Case Title: Teagle v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 496, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
TERRENCE TEAGLE,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 496, 2006 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0510015293 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  March 7, 2007 
Decided:  April 4, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 4th day of April, 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
Appellant-defendant Terrence Teagle appeals a Superior Court 
judge’s denial of his motion to withdraw his no contest pleas to robbery in the first 
degree and other related crimes.  Teagle argues that there is a “fair and just reason” 
to allow him to withdraw his pleas before sentencing under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 32(d) because his lawyer and the trial judge incorrectly advised him 
that he faced nine years minimum imprisonment if he accepted a proffered plea 
agreement when in fact he would be subject to eleven years. 
(2) 
After consideration of the record, it appears that Teagle’s lawyer and a 
Superior Court judge incorrectly informed him that he faced a minimum of nine 
 
2
years imprisonment when, in fact, he faced eleven years minimum imprisonment.  
The State, however, entered a nolle prosequi on one of the robbery charges, 
reducing Teagle’s minimum prison term to eight years, one year less than that to 
which he agreed under the plea agreement.  Thus, although there was a procedural 
defect in the plea agreement related to the minimum prison term, the State cured 
that defect when it dropped a single robbery count.  Teagle knowingly and 
voluntarily consented to the plea agreement with an understanding that he faced 
nine years imprisonment and, tellingly, does not assert his innocence.  Any 
complaint that defense counsel may have inadequately represented him throughout 
the proceedings is cured by the revised charges, and the trial judge found that 
granting Teagle’s motion would cause prejudice to the criminal justice system and 
unduly inconvenience the trial court.  Therefore, we hold that the Superior Court 
judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied Teagle’s motion to withdraw his 
no contest pleas.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
(3) 
On October 20, 2005, the police arrested Teagle after he allegedly 
committed an armed robbery the previous day.  In December 2005, a Sussex 
County grand jury indicted Teagle on two counts of robbery in the first degree, two 
counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and one count 
of possession of ammunition by a person prohibited.  The State later entered a 
 
3
nolle prosequi on one of the counts of possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony.   
(4) 
On March 10, 2006, the State moved to declare Teagle a habitual 
offender on the charge of possession of ammunition by a person prohibited.  That 
same day, at final case review, Teagle refused to accept a plea agreement.  On 
March 15, the morning his trial was scheduled to begin, Teagle changed his mind 
and accepted a plea agreement that required him to plead no contest to the 
remaining charges.  During his plea colloquy, Teagle acknowledged that there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty of each charge.  Teagle also 
indicated that he was satisfied with his lawyer and that no one had pressured him 
into accepting the agreement.  Teagle accepted it because, as he said, “I’d rather go 
and take the plea bargain, you know, than fac[e] a whole bunch of time on my 
hand.”  A Superior Court judge accepted Teagle’s no contest pleas and scheduled 
sentencing for May 12.  
(5) 
Before his sentencing, Teagle realized that his defense counsel and the 
Superior Court judge had incorrectly informed him about the length of the 
minimum prison term.  Because of his previous felony convictions, the charge for 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony actually carried a 
minimum prison term of five years, and not three.  Therefore, he actually faced a 
minimum of eleven years imprisonment, rather than the nine stated in his plea 
 
4
agreement.  On May 5, 2006, Teagle moved to withdraw his no contest pleas under 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d).  
(6) 
On August 25, 2006, a Superior Court judge held an evidentiary 
hearing on the motion to withdraw.  The judge stated that “the information that was 
given to the Court and Mr. Teagle at the time of the plea [was] that it was a nine 
year minimum, when in fact it was eleven.”  To correct this defect, the State 
entered a nolle prosequi on one of the robbery charges, reducing Teagle’s 
minimum prison term from eleven years to eight.  Thus, the State reduced the 
minimum term to an amount less than the nine years to which he agreed under the 
plea agreement.  The State entered the nolle prosequi on the robbery charge a 
result undoubtedly favorable to Teagle.  Teagle did not object and the nolle 
prosequi substantially cured any defect in the plea agreement.  The judge then 
denied Teagle’s motion to withdraw in an oral ruling, and later sentenced Teagle to 
twenty years imprisonment, followed by descending levels of  probation.   
(7) 
Teagle’s only argument on appeal is that there was a “fair and just 
reason” to allow him to withdraw his no contest pleas under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 32(d) because both his counsel and the court incorrectly advised 
him about the minimum prison term.  Teagle contends that during a plea colloquy a 
Superior Court judge is required to correctly advise the defendant of the minimum 
prison term.  Therefore, Teagle contends that, because his lawyer and the judge did 
 
5
not accurately advise him of the minimum term, the judge should have permitted 
him to withdraw his pleas.  We review the judge’s denial of Teagle’s motion to 
withdraw for abuse of discretion.1   
(8) 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d) provides that “[i]f a motion for 
withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made before imposition or 
suspension of sentence or disposition without entry of a judgment of conviction, 
the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of 
any fair and just reason.”2  To determine whether a “fair and just reason” exists, a 
Superior Court judge considers the following factors: 
(i) whether there was a procedural defect in taking the plea; (ii) 
whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to the 
plea agreement; (iii) whether the defendant has an adequate basis to 
assert his legal innocence; (iv) whether the defendant had adequate 
legal counsel throughout the proceedings; and (v) whether granting 
the motion will prejudice the State or unduly inconvenience the trial 
court.3   
 
(9) 
After carefully reviewing the record, we find that the judge did not 
abuse his discretion when he denied Teagle’s motion to withdraw his no contest 
pleas.  Although there was a procedural defect related to the minimum prison term, 
the State cured that defect when it entered the nolle prosequi on the robbery 
                                                 
1  
Patterson v. State, 684 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Del. 1996) (“A motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.  The denial of such a motion is generally 
reviewable only for abuse of discretion.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 
2  
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 32(d) (emphasis added). 
 
3  
Lane v. State, 2006 Del. LEXIS 663, at *4 (Order); Patterson, 684 A.2d at 1238. 
 
6
charge, thereby reducing the minimum term to eight years, one year less than that 
to which Teagle had agreed under the plea agreement.   
(10) Moreover, in his oral ruling denying Teagle’s motion to withdraw, the 
judge noted that, during the plea colloquy, Teagle indicated his understanding of 
the terms of the plea agreement and stated that no one had forced him or threatened 
him into entering the agreement.  Teagle also indicated that he was satisfied with 
his attorney.  Based on Teagle’s representations, the judge concluded that Teagle 
knowingly and voluntarily consented to the plea agreement, and that his attorney 
had provided adequate legal counsel throughout the proceedings.  With respect to 
whether Teagle had an adequate basis to assert his legal innocence, the judge stated 
that the evidence against Teagle was significant, and he noted that Teagle 
acknowledged that the evidence was sufficient to convict him.  Finally, the judge 
found that were he to grant Teagle’s motion, it would prejudice the criminal justice 
system and present an undue inconvenience to the Superior Court.  Therefore, the 
judge concluded that Teagle had not established a “fair and just reason” to permit 
withdrawal of his no contest pleas.  After consideration of the record, we agree 
with the judge’s reasoning, and hold that he did not abuse his discretion by denying 
Teagle’s motion to withdraw.  Accordingly, we affirm.   
 
7
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice