Case Title: State ex rel. C.V. Perry & Co. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Elections

Citation: 2002-Ohio-1369

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. C.V. Perry & Co. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Elections, 94 Ohio St.3d 442, 
2002-Ohio-1369.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. C.V. PERRY & CO. v. LICKING COUNTY BOARD OF 
ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. C.V. Perry & Co. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Elections (2002), 
94 Ohio St.3d 442.] 
Elections — Prohibition — Writ sought to prevent Licking County Board of 
Elections, its chairman, and its members from submitting Etna Township 
Resolution 01-12-03-03 involving rezoning to a referendum at the May 7, 
2002 election — Complaint dismissed, when. 
(No. 02-209 — Submitted February 26, 2002 — Decided March 1, 2002.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  In 1999 and 2000, relator, C.V. Perry & Co. (“Perry”), 
contracted to purchase two adjoining parcels of land in Etna Township, Licking 
County, Ohio.  The property was zoned agricultural.  In December 2000, Perry 
applied to change the zoning classification of the property from agricultural to 
planned unit development so that it could build single-family residences and 
residential condominiums on the property.  In response to concerns raised by 
neighboring residents of the proposed development, Perry removed the proposed 
condominiums from the development plan.  Perry filed its final development plan, 
which was dated September 11, 2001. 
 
On November 14, 2001, the Etna Township Zoning Commission 
recommended to the Etna Board of Township Trustees that Perry’s application to 
rezone the property to planned unit development for the final development plan be 
approved.  On December 3, 2001, the board of township trustees enacted 
Resolution 
01-12-03-03, 
which 
adopted 
the 
zoning 
commission’s 
recommendation and provided: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
“To accept the recommendation of the Etna Township Zoning 
Commission to rezone the Frontier Ranch property at National Road and York 
Road from AG to PUD, Final Development Plan dated September 11, 2001 and to 
send a letter of support to the Licking County Planning Commission for a gate at 
Daisy Drive or to not have a stub street to Daisy Drive.” 
 
In late December 2001, a petition to have a referendum on the resolution 
at the May 7, 2002 election was filed with the board of township trustees.  The 
summary of Resolution 01-12-03-03 on the petition provided: 
 
“To rezone a parcel of land commonly referred to as the Frontier Ranch 
property, which contains approximately 170.46 acres, more or less, located at 
National Road (U.S. Route 40) and York Road, from AG to PUD, as shown on 
the attached map. 
 
“The proposed amendment was adopted by the Etna Township Trustees on 
December 3, 2001 as Resolution 01-12-03-03.” 
 
On January 4, 2002, Perry filed a protest with respondent Licking County 
Board of Elections against the referendum petition.  Perry amended the protest on 
January 15 and 28.  On January 28, 2002, respondents, the board of elections, its 
chairman, and its members, held a hearing on Perry’s protest at which testimonial 
and documentary evidence was presented.  At the conclusion of the hearing, 
respondents denied the protest and certified the referendum issue for the May 7, 
2002 ballot. 
 
On February 4, Perry filed this action for a writ of prohibition to prevent 
respondents from submitting the referendum issue to the township electors.  On 
February 8, Perry filed a motion to treat this action as an expedited election matter 
pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9).  On February 21, respondents filed an answer.  
This cause is now before the court for our S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) determination, as 
well as our consideration of Perry’s motion for expedited consideration. 
Motion to Expedite 
January Term, 2002 
3 
 
Perry requests that this case be treated as an expedited election matter 
under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9).  S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) provides an expedited evidence and 
briefing schedule when an original action relating to a pending election is filed 
within ninety days prior to the election.  Because Perry’s prohibition action was 
filed ninety-two days before the May 7, 2002 election, it is not an expedited 
election matter under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9). 
 
Nevertheless, Perry requests that we treat this case as an expedited 
election matter under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) because “[e]xpediting the case will be in 
the interests of the parties and prevent any interference with the election 
schedule.” 
 
We grant Perry’s request but only to the extent that we expedite our 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) determination, i.e., following a response by respondents, which 
has now been filed.  “We have consistently required relators in election cases to 
act with the utmost diligence.”  State ex rel. Carberry v. Ashtabula (2001), 93 
Ohio St.3d 522, 523, 757 N.E.2d 307.  Given the required diligence in election 
cases, expediting our S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) determination will be beneficial to 
township electors here. 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) Determination 
 
Under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5), we must determine whether dismissal, an 
alternative writ, or a peremptory writ is appropriate.  Dismissal is warranted if it 
appears beyond doubt, after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations 
and making all reasonable inferences in favor of Perry, that Perry is not entitled to 
the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition.  State ex rel. Rasul-Bey v. 
Onunwor (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 119, 120, 760 N.E.2d 421.  On the other hand, if, 
after construing the material factual allegations of the complaint most strongly in 
Perry’s favor, it appears that his complaint may have merit, an alternative writ 
should be granted, and a schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefs 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
should be issued.  State ex rel. DeBrosse v. Cool (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 716 
N.E.2d 1114. 
 
In order to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Perry must establish that (1) 
the board of elections is about to exercise quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of 
that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denial of the writ will cause injury for 
which no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law exists.  State ex rel. 
Newell v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 592, 594, 757 
N.E.2d 1135.  The dispositive issue here is whether Perry established that the 
board’s exercise of quasi-judicial authority in denying the protest was 
unauthorized by law. 
 
In determining whether Perry established this requirement, the applicable 
standard is whether the board engaged in fraud or corruption, abused its 
discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions in denying 
Perry’s protest.  State ex rel. Phillips v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 
Ohio St.3d 535, 538, 757 N.E.2d 319.  Perry asserts that the board of elections 
abused its discretion and clearly disregarded R.C. 519.12(H) by denying its 
protest.  For the reasons that follow, the board neither abused its discretion nor 
clearly disregarded R.C. 519.12(H) in denying Perry’s protest, and we deny the 
requested extraordinary relief in prohibition. 
R.C. 519.12(H):  Brief Summary Requirement 
 
R.C. 519.12(H) provides that a petition requesting a referendum on a 
township zoning amendment resolution contain a brief summary of the contents 
of the resolution: 
 
“Such [zoning] amendment adopted by the board [of township trustees] 
shall become effective in thirty days after the date of such adoption, unless, within 
thirty days after the adoption of the amendment, there is presented to the board of 
township trustees a petition * * * requesting the board of township trustees to 
submit the amendment to the electors of such area for approval or rejection at a 
January Term, 2002 
5 
special election to be held on the day of the next primary or general election.  
Each part of this petition shall contain the number and the full and correct title, if 
any, of the zoning amendment resolution, motion, or application, furnishing the 
name by which the amendment is known and a brief summary of its contents.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The R.C. 519.12(H) “brief summary of its contents” requirement refers to 
the zoning resolution, motion, or application passed or approved by the board of 
township trustees.  State ex rel. O’Beirne v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 
80 Ohio St.3d 176, 179, 685 N.E.2d 502.  A valid zoning referendum petition 
summary must be accurate and unambiguous; therefore, “ ‘[i]f the summary is 
misleading, inaccurate, or contains material omissions [that] would confuse the 
average person, the petition is invalid and may not form the basis for submission 
to a vote.’ ”  State ex rel. Hamilton v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections (1993), 67 
Ohio St.3d 556, 559, 621 N.E.2d 391, quoting Shelly & Sands, Inc. v. Franklin 
Cty. Bd. of Elections (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 140, 141, 12 OBR 180, 465 N.E.2d 
883, both construing the analogous R.C. 303.12(H) summary requirement for 
referenda on county zoning resolutions; O’Beirne, 80 Ohio St.3d at 179, 685 
N.E.2d 502 (township zoning resolution). 
 
Perry asserts that the referendum petition summary of Resolution 01-12-
03-03 does not comply with R.C. 519.12(H) because “it failed to include any 
reference to the zoning change being for Relator’s development plan dated 
September 11, 2001 or for any specific development plan, failed to include any 
statement that the zoning change was for single family residences, and failed to 
describe the proposed change in zoning classifications as being from 
‘Agricultural’ to ‘Planned Unit Development.’ ”  According to Perry, the 
summary thus failed to inform signers of the precise nature of the zoning change, 
contained material omissions, and was ambiguous, all of which could confuse the 
average person signing the petition. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
Regarding Perry’s challenge of the referendum petition’s failure to include 
a statement that the zoning change was for single-family residences and to specify 
the meaning of the zoning classifications “AG” and “PUD,” the petition summary 
contained the same information as the resolution it summarized.  In other words, 
Resolution 01-12-03-03 does not include a statement that the zoning change is for 
single-family residences, nor does it explain that “AG” means agricultural or that 
“PUD” means planned unit development. 
 
In this regard, the summary is an accurate reflection of the language 
contained in the resolution that is the subject of the referendum petition.  
Inclusion of this text of the resolution satisfies the “brief summary” requirement 
of R.C. 519.12(H).  See, generally, O’Beirne, 80 Ohio St.3d at 180, 685 N.E.2d 
502 (“Inclusion of the full text of the amendment of the ordinance generally 
satisfies the ‘brief summary’ requirement of R.C. 519.12[H]”); Christy v. Summit 
Cty. Bd. of Elections (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 35, 39, 671 N.E.2d 1.  We will not 
penalize the township electors’ attempt to exercise their right of referendum for 
summarizing the resolution with substantially the same wording as the resolution 
itself. 
 
Similarly, the summary’s omission of any reference to the final 
development plan was not so material as to mislead or confuse the average 
person.  The summary informs electors of the precise nature of the zoning change, 
i.e., from the “AG” classification to the “PUD” classification.  As emphasized by 
the appellate court in Rose v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections (Sept. 22, 1995), 
Montgomery App. No. 15358, unreported, 1995 WL 558820: 
 
“R.C. 519.12 requires a ‘brief summary’ of the contents of the zoning 
amendment.  Both the adjective ‘brief’ and the noun ‘summary’ connote brevity 
rather than comprehensiveness.” 
 
Based on the foregoing, while the language suggested by Perry’s claims 
may have constituted an improvement over the language used by the referendum 
January Term, 2002 
7 
petitioners, the summary is not misleading or inaccurate and does not contain 
material omissions that would confuse the average person.  Therefore, the board 
did not abuse its broad discretion in denying Perry’s protest.  This result comports 
with our duty to liberally construe referendum provisions in order to permit the 
exercise of the power and to promote rather than prevent or obstruct the object 
sought to be attained.  See, e.g., Stutzman v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Elections (2001), 
93 Ohio St.3d 511, 514, 757 N.E.2d 297.  Accordingly, we dismiss the cause. 
Cause dismissed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Donald J. McTigue, for relator. 
 
Robert L. Becker, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brent W. 
Shenk, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents. 
__________________