Case Title: MATTER OF KUJATH

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
No, 13062 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 I N T H E M A T T E R O F THE ESTATE O F GOLDIE MAHR K U J A T H , Deceased . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Peter G. Meloy, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Longan and Holmstrom and Vicki W. Dunaway, Billings, Montana James C, Capser argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent : Small, Cummins and Hatch, Helena, Montana Gregory A. Jackson argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: December 11, 1975 Decided : JAN 1 3 1976 Filed : JFF 13 If?76 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment of the d i s t r i c t court, Lewis and Clark County, declaring section 91-102, R.C.M. 1947, invalid a s being i n contravention of A r t i c l e 11, Section 4 , 1972 Montana Constitution. Goldie Mahr Kujath died on August 8, 1973, two days a f t e r executing a w i l l i n which she l e f t nothing t o her surviving husband, John H. Kujath. The Kujaths, who had been childhood sweetheaas, were married on April 5, 1973. Both had been married previously, had families and each had l o s t the f i r s t spouse by death. Goldie was a long time resident of Lewis and Clark County and John a long time resident of Carbon County. Following t h e i r marriage they resided i n the honeof John on a small farm near Fromberg, Montana. Late i n July 1973, the couple came t o Helena t o attend t o some of oldie's business a f f a i r s and she died on August 8 i n Helena. The F i r s t National Bank and Trust Company of Helena was designated t o a c t a s executor of t h e Last W i l l and Testament of Goldie and it petitioned t h e court f o r admission of the W i l l t o probate and f o r appointment a s executor. Following appointment of the i n s t i t u t i o n a s executor, a p e t i t i o n was received on behalf of John H. Kujath, i n accordance with section 91-3801, R.C.M. 1947, asking t h a t the court declare he was, pursuant t o section 91-102, R.C.M. 1947, e n t i t l e d t o one-third of h i s wife's e s t a t e . The executor opposed the p e t i t i o n and t h e r e a f t e r agreed t o submit the matter t o the d i s t r i c t court f o r i t s determination. The d i s t r i c t court held t h a t section 91-102, R.C.M. 1947, violated A r t i c l e 11, Section 4 , 1972 Montana Constitution and denied the p e t i t i o n of John H. Kujath t o have s e t over t o him one-third of h i s wife's e s t a t e . The sole issue before t h i s Court i s whether section 91-102 imposes a discriminatory r e s t r i c t i o n on a wife solely because of her sex and therefore i s i n violation of the United States and Montana Constitutions. Section 91-102, provides: 1 I Married Women, Wills by. k married woman may made a w i l l i n the same manner and with the same e f f e c t a s i f she were sole, except t h a t such w i l l s h a l l not, without t h e written consent of her husband, operate t o deprive him of more than two- t h i r d s of her r e a l e s t a t e or of more than two- t h i r d s of her personal e s t a t e . I 1 This Court i n a s e r i e s of cases has held t h a t when considering t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a s t a t u t e , the constitu- t i o n a l i t y is presumed and anyone attacking the v a l i d i t y of a s t a t u t e has a heavy burden of proving the invalidity. City of Billings v. Smith, 158 Mont. 197, 490 P.2d 221; S t a t e v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 106 Mont. 182, 76 P.2d 81. In establishing t h i s t e s t , Montana i s i n accord with every jurisdiction i n the United States. 16 Am. Jur.Zd, Constitutional Law, $137; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, In the i n s t a n t case, the question of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of section 91-102 i s more exact, f o r t h i s Court previously con- sidered the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the s t a t u t e i n an i d e n t i c a l factual situation. In r e ~ a h a f f a y ' s Estate, 79 Mont. 10, 24, 254 P. 875 (1927). There the same s t a t u t e was attacked a s being i n violation of the Fourteenth Amendment t o the United States Constitution i n t h a t it denied c e r t a i n persons the equal protec- tion of the law. In upholding the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e s t a t u t e , t h i s Court noted: h he r u l e has been many times declared by t h i s court t h a t when a s t a t u t e i s assailed a s unconstitutional, the question i s not whether it i s possible t o condemn, but whether it i s possible t o uphold, and t h a t it w i l l not be declared invalid unless i t s c o n f l i c t with t h e Constitution, i n the judgment of the court, i s placed beyond a reasonable doubt. * * Testing the s t a t u t e under consideration by t h i s r u l e and i n the l i g h t of j u d i c i a l history, we think i t s v a l i d i t y should be up- held. " Respondent-executor argues t h a t Mahaffay should not be controlling because the laws and the policy of t h e s t a t e , under ~ o n t a n a ' s 1972 Constitution, have changed. In support it c i t e s A r t i c l e 11, Sections 4, 1972 Montana Constitution, which reads: "The dignity of the human being i s inviolable. N o person s h a l l be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the s t a t e nor any person, firm, corporation, or i n s t i t u t i o n s h a l l dis- criminate against any person i n the exercise of h i s c i v i l or p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s on account.of race, color, sex, c u l t u r e , s o c i a l origin o r condition, or p o l i t i c a l or religious ideas. I t Further, t h a t Montana r a t i f i e d . . the Equal Rights Amendment which provides : " A r t i c l e Section 1. Equality of r i g h t s under the law s h a l l not be denied o r abridged . by the United States or by any S t a t e on account A *'I of sex. * LL Relying on t h e changes noted heretofore, respondent argues t h e law and the policy of the s t a t e of Montana have changed since Mahaffay, favoring a greater equality between sexes. W e could agree with t h i s argument i f section 91-102, R.C.M. 1947, stood alone i n ~ o n t a n a ' s s t a t u t e s . However, it does not stand alone but r a t h e r imposes upon married women a r e s t r i c - t i o n reciprocal t o t h a t placed on men i n other sections of the code. Section 91-102 must be read i n conjunction with the dower and e l e c t i v e share s t a t u t e s . The dower r i g h t of a widow ( T i t l e 22, Chapter 1, sections 22-101 through 22-117), has been recognized i n Montana since statehood. Section 22-107, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "Widow may elect---Every devise o r bequest t o her by her husband's w i l l s h a l l bar a widow's dower i n h i s lands and her share i n h i s personal e s t a t e unless otherwise expressed i n the w i l l ; but she may e l e c t whether she w i l l take under the provisions f o r her i n the w i l l of her deceased husband o r w i l l renounce the benefit of such provisions f o r her, and take her dower i n the lands and her share i n the personal e s t a t e under the succession s t a t u t e s , a s i f there had been no w i l l , but not i n excess of two- t h i r d s ( 2 1 3 ) of the husband's n e t e s t a t e r e a l and personal, a f t e r the payment of creditors claims, 2Xpt2LISt?b of adnilnisiratko11 a11d any and all taxes, including s t a t e and f e d e r a l inheritartce and e s t a t e taxes." (Emphasis added) Under Montana's s t a t u t e s a widow has a dower r i g h t t o u n e - - ~ h i r d of a l l lands which her husband was seized of during !:he marriage and under t h e succession s t a t u t e , section 91-403, K.Z.M. 1947, a widow i s e n t i t l e d t o a minimum of one-third of her husband's e s t a t e . Thus, t h e s t a t u t e s p r o t e c t t h e widow by r e - s t ~ i c t i n g t h e husband on t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of h i s e s t a t e i n a s i m i l a r i f not i d e n t i c a l manner t o t h e r e s t r i c t i o n imposed on the wife by section 91-102. I n a c t u a l i t y , ~ o n t a n a ' s s t a t u t e s provide ::he wife with a g r e a t e r p o t e n t i a l i f she choses t o e l e c t t o take against t h e w i l l a s provided i n section 22-107, than t h e share ehe husband might receive under section 91-102. Since statehood t h e l e g i s l a t u r e has prescribed t h e policy : h a t aLL c~f Montana's s t a t u t e s should be read together t o f u l l y understand the meaning of any individual s t a t u t e . Section 12- 2 i l , R.C.M. 1947, provides: "Construction of the codes with r e l a t i o n t o each other. With r e l a t i o n t o each o t h e r , t h e provisions of the four codes must be construed a s though a l l such codes have been passed a t t h e same moment of time, and were p a r t s of t h e same s t a t u t e . I I qee: ?teek-v. Gilpatrick, 18 Mont. 453, 454, 45 P. 1089 (1896); . a S t a t e ex r e l . Nissler v. Donlan, 32 Mont. 256, 264, 80 P. 244 (1905) ; Brown v. Foster, 48 IJZont. 114, 119, 135 P. 993 (1913) ; Stace ex r e l . School D i s t r i c t No. 4 v. McGraw, 74 Mont. 152, 158, !YO P. 812 (1925); S t a t e v. Kearns, 79 Mont. 299, 257 P. 1002 (1327); Barth v. Ely, 85 Mont. 310, 322, 278 P. 1002 (1929); S t a t e v. Zorn, 99 Mont. 63, 68, 41 P.2d 513 (1935); S t a t e ex r e l . Walker v. Board of Commissioners, 120 Mont. 413, 187 P.2d Lu13 (1947). W e find no policy change i n Montana since t h e adoption 3i :ne L972 Constitution t h a t would j u s t i f y overruling t h e tfahaffay J ~ L ~ ~ L O I I . ive n o t e ?ere I S L I ~ ; ~ .'iorita~ld s l l d w IJrobdte Code, adop~ecl l i t e r t h e 1972 Montana Constitution, places the i d e n t i c a l r e s t r i c - t i o n on both married men and women a s t h a t imposed by s e c t i o n 41-102, R.C.M. 1947. The decision of t h e d i s t r i c t court is reversed. The Lause is remanded with d i r e c t i o n t o grant t h e p e t i t i o n . J u s t i c e s