Case Title: The People v. Chris Dorm

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
- 1 -
=================================================================
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
No. 17  
The People &c., 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Chris Dorm, 
            Appellant.
Peter Theis, for appellant.
Britta Gilmore, for respondent.
JONES, J.:
Defendant and victim had been involved in a romantic
relationship for three months when the charged crimes occurred. 
On January 1, 2005, after a New Year's Eve party, defendant and
- 2 -
No. 17
- 2 -
victim returned to victim's apartment where an argument erupted
during which defendant blocked victim's attempts to leave and
bolted the door.  The altercation escalated from pushing and
shoving, to throwing of a phone, and ultimately to victim
punching defendant and defendant manually choking victim on her
bed.  The couple unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile in the
weeks that followed and the relationship terminated.  On January
18, 2005, victim informed the police about the New Year's Eve
incident.  Defendant appeared uninvited at victim's place of
employment on January 20, 2005 and after speaking with her at a
nearby café, defendant grabbed victim's hand so as to prevent her
from leaving.  Victim again contacted the police and defendant
was arrested the next day when he returned to that location.
Defendant was charged with assault in the second and
third degree, unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, and
stalking in the fourth degree.  As probative of intent, motive,
and the nature and background of the relationship, the People
sought to introduce evidence of defendant's prior conduct toward
victim, and similar conduct against other women which resulted in
prior arrests of defendant.   The People were precluded from
introducing such evidence at the first trial and the jury
acquitted defendant of assault in the third degree and stalking
in the fourth degree.  The jury was deadlocked on the remaining
charges.
Defendant was retried on the two remaining charges
- 3 -
No. 17
* The evidence included: (1) a prior incident at a New York
City night club where defendant tried to prevent victim from
leaving the club and later prevented her from leaving the lobby
of her apartment building, (2) a subsequent incident occurring on
January 20, 2005 where defendant appeared uninvited at victim's
place of employment and prevented her from leaving a café where
they chatted, and (3) defendant's frequent arguments and
conflicts with victim during their relationship.
- 3 -
before a different Justice.  Unlike the first trial, the court in
the second trial allowed the People to introduce evidence of
defendant's prior and subsequent conduct toward victim* and gave
limiting instructions to the jury explaining the proper use of
such evidence.  The court did not allow evidence of defendant's
similar conduct against other women.  The jury subsequently
convicted defendant of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree
and assault in the second degree.  The Appellate Division
unanimously affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the trial
court properly permitted "evidence of conflicts between defendant
and the victim before and after the incident at issue" because
the evidence was "relevant to defendant's motive, and provided
necessary background regarding the couple's relationship that
tended to explain aspects of the victim's testimony that might
otherwise have been unbelievable or suspect" (47 AD3d 503
[2008]).  A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal and we
now affirm.
Evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts may be
admissible when it is relevant to a material issue in the case
other than defendant's criminal propensity (see People v Lewis,
- 4 -
No. 17
- 4 -
69 NY2d 321 [1987]; People v Bearn, 57 NY2d 241 [1982]; People v
Allweiss, 48 NY2d 40 [1979]; People v Carmack, 44 NY2d 706
[1978]).  Under People v Molineux (168 NY 264 [1901]), the People
may use such evidence to prove motive, intent, lack of mistake or
accident, identity, common scheme or plan (see People v Alvino,
71 NY2d 233, 242 [1987]).  However, this list is "merely
illustrative and not exhaustive" (People v Rojas, 97 NY2d 32, 37
[2001]).  Where there is a proper non-propensity purpose, the
decision whether to admit evidence of defendant's prior bad acts
rests upon the trial court's discretionary balancing of probative
value and unfair prejudice. 
Contrary to defendant's arguments, the evidence in this
case was not propensity evidence, but was probative of his motive
and intent to assault his victim; it provided necessary
background information on the nature of the relationship and
placed the charged conduct in context (see People v Resek, 3 NY3d
385, 389 [2004]; People v Till, 87 NY2d 835, 837 [1995]).  We
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it
allowed only the evidence of prior conduct relating to victim and
gave proper limiting instructions to the jury.
Furthermore, the fact that two justices ruled
differently on the admissibility of such evidence does not
suggest an abuse of discretion.  Both rulings are legitimate
exercises of discretion notwithstanding the fact that the first
trial resulted in acquittals and a hung jury when the subject
- 5 -
No. 17
- 5 -
evidence was precluded and the second trial resulted in
convictions when it was admitted.  The outcome of a trial has no
bearing on whether the court properly exercised its discretion in
admitting evidence.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Jones.  Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Read, Smith and Pigott concur.  Chief Judge Lippman took
no part.
Decided February 12, 2009