Case Title: Shelly Materials, Inc v. City of Streetsboro Planning & Zoning Commission

Citation: 2019-Ohio-4499

Docket Number: 2018-0237

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2019-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Shelly Materials, Inc. v. Streetsboro Planning & Zoning Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-
4499.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-4499 
SHELLY MATERIALS, INC., APPELLANT, v. THE CITY OF STREETSBORO 
PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Shelly Materials, Inc. v. Streetsboro Planning & Zoning 
Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4499.] 
Zoning—Surface mining as a permitted conditional use—Administrative appeals—
R.C. 2506.04—Standard of review applicable to court of appeals’ review of 
decision of common pleas court in R.C. Chapter 2506 administrative 
appeal—Court of appeals in an administrative appeal may not reweigh the 
evidence. 
(No. 2018-0237—Submitted March 26, 2019—Decided November 5, 2019) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Portage County, No. 2017-P-0025, 
2017-Ohio-9342. 
__________________ 
 
STEWART, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 1} The questions raised in this appeal concern the scope of review 
conducted by a court of appeals in an R.C. Chapter 2506 administrative appeal.  For 
the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Eleventh District Court of Appeals 
exceeded its scope of review in this case and we accordingly reverse the judgment 
of the court of appeals and remand the cause to that court for further consideration 
consistent with this opinion. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Shelly Materials, Inc. (“Shelly”), entered into a mineral-
rights lease in 2015 for an approximately 225-acre horse-farm property, commonly 
called Sahbra Farms, located in the city of Streetsboro (“the city”).  The property 
is zoned “R-R, Rural Residential District,” and at the time, surface mining was 
allowed as a conditional use in a rural-residential district upon the approval of an 
application for a conditional-use permit.  Shelly leased the mineral rights of the 
Sahbra Farms land to engage in surface mining of sand and gravel.  When Shelly 
entered into the lease, surface mining had been conducted on an adjacent property 
by a different company for a number of years as a permitted conditional use. 
{¶ 3} Some city residents became aware of Shelly’s plan to convert the 
horse farm into a mining operation and, under the name “Stop Sahbra Dig,” 
submitted an application to amend the city’s zoning code to remove surface mining 
as a conditional use in all districts where it was permitted, including in a rural-
residential district.  The city’s planning and zoning director, an appellee in this 
case,1 agreed with the residents and recommended to appellee Streetsboro Planning 
and Zoning Commission that surface mining no longer be permitted as a conditional 
use in any district.  The commission then recommended that Streetsboro City 
Council pass an ordinance to remove surface mining from the zoning code, and city 
council eventually voted to do so.  But because Shelly filed its application for a 
                                                 
1.  The third appellee in this case is the city’s zoning inspector. 
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conditional-use permit to engage in surface mining before the ordinance took effect, 
the parties agree that the ordinance amending the zoning code may not be applied 
retroactively in this case. 
{¶ 4} The commission conducted three hearings on Shelly’s application, 
after which it unanimously issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law 
ultimately determining that “Shelly did not establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that Shelly’s proposed conditional use met the relevant standards outlined 
in the Streetsboro Codified Ordinances necessary for the issuance of a conditional 
use permit.”  Streetsboro Codified Ordinance 1153.03 sets forth the requirements 
an applicant must meet to obtain a conditional-use permit: 
 
 
(a) The applicant shall be required to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that the general standards of this Zoning 
Ordinance and this Chapter and the specific standards pertinent to 
each proposed use shall be met for the proposed use provided further 
that any requirements of this Zoning Ordinance for permitted use(s) 
within a district shall be applicable to any conditional use unless 
otherwise stated herein. 
 
(b) The Planning and Zoning Commission shall determine if 
the proposed use complies with these regulations and shall insure 
[sic] that the specific standards and requirements of this Zoning 
Ordinance pertinent to the proposed use shall be satisfied. 
 
(c) General Standards.  The Planning and Zoning 
Commission shall review the particular facts and circumstances of 
each proposed use in terms of the following standards and shall find 
adequate evidence showing that such use of the proposed location: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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(1) Will be harmonious with and in accordance with the 
general objectives or with any specific objective of the Streetsboro 
Development Policy Plan of current adoption; 
 
(2) Will be designed, constructed, operated and maintained 
so as to be harmonious and appropriate in appearance with the 
existing or intended character of the general vicinity and that such 
use will not change the essential character of the same area; 
 
(3) Will not be hazardous or disturbing to existing or future 
neighboring uses; 
 
(4) Will not be detrimental to property in the immediate 
vicinity or to the community as a whole; 
 
(5) Will be served adequately by essential public facilities 
and services such as highways, streets, police and fire protection, 
drainage structures, refuse disposal, and school; or that the persons 
or agencies responsible for the establishment of the proposed use 
shall be able to provide adequately any such service[;] 
 
(6) Will have vehicular approaches to the property which 
shall be so designed as not to create an interference with traffic on 
surrounding public streets or roads. 
 
(Underlining sic.) 
{¶ 5} Among other conclusions, the commission stated that “Shelly’s 
proposed use would be detrimental to the properties in the immediate vicinity as a 
whole and, thus, constitute[s] a substantial negative effect on neighboring property 
values.”  In reaching this conclusion, the commission rejected an opinion offered 
by Shelly’s certified real-estate appraiser that surface mining would not adversely 
affect the value of property located near the proposed surface mine, concluding that 
the appraiser’s analysis was flawed because it contained “incongruent real estate 
January Term, 2019 
 
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comparisons.”  The commission also stated that the appraiser’s testimony “showed 
that the value of four out of five homes in Streetsboro would likely suffer if Shelly’s 
proposed use were to operate in its proposed location.” 
{¶ 6} Shelly filed an R.C. Chapter 2506 appeal in the Portage County Court 
of Common Pleas.  The court referred the case to a magistrate, who issued a 
decision that contained findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The magistrate 
concluded that the commission had made its determinations under the provisions 
of the zoning code not based on admissible and probative evidence but on 
subjective public-opinion comments that property values near the proposed use 
would be adversely impacted.  The magistrate concluded that Shelly had offered 
“evidence” in the form of the opinion and report of a certified real-estate appraiser, 
while the commission had relied only on what the magistrate characterized as 
“unsubstantiated speculation about detrimental impact on property values” from 
sources that included nonexpert testimony from the city’s planning and zoning 
director.  With the city having offered no “competent testimony from a witness 
qualified to render opinions about property values,” the magistrate concluded that 
the city planning and zoning director’s “unsubstantiated speculation is outweighed 
by the evidence from [Shelly’s appraiser] as a matter of law.”  The magistrate 
further ultimately determined that Shelly had carried its burden of proof as to all 
six requirements in Streetsboro Codified Ordinance 1153.03(c). 
{¶ 7} The court of common pleas adopted the magistrate’s decision over the 
city’s objections, concluding that the commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
by denying Shelly’s application for a conditional-use permit.  The court held that 
the commission’s denial of the application “is unsupported by the preponderance 
of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.”  The court also determined that the 
commission’s denial of the application was “arbitrary and capricious,” because the 
commission had reviewed it in light of the city’s recent zoning change to prohibit 
surface mining.  The court stated that it was “probable” that the application “would 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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not have ever been approved, given the prevailing position of the City and residents 
that surface mining is not in keeping with the Master Plan,” even though the city 
“had the opportunity for nearly two years” prior to the filing of the application to 
amend the zoning code to remove surface mining as a conditional use.  (Emphasis 
sic.)  The court of common pleas thus determined that “[t]he underlying motivation 
to deny the conditional use application emerges as a desire to deny all surface 
mining as a conditional use, rather than because [Shelly] failed to satisfy the 
standards set forth in” the city’s zoning code. 
{¶ 8} A divided panel of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed 
the judgment of the court of common pleas.  The majority found the issue regarding 
the fourth of the city zoning code’s six criteria for granting a conditional-use 
permit—whether Shelly’s proposed use would be detrimental to property in the 
immediate vicinity or to the community as a whole, Streetsboro Codified Ordinance 
1153.03(c)(4)—to be “dispositive,” 2017-Ohio-9342, 104 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 32 (11th 
Dist.), and it accordingly did not address any other “separate issues” asserted in the 
appeal, id. at ¶ 15, including arguments that the commission had correctly 
determined that Shelly had failed to satisfy other provisions of Streetsboro Codified 
Ordinance 1153.03(c) and additional arguments that went to other matters. 
{¶ 9} After acknowledging that Shelly’s expert “had 30 years of experience 
as an appraiser and had submitted a 76-page report in support of his opinion,” id. 
at ¶ 33, the majority nonetheless decided that the commission could have justifiably 
concluded that Shelly’s expert lacked credibility, because he had “acknowledged 
that the comparison properties utilized to form his opinion were further away from 
the surface mine than the properties at issue,” id. at ¶ 36.  In addition, the majority 
stated that the expert had “acknowledged that some of the properties in the 
comparison group were probably separated from mining operations by natural 
buffers, such as woods, furthering [sic] distinguishing the comparison properties 
from the properties at issue.”  Id.  After concluding that the commission had been 
January Term, 2019 
 
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justifiably entitled to reject the expert’s opinion, the majority held that Shelly had 
failed to carry its burden to obtain the conditional-use permit.  Id. at ¶ 37. 
{¶ 10} We accepted jurisdiction over Shelly’s appeal, 152 Ohio St.3d 1478, 
2018-Ohio-1990, 98 N.E.3d 294, to consider three propositions of law: 
 
 
1.  An administrative decision that is unconstitutional, 
illegal, arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, cannot be affirmed 
simply because it is supported by the preponderance of the evidence, 
nor can an unsupported decision be affirmed simply because it is not 
illegal or arbitrary; rather, a common pleas court must reverse if it 
finds any one of the statutory grounds for reversal of an 
administrative decision. 
 
2.  It is the proper function of the court of common pleas in 
an appeal under Ohio Revised Code 2506.01 to evaluate the 
character of evidence to determine if it was “substantial, reliable, 
and probative.” 
 
3.  It is not the function of a court of appeals in an appeal 
under Ohio Revised Code 2506.01 to review the common pleas 
court’s judgment de novo, but its review under R.C. 2506.04 is 
limited to “questions of law.”  R.C. 2506.04. 
 
Analysis 
{¶ 11} Shelly’s principal argument is that the court of appeals exceeded the 
narrow scope of its review and conducted a de novo review of the commission’s 
findings by substituting its judgment for that of the common pleas court with 
respect to the “dispositive” issue—whether the commission erred by finding that 
Shelly’s expert lacked credibility. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 12} Decisions of administrative agencies are directly appealable to a 
court of common pleas.  A common pleas court has jurisdiction to review final 
orders issued by “any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, 
department, or other division of any political subdivision of the state.”  R.C. 
2506.01(A).  Acting as an appellate court, the common pleas court “may find that 
the order, adjudication, or decision is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, 
unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and 
probative evidence on the whole record.”  R.C. 2506.04.  These grounds for reversal 
are set forth in a disjunctive list, so each ground must be read to have a distinct 
meaning.  See Freedom Rd. Found. v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control, 80 Ohio St.3d 
202, 205, 685 N.E.2d 522 (1997).  The presence of any one of the six grounds listed 
in R.C. 2506.04 will therefore by itself justify a court of common pleas’ reversal of 
an administrative order. 
{¶ 13} We have said that the scope of review for a common pleas court in 
an R.C. Chapter 2506 administrative appeal is not de novo but that the appeal “ 
‘often in fact resembles a de novo proceeding.’ ”  Kisil v. Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d 
30, 34, 465 N.E.2d 848 (1984), quoting Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Glendale, 42 Ohio 
St.2d 368, 370, 328 N.E.2d 808 (1975).  “The court weighs the evidence to 
determine whether a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence 
supports the administrative decision, and if it does, the court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of” the administrative agency.  Independence v. Office of the 
Cuyahoga Cty. Executive, 142 Ohio St.3d 125, 2014-Ohio-4650, 28 N.E.3d 1182, 
¶ 13.  The court of common pleas may not “blatantly substitute its judgment for 
that of the agency, especially in areas of administrative expertise.”  Dudukovich v. 
Lorain Metro. Hous. Auth., 58 Ohio St.2d 202, 207, 389 N.E.2d 1113 (1979).  
Nevertheless, the court of common pleas has “the power to examine the whole 
record, make factual and legal determinations, and reverse the [administrative 
agency’s] decision if it is not supported by a preponderance of substantial, reliable, 
January Term, 2019 
 
9
and probative evidence.”  Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning 
Appeals, 141 Ohio St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, 23 N.E.3d 1161, ¶ 24, citing 
Dudukovich at 207. 
{¶ 14} When considering Shelly’s application for a conditional-use permit, 
the commission reviewed the standards set forth in Streetsboro Codified Ordinance 
1153.03(c), including that the conditional use “[w]ill not be detrimental to property 
in the immediate vicinity or to the community as a whole,” Streetsboro Codified 
Ordinance 1153.03(c)(4).  Addressing this standard, the commission determined 
that “[t]he appraisal data offered by Shelly’s real estate appraiser did not reflect a 
valid comparison between the subject property and neighboring properties and the 
properties used in the appraiser’s report.”  For this reason, the commission 
concluded that “Shelly’s real estate appraiser’s testimony was flawed and contained 
incongruent real estate comparisons” and that the “appraiser’s testimony showed 
that the value of four out of five homes in Streetsboro would likely suffer if Shelly’s 
proposed use were to operate in its proposed location.” 
{¶ 15} The court of common pleas determined that the commission had 
erroneously focused on the expert’s sales data for particular houses, as opposed to 
his opinion that surface-mining operations would have no adverse effect on 
property values for the community as a whole.  The court, quoting Streetsboro 
Codified Ordinance 1153.03(c)(4), stated that “the proper test is not the 
unsubstantiated speculation regarding the sale of any particular house; the test is 
whether the use will be ‘detrimental to property in the immediate vicinity or to the 
community as a whole.’ ”  In considering the impact that Shelly’s mining 
operations would have on the community as a whole, Shelly’s expert testified 
before the commission that he had found no recent sales that he could use for 
comparison that involved houses adjacent to property where mining operations 
were currently being conducted on land that had shortly before been used for a 
farm-type purpose.  For that reason, he expanded his analysis to cover 12 house 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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sales that had occurred since 2014 in the city and two neighboring townships that 
also had active surface-mining operations, stating that all of the houses were in 
relatively “close proximity” to nearby mining operations.  The expert testified that 
he had employed a methodology in which he “analyzed a distance from an existing 
ongoing gravel and sand operation to the actual property that sold and tried to 
analyze those particular sales to the average sales in the local neighborhood to see 
if there’s any measurable effect.”  After comparing 24 indicators, the expert in his 
appraisal report concluded that “the majority of indicators show no effect for being 
near an active gravel quarry.  It is possible that unique locations of a residential 
property could be impacted by gravel extraction activities, but as a whole general 
property values show limited effect based on close proximity.”  The expert thus 
concluded that there was “little to no conclusive evidence” to show that sales of 
property in close proximity to surface-mining operations were adversely affected. 
{¶ 16} The city’s planning and zoning director, who by his own admission 
was “not an appraiser,” testified before the commission that Shelly’s application 
should be denied, in part because of the proposed mining operation’s effect on 
property values.  The director stated his opinion that there were “shortcomings” in 
Shelly’s expert appraiser’s analysis and explained what he viewed those 
shortcomings to be.  The court of common pleas concluded that the planning and 
zoning director was not qualified to render an opinion about property appraisals 
and that the director’s “unsubstantiated speculation is outweighed by the evidence 
from [Shelly’s expert] as a matter law.” 
{¶ 17} A party who disagrees with a decision of a court of common pleas 
in an R.C. Chapter 2506 administrative appeal may appeal that decision to the court 
of appeals but only on “questions of law.”  R.C. 2506.04.  For this reason, we have 
stated that under R.C. 2506.04, an appeal to the court of appeals is “more limited 
in scope” than was the appeal to the court of common pleas.  Kisil, 12 Ohio St.3d 
at 34, 465 N.E.2d 848; see id. at 34, fn. 4.  While the court of common pleas is 
January Term, 2019 
 
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required to examine the evidence, the court of appeals may not weigh the evidence.  
Independence, 142 Ohio St.3d 125, 2014-Ohio-4650, 28 N.E.3d 1182, at ¶ 14.  
Apart from deciding purely legal issues, the court of appeals can determine whether 
the court of common pleas abused its discretion, which in this context means 
reviewing whether the lower court abused its discretion in deciding that an 
administrative order was or was not supported by reliable, probative, and 
substantial evidence.  Boice v. Ottawa Hills, 137 Ohio St.3d 412, 2013-Ohio-4769, 
999 N.E.2d 649, ¶ 7, citing Kisil at 34. 
{¶ 18} The Eleventh District reversed the judgment of the court of common 
pleas on the grounds that the commission had a justifiable reason to reject Shelly’s 
expert’s opinion, because “the comparison properties utilized to form his opinion 
were further away from the surface mine than the properties at issue.”  2017-Ohio-
9342, 104 N.E.3d 1, at ¶ 36.  This was not a question of law for the court of appeals 
to decide in an administrative appeal under R.C. 2506.04; it was a question 
concerning the weight of the evidence to be given to the expert’s opinion. 
{¶ 19} The Eleventh District concluded that Shelly’s expert’s failure to use 
appropriate comparables when offering his opinion that Shelly’s operations would 
not be detrimental to property in the immediate vicinity was, in essence, a complete 
failure of proof pursuant to Streetsboro Codified Ordinance 1153.03(c)(4).  Experts 
are not required to give precise opinions, but an expert’s opinion is normally offered 
to a reasonable degree of certainty within the expert’s field.  See State v. Beasley, 
153 Ohio St.3d 497, 2018-Ohio-493, 108 N.E.3d 1028, ¶ 162.  To be sure, an 
expert’s opinion may not be based on “mere possibility or speculation,” id., but 
when an expert’s opinion on the value of real estate is based on “comparables” 
because there is no recent arms-length sale of the property in question, the appraisal 
will be based on a professional’s judgment that the property will sell for a price 
consistent with prices for similar and similarly situated properties.  Absolute 
certainty in land appraisals is not required, nor is it even possible, in most cases.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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United States v. Glanat Realty Corp., 276 F.2d 264, 266 (2d Cir.1960) (“the 
decisions are full of expressions recognizing that land value almost always depends 
upon the hypothetical opinions of those generally familiar with transactions in the 
neighborhood”). 
{¶ 20} In fact, at least one commission member during one of the hearings 
before the commission acknowledged the difficulty of obtaining direct comparisons 
of houses for purposes of appraisal when he questioned Shelly’s expert appraiser: 
 
 
[Commission member:]  Did you find any comps at all—I 
grant you this would probably be very difficult—where you had 
property that was not already adjacent to a surface mine but rather 
was adjacent to a very pastoral, horse-farmish looking land and then 
became a surface mine and what would happen to the value of those 
farms? 
 
[Shelly’s expert:]  Unfortunately not.  I could not find— 
 
[Commission member:]  That’s nearly impossible, I grant 
you. 
 
{¶ 21} Given that the lack of comparable properties near the location of the 
proposed surface mine made it difficult to ascertain whether mining operations 
would be detrimental to property in the immediate vicinity, the opinion of an expert 
appraiser was important.  No objections were made to Shelly’s expert’s 
qualifications to render an opinion, so the validity of his appraisal was ultimately a 
matter of credibility for the commission to determine.  See Kokitka v. Ford Motor 
Co., 73 Ohio St.3d 89, 92, 652 N.E.2d 671 (1995).  The court of common pleas, 
acting within the scope of its review under R.C. Chapter 2506, weighed the expert’s 
opinion differently than the commission.  The court of appeals had no authority to 
second-guess the decision of the court of common pleas on questions going to the 
January Term, 2019 
 
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weight of the evidence supporting the commission’s findings.  We accordingly 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals on the only issue it addressed. 
{¶ 22} The dissenting opinion criticizes us for not addressing the court of 
appeals’ holding that that the trial court erred by putting the burden of proof on the 
wrong party.  No additional discussion is necessary—in its decision adopting the 
magistrate’s decision, the trial court stated: 
 
 
A review of the record indicates that [Shelly] presented clear 
and convincing evidence during the Commission hearings relative 
to the general standards, the specific standards as to surface mining, 
and the specific objectives of the Master Plan.  The Court finds that 
the Commission’s decision to deny the conditional use application 
is unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and 
probative evidence. 
 
{¶ 23} Without question, the trial court properly recognized that Shelly had 
the burden of proving its entitlement to the conditional-use permit by clear and 
convincing evidence and that it had met that burden of proof.  Indeed, the court of 
appeals recognized the same thing, stating that “[t]he flaw is that the magistrate 
fails to recognize that [Shelly] has the burden, and provided [the expert’s] 
testimony lacks credibility, [Shelly] fails” (emphasis added), 2017-Ohio-9342, 104 
N.E.3d 1, at ¶ 34.  The court of appeals thus recognized that if the expert’s testimony 
was credible, Shelly would have carried its burden of proof. 
{¶ 24} The dissent also asserts that the magistrate did not use the correct 
standard of review and that the trial court’s “conclusory recitation of the zoning 
ordinance’s requirements” cannot “magically turn the magistrate’s obvious 
application of the wrong legal standard into something that passes legal muster.”  
Dissenting opinion at ¶ 38.  This assertion improperly elevates a magistrate’s 
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decision over a judgment issued by a trial judge.  “Civ.R. 53 places upon the court 
the ultimate authority and responsibility over the [magistrate’s] findings and 
rulings.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 5, 615 N.E.2d 617 
(1993).  Thus, we have held that a trial court “has the responsibility to critically 
review and verify to its own satisfaction the correctness of [a magistrate’s 
decision].”  Normandy Place Assocs. v. Beyer, 2 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 443 N.E.2d 
161 (1982).  It is for this reason that Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b) gives the trial court the 
authority to “adopt or reject a magistrate’s decision in whole or in part, with or 
without modification.”  And we emphasize that a magistrate’s decision is not 
effective “unless adopted by the court.”  Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(a).  To assert that the 
magistrate erred is to create a straw man: it makes no difference if the magistrate 
used the wrong standard of review; what is important is that the trial court used the 
correct standard of review. 
{¶ 25} The Eleventh District determined that its resolution of the issue 
regarding Streetsboro Codified Ordinance 1153.03(c)(4) was dispositive of the 
appeal, obviating the need for it to consider any of the various other issues raised 
by the commission and the two city officials in their appeal from the decision of 
the court of common pleas.  Because those issues that were not addressed should 
be resolved by the Eleventh District in the first instance, we remand this cause to 
the court of appeals for further consideration consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
KENNEDY and DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O’CONNOR, C.J., and 
ZIMMERMAN, J. 
WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN, J., of the Third District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
FRENCH, J. 
January Term, 2019 
 
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_________________ 
DEWINE, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 26} Let’s review what happened here.  The City of Streetsboro passed an 
ordinance allowing surface mines if the mine operator can show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the mine will satisfy certain standards.  Among those 
standards is that the mine “[w]ill not be detrimental to property in the immediate 
vicinity or to the community as a whole.”  The Streetsboro Planning and Zoning 
Commission reviewed an application for a conditional-use permit and found that 
the company failed to meet this burden.  But the court of common pleas overturned 
the commission’s decision on the grounds that the commission had not provided 
sufficient evidence justifying its rejection of the application.  And the court of 
appeals reversed, rightly noting that this put the burden on the wrong party, and 
reinstated the commission’s decision. 
{¶ 27} Nevertheless, a majority of this court today reverses the court of 
appeals.  In doing so, the lead opinion neither analyzes whether Shelly Materials 
provided clear and convincing evidence that it satisfied the ordinance’s 
requirements nor addresses the failure of the trial court to actually apply that 
standard.  Instead, the lead opinion asserts that the obvious error in the magistrate’s 
analysis—which was adopted by the court of common pleas—can be ignored 
because of the trial court’s conclusory recitation of the proper standard of review 
under the zoning ordinance.  In short, the lead opinion disregards the evidentiary 
standard in the city ordinance that the commission was lawfully required to apply.  
It thereby effectively robs Streetsboro of the right to set the standards for granting 
a conditional-use permit. 
The court of common pleas did not apply the right standard in reviewing the 
commission’s decision 
{¶ 28} The determinative question in this case is what standard the court of 
common pleas should have applied in reviewing the commission’s decision.  On 
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review of an administrative agency’s decision under R.C. 2506.04, “the Court of 
Common Pleas must weigh the evidence in the record, and whatever additional 
evidence may be admitted pursuant to R.C. 2506.03, to determine whether there 
exists a preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial evidence to support the 
agency decision.”  Dudukovich v. Lorain Metro. Hous. Auth., 58 Ohio St.2d 202, 
207, 389 N.E.2d 1113 (1979). 
{¶ 29} A complicating feature here is that the zoning ordinance imposes a 
“clear and convincing” evidentiary standard.  That is, under the ordinance, an 
applicant must provide clear and convincing evidence that the proposed use will 
satisfy each of six requirements.  Streetsboro Codified Ordinance 1153.03.  The 
commission is legally bound to apply the terms of the zoning ordinance, including 
any evidentiary standard contained therein.  Hence, if a reviewing court is to assess 
the commission’s decision, as required by R.C. 2506.04, it must ask whether the 
commission applied the terms of the zoning ordinance, including the evidentiary 
burden.  As a result, when the zoning ordinance imposes a clear-and-convincing-
evidence requirement, the court of common pleas must, at a minimum, ask whether 
the petitioning entity provided evidence of that quality. 
{¶ 30} Here, nothing in the court of common pleas’ decision assesses 
whether Shelly Materials had provided clear and convincing evidence that the 
proposed use would not “be detrimental to property in the immediate vicinity or to 
the community as a whole” under Streetsboro Codified Ordinance 1153.03(c)(4).  
The magistrate’s conclusions—adopted by the court of common pleas—first stated 
that the commission’s findings were supported only by “unsubstantiated 
speculation about detrimental impact on property values, not by substantial 
probative evidence, and not by expert testimony.”  The magistrate reached this 
conclusion by entirely discounting the opinion of Streetsboro Planning and Zoning 
Director John Cieszkowski.  Thus the magistrate concluded that the commission’s 
positive evidence (Cieszkowski’s opinion) was “outweighed by the evidence from 
January Term, 2019 
 
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Mr. Bidwell [Shelly Materials’ expert appraiser] as a matter of law.”  In essence, 
the magistrate reasoned that Shelly Materials provided some evidence and the 
commission provided no credible competing evidence and hence, Shelly Materials 
wins.  That analysis might work if the burden was a preponderance of the evidence.  
But, as I’ve explained, if the evidentiary burden set forth in the zoning ordinance is 
not to be rendered a nullity, the court of common pleas should have asked whether 
Shelly Materials provided clear and convincing evidence. 
{¶ 31} Clear and convincing evidence is “that measure or degree of proof 
which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to 
the allegations sought to be established.”  Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 
120 N.E.2d 118 (1954).  When a party must provide clear and convincing evidence, 
the other party need not provide any competing evidence at all.  Weak evidence can 
fail to be clear and convincing even in the absence of competing evidence.  By 
implying that the commission had to provide some competing evidence and by 
failing to assess the quality of the evidence in the record to determine whether it 
was clear and convincing, the magistrate applied the wrong standard and 
improperly placed a burden on the commission to present competing evidence.  As 
the court of appeals correctly noted, “the magistrate fails to recognize that [Shelly 
Materials] has the burden, and provided Bidwell’s testimony lacks credibility, 
[Shelly Materials] fails.”  2017-Ohio-9342, 104 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 34.  This is right, of 
course, because evidence that lacks credibility is, by definition, not clear and 
convincing. 
The evidence presented to the commission 
{¶ 32} The lead opinion claims that the court of appeals erred by second-
guessing the court of common pleas’ decision on questions regarding the weight of 
the evidence.  But that mischaracterizes both what the court of appeals did and what 
the record here shows.  To see why, let’s review the record. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 33} Shelly Materials’ evidence regarding detrimental effects on 
properties in the immediate vicinity came from its appraiser, Paul Bidwell.  Bidwell 
provided an analysis based on the sales of 12 comparator properties that were 
chosen based on proximity to surface mines.  He initially opined that there would 
be “no adverse effect” on property values in the immediate vicinity.  But he almost 
immediately qualified this conclusion.  First, he conceded that many of the 
comparator properties were much farther away from a mining site than the 
properties at issue here would be and that some of the comparators had natural 
buffers insulating them from the mine site.  In other words, he admitted that many 
of the “comparables” weren’t particularly useful in assessing the effect of a mine 
on properties adjacent to the site.  And he later clarified that his evidence did not 
show that there would be no adverse effect.  Rather, it only failed to show that there 
would be an adverse effect.  As Bidwell put it, “based on the information I have, I 
can’t conclude one way or another” about the effect of the mine on the value of the 
closest homes, “but I can say that there is not evidence to show a specific adverse 
effect based on what I studied.”  And he later further clarified that “even though the 
immediate properties in the area potentially could have or see some possible effect, 
the general area on which I’m concentrating for this conditional use permit * * * is 
not conclusive for an adverse effect.” 
{¶ 34} Note what’s happened here.  Bidwell first opined that there would 
be no adverse effect on nearby properties.  This is the one line picked up by the 
magistrate.  But when one reads on, it is clear that Bidwell thought only that his 
evidence failed to show an adverse effect.  That’s hardly a relevant result if one is 
tasked with assessing whether there is clear and convincing evidence that there will 
be no adverse effect.  As the saying goes, the absence of evidence is not evidence 
of absence. 
 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
19 
The lead opinion makes the same mistake as the court of common pleas 
{¶ 35} The lead opinion claims that the court of appeals had “no authority 
to second-guess the decision of the court of common pleas on questions going to 
the weight of the evidence supporting the commission’s findings.”  Lead opinion 
at ¶ 21.  By framing the issue as one of “second-guessing” the decision of the court 
of common pleas regarding the weight of the evidence, the lead opinion commits 
two errors.  First, based on the record, the court of appeals didn’t have to reweigh 
Bidwell’s testimony—it merely had to take Bidwell at his word.  Bidwell admitted 
that his evidence failed to show that the mine would not have detrimental effects 
on neighboring properties. 
{¶ 36} Second, when the evidentiary burden is clear and convincing 
evidence, a reviewing court must “examine the record to determine whether the 
trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of 
proof.” State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990); Ford v. 
Osborne, 45 Ohio St. 1, 3, 12 N.E. 526 (1887).  And it must assess whether the 
requisite quantum of evidence was produced, which, we have said, is “ ‘in essence’ 
” a legal question.  Kisil v. Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 35, 465 N.E.2d 848 (1984), 
quoting Univ. of Cincinnati v. Conrad, 63 Ohio St.2d 108, 111, 407 N.E.2d 1265 
(1980).  The lead opinion, like the court of common pleas, fails to assess whether 
Shelly Materials met the burden of providing clear and convincing evidence. 
{¶ 37} The lead opinion goes to some length to explain that experts are “not 
required to give precise opinions” and to highlight the difficulty of finding good 
comparable properties that can be used to accurately assess the effect of a mine on 
property values.  Lead opinion at ¶ 19.  Fine, but the ordinance requires clear and 
convincing evidence, and we cannot ignore that requirement.  The fact that it may 
be difficult to locate good comparable properties cannot excuse a party from 
meeting its evidentiary burden. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 38} The magistrate patently applied the wrong standard.  The common 
pleas judge adopted the magistrate’s reasoning without any independent analysis 
about the disputed provisions in the ordinance.  The lead opinion seems to believe 
that the common pleas court’s conclusory recitation of the zoning ordinance’s 
requirements can magically turn the magistrate’s obvious application of the wrong 
legal standard into something that passes legal muster.  I disagree. 
{¶ 39} The court of appeals would have reinstated the commission’s 
decision.  Because I believe that it is procedurally best to allow the court of common 
pleas to apply the correct standard in the first instance, I would remand this case to 
the trial court for it to apply the correct standard and determine whether Shelly 
Materials met its burden of providing clear and convincing evidence that the 
proposed use would satisfy all six standards under the zoning ordinance.2  Because 
a majority of the court sees things differently, I respectfully dissent. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Eastman & Smith, Ltd., Reginald S. Jackson Jr., Brian P. Barger, and Barry 
W. Fissel, for appellant. 
Sutter O’Connell Co., Robert E. Cahill, and Matthew C. O’Connell, for 
appellees. 
Brady, Coyle & Schmidt, Ltd., and Margaret G. Beck, urging reversal for 
amici curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce; NAIOP of Ohio, Inc.; National 
Federation of Independent Business; Ohio Chemistry Technology Council; Ohio 
Aggregates and Industrial Minerals Association; National Stone, Sand and Gravel 
                                                 
2.  Shelly Materials claims that the commission’s decision should also have been overturned on the 
grounds that the commission had an improper motive.  But what Shelly Materials fails to realize is 
that even if the commission had an improper motive, that does not automatically mean that the 
permit should have been granted.  Shelly Materials was required to provide clear and convincing 
evidence to obtain a conditional-use permit.  Whether it did so is something that our law requires 
the court of common pleas to assess.  It did not do so, and hence, we should remand for a proper 
assessment. 
January Term, 2019 
 
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Association; Flexible Pavements of Ohio; Ohio Ready Mixed Concrete 
Association; Ohio Forestry Association; Ohio Home Builders Association; and 
Ohio Contractors Association. 
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