Case Title: Quinones v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13042

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13042 
 
HENRY QUINONES  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
February 4, 2021. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Practice, Criminal, Discovery. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Henry Quinones, appeals from a judgment of 
a single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We affirm. 
 
 
Quinones has been charged in a complaint with solicitation 
to commit a crime, in violation of G. L. c. 274, § 8.  The 
charge stems from an incident that occurred while he was 
incarcerated at Old Colony Correctional Center (prison).  
According to a Department of Correction (department) 
disciplinary report, inmate mail monitoring and telephone 
surveillance revealed that Quinones conspired with and solicited 
parties outside the prison to "introduce an illicit substance 
into a correctional facility for profit."  Essentially, on the 
basis of information from an informant, the department 
intercepted a letter, purportedly written by Quinones, providing 
directions for Quinones's family to purchase Suboxone that would 
ultimately be brought into the prison. 
 
 
During the course of the trial court proceedings, Quinones 
sought discovery related to the informant from the department 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 14, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 
(2004).  The department opposed the motion on the basis that 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 17, as appearing in 378 Mass. 885 (1979), 
rather than rule 14, applied to Quinones's request because the 
information in question was in the control and custody of the 
department.  In the department's view, it is a third party to 
the proceedings, and therefore subject to rule 17, and not, as 
2 
 
Quinones would have it, a part of the prosecution team such that 
the department's records would be subject to rule 14.  Quinones 
also filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether the department is a third party or whether it had 
participated in the investigation for the district attorney.  A 
judge in the trial court denied both motions.1  Quinones then 
filed a motion to compel production of informant information 
from the department pursuant to rule 17.  The department opposed 
the motion, and a different judge denied it on the basis that 
Quinones had not met the requirements of Commonwealth v. 
Lampron, 441 Mass. 265 (2004).2 
 
 
Quinones's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition followed.  There, he 
asked a single justice of this court to vacate the trial court's 
orders denying his various discovery-related motions.  He argued 
that the department regularly filed applications for criminal 
complaints for matters that occur within its facilities and that 
there is no well-established law addressing whether rule 14 or 
rule 17 applies to a defendant's related discovery requests.  A 
single justice denied the petition without a hearing on the 
basis that Quinones has an adequate alternative remedy in the 
normal appellate process and that the case does not present an 
extraordinary circumstance that warrants the exercise of this 
court's authority pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
 
 
The case is now before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as 
amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a showing that 
"review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be 
                                                 
 
1 The judge's decision refers by name only to Quinones's 
motion for an evidentiary hearing, but it seems apparent from 
the text of the brief decision that the judge was also denying 
Quinones's rule 14 discovery motion. 
 
2 A party seeking to subpoena documents from the third party 
prior to trial pursuant to rule 17 must show 
 
"(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) 
that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in 
advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the 
party cannot properly prepare for trial without such 
production and inspection in advance of trial and that the 
failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to 
delay the trial; and (4) that the application is made in 
good faith and is not intended as a general 'fishing 
expedition'" (citation omitted). 
 
Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 269 (2004). 
3 
 
obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial 
court or by other available means."  S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2).  
Quinones has not made such a showing.  As a starting point, 
Quinones's argument that the "matter may not be appealable" 
after a trial misses the mark.  He argues that if he proceeds to 
trial with no further discovery related to the letter that he 
purportedly wrote, the letter, in his view, should be excluded 
at trial (for reasons related to the Commonwealth's ability, or 
lack thereof, to prove that he wrote the letter).  
Alternatively, he argues that the letter might be admitted and 
he might nonetheless be found not guilty. 
 
 
In either scenario, Quinones argues, there will be no 
appealable issue related to the letter and to the discovery that 
Quinones sought but did not receive.  Quinones will not, in 
other words, have an opportunity to contest the denial of his 
discovery motions.  While this may be true, it is equally true 
that Quinones will not have been prejudiced in either of those 
scenarios.  In the first scenario, if the letter is excluded, it 
cannot be used as evidence against him and he will not be harmed 
in any way by not having had access to it; in the second 
scenario, if the letter is admitted and Quinones is acquitted, 
he likewise is not harmed.  If, on the other hand, the letter is 
admitted and Quinones is convicted, he can raise the issue in 
the normal course of a direct appeal.  He has, in other words, 
the quintessential adequate appellate remedy. 
 
 
Quinones also argues that whether the department is subject 
to rule 14 or rule 17 in cases such as this that arise out of 
the department's facilities is a recurring issue in the trial 
court that needs resolving, and that for that reason, the single 
justice abused his discretion in denying the petition.  "While a 
single justice might be warranted in finding exceptional 
circumstances when . . . [a] petition raises a novel or systemic 
issue . . . the single justice is not compelled to do so every 
time one of those criteria is present.  Each case must be 
examined by the single justice on its own, to determine whether 
general superintendence intervention is necessary in that 
particular case."  Commonwealth v. Dilworth, 485 Mass. 1001, 
1003 (2020), citing Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 26 
(2019).  That the issue allegedly arises with some regularity in 
the trial court is not in and of itself extraordinary.  
Furthermore, it is not, in any event, an abuse of discretion to 
decline to consider the issue, particularly in a case such as 
this where if Quinones is prejudiced as a result of the denial 
of his discovery motions, he can seek review of any error in the 
normal appellate process. 
4 
 
 
 
The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in 
denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
Christian Baillet, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the petitioner.