Case Title: Knapp v. O'BRIEN

Citation: 179 N.W.2d 88

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1970-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
179 N.W.2d 88 (1970) John KNAPP, John J. Todd, and Leif R. Langsjoen, individually and as members of the Minnesota Tax Court, Appellants, Nicholas D. Coleman, et al., plaintiffs in intervention, Appellants, v. William J. O'BRIEN, as Auditor of the State of Minnesota, Respondent. No. 42368. Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 24, 1970. Rehearing Denied September 10, 1970. *89 John Knapp, Albany, John J. Todd, South St. Paul, Leif R. Langsjoen, Willmar, for appellants. H. Blair Klein, Senate Counsel, and Bruce D. Campbell, Asst. Senate Counsel, Thomas Clifford, Director of Research, House of Rep., St. Paul, for Coleman et al. Douglas Head, Atty. Gen., Richard H. Kyle, Sol. Gen., James M. Kelley, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent. Greer Lockhart, James L. Hetland, Minneapolis, amicus curiae. KNUTSON, Chief Justice. This is an action for a declaratory judgment to determine the constitutionality of L.1969, c. 1125, passed by the Legislature during the last session. The facts, which are not in dispute, have been stipulated. Plaintiff-appellants, John Knapp, John J. Todd, and Leif R. Langsjoen, are duly appointed members of the Minnesota Tax Court. Intervenor-appellants Nicholas D. Coleman, Stanley W. Holmquist, and Gordon Rosenmeier are members of the Minnesota Senate; intervenor-appellants Aubrey W. Dirlam, Robert W. Johnson, and Martin O. Sabo are members of the Minnesota House of Representatives. Respondent, William J. O'Brien, is the auditor for the State of Minnesota. The Senate and House of Representatives convened in regular session on Tuesday, January 7, 1969. L.1969, c. 1125, was introduced in the House of Representatives on March 6, 1969, as H.F. 1448. The bill would have changed the compensation of members of the Tax Court from a perdiem to a calendar-year basis. The House of Representatives gave final approval to this bill on May 22, 1969, and the Senate, on May 26, 1969, the day on which each house individually adjourned sine die. On May 26 both houses convened for the transaction of business. The House of Representatives, with but one recess, proceeded with its business to adjournment sine die. The Senate, after transacting some of its business, recessed and reconvened at 2 p. m. After its recess, the Senate gave final approval to H.F. 1448 and sent it to the officers of the House of Representatives for enrollment and transmittal to the governor. H.F. 1448 was received by the officers of the House of Representatives after the house had adjourned sine die. The Journal of the Senate shows that May 26, 1969, was the 102nd day of actual sessions. The members of the Tax Court have demanded that the state auditor recognize and implement the provisions of L.1969, c. 1125, but the auditor has refused to do so and has communicated his intention to persist in such refusal until validity of the act has been determined by the courts. The constitutional provisions involved are Minn.Const. art. 4, § 1, which states: and art. 4, § 22, which provides: On the basis of the stipulation of facts, the trial court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that L.1969, c. 1125, was passed by the Senate after the expiration of the 120 legislative days exclusive of Sundays permitted by the constitution and was therefore unconstitutional and void. This appeal followed. The question raised here is what is a legislative day within the meaning of Minn. Const. art. 4, § 1. Appellants contend that "legislative day" means any day on which the Legislature actually meets, while respondent contends that a legislative day is any day on which the Legislature may meet, which includes each calendar day from the day of convening, excluding only Sundays. Appellants and amici curiae devote most of their briefs and arguments to the desirability of a more flexible legislative session in order to more efficiently cope with the growing complexities of legislative work, but they do not come to real grips with the decisive issue involved. From a policy standpoint we might well agree that there is much merit in these arguments, but that is not before us. The present constitutional provision came into being by amendment of the constitution in 1962. The constitution belongs to the people. They have adopted it and they alone can amend it. Neither the Legislature nor this court has any right to bypass the people under the guise of a liberal interpretation which in effect would amend the constitution, no matter how desirable the amendment might be. The historical record of the adoption of our constitution and the amendments pertinent to the issue before us may shed some light on a determination of what the people intended when they brought about the amendment of art. 4 in 1962. Originally, art. 4, § 1, simply provided that the Legislature should meet "at such times as shall be prescribed by law." No limitation on the length of the session was provided. Within 3 years after the adoption of the constitution, this provision was amended by adding to § 1 the clause "but no session shall exceed the term of sixty days."[1] In 1873 two amendments were proposed, one of which would have established a system of biennial sessions and limited them to 70 days; the other would have made the terms of representatives and senators 2 and 4 years respectively.[2] Both of these proposed amendments were defeated by the people. In 1877 they were resubmitted, with the modification that the sessions were not to exceed 60 days. This time they were adopted.[3] Apparently the 60-day term was insufficient to permit completion of the *91 Legislature's work. In 1881 the Legislature proposed that the time limit be entirely removed, but this was defeated by the people.[4] In 1888 an amendment was adopted under which biennial sessions were extended to 90 legislative days with the proviso that "no new bill shall be introduced in either branch, except on the written request of the governor, during the last twenty (20) days of such sessions, except the attention of the legislature shall be called to some important matter of general interest by a special message from the governor."[5] The constitution remained as amended in 1888 until the 1962 amendment. For a history of these amendments, see Anderson, A History of the Constitution of Minnesota, p. 165. In 1905 the legislature requested the opinion of the attorney general as to the last day of the legislative session under the constitution as it then existed. He calculated the number of days the Legislature could constitutionally exist, and stated the following (Journal of the House, 1905, p. 902): At subsequent sessions thereafter, the Legislature has requested the attorney general's opinion as to when the sessions must end. Each time the attorney general has given his opinion based upon the same calculation as in 1905. The Legislature has accepted these opinions as the proper construction of our constitution over all these years. Not only the Legislature but the governor has acted upon the assumption that the computation of time during which the Legislature can legally meet as stated by the attorney general was the correct interpretation of our constitution. In 1959 the Legislature convened on January 6 and adjourned sine die on April 21 pursuant to the advice of the attorney general. Governor Freeman called the Legislature into special session beginning on April 25, 1959. The extra session adjourned sine die July 1, 1959. In 1961 the Legislature adjourned sine die April 17 pursuant to the advice of the attorney general. The governor called the Legislature into special session on April 24 and in so doing said in part: It may be of some significance that in the special session thus called in 1961 a proposal was made to amend the constitution to extend the term of the Legislature to 120 days.[6] So far as material it reads: That proposal was adopted by the people in 1962 and is the provision of the constitution now before us. If a proposed amendment of the constitution is to be submitted to the people, Minn. St. 3.21 requires the attorney general to furnish an interpretation of what the effect of the amendment will be. The pertinent portions of this statute read: This requirement came into being in 1887.[7] It has existed, substantially as originally enacted, since that time. It is evident that the Legislature has been mindful of the fact that frequently people who are not educated in law do not understand the legal terminology of a proposed constitutional amendment and, for that reason, has required that the attorney general explain it to them so they understand what they are *93 voting on. Pursuant to this legislative mandate the attorney general, in explaining the proposed amendment to be voted on in 1962, said: The same is true of the amendment adopted in 1888 when the words "legislative day" first came into existence. In informing the electorate what the amendment would accomplish, as required by the statute adopted in 1887, the attorney general stated among other things: That is what the people voted on. There is no indication, either in the proposed amendments of 1888 and 1962 or in the explanation of either by the attorney general, that the interpretation theretofore placed upon art. 4, § 1, should be changed, except to extend the sessionfirst from 60 to 90 days, and then from 90 to 120 days. Inasmuch as the term "legislative days" was not used in the attorney general's statement involving either the 1888 amendment or the 1962 amendment, it can hardly be contended, we believe, that the people had in mind changing the manner of computing the number of days during which the Legislature could be in session. After the 1962 amendment, the Legislature in 1963, 1965, 1967, and 1969 continued to ask the attorney general for his opinion as to the duration of the session. In all but the 1969 session the Legislature concurred in that opinion. In 1967 the Legislature convened on January 3. They adjourned on May 22, which was the 102nd day of actual legislative sessions and is so shown by the Senate journal. As had been done by governors prior to the 1962 amendment, immediately after adjournment Governor LeVander called an extra session, to convene on Tuesday, May 23, 1967, at 2 p. m. The House and Senate adjourned on June 2, 1967, after 8 days of legislative meetings during which they completed work they were unable to complete within the session as advised by the attorney general. While the argument that practical construction of the constitution does not have a binding force may be of some validity where the matter involved includes only an interpretation of language that may have an ambiguous meaning, in City of Faribault v. Misener, 20 Minn. 396, 401, Gil. 347, 352, we said: Here there is no question but that the Legislature, the attorney general, and several governors have interpreted art. 4, § 1, to mean that the Legislature may not meet in regular session more than 120 calendar days, now excluding Sundays. Formerly, holidays were also excluded, but Minn. St. 645.44, subd. 5, was amended in 1959 to provide that "[n]o public business shall be transacted on any holiday, except in cases of necessity and except in cases of public business transacted by the legislature." Since that time only Sundays have been excluded *94 from the computation of the length of the legislative session. In view of this long legislative history, how can it be said that the people intended to ignore it when voting on the constitutional amendment in 1962? Appellants rely on several foreign cases that construe the words "legislative days" to mean what appellants and amici curiae would like us now to construe them to mean.[9] There are also cases holding that long acceptance of a practice is entitled to great weight.[10] We do not believe these foreign decisions are binding upon us and we conclude it would be contrary to the understanding of the people to hold that they intended to accomplish in 1962 what appellants now seek to have us ordain by judicial decision instead of by constitutional amendment. It goes without saying that the people generally were unfamiliar with these foreign decisions when they voted on the amendment. To the contrary, it must be assumed that they relied on the attorney general's explanation of the effect of the amendment. Kentucky, confronted with the same problem, attempted to amend its constitution. The pertinent portion of section 42 of the Kentucky constitution provides: The section does not say whether "legislative days" are consecutive calendar days, so an amendment to the constitution was proposed to clarify its meaning. The proposed amendment, although rejected by the voters, stated: Our Legislature could easily have submitted a similar amendment to the people or, as has been done in prior years, the governor could have called a special session *95 following the adjournment of the Legislature during which the bill now under consideration could validly have been passed. We do not speculate on why he did not do so. Had a constitutional amendment been proposed in 1969 it could have been voted on in 1970 and, if approved by the people, could have become operative by the time the next session convenes. We are not persuaded that we should take from the people their prerogative to pass on this matter. From the legislative history of this provision of our constitution, particularly the defeat of some of the proposed constitutional amendments, it is apparent that the people were not always in favor of unlimited sessions of the Legislature. The trial court came to the right conclusion and must be affirmed. In view of our decision on the decisive issue of the case, we do not reach the other questions raised by the appeal. Affirmed. KELLY, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] L.1860, c. 22. [2] L.1873, c. 3. [3] L.1877, c. 1. [4] L.1881, c. 2. See, Anderson, A History of the Constitution of Minnesota, p. 165. [5] L.1887, c. 3. [6] Ex.Sess.L.1961, c. 100. [7] L.1887, c. 157. [8] The original attorney general's statement which the law requires be filed in the office of the secretary of state has been lost, but a published copy of the statement, as also required by law may be found in the St. Paul Pioneer Press of October 12, 1888, preserved by the Minnesota State Historical Society. [9] The two most widely cited authorities defining a legislative day are Moog v. Randolph, 77 Ala. 597, and Opinions of the Justices, 216 Ala. 545, 113 So. 621. In the Moog case the court construed the length of the legislative session exactly contrary to that which has been followed in Minnesota for many years. The court said (77 Ala. 608): "This question [length of the legislative session] has been repeatedly considered by the judiciary committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, at successive sessions of the General Assembly, since the adoption of the Constitution; and their reports, concurring in this view, have in each instance been adopted by those bodies. Even if we regarded the question a doubtful one, we would hesitate to depart from this settled legislative construction of the fundamental law, especially in view of the serious consequences which would necessarily flow from it." As a matter of fact, since the court adhered to well-established construction, the case really supports respondent's position rather than appellants'. See, also, Cheyney v. Smith, 3 Ariz. 143, 23 P. 680; Shaw v. Carter, 148 Okla. 57, 297 P. 273; Okanogan, Methon, San Poelis (or San Poie), Nespelem, Colville, and Lake Indian Tribes or Bands of State of Washington v. United States, 279 U.S. 655, 49 S. Ct. 463, 73 L. Ed. 894; White v. Hinton, 3 Wyo. 753, 30 P. 953. [10] Walker v. Baker, 145 Tex. 121, 196 S.W.2d 324; State ex rel. White v. Grant Superior Court, 202 Ind. 197, 172 N.E. 897, 71 A.L.R. 1354; State ex rel. Heck's Discount Centers, Inc. v. Winters, 147 W.Va. 861, 132 S.E.2d 374, which contains an interesting discussion of the practice of stopping or covering the clock at midnight.