Case Title: Rodabaugh v. Ross

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rodabaugh v. Ross1991 WY 27807 P.2d 380Case Number: 89-184Decided: 03/11/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
Andrea M. RODABAUGH, as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Douglas Paul Rodabaugh, Petitioner 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Charles ROSS and Rupert 
Romero, Respondents (Defendants).

Appeal from the Supreme 
Court, Thomas, J.

Mark J. White, 
White, White, Keenan & Roberts, P.C., Riverton, and Robert R. Rose, Jr., and 
Robert R. Rose, III, Spence, Moriarity & Schuster, Cheyenne, for 
petitioner.

Frederick J. 
Harrison, Rawlins, for respondent 
Ross.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Ron Arnold, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Larry M. Donovan, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., for amicus curiae, State of Wyo.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS,* CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1.]     The question sought to 
be raised in this case by virtue of the certification of a constitutional 
question pursuant to § 1-13-101, W.S. 1977 (June 1988 Repl.),1 and Rule 52(c), W.R.C.P., is 
whether Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4, forecloses the extension of immunity to a 
co-employee pursuant to § 27-14-104(a), W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.). The essence 
of the Petitioner-Plaintiff's position is that this extension of immunity 
eliminates a cause of action in favor of an injured worker and that such a 
limitation is not permissible because it constitutes a limitation on the damages 
recoverable for injury or death. Because the case came to us as a reserved 
constitutional question, we are sensitive to the limitations upon the authority 
of this court to respond to certified constitutional questions that have been 
imposed by precedent. After scrutinizing the record, we are persuaded that this 
is not a case in which there is nothing left for the trial court to do but to 
apply the constitutional ruling and decide the case. Consequently, while we 
recognize the frustrations that this approach may impose upon the parties and 
the trial court, we conclude that the case must be remanded without answering 
the constitutional questions.

[¶2.]     Andrea M. Rodabaugh 
(Rodabaugh), the personal representative of the estate of Douglas Paul 
Rodabaugh, deceased, as the Petitioner-Plaintiff, articulates the substantive 
issue as follows:

"1. Is W.S. 1977 § 
27-14-104(a); Laws 1989, ch. 226 § 1 unconstitutional as being in violation of 
the provisions of Article 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution?"

That statement 
of the substantive issue was accepted by Charles Ross (Ross), one of the 
Respondents-Defendants. Rupert Romero (Romero) did not provide any separate 
response in this case.

[¶3.]     A brief discussion of 
the underlying facts is helpful in understanding the court's refusal to respond 
to the constitutional question. On October 8, 1987, Douglas Paul Rodabaugh, the 
Plaintiff-Petitioner's decedent, was employed by Forrest Construction, a sole 
proprietorship owned by Douglas Forrest. Ross and Romero were co-employees of 
Douglas Rodabaugh. Forrest had entered into a contract with the Sinclair 
Refinery to haul its waste materials to a disposal site approximately five miles 
from the refinery. Douglas Rodabaugh was returning to the refinery in an empty 
truck at the same time that Ross and Romero were departing the refinery with 
full loads. When these drivers were approximately one to one and one-half miles 
apart and proceeding toward each other, Ross pulled into the driving lane 
occupied by Douglas Rodabaugh's oncoming truck. There is an indication in the 
record that Ross had been known to play dangerous games while driving on prior 
occasions. Douglas Rodabaugh had no such reputation. Evasive action was 
attempted, but Douglas Rodabaugh was killed in the ensuing head-on collision. 
Ross survived the accident, but was seriously injured.

[¶4.]     A little more than a 
year later, Rodabaugh filed a wrongful death action against Ross, Romero, and 
Forrest in which she asserted a claim for damages for the wrongful death of 
Douglas Rodabaugh based upon allegations of negligence, gross negligence, and 
culpably negligent conduct on the part of all defendants. Forrest was Douglas 
Rodabaugh's employer and had worker's compensation coverage in effect. 
Therefore, Forrest was dismissed as a party to the suit. In April of 1989, an 
amended complaint was filed pursuant to which Rodabaugh added claims of 
negligent entrustment and negligence per se and sought relief in the form of a 
declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of § 27-14-104(a), W.S. 1977 
(June 1987 Repl.). Rodabaugh then filed her Motion to Reserve Constitutional 
Issue to the Supreme Court for the State of Wyoming. The trial court entered its Order of 
Reservation granting the motion pursuant to § 1-13-101, W.S. 1977, and the 
matter proceeded in this court through briefing and oral argument.

[¶5.]     The Order of 
Reservation entered in the trial court on August 3, 1989 does not reference the 
statute and, further, no mention is made of Rule 52(c), W.R.C.P. Rule 52(c), 
W.R.C.P., provides:

"(c) Reserved 
questions. - In all cases in which a district court reserves an important 
and difficult constitutional question arising in an action or proceeding pending 
before it, the district court, before sending the question to the Supreme Court 
for decision, shall (1) dispose of all necessary and controlling questions of 
fact and make special findings of fact thereon, and (2) state its conclusions of 
law on all points of common law and of construction, interpretation and meaning 
of statutes and of all instruments necessary for a complete decision of the 
case. No constitutional question shall be deemed to arise in an action unless, 
after all necessary special findings of fact and conclusions of law have been 
made by the district court, a decision on the constitutional question is 
necessary to the rendition of final judgment. The question reserved shall be 
specific, and shall identify the constitutional provision to be interpreted. The 
special findings of fact and conclusions of law required by this subdivision of 
this rule shall be deemed to be a final order from which either party may 
appeal, and such appeal may be considered by the Supreme Court simultaneously 
with the reserved question."

This court has 
said that the rule "provides a supplement to the statutory procedure for 
reserving constitutional questions to this court in civil cases." State v. 
Rosachi, 549 P.2d 318, 320 (Wyo. 1976). See Matter of Certified Question 
from United States District Court, District of Wyoming, 549 P.2d 1310 
(1976).

[¶6.]     In the trial court, the 
original Rodabaugh complaint asserted that Romero and Ross were acting outside 
the scope of their employment. In an answer, the response was made that both 
were acting within the scope of their employment. The amended complaint does not 
address scope of employment, and no answer was filed to it. Instead, Ross 
proceeded to file a motion for summary judgment premised upon the assumption 
that, because all drivers had received worker's compensation benefits, there was 
no question as to scope of employment. In responding to the motion for summary 
judgment, Rodabaugh first contended that the statute upon which Ross premised 
his motion was unconstitutional, but went on to urge upon the trial court the 
proposition that, if the statute were deemed to be constitutional, a question, 
which Rodabaugh contended was a genuine issue of material fact, still existed as 
to whether Ross and Romero were within the scope of their 
employment.

[¶7.]     There is present an 
issue of fact in the district court as to whether Ross and Romero were within 
the scope of their employment. If they were not, the accused statute, of course, 
would have no application, and the constitutionality of the statute would not be 
in issue. Under those circumstances, responding to the certified question could 
cast this court in the posture of having rendered an advisory opinion, a 
function that does not belong to the court under our constitutional framework 
and precedent. WyomingState Treasurer v. City of Casper, 551 P.2d 687 (Wyo. 
1976); Tobin v. Pursel, 539 P.2d 361 (Wyo. 1975). We should not afford an advisory 
opinion with respect to what might happen in the future with respect to this 
particular case. West v. Willey, 453 P.2d 883 (Wyo. 1969). See Ririe v. Board of Trustees of 
School District No. One, Crook County, Wyoming, 674 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 
1983).

[¶8.]     Given the situation 
that pertains in this case, we conclude that the court is well advised to follow 
the wisdom espoused in earlier cases and, therefore, decline to answer the 
certified question. We have, without deviation, held that the court should not 
address, and resolve, the constitutional issue in those instances in which the 
trial court has not disposed of all of the necessary, and controlling, questions 
of fact and has not set forth its conclusions of law with respect to all 
questions other than the constitutional question. Rosachi; Griffith, ex rel. 
Workmen's Compensation Department v. Stephenson, 494 P.2d 546 (Wyo. 1972); 
Harding v. State, 478 P.2d 64 (Wyo. 1970); State ex. rel. Fawcett v. Board of 
County Commissioners of Albany County, 73 Wyo. 69, 273 P.2d 188 (1954); Keefe, 
State ex rel. v. Jones, 62 Wyo. 61, 161 P.2d 135 (1945). See Roberts v. City of 
Rock Springs, 52 Wyo. 89, 68 P.2d 891 (1937).

[¶9.]     We acknowledge the 
temptation to simply dispose of this case on the merits in light of the decision 
in Mills v. Reynolds, 807 P.2d 383 (Wyo. 1991). Appropriate exercise of judicial 
restraint, however, dictates otherwise. The case must be remanded without 
resolving the reserved questions.

[¶10.]  Case remanded - questions 
unanswered.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 1-13-101, W.S. 
1977 (June 1988 Repl.), provides:

"When an important and 
difficult constitutional question arises in a proceeding pending before the 
district court on motion of either party or upon his own motion the judge of the 
district court may cause the question to be reserved and sent to the supreme 
court for its decision."

 
 

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

[¶11.]  This court has accepted the amicus curiae 
position taken by the State to require remand. With that result, I concur, since 
there is a "status" dispute factually remaining which had not been resolved by a 
court decision.

[¶12.]  Upon remand, the trial court will be 
called to determine whether Charles Ross had engaged in the game of "chicken" 
while driving a large dirt-hauling truck on a narrow countryside road and, if 
so, retained his status for immunity purposes of being within his scope of 
employment. The decision will be required, even though both the decedent's 
survivors and Charles Ross received Worker's Compensation benefits as a result 
of the fatal two-vehicle, head-on collision. This legal question of how workers 
can be covered for one purpose and not covered for another purpose at the same 
time within the same industrial accident will leave an interesting analysis for 
the trial court upon remand.

[¶13.]  This case and its yet undeveloped facts 
re-emphasize why the majority is wrong in Mills v. Reynolds, 807 P.2d 383 
(Wyo. 1991) and Bunker v. Niggemyer, 807 P.2d 383 (Wyo. 
1991), both in constitutional concept and work place damage 
analysis.

[¶14.]  Taking one contention of the facts in 
this case where a fact finding trial has not yet been provided, a co-employee, 
Charles Ross, was engaged in criminal driving misconduct in playing "chicken" on 
a narrow country road while driving a large earth-hauling vehicle. The available 
record would suggest that he did not know that it was his foreman, not a 
co-employee with whom he had previously played the game, that he met that 
October morning on that countryside driveway. A man was killed as a result. If 
these facts are correct, a serious crime was committed and a wrongful death was 
caused by conduct which in no way related to the proper performance of his 
employee responsibilities.

[¶15.]  For whatever reasons of misguided policy, 
the legislative amendment took away from the survivors of the foreman centuryold 
rights to recover redress for a most serious wrong - the killing of their 
husband and father. Significant specific and clear constitutional rights are 
lost by the legislative abrogation. See Mills, 807 P.2d 383, Urbigkit, Chief 
Justice, dissenting. As this case goes back to the trial court, and then most 
likely again to return, I will continue my objection to a Wyoming constitutional 
amendment by statutory enactments. I will also continue to believe that the 
specific rights clearly provided by the Wyoming Constitution both deserve and 
require our protection and maintenance. The insurance companies, which 
constitute the real parties in interest in these cases, do not deserve the 
largess provided by applied immunity of their insureds from responsibility. This 
is not litigation between an employer and employee - this involves two drivers 
on a country road, one of whom was killed when hit head-on by a vehicle which 
was in his lane at impact. In concurring to remand, I will not accept the 
validity of ultimate resolution by the immunizing application of W.S. 
27-14-104(a).

[¶16.]  Consequently, I specially concur, 
although I believe that justice will not be served until constitutional rights 
under Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4 and access to the courts under Wyo. Const. art. 
1, § 8 are reaffirmed within our responsibility to preserve that standard for 
Wyoming 
society.

MACY, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶17.]  I dissent. This Court is being 
hyper-technical. As a matter of judicial economy, we should grant a writ of 
certiorari and dispose of this case in accordance with Mills v. Reynolds, 807 P.2d 383 (Wyo. 
1991).