Case Title: Lyden By and Through Lyden v. Winer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lyden By and Through Lyden v. Winer1996 WY 45913 P.2d 451Case Number: 95-108Decided: 03/20/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

LARRY 
LYDEN, By and Through DAVID LYNDEN, Conservator of the Estate of Larry 
Lyden,  

Appellant 
(Plaintiff), 

 

v. 

 

ERNEST 
WINER, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County 

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge.

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

James R. 
McCarty and John D. Whitaker, Casper. 

Representing 
Appellee: 

Rex O. 
Arney and Todd H. Hambrick of Murane & Bostwick, 
Casper.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]       This appeal 
involves a case wherein a social guest of a tenant was injured while visiting 
the tenant's rented residence and thereafter sought to hold the landlord liable 
for his injuries. Appellant Larry Lyden (Lyden), the social guest, by and 
through his conservator, David Lyden, filed a negligence action against appellee 
Ernest Winer, the landlord. After a jury trial on the merits, judgment was 
entered finding that Winer was not negligent in connection with Lyden's 
injuries. On appeal, Lyden asserts that the district court erred in excluding 
certain evidence and testimony and refusing to give a requested jury 
instruction.

 

[¶2]       We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]       Lyden 
presents the following issues for review:

 

Did the 
trial court err when it applied the law of the case doctrine to prohibit 
Plaintiff from introducing evidence of the Defendant's violation of the building 
code and evidence of agency between landlord and tenant to prove that the 
Defendant was negligent?

 

Did the 
trial court err when it refused to allow the Plaintiff's safety expert to 
testify that the Defendant's stairway was a violation of the applicable standard 
of care required of a homeowner in that the stairway did not have sufficient 
headroom clearance and handrails?

 

[¶4]       Winer 
responds with the following issues:

 

I. Did 
the trial court commit a clear error of law when limiting the issues at trial to 
those specifically mandated by the Wyoming Supreme Court?

 

A. In 
the event that the Court holds that the application of the law of the case 
doctrine was a clear error, was it harmless error?

 

II. Was 
it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude the testimony of 
Douglas Barrett?

 

BACKGROUND

 

[¶5]       A full 
recitation of the facts surrounding Lyden's claim can be found in Lyden v. Winer, 878 P.2d 516 (Wyo. 
1994). In summary, Winer owned a house in Casper which he rented to a tenant. 
While visiting the tenant, Lyden slipped and fell down a flight of steps leading 
to the basement. Lyden hit his head and was seriously injured. Lyden filed suit 
against Winer alleging he had negligently maintained the stairs. Winer moved for 
and was granted summary judgment. On appeal, we held that whether Winer retained 
control over any area of the premises was a question of fact and, therefore, a 
genuine question of fact existed for the trier of fact to determine. Lyden, at 520. We reversed the decision 
of the district court and remanded for proceedings consistent with our 
opinion.

 

[¶6]       After the 
mandate issued, Winer filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The district 
court concluded that its prior finding of no genuine issues of material fact as 
to Lyden's claims of agency/joint enterprise and violations of the building code 
was the law of the case and, therefore, Winer continued to have summary judgment 
as to those issues.

 

[¶7]       A trial on 
the merits was held wherein Lyden was allowed to present to the jury his theory 
of the case that Winer had retained control over the stairs and that he was 
negligent in maintaining those stairs. Lyden was not allowed to present evidence 
as to his agency/joint enterprise theory and was not allowed to present evidence 
that Winer had violated the building code. The jury returned a verdict for 
Winer, finding that he was not negligent. Lyden timely 
appeals.

 

DISCUSSION

 

I. 
Application of the "law of the case" doctrine

 

[¶8]  Lyden contends that the district court 
erred in concluding that the law of the case doctrine dictated that Winer 
continued to have summary judgment as to his agency/joint enterprise and 
violation of building code claims. Lyden argues that our holding and mandate in 
Lyden did not rule that summary judgment applied to those 
claims.

 

[¶9]       The "law of 
the case" doctrine stands for the proposition that a court's decision on an 
issue of law made at one stage of a case becomes a binding precedent to be 
followed in successive stages of the same litigation. Triton Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 846 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo. 1993); see also 1B 
Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.404[1] (2d ed. 1991). This doctrine is designed 
to avoid repetitious litigation and to promote consistent decision making; thus, 
it is related to res judicata, collateral estoppel and stare decisis. Triton Coal, at 667. Usually the "law of 
the case" doctrine requires a district court to adhere to its prior rulings, 
adhere to the rulings of an appellate court, or adhere to another judge's 
rulings in the same case or a closely related case. Triton Coal, at 668; see also 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: § 
4478 (1981).

 

[¶10]     In Lyden, 878 P.2d  at 520, we 
held:

 

Likewise, 
whether landlord's control of the premises may be inferred from the facts 
present in this case is a question for the trier of fact. * * * We thus reverse 
and remand for a determination by the trier of fact.

 

As noted 
earlier, if the trier of fact determines that appellee landlord retained control 
of the rented premises, or the portion in question, then appellee owes the same 
duty of care to both the tenant and her social guest. * * 
*

 

Landlord 
owes a duty, to his tenant and any person on the premises by right of the 
tenant, to exercise reasonable care in maintaining those areas of the rented 
premises over which he retains control. Whether appellee landlord retained 
control over any area of the premises is a question of fact, and, in this case, 
a genuine question of fact does exist.

 

We 
reverse the decision of the district court and remand for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.

 

[¶11]     The mandate states, in 
relevant part:

 

MANDATE 
REVERSING JUDGMENT

 

The 
referenced cause was taken under advisement and the opinion of this Court was 
delivered on July 27, 1994, reversing the judgment of the district court. 
Therefore, in accordance with WYO.R.APP.P. 9, it is,

 

ORDERED that 
the judgment of the Seventh Judicial District Court, Natrona County, Wyoming, be 
and hereby is, reversed.

 

Even 
though the mandate is stated in fairly general terms, the language in Lyden is 
very clear and specific - an issue of material fact existed as to whether Winer 
retained control of the premises. This court made no findings concerning other 
claims. Our reversal, without affirming any part of the summary judgment order, 
necessarily meant that the entire order was reversed. Accordingly, because the 
summary judgment order became a nullity, the district court was in error for 
relying on the "law of the case" doctrine in ruling that Winer continued to have 
summary judgment as to Lyden's other claims. However, we find this to be 
harmless error.

 

[¶12]     The effect of a general 
reversal of a summary judgment order is to nullify it completely and to leave 
the case standing as if such judgment, order, or decree had never been rendered, 
except insofar as rights to a new trial or further proceedings may survive. Triton Coal, 846 P.2d  at 668; see also 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 959 at 457 (1993). 
Following a complete reversal, the issues are open to a district court except as 
qualified by the appellate court. Triton 
Coal, at 678 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This general principle is embodied in 
5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 792 
(1995):

 

[A] 
trial court taking a case on remand may generally consider or decide any matter 
left open by the remanding appellate court. Moreover, a court on remand * * * is 
ordinarily free to make an order or direction on questions not presented or 
settled by the appellate court which is not inconsistent with the appellate 
court's opinion. * * * In addition, issues that were not, or could not have 
been, dispositively resolved on their merits in the appellate court may be 
considered on remand. (Footnotes omitted.) When there is nothing in the terms of 
the mandate to prevent it, the district court has the power, on reconsideration, 
to find the same facts and determinations regarding an issue as in its original 
holding or to find different facts and determinations and change its original 
holding.

 

[¶13]     In the case on appeal, 
after we issued Lyden and its 
mandate, Winer moved for partial summary judgment regarding Lyden's other 
claims. Nothing in the terms of the mandate or Lyden prevented the district court from 
reconsidering the other claims and finding that Winer was still entitled to 
summary judgment on those claims. The purpose of summary judgment is to dispose 
of those issues that are not in dispute or that cannot be proved at trial. The 
initial burden was on Winer to show that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact. Once that showing was made, it was incumbent upon Lyden, as the party 
opposing summary judgment, to come forward with specific facts to show that 
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to those claims. Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1098 (Wyo. 1987). Conclusory affidavits are insufficient and specific 
facts must be shown. Id.

 

[¶14]     In this regard we are 
somewhat hindered by the fact that Lyden's memorandum brief in opposition to 
Winer's motion for partial summary judgment was not designated as part of the 
record on appeal; and, therefore, we are constrained to review only those 
materials Lyden presented in the original summary judgment proceeding. The 
record discloses no specific fact or evidence that Winer knew that the stairs 
were in violation of building codes or that the tenant was Winer's agent. Thus, 
no genuine issues of material fact existed as to those claims. As such, summary 
judgment was appropriate.

 

[¶15]     The district court 
could have found, and in all likelihood did find, that nothing had changed 
regarding those claims since the original summary judgment order and, therefore, 
Winer was still entitled to summary judgment because no dispute over genuine 
issues of material fact existed regarding those claims. This determination is 
not inconsistent with our holding in Lyden, 878 P.2d 516. Consequently, Lyden 
was not entitled to have the jury instructed regarding these claims, and the 
district court did not err in refusing such instructions.

 

II. 
Expert Testimony

 

[¶16]     During trial, the 
district court refused to allow Lyden's expert witness to express opinions 
concerning the standard of care for a residential stairway. Lyden argues this 
amounted to an abuse of discretion in that the testimony would have 
substantiated his claim that Winer was negligent in his control of the 
premises.

 

[¶17]     Expert testimony is the 
subject of W.R.E. 702, which provides:

 

If 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise.

It is 
not the purpose of W.R.E. 702 to provide for blanket admissibility of expert 
testimony. Anderson v. 
Louisiana-Pacific, 859 P.2d 85, 87 (Wyo. 1993). A district court is vested 
with discretion to exclude expert testimony if it is deemed unnecessary or not 
helpful to the trier of the factual issues. Such a determination will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Id.; Reed v. Hunter, 663 P.2d 513, 517 (Wyo. 
1983). "In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the 
ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did." 
DJG v. MAP, 883 P.2d 946, 947 (Wyo. 
1994) (quoting Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980)). Whether in any given case expert testimony is 
necessary to aid the jury in its search for the truth depends upon a variety of 
factors readily apparent only to a trial court, and we must depend heavily upon 
its judgment. Anderson, 859 P.2d  at 
87.

 

[¶18]     We find that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Lyden to 
present expert testimony. The proposed expert testimony involved matters that 
the average juror could understand. The safety of stairs, including handrails 
and headroom, is not so beyond an average person's experience and understanding 
that expert testimony is required to explain it. The district court reasonably 
concluded that the testimony should not be allowed, and no abuse of discretion 
occurred.

 

CONCLUSION

[¶19]     It was harmless error 
for the district court to base its summary judgment ruling upon the law of the 
case doctrine, as no genuine issues of material fact existed regarding Lyden's 
agency/joint enterprise claim and violations of building code claim; as a matter 
of law, Winer was entitled to summary judgment as to those claims. Finally, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow Lyden to 
present expert testimony regarding safety of the stairs, as this issue was fully 
within the knowledge and understanding of the average juror, and thus was not 
necessary to assist the trier of fact.

 

[¶20]     Affirmed.