Case Title: Williams v. Miller

Citation: 272 P.2d 676, 58 N.M. 472

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1954-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
272 P.2d 676 (1954) 58 N.M. 472 WILLIAMS et al. v. MILLER et al. No. 5754. Supreme Court of New Mexico. June 28, 1954. *677 Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Mims & Akin, John D. Robb, Albuquerque, for appellants. Irwin S. Moise, Lewis R. Sutin, Albuquerque, for appellees. McGHEE, Chief Justice. In addition to the worries we have in common with other citizens over worldwide and everyday affairs, we have here a very troublesome question arising from our Rule 14(a), commonly known as the third-party defendant rule, which, so far as counsel for the parties and our independent research has disclosed, has not beset any other appellate court. A fire following an explosion of gas carried in a line of the Southern Union Gas Company destroyed a building, stock of goods and fixtures belonging to the plaintiffs (residents of New Mexico), who sued the gas company (a Delaware corporation) in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, claiming the fire and resulting loss were occasioned by the negligence of the defendant in failing to properly inspect and promptly repair its gas line which had been broken by the present defendants (residents of New Mexico) while they were digging a ditch for a sewer in an adjoining street. The gas company brought in the present defendants as third-party defendants under Federal Rule 14(a), 28 U.S.C.A., and asked for judgment over against them for any judgment rendered against it. It is agreed that because of lack of diversity of citizenship between the plaintiffs and the third-party defendants no judgment could have been rendered in the federal court in favor of the plaintiffs and against such third-party defendants. In addition, the third-party defendant requested the following instructions on the point: The trial court instructed the jury on this point as follows: The interrogatories which were answered read: The judgment recites that special findings were submitted and answered, and the decretal part reads: Following the failure of the plaintiffs to obtain judgment against the gas company in the federal court they filed suit here against the defendants, the identical parties who were third-party defendants in the federal court case, alleging the fire and destruction of the building, fixtures and stock of goods were caused by their negligence in breaking the gas line and failing to promptly give notice of the break. The defendants interposed a plea of res judicata and a motion for summary judgment based on the federal court case. The motion was granted and this appeal followed. As heretofore stated, the defendants admit no judgment could have been rendered against them in the federal court because they and the plaintiffs were residents of New Mexico, but say both they and the gas company pleaded lack of negligence on their parts, and that the explosion and fire were the result of an unavoidable accident; that the jury sustained such defenses; that, therefore, they may not again be vexed by the present suit. The cases which more nearly support the position of the defendants are: Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, 8 Cir., 1907, 158 F. 63, 16 L.R.A., N.S., 677; Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 1942, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892; Barrabee v. Crescenta Mutual Water Co., 1948, 88 Cal. App. 2d 192, 198 P.2d 558; Hawley v. Davenport, R.I. & N.W. Ry. Co., 1951, 242 Iowa 17, 45 N.W.2d 513; Harding v. Carr, 1951, 79 R.I. 32, 83 A.2d 79; Hill v. Bain, 1885, 15 R.I. 75, 23 A. 44. However, except for the Harding case, supra, the principal actor had been previously absolved of liability and it was sought in the second suit to hold one whose liability depended on that of such previous actor, or the indemnitor had been absolved and it was then sought to hold the indemnitee, as was the situation in the case of Hawley v. Davenport, R.I. & N.W. Ry. Co., supra. Perhaps the best analysis of the exception to the general rule that there must be mutuality before res judicata may be invoked is made in the opinion in Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, supra, by then Circuit Judge Vandeventer. There the owner of a mine had leased it to one who extended the drift beyond the property line and had taken ore from the property of another who brought suit against the lessee for such trespass. Judgment was rendered for the defendant and the adjoining owner then sued the lessor on the theory it had ratified such wrongful act. In this case it was stated [158 F. 68]: It is true the plaintiffs in the federal court opened their case by showing the present defendants broke the gas line, but this was merely a preliminary step in their proof the gas company was negligent in failing to inspect and promptly make repairs. No such duty could devolve on the gas company in the absence of a leak from some cause. In that case the plaintiffs were not concerned with the negligence of these defendants except to prove a break, as the gas company was their defendant and the concern to which they looked to recoup their damages, while in the present case they are after the defendants as principal actors the ones who threw the squid. The claimed negligence of the gas company was an entirely different thing from the claimed negligence of the defendants, and its duty to the plaintiff in no manner depended on whether or not these defendants acted negligently when they broke the pipe. If there is a principal actor in the case, and we believe there is, it is these defendants who, it is claimed in the pleadings, negligently broke the pipe. But, say the defendants, the jury found the explosion was caused by an unavoidable accident and that they were not negligent, disregarding the fact that under the instructions of the court, and in fact, that case was over when the jury answered interrogatory number one in the negative, that the gas company had not failed to properly inspect its lines and was not guilty of negligence. The fact that its members in disregard of instructions proceeded to answer the other interrogatories which were not necessary to a judgment in behalf of both defendants may not be used to deny the plaintiffs their day in court against the principal actor. Whatever may have been the law touching res judicata in this state prior to the decision in Paulos v. Janetakos, 1942, 46 N.M. 390, 129 P.2d 636, 142 A.L.R. 1237, it is now settled that only such questions, points or matters of fact in issue in a case which were essential to a decision, and upon a determination of which the judgment was rendered, are res judicata. To the same effect are State v. Johnson, 1948, 52 N.M. 229, 195 P.2d 1017, and McCarthy v. Kay, 1947, 52 N.M. 5, 189 P.2d 450. The fact necessary to a determination of the federal court case, so far as the plaintiffs were concerned, was whether the gas company was negligent. The defendants also rely on the case of Supulver v. Gilchrist & Dawson, Inc., 1922, 28 N.M. 339, 211 P. 595, 596, where one who had been convicted of embezzlement thereafter brought suit for money had and received for the amount that had been turned over to the defendant in this latter civil action following the conviction. This Court held the judgment in the criminal action was a bar to the maintenance of the civil action by the one who had been convicted. This decision, however, was based upon an old English statute and the common-law practice built upon it that in such case a writ of restitution would be granted *681 the owner who had his property stolen. In support of the opinion the court quoted from 1 Chitty's Cr. Law (5th Am.Ed.) 820, in addition to other authorities, as follows: The rule relating to stolen property after the conviction of the thief may not be used to aid the defendants here. It is our conclusion the Harding case, supra, from the Rhode Island court is not authority for what the defendants urge here, but if we have incorrectly appraised its true import, we do not care to follow it here. We do not believe the third-party rule was designed to accomplish the end sought by the defendants here; certainly the writer had no such thought when he voted to adopt it as one of our rules. We have read all of the cases cited in the briefs and an independent research has been made here, and we are of the opinion the learned trial judge erred in granting a summary judgment to the defendants. The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court with instructions to vacate its judgment, deny the motion for a summary judgment, and proceed in accordance with the views herein expressed, and it is so ordered. SADLER, COMPTON, LUJAN and SEYMOUR, JJ., concur.