Case Title: GMAC Mortgage Corporation of Pennsylvania v. Michael Gisvold

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP001663

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1663 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
GMAC Mortgage Corporation of Pennsylvania, f/k/a 
GMAC Mortgage Corporation of Iowa,  
 
Plaintiff, 
Randall Cudd and Jim Claycomb,  
Intervenors-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Michael Gisvold and Drew Gisvold,  
 
Defendants-Appellants, 
United States of America, U.S. Attorney General, 
Chicago Title Insurance Company, a/k/a Old 
Republic National Insurance Company, Title 
Insurance Company of Minnesota,  
 
Defendants.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  206 Wis. 2d 396, 557 N.W.2d 826 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
January 28, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 7, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
St. Croix 
 
JUDGE: 
Eric J. Lundell 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the intervenors-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Catherine R. Quiggle and Rodli, Beskar, Boles & 
Krueger, S.C., River Falls and oral argument by Catherine R. 
Quiggle. 
 
 
For the defendants-appellants there was a brief 
by R. Michael Waterman and Mudge, Porter, Lundeen & Seguin, S.C., 
Hudson and oral argument by R. Michael Waterman. 
 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1663 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
GMAC Mortgage Corporation of  
Pennsylvania, f/k/a GMAC Mortgage  
Corporation of Iowa,  
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
Randall Cudd and Jim Claycomb,  
 
          Intervenors-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael Gisvold and Drue Gisvold,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
United States of America, U.S. Attorney  
General, Chicago Title Insurance Company,  
a/k/a Old Republic National Insurance  
Company, Title Insurance Company of  
Minnesota,  
 
          Defendants.  
FILED 
 
JAN 28, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Petitioners seek review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals,1 reversing an order 
of the circuit court for St. Croix County, the Honorable Eric. 
J. 
Lundell 
presiding. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
excused 
the 
                     
1 GMAC v. Gisvold, 206 Wis. 2d 396, 557 N.W.2d 826 (Ct. App. 
1996). 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
2 
petitioners' non-compliance with Wis. Stat. § 846.17 (1993-94),2 
which requires the purchaser at a foreclosure sale to submit the 
balance of the purchase price within ten days of confirmation of 
the sale, and afforded the petitioners an opportunity to 
complete the purchase in accordance with § 846.17.  The circuit 
court further determined that the redemption period allowed for 
the respondents had expired and, consequently, their attempt to 
redeem the property was not valid.   
¶2 
The court of appeals reversed, concluding the circuit 
court had no equitable authority to waive the petitioners' 
statutorily imposed payment requirements.  The court of appeals 
reasoned the language in Wis. Stat. § 846.17, commanding 
forfeiture of the purchasers' deposit and resale of the property 
if the ten-day time period is not complied with, is mandatory.  
As such, the petitioners had forfeited their ten percent 
deposit.  The court of appeals further determined that the 
respondents had properly redeemed the property.   
¶3 
Upon review, we conclude that the respondents did not 
successfully redeem the property when they paid the balance of 
their mortgage on March 19, 1996.   We further conclude that the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 846.17 is mandatory insofar as it 
requires forfeiture of a purchaser's deposit and resale of the 
property in the event the purchaser does not comply with the 
ten-day time limitation.  Therefore, when a purchaser fails to 
submit the balance of the purchase price within ten days of 
confirmation of the sale, a circuit court has no equitable 
                     
2 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes will be to 
the 1993-94 version of the statutes. 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
3 
authority to excuse non-compliance and must adhere to the 
statute by ordering forfeiture of the purchaser's deposit and 
resale of the property.  We also conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.165 contemplates notice to the purchaser at a foreclosure 
sale of when the sale is confirmed, when the mortgagor's 
redemption period ends, and when the purchaser's ten-day period 
for payment of the purchase price balance expires.  Finally, we 
conclude that the petitioners complied with the statutory 
mandate of Wis. Stat. § 846.17 because they submitted the 
balance of the purchase price within ten days of the effective 
date of the confirmation of the sale which was June 5, 1996.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
I. 
¶4 
The 
relevant facts, 
though 
lengthy 
and somewhat 
confusing, are not in dispute.  In 1992, respondents Michael and 
Drue Gisvold defaulted on their home mortgage held by GMAC 
Mortgage Corporation ("GMAC").  GMAC initiated foreclosure 
proceedings, and a foreclosure judgment was entered on April 27, 
1993, in favor of GMAC.  A sale of the home was subsequently 
scheduled for the following November.  The sale did not 
transpire because Drue Gisvold filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
petition shortly before the scheduled sale.  That bankruptcy 
petition was voluntarily dismissed on January 5, 1994. 
¶5 
A foreclosure sale was thereafter scheduled and was 
conducted on March 15, 1994.  Petitioners Randall Cudd and Jim 
Claycomb were the successful bidders at the sale.  They 
deposited ten percent of the purchase price, and the sale was 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
4 
subsequently confirmed on March 30, 1994.  Cudd and Claycomb 
submitted the remaining balance of the purchase price to the 
clerk of courts within ten days of the confirmation of the sale 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 846.17.   
¶6 
On April 6, 1994, the Gisvolds filed a motion to 
vacate the circuit court's order confirming sale, arguing they 
did not receive sufficient notice of the confirmation hearing.  
Receiving no objection to the motion, the circuit court vacated 
the order confirming sale on June 3, 1994.   
¶7 
The confirmation hearing was rescheduled for July 8, 
1994.  Michael Gisvold filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition 
prior to the scheduled hearing date, and the confirmation 
hearing was canceled.  GMAC brought a motion before the 
bankruptcy court for relief from the automatic stay of the 
foreclosure proceeding initiated by the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition.  On February 13, 1995, the bankruptcy court granted 
GMAC's motion for relief. 
¶8 
The confirmation hearing was again rescheduled and set 
for April 6, 1995.  The circuit court denied GMAC's motion to 
confirm the foreclosure sale in an order dated April 17, 1995.  
However, the circuit court's order provided that GMAC could 
schedule another foreclosure sale and commence posting and 
publishing notice of such sale. 
¶9 
A second foreclosure sale was conducted on June 13, 
1995, and it is the events surrounding the confirmation of this 
sale which provide the basis for the dispute before us now.  At 
the sale, Cudd and Claycomb were once again the successful 
bidders.  They deposited ten percent of the purchase price, and 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
5 
a confirmation hearing was scheduled for June 27, 1995.  Prior 
to the scheduled hearing, the foreclosure proceeding was stayed 
due to Drue Gisvold filing another bankruptcy petition seeking 
relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.  The bankruptcy 
petition was dismissed voluntarily on July 25, 1995, and the 
confirmation hearing was rescheduled for October 3, 1995.  
Again, the hearing did not take place because Michael Gisvold 
filed a bankruptcy petition.  That bankruptcy petition was 
voluntarily dismissed on October 19, 1995.   
¶10 The confirmation hearing was rescheduled for a third 
time and set for December 27, 1995.  This hearing did take 
place.    As a purchaser of the foreclosed property, Cudd was 
present at the hearing.3   The circuit court granted GMAC's 
application for confirmation of the sale.  However, in accord 
with an in-court stipulation between GMAC and the Gisvolds, the 
circuit court stayed entry of the confirmation order until 
January 15, 1996, to allow the Gisvolds additional time to 
redeem the property.4  The order indicated that if the Gisvolds 
                     
3 We find no specific evidence in the record indicating that 
Cudd and Claycomb received notice of the confirmation hearing.  
Because purchasers are "quasi-parties" appearing in an action to 
confirm a foreclosure sale and may appeal orders affecting their 
right to confirmation of the sale, Gumz v. Chickering, 19 
Wis. 2d  625, 121 N.W.2d 279 (1963), they should receive notice 
of the confirmation hearing.  See John S. Goodland, Mortgage and 
Land Contract Foreclosures in Wisconsin § 9.02 (1989).  We assume 
such notice was given in this case since Cudd was present at the 
hearing. 
4 The record does not include a transcript of the December 
27, 1995, hearing setting forth the oral stipulation between 
GMAC and the Gisvolds.  However, the parties do not dispute that 
the stipulation was in fact entered into at that time, and the 
circuit court's order dated January 16, 1996, incorporates the 
in-court stipulation. 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
6 
did not redeem the property by January 15, 1996, at 4:00 p.m., 
the sale would be approved and confirmed effective January 16, 
1996, and Cudd and Claycomb would have ten days from January 16, 
1996, to pay the balance of the purchase price to complete the 
sale. 
¶11 On January 12, 1996, GMAC and the Gisvolds agreed to 
amend their stipulation and extend the Gisvolds' redemption 
period for an additional two days.  The circuit court approved 
the stipulation on January 12, 1996, and amended its original 
order in light of the fact that January 15, 1996, was a federal 
holiday.  Because all banks would be closed on that day, it 
would impact the Gisvolds' ability to transfer funds to redeem 
the property.  The specific terms of the amended order provided 
that if the Gisvolds did not redeem the property by January 17, 
1996, at 4:00 p.m., the foreclosure sale would be approved and 
confirmed effective January 18, 1996, and Cudd and Claycomb 
would thereafter be given ten days to deposit the remaining 
balance of the purchase price with the clerk of courts to 
complete the sale. 
¶12 On January 17, 1996, approximately three hours before 
the Gisvolds' redemption period was to expire, Michael Gisvold 
filed yet another bankruptcy petition, seeking relief under 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.   The bankruptcy petition was 
voluntarily dismissed on March 12, 1996.  Cudd and Claycomb did 
not receive notice of the bankruptcy dismissal.  
¶13 On March 19, 1996, in an attempt to redeem their 
property, the Gisvolds paid the balance due on their mortgage to 
the clerk of courts for St. Croix County.  It was only after the 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
7 
Gisvolds made this payment that Cudd and Claycomb became aware 
the bankruptcy petition had been dismissed.  At no point during 
the period between the December 27, 1995, confirmation hearing 
and the Gisvolds' attempt to redeem the property on March 19, 
1996, did Cudd and Claycomb submit the balance of the purchase 
price to the clerk of courts to complete the sale. 
¶14 GMAC brought a motion for a determination of whether 
the Gisvolds had successfully redeemed their property or whether 
Cudd and Claycomb still had a right to purchase the property.  
GMAC took no position regarding either party's right to the 
property.  The circuit court determined that the period allowed 
for redemption in accord with the stipulation had expired and, 
therefore, the Gisvolds had not properly redeemed the property. 
 The circuit court further concluded that Cudd and Claycomb's 
failure to submit the purchase price within ten days of the 
confirmation of the sale was excusable in light of the fact that 
they had not been notified of the dismissal of the bankruptcy 
petition and thus did not know when the ten-day period for 
submitting the balance of the purchase price expired.  The 
circuit court exercised its discretion and held that Cudd and 
Claycomb should be afforded an opportunity to purchase the 
property.  Accordingly, the circuit court ordered the sale 
confirmed as of June 5, 1996, and determined Cudd and Claycomb 
had ten days from that date to submit the balance of the 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
8 
purchase price.5  Within the time allowed, Cudd and Claycomb 
submitted the balance to complete the purchase. 
¶15 The court of appeals reversed, concluding the circuit 
court does not have the equitable authority to waive a 
purchaser's non-compliance with Wis. Stat. § 846.17.  The court 
of appeals held that the language of the statute, requiring 
forfeiture of the deposit and resale of the property if a 
purchaser does not comply with the ten-day payment period, is 
mandatory.  The court of appeals determined that although a 
circuit court has discretion in confirming a foreclosure sale, 
that discretion does not extend to granting equitable relief to 
Cudd and Claycomb in violation of the statutory mandate 
commanding forfeiture and resale.  The court of appeals further 
determined that the Gisvolds validly redeemed the property, and 
that because Cudd and Claycomb failed to tender the balance of 
the purchase price within the time required, they forfeited 
their ten percent deposit.  
¶16 We are presented with five issues arising from the 
foregoing facts, some of which are interrelated.  First, did the 
Gisvolds properly redeem the property when they tendered the 
balance of their mortgage to the clerk of courts on March 19, 
1996?  Second, is the language of Wis. Stat. § 846.17, which 
                     
5 The record does not include a hearing transcript dated 
June 5, 1996.  A detailed review of the record and discussions 
with the St. Croix County clerk of courts lead us to conclude 
that Record 19 is a transcript from the June 5, 1996, hearing 
but was erroneously dated as a transcript from a February 29, 
1996, hearing.  No hearing occurred on February 29, 1996, in 
this case.  The subject matter referenced in Record 19 and a 
review of the St. Croix circuit court hearing minutes evinces 
that Record 19 is, in fact, a transcript from the June 5, 1996, 
hearing. 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
9 
commands forfeiture of a purchaser's deposit and resale of the 
property, mandatory or directory?  Third, if we determine the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 846.17 is mandatory, does the circuit 
court have the equitable authority to excuse a purchaser's non-
compliance with Wis. Stat. § 846.17?  Fourth, did Cudd and 
Claycomb comply with Wis. Stat. § 846.17?  Fifth, if we 
determine Cudd and Claycomb did not comply with Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.17, have they forfeited their ten percent down payment?  
Each of these issues will be addressed in turn. 
II. 
¶17 We first consider whether the Gisvolds successfully 
redeemed their property.  Because the relevant facts are 
undisputed, this is a question of law and one this court reviews 
de novo.  See State v. Williams, 104 Wis. 2d 15, 21-22, 310 
N.W.2d 601 (1981). 
¶18 The Gisvolds' rights with respect to redemption of the 
property were defined pursuant to the provisions of the 
stipulations 
between 
themselves 
and 
GMAC, 
which 
were 
incorporated into the circuit court's orders.  The original 
stipulation was entered into at the December 27, 1995, hearing 
and constituted a binding in-court stipulation pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 807.05.6  The amended stipulation, which was signed by 
                     
6 Wis. Stat. § 807.05 states:  
Stipulations.  No agreement, stipulation, or consent 
between the parties or their attorneys, in respect to 
the proceedings in an action or special proceeding 
shall be binding unless made in court or during a 
proceeding conducted under s. 807.13 or 967.08 and 
entered in the minutes or recorded by the reporter, or 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
10
the parties and approved by the court on January 12, 1996, was 
also binding with respect to the Gisvolds' redemption rights 
since it was made in writing and subscribed by the parties' 
attorneys. See Wis. Stat. § 807.05.   Therefore, the amended 
stipulation and order provides a basis for a determination of 
the date upon which the Gisvolds' redemption rights expired.  
See Wyandotte Chem. Corp. v. Royal Elec. Mgf. Co., Inc., 66 
Wis. 2d 577, 589, 225 N.W.2d 648 (1975); Thayer v. Federal Life 
Ins. Co., 217 Wis. 282, 285-86, 258 N.W. 849 (1935).  
¶19 The amended stipulation and order set forth January 
17, 1997, at 4:00 p.m., as the date and time upon which the 
Gisvolds' redemption rights would expire.  Approximately three 
hours before their redemption period expired in accord with the 
stipulation, Michael Gisvold filed a bankruptcy petition.  The 
Gisvolds argue that the filing of the bankruptcy petition did 
not extend their redemption rights.  We disagree.   
¶20 It is within our jurisdiction to review whether the 
bankruptcy petition stayed the foreclosure proceeding as a state 
court has jurisdiction to determine whether the action pending 
before it is subject to a stay under the Bankruptcy Code.  See 
State v. Weller, 189 B.R. 467, 471 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1995); see 
also In re Cummings, 201 B.R. 586, 588 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996); 
Board of Directors v. Resolution Trust Corp., 161 B.R. 860, 862 
(Bankr. D.C. 1993).  The interpretation of a federal statute is 
an issue of law, which this court reviews de novo.  See Franklin 
v. Housing Auth. of Milwaukee, 155 Wis. 2d 419, 425-26, 455 
N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1990). 
                                                                  
made in writing and subscribed by the party to be 
bound thereby or the party's attorney. 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
11
¶21 Under the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code, 
Michael 
Gisvold's 
bankruptcy 
filing 
stayed 
the 
commencement or continuation of any action or proceeding against 
him.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).7  The language of § 362 is very 
broad and provides for the stay of virtually any type of 
creditor activity against the debtor or the debtor's estate.  
See Collier on Bankruptcy (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th 
ed. 1997).  The stay is automatic and is not premised on notice 
to any party, including the creditor.  See id. It applies to 
prevent the continuation of a foreclosure proceeding "[a]s long 
as the debtor retains any legal or equitable interest in 
property . . . ."  Arthur M. Moglowsky et al., Wisconsin 
Mortgage Foreclosures 265 (1989).  The provisions of § 362 stay 
proceedings against the debtor until the time the bankruptcy 
case is closed, or until the time the bankruptcy case is 
dismissed, whichever is earlier.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2). 
¶22 Notwithstanding the broad application of § 362, some 
federal courts have held, and there is a strong argument, that  
§ 362 does not work to indefinitely stay a redemption period.  
See Goldberg v. Tynan, 773 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985); Johnson v. 
First Nat. Bank of Montevideo, Minn., 719 F.2d 270, 277 (8th 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 1015 (1984).   Rather, when 
the automatic stay provisions of § 362 become effective, "time 
deadlines for debtors . . . are tolled" pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 108.  Richard S. Ralston, Bankruptcy Stays:  A Practitioner's 
                     
7 All future references to the United States Code will be to 
the 1995 version. 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
12
Guide to Stays and Relief from Stays 37 (1990).  Section  108(b) 
states, in pertinent part: 
 
(b)  . . . if applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order 
entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement 
fixes 
a 
period 
within 
which 
the 
debtor . . . may . . . cure a default, and such period 
has not expired before the date of the filing of the 
petition, 
the 
trustee 
may 
only 
 . . . cure . . . before the later of— 
 
 
(1) the end of such period, including any 
suspension of such period occurring on or after the 
commencement of the case; or 
 
 
(2) 60 days after the order for relief. 
 
(emphasis supplied). 
¶23 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the 
issue of whether § 362 stays, or § 108(b) tolls, the debtor's 
redemption period in Goldberg v. Tynan, 773 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 
1985).  The Tynan court determined that in a foreclosure action 
under Illinois mortgage law "when a petition in bankruptcy is 
filed before the expiration of the applicable state redemption 
period, § 108(b) extends the redemption period for 60 days from 
the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings."  Id. at 179.  The 
Tynan court found persuasive the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Johnson, 719 F.2d at 277, wherein the court 
determined that § 362 does not operate to stay the statutory 
redemption period set forth under Minnesota law, and that § 108 
governs the running of the statutory redemption period.  The 
Johnson court recognized that an analysis of whether § 362 stays 
the redemption period or § 108 tolls the redemption period must 
be done in conjunction with an analysis of the underlying state 
mortgage law as the mortgagor's rights at the time the 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
13
bankruptcy 
petition 
is 
filed 
are 
relevant 
to 
such 
a 
determination.  See id. at 276-77.   
¶24 There is no decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals addressing the issue of the application of § 362 or § 
108 to a mortgagor's redemption rights under Wisconsin law.  We 
decline to decide whether the appropriate application is § 362 
or § 108 because we conclude the Gisvolds failed to redeem the 
property under an analysis of either section.   
¶25 At the time the bankruptcy petition was filed at 
approximately 1:00 p.m. on January 17, 1996, GMAC and the 
Gisvolds had entered into an agreement extending the Gisvolds' 
redemption period to 4:00 p.m. on January 17, 1996.  If we were 
to determine that § 362 stayed the Gisvolds' redemption rights 
under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B), the stay was lifted on March 12, 
1996the day the bankruptcy petition was dismissed.  Arguably, 
the Gisvolds had an additional three hours after the bankruptcy 
petition was dismissed to the redeem the property as that was 
the amount of time left pursuant to the amended stipulation and 
order when the bankruptcy petition was filed.  The exact time 
calculation is irrelevant, however, as the Gisvolds did not pay 
the balance of their mortgage until March 19, 1996seven days 
after their redemption rights expired if a § 362 analysis is 
utilized. 
¶26 Under 11 U.S.C. § 108(b), the Gisvolds would have had 
60 days from the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition 
to redeem the property.  Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure sets forth the procedures for computing a period of 
time under federal law.  The relevant portions of Rule 6(a) 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
14
state that in computing 
time periods, the 
"day of the 
act, . . . shall not be included" but the "last day of the 
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a 
Sunday, or a legal holiday. . . ."  The day of the act was the 
date on which the bankruptcy petition was filedJanuary 17, 
1996.  See Tynan, 773 F.2d at 179.  Therefore, January 18, 1996, 
was the first day of the 60-day period.  Sixty days from that 
date was March 17, 1996.  Since March 17, 1996, was a Sunday, we 
are unable to count that date as the last day of the time 
period.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a).  Therefore, March 18, 1996, 
was the last day upon which the Gisvolds could have redeemed the 
property.8  The Gisvolds did not pay the balance of their 
mortgage until March 19, 1996one day after their redemption 
rights expired if a § 108 analysis is utilized.9 
¶27 The Gisvolds were fully aware of when their redemption 
rights ended.  They were present at the December 27, 1995, 
                     
8 In their brief, Cudd and Claycomb argue that the Gisvolds 
did not redeem the property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 108 because 
they did not cure the mortgage default prior to the date the 
bankruptcy petition was dismissed.  The language of § 108(b) 
does not address application of the tolling provisions in an 
instance where the bankruptcy petition is dismissed, and we find 
it unnecessary to consider the issue.  The bankruptcy petition 
was dismissed on March 12, 1996, and the 60-day time period 
would not have expired until March 18, 1996.  We reach our 
conclusion in consideration of the 60-day time period, which 
encompasses the date of the dismissal of the bankruptcy 
petition.  
9 The Gisvolds argue that 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) does not extend 
their redemption rights as debtors because the specific language 
indicates that only the "trustee" may cure a default.  This 
analysis is inaccurate as the term "trustee" properly includes 
any "debtor in possession." See Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank of 
Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1983); In re Flying S. Land & 
Cattle Co., Inc., 77 B.R. 183 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987). 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
15
hearing and were parties to the first stipulation.  Similarly, 
the Gisvolds were parties to the amended stipulation and were 
apprised 
of 
the 
order 
approving 
the 
extension 
of 
their 
redemption period for two additional days.  Finally, as the 
party initiating the January 17, 1996, bankruptcy proceeding, 
Michael Gisvold was also aware of the date the bankruptcy 
petition was filed as well as the date the bankruptcy petition 
was dismissed.   
¶28 We recognize that redemption is remedial in nature and 
should be liberally construed in favor of the debtor.  See State 
Central Credit Union v. Bigus, 110 Wis. 2d  237, 241, 304 N.W.2d 
 148 (Ct. App. 1980); Hobl v. Lord, 157 Wis. 2d 13, 20, 458 
N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1990) rev'd on other grounds 162 Wis. 2d 
226, 470 N.W.2d 265 (1991), cert. denied Lord v. Farm Credit 
Bank of St. Paul, 502 U.S. 968 (1991).  However, the Gisvolds 
were given ample opportunity via numerous bankruptcy filings10 
and stipulations with GMAC to redeem the property.  Their 
redemption rights were defined pursuant to the terms of the 
amended stipulation and order and were extended by the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition.  They failed to redeem the property 
within the time provided.  We therefore conclude that the 
Gisvolds' payment of their mortgage balance on March 19, 1996, 
was not a proper redemption of the property.   
III. 
                     
10 We note that it is for the Bankruptcy court, not this 
court, to impose sanctions where there has been apparent abuse 
of the Bankruptcy Code. 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
16
 
¶29 We next consider whether the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 846.17 pertinent to this dispute is mandatory or 
directory. This is an issue of statutory interpretation which 
this court reviews de novo.  See Cross v. Soderbeck, 94 Wis. 2d 
331, 340, 288 N.W.2d 779 (1980).   
¶30 The objective in interpreting statutory language is to 
identify and give effect to the intent of the legislature.  See 
Stockbridge School Dist. v. Dep't of Pub. Instruction Sch. Dist. 
Boundary Appeal Bd., 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996). 
In an attempt to construe the legislature's intent, we first 
consider the plain language of the statute.  See id. at 220 
(quoting Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 
N.W.2d 519 (1996)).  If the meaning of the statutory language is 
clear, we will not look outside the language of the statute to 
ascertain legislative intent.  See Ball v. Dist. No. 4 Area 
Board of Vocational Technical, and Adult Educ., 117 Wis. 2d 529, 
537-38, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984). 
¶31 The provisions of Wis. Stat. § 846.17 relevant to this 
dispute state: 
 
Upon any such sale being made the sheriff . . . shall 
make and execute to the purchaser . . . a deed of the 
premises sold . . .; and the purchaser . . . shall be 
let into the possession of the premises so sold on 
production of such deed or a duly certified copy 
thereof, and the court may, if necessary, issue a writ 
of assistance to deliver such possession.  Such deed 
 . . . shall be . . . held by the clerk until the 
confirmation 
of 
the 
sale . . ., 
and 
upon 
the 
confirmation thereof the clerk of the court shall 
thereupon pay to the parties entitled thereto, or to 
their attorneys, the proceeds of the sale, and shall 
deliver 
to 
the 
purchaser 
. . . such 
deed 
upon 
compliance by such purchaser with the terms of such 
sale, and the payment of any balance of the sale price 
to be paid.  In the event of the failure of such 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
17
purchaser to pay any part of the purchase price 
remaining to be paid within 10 days after the 
confirmation of such sale, the amount so deposited 
shall be forfeited and paid to the parties who would 
be entitled to the proceeds of such sale as ordered by 
the court, and a resale shall be had of said 
premises . . . . 
 
(emphasis added). 
¶32  The general rule in interpreting statutory language is 
that "the word 'shall' is presumed mandatory when it appears in 
a statute."  Karow v. Milwaukee Co. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 82 
Wis. 2d 565, 570, 263 N.W.2d 214 (1978) (citing Scanlon v. 
Menasha, 16 Wis. 2d 437, 443, 114 N.W.2d 791 (1962)).  Further 
support is given to a mandatory interpretation of "shall" when 
the legislature uses the words "shall" and "may" in a particular 
statutory section, indicating the legislature was aware of the 
distinct meanings of the words.  See Karow, 82 Wis. 2d at 571.   
¶33 The 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 846.17, 
requiring 
forfeiture and resale of the foreclosed property, is preceded by 
the word "shall," evincing the legislature's intent that the 
language is mandatory.  Furthermore, the legislature used the 
word "may" as well as "shall" in Wis. Stat. § 846.17.11  
Therefore, we "can infer that the legislature was aware of the 
different denotations and intended the words to have their 
precise meanings."  Id.  Hence, the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.17 indicates the legislature intended forfeiture and 
                     
11 There are also numerous other sections within Wis. Stat. 
ch. 846 wherein the legislature specifically used both "may" and 
"shall."  See, e.g., Wis. Stats. §§ 846.02, 846.04, 846.07, 
846.08, 846.09, 846.10, 846.101, 846.102, 846.103, 846.12, 
846.13, 846.14, 846.15, 846.16, 846.162. 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
18
resale to be mandatory if the purchaser does not comply with the 
ten-day payment requirement.12   
¶34 We are not precluded from determining that the 
pertinent language of Wis. Stat. § 846.17 is directory if we 
find such "construction is demanded by the statute in order to 
carry out the clear intent of the legislature."  City of 
Wauwatosa v. Milwaukee Co., 22 Wis. 2d 184, 191, 125 N.W.2d 386 
(1963).  However, the parties do not offer, and our research has 
not revealed, any legislative history lending support to the 
contention that the legislature intended its command to the 
court to be directory.   
¶35 We therefore conclude that the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 846.17 is mandatory insofar as it requires the court to 
order forfeiture of the deposit and resale of the premises if 
                     
12 The Gisvolds urge us to undertake the analysis of Karow 
v. Milwaukee Co. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 263 N.W.2d 
214 (1978) to support their contention that the statutory 
language is mandatory.  In Karow, we set forth factors to 
consider when determining if a statutory provision is mandatory 
or directory, despite the legislature's use of the word "shall." 
 The application of Karow is limited to cases where the disputed 
statutory language sets a time limitation for the taking of some 
action.  See F.T. v. State, 150 Wis. 2d  216, 222-23, 441 N.W.2d 
 322 (Ct. App. 1989).  In each of the cases where a Wisconsin 
court has applied Karow, "shall" was used to directly reference 
a statutory time limitation.  See, e.g., State v. R.R.E., 162 
Wis. 2d 698, 707, 470 N.W.2d  283 (1991); Eby v. Kozarek, 153 
Wis. 2d 75, 79, 450 N.W.2d 249 (1990).  In the present case, 
there is no dispute that the statutory language requiring a 
purchaser to submit payment within ten days of confirmation is 
mandatory. The dispute concerns whether the circuit court is 
bound by the language requiring forfeiture of the deposit and 
resale of the property.  The purchasers' failure to comply with 
the time limitation triggers forfeiture and resale, yet the 
actual imposition of forfeiture and resale, which is the 
language preceded by "shall," is not set forth in relation to 
any time limitation.  Therefore, we decline to apply Karow. 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
19
the purchaser does not submit the balance of the purchase price 
within ten days of the confirmation of the sale.   
IV. 
¶36 We next address whether the circuit court has the 
equitable authority to excuse a purchaser's non-compliance with 
the 
ten-day 
payment 
requirement, 
notwithstanding 
our 
determination 
that 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 846.17, 
requiring forfeiture and resale, is mandatory.  The issue of 
whether judicial authority exists is a question of law and 
therefore one which this court reviews de novo.  See Brier v. 
E.C., 130 Wis. 2d 376, 381, 387 N.W.2d 72 (1986). 
¶37 Foreclosure proceedings are equitable in nature, and 
the circuit court has the equitable authority to exercise 
discretion throughout the proceedings.  See Family Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Barkwood Landscaping Co., Inc., 93 Wis. 2d 190, 202, 
286 N.W.2d 581 (1980).  This discretion extends even after 
confirmation of sale, if necessary to provide "'that no 
injustice shall be done to any of the parties.'"  Id. (quoting 
Strong v. Catton, 1 Wis. 408, 424 (1853)). 
A circuit court has 
the "authority to grant equitable relief, even in the absence of 
a statutory right."  Breier, 130 Wis. 2d at 388-89.  Moreover, a 
circuit court's equitable authority may not be limited absent a 
"clear 
and 
valid" 
legislative 
command. 
 
State 
v. 
Excel 
Management Servs., 111 Wis. 2d 479, 490, 331 N.W.2d 312 (1983).  
¶38 This equitable authority is not unfettered, however.  
Thus, a court's exercise of equitable authority is only 
appropriate when a legally protected right has been invaded. See 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
20
Breier, 130 Wis. 2d at 389.   Additionally, a court may not 
exercise its equitable authority if such exercise would ignore a 
statutory mandate.  See First Federated Sav. Bank v. McDonah, 
143 Wis. 2d 429, 434, 422 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1988).  
¶39 We have already determined that the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 846.17, requiring forfeiture of a purchaser's deposit 
and resale of the property if the purchaser does not comply with 
the ten-day payment period, is mandatory.  Therefore, the 
circuit court has no equitable authority to grant relief to a 
purchaser who fails to comply with the ten-day payment period 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 846.17. See id. 
V. 
¶40 We now consider whether Cudd and Claycomb complied 
with the statutory mandates of Wis. Stat. § 846.17.  The 
application of a statute to a particular set of facts is a 
question of law and one which this court reviews de novo.  See 
Kania v. Airborne Freight Corp., 99 Wis. 2d 746, 758, 300 N.W.2d 
63 (1981). 
¶41 We conclude that Cudd and Claycomb did comply with the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 846.17.  This decision is premised 
on our determination that Wis. Stat. § 846.165 contemplates 
notice to the purchaser at a foreclosure sale of when the sale 
is 
confirmed, 
thereby 
notifying 
the 
purchaser 
that 
the 
mortgagor's redemption period has ended and apprising the 
purchaser of when the ten-day time period for payment will 
expire.  Because Cudd and Claycomb did not receive proper notice 
of when the GMAC's redemption period ended and when the ten-day 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
21
period for payment expired until June 5, 1996, there was no 
binding, effective confirmation of sale until that date.  After 
the confirmation on June 5, 1996, Cudd and Claycomb complied 
with the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 846.17 by submitting the 
balance of the purchase price within the ten-day time period 
allowed. 
¶42 Wisconsin Statutes ch. 846 governs the procedures to 
be followed in a real estate foreclosure proceeding.  The 
language 
of 
ch. 
846 
convinces 
us 
that 
the 
legislature 
contemplated notice to purchasers of actions that may affect 
their rights and obligations with respect to confirmation of a 
foreclosure sale.  Specifically, Wis. Stat. § 846.16513 states 
that before a foreclosure sale may be confirmed, all parties 
appearing in the action must be given at least five days notice 
of when the motion for confirmation of sale will be heard.  
¶43 Although the purchaser is not necessarily a party 
appearing in the foreclosure action for purposes of the judgment 
and sale, "[t]he purchaser at the sale is a party interested in 
the proceedings to confirm the sale."  Shuput v. Lauer, 109 
Wis. 2d 164, 171, 325 N.W.2d 321 (1982).  The purchaser is a 
"quasi-party in the action confirming the foreclosure sale and 
                     
13 Wis. Stat. § 846.165 states, in relevant part: 
Application for confirmation of sale and for deficiency 
judgment.  (1) No sale on a judgment of mortgage foreclosure 
shall be confirmed unless 5 days' notice has been given to all 
parties that have appeared in the action.  . . . the notice 
shall state, in addition to other matters required by law, the 
amount of the judgment, the amount realized upon the sale, the 
amount for which personal judgment will be sought against the 
several parties naming them, and the time and place of hearing. 
  
No. 17122.rtf 
 
22
may appeal court orders affecting his or her rights with respect 
to the confirmation."  Gumz v. Chickering, 19 Wis. 2d 625, 632, 
121 N.W.2d 279 (1963).  Accordingly, the purchaser is entitled 
to notice of the confirmation hearing.  See John S. Goodland, 
Mortgage and Land Contract Foreclosures in Wisconsin § 9.02 
(1989).  The effect of providing notice to the purchaser is, in 
part, to inform the purchaser of the confirmation and thereby 
inform the purchaser of the expiration of the mortgagor's 
redemption rights and the dates encompassed in the purchaser's 
ten-day payment period. 
¶44 Generally, when a hearing is held to confirm a 
foreclosure sale, confirmation of the sale is not stayed by 
stipulation or otherwise.  Rather, the confirmation becomes 
effective immediately, and the order is entered at or following 
the hearing.  In the standard scenario the purchaser has 
received notice of the confirmation hearing; the purchaser has 
been given an opportunity to be present at the hearing; the 
purchaser is aware that the sale is confirmed at or soon after 
the hearing; the purchaser is aware that the redemption period 
is over, and the balance of the purchase price must be submitted 
to the clerk of courts within ten days. 
¶45 In the present case, Cudd and Claycomb were not 
afforded the notice contemplated under Wis. Stat. § 846.165.  At 
the confirmation hearing on December 27, 1995, GMAC and the 
Gisvolds agreed, and the court approved, staying confirmation of 
the sale until January 15, 1996.   Cudd and Claycomb apparently 
 received notice of the confirmation hearing and, accordingly, 
Cudd was present at the hearing.  Cudd and Claycomb were 
No. 17122.rtf 
 
23
therefore apprised of the terms of the original in-court 
stipulation and court order, defining the date of confirmation 
of the sale, the expiration of the Gisvolds' redemption rights, 
and Cudd and Claycomb's right to purchase the property.   
¶46 Cudd and Claycomb received no notice of the events 
which occurred after the confirmation hearing that affected 
their rights to the foreclosed property.  Confirmation of the 
order was stayed an additional two days in accord with an 
amended stipulation entered into between GMAC and Gisvold.  Cudd 
and Claycomb were not parties to this second stipulation, and 
there is no evidence in the record that Cudd and Claycomb were 
notified of the stipulation or amended order.  The stipulation 
and amended order did affect their rights to purchase the 
property because all terms and conditions of the original order 
were extended an additional two days.  Consequently, because the 
stipulation provided the Gisvolds an extended period for 
redemption, Cudd and Claycomb's right to purchase the property 
was delayed.  Michael Gisvold's act of filing a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy petition also affected Cudd and Claycomb's right to 
purchase the property because the bankruptcy filing extended the 
Gisvolds' redemption period.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 108, 362.  
Accordingly, Cudd and Claycomb were entitled to notice of these 
events insofar as they affected their right to complete the 
purchase of the property. 
¶47 GMAC's motion to bring the matter before the circuit 
court for a determination of rights was the appropriate action to 
take as it provided notice to all parties appearing in the action 
of the events affecting their respective property interests.  
No. 17122.rtf 
 
24
Furthermore, as mortgagee, GMAC was the appropriate party to 
bring such motion before the circuit court.  Although all parties 
were affected by the confusing set of circumstances presented in 
this case, GMAC is the 
party initiating 
the 
foreclosure 
proceeding and arguably would have the greatest interest in a 
resolution of the proceedings so that the property debt could be 
satisfied, either by the mortgagor or the purchasers.   
¶48 In response to GMAC's motion, the circuit court held  
hearings on May 3, 1996, and June 5, 1996.  The hearings provided 
all parties, including Cudd and Claycomb, notice of the events 
surrounding the confirmation.  Because Cudd and Claycomb did not 
receive the proper notice until that time, as is contemplated by 
Wis. Stat. § 846.165, there was no valid confirmation of sale 
until the June 5, 1996, hearing.14 
¶49 In its June 5, 1996, order, the circuit court approved 
and confirmed the foreclosure sale.  The circuit court ordered 
that Cudd and Claycomb would have ten days from that date to 
submit the balance of the purchase price to complete the sale.  
In the event Cudd and Claycomb did not so comply, the court order 
indicated that their deposit would be forfeited and an action to 
initiate a new sale would commence.  Cudd and Claycomb submitted 
the payment to the clerk of courts within ten days of the 
                     
14 We recognize that, generally, a mortgagor may redeem the 
property until a foreclosure sale is confirmed.  See Gerhardt v. 
Ellis, 134 Wis. 191, 196 (1908).  In the present case, our 
determination that the sale was not confirmed until June 5, 
1996, does not extend the Gisvolds' redemption period.  The 
Gisvolds' redemption period was defined pursuant to the terms of 
binding stipulations voluntarily entered into and incorporated 
into the circuit court's orders.  See Wis. Stat. § 807.05.  
No. 17122.rtf 
 
25
confirmation 
and, 
therefore, 
complied 
with 
the 
statutory 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 846.17. 
VI. 
¶50 Because we determine that Cudd and Claycomb completed 
their purchase of the foreclosed property in compliance with 
Wis. Stat. § 846.17, it is not necessary that we reach the issue 
whether Cudd and Claycomb forfeited their deposit. 
VII. 
¶51 In sum, we conclude that the respondents failed to 
successfully redeem their property.  We further conclude that 
the language of Wis. Stat. § 846.17 is mandatory insofar as it 
directs forfeiture of a purchaser's deposit and resale of the 
property in a foreclosure proceeding, if the purchaser does not 
submit the balance of the purchase price within ten days of the 
confirmation of the sale.  Therefore, the circuit court has no 
equitable authority to waive a purchaser's non-compliance with 
the ten-day payment period set forth in Wis. Stat. § 846.17.  We 
also conclude that Cudd and Claycomb have a right to notice of 
when the sale is confirmed, when the Gisvolds' redemption period 
ends, and when their ten-day payment period expires, as 
contemplated by Wis. Stat. § 846.165.  Finally, we conclude that 
Cudd and Claycomb complied with the directives of Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.17 by submitting the balance of the purchase price within 
ten days of the effective date of confirmation of the sale, 
which was June 5, 1996.  
No. 17122.rtf 
 
26
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.