Case Title: BRANDY DIANA LARGE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-89

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
BRANDY DIANA LARGE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 22177 P.3d 807Case Number: 06-89Decided: 02/28/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
BRANDY DIANA 
LARGE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty

The 
Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

D. Terry Rogers, Interim Public 
Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant 
Public Defender; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Public Defender.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; 
Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Causey.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]         
Brandy 
Large appeals her convictions on one count of Conspiracy to Commit Sexual 
Assault in the Second Degree, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-303(a)(v) 
and 6-1-303(a),  and two counts of 
Sexual Exploitation of Children, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-4-303(b)(ii).1  She contends that the trial court 
allowed impermissible testimony that vouched for the victim's credibility as 
well as testimony that constituted improper expert opinion of her guilt.  She also challenges testimony that she 
asserts was inadmissible hearsay.  
We affirm her convictions.

[¶2]         
Ms. Large 
phrases the issues as follows:

1.                  
Did plain 
error occur when the trial court permitted expert witness testimony that vouched 
for and bolstered the victim's testimony and out-of-court 
statements?

2.                  
Did per se error occur when the prosecutor 
elicited expert witness testimony that Appellant was guilty of participating in 
the sexual assault of the victim?

3.                  
Did plain 
error occur when the trial court allowed witnesses to repeat the alleged 
victim's and her brother's out-of-court statements?

The State presents the issues as 
follows:

1.         
Did the district court erroneously allow the testimonies of two expert 
witnessesPsychologist Dr. Mark Gibson and therapist Kathy Englandregarding 
their interactions with and opinions regarding Appellant's young victim, 
JL?

2.         
Did the prosecutor elicit expert testimony from Dr. Mark Gibson that he 
believed Appellant had participated in the sexual abuse of the victim, 
JL?

3.         
Did the district court commit plain error by allowing the introduction of 
testimonies from a foster parent and a prosecution investigator concerning their 
interactions and conversations with JL and her brother, 
ML?

[¶3]         
JL is the 
daughter of Ms. Large.  She was 
eight years old at the time of the alleged crimes.  Mr. Dye was Ms. Large's boyfriend.  He admitted sexually abusing JL on two 
occasions, and agreed to plead guilty to charges arising from those 
incidents.  The issue at trial was 
whether Ms. Large also participated.  
At trial, Mr. Dye testified that it was Ms. Large who suggested involving 
JL in their sexual activity.  On two 
occasions, according to Mr. Dye, they acted on her suggestion and Ms. Large 
actively participated.  

[¶4]         
JL 
testified at trial that Mr. Dye and Ms. Large forced her to perform several 
sexual acts.  She described the 
sexual acts and testified that all three participants were unclothed at the time 
of the incidents.  JL reported that 
Ms. Large showed her how to perform the acts and then made her do them.  JL's younger brother, ML, also testified 
briefly.  He testified that he had 
seen JL, Mr. Dye, and Ms. Large in their home's living room, that Mr. Dye "was 
showing [JL] how to do sex," and that Ms. Large was with them.  ML testified that they were unclothed at 
the time.  He also testified that 
Ms. Large instructed him not to tell anyone what he had 
seen.

[¶5]         
During 
the trial, the State also presented the testimony of JL's two foster mothers, 
Ms. Shelley Hamel and Ms. Teri Harmon.  
Ms. Hamel testified that during the six to seven weeks that JL lived with 
her, she observed several behaviors in JL that she considered inappropriately 
sexual for a child of JL's age.  
After one particular incident involving JL and another foster child, Ms. 
Hamel grew concerned that JL posed a threat to the safety of other children in 
the household.  She called the 
Department of Family Services (DFS) and asked that JL be moved to a different 
foster home.  DFS acceded to the 
request and placed JL with Ms. Harmon.

[¶6]         
Ms. 
Harmon also testified that JL engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior while in 
her care.  She testified that the 
school sent home notes to her describing similar behavior while JL was in 
school.  When Ms. Harmon asked JL 
about the behavior, JL revealed information indicating that she had been 
sexually abused by Mr. Dye.  Later, 
JL disclosed to Ms. Harmon that Ms. Large had participated in the sexual 
activity.  

[¶7]         
JL's two 
counselors also testified at trial.  
Dr. Mark Gibson is a counseling psychologist who provided treatment to JL 
while she was in foster care.  Dr. 
Gibson had also briefly treated JL several years previously.  Dr. Gibson testified that over the 
course of treating JL while she was in foster care, he observed behaviors that 
JL had not exhibited during her earlier treatment.  These new behaviors led him to conclude 
that JL had been sexually abused in the interim.  Dr. Gibson testified that, in the course 
of treatment, JL described her sexual activity with Mr. Dye and Ms. Large.  He reported to DFS that JL may have been 
sexually abused by Mr. Dye and Ms. Large. 

[¶8]         
Ms. Kathy 
England, a licensed counselor, began treating JL in late summer of 2005.  She testified that she provided 
counseling to JL at DFS's request and that, during treatment, JL described her 
sexual activity with Mr. Dye and Ms. Large.  The State also called its investigator, 
Randy Bingham, who testified about his interview with JL's brother, ML, and 
repeated statements made by ML during that interview.  

[¶9]         
Ms. Large 
did not dispute that Mr. Dye sexually abused JL.  Instead, her defense theory was that JL 
and ML had been influenced by the questioning of various adults to make false 
accusations against her.  As part of 
this defense strategy, Ms. Large mounted a pre-trial challenge to JL's 
testimony.  She asserted that JL was 
not competent to testify, and that JL had been subject to undue influence from 
the adults involved in the investigation and in JL's mental health 
treatment.  The district court held 
a pre-trial hearing to address Ms. Large's claims and ruled that JL would be 
permitted to testify at trial.  
During trial, Ms. Large pursued this line of defense throughout opening 
statements, cross-examination of witnesses, and closing argument.  She did not testify and rested at the 
conclusion of the State's case against her.

[¶10]    
The jury 
found Ms. Large guilty on all three counts.  The district court sentenced Ms. Large 
to six to fifteen years imprisonment for Conspiracy to Commit Sexual Assault in 
the Second Degree, and six to twelve years for each of the two counts of Sexual 
Exploitation of Children, all three sentences to run consecutively.  Ms. Large filed this timely 
appeal.

[¶11]    
Ms. Large 
contends that Dr. Gibson impermissibly provided opinion testimony of her guilt 
and vouched for the credibility of JL.  She asserts that the alleged 
opinion testimony was elicited directly by the State and that the testimony 
was error per se mandating reversal of her convictions.  She contends that 
receipt of the alleged "vouching" testimony was plain error.  The State denies that Dr. Gibson offered 
any opinion regarding Ms. Large's guilt and also asserts that Dr. Gibson did not 
improperly vouch for JL's credibility.  
Regardless of whether the issue presented is viewed as "opinion of guilt" 
or "vouching," the State contends that we must apply a plain error 
analysis.

[¶12]       
Ms. Large 
focuses her challenge on two excerpts from the testimony of Dr. Gibson.  
The first portion of testimony reads:

Q.        [By the 
prosecutor]: And do you go into detail about what happened to her that caused 
this change [in behavior from the first time you treated JL]?  Because it does seem, and I'm not an 
expert, it seems like there's a big change between 2001 and 2004 in this little 
girl.  Am I right or 
wrong?

A.        There was a 
change.  Something I failed to 
mention, there was alsoat least according to my memory from the first report, 
there wasn't [the same conduct that the foster mothers observed].  . . .  [W]hen I see [those behaviors], it leads 
me along a path to believe that, wow, something's happened here.  It's not a foolproof symptomology, but 
it's definitely something's happened to this little girl that's very 
concerning.

Q.        And what 
was that?  What did you think was 
happening or had happened to her?

A.        My belief 
was that she had been abused in some way, and later, it was reported by the 
client herself, [JL], that that was true.

Q.        What did 
she tell you in that regard?

A.        As you 
said, itit did come out bit by bit.  
She was too nervous to talk about much at all, and I believe she even 
told her second set ofwell, her foster parents some of the things that happened 
to her before she would talk to me about it, and somehow much . . . detail [do] 
you want me to go [in] on these things?

Q.        Well, was 
there an incident that occurred with her foster parents that kind of 
triggeredtriggered this feeling on your part that there was a problem with the 
sexual assault?

A.        When she 
was with the [first foster] family, they were having a great deal of trouble 
with her behaviors, but theythey also did a good job with what they were asked 
to do, and they would-and part of that was they would have long talks with her, 
and they would have times when they would just hold her, and they would talk to 
her one-on-one or two-on-one, and during some of those discussions, she would 
reveal things to them that had happened to her in the past, and she would do 
this inin tears, and the foster parents believed she was very sincere with what 
happened.

[Defense 
Counsel]: Objection.  It's 
hearsay.

The 
Court: Sustained.

[Defense 
Counsel]: And inappropriate.

The 
Court: The objection is sustained.

Q.        [By 
the prosecutor]: Did you get this information as far as who might have sexually 
abused her?

A.        From 
the client herself?

Q.        
Yes.

A.        
Yes.  I did eventually, 
yes.

[Defense 
Counsel]: Same objection, your Honor.  Calls for hearsay.

[Prosecutor]: 
I would like to qualify this witness as an expert, if I could.  Would that be all right at this 
time?

The 
Court: Yes.

            
. . .

Q.        As part of 
your diagnosis, then, you learn who this little girl indicated had sexually 
abused her; is that correct?

A.        
Yes.

Q.        And that 
was necessary in your diagnosis in this case; is that 
correct?

A.        Yes, it 
was.

Q.        And who was 
that person or persons?

A.        David Dye, 
and then she was thehe was the first one that she revealed to me that 
inappropriately touched her and sexually abused her, and later on, itshe 
indicated that Brandy [Large] was involved as well.

            
. . . 

Q.        And this 
little girl reported that her mother had sexually abused her.  Was there any undue influence on this 
little girl at this time?

A.        It was a 
regular session.  We had sessions 
once or twice a week, and this information came out bit by bit from her, and 
there were no leading questions on my part, just part of therapy.

Ms. Large contends that this 
testimony reflects both improper vouching for the credibility of JL and an 
opinion that Ms. Large is guilty. We disagree.

[¶13]    
Ms. Large 
does not specifically identify the statements in the challenged testimony that 
she finds objectionable, but we perceive two possible bases for her claim of 
error.  The first is Dr. Gibson's conclusion that JL had been abused.  
The first question we must answer, then, is whether Dr. Gibson's statement of 
his diagnosis is permissible.  We have previously recognized that "an 
expert is permitted to state an opinion that someone is a victim of sexual 
assault but, of course, that expert cannot vouch for the credibility of the 
victim."  Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 939 (Wyo. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by 
Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 442-43 (Wyo. 1993); Hayes v. 
State, 935 P.2d 700, 704 (Wyo. 1997) ("Because the question of whether a 
child has been molested is generally beyond common experience, allowing an 
expert to testify on the issue assists the trier of fact.").  Ms. Large 
does not dispute that Dr. Gibson was qualified to render expert testimony in 
this case.  His expert testimony 
related to his diagnosis and was not improper.

[¶14]    
The 
second question is whether Dr. Gibson's testimony regarding JL's statements that 
she was abused by Ms. Large was admissible.  We employ a two-part test for 
determining the admissibility of a patient's identification of the offender in 
sexual abuse cases: 1) the declarant's motive must be consistent with the 
purposes of promoting treatment or diagnosis; and 2) the content of the 
disclosure must be that reasonably relied on by the expert.  Stephens v. 
State, 774 P.2d 60, 72 (Wyo. 1989); 
Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1015-19 (Wyo. 1993).  The two-part test was met in Ms. Large's 
case.  Notably, Dr. Gibson was called in to treat JL, rather than to 
perform a forensic evaluation.  There is no indication that JL's motive was 
anything other than to receive treatment.  There is also clear foundation 
in the record that JL's identification of the perpetrators of her abuse was a 
necessary part of Dr. Gibson's diagnosis and treatment.  This testimony was not erroneously 
admitted.

[¶15]    
The 
second challenged portion of Dr. Gibson's testimony is more 
troubling:

Q.        [By 
the prosecution]:  Do you have a 
duty to report sexual abuse if you believe it's occurring?

A.        I 
do.                                                                                         

Q.        Did 
you do that in this particular case?

A.        I 
did.  Yes, I 
did.

Q.        And 
who are the persons that you indicated possibly perpetrated this sexual 
abuse?

A.        David 
Dye and Brandy Large.

Ms. Large asserts that Dr. Gibson 
opined as to her guilt in this exchange.

[¶16]    
Dr. 
Gibson's testimony is very 
similar to testimony that we have held to be improper in other cases.  In Stephens, three expert witnesses 
provided opinions of Mr. Stephens's guilt over defense objections.  774 P.2d  at 65-66.  In one instance the prosecutor asked a 
school counselor, "Based on your sessions with [the victim] and talking to him, 
do you have an opinion as to who the perpetrator is?"  Id. 
at 65.  The witness responded, 
"Based on the fact that I have seen him for a year-and-a-half and that he has 
not changed who has done it to him, I would say that it was his father, [Mr. 
Stephens]."  Id.  The prosecutor also asked a licensed 
clinical social worker, "Do you have an opinion about who this [illicit sexual] 
contact has been with?"  Id. at 66.  The social worker responded, over 
defense objection, "He shares with me that it was daddy Bill [Mr. 
Stephens]."  Id.  We 
determined that this testimony, and that of the third witness who testified 
similarly, constituted an impermissible opinion of guilt.  Id. 
at 68.

[¶17]    
The State 
contends that the testimony does not rise to the level of opinion of guilt 
testimony.  The initial question 
implicates only Dr. Gibson's opinion regarding whether sexual abuse was 
occurring.  Presumably the "duty" 
referred to by the prosecutor relates to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-205(a), which 
requires "[a]ny person who knows or has reasonable cause to believe or suspect 
that a child has been abused . . . [to] immediately report it to the child 
protective agency [DFS] or local law enforcement agency."  Standing alone, this testimony does not 
run afoul of the prohibition against opinion of guilt testimony.  It does not provide an opinion regarding 
the perpetrator of the abuse and is potentially relevant as context for the 
investigation.

[¶18]    
Dr. 
Gibson's identification of Ms. Large as one of the perpetrators of the abuse is 
a different matter, however.  On one 
hand, the overall tenor of the questioning promotes the conclusion that Dr. 
Gibson held an opinion that Ms. Large was guilty of abusing JL.  On the other, the prosecutor's use of 
the word "possibly" in his question seeking identification from Dr. Gibson may 
have been sufficient to avoid violation of the prohibition against opinion of 
guilt testimony.  In evaluating the 
testimony, however, we cannot ignore the prosecutor's closing argument.  In his argument, the prosecutor 
stated:

And Dr. Gibson, you've heard his 
testimony, taking a look at the allegations of sexual abuse, not only by David 
Dye, but Brandy Large, did report to the Department of Family Services that he 
believed sexual abuse had occurred, that abuse had occurred at the hands of 
Brandy Large and David Dye.

In light of this argument, we must 
conclude that the challenged testimony was an improper prosecutor-elicited 
opinion of guilt.

[¶19]    
As 
mentioned previously, Ms. Large did not object at trial to any of the challenged 
testimony.  We typically apply a 
plain error standard of review when a defendant fails to assert an objection to 
the challenged testimony.  "This 
standard requires the alleged error 1) be 
clearly 
reflected in 
the record, 2) be a 
violation of a clear and unequivocal, not merely arguable, rule of law, and 3) 
deny an appellant a substantial right resulting in material prejudice."  Sanderson v. State, 2007 WY 127, ¶ 16, 
165 P.3d 83, 89 (Wyo. 2007).  Under 
the "error per se analysis," which Ms. Large contends is the applicable 
standard, the appellant need not establish prejudice in order to prevail.  See Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 68.  For several reasons, we agree with the 
State that plain error is the appropriate standard and that Ms. Large must 
demonstrate prejudicial error to prevail on appeal.

[¶20]    
The State 
contends that Dr. Gibson's testimony is relevant and necessary to counter 
defense contentions that JL's testimony was "tainted" by "well-meaning 
folks."  There is support in the 
record for the State's position.  As 
we understand the defense position at trial, certain "well-meaning folks" 
suggested to JL that she had been molested by her mother, and encouraged JL to 
make those allegations against her mother.  At trial, Ms. Large did not 
identify those "well-meaning folks" by name, but it is a fair inference from the 
trial record that Ms. Large included Dr. Gibson as one of them.  If so, Dr. 
Gibson's belief that JL had been molested by her mother would supply a motive 
for Dr. Gibson to encourage JL to name her mother as one of the perpetrators of 
the abuse.  Indeed, the trial 
court, in one exchange away from the jury, said that defense counsel "made the 
comment that perhaps there was some undue influence or fabrication by the State, 
and so I think that door was opened there."

[¶21]    
If an 
objection had been made at trial, the potential relevance of the expert 
testimony could have been explored.  Even if relevant, the trial court 
could have weighed the potential probative value of the testimony against the 
danger of unfair prejudice and made a determination as to admissibility which we 
would have reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  If the trial court had allowed the 
testimony, a limiting instruction may also have been appropriate if requested by 
defense counsel.

[¶22]    
This is 
precisely what occurred in Metzger v. 
State, where the district court properly instructed the jury after a defense 
objection.  4 P.3d 901, 905 (Wyo. 
2000).  Using a similar trial 
strategy to that Ms. Large employed, defense counsel in Metzger brought the witness's beliefs 
about the child victim's credibility into question.  On cross-examination, the State explored 
those beliefs.  Because Mr. Metzger 
objected to the opinion testimony that the prosecutor elicited, the district 
court was able to consider the evidence and evaluate it within the context of 
the entire trial.  When it did so, 
the district court gave the jury a limiting instruction.  We stated: "Therefore, in view of the 
open door' doctrine and, in particular, in view of the limiting instruction 
given by the trial court, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in permitting the disputed question to be asked and answered."  Id. 
at 906.  See also McClelland v. State, 2007 WY 
57, ¶ 32, 155 P.3d 1013, 1023 (Wyo. 2007) (The district court sustained defense 
objections and ordered the challenged response stricken from the record.  "Given these remedial efforts of the 
district court [sustaining defense objections and ordering challenged response 
stricken], we decline to categorize this incident as error.").  In Ms. Large's case, however, the 
district court had no opportunity to address this issue because Ms. Large never 
objected.  Given the overall defense 
strategy, Ms. Large's failure to object to the testimony may simply have been a 
trial tactic.  Under such 
circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that an error per se approach to Dr. 
Gibson's testimony is appropriate.

[¶23]    
As a 
general principle, the choice between the plain error standard and the error per 
se standard depends upon whether the error is a "structural" error or a "trial" 
error.  The United States Supreme 
Court first examined this distinction in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991).  
In Fulminante, the criminal 
defendant protested the State's use of his confession, which he claimed was 
coerced.  499 U.S.  at 282, 111 S. Ct.  at 1250.  One issue before the 
Court was whether admission of a coerced confession is subject to a 
harmless-error analysis.  Id., 499 U.S.  at 307-12, 111 S. Ct.  at 
1263-66.

[¶24]    
The Court 
reviewed prior decisions in which it had held that a criminal defendant need not 
show prejudice on appeal.  For 
example, total deprivation of trial counsel in violation of Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 
83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963), and lack of an impartial judge in violation 
of Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749 (1927) were both circumstances requiring 
reversal without evaluating prejudice to the defendant.  Fulminante, 499 U.S.  at 309, 111 
S.Ct. at ­­­1265.  The 
Court noted that "[t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is 
obviously affected by the absence of 
counsel for a criminal defendant, just as it is by the presence on the bench of 
a judge who is not impartial."  
Id., 499 U.S.  at 309-10, 
111 S.Ct. at ­­­1265.  
Other errors that were reversible without a showing of prejudice included 
"unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand jury, 
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 
U.S. 254[, 106 S. Ct. 617, 88 L. Ed. 2d 598] (1986); violation of the right to 
self-representation at trial, McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-178, n.8[, 104 S. Ct. 944, 950-951, n.8, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122] (1984); and violation of the right to 
public trial, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, [49-50, n.9, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2217, n.9, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31] (1984)."  
Fulminante, 499 U.S.  at 310, 111 S.Ct. at 
­­­1265.   

[¶25]    
The 
important common factor in cases applying an error per se standard, according to 
the Court, was that "[e]ach of these constitutional deprivations is a similar 
structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, 
rather than simply an error in the trial process itself."  Id.  In Fulminante, in contrast, the Court held 
that introducing an involuntary confession was a "trial" error, not a 
"structural" error, and therefore introducing the confession was not reversible 
per se.  Id.  Notably, the Court pointed out that 
admitting an involuntary confession was not "the type of error which transcends 
the criminal process.'"  Id., 499 U.S.  at 311, 111 S.Ct. at 
­­­1265.  The 
distinction between structural and trial error has also been adopted by several 
states.  E.g., Berry v. State, 651 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 2007); 
State v. Frost, 161 P.3d 361 (Wash. 
2007); State v. Langley, 958 So. 2d 1160 
(La. 2007); 
Arteaga-Lansaw v. People, 159 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2007).

[¶26]    
We first 
applied an error per se standard to opinions of guilt in Stephens, 774 P.2d 60.  The defendant in Stephens was charged with taking immoral 
or indecent liberties with his minor son.  
774 P.2d  at 62.  During the 
trial, the prosecutor asked three forensic experts whether they thought the 
victim had been sexually abused.  
All three responded in the affirmative.  Id. 
at 65-66.   The prosecutor also 
asked two of the three witnesses who they believed had assaulted the victim, and 
they indicated it was the defendant.  
We found that their testimony constituted an impermissible opinion of 
guilt because an expert's testimony of an accused's guilt is not helpful to the 
jury and encourages the jury to abdicate its responsibility to properly 
adjudicate the case.  Id. at 67.  Subsequent cases maintained the rule 
that testimony of guilt is improper.  
E.g., Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 881 
(Wyo. 1990); Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1338 
(Wyo. 
1992).  Of particular significance 
here, Stephens established that 
"testimony offering an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant, when elicited 
by a prosecuting attorney, should be perceived as error per se."  774 P.2d  at 68.  

[¶27]    
Our later 
decisions narrowed this rule by holding that the error per se standard was 
appropriate only when the prosecutor elicited the improper testimony.  If the witness spontaneously offered an 
opinion of an accused's guilt, we applied either a harmless or plain error 
standard of review, depending on whether the defendant objected to the 
testimony.  In Whiteplume, for example, the prosecutor 
did not elicit an opinion of guilt, but simply asked a testifying police officer 
the question, "What did you do next?"  
841 P.2d  at 1339.  The 
officer volunteered that he had made a "determination that [the victim] had been 
raped."  Id.  Because "the prosecution did not ask the 
direct question," we did not apply the error per se rule, but instead considered 
whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the officer's opinion 
testimony.  Id.  We ultimately reversed the conviction 
because "a reasonable possibility exist[ed] that, [without the testimony], the 
verdict might have been more favorable to appellant."  Id. 
at 1341.  We later 
commented:

Since 
Whiteplume, our review 
of issues concerning opinion testimony has developed the following rules. We 
apply an error-per-se standard when a prosecutor has improperly elicited an 
opinion of either defendant's guilt or the truthfulness of a witness. Taylor v. 
State, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 21, 17 P.3d 715, ¶ 21 (Wyo. 2001). When the prosecutor's question is not a signal for 
the witness's credibility-opinion-testimony and defense counsel did not object 
at trial the plain error standard, not the per se error standard, applies. 
Dudley v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Wyo. 1998). When a prosecutor does not seek an 
opinion but an investigating officer's testimony supplies one, we review the 
record to determine if the officer is implying that he believed or held an 
opinion with respect to the victim's version of the events surrounding the 
assault. Whiteplume, 841 P.2d  at 1339-40. If the officer intended to impliedly vouch for the truth of the 
victim's accusations, no corroborating evidence exists, and the central jury 
issue is the victim's credibility, we will find reversible error when our review 
of all of the circumstances demonstrates prejudice to the extent that our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined. Id. at 1340-41; Dudley, 951 P.2d  at 
1180.

 Mitchell v. State, 2003 WY 160, ¶ 11, 81 P.3d 180, 183 (Wyo. 2003).  

[¶28]       
Neither 
Stephens nor any subsequent decisions 
involving opinions of guilt considered whether the error was structural or trial 
error.  Considering that distinction 
here, the conclusion is inescapable that opinion of guilt testimony is not a 
structural error, but a trial error to which an error per se standard should not 
apply.  This conclusion is 
consistent with our prior cases applying a plain error analysis when the 
testimony has not been elicited by the prosecution.  If the error is "structural," it should 
not matter how the testimony was elicited.  
If, for example, Dr. Gibson had testified: "I concluded that Ms. Large 
abused JL," the conviction would be reversed automatically if the prosecutor's 
question elicited the testimony.  
But the same statement in response to an innocent question such as, "What 
did you do next?" would not be error per se.  In each case, the jury would hear 
precisely the same answer.  The only 
difference in the two situations is the prosecutor's 
question.

[¶29]    
Our 
conclusion that opinion of guilt testimony is not a structural error does not 
completely resolve the question of whether an error per se approach is 
appropriate.  Our prior decisions 
applied different standards of review depending on whether the testimony was 
elicited by the prosecutor.  This 
suggests that prosecutorial misconduct was a factor in establishing error per se 
as the standard of review.  In 
examining claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we typically require an appellant 
to demonstrate prejudice in order to prevail.  E.g., Talley v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 9, 
153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2007); Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 23, 63 P.3d 875, 884 (Wyo. 2003).  In at least one area of repeated prosecutorial misconduct, however, 
we imposed an error per se rule as a deterrent:  

Since we overruled Clenin v. 
State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 844 
(1978) in Richter v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1269 (1982), where 
we held that such violations were not necessarily prejudicial and, under some 
fact situations, constitute harmless error, our attention has been called to far 
too many instances where prosecutors seem to be playing "Russian roulette" with 
this impermissible practice. The game seems to be that prosecutors will take the 
chance and ask about or comment upon silence even though they know that these 
interrogations are impermissible as being in violation of the defendant's Fifth 
Amendment rights to the federal constitution and his Art. 1, § 11, Wyoming constitutional 
rights [against forced self incrimination]on the theory that the Supreme Court 
in all probability will hold the error to be harmless.

No more.

We herewith return to the rule of 
Clenin v. State, supra, 
and will hold that any comment upon the accused's exercise of his or her right 
to remain silent is prejudicial error which will entitle the accused to a 
reversal of the conviction.

Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220, 221-22 (Wyo. 1984) (footnotes 
omitted).  Although we have 
previously applied an error per se analysis to prosecutor-elicited opinions of 
guilt, we have never done so because of a perceived need to curb prosecutorial 
misconduct in this specific area.  
We perceive no such need now.

[¶30]    
In 
summary, we find there is no proper basis for applying an error per se standard 
of review to prosecutor-elicited opinions of guilt.  While it may be error to admit an 
opinion of guilt, it is trial error rather than structural error.  That remains true whether or not the 
prosecutor elicits the opinion.  It 
is unnecessary to apply an error per se standard as a deterrent to repeated 
prosecutorial misconduct.  
Accordingly, we will no longer treat a prosecutor-elicited opinion of 
guilt as error per se.  To the 
extent this conflicts with our holding in Stephens, we hereby overrule Stephens.

[¶31]    
Because 
Ms. Large did not object to the trial testimony she now claims should not have 
been admitted, we review for plain error.  
E.g., Talley, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d  at 260.  "This standard requires the alleged 
error 1) be clearly reflected in the record, 2) be a violation of a clear and 
unequivocal, not merely arguable, rule of law, and 3) deny an appellant a 
substantial right resulting in material prejudice."  Sanderson, ¶ 16, 165 P.3d  at 89.  Finding plain error is an exceptional 
circumstance.  "The 
plain-error' doctrine will be applied only where the error seriously affects 
the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings."  Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150, 1153 
(Wyo. 
1978).

[¶32]    
In Ms. 
Large's case, the alleged error is clearly reflected in the record, and we have 
determined that Dr. Gibson's testimony constituted an improper opinion of Ms. 
Large's guilt.  Nevertheless, when 
viewed in context of the entire record, Dr. Gibson's opinion testimony was 
harmless.  Given all of the evidence 
introduced against Ms. Large at trial, there is no reasonable possibility that 
the verdict might have been more favorable to her in the absence of the 
challenged testimony.  There is no 
dispute that JL was sexually abused, and she testified that Ms. Large was one of 
the perpetrators.  This testimony 
was corroborated by Mr. Dye and by ML.  
Under the circumstances, Ms. Large has not established that Dr. Gibson's 
opinion of guilt testimony was prejudicial.  Accordingly, we do not find plain 
error.

[¶33]    
Ms. 
Large also claims that three portions of Ms. England's 
testimony constituted improper vouching.  
The first section of Ms. England's testimony that Ms. Large claims is 
plain error is from the prosecution's direct examination concerning Ms. 
England's diagnosis that JL suffered 
from Reactive Attachment Disorder (RAD):

Q.        Which of 
those [RAD symptoms] do you recall that [JL] has?

A.        [JL]the 
primary thing that [JL] has is the control, the control issues, . . . she's very 
accepting of strangers.  She'sshe 
can be very clingy with a person that she doesn't know well.  She's perfectly willing to go off with 
whoever comes along.  At the same 
time, she's very guarded and defensive and distrustful of people that normally a 
child might trust.  She'sshe is 
very guarded with caretakers.  She's 
very guarded with people thatthat she would be expected to trust.  She doesn't trust them.  Sheshe lies, but she's not a good 
liar.  She'sshe's obvious in her 
lies, andand it's pretty easy to get her toto acknowledge that something is a 
lie, but she does lie.

The 
second is the following cross-examination testimony elicited by defense counsel 
from Ms. England:

Q.        You 
indicated, did you not, that one of the characteristics of someone who has [RAD] 
is lying?

A.        
Yes.

            
. . .

Q.        Is it 
possible if people from [DFS] or law enforcement personnel or prosecutors meet 
with children and discuss their sexual abuse that those children might come to 
perceive that that's what they think is important about 
them?

A.        If it was 
ongoing.  See, that's the thing with 
my relationship with [JL].  I am 
with the child two, three, four times a week.

Q.        I'm not 
asking

A.        Ititif a 
law enforcement person interviewed her once or twice, that's not an ongoing 
relationship, and it would be less likely to have that 
effect.

Q.        But is it 
possible?  What would be 
possible?

A.        I suppose 
it would be possible.

Q.        And 
wouldn't it also be possible that if that's the case, she might tell a number of 
different things in order to get their favor if what you just indicated was 
correct?

A.        Well, I'm 
not entirely sure what you indicated is correct, butbut sure, you know, if you 
reinforce something, if you reinforce a behavior, you're going to see more of 
it.  [JL] is not a good liar.  She's not a kid who can sustain a story 
or a lie.  She will lie, but she's 
not a kid who can sustain it.  She's 
not a kid who can keep it up andand be consistent in her presentation of the 
lie.

Q.        Is that an 
obvious thing?  I mean, anyone who's 
around her on a regular basis would be able to tell if she's lying or not, at 
least in your opinion?

A.        Anyone who 
is around her on a regular basis, I wouldI would say begins to pick up on when 
she's lying, yeah.  She telegraphs 
it.  Plus, she responds to being 
asked to tell the truth.

And, 
finally, Ms. Large objects to Ms. England's testimony elicited by the 
prosecutor during re-direct examination:

Q.        Why can't 
[JL] lie well?

A.        [JL]'s 
intellectual functioning is notshe is notshe does not fall in the average 
range of intellectual functioning.  
She falls in the lower part of the borderline range . . . so thepart of 
the reason is thatthat she doesn't have the intellectual capability of 
sustaining a lie over time.  She 
doesn'tshe doesn't remember whatwhat she said or quite how she said it or what 
details she put into it, and so she'll tell you one thing one time, and the next 
time it's significantly different.

            
And the other thing is that if you confront her with it, "[JL], that's 
just not true," her eyes drop, and if you are patient and you wait her out, 
she'll usually tell you what is true.

Q.        [Defense 
counsel] is alleging that a variety of people got together and encouraged people 
to lie. [Overruled objection] Are you aware of any people who have encouraged 
[JL] to lie?

A.        I am 
not.

Q.        Have you 
encouraged her to lie?

A.        
Certainly not.

Q.        What 
have you encouraged her to do?

A.        I've 
encouraged her to trust, learn tolearn to trust adults, and I've encouraged her 
to take it on faith that adults will behave toward her in a trustworthy 
manner.  It's very hard for 
her.

[¶34]    
Ms. 
England, in her testimony, did not 
improperly vouch for JL's credibility.  
Ms. England related her diagnosis and the 
foundations for that diagnosis.  
Furthermore, as the excerpts show, Ms. England's 
reference to JL's lying behavior was initially quite brief, and it was defense 
counsel who attempted to capitalize on what might be considered useful 
impeachment material.  By doing so, 
the door was opened, and we can see nothing improper in the prosecutor's 
treatment of the issue on re-direct examination.  Consequently, there is no plain error in 
the admission of Ms. England's 
testimony.

[¶35]    
In Ms. 
Large's final appellate issue, she objects to testimony of Ms. Harmon and the 
prosecutor's investigator, Randy Bingham, to the extent that they testified 
about their interactions with JL and ML.  
Both witnesses repeated statements made by JL and ML in those 
interactions.  Ms. Large claims on 
appeal that Ms. Harmon's and Mr. Bingham's testimony constituted hearsay and, 
consequently, was inadmissible.  Ms. 
Large made no objection to this testimony at trial, thus we will review her 
claims for plain error.

[¶36]    
We agree 
with the State that these statements are not hearsay under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), 
which states:

A 
statement is not hearsay if: . . . The declarant testifies at the trial or 
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the 
statement is . . . consistent with his testimony and is offered to 
rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper 
influence or motive.

[¶37]    
We have 
previously listed four elements that determine whether W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) 
applies: "(1) The declarant testifies at trial; (2) the declarant is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the prior statement; (3) the prior statement is 
consistent with the declarant's trial testimony; and (4) the prior statement is 
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive."  Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 26, 157 P.3d 923, 929 (Wyo. 2007).  When 
evaluating the cross-examination requirement, we have previously allowed 
testimony under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) even when "counsel for the defense 
studiously avoided cross-examining most witnesses and deferred his opening 
statement until after the State had presented its case."  Alicea v. State, 13 P.3d 693, 698 (Wyo. 
2000).  We also do not require, 
under the third element, that a declarant testify, point-by-point, to every 
detail in the prior statements.  See id. at 699.  For example, in Alicea we held that the testimony of the 
child witnesses satisfied this requirement, although the later adult testimony 
contained considerably more detail.  
Id.  

[¶38]    
The 
first requirement is easily met: JL and ML testified at trial.  The second is also met because Ms. Large 
had an opportunity to cross-examine JL and ML, even though she chose not to take 
that opportunity with JL, and only briefly cross-examined ML.  The third requirement is satisfied as 
well.  In spite of Ms. Large's 
contention that the trial testimony did not precisely mirror the out-of-court 
statements, it is not necessary that the witness do so.  JL had described both instances of abuse 
and said that Ms. Large actively participated in them.  She also testified that the three of 
themJL, Mr. Dye, and Ms. Largewere unclothed during the incidents.  ML testified that he had seen Mr. Dye, 
Ms. Large, and JL unclothed in the living room, and described what they were 
doing.  In fact, their testimony was 
quite similar to that in Alicea, 
noted above.  The children's 
testimony met the third element and was sufficient to render the testimony of 
the foster mother and the investigator admissible under W.R.E. 
801(d)(1)(B).

[¶39]    
As for 
the fourth element, the record shows that the prior statements were in fact 
offered to rebut explicit charges of improper influence.  Defense counsel claimed from the opening 
statement that the children had been influenced to tell false stories about Ms. 
Large's involvement: "[W]hat I suggest the evidence will show is not so much 
that they helped the children open up to speak of these horrendous acts, but 
that these well-meaning folks actually helped create the story that they're now 
reporting."  Defense counsel 
consistently pursued this strategy throughout opening statement,2 in the cross-examination of 
witnesses,3 and in closing argument.4

[¶40]    
The 
record leaves little doubt in our minds that the defense theory throughout the 
trial was that the children had been improperly influenced to make false 
accusations.  Because the record 
establishes that all four elements required to apply W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) are met 
in this case, the trial court did not violate any clear and unequivocal rule of 
law when it allowed this testimony.  
As a result, we can find no plain error.

[¶41]    
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-303(a) (LexisNexis 2005):

Any 
actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the 
second degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the 
first degree:

. . 
.

(v) At 
the time of the commission of the act the victim is less than twelve (12) years 
of age and the actor is at least four (4) years older than the 
victim.

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303(a) (LexisNexis 2005): "A person is guilty of conspiracy to 
commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) or 
more of them will commit a crime and one (1) or more of them does an overt act 
to effect the objective of the agreement."

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-4-303(b) (LexisNexis 2005): "A person is guilty of sexual 
exploitation of a child if, for any purpose, he knowingly: . . . (ii) Causes, 
induces, entices or coerces a child to engage in, or be used for, any explicit 
sexual conduct."

2"[W]hat 
it takes [to get the children to disclose] are leading questions and basically 
rewarding them when they tell the story that the State wants you to 
hear."

3"Is it 
possible if people . . . meet with children and discuss their sexual abuse that 
those children might come to perceive that that's what they think is important 
about them?"

4"On 
every occasion . . . [JL] would respond to indicate that she had been sexually 
abused after being confronted about misbehavior at school or elsewhere or when 
it was possible that she might be leaving [the foster 
home]."