Case Title: Idaho v. Lopez-Orozco

Citation: 

Docket Number: 40859

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2015-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Docket No. 40859
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Boise, June 2015 Term
Plaintiff Respondent-Cross Appellant, )
) 2015 Opinion No. 104
y )
) Date: November 4, 2015
JORGE ALBERTO LOPEZ-OROZCO,
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk.
Defendant-Appellant-Cross )
Respondent. )
)

Appeal from the District Court ofthe Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, Elmore County. Hon. Timothy Hansea, District Judge

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

 

Sara B. Thomas, Idaho State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, attorney for
appellant, Sally J. Cooley argued.

Hon, Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attomey General, Boise attomey for
respondent, Jessica M. Lorello argued,

W. JONES, Justice
LNATURE OF THE Case,

A jury convicted Jonge Lopez-Orozeo (“Defendant”) of three counts of frst degree
‘murder. The district court imposed three concurrent determinate life sentences. Defendant
appeals from the judgment of conviction based on two alleged evidentiary errors commited by

 

the district court. First, Defendant argues the district court erred in finding that his brother was an
"unavailable witness at trial and permitting his brother's preliminary hearing testimony to be read

into evidence. Second, Defendant contends that the court erred in allowing his brother's unswoen

 

written statement to law enforcement 10 also be read into evidence. Defendant requests that his
‘convictions be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.
"ACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

 

(On August 11, 2002, a burned car was found in a remote desert area outside of Mountain,
Home, Idaho. Inside the car were the charred remains and bone fragments of Rebecea Ramirez
‘Almarez (“Almarez”) and her two sons, four-year-old R.R. and two-year-old MH. Almarez. and
MH. had suffered fatal gunshot wounds to the head, but R.R’s cause of death was
undetermined. The vehicle belonged to Defendant, who previously dated Almarez.

(On August 16, 2002, the State filed complaint charging Defendant with three counts of
first-degree murder for the deaths of Almarez and her two sons, Defendant fled to and remained
in Mexico, where he was discovered by Mexican law enforcement in 2009, Defendant was
extradited to Maho in 2011 and placed under arrest forthe murders. In June 2011, the magistrate
<ivision of the district court held a preliminary hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
‘magistrate judge found probable cause to support the three first-degree murder charges against
Defendant, Defendant pleaded not guilty to the charges and the case proceeded to tral in October

2012. A jury convicted Defendant on all three counts, and the court imposed three concurrent

 

fixed life sentences, Defendant timely appealed two issues related to the testimony and
statements of his brother, José Lopez-Orozco (“Jose”)

José is Defendant's youngest brother. At both the preliminary hearing and trial, José was
called by the State to testify as to certain incriminating statements Defendant allegedly made in
José's presence in San Jose, California, in late July or early August 2002, According to @ written
statement José provided to law enforcement, José was present at the apartment he shared with
Valvina Lopez-Orozeo (*Valvina”) when Defendant discussed the events on the evening of the
‘murders. José allegedly overheard Defendant confess to killing Almarez and the children and to
bbuming his white Pontiac Grand AM with Almarez.and the chikiren inside. These statements
were made by Defendant to Valvina and Simén Lopez-Orozco ("Simén") while Valvina, Simin,
‘and Defendant were siting at the kitchen table. Defendant, José, Simén, and Valvina are
siblings. José overheard this conversation from his position inthe living room,

Defendant's confession was purportedly unearthed during a discussion between José and

Detective Enrique Garcia of the San Jose Police Department on August 16, 2002, Josés August

 

2002 interview with Detective Garcia was latcr summarized, reduced to writing, and prepared for
Jose's signature. José signed
of José Aurelio Lopez Oroze

 

writen statement in 2009. The document, entitled “Statement
" was initially drafted in Spanish and signed and dated by José,

 

with each page also initialed by José, The document was translated to English, the accuracy of
Which is not contested by either the State or Defendant,
On June 15, 2011, José provided limited testimony at Defendant's preliminary hearing
regarding the statements made by Defendant in Califomia in 2002. Over Defendant's hearsay
‘objection, the writen statement was admitted at the preliminary hearing under the recorded
recollection exception. At Defendant's trial in October 2012, José was again called by the State
(o testify. In this instance, José testified that he did not remember any of Defendant's statements
regarding why he let Maho, any of his own statements to law enforcement in California, or any

 

‘of his testimony atthe preliminary hearing. Based on this lack of recollection, the State asked the
district court to declare José unavailable as a witness and to allow his preliminary hearing
testimony t0 be read to the jury. The State also asked for the contents of the written statement
José signed for law enforcement in 2009 to be read into evidence. The cour allowed the written
Satement and certain relevant portions of José’s preliminary hearing testimony to be read into
the record, but not admitted as exhibits

Defendant argues that the district court erred in permitting José"s preliminary hearing
testimony to be read to the jury, which was based on its finding that he was an unavailable
‘witness, and further erred in permitting his written statement to law enforcement to also be read
to the jury,

IIL Issues oN Arreat

|. Whether the district court erred in declaring José an unavailable witness and allowing his
preliminary hearing testimony to be read into evidence under the former testimony
hearsay exception,

2. Whether the district court erred in permitting José"s written statement to law enforcement
to be read to the jury under the recorded recollection hearsay exception.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The tial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence and its
decision to admit evidence will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that
discretion.” State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 112, 106 P.3d 436, 438 (2005). When evidence is
‘admitted under a recognized hearsay exception, the key inquiry is “whether the district court
recognized that it did not have discretion to admit the hearsay evidence if the requirements for an
exception were not met; whether it acted consistently with the rules goveming hearsay

 

exceptions: and whether it reached its decision to admit the hearsay by an exercise of reason.”
‘State v, Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 423, 224 P.3d 485, 490 (2009), However, “inthe absence of «
timely [and specific] objection to an alleged error at tral, this Court will not consider the alleged
error on appeal.” State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 423, 776 P.2d 424, 432 (1989); LRE
103(a\(1). “{Alppellate courts will not consider new arguments raised for the first time on
appeal.” Obenchain v. Medlvain Constr. Inc. 143 Idaho $6, $7, 137 P34 443, 444 (2006).

V. ANALYSIS

lecision to permit José’s preliminary hearing testimony to be
ot an abuse of discretion.

After being held briefly in contempt, fined, and remanded to the custody of the Elmore
‘County Sheriff's Office based on his refusal to respond to the State’s questions, José eventually
«cooperated and provided some limited testimony at Defendant's preliminary hearing on June 15,

 
   

2011. After providing this testimony, these sanetions were lifted by the magistrate court,
Specifically, José was asked to testify atthe preliminary hearing regarding the subject matter of
his statements to law enforcement in 2002 and the written statement he signed for law
enforcement in 2009, which cover the same subject matter since the written statement purports to
summarize the interview. The erux of the written statement detailed Defendants incriminating
statements to Valvina and Simin that José overheard in 2002,

‘At the preliminary hearing. José testified about certain of his catler statements to law
‘enforcement, but was unable to recall many of the material details he previously provided.
‘Specifically, José testified that he overheard Defendant say that he picked Almarez up from her
father's house in Oregon and that someone wanted to kill Defendant and/or Almarez. However,
he further testified that he did not remember overhearing Defendant discuss what happened to
‘Almarez. In response to this lack of recollection, the State provided José with his signed
statement. After reviewing this written statement, José testified that the signature and initials on
the statement were his, and thatthe statement was an accurate depiction of his memory at the
time he spoke to Detective Garcia in August 2002 and when he signed it in 2009, Based on
Jose's lack of recollection, the State moved to admit the statement under the recorded
recollection hearsay exception. Over Defendant's hearsay objection, the magistrate court granted
the State's request

osé was again called to testify t Defendants trial
stand on October 29, 2012, and based on the State's discussions with José and Valvina in

anticipation oftheir testimony, the court heard argument outside of the jury's presence regarding

2012. However, prior to taking the

 

 

 
lack of memory as t0 any of the information the State was seeking to elicit from them in their
trial testimony. Based on this anticipated unavailability the State asked that José and Valvina’s
preliminary hearing testimony and José"s written statement be admitted at trial under various
‘hearsay exceptions. The district court stated that it would entertain argument from counsel and
provide the partes with a tentative ruling, but clarified that the witnesses would have to be

 

present ancl testify before the court could make a definitive determination as to whether José or
Valvina qualified as unavailable. In the court's view, any resolution reached prior to their
attempted testimony “was simply to be a preliminary ruling from the (cJourt rather than a final
ruling, depending on the testimony of the witnesses when they are called.”

With this understanding, the parties argued whether the requirements for certain hearsay
exceptions were satisfied with respect to these out-of-court statements. The State argued that the
writen statement qualified under the public records exception of Kdaho Rule of Evidence 803(8)
‘or as a recorded recollection under Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(5). The State also asserted that
José’s preliminary hearing testimony should be admitted pursuant fo Idaho Rule of Evidence
'804(b\(1) and Idaho Code section 9-336,' the former testimony exception and a statutory
provision specifically covering the admissibility of preliminary hearing testimony. The crux of
the State's oral argument focused on whether or not Defendant had an adequate opportunity to
cross-examine José atthe preliminary hearing. Specifically, the State argued that Defendant was

 

represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing, defense counsel had a sufficient opportunity to
prepare forthe hearing, Defendant had a means and motive to cross-examine José and Valvina at
the preliminary hearing similar to his motive at trial, the magistrate judge put no significant
limitations on the scope of the prior examination, and there was no showing of a new or material
line of questioning which would render the prior lie of questioning inapplicable or insufficient.
In response to these arguments, Defendant asserted that these are not the only individuals
‘capable of providing substantial evidence on certain material clements of the offenses charged.
In addition, Defendant disagreed with the State's reliance on Rule 803(8), arguing thatthe public
records exception does not apply ta statement being utilized by the State which was prepared
by law enforcement in preparation of a criminal charge or during the course of an investigation

 

'Adato Code ection 9-336 was repealed during the 2018 Legislative Session, Ch, 140, § 1,201 Kao Ses
Laws 344.34. lrwas replaced by Maho Code section 74125, which contains identical language f section 9-336.
1c. § 7425,
Defendant also contended that José's preliminary hearing testimony was compromised and
‘unreliable because he was not represented by counsel at the hearing and certain of his due
process rights were not explained to him. Lastly, while maintaining that the hearsay exceptions.
do not apply, Defendant altematively argued that if an exception is utilized, the prior testimony
and writen statement should be real tothe jury but not introduced into evidence as exhibits.
Atthe conclusion of oral argument, the district court articulated a number of Findings and
conclusions. Fist, the court found that idaho Rule of Evidence 803(8) did not apply. specifically
that the public records exception did not cover Jose's written statement to law enforcement. This
finding is not challenged on appeal. Second, and assuming José and Valvina testified to a
‘imini
testimony qualified for admittance under Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b\1) as former sworn,

hed memory as represented, the court tentatively ruled that their preliminary hearing

 

preliminary hearing testimony which was subject to cross-examination. The court specifically

 

found that defense counsel “hac a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine [Joss regardless of
the nature of the eross-examination that was conducted.” On the issue of whether the evidence
sought to be offered was material and more probative than any other evidence which the State
could procure through reasonable efforts, the cour stated that José and Valvina were the only
two witnesses realistically available to attribute these statements to Defendant in the apartment in

2002. For these reasons, the court preliminarily found that José's pretiminary hearing testimony

 

‘qualified under the former testimony hearsay exception and the statute controlling the
admissibility of pretiminary hearing testimony, Defendant appeals these findings with respect to
José’s prior testimony.

‘The district court then turned to the issue of whether José's written statement to law
enforcement qualified as a recorded recollection under Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(5). The

 

court's analyses and the parties’ arguments on this issue will be outlined in section V(B), infra

 

‘After the court entered its preliminary ruling on the applicable hearsay exceptions, the
jury was re-swor and José took the witness stand, José prompily testified that he could not
‘remember any statements that Defendant made about leaving Idaho in 2002, he could not recall
any of his own statements to law enforcement about Defendants statements, and he had no
‘memory of his own preliminary hearing testimony. José stated that his lack of recollection was
possibly duc to the length of time that had passed and because this was an “emotionally charged

issue” for him. As a result of this testimony, the State asked the district court to declare José

6
unavailable as a witness and to permit his preliminary hearing testimony to be read tothe jury
Based on Jose's testimony, the State's request, the prcliminary arguments advanced, and the
cour’s tentative ruling on this sve, the court granted the request.

(On appeal, Defendant argues the cout ered in declaring José unavailable for two related
reasons. First, Defendant contends that José “merely lacked memory of having made the out-of=
court statements,” but did not lack “memory of the subject matte Second, Defendant argues
that the State's “inguiry was insufficient to establish that José had no memory of the subject
‘atter” of his own and Defendan's statements, Defendant's arguments fail fortwo reasons. For
one, this issue was not properly preserved because these arguments were not raised before the
district court. Second, the court had substantial evidence to permit the reading of Jose's prior
testimony under the former testimony hearsay exception. Specifically. the district court
recognized it did not have the discretion to read José's preliminary hearing testimony’ into
‘evidence unless a hearsay exception existed under the Iaho Rules of Evidence, it acted
consistently within the bounds ofits discretion and the evidentiary and statutory rules governing

  

this exception, and it reached its decision through an exercise of reason.
The following exchange during the State's direct examination of José at trial is
illustrative as to both the preservation and merits ofthis issue:

State: Sir, do you recall any statements that the defendant made in your
presence about his leaving Idaho in 2002?

José: No.

State: Sir, do you recall any statements that you gave to law enforcement
bout what you overheard the defendant say?

José: No.

State Sir, do you recall the testimony that you provided on June 15, 2011
[atthe preliminary hearing} on these very issues?

José: No.

State: ‘And sir, is your lack of recall due to the length [of] time since

 

2002, when these events occurred,
José: Maybe.

It's been a long time for you?

 

7
José: Yes.

State: And this has been avery emotionally charge issue for you?

José: “Too emotional

State - Allright. Your Honor, at this time the State would ask the
oui to find the witness unavailable under Idaho Rule of Evidence
804013).

lury excused)

Cour: In this case, then, [Ste], is there any additional record that you

‘would like to make concerning your request at this time?

State: Your Honor, the witness has testified under oath today that he does
not remember any of the statements made by the defendant, that he
does not recall any statements that he has provided 1 law
enforcement, and that he docs not recall the content of his
testimony from June 1Sth 201 1

At this time, Your Honor, the State submits that the State has
established that he is unavailable under Idaho Rule of Evidens
804(a)(3). We would ask the Court to allow publication of his
preliminary hearing testimony under 804(6X1) as prior testimony
of this witness,

 

    

 

Court: [Defense counsel], two issues, I believe, because this issue is one
‘of fact for the Court in terms of making its determination as to the
‘unavailability of the witness, did you have any questions that you
‘would like 10 ask [José] conceming the questions of “his

 

Defense Aty: Judge, I would not.

Court: (Okay. Is there any additional argument then that you would like to
rake concerning the State's request at this time?

Defense Aty: I think we have to . .. {distinguish} between what is happening
here and what happened in State versus Barcella, 2 refusal 10
testify versus an inability to recall, But other than that, Judge, 1
‘would rest on the record.

The tial court went om to clarify that it viewed this asa case of diminished memory, not refusal

   

to testify. Specifically the district judge found persuasive José's answer that the lapse in time
“maybe” contributed to his memory loss, along with his admission that this was an emotionally
charged issue for him, For these reasons, the court found that José"s sworn testimony “laid
sufficient Factual basis from which the [cJour can determine that [José] simply lacks the memory
6 recollection of the incidents in question.”

Regarding preservation, Defendant advances only one argument on appeal regarding the
admissibility of José’s preliminary hearing testimony: the ial court ered in finding José
‘unavailable as a witness under the statutory and evidentiary standards controlling the former
testimony hearsay exception and the admission of preliminary hearing testimony at trial. Before
the tral court, however, defense counsel only objected to the admissibility of the preliminary
hhearing testimony on the following grounds: the adequacy of Defendant's prior opportunity to
cross-examine José; whether Defendant had a similar motive to challenge or develop José"s
testimony at the preliminary hearing stage; and, arguing the State's ability wo elicit the same or
similar testimony from other sources. No other issues were raised or argued below, and
Defendant never objected to or squarely challenged the district coun’s finding that José was
unavailable due to memory loss. Instead, Defendant's only response to the trial cour’s now=
contested finding was to seek clarification as 10 whether José’s unavailability was due 10
ally invited by the
district court judge to supplement the record on this issue, Defense counsel, however, deelined to
further develop or challenge the foundation laid by the State regarding José's memory-based

   

diminished memory or a refusal to testify, even though Defendant was spes

 

unavai
timely and specific objection to this alleged eror at trial. State v: Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 423,
776 P.24 424, 432 (1989), Instead, Defendant improperly advances these arguments for the first
time on appeal. Obenchain v. MeAlvain Const, 143 Idaho $6, 57, 137 P3d 443, 444 (2006).
However, even ifthe issue was properly preserved for appeal, Defendant's arguments fail
ty of Jose's

ly. Thus, Defendant failed to preserve the issue of Jose's availability by not raising a

 

 

fon the merits. The district court made pertinent findings as to the admis

 

preliminary hearing testimony both prior to and after José’s failure to adequately testify at trial

 
‘These findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and satisfy the applicable
statutory and evidentiary standards.

“The Idaho Rules of Evidence define hearsay as an out-of-court statement “offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted LR.E. 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible
unless specifically provided for inthe Rules of Evidence. LR.E, 802." State v. Joy, 155 Klaho 1,
13, 304 P.3d 276, 288 (2013), Jose's preliminary hearing testimony qualifies as hearsay. Absent
an exception, this testimony should have been barred from admission a trial. The district court
recognized this standard and these requirement in rendering its decision.

Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) provides an exception to the hearsay rule where a
witness is unavailable at trial. It allows for the admis
witness is unavailable; and (2) “the party against whom the testimony is now offered... had an

 

‘of former testimony where: (1) the

‘opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, oF redireet
examination.” LR.E. 804(by(1).

Idaho Rule of
‘of Evidence 804(bX1). It includes situations in which the declarant “testifies to a lack of memory
‘of the subject matter of declarant’s statement.” LR-E. 804(a)(3). In assessing whether a witness is,

dence 80a) defines witness unavailability for purposes of Idaho Rule

 

unavailable due to lack of memory, the relevant inguiry isnot whether the witness recall making
the statement, but rather whether he or she has no current memory ofthe subjeet matter. Stat
Fair, 196 Idaho 431, 435, 327 P.3d 989, 993 (Ct. App. 2014). In determining unavailability,
“uf distit cour’ factual finding must be supported by substantial and competent evidence
State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, $31, 328 P.34 S04, $11 (2014). The proponent of admitting
the forme testimony bears the burden of proving the declarant’ unavailability. Fair, 156 Idaho
at 434,327 P3d 0192,

With regard to Rule 804), dhe State carted its burden inthis ase, and the wal coun’
findings re supported by substantial and competent evidence. Joss wal testimony supports the

‘court's finding that his memory of Defendant's confession was so diminished by the time ofthe
trial that it rendered him unavailable to testify. Specifically, the subject matter at issue is what
Defendant told his siblings in 2002 about his departure from Idaho. To that end, the State
inquired of José whether he recalled “any statements thatthe defendant made in your presence
bout his leaving Idaho in 2002," to which José answered, "No." José further testified that he did

not remember any of his own statements to law enforcement in 2002 oF 2009, ot his preliminary

10
testimony on the subject matter in 2011, José attributed this lapse in memory 10 the

length of time that had passed since the events and the emotional nature of the subject matter.
Given José’s testimony that he lacked the memory to testify regarding the subject matter

at issue, the district court found that José’s responses made clear that he “simply lackfed] the

‘memory or recollection of the incidents in question.” This finding is supported by substantial and

 

‘competent evidence.

Defendant argues that the State was required to do something more to develop and
‘establish the contours of José"s unavailability. Specifically, Defendant goes to great lengths to
argue thatthe State's line of questioning merely established that José lacked memory of having
‘made the prior out-of-court statements, but did not lack memory of the actual subject matter of
iced by José’s trial testimony and

   

those statements. However, this argument is

 

ieetly contr

 

tate

 

ls to account for the first question in the State's line of questioning, wherein the
specifically inquired into whether José remembered the substance of the conversation he
‘overheard between Defendant and his siblings regarding why Defendant left Idaho in 2002. It
‘was only with the State's second and third questions that it inquired into whether José had any
memory of his own statements 0 law enforcement or his preliminary hearing testimony on this
subject matter, José's testimony satisfies the requirements of Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(a)3)
‘and constitutes substantial and competent evidence supporting the disriet court's finding

[As to the second factor under Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(by(1), Defendant had ampte
‘opportunity to develop testimony through cross-examination of José atthe preliminary hearing.
Defendant was represented by counsel at that time, who had sufficient opportunity to prepare for
the hearing. Further, the magistrate judge put no significant imitations on the scope of the prior
‘examination, Defendant therefore had means and motive 10 crossexamine José at the

preliminary hearing similar to his means and motive at trial. Finally, Defendant has failed to

 

show any new and material line of questioning which would render the prior line of questioning,
inapplicable or insufficient.

In addition to Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), Idaho Code section 9-336 also purported

 

to admit preliminary hearing testimony; however, any statute pertaining to the admission of
evidence is of no force or effect where an Idaho Rule of Evidence covers the same subject

matter. LR.E. 1102. Where a statutory provision is not in conflict with the applicable rules of |

 

‘evidence then it will be immaterial. Conversely, where a statutory provision is inconsistent with
the applicable rules of evidence, then that statutory provision is invalid. Because the subject
‘matter of Idaho Code section 9-336 is already governed by Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), it
is not necessary for this Court to provide any analysis of Idaho Code section 9-336.

In summary. the tial cour’s findings regarding José’s unavailability are supported by
substantial and competent evidence and comport with the requirements of Rule 804(bX1).

B. The district court's decision to permit José’s written statement to law enforcement
to be read to the jury was not an abuse of discretion.

Before José was called as a witness by the State at Defendant's trial, the distriet court
lings with respect to Jose's written statement to law

enforcement, Fist, the court found that the public records hearsay exception outlined in Idaho

 

 

‘made two preliminary but pertinent fi

not challenged on

   

Rule of Evidence 803(8) did not apply to this written statement, This finding
appeal. Second, the court Found that José’s written statement qualified as a recorded recollection
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(5) so long as the State laid the necessary foundation at
trial through José’s testimony, which the trial court ultimately concluded it did. Defendant
appeals this second finding.

The writen statement to law enforcement signed by José qualifies as hearsay. LLR.E
801(¢). Absent an applicable exception, this statement is inadmissible to prove the truth of the
‘matter asserted under the evidentiary rules. LR.E. 802. In this ease, the district court correctly
recognized that it did not have discretion to read this written statement into evidence unless the
requirements of a hearsay exception were met, acted consistently within the bounds of its
discretion and the rules governing hearsay exceptions, and reached its decision through an
cexereise of reason. For the reasons outlined below, the recorded recollection exception outlined
in Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(5) applies to José’s written statement, and the district court did
not abuse its discretion in permitting the same statement to be admitted under this exception.

Under Rule 803(5), the trial court is vested with the
statement to be read into the record as a recorded recollection. LR.E, 803(
122 Idaho 590, 599, 836 P.2d 536, 545 (1992). Under Rule 803(5), a reconded recollection is
defined as:

‘A memorandum or record conceming a matter about which a witness once had
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify
fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when
the matter was fresh in the memory of the witness and to reflect that knowledge

 

isretion to allow José’s written

 

: State v. Higgins,

2
correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but
‘may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.

LRE, 80365).

The district court found that the requirements of Rule 803(S) were satisfied for purposes
of admissibility. Defendant argues that the district court erred in reaching this conclusion,
contending thatthe requisite safeguards for reliability and accuracy were not present because the
‘writen statement was unswom, substantial time had lapsed between the events at issue and the
preparation of the statement, the statement was not prepared by José and was allegedly not
adopted by him, and because it did not accurately reflect his knowledge in 2002. The State
‘argues that Defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal, but asserts in the altemative that

 

 

Defendant's arguments fal on the merits. For the reasons outlined it greater detail below,
Defendants appellate argument fal as unpreserved and also on the merits.

On the issve of preservation, a thorough review of the recon of the proceedings below
Indicates that Defendant failed to raise these arguments to the district court at tial. While
defense counsel lodged a general hearsay objestion purporting to cover both the admission ofthe
preliminary hearing testimony and also the written statement, counsel's tral arguments focused
almost exclusively on the preliminary hearing transcript, Defendant failed to raise specific
arguments regarding the applicability of the recorded recollection exception to the written
statement at til, thus filing to preserve this issue for appeal. State . Bingham, 116 Idaho 415,
423, 776 P.2d 424, 432 (1989), Defendant did, however, create a record before the magistrate
court at the preliminary hearing reyanding the admissibility of José's writen statement. This
transcript, which contained Defendant's panicularized hearsay objections to the written
statement, was read into evidence at trial. While this
the district cout reviewed and considered the preliminary hearing transcript at ral, this opi
will address the merits of the arguments advanced on appeal. However, this Court holds that
Defendant's failure to renew, lodge, or raise the same, similar, oF any specific objection or

argument atrial regarding the written statement leaves the arguments unpreserved for appeal,

 

 

insufficient to preserve the issue, because

 

 

Even if the issue was properly preserved below, the tral court did not abuse its discretion

 

in permitting the written statement to be read to the jury under the recorded recollection hearsay

exception, In analyzing thi

 

ue, itis helpful for this Court to first review the contents of the
“written statement José signed for law enforcement in 2009, In pertinent part, José declares in his
‘non-sworn statement to law enforcement as follows:

(On August 16, 2002, I talked to Detective Enrique Garcia. of the San Jose
Police Department, Homicide Unit, regarding the whereabouts of my brother
[Defendant] [Defendant] is also known as “Pepe.”

‘When Detective Garcia talked to me, I told him that I knew why (he)
wanted to sec me. I told [him] that it was because [Defendant] killed his
girlfiend. | told Detective Garcia during this interview that in late July or early
‘August of 2002, [Defendant] arrived at the apartment that I shared with my sister
[VJalvina, in San Jose, California, The rest of this statement shows what I told
Detective Garcia about [Defendants] visit and what happened during the visit.

In late July or early August of 2002, Simén Lopez Orozco (from here on,
“Simén"), who is also my brother, brought [Defendant to the apartment that I
shared with my sister [VJalvina in San Jose, California. That night, [Defendant].
Simén and [Vjalvina were sitting atthe kitchen table, and I was in the living

 

 

(Defendant) seemed sad and desperate when he told [Vjalvina and Simén
how he had killed Rebecca [Almarez}, also known as Becky, and the children.
[Defendant] sai that he had also burned his vehicle, a white [Pontiac] Grand AM,
with [Almarez] and the children inside. [Defendant] didn’t say how he had burned
the vehicle. [Defendant] didn't say where this had happened.

1 also heard [Defendant] say the following: [Almarcz] was in Oregon
visiting her fitter, and she called [Defendant] and asked him to pick her up.
[Defendant] drove to Oregon in a white Grand AM vehicle. When he arived to
pick her up, [Almarez] didn’t want to go with him. [Defendant] was on his way
tack to Idaho when [Almarez] called him again and asked him to go back to pick
her up. [Defendant] returned to Oregon to pick up [Almarez). When he arrived, he
noticed some suspicious individuals inthe area. [Almarez] and her two children
left with [Defendant] to Idaho. The suspicious individuals started following them
ina truck and fired some bullets at them. [Defendant] wasnt hit, and he was able
to get rd ofthe individuals. At some point in time, a police car was behind them,
but didn’t stop them. [Almarez] was telling [Defendant] that she would tll the
police that he was keeping her against her will [Almarez} threatened to throw one
‘of the children out ofthe window if [Defendant] didn’t stop the ear, (Defendant}
didn’t stop the car. [Defendant] reacted to [Almarez's threats and shot her. Then
[Defendant] took her body to fied and bumed it inside the vehicle. (Defendant)
didn't mention in detail what happened with the children.

was able to hear [Defendant] say allthis because the kitchen where the
conversation took place was beside the living oom, where | was. [Defendant]
would have known that I was in the living room, 1 haven't had contact with
[Defendant] or Simén since August of 2002

led each page of the statement and signed and dated it atthe end.
In determining whether this statement qualified for treatment under the reconded

 

 

 

 

José ini

recollection hearsay exception, the district court applied Rule 803(5)'s standards as follows:

4
 

‘The standard [for Rule 803(5)] is whether or not the memorandum of
record in question is something of which a witness once had knowledge but now
has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately
and was shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the mater was

the memory of the witness and to reflect that knowledge correctly. It also
as to how that is provides to the jury, [but] Tl get to that here in just a
‘moment
[T]he question for the [clourt therefore becomes whether or not we
have an issue of insufficient recollection and whether or not... the statement was.
made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the memory of the
“witness and appears to reflect the knowledge correctly.

 

‘The Court would find that based upon the information contained in the
preliminary hearing transcript, .. it appears that the statements were made or
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in their memory, [and] there is
no time limit as to when that occurs. But it docs appear tome from the
formation and evidence provided that the element has been established and
does, in fact, appear to correctly reflect the knowledge at that time, Therefore, the
[cJourt does find that that would come in pursuant to 803(5),

In addition, the [cJourt also notes and acknowledges the magistrate’s
findings, which the [eJourt finds to be appropriate, as well. The issues related to
coercion or alleged coercion or threats [by law enforcement] or anything such as
that goes more to weight than to admissibility. As long as the State is able to
provide the necessary foundation from 803(5)[,] those recollections should be
made available tothe jury for their consideration.

 

 

 

Based upon these findings, the distrit court permitted José’s statement to be read to the
jury under the recorded recollection hearsay exception, The district court's findings are
supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record, At tril, José was called as a
witness and promptly denied any memory of Defendant's alleged confession. In response, the
State asked José to review his 2009 written statement to law enforcement as an attempt to refiesh

 

his recollection, After reviewing this statement, José testified that his initials and signature
‘appeared on the statement, but again denied any memory of Defendants statements in 2002, his
in 2002 and 2009, and his preliminary hearing testimony in
2011. However, in response to the State's inquiry as to whether the written statement truthfully

 

own statements fo law enforcemer

depicted what he remembered atthe time he signed it, José testified that it did
Specifically, the following exchange during the State's direct examination of José at tril
is instructive as to José’s prior recollection and his adoption of the written statement:

State ‘Okay. AC the time that you signed the {s}tatement, di it truthfully
set forth what you remember?

 

1s
Jose: Yes, | couldn't really remember much,

State: Does the {s}tatement set forth what you remember in 2009?

José: That is part ofthe [s]tatement that I gave in 2002 that isin the front
ofit

State: Right. You provided a statement in 2002, correct?

José: Yes.

State: ‘And what you [reported being] told by [Defendant] was putin this
‘document in 2008, correct?

José: Seems that way,

State: ‘So when you signed this in 2009, was it true?

José: ‘That's what I said before,

State: ‘Okay. And today you don’t remember everything you remembered
in 2002?

José: No.

State: ‘An today you don’t remember everything you remember in 2009?

José: No.

 

Given this exchange and José"s testimony regarding the contents of his signed statement
to law enforcement, there is substantial evidence to support the district cour’s finding that the
requirements for admission of the statement as a recorded recollection under Rule 803(5) were
satisfied. On appeal, Defendant argues that the statement was unreliable and should not have
‘been admitted because it was not prepared by José, it was not properly adopted by him, and it did
hot accurately reflect his knowledge in 2002. ‘These arguments, however, are directly
‘contradicted by José"s trial testimony, and further fil because nothing inthe rules governing the
hearsay exception requires that the statement be prepared by José. The acts of signing and
initialing the agreement, in conjunction with José’s testimony, provide adequate evidence that
the contents of the statement were adopted by José while they were fresh in his memory.

In an attempt to undermine the adoption requirement, Defendant contends that prior t

 

José’s above-outlined testimony, José testified in an inconsistent manner during the same direct

16
‘examination wherein he denied the accuracy of his written statement. This inconsistent
testimony, however, does not negate José’ later testimony which established thatthe contents of
the statement were adopted while they were fresh in José’s memory. While it certainly goes to
the Weight ofthis evidence, it does not impact its admissibility under this hearsay exception
Lastly, Defendant challenges the freshness requirement of this exception, arguing that oo
‘much time elapsed between the events in question and the preparation of the writen statement.
‘Specifically, Defendant states thatthe written statement “was likely erated based on Detective
Garcia's notes from his interrogation of José back in 2002, [but that] it does not appear that the
‘document was actually prepared until 2009—seven years afer José spoke to Detective Garcia.”
This issue is also cured by José's tril testimony. He stated that he was interviewed by Detective
Garcia in 2002 shortly after overhearing Defendant's statements, and further testified that a
‘writen statement was prepared in 2009 which accurately memorialized his 2002 interview. This

 

 

 

 

testimony is sufficient to support a finding thatthe events were fresh in José"s min.

For the reasons outlined above, the trial court did not abuse its disereton in finding that
the written statement signed by José satisfied the requirements of Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(5).
‘The admission of this statement as verbal testimony under the recorded recollection hearsay
‘exception was supported by substantial and competent evidence. Thus, the district court's

decision is affirmed,

 

VI. Conctusion
‘The judgment of the district cour is affirmed.
(Chief Justice J. JONES, Justices EISMANN, BURDICK, and HORTON CONCUR.