Case Title: In re Harris

Citation: 

Docket Number: S46572

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  July 11, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
DAVID B. HARRIS,
Accused.
(OSB 99-37, 99-62 to 99-64, 99-114 to 99-117; SC S46572)
	En Banc
	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted March 15, 2002.
	David B. Harris, Portland, argued the cause and filed briefs
in propria persona.
	W. Eugene Hallman, Hallman & Dretke, Pendleton, also argued
the cause and filed briefs for the accused.
	Steven W. Seymour, Samuels Yoelin Kantor, Portland, argued
the cause for the Oregon State Bar.  With him on the brief was
Jane E. Angus, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego.
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is disbarred, effective 60 days from the date of
filing of this decision.
		In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, we address the
question left open in In re Devers, 328 Or 230, 233-34, 974 P2d
191 (1999), whether a lawyer has a constitutional right to
appointed counsel in a disciplinary proceeding.  We conclude that
an accused lawyer has no such constitutional right, and, further,
we decline to require the appointment of counsel under our
general authority over lawyer disciplinary matters.  Also, we
agree with the decision of the trial panel of the Disciplinary
Board to disbar the accused.
		We begin with a review of the proceedings below and in
this court.  In eight separate cases, which were consolidated for
proceedings before the trial panel, the Oregon State Bar (Bar)
brought 17 causes of complaint alleging a total of 32 violations
of nine different disciplinary rules and ORS 9.527(4) (willful
deceit or misconduct in legal profession) by the accused.  A full
recitation of the facts and violations that the Bar alleged is
unnecessary.  They include multiple instances of failure to
complete work on behalf of clients; repeated misrepresentations
to judges, one of which resulted in a conviction for criminal
contempt of court; misrepresentations to the State Court
Administrator in connection with a fee request in a court-appointed criminal matter; filing a false police report;
violation of probation conditions, including use of illegal
drugs; failure to cooperate with the Bar's investigation; and
practicing law when the accused had been suspended.
The Bar filed its first formal complaint against the
accused on June 21, 1999, and the accused accepted service of the
complaint on July 3, 1999. (1)  In the proceedings before the trial
panel, the accused missed multiple deadlines for filing pleadings
and responding to discovery requests and failed to attend various
hearings and depositions.  On two occasions, the trial panel
issued orders of default because of the accused's failure to
comply with procedural rules, and the trial panel later set aside
each default order based on a motion by the accused.  After the
accused again failed to produce documents that the Bar had
requested and failed to appear for his deposition, the Bar moved
for sanctions.  As a sanction, the trial panel struck the
accused's answer and deemed the allegations in the Bar's amended
complaint to be true, as it was authorized to do under Bar Rules
of Procedure (BR) 4.5(e) and 5.8(a).
		The trial panel set an April 5, 2000, date for a
hearing on the sanction to be imposed on the accused for the
violations alleged in the amended complaint and held the hearing
on that date.  The accused did not appear at the hearing or
communicate with the Bar or the trial panel before the hearing. 
The trial panel took the matter under advisement.  On July 19,
2000, the accused filed a motion asking the trial panel to set
aside the order of default (the sanction order), to appoint
counsel to represent the accused, and to reset trial and
discovery dates.  After receiving the accused's motion, the Bar
gave notice of the accused's deposition for July 25, 2000.  The
accused again did not appear.  On August 3, 2000, the trial panel
denied the accused's motions.  On October 31, 2000, the trial
panel issued an opinion concluding that the accused had committed
32 violations of the disciplinary rules and ORS 9.527.  The trial
panel decided to disbar the accused. 
		Our review of the decision of the trial panel is
automatic, ORS 9.536(2); BR 10.1 (each providing for automatic
review of lawyer suspensions exceeding six months), and de novo,
ORS 9.536(3); BR 10.6.  The Bar contends that we should accept
the trial panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
disbar the accused.  The accused seeks review of the trial
panel's decision, pursuant to BR 10.5, and argues that we should
impose a suspension of three years.   
In addition to seeking review of the trial panel's
decision, the accused moved this court for permission to brief
and argue the issue whether the Bar should have appointed counsel
to represent him before the trial panel, and we granted that
motion.  The accused filed a brief and a reply brief pro se that
accepted some of the trial panel's findings of fact, objected to
other findings, and asserted a number of mitigating factors that,
according to the accused, the trial panel should have considered
in its decision regarding sanctions.  Attached to the accused's
pro se brief were affidavits and other materials that were not
part of the record before the trial panel.  Counsel for the
accused filed a separate brief, including an affidavit and other
material not part of the record, and a reply brief, both of which
dealt with the issue of appointment of counsel. (2)    
		The Bar moved to strike portions of the accused's pro
se brief and pro se reply brief, and of the brief that counsel
had filed for the accused, on the grounds that they included or
referred to material not found in the record and otherwise failed
to comply with applicable procedural rules.  Those portions of
the briefs primarily related to drug addiction generally and to
the accused's addiction in particular.  The pro se briefs and the
brief that counsel filed for the accused relied on that
information to support the accused's claim that the trial panel
should have appointed counsel to represent him because his
addiction had rendered him unable to participate in the
proceedings against him.  In the pro se briefs, the accused also
used the proffered material regarding addiction to support his
argument that mitigating factors were present that the trial
panel should have considered in deciding on a sanction.  The Bar
also moved to strike portions of the pro se briefs that did not
relate to the accused's drug addiction, but responded on the
merits to the Bar's allegations of violations of the disciplinary
rules by asserting facts outside the record before the trial
panel.  Because we review lawyer disciplinary matters on the
record that was before the trial panel, BR 10.6, and because the
accused had ample opportunity to present the material contained
in the briefs to the trial panel but failed to do so in a timely
manner, we allowed the Bar's motion to strike.
		We begin with the accused's claim that the trial panel
should have appointed counsel to represent him.  In Devers, an
accused lawyer asserted that his due process rights were violated
when a trial panel denied his motion for appointed counsel.  328
Or at 233.  This court declined to reach the merits of that
claim, because only an indigent accused would have a right to
appointed counsel, if such a right existed.  The accused lawyer
had presented no evidence of indigence to the trial panel and had
not claimed that he was indigent in his brief to this court.  Id.
at 234.  Here, the accused submitted an affidavit to the trial
panel that identified his limited assets and asserted that he was
indigent.  The accused continued to assert his indigence in his
brief in this court and noted that, at approximately the same
time as the proceedings before the trial panel, he was found to
be indigent for purposes of a criminal proceeding against him. 
We conclude that the accused has demonstrated indigence
sufficient for him to raise before this court the issue whether
the trial panel should have appointed counsel to represent him in
the disciplinary proceeding.  We now turn to the merits of that
claim.
		The accused first argues that he has a constitutional
right to court-appointed counsel under Article I, section 11, of
the Oregon Constitution, which provides, in part, that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right * * * to
be heard by himself and counsel * * *."  (Emphasis added.)  This
court has held that Article I, section 11, "mandates the
appointment of counsel for all indigent defendants whose
convictions may result in a loss of liberty."  Stevenson v.
Holzman, 254 Or 94, 104, 458 P2d 414 (1969).  Further, in Brown
v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct., 280 Or 95, 570 P2d 52 (1977), this
court focused on the words of the constitutional provision and
held that, if a proceeding properly could be characterized as a
"criminal prosecution," the subject of the proceeding was
entitled to constitutional protections, including the right to
counsel, even if imprisonment was not a possible sanction.  Id.
at 102-08.  
		In Brown, this court examined the first-time offense
for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), which the
legislature, as part of an effort to "decriminalize" certain
traffic violations, had designated as a "traffic infraction"
rather than a "traffic crime," thereby eliminating the
possibility of any imprisonment for the offense.  280 Or at 97. 
To determine whether a civil penalty proceeding, like the newly
decriminalized DUII offense, nonetheless remained a "criminal
prosecution" for constitutional purposes, this court examined
certain "indicia" and noted that "[a]ll [of the indicia] are
relevant, but none is conclusive" in reaching the "ultimate
determination."  Id. at 102.  The indicia are:  (1) the type of
offense; (2) the penalty incurred; (3) collateral consequences;
(4) punitive significance; and (5) the role, if any, of arrest
and detention.  Based on those indicia, this court concluded in
Brown that the "decriminalization" of a first offense of DUII
"did not free [that] offense from the punitive traits that
characterize a criminal prosecution."  Id. at 110.  Accordingly,
the court held that one charged with that offense is entitled to
constitutional protections, including the right to counsel, that
inure to those charged with more serious traffic crimes for which
imprisonment is a possible penalty.  Id. at 110-11. 
		The accused argues that, except for the possibility of
"arrest and detention" in connection with the offense, each of
the other four indicia discussed in Brown points to the
conclusion that a lawyer disciplinary proceeding -- at least one
in which disbarment is a possible sanction -- is a "criminal
prosecution" for purposes of Article I, section 11.  We disagree. 
		At the outset, we take note of ORS 9.529:
	"Bar proceedings relating to discipline, admission and
reinstatement are neither civil nor criminal in nature. 
They are sui generis and within the inherent power of
the Supreme Court to control. * * *"
Although we agree with the accused that the mere labeling of
lawyer disciplinary proceedings as "sui generis" and not
"criminal in nature" is not dispositive of whether they might
constitute "criminal prosecutions" under Article I, section 11,
see Brown, 280 Or at 102, the legislature's statement in that
regard is relevant to our analysis.  ORS 9.529 identifies lawyer
disciplinary proceedings as matters within this court's
regulatory authority over those who practice in the Oregon
courts, rather than as part of the criminal law process.  ORS
9.529 is part of a statutory scheme under which the court may
discipline a lawyer determined to have violated applicable rules. 
See ORS 9.536 (authorizing sanctions).  Moreover, this court has
stated that
	"[p]roceedings for the discipline of an attorney are
not to punish the attorney for the commission of a
crime.  That matter is left to the criminal courts."
In re Carstens, 297 Or 155, 166, 683 P2d 992 (1984).  Instead,
this court has stated that the purpose of lawyer disciplinary
proceedings is to "'protect the public and the administration of
justice from lawyers who have not discharged * * * their
professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and
the legal profession.'"  In re Smith, 315 Or 260, 266, 843 P2d
449 (1992) (quoting American Bar Association's Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1986), Standard 1.1).  That purpose
overlaps, but is not co-extensive with, the principles underlying
the criminal law, which the Oregon Constitution identifies as the
"protection of society, personal responsibility, accountability
for one's actions and reformation."  Or Const, Art I, § 15.  The
aspects of lawyer disciplinary proceedings described above are
relevant to several of the Brown factors and support the
conclusion we reach below that those proceedings are not
"criminal prosecutions."  We now turn to the indicia identified
in Brown.
		In determining "whether an ostensibly civil penalty
proceeding remain[ed] a 'criminal prosecution' for constitutional
purposes," the Brown court first considered the "type of
offense."  280 Or at 102.  Significantly, Brown itself found that
factor unhelpful in determining whether a first-time DUII was
"criminal" in nature, and the court agreed that the legislature
could "decriminalize" offenses that traditionally were considered
crimes, including DUII.  Id. at 102-03.  Here, the accused points
to the Bar's causes of complaint that are based upon traditional
criminal conduct and suggests that disciplinary proceedings based
upon that conduct are in the nature of criminal prosecutions.  
		The accused misses the point.  Certainly, the
possession of illegal drugs, filing of a false police report, and
other acts that are the basis for certain of the Bar's causes of
complaint constitute crimes that could be, and in some instances
have been, the subject of "criminal prosecutions" against the
accused.  To the extent that the accused is prosecuted for those
crimes, he is entitled to receive all the protections that
Article I, section 11, affords.  A Bar proceeding based on that
conduct, however, is not a substitute for what otherwise would be
a criminal prosecution.  Rather, it is a separate proceeding that
the Bar might bring against an accused lawyer whether or not the
lawyer is prosecuted criminally and, in fact, might bring even if
the lawyer were acquitted of the criminal charges.  See In Re
Kimmell, 332 Or 480, 485, 31 P3d 414 (2001) (disciplinary rule
violation may be based on conduct that constitutes a criminal
act, but does not require criminal conviction).  The Bar
proceeding is not an indirect means of prosecuting the accused
for criminal conduct without affording him the constitutional
rights given to others who may be criminally prosecuted for the
same conduct.  The Bar bases some of its causes of complaint in
this proceeding on actions that also constitute crimes, but the
"type of offense" involved in each cause of complaint is a
violation of disciplinary rules or ORS chapter 9.  
		The second factor identified in Brown is the nature of
the penalty.  280 Or at 103.  There, the court noted that,
although the possibility of imprisonment was "generally regarded
as the single most important criterion" for determining whether a
proceeding is a criminal prosecution, "the absence of potential
imprisonment does not conclusively prove a punishment non-criminal."  Id.  This court stated that the assessment of whether
a punishment is non-criminal "has been made on two factors -- the
severity of the penalty and whether it is 'infamous.'"  Id.  The
accused argues that the potential penalties in a lawyer
disciplinary proceeding are both severe and "infamous."  He
asserts that, if the court assesses costs against him, they
likely will exceed the $500 to $1,000 fines for first-time DUII
offenders that the Brown court found to be of "punitive
significance."  He also claims that "disbarment for any reason is
without question 'infamous.'"  
		Brown does not support the accused's position.  First,
the civil penalties at issue in Brown were fines for violating
the Oregon Vehicle Code, and the only question was the level at
which a court should consider those fines to be "criminal,"
rather than civil, for constitutional purposes.  In contrast, the
potential assessment of costs against an accused lawyer in a
disciplinary proceeding is not a penalty assessed to punish the
lawyer for past violations or to deter future violations.  The
award of costs to the prevailing party, either by the trial panel
or this court, see BR 10.7 (authorizing award of costs), is
simply an aspect of the disciplinary proceeding process, similar
to the practice of awarding costs to a prevailing party in civil
litigation, see ORCP 68 B (providing for award of costs and
disbursements to prevailing party).  The amount of the costs
awarded will vary, but the imposition of those costs connotes
only that a party did not prevail and is of no "punitive
significance" whatsoever.  
		Second, the accused misconstrues the word "infamous" as
used by the Brown court.  In that case, the court explicitly
stated that the identification of a punishment as "infamous"
related to the "significance attached to imprisonment * * *, even
for a short term."  280 Or at 103-04 (emphasis in original). 
Imprisonment is not a potential penalty in a lawyer disciplinary
proceeding.  The accused asserts, however, that disbarment is
inherently infamous and, in addition, that its infamous nature is
evidenced by ORS 113.095, which prohibits a disbarred lawyer from
acting as a personal representative.  The degree to which
disbarment is or is not infamous may be subject to debate, but
the accused cites no case and makes no argument to support his
assertion that a sanction short of imprisonment carries such
infamy that Article I, section 11, requires the same protections
provided for criminal prosecutions.
		The next factor that the Brown court identified as
relevant to determining whether constitutional protections apply
to a particular proceeding is the possibility of collateral
consequences.  280 Or at 105.  In Brown, this court held that
suspension or revocation of a driver license was not an example
of collateral consequences of committing a traffic offense.  Id. 
The accused asserts, without elaboration, that the loss of a
professional license is a serious collateral consequence that is
"substantially different" from the loss of a license to operate a
motor vehicle.  However, the personal and professional
consequences of disbarment are simply the direct results of
regulatory action taken by the court and do not impose a
collateral punishment of a criminal nature.  See id.
(distinguishing between license revocation that is "regulatory"
and that which is "another form of punishment").
		Finally, we consider the relevance of Brown's final
factor -- "punitive significance" -- to disbarment.  280 Or at
105-07.  The accused argues that disbarment for criminal conduct
carries at least as great a "stigma of condemnation" as a
criminal conviction.  The "punitive significance" of disbarment
is such that, according to the accused, the ostensibly non-penal
sanction nevertheless is sufficient to invoke the constitutional
standards for a criminal prosecution, including the right to
counsel protected by Article I, section 11.  We agree that
disbarment carries a stigma, particularly within the legal
profession, but we note that that stigma is an unavoidable
consequence of the means by which this court is able to protect
the public from harm and preserve the integrity of the judicial
system.   
		We have examined the indicia described in Brown, and we
conclude that they do not support the accused's assertion that a
lawyer disciplinary proceeding in which disbarment is a possible
sanction is a "criminal prosecution" for the purposes of Article
I, section 11.  In the absence of the other factors that the
Brown court identified as relevant, the stigma and possible
infamy of disbarment are not sufficient grounds upon which to
characterize a lawyer disciplinary proceeding as a criminal
proceeding that requires constitutional protections. 
Accordingly, Article I, section 11, does not require the
appointment of counsel for an accused lawyer in a disciplinary
proceeding.
		The accused next argues that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that a trial panel appoint counsel for an indigent
lawyer in a bar disciplinary proceeding.  In criminal
proceedings, the United States Supreme Court has determined that
the Due Process Clause makes applicable to state prosecutions the
right to counsel contained in the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.  Alabama v. Shelton, ___US___, ___, 122 S Ct
1764, 1769, ___ L Ed 2d ___ (2002) (so stating).  The Sixth
Amendment, however, like Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution, applies by its terms only to "criminal
prosecutions," and the accused cites no case in which a court has
held that a lawyer disciplinary proceeding is a criminal
prosecution for Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel purposes.  
		Citing Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452
US 18, 33, 101 S Ct 2153, 68 L Ed 2d 640 (1981), however, the
accused asserts that we should interpret the Due Process Clause
to require the right to counsel here because the Fourteenth
Amendment "imposes on the States the standards necessary to
ensure that judicial proceedings are fundamentally fair."  Even
if we agree, for purposes of argument, that lawyer disciplinary
proceedings are "judicial proceedings" and that "fundamental
fairness" is required, we do not believe the Due Process Clause
requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent lawyer
accused of violating Bar disciplinary rules.  In Lassiter, the
Supreme Court agreed that due process might require the
appointment of counsel in some non-criminal proceedings, but
stated that there was a "presumption that an indigent litigant
has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may
be deprived of his physical liberty."  452 US at 26-27.  A lawyer
disciplinary proceeding, of course, poses no risk of a loss of
physical liberty to the accused lawyer.  The accused advances no
other argument that would justify, in this context, a departure
from the presumption that Lassiter discussed.  Moreover, many
cases have considered -- and rejected -- the argument that due
process requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent
lawyer in a disciplinary proceeding.  See, e.g., Annot.,
Appointment of Counsel for Attorney Facing Disciplinary Charges,
86 ALR 4th 1071 (1991) (collecting cases).
		  Even if no state or federal constitutional provision
requires the appointment of counsel, the accused argues, this
court should exercise its inherent authority to appoint counsel
to ensure fair lawyer disciplinary proceedings.  The accused
points to the significant personal interest that the accused
lawyer has in such a proceeding, the risk that a trial panel may
reach an erroneous decision if an accused party is unrepresented,
and the interest of the state and the public in fairly
adjudicated disciplinary proceedings.  The accused argues that
those considerations support the appointment of counsel, even if
due process does not require such appointment.  The accused
points out that Oregon law requires appointed counsel in other
adversarial settings, such as juvenile cases, ORS 419B.195,
termination of parental rights cases, ORS 419B.518, and mental
commitment hearings, ORS 426.100.  He also invites this court to
follow the practice of certain other states where counsel is
appointed for lawyers in some disciplinary proceedings.   
We decline the invitation.  The routine appointment of
counsel in lawyer disciplinary matters might or might not be a
better policy than that contained in the current procedures. (3) 
Those procedures, however, are based upon rules that the Bar's
Board of Governors has adopted and that this court has approved. 
If those rules are to be changed in the manner that the accused
advocates, that change "must await the full debate that is
contemplated by the process for adopting and amending" them.  In
re Gatti, 330 Or 517, 532, 8 P3d 966 (2000).
		We return to the merits of this case.  As noted above,
the accused failed, on multiple occasions, to respond to the
Bar's complaint.  The Bar's efforts to communicate with the
accused and to serve him with applicable papers and notices met
the requirements of due process.  On two occasions, the trial
panel set aside default orders and gave the accused additional
time to respond to discovery requests and to the charges against
him.  When the accused again failed to comply with orders from
the trial panel, that panel, in an order signed March 31, 2000,
struck the accused's answer and deemed the allegations in the
formal complaint to be true.  BR 4.5(e); BR 5.8(a).  The accused
moved to set aside that order, but again failed to comply with
discovery requirements.  
		On August 3, 2000, the trial panel issued findings and
an order that, among other things, denied the accused's motions
to set aside the sanction order, to appoint counsel, and to reset
discovery and trial dates.  On October 31, 2000, the trial panel
issued its opinion on the merits, concluding that the accused had
committed 32 violations of the disciplinary rules and ORS 9.527,
and disbarring the accused.
On de novo review, and for the reasons discussed above,
we agree with the trial panel's denial of the accused's request
that counsel be appointed to represent him.  We also agree with
the trial panel's order denying the accused's motion to set aside
the default (sanction) order.  Because the trial panel properly
struck the accused's answer, the trial panel correctly deemed the
allegations in the Bar's complaint to be true.  Based on those
allegations, the record as a whole, and the opinion of the trial
panel, we agree with the trial panel that the accused committed
the violations charged and that he should be disbarred. (4)
		The accused is disbarred, effective 60 days from the
date of filing of this decision.



1. 	The Bar also filed a petition for suspension during
pendency of disciplinary proceedings under Bar Rule of Procedure
(BR) 3.1, and this court entered an order of suspension on July
1, 1999.  Although BR 3.1(h) limits a suspension order under the
rule to 270 days, the court also suspended the accused for
failure to pay Bar dues, failure to pay Professional Liability
Fund assessments, and failure to comply with MCLE requirements,
and has not reinstated him.

2. 	Counsel for the accused requested as relief a remand to
the trial panel to consider the request for appointment of
counsel, rather than the three-year suspension requested in the
accused's pro se brief.  Because of our disposition of this
proceeding, we need not consider the relevance, if any, of the
variation between the relief requested in the briefs. 

3. 	We note that the BR 3.2 already permits a court to
appoint counsel for a lawyer facing a disciplinary proceeding in
those exceptional cases in which the accused lawyer suffers from
a personality disorder, mental illness, senility, or addiction. 
Although the accused allegedly did suffer from addiction, he did
not indicate that he was addicted during the disbarment
proceedings, he did not petition for appointed counsel under that
rule, and he participated -- albeit intermittently -- in the
proceedings against him.  In any event, the rule is permissive,
rather than mandatory.

4. 	The accused's repeated violations of the disciplinary
rules are sufficient to warrant disbarment.  In arriving at that
conclusion, we do not consider the effect or relevance of the
trial panel's conclusion that the accused also violated ORS
9.527(4).  See In re Kimmel, 332 Or 480, 487, 31 P3d 426 (2001)
(violation of provision of ORS chapter 9 generally has no effect
on sanction that this court imposes for violations of
disciplinary rules).