Case Title: State v. Bunyard

Citation: 

Docket Number: 112645

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2018-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 112,645 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JOSIAH R. BUNYARD, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
A district judge's denial of a criminal defendant's right to forego counsel and 
represent himself or herself is structural error requiring reversal of the defendant's 
convictions.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed April 29, 2016. 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; CHRISTOPHER MAGANA, judge.  Opinion filed February 16, 2018.  
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is 
reversed and remanded. 
 
Richard Ney, of Ney & Adams, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, 
and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BEIER, J.:  Defendant Josiah R. Bunyard appeals his convictions for battery, 
aggravated battery, attempted violation of a protective order, and intimidation of a 
witness. 
 
2 
 
During the course of his case, Bunyard was very active in his defense. At a 
motions hearing on the Friday before his trial was to begin on Monday, Bunyard 
interjected during argument before the court. The district judge told Bunyard that he 
could either speak through his appointed lawyer or represent himself. Given those 
options, Bunyard said he would represent himself. After discussing the matter with 
counsel, Bunyard temporarily dropped the issue. But, before the conclusion of the 
hearing, Bunyard again interjected and stated that he wanted it on the record that he was 
"unequivocally" asserting his right to self-representation. The judge refused to take up the 
matter of self-representation at that time, instead telling Bunyard that he must file a 
written motion if he wanted to represent himself. Bunyard did not file a written motion or 
otherwise reassert the right to self-representation when court reconvened the next week.  
  
Before the Court of Appeals, Bunyard raised multiple issues. Included among 
them was denial of his right to self-representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this 
claim and the other claims Bunyard raised and affirmed his convictions and sentence. See 
State v. Bunyard, No. 112,645, 2016 WL 1719607, at *17 (Kan. App. 2016).  
 
Bunyard filed a petition for review by this court, which was granted. We hold that 
there was structural error in the handling of Bunyard's invocation of his right to self-
representation, and we reverse the Court of Appeals decision and the judgment of the 
district court. The case must be remanded to district court for further proceedings. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
To resolve Bunyard's appeal, it is not necessary to recite the facts leading to the 
charges against him in detail. Highly summarized, the State alleged that Bunyard choked 
and broke the jaw of his girlfriend, Jennifer Wood. After Bunyard was arrested and 
ordered not to have any contact with Wood, Bunyard sent a letter to a mutual friend that 
the State alleged was intended to be passed to Wood. See 2016 WL 1719607, at *1.  
3 
 
At the Friday pretrial hearing referenced above, the district judge took up two 
motions, including the State's motion to introduce Wood's preliminary hearing testimony 
at trial. The State had unsuccessfully attempted to find Wood to secure her attendance 
and live testimony.  
 
Multiple witnesses testified about the State's efforts to locate Wood. After the 
testimony concluded, Mark Sevart, Bunyard's appointed counsel, argued that the State 
was not diligent enough to render Wood unavailable to testify. In the alternative, Sevart 
argued, even if Wood qualified as legally unavailable, it would be inappropriate to admit 
her preliminary hearing testimony, because, according to him, the cross-examination of 
Wood conducted by Bunyard's previous counsel, Charles O'Hara, was insufficient to 
satisfy the Confrontation Clause.   
 
During the State's response to Sevart's argument, the prosecutor noted that he had 
new information on the whereabouts of another witness, for which both the State and 
defense had requested a material witness warrant. During a colloquy between the judge 
and the State about that witness, Bunyard interrupted. The transcript of the hearing 
includes the following exchange:   
 
"THE COURT:  So you're not seeking to have her declared unavailable since, 
apparently, she's recently been located? 
 
"[THE STATE]:  That's correct.  
 
 . . . . 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Your Honor, could I please be heard? 
 
"THE COURT:  Mr. Bunyard, you have appointed counsel who has filed this 
motion or is responding to this motion, so you're either having Mr. Sevart argue this 
case—or are you representing yourself? Which is it?  
4 
 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  "I'll represent myself, if that's the choice. I will 
definitely— 
 
"THE COURT:  You're seeking to have Mr. Sevart taken off this case? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  If those are my options, then, yes. 
 
"THE COURT:  What are you asking, Mr. Bunyard? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  I'm asking to be heard right now. 
 
"THE COURT:  About what? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  About what we're having the hearing on. I have some 
information that—they've given you information that's not correct. 
 
"THE COURT:  Mr. Sevart, why don't you take a moment . . . and speak off the 
record with your client. Do you expect this to be a lengthy conversation? 
 
"MR. SEVART:  Well, Your Honor, perhaps we should reconvene Monday, as 
far as—or, I mean, later today, I guess, too, but, I mean, I know you've got some other 
items— 
 
"[THE STATE]:  At the very minimum, I'd ask that you authorize a material 
witness warrant for Ms. Wood. We need to have the weekend to try to find her.  
 
"THE COURT:  Mr. Sevart, why don't you take a few minutes and speak with 
him there at counsel table, and then we'll see if we can resolve this. 
 
"[THE STATE]:  Do you want me to step out, Judge? 
 
"THE COURT:  No. You're fine." 
 
5 
 
When the court came back on the record, the judge noted that the prosecutor had 
left the courtroom briefly while Sevart and Bunyard spoke. The judge then asked Sevart 
to inform the court of Bunyard's decision. 
 
 
"MR. SEVART:  Your Honor, I think the points that my client wanted to raise 
that may or may not make any difference but should be presented to you are, apparently, 
Mr. O'Hara was retained with respect to one of the earlier cases. His status, whether he 
was appointed or just showed up or whatever with respect to this case, I guess, is not real 
clear. . . . 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Well, let me stop you right there, and let's nail this down. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Mr. O'Hara generally doesn't take appointments on criminal 
cases, so if he was present, whether pro bono or in relation to another case, he was not—
you would agree he was not appointed by the Court to represent Mr. Bunyard on this case 
at the preliminary hearing; correct? On this case. 
 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  He was not retained by Mr. Bunyard, either. 
 
 
"THE COURT:  That is not my question, Mr. Bunyard. I am addressing my 
question to Mr. Sevart, not to you.  
 
 
"My question, Mr. Sevart, is:  Was he appointed by the Court to represent Mr. 
Bunyard? 
 
 
"MR. SEVART:  No." 
 
The district judge and Sevart then continued to discuss O'Hara and whether there 
had been any objection raised at the preliminary hearing to his representation of Bunyard. 
As the judge was about to rule on one of the motions, Bunyard again interjected during 
the following exchange:  
6 
 
 
"MR. SEVART:  What . . . I was getting to, Your Honor, is I think we can get to 
the motion on the witness, as far as the issuance of the warrant, and if the Court would 
reserve ruling until Monday with respect to the preliminary hearing—the usage of the 
preliminary hearing transcript, it may be moot if they locate her. But perhaps we have 
time so the Court can review that transcript, and then, also, I can visit with my client a 
little further and we can reconvene Monday morning on this motion. 
 
"THE COURT:  All right. I'm going to go ahead and rule on the one motion. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  I want it on the record I wish to represent myself 
unequivocally. 
 
"THE COURT:  Mr. Bunyard, for the time being, I'm not going to take up an oral 
motion made at this time. I'm going to give you an opportunity to speak further with Mr. 
Sevart. I'm also going to give you an opportunity, if you decide to pursue that route, to 
file a proper motion to the Court. But we're not going to address that at this time.  
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  How will I get that to— 
 
"THE COURT:  Mr. Bunyard, that's all there is to say on that issue. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  How will I get it to the Court? How do I tell them that? 
 
"THE COURT:  Mr. Bunyard, you seem quite familiar with the procedures in 
filing pro se motions, so I'm not going to dictate to you how to represent yourself or 
proceed in that fashion if you want to. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  The Court is—there's no mail going out for the weekend. 
There's no way I can get it there. 
 
"THE COURT:  Mr. Bunyard, we're not addressing this matter further. 
 
"SHERIFF'S DEPUTY:  Do you want him removed, sir? 
7 
 
 
"THE COURT:  We'll—we'll proceed."  
 
The judge then ruled that Wood was unavailable and that the transcript of her 
preliminary hearing testimony could be introduced by the State at trial. He then 
concluded the motions hearing.  
 
When Bunyard's trial began on Monday, before jury selection began, the district 
judge and parties addressed several outstanding issues.  
 
"THE COURT:  Thank you. We're here this morning on the day of trial. We have 
spent the morning in some conversations in chambers and with defense counsel and the 
prosecuting attorney dealing with several outstanding issues trying to reach a resolution 
on some of them, addressing some last-minute matters. At this point, we're going to place 
on the record several things and address several outstanding matters. 
 
"To recap, on Friday, February 21st, we appeared and, to clarify and confirm 
with counsel, at that time as to the [S]tate's motion to determine witness availability I did 
find that as to witness Jennifer Wood that reasonable diligence had been shown by the 
[S]tate and, therefore, the preliminary hearing transcript of Ms. Wood could be used at 
trial. 
 
"I ruled as to the consolidation of these two cases that resulting from two or more 
acts or transactions connected together, or constituting parts of a common scheme or 
plan, that these cases would be consolidated. 
 
"The Motion to Suppress . . . filed by Mr. Sevart was withdrawn as the [S]tate 
indicated they did not intend to use any evidence taken from the defendant's home at trial. 
 
"There were three separate motions to endorse; all of those were granted without 
objection. And I believe those were all the motions that were filed by either the defense 
or the [S]tate that were outstanding that needed to be dealt with Friday, correct? 
 
8 
 
. . . . 
 
"THE COURT:  All right. Obviously, depending on the trial, the [S]tate could 
reserve the right to bring something up in rebuttal. But, other than that, that is your 
understanding, Mr. Sevart, of all of the motions? 
 
"MR. SEVART:  Your Honor, of the motions that— 
 
"THE COURT:  Filed by you. 
 
"MR. SEVART:  Yes, filed by me. We do have some issues with respect to some 
pro se motions and if we could address that[,] I'd appreciate it. 
 
"THE COURT:  All right. Then at this time it looks like we need to address Mr. 
Bunyard and Mr. Sevart on this. There have been a number of pro se motions filed by the 
defendant, my understanding would be while he was represented by various attorneys in 
this case, and we need to—without having a clear record on what remains at issue, we 
need to address that. So, Mr. Sevart, how are you proposing we proceed?  
 
"MR. SEVART:  Your Honor, if the Court would allow, what I would propose 
that we do is to—I guess, a formal method would be to withdraw all of those pretrial 
motions and in lieu of that have me present to the Court by way of oral motion the issues, 
I guess, that are—that are outstanding with respect to items raised in those pretrial 
motions. In other words, to substitute, I guess, maybe, is a better word, an oral 
presentation this morning that would dispose of all remaining issues and, therefore, I 
guess, all those other pretrial motions can be withdrawn or resolved by way of a 
substitution oral motion. 
 
"THE COURT:  All right. Mr. Bunyard, you are aware that you have filed a 
number of motions purporting to represent yourself during the course of this case, and at 
this time you've had an opportunity to speak with Mr. Sevart either on Friday, over the 
weekend, or this morning about how you wish to proceed on those motions. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  I'm sorry, I didn't understand exactly what you said. 
9 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Have you had an opportunity to speak with Mr. Sevart about all 
of the pro se motions that you have filed? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. He's—he's got a list that—that is going to sum up 
the ones that are still relevant and—yeah. 
 
"THE COURT:  All right. Mr. Bunyard, you have filed a lot of motions, and at 
this point because it's unclear exactly what is still at issue from your perspective, or what 
has or has not been ruled upon, what Mr. Sevart is proposing, and I'm prepared to do, is 
you're going to withdraw, if you would like, all of your motions. So all of the motions 
you have filed you're basically saying you no longer want them heard, and then what Mr. 
Sevart is saying is he will now make an oral motion on the ones that, apparently, you two 
have discussed and that you still believe are relevant; you understand that? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
 
"THE COURT:  And is that what you want to do? Do you want to, at this time, 
withdraw all of the motions that you, yourself, have personally filed in this case? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  As long as he argues the ones still that we've discussed 
that he's going to do, as long as that's still going to take place, then, yeah. 
 
"THE COURT:  That's my understanding. Mr. Sevart has spoken with you and he 
says that he knows what you still want to be heard. He's going to make an oral motion on 
those. But, as far as your written motions, you're fine with withdrawing all of those 
motions and not having those motions heard where you would basically tell me what your 
arguments were. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Again, as long as he argues the ones that we've discussed, 
yes. 
 
"THE COURT:  All right. Then, at this time, I'm going to show all of the pro se 
motions that you have filed to date that haven't already been ruled upon in some fashion 
10 
 
by another judge as being withdrawn at this time. And you don't object to that, correct, 
Mr. Bunyard? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Again, as long as all this is argued that we're talking about 
that I've discussed with him, I do not object. 
 
"THE COURT:  All right. In that case, Mr. Sevart, I'll allow you to proceed with 
your first oral motion." 
 
 
Sevart then argued the substance of several of the pro se motions, and the district 
judge ruled upon them.  
 
 
After the conclusion of evidence and closing arguments at trial, the jury returned 
guilty verdicts on all four counts. The district judge sentenced Bunyard to 144 months on 
the aggravated battery conviction. For each of the three other counts, he imposed a 
sentence of six months in jail to run concurrent to the aggravated battery sentence.   
 
When the Court of Appeals took up Bunyard's self-representation issue, the panel 
noted that "a district court cannot effectively filibuster a criminal defendant's spontaneous 
request for self-representation by refusing to rule on the request or by imposing 
requirements that the defendant reassert that request in a detailed written form or in 
successive hearings to secure a ruling." Bunyard, 2016 WL 1719607, at *4 (citing State v. 
Vann, 280 Kan. 782, 794, 127 P.3d 307 [2006]). Likewise, the panel said, a district judge 
cannot "act in a manner likely to foster the impression the request will necessarily be 
denied or withhold a discussion of the implications of self-representation to stymie a 
defendant's desire to represent himself or herself." 2016 WL 1719607, at *4. 
Nevertheless, the panel ruled that there had been no "functional or deliberate" 
undermining of Bunyard's right to represent himself. 2016 WL 1719607, at *4.  
 
 
11 
 
"Bunyard was exceptionally active personally in the defense of the charges both through 
his extensive pro se filings and his comments during court appearances. Yet, he did not 
make a request for self-representation until the district court mentioned it a couple of 
days before trial. Bunyard did not then act on the district court's direction by preparing 
even a nominal or bare-bones motion for self-representation—something that was within 
his capacity." 2016 WL 1719607, at *4.  
 
The panel also noted that Bunyard did not "resurrect" the issue on the morning of trial, 
when, in its words, he "affirmatively assented" to counsel's argument on other 
outstanding pro se motions. 2016 WL 1719607, at *4. 
 
We granted Bunyard's petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The extent of the right to assistance of counsel and the related right to self-
representation is a question of law over which this court exercises unlimited review. See 
State v. Jones, 290 Kan. 373, 376, 228 P.3d 394 (2010). 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held "that the Sixth Amendment, as made 
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that a defendant in a 
state criminal trial has an independent constitutional right to self-representation." Vann, 
280 Kan. at 793 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 
562 [1975]). "'The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers 
the consequences if the defense fails.'" Jones, 290 Kan. at 377 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. 
at 819).  
 
"A criminal defendant who before trial clearly and unequivocally expresses a wish to 
proceed pro se has the right to self-representation after a knowing and intelligent waiver 
of the right to counsel. A knowing and intelligent waiver requires that the defendant be 
informed on the record of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The 
12 
 
choice is to be made '"with eyes open."'" State v. Graham, 273 Kan. 844, 850, 46 P.3d 
1177 (2002). 
 
There is obvious potential tension between the right to counsel and the right, as a 
layperson, to represent oneself.  
 
"'Because the right to proceed pro se is at odds with the right to be represented by 
counsel, "[t]he courts must indulge 'every reasonable presumption against waiver' of the 
right to counsel, and will 'not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights 
[i.e., the right to counsel].'" [Citation omitted.] "[U]nlike the right to counsel, the right to 
self-representation can be waived by mere failure to assert it." [Citation omitted.]' State v. 
Lowe, 18 Kan. App. 2d 72, 74-75, 847 P.2d 1334 (1993)." Vann, 280 Kan. at 793. 
 
Still, "[a] trial court may not measure a defendant's competence to waive his or her 
right to counsel by evaluating the defendant's 'technical legal knowledge.'" Jones, 290 
Kan. at 377 (citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399-400, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 125 L. 
Ed. 2d 321 [1993]). Whether a lawyer could better represent a defendant also is not the 
question for the court to decide. See State v. Lowe, 18 Kan. App. 2d 72, 75, 847 P.2d 
1334 (1993).  
 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a failure to honor a criminal 
defendant's properly asserted right to self-representation is structural error. "'Since the 
right of self-representation is a right that when exercised usually increases the likelihood 
of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to "harmless 
error" analysis. The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be 
harmless.'" Vann, 280 Kan. at 793 (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8, 
104 S. Ct. 944, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122 [1984]).  
 
Two previous cases—one from this court and one from the Court of Appeals are 
instructive here.  
13 
 
 
In the first, State v. Vann, the State charged defendant Durayl Vann with attempted 
first-degree murder, among other crimes. Two months after the district court appointed 
counsel for Vann, he filed a pro se motion requesting different counsel and alleging a 
conflict of interest between himself and counsel. Vann did not serve counsel with a copy 
of the motion, and the motion was not addressed at Vann's preliminary hearing, which 
was held a few days after the motion was filed. The day after the preliminary hearing, 
Vann sent a letter to the clerk, asking about the motion for new counsel. A few days later, 
Vann filed several more pro se motions, including a motion to proceed pro se and retain 
stand-by counsel. The presiding district judge forwarded the letter Vann had written to 
the clerk to Vann's counsel and advised that if counsel wanted a hearing on the matter, he 
needed to contact the court and a hearing would be scheduled. Vann, 280 Kan. at 786-87. 
 
Before trial, the State reminded the district judge that Vann had filed pretrial pro 
se motions. The judge responded that he did not ordinarily hear pro se motions when a 
defendant had representation. But, if the defendant wanted to discuss the motions with his 
counsel and have counsel bring them before the court, the judge said, he would hear 
them. Vann's counsel did not want to bring any other motions before the court, and Vann 
did not say anything to the court about the motions at that time.  
 
Vann did not raise any of his pro se motions again until the court heard a motion 
for new trial after Vann's convictions. Vann then brought up his motion for new counsel. 
The district judge told Vann that he should have called the court's attention to the motion 
on the morning of trial. At sentencing, Vann again brought up his pro se motion for new 
counsel, and the district judge again declined to address it.  
 
On appeal, this court addressed whether the district court's refusal to address 
Vann's motion to proceed pro se with stand-by counsel violated his right to self-
representation.  
14 
 
The court framed the dispositive issue as "whether the defendant clearly and 
unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation prior to trial." 280 Kan. at 794. Cf. 
State v. Cromwell, 253 Kan. 495, 505, 856 P.2d 1299 (1993) (right of self-representation 
unqualified if asserted before trial; after trial starts, district judge has discretion to grant 
request). The State argued that Vann's "failure to serve the motion on counsel, request a 
hearing, or to raise the issue at the pretrial motions hearing was a waiver of the right to 
self-representation." Vann, 280 Kan. at 794. This court disagreed.  
 
"The defendant's motion 'to proceed pro se and retain the attorney as consultant 
in an advis[o]ry capacity' was a clear and unequivocal assertion of the right to proceed 
pro se prior to trial. While we acknowledge that the defendant had filed other motions 
requesting the appointment of a new attorney, this did not change the fact that the 
defendant expressed a desire to proceed pro se. In fact, the existence of these other 
motions was a greater reason for the court to conduct a further inquiry into the 
defendant's position. 
 
"Once the defendant asserted his constitutional right to self-representation by 
pretrial motion, his counsel was advised of the existence of the defendant's pro se 
motions by letter from the district court, and the defendant was told by the court that it 
would not consider motions raised by the defendant himself. The defendant subsequently 
explained to the court that counsel had advised him against raising his pro se motions. 
Based on these facts . . . a possibility certainly existed at the pretrial motions hearing that 
the defendant allowed defense counsel to continue representing him because he felt that 
he had no other choice." 280 Kan. at 794. 
 
This court stated that a holding to the contrary would mean "a defendant would 
bear the burden of continually reasserting his or her right to self-representation or it is 
waived." 280 Kan. at 794-95. But "where the defendant allows defense counsel to 
continue representing him without reasserting his right to self-representation, it does not 
constitute a waiver of that right." 280 Kan. at 795. Because the district judge failed to 
15 
 
consider Vann's pretrial assertion of his right to self-representation, we reversed his 
convictions and remanded the case for new trial. 280 Kan. at 795. 
 
The second case, State v. Lowe, from the Court of Appeals lent support to our 
court's decision in Vann. See Vann, 280 Kan. at 793-95 (citing Lowe, 18 Kan. App. 2d at 
74-76, 79). In Lowe, counsel for defendant Michael Lowe informed the district judge that 
her client wished to represent himself. The judge then spoke directly to Lowe:   
 
 
"'[THE COURT:]  She said you wanted to represent yourself, which I need to 
bring you in here and tell you what the law is on that.  
 
 
"'The only way I can do that is if I make a finding that it would not be of benefit 
to you to have a lawyer in the case, is the only way that I can let you be your own lawyer.  
 
 
"'I've never been a defendant in a case. I've been a lawyer in a case; I've been a 
judge in a case. I tell you, you don't want to try and undertake that yourself, when you are 
so close to it, when you are the defendant.  
 
 
"'I've tried a number of defendants and you are better off letting the lawyer make 
the legal decisions. Whether you enter a plea or not or that sort of matter, that's up to you; 
your lawyer doesn't have nothing to say about that. But where to stand and, oh, legal 
things I'm talking about, you know, how to make a legal argument on whether a piece of 
evidence is permissible or not, you are better off with a lawyer, I'm telling you.  
 
 
"'Another thing, you have a right to be in your proper clothes in your case. Your 
lawyer told me you wouldn't say one way or the other. We have a suit of clothes. I'll get 
those. We have those up here. We'll let you go to the library, jury room, put on your 
proper clothes. You don't have to. That's up to you.  
 
 
"'Another reason I moved up here from my courtroom is that holding cell is 
wired for sound. If you participate—you don't have to—but you can hear everything 
going on from back there.  
 
16 
 
 
"'It's your case. I'm not trying to tell you what to do about it. I want to make sure 
that you know what's going on. If you want a trial, that's what we'll do right here this 
afternoon. We want to do everything right and proper and participate in it, being it's your 
case.  
 
 
"'Do you understand where you are at? 
 
 
"'What did you want to do?  
 
 
"'THE DEFENDANT:  I want a trial.  
 
 
"'THE COURT:  Did you want to be out here? 
 
 
"'THE DEFENDANT:  Yeah.  
 
 
"'THE COURT:  Do you want to put on your civilian clothes?  
 
 
"'THE DEFENDANT:  No.  
 
 
"'THE COURT:  Okay. Now, when the people see—there's been so much 
publicity on the orange jumpsuits—they'll know where you are at. I'll tell the jury that 
they may not consider that, that has nothing to do with anything. If they consider the fact 
that you are in that orange jumpsuit, they are acting improperly. I'll tell them that but it's 
whatever you want to do as far as dress.  
 
 
"'THE DEFENDANT:  I'm fine like this.  
 
 
"'THE COURT:  You want to wear your orange jumpsuit? 
 
 
"'THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.  
 
 
"'THE COURT:  I advise you again you don't have to. I advise you to please 
listen to your lawyer. She has your best interests at heart, no matter what you think right 
now. I understand this is a very tense moment. It's a rough case but your lawyer cares a 
17 
 
lot about helping people. I've seen her try other cases. She's a good lawyer. I wouldn't be 
afraid to have her represent me if I was in your shoes.  
 
 
"'Do you have any questions whatsoever about what's going on? Do you 
understand what you are charged with? 
 
 
"'THE DEFENDANT:  (Indicating affirmatively.) 
 
 
"'THE COURT:  You are ready to go forward?  
 
 
"'THE DEFENDANT:  (Indicating affirmatively.)'" 18 Kan. App. 2d at 73-74. 
 
The Court of Appeals panel rejected the State's assertion that counsel could not 
invoke the right to self-representation on behalf of her client. "The [district] court 
understood that Lowe was asserting his right to self-representation and acted accordingly 
by proceeding to advise Lowe concerning the dangers inherent in self-representation." 18 
Kan. App. 2d at 75. But then the district judge erred, telling Lowe that in order for him to 
represent himself, the judge would have to find "that it would not be of benefit to [Lowe] 
to have a lawyer in the case." 18 Kan. App. 2d at 75. In fact, no requirement for such a 
finding existed. The counseling on the benefits of legal representation that followed the 
judge's misstatement of the law was "consistent with the requirement that . . . a defendant 
must make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel." 18 Kan. App. 2d at 
76 (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; State v. Cunningham, 222 Kan. 704, 706-07, 567 
P.2d 879 [1977]).  
 
"However, when all the court's statements are reviewed, we cannot conclude Lowe made 
a knowing and intelligent decision regarding his right to represent himself. The court 
specifically stated that Lowe would be better off with counsel and, after explaining the 
pitfalls of self-representation, did not give Lowe the opportunity to state whether he 
wanted to represent himself. When the court's statements and actions are viewed in toto, 
there is the danger that Lowe understood not only that his request had been denied, but 
18 
 
also that there was no possibility the court would allow him to represent himself." Lowe, 
18 Kan. App. 2d at 76.  
 
The Lowe panel also quoted extensively from the Third Edition of the Kansas 
Criminal Law Handbook, edited by Judge Michael Barbara, for the information a prudent 
and careful judge should share with a defendant who asserts a right to represent himself 
or herself:   
 
"'The judge should inform the defendant:  
 
 
"'1. That at any time he or she could change his or her mind and retain counsel to 
represent him or her or petition the court for appointment of counsel to represent him or 
her [to] assist with his or her defense.  
 
 
"'2. That no postponement would be permitted at any time during the proceeding 
for the reason that counsel was newly brought into the case.  
 
 
"'3. That the court may and will terminate self-representation if the defendant 
deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct before the court or in any 
proceeding.  
 
 
"'4. That the court [considers] it detrimental for the defendant not to accept or 
employ counsel to represent him or her.  
 
 
"'5. That if the defendant is allowed to represent himself or herself, he or she 
must follow all legal rules applicable to the trial of any criminal action.  
 
 
"'6. That there are numerous dangers and disadvantages to self-representation, 
including the following:  
 
(a) The law provides for numerous pretrial motions available to the 
defendant, which are of a technical nature, the advantage of which the 
defendant would lose if allowed to represent himself or herself; 
19 
 
 
(b) The defendant's vocabulary may impede clear communication with 
the court and opposing counsel; 
 
(c) Judges will not act on behalf of a defendant in asserting objections or 
making appropriate motions where ordinarily it is the duty of counsel to 
call such matters to the court's attention; 
 
(d) The district attorney will not assist in the defense of the case; 
 
(e) The rules of law are highly technical and will not be set aside in view 
of his or her status; 
 
(f) A defendant may waive constitutional, statutory, and common law 
rights unknowingly;  
 
(g) If the defendant is in custody, it is difficult for a defendant in custody 
to locate witnesses, interview them, prepare subpoenas, and have them 
served. 
 
"'7. Of the maximum sentence for the offense . . . . 
 
"'After receiving the defendant's responses, the court must make findings 
that the defendant understood the nature of the questions and statements of the 
court, and that he or she has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel 
and a knowing and intelligent decision to represent himself or herself. The court 
should then allow the defendant to appear without counsel. 
 
"'In some instances, the court may provide counsel for the defendant only 
for purposes of giving advice to the defendant, if the defendant expressly 
requests it. Counsel will sit with the defendant throughout the trial, but will not 
participate without the express request of the defendant or by order of the court, 
if the court first determines that the defendant is not competent nor qualified to 
continue with his or her own defense.'" 18 Kan. App. 2d at 76-77. 
20 
 
 
The handbook's advice to district judges faced with a criminal defendant's 
invocation of the right of self-representation is still sound today. See Cateforis, Kansas 
Criminal Law 11-9 (5th ed. 2016). The Lowe panel then completed its examination of the 
record before it:   
 
 
"In the procedure described, the court is to make a finding that the defendant has 
made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel and a knowing and intelligent decision 
to proceed pro se. To make that finding, the court must at some point ask defendant, after 
all dangers and disadvantages of self-representation have been explained, whether 
defendant still wants to proceed pro se. 
 
 
"In the present case, the court touched on areas relevant to informing Lowe of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation but, following that explanation and 
before continuing with the trial, the court failed to ask Lowe if he still wanted to proceed 
pro se. Defendant was not afforded the opportunity to make the choice described in 
Faretta between proceeding with counsel or proceeding pro se.  
 
 
"The State argues Lowe waived his right to represent himself by failing to 
reassert his right to self-representation and by allowing counsel to continue to represent 
him when the proceedings continued. In McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183, the Supreme Court 
noted that '[o]nce a pro se defendant invites or agrees to any substantial participation by 
counsel, subsequent appearances by counsel must be presumed to be with the defendant's 
acquiescence, at least until the defendant expressly and unambiguously renews his 
request that standby counsel be silenced.' In McKaskle, the defendant asserted his right to 
proceed pro se, but then requested counsel's help in questioning a witness. The defendant 
also acquiesced in some of the motions made by counsel while objecting to others.  
 
 
"We find no waiver of the right to self-representation in the present case. Here, 
Lowe did not invite counsel's subsequent participation. At most, he allowed counsel to 
continue without reasserting his request to represent himself. After the court had 
explained some of the pitfalls of self-representation, Lowe was not given the opportunity 
to state whether he wanted to represent himself before counsel continued her 
21 
 
representation of Lowe. In this context, Lowe could have believed the court had denied 
his request and there was nothing more he could do. In Orazio v. Dugger, 876 F.2d 1508, 
1512 (11th Cir. 1989), the court held that, once a request to proceed pro se has been 
conclusively denied, a defendant is not required to continually reassert the right to self-
representation to avoid a waiver of the previously invoked right." 18 Kan. App. 2d at 77-
78.  
 
Like Vann, Bunyard filed multiple pro se motions during the pendency of his 
prosecution. Then—admittedly at the eleventh hour and only when prompted by what 
may have been intended as a rhetorical question by an all-but-fully-exasperated trial 
judge—Bunyard made more than one clear statement that he wished to proceed pro se. 
Despite this expressly "unequivocal" invocation of his right to self-representation, the 
district judge did not counsel Bunyard with a view toward ascertaining Bunyard's 
informed wishes. Rather, the judge put off addressing Bunyard's request, saying that he 
would not address it at all unless Bunyard filed a written motion. Bunyard had no 
practical way to file a written motion over the weekend, and the judge's demand for such 
a motion appeared to leave Bunyard, like Lowe, without recourse on the issue. In this 
context, Bunyard's silence on Monday when other pro se motions were heard was 
understandable. He had been left with a firm impression that he would not be permitted to 
represent himself. His failure to reassert his right to do so in such circumstances and his 
allowance of counsel's representation during the trial did not amount to an implicit 
decision not to pursue self-representation.  
 
Bunyard's pretrial requests to represent himself were not, as the State argues, 
"simply based on his desire to ensure that certain arguments were advanced on his 
behalf." The record certainly demonstrates that he believed he had information and 
argument not being explained on Friday by his counsel, and that prompted his 
interruption of the proceedings. But, at that point, the judge presented Bunyard with a 
choice:  Either allow counsel to proceed without interference or represent yourself. 
Bunyard chose the latter. And his choice did not change after his consultation with 
22 
 
counsel. Instead, he "unequivocally" repeated his choice on the record. At that point the 
law required that he be advised about the perils of proceeding pro se and then permitted 
to do so if he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Instead, the 
judge told Bunyard that the subject of self-representation would not be addressed on 
Friday and erected a writing requirement barrier that was virtually guaranteed to thwart 
Bunyard's express intention. The judge then ruled on the very motion on which Bunyard 
had tried to be heard, and he never took up the subject of self-representation again. Using 
the words of the Court of Appeals panel but reaching the opposite conclusion, we hold 
that regardless of whether there was a "deliberate undermining" of Bunyard's right to 
represent himself, there was certainly a "functional" undermining of that right. See 2016 
WL 1719607, at *4.  
 
The judge's error was structural, and it requires us to reverse all of Bunyard's 
convictions.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because we conclude that the violation of defendant Josiah R. Bunyard's right to 
self-representation was structural error, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision and the 
judgment of the district court. This case is remanded to district court for further 
proceedings.