Case Title: Vega v. State

Citation: 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 33

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
126 Nev, Advance Opinion 33
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

BERNARDO PRADO VEGA, No. 58752

‘Appellant, FILED
v8.

‘THE STATE OF NEVADA, AUG 12 2010

Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury

verdict, of two counts of lewdness with a child under the age of 14, one

 

count of attempted sexual assault of a minor under the age of 14, three
counts of sexual assault ofa minor under the age of 14, one count of sexual
assault of a minor under the age of 16, and two counts of open or gross
lewdness. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Valerie Adair,
Judge.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded,

Susan D. Burke, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger
District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and
Elissa Luzaich, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,

for Respondent.

BEFORE HARDESTY, DOUGLAS and PICKERING, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J:

In this opinion, we address three issues on appeal

JO- Z0%S

 
on ae

 

First, we consider whether appellant Bernardo Vega’s
constitutional right to confrontation under the Confrontation Clause,
(Crawford _v, Washington, 641 US. 36 (2004), and Melendez-Diaz_v.
Massachusetts, 557 US. __, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), was violated. We
conclude that Vega's constitutional right to confrontation was violated
when the district court erroneously admitted the testimonial statements
from an unavailable expert witness without the witness previously being
subjected to cross-examination. However, we conclude that the error did
Inot affect Vega’s substantial rights and did not amount to plain error
because the testifying expert offered her own opinions independent of
those of the unavailable expert witness.

Second, we consider whether the district court properly
admitted evidence that the child victim made two suicide attempts during
[the time period when she was subjected to sexual abuse. Vega asserts
that this evidence was irrelevant and intended to appeal to the emotions of
the jury. We disagree. The State introduced evidence regarding the
victim's suicide attempts to demonstrate that Vega had subjected the
victim to ongoing and repetitive sexual abuse, and to show the effect and
harm the abuse had on the victim. Therefore, we conclude that it was not
manifest error for the district court to admit this evidence.

‘Third, Vega challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
convict him on counts 4, 5, and 9 of sexual assault with a minor under the
lage of 14 because the record does not show that the child victim was under
the age of 14 at the time of the sexual assaults, We conclude that based
lon the evidence presented at trial, a rational jury could have reasonably
Jdetermined that the victim was under the age of 14 at the time the sexual

lassaults charged in counts 4 and 5 occurred, but not when the sexual

 
lassault charged in count 9 occurred. Thus, we conchide that there was
sufficient evidence to support Vega's convictions on counts 4 and 5, but
{that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on count 9.
FACTS:

‘The child victim was born September 30, 1990, and lived in
[Las Vegas with her mother, her stepfather Vega, and her brother. Vega
moved into the family home when the victim was approximately four years
jold, and he began sexually abusing the victim when she was eight years
lold. Despite the victim's two suicide attempts, Vega continued to sexually
labuse the victim until December 2006, when she reported the abuse to her
‘mother and then eventually to the police.
‘Sexual abuse

‘Vega committed various forms of sexual abuse of the child
victim beginning when she was eight years old. In addition to the other
jincidents of sexual abuse, the evidence showed that the victim would
habitually suck her thumb while sleeping and Vega would remove the
victim's thumb and insert his penis into her mouth. The first instance of
this form of abuse occurred when the victim was 12 years old; however,
[she awoke when Vega removed her thumb and saw Vega’s penis out of his,
pants and in front of her face. ‘The victim testified that over the course of
ithe next two years there were other occasions when she would wake up
with Vega's penis in her mouth. She would hit Vega and then go to the
bathroom and brush her teeth. ‘These assaults eventually subsided when
the victim was 14 years old and she stopped sucking her thumb.

Vega's sexual assault of the victim escalated when she entered
middle school. The victim testified that around this time Vega placed his

fingers into her vagina. This occurred on several occasions while she slept

jon the couch during the summer months when she was either in the

 

 
|seventh or eighth grade.’ On cross-examination, the victim testified that
ithe digital penetration may have occurred in the summer between her
jeighth and ninth grade years, but she could not specify her exact age,
either 13 or 14 years old.

The victim also testified that, on a single occasion, Vega
penetrated her vagina with his penis. She recalled a specific incident
Iwhere she was sleeping on the couch and awoke to find that her shorts
Iwere at her ankles and Vega was on top of her with his pants down and
{that it felt like his penis was in her vagina. She then kicked and screamed
Jat Vega to get him off of her, and he told her to be quiet because the
neighbors would hear the commotion. Although the victim was unable to
identify her specific age at the time of the assault—she again was not sure
whether she was 13 or 14 years old at the time—she specifically recalled
‘that she only slept on the couch in the daytime during the summer months
and, for this reason, she believed that this incident occurred around the
Jeighth grade during the summer.

Suicide attempts

The victim testified that she attempted suicide on two
separate occasions in an effort to stop the abuse and to get away from
Vega. The first suicide attempt occurred in March 2005 while the victim
was 14 years old and in the ninth grade. The victim obtained sleeping
pills from a drawer in Vega’s bedroom and confronted Vega, telling him
that she was going to commit suicide because she “didn’t want to be

{We note that throughout the victim’s testimony, she was unable to
recall her specific age at the time of the abuse and often referred to her
|school grade level as an indication of her age.

 

 
on

 

laround him anymore.” After taking the pills, the victim testified that she
lonly remembered waking up in the hospital, but she did not tell anyone of
ithe soxual abuse, The victim testified that a few weeks after the first
suicide attempt, Vega once again began the sexual abuse by touching her
breasts and genitals.

The second suicide attempt occurred in November 2006 when
ithe victim again ingested sleeping pills. After being released from the
hhospital, the vietim wrote a letter to her mother explaining that Vega had
been molesting and abusing her since she was eight years old. During an
argument with her mother, the victim told her about the letter and asked
that she read it. After reading the letter, her mother took the vietim to
stay at her aunt's house for a few weeks while the victim's mother
jreturned home to confront Vega about the accusations. Vega admitted to
the victim's mother that he sexually abused the victim,

Police investigation

The vietim met with Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department (LVMPD) Detective John Baltas and his partner in December
12006 and provided them with details of the sexual abuse. Acting on that
levidence, Detective Baltas and his partner went to Vega’s residence, and
Vega agreed to accompany them to the police department and to
participate in an interview. Detective Baltas testified that during the
interview Vega admitted to committing various forms of sexual abuse
lupon the victim. However, Vega continually denied that he penetrated the
victim's vagina with his penis. At the conclusion of the interview, Vega
lwrote a letter to the victim apologizing for his actions.

[Sexual abuse examination
‘The victim underwent a sexual abuse examination by Nurse

Phyllis Suiter at the Clark County Child Advocacy Center. During the

 
‘examination, Suiter obtained the victim's medical history and history of
sexual abuse by asking the victim a series of questions, and requested that
the victim describe the different acts of sexual abuse, as well as any
resulting emotional or physical effects from the abuse, Suiter also
performed a physical examination of the victim's vaginal area, which was

recorded by video and depicted by diagram. In conjunction with the sexual

 

abuse examination, Suiter prepared a written report that included her
‘questions, the victim’s responses, the victim's medical history and history

of sexual abuse, and Suiter's findings indicating that there was a “healed

 

transection” on the victim's hymen.

Because Suiter was unavailable to testify at trial, the State
asked Dr. Neha Mehta to review Suiter’s examination report and the
diagram and video of the examination. At trial, Dr. Mehta testified
regarding her own training and experience, and relayed to the jury
Suiter’s training and qualifications. She further summarized Suiter’s
questions to the victim and the victim's responses to those questions
depicting the victim's medical history and history of sexual abuse,
described in general how an examination is performed, and recounted
Suiter’s findings from the examination. Dr. Mehta went on to explain and
interpret Suiter’s diagram and markings and generally described what
scarring or evidence will be present on the hymen if a penis or other object
is inserted into the vagina. Dr. Mehta testified that, while independently
reviewing the video recording of Suiter's examination of the victim, she
found an area of concern, and that based on her review of the video, her

findings were consistent with Suiter's written findings—there was a

“healed transection” on the victim's hymen.

 

 
Post-sexual abuse

After reporting the abuse, the victim struggled in school and
Jeventually withdrew from the eleventh grade in February 2007 when she
]was 16 years old. The victim testified that prior to withdrawing from the
jeleventh grade she had attended school without repeating or being held
back in any grade

Following a jury trial, Vega was convicted on counts 1 and 3—
llewdness with a child under the age of 14; count 2—attempted sexual
assault with a minor under the age of 14; counts 4, 5, and 9—sexual
assault with a minor under the age of 14; count 6—sexual assault with a
minor under the age of 16; and counts 7 and 8—open or gross lewdness.
Vega now appeals the judgment of conviction,

DISCUSSION

\Confrontation Clause violation

Vega argues that it was a violation of the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to
permit Dr. Mehta to testify regarding Suiter’s observations, findings, and
statements contained in Suiter’s sexual abuse examination report.
Because Vega failed to object to Dr. Mehta's testimony at trial, our review
is limited to plain error only. Nelson v. State, 123 Nev. 634, 543, 170 P.3d
517, 624 (2007). To amount to plain error, the “error must be so
Junmistakable that it is apparent from a casual inspection of the record.”
1d. (quoting Garner v, State, 116 Nev. 770, 783, 6 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2000),
overruled on other grounds by Sharma v, State, 118 Nev. 648, 56 P.3d 868
(2002)). Vega “must demonstrate that the error was prejudicial in order to

prove that it affected his substantial rights.” Id,
Under Crawford v. Washington, 641 U.S, 36 (2004), the

testimonial statement of an otherwise unavailable witness is inadmissible

 

 
“unless the defendant had an opportunity to previously cross-examine the
witness regarding the witness's statement.” Medina v. State, 122 Nev,
846, 853, 148 P.3d 471, 476 (2006). Recently, in Melendez-Diaz_v.
Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the

admission of a forensic analysts’ affidavits that reported that a seized

 

substance was cocaine, without the analysts themselves being subject to
cross-examination, violated the defendant's right to confrontation, 557
US.__, _, _, 129S. Ct, 2527, 2530, 2542 (2009). The Court observed
that the analysts’ affidavits were “functionally identical to live, in-court
testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination.”
Id, at _, 129 S. Ct, at 2532 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,
830 (2006)). In response to the government's claim that the analysts
affidavits should not be subject to the Confrontation Clause because they
represent “neutral and scientific testing,” the Court concluded that

confrontation of the analysts would be beneficial to “test[ } {the] analysts’

 

honesty, proficiency, and methodology—the features that are commonly
the focus in the cross-examination of experts.” Id, at __, 129 S. Ct. at
2536-38 (internal quotations omitted). Requiring the cross-examination of
an analyst or examiner is “one means of assuring accurate [results]” and
“(like expert witnesses generally, an analyst's for examiner's} lack of
proper training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed.” Id, at _,
129 S, Ct. at 2536-37.

The threshold question in evaluating a confrontation right
under Crawford and Melendez-Diaz is whether the statement was
testimonial in nature. See Chavez v. State, 125 Nev. __, _. 213 P.3d.
476, 484 (2009). Although Crawford does not specifically define what

 

constitutes a testimonial statement, we have previously concluded that “a

 

 
jstatement is testimonial if it “would lead an objective witness” to
reasonably believe “that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial.”" Medina, 122 Nev. at 354, 143 P.3d at 476 (quoting Flores v.
State, 121 Nev. 706, 719, 120 P.8d 1170, 1178-79 (2005) (quoting
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52). In a child sexual assault context, an
jexamination conducted pursuant to an investigation by law enforcement
jgenerally renders the examination report testimonial. Cf, Ramirez v.
fate, 114 Nev. 560, 561, 958 P.2d 724, 731 (1998).

Here, after meeting with LVMPD detectives, the victim

 

junderwent a sexual abuse examination conducted by Suiter at the Clark
County Child Advocacy Center. Suiter prepared a written report, which
included her questions to the victim and the victim’s answers concerning
the victim's medical history and history of sexual abuse, the nature of the
jsexual abuse, the frequency of the abuse, and the emotional and physical
results of the abuse, and Suiter's observations and findings. In addition to
{the written report, the sexual abuse examination included a gynecological
lexamination of the victim, which was recorded on video and depicted by
diagram.

Because Suiter was unavailable to testify at trial, the State
lasked Dr. Mehta to review Suiter’s written report and the diagram and
video of the examination. Without objection, the district court permitted
Dr. Mehta to testify as to the contents of Suiter’s written report, including
ISuiter’s questions and the victim's responses concerning the victim's
Imedical history and history of sexual abuse and Suiter’s observations and
findings upon conducting the gynecological examination.

Dr. Mehta testified that a primary purpose of conducting a

lsexual assault examination in conjunction with a police investigation is to

 

 
provide evidence as to whether a sexual assault has occurred
Accordingly, we conclude that a medical professional conducting such an
examination would reasonably believe that his or her report and findings
regarding the examination would be available for use at a later trial
Therefore, because Suiter could have reasonably believed that her report
Iwould be available for use at a later trial, we determine that her written
report was testimonial in nature and inadmissible unless Suiter was
subject to cross-examination under Crawford and Melendez-Diaz.

Dr. Mehta’s testimony regarding the content of Suiter's
written report effectively admitted the report into evidence, which
functioned as the equivalent of Suiter's testimony, without subjecting
[Suiter to cross-examination, To the extent that Dr. Mehta's testimony
jadmitted Suiter’s written report, including Suiter’s questions, the victim’s
responses detailing the victim's medical history and history of sexual
Jabuse, and Suiter’s observations and findings without Suiter being subject
to cross-examination, we conclude that this violated the Confrontation
Clause, Crawford, and Melendez-Diaz. In contrast, however, after
reviewing the video recording and the diagram of the gynecological
lexamination, Dr. Mehta offered her independent opinion as an expert
Iwitness that there was a “healed transection” on the victim’s hymen. We
Jconclude that Dr. Mehta's independent opinion based on the diagram and
video recording does not violate the Confrontation Clause, Crawford, or
Melendez-Diaz because Dr. Mehta's judgment, proficiency, and
methodology were subject to cross-examination.

‘Therefore, following the reasoning in Crawford and Melendez-
|Diaz, we conclude that the district court erroneously permitted Dr. Mehta

jto testify regarding the contents of Suiter's sexual abuse examination

 

 
com oe

 

roport because the report was testimonial and Vega was not afforded the

 

opportunity to cross-examine Suiter. We now turn our attention to
whether this error was prejudicial and, therefore, affected Vega’s
substantial rights.

Confrontation Clause violation did not amount to plain error

When an error has been properly preserved for review, we
traditionally review the prejudicial offects of a Crawford violation under a
harmless-error analysis, However, because Vega did not object at trial,
thereby failing to preserve the error for review, the Crawford violation is
reviewed for plain error, requiring Vega to demonstrate that the error was
elson, 123

 

prejudicial and, therefore, affected his substantial rights.
Nov. at 543, 170 P.3d at 524.

In this case, the State argues that any improper testimony by
Dr. Mehta was either repetitive or inconsequential and, therefore, was not
prejudicial and did not affect Vega’s substantial rights. We agree. In the
portion of Dr. Mehta’s testimony that we concluded violates Crawford and
Melendez-Diaz, Dr. Mehta recounted Suiter's questions, the victim's
answers depicting the vietim’s medical history and history of sexual abuse,
and Suiter's observations and findings. However, this testimony was
duplicative of the victim's detailed testimony describing the sexual abuse
and consistent with Dr. Mehta’s independent opinion that the victim's
hymen had a “healed transection.” Furthermore, Dr. Mehta's testimony
does not implicate Vega as having caused the “healed transection,” and
she acknowledged that objects other than a penis could have caused the
injury. As such, we conclude that Dr. Mehta's erroneously admitted
testimony was inconsequential, and Vega has failed to demonstrate that
the Crawford and Melendez-Diaz violation was prejudicial. Therefore, we
conclude that the violation did not affect Vega's substantial rights.

u

 
Relevant evidence

Next, Vega asserts that the

 

ict court erred when it
allowed the State to introduce evidence of the victim's two suicide
Jattempts, arguing that this evidence was irrelevant and intended to
lemotionally appeal to the sympathies of the jury. A trial court has broad
discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence, Thompson v, State,
125 Nev. __, __, 221 P.3d 708, 714 (2009), and its “determination to
admit or exclude evidence is given great deference and will not be reversed
labsent manifest error.” Baltazar-Monterrosa v. State, 122 Nev. 606, 613-
14, 137 P.3d 1137, 1142 (2006). Relevant evidence is admissible pursuant
ito NRS 48.025, and is defined as “evidence having any tendency to make
ithe existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
faction more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” NRS
48.0165.

Here, the State argues that evidence of the suicide attempts
[was relevant in order to provide a complete picture of the extent of the
labuse, show how the abuse was ultimately revealed, and supply support
for its theory that the victim was not a willing participant in the sexual
abuse. When questioned about her motives for attempting suicide, the
victim testified that she was trying to stop the abuse and avoid “be[ing]
Jaround [Vega] anymore.” The victim further testified that after she
Jattempted suicide a second time, she and her mother had an argument
Jand she ultimately revealed to her mother that Vega had been sexually
jabusing her since she was eight years old.

We conclude that the evidence of the victim's suicide attempts

Jwas relevant as it had a tendency to establish that it is more probable

than not that Vega had sexually assaulted the victim and that the abuse

 

 
had occurred for several years. Thus, we conclude that it was not manifest

 

Sufficiency of the evidence

Notwithstanding Vega’s convictions on multiple counts of
sexual misconduct with a minor, Vega’s appeal concerning the sufficiency
lof the evidence is limited to challenging his convictions on counts 4, 5, and
9 of soxual assault of a minor under the age of 14.

The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
requires that each element that constitutes a crime be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 202, 163 P.8d 408, 414
(2007). Vega argues that because the victim could not definitively testify
as to whether the abuse occurred before or after she was 14 years old,
‘there was insufficient evidence for a rational jury to determine beyond a
reasonable doubt that the abuse was committed prior to the victim
reaching the age of 14.

“When determining whether a jury verdict was based on
sufficient evidence to meet due process requirements, we will inquire

2Voga also argues that the State's reference to the victim's

involvement in a homosexual relationship was irrelevant and improper.
Wo agree. However, because the State's reference was isolated, without
jany further follow-up questions, and overwhelming evidence supports
VVega's conviction, we conclude that the reference was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, See Domingues v. State, 112 Nev. 683, 693, 917 P.2d

'1364, 1372 (1996) (holding that the admission of irrelevant evidence was
harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence supporting the conviction).

*Both Vega and the State argue that age is an element of the crime

[charged under NRS 200.366. As such, we do not address whether the age

lof the victim is an element of the crime or a sentencing factor. See Harris
Inited States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).

 

 

 
 

“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
‘elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id, (quoting Origel-
Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1998) (quoting
Kora_v. State, 100 Nev. 245, 250, 681 P.2d 44, 47 (1984). The jury's
verdict will not be disturbed on appeal when there is substantial evidence
supporting it. LaPierre v, State, 108 Nev. 528, 530, 836 P.2d 56, 57
(1992), We have previously held that in sexual assault cases a “victim's
{testimony alone is sufficient to uphold a conviction.” Rose, 123 Nev. at
1203, 163 P.3d at 414. This court has further recognized that “child victims
fare often unable to articulate specific times of events and are oftentimes
reluctant to report the abuse to anyone until quite some time after the
incident.” LaPierre, 108 Nev. at 531, 836 P.2d at 58.

Here, since the parties argue that age is an essential element
lof the crimes charged in counts 4, 5, and 9, we must balance the due
process requirement of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt
with this court's recognition in LaPierre—that a child victim is often
junable to specifically articulate the timing of events—in order to
determine whether sufficient evidence supports Vega’s conviction on each
[count he challenges on appeal such that a rational jury could have found
that the victim's age had been established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Count 4—sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14 (digital
penetration)

On direct examination, the victim testified that Vega digitally
penetrated her vagina while she slept on the couch in the living room
[during the summer months when she was in the seventh or eighth grade,
lout she could not specifically remember her age, However, on cross.

jexamination, the victim testified that the abuse occurred during either the

4

 
0

 

leighth or “going to ninth” grade and again stated that she did not know
Jwhether sho was 13 or 14 years old. Although the victim could not
specifically recall her age at the time the abuse occurred, the evidence
presented contained certain age identifiers that a rational jury could have
utilized to make logical inferences with respect to the victim’s age at the
time. See Adler v, State, 95 Nev. 339, 344, 594 P.2d 725, 729 (1979)
(stating that it is the jury's “prerogative to make logical inferences which
flow from the evidence’).

Our review of the record shows that the victim was born on
September 30, 1990. The victim often equated her age with her school
grade level, and she progressed through school without repeating or being
fheld back in any grade level. However, the vietim testified that she
withdrew from the eleventh grade (the 2006/2007 school year) in February
2007 at the age of 16. The victim further testified that she first attempted
suicide during the ninth grade (the 2004/2005 school year) in March 2005,
Iwhen she was 14 years old. Her second suicide attempt was in November
2006, when she was 16 years old. And finally, during its closing
largument, the State illustrated for the jury the victim's age and
correlating grade and school year from the time she started kindergarten,
luntil she withdrew from school in the eleventh grade.

Based on the evidence presented, we determine that by using
these age identifiers, a rational jury could logically infer that the victim
turned 14 years old on September 30, 2004, and, thus, the victim would
fhave already begun her 2004/2005 ninth grade school year. Therefore, we
Jconclude that the jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt
that the victim was under the age of 14 when Vega sexually assaulted her
jas pleaded in count 4.

16

 
 

Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to

support Vega’s conviction on count 4.

Count 5—sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14 (penile
penetration)

‘The age-identifying evidence presented to support Vega’s
conviction on count 5 is similar to that evidence supporting his conviction
on count 4. The victim testified that Vega sexually assaulted her by
penetrating her vagina with his penis while she was sleeping on the couch
during the summer when she was in the eighth grade. Again, during
cross-examination, Vega challenged the victim's recollection of her age at
the time of the abuse. The victim testified that while she could not recall
whether she was 13 or 14 years old, she specifically recalled that she only
slept on the couch in the daytime during the summer months, and, for this
reason, she believed that this incident occurred around the time that she
was in the eighth grade during the summer.

Based on the evidence presented, we determine that by using
the age identifiers described above, a rational jury could logically infer
that the victim was under the age of 14 when the abuse alleged in count 5
occurred. Therefore, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to
support Vega’s conviction on count 5.

Count 9—sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14 (fellatio

Unlike the evidence presented to support Vega’s convietions on
counts 4 and 5, our review of the record indicates that the evidence lacks
specificity sufficient enough to support Vega’s conviction on count 9. In
particular, the victim testified that she habitually sucked her thumb while
sleeping until she was 14 years old, and that there were occasions when
Vega would remove her thumb and insert his penis into her mouth. ‘The

victim testified that Vega first attempted to do this when she was 12 years

16

 
old, but that he was unsuccessful because she woke up when her thumb
was removed.' The vietim testified that there were other occasions where

she woke up with Voga’s penis in her mouth. On cross-examination, the

 

victim testified that she could not say with certainty but she was probably
14 years old and in the ninth grade when this abuse occurred. However,
the victim's testimony does not clarify, and there is no other evidence in
the record that shows, whether these other occasions of abuse occurred
when the victim was under the age of 14.

‘The victim's testimony was the only evidence presented upon
which the jury could have relied to determine whether the vietim was
under the age of 14 when this sexual abuse occurred. Based on the
uncertainty of this testimony, we determine that no rational jury could
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was under the age
of 14 when the alleged sexual abuse associated with count 9 occurred.
Accordingly, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support
Voga's conviction on count 9, and we reverse Vega’s conviction on this
count

4For this incident, Vega was convicted of count 2—attempted sexual
assault with a minor under the age of 14. Vega does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence for this conviction on appeal.

 

Vega also argues that the jury instructions were confusing and
failed to properly instruct the jury on the State's burden to prove each
element of the crime. We conclude that this argument is without merit,
because Vega failed to object or request a jury instruction at trial, and
instruction no. 14, in pertinent part, clearly informs the jury that “[t]his,
presumption [of innocence] places upon the State the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crime charged.”

See Flanagan v. State, 112 Nev. 1409, 1423, 930 P.2d 691, 700 (1996).

 

 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction on all
[counts except for count 9, which we reverse, and we remand this matter to

the district court for entry of an amended judgment of conviction

(ohne, 4.

Hardesty

[consistent with this opinion.

 

{We concur:

Lot ,
Douglas