Case Title: PHILIP L. HOY and PHILIP'S WELDING SERVICE, INC., a Wyoming corporation v. K.C. MILLER; DOUGLAS D. MILLER; and MARY S. MILLER; KATHRYN ARMSTRONG STOLECKI; JOHN MILLER, JR., individually and as trustee of the John C. Miller Trust created 9/27/93; DEBBIE ELDER PUCKETT; WALTER F. SCOTT, JR. and BROWNIE SCOTT, individually and as co-trustees of the Scott Family Revocable Trust dated 8/23/95; ANN SPAULDING; KAREN THOMPSON; MIKE W. MILLER; JUDY L. WOODWORTH; LAURA L. BENDRICK; MARSHA ANDERSON; and MICHAEL JERRY SCOTT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-294

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
PHILIP L. HOY and PHILIP'S WELDING SERVICE, INC., a Wyoming corporation v. K.C. MILLER; DOUGLAS D. MILLER; and MARY S. MILLER; KATHRYN ARMSTRONG STOLECKI; JOHN MILLER, JR., individually and as trustee of the John C. Miller Trust created 9/27/93; DEBBIE ELDER PUCKETT; WALTER F. SCOTT, JR. and BROWNIE SCOTT, individually and as co-trustees of the Scott Family Revocable Trust dated 8/23/95; ANN SPAULDING; KAREN THOMPSON; MIKE W. MILLER; JUDY L. WOODWORTH; LAURA L. BENDRICK; MARSHA ANDERSON; and MICHAEL JERRY SCOTT2006 WY 147146 P.3d 488Case Number: No. 05-294Decided: 11/15/2006
 
 
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

                                                                                                            

PHILIP 
L. HOY and PHILIP'S WELDING SERVICE, INC., 

aWyoming 
Corporation,

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

                                                                                                

v.

                                                                                                            

K.C. 
MILLER; DOUGLAS D. MILLER; and MARY S. MILLER; KATHRYN ARMSTRONG STOLECKI; JOHN 
MILLER, JR., individually      and as trustee of 
the John C. Miller Trust created 9/27/93; 
DEBBIE ELDER PUCKETT; WALTER F. SCOTT, JR. and BROWNIE SCOTT, individually and 
as co-trustees of the           

Scott 
Family Revocable Trust dated 8/23/95; ANN SPAULDING; KAREN THOMPSON; MIKE W. 
MILLER; JUDY L. WOODWORTH; LAURA L. BENDRICK; MARSHA ANDERSON; and MICHAEL JERRY 
SCOTT, Appellees (Defendants).      

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Virgil 
G. Kinnaird of Kinnaird Law Office, P.C., Sheridan, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Patrick 
G. Davidson, Matthew R. Sorenson, and Tad T. Daly of Daly Law Associates, LLC, 
Gillette, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Daly. 

 
 

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL,* KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 
* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument 

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellees, K.C. 
Miller, et al. (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Miller"), own and 
operate a stock reservoir located south and east of real property owned by 
Philip Hoy and Philip's Welding Services, Inc. (hereinafter referred to 
collectively as "Hoy").  Hoy sued 
Miller, claiming that water seeping out of Miller's reservoir had damaged his 
property.  At trial, Hoy alleged 
that Miller was absolutely liable for any damages caused by seepage from the 
reservoir.  After a bench trial, the 
district court held that the theory of absolute liability does not apply to the 
instant facts.  Applying a regular 
negligence standard, the district court held that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a claim of negligence against Miller and dismissed Hoy's 
complaint.  We 
affirm.

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Hoy presents two 
arguments on appeal:

 
 
A.  The District Court erred in its 
application of a negligence standard in finding that there was no breach of duty 
or, stated in the alternative, failing to find that [Miller] ha[s] produced no 
evidence of the exceptions to absolute liability.

 
 
B.  The District Court erred in finding no 
proximate cause.

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The properties in 
question are located north of Gillette.  
Miller's property contains a stock reservoir, which has been there for 
more than 45 years.  The reservoir 
is an on-channel reservoir filled by Little Rawhide Creek.  Little Rawhide creek flows generally 
south to north, through Miller's property and then through Hoy's property. Hoy's 
property is down gradient from the reservoir.    

 
 
[¶4]      Little Rawhide 
Creek is a seasonal creek, usually drying up in the summer or fall.  Miller's stock reservoir also 
historically dried up on occasion during the summer.  In 2001, Miller had the reservoir 
reworked, primarily desilted, to improve its capacity to hold water.  After the reservoir was reworked, the 
reservoir held water better and no longer dried up, even when Little Rawhide 
Creek dried up.    

 
 
[¶5]      It is agreed that 
the actual dam for the reservoir does not leak.  Rather, Hoy alleges that water seeps 
through the bottom of the reservoir and runs down to his property, thereby 
creating a high groundwater problem for him. Hoy alleges that the raised 
groundwater level has caused damage to his septic system and several structures 
on the property.  Hoy began noticing 
the damage in 1999.  

 
 
[¶6]      In 2003, Hoy 
filed a complaint against Miller entitled "Complaint for Negligent Operation of 
Reservoir and Injunction."  
Ultimately a three-day bench trial ensued.  At the end of Hoy's case, Miller moved 
for a directed verdict, arguing that the elements of negligence had not been 
satisfactorily proven.  Hoy 
responded by arguing that the case was not a negligence action, but rather an 
action resting on the theory of absolute liability.  Miller objected, arguing that Hoy's 
complaint stated a claim for negligence and contained no mention of absolute 
liability.  The district court took 
the motion for a directed verdict under advisement, and Miller presented his 
case.    

 
 
[¶7]      At the end of the 
trial, the district court issued a decision letter in which it expressly 
analyzed and rejected the application of absolute liability.  Applying a negligence standard, the 
district court ruled that Hoy had failed to prove any potential seepage from the 
reservoir was the proximate cause of his alleged damages.  The district court accordingly dismissed 
Hoy's complaint with prejudice.  Hoy 
instituted the instant appeal.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶8]      Our review on 
appeal from a bench trial is well-settled and oft repeated.  This Court reviews a trial court's 
conclusions of law de novo.  Unlike 
the limited review afforded to jury findings, this Court reviews a trial judge's 
factual findings of fact to determine if they are clearly erroneous.  Mullinnix LLC v. HKB Royalty Trust, 2006 
WY 14, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 909, 916 (Wyo. 2006); Fraternal Order of Eagles Sheridan Aerie No. 
186, Inc. v. State ex rel. Forwood, 2006 WY 4, ¶ 24, 126 P.3d 847, 857 (Wyo. 
2006).  A finding is clearly 
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, we are left with the 
definite and firm conviction that, on the entire evidence, a mistake has been 
committed.  We are mindful of the 
fact that our review does not entail re-weighing disputed evidence, and we 
cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.  Id.  

 
 
[¶9]      We begin our 
review therefore with a presumption that the trial court's findings of fact are 
correct.  In reviewing the findings 
of fact,

 
 
[t]here 
are settled appellate concepts which we follow, all for the most part favorable 
to the party prevailing in the trial court.  An appealing party has a heavy burden to 
overcome.  We must assume that the 
evidence in favor of the successful party is true, leave out of consideration 
entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party that conflicts with it and give 
the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may 
reasonably and fairly be drawn from it.  
In this case, there were special findings of fact which must be construed 
liberally and favorably to the judgment.  
We presume that they are right and where the findings of the trial court 
are not inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or contrary to the 
great weight of the evidence, they will not be disturbed on appeal.  Moreover, the trial judge was present 
and observed at first hand the demeanor and expressions of the witnesses.  We must not forget that when we examine 
the cold words of the transcript of testimony, we do not have the benefit of how 
the trial judge sees and hears the witness--the pitch of the voice, facial 
changes, the movement in the witness--all of which may tell a separate story, to 
be given credence.  The conclusion 
of what preponderates is with the trier of fact.  Credibility of witnesses is for the 
trial court.  Appellate courts 
cannot try a case de novo.  

 
 

Madrid 
v. Norton, 596 P.2d 1108, 1117 (Wyo. 1979) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
 
 

Absolute 
Liability and Proximate Cause

 
 
[¶10]   Absolute liability is "liability 
without fault  liability for which there is no excuse."  Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. McGuire, 
537 P.2d 1128, 1132 (Wyo. 1975).  In other words, absolute liability is 
imposed upon certain conduct, regardless of whether or not such conduct is 
negligent.  Even if liability is 
absolute, however, such liability extends only to damages proximately caused by 
the alleged harmful conduct.  Rylands v. Fletcher, (1866) L.R. 1 Exch. 
265, 279 (one is absolutely liable only for the "natural and anticipated 
consequences" of his actions), aff'd (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.  Thus, we need not decide the issue of 
whether Miller is subject to absolute liability if, as the district court found, 
Hoy's alleged damages were not proximately caused by any conduct of Miller.  Since the existence of proximate cause 
is a question of fact, Lynch v. Norton 
Const., Inc., 861 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Wyo. 1993), the district court's finding 
on proximate cause will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.  

 
 
[¶11]   Hoy's theory of causation was that 
water seeped out of the bottom of Miller's reservoir and down to his property, 
causing his high groundwater problem.  
Roughly, Hoy attempted to support his theory with evidence on four main 
points: 1) his property is down gradient from Miller's reservoir; 2) the bottom 
of the reservoir is comprised of porous sand; 3) more water goes into the 
reservoir than comes out of it; and 4) there is a correlation between high water 
levels in the reservoir and high groundwater levels at his property.  In addition to his own testimony, Hoy 
presented one expert witness to testify on the issue of causation, Walter 
Merschat.  Mr. Merschat summed up 
the theory of causation by stating: "Water flows downhill and it goes through 
porous sediments.  That's all you 
need to know."   

 
 
[¶12]   It would serve no purpose to 
regurgitate the evidence in full.  
In general, Mr. Merschat testified as to the methodology he used in 
reaching his conclusion.  In 
response, Miller presented three experts.  
All three experts discredited Mr. Merschat's methodology and rejected his 
conclusion.  They all agreed that 
Mr. Merschat's investigation was not thorough enough to allow for Mr. Merschat 
to validly conclude that there was any correlation between water in the 
reservoir and Hoy's high groundwater.  
Among the criticisms against Mr. Merschat's opinion were that Mr. 
Merschat: failed to adequately account for seasonal and annual groundwater level 
fluctuations, which could be as high as six feet; ignored inspection reports 
from the Department of Environmental Quality relating to the Hoy property; and 
failed to conduct appropriate sub-surface testing.  As one expert opined, Mr. Merschat's 
ultimate conclusion was based on "poor science."  There was also evidence from several 
sources, including Hoy himself, that Hoy's property, as well as some of the 
surrounding property, had been subject to high groundwater conditions dating 
back to at least 1985.  Given this 
evidence, we find no basis for concluding that the district court's findings 
were clearly erroneous.

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶13]   Regardless of the theory of 
liability, Hoy still needed to present sufficient proof that his damages were 
caused by seepage from Miller's reservoir.  
The district court found that Hoy had failed to fulfill this burden.  Upon review of the record, we find ample 
evidence supporting the decision of the district court.  Affirmed.