Case Title: CYRIL K. RICHARD V. DONNA TAYLOR RICHARD

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0038

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
CYRIL K. RICHARD V. DONNA TAYLOR RICHARD2007 WY 180170 P.3d 612Case Number: S-07-0038Decided: 11/13/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
CYRIL 
K. RICHARD,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.DONNA TAYLOR 
RICHARD,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal from theDistrictCourtofTetonCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

William 
R. Fix and Jenna V. Mandraccia of William R. Fix, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Lea 
Kuvinka of Kuvinka & Kuvinka, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and BURKE, JJ., and SANDERSON, 
D.J.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Cyril 
K. Richard (Husband), seeks review of an order of the district court that denied 
his motion for relief from the decree of divorce entered by the district 
court.  That motion was filed 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b)1 and Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-16-401 
(LexisNexis 2007).2  Husband contended that Appellee, 
Donna Taylor Richard (Wife), 
"intentionally and negligently misrepresented to [Husband] material facts that 
inherently effected [sic] [Husband's] rights to a fair distribution of the 
parties' property, assets, debts, and liabilities, namely the above-referenced 
misrepresentations in relation to Jackson Hole Athletic Club."  Husband also contends that the district 
court erred in denying his motion for a continuance of the hearing on his Rule 
60(b) motion.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Husband 
articulates this issue:

 
 
I.          
Whether the lower Court's Order Denying [Husband's] W.R.C.P. 60(b) Motion 
for Relief was proper and in accordance with established 
law.

 
 
Wife 
more accurately captures the contentions argued in Husband's 
brief:

 
 
1.  Did 
the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied the Husband's Motion to 
Vacate and Reset Hearing?

 
 
2.  Did 
the District Court err in denying Husband's Rule 60(b) 
motion?

 
 
PROCEEDINGS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT

 
 
[¶3]      The parties 
entered into a sealed settlement agreement which was filed in the district court 
on March 15, 2005.  A decree of 
divorce that contained very little information, other than referring to the sealed 
settlement agreement, was entered on September 28, 2005.  Husband filed his Rule 60(b) motion on 
September 25, 2006.  Wife filed her 
response on October 12, 2006.  By 
order entered on October 25, 2006, the district court set the matter for a 
one-half hour long hearing on November 9, 2006 (although it turned out the 
district court allowed forty-five minutes).  On November 2, 2006, Husband filed a 
motion to vacate and to reset the hearing, contending that he needed more time 
"to conduct discovery and depositions in this matter," and that more than 
one-half hour would be required for the hearing.  Wife objected to what we will refer to 
as a motion for a continuance, asserting that Husband had had over a year since 
the divorce decree was entered in which to do any necessary discovery.  The district court denied the motion for 
continuance.  By order entered on 
December 22, 2006, the district court denied Husband's substantive motion.  Husband's notice of appeal was filed on 
January 19, 2007.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Denial 
of Motion for Continuance

 
 
[¶4]      This appears to 
be a threshold question, because if Husband was entitled to more time to develop 
his "fraud" theory, by means of discovery of various sorts, then it might be 
necessary to reverse the district court's substantive order.  On the other hand, as we will set out 
more fully below, Husband may not have been entitled to a hearing at all unless 
he had, by his motion, posited an actual controversy before the district court 
which merited a hearing.  Wife 
contends that the parties' sealed settlement agreement prohibited Husband from 
filing such an action  even if he could have posited an actual controversy for 
the district court's consideration.  
Finally, these parties settled amongst themselves the terms of their 
divorce, and we have always expressed our preference for honoring such 
settlements.  Thus, the district 
court might well have not taken this matter up at all, in light of our 
historical commitment to not disturbing such settlements.

 
 
[¶5]      However, we will 
begin with the district court's denial of the motion for a continuance 
(denominated by Husband as a motion to vacate and reset) for the sake of 
simplicity.  U.R.D.C. 201 
provides:  "Cases will not be 
continued upon stipulation of counsel.  
Continuances will be granted only for good cause shown in writing."  At the outset, of course, this case was 
not in a posture where it was set for trial, the time for that had long since 
come and gone.

 
 
[¶6]      The trial court 
has broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for continuance, and absent 
a manifest abuse of discretion, the reviewing court will not disturb such a 
ruling.  To find an abuse of 
discretion, the refusal must be so arbitrary as to deny appellant due process, 
and the burden rests upon appellant to prove actual prejudice and a violation of 
his rights.  Upon review, we look at 
the peculiar circumstances of the case and the reasons presented to the trial 
judge at the time of the request.  
Abraham v. Great Western 
Energy, LLC, 2004 WY 145, 
¶ 16, 101 P.3d 446, 454 (Wyo. 2004) (citing Byrd v. Mahaffey, 2003 WY 137, ¶ 7, 
78 P.3d 671, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2003)); also see Urich v. Fox, 687 P.2d 893, 894-897 
(Wyo. 1984) (it is an abuse of discretion to set trial with only five days of 
notice).  Husband relies heavily 
upon our decision in Abraham even 
though it is not pertinent authority for the proposition he brings before 
us.  In Abraham, the district court set a 
deadline for discovery as a part of its pretrial order, but then held a hearing 
on a motion for summary judgment before that deadline had passed.  We held that that was an abuse of 
discretion and a denial of due process, especially because Abraham was in the 
process of conducting important discovery in response to materials submitted 
with the motion for summary judgment.  
The circumstances of Husband's case differ markedly from those presented 
by Abraham.  We conclude that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for 
continuance.

 
 
Denial 
of Rule 60(b) Motion

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court's order stated only that the motion was denied.  During the hearing, the district court 
heard the arguments of counsel and made these brief comments at the end of those 
arguments:

 
 
            
Mr. Fix, I obviously didn't give you the continuance.  I am going to hold that  and I agree, 
Mr. Fix and Mr. Richard, with Ms. Kuvinka that Section 17 does preclude 
obviously that the parties agreed, I think both parties probably have more 
business knowledge, obviously had more experience running businesses than most 
of the people, probably than any of us in this courtroom, the attorneys and the 
Court certainly included.

But 
that the settlement agreement was fair and equitable and that the parties 
entered into it with their experts and the mediation, serial mediation as Mr. 
Fix referred to it, and that Section 17 does preclude the Court going any 
further and I don't even think that I have to reach the question of 
estoppel.

            
I was going to reread that Abraham case, that has to do with your 
discovery motion, however, Mr. Fix, but I don't think that's necessary because I 
do agree that  I don't know what good the discovery would do because Section 
17, I think, precludes the reopening of this based on the reasons as set forth 
in your motion.

 
 
[¶8]      Husband contends 
that the district court's reliance on Section 17 of the agreement is misplaced 
and, therefore, the matter must be remanded to the district court for 
reconsideration.  We will discuss 
that further below, but we interject here a reminder that the district court may 
be affirmed on any valid basis appearing in the record.  Arnold v. Day, 2007 WY 86, ¶ 14, 158 P.3d 694, 698 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶9]      After the 
district court made its determination, it did hear an offer of proof3 from Husband that was directed both 
to the question of fraud, as well as to why he had not conducted any 
discovery/depositions prior to filing the motion (in essence he stated that he 
had tried to discuss it with Wife for many months, but she refused to discuss 
the matter).  In any event, the 
offer of proof did nothing to advance Husband's claims of fraud, nor did it 
excuse his lack of clear and convincing evidence to support his personal opinion 
that his wife had defrauded him (or for that matter got the better of him in the 
divorce settlement).

 
 
[¶10]   The Settlement Agreement contained 
these recitals:

 
 
The 
parties fully understand the terms, conditions and provisions of this Agreement 
and each believes the terms are fair, just and reasonable.  Each of the parties has had an 
opportunity to consult with counsel prior to the execution of this Settlement 
Agreement.  Each party has also had 
an opportunity to consult with his or her accountant or bookkeeper relative to 
any tax consequence of this Agreement.

 
 
            
Husband and Wife fully and freely accept the provisions of this 
Settlement Agreement and agree as follows:

 
 
.

            
17.  ENTIRE AGREEMENT.  This agreement contains the entire 
understanding of the parties and there are no representations, warranties, 
covenants or undertakings other than those expressly set forth 
herein.

 
 
[¶11]   We need not dispositively determine 
if Section 17 precluded this action, although it appears that it probably 
did.  There is, however, a more 
definitive and dispositive reason for affirming the district court, and that is 
that Husband did not meet his burden of coming forward with the requisite level 
of "clear and convincing evidence" to sustain his claim (and this is so even 
when we accept all of his allegations and offer of proof as true).  11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller 
and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, § 2860 (Fraud, Misrepresentation, and Other Misconduct  
Generally), at 310-317 (1995 and Supp.2007); also see generally Stephen R. 
Pitcher, Divorce and Separation:  Fraudulent Procurement of Property 
Settlement, 28 Am. Jur. POF2d 663 (1981 and Supp. 
2007).

 
 
[¶12]   Indeed, Husband's assertion 
evaporates completely when the documentation included in the record is taken 
into consideration.  The gravamen of 
his contention is that Wife misled him about the value of the Jackson Hole 
Athletic Club.  In an apparent 
effort to value the Athletic Club at a very high level, because he assumed Wife 
wanted it as a part of her portion of the property division, Husband submitted 
an affidavit for the district court's consideration that stated that the Club 
made a profit of $76,000.00 in 2002 (this profit was after Wife received her 
salary of $4,333.33 per month and after taking off the debt service  otherwise 
profit would have been $107,000.00).  
Husband went on to opine that the business "could fetch $740,000.00 on 
the open market."  This is in marked 
contrast to Wife's assertion that the Athletic Club had a negative value of 
$287,000.00 and was wallowing in debt, which turned out to be an accurate 
assessment of its financial condition.

 
 
[¶13]   Finally, of course, there is the 
matter of our longstanding principle that the courts favor property settlement 
agreements.  Lipps v. Loyd, 967 P.2d 558, 560-61 
(Wyo. 
1998).  We have examined the 
settlement agreement entered into by the parties prior to their divorce and 
determine that this is an appropriate case to employ that principle.  The parties acknowledged as a part of 
the agreement that it is fair and just, and the evidence in the record bears 
that out.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶14]   For the reasons set out above, we 
hold that the district court did not err in denying Husband's motion for a 
continuance nor did the district court err in denying Husband's Rule 60(b) 
motion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1W.R.C. P. 
60(b) provides:

 
 
(b)  Other Reasons. 
-- On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or 
a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons:  (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;  (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b);  (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse 
party;  (4) the judgment is 
void;  (5) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based 
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application;  or (6) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment.  
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), 
(2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken.  A motion under 
this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation.  This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from 
a judgment, order, or proceeding as provided by statute, or to grant relief to a 
party against whom a judgment or order has been rendered without other service 
than by publication as provided by statute.  Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, 
audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, 
are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall 
be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.  [Emphasis 
added.]

  

2§ 1-16-401. Authority of 
court; grounds.

 
 
            
(a)  A district court may vacate or modify its own judgment or 
order after the term at which it was made:

(i)  By granting a new trial when the grounds for a new trial 
could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered before, but are 
discovered after the original motion for a new trial has been passed upon by the 
district court;

                        
(ii)  By a new trial granted in proceedings against defendants 
constructively summoned;

            
(iii)  For mistake, neglect or omission of the clerk or 
irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order;

                        
(iv)  For fraud 
practiced by the successful party in obtaining a judgment or 
order;

            
(v)  For erroneous proceedings against a minor or person of 
unsound mind, when the condition of the defendant does not appear in the record 
nor the error in the proceedings;

                        
(vi)  For the death of the parties before judgment in the 
action;

            
(vii)  For unavoidable casualty or misfortune preventing the 
party from prosecuting or defending;

(viii)  For errors in a judgment shown by a minor within twelve 
(12) months after arriving at the age of majority;

(ix)  For taking judgments upon warrants of attorney for more 
than was due the plaintiff, when the defendant was not summoned or otherwise 
legally notified of the time and place of taking the 
judgment;

(x)  When the judgment or order was obtained in whole or in a 
material part by false testimony on the part of the successful party or any 
witness in his behalf which ordinary prudence could not have anticipated or 
guarded against and the guilty party has been convicted.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 

3Rule 103. 
Rulings on evidence.

 
 
            
(a)  Effect of Erroneous 
Ruling. -- Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, 
and

(1)  Objection. -- In case the 
ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears 
of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was 
not apparent from the context;  
or

(2)  Offer of Proof. -- In 
case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which 
questions were asked.

            
(b)  Record of Offer and 
Ruling. -- The court may add any other or further statement which shows the 
character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, 
and the ruling thereon.  It may 
direct the making of an offer in question and answer 
form.

            
(c)  Hearing of 
Jury. -- In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent 
practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the 
jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking 
questions in the hearing of the jury.

            
(d)  Plain Error. -- 
Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting 
substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the 
court.