Case Title: State v. Wright

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP002006-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 WI 45 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP002006-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
John Patrick Wright, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 383 Wis. 2d 602,918 N.W.2d 128 
 (2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 30, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 16, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Hannah C. Dugan 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by David H. Perlman, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs is Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by David H. Perlman.  
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Carly M. Cusack, assistant state public defender. There was an 
oral argument by Carly M. Cusack.  
 
 
2019 WI 45
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP2006-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2016CM2845) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
John Patrick Wright, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 30, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming an order 
of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Hannah Dugan, Judge, 
granting John Patrick Wright's motion to suppress evidence.1  The 
                                                 
1 State v. Wright, No. 2017AP2006-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 12, 2018). 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
2 
 
appeal was decided by one judge, Joan F. Kessler, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(f) (2015-16).2 
¶2 
John Patrick Wright, the defendant, was charged with 
unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 941.23(2).  The weapon was discovered in Wright's 
vehicle's glove compartment during a traffic stop.  Wright did 
not hold a valid permit to carry a concealed weapon, commonly 
referred to as a CCW permit.   
¶3 
Wright filed a motion to suppress the evidence.  
Wright admitted that the traffic stop was lawfully initiated 
because it was supported by reasonable suspicion that Wright was 
violating the traffic code.   
¶4 
Wright argued, however, that the police violated the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
by 
taking 
three 
actions 
unsupported 
by 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity:  (1) the police asked 
Wright whether he had a weapon in the vehicle; (2) the police 
asked Wright whether he held a permit to carry a concealed 
weapon; and (3) the police verified whether Wright in fact had a 
valid CCW permit (a CCW permit check).   
¶5 
The circuit court, relying on Rodriguez v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), held that the officer unlawfully 
extended the traffic stop by asking Wright whether he had a 
weapon in the vehicle and whether he held a permit to carry a 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
3 
 
concealed weapon.  The court of appeals affirmed, adopting the 
same reasoning as the circuit court. 
¶6 
The case presents three Fourth Amendment issues:  (1) 
in the absence of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, may 
an officer ask a lawfully stopped motorist about the presence of 
weapons; (2) in the absence of reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, may an officer ask a lawfully stopped motorist whether 
the motorist holds a CCW permit; and (3) in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, may an officer 
conduct a CCW permit check. 
¶7 
We conclude that, in the instant case, none of the 
officer's questions or actions violated the Fourth Amendment. 
¶8 
A traffic stop constitutes a seizure for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.3  The United States Supreme Court has 
described a routine traffic stop as more akin to a Terry4 stop 
than a formal arrest.  It has held that, like a Terry stop, "the 
tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop 
context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'——to address the 
traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related 
safety concerns."5   
                                                 
3 Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015); 
State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶20, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 
N.W.2d 560. 
4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
5 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (citations omitted); see 
also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009); Illinois v. 
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 
U.S. 113, 117 (1998). 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
4 
 
¶9 
The 
"mission" 
of 
a 
traffic 
stop 
includes: 
(1) 
addressing the traffic violation that warranted the stop; (2) 
conducting ordinary inquiries incident to the stop; and (3) 
taking negligibly burdensome precautions to ensure officer 
safety.6  Authority for the seizure ends when these tasks are, or 
reasonably should have been, completed.7   
¶10 This is not to say, however, that police action 
unrelated to the traffic stop's mission necessarily violates the 
Fourth Amendment.  To the contrary, the Supreme Court has 
recognized "that the Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain 
unrelated investigations that [do] not lengthen the roadside 
detention."8  In other words, "[t]he seizure remains lawful only 
'so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the 
duration of the stop.'"9 
¶11 We conclude that Wright's Fourth Amendment rights were 
not violated when the officer asked Wright about the presence of 
weapons in the vehicle.  As this court stated in State v. Floyd, 
2017 WI 78, ¶28 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560, questioning a 
                                                 
6 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 
408. 
7 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614; see also United States v. 
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (in determining the reasonable 
duration of a stop, "it is appropriate to examine whether the 
police diligently pursued [the] investigation"). 
8 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614; see also Johnson, 555 U.S. 
at 327-28; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406-08. 
9 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (brackets in original) 
(quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333). 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
5 
 
lawfully stopped motorist about the presence of weapons relates 
to officer safety and is negligibly burdensome.  The question is 
part of the traffic stop's mission.10 
¶12 Neither the officer's question nor the subsequent CCW 
permit 
check 
"measurably 
extend[ed] 
the 
duration 
of 
the 
[traffic] stop."11  Thus, neither the officer's questioning 
whether Wright held a CCW permit, nor the officer's subsequent 
CCW permit check, violated the Fourth Amendment.  
¶13 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals, vacate the circuit court's order granting Wright's 
motion to suppress, and remand the cause to the circuit court 
for further proceedings. 
I 
¶14 The following facts are taken from the transcript of 
the evidentiary hearing on Wright's motion to suppress, as well 
as the transcript of the circuit court's oral decision granting 
Wright's motion. 
¶15 On June 15, 2016, Milwaukee Police Officers Jesus 
Gloria and Kristopher Sardina stopped Wright's car because the 
passenger-side headlight was out.   
¶16 While Officer Gloria approached the passenger-side 
window of Wright's vehicle, Officer Sardina approached the 
driver's-side window and made contact with Wright.  Officer 
                                                 
10 Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶28. 
11 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333. 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
6 
 
Sardina asked Wright for his driver's license, asked whether he 
was a CCW permit holder, and asked whether Wright had any 
weapons in the car.  Officer Sardina testified on cross-
examination that although he does not recall how many questions 
he asked or the order in which he asked them, all of these 
questions usually "come pretty fast" after he makes initial 
contact with a motorist.   
¶17 Wright responded to the officer that he had just 
finished the CCW permit class and that he did have a firearm in 
his vehicle.12  Officer Sardina asked Wright if the officers had 
his permission to remove the firearm from the vehicle for the 
duration of the stop.  Wright consented, stating that the 
firearm was in the glove compartment; Officer Gloria retrieved 
the firearm.13 
¶18 Officer Sardina took Wright's license and went back to 
the squad car to "run [Wright's] information."14  During this 
                                                 
12 At this point, Officer Sardina arguably had reasonable 
suspicion that Wright was violating Wis. Stat. § 941.23(2).  The 
State, however, does not argue that reasonable suspicion 
existed.  We therefore do not resolve the issues in the instant 
case on that basis. 
13 The firearm was loaded. 
14 We infer that Officer Sardina was checking Wright's 
driver's license and/or determining whether Wright had any 
outstanding warrants.  See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 
(quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408) (explaining that the 
"ordinary inquiries" incident to the traffic stop include 
"checking the driver's license [and] determining whether there 
are outstanding warrants against the driver"). 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
7 
 
time, Officer Sardina also ran a CCW permit check to see if 
Wright was a valid CCW permit holder.  Officer Sardina 
discovered that Wright did not have a valid CCW permit.  Officer 
Sardina then arrested Wright under suspicion of unlawfully 
carrying a concealed weapon.  Wright was later charged with 
unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 941.23(2). 
¶19 Wright moved to suppress the gun evidence, and, after 
an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court granted Wright's 
motion.  The circuit court concluded, relying on Rodriguez, that 
asking the CCW permit question and the question about the 
presence of weapons unlawfully extended the traffic stop in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
¶20 The State appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
The court of appeals, relying on Rodriguez, concluded that 
asking the CCW permit question and the question about the 
presence of weapons unlawfully extended the traffic stop.  
Although the State briefed the application of this court's 
decision in State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶28, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 
898 N.W.2d 560, a decision that was released after the circuit 
court's decision but before the court of appeals' decision, the 
court of appeals failed to address Floyd. 
¶21 The State petitioned this court for review. 
II 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
8 
 
¶22 Whether evidence should be suppressed is a question of 
constitutional fact.15  When presented with a question of 
constitutional fact, this court engages in a two-step inquiry.  
"First, we review the circuit court's findings of historical 
fact 
under 
the 
clearly 
erroneous 
standard. 
 
Second, 
we 
independently 
apply 
constitutional 
principles 
to 
these 
historical facts."16 
III 
¶23 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
prohibits unreasonable seizures.17  A traffic stop constitutes a 
seizure for constitutional purposes, and "[a] seizure for a 
traffic violation justifies a police investigation into that 
violation."18  The United States Supreme Court has characterized 
a routine traffic stop as more akin to a Terry stop than to a 
                                                 
15 State v. Reed, 2018 WI 109, ¶51, 384 Wis. 2d 469, 920 
Wis. 2d 56; State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶13, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 
729 N.W.2d 182; State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶19, 285 
Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899. 
16 Reed, 384 Wis. 2d 469, ¶51 (footnotes omitted); Johnson, 
299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶13; Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶19. 
17 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
Wright also argues that his rights under Article 1, Section 
11 of the Wisconsin Constitution were violated.  However, 
Wright's 
only 
developed 
argument 
pertains 
to 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment.  See State v. Grandberry, 2018 WI 29, ¶30 n.19, 380 
Wis. 2d 541, 910 N.W.2d 214 (explaining that we typically do not 
address undeveloped arguments).  Thus, we confine our analysis 
to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.   
18 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
9 
 
formal arrest.  It has held that, like a Terry stop, "the 
tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop 
context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'——to address the 
traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related 
safety concerns."19 
¶24 The "mission" of a traffic stop includes:  (1) 
addressing the traffic violation that warranted the stop; (2) 
conducting ordinary inquiries incident to the stop;20 and (3) 
taking negligibly burdensome precautions to ensure officer 
safety.21  Authority for the seizure ends when these tasks are, 
or reasonably should have been, completed.22 
¶25 Because traffic stops are "especially fraught with 
danger to police officers,"23 the Supreme Court has explained 
that "an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome 
precautions in order to complete his mission safely."24  Indeed, 
                                                 
19 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
20 "Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver's 
license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants 
against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration 
and proof of insurance."  Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (quoting 
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408). 
21 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 
408; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1979); see also 4 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.3(c) (5th ed. 2012). 
22 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. 
23 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 
U.S. 1032 (1983)). 
24 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
10 
 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
stated 
that 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
categorically authorizes the police to order the driver25 and all 
passengers26 out of the vehicle for the duration of the traffic 
stop in order to ensure the safety of the officer. 
¶26 The police may take these precautions because "the 
government's officer safety interest stems from the mission of 
the stop itself."27  As this court has explained, questions 
related to officer safety are part of the traffic stop's 
mission, and therefore, those questions do not cause an 
extension of the stop.28 
¶27 Moreover, the Supreme Court has "concluded that the 
Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations 
that [do] not lengthen the roadside detention."29  That is, the 
seizure remains lawful despite these unrelated inquiries "so 
                                                 
25 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977). 
26 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411 (1997). 
27 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. 
28 Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶28 ("[B]ecause the questions 
related to officer safety and were negligibly burdensome, they 
were part of the traffic stop's mission, and so did not cause an 
extension."). 
29 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614; see also Johnson, 555 U.S. 
at 327-28; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407-08. 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
11 
 
long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of 
the stop."30 
¶28 With these principles in mind, we now examine whether 
the questions posed by Officer Sardina fall under the "mission" 
of the stop, and if they do not, whether they "measurably 
extend[ed] the duration of the stop."31  If they constitute part 
of the mission of the stop, they will not be considered an 
extension of that stop.  If, however, they are unrelated to the 
mission of the stop, they will violate the Fourth Amendment if 
they measurably extended the duration of the stop. 
IV 
A 
¶29 We first address Officer Sardina's question regarding 
the presence of weapons in Wright's vehicle.  We conclude that 
this question constitutes part of the stop's mission because the 
question is a negligibly burdensome precaution taken to ensure 
officer safety. 
¶30 In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977), 
the Supreme Court created a rare bright-line, categorical rule 
under the Fourth Amendment:  In the interest of officer safety, 
                                                 
30 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333; see also Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 
at 1615 ("An officer, in other words, may conduct certain 
unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop."); 
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407 (cautioning that a traffic stop "can 
become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably 
required to complete th[e] mission" of the stop). 
31 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333. 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
12 
 
a police officer may order a driver out of his or her vehicle 
for the duration of the traffic stop.  This rule was 
subsequently expanded in Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411 
(1997), to include all passengers in the vehicle. 
¶31 Asking a lawfully stopped motorist about the presence 
of weapons is significantly less burdensome than ordering all 
occupants out of the vehicle for the duration of the stop.  If a 
police officer may, in the interest of officer safety, order all 
occupants out of the vehicle for the duration of the stop 
without violating the Fourth Amendment, the officer may take a 
less burdensome precaution to ensure officer safety. 
¶32 The State correctly points out that this court's 
recent decision in State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶28, 377 
Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560, supports the conclusion that a 
police officer may ask about the presence of weapons during a 
traffic stop without violating the Fourth Amendment.   
¶33 In Floyd, "Deputy Ruffalo asked Mr. Floyd if he had 
any weapons or anything that could harm him.  When Mr. Floyd 
said he didn't, Deputy Ruffalo asked if he could perform a 
search for his safety."32  The Floyd court explained that "[b]oth 
questions specifically related to the officer's safety."33  The 
Floyd court concluded that "because the questions related to 
officer safety and were negligibly burdensome, they were part of 
                                                 
32 Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶28. 
33 Id. 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
13 
 
the traffic stop's mission, and so did not cause an extension" 
of the stop.34  
¶34 Floyd controls.  Officer Sardina's question to Wright 
regarding whether Wright was carrying any weapons directly 
related to officer safety and was negligibly burdensome.  As 
such, it was part of the traffic stop's mission.  It did not 
cause an extension of the stop.  
B 
¶35 We now turn to Officer Sardina's question about the 
CCW permit and the CCW permit check.   
¶36 Neither the question regarding the CCW permit nor the 
CCW permit check addresses the traffic violation that warranted 
the stop.35  Further, the parties agree, as do we, that the CCW 
permit question and the CCW permit check are not part of the 
"ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop."36 
¶37 Instead, the parties focus on whether the CCW permit 
question and the CCW permit check further the interest of 
                                                 
34 Id. 
35 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 1614 (traffic stop's "mission" 
includes "address[ing] the traffic violation that warranted the 
stop"). 
36 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408; see also Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 
at 1615 ("Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver's 
license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants 
against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration 
and proof of insurance.  These checks serve the same objectives 
as enforcement of the traffic code:  ensuring that vehicles on 
the road are operated safely and responsibly."). 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
14 
 
officer safety.37  On this issue, we agree with Wright.  Knowing 
whether or not an individual has a valid CCW permit does not 
make the officer any safer than the officer otherwise would have 
been in the absence of that knowledge.  It is the potential 
presence of a weapon that implicates the safety of the officer, 
not whether that weapon is being lawfully carried under Wis. 
Stat. § 941.23.  In the absence of reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity, asking whether a motorist holds a CCW permit 
and conducting a CCW permit check constitute an unrelated 
investigation into whether the motorist is unlawfully carrying a 
concealed weapon. 
¶38 Our conclusion that the CCW permit question and CCW 
permit check are unrelated to the mission of the stop does not, 
however, mean that the question and the permit check violated 
the Fourth Amendment.  "[T]he Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] 
certain unrelated investigations that [do] not lengthen the 
roadside detention."38  Inquiries unrelated to the original 
justification for the stop are permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment "so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend 
the duration of the stop."39 
¶39 To illustrate this principle, it is helpful to compare 
the facts of Illinois v. Caballes and Rodriguez v. United 
                                                 
37 Rodriguez, 543 U.S. at 1614 (traffic stop's "mission" 
includes "safety concerns" related to the stop). 
38 Id. 
39 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333. 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
15 
 
States.  Both of these cases involved a K-9 dog sniff unrelated 
to the mission of the traffic stop, but the cases reached 
different results as to the constitutionality of the dog sniff. 
¶40 In Caballes, the Supreme Court concluded that the dog 
sniff did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that "[a] seizure that is justified solely by the 
interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become 
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required 
to complete that mission."40  However, the dog sniff at issue in 
Caballes did not prolong the stop beyond the time reasonably 
required to complete the mission of the stop.  Rather, the dog 
sniff occurred while the traffic stop's mission was still being 
completed.  That is, while one officer was in the process of 
writing Caballes a warning ticket, a different officer arrived 
at the scene and walked his K-9 around Caballes's car.  There 
was no extension of the stop beyond the time reasonably 
necessary to complete the mission of the stop.  The Caballes 
Court explained:  
In the state-court proceedings, however, the judges 
carefully reviewed the details of Officer Gillette's 
conversations with respondent and the precise timing 
of his radio transmissions to the dispatcher to 
determine whether he had improperly extended the 
duration of the stop to enable the dog sniff to occur.  
We have not recounted those details because we accept 
the state court's conclusion that the duration of the 
stop in this case was entirely justified by the 
                                                 
40 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
16 
 
traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to 
such a stop.41 
¶41 In Rodriguez, however, the Supreme Court concluded 
that the dog sniff did violate the Fourth Amendment.  The 
Rodriguez Court reached this conclusion because, unlike the dog 
sniff at issue in Caballes, the dog sniff in Rodriguez prolonged 
the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the 
mission of the stop. 
¶42 The officer in Rodriguez admitted that by 12:27 a.m. 
or 12:28 a.m., he finished explaining the warning that he had 
issued to Rodriguez and returned both Rodriguez's and the 
passenger's documents.42  At this point, the "mission" of the 
traffic stop was complete.  However, the officer continued to 
conduct an investigation into unrelated criminal activity.  The 
officer asked Rodriguez for permission to walk his K-9 around 
Rodriguez's vehicle.43  When Rodriguez said no, the officer 
instructed Rodriguez to turn off the ignition and wait for a 
second officer to arrive.44  At around 12:33 a.m., the second 
officer arrived, the two officers led the K-9 around Rodriguez's 
vehicle, the dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and the 
                                                 
41 Id. at 408. 
42 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1613. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
17 
 
officer discovered a large bag of methamphetamine in Rodriguez's 
car.45 
¶43 The key fact driving the different conclusions in 
Caballes and Rodriguez is that in Caballes, the dog sniff added 
no time at all to the traffic stop because it was conducted 
simultaneously with mission-related activities.  In Rodriguez, 
all mission-related activities had been completed, and thus, the 
dog sniff unlawfully extended the duration of the stop. 
¶44 Accordingly, although we have concluded that the CCW 
permit question and the CCW permit check were unrelated to the 
mission of the traffic stop, they are nonetheless permissible 
under the Fourth Amendment "so long as those inquiries do not 
measurably extend the duration of the stop."46 
¶45 In the instant case, there is no evidence that the CCW 
permit question or the CCW permit check measurably extended the 
duration of the traffic stop.  Although the circuit court record 
is not richly detailed, the record is sufficient to conclude 
that the CCW permit question and the CCW permit check in the 
instant case were conducted while mission-related activities 
were occurring. 
¶46 Although Officer Sardina admitted that he could not 
recall the order in which he asked his questions when he first 
approached Wright's vehicle, he testified that all of the 
                                                 
45 Id. 
46 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333. 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
18 
 
questions "come pretty fast" after he makes initial contact with 
a motorist.  That is, within a few moments of approaching the 
vehicle, Officer Sardina asked for Wright's driver's license, 
asked whether Wright was carrying any weapons, and asked whether 
Wright had a CCW permit.   
¶47 We conclude that Officer Sardina's question about 
whether Wright held a CCW permit did not "measurably extend the 
duration of the stop."47  Obviously, Officer Sardina's CCW permit 
question took some amount of time to ask.  However, we view the 
time it took Officer Sardina to ask the CCW question as de 
minimis and virtually incapable of measurement.  Thus, the CCW 
question did not violate the Fourth Amendment in the instant 
case. 
¶48 As for the CCW permit check, Officer Sardina testified 
that he took Wright's license and returned to his squad car in 
order 
to 
"run 
[Wright's] 
information." 
 
Officer 
Sardina 
testified 
that, 
in 
addition 
to 
"run[ning] 
[Wright's] 
information[,]" he also ran a CCW permit check. 
¶49 We conclude that the CCW permit check in the instant 
case did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was 
conducted concurrently with mission-related activities, namely, 
running Wright's information.  Like the dog sniff in Caballes, 
it cannot be said that the CCW permit check measurably extended 
the duration of the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
                                                 
47 Id. 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
19 
 
¶50 Because neither the CCW permit question nor the CCW 
permit check measurably extended the duration of the traffic 
stop in the instant case, Wright's Fourth Amendment rights were 
not violated. 
¶51 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals, vacate the circuit court's order granting Wright's 
motion to suppress, and remand the cause to the circuit court 
for further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No. 
2017AP2006-CR   
 
 
 
1