Case Title: James Franklin Rose v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC94-317

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC94317
____________
JAMES FRANKLIN ROSE,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[April 5, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the
death penalty upon James Franklin Rose.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(1),
Fla. Const.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and
sentence of death.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
James Franklin Rose was indicted for the kidnapping and first-degree murder
of eight-year-old Lisa Berry in November 1976.  Rose’s first trial resulted in a
1Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
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mistrial because the jury could not reach a verdict.  On retrial, he was convicted of
both counts and sentenced to life on the kidnapping count and death on the murder
count.  This Court affirmed both of his convictions but vacated the death sentence. 
See Rose v. State, 425 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1982).  The Court found the trial court
erred during the penalty phase in giving an improper “dynamite” or “Allen charge”1
after the jury sent the following note to the judge: “We are tied six to six, and no
one will change their mind at the moment.  Please instruct us.”  We held that the
trial court erred in failing to recognize that where seven jurors fail to vote to
recommend death, the jury recommendation is for life.  The case was remanded for
a resentencing.  See id. at 525.
At resentencing the new jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of
eleven to one, and the trial court sentenced Rose to death.  This Court affirmed the
sentence.  See Rose v. State, 461 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1984).  Following the Governor’s
subsequent issuance of a death warrant, Rose petitioned this Court for a writ of
habeas corpus and a motion to stay his execution, asserting, among others, claims
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  This Court denied relief.  See Rose
v. Dugger, 508 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1987).  Thereafter, Rose filed a motion for
postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, alleging
2Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
3Though Rose enumerates twenty separate issues, we address all of his
claims in the following seventeen issues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State
to present gruesome photographic evidence; (2) the State violated Brady v.
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ineffective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. 
The trial court summarily denied the motion without conducting an evidentiary
hearing but this Court reversed, and directed the trial court to hold an evidentiary
hearing.  See Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1992).  
After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court again denied all relief. 
Thereafter, this Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel at the guilt phase.  See Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567 (Fla.
1996); however, we reversed the trial court’s ruling with regard to the penalty phase
ineffectiveness of counsel and remanded for a new sentencing.  See id. at 569. 
Pursuant to this Court’s reversal, a new jury was selected and penalty phase
proceedings were held.  At the close of this latest penalty phase, the jury
recommended death by a vote of nine to three.  After the jury’s recommendation,
sentencing memoranda were submitted by the parties and victim impact evidence
was presented to the judge at a Spencer2 hearing.  On February 13, 1998, the trial
court sentenced Rose to death.  Rose now appeals and raises seventeen issues for
review in this appeal from his sentencing.3
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), in its late release of autopsy photographs; (3) the
trial court erred in failing to rule following a hearing held pursuant to Richardson v.
State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971), concerning the late discovery of the Brady
material; (4) prosecutorial comments made during closing arguments were harmful
to Rose; (5) the State engaged in misconduct in its cross-examination of the
defense’s expert; (6) the trial court erred in allowing the State to elicit testimony
designed to imply that a sexual assault had been committed; (7) the trial court erred
in allowing the State to present evidence of the impermissible age aggravator; (8)
the trial court erred in (a) its consideration and finding of the “prior violent felony”
aggravator and (b) impermissibly doubling this aggravator with the “parole”
aggravator; (9) the trial court erred in finding the kidnapping aggravator; (10) the
trial court erred in finding HAC; (11) the trial court erred in its consideration of
mental mitigation; (12) victim impact testimony was improperly allowed; (13) the
trial court erred by refusing to read nonstatutory mitigators; (14) the sentence is not
proportional; (15) the time spent on death row violates Rose’s constitutional rights;
(16) death by electrocution violates state and federal constitutions; and (17) Rose
deserves a life sentence on the ground of the penalty phase “Allen charge” issue
from his original trial.
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FACTS
The essential facts of this case are described in this Court’s opinion on
Rose’s first direct appeal:
     Although circumstantial in nature, the evidence was
sufficient for the jury to have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant, and no other person, kidnapped
and murdered eight-year-old Lisa Berry.  The evidence
reveals that defendant was the last person to be seen with
Lisa at the bowling alley on the night she disappeared.
Barbara Berry, Lisa's mother, was at the bowling alley
with family and friends when defendant arrived shortly
after 9 p.m. on October 22, 1976.  According to Barbara,
defendant joined her and other team members at the
bowling circle where they talked for several minutes.
Shortly after 9:30 p.m., defendant said that he was going
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to the poolroom area of the bowling alley.  Lisa told her
mother that she was going with him.  Defendant and Lisa
were last seen by Lisa's sister Tracy, who testified that
Lisa was outside the front door of the bowling alley and
defendant was standing just inside the front door.
Defendant gave Tracy money for cokes, but when she
returned from the snack bar with the cokes, both
defendant and Lisa were gone.  Upon being informed by
Tracy that she could not find defendant and Lisa, Barbara
attempted to find them.  While looking for them, she was
paged for a telephone call which turned out to be from
defendant.  He asked Barbara the time; she said 10:30. 
He responded that it was 10:23.  He asked what time she
would be finished bowling; she said 11:30. Defendant
was next seen entering the bowling alley at approximately
11:30 p.m.  The medical examiner's testimony established
the time of Lisa's death to be within twenty-four hours
either side of 1 a.m., October 23, 1976.
     The evidence reveals that defendant had a motive for
killing Lisa.  Although he and Lisa's mother had dated for
about nine months, they were no longer dating regularly
because he was extremely jealous about her working in
the bowling alley bar and being around other men.  Lisa's
mother testified that defendant told her that he could hurt
her and that she did not know what he was capable of
doing.  A male friend of Barbara's who was at the
bowling circle when defendant was there was asked by
Lisa if he was going to have breakfast with her and her
mother.  According to testimony at trial, defendant, after
having overheard this conversation had a look on his face
as if to say, "What is going on?"
     Several people present at the bowling alley testified
that when defendant returned at approximately 11:30, he
had a large red spot on his lower right trousers leg.
Expert testimony revealed the spot to be type B blood.
Type B bloodstains also were found on the outside of the
passenger's door of defendant's white van, on the
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passenger's seat, and on the engine cover.  Fingernail
scrapings taken from defendant revealed blood. It was
stipulated in the record that Lisa had type B blood and
that defendant had type A blood.
     At about 11:45 p.m. on the night Lisa disappeared, a
white van was seen behind a Pantry Pride store located
about a quarter of a mile from the bowling alley.
Defendant was seen driving his white van that same night. 
According to testimony at trial, when the search for Lisa
began shortly after defendant's return to the bowling alley
at 11:30, he drove away and returned at least three times. 
Lisa's green sweater and pink pants were found the next
afternoon behind the Pantry Pride. Her pink blouse was
later found in defendant's van. Lisa's nude body was
found four days after her disappearance in a canal
approximately ten miles from the bowling alley.  Her
shoes were found about a mile apart alongside a road
between the canal and the bowling alley.
     A paint-stained hammer was found in the canal about
six feet from Lisa's body.  Defendant was a painter, and
expert testimony revealed that paint samples from the
hammer were similar to paint samples taken from paint
cans in his van.  The medical examiner testified that Lisa's
death resulted from severe head injuries caused by blunt
force.
     Expert witnesses also testified that a green fiber taken
from defendant's clothing after his arrest was consistent
with fibers from Lisa's green sweater found behind the
Pantry Pride and that a crushed hair taken from
defendant's sock was consistent with hair from Lisa's
hairbrush.
     Defendant made numerous inconsistent attempts to
account for his whereabouts on the evening Lisa
disappeared and to explain away certain evidence.
Defendant told Lisa's mother that he was at the Highway
Bar when he telephoned her regarding the time and stated
to her that it was 10:23.  He was uncharacteristically exact
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about the time, and he could be clearly heard without
background noise which, according to testimony, would
not have been possible had he been at the bar when he
telephoned since the band at the bar would have been
playing loudly at that particular time.
     When defendant returned to the bowling alley at 11:30,
he pretended that Lisa was still alive.  Acting as though
Lisa was present at the bowling alley in his visible sight,
he commented to Lisa's mother that Lisa was getting
chubby and asked who was the person with the goatee to
whom Lisa was talking.  When she turned around to see
who defendant was referring to, she saw neither Lisa nor
a person with a goatee.
     After initially denying that the spot on his trousers leg
was blood, defendant later explained that he had cut
himself changing a tire.  Testimony indicated the spare
tire was fully inflated.  He told a police officer that he had
cut his leg while crawling underneath the van to check out
a noise he had heard.  When the officer took defendant to
the area where he claimed to have crawled under the van,
the officer could not find any impressions in the sand that
could have been made by a human body.
     In an attempt to cover the blood spot on his trousers
which was first noticed and called to his attention upon
his return to the bowling alley at 11:30, defendant first
covered it with a whitewash or paint.  Later, after he went
into a restroom, the spot was covered with grease or
some black substance.  Defendant explained to a police
detective that the blood on the seat of his van was from
an injured friend whom he had taken home about two
months earlier.  The friend had type A blood.  The blood
on the seat was type B, the same as Lisa's.
     Defendant, at one point, told police detectives that
Lisa had last been near the van about two weeks prior to
the night of her disappearance.  He later stated that Lisa
had attempted to get into the van earlier that evening and
he told her to get out.  Lisa's mother testified that Lisa
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had not been in defendant's van for about a year.
     Defendant was convicted for the kidnapping and
first-degree murder of Lisa Berry.
Rose, 425 So. 2d at 522-23.
PENALTY PHASE HEARING
In the most recent penalty phase, the State presented evidence through the
medical examiner, Dr. Abdullah Fatteh, relating to the time, cause and manner of the
victim’s death.  He testified that despite the decomposed state of the victim’s
body, he was able to determine that she died of severe head injuries.  The external
injuries included a fracture at the base of her skull and cerebral hemorrhage.  The
nature of the hemorrhage indicated that the blows were sustained while she was still
alive.  He also testified that the injuries to the back of the head were caused by the
side or blunt end of a hammer or possibly by the kicking of the victim’s head by an
adult wearing shoes.  Dr. Fatteh initially testified that death likely occurred within
minutes to no longer than an hour after the injuries.  However, on cross-examination
he stated that she probably died within four to eight minutes.  
Sergeant Dennis Walker, one of the first to arrive at the bowling alley in
response to the missing person call, testified that he encountered Rose and could
smell alcohol about Rose’s body and that Rose “appeared to be under some
influence, but [he] wouldn’t say drunk,” as he was cooperative and polite.  Retired
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Detective Arthur McLellan, who got there at approximately the same time as
Sergeant Walker, testified that he did not smell alcohol about Rose’s person and
felt that Rose was sober.  Detective Edward, who interviewed Rose on October 23,
1976, the day after the killing, testified that Rose told him that he momentarily left
the bowling alley to get a drink at a local bar and then left the bar after getting the
drink.  The bartender on duty, however, testified that she did not see Rose at the
bar that night.  Rose’s former probation officer, Charles Dickun, testified that Rose
and everyone he interviewed who knew Rose indicated that Rose had an alcohol
problem.  Dickun’s testimony, however, did not pertain to the night of the killing. 
Rose presented four witnesses in mitigation.  Three testified about his
personality and good nature.  Judy Greear had known Rose for twenty-four years
and had lived with him in 1975.  She testified that he was a good man and good to
her two children.  She added that although Rose was jealous, she had never
observed any act of violence on his part.  Floyd Templeton, whom Rose worked
for as a painter, testified that Rose was honest, trustworthy, and his best worker. 
Floyd and Mrs. Templeton testified that they trusted Rose with their grandchildren
as he used to always play with them when he came over to their home.
The last witness for Rose, Dr. Jethrow Toomer, a mental health expert,
presented extensive testimony regarding Rose’s troubled history and mental
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problems.  He testified that Rose was born out-of-wedlock and never knew his
biological father, who apparently abandoned him a few months after birth.  Rose’s
subsequent relationship with a stepfather was not supportive or nurturing, but was
in fact hostile and lacking of any emotional support.  Dr. Toomer performed
several mental tests upon Rose and testified that the results suggested the likelihood
of some organic impairment or brain damage, due in part to two head injuries Rose
had suffered from falls, including one from a ladder.  He pointed out that Rose had
always been a slow learner as evinced by the fact that he was retained in fourth,
fifth, and seventh grades of school and then dropped out of school entirely.  Rose
had scored an eighty-nine on an IQ test and Toomer concluded that Rose suffered
the effects of a borderline personality disorder.
On cross-examination, the State undermined many of the points made by Dr.
Toomer regarding Rose’s mental and emotional state before, during, and after the
commission of the murder.  The State brought up the fact that a more recent IQ
test administered to Rose while in prison produced a score of ninety-nine.  The
State also presented Dr. Toomer with psychological reports performed in the
1970's by other doctors.  Two of the reports, performed in 1971 and 1976,
concluded that Rose was a sociopath, while another done in 1973 concluded there
was no evidence of psychosis or acute emotional distress.  Other findings in the
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reports indicated that Rose’s memory was intact, he was an outgoing person, and
he was of average intelligence.  The State also suggested in its questioning that Dr.
Toomer failed to consider important information in arriving at his findings.  For
instance, Dr. Toomer conceded he never talked to any of the doctors who
performed the earlier examinations of Rose.  The State also established the
doctor’s failure to talk to individuals who were close to Rose to get insights on his
personal relationships.
Subsequent to the penalty phase trial and the jury’s recommendation of
death, the court held a Spencer hearing wherein victim impact evidence was
presented by the State.  Ms. Margaret Szabo, the victim’s grandmother, testified
about the hardship involved in having to relive this experience and wondered what
the victim could have become with her intelligence, compassion and personality. 
The other witness, Ms. Berry, the victim’s mother, testified about her perpetual
pain and grief in having to continually go through this process.  She also echoed the
testimony regarding the victim’s intelligence, love, and leadership at such a young
age.  After the hearing, the trial court sentenced Rose to death.
Photographic Evidence
We address first Rose’s claim that reversal is required because the
photographs of the victim were gruesome and prejudicial beyond any value as
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relevant evidence.  
As recently stated in Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 16 (Fla. 2000), relevant
evidence is ordinarily admissible unless it is barred by a rule of exclusion or its
admission fails a balancing test to determine whether the probative value is
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  This standard is equally applicable to
photographs.  See Pangburn v. State, 661 So. 2d 1182, 1188 (Fla. 1995).  Hence,
we have held that autopsy photographs, even when difficult to view, are admissible
to the extent that they fairly and accurately establish a material fact and are not
unduly prejudicial.  See id.  Absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion by the
trial court, a ruling on admissibility of such evidence will not be disturbed.  See
Gudinas v. State, 693 So. 2d 953, 963 (Fla. 1997).
The State presented the testimony of the medical examiner, Dr. Fatteh, who
testified about his findings regarding the crime scene and the manner and cause of
the victim’s death.  As he attempted to explain injuries sustained by the victim, the
State offered two photographs purportedly depicting the injuries, including a
fracture at the base of the victim’s skull.  Defense counsel immediately objected,
asserting that the photographs were unnecessary and irrelevant since the defendant
had already been convicted of the murder.  The trial court allowed the photographs.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s action.  First, we agree
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with the State that the photographs could be used to illustrate the extent of the
victim’s injuries and to familiarize the sentencing jury with the facts of the case. 
See generally Charles W. Erhardt, Florida Evidence § 401.2, at 108 (1999 ed.)
(stating that photographs are admissible both for illustrative and independent
evidentiary value).  After all, this jury was not the jury at the guilt phase which took
place years before the latest sentencing proceedings.  Thus, the State had a proper
interest in familiarizing this new jury with the cause of the victim’s death and the
nature of the fatal wounds.
It appears that the photographs were also relevant to the establishment of the
HAC (heinous, atrocious and cruel) aggravator claimed by the State.  For example,
there was a question as to whether the victim’s skull fracture resulted from a direct
injury or the skull became split after submersion in the canal for several days. 
Consistent with Pangburn, 661 So. 2d at 1188, and Gudinas, 693 So. 2d at 963,
these asserted reasons were sufficient to support the trial court’s rulings and we
find no error.  
Brady Violation
In issue two, Rose argues the State improperly withheld autopsy
photographs until the current proceedings in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963).  Specifically, he argues that the withheld photographs should have
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been disclosed earlier because they would have been relevant in establishing a more
favorable time of death as it relates to the State’s assertion of the HAC aggravator. 
Although this claim appears to constitute a Richardson claim as well as a Brady
issue we find no reversible error under either analysis.
The United States Supreme Court has recently provided the following three-
prong analysis when determining the merits of a Brady violation claim:
The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused,
either because it is exculpatory, or because it is
impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by
the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice
must have ensued. 
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).  With regard to the third prong,
the Court emphasized that prejudice is measured by determining “whether ‘the
favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’”  Id. at 290.  In applying
the foregoing test, the evidence must be considered in the context of the entire
record.  See Sireci v. State, 773 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 2000) (citing Riechmann v. State,
25 Fla. L. Weekly S163 (Fla. Feb. 24, 2000), and Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So.
2d 466, 470 (Fla. 1997)). 
The crux of the controversy here involves the late discovery of photographs
which purportedly depict one of the injuries suffered by the victim.  As previously
4It should be noted that the Brady claim here is limited to penalty phase
issues because the photographs only go to the manner of death, not to identity or
other reasonable doubt-related factors that might have been relevant at the guilt
phase.  Brady, of course, is applicable to both guilt and punishment.  See Strickler,
527 U.S. at 280.
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mentioned, Dr. Fatteh testified that the victim suffered a fracture at the base of her
skull.  In order to illustrate the nature of the injuries, including this fracture, the State
presented Dr. Fatteh’s testimony along with certain photographs, the admissibility
of which was challenged and addressed in issue 1, supra.  However, these
photographs are not at issue in the Brady claim.  The photographs claimed to be a
violation of Brady consist of two sets, one containing two prints of the victim’s
skull, and another containing sixteen other autopsy photographs, totaling in all
eighteen prints.  Rose argues the two-print set could be used to show that the
fracture resulted not from a head injury, but instead from the erosion of that part of
the skull by the work of maggots who had invaded the decaying body in the days
after death. 
Starting with Strickler’s first prong, we agree the photographs were in fact
material in rebutting the State’s evidence of the HAC aggravator.4  To the extent
that these two photographs might have shown that the victim died very quickly,
they might have negated the State’s theory on HAC.  The second prong of Strickler
was met here as well.  These two sets of photographs curiously surfaced in the
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most recent penalty phase.  Because of this late disclosure, the trial court held a
Richardson hearing.  Although it is not altogether clear, the prosecutor testified that
he only became aware of the photographs just a week before the hearing and he
immediately gave copies to Rose’s counsel.  Dr. Robert Hinman and Dr. Joshua
Perper, members of the medical examiner’s office in Broward County who
performed the autopsy at the time of the crime, testified as well.  At some point, Dr.
Perper, who was not totally sure of the existence of a fracture, inquired about the
shots depicting the maggots covering the victim’s head, but could not locate them. 
Dr. Hinman then remembered that negatives were kept at the morgue office, went
there and found the negatives.  
As provided by Strickler, even where the prosecutor does not know about
the existence of the exculpatory material, a suppression may still be deemed to have
occurred if the State’s agents possess the evidence and it is not disclosed.  In this
instance, the medical examiner for the State on this case became aware of the
photographs in the State’s possession but did not disclose them to defense
counsel; thus, for the purposes of analysis the photographs appear to have been
withheld.
However, Strickler’s third and dispositive prong has not been met.  As
asserted, the utility of these photographs would have gone toward establishing
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some time line in rebutting the HAC aggravator.  Nonetheless, it does not seem that
the evidence would have established how long it took for the victim to die beyond
what was estimated by the medical examiner in his testimony.  Even assuming that
the skull fracture resulted from the maggots eating out the particular part of the
victim’s skull and not from a direct impact to the head, it is hard to see how that
establishes a quicker death for the victim.  In other words, the photographs would
have done very little in either confirming or negating Dr. Fatteh’s testimony that the
death occurred within four to eight minutes of the head injuries.
More importantly, as part of the Richardson process, the trial court offered
to allow trial counsel as much time as necessary to go over the two pictures with
Dr. Wright, a defense witness, on manner and cause of death, but counsel refused. 
Counsel appeared concerned that, because of their gruesome nature, the use of the
photographs before the jury would have actually hurt his client.  Accordingly, in
addition to the fact that the photographs were of questionable relevancy to rebut
HAC, the fact that counsel tactically chose not to use this material undermines any
claim of prejudice.  See Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2000) (affirming denial
of postconviction relief where photographic evidence did not put the case in such
5Contrary to the State’s assertion, this Brady claim seems to be properly
before this Court.  Rose brought this matter up below and a Richardson hearing
was held determining whether improprieties were committed.  That was sufficient to
properly preserve this issue.  Nonetheless, as discussed above, the claim is without
merit.
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different light as to undermine confidence in proceeding).5
Failure to Rule Upon Richardson Hearing
In issue three, Rose argues that the trial court erred in failing to rule on the
Richardson issue.  We disagree.  As a general rule, the failure of a party to get a
timely ruling by a trial court constitutes a waiver of the matter for appellate
purposes.  See Richardson v. State, 437 So. 2d 1091, 1094 (Fla. 1983).  As just
mentioned above, the trial court held a hearing regarding the late discovery of the
two sets of photographs.  Although it could not be determined whether the State
wilfully committed improprieties regarding the late discovery of the photographs,
Rose’s counsel realized that the use of these photographs would have at best had
the effect of a double-edged sword because of their gruesome nature.  In a tactical
move, Rose’s counsel decided not to use the photographs and not to call his own
expert despite the trial court’s urging.  Trial counsel’s decision effectively resolved
the matter and any failure of the court to formally rule was rendered harmless.  See
Richardson, 437 So. 2d at 1094.
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Prosecutorial Comments Made During Closing
In issue four, Rose argues the prosecutor engaged in an improper closing
argument in commenting on what he believed the victim might have said.  While we
have cautioned against arguments “imagining” what may have happened to a victim,
we have held that wide latitude is afforded counsel during arguments.  See Moore
v. State, 701 So. 2d 545, 550 (Fla. 1997).  In order to get a new trial on this
ground, the comments “must either deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial
. . . or be so inflammatory that they might have influenced the jury to reach a more
severe verdict than that it would have otherwise.”  Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d
377, 383 (Fla. 1994).  Still, it is within the trial court’s discretion to control the
comments made to a jury and the court’s decision will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion.  See id. 
At closing, the prosecutor commented:
So you know who the last person to see Lisa alive was,
as shown by the evidence?  James Franklin Rose.  And
he takes this little eight-year-old girl in his van to
somewhere.  And don’t you know, drawing on your own
human experience and common sense, she probably
wanted to know where are we going?  My mother’s at the
bowling alley.
(Record on Appeal, Vol. XIV, at 1410-11).  Defense counsel immediately objected
and the trial court sustained the objection.  Trial counsel did not seek a mistrial. 
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We conclude these comments are not so egregious or fundamental as to warrant
reversal.  We conclude the prosecutor's remarks were harmless.  See James v.
State, 695 So. 2d 1229, 1234 (Fla. 1997) ("[W]e conclude that the prosecutor's
poorly phrased comment was a harmless error as there is no possibility that it
contributed to the outcome in this case.").  In addition, this claim is procedurally
barred for Rose’s failure to move for a mistrial after the trial court sustained the
objection.  See James, 695 So. 2d at 1234 (“The issue is preserved if the defendant
makes a timely specific objection and moves for a mistrial.”) (emphasis added). 
This procedural rule is intended to require counsel to act if she believes the error
truly merits an end to the trial.  Counsel did not act here.
Cross-Examination of Rose’s Mental Health Expert
In issue five, Rose argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by
inappropriately discrediting Rose’s mental health expert, Dr. Toomer, during cross-
examination.  Generally, matters affecting the credibility of a witness may be
inquired into on cross-examination.  See Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186, 195-96
(Fla. 1997).  As a form of impeachment, section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1997),
provides, for example, that any party may attack the credibility of a witness by
showing that the witness is biased.  We have in fact recognized a host of matters
upon which cross-examining counsel may inquire in demonstration of bias,
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including, for instance, the frequency with which a defense expert testifies for
capital defendants.  See Henry v. State, 574 So. 2d 66, 71 (Fla. 1991).
During the proceedings below, Dr. Toomer provided lengthy testimony
regarding Rose’s emotional and mental history.  On cross-examination, the State
asked questions relating to Dr. Toomer’s prior testimony for other defendants and
other questions relating to his qualifications.  Contrary to Rose’s arguments, we
conclude the questions asked by the State were within the broad range of
permissible cross-examination.  In fact, this line of questioning is almost identical to
the one in Henry.  See id.  To the extent that this Court found this inquiry relevant
in demonstrating the expert’s bias in Henry, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing the questions here.
State’s Elicitation of Improper Testimony on Sexual Assault
In issue six, Rose argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to
introduce evidence suggesting the decedent had been the victim of a sexual assault. 
Rose states that clearly there was no such evidence and the related testimony
should not have been allowed.  As earlier mentioned, Dr. Fatteh was the State’s
main witness in establishing the cause and manner of death.  At one point, he was
asked by the State about oral, vaginal, and rectal swabs taken from the victim. 
Defense counsel immediately objected and a sidebar was had.  Defense counsel
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was concerned that the State was attempting to present some evidence of sexual
contact to the extent that Dr. Fatteh would testify that though he could not find any
evidence of sexual abuse, he could not exclude the possibility.  The State then
submitted that in a conversation with a detective at the jail, Rose worried: “This is
so bad.  What will everybody think about me because she was raped and
everything.”  The State suggested that though the admissibility of the statement was
doubtful, it was relevant as a proper predicate for HAC.  However, the trial court
disagreed with the State and ruled that the statement along with any other sexual
abuse reference would not be allowed unless the State had a witness that would (1)
establish that there was sexual contact and (2) such contact occurred prior to the
death.  
At issue on appeal is whether the State violated the judge’s rulings through
subsequent inquiries made by the State of Detective Charles Tipton and Detective
Edward King:
[State]: I would like to show you what is in evidence as
State’s Exhibit 6 and State’s Exhibit 7, and ask you if
these appear familiar to you?
[Det. Tipton]: This is the sweater and the slacks that I
took pictures of.
[State]: Okay, sir.  Now, when you took custody of the
slacks, were they in simply the same situation, condition
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they are now?
[Det. Tipton]: Yes.
[State]: Including the zipper?
[Det. Tipton]: Right
(Record on Appeal, Vol. VIII, at 778).  Detective King, who participated in the
questioning of Rose for the murder and who was also the arresting and
investigating officer in Rose’s burglary case in 1969, took the stand for the State. 
The relevant part of his testimony was as follows:
[State]: . . . Do you know if he had been charged with any
other burglaries after the one that you arrested him for?
[Det. King]: My own personal knowledge?
[State]: Yes.
[Det. King]: No.
[State]: Or do you know from any other source?
[Det. King]: Yes.  I heard from other sources that he was
arrested in Wilton Manors.
[State]: Do you know for what?
[Det. King]: Supposedly broke into a -- didn’t break into
the house.  He knew a white female and it was the wife of
a friend of his, supposedly somebody that he knew, and
he went there and apparently took advantage of her and
either tried to rape her or --
6Though the first inquiry seemed proper by itself, combined with Detective
King’s examination, it may be that the State attempted to send some signal about
Rose’s proclivity to commit sexual assault.  In light of the trial court’s earlier ruling
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[Defense counsel]: Objection as to the words “took
advantage of her.”
[Court]:  That’s sustained.
[Defense counsel]: I would move to strike.
[Court]: The jury will disregard that phrase.
[State]:  But you don’t have personal knowledge of that?
[Det. King]: I don’t have much information.  I just heard
that he was involved in a possible rape there.
[Defense counsel]: Objection to “possible rape,” Judge.
[Court]: Next question.
(Record on Appeal, Vol. IX, at 932-33).  As shown above, counsel objected only
to Detective King’s examination, and therefore his claim relating to Detective
Tipton’s testimony was not preserved.  See J.B. v. State, 705 So. 2d 1376, 1378
(Fla. 1998) (holding that except where a fundamental error exists, to raise an error
on appeal, a contemporaneous objection is required at the trial level when the
alleged error occurred).  Similarly, the objections made during King’s testimony
appear inadequate to preserve the issue for appeal.  In any case, after examining the
challenged testimony, we find any error to be harmless at most.6 
about staying away from this issue, this line of questioning may have been risky on
the part of the State.  However, by itself, this was harmless.  See James, 695 So. 2d
at 1234.
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Ex Post Facto Violation in Use of Aggravator
In issue seven, Rose argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to
present evidence of and rely upon the aggravator that the victim was twelve years
old pursuant to section 921.141(5)(1), Florida Statutes (1997).  He contends that
this aggravator was enacted well after the commission of the crime and the trial. 
Thus, the introduction of this aggravator and consideration by the jury constitutes a
violation of ex post facto principles, requiring a new penalty phase or alternatively a
reduction of his sentence to life.  
Below, the State was allowed to argue that “the victim of the capital felony
was a person less than twelve years of age.”  § 921.141(5)(l), Fla. Stat. (1997). 
Rose unsuccessfully objected to this aggravator on the ground that it was enacted
in 1995, well after the crime was committed in 1976, and therefore, its introduction
violates ex post facto principles.  In fact, soon after Rose’s sentencing, we issued
State v. Hootman, 709 So. 2d 1357, 1360 (Fla. 1998), holding, consistent with
Rose’s arguments at resentencing, that the retroactive application of an aggravator
indeed constitutes an ex post facto violation and is therefore impermissible. 
Immediately after the release of Hootman, Rose filed with the trial court
-26-
Defendant’s Second Motion to Correct Sentencing Error pursuant to Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) or Motion for New Sentencing Hearing.  After full
consideration of the crime, the trial court performed a harmless error analysis and
held that in light of the remaining aggravating circumstances, death was still the
proper sentence and the invocation of the improper aggravator had had no possible
effect on the sentencing proceedings.  
Recently in Lukehart v. State, 762 So. 2d 482, 501 (Fla. 2000), we decided a
similar issue wherein the Court found that the Legislature, in amending section
921.141(5)(a), Florida Statutes, to include the phrase "or on probation," altered the
substantive law by adding an entirely new aggravator to be applied upon the
defendant.  Though we found an ex post facto violation in Lukehart, we applied a
harmless error analysis and rejected Lukehart’s claim in light of the fact that the jury
was already aware that he was on probation when he committed the crime, and in
view of the remaining aggravators there.  See id.; see also Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d
9, 25 (Fla. 2000) (finding harmless error in light of remaining aggravators).  Much
as in Lukehart, the jury here was aware at all times that the victim was eight years
old at the time of death.  We find no error in the trial court’s harmless error
analysis.
Prior Violent Felony Aggravator
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In issue 8 Rose argues the court gave undue weight to the prior violent felony
aggravator because the predicate felony did not involve a threat of violence. 
Section  921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes, provides: “The defendant was previously
convicted of another capital felony or another felony involving the use of threat of
violence to the person.”  We have held that the “finding of a prior violent felony
conviction aggravator only attaches ‘to life-threatening crimes in which the
perpetrator comes in direct contact with a human victim.’”  Mahn v. State, 714 So.
2d 391, 399 (Fla. 1998).  Further, we have provided that whether a crime
constitutes a prior violent felony is determined by the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the prior crime.  Gore v. State, 706 So. 2d 1328, 1333 (Fla.
1997).  
We find sufficient support in the record for the finding of this aggravator. 
First of all, there are two prior felonies at play here.  In November 1969, Rose was
placed on probation for breaking and entering of a dwelling with intent to commit
grand larceny.  His probation was subsequently revoked and he was then
adjudicated guilty and was sentenced to a prison term.  In 1971 he was convicted
for breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a rape (presumably the
event which triggered the violation of probation since the sentence was to run
concurrent with the sentence of the 1969 case, but that is not stated in the record). 
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He was later released on parole, during which he committed the murder under
review.  
The State presented evidence that there was some violence in the
commission of the crime in the 1969 case.  The detective who investigated the 1969
case testified that Rose entered the victim’s apartment in the middle of the night and
covered her mouth with his hand as he threatened to kill her if she made any noise. 
He then shoved her to the floor on his way out of the apartment.  The victim
suffered some minor injuries from the incident.  These circumstances are consistent
with a “life-threatening crime in which the perpetrator comes in direct contact with a
human victim.”  Mahn, 714 So. 2d at 399.  Therefore, we conclude the prior violent
felony aggravator was properly established.
On a related claim, Rose also argues that the prior violent felony aggravator
was actually impermissibly doubled and improperly used against him twice.  The
consideration of two aggravating circumstances, referred to as doubling, is
improper when the aggravators are based upon the same aspect of the crime.  See
Banks v. State, 700 So. 2d 363, 367 (Fla. 1997).  However, the facts in a given
case may support multiple aggravating factors “so long as they are separate and
distinct aggravators and not merely restatements of each other, as in murder
committed during a burglary or robbery and murder for pecuniary gain, or murder
-29-
committed to avoid arrest and murder committed to hinder law enforcement.”  Id.
In the current case, the State argued and the trial court found the existence of
the aggravators that (1) the crime for which the defendant was to be sentenced was
committed by someone previously convicted of a felony and under a sentence of
imprisonment or on parole and (2) the defendant was previously convicted of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence.  Contrary to Rose’s argument, we
find no error in the trial court’s findings.  In Hildwin v. State, 727 So. 2d 193, 196
n.3 (Fla. 1998), the defendant had been convicted of rape and was on parole at the
time of the commission of the murder.  The defendant there argued, as Rose
presently does, that the concurrent use of the prior violent felony and parole
aggravators constituted improper doubling.  We rejected the argument.  See id. at
196.  Likewise, we reject Rose’s contention here.
Kidnapping Aggravator  
In issue nine Rose argues that undue weight was given to the aggravator that
the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the
commission of or attempt to commit a kidnapping.  As pointed out by the State,
this issue was previously resolved unfavorably to Rose when we affirmed his
conviction on the murder and the kidnapping counts.  See Rose, 425 So. 2d at 523. 
Hence, that legal issue has already been decided.
-30-
HAC Aggravator
In issue ten Rose argues the trial court erred in finding that the capital felony
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  As provided by section 921.141(5)(h),
Florida Statutes, the fact that a capital felony is especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel is an aggravator.  We have provided that this aggravator attaches “only in
torturous murders–those that evince extreme and outrageous depravity as
exemplified either by the desire to inflict a high degree of pain or utter indifference
to or enjoyment of the suffering of another.”  Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 1155,
1159 (1998).  The crime must be conscienceless or pitiless and unnecessarily
torturous to the victim.  See id. 
As reflected by the record and the trial court’s order, there is sufficient
evidence to support the finding of this aggravator.  Though the exact time of death
could not be determined, the State asserts that the young victim was aware of her
fate during her abduction and in the moments leading to her death.  For example,
the State asserts that this was established by the fact that the victim was found in
the canal and no blood was found on the clothes she wore that night.  The State
claims this indicates that Rose removed her clothes before applying the fatal blows. 
As stated by Dr. Fatteh, had she been wearing her clothes at the time of the blows,
some blood would have landed on some part of her clothes.  Therefore, it was
7Rose also submitted his age at the time of the crime as a statutory mitigator. 
We conclude that the trial court properly rejected this mitigator.  Rose was thirty-
one years old at the time.
-31-
proper for the jury to have inferred that, though the exact time it took for the victim
to die was unknown, the victim consciously suffered anguish prior to the striking of
the fatal blows.  See, e.g., Wyatt v. State, 641 So. 2d 1336, 1340 (Fla. 1994).   
Consideration of Mental Mitigation
In issue eleven Rose argues that the trial court’s finding on mitigation that
Rose was not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the
time of the offense is unsupported by the record.  A great deal of unrebutted
evidence, he advances, was presented to this effect, including his out-of-wedlock
birth, his troublesome childhood, his low IQ, his diagnosis of a borderline
personality disorder, his neurological impairments, brain damage, and the evidence
of intoxication on the night of the murder.  Rose also argues that the court erred in
refusing to accord each of the remaining mitigating circumstances greater weight.  
Dr. Toomer testified extensively for the purpose of establishing the following
statutory mitigators: (1) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and (2) the
capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to
conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.7 
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He testified that Rose suffered from a borderline personality disorder which caused
him to do well for short periods of time but, because of his lack of coping skills
and alcohol problem, resulted in his criminal problems.  He also testified that tests
results suggested the likelihood of some organic impairment or brain damage.
With regard to a trial court’s finding of a mitigating circumstance, we have
held:
     The decision as to whether a mitigating circumstance
has been established is within the trial court's discretion. 
Moreover, expert testimony alone does not require a
finding of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  Even
uncontroverted opinion testimony can be rejected,
especially when it is hard to reconcile with the other
evidence presented in the case.  As long as the court
considered all of the evidence, the trial judge's
determination of lack of mitigation will stand absent a
palpable abuse of discretion.
Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747, 755 (Fla. 1996) (citations omitted).  
At first glance, the testimony paints a disturbing picture of Rose’s emotional
and mental state.  Undoubtedly, we have found such circumstances to be of a
significantly mitigating character.  See, e.g., Hawk v. State, 718 So. 2d 159, 162
(Fla. 1998) (clinical and statistical evidence of brain damage, mental illness, and
intoxication at the time of crime constituted strong mitigation requiring reversal of
death sentence).  However, as stated in Foster, the trial court was not bound to find
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the submitted mitigators simply because of Dr. Toomer’s testimony.  Foster, 679
So. 2d at 755.  A close review of the record reveals that the State successfully
attacked Dr. Toomer’s findings through a combination of factors including: Rose’s
score of a ninety-nine on his most recent IQ test in prison; the rebuttal of Dr.
Toomer’s finding of a borderline personality disorder by the State’s theory that
Rose was a sociopath, as supported by various psychological reports done in the
1970's; indications from the reports that Rose’s memory was intact, he was an
outgoing person, and was of average intelligence; Dr. Toomer’s oversight in not
contacting any of the various doctors who had previously examined Rose; and Dr.
Toomer’s failure to interview any of the individuals closest to Rose.  Considering
this impeachment the trial court did not abuse its discretion on this point.  See id.
Testimony was also presented regarding whether Rose was intoxicated on
the night of the murder.  Sergeant Walker testified that Rose “appeared to be under
some influence, but [he] wouldn’t say drunk,” as he was cooperative and polite. 
Detective McLellan, who was there at the same time as Sergeant Walker, however,
testified that he did not smell alcohol about Rose’s person and felt that he was
sober.  The bartender at the bar Rose stated that he had gone to that night testified
that she did not see him that night.  Once again, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion on this point.  See Foster, 679 So. 2d at 755. 
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Victim Impact Testimony
In issue twelve Rose argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
testimony from family members of the decedent and in allowing the decedent’s
mother to remain in the courtroom throughout the sentencing phase proceedings
over defense objection.
Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1997), provides: 
Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the
existence of one or more aggravating circumstances as
described in subsection (5), the prosecution may
introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact
evidence.  Such evidence shall be designed to
demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual
human being and the resultant loss to the community's
members by the victim's death.  Characterizations and
opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the
appropriate sentence shall not be permitted as a part of
victim impact evidence.
This Court has previously recognized this statute and approved the presentation of
victim impact evidence while counseling restraint in its proper use.  See Mansfield
v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 649 (Fla. 2000); Bonifay v. State, 680 So. 2d 413, 419-20
(Fla. 1996).
In the instant case, the mother and grandmother of the victim testified at the
Spencer hearing about the impact of her death upon their lives and about the
uniqueness of the victim at such a young age.  As admitted by Rose, this testimony
-35-
was permissible as provided for by the statute and precedents of this Court.  See
Mansfield, 758 So. 2d at 649; Bonifay, 680 So. 2d at 419-20.  We conclude no
reversible error has been demonstrated.
Addressing the second part of this claim, Rose recognizes that section
90.616, Florida Statutes (1997), provides:
(2) A witness may not be excluded if the witness is:
. . . .
(d) In a criminal case, the victim of the crime, the
victim’s next of kin, the parent or guardian of a minor
child victim, or a lawful representative of such person,
unless, upon motion, the court determines such person’s
presence to be prejudicial.  
This right is also provided for by the constitution.  See art. 1, § 16, Fla. Const. 
Ms. Berry, the mother of the minor child victim here, was clearly covered under the
statute and therefore was properly allowed to remain in the courtroom.  See Gore v.
State, 599 So. 2d 978, 985-86 (Fla. 1992).  In addition, there has been no showing
here of any prejudice by the presence of these persons.
Reading of Nonstatutory Mitigation to Jury
In issue thirteen Rose argues the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
concerning fourteen nonstatutory mitigators which were present in the case.  Rose
concedes that this issue has been resolved unfavorably to him in opinions of this
Court.  Essentially this Court has held that trial courts are required to give only the
8See § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997).
9See § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997).
10See § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1997).
11See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1997).
-36-
“catch-all” instruction on mitigating evidence and nothing more.  See Zakrzewski v.
State, 717 So. 2d 488, 495 (Fla. 1998).  Therefore, no error occurred.
Proportionality of Death Sentence
Due to the uniqueness and the finality of death, this Court addresses the
propriety of all death sentences in a proportionality review.  See Porter v. State, 
564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990).  In conducting this review, this Court makes a
comprehensive analysis in which it determines whether the crime falls within the
category of both the most aggravated and the least mitigated of murders, see
Cooper v. State, 739 So. 2d 82, 85 (Fla. 1999), thereby providing for uniformity in
the application of the sentence, see Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416-17 (Fla.
1998). 
We do not find the death sentence disproportionate here.  The court initially
found five aggravators: (1) capital felony committed while on felony probation;8 (2)
prior felony involving violence;9 (3) committed during a kidnapping;10 (4) HAC;11
12See § 921.141(5)(l), Fla. Stat. (1997).
-37-
and (5) victim less than twelve years old.12  As earlier discussed in issue 7, supra,
the fifth aggravator was inapplicable.  However, we have concluded that the proper
finding of the remaining four aggravators renders the use of the age aggravator
harmless.
As to statutory mitigators, the court rejected the following: (1) under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) impaired capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct; and (3) defendant’s age at the time of the
crime (thirty-one years old).  As discussed in issue 11, supra, the trial court’s
decision to reject the statutory mitigators was supported by competent substantial
evidence.  See Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 1990).  In its
consideration of the nonstatutory mitigators, however, the court found the first
statutory mitigator to qualify as nonstatutory.  The court then addressed the
remaining nonstatutory mitigators as follows: (1) defendant’s non-nurturing
childhood (some weight); (2) defendant is of below average intelligence and is a
slow learner (little weight); (3) the defendant is an alcoholic and was intoxicated at
the time of the murder (nonexistent); (4) defendant’s employment history (some
weight); (5) defendant is a good person who has adapted to life in prison (little
weight); (6) cooperation with the police (little weight); (7) defendant’s unwavering
-38-
maintenance of his innocence (little weight); (8) defendant’s performance of
specific good deeds (little weight); (9) defendant possesses specific good
characteristics (some weight); and (10) defendant’s poor health (nonexistent).
We have affirmed death sentences where there was even less aggravation
than in the current case and somewhat comparable mitigation.  See Sliney v. State,
699 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1997) (finding the death penalty proportional with the
existence of two aggravating circumstances of commission during a robbery and to
avoid arrest, two statutory mitigators (age and lack of criminal history), and a
number of nonstatutory mitigators); Hayes v. State, 581 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1991)
(affirming the death penalty where evidence established two aggravating
circumstances of CCP and commission during a robbery, one statutory mitigator
(age), and other nonstatutory mitigators).  Rose asserts, however, that we have also
found the death sentence disproportionate in other instances.  In Nibert, for
instance, we reversed a death sentence where “the record shows that Nibert was a
child-abused, chronic alcoholic who lacked substantial control over his behavior
when he drank, and that he had been drinking heavily on the day of Snavely's
murder.”  574 So. 2d at 1063.  However, the current case is different from Nibert in
that the evidence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and Nibert’s impaired
capacity at the time of the crime were uncontroverted.  Considered in that light, we
-39-
find the present sentence distinguishable and conclude that it meets our
proportionality requirements.
Extended Time on Death Row
In issue fifteen Rose maintains that because he had been continuously
incarcerated since October 27, 1976, and has been under a sentence of death since
May 13, 1977, sentencing delay in his case violates the state and federal
constitutions.  In essence, he contends that prolonged stay on death row
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  We have addressed a similar claim in
Hitchcock v. State, 578 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1990), wherein the appellant argued the
delay between his arrest and resentencing violated his right to a speedy trial and his
due process rights and constituted cruel and unusual punishment.  The Court found
the claim to be without merit.  See id.; see also Hitchcock v. State, 673 So. 2d 859,
863 (Fla. 1996) (rejecting renewed claim of delay in sentencing).  Likewise, we find
Rose’s argument here is without merit.
Electrocution as a Method of Execution
In issue sixteen Rose contends that imposition of a sentence of death by
electrocution violates his state and federal constitutional rights.  This issue has been
resolved unfavorably to Rose since the Legislature recently amended the death
penalty statute to provide that execution shall be by lethal injection unless the
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sentenced person affirmatively elects to be executed by electrocution.  See
Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2000); Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119
(Fla. 2000).
Jury Note Issue
Finally, Rose asserts that he should get a life sentence because at his guilt
phase trial back in 1976, the jurors sent a note to the trial judge informing him: “We
are tied six to six, and no one will change their mind at the moment.  Please, instruct
us.”  Rose, 425 So. 2d at 525.  Rose asserts that the jury’s note should be treated
as a recommendation for life.  We have already rejected this claim.  See id. 
Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment and
imposition of the death sentence upon Rose.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, HARDING, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., concurs in result only with an opinion.
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result only.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., concurring in result only.
As I did when this case was here in 1996, I again find that the death penalty
should be affirmed.  However, I do not join in parts of the majority opinion,
-41-
including the discussion of the Brady, Richardson, and prosecutorial comment
issues.
I also write to repeat my serious concern about the length of time of the
judicial process in capital cases from the 1970s and 1980s.  This was an October
1976 crime, and the case has yet to reach postconviction proceedings.  I believe all
who are involved in postconviction proceedings in this and other similarly situated
capital cases–this Court, the trial judges, the state attorneys, and collateral
counsels–simply must give these cases the highest priority.
The proceedings in this case on rehearing in this Court should be expedited,
and, if rehearing is denied, also in the postconviction proceedings in state court.  If
no relief is granted in state court, postconviction proceedings in federal courts need
early attention.  If this defendant’s sentence is not to be executed, he should be
removed from death row at an early time from now.  On the other hand, if the
sentence is to be executed, then that should be done at an early time from now. 
Even if proceedings are expedited, if the sentence is executed, it is likely that this
case will have been in the courts for thirty years.  Plainly, we must focus upon and
deal with issues in this process which have resulted in such an extended period.
ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
13Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
-42-
I concur in all respects with the majority, with the sole exception of its
treatment of appellant’s claim of an entitlement to a jury recommendation of life
based upon the jury’s six-to-six vote as to the penalty in his original trial.  I write
separately, as I did in Patton v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S749 (Fla. Sept. 28, 2000),
to address what I perceive to be a fundamental injustice perpetuated by the
majority’s rejection of appellant’s claim. 
During the penalty phase of appellant’s trial, and, after seven hours of
deliberation, the jury sent a note to the court stating, “We are tied six to six, and no
one will change their mind at the moment.  Please instruct us.”  Rose v. State, 425
So. 2d 521, 525 (Fla. 1982) (emphasis supplied).  Instead of telling the jury that a
six-to-six split was a perfectly acceptable vote, the judge erroneously sent the jury
back with an admonition to reach a majority vote.  In appellant’s initial appeal,
Rose asserted that the trial court erred in not accepting the jury’s vote as a
recommendation for life as provided by Florida law, and instead, improperly giving
an Allen13 charge to the jury.  This Court agreed that the trial court had erred:
At that point, the trial judge should have advised the jury that it was
not necessary to have a majority reach a sentencing recommendation
because, if seven jurors do not vote to recommend death, then the
recommendation is life imprisonment.  There was no reason to give the
"Allen charge" during the penalty phase of the trial.  
-43-
Id. at 525.  However, instead of accepting the jury’s unequivocal and undisputed
six-to-six vote, this Court ruled that the State was entitled to another opportunity to
convince a new jury to recommend the death penalty.  In doing so I believe we
erred and permitted a fundamental injustice that we now have the opportunity to
correct.
This Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have held that a capital defendant
who once receives a life recommendation from a jury is entitled to that
recommendation throughout any subsequent proceedings under the principles of
double jeopardy.  See, e.g., Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1326
(Fla. 1994); see also Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263, 287 (Fla. 2000) (citing Monge
v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998)).  Of course, the principle that a six-to-six vote
by an advisory jury is a life recommendation is well established.  See, e.g., Scott v.
State, 657 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 1995) (“[A] 6-to-6 split . . . constitutes a life
recommendation under Florida law.”); Amos v. State, 618 So. 157, 161 (Fla. 1993)
(“By a vote of six to six, the jury returned a recommendation of life for the killing
of the store clerk . . . .”); Cave v. State, 476 So. 2d 180, 187 (Fla. 1985) (“[W]e are
dealing with an advisory sentence which does not require a unanimous vote for a
recommendation of death or a majority vote for a recommendation of life
imprisonment.”). 
-44-
In my view, we should recognize our previous error as a manifest injustice,
considering the gravity of the issue, the extent of the jury’s deliberations, and the
clarity of the jury’s vote.  These are clearly inappropriate circumstances for
adhering to stare decisis.  See Delgado v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S1144, S1147
(Fla. Dec. 14, 2000) (“While we are aware of the importance of stare decisis, this
principle must give way to common sense and logic.”); State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d
715, 720 (Fla. 1997) (“This Court has the power to reconsider and correct
erroneous rulings in exceptional circumstances and where reliance on the previous
decision would result in manifest injustice, notwithstanding that such rulings have
become the law of the case.”).  
Finally, I note my agreement with the views of Justice Marshall of the U.S.
Supreme Court, expressed in a similar case:
Petitioner was deprived of a jury’s life recommendation without
any court having found that advisory verdict unreasonable.  Under
Florida law, a 6-to-6 vote is a life recommendation.  See Rose v. State,
supra, at 525.  When the trial judge received the jury’s note indicating
that it was deadlocked 6 to 6, there was therefore nothing left for him
to do but recall the jury and apply the Tedder [v. State, 322 So. 2d
908 (Fla. 1975)] standard to its life recommendation.  I can scarcely
believe that the trial judge would have overridden such a
recommendation in this case; had he done so, he doubtless would
have been reversed on appeal.  But instead, the trial judge altered the
verdict by giving an Allen charge.  Then, even while holding the judge
to have erred in giving the charge, the Florida Supreme Court
proceeded to disregard the fact that the jury’s deadlock was a finding
-45-
for defendant on the issue of death.  The Supreme Court’s decision to
remand was not based upon any finding that a life sentence was
unreasonable.  The Supreme Court remanded only because the jury’s
report of a 6-to-6 deadlock had not been contained in a formal
recommendation.  Since I do not believe that this adherence to
formalism is consistent with the double jeopardy concerns implicated
by the Supreme Court’s demand that petitioner convince yet another
jury that he does not deserve to die, I must dissent from this Court’s
refusal to hear this case.
Patten v. Florida, 474 U.S. 876, 878 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,
Paul L. Backman, Judge - Case No. 76005036CF10A
Richard L. Rosenbaum, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Leslie T. Campbell, Assistant Attorney
General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Appellee