Case Title: Crumplar v. Superior Court

Citation: 

Docket Number: 643, 2011, 644, 2011

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
THOMAS C. CRUMPLAR, ESQUIRE, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 643 & 644, 2011 
 
 
 
 
Appellant,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE  
)  C.A. Nos. 09C-07-128 & 
STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR 
)  09C-11-059 
NEW CASTLE COUNTY, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  August 15, 2012 
Decided:  October 22, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED in part and 
REVERSED in part. 
 
 
Thomas S. Neuberger and Stephen J. Neuberger, The Neuberger Firm, P.A., 
Wilmington, Delaware; Edward N. McNally (argued), Morris James LLP, 
Wilmington, Delaware for appellant. 
 
 
Ralph K. Durstein (argued), Edward K. Black and Thomas E. Brown, 
Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
Per Curiam: 
2 
 
 
 
Attorney Thomas Crumplar appeals a Superior Court judge’s sanctions 
under Superior Court Civil Rule 11.  We affirm the Superior Court’s holding that 
an objective standard should govern a determination of whether Rule 11 has been 
violated.  We also extend In re Infotechnology, Inc.1 to bar judges from sanctioning 
attorneys except where the attorney’s conduct prejudicially disrupts the 
administration of justice in a particular case.  Finally, we require that judges 
conduct a hearing before imposing sanctions on their own motion.  Therefore we 
AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the Order imposing sanctions and 
VACATE the sanctions. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. 
The First Order to Show Cause: Supplying the Wrong Case Name for a 
Correct Proposition  
 
 
A Superior Court judge issued to attorney Thomas Crumplar two orders to 
show cause under Superior Court Civil Rule 11.  The judge did that on her own 
initiative.  The First Order to show cause concerned Crumplar’s representations to 
the court in an asbestos lawsuit in which he represented Joseph Turchen.  The 
defendant in that case, County Insulation, had moved for summary judgment 
focused on the argument that Turchen could not show a nexus between its product 
                                                          
 
1 582 A.2d 215, 218 (Del. 1990). 
 
3 
 
and the decedent.  In one argument made in response to the motion, Crumplar 
stated:  
County did work in a neighboring building.  This Court in [McNulty] 
found this nexis [sic] sufficient for purposes of summary judgment.  
Plaintiff has no transcript of the hearing on Summary Judgment and 
so can only rely on the foregoing statements offered by counsel as 
officers of the Court.2   
 
After County Insulation’s counsel responded that McNulty settled before the court 
could decide the motion Crumplar referenced, the trial judge issued the First Order.  
She noted that the “circumstances raise at least a possibility that [Crumplar] may 
have misrepresented [McNulty’s events] in an attempt to fabricate a ruling in 
support of [his] position.”3 
 
In response to the First Order, Crumplar stated that he had a “distinct 
recollection” that his firm had prevailed against County Insulation “on a Product 
ID summary judgment . . . arising out of exposure at the Avisun/Amoco 
polymer/film plant.”4  To find the case “everyone was so certain we won on 
Summary Judgment,” Crumplar consulted his staff and incomplete records.5  
                                                          
 
2 In re Asbestos Litig. (Turchen), 2011 WL 5344308, at *3 (Del. Super. Oct. 28, 2011) (quoting 
Pls.’ Resp. to Def. County Insulation’s Mot. Summ. J. 6) (emphasis added by Superior Court).  
Crumplar was referring to McNulty v. Anchor Packing Co., C.A. No. 03C-11-116 (Del. Super. 
Nov. 13, 2003). 
 
3 In re Asbestos Litig. (Turchen), C.A. No. 09C-11-059, at 7 (Del. Super. July 11, 2011). 
 
4 App. to Opening Br. A416. 
 
5 Id. 
4 
 
Crumplar discovered the brief his firm had filed in McNulty, which seemed to 
corroborate his recollection.  He also determined that McNulty had settled the same 
day as the summary judgment hearing, further supporting his recollection.  Based 
on these records and his consultation with his staff, Crumplar thought McNulty was 
the correct case.  In fact, Crumplar was mistaken.  Although he admitted that it 
appeared McNulty had settled before the Court heard the summary judgment 
motion, Crumplar still believed a case existed that supported the proposition he had 
attributed to McNulty, although he had not located the name of that case by the 
time he responded to the First Order.  Two days later, Crumplar notified the judge 
that he had contacted County Insulation’s counsel, and with her help he discovered 
that the name of the case he should have originally cited was Opalczynski.6   
B. 
The Second Order to Show Cause: Failing to Distinguish Precedent 
 
The Second Order to show cause concerned briefs Crumplar filed in 
opposition to a different motion for summary judgment relevant to Turchen and to 
claims involving harm to Gerald Johnston.  Three previous Superior Court cases 
had already resolved the issue presented on the motion.  The question was whether 
McArdle-Desco Corporation owed a duty to warn of dangers arising from 
asbestos-containing products it did not manufacture.  The earlier cases held that 
because McArdle-Desco had acted as a supplier during the relevant time period, it 
                                                          
 
6 In re Asbestos Litig. (Opalczynski), C.A. No. 04C-03-264 (Del. Super. Oct. 25, 2006) 
(TRANSCRIPT). 
5 
 
did not have the heightened duty borne by product installers or manufacturers.  The 
Superior Court judge took issue with Crumplar’s failure to distinguish these cases, 
even though opposing counsel had raised them.  The judge stated: 
Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel disregarded “existing law,” and the Court 
therefore cannot discern what “nonfrivolous arguments” might have 
been made therefrom to support their position.  Not only were the 
Court’s decisions in Rotter, Dieterle [sic], and Weber not raised in 
either of Plaintiffs’ submissions, but Plaintiffs’ counsel presented 
arguments identical to those rejected by Judge Babiarz in his decisions 
without any acknowledgement or explanation of those rulings.7 
 
 
In response to the Second Order, Crumplar denied that Rule 11 imposed a 
duty to cite contrary authority if that authority had already been raised by the other 
party.8   
C. 
The Sanctions Opinion 
 
After finding that Crumplar had failed to show cause why he should not be 
sanctioned, the Superior Court judge imposed a $25,000 penalty.  Relying on 
Superior Court Civil Rule 11(b), the judge imposed the monetary sanction based 
on the First Order, but devoted a large portion of her opinion to the Second Order 
as well.9  After conceding that the $25,000 sanction might appear “arbitrarily 
                                                          
 
7 In re Asbestos Litig. (Johnston), C.A. No. 09C-07-128, at 4 (Del. Super. July 21, 2011). 
 
8 Crumplar also argued that our intervening opinion in Fleetwood v. Charles A. Wagner Co, Inc., 
832 A.2d 705 (Del. 2003), was the controlling law.  Turchen, 2011 WL 5344308, at *7. 
 
9 The Superior Court judge based the monetary sanctions entirely on the First Order, because the 
case underlying the Second Order had settled before the court issued the order, and therefore was 
an improper basis for a sua sponte sanctions award.  Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11(c)(2)(B).  The judge 
6 
 
excessive,” the judge justified the amount by noting that asbestos settlements and 
verdicts were “typically in the millions of dollars” and contingency fees were 
“often as high as 40 percent.”10  The judge stated that “the propriety of the Court’s 
sanctions becomes self-evident” in the context of the severe burden imposed by the 
asbestos litigation docket.11  The sanctions also rested on a crucial factual finding:  
It is against this backdrop that the Court is called upon to apply Rule 
11 sanctions for conduct that amounts to an attorney’s efforts to 
mislead the Court and to take advantage of the vast amount of reading 
generated by the high volume of the asbestos cases in the hopes that 
distortions of law and fact might be overlooked.12 
 
 
On appeal, Crumplar argues that the Superior Court judge erred by applying 
an objective standard to determine a Rule 11 violation, and that even if an 
objective test applies, the Superior Court judge abused her discretion by finding 
Crumplar had violated the standard.  Second, Crumplar argues that the Superior 
Court judge denied him due process by making credibility determinations and 
imposing monetary sanctions without holding an evidentiary hearing or allowing 
him to respond personally at an oral argument.  In response, the Superior Court 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
referred the conduct underlying the Second Order to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.  
Turchen, 2011 WL 5344308, at *8. 
 
10 Turchen, 2011 WL 5344308, at *9. 
 
11 Id. at *1. 
 
12 Id. 
 
7 
 
argues that the judge proceeded properly and applied the correct standard while 
imposing Rule 11 sanctions.     
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We review questions of law de novo, and therefore independently determine 
what process Rule 11 demands.13  The legal issue on which we focus is whether an 
objective or subjective test applies to a review of attorneys’ conduct.  We review 
decisions to impose sanctions for an abuse of discretion.14   
III. 
DISCUSSION 
A. 
Superior Court Civil Rule 11 
 
Superior Court Civil Rule 11(c) provides a trial judge with authority to 
impose an “appropriate sanction” on attorneys who violate Rule 11(b), but only 
after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.15  In turn, Rule 11(b) informs 
attorneys of the standards that will be applied to documents they file with the 
court: 
By representing to the Court . . . a . . . written motion . . . an attorney 
. . . is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances,— 
                                                          
 
13 Plummer v. Sherman, 861 A.2d 1238, 1242 (Del. 2004).  
 
14 Gooch v. Bradley Eaby & Barros, 718 A.2d 527, 1998 WL 515345, at *2 (Del. June 26, 1998) 
(TABLE). 
 
15 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11. 
 
8 
 
. . . (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are 
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the 
establishment of new law; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary 
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary 
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 
discovery . . . .16 
   
B. 
Should Judges Apply an Objective or a Subjective Standard to Attorney 
Conduct when Considering Imposing Rule 11 Sanctions? 
 
 
The first question is whether the Superior Court judge should have evaluated 
Crumplar’s conduct under an objective or a subjective standard.  That is, when 
deciding whether Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate, should the judge consider an 
attorney’s internal belief to determine whether he performed an inquiry reasonable 
under the circumstances, or should the judge measure the reasonableness of the 
attorney’s inquiry against objective criteria? 
 
Our trial courts appear either divided or inconsistent on whether Rule 11 
requires an objective or a subjective test.17  In the 1973 case of Singer v. Creole 
Petroleum Corp., we interpreted the then-operative version of Court of Chancery 
Rule 11’s “good ground” requirement as establishing a test based on the “good 
                                                          
 
16 Id. 
 
17 Compare Coverdale v. Fisher, 1993 WL 487911, at *5 (Del. Super. Nov. 8, 1993) (“The 
Superior Court has imposed a subjective good faith test in considering Rule 11 motions.”), with 
ASX Inv. Corp. v. Newton, 1994 WL 178147, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 3, 1994) (“The attorney’s duty 
is one of reasonableness under the circumstances; a subjective good faith belief in the legitimacy 
of a claim does not alone satisfy the requirements of [Court of Chancery] Rule 11.”). 
 
9 
 
faith of the attorney in signing the pleading.”18  After Singer was decided, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended, and parallel changes were made 
in both the Superior Court Civil Rules and the Court of Chancery Rules.19   
Before the amendment, Rule 11 stated: “[t]he signature of an attorney 
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is 
not interposed for delay.”20  After the amendment, Rule 11 read:  
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him 
that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best 
of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable 
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or 
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law . . . .21 
 
In Hurst v. General Dynamics Corp., the Vice Chancellor noted that no Delaware 
cases had interpreted the new language.22  He cited federal cases to hold that the 
“reasonable inquiry” language of the revised Court of Chancery Rule 11 created an 
objective standard.23 
                                                          
 
18 Singer v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 311 A.2d 859, 863 (Del. 1973). 
 
19 See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11 (1948) (amended 1984); Ct. Ch. R. 11 (1947) (amended 1984). 
  
20 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11 (1948) (amended 1984) (emphasis added). 
 
21 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11 (1984) (amended 1989) (emphasis added). 
 
22 Hurst v. General Dynamics Corp., 583 A.2d 1334, 1342, 1342 n.12 (Del. Ch. 1990). 
 
23 Id. at 1342 (collecting cases). 
10 
 
In Fort Howard Cup Corp. v. Quality Kitchen Corp, the Superior Court 
continued to apply a subjective standard without analyzing the revised language.24  
Later cases cited Fort Howard as holding that the standard for determining 
whether conduct has violated Rule 11 was a subjective good-faith test.25  Abbott v. 
Gordon, a 2008 decision the judge in this case relied upon, was the first Superior 
Court case to apply an objective test.26  Abbott held without citation that the “duty 
is one of reasonableness under the circumstances, and a subjective good faith belief 
. . . does not alone satisfy the requirements of Rule 11.”27 
 
Given the division within the Superior Court and between that Court and the 
Court of Chancery, we consider interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure by other courts to guide our analysis.  Although the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure do not apply in Delaware courts, Superior Court Civil Rule 11 
closely tracks the language of Federal Rule 11; therefore, interpretations of the 
Federal Rules provide persuasive guidance.28  The Advisory Committee Note to 
                                                          
 
24 See 1991 WL 18003, at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 1, 1991). 
 
25 See e.g., Ford v. Bank of Delaware, 1992 WL 423830, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 8, 1992) (citing 
Fort Howard Cup Corp. v. Quality Kitchen Corp., 1991 WL 18003 (Del. Super. Feb. 1, 1991)). 
 
26 2008 WL 821522, at *25 (Del. Super. Mar. 27, 2008), aff’d, 957 A.2d 1 (Del. 2008) (TABLE). 
 
27 Id.  
 
28 Apartment Cmtys. Corp. v. Martinelli, 859 A.2d 67, 70–71 (Del. 2004) (citing Canaday v. 
Superior Court, 119 A.2d 347, 352 (Del. 1955)).  Superior Court Civil Rule 11 is not an exact 
copy of Federal Rule 11, however, the relevant language—“an inquiry reasonable under the 
11 
 
the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the 
previous version of Federal Rule 11 was ineffective and that the new Federal Rule 
11 therefore provided a standard of “reasonableness under the circumstances” that 
is “more stringent than the original good-faith formula.”29  This indicates that the 
drafters of Federal Rule 11—which Superior Court Civil Rule 11 substantially 
parallels—intended to eliminate the subjective good-faith standard. 
Judicial construction of Federal Rule 11 further supports that view.  In 
Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, which the Court of Chancery 
cited in Hurst,30 the Second Circuit noted that before 1983, Rule 11 spoke in 
subjective terms.31  The court reasoned that “[t]he addition of the words ‘formed 
after a reasonably inquiry’” demanded a revision of the standard.32  The court held 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
circumstances”—is identical to the federal rule.  Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, with Super. Ct. 
Civ. R. 11.   
 
29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, Advisory Committee Note, 1983 Amendments. 
 
30 Hurst v. General Dynamics Corp., 583 A.2d 1334, 1342 (Del. Ch. 1990) (citing Eastway 
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 
(1987)). 
 
31 Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 918 (1987).  A Second Circuit panel later held, over a spirited dissent, that the 
subjective standard should apply to court-initiated Federal Rule 11 sanctions proceedings 
initiated long after the attorney could amend or withdraw the submission.  In re Pennie & 
Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2003).  The Second Circuit’s interpretation has not 
been followed by other circuits, however, and the Superior Court judge did not wait an unduly 
long period before issuing the orders to show cause.  See Young v. City of Providence ex rel. 
Napolitano, 404 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that the Pennie decision has not been 
followed by other federal circuits). 
 
32 Eastway, 762 F.2d at 253 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983) (amended 1987)). 
12 
 
that the rule “imposes an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable 
inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is signed” and that subjective good 
faith no longer protected attorneys.33 
The Second Circuit’s construction of the amendments to Federal Rule 11 is 
persuasive.  Although a later amendment to Superior Court Civil Rule 11 changed 
the language “formed after reasonable inquiry” to “formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances,”34 we do not interpret that modification to 
resurrect a subjective standard.  Fort Howard—the unreported Superior Court 
opinion which established a subjective standard—neither accounted for Rule 11’s 
amendment nor cited any authority for the subjective standard.35  Fort Howard 
does not persuade us that any basis for a subjective standard exists in the current 
text of Rule 11. 
Judges in all Delaware trial courts should determine whether an attorney 
should be sanctioned under Rule 11 under an objective standard.  Delaware 
demands more from attorneys than pure hearts and empty heads.  We therefore 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
33 Id. 
 
34 See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11. 
 
35 Fort Howard Cup Corp. v. Quality Kitchen Corp., 1991 WL 18003, at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 1, 
1991). 
 
13 
 
adopt the test employed in cases such as Abbott v. Gordon,36 Fairthorne 
Maintenance Corp. v. Ramunno,37 and ASX Investment Corp. v. Newton:38 the 
attorney’s duty is one of reasonableness under the circumstances; an attorney’s 
subjective good-faith belief in the propriety of his actions does not alone satisfy 
Rule 11.  We hereby overrule the cases endorsing a subjective good-faith test, as 
exemplified by Fort Howard Cup Corp. v. Quality Kitchen Corp.39 
C. 
Did Crumplar’s Conduct Meet the Objective Standard? 
Because Crumplar’s behavior satisfied the objective standard, we hold that 
the Superior Court judge abused her discretion by imposing sanctions.  With regard 
to the First Order, Crumplar distinctly recalled that a case existed where he had 
won a summary judgment motion on weaker facts than those presented in Turchen.  
Before he identified that case to the court as McNulty, Crumplar consulted his staff, 
who were also certain the case existed.  McNulty and Opalczynski were very 
similar cases involving plaintiffs who did not work at the alleged site of the 
asbestos source.  The case (whatever its name) settled the same day as the 
summary judgment hearing, which Crumplar reasonably inferred probably resulted 
                                                          
 
36 Abbott v. Gordon, 2008 WL 821522, at *25 (Del. Super. Mar. 27, 2008) aff’d, 957 A.2d 1 
(Del. 2008) (TABLE). 
 
37 Fairthorne Maint. Corp. v. Ramunno, 2007 WL 2214318, at *10 (Del. Ch. July 20, 2007).   
 
38 ASX Inv. Corp. v. Newton, 1994 WL 178147, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 3, 1994). 
 
39 Fort Howard, 1991 WL 18003, at *3. 
14 
 
from a favorable ruling.  Because the Superior Court does not maintain a publicly 
available database of summary judgment motions, Crumplar followed a procedure 
that may be typical in asbestos litigation.  The fact that he named the case 
incorrectly does not make his inquiry unreasonable, especially given Opalczynski’s 
existence—a case that stands for the very point Crumplar sought to make. 
Crumplar’s discovery of the correct case name after a conversation with 
opposing counsel—a fact the Superior Court judge believed illustrated Crumplar’s 
shortcomings—does not indicate that his initial investigation fell short of 
reasonableness.  At the time Crumplar cited McNulty, both he and his staff 
believed McNulty to be the correct case.  In these circumstances, no reasonable 
attorney would have called another attorney, especially not opposing counsel, to 
confirm what he and his staff reasonably believed. 
 
Nor did Crumplar violate Rule 11’s objective standard by failing to discuss 
three cases the Superior Court judge held were directly on point and contrary to his 
clients’ position.  The trial judge abused her discretion by finding otherwise.  An 
attorney who fails to respond directly to an opponent’s citation of contrary 
Superior Court cases does not ipso facto face Rule 11 sanctions.40  It is not a Rule 
11(b)(2) violation to offer the same arguments that a Superior Court judge found 
                                                          
 
40 Of course, an attorney would violate the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct if 
opposing counsel had failed to cite controlling precedent.  Del. Lawyers’ Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
R. 3.3(a)(2).  That was not the case here, however, and Rule 11 sanctions cannot be a means for 
policing compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
15 
 
unpersuasive in previous cases.  So long as those arguments are “nonfrivolous,” 
they may convince a judge to rule differently in the case at bar.  The practice of 
law imposes many informal penalties on attorneys who do not make thorough 
arguments.  Rule 11 sanctions are not among them. 
 
D. 
When May a Trial Judge Properly Sanction a Party Under Rule 11? 
An additional, independent reason for vacating the sanctions imposed here is 
that the sanctions appear to be based on the judge’s concern that the behavior she 
found problematic in these particular cases would cause her problems in future 
cases.  The Superior Court judge’s heavy emphasis on the high volume of cases as 
support for the reasonableness of the sanctions suggests that the court relies on 
attorneys’ representations, and would face an even greater burden in the future if 
required to double check every representation made by Crumplar.   
This Court has previously articulated the limits of a trial judge’s ability to 
enforce the Delaware Rules of Professional Conduct.  In In re Infotechnology, Inc. 
we examined whether a nonclient litigant (i.e., a client who had not previously 
been represented by opposing counsel) had standing to argue that its opposing 
counsel should be disqualified because of a conflict of interest that violated the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.41  The trial judge in Infotechnology held that there 
                                                          
 
41 In re Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 218 (Del. 1990). 
 
16 
 
was no threat to the fairness of the proceeding, but still disqualified the law firm.42  
We reversed, and required that for disqualification to be appropriate, the litigant 
must show that the conflict prejudiced the fairness of the proceeding, not merely 
that a violation of the Rules had occurred.43 
Our holding was based on this Court’s exclusive power to supervise the 
practice of law in Delaware and to enforce the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct.44  Absent conduct that prejudicially disrupts the proceeding, 
trial judges have no independent jurisdiction to enforce the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.45  Trial judges may pursue their concerns in deterring future troublesome 
conduct by reporting attorneys to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel where the 
facts merit the referral.46 
Although Infotechnology did not involve a Rule 11 sanction, the trial judge’s 
actions in this case raise identical concerns.  If a trial judge believes an attorney 
has committed misconduct, referral to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, not Rule 
                                                          
 
42 Id. at 216. 
 
43 Id. at 221.  In In re Estate of Waters, we held that the necessary prejudice had been shown 
when an attorney was both trial counsel and a necessary witness in a probate proceeding.  In re 
Estate of Waters, 647 A.2d 1091, 1097–98 (Del. 1994) (citing Infotechnology, 582 A.2d at 221–
22). 
 
44 Infotechnology, 582 A.2d at 216–17. 
 
45 Id. at 221. 
 
46 See id. at 220. 
 
17 
 
11 sanctions, is the proper recourse in the absence of prejudicial disruption of the 
proceeding.  For these reasons, we today extend the principle first announced in 
Infotechnology:   
While we recognize and confirm a trial court’s power to ensure the 
orderly and fair administration of justice in matters before it, 
including the conduct of counsel, the Rules may not be applied in 
extra-disciplinary 
proceedings 
solely 
to 
vindicate 
the 
legal 
profession’s concerns in such affairs.  Unless the challenged conduct 
prejudices the fairness of the proceedings, such that it adversely 
affects the fair and efficient administration of justice, only this Court 
has the power and responsibility to govern the Bar, and in pursuance 
of that authority to enforce the Rules for disciplinary purposes.47 
 
Our holding is not intended to leave a judge confronted with an attorney’s 
problematic behavior without recourse.  The Office of Disciplinary Counsel is well 
equipped to investigate attorneys and recommend appropriate action.48  Referral to 
the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, an agency of this Court, is consistent with the 
principle that this Court alone has the inherent and exclusive responsibility for 
disciplining members of the Delaware Bar.49  This extension of Infotechnology 
prevents wasteful, duplicative, and potentially inconsistent enforcement of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.   
                                                          
 
47 Id. at 216–17; see also Waters, 647 A.2d at 1098 (citing Infotechnology, 582 A.2d at 222). 
 
48 See Supr. Ct. R. 64(e) (describing the powers and duties of the Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel). 
 
49 In re Reardon, 759 A.2d 568, 575 (Del. 2000) (citing In re Green, 464 A.2d 881, 885 (Del. 
1983)). 
 
18 
 
Crumplar’s incorrect case citation for an otherwise accurate statement, in a 
single paragraph of a response to a motion he nevertheless lost, did not adversely 
affect the integrity of the proceeding.  The record does not support the judge’s 
finding that it “tainted the fairness and efficiency of the adversarial process.”50  
Crumplar’s mistake resulted in some unnecessary confusion, but his ultimate 
argument was fairly grounded and his statement did not prejudice his opponent or 
“the fairness of the proceeding.”  Similarly, Crumplar’s failure to discuss or 
distinguish the Superior Court authority raised in his opponent’s motion for 
summary judgment did not adversely affect the proceedings, because both cases 
settled before the judge decided the motion.  This case contrasts with cases such as 
Fairthorne Maintenance, where the Vice Chancellor sanctioned a defendant for 
burdening the plaintiff and the court by raising factually baseless counterclaims 
and affirmative defenses, in some cases without citing any authority whatsoever 
for the claim.51 
 
E. 
What Process Does Rule 11 Require? 
 
                                                          
 
50 In re Asbestos Litig. (Turchen), 2011 WL 5344308, at *9 (Del. Super. Oct 28, 2011); cf. 
Waters, 647 A.2d at 1097–98 (holding that prejudice existed when an attorney was both the trial 
counsel and a necessary witness). 
 
51 Fairthorne Maint. Corp. v. Ramunno, 2007 WL 2214318, at *11 (Del. Ch. July 20, 2007). 
 
19 
 
As the Superior Court judge noted, raising Rule 11(c) sua sponte is an 
extraordinary action.52  The seriousness of a Rule 11 violation is illustrated by 
subsection 11(c)’s language, which allows the Superior Court to impose sanctions 
only “after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.”53  Crumplar argues 
that the judge’s actions violated his right to due process, and he grounds his 
contentions in several federal decisions.54  While we decline to reach Crumplar’s 
constitutional claim, we do hold that Rule 11(c)’s plain language requires a more 
refined process than he received. 
Rule 11(c)(1)(B) requires the trial court to “enter an order describing the 
specific conduct that appears to violate” Rule 11(b) when the court raises Rule 11 
on its own initiative.55  The trial judge issued two written orders to show cause 
containing particularized descriptions of the troublesome conduct, providing 
appropriate notice to Crumplar.   
Adequate notice, however, is not enough.  Rule 11 authorizes a judge to 
impose sanctions only after the party has had a reasonable opportunity to 
                                                          
 
52 Turchen, 2011 WL 5344308, at *9.   
 
53 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11. 
 
54 See, e.g., Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1359 (3d Cir. 1990) (mandating, in 
some situations, “an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputes of material fact when the cold record 
may not disclose the full story”). 
 
55 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11(c)(1)(B).  
 
20 
 
respond.56  In determining what a “reasonable opportunity to respond” requires 
under the circumstances, we note that sua sponte imposition of Rule 11 sanctions 
involve some of the same elements as a finding of criminal contempt. 
In DiSabatino v. Salicete, we held that a trial judge’s contempt finding was 
criminal, not civil, and therefore justified more procedural protections, because the 
sanction was intended to punish past conduct and could not be avoided through 
compliance with the court’s order.57  We recognized U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
holding that contempt occurring outside the court’s presence (i.e., indirect 
contempt) could not be summarily punished.58  We concluded that the indirect 
criminal contempt present in DiSabatino mandated heightened procedural 
protections, which, under those facts, included a jury trial.59   
By analogy to the criminal contempt sanctions imposed in DiSabatino, here 
the trial judge intended to punish Crumplar’s past conduct, and Crumplar had no 
opportunity to avoid the sanctions through future action.  Because the Superior 
Court issued the orders sua sponte, she did not afford Crumplar the Rule’s 21-day 
“safe harbor” period to amend or withdraw the papers that he would have enjoyed 
                                                          
 
56 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11(c). 
 
57 See DiSabatino v. Salicete, 671 A.2d 1344, 1351 (Del. 1996). 
 
58 Id. at 1349 (citing Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 838 (1994)). 
 
59 Id. at 1351 (citing Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 838 (1994)). 
 
21 
 
had his opponent moved for sanctions.60  While interpretations of the analogous 
Federal Rule 11 persuade us that contempt procedures are not mandated,61 this 
does not mean that no additional protections should be afforded when a judge 
unilaterally invokes Rule 11(c)(1)(B).  We hold that trial judges should afford the 
affected party heightened procedural protections when the judges raise Rule 11 on 
their own motions. 
A “reasonable opportunity to respond” when a court invokes Rule 
11(c)(1)(B) should include an opportunity for the attorney to present evidence and 
respond orally before a court imposes sanctions.  The judge should provide this 
hearing even if the attorney fails to request it.  Because Rule 11(c)(1)(B), unlike 
Rule 11(c)(1)(A), does not allow attorneys an opportunity to correct or withdraw 
their filing, a personal right to be heard becomes all the more important.  Attorneys 
have too much at stake for trial judges to assess their credibility and impose Rule 
11 sanctions based on papers alone.  Without an opportunity to respond orally, 
paper submissions may only accentuate the initial intuitions that led the judge to 
issue an order to show cause. 
                                                          
 
60 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11(c)(1)(A). 
 
61 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, Advisory Committee Note, 1993 Amendments (“Whether the matter should 
be decided solely on the basis of written submissions or should be scheduled for oral argument 
(or, indeed, for evidentiary presentation) will depend on the circumstances.”); In re Deville, 361 
F.3d 539, 553 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 11 
clearly indicates that a criminal contempt process is not required). 
 
22 
 
If a judge anticipates imposing monetary sanctions, the hearing should 
include an inquiry into the attorney’s ability to pay.  We adopt the logic of other 
jurisdictions’ holdings that the attorney’s ability to pay should be a significant 
factor in determining the size of the award.62  The deterrent effect of Rule 11 
sanctions depends on a party’s resources, but “courts must be careful not to impose 
monetary sanctions so great that they are punitive—or that might even drive the 
sanctioned party out of practice.”63  We reject the trial judge’s apparent premise 
that the reasonableness of a sanction can be determined solely by a back-of-an-
envelope calculation of an attorney’s contingency fee if he were to prevail at trial. 
 
The Superior Court judge, although motivated by understandable frustration 
compounded by the demands of a large docket, sanctioned an attorney on her own 
initiative supported only by “cold” papers, and imposed a large fine without 
inquiring into the attorney’s ability to pay.  These procedural shortcomings did not 
provide Crumplar with the “reasonable opportunity to respond,” to which he was 
entitled.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the holding that an objective test 
applies to the analysis of attorney conduct before imposing Rule 11 sanctions, 
                                                          
 
62 See Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 528–29 (11th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). 
 
63 Doering v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1988). 
23 
 
reverse the judgment of the Superior Court, and vacate the order imposing 
sanctions.