Case Title: Wolfe v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 021872

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, 
JJ., and Carrico* and Stephenson, S.JJ. 
 
JUSTIN MICHAEL WOLFE 
 
v.  Record No. 021872 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
 
 
                    February 28, 2003 
JUSTIN MICHAEL WOLFE 
 
v.  Record No. 022194 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
Herman A. Whisenant, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In these appeals, we review the capital murder 
conviction, sentence of death, and related convictions imposed 
upon Justin Michael Wolfe. 
I. 
 
The defendant was tried before a jury on indictments for 
the following offenses:  the capital murder of Daniel Robert 
Petrole, Jr., in violation of Code § 18.2-31(2), the willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person by another 
for hire; use of a firearm in the commission of a felony in 
violation of Code § 18.2-53.1; and conspiracy to distribute 
marijuana in violation of Code §§ 18.2-248.1 and -256.  The 
jury found the defendant guilty of these crimes and fixed his 
                     
* Chief Justice Carrico presided and participated in the 
hearing and decision of this case prior to the effective date 
of his retirement on January 31, 2003. 
punishment at 30 years imprisonment for the drug charges and 
three years imprisonment for the use of a firearm. 
 
In the penalty phase of the capital murder trial, the 
jury fixed the defendant's punishment at death, finding that 
he represented a continuing serious threat to society and that 
his offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or 
inhuman in that it involved an aggravated battery to the 
victim.  After considering a report prepared by a probation 
officer pursuant to Code § 19.2-299, the circuit court 
sentenced the defendant in accordance with the jury verdicts. 
 
We consolidated the automatic review of the defendant's 
death sentence with the appeal of his capital murder 
conviction, and the defendant's appeal of his non-capital 
convictions was certified from the Court of Appeals.  We have 
consolidated the defendant's appeal of his non-capital 
convictions with his capital murder appeal, and we have given 
these appeals priority on our docket. 
II. 
 
In accordance with well-established principles of 
appellate review, we will review the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party 
below.  Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 320, 323, 551 S.E.2d 
601, 602 (2001). 
 
2
 
The defendant was a major drug dealer in Northern 
Virginia.  He regularly sold high-grade marijuana, referred to 
as "kind bud" or "chronic," for a price between $4,200 and 
$5,000 per pound.  His marijuana supplier was Daniel Robert 
Petrole, Jr., who began to supply marijuana to defendant in 
November 2000, seven months before he was murdered. 
 
Petrole, a major drug supplier of high-grade marijuana in 
Northern Virginia, regularly purchased about 100 pounds of 
marijuana per month at a price of $360,000.  Petrole usually 
sold the defendant between eight and 18 pounds of marijuana 
every two weeks.  The defendant described Petrole as his 
"chronic man." 
 
In furtherance of their drug activities, the defendant 
and Petrole utilized an informal system of credit described as 
"fronting."  When Petrole sold the defendant marijuana, the 
defendant gave Petrole a quantity of cash as a down payment, 
and the defendant paid the balance when he received proceeds 
from the sales of marijuana to others.  Petrole maintained a 
record of sales of marijuana to dealers such as the defendant, 
and payments made by those dealers, on documents commonly 
known as "owe sheets."  The "owe sheets" contained the amounts 
of the debts that drug dealers owed to Petrole.  On occasions, 
the defendant owed Petrole as much as $100,000.  An "owe 
sheet" that was discovered on Petrole's body the night he was 
 
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murdered indicated that the defendant owed Petrole more than 
$60,000. 
 
The defendant and his friends, T. Jason Coleman and Chad 
E. Hough, had discussions about robbing drug dealers.  On one 
occasion, the defendant, Hough and Coleman planned to rob a 
drug dealer at a location in Washington, D.C., but after they 
conducted surveillance of the planned location of the robbery, 
they concluded that the extensive level of security at the 
location rendered their plan too risky. 
 
Janelle E. Johnson, Coleman's wife, testified that in the 
winter of 2000, the defendant and Coleman discussed committing 
a burglary or stealing money from another drug dealer who sold 
marijuana in Northern Virginia.  In furtherance of this plan, 
the defendant and Coleman purchased ski masks and duct tape. 
 
Hough testified that he and the defendant "talked about 
performing robberies most of the time.  Almost every time we 
got together, it was usually some type of robbery connected 
with drugs."  In January or February 2001, the defendant asked 
Hough if he "wanted to maybe be in on making some money, and 
[the defendant] mentioned . . . that [Hough] could . . . make 
some money by taking [part] in a robbery . . . ."  The 
defendant wanted Hough to rob a drug dealer when the defendant 
was "making a buy."  The defendant wanted Hough to follow the 
drug dealer and rob him.  The defendant did not mention the 
 
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drug dealer's name, but Hough concluded that the defendant 
wanted Hough to rob the defendant's drug supplier. 
 
Owen M. Barber, IV, and the defendant had been "good 
friends" for six or seven years.  Barber, who was also a drug 
dealer, purchased low-quality marijuana, referred to as 
"shwag."  Occasionally, he sold pounds of marijuana to the 
defendant.  The defendant asked Barber if he "wanted to get 
[the defendant's] chronic man."  The defendant stated that 
Barber must not merely rob his "chronic man," but that Barber 
must shoot him because Petrole knew too many people.  Barber 
testified as follows: 
 
"Q:  [D]id there come a point in time when you 
had a discussion concerning [the defendant's] 
supplier of chronic or kind bud [marijuana]? 
 
 
"A:  Yeah.  It was one day when we were at [a 
restaurant] just drinking and [the defendant] asked 
me if I wanted to get his chronic man. 
 
 
"Q:  Get the chronic man? 
 
 
"A:  Yeah.  And I was like, yeah, you know, 
we'll just rob him or whatever.  And I was like, all 
right, you know and then he said, no, no you can't 
rob him.  He was like, we got to shoot him because 
he knows too many people. 
 
 
"Q:  He knows too many people? 
 
 
"A:  Yeah. 
 
 
"Q:  At that point in time, did he tell you who 
his chronic man was? 
 
 
"A:  Yeah. 
 
 
5
 
"Q:  Who was it? 
 
 
"A:  He said Danny Petrole. 
 
 
"Q:  Had you known Danny Petrole prior to that 
time? 
 
 
"A:  No.  I knew the name.  I didn't know him 
like personally." 
 
This conversation occurred in late February or early March, 
2001. 
 
The "next couple of days" after the defendant and Barber 
had the conversation about robbing and killing Petrole, the 
defendant and Barber planned how they "could do it and how 
[they would] have to find him or . . . follow him or catch him 
alone."  On one occasion, the defendant and Barber went to 
Petrole's apartment in Washington, D.C. to determine if it was 
feasible to kill him at that location.  The owner of the 
apartment building employed a doorman, and the defendant and 
Barber concluded that they should not kill Petrole at that 
location. 
 
Subsequently, the defendant and Barber made another 
attempt to locate and kill Petrole.  The defendant made a 
telephone call to Petrole one night, and Petrole informed the 
defendant that Petrole intended to attend a class at the 
Northern Virginia Community College campus in Arlington or 
Annandale, Virginia.  Barber was not sure of the specific 
campus where Petrole attended community college.  The 
 
6
defendant and Barber got in Barber's car and traveled to the 
campus.  They "drove around the parking lot" looking for 
Petrole's car, but they were unable to find it. 
 
On another occasion, the defendant spoke with Petrole, 
who informed the defendant that he (Petrole) planned to eat 
dinner at a restaurant in Washington, D.C.  The defendant and 
Barber traveled to the restaurant in search of Petrole.  
Barber testified that they "went and looked for him at the 
restaurant . . . and we didn't see him.  Then we went back and 
we waited in the parking lot . . . behind his building."  
Barber and the defendant did not find Petrole that evening.  
Barber and the defendant concluded that they were going to 
kill Petrole if he returned to his apartment that night.  If 
he did not return to his apartment, they were going to wait 
until they had another opportunity to kill him. 
 
During the next several days, Barber and the defendant 
continued to discuss their plan to kill Petrole.  On March 15, 
2001, the defendant placed a telephone call to Barber, who was 
with a friend, Robert H. Martin, Jr.  The defendant directed 
Barber to meet the defendant at a restaurant in Fairfax 
County.  Barber and Martin went to the restaurant, and Barber 
and the defendant spoke alone in a parking lot.  The defendant 
informed Barber that the defendant had spoken to Petrole, and 
the defendant planned to meet him that night.  Petrole had 
 
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agreed to bring a large quantity of high-grade marijuana to an 
apartment that the defendant shared with his girlfriend, 
Regina A. Zuener. 
 
The defendant and Barber agreed that Barber would follow 
Petrole once he left Zuener's apartment.  Barber returned to 
the car where Martin had waited, and they went to Barber's 
apartment.  About an hour later, the defendant, using his 
cellular telephone, called Barber to inform him that Petrole 
was "on his way" to Zuener's apartment.  Barber called the 
defendant and inquired whether Petrole had arrived, and the 
defendant informed Barber that Petrole had not. 
 
Barber asked Martin if he wanted to accompany Barber "on 
this thing [Barber] had to do," but Martin refused.  Barber 
testified as follows:  "I think I told [Martin], you know, 
I've got to go do this thing and he was like – he said he was 
[willing] to beat him up or to rob him or whatever.  And I was 
like, no, you know, it's more than that.  He's like, no, no, 
I'm not going to do it.  I'll let you have my car, but I'm not 
going to do it."  Barber wanted to use Martin's car to travel 
to Zuener's house so that he could rob and kill Petrole 
because Barber's car was too distinctive.  Barber's car was 
equipped with racing tires and a large noisy engine. 
 
Barber, armed with a Smith & Wesson nine millimeter 
pistol that he had purchased from Coleman, got into Martin's 
 
8
car and drove to a cul-de-sac at the end of a street near 
Zuener's apartment.  Petrole arrived at Zuener's apartment in 
Centreville.  The defendant, Jennifer E. Pascquierllo, 
Nicholas Soto, and Coleman were present.  Petrole knocked on 
the door, and Zuener let him in.  Petrole was carrying a large 
black duffel bag filled with high-grade marijuana.  Petrole 
and the defendant went upstairs to a bedroom.  Later, Zuener 
went to the bedroom where she observed a large drug 
transaction occur between Petrole and the defendant.  She saw 
between 10 and 15 pounds of high-grade marijuana on her bed.  
Petrole had a large amount of money.  The marijuana was 
packaged in separate bags, weighing approximately one pound 
each.  When the drug transaction was completed, the defendant 
and his friends went to a nightclub, and Petrole left the 
apartment and got in his car. 
 
As Petrole began to drive his car, unbeknownst to him, 
Barber followed Petrole as he drove through Fairfax County.  
Petrole parked his car in front of a house in Fairfax County 
and went inside.  Barber, using his cellular telephone, called 
the defendant and informed him that Petrole "went into some 
house in Fairfax City."  Later, Petrole got back in his car 
and drove off as Barber continued to follow him.  While 
following him, Barber temporarily lost sight of Petrole's car, 
but managed to locate it and continued to follow him.  Petrole 
 
9
drove his car to a neighborhood where he had recently 
purchased a townhouse and parked his car.  Barber stopped the 
car he was driving and "jumped out."  Barber stated, "I shot 
him across through the passenger side window and the[n] jumped 
back in the car and turned around and then left out with . . . 
my lights off."  Barber shot Petrole 10 times, and he was five 
or six feet from the victim when he discharged the pistol.  
Barber damaged Martin's car during the murder.  As Barber sped 
away, he tossed the pistol and gloves he used out of the car 
window. 
 
Issa Hassan, Walter P. Gunning, Jr., and Jeanette 
Lorentzen were in Petrole's townhouse when they heard noises 
and ran to the window.  They observed a red Ford Escort as it 
"sped off real fast and turned its lights as it turned around 
the corner."  Issa Hassan went outside, and he saw Petrole 
seated in the driver's seat of the car.  Hassan opened the 
door and shook Petrole.  Petrole's neck was "flimsy," and he 
did not have a pulse.  The car's windows were shattered, and 
there was "glass everywhere in the car." 
 
Police officers responded to the scene of the murder and 
found $965 on the victim's body.  The police officers found 
$17,460 in United States currency in the victim's duffel bag 
located in the trunk of his vehicle.  The police officers 
searched the victim's house and found approximately $120,000 
 
10
cash, 46 pounds of high-grade marijuana, which was "vacuum 
packed" in plastic bags, 4,000 tablets of metholanedioxine, an 
amphetamine, also known as Ecstasy, and an "owe sheet." 
 
Gunning, Petrole's roommate, testified that Petrole was 
angry with the defendant because he owed Petrole over $66,000 
and that the defendant had taken "a little longer than what he 
expected to pay him back." 
 
Dr. Frances P. Field, an assistant medical examiner, 
conducted an autopsy upon Petrole's body.  She gave the 
following testimony.  The victim had nine gunshot wounds in 
his body.  One bullet penetrated the victim's spinal column 
and severed the spinal cord.  Bullets damaged the victim's 
ribs, abdomen, liver, kidney, large intestines, small 
intestines, aorta, lung, and chest.  Dr. Field opined that the 
defendant's death was caused by multiple gunshot wounds, and 
that any of the wounds which injured the internal organs such 
as the lung, liver, kidney, or spinal canal could have proven 
fatal because of bleeding from those sites. 
 
After he had committed the murder, Barber returned to his 
apartment and told Martin that he had killed Petrole.  Barber 
used his cellular telephone to talk with the defendant, who 
was at the nightclub. 
 
Barber changed clothes, and he and Martin went to the 
nightclub to meet the defendant.  Once Barber and Martin 
 
11
entered the nightclub, Barber and the defendant spoke outside 
of Martin's presence.  Barber told the defendant that he 
(Barber) "did it and it was done."  The defendant responded, 
"all right."  Then the defendant gave Barber "like a pound and 
a half hug."  The defendant "ordered a round of drinks" for 
himself, Barber, and Martin.  The defendant commented that "we 
got to have a made cake now – or like a rack of cake," a slang 
expression that means "we made a lot of money."  The purpose 
of the toast was to celebrate their "rack of money." 
 
In return for his act of killing Petrole, the defendant 
told Barber that he did not have to pay for four pounds of 
marijuana that the defendant had previously sold him.  
Additionally, the defendant gave Barber a half pound of 
"chronic" marijuana, forgave Barber's $3,000 debt for past 
drug transactions, and promised to pay Barber $10,000 in cash. 
 
Martin testified at trial, and his testimony corroborated 
Barber's version of the events on the night of the murder.  
Martin and Barber had dinner with Martin's parents on the 
evening of March 15 before the murder.  After dinner, Barber 
and Martin went to Barber's apartment that he shared with 
Coleman.  They drank beer and smoked marijuana.  Martin 
observed Barber when he had the conversation with the 
defendant in the parking lot of the restaurant.  After the 
conversation, when the men were at Barber's apartment, Barber 
 
12
told Martin that Barber intended to "put one in each kneecap."  
Barber told Martin that Barber intended to leave the apartment 
with his pistol after he received a telephone call from the 
defendant.  After Barber received the telephone call, he left 
the apartment, followed Petrole, and killed him. 
 
Martin testified that after the murder, he and Barber 
went to the nightclub and when they met the defendant, Barber 
told Martin "to go away" so that the defendant and Barber 
could have a private conversation.  After the defendant and 
Barber had concluded their private conversation, Martin 
approached them.  The defendant and Barber gave Martin an 
alcoholic beverage, and the defendant "told [Martin] right 
there you can't say nothing about this and I'm about to make a 
lot of money."  Immediately, the defendant, Barber, and Martin 
made a toast. 
 
After the murder, Martin approached the defendant and 
asked for a discount for the purchase of marijuana.  Martin 
told the defendant, "I know what happened."  The defendant 
gave Martin a discount on the purchase and forgave him of a 
past drug debt. 
 
The day after the murder, the defendant and several 
friends, including Barber, went shopping to purchase clothes 
to wear to a birthday party in honor of the defendant on March 
17, 2001.  The defendant and his friends purchased several 
 
13
bottles of expensive champagne for his birthday party that 
cost in excess of $200 per bottle. 
 
After his birthday party, the defendant decided that 
things were getting "too hot" with the police, and he fled to 
Florida.  Police officers searched Barber's apartment and 
interrogated him, but he denied any involvement in Petrole's 
murder.  Barber left Virginia, went to Florida, and then fled 
to San Diego, California.  Barber contacted his former 
girlfriend, Jennifer Pascquierllo, and asked her to obtain 
money from the defendant and bring the money to Barber.  The 
defendant gave her $1,000.  She drove her car to meet Barber 
in San Diego, where he was eventually arrested by United 
States Marshals. 
 
Three days after the murder, Barber gave Martin $540 and 
directed him to repair the damage to his car and to replace 
the tires.  Barber was afraid that the car's tires may have 
created identifiable skid marks at the scene of the murder.  
Barber instructed Martin to take the car to Virginia Beach, 
Virginia, and get it repaired there.  Martin told Barber that 
Martin was not "going to help him out."  Martin tried to 
return the money, but Barber would not accept it.  That night, 
Martin contacted police officers and reported the crime. 
 
Pascquierllo testified that Barber relayed to her the 
facts relating to the murder of Petrole.  Her testimony 
 
14
concerning these facts was consistent with Barber's trial 
testimony.  She also testified:  "I asked [Barber] what the 
sum of money was, what kind of sum of money it could have 
been, and he told me that it was $10,000 and he got some weed, 
but that he had to flush it, and then he told me that it was 
also the $3,000 debt that involved me."  Pascquierllo 
testified that Barber tried unsuccessfully to obtain from the 
defendant the $10,000 that he had promised to pay Barber to 
kill Petrole. 
 
The defendant made numerous admissions during his 
testimony.  The defendant admitted that he had been a drug 
dealer for four or five years before Petrole's death.  He 
admitted that he was guilty of the charge of conspiracy to 
distribute more than five pounds of marijuana.  He had 
distributed more than 100 pounds of marijuana throughout 
Northern Virginia since he began selling drugs.  He admitted 
that he had spoken to his friends about robbing a drug dealer.  
He admitted that he had discussed with Coleman the possibility 
of committing robberies.  The defendant admitted that he was 
the last person Barber called before Barber killed Petrole and 
the first person Barber called after Petrole's death.  He 
admitted that he sold marijuana to Martin after the murder and 
that Martin stated, "I know what happened."  After Martin made 
 
15
this statement, the defendant admitted he decreased the price 
of the marijuana he sold to Martin. 
 
The defendant testified that one of his highest 
priorities was the "high life" that money could obtain for 
him.  The defendant regularly spent between $2,000 and $3,000 
on weekends for entertainment purposes.  The defendant 
admitted that he owed Petrole more than $80,000 at the time of 
Petrole's death. 
 
The defendant claimed that Barber testified untruthfully 
about him because the defendant purportedly had had sexual 
relations with Barber's former girlfriend, Pascquierllo.  
However, the defendant admits that when asked by the police 
detectives, "[d]id Owen have anything against you?," the 
defendant responded, "no."  Additionally, Pascquierllo denied 
that she ever had a sexual relationship with the defendant. 
III. 
 
During the penalty phase of the capital murder 
proceedings, the Commonwealth adduced the following evidence.  
Daniel Petrole, Sr., and Jane Alison Petrole, the victim's 
parents, discussed the impact of his death upon their family.  
The Commonwealth also presented the defendant's juvenile 
records which consisted of an order dated October 10, 1997, 
which was an adjudication of guilt for possession of less than 
five pounds of marijuana.  Additionally, the defendant, as a 
 
16
juvenile, had committed numerous probation violations by 
breaking into his mother's home, purchasing alcoholic 
beverages, possessing a false identification card, assuming a 
false name, and testing positive for amphetamines and 
cannabinoids.  The defendant also had been convicted in 
Florida for possession of a false identification card. 
 
The defendant presented extensive evidence about his 
background and character.  Dr. William Ling, a clinical 
psychologist who qualified as an expert witness, presented 
testimony favorable to the defendant.  Dr. Ling testified, 
however, that "the best predictor of future behavior is past 
behavior," and that "[s]ubstance abuse has been shown to have 
a high incidence or a high correlation with risk of future 
violence." 
IV. 
 
The defendant filed 37 separate assignments of error.  
However, the defendant failed to brief assignments of error 2, 
3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21, 23, 30, 31, and 32.  Even though the 
defendant claimed in his reply brief that he discussed these 
assignments of error in his opening brief, the defendant's 
assertions are incorrect.  In his reply brief to the 
Commonwealth's brief, the defendant purportedly identified 
pages in his initial brief where the assignments of error were 
discussed.  We have reviewed the defendant's brief, and the 
 
17
arguments are simply not present therein.  Moreover, during 
the oral argument before this Court, the defendant could not 
demonstrate where in his brief these assignments of error were 
addressed.  He merely referred this Court to his reply brief. 
 
In accordance with our well-established precedent, Lenz 
v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 458, 544 S.E.2d 299, 303, cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 1003 (2001); Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 
407, 413, 508 S.E.2d 57, 60 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 
1038 (1999), the following assignments of error, not having 
been briefed, are waived: 
 
"2.  The court below erred in improperly 
limiting voir dire of the jury venire by the 
defense. 
 
 
"3.  The court below erred in allowing the 
jurors be the judges of their own impartiality. 
 
 
"10.  It was error for the court below to 
exclude Justin Wolfe's testimony that he had been 
told that Ian Wiffin had been indicted. 
 
 
"11.  The court below erred in allowing the 
Commonwealth to lead its own witnesses. 
 
 
"12.  The court below erred in allowing the 
Commonwealth to present evidence that it had not 
disclosed to the defense as required by the 
Discovery Order and Rule 3A:11 of the Rules of the 
Supreme Court of Virginia. 
 
 
"13.  The Court below erred in allowing the 
Commonwealth to withhold exculpatory evidence, the 
withholding of which was revealed during the course 
of the trial, and which was producible in accordance 
with the court's order and the applicable laws 
regarding the prosecution's duty to provide 
 
18
exculpatory evidence in order to ensure a fair trial 
and just outcome. 
 
 
"21.  The court below erred by failing to 
instruct the jury on the necessity of and procedure 
for balancing the aggravating and mitigating 
factors. 
 
 
"23.  The court below erred in its instructions 
on accessory before the fact, principle in the 
second degree, and concert of action.  These 
instructions were erroneous. 
 
 
"30.  The court below erred by failing to set 
aside the verdict when there was evidence that at 
least one juror slept through part of the trial. 
 
 
"31.  The court below erred by stating that the 
evidence presented at the judicial sentencing was 
not new evidence, and ignoring the new evidence 
presented for the first time at the judicial 
sentencing which included evidence of false and 
misrepresented facts in the Commonwealth's case. 
 
 
"32.  The court below erred by not rejecting 
the jury recommendation of death and imposing a 
sentence of life without parole." 
 
 
We will not consider assignment of error 37 because it is 
vague.  That assignment of error states:  "Such other grounds 
as may become evident through a more thorough examination of 
the record."  Rule 5:17(c).  The defendant does not assign any 
error to his non-capital convictions.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm those convictions. 
V. 
 
The defendant has raised two issues on appeal that have 
been decided adversely to his claims by our previous 
 
19
decisions.  We adhere to those rulings, and we will not 
discuss them further.  The issues previously resolved are: 
 
(i) whether the future dangerousness aggravator is 
unconstitutionally vague.  This argument was rejected in Bell 
v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 203, 563 S.E.2d 695, 716 (2002), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 860 (Jan. 13, 2003); 
Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 355, 551 S.E.2d 620, 
634 (2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1928 (2002); 
 
(ii) whether the vileness factor is unconstitutionally 
vague.  This argument was rejected in Morrisette v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 386, 397, 569 S.E.2d 47, 55 (2002); Beck 
v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 387, 484 S.E.2d 898, 907, cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 1018 (1997). 
VI. 
 
The defendant argues that the circuit court erred in 
failing to remove for cause two members of the venire, 
Patricia Grisham and Leo Green.  The defendant claims that the 
circuit court should have removed these members of the venire 
for cause because of their exposure to media coverage of the 
crimes.  The defendant states:  "Juror Grisham remembered 
being baffled as to why young people under the age of 21, and 
not of legal drinking age, would be in a D.C. nightclub after 
it happened.  Juror Green said that he had read about it and 
heard about it on the radio.  He also recalled hearing about 
 
20
the case the week before.  He specifically remembered the guy 
was killed, there was dope involved, and a stash of money was 
found."  The defendant claims there was "reasonable doubt" 
regarding these jurors' ability to give him a fair and 
impartial trial. 
 
The defendant's contentions are without merit.  The 
circuit court and counsel conducted the voir dire of the 
venire.  Grisham stated that she had not acquired any 
information about the defendant's alleged criminal acts from 
the news media or other sources that would affect her 
impartiality in this case.  Grisham also stated that she did 
not "know of any reason whatsoever why [she] would not be able 
to give a fair and impartial trial to the Commonwealth and to 
the accused based solely on the evidence [she] would hear in 
this courtroom and the instructions of law" that the circuit 
court would give the jury. 
 
Additionally, the following colloquy occurred between the 
Commonwealth's attorney and Grisham: 
"Commonwealth's Attorney:  This case involves 
the alleged distribution of drugs by some young 
people in Northern Virginia, one of whom was 
followed into this County and killed. 
 
"Do you think you have heard something about 
that? 
 
"Ms. Grisham:  I believe I read it in The 
Washington Post. 
 
 
21
. . . . 
 
"Commonwealth's Attorney:  Irrespective of what 
you heard or read, would you be able to put that 
aside and render an opinion based solely on the 
evidence that you will hear in this courtroom and 
the law that the Court will give you? 
 
"Ms. Grisham:  Yes." 
 
The following colloquy occurred between defendant's counsel 
and Grisham: 
 
"Defense Counsel:  You indicated that you . . . 
read articles in The Washington Post. 
 
 
"Ms. Grisham:  Uh-huh. 
 
 
"Defense Counsel:  What do you remember of 
those articles when they came out? 
 
 
"Ms. Grisham:  I think the part that I remember 
the most is I believe that after it happened they 
were at a nightclub, I believe, I want to say the 
D.C. area.  And I think I remember their ages as 
being under twenty-one, a few of them. 
 
"And I was – in my mind I was thinking, why are 
they at a nightclub if they are not of legal 
drinking age? 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"Defense Counsel:  Did those articles have any 
impact on your ability to – have you formed any 
opinions about this case? 
 
 
"Ms. Grisham:  No. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"Defense Counsel:  And you think you can be 
fair even in light of those articles? 
 
 
"Ms. Grisham:  Yes." 
 
 
22
The following colloquy occurred between defense counsel 
and Green: 
"Defense Counsel:  Could you tell me what 
reports you heard, to the best of your recollection, 
or saw? 
 
"Mr. Green:  I don't remember any one in 
particular.  I just heard it on the news.  I heard 
about it and I read about it in the newspapers when 
it happened.  And then I think last week or sometime 
when they brought it up again I heard it on the 
news. 
 
"Defense Counsel:  Do you have any recollection 
of any substance of the reports, or did you form any 
opinions? 
 
"Mr. Green:  No.  The only thing I remember was 
that the guy was killed and there was dope involved 
in it and they found a stash of money in there with 
him.  That's all I know about it. 
 
"Defense Counsel:  Do you think that you could 
set aside those facts and listen only to the 
testimony and evidence as presented during this 
trial? 
 
"Mr. Green:  Yes. 
 
 
"Defense Counsel:  Do you think you could 
forget about what you've heard in the media? 
 
 
"Mr. Green:  Yes." 
 
 
In response to the court's question, "Have any of you 
acquired any information about these offenses or about the 
accused from the news media or other sources, and if so, would 
that information affect your impartiality in these cases?," 
Green responded, "I have read the newspapers and heard on the 
radio something about it."  However, Green stated that he had 
 
23
not "expressed or formed any opinions as to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused."  Green also stated that he could 
put any information that he had read aside, listen to the 
evidence presented in the courtroom, and render his verdict 
based solely upon the evidence. 
 
An accused has a constitutional right to an impartial 
jury.  U.S. Const. amends. VI and XIV; Va. Const. art. I, § 8.  
Green v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 105, 115, 546 S.E.2d 446, 451 
(2001).  Additionally, we have held that a prospective juror 
"must be able to give [the accused] a fair and 
impartial trial.  Upon this point nothing should be 
left to inference or doubt.  All the tests applied 
by the courts, all the enquiries made into the state 
of the juror's mind, are merely to ascertain whether 
[the juror] comes to the trial free from partiality 
and prejudice. 
 
"If there be a reasonable doubt whether the 
juror possesses these qualifications, that doubt is 
sufficient to insure his exclusion.  For, as has 
been well said, it is not only important that 
justice should be impartially administered, but it 
should also flow through channels as free from 
suspicion as possible." 
 
Wright v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 941, 943 (1879); 
accord Green, 262 Va. at 115, 546 S.E.2d at 451; Barker v. 
Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370, 374-75, 337 S.E.2d 729, 732-33 
(1985); Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 976, 266 S.E.2d 
87, 90-91 (1980). 
 
Additionally, this Court must give deference to the 
circuit court's determination whether to exclude a prospective 
 
24
juror because the circuit court was able to see and hear each 
member of the venire respond to the questions asked.  The 
circuit court is in a superior position to determine whether a 
prospective juror's answers during voir dire indicate that the 
juror would be prevented from or impaired in performing the 
duties of a juror required by the juror's oath and the court's 
instructions.  Green, 262 Va. at 115, 546 S.E.2d at 451; 
Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 510, 537 S.E.2d 866, 875 
(2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 815 (2001).  This Court must 
consider the voir dire as a whole, and not simply the juror's 
isolated statements.  Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 90, 
472 S.E.2d 263, 269 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1122 
(1997).  And, we will not disturb the circuit court's refusal 
to strike a juror for cause unless that decision constitutes 
manifest error.  Green, 262 Va. at 116, 546 S.E.2d at 451; 
Clagett, 252 Va. at 90, 472 S.E.2d at 269; Roach v. 
Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 343, 468 S.E.2d 98, 109, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 951 (1996). 
 
Applying the aforementioned principles, we hold that the 
circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to 
grant the defendant's motion to strike Grisham and Green.  Our 
review of the entire voir dire of Grisham and Green, including 
their statements summarized above, indicates that these 
jurors' ability to give the defendant a fair and impartial 
 
25
trial was not left to inference or doubt.  Both Grisham and 
Green stated that they could put aside any information that 
they had read or heard and give the defendant a fair trial 
based solely upon the evidence admitted during the trial and 
the jury instructions that the court would give to the jury.  
And, as the Supreme Court has held, the federal Constitution 
does not require that a court disqualify a juror simply 
because that juror has been exposed to media coverage.  Mu'Min 
v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 430 (1991).  Accord Murphy v. 
Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-800 (1975); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 
717, 722-23 (1961). 
VII. 
Guilt Phase 
A. 
 
During the guilt phase of the capital murder trial, the 
Commonwealth presented several witnesses who testified that 
the defendant had planned to rob drug dealers.  The defendant 
argues that "[t]his evidence was only admissible if it was 
being used to prove felony murder" but that "the Commonwealth 
relied on this evidence to prejudice the jury against Mr. 
Wolfe."  We will not consider this argument because the 
defendant did not object to the admission of this evidence at 
trial.  Rule 5:25. 
B. 
 
26
 
The defendant claims that the circuit court erred because 
it purportedly "permitted a lay witness to express an opinion 
about what she thought might have happened on the night of the 
offense."  Not only does the defendant mischaracterize Janelle 
Johnson's testimony, but the defendant failed to make any 
objection to such purported testimony and, therefore, we will 
not consider this argument.  Rule 5:25. 
C. 
 
The defendant argues that the circuit court erred because 
it permitted witnesses Chad Hough and Jason Coleman to violate 
the rule on the exclusion of witnesses, and the court failed 
to strike Hough's testimony.  The defendant claims that even 
though the court granted a joint motion by the defendant and 
the Commonwealth to exclude the witnesses pursuant to Code 
§ 19.2-265.1, Hough and Coleman violated that order.  The 
defendant says that his counsel spoke with Coleman after Hough 
had testified during the trial.  Allegedly, Hough discussed 
with Coleman, in detail, defense counsel's cross-examination 
of Hough. 
 
Continuing, the defendant states that "[e]ven though the 
Commonwealth did not call Coleman as a witness, the 
impropriety prevented the defendant from calling him and 
getting his unfettered answers and/or surprised reaction.  It 
put the defense in the position of having to cross-examine 
 
27
[its] own witness had Coleman not answered with the 
anticipated response.  To balance the impact of having Hough's 
testimony alone, [Coleman's] testimony should have been 
stricken." 
 
The circuit court denied the defendant's motion for a 
mistrial.  The court stated that neither Hough nor Coleman was 
in the courtroom when the court granted the motion to exclude 
witnesses.  The court concluded:  "It would be awful hard for 
this Court to find any intentional impropriety simply because 
these witnesses were not here to receive the Court's order.  
And indeed, the Commonwealth may have talked to these 
witnesses, but you [defense counsel] talked to the witnesses 
also because you said you actually called the witness, Mr. 
Coleman, and talked to him." 
 
Code § 19.2-265.1 requires a circuit court to exclude 
witnesses from the courtroom upon the motion of any litigant.  
We have held that a circuit court has discretion to decide 
whether a witness who violates an exclusion order should be 
prohibited from testifying.  Brickhouse v. Commonwealth, 208 
Va. 533, 537, 159 S.E.2d 611, 614 (1968).  "Factors to be 
considered in resolving the question include whether there was 
prejudice to the defendant and whether there was intentional 
impropriety attributable to the prosecution.  It is also 
pertinent whether the out-of-court comments concerned any 
 
28
substantive aspect of the case and whether they had any effect 
on the witness' testimony."  Bennett v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 
448, 465, 374 S.E.2d 303, 314 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 
1028 (1989). 
 
Applying our precedent, we hold that the circuit court 
did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion 
for a mistrial.  The defendant failed to establish that he was 
prejudiced, and he failed to show any intentional impropriety 
attributable to the Commonwealth.  And, as we have already 
stated, the circuit court found that neither Hough nor Coleman 
was aware of its ruling that excluded the witnesses. 
D. 
 
The defendant argues that the Commonwealth's evidence 
established that he was guilty of the crime of felony murder, 
not capital murder.  The defendant states that Ian Wiffin, 
whom the defendant describes as a key witness for the 
Commonwealth, testified that the defendant told Wiffin after 
the crimes had occurred that Barber "was supposed to rob [the 
victim], but he messed it up and ended up killing him."  
Continuing, the defendant contends that at the very least, the 
Commonwealth's evidence established reasonable doubt whether 
the defendant hired Barber to kill the victim.  The 
defendant's contentions lack merit. 
 
29
 
The jury in this case was properly instructed by the 
court to consider all the evidence.  Our review of the record 
in this case reveals that the Commonwealth presented evidence 
that permitted the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant hired Barber to kill Daniel Petrole.  Barber 
testified that the defendant paid him to kill Petrole.  
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the defendant agreed 
to pay Barber $10,000 in cash, he forgave Barber's prior drug 
debts and gave Barber a half pound of marijuana.  The 
defendant and Barber stalked the victim on numerous occasions 
in an effort to kill him.  The defendant devised a plan to 
lure the victim to the defendant's girlfriend's apartment so 
that Barber could then follow the victim and execute him at 
the appropriate time.  After Barber killed the victim, Barber 
called the defendant.  Barber and the defendant met at a club, 
and the defendant boasted that he just made a "rack of cake," 
a slang expression for "a lot of money."  And, Barber's 
version of the murder-for-hire scheme is consistent with the 
testimony of numerous other witnesses.  Moreover, contrary to 
the defendant's assertion, the jury was not required to accept 
as true his self-serving statements that he made after the 
murder that Barber "messed it up and ended up killing 
[Petrole]." 
E. 
 
30
 
Hough and Ian Wiffin, who testified on behalf of the 
Commonwealth, stated that criminal charges were pending 
against them in the federal district courts for possession and 
distribution of drugs.  Hough had executed a plea agreement 
with a United States Attorney in West Virginia that provided a 
maximum punishment of 20 years imprisonment.  Pursuant to the 
terms of the agreement, the United States Attorney was 
required to make "nonbinding recommendations" to the federal 
district court for reductions in Hough's sentence based upon 
his cooperation with federal law enforcement agencies.  Hough 
testified at trial that he hoped that the federal district 
court would reduce his sentence based on his cooperation and 
testimony in the defendant's capital murder trial. 
 
Wiffin had been indicted by a federal grand jury in 
Virginia.  He testified that his lawyer had advised him that 
his testimony "might help" Wiffin in his federal criminal 
proceedings.  A draft of a plea agreement had been prepared, 
but no agreement had been executed between Wiffin and the 
United States Attorney. 
 
At trial, the defendant tried to present testimony from 
an attorney who considered himself an expert on the subject of 
federal sentencing guidelines.  The circuit court refused to 
permit this purported expert witness to testify because, among 
other things, such testimony would have been pure speculation. 
 
31
 
We agree with the circuit court, and we hold that the 
court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to permit 
such testimony.  The plea agreement that Hough had executed 
with a United States Attorney simply provided that the United 
States would make nonbinding recommendations on his sentence 
based upon his cooperation with federal authorities.  No one, 
including the so-called expert witness, could opine what 
sentence the federal district court would ultimately impose 
upon Hough.  Wiffin had not yet signed a written agreement 
with a United States Attorney in Virginia.  Accordingly, any 
so-called expert testimony on this subject would have been 
utter speculation and, thus, inadmissible.  As we have 
recently stated, expert testimony that is speculative is not 
admissible.  John v. Im, 263 Va. 315, 320, 559 S.E.2d 694, 696 
(2002). 
VIII. 
A. 
Penalty Phase 
 
Code § 19.2-264.2 states: 
 
"In assessing the penalty of any person 
convicted of an offense for which the death penalty 
may be imposed, a sentence of death shall not be 
imposed unless the court or jury shall (1) after 
consideration of the past criminal record of 
convictions of the defendant, find that there is a 
probability that the defendant would commit criminal 
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing 
serious threat to society or that his conduct in 
 
32
committing the offense for which he stands charged 
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or 
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of 
mind or an aggravated battery to the victim; and (2) 
recommend that the penalty of death be imposed." 
 
The defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient as a 
matter of law to establish his future dangerousness.  The 
defendant states that he has never been charged with, involved 
in, or convicted of any violent or assaultive crime.  He 
states that his prior record of simple possession of 
marijuana, possession of a false identification, and obtaining 
alcohol while under the age of 21 is insufficient to prove his 
future dangerousness.  Additionally, he says that the key 
evidence upon which the Commonwealth relied to prove future 
dangerousness involved a student who brought a razor blade and 
syringes to school in violation of school rules.  The 
defendant's brother, not the defendant, was guilty of that 
infraction.  We disagree with the defendant's contentions that 
the evidence is insufficient to prove that he is a future 
danger. 
 
Based upon our review of the record, we hold that the 
evidence of record permitted the jury to find that there is a 
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of 
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to 
society.  Contrary to the defendant's assertion, it is not 
necessary that he have a prior criminal record as a predicate 
 
33
on which the jury must rely before it can sentence him to 
death based on future dangerousness.  Kasi, 256 Va. at 423, 
508 S.E.2d at 66; Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 467, 470 
S.E.2d 114, 130-31, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996); Breard 
v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 86, 445 S.E.2d 670, 681, cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 
136, 144, 431 S.E.2d 48, 53, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928 
(1993). 
 
The evidence of record establishes, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that this defendant is a future danger to society.  The 
defendant was a major drug dealer in Northern Virginia.  He 
had been a major drug dealer for four or five years before 
March 15, 2001, the date he arranged for the murder of his 
supplier.  He admitted that he sold over 100 pounds of 
marijuana, and he purchased between eight and 18 pounds of 
marijuana every two weeks from the victim. 
 
Prior to this murder, the defendant had spoken with 
others and discussed committing robberies of drug suppliers.  
For example, Hough testified that he and the defendant "talked 
about performing robberies most of the time.  Almost every 
time we got together, it was usually some type of robbery 
connected with drugs."  Additionally, Hough stated that "[i]t 
was usually like maybe holdup styles, as far as whether – I 
remember one time it was – Justin would go to make a buy.  We 
 
34
would go in and tie them up and beat them up and take the 
drugs and money . . . ." 
 
The evidence also showed that the defendant and another 
friend, Coleman, purchased ski masks and duct tape in 
furtherance of a plan to rob a drug dealer.  The defendant and 
Hough discussed robbing a drug dealer who lived in Washington, 
D.C., but they abandoned their plan because the defendant 
concluded that the level of security in the apartment building 
where the intended victim lived was too extensive. 
 
The evidence showed that this defendant devised a plan 
whereby he lured Petrole, his major drug supplier, to a 
specific location in Virginia.  The defendant paid his 
longtime friend, Barber, to follow Petrole, and then execute 
him because Petrole knew too many people.  The defendant 
directed Barber to kill Petrole, stating, "we got to shoot him 
because he knows too many people."  The evidence also showed 
that prior to the actual murder of Petrole, the defendant and 
Barber had made several other attempts to locate and kill 
Petrole.  Certainly, these acts are sufficient to support the 
jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a 
reasonable probability that this defendant is a future danger 
to society.  Additionally, the fact that soon after Petrole 
was killed, the defendant celebrated at a party and drank a 
 
35
toast in honor of the murder is indicative of the danger he 
poses to others. 
B. 
 
The defendant argues that Code § 19.2-264.2 does not 
permit him to be sentenced to death based upon the vileness 
predicate because the vile acts of Barber cannot be attributed 
vicariously to the defendant.  Additionally, the defendant 
argues that the evidence was not sufficient to establish 
vileness.  We need not, and expressly do not, consider these 
arguments because the defendant was sentenced to death based 
upon the vileness predicate as well as the future 
dangerousness predicate.  The future dangerousness predicate 
is a separate and independent basis to support the imposition 
of the death penalty, and as we have already discussed, the 
evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant 
constituted a continuing serious threat to society. 
IX. 
 
During the penalty phase of the trial, the jury, as 
required by our decision in Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 
347, 374, 519 S.E.2d 602, 616 (1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. 
___, 122 S.Ct. 1925 (2002), was instructed that it could 
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment, life imprisonment 
and a fine, or death, and that:  "the words 'imprisonment for 
 
36
life' mean imprisonment for life without possibility of 
parole." 
 
After the jury began to deliberate on the appropriate 
punishment, the jury submitted several questions to the 
circuit court.  Among other things, the jury asked the 
following questions:  "Does life imprisonment mean that the 
defendant will never be released from prison by any means?"  
The court, out of the jury's presence, informed counsel as 
follows: 
 
"The Court has not considered this a parole 
question because [the jury] didn't mention the word 
parole.  It says by any means and this gets into 
areas of executive clemency and the other means, 
because obviously [the jury] said any means. 
 
"So I don't think the Court – it's 
[in]appropriate for me to address the question one 
way or the other." 
 
The defendant's counsel stated that the court should instruct 
the jury that parole had been abolished.  The court responded: 
 
"I think [the jury has] been informed . . . in 
the instruction that [the jury has] already 
received, which says that life imprisonment means 
imprisonment for life without the possibility of 
parole. 
 
"That instruction [the jury has] and I notice 
this question did not mention parole.  This is not a 
parole question. . . . 
 
"I think obviously what [the jury is] talking 
about is any means and we're talking about like 
executive clemency, for example, or any other means 
that may be available and I think it's inappropriate 
to be addressed at this time." 
 
 
37
The circuit court instructed the jury that it must proceed on 
the instructions that the jury had already received from the 
court. 
 
The jury began to deliberate further.  Subsequently, the 
jury submitted another written question to the court:  "In the 
instructions it says 'life means life' – what is the 
definition of life?"  The court responded:  "The instruction 
you received says 'The words "imprisonment for life" mean 
imprisonment for life without possibility of parole.' "  The 
defendant objected to the court's response and suggested that 
the word "life" means "Justin Wolfe's natural life."  The 
court responded: 
 
"That could be misleading because that's not 
what it means in that instruction . . . .  You do 
have executive clemency, you do have geriatric 
parole.  So obviously if we take that definition [of 
Justin Wolfe's natural life] that's not accurate. 
 
"What the Court has proposed is simply to tell 
them to go back and read the definition – the 
instruction because the instruction didn't say life 
means life, first of all.  The instruction says the 
words imprisonment for life mean imprisonment for 
life without the possibility of parole.  That's the 
instruction that comes from our 1999 Yarbrough v. 
Commonwealth case that our Supreme Court says was 
the proper instruction to be given when requested by 
defense counsel. 
 
"If we expand that, I think we're going into 
areas that simply would not be accurate." 
 
 
The defendant argues that the circuit court should have 
instructed the jury that "imprisonment for life means Justin 
 
38
Wolfe's natural life."  We disagree with the defendant's 
contentions. 
 
In Bell, supra, a jury in the trial of a capital murder 
case was instructed regarding the definition of imprisonment 
for life as mandated by our decision in Yarbrough.  The jury 
asked the circuit court, " 'Understanding that imprisonment 
for life means no possibility of parole, is there any other 
way to be released from prison?' "  The court instructed the 
jury that it " 'would have to rely on the evidence that [it] 
heard, and the instructions already presented in deciding the 
punishment.' "  The circuit court in Bell concluded that a 
more detailed answer to the jury's question would have 
required the court to discuss matters that were speculative 
and inappropriate for the jury to consider.  264 Va. at 204, 
563 S.E.2d at 716. 
 
In Bell, we stated that the question that the jury asked 
"was general and could not have been accurately 
answered without telling the jury about executive 
clemency or pardon.  Yet, we have never allowed a 
jury to have that information because of the 
potential for jury speculation resulting in a 
harsher sentence than would otherwise be warranted. 
 
"So, the only response that would have 
comported with our precedent was to instruct the 
jurors that geriatric release and sentencing credits 
were not available to Bell and that they should not 
concern themselves with anything else.  Yet, that 
kind of response would have suggested that there is 
some other form of early release still available to 
Bell and would have, in fact, invited the jury to 
speculate. . . .  Such speculation is 'inconsistent 
 
39
with a fair trial both to the defendant and the 
Commonwealth.' " 
 
Id. at 207-08, 563 S.E.2d at 718.  We concluded in Bell that 
the circuit court did not err when it directed the jury to 
rely on the evidence that it had heard and the instructions 
that it had been given because any other response would have 
either been inaccurate or would have led to speculation by the 
jury. 
 
Our holding in Bell requires a similar conclusion in this 
appeal.  Had the circuit court instructed the jury, as 
requested by the defendant, that natural life meant the 
natural life of Justin Wolfe, such response would have been 
inaccurate because, just as in Bell, that response would have 
negated the possibility of early release through an act of 
executive pardon or clemency.  These possibilities are 
inappropriate for a jury to consider because such information 
could cause the jury to speculate, and such speculation might 
result in a harsher sentence than would otherwise be 
warranted.  Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did 
not err when it denied the defendant's request for a jury 
instruction that life means the natural life of Justin Michael 
Wolfe. 
X. 
 
40
 
The defendant argues, in a very conclusional fashion, 
that he was somehow deprived of his right to due process 
because of Rule 1:1.  The defendant's contention lacks merit. 
 
Rule 1:1 states in part: 
 
 
"All final judgments, orders, and decrees, 
irrespective of terms of court, shall remain under 
the control of the trial court and subject to be 
modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days 
after the date of entry, and no longer.  But 
notwithstanding the finality of the judgment, in a 
criminal case the trial court may postpone execution 
of the sentence in order to give the accused an 
opportunity to apply for a writ of error and 
supersedeas; such postponement, however, shall not 
extend the time limits hereinafter prescribed for 
applying for a writ of error." 
 
 
Even though the defendant asserts that the circuit court 
refused to grant him an evidentiary hearing within the 21 days 
after a witness purportedly recanted her testimony, the 
defendant does not demonstrate how he was deprived of any 
right of due process.  Our review of the record shows that the 
circuit court considered and denied all the defendant's post-
trial motions in a timely manner and that Rule 1:1 was not 
implicated in the proceedings below. 
XI. 
 
The defendant argues that the Commonwealth's attorney 
"misstated both the facts and the law to the jury."  
Continuing, the defendant asserts that the Commonwealth 
presented "false evidence about a school incident."  The 
 
41
defendant also argues that the Commonwealth asked the jury 
during its closing argument "to impose the death sentence in 
order to 'send a message' to those who would consider getting 
involved in drugs and told the jury that Mr. Wolfe may not 
stay in prison.  These false statements about the facts and 
the law individually, and in combination, denied Mr. Wolfe a 
fair trial." 
 
The defendant's contentions regarding the closing 
argument are without merit.  The defendant did not object to 
the Commonwealth's closing argument and, therefore, he may not 
raise objections to this argument for the first time on 
appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
 
During the cross-examination of several of the 
defendant's witnesses during the penalty phase of the trial, 
the Commonwealth's attorney asked those witnesses about an 
incident that occurred when the defendant allegedly took razor 
blades and syringes to school when he was in parochial school.  
For example, the Commonwealth asked the defendant's stepmother 
the following: 
 
"Q:  How many conversations do you think you 
had with the [defendant's parochial school] 
principal there? 
 
 
"A:  I only remember having one. 
 
 
"Q:  Only one? 
 
 
42
 
"A:  And I don't even remember what it was 
about. 
 
 
"Q:  And you don't remember that being about 
him bringing razor blades and syringes to school? 
 
 
"A:  Now that you mention it, I do, but I had 
forgotten it. 
 
 
"Q:  Oh, I see.  You do remember that occurred.  
And you do remember going down there and pleading 
with the principal to please let [the defendant] 
stay in school there? 
 
 
"A:  I don't remember pleading. 
 
 
"Q:  What do you remember, ma'am? 
 
 
"A:  I'm sorry.  I remember having a discussion 
with the principal. . . . I was concerned. 
 
 
"Q:  Do you remember that that was what the 
problem was, that he had brought razor blades and 
syringes into the school? 
 
 
"A:  Yes." 
 
 
Michael W. Wolfe, the defendant's father, testified that 
the defendant did not take razor blades and syringes to school 
when he was in the eighth grade, but that his brother, Wesley 
J. Wolfe, had done so.  Even though the Commonwealth 
vigorously cross-examined the defendant's father on this 
point, the defendant's father consistently stated that Wesley 
Wolfe, not Justin Wolfe, had taken the razor blades and 
syringes to school.  The defendant's mother, Theresa 
Steinberg, also testified that Wesley Wolfe, who was a fourth-
grade student at the time the incident occurred, found a bag 
 
43
of razor blades and syringes and took them to school, and that 
the defendant had no involvement in that incident.  Wesley 
Wolfe testified that he, not the defendant, took the razor 
blades to school when he was in the fourth grade. 
 
Marilyn S. Valatka, principal of the school that the 
defendant attended, testified during the penalty phase that 
according to her recollection, the defendant brought to school 
a small package of razor blades and a couple of plastic 
syringes, not needles.  However, several months after the jury 
had sentenced the defendant to death, the defendant presented 
an affidavit from Ms. Valatka, who claimed that she was 
mistaken about her testimony that the defendant brought the 
razor blades and syringes to school.  The circuit court 
refused to consider the affidavits.  The court stated:  "I 
think we should not proceed on the affidavits at this time 
because those witnesses could have been present for the Court 
to consider and are not.  So I'm not going to proceed on 
affidavits."  The defendant did not assign error to the 
circuit court's ruling.  The affidavits upon which the 
defendant relies to make his argument are not a part of the 
record before this Court and, therefore, we will not consider 
them or the defendant's related arguments based upon those 
affidavits. 
XII. 
 
44
 
The defendant argues:  "The indictment charging Justin 
Wolfe with capital murder is defective as a matter of law.  
The grand jury failed to vote on the aggravators in [Code] 
§§ 19.2-264.3 and .4 which are necessary for consideration of 
the death penalty, and did not reference by words or citation 
the required predicate facts that must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt before the death penalty may even be 
considered as a possible punishment.  These factors are 
elements . . . in a separate statute which was not considered 
by the grand jury and they were not a part of the indictment." 
 
The defendant's contentions challenge the content and 
sufficiency of the indictment.  However, the defendant did not 
raise his contentions in the circuit court until several 
months after the jury had returned its verdict.  We will not 
consider the defendant's contentions because he failed to 
raise those contentions in a timely manner. 
 
Rules 3A:9(b) and (c) mandate that a defense "based on 
defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the 
written charge upon which the accused is to be tried" must be 
raised "before a plea is entered" or "at least 7 days before 
the day fixed for trial."  Pursuant to this Rule, failure to 
make a timely defense constitutes a waiver, except for 
jurisdictional defects, which are not present in this appeal.  
Additionally, this Court has consistently and repeatedly held 
 
45
that generally a defendant must challenge the sufficiency of 
an indictment before the jury's verdict, or the alleged defect 
is waived.  See Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 713, 324 
S.E.2d 682, 686 (1985); Washington v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 
185, 192, 217 S.E.2d 815, 822 (1975); Guthrie v. Commonwealth, 
212 Va. 550, 551, 186 S.E.2d 26, 28 (1972); McDougal v. 
Commonwealth, 212 Va. 547, 549, 186 S.E.2d 18, 20 (1972); 
Forester v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 764, 767, 173 S.E.2d 851, 
854 (1970); Council v. Smyth, 201 Va. 135, 138, 109 S.E.2d 
116, 119 (1959); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 814, 822, 71 
S.E.2d 368, 372 (1952); Honaker v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 752, 
754, 118 S.E. 85, 86 (1923); Flanary v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 
665, 666, 112 S.E. 604, 604 (1922); Burgess v. Commonwealth, 4 
Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 483, 488 (1825). 
XIII. 
Passion and Prejudice 
 
Code § 17.1-313(C)(1) requires that this Court determine 
"[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the 
influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary 
factor."  The defendant argues that his sentence of death was 
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, and other 
arbitrary factors.  He claims that the jury was prevented from 
considering all the evidence in a fair manner because of the 
purported false argument by the Commonwealth's attorneys, the 
 
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admission of victim impact testimony that did not fall within 
the parameters of the statute authorizing such testimony, and 
the admission of unadjudicated prior conduct when the 
Commonwealth purportedly did not provide notice of its intent 
to rely on such evidence.  We disagree with the defendant's 
contentions. 
 
First, we have reviewed the Commonwealth's closing 
argument during the penalty phase of the trial, and we find no 
statements in the closing argument that would have inflamed 
the jury.  The circuit court properly permitted the victim's 
mother to testify about the impact that the murder of her son 
has had upon her family because such testimony is within the 
scope of Code §§ 19.2-299.1 and 19.2-264.4. 
 
The defendant complains that the Commonwealth asked 
improper questions of certain witnesses that improperly 
inflamed the jury.  The Commonwealth asked a friend of the 
defendant who testified at trial whether he knew that the 
defendant was a drug dealer, and whether he knew about the 
"hundreds of thousands of dollars that was flowing through 
[the defendant's] house on a weekly basis," and the witness 
responded, "no."  The defendant's father was also asked during 
cross-examination in the penalty phase whether he knew that 
his son made hundreds of thousands of dollars selling drugs, 
and the father responded, "no."  The defendant's brother, 
 
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Wesley Wolfe, was also asked by the Commonwealth whether he 
knew that the defendant "had plenty of money, hundreds of 
thousands of dollars," and the brother responded, "no."  
Contrary to the defendant's assertions, we hold that these 
questions did not inflame the jury.  In fact, there is 
evidence in this record from which the jury could have found 
that the defendant was involved in the purchase and sale of 
hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of illegal drugs. 
 
The defendant contends that the sentence of death was 
imposed based upon the influence of passion, prejudice, or 
other arbitrary factors because the Commonwealth stated that 
the defendant had a history of violence.  The defendant claims 
that the Commonwealth's statement regarding his "history of 
violence" was based upon an incident that involved a student 
who took a razor blade and syringes to school in violation of 
school policies.  The defendant claims that his brother was 
the individual who was involved in this incident. 
 
We have reviewed the Commonwealth's closing argument in 
the penalty phase of the trial, and the Commonwealth simply 
does not refer to this incident.  The Commonwealth's reference 
to the defendant's history of violence pertained to the 
defendant's prior efforts to enlist others to rob drug 
dealers.  For example, the Commonwealth stated: 
 
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"You heard [Janelle] Johnson say her husband, 
or ex-husband, whatever the status of their marriage 
is today, was one of [the defendant's] confederates.  
They talked on the phone about robbing people.  They 
talked about robbing Matt Chevlin. 
 
"They took the weapon which you've seen . . . 
her gun . . . and they would go out to collect drug 
debts. 
 
"That is not violent?  Now, he didn't have a 
gun in his possession.  He went along with Mr. 
Coleman, because Mr. Coleman is his confederate, 
because he is not the type of person, from all of 
the evidence that would actually take the gun and 
commit the act. 
 
"No, he's the type of person who would direct 
someone to do it." 
 
 
We have reviewed the entire record as required by Code 
§ 17.1-313(C)(1), and we conclude that the sentence of death 
was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or 
any other arbitrary factor. 
XIV. 
Excessiveness and Proportionality 
 
Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) requires this Court to consider and 
to determine "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant."  The test of 
proportionality that we apply is whether "juries in this 
jurisdiction generally approve the supreme penalty for 
comparable or similar crimes."  Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 
Va. 328, 342, 513 S.E.2d 634, 642, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952 
(1999).  Accord Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 145, 431 
 
49
S.E.2d 48, 54, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993) (quoting 
Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 284, 257 S.E.2d 808, 824 
(1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980)). 
 
The defendant argues that his sentence is excessive when 
compared to similar cases.  We have examined the records of 
all capital murder cases reviewed by this Court when, as here, 
the death penalty was based upon murder for hire.  Williams v. 
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 3, 472 S.E.2d 50, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 
998 (1996); Murphy, 246 Va. 136, 431 S.E.2d 48; Stockton v. 
Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 314 S.E.2d 371, cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 873 (1984); Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 257 
S.E.2d 784 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).  Even 
though no two capital murder cases are identical, we are 
confident that given the special heinousness associated with 
the murder for hire in this particular case, the sentence of 
death is neither excessive nor disproportionate to sentences 
generally imposed by other sentencing bodies in this 
Commonwealth for crimes of a similar nature considering the 
crime and this defendant. 
XV. 
 
We have considered all the defendant's remaining 
arguments, and they are without merit.  Having reviewed the 
sentence of death, finding no reversible error in the record, 
 
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and perceiving no reason to commute the death sentence, we 
will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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