in s. 775.082 . . . .”). 
Lastly, although fees and costs can reasonably be said to differ in many 
respects from restitution and fines, various court pronouncements and statutory 
provisions similarly support including them within the scope of Amendment 4’s 
phrase “all terms of sentence.”  See, e.g., Osterhoudt v. State, 214 So. 3d 550, 551 
(Fla. 2017) (“[T]rial courts must individually pronounce discretionary fees, costs, 
 
- 26 - 
and fines during a sentencing hearing to comply with due process requirements.”); 
Rollman v. State, 887 So. 2d 1233, 1234 (Fla. 2004) (“[T]he same sentencing judge 
pronounced Rollman’s sentence, which imposed ten years in prison, ten years of 
probation, and the payment of restitution and court costs.”); Bassett v. State, 23 So. 
3d 236, 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“Bassett was sentenced to five years’ prison to 
be followed by five years’ probation.  As part of his sentence he was ordered to 
pay certain costs and fees.”); § 27.52(1)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2019) (authorizing the 
court to “[a]ssess the application fee [for the appointment of a public defender] as 
part of the sentence”); § 435.07(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2019) (referring to “any fee, fine, 
fund, lien, civil judgment, application, costs of prosecution, trust, or restitution” 
ordered by the court “as part of the judgment and sentence”); § 633.107(1), Fla. 
Stat. (2019) (similar). 
This Court’s decision in Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2008), is 
instructive.  Jackson among other things clarified the definition of a “sentencing 
error” for purposes of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b).  After noting 
that the commentary to rule 3.800 technically distinguished “orders of probation, 
orders of community control, [and] cost and restitution orders” from “the sentence 
itself,” 983 So. 2d at 572 (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800 court cmt.), Jackson 
construed “a defendant’s sentence” to encompass the various “orders entered as a 
result of the sentencing process”—i.e., those “related to the ultimate sanctions 
 
- 27 - 
imposed, whether involving incarceration, conditions of probation, or costs,” id. at 
572-73; see also Kirby, 863 So. 2d at 244 (referring to “the trial court’s statutory 
obligation to impose restitution as part of the criminal sanction”). 
Amendment 4’s use of the broad phrase “all terms of sentence” can only 
reasonably be understood to similarly encompass “the ultimate sanctions 
imposed,” including “costs.”  Jackson, 983 So. 2d at 573.  Or in the words of the 
Sponsor’s counsel, the phrase encompasses “all obligations” or “all matters.” 
CONCLUSION 
We answer Governor DeSantis’s question by stating that it is our opinion 
that the phrase “all terms of sentence,” as used in article VI, section 4, has an 
ordinary meaning that the voters would have understood to refer not only to 
durational periods but also to all LFOs imposed in conjunction with an 
adjudication of guilt.  We express no opinion on any question other than the 
narrow one presented to us. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result and dissents in part with an opinion. 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
- 28 - 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I concur with the majority’s ultimate decision that the phrase “all terms of 
sentence,” as used in article VI, section 4 (Amendment 4), encompasses all “legal 
financial obligations” (LFOs) imposed by the sentencing judge.  I do not concur, 
however, with the majority’s conclusion that the phrase “all terms of sentence,” as 
used in Amendment 4, “has an ordinary meaning that the voters would have 
understood” to include LFOs.  Nor do I concur with the majority’s strict adherence 
to the application of the theory referred to as the “supremacy-of-text principle” to 
the exclusion of available extrinsic evidence that would assist the Court in 
elucidating the meaning of the text in question. 
 
According to the majority, it adheres to the “supremacy-of-text principle”: 
“The words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey in 
this context, is what the text means.”  Majority op. at 14 (quoting Antonin Scalia & 
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)).  
Context is the operative word of this theory.  As explained by Justice Scalia in his 
dissent in King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015), “[S]ound interpretation 
requires paying attention to the whole law, not homing in on isolated words or 
even isolated sections.  Context always matters.”  As noted by the majority, the 
discussion of this approach to interpretation of constitutional texts, later coined 
“textualism,” dates back to as early as the 1800s when Justice Joseph Story, who 
 
- 29 - 
served on the United States Supreme Court from 1812 to 1845, emphasized that in 
interpreting the Constitution, every word must be afforded its “plain, obvious, and 
common sense” meaning, “unless the text furnishes some ground to control, 
qualify, or enlarge it.”  Majority op. at 14.  Since that time, textualism has been 
advocated by justices such as Hugo Black and, in recent history, Antonin Scalia, an 
ardent supporter of the theory.  To be sure, it is a sound theory of interpretation 
which, in most instances, proves to be determinative.  My concern is with its strict 
disapproval of consideration of extrinsic sources which, in some instances, such as 
in this case, prove to be not only helpful, but dispositive.    
 
The problem usually arises when the constitutional language in question is 
uncertain.  In such situations, the majority suggests referring to dictionary 
definitions because “in general, a dictionary may provide the popular and 
common-sense meaning of terms presented to the voters.”  Majority op. at 15 
(quoting In re Advisory Op. to Atty. Gen., 132 So. 3d 786, 800 (Fla. 2014)).  As 
more fully discussed below, in many instances it is not that simple. 
Indeed, this Court has considered other avenues to construe a constitutional 
provision when the text is unclear or ambiguous.  One such avenue is to seek to 
ascertain the intent of the framers and voters, an approach which, as discussed 
later, proved to be not only helpful, but determinative in this case.    
 
- 30 - 
 
This Court has long observed that “[t]he fundamental object to be sought in 
construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain the intent of the framers and the 
provision must be construed or interpreted in such manner as to fulfill the intent of 
the people, never to defeat it.  Such a provision must never be construed in such 
manner as to make it possible for the will of the people to be frustrated or denied.”  
Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 852 (Fla. 1960); see also In re Senate Joint 
Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 599 (Fla. 2012) 
(“When interpreting constitutional provisions, this Court endeavors to ascertain the 
will of the people in passing the amendment.”); Zingale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 277, 
282 (Fla. 2004) (“[T]his Court endeavors to construe a constitutional provision 
consistent with the intent of the framers and the voters.” (quoting Carib. Conserv. 
Corp. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conserv. Comm’n, 838 So. 2d 492, 501 (Fla. 2003))); 
Williams v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1978) (“[I]n construing the 
Constitution, we first seek to ascertain the intent of the framers and voters, and to 
interpret the provision before us in the way that will best fulfill that intent.”).   
 
In taking issue with this consistently applied approach, the majority contends  
“that such [extraneous considerations] can be misleading because they may be 
misunderstood to shift the focus of interpretation from the text and its context to 
such extraneous considerations.  And such extraneous considerations can result in 
the judicial imposition of meaning that the text cannot bear, either through 
 
- 31 - 
expansion or contraction of the meaning carried by the text.”  Majority op. at 14.  
Thus, according to the majority’s approach, clear and unambiguous extrinsic 
evidence of the true intent of the framers and voters, such as the evidence available 
in this case, must be disregarded.  I respectfully disagree. 
Textualist abhorrence of consideration of the intent of the framers of a 
constitutional or statutory provision has been persistently and stubbornly present 
throughout the theory’s history.  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, for instance, was 
quite explicit on the question of intent: “[W]e ask, not what this man meant, but 
what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using 
them in the circumstances in which they were used . . . . We do not inquire what 
the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.”  Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417-19 (1899).  
 
I agree with the majority that the lodestar of constitutional and statutory 
interpretation should be, in the first instance, the application of the words of the 
governing text read in context.  However, the analysis should provide some 
allowance for consideration of the intent of the framers and voters in instances 
where it will assist in elucidating the meaning of the text in question.       
 
The majority opinion in this case extensively refers to reliable and 
unambiguous extrinsic evidence that is dispositive of any question concerning 
whether the phrase “all terms of sentence” encompasses all LFOs imposed by the 
 
- 32 - 
sentencing judge.  Nevertheless, in strict adherence to the “supremacy-of-text  
principle,” the majority has chosen to disregard this revealing and helpful extrinsic 
evidence and rely strictly on its interpretation of the meaning of “all terms of 
sentence.”    
 
The majority opened its opinion with Governor DeSantis’s letter of 
August 9, 2019, requesting this advisory opinion.  The letter, includes, inter alia, 
the responses by counsel for the sponsor of Amendment 4, Floridians for a Fair 
Democracy, to questions posed by Justices Polston and Lawson during oral 
argument in 2017.  Arguably, these exchanges provide the most helpful revelations 
concerning what “completion of all terms of sentence” encompassed.  Justice 
Polston pointedly asked whether “completion of [all] terms” included “full 
payment of any fines,” and counsel for the sponsor responded: “Yes, sir . . . all 
terms mean all terms within the four corners.”  Majority op. at 2.  Justice Lawson 
similarly asked, “You said that terms of sentence includes fines and costs . . .  
that’s the way it’s generally pronounced in criminal court, would it also include 
restitution when it is ordered to the victim as part of a sentence?”  Counsel 
answered, “Yes.”  Majority op. at 2.   
The majority opinion also includes revelations made in the sponsor’s brief, 
which clearly express the sponsor’s intention that payment of all LFOs would be 
required.  The sponsor’s brief asserted: “Specifically, the drafters intend that 
 
- 33 - 
individuals with felony convictions, excluding those convicted of murder or a 
felony sexual offense, will automatically regain their right to vote upon fulfillment 
of all obligations imposed under their criminal sentence.”  Majority op. at 10.  The 
majority summed up the sponsor’s position with the following statement: “In other 
words, the Sponsor intended that ‘all terms’ refer to obligations, not durational 
periods.  No briefs were submitted in opposition to Amendment 4.”  Majority op. 
at 11 (emphasis added).  
 As a follow-up, the majority included a similar statement, made during oral 
argument, that the operative language in Amendment 4 “means all matters—
anything that a judge puts into a sentence.”  Majority op. at 11.  The majority 
added:  
 
As noted in the Governor’s letter, that oral argument involved 
discussion of LFOs—including fines, costs, and restitution—as well 
as the process for confirming payment of LFOs.  Counsel for the 
Sponsor summed up by reiterating that Amendment 4 was intended to 
be “a restoration of voting rights under these specific conditions.”  It 
is beyond dispute that the Sponsor expressed the intention that “all 
terms of sentence” include all LFOs ordered by the sentencing judge. 
 
Majority op. at 11 (emphasis added). 
 
In further consideration of the sponsor’s intent, the majority opinion 
included an advertisement from the sponsor’s paid political website which 
included the following assurances to prospective voters in bold-italicized text:  
“Amendment 4 restores the eligibility to vote to people with past felony 
 
- 34 - 
convictions who fully complete their entire sentence – including any probation, 
parole, and restitution – before earning back the eligibility to vote.”  Majority op. 
at 11.   
 
Finally, the majority included in its opinion the American Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation of Florida’s 2018 voter guide which informed voters that 
Amendment 4 “includ[ed] any probation, parole, fines, or restitution.”  Majority 
op. at 12. 
 
The majority wraps up its discussion of these “extraneous considerations” 
with the following revealing statement: “The Sponsor’s expressed intent and 
campaign statements simply are consistent with that ordinary meaning that would 
have been understood by voters.”  Majority op. at 13 (emphasis added).   
 
This evidence clearly resolves any question regarding the meaning of the 
phrase “all terms of sentence” and should not be excluded from consideration.  
Surely, if the text in this case had said, “all terms of sentence, including payment in 
full of all financial obligations imposed by the court,” or conversely, “upon 
completion of all terms of incarceration of the sentence,” consideration of extrinsic 
sources, including dictionaries, would not have been necessary.  Unfortunately, for 
whatever reason, it did not. 
 
Moreover, textualism, for all its usefulness, is less reliable when the text in 
question, such as the four-word text in this case, is not sufficiently developed to 
 
- 35 - 
allow its full meaning to be discernable.  In such instances, consideration of 
unambiguous extrinsic evidence is essential to determine the meaning of the text in 
question.  Unfortunately, given the majority’s decision today setting forth the so-
called “supremacy-of-text principle” as the law of constitutional and statutory 
interpretation in Florida, such valuable extrinsic evidence will no longer be 
afforded its due consideration.  While I agree that the initial step in resolving 
questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation should be to carefully 
examine the words of the governing text in context, I disagree with the summary 
exclusion from consideration of extrinsic credible information that would assist in 
determining the meaning of the text—including the intent of the framers and voters 
as we have consistently done in the past.    
 
Indeed, without the existence and consideration of the extrinsic evidence  
concerning the intention of the sponsor and others involved in the process of 
proposing Amendment 4, based on this record, I could not concur with the majority  
based solely on the theory that “the only objective evidence for the intent of a text 
is what the text says understood in context”—not in this case.  
 
Accordingly, I concur with the majority’s ultimate decision that the phrase 
“all terms of sentence” encompasses all “legal financial obligations.”  I am able to 
do so only because the extrinsic evidence presented concerning the sponsor’s intent 
assisted me.  I dissent to the majority’s position that the phrase “all terms of 
 
- 36 - 
sentence” is unambiguous and that the voters would “most likely understand” it to 
include all LFOs—without more.  I also dissent to the majority’s unbending 
application of the “supremacy-of-text principle” to Florida law, to the exclusion of 
available extrinsic evidence that would assist the Court in construing constitutional 
and statutory provisions. 
Original Proceedings – Advisory Opinion to the Governor 
 
Joseph W. Jacquot, General Counsel, Nicholas A. Primrose, John MacIver, 
Colleen Ernst, and James Uthmeier, Deputy General Counsel, Joshua E. Pratt, 
Assistant General Counsel, Executive Office of the Governor, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for The Honorable Ron DeSantis, Governor of Florida 
 
Theodore Leopold, Diana L. Martin, and Poorad Razavi of Cohen Milstein Sellers 
& Toll, PLLC, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida; and Cecilia Aguilera and Jon 
Sherman, Fair Elections Center, Washington, District of Columbia, 
 
 
for Interested Party, Fair Elections Center 
 
Jimmy Midyette, Jacksonville, Florida, Julie A. Ebenstein, Rodkangyil Orion 
Danjuma, and Jonathan S. Topaz, New York, New York, Daniel B. Tilley, and 
Anton Marino, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc., Miami, 
Florida; Leah C. Aden and John S. Cusick, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational 
Fund, Inc., New York, New York; and Sean Morales-Doyle and Eliza Sweren-
Becker of Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, New York, New 
York, 
 
for Interested Parties, Orange County Florida Branch of the NAACP, the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the American Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation of Florida, the American Civil Liberties Union, The 
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University Law School, the Florida 
Conference of the NAACP, and League of Women Voters of Florida 
 
Mark R. Schlakman of Florida State University Center for the Advancement of 
Human Rights, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
- 37 - 
 
for Interested Party, Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
(FACDL) 
 
Daniel Bell, General Counsel, J. Michael Maida, Deputy General Counsel, and W. 
Jordan Jones, Staff Attorney, House Judiciary Committee, Tallahassee, Florida; 
and Jonathan L. Williams of Lash & Goldberg LLP, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Interested Party, Florida House of Representatives 
 
Adam Richardson, pro se, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
Interested party 
 
Jeremiah Hawkes, General Counsel, and Ashley Istler, Deputy General Counsel, 
The Florida Senate, Tallahassee, Florida 
 
for Interested Parties, The Florida Senate and Bill Galvano, in his official 
capacity as President of The Florida Senate 
 
Jennifer LaVia and Carla Laroche, pro se, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
Interested parties 
 
Chad W. Dunn of Brazil & Dunn, L.L.P., Miami, Florida; and Danielle Lang, 
Molly E. Danahy, and Mark P. Gaber of Campaign Legal Center, Washington, 
District of Columbia 
 
 
for Interested Parties, Bonnie Raysor, Diane Sherrill, and Lee Hoffman 
 
Bradley R. McVay, General Counsel, Ashley E. Davis, Deputy General Counsel, 
Florida Department of State, Tallahassee, Florida; Mohammad O. Jazil and Gary 
V. Perko of Hopping Green & Sams, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; and George N. 
Meros, Jr., and Tara R. Price of Holland & Knight LLP, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Interested Party, the Florida Secretary of State, Laurel M. Lee