Case Title: Laramie County Sheriff's Dep't v. Cook

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0152

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
LARAMIE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT v. KENNETH COOK2012 WY 47Case Number: S-11-0152Decided: 03/28/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
LARAMIE 
COUNTY SHERIFF’S 
DEPARTMENT,Appellant(Respondent),v.KENNETH 
COOK,Appellee(Petitioner).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County
The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, Deputy Laramie County Attorney, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Stephen 
H. Kline and Melinda S. McCorkle, Kline Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Kline.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]      Kenneth Cook was 
terminated from his employment as a Laramie County Sheriff Department (Sheriff 
Department) deputy for violating department policies related to report writing 
and firearms security.  Deputy Cook 
requested a contested case hearing before the Laramie County Sheriff (Sheriff), 
who upheld his dismissal from the department.  He then petitioned the district court 
for review.  The district court 
reversed, concluding that the record did not contain substantial evidence 
demonstrating cause existed to dismiss Deputy Cook on the basis of his violation 
of department policies.  The 
Sheriff’s Department appealed to this Court.  We agree with the district court that 
the record does not substantiate the Sheriff’s findings that there was 
sufficient cause to terminate Deputy Cook’s employment with the Sheriff’s 
Department.
 
 
[¶2]      We, therefore, 
affirm the district court’s reversal of the Sheriff’s decision.  
 
ISSUE
 
[¶3]      Both parties 
present the same issue for our review:
 
Whether 
the Laramie County Sheriff’s decision to terminate Appellee from his employment 
as a deputy sheriff was supported by substantial evidence, was in accordance 
with law, or was arbitrary, capricious, or constituted an abuse of 
discretion.
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]      Deputy Cook was a 
deputy sheriff with the Sheriff’s Department.  During the early morning hours of 
December 27, 2009, Deputy Cook was performing off-duty security for the Outlaw 
Saloon in Cheyenne, Wyoming.  In 
accordance with department policy, he was dressed in uniform even though he was 
technically working for the Outlaw Saloon.  
United States Air Force Sergeant Timothy Finch, who was stationed at F.E. 
Warren Air Force Base, and Russell Edwards, an off-duty Cheyenne Police 
Department officer, got into a fight in the bar.  At the request of saloon personnel, 
Deputy Cook and another deputy who was also working off-duty security at the 
Outlaw Saloon escorted the men out of the establishment.  Deputy Cook took charge of Sergeant 
Finch, who stated that his face hurt as a result of the fight.  Deputy Cook offered to call an 
ambulance.  The sergeant initially 
refused but later accepted the offer, and he was transported to the 
hospital.  
 
[¶5]      After finishing 
his shift at the Outlaw Saloon at approximately 2:00 a.m., Deputy Cook reported 
for duty at the Sheriff’s Department at 6:15 a.m. on the same day; he was also 
on duty the following three days.  
Deputy Cook did not initially prepare a report on the incident because he 
said “it wasn’t a typical call for service where somebody called and asked for 
our help,” neither Sergeant Finch nor Officer Edwards indicated he wanted to 
press charges, and he did not see any visible sign of injury to Sergeant 
Finch.    
 
[¶6]      On December 28, 
2009, the victim assistance coordinator for the Sheriff’s Department was 
contacted by an official from the F.E. Warren Air Force Base, seeking 
compensation for Sergeant Finch’s injuries.  He had apparently suffered a detached 
retina, broken eye socket and broken cheekbone.  The victim assistance coordinator asked 
Lieutenant Linda Gesell about the incident, but she did not know anything about 
it.  Later, the victim assistance 
coordinator contacted Deputy Cook and he provided information about the 
incident.  Lieutenant Gesell walked 
in during this conversation and asked for Deputy Cook’s report.  Deputy Cook replied that he had not 
written a report and did not feel that one was necessary.  She instructed him to prepare a report 
and submit it to her the next day.  
  
 
[¶7]      Deputy Cook 
complied with Lieutenant Gesell’s request and submitted a report the next day. 
 Nevertheless, she opened an 
administrative investigation to review his possible violations of department 
policies during the Outlaw Saloon incident.  After her investigation, Lieutenant 
Gesell determined that Deputy Cook had violated department policies and 
recommended that he be terminated from his position.  Deputy Cook’s supervisor, Captain 
Richard Hillegas, agreed with the recommendation of dismissal and placed Deputy 
Cook on administrative leave pending a hearing.   
 
[¶8]      Deputy Cook was 
on duty when he was placed on administrative leave and was escorted to his 
patrol car to gather his department-issued weapons.  His department-issued shotgun was not in 
his patrol car, but was, instead, in a gun locker at his brother’s house.  Upon learning that Deputy Cook did not 
have the shotgun in his car, Lieutenant Gesell issued a second recommendation 
for termination, concluding that he had violated the department’s firearm 
policy.  Captain Hillegas again 
agreed with Lieutenant’s Gesell’s recommendation.    
 
[¶9]      Pursuant to 
Deputy Cook’s request, a contested case hearing was held on April 29, 2010, 
before the Sheriff.  After the 
hearing, the Sheriff issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order 
terminating Deputy Cook from the Sheriff’s Department.  Deputy Cook petitioned the district 
court for review of the Sheriff’s decision.  The district court reversed, concluding 
that the record did not support the Sheriff’s determinations that Deputy Cook 
had violated department policies and, consequently, did not establish cause for 
his termination.  The Sheriff’s 
Department appealed to this Court.            

 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶10]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-611(b) 
(LexisNexis 2011) states that non-probationary full-time deputies employed by 
large sheriff’s departments are entitled to a hearing before being dismissed 
from employment.  The Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act governs the proceeding; accordingly, judicial 
review of a sheriff’s decision after a contested case hearing is accomplished 
under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 
2011):
 
(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:
     (i) Compel agency 
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
    (ii)  Hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings and conclusions found to be:
         
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;
         
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;
         
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or 
lacking statutory right;
         
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or
         
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute.
 
[¶11]   When an appeal is taken from a 
district court’s review of an administrative agency’s decision, we review the 
case as if it had come directly from the administrative agency without deferring 
to the district court’s decision.  Dutcher v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 
10, ¶ 9, 223 P.3d 559, 561 
(Wyo. 2010); Dale 
v. S & S Builders, LLC, 
2008 WY 84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 
2008).  In accordance 
with § 16-3-114(c)(ii), we review the agency’s findings of fact by applying the 
substantial evidence standard.  
Dale, 
¶ 21, 188 P.3d  at 561.  Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 
Bush v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. Div., 
2005 WY 120, ¶ 5, 120 P.3d 176, 179 (Wyo. 
2005) 
(citation omitted).  “'Findings of 
fact are supported by substantial evidence if, from the evidence 
preserved in the record, we can discern a rational premise for those 
findings.’” 
Kenyon v. 
State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 14, 
¶ 11, 247 P.3d 845, 849 (Wyo. 
2011), quoting Bush, ¶ 5, 120 P.3d  at 
179.  
 
[¶12]   The arbitrary and capricious 
standard is a safety net “'to catch agency action which prejudices a party’s 
substantial rights or which may be contrary to the other W.A.P.A. review 
standards yet is not easily categorized or fit to any one particular standard.’” 
 Dale, ¶ 23, 188 P.3d  at 561, quoting 
Newman 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 
2002 WY 91, ¶ 23, 49 P.3d 163, 172 (Wyo. 
2002).  The arbitrary and capricious standard 
applies, for example, if “the hearing examiner refused to admit testimony or 
documentary exhibits that were clearly admissible or failed to provide 
appropriate findings of fact or conclusions of law.” Dale, ¶ 23, 188 P.3d  at 561.  An agency’s conclusions of law are 
always reviewed de novo.  Moss v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2010 WY 
66, ¶ 11, 232 P.3d 1, 4 
(Wyo. 2010); Dale, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d  at 
561.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶13]   Section 18-3-611(a) and (b) 
governed Deputy Cook’s dismissal:
 
(a)  
This 
section applies to sworn nonprobationary, full-time deputies of a sheriff's 
department which employs at least twenty (20) sworn, full-time deputies. . . . 

(b)  
A 
deputy sheriff shall not be discharged from employment, reduced in rank or 
suspended without pay except for cause and after notice and opportunity for a 
hearing. The hearing and any appeal shall be conducted in accordance with the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. The hearing shall be closed unless both 
the sheriff and the deputy involved agree otherwise.

In 
Lucero v. Mathews, 901 P.2d 1115, 1122-23 (Wyo. 1995), 
we defined “cause” under § 18-3-611(b) as “cause 
or justification which bears a reasonable relationship to the deputy sheriff’s 
ability and fitness to perform and discharge the duties of his or her 
position.”  Violation 
of department disciplinary policies may provide cause for termination.  See, Fisch v. Allsop, 4 P.3d 204, 208 (Wyo. 2000).  
 
[¶14]   The Sheriff determined that Deputy 
Cook had violated three different employment policies with respect to the 
incident at the Outlaw Saloon. 
 His decision 
stated:
 
28.  On December 27, 2009, Deputy Kevin Cook 
and [another deputy] worked an off-duty detail in uniform, providing security 
for the Outlaw Saloon.  As an 
off-duty officer, Deputy Cook was first and foremost a deputy sheriff of the 
Laramie County Sheriff’s Department, with “authority to enforce State law and 
maintain public order.”  Department 
Policy No. 07.03.  Clearly, Deputy 
Cook and [the other deputy] were hired by the Outlaw in a uniformed, off-duty 
capacity because of their Wyoming Peace Officer status.  During this off-duty detail, Deputy Cook 
was asked to escort from the bar, Airman Timothy Finch, who reported to Deputy 
Cook he had been sucker punched and requested an ambulance.  Deputy Cook contacted the Laramie County 
Sheriff’s Department regarding the “situation and need for an ambulance” and the 
Department dispatch recorded the following:  “23 yoa male possible broken cheek 
bone.”  Deputy Cook was aware Finch 
had been injured, that at least a violent misdemeanor had occurred and knew 
Finch was an airman, yet failed to notify an on-duty supervisor regarding the 
incident or to “perform his/her duties as required by law and Department policy 
and procedure.”  Department Policy 
07.03.  Deputy Cook failed to take 
appropriate action as a certified police officer of the State of Wyoming.  
 
            
29.       
Later the same morning of the Outlaw Saloon incident, Deputy Cook was 
on-duty in his position as a deputy for the Laramie County Sheriff’s 
Department.  Until [the victim 
assistance coordinator] received a phone call from [Air Force personnel] 
regarding Airman Finch, no one in the Department other than Deputies Cook [and 
the other deputy] knew about the altercation between Finch and Edwards in which 
. . . Finch suffered a detached retina, fractured cheek bone and broken eye 
socket and was transported by ambulance to the hospital.  When asked by Lt. Gesell about a report 
of the incident, Deputy Cook stated a report did not need to be written although 
he admitted in his testimony a report should have been written.  Deputy Cook’s failure to investigate the 
incident and write a report until ordered to do so exhibits unsatisfactory work 
performance, carelessness, failure to perform assigned duties and the exercise 
of poor judgment in violation of Department Policy No. 3.04.    
 
            
30.       
Airman Finch suffered serious injuries in the altercation at the Outlaw 
Saloon.  Deputy Cook’s call to 
dispatch requesting an ambulance acknowledged the seriousness of Airman Finch’s 
injuries evidenced by the dispatch record, noting “23 yoa male possible broken 
cheek bone.”  Under Department 
Policy No. 04.13, deputies are responsible for their own case management.  Finch’s request for an ambulance and the 
notation from Deputy Cook’s call to dispatch shows Deputy Cook clearly 
understood that Finch had been involved in at least a violent misdemeanor, 
requiring a written report under Department Policy No. 04.13 C (2).  Deputy Cook failed to provide a written 
report until ordered to do so in violation of Department Policy No. 04.13.    
 
[¶15]   The Sheriff referred to policies 
03.04, 04.13, and 07.03 in his decision.  
Policy No. 03.04, titled “Employee Discipline,” stated in 
part:
 
General 
Provisions
 
A.   The 
Laramie County Sheriff’s Department does not provide its employees with an 
all-inclusive list of prohibited behavior that may result in discipline.  The following list represents examples 
of conduct that may result in disciplinary action.  The list is intended to provide examples 
of such conduct that may result in discipline, but is not intended to be all 
inclusive:
. 
. . .
2.         
Failure to perform assigned duties
 
3.         
Carelessness
. 
. . .
10.       
Unsatisfactory work performance 
 
Policy 
No. 04.13, titled “Case Management and Report Writing,” stated in pertinent 
part:
 
Procedure
 
A.   The 
patrol section is responsible for taking initial complaints.  Reports on criminal incidents will be 
completed by the deputies initially assigned.  Cases involving follow-up investigations 
will be handled by the deputy initially assigned; although, those cases that are 
unusually complicated may be forwarded to detectives with the approval of the 
shift supervisor.  Deputies should 
complete their reports in the field as much as possible.  Reports must be submitted to the records 
section no later than the last workday of the deputy’s workweek.  Reports of arrested persons or emergency 
detentions will be completed prior to the end of shift.  
 
B.   Deputies 
are responsible for their own case management . . . . 
C.   The 
following types of crimes/incidents require a written 
report:
 
2.         
All misdemeanors involving violence . . . .
. 
. . .
19.       Any other 
incident requiring a report by Wyoming State Statutes. 
 
The 
relevant part of Policy No. 07.03, titled “Off-Duty Employment,” 
stated:
 
                        
POLICY:
 
Department 
employees may be allowed to seek part-time, off-duty employment so long as such 
employment doesn’t constitute a conflict of interest or interfere with 
Department operations.
 
Definitions:
 
Off-Duty 
Employment
 
Any 
employment that constitutes an activity, contract agreement or arrangement with 
any person, business, group, activity, industry or endeavor, whether public or 
private, where payment is received by the off-duty employee for services 
rendered.
 
Law 
Enforcement Work
 
Any 
employment in which off-duty deputies are hired because of their Wyoming Peace 
Officer status giving them the authority to enforce State law and maintain 
public order.
 . . . .
Procedure:
. 
. . .
Law 
Enforcement Work
 
A.   [sic]  Off-duty deputies are deputy sheriffs of 
the Laramie County Sheriff’s Department first and foremost, and secondarily 
employees of their off-duty employer.  
In any situation where the law enforcement function of the deputy 
conflicts with the desires of the off-duty employer, the off-duty deputy will 
perform his/her duties as required by law and Department policy and 
procedure.     

 
[¶16]   We interpret the Department’s 
employment policies by inquiring into the ordinary and obvious meaning of the 
words.  See, e.g., Bailey v. State, ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 
152, ¶ 10, 243 P.3d 953, 956 
(Wyo. 2010) (interpreting administrative rules like statutes); Town of Evansville Police Dep’t v. Porter, 
2011 WY 86, ¶ 18, 256 P.3d 476, 486 (Wyo. 2011) 
(interpreting police department personnel rule/ordinance as administrative 
regulation).  This Court will 
generally “defer to an administrative agency’s construction of its rules unless 
that construction is clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the plain meaning of 
the rules.”  Pinther v. State of Wyoming, Dep’t of Admin. 
& Information, 866 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Wyo. 1994).   

 
[¶17]   The Sheriff stated, in Paragraph 28 
of his decision, that Deputy Cook violated his duties under Policy 7.03 by 
failing to notify an on-duty supervisor regarding the incident at the Outlaw 
Saloon.  The clear language of 
Policy 7.03 requires an off-duty deputy who is performing law enforcement work 
to perform his duties required by law and Department policy and procedure.  However, there is nothing in Policy 
7.03, or any other policy cited by the Sheriff, which required Deputy Cook to 
notify his supervisor of the incident.  
As such, the Sheriff did not have a rational premise for his finding that 
Deputy Cook violated Policy 7.03, and that finding is not supported by 
substantial evidence.
 
[¶18]   In Paragraphs 29 and 30, the 
Sheriff stated that Deputy Cook’s failure to investigate and write a report 
until ordered to do so violated Department Policy 4.13’s requirements regarding 
written reports and exhibited unsatisfactory work performance, carelessness, 
failure to perform assigned duties and the exercise of poor judgment in 
violation of Department Policy 3.04.  
The evidentiary record does not support the Sheriff’s finding that Deputy 
Cook failed to investigate until ordered to do so.  Deputy Cook’s undisputed testimony 
indicated that he conducted an investigation, albeit an abbreviated one, on the 
night of the incident.  He stated 
that he talked with witnesses about their observations of Sergeant Finch’s 
behavior during the night in question and the altercation between Sergeant Finch 
and Officer Edwards and questioned Sergeant Finch about the fight right after it 
occurred.  Deputy Cook conducted 
additional investigation in preparation for filing his written report.       

 
[¶19]   Concerning Deputy’s Cook’s 
obligation to submit a written report, Department Policy 4.13 governed deputies’ 
case management duties and required written reports for all misdemeanors 
involving violence.  The policy 
contained no language indicating that a violation of its provisions occurred if 
a deputy did not write a report until ordered to do so.  Instead, the clear language of the 
policy stated that “[r]eports must be submitted to the records section no later 
than the last workday of the deputy’s workweek.”  The undisputed facts of this case 
established that Deputy Cook briefly investigated the incident on the night of 
its occurrence, conducted additional investigation after Lieutenant Gesell asked 
for a report, and submitted his report prior to the end of his work week on 
Wednesday, December 30, 2009.  As 
such, the Sheriff’s determination that Deputy Cook failed to comply with 
department policies in regard to his written report is not supported by 
substantial evidence.    

 
[¶20]   Policy 3.04 provides a 
non-exclusive list of prohibited behaviors which can establish cause for 
discipline.  The Sheriff stated that 
Deputy Cook violated the express provisions of Policy 3.04 by his “failure to 
perform assigned duties,” “carelessness,” and “unsatisfactory work performance.” 
 The Sheriff also stated that Deputy 
Cook’s actions otherwise violated Policy 3.04 by exhibiting poor judgment.  Although the Sheriff had authority to 
discipline Deputy Cook for any of those stated reasons, he did not offer any 
explanation of how Deputy Cook violated the policy except to say that he failed 
to investigate and submit a report until ordered to do so.  Given our conclusion that the record 
does not support the Sheriff’s determination that Deputy Cook violated his 
obligations to investigate or submit a written report, the Sheriff’s findings 
that he violated Policy 3.04 by the same actions and such violations amounted to 
cause for his termination are, likewise, unsupported by substantial evidence in 
the record.1
 
[¶21]   The Sheriff also concluded that 
dismissal of Deputy Cook from his position was appropriate because he violated 
Department Policy 5.03 by failing to properly secure his shotgun.  The Sheriff’s decision 
stated:
 
31.       Deputy Cook 
was on-duty as a Sheriff’s deputy at the time of his suspension from employment 
with the Department and according to Department procedure, was escorted to his 
patrol vehicle to obtain his lethal and less lethal weapons.  Deputy Cook’s shotgun was not in his 
patrol vehicle, nor was it secured in a Department weapons locker, office or his 
vehicle trunk.  Instead, for more 
than a year, Deputy Cook had locked his shotgun in a gun locker at his brother’s 
house, away from his control.  
Although Deputy Cook had informed Sgt. James that his gun did not fit in 
the patrol car’s gun mount and Sgt. Lopez testified he failed to follow up on 
providing either a gun case or gun mount for the shotgun, the ultimate 
responsibility remained with Deputy Cook to ensure his firearm was under his 
control.  It is incredulous to think 
that if a situation arose in which Deputy Cook required the use of his less 
lethal shotgun, he could drive to his brother’s house to retrieve it.  By failing to secure the shotgun in a 
manner under his control, Deputy Cook placed the public, other deputies, himself 
and someone who may need the application of less than lethal force, in grave 
danger, violating Policy No. 05.03.   
  
 
[¶22]   Department Policy 05.03 was titled 
“Firearms/Duty Gear,” and stated, in relevant part: 
 
Firearms 
Security
 
A.   Deputies, 
while on duty, are responsible for the security of all firearms under their 
control.  Any firearms left outside 
the deputy’s area of immediate control will be secured with a lock.  This could include being locked in a 
weapons locker, locked office, vehicle trunk, desk, file cabinet, vehicle 
gunlock, etc.  Deputies while off 
duty, are responsible for the security of Department issued weapons under their 
control.  
 
[¶23]   As we stated above, we look to the 
ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed in the policy to determine 
its meaning.  Bailey, ¶ 10, 243 P.3d  at 956; Town of Evansville Police Dep’t, ¶ 18, 
256 P.3d  at 486.  The policy states 
that on-duty deputies are responsible for the security of all firearms under 
their control.  Lieutenant Gesell 
testified:
 
Q.        What 
is the department’s expectation with where an officer’s department-issued 
weapons will physically be while that officer is on duty?
 
A.        Well, 
under their immediate control.  If 
for some reason that it has to be locked up, we would suggest a gun locker at 
the sheriff’s department, a locked office at the sheriff’s department, a locked 
cabinet at the sheriff’s department.  
The trunk of their car would suffice while they’re on duty in a case so 
they would have it.  Ultimately it 
should be carried in their gun rack in their car.  
 
Q.        So 
the ideal place is in the gun rack in the car?
 
A.        
Correct.
 
Q. 
       So if 
I see a patrol officer on the streets, I could reasonably expect there to be 
shotgun in the rack in his vehicle?
 
A.        If 
the department issues it, yes.  

. 
. . .
Q.        So 
why is it -- I mean, he’s -- I understand from [Deputy Cook’s attorney] that 
Deputy Cook’s going to testify the shotgun was, in fact, secure and that it was 
not accessible to other people.  How 
does that impact his ability to serve in his role as a peace officer with it 
being at his brother’s house?
 
A.        When 
you are placed in a situation where we have to use a level of force, whether it 
be a low level of force or the ultimate level of force, meaning deadly force, 
you don’t get time to call king’s X and get a chance to run to your home to pick 
up a piece of equipment or someone else’s home to pick up a piece of 
equipment.  We don’t have that 
luxury.  We have to deal with what 
we have right then and there.  

 
[¶24]   The plain language of the policy 
does not support Lieutenant Gesell’s interpretation.  Policy 5.03 does not state that all 
weapons have to be within an officer’s immediate control while he is on 
duty.  It states that, while on 
duty, deputies “are responsible for the security of all firearms under their 
control.”  Department Policy 
5.03.  The policy specifically 
contemplates that a deputy will not always have immediate control of the weapon 
when it states:  “Any firearms left 
outside the deputy’s area of immediate control will be secured with a 
lock.”  Id.  In addition, although Lieutenant Gesell 
testified, and the Sheriff agreed, that the policy was intended to require the 
shotgun to be readily available to the deputy, the policy does not state that.2  The obvious purpose of the “Firearms 
Security” policy is to make sure that weapons are properly secured at all 
times.  
 
[¶25]   The undisputed facts establish that 
Deputy Cook’s shotgun was secured in a gun locker at his brother’s house.  This arrangement fit within the clear 
meaning of the policy which required that, while outside of a deputy’s immediate 
control, the weapon would be secured with a lock.  One of the possible locations allowed by 
the policy was in a weapons locker.  
The Sheriff’s ruling that Deputy Cook violated the policy by keeping his 
shotgun in a gun locker at his brother’s house is not supported by substantial 
evidence.3  
 
[¶26]   We, therefore, conclude the 
Sheriff’s determination that cause existed to discharge Deputy Cook on the basis 
of his violation of department policies is not supported by substantial 
evidence.  In light of our ruling 
that there is no evidentiary basis for the Sheriff’s decision, we do not need to 
specifically consider whether it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion or otherwise contrary to law.
 
[¶27]   We affirm the district court’s 
decision reversing the Sheriff’s order.  
 
 
FOOTNOTES
1The Sheriff’s Department argues, on appeal, that prior disciplinary 
incidents involving Deputy Cook also supported the Sheriff’s decision that 
Deputy Cook violated Policy 3.04.  
There was evidence that Deputy Cook had previously been disciplined for 
“spark testing” his Taser in a hospital emergency room and falling asleep in his 
patrol car when he was supposed to be providing security for cash stored 
overnight at Frontier Park during Frontier Days.  Although the Sheriff referred to the 
incidents in his findings of fact, he did not specifically rely on those 
previous disciplinary actions in finding cause for Deputy Cook’s dismissal in 
this case.  

2Of course, the Sheriff’s Department has the authority to adopt a policy 
to meet the unquestionably laudable goal of requiring deputies to keep their 
shotguns within their immediate control while on duty.  
3There was a great deal of testimony at the hearing about the reason for 
Deputy Cook’s decision to keep the shotgun at his brother’s house.  Apparently, the gun would not fit in the 
gun mount in his patrol car and he was unable to locate a gun case so it could 
be stored in the trunk of his car.  
One of his supervisors, Sergeant Rick Lopez, testified that he had 
failed, as a supervisor, to follow up after Deputy Cook told him about the 
problems he had with keeping his shotgun in his car.  We will not delve into this aspect of 
the evidence as it is clear that Deputy Cook did not violate the policy by 
keeping his shotgun in the gun locker at his brother’s house, regardless of his 
reasons for doing so.