Case Title: HARBER v. JENSEN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 03-228

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
HARBER v. JENSEN2004 WY 10497 P.3d 57Case Number: 03-228Decided: 09/09/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

JOHN 
B. HARBER and SYLVIA HARBER,

Trustees 
under the Harber Family Trust,

dated 
April 1, 1997; and LARRY LOZIER

and 
SHARON LOZIER, Trustees of the

Larry 
Lozier and Sharon E. Lozier Revocable

Trust 
dated February 16, 1994,

 

Appellants(Defendants) 
,

 

v.

                                                                                                

JOHN 
W. (WAYNE) JENSEN and

MARY 
KAY JENSEN, husband and wife,

 

Appellees(Defendants) 
.

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sublette County

 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Ralph E. Wood, Pinedale, Wyoming. 

 

Representing 
Appellees:

            
William L. Miller of Miller & Fasse, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming. 

 

 

Before 
GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and BROOKS, DJ.

 

 

KITE, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      To access their 
ranch, John and Mary Kay Jensen (Jensens) claimed an irrevocable license to use 
a road located on land belonging to their neighbors, Larry and Sharon Lozier, as 
trustees of the Larry Lozier and Sharon Lozier Trust (Loziers), and John B. and 
Sylvia Harber, Trustees under the Harber Family Trust (Harbers).  The Jensens purchased their ranch from 
Mr. Jensen's parents, who had used the road for many years, and claimed they 
made certain improvements in reliance on continued permissive use of the 
road.  The district court found an 
irrevocable license and granted a permanent injunction against the Loziers and 
the Harbers preventing them from interfering with the Jensens' use of the 
road.  We hold the district court 
erred when it failed to find all of the required elements of an irrevocable 
license, and we reverse.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The Harbers and 
the Loziers present the following issues for review:

 

A.        Was 
the Appellees' reliance on the continued permissive use of the subject road 
reasonably sufficient to be in good faith and to constitute a "fraud" where 
there was no express grant of permission only 
acquiescence?

 

B.        Was 
the reliance of the Appellees on the mere acquiescence of the landowners over 
whose lands the subject access road crossed, sufficient to give rise to an 
irrevocable license where there was no actual request for the continued use of 
said road and express consent given?

 

C.        Did 
the District Court err in granting a permanent injunction where an injunction 
limited to the life of the improvements would have allowed Appellees to recover 
their economic investment?

 

D.        Did 
the District Court err in granting an overbroad irrevocable license for general 
access use which exceeds the access necessary to utilize the constructed 
improvements from which the irrevocable license developed?

 

[¶3]      The Jensens 
phrase this issues as:

 

 

I.          
Did the district court err in finding that the appellees a[c]quired an 
irrevocable license for the use of the historic road?

 

II.          
Did the district court err in granting a permanent injunction enjoining 
the appellants from interfering with the appelle[es'] use of the historic 
road?

 

III.         
Did the district court err by granting an irrevocable license which is 
overbr[oa]d?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Beginning in the 
1930s, the Jensen family owned and operated a ranch in Sublette County, 
Wyoming.  John and Mary Kay Jensen 
purchased the ranch from John's parents in 1975.  Throughout their seventy years of 
ownership, the Jensen family accessed the ranch using a road crossing, the Lozier and Harber property, which 
connected to State Highway 353.  The 
road was the only existing means by which the Jensens could access their ranch 
headquarters year around.  The 
Jensens, Loziers and Harbers were the only people who used the road, and they 
used it exclusively for ranch operations.  
The parties agreed that the Jensens' use of the road was at all times 
permissive and no written easement existed.  Without informing the Loziers and the 
Harbers, or seeking specific permission to continue to use the road, the Jensens 
purchased the ranch in 1975 and made improvements, including rebuilding corrals 
in 1977, building two calving sheds in 1980 and 1981, and building a storage 
shed in 1997.  The Jensens spent 
approximately $9,500 building the sheds.  
They did not provide evidence of the cost of the other improvements.  The ranch was valued at approximately 
$2,000,000 at the time of trial.  
The southeast corner of the Jensen property abuts the Sublette County 
Boulder Lake Road, which could provide the Jensens with alternate access to 
their property.  However, no road 
exists from their ranch buildings to that county road and the land in that area 
is boggy and impassable in the summer months.  

 

[¶5]      In 2002, Mr. 
Harber requested that the Jensens consider building a road on their own property 
to the Sublette County Boulder Lake Road and cease using the road across their 
property.  The record reflected that 
it would cost between $20,000 and $40,000 to construct a road through the boggy 
area in the southeast corner of the Jensen property to the adjoining county 
road.  When the Jensens refused, the 
Harbers gave notice that permission to use the road on their land would 
terminate on December 21, 2002.  
Ultimately, the Harbers locked a gate across the road where it intersects 
State Highway 353.  The Jensens 
filed a complaint alleging they had acquired an irrevocable license to use the 
road and sought an injunction prohibiting any interference with their use of the 
road.  The district court granted a 
preliminary injunction allowing the Jensens to continue to use the road until 
final resolution of the case.  The 
case was tried to the court and no transcript of the trial was prepared.  However, pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03, the 
parties prepared a statement of the evidence, which the district court 
adopted.  In addition, the district 
court personally viewed the access road, the Jensen ranch and improvements, and 
the proposed access road to the Sublette County Boulder Lake Road.  

 

[¶6]      The district 
court entered judgment in favor of the Jensens finding they had acquired an 
irrevocable license to use the road across the Harber and Lozier property.  In support of that conclusion, the court 
found the Jensens had historically used the road, and they had constructed 
improvements in reliance upon the permissive use of the road, although they had 
not sought permission for continued use of the road before doing so.  In addition, the district court 
concluded the Jensens had no other "practical" access to the ranch and would be 
irreparably harmed if they were prevented from using the historical access.  The court granted a permanent injunction 
prohibiting the Harbers and Loziers from interfering with the Jensens' use of 
the road.  The Harbers and Loziers 
filed a timely appeal of the judgment.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      When reviewing 
the factual findings of a district court following a bench trial, we apply the 
following standards:

 

The factual findings of a judge are not entitled 
to the limited review afforded a jury verdict.  While the findings are presumptively 
correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence 
in the record.  Due regard is given 
to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing disputed evidence.  Findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  
A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to 
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

 

Life 
Care Centers of America, Inc. v. Dexter, 
2003 WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 2003).  Findings may not be set aside because we 
would have reached a different result. Double Eagle Petroleum & Mining 
Corp. v. Questar Exploration & Production Co., 2003 WY 139, ¶ 6, 78 P.3d 679, ¶ 6 (Wyo. 2003).  Also, in 
reviewing a trial court's findings of fact,

 

"we assume 
that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that party 
every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from it.  We do not substitute ourselves for the 
trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings unless 
they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of 
law."

 

We affirm 
the trial court's findings if there is any evidence to support them.  

 

Life 
Care Centers, ¶ 
7 (citation omitted).

 

[¶8]      When reviewing 
questions of law de novo, we afford no deference to the decision of the district 
court. Double Eagle Petroleum, ¶ 7.  
Requests for equitable relief are matters over which the district 
court exercises broad discretion. Wilson v. Lucerne Canal and Power 
Co., 2003 WY 126, ¶ 9, 77 P.3d 412, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 2003).  We, therefore, review the district 
court's determination that an irrevocable license existed under the abuse of 
discretion standard.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      The Harbers and 
the Loziers contend the district court erred in finding the evidence supported 
the creation of an irrevocable license because the Jensens' reliance on 
continued permissive use of the road was not reasonable.  They contend that mere acquiescence, 
without notice, is insufficient to create an irrevocable license and that the 
Jensens were required to show an express grant of permission or that they were 
induced into undertaking the improvements on their property in reliance upon 
their neighbors' longstanding permission to use the road.  In addition, the Harbers and the Loziers 
contend a permanent injunction exceeds what was necessary to allow the Jensens 
to recover the economic value of their improvements.  The Jensens respond that they made 
significant expenditures in reliance upon their neighbors' historic 
acquiescence, warranting the district court's finding of an irrevocable 
license.

 

[¶10]   A license is the authority to do 
certain acts on land without possessing any interest in the land.  The privilege granted by a license is 
generally personal, revocable, and non-assignable.  As a personal privilege, a license is 
generally revocable at the will of the licensor for any reason and without 
notice.  Jon W. Bruce and James W. 
Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land, § 11.1 (West 
2001).   In certain 
circumstances, courts have determined licenses to be irrevocable. Generally, 
those circumstances are 1) when a licensee owns personal property on the land of 
the licensor, which creates a license "coupled with an interest" and (2) when 
the licensee has expended money or labor in reasonable reliance on the continued 
existence of the privilege.  
Id. at §§ 11:8-11:9.  
The Bruce/Ely treatise contains a thorough and elucidating analysis of 
the development and scope of irrevocable licenses and notes they are "illusive," 
"a contradiction in terms," "potentially unfair to the licensor," and the cause 
of "a great deal of litigation."  
Id. at § 11:7.  The 
treatise points out the similarity between irrevocable licenses and easements by 
estoppel.  Id. at § 6:1.  Noting that the courts narrowly apply 
easements by estoppel, the treatise instructs that "courts are reluctant to find 
an easement by estoppel on the basis of mere passive acquiescence.'"  Id.  To do so would run counter to the 
accepted notion that it is impossible to obtain a license by prescription 
because a license is predicated upon permissive use.  Id. at § 11:2.  Something more than mere acquiescence is 
required to create an irrevocable license because the doctrine is based on 
notions of estoppel or fraud with courts reasoning it would be inequitable to 
permit the licensor to revoke the privilege when the licensee has changed 
position in reliance upon the permitted use.  Id. at § 11:9.   In recognition of the potential 
problems caused by the uncertainty of irrevocable licenses, courts have imposed 
a variety of limitations upon their creation, such as expenditures of 
"substantial" sums of money with the licensor's knowledge, and even express 
permission by the licensor.  
Id.

 

[¶11]   While Wyoming has long recognized 
the concept of an irrevocable license founded on the theory of equitable 
estoppel, the parties do not cite, and we are unable to find, any precedent for 
imposing an irrevocable license when the alleged licensor had no knowledge of 
the licensee's expenditure of money in reliance upon the mere silent 
acquiescence of the licensor.  
Justice Blume outlined our irrevocable license jurisprudence in Coumas 
v. Transcontinental Garage, Inc., 68 Wyo. 99, 129, 230 P.2d 748, 759 (Wyo. 
1951) which began with Metcalf v. Hart, 3 Wyo. 513, 560, 27 P. 900, 918 
(Wyo. 1893).  In Metcalf, the 
licensor had an unpatented desert land entry where the town of Buffalo, Wyoming 
now stands.  Anxious to have a town 
built, Hart offered deeds to all who built on the land by the time he received a 
patent.  Metcalf built a store on 
the land and the court applied the doctrines of license and equitable estoppel 
to afford him relief when Hart's heirs sought to claim title to the 
property.  The court noted, however, 
that no general rule could be laid down as to the revocability of licenses after 
expenditures of money.  Justice 
Blume agreed, noting that there are many cases in which it clearly appears that 
a license is for temporary purposes only and no easement should be implied.  Justice Blume quoted Metcalf as 
saying: 

 

"[W]e 
believe the court was right in saying it would be a fraud to revoke the license 
in reliance upon which a house had been built, and that, if not at law, at least 
in equity, there is a remedy for the licensee * * *."  

 

Justice 
Blume further said:

 

"When 
we have traveled through the mass of decisions, cloudy and conflicting at times, 
and have arrived at the principle that equity will relieve where there is fraud, 
actual or constructive, we have arrived at a principle in regard to which there 
is no conflict.  And courts of 
equity, . . . are very generally agreed that the revocation of a parol license 
to permanently occupy and improve realty after any considerable expense has been 
incurred, on the faith of such license, under circumstances such that the 
parties cannot be placed in status quo, is either actual or constructive 
fraud.  Even the courts of law very 
extensively recognize the fraud, and some of them remedy it by equitable 
estoppel; but it seems the majority of them acknowledge their inability to 
furnish the appropriate remedy, while suggesting frequently that equity may do 
so." 

 

 Coumas, 68 Wyo. at 124, 230 P.2d  
at 756.         

[¶12]   The Coumas opinion also 
cited Gustin v. Harting, 20 Wyo. 1, 121 P. 522 (Wyo. 1912), in which the 
court held a license to construct a flume in connection with irrigation could 
not be revoked after it was constructed.  
However, as Justice Blume noted, the Gustin court stressed that 
one reason to recognize a license in those circumstances was that, under Wyoming 
statutes, the builders of the flume could have condemned a right-of-way for the 
flume.  In Forde v. Libby, 22 
Wyo. 464, 143 P. 1190 (Wyo. 1914), the owners had built their buildings in 
accordance with an agreement for an alley and the question was whether or not 
the license was revocable.  The 
court held it was not, stating among other things:  "We deem it unnecessary in the view we 
take of this case to enter into a lengthy discussion as to the difference 
between a parol license which may be revoked at will and an easement other than 
to say that it has been held by this court that a parol license may ripen into 
an easement when the licensee has expended money and the license has become 
executed."  
Id.

 

[¶13]   Summarizing Wyoming case law on 
revocable versus irrevocable licenses, Justice Blume said:

 

We 
think that this court under these decisions is committed to the rule that in the 
proper case a parol license to use part of the real estate of another becomes 
irrevocable when a license is executed, and when the licensee in pursuance of 
and in reliance thereon has incurred expenditures of money or labor in making 
improvements of a permanent character.  
It has  become a  rule of  property  which  should  not  be  
lightly 

repudiated.  

 

Coumas, 
68 Wyo. at 125, 230 P.2d  at 757.  
However, the opinion cautioned:

 

What 
has been said does not mean that all licenses, followed by expenditures of money 
or labor, result in the irrevocability thereof, or that the same relief will be 
given in all cases.  It has been 
said that each case depends "on the nature of the license and other 
circumstances and on whether a revocation in a given case would amount to a 
fraud on the rights of the licensee."  
53 C.J.S., 816.  In 5 
Restatement of the Law, Property Servitudes, page 3135 we find it stated:  "In many transactions which involve the 
creation of a privilege to use land, the privilege is such a minor incident to 
other purposes of the transaction that considerations of practical convenience 
prevent the transaction as a whole from being considered as an attempt to create 
an interest in land so far as concerns the compliance with formal requirements 
for the creation of such interests."  
In Metcalf v. Hart, supra, the court stated among other 
things:  "Cases may arise and have 
arisen where a license to occupy land has been intended and understood as a mere 
personal favor to the licensee to give him a place to live, or to occupy for 
some other beneficial purpose not transmissible, but revocable at will.  Then expenditures would naturally be 
made accordingly.  In other cases 
the granting of the license has been in terms an assurance of permanent 
possession.  It is evident that the 
same rule cannot apply to both classes of cases.  The revocation of the license, even 
after expenditures made in consequence of it, in the one case is a right, in the 
other a fraud.  No general rule can 
be made as to the revocability of such licenses after such expenditures.  Each case stands upon its own 
circumstances."   

 

Id.  Applying our precedent, this Court found 
the facts in Coumas justified finding an irrevocable license.  Therein, the owner of a brick building 
with one wall on the boundary of his lot orally agreed to allow his neighbor to 
use that wall as part of a brick building the neighbor was constructing.  After the construction was completed, 
the two neighbors shared the brick wall for many years.  Ultimately, the owner of the wall sought 
to have the neighbor cease his use of the wall arguing such use was detrimental 
to the stability of the structure.  
Resisting the argument that an irrevocable license had been created, the 
owner argued his neighbor had not expended significant money in reliance on the 
license and, in fact, had saved money by not having to construct a wall of his 
own.  Addressing the adequacy of the 
expenditure necessary to create an irrevocable license, we cited the 
well-settled common law doctrine 

 

that a mere 
license, whether by deed or parol, is revocable at the pleasure of the licensor, 
unless coupled with an interest, or grant; or unless it is executed; or, 
according to the rule in many jurisdictions, unless, by reason of expenditures 
made by the licensee on the strength of the license, it would otherwise be 
inequitable to permit the licensor to effect a revocation.  

 

Id. at 
760-61.

[¶14]   The conclusion we draw from the 
Coumas discussion is that if an owner actively agrees to an expenditure 
being made by the licensee sufficient to cause a revocation of the license to 
work a fraud on the licensee, equitable principles demand that the license 
becomes irrevocable.  In 
Metcalf, 3 Wyo. at 547, 27 P.  at 913, we recognized the difficulty of 
establishing broad rules as to what constitutes fraud in this context and stated 
simply that fraud was "unfair dealing."  
If that unfair dealing caused another to change his position, or enticed 
him, fraud occurred and the perpetrator should be equitably estopped from 
benefiting from his actions.  We can 
glean from Metcalf and its progeny that the fundamental purpose of an 
irrevocable license has always been to avoid the consequences of 
fraud.

 

[¶15]   The only irrevocable license case 
we have considered since Coumas is Roberts Construction Co. v. 
Vondriska, 547 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1976).  
In that case, we reiterated that the law of irrevocable licenses is 
founded in principles of estoppel. 

 

There 
is little doubt in our minds that the enforcement of oral licenses against 
attempted revocation is based on principles of equitable estoppel.  Summarizing briefly from 28 Am.Jur.2d 
Estoppel and Waiver § 35, p. 640 et seq. the elements of such estoppel, we find 
that the person estopped must be guilty of conduct which amounts to false 
representation, intention that such conduct be acted upon, and have knowledge of 
the real facts.  The party claiming 
the estoppel must be without knowledge or means of knowledge, rely in good faith 
upon the conduct or statements of the other party, and either take action or 
refrain therefrom so as to change his position to his injury or prejudice.  Application of the doctrine depends upon 
the facts of each particular case and "manifestly there can be no equitable 
estoppel if any essential element thereof is lacking or is not satisfactorily 
proved."  

 

 

Id. 
at 1176 (citation omitted).  In 
Roberts, this Court rejected a gravel mining company's claim of an 
irrevocable license to stockpile gravel on property adjoining its mine.  Finding no permanent improvements had 
been made on the licensee's property and no expenditures were made in reliance 
on the permissive use of the stockpile, we concluded the elements of estoppel 
were not proven.  While the gravel 
mining company provided evidence of certain expenditures made in the course of 
conducting its operation, this Court stated, "it does not appear that any of 
these operations were in any way peculiar to or irrevocably required the use of 
this particular tract.  These are 
expenditures which would have had to be made if the limestone was piled on the 
quarry tract which as we have pointed out Roberts had the full right to under 
its lease."  Id. at 
1177.   

 

[¶16]   We believe it is clear from this 
precedent that one claiming an irrevocable license must prove the licensor had 
knowledge of the licensee's improvements and acted in some way to induce the 
licensee's reliance on the permissive use to make such improvements.  Additionally, the improvements 
themselves must have required the use of the licensor's property. 

 

[¶17]   When we apply these elements to the 
facts of this case, we find the Jensens' claim lacking and the district court 
ruling in error because of its failure to find the necessary elements.  The statement of the evidence set forth 
the following facts relevant to the application of these 
elements:

 

            
1. The use of the road was permissive in nature at all 
times.

 

            
2. Prior to their purchase of the ranch, the Jensens did not inform the 
landowners of their intent to purchase the ranch or request permission to use 
the road for access purposes.

 

            
3. The Jensens constructed certain improvements in reliance on the 
continued permissive use of the access road.  Prior to constructing the improvements, 
the Jensens did not notify the landowners of their intent to construct the 
improvements and did not request permission to continue to use the road to 
access the improvements.

 

            
4. The corrals, calving sheds and storage sheds were utilized in the 
Jensens' ranching operation, which has an approximate value of 
$2,000,000.

 

            
5.  The Jensen ranch abuts 
and has physical access to the Sublette County Boulder Lake Road.  Expenditures of $20,500 to $40,000 would 
be necessary to construct a useable road to connect to that county road.  

 

[¶18]   This evidence supported the 
district court's findings of fact as far as they went.  However, a review of this evidence and 
the district court's findings exposes problems with the Jensens' claim of an 
irrevocable license.  First, there 
was no evidence that the landowners ever knew the Jensens were making 
improvements in reliance on the permissive use of the road or that they took any 
action at all to induce such improvements.  
In all of our previous cases where we found irrevocable licenses were 
created, the landowner had taken some kind of affirmative action to allow the 
use to occur with full knowledge that the licensee intended to expend money in 
reliance upon the existence of the license.  The landowners in this case took no such 
action.  Second, the improvements 
made in previous cases required the use of the landowner's property in order to 
function.  Here, the Jensens' ranch 
has other, albeit more expensive, access.  
Consequently, their improvements can be utilized without the use of their 
neighbors' property.

 

[¶19]   To find an irrevocable license in a 
situation where the use was solely permissive, and the landowner had no notice 
of the licensee's expenditures in reliance upon the license and took no action 
to induce the licensee's actions, would take irrevocable license to a point far 
beyond where this and other courts have been willing to go.  In addition, it would  lead to a result counter to our clear 
precedent proscribing easements by prescription when the use was 
permissive.  Yeager v. 
Forbes, 78 P.3d  at 255; Lincoln County Board of Commissioners v. Cook, 
2002 WY 23, 39 P.3d 1076 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶20]   Under the facts of this case, 
concluding, as the district court did, that the Jensens had an irrevocable 
license to use the access road, essentially granted them a prescriptive 
easement, which they could not establish because the use was permissive, even 
though they failed to give the landowners any notice of their intent to expend 
money in reliance upon their continued use of the road.  We believe that result is unwise, unfair 
to landowners, and inconsistent with our precedent on irrevocable licenses.  The policy of promoting neighborliness 
runs throughout both our prescriptive easement and license precedent.  The aim of both is to support permissive 
use without subjecting landowners to unintended consequences by their mere 
cooperation with a neighbor.  It 
appears the district court was moved by the Jensens' long history of using the 
road in the family ranching operation, with no apparent disadvantage to their 
neighbors, and we admit to a similar reaction.  However, the rule we adopt in this 
context will be applicable in multiple and differing circumstances and must be 
fair to all parties, including those who are simply trying to be good 
neighbors.

 

[¶21]   We hold the Jensens did not acquire 
an irrevocable license to use the road under the facts of this case.  As a result of that holding, we will not 
address the other issues raised by the Harbers and Loziers concerning the scope 
and length of the license.  We 
reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with directions to enter 
such orders as may be necessary and consistent with this opinion.