Case Title: Beckett v. Warren

Citation: 2010-Ohio-4

Docket Number: 20082106

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Beckett v. Warren, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-4 
BECKETT ET AL. , CROSS-APPELLEES, v. WARREN ET AL., CROSS-APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Beckett v. Warren, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4.] 
Torts — Negligence — R.C. 955.28 — A plaintiff may, in the same case, pursue a 
claim for a dog-bite injury under both R.C. 955.28 and common-law 
negligence. 
(No. 2008-2106 — Submitted September 30, 2009 — Decided January 6, 2010.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County,  
No. 23909, 2008-Ohio-4689. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A plaintiff may, in the same case, pursue a claim for a dog bite injury under both 
R.C. 955.28 and common law negligence. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Today this court must decide whether a plaintiff pursuing a claim 
for bodily injuries caused by a dog must elect either a statutory remedy under 
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R.C. 955.28 or a remedy at common law for negligence.  Because we hold that 
both remedies may be pursued in the same case, we affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} Yoshanta Beckett, plaintiff and cross-appellee (“plaintiff”), filed a 
personal injury action against Richard Warren and Mary Wood, defendants and 
cross-appellants (“defendants”), on behalf of her minor child, who was bitten on 
the head by Warren and Wood’s dog.  The suit contained three counts:  two 
common law negligence claims and one statutory claim for damages under R.C. 
955.28. 
{¶ 3} The trial court required Beckett to choose between pursuing either 
the statutory or common law remedy.  Beckett chose the statutory remedy, and 
ultimately the jury entered a verdict in favor of Beckett for $5,000 in damages.  
Beckett moved the court for a new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A)(4) and (6) and 
argued that the damages award was inadequate and that the judgment was not 
sustained by the weight of the evidence.  The trial court denied Beckett’s motion 
for new trial. 
{¶ 4} On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Summit County held that a 
party may simultaneously pursue claims for a dog bite injury under R.C. 955.28 
and common law negligence.  Thus, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of 
the trial court and remanded the matter to the trial court for a new trial on 
Beckett’s statutory and common-law claims.  Beckett v. Warren, 9th Dist. No. 
23909, 2008-Ohio-4689, ¶ 15-16. 
{¶ 5} Both parties appealed to this court.  The court of appeals certified a 
conflict between its decision in this case and the case the trial court relied on, 
Rodenberger v. Wadsworth (Nov. 25, 1983), Ottawa App. No. OT-83-18. 
{¶ 6} This court determined that a conflict exists and ordered the parties 
to brief the issue of “[w]hether a plaintiff pursuing a claim for bodily injury 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
damages in a case involving a dog [is] required to elect between pursuing a 
statutory claim under R.C. 955.28 and a common law claim for negligence.”  
Beckett v. Warren, 121 Ohio St.3d 1424, 2009-Ohio-1296, 903 N.E.2d 324.  
Further, this court accepted defendants’ Proposition of Law I in a discretionary 
cross-appeal:  “The plaintiff in a dog bite case may file a complaint alleging a 
statutory cause of action and a negligence theory, but to avoid confusion of issues 
and the presentation of evidence which is admissible in one action and 
inadmissible in another, the plaintiff must elect which cause of action will be 
pursued at trial.”  See id. 
Analysis 
Common Law Cause of Action 
{¶ 7} There are two bases for recovery in Ohio for injuries sustained as a 
result of a dog bite: common law and statutory.  “At common law, the keeper of a 
vicious dog could not be liable for personal injury caused by the dog unless the 
person [keeper] knew of the dog’s ‘vicious propensities.’ ”  Bora v. Kerchelich 
(1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 146, 147, 2 OBR 692, 443 N.E.2d 509, quoting Hayes v. 
Smith (1900), 62 Ohio St. 161, 56 N.E. 879, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Thus, 
in a common law action for bodily injuries caused by a dog, a plaintiff must show 
that (1) the defendant owned or harbored the dog, (2) the dog was vicious, (3) the 
defendant knew of the dog’s viciousness, and (4) the dog was kept in a negligent 
manner after the keeper knew of its viciousness.  Hayes at paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  In a common law action for bodily injuries caused by a dog, as in any 
other common law tort action, punitive damages may be awarded.  McIntosh v. 
Doddy (1947), 81 Ohio App. 351, 359, 37 O.O. 203, 77 N.E.2d 260. 
Statutory Cause of Action 
{¶ 8} On April 10, 1900, the General Assembly amended a prior statute 
concerning dogs.  The amendment provided:  “Any animal of the dog kind that 
chases, worries, injures, or kills any sheep, lamb, goat, kid, domestic fowl, animal 
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or person, may be killed by any person, at any time or place.  And the owner, 
owners or harborers of any animal of the dog kind that chases, worries, injures, or 
kills any sheep, lamb, goat, kid, animal or person, shall be jointly and severally 
liable to any person so damaged to the full amount of the injury done * * *.”  H.B. 
No. 244, 94 Ohio Laws 118. 
{¶ 9} This statute later became G.C. 5838 in 1953, which provided: “A 
dog that chases, worries, injures or kills a sheep, lamb, goat, kid, domestic fowl, 
domestic animal or person, can be killed at any time or place. * * * The owner or 
harborer of such dog shall be liable to a person damaged for the injury done.” 
{¶ 10} R.C. 955.28, the successor statute currently before the court, 
imposes strict liability upon the owner, keeper, or harborer of a dog “for any 
injury, death, or loss to person or property that is caused by the dog” unless the 
injured individual was trespassing or committing a criminal offense other than a 
minor misdemeanor on the property.  R.C. 955.28(B). 
{¶ 11} The statutory cause of action “eliminated the necessity of pleading 
and proving the keeper’s knowledge” of the dog’s viciousness.  Bora v. 
Kerchelich (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 146, 147, 2 OBR 692, 443 N.E.2d 509.  
Consequently, in an action for damages under R.C. 955.28, the plaintiff must 
prove (1) ownership or keepership [or harborship] of the dog, (2) whether the 
dog’s actions were the proximate cause of the injury, and (3) the monetary 
amount of the damages.  Hirschauer v. Davis (1955), 163 Ohio St. 105, 56 O.O. 
169, 126 N.E.2d 337, paragraph three of the syllabus.  In an action brought under 
the statute, punitive damages are not recoverable.  See Kleybolte v. Buffon (1913), 
89 Ohio St. 61, 105 N.E. 192, syllabus.  Thus, the defendant’s knowledge of the 
dog’s viciousness and the defendant’s negligence in keeping the dog are irrelevant 
in a statutory action. 
Statute Does Not Abrogate Common Law 
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{¶ 12} Turning to the relationship between the common law and statutory 
actions for damages resulting from bodily injuries caused by a dog, this court held 
in 1924 that “[t]he right to maintain an action at common law for damages 
resulting from injuries, which by his negligence the owner of a dog suffers such 
animal to commit, has not been abrogated by statute and such suit may be 
maintained either under the statute or at common law.”  Lisk v. Hora (1924), 109 
Ohio St. 519, 143 N.E. 545, syllabus. 
{¶ 13} Further, this court held that R.C. 955.28, “which imposes a rule of 
absolute liability upon the owner or harborer of a dog for damage or injury caused 
by such dog (with certain exceptions), creates a new and different cause of action 
in no way dependent upon common-law principles and does not abrogate the 
common-law right of action for damage or injury caused by a dog.  A suit may be 
instituted either under the statute or at common law.”  (Emphasis added.)  Warner 
v. Wolfe (1964), 176 Ohio St. 389, 27 O.O.3d 356, 199 N.E.2d 860, syllabus. 
{¶ 14} The defendants argue, and the conflict case, Rodenberger v. 
Wadsworth (Nov 25, 1983), Ottawa App. No. OT-83-18, 1983 WL 7005, held, 
that the final sentence of the Warner syllabus means that the two causes of action 
may not be instituted and pursued in one case.  We disagree.  Our focus in Lisk 
and Warner was not on whether the statutory and common law claims for dog bite 
injuries could be pursued simultaneously, but rather whether the statutory cause of 
action abrogated the common law cause of action, which we held it did not.  
Therefore, we disagree with the Rodenberger court’s restrictive interpretation of 
our decision in Warner. 
Simultaneous Claims in the Same Case 
{¶ 15} In answering the certified question and the proposition of law 
asking whether the two causes of action may be pursued in the same case, we 
must first look to the plain language of the statute and apply it as written if the 
meaning is unambiguous.  State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 
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861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 9.  There is no language in R.C. 955.28 to indicate that it was 
intended to be the sole cause of action for personal injuries sustained from a dog.  
Nor is there any language in the statute to indicate that a plaintiff is required to 
elect between pursuing a common law action or a statutory action at trial.  Rather, 
we must conclude that the statute was enacted to protect the public and hold 
owners strictly liable for the actions of their dogs without permitting “one free 
bite.”  Thus, the statute itself does not preclude a simultaneous common law 
action for damages for bodily injuries caused by a dog. 
{¶ 16} Further, we note that our Rules of Civil Procedure support our 
holding today.  For example, Civ.R. 8(A) provides: “Relief in the alternative or of 
several different types may be demanded.”  Further, Civ.R. 8(E)(2) states: “[A] 
party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or 
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. * 
* * A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has 
regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or equitable grounds.” 
{¶ 17} Beyond the issue of whether plaintiffs are permitted to plead both 
common law and statutory claims for bodily injuries caused by a dog, the 
defendants argue that the doctrine of election of remedies demands that they elect 
only one theory to pursue at trial.  See Norwood v. McDonald (1943), 142 Ohio 
St. 299, 315, 27 O.O. 240, 52 N.E.2d 67 (“The doctrine of election of remedies is 
applicable only where, at the time of election, there are available to the litigant for 
the assertion of a single right, two or more coexisting remedies which are 
repugnant to and inconsistent with each other”).  However, the statutory and 
common law remedies in this case are not repugnant to or inconsistent with each 
other.  The common law cause of action simply provides a potential additional 
remedy — punitive damages — if the elements of knowledge of prior viciousness 
and negligence are proven. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 18} In addition to their election-of-remedies argument, the defendants 
also argue that the jury may become confused when sifting through the evidence 
and trying to determine to which cause of action each piece of evidence relates.  
However, it is the responsibility of the trial judge to provide the jury a plain, 
distinct, and unambiguous statement of the law applicable to the evidence 
presented by the parties to the trier of fact.  Marshall v. Gibson, (1985), 19 Ohio 
St.3d 10, 12, 19 OBR 8, 482 N.E.2d 583.  And, “[a] trial jury is presumed to 
follow the instructions given to it by the judge.”  State v. Henderson (1988), 39 
Ohio St.3d 24, 33, 528 N.E.2d 1237, citing Parker v. Randolph (1979), 442 U.S. 
62, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 713. 
{¶ 19} To that end, we cite to the First District Court of Appeals’ analysis 
in McIntosh v. Doddy (1947), 81 Ohio App. 351, 356-357, 37 O.O. 203, 77 
N.E.2d 260:  “[T]he common-law action [for injury by a dog] includes all the 
elements of the statutory action and in addition the elements of scienter and 
negligence.  * * * [W]here a petition contains all the elements of a common-law 
action but the proof covers the statutory elements only, * * * the court would not 
dismiss the plaintiff, but would award to him the relief to which the proof entitled 
him, that is, compensation for the injury received.  That would be the relief to 
which he would be entitled on the cause of action pleaded, shorn of the 
allegations of scienter and negligence, which he had failed to prove.  And those 
allegations would be treated as surplusage.” 
{¶ 20} The McIntosh court concluded that the jury had found against the 
defendants on the issue of negligently keeping the dog and in so finding, the jury 
had found that the defendant had harbored the dog.  The court held that “[t]he fact 
that it also found that the dog was vicious and that the harboring was negligent 
and occurred after she had knowledge of its viciousness, certainly is not 
prejudicial to the defendant.”  Id. at 359. 
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{¶ 21} We agree.  When the plaintiff pursues both a statutory and 
common law claim for bodily injuries caused by a dog, a judge can easily instruct 
the jury that if it finds no evidence of the defendant’s knowledge of the dog’s 
viciousness, then only compensatory damages under the statutory cause of action 
are available.  In that case, the plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages to be 
made whole under the intent of the statute.  When the plaintiff pursues both a 
statutory claim and a common law claim for bodily injuries caused by a dog, a 
judge can just as easily instruct the jury that if it finds that the plaintiff proved that 
the defendant had knowledge of the dog’s viciousness and kept the dog in a 
negligent manner, the jury may award the additional remedy of punitive damages 
under the common law action.  Compensatory damages remain the same under 
either theory of recovery, i.e., there is no double recovery.  The remedies are not 
inconsistent under the law. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 22} For all of the reasons above, we hold that a plaintiff may, in the 
same case, pursue claims for a dog bite injury under both R.C. 955.28 and 
common law negligence.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 23} Respectfully, I dissent.   
{¶ 24} I write to lament what today’s majority opinion proposes to foist 
on trial judges and juries who litigate cases involving bodily injuries arising out of 
incidents with dogs.  Dog owners have no idea what the court has done to them. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 25} Pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, whenever a certified conflict 
exists between appellate districts in Ohio, the Supreme Court has the 
responsibility to resolve the law.  See Section 3(B)(4), Article IV, Ohio 
Constitution. 
{¶ 26} The certified question in the matter now before the court is as 
follows:  “Whether a plaintiff pursuing a claim for bodily injury damages in a 
case involving a dog are [sic] required to elect between pursuing a statutory claim 
under R.C. 955.28 and a common law claim for negligence.” 
{¶ 27} Rather than resolving that conflict and settling the law in a manner 
in accordance with the existing precedent of this court, the majority has fashioned 
a new theory of litigating these cases that will create chaos and confusion by 
directing the commingling of separate and inconsistent causes of action, which 
will further complicate the task of trial judges – all for no purpose, because the 
majority admits only one recovery is possible.  Instead of taking the path of 
simplicity and bringing order out of chaos by following stare decisis, the majority 
chooses to abandon our precedent and forge a new trail, throwing these cases to 
the dogs. 
{¶ 28} In Warner v. Wolfe (1964), 176 Ohio St. 389, 27 O.O.2d 356, 199 
N.E.2d 860, this court held that “ ‘[t]he right to maintain an action at common law 
for damages resulting from injuries, which by his negligence the owner of a dog 
suffers such animal to commit, has not been abrogated by statute and such suit 
may be maintained either under the statute or at common law.’ ”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id., quoting Lisk v. Hora (1924), 109 Ohio St. 519, 143 N.E. 545, 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 29} In accord with that direction, although the complaint alleged 
claims sounding in negligence as a theory of recovery and also a strict liability 
claim pursuant to R.C. 955.28, the trial court judge ordered Yoshanta Beckett, on 
behalf of her child, to elect which claim would be presented to the jury.  Beckett 
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elected to pursue the statutory claim.  Following trial on the statutory claim, the 
jury returned a verdict of $5,000.  On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals 
in a 2-1 decision reversed that judgment, held the trial court erred in requiring an 
election, and remanded for a new trial.  Recognizing that its decision conflicted 
with a case from the Sixth District Court of Appeals, the appellate court certified 
a conflict, bringing the matter to this court. 
{¶ 30} In a well-reasoned decision in Rodenberger v. Wadsworth (Nov. 
25, 1983), Ottawa App. No. OT-83-18, 1983 WL 7005, the Sixth District Court of 
Appeals relied on Warner, supra, for the proposition that a litigant must elect one 
theory of recovery and held that “the words ‘either under the statute or at common 
law’ indicate that the plaintiff in a dog bite case may not proceed under both 
theories of liability * * * .”  Id. at *2. 
{¶ 31} The analysis and reasoning of the Sixth District in Rodenberger is 
persuasive.  The appellate court in Rodenberger noted that in an action under the 
statute, evidence necessary to prove the common-law theory of recovery – that the 
dog had previously bitten another and that the owner had knowledge of the 
previous injury – is inadmissible; thus, proceeding under both theories of liability 
would result in the presentation of evidence necessary to prove the element of 
viciousness under a common-law negligence theory of recovery, id., and at the 
same time inadmissible under the statutory, strict-liability cause of action, id., 
quoting Kleybolte v. Buffon (1913), 89 Ohio St. 61, 105 N.E. 192. 
{¶ 32} This insightful analysis did not escape Judge Vukovich of the 
Seventh District Court of Appeals in Koruschak v. Smotrilla (July 16, 2001), 
Mahoning App. No. 99 CA 320, 2001 WL 884093, where in a concurring opinion 
he artfully pointed out that the elements of proof of the causes of action are 
separate and distinct and their commingling at trial invites confusion for the trier 
of fact.  Id. at *4.  He noted the “daunting task” for a jury to sift through evidence 
and assign it to one of two causes of action.  Id. 
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{¶ 33} And in his dissenting opinion in the instant case, Judge Slaby noted 
that “if both claims were allowed to proceed to trial and the evidence necessary to 
establish the negligence claim were admissible despite the requirements to 
establish a claim under R.C. 955.28, it would be nearly impossible for a judge to 
construct a proper jury instruction.”  Beckett v. Warren (Sept. 17, 2008), Summit 
App. No. 23909, 2008 WL 4227189, *4 (Slaby, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 34} Judge Slaby is exactly correct.  It makes no sense to have a trial 
court judge explain to jurors the law of two inconsistent theories of recovery, and 
then instruct them to apply the law of one to some facts and the law of another to 
other facts while ignoring the facts relating to the first rule of law.  It is logically 
inconsistent to tell a jury to consider a dog’s vicious propensity for a common-law 
negligence claim and, at the same time, instruct the same jurors to ignore that 
evidence in connection with evidence relating to a statutory claim. 
{¶ 35} Our holding in Warner resolves this case, clarifies any budding 
confusion, and eliminates the inconsistency recognized by astute appellate judges 
who have dealt with this issue. 
{¶ 36} The right to maintain an action at common law for damages 
resulting from injuries arising out of the negligence of a dog owner is not 
abrogated by statute, and such suit may be maintained either under the statute or 
at common law, but not simultaneously in the same lawsuit. 
{¶ 37} The certified question should be answered in the affirmative. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
O’Shea & Associates Co., L.P.A., and Michael J. O’Shea, for cross-
appellees. 
Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews and Donald P. Wiley, for cross-
appellants. 
______________________