Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Leksan

Citation: 2013-Ohio-2415

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Leksan, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-2415.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-2415 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. LEKSAN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Leksan,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-2415.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Mismanagement 
of 
client 
trust 
account—
Misappropriation of client funds—Significant mitigating circumstances—
Indefinite suspension with reinstatement upon specified conditions. 
(No. 2012-2055—Submitted February 6, 2013—Decided June 13, 2013.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 12-031. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Thomas John Leksan of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0027125, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1982.1   
                                                 
1 Leksan testified at the disciplinary hearing that he is also licensed to practice law in Kentucky. 
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{¶ 2} In a complaint certified by a probable-cause panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline in April 2012, relator, disciplinary 
counsel, charged Leksan with 22 violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
arising from the improper handling of his client trust account.  Relator alleged that 
Leksan had failed to maintain adequate records of the funds held in his client trust 
account; had failed to reconcile the account on a monthly basis; had 
misappropriated client funds for his personal and business expenses, for loans to 
his friends, and for distribution to clients whose funds he had previously 
misappropriated; and had improperly deposited his personal funds into his client 
trust account.  Relator further alleged that Leksan’s conduct involved dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, was prejudicial to the administration of justice, 
and adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law. 
{¶ 3} The parties submitted stipulations of fact and misconduct and of 
aggravating and mitigating factors and suggested that the appropriate sanction for 
Leksan’s misconduct is a two-year suspension, with conditions on his 
reinstatement.  They also submitted 26 stipulated exhibits. 
{¶ 4} A panel of the board conducted a hearing in which Leksan testified 
about his misconduct, his long-term depression, and his gambling addiction.  The 
panel adopted the parties’ stipulations of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and 
mitigating factors but rejected the stipulated sanction, finding that an indefinite 
suspension with the stipulated conditions on Leksan’s reinstatement is more 
appropriate. 
{¶ 5} The full board adopted the panel’s findings and recommended 
sanction.  The board further recommends that we adopt the parties’ stipulated 
conditions for Leksan’s reinstatement to the practice of law.  No objections have 
been filed. 
{¶ 6} Having reviewed the record, we adopt the board’s findings of fact 
and misconduct and indefinitely suspend Leksan from the practice of law in Ohio. 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
Misconduct 
Count One—General Trust-Account Violations 
{¶ 7} The parties stipulated that since 2009, Leksan has failed to maintain 
a general ledger or individual ledgers of client funds in his possession in violation 
of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a record for each client 
on whose behalf funds are held) and 1.15(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a 
record for the lawyer’s client trust account, setting forth the name of the account, 
the date, amount, and client affected by each credit and debit, and the balance in 
the account) and has failed to reconcile his client trust account in violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(5) (requiring a lawyer to perform and retain a monthly 
reconciliation of the funds held in the lawyer’s client trust account).  From at least 
February 2009 through at least March 2011, Leksan retained earned fees in his 
client trust account and withdrew them on an as-needed basis, deposited at least 
$89,435.55 in personal funds into that account to cover shortages created by his 
misappropriation of client funds, and used funds from the account to make more 
than $30,000 in personal loans to two of his friends, in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 
1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold property of clients in an interest-bearing client 
trust account, separate from the lawyer’s own property) and 1.15(b) (permitting a 
lawyer to deposit his or her own funds in a client trust account only for the 
purpose of paying or obtaining a waiver of bank service charges). 
Count Two—Misappropriation of Funds Regarding Multiple Clients 
{¶ 8} On February 12, 2009, Leksan opened a client trust account at Park 
National Bank and deposited there a $50 check from a client trust account he 
maintained at Huntington Bank.  He closed his client trust account at Huntington 
Bank later that month.  Although he should have held more than $36,000 in trust 
for two clients at that time, he did not transfer any more funds to the Park 
National Bank account because he had used his clients’ money to pay his personal 
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or business expenses or to pay other clients whose funds he had previously 
misappropriated. 
{¶ 9} Over the next two and one-half years, Leksan repeatedly 
misappropriated funds from clients to satisfy his own financial obligations or 
obligations 
regarding 
other 
clients 
whose 
funds 
he 
had 
previously 
misappropriated.  The parties and the board cite five examples of this pattern of 
misconduct: 
{¶ 10} A.  On August 25, 2009, Leksan deposited an $8,000 settlement 
check into his client trust account, from which his client, David Leach, was 
entitled to receive $5,557.77.  Instead of distributing those funds to Leach, he paid 
another client, April Mills, $5,450.17, leaving a balance of only $112.42 in his 
client trust account at that time. 
{¶ 11} B.  On August 27, 2009, Leksan deposited a $55,000 settlement 
check in his client trust account.  After attorney fees, costs, and expenses were 
deducted from that settlement, his clients, Judy and Edward Beasley, were entitled 
to receive $25,000.  From August 28, 2009, through September 8, 2009, Leksan 
did not distribute any funds to the Beasleys or their creditors, but used the 
proceeds of their settlement to pay his client, Jennie Moore, $31,050.63 and 
Leach $5,557.77, and to loan his friend, Ron Tripodo, $15,000, leaving just 
$53.95 in his client trust account. 
{¶ 12} C.  On November 25, 2009, Leksan deposited a $36,500 settlement 
check into his client trust account, from which his clients, Mary and Stewart 
Daniel, were entitled to receive $18,643.52.  From November 25, 2009, through 
January 19, 2010, before disbursing any funds to the Daniels, he paid various bills 
on behalf of himself and other clients and loaned Tripodo another $10,000, 
leaving a balance of just $296.48 in his client trust account. 
{¶ 13} D.  On January 22, 2010, Leksan deposited a $19,730 settlement 
check—the entire amount of which he was to pay to Toyota Financial on behalf of 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
his client, Christopher Seda—into his client trust account.  On January 25, 2009, 
before paying Toyota Financial, he used the settlement proceeds to pay the 
Daniels the $18,643.52 they were entitled to receive from their settlement.  On 
February 11, 2010, his client trust account held only $132.96 when it should have 
held at least $19,730. 
{¶ 14} E.  On February 19, 2010, Leksan deposited two settlement checks 
totaling $10,655.24 into his client trust account, from which his client, Lila 
Bumstead, was entitled to receive $4,194.24, and his client, Victoria Bumstead, 
was entitled to receive $2,794.29.  Within days of depositing the settlement 
checks Leksan withdrew $8,500 from his client trust account leaving a balance of 
$2,288.20—$4,700.33 less than he owed the Bumsteads. 
{¶ 15} The parties stipulated and the board found that by prematurely 
withdrawing client funds to satisfy his own personal obligations and those 
regarding other clients, Leksan violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a), 8.4(c) (prohibiting 
a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation), and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). 
Count Three—The Chasteen Matter 
{¶ 16} On March 2, 2010, Leksan deposited a $137,500 check—the gross 
proceeds of a settlement he had obtained on behalf of his clients, Kenneth and 
Alta Chasteen—into his client trust account.  After deductions for attorney fees, 
costs, and medical expenses, the Chasteens were entitled to receive $84,685.55.  
However, Leksan used the settlement proceeds to pay $6,988.53 to the Bumsteads 
and $19,730 to Toyota Financial on behalf of Seda and to loan $6,000 to Tripodo. 
{¶ 17} In mid-April 2010, Leksan issued a partial distribution of $45,000 
to the Chasteens from his client trust account and advised them that he would hold 
the remaining $39,685.55 of their settlement proceeds while he negotiated their 
outstanding medical bills and insurance-subrogation matters.  By July 22, 2010, 
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however, he had withdrawn the remaining proceeds to pay personal or business 
expenses, leaving just $7.45 in his client trust account.  Two insurers agreed to 
waive their entire subrogation liens, and in August 2010, the last subrogated 
insurer agreed to accept $5,000 as full and final payment.  Leksan paid that 
insurer on November 2, 2010, using personal funds that he had deposited into his 
client trust account the previous week. 
{¶ 18} The Chasteens inquired more than once about the remainder of 
their settlement proceeds, and Leksan initially advised them that their subrogation 
matters were still pending.  Once the subrogation matters were resolved, however, 
he stopped accepting the Chasteens’ calls.  He did not distribute the remainder of 
their settlement proceeds to them until July 29, 2011—almost nine months after 
he had resolved the subrogation issues in their case. 
{¶ 19} The parties stipulated and the board found that Leksan’s conduct in 
the Chasteen matter violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply 
as soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the client), 
1.15(a), 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer to promptly deliver funds or other property 
that the client is entitled to receive), 8.4(c), 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(h). 
Count Four—The Hedrick Matter 
{¶ 20} On August 20, 2010, Leksan deposited into his client trust account 
a $3,750 settlement check that he had received on behalf of his client, Michael 
“Lars” Hedrick.  The settlement proceeds were to be distributed as follows:  
$2,114.78 to Hedrick, $1,250 to Leksan, and $385.22 to Boilermakers National 
Health and Welfare Fund in satisfaction of a lien.  Hedrick requested that Leksan 
pay the $385.22 directly to him so that Hedrick could extinguish the lien.  While 
Leksan issued a $2,114.78 check payable to Hedrick on September 20, 2010, and 
withdrew his attorney fees from his client trust account on an as-needed basis, he 
did not release the remaining $385.22 to Hedrick until March 5, 2012.  The 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
balance in Leksan’s client trust account, however, dropped below that amount on 
several occasions between August 20, 2010, and July 29, 2011, and the account 
was overdrawn by $107.54 on March 17, 2011. 
{¶ 21} The parties stipulated and the board found that Leksan’s conduct in 
the Hedrick matter violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a), 1.15(d), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h). 
Count Five—The Carnine Matter 
{¶ 22} Leksan deposited a $19,000 settlement check into his client trust 
account on January 28, 2011.  He met with his client, Jason Carnine, to distribute 
the settlement proceeds on January 31, 2011, and issued two checks to himself for 
fees and expenses totaling $6,612.44 and three checks to Carnine (at Carnine’s 
request) totaling $7,977.35.  He also drafted checks payable to five of Carnine’s 
medical providers, showed Carnine the checks, and told him that he would mail 
them to the medical providers on Carnine’s behalf.  Leksan waited about five 
months—until June and July 2011—to mail the checks and in the interim he used 
the funds to pay his personal and business expenses or to pay other clients whose 
funds he had misappropriated.  Although he should have retained at least 
$4,409.61 in his client trust account during that time, it was overdrawn by $57.54 
in February 2011. 
{¶ 23} The parties stipulated and the board found that Leksan’s conduct in 
the Carnine matter violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a), 1.15(d), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h). 
{¶ 24} Upon a thorough review of the record, we adopt the board’s 
findings of fact and misconduct with respect to each of these five counts. 
Sanction 
{¶ 25} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
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listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 26} As aggravating factors, the parties stipulated and the board found 
that Leksan acted with a selfish or dishonest motive, engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct involving multiple offenses, and committed misconduct that caused 
harm to his clients.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (c), (d), and (h).  In 
mitigation, the parties stipulated and the board found that Leksan had no prior 
disciplinary record, made a good-faith effort to rectify the consequences of his 
misconduct, fully and freely disclosed his conduct to relator and displayed a 
cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and submitted evidence 
of his good character and reputation apart from the charged misconduct.  See 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (c), (d), and (e). 
{¶ 27} The board also found that Leksan was recovering from a gambling 
addiction, was struggling with an alcohol addiction, and had been engaged in 
treatment for these and other problems for more than ten years.  Relevant to these 
considerations, the record contains a letter from psychiatrist John M. Hawkins, 
M.D., who states that he has treated Leksan for depression and low self-esteem 
for more than ten years.  Dr. Hawkins’s letter states that Leksan has focused on 
helping people in his law practice, but that Leksan failed to stay on top of his 
accounts receivable and accepted too many cases in which the clients could not 
pay him.  In Dr. Hawkins’s view, several factors, in particular Leksan’s “desire to 
be with people in a higher socio-economic class and spending beyond his means, 
led to mismanagement of his personal and professional accounts.”  Dr. Hawkins’s 
letter additionally states that Leksan believed that his gambling addiction was a 
way to resolve his debts and used gambling as a psychological distraction to avoid 
his feelings of pain and low self-acceptance.  Unfortunately, that addiction only 
worsened Leksan’s financial condition. 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
{¶ 28} Dr. Hawkins states that Leksan began to address his gambling and 
alcohol addictions in early 2009 with the help of Gamblers Anonymous, 
Alcoholics Anonymous, and the Ohio Lawyers’ Assistance Program (“OLAP”).  
He believes that Leksan has made tremendous strides in the treatment of his 
psychological problems and addictions, that he has new tools and a support 
system to assist him, and that he remains committed to his treatment program.  He 
believes that Leksan can successfully and responsibly practice law in the future.  
Based on Dr. Hawkins’s statements, we find that Leksan’s depression and alcohol 
and gambling addictions qualify as mitigating factors pursuant to BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g). 
{¶ 29} The parties stipulated that the proper sanction for Leksan’s 
misconduct is a two-year suspension from the practice of law, with reinstatement 
conditioned on the submission of proof that he has (1) completed 12 hours of 
continuing legal education (“CLE”) in law-office management, (2) implemented a 
system to properly manage client funds in his practice, and (3) complied with his 
OLAP contract as well as the recommendations of his treating professionals. 
{¶ 30} Disbarment is the presumptive sanction for an attorney who 
misappropriates client funds, but we have recognized that in some 
misappropriation cases significant mitigating circumstances may weigh in favor 
of an indefinite suspension.  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Rothermel, 104 Ohio St.3d 
413, 2004-Ohio-6559, 819 N.E.2d 1099, ¶ 18, citing Cleveland Bar Assn. v. 
Dixon, 95 Ohio St.3d 490, 2002-Ohio-2490, 769 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 31} In support of their stipulated sanction, the parties cited Columbus 
Bar Assn. v. King, 132 Ohio St.3d 501, 2012-Ohio-873, 974 N.E.2d 1180 
(imposing a two-year suspension on an attorney who, over a period of months, 
used client-trust-account funds to pay his own expenses, deposited personal funds 
into and failed to keep adequate records of the funds held in his client trust 
account, fabricated a fee dispute to justify his failure to promptly return a client's 
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money, and failed to advise his clients that he did not carry malpractice 
insurance), and Disciplinary Counsel v. Crosby, 124 Ohio St.3d 226, 2009-Ohio-
6763, 921 N.E.2d 225 (imposing a two-year suspension on an attorney who used 
his client trust account for personal and business expenses, failed to maintain 
adequate records of the funds, and failed to promptly withdraw his earned fees).  
Neither of these cases, however, involved Leksan’s primary offense—the 
misappropriation of substantial client funds. 
{¶ 32} The board acknowledged that Leksan obtained treatment for his 
diagnosed depression, as well as his alcohol and gambling addictions, and that he 
continues to aggressively pursue treatment by meeting with his treating 
professionals five days per week.  He has made his clients whole, having restored 
most of the misappropriated funds before his misconduct was even discovered.  
He has confessed his misconduct to all but one of the affected clients and many 
have written letters of recommendation on his behalf asking for leniency.2  He 
also has submitted more than 20 letters—many from fellow attorneys—attesting 
to his honesty, professionalism, and good character apart from the charged 
misconduct.  Two of Leksan’s character-reference letters are from members of 
Gamblers Anonymous who praise him for the inspiration and assistance he has 
given them (and others like them) in addressing not only their compulsive 
gambling but also the legal repercussions of their addictions. 
{¶ 33} The board found that Leksan had been cooperative, sincere, and 
frank with relator and the panel.  The board also expressed a belief that he 
“knowingly” caused his client trust account to be overdrawn (by less than $150) 
so that the bank would inform relator of the overdraft and bring a stop to his 
ethical violations.  In light of these mitigating factors, the absence of any prior 
violations, Leksan’s demeanor at the panel hearing, and his efforts to wind down 
                                                 
2 Leksan testified at the disciplinary hearing that the remaining client could not be located. 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
his practice, the panel was persuaded that permanent disbarment was not 
warranted.  But the panel was not convinced that the stipulated two-year 
suspension was an adequate sanction for Leksan’s misconduct.  Therefore, the 
panel recommended that he be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in 
Ohio and that his reinstatement be subject to the conditions stipulated by the 
parties.  The board concurred in the panel’s analysis and recommendation. 
{¶ 34} Having reviewed the record, including the circumstances of 
Leksan’s misconduct as well as the aggravating and mitigating factors found by 
the board, we agree that an indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction in this 
case.  We have imposed indefinite suspensions for similar instances of 
misconduct involving the misappropriation of client funds.  See, e.g., Akron Bar 
Assn. v. Smithern, 125 Ohio St.3d 72, 2010-Ohio-652, 926 N.E.2d 274 
(indefinitely suspending an attorney for converting client funds on more than 30 
separate occasions and for depositing more than $100,000 in client retainers into 
her personal bank account rather than her firm’s trust account; mitigating factors 
included more than 20 years of practice without disciplinary violations, 
cooperation in the disciplinary proceedings, an agreement to make full restitution, 
and gambling and alcohol addictions that were causally related to the attorney’s 
misconduct). 
{¶ 35} Accordingly, Thomas John Leksan is indefinitely suspended from 
the practice of law in Ohio and his reinstatement is conditioned on the submission 
of proof that he has (1) completed 12 hours of CLE in law-office management in 
addition to meeting the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, (2) implemented a system 
to properly manage client funds in his practice, and (3) complied with his OLAP 
contract and the recommendations of his treating professionals.  Costs are taxed to 
Leksan. 
Judgment accordingly. 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_____________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, L.P.A., and George D. Jonson, for 
respondent. 
________________________