Case Title: Harich v. State

Citation: 573 So. 2d 303

Docket Number: 74620

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1990-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
573 So. 2d 303 (1990)
Roy Allen HARICH, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 74620.

Supreme Court of Florida.
December 13, 1990.
Rehearing Denied February 11, 1991.
Larry Helm Spalding, Capital Collateral Representative and Billy H. Nolas, Chief Asst. CCR, Office of Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, and Allan M. Pepper, Steven Glickstein, John D. Chapman, Stanley N. Alpert and Suzanne M. Jaffe of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, New York City, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Margene A. Roper, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Roy Allen Harich appeals the trial court's order denying postconviction relief, which was entered after an evidentiary hearing on Harich's claim that his trial counsel's appointment as a special deputy sheriff resulted in his providing Harich ineffective assistance at his trial. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed, we affirm.
Harich was found guilty of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and two counts of kidnapping. The trial court imposed the death penalty, and this Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence in Harich v. State, 437 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S. Ct. 1329, 79 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1984). Harich subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, and the trial court denied relief. He appealed and also petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirmed the trial court in *304 Harich v. State, 484 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1986), and denied Harich's petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Harich v. Wainwright, 484 So. 2d 1237 (Fla.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1178, 106 S. Ct. 2908, 90 L. Ed. 2d 993 (1986). Harich then sought relief in the federal courts, which eventually denied habeas corpus relief. Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071, 109 S. Ct. 1355, 103 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1989). In March, 1989, after the governor had signed a death warrant, Harich filed a second motion for rule 3.850 relief, which included a claim of conflict of interest based upon Harich's trial counsel's failure to reveal that he was a special deputy sheriff in an adjacent county at the time that he represented Harich. The trial court denied all relief without an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, we found that the allegations concerning trial counsel's alleged service as a special deputy sheriff were sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing. We remanded solely for a hearing on that issue, and we denied relief on all other claims. Harich v. State, 542 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1989).
In the hearing on remand, Harich was afforded an opportunity to present evidence concerning his claim that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because his counsel, who was the senior public defender in charge of capital cases in the Seventh Judicial Circuit, owed conflicting duties because of his status as a special deputy sheriff in an adjacent county. The trial court, after an extensive evidentiary hearing, made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
In this appeal, Harich claims that his public defender's undisclosed special deputy position amounted to a violation of his rights under the sixth and eighth amendments to the United States Constitution and his rights under article II, section 5(a), and article I, section 16, of the Florida Constitution. Harich also argues that the public defender violated section 454.18, Florida Statutes (1981), the common law doctrine of incompatibility, and several of this Court's disciplinary rules. He asserts that the mere fact of his counsel's position as a special deputy sheriff in an adjacent jurisdiction constitutes an actual conflict, that prejudice is presumed, and that this conflict is a per se violation of the cited constitutional provisions. Harich further claims that, even if the per se rule does not apply, the public defender's position was a conflict of interest that actually affected his performance at the trial, resulting in Harich's entitlement to relief.
We approve the findings of fact made by the trial judge and find that they are fully supported by this record. Considering the duties and status of a special deputy sheriff, as found by the trial judge, we conclude *306 that the public defender did not violate the duty he owed to Harich and that the public defender's special deputy status, under the circumstances present in this case, did not result in a per se conflict of interest. We agree with the trial judge that defense counsel's special deputy status was very different from that of an active or auxiliary deputy sheriff and that his position could best be characterized as "honorary." We find none of the cases cited by Harich to be applicable to the facts of this case. Further, we find no actual conflict or deficiency in this public defender's representation of Harich. Interestingly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in reviewing this public defender's representation of Harich in the trial of this cause, stated: "Indeed, we think that the lawyer was above average if not outstanding in representing his client in this case." Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464, 1471 n. 6 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071, 109 S. Ct. 1355, 103 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1989).
We also must address the collateral issue of collateral relief counsel's being found in contempt of the court by the trial judge initially assigned to try this cause. The finding of contempt was announced immediately before the judge recused himself from hearing this cause on remand. The record reflects that counsel was found in contempt for being late to the evidentiary hearing and for perceived dilatory conduct. We find it unnecessary to fully articulate the circumstances, but we conclude that, in light of this record, we should vacate the order of contempt. In doing so, we do not condone collateral counsel's conduct.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of rule 3.850 relief, vacate the stay of execution previously entered in this proceeding, and vacate the contempt order entered against collateral relief counsel.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, EHRLICH, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.