Case Title: State v. Lennon

Citation: 

Docket Number: S057150

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: April 8, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner
on Review,
v.
CHARLES KAVIN LENNON,
aka Charles Cavin Lennon,
Respondent
on Review.
(CC
02C46833; CA A122082; SC S057150)
En Banc
On appeal from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
January 5, 2010.
Doug M. Petrina,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on
review.  With him on the briefs were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and
Jerome Lidz, Solicitor General.
Meredith Allen, Senior
Deputy Public Defender, Office of  Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  With her on the briefs were Peter Gartlan, Chief
Defender, and Louis R. Miles, Deputy Public Defender.
LINDER, J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 
*Appeal from Marion
County Circuit Court, Albin W. Norblad,
Judge. 225 Or App 318, 201
P3d 264 (2009).
LINDER, J.
This case is before us a second
time.  In its first decision, the Court of Appeals determined that it was plain
error for the sentencing court not to have given defendant the option of a jury
trial to decide the facts on which the court imposed an upward departure sentence
for his conviction; the Court of Appeals then exercised its discretion to
correct that error.  State v. Lennon, 204 Or App 111, 129 P3d 209 (2008)
(Lennon I).  On review, this court vacated that decision and remanded
for reconsideration in light of State v. Ramirez, 343 Or 505, 173 P3d
817 (2007), adh'd to as modified on recons, 344 Or 195, 179 P3d 673
(2008).(1) 
State v. Lennon, 345 Or 315, 199 P3d 63 (2008).  On remand, the
Court of Appeals reconsidered whether it should exercise its discretion to
consider defendant's challenge to his sentence.  It determined that it should
do so, and again remanded the case for resentencing.  State v. Lennon,
225 Or App 318, 320, 201 P3d 264 (2009) (Lennon II).  We allowed
the state's petition for review.  For the reasons we explain below, we now
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.
Defendant was convicted after a jury
trial of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (methamphetamine).  After
the jury returned its verdict, the trial court discharged the jury without
objection.  About one month later, the court held a hearing to impose sentence.
 Based on the seriousness of his current offense and the existence of two
person-related felony convictions in his criminal history, the presumptive
sentence for defendant's offense under the sentencing guidelines was 35 to 40
months of incarceration.  The presentence report prepared by the Department of
Corrections for defendant's sentencing catalogued a much more extensive criminal
record for defendant than had factored into defendant's presumptive sentence
under the guidelines.  Based on the presentence report, the sentencing court imposed
a durational departure sentence of an 80-month term of incarceration, followed
by 36 months of post-prison supervision.  The sentencing court expressly found
that "prior incarcerations, probations, paroles, sanctions haven't
worked" to deter defendant from continued criminal activities.  Defendant did
not object to his sentence at the time of sentencing.
On appeal, defendant argued for the
first time that, under Blakely v. Washington, 542 US 296, 124 S Ct 2531,
159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 120 S Ct
2348, 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), the sentencing court had committed plain error in
imposing a departure sentence based on facts that were neither admitted by
defendant nor found by a jury.  The Court of Appeals agreed.  The Court of
Appeals further agreed with defendant that it should exercise its discretion to
correct that error, and it reversed.  Lennon I, 204 Or App at 112.  
The state petitioned for review and,
while that petition was pending, this court issued its decision in Ramirez.
 As we have noted, we thereafter allowed the state's petition for review
in this case, vacated the Court of Appeals decision, and remanded for
reconsideration in light of Ramirez.  On remand, the Court of Appeals
adhered to its prior disposition.  Lennon II, 225 Or App at 320.  The
state again petitioned for review, and we allowed the petition.
To provide context for our discussion
of the Court of Appeals decision on remand, we begin by briefly describing our
decision in Ramirez.  In Ramirez, this court was presented with
two issues.  The first was whether it was plain error for a sentencing court to
make the factual findings supporting a departure sentence.  Under Blakely and
Apprendi, such findings must be made by a jury unless the defendant
waives his right to have the jury decide them.  More specifically, the issue
was whether it was plain error for the sentencing court to make the departure
findings, given that the defendant had invoked his right to a jury trial to
determine guilt and then did not object when the jury was discharged and the
trial court imposed the departure sentence.  Ramirez, 343 Or at 512.(2) 
The second issue was whether, if the sentencing court committed plain error,
the Court of Appeals properly exercised its discretion to reach it.  Id.
This court declined to reach the
first issue in Ramirez, concluding that the more "expeditious"
way to resolve the case was to assume for purpose of that case that it was
plain error for the sentencing court to have discharged the jury and made the
findings necessary to support the departure sentence.  Id.  This court
instead resolved the case based only on the second issue -- i.e.,
whether the Court of Appeals had properly exercised its discretion to correct
the error.  Id.  In Ramirez, the defendant was convicted of
attempted murder and first-degree assault after having shot the victim in the
head.  The victim survived, but lost an eye.  At sentencing, the trial court imposed
an upward departure sentence, based in part on the fact that the victim had
sustained a permanent injury -- a factor, the trial court concluded, that alone
was sufficient to support the departure.  After assuming that it had been error
for the trial court, rather than the jury, to make the factual findings
supporting the sentence, this court further concluded that the Court of Appeals
should not have exercised its discretion to correct the error: 
"If, as the record reveals, there is no legitimate
debate that the victim suffered a permanent injury as a result of the
shooting, then defendant's interest in a second hearing is minimal, if not
nonexistent:  A second hearing would only confirm that the departure sentence
was warranted.  The state, for its part, has a significant interest in avoiding
a second, unnecessary sentencing hearing.  Viewed in that light, the competing
interests of the parties establish that this was not an appropriate case in
which to consider defendant's unpreserved error."
Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
After this court remanded this case
to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Ramirez, the
Court of Appeals began by declining to reconsider whether the sentencing court
had committed plain error by discharging the jury and judicially finding the
facts on which the departure sentence was based.  In that regard, the Court of
Appeals noted that Ramirez had not disturbed the Court of Appeals' plain
error determination; instead, Ramirez had reversed only on the
conclusion that the Court of Appeals should not have exercised its discretion
to reach the error.  Lennon II, 225 Or App at 321.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals on
reconsideration revisited only whether it should exercise its discretion in
this case to correct the error.  It concluded that it should.  Id.  Its
decision in that regard was predicated on its view of what factual inferences
are legally required to support a departure sentence on the ground that the
trial court relied on in this case -- viz., that prior criminal
sanctions had failed to deter defendant from further criminal conduct.  Relying
on its own precedent, the Court of Appeals concluded that "failure to deter"
could not be inferred from a defendant's criminal history alone.  Rather, a defendant's
criminal history must support the further factual inference that the defendant
possessed a "malevolent quality" as part of his character:                   
 "[T]he determination of whether a defendant had been
undeterred by prior sanctions involves more than merely recounting the
defendant's criminal history.  There also must be evidence that is
sufficient to allow a factfinder to draw an inference about 'the malevolent
quality of the offender,' and the failure of probation to serve as an
effective deterrent."
Id. at 323 (quoting State v. Allen, 198 Or App
392, 396, 108 P3d 651, adh'd to as clarified on recons, 202 Or App 565,
123 P3d 331 (2005), disposition withdrawn, 207 Or App 295, 140 P3d 1135,
rev den, 342 Or 46 (2006)) (emphasis added).  The Court of Appeals thus
held that "a finding that a defendant has not been deterred by prior
probations or incarcerations depends on inferences about the defendant's
personal characteristics and circumstances that are subject to the jury trial
right[.]"  Lennon II, 225 Or App at 322.
Taking guidance from Ramirez,
the Court of Appeals examined the record in this case to determine if there was
"no legitimate debate" as to the inferences that the Court of Appeals
believed the factfinder must draw.  In particular, the Court of Appeals reviewed
defendant's extensive criminal history of prior incarcerations, arrests, other
sanctions, and parole and probation violations, most of which were not
considered in calculating the presumptive sentence for defendant's current
crime of conviction.  The Court of Appeals was unable to conclude that there
was "no legitimate debate" as to whether the jury would have found
the departure factor that the sentencing court relied on.  As noted, the court
reasoned that determining whether a defendant has been undeterred by prior
criminal sanctions required "more than merely recounting the defendant's
criminal history" and instead required a further inference "about the
malevolent quality of the defendant."  In the Court of Appeals' view,
"the record here -- which consists merely of defendant's criminal history
and the state's characterization of defendant's performance while on probation
-- does not satisfy that standard."  Lennon II, 225 Or App at 324.(3)
On review, the parties take issue
with whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that, for a departure
sentence to be based on "failure to deter," a factfinder must specifically
infer that there is a separate "malevolent quality" to defendant's
character.  The state contends that, as an upward departure sentencing factor,
"failure to deter" may be permissibly inferred from the extensiveness
and nature of a defendant's history.  According to the state, when that
inference is drawn, it is a sufficient basis for a departure sentence; a
further inference of a separate "malevolent quality" is not required
by law, makes little sense, and should be discarded.(4) 
In response, defendant acknowledges that the phrase "malevolent
quality" may be a less-than-ideal way to describe what a factfinder must
infer to support a departure sentence in this case.  Defendant argues, however,
that the Court of Appeals was correct in requiring more than a finding of
"failure to deter."  Defendant reasons that, under ORS 137.671(2), a
sentencing court may impose a departure sentence only if "there are
substantial and compelling reasons" for the departure.  According to
defendant, it is a "truism" that prior criminal sanctions have not
deterred a defendant whenever that defendant commits a subsequent crime. 
Defendant thus argues that something more than a defendant's criminal history
is required to establish a "failure to deter" sufficient to provide a
substantial and compelling basis for a departure.(5)
This court's decision in State v. Bray, 342 Or 711, 160 P3d 983 (2007), provides guidance in resolving the
issue framed by the parties' arguments.  One of the issues in Bray was
whether a departure factor -- "persistent involvement in similar
offenses" -- fell within the prior conviction exception to the rule in Apprendi. 
If so, then the factor was not subject to the Blakely/Apprendi jury
trial right; if not, then defendant was entitled to have a jury decide his
"persistent involvement in similar offenses" unless he waived a jury trial
on the issue.  
This court held that, in determining
whether the record establishes a defendant's "persistent involvement in
similar offenses," a sentencing court "must do more than find that a
defendant has two or more prior convictions for similar offenses."  Bray,
342 Or at 724.  Rather, the trier of fact "must infer from the number and
frequency of those prior convictions whether the defendant's involvement in
those offenses is 'persistent[.]'"  Id.  In determining what
"persistent" entails, this court drew from the ordinary understanding
of that term -- i.e., recurring or continuing.  Id. (citing
dictionary definition).  Given the particular record in Bray, this court
concluded that more than one inference could have been drawn from the
defendant's criminal history as to whether his criminal conduct was recurring
or continuing because, although defendant had 10  offenses in his criminal
history that were similar to his current crime of conviction, all had arisen
out of a single prior criminal incident involving two victims.  As a result,
this court determined that the failure to submit the issue of "persistent
involvement" to a jury -- which was a preserved claim of error in Bray
-- was not harmless.  Id. 
Bray is significant here,
because this court required no further inference to support a departure, beyond
the inference of "persistent involvement" that a factfinder might
permissibly draw from a defendant's criminal history.  In contrast, the Court
of Appeals had held, in a series of cases that preceded Bray, that
"persistent involvement" entailed a further inference that
defendant's criminal history reflected a "separate malevolent
quality" in his character.(6) 
In the wake of Bray, the Court of Appeals recognized that requiring a
"separate malevolent quality" to be inferred from a defendant's
criminal history placed a "gloss" on the operative departure standard
that had no place in the analysis.  State v. Schenewerk, 217 Or App 243,
247, 174 P3d 1117 (2007), rev den, 344 Or 671, 189 P3d 26 (2008).  The
Court of Appeals acknowledged, instead, that imposing a departure sentence on
the ground of "persistent involvement" was more "straightforward." 
Id. at 246.  In particular, the factfinder was entitled to determine,
from the "number and frequency" of a defendant's prior convictions
for similar offenses, whether the defendant's involvement in those offenses was
so "continuous or recurring" as to be "persistent."  Id.
at 247; see also State v. Agee, 223 Or App 729, 196 P3d 1060 (2008)
(same).
We agree with the Court of Appeals'
reconsideration of its former "separate malevolent quality" analysis
in the context of the "persistent involvement in similar offenses"
ground for a departure sentence.  A similar analysis applies here.  To find a
failure to deter, the factfinder must infer that a defendant's prior criminal
sanctions should have deterred the defendant from committing the current
offense.  Whether that inference follows from the defendant's prior criminal
sanctions will depend on such factors as the number of past convictions or
sanctions, when they occurred, and the kind of crimes that the defendant
committed.  A finding that those past criminal sanctions have not deterred a
defendant from committing further crimes thus requires something beyond a
conclusion that a defendant has one or more criminal convictions in his
past.(7) 
But a finding of a "separate malevolent quality" is not necessary.  If
the record supports the factual inference that a defendant's prior criminal convictions
or sanctions should have, but did not, deter the defendant from committing his
new offense or offenses, that factual finding can, in a proper case, support a
departure sentence.  It is then for the sentencing court to decide, based on
that predicate factual determination, whether there is a "substantial and
compelling" reason to impose an upward departure sentence in a particular
defendant's case.  See State v. Upton, 339 Or 673, 681, 125 P3d 713
(2005) (defendant has right under Blakely to have jury decide existence
of facts that sentencing court then may consider to determine whether
substantial and compelling reasons exist to impose sentence that exceeds
presumptive range).(8)
In this case, the record of defendant's
criminal history provides "no legitimate debate" that prior criminal
sanctions have failed to deter defendant from engaging in criminal activity. 
The presentence report, on which the sentencing court relied, shows that
defendant's criminal history spans two decades, without a significant lapse of
time between his criminal activities.  He has been convicted of 37 criminal offenses;
has received supervision terms in 22 cases, and has violated supervision at
least 34 times.  His parole and probation record includes over 1,500 entries
that detail repeated instances of arrest and incarceration, illegal drug use,
restraining order violations, failing to report or keep contact with parole and
probation officers, and failing to undergo or complete court-ordered drug
treatment.  What is more, defendant committed the drug offense in this case
while awaiting sentencing on a drug-related conviction for which he had been
tried only about two weeks earlier.  Based on those facts, we conclude that
there is no legitimate debate that past criminal sanctions have failed to deter
defendant from engaging in criminal conduct.  The Court of Appeals erred in reaching
a contrary conclusion, based on the erroneous legal premise that the record must
also establish that defendant possessed a separate malevolent quality.  The
Court of Appeals should not have exercised its discretion to correct any error
in the imposition of defendant's departure sentence.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 
1. In
remanding, we also cited State v. Fults, 343 Or 515, 173 P3d 822 (2007),
which was a related case decided on the same date as Ramirez.  For
purposes of this case, Ramirez is the more important precedent and we
cite and discuss it without considering Fults further.
2. That
issue in Ramirez arose aftermath this court's decision in State v.
Gornick, 340 Or 160, 130 P3d 780 (2006).  In Gornick, this court
held that it was not plain error for the sentencing court to make the findings
that supported a departure sentence.  This court concluded that defendant's
failure to object to the sentence permitted competing inferences as to whether
the defendant waived his right to have a jury decide the facts necessary to
support the departure, and that those competing inferences precluded treating
the error as "plain."  
In Gornick, the defendant, in
advance of trial, had executed a valid written waiver of his right to a jury
trial to decide guilt.  The "plain error" question in Ramirez
was whether the conclusion that this court reached in Gornick -- viz.,
that competing inferences could be drawn from defendant's failure to claim at
sentencing that he was entitled to a jury trial on the departure findings --
should follow in a case in which the defendant, rather than having waived a
jury at the outset of the trial, had instead invoked his right to a trial by
jury. 
3. The
Court of Appeals decision may reflect some misunderstanding of our holding in Ramirez. 
The Court of Appeals appears to have used the "no legitimate debate"
standard in Ramirez as the test for whether to exercise its discretion
to reach the error.  That is an incorrect understanding of the holding in Ramirez. 
The "no legitimate debate" criterion, if satisfied, places the error
outside the universe of what the Court of Appeals may consider as a
discretionary matter.  An opposite conclusion -- i.e., that there is a
legitimate debate about what factual conclusion a jury might reach -- means
only that the error is one that the Court of Appeals may consider; it
does not mean that the court must do so.  In other words, in the latter
circumstance, the Court of Appeals may, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, make either choice -- i.e., not to reach and correct the
error or, alternatively, to reach and correct the error.
4. The
state also presents, as a second question for this court's review, whether the
sentencing court committed plain error at all.  Specifically, the state asserts
that, as this court concluded in Gornick, 340 Or 160 and State v.
Perez, 340 Or 310, 131 P3d 168 (2006), unpreserved Apprendi/Blakely
claims are susceptible to competing inferences as to whether a defendant may
have deliberately failed to raise the claim, and they therefore do not qualify
as error apparent on the record.  We decline to reach that issue, for two
reasons.  First, as we have already noted, in remanding this case for
reconsideration, we expressly did so citing Ramirez, a case in
which we declined to resolve the plain error issue and instead considered only
whether the Court of Appeals properly exercised its discretion to correct that
"assumed" error.  In light of the terms of our remand, the Court of
Appeals understandably did not revisit its plain error conclusion in this
case.  Second, and in all events, our reasons for approaching the problem as we
did in Ramirez remain valid.  Statutory changes have diminished the
extent to which the issue will arise in future cases, and it remains more
expeditious to resolve this case based on whether this is a circumstance in
which the Court of Appeals had discretion to correct the perceived error.  See
Ramirez, 343 Or at 512 (discussing those considerations).  
5. Defendant
raises several other issues in his brief on the merits, some of which present
constitutional challenges to aspects of Oregon's sentencing guidelines.  Those
additional issues were not raised at sentencing, were not presented to the
Court of Appeals, and therefore are not properly before this court.  See ORAP
9.20(2) (reviewable questions before Supreme Court include all questions
properly before the Court of Appeals that the petition or the response claims
were erroneously decided by that court).
6. See
State v. Kennedy, 113 Or App 134, 137-38, 831 P2d 712 (1992)
("persistent involvement in similar offenses," as ground for
departure sentence, was intended to capture "a separate malevolent quality
in the offender" represented by repetitive nature of offender's criminal
history); see also State v. Perez, 196 Or App 364, 372-73, 102 P3d 705
(2004) ("persistent involvement" ground for departure sentence
requires factfinder to infer separate malevolent quality, over and above
counting the number of offenses in a criminal offender's history).
7. For
example, a defendant might have a 15-year-old conviction for an assault that he
committed as a young man during an argument over a girlfriend.  Years later, he
may have become involved with drugs and have a current conviction for a drug
offense.  The single 15-year-old assault conviction would be a weak basis for a
"failure to deter" inference in such a circumstance.
8. Defendant's argument appears in certain respects to take issue with whether the
"failure to deter" ground for a departure sentence can, without more,
legally constitute "substantial and compelling" grounds for a
departure sentence.  However, defendant raised no objection to the sentencing
court's decision to depart on a "failure to deter" ground.  If
defendant believed that "failure to deter," once a factual basis for
it is found, is nevertheless not a ground that legally supports a departure
sentence, he needed to preserve that argument by objecting on that theory at
the time of sentencing.  Defendant did not do so in this case.