Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell

Citation: 2010-Ohio-3265

Docket Number: 20092034

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3265.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-3265 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CAMPBELL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3265.] 
Judicial misconduct — Discipline — Improper investigation of criminal matter — 
Failure to act in courteous, dignified manner — Improper use of judicial 
office to pressure persons into action — Improper handling of indigency 
determinations — One-year suspension with six months stayed on 
condition of no further violations. 
(No. 2009-2034 — Submitted January 13, 2010 — Decided July 15, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 08-030. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Phil William Campbell of Convoy, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0009352, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
November 1976.  First appointed to the Van Wert Municipal Court in March 
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1987, respondent was subsequently elected in November 1987 and reelected in 
1993, 1999, and 2005.  His current term ends on December 31, 2011.  In a 
complaint filed May 13, 2008, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent 
with multiple violations of the former Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of 
Professional Responsibility.1 
{¶ 2} The complaint encompasses incidents from 2003 through 2007, 
including respondent’s allegedly improper investigation of a criminal matter then 
pending in his court; failure to act in a patient, dignified, and courteous manner; 
use of his position as a judge to pressure persons into action; improper handling of 
proceedings to appoint counsel to indigent defendants; failure to act in a manner 
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary; 
and failure to faithfully follow the law. 
{¶ 3} In June 2009, a three-member panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline conducted a hearing.  Based upon 
respondent’s testimony, the parties’ factual stipulations, 150 stipulated exhibits, 
and respondent’s deposition testimony, the panel unanimously agreed to dismiss 
Count Ten of the original complaint, and all violations charged in the original 
complaint but not stipulated to by the parties.  The panel unanimously adopted the 
parties’ 125 stipulations of fact, including the stipulated violations of the former 
Code of Judicial Conduct and Code of Professional Responsibility, and the 
parties’ stipulated recommendation of a 12-month suspension with six months 
stayed. The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
recommended sanction, and we agree.  However, we grant the six month stay 
upon the condition that respondent commit no further disciplinary violations 
during the 12-month period of sanction. 
                                                 
1.  Because all of the conduct in this case occurred before the effective dates of the current Rules 
of Professional Conduct (effective February 1, 2007) and the current Code of Judicial Conduct 
(effective March 1, 2009), respondent was charged under the former versions of each. 
January Term, 2010 
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Misconduct 
Count One 
{¶ 4} In April 2005, a defendant was twice convicted of underage 
consumption of alcohol in the Van Wert Municipal Court.  He pleaded guilty and 
received a suspended ten-day jail sentence, conditioned upon his compliance with 
probation.  In September 2005, defendant was charged with underage 
consumption and furnishing alcohol to a minor.  He pleaded guilty and was 
sentenced to 90 days in jail, with 70 days suspended on the condition that he 
comply with the terms of his probation. 
{¶ 5} Seven months later, defendant was arrested while sitting in his 
vehicle and charged with physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated, underage 
consumption of alcohol, and possession of marijuana.  At his arraignment, the 
state changed the physical-control charge to a charge of operating a vehicle while 
intoxicated.  Because he was still on probation for his prior convictions, 
respondent ordered defendant incarcerated, with work and school release, pending 
his probation-violation hearing.  Because the jail did not have space in the work-
release dorm, respondent transferred him from jail to electronically monitored 
home arrest (“EMHA”). 
{¶ 6} On April 9, 2006, several other individuals were arrested for 
underage consumption at a party held at the apartment where defendant had been 
arrested.  Two of the others arrested appeared before respondent on April 13 and 
pleaded guilty.  Without placing them under oath, respondent questioned them 
about who had brought alcohol to the party, and each stated that defendant had 
supplied alcohol.  Although two attorneys had already entered an appearance of 
counsel on defendant’s behalf, they were not present at this hearing.  Afterwards, 
respondent spoke to a police officer off the record and indicated that he should 
follow up on the information that defendant had brought alcohol to the party.  The 
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Van Wert Police investigated the matter and did file a charge against defendant 
for furnishing alcohol to minors. 
{¶ 7} At his May 3, 2006 pretrial and probation-violation hearing, 
defendant entered a not-guilty plea.  The city law director moved to dismiss the 
furnishing charge because it appeared that the police had questioned defendant 
outside of the presence of his counsel and without giving him his Miranda 
warnings.  Respondent denied the motion, stating, “Well it doesn’t matter if he 
was given Miranda or not it is the testimony of the other people [sic].  On the new 
charge.”  When the law director noted that defendant had made an admission to 
the officer, respondent replied, “So, he can suppress it.  It doesn’t change the 
charge.” 
{¶ 8} Two days later, the same two individuals previously questioned 
appeared before respondent to enter pleas to related underage-consumption 
charges.  Respondent asked who had brought the alcohol to the party, and one 
mentioned defendant’s name.  When the other also mentioned defendant in 
response to questions, respondent placed him under oath.  Before he continued the 
questioning, respondent asked the law director who was representing defendant.  
She replied by identifying the attorney and, after acknowledging her response, 
respondent continued to question the other defendant. 
{¶ 9} At defendant’s June 12 pretrial, the parties proposed a plea that 
would have dismissed the furnishing charge in exchange for a plea on other 
charges.  However, after a discussion with the parties, respondent declined the 
plea, stating, “Alright, then I guess we will set that one [the furnishing charge] for 
trial.  Furnishing is a very serious crime and this court takes a very serious 
approach to that.” 
{¶ 10} During a later off-the-record discussion of the plea agreement, 
respondent opened a volume of the Ohio Revised Code to R.C. 2945.50, covering 
depositions in criminal cases, and left the bench.  When respondent returned, 
January Term, 2010 
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defendant’s attorney stated that he did not want to depose witnesses on the 
furnishing charge due to the added expense.  Respondent then asked the clerk to 
get the audio recordings of the earlier hearings.  Using headphones because the 
recordings could not be played on the courtroom speakers, respondent listened to 
the portions where defendant was implicated for bringing alcohol to the party.  He 
then relayed what he had heard to the attorneys. 
{¶ 11} Respondent stated that he wished to proceed with the probation-
violation hearing.  Defendant’s attorney objected, stating that because the 
probation violation was based upon the same facts as the furnishing and underage-
consumption charges, the hearing should be continued until those charges were 
resolved.  The parties stipulated and the board found that respondent set the case 
for a pretrial and probation-violation hearing and permitted defendant to remain 
on EMHA.  But the record demonstrates that before doing so, respondent 
proceeded to hear the testimony of an officer of the Van Wert City Police 
Department.  Only when defendant’s attorney renewed his objection at the 
conclusion of the state’s direct examination of the witness did respondent agree to 
continue the hearing.  At that time, respondent also terminated defendant’s bail 
for EMHA and remanded him into custody. 
{¶ 12} Based upon these facts, the parties stipulated and the board found 
that respondent engaged in misconduct by (1) encouraging the officer to follow up 
on the statements of two other individuals who had implicated defendant for 
furnishing alcohol and (2) questioning the other minors about who had supplied 
their alcohol after defendant had been charged with furnishing alcohol to a minor. 
{¶ 13} We do not suggest that a judge who obtains information about 
illegal conduct may not relay that information to law-enforcement officials who 
may, at their discretion, elect to investigate.  Here, however, the judge did more 
than merely forward information that came to his attention; he became a 
participant in the investigation.  The totality of the evidence in this case clearly 
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and convincingly demonstrates that respondent (1) actively sought information 
about the defendant who allegedly supplied the minors with alcohol, knowing that 
he already had a case pending before the court, (2) placed one of the minors under 
oath for the specific purpose of obtaining evidence against the defendant, (3) 
initiated the law-enforcement investigation of the defendant for furnishing alcohol 
to minors, (4) repeatedly and unreasonably refused to either dismiss the furnishing 
charge or to consider a plea that would result in the dismissal of that charge, (4) 
revoked the defendant’s EMHA after counsel requested a continuance of his 
probation-violation hearing until after the furnishing and underage-consumption 
charges were resolved.  Moreover, the record demonstrates that on August 25, 
2006, while denying that any basis existed for his disqualification, respondent 
assigned the case to a visiting judge.  And on August 28, 2006, pursuant to R.C. 
2701.031, respondent was removed from this case in response to an affidavit of 
disqualification filed by defendant’s counsel, based upon a “lingering distrust” 
that respondent could fairly and impartially decide the case.  Therefore, we 
conclude that respondent’s conduct crossed the line from the permissible relay of 
information to law enforcement to the impermissible active participation in the 
investigation and collection of evidence against the defendant. 
{¶ 14} As respondent conceded at his hearing, it is the role of law 
enforcement, not the judiciary, to conduct investigations.  In Disciplinary Counsel 
v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, we stated, “ 
‘The responsibility of a judge is to decide matters that have been submitted to the 
court by the parties.  The judge may not, having decided a case, advocate for or, 
as in this case, materially assist one party at the expense of the other.  Such 
advocacy creates the appearance, and perhaps the reality, of partiality on the part 
of the judge.  This, in turn, erodes public confidence in the fairness of the 
judiciary and undermines the faith in the judicial process that is a necessary 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
component of republican democracy.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 13, quoting  In re Complaint 
Against White (2002), 264 Neb. 740, 752, 651 N.W.2d 551. 
{¶ 15} Accordingly, we agree with the board’s conclusion that 
respondent’s conduct violated former Canon 1 (a judge shall uphold the integrity 
and independence of the judiciary), former Canon 2 (a judge shall respect and 
comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary), and DR 1-102(A)(5) 
(a lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
Count Two 
{¶ 16} During an off-the-record pretrial hearing in chambers in May 2006, 
one of the attorneys representing a defendant in a domestic-violence matter 
informed respondent that his client would not accept a plea agreement and wanted 
a jury trial.  Respondent became upset with the attorney and told him that he was 
“behaving like a horse’s ass.”  After the attorneys left the pretrial for the lunch 
recess, respondent encountered a police officer in a back hallway and asked him 
to open defendant’s holding cell.  In a raised voice and outside the presence of 
defendant’s counsel, respondent told him that he would be taken back to the jail 
because there was not going to be a plea.  When counsel returned after lunch, 
respondent continued the pretrial for two months.  Respondent testified that his 
statement to defense counsel was “out of line” and that he should not have spoken 
to a defendant who had an attorney. 
{¶ 17} The parties stipulated, the board found, and we agree that 
respondent’s conduct violated the former Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 2 and 
3(B)(4) (a judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, 
witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity 
and shall require similar conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court officials, and 
others subject to the judge’s direction and control). 
Count Three 
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{¶ 18} On January 13, 2005, a defendant appeared before respondent to be 
arraigned for OMVI and possession of marijuana.  On February 7, 2005, he 
pleaded guilty to an amended charge of reckless operation and was fined $150.  
At the time of his plea and sentencing, the results of a second test of his urine 
sample were not available. 
{¶ 19} Even though he knew that defendant’s case had been closed, in 
mid-February 2005, respondent asked the city law director’s secretary to bring the 
law director’s file on defendant to the municipal court.  Upon examining the file, 
respondent found that it did not contain the results of the second drug test.  The 
law director was unaware of respondent’s request for her case file until she 
discovered it sitting on the counter in the clerk’s office. 
{¶ 20} At the panel hearing, respondent testified that it was wrong for him 
to use his position as a judge to pressure someone, in this instance the law 
director’s secretary, to do something.  He also conceded that it was not part of his 
job to look in the prosecutor’s file.  The parties stipulated, the board found, and 
we agree that respondent’s conduct with respect to Count Three violated Canon 2 
of the former Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Count Four 
{¶ 21} On December 15, 2006, a defendant, an ironworker from 
Nebraska, was arrested for assault, aggravated menacing, and criminal damaging 
causing serious risk of physical harm – all first degree misdemeanors.  At his 
arraignment, respondent spoke to defendant regarding his eligibility for appointed 
counsel: 
{¶ 22} “COURT:  Have you hired an attorney * * *? 
{¶ 23} “DEFENDANT:  No. 
{¶ 24} “COURT:  You’re a union ironworker? 
{¶ 25} “DEFENDANT:  Well, I was until Friday. 
{¶ 26} “COURT:  You were on the date of – of the event? 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 27} “DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
{¶ 28} “COURT:  The Court finds you’re not indigent; you’ll have to hire 
an attorney.” 
{¶ 29} Because of the defendant’s criminal record and the fact that he was 
a Nebraska resident who had worked in Van Wert only a short time, the city law 
director requested a high cash bond.  Respondent set bail at $20,000 secured bond 
or ten percent cash bond.  Unable to make bail, defendant was held in jail. 
{¶ 30} Defendant repeatedly requested appointed counsel.  The acting law 
director relayed one such request to the court before trial.  At trial on January 9, 
2007, defendant made at least three separate requests for appointed counsel and 
stated at least six times either that he had no money or that he had no money to 
hire an attorney.  Respondent denied those requests, stating that the court had 
already determined that he was ineligible for appointed counsel, but granted him a 
continuance to obtain counsel at his own expense. 
{¶ 31} Attorney Steve Diller ultimately entered an appearance on 
defendant’s behalf and represented him on a pro bono basis.  A guilty plea was 
entered, and respondent sentenced defendant to 180 days in jail with credit for 
time served, suspended the balance upon payment of a $250 fine and costs, and 
placed him on probation for one year. 
{¶ 32} At the panel hearing, respondent testified that he had 
misunderstood the law that applies to appointment of counsel for indigent 
defendants, in that he believed that the focus of the determination was defendant’s 
status at the time of the offense.  He stated that had he properly understood the 
law, he would have made a more thorough inquiry regarding defendant’s finances 
at the arraignment.  The parties stipulated, the board found, and we agree that 
respondent’s conduct in Count Four violated Canon 2 of the former Code of 
Judicial Conduct, as well as DR 1-102(A)(5). 
Count Five 
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{¶ 33} On April 30, 2007, three defendants who were in custody and 
apparently indigent and in need of appointed counsel appeared before respondent; 
however there were no public defenders available that day.  While arraigning one 
of the three, respondent tried unsuccessfully to reach the public defender’s office 
to determine whether someone could provide counsel.  When he was unable to 
locate a public defender, respondent stated on the record that a public defender is 
normally present in court, but that the “county commissioners chose not to 
properly endorse the contract; so, therefore, no county – no public defender is 
here.” 
{¶ 34} After commencing the third such arraignment, respondent called a 
county prosecutor who was also president of the Van Wert County Bar 
Association, to see if she could assist him in locating an attorney who would be 
willing to act as a public defender that day.  When this attempt failed, respondent 
continued these three arraignments and remanded all three defendants to custody 
until the following morning.  Respondent then wrote a letter to the prosecutor and 
copied it to the public defender, detailing what had occurred during the 
arraignments. 
{¶ 35} At the panel hearing, respondent agreed that it was inappropriate 
for him to make comments regarding the acts of the county commissioners and 
admitted that those remarks improperly gave the impression that the three 
defendants were remanded into custody due to a failure on the part of the county 
commissioners.  The parties stipulated, the board found, and we agree that based 
upon these facts, respondent’s conduct violated Canon 2 of the former Code of 
Judicial Conduct. 
Count Six 
{¶ 36} On August 6, 2007, a defendant appeared before respondent and 
entered a no contest plea to misdemeanor charges of possession of marijuana and 
drug paraphernalia.  After entering her plea, defendant volunteered that she was 
January Term, 2010 
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not currently using marijuana, but had been prescribed marijuana in pill form 
during an earlier hospitalization and had continued to use it in plant form for a 
time afterwards.  Based upon her representation, respondent asked if she would 
take a urine drug screen, and defendant agreed. 
{¶ 37} Shortly after defendant left with a female staff member, she 
returned to the courtroom where respondent was conducting further arraignments.  
She stated that she would require a blood test because she had end-stage renal 
disease and was unable to produce urine.  Respondent had her placed in a holding 
cell for approximately 49 minutes while he completed his arraignment docket.  
Upon defendant’s return to the courtroom, respondent questioned her, under oath 
and on the record, about her medical conditions. 
{¶ 38} At the panel hearing, respondent acknowledged that because 
defendant had not been disorderly or out of line, it was neither prudent nor 
necessary to place her in a holding cell until he was ready to discuss her case.  
The parties stipulated, the board found, and we agree that respondent’s conduct in 
Count Six violated former Canons 2 and 3(B)(4). 
Count Seven 
{¶ 39} The Van Wert City Law Director gave notice of her resignation, 
effective December 31, 2006.  In the early morning of January 2, 2007, 
respondent learned that her successor had not yet received a signed contract from 
the city and so would not serve as the prosecutor that day.  Without a 
representative for the prosecution, the arraignments scheduled in respondent’s 
courtroom could not proceed. 
{¶ 40} Respondent called the mayor’s office and spoke with his secretary.  
Shortly thereafter, the mayor arrived at the courthouse and went to the clerk’s 
office to see respondent.  Seeing the mayor, respondent entered the clerk’s office 
wearing his judicial robe and gesturing toward the courtroom.  After the two men 
entered the courtroom and respondent took the bench, the clerk announced that 
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court was in session.  Respondent called the mayor to the bench and proceeded to 
question him, on the record but not under oath, about why the new law director’s 
contract had not been approved.  The mayor explained that before the new law 
director could assume his duties, three people had to sign the contract – the 
mayor, the new law director, and the city auditor.  Respondent then asked the 
mayor whether the law director would be in court at 11:00, and the mayor said 
that he would be. 
{¶ 41} Respondent conceded that by wearing his robe and bringing the 
mayor into the courtroom, he gave the appearance that he was trying to force the 
mayor to execute the law director’s contract and that his conduct was not 
appropriate.  The parties stipulated, the board found, and we agree that this 
conduct violated Canon 2 of the former Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Count Eight 
{¶ 42} On July 15, 2004, a defendant appeared before respondent, pro se, 
and entered a guilty plea to one charge of violating a civil protection order 
(“CPO”) that had been granted in her favor by allowing the person against whom 
she had obtained the order to stay in her home.  Respondent convicted her and 
sentenced her to serve one day in jail and to pay a fine of $50. 
{¶ 43} Six days later, an attorney entered an appearance on defendant’s 
behalf.  Citing this court’s decision in State v. Lucas, 100 Ohio St.3d 1, 2003-
Ohio-4778, 795 N.E.2d 642, for the proposition that the protected subject of a 
CPO cannot violate her own CPO, the attorney moved the court for withdrawal of 
the guilty plea.  Respondent denied the motion.  Defendant appealed to the Third 
District Court of Appeals. 
{¶ 44} Citing Lucas, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the 
language of R.C. 3113.31(E)(7)(a) demonstrates a legislative intent that only the 
party against whom a CPO is issued can be criminally responsible for violating 
the order.  State v. Youngpeter, Van Wert App. Nos.  15-04-09 and 15-04-10, 
January Term, 2010 
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2005-Ohio-329, ¶ 15.  Because defendant was the protected party in the CPO and 
had entered a guilty plea to the charge of violating that CPO, the court determined 
that respondent’s denial of her motion to withdraw that plea created a manifest 
injustice.  Id. at ¶ 16.  Accordingly, the court vacated the conviction and 
remanded the case for further proceedings. 
{¶ 45} On remand, respondent permitted defendant to withdraw her guilty 
plea and enter a plea of not guilty to the original charge.  Respondent made it 
clear that he would not dismiss the charge until an amended charge was filed.  
After a discussion off the record with the law director and defense counsel as to 
which charge would be appropriate, the prosecution amended the charge to 
obstruction of justice.  Defendant pleaded guilty to that lesser charge.  Respondent 
convicted her and sentenced her to ten days’ incarceration, all suspended, one 
year of probation, plus a $50 fine and costs.  Additionally, as a condition of her 
probation, respondent ordered defendant to have no contact with the party against 
whom she had obtained the CPO. 
{¶ 46} At the panel hearing, respondent stated that he had misunderstood 
his role upon remand from the appellate court and admitted that he should have 
dismissed the original charge.  He also acknowledged that as a judge, it was his 
duty to serve as the neutral referee and that it was improper for him to be involved 
in the formulation or prosecution of charges.  The parties stipulated, the board 
found, and we agree that respondent’s conduct with respect to Count Eight 
violated Canons 2 and 3(B)(2) (a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain 
professional competence in it) of the former Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Count Nine 
{¶ 47} Count Nine relates to respondent’s treatment of two defendants as 
he assessed their eligibility for appointed counsel in their criminal cases. 
{¶ 48} One defendant completed a personal-data form and bail 
questionnaire stating that he was homeless, was not employed, and owned no 
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property.  Respondent had this information available to him at defendant’s 
arraignment on one count of breaking and entering.  However, respondent 
badgered him by repeatedly inquiring about his employment history, his efforts to 
seek employment, why he had not sought employment, and why he did not want 
to work.  Although respondent often cut off defendant’s attempts to answer, 
defendant eventually stated that he had not been employed since 2004. 
{¶ 49} Based upon the information obtained at hearing, respondent 
determined that defendant was indigent, appointed a public defender, and ordered 
a mental-health evaluation.  Although defendant was homeless and had no 
income, respondent set bail at $2,500 cash, which required defendant to be held in 
jail. 
{¶ 50} Another defendant similarly appeared before respondent for 
arraignment.  In her bail questionnaire and personal-data form, defendant stated 
that she was not employed, had income of both “0” and “100,” was married, and 
was living at the House of Transition, a local women’s shelter.  In assessing her 
eligibility for appointed counsel, respondent asked defendant about her husband’s 
employment and income.  Defendant responded that she had separated from her 
husband and had obtained a CPO against him in Greenwood, Indiana.  When 
respondent asked to see the CPO, defendant stated that she did not have a copy, 
that the issuing court did not know her whereabouts, and that once she got settled 
in locally, her attorney in Indiana would send her the paperwork.  Respondent 
indicated that without a copy of the CPO, he would have to consider defendant’s 
husband’s income in determining her eligibility for appointed counsel. 
{¶ 51} Respondent also inquired about defendant’s residence, stating that 
“as I understand your statement [you’re] homeless; correct?”  When she replied, 
“Well, I have the House of Transition,” the court insisted, “No, you’re homeless.  
The house – You have no right to be at the House of Transitions.  That’s a 
conditional, vol- — that’s an – something you’re allowed to be at, ” and continued 
January Term, 2010 
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to refer to her as “homeless” throughout the hearing.  At the conclusion of the 
hearing, respondent conditionally appointed a public defender to represent 
defendant, set bail at $5,000 cash bond, and remanded her to jail. 
{¶ 52} At the panel hearing, respondent acknowledged that he had not 
treated either of these defendants with the requisite courtesy and admitted that he 
“basically lapsed into a trial lawyer cross-examination,” asking too many 
questions and pressing too hard to get answers.  The parties stipulated, the board 
found, and we agree that respondent’s conduct in these matters violated Canons 2 
and 3(B)(4) of the former Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 53} In determining the appropriate sanction for respondent’s violations 
of the former Code of Judicial Conduct and Code of Professional Responsibility, 
we consider the duties violated, the injury caused, respondent’s mental state, the 
existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances listed in Section 10(B) of the 
Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”), 
and applicable precedent.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Sargeant, 118 Ohio St.3d 322, 
2008-Ohio-2330, 889 N.E.2d 96, ¶ 28, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans 
(2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 497, 501, 733 N.E.2d 609. 
{¶ 54} Respondent has committed 14 violations of the former Code of 
Judicial Conduct, including one violation of Canon 1, nine violations of Canon 2, 
one violation of Canon 3(B)(2), and three violations of Canon 3(B)(4).  He has 
also committed two violations of DR 1-102(A)(5) of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. 
{¶ 55} Respondent injected himself into a criminal investigation, 
impairing the independence of the judiciary.  His conduct with respect to that 
investigation and his efforts to try an indigent defendant without appointing him 
counsel to aid in his defense were prejudicial to the administration of justice.  
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Respondent also failed to follow applicable precedent from this court and 
faithfully discharge his duties upon a remand from an appellate court.  He 
behaved in an undignified, unprofessional, and discourteous manner toward 
attorneys and litigants in his courtroom.  These actions, as well as his use of his 
judicial authority to gain access to a prosecutor’s file and question the mayor, 
demonstrated disrespect for the law and served to erode public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.  Furthermore, respondent’s conduct 
caused harm, most notably to the indigent criminal defendants appearing in his 
courtroom who were temporarily deprived of appointed counsel and subject to 
unnecessary and embarrassing questions about their personal affairs. 
{¶ 56} The parties presented no evidence regarding respondent’s mental 
state at the time of these violations.  Therefore, “we presume that he was healthy 
and unhindered in that regard.”  Sargeant, 118 Ohio St.3d 322, 2008-Ohio-2330, 
889 N.E.2d 96, ¶ 31. 
{¶ 57} The parties stipulated, the board found, and we agree that the 
following mitigating factors are present:  (1) respondent has not been the subject 
of previous discipline, (2) respondent has not acted with a dishonest or selfish 
motive, and (3) respondent has made a full and free disclosure to the board and 
has exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(a), (b) and (d).  Although the parties did not stipulate to aggravating 
factors and the board made no findings in that regard, we find that respondent has 
engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses and caused harm 
to vulnerable persons, namely criminal defendants appearing in his courtroom.  
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c), (d) and (h). 
{¶ 58} In Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-
Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, as in this case, we found that the respondent had 
committed multiple violations of former Canons 1, 2, 3(B)(2), and 3(B)(4), and 
DR 1-102(A)(5), in addition to violations of former Canons 3, 3(B)(7), 3(C)(1), 
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3(E)(1), 4, 7(C)(1), 7(C)(2)(a),  and DR 1-102(A)(4).  Id. at ¶ 20, 28, 40, 41, and 
44.  We noted that the respondent had used “coercive tactics to expedite 
dispositions in criminal cases” as a means to manage her docket, engaged in 
improper ex parte communications, “violated her duties to remain impartial and 
avoid advocacy,”  “engaged in a pattern of misrepresentation in her interactions 
with judges, litigants, attorneys, and court personnel,”  engaged in “a pattern of 
rude, undignified, and unprofessional conduct that included abusive verbal 
outbursts, unjustified expulsions from the courtroom, and berating or humiliating 
persons in the presence of others,” and had “no appreciation of the gravity of her 
actions or their effect on the integrity and operation of both her courtroom” and 
the court of common pleas as a whole.  Id. at ¶ 4, 11, 23, 30, and 36. 
{¶ 59} Aggravating factors in O’Neill included “a selfish motive, a pattern 
of misconduct, multiple offenses, the submission of false statements in the 
disciplinary process, a refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct, 
and harm to vulnerable persons, e.g., criminal defendants and court personnel.”  
Id. at ¶ 48.  And, in mitigation, we noted the absence of a prior disciplinary 
record, and O’Neill’s involvement in educating middle school and high school 
students about the legal system.  Id. at ¶ 49.  There, recognizing that the case was 
“extraordinary” and “unprecedented” in size and scope, we imposed a two-year 
suspension from the practice of law with one year stayed on conditions.  Id. at ¶ 
50, 55. 
{¶ 60} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire, 116 Ohio St.3d 110, 2007-Ohio-
5588, 876 N.E.2d 933, respondent committed single violations of Canons1 and 2, 
24 violations of Canon 3, and 13 violations of Canon 4 of the former Code of 
Judicial Conduct, as well as two violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) and ten violations 
of DR 1-102(A)(5) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Id. at ¶ 94.  Her 
multiple offenses included a “ ‘pattern of ignoring clear procedural and 
substantive requirements of the law necessarily to be followed by a judge for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
prompt, fair, and impartial decision of issues presented for her judicial decision; a 
pattern of intemperate, unjudicial conduct in proceedings brought before her; a 
pattern of failure to follow the law and of blaming other judges, lawyers and 
litigants for the consequences of her failures and actions; a pattern of rationalizing 
and revising the facts of past events to excuse her own conduct or to blame others 
by making baseless allegations of wrongful or malicious actions and motives of 
others; a pattern of judicial over-reaction and abuse of judicial power to hold or 
threaten to hold lawyers in contempt of court; a pattern of ex parte 
communication with parties, counsel and witnesses and of improper judicial 
investigations; and a pattern of failure or refusal to recuse herself as judge in 
proceedings where her impartiality and bias was manifested.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 81, 
quoting the panel report in that case. 
{¶ 61} The board concluded and we agreed that “ ‘[r]espondent’s 
persistent pattern of legal errors and her inability to recognize them for what they 
are and accept responsibility for them demonstrates her continuing lack of judicial 
temperament and judgment.”  Id. at ¶ 106.  We determined that “[r]espondent’s 
intemperance and complete disrespect for litigants and attorneys who appeared 
before her, coupled with her total failure to take responsibility for her 
misconduct” mandated the imposition of a two-year suspension with one year 
stayed on the condition that the respondent commit no further disciplinary 
violations.  Id. at ¶ 112. 
{¶ 62} Here, although respondent violated many of same provisions of the 
former Code of Judicial Conduct and Code of Professional Responsibility, his 
violations were neither as numerous nor as egregious as those committed by 
O’Neill and Squire.  Moreover, the combination of aggravating and mitigating 
factors present in this case, as well as respondent’s acknowledgement of the 
wrongful nature of his conduct, warrants a sanction less severe than those 
imposed in O’Neill and Squire. 
January Term, 2010 
19 
 
{¶ 63} Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the sanction 
recommended by the parties and the board is reasonable and appropriate.  
Accordingly, Phil William Campbell is hereby suspended from the practice of law 
in the state of Ohio for one year, with six months of that suspension stayed on the 
condition that he commit no further violations during the 12-month period of 
sanction.  If respondent fails to meet this condition, the stay will be lifted, and 
respondent will serve the entire one-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to 
respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Heather L. Hissom, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
George D. Johnson and Kimberly Vanover Riley, for respondent. 
______________________