Case Title: Wilk Paving, Inc. v. Southworth-Milton, Inc.

Citation: 162 Vt. 552, 649 A.2d 778

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILK_PAVING_V_SOUTHWORTH-MILTON.93-487; 162 Vt. 552; 649 A.2d 778


 [Filed 16-Sep-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers
 are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109
 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609- 0801 of any errors in order that
 corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                           No. 93-487


 Wilk Paving, Inc.                         Supreme Court

                                           On Appeal from
   v.                                      Rutland Superior Court

 Southworth-Milton, Inc.                   March Term, 1994



 Richard W. Norton, J.

 Frank E. Talbott of Wilson Powell Lang & Faris, Burlington, for 
 defendant-appellant

 Bernard J. Boudreau of Edward R. Seager, P.C., Rutland, for 
 plaintiff-appellee


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

 

     ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant Southworth-Milton, Inc. appeals from a judgment
 in favor of plaintiff, Wilk Paving, Inc., in the amount of the purchase price
 of an asphalt roller that plaintiff had purchased from defendant.  After a
 bench trial, the court ruled that plaintiff was entitled to revoke acceptance
 and effectively had revoked acceptance under the Uniform Commercial Code
 (UCC), see 9A V.S.A.  2-101 to 2-725 (Article 2, Sales).  We affirm. 

      On October 10, 1989, plaintiff purchased the roller, relying in part on
 representations in a brochure provided by defendant that the machine was
 versatile, well-suited for plaintiff's typical paving jobs, reliable, and
 easy to maintain.  As part of the purchase contract, defendant warranted
 repair and replacement of defective parts for one year and disclaimed all
 other warranties.  On December 8, 1989, plaintiff discovered that the right
 rear vibratory motor was leaking oil and that the electrical system required
 repair.  Plaintiff was advised to deliver the roller to defendant's place of
 business, and on December 18, 1989, the repair work was done 

 

 to correct the foregoing problems.  In addition, defendant replaced a blown
 fuse, tightened loose hydraulic lines that were leaking oil, resealed a
 hydraulic feedline to the vibratory motor, and gave the roller a general
 tune-up.  Thereafter, plaintiff did not use the roller until the spring, when
 weather permitted resumption of paving projects. 

     On June 7, 1990, oil was observed to be leaking from the brake housing,
 requiring replacement of the housing and seals.  On June 21, 1990, defendant
 found that the front drive motor was leaking oil from the parking brake
 piston.  On June 29, 1990 the water pump seal was leaking and required
 disassembly, cleaning, and resealing.  On August 16, 1990, the starter failed
 because of loose wiring in the principal wiring harness and starter.  On
 August 28, 1990, the oil plug broke off, causing oil to leak over the surface
 of the pavement being applied.  As a result, plaintiff had to replace the
 affected surface.  All but the last of these problems were reported to
 defendant.  Plaintiff also complained that the problems with the internal
 hydraulics made it difficult to drive the roller onto a trailer for
 transporting. 

     In September 1990, plaintiff's president informed defendant that he no
 longer wanted the machine and requested a return of the purchase price, less
 a reasonable rental fee for the time plaintiff used the roller during the
 summer.  In November 1990, the roller was parked in plaintiff's lot and
 covered with a tarp.  Examinations of the roller by experts in 1992 in
 preparation for trial disclosed that it was still leaking oil. 

     After trial, plaintiff was awarded the purchase price of the roller, but
 was denied recovery for consequential damages.  Defendant then moved to alter
 or amend the judgment to provide defendant a setoff of the reasonable rental
 value of the roller.  Defendant also moved to amend its answer to assert
 setoff as an affirmative defense.  Both motions were denied. 

     On appeal, defendant contends that it was not afforded an opportunity to
 cure the roller's defects, that plaintiff failed to prove a non-conformity
 sufficient to create a right of revocation of acceptance, and that any such
 right to revoke was waived when plaintiff continued to use the roller. 
 Defendant also challenges the trial court's ruling regarding the right to
 setoff.  Plaintiff 

 

 cross-appeals the denial of consequential damages. 

     On review, this Court will not disturb the trial court's findings of
 fact or conclusions of law unless the party challenging them demonstrates
 they are clearly erroneous.  V.R.C.P. 52(a); Estate of Sawyer v. Crowell, 151
 Vt. 287, 291, 559 A.2d 687, 690 (1989).  Findings of fact will stand if
 supported by any reasonable and credible evidence, even if contrary evidence
 exists. Community Feed Store v. Northeastern Culvert Corp., 151 Vt. 152, 155,
 559 A.2d 1060, 1069 (1989). 

                                     I.
                                     A.
     Defendant first argues that plaintiff should be barred from any recovery
 for revoking acceptance without first giving defendant an opportunity to cure
 defects in the roller.  As a general rule, once a buyer accepts tender the
 buyer must, within a reasonable time after discovery of a breach, notify the
 seller of the breach or be barred from any remedy.  9A V.S.A.  2-607(3)(a).
 This notice requirement affords a seller the opportunity to cure the claimed
 defects or minimize the buyer's losses.  Desilets Granite Co. v. Stone
 Equalizer Corp., 133 Vt. 372, 375,