Case Title: Town of Moorcroft v. Lang

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-09-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Town of Moorcroft v. Lang1988 WY 110761 P.2d 96Case Number: 87-182, 87-183Decided: 09/07/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming

TOWN OF 
MOORCROFT, WYOMING, APPELLANT, (DEFENDANT), 
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, A FORMER NEBRASKA CORPORATION, (DISSOLVED AUGUST 5, 1974, 
AND ANY AND ALL SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST, HEIRS, EXECUTORS, ADMINISTRATORS, 
TRUSTEES AND ASSIGNS THEREOF (DEFENDANTS),

v.

GLADYS D. LANG, ROBERT H. 
HAYS, AND EVELYN J. HINZ, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS). 

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, A 
FORMER NEBRASKA CORPORATION, (DISSOLVED AUGUST 5, 1974, AND ANY AND ALL 
SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST, HEIRS, EXECUTORS, ADMINISTRATORS, TRUSTEES AND ASSIGNS 
THEREOF APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), TOWN 
OF MOORCROFT, WYOMING, 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

GLADYS D. LANG, ROBERT H. 
HAYS, AND EVELYN J. HINZ, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CrookCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

Cecil A. Cundy, 
Sundance, and Harlan A. Schmidt, Spearfish, S.D., for appellant Lincoln Land 
Co.

Mark L. Hughes 
of Hughes & Dumbrill, Sundance, for 
appellant Town of Moorcroft.

Thomas D. 
Roberts of Morgan, Brorby, Price & Roberts, Gillette, for appellees. 

Before BROWN, C.J.*, and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT, JJ., and 
KALOKATHIS, District Judge.

* Retired June 30, 
1988.

KALOKATHIS, District 
Judge.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an order granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees, whose property 
abuts the streets and alleys in the Town of Moorcroft (Town). It concerns the ownership of 
mineral rights under land originally dedicated as streets and alleys to the Town 
of Moorcroft. 
The contestants for these mineral rights include the Town, the original 
dedicator, Lincoln Land Company (Lincoln) and the abutting 
landowners.

[¶2.]     The dispute arose over 
claims asserted to mineral rights underlying property in Township 49 North, 
Range 67 West, 6th P.M., Crook County, Wyoming, Section 6: Lot 3, now a portion of the Town of 
Moorcroft, Wyoming. The abutting landowners moved for 
summary judgment on April 10, 1987. The trial court found that the abutting 
landowners, or their successors in interest, possessed a fee ownership in a 
mineral estate under streets and alleyways originally dedicated to the Town and 
granted their motion. From this finding the Town and Lincoln 
appeal.

[¶3.]     We hold that the 
mineral rights remain in the original dedicator.

The Town presents the 
following issue: Who owns the oil, gas and other minerals underlying the 
streets, alleys, parks, etc. within the town limits of the Town of Moorcroft, 
Wyoming, among the adjoining lot owners, the original dedicator and the Town of 
Moorcroft and should the ruling of this court in the case of City of Evanston v. 
Robinson, 702 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1985) be overturned.

[¶4.]     Lincoln states the issue 
as:

Whether the developer, 
the Town or the adjoining lot owners own the oil, gas and other mineral 
interests underlying the streets and alleys of the Town of Moorcroft?

[¶5.]     The area in question 
was originally platted as a town by appellant Lincoln on April 25, 1901, through the filing of a plat in 
Crook County, Wyoming. Following the initial plat, two 
additional filings were designated. These filings occurred on February 4, 1904, 
and on May 8, 1920. Following the platting of these areas, title was transferred 
by Lincoln 
through warranty deed to individual lot purchasers, the successors and assigns 
of whom are appellees herein. The plat filed May 6, 1901, stated that "as 
indicated by said plat and surveyors certificate, that the streets, avenues and 
alleys * * * are hereby dedicated to the public use." The warranty deeds 
conveyed by Lincoln to the individual lot purchasers did 
not reserve or except a mineral estate, including oil, gas and associated 
hydrocarbons.

[¶6.]     On March 24, 1984, the 
Town granted an oil and gas lease to Buckhorn Petroleum Company, a Colorado 
company, which leased all of the lands owned by the Town "including all lots 
owned or controlled by the town, two public parks, the city dump, the cemetery, 
and all streets and alleyways * * *." Oil was discovered beneath the surface of 
the area in question. The producing well in question was designated "Gill 3-6 
Oil Well."

[¶7.]     On October 30, 1986, a 
number of lot owners whose lots abutted dedicated streets within the Town filed 
a complaint in the district court for declaratory judgment to quiet title. They 
moved to certify the matter as a class action under W.R.C.P. 23, and notice was 
sent to the Town and to Lincoln. On November 5, 1986, the trial court 
gave notice of the class action and rights to class members. On November 28, 
1986, a separate answer was filed by Lincoln claiming all right, title or interest 
in the oil, gas and associated hydrocarbons and other minerals in and under the 
streets and alleyways. Lincoln claimed its right to the mineral estate 
under color of a warranty deed dated July 13, 1891, which contained no exception 
or reservation of oil, gas or associated hydrocarbons or other minerals. A 
separate answer was filed by the Town seeking a declaration that it be adjudged 
the true and lawful owner of all of the oil, gas, coal and other associated 
hydrocarbons found under the streets and alleyways which had originally been 
dedicated to the public use by Lincoln.

[¶8.]     The trial court 
characterized the Town's interest as an easement in the streets or alleyways and 
found that the possessory rights to the underlying minerals were in the abutting 
property owners. The trial court also noted that the conveyances of the property 
from Lincoln to 
abutting owners contained no reservation of right for any mineral interest. 
Lincoln claims 
that the dedication did not affect its possessory interest in the mineral estate 
underlying the dedicated streets and alleyways and argues that it retained the 
rights to the minerals, oil and gas.1

[¶9.]     The Town asserts 
ownership to the mineral estate by virtue of W.S. 34-12-104, which states that 
the acknowledgment and recording of a plat is "equivalent to a deed in fee 
simple of such portion of the premises platted as is on such plat set apart for 
streets, or other public use * * *." Additionally, the Town urges this court to 
overrule its holding in City of Evanston v. Robinson, 702 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Wyo. 
1985), which held that a municipality acquires no interest in the oil, gas or 
other minerals underlying the streets as a result of the recording and 
acknowledgment of a subdivision plat. The abutting landowners argue that the 
order granting summary judgment as properly decided in their favor and the 
judgment should be affirmed.

[¶10.]  Dedication of land for use by the public 
may occur either by virtue of common law or through statute. 11 E. McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations, § 33.03, p. 640 (3d ed. 1983), distinguishes between 
these two types of dedication:

A statutory dedication is 
one pursuant to the terms of the statute, and is almost universally created by 
the filing and recording of a plat. A common-law dedication requires an 
intention to dedicate expressed in some form, and an acceptance of the 
dedication by the proper public authorities, or by general public user. It is 
distinguishable from a statutory dedication, which is in the nature of a grant, 
and from prescription which is based on a long period of use. Generally a 
common-law dedication rests upon the doctrine of estoppel. Statutory dedication 
generally vests the legal title to the grounds set apart for public purposes in 
the municipal corporation, while the common-law method leaves the legal title in 
the original owner. * * *

[¶11.]  In Wyoming, dedication at common law creates an 
easement in the municipality. We stated in Gay Johnson's Wyoming Automotive 
Service Co., Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, Wyoming, 367 P.2d 787, 788 (Wyo. 
1961).

Under common law, at 
dedication the public or municipality acquires an easement in the streets and 
alleys, but the fee remains in the original proprietor or abutting owner. 
[Citations.]

[¶12.]  The dedication accomplished by the 
recording and acknowledgment of the plat in this case was governed by statute, 
namely § 1402 of Revised Statutes of Wyoming, 1887. That section decreed the 
recording of a plat "equivalent to a deed in fee simple of such portion of the 
premises platted." The present Platting and Dedication Act, W.S. 34-12-101 
through 34-12-115, is virtually identical to that early 
statute.

[¶13.]  We have held that, upon dedication under 
this statutory language, a fee simple determinable2 in the surface is created. It 
encompasses that area of dedicated property "set apart for streets and alleys 
and reasonably includes only the surface and so much of the subsurface as is 
necessary for street construction and municipal services." City of Evanston, 702 P.2d  at 
1289.

Dedication is the 
intentional appropriation of land by the owner to some proper public use. The 
intention of the owner to set aside lands or property for the use of the public 
is the foundation and life of every dedication. 
[Citation.]

City of 
Phoenix v. Landrum & Mills Realty Co., 71 
Ariz. 382, 
386, 227 P.2d 1011, 1013 (1951).

[I]t is vital to a 
dedication of property to public use that it is to be forever and irrevocable 
after acceptance, and that it be for a public use. 11 E. McQuillin, supra, § 
33.02 at 636.

Thus, dedication 
is the concomitant of public use. Dedication for public use generally involves 
such matters as use of ground for cemeteries, schools, highways, bridges and 
parks. 26 C.J.S. Dedication § 8, pp. 407-412 (1956). We cannot assume that 
dedicated property, subject to mineral exploitation, meets the criterion of 
public use.

[¶14.]  Early case law did not see fit to include 
within the meaning of "public use" an attempt to exploit the mineral estate. A 
Colorado case 
held that

the intent and purpose of 
our statute is to clothe the city in its governmental capacity with entire title 
to the streets, as such, for public use and not for the `profit or emolument of 
the city.' It was plainly the intention of the dedicator to part with the title 
to so much of its property only as was necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
establishing certain streets and alleys designated and described upon the plat 
for public use and to clothe the city with the absolute title thereto for that 
purpose only, and not to vest it with any estate or interest in ores that may 
exist thereunder * * *.

City of 
Leadville v. Bohn Mining Co., 37 Colo. 248, 86 P. 1038, 
1040 (1906).

[¶15.]  Revenues from such mineral exploitation 
may ultimately benefit the public, especially if retained by the Town. However, 
the public retention of funds does not meet the public use test. See 11 E. 
McQuillin, supra, § 32.29a at 350-352.

[¶16.]  Since the revenues derived from the 
minerals and oil and gas do not qualify as a "public use" of the dedicated 
property, there is no compelling reason to depart from the doctrine of stare 
decisis and overrule City of Evanston v. Robinson, 702 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1985), as 
the Town urges. The fee simple determinable that the Town acquired when Lincoln 
dedicated streets and alleyways for public use was specially limited by the 
language of W.S. 34-12-104, which requires continuous public use. Since the 
concept of public use is inconsistent with an attempt to exploit the mineral 
estate for profit, the original dedication did not operate to transfer that 
estate. The abutting landowners did not lose any rights to the minerals 
underlying their parcels because, under the applicable statute, title to the 
mineral estate remained in Lincoln.

[¶17.]  The trial court determined that "[a] city 
or town does not acquire an interest in oil, gas or minerals underlying the 
streets or alleyways pursuant to [W.S. 34-12-104], but only acquires so much of 
the surface and subsurface as is necessary for street construction and municipal 
services." We agree with this portion of the order. However, based on this 
finding and our discussion above, summary judgment favoring the abutting 
landowners is reversed. The trial court is instructed to enter judgment on 
behalf of the LincolnCountyLand and Title Company or its successors 
and assigns.

FOOTNOTES

1 It should be noted that 
the mineral rights underlying the lots conveyed by Lincoln to the abutting 
landowners are not at issue in this decision. It is also important to note that 
the streets and alleyways were initially dedicated to the public use and were 
never conveyed to the landowners.

2 An estate in fee simple 
determinable, also called an estate in fee simple defeasible, is defined 
as

An estate in fee simple 
which is subject to a special limitation (defined in § 23), a condition 
subsequent (defined in § 24), an executory limitation (defined in § 25) or a 
combination of such restrictions. Restatement of Property, § 16, p. 43 
(1936).

The determinable 
character of such an estate includes both expiration and divestment. Id. The estate created 
under the statute at issue in this case is a fee simple determinable in the 
surface because, upon vacation of any platted streets or alleyways, the Town 
loses all right to the property. See Payne v. City of Laramie, 398 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 1965); and W.S. 
34-12-104.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶18.]  Although I am not in complete accord with 
the rationale for its decision, I would affirm the district court in this case. 
Its conclusion that the abutting landowners own the minerals lying under the 
streets and alleys in the Town of Moorcroft is 
eminently correct under Wyoming law and the recognized law from other 
jurisdictions. Except to the extent that the majority opinion reaffirms City of 
Evanston v. Robinson, 702 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1985), declining the 
invitation to overrule that case, I respectfully dissent. I would hold that 
Lincoln Land Company conveyed title to the center of each street and alley to 
the abutting landowners, and, as a matter of law, those abutting landowners 
possess the mineral estate to the center of the street or alley since Lincoln 
Land Company did not reserve or except minerals in its 
conveyances.

[¶19.]  The Supreme Court of Illinois put the 
matter succinctly in Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 132 N.E. 280, 18 A.L.R. 992 (1921). 
It was argued in that case that the legislature could not dispose of the 
reversionary interest of a dedicator in the land within the dedicated plat 
because legislative action such as that would constitute a deprivation of 
property without due process of law. The Illinois Supreme Court, in rejecting 
the argument, said:

"* * * After the 
dedicator has executed and recorded the plat in conformity with the statute and 
there has been an acceptance, he has neither a reversion nor a possibility of 
reverter in the streets. He has completely disposed of all of his interest. 
When, then, the street is afterwards vacated, the dedicator, having no interest 
of any kind therein, is not deprived of any property without due process of law. 
The proprietor, by reason of dedicating a part of the premises for streets, 
enhances the value of the lots to which such streets give access. His grantees 
pay the enhanced value, and the proprietor thereby receives a consideration not 
only for the precise amount of the land described in each lot, but also, in 
effect, for that embraced in the street upon which the lots abut. Having been 
once paid for the land embraced in a street, he ought not to be permitted, on 
vacation, to assert title thereto as against one who has paid him the 
consideration therefor." Prall v. Burckhartt, supra, 132 N.E.  at 
284.

This rule 
clearly is the law in Wyoming. If the Town of Moorcroft were to vacate 
the dedicated streets and alleys, the abutting landowners would receive title to 
the surface estate. Section 34-12-109, W.S. 1977; Thomas v. Jultak, 68 
Wyo. 198, 231 P.2d 974 (1951); Tissino v. 
Mavrakis, 67 Wyo. 560, 228 P.2d 106 (1951). Cf. Gay 
Johnson's Wyoming Automotive Service Company v. City of Cheyenne, 367 P.2d 787 (Wyo. 1961), reh. denied 369 P.2d 863 
(Wyo. 1962). 
Section 34-12-109, W.S. 1977, manifests the legislative decision that, in the 
event of a vacation of an area in a dedicated plat, the abutting landowners, not 
the dedicators and not the city, have the strongest claim to the area 
vacated.

[¶20.]  The rule really is quite straightforward. 
The mineral estate is not transferred by the dedication and is retained in favor 
of the abutting landowner to the center of a dedicated street or alley. If the 
owner of the platted land has not conveyed the abutting property, he owns the 
minerals; if the owner of the platted property has sold it, his grantees own the 
minerals.

[¶21.]  This rule lead ineluctably to the 
decision in City of Evanston v. Robinson, supra. In that case, we 
held that a statutory dedication conveyed a determinable fee in the surface 
estate to the city. The holding was compatible with the rationale of our prior 
decisions, as well as with the reasoning of courts in other jurisdictions that 
have adopted language in their statutes similar to that found in the Wyoming 
statutes relating to the interest that is conveyed by the "acknowledgement and 
recording" of a plat. Section 34-12-104, W.S. 1977. See, e.g., Ruby Drilling 
Company, Inc. v. Billingsly, 660 P.2d 377 (Wyo. 1983); Payne v. City of Laramie, 
398 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 1965); Tissino v. Mavrakis, supra; Mochel v. Cleveland, 51 
Idaho 468, 5 P.2d 549 (1930); Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, 36 Utah 127, 104 P. 111 (1909); City of Leadville v. Bohn Mining Company, 37 Colo. 248, 86 P. 1038 
(1906). Cf. Morad v. Brown, 549 P.2d 312, 316 (Wyo. 1976) ("a dedication conveys an easement 
in the people to use the streets and alleys * * *"). These decisions manifest 
the rule that, following the dedication, the dedicator retains a fee simple in 
the land, including the mineral estate, subject to the determinable fee in the 
surface estate owned by the city.

[¶22.]  Thus, in City of Leadville v. Bohn Mining 
Company, supra, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a lessee from the 
dedicator could mine underneath the streets as long as the mining did not 
interfere with the use by the public or the municipality of the streets as 
highways. See, generally, 2 B. Elliott & W. Elliott, Roads and Streets § 
876.1 at 1142-1143 (4th ed. 1926). I emphasize that the facts in City of 
Leadville v. 
Bohn Mining Company, supra, demonstrate that title to the abutting land and that 
horizontal estate underlying the streets was retained by the dedicator. 
Hypothetically, in this instance, Lincoln Land Company did own the horizontal 
estate beneath the streets and alleys up until the time it conveyed the abutting 
land to other persons. At the time of conveyance, it had the opportunity to 
except or reserve the mineral estate in the deeds. If it had not conveyed the 
land or had reserved the mineral estate, I would agree that Lincoln Land Company 
and its successors in interest should receive any proceeds from the recovery of 
oil underlying the dedicated streets and alleys.

[¶23.]  The record does not justify any claim of 
an excepted or reserved mineral estate in favor of Lincoln Land Company. 
Instead, the record clearly shows that, subsequent to the dedication, Lincoln 
Land Company conveyed the land abutting the dedicated areas by various deeds. 
The conveyances describe the property in terms of lots and blocks, and none of 
those deeds includes any reservation of a mineral estate. The general rule is 
that "a conveyance by lot and block, and by reference to a map or plat which 
locates the premises on a public highway, street, or alley, carries title to the 
center of the way if the grantor owns so much, unless an intention to the 
contrary sufficiently appears." 12 Am.Jur.2d Boundaries § 48 at 587 (1964); 11 
C.J.S. Boundaries § 35 at 583-584 (1938); see also Shaw v. Johnston, 17 Idaho 676, 
107 P. 399 (1910) (cited in Payne v. City of Laramie, supra, as consistent with Wyoming law). Cf. Coumas 
v. Transcontinental Garage, 68 Wyo. 99, 230 P.2d 748 (1951) (recognizing the 
general rule but holding it to be inapplicable in the facts of that particular 
case).

[¶24.]  It also is generally accepted that a 
conveyance of any parcel of land, without reserving or excepting the mineral 
estate, passes title to both the surface and mineral estate, if both are owned 
by the grantor. 38 Am.Jur.2d Gas and Oil § 14 at 493-494 (1968). Cf. Holland v. 
Windsor, 461 P.2d 47, 51 (Wyo. 1969) (any exception 
from the estate owned "should be as clearly described as the parcel granted * * 
*"). The result from applying these general rules is that Lincoln Land Company 
conveyed its entire interest in the dedicated streets and alleys to the center 
of the street or alley to the abutting landowners, including its interest in the 
mineral estate. The abutting landowners took subject only to the determinable 
fee in the surface estate of the dedicated area, which previously had been 
conveyed to the Town of Moorcroft.

[¶25.]  It follows that the holding in the 
majority opinion that the mineral estate was retained by the dedicator, Lincoln 
Land Company, for the benefit of its successors cannot be supported and is 
wrong. It is inconsistent with City of Evanston 
v. Robinson, supra, and other Wyoming cases. The decision of the district 
court should be affirmed in accordance with the appropriate and generally 
recognized rules of law.