Case Title: State v. Castagnola

Citation: 2015-Ohio-1565

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Castagnola, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-1565.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-1565 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CASTAGNOLA, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Castagnola, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-1565.] 
Search-warrant affiant’s undisclosed evidentiary inference stated as an empirical 
fact usurped the inference-drawing authority of the magistrate who issued 
the warrant in reliance on the affidavit—The particularity requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment applies to the search of a computer and requires a 
search warrant to particularly describe the items believed to be contained 
on the computer with as much specificity as the affiant’s knowledge and 
the circumstances of the case allow and that the search be conducted in a 
manner that restricts the search for the items identified. 
(No. 2013-0781—Submitted May 28, 2014—Decided April 28, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County,  
Nos. 26185 and 26186, 2013-Ohio-1215. 
______________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from the Ninth District Court of 
Appeals, we consider whether a search-warrant affiant’s undisclosed evidentiary 
inference stated as an empirical fact usurped the inference-drawing authority of 
the magistrate who issued the warrant in reliance on the affidavit.  We also 
consider the application of the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
to the search of a computer.  For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the 
search warrant at issue in this case was invalid and that the evidence obtained in 
executing the warrant must be suppressed.  We therefore reverse the judgment of 
the appellate court. 
I. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} David Maistros is the law director and prosecutor for the city of 
Twinsburg, in Summit County.  In April 2010, Maistros charged appellant, 
Nicholas Castagnola, with selling alcohol to minors, a first-degree misdemeanor.  
Two months later, on June 15, 2010, Maistros discovered that his family vehicles 
had been damaged and egged. 
{¶ 3} On June 27, a police source known as Source May, showed 
Twinsburg patrolman Alan Ternosky a series of text messages that he had 
received from Castagnola bragging about having damaged Maistros’s vehicles.  
After reviewing those messages, Ternosky had Source May wear a concealed 
recording device and record a conversation with Castagnola at Castagnola’s 
home.  In the recorded conversation, Castagnola admitted that he and Zach 
Downer had damaged and egged Maistros’s vehicles.  He added that he had had 
to “look up” Maistros’s address on court records. 
{¶ 4} Armed with the text messages and recording, Twinsburg detective 
Mark Kreiger sought an arrest warrant for Castagnola and a warrant to search his 
residence.  The detective began the search-warrant affidavit by describing his 
training and experience in law enforcement and in narcotics investigations.  The 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
3
affidavit then identifies Castagnola’s residence and requests that a search warrant 
be issued for the premises and persons and vehicles on the property for 
 
[r]ecords and documents either stored on computers, 
ledgers, or any other electronic recording device to include hard 
drives and external portable hard drives, cell phones, printers, 
storage devices of any kind, printed out copies of text messages or 
emails, cameras, video recorders or any photo imaging devices and 
their storage media to include tapes, compact discs, or flash drives. 
 
{¶ 5} The affidavit states that any items found would be seized and used 
as evidence in prosecuting the crimes of retaliation, criminal trespassing, criminal 
damaging, and possession of criminal tools.  In the section titled “This 
Knowledge Is Based on the Following Facts,” the affidavit sets forth the facts that 
led the detective to believe that evidence of the crimes charged would be found in 
the items sought to be seized. 
{¶ 6} The affidavit states that approximately 25 incidents of criminal 
mischief had occurred within the prior two months involving intentional damage 
to vehicles in Twinsburg and Reminderville.  Thereafter, the affidavit quotes the 
following text messages that Source May received from Castagnola on June 24 
and June 25: 
 
Found this address and went to his house and did more than 
chief[1] it but keep that down ok. 
It was funny he lives in Chagrin Falls and his law office is 
there too and I can’t tell you in text but in person. 
Where are you I did some damage. 
                                                          
 
1   Twinsburg patrolman Alan Ternosky testified that “chiefing” is another name for “egging.”   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
Well we should chief Twinsburg Police. 
What do you think my teaching the prosecutor a lesson 
LOL. 
How many David Maistros’ could there be who are 
attorneys. 
LOL as for his car objects are no longer closer than they 
appear lol. 
HAHAHA well he should not mess with me the bastard I 
hate him so are you and Austin coming to my trial on the 14th? 
Ok well it will be fun whether I win or lose. 
 
{¶ 7} The affidavit states that on June 28, Source May agreed to go to 
Castagnola’s home while wearing a concealed recording device.  It states that 
during the recorded conversation with Source May, Castagnola admitted that he 
and Downer had damaged Maistros’s cars and a Reminderville police car. 
{¶ 8} In lieu of attaching the recording of the conversation or a transcript 
of the recording to his search-warrant affidavit, the detective paraphrased the 
exchange between Source May and Castagnola as follows:  
 
[Castagnola] states that that’s some funny shit though isn’t it?  Go 
to his house and knock off his shit.  He was so pissed off today in 
court. * * * Castagnola then says that he found Maistros online in 
the clerk of courts because he [Maistros] got a parking ticket several 
years ago.  Castagnola said that he * * * went through Maistros’s 
mailbox to confirm that Maistros did live at the address he found 
for him online. 
 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
5
{¶ 9} The detective did not state in the search-warrant affidavit the 
Internet-access capability or other capabilities of Castagnola’s cell phone.  Nor 
did the search-warrant affidavit provide information, beyond the “online” 
inference, to indicate that Castagnola had conducted an online search for 
Maistros’s address or that a computer that was used to conduct such a search was 
located in Castagnola’s residence. 
{¶ 10} After reviewing the search-warrant affidavit, a judge of the Stow 
Municipal Court issued the search warrant.  The warrant repeated the affidavit’s 
description of the items to be searched for and the affidavit’s statement that if the 
items were found, they would be seized and used as evidence in prosecuting the 
alleged crimes. 
{¶ 11} The execution of the search warrant led to the seizure of numerous 
items, including two computers, one of which had not been used in two years. 
{¶ 12} Natasha Branam, a forensic cyber-crimes analyst at the Ohio 
Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (“BCI”), examined 
Castagnola’s computers.  She later testified that Castagnola’s computer “was 
brought in for [a case involving] menacing, threatening, and intimidation.”  
Initially she reviewed the case synopsis and the search warrant, which said that 
Castagnola had obtained Maistros’s address online.  Branam performed her 
analysis by making a copy of the hard drive of the recently used computer.  She 
then used a forensic software program, which “go[es] through documents, images, 
videos” on the hard drive.  She testified that initially, she was “looking for any 
evidence of intimidation of David Maistros * * * and anything associated with 
that.”  She searched for the name “David Maistros” using her software program, 
without result.  However, Branam testified that she later found data on David 
Maistros in the computer’s “unallocated space,” which is “the space where 
deleted data goes.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
{¶ 13} Branam then “went to the images to find images associated with 
court websites.”  She explained that the “My Image” tab “has all the images 
associated with the drive being examined.  It includes regular pictures saved to the 
computer, website pictures, icons, any pictures that would be in a document.”  
Under this tab, Branam could see virtual images not only of court websites but of 
all the websites that had been visited using that computer and all the pictures 
saved on the computer.  As soon as she clicked on the “My Image” tab, the screen 
filled with images that she thought might be child pornography.  She stopped her 
investigation and sought another warrant. 
{¶ 14} A Twinsburg police detective obtained a second warrant to search 
the contents of the computers for evidence relating to child pornography.  The 
evidence from the search resulted in Castagnola’s indictment in September 2010 
for ten counts of pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor, fourth-
degree-felony offenses. 
{¶ 15} BCI reported its findings on November 4, 2010.  The report says, 
“The two (2) HTML documents that were recovered from unallocated space show 
information about David Maistros’ parking violation that occurred on 9/16/2002; 
the contents of these documents match the text available upon the Stow Municipal 
Court website.” 
{¶ 16} Regarding the pandering charges, the report discloses that the 
search based on the second search warrant revealed over a thousand videos and 
images of suspected child pornography.  In December 2010, Castagnola filed a 
motion to suppress, arguing that the first search warrant was not supported by 
probable cause, because nothing on which the affidavit was based suggested that 
there was a computer in Castagnola’s home, let alone that a computer in his home 
concealed evidence of a crime.  Moreover, at the hearing on the motion, he 
asserted that he had never used the term “online” in his conversation with Source 
May and thus the detective’s use of the term in the affidavit was an unwarranted 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
7
inference drawn by the detective, and only the neutral magistrate is allowed to 
draw inferences.  Therefore, Castagnola argued, the officers’ reliance on the first 
warrant was unreasonable.  Since the first search warrant led to the second search 
warrant, Castagnola reasoned, all evidence resulting from both warrants must be 
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
{¶ 17} At the suppression hearing, the detective testified that a search-
warrant affidavit has two parts: the first part tells the court what the police are 
looking for, and the second part, titled “This Knowledge Is Based on the 
Following Facts,” tells the court the facts that the police believe provide probable 
cause for the search. 
{¶ 18} When asked what specific facts in the affidavit provided probable 
cause for seizing and searching Castagnola’s computers, the detective referred to 
the following statement in the affidavit: “Castagnola [said] he found Maistros 
online in the clerk of courts because he got a parking ticket several years ago.”  
The source of that information, according to the detective, was the recorded 
conversation between Castagnola and Source May. 
{¶ 19} Thereafter, he was asked about the capability of a smart phone to 
search online.  At first, he said he was uncertain of a smart phone’s capability to 
conduct an online search.  Then he admitted that he had used the Internet and that 
he had a smart phone but said that he had never used his smart phone to search the 
Internet.  After acknowledging that a smart phone can access the Internet, he 
acknowledged that “theoretically,” a smart phone could access online court 
records. 
{¶ 20} Immediately after that exchange, the defense attorney told the 
detective that Castagnola had never said the word “online” during the recorded 
conversation.  In response to that revelation, the detective said, “Well, I thought 
he did.  I thought he did mention the word ‘online.’ * * * I could have sworn he 
did, yes.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
{¶ 21} Counsel then asked him whether his sole basis for believing that a 
computer in Castagnola’s home contained evidence of the alleged crimes was his 
using the term “online” during the conversation with Source May.  After 
reviewing his report, the detective said: 
 
 
Well, the other thing that kind of led me to believe that he 
searched for him using the computer were statements that he had 
texted my source stating, “How many David Maistroses could 
there be who are attorneys,” and — well, that was the one which 
is — which kind of made me believe that he had done searches 
for David Maistros in an online capacity. 
 
{¶ 22} When asked whether someone could use the white pages to find 
such information, the detective stated, “Well, that’s one way of doing it.  But in 
today’s day and age, everybody goes to a computer.” 
{¶ 23} The detective was then asked to describe how he believed 
Castagnola would have looked for Maistros’s address using a computer.  He 
replied that Castagnola could have run a Google search of the name David 
Maistros or could have searched the online version of the white pages or a clerk 
of courts’ website.  When asked where on the computer such search information 
would be found, the detective indicated that from his “experience with other cases 
involving BCI and their analyzation of computers,* * * [he knew that a search] 
creates * * * a cookie, which will tell you where they have been, what searches 
they have done, things of that nature.”  And the detective explained that in a 
recent case he had worked on, such information was found on a computer a year 
after the Internet search had been conducted. 
{¶ 24} The court then began questioning the detective and drew his 
attention back to the affidavit and the section titled “This Knowledge Is Based on 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
9
the Following Facts.”  The court then began quoting from the affidavit, “Found 
this address and went to his house and did more than chief—,” at which point the 
detective cut the court off and stated, “That was the other — that was the other 
line I was looking for when I — when I had mentioned: How many David 
Maistroses could be there — could there be who are attorneys?”  
{¶ 25} Regardless of whether Castagnola had used the term “online” in his 
recorded conversation with Source May, the detective explained, he was still 
convinced that Castagnola had searched for Maistros’s address on a computer.  
Thereafter, the following exchange occurred between the prosecutor and the 
detective: 
 
Q.  Everything that you were asking to search at that point in 
time, did you personally when you swore this affidavit believe that 
those items were reasonably expected to be there? 
A.  Yes.  And only because Mr. Castagnola was sending 
numerous things via text which implicated himself in this crime to a 
guy that, in my opinion, he barely knew.  So I assumed that — at 
that point, if he is just that blatant in sending these texts out and 
talking about it, that there is probably other items in the house that 
would be of evidentiary value. 
 
{¶ 26} The trial court listened to the recording.  In overruling the motion 
to suppress, the judge held that the search-warrant affidavit’s two references to 
Castagnola’s “online” efforts to locate Maistros’s address had provided the 
issuing judge with a “substantial basis” for determining that probable cause 
existed to seize and search computers from Castagnola’s home.  Affording great 
deference to the issuing judge’s determination, the trial court held: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10
In this age of “online” activities, particularly among people under 
the age of 40, such a standard [requiring that a search-warrant 
affidavit recite specific facts concerning the use of a computer in 
the commission of a crime or in storing incriminating information] 
would require the issuing judge to ignore the totality of the 
circumstances rather than to take them into consideration.  This is 
particularly so where, as here, the affidavit was replete with 
references to text messaging and at least two references to online 
research. The issuing court certainly could have drawn “reasonable 
inferences amounting to a fair probability” [State v. George, 45 
Ohio St.3d 325, 330, 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989)] that cell phone data 
and messages are commonly backed up and/or synchronized to 
computer files.  If nothing else * * * the content of the text 
messages received by the informant from Castagnola created a 
suspicion of criminal activity engaged in through the use of modern 
technology and provided the court a substantial basis for concluding 
that there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime would be found in the computers that were seized. 
Moreover, defense counsel’s concession * * * that the 
information in the affidavit would have justified the issuance of a 
search warrant authorizing the seizure of a cell phone that had 
Internet browser functionality * * * is utterly inconsistent with their 
position on this motion.  * * * If the affidavit was sufficient to 
support a probable cause conclusion concerning the potential that a 
cell phone was used to conduct the Internet research, it certainly 
does so for a computer. 
 
(Footnote deleted.) 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
11
{¶ 27} While agreeing with Castagnola that the word “online” was not 
used in the recorded conversation, the trial court found “[the detective’s] 
paraphrase to be a fair characterization of the substance of the conversation and 
his explanation to be sufficient to demonstrate that there was no effort to mislead 
the judge.”  He concluded that the detective had acted with “objective good faith,” 
and so excluding the evidence would have no deterrent effect on police 
misconduct. 
{¶ 28} The retaliation case went to trial in May 2011, and Castagnola was 
found guilty on all six counts: retaliation (two counts), third-degree felonies; 
criminal damaging, a second-degree misdemeanor; vandalism, a fifth-degree 
felony; criminal trespass, a fourth-degree misdemeanor; and possessing criminal 
tools, a fifth-degree felony.  After a bench trial on the pandering charges, fourth-
degree felonies, the judge found Castagnola guilty of the ten charges. 
{¶ 29} The judge sentenced Castagnola on both matters on October 18, 
2011.  Castagnola received a total of 30 months in prison and was classified as a 
Tier II sex offender. 
{¶ 30} On appeal, Castagnola asserted that the trial court had erred in 
denying his motion to suppress the information found on his computer.  
Castagnola argued that the affidavit did not provide a substantial basis for 
concluding that evidence of criminal activity would be found there.  In a two-to-
one decision, the court of appeals held that a search warrant can be secured for a 
device with Internet capabilities “once [police] have probable cause to establish 
that an online search has occurred in connection with unlawful activities.”  9th 
Dist. Summit Nos. 26185 and 26186, 2013-Ohio-1215, ¶ 14.  It determined that 
the detective had reasonably surmised that Castagnola’s investigation into 
Maistros’s address had taken place online.  It concluded that the warrant itself 
appeared to be based on probable cause and that the detective had not provided a 
false affidavit or recklessly disregarded the truth.  One judge dissented, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12
concluding that the “State’s invasion into the Castagnola family home and seizure 
of all the computers was not supported by probable cause that ‘evidence of a 
crime’ would be found.”  Id. at ¶ 36 (Carr, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 31} We accepted jurisdiction of Castagnola’s appeal, in which he 
asserts the following two propositions of law:   
 
1.  In determining whether an affidavit is sufficient to 
establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the 
inquiry is limited to the four corners of the affidavit, or testimony 
taken by the magistrate under oath, and cannot be based on 
inferences drawn by the affiant unless those inferences were fairly 
communicated to the issuing magistrate. 
2.  A general exploratory search for evidence on a computer 
does not meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.  An affidavit and search warrant authorizing the 
seizure and search of a computer must describe with particularity 
the type of items to be sought, supported by probable cause to 
believe that those items will be found on the computer. 
 
 II. Standard of Review 
{¶ 32} The review of a motion to suppress is a mixed question of law and 
fact.  State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71.  
The very nature of the questions presented requires a case-by-case fact-driven 
analysis. State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St.3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6426, 920 N.E.2d 949,  
¶ 14.  Moreover, when a reviewing court determines that a warrant should not 
have been issued, it must then determine whether the good-faith exception 
applies, and that question is a question of law, subject to de novo review by the 
appellate court.  United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 606 (10th Cir.1988). 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
13
III. Legal Analysis 
{¶ 33} “The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the 
police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free 
society.”  Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 
(1949), overruled on other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 
L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).  The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
  
{¶ 34} Central to the Fourth Amendment is the probable-cause 
requirement.  While a probable-cause determination for an arrest warrant is 
similar in nature to that for a search warrant, a search-warrant inquiry is much 
more complex and presents special considerations.  2 LaFave, Search and Seizure, 
Section 3.1(b)  (5th Ed.2012).  Special considerations to be taken into account 
when determining whether to issue a search warrant include how stale the 
information relied upon is, when the facts relied upon occurred, and whether there 
is a nexus between the alleged crime, the objects to be seized, and the place to be 
searched.  Id., Section 3.7(a), (b), and (d). 
{¶ 35} For a search warrant to issue, the evidence must be sufficient for 
the magistrate to conclude that there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime 
will be found in a particular place.  The reviewing court then must ensure that the 
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.  
State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 329, 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989), citing Illinois v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), quoting 
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). 
{¶ 36} Castagnola challenges the validity of the search warrant on two 
bases.  First, Castagnola argues that the search-warrant affidavit lacked probable 
cause because it set forth as an empirical fact an undisclosed inference drawn by 
the detective thereby usurping the inference-drawing authority of the magistrate.  
Second, Castagnola argues that the search warrant violated the Fourth 
Amendment requirement of particularity thereby rendering invalid the search of 
the computer. 
A.  First proposition of law: Inference 
{¶ 37} Under his first proposition of law, Castagnola argues that the 
detective, by drawing the inference that Castagnola had looked for Maistros’s 
address online, usurped the inference-drawing authority of the magistrate. 
{¶ 38} A search warrant 
 
shall issue on either an affidavit or affidavits sworn to before a 
judge of a court of record or an affidavit or affidavits communicated 
to the judge by reliable electronic means establishing the grounds 
for issuing the warrant.  * * *  [T]he affidavit shall name or describe 
the person to be searched or particularly describe the place to be 
searched, name or describe the property to be searched for and 
seized, state substantially the offense in relation thereto, and state 
the factual basis for the affiant’s belief that such property is there 
located. 
 
Crim.R. 41(C)(1). 
{¶ 39} When oral testimony is not offered in support of a search-warrant 
affidavit, the magistrate determines the sufficiency by “evaluating only [the facts 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
15
alleged within] the four corners of the affidavit and [applying] an objective 
reasonableness standard.”  United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 559 (6th 
Cir.2011), fn. 11 (Moore, J., concurring in judgment only), citing United States v. 
Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1378 (6th Cir.1996).  On appeal, “ ‘the reviewing court is 
concerned exclusively with the statements contained within the affidavit itself.’ ”  
Id., quoting Weaver at 1378.  Courts have held that affiants may make reasonable 
inferences within search-warrant affidavits. 
{¶ 40} Courts have recognized that affidavits that include a factual 
narrative will inevitably include a number of inferences drawn by the affiant.  
People v. Caffott, 105 Cal.App.3d 775, 782, 164 Cal.Rptr. 499 (1980).  However, 
“the magistrate must be afforded the opportunity to test any significant inference 
drawn by the affiant.”  People v. Smith, 180 Cal.App.3d 72, 87, 225 Cal.Rptr. 348 
(1986).  The facts upon which those inferences are based must be disclosed to 
permit a magistrate’s independent review.  State v. Bean, 13 Ohio App.3d 69, 74, 
468 N.E.2d 146 (6th Dist.1983).  See also State v. Garza, 2013-Ohio-5492, 5 
N.E.2d 89, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.). 
{¶ 41} Similarly, magistrates may make reasonable inferences when 
deciding whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant.  Gates, 462 U.S. at 
240, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527; State v. Hobbs, 133 Ohio St. 43, 2012-
Ohio-3886, 975 N.E.2d 965, ¶ 10; State v. Jordan, 11th Dist. Lake No. 97-L-211, 
1998 WL 684231, *3 (Sept. 25, 1998) (O’Neill, J., dissenting).  However, a 
magistrate cannot be viewed as neutral and detached if the magistrate issues a 
search warrant that is unknowingly based on the police officer’s conclusions.  See 
State v. Joseph, 25 Ohio St.2d 95, 96, 267 N.E.2d 125 (1971). 
{¶ 42} We agree with the state that if the argument that Castagnola was 
making was that the statements in the affidavit were false, inaccurate, or perjured 
information akin to a misstatement or omission, we would simply apply our 
precedent as established in State v. McKnight, 107 Ohio St.3d 101, 2005-Ohio-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16
6046, 837 N.E.2d 315, ¶ 31.  McKnight holds that when a defendant challenges 
the sufficiency of a search warrant on the basis that the affidavit contains a false 
statement affecting the magistrate’s probable-cause determination, a reviewing 
court must consider whether those statements were made intentionally or with 
reckless disregard for the truth.  However, the argument that Castagnola makes is 
not that the statements in the affidavit were false, but rather that the detective, by 
not disclosing that he had drawn an inference but instead presented the inference 
as an empirical fact, usurped the inference-drawing function of the magistrate in 
determining probable cause.  While no Ohio case has passed upon this issue, we 
are persuaded by the test outlined in Caffott, 105 Cal.App.3d 775, 164 Cal.Rptr. 
499. 
{¶ 43} In Caffott, the defendant challenged the validity of a search warrant 
on the basis that the affiant had “improperly usurped the ‘inference-drawing’ 
function of the magistrate.”  Id. at 778.  The affidavit disclosed that the affiant 
was relying on information gathered from an untested source, known as Lydia, 
who stated that she had purchased heroin from the defendant on a number of 
occasions and had described the defendant’s home and vehicle. 
{¶ 44} The affidavit also disclosed that Lydia had been arrested for being 
under the influence of heroin the day after she claimed to have last purchased 
heroin from the defendant and that based upon the affiant’s experience as a 
narcotics officer, he knew that Lydia was a heroin user.  The affidavit further 
stated that the affiant had verified the location of the defendant’s house and 
vehicle and that the defendant had a prior arrest for possession of a controlled 
substance and was on probation for false representation to obtain prescription 
drugs. 
{¶ 45} The affidavit also contained a summary of a monitored phone 
conversation between Lydia and the defendant.  The affidavit states: 
 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
17
The conversation between the informant and the male person 
consisted of the informant asking if the male person had anything 
and a reply in the affirmative by the male person.  The conversation 
was also heard to contain an arrangement between the informant 
and the male person on the telephone for the informant to come to 
the residence for the arrangements to purchase heroin. 
 
Caffott, 105 Cal.App.3d at 778, 164 Cal.Rptr. 499. 
{¶ 46} The affiant did not present a transcript of the call to the issuing 
magistrate.  A review of the actual call demonstrated that neither Lydia nor the 
defendant had used the word heroin or a common street name for heroin. 
{¶ 47} After hearing the tape, the trial court concluded that the affiant’s 
summary of the telephone conversation was a “reasonable misstatement” and that 
even if the statement had been negligently made and should be excised from the 
affidavit, the remaining, accurate information in the affidavit was sufficient to 
establish probable cause.  Id. at 780-781. 
{¶ 48} In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court 
held: 
  
 
It is axiomatic that a search-warrant affidavit should leave 
any significant inference-drawing to the issuing magistrate. * * * At 
the least the magistrate must be afforded an opportunity to test for 
himself any significant inference drawn by the affiant; for this 
reason, “in preparing affidavits for search warrants the affiant 
must—under the compulsion of the Fourth Amendment—take 
particular care to state explicitly when he or she is drawing 
conclusions rather than reciting facts.”  (People v. Superior Court 
(McCaffery), supra. 94 Cal.App.3d [367] at pp. 369-370 [156 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18
Cal.Rptr. 416 (1979)]).  The facts which underlie any such 
significant inference should be disclosed to the magistrate. 
 
Id. at 781. 
{¶ 49} While search-warrant affidavits will inevitably include undisclosed 
inferences, under Fourth Amendment analysis, there is “ ‘a line between 
permissible police interpretation and usurpation of the magistrate’s function.’ ” 
Caffott, 105 Cal.App.3d at 782, 164 Cal.Rptr. 499, quoting Rodriguez v. Superior 
Court, 87 Cal.App.3d 822, 831, 151 Cal.Rptr. 233 (1978), fn. 3.  If the defendant 
alleges only that the statement of fact (which is actually an undisclosed inference) 
is false, then the trial court should apply the established rules for factual 
misstatements and omissions.  Id. at 782.  However, Caffott alleged not that the 
statement was false but that the inference made by the detective was presented as 
an empirical fact and thus the detective usurped the magistrate’s inference-
drawing authority.  Id. at 783.  In that circumstance, the court of appeals directed, 
a trial court should do as follows: 
 
 
[D]etermine whether the hidden inference was so significant 
as to cross the line between permissible interpretation and 
usurpation. * * *  A hidden inference should be deemed significant 
if it can be fairly concluded that it had a substantial bearing on the 
magistrate’s determination of probable cause in each of two 
respects: 
(1) Relevance: The more directly relevant the inference is to 
the magistrate’s inquiry, the more substantial its bearing and the 
more significant it will be.  * * *   
(2) Complexity: The more complex and attenuated the 
logical process by which a relevant conclusion is reached, the more 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
19
important it is that the magistrate receive an opportunity to test the 
inference for validity as part of his neutral and detached function.  
Conversely, an inference so straightforward, and so patently within 
the affiant’s area of expertise, as to be a matter of “routine 
interpretation” for the affiant is probably not so significant as to 
require the magistrate’s review even though the conclusion thus 
reached is highly relevant. 
 
(Italics sic.)  Caffott at 783. 
{¶ 50} If the inference is significant, then the trial court should examine 
the affiant’s animus.  Id. at 784.  If the affiant acted intentionally or with 
conscious indifference, then the warrant should be invalidated and the evidence 
suppressed.  Id. at 785.  However, if the affiant acted negligently, then the 
misstatement should be removed, the omitted underlying facts added, and the 
affidavit reassessed.  Id. 
{¶ 51} While holding that the “sensible course” would have been to 
furnish the magistrate with both the actual text of the call and the affiant’s 
interpretation of the call, the appellate court found that the record supported the 
trial court’s determination that the affiant’s failure to furnish both was reasonable.  
Id. at 784.  The appellate court also determined that the record supported the trial 
court’s determination that the affiant’s interpretation of the recorded conversation 
was reasonable. 
{¶ 52} The affiant was an experienced narcotics officer who had 
personally interviewed Lydia, a heroin user who had been found to be under the 
influence of heroin within one day of her last reported purchase of heroin from the 
defendant.  Lydia’s recorded conversation with the defendant was short and 
plainly indicated that the parties were to meet at the defendant’s home.  Lydia had 
told the affiant that the parties’ connection was heroin.  The exchange between 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20
Lydia and the defendant (“You don’t have nothing?”  “Ya.”) was susceptible of a 
reasonable interpretation that the defendant had heroin for sale.  Id. at 779, 784, 
and fn. 1. 
{¶ 53} As in Caffott, the recording of Castagnola’s conversation with 
Source May was not provided to the magistrate.  Unlike in Caffott, however, 
neither the trial court nor the appellate court in this case examined the issue 
whether the detective, by presenting his inference as an empirical fact, had 
usurped the magistrate’s inference-drawing authority in determining probable 
cause. 
{¶ 54} The trial court held that the two separate references in the affidavit 
to “online” provided the issuing magistrate with a “substantial basis for 
concluding that probable cause existed to justify a search for and/or seizure of the 
computers found at defendant’s residence.”  Moreover, while acknowledging that 
Castagnola did not use the word “online” on the recording, the trial court held that 
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because he found 
credible the affiant’s testimony at the suppression hearing as to “how he 
interpreted the substance of what was said” and “how he attempted to paraphrase 
the same in his affidavit.” 
{¶ 55} Similarly, the Ninth District Court of Appeals, though conceding 
that the word “online” was never used by Castagnola on the recording, affirmed 
the trial court’s judgment, holding that under the totality of the circumstances, a 
substantial basis was provided for the issuing magistrate to conclude that 
Castagnola had used a computer to find David Maistros’s address. 
{¶ 56} Since neither court addressed the underlying issue, we reject their 
probable-cause  determinations and consider the question here.  In turning to the 
test enunciated in Caffott, we first determine whether the inference was “so 
significant as to cross the line between permissive interpretation and usurpation,” 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
21
considering both the relevance and the complexity of the undisclosed inference.  
Caffott, 105 Cal.App.3d at 783, 164 Cal.Rptr. 499. 
{¶ 57} Numerous statements in the search-warrant affidavit support the 
conclusion that Castagnola had searched for Maistros’s address, but only the two 
statements containing the “online” inference linked the search for Maistros’s 
address to the Internet.  Because without those two statements there is nothing in 
the search-warrant affidavit that supports a probable-cause finding that 
Castagnola used a computer in furtherance of the alleged crimes and that the 
computer he used was located in his residence and that that computer still had 
evidence on it, the “online” inference must also support these additional 
inferences.  Because of the inference building required to support the probable-
cause determination that there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime 
would be found on a computer in Castagnola’s home, we find that the “online” 
inference was directly relevant to the magistrate’s determination. 
{¶ 58} We now consider the complexity of the detective’s conclusion that 
Castagnola had searched online for Maistros’s address.  We summarily reject the 
assertion that the method of search was so obvious that the “online” inference was 
a matter of “routine interpretation” for the affiant.  See Caffott at 783.  As 
explained above, the “online” inference was required to provide the nexus 
between the alleged crimes and the items to be searched for in Castagnola’s home 
(the computers).  This determination is so profoundly significant that the issuing 
magistrate should have been given the opportunity to test the validity of the 
undisclosed inference. 
{¶ 59} We find the undisclosed inference so significant that it “cross[ed] 
the line between permissible interpretation and usurpation” of the magistrate’s 
inference-drawing authority.  Caffott, 105 Cal.App.3d at 783, 164 Cal.Rptr. 499.  
However, this conclusion does not end our analysis.  We next consider the 
affiant’s animus.  Caffott at 784-785.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22
{¶ 60} The detective seemed genuinely surprised that Castagnola had not 
used the word “online” on the recording.  In response to this revelation, he 
replied, “Well, I thought he did.  I thought he did mention the word ‘online.’ * * * 
I could have sworn he did, yes.”  Even Castagnola did not believe that the 
detective’s inclusion of the word “online” in the affidavit was an act of 
misfeasance or malfeasance.  On this record, we do not find that the detective 
intentionally usurped the magistrate’s inference-drawing authority in making the 
probable-cause determination or that he proceeded with conscious indifference. 
{¶ 61} Since we have determined that the affiant negligently usurped the 
magistrate’s inference-drawing authority, Caffott requires us to excise the 
inference, insert the omitted underlying facts, and reassess the affidavit for 
probable cause.  Id., 105 Cal.App.3d at 785, 164 Cal.Rptr. 499.  Removing the 
references to “online” and inserting the omitted statement from the recording that 
the detective had relied on to conclude that Castagnola had searched online 
(Castagnola’s statement that he had had to “look up” Maistros’s address on court 
records), we find, based on the totality of the circumstances, that there was no 
probable cause to believe that a computer in Castagnola's residence was used in 
furtherance of the alleged crimes. 
{¶ 62} The affidavit provides the following information: The affiant had 
over 14 years of law-enforcement experience, with eight of those years in the drug 
unit.  Twenty-five incidents of criminal mischief involving intentional damage to 
vehicles in Twinsburg and Reminderville had occurred in the two months prior to 
the search-warrant request.  A confidential informant had given police ten text 
messages originating from a phone number assigned to Castagnola.  The text 
messages indicated that Castagnola had found Maistros’s home and law office 
and that he did not believe that there could be more than one person by that name 
who was also a lawyer.  In the text messages, Castagnola admitted having egged 
and damaged Maistros’s vehicles.  The recording that the magistrate did not hear 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
23
reveals Castagnola saying that to find Maistros’s address, he had had to “look up” 
Maistros on court records and had found that a David Maistros had received a 
parking ticket.  He also said that he had verified that he had the correct address by 
checking the mail in the mailbox. 
{¶ 63} In short, while there was probable cause to believe that Castagnola 
had searched for Maistros’s address, the method of his search was not clear.  We 
affirmatively reject the trial court’s assertion that in determining whether an 
affidavit supports probable cause to issue a search warrant, a magistrate can infer 
“online” activities by people of a certain age.  We further reject the trial court’s 
supposition that statements sent by text message admitting criminal activity create 
a substantial basis for concluding that evidence of a crime will be found on a 
computer.  Similarly, we are not inclined to leap to the conclusion that the 
information stored on a phone will necessarily be backed up on a computer.  
Although we are in the computer age, records of court activity still exist in paper 
form and are available to the public in clerk of courts’ offices around the state. 
{¶ 64} The dissent dismisses Caffott because it is from an “out-of-state, 
intermediate court.”  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 117.  However, we have consistently 
looked to out-of-state cases when considering issues of first impression and have 
adopted the reasoning in those cases when the opinions were persuasive and on 
point.  In fact, when writing for the majority in prior cases, the author of the 
dissent has sought guidance from out-of-state authority under similar 
circumstances.  E.g., Schwering v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys. Inc., 132 Ohio St.3d 
129, 2012-Ohio-1481, 970 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 17 (citing cases from Minnesota and 
Illinois). 
{¶ 65} Having determined that the affiant negligently usurped the 
inference-drawing authority of the magistrate and that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, the next 
step of our analysis is typically to consider whether the good-faith exception to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24
the exclusionary rule applies.  See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 
S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144, 
129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009).  However, as we explain in further detail 
in our discussion of the exclusionary rule below, a search warrant that is 
invalidated on the basis that the search-warrant affidavit was negligently written 
does not per se require suppression of the evidence.  Id.  Therefore, we turn to 
Castagnola’s second challenge to the search warrant. 
 
B.  Second proposition of law: Particularity 
{¶ 66} Under his second proposition of law, Castagnola argues that the 
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies not only to the seizure 
of the computer but also to the search of the computer.  The state asserts that 
Castagnola waived this issue by failing to raise it below and that under the 
circumstances of this case, the warrant was sufficiently particular. 
{¶ 67} “[Generally,] this court will not consider arguments that were not 
raised in the courts below.”  Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners’ Assn. v. R.E. 
Roark Cos., Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d 274, 279, 617 N.E.2d 1075 (1993).  However, 
“[w]hen an issue of law that was not argued below is implicit in another issue that 
was argued and is presented by an appeal, we may consider and resolve that 
implicit issue.”  Id. 
{¶ 68} The dissent argues that Castagnola failed to preserve the 
particularity issue in the court of appeals by focusing on the detective’s inference 
rather than on the warrant’s lack of particularity.  However, as set forth below, 
Castagnola argued particularity in both the trial and appellate courts.  
Furthermore, State v. Price, 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 398 N.E.2d 772 (1979), which is 
cited in the dissent, does not prevent us from considering a proposition of law 
even if the issue was not raised below.  Price states: “The Supreme Court will not 
ordinarily consider a claim of error that was not raised in any way in the Court of 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
25
Appeals and was not considered or decided by that court.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. 
at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 69} Castagnola challenged the particularity of the search warrant both 
at the suppression hearing and in his brief before the Ninth District Court of 
Appeals, in which he argued:  “Essentially, the trial court’s decision boils down to 
a holding that someone’s sending a text message creates probable cause to seize 
and search his computer.  While this would undoubtedly prove a boon to law 
enforcement, it is impossible to reconcile with the ‘particularity’ requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment, or the privacy concept that is at its core.” 
{¶ 70} As the dissenting opinion in the court of appeals pointed out, the 
probable-cause and particularity requirements overlap.  “ ‘There is interplay 
between probable cause, particularity, and reasonableness.’ ”  2013-Ohio-1215,  
¶ 46 (Carr, J., dissenting), quoting In re Appeal of Application for Search 
Warrant, 193 Vt. 51, 2012 VT 102, 71 A.3d 1158, ¶ 33.  Other courts have also 
found the issues to be inseparable.  See, e.g., United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 
1078, 1094 (10th Cir.2009). Therefore, the particularity issue is implicit in a 
probable-cause argument, which Castagnola clearly raised below, so he did not 
waive the particularity issue that he raises here in his second proposition of law. 
{¶ 71} Since neither the trial court nor the appellate court in this case 
addressed the issue of particularity, we reject their determination of probable 
cause and examine the issue here.  The scope of our inquiry is limited to whether 
the search warrant particularly described what was to be searched for on 
Castagnola’s computer. 
{¶ 72} It is important to note that regarding the search warrant that is the 
subject of this case, that single warrant was used first to search the house in order 
to seize the computer and then was used for a second search, the search of the 
computer itself.  To reiterate, the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, “[N]o Warrants shall issue * * * [except those] particularly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  
“[T]he presumptive rule against warrantless searches applies with equal force to 
searches whose only defect is a lack of particularity in the warrant.”  Groh v. 
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004). 
{¶ 73} We cannot overstate the variety and complexity of the 
considerations that a neutral and detached officer must make when determining 
whether the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is met.  There are 
myriad factors, all of which are driven by the nature or character of the item to be 
seized and searched.  2 LaFave, Search and Seizure, Section 4.6(a). 
{¶ 74} Moreover, “[t]he modern development of the personal computer 
and its ability to store and intermingle a huge array of one’s personal papers in a 
single place increases law enforcement’s ability to conduct a wide-ranging search 
into a person’s private affairs, and accordingly makes the particularity 
requirement much more important.” United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 
(10th Cir.2009).  Courts have held that the Fourth Amendment does not require 
heightened protections for computers, nor does it diminish its protections because 
of the challenges of searching it.  Richards, 659 F.3d at 538.  The “bedrock 
principle” is “reasonableness on a case-by-case basis.”  Id. 
{¶ 75} According to the state, the search warrant at issue here was as 
particularized as the facts of this case reasonably permitted.  The state contends 
that the warrant identifies the offenses charged, identifies the items to be searched 
for, and “indicates that the listed items are connected with the [listed] offenses.”  
Therefore, the state alleges, the search warrant instructed officers to “search only” 
for items connected to the crimes charged.  We disagree. 
{¶ 76} The warrant is separated into distinct sections.  Under the title 
“There is now being concealed certain property, to-wit,” the warrant lists the 
items subject to seizure from Castagnola’s residence and persons and vehicles at 
the residence as follows: 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
27
   
Records and documents either stored on computers, ledgers, 
or any other electronic recording device to include hard drives and 
external portable hard drives, cell phones, printers, storage devices 
of any kind, printed out copies of text messages or emails, cameras, 
video recorders or any photo imaging devices and their storage 
media to include tapes, compact discs, or flash drives. 
 
{¶ 77} Since the issue we address is the search of Castagnola’s computer, 
the language “[r]ecords and documents stored on computers” is the focal point.  
The plain language of this paragraph demonstrates that there is no limitation on 
what records and documents were to be searched for in Castagnola’s computer. 
{¶ 78} A separate section, which does not expressly or indirectly relate 
back to the first, is titled “If found, said items will be seized and used as evidence 
in the prosecution of.”  Under that title, the following crimes are listed: retaliation, 
criminal trespassing, criminal damaging, and possession of criminal tools.  The 
state argues that the warrant language “If found, said items will be seized and 
used as evidence in the prosecution of” establishes a limitation on the search of 
the computer.  However, this interpretation belies the language of the search 
warrant and in this case, is contrary to law. 
{¶ 79} Courts addressing the particularity requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment are concerned with two issues.  The first issue is whether the warrant 
provides sufficient information to “guide and control” the judgment of the 
executing officer in what to seize.  United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 
(1st Cir.1999).  The second issue is whether the category as specified is too broad 
in that it includes items that should not be seized.  See United States v. Kow, 58 
F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir.1995). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28
{¶ 80} A search warrant that includes broad categories of items to be 
seized may nevertheless be valid when the description is “ ‘ “as specific as the 
circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit.” ’ ” Guest 
v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir.2001), quoting United States v. Henson, 848 
F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir.1988), quoting United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 
1001 (11th Cir.1985).  Warrants that fail to describe the items to be seized with as 
much specificity as the government’s knowledge and the circumstances allow are 
“invalidated by their substantial failure to specify as nearly as possible the 
distinguishing characteristics of the goods to be seized.”  United States v. 
Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173, 176 (1st Cir.). 
{¶ 81} Because computers can store a large amount of information “there 
is a greater potential for the ‘intermingling’ of documents and a consequent 
invasion of privacy when police execute a search for evidence on a computer.  
* * * Officers must be clear as to what it is they are seeking on the computer and 
conduct the search in a way that avoids searching files of types not identified in 
the warrant.”  United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir.2001).  
“[P]ractical accuracy rather than technical precision” is the operative 
consideration.  United States v. Dorrough, 927 F.2d 498, 500 (10th Cir.1991). 
{¶ 82} Here, the search warrant did not contain any description or 
qualifiers of the “records and documents stored on the computer” that the searcher 
was permitted to look for.  The next section of the search warrant, which 
delineated that if any records and documents were seized, those items would be 
used to prosecute Castagnola for the crimes of retaliation, criminal trespassing, 
criminal damaging, and possession of criminal tools, added nothing to narrow the 
search.  As written, this search warrant failed to address both concerns that courts 
consider when determining whether a warrant satisfies the particularity 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
29
{¶ 83} First, as evidenced by the testimony of the BCI analyst, the 
language of the search warrant did not “guide and control” her judgment as to 
what was to be seized on the computer.  See Upham, 168 F.3d at 535.  She 
indicated that Castagnola’s computer was brought in for a case involving 
“menacing, threatening, and intimidation.”  The analyst read the case synopsis 
and the search-warrant affidavit and then looked at all the information on the hard 
drive “looking for any evidence of intimidation of David Maistros * * * and 
anything associated with that.”  Therefore, the determination on what to seize was 
within her discretion. 
{¶ 84} Second, the broad language of this search warrant clearly included 
items that were not subject to seizure.  The search warrant permitted her to 
examine every record or document on Castagnola’s computer in order to find any 
evidence of the alleged crimes.  In processing the hard drive, she testified, she 
was going through the “documents, images, videos.” 
{¶ 85} The state, without addressing Castagnola’s argument that the 
warrant lacked particularity as to “what” was to be seized in the computer, asserts 
that “[n]othing in the record suggests that the police knew ahead of time precisely 
where or on which devices those items were stored.”  However, the particularity 
issue we address here does not relate to where the information was stored but 
rather “what” evidence the detective had a fair probability of believing existed on 
Castagnola’s computers. 
{¶ 86} In this case, the detective believed that Castagnola had found 
Maistros’s address online and that evidence of the online search would be useful 
in the prosecution of the alleged offenses.  The detective testified at the 
suppression hearing that in addition to a general Google or online-white-pages 
search for Maistros’s name, he believed that Castagnola may have searched a 
clerk of courts’ website for information about Maistros because Castagnola had 
mentioned in his conversation with Source May that he had discovered that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30
Maistros had received a parking ticket years earlier.  The detective also testified 
that from his previous experience, he knew that an online search would create “a 
cookie, which will tell you where [the persons who have used the computer] have 
been, what searches they have done, things of that nature.” 
{¶ 87} Under the Fourth Amendment, these details regarding the records 
or documents stored on the computer should have been included in the search 
warrant to guide and control the searcher and to sufficiently narrow the category 
of records or documents subject to seizure.  Moreover, this degree of specificity 
was required, since the circumstances and the nature of the activity under 
investigation permitted the affiant to be this specific.  Guest, 255 F.3d at 336. 
{¶ 88} In urging this court to find that the search warrant sufficiently 
particularized the items to be searched for, the state provides a breadth of 
authority rejecting the notion that a search warrant must contain a restrictive 
protocol, methodology, or other strategy for conducting the search in order to 
satisfy the Fourth Amendment.  We agree that the Fourth Amendment does not 
require a search warrant to specify restrictive search protocols, but we also 
recognize that the Fourth Amendment does prohibit a “sweeping comprehensive 
search of a computer’s hard drive.”  Walser, 275 F.3d at 986.  The logical balance 
of these principles leads to the conclusion that officers must describe what they 
believe will be found on a computer with as much specificity as possible under 
the circumstances.  This will enable the searcher to narrow his or her search to 
only the items to be seized.  Adherence to this requirement is especially important 
when, as here, the person conducting the search is not the affiant.  See generally 
United States v. Gahagan, 865 F.2d 1490, 1498-1499 (6th Cir.1989). 
{¶ 89} “[W]e do not intend to make the process of determining the 
sufficiency of an affidavit a hypertechnical one.”  State v. Kinney, 83 Ohio St.3d 
85, 95, 698 N.E.2d 49 (1998).  We understand that police and magistrates are not 
required to do the impossible.  However, the specific evidence sought must be 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
31
clearly stated:  “As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the 
officer executing the warrant.”  Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 
S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927). “[A] search conducted pursuant to a warrant that 
fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is 
unconstitutional.”  Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988, 104 S.Ct. 
3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), fn. 5. 
{¶ 90} Having determined that the search warrant lacked particularity and 
was therefore invalid, we must now consider whether the evidence obtained in 
execution of the invalid search warrant should be suppressed. 
 
IV. The Exclusionary Rule and the Good-Faith Exception 
{¶ 91} Castagnola argues that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule does not apply in this case.  We agree. 
{¶ 92} The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy for Fourth 
Amendment violations.  United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 
613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974).  The question whether the evidence seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment should be excluded is a separate question 
from whether the Fourth Amendment was violated.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 104 
S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677.  “The exclusionary rule should not be applied to 
suppress evidence obtained by police officers acting in objectively reasonable, 
good faith reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral 
magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid.”  State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 
251, 490 N.E.2d 1236 (1986), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 93} The “inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question 
whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was 
illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.”  Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. 
3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, fn. 23.  In making this determination, a court should 
consider the total circumstances and assume that the executing officers have a 
“reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.”  Id. at 919, fn. 20.  When 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32
considering a facially invalid warrant, the trial court “must also review the text of 
the warrant and the circumstances of the search to ascertain whether the agents 
might have ‘reasonably presume[d] it to be valid.’ ” Leary, 846 F.2d at 607, 
quoting Leon at 923. 
{¶ 94} We therefore review whether the officer associated with the search 
should have known that the warrant was invalid. 
{¶ 95} Our analysis is an objective one and does not depend on the 
subjective knowledge of any individual police officer.  Herring, 555 U.S. 135, 
135, 145-146, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496.  However, because Fourth 
Amendment violations do not automatically result in application of the 
exclusionary rule, before applying it, we must consider the reason that the 
judiciary created it. 
{¶ 96} The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct.  
If officers act in good-faith reliance on a warrant that is later determined to be 
invalid, suppressing the evidence obtained from the search would not serve the 
purpose of the exclusionary rule.  State v. Hoffman, 141 Ohio St.3d 428, 2014-
Ohio-4795, 25 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 46. 
{¶ 97} Courts may apply the exclusionary rule only when its benefits 
outweigh the societal risks.  Herring at 141.  The application of the exclusionary 
rule is “restricted to those areas where its remedial objects are most efficaciously 
served.”  Leon, 468 U.S. at 908, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677.  “[A]n 
assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an important step 
in the calculus.”  Id. at 911.  The exclusionary rule should not be applied when 
“ ‘the official action was pursued in complete good faith’ ” because it would have 
no deterrent effect.  George, 45 Ohio St.3d at 331, 544 N.E.2d 640, quoting Leon 
at 919. 
{¶ 98} However, an officer’s reliance on the warrant must be “objectively 
reasonable.”  Id. at 922.  Suppression remains an appropriate remedy (1) when an 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
33
officer relies on a warrant that is based on an affidavit “ ‘so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable’ ” 
and (2) when a warrant is “so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the 
place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot 
reasonably presume it to be valid.”  Id. at 923, quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
590, 611, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) 2265-2266 (Powell, J., 
concurring in part). 
{¶ 99} If the only problem in this case were the detective’s negligence—
the undisclosed inference in the search-warrant affidavit—then application of the 
exclusionary rule would not promote the purpose of the rule.  One instance of 
police negligence does not justify the exclusion of the evidence.  Id. at 147. 
{¶ 100} However, the negligent inclusion of the undisclosed inference is 
just the tip of the iceberg here.  The affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable 
cause and the warrant was so facially deficient in failing to particularize the items 
to be searched for on Castagnola’s computer that the detective could not have 
relied on it in objective good faith. 
{¶ 101} Quite simply, the search-warrant affidavit was not based on 
evidentiary fact.  It was based on layered inferences.  Moreover, the search 
warrant failed to particularly describe the items to be searched for on Castagnola’s 
computer with as much specificity as the detective’s knowledge and the 
circumstances allowed.  Perhaps the most telling flaw of the warrant request came 
at the end of the detective’s testimony at the suppression hearing: 
 
Q.  Everything that you were asking to search at that 
point in time, did you personally when you swore this affidavit 
believe that those items were reasonably expected to be there? 
A.  Yes.  And only because Mr. Castagnola was sending 
numerous things via text which implicated himself in this crime 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
34
to a guy that, in my opinion, he barely knew.  So I assumed 
that—at that point, if he is just that blatant in sending these texts 
out and talking about it, that there is probably other items in the 
house that would be of evidentiary value. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 102} A search cannot depend on mere suspicion.  Gates, 462 U.S. at 
276, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527.  Although in the ordinary case, an officer 
cannot question a magistrate’s probable-cause determination, this is no ordinary 
case.  Here, the detective did not have a reasonable basis to believe that the 
warrant was valid.  Where a privacy intrusion is based on blatant conjecture that 
evidence exists on a computer in a residence because of a text-message admission 
of vandalism, the societal benefits of suppressing the evidence outweigh the 
societal risks of harm. 
{¶ 103} The dissent cites Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 
2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978).  However, Franks is not relevant here.  In Franks, 
the United States Supreme Court held that if a “substantial preliminary showing 
that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for 
the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly 
false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth 
Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request.”  Id. at 
155-156.  Franks is a pre-Gates case addressing when a specific type of hearing 
that supplements a suppression hearing must be held.  It has no application here, 
because in this case, the warrant was not valid on its face and the search and 
seizure were in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
{¶ 104} This is a difficult case, and applying the exclusionary rule to strip 
the state of reliable evidence of wrongdoing seems harsh, particularly because 
Castagnola’s actions that led to the search warrant were despicably malicious and 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
35
the evidence discovered as a result of the search is horrifically objectionable.  
“There is always a temptation in criminal cases to let the end justify the means, 
but as guardians of the Constitution, we must resist that temptation.”  State v. 
Gardner, 135 Ohio St. 3d 99, 2012-Ohio-5683, 984 N.E.2d 1025, ¶ 24. 
{¶ 105} We leave for another day the question whether the Fourth 
Amendment permits the seizure of any device capable of searching the Internet, 
once a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that a suspect conducted an 
online search in furtherance of criminal activity. 
V.  Conclusion 
{¶ 106} We hold that when no oral testimony is presented to the neutral 
and detached magistrate in conjunction with an affidavit for a search warrant, the 
probable-cause determination is based on the four corners of the document.  We 
further hold that when a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence challenges the 
validity of a search warrant, claiming that an undisclosed inference stated as an 
empirical fact usurped the magistrate’s inference-drawing authority, a reviewing 
court should consider (1) whether the inference was so significant that it crossed 
the line between permissible interpretation and usurpation of the magistrate’s role 
in finding probable cause, considering both the relevance and the complexity of 
the inference and (2) whether the affiant intended the inference to deprive the 
magistrate of his or her authority to determine whether probable cause existed.  
We further hold that the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
applies to the search of a computer and requires a search warrant to particularly 
describe the items believed to be contained on the computer with as much 
specificity as the affiant’s knowledge and the circumstances of the case allow and 
that the search be conducted in a manner that restricts the search for the items 
identified. 
{¶ 107} Finally, we conclude that in this case, the affiant negligently 
usurped the magistrate’s inference-drawing authority in determining whether 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
36
there was probable cause to issue the search warrant.  Although one act of 
negligence does not justify the exclusion of evidence seized in good faith, we 
suppress the evidence at issue here because the search-warrant affidavit was so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause and the search warrant failed to state with 
particularity the items to be searched for on Castagnola’s computer that the 
detective could not have relied upon it in good faith. 
{¶ 108} We reverse the judgment of the appellate court and order that the 
evidence obtained in executing the invalid search warrant be suppressed.  We 
remand the matter to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and FRENCH, JJ., dissent. 
________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 109} I cannot agree that we should break with precedent and adopt the 
reasoning of a California appellate court opinion to conclude that the officer in 
this case “negligently usurped the inference drawing authority of the magistrate,” 
majority opinion at ¶ 65,  and caused an invalid search warrant to be issued.  Nor 
would I address the question of particularity that appellant, Nicholas Castagnola, 
failed to present to the trial or appellate court.  I therefore respectfully dissent and 
would uphold the judgment of the court of appeals. 
The proposition of law on particularity was forfeited 
{¶ 110} Castagnola did not argue either in his motion or at the suppression 
hearing that the warrant failed to particularly describe the scope of the search of 
the computer.  The majority states that the particularity issue is implicit in the 
probable-cause argument and notes a single reference to “particularity” in 
Castagnola’s merit brief to the Ninth District as a reason to excuse his failure to 
raise this issue.  Majority opinion at ¶ 70 and 69.  I do not agree. 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
37
{¶ 111} Castagnola raised the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress 
in the first of his four assignments of error, arguing only that the computer should 
not have been seized.  He did not mention the scope of the computer search or say 
that the warrant failed to properly guide and control the forensic analyst or argue 
that the search was general or exploratory.  He contended only that the computer 
should not have been seized, because it had no nexus the crime with which he was 
charged.  In any event, because Crim.R. 47 requires a motion to suppress to state 
the specific grounds upon which it is made, it is insufficient to say that the issue 
was implicitly raised in another argument.  Because the particularity issue was 
raised for the first time before us, we should not address it.  See State v. Price, 60 
Ohio St.2d 136, 398 N.E.2d 772 (1979), paragraph two of the syllabus. 
Probable cause exists under the totality of the circumstances 
{¶ 112} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution provide that a warrant can be issued 
only if probable cause for the warrant is supported by an oath or affirmation.  
When determining whether to issue a warrant, a magistrate must simply “make a 
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in 
the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”  Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).  As long as the “magistrate 
had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed,” a reviewing 
court should uphold the warrant.  State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 544 N.E.2d 
640 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus.  We have called this standard for 
reviewing warrants the “totality-of-the-circumstances standard.” 
{¶ 113} We recently reiterated that totality of the circumstances is the 
proper standard of review to determine whether probable cause existed to issue a 
search warrant.  State v. Jones, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2015-Ohio-483, __ N.E.3d __. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
38
 
The Supreme Court of the United States has provided that in 
determining whether a search warrant was issued upon a proper 
showing of probable cause, reviewing courts must examine the 
totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 
103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).  “[T]he duty of a reviewing 
court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis 
for * * * conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.”  Id. at 238-239, 
103 S.Ct. 2317, quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 
80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), overruled on other grounds, 
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 
619 (1980).  The Gates court stated that the issuing magistrate’s 
duty is to determine whether “there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place * * *.”  Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317. 
 
Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 114} Castagnola challenges the use of the word “online” in the 
detective’s affidavit in support of the search warrant.  In describing the discussion 
between the confidential informant and Castagnola, the detective stated in his 
affidavit: 
 
Castagnola then says that he found Maistros online in the clerk of 
courts because he got a parking ticket several years ago.  
Castagnola said that he also found that Maistros law offices were in 
Chagrin Falls and went through Maistros’s mailbox to confirm that 
Maistros did live at the address he found for him online. 
 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
39
{¶ 115} For a search warrant that appears to be valid on its face to run 
afoul of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the affiant made a false statement, either “intentionally, or with 
reckless disregard for the truth.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-156, 98 
S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978).  We have said that “ ‘[r]eckless disregard’ 
means that the affiant had serious doubts of an allegation’s truth.”  State v. 
Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 441, 588 N.E.2d 819 (1992).  Negligent or innocent 
mistakes in an affidavit will not invalidate a search warrant.  See Franks at 171.  
Contrary to what the majority states in the opinion, Castagnola does argue that use 
of the word “online” is a false statement—he denies saying that word in the 
recorded conversation.  Majority opinion at ¶ 42.  But although the word “online” 
was not used in the recorded conversation, the detective’s affidavit does not claim 
to be quoting Castagnola.  The detective testified that he honestly believed that 
Castagnola had made such a reference.  And at the suppression hearing, defense 
counsel conceded that there was not misfeasance or malfeasance on the part of the 
detective.  This in and of itself makes a Franks violation impossible. 
{¶ 116} Castagnola also alleges, however, that the detective usurped the 
role of the magistrate by inferring that the address had been found online and 
stating this to be an empirical fact.  He contends that it was the magistrate’s job to 
determine whether the evidence justified the inference that Castagnola had 
conducted the search for the address online. 
{¶ 117} Without fully discussing our standard of reviewing the totality of 
the circumstances, the majority adopts the reasoning of a 35-year-old, out-of-
state, intermediate court to change the law of Ohio.  Majority opinion at ¶ 42-64, 
relying on People v. Caffott, 105 Cal.App.3d 775, 164 Cal.Rptr. 499 (1980).2  
Under the majority’s approach, a negligent misstatement within an affidavit 
                                                          
 
2 People v. Caffott, 105 Cal.App.3d 775, 164 Cal.Rptr. 499 (1980), has been cited in later opinions 
only three times, and not once after 1986. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
40
causes the entire affidavit to be subject to reassessment without any deference to 
the issuing magistrate.  Caffott’s test to determine the relevance and complexity of 
a “hidden inference” is inconsistent with established case law and appears to 
circumvent the holding in Franks that a facially valid search warrant will not be 
set aside unless the affiant makes a false statement intentionally or with reckless 
disregard for the truth.  Requiring an affiant to present a hypertechnical recitation 
of the facts to obtain a search warrant is unnecessary.  A magistrate can question 
an affiant to determine whether probable cause exists if the facts stated are 
unclear.  The Franks rule that invalidates warrants that are based on intentional or 
reckless misstatements already guards truth and promotes honesty.  There is no 
reason to abandon precedent.  In George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 544 N.E.2d 640, we 
stated: 
 
 
It is also important to note that the totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis of Gates not only addresses the original 
probable cause determination of the magistrate but carefully limits 
the role of a reviewing court as well to that of simply “* * * 
ensur[ing] that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for * * * 
concluding’ that probable cause existed. * * *”  Id. [462 U.S.] at 
238-239 [103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527]. 
 
Id. at 329.  We should not second-guess the issuing magistrate by looking for 
“hidden inferences.” 
{¶ 118} I would hold that under the totality of the circumstances, the 
magistrate had a substantial basis for issuing the search warrant.  In the affidavit, 
the detective outlined the offenses alleged to have been committed by the 24-year-
old Castagnola.  The detective quoted the text messages Castagnola had sent and 
summarized the recorded conversation Castagnola had had with a confidential 
 
January Term, 2015 
 
41
informant, both of which implicated Castagnola in the offenses.  Although the 
word “online” was not used in the recorded conversation, Castagnola did state 
that he had “look[ed] up on court records” and found a parking ticket with 
Maistros’s address.  Based on Castagnola’s age, the text messages that he sent, 
and the statements he actually made, I agree with the trial court that the 
detective’s paraphrase was “a fair characterization of the substance of the 
conversation.”  For a search warrant to issue there needs to be only a fair 
probability that evidence will be found in a particular place.  Given today’s 
ubiquitous use of technology to obtain information, it is more than likely that 
Castagnola found the information online. 
{¶ 119} For these same reasons, I also strenuously dissent from the 
majority’s determination that the warrant was not executed in good faith.  The 
affidavit in support of the warrant stated that a 24-year-old man had sent several 
text messages admitting his involvement in the egging of vehicles belonging to 
David Maistros and that during a conversation with a confidential informant he 
had stated that he had found Maistros’s address online.  A reasonable officer 
would have no reason to question the validity of the search warrant. 
{¶ 120} I respectfully dissent. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
___________________ 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Heaven 
DiMartino, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Russell S. Bensing, for appellant. 
___________________