Case Title: Idaho v. Kralovec

Citation: 

Docket Number: 44250

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2017-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 44250 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
           Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
THOMAS JOHN KRALOVEC, 
 
           Defendant-Appellant. 
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Boise, December 2016 Term 
 
2017 Opinion No. 3 
 
Filed:  January 23, 2017 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of  
Idaho, Ada County.  Hon. Jason D. Scott, District Judge.  Hon. Renae Hoff,  
Senior District Judge. 
 
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. 
 
 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, Boise, for appellant.  Dennis Benjamin  
  
argued. 
 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.  Kenneth K.  
  
Jorgensen argued. 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
HORTON, Justice. 
Thomas Kralovec appeals from his judgment of conviction for one count of battery on a 
correctional officer. I.C. §§ 18-915(2) and 18-903. We affirm. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On February 6, 2014, Kralovec was arrested by Boise City Officer Tad Miller for public 
intoxication and resisting and obstructing arrest. While he was being transported to jail, Kralovec 
was antagonistic. He cursed, insulted, and threatened Officer Miller. Upon arrival at the jail, 
Kralovec was met by Deputies Gary Ambrosek, Ralph Thompson, Luis Torres, and Richard 
Michaelson and taken to a holding cell. 
Kralovec remained combative and non-compliant during the intake process. The four 
deputies took turns restraining Kralovec to search him and remove his handcuffs so that he could 
be left alone in the cell. The deputies placed Kralovec on a concrete bench in the cell in a prone 
position with his legs in a “figure four leg trap” with his face to the wall. At some point during 
 
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the search, Kralovec’s right leg came free and kicked out, knocking a microphone loose from the 
clip on Deputy Ambrosek’s shirt and allegedly striking Deputy Michaelson in the shoulder. The 
incident was recorded by a camera in the holding cell. It is undisputed that Deputy Michaelson’s 
shoulder was injured at some point during the incident; however, the parties disagree as to the 
cause of the injury. 
On April 30, 2014, the State filed an information charging Kralovec with one count of 
battery on a peace officer under Idaho Code sections 18-915(3) and 18-903(a) for striking 
Deputy Michaelson. On October 3, 2014, the State filed an amended information charging 
Kralovec with battery on a correctional officer in violation of Idaho Code sections 18-915(2) and 
18-903. 
On July 2, 2014, the State filed notice of its intent to introduce audio evidence of 
Kralovec’s arrest and transport to jail to show Kralovec’s knowledge and intent pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b). Kralovec objected, arguing that the evidence was either not 
relevant, or its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The district 
court concluded that the evidence was res gestae evidence temporally connected with the alleged 
battery and had a tendency to explain Kralovec’s alleged misbehavior during the booking 
process. The district court further concluded that the evidence was admissible under Idaho Rule 
of Evidence 404(b) as it was relevant to Kralovec’s intent. 
Kralovec’s jury trial took place on October 6–8, 2014. Prior to the trial, Judge Jason Scott 
had presided over the proceedings; however, Senior Judge Renae Hoff presided over the trial. 
During the trial, the State presented testimony from Officer Miller and Deputies Michaelson, 
Torres, Thompson, and Ambrosek, photographic and video evidence taken from the holding cell, 
and an audio recording from Kralovec’s transport to the jail. The jury found Kralovec guilty of 
battery on Deputy Michaelson. 
Following the jury trial, a hearing was held on October 24, 2014, before Judge Scott. The 
record does not contain a transcript of the hearing, but the court minutes show that Kralovec 
requested “for Judge Hoff to do sentencing or in alternative this Court listen to the audio of the 
[jury trial].” The State responded that “[a]ll info this Court needs will be in PSI, [Defendant] can 
argue at sentencing any evidence.” The district court denied the motion to have Judge Hoff 
handle the sentencing hearing; however, the court indicated that Kralovec was free to file a 
 
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written motion if he wanted. The court minutes are silent as to the disposition of Kralovec’s 
request for Judge Scott to listen to the audio recordings of the jury trial. 
Sentencing was held on November 14, 2014. Prior to receiving arguments from the 
parties, Judge Scott inquired if either party wished to submit any further evidence regarding 
sentencing. Neither party submitted additional evidence. The district court imposed a suspended 
five-year sentence, with one year fixed, and placed Kralovec on probation for five years. After 
the sentence was pronounced, Kralovec’s counsel inquired as to the materials Judge Scott had 
reviewed prior to sentencing. Judge Scott explained: 
THE COURT: I have reviewed the entirety of the presentence 
investigation report, and there is an addendum to the presentence report dated 
November 13 of this year. I have reviewed those items. 
And I have my preexisting familiarity with the case from the matters that 
were brought in front of me and in the course of the rulings I made. I will 
acknowledge that I have not reviewed the trial transcript. 
[KRALOVEC’S COUNSEL]: Has Your Honor reviewed the video? 
THE COURT: I have not reviewed the video. 
Kralovec timely appealed and the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed Kralovec’s judgment of conviction and sentence. This Court granted 
Kralovec’s petition for review. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“When this Court hears a case on a petition for review from the Court of Appeals, it 
‘gives serious consideration to the Court of Appeals’ views, but will review the trial court’s 
decision directly,’ and ‘acts as if the appeal was directly from the trial court’s decision.’ ” State 
v. Hansen, 156 Idaho 169, 173, 321 P.3d 719, 723 (2014) (quoting State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 
170, 172, 307 P.3d 187, 189 (2013)). This Court “will uphold a judgment of conviction entered 
upon a jury verdict so long as there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could conclude that the prosecution proved all essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009) (citing State 
v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Kralovec contends: (1) the State failed to present constitutionally sufficient 
evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the State sustained its 
burden of proving the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the district 
 
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court abused its discretion when it admitted audio evidence of Kralovec’s encounter with Officer 
Miller as res gestae and under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b); and (3) the sentencing judge 
abused his discretion by refusing to review the trial transcripts and exhibits prior to sentencing. 
We address these issues in turn. 
A. The State presented substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could 
conclude that the prosecution proved all essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Kralovec argues his conviction must be vacated and a judgment of acquittal entered 
because the State failed to carry its burden of proof and failed to present sufficient evidence to 
establish that Kralovec kicked or even touched Deputy Michaelson. Kralovec argues that the 
video from the holding cell clearly shows that Kralovec did not kick Deputy Michaelson in direct 
contradiction of Deputy Michaelson’s testimony. Therefore, the State did not present substantial 
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that Kralovec committed battery 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Kralovec also contends that the State failed to present any proof that Kralovec 
intentionally kicked Deputy Michaelson. Kralovec argues that because the deputies had 
Kralovec’s legs in a trap, the State did not and could not present substantial evidence that any 
movement of Kralovec’s legs out of the trap was willfully or intentionally directed toward 
Deputy Michaelson.  
Kralovec’s arguments are predicated on his interpretation of what the video evidence 
shows. Our review of the video evidence leads us to conclude that it is entirely unhelpful in 
determining whether or not Kralovec’s foot struck Deputy Michaelson’s shoulder during the 
incident. Certainly, the video shows some motion and struggling on Kralovec’s part and 
movement of Deputy Michaelson’s body; however, during the vast majority of the relevant 
portion of the video recording, Deputy Michaelson’s body is situated between the camera and 
Kralovec. In short, we are unable to agree with Kralovec’s contention that the video recording 
directly and conclusively refutes Deputy Michaelson’s testimony.  
Kralovec’s contention that the State failed to present any proof that Kralovec 
intentionally kicked Deputy Michaelson is similarly unpersuasive. Idaho Code section 18-903(a) 
defines battery as any: “Willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of 
another.” I.C. § 18-903(a). Idaho Code section 18-101(1) provides: “The word ‘willfully,’ when 
applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or 
 
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willingness to commit the act or make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to 
violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.” I.C. § 18-101(1). 
Here, the State presented more than just the video evidence. Deputy Michaelson testified 
that Kralovec kicked him in the shoulder. Further, the State presented corroborating testimony 
from Officer Miller, Deputies Torres, Thompson, and Ambrosek, as well as photographic and 
video evidence taken from the holding cell and audio evidence from Kralovec’s transport to the 
jail. Kralovec makes no other attempt to explain or refute the testimony or evidence other than 
through his interpretation of the video. We conclude that Kralovec is merely asking this Court to 
substitute its own opinion on the credibility and weight of the evidence for that of the jury. We 
decline to do so.  
On appeal, where a defendant stands convicted, the evidence is viewed in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution and the reviewing court is precluded from 
substituting its judgment for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the 
weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence.  
State v. Allen, 129 Idaho 556, 558, 929 P.2d 118, 120 (1996) (quoting State v. Gardiner, 127 
Idaho 156, 163, 898 P.2d 615, 622 (Ct. App. 1995)). We hold that the State presented substantial 
evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the State proved all essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the audio recording of 
Kralovec’s transport to the jail as evidence of intent under Idaho Rule of Evidence 
404(b). 
While we reach our decision based on the district court’s Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) 
analysis, we first consider the issue of res gestae. The district court concluded that the audio 
evidence of Kralovec’s transport to jail was res gestae evidence temporally connected with the 
alleged battery and had a tendency to explain Kralovec’s alleged misbehavior during the booking 
process. The district court explained: 
Res gestae evidence is “other acts that occur during the commission of or 
in close temporal proximity to the charged offense which must be described to 
‘complete the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the context of nearby and 
nearly contemporaneous happenings.’ ” State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 18, 878 
P.2d 188, 192 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting 1 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on 
Evidence § 190 at 799 (4th ed. 1992)). It is admissible, despite I.R.E. 404(b)’s 
general prohibition on “prior bad act” evidence, if “the charged act and the 
uncharged act are so inseparably connected that the jury cannot be given a 
rational and complete presentation of the alleged crime without reference to the 
 
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uncharged misconduct.” Id. at 19, 878 P.2d at 193 (holding that the defendant’s 
use of drugs and provision of drugs to his victim shortly before committing the 
alleged sex offense was admissible res gestae evidence). 
The district court concluded that the recording was admissible as res gestae evidence. While the 
district court’s reasoning is sound, we decline to perpetuate the use of the res gestae doctrine in 
Idaho. 
The term res gestae seems to have come into common usage in 
discussions of admissibility of statements accompanying material acts or 
situations in the early 1800s. At this time, the theory of hearsay was not well 
developed, and the various exceptions to the hearsay rule were not clearly 
defined. In this context, the phrase res gestae served as a convenient vehicle for 
escape from the hearsay rule in two primary situations. First, it was used to 
explain the admissibility of statements that were not hearsay at all. Second, it was 
used to justify the admissibility of . . . (1) statements of present sense impressions, 
(2) excited utterances, and (3) statements of present bodily condition, mental 
states, and emotions. 
2 McCormick On Evid. § 268 (7th ed.) (footnotes omitted).1 In 1979, the Board of 
Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar appointed the Idaho Evidence Committee (Committee) to 
review the Idaho law of evidence and rules of evidence from other jurisdictions and draft rules of 
evidence for Idaho. M. Clark, Report of the Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee, Preface, p. 1 
(revised 1985). In the commentary to its recommendation for the adoption of Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 803, the Committee found that “Idaho does not have a statute or rule allowing 
admission of statements, otherwise hearsay, as present sense impressions. However, Idaho case 
law does recognize the doctrine of res gestae which serves to admit many of the statements.” M. 
Clark, Report of the Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee, C 803, p. 2 (revised 1985). Similarly, 
the Committee determined that “Idaho has no statute or rule providing for the excited utterance 
exception. The exception has, however, been recognized and applied by the Idaho courts and is 
generally discussed in terms of res gestae.” M. Clark, Report of the Idaho State Bar Evidence 
Committee, C 803, p. 3 (revised 1985). 
The commentary to sections 803(1)–(3) shows that the Committee considered them to 
encompass the admissibility of evidence through various exceptions to the rule against hearsay 
                                                 
1 One commentator provided a less charitable description of reliance on the doctrine: “The marvelous capacity of a 
Latin phrase to serve as a substitute for reasoning, and the confusion of thought inevitably accompanying the use of 
inaccurate terminology, are nowhere better illustrated than in the decisions dealing with the admissibility of 
evidence as ‘res gestae.’ ” 2 McCormick On Evid. § 268 (7th ed.) (quoting Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested 
Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 Yale L.J. 229, 229 (1922)). 
 
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which were previously allowed under the loosely defined doctrine of res gestae. Based on this 
and the subsequent shift away from the doctrine in favor of the Rules of Evidence, we conclude 
that evidence previously considered admissible as res gestae is only admissible if it meets the 
criteria established by the Idaho Rules of Evidence.  
The district court provided an alternative basis for its conclusion that the audio evidence 
was admissible, holding that it was admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) as evidence 
of Kralovec’s intent. Kralovec argues the audio evidence did not indicate Kralovec intended to 
batter Deputy Michaelson, rather, the evidence simply showed that Kralovec was an obnoxious 
person. Kralovec further contends that the audio’s “limited probative value is far outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice.” Kralovec argues that his frequent use of profanity and threats of 
violence against Officer Miller created prejudice against Kralovec and in favor of the law 
enforcement officers. Kralovec concludes that this “prejudice was so great that it rendered the 
audio inadmissible under IRE 403.” We disagree.  
This Court reviews questions regarding the admissibility of evidence using 
a mixed standard of review. First, whether the evidence is relevant is a matter of 
law that is subject to free review. Second, we review the district court’s 
determination of whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect for an abuse of discretion.  
State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907, 354 P.3d 462, 469 (2015) (internal citations omitted). “The 
district court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence, and its decision to 
admit such evidence will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.” 
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). “We determine whether the 
district court abused its discretion by examining: (1) whether the court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently within the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Ehrlick, 158 Idaho at 907, 354 P.3d at 469. 
Kralovec does not attempt to explain how the district court abused its discretion2 by 
admitting the evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b). We do not find this to be 
surprising, given the district court’s reasoned analysis: 
                                                 
2 We note that this Court has seen an increasing number of cases where a party completely fails to address the 
factors we consider when evaluating a claimed abuse of discretion. We emphasize that when a party “does not 
contend that the district court failed to perceive the issue as one of discretion, that the district court failed to act 
within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it or that the district court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason,” such a conclusory 
 
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Alternatively, it is admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) even if not res gestae 
evidence. “Prior bad act” evidence “is not admissible to prove the character of the 
person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” I.R.E. 
404(a). It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as to show the 
person’s intent. I.R.E. 404(b). A person’s prior bad act can be admitted into 
evidence if (i) the evidence shows it actually occurred, (ii) it is relevant to a 
material and disputed issue, other than the person’s propensity to commit the 
charged crime, and (iii) it survives the I.R.E. 403 balancing test. E.G., State v. 
Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009). Item (i) is not at issue here; 
Kralovec does not deny the recording is of him interacting with Officer Miller. 
Kralovec disputes that he intended to batter Deputy Michaelson. The State 
contends the recording is probative of his intent in that regard, given the threats he 
leveled against Officer Miller before arriving at the Ada County Jail. The State’s 
argument, in essence, is that the threats leveled against Officer Miller are 
generalized threats against law-enforcement officers (rather than personalized 
threats against Officer Miller) and that they provide a window into Kralovec’s 
state of mind at the time of the alleged battery against Deputy Michaelson, having 
shortly preceded it. The Court agrees that the recording is relevant to the issue of 
intent, given the threats against Officer Miller and given Kralovec’s belligerent 
refusal to accept that public drunkenness is grounds for his arrest. Thus, item (ii) 
of the above test is satisfied. 
Item (iii) also is satisfied. The recording is, again, probative of Kralovec’s 
intent. Intent is a key issue in this case; the Court understands Kralovec will 
defend the case by contending he did not mean to kick Deputy Michaelson. His 
position in that regard is undermined by evidence showing that, shortly 
beforehand, he repeatedly threatened his arresting officer with physical violence 
and repeatedly and belligerently challenged the propriety of his arrest. That 
recording is undoubtedly prejudicial to Kralovec, given his loutish recorded 
behavior. But its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. Accordingly, the recording survives the I.R.E. 403 balancing 
test. 
The record demonstrates that the district court explicitly evaluated the probative value of the 
evidence and weighed it against the danger of unfair prejudice as required by Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 403. Kralovec has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion when it 
admitted the audio recording of Kralovec’s conduct while being transported to the jail. 
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to review the trial transcript 
and exhibits prior to sentencing. 
Kralovec argues the district court abused its discretion by refusing to review the trial 
transcripts and exhibits prior to sentencing. Kralovec supports his argument by directing us to 
                                                                                                                                                             
argument is “fatally deficient” to the party’s case. Cummings v. Stephens, 160 Idaho 849, 855, 380 P.3d 168, 174 
(2016). “We will not consider assignments of error not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief.” 
Id. 
 
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State v. Izagurre, 145 Idaho 820, 186 P.3d 676 (Ct. App. 2008). In Izagurre, the district court 
was unwilling to consider articles from professional journals on brain development that were 
submitted in support of a Rule 35 motion. Id.at 824, 186 P.3d at 880. The Court of Appeals held 
the trial court abused its discretion when it unduly limited the information it considered. Id. 
Kralovec analogizes a district court’s unwillingness to consider evidence presented in support of 
a Rule 35 motion to the district court sentencing Kralovec without reading the transcript of the 
jury trial. We do not find the analogy to be apt. In Izagurre, the district court erred by refusing to 
consider evidence offered by the defendant; here, the alleged error is based upon a failure to 
consider evidence that the defendant did not offer.  
“We have stated that a ‘sentencing judge is entitled to consider a wide range of relevant 
evidence when he evaluates what the appropriate sentence for each particular defendant he 
sentences must be.’ ” State v. Dunlap, 125 Idaho 530, 535, 873 P.2d 784, 789 (1993) (quoting 
Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 214, 731 P.2d 192, 209 (1986)). “Due process is violated when a 
sentence is based on materially false or unreliable information.” State v. Sivak, 127 Idaho 387, 
391, 901 P.2d 494, 498 (1995). This Court has held that certain conditions must be satisfied in 
order to insure the reliability and fairness of a sentencing or probation disposition: 
(1) that the defendant be afforded a full opportunity to present favorable evidence; 
(2) that the defendant be afforded a reasonable opportunity to examine all the 
materials contained in the pre-sentence investigation report; (3) that the defendant 
be afforded a full opportunity to explain and rebut adverse evidence. 
State v. Moore, 93 Idaho 14, 17, 454 P.2d 51, 54 (1969). 
We observe that Kralovec frames the issue as the district court’s refusal to review the 
trial transcripts and exhibits prior to sentencing. The record does not support this claim. 
Following Kralovec’s jury trial, a hearing was held before Judge Scott and the court minutes 
from that hearing show that Kralovec requested “for Judge Hoff to do sentencing or in 
alternative this Court listen to the audio of the [jury trial].” The minutes show Judge Scott denied 
the motion to have Judge Hoff handle the sentencing hearing; however, Judge Scott indicated 
that Kralovec was free to file a written motion if he wanted and the State argued all relevant 
evidence was either contained in the presentence investigation report or could be presented at 
sentencing. Kralovec did not file an additional motion. At the time of Kralovec’s request, the 
trial transcript had not been prepared.3 Thus, Kralovec was asking the district court to listen to 
                                                 
3 The record reflects that the trial transcript was not signed by the court reporter until April 6, 2015. 
 
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three days of trial audio. This was an unreasonable request and it was not an abuse of discretion 
for the district court to deny it. The record does not show that Kralovec ever requested the 
district court to consider the exhibits admitted at trial. 
The record demonstrates that Kralovec was given every opportunity to present any 
evidence that he wished for Judge Scott to consider in connection with his sentencing. In 
addition to the earlier invitation to file an appropriate motion, prior to hearing the parties’ 
sentencing arguments, Judge Scott inquired if Kralovec wished to submit any further evidence. 
Kralovec offered none.  
Although it is a far better practice for the judge that presided over a trial to sentence the 
defendant, it is not per se reversible error for a different judge to pronounce sentence. Based on 
the record before this Court, we conclude that Kralovec was (1) “afforded a full opportunity to 
present favorable evidence;” (2) “afforded a reasonable opportunity to examine all the materials 
contained in the pre-sentence investigation report;” and, (3) “afforded a full opportunity to 
explain and rebut adverse evidence.” Moore, 93 Idaho at 17, 454 P.2d at 54. Here, Kralovec 
failed to take advantage of the opportunity to submit evidence to the district court that he now 
wishes the district court had considered prior to sentencing. This was not an error by the trial 
court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm Kralovec’s judgment of conviction. 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices EISMANN, W. JONES and Justice Pro Tem J. 
JONES, CONCUR.