Case Title: Smith v. State

Citation: 708 So. 2d 253

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
708 So. 2d 253 (1998)
Frank Lee SMITH, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 78199.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 22, 1998.
Rehearing Denied April 8, 1998.
*254 Gregory C. Smith, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern Region, and Stephen M. Kissinger, Chief Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern Region, Tallahassee, Peter Warren Kenny, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, and Martin J. McClain, Litigation Director, Office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Miami, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Sara D. Baggett, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Frank Lee Smith appeals an order entered by the trial court below pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), (7), Fla. Const.
The procedural history of this case is set forth in State v. Lewis, 656 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1994),[1] as follows:
Id. at 1249.[2]
In August 1996, the trial court, with Judge Mark A. Speiser presiding, held an evidentiary hearing on the alleged ex parte communication. Smith now appeals the trial court's second denial of post-conviction relief, raising two issues: (1) whether Judge Tyson engaged in improper ex parte communications with state attorney Paul Zacks and (2) whether newly discovered evidence establishes that Smith's conviction and sentence are constitutionally unreliable.[3] Our resolution *255 of the first issue renders the second issue moot.
The record reflects that the trial court may have engaged in at least three separate ex parte communications with the state during the pendency of Smith's rule 3.850 motion. The first communication occurred when Judge Tyson telephoned state attorney Zacks to prepare the order denying relief. The second occurred[4] when Judge Tyson called Zacks and asked him to make a deletion in the order. The third occurred when Judge Tyson discussed with Zacks Smith's motion to disqualify him. We reject the State's argument that Smith's due process rights were not violated by the ex parte communications because he had ample opportunity to object to the substance of the proposed order. In Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.1992), we explained that
Id. at 1183.
At the August 1996 hearing, Judge Tyson testified that Zacks convinced him to change his mind about the order denying Smith's relief. In the judge's own words:
(Emphasis added.) Based on our review of the record, and especially the foregoing testimony, we conclude that the "impartiality of the tribunal" was compromised and the ex parte communications were improper. "[A] judge should not engage in any conversation about a pending case with only one of the parties participating in that conversation."[5] We therefore vacate the order denying Smith's motion for post-conviction relief and remand with directions for Judge Speiser to conduct a new evidentiary hearing on the newly discovered evidence issue[6] within sixty (60) days.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.
[1]  The facts are set out fully in Smith v. State, 515 So. 2d 182 (Fla.1987).
[2]  See State v. Lewis, 656 So. 2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 1994) ("[A] party may be allowed to take post-conviction depositions of the judge who presided over the trial only when the testimony of the presiding judge is absolutely necessary to establish factual circumstances not in the record, provided the requirements set forth above are fulfilled and the judge's thought process is not violated.")
[3]  Smith claimed that a key identification witness, Chiquita Lowe, recanted her trial testimony wherein she identified Smith as the man she had seen in front of the victim's house an hour or so before the murder, and was now indicating that the man she saw was Eddie Lee Mosley.
[4]  We recognize that Judge Tyson testified that he had asked the attorneys if they objected to him calling the attorney for the party in whose favor he decided to rule to prepare the order. He said he understood the attorneys to have agreed to this procedure. Smith's attorney contended that he had objected to such procedure.
[5]  Id. ("Obviously, we understand that this would not include strictly administrative matters not dealing in any way with the merits of the case.").
[6]  See supra note 3.