Case Title: State v. Triplett

Citation: 1997-Ohio-182

Docket Number: 19951708

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State of Ohio, Appellant, v. Triplett, Appellee. 
[Cite as State v. Triplett (1997),    Ohio St.3d   .] 
Criminal law -- Fifty-four-month delay between indictment and trial not 
a violation of Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, when. 
 
(No. 95-1708--Submitted September 25, 1996-- Decided June 11, 1997.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 67450. 
 
On March 7, 1989, appellee, Narveter Triplett, was arrested by 
Warrensville Heights police for drug abuse and possession of criminal tools.  
Triplett was released the day she was arrested, pending grand jury review.  No 
bond was required, since no formal charges were pending -- the drugs 
confiscated had to be tested by a forensic laboratory, and police were still 
gathering information. 
 
On her booking slip, Triplett listed her address as 4258 East 133d Street, 
Cleveland, and stated that she had lived there for twenty-five years.  On May 2, 
1989, Triplett was indicted for drug abuse and possession of criminal tools.  A 
summons was issued on May 9, 1989.  On that same date, the summons was 
sent, along with a copy of the indictment, by certified mail, return receipt 
 
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requested, to the above address, ordering Triplett to appear for arraignment on 
May 19.  The letter was never claimed.  When Triplett failed to appear for her 
arraignment, a capias was issued for her arrest.  Over four years later, on 
October 26, 1993, Triplett was arrested on the capias during a sting operation 
by the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Department.  She was arraigned on October 
28, 1993. 
 
On November 10, 1993, Triplett appeared before a trial judge to read a 
proposed plea agreement into the record.  The judge asked Triplett where she 
had been since the time of her original arrest.  She told him that she had been 
working and was unaware of the pending charges.  The judge then sua sponte 
raised the issue of whether Triplett had received a speedy trial.  Triplett’s 
counsel then requested a continuance in order to file a motion to dismiss for 
speedy trial reasons.  On November 17, 1993, Triplett filed a motion to dismiss 
for violation of her right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and R.C. 2945.71. 
 
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On December 20, 1993, the trial court conducted a hearing on the 
motion.  The state’s first witness was Triplett’s arresting officer, Sergeant 
Richard Moeller of the Warrensville Heights Police Department, who testified 
that Triplett had provided the Cleveland address on her booking slip.  He also 
testified that Triplett was released without being charged because the evidence 
taken at the scene had yet to be analyzed by the Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation. 
 
Terry Murphy, a docket clerk at the Cuyahoga County Clerk’s Office, 
testified regarding procedures for notifying defendants of an indictment.  After 
an indictment is filed, a summons with a copy of the indictment is sent to the 
defendant by certified mail.  At the same time, a summons is sent by ordinary 
mail.  The summons sent by ordinary mail tells the defendant to come to court 
to pick up the indictment.  The certified mail summons is recorded on the 
court’s criminal docket, but the ordinary mail summons is not recorded. 
 
Murphy identified the certified mail that had been sent to Triplett at 4258 
East 133d Street, Cleveland, Ohio.  It was postmarked May 9, 1989.  He also 
 
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identified two notices to claim the certified mail, attached to the envelope and 
dated May 10, 1989 and May 15, 1989.  The word “unclaimed” was stamped 
on the envelope, indicating that no one had picked up the certified mail at the 
post office after an unsuccessful home delivery.  Murphy testified that if the 
certified mail had been refused, the envelope would have been marked 
“refused” rather than “unclaimed.” 
 
The state’s last witness was Lieutenant Dan Pukach of the Cuyahoga 
County Sheriff’s Department.  He testified that the capias originally issued 
upon Triplett’s failure to appear became one of twelve thousand arrest warrants 
outstanding at any given time in Cuyahoga County, and one of one thousand 
capias orders in an average month.  The eight deputies assigned to execute 
warrants give priority to cases involving murder, robbery, and rape. 
 
Pukach was involved with the Ohio Attorney General’s Office in a sting 
operation to clear up outstanding warrants.  He testified that Triplett was 
arrested on October 26, 1993, after a letter was sent to her at 4258 East 133d 
Street, stating that she was entitled to a consumer refund as a part of a 
 
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successful class action lawsuit and requesting that she respond in person to 
claim her settlement.  Triplett took the bait and was arrested on the outstanding 
capias.  
 
Triplett testified that after her original arrest in March 1989, she was told 
by a police officer that she was being released because of a lack of evidence.  
She stated that she became aware of the outstanding charge against her only 
after the sting operation in October 1993.  Triplett testified that at the time of 
her original arrest she had given police the address where she had resided since 
1986 with her four children and mother.  At the time of the December 1993 
hearing, she still lived there.  She claimed that she had never received a 
summons in May 1989 and never knew of any postal slips that had been left at 
her house indicating that a certified letter was waiting for her at the post office. 
 
In a June 10, 1994 ruling, the trial judge found that Triplett’s statutory 
right to a speedy trial was not violated, but that her constitutional right thereto 
was violated, and thus granted the motion to dismiss.  The state appealed, and 
 
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the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
 
______________ 
 
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
George J. Sadd, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
James A. Draper, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Donald Green, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. 
________________ 
 
Pfeifer, J.  We consider in this case whether the fifty-four-month delay 
between Triplett’s indictment and trial constituted a violation of her Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial.  Because Triplett precipitated the delay by 
failing to claim certified mail informing her of her indictment, we find that the 
delay did not violate Triplett’s constitutional rights. 
 
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In United States v. MacDonald (1982), 456 U.S. 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 
1502, 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 704, the United States Supreme Court stated the purpose 
of the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause: 
 
“The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is * * * not primarily 
intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time; that 
interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by statutes of 
limitations.  The speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility 
of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless 
substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on 
bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of 
unresolved criminal charges.”  
 
In Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 
101, the court set forth a four-part test to determine whether the state has 
violated an accused’s right to a speedy trial.  The four factors include (1) the 
length of the delay, (2) the reason the government assigns to justify the delay, 
(3) the defendant’s responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the 
 
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prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530-532, 92 S.Ct. at 2192-2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 
116-118. 
 
In Doggett v. United States (1992), 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 
L.Ed.2d 520, the court found that the eight-and-one-half-year delay between 
the accused’s indictment and arrest violated his Sixth Amendment rights.  
Doggett was secretly indicted on federal drug charges, but left the country 
before the Drug Enforcement Agency could secure his arrest.  Doggett was 
thereafter imprisoned in Panama, and upon his release in 1982, moved to 
Colombia.  Doggett eventually returned to the United States two and one-half 
years after the issuance of the indictment.  From that point until his arrest, he 
lived openly under his own name, married, earned a college degree, and found 
steady employment.  The United States Marshal’s Service eventually located 
him in 1988 during a simple credit check on individuals with outstanding 
warrants.  There was no evidence that Doggett had ever known of the charges 
against him until his arrest. 
 
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Of special concern to the court in Doggett was the fourth factor of the 
Barker test, prejudice to the defendant.  While Doggett was unable to 
demonstrate specifically any prejudice from the delay, the court found that the 
lengthy lag was presumptively prejudicial. Id. at 655, 112 S.Ct. at 2693, 120 
L.Ed.2d at 530.  Weighing that factor with the rest of the Barker factors, the 
court concluded that the delay violated Doggett’s Sixth Amendment rights. 
 
In the present case, the Barker factors weigh more heavily on the side of 
the state.  The first factor, the length of the delay, is a “triggering mechanism,” 
determining the necessity of inquiry into the other factors. Id., 407 U.S. at 530, 
92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117.  The fifty-four-month delay in this case is 
certainly enough to trigger that inquiry -- one year is generally considered 
enough. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. at 2691, 120 L.Ed.2d at 528, fn. 1.  
However, the delay in this case, while significant, did not result in any 
infringement on Triplett’s liberty.  In fact, according to her own testimony, she 
was completely ignorant of any charges against her.  The interests which the 
Sixth Amendment was designed to protect -- freedom from extended pretrial 
 
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incarceration and from the disruption caused by unresolved charges -- were not 
issues in this case.  Therefore, while the first factor does technically weigh in 
Triplett’s favor, its weight is negligible. 
 
The second factor to consider is the reason the government assigns for 
the delay.  The record reveals that the government complied with Crim.R. 4(D) 
by sending Triplett a summons and a copy of the indictment via certified mail, 
and at the same time by ordinary mail.  Only the portion of the delay which is 
attributed to the government’s neglect is to be weighed in a defendant’s favor.  
Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at 658, 112 S.Ct. at 2694, 120 L.Ed.2d at 532.  
Triplett’s failure to accept the certified mail at the address which she gave 
police was the precipitating event in the lengthy delay.  It was Triplett who was 
arrested, gave police her address, and then ignored certified mail that arrived 
soon thereafter.  It is this factor which distinguished this case from Doggett.  
To reward Triplett for ignoring this notice would be a repudiation of Crim.R. 4. 
 
Certainly, the state could have done more to bring Triplett to immediate 
justice and must shoulder some of the blame for the delay.  If the state wishes 
 
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to prosecute small-time offenders like Triplett, it ought to expend the resources 
to do so.  Still, a person furnishing an address to police upon arrest has some 
duty to accept certified mail delivered to that same address within a reasonable 
time.  We cannot always prevent such persons from avoiding detection by 
underzealous police, but we should not allow them to use their slipperiness to 
claim the protection of the Sixth Amendment.  Therefore, we find that the 
second factor weighs heavily against Triplett in this case. 
 
The third factor involved is the timeliness of a defendant’s invocation of 
the speedy trial right.  Were it proven that Triplett did know of her indictment, 
perhaps  through the ordinary mail service, the third factor would weigh 
heavily against her.  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653, 112 S.Ct. at 2691, 120 L.Ed2d at 
529.  No matter how dubious Triplett’s claim of ignorance is, there is no 
evidence in the record that she knew of the indictment prior to her arrest in 
1993.  Finally, it was only at a 1993 hearing in which her plea agreement was 
being read into the record that the trial judge brought up sua sponte the issue of 
speedy trial.  While the proceeding had moved briskly after Triplett’s second 
 
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arrest, the speedy trial issue was not raised until the eleventh hour.  We accord 
only moderate weight to the third factor in Triplett’s favor. 
 
In Doggett, the court stated that, as to the fourth factor, the possibility 
that a defense could be impaired by dimming memories and the loss of 
exculpatory evidence is the most serious form of prejudice a pretrial delay can 
bring. 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. at 2692, 120 L.Ed.2d at 530.  The Doggett 
defendant, like Triplett, was unable to affirmatively show that the delay 
weakened his ability to raise specific defenses, elicit specific testimony, or 
produce specific items of evidence.  However, recognizing that “time’s erosion 
of exculpatory evidence and testimony ‘can rarely be shown,’” the court wrote 
that “‘we generally have to recognize that excessive delay presumptively 
compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for 
that matter, identify.’” Id. at 655, 112 S.Ct. at 2692-2693, 120 L.Ed.2d at 530-
531, quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118.  The 
court held that while such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth 
Amendment claim, “it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance 
 
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increases with the length of delay.” Doggett at 656, 112 S.Ct. at 2693, 120 
L.Ed.2d at 531. 
 
For the Doggett court, the role that this presumptive prejudice is to play 
related directly to the reason for the delay.  Where the defendant himself causes 
the delay, by going into hiding, for instance, and the government pursues him 
with reasonable diligence, a speedy trial claim would fail.  Id. at 656, 112 S.Ct. 
at 2693, 120 L.Ed.2d at 531.  Where the delay is caused by the government’s 
intentional footdragging in order to gain some impermissible advantage at trial, 
the delay will be weighed heavily against the government.  “Between diligent 
prosecution and bad-faith delay, official negligence in bringing an accused to 
trial occupies the middle ground.” Id. at 656-657, 112 S.Ct. at 2693, 120 
L.Ed.2d at 531.  Negligence, however “still falls on the wrong side of the 
divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal 
prosecution once it has begun.” Id. at 657, 112 S.Ct. at 2693, 120 L.Ed.2d at 
531-532.  The longer the delay due to official negligence, the less tolerable the 
delay becomes. Id. at 657, 112 S.Ct. at 2693, 120 L.Ed. 2d at 532.  The eight-
 
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and-one-half-year delay in Doggett’s case, with six years directly attributable to 
the government’s negligence, was too much for the court to countenance. 
 
We do not find the time span in this case to be as prejudicial as the 
period in Doggett.  The fifty-four months at issue in this case is also 
exceedingly long, but it is the cause of that delay that sets this case apart from 
Doggett.  In Doggett, there was no evidence that the accused ever knew that he 
had been charged with a crime or that the government had ever attempted to 
notify him of his indictment.  He was never even in police custody until eight 
and a half years after his indictment.  Triplett was arrested, immediately 
booked, and indicted soon thereafter, and a certified mail notice of her 
indictment was then sent to the address she had provided to police after her 
arrest.  Hence, any delay after that point was her fault. 
 
Of course, police did not do all they could to apprehend Triplett.  There 
is nothing in the record suggesting that police made any effort to go to the 
address in person to attempt to find Triplett.  While this factor should be 
weighed, on balance, against the state, we do not find it fatal to the prosecution. 
 
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The length of the delay and the prejudice presumed to arise from that, as 
well as Triplett’s timely assertion of her Sixth Amendment rights, are factors in 
her favor under a Barker analysis.  Still, none of those factors ever would have 
become factors without Triplett’s own hampering of her Sixth Amendment 
rights.  Triplett cannot overcome the fact that the genesis of the delay was her 
failure to accept certified mail or her failure to give police a suitable address 
upon her arrest.  
 
We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand 
the cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in judgment only.