Case Title: In Re Estate of Rooney

Citation: 181 Kan. 1029, 317 P.2d 416

Docket Number: 40,652

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1957-11-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
181 Kan. 1029 (1957)
317 P.2d 416
In the Matter of the Estate of Harry P. Rooney, Deceased.
MARGUERITE ROONEY, Executrix, and individually, Appellant,
v.
HARRY B. TILLER, Appellee.
No. 40,652

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 9, 1957.
Charles Rooney and Charles Rooney, Jr., both of Topeka, were on the briefs for the appellant.
J. Francis Hesse, of Wichita, argued the cause, and W.D. Jochems, J. Wirth Sargent, Emmet A. Blaes, Roetzel Jochems, Robert G. Braden, James W. Sargent, Stanley E. Wisdom, Vincent L. Bogart, Cecil E. Merkel, John W. Brimer and Harry L. Hobson, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
This action involves the title to a quarter section of land in Haskell County referred to as the "McCoy place," and which was owned by testator and his wife as joint tenants. Inherent in *1030 the case is the question of the validity of her written consent to his will which devised the property (with certain reservations) to a nephew of testator, and the further question whether the will, and her consent thereto, divested her of survivorship rights as a joint tenant.
Harry P. Rooney (hereinafter referred to as Harry) and his wife Marguerite were married in 1917. During their married life they accumulated several thousand acres of land. The "McCoy place" was acquired by them on January 15, 1951. Title was taken in "H.P. Rooney and Marguerite Rooney, and the survivor of them, as joint tenants and not as tenants in common." The deed was recorded two weeks later.
In December, 1953, Harry became ill and went from his home in Satanta to a hospital in Wichita. On January 22, 1954, he called his attorney cousin, Charles Rooney, of Topeka, and requested that he come to the hospital to prepare a will. The attorney arrived the next morning and in Harry's room in the hospital there was a detailed discussion as to how he desired to dispose of his property. Marguerite and a nurse were in and out of the room. From the data and information supplied by Harry, the attorney prepared the will in typewritten form, precisely as directed by Harry. That evening the attorney and Marguerite returned to the hospital at which time the three of them discussed in detail the provisions of the will, and Marguerite was apprised of her rights under the will and as a widow by statute. Harry signed the will and Marguerite signed her written consent thereto. Each of their signatures was witnessed by the nurse and the attorney. Although somewhat lengthy, we nevertheless think it advisable to set out the will in its entirety, and it follows:
"LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF HARRY P. ROONEY
"ITEM I
"ITEM II
*1031 "ITEM III
"ITEM IV
"ITEM V
"ITEM VI
"ITEM VII
"ITEM VIII
"ITEM IX
"ITEM X
*1032 "ITEM XI
"ITEM XII
"ITEM VIII
"ITEM XIV
"ITEM XV
"ITEM XVI
Harry died on March 15, 1954, and on May 17, 1954, Marguerite, named in the will as executrix, filed a petition in the probate court for its admission to probate. On June 11, 1954, the will and the written consent thereto were proved and admitted to probate, and Marguerite qualified as executrix. On the same date, June 11, 1954, she filed in the probate court the following document:
"CONSENT RESTRICTION.
Thereafter, on a date not shown, Harry Bernard Tiller, the devise of the "McCoy place" in Item III of the will (and concerning which this lawsuit is really about) filed in the probate court a petition for "Disclosure and Establishment of Devise" in which he alleged the probate of the will containing the devise to him (with certain reservations) of the "McCoy place"; that Marguerite, as executrix, had *1034 failed, neglected and refused to include the property in the inventory filed by her, thus attempting to conceal and exclude the same from the jurisdiction of the court, and further alleged that Marguerite was converting the property and the income therefrom to her own use. The prayer was for an order requiring Marguerite to include the property in the inventory and to account for income received from it, and for a further order adjudging the petitioner to be the rightful devisee of the fee simple title to the property, subject only to the reservations mentioned in Item III of the will.
Marguerite filed her written defenses to this petition setting forth that the property in question had been conveyed to testator and her as joint tenants with right of survivorship; that at the time of the execution of the will neither she nor her husband knew that the title to the property was in their names as joint tenants; that she did not learn the true facts of the matter until shortly before the will was admitted to probate, and that such fact caused her to file her "Consent Restriction," and the prayer was for an order denying the petition and for a further order to the effect that upon her husband's death title to the land in question vested in her absolutely by virtue of her rights of survivorship.
After hearing the matter, the probate court made an order denying Tiller's petition and held that he had no right, title or interest to the property in question under Harry's will.
From this order and finding Tiller appealed to the district court.
Following a full hearing in the district court at which considerable evidence was introduced, the court reversed the ruling of the probate court and held that Tiller was the devise of the property in question under Item III of Harry's will, subject only to the reservations mentioned therein. In rendering the judgment the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law as follow:
"FINDINGS OF FACT.
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Marguerite filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds the findings of fact were in part contrary to the evidence; the conclusions of law were contrary to the evidence and law, and on the further grounds of accident and surprise, and newly discovered evidence.
This motion was denied, with the exception that finding of fact No. 6 was amended to read as follows:
Judgment was entered in harmony with the findings and conclusions and Marguerite has appealed, her sole specification of error being:
In her brief she states the questions to be:
It is to be noted that notwithstanding the specification of error, the record does not disclose any motion by Marguerite to set aside any of the findings of fact, and in her brief it is not contended that any of the findings are unsupported by evidence. For that reason we forego a detailed discussion of the evidence and merely state that from our examination of it, it may not be said the findings are unsupported.
We think, however, that in view of the record and the various contentions made, the basic question is whether the findings support the judgment. In other words, if Marguerite's written general consent to the will is to stand, does Item III of the will divest her of survivorship rights in the property in question?
The question of sufficiency of consent by one spouse to the will of the other has been treated in many decisions by this court dealing with diverse facts and circumstances. The general rule deduced from all of the decisions is that the consent must be given freely, understandingly and intelligently. (In re Estate of Ellis, 168 Kan. 11, 28, 210 P.2d 417; In re Estate of Patzner, 173 Kan. 133, 244 P.2d 1183.)
While it is true that Marguerite brought no formal action, as such, to set aside her consent to the will, we think that under all of the facts and circumstances presented, the filing of her so-called "Consent Restriction," and her written defenses to the petition filed by Tiller, were sufficient to raise the question and vest the court with jurisdiction to determine the matter.
As stated in finding No. 5, at the time the will was executed both Harry and Marguerite were unaware of, or had forgotten that the "McCoy place" was owned by them in joint tenancy with right of survivorship. From one standpoint, therefore, it might be argued that her consent was not "understandingly" given. On the other hand, the evidence shows, and the court so found, that her rights as a beneficiary under the will, and as a surviving spouse under the law, were fully explained to her, and that, notwithstanding her specific objections to the devise in question to Tiller, and also to another provision of the will, she, nevertheless, signed the unqualified general consent. It is not contended that she was in any way overreached, coerced or taken advantage of. The pattern of the entire will is such as to indicate a desire by testator that numerous *1039 persons other than Marguerite were to share in his estate. All matters in connection with the execution of her consent were aired fully in the trial court. Some of the evidence was in dispute. Inherent in the court's findings is the conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to overthrow her unqualified general consent, and she is bound thereby.
This brings us, then, to the ultimate question whether by Item III of the will, and Marguerite's written consent thereto, she was divested of survivorship rights in the property in question.
In support of her position she cites a number of authorities from other jurisdictions and textbooks (14 Am. Jur., Cotenancy, § 6, p. 80) to the effect that a consequence of the doctrine of survivorship is that a joint tenant cannot devise his interest in the land, for the devise does not take effect until after the devisor's death, and the claim of the surviving tenant arises in the same instant with that of the devise and is preferred thereto.
That, however, is not this case, because of the cotenant's (Marguerite's) unqualified written consent to the specific devise in question. While the facts before us are not those in Berry v. Berry, 168 Kan. 253, 212 P.2d 283, the analogy is clear. In our opinion the general principle underlying the holding in Brooks v. Olson, 170 Kan. 138, 223 P.2d 721 (and cases cited therein), is applicable to and decisive of the question before us. There it was held that where a testator devises property, title to which is held by his wife, and she gives her written consent to such testamentary disposition, she thereby in effect renounces her right of ownership in the devised property. As a practical matter, that is what was done here. Testator and his wife owned the property in question as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. He devised it, with certain reservations, to a third party. Her unqualified written consent to such devise is therefore binding upon her.
Other contentions made in this appeal have been neither overlooked nor ignored, but in our opinion are either inapplicable or without merit. We are convinced the trial court reached a correct decision in this case, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.