Case Title: KEITH ALLAN LEYVA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-233

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
KEITH ALLAN LEYVA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 136165 P.3d 446Case Number: 06-233Decided: 08/23/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
KEITH 
ALLAN LEYVA,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

The Honorable Wade E. 
Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Donna D. 
Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; 
Kirk A. Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. 
Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Mr. Pauling.                              

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]         
Mr. Leyva appeals his 
conviction on two felony counts, one for burglary and one for third offense 
illegal possession of a controlled substance.  We affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]         
Mr. Leyva and the State 
agree on the two issues to be resolved in this case, and we state them as 
follows:

 
 
1.         
Did the district court improperly withdraw its acceptance of 
Mr. Leyva's guilty plea?

 
 
 2.        Did 
the district court err in allowing evidence of uncharged misconduct to be 
admitted at trial?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]         
On September 8, 2005, 
Rawlins police received a phone call from Kelly King, who reported that a 
television set had been taken from his apartment.  When officers arrived at the apartment 
complex, they observed a parked vehicle with a television set in the front 
passenger seat.  At the officers' 
request, Mr. King's son identified the television as the one taken from his 
father's apartment.  Soon 
thereafter, the officers saw two individuals getting into the vehicle.  The individuals turned out to be Erin 
Setright, who owned the vehicle, and Mr. Leyva.  Ms. Setright told the officers that Mr. 
Leyva had the television set with him when he asked her for a ride.  

 
 

[¶4]         
The officers detained Mr. 
Leyva on suspicion of stealing the television set.  Then, after learning of an outstanding 
warrant, they placed Mr. Leyva under arrest.  Their pat down search of Mr. Leyva 
revealed, among other items, a knife, a brass pipe with marijuana residue, and a 
plastic bag containing a minimal amount of methamphetamine residue.  Mr. Leyva told the police that he had 
borrowed the television set from Mr. King.  He also claimed that he had borrowed the 
pants he was wearing from Mr. King.  
The brass pipe was not his, he said, and must have been in the pocket 
when he borrowed the pants that morning.  
The knife was his, he admitted, but with the inconsistent explanation 
that he had put the knife in the pocket of the pants the night 
before.

 
 

[¶5]         
Mr. Leyva was charged 
with two felony counts, one for burglary involving the television set, and one 
for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), third offense.  Before trial, Mr. Leyva and the 
State reached a plea agreement, under which Mr. Leyva would plead guilty to 
the methamphetamine charge and the State would dismiss the burglary charge.  The State also agreed to recommend a 
sentence of three to five years, and not to oppose probation if it was 
recommended in the presentence investigation report.  At the change of plea hearing, the 
district court questioned Mr. Leyva, and found that an adequate factual basis 
for the plea had been established, and that the plea was entered freely and 
voluntarily after consultation with competent counsel.  The district court took the plea 
agreement under advisement, ordered a presentence investigation, and delayed the 
sentencing until after the presentence investigation report was received.  

 
 

[¶6]         
At the subsequent 
sentencing hearing, the district court confirmed that Mr. Leyva wished to 
maintain his guilty plea, then accepted the plea and pronounced a sentence of 
three to five years in the state penitentiary, with the recommendation that Mr. 
Leyva be referred to a youth offender program commonly known as "boot 
camp."  Upon further questioning, 
however, Mr. Leyva indicated his belief that there had been a misunderstanding 
about the sentence.  He expected to 
be put on probation, not referred to boot camp.  Because of the misunderstanding, and at 
Mr. Leyva's request, the court allowed him to withdraw the guilty plea on the 
count of illegal possession of methamphetamine.  Mr. Leyva's case was then set for trial 
on the two original counts, burglary and illegal possession of 
methamphetamine.

 
 

[¶7]         
During the trial, Mr. 
Leyva objected to the State's evidence that he was in possession of a brass pipe 
containing marijuana residue at the time of his arrest.  The district court admitted the 
evidence.  The jury subsequently 
returned a verdict of guilty on both charges.  Mr. Leyva was sentenced to three to 
five years in the state penitentiary, with the recommendation that he be 
referred to boot camp.  Mr. Leyva 
filed this timely appeal.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.         
Did the district court improperly withdraw its acceptance of 
Mr. Leyva's guilty plea?

 
 

[¶8]         
In reviewing a district 
court's decision to accept or reject a guilty plea, this Court generally applies 
an abuse of discretion standard.  Herrera v. State, 2003 WY 25, ¶ 10, 
64 P.3d 724, 727 (Wyo. 2003).  In 
this case, however, Mr. Leyva made no objection to the district court's 
decision, and the State urges us to apply a plain error standard.  All of the Wyoming cases we have 
found on this issue involve appeals of a trial court's denial of a defendant's 
motion to accept or withdraw a plea.  
Because such a denial is necessarily contrary to the defendant's motion, 
none of these cases involves a defendant's failure to object, and none applies 
the plain error standard of review.  
However, in analogous cases involving sentencing under a plea agreement, 
we have applied the plain error standard when the defendant did not enter any 
objection.  See, e.g., Meyers v. State, 2005 WY 163, ¶ 16, 124 P.3d 710, 716 (Wyo. 2005).  We find 
the plain error standard appropriate, because Mr. Leyva's lack of objection 
deprived the district court of an opportunity to consider or correct the alleged 
error.  In the unusual circumstances 
of this case, we will review for plain error, using a familiar three-step 
process:

 
 
"First, the record must 
be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party 
claiming the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove a 
substantial right has been denied him and, as a result, he has been materially 
prejudiced."

 
 

Id. (quoting Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 7, 49 P.3d 975, 981 (Wyo. 2002)).

 
 

[¶9]         
To resolve this issue, it 
is necessary to review the record in some detail and place the events in 
context.  Approximately six months 
after he was arrested, Mr. Leyva and the State reached a plea agreement.  At a change of plea hearing held on 
March 21, 2006, the district court was advised that Mr. Leyva had agreed to 
plead guilty to the charge of third offense possession of methamphetamine, and 
in return, the State had agreed to dismiss the burglary charge.  The State had also agreed to recommend a 
three to five year sentence, and not to oppose probation if that was recommended 
in the presentence investigation report.  
After questioning Mr. Leyva, the district court found that an 
adequate factual basis for the plea had been established, and that the plea was 
being entered freely and voluntarily after consultation with competent 
counsel.  The district court took 
the plea under advisement, and said it would sentence Mr. Leyva after 
receiving the presentence investigation report.

 
 

[¶10]    
Two months later, the 
presentence investigation report was complete, and a sentencing hearing was 
held.  The district court noted that 
the State had agreed not to oppose probation if the presentence investigation 
report recommended it.  However, the 
report recommended referral to boot camp.  
It recommended probation only if the district court rejected the boot 
camp recommendation.  The district 
court told Mr. Leyva that it would accept the boot camp 
recommendation:

 
 
The Court fully intends 
to sentence Mr. Leyva to not less than 3 nor more than 5 years in prison with a 
recommendation to boot camp.  I want 
to make sure that doesn't surprise Mr. Leyva.  I want to make sure that . . . doesn't 
give him the opportunity today to withdraw his plea of guilty and request a jury 
trial.

 
 
The district court then 
questioned Mr. Leyva, who initially said that he was not surprised by the 
sentence, that he believed the State was still honoring the terms of the plea 
agreement, and that he did not want to withdraw his guilty plea.  The district court then pronounced a 
sentence of three to five years, with a recommended referral to boot 
camp.

 
 

[¶11]    
Even after pronouncing 
sentence, however, the district court still had doubts about Mr. Leyva's 
concession that his sentence conformed to the plea agreement.  The district court made one more attempt 
at clarification:

 
 
THE COURT:  Let's take this bull by the horns, Mr. 
Leyva, and I am going to give you an opportunity right now, one time, to 
withdraw your plea of guilty and we will have a jury trial and we will do this 
sentencing all over again if you are convicted at your jury trial. 

 
 
Take a moment, discuss 
that with [defense counsel].

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]?

 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Thank you for the additional time, Your 
Honor.  Mr. Leyva informs me that 
there's been a misunderstanding. . . .  

 
 
Is that 
correct?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.

 
 
THE COURT:  And that he does not wish to proceed 
further pursuant to the plea agreement; is that correct?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.

 
 
THE COURT:  Which means you will be going to trial 
probably on two counts; is that correct?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.

 
 
THE COURT:  So the deal is off.  Mr. Leyva wants his jury trial to two 
potential charges.  The first is 
felony  third offense possession of meth and the second is 
burglary.

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 

 
 

[¶12]    
Mr. Leyva contends on 
appeal that it was improper for the district court to withdraw its acceptance of 
the guilty plea after it had accepted the plea and pronounced sentence.  He relies on two cases, United States v. Ritsema, 89 F.3d 392 
(7th Cir. 1996), and State ex rel. Brewer v. Starcher, 195 
W.Va. 185, 465 S.E.2d 185 (1995), for the general proposition that a trial court is bound by an 
approved plea agreement.  
Specifically, those cases hold that after a guilty plea is accepted and 
the sentence pronounced, the trial court may not withdraw its acceptance, Ritsema, 89 F. 34d at 399, or increase 
the sentence.  Starcher, 195 W.Va. at 193, 465 S.E.2d  
at 193.

 
 

[¶13]    
In both of those cases, 
however, the trial court was acting unilaterally, and over the objections of the 
defendants.  In this case, the 
district court asked Mr. Leyva if he wished to withdraw his plea, Mr. Leyva 
said yes, and the district court allowed him to withdraw the plea.  Not surprisingly, Mr. Leyva cites 
no precedent for reversing a trial court's decision allowing a defendant to 
withdraw a guilty plea when that was exactly what the defendant asked the trial 
court to do.

 
 

[¶14]    
The district court's 
actions were consistent with our rules of criminal procedure.  Under W.R.Cr.P. 11(d), "[t]he court 
shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by 
addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is 
voluntary . . . ."  Even though 
Mr. Leyva initially indicated that his plea was voluntary, the district 
court remained doubtful.  The record 
does not indicate the basis for this doubt, but the district court must have 
been responding to nonverbal cues not reflected in the written record.  We have previously observed that it is 
difficult to discern the atmosphere in a courtroom "from the sterile, black and 
white transcript."  Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, ¶ 24, 73 P.3d 1041, 1081 (Wyo. 2003).  In 
making certain that Mr. Leyva was voluntarily maintaining his guilty plea, 
the district court was diligently complying with the mandate of W.R.Cr.P. 
11(d).

 

[¶15]    
The district court did 
not lose the authority to reconsider the guilty plea after it pronounced 
sentence, as Mr. Leyva suggests.  
W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) provides that:

 
 
If a motion for 
withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made before sentence is 
imposed, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the 
defendant of any fair and just reason.  
At any later time, a plea may be set aside only to correct manifest 
injustice.

 
 
It is not entirely clear 
that Mr. Leyva's was a case of manifest injustice.  It is clear that the district court had 
the authority to reach that conclusion, and to allow Mr. Leyva to withdraw 
his guilty plea.

 
 

[¶16]    
Because we conclude that 
the district court's decision did not violate any clear and unequivocal rule of 
law, it is not necessary to consider whether Mr. Leyva has established material 
prejudice.  We note, however, that 
after the district court allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea, Mr. Leyva was 
given another chance to change his plea.  
A hearing was scheduled, but Mr. Leyva declined to change his plea, 
and reaffirmed his desire to go to trial:

 
 
THE COURT:  This matter was  Mr. Leyva changed his 
plea on one occasion, and the matter was set for sentencing on June 26.  The Court allowed Mr. Leyva to withdraw 
his plea, the matter was set for Jury trial on July 25.  The Court was informed that Mr. Leyva 
was again to change his plea, and it was set again for [hearing today].  

 
 
Mr. Leyva, I am now 
informed that you again changed your mind, you don't want to change your plea 
and you want a jury trial.  Is that 
correct, Mr. Leyva?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.

 
 
THE COURT:  This case will go to trial.  It will go to trial on 
July 25.  No other 
postponements, continuances, excuses, and no other games will be played, Mr. 
Leyva.  Is that 
clear?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.

 
 
THE COURT:  Do you and I understand one 
another?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.

 
 
THE COURT:  You want a jury trial, I will give you a 
jury trial.  Is that 
clear?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.

 
 
We also note that, after 
Mr. Leyva was convicted on both counts, the district court sentenced him to the 
original term of three to five years on each count, and ordered that the 
sentences run concurrently.  The 
district court also recommended referral to boot camp.  The district court explained the 
sentence as follows:

 
 
Mr. Leyva, this 
Court will not punish you for exercising your constitutional right for a trial 
and will therefore give the same sentence that you would have received under the 
terms of the plea agreement.

  

We find neither error nor 
prejudice in the district court's decision to allow Mr. Leyva to withdraw 
his guilty plea.

 
 

2.         
Did the district court err in allowing evidence of uncharged misconduct 
to be admitted at trial? 

[¶17]    
A trial court's decision 
on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to considerable deference, and will 
not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant demonstrates a clear abuse of 
discretion.  "[A]s long as there 
exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be 
disturbed on appeal."  Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 20, 142 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 

[¶18]    
When Mr. Leyva was 
arrested, he was in possession of a brass pipe containing marijuana 
residue.  This evidence, he says, 
was introduced by the State for the sole purpose of proving that he had the 
character to possess drugs, and to show that he acted in conformity with that 
character.  He contends that this 
evidence was inadmissible under W.R.E. 404(b).

 
 

[¶19]    
A core principle of 
W.R.E. 404(b) is that the defendant in a criminal case "should not be convicted 
because he is an unsavory person, nor because of past misdeeds, but only because 
of his guilt of the particular crime charged."  1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence 
§ 4:21, at 691-92 (3d ed. 2007).  
The Wyoming Rules of Evidence reflect this principle, and restrict the 
admissibility of evidence about other misdeeds:

 
 
Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

 
 
W.R.E. 404(b).  

 
 

[¶20]    
We agree with 
Mr. Leyva that evidence that he was in possession of a brass pipe 
containing marijuana residue is evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" 
under W.R.E. 404(b).  Those 
terms are not defined in the rules, but we have previously said that "wrongs" 
include "any sort of conduct that is likely to reflect adversely on the person 
in the eyes of the jury," and "other acts" include "any conduct, good or bad, 
that tends to show the character of the person involved."  Sanchez, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 21, 142 P.3d  at 
1140 (quoting from 22 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure:  Evidence § 5239, at 456 
(1978)).  When the crime charged is 
illegal possession of methamphetamine, evidence that the defendant was also in 
possession of marijuana is exactly the kind of uncharged misconduct evidence to 
which W.R.E. 404(b) is meant to apply.  Such evidence tends to show the 
character of the accused, increases the likelihood that the jury will render a 
guilty verdict on an improper basis, and should not be admitted unless the 
requirements of W.R.E. 404(b) are met.

 
 

[¶21]    
The State maintains that 
the evidence was not subject to W.R.E. 404(b) because it was "part and parcel" 
of the events surrounding and following Mr. Leyva's arrest.  Mr. Leyva told the police officers 
that he had borrowed the television set and the pants from Mr. King.  Explaining the items in the pockets of 
the pants, Mr. Leyva gave inconsistent accounts of when he had borrowed the 
pants, saying he had put the knife in the pocket the evening before, but that 
the pipe must have been in the pocket when he borrowed the pants that 
morning.  These inconsistent 
statements cast doubt on Mr. Leyva's veracity, in the State's view, and made it 
more likely that he had stolen the television, as the State asserted, and less 
likely that he had borrowed it from Mr. King, as Mr. Leyva had told the 
police.  The State said it would be 
difficult or impossible to relate the inconsistent statements to the jury 
without reference to the knife and the pipe, because the inconsistent statements 
were made about those very items.  
Evidence of the knife and the pipe was admissible, the State asserted, 
because it was necessary to "give the jury the whole story and enhance the 
natural development of the facts of the case."

 
 

[¶22]    
While the State uses the 
term "part and parcel" of the crimes charged, this Court has more often termed 
evidence of this type "intrinsic" evidence.  We have said that evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is intrinsic when it "and the evidence of the crime 
charged are inextricably intertwined or both acts are part of a single criminal 
episode or the other acts were necessary preliminaries to the crime 
charged."  Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 12, 42 P.3d 483, 
487 (Wyo. 2002) (quotation marks omitted).  See also Barker v. State, 2006 WY 104, ¶ 36, 
141 P.3d 106, 118 (Wyo. 2006) (contrasting intrinsic and extrinsic 
evidence).

 
 

[¶23]    
Intrinsic evidence is 
still subject to W.R.E. 404(b).  In 
Howard and Barker, we did not hold that intrinsic 
evidence was beyond the reach of W.R.E. 404(b).  Rather, we upheld the admission of 
intrinsic evidence because the trial court had properly found it admissible 
under W.R.E. 404(b).  See also Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 
969-70 (Wyo. 1996) (Evidence "which does not constitute a portion of [the] 
crimes charged but has a natural, necessary, or logical connection to the crime" 
must be analyzed for admissibility under W.R.E. 404(b).).  

 
 

[¶24]    
Evidence of "other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts," intrinsic or not, may improperly invite the jury to 
convict a defendant because of other misdeeds, not because of his guilt of the 
crime charged.  Such evidence should 
be admitted only when it has some proper purpose, is relevant, and is more 
probative than prejudicial.  As 
detailed in the discussion below, this is the result W.R.E. 404(b) is designed 
to accomplish.  For that reason, 
placing intrinsic evidence beyond the reach of W.R.E. 404(b) would be "unwise 
and wrong."  1 Mueller & 
Kirkpatrick, supra, § 4:33, at 
818.  See also 22 Wright & Graham, supra, 
§ 5239.

 
 

[¶25]    
Evidence that 
Mr. Leyva was in possession of a pipe with marijuana residue was analyzed 
by the district court at a hearing held during the trial.  The district court ruled as 
follows:

 
 
I'm going to allow the 
evidence of the marijuana pipe in Mr. Leyva's pocket.  I'm not sure that this evidence is 
uncharged misconduct evidence as described in 404(b) and the Gleason case.  But if it is uncharged misconduct 
evidence  and again, I think it is not.  
I think it is part and parcel of the crimes charged, in fact.  I believe it is properly admissible as 
relevant.  Clearly it's prejudicial, 
but all evidence introduced by the State against Mr. Leyva is prejudicial.  It is more probative than it is 
prejudicial for the purpose of explaining or countering, if you will, statements 
made by Mr. Leyva to the police.  
And on that basis, I will allow testimony as to the pot pipe found in 
Mr. Leyva's pocket.

 
 
If the district court 
incorrectly stated that the evidence was not subject to W.R.E. 404(b), that 
misstatement was rendered immaterial when the court immediately proceeded to 
analyze the evidence under W.R.E. 404(b).

  

[¶26]    
We have said that a 
district court must consider four criteria in applying W.R.E. 404(b) to 
uncharged misconduct evidence:  (1) 
Is the evidence offered for a proper purpose?  (2) Is the evidence relevant?  (3)  Is the probative value of the evidence 
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice?  (4) Upon request, should the jury be 
given a limiting instruction?  Blakeman v. State, 2004 WY 139, ¶ 31, 
100 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Wyo. 2004) (citing Howard, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 17, 42 P.3d  at 
488, and Huddleston v. United States, 
485 U.S. 681, 691, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 1502, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988)).  No request for a limiting instruction 
was made, so we will review the district court's application of the first three 
criteria.  If the district court 
applied these criteria and had a legitimate basis for its ruling, we will uphold 
the decision.  Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 20, 57 P.3d 332, 341 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
 

[¶27]    
Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is admissible if it serves a proper purpose, and is excluded 
only if its sole purpose is to prove that a defendant has a disposition to 
commit crimes.  Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d 1202, 1207 (Wyo. 2007); Blakeman, 2004 WY 139, ¶ 32, 100 P.3d  at 
1237.  W.R.E. 404(b) lists several 
purposes, other than proof of character, for which evidence may be 
admitted:  proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident.  The list of 
allowable purposes identified in W.R.E. 404(b) is exemplary, not 
exhaustive.  Blakeman, 2004 WY 139, ¶ 32, 100 P.3d  at 
1237; 1 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, § 4:33, at 809.  

 
 

[¶28]    
We have previously 
recognized that evidence of uncharged misconduct is admissible if it "forms part 
of the history of the event or serves to enhance the natural development of the 
facts."  Bromley, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d  at 
1207; Blakeman, 2004 WY 139, ¶ 32, 
100 P.3d  at 1237; Crozier v. State, 
723 P.2d 42, 49 (Wyo. 1986).  We have referred to this as the "course 
of conduct" purpose.  Crozier, 723 P.2d  at 49.  Other jurisdictions applying this 
concept have called it the "same transaction" purpose or the "complete story" 
purpose.  Id.

 
 

[¶29]    
The State asserted that 
the evidence at issue was intrinsic because it was needed to "give the jury the 
whole story and enhance the natural development of the facts of the case."  While that does not mean the evidence 
was beyond the reach of W.R.E. 404(b), it does show that the State had a 
proper "course of conduct" or "complete story" purpose for admitting the 
evidence.  In its ruling, the 
district court did not explicitly use the terms "course of conduct," but it 
plainly agreed with the State that the evidence was offered for that proper 
purpose.  The record provides a 
legitimate basis for the district court's conclusion.  Bromley, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d  at 
1207; Blakeman, 2004 WY 139, ¶ 32, 
100 P.3d  at 1237; Crozier, 723 P.2d  
at 49.    

 
 

[¶30]    
The district court 
expressly found that the evidence was relevant, and that the evidence was more 
probative than prejudicial.  The 
State had emphasized the relevance and probative value of the evidence because 
it was part of Mr. Leyva's inconsistent stories about borrowing the pants, 
making it more likely that the television was stolen and less likely that it was 
borrowed.  The district court 
agreed.  As stated above, a trial 
court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence are entitled to considerable 
deference.  Sanchez, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 20, 142 P.3d  at 
1140.  The record reflects that the 
district court considered the required criteria, had legitimate bases for its 
conclusions, and did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence at 
trial.

 
 

[¶31]    
However, Mr. Leyva 
further challenges the district court's ruling on procedural grounds.  He correctly states that this Court has 
adopted a procedure to be followed when uncharged misconduct evidence is to be 
introduced at trial:

 
 
[W]hen a defendant files 
a pretrial demand for notice of intent to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b), the same shall be treated as the making of a timely objection to the 
introduction of such evidence.  The 
State must then respond with sufficient information to meet the balance of our 
four-part test for determining the admissibility of other bad acts 
evidence.  

 
 

Barker, 2006 WY 104, ¶ 35, 141 P.3d  at 117 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  Our decision in Howard, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 23, 42 P.3d  at 
491, indicated the reasons for this procedure:

 
 
Not only will such a rule 
enhance the defendant's prospects of receiving due process and a fair trial, it 
will also enhance the district court's ability to reflect and rule upon a 
significant evidentiary issue.  
Rulings on uncharged misconduct evidence are too important to be made in 
the heat and pressure of a trial, with the jury twiddling its thumbs in the next 
room.

 
 
We have also imposed 
requirements on the trial court:

 
 
In future cases involving 
the admissibility of evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), the record shall reflect the 
trial court's identification of the purpose or purposes for admission of the 
evidence, the findings and conclusions establishing relevance and probative 
value, and the factors considered in balancing probative value against the 
potential for unfair prejudice.  The 
"shotgun approach" of listing every conceivable purpose for admissibility, 
followed by a bald statement that probative value outweighs prejudicial effect 
will no longer be sufficient.  While 
the trial court need not make an express finding on every factor . . . the 
record must contain sufficient findings to support the trial court's 
conclusions.

 
 

Gleason, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 30, 57 P.3d  at 343.

 
 

[¶32]    
Mr. Leyva filed a 
pretrial demand for notice of intent to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), 
preserving the timely objection on which this appeal is based.  The State responded that it did not 
intend to introduce any evidence pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b), and did not mention 
the pipe with marijuana residue.  At 
the hearing on this issue, the State explained that it had not mentioned the 
marijuana pipe because it did not believe the evidence was subject to W.R.E. 
404(b).  The State maintained this 
position on appeal, and although we disagree, the position was not untenable or 
unreasonable.  Indeed, the district 
court agreed with it.  When there is 
any question that evidence is subject to W.R.E. 404(b), the State should list 
that evidence in response to a defendant's pretrial demand.  However, Mr. Leyva does not assert, 
nor does the record suggest, that the prosecution failed to list the evidence in 
bad faith, or to surprise the defendant unfairly at trial. 

 
 

[¶33]    
In fact, Mr. Leyva was 
not unfairly surprised at trial.  
The State listed this evidence in its pretrial memorandum, filed more 
than six months before trial.  
Mr. Leyva made no claim that the evidence was inadmissible under 
W.R.E. 404(b) until the trial was in progress.  At that point, the district court 
dismissed the jury and conducted a hearing on the issue.  We have expressed a "firm preference" 
for a pretrial hearing on uncharged misconduct evidence.  Howard, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 23, 42 P.3d  
at 491.  However, when the issue is 
not raised until trial, and a prompt and thorough hearing is held at that time, 
the district court's failure to hold a pretrial hearing cannot be considered an 
abuse of discretion.

[¶34]    
Further, when the 
district court ruled that the evidence was admissible, it did not take "[t]he 
shotgun approach' of listing every conceivable purpose for admissibility," the 
procedure we condemned in Gleason, 
2002 WY 161, ¶ 30, 57 P.3d  at 343.  
One key purpose of the mandatory procedures under W.R.E. 404(b) is to 
ensure that the record contains sufficient information to support the trial 
court's conclusions, and to allow our review of those conclusions on 
appeal.  Gleason, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 30, 57 P.3d  at 
343.  Our prior discussion 
demonstrates that the record in Mr. Leyva's case contains sufficient information 
to explain and support the trial court's conclusions, and to allow meaningful 
review.  Accordingly, we find no 
abuse of discretion in admission of the challenged evidence. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶35]    
The district court did 
not err in granting Mr. Leyva's request to withdraw his guilty plea.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting uncharged misconduct evidence.  Rather, the district court properly 
analyzed the evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), had a legitimate basis for admitting 
the evidence, and under the circumstances, fulfilled the mandatory requirements 
for admitting evidence under W.R.E. 404(b).  We affirm the district court's decisions 
in all respects.