Case Title: Baessler v. Freier

Citation: 2011 WY 125, 258 P.3d 720

Docket Number: 2011-wy-125

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-08-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
PAUL 
BAESSLER, as personal representative for the ESTATE OF CAROL ANN MUNKBERG, 
Deceased; and KAREN R. SCHMID, as personal representative for the ESTATE OF JOHN 
ALLAN MUNKBERG, Deceased,Appellants (Plaintiffs),v.DOUG 
FREIER and DENNY FREIER, husband and wife, individually and d/b/a STOCKMAN'S BAR 
and the SMOKEHOUSE SALOON, Wyoming Partnerships in Fact,Appellees 
(Defendants).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Big Horn County
The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellants:
Larry 
B. Jones and William L. Simpson of Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, LLC, The Cody, 
Wyoming division of Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh and Jardine, P.C., Cody, 
Wyoming; and Patrick J. Crank of Nicholas & Crank, PC, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Jones.
 
Representing 
Appellees:
Ryan 
P. Healy of Healy Law Firm, Sheridan, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Wyoming Attorney General in his official capacity:
Jay 
Jerde, Deputy Attorney General.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
VOIGT, 
J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; KITE, 
C.J., 
files a dissenting opinion in which HILL, 
J., 
joins.
 
*This 
case was reassigned to Justice Voigt on July 19, 2011.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      The district 
court dismissed the appellants’ civil action against the appellees for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  The dismissal and this appeal raise 
issues of statutory construction and the constitutionality of a statute, with 
the focal question being the liability of a provider of alcohol for damages 
caused to a third person by the person to whom alcohol was provided.1  We affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      1.    Does the word “legally” in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(a) (LexisNexis 2011) encompass legal enactments 
beyond Title 12 of the Wyoming Statutes such as the municipal ordinances at 
issue in this case?
 
2.    If Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
12-8-301(a) prohibits liability under municipal ordinances, is the statute 
unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection provisions of the United 
States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution?
 
3.    If Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
12-8-301(a) prohibits liability under municipal ordinances, is the statute 
unconstitutional as violative of the special law provisions of article 3, 
section 27 of the Wyoming Constitution?
 
WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 12-8-301
 
[¶3]      § 
12-8-301.  Limitation of 
liability.
 
(a)    No person who has legally 
provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any other person is liable for 
damages caused by the intoxication of the other person.
 
(b)    This section does not affect 
the liability of the intoxicated person for damages.
 
(c)     This section does not 
affect the liability of the licensee or person if the alcoholic liquor or malt 
beverage was sold or provided in violation of title 12 of the Wyoming 
statutes.
 
(d)    For purposes of this section 
“licensee” is as defined in W.S. 12-1-101(a)(viii) and includes the licensee’s 
employee or employees.
 
FACTS2
 
[¶4]      
The 
appellants are the personal representatives of the estates of a husband and 
wife, Allan and Carol Ann Munkberg, who were killed in a motor vehicle accident 
caused by Randall LaBrie, who also died in the accident.  Prior to the accident, LaBrie became 
intoxicated as a result of consuming alcoholic beverages at the Stockman’s Bar 
in Basin, Wyoming, and the Smokehouse Saloon in Greybull, Wyoming, both of which 
establishments are owned by the individually named appellees.  LaBrie’s conduct at both establishments 
showed that he was highly intoxicated, and such conduct was obvious and 
noticeable to anyone in his presence.  
Nevertheless, the appellees’ employees at both establishments continued 
to serve alcoholic beverages to LaBrie.
 
[¶5]      The appellants 
filed a wrongful death/negligence complaint against the appellees, in which they 
also sought a judgment declaring § 12-8-301 unconstitutional if, as a matter of 
law, the statute provided immunity to the appellees for their tortious 
conduct.  The appellees responded 
with a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  After additional briefing and argument, 
the district court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that this Court 
had already found the statute to be constitutional in Greenwalt v. Ram Restaurant Corporation of 
Wyoming, 2003 WY 77, 71 P.3d 717 (Wyo. 2003).  This appeal 
followed.
 
DISCUSSION
 
Does 
the word “legally” in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(a) (LexisNexis 2011) encompass 
legal enactments beyond Title 12 of the Wyoming Statutes such as the municipal 
ordinances at issue in this case?
 
[¶6]      As applicable to 
the issues now before the Court, we have described our standard for the review 
of a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as 
follows:
 
Our 
review is de novo, and we employ the 
same standards and examine the same materials as the district court.  We accept the facts alleged in the 
complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party.  Dismissal is appropriate 
only if it is certain on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot 
assert any facts that create entitlement to relief.
 
Swinney 
v. Jones, 
2008 WY 150, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 512, 515 (Wyo. 2008).  Statutory construction is also a 
question of law that is reviewed de 
novo.  Sponsel v. Park County, 2006 WY 6, ¶ 9, 
126 P.3d 105, 108 (Wyo. 2006).
 
[¶7]      The issue of 
statutory construction presently before the Court is whether the limitation of 
liability provided in § 12-8-301(a) extends to any provider who has not violated 
a provision of Title 12 of the Wyoming Statutes or, to the contrary, extends to 
any provider who has not violated a provision of Title 12 of the Wyoming 
Statutes or any other provision of law that may apply to the sale or providing 
of alcohol.  Specifically, if the 
appellees did not violate Title 12 in providing alcohol to LaBrie, but did 
violate the provisions of local ordinances, do they lose the limitation on 
liability provided by the statute?  
Stated differently, and in terms related to a negligence cause of action, 
is the standard of care under the phrase “legally provided” limited to adherence 
to the provisions of Title 12, or can the standard of care under the statutory 
language be determined by the existence of a municipal 
ordinance?
 
[¶8]      While this 
precise question may not directly have been presented in Greenwalt, the opinion in that case 
clearly reveals our conclusion that Title 12 “covers the field” in regard to the 
meaning of “legally provided” in § 12-8-301(a).  In the course of generally discussing 
the plenary nature of the police power of the legislature, we examined that 
body’s 1985 response to McClellan v. 
Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983), in which case this Court had 
“established a common law tort claim upon which relief could be granted against 
a liquor vendor and in favor of an injured third-party.”  Greenwalt, 2003 WY 77, ¶ 12, 71 P.3d  at 
723.  First, we recognized that 
“regulation of all matters concerning intoxicating liquors is an area over which 
the legislative department is free to exercise its plenary police power.”  Id. at ¶ 19, at 725.  Next, we noted that the legislature’s 
“comprehensive exercise” of those powers is “largely found” in Title 12.  Id. at ¶ 20, at 726.  With this background, we concluded 
that
 
It 
is within this comprehensive regulatory scheme that we find the evidence of the 
legislature’s exercise of its plenary police power in the form of those specific 
sections creating the third-parties’ tort claim against those liquor licensees 
and non-licensees who furnish intoxicating liquor to persons who become 
intoxicated and cause damage to those third parties.
 
Id.
 
 
 
[¶9]      The post-McClellan 1985 legislation provided as 
follows:
 
12-8-301.  Limitation of 
liability.
 
(a)    No licensee is liable for 
damages caused by an intoxicated person to whom the licensee legally sold or 
furnished alcoholic liquor or malt beverage unless the licensee sold or provided 
alcoholic liquor or malt beverages to a person who was intoxicated; 
and:
 
(i)      It was reasonably 
apparent to the licensee that the person buying or receiving the alcoholic 
liquor or malt beverage was intoxicated; or
 
(ii)     The licensee knew or 
reasonably should have known from the circumstances that the person buying or 
receiving the alcoholic liquor or malt beverages was 
intoxicated.
 
(b)    No person who is not a 
licensee who has gratuitously and legally provided alcoholic liquor or malt 
beverage to any other person is liable for damages caused by the intoxication of 
the other person.
 
(c)     This section does not 
affect the liability of the intoxicated person for 
damages.
 
(d)    This section does not affect 
the liability of the licensee or person if the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage 
was sold or provided in violation of title 12 of the Wyoming 
statutes.
 
(e)    For purposes of this section 
“licensee” is as defined in W.S. 12-1-101(a)(viii) and includes the licensee’s 
employee or employees.
 
1985 
Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 205, § 1 at 342.
 
[¶10]   We will not repeat Greenwalt’s lengthy analysis of the 1985 
legislation.  Suffice it to say for 
the purpose of our current analysis that the statute recognized two types of 
licensee liability: in subsection (a), liability for selling or providing 
alcohol to an intoxicated person under certain circumstances, and in subsection 
(d), liability for selling or providing alcohol in violation of Title 12.  Clearly, the legislature viewed the type 
of liability recognized in subsection (a) as being legislative business within 
its police powers.  As stated in Greenwalt, the legislation “had enacted 
a full and comprehensive regulatory scheme expressing the state’s social policy 
in the problematic area of liquor provider liability.”  Greenwalt, 2003 WY 77, ¶ 25, 71 P.3d  at 
727.
 
[¶11]   Less than a year after the close of 
the 1985 legislative session, however, § 12-8-301 was amended to read as it does 
today, and as it is set forth above.  See supra ¶ 3.  We noted in Greenwalt that
 
one 
readily sees significant legislative retrenchment of civil liability compared to 
the 1985 legislation.  Importantly, 
in this regard a licensee which legally furnishes liquor to an 
intoxicated customer is not liable for damages caused by that customer’s 
intoxication.  § 12-8-301(a).  However, the civil liability of a 
licensee or non-licensee person who sells or provides liquor in violation of 
Title 12 of the Wyoming statutes remains intact.  § 12-8-301(c).
 
Id. 
at ¶ 27, at 727.  We then went on to 
list the various ways in which a licensee or non-licensee could be exposed to 
civil liability by violating various provisions of Title 12.3  Our conclusion was that “the legislative 
product remained a full and comprehensive regulatory scheme expressing the 
State’s social policy in this most complex area of damages caused by intoxicated 
members of our society.”  Id. at ¶ 32, at 728.  We still hold to that belief and we 
again conclude that the word “legally” in § 12-8-301(a) was intended by the 
legislature to mean only the law related to selling or providing alcohol set 
forth in Title 12.  

 
[¶12]   We will rely upon Greenwalt for iteration of one 
additional consideration in regard to this issue.  The argument has been made that it would 
be better social policy to have the duty of monitoring alcohol consumption fall 
upon the provider, than to place the general public at risk due to the lack of 
such duty.  In Greenwalt, we said the following in 
regard to that argument:
 
            
Answering the Greenwalts’ argument that the legislature would have been 
better advised to place on the alcohol provider (vendor, bartender, wait staff, 
liquor store clerks, and social hosts of every kind) the duty to monitor the 
drinking citizen’s consumption, the [appellees and the state] respond that, yes, 
the legislature could have drawn the line differently than it did, but sound 
reasons exist why it chose not to.
 
Id. 
at ¶ 58, at 737.  The point is that 
the legislature, a policy-making branch of government, chose not to place that 
duty upon the alcohol provider.  
Where the legislature has, in effect, preempted the field as to a 
statewide social issue, it is not the province of municipalities to enact 
contrary laws.  Green River v. Debernardi Constr. Co., 
816 P.2d 1287, 1290-91 (Wyo. 1991); see 
also Laramie Citizens for Good Government v. City of Laramie, 617 P.2d 474, 
482-83 (Wyo. 1980).4  “[T]he decision to impose liability, and 
under what circumstances, upon the suppliers of alcohol for the torts of their 
intoxicated patrons or guests is a matter of public policy which the legislature 
is best equipped to handle.”  Bland v. Scott, 112 P.3d 941, 949 (Kan. 
2005).  Consequently, whereas 
municipalities may to some extent police the sale and consumption of alcoholic 
beverages at the local level, they may not by ordinance establish a negligence 
standard of care different from that chosen by the 
legislature.
 
If 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(a) prohibits liability under municipal ordinances, is 
the statute unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection provisions of 
the United States Constitution and the Wyoming 
Constitution?
 
[¶13]   When the constitutionality of a 
statute is challenged, we apply the following standard of 
review:
 
            
“Issues of constitutionality present questions of law.  We review questions of law under a de novo standard of review and afford no 
deference to the district court’s determinations on the issues.  Anderson v. Bommer, 926 P.2d 959, 961 
(Wyo. 1996).  In reviewing a 
constitutionally based challenge to a statute, we presume the statute to be 
constitutional and any doubt in the matter must be resolved in favor of the 
statute’s constitutionality.  Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow 
Committee, 651 P.2d 778, 789-90 (Wyo. 1982).  [Appellant] bears the burden of proving 
the statute is unconstitutional.  Pfeil v. Amax Coal West, Inc., 908 P.2d 956, 961 (Wyo. 1995).”
 
Reiter 
v. State, 
2001 WY 116, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d 586, 589 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting V-1 Oil Co. v. State, 934 P.2d 740, 742 
(Wyo. 1997)).  The appellant’s 
burden of proof is heavy, and it includes the obligation to show both that he 
has a constitutionally protected interest and that it has been infringed in an 
impermissible way.
 
Fraternal 
Order of Eagles Sheridan Aerie No. 186, Inc. v. State, 
2006 WY 4, ¶ 47, 126 P.3d 847, 863 (Wyo. 2006) (some internal citations 
omitted).
 
[¶14]   There is little to be gained by a 
repetition here of all that we said in Greenwalt in regard to this issue.  See Greenwalt, 2003 WY 77, ¶¶ 38-66, 71 P.3d  at 729-39.  The doctrine of stare decisis requires us to accept the 
principal underlying rationale of our determination in that case that § 12-8-301 
does not violate the equal protection provisions of the state and federal 
constitutions.  Stare decisis is “the doctrine of 
precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the 
same points arise again in litigation.”  
Alpine Lumber Co. v. Capital West 
Nat’l Bank, 2010 WY 62, ¶ 12, 231 P.3d 869, 872 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1537 (9th ed. 
2009)).  Adherence to precedent 
“furthers the even-handed, predictable, and consistent development of legal 
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the 
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”  Goodrich v. Stobbe, 908 P.2d 416, 420 
(Wyo. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  And, of significance in this case, “stare decisis in respect to statutory 
interpretation has 'special force’ . . . .”  Alpine Lumber, 2010 WY 62, ¶ 12, 231 P.3d  at 873 (quoting John R. Sand & 
Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139, 128 S. Ct. 750, 756, 169 L. Ed. 2d 591 (2008)).
 
[¶15]   The underlying rationale of Greenwalt’s equal protection analysis is 
this: it is the legislature’s prerogative to determine, as a matter of public 
policy, that the risk of injury to third persons as a result of someone’s 
alcohol consumption is better placed upon the consumer of that alcohol than upon 
its provider.  2003 WY 77, ¶¶ 63-64, 
71 P.3d  at 738-39.  We said in Greenwalt that “the legislature has 
defined the duty/breach of duty elements [of a negligence claim] in terms of the 
liquor providers’ violations of the regulatory provisions of Title 12.”  Id. at ¶ 56, at 737.  In other words, we have already 
determined that this legislative line-drawing that results in injured third 
parties being able to recover from the alcohol consumer who injured them, but 
not the person who provided the alcohol to that consumer, does not violate the 
concept of equal protection of the laws.  In their appellate brief, the appellants 
place great reliance upon the dissenting opinion in Greenwalt, but that dissenting opinion, 
obviously, is not the law of the State.  Because we also recognized and accepted 
in Greenwalt that the legislature had 
allowed for liability on the part of the provider under certain circumstances, 
with those circumstances being limited to those set forth in Title 12, we do not 
believe that addition of the municipal ordinance argument in the instant case 
changes the result.  Id.  In the pervasive regulatory scheme 
established in Title 12, the legislature established not only the regulations, 
but the consequences for their violation.  
The legislature’s 1986 amendment of the 1985 legislation to remove the 
liability of providers to injured third parties except where a provision of 
Title 12 had been violated was a clear rejection of the appellees’ present 
argument.
 
If 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(a) prohibits liability under municipal ordinances, is 
the statute unconstitutional as violative of the special law provisions of 
article 3, section 27 of the Wyoming 
Constitution?
 
[¶16]   The appellants contend that § 
12-8-301(a) violates article 3, section 27 of the Wyoming Constitution, 
which prohibits “special laws” that, inter alia, limit civil actions, or that 
grant “to any corporation, association or individual . . . any special . . . 
immunity. . . .”  A special law is a 
“law that pertains to and affects a particular case, person, place, or thing, as 
opposed to the general public.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 963 (9th ed. 
2009).  In more detail, a special 
law has been described as follows:
 
            
Ordinarily, a statute is regarded as a “special law” if it does not have 
a uniform operation.  A law is 
“special” if it operates upon and affects only a fraction of the persons or a 
portion of the property encompassed by a classification, granting privileges to 
some while denying them to others.  
Special legislation relates either to particular persons, places, or 
things, or to persons, places or things which, though not particularized, are 
separated by any method of selection from the whole class to which the law 
might, but for such legislation, be applied.  Classifications for the purpose of 
legislation, under a state constitution’s prohibition against special 
legislation, must be real and not illusive, and they cannot be based on 
distinctions without a substantial difference.
 
73 
Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 4 (2001).  By contrast, a “general law” is a law 
that meets the following description:
 
            
General laws are those operating uniformly throughout a state, which 
prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally, and which operate with 
general uniform application throughout the state under the same circumstances 
and conditions.  A law uniformly 
applying to a class of persons or things having a reasonable and just 
relationship to the regulated subject matter is a general law.  Thus, for example, where a legislative 
method of providing aid has an equal impact on all members of a rationally 
defined class similarly situated, the law is a general 
law.
 
            
. . . .
 
            
Some state constitutions require that laws of a general nature must have 
uniform operation.  General laws 
operate uniformly, not because they operate on every person in the state, but 
because every person brought under the law is affected by it in uniform fashion, 
and a legislature may exclude certain persons or things from the application of 
a general law.  A general law does 
not lose its general law status so long as it operates uniformly upon subjects 
as they may exist in the state, applies uniformly within permissible 
classifications, and operates universally throughout the state or so long as it 
relates to state function or instrumentality.  However, a general law operates as an 
unreasonable classification, in violation of a uniformity clause, when it seeks 
to create artificial distinctions where no real distinction 
exists.
 
Id. 
at § 3.
 
[¶17]   With relative consistency, this 
Court has for years treated article 3, section 27 as an equal protection 
provision, and we have interpreted it in conjunction with article 1, section 34, 
which proclaims that “[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have a uniform 
operation.”  See, e.g., Krenning v. Heart Mountain 
Irrigation Dist., 2009 WY 11, ¶ 33 n.4, 200 P.3d 774, 784 n.4 (Wyo. 2009); 
Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Geringer, 
941 P.2d 742, 746 (Wyo. 1997); Mills v. 
Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 52-53 (Wyo. 1992); White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1316 
(Wyo. 1989); Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 781-82 (Wyo. 1988); and Phillips v. 
ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821, 826 (Wyo. 1980).  The appellants in the instant case have 
followed that lead, providing a special law argument that simply mirrors their 
equal protection argument.  That 
argument, in essence, is that § 12-8-301 creates two unlawful 
classifications that are not rationally related to the purpose of the 
legislation: (1) vendors who are not liable for injuries caused by patrons 
served inside an establishment vs. vendors who are liable for injuries caused by 
patrons served in a drive-in area; and (2) third parties who may not recover 
from vendors who sold to patrons served inside an establishment vs. third 
parties who may recover from vendors who sold to patrons served in a drive-in 
area.
 
[¶18]   To some extent, this issue was 
decided against the appellants by our decision in Greenwalt, where we considered the 
Greenwalts’ argument to be based in part on the constitutional prohibition of 
special legislation.  Greenwalt, 2003 WY 77, ¶ 6, 71 P.3d  at 
717.  Beyond that, however, is our 
perception that § 12-8-301 simply is not a special law when viewed under the 
definitions set forth above.  The 
statute has general application across the State, applies to all liquor vendors, 
and applies to all liquor vendors in the exact same fashion.  The legislature has chosen to set forth 
the liquor industry regulatory scheme in Title 12 of the statutes, and has made 
liquor vendors liable for damages to third parties injured by patrons who 
obtained alcoholic beverages from vendors in violation of Title 12 
provisions.  The fact that the 
legislature chose not to incorporate into the law vendor liability based upon 
common law negligence, or upon laws lying outside of Title 12, does not render 
the section a special law.  Recovery 
against vendors is a legislative creation, subject to legitimate limitations 
placed thereon.  Stevens v. Lou’s Lemon Tree, Ltd., 187 
Ill. App. 3d 458, 465, 543 N.E.2d 293, 298 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 128 Ill. 2d 672, 548 N.E.2d 1078 (Ill. 1989).
 
[¶19]   Not every immunity granted to an 
industry or practice violates article 3, section 27 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  For instance, in Krenning we recognized that the 
legislature could have a legitimate legislative purpose in granting governmental 
immunity to an irrigation district.  
Krenning, 2009 WY 11, ¶ 36, 
200 P.3d  at 784-85.  Similarly, in 
Greenwalt, we acknowledged that the 
legislature could reasonably conclude that it would be difficult to require 
vendors and their employees to substitute their judgment for that of the 
consumer as to what reasonable amount of alcohol could be consumed, especially 
where the vendor or employee would not necessarily even know if the consumer 
would be driving.  Greenwalt, 2003 WY 77, ¶ 58, 71 P.3d  at 
737-38.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶20]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(a) does 
not encompass municipal ordinances in the concept of “legally” as used therein, 
and the statute violates neither the constitutional doctrine of equal protection 
nor the constitutional prohibition of special laws.
 
[¶21]   We affirm.
 
 
KITE, 
Chief 
Justice, dissenting, with whom 
HILL, Justice, 
joins.
[¶22]  I disagree with the majority opinion’s 
conclusion that the 
word “legally” as used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(a) (LexisNexis 2011) 
encompasses only violations of Title 12 and does not extend to violations of 
municipal ordinances.  I also 
disagree that the legislature has preempted the field so as to preclude cities 
and towns from enacting ordinances intended to reduce damages caused by 
excessive consumption of alcohol in their communities.  Were I writing the majority opinion, I 
would hold that § 12-8-301(a) means what it says—no person who legally 
provides alcohol to another person is liable for damages caused by that person’s 
intoxication.  I would further hold, 
however, that under § 12-8-301(a) a person who provides alcohol to another 
person in violation of the law, including a municipal ordinance, may be liable 
for such damages.   

 
[¶23]  Our standards for interpreting statutory 
provisions are well established:
 
The 
paramount consideration is to determine the legislature’s intent, which must be 
ascertained initially and primarily from the words used in the statute.  We look first to the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the words to determine if the statute is ambiguous.  A statute is clear and unambiguous if 
its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning 
with consistency and predictability.  
Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or 
uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.  If we determine that a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the statute.  
Dorr 
v. Smith, Keller & Associates, 
2010 WY 120, ¶ 11, 238 P.3d 549, 552 (Wyo. 2010).
 
[¶24]  Section 12-8-301(a) 
unambiguously states that a person who legally provides alcohol to another is 
not liable for damages caused by the intoxication of the person.  The word “legal” means “conforming to or 
permitted by law or established rules.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 
1290 (2002).  Giving the word 
“legally” its plain and ordinary meaning as used in § 12-8-301(a), a person who 
provides alcohol to another in conformance with or as permitted by law or 
established rules is not liable for damages caused by the intoxication of the 
other person.  

 
[¶25]  An ordinance is a law adopted by a 
governmental authority, specifically, a municipality.   Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 
1588 (2002).  Thus, a person who 
provides alcohol to another in conformance with or as permitted by ordinance is 
not liable under § 12-8-301(a).  The 
immunity afforded by § 12-8-301(a), however, does not apply when a person 
provides alcohol in violation of the law.  
If the liquor vendors who provided alcohol to Mr. LaBrie did so in 
violation of the town ordinances, they can be liable for damages caused by his 
intoxication.
 
[¶26]  In holding otherwise, the majority in 
essence construes § 12-8-301(a) to mean that a person who provides alcohol to 
another “in compliance with Title 12” is not liable for damages resulting from 
the other person’s intoxication.  
This construction reads words into the statute that the legislature 
omitted, contrary to our standards for interpreting statutes.  Kennedy Oil v. Dep’t of Revenue, 2008 WY 
154, ¶ 14, 205 P.3d 999, 1004 (Wyo. 2008).  
The plain and ordinary meaning of “legally” is not “in compliance with 
Title 12.” Absent language expressly limiting the word legally to mean “in 
compliance with Title 12,” I would give the word its plain meaning—“conforming 
to or permitted by law or established rules,” which includes municipal 
ordinances.
 
[¶27]  Also contrary to our standards of 
statutory interpretation, the majority’s reading of § 12-8-301(a) makes 
superfluous subsection (c), which states:  
“This section does not affect the liability of the licensee or person if 
the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was sold or provided in violation of title 
12 of the Wyoming statutes.”  If the 
legislature intended the word “legally” as used in subsection (a) to mean “in 
compliance with Title 12,” subsection (c) is unnecessary.  It is well established that we do not 
interpret a statute in a way that renders any portion meaningless.  Stutzman v. Office of the Wyoming State 
Engineer, 2006 WY 30, ¶ 16, 130 P.3d 470, 475 (Wyo. 2006).  Additionally, when the legislature 
specifically uses a word in one place, we will not interpret that word into 
other places where it was not used.  
Qwest Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n 
of Wyo., 2007 WY 97, ¶ 25, 161 P.3d 495, 501 (Wyo. 2007).   
 
[¶28]  The majority also concludes “the 
legislature has, in effect, preempted the field as to [this] statewide social 
issue [and] it is not the province of municipalities to enact contrary 
laws.”  I disagree with this 
conclusion, first, because it ignores Art. 13 § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution 
and, second, because I see nothing in the ordinances at issue in this case that 
is contrary to the plain language of § 12-8-301(a).  
 
[¶29]  In 1972, Art. 13, § 1 of the Wyoming 
Constitution was amended to provide in pertinent part:
 
   (b)  All cities and towns are hereby 
empowered to determine their local affairs and government as established by 
ordinance passed by the governing body, subject to referendum when prescribed by 
the legislature, and further subject only to statutes uniformly applicable to 
all cities and towns . . . .
. 
. . .
   (d)  The powers and authority granted to 
cities and towns, pursuant to this section, shall be liberally construed for the 
purpose of giving the largest measure of self-government to cities and 
towns.
 
[¶30]  Prior to this amendment, municipalities 
in Wyoming operated under Dillon’s Rule, meaning they were considered a creature 
of the state with no inherent right of self government.  Thomas S. Smith, No Home on the Range for Home Rule, 31 
Land & Water L. Rev. 791, 793 (1996).  
The amendment was approved in 1972 by an overwhelming majority of Wyoming 
voters.  Id. at 791 n.2.  With the amendment, Wyoming became one 
of forty-eight states with some type of home rule.  Id. at 794.  “Home rule . . . is based on the premise 
that municipalities should be free to regulate their own municipal affairs 
without interference from the state.”  
Id. at 793.  As reflected in Art. 13, § 1(b), a 
municipality’s constitutional right to determine its local affairs “is subject 
[in relevant part] only to statutes uniformly applicable to all cities and 
towns.”  
 
[¶31]  There is no language in Title 12 making 
§ 12-8-301(a) applicable only to those who violate that title and I see nothing 
in the statutes suggesting it was meant to preclude cities and towns from 
exercising home rule with respect to alcohol.  Moreover, the legislature has expressly 
authorized cities and towns to regulate alcohol and conduct resulting from 
excessive alcohol consumption.    

 
[¶32]  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-4-101(a) 
(LexisNexis 2011) provides:
 
Incorporated 
cities, towns and counties within Wyoming shall license and regulate or prohibit 
the retail sale of alcoholic and malt beverages under this 
title.
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 15-1-103(a) (LexisNexis 2011) further 
provides:
 
(a) 
The governing bodies of all cities and towns may:
   . . . .
   (xiii)  . . . regulate any business whatsoever 
conducted . . . within the limits of the city or town for the purpose of raising 
revenue . . . ;
   . . . .
   (xv)       Regulate . 
. . saloons . . .;
   (xviii)  Regulate . . . any . . . conduct which 
disturbs or jeopardizes the public health, safety, peace . . . in any public or 
private place;
   . . . .
   (xli)  Adopt ordinances, resolutions and 
regulations, including regulations not in conflict with this act and necessary 
for the health, safety and welfare of the city or town . . . 
;
 
[¶33]  With these provisions, the legislature 
has clearly and unambiguously authorized cities and towns to enact ordinances 
regulating the sale and consumption of alcohol in their communities.   Pursuant to Art. 13, § 1(d) the 
powers and authority granted to cities and towns “shall be liberally construed 
for the purpose of giving the largest measure of self-government to cities and 
towns.”  The majority opinion is 
directly contrary to this constitutional directive.
 
[¶34]  As authorized by Art. 13, § 1 of the 
Wyoming Constitution and §§ 12-4-101(a) and 15-1-103(a) of the Wyoming Statutes, 
the town of Basin adopted Ordinance 2-2-5-1(E) which prohibits “[e]xcessive 
drinking of alcoholic and malt beverages . . . .”  and the town of Greybull adopted 
Ordinance 9.40.020 which makes it unlawful for a saloon-keeper to “suffer any 
drunkenness . . . in his or her or their premises.”  To the extent that the 
liquor vendors who provided alcohol to Mr. LaBrie did so in violation of these 
ordinances, I would hold that the immunity provided under § 12-8-301(a) does not 
apply and they may be liable to the extent they failed to exercise the degree of 
care required of a reasonable person in light of all the circumstances.  McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 
412 (Wyo. 1983).      

 
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1The 
Attorney General of the State of Wyoming has appeared in this appeal to defend 
the constitutionality of the statute in question, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-37-113 (LexisNexis 2011).
 
2Because 
this is an appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, we accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and 
view them in the light most favorable to the appellants.  Swinney v. Jones, 2008 WY 150, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 512, 515 (Wyo. 2008).
 
3Examples 
include a non-licensee who furnishes alcohol to an underage person (§ 
12-6-101(a)), a licensee who furnishes alcohol to a minor after having received 
notice that the person is a minor (§ 12-5-502), a licensee who furnishes alcohol 
to a “habitual drunkard” after having received notice that the person is a 
habitual drunkard (§ 12-5-502), and a licensee who furnishes alcohol to a minor 
or to an intoxicated person in the drive-in area (§ 12-5-301(a)(v)).  See Greenwalt, 2003 WY 77, ¶ 29, 71 P.3d  
at 727-28.
 
4Contrast 
Pinnacle Bank v. Villa, 2004 WY 150, 
100 P.3d 1287 (Wyo. 2004), where we allowed that a municipal ordinance may 
establish a duty of care where there is no such duty at common law.  Id. at ¶ 7, at 1290.  That situation is distinguishable from 
the situation at hand, where the municipal ordinances would establish a duty 
contrary to that established by statutory law.