Case Title: Lingle v. Hawai'i Government Employees Association. Concurring Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf].

Citation: 107 Haw. 178

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
aw LiaRARY
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

000

 

LINDA LINGLE,’ Governor, State of Hawai'i,
Pet itioner/Appellant-Appellee,

HAWAI' GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, APSCME,
Local 152, AFL-CIO; MUFI HANNENAN, Mayor,
City and County of Honolulu; HARRY KIM, Mayor,
County of Hawai'i; BRYAN J. BAPTISTE, Mayor,
County of Kauai; and ALAN M. ARAKAWA, Mayor,
county of Maui, Intervenors/Appellants-Appellees,

UNITED PUBLIC WORKERS, AFSCME, Local 646,
AFL-CIO, Intervenor/Appellee-Appellant,

HAWAI'T LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Appellee-Appellee.

oo

Wo. 24237

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO, 00-1-2134-07 SSM)

aaa

MARCH 31, 2005

  

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY,

35.
AACOBA, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY

 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.

Intervenor-appellee-appellant United Public Workers,
AFSCME Local 646, AFI

 

-CzO (hereinafter, UPH] appeals from the

Pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 43(c) (2008),
Governor Linda Lingle and Mayors Mufi Hanneman, Harey Kim, Bryan Saptiete,
Rian Arakawa were substituted

instant appeal.

 

and
parties tot

 

 
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first circuit court's? April 25, 2001 final judgment
(2) remanding this case to appellee Hawai'i Labor Relations Board
(HRB) for further proceedings regarding its order denying
petitioner-appellant-appellee the State of Hawai'i Department of
Transportation's (DOT) petition for a declaratory ruling and

(2) denying UPW’s motion to dismias intervenor-appellant -appellee
Hawai'i Government Employees Aesociation, AFSCME, Local 152, APL“
cr0"s (hereinafter, HGEA] July 7, 2000 notice of appeal to the
cixcuit court. On appeal to this court, UPd challenges the

circuit court's: (1) determination that it had jurisdiction to

 

review the HLRB‘s refusal to issue a declaratory ruling pursuant
to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 92-14 (1993); (2) allowance
of a collateral attack on a court-confirmed arbitration award;
and (3) conclusion that the underlying dispute in thie case was
not moot.

Based on the following, we affirm the April 25, 2002

final judgment.

A. Pactual Backaround
The dispute in the instant case criginated from the
DOT's temporary work ageignment involving the landscaping crew of

es the

 

the highway maintenance operations in Kane‘che and impli

> the Honorable Sabrina S. MeKenna presided over the matter at {aeue on
appeat
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collective bargaining agreements (CBA) of UPW and HGEA.?
Specifically, on June 17, 1996, the DOT temporarily awarded a
vacant Bargaining Unit 2 (BU-02) position in the “Windward crew"
co a BU-02 employee from another baseyard. As a result, UPW --
the collective bargaining agent for Sargaining Unit 1 (BU-01)
employees -- filed a grievance against the DOT on behalf of
William Kapuwai, a BU-01 truck driver for the DOT and the most
senior employee in the Windward Crew. UPW alleged that its CBA
(hereinafter, CBAL] required the DOT to award the temporary
assignment to Kapuwai.‘ After exhausting all the remedies
required by CBA1, UPW aubmitted notice of its intent to arbitrate
the grievance to the Dor.
B. Procedural Background

1, Arbitration Proceedings and Circuit Court Confirmation

on October 8, 1997, arbitration proceedings between UPW

and the DOT commenced. arts

> me collective bargaining agreements for UPW and HOEA define
temporary asvignmente ae “che assignment by a competent authority and the
Aseumption, without a formal change in position assignment, of the significant
Guties and responsibilieies of another person{.]”

4 au-01 ie made up of employees in the state in non.
collar position. "HRS § 69-G(a) (2) (Supp. 1996). Under CBAL, = temporary
Seeignnent must be avarded vo the jalitied employee in the

fe in the clase inediately below that of the temporarily vacant pos
Chal does not specify whether BU-0l employees may be assigned to non-
positions

       
 
  

 

We note that SU-o2 is made up of employees in the state in supervisory
biue-coilar positions, ARS § @9-6(a) (2). (Supp. 1996), and are represented by
HOBA. Unlike CAL, AGBA's CBA hereinafter, CBA2] specifically provides that
Priority for temporarily vacant 30-02 positions must be given to’ the saat

he DOT's Highway Divieien who ie in

Semler ee eitaccly beioe teat of the vacancy. ‘in cther words, Gan
Pequires chat only BU-02 employees can fil1 temporary BU-02 vacancies

 

 
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UPW contended that the DOT violated CBA1 by awarding the
temporarily vacant BU-02 position in the Windward Crew to a BU-02
employee from another basevard. TI

to award temporary assignments was a “management right" under HRS

 

1 DOT responded that the right

§ 89-9(d) (1993)* and, therefore, preempted any contradictory
provision in CBAL, In other words, the 007 asserted that, even
if its award of a BU-02 temporary assignment to a BU-02 employee
from another baseyard violated CBAl, it was entitled to do so as
of right under HRS § 89-9(a).

on May 11, 1998, the arbitrator issued a final written
decision and award in favor of UPW, in which he ruled that the
right to issue temporary assignnents was not a management right
and, therefore, the DoT violated CBA1. On May 15, 1998, UPW
moved the circuit court to confixm the arbitration award, which
the circuit court, the Honorable Kevin S.C. chang presiding,

granted on July 21, 1998.

 

Proceedings Before the HLRB
nile the arbitration proceedings were still in
progress, the DOT, on October 20, 1997, submitted a petition to
the HERB for a declaratory ruling [hereinafter, petition]

pursuant to HRS § 91-8 (1993) and Hawai'i Administrative Rules

 

> ane srovides in pertinent part: “The employer and the
exclusive representative ghall aot agree to any proposal vaien would ss
interfere with the rights and obligations of a public employer to... hire,
promote, transfer, acsign, and retain employees in poeitione{.)*

 

 

 

© HRS § 91-8 is quoted in section IITA, intra
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(HAR) Rule 12-42-9 (1981)’ as to whether a ruling by the
arbitrator that the DOT must award a BU-01 employee a temporarily

vacant BU-02 position would

 

late the DOT’s management rights
under HRS § 89-9(d). The DOT alleged that the arbitrator only
had jurisdiction to interpret CBAL and, therefore, a decision by
the arbitrator requiring the DOT to award temporary BU-02
assignments to BU-01 employees would require the DOT to knowingly
violate the CBA2 provision mandating that BU-02 temporary
assignments be awarded to BU-02 employees

on Novenber 7, 1997, HGHA filed a petition to intervene
in the declaratory proceedings, alleging, inter alia, that UPW's
attempt to require the DOT to assign BU-02 positions to BU-o1
employees infringed upon HGEA’s rights as the exclusive
bargaining representative of BU-02 employees to “bargain over the
pronotion and transfer of employees to positions within BU-02*
under HRS § 89-8(a) (1993). On November 10, 1997, UPW also
filed a petition to intervene on the ground that the proceedings
implicated the temporary ageignnent rights of BU-01 employees

under CBAL. Soon thereafter, all counties in the State filed

 

+ HAR Rule 12-42-9 ie quoted in section III-A, infra.

"HRS § 49-9(a) provides in pertinent part:

  

‘The euployee organization which hag bean c
tthe hoard ae representing the majority of employees in an
Appropriate bargeizing unit shall be the exciueive
Fepresentative of all employees in the unit. As exclusive
Fepresentative, it ehall have the right to act for and
fegoriate agrecrents covering all employees in the unit and

fail be responsible for representing the interests of all
Such enployeee without discrimination and without regard to
Guployee organization mesbership.

 

 

 

   

 
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ions to intervene on the ground that their rights to award

 

pet
temporary assignments could be affected by the HLRB’s declaratory
ruling, The HLRB granted all of the intervenore’ motions on
December 31, 1997

on January 21, 1998, UPW filed a menorandum urging the
HLRB to refrain from issuing a declaratory ruling, alleging,
Anter alia, that (1) the HLURB lacked jurisdiction because the
Giepute was properly submitted to “final and binding’
arbitration; (2) the DOT lacked standing to seek relief because
ite practices and policies were conaistent with the proper
exercise of “management rights" under HRS § 89-9(4); (3) the
proceedings for declaratory relief constituted an impermissible
collateral attack on the confirmed arbitration award; and (4) the
DOT was collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issues
presented in the arbitration proceedings.

on dune 7, 2000, the HLRE entered an order denying the
petition for a declaratory ruling (hereinafter, HLRB’s order]
pursuant to HAR Rule 12-42-9(£), in which the HLRB found that
‘che isaues herein are moot as the Arbitration Award has been
rendered and confirmed and there is no actual controversy between
the parties at this stage.” In essence, the HLRB refused to
iesue a declaratory ruling on the merite.

3. Appeal of the HLRB Decision to the Circuit court
on Guly 7, 2000, HOBA filed a notice of appeal to the

circuit court, the Honorable Sabrina S. McKenna presiding, from

 
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the HIRB’s order. On appeal, HGRA contended, inter alia, that
the HLRB’s deferral to the arbitration award was improper

inasmich as: (1) the iasue of whether temporary assignments was

 

a management right under HRS § 89-9(d) was not moot; and
(2) HOEA’s rights under HRS §§ 89-8 (a) and 89-9(4) as the
exclusive bargaining representative of BU-02 employees were
violated. Thus, HGEA requested that the circuit court order the
HLRB to issue a declaratory ruling on these issues. After
reviewing the matter under HRS § 92-14(a) (4) (1993), the court
determined that it was an Yerror of law" for the HLRB to conclude
that the dispute was moot ‘inasmuch as the petition for
declaratory ruling, as stated, indicates a recurring problem.
As such, the circuit court remanded the case to the HLRB to enter
a declaratory ruling.

Final judgment wae entered on April 25, 2002. on April
30, 2001, UPW filed its timely notice of appeal to this court.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

existence of juriediction is a qu
Wiew de nove under the right/wrong
Tegarding subject matter jurisdiction may be
any stage of a cause of action. When reviewing @
Stee where the circuit court lacked subject matter
Surledietion, the appellate court retains jurisdiction, not
ae the serits, but for the purpore of correcting the error
fh Suriediction, A judgment rendered by a circuit court
Wiehoue subject matter jurisdiction is void.

Amatiad v. Odum, 90 Hawai'i 152, 158-59, 977 P.2d 160, 166-67

   

(1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted) .

 
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+ Statutory Interpretation

Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of
law tobe reviewed da uave under the right/vrong standard.
our seatuvory construction ie guided by the following well
established principles:
Sur forenoee obligation Le to ascertain and give
effect co the intention of the legislature, xhien ie
fo be obtained primarily from the language concained
in the statute itself. And we mist read statutory
language in the context of the entire statute and
construe ir inva manner consistent with its purpose
hen there Ie doubt, doubleness of
meaning, or indistinetivenees or uncertainty of sn
Sipreasion used in aeeatute, an ambiguity
in construing an ambiguous statute, “(c}he
meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by
Geamining the context, with which the ambiguous words,
Phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to
Aecertain their erue meaning. Moreover, the courts
Bay resort to extrinsic aids in determining
Jegislative inent. One avenue is the use of
Legislative history as an interpretive tool.
‘This court may also consider “(t]he reason
Jaw, and the Cause which induced the legislature to enact
ie, SS covaiecover ite true seaning.

Guth v. Preeland, 96 Hawai"i 147, 149-50, 26 P.3d 982, 984-85

(2001) (citations omitted) (ellipses points in original).

C. Review of an Agency Decision

Review of a decision made by the circus
ite review of an agency's decision is a
appeal. The standard of review 1s one in which this
Shure must determine whether the circuit court wae
Fight Sr wrong in ies decision, applying the standards
Set forth in HAS § 91-14(g) [(1983)] to the agency's
Secieion,

ung § 91-14, eatitled “Judicial review of conts

provides in'xelevant part:

(@). Upon review of the record the court may affirm
the decision of the agency or remand the case with
Ingeructions for fureher proceedings; or it may reverse oF
nedity the decision and order if the substantial rignts of
the petitioners may have been prejudiced becaise the
Adninistrative findings, conclusions, decisions, or ordere

 

 

 

  

 

ced cases,”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(2) ta violation of consetevetonal or
provisions; or
@ Of the statutory authoricy
or Surinaietion of the agency; oF
(3) Made upon unlawful proceaure; or
(a) Affected by other efror of law; oF
(5) Clearly erzoneaus in view of the

fellable, probative, snd eubetancial
‘Gvidence on the whole record; oF

 

 
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SS

(6) ambitrary, oF capricious, or
Characterized by abuse of discretion
or clearly unwarranted exercise of
Siecretion.
[winder HRs § 51-14(g), conclusions of law are reviewable
Under subsections (1), (2) and (4); questions regarding
Procedural defects under subsection (3); findings of fact
Ender subsection (3); jency'# exercise of discretion
Under subsection (6)

 

 

 

  

wl Inc. v, 104 Hawai'i 412, 426, 92
P.3d 494, 498 (2004) (citations and some quotation marks omitted)
(brackets in original).

TIT. PESCUSSTON

on appeal, UPW contends that the circuit court
(2) aid not have jurisdiction to review the HLRB’s order under
HRS § 91-14; (2) improperly allowed a collateral attack on a
court-confirmed arbitration award; and (3) erred in concluding
that the underlying dispute in this case was not moot
A. Jurisdiction to Review the HLRB“s Order

UpW contends that the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction to review the HLRB’s order under HRS § 91-14 because
the HIRB’s order did not result from a contested case. HGEA, on
the other hand, maintains that, pursuant to HRS §§ 91-8 and
91-14, a contested cage was unnecessary in order to confer
jurisdiction upon the circuit court.

‘the right to appeal is purely statutory and exists only
when jurisdiction is given by some constitutional or statutory
provision. Burk nt) si, 95 Hawai'i 288, 269, 22 P.3d
4, a5 (2002); rv ‘LIne. co., 77 Hawai'i 88,

oi, 881 P.2d 1234, 1237 (1994); Chambers v. Leavey, 60 Haw. 52,

 
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57, $87 P.24 607, 810 (1978). Jurisdiction is conferred upon
circuit courts to review administrative decisions by HRS § 91-14,

which provides in pertinent part

(a) Any person aggrieved by a finsl decision and order
in a contested case or by a preliminary ruling of the nature
thet deferral of review pending entry of a subeequent final
Gecision would deprive appellant of adequate relief is
entitled to judicial review thereof under ehis chapter

 

in other words, appellate review of a final administrative

decision is available where the decision results from a

Yeontested case." See Pub. Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i
County Planning Comm'n, 79 Hawai'i 425, 431, 903 P.24 1246, 1252

(1995) (hereinafter, PASH].

A contested case is defined in HRS § 91-1(5) (1953) ae
“a proceeding in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of
apecific parties are required by law to be determined after an
opportunity for agency hearing.” In Bush v. Haw
Comm'n, 76 Hawai'i 128, 134, 870 P.2d 1272, 1278 (1994), this
court held:

If the statute or rule governing the activity in question

does not gandate @ hearing(’) prior to the aduinistracive

agency's decieion-maving, the actions of the aduinistracive

agency are not required by law and do not ayount to va

final decision or order in a contested case” from which a

Girect appeal co circuit court 1s possible.

see also FASH, 79 Hawai'i at 431, 903

P.2d at 1252, Thus, pursuant to ERS § 91-14, in order for

 

(Emphasis in original)

 

proceedings before an agency to constitute a contested case from

 

° an tagency hearing" ie defined as a “hearing held by an agency
inmedsately prior to's judicial review of a contested case ae proviced in
section Sivte-*" HRS § 91-1(6) (1993)

 

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which an appeal can be maintained, the agency must be required by
law to hold a hearing before a decision is rendered. stated
differently, diecretionary hearings are not contested cases

because they are not required by law. See Pele Defense Fund vs

B Venture, 77 Hawai'i 64, 68, 881 P.2d 1210, 1214

(1994).

In the instant cage, the HLRB’s order was issued
pursuant to HRS § 91-8 and HAR Rule 12-42-9. ERS § 91-8

provides:

Any interested person may petition an agency for a
Geciaratory order ae to the applicabiliey of any
Provision or of any rule or order of the agency.
Egency shall adopt rules prescriving the farm of the
petitions and the procedure for their submission,
Poneideration, and prompt disposition. Orders disposing of

agency orders.

(Emphasis added). HAR Rule 12-42-9 was promulgated pursuant to

       

  

HRS § 91-8 and etates in pertinent part:

Declaratory rulings by the board.
{s) Any public employee, employee organization, public
employer, of interested person or organization may petition the
board for a declaratory order aa to the applicability of any
statutory provision o: of any rule or order of the board

if) the board may, for good cause, refuse to issue a
without 1imieing the generality of the

 
  

The question ia specu

hypothetical and does

Gr facts which can re
exist in the near fue!

(2) The peticioner's interest is not of the type
Gihich vould give the petitioner standing to
taintain an action if such petitioner were to
Seek Judicial relief.

(3) The iesuance of the declaratory order may
Adversely affect the interests of the board or
fry of tee officers or employees in a litigat
“mich is pending or may reasonably be expected

(4) The matter ie not within the jurisdiction of the
Bosra.

  

 

 

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(00) Hearing:
(2) “*iehough in the usual course of precessing a

 

petition sora declaratory rilina ue formal
Bearing shall be aranted £0 the petitioner. che
board sav. in ite discretion, omer euch

Broceading eet down for hearing.

(2) Ray petitioner who desizes a hearing on a
petition for declaratory ruling shall set forth
In detail in a written request the Feasons why
the matters alleged in the petition, rogether’
with supporting affidavits or other written
evidence and briefs or wencranda or legal
Suthoricies, will not permit the fair and
expeditious disposicion of the petition and, to
the extent that such request for hearing 1s
dependent upon factuel aasertion, shall

‘company such request by affidavit establishing

 

 

(emphases added)
As illustrated above, HRS § 91-8 and HAR Rule 12-42-9
do not require the HLRB to hold a hearing prior to issuing a
ruling on a declaratory petition. In fact, HAR
Rule 12-42-9(h) (1) specifically provides that a hearing is
@iscretionary. Because there is clearly no statutory mandate or
administrative rule entitling the DOT to a hearing, it would
appear that the HLRB‘s order does not result from a contested
HGEA, however, contends that the HLRB’s order need not,
result from a contested case and that, read together, HRS §§ 91-8
and 91-14 conferred jurisdiction upon the circuit court. We
agree. HRS § 91-8 provides that “[o]rders disposing of petitions

[for declaratory rulings] shall have the sane status as other

   

agency orders.” Inasmuch as the phrase “other agency orders” is
not defined anywhere in the Hawai'i Administrative Procedure Act

(HAPA), HRS Chapter 91, and is unclear on its face, we look to
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extrinsic aids in order to determine what the legislature
intended by “other agency orders.” See Freeland, 96 Hawai'i at
149-50, 28 P.3d at 984-85 (“When there is doubt, doubleness of
meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression
used in a statute, an ambiguity exists. . . . In construing an
ambiguous statute . . . the courte may resort to extrinsic aids
in determining legislative intent.")

one avenue in construing an ambiguous statute is the
use of legislative history as an interpretive tool. Id.
According to a House Standing Committee Report, a basic purpose
of HAPA is to “provide for judicial review of agency decisions
and orders on the record, except where the right of trial de
novo, including the right of trial by jury, is provided by law.*
Hse. Stand. Com. Rpt. No, 8, in 1961 House Journal at 655
(hereinafter, House Report]. Additionally, in addressing an
agency's refusal to issue a declaratory ruling under HAPA -- such
as that in the instant cage -- the House report states that,
“[slince the refusal in itself would be an agency order, in
appropriate cases, application for judicial review on the grounds
that denial was an abuse of discretion on the part of the agency
nay be made." Id, at 659. Thus, we believe the legislature
intended the phrase “other agency orders" to permit review of
petitions for declaratory relief

Moreover, we note that this court has consistently

recognized that circuit courts have jurisdiction, pursuant to HRS
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§ 91-14, to review orders disposing of petitions for declaratory

rulings. See ¢.9., Vail v. Employees’ Ret. Sye., 75 Haw. 42,

ertaining an appeal,

 

 

49-51, @56 P.2d 1227, 1232-33 (1993) (
brought pursuant to HRS § 91-14, of an HRS § 91-8 declaratory
order); v. State Pub. nt Relations Bd., 60 Haw. 436,
437-43, 591 P.2d, 123, 114-16 (1979) (noting that the “circuit
court acquired jurisdiction (over a declaratory ruling]
pursuant to HRS § 91-14"); see also Sierra Club v. Hawai'i
Tourism Auth., 100 Hawai'i 242, 264, 59 P.34 877, 699 (2002)
(explaining that HAPA “applies only to judicial review of
contested case hearings, gee HRS § 91-14, or . . . a declaratory
order from an agency regarding the ‘applicability of any
statutory provision or of any rule or order of the agency,’
HRS § 91-8"). Accordingly, we hold that orders disposing of
petitions for declaratory rulings under HRS § 91-8 are appealable
to the cizcuit court pursuant to HRS § 91-14. Consequently, the
circuit court in the instant case had proper jurisdiction to
review the HLRB’s order.
B. fa " 1

Although unclear, UPW appears to allege that the
circuit court erred in remanding the case to the HLRB because the
proceeding for declaratory ruling constituted an inpermissible

collateral attack and was barred by collateral estoppel.

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2, Collateral attack
A collateral attack “is an attempt to impeach a
judgment or decree in a proceeding not instituted for the express

purpose of annulling, correcting or modifying such judgment or
decree." Eixat Hawaiian Bank v. Weeks, 70 Haw. 392, 398, 772
P.2d 1187, 1191 (1989) (citing Kapi‘olani Estate, Ltd. v.
Atcherly, 14 Haw. 652, 661 (1903)) (quotation marke omitted). As
a general rule, a collateral attack may not be made upon a
judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. id; ase
also In-xe Genesve Data Tech., Inc., 95 Hawai'i 33, 40, 18 P.3d
895, 902 (2001).

UPW appears to contend that HGEA’s pursuit of a
declaratory ruling and subsequent appeal of the HLRB’s order
refusing to issue such a ruling constitute impermissible
collateral attacks on a final judgment. In the instant case, the
arbitration award became a final judgment under HRS §§ 658-12 and
658-14 (1993)! when it was confirmed by the circuit court.
However, HGEA filed its petition for intervention in the HLRB
proceedings while the arbitration was still ongoing and, thus,
well before the arbitration award was rendered or confirmed. As
such, the HGEA’s petition for intervention and subsequent appeal

of che HLRB’s order cannot, as UPW contends, be characterized as

 

“ung chapter 65@ was repealed in ite entirety in connection with che
enactment of the Uniform Arbitration Act, HRS Chapter 656A, 2002 Haw. Seau,
five Act 265, #5, at 20, Although HRS Chapter 658 was repealed, 2 ie
Applicable £0 the' instant ‘case becaise the recodified casper necane effective
after the arbitration award wae confirmed on May 15, 1998, 700: Haw. Sea!

fous Act 265, £ €, at 620, (oThie Act ehall take effect on July 2, 2002.

    

   

s+

 
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attempts to “impeach a judgment’ because there was no judgment or
award to impeach at the time HGEA brought its petition
2. Collateral Estoppel
UPW appears to argue that HGEA was collaterally

estopped from seeking declaratory relief from the HLRB because
HOEA was in privity with the DOT, who was a party to the
arbitration proceedings. “Collateral estoppel is an aspect of
rea judicata which precludes the relitigation of a fact or issue
which wae previously determined in a prior suit on a different
claim between the sane parties or cheir privies.* Maxeland v.

+2 S00" eae, 66 Haw, 119, 124, 657 P.2d
3035, 1039 (1983) (citation omitted). In order to establish a
claim of collateral estoppel, the party asserting the claim has

the burden of establishing that:

(2) {tlhe Sgoue decided in the prior adjudication 4
identical to the one prevented in ehe action in quest
(2) there is 3 final Juagnent on the nerite; (3) che iscue
lecided in the prior adjudication was essential to the final
Sudgmenc; and (8) the party against whom collateral estoppel
is aeserted was a party or in privity with a party to the
prior adjudication (.)

       

 

 

   

 

See Dorrance v. Lee, 90 Hawai'i 143, 149, 976 P.24 904, 910
(2999).

Ae stated above, a party asserting collateral estoppel
must satisfy all four elenents of the claim. Inasmuch as the

fourth element is lacking in the instant case, UPW’s claim is

 

without merit. In addressing privity, this court has previously
stated that “{plreclusion is fair in circumstances where the

nonparty and party had the same practical opportunity to control

<16-
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the course of the proceedings." Bush v, Matson, 61 Hawai! 474,
480, 918 P.2d 1130, 1136 (1996) (citation omitted). “Preclusion
nay also be appropriate where the party in the previous action
was acting in a representative capacity for the current party
However, several important rules limit the extent of preclusion
by representation. The most obvious rule is that the
representative mist have been appointed by a valid procedure.”
Id. at 481, 918 P.2d at 1137 (citation, brackets and quotation
marks omitted).

In the instant case, HGEA’s participation in the
arbitration proceedings was limited to the testimony of HGEA
representatives who were called to testify by UPW. HGEA was not
fa party in the arbitration and, thus, was not allowed to call its
own witnesses or cross-examine witnesses for UPW. As such, it
cannot be said that HGEA had the same opportunity as the DOT to
control the arbitration proceedings. In addition, although UPW
argues that the DOT served as a representative of HGEA, there is
no evidence in the record that HGEA appointed the DOT to
represent its interests by any valid procedure. Accordingly,
because HGEA was not in privity with the DOT, we hold that HGEA
was not collaterally estopped from seeking a declaratory ruling
from the HLRB.

Cc. Mootnese
upW contends that the circuit court erred in concluding

that the HLRS committed an error of law in ruling that the issues

w7-
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presented in the petition for a declaratory ruling were rendered
moot by the confirmed arbitration award. It is well-established
that “[c]ourts [will] not consume time deciding abstract
propositions of law or moot cases, and have no juriadiction to do
so." Wong v. Bd, of Regents, Univ. of Hawai'i, 62 Haw. 391, 395,
616 P.2d 201, 204 (1980) (citing Territory v, Aldridge, 25 Haw.
565, 567-68 (1940)).

HGEA, however, contends, inter alia, that, even if the
confirmed arbitration award rendered the petition moot, the
circuit court properly remanded the case to the HLRB inasmuch as
the issues presented in the petition fell within an exception to
the moctness doctrine. *[WJe have repeatedly recognized an
exception to the nootnese doctrine in cases involving questions
that affect the public interest and are ‘capable of repetition
yet evading review.’* Qkada Trucking Co. v. Bd, of Water supply,
99 Hawai'i 191, 196, 53 P.24 799, 804 (2002) (citations omitted).

Im the instant case, it appears that the circuit court
remanded thie case to the HRB “inasmuch ag the petition for
declaratory ruling, as stated, indicates 2 recurring problem.”
We read the foregoing as a determination by the circuit court
that the issues raised by HGRA involved questions affecting the

public interest and presented a problem that was capable of

 

repetition yet evading review. UPW fails to challenge this

determination and the record contains evidence indicating that

 

ions and

 

the isgues presented by HGEA have arisen in past arbitr:

sie
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

are likely to recur in the future. Thus, to the extent that the
cireuit court’s ruling and the record support a determination
that the issues presented to the HLRB fell within an exception to
the mootnese doctrine, we hold that the circuit court did not err
in concluding that the HLRB committed an error of law
iV, CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court’s

April 25, 2001 final judgment.

Y
on the brief: ©

Herbert 8. Takahashi (of Barbro

Takahashi, Masui &

 

Tapconceiiceh tot Dean Cause ree
‘ftstvence/eppetice-appetlant
United Public Workers, Cre ucts be

APSCME, Local 636

charles K. Y. Khim,
for intervenor/appellant-
appellee Hawai'i Government
Employees Association,
APSCME, Local 152, AFL-CIO

Kathleen N. A. Watanabe and
Daniel A. Morris, Deputy
Attorneys General, for
petitioner/appellant-

appellee Linda Lingle,
Governor, State of Hawai'i,
joining in HGEA’s first amended
answering brief

 

Paul 7. Tsukiyama, Deputy
Corporation Counsel, for
intervenor /appel lant -appt
Mufi Hanneman, Mayor, City
and County of Honolulu,

joining in HEGA’s first amended
answering brief

 

 

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