Case Title: People v. De La Paz

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93208

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 93208-Agenda 3-January 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								PAUL A. DE LA PAZ, Appellant.
Opinion filed May 8, 2003.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Petitioner, Paul De La Paz, is currently serving an extended-term sentence for an armed robbery conviction. He has exhausted
his direct appeals and is now before this court on appeal from the
dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. He argues that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the
postconviction proceedings and also argues that his extended-term sentence should be reversed because the procedures
followed by the circuit court did not comply with the Supreme
Court's mandate in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). We affirm, finding
specifically with respect to the latter claim that Apprendi does
not apply retroactively to causes in which the direct appeal
process had concluded at the time that Apprendi was decided.

BACKGROUND
	In 1985, a jury in the circuit court of Cook County convicted
petitioner of armed robbery, armed violence, home invasion and
aggravated battery. A detailed recitation of the circumstances of
the crime is not necessary for our analysis, but the facts adduced
at trial established that petitioner entered the home of the 77-year-old victim brandishing a hammer and demanding the
victim's wallet. After the victim produced his wallet, petitioner
hit him on the head with the hammer and began to ransack his
home. Petitioner later also hit the victim with a gun, knocking
him unconscious. The circuit court sentenced petitioner to a 55-year extended sentence on the armed robbery conviction and a
concurrent 5-year sentence for the aggravated battery conviction.
The appellate court affirmed petitioner's convictions on direct
appeal. People v. De La Paz, No. 1-85-3293 (1989)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	Petitioner first petitioned for postconviction relief in
September 1986, while his direct appeal was still pending.
Appointed counsel filed an amended petition in October 1999,
and petitioner followed with a supplemental pro se petition.
Because the arguments raised on appeal do not involve the
arguments raised in the various petitions, we will not recount
them in detail. We do note that in petitioner's supplemental pro
se petition, he stated that he had "spoken with the Assistant
Public Defender Ingrid Gill, [p]rior to her filing this
Supplemental Petition for Post Conviction relief, whereas she
had said in a telephone conversation that she was only going to
raise One Issue and that issue being the one she now raised in"
the October petition. (Emphasis in original.) Petitioner
continued: "Petitioner not only argued with her about this only
issue [sic], he filed a complaint with the ARDC Attorney
Registration Disciplinary Commission of the Illinois Supreme
Court." Petitioner stated that according to his review of the
authorities-specifically citing People v. Britz, 174 Ill. 2d 163
(1996)-the issue counsel raised in the amended petition was
"worthless."
	The State moved to dismiss, and the court granted the
State's motion in March 2000. Petitioner appealed, and the
appellate court affirmed the dismissal. No. 1-00-0976
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	During the unusual length of time that the petition remained
pending in the circuit court, petitioner composed numerous
documents complaining of the circumstances that had resulted in
his conviction. These included a complaint with the Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Committee (ARDC) against his
trial attorney; a letter to the circuit court of Cook County that
indicated that he was planning to file a lawsuit against the trial
judge, his trial attorney, and the State's Attorney; and a second
letter to a deputy clerk of the circuit court of Cook County
reiterating that the assistant State's Attorney and petitioner's trial
judge were prejudiced against him.
	Also, after petitioner filed his postconviction petition, he
filed a "motion for leave to file an original petition for writ of
mandamus" and a "petition for writ of mandamus," requesting
that his postconviction petition be heard in another county. This
request was based on petitioner's contention that Judge Gillis,
who had presided over petitioner's original trial, was prejudiced
against him to such an extent that petitioner could not receive a
fair hearing on his postconviction proceeding before Judge Gillis
or any other judge in the circuit court of Cook County. The
motion was denied. Later, petitioner filed motions for extensions
of time to file a "supplemental brief," contending that the
assistant public defender assigned to his case was indifferent to
his claims. As a result of these allegations, the assistant public
defender was permitted to withdraw as counsel in 1987, and
petitioner proceeded pro se. However, no further activity
occurred in the case until the court granted a motion to reinstate
the petition in June 1993, with the matter reassigned to a
different judge. In July 1997 petitioner filed a motion for
supervisory order, naming as respondents the judge before whom
his petition was pending, the public defender, and two assistant
public defenders. In that motion petitioner complained that no
progress was being made in his case.
	A new assistant public defender, Ingrid Gill, filed an
appearance in the case in May 1999. Soon thereafter, petitioner
filed a complaint against her with the ARDC, which the ARDC
found to be "unfounded."
	The matter was set for hearing in March 2000. At that time,
counsel filed a certificate of compliance with Rule 651(c).
Counsel then summarized for the court's benefit the course of
proceedings until that point, including the fact that in addition to
the filings above, petitioner had also filed lawsuits in federal
court against the police and Cermak Hospital, which had been
dismissed. The court dismissed the postconviction petition, the
appellate court affirmed, and we granted petitioner leave to
appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS
	Before this court, petitioner raises two issues. He contends
that (1) his sentence should be reversed because the circuit court
did not comply with the procedures required by Apprendi in
sentencing him, and (2) his postconviction counsel was
ineffective in failing to request a hearing on petitioner's
competency to participate in postconviction proceedings.

I. Apprendi
	We first address petitioner's argument that his 55-year
sentence for armed robbery must be vacated and the cause
remanded for resentencing because the circuit court entered that
sentence without following the procedures required by the
Supreme Court in Apprendi.
	Initially, we note that petitioner failed to present this
argument in his postconviction petition. A petition under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act must, inter alia, "clearly set forth
the respects in which petitioner's constitutional rights were
violated." 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 1994). Just as the legislature
has set forth what must be contained in a petition, it has specified
the consequences of omitting a claim: "[a]ny claim of substantial
denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an
amended petition is waived." 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1994).
"Waiver" is a well-established term of art in the legal field. This
court has long recognized that we may, in appropriate cases,
reach issues notwithstanding their waiver. At least as long ago as
1957, this court had held that
			"the general rule is that where a question is not raised
or reserved in the trial court, or where, though raised in
the lower court, it is not urged or argued on appeal, it
will not be considered and will be deemed to have been
waived. However, this is a rule of administration and not
of jurisdiction or power, and it will not operate to
deprive an accused of his constitutional rights of due
process. 'The court may, as a matter of grace, in a case
involving deprivation of life or liberty, take notice of
errors appearing upon the record which deprived the
accused of substantial means of enjoying a fair and
impartial trial, although no exceptions were preserved or
the question is imperfectly presented.' " People v.
Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360, 370-71 (1957), quoting 3 Am.
Jur. Appeal & Error §248, at 33 (1936).
See also Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill. 2d 430, 438 n.1 (2002) (waiver
is an admonition to the parties, not a limitation upon the powers
of this court); Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967) (this
court has "the responsibility *** for a just result and for the
maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent [that]
may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem
from the adversary character of our system").
	" 'Where statutes are enacted after judicial opinions are
published, it must be presumed that the legislature acted with
knowledge of the prevailing case law.' " Burrell v. Southern
Truss, 176 Ill. 2d 171, 176 (1997), quoting People v. Hickman,
163 Ill. 2d 250, 262 (1994). We may thus assume that the
legislature understood the legal ramifications of the term
"waiver"-including the fact that reviewing courts may overlook
waiver in appropriate circumstances-when it enacted section
122-3 in 1964.
	In view of the principles noted above, this court has never
considered section 122-3 to be jurisdictional in nature. Indeed,
we have consistently rejected any notion that section 122-3
stands as an "ironclad" bar to attempts to litigate claims not
raised in the original or an amended petition. People v. Free, 122 Ill. 2d 367, 376 (1988). In this case, the State has not made any
argument based on defendant's waiver of the issue. It is well
established that the State may waive waiver. See, e.g., People v.
Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 347 (2000); Fagan v. Washington, 942 F.2d 1155, 1157 (7th Cir. 1991).
	Accordingly, we address the waived issue on the merits.
	These preliminary concerns aside, we now turn to the
question whether Apprendi should be applied retroactively to
criminal cases in which direct appeals were exhausted before
Apprendi was decided.
	In general, new rules do not apply retroactively to cases on
collateral review. People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 430 (1997);
Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d  at 239. However, this court has adopted the
test the Supreme Court promulgated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989) (plurality op.), to
determine when, in derogation of the default rule, a new rule
should apply retroactively. According to that test, retroactivity
will obtain when
		"the new rule either (1) places certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law making authority to proscribe, or (2)
requires the observance of those procedures that are
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d  at 237, citing Teague, 489 U.S.  at 307, 103 L. Ed. 2d  at 353, 109 S. Ct.  at 1073 (plurality op.).
	Petitioner does not argue that retroactive application of
Apprendi is authorized under the first Teague exception. Nor
would such an argument be persuasive, if made-Apprendi did
not "decriminalize" (see Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 345,
124 L. Ed. 2d 306, 320, 113 S. Ct. 2112, 2119 (1993), citing
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495, 108 L. Ed. 2d 415, 429, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (1990)) any conduct. The case dealt solely
with procedural, not substantive, law.
	Accordingly, if Apprendi is to be applied retroactively, it can
only be because the rule announced in that case falls within the
second Teague exception. We conclude that this is not the case.
Thus, Apprendi should not be taken outside the general rule
barring retroactivity.
	A new rule does not qualify for the second Teague exception
merely because it "is aimed at improving the accuracy of trial.
More is required." Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 111 L. Ed. 2d 193, 211, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831 (1990). The second
Teague exception permits retroactive application only of those
" 'watershed rules of criminal procedure' " that " ' "alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements" ' essential to
the fairness of a proceeding" (emphasis omitted) (Sawyer, 497 U.S.  at 241-42, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 211, 110 S. Ct.  at 2831, quoting
Teague, 489 U.S.  at 311, 315, 103 L. Ed. 2d  at 357, 359, 109 S. Ct.  at 1076, 1078 (plurality op.), quoting Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 693, 28 L. Ed. 2d 404, 421, 91 S. Ct. 1160,
1180 (1971)), "without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished" (Teague, 489 U.S.  at 313,
103 L. Ed. 2d  at 358, 109 S. Ct.  at 1077 (plurality op.)). See also
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828,
838, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1610 (1998) ("The Teague doctrine is
founded on the notion that one of the 'principal functions of
habeas corpus [is] "to assure that no man has been incarcerated
under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that
the innocent will be convicted" ' "). Teague cautioned that
because "such procedures would be so central to an accurate
determination of innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that
many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge."
Teague, 489 U.S.  at 313, 103 L. Ed. 2d  at 358, 109 S. Ct.  at
1077.
	Our appellate court is divided on the issue of whether
Apprendi should be given retroactive application under the
second Teague exception. The seminal cases for the two lines are
People v. Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d 693 (2000), vacated &
remanded, 201 Ill. 2d 577 (2002) (supervisory order) (Apprendi
is retroactive), and People v. Kizer, 318 Ill. App. 3d 238 (2000)
(Apprendi is not retroactive).
	In Beachem, the appellate court acknowledged that
"[f]inding retroactivity never should be lightly done" (Beachem,
317 Ill. App. 3d at 706), and recognized that neither this court
nor the Supreme Court has ever found any new rule to qualify for
retroactivity under the second Teague exception (Beachem, 317
Ill. App. 3d at 702). Nevertheless, the court concluded that an
Apprendi violation is so "repugnant to our notions of
fundamental fairness" as to necessitate retroactive application
under the second Teague test. Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 702,
706. That conclusion was based on the following
characterization of Apprendi:
			"We take Apprendi to mean that once the defendant
serves the prescribed maximum sentence, he or she
remains in prison on a charge never made and never
proved. And if we acknowledge the defendant remains
in prison on a charge never made or proved, we have
impugned the integrity of our criminal justice system. It
is as if the sentencing judge actually said to the
defendant: 'I have convicted you of a charge never made
against you and never heard by the jury, and I have done
it based on the preponderance of the evidence.' "
Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 702.
	In Kizer, the appellate court diverged from Beachem. Kizer
looked first to Flowers, the case in which this court adopted the
Teague framework. The appellate court noted that in Flowers,
this court declined to extend retroactive application to our earlier
decision in People v. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d 184 (1988). In Reddick,
we had determined that
		"the Illinois pattern jury instructions regarding murder
and voluntary manslaughter, used by the trial court at the
Reddick defendants' trials, incorrectly advised the jury
that it was the State's burden to prove one of the
mitigating mental states that would reduce murder to
voluntary manslaughter. This court determined that the
instructions should have told the jury that it was the
State's burden to disprove the pertinent mitigating
mental states." (Emphases in original.) People v.
Salazar, 162 Ill. 2d 513, 518 (1994) (discussing
Reddick).
	The Kizer court reasoned that if the second Teague
exception was to be so narrowly construed that a determination
that instructions reversing the burden of proof did not merit
retroactive application, neither then could Apprendi.
	The difficulty with the approach taken in Beachem stems
from the overstatement in its characterization of Apprendi.
Apprendi is about sentencing only. For Apprendi concerns to
come into play, a criminal defendant must already have been
found guilty of the underlying crime. A defendant raising an
Apprendi claim on appeal is simply complaining that he received
a sentence in excess of the normal sentencing range, without the
fact or facts necessary to permit such sentence having been
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v.
Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 671 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting
retroactive application of Apprendi because Apprendi "only
affects the enhancement of a defendant's sentence once he or she
has already been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, it does not rise to the level of importance of" other
cases which have been found to apply retroactively). Thus an
Apprendi violation does not mean that a defendant is imprisoned
on "a charge never made *** and never heard by the jury." The
most that can be said is that an Apprendi violation results in a
defendant's imprisonment on a charge one element of which-the
sentencing enhancement-was not proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court has already held that
"failure to submit [an] element of" a crime to a jury may
constitute harmless error (Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19-20, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35, 53, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1839 (1999)), a
holding which applies in the Apprendi context (People v.
Thurow, No. 90911 (February 6, 2003)). We decline to hold that
an Apprendi violation comprises such constitutional "bedrock"
as to require retroactive application, when such error is
potentially harmless.
	In a similar vein, we also find guidance in United States v.
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002).
There, the Court held that an Apprendi violation was not plain
error because there was " 'no basis for concluding that the error
"seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings." ' " Cotton, 535 U.S. at ___, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 869, 122 S. Ct.  at 1786, quoting Johnson v. United States,
520 U.S. 461, 470, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718, 729, 117 S. Ct. 1544,
1550, (1997).
	We recognize that the Court so concluded because the
evidence of the particular fact in question in the case before it
was "overwhelming." Nevertheless, the implication of the
Court's statement for the instant case is plain. Retroactivity is an
all-or-nothing proposition. See Kizer, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 249,
citing E. Boshkoff, Resolving Retroactivity After Teague v. Lane,
65 Ind. L.J. 651, 658 (1990); Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d  at
671. An error which does not seriously affect the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings in one or
more cases cannot be such a bedrock procedural element
essential to the fairness of a proceeding as to fall within the
second Teague exception, requiring retroactive application in all
cases.
	Additional support for our conclusion is drawn from Teague
itself. There, the specific question before the Court was whether
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986)-which concerned the sixth amendment "fair cross-section" requirement-should be given retroactive application.
The Court answered this question in the negative. In the course
of its analysis, the Court stated that
		"the fair cross section requirement '[does] not rest on the
premise that every criminal trial, or any particular trial,
[is] necessarily unfair because it [is] not conducted in
accordance with what we determined to be the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment.' " (Emphases
added.) Teague, 489 U.S.  at 314-15, 103 L. Ed. 2d  at
359, 109 S. Ct.  at 1077-78 (plurality op.), quoting
Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 32, 42 L. Ed. 2d 790,
793, 95 S. Ct. 704, 705 (1975).
	In other words, a sixth amendment violation does not
necessarily render every or any particular trial unfair-thus, again,
lending support to our conclusion that the violation of the sixth
amendment recognized in Apprendi is not such a "bedrock
procedural element" as requires retroactive application under the
second Teague exception.
	Finally, although as noted our own appellate court is divided
on the question, our conclusion that Apprendi does not apply
retroactively is in accord with the vast majority of foreign
authority, both state(1) and federal.(2) Indeed, our research has
revealed no current decision extending retroactive effect to
Apprendi outside of Illinois. Although this is not a deciding
factor, it does lend additional weight to the conclusion we reach.
We choose to align ourselves with these other jurisdictions, and
hold that Apprendi does not fall within the second Teague
exception. Accordingly, it does not apply retroactively.
	Because we have found that Apprendi does not apply in this
case, we need not further address petitioner's Apprendi-based
argument.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
	Petitioner also contends that his postconviction counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise the issue of his mental fitness to
participate in postconviction proceedings. We find this issue to
be without merit. A defendant is presumed to be mentally fit at
the time of postconviction proceedings. People v. Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d 257, 269 (2000). The level of competency required during
postconviction proceedings is less than that required at trial:
		"A defendant is considered unfit to stand trial when,
'because of his mental or physical condition, he is
unable to understand the nature and purpose of the
proceedings against him or to assist in his defense.' 725
ILCS 5/104-10 (West 1998). In contrast, a defendant is
considered unfit to proceed with the post-conviction
process [only] when, because of a mental condition, he
cannot communicate his allegations of constitutional
deprivations to counsel, thus frustrating his entitlement,
under the Act, to a reasonable level of assistance."
Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d  at 269.
Moreover, as a defendant has no constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel at a postconviction proceeding, we require
only "a reasonable level of assistance" by appointed counsel at
such proceedings. People v. Moore, 189 Ill. 2d 521, 541 (2000).
	In this case, nothing indicates that petitioner did not receive
that level of assistance to which he was entitled. He complains
before this court that his various filings complaining about the
judge and the attorneys in his original trial should have alerted
postconviction counsel that he was possibly mentally unfit to
participate in postconviction proceedings. We find no basis for
concluding that postconviction counsel erred in failing to raise
this claim. We note that counsel was cognizant of the presence
of issues concerning mental fitness, as the amended petition
counsel filed contained allegations concerning petitioner's
fitness at the time of trial. However, postconviction counsel filed
a Rule 651(c) certificate (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)), in which she
certified, inter alia, that she had "consulted with the petitioner
by letter and phone on numerous occasions to ascertain his
contentions of deprivations of constitutional rights." Further, in
petitioner's own supplemental pro se petition, he affirmatively
stated that he had "spoken with the Assistant Public Defender"
about the issues to be included in the supplemental petition, that
he had indeed "argued with" counsel about the matter, filed a
complaint with the ARDC because of their disagreement, and
conducted his own review of the authorities counsel cited.
	All the "fitness" that was required for the postconviction
matter to proceed was that petitioner be able to "communicate
allegations of constitutional violations to counsel." Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d  at 270. Petitioner's anger and frustration with the outcome
of his initial criminal trial, and his exploration of many potential
alternative avenues in search of relief, does not overcome the
presumption of fitness, the plain language of postconviction
counsel's Rule 651(c) affidavit, and petitioner's own admission
that he had communicated with counsel. Nothing in the record
before us leads us to conclude that counsel failed to provide a
"reasonable level of assistance" by believing the evidence of her
own eyes that petitioner was perfectly capable of communicating
with her about the alleged constitutional violations at his trial.
An angry or difficult client is not, intrinsically, a client unfit to
participate in postconviction proceedings.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court, which affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of
defendant's postconviction petition.
Affirmed.
	I agree with the majority's conclusion that petitioner's
postconviction petition was properly dismissed, and therefore I
concur in its judgment. I also agree with its conclusion that
Apprendi does not apply retroactively. I cannot agree, however,
with its decision to resolve that issue in this case because there
is no Apprendi claim in petitioner's postconviction petition. In
reaching the merits of the Apprendi issue, the majority has
disregarded both the entire Post-Conviction Hearing Act and this
court's binding precedent interpreting the Act. As I will
demonstrate below, the majority's stated justifications for
addressing the issue reveal a manifest confusion over the
difference between a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction
and review of a trial court's order dismissing a postconviction
petition.
	The majority opinion should come to an end shortly after the
third paragraph. In this paragraph, the majority alerts the reader
that, "Because the arguments raised on appeal do not involve the
arguments raised in the various petitions, we will not recount
them in detail." Slip op. at 2. This, of course, should signal that
the end of the opinion is coming soon, but the majority manages
to go on for 30 paragraphs after acknowledging that petitioner is
raising arguments unrelated to the claims he made in his
petitions.
	Before getting into the specific requirements of the Act, I
would note that even as a matter of plain common sense, we
should not be addressing arguments about claims that do not
appear in the petition. As this court stated in People v. Coleman,
183 Ill. 2d 366, 388 (1998), "[t]he question raised in an appeal
from an order dismissing a post-conviction petition is whether
the allegations in the petition, liberally construed and taken as
true, are sufficient to invoke relief under the Act." How can an
argument about a claim that does not appear in the petition have
any bearing on whether the trial court erred in dismissing that
petition? For instance, if the majority had reached the opposite
conclusion in this case and determined that Apprendi claims can
be raised in postconviction petitions, would the majority have
reversed the trial court and said that the trial court erred in
dismissing the petition? How could the trial court have made
such an error if there is no Apprendi claim in the petition?
	A perfect analogy would be in the civil context when a trial
court dismisses a complaint. Assume that a plaintiff files a three-count complaint against a defendant, and the trial court dismisses
the complaint with prejudice. The plaintiff then appeals, arguing
that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. However,
the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred not because any of
the counts in the complaint have merit but because a different
count, never filed and presented for the first time on appeal, has
merit. No reviewing court would give the time of day to such a
preposterous argument, yet that is exactly the position the
majority has adopted in the postconviction context.
	Turning to the specific requirements of the Act, the majority
acknowledges that section 122-3 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-3
(West 2000)) specifically provides that "[a]ny claim of
substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the
original or an amended petition is waived." The majority
immediately treats this provision as merely directory rather than
mandatory. Several reasons are then given for why this court is
free to ignore section 122-3.
	The majority asserts that the State has not argued that the
claim is waived, and thus the State waived the waiver argument.
Slip op. at 7. In support, the majority cites this court's opinion in
a direct appeal, People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306 (2002). As
noted earlier, the only question for a reviewing court on review
of the dismissal of a postconviction petition is whether the
allegations in the petition, liberally construed and taken as true,
are sufficient to invoke relief under the Act. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 
at 388.(3) Yet the majority would have us believe that unless the
State points out that a claim is not included in the petition, this
court cannot look at the petition but instead must address the
petitioner's argument raised for the first time on appeal. The
absurdity of the majority's argument can be demonstrated by the
following hypothetical. A defendant files a postconviction
petition raising three issues. The trial court dismisses it as
frivolous and patently without merit. The defendant appeals, but
does not raise any of the issues in his petition. Instead he raises
seven new issues. The State then either neglects to file a brief or
files its brief too late for consideration by the reviewing court.
According to the majority, the reviewing court would then have
to consider all seven of these arguments and could not rely on the
defendant's failure to include them in his petition. Such a
position is obviously untenable.
	The majority's position on the State having "waived waiver"
overlooks the difference between a direct appeal from a
judgment of conviction and an appeal from the dismissal of a
postconviction petition. In a direct appeal of a judgment of
conviction and sentence, everything that occurred at trial is
potentially before the appellate court. The appellate court has
appellate jurisdiction over the entire case and can potentially
address any errors that occurred. However, it may be that certain
errors were not properly preserved and thus are considered
waived. Because waiver is a limitation on the parties and not on
the reviewing court, the court may sometimes choose to ignore
waiver and reach an issue not properly preserved.
	In a postconviction proceeding, the entire case is the
petition. Any issues must be raised by a petition filed in the
circuit court. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West 2000). On appeal from
the dismissal of the petition, the court of review obtains appellate
jurisdiction only over the judgment of dismissal. See Coleman,
183 Ill. 2d  at 388; 725 ILCS 5/122-7 (West 2000) ("Any final
judgment entered upon such petition shall be reviewed in a
manner pursuant to the rules of the Supreme Court"(emphasis
added)); People v. Hartman, 408 Ill. 133, 138 (1951) ("Where
the statute refers to 'such petition' it refers to one in which
specific actions, constituting denial of constitutional right, are
alleged to have resulted in the petitioner's imprisonment. The act
does not cover any other type of review"). Thus, unlike in a
direct appeal, the only matters before the appellate court are
those specifically identified in a petition filed in the circuit court.
The problem with issues left out of the petition is not they were
not properly preserved; they are not even part of the case.
	Essentially what the majority argues is that it can assert
original jurisdiction over postconviction claims. It would have
to do so to consider a claim not included in the petition because
its appellate jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the trial court's
dismissal of the petition. The appellate court may exercise
original jurisdiction only "when necessary to the complete
determination of any case on review." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,
§6. The supreme court may exercise original jurisdiction for the
same reason, or in other specified cases, such as revenue,
mandamus, prohibition or habeas corpus. Ill. Const. 1970, art.
VI, §4. Original jurisdiction is not given to the supreme or
appellate courts in postconviction cases, and reaching a
postconviction claim filed for the first time in the appellate court
is not necessary for the complete determination of the case on
review. All that is necessary to determine completely the case on
review is to determine if the allegations of the petition, liberally
construed and taken as true, are sufficient to invoke relief under
the Act. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388. Thus, a reviewing court
would act outside its constitutional authority in exercising
original jurisdiction over a postconviction claim. That is why it
makes no sense to talk about the State having "waived waiver"
in the context of claims omitted from postconviction claims. The
reviewing court's appellate jurisdiction is limited to the contents
of the petition, regardless of what the State argues in its brief and
regardless of whether the State even files a brief. The parties
cannot confer jurisdiction by consent or acquiescence. Droste v.
Kerner, 34 Ill. 2d 495, 498 (1966).
	In People v. Day, 152 Ill. App. 3d 416 (1987), the appellate
court recognized the concept that eludes today's majority. In
Day, the trial court improperly allowed the State to file its
motion to dismiss at the first stage of a postconviction
proceeding. In dismissing the petition, the trial court relied on
the State's motion to dismiss and did not enter either a verbal or
written order specifying findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the appellate court could
make the original determination of whether the petition was
frivolous or patently without merit. The appellate court agreed
with the State that it did not have the jurisdiction do to so:
			"We further observe that we cannot, as defendant
argues, make a determination as to whether or not his
petition is frivolous or patently without merit. We agree
with the State that we do not have jurisdiction to do so.
Jurisdiction to determine whether Day's petition is
frivolous or patently without merit is vested in 'the court
in which the conviction took place.' (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985,
ch. 38, par. 122-1.) Day's conviction took place in the
circuit court of Cook County, not in this court." Day,
152 Ill. App. 3d at 421.
Similarly, here, defendant's conviction took place in the circuit
court of Cook County, not in the appellate court and not in the
supreme court. Thus, pursuant to the Act, defendant can raise a
postconviction claim solely by means of a verified petition filed
in the circuit court of Cook County. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West
2000). The Act does not provide for postconviction claims to be
raised by means of a brief filed in a reviewing court. Thus, we
simply do not have jurisdiction over defendant's Apprendi claim,
and the majority commits a serious error in reaching it.
	The majority further asserts that it can excuse petitioner's
compliance with section 122-3 because "waiver is an admonition
to the parties, not a limitation upon the powers of this court."
Slip op. at 5, citing Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill. 2d 430, 438 n.1
(2002). Not surprisingly, the majority does not cite a case
construing section 122-3 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act for
this proposition. Rather, the majority cites Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill. 2d 430 (2002), a direct appeal from a trial court ruling that the
Gift Ban Act was unconstitutional. Also included is a block
quote from a direct appeal, People v. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360
(1957). While it may be proper for this court to say that waiver
is a limitation on the parties and not on the court when
discussing our Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (188 Ill. 2d R.
341(e)(7)), which provides that issues are waived when not
included in the appellant's brief, or the rule we stated in People
v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988), that both an objection and
a written posttrial motion are necessary to preserve an error for
review, it is quite another thing to say that we can ignore waiver
in a situation in which the waiver is mandated by the legislature.
	The majority provides no support for its assertion that the
legislature intended its pronouncement in section 122-3 to be
merely directory. A postconviction proceeding, unlike a criminal
trial and appeal, is entirely a matter of statute. The legislature
prescribes the rules that must be followed, and this court may not
ignore them. The best statement of this principle can be found in
Justice Freeman's special concurrence in People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds,
People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89 (2002). Discussing the
mandatory requirements of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
Justice Freeman wrote:
			"This court has consistently recognized that the
legislature, having conferred a right of action, 'may
determine who shall sue and the conditions under which
the suit may be brought.' " (Emphasis added.) Wilson v.
Tromly, 404 Ill. 307, 310 (1949). We have also
consistently adhered to the notion that the General
Assembly may attach conditions to the relief it creates.
See Wilson, 404 Ill.  at 311. That being the case, it is the
party seeking the statutorily created relief who must
' "bring himself within the prescribed requirements
necessary to confer the right of action." ' " 189 Ill. 2d  at
23-24 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by
McMorrow, J.), quoting Wilson, 404 Ill.  at 311, quoting
Hartray v. Chicago Rys. Co., 290 Ill. 85, 87 (1919).
	Here, by raising his Apprendi claim for the first time on
appeal from the dismissal of his postconviction petition,
petitioner did not "bring himself within the prescribed
requirements necessary to confer the right of action," and this
court cannot consider the claim. This court is not free to ignore
the legislature's pronouncement in section 122-3.
	Further, what the majority apparently does not realize is that
it is excusing compliance not only with section 122-3, but also
with the entire Post-Conviction Hearing Act. As noted above, the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act is entirely a creature of statute, and
the legislature has mandated specific requirements that a
petitioner must meet to assert a claim under the Act. Any
allegation of a substantial denial of constitutional rights must be
included in the postconviction petition, and the petition must be
verified. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West 2000). The Act sets out
specific time limits for filing the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c)
(West 2000). The petition must contain certain information
required by the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2000)) and must
have attached thereto "affidavits, records, or other evidence
supporting its allegations" or shall state why they are not
attached (725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2000)). "Any claim of
substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the
original or an amended petition is waived." 725 ILCS 5/122-3
(West 2000).
	After the petition is filed, the trial court examines it to
determine if it is frivolous or is patently without merit. 725 ILCS
5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000). At this stage, counsel may be
appointed for an indigent defendant if it is a capital case. 725
ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(1) (West 2000). If the trial court determines
that the petition is frivolous or patently without merit, it
dismisses the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000).
If not, the trial court dockets the petition for further
consideration pursuant to sections 122-4 through 122-6. 725
ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 2000).
	At the second stage, the trial court may appoint counsel for
an indigent defendant. 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2000). Counsel
may seek leave to file amendments to the petition. 725 ILCS
5/122-5 (West 2000). Also, the State has 30 days to either
answer the petition or move to dismiss.725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West
2000). If it files a motion to dismiss which is denied, it then has
20 days to answer the petition.725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2000).
The court may "receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral
testimony, or other evidence" and, in its discretion, may require
the petitioner to be brought before the court for a hearing. 725
ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2000). Finally, the court enters a final
judgment on the petition, and any final judgment may be
reviewed in the manner provided for in the supreme court rules.
725 ILCS 5/122-7 (West 2000).
	Petitioner did not follow any of the above procedures with
respect to his Apprendi claim. Thus, the majority is not only
excusing compliance with section 122-3, it is excusing
compliance with the entire Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
Defendant's Apprendi claim was not in a petition (violating
section 122-1(b)), was not verified by affidavit (violating section
122-1(b)), was not served upon the State's Attorney (violating
section 122-1(b)), was not timely (violating section 122-1(c)),
did not have attached thereto affidavits or other evidence
supporting its claims (violating section 122-2), and was not filed
in the trial court (violating section 122-1(b)). Further, the trial
court did not have an opportunity to review it (violating section
122-2.1), and the State's Attorney did not have a chance to move
to dismiss it (violating section 122-5). The majority confines its
analysis solely to section 122-3 and refuses to discuss how
compliance with the Act's other sections may be excused. There
is no provision in the Act that says that the supreme court can
decide that the entire Act is merely optional. See 725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000). I cannot emphasize enough that this
issue does not merely involve relaxing waiver. It involves
whether this court can excuse compliance with all of the Act's
substantive and procedural requirements.
	According to the majority, a claim under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act can be asserted either by following all
of the procedures set forth in the Act or by simply raising the
claim for the first time on appeal. No support is provided for this
novel proposition, and it would seem to directly contradict this
court's opinion in People v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59 (2002). In that
case, we held that a petitioner's verification affidavit (725 ILCS
5/122-1(b) (West 2000)) could not also serve as the affidavits or
other evidence supporting the petition's allegations required by
section 122-2. We explained that these provisions are distinct
requirements, and that a petitioner must comply with both of
these to properly assert a claim under the Act. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 
at 66-67. A contrary reading would render section 122-2
meaningless surplusage. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d  at 67. Contrast that
with today's case, in which the majority allows a petitioner to
ignore the entire Act. The majority's claim renders the entire
Post-Conviction Hearing Act mere surplusage if a petitioner can
ignore all of its procedures and simply assert a postconviction
claim for the first time in an appellate brief. If this is true, the
petitioner in Collins would have been better off waiting until
appeal to assert the claim he truly wanted to raise.
	Curiously, the majority refuses to follow People v. McNeal,
194 Ill. 2d 135 (2000), in which we directly confronted the same
situation as in this case. The petitioner wished to assert a claim
based on a decision that was filed after his petition was already
in the appellate stage. We summarily rejected this attempt:
			"The defendant cannot raise this question for the first
time on review. Section 122-3 of the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act provides, 'Any claim of substantial denial
of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an
amended petition is waived.' 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West
1996). Accordingly, the issue has been waived. People
v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 233 (1993). We need not
consider here whether this court's determination in
Woods would support the filing of a successive petition
by the defendant. Cf. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205 (1997) (defendant allowed to pursue second
post-conviction petition to raise sentence-disparity issue
after codefendant was sentenced). It is well established,
however, that the defendant may not add an issue to the
case while the matter is on review." McNeal, 194 Ill. 2d 
at 147.
This statement in McNeal reflected the approach this court has
consistently taken; indeed, the only approach the statute permits
this court to take. See, e.g., People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410,
423 (1996); People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 154-55 (1995);
People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 405 (1995); People v. Brisbon,
164 Ill. 2d 236, 258 (1995) (all citing section 122-3 and refusing
to consider issues not raised in the postconviction petition).
	The majority's approach turns McNeal on its head. In
McNeal, we held that if a petitioner neglects to include an issue
in his petition he cannot raise it on appeal from the dismissal of
the petition but he may raise the issue in a subsequent petition.
However, he can raise the issue in a successive petition only if
he can satisfy the cause and prejudice test. People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 449 (2001). Today, the majority holds that a
petitioner is actually better off if he raises the claim for the first
time on appeal. A petitioner has to meet the cause and prejudice
test to raise the waived issue in a subsequent petition, but has to
show nothing to raise the claim for the first time on appeal. Once
the petitioner fails to include the issue in an original or amended
petition it is waived pursuant to section 122-3. Why does the
majority place the petitioner who ignores what we said in
McNeal in a better position than the petitioner who does exactly
what we told him to do in McNeal? The majority must address
why a petitioner who asserts a postconviction claim for the first
time on appeal does not have to meet any standard before doing
so.(4)
	Although not stated in the majority opinion, it can be
assumed that the reason the majority is ignoring the entire Post-Conviction Hearing Act and acting outside its jurisdiction is that
Apprendi retroactivity is an important issue and the majority
wishes to resolve it. In addition to this court's lack of jurisdiction
over the claim, two problems with such an approach are
immediately apparent. First, the issue is not in petitioner's
postconviction petition, and we are reviewing whether the trial
court erred in dismissing the petition. "The question raised in an
appeal from an order dismissing a post-conviction petition is
whether the allegations in the petition, liberally construed and
taken as true, are sufficient to invoke relief under the Act."
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388. Regardless of the issue's
importance, we simply cannot consider it on appeal from the
dismissal of a petition if it is not in the petition. Second, the
majority is being disingenuous if it is suggesting that the
importance of the issue mandates that we resolve it in this
particular case. There is currently another case pending on this
court's advisement docket, People v. Lee, Nos. 93221, 93363
cons., that also involves Apprendi retroactivity. In Lee, the issue
was raised in the postconviction petition. Additionally, this court
is currently holding 177 petitions for leave to appeal that raise
the issue of Apprendi retroactivity.(5) Thus, we do not have to
resolve Apprendi retroactivity in this particular case. 
	Recently, the Appellate Court, Fourth District, was asked to
consider a claim on appeal from the dismissal of a
postconviction petition, but the claim was not included in the
petition. The appellate court explained that it simply could not
consider such a claim:
		"Defendant's contentions of error, even if they were of
constitutional magnitude, are forfeited. As we have
previously stated, '[d]efendant does not cite, nor are we
aware of, any case in which the [Post-Conviction
Hearing Act] has been construed as permitting a
defendant to raise on appeal from the dismissal of a
postconviction petition an issue he never raised in that
petition. This court will not be the first to so hold.' "
People v. Reed, 335 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1040 (2003),
quoting People v. Griffin, 321 Ill. App. 3d 425, 428
(2001).
Regrettably, this court will be the first to so hold.
	In sum, I would hold that the trial court properly dismissed
petitioner's postconviction petition. I would not reach the issue
of whether Apprendi applies retroactively because petitioner did
not include his Apprendi argument in his petition. I simply
cannot fathom why deciding Apprendi retroactivity in this
particular case, when we have been petitioned to consider the
argument in so many cases in which the claim has been presented
properly, is worth ignoring common sense, the entire Post-Conviction Hearing Act, years of established precedent by this
court, and firmly established rules of appellate procedure. I
therefore cannot join the majority opinion.
	I agree with the following reasoning of the Beachem court:
			"Apprendi *** mean[s] that once the defendant serves
the prescribed maximum sentence, he or she remains in
prison on a charge never made and never proved. And if
we acknowledge the defendant remains in prison on a
charge never made or proved, we have impugned the
integrity of our criminal justice system. It is as if the
sentencing judge actually said to the defendant: 'I have
convicted you of a charge never made against you and
never heard by the jury, and I have done it based on the
preponderance of the evidence.' " People v. Beachem,
317 Ill. App. 3d 693, 702 (2000).
	The fundamental meaning of the sixth amendment's jury
trial guarantee is that all facts essential to impose the level of
punishment that a defendant receives must be found by the trier
of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, __, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556, 578, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2444 (2002)
(Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.). This was true long
before the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
Apprendi, at least 202 years before Apprendi to be sure. See In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 373-74, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1071 (1970) (though expressed from ancient times, the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard seems to have developed
by 1798 and is now the accepted " 'measure of persuasion by
which the prosecution must [prove] all the essential elements of
guilt,' " quoting C. McCormick, Evidence §321, at 681-82
(1954)). Accordingly, the majority's decision not to apply
Apprendi retroactively is unnecessary and incorrect. The core of
the Apprendi holding-the requirement that each element
necessary to prove a crime be submitted to the trier of fact for
proof beyond a reasonable doubt-is nothing new. The principle
has been active for at least two centuries. I believe that the
failure to comply with this basic tenet of constitutional law is an
error so injurious to our fundamental civil liberties that no
sentence meted out in derogation of Apprendi should be allowed
to stand. See People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378, 392 (2002) (finding
that defendant's crime was brutal and heinous unconstitutionally
made by a trial judge); People v. Thurow, No. 90911, slip op. at
18-20 (February 6, 2003) (Kilbride, J., dissenting); People v.
Crespo, No. 86556, slip op. at 12-15 (March 31, 2003) (Kilbride,
J., dissenting). Through Thurow, Crespo and now the case at bar,
the majority has rendered the sixth amendment jury trial
guarantee, identified in Apprendi, an illusion in this state. For
this reason, I respectfully dissent.
	 
	 
1.      1See People v. Bradbury, No. 01-CA-0541 (Colo. App. September
12, 2002); State v. Sepulveda, 201 Ariz. 158, 32 P.3d 1085 (App. 2001);
Sanders v. State, 815 So. 2d 590, 591-92 (Ala. App. 2001); Whisler v.
State, 272 Kan. 864, 36 P.3d 290 (2001); State ex rel. Nixon v. Sprick,
59 S.W.3d 515 (Mo. 2001); Teague v. Palmateer, 184 Or. App. 577,
591, 57 P.3d 176, 186 (2002); Greenup v. State, No.
W2001-01764-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. App. October 2, 2002). See also
Hughes v. State, 826 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. App. 2002) (finding Apprendi
nonretroactive under pre-Teague test set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199, 87 S. Ct. 1967 (1967), and Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601, 85 S. Ct. 1731 (1965)).

2.      2See Goode v. United States, 305 F.3d 378, 385 (6th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2002); Curtis v. United
States, 294 F.3d 841, 842-43 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002); Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d  at 671;
McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 1001-02 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 150-51 (4th Cir. 2001).

3.      3The majority has implicitly overruled this portion of Coleman.
Today, the majority holds that the question on appeal from the dismissal
of a postconviction petition is whether the allegations in the petitioner's
appellate brief, liberally construed and taken as true, are sufficient to
invoke relief under the Act.

4.      4I do not mean by this argument to endorse the cause and prejudice
test for reaching claims asserted for the first time on appeal from the
dismissal of a postconviction petition. Such a test would be completely
unnecessary because we already have a mechanism for petitioners to
assert waived claims when fundamental fairness so requires-the
successive petition. More importantly, this cannot be a test to reach
claims left out of the petition because our review is limited to the four
corners of the petition and we do not have original jurisdiction over
postconviction claims. I simply raise the issue to point out that the
majority is putting the petitioner who refuses to follow proper procedure
in a better position than one who does exactly what he is supposed to
do.

5.      5This does not include additional petitions for leave to appeal held
at the March 2003 term.