Case Title: Clark v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 417, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JAMES T. CLARK,
§
§
No. 417, 2005
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
§
v.
§
Court Below: Superior Court
§
of the State of Delaware
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
in and for Kent County
§
Cr. I.D. No. 0406016386
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted: March 1, 2006
Decided: May 2, 2006
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.
O R D E R
This 2  day of May, 2006, on consideration of the briefs of the parties, it
nd
appears to the Court that:
1) James T. Clark appeals from his convictions, following a jury trial, of six
counts of unlawful sexual intercourse first degree, four counts of unlawful sexual
intercourse second degree, and two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child.  He
argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion when it instructed the jury that the
dates of the offenses are not elements of the crimes.  
The Court has given pseudonyms for the names of the victims and their family pursuant to
1
Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
There is some confusion as to how old the boys were when Clark moved in with them.
2
They might have been two years younger.
2
2) Clark moved in with his girlfriend, Naomi Mitchell,  in late December 1995.
1
At that time, Mitchell’s two boys, Thomas and Jeffrey, were 7 and 9.   Both boys
2
testified that Clark sexually abused them about once a week for about six months.
The abuse stopped when the children threatened Clark that they would tell their
mother.  Mitchell testified that she knew nothing about the abuse until June 2004,
when Jeffrey’s girlfriend reported it.  
3) All counts in the indictment stated that Clark engaged in the charged
unlawful sexual activity during the period between January 1, 1995, and December
31, 1995.  But Clark testified that he did not move in with Mitchell until Christmas
time 1995.  If that testimony was accurate, then the abuse must have occurred during
1996, not 1995.  Because of the uncertainty as to the dates of the alleged abuse, the
State asked the trial court to instruct the jury that the date of the offense is not an
element of the crime, and that proof of when the acts allegedly occurred is sufficient
if the offenses were committed within the applicable statute of limitations.
4)  On appeal, Clark argues that the trial court abused its discretion in giving
the jury instruction requested by the State.  He says that the instruction essentially told
Phipps v. State, 1996 WL 145739 (Del. Supr.), citing Monastakes v. State, 127 A. 153, 154
3
(Del. 1924).
Appellant’s Appendix, A-74.
4
3
the jury to disregard inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony concerning when the
offenses occurred.  But those inconsistencies not only created doubt as to when the
offenses occurred, they also created doubt as to whether the offenses occurred.  Clark
contends that the instruction, therefore, impermissibly tipped the balance in favor of
the State.
5) As Clark acknowledges, under settled law, the “time when the crime
occurred is not an essential element of the charged offense.”   Thus, there is no
3
question but that the jury instruction was a correct statement of the law.  Nonetheless,
the trial court was not inclined to give the instruction until it learned that Clark was
going to use the timing inaccuracies to argue for acquittal:
[U]nless the defense takes a position with the jury that you must acquit
because these activities occurred in 1996, and the indictment says 1995,
then it doesn’t matter if this instruction is in there.   
4
The instruction only became necessary when Clark advised the court that he was
going to seek acquittal based on the timing argument.  We conclude that the trial court
acted well within its discretion in responding to Clark’s tactical decision by giving the
jury instruction.  
4
6)  In addition, we find no merit to the claim that the instruction effectively told
the jury to disregard inconsistencies, thereby prejudicing Clark.  The instruction
simply told the jury that the dates are not elements of the offenses.  Clark was free to
argue that all the inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony (about dates and other
facts) should raise a reasonable doubt as to whether any crimes had been committed.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superior
Court be, and the same hereby are, AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice