Case Title: State v. Zamzow

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP002603-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 29 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2603-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Glenn T. Zamzow, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
366 Wis. 2d 562, 874 N.W.2d 328 
(Ct. App. 2016 – Published) 
PDC No: 2016 WI App 7 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 6, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 13, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac 
 
JUDGE: 
Gary R. Sharpe 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. joined by BRADLEY, A. W., J. 
dissent (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there was a brief 
and oral argument by Thomas B. Aquino, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Warren 
D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 29
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP2603-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CT145) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Glenn T. Zamzow, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 6, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   We review a published 
opinion of the court of appeals,1 which determined that use of a 
deceased police officer's recorded statements at a suppression 
hearing2 did not violate Glenn T. Zamzow's rights under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  We hold that the Confrontation Clause protects a 
                                                 
1 State v. Zamzow, 2016 WI App 7, 366 Wis. 2d 562, 874 
N.W.2d 328. 
2 The Honorable Gary R. Sharpe, Fond du Lac County Circuit 
Court, presiding. 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
2 
 
defendant's 
right 
to 
confrontation 
at 
trial 
but 
not 
at 
suppression hearings, and admission of the deceased officer's 
recorded statements during the suppression hearing did not 
deprive Zamzow of due process.  We therefore affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Officer Craig Birkholz of the Fond du Lac Police 
Department stopped Zamzow's car early on a Sunday morning after 
observing the car cross the center line.  During the stop, 
Zamzow smelled of intoxicants and admitted to drinking alcohol.  
Officer Curt Beck arrived on the scene with a third officer to 
assist Birkholz.  The officers arrested Zamzow, and the State 
charged him with operating while intoxicated and operating with 
a prohibited alcohol concentration, both as third offenses.3  
Zamzow filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained during 
the stop, claiming Birkholz lacked reasonable suspicion.  Before 
the court could hold a suppression hearing, Birkholz died. 
¶3 
With 
Birkholz 
unavailable 
to 
testify 
at 
the 
suppression hearing, the State instead relied on a recording of 
the stop, as well as testimony by Beck and a computer forensic 
specialist from the police department, to establish reasonable 
suspicion.  The computer forensic specialist first testified 
about recordings from cameras mounted on the two squad cars 
involved in the stop.  He testified that he prepared a DVD 
containing the dashboard camera video from each car.  Next, Beck 
                                                 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)-(b) (2011-12). 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
3 
 
explained his role in assisting with the stop.  He acknowledged 
watching the DVD with the dashboard camera videos, and he 
confirmed that the recording produced by his own car's camera 
fairly and accurately depicted the stop as he remembered it.  
Additionally, he confirmed that the dashboard camera video from 
Birkholz's car fairly and accurately depicted the events Beck 
personally observed, and verified that the video consisted of a 
continuous and uninterrupted segment. 
¶4 
Based on the two officers' testimony——and over defense 
counsel's objection to the impossibility of cross-examining 
Birkholz about his reasons for initiating the stop——the circuit 
court allowed the State to introduce the video from Birkholz's 
car, which the court viewed.  After hearing arguments from 
Zamzow's counsel and from the State, the court took the 
suppression motion under advisement in order to further review 
the video.  While watching the video again in chambers, the 
circuit court discovered that the recording included audio, 
which had not accompanied the video at the suppression hearing.  
The court ordered a second suppression hearing so the audio 
accompanying the video could be played on the court record. 
¶5 
At the second suppression hearing, the court heard the 
initial statement Birkholz made to Zamzow after initiating the 
stop:  "Officer Birkholz, city police.  The reason I stopped you 
is you were crossing the center line there coming at me and then 
again when I turned around and got behind you."  The court also 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
4 
 
heard audio in which Birkholz explained his basis for the stop 
to the arriving officers.4  Zamzow's counsel objected to 
admission of both audio statements, arguing that the inability 
to cross-examine Birkholz denied Zamzow his right to confront a 
witness against him. 
¶6 
The circuit court denied Zamzow's suppression motion 
and made the following findings of fact: 
[O]n Sunday night, March 13th, at 3:04 a.m. or 
thereabouts, the officer in this case, deceased 
Officer Birkholz, did make an observation that the 
defendant had crossed the center line on Johnson 
Street as he was approaching the Johnson street bridge 
from the east traveling west.  The officer turned 
around, stopped the vehicle, and has testified that 
the vehicle crossed the center line again as it was 
going over the Johnson Street bridge. 
From 
the 
video, 
the 
court 
could 
not 
"discern 
in 
any 
fashion . . . whether a cross of the center line occurred prior 
to the two vehicles crossing paths," and the court added that it 
was "difficult from the video to discern whether the defendant's 
vehicle actually crossed the center line as it was going over 
the bridge."  Focusing instead on the statement Birkholz made to 
Zamzow, the court concluded, "[T]he . . . testimony that the 
vehicle did, in fact, cross the center line twice in that short 
amount of time" provided a "sufficient basis for the officer to 
have made a stop for further inquiry." 
                                                 
4 In its reasonable suspicion determination, the court did 
not rely on Birkholz's statement to the arriving officers. 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
5 
 
¶7 
On Zamzow's motion for reconsideration, the circuit 
court clarified its decision.  Relying on State v. Frambs, 157 
Wis. 2d 700, 460 N.W.2d 811 (Ct. App. 1990), the court concluded 
that the Confrontation Clause does not apply at a suppression 
hearing.  The court added that, even if the Confrontation Clause 
does apply at suppression hearings, Birkholz's statement to 
Zamzow was nontestimonial and therefore admissible. 
¶8 
Zamzow proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted him on 
both counts.  At trial, the jury did not hear the audio 
recording of Birkholz's statement.  After the circuit court 
denied Zamzow's motion for postconviction relief, he appealed 
and the court of appeals affirmed.  State v. Zamzow, 2016 WI App 
7, ¶1, 366 Wis. 2d 562, 874 N.W.2d 328.  The court of appeals 
agreed with the circuit court that "the Confrontation Clause 
simply does not apply to pretrial hearings such as the 
suppression hearing at issue in this case."  Id., ¶11.  
Emphasizing United States Supreme Court precedent suggesting the 
right to confrontation is a trial right, the court rejected 
Zamzow's contention that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004), undermined Frambs and extended the confrontation right 
to pretrial proceedings.  Id., ¶¶10-11.  Additionally, the court 
of appeals rejected Zamzow's claim, first raised in his 
postconviction motion, that admitting the audio statements 
denied him due process of law.  Id., ¶16.  In particular, the 
court of appeals relied on United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 
164 (1974), and United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), 
to conclude that "the Supreme Court has, at a minimum, intimated 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
6 
 
that admission at a pretrial suppression hearing of hearsay 
statements where the declarant cannot be cross-examined does not 
present a due process problem."  Zamzow, 366 Wis. 2d 562, ¶13. 
¶9 
Zamzow filed a petition for review, which we granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 Ordinarily, the decision whether to admit evidence is 
within the circuit court's discretion.  State v. Griep, 2015 WI 
40, ¶17, 361 Wis. 2d 657, 863 N.W.2d 567 (citing State v. 
Deadwiller, 2013 WI 75, ¶17, 350 Wis. 2d 138, 834 N.W.2d 362). 
Whether the admission of evidence violates a defendant's rights 
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment presents a 
question of law, which this court reviews do novo.  Id. (citing 
Deadwiller, 350 Wis. 2d 138, ¶17).  "Whether a defendant's right 
to due process was violated also presents a question of law that 
we review de novo."  State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶26, 328 
Wis. 2d 289, 786 N.W.2d 227. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Confrontation Right 
¶11 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him . . . ."  In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), 
the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
7 
 
Clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 403, 405.5 
¶12 Zamzow 
contends 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
confrontation "[i]n all criminal prosecutions" guarantees a 
right to confront the witnesses against him at suppression 
hearings.  Although he acknowledges the Supreme Court has never 
directly addressed the question, he argues the Court assumed the 
Confrontation Clause applies at a suppression hearing in McCray 
v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).6  He also draws analogies to 
the Court's decisions regarding other Sixth Amendment rights, 
noting the Public Trial Clause applies at suppression hearings, 
                                                 
5 Zamzow has not raised any argument that his right to 
confrontation differs under the Wisconsin Constitution, which 
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face."  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 7.  "We have observed that [the Confrontation 
Clause 
and 
Wis. 
Const. 
art. I, 
§ 7] 
are 
'generally' 
coterminous . . . ."  State v. Rhodes, 2011 WI 73, ¶28, 336 
Wis. 2d 64, 799 N.W.2d 850 (citing State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, 
¶43, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637). 
6 In support of this argument, Zamzow directs us to 
Professor LaFave's Search and Seizure, which asserts, "It should 
not be assumed that 
the right of confrontation has no 
application at a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing, for such 
is not the case."  6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 11.2(d), at 92 (5th ed. 2012).  But see 3 Wayne R. LaFave et 
al., Criminal Procedure § 10.5(e), at 618 (4th ed. 2015) 
("[D]efendant's right of cross-examination at the suppression 
hearing may be substantially narrower than that available at 
trial." (citing McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967))); cf. 
Nancy Hollander et al., Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 8:10, at 
8-28 (14th ed. 2015) ("At the federal level, the defendant's 
right to confront a witness, embodied in the Sixth Amendment of 
the Constitution, was early held not to apply to the preliminary 
hearing." (footnote omitted)). 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
8 
 
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46-47 (1984), and the Counsel 
Clause applies at preliminary hearings, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 
U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970).  Emphasizing the Court's relatively recent 
overhaul of its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in Crawford, 
Zamzow asserts that evidence presented at suppression hearings 
should also be subject to the Confrontation Clause's guaranteed 
procedural mechanism for scrutinizing witness testimony. 
¶13 In recent years, Crawford and its progeny initiated a 
reassessment of the nature of the Confrontation Clause's 
protections.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 ("To be sure, the 
Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but 
it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.").  By 
contrast, Zamzow presents a different question here, asking not 
what the Confrontation Clause protects but when its protections 
apply.  To answer Zamzow's question, we begin with the text of 
the Sixth Amendment and, building on the historical analyses in 
Crawford, examine the Confrontation Clause's meaning at the time 
of its adoption. 
¶14 On its face, the Sixth Amendment's introductory phrase 
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions" seems to speak in broad terms, 
and early English dictionaries provide little guidance regarding 
the scope of "prosecutions" during the Framing era.  Samuel 
Johnson's dictionary defined a "prosecution" as a "[s]uit 
against a man, in a criminal cause."  2 Samuel Johnson, A 
Dictionary of the English Language (London 1756).  Noah Webster 
provided a more comprehensive definition: "the process of 
exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
9 
 
tribunal, and pursuing them to final judgment."  2 Noah Webster, 
An American Dictionary of the English Language (New York, S. 
Converse 1828).  Although both definitions contemplate a formal 
process for pursuing criminal charges, neither delineates the 
specific procedures used to determine guilt or innocence.  
Consequently, the Sixth Amendment's text does not alone provide 
precise insights into the applicability of the Confrontation 
Clause during particular stages of a criminal proceeding. 
¶15 Accordingly, 
because 
"[t]he 
founding 
generation's 
immediate 
source 
of 
the 
[right 
to 
confront 
one's 
accusers] . . . was the common law," Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43, 
we also look to the common law to guide our understanding of the 
Confrontation Clause's meaning.  See Mattox v. United States, 
156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) ("We are bound to interpret the 
Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time 
it was adopted . . . .").  Blackstone extolled the virtues of 
confrontation in his discussion of "the nature and method of the 
trial by jury."  3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws 
of England 349 (Philadelphia 1772) (emphasis omitted).  He 
explained that "the confronting of adverse witnesses" affords an 
"opportunity of obtaining a clear discovery" of the underlying 
truth of the matter at issue.  Id. at 373.  Unlike a "private 
and secret examination taken down in writing before an officer" 
and later read at trial, the "examination of witnesses viva 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
10 
 
voce"7 provides a superior mechanism for achieving the trial's 
primary aim:  "the clearing up of truth" in the presence of the 
jury.  Id.  Absent from Blackstone's commentary was any 
indication the common law right to confront witnesses existed at 
any stages preceding the trial.  See 4 id. at 317-57. 
¶16 In Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), one 
of 
the 
Supreme 
Court's 
earliest 
opinions 
discussing 
the 
Confrontation Clause, the Court described the common law right 
in a manner consistent with Blackstone's articulation: 
The 
primary 
object 
of 
the 
constitutional 
provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex 
parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner 
in 
lieu 
of 
a 
personal 
examination 
and 
cross-
examination of the witness in which the accused has an 
opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and 
sifting 
the 
conscience 
of 
the 
witness, 
but 
of 
compelling him to stand face to face with the 
jury . . . . 
Id. at 242.  Like Blackstone, the Court emphasized the trial-
oriented protection afforded by the right to confrontation of 
witnesses, which guarantees the "personal presence of the 
witness before the jury."  Id. at 243.8 
                                                 
7 "By word of mouth; orally. . . .  In reference to the 
examination of witnesses, the term means that oral rather than 
written testimony was taken."  Viva Voce, Black's Law Dictionary 
1804 (10th ed. 2014). 
8 We make no pretense of replicating Crawford's encyclopedic 
review of the Sixth Amendment's history, but the dissent faults 
the depth and breadth of our inquiry into the common law right 
of confrontation and the original public meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause.  See Dissent ¶41 n.7, ¶49.  As contrary 
evidence of historical meaning, however, the dissent cites two 
twenty-first century law review articles about confrontation at 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
11 
 
¶17 As criminal procedure evolved over the past century to 
include 
various 
pretrial 
proceedings, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
addressed questions about non-trial criminal hearings and their 
relationship 
to 
procedural 
guarantees 
mandated 
by 
the 
Constitution.  In particular, suppression hearings have become 
an important stage in many criminal cases since the Supreme 
Court adopted the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 
232 U.S. 383 (1914).9  When examining the intersection of 
constitutional requirements and non-trial proceedings, the Court 
identified a "difference in standards and latitude allowed in 
passing upon the distinct issues of probable cause and guilt."  
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).  At a 
criminal trial, traditionally before a jury, "[g]uilt . . . must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to 
that which long experience in the common-law tradition, to some 
                                                                                                                                                             
sentencing, two modern treatises, a 1924 case from this court, 
contradictory separate writings in Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 
U.S. 368 (1979), and a non-precedential 1974 dissent from denial 
of certiorari.  Only the dissent's quotation from Joseph Chitty, 
A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law (5th ed. 1847), even 
begins to offer any persuasive insight into common law practice 
at the time of the Sixth Amendment's framing.  Although the 
dissent's authorities assuredly provide thoughtful commentary 
for any court reconciling the Sixth Amendment's protections with 
modern 
criminal 
procedure, 
after-the-fact 
analysis 
is 
no 
substitute for contemporaneous evidence when examining original 
meaning. 
9 Although the exclusionary rule originally applied only in 
federal criminal cases, the Supreme Court later held in Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), that the exclusionary rule also 
applies in state criminal cases through the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
12 
 
extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules 
of evidence consistent with that standard."  Id. (emphasis 
added).  Probable cause, in contrast, implicates only "the 
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."  Id. at 
175. 
¶18 When discussing the government's privilege not to 
reveal the identity of a confidential informant, the Supreme 
Court relied on this distinction between proof at trial——where a 
defendant's guilt or innocence is at stake——and proof at a 
suppression hearing.  In McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 
(1967), the Court explained it never held that, as an 
evidentiary principle, "an informer's identity need always be 
disclosed in a federal criminal trial, let alone in a 
preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for an arrest or 
search."  Id. at 312.  Faced with an undeveloped challenge to an 
unidentified informant's absence from a suppression hearing, the 
Court succinctly noted, "Petitioner also presents the contention 
here that he was unconstitutionally deprived of the right to 
confront a witness against him, because the State did not 
produce the informant to testify against him.  This contention 
we consider absolutely devoid of merit."  Id. at 313-14 
(emphasis added) (quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 
n.2 (1967)).  Where testimony by the arresting officers at the 
suppression hearing was sufficient to establish probable cause 
for 
the 
arrest 
and 
resultant 
search, 
id. 
at 
304, 
the 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
13 
 
confidential informant's absence did not violate the Sixth 
Amendment.10 
¶19 Elsewhere, the Court made more explicit the connection 
between criminal trials and the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of 
confrontation and cross-examination.  Four members of the Court 
endorsed a concise statement on the matter in Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987):  "[T]he right to confrontation is a 
trial right . . . ."  Id. at 52 (plurality).  In California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the Court declared, "[I]t is [the] 
literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial 
that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation 
Clause . . . ."  Id. at 157.  Earlier, in Barber v. Page, 390 
U.S. 719 (1968), the Court described a clear connection between 
the confrontation right and particular stages of a criminal 
case: 
The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.  
It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and 
the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the 
witness.  A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much 
less searching exploration into the merits of a case 
than a trial, simply because its function is the more 
limited one of determining whether probable cause 
exists to hold the accused for trial. 
Id. at 725. 
                                                 
10 A few years later, the Court confirmed the Sixth 
Amendment implications of its decision in McCray, observing that 
it had "specifically rejected the claim that defendant's right 
to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment and Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had in any way been 
violated."  United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 175 (1974). 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
14 
 
¶20 Consistent with the Supreme Court's implicit and 
explicit characterizations of the Confrontation Clause, this 
court recently held that "[o]ur caselaw establishes that the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
preliminary 
examinations."  State v. O'Brien, 2014 WI 54, ¶30, 354 
Wis. 2d 753, 850 N.W.2d 8 (first citing State ex rel. Funmaker 
v. Klamm, 106 Wis. 2d 624, 634, 317 N.W.2d 458 (1982)); then 
citing State v. Oliver, 161 Wis. 2d 140, 146, 467 N.W.2d 211 
(Ct. App. 1991); and then citing State v. Padilla, 110 
Wis. 2d 414, 422, 329 N.W.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1982)).  The primary 
case on which this court relied explained that the "purpose of a 
preliminary hearing is quite different from a trial" because 
"the defendant's guilt need not be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  Funmaker, 106 Wis. 2d at 634. 
¶21 Wisconsin 
is 
not 
alone 
in 
interpreting 
the 
Confrontation Clause as protecting a trial right; numerous state 
and federal courts agree.  Peterson v. California, 604 F.3d 
1166, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he right to confrontation is 
basically a trial right. . . .  Accordingly, Crawford does not 
affect 
the . . . Supreme 
Court 
cases 
holding 
that 
the 
Confrontation Clause is primarily a trial right."); Whitman v. 
Superior Court, 820 P.2d 262, 271 (Cal. 1991) ("[T]he United 
States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that '[t]he right to 
confrontation is basically a trial right.'" (quoting Barber, 390 
U.S. at 725)); Blevins v. Tihonovich, 728 P.2d 732, 734 (Colo. 
1986) (en banc); Leitch v. Fleming, 732 S.E.2d 401, 404 (Ga. 
2012); People v. Blackman, 414 N.E.2d 246, 247–48 (Ill. App. Ct. 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
15 
 
1980); State v. Sherry, 667 P.2d 367, 376 (Kan. 1983) ("The 
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is a protection that 
exists at the trial of the defendant."); Oakes v. Commonwealth, 
320 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Ky. 2010) ("[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has 
never held that the right to confront witnesses applies to pre-
trial hearings.  In fact, to the contrary, it has repeatedly 
described the right as a trial right."); State v. Daly, 775 
N.W.2d 47, 66 (Neb. 2009) ("[I]t is well established that 
Confrontation Clause rights are trial rights that do not extend 
to pretrial hearings in state proceedings."); Sheriff v. 
Witzenburg, 145 P.3d 1002, 1004 (Nev. 2006) ("[C]onfrontation 
has historically been described as a trial right."); State v. 
Lopez, 2013-NMSC-047, ¶2, 314 P.3d 236 ("[T]he right of 
confrontation . . . applies only at a criminal trial where guilt 
or innocence is determined."); Commonwealth v. Tyler, 587 A.2d 
326, 328 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) ("[T]he right to confrontation is 
a trial right."); State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ¶11, 218 
P.3d 590 ("Barber, Green, and Ritchie establish Supreme Court 
precedent confining the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause to 
trial."). 
¶22 Although we now address, for the first time, whether 
the Confrontation Clause applies at suppression hearings,11 
                                                 
11 In State v. Frambs, 157 Wis. 2d 700, 460 N.W.2d 811 (Ct. 
App. 1990), the court of appeals observed that it saw "no 
evidence that the Supreme Court intended the protection of the 
confrontation 
clause 
to 
be 
available 
to 
a 
defendant 
in . . . pretrial situations."  Id. at 704.  The statement arose 
during an analysis based on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
16 
 
courts in other states have already tackled the question in the 
post-Crawford era.  The New Mexico Supreme Court presents a 
representative example, holding that "the Confrontation Clause 
does not apply to preliminary questions of fact elicited at a 
suppression hearing."  State v. Rivera, 2008-NMSC-056, ¶13, 192 
P.3d 1213.  That court relied on Ritchie and Barber when 
explaining, "[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that a 
defendant's right to confront witnesses against him is primarily 
a trial right, not a pretrial right."  Id., ¶¶13-14.  The court 
added, "A trial focuses on the ultimate issue of an accused's 
guilt or innocence, whereas in a pretrial hearing the focus is 
generally on the admissibility of evidence."  Id., ¶15.  
Recognizing the continued validity of that distinction in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court emphasized that "recent 
cases continue to focus on the protections afforded a defendant 
at trial."  Id., ¶18 (first citing Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 
353, 357-58 (2008); then citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68). 
¶23 Other courts reached similar conclusions.  See, e.g., 
People v. Felder, 129 P.3d 1072, 1073-74 (Colo. App. 2005) 
(observing that "[n]othing in Crawford suggests that the Supreme 
Court intended to alter its prior rulings allowing hearsay at 
                                                                                                                                                             
which the Supreme Court overruled in Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004).  Any effect on Frambs following Crawford's 
overruling of Roberts is irrelevant for our purposes here, as we 
conduct 
an 
independent, 
comprehensive 
review 
of 
the 
applicability 
of 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
at 
suppression 
hearings. 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
17 
 
pretrial proceedings, such as a hearing on a suppression motion 
challenging the sufficiency of a search warrant," and reasoning 
that "had the Court intended the rule of Crawford to apply at 
the pretrial stage, it would have revisited its prior decisions 
refusing to recognize a Sixth Amendment right of pretrial 
confrontation"); State v. Woinarowicz, 2006 ND 179, ¶11, 720 
N.W.2d 635 ("In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court did 
not indicate it intended to change the law and apply the 
Confrontation Clause to pretrial hearings. . . .  The Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation is a trial right, which does 
not apply to pretrial suppression hearings."); Vanmeter v. 
State, 165 S.W.3d 68, 74-75 (Tex. App. 2005) ("Crawford did not 
change prior law that the constitutional right of confrontation 
is a trial right, not a pretrial right . . . .  We hold, 
therefore, that Crawford does not apply at pretrial suppression 
hearings."); see also Ebert v. Gaetz, 610 F.3d 404, 414 (7th 
Cir. 
2010) 
("[T]he 
court 
considered 
the 
statement 
at 
a 
suppression hearing, not . . . trial; the Confrontation Clause 
was not implicated." (citing United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 
573, 584 (1971) (plurality))); State v. Watkins, 190 P.3d 266, 
270-71 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Harris, 2008-2117 (La. 
12/19/08), 998 So. 2d 55 (per curiam); State v. Williams, 960 
A.2d 805, 819-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008); People v. 
Mitchell, 2 N.Y.S.3d 207, 209-10 (App. Div. 2015); State v. 
Brown, 2016-Ohio-1258, 61 N.E.3d 922, ¶¶13-15 (Ct. App., 2d 
Dist.); State v. Fortun-Cebada, 241 P.3d 800, ¶41 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
18 
 
¶24 We agree with those jurisdictions in concluding that 
the Confrontation Clause does not apply during suppression 
hearings.  At common law, the right to confront witnesses 
developed as a mechanism for assessing witness reliability in 
the presence of the fact-finder, and several decisions by the 
Supreme 
Court 
indicate 
the 
confrontation 
right 
protects 
defendants at trial——when guilt or innocence is at stake.  See 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52 (plurality); Green, 399 U.S. at 157; 
Barber, 390 U.S. at 725; Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 174-75.  
Presenting live witnesses at a suppression hearing undoubtedly 
strengthens testimony offered by the State,12 but when cross-
examination of a witness becomes impossible, the Confrontation 
Clause does not prohibit use of valuable evidence, such as the 
video at issue here. 
¶25 It is important to recognize the dissimilarity between 
the inquiry at trial and the inquiry at suppression hearings:  
while the purpose of a trial is to ascertain a defendant’s guilt 
or innocence, the function of a suppression hearing is to 
                                                 
12 We therefore do not share the concern, articulated by the 
dissents both here and at the court of appeals, that our holding 
will reduce suppression hearings "to a paper review in which 
trial courts read police reports and review evidence such as 
dash cam videos to determine whether a warrantless search or 
seizure was nevertheless lawful."  Dissent, ¶85 (quoting Zamzow, 
366 Wis. 2d 562, ¶22 (Reilly, J., dissenting)).  Because of the 
weight live testimony carries when it emerges intact from the 
gauntlet of cross-examination, a prosecutor has no incentive to 
intentionally weaken the State's own case by failing to bring an 
available 
witness 
before 
the 
court 
to 
defend 
against 
a 
defendant's suppression motion. 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
19 
 
determine 
whether 
the 
police 
violated 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional rights.  In McCray, the Supreme Court explained 
that the suppression hearing implicates a lesser concern than 
the trial itself: 
We must remember . . . that we are not dealing 
with the trial of the criminal charge itself.  There 
the need for a truthful verdict outweighs society's 
need for the informer privilege.  Here, however, the 
accused seeks to avoid the truth.  The very purpose of 
a motion to suppress is to escape the inculpatory 
thrust of evidence in hand, not because its probative 
force is diluted in the least by the mode of seizure, 
but rather as a sanction to compel enforcement 
officers to respect the constitutional security of all 
of us under the Fourth Amendment.  If the motion to 
suppress is denied, defendant will still be judged 
upon the untarnished truth. 
386 U.S. at 307 (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Burnett, 
201 A.2d 39, 44 (N.J. 1964)).  The proceedings here reveal the 
gulf between these inquiries.  Although the circuit court did 
consider 
Birkholz's 
statement 
when 
evaluating 
reasonable 
suspicion, the jury that actually convicted Zamzow at trial 
never heard the audio recording.  Birkholz's statement itself 
played no part in the determination of guilt or innocence.  
Zamzow was "judged upon the untarnished truth."  Id. 
¶26 While the Supreme Court has applied the Public Trial 
and Counsel Clauses of the Sixth Amendment to certain pretrial 
hearings, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984); Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), tellingly, it has not done so with 
respect to the Confrontation Clause.  Cases holding that the 
Public 
Trial 
and 
Counsel 
Clauses 
apply 
during 
pretrial 
proceedings base their conclusions on the nature of the rights 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
20 
 
those clauses protect.  See Waller, 467 U.S. at 46-47; Coleman, 
399 U.S. at 9-10 (plurality); id. at 11-12 (Black, J., 
concurring).  Here, elevating suppression hearings to a level of 
constitutional significance on par with trials would contravene 
the clear distinction the Supreme Court has described between 
pretrial hearings and the trial itself for Confrontation Clause 
purposes.  The Court never nullified that distinction in 
Crawford or any subsequent Confrontation Clause case, and we 
will not adopt such a construction here.  Because the Court has 
made clear that the interests protected by the confrontation 
right 
specifically 
target 
the 
determination 
of 
guilt 
or 
innocence, the justifications underpinning application of the 
Public Trial and Counsel Clauses of the Sixth Amendment to 
pretrial 
proceedings 
do 
not 
logically 
attach 
to 
the 
Confrontation Clause.13 
¶27 In light of the longstanding principle that the 
Confrontation Clause protects a trial right, we conclude the 
Confrontation Clause does not require confrontation of witnesses 
at suppression hearings.  By relying on Birkholz's recorded 
                                                 
13 Accusing us of placing form ahead of substance, the 
dissent insists that "the temporal factor does not control" 
whether the Confrontation Clause applies.  Dissent, ¶¶51-52.  We 
agree.  As demonstrated by our review of historical evidence and 
Supreme Court decisions, we choose to join other jurisdictions 
in holding that the confrontation right is a trial right not out 
of "cursor[y] rel[iance] on . . . references to 'at trial' in 
United States Supreme Court cases," dissent, ¶48, but because we 
are persuaded that the confrontation right applies to testimony 
before a finder of fact weighing the ultimate question of a 
defendant's guilt or innocence. 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
21 
 
audio statement to make a reasonable suspicion determination, 
the circuit court did not deny Zamzow his right to confrontation 
under the Sixth Amendment.14 
B.  Due Process 
¶28 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution provides:  "No state shall . . . deprive any person 
of 
life, 
liberty, 
or 
property, 
without 
due 
process 
of 
law . . . ."  As an alternative to his Confrontation Clause 
argument, Zamzow contends the circuit court denied him due 
process of law at the suppression hearing by relying on the 
audio recording of Birkholz's statements without any possibility 
of cross-examination, quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
269 (1970): "[i]n almost every setting where important decisions 
turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity 
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses." 
¶29 We agree with the court of appeals that clear 
precedent from the Supreme Court undermines Zamzow's due process 
argument.  In many of the Confrontation Clause cases discussed 
above, the Supreme Court also addressed alleged due process 
violations.  Drawing those cases together, the Court explained 
that the distinction between trials and pretrial hearings 
applies in the due process context, too: 
This Court . . . has noted that the interests at 
stake in a suppression hearing are of a lesser 
                                                 
14 Because we conclude the Confrontation Clause did not 
require confrontation at the suppression hearing, we need not 
determine whether Birkholz's statement was testimonial. 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
22 
 
magnitude than those in the criminal trial itself.  At 
a suppression hearing, the court may rely on hearsay 
and other evidence, even though that evidence would 
not be admissible at trial.  United States v. Matlock, 
415 U.S. 164, 172-174 (1974); Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-174 (1949).  Furthermore, 
although the Due Process Clause has been held to 
require the Government to disclose the identity of an 
informant at trial, provided the identity is shown to 
be relevant and helpful to the defense, Roviaro v. 
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957), it has never 
been held to require the disclosure of an informant's 
identity 
at 
a 
suppression 
hearing. 
 
McCray 
v. 
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).  We conclude that the 
process due at a suppression hearing may be less 
demanding and elaborate than the protections accorded 
the defendant at the trial itself. 
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980) (citation 
omitted).  Any right to confrontation and cross-examination 
implicated by the Due Process Clause is therefore relaxed at a 
suppression hearing. 
¶30 Ultimately, "due process is flexible and calls for 
such 
procedural 
protections 
as 
the 
particular 
situation 
demands."  State v. Chamblis, 2015 WI 53, ¶54, 362 Wis. 2d 370, 
864 N.W.2d 806 (alteration omitted) (quoting Gilbert v. Homar, 
520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997)).  Here, Birkholz's death rendered him 
unavailable to testify at the suppression hearing.  But 
testimony by Beck established that the recording from the 
dashboard 
camera 
on 
Birkholz's 
squad 
car 
accurately 
and 
continuously documented the portions of the stop observed by 
Beck.  The audio portion of that same continuous recording 
captured a statement made by Birkholz to Zamzow before Beck's 
arrival on the scene.  The circuit court's reliance on that 
No. 
2014AP2603-CR 
 
23 
 
hearsay statement did not offend the reduced standard for due 
process of law required at a suppression hearing. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶31 The right to confrontation arose at common law as a 
tool to test witness reliability at trial.  With the advent of 
pretrial evidentiary hearings during the twentieth century, the 
Supreme Court has signaled that the right to confrontation 
persists as a trial protection and does not apply during 
pretrial proceedings.  The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a 
defendant whose guilt or innocence is at stake at trial may 
employ the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of truth."  Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (quoting 5 John 
Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).  But the Sixth 
Amendment does not mandate that statements considered at a 
suppression hearing face the crucible of cross-examination.  Nor 
does the Due Process Clause demand this.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the circuit court did not deny Zamzow his rights 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution by 
relying on an audio recording of a deceased officer's statement 
at the suppression hearing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶32 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  The Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution enumerates an 
accused's rights "in all criminal prosecutions."  Glenn T. 
Zamzow, convicted of drunk driving, asserts that he was denied 
his Sixth Amendment enumerated right "to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him" during a hearing on his motion to 
suppress evidence.  The majority opinion declares, without 
equivocation, that no such right exists. 
¶33 The United States Supreme Court has not squarely 
addressed the issue presented in the instant case.  Thus, to 
decide the instant case the majority opinion must predict, on 
the basis of case law tackling other questions, what the United 
States Supreme Court will do when it has the opportunity to 
decide the issue presented in the instant case.   
¶34 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.  (Emphasis added.)   
¶35 The 
instant 
case 
involves 
a 
Fourth 
Amendment 
suppression hearing,1 not a preliminary examination.  The two are 
                                                 
1 The defendant asserts that the stop of his vehicle was 
unlawful and therefore that all evidence derivative of the stop 
should be suppressed.   
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
very different.  Cases cited by the majority opinion relating to 
preliminary examinations are not relevant to the instant case.2   
¶36 To put the instant case in context, the Sixth 
Amendment 
Confrontation 
Clause 
is 
implicated 
when 
the 
declarant's statement is testimonial.  Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004).  Majority op., ¶27 n.14.  The circuit court 
found that some of the declarant's (here Officer Birkholz's) 
statements were testimonial and some were not.  Silently 
assuming that all the evidence at issue is testimonial, the 
court of appeals and the majority opinion do not determine 
                                                 
2 Neither a 
constitutional nor a statutory right of 
confrontation exists in a preliminary examination in Wisconsin.  
Wis. Stat. § 970.038; State v. O'Brien, 2014 WI 54, ¶¶30-31, 354 
Wis. 2d 753, 850 N.W.2d 8.  
In a preliminary examination, the question is whether there 
is probable cause to hold the accused for trial.  See majority 
op., ¶17.  
The United States Supreme Court has held that a probable 
cause determination for the sole purpose of pretrial detention 
does not require the full panoply of adversarial safeguards, 
including confrontation.  This type of pretrial proceeding does 
not impair the accused's defense on the merits. Gerstein v. 
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975); United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 
1148, 1154 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981).    
In a suppression hearing, the question is what evidence 
will be admitted at trial to determine guilt.  A suppression 
hearing is a more searching exploration into the merits of the 
case than a preliminary examination. 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
whether the evidence is testimonial under Crawford.3  Apparently, 
it 
is 
easier 
for 
the 
majority 
opinion 
to 
answer 
the 
constitutional 
confrontation 
question 
regarding 
suppression 
hearings than to answer whether the evidence of Zamzow's driving 
and law enforcement's stop is testimonial.  I take on the same 
question the majority opinion does.           
¶37 I conclude that the Sixth Amendment confrontation 
right applies at suppression hearings.  My analysis will proceed 
as follows:  
I. The text and history of the Sixth Amendment 
enumerating 
the 
confrontation 
right 
"in 
all 
criminal prosecutions" informs the interpretation 
of the confrontation right at a suppression 
hearing.  Cross-examination is the core of the 
confrontation right. 
II. 
The phrase "in all criminal prosecutions" in the 
Sixth Amendment is not limited to what occurs at 
trial.  In any event, at the time of the adoption 
                                                 
3 "Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial" 
violate a defendant's confrontation right unless "the declarant 
is 
unavailable, 
and . . . the 
defendant 
has 
had 
a 
prior 
opportunity to cross-examine."  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 59 (2004).  Whether statements of different types and 
contexts are testimonial has been progressively defined by the 
Court since Crawford: "[T]o rank as 'testimonial,' a statement 
must have a 'primary purpose' of 'establish[ing] or prov[ing] 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."  
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 659 n.6 (2011) (quoting 
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)). 
Court of Appeals Judge Paul Reilly concluded that Officer 
Birkholz's statement that Zamzow crossed the center line prior 
to the stop was testimonial, as it described a past event with 
the purpose of establishing or proving that event in a later 
criminal prosecution and was made by an officer who intended to 
bear testimony in that prosecution.  State v. Zamzow, 2016 WI 
App 7, ¶17, 366 Wis. 2d 562, 874 N.W.2d 328. 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
of the Sixth Amendment, suppression hearings were 
generally conducted at trial. 
III. The United States Supreme Court's interpretation 
of 
the 
textual 
phrase 
"in 
all 
criminal 
prosecutions" in applying an enumerated Sixth 
Amendment right other than the confrontation 
right informs the interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment 
confrontation 
right. 
 
The 
Sixth 
Amendment 
Counsel, 
Compulsory 
Process, 
and 
Confrontation Clauses are structurally identical.   
A. Enumerated Sixth Amendment rights attach to 
non-trial 
critical 
stages 
in 
a 
criminal 
prosecution.   
B. The purpose and function of a proceeding in a 
criminal prosecution determines the application 
of an enumerated Sixth Amendment right.    
I 
¶38 I start where the majority opinion starts——with the 
text of the Sixth Amendment enumerating rights "in all criminal 
prosecutions."  The text informs the interpretation of the 
confrontation right.  Majority op., ¶13. 
¶39 The constitutional text alone might not resolve the 
instant case, but it helps a great deal.4  The very words "in all 
criminal prosecutions" signify that the confrontation right is 
guaranteed in proceedings before, during, and after the trial.5  
Unfortunately, the majority opinion does not seriously engage 
with the text of the Sixth Amendment. 
                                                 
4 In writing Crawford, a seminal Confrontation Clause case, 
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment's text 
alone does not resolve how to apply the Confrontation Clause.  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-43.   
5 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 14 (1970) (Douglas, J., 
concurring).  
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶40 The majority opinion in the instant case, without 
careful attention to Justice Scalia's historical analyses of 
confrontation in Crawford, looks to history.  It limits its 
historical research and its originalist view of "in all criminal 
prosecutions" 
and 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
to 
some 
old 
dictionaries, Blackstone's Commentaries, and one 1895 United 
States Supreme Court case.6  See majority op., ¶¶14-16.  As the 
majority opinion correctly acknowledges, its historical analysis 
is not illuminating.  
¶41 Justice 
Scalia's 
and 
Chief 
Justice 
Rehnquist's 
historical analyses of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford are 
helpful in the instant case.  To understand the meaning of the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, Justice Scalia turned to 
the historical background of the Clause, devoting a significant 
part of his opinion to this endeavor.  The Justice examined 
details of English common law, colonial American practice, and 
American cases.  He used diverse sources such as English and 
                                                 
6 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).  The 
majority opinion, ¶15, cites Mattox for the proposition that the 
Constitution is interpreted in light of the law existing when it 
was adopted.  In ¶16, the majority opinion quotes from Mattox to 
emphasize the trial-oriented protections of the confrontation 
right.  The Mattox language quoted by the majority opinion 
states that the "primary object" of the Confrontation Clause is 
to prevent convictions based on depositions and ex parte 
affidavits.  Applying the Confrontation Clause at a suppression 
hearing may result in the suppression of the use of depositions 
and ex parte affidavits at trial.   
Justice Scalia explains Mattox's holding to be that prior 
trial or preliminary hearing testimony is admissible at trial 
only if the defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine the witness before trial.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57.  
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
American cases; histories of English law; histories of the Sixth 
Amendment; evidence, criminal law, and constitutional law texts; 
law review articles; and nineteenth-century treatises.  Chief 
Justice 
Rehnquist's 
concurrence 
in 
the 
Crawford 
judgment 
proffered its own extensive view of historical evidence on the 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause.7 
¶42 These analyses are edifying for purposes of this 
writing. 
 
The 
history 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
right 
of 
confrontation was very important in Roman, English, and American 
legal history.  From this history, the following precepts can be 
drawn from Crawford about the confrontation right:     
• The English common-law tradition is one of live 
testimony in court subject to adversarial testing.8   
• "Nothing 
can 
be 
more 
essential 
than 
the 
cross 
examining [of] witnesses, and generally before the 
triers of the facts in question . . . ."9   
                                                 
7 For additional historical analyses of the Confrontation 
Clause, see Benjamin C. McMurray, Challenging Untested Facts at 
Sentencing:  The Applicability of Crawford at Sentencing After 
Booker, 37 McGeorge L. Rev. 589, 605-08 (2006); Shaakirrah R. 
Sanders, Unbranding Confrontation as Only a Trial Right, 65 
Hastings L.J. 1257, 1261-66 (2014). 
Cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause comes to 
us on faded parchment.  History seems to give us very little 
insight 
into 
the 
intended 
scope 
of 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
Confrontation Clause.").    
8 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. 
9 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49 (quoted source omitted). 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
• Many 
early 
American 
cases 
demonstrate 
that 
prosecutions are carried on to conviction by witnesses 
confronted by the accused and subjected to the 
accused's personal examination.10   
• "[T]he common law in 1791 [when the Sixth Amendment 
was adopted] conditioned admissibility of an absent 
witness's examination on unavailability and a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine.  The Sixth Amendment 
therefore incorporates those limitations."11   
• The historical sources do not say "that a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine was merely a sufficient, 
rather than a necessary, condition for admissibility 
of testimonial statements.  They suggest that this 
requirement was dispositive."12   
• The Confrontation Clause reflects the judgment that 
reliability of evidence is tested "in the crucible of 
cross-examination."13   
                                                 
10 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49-50 (citations omitted).  
11 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54. 
12 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55. 
13 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.  "Where testimonial statements 
are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to 
satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution 
actually prescribes:  confrontation."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-
69. 
"Dispensing 
with 
confrontation 
because 
testimony 
is 
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because 
a defendant is obviously guilty.  This is not what the Sixth 
Amendment prescribes."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.  
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶43 In sum, the text and historical analyses of the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
lead 
to 
the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
confrontation right is of great significance in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence and that the significance of the confrontation 
right lies in the accused's right to cross-examine a witness. 
II 
¶44 The majority opinion rests its conclusion on its 
certitude that the accused's right of confrontation is limited 
to the trial.  Majority op., ¶¶17-21.  This purported certitude 
has no basis in the text of the Sixth Amendment.  The text of 
the Sixth Amendment does not use the word "trial" in stating the 
accused's confrontation right. In comparison, the accused's 
Sixth Amendment right to "enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial" explicitly refers to "speedy and public" as a trial 
right.       
¶45 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has never 
explicitly held that the Confrontation Clause is an accused's 
right at trial only.14   
                                                 
14 In McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 305 (1967), the 
Court tacitly assumed that the Confrontation Clause applies to a 
suppression hearing.  In that case, the Court concluded that a 
defendant could not ask for the name of a confidential informant 
during cross-examination at a suppression hearing, citing the 
confidential informant privilege.  McCray held that the Clause 
was not violated by limiting cross-examination; it did not hold 
that the Clause was inapplicable to a suppression hearing.  The 
McCray Court distinguished between suppression hearings and 
trials 
(in 
which 
guilt 
is 
determined) 
in 
balancing 
the 
application of an informer privilege.  McCray, 386 U.S. at 307. 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶46 True, the Court has referred to confrontation as a 
trial right or a right at trial in its discussion of the Sixth 
Amendment.  But these references have been in the context of 
cases involving trials.15  It makes good sense to confine an 
opinion's discussion to the facts presented——which, in each of 
the Court's cases referenced by the majority opinion, was a 
trial.  It does not make good sense to extrapolate from these 
decisions that the confrontation right is exclusively a right at 
trial.16   
                                                                                                                                                             
Recognizing a Sixth Amendment confrontation right at a 
suppression hearing does not mean that the confrontation right 
at the suppression hearing has no limits.  Indeed the limits on 
the right to confrontation at a suppression hearing and at trial 
are not necessarily the same.  The majority opinion misses this 
point when it implies that Professor LaFave's writings are 
inconsistent on the question whether a right to confrontation 
exists at a suppression hearing.  See majority op., ¶12 n.6.  
15 See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) 
("it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time 
of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the 
Confrontation Clause"); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-26 
(1968) (the confrontation right encompasses "the opportunity to 
cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the 
demeanor of the witness"). 
16 Indeed the Court has recently indicated that the "trial 
right" reading of the Confrontation Clause may be erroneous.  
See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 315 
(2009) (in discussing a paradigmatic historical example of a 
violation of the Confrontation Clause, the Court noted that the 
rejection of ex parte affidavits at trial is "the core of the 
right to confrontation, not its limits.").   
I 
conclude 
that 
although 
an 
accused's 
right 
of 
confrontation at a suppression hearing may not be the "core" of 
the Confrontation Clause, it is within its limits. 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶47 A suppression hearing affects the trial and the 
ultimate question of a defendant's guilt or innocence.  If 
evidence is not suppressed at the suppression hearing, it can be 
introduced at trial.  An issue not discussed by the majority 
opinion but of importance is the defendant's ability to raise 
the suppression issue again at trial.17  If the right of 
confrontation 
is 
not 
available 
to 
the 
defendant 
at 
the 
suppression hearing, but is available at trial, will the 
defendant have the right to relitigate the suppression ruling at 
trial when the constitutional guarantee of confrontation is in 
effect?  If so, what is the purpose of the suppression hearing?  
If the defendant pleads guilty, does he or she waive the right 
to raise the confrontation issue on appeal?  If so, is the 
Wisconsin statute allowing a defendant to appeal the denial of a 
motion to suppress effective?  See majority op., ¶26 n.13; see 
also Curry v. Texas, 228 S.W.3d 292, 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).  
¶48 Nevertheless, the majority opinion joins courts in 
other jurisdictions cursorily relying on these references to "at 
trial" in United States Supreme Court cases to eliminate the 
confrontation right at a suppression hearing.18  See, e.g., 
majority op., ¶21 (collecting cases).       
                                                 
17 See 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Search and Seizure 
§ 11.2(f), at 110-22 (5th ed. 2012). 
18 See e.g., State v. Rivera, 192 P.3d 1213, ¶14 (N.M. 2008) 
("[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant's 
right to confront witnesses against him is primarily a trial 
right . . . ."); State v. Woinarowicz, 720 N.W.2d 635, 641 (N.D. 
2006) ("The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is a trial 
right, which does not apply to pretrial suppression hearings."). 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶49 Not only is this conclusion devoid of substantial 
analysis and support in the cases cited, it is also devoid of 
historical 
support.19 
 
Historically, 
the 
suppression 
of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence occurred during the trial.20  
"Indeed, the modern suppression hearing, unknown at common law, 
is a type of objection to evidence such as took place at common 
law . . . in 
open 
court . . . ." 
 
Gannett 
Co., 
Inc. 
v. 
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 437 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part).21  See also I Joseph Chitty, A 
                                                 
19 By contrast, see 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Search and 
Seizure § 11.2(d), at 92 (5th ed. 2012), concluding that the 
right of confrontation applies at a Fourth Amendment suppression 
hearing. 
20 See, 
e.g., 
3 
Wayne 
R. 
LaFave, 
Criminal 
Procedure 
§ 10.1(a) (4th ed. 2016) ("At one time, it was not uncommon for 
states to treat objections to illegally obtained evidence as 
subject to the usual principle that the admissibility of 
evidence is determined when it is tendered and not in advance of 
trial. 
 
A 
few 
jurisdictions 
still 
follow 
[this 
approach] . . . .") (internal quotation marks omitted).   
See, e.g., State v. Allen, 183 Wis. 323, 197 N.W. 808 
(1924) (motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence brought 
during trial, when prosecution seeks to use the evidence).  
21 See also Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 
395-96 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("When the Sixth 
Amendment was written, and for more than a century after that, 
no one could have conceived that the exclusionary rule and 
pretrial motions to suppress evidence would be part of our 
criminal jurisprudence.").  
See also North Carolina v. Wrenn, 417 U.S. 973 (1974) 
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("Evidence 
used against [the defendant] at trial was seized under a search 
warrant issued by a magistrate on an affidavit which was 
sustained at trial after an evidentiary hearing out of the 
presence of a jury.").  
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law 571 (5th ed. 1847) ("The 
practice . . . at present, is for the prosecutor's counsel, on 
his examination of his own evidence in chief, to inquire of the 
witnesses all the facts, so as to satisfy the jury that the 
confession was voluntarily made, and duly taken."). 
¶50 As the years passed, however, courts began hearing 
suppression motions before trial instead of at trial.  Moving 
the suppression hearing up in time in a criminal prosecution to 
precede the trial offered greater judicial convenience and 
efficiency, and it prevented delay while a jury was sitting.22  
Indeed, federal and Wisconsin rules of criminal procedure now 
generally require that defendants bring a motion to suppress 
evidence before trial.23 
                                                 
22 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264 (1960), 
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 
U.S. 83 (1980): 
In the interest of normal procedural orderliness, a 
motion to suppress, under Rule 41(e), must be made 
prior to trial, if the defendant then has knowledge of 
the grounds on which to base the motion. . . .  This 
provision of Rule 41(e), requiring the motion to 
suppress to be made before trial, is a crystallization 
of decisions of this Court requiring that procedure, 
and is designed to eliminate from the trial disputes 
over police conduct not immediately relevant to the 
question of guilt.   
23 See, e.g., Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 12(e); 
United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 948 (10th Cir. 2009):  
Rule 12(b)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure requires that a party raise a motion to 
suppress before trial.  A party who fails to do so 
"waives any Rule 12(b)(3) defense, objection, or 
request," although "[f]or good cause, the court may 
grant relief from the waiver."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶51 That a suppression hearing has changed temporal 
location does not detract from its ultimate goal of excluding 
illegally obtained evidence at trial and should not influence 
the 
application 
of 
the 
accused's 
confrontation 
right.  
Interpreting the accused's constitutional confrontation right on 
the basis of when it is asserted is contrary to the general rule 
that form is not placed over substance and is contrary to tenets 
of constitutional law.  "A rule of practice must not be allowed 
for any technical reason to prevail over a constitutional 
right."  Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 313 (1921); 
abrogated on other grounds by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. 
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).  
¶52 Justice Blackmun got it right.  He concluded that "for 
purposes of applying the public-trial provision of the Sixth 
Amendment" to a suppression hearing, the temporal factor does 
not control the analysis.  Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 
U.S. at 436-37 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
¶53 In sum, the broad text of the Sixth Amendment in the 
phrase "in all criminal prosecutions" and the fact that 
suppression hearings were conducted at trial at the time of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
12(e).  This waiver rule applies not only when a 
defendant fails to file any pretrial motion to 
suppress, but also when a defendant fails to assert a 
particular argument in a pretrial suppression motion 
that he did file. 
See also Wis. Stat. § 971.31(2) ("[O]bjections based 
on . . . the use of illegal means to secure evidence shall be 
raised before trial by motion or be deemed waived. . . .") 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
adoption of the Sixth Amendment lead to the conclusion that the 
accused's Sixth Amendment confrontation right may be asserted at 
the suppression hearing. 
III 
¶54 I next examine the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretations of the Sixth Amendment text "in all criminal 
prosecutions" in applying an enumerated Sixth Amendment right 
other than the confrontation right.  These interpretations 
inform the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment confrontation 
right because the Sixth Amendment Counsel, Compulsory Process, 
and Confrontation Clauses are structurally identical.     
A 
¶55 In its cases interpreting and applying the enumerated 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court has interpreted the 
Sixth Amendment text "in all criminal prosecutions" to mean at 
"critical stages" of the criminal prosecution.  Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970).24   
                                                 
24 See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970) (an accused 
"requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him") (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45, 69 (1932)); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 336 (1967) 
("It is central to that principle that in addition to counsel's 
presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not 
stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, 
formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence 
might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial.") 
(emphasis added). 
Coleman involved a pretrial hearing to determine whether 
there was sufficient evidence against the accused to warrant 
proceeding with the criminal prosecution. 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶56 A 
critical 
stage 
is 
any 
stage 
in 
a 
criminal 
prosecution, "formal or informal, in court or out, where 
counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a 
fair trial . . . as affected by his right to meaningfully cross-
examine the witnesses against him. . . ."  United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967) (emphasis added) (relating to 
counsel at post indictment line-up).25  In applying the right to 
counsel and determining the critical stage, a court scrutinizes 
the 
pretrial 
proceeding 
to 
determine 
whether 
counsel 
is 
"necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair 
trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the  
witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of 
counsel at the trial itself."  Coleman, 399 U.S. at 7.  The 
efficacy of an accused's right to counsel is diminished without 
an accused's confrontation right.  Examining witnesses is an 
area of counsel's expertise. 
¶57 The Court's focus on giving a defendant the right to 
counsel at a pretrial proceeding to ensure the defendant's 
constitutional right to a fair trial and cross-examination 
implies that a suppression hearing (inherently tied to fair 
                                                 
25 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies at "critical 
stages" of the criminal prosecution when there is "potential 
substantial 
prejudice 
to 
[the] 
defendant's 
rights" 
that 
"confrontation 
and 
the 
ability 
of 
counsel 
[helps 
to] 
avoid. . . ."  Wade, 388 U.S. at 227. 
See also State v. Curry, 147 P.3d 483, 485-86 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2006) (concluding that the suppression hearing is a 
critical stage where counsel must be present to cross-examine 
the prosecution's witness).    
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
trial and cross-examination) is a critical stage in criminal 
prosecutions.26 
¶58 The Wisconsin supreme court has long recognized that 
the confrontation right "is an essential and fundamental 
requirement for a fair trial."  State v. Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d 204, 
208, 325 N.W.2d 857 (1982) (citation omitted).       
¶59 Courts 
in 
several 
jurisdictions 
recognize 
the 
applicability of the Sixth Amendment confrontation right at 
suppression hearings on the ground that the suppression hearing 
is a critical stage in a criminal prosecution that requires 
cross-examination to ensure a fair trial.27  The Seventh Circuit 
                                                 
26 "The security of that right is as much the aim of the 
right to counsel as it is of the other guarantees of the Sixth 
Amendment . . . [including] his right to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him . . . ."  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218, 226–27 (1967).  
27 See, e.g., Curry v. State, 228 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2007) (the Confrontation Clause applies at a suppression 
hearing because it is a "critical stage" of the criminal 
prosecution); State v. Sigerson, 282 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. App. 
1973) ("The hearing on the motion to suppress, while not 
deciding the guilt or innocence of the appellee, is clearly a 
critical stage of the prosecution and the confrontation clause 
of the Sixth Amendment to the United States constitution 
guarantees an accused in a criminal case the right to confront 
the witnesses against him."); United States v. Hodge, 19 
F.3d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (a suppression hearing is a 
critical stage of the prosecution and "any limitations on the 
right of cross-examination . . . must be justified by weighty 
considerations") 
(internal 
quotation 
marks 
and 
citations 
omitted).  See also United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 246-47 
(2d Cir. 1973) (the defendant has a right to be present at a 
pretrial 
suppression 
hearing 
"held 
to 
determine 
the 
constitutionality of a seizure of evidence from an accused"; 
defendant was "entitled to assist his counsel in cross-examining 
[the prosecution's] witnesses and in developing [ ] matters 
further at the suppression hearing."). 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
Court of Appeals has declared that "a pretrial suppression 
hearing is a critical stage."  United States v. Johnson, 859 
F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir. 1988).28   
¶60 Judge Harry Edwards wrote that the suppression hearing 
is a critical stage of the prosecution because it "affects 
substantial rights of an accused person; the outcome of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Professor LaFave in 6 Search & Seizure, § 11.2(d), at 93 n. 
217, cites the following cases in support of a confrontation 
right at suppression hearings: 
• United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(where suppression hearing aborted because of illness 
of judge and new hearing held before another judge, it 
error for that judge merely to read transcript of some 
prosecution witnesses' testimony at aborted hearing; 
continuance should have been granted "so that the 
government's two main witnesses would testify in 
person and be cross-examined in front of the judge who 
would be required to assess their credibility"). 
• People v. Levine, 585 N.W.2d 770 (Mich. App. 1998) 
(citing 
cases 
from 
other 
states 
in 
support 
of 
conclusion that "the protections of the Confrontation 
Clause extend to a pretrial suppression hearing") (the 
Michigan Supreme Court vacated this decision on other 
grounds, and did not address the appellate court's 
decision that the Confrontation Clause applies at 
suppression hearings). 
• State v. Ehtesham, 309 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1983) 
(suppression hearing should be "a meaningful hearing, 
at which both the state and the defendant should be 
afforded the opportunity to produce evidence and to 
examine 
and 
cross-examine 
witnesses"; 
defendant's 
right denied where judge refused defense opportunity 
to cross examine officer who obtained search warrant). 
28 See also People v. Strothers, 928 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2011) (the suppression hearing is a critical stage and 
trial judge's decision to proceed without defendant's counsel, 
who was running late, was reversible error). 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
hearing——the 
suppression 
vel 
non 
of 
evidence——may 
often 
determine the eventual outcome of conviction or acquittal."  
United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  
The Green court declared that because of the historical and 
practical importance of the right of cross-examination, any 
limitations on the right at the suppression hearing must be 
justified by weighty considerations.  Green, 670 F.2d at 1154.29  
I agree. 
¶61 In interpreting the Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause, the majority opinion errs in failing to consider the 
right to a fair trial and the significant role of cross-
examination.     
¶62 A federal court of appeals has written of the right of 
cross-examination as follows:  "So basic is the right [to cross-
examine witnesses] that the Supreme Court has held that its 
denial, 'without waiver . . . would be constitutional error of 
the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of 
prejudice would cure it.'"  Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 
                                                 
29 A limitation on the right of confrontation at a 
suppression hearing is an informer's privilege.  See United 
States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
1227, 1251 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 
129, 131 (1968)).30  
¶63 In sum, the United States Supreme Court has indicated 
that the Sixth Amendment text "in all criminal proceedings" 
includes a pretrial proceeding that lays the groundwork for a 
fair trial and enables the accused to cross-examine witnesses.  
Thus the Court's cases have kept the door open for an accused's 
Sixth Amendment confrontation right to apply at a suppression 
hearing.  Looking to the critical stage analysis, I conclude 
that the confrontation right should apply at suppression 
hearings to permit cross-examination, which promotes a fair 
trial. 
B 
¶64 In its cases interpreting and applying enumerated 
Sixth Amendment rights, the Court has interpreted and applied 
the Sixth Amendment text "in all criminal prosecutions" by 
examining the purpose and function of the particular criminal 
proceeding.  Whether the Court applies a Sixth Amendment right 
in a pretrial proceeding requires comparing the purpose and 
                                                 
30 See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) 
(holding that adequate cross-examination is required by the 
Sixth Amendment and stating that "[c]ross-examination is the 
principal means by which the believability of a witness and the 
truth of his testimony are tested."); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 
U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (stating that "[o]ur cases construing the 
[confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest secured by 
it is the right of cross-examination . . . ."). 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
function of the pretrial proceeding with the purpose and 
functions of the enumerated right and the trial.31  
¶65 For example, the United States Supreme Court has 
declared that an accused's Sixth Amendment right to a public 
trial grants an accused the right to a public suppression 
hearing.  In Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), the Court 
described the function of the accused's Sixth Amendment public 
trial right as "ensuring that judge and prosecutor carry out 
their duties responsibly," "encourag[ing] witnesses to come 
forward," and "discourage[ing] perjury."  Waller, 467 U.S. at 
46.        
¶66 The Waller Court reasoned that the accused's Sixth 
Amendment's right to a public trial extends to a pretrial 
suppression 
hearing 
because 
"[t]hese 
aims 
and 
interests 
[protected at trial] are no less pressing in a hearing to 
suppress wrongfully seized evidence."  Waller, 467 U.S. at 46.     
                                                 
31 See Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Unbranding Confrontation as 
Only a Trial Right, 65 Hastings L.J. 1257 (2014) (arguing that a 
defendant's right to confrontation at a non-trial proceeding is 
determined by analogizing the protection afforded by the Sixth 
Amendment at trial).   
Although I do not further discuss these cases in the 
instant dissent, I note that other Sixth Amendment rights apply 
in criminal prosecutions beyond the trial.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Bowe, 698 F.2d 560, 565 (2d Cir. 1983) (the Compulsory 
Process Clause applies at a suppression hearing, unless that 
witness invoked the Fifth Amendment); Mempa v. Riley, 389 U.S. 
128, 136-37 (1967) (Counsel Clause applies at sentencing in 
Washington state probation revocation proceeding); Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (Jury Clause applies at 
sentencing fact-finding); Alleyne United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 
(2013) (Jury Clause applies at sentencing for fact-finding for a 
fact that increases the penalty). 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
21 
 
¶67 Furthermore, the pretrial suppression hearing has in 
many 
instances 
supplanted 
the 
trial. 
 
The 
Waller 
Court 
recognized that for many defendants the suppression hearing is 
"the only trial, because the defendants [will] thereafter 
plead[] guilty . . . ."  
Waller, 467 U.S. at 47.  The 
suppression hearing resembles a bench trial:  witnesses are 
called; the defendant has a right to counsel who can question 
witnesses; the judge must find facts and apply legal principles 
to the facts found; the conduct of law enforcement officials is 
often reviewed at a suppression hearing.  The Waller Court 
elaborated as follows: 
[A] suppression hearing often resembles a bench trial:  
witnesses are sworn and testify, and of course counsel 
argue their positions.  The outcome frequently depends 
on a resolution of factual matters.  The need for an 
open proceeding may be particularly strong with 
respect to suppression hearings.  A challenge to the 
seizure of evidence frequently attacks the conduct of 
police and prosecutor. . . . [S]trong pressures are 
naturally at work on the prosecution's witnesses to 
justify the propriety of their conduct in obtaining 
the evidence.   
Waller, 467 U.S. at 46-47 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).   
¶68 In 
effect, 
the 
Waller 
court 
recognized 
that 
suppression hearings are tantamount to trials, in both form and 
importance. 
¶69 The purpose and function of an accused's Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial echo the purpose and function 
of the exclusionary rule.  The exclusion of evidence at trial is 
an accused's objective in a suppression hearing.  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court first adopted and applied the exclusionary rule in 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
22 
 
Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).  Since then, 
evidence has been excluded as a check on law enforcement.  
"Unlawful police conduct is deterred when evidence recovered in 
unreasonable searches is not admissible in courts."32  State v. 
Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 133–34, 423 N.W.2d 823 (1988); State 
v. Gums, 69 Wis. 2d 513, 516–17, 230 N.W.2d 813 (1975).  See 
also Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 635, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974) 
(explaining that judicial integrity could be compromised if 
unlawful police conduct were sanctioned by the use of evidence 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).   
¶70 Both the Public Trial Clause and the exclusionary rule 
are aimed at deterring unlawful conduct.  This deterrent effect 
would be weakened if the Sixth Amendment right to public trial 
did not apply to a suppression hearing or the right to 
confrontation were not recognized in suppression hearings.  
Without an accused's confrontation right, the state's evidence 
will not be examined adequately at the suppression hearing. 
¶71 In determining whether the Sixth Amendment right to a 
public trial applies to render a suppression hearing public, 
Justice Blackmun compared the purpose and function of the 
suppression hearing to the purpose and function of a trial.  
Justice Blackmun reasoned that the pretrial suppression hearing 
"resembles and relates to the full trial in almost every 
                                                 
32 See also 1 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Search & Seizure 
§ 1.1(f) (5th ed. 2012) ("[T]he deterrence of unreasonable 
searches and seizures is a major purpose of the exclusionary 
rule."). 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
23 
 
particular," and therefore the Sixth Amendment right to a public 
trial requires a public suppression hearing.  "[T]he pretrial 
suppression hearing . . . must be considered part of the trial."  
Gannett, 443 U.S. at 434, 436-37 (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  The following characteristics of 
a suppression hearing led the Justice to this conclusion:  
• "Evidence is presented by means of live testimony, 
witnesses are sworn, and those witnesses are subject 
to cross-examination." 
• "Determination of the ultimate issue depends in most 
cases upon the trier of fact's evaluation of the 
evidence, and credibility is often crucial."  
• "[T]he pretrial suppression hearing often is critical, 
and it may be decisive, in the prosecution of a 
criminal case.  If the defendant prevails, he will 
have dealt the prosecution's case a serious, perhaps 
fatal, blow; the proceeding often then will be 
dismissed or negotiated on terms favorable to the 
defense.  If the prosecution successfully resists the 
motion to suppress, the defendant may have little hope 
of success at trial (especially where a confession is 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
24 
 
in issue), with the result that the likelihood of a 
guilty plea is substantially increased."33  
• "The suppression hearing often is the only judicial 
proceeding of substantial importance that takes place 
during a criminal prosecution."   
Gannett, 443 U.S. 434-36 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 
¶72 For Justice Blackmun, these factors led him to  
conclude that the suppression hearing——so much like a trial——
must, like a trial, be public under the Sixth Amendment.   
¶73 These factors lead me to conclude that the suppression 
hearing——so much like a trial——must, like a trial, afford an 
accused the confrontation right.34 
                                                 
33 "[A] decision on the motion to suppress is often outcome 
determinative if it is adverse to the government.  Thus, from 
the prosecution's viewpoint, if evidence is suppressed, at 
worst, the case will be dismissed; at best, valuable evidence 
will be lost and the defendant will be in an enhanced plea 
bargaining position."  Elizabeth Phillips Marsh, Does Evidence 
Law Matter in Criminal Suppression Hearings?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. 
Rev. 987, 996 (1992).  
34 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "we 
safeguard the right to cross-examination at the suppression 
hearing because the aims and interests involved in a suppression 
hearing are just as pressing as those in the actual trial."  
United States v. Stewart, 93 F.3d 189, 192 n.1 (5th Cir. 1996).  
Justice Blackmun offered a similar approach in Kentucky v. 
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987), and Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 
U.S. 39 (1987).  Justice Blackmun was persuaded that "there are 
cases in which a state rule that precludes a defendant from 
access to information before trial may hinder that defendant's 
opportunity for effective cross-examination at trial, and thus 
that such a rule equally may violate the Confrontation Clause." 
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 738 n.9.   
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
25 
 
 
¶74 The most striking aspect of the suppression hearing 
that leads me to this conclusion is that the suppression hearing 
is the turning point in many criminal prosecutions.35  The 
majority opinion concedes (as it must) that "suppression 
hearings have become an important stage in many criminal cases 
since the Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule . . . ."  
Majority op., ¶17.  Yet the majority opinion strangely suggests 
that guilt or innocence is not at stake in the suppression 
hearing.  The majority opinion asserts that its conclusion that 
the confrontation right does not apply at suppression hearings 
is 
compelled 
because 
the 
"confrontation 
right 
protects 
defendants at trial——when guilt or innocence is at stake."  
Majority op., ¶24; see also majority op., ¶29.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Justice Blackmun raised the same point in his separate 
writing in Ritchie, in which he faulted the majority for 
limiting its confrontation analysis to whether cross-examination 
is available and not inquiring into the "effectiveness of cross-
examination."  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 62; see also Ritchie, 480 
U.S. at 71 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The creation of a 
significant impediment to the conduct of cross-examination thus 
undercuts the protections of the Confrontation Clause, even if 
that impediment is not erected at the trial itself.") (emphasis 
added). 
In Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 54 n.10, Justice Powell, however, 
observed in his plurality opinion that the Court has not yet 
recognized a Confrontation Clause violation prior to trial.   
35 The significance of a decision in a suppression case is 
seen in Wis. Stat. § 808.03(3)(b), providing:  "An order denying 
a motion to suppress evidence or a motion challenging the 
admissibility of a statement of a defendant may be reviewed upon 
appeal from a judgment or order notwithstanding the fact that 
the judgment or order was entered upon a plea of guilty or no 
contest to the information or criminal complaint."   
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
26 
 
¶75 But 
guilt 
or 
innocence 
is 
often 
at 
stake 
at 
suppression 
hearings. 
In 
drug 
offenses 
and 
drunk-driving 
prosecutions, for instance, the result of the suppression 
hearing is often determinative of the case.36  Often, when a 
defendant's motion to suppress fails, the defendant pleads 
guilty.  "Something in the neighborhood of 85 percent of all 
criminal charges are resolved by guilty pleas, frequently 
after . . . motions to suppress evidence have been ruled upon."  
Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 397 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring).37  
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that because our 
criminal justice system has become "'for the most part a system 
of pleas, not a system of trials,' it is insufficient simply to 
point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., Vill. of Granville v. Graziano, 858 N.E.2d 
879, 882 (Ohio Mun. 2006) (applying the confrontation clause at 
a suppression hearing because the distinction between trial and 
pretrial suppression hearings has become particularly blurred in 
drunk driving cases, in which defendants must raise issues of 
the admissibility of test results in a pretrial motion to 
suppress); Curry v. State, 228 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2007) ("In drug possession cases like the one before us, the 
outcome of the suppression hearing often determines the outcome 
of the trial itself."); Olney v. United States, 433 F.2d 161, 
163 (9th Cir. 1970) ("We think that a motion to suppress 
evidence can well be [a critical] stage of prosecution, 
particularly in narcotics cases, where the crucial issue may 
well be the admissibility of narcotics allegedly found in the 
possession of the defendant.").   
37 By all accounts, this statistic is up:  "In fiscal year 
2015 the vast majority of offenders (97.1%) pleaded guilty."  
United 
States 
Sentencing 
Commission, 
Overview 
of 
Federal 
Criminal 
Cases 
Fiscal 
Year 
2015 
4 
(2016), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/research-
publications/2016/FY15_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf  
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
27 
 
inoculates any errors in the pretrial process."  Missouri v. 
Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 143-44 (2012) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).38  
¶76 Because the suppression hearing is frequently outcome-
determinative, involves adversarial and trial-like practices, 
and requires the circuit court to weigh testimony as a fact-
finder and apply the law to the facts, the Sixth Amendment 
compels the conclusion that an accused's Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right applies.   
¶77 I conclude on the basis of the text of the Sixth 
Amendment, the history of the suppression hearing as a trial 
proceeding, the purpose and function of the suppression hearing, 
and the United States Supreme Court's interpretation and 
application of the enumerated Sixth Amendment rights to non-
trial proceedings, that Zamzow has a Sixth Amendment right to 
confront witnesses at the suppression hearing.  
                                                 
38 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 143-44 (2012): 
The reality is that plea bargains have become so 
central to the administration of the criminal justice 
system that defense counsel have responsibilities in 
the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must 
be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel 
that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal 
process at critical stages.  Because ours 'is for the 
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,' 
it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of 
a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors 
in the pretrial process (internal citations omitted). 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
28 
 
¶78 The majority opinion nullifies the accused's Sixth 
Amendment's confrontation right at suppression hearings by 
adopting an absolute, no-exceptions-allowed holding.       
* * * * 
 
¶79 To conclude briefly, the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation applies at suppression hearings. 
 
¶80 Suppression hearings are historically and functionally 
a part of the trial.  Indeed, a suppression hearing often 
supplants the trial.  The suppression hearing is a critical 
stage of the "criminal prosecution"; a defendant's right to a 
fair trial is dependent on counsel's ability to cross-examine 
adverse witnesses.  The deterrence effect of the exclusionary 
rule will not be realized if the right to confrontation does not 
exist at the suppression hearing.  
¶81 Because the suppression hearing involves adversarial 
and trial-like practices, is frequently outcome-determinative, 
and requires the circuit court to weigh testimony as fact-finder 
and apply the law to the facts, the Sixth Amendment, in my 
opinion, compels a court to recognize that defendants have a 
right to confrontation at a suppression hearing.  By refusing to 
give Zamzow a confrontation right at the suppression hearing in 
the instant case, the majority opinion nullifies the Sixth 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
29 
 
Amendment's guarantee that the "accused" shall have the right to 
confrontation "in all criminal prosecutions."39     
¶82 Finally, the majority opinion seems to pose a serious 
problem for future suppression hearings.  The State generally 
has the burden of proof at a suppression hearing that the 
evidence is admissible at the hearing.  Rules of evidence 
apparently are not fully applicable at a suppression hearing.  
See Wis. Stat. §§ 901.04(1), 911.01(4)(a); State v. Jiles, 2003 
WI 66, ¶¶25-30, 262 Wis. 2d 457, 663 N.W.2d 798.40         
¶83 In the future, according to the majority opinion, the 
State may offer hearsay evidence in a suppression hearing.  As a 
practical matter, the defendant may not ever be able to 
effectively cross-examine the witness.  Isn't the result of the 
                                                 
39 Christine Holst, in The Confrontation Clause and Pretrial 
Hearings: A Due Process Solution, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1599, 
1624, proposes that the best avenue to protect a defendant's 
right to confrontation is under the Due Process Clause, rather 
than the Confrontation Clause.  She concludes that "[a] 
restriction on confrontation at a pretrial hearing would then be 
unconstitutional if it denied the defendant his or her right to 
fundamentally 
fair 
procedure 
in 
the 
criminal 
prosecution 
process."   
40 See also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172–74 
(1974) ("[T]he rules of evidence normally applicable in criminal 
trials do not operate with full force at hearings before the 
judge to determine the admissibility of evidence.") (discussing 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Fed. R. Evid. 
104(a) & 1101(d)(1); and citing 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1385 
(3d ed. 1940); C. McCormick, Evidence § 53 n.91 (2d ed. 1972)); 
see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980) ("At 
a suppression hearing, the court may rely on hearsay and other 
evidence, even though that evidence would not be admissible at 
trial."). 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
30 
 
suppression hearing that the unsuppressed evidence may be 
introduced at trial?  See ¶47, supra.   
¶84 Court of Appeals Judge Paul Reilly, dissenting from 
the court of appeals decision in the instant case, posed the 
problem as follows:  A paper review in which trial courts read 
police reports and review evidence such as dash cam videos to 
determine whether evidence should be suppressed may become the 
norm.  The possible effect of the court of appeals decision (and 
the majority opinion in the instant case), according to Judge 
Reilly, is that hearsay and double hearsay testimony may be used 
at 
a 
suppression 
hearing 
to 
support 
the 
constitutional 
reasonableness of a search and seizure and therefore the 
admissibility of contraband, for example, when the same hearsay 
would likely not be admitted at trial.   
¶85 Judge Reilly wrote as follows:      
The 
effect 
of 
the 
majority's 
decision 
is 
that 
evidentiary hearings are no longer necessary to the 
determination of whether a warrantless search and/or 
seizure was constitutional.  Suppression hearings may 
be reduced to a paper review in which trial courts 
read police reports and review evidence such as dash 
cam videos to determine whether a warrantless search 
or seizure was nevertheless lawful.  The majority 
mistakes us for a civil law country rather than 
recognizing our common law foundation. 
. . . . 
The majority provides no guidance in how it expects 
courts to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of a 
criminal defendant such as Zamzow absent the Sixth 
Amendment's 
"crucible 
of 
cross-examination" 
in 
evaluating the government's accusations.  By relying 
on Frambs, the majority disregards the 
Crawford 
Court's lament over the legacy of Roberts as one of 
"fail[ure] to provide meaningful protection from even 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
31 
 
core confrontation violations." . . . As I fear this 
case continues that unfortunate legacy, I dissent.      
State v. Zamzow, 2016 WI App 7, ¶¶22, 23, 366 Wis. 2d 562, 874 
N.W.2d 328 (Reilly, J., dissenting).   
¶86 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶87 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissenting opinion. 
 
No.  2014AP2603-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1