Case Title: Robinson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 18S-CR-33

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2018-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 18S-CR-33 
Jacob O. Robinson, 
Appellant (Defendant), 
–v– 
State of Indiana, 
Appellee (Plaintiff). 
Argued: February 15, 2018 | Decided: February 23, 2018 
Appeal from the Floyd Circuit Court, No. 22C01-1402-FD-377 
The Honorable J. Terrence Cody 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,  
No. 22A01-1604-CR-856 
Per Curiam Opinion 
All Justices concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Feb 23 2018, 11:47 am
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Per Curiam. 
Facts and Procedural History 
On February 21, 2014, Jacob O. Robinson fled from police on foot, 
attempted to enter a house without the owner’s permission, and broke the 
doorknob. The State charged Robinson under Case No. 22C01-1402-FD-
377 (“Case 377”) with Class D felony attempted residential entry, Class D 
felony possession of methamphetamine, Class D felony unlawful 
possession of a syringe, Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana, 
Class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and Class A 
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The State also alleged Robinson 
is a habitual offender and a habitual substance offender. 
In November 2014, while out on bond, Robinson fled from police while 
driving his car. The State charged Robinson under Case No. 22C01-1411-
F6-1932 (“Case 1932”) with Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and 
alleged he is a habitual offender. 
In Case No. 377, Robinson pleaded guilty to Class D felony attempted 
residential entry. See Ind. Code §§ 35-43-2-1.5 (effective 1991 to June 30, 
2014), 35-41-5-1 (effective 1977 to June 30, 2014). He also admitted to being 
a habitual substance offender. In Case No. 1932, Robinson pleaded guilty 
to Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. In exchange, the State 
dismissed all other charges in Case No. 377 and, in both cases, dropped 
the allegation that Robinson is a habitual offender.   
At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court scheduled a sentencing 
hearing for September 24, 2015, at 10:30 a.m., and instructed Robinson to 
make an appointment with the probation department for purposes of the 
presentence investigation report. (Tr. pp. 20-21.) Robinson failed to attend 
two scheduled appointments.   
Robinson also failed to appear at his sentencing hearing. His attorney 
appeared late due to a trial in another county. Counsel orally moved for a 
continuance of the sentencing hearing, informing the court he had 
received a text from Robinson that morning at 6:34 a.m. asking counsel to 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-CR-33 | February 23, 2018 
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“get this case laid over” because Robinson had a real estate closing 
“coming up in the next few days” and “wish[ed] to get his ducks in line.” 
(Tr. p. 25.) Counsel had tried to call Robinson, but Robinson’s phone did 
not accept calls, only texts, and counsel was unable to send a text due to 
problems with his service provider.  
The trial court denied a continuance, indicating  
Mr. Robinson was in Court on the day that this hearing was 
scheduled and he blew off two appointments with . . . the 
probation officer [ ] in preparation of the Report and that leads 
me to the conclusion that Mr. Robinson isn’t taking this matter 
seriously so that’s why I’m denying the continuance[.]  
(Tr. p. 27.) 
The court held the hearing in Robinson’s absence, and counsel 
presented argument in Robinson’s defense. The presentence investigation 
report filed with the court indicates Robinson has an extensive criminal 
history that includes multiple drug related convictions. The court 
sentenced Robinson to three years executed on the attempted residential 
entry conviction and two years executed on the resisting law enforcement 
conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively. The court 
withheld sentencing on the habitual substance offender enhancement 
until Robinson appeared in court and issued a warrant for his arrest. 
Robinson was arrested in January 2016. He appeared with counsel at 
the second sentencing hearing on March 3, 2016. The court imposed a 
three-year sentence on the habitual substance offender enhancement, with 
one and one-half years executed and one and one-half years suspended to 
probation.   
Robinson appealed and raised two issues. First, whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue the sentencing 
hearing. Second, whether the maximum sentence on the attempted 
residential entry conviction was inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). 
The Court of Appeals addressed neither issue and, instead, sua sponte 
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reversed on other grounds. Robinson v. State, 84 N.E.3d 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2017), vacated.   
Having granted transfer, we address the issues Robinson raised on 
appeal.1     
Discussion and Decision 
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying 
a Continuance. 
Rulings on non-statutory motions for continuance are within the trial 
court’s discretion and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion 
and resultant prejudice. Maxey v. State, 730 N.E.2d 158, 160 (Ind. 2000). An 
abuse occurs only where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the 
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Palmer v. State, 704 N.E.2d 
124, 127 (Ind. 1999). “There is a strong presumption that the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion.” Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 239, 247 (Ind. 
2002). 
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Robinson’s request to continue the sentencing hearing.  Robinson sought a 
last-minute continuance on grounds he had a real estate closing within the 
next few days and desired to “get his ducks in line.” He also failed to 
attend two appointments with the probation department.   
II. The Trial Court’s Sentence for Attempted Residential 
Entry Is Not Inappropriate. 
The Indiana Constitution authorizes appellate review and revision of a 
trial court’s sentencing decision.  Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Serino v. State, 
                                                 
1 The State raised a single issue on cross-appeal, whether Robinson timely filed his Notice of 
Appeal.  We find it unnecessary to address this issue.     
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798 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ind. 2003).  This authority is implemented through 
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a 
sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the 
sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 
and the character of the offender. Serino, 798 N.E.2d at 856. The principal 
role of such review is to attempt to leaven the outliers. Cardwell v. State, 
895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). The burden is on the defendant to 
persuade the reviewing court that the sentence is inappropriate. Bowman 
v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1181 (Ind. 2016).   
Under the statute then in effect, the sentence for a Class D felony was a 
fixed term between six months and three years, with an advisory term of 
one and one-half years. I.C § 35-50-2-7 (effective July 1, 2013 to June 30, 
2014). The trial court sentenced Robinson to three years executed on the 
conviction for Class D felony attempted residential entry, finding 
Robinson’s criminal history outweighed any mitigating factors. (Tr. p. 35.)  
Our judgment is that the sentence imposed by the trial court is not 
inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) and does not warrant appellate 
revision.   
Conclusion 
We affirm the trial court. 
All Justices concur.   
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
R. Patrick Magrath 
Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP 
Madison, Indiana 
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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Tyler G. Banks 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana