Case Title: Chrysler Motor Corp. v. Andresen

Citation: 454 P.2d 825, 76 Wash. 2d 22

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1969-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
76 Wn.2d 22 (1969) 454 P.2d 825 CHRYSLER MOTOR CORPORATION, Appellant, v. ARVID M. ANDRESEN et al., Respondents.[*] No. 39833. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. May 15, 1969. Paul W. Robben and Arthur G. Barnett, for appellant. Davies, Pearson, Anderson, Pearson & Gadbow, by Wayne J. Davies, for respondents. McGOVERN, J. This action had its genesis in Williams v. Andresen, 63 Wn.2d 645, 388 P.2d 725 (1964). The underlying facts are the same and are recited from that opinion, at 646: After we affirmed the jury verdict against the defendants, Levi Williams, the plaintiff, collected one-half of that judgment from defendants Andresen and Clark and the other half from defendant Chrysler Motors Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Chrysler). Chrysler then brought this action against Andresen and Clark, seeking judgment in an amount equal to what it had paid Levi *24 Williams, and this appeal is taken from a dismissal of that claim. The action was predicated on the indemnification theory of law that Chrysler, as principal, was entitled to recover from defendants, its agents, whatever Chrysler had paid Mr. Williams on account of the injuries he suffered through the negligence of its agents. Chrysler argued that the judgment against it in the prior action was founded solely on the basis of constructive liability and that it was therefore entitled to this indemnification. See Rufener v. Scott, 46 Wn.2d 240, 280 P.2d 253 (1955). Interestingly, its present position on the agency question is exactly contrary to the position taken by it in the earlier cause. Chrysler then alleged that Andresen was not authorized to demonstrate or sell the automobile and, because the car had been left with Andresen only for storage, defendant Clark was not its agent at the time Mr. Williams was injured. With equal vigor it now urges otherwise. It insists that an agency relationship did exist and that the jury so found. We must agree. The jury did consider the question and did find that such relationship existed. We referred to that fact in Williams, 63 Wn.2d at 651: The jury decided that Chrysler had left its automobile with Andresen to demonstrate and sell. That is apparent *25 because it brought in a verdict against Chrysler after being charged as follows: [1] Although we are satisfied that the question of agency was decided under appropriate instructions, it does not follow that we consider Chrysler's liability to have been predicated solely on that basis. The trial court here found otherwise and we agree with it, i.e., Chrysler was in fact actively negligent. The record supports that finding. Mr. Clair Ogle, a Chrysler employee, had driven the automobile as a field car for approximately 1,500 miles. The jury found that he left the car with defendants to demonstrate and sell and that Mr. Williams was injured while the automobile was being demonstrated to him. Otto F. Smith, the Andresen Motor Company service manager, testified that the automobile was brought to him after the accident and he found the push-button selector panel for the transmission to be malfunctioning. He said that when the neutral button was pushed in, the drive button would come out but that the forward drive gear would still be engaged. The car would then move forward when the engine was accelerated. Mr. Williams was injured in that manner. Chrysler owned, and through its employee, operated the automobile at the time it left the car with Andresen for demonstration and sale. Although it was chargeable with knowledge of the operational limitations of the vehicle[1]*26 (Woods v. Goodson, 55 Wn.2d 687, 349 P.2d 731 (1960)), the record is clear that it failed to warn the defendants of the defect, knowing full well that the automobile would be used and that such users would rely on the operational adequacy of the transmission system. The trial court found that Chrysler had a duty to warn Andresen and Clark of the defect and that it failed to do so. It further found that such failure to warn constituted active negligence on the part of Chrysler and that such act was a material and proximate cause of the injuries to Levi Williams. We agree. For the foregoing reasons, Chrysler is not entitled to recover from defendants. The judgment is affirmed. HUNTER, C.J., FINLEY, WEAVER, and HAMILTON, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 454 P.2d 825. [1] In Williams v. Andresen, 63 Wn.2d 645, 388 P.2d 725 (1964), at 650, we stated that the evidence "showed an operational limitation of the automobile" that justified an application of the rule laid down in Woods v. Goodson, 55 Wn.2d 687, 349 P.2d 731 (1960).