Case Title: In re Fink

Citation: 171 Vt. 319, 764 A.2d 1208

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2000-10-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Fink (99-558); 171 Vt. 319; 764 A.2d 1208

[Filed 27-Oct-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-558

In re Melvin D. Fink, Esq.	                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
    	                                         Professional Conduct Board

                                                 June Term, 2000

Stephen S. Blodgett, Special Bar Counsel, Burlington, for Appellant.

Melvin D. Fink of Fink and Birmingham, P.C., Ludlow, Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.   Appellant Special Bar Counsel filed a petition of
  misconduct against  appellee-attorney, alleging that appellee had violated
  DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct  involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
  or misrepresentation), and DR 7-102(A)(7) (counseling client in  conduct
  attorney knows to be illegal or fraudulent) of the Code of Professional
  Responsibility. (FN1)   A hearing panel held a hearing, concluded that
  appellee had violated DR 1-102(A)(4), but not  7-102(A)(7), and recommended
  a sanction.  The Professional Conduct Board (Board) subsequently  held a
  hearing and adopted the panel's findings of fact, but concluded that
  appellee had not violated  either DR 1-102(A)(4) or 7-102(A)(7), and
  dismissed the petition.  Special Bar Counsel appeals the 

 

  Board's conclusion that appellee had not violated DR 1-102(A)(4).  We
  affirm.

       The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Appellee represented Robin
  Bushey in a divorce matter  and assisted in preparing the parties'
  stipulated itemized division of personal property.  The final  divorce
  order incorporated the stipulation and further provided:  "Each of the
  parties is awarded the  personal property in his or her possession free and
  clear of any and all marital right or claim of the  other . . . ."  Neither
  the stipulation nor the final divorce order made reference to a Subaru
  automobile  that Bushey had in her possession at the time the final divorce
  order was issued.  As the Board stated:  "While it would have been better
  practice to itemize such a significant item of personal property to  avoid
  all confusion, it is clear that the client, Robin, was to have complete
  ownership rights in that  vehicle."

       A few months after the final divorce order was issued, Bushey decided
  to trade in the Subaru.  When she realized that her ex-husband's name was
  on the certificate of title, and that, in order to  trade in the car, she
  needed her ex-husband's signature, she called appellee and asked if she
  could  sign her ex-husband's name.  Relying on the above-quoted provision
  of the divorce decree, and upon  something he recalled reading in a legal
  treatise several years earlier, appellee told Bushey that she  could.  When
  she traded in the car, Bushey signed her ex-husband's name, but did not
  tell the dealer  that she had done so.  The legal treatise appellee relied
  upon turned out to be inapplicable.  Prior to  giving his client the
  above-noted advice, appellee failed to conduct legal research on the issue. 
  Had  he done so, he might have discovered 23 V.S.A. § 2025 (involuntary
  transfers), under which Bushey  could obtain a new title to the automobile
  under circumstances such as presented in this case.

       The hearing panel, whose findings were adopted by the Board, stated:

 

    We find respondent's testimony that he did not believe that there
    was  any harm to Jeffrey Bushey because of the provisions of the
    divorce  decree giving Robin the Subaru automobile truthful. . . . 
    [W]e find  that he gave her the advice to sign Jeffrey Bushey's
    name because he  thought it was the simplest resolution of her
    problem and had, in  Respondent's mind, was [sic] a minimal risk
    of adverse  consequences.

  The panel concluded that appellee had violated DR 1-102(A)(4), stating:

    [B]y signing the name of Jeffrey Bushey, Robin Bushey made a 
    misrepresentation and deceived the dealership. . . .  In telling
    Robin  Bushey that she could sign Jeffrey Bushey's name on the
    certificate of  title, he intended her to rely on that advice to
    sign Jeffrey Bushey's  name, and he knew that she would rely on
    his advice in signing  Jeffrey Bushey's name on the certificate of
    title, and that she did so. 
       	
       The Board reversed.  While noting that appellee may have provided
  legal advice without  adequate preparation, the Board could not find "by
  clear and convincing evidence that Respondent  engaged in conduct involving
  dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of  DR
  1-102(A)(4)."

       DR 1-102(A)(4) provides:  "A lawyer shall not: . . . [e]ngage in
  conduct involving dishonesty,  fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."  Here,
  appellee was familiar with the final divorce order that  awarded the
  parties the property in their possession; he knew the Subaru was in
  Bushey's possession;  he believed his advice was supported by a legal
  treatise; and he believed that advising 

 

  Bushey that she could sign her ex-husband's name would cause no harm to
  anyone.  Appellee's major  transgression was that he failed to conduct
  adequate legal research.  Given these facts, we agree with  the Board that,
  while appellee's conduct may have been sufficient to conclude that he
  violated DR 6-101(A)(2) (attorney shall not handle legal matter without
  adequate preparation), the advice he gave  Bushey did not constitute
  dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

       The cases in which we have upheld the determination that an attorney
  has violated  DR 1-102(A)(4) involve facts much more egregious than those
  of the instant case.  See In re Karpin,  162 Vt. 163, 170-71,