Case Title: Gyugo v. Franklin County Board of Developmental Disabilities

Citation: 2017-Ohio-6953

Docket Number: 2016-0564

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2017-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Gyugo v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Dev. Disabilities, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-6953.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-6953 
GYUGO, APPELLANT, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Gyugo v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Dev. Disabilities, Slip Opinion 
No. 2017-Ohio-6953.] 
Sealing of records—R.C. 2953.33(B)—Questions explicitly requiring disclosure of 
sealed convictions on Department of Developmental Disabilities 
applications to renew registration as adult-services worker did not violate 
R.C. 2953.33(B) because questions were directly and substantially related 
to appellant’s position with appellee and his qualifications for adult-
services registration—Court of appeals’ judgment affirming appellant’s 
termination for dishonestly answering the questions affirmed. 
(No. 2016-0564—Submitted April 4, 2017—Decided July 27, 2017.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 15AP-150,  
2016-Ohio-823. 
_____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Michael Gyugo, challenges the termination of his 
employment by appellee, Franklin County Board of Developmental Disabilities 
(“board”), for his failures to disclose his sealed criminal conviction on an 
application for employment and on applications to renew his registration as an 
adult-services worker with the Ohio Department of Developmental Disabilities 
(“department”).  Gyugo maintains that he was not obligated to disclose his sealed 
conviction because the application questions that required disclosure of sealed 
convictions violated R.C. 2953.33(B). 
{¶ 2} In this opinion, we consider only the questions on the registration 
applications that explicitly required disclosure of sealed convictions.  We hold 
that those questions did not violate R.C. 2953.33(B) because the questions bore a 
direct and substantial relationship to Gyugo’s position with the board and to his 
qualifications for registration.  Like the court of appeals, we conclude that Gyugo 
was not excused from honestly answering those questions.  Gyugo not only failed 
to disclose his conviction when answering those questions on his applications to 
renew his adult-services registration; in each of the four registration applications, 
he affirmatively denied the existence of any conviction, even if sealed.  Those 
responses constitute dishonesty.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals, which affirmed Gyugo’s termination. 
Facts and procedural background 
{¶ 3} In 1992, an Ohio common pleas court entered an order pursuant to 
R.C. 2953.32(C)(2) to seal the record of Gyugo’s prior conviction for an offense 
that our record does not identify.  According to the parties’ stipulation to this 
court, the sealing order stated that the proceedings in the underlying criminal case 
were deemed not to have occurred, that the conviction was expunged, and that the 
records pertaining to the conviction would be confined to the specific uses set 
forth in R.C. 2953.32 and 2953.35 by the officials named in those statutes. 
January Term, 2017 
 
3
{¶ 4} In 1995, Gyugo applied for employment as a training specialist with 
the board.  The employment application asked whether Gyugo had ever been 
convicted of or pleaded guilty to (1) a felony under the Revised Code, (2) a crime 
under the Revised Code that is a first-degree misdemeanor on the first offense and 
a felony on subsequent offenses or (3) a substantially equivalent violation of an 
existing or former state or federal statute.  Gyugo answered “No” to each of the 
three questions.  The employment application informed Gyugo that he would be 
subjected to a criminal-background investigation if he came under final 
consideration for employment, but the investigation ultimately conducted into 
Gyugo’s criminal background did not reveal his sealed conviction. 
{¶ 5} From 1995 to 2013, the board employed Gyugo as a training 
specialist.  His duties included training and instructing employees with 
developmental disabilities in a vocational/habilitation setting, assisting employees 
with personal-care needs, and assisting with the development and implementation 
of training plans. 
{¶ 6} In 1995 and again in 2004, Gyugo acknowledged receipt of the 
board’s policy manual, which prescribed the terms and conditions of his 
employment.  The policy manual listed offenses that warranted discipline, up to 
and including termination, upon a first offense.  Offenses warranting termination 
upon a first offense included “giving false information or withholding pertinent 
information called for in making application for employment,” dishonesty, and 
failing to maintain registration required for the position. 
{¶ 7} Gyugo’s position required him to maintain registration with the 
department as an adult-services worker.  To that end, in 1996, 2000, 2004, and 
2008, Gyugo applied to renew his adult-services registration.  Each registration 
application asked whether Gyugo had ever been convicted of a felony or a 
misdemeanor other than a minor traffic offense and stated that he had to “answer 
this question even if the record of [his] conviction(s)” had been sealed or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
expunged.  The 2008 application also stated that he had to “answer this question * 
* * regardless of whether or not the conviction appears on a criminal background 
check.”  On each of the four registration applications, Gyugo answered “No” to 
the question. 
{¶ 8} The board first learned of Gyugo’s sealed conviction when it 
completed criminal-record checks on all its employees in 2013.  After affording 
Gyugo notice and a predisciplinary hearing, the board terminated Gyugo’s 
employment in October 2013 for “[d]ishonesty and other failure of good behavior, 
i.e., you misrepresented your past criminal record on the application for 
employment and on each of four applications for certification/registration 
required for your position.” 
{¶ 9} Gyugo appealed his termination to the State Personnel Board of 
Review (“SPBR”).  The administrative-law judge found that the registration-
application questions at issue were not improper.  She concluded that Gyugo’s 
belief that he was not required to disclose his sealed conviction on his 1995 
employment application was reasonable because that application did not refer to 
sealed or expunged records.  But she concluded that his reliance on that belief was 
unreasonable with respect to the registration applications, based on the wording of 
the application questions and the board’s policy manual.  She held that Gyugo’s 
failure to disclose his conviction on the registration applications constituted 
dishonesty and failure of good behavior sufficient to justify his termination.  The 
SPBR overruled Gyugo’s objections, adopted the administrative-law judge’s 
recommendation, and affirmed Gyugo’s termination. 
{¶ 10} Gyugo appealed to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 
which affirmed the SPBR’s order.  The Tenth District likewise affirmed, in a two-
to-one decision.  The majority rejected Gyugo’s argument that the application 
questions about prior convictions were impermissibly broad, and it held that at 
least his answer on the 2008 registration application “was plainly dishonest” “in 
January Term, 2017 
 
5
the face of clear language calling for him to disclose his sealed conviction 
regardless of criminal check results.”  2016-Ohio-823, 60 N.E.3d 715, ¶ 17, 23, 
26-27. 
{¶ 11} This court accepted Gyugo’s discretionary appeal.  146 Ohio St.3d 
1469, 2016-Ohio-5108, 54 N.E.3d 1268.  Gyugo submits the following 
proposition of law: 
 
An applicant with a criminal conviction that has been 
sealed pursuant to R.C. 2953.32 is not obliged to disclose it in 
response to an application question posed in violation of R.C. 
2953.33(B)(1) and may not be disciplined for declining to do so. 
 
{¶ 12} We reject the premise of Gyugo’s proposition.  We hold that the 
registration-application questions explicitly requiring disclosure of sealed 
convictions did not violate R.C. 2953.33(B)(1) and that the board could discipline 
Gyugo for failing to disclose his conviction when answering those questions on 
the applications that he submitted in 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008. 
Analysis 
{¶ 13} An appellate court reviews a common pleas court’s decision in an 
administrative appeal to determine whether the common pleas court abused its 
discretion in determining whether reliable, probative, and substantial evidence 
supports the administrative order.  Pons v. State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 
621, 614 N.E.2d 748 (1993).  But an appellate court exercises plenary review over 
questions of law, including questions of statutory interpretation, like those before 
us here.  State v. Straley, 139 Ohio St.3d 339, 2014-Ohio-2139, 11 N.E.3d 1175,  
¶ 9. 
{¶ 14} Our review in this appeal implicates a confusing array of statutes, 
including many that the General Assembly amended—in some cases, multiple 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
times—during the course of Gyugo’s employment by the board.  Because Gyugo 
premises his proposition of law on R.C. 2953.32 and 2953.33, we begin our 
analysis there. 
{¶ 15} When a court orders a criminal record sealed, the proceedings in 
the underlying case “shall be considered not to have occurred,” R.C. 
2953.32(C)(2), and the order restores the offender “to all rights and privileges not 
otherwise restored” by termination of the sentence or community-control sanction 
or final release on parole or postrelease control, R.C. 2953.33(A).  A sealed 
conviction is not permanently irretrievable, however; it is “shield[ed] from the 
public’s gaze,” but not for all purposes.  State v. Aguirre, 144 Ohio St.3d 179, 
2014-Ohio-4603, 41 N.E.3d 1178, ¶ 5, fn. 2.  For example, R.C. 2953.32(D)(8) 
authorizes the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (“BCI”) to 
inspect sealed records in order to provide information about an applicant for 
employment to a county board of developmental disabilities pursuant to R.C. 
109.57. 
{¶ 16} At all times relevant to this case, former R.C. 2953.33(B) (now 
R.C. 2953.33(B)(1)) limited application questions about sealed convictions: “In 
any application for employment, license, or other right or privilege * * *, a person 
may be questioned only with respect to convictions not sealed * * * unless the 
question bears a direct and substantial relationship to the position for which the 
person is being considered.”  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 490, 149 Ohio Laws, Part V, 
9484, 9739.  Importantly for our purposes, R.C. 2953.33(B) acknowledges that in 
certain circumstances—when questions directly and substantially relate to the 
position for which the applicant is being considered—applications may require 
the applicant to disclose any prior conviction, even if sealed.1 
                                          
 
1 R.C. 9.73(B), which took effect in March 2016, now prohibits public employers from including 
on an employment application any question concerning the applicant’s criminal history.  But that 
prohibition does not extend to applications for licensure, registration or other rights or privileges.  
January Term, 2017 
 
7
{¶ 17} We turn, next, to the relevant statutes and regulations that prescribe 
qualifications for employment by the board and, relatedly, govern registration 
with the department as an adult-services worker. 
{¶ 18} Prior to 2013, and subject to exceptions not relevant here, former 
R.C. 5126.28(E)(1) prohibited the board from employing a person who had been 
convicted of certain specified criminal offenses.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 694, 145 Ohio 
Laws, Part IV, 6924, 6998.2  And former R.C. 5126.28(E)(2) prohibited the board 
from employing a person who had been convicted of unspecified felonies that 
bore a direct and substantial relationship to the duties and responsibilities of the 
position.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 694, 145 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 6998. 
{¶ 19} During the period of Gyugo’s employment, the General Assembly 
enacted R.C. 5123.081(B)(2), which prohibits a county board of developmental 
disabilities from employing a person who has been convicted of a “disqualifying 
offense,” as defined in R.C. 5123.081(A)(4) and 109.572(A)(3)(a) through (e), 
except as provided by administrative rules.  Under the current statutes, 
“disqualifying offense” does not include a catch-all category for felonies that bear 
a direct and substantial relationship to the duties and responsibilities of the 
position. 
{¶ 20} When Gyugo applied for his position, former R.C. 5126.28(B) 
required the superintendent of a county board of developmental disabilities to 
request from BCI a criminal-records check of any applicant for employment.  
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 694, 145 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 6996.  Upon request for a 
criminal-records check pursuant to former R.C. 5126.28, former R.C. 
109.572(B)(1) required BCI to review all relevant information, including “any 
relevant information contained in records that have been sealed.”  Am.Sub.H.B. 
                                                                                                                   
R.C. 2953.33(B) therefore continues to govern questions about sealed convictions on those types 
of applications as well as on applications for private employment. 
2 Former R.C. 5126.28(E) was subsequently amended, but the General Assembly made no 
substantive changes relevant to this opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
No. 694, 145 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 6929.  Former R.C. 109.572(A)(1) required 
BCI to determine whether the applicant had been convicted of or pled guilty to 
any offense listed in R.C. 109.572(A)(1)(a) or a substantially equivalent offense.  
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 694, 145 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 6928-6929.  The list of 
offenses in R.C. 109.572(A)(1) mirrored the list of offenses in former R.C. 
5126.28(E)(1) that disqualified an applicant for employment by a county board of 
developmental disabilities.  Taken together, these provisions entitled a county 
board of developmental disabilities to information about an applicant’s sealed 
convictions for disqualifying offenses. 
{¶ 21} During the period of Gyugo’s employment, a training specialist 
employed by the board had to register as an adult-services worker with the 
department and maintain that registration as a condition of employment.  Each 
time Gyugo applied to renew his adult-services registration, former R.C. 
5126.25(D) and former Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04(D) required the department 
to deny a registration application or revoke registration if the applicant had been 
convicted of any of the offenses described in R.C. 5126.28(E) or Ohio Adm.Code 
5123:2-5-04(D) unless the applicant met the standards for rehabilitation 
established in the Ohio Administrative Code.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 694, 145 Ohio 
Laws, Part IV, at 6995;3 1995-1996 Ohio Monthly Record 1677, effective Jan. 12, 
1996.4  In former Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04, the department declared that a 
sealed conviction had to be disclosed because that information “b[ore] a direct 
and substantial relationship to any position” for which registration was required.  
Former Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04(I), 1995-1996 Ohio Monthly Record 1677; 
                                          
 
3 Former R.C. 5126.25 was subsequently amended, but the General Assembly made no substantive 
changes relevant to this opinion. 
4 Former Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04 was subsequently amended, but the department made no 
substantive changes relevant to this opinion.  See 2002-2003 Ohio Monthly Record 717-718, 
effective Oct. 10, 2002. 
January Term, 2017 
 
9
former Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04(J), 2002-2003 Ohio Monthly Record 718, 
effective Oct. 10, 2002. 
{¶ 22} Prior to July 25, 2013, former Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04(G) 
afforded applicants the opportunity to avoid disqualification by satisfying certain 
conditions to demonstrate rehabilitation.  1995-1996 Ohio Monthly Record 1677.  
If an applicant satisfied the rehabilitation conditions—one of which was that the 
record of the prior conviction had been sealed—the department could not deny or 
revoke registration based on the prior conviction.  Former Ohio Adm.Code 
5123:2-5-04(G)(4), 1996-1997 Ohio Monthly Record 1677; former Ohio 
Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04(G)(7), 2002-2003 Ohio Monthly Record 718.  Sealing 
alone did not establish rehabilitation; the applicant had to satisfy all the conditions 
listed in Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04(G) to avoid disqualification.  Former Ohio 
Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04(H), 1995-1996 Ohio Monthly Record 1677; former Ohio 
Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04(I), 2002-2003 Ohio Monthly Record 718. 
{¶ 23} Having reviewed the myriad statutes and regulations implicated 
here, we turn to their application in this case. 
The order sealing Gyugo’s conviction does not negate disqualifications under 
R.C. 5123.081 and former R.C. 5126.28 
{¶ 24} Gyugo stipulates that his sealed conviction was for an offense that 
is currently listed in R.C. 109.572(A)(3)(a) and that was listed in former R.C. 
109.572(A)(1)(a) when he applied for his position with the board.  Gyugo’s prior 
offense was therefore also listed in former R.C. 5126.28(E)(1) as a disqualifying 
conviction when he applied for his position with the board.  Gyugo admits that his 
conviction—had it not been sealed—would have disqualified him from 
employment with the board.  But he argues that the order sealing his conviction 
removed that disqualification and that the statutory disqualifications from 
employment apply only with respect to unsealed convictions.  We disagree. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
{¶ 25} First, Gyugo’s argument is contrary to the plain language of R.C. 
2953.33(B), which itself permits application questions about sealed convictions if 
the questions bear a direct and substantial relationship to the position sought.  
Additionally, the requirement in former R.C. 5126.28(B) that a county board of 
developmental disabilities obtain information from BCI about an applicant’s 
criminal record, including information in sealed records, as part of its evaluation 
of the applicant’s qualifications shows that a disqualifying conviction could be 
relevant even though the record had been sealed.  And finally, the rehabilitation 
provisions in former Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04(G) likewise show that an order 
sealing the record of a prior conviction did not, by itself, preclude 
disqualification.  If sealing alone were sufficient to remove the disqualifying 
nature of an applicant’s prior conviction, the remaining rehabilitation conditions 
listed in former Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04(G), which Gyugo does not claim to 
have satisfied, would have been meaningless. 
Questions explicitly requiring disclosure of sealed convictions on the registration 
applications bore a direct and substantial relationship to Gyugo’s position and 
adult-services registration 
{¶ 26} The prior-conviction questions on all four of Gyugo’s applications 
to renew his adult-services registration stated that he had to disclose sealed 
convictions.  Regardless of any belief on his part that the 1992 sealing order 
precluded questions about his prior conviction, Gyugo failed to disclose on the 
registration applications that he had a prior conviction.  The issue becomes 
whether the department was entitled to ask those questions.  See 2016-Ohio-823, 
60 N.E.3d 715, at ¶ 18.  We conclude that it was. 
{¶ 27} R.C. 2953.33(B) permits application questions about sealed 
convictions if the questions are directly and substantially related to the position 
for which the applicant is being considered.  Review of the statutes and 
regulations governing employment by a county board of developmental 
January Term, 2017 
 
11 
disabilities and adult-services registration with the department compels the 
conclusion that the prior-conviction questions explicitly requiring disclosure of 
sealed convictions bore a direct and substantial relationship to Gyugo’s position 
and adult-services registration. 
{¶ 28} Subject to the rehabilitation provisions in former Ohio Adm.Code 
5123:2-5-04(G), former R.C. 5126.25(D) prohibited the department from granting 
or renewing adult-services registration if the applicant had a conviction for an 
offense described in R.C. 5126.28(E), and former Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-5-
04(D) prohibited the department from granting or renewing adult-services 
registration if the applicant had a conviction for an offense described in Ohio 
Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04(D)(1) through (4).  At all times relevant to this case, the 
offenses described in former R.C. 5126.28(E)(2) and former Ohio Adm.Code 
5123:2-5-04(D)(2) included an Ohio felony that bore a direct and substantial 
relationship to the position for which the applicant was being considered or for 
which registration with the department was required.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 269, 146 
Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10752, 11090-11091; 1995-1996 Ohio Monthly Record 
1677.  And the rules that governed the grant or renewal of adult-services 
registration expressly stated that sealed convictions bore a direct and substantial 
relationship to any position for which certification and registration were required.  
Former Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04(I), 1995-1996 Ohio Monthly Record 1677; 
former Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04(J), 2002-2003 Ohio Monthly Record 718. 
{¶ 29} Former Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04(D)(2) left to the department 
the task of determining whether an unlisted felony offense bore a direct and 
substantial relationship to the position for which registration was required.  
Relevant factors included the duties and responsibilities of the position, the nature 
and seriousness of the offense, the circumstances surrounding the offense, the 
victim’s characteristics, the applicant’s participation in the offense, and the extent 
to which the position would provide an opportunity for the commission of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
same or a similar offense.  Former Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-5-04(F), 1995-1996 
Ohio Monthly Record 1677. 
{¶ 30} Consistently with the dissenting opinion from the Tenth District, 
Gyugo argues that the registration-application questions at issue here violated 
R.C. 2953.33(B) because they did not list the offenses the department deemed to 
bear a direct and substantial relationship to his position.  In support, Gyugo cites 
the 2008 revisions to R.C. 2953.33(B), 2008 Sub.H.B. No. 428.  The 2008 version 
of the statute limited questions about sealed convictions to application questions 
that bear a direct and substantial relationship to the position for which the 
applicant is being considered “except as provided * * * in [R.C.] 3319.292.”  Id.  
R.C. 3319.292 states as follows: 
 
The state board of education and the department of 
education may question an applicant for issuance or renewal of any 
license with respect to any criminal offense committed or alleged 
to have been committed by the applicant.  If the record of a 
conviction * * * has been sealed or expunged, the state board and 
the department need not assert or demonstrate that its questioning 
with respect to the offense bears a direct and substantial 
relationship to the issuance or renewal of the license or to the 
position in which the applicant will work under the license. 
 
Gyugo argues that R.C. 2953.33(B)’s incorporation of that statute demonstrates 
that a board or agency other than the Department of Education or the State Board 
of Education must affirmatively assert in an application that questions about 
sealed convictions bear a direct and substantial relationship to the position or 
license sought.  We disagree. 
January Term, 2017 
 
13 
{¶ 31} The exclusion of the Department of Education and the State Board 
of Education from R.C. 2953.33(B)’s limits says nothing about the obligations of 
agencies that are subject to those limits.  The second above-quoted sentence of 
R.C. 3319.292 simply clarifies the first sentence: the Department of Education 
and the State Board of Education are not restricted in their questioning by the 
direct-and-substantial-relationship test.  Other boards or agencies may have to 
defend the relationship between application questions and a particular position, if 
challenged.  But neither R.C. 3319.292 nor its incorporation as an exception in 
R.C. 2953.33(B) suggests that those other boards and agencies must affirmatively 
demonstrate the required relationship on the application itself. 
{¶ 32} Gyugo’s proposed requirement that application questions about 
sealed convictions specifically list all sufficiently related offenses is contrary to 
the department’s statutory and regulatory discretion.  The department was not able 
to list every offense that might be directly and substantially related to the position 
because, in light of its fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis, a particular offense 
might be sufficiently related to require disqualification in some circumstances but 
not in others. 
{¶ 33} Gyugo’s argument also disregards the difference between the 
relationships required by R.C. 2953.33(B) and those required by former R.C. 
5126.28(E)(2).  The issue under R.C. 2953.33(B) is whether the application 
questions bear a direct and substantial relationship to his position, but the issue 
under former R.C. 5126.28(E)(2) was whether a prior offense bore a direct and 
substantial relationship to the position.  Some Ohio courts have addressed the 
relationship between a prior offense and the position sought when applying R.C. 
2953.33(B).  See Kistler v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 
04AP-1095 and 04AP-1100, 2006-Ohio-3308, ¶ 39 (conviction for conspiring to 
defraud insurance companies by submitting false and inflated medical bills was 
directly and substantially related to certification to provide medical services to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
injured employees and to bill for those services); State v. Bissantz, 40 Ohio St.3d 
112, 115, 532 N.E.2d 126 (1988) (bribery-in-office conviction bore a direct and 
substantial relationship to the privilege of holding public office).  But while a 
direct and substantial relationship between a prior offense and the position sought 
may satisfy R.C. 2953.33(B) by also demonstrating that application questions 
about the prior offense are also directly and substantially related to the position, 
R.C. 2953.33(B) does not require the former relationship. 
{¶ 34} We think Kistler is instructive.  There, a Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation (“BWC”) regulation prohibited certification of a healthcare 
provider for participation in the Health-Partnership Program (“HPP”) if the 
provider had a “ ‘history of a felony conviction in any jurisdiction’ ” or “ ‘a 
conviction for an act involving dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation.’ ”  Kistler 
at ¶ 3, quoting former Ohio Adm.Code 4123-6-022(B).  Kistler disclosed his 1981 
Florida felony conviction for conspiring to defraud insurance companies on his 
application for certification in 1996 and his application for recertification in 2002, 
but the BWC nevertheless granted both applications, certifying him as an HPP 
provider.  In 2003, however, the BWC revoked Kistler’s certification due to the 
Florida conviction. 
{¶ 35} Kistler challenged the revocation, arguing that the BWC could not 
consider his Florida conviction because the records of the conviction had been 
sealed pursuant to R.C. 2953.32.  The Tenth District rejected that argument and 
instead applied the exception in R.C. 2953.33(B) for questions that bear a direct 
and substantial relationship to the position for which the person is being 
considered.  It held that revocation was proper because the BWC regulation 
“absolutely prohibits physicians who have certain convictions from certification 
as a[n] HPP provider.”  Kistler at ¶ 27.  Although Kistler’s prior offense bore a 
direct and substantial relationship to certification as an HPP provider, id. at ¶ 41, 
the Tenth District’s opinion affirms that application questions about sealed 
January Term, 2017 
 
15 
convictions are directly and substantially related to determining the applicability 
of a statutory disqualification as the result of a prior offense.  We agree. 
{¶ 36} Here, we conclude that the prior-conviction application questions 
explicitly requiring disclosure of sealed convictions bore a direct and substantial 
relationship to Gyugo’s position, for which registration as an adult-services 
worker was required.  Determination of both Gyugo’s qualifications for 
employment by the board and qualifications for the required adult-services 
registration involved consideration of Gyugo’s criminal history, including any 
convictions that had been sealed.  Therefore, the application questions were 
directly and substantially related to Gyugo’s position as a training specialist and 
registration as an adult-services worker. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 37} The prior-conviction questions explicitly requiring disclosure of 
sealed convictions on Gyugo’s applications to renew his adult-services 
registration did not violate R.C. 2953.33(B) because the questions were directly 
and substantially related to his position and his qualifications for adult-services 
registration.  Gyugo was therefore not excused from disclosing his sealed 
conviction in response to those questions.  His failure to disclose his conviction, 
despite an express requirement to do so, supports the board’s decision to 
terminate Gyugo’s employment.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, O’NEILL, FISCHER, and 
DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
McFadden & Winner, Mary Jane McFadden, and Joseph C. Winner, for 
appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Denise L. 
DePalma, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Russell S. Bensing, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, and Ryan Harmanis, Deputy 
Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae state of Ohio. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Anne Marie Sferra, and Jill K. Bigler, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association of County Boards of 
Developmental Disabilities. 
_________________