Case Title: Commonwealth v. Hutchins

Citation: 

Docket Number: 992355

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 992355 
September 15, 2000 
 
RUDOLPH LYNWOOD HUTCHINS, JR. 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
I. 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Commonwealth 
violated the defendant's statutory rights to a speedy trial 
contained in Code § 19.2-243.  That statute states in relevant 
part:   
 
"Where a general district court has found that 
there is probable cause to believe that the accused 
has committed a felony, the accused, if he is held 
continuously in custody thereafter, shall be forever 
discharged from prosecution for such offense if no 
trial is commenced in the circuit court within five 
months from the date such probable cause was found 
by the district court; and if the accused is not 
held in custody but has been recognized for his 
appearance in the circuit court to answer for such 
offense, he shall be forever discharged from 
prosecution therefor if no trial is commenced in the 
circuit court within nine months from the date such 
probable cause was found. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"The provisions of this section shall not apply 
to such period of time as the failure to try the 
accused was caused: 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"4. By continuance granted on the motion of the 
accused or his counsel, or by concurrence of the 
accused or his counsel in such a motion by the 
attorney for the Commonwealth, or by the failure of 
the accused or his counsel to make a timely 
objection to such a motion by the attorney for the 
Commonwealth, or by reason of his escaping from jail 
or failing to appear according to his 
recognizance . . . ." 
 
II. 
 
 
Rudolph Lynwood Hutchins, Jr., was arrested on September 
18, 1996, and charged with two counts of malicious wounding, 
in violation of Code § 18.2-51.  He was taken before a 
magistrate who set his bond at $100,000.  The defendant, 
unable to post the bond, was remanded to the custody of the 
sheriff of Martinsville and remained in continuous custody in 
the Martinsville City Jail.  On October 23, 1996, the 
defendant appeared in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
District Court for the City of Martinsville for a preliminary 
hearing on the charged offenses.  The charges were certified 
to a grand jury which indicted the defendant on February 10, 
1997.  The defendant appeared in the Circuit Court for the 
City of Martinsville on February 25, 1997, and was arraigned 
on two indictments for malicious wounding. 
 
The defendant entered pleas of not guilty and requested a 
jury trial.  In response to the court's inquiry:  "If you will 
sign here that you want a trial by a jury.  Friday, June the 
6th [1997]?," the defendant's counsel responded:  "That's 
fine, Judge."  The defendant and his counsel signed an order 
 
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captioned, "REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL and CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE 
TO APPEAR" which stated that the defendant's jury trial was 
set for June 6, 1997. 
 
On May 15, 1997, six months and 22 days after the 
preliminary hearing, the defendant, relying upon Code § 19.2-
243, filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him.  The 
defendant stated in his motion "[t]hat on February 25, 1997, 
the trial court set a trial date for June 6, 1997.  Both the 
Commonwealth and the Defendant acquiesced to that trial date.  
Neither the Commonwealth nor the Defendant requested a 
continuance to that date."  The circuit court denied the 
defendant's motion, he was tried by a jury and convicted of 
one count of unlawful wounding, and he was sentenced to three 
years imprisonment.  The circuit court entered an order 
confirming the jury verdict, and the defendant appealed to the 
Court of Appeals. 
 
A panel of the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished 
opinion, affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.  Hutchins 
v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1439-97-3 (January 19, 1999).  The 
Court of Appeals held that the defendant's statutory speedy 
trial rights were not violated because his trial commenced 
when he was arraigned and that the arraignment occurred within 
five months from the date that the district court found 
probable cause. 
 
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The Court of Appeals granted the defendant's petition for 
rehearing en banc and reversed and dismissed the defendant's 
conviction, holding that the trial did not commence within the 
intendment of Code § 19.2-243 until the jury was sworn on June 
6, 1997, and, therefore, the trial was beyond the five-month 
period prescribed in Code § 19.2-243.  Hutchins v. 
Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 574, 580, 518 S.E.2d 838, 841 
(1999).  The Court of Appeals did not discuss the 
Commonwealth's argument that the circuit court's action on 
February 25, 1997, in scheduling the trial date for June 6, 
1997, constituted a continuance and that the defendant's 
failure to object to that date, as required by Code § 19.2-
243(4), barred the defendant from applying the period of time 
between February 25, 1997 and June 6, 1997, to the five-month 
period prescribed in Code § 19.2-243.  The Commonwealth 
appeals. 
III. 
 
The Commonwealth asserts, among other things, that the 
defendant's statutory speedy trial rights were not violated 
because he did not object when the circuit court set the trial 
date for June 6, 1997, and, therefore, the circuit court's 
action scheduling the trial for that date must be viewed as a 
continuance.  The defendant responds that he did not waive his 
statutory right to a speedy trial merely because he remained 
 
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silent or did not demand that a trial date be set within the 
prescribed period.  We disagree with the defendant. 
 
In Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 362 S.E.2d 650 
(1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971 (1988), we considered 
whether a defendant's conviction should be reversed and the 
indictments dismissed because of an alleged violation of his 
statutory right to a speedy trial.  The defendant, Richard 
Townes, Jr., was indicted for robbery, capital murder in the 
commission of robbery, and use of a firearm while committing 
robbery.  A general district court found probable cause on 
August 23, 1985, and Townes was held in continuous custody.  
Id. at 312, 321, 362 S.E.2d at 652, 658. 
 
On October 16, 1985, Townes appeared in the circuit court 
and requested a continuance, which was granted by order 
entered the same date, and the trial date was continued until 
December 4, 1985.  On that date, Townes and his counsel 
appeared in court on a number of motions, including a motion 
that Townes be allowed to represent himself.  The circuit 
court granted this motion and designated Townes' former 
counsel as standby counsel.  A discussion occurred regarding a 
new trial date, and Townes' standby counsel suggested a date 
of March 3, 1986, and everyone assented.  An order was entered 
on December 23, 1985, which embodied the actions taken by the 
court on December 4, 1985.  Id. at 321-22, 363 S.E.2d at 658.  
 
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The December 23, 1985 order contained a statement that "the 
trial of this matter is set for March 3, 1986, on motion of 
both parties by agreement."  Id. at 322, 362 S.E.2d at 658.  
 
Rejecting Townes' contention that his statutory right to 
a speedy trial was violated, we stated: 
"The order of December 23, entered well within the 
five-month period, expressly states that the March 
3, 1986 trial date was set 'on motion of both 
parties by agreement.'  This recitation imports 
verity and reflects judicial action constituting a 
continuance granted with the concurrence of both the 
prosecution and the accused.  This continuance, from 
December 4 until March 3, extended the five-month 
period for three months less one day, or more than 
enough to satisfy the requirements of Code § 19.2-
243 . . . ." 
 
Id. at 323, 362 S.E.2d at 659.  We also observed in Townes 
that "the recital in the order of December 23, 1986, with 
respect to agreement on the trial date, not only imports 
verity but also is supported by the record."  Id. at 323 n.3, 
362 S.E.2d at 659 n.3. 
 
In the present case, the defendant, Hutchins, agreed to 
the trial date of June 6, 1997.  Indeed, the defendant 
admitted, as we have already stated, in his motion to dismiss 
that "[b]oth the Commonwealth and the Defendant acquiesced to 
[the June 6, 1997] trial date."  The defendant also states in 
his brief filed with this Court that he acquiesced to that 
trial date.  And, as we have already stated, the record shows 
defendant's counsel informed the circuit court that a trial by 
 
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jury on June 6, 1997, was "fine."  Therefore, we can only 
conclude that the defendant's actions in acquiescing with and 
agreeing to the order dated February 25, 1997, signed by the 
defendant and his counsel, which was entered well within the 
five-month period, constituted a continuance of the trial date 
within the intendment of Code § 19.2-243(4).  The defendant 
made no objection to this continuance.  Indeed, rather than 
object, the defendant affirmatively agreed to the trial date, 
and there is no dispute that when the period of time between 
February 25, 1997 and June 6, 1997 is not included, the 
defendant's trial was within the statutorily prescribed 
period.  Therefore, we hold that the defendant's right to a 
speedy trial provided by Code § 19.2-243 was not violated. 
IV. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals, and we will reinstate Hutchins' conviction 
in accordance with the circuit court's judgment order.*
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
* In view of our holding, we do not consider the Court of 
Appeals' holding that a trial commences within the intendment 
of Code § 19.2-243 when the jury is sworn. 
 
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