Case Title: Board of Supervisors v. Robertson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 030039

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF 
FAIRFAX COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 030039  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   October 31, 2003 
RICHARD M. ROBERTSON 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Arthur B. Vieregg, Judge 
 
 
 
The primary issue in this appeal concerns a challenge 
to the judgment of the circuit court holding that the  
denial of a landowner’s application seeking a deviation 
from a setback requirement was arbitrary, capricious, and 
unreasonable.  Finding sufficient evidence of 
reasonableness to make the denial a fairly debatable issue, 
we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court. 
MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS 
 
The appellee, Richard M. Robertson (“Robertson”), owns 
approximately 2.78 acres of real estate located on the west 
side of the Dulles Airport Access Road (“DAAR”) and south 
of Idylwood Road in Fairfax County.  The property is zoned 
to the R-3 District, permitting the development of three 
residential dwelling units per acre.  Although the 
property’s lengthy southeastern boundary abuts the DAAR, it 
is shielded from that roadway by an eight-foot, wooden 
acoustical fence.  Because of the property’s configuration, 
virtually all the parcel lies within 200 feet of the DAAR.  
Thus, a 200-foot setback restriction set forth in Fairfax 
County Zoning Ordinance (“Zoning Ordinance”) § 2-414(1)(A) 
is applicable and affects the development of Robertson’s 
property. 
The provisions of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(1)(A) 
require a minimum distance of 200 feet between all 
residential buildings and “right(s)-of-way of interstate 
highways and the Dulles Airport Access Road.”  Pursuant to 
subsection (3) of that ordinance, “[d]eviations” from the 
setback requirement “may be permitted with Board of 
Supervisors’ approval of appropriate proffered conditions, 
if it finds that such deviations will further the intent of 
the Ordinance, adopted comprehensive plan and other adopted 
policies.”  However, the setback requirement “shall not 
apply in those instances where a lot has been recorded 
prior to the effective date of this Ordinance where the 
enforcement of this regulation would negate the use of the 
lot in accordance with the provisions of the zoning 
district in which located.”  Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(4).  
Since Robertson’s property satisfied the conditions in 
subsection (4), the parties stipulated that he could 
develop one single-family dwelling on the property. 
 
2
 
Robertson, however, wanted to build four single-family 
dwelling units on his property.  Thus, in accordance with 
the provisions of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(3), Robertson 
filed a proffered condition amendment application seeking a 
deviation from the 200-foot setback requirement.  The 
proffers submitted with Robertson’s application included, 
among other things, the use of certain materials and 
building techniques that would reduce the interior noise 
level in the four dwellings that he proposed to construct 
on the subject property. 
 
After several hearings before the Fairfax County 
Planning Commission (“the Commission”), the Commission 
denied Robertson’s application.1  One of the commissioners 
voiced concerns about noise levels in the yards of the 
homes that would be constructed if the deviation was 
approved and about traffic data showing an increasing 
number of vehicles using the DAAR each day.  The 
commissioner also stated that Robertson’s right to build 
one home on the property was a reasonable use of his 
                     
1 The Fairfax County Department of Planning and Zoning 
had recommended that the Commission approve Robertson’s 
application but only after considerable discussion by the 
staff about the fact that a 1997 noise study submitted by 
Robertson did not address future noise levels on the 
property.  The staff was also concerned about the character 
and age of the wooden acoustical wall that separated the 
property from the DAAR. 
 
3
property and that granting his requested deviation would 
not enhance the ordinance at issue or the Comprehensive 
Plan for Fairfax County, Virginia (“Comprehensive Plan”).  
The Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County (“the Board”) 
subsequently heard Robertson’s application and also denied 
it, adopting the comments at the Commission’s hearing. 
 
Robertson then filed a second amended bill of 
complaint against the Board and Fairfax County  
(collectively, “the defendants”), seeking a declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief.  In that pleading, 
Robertson acknowledged that, because most of his property 
lies within 200 feet of the DAAR, the terms of Zoning 
Ordinance §§ 2-414(1)(A) and –414(4) limit the development 
of the property to one dwelling unit.  Among other things, 
Robertson alleged that the Board’s denial of his 
application was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, 
and bore no substantial relation to public health, safety, 
and welfare. 
The circuit court sustained a plea in bar and demurrer 
filed by the defendants in response to the second amended 
bill of complaint.  After that ruling, the only claims 
remaining in the case were 
that the action of the Board in denying 
[Robertson’s] application was arbitrary, 
capricious and unreasonable and an abuse of 
 
4
discretion; and/or failed to advance a legitimate 
public purpose and bore no relationship to the 
public health, safety and welfare; and/or failed 
to have a rational nexus to any legitimate state 
interest or public purpose. 
 
After hearing evidence relevant to those claims, the 
circuit court issued an interim letter opinion.  The court 
ruled, sua sponte, that the provisions of Zoning Ordinance 
§ 2-414(4) do not apply to the subject property and that 
Robertson, therefore, cannot develop even one dwelling on 
his property due to the 200-foot setback requirement unless 
the Board approves a deviation from that requirement.  The 
court believed that the express terms of subsection (4) 
limit its application to a “lot.”  That term is defined as 
“a parcel of land that is designated at the time of 
application for a special permit, a special exception, a 
Building Permit, or Residential/Non-Residential Use Permit, 
as a tract all of which is to be used, developed or built 
upon as a unit under single ownership.”  Zoning Ordinance 
§ 20-300.  The court reasoned that, since Robertson’s 
property was not the subject of an application for one of 
the permits listed in that definition, it was not a “lot” 
as that term is defined in Zoning Ordinance § 20-300 and 
 
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therefore did not come within the purview of Zoning 
Ordinance § 2-414(4).2
After the circuit court made that ruling, the 
defendants asked the court to reconsider.  In support of 
their motion, the defendants presented testimony from Jane 
W. Gwinn (”Gwinn”), Zoning Administrator for Fairfax 
County, about her interpretation of Zoning Ordinance § 2-
414(4).  Gwinn testified that she had consistently 
construed the provisions of that subsection to mean that, 
if a lot was recorded prior to August 14, 1978, the 
effective date of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414, and if 
application of the 200-foot setback requirement would 
negate all use of the lot, the lot was “grandfathered” and 
the landowner could construct one dwelling on the lot 
without complying with the 200-foot setback requirement.  
Since Robertson’s property satisfied those conditions, 
Gwinn indicated that Robertson would have a right to a 
building permit allowing construction of one single-family 
dwelling.  Gwinn noted, however, that, when a landowner, 
such as Robertson, wishes to further subdivide a lot, the 
additional lots would not be recorded prior to the 
                     
2 The court further ruled that the defendants’ 
proffered evidence showing the development of one single-
family dwelling as a reasonable use of Robertson’s property 
was irrelevant. 
 
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effective date of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414 and the setback 
requirement would, therefore, be applicable.  In that 
situation, the landowner would need to obtain the Board’s 
approval of a proffered condition amendment and deviation 
under subsection (3) or apply to the board of zoning 
appeals for a variance. 
Gwinn also explained how she applied the definition of 
the term “lot” in the context of Zoning Ordinance § 2-
414(4).  She testified that, when determining the 
applicability of subsection (4) to a particular parcel of 
real estate, the determination is made on the basis that 
the landowner will be applying for a building permit.  In 
Gwinn’s view, that approach brings the parcel within the 
meaning of the term “lot.” 
After hearing this testimony, the circuit court denied 
the defendants’ motion to reconsider.  The court’s decision 
on this particular issue led it to evaluate the propriety 
of the Board’s denial of Robertson’s application from the 
perspective that the provisions of Zoning Ordinance § 2-
414(1)(A) prevented any development of the subject property 
and that Robertson sought a deviation that would allow him 
to build four single-family residences on the property.  
That level of development would result in a density lower 
                                                             
 
 
7
than what would have been permissible under the R-3 zoning 
classification absent the 200-foot setback requirement. 
The circuit court subsequently issued a letter 
opinion, in which it initially reiterated its prior ruling 
regarding the applicability of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(4).3  
The court then held that Robertson had met his “twin burden 
of proving his proffered use of the property was reasonable 
and the Board’s rejection of his application was 
unreasonable.”  Next, the court considered whether the 
defendants had produced evidence to establish that the 
Board’s rejection of Robertson’s application was fairly 
debatable.  The court concluded that the defendants had 
failed to do so.  In the court’s view, the defendants had 
“not provided probative evidence demonstrating that DAAR 
noise levels at the [p]roperty [were] presently 
problematic,” or that “noise levels will be problematic in 
the future.”  Thus, the court held that the Board’s denial 
of Robertson’s application was arbitrary, capricious, and 
unreasonable.  In a final decree incorporating its letter 
                     
3 The court actually issued two letter opinions.  It 
withdrew the first one after the Board objected, in part, 
on the basis that the court was mistaken about the location 
of the property.  The court initially believed that 
Robertson’s property is located outside a road known as the 
Washington Beltway when, in fact, it is located inside that 
road. 
 
 
8
opinion, the circuit court remanded Robertson’s application 
to the Board for further action consistent with the court’s 
letter opinion.  The defendants appeal from that judgment. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Standard of Review 
 
“When a governing body of any locality reserves unto 
itself the right to issue special exceptions, the grant or 
denial of such exceptions is a legislative function.”  
Board of Supervisors v. McDonald’s Corp., 261 Va. 583, 589, 
544 S.E.2d 334, 338 (2001) (citing Cole v. City Council of 
Waynesboro, 218 Va. 827, 837, 241 S.E.2d 765, 771 (1978)).  
In this case, the Board’s authority to grant “[d]eviations” 
from the setback requirement of Zoning Ordinance § 2-
414(1)(A) is a legislative function.  As such, a 
presumption of legislative validity attached to the Board’s 
denial of Robertson’s application.  Id.; County of 
Lancaster v. Cowardin, 239 Va. 522, 525, 391 S.E.2d 267, 
269 (1990); City of Richmond v. Randall, 215 Va. 506, 511, 
211 S.E.2d 56, 60 (1975). 
 
This presumption of validity remains with the 
legislative action as we review the decision of the circuit 
court in accordance with the following principles: 
 
[W]e accord the court’s finding, as with the usual 
case, a presumption of correctness, but we also give 
full credit to the presumption of validity of the 
 
9
legislative action involved in the denial and then, 
assimilating the two presumptions, we examine the 
record to determine whether the evidence sustains the 
court’s finding.  In other words, the presumption of 
validity of legislative action does not disappear when 
a trial court finds that the action is unreasonable; 
the presumption accompanies the legislative action 
when the latter is brought to this [C]ourt for review, 
and it is viable until this [C]ourt holds with the 
trial court that the legislative action is 
unreasonable. 
 
Board of Supervisors v. Lerner, 221 Va. 30, 34-35, 267 
S.E.2d 100, 103 (1980) (internal citation omitted); accord 
McDonald’s, 261 Va. at 589, 544 S.E.2d at 338. 
II. Presumption of Reasonableness 
 
The presumption of legislative validity that attached 
to the Board’s denial of Robertson’s application is a 
presumption of reasonableness.  McDonald’s, 261 Va. at 590, 
544 S.E.2d at 338; Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. 
Corp., 214 Va. 655, 659, 202 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1974).  
“Legislative action is reasonable if the matter in issue is 
fairly debatable.”  Lerner, 221 Va. at 34, 267 S.E.2d at 
102 (citing County of Fairfax v. Parker, 186 Va. 675, 680, 
44 S.E.2d 9, 12 (1947)).  An issue is “fairly debatable 
when the evidence offered in support of the opposing views 
would lead objective and reasonable persons to reach 
different conclusions.”  Board of Supervisors v. Williams, 
216 Va. 49, 58, 216 S.E.2d 33, 40 (1975); accord Board of 
Supervisors v. Stickley, 263 Va. 1, 7, 556 S.E.2d 748, 751 
 
10
(2002); McDonald’s, 261 Va. at 590, 544 S.E.2d at 339; 
Lerner, 221 Va. at 34, 267 S.E.2d at 102.  The evidence 
must meet both quantitative and qualitative tests.  
Williams, 216 Va. at 58, 216 S.E.2d at 40. 
 
We have enunciated the following principles for 
determining whether the presumption of reasonableness in a 
given case should prevail or has been overcome: 
 
Where presumptive reasonableness is challenged by 
probative evidence of unreasonableness, the challenge 
must be met by some evidence of reasonableness.  If 
evidence of reasonableness is sufficient to make the 
question fairly debatable, the [legislative action] 
‘must be sustained’.  If not, the evidence of 
unreasonableness defeats the presumption of 
reasonableness and the [legislative action] cannot be 
sustained. 
 
Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. at 659, 202 S.E.2d at 893; 
accord Stickley, 263 Va. at 7, 556 S.E.2d at 751; County 
Bd. of Arlington County v. Bratic, 237 Va. 221, 227, 377 
S.E.2d 368, 371 (1989); Williams, 216 Va. at 58-59, 216 
S.E.2d at 40. 
III. Discussion 
 
The defendants assigned error to the circuit court’s 
finding that the Board’s denial of Robertson’s application 
was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  To decide 
this issue, we will use the analytical framework utilized 
by this Court in Cowardin and Bratic.  We do so because the 
requested deviation did not involve a challenge to the 
 
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reasonableness of the current zoning classification 
assigned to Robertson’s property.  Thus, the application 
for a deviation in this case is analogous to the 
application for a conditional use permit in Cowardin, 239 
Va. at 523, 391 S.E.2d at 268, and the application for a 
use permit in Bratic, 237 Va. at 222, 377 S.E.2d at 368.  
Accordingly, we will assume, as we did in both of those 
cases, that Robertson’s request to deviate from the 200 
foot setback requirement by building, with proffered 
conditions, four dwelling units is an appropriate use of 
his property and that the denial of his application is 
probative evidence of unreasonableness.  See Cowardin, 239 
Va. at 526, 391 S.E.2d at 269; Bratic, 237 Va. at 228, 277 
S.E.2d at 371.  Thus, the dispositive inquiry is whether 
the defendants produced sufficient evidence of 
reasonableness to make the Board’s rejection of Robertson’s 
request for a deviation fairly debatable.4  Id.; Cowardin, 
239 Va. at 526, 391 S.E.2d at 269. 
                     
4 It is important to note that this case did not 
involve an application for rezoning.  Robertson 
acknowledged this fact at one of the Commission’s hearings 
and on brief.  Additionally, a senior staff coordinator in 
Fairfax County’s Department of Planning and Zoning, Peter 
H. Braham, testified that Robertson’s application did not 
request a change in zoning or an increase beyond the 
density allowed in the R-3 zoning classification.  Thus, 
Robertson did not have to produce evidence showing that the 
use of his property for one single-family dwelling was 
 
12
 
Resolution of the dispositive question turns on the 
evidence concerning future noise levels on the subject 
property.  The defendants and Robertson presented testimony 
about the noise levels from experts in the field of 
acoustical engineering.  Kevin Miller testified on behalf 
of Robertson and based his conclusions on a noise study 
performed on the property in 1997.  Gary E. Ehrlich 
performed an acoustical analysis of Robertson’s property in 
2002 for the defendants and testified on their behalf. 
 
Miller stated that the exterior noise levels on the 
subject property when the 1997 study was conducted were 
below Fairfax County’s exterior noise criterion of 65 dBA 
Ldn at any ground level.5  Although Ehrlich used a different 
                                                             
unreasonable.  Contra City Council of Virginia Beach v. 
Harrell, 236 Va. 99, 102, 372 S.E.2d 139, 141 (1988).  
“When a landowner has been denied rezoning and he 
challenges the denial, his threshold burden of proof 
requires a clear demonstration that ‘the existing zoning 
classification is no longer reasonable or appropriate.’ ”  
Board of Supervisors v. International Funeral Serv., Inc., 
221 Va. 840, 843, 275 S.E.2d 586, 588 (1981) (emphasis 
added) (citing Vienna Council v. Kohler, 218 Va. 966, 976, 
244 S.E.2d 542, 548 (1978)). 
 
5 The term “dBa Ldn” refers to the day-night average 
sound level measured in decibels for a 24-hour period.  Ten 
decibels are added to readings made during the period from 
10 p.m. until 7 a.m. because humans are more sensitive to 
noise at nighttime. 
The Comprehensive Plan states that “[n]ew development 
should not expose people in their homes, or other noise 
sensitive environments to noise in excess of 45 dBA Ldn, or 
to noise in excess of 65 dBA Ldn in the outdoor recreation 
 
13
method to measure the noise levels on Robertson’s property 
than the one utilized in the 1997 study, he agreed that 
there was no appreciable difference between his 2002 noise 
level measurements and the 1997 measurements.  However, 
Ehrlich obtained traffic projections from Fairfax County 
and, using those projections in conjunction with his noise 
level measurements, he analyzed future noise levels on 
Robertson’s property.  Ehrlich opined that, in some 
locations on the property, future noise levels will exceed 
65 dBA Ldn as early as 2010. 
 
Although Miller confirmed that he often examines 
future traffic projections and the effect of that traffic 
on future noise levels on a given parcel of real estate, he 
admitted that the 1997 study did not address future noise 
levels on Robertson’s property and was actually a “snapshot 
in time as of May of 1997.”  However, Braham, the senior 
staff coordinator in the department of planning and zoning, 
indicated that there is a “submission” requirement stating 
that an application for a deviation from the 200-foot 
setback provision should include a study addressing 
“projected noise levels or projected traffic.”  Braham also 
                                                             
areas of homes.”  The Comprehensive Plan further provides 
that, in order “[to] achieve these standards[,] new 
residential development in areas impacted by highway noise 
between 65 and 75 dBA Ldn will require mitigation.” 
 
14
testified that future noise levels in Fairfax County is a 
concern. 
 
Despite the fact that Robertson offered no evidence 
regarding future noise levels on his property and that the 
only evidence on this question showed that future noise 
levels would exceed the 65 dBA Ldn guideline, the circuit 
court concluded that the defendants failed to produce 
sufficient probative evidence of reasonableness to make the 
Board’s denial of Robertson’s application a fairly 
debatable issue.  The court reached this conclusion by 
rejecting Ehrlich’s testimony because of the methodology 
Ehrlich used to measure the noise levels on the property,6 
and because Ehrlich relied on, what the court viewed as, 
the “fatally flawed projections of future traffic 
increases” on the DAAR prepared by Robert O. Owolabi, Chief 
                                                             
 
6 The circuit court questioned Ehrlich’s methodology 
because he did not measure the noise on the property for a 
continuous 24-hour period but instead measured external 
noise at 5-minute intervals and then averaged the readings.  
In the court’s opinion, the Comprehensive Plan required one 
Ldn figure.  And, Miller testified that acoustical 
engineering practice required continuous, 24-hour 
monitoring.  For these reasons, the court concluded that 
“Ehrlich’s methodology was flawed.”  Assuming the court was 
correct that the Comprehensive Plan required one Ldn figure 
and continuous 24-hour monitoring, the Board had the 
discretion to decide whether to adhere to the guidelines in 
the Comprehensive Plan or to follow some other reasonable 
approach in making its decision on Robertson’s application.  
See, Lerner, 221 Va. at 37, 267 S.E.2d at 104. 
 
15
of Technical Analysis and Research of the Fairfax County 
Department of Transportation.7  Disagreeing with the Board, 
the court stated that it was not bound to accept the 
testimony of Ehrlich and Owolabi because, according to the 
court, their testimony had been challenged on cross-
examination. 
 
Relying on this Court’s decision in Stickley, the 
defendants argue on appeal that the circuit court failed 
“to appreciate the significant difference between a case 
challenging a legislative decision, and an ore tenus bench 
trial not involving a legislative decision.”  The 
defendants also claim that the evidence regarding future 
noise levels on the property and whether they would exceed 
the Comprehensive Plan guideline of 65 dBA Ldn was 
sufficient to make the Board’s denial of Robertson’s 
application fairly debatable.  We agree with the 
defendants’ position. 
 
In Stickley, the landowner argued “that, because the 
trial court heard the evidence ore tenus, ‘its factual 
findings carry the same weight as [a] jury’s verdict.’ ”  
                     
7 Owolabi, testifying as an expert in traffic 
forecasting and traffic calculations, stated that traffic 
levels adjacent to the property would increase from an 
“Average Daily Traffic” (“ADT”) of 75,000 vehicles in 2000 
to an ADT of 86,945 vehicles in 2005, 100,790 vehicles in 
2010, and 111,445 vehicles in 2020. 
 
16
263 Va. at 6, 556 S.E.2d at 751.  We rejected that argument 
because the case involved legislative action by a board of 
supervisors.  Id.  “In such a case, while we accord the 
trial court’s finding the usual presumption of correctness, 
we also accord the legislative action a presumption of 
validity.”  Id.
 
The factual issue in Stickley was whether a special 
use permit allowing the landowner to raise and release game 
birds on his farm would create an increased risk that 
certain diseases harmful to poultry would spread between 
commercial poultry flocks in the county where the landowner 
resided.  Id. at 5-6, 556 S.E.2d at 750-51.  With regard to 
that issue, the evidence was “a battle of the experts,” the 
landowner having presented testimony from four experts and 
the governing body having elicited testimony from one 
expert.  Id. at 7-8, 556 S.E.2d at 752.  The relevant 
question, however, was “not who presented the greatest 
number of expert witnesses or even who won the battle of 
the experts,” but rather “whether there [was] any evidence 
in the record sufficiently probative to make a fairly 
debatable issue of the . . . decision to deny [the 
landowner] a special use permit.”  Id. at 11, 556 S.E.2d at 
754.  We concluded that the testimony of the governing 
                                                             
 
 
17
body’s expert about the “ ‘significant risk’ to poultry 
from the release of pen-raised game birds” was sufficient 
to make the issue fairly debatable.  Id.
 
The same rationale applies in this case.  Probative 
evidence demonstrated that future noise levels on 
Robertson’s property will likely exceed the Comprehensive 
Plan guideline.  We further note that one of the concerns 
initially voiced at the Commission’s hearing dealt with 
future noise levels and whether they would exceed 65 dBA 
Ldn.  Yet, the 1997 study submitted by Robertson did not 
address future noise levels on his property.  And, his 
proffers dealt only with building techniques and materials 
needed to achieve the guideline of 45 dBA Ldn for interior 
noise levels in the proposed dwellings.  None of the 
proffers included measures designed to reduce exterior 
noise even though the 1997 study stated that the 8-foot 
high wooden acoustical fence running along the DAAR 
provided only 3 dBA attenuation of the DAAR traffic noise 
at ground level on the property. 
 
As we said in Stickley, the question is not “who won 
the battle of the experts.”  263 Va. at 11, 556 S.E.2d at 
754.  The relevant inquiry is “whether there [was] any 
evidence in the record sufficiently probative to make a 
fairly debatable issue of the . . . decision to deny” 
 
18
Robertson’s application for a deviation from the setback 
requirement.  Id. (emphasis added).  Having examined the 
record, we find sufficient evidence of reasonableness to 
make the Board’s rejection of Robertson’s request for a 
deviation a fairly debatable issue, i.e. the evidence 
“would lead objective and reasonable persons to reach 
different conclusions.”  Williams, 216 Va. at 58, 216 
S.E.2d at 40.  Thus, we hold that the circuit court erred 
in finding that the Board’s denial was arbitrary, 
capricious, and unreasonable. 
 
We turn now to the defendants’ two remaining 
assignments of error.  First, the defendants assert that 
the circuit court erred in ruling that Zoning Ordinance 
§ 2-414(4) did not apply to Robertson’s property and that 
the 200-foot setback requirement prevented any development 
on the property unless the Board approved a deviation.  In 
the final assignment of error, the defendants contend that 
the circuit court erred in ruling, sua sponte, that the 
Board’s denial of Robertson’s application constituted 
piecemeal downzoning. 
 
With regard to the first issue, the defendants argue 
that Robertson never disputed that the provisions of Zoning 
Ordinance § 2-414(4) apply to his property and, pursuant to 
that subsection, he can construct one single-family 
 
19
dwelling on the property.  We agree.  In fact, Robertson 
affirmatively pled in the second amended bill of complaint 
that “the literal terms of Section 2-414 would limit the 
property to the development of one dwelling unit.”  
Moreover, Robertson entered into a stipulation stating that 
“[t]he parties agree that Richard M. Robertson is permitted 
to build one single-family home on the subject property by 
right.” 
 
Since Robertson never alleged that the Board had 
misconstrued either Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(4) or the term 
“lot,” the circuit court erred in deciding issues never 
pleaded or claimed by Robertson.  “It is firmly established 
that no court can base its judgment or decree upon facts 
not alleged or upon a right which has not been pleaded and 
claimed.”  Ted Lansing Supply Co. v. Royal Aluminum & 
Constr. Corp., 221 Va. 1139, 1141, 277 S.E.2d 228, 229 
(1981) (citing Potts v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 165 Va. 
196, 207, 181 S.E. 521, 525 (1935)); accord, Jenkins v. Bay 
House Assoc., 266 Va. 39, 43, 581 S.E.2d 510, 512 (2003).  
“A litigant’s pleadings are as essential as his proof, and 
a court may not award particular relief unless it is 
substantially in accord with the case asserted in those 
pleadings.”  Id.
 
20
 
Furthermore, we are persuaded by the interpretation 
given to the provisions of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(4) and 
the definition of the term “lot” by the Board and Gwinn.  
Their consistent interpretation of these provisions is 
entitled to great weight.  See Masterson v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals, 233 Va. 37, 44, 353 S.E.2d 727, 733 (1987) 
(“consistent administrative construction of an ordinance by 
the officials charged with its enforcement is entitled to 
great weight”); Rountree Corp. v. City of Richmond, 188 Va. 
701, 712, 51 S.E.2d 256, 261 (1949) (“construction long 
placed upon statutes without protest from officials charged 
with their enforcement is entitled to great weight”). 
 
With regard to the final assignment of error, we hold, 
that, like the preceding issue, Robertson did not claim or 
plead that the Board’s denial constituted piecemeal 
downzoning.  Although the circuit court stated that it was 
not addressing that issue, the court nevertheless concluded 
that the Board’s application of Zoning Ordinance § 2-414 
was “in-fact impermissible piecemeal downzoning.”  Thus, to 
the extent the circuit court decided this issue, it was 
error to do so since Robertson did not assert such a claim.  
See Jenkins, 266 Va. at 43, 581 S.E.2d at 512. 
CONCLUSION 
 
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For these reasons, we conclude that the Board’s denial 
of Robertson’s proffered condition amendment application 
seeking a deviation from the 200-foot setback requirement 
was not arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  The 
defendants presented sufficient evidence of reasonableness 
to make the Board’s denial of Robertson’s application a 
fairly debatable issue.  The circuit court erred in finding 
otherwise.  The circuit court also erred in deciding two 
issues never pleaded or claimed by Robertson.  Accordingly, 
we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court and enter 
judgment in favor of the defendants. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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