Case Title: In re Dunnett

Citation: 172 Vt. 196, 776 A.2d 406

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Dunnett  (98-314); 172 Vt. 196; 776 A.2d 406

[Filed 4-May-2001]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-314

In re George Dunnett	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
                                                 Environmental Court
 
                                                 September Term, 2000

Merideth Wright, J.

Matthew T. Birmingham, III of Fink & Birmingham, P.C., Ludlow, for Appellant.

George Dunnett, Pro Se, Ludlow, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       MORSE, J.   Permit applicant Kenneth Tofferi, owner and operator of
  Totem Pole Ski Shop,  Inc., appeals from the decision of the environmental
  court granting him a conditional use permit, but  denying him a variance in
  connection with renovations of a ski shop located on a parcel of land in 
  the Village of Ludlow.  Tofferi argues on appeal that the environmental
  court erred by conducting a  de novo hearing with regard to his
  applications instead of simply reviewing the decisions of the  Ludlow
  Development Review Board on the record and that the court improperly denied
  him a  variance.  Adjoining landowner, George Dunnett, cross-appeals and
  argues that the court erred by  granting Tofferi a conditional use permit. 
  We affirm.

 

       Tofferi owns and operates a ski shop on the corner of Pond Street and
  West Hill Road in the  Village of Ludlow.  Tofferi and Dunnett had
  previously operated the business as partners until  Tofferi bought out
  Dunnett's share sometime around 1982.  Dunnett now runs a separate ski shop
  on  property he owns that adjoins the parcel that is the subject of this
  appeal.  He also resides on the  adjoining property. 

       The property on which the shop is located is comprised of what was
  originally two separate  parcels of land designated 16 1/2 and 18 Pond 
  Street which had independent structures that Tofferi  later connected.  It
  is located in a residential-commercial district within the Village.  In
  December  1995, Tofferi applied to the Village for a conditional use permit
  in order to undertake additional  renovations to the property.  He
  subsequently sought a variance which also appeared to be necessary  for the
  proposed construction. 
  
       The renovations entailed improvements to and rebuilding of existing
  structures, as well as  demolishing a portion of the existing ski shop and
  erecting an addition in a new location on the  property.  Tofferi planned
  to undertake the changes in part to alleviate a traffic problem created by 
  the parking configuration on his lot.  According to testimony before the
  environmental court, the  Village had threatened Tofferi with litigation
  and planned to deny him a certificate of occupancy  unless he fixed his
  parking accommodations. 

       Tofferi's proposed changes resulted in a reduction in the square
  footage of the footprint of the  building and a reduction in the overall
  gross square footage of the structure.  Tofferi's lot, measuring  roughly
  .37 acre, does not meet the minimum lot size requirement for the district
  in which it is  located, however.  Furthermore, the proposed new structure
  did not meet the minimum setback 

 

  requirements contained within the Village's zoning ordinance.  Nor did the
  structures, either before  or after the changes, conform with the maximum
  lot coverage limit established by the Village.

       Tofferi applied for a conditional use permit for the changes to the
  existing structures and a  variance with respect to the new structure, both
  of which were granted by the Village after hearings  on the matter. 
  Dunnett, Tofferi's neighbor, then appealed the decisions to the
  environmental court.   After a de novo hearing, the court granted Tofferi a
  conditional use permit, excepting a dormer for  which the court determined
  that Tofferi needed to seek an additional variance, and concluded that he 
  was not entitled to a variance for the new structure based on a
  determination that he failed to meet  any of the five criteria necessary
  for its grant.  Tofferi now appeals to this Court, and Dunnett cross-
  appeals.

       Tofferi argues that two 1995 resolutions by the Village Board of
  Trustees creating the  Development Review Board and establishing that the
  Board be governed by the Municipal  Administrative Procedure Act entitle
  the Board to on-the-record review by the environmental court  pursuant to
  24 V.S.A. § 4471(a) (allowing for on-the-record appeals to the
  environmental court from  decisions of municipal boards).  Both Tofferi and
  the environmental court also refer to an additional  resolution or motion
  by the Board of Selectmen establishing that appeals of the Development
  Review  Board to the environmental court be on the record.  This motion or
  resolution does not appear  anywhere in the record, however.

       The environmental court determined that the Board's practice of simply
  keeping minutes of  hearings as opposed to audio or video recordings did
  not satisfy the requirement that proceedings "be  recorded" found in the
  Municipal Administrative Procedure Act, 24 V.S.A. § 1205(c), the 
  application of which is statutorily required for on-the-record review under
  § 4471, and the 

 

  requirement of an "adequate record" found in § 4471 itself.  We find no
  error in the court's  conclusion.

       As the court noted, if minutes were sufficient to qualify for
  on-the-record review, the new  amendments regarding the record, i.e., that
  proceedings "be recorded" and that an "adequate record"  be produced, would
  have been superfluous because municipal boards have consistently been
  required  to keep minutes under 24 V.S.A. § 4462 since its enactment in
  1967.  1967, No. 334 (Adj. Sess.),  § 1, amended by 1993, No. 232 (Adj.
  Sess.), § 14; see also Payea v. Howard Bank, 164 Vt. 106, 107,