Case Title: State v. Iverson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP000515-FT

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 101 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP515-FT 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Daniel S. Iverson, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 358 Wis. 2d 712, 856 N.W.2d 346) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 25, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 8, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse 
 
JUDGE: 
Ramona A. Gonzalez 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., concurs joined by A.W. BRADLEY, 
J.(¶¶64-66 ONLY). (Opinion Filed) 
A.W. BRADLEY, J., concurs. (Opinion Filed) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: R.G. BRADLEY, J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Donald V. Latorraca, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Brad D. Schimel, Attorney General. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief by Joseph 
G. Veenstra and Johns, Flaherty & Collins, S.C., La Crosse, and 
oral argument by Joseph G. Veenstra. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 101
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP515-FT 
(L.C. Nos. 2013TR4032 & 2013TR4033) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Daniel S. Iverson, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 25, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Iverson, 
No. 2014AP515–FT, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 
2014), which affirmed the order of the La Crosse County circuit 
court1 granting defendant Daniel S. Iverson's ("Iverson") motion 
to suppress evidence of drunk driving obtained by an officer of 
the state traffic patrol during a traffic stop of Iverson's 
vehicle.  
                                                 
1 The Honorable Ramona A. Gonzalez presided. 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Iverson asserts that the officer lacked authority to 
seize Iverson's vehicle to investigate the violation of a state 
statute prohibiting littering, Wis. Stat. § 287.81 (2011-12).2  
Iverson argues in the alternative that the officer lacked 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a violation of the 
littering statute had occurred. 
¶3 
The central issue before us in this case is whether 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution permit an 
officer of the state traffic patrol to stop a vehicle based 
solely on the officer's observation of the commission of a non-
traffic civil forfeiture offense by an occupant of that vehicle.  
¶4 
We conclude that: (1) the Wisconsin Legislature has 
explicitly authorized state troopers to conduct traffic stops in 
order to investigate violations of Wis. Stat. § 287.81 and to 
arrest violators of the statute under specified conditions; (2) 
a traffic stop to enforce § 287.81 is generally reasonable if an 
officer has probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a 
violation of § 287.81 has occurred; (3) discarding a cigarette 
butt onto a highway violates § 287.81; and (4) based on his 
observations, the officer in this case had probable cause to 
believe that an occupant of Iverson's vehicle had violated 
§ 287.81 by throwing a cigarette butt onto the highway.  
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
3 
 
¶5 
The defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained 
during this traffic stop and to dismiss this case should have 
been denied.  We reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and remand the case to the circuit court for reinstatement of 
charges and further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
On January 29, 2014, Wisconsin State Patrol Trooper 
Michael Larsen ("Trooper Larsen") testified at a hearing on 
Iverson's motion to suppress evidence.  The following facts are 
taken from his testimony. 
¶7 
On September 18, 2013, at about 1:00 a.m., Trooper 
Larsen was traveling northbound on Rose Street in the City of 
La Crosse.  He observed a silver jeep in front of him drift 
within its lane toward the centerline and back.  The vehicle did 
not cross the centerline or strike the curb.  The vehicle 
approached an intersection secured by a flashing yellow traffic 
light.  Although there was no traffic at the intersection, the 
vehicle came to a complete stop at the light before continuing 
past the intersection.  The vehicle then arrived at a second 
flashing yellow light.  Again, despite a lack of traffic at the 
intersection, the vehicle stopped at the light before continuing 
north.  Trooper Larsen testified that at this point in time he 
did not feel that he possessed the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to conduct a traffic stop.3  
                                                 
3 We do not necessarily accept the officer's conclusion in 
this regard as our own.  We need not address its soundness for 
purposes of analyzing the issues before the court. 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
4 
 
¶8 
Trooper Larsen then observed a cigarette butt "being 
thrown from the passenger side of the vehicle."  The cigarette 
butt hit the ground and scattered ashes across the right lane of 
the road.  After crossing an overpass, Trooper Larsen initiated 
a traffic stop of the vehicle.  Trooper Larsen testified that 
the reason for the stop was the ejection of the cigarette butt 
from the vehicle he had been following.  He relied upon Wis. 
Stat. § 287.81, entitled "Littering," which states in relevant 
part:  
[A] person who does any of the following may be 
required to forfeit not more than $500: 
(a) Deposits or discharges any solid waste on or 
along any highway, in any waters of the state, on the 
ice of any waters of the state or on any other public 
or private property.  
(b) Permits any solid waste to be thrown from a 
vehicle operated by the person. 
Wis. Stat. § 287.81(2)(a)-(b).  Trooper Larsen informed the 
driver of the vehicle, Iverson, that a cigarette butt had been 
thrown out of Iverson's vehicle.  Iverson denied knowledge, but 
the passenger admitted responsibility and stated that he had not 
known that the action was illegal. 
¶9 
Trooper Larsen eventually cited Iverson for operation 
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), and operation of a 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
5 
 
motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration, first 
offense, in violation of § 346.63(1)(b).4  
II.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶10 On October 17, 2013, Iverson pleaded not guilty to the 
violations alleged in the traffic citations he had received.  On 
December 27, 2013, Iverson filed a motion to suppress any and 
all evidence obtained following the stop of his vehicle and to 
dismiss the case.  At the January 9, 2014 hearing on the motion, 
the La Crosse County circuit court granted Iverson's motion.  
The court stated:  
[Trooper Larsen] wasn't stopping [Iverson] to cite him 
for the litter.  He was stopping him to see if he was 
a drunk driver. . . . The litter is the excuse, and if 
that cigarette butt comes out of the driver's side, 
I'm with you, Trooper . . . but not out of the 
passenger side. 
On January 14, 2014, the court entered an order granting the 
motion to suppress evidence and to dismiss the case.  On 
February 26, 2014, the State filed a notice of appeal.   
¶11 On October 9, 2014, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's order on different grounds.  It found that "an 
articulable suspicion or probable cause of violation of a 
forfeiture that is not a violation of a traffic regulation is 
[not] sufficient justification for a warrantless seizure of a 
citizen."  See State v. Iverson, No. 2014AP515-FT, unpublished 
slip op., ¶11 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2014).  
                                                 
4 The facts upon which Trooper Larsen based the citations 
are not at issue in this case. 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
6 
 
¶12 In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals first 
examined Wis. Stat. § 968.24, which it properly characterized as 
a "legislative codification" of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968).  Iverson, No. 2014AP515-FT, unpublished slip op., ¶6; 
see State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶11, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 
N.W.2d 634.  The statute authorizes law enforcement officers to 
conduct temporary questioning without arrest "when the officer 
reasonably suspects that such a person is committing, is about 
to commit or has committed a crime."  Wis. Stat. § 968.24.   
¶13 The court of appeals further noted that Wis. Stat. 
§ 345.22 permits warrantless arrests for violations of traffic 
regulations.  Iverson, No. 2014AP515-FT, unpublished slip op., 
¶10.  The court of appeals reviewed our decision in State v. 
Popke, 2009 WI 37, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569, where we 
held that "[e]ven if no probable cause exist[s], a police 
officer may still conduct a traffic stop when, under the 
totality of the circumstances, he or she has grounds to 
reasonably suspect that a crime or traffic violation has been or 
will be committed."  Id., ¶8 (quoting State v. Popke, 2009 WI 
37, ¶23, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569) (emphases added) 
(citation omitted).   
¶14 Finally, the court of appeals quoted from one of its 
own decisions, State v. Krier, 165 Wis. 2d 673, 478 N.W.2d 63 
(Ct. App. 1991), in which it had held that where an individual's 
conduct might constitute either a civil forfeiture or a crime, 
depending on the nature of the conduct and on whether the 
individual is a repeat offender, "[j]ust as there is no 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
7 
 
prohibition for stopping [an individual] because the behavior 
may end up being innocent, there is also no prohibition for 
stopping because the behavior may end up constituting a mere 
forfeiture."  Id., ¶12 (quoting State v. Krier, 165 Wis. 2d 673, 
678, 478 N.W.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
¶15 The court of appeals reasoned that, because littering 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 287.81 is not a crime or traffic 
violation,5 neither Terry, nor Wis. Stat. § 968.24, nor Wis. 
Stat. § 345.22, nor Popke authorized Trooper Larsen's stop.  
Id., ¶¶8-10, 13.  Additionally, the court of appeals read the 
language in Krier to imply that conduct potentially resulting 
only in a "mere forfeiture" does not warrant a traffic stop.  
The court therefore affirmed suppression of the evidence 
gathered by Trooper Larsen.  Id., ¶¶12, 14. 
¶16 On December 19, 2014, the State filed a petition for 
review in this court.  On March 16, 2015, we granted the 
petition.  
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 "Our review of an order granting or denying a motion 
to suppress evidence presents a question of constitutional 
fact."  State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 
                                                 
5 Compare 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 287.81(2), 
(2m) 
(violation 
of 
littering statute punishable by forfeiture), with Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.12 ("Conduct punishable only by a forfeiture is not a 
crime"), and Wis. Stat. § 345.20(1)(b) (defining "[t]raffic 
regulation" as "a provision of chs. 194 or 341 to 349 for which 
the penalty for violation is a forfeiture or an ordinance 
enacted in accordance with s. 349.06"). 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
8 
 
N.W.2d 463 (citation omitted).  Similarly, "[w]hether there is 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle is a 
question of constitutional fact."  Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶10 
(citations omitted). 
¶18 "When presented with a question of constitutional 
fact, this court engages in a two-step inquiry.  First, we 
review the circuit court's findings of historical fact under a 
deferential standard, upholding them unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Second, we independently apply constitutional 
principles to those facts."  Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶22 
(citations omitted). 
¶19 This case also requires us to interpret and apply Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 287.81 
and 
other 
relevant 
statutes. 
 
"Statutory 
interpretation and application present questions of law that we 
review de novo while benefiting from the analyses of the court 
of appeals and circuit court."  118th St. Kenosha, LLC v. DOT, 
2014 WI 125, ¶19, 359 Wis. 2d 30, 856 N.W.2d 486 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
¶20 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'  Statutory language is given its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Milwaukee City Hous. Auth. v. 
Cobb, 2015 WI 27, ¶12, 361 Wis. 2d 359, 860 N.W.2d 267 (quoting 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110) (internal quotation marks 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
9 
 
omitted).  "The context and structure of a statute are also 
important to the meaning of a statute."  Noffke ex rel. Swenson 
v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶11, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156 
(citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46). 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
¶21 Iverson's citation for drunk driving gives rise to the 
issues before the court because he contends that the stop was in 
violation of his constitutional rights.  Specifically, Iverson 
argues that the citations cannot stand because Trooper Larsen 
was without legal authority to stop Iverson's vehicle based 
solely upon violation of the littering statute, a non-traffic 
civil forfeiture law.  In addition, Iverson argues that the 
conduct upon which Trooper Larsen based the stop did not violate 
the littering statute.  In other words, we must address whether 
Trooper Larsen was endowed with the legal authority to stop 
Iverson's vehicle after observing a cigarette butt being thrown 
onto a highway from the vehicle.  Consequently, the focus of 
this opinion centers upon whether this conduct constitutes 
"littering" so as to justify this traffic stop and whether this 
traffic stop can be based upon violation of this non-traffic 
civil forfeiture law. 
¶22 As it relates to the constitutional issues now before 
this court, Iverson does not contend that he otherwise has a 
viable defense to the drunk driving charges.  Similarly, he does 
not assert that we should undertake a traditional totality of 
the circumstances test so to evaluate whether his driving on 
that particular evening would otherwise justify a traffic stop.  
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
10 
 
Indeed, if we were to analyze the totality of the circumstances 
of the stop at issue, we might not reach the question before the 
court, 
and 
that 
analysis 
would 
only 
serve 
to 
restate 
longstanding legal principles.  See, e.g., Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶¶12-13; State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶¶21-24, 274 Wis. 2d 540, 
683 N.W.2d 1.  Thus, we neither accept nor reject the officer's 
stated belief that he was without reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a traffic stop before the alleged littering occurred. 
¶23 Our method of inquiry is shaped by a few important 
considerations.  First, Trooper Larsen, an officer of the state 
traffic patrol, stopped Iverson's vehicle in order to enforce 
Wis. Stat. § 287.81.  Second, Wis. Stat. § 110.07 delineates the 
powers and duties of officers of the state traffic patrol.  And 
third, the automobile stop at issue must not be constitutionally 
unreasonable 
under 
the 
circumstances. 
See 
Popke, 
317 
Wis. 2d 118, ¶11 (citation omitted).  
¶24 Therefore, in order to determine the lawfulness of 
Trooper 
Larsen's 
traffic 
stop, 
we 
analyze 
two 
statutory 
questions and two constitutional questions: (1) whether throwing 
a cigarette butt onto a highway constitutes a violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 287.81; (2) whether Trooper Larsen possesses authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 110.07 to conduct warrantless traffic stops 
as a means of enforcing § 287.81; (3) whether a state traffic 
patrol officer may conduct a warrantless traffic stop based on 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a violation of a 
non-traffic civil forfeiture law has occurred; and (4) whether 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
11 
 
Trooper Larsen possessed probable cause or reasonable suspicion 
that a violation of § 287.81 had occurred. 
 
A.  Statutory Authority to Conduct the Traffic Stop  
 
1.  Whether Throwing a Cigarette Butt onto a Highway  
Violates Wis. Stat. § 287.81 
¶25 Iverson argues that throwing a cigarette butt onto a 
highway does not violate Wis. Stat. § 287.81.  Although the 
statute prohibits the depositing or discharge of "solid waste" 
onto a highway, Iverson claims that a cigarette butt is not 
"solid waste" under the statute.  We disagree. 
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. § 287.81 states in relevant part: "[A] 
person who does any of the following may be required to forfeit 
not more than $500:  (a) Deposits or discharges any solid waste 
on or along any highway . . . ."6  Wis. Stat. § 287.81(2)–(2)(a). 
¶27 The definitional provision of the chapter within which 
Wis. Stat. § 287.81 falls defines "solid waste" as having "the 
meaning given in s. 289.01(33)."  Wis. Stat. § 287.01(10).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 289.01(33) reads:  
"Solid waste" means any garbage, refuse, sludge 
from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment 
plant or air pollution control facility and other 
discarded or salvageable materials, including solid, 
liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous materials 
                                                 
6 "Highway" is defined in the statute as having "the meaning 
given in s. 340.01(22)."  Wis. Stat. § 287.81(1)(am).  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 340.01(22) in turn states in relevant part: "'Highway' 
means all public ways and thoroughfares and bridges on the same.  
It includes the entire width between the boundary lines of every 
way open to the use of the public as a matter of right for the 
purposes of vehicular travel."  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(22). 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
12 
 
resulting from industrial, commercial, mining and 
agricultural 
operations, 
and 
from 
community 
activities, but does not include solids or dissolved 
material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved 
materials in irrigation return flows or industrial 
discharges which are point sources subject to permits 
under ch. 283, or source material, as defined in 
s. 254.31(10), special nuclear material, as defined in 
s. 254.31(11), or by-product material, as defined in 
s. 254.31(1). 
Wis. Stat. § 289.01(33) (emphasis added).  "Garbage" and 
"refuse" each also possess unique definitions.  Garbage "means 
discarded materials resulting from the handling, processing, 
storage and consumption of food."  § 289.01(9).  Refuse "means 
all matters produced from industrial or community life, subject 
to decomposition, not defined as sewage."  § 289.01(28). 
¶28 One could easily spend all day exploring Wis. Stat. 
§ 289.01(33)'s various nooks and crannies, but we need not stop 
to 
ponder 
whether 
cigarette 
butts 
are 
"subject 
to 
decomposition," § 289.01(28), or "result[] . . . from community 
activities," Wis. Stat. § 289.01(33), because cigarette butts 
manifestly constitute "other discarded . . . materials."   
¶29 "Judicial deference to the policy choices enacted into 
law by the legislature requires that statutory interpretation 
focus primarily on the language of the statute.  We assume that 
the 
legislature's 
intent 
is 
expressed 
in 
the 
statutory 
language."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44.  And "[i]f the meaning 
of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.  
Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
13 
 
meaning."  Id., ¶45 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
¶30 To "discard" means "to drop, dismiss, let go, or get 
rid 
of 
as 
no 
longer 
useful, 
valuable, 
or 
pleasurable."  
Webster's 
Third 
New 
International 
Dictionary 
644 
(1961).7  
Cigarette 
butts 
are 
perhaps 
a 
paradigmatic 
example 
of 
"discarded" materials under this definition, as they are the 
abandoned remains of cigarettes, items that were once (at least 
to their users) useful, valuable, and pleasurable.  
¶31 "Material," the singular of "materials," id. at 1392, 
is a broad and indefinite word.  One sense of the word, and the 
sense that we find most plausible here, is "the whole or a 
notable part of the elements or constituents or substance of 
something physical . . . ."  Id.  Viewed in isolation, this 
definition clearly supports inclusion of cigarette butts within 
the 
phrase 
"discarded . . . materials." 
 
Nevertheless, 
a 
nebulous term like "materials" draws meaning from its context, 
so we further analyze the passage to confirm the word's import. 
¶32 Iverson points to the list introduced by the phrase 
"other discarded . . . materials, including" and asserts that 
cigarette butts do not fall within any of the ensuing enumerated 
items.  But even if a cigarette butt did not constitute 
"solid . . . materials resulting from industrial, commercial, 
                                                 
7 This is the second sense of the word provided in the entry 
in Webster's.  The first sense pertains to playing cards.  See 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 644 (1961). 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
14 
 
mining 
and 
agricultural 
operations, 
and 
from 
community 
activities"——a proposition we find doubtful given consideration 
of the manufacture, sale, and use of cigarettes——the "including" 
clause does not exhaust the possible applications of "other 
discarded . . . materials."  See, e.g., Liebovich v. Minnesota 
Ins. Co., 2008 WI 75, ¶26, 310 Wis. 2d 751, 751 N.W.2d 764 ("The 
presence of a comma and the word 'including' in [the phrase] 
indicates that the word 'including' is not meant to reference an 
exhaustive list."); Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck 
Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941) ("[T]he term 'including' is 
not one of all-embracing definition, but connotes simply an 
illustrative application of the general principle.").   
¶33 The 
longstanding 
canon 
of 
construction 
"ejusdem 
generis" supports our analysis.  This canon "instructs that when 
general words follow specific words in the statutory text, the 
general words should be construed in light of the specific words 
listed."  State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶27, 308 Wis. 2d 615, 
748 
N.W.2d 447 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
The 
specific 
words 
"garbage," "refuse," and "sludge from a waste treatment plant, 
water supply treatment plant or air pollution control facility" 
do 
not 
so 
limit 
the 
more 
general 
phrase 
"other 
discarded . . . materials" that cigarette butts are of necessity 
excluded.  In fact, these specific terms clarify that the 
definition encompasses more conventional items like cigarette 
butts.   
¶34 The definition of garbage, for example ("discarded 
materials resulting from the handling, processing, storage and 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
15 
 
consumption 
of 
food," 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 289.01(9)), 
suggests 
inclusion of objects such as fast food wrappers and paper 
napkins.  The definition of refuse ("all matters produced from 
industrial or community life, subject to decomposition, not 
defined 
as 
sewage," 
§ 289.01(28)) 
apparently 
contemplates 
objects of both a specialized nature ("industrial" refuse) and 
of a more ordinary nature ("community life" refuse); into this 
latter category might fall objects such as newspapers and food 
waste, items likely found in vehicles throughout the state.  The 
final term, "sludge," indicates materials of a specialized 
nature.  The statute's specific enumerations thus run the gamut 
from ordinary to specialized waste; they do not provide reason 
to omit cigarette butts from the broad category of "discarded 
materials."8  
¶35 The most natural reading of "other . . . discarded 
materials" affords the definition of "solid waste" a broad 
sweep, but it is not within our province to artificially limit 
the obvious reach of a statute without adequate reason.  "It is 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 287.05 establishes "policies of the 
state concerning the reduction of the amount of solid waste 
generated, the reuse, recycling and composting of solid waste 
and resource recovery from solid waste."  The first policy 
listed states "[t]hat maximum solid waste reduction, reuse, 
recycling, composting and resource recovery is in the best 
interest of the state in order to protect public health, to 
protect the quality of the natural environment and to conserve 
resources and energy."  Wis. Stat. § 287.05(1) (emphasis added).  
Though the provision is not helpful in determining the meaning 
of "solid waste," we note that inclusion of cigarette butts 
within that definition serves these purposes. 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
16 
 
the court's role, in the context of statutory interpretation, to 
give effect to legislation unless we find that the legislature 
could not have intended the absurd or unreasonable results a 
statute appears to require."  Johnson v. Masters, 2013 WI 43, 
¶20 n.12, 347 Wis. 2d 238, 830 N.W.2d 647.  It is hardly absurd 
for a statute entitled "Littering" to prohibit disposal of 
cigarette butts onto the state's roads.9  Therefore, we will 
simply give effect to the statute's natural meaning. 
¶36 At the circuit court, Iverson's attorney submitted an 
affidavit that stated in part:  
I have never in my legal experience had a call 
from 
or 
represented 
someone 
who 
was 
cited 
for 
littering or any other offense due to the throwing of 
a cigarette butt.  In fact, I have witnessed hundreds 
of cigarette butts on the grounds outside our office, 
along the streets near our office and outside of 
taverns and other businesses located in downtown 
La Crosse and have never heard of anyone being cited 
for such disposal of cigarette butts. 
If the image of masses of cigarette butts strewn throughout the 
streets of a Wisconsin city is meant to suggest that the 
                                                 
9 In fact, cigarette butt litter is a widely recognized 
problem.  See, e.g., Leslie Kaufman, Cigarette Butts: Tiny Trash 
That 
Piles 
Up, 
N.Y. 
Times 
(May 
28, 
2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/us/29cigarettes.html?_r=0; 
Brian Clark Howard, Watch: Cigarette Butts, World's #1 Litter, 
Recycled as Park Benches, Nat'l Geographic (May 5, 2015), 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/05/150504-cigarette-
butt-litter-recycling-environment/. 
 
Cigarette 
butt 
litter 
pollutes waterways, costs millions of dollars in clean-up costs, 
and spoils the appearance of otherwise attractive surroundings.  
See Kaufman, supra.  "Cigarette butts are, by some counts, the 
world's number one litter problem."  Howard, supra. 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
17 
 
disposal of cigarette butts along highways is somehow a de 
minimis offense under Wis. Stat. § 287.81, it fails to persuade.  
The 
cumulative 
effect 
of 
improper 
waste 
disposal 
is 
a 
demonstrable example of why littering is problematic.  The 
statement from the affidavit merely highlights the ills that the 
statute seeks to rectify by its plain terms. 
¶37 In 
any 
event, 
the 
structure 
of 
the 
statute 
demonstrates that the legislature could easily have created a 
quantitative threshold for the littering offense but did not.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 287.81(2m) imposes a larger forfeiture of 
$1,000 on "a person who deposits any large item on or along any 
highway . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 287.81(2m). "Large item" is 
defined in the statute as "an appliance, an item of furniture, a 
tire, a vehicle, a boat, an aircraft, building materials, or 
demolition waste."  § 287.81(1)(as).  The legislature thus 
considered quantity terms but did not set an amount necessary to 
trigger the statute, something the legislature has proven itself 
capable of doing in other contexts.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§§ 348.15-348.16 
(setting 
pound-specific 
vehicle 
weight 
limitations). 
¶38 We conclude that discarding a cigarette butt onto a 
highway violates Wis. Stat. § 287.81. 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
18 
 
 
 
 
2.  Whether Trooper Larsen is Statutorily Authorized  
to Conduct Traffic Stops to Enforce Wis. Stat. § 287.81 
¶39 Iverson asserts that Trooper Larsen is without legal 
authority to effectuate this stop.  However, the plain meaning 
of Wis. Stat. § 110.07, "Traffic officers; powers and duties," 
instructs otherwise.  The statute states in relevant part: 
Members of the state traffic patrol shall:   
1. Enforce and assist in the administration 
of . . . [Wis. Stat. §] 287.81 . . . . 
. . . . 
3.  Have authority to enter any place where 
vehicles subject to this chapter, ss. 167.31(2)(b) to 
(d) and 287.81 and chs. 194, 218 and 341 to 350 are 
stored or parked at any time to examine such vehicles, 
or to stop such vehicles while en route at any time 
upon the public highways to examine the same and make 
arrests for all violations thereof. 
Wis. Stat. § 110.07(1)(a)1., (a)3. (emphases added).  
¶40 The statute further grants officers of the state 
traffic patrol "the arrest powers of a law enforcement officer 
under [Wis. Stat. §] 968.07, regardless of whether the violation 
is punishable by forfeiture or criminal penalty."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 110.07(2m).   
¶41 The authority of state troopers is also addressed in 
Wis. Stat. ch. 23, entitled "Conservation."  Specifically, Wis. 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
19 
 
Stat. § 23.58 authorizes "an enforcing officer"10 to "stop a 
person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when 
the officer reasonably suspects that such person is committing, 
is about to commit or has committed a violation of those 
statutes enumerated in s. 23.50(1)" and to "demand the name and 
address of the person and an explanation of the person's 
conduct."  Wis. Stat. § 23.58.11  Wisconsin Stat. § 287.81 is one 
of the statutes enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 23.50(1).  Wis. Stat. 
§ 23.50(1).  
¶42 Finally, Wis. Stat. §§ 23.56 and 23.57 provide certain 
authority to conduct arrests, both with and without warrants, 
for violations of the statutes listed in Wis. Stat. § 23.50(1).12  
                                                 
10 "'Enforcing 
officer' . . . means 
a 
person 
who 
has 
authority to act pursuant to a specific statute."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 23.51(3). 
11 "Such a stop may be made only where the enforcing officer 
has proper authority to make an arrest for such violation," and 
"[s]uch detention and temporary questioning shall be conducted 
in the vicinity where the person was stopped."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 23.58.  Additionally, the enforcing officer must identify 
himself or herself as such.  Id. 
12 This 
authority 
is 
limited 
by 
various 
conditions. 
Warrantless arrests in particular are authorized only where: 
(a) The person refuses to accept a citation or to 
make a deposit under s. 23.66; or  
(b) The person refuses to identify himself or 
herself satisfactorily or the officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person is supplying false 
identification; or  
(c) Arrest 
is 
necessary 
to 
prevent 
imminent 
bodily harm to the enforcing officer or to another. 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
20 
 
¶43 In sum, the Wisconsin Legislature has explicitly 
authorized state troopers to conduct traffic stops in order to 
investigate violations of Wis. Stat. § 287.81 and to arrest 
violators of the statute under specified conditions.  Trooper 
Larsen therefore possessed statutory authority to stop Iverson's 
vehicle upon witnessing the disposal of a cigarette butt onto 
the highway. Whether the stop was constitutionally reasonable, 
however, is the question to which we now turn.  
 
B.  Constitutional Authority to Conduct the Traffic Stop  
 
1.  Whether a State Traffic Patrol Officer May Conduct a 
Warrantless Traffic Stop Based on Probable Cause or  
Reasonable Suspicion that a Violation of a Non-Traffic  
Civil Forfeiture Law Has Occurred 
¶44 A state traffic patrol officer's traffic stop of a 
vehicle is a "seizure" of "persons" under the Fourth Amendment.13  
See Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶11 (citations omitted).  "An 
automobile 
stop 
must 
not 
be 
unreasonable 
under 
the 
circumstances.  A traffic stop is generally reasonable if the 
officers have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation 
has occurred, or have grounds to reasonably suspect a violation 
has been or will be committed."  Id. (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The issue before us is whether it is 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wis. Stat. § 23.57(1)(a)-(c).  
13 "[W]e 
have 
traditionally 
understood 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution's provision on search and seizure to be coextensive 
with the Fourth Amendment."  State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶49, 
364 Wis. 2d 234, 868 N.W.2d 143 (citation omitted). 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
21 
 
reasonable to effectuate a stop for a non-traffic civil 
forfeiture offense.  
¶45 The court of appeals below concluded that a traffic 
stop may not be premised solely on a non-traffic civil 
forfeiture offense.  In other words, even if an officer observes 
a violation of the littering statute, the officer is without 
legal authority to stop the vehicle.  Examining our statement in 
Popke that "a police officer may . . . conduct a traffic stop 
when, under the totality of the circumstances, he or she has 
grounds to reasonably suspect that a crime or traffic violation 
has been or will be committed," Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶23 
(emphases added) (citation omitted), the court of appeals 
seemingly concluded that in order to so effectuate a stop, the 
officer must be granted specific authority under Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.24 ("Temporary questioning without arrest" to investigate 
suspected criminal activity) or Wis. Stat. § 345.22 ("Authority 
to 
arrest 
without 
a 
warrant" 
for 
violations 
of 
traffic 
regulations).  
¶46 The opinion of the court of appeals does not consider, 
however, whether Wis. Stat. § 110.07 ("Traffic officers; powers 
and duties") or Wis. Stat. § 23.58 ("Temporary questioning 
without arrest" to investigate suspected violations of certain 
enumerated statutes, including Wis. Stat. § 287.81), impact the 
analysis.14  
                                                 
14 Krier is not controlling for this reason.  In Krier the 
court of appeals relied on Wis. Stat. § 968.24 for its 
definition of the permissible bounds of the police officer's 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
22 
 
¶47 Under the court of appeals' interpretation, an officer 
would be required to sit idly by even if an individual threw an 
entire bag of garbage out of a vehicle's window, simply because 
littering is a non-traffic civil forfeiture offense.15  Neither 
Wis. Stat. § 968.24, nor Wis. Stat. § 345.22, nor Popke require 
this conclusion.  Although § 968.24 and § 345.22 pertain only to 
crimes and violations of traffic regulations, neither statute 
                                                                                                                                                             
conduct.  E.g., State v. Krier, 165 Wis. 2d 673, 678, 478 
N.W.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1991) ("We hold that when a person's 
activity can constitute either a civil forfeiture or a crime, a 
police officer may validly perform an investigative stop 
pursuant to s. 968.24, Stats." (emphasis added)).  In this case, 
however, Trooper Larsen derived his authority from Wis. Stat. 
§ 110.07 and Wis. Stat. § 23.58.  These statutes, in contrast to 
Wis. Stat. § 968.24, authorize traffic stops based on conduct 
punishable 
by 
civil 
forfeiture 
alone. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 110.07(1)(a)3.; Wis. Stat. § 23.58. 
15 Some 
might 
suggest 
that 
an 
officer 
who 
witnesses 
littering on the highway should get a warrant or issue a ticket 
in the mail, but one quickly sees how these are remedies in 
search of a problem.  First, the issuance of a littering 
citation is notably different from the issuance of, for example, 
a parking ticket; the latter is placed on a stopped vehicle and 
tracks the registered owner of the vehicle rather than the 
person who actually parked the car.  See, e.g., State of 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, Division of Motor 
Vehicles, Unpaid Parking Tickets, Judgments and Towing and 
Storage 
Fees, 
http://wisconsindot.gov/Pages/dmv/vehicles/prkg-
tckt/unpaid-tickets.aspx 
(last 
visited 
Sept. 
30, 
2015) 
(describing the Traffic Violation and Registration Program and 
noting that "[a]n authority issuing a parking ticket will send 
two notices to the registered owner of the vehicle").  Second, 
if an officer were relegated to such remedies, the officer would 
most likely be precluded from determining to whom a citation 
should be issued.  In effect, the officer would not be able to 
issue the ticket to the person who is responsible for the 
offense.  These approaches are ill-suited for a statute like 
Wis. Stat. § 287.81.   
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
23 
 
forecloses traffic stops to enforce non-traffic civil forfeiture 
offenses. 
 
Similarly, 
while 
Popke 
analyzed 
an 
officer's 
authority to effectuate traffic stops for crimes and for 
violations of traffic regulations, Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶¶23, 
28, 
our 
statement 
in 
Popke 
that 
"a 
police 
officer 
may . . . conduct a traffic stop when, under the totality of the 
circumstances, he or she has grounds to reasonably suspect that 
a crime or traffic violation has been or will be committed," 
id., ¶23 (emphases added) (citation omitted), did not purport to 
circumscribe the universe of possible scenarios within which 
traffic stops permissibly may occur, or to make such limits 
contingent on whether the legislature has titled a particular 
law a "traffic regulation."  The facts in Popke involved a stop 
based on criminal and traffic offenses, not a non-traffic civil 
forfeiture offense.  Thus, the language in Popke was limited to 
the issue then before the court.  The question of whether a non-
traffic civil forfeiture offense can justify a vehicular stop is 
before the court today. 
¶48 Iverson would attach constitutional significance to 
the legislature's categorization of civil forfeitures as either 
traffic-related or non-traffic-related, with the effect of 
limiting the ability of law enforcement officers to administer 
laws that the legislature saw fit to enact.  But the legislature 
did not place any such limits on law enforcement.  
¶49 Some civil violations, such as littering, can occur 
whether or not a vehicle is involved.  Indeed, the legislature 
may have found characterization of Wis. Stat. § 287.81 as a 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
24 
 
"traffic regulation" improper simply because not all littering 
is done on the roads; the prohibition contained in the statute 
applies to all areas of Wisconsin, not just the state's 
highways. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 287.81(2)(a). 
 
Perhaps 
the 
legislature found it more appropriate to classify the littering 
offense as one pertaining to "Solid Waste Reduction, Recovery 
and Recycling," Wis. Stat. ch. 287, and group it with similar 
legislation, see Wis. Stat. ch 280 ("Pure Drinking Water"); Wis. 
Stat. ch. 285 ("Air Pollution") rather than with the traffic 
laws.  Whatever the reason for Wis. Stat. § 287.81's separation 
from the traffic laws, the legislature did not limit the 
littering statute to just one domain.  Instead, the broad 
language of the statute applies to Wisconsin's highways and the 
state traffic patrol has been given authority to enforce it 
under Wis. Stat. § 110.07(1)(a)1.16  The statute's classification 
as traffic-related or not does not by itself provide grounds for 
departure from our usual Fourth Amendment analysis.  "We cannot 
                                                 
16 We add that Wis. Stat. § 345.20, a provision setting out 
procedure governing "traffic forfeiture actions," makes specific 
mention of the littering statute.  Wis. Stat. § 345.20 (emphasis 
added). Wisconsin Stat. § 345.20 provides that procedures set 
out in the "Conservation" chapter of the Wisconsin Statutes, 
Wis. Stat. ch. 23, "apply to actions in circuit court to recover 
forfeitures 
for 
violations 
of 
s. 287.81." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 345.20(g).  At the same time, Wis. Stat. § 23.53 provides that 
the citation created within the "Conservation" chapter governs 
violations of certain statutes enumerated within that chapter, 
"except 
that 
the 
uniform 
traffic 
citation 
created 
under 
s. 345.11 may be used by . . . a traffic officer employed under 
s. 110.07 in enforcing s. 287.81."  Wis. Stat. § 23.53(1).  
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
25 
 
accept that the search and seizure protections of the Fourth 
Amendment . . . can be made to turn upon such trivialities."  
Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (Fourth Amendment 
protections not dependent on whether officers followed police 
enforcement practices).  
¶50 If we otherwise analyze the reasonableness of this 
traffic stop, not in terms of the traditional totality of the 
circumstances test based on Iverson's driving on the evening in 
question but, more abstractly, in terms of whether a traffic 
stop for littering is ever reasonable, we arrive at the 
conclusion that such a stop is reasonable.  See, e.g., Popke, 
317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶11; see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 
106, 108-09 (1977).  We judge reasonableness in this context by 
"balanc[ing] . . . the public interest and the individual's 
right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by 
law officers."  See Malone, 274 Wis. 2d 540, ¶21 (quoting Mimms, 
434 U.S. at 109). 
¶51 "A routine traffic stop . . . is a relatively brief 
encounter and 'is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop" 
. . . than to a formal arrest.'"  Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 
117 (1998) (citation omitted); see also Malone, 274 Wis. 2d 540, 
¶24 (analogizing traffic stops and Terry stops). 
¶52 We clarified last term that "reasonable suspicion that 
a traffic law has been or is being violated is sufficient to 
justify all traffic stops," State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶30, 
364 Wis. 2d 234, 868 N.W.2d 143, and noted that, "[i]n at least 
some circumstances, reasonable suspicion that a non-traffic-
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
26 
 
related law has been broken may also justify a traffic stop."  
Id., ¶30 n.6.  After reviewing the decisions of the federal 
courts of appeals, we reasoned that the brief nature of traffic 
stops, "weighed against the public interest in safe roads," 
warranted our conclusion.  See id., ¶30.  
¶53 The current case features a violation of a law 
applicable to the state's highways and statutorily enforceable 
by the state's traffic patrol.  Enforcement of the law 
conceivably helps keep the state's roads safe.17  In addition, we 
note that the legislature has specifically defined the terms 
according to which officers may briefly detain potential 
violators of Wis. Stat. § 287.81.  Our approval of the traffic 
stop at issue is therefore not at odds with Houghton.  A 
reasonable suspicion that a violation of the littering statute, 
§ 287.81, has occurred justifies a brief and limited traffic 
stop.  The more onerous standard of probable cause would also 
therefore 
justify 
a 
traffic 
stop. 
 
See 
Houghton, 
364 
Wis. 2d 234, ¶21. 
                                                 
17 In its brief before this court, the State asserted that 
littering creates hazards for other motorists and that discarded 
lit cigarettes in particular can cause brush, grass, and forest 
fires leading to property damage.  These dangers are self-
evident and at least as serious as many of the interests with 
which Wisconsin's traffic-related civil forfeiture laws are 
apparently 
concerned. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 341.04 
(prohibiting the operation of an unregistered or improperly 
registered vehicle); Wis. Stat. § 346.20(1) (requiring vehicle 
operators to yield the right-of-way at intersections to vehicles 
in funeral processions when the latter have their headlights 
lighted); § 346.29(3) (unlawful to use certain bridges for 
fishing).   
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
27 
 
¶54 We have already held, more broadly, that "arrests for 
civil forfeitures are not per se unconstitutional."  State v. 
Pallone, 2000 WI 77, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568 (open 
intoxicants in a motor vehicle), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97; 
see also City of Milwaukee v. Nelson, 149 Wis. 2d 434, 456, 439 
N.W.2d 562 (1989) (loitering).18  Neither are traffic stops to 
enforce civil forfeiture laws per se unconstitutional, even when 
those laws are not technically "traffic regulations."  As we 
intimated in Popke, this court has no authority to decide which 
laws "are sufficiently important to merit enforcement."  See 
Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶19 (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 819).  
                                                 
18 In Nelson we "note[d] that it has long been established 
in Wisconsin" that law enforcement officers generally may make 
warrantless arrests upon probable cause for ordinance violations 
occurring in the presence of officers.  City of Milwaukee v. 
Nelson, 149 Wis. 2d 434, 458, 439 N.W.2d 562 (1989) (citation 
omitted).  Wisconsin Stat. § 110.07 once contained such an "in 
presence" requirement.  See Wis. Stat. § 110.07(2m) (1971-72).  
However, the legislature later eliminated this requirement, see 
Wis. Stat. § 110.07 (1973-74), and today officers of the state 
traffic patrol possess "the arrest powers of a law enforcement 
officer under [Wis. Stat. §] 968.07, regardless of whether the 
violation is punishable by forfeiture or criminal penalty."  
Wis. Stat. § 110.07(2m) (2011-12).  We do not address today what 
the elimination of that requirement may mean, given that the 
violation here occurred in the officer's presence.  See Atwater 
v. City of Lago, 532 U.S. 318, 340 n.11 (2001) (declining to 
speculate on "in presence" requirement for misdemeanor arrests, 
but quoting statement of dissent in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 
740, 756 (1984) (White, J., dissenting), that "the requirement 
that a misdemeanor must have occurred in the officer's presence 
to justify a warrantless arrest is not grounded in the Fourth 
Amendment").    
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
28 
 
We entrust that task to "the good sense (and, failing that, the 
political accountability)" of our lawmakers and law enforcers.  
Atwater v. City of Lago, 532 U.S. 318, 323-24, 353-54 (2001) 
(applying usual probable cause standard to warrantless arrests 
for violation of misdemeanor of failing to wear seatbelt).  
¶55 We conclude that a traffic stop to enforce Wis. Stat. 
§ 287.81 is generally reasonable if an officer has probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion that a violation of § 287.81 has 
occurred.  
 
2.  Whether Trooper Larsen had Probable Cause or Reasonable 
Suspicion that a Violation of Wis. Stat. § 287.81 Had Occurred 
¶56 "Probable cause refers to the 'quantum of evidence 
which would lead a reasonable police officer to believe' that a 
traffic violation has occurred."  Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶14 
(quoting Johnson v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 344, 348, 249 N.W.2d 593 
(1977)).  "The evidence need not establish proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt or even that guilt is more probable than not, 
but rather, probable cause requires that 'the information lead a 
reasonable officer to believe that guilt is more than a 
possibility.'"  Id. (quoting Johnson, 75 Wis. 2d at 348-49). 
¶57 Trooper Larsen testified that he witnessed a vehicle 
drift within its lane and twice come to a complete stop at a 
flashing yellow light despite the absence of traffic.19  He then 
                                                 
19 Although we rely on Trooper Larsen's testimony regarding 
the reason for the traffic stop, this opinion should not be read 
to exclude a traffic stop based upon the conduct that Trooper 
Larsen witnessed prior to his observation of the disposal of the 
cigarette butt.  In other words, Trooper Larsen might well have 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
29 
 
saw a cigarette butt "being thrown from the passenger side of 
the vehicle."  The cigarette butt hit the ground and scattered 
ashes across the right lane of the road.   
¶58 It 
is 
a 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 287.81 
to 
"[d]eposit[] or discharge[] any solid waste on or along any 
highway . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 287.81(2)(a).  We conclude that, 
based on his observations, Trooper Larsen had probable cause to 
believe that an occupant20 of Iverson's vehicle had violated 
§ 287.81 by throwing a cigarette butt onto the highway.  
¶59 Because Trooper Larsen's traffic stop was based on 
probable cause, we need not consider whether he also possessed 
reasonable suspicion that a violation of the littering statute 
had occurred. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶60 We conclude that: (1) the Wisconsin Legislature has 
explicitly authorized state troopers to conduct traffic stops in 
                                                                                                                                                             
possessed probable cause or reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
traffic stop at this point in time.  Cf. State v. Post, 2007 WI 
60, ¶24, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634 ("[A] driver's actions 
need not be erratic, unsafe, or illegal to give rise to 
reasonable suspicion.").  
20 Despite Iverson's suggestions to the contrary, the 
question of who threw the cigarette butt out of the vehicle is 
not relevant to our determination today.  For a traffic stop to 
be lawful as to all occupants, "[t]he State need not establish 
that the police had reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize 
the particular defendant before the court, but only that the 
police possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize 
someone in the vehicle."  State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 260, 
557 N.W.2d 245 (1996).  
No. 
2014AP515-FT   
 
30 
 
order to investigate violations of Wis. Stat. § 287.81 and to 
arrest violators of the statute under specified conditions; (2) 
a traffic stop to enforce § 287.81 is generally reasonable if an 
officer has probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a 
violation of § 287.81 has occurred; (3) discarding a cigarette 
butt onto a highway violates § 287.81; and (4) based on his 
observations, Trooper Larsen had probable cause to believe that 
an occupant of Iverson's vehicle had violated § 287.81 by 
throwing a cigarette butt onto the highway. 
¶61 The defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained 
during this traffic stop and to dismiss this case should have 
been denied.21  We reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and remand the case to the circuit court for reinstatement of 
charges and further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
By the Court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
¶62 REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
                                                 
21 In granting Iverson's motion, the circuit court suggested 
that violation of the littering statute was Trooper Larsen's 
"excuse" for stopping Iverson's vehicle.  But "pretextual 
traffic stops . . . are not per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment."  Houghton, 364 Wis. 2d 234, ¶25 (explaining the 
holding of Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).  As the traffic 
stop here was based on "an objectively ascertainable basis for 
probable cause," Trooper Larsen's "subjective motivations" are 
"of little concern."  See State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶27, 315 
Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598. 
No.  2014AP515-FT.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶63 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  This case 
addressing the constitutionality of a vehicle stop based on a 
non-traffic forfeiture offense is one of first impression.1  I 
conclude that a state trooper has authority, under certain 
circumstances, to stop a vehicle based on probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion of a violation of Wisconsin's littering 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 287.81.2    
¶64 My concern is that the majority opinion seems to 
explicitly 
reject 
the 
touchstone 
of 
Fourth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence.3  Majority op., ¶50.  The Fourth Amendment 
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.4  "An automobile 
stop must not be unreasonable under the circumstances."5  
                                                 
1 Other cases have considered whether, outside the context 
of a vehicle stop, a stop for a non-traffic forfeiture offense 
is constitutionally permissible.  See City of Milwaukee v. 
Nelson, 149 Wis. 2d 434, 439 N.W.2d 562 (1989).   
2 See majority op., ¶50.     
3 U.S. Const. amend. IV.     
4 See 
Ohio 
v. 
Robinette, 
519 
U.S. 33, 
39 
(1996) 
("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by 
examining the totality of the circumstances."); Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) ("Reasonableness, of course, 
depends 'on a balance between the public interest and the 
individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary 
interference by law officers.'") (quoting United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). 
5 State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶11, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 
N.W.2d 569 (citing State v. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 605, 558 
N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1996)); see also State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 
79, ¶29, 364 Wis. 2d 234, 868 N.W.2d 143 ("It is undisputed that 
traffic stops must be reasonable under the circumstances.") 
(citing Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d at 605). 
No.  2014AP515-FT.ssa 
 
2 
 
Reasonableness 
is 
gauged 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances.6   
¶65 The majority opinion explains how it analyzes the 
reasonableness of the automobile stop in the instant case: "not 
in terms of the traditional totality of the circumstances test 
based on Iverson's driving on the evening in question but, more 
abstractly, in terms of whether a traffic stop for littering is 
ever reasonable . . . ."7  The majority opinion does not explain 
what its "abstract" approach entails or how this "abstract" 
approach meshes with the traditional reasonableness under the 
totality of the circumstances analysis.8 
¶66 The court has frequently stated that reasonableness 
under the Fourth Amendment depends on a court's balancing the 
public interest against an individual's right to personal 
                                                 
6 See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 ("The touchstone of our 
analysis 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
always 
'the 
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular 
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.") 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also 
Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 ("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured 
in 
objective 
terms 
by 
examining 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances."); State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶21, 274 
Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 1 (a court must "carefully scrutinize 
the totality of the circumstances.").   
7 Majority op., ¶50. 
8 The majority opinion merely states that "if we were to 
analyze the totality of the circumstances of the stop at issue, 
we might not reach the question before the court and that 
analysis 
would 
only 
serve 
to 
restate 
longstanding 
legal 
principles."  Majority op., ¶22.   
No.  2014AP515-FT.ssa 
 
3 
 
security free from interference by law enforcement.9  In striking 
this balance, a court must carefully scrutinize the totality of 
the circumstances.10  The majority opinion does not apply this 
balancing test. 
¶67 When a court looks at the public interest in a typical 
vehicle stop case, the underlying offense is ordinarily a 
criminal or traffic violation.  The public interest is high in 
such a case.  Public safety is ordinarily at risk by criminal 
behavior or a violation of traffic laws.11  The public interest 
in stopping the vehicle in the instant case is comparatively 
low; there is no evidence that throwing a single cigarette butt 
from Iverson's car created any hazard.  In the case of a civil, 
non-traffic, forfeiture offense (like littering), the state's 
interests in ensuring safe travel and combating crime are either 
                                                 
9 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109 ("Reasonableness, of course, 
depends 'on a balance between the public interest and the 
individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary 
interference by law officers.'") (quoting United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)); see also Malone, 274 
Wis. 2d 540, ¶21 (citing Mimms).      
10 Malone, 274 Wis. 2d 540, ¶21. 
11 See State v. Day, 168 P.3d 1265, 1269 (Wash. 2007) 
(quoting State v. Johnson, 909 P.2d 293, 306 (Wash. 1996)); see 
also State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶56, 364 Wis. 2d 234, 868 
N.W.2d 143 (recognizing that "[t]he Wisconsin Statutes contain a 
tremendous number of provisions directed toward safety on the 
roadway").   
No.  2014AP515-FT.ssa 
 
4 
 
non-existent or significantly weaker than in a vehicle stop for 
a crime or a traffic violation.12    
¶68 The individual's countervailing interest is personal 
security and freedom from intrusion by the government.  Unlike 
other courts, the majority opinion is dismissive of the 
intrusiveness of a vehicle stop.  A vehicle stop by a law 
enforcement officer is a "major interference in the lives of the 
[vehicle's] occupants."  Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443, 478 (1971).   
¶69 An intrusion on privacy occurs every time a law 
enforcement officer stops a car, regardless of the motivation 
for the stop.  A vehicle stop interferes with a person's freedom 
of movement and is inconvenient, time-consuming, and anxiety-
inducing.  Moreover, a vehicle stop provides a law enforcement 
                                                 
12 For an example of the United States Supreme Court's 
considering the non-criminal, civil forfeiture nature of an 
offense in determining whether exigent circumstances exist to 
justify a warrantless entry into a home, see Welsh v. Wisconsin, 
466 U.S. 740, 749-51 (1984).  The gravity of the offense is an 
important part of the constitutional analysis.  Welsh, 466 U.S. 
at 753.  
The seriousness of the underlying offense is also relevant 
to whether a stop is constitutionally permissible in other 
contexts.  See United States v. Griggs, 498 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that in assessing an investigatory stop 
based on a completed misdemeanor, in that case playing a car 
stereo at excessive volume, "a reviewing court must consider the 
nature of the misdemeanor offense in question, with particular 
attention 
to 
the 
potential 
for 
ongoing 
or 
repeated 
danger . . . and any risk of escalation . . . .  An assessment 
of the 'public safety' factor should be considered within the 
totality of the circumstances, when balancing the privacy 
interests 
at 
stake 
against 
the 
efficacy 
of 
a 
Terry 
stop . . . .").    
No.  2014AP515-FT.ssa 
 
5 
 
officer with an opportunity for further intrusion on the driver, 
passengers, and the contents of the vehicle.13     
¶70 For this reason, some courts have declined to extend 
the general reasonable suspicion standard in striking the 
balance between public and individual interests in cases of 
vehicle stops for extremely minor infractions, such as a parking 
violations.14    
¶71 The majority opinion suggests that "the issuance of a 
littering citation is notably different from the issuance of, 
for example, a parking ticket," because parking tickets are 
placed on a stopped vehicle and track the registered owner, 
while a littering citation is issued to the litterer.15  True, 
but constitutionally not relevant.  There is a similarity 
between stopping a vehicle for littering and stopping a moving 
vehicle for an observed parking violation.  In both instances 
the 
public 
interest 
in 
enforcing 
the 
minor 
offense 
is 
comparatively low, while the individual's right to be free from 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶2, 255 
Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834.   
14 See, e.g., Day, 168 P.3d at 1269-70 (declining to allow 
an investigative stop under Terry for parking infractions); 
State v. Holmes, 569 N.W.2d 181, 185-86 (Minn. 1997) (concluding 
that a parking violation was not sufficiently serious to merit a 
Terry stop, permitting stops based solely on probable cause and 
"only 
if 
the 
stop 
is 
necessary 
to 
enforce 
the 
violation . . . .").  See also State v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513, 
517-19 (Wash. 2002) (declining to extend Terry to general civil 
infractions).   
15 Majority op., ¶47 n.15.   
No.  2014AP515-FT.ssa 
 
6 
 
the intrusion of having the vehicle stopped remains the same as 
in any other vehicle stop.   
¶72 When an officer has reasonable suspicion to issue a 
parking ticket or a littering citation, in the absence of some 
public safety risk or other significant public interest, the 
public interest in issuing the citation does not automatically 
overcome an individual's right to be free from the intrusion of 
having the vehicle stopped.  
¶73 This distinction between an infraction that does and 
does not present a public safety risk or otherwise violate a 
significant public interest is illustrated by several examples 
on which the majority opinion relies.  The majority opinion 
illuminates that "discarded lit cigarettes in particular can 
cause brush, grass, and forest fires leading to property 
damage."16  The majority opinion also explains that throwing a 
large bag of trash out of a moving vehicle is dangerous to 
others who use the road.17   
¶74 The 
examples 
in 
the 
majority 
opinion 
suggest 
circumstances that would be relevant under a totality of the 
circumstances analysis.  A cigarette butt thrown out of a 
vehicle in a dry, fire-prone area may very well pose a risk to 
public safety and the environment.  No such danger by the single 
cigarette butt in the instant case is alleged.  Ash from a 
                                                 
16 Majority op., ¶53 n.17.   
17 Majority op., ¶47.   
No.  2014AP515-FT.ssa 
 
7 
 
cigarette likely poses no danger at all.18  A trash bag thrown 
out of a moving vehicle obviously may very well pose a danger to 
other motorists; a single cigarette butt ordinarily does not.  
These examples flesh out the totality of circumstances to be 
considered.   
¶75 In the instant case, no proof of a public safety risk 
was offered.  Iverson was driving in the wee hours of the 
morning in the city of La Crosse.  There is no evidence in the 
record suggesting that other drivers on the road were somehow 
endangered by the passenger's tossing a cigarette butt, let 
alone that there was a risk of fire, property damage, or other 
significant danger as a result of the discarded cigarette.   
¶76 Rather, the traffic stop in this case is a variation 
on familiar themes.  The trooper stopped Iverson based on a 
minor violation, here littering.  See Wis. Stat. § 287.81.  The 
stop was pretextual.  The trooper's true motive was not to issue 
a citation for littering, but to investigate a more serious 
traffic offense or potentially criminal offense, namely drunk 
driving.  The trooper saw Iverson's vehicle driving late at 
night and began following the vehicle.  The trooper saw the 
vehicle drift within its lane and stop at two flashing yellow 
lights despite the absence of traffic.   
¶77 The trooper evidently had a hunch that the driver was 
intoxicated (and his hunch was apparently correct).  The trooper 
                                                 
18 Cf. State v. Qualls, No. 2014AP141-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶6 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2014) (not reaching the issue of 
whether ash constituted "litter" under a village ordinance).   
No.  2014AP515-FT.ssa 
 
8 
 
concluded, however, that he did not have reasonable suspicion to 
stop the vehicle.19  Then came the "a-ha" moment.  When the 
trooper saw a cigarette butt thrown from the passenger side of 
the vehicle, the trooper concluded that he had grounds to stop 
the vehicle.      
¶78 Underscoring the pretextual nature of the stop, 
neither Iverson nor his passenger was cited for littering.  
Instead, Iverson was arrested for drunk driving.  
¶79 The circuit court relied on the pretextual nature of 
the stop in granting the motion to suppress.  However, under 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996), and other 
cases, the constitutional reasonability of a stop does not 
                                                 
19 Majority op., ¶7 & n.3.  The trooper stated that "prior 
to 
the 
cigarette 
butt 
being 
thrown . . . I 
didn't 
feel . . . that I had the reasonable suspicion to initiate a 
traffic stop . . . ."   
The majority opinion insinuates that drifting within a lane 
and stopping at flashing yellow lights constitute reasonable 
suspicion of drunk driving.  Majority op., ¶7 n.3.  That 
conclusion is questionable.  See State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, 
¶¶18-21, 
301 
Wis. 2d 1, 
733 
N.W.2d 634 
(concluding 
that 
repeatedly weaving within a single lane, standing alone, does 
not constitute reasonable suspicion); State v. McConnell, No. 
M2012-02238-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 1912584, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
May 8, 2013) (finding no reasonable suspicion when the defendant 
stopped at a flashing yellow light for several seconds before 
going through the intersection). 
Wisconsin Stat. § 346.39(2) provides that "operators of 
vehicles may proceed through the intersection or past [a 
flashing yellow light] only with caution."   
No.  2014AP515-FT.ssa 
 
9 
 
depend 
on 
the 
subjective 
motivations 
of 
the 
officer.20  
Pretextual stops have been accepted under the Fourth Amendment. 
¶80 In the instant case the dominant factors to gauge in 
assessing the reasonableness of the vehicle stop under the 
totality of the circumstances can be summarized as follows: the 
public interest in this particular stop for littering was slight 
or insubstantial; a vehicle stop is a significant intrusion on a 
person's security; the statutory violation was flimsy; and the 
reason for the vehicle stop was pretextual.  This combination of 
circumstances, had the case been presented this way, might lead 
me to conclude that the vehicle stop was not reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment.   
¶81 I caution that the majority opinion should not be over 
read.  I do not think the majority intends its opinion to be 
read as granting law enforcement officers extraordinarily broad 
powers to stop vehicles without meaningful judicial review.  
¶82 In sum, the traditional Fourth Amendment rules still 
apply in Wisconsin.  The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable 
                                                 
20 This rule has been criticized.  See, e.g., 1 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 
§ 1.4(f) (5th ed. 2012) (critiquing Whren v. United States, 517 
U.S. 806 (1996)); State v. Newer, 2007 WI App 236, ¶4 n.2, 306 
Wis. 2d 193, 742 N.W.2d 923 (Ct. App. 2007) ("We note that the 
officer's subjective motivation for making a stop is not the 
issue; if the officer has facts that could justify reasonable 
suspicion (or probable cause), it is of no import that the 
officer is not subjectively motivated by a desire to investigate 
this suspicion.  We question the wisdom of this rule when it 
comes to extremely minor traffic violations, but that is for 
another day.") (internal citations omitted) (citing Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); State v. Baudhuin, 141 
Wis. 2d 642, 650-51, 416 N.W.2d 60 (1987)).   
No.  2014AP515-FT.ssa 
 
10 
 
searches and seizures.21  Reasonableness is gauged under the 
totality of the circumstances.22  "An automobile stop must not be 
unreasonable under the circumstances."23  
¶83 Reasonableness depends on a court's balancing the 
public interest against an individual's right to personal 
security free from interference by law enforcement.  In striking 
this balance, a court must carefully scrutinize the totality of 
the circumstances.  Unfortunately, the majority opinion did not 
apply these rules.  I therefore write separately.             
¶84 Before I conclude, however, I add a comment about the 
statutes applicable in the instant case.  The statutes at issue 
are part of Wis. Stat. chapter 287, entitled "Solid Waste 
Reduction, Recovery and Recycling."   
¶85 Wisconsin Stat. § 287.81(2), entitled "Littering," 
provides that a person who "[d]eposits or discharges any solid 
waste on or along any highway" or "[p]ermits any solid waste to 
                                                 
21 U.S. Const. amend. IV.     
22 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 ("The touchstone of our 
analysis 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
always 
'the 
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular 
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.") 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also 
Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 ("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured 
in 
objective 
terms 
by 
examining 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances."); Malone, 274 Wis. 2d 540, ¶21 (a court must 
"carefully scrutinize the totality of the circumstances.").   
23 Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶11; see also Houghton, 364 
Wis. 2d 234, ¶29 ("It is undisputed that traffic stops must be 
reasonable under the circumstances.") (citing Gaulrapp, 207 
Wis. 2d at 605). 
No.  2014AP515-FT.ssa 
 
11 
 
be thrown from a vehicle operated by the person" may be required 
to forfeit no more than $500.24   
¶86 Section 287.01(10) adopts the meaning of "solid waste" 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 289.01(33).25  The definition of "solid 
waste" lists many materials, including garbage, refuse, and 
materials resulting from "community activities."26  "Refuse" is 
defined in part as "matters produced from industrial or 
community life."27   
¶87 The phrases "community activities" and "produced from 
industrial or community life" defy almost any effort at 
definition. 
¶88 Would a simpler littering statute not intimately 
connected with solid waste suffice, so a court need not spend 14 
paragraphs, 9 double-spaced pages, and a lot of dictionary 
research for a discourse on whether a cigarette butt violates 
the littering statute?  "Littering" is a word in common usage, 
with a generally accepted meaning, but the word "littering" is 
not used in chapter 287 other than in the title to subchapter IV 
of chapter 287 and the title of Wis. Stat. § 287.81.     
¶89 Should the legislature take another look at Wis. Stat. 
§§ 287.01 and 287.81?  See Wis. Stat. § 13.92(2)(j).  
¶90 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
                                                 
24 Wis. Stat. § 287.81(2)(a), (b).   
25 Chapter 289 is titled "Solid Waste Facilities."   
26 Wis. Stat. § 289.01(33).   
27 Wis. Stat. § 289.01(28).   
No.  2014AP515-FT.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶91 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins ¶¶64-66 of this opinion.  
No.  2014AP515-FT.awb 
 
 
 
1 
 
¶92 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring).  I agree with the 
majority conclusion that "the officer in this case had probable 
cause to believe that an occupant of Iverson's vehicle had 
violated § 287.81 by throwing a cigarette butt onto the 
highway."  Majority Op., ¶4.  
¶93 I write separately, however, because I disagree with 
the majority's failure to employ a totality of circumstances 
analysis.  As the above concurrence explains, a totality of the 
circumstance analysis is, has been, and remains the touchstone 
of 
Fourth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
 
Accordingly, 
I 
join 
paragraphs 64-66 of the above concurrence.