Case Title: Sartino v. First Alabama Bank of Birmingham

Citation: 435 So. 2d 39

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1983-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
435 So. 2d 39 (1983)
Vincent J. SARTINO
v.
FIRST ALABAMA BANK OF BIRMINGHAM.
Harold M. STEPHENS
v.
FIRST ALABAMA BANK OF BIRMINGHAM.
82-306 & 82-307.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 1, 1983.
*40 Anthony L. Cicio of Cicio & Nolen, Birmingham, for appellant Vincent J. Sartino.
Coleman D. Hamm, Jr. of Amari & Hamm, Birmingham, for appellant Harold M. Stephens.
James L. Clark of Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Birmingham, for appellee.
SHORES, Justice.
First Alabama Bank of Birmingham brought this action against Sartino and Stephens for money owed the bank under the terms of separate continuing guaranty agreements signed by them in May 1979.
After the motions to dismiss filed by each defendant were overruled, the bank filed a motion for summary judgment supported by two affidavits. These affidavits established that Total Refrigeration Service, Inc., executed two commercial notes to the bank, one for $8,000 and the other for $15,000. Both notes contained the provision that they were secured by continuing guaranty by Sartino and Stephens. Both men had signed the aforementioned guaranty agreements in which they unconditionally guaranteed and promised to pay the bank all indebtedness of Total Refrigeration Service, Inc., including attorney's fees and all other costs and expenses. One affidavit was by the bank's attorney, who swore that Act No. 2052 of the 1971 Regular Session of the Legislature (Mini-Code) had not been violated. The other affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment was by a bank employee who swore that he witnessed the signatures of both guarantors on the guaranty agreements. He also stated under oath that the total amount owed by the defendants as of November 7, 1982, was $30,155.26.
In opposition to the bank's motion, Sartino first filed an affidavit in which he said that the money borrowed by the corporation "was never intended to be a personal obligation but an obligation of the corporation and we have other defenses to present in that regard." He also said the amount claimed in the complaint was incorrect "since there were additional payments made on this amount which apparently have never been credited."
Stephen's affidavit in opposition to the bank's motion stated:
Mr. Sartino filed two additional affidavits in which he made the following statements:
The third affidavit filed by Mr. Sartino was dated December 3, 1982. This additional affidavit contained the following assertions:
The bank established by affidavit that the debt sued on was due, and that Sartino and Stephens were unconditional guarantors of that debt, having executed the guaranty agreements relied on.
Rule 56(e), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
The bank having carried its burden, the question then is whether the affidavits of Sartino and Stephens set forth specific facts, admissible under the rules of evidence, to show a genuine issue of specific fact. A careful examination of these affidavits convinces us that they do not contain specific facts. To the contrary, all of them amount to vague and general assertions, such as "it was never intended to be a personal obligation." There are assertions of payments "apparently" never credited, and that Sartino did not remember signing a document to pay all the debt of the corporation. These assertions do not raise genuine issues of material fact so as to prevent summary judgment. Neither Sartino nor Stephens denied signing the respective guaranty agreements, and neither identified any payment not credited to the account. Sartino generally alludes to defenses which would be made.
In Whatley v. Cardinal Pest Control, 388 So. 2d 529 (1980 Ala.), we said:
388 So. 2d  at 532.
In Real Coal, Inc. v. Thompson Tractor Co., 379 So. 2d 1249 (Ala.1980), which also involved personal guaranties of corporate debtors, the affidavit in opposition to the creditor's motion for summary judgment contained the following assertion:
379 So. 2d  at 1251.
The Court held that summary judgment was proper, saying:
379 So. 2d  at 1251.
The present case is indistinguishable from Real Coal, supra, and Day v. Merchants National Bank of Mobile, 431 So. 2d 1254 (Ala.1983). The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, due to be and the same is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, and BEATTY, JJ., concur.