Case Title: Norwest Bank South Dakota v. Venners

Citation: 440 N.W.2d 774

Docket Number: 

State: south-dakota

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1989-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
440 N.W.2d 774 (1989) NORWEST BANK SOUTH DAKOTA, N.A., f/k/a First National Bank of the Black Hills, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Ted VENNERS, Defendant and Appellant, and Stanford M. Adelstein, Robert Adelstein, Black Forest Development, Inc., Black Forest Realty, Inc., Black Forest Inn, Inc., Forest Inn, Inc., Robford Company, and Bank Realty Company, Defendants. No. 16330. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Considered on Briefs March 22, 1989. Decided May 31, 1989. Joseph M. Butler and Patrick Duffy of Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye & Simmons, Rapid City, for defendant and appellant. J. Crisman Palmer of Gunderson, Palmer, Goodsell & Nelson, Rapid City, for plaintiff and appellee. Wayne F. Gilbert of Banks, Johnson, Johnson, Colbath & Huffman, Rapid City, for defendants. BOGUE, Circuit Judge. This case is an appeal from a summary judgment for Norwest Bank of South Dakota, *775 N.A., f/k/a First National Bank of the Black Hills (Norwest) and against Ted Venners (Venners), who is the only appellant, and Stanford M. Adelstein (Adelstein). The circuit court found no genuine issue as to a material fact and found that Venners was liable as a guarantor of certain promissory notes to Norwest. Venners claims that a genuine issue of a material fact exists about Norwest's waiver of Venners' liability upon the guarantee. We affirm. By September of 1975, loans from Norwest were in excess of $400,000.00 to Black Forest Development, Inc., Black Forest Realty, Inc., Black Forest Inn, Inc., and Forest Inn, Inc., land development corporations owned by Venners and Adelstein. In 1977 Norwest requested a restructuring of the debt, additional collateral and a guarantee of the loan from Venners and Adelstein. Just prior to execution of the written guarantee by Venners and Adelstein, Venners signed over his stock in the Black Forest corporations to Adelstein. Adelstein and Venners discussed division of the surplus, if any, that might later develop. Thereafter, Adelstein ran the companies. In 1983, at a Norwest discount committee meeting, Norwest noted it was no longer looking to the corporations or Venners for repayment, but to Adelstein: This information was not communicated to Venners, whose first knowledge of it came after this action was started. In 1985 Norwest notified Venners that the borrowers still owed on the note. This action against Venners began in November 1986. The well known requirements for summary judgment set forth in Wilson v. Great Northern Railway Company, 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19 (1968) need not be restated. Here, Venners claims Norwest waived its right to recover against him based upon, (1) the inactivity and lack of communication by Norwest with Venners, and (2) the loan committee's notes. Regardless of anything in the guarantee to the contrary, Norwest could waive its right to the guarantee. No factual dispute exists about the genuineness of the notes or guarantees, the default or the amounts due. No dispute exists about the fact that Norwest did not seek recovery from Venners until the commencement of this action or communicate with him concerning the defaults or any actions against the corporations or Adelstein. The language of the loan committee notes is also not disputed, nor is the fact that Venners knew nothing of the committee meeting or the committee notes until after this action began. Subsurfco, Inc. v. B-Y Water Dist., 337 N.W.2d 448, 456 (S.D.1983). Waiver may be either express or implied. If implied, it arises from an act or acts which clearly are inconsistent with the right to be exercised. Under the facts most favorable to Venners, Norwest's only acts were a forbearance to proceed against *776 the corporation and a lack of notification to Venners that it intended to hold him under the guarantee. These, however, are not inconsistent with the right to hold Venners to his guarantee. The language of Venner's guarantee waives notice, and SDCL 56-1-26 relieves Norwest of any delay. Venners cannot use the delay or lack of notice to provide a basis for waiver. If the waiver is express, it also must be clear, unequivocal and decisive. It must also be published and cannot be the secret intention of the party waiving. Gerard v. Sanner, 110 Mont. 71, 103 P.2d 314 (1940), which both parties cite, states: Also 92 C.J.S. Waiver at 1061 (1955) states: When taken in context the loan committee notes do not clearly express an intention to waive by saying "looking to," and there clearly is no indication of an intent to release both Venners and the corporation from any debt action. Also, the notes were never published or communicated to Venners and fall short of being a waiver. The judgment is affirmed. WUEST, C.J., and MORGAN, SABERS and MILLER, JJ., concur. BOGUE, Circuit Judge, for HENDERSON, J., disqualified.