Case Title: Personhood Nevada v. Bristol

Citation: 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 56

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
426 Nev, Advance Opinion Sto

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

PERSONHOOD NEVADA, A BALLOT
ADVOCACY GROUP; RICHARD ZISER;
OLAF VANCURA; AND KENNETH,
WILSON, INDIVIDUALS, | FILED
Appellants,

vs. 210
EMMILY BRISTOL; MINDY HSU, cnpealf vx
RPH.; AND WILLIAM RAMOS, M_D.,
Respondents.

No, 55429

 

 

  

Appeal from a district court order determining that a proposed
initiative violated NRS 295.009's single-subject rule and enjoining its
placement on the general election ballot. First Judicial District Court,
James Todd Russell, Judge.

Dismissed.

Michael L. Peters, Las Vegas; Brooks Bauer LLP and Michael R. Brooks,

Las Vegas,
for Appellants

Carson Cit

 

 

American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada and Lee B. Rowland and
Margaret A. McLetchie, Reno; American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
and Diana Kasdan and Jennifer E. Dalven, New York, New York;
Kaempfer Crowell Renshaw Gronauer & Fiorentino and John W. Griffin,
Jason Woodbury, and Severin A. Carlson, Carson City; Planned
Parenthood of America, Inc., and Mimi Liu, Washington, D.C.,

for Respondents.

 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

 

——- 10-34033

 
OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.

This is an appeal from a district court order determining that
a proposed initiative violated NRS 295.009's single-subject rule and
enjoining its placement on the 2010 general election ballot. Before this
appeal could be decided, the deadline for submitting initiative signatures
to the Secretary of State passed without the initiative’s proponents having
submitted any signatures, and the 2010 general election concluded
without the initiative being included on the ballot. As a result, even if this
court were to reverse the district court’s order, we could grant no effective
relief from that order, rendering this appeal moot. Because the appeal is
moot, we dismiss it. In so doing, we address whether issue preclusion
principles apply to the district court's order, even though the appeal from
that order is dismissed as moot, and we conclude that they do not.

FACTS

In anticipation of the November 2010 general election,
appellant Personhood Nevada, an advocacy group, filed with the Secretary
of State a ballot initiative proposing to amend Article 1 of the Nevada
Constitution.! After the initiative petition was filed with the Secretary of
State, respondents, interested persons and Nevada registered voters,
sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the district court, asserting that

the initiative petition impermissibly encompassed more than one subject

lArticle 1 of the Nevada Constitution sets forth the people's
“Declaration of Rights.”

 

 
and contained a misleading and insufficient description of effect.t See
NRS 295.009; NRS 295.061. The district court determined that
appellants’ proposed amendment violated NRS 295.009's single-subject,
rule because it was “too general and vague” to identify a single subject and

because its widespread effects were neither sufficiently related and

 

germane to a single subject nor described in a manner that would inform
the p
Based on those findings, the district court enjoined the Secretary of State

 

ition signers and voters of the initiative's varied consequences.

from placing the initiative on the November 2010 general election ballot.

Appellants then appealed the district court’s injunctive order

 

to this court, However, before our review of the matter could be
completed, the June 15, 2010, deadline for submitting proposed initiatives
to the Secretary of State passed without appellants obtaining the
necessary number of signatures or submitting the initiative to the
Secretary. Nev. Const. art. 19, §§ 2(4) and 3(2); We the People Nevada v,
Secretary of State, 124 Nev. 874, 192 P.8d 1166 (2008). Accordingly, we
directed appellants to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed
as moot. In responding, the parties were also asked to address a second
question: whether, in the event that this court determines that this appeal
is moot, the district court's order should be vacated to avoid any preclusive
effects on future efforts to qualify a similar initiative. In addition,
respondents filed a motion to dismiss this appeal as moot, for the same

"Below, respondents also argued that the initiative constituted an
improper attempt to revise the Constitution. See Nev. Const. art. 16, § 2
(providing that when “a revision of [Nevada's] entire Constitution” is
necessary, the Legislature and the people must vote to call a convention to

do so). The district court declined to rule on that argument, however, and
it was not raised on appeal.

  

 

 
ne

 

reason noted in our show-cause order. Appellants concurrently opposed
the motion and responded to the show-cause order, and respondents filed a
reply. Both parties filed supplemental briefs addressing the vacatur issue.
After the supplemental briefs were filed, the November 2010 general

election concluded.

 

‘Thisappeal is moot

The question of mootness is one of justiciability. This court's
duty is not to render advisory opinions but, rather, to resolve actual
controversies by an enforceable judgment. NCAA v, University of Nevada,
97 Nev. 56, 57, 624 P.2d 10, 10 (1981). Thus, a controversy must be
present through all stages of the proceeding, see Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997); Lewis _v. Continental Bank
Corp,, 494 U.S. 472, 476-78 (1990), and even though a case may present a
live controversy at its beginning, subsequent events may render the case
moot. University Sys, v, Nevadans for Sound Gov't, 120 Nev. 712, 720,
100 P.3d 179, 186 (2004); Wedekind v, Bell, 26 Nev. 395, 413-15, 69 P. 612,
613-14 (1902).

In this case, the appeal was rendered moot when appellants
failed to submit sufficient signatures on the initiative petition by the June
15 submission deadline, rendering the proposed initiative ineligible for
vote in the 2010 general election regardless of our decision. In addition,
the 2010 general election has now concluded. Thus, this court is unable to
grant effective relief with respect to the district court injunction at issue,
and this appeal is moot. See Langston v. State, Dep't of Mtr. Vehicles, 110
Nev. 342, $44, 871 P.2d 362, 364 (1994).

Even when an appeal is moot, however, we may consider it if
it involves a matter of widespread importance that is capable of repetition,

 
no ie

 

 

yet evading review. ‘Traffic Control Servs, v. United Rentals, 120 Nev.
168, 171-72, 87 P.3d 1054, 1057 (2004) (recognizing that the capable-of-
repetition-yet-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine applies
when the duration of the challenged action is “relatively short” and there
a “likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the future” (citing Binegar
v. District Court, 112 Nev. 544, 548, 915 P.2d 889, 892 (1996) (noting that
the matter must be important), and Langston, 110 Nev. at 344, 871 P.2d
at 363 (pointing out that facts unique to a particular party will not give
rise to the mootness exception))). Appellants contend that this exception
to the mootnes

 

doctrine applies to the present matter for two reasons.

First, appellants point out that challenges under the NRS
295.009 single-subject requirement and to the description of effect must be
made within 15 days of the proposed initiative's initial submission to the
Secretary of State, NRS 295.061(1), which period, they assert, does not
allow sufficient time to gather signatures pre-challenge. They argue that,
in this instance, they were prohibited from collecting any signatures post-
challenge by the district court's order. In appellants’ view, collecting
signatures on the petition was impracticable because the district court had
declared the initiative invalid and suggested that its description of effect
was improper.

Second, appellants indicate that they are planning to file an
identical initiative petition in 2012, and thus, they continue to seek this

As respondents point out, the district court's order enjoined the
Secretary of State from placing the matter on the ballot, not the collection
of signatures. Appellants provided no support in their written and oral
arguments for their contention that they were unable to collect signatures
due to the district court’s order.

 
om

 

court's guidance on the matter now, suggesting that because of the short
time period governing ballot initiatives, the issue could again become moot
and evade review.

As to appellants’ concerns that the initiative-challenge statute
does not allow adequate time for pro-challenge signature gathering or for
judicial review, we note that while the initiative deadlines in general are
relatively short, the district court must expedite any challenges to an
initiative, NRS 295,061(1), and this court typically resolves ballot-related
cases before they become moot, often expediting such cases when
requested to do so. See, e.g., In xe Candelaria, 126 Nev. __, _ P.3d __
(Adv. Op. No. 40, October 14, 2010) (expediting briefing and entering a
summary disposition before later explai

 

 

ing the disposition in an opinion,

LYCVA v. Secretary of State, 124 Nev. 669,
191 P.3d 1188 (2008) (expediting appeals and resolving case before

to meet election deadline:

 

November general election).

As for appellants’ plans to file a similar initiative petition in
2012, addressing a potential future initiative at this point would be
jon. See Nev. Const. art.
6, § 4; Applebaum v. Applebaum, 97 Nev. 11, 12, 621 P.2d 1110, 1110
(1981) (This court will not render advisory opinions on moot or abstract
questions.”); City of No. Las Vegas v. Cluff, 85 Nev. 200, 201, 452 P.2d
461, 462 (1969) (declining to review a challenge to an initiative when no
actual controversy existed). Further, it is not clear that this matter, which
concerns facts specific to this initiative, is of such public, widespread

 

speculative and lead to an improper advisory opii

importance to necessitate this court's review regardless of the claimed
inability to provide effective relief. ‘Thus, as the matter does not appear

likely to evade review in the future and does not raise a legal issue or

 
 

public policy question of widespread importance, we are not convinced that
the exception to the mootness doctrine applies.

As respondents point out in their reply, other courts have
fismissed appeals under similar circumstances. See Ulmer y. Alaska
Restaurant & Beverage Ass'n, 33 P.3d 778 (Alaska 2001) (dismissing an

appeal because the question regarding a proposed initiative petition’s

 

summary became moot when its sponsors failed to file the petition by the
deadline and no exception to the mootness doctrine applied, since that
court typically resolves such issues in time, the initiative might not be
proposed again, and the issue was not so important as to warrant
discussion despite lacking a current controversy); Asher v. Carnahan, 268
S.W.3d 427 (Mo, Ct. App. 2008) (dismissing an appeal challenging the
language of a ballot summary that became moot when the proponents of
the initiative petition failed to submit signatures by the deadline, since no
guarantee existed that the language at issue would be used again in the
future by both the secretary of state and the lower court); Kerr_v,
Bradbury, 131 P.3d 737 (Or. 2006) (dismissing as moot a petition for
review when the proponents of a ballot measure failed to collect sufficient
signatures). Likewise, we conclude that the capable-of-repetition-yet-
evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine is inapplicable here,
and this appeal should be dismissed. Accordingly, we now consider
whether, in dismissing this appeal, it is necessary to vacate the district
court decision in order to avoid preclusive effects on subsequent initiative
petitions.
Vacatur is not necessary

Generally, courts agree that parties whose appeal from a
judgment has been prevented through no fault of their own should not
necessarily be bound in future litigation by the preclusive effects arising

7

 
from that judgment. See 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 531 (2006). This
principle has been effectuated in at least two different ways, however.

One approach, taken by the federal courts, applies preclusion
principles unless the party seeking relief has asked the appellate court to
reverse or vacate the underlying judgment. See U.S, Bancorp Mortgage
Co, v, Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1994); United States v.
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 86 (1950); 18C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3633.10 (3d
ed. 2008 and Supp. 2010). This practice “clears the path for future

 

relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment,
review of which was prevented through happenstance.” Bonner Mall
Partnership, 513 U.S, at 22-23 (quoting Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40).
According to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments,
however, the federal approach of requiring a party to move for reversal or
vacatur to avoid preclusion has been “criticized as setting a procedural
trap for the unwary” and has not been adopted by many state courts,
although some have made clear in their dismissal orders that no
preclusive effect is to be given to the lower court's order, Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 28 (1982) reporter's note (citing 46 Am. Jur, 24
judgments § 464 (1969)). Therefore, the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments advocates a second approach: issue preclusion principles
simply do not apply when an appeal has been rendered moot.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(1) cmt. a.

Many state courts agree. For example, the Connecticut
Supreme Court, in Commissioner of Motor Vehicles v. DeMilo & Co,, 659
A.2d 148, 156-59 (Conn. 1995), adopted the Restatement (Second)
approach as regards issue preclusion, consequently declined to follow the

 

 
federal approach, and determined that as for collateral consequences
stemming from the unreviewable judgment itself, that judgment was not
void, but voidable and subject both to direct attack by motion to set aside
upon balancing the hardships and finality considerations and to collateral
attack in an enforcement proceeding. See also Grau v, Board of Zoning
Appeals of Baltimore County, 122 A.2d 824 (Md. 1956); Salem v, Mass,
Com'n Against Discrimination, 693 N.E.24 1026 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998),
‘overruled _on other grounds by Trustees of Health and Hospitals. v,
MCAD, 839 N.H.2d 861 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005); In re Guardianship of
Doornbos, 151 P.3d 126, 127 (Okla. 2006). We agree with the courts that
adopt the Restatement (Second) § 28(1), comment a, and conclude that in

 

Nevada, when an appeal is dismissed as moot by no fault of the appellant,
the lower court's determination of an issue in the matter will have no
preclusive effect in future litigation.

Relying on the Connecticut opinion, appellants ask that their
supplemental brief be considered a direct motion to set aside the district
court's order based “upon balancing the hardships and finality
considerations,” asserting that the decision could be asserted as binding
precedence in the future. DeMilo & Co,, 659 A.2d at 158. But as
discussed above, under the Restatement (Second) of Judgments approach,
the district court's order has no preclusive effect, and thus, there is no
need to set the order aside to avoid it: being used as binding precedent. Id,
at 158, Accordingly, as appellants have not justified any remand to the
district court for the balancing of any hardships collaterally imposed by
the court's order against finality considerations, we deny their request to

consider the brief a motion to set the order aside,

 

 
om

 

CONCLUSION
Because the deadline for submitting ballot initiative
signatures and the November 2010 election have passed, this court can
afford no relief from the district court's injunctive order, and this appeal is
dismissed as moot. Adopting the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, we

conclude that because appellate review was precluded as a matter of law,

Ino preclusive effect is to be given the district court's order in any
subsequent litigation.

Hardesty

10