Case Title: Kurpiel v. Hicks

Citation: 

Docket Number: 112192

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2012-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
PATRICIA G. KURPIEL, ET AL. 
 
 
 
   OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 112192  
JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  September 14, 2012 
 
ANDREW HICKS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STAFFORD COUNTY 
Sarah L. Deneke, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Circuit Court of 
Stafford County ("trial court") erred when it sustained the 
demurrer of Andrew C. Hicks and Tammy L. Hicks (together, the 
"Hicks") and dismissed the complaint of Patricia G. Kurpiel and 
George L. Kurpiel (together, the "Kurpiels") alleging common 
law trespass on the grounds that the Kurpiels did not allege 
facts stating a cause of action upon which the requested relief 
may be granted. 
I. Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
On June 1, 2011, the Kurpiels filed a complaint for 
declaratory judgment and civil damages against the Hicks in the 
trial court.  The Kurpiels' complaint alleged common law 
trespass against the Hicks, arguing that the Hicks "did not 
develop their land in a reasonable manner" and that the Hicks 
"directed and caused storm water . . . to flow upon the 
Kurpiel[s'] property, in such amounts and in such quantity as 
to cause damage[s] to the Kurpiel[s'] property and impair its 
use."  The Kurpiels sought a declaration of their respective 
2 
 
property rights and monetary damages for the Hicks' alleged 
trespass.  In response, the Hicks filed a demurrer and motion 
to dismiss, arguing that "the Kurpiels d[id] not allege a basis 
for declaratory judgment because the acts of the Hicks that the 
Kurpiels complain[ed] of ha[d] already 'occurred and matured' 
when their [c]omplaint was filed," and the Kurpiels had "other 
remedies available."  On August 1, 2011, the trial court 
entered an order sustaining the Hicks' demurrer, without 
prejudice, as to the Kurpiels' claim for declaratory judgment 
and permitting the Kurpiels to file an amended complaint. 
 
The Kurpiels subsequently filed an amended complaint 
containing one count of common law trespass, requesting 
injunctive relief to prevent the further trespass of surface 
water onto the Kurpiels property as a result of the Hicks' 
"unreasonable development of the[ir] adjacent property" and 
$35,000 in monetary damages.  The Kurpiels' amended complaint 
alleged that the Hicks "did not develop their land in a 
reasonable manner," in violation of the modified common law 
rule applicable to surface water and, as a result, directed and 
caused storm water to run onto the Kurpiels' property, which 
caused damage, and such unauthorized entry of storm water 
constituted a trespass. 
 
Specifically, the Kurpiels alleged that the Hicks: (1) 
began to develop their property, which adjoined the Kurpiels' 
3 
 
property, for residential use in early 2007; (2) stripped their 
land "of virtually all vegetation"; (3) "excessively cleared 
[their land] in violation of state law and County regulations"; 
(4) did not utilize proper drainage controls; (5) "left the 
land unvegetated longer than necessary"; (6) replaced plants 
along the respective properties' border "with insufficient and 
inadequate vegetative cover"; (7) "significantly altered the 
storm water drainage situation, changed the elevation of the 
land, and brought in additional fill, which . . . caused 
excessive storm water to flow from the Hicks' property onto the 
Kurpiel lands"; (8) knew that a storm water problem did not 
exist prior to their development of their property, but 
continued to "develop[] their property without regard to 
creating a new problem"; and (9) failed to control resulting 
"sediment loads and siltation running onto the Kurpiel[s'] 
property." 
 
The Kurpiels further alleged that: (1) prior to the Hicks' 
development of their property, the existing plantings, 
vegetation, and topography of the land had contained the water 
runoff; (2) with each significant storm, the discharge of storm 
water from the Hicks' property physically entered and 
interfered with the Kurpiels' exclusive possession of their 
property; and (3) none of the Kurpiels' efforts to control the 
4 
 
resulting surface water drainage, "including diversion of roof 
drains, sand bags and plantings" were successful. 
 
In response, the Hicks filed a "demurrer and motion to 
dismiss with prejudice," arguing that "[t]he few factual 
allegations contained in the Kurpiels' [a]mended [c]omplaint 
[did] not state a cause of action upon which the relief sought" 
could be granted.  The Hicks argued that surface water is a 
"common enemy" and, under Virginia law, landowners may fight 
off surface water subject to the exception set forth in Mullins 
v. Greer, 226 Va. 587, 589, 311 S.E.2d 110, 112 (1984) (stating 
that "one may, in the reasonable development of his property, 
grade it or erect a building thereon and not be liable for 
discharging additional diffused surface water as a result 
thereof") (internal citations omitted).  The Hicks further 
argued that "the Kurpiels [did] not and cannot allege facts 
that the Hicks did not develop their property in the 'usual and 
customary way' . . . ." 
The Kurpiels filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
Hicks' demurrer, arguing that whether the Hicks developed their 
property in the usual and customary way is only one factor to 
be considered, and that the modified common law rule applicable 
to surface water requires consideration of a number of factors 
related to reasonable use.  The Kurpiels argued that the Hicks 
"significantly altered the storm water drainage, changed the 
5 
 
elevation of the land, and brought in additional fill, all 
causing excessive surface water flow," and these allegations 
raised questions regarding the reasonableness of the Hicks' 
actions.  The Kurpiels argued that it is immaterial whether the 
Hicks had a right to build a home on their land, grade it, or 
fend off surface water; rather, the issue is whether the Hicks 
"acted reasonably in the development and changes that they 
undertook," and whether the Hicks undertook "such actions in a 
reasonable manner so as to not injure the property of another."  
Accordingly, the Kurpiels argued that they pled sufficient 
facts to establish a cause of action for trespass. 
 
The trial court sustained the Hicks' demurrer with 
prejudice, finding that the Kurpiels failed to allege facts 
sufficient to support a cause of action for trespass.  
Specifically, the trial court held that the Kurpiels' complaint 
"fail[ed] to allege facts which could support a claim that the 
[Hicks'] use of the property [wa]s unreasonable, that the 
[Hicks] acted in bad faith or with an intention to interfere 
with [the Kurpiels'] property or that the property 
modifications were done improperly or carelessly." 
 
The Kurpiels timely filed their notice of appeal, and we 
granted an appeal on the following assignments of error: 
 
6 
 
1. 
The trial court erred in its interpretation and 
application of the modified common law rule governing 
the control of surface water drainage by ruling upon 
whether Plaintiffs allegations sufficiently pleaded 
that Defendants' use of their property is 
unreasonable rather than whether the Defendants' 
efforts to control surface water was unreasonable.  
 
2. 
The trial court erred in ruling that the Plaintiffs 
failed to allege sufficient facts to support a cause 
of action for trespass based on violation of 
Virginia's modified common law rule [applicable] to 
surface water where Plaintiffs had alleged that 
Defendants (1) developed their land in a reasonable1 
manner by excessive[ly] clearing their land and 
failing to apply proper drainage controls; (2) 
significantly altered the storm water drainage; (3) 
changed the elevation of the land; (4) brought in 
additional fill; (5) cleared vegetation from legally 
protected areas and between the adjacent properties; 
(6) performed extensive regrading; and (7) violated 
county ordinances and state laws for erosion and 
sediment control, all of which Plaintiffs asserted 
constituted a knowing, careless and unreasonable use 
of land which injured Plaintiffs by directing 
significant surface water and soil erosion onto 
Plaintiffs' land which had never occurred before. 
 
3.  The trial court erred in ruling that Plaintiffs 
failed to allege sufficient facts to support a cause 
of action for trespass where Plaintiffs had alleged 
that Defendants (1) directed and caused storm water 
to flow to Plaintiffs' land; (2) which included 
substantial amounts of silt and sediment; (3) which 
damaged Plaintiffs['] land by washing out driveways 
and walkways and washing mud, debris and silt into 
the waterway adjoining the Plaintiffs' property. 
 
 
                     
1 The Kurpiels have explained, to our satisfaction, that 
"[t]here was a typographical error in the statement of the 
error assigned in the Petition for Appeal."  The Kurpiels' 
Petition for Appeal should have read "developed their land in 
an unreasonable manner" rather than "developed their land in a 
reasonable manner." 
7 
 
II. Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
Well-established principles guide our review of a trial 
court's judgment sustaining a demurrer. 
The purpose of a demurrer is to determine whether 
a [complaint] states a cause of action upon which 
the requested relief may be granted.  A demurrer 
tests the legal sufficiency of facts alleged in 
pleadings, not the strength of proof.  
Accordingly, we accept as true all properly pled 
facts and all inferences fairly drawn from those 
facts.  Because the decision whether to grant a 
demurrer involves issues of law, we review the 
circuit court's judgment de novo. 
 
Abi-Najm v. Concord Condo., LLC, 280 Va. 350, 356-57, 699 
S.E.2d 483, 486-87 (2010) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
B. The Trial Court Erred 
 in Sustaining the Hicks' Demurrer 
 
The Kurpiels argue that the trial court erred in 
sustaining the Hicks' demurrer as a result of its conclusion 
that the Kurpiels "failed to allege sufficient facts to support 
a cause of action for trespass based on violation of Virginia's 
modified common law rule [applicable] to surface water."  We 
agree with the Kurpiels. 
We have previously recognized that an action for common 
law trespass to land derives from the "general principle of law 
[that] every person is entitled to the exclusive and peaceful 
enjoyment of his own land, and to redress if such enjoyment 
8 
 
shall be wrongfully interrupted by another."  Tate v. Ogg, 170 
Va. 95, 99, 195 S.E. 496, 498 (1938).  We have also recognized: 
 
[A] trespass is an unauthorized entry onto 
property which results in interference with the 
property owner's possessory interest therein.  
Thus, in order to maintain a cause of action for 
trespass to land, the plaintiff must have had 
possession of the land, either actual or 
constructive, at the time the trespass was 
committed.  
 
 
In addition, to recover for trespass to 
land, a plaintiff must prove an invasion that 
interfered with the right of exclusive possession 
of the land, and that was a direct result of some 
act committed by the defendant.  Any physical 
entry upon the surface of the land constitutes 
such an invasion, whether the entry is a walking 
upon it, flooding it with water, casting objects 
upon it, or otherwise. 
 
Cooper v. Horn, 248 Va. 417, 423, 448 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1994) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Significantly, for the purposes of this case, Virginia 
applies the modified common law rule applicable to surface 
water.  Mullins, 226 Va. at 589, 311 S.E.2d at 112.  Under this 
rule, "surface water is a common enemy, and each landowner may 
fight it off as best he can, provided he does so reasonably and 
in good faith and not wantonly, unnecessarily or carelessly."  
Id. (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). 
We observed in McGehee v. Tidewater Railway Co.:  
Two general rules prevail in the United 
States with respect to surface water, the civil 
law rule and the common law rule. The former is 
thus expressed in the Code Napoleon, sec. 640: 
9 
 
"Inferior lands are subjected, as regards those 
which lie higher, to receive the waters which 
flow naturally therefrom to which the hand of man 
has not contributed. The proprietor of the lower 
ground cannot raise a bank which shall prevent 
such flowing. The superior proprietor of the 
higher lands cannot do anything to increase the 
servitude of the lower." 
 
On the other hand, by what is known as the 
common law rule . . . "surface water is regarded 
as a common enemy, and every landed proprietor 
has the right, as a general proposition, to take 
any measures necessary to the protection of his 
property from its ravages, even if in doing so he 
prevents its entrance upon his land and throws it 
back upon a coterminous proprietor." 
 
108 Va. 508, 509-10, 62 S.E. 356, 356-57 (1908).  
Significantly, however, we further stated in McGehee: 
 
While it is true that this so-called common 
law doctrine prevails in Virginia, it is, 
nevertheless, subject to the important 
qualification, that the privileges conferred by 
it may not be exercised wantonly, unnecessarily, 
or carelessly; but is modified by that golden 
maxim of the law, that one must so use his own 
property as not to injure the rights of another.  
It must be a reasonable use of the land for its 
improvement or better enjoyment, and the right 
must be exercised in good faith, with no purpose 
to abridge or interfere with the rights of 
others, and with such care with respect to the 
property that may be affected by the use or 
improvement as not to inflict any injury beyond 
what is necessary. 
 
Id. at 510, 62 S.E. at 357. 
 
As in this case, the plaintiff in McGehee brought an 
action for trespass against the defendant to recover damages 
for losses sustained when the plaintiff's property was flooded.  
10 
 
Id. at 509, 62 S.E. at 356.  The defendant railway company in 
McGehee had "acquired a strip of ground adjoining the 
plaintiff's lot . . . for its right of way and passenger 
station and approaches."  Id.  In the construction of a roadbed 
over its acquired strip of ground, the railway company did not 
make a "provision for the escape of surface water through its 
premises by culvert, drain, or otherwise.  The result of that 
method of construction was to retain and cast back the waters 
upon the plaintiff's lot."  Id.  The plaintiff's property was 
subsequently flooded and damaged; nonetheless, the trial court 
ruled for the defendants in the plaintiff's action for 
trespass.  Id. 
 
Upon review, we held that the trial court in McGehee 
"erred in holding, as a matter of law, that no duty rested upon 
the defendant to supply reasonably adequate means of escape for 
surface water under its roadbed and through its property."  Id. 
at 513, 62 S.E. at 358.  We held that the "question, whether or 
not the company, in the construction of its road and 
improvement of the grounds and approaches to its station, was 
reasonably prudent and careful to avoid injury to the plaintiff 
from the flooding of surface water, ought to have been 
submitted to the jury."  Id. (emphasis added). 
In this case, the Kurpiels' amended complaint alleged one 
count of trespass, resulting from the Hicks' careless, 
11 
 
unnecessary, and unreasonable development of their property, in 
violation of the modified common law rule applicable to surface 
water.2  The Kurpiels' amended complaint alleged that they were 
the owners of the damaged land in question, and that the Hicks' 
actions resulted in the interference with the Kurpiels' right 
to exclusive possession of their land.  The Kurpiels further 
alleged an unauthorized entry onto their land from the Hicks' 
actions directing and causing storm water, including sediment 
and silt, to flow from the Hicks' property onto the Kurpiels' 
property. 
Moreover, the Kurpiels alleged in their amended complaint 
that the Hicks "did not develop their land in a reasonable 
manner" and that the Hicks' actions were "careless, and 
unnecessary" because they: (1) stripped their land "of 
virtually all vegetation, including unauthorized removal of 
vegetation within the Resource Protection Area, a protected 
land disturbance zone established by the Chesapeake Bay 
Preservative Act"; (2) "cleared and/or improperly disturbed 
these protected areas" on their property; (3) "excessively 
cleared [their land] in violation of state law and County 
                     
2 The Kurpiels argue on appeal that they pled alternative 
claims of trespass and violation of the modified common law 
rule applicable to surface water in the trial court.  We 
disagree; the Kurpiels' amended complaint clearly alleges only 
one count of common law trespass based upon the Hicks' alleged 
violation of the modified common law rule applicable to surface 
water. 
12 
 
regulations"; (4) "did extensive regrading of the property"; 
(5) changed the elevation of the property; (6) "brought in 
additional fill dirt"; (7) "left the land unvegetated longer 
than necessary"; (8) demanded the Kurpiels remove plantings 
along the property border, and then "replaced such plants with 
insufficient and inadequate vegetative cover"; (9) did not use 
proper drainage controls; and (10) "failed to control sediment 
loads and siltation running onto the Kurpiel[s] property." 
Whether the actions taken by the Hicks in developing their 
property were in fact reasonable, in good faith and not wanton, 
unnecessary or careless, is a factual question to be decided by 
the fact finder, not a question of law to be decided on 
demurrer.  See Mullins, 226 Va. at 589, 311 S.E.2d at 112 
(stating that "surface water is a common enemy, and each 
landowner may fight it off as best he can, provided he does so 
reasonably and in good faith and not wantonly, unnecessarily or 
carelessly") (internal quotation marks omitted); McGehee, 108 
Va. at 513, 62 S.E. at 358 (concluding that that the trial 
court erred because "[t]he question, whether or not the 
[defendant], in the construction of its road and improvement of 
the grounds and approaches to its station, was reasonably 
prudent and careful to avoid injury to the plaintiff from the 
flooding of surface water, ought to have been submitted to the 
jury").  Significantly, "we accept as true all properly pled 
13 
 
facts and all inferences fairly drawn from those facts" when 
reviewing a trial court's decision to sustain a demurrer.  Abi-
Najm, 280 Va. at 357, 699 S.E.2d at 487. 
Accordingly, we hold that the Kurpiels' amended complaint 
alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action for common 
law trespass based upon a violation of the modified common law 
rule applicable to surface water and that the trial court erred 
in sustaining the Hicks' demurrer. 
III. Conclusion 
We hold that: (1) the Kurpiels' amended complaint alleged 
sufficient facts to state a cause of action for common law 
trespass based upon a violation of the modified common law rule 
applicable to surface water; and (2) the trial court erred in 
sustaining the Hicks' demurrer.  Accordingly, we will reverse 
the judgment of the trial court and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.