Case Title: State v. Gary

Citation: 348 N.C. 510

Docket Number: 375PA97

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 375PA97
FILED: 9 JULY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
WILLIE LEE GARY, JR.
On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b)
to review judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment
entered by Albright, J., at the 3 October 1994 Criminal Session
of Superior Court, Guilford County, upon a jury verdict of guilty
of first-degree murder in a noncapital trial.  Heard in the
Supreme Court 27 May 1998.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Tina A.
Krasner, Associate Attorney General, for the State.
A. Wayland Cooke and H. Davis North, III, for
defendant-appellant.
PARKER, Justice.
Defendant Willie Lee Gary, Jr. was indicted on
13 December 1993 for the first-degree murder of Carolyn Hammonds
(“victim”) on 26 October 1993.  At the noncapital trial defendant
was found guilty as charged and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that defendant’s
trial was free from prejudicial error.
The State presented evidence at trial tending to show
that defendant and the victim had been seeing each other socially
and that the victim was trying to break up with defendant because
he had become physically abusive toward her.  In May of 1993
defendant had assaulted the victim by throwing a hammer at her
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and threatening to harm her or kill her if she broke up with him
or called the police.  On 27 October 1993 the victim’s father
found the victim dead in her home in Greensboro, North Carolina. 
She was found lying on her back on the bed in her blood-spattered
bedroom, wearing only socks.  She had a large amount of blood on
her head and face.  She died as a result of blows to her head
with a blunt object which, according to an expert medical
examiner, was either a hammer or hammer-shaped object.  Almost
any of the several blows she suffered would have led to her
death.
Detective David Spagnola of the Greensboro Police
Department talked to the victim’s parents, who lived three doors
away and had seen defendant’s truck go by the victim’s house
several times the night of the murder, 26 October 1993.  The
victim’s next-door neighbor saw defendant’s truck parked on the
street outside the victim’s house on the evening of 26 October
1993.  Detective Spagnola obtained defendant’s address and
telephone number, drove to defendant’s house, and called him from
his car telephone.  Detective Spagnola told defendant that he
needed to speak with him and that he would send a police officer
to pick him up if he would come out on the front porch.  The
detective then saw defendant go out the back door of the house
toward a storage shed.  Detective Spagnola approached defendant,
identified himself, and told defendant to sit down on the ground. 
An officer then arrived and arrested defendant on some
outstanding warrants.
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Michael DeGuglielmo, an expert in forensic analysis and
DNA testing, compared the bloodstains found on pants owned by
defendant to the victim’s blood.  He found the blood on
defendant’s pants to be consistent with the victim’s blood to a
statistical certainty of one in 1.4 billion.
Defendant presented no evidence.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred and
violated both his federal and state constitutional rights by
denying his motions for new counsel.  Defendant was granted a
pretrial hearing on his pro se motion alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel.  Judge Peter McHugh denied the motion and
made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:  that
there was no showing of ineffective assistance of counsel, that
the standards of practice of defendant’s trial counsel were in
all regards according to the standards of legal practice in North
Carolina, and that defendant failed to show good cause for an
order from the court substituting counsel of record.
Defendant renewed his objections at trial; and, in the
absence of the jury, the trial court entertained a lengthy and
disjointed argument from defendant.  The essence of defendant’s
contention was that his counsel’s representation was ineffective
in that counsel had decided not to subpoena certain witnesses
whom defendant claimed would have provided alibi testimony.  The
trial judge denied defendant’s motion for substitute counsel and
entered the following findings of fact:
6.  Basically, a conflict of wills has
developed between the defendant and his
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court-appointed lawyer with regard to trial
tactics and strategies;
. . . .
10.  Indeed, the so-called witnesses
that the defendant desires to subpoena are
witnesses known to [defense counsel] and do
not surprise him in the least.  He is aware
of what these witnesses will testify to, if
called.  He has made a strategic legal
decision that these witnesses should not be
called for [the] reason that in his
professional opinion they will do more harm
than good to the defendant’s cause[.]
Based on these findings of fact, the trial court concluded as a
matter of law:
10.  A mere disagreement between the
defendant and his court-appointed counsel as
to trial tactics is not sufficient to require
the trial court to replace court-appointed
counsel with another attorney.  Trial
counsel, whether court appointed or privately
employed, is not the mere lackey or
“mouthpiece” of his client.  Indeed, he is in
charge of and has the responsibility for the
conduct of the trial, including the selection
of witnesses to be called to the stand on
behalf of his client and the interrogation of
them.  He is an officer of the Court and owes
duties to it as well as to his client;
11.  The existence here of a conflict of
wills between the defendant and his court-
appointed counsel with regard to trial
strategy and tactics and the call of
witnesses do[es] not require this Court to
replace present counsel with another attorney
under the totality of the circumstances. 
Indeed, the defendant’s dissatisfaction with
his court-appointed counsel appeared to the
trial court to have been completely
unjustified;
12.  Such conflict of will, as described
by the defendant in vague, general and
overbroad terms does not rise to the level of
a fundamental conflict involving the
defendant’s basic rights;
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13.  In the present case, this defendant
has not shown ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial or any impediment to the
presentation of his defense caused by
counsel’s exercise of professional judgment. 
There is no substantial reason shown for the
appointment of a replacement counsel[.]
Defendant now concedes that if this were a mere
disagreement over trial tactics, defendant would not be entitled
to new counsel.  State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 352, 271 S.E.2d
252, 255 (1980).  Defendant asserts, however, that this is a more
substantial issue than a disagreement over trial tactics. 
Defendant contends that because his counsel did not issue process
for or call his alibi witnesses to testify, defendant was denied
his basic rights under both the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which affords criminal defendants the right
“to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor,” and Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina
Constitution, which guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
“confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony.”  We
disagree with defendant’s contentions.
After a review of the transcript and record, we
conclude that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion
for substitute counsel and that this denial does not impinge upon
defendant’s constitutional rights.  As we have previously stated,
“the type of defense to present and the number of witnesses to
call is a matter of trial tactics, and the responsibility for
these decisions rests ultimately with defense counsel.”  State v.
McDowell, 329 N.C. 363, 384, 407 S.E.2d 200, 211 (1991).  A
disagreement between the defendant and his court-appointed
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counsel over trial tactics is not sufficient to require the trial
court to replace court-appointed counsel with another attorney. 
State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 66, 224 S.E.2d 174, 179-80
(1976).  In order to be granted substitute counsel, “the
defendant must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a
complete breakdown in communication, or an irreconcilable
conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.”  State v.
Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 372, 230 S.E.2d 524, 528-29 (1976). 
Substitution of counsel rests in the sound discretion of the
trial court.  Robinson, 290 N.C. at 66, 224 S.E.2d at 180. 
Nothing in the record in this case supports defendant’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, and nothing in the record
supports defendant’s claim that he was denied his right to
present his own witnesses to establish a defense.  Accordingly,
this assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next contends that the trial judge made a
disparaging comment about defendant’s intelligence which called
into question the trial judge’s impartiality and which now
entitles defendant to a new trial.  Outside the presence of the
jury, an extensive colloquy took place between defendant and the
trial court when defendant moved to have his trial counsel
replaced for failure to subpoena witnesses whom defendant wanted
called.  After this colloquy, in a lengthy dictated order denying
defendant’s motion, the trial court included in its findings of
fact the statement that “[i]t is readily apparent to anyone with
an IQ level above room temperature that the differences between
counsel and the defendant relate to trial strategy and tactics.” 
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Defendant asserts that the trial judge should have recused
himself under Canon 3C(1) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial
Conduct, which provides in pertinent part that “[a] judge should
disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned,” such as in a case in which “[h]e
has a personal bias against a party.”  Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 3C(1)(a), 1998 Ann. R. N.C. 248.
We conclude that defendant has not presented
substantial evidence of partiality or evidence manifesting an
appearance of partiality on the part of the trial judge.  See
State v. Scott, 343 N.C. 313, 325-26, 471 S.E.2d 605, 612-13
(1996).  The trial judge’s statement did not directly implicate
either defendant or the merits of the case.  Read in the context
of the entire order, this finding of fact merely attempted to
draw the contrast between what defendant characterized as a
fundamental conflict involving his basic constitutional right to
call witnesses in his defense and what is more properly
characterized as a difference of opinion as to trial strategy. 
Just prior to the finding of fact contested by defendant, the
trial court noted that defendant’s trial counsel was aware of the
witnesses that defendant desired to subpoena; that trial counsel
was aware of what those witnesses would testify to if called; and
that trial counsel had made a strategic legal decision that those
witnesses should not be called since, in his professional
opinion, they would do substantially more harm than good to
defendant’s cause.  This assignment of error is overruled.
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Defendant next argues five assignments in which he
contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence certain
testimony by several of the State’s witnesses.  Specifically,
defendant asserts that admission of the following testimony was
error:  (i) the testimony of Detective Spagnola that upon seeing
defendant go out the back door, “I wasn’t sure exactly what he
was going to do.  In my mind, I thought he was either going to
flee the residence or maybe secure or hide a weapon back there or
get a weapon”; (ii) the testimony of SBI Agent W.F. Lemmons that
the blood stains on defendant’s trousers were “high-velocity
stains.  Very small.  Come from an impact”; (iii) the testimony
by defendant’s grandmother and by Detective D.M. Sexton that
defendant had a child by another woman; (iv) the testimony of
Carter Allen that on previous occasions he “observed what
appeared to be the defendant pushing [the victim] back into her
house” and that he saw defendant “forcefully putting his hand on
[the victim]”; and (v) the testimony of Detective Sexton that
defendant was transported to the Guilford County jail where he
was “incarcerated on some unrelated charges.”
Defendant concedes that in each instance he lodged no
objection when the testimony was offered at trial but asserts in
his assignments of error that the trial court should have
intervened ex mero motu to strike the testimony as irrelevant and
prejudicial.  We note that where a criminal defendant has not
objected to the admission of evidence at trial, the proper
standard of review is a plain error analysis rather than an ex
mero motu or grossly improper analysis.  See State v. York, 347
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N.C. 79, 86, 489 S.E.2d 380, 384 (1997) (plain error analysis
applied to admission of evidence); State v. Cummings, 346 N.C.
291, 313-16, 488 S.E.2d 550, 563-65 (1997) (plain error analysis
applied to admission of confessions), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
139 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1998); see also State v. Hester, 343 N.C. 266,
272-73, 470 S.E.2d 25, 28 (1996) (correct standard of review of
prosecutorial argument is not plain error but whether the
arguments were so prejudicial and grossly improper as to require
corrective action by the trial judge ex mero motu).  Moreover,
where a defendant fails to assert plain error in his assignments
of error, as defendant has failed to do in this case, he has
waived even plain error review.  N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4); State
v. Truesdale, 340 N.C. 229, 232-33, 456 S.E.2d 299, 301 (1995). 
Even assuming arguendo that defendant properly preserved plain
error review and that the trial court committed some error in
admitting the testimony cited in these assignments of error, we
conclude that the alleged errors do not rise to the level of
plain error.  To prevail on plain error review, defendant must
show that (i) a different result probably would have been reached
but for the error or (ii) the error was so fundamental as to
result in a miscarriage of justice or denial of a fair trial. 
State v. Bishop, 346 N.C. 365, 385, 488 S.E.2d 769, 779 (1997). 
Defendant having failed to make the necessary showing, these
assignments of error are overruled.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in
admitting the testimony of the victim’s mother, Hazel Hobbs,
concerning prior bad acts of defendant.  Defendant objected at
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trial to the following testimony by Mrs. Hobbs:  “He [defendant]
cursed me out.  I went down there to talk to him and he cursed at
me and my husband through me.”  Defendant argues that although
the trial court had ruled, pursuant to Rule 803(3) of the Rules
of Evidence, that Mrs. Hobbs could testify to statements made by
defendant to the victim to show the victim’s state of mind, this
statement had nothing to do with the victim’s state of mind, was
not relevant to any issue in the case, and could have been
offered only to prejudice defendant unfairly in the eyes of the
jury.
We conclude that, viewed in the context of the entire
examination, the witness’ testimony is relevant to show the
nature of the relationship between defendant and the victim and
is, therefore, admissible:
Q:  In the days or few weeks that preceded
October 26, 1993, did you have occasion to
speak to your daughter about her relationship
with [defendant]?
A:  Yes, sir.
Q:  And what did she tell you?
A:  She -- she said, “Mama,” she said, “I
know how he is.”  But she said, “Let me work
things out myself.”  Because she didn’t want
-- she was just peace loving.  She didn’t
want him to be angry with her.
Q:  Now, when she said she wanted to work
things out herself, what had happened or what
had transpired or what had occurred to cause
her to feel that she needed to work things
out herself?
A:  He started -- he started abusing her.  He
started -- he cursed every breath.  He cursed
me out.  I went down there to talk to him and
he cursed at me and my husband through me.
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. . . .
Q:  Did your daughter say that [defendant]
had said anything to her about what he was
going to do to her?
A:  Yes, sir.
Q:  Tell the jury about that[.]
A:  I kept talking to her.  And she had been
under the doctor’s care for her nerves, and
she was beginning to look so peaked, I said,
“Honey, what’s the matter?”  She said -- she
said, “He told me he’d kill me if I left
him.”  And then he threatened her all along. 
And he told her again.  She said that he
would kill her if she didn’t marry him.  And
she --
Q:  Do you know when --
A:  She just acted like she was just scared
to death of him.
Furthermore, in context Mrs. Hobbs’ statement to which defendant
takes exception, that defendant cursed the victim’s parents on
one occasion, is not so inflammatory as to be excluded as
unfairly prejudicial pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403.  The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to exclude
this testimony, and we overrule this assignment of error.
By defendant’s next assignment of error, he contends
that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence testimony
concerning defendant’s prior convictions for assault on a female
and communicating threats.  The State offered evidence that
defendant pled guilty to assaulting the victim by throwing a
hammer at her and communicating a threat to her by stating, “If
you call the police, when I get out I am coming back to kill
you.”  Defendant argues that these offenses, which occurred on
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2 May 1993, almost six months prior to the victim’s death, were
too remote in time to be relevant under Rule 404(b) of the Rules
of Evidence.  Defendant also argues that the evidence should have
been excluded under Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence since its
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.
Under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b), “‘evidence of other
offenses is admissible so long as it is relevant to any fact or
issue other than the character of the accused.’”  State v.
Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990) (quoting
State v. Weaver, 318 N.C. 400, 403, 348 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1986)). 
Rule 401 provides that
“[r]elevant evidence” means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (1992).  Evidence is competent and
relevant when it reveals a circumstance surrounding one of the
parties and is necessary to understand properly their conduct or
motives or if it allows the jury to draw a reasonable inference
as to a disputed fact.  State v. Riddick, 316 N.C. 127, 137, 340
S.E.2d 422, 428 (1986).
This Court has repeatedly held that evidence of a
defendant’s prior assaults on the victim for whose murder the
defendant is being tried is admissible for the purpose of showing
malice, premeditation, deliberation, intent or ill will against
the victim under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b).  State v. Alston,
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341 N.C. 198, 229, 461 S.E.2d 687, 703 (1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1148, 134 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1996).  In this case defendant’s
prior assault tends to establish malice, intent, premeditation,
and deliberation--all elements of first-degree murder. 
Similarly, evidence of prior threats by a defendant against a
victim has also been held by this Court to be admissible in
trials for first-degree murder to prove premeditation and
deliberation.  State v. Cox, 344 N.C. 184, 188, 472 S.E.2d 760,
762 (1996).  The remoteness in time of the prior assaults or
threats generally goes to the weight of the evidence rather than
to its admissibility.  Id.
The evidence of defendant’s prior assault on the victim
was also relevant to show identity.  In order for evidence of
defendant’s prior crimes or bad acts to be admissible to show the
identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime for
which he is being tried, there must be “‘some unusual facts
present in both crimes or particularly similar acts which would
indicate that the same person committed both crimes.’”  Riddick,
316 N.C. at 133, 340 S.E.2d at 426 (quoting State v. Moore, 309
N.C. 102, 106, 305 S.E.2d 542, 545 (1983)).  The similarities
need not rise to the level of the unique and bizarre, but must
tend to support a reasonable inference that the same person
committed both the earlier and the later acts.  State v. Stager,
329 N.C. 278, 304, 406 S.E.2d 876, 891 (1991).  In this case the
State was required to prove the identity of the killer of the
victim.  Testimony from Dr. John D. Butts, the chief medical
examiner, was that the victim died as a result of blows to her
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head from either a hammer or a hammer-shaped object.  The
evidence that defendant had assaulted the victim by throwing a
hammer at her and the evidence that her death resulted from blows
to the head most likely caused by a hammer are sufficiently
similar for the evidence of the prior assault to be admissible to
show identity under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b).  See State v.
Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 587-88, 451 S.E.2d 157, 167 (1994), cert.
denied, 515 U.S. 1107, 132 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1995).
Whether to exclude relevant evidence as unfairly
prejudicial under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403 is a matter left to
the sound discretion of the trial court.  State v. Handy, 331
N.C. 515, 532, 419 S.E.2d 545, 554 (1992).  In this case the
trial court conducted voir dire to determine whether the evidence
of defendant’s prior convictions was offered pursuant to Rule
404(b) and was relevant for some purpose other than showing
defendant’s propensity for the type of conduct at issue.  This
hearing suggests that the trial judge weighed the probative value
of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice.  We
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under
Rule 403 by admitting this evidence.  This assignment of error is
overruled.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
allowing hearsay testimony from Mrs. Hobbs, the victim’s mother,
regarding threats made by defendant to the victim.  In response
to the prosecutor’s question, “Did your daughter say that
[defendant] had said anything to her about what he was going to
do to her?” Mrs. Hobbs answered, in pertinent part, “[S]he said,
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‘He told me he’d kill me if I left him.’”  Defendant argues that
it was error to admit this testimony over his objection and
without a limiting instruction since the testimony constituted
double hearsay and since the State offered it for the
inflammatory purpose of showing that defendant committed the
murder rather than to show the victim’s fearful state of mind. 
We disagree.
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(3) allows the admission of
hearsay testimony if it tends to demonstrate the victim’s then-
existing state of mind.  See Bishop, 346 N.C. at 379, 488 S.E.2d
at 776.  A murder victim’s statements falling within the state of
mind exception to the hearsay rule are relevant to show the
status of the victim’s relationship to the defendant.  Scott, 343
N.C. at 335, 471 S.E.2d at 618.  The victim’s statements relating
factual events that tend to show the victim’s state of mind when
making the statements are not excluded from the coverage of Rule
803(3) where the facts “serve . . .  to demonstrate the basis for
the [victim’s] emotions.”  State v. Gray, 347 N.C. 143, 173, 491
S.E.2d 538, 550 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d
___ (1998).  The testimony in this case was admissible to show
the victim’s fear at the time of the conversation with her mother
and to demonstrate the basis for her fear, namely, the threat to
her life.  See Lynch, 327 N.C. at 223, 393 S.E.2d at 819.  The
fact that this hearsay statement by defendant was contained
within a hearsay statement by the victim does not affect its
admissibility since both statements were admissible.  State v.
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Larrimore, 340 N.C. 119, 147, 456 S.E.2d 789, 803 (1995).  This
assignment of error is overruled.
In defendant’s next assignments of error, he contends
that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the
first-degree murder charge at the close of the State’s evidence
and again at the close of all the evidence on the ground that the
State did not offer any direct evidence of premeditation or
deliberation.  Defendant argues that while there were several
wounds to the victim, all indications were that this was a crime
of passion carried out in one frenzied attack.
When considering a motion to dismiss for insufficiency
of the evidence, the court must examine the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State; and the State is entitled to every
reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.  State v.
Allen, 346 N.C. 731, 739, 488 S.E.2d 188, 192 (1997).  The court
must also consider whether all the elements of the crime are
supported by substantial evidence.  Id.  “Substantial evidence”
is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
sufficient to support a conclusion.  Id.  First-degree murder is
the unlawful killing of a human being with malice, premeditation,
and deliberation.  State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 26, 446 S.E.2d
252, 265 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1134, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895
(1995).  “Premeditation means that the act was thought out
beforehand for some length of time, however short, but no
particular amount of time is necessary for the mental process of
premeditation.”  State v. Conner, 335 N.C. 618, 635, 440 S.E.2d
826, 835-36 (1994).  “Deliberation means an intent to kill,
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carried out in a cool state of blood, in furtherance of a fixed
design for revenge or to accomplish an unlawful purpose and not
under the influence of a violent passion, suddenly aroused by
lawful or just cause or legal provocation.”  Id. at 635, 440
S.E.2d at 836.  Notwithstanding cases from other jurisdictions
cited by defendant, this Court has stated:
Among other circumstances from which
premeditation and deliberation may be
inferred are (1) lack of provocation on the
part of the deceased, (2) the conduct and
statements of the defendant before and after
the killing, (3) threats and declarations of
the defendant before and during the
occurrence giving rise to the death of the
deceased, (4) ill-will or previous difficulty
between the parties, (5) the dealing of
lethal blows after the deceased has been
felled and rendered helpless, (6) evidence
that the killing was done in a brutal manner,
and (7) the nature and number of the victim’s
wounds.
State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 238, 400 S.E.2d 57, 62 (1991).
In this case, viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the State, the evidence showed the following: that
the victim and defendant had a stormy relationship; that
defendant abused the victim physically; that the victim was
afraid of defendant; that defendant had on an earlier occasion
assaulted the victim by throwing a hammer at her and that he
threatened her at that time stating, “If you call the police,
when I get out I am coming back to kill you”; that the victim
called police in that instance, leading to defendant’s arrest and
guilty plea to charges of assault and communicating threats; that
at various other times, defendant threatened to kill the victim
if she broke up with him; that the victim was trying to break up
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with defendant; that the victim died as a result of repeated
blows to her head with a hammer or hammer-shaped object.  On this
record we conclude that the State presented substantial evidence
of premeditation and deliberation and that the trial court
properly submitted to the jury the question of defendant’s guilt
of first-degree murder based on the theory of premeditation and
deliberation.  These assignments of error are overruled.
In his final assignment of error, defendant asserts
that the trial court erred in not charging the jury as to the
lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.  Murder in the
second degree is defined as the unlawful killing of another with
malice but without premeditation and deliberation.  State v.
Lambert, 341 N.C. 36, 46, 460 S.E.2d 123, 129 (1995).  The test
for determining whether an instruction on second-degree murder is
required is as follows:
The determinative factor is what the State’s
evidence tends to prove.  If the evidence is
sufficient to fully satisfy the State’s
burden of proving each and every element of
the offense of murder in the first degree,
including premeditation and deliberation, and
there is no evidence to negate these elements
other than defendant’s denial that he
committed the offense, the trial judge should
properly exclude from jury consideration the
possibility of a conviction of second degree
murder.
State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. 274, 293, 298 S.E.2d 645, 658
(1983), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Johnson,
317 N.C. 193, 344 S.E.2d 775 (1986).  An instruction on a
lesser-included offense must be given only if the evidence would
permit the jury rationally to find defendant guilty of the lesser
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offense and acquit him of the greater.  State v. Conaway, 339
N.C. 487, 514, 453 S.E.2d 824, 841, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884,
133 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1995).
Defendant argues that the evidence was sufficient for a
jury rationally to conclude that defendant killed the victim in
the heat of passion and without premeditation and deliberation. 
Defendant points to three factors to support this contention: 
(i) the nature of the wounds, (ii) that defendant may have
arrived at the victim’s house unarmed, and (iii) that the victim
was found wearing only socks.  Defendant first argues that the
wounds were consistent with a killing done in the heat of
passion.  Evidence of multiple blows to the head with a heavy,
blunt object, any one of which blows could have killed the
victim, does not, however, in and of itself constitute evidence
of a killing in the heat of passion.  Defendant presented no
evidence to support a heat-of-passion killing, and mere
speculation is not sufficient to negate evidence of premeditation
and deliberation.
Next, defendant argues that the State’s evidence that a
hammer had been beside the bed in the victim’s room three days
before the murder and that the fatal wounds were inflicted by a
hammer or a hammer-shaped object “certainly indicates the murder
weapon was on the premises and not brought there by the
assailant” and that the killing might not have been premeditated
and deliberate.  Nothing else appearing, this evidence is
insufficient for a rational juror to find that premeditation and
deliberation are negated.  Defendant’s reliance on State v.
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Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 340 S.E.2d 673 (1986); State v. Calloway,
305 N.C. 747, 291 S.E.2d 622 (1982); State v. Myers, 299 N.C.
671, 263 S.E.2d 768 (1980); and State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126,
244 S.E.2d 397 (1978), cases where this Court has recognized
evidence that defendant brought a weapon to the murder scene as
evidence of premeditation, is misplaced.  The fact that a
defendant uses a weapon already at the scene does not, standing
alone, negate premeditation and deliberation or raise the
inference that the defendant acted in the heat of passion.
Finally, defendant argues that the jury could infer
from the fact that the victim was found wearing only socks that
an argument or fight may have arisen in the “quasi-domestic
relationship” existing between her and defendant, which may have
led to a killing in the heat of passion.  This contention again
is mere speculation.  No evidence suggested that the victim and
defendant argued or fought just prior to the murder or that the
victim in any way provoked defendant.
In sum defendant has shown no evidence supporting the
submission of second-degree murder.  All the evidence in this
case supports a finding of premeditation and deliberation:  the
threats to kill the victim if she left him or if she called the
police after he assaulted her with a hammer, the demonstrated
malice as evidenced by repeated physical abuse, and the multiple
blows to the victim’s head with a hammer or hammer-shaped object. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct
the jury on second-degree murder, and this assignment of error is
overruled.
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For the foregoing reasons we conclude that defendant
received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.
NO ERROR.