Case Title: Adam v. State

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 54

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
427 Nev. Advance Opinion S4t
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

RAMON DINKHA ADAM, | No. 54121

Agee FILED

‘THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.

 

verdict, of trafficking in a controlled substance. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Douglas W. Herndon, Judge.

Affirmed,
Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Jason B. Trauth and Audrey M.

Conway, Deputy Public Defenders, Clark County,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger,
District Attorney, Nancy A. Becker and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy
District Attorneys, and Sonia V. Jimenez, Deputy District Attorney, Clark
County,

for Respondent.

BEFORE SAITTA, C.J., HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.

At his trial for trafficking in a controlled substance, appellant
Ramon Dinkha Adam sought a jury instruction on the procuring agent
defense, which generally provides that if a defendant is an agent of the

1-898

 
ore

purchaser, then the defendant should only be held as culpable as the
purchaser. ‘The district court rejected the instruction, even though there

 

some evidence, and Nevada caselaw, that supported giving the
instruction. In this appeal, we revisit that prior precedent holding that
the procuring agent defense is applicable to a charge of trafficking in a
controlled substance, After reviewing the trafficking statute and our prior
caselaw, and looking at other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue,
however, we conclude that the procuring agent defense is inapplicable to
trafficking charges, regardless of the theory the defendant is charged
under, ie, sale, manufacture, delivery, or actual or constructive
possession. NRS 453.3385. We therefore affirm Ada:

 

's conviction, and
overrule prior precedent that is inconsistent with this opinion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A confidential informant told Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Detective Mike Wilson that Adam had the ability to procure drugs. The
informant then introduced Detective Wilson, undercover at the time, to
Adam, who thereafter became the target of further undercover police
investigation. Detective Wilson stayed in contact with Adam over the
course of four months and the two built a friendship. At some point
during the four-month investigation, Detective Wilson claimed that Adam
told him he had “connects’ to purchase illegal drugs. According to
Detective Wilson, some time after Adam made that comment, Detective
Wilson asked Adam if he could procure methamphetamine. Adam agreed
to help Detective Wilson.

 
Adam arranged to meet the suppliers at a tattoo shop in Las
Vegas. He and Detective Wilson waited for them in the tattoo shop but
eventually exited the shop and waited in Adam's car. When the suppliers
arrived, one of them approached Adam's car where Adam was sitting in
the driver's seat and Detective Wilson was in the passenger seat. The
man handed Adam what appeared to be methamphetamine through the
driver's window, which Adam placed on a scale he already had in his car,
After weighing the methamphetamine, Adam informed the man that the
weight was not correct. ‘The man went back to his truck and returned
with more methamphetamine, which Adam added to the scale and said

the amount was now correct at 15 grams, Detective Wilson previously

 

gave Adam $500 for the methamphetamine, and he observed Adam hand
the money to the supplier. Adam then handed the methamphetamine to
Detective Wilson.

Adam was charged with trafficking in a controlled substance
in violation of NRS 453.3385 for knowingly or intentionally having actual
or constructive possession of 12.64 grams of methamphetamine. At the
close of evidence, Adam requested that the district court instruct the jury
on the procuring agent defense. The district court denied Adam's request,
indicating that Adam’s request was untimely and Adam had not presented

1Adam's first attempt to help Detective Wilson was unsuccessful
He met with his suppliers outside of the tattoo shop, but he allegedly told
the suppliers that the methamphetamine was of poor quality and to return
with a higher quality product.

“Initially, Adam was also charged with and found guilty of transport
of a controlled substance in violation of NRS 453.321, but the charge was
later dismissed and is not at issue in this appeal.

 
om

any evidence to support the instruction and finding that Adam did not act
as a procuring agent because he initiated the sale when he mentioned that
he had “connects” to get drugs. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found
Adam guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance, and he was sentenced
to. maximum of 48 months in prison,
DISCUSSION
Adam asserts that the district court erred when it refused to

 

instruct the jury on the procuring agent defense. The State argues that
the district court properly declined to give the instruction and urges this
court to revisit prior decisions applying the procuring agent defense to a
charge of trafficking based on possession® because they are inconsistent
with the purpose of the procuring agent defense. After reviewing our
previous caselaw, the trafficking statutes, and the purpose of the
procuring agent defense, we agree with the State.
Neva in

In 1971, this court recognized the procuring agent defense,
which was first announced in United States v. Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169 (34
Cir. 1954). See Roy v. State, 87 Nev. 517, 489 P.2d 1158 (1971). Under
this defense, if the jury finds that the defendant was only acting on behalf
of a buyer when procuring drugs, then the defendant could not be
convicted of selling drugs. Sawyer, 210 F.2d at 170; Roy, 87 Nev. at 519,
489 P.2d at 1159. In Buckley v. State, 95 Nev. 602, 604, 600 P.2d 227, 228,

8Under NRS 463.3885, a person can be guilty of trafficking in five
distinct ways: (1) selling, (2) manufacturing, or (3) delivering a controlled
substance, (4) bringing a controlled substance into this state, or (5)
knowingly or intentionally being in actual or constructive possession of a
controlled substance,

 

 
 

(1979), we held that the procuring agent defense is not applicable when
the defendant is charged with the crime of possession.*

Several years after the trafficking statutes were adopted, this
court considered the procuring agent defonse’s applicability to charges of
trafficking based on possession and held that “[e]ven when possession for
sale is not specifically alleged, the [procuring agent] instruction may be
required where possession was clearly incidental to a contemplated sales
transaction initiated by an informant.” Hillis v, State, 103 Nev. 531, 535,
746 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1987). We have since relied on Hillis for the general
proposition that “the procuring agent defense is applicable to a trafficking
case where the State charges trafficking on a theory of possession, but the
facts reveal a sale was contemplated.” Love v, State, 111 Nev. 545, 548-
49, 898 P.2d 376, 378 (1995).

Overturning Nevada precedent

“[U}nder the doctrine of stare decisis, [this court} will not
overturn [precedent] absent compelling reasons for so doing. Mere
disagreement does not suffice.” Secretary of State v, Burk, 124 Nev. 579,
597, 188 P.3d 1112, 1124 (2008) (footnotes omitted). Those compelling
reasons must be “weighty and conclusive.” Id. (quoting Kapp -v. Kapp, 31
Nev. 70, 73, 99 P. 1077, 1078 (1909)). However, “[t]he doctrine of stare
decisis must not be so narrowly pursued that the...law is forever

‘The defendant in Buckley was convicted of possession of a
controlled substance pursuant to NRS 453.336. 95 Nev. 602, 603, 600 P.2d
227, 228 (1979). The trafficking statutes were not adopted until 1983. See
1983 Nev. Stat., ch. 111, §§ 2-4, at 287-88.

 
as

encased in a straight jacket.” Rupert v, Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 400, 528
P.2d 1013, 1015 (1974).

The weighty and conclusive reason the State offers for
tially, that the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act, which Nevada based its trafficking statutes on,

overturning our prior precedent is, es

 

 

designed to make all actors in the illicit drug deal equally culpable
when a trafficking quantity of a controlled substance is involved, The
State goes on to argue that that purpose would be defeated if this court

allowed the use of the procuring agent defense to defend against a charge

 

of trafficking, We agree.

‘The principle behind the procuring agent defense is that a
person who acts solely as a procuring agent for the purchaser of drugs is a
principal to the purchase, not the sale, and thus, should be held liable only
to the same extent as the purchaser. Because the purchaser cannot be
held liable for selling the drugs, neither can the purchaser's agent. 25 Am.
Jur. 2d Drugs and Controlled Substances § 185 (2004). The purchaser
typically is liable for possession of the drugs and, therefore, that is the
extent of his procuring agent's liability as well—which explains why this
court summarily held in Buckley that the procuring agent defense docs
not apply to the crime of possession.

“The case cited as support in Buckley provides a more detailed
explanation focusing on the fact that the procuring agent defense
“{clonceptually ...does not fit within the ambit of mere possession, as
distinguished from possession with intent to sell, since the former contains
no element pertaining to or any exception in respect to an agent or person
possessing on behalf of another.” People v, Sierra, 379 N.E.2d 196, 199
(N.Y. 1978), cited in Buckley, 95 Nev. at 604, 600 P.2d at 228.

 

 
‘The same point is implicit in the seminal procuring agent case,
wherein the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded its discussion
recognizing the defense with the observation that “[tJhe government
having elected to charge the defendant with the crime of sale rather than
illegal possession, the jury should have been alerted to the legal
limitations of the sale concept in relation to the circumstances of this
case.” Sawyer, 210 F.2d at 170 (emphasis added); accord People v. Hall,
622 P.2d 571, 672-73 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980) (explaining that procuring
‘ential element of the

agent defense negates an Jes offense—the sale

 

itself{—and therefore the defense is not applicable in a prosecution for
mere possession); State v. Osburn, 505 P.2d 742, 746 (Kan. 1973) (“Where

possession of a substance, such as a narcotic, is unlawful a procuring

 

agent for a purchaser may be convicted of unlawful possession
thereof...."), Thus, while the procuring agent defense protects the
purchaser's agent from a conviction for a charge that involves the sale of a
controlled substance, it does not protect the purchaser's agent from a
conviction for a charge of possession of the controlled substance.

Although this court implicitly recognized this conceptual
limitation on the procuring agent defense with the holding in Buckley, 95
Nev. at 604, 600 P.2d at 228, that “the agency defense is inapplicable to
the crime of possession,” no mention was made of that limitation or
Buckley when this court first considered whether the procuring agent
defense applies to a charge of trafficking in a controlled substance in
Hillis. The Hillis court held that the procuring agent defense is applicable
to a trafficking charge that is based on a theory of possession if the facts
reveal that the “possession was clearly incidental to contemplated sales
transaction.” 103 Nev. at 535, 746 P.2d at 1095. The court in Hillis

 
asserted that the “principle enunciated in Roy[, 87 Nev. 517, 489 P.2d
1158,] logically extends to the chargo of possession for the purpose of sale.”
Id, That logical extension makes sense: the procuring agent defense
applies to a charge of possession for the purpose of sale because the
defense negates an element of the offense—the intent to sell the controlled
substance, see NRS 453.337—the same as it negates the sales element in
a charge of selling a controlled substance. But that logical extension does
not explain the Hillis court’s next conclusion: “Even when possession for
sale is not specifically alleged, the instruction may be required where
possession was clearly incidental to a contemplated sales transaction
initiated by an informant.” 103 Nev. at 635, 746 P.2d at 1095, That
conclusion was not supported by any authority. More importantly, the
Hillis court's ultimate conclusion suffers from at least two fatal flaws.

‘The first flaw in Hillis’ conclusion is that it does not comport
with the principle behind the defense: that the purchaser's agent should
be held liable only to the same extent as the purchaser. Although the
purchaser clearly is liable for a charge of trafficking based on actual or
constructive possession of a trafficking quantity of a controlled substance,
Hillis would absolve the purchaser's agent of that same liability. This is
in direct conflict with the trafficking statutes, which make everyone who
has any part in the transaction—from the person who manufactured the
drugs to the end purchaser and everyone in between—guilty of the same
offense (trafficking) and subject to the same potential penalty when a
trafficking quantity of a controlled substance is involved. See, e.g., NRS
453.3385. In contrast, when a trafficking quantity is not involved, the sale
offenses typically carry harsher penalties than the possession offense.

Compare NRS 453.336 (providing that first and second offense of simple

 

 
possession is category E felony), with NRS 453.321 (providing that sale of
controlled substance is category B felony), and NRS 453.838 (providing
that first and second offense of possession for the purpose of sale is
category D felony). It therefore makes a difference in that context
whether the defendant is charged with a sales offense or simple
possession. As a result, the procuring agent defense has a place when the
transaction involves a nontrafficking amount—it ensures that the

purchaser's agent has only the same liability

 

the purchaser rather than
the greater liability imposed on the seller, But because the trafficking
statutes do away with any distinction between seller and buyer for all
practical purposes, the statutes already achieve the result that would
otherwise be achieved by the procuring agent defense, and, thus, there is
no place for the defense when the charge is trafficking.

‘The second flaw in Hillis’ conclusion is that it disregards how
the procuring agent defense works as a defense. The procuring agent
defense works as a defense to a charge of selling a controlled substance
because it negates an element of the offense—the sale. When the charge
is simple possession, see NRS 453.336, or trafficking based on possession,
see NRS 453.3385-.3395, the defense does not negate an element of the
offense, and therefore it does not work as a defense to those charges, The
court seemingly recognized this problem in Love v, State, 111 Nev. 545,
893 P.2d 376 (1995), in the context of deciding who has the burden of proof
regarding the procuring agent defense. There, the court rejected the
State's argument that the instructions adequately informed the jury
regarding the State's burden of proof on the procuring agent defense
because the instructions gave the impression that the elements of

trafficking and the procuring agent defense were two separate issues:

 
90 Be

“This is a result of the State having charged Love with trafficking based

purely on possession: the procuring agent defense does not negate any
element of the trafficking offense on which the jury was instructed.” Id. at

550, 893 P.2d at 379 (emphasis added). Despite that observation, the Love
court did not question the idea that the State had the burden of proof on
the defense, which is only the case if the defense negates an clement of the
offense. Soo id, at 549-51, 893 P.2d at 378-79. Love thus is internally
inconsistent—it indicates that the State had the burden of proof on the
procuring agent defense because the defense negates an element of the
charged offense, but because the State charged the defendant with
trafficking based solely on possession, there was no element of the offense
for the procuring agent defense to negate.

Based on the above, we overrule our prior cases insofar as they
have allowed a defendant to use the procuring agent defense to defend
against a charge of trafficking in a controlled substance based on a
possession theory. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reasons, when it refused to
instruct the jury on the procuring agent defense, sce Wyatt v, State, 86

 

10

 
Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970), and we affirm the judgment of

dite

Hardesty

We concur:

 

Cul
Sajtta

Parraguirre

Adam also argues that cumulative error warrants reversal and that
the district court erred by (1) denying his motion to discover the identity of
the confidential informant, (2) allowing a police detective that filmed the
drug transaction to narrate that film during trial, (8) refusing to allow
Adam to argue in closing argument that the drug suppliers were the
confidential informants, and (4) failing to instruct the jury on lesser
included offenses. We conclude that these arguments are without merit
and require no further discussion. Adam's final argument is that thero is
not sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict, but after reviewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that
there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict. See Origel-Candido v.
State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1998).