Case Title: State v. Streeter

Citation: 406 P.2d 590, 67 Wash. 2d 39

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1965-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
67 Wn.2d 39 (1965) 406 P.2d 590 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. BRENT MERRILL STREETER, Appellant.[*] No. 37665. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. September 30, 1965. Wettrick, Toulouse, Lirhus & Hove and Arnold J. Barer, for appellant. Charles O. Carroll and August F. Hahn, for respondent. HAMILTON, J. The defendant stands convicted of seven counts of burglary and one count of grand larceny. On appeal, he makes two assignments of error. He contends (a) that the trial court did not determine the voluntariness and admissibility of certain incriminating oral statements and a written confession before submitting them to the jury, as required by Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 101.20W, RCW vol. 0, and (b) that the written confession was the product of an implied promise that the statement would not be used against him, thus involuntary. Briefly, the background facts are as follows: On the afternoon of October 31, 1963, several King County law enforcement officers, armed with a search warrant, entered a dwelling house in Seattle in search of stolen property. In the course of the search, they apprehended and arrested *40 the defendant who then, and shortly thereafter, made incriminating oral statements relative to the several offenses forming the basis of the various counts. Subsequently, on November 4, 1963, an officer from the Kirkland City Police Department interviewed defendant concerning the burglarizing of a Kirkland cannery, an offense constituting one of the counts. Defendant admitted participation in the Kirkland burglary and signed a written statement to that effect. Before trial commenced, defendant challenged the voluntariness of the oral and written statements. A hearing was held in the absence of the jury to determine the issues raised by defendant's challenge. At this hearing defendant, in essence, asserted that the oral statements were the result of force and fear. The officers who heard the oral admissions denied the use of any force or threats. Concerning the written statement, defendant testified as follows: On cross-examination, the defendant further testified: *41 The officer taking the statement testified relative thereto as follows: At the conclusion of the testimony and the arguments of counsel, the trial court summarized its findings upon defendant's challenge as follows: And, speaking particularly with reference to the taking of the written confession, the trial court further said: A jury was thereafter selected and, during the course of the trial, the oral admissions and the written confession *42 were admitted in evidence. Defendant did not take the stand and testify before the jury. His conviction followed. We find no merit in defendant's contention that the trial court did not, prior to submission of the oral and written statements to the jury, determine their voluntariness. In support of this contention, defendant makes reference to certain preliminary remarks of the trial judge concerning the procedure required by Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 101.20W, RCW vol. 0, and the principles confirmed by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 84 Sup. Ct. 1774, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1964). These remarks, however, are taken out of context. A full review of the preliminary proceedings and of the trial judge's decision at the conclusion thereof, with particular reference to the portions hereinabove quoted, dispels the unfortunate inferences created by the inapposite remarks referred to by defendant. We are satisfied the trial judge did determine the voluntariness of the confessions in question before submitting them to the jury. Defendant's principal contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in its determination of voluntariness and admissibility of the written confession concerning the Kirkland burglary. He does not contend nor assert that the confession is false, for, as the testimony indicates, he frankly admitted during the course of the preliminary hearing before the trial court that he did participate in the Kirkland burglary. He contends, rather, that the confession was the product of an implied promise that it would not be used against him and, therefore, its admission into evidence contravened his rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. In support of his contention, defendant relies upon Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 42 L. Ed. 568, 18 Sup. Ct. 183 (1897), and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489 (1964). [1] We have not heretofore had occasion to pass directly upon the precise issue raised by this contention, because RCW 10.58.030 (based upon Laws of Wash. Terr. 1854, *43 § 96, p. 117; Laws of Wash. Terr. 1873, § 232, p. 234; Code of 1881, § 1070) provides in part: Whatever lingering doubts may have remained concerning the import of RCW 10.58.030, as it bore upon confessions induced by promises, rather than coercion, have been effectively obliterated by the United States Supreme Court decision in Malloy v. Hogan, supra, wherein that court states (p. 6): In the instant case, we are convinced, as was the trial court, that the officer's version of the conversation surrounding the making of the written confession is straightforward and true, and that the defendant's recollection of the conversation is hazy. Under the officer's version, he advised the defendant, in essence, that it was not his prerogative to file charges but that it was his duty to turn any statement made by the defendant over to the prosecuting attorney. In short, he told the defendant the truth. Against this background, the defendant gave the written confession in question. Applying the "free and voluntary" test of the Malloy case, supra, to the circumstances here revealed, we are satisfied that the officer's statements to the defendant did not amount to a direct or indirect promise of whole or partial immunity. It cannot, therefore, be realistically stated that the confession was the product of such inducement. The judgment and sentence is affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., DONWORTH and WEAVER, JJ., and STAFFORD, J. Pro Tem., concur. November 19, 1965. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 406 P.2d 590. [1] The written summary designated as exhibit No. 2 was not submitted to the jury.