Case Title: RONALD HARRY GORSETH V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-122

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
RONALD HARRY GORSETH V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 109141 P.3d 698Case Number: 05-122Decided: 08/31/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
RONALD 
HARRY GORSETH,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jennifer K. Stone, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Ronald 
Gorseth (Gorseth), contends that the procedures followed in the sentencing 
portion of the proceedings in this case were improper and deprived him of due 
process of law.  He asks as a remedy 
that we remand this matter back to the district court for the sentencing process 
to be conducted anew, and especially that a new presentence report be prepared 
by an individual who will provide the district court with accurate, balanced 
information.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
[¶2]      Gorseth raises 
this issue:

 
 
            
Whether Gorseth was denied a fair sentencing when probation and parole 
issued a presentence investigation report which was not neutral and did not 
comply with the rules of criminal procedure.

 
 
In 
response, the State simply contends that the sentencing procedure was fair and 
complied with the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      On December 7, 
2004, Gorseth was charged in a criminal information which alleged eight 
counts.  The first six counts 
detailed six separate acts of sexual assault against the principal Victim in 
this case.  The seventh count 
alleged that Gorseth kidnapped that same Victim.  The eighth count alleged that Gorseth 
kidnapped the Victim's daughter (Daughter).  All of these crimes were committed on 
December 6, 2004.

 
 
[¶4]      The terrifying 
ordeal suffered by the Victim and her Daughter began shortly after 5:00 p.m., on 
December 6th, when the Victim stopped at a 
convenience store in Casper.  
She carried her Daughter into the store with her and when she returned to 
her car and began to place her Daughter into her car seat, Gorseth attacked the 
Victim from behind.  Gorseth grabbed 
her by the throat and said he had a knife and would kill her if she did not 
listen to him.  Gorseth forced the 
Victim into her car and sped away.  
The Victim had been forced onto the floor of the front seat of the car, 
and as they were driving away, Gorseth demanded that she perform fellatio upon 
him and shoved her head toward his genital area.  The Victim initially refused to submit 
to Gorseth's demands, but after he twice threatened to harm her Daughter she 
began to do as he asked, although she continued to resist as strenuously as she 
could.  Gorseth then drove the 
Victim to CasperMountain.

 
 
[¶5]      The details of 
Gorseth's vicious assault upon the Victim will not enhance this opinion.  The record contains a vivid description 
of how she was brutally penetrated, both genitally and digitally, and repeatedly 
forced to perform fellatio.  The 
assault continued after Gorseth left CasperMountain and moved to another 
location.

 
 
[¶6]      Because he had 
run the Victim's car out of gas, Gorseth drove to a gas station in ParadiseValley.  There the Victim managed to escape from 
Gorseth with her Daughter, and good Samaritans at that site aided the Victim in 
her rescue.

 
 
[¶7]      The Victim was 
able to positively identify Gorseth as her attacker, and surveillance videos 
showed that Gorseth was present at locations and times associated with the 
crime.  Gorseth's initial contact 
with the Casper Police Department went like this:

 
 
            
Your affiant made contact with Ronald Gorseth who identified 
himself.  Gorseth was read his 
Miranda Rights which he waived, agreeing to speak to Davison [Police Officer 
Kathryn Davison].  Gorseth 
immediately stated, "I might be in a little trouble."  Davison stated, "what kind of trouble 
would you be in."  Gorseth stated, 
"It's about robbery and rape."  
Davison stated, "tell me all about that."  Gorseth told your affiant that he met a 
blonde, very small blonde woman at the Kum and Go  on this date, 120604 in the 
evening.  Gorseth stated that the 
woman made contact with him and asked him if he wanted any "crank" which Gorseth 
described was methamphetamine.  
Gorseth said he agreed and got into the woman's car with her child 
inside.  Gorseth said he received "a 
line" of meth and did it, but the woman did not have any drugs.  Gorseth was asked about sex with the 
woman.  Gorseth said the two of them 
"may have monkeyed around" and that the woman "came on to me by snuggling a 
little bit, she wanted to have sex with me."  Gorseth said he did not remember having 
sex.  Gorseth stated he was pretty 
drunk.  Gorseth said the two of them 
drove to the mountain, he driving, and parked at Look Out Point.  Gorseth said that he and this woman may 
have "monkeyed" around there.  
Gorseth said he did kiss the woman.  
Gorseth said he then drove the woman to the Exxon in the "Valley" at 
ParadiseValley where the car ran 
out of gas, a person pushed the woman's car into the station with a truck, and 
he paid $20.00 gas for the woman's car.  
Gorseth then stated that the woman started yelling that Gorseth "robbed 
and raped" her.  Gorseth said he 
walked away, went to his sister in laws.  
Gorseth said at 4 Cacti he got a cab ride home.  Gorseth could not tell Davison the 
woman's name, but said he wanted to crank but knew he should not and his wife 
was going to be mad at him.  Gorseth 
denied kidnapping the woman, denied injuring her, denied sexual assaulting her 
and said it was consensual.  Gorseth 
talked about being a registered sex offender from California and said he is currently registered in 
Casper.

 
 
[¶8]      Gorseth appeared 
before the district court on January 10, 2005, for arraignment.  At that time, Gorseth's attorney told 
the district court that Gorseth had decided to plead guilty to some of the 
charges leveled against him:

 
 
            
 Pursuant to negotiations, we'll be entering pleas of guilty to Counts 
I, III, V, and VII.  Those will be 
cold pleas but concurrent.  There 
will also be a cold plea to Count VIII.  
Whether that's concurrent or consecutive will be left up to argument by 
the parties.  It's also a cold plea 
if I didn't say that, sir.

 
 
[¶9]      In addition, 
Gorseth's attorney agreed that there were additional terms to the plea agreement 
(although it was not reduced to writing or, if it was, it does not appear in the 
record on appeal).  The prosecutor 
expounded the additional terms, which included a statement that the counts not 
enumerated above would be dismissed:

 
 
            
 He would remain accused of three counts of first-degree sexual 
assault.  Each of those counts is 
normally a 5 to 50, but given that there is more than two counts of first-degree 
sexual assault, the enhanced penalty provisions of 6-2-306(b)(i) and (c)(i) 
would be indicated to be applied, which would make each of those punishable by 
not less than 5 years nor more than life and up to a $10,000 fine under the 
general fine provision of 6-10-102.

            
He would also be charged with two counts of aggravated kidnapping as 
outlined by counsel, each of those punishable under 6-2-201(d) because the 
victims were not released voluntarily of 20 to life and up to a $10,000 fine on 
each one of those.  Counsel 
otherwise described the concurrent and consecutive natures correctly.  Conditioned upon his pleas of guilty to 
those five counts, we would move to dismiss Counts II, IV, and 
VI.

 
 
[¶10]   Gorseth agreed that he understood 
the plea agreement, that he voluntarily joined in that agreement, and that no 
promises of sentences lighter than those described to him had been made by 
anyone.  At the arraignment, Gorseth 
admitted to the factual basis for each of the crimes to which he entered pleas 
of guilty by answering a series of "yes" and "no" questions (i.e., he did not 
describe his conduct in detail or in his own words).

 
 
[¶11]   The district court ordered that a 
presentence investigation (PSI) be prepared pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
32(a):

 
 
(a)  Presentence Investigation. 
--

                        
(1)  When Made.  --  
In every felony case the Department of Probation and Parole shall conduct 
a presentence investigation and submit a report to the court.  The court may order an investigation and 
report in misdemeanor cases.  In 
felony cases the investigation and report may not be waived but, with the 
parties' consent, the court may permit the report to be filed after 
sentencing.  Otherwise, it shall be 
considered by the court before the imposition of sentence or the granting of 
probation.  Except with the written 
consent of the defendant, the report shall not be submitted to the court or its 
contents disclosed to anyone unless the defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo 
contendere or has been found guilty.

                        
(2)  Report.  --  
The report of the presentence investigation shall 
contain:

(A)  Information 
about the history and characteristics of the defendant, including prior criminal 
record, if any, financial condition, and any circumstances affecting the 
defendant's behavior that may be helpful in imposing sentence or in the 
correctional treatment of the defendant;

(B)  Verified 
information stated in a nonargumentative style 
containing an assessment of the financial, social, psychological, and medical 
impact upon, and cost to, any individual against whom the offense has been 
committed and attaching a victim impact statement as provided in W.S. 7-21-103 
if the victim chooses to make one in writing.  In any event the report shall state that 
the victim was advised of the right to make such a statement orally at the 
defendant's sentencing or in writing.  
If the victim could not be contacted, the report shall describe the 
efforts made to contact the victim;

(C)  Unless 
the court orders otherwise, information concerning the nature and extent of 
non-prison programs and resources available for the defendant;  and

(D)  Such 
other information as may be required by the court.

                        
(3)  Disclosure. 

(A)  At 
least 10 days before imposing sentence, unless this minimum period is waived by 
the defendant, the court shall provide the defendant and the defendant's counsel 
with a copy of the report of the presentence investigation, including the 
information required by subdivision (a)(2).  The court shall afford the defendant and 
the defendant's counsel an opportunity to comment on the report and, in the 
discretion of the court, to introduce testimony or other information relating to 
any alleged factual inaccuracy contained in it.

(B)  Any 
material which may be disclosed to the defendant and the defendant's counsel 
shall be disclosed to the attorney for the state.

(C)  If 
the comments of the defendant and the defendant's counsel or testimony or other 
information introduced by them allege any factual inaccuracy in the presentence 
investigation report or the summary of the report or part thereof, the court 
shall, as to each matter controverted, make:

(i)  A 
finding as to the allegation; or

(ii)  A 
determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted 
will not be taken into account in sentencing.  A written record of such findings and 
determinations shall be appended to and accompany any copy of the presentence 
investigation report thereafter made available to penal institutions.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶12]   The PSI was filed in the district 
court on February 24, 2005.  In this 
appeal, Gorseth complains that the report "was not neutral," that it was 
"argumentative," that it contained facts that "were not verifiable," and that 
"it did not conform to the rules."  
On page 13 of the PSI, the probation agent assigned to prepare it 
included this information:

 
 
VII.  EVALUATION & 
RECOMMENDATION

 
 
Evaluation:

Before 
the Court is Ronald Harry Gorseth a forty-four (44) year old male who is facing 
sentencing in his most recent felony convictions.  Mr. Gorseth has only two (2) violations 
as a juvenile but since becoming an adult he has been convicted of Oral 
Copulation, Penetration with a Foreign Object, Felon in Possession of a Firearm, 
Battery (twice), Driving While Under the 
Influence (twice), and driving Under Suspension.  For his past crimes, the Defendant has 
been given supervised probation, jail time and sentence directly to a 
penitentiary.  The one time he 
received supervised probation, for one of the Driving Under the Influence 
convictions, the Defendant failed to complete probation and received jail 
time.

 
 
Of 
concern to this agent is the strangely similar attacks on the two (2) different 
women over ten (10) years apart.  
Back in 1992 when the Defendant was first convicted as a sex offender he 
used a knife and surprised the victim in her apartment and in this recent case 
he used a knife and surprised the victim getting into her car.  The acts he made both women complete are 
pretty much the same and while he voluntarily left his first victim after 
apologizing, it is unknown what he would have done to this victim had a good 
Samaritan not intervened to help her.  
While the defendant does accept responsibility in this case he has never 
taken responsibility in his first case which causes concern for this 
agent.

 
 
[¶13]   In the district court, Gorseth 
contended that this information was inaccurate and argumentative, and that the 
agent also quoted from a California Report of Probation Officer, but that the 
quotation did not accurately reflect the overall tenor of that report.  As a result, the district court 
determined that it would ignore the information which Gorseth considered to be 
inaccurate and, instead, included the entirety of the report in an addendum to 
the original PSI.  Because Gorseth 
contended that the Wyoming probation agent had not included 
information concerning the nature and extent of non-prison programs and 
resources available for Gorseth, the addendum also included that information 
along with an iteration of the probation officer's recommendation that Gorseth 
be incarcerated because of the seriousness of his crimes.

 
 
[¶14]   At the second sentencing hearing, 
the district court listened to all of Gorseth's objections to the PSI, as 
modified by the addendum, and stated that it would ignore all information to 
which Gorseth objected.  However, 
Gorseth persisted in his contention that a new PSI should be done by a probation 
agent who would present the PSI in a "nonargumentative style."  Gorseth also contended that the district 
court should not consider the California probation report at all, but only 
the fact that Gorseth had committed a crime similar to the crime at issue in 
this case.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶15]   We apply this standard of review in 
analyzing the district court's imposition of sentence:

 
 
            
When imposing sentence, the trial court is given broad discretion to 
consider a wide variety of factors about the defendant and his crimes.  Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1115 
(Wyo.1993);  Griebel v. State, 763 P.2d 475, 477 
(Wyo.1988).  We will not disturb a 
sentencing decision absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Jones v. State, 771 P.2d 368, 371 
(Wyo.1989).  In sentencing, due 
process provides a right to be sentenced only on accurate information.  Mehring, 860 P.2d at 1117;  Clouse v. State, 776 P.2d 1011, 1014 
(Wyo.1989).  On appeal, the 
defendant must demonstrate that the trial court relied upon the statements in 
sentencing to prevail.  Mehring, at 1115. Victim impact 
information about other crimes or convictions unrelated to the particular crime 
for which sentence is about to be imposed is permissible.  Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1116-17.  "W.R.Cr.P. 32(a) specifically permits 
information about the prior criminal record of the defendant and his 
characteristics to be considered by the trial court before imposing 
sentence.  In evaluating character, 
the trial court, in exercising its discretion, may consider a broad range of 
reports and information."  
Id.;  see also Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Wyo.1987).  Evidence 
of prior criminal activity is "highly relevant to the sentencing decision" and 
may be considered by the sentencing court despite the fact that no prosecution 
or conviction may have resulted.  Mehring, at 1117.  

 
 

Burkhardt 
v. State, 2005 
WY 96, ¶ 21, 117 P.3d 1219, 1225-26 (Wyo. 2005); Manes v. State, 2004 WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo.2004); also see Bitz 
v. State, 2003 WY 140, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 257, 259 
(Wyo.2003).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶16]   Gorseth contends there were five 
errors in the sentencing proceedings that require reversal of his sentence and 
remand to the district court for a new presentence report and a new sentencing 
proceeding:  (1)  The inclusion of the California 
probation report; (2) the failure of the probation agent to contact members of 
Gorseth's family; (3) the probation agent's failure to discuss non-prison 
programs and resources that might be available to Gorseth; (4) the probation 
agent's recommendation that Gorseth be given a life sentence was based on 
inaccurate information; and (5) the probation agent failed to remain neutral and 
instead advanced the position of the State.

 
 
The 
California 
Probation Report

 
 
[¶17]   As we noted in our recitation of 
the standard of review, it is well within the district court's discretion to 
consider any reliable and accurate information that enlightens the sentencing 
court about the crime and criminal at hand.  The California probation report falls comfortably 
within that category, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
allowing its admission.  

 
 
Failure 
to Contact Family

 
 
[¶18]   Gorseth contends that the probation 
agent failed to contact members of Gorseth's family so as to obtain more 
"balanced information" about him.  
There is no mandate in W.R.Cr.P. 32 that information from the family of a 
defendant be compiled for the trial court's consideration.  In many circumstances, such information 
may be of some significance.  
Certainly it is common for a defendant to provide such information to the 
sentencing court, and we expect that the sentencing court will always give it 
the consideration that it is due, whether that information exhorts the court to 
be lenient, to lock up the defendant and throw away the key, or if the 
information is more balanced in its content.  Gorseth was 44 years of age at the time 
of sentencing, and the record is not clear how much contact Gorseth had with his 
family during his adult life.  
However, we find no error in the failure of the probation agent to have 
solicited information from members of Gorseth's family.  Therefore, we also conclude that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering a new PSI to obtain 
such information. 

 
 
Failure 
to Discuss Prison Alternatives

 
 
[¶19]   In the initial presentence report, 
the probation agent did not discuss alternatives to prison.  That is likely because of Gorseth's 
criminal record and the seriousness of the crimes to which he had entered pleas 
of guilty.  Nonetheless, the 
district court did direct the probation agent to add such information to the 
addendum to the presentence report.  
To the extent there was any error to begin with, and we do not intend to 
intimate that there was any, it was most certainly cured by the 
addendum.

 
 
The 
Allegedly Inaccurate Statement

 
 
[¶20]   As we read Gorseth's brief, his 
contention is that, under the circumstances which occurred here, the district 
court was required to make a finding on the record that the probation agent's 
statement that Gorseth had not taken responsibility for that crime was 
inaccurate.  On the other hand, 
Gorseth appears to concede that, when the California probation report is read in its 
entirety, it is possible for one to conclude that Gorseth had, indeed, not taken 
"responsibility" for that crime, although he did enter a nolo contendere plea to 
it.  This contention by Gorseth is 
based upon the following language from the case, Bitz, ¶ 17, 78 P.3d 
261:

 
 
Once a 
defendant has alleged a factual inaccuracy in the PSI, the district court must 
either make a finding as to the contested matter or make a determination that no 
finding is necessary because the matter will not be considered for 
sentencing.  In the instant case, 
the district court clearly did not follow the latter route because he 
specifically relied upon the dismissed charges in sentencing the appellant.  Consequently, before relying on that 
information, the district court was obligated to make a finding based on 
sufficient evidence that the information was reliable, to develop a written 
record supporting that finding, and to append that record to the PSI.  None of that was done in this 
case.

 
 
[¶21]   We stand by all of what we had to 
say in Bitz, but that excerpt, taken 
out of context, does not persuade us that the district court erred in the 
instant case.  It is apparent that 
the district court made an independent conclusion about the degree to which 
Gorseth took "responsibility" for his crimes.  To begin with, we are not persuaded that 
the probation agent's opinion that Gorseth did not take "responsibility" for the 
California 
crime is inaccurate.  That opinion 
may be a matter for debate, but it is certainly not an error, or a mistake, or 
inherently "inaccurate."  Gorseth's 
acceptance of "responsibility" for his crimes was consistent over the 
years.  He readily admitted his 
crimes, but was conveniently able to hedge about the details because he was 
drunk or otherwise intoxicated and could not remember what he had done.  However, whatever it was "they" said he 
did, he would not contest it.   
We find no error in the sentencing process in this 
regard.

 
 
Failure 
of Probation Agent to Remain Neutral

 
 
[¶22]   Gorseth bases this argument on some 
very slender threads.  He contends 
that the probation agent was "argumentative" in favor of the State because she 
recommended a lengthy prison sentence, because she asserted he did not take 
"responsibility" for his crimes (see above), because she speculated about what 
might have happened to the victims had not a good Samaritan come to their 
rescue, and because she neglected to contact Gorseth's family to obtain 
information about him.  We have 
carefully examined the presentence report and the addendum and conclude that the 
probation agent did present the information in a "nonargumentative style" as 
required by Rule 32(a).  Although 
Rule 32 does not specifically charge a probation agent with giving an opinion 
about the defendant (making an evaluation and giving recommendations), it is 
apparent that the district courts deem such information to be of value in the 
sentencing process because the form used in that process calls for such 
evaluations and recommendations.  We 
conclude that that it is not an abuse of discretion for the district court to 
utilize such information in imposing sentence.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court are affirmed in all respects.