Case Title: Morrison v. Jennings

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Tammy MORRISON, Administratrix of the Estate
of Sandra Kay Finsel, Deceased v. Charles A.
JENNINGS, M.D., and Munir Zufari, M.D.

96-1453                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 28, 1997


1.   Judgment -- summary judgment discussed. -- Under ARCP Rule 56(c),
     summary judgment is to be rendered only in those instances
     where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories
     and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
     show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
     and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
     matter of law; the burden of sustaining a motion for summary
     judgment is the responsibility of the moving party; on appeal,
     the supreme court views all proof submitted in a light most
     favorable to the nonmoving party, with any doubts or
     inferences resolved against the moving party.

2.   Appeal & error -- decedent's minor granddaughter not party to suit --
     merits of argument based on her claim not reached. -- Where the
     decedent's minor granddaughter was not a party to the suit,
     the supreme court did not reach the merits of appellant's
     argument that her claim was not barred by the statute of
     limitations because the granddaughter's claim could not be
     barred until she reached the age of twenty-four years as
     provided in Ark. Code Ann.  16-56-116(a).


3.   Appeal & error -- failure to obtain ruling precludes appellate review. --
     Where appellant argued that the Medical Malpractice Act was
     special legislation in violation of Ark. Const. amend. 14, but
     it was evident from the abstract that appellant did not obtain
     a ruling from the trial court on the issue, the supreme court
     did not reach the merits of the claim; the failure to obtain
     a ruling on an issue at the trial court level, including a
     constitutional issue, precludes a review of the issue on
     appeal.

4.   Appeal & error -- issues raised for first time on appeal not addressed. -
     - Where appellant argued for the first time on appeal that
     application of the two-year medical malpractice statute of
     limitations to wrongful-death actions violated the open-court
     provision contained in Ark. Const. art. 2,  13, and where the
     abstract did not reflect that appellant obtained a ruling from
     the trial court on her argument that application of the two-
     year limitations to wrongful death actions violated notions of
     due process under the federal and state constitutions, the
     supreme court did not address the merits of the issues.

5.   Constitutional law -- standing -- constitutional rights are personal rights
     -- exception not applicable. -- The supreme court concluded that
     appellant lacked standing to raise her equal protection and
     due process argument because she was not a member of the class
     of persons she claimed would be deprived of due process and
     equal protection of the law, namely those persons with claims
     on behalf of persons who died as the result of a medical
     injury more than two years from the date of the injury; for a
     litigant to have standing to challenge the constitutionality
     of a law, it must be unconstitutional as applied to him; the
     general rule is that one must have suffered injury or belong
     to a class that is prejudiced in order to have standing to
     challenge the validity of a law; constitutional rights are
     personal rights and may not be raised by a third party,
     although there is a narrow exception for cases in which the
     issue would not otherwise be susceptible of judicial review
     and it appears that the third party is sufficiently interested
     in the outcome that the interest of the party whose
     constitutional rights were allegedly deprived would be
     adequately represented; that exception did not apply here, and
     appellant therefore lacked standing to raise the equal
     protection and due process argument.

6.   Appeal & error -- unsupported assignments of error will not be considered
     on appeal. -- Appellant's argument that the decedent was under
     appellee surgeon's continual treatment even after she had died
     was clearly not well grounded in law, and no authority was
     offered to support the contention; assignments of error that
     are unsupported by convincing argument or authority, will not
     be considered on appeal where it is not apparent without
     further research that they are well taken.

7.   Appeal & error -- no convincing authority or argument in support of
     allegation of fraudulent concealment. -- Appellant did not explain
     how appellee surgeon's reference to what appellee consulting
     physician concluded in findings concerning the decedent's
     suitability for surgery rose to the level of an attempt by
     appellee surgeon fraudulently to conceal his own alleged
     negligence; the supreme court declined to address the argument
     because appellant had cited no convincing authority or
     argument in support of her allegation of fraudulent
     concealment. 

8.   Limitation of actions -- two-year statute of limitations for medical injury
     applicable to alleged cause of decedent's death. -- Because the
     language of the Medical Malpractice Act provides that the act
     supersedes any inconsistent provision of law, the two-year
     statute of limitations set forth in the act applies to any
     claim of medical injury, regardless of whether the injured
     person ultimately died as a result; where, in the present
     case, the alleged cause of the decedent's death was a medical
     injury, the two-year statute of limitations provided in Ark.
     Code Ann.  16-114-203 was applicable.

9.   Limitation of actions -- appellant's wrongful-death claim against appellees
     barred by two-year statute of limitations -- dismissal of action with
     prejudice affirmed. -- The supreme court held that appellant's
     wrongful-death claim against both appellees was barred because
     it was not filed until more than two years after the latest
     dates upon which either appellee could have committed a
     negligent act upon the decedent; the supreme court affirmed
     the trial court's judgment dismissing appellant's cause of
     action with prejudice as to both appellees.


     Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court, Greenwood District; John
G. Holland, Judge; affirmed.
     Charles Karr and James R. Filyaw, for appellant.
     Warner, Smith & Harris, PLC, by: Douglas O. Smith, Jr., for
appellee Charles A. Jennings, M.D.
     Ledbetter, Hornberger, Cogbill, Arnold & Harrison, by: Charles
R. Ledbetter, R. Ray Fulmer II, and J. Michael Cogbill, for
appellee Munir Zufari, M.D.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant Tammy Morrison, Administratrix of the Estate of
Sandra Kay Finsel, appeals the order of the Sebastian County
Circuit Court, Greenwood District, granting summary judgment to
Appellees Dr. Charles A. Jennings and Dr. Munir Zufari and
dismissing with prejudice her wrongful-death action against them. 
Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(1), (15),
and (17) (as amended by per curiam July 15, 1996).  Appellant
raises five points for reversal.  We find no error and affirm.
                  Facts and Procedural History
     The following facts are provided in Appellant's initial
complaint filed on July 11, 1994.  On April 15 and 18, 1992,
Appellee Dr. Zufari saw the decedent in his clinic in Mansfield,
Arkansas, for pain in her back, pain and discomfort in her chest
which radiated to her back, shortness of breath, and numbness in
her arms.  The decedent was subsequently admitted to the Crawford
Memorial Hospital in Van Buren, Arkansas, on April 27, 1992, where
she underwent surgery on her gallbladder, a laparoscopic
cholecystectomy, performed by Dr. Zufari the following day.  On
April 29, 1992, the decedent was discharged from the hospital, but,
for unknown reasons, Dr. Zufari did not dictate his discharge
summary of the patient until August 30, 1992.  The decedent was
admitted to St. Edward Mercy Medical Center in Fort Smith,
Arkansas, by Dr. Zufari on May 2, 1992, and subsequently discharged
on May 8, 1992.  The decedent was later readmitted to St. Edward
Mercy Medical Center on May 12, 1992, where she remained until her
death on July 11, 1992.  
     Appellant alleged in her first complaint that during the
decedent's hospitalization at St. Edward Mercy Medical Center, it
was discovered that she had suffered at least two heart attacks
prior to and at the time of her gallbladder surgery by Dr. Zufari. 
Appellant alleged that Dr. Zufari was negligent in his care of the
decedent, thus, causing her wrongful death.  None of the above-
referenced dates contained in Appellant's complaints were disputed
by Dr. Zufari.
     An amended complaint was filed on August 26, 1994, naming
Appellee Dr. Jennings as a defendant.  Specifically, Appellant
alleged that the decedent was seen by Dr. Jennings on April 27,
1992, for consultation, and that Dr. Jennings had cleared her for
surgery.  Appellant alleged that Dr. Jennings was negligent in his
care of the decedent.  In his answer, Dr. Jennings admitted that he
did see the decedent on that date and that he issued a consultation
report.  None of the relevant dates in the amended complaint were
disputed by Dr. Jennings.
     On March 7, 1996, Appellees moved separately for summary
judgment on the ground that Appellant's claim was barred by the
two-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice
actions as provided in Ark. Code Ann.  16-114-203 (Cum. Supp.
1991).  
     In her response, Appellant argued that summary judgment was
not appropriate for several reasons, including the following:  (1)
The claims of the decedent and Ashley Finsel, the decedent's minor
heir, were preserved by the general savings clause; (2) the Medical
Malpractice Act is special legislation in violation of Amendment 14
of the Arkansas Constitution; (3) the statute of limitations for
medical malpractice claims as applied in wrongful-death actions
denies equal protection of the law in violation of both the
Arkansas and United States Constitutions; (4) the statute of
limitations did not begin to run against Dr. Zufari until he
dictated his discharge summary on August 30, 1992; and (5) this
court's opinion in Hertlein v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 323
Ark. 283, 914 S.W.2d 303 (1996), should not be followed or should,
in the alternative, be overruled.     
     On March 28, 1996, after both motions for summary judgment, as
well as Appellant's response thereto, had been filed, Appellant
filed a second amended complaint, this time alleging that
Dr. Zufari had fraudulently concealed his negligence.  The
Appellant alleged that by not dictating his discharge summary until
after the decedent's death, and by including in that summary a
statement referencing Dr. Jennings's report, which Dr. Zufari
allegedly knew to be false, Dr. Zufari had fraudulently concealed
his negligence.  Appellant alleged that because Dr. Zufari knew
that the statement by Dr. Jennings was false, its inclusion in his
report constituted fraudulent concealment of his own negligence in
the care and treatment of the decedent.
     In an order filed August 19, 1996, the trial court granted
summary judgment to both Appellees on the bases that there were no
genuine issues of material fact left to be resolved and that
Appellant's cause of action was barred by the statute of
limitations.  The trial court's order reflected that the cause of
action was dismissed with prejudice.  This appeal followed.
                       Standard of Review
     Summary judgment is to be rendered only in those instances
where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  ARCP
Rule 56(c); Pastchol v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 326 Ark.
140, 929 S.W.2d 713 (1996).  The burden of sustaining a motion for
summary judgment is the responsibility of the moving party.
Pastchol, 326 Ark. 140, 929 S.W.2d 713.  On appeal, we view all
proof submitted in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
with any doubts or inferences resolved against the moving party. 
Id.
                      Ashley Finsel's Claim
     Appellant contends that her claim was not barred by the
statute of limitations because Ashley Finsel's claim could not be
barred until she reached the age of twenty-four years as provided
in Ark. Code Ann.  16-56-116(a) (1987).  Ashley, who was eight
years old at the time of the decedent's death, is the decedent's
minor granddaughter of whom the decedent was legal guardian up to
the time of her death, when Appellant was appointed as Ashley's
guardian.  Appellant does not contend that the suit instituted
below was filed by her in her capacity as legal guardian of Ashley. 
Rather, it is evident from the pleadings that Appellant brought
this suit in her capacity as administratrix of the decedent's
estate.  Thus, because Ashley is not a party to the suit, we do not
reach the merits of this argument.  See ARCP Rule 17(b); Williams
v. State, 320 Ark. 67,