Case Title: Shak v. Shak

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12748

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12748 
 
MASHA M. SHAK  vs.  RONNIE SHAK. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     November 4, 2019. - May 7, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Divorce and Separation, Discontinuance of libel.  Constitutional 
Law, Freedom of speech and press, Divorce. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint for divorce filed in the Norfolk Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on February 5, 2018. 
 
 
A complaint for contempt, filed on June 8, 2018, was heard 
by George F. Phelan, J., and questions of law were reported by 
him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Richard M. Novitch (Gary Owen Todd & Julianna Zane also 
present) for the mother. 
 
Jennifer M. Lamanna for the father. 
 
Ruth A. Bourquin & Matthew R. Segal, for American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  Nondisparagement orders often are issued as a 
means to protect minor children during contentious divorce or 
2 
 
 
child custody proceedings in order to protect the child's best 
interest.  At issue here are orders issued to the parties in 
this case in an attempt to protect the psychological well-being 
of the parties' minor child, given the demonstrated breakdown in 
the relationship between the mother and the father.  We conclude 
that the nondisparagement orders at issue here operate as an 
impermissible prior restraint on speech.1 
 
Background.  Ronnie Shak (father) and Masha M. Shak 
(mother) were married for approximately fifteen months and had 
one child together.  The mother filed for divorce on February 5, 
2018, when the child was one year old.  The mother then filed an 
emergency motion to remove the father from the marital home, 
citing his aggressive physical behavior (including roughly 
grabbing their child and throwing items at their neighbors), 
temper, threats, and substance abuse.  A Probate and Family 
Court judge ordered the father to vacate the marital home and 
issued temporary orders granting the mother sole custody of the 
child, and a date for a hearing was set.  Before the hearing, 
the mother filed a motion for temporary orders, which included a 
request that the judge prohibit the father from posting 
disparaging remarks about her and the ongoing litigation on 
social media.  After a hearing, the judge issued temporary 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. 
3 
 
 
orders that included, in paragraphs six and seven, 
nondisparagement provisions against both parties (first order): 
"6.  Neither party shall disparage the other -- nor permit 
any third party to do so -- especially when within hearing 
range of the child. 
 
"7.  Neither party shall post any comments, solicitations, 
references or other information regarding this litigation 
on social media." 
 
 
The mother thereafter filed a complaint for civil contempt 
alleging that the father violated the first order by 
"publish[ing] numerous [social media] posts and commentary 
disparaging [her] and detailing the specifics of th[e] 
litigation on social media."  The mother further alleged that 
the father had shared these posts with members of her religious 
community, including her rabbi and assistant rabbi, as well as 
with her business clients.  In the father's answer, he denied 
having been timely notified of the judge's first order and 
raised the judge's lack of authority "to issue [a] prior 
restraint on speech." 
After a hearing, a different judge declined to find 
contempt on the ground that the first order, as issued, 
constituted an unlawful prior restraint of speech in violation 
of the father's Federal and State constitutional rights.  
However, the judge concluded that orders restraining speech are 
permissible if narrowly tailored and supported by a compelling 
State interest.  The judge sought to cure the perceived 
4 
 
 
deficiencies of the first order by issuing further orders of 
future disparagement (orders) which stated in relevant part: 
"1) Until the parties have no common children under the age 
of [fourteen] years old, neither party shall post on any 
social media or other Internet medium any disparagement of 
the other party when such disparagement consists of 
comments about the party's morality, parenting of or 
ability to parent any minor children.  Such disparagement 
specifically includes but is not limited to the following 
expressions:  'cunt', 'bitch', 'whore', 'motherfucker', and 
other pejoratives involving any gender.  The Court 
acknowledges the impossibility of listing herein all of the 
opprobrious vitriol and their permutations within the human 
lexicon. 
 
"2) While the parties have any children in common between 
the ages of three and fourteen years old, neither party 
shall communicate, by verbal speech, written speech, or 
gestures any disparagement to the other party if said 
children are within [one hundred] feet of the communicating 
party or within any other farther distance where the 
children may be in a position to hear, read or see the 
disparagement."2 
 
The judge stayed those orders and purported to report two 
questions to the Appeals Court.3  We allowed the mother's 
                     
 
2 The judge's orders included two additional sections that 
were neither challenged by the parties nor addressed in the 
judge's reported questions.  We therefore do not express an 
opinion about them. 
 
 
3 The questions reported by the judge are: 
 
(1) "Are 'Non-Disparagement' orders [issued in the context 
of divorce litigation] an impermissible restraint on 
constitutionally protected free speech?" 
 
(2) "Are 'Non-Disparagement' orders [issued in the context 
of divorce litigation] enforceable and not an impermissible 
restraint on free speech when there is a compelling public 
interest in protecting the best interests of minor 
children?" 
5 
 
 
application for direct appellate review.  Rather than answering 
the reported questions, we focus strictly on the correctness of 
the orders issued by the second judge in this case.  See McStowe 
v. Bornstein, 377 Mass. 804, 805 n.2 (1979) ("Although a judge 
may report specific questions of law in connection with an 
interlocutory finding or order, the basic issue to be reported 
is the correctness of his finding or order.  Reported questions 
need not be answered in this circumstance except to the extent 
that it is necessary to do so in resolving the basic issue").  
See also Mass R. Dom. Rel. P. 64(a). 
 
Discussion.  The First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech."  "[A]s a general matter, the 
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content."  Ashcroft v. American Civ. Liberties 
Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002), quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983).  Article 16 of the 
Declaration of Rights, as amended by art. 77 of the Amendments, 
is at least as protective of the freedom of speech as the First 
6 
 
 
Amendment.4  Care & Protection of Edith, 421 Mass. 703, 705 
(1996). 
 
"The term 'prior restraint' is used 'to describe 
administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain 
communications when issued in advance of the time that such 
communications are to occur.'"  Alexander v. United States, 509 
U.S. 544, 550 (1993), quoting M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of 
Speech § 4.03, at 4-14 (1984).  Nondisparagement orders are, by 
definition, a prior restraint on speech.  See Care & Protection 
of Edith, 421 Mass. at 705 ("An injunction that forbids speech 
activities is a classic example of a prior restraint").  Because 
the prior restraint of speech or publication carries with it an 
"immediate and irreversible sanction" without the benefit of the 
"protections afforded by deferring the impact of the judgment 
until all avenues of appellate review have been exhausted," it 
is the "most serious and the least tolerable infringement on 
First Amendment rights."  Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 
U.S. 539, 559 (1976).  See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. 
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) ("a free society prefers to 
punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the 
law than to throttle them and all others beforehand"). 
                     
 
4 Article 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as 
amended by art. 77 of the Amendments, states in pertinent part:  
"The right of free speech shall not be abridged." 
7 
 
 
As "one of the most extraordinary remedies known to our 
jurisprudence," Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 562, in order 
for prior restraint to be potentially permissible, the harm from 
the unrestrained speech must be truly exceptional.  See Near v. 
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).5,6  A prior 
restraint is permissible only where the harm expected from the 
unrestrained speech is grave, the likelihood of the harm 
occurring without the prior restraint in place is all but 
                     
5 Leading cases from the Supreme Court that have held prior 
restraints to be unconstitutional illustrate what constitutes 
truly exceptional circumstances.  See, e.g., New York Times Co. 
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 718 (1971) (Black, J., 
concurring) (prior restraint against publication of classified 
information allegedly involving national security concerns 
unconstitutional); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 
561-562, 569 (1976) (in circumstances, prior restraint against 
publication of information about defendant's criminal trial 
unconstitutional despite risk of "adverse impact on the 
attitudes of those who might be called as jurors"); Kingsley 
Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of 
N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959) (prior restraint on display of 
films promoting "sexual immorality" unconstitutional censorship 
of ideas). 
 
 
6 In Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 
(1931), the Supreme Court established three categories of speech 
that potentially could justify a prior restraint:  obscene 
speech, incitements to violence, and publishing national 
secrets.  With respect to these exceptions, two of the three -- 
obscenity and incitement to violence -- are no longer considered 
protected speech under the First Amendment.  See Nebraska Press 
Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 590, and cases cited (Brennan, J., 
concurring); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48 
(1961).  Even so, in cases involving obscenity and incitement to 
violence, "adequate and timely procedures are mandated to 
protect against any restraint of speech that does come within 
the ambit of the First Amendment."  Nebraska Press Ass'n, supra 
at 591, and cases cited (Brennan, J., concurring). 
8 
 
 
certain, and there are no alternative, less restrictive means to 
mitigate the harm.  See Nebraska Press Ass'n, supra. 
 
It is true that "[p]rior restraints are not 
unconstitutional per se."  Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., 420 
U.S. at 558, citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 
70 n.10 (1963).  See Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 570, and 
cases cited ("This Court has frequently denied that First 
Amendment rights are absolute and has consistently rejected the 
proposition that a prior restraint can never be employed").  
However, the Supreme Court has made clear that prior restraints 
are heavily disfavored.  See Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (prior 
restraint is appropriate "only in exceptional cases").  The 
Court has stated specifically that "[a]ny system of prior 
restraint . . . comes . . . bearing a heavy presumption against 
its constitutional validity" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., supra at 558, and cases cited. 
 
A prior restraint "avoids constitutional infirmity only if 
it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate 
the dangers of a censorship system."  Southeastern Promotions, 
Ltd., 420 U.S. at 559, quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 
51, 58 (1965).  To determine whether a prior restraint is 
warranted, the Supreme Court has looked to (a) "the nature and 
extent" of the speech in question, (b) "whether other measures 
would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained" speech, 
9 
 
 
and (c) "how effectively a restraining order would operate to 
prevent the threatened danger."  Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. 
at 562.  "[T]he barriers to prior restraint remain high and the 
presumption against its use continues intact."  Id. at 570. 
 
We have acknowledged that prior restraints "require an 
unusually heavy justification under the First Amendment."  
Commonwealth v. Barnes, 461 Mass. 644, 652 (2012), quoting New 
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733 (1971) 
(White, J., concurring).  Given the "serious threat to rights of 
free speech" presented by prior restraints, we have concluded 
that such restraints cannot be upheld unless "justified by a 
compelling State interest to protect against a serious threat of 
harm."  Care & Protection of Edith, 421 Mass. at 705.  
Additionally, "[a]ny limitation on protected expression must be 
no greater than is necessary to protect the compelling interest 
that is asserted as a justification for the restraint."7  Id. 
On the occasions that we have considered claims of prior 
restraint, we have concluded that the restraint in question was 
                     
 
7 We note that other State courts also have ruled on prior 
restraint claims in the context of divorce, child custody, and 
child welfare cases and, in doing so, have used various language 
to describe the applicable standard.  The common theme is that 
the bar for a prior restraint is extremely high.  See, e.g., In 
re Marriage of Newell, 192 P.3d 529, 535-537 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2008); In re Summerville, 190 Ill. App.3d 1072, 1077-1079 
(1989); Johanson v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 124 Nev. 245, 
250-253 (2008); Matter of Adams v. Tersillo, 245 A.D.2d 446, 447 
(N.Y. 1997); Grigsby v. Coker, 904 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1995). 
10 
 
 
impermissible.  See, e.g., Barnes, 461 Mass. at 656-657 (prior 
restraint on Internet streaming of court proceedings deemed 
unlawful in circumstances); George W. Prescott Publ. Co. v. 
Stoughton Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 428 
Mass. 309, 311-312 (1998) (prior restraint on newspaper 
publisher's ability to report on juvenile records and 
proceedings unlawful); Care & Protection of Edith, 421 Mass. at 
705-706 (prior restraint forbidding father from discussing care 
and protection proceeding with press unlawful). 
Turning to the order in question, the judge properly noted 
that "the State has a compelling interest in protecting children 
from being exposed to disparagement between their parents."  See 
Barnes, 461 Mass. at 656, quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-608 (1982) (safeguarding 
physical and psychological well-being of minor is compelling 
interest).  However, as important as it is to protect a child 
from the emotional and psychological harm that might follow from 
one parent's use of vulgar or disparaging words about the other, 
merely reciting that interest is not enough to satisfy the heavy 
burden of justifying a prior restraint. 
Assuming for the sake of discussion that the Commonwealth's 
interest in protecting a child from such harm is sufficiently 
weighty to justify a prior restraint in some extreme 
circumstances, those circumstances do not exist here.  No 
11 
 
 
showing was made linking communications by either parent to any 
grave, imminent harm to the child.  The mother presented no 
evidence that the child has been exposed to, or would even 
understand, the speech that gave rise to the underlying motion 
for contempt.  As a toddler, the child is too young to be able 
to either read or to access social media.  The concern about 
potential harm that could occur if the child were to discover 
the speech in the future is speculative and cannot justify a 
prior restraint.  See Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 563.  
Significantly, there has been no showing of anything in this 
particular child's physical, mental, or emotional state that 
would make him especially vulnerable to experiencing the type of 
direct and substantial harm that might require a prior restraint 
if at any point he were exposed to one parent's disparaging 
words toward the other.  Cf. Felton v. Felton, 383 Mass. 232, 
233-234 (1981), and cases cited (reversing and remanding for 
further consideration probate judge's order restricting father's 
visitation unless he refrained from instructing children in his 
religion -- "harm to the child . . . should not be simply 
assumed or surmised; it must be demonstrated in detail"). 
 
Because there has been no showing that any harm from the 
disparaging speech is either grave or certain, our analysis 
regarding the permissibility of the nondisparagement order 
issued in this case ends here.  We note, however, that there are 
12 
 
 
measures short of prior restraint available to litigants and 
judges in circumstances in which disparaging speech is a 
concern.  For example, our ruling does not impact 
nondisparagement agreements that parties enter into voluntarily.  
Depending upon the nature and severity of the speech, parents 
who are the target of disparaging speech may have the option of 
seeking a harassment prevention order pursuant to G. L. c. 258E, 
or filing an action seeking damages for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress or defamation.  See Roman v. Trustees of 
Tufts College, 461 Mass. 707, 717-718 (2012), quoting Sena v. 
Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 250, 263-264 (1994) (setting forth 
elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress); White 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 442 Mass. 64, 66 
(2004) (setting forth elements of defamation).  And certainly 
judges, who are guided by determining the best interests of the 
child, can make clear to the parties that their behavior, 
including any disparaging language, will be factored into any 
subsequent custody determinations.  See Ardizoni v. Raymond, 40 
Mass. App. Ct. 734, 738 (1996).  Of course, the best solution 
would be for parties in divorce and child custody matters to 
rise above any acrimonious feelings they may have, and, with the 
well-being of their children paramount in their minds, simply 
refrain from making disparaging remarks about one another. 
13 
 
 
We recognize that the motion judge put careful thought into 
his orders in an effort to protect a child caught in the middle 
of a legal dispute who was unable to advocate for himself.  
However, because there was no showing of an exceptional 
circumstance that would justify the imposition of a prior 
restraint, the nondisparagement orders issued here are 
unconstitutional. 
 
Conclusion.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the judge's further 
orders on future disparagement, dated October 24, 2018, are 
hereby vacated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.