Case Title: In re Aiden J.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 221

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 221 
Docket: 
Som-17-255 
Submitted 
On Briefs: November 29, 2017 
 
 
Decided: 
December 7, 2017 
 
 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
IN RE AIDEN J. et al. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The mother of Logan J., Aiden J., Marissa J., Belladonna J., and 
Jessie B. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Skowhegan, Nale, J.) 
terminating her parental rights to her five children pursuant to 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2016).1  She challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support both the court’s finding of parental 
unfitness and its determination that termination is in the children’s best 
interests.  The mother also argues that the Department of Health and Human 
Services failed to comply with 22 M.R.S § 4041 (2016) because it did not 
provide the mother with Home Community Treatment (HCT) services.  We 
affirm the judgment. 
                                         
1  The children’s father consented to the termination of his parental rights and is not a party to 
this appeal. 
 
2 
[¶2]  Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found by 
clear and convincing evidence that the mother (1) is unable to protect the 
children from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within 
a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs; and (2) is 
unable to take responsibility for the children within a time that is reasonably 
calculated 
to 
meet 
the 
children’s 
needs. 
 
See 
22 
M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).  The court also found that termination of the 
mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).  We review factual findings supporting the unfitness 
determination for clear error and apply the same standard to the factual 
findings supporting the best interest determination, although we review the 
court’s ultimate conclusion that termination is in the children’s best interests 
for an abuse of discretion.  See In re M.B., 2013 ME 46, ¶ 37, 65 A.3d 1260. 
[¶3]  The court based its determinations on the following findings of 
fact: 
There is . . . no question that [the mother] has made some 
progress participating in the services that were designed to help 
her address her mental-health issues. . . .  However, the progress 
that [the mother] has made in reunifying with her children over 
the past seventeen-to-twenty-two months is insufficient to meet 
these five children’s needs, as explained by [the psychologist] in 
his Court Ordered Diagnostic Evaluation and expanded upon in 
his testimony.  The Court accepts [the psychologist’s] conclusions 
 
3 
and assigns a great weight and credibility to his report and 
testimony.  Based on [the psychologist’s] evaluation and 
testimony, the Court finds that [the mother] is not yet close to 
alleviating jeopardy. 
 
The critical issue, for [the mother], is her ability to protect 
the children and take responsibility for them.  The original 
jeopardy with regard to all five children centered around [the 
mother’s] inability to provide the children adequate supervision 
and care.  With regard to this, the issue of [the mother’s] relative 
parental fitness, the Court is most persuaded by [the 
psychologist].  His written evaluation, in conjunction with his 
testimony, demonstrated to the Court the troublingly high 
probability that the progress she has made, such as it is, would 
collapse if these children were returned to her custody. 
 
At the outset, [the psychologist] was asked to assess 
whether [the mother] is “capable of providing for the needs of 
these five children, including two [Logan and Aiden] which have 
been specifically identified with special needs.”  He answered 
simply: “By herself, no.”  Having heard from all the children’s 
foster parents, and the counselors for Logan and Aiden, the Court 
is familiar with these five children’s particular needs.  The Court 
agrees with [the psychologist] and finds that, by herself, [the 
mother] is simply not capable of providing for [the children]. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
Based on the complete picture of the evidence before it, but 
particularly [the psychologist’s] report and testimony, the Court 
finds that it is essentially a full-time task for [the mother] to tend 
to her own high needs.  The Court recognizes that, in answering 
“[b]y herself, no,” [the psychologist] raised the possibility that, 
with the assistance of a capable adult, it is conceivable that [the 
mother] could find some way to meet these five children’s needs 
someday.  However, looking at all the evidence, and in particular 
[the mother’s husband’s] own live testimony, the Court is unable 
to find that [the mother’s] husband is a person who is capable of 
 
4 
helping her sufficiently shorten the substantial amount of time it 
would take her to alleviate the persistent jeopardy that was first 
found to exist in September of 2015. 
 
[The mother] finds herself in tragic circumstances.  In her 
testimony, she asked for acknowledgment that where she finds 
herself today is not entirely the result of choices that she has 
made.  The Court does acknowledge that.  She has been abused in 
her life.  That is not her fault. 
 
However, as evidenced by her own testimony, [the mother] 
still does not have an adequate understanding as to what effect 
her own mental-health challenges have already had—and are 
highly likely to continue having—on her children.  What she must 
do to protect and take responsibility for these five children, she 
cannot do in a timely manner[,] if she can do it at all. 
 
After twenty-two months out of their mother’s care for 
Logan, Aiden, Marissa, and Belladonna, and seventeen months out 
of her mother’s care for Jessie, and with no clear path forward for 
the mother to alleviate jeopardy any time soon, the law demands 
permanency for these children so that they can be happy, healthy, 
safe, and productive.  [The psychologist], in his written report, 
informed this Court that, after studying the mother, he “does not 
have any idea of how long treatment would have to take place for 
her to be able to parent these children.” 
 
 
[¶4]  Given these findings and the court’s other specific findings of fact, 
all of which are supported by competent evidence in the record, the court did 
not err in its finding of parental unfitness, nor did it err or abuse its discretion 
in determining that termination of the mother’s parental rights, with a 
permanency plan of adoption, is in the children’s best interests.  See 
 
5 
In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23, ¶ 3, 155 A.3d 430; In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, 
¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297. 
 
[¶5]  The mother contends that the court’s findings are nonetheless 
unsupported by the record because the Department failed to comply with 
22 M.R.S. § 4041, specifically by failing to provide her with HCT.2  To the 
contrary, the record shows that the Department developed a reunification 
plan that clearly outlined the safety goals and services in which the mother 
needed to engage, offered the mother numerous reunification services,3 and 
made a good faith effort to cooperate with and seek the participation of the 
mother throughout these proceedings.  See generally 22 M.R.S. § 4041.  
Despite the Department’s reunification efforts, the mother was still 
unsuccessful in reunifying with the children. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
2  The mother requested HCT but was never offered this service.  The testimony from the 
Department in this case indicates that this service was not recommended for the mother and her 
children because the mother lacked consistency in her participation in visitation with her children 
and she was still struggling with her mental health stability.  Regardless, “[e]ven if the Department 
had not made reasonable efforts to reunify, which is not the case here, that failure alone does not 
preclude a termination of parental rights.”  In re Danika B., 2017 ME 209, ¶ 4, --- A.3d ---. 
3  These services included, among others, transportation services, mental health counseling, 
medication management, domestic violence counseling, supervised visitation with the children, 
family team meetings, and the aid of a number of caseworkers. 
 
6 
Richard W. McCarthy, Jr., Esq., Pittsfield, for appellant mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Skowhegan District Court docket numbers PC-2015-38 and PC-2015-72 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY