Case Title: Brunmeier v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Brunmeier v. State1987 WY 20733 P.2d 265Case Number: 86-140Decided: 02/26/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
JUNE BRUNMEIER, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. Munker, State 
Public Defender, Julie D. Naylor (argued), Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, Gerald 
M. Gallivan, Wyoming Public Defender Program, Laramie, and John D. Whitaker, 
Public Defender Program, Casper, for 
appellant.

 
 
A.G. McClintock, Atty. 
Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen., and Terry L. Armitage (argued), Legal Intern, for appellee.

 
 
Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

 
 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant was convicted 
of violating the Wyoming forgery statute, § 6-3-602(a)(ii), W.S. 1977, and was 
sentenced to incarceration for a period of not less than 18 months nor more than 
48 months and fined $1,000. The single issue raised on appeal is whether 
appellant's privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by Art. I, § 11 of 
the Wyoming Constitution was violated when she was required to produce a 
handwriting exemplar.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     On July 5, 1985, 
appellant cashed a $300 check at the Horizon Lounge in Gillette, Wyoming. The check was drawn on the account of 
Jerome Kastrow and was made payable to the order of appellant. Later that 
evening the manager of the Horizon Bar contacted Mr. Kastrow and asked him to 
come to the lounge. When Mr. Kastrow arrived, the manager presented the 
instrument and demanded payment. Mr. Kastrow insisted that he did not issue the 
check and refused to pay.

 
 

[¶4.]     On July 15, 1985, Mr. 
Kastrow signed an affidavit of forgery at the Stockmens Bank in Gillette, Wyoming. He informed officers of the Campbell 
County Sheriff's Office that he believed appellant was the person who cashed the 
check and that she did so without his consent or authorization. On August 26, 
1985, appellant was arrested and charged with two counts of forgery. One count 
was subsequently dropped.

 
 

[¶5.]     Before trial, the State 
obtained an order compelling appellant to provide a handwriting exemplar for use 
at trial. Appellant complied with the order, over objection, and now contends 
that her privilege against self-incrimination under Art. I, § 11 of the Wyoming 
Constitution was violated when she was compelled to furnish the handwriting 
exemplar.

 
 

[¶6.]     It is well established 
that the privilege against self-incrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution does not prohibit a court from compelling a 
defendant to furnish handwriting exemplars. In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 1953, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 (1967), the United States Supreme Court held 
that

 
 
"[t]he taking of 
[handwriting] exemplars did not violate petitioner's Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. The privilege reaches only compulsion of `an 
accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of 
responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena 
to produce one's papers,' and not `compulsion which makes a suspect or accused 
the source of "real or physical evidence" * * *.' Schmerber v. State of 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-764, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1833, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 [1966]. 
One's voice and handwriting are, of course, means of communication. It by no 
means follows, however, that every compulsion of an accused to use his voice or 
write compels a communication within the cover of the privilege. A mere 
handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what is written, like the 
voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside its 
protection. United States v. 
Wade, supra, 388 U.S. [218], at 222-223, 87 S.Ct. 
[1926], at 1929-1930 [18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967)]."

 
 
This court has observed 
that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only protects 
against the compulsion of incriminating evidence of a testimonial or 
communicative nature. Cook v. State, Wyo., 631 P.2d 5, 9 (1981). In this case 
appellant asks us to hold that Art. I, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution provides 
greater protection to a criminal defendant.1 We decline to do so. 

 
 

[¶7.]     Our decision is 
supported not only by the overwhelming weight of authority, see Annot., 43 
A.L.R.3d 653 (1972), but also by the specific wording of Art. I, § 11, which is 
even more restrictive than that of the federal constitutional provision. While 
the federal provision states that "no person * * * shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself," our state constitution provides 
that: "No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal 
case * * *." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶8.]     Appellant urges us to 
adopt the rule followed by Georgia, the single jurisdiction that 
has departed from the federal rule. The Georgia Supreme Court has held that a 
defendant may not be compelled to produce a handwriting exemplar because Art. I, 
§ 1, Paragraph XIII of the Georgia Constitution (1976) protects a defendant from 
being forced to "perform an act which results in the production of incriminating 
evidence." State v. Armstead, 152 Ga. App. 56, 262 S.E.2d 233, 234 (1979). The 
Armstead court, following the rule previously announced in Creamer v. State, 229 
Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972), drew a distinction between forcing a defendant 
to submit to an act and compelling him to affirmatively perform an act which tends 
to incriminate him. In Hansen v. Owens, 
Utah, 619 P.2d 315 (1980), the Supreme Court of 
Utah adopted the Georgia 
approach. In 1985, however, Hansen was overruled. In AmericanForkCity v. Crosgrove, Utah, 701 P.2d 1069 (1985), the Utah Supreme 
Court identified the shortcomings of the submission/affirmative act distinction, 
stating:

 
 
"[T]he standard can lead 
to irrational distinctions and incongruous results. For example, under the 
affirmative act standard, an accused could not be compelled to place his foot in 
a footprint near the scene of the crime * * * [y]et an officer could forcibly 
remove the accused's shoe and place it in the track. Similarly, an accused could 
not be compelled to provide a voice exemplar, to be matched against a voice 
graph from a recording made at the time of the crime, but he could be 
fingerprinted against his will. * * * The distinction might also mean that the 
state could obtain blood samples from an unconscious person, but could not get a 
breath sample from a conscious person, even though the latter is far less 
intrusive upon a person's privacy and bodily integrity. In short, the 
affirmative act standard requires the state to make overly fine distinctions 
that may not further significantly the policies of the privilege." (Citations 
omitted.) Id. 
at 1074-1075.

 
 
We find the reasoning of 
the Utah Supreme Court persuasive and, therefore, we decline to adopt the 
affirmative act standard urged by appellant.

 
 

[¶9.]     Appellant's conviction 
is affirmed.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1"[C]onstitutional 
standards announced by the Supreme Court of the United States 
are minimal, which rights may be enlarged under State constitutional provisions 
if justifiable." Richmond v. State, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1217, 1223 
(1976).

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶10.]  While the court's opinion is in accord 
with the principles of federal constitutional law enunciated by a majority of 
the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967); and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 (1967), I am persuaded by the compelling reasoning of the 
four dissenters to those opinions. In the present factual situation I would 
extend to accused persons greater rights under the Wyoming Constitution than 
those apparently afforded by the judicially diluted Bill of Rights of the United 
States Constitution.

 
 

[¶11.]  June Brunmeier was compelled, for the 
State's case, not her own defense, to give handwriting exemplars so as to 
simulate the checks she was charged with forging. In short, this defendant was 
required to reenact the crime with which she was charged, and the State 
introduced the resulting evidence against her at trial.

 
 

[¶12.]  Logic and justice should determine that 
the compulsory handwriting exemplar violated appellant's privilege against 
self-incrimination guaranteed by Art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution. The 
reasoning found in the dissenting opinions to the federal precedent relied on by 
this court is compelling, and I believe justifies a broader interpretation of 
this privilege than the federal courts have given it.

 
 

[¶13.]  In Schmerber the petitioner was 
compelled, against his will, to allow a doctor to extract a blood sample for 
alcohol analysis, the results of which were then used as evidence to convict the 
petitioner of a crime. The Schmerber court held, 5 votes to 4, that the 
compulsory blood-letting did not violate the Fifth Amendment prohibition against 
compelling a person to be a witness against himself because the blood extraction 
was neither communicative nor testimonial, but rather a source of real or 
physical evidence.

 
 

[¶14.]  Justice Black's response in his dissent, 
compelling in reasoning to me, stated:

 
 
"* * * To reach the 
conclusion that compelling a person to give his blood to help the State convict 
him is not equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself strikes 
me as quite an extraordinary feat.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"In the first place it 
seems to me that the compulsory extraction of petitioner's blood for analysis so 
that the person who analyzed it could give evidence to convict him had both a 
`testimonial' and a `communicative nature.' The sole purpose of this project 
which proved to be successful was to obtain `testimony' from some person to 
prove that petitioner had alcohol in his blood at the time he was arrested. And 
the purpose of the project was certainly `communicative' in that the analysis of 
the blood was to supply information to enable a witness to communicate to the 
court and jury that petitioner was more or less drunk." 384 U.S.  at 773, 86 S. Ct.  at 1837.

 
 

[¶15.]  Later, in his partial dissent to Gilbert 
v. California, supra, 388 U.S.  at 278, 87 S. Ct.  at 1963, Justice Black stated:

 
 
"* * * Compelling a 
suspect or an accused to be `the source of "real or physical evidence" * * *,' 
so says Schmerber, 384 U.S.  at 764, [86 S. Ct.  at 1832], is 
not compelling him to be a witness against himself. Such an artificial 
distinction between things that are in reality the same is in my judgment wholly 
out of line with the liberal construction which should always be given to the 
Bill of Rights. See Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616 [6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746]."

 
 

[¶16.]  In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886), the court announced a rule of constitutional 
interpretation followed particularly in judicial construction of Bill of Rights 
guarantees:

 
 
"* * * It is the duty of 
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen and against 
any stealthy encroachments thereon." 116 U.S.  at 635, 6 S. Ct.  at 535.

 
 

[¶17.]  In United States v. 
Wade, supra, the defendant was compelled to stand in a lineup and utter the 
words purportedly uttered by the robber. The United States Supreme Court held, 
again 5 votes to 4, that the defendant was not compelled to utter statements 
testimonial in nature, but was only required to use his voice as an identifying 
physical characteristic.

 
 

[¶18.]  In his partial dissent, Justice Black 
reasoned:

 
 
"* * * Had Wade been 
compelled to utter these or any other words in open court, it is plain that he 
would have been entitled to a new trial because of having been compelled to be a 
witness against himself. Being forced by the Government to help convict himself 
and to supply evidence against himself by talking outside the courtroom is 
equally violative of his constitutional right not to be compelled to be a 
witness against himself." 388 U.S.  at 245, 87 S. Ct.  at 
1942.

 
 

[¶19.]  Justice Fortas' opinion, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, 
stated:

 
 
"It is the kind of 
volitional act - the kind of forced cooperation by the accused - which is within 
the historical perimeter of the privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"* * * To compel him to 
speak would violate the privilege against self-incrimination, which is 
incorporated in the Fifth Amendment.

 
 
"This great privilege is 
not merely a shield for the accused. It is also a prescription of technique 
designed to guide the State's investigation. History teaches us that 
self-accusation is an unreliable instrument of detection, apt to inculpate the 
innocent-but-weak and to enable the guilty to escape. But this is not the end of 
the story. The privilege historically goes to the roots of democratic and 
religious principle. It prevents the debasement of the citizen which would 
result from compelling him to `accuse' himself before the power of the state. 
The roots of the privilege are deeper than the rack and the screw used to extort 
confessions. They go to the nature of a free man and to his relationship to the 
state." 388 U.S.  at 260-261, 87 S. Ct.  at 
1949-1950.

 
 

[¶20.]  In Gilbert v. California, supra, the 
State obtained handwriting exemplars which were admitted in evidence at trial 
over objection that they were obtained in violation of petitioner's Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination. The court rejected petitioner's 
argument, and held that

 
 
"* * * [o]ne's voice and 
handwriting are, of course, means of communication. It by no means follows, 
however, that every compulsion of an accused to use his voice or write compels a 
communication within the cover of the privilege. A mere handwriting exemplar, in 
contrast to the content of what is written, like the voice or body itself, is an 
identifying physical characteristic outside its protection. United States v. 
Wade, supra, at 222-223 [87 S.Ct. at 1929-1930]. No claim is made that the 
content of the exemplars was testimonial or communicative matter." 388 U.S.  at 266-267, 87 S. Ct.  at 
1953.

 
 

[¶21.]  Again four Justices dissented to this 
section of the court's holding. In his partial concurrence and partial dissent, 
with which Chief Justice Warren joined, Justice Fortas 
observed:

 
 
"The Court today appears 
to hold that an accused may be compelled to give a handwriting exemplar. Cf. 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 [86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908] (1966). Presumably, he may be punished if he adamantly refuses. Unlike 
blood, handwriting cannot be extracted by a doctor from an accused's veins while 
the accused is subjected to physical restraint, which Schmerber permits. So 
presumably, on the basis of the Court's decision, trial courts may hold an 
accused in contempt and keep him in jail - indefinitely - until he gives a 
handwriting exemplar.

 
 
"This decision goes 
beyond Schmerber. Here the accused * * * is compelled to cooperate, not merely 
to submit; to engage in a volitional act, not merely to suffer the inevitable 
consequences of arrest and state custody; to take affirmative action which may 
not merely identify him, but tie him directly to the crime. I dissented in 
Schmerber. For reasons stated in my separate opinion in United States v. 
Wade, supra, I regard the extension of Schmerber as impermissible." 388 U.S.  at 291-292, 87 S. Ct.  at 
1965-1966.

 
 

[¶22.]  I agree with those able and thoughtful 
writers in dissent, that the Fifth Amendment proscription against 
self-incrimination should also apply to compulsory handwriting exemplars. It is 
unsound in language and logic to characterize such a handwriting requirement as 
mere physical evidence, particularly where the accused is compelled, as in this 
case, to reenact the crime. Compelling such a reenactment clearly violates the 
constitutional guarantee that one need not testify against 
himself.

 
 

[¶23.]  The holding in Gilbert v. California, supra, cited 
by this court reveals the absurdity of the Gilbert court's reasoning. That court 
said:

 
 
"* * * A mere handwriting 
exemplar, in contrast to the content of 
what is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical 
characteristic outside [Fifth Amendment] protection." (Emphasis added.) 388 U.S.  at 266-267, 87 S. Ct.  at 
1953.

 
 
Does this mean that a 
defendant may not be compelled to write "I forged the check," but may be 
compelled to forge a blank check - to actually do the act for which he is being 
prosecuted? If that is the incongruous holding in Gilbert, I see no reason to 
join in the artless reasoning leading to such a result. In both cases, the 
defendant is compelled to witness against himself, "to accuse himself by a 
volitional act." United 
States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S.  at 261, 87 S. Ct.  at 1950, Fortas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part.

 
 

[¶24.]  This court suggests that the distinction 
between the language contained in the federal constitutional provision and the 
Wyoming Constitution is meaningful, in adversity to the criminally accused. I 
respectfully disagree. Whether the proscription is against the compulsion "to be 
a witness against himself," as stated in the federal constitution, or "to 
testify against himself," as stated in the Wyoming Constitution, under the 
language of either provision, a compulsory reenactment of the crime is 
prohibited. To force a defendant to simulate the forging of a check is to compel 
him to testify against himself. Any attempt to hold otherwise is, in my opinion, 
a misadventurous perpetuation of the "artificial distinction between things that 
are in reality the same." Gilbert v. California, supra, 388 U.S.  at 278, 87 S. Ct.  at 1963, Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. My reading 
of the annals of the Wyoming Constitutional Convention provides no demonstration 
of a diminished interest in individual rights and guarantees in what was then 
the raw frontier of an individualistic society.

 
 

[¶25.]  Where, by the slimmest of majorities, the 
United States Supreme Court has failed to breathe life into the spirit of the 
Fifth Amendment prohibition against self-incrimination, this court should now 
awaken that spirit and give life to the similar prohibition in the Wyoming 
Constitution. Today, by acquiescing in the artificial distinction between 
physical evidence and testimonial communicative evidence, we, as justices of 
this court who are designated guardians of the Wyoming Constitution, pass up an 
opportunity to champion the fundamental right not to testify against himself 
assured every citizen by the basic principles of our democratic society and the 
Anglo-Saxon constitutional foundation of our judicial 
heritage.

 
 

[¶26.]  I dissent.