Case Title: State v. Davis

Citation: 165 Vt 240, 683 A.2d 1

Docket Number: 95-090

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Davis (95-090); 165 Vt 240; 683 A.2d 1

[Opinion Filed 21-Jun-1996]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 95-090


State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit

Richard Davis                                     April Term, 1996


David Suntag, J.

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

Charles S. Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       ALLEN, C.J.  Defendant appeals his jury convictions for kidnapping, 13
  V.S.A. § 2405, and simple assault, 13 V.S.A. § 1023.  He argues that the
  allocation of the burden of proof under 13 V.S.A. § 2405(b) violates the
  United States and Vermont Constitutions and that the trial court erred when
  it failed to hold a competency hearing.  Defendant also argues that the
  court committed other trial errors regarding the admission or exclusion of
  evidence.  We affirm.

       On July 10, 1993, the victim, then married to defendant, left him and
  obtained a restraining order against him.  She filed for divorce on July
  23, and defendant subsequently threatened her with violence if she
  proceeded with the divorce.  On August 16, defendant entered the victim's
  home and waited there for her to return from work.  When the victim opened
  the door, defendant sprayed her in the face with pepper spray.  He struck
  her in the face, hitting her in the jaw and nose.  He then pulled her into
  the bedroom by her hair, while at the same time kicking her.  After
  throwing the victim onto the bed, defendant tore her clothes from her body
  while continuing to strike her.  Picking up some duct tape, defendant told
  her to put

 

  her hands behind her back and that she was "going for a ride."  She
  initially refused but he threatened to beat her more if she did not
  cooperate with his request.

       After allowing the victim to put some clothes back on, defendant taped
  her hands behind her back.  He led her to her car, where he forced her face
  down into the back seat.  At that time, he said, "I put a gun in the trunk. 
  You're going to go with me and watch me while I shoot myself."  Defendant
  then drove the car up an isolated mountain road.  After a while, he stopped
  the car and spoke to her in a desultory manner, saying that he was not sure
  whether he was going to shoot himself, or her, or her and then himself.

       Defendant moved the victim to the front seat and continued to drive. 
  While driving, he continued to threaten the victim with violence.  As they
  passed a home with people outside, the victim yelled for help.  In
  response, defendant sped up and struck the victim in the jaw. Defendant
  then turned off the road and drove across a field, stopping at the edge of
  a wooded area.  Defendant dragged the victim from the car and towards the
  woods.  Before reaching the woods, he severed the tape binding her wrists
  and said, "Go on.  Get out of here."  As the victim fled, defendant drove
  the car towards her.  She jumped into a grove of trees, and he drove off.

       The victim walked to the road and flagged down a passing motorist. 
  The motorist took the victim to an emergency room in St. Johnsbury, where
  she was found to have a laceration above her right eye, bruising and
  swelling around both eyes, a swollen left cheek and jaw, a broken nose,
  scratches and abrasions on her neck, and abrasions on her back and
  buttocks.

       The incident was reported to the police and a bulletin to "be on the
  lookout" for defendant, possibly driving the victim's car, was broadcast to
  officers on patrol.  Later that evening, two state troopers drove to
  defendant's mother's trailer, where defendant lived, to look for him. 
  Before knocking on the trailer door, the officers noticed the victim's
  automobile parked seventy feet behind the trailer.  Although the troopers
  did not find defendant at that location, they had the victim's automobile
  removed by a wrecker and taken to a secure location.

 

  The victim's automobile was subsequently searched with her consent.

       The police also looked for defendant at the victim's home, and
  searched for evidence of the crime while there.  They located a paper bag
  containing a number of items from the victim's home, but which she had not
  placed in the bag.  One item, not from her home but found in the bag, was a
  United States Navy knife and sheath, both wrapped in a vinyl tent bag.  At
  trial, the victim testified that she had never seen the knife before, and
  did not know to whom it belonged. She recognized the tent bag as from a
  tent that she had purchased; she had given the tent to defendant's parents
  when they came to collect defendant's belongings after the victim and
  defendant separated.

       Defendant was apprehended and subsequently charged with kidnapping and
  aggravated assault.  The information charging defendant with kidnapping
  reflected the statutory punishment of life imprisonment.  On November 23,
  1993, defendant entered into a plea agreement, and the State amended the
  charge to mitigated kidnapping, with a maximum sentence of thirty years
  imprisonment.  Defendant later withdrew his plea with the permission of the
  court.  Before trial, however, the information was not amended to again
  reflect punishment of life imprisonment.

       Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude
  evidence of the victim's psychiatric hospitalizations in 1969 and 1984. 
  The defense sought to introduce medical records showing the victim had
  attempted suicide and had been hospitalized for observation.  The medical
  records also included references to her use of alcohol.  The defense sought
  to use the evidence to impeach the victim.  The trial court excluded the
  evidence on the ground that it was not probative of the victim's
  truthfulness.  The court also found the evidence prejudicial to the victim.

       Before trial, defendant's attorney filed a motion for a competency
  evaluation, and the court ordered an examination.  The competency
  evaluation was performed on October 5, 1993. The psychiatric examiner's
  report noted that defendant was of low-average intelligence and had no
  previous inpatient or outpatient psychiatric history.  In the report, the
  examiner also stated

 

  that defendant understood the charges against him, understood the roles of
  the participants in the criminal proceeding, and was capable of assisting
  in the preparation of his defense.  A competency hearing, scheduled for
  November 9, 1993, was cancelled when defendant entered into a plea
  agreement.  When defendant sought to change his plea, defense counsel
  stipulated to the findings in the psychiatric report and agreed that
  defendant was competent to stand trial.

       A different attorney was assigned to defendant for the trial. 
  Defendant's second attorney told the court that he was "concerned about
  competency" and noted that defendant had been uncooperative because he
  "either doesn't have the ability or he's unwilling and stubborn."  The
  trial judge noted that, based on his own observations and his review of the
  competency report, he was not concerned about defendant's competency. 
  Nevertheless, the judge suggested that a mental health screener evaluate
  defendant to determine whether a full-scale competency examination should
  be performed.  Defense counsel told the court that that course of action
  was "acceptable."

       The following morning, the court provided defendant with a mental
  health screener. Defendant refused to speak with the mental health
  screener, so the mental health screener reviewed the competency report and
  spoke to defense counsel about defendant's behavior.  The mental health
  screener concluded that defendant's unwillingness to cooperate with counsel
  resulted from immaturity rather than mental illness.  Defense counsel
  "continue[d] to have some concerns" and said, "I don't know if that's
  paranoia or not, but he feels very isolated, feels that nobody has listened
  to him."  The trial judge responded that, "it does not appear to me there
  is a competency issue."  The competency issue did not arise again.

       During trial, defendant filed two motions seeking the recusal of the
  trial judge, the first before trial and the second before sentencing.  The
  first motion sought recusal on the ground that the judge had presided over
  defendant's change-of-plea hearing.  The administrative judge denied
  defendant's first motion because the trial judge's prior involvement in a
  judicial capacity was insufficient grounds for disqualification.  The
  second motion sought the trial judge's recusal from

 

  sentencing because information from defendant's competency evaluation had
  erroneously been included in the presentence investigation report, which
  the trial judge had reviewed.  On defendant's request, however, the trial
  judge struck from the report defendant's competency evaluation and ordered
  the preparation of a new report by a different probation officer.  The
  administrative judge also denied defendant's second recusal motion.

       A jury convicted defendant of kidnapping and of the lesser-included
  offense of simple assault.  The trial judge sentenced defendant to life
  imprisonment, with not less than twenty-five years to serve.

                                I.

       Defendant argues that the kidnapping statute, 13 V.S.A. § 2405,
  unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to the defendant.  We
  conclude that the legislative allocation of the burden of proof in §
  2405(b)(FN1) is clearly permissible under the United States and Vermont
  Constitutions.

       In Patterson v. New York,