Case Title: State v. Apanovitch

Citation: 2018-Ohio-4744

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2018-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Apanovitch, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4744.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-4744 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. APANOVITCH, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Apanovitch, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4744.] 
Criminal Law—Postconviction DNA testing—R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23(A)—Trial 
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain untimely and 
successive petition for postconviction relief when requirements of R.C. 
2953.23(A) were not satisfied—Judgment vacated and cause remanded. 
(No. 2016-0696—Submitted June 26, 2018—Decided November 29, 2018.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
Nos. 102618 and 102698, 2016-Ohio-2831. 
__________________ 
FISCHER, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellee, Anthony Apanovitch, was convicted of aggravated murder, 
aggravated burglary, and two counts of rape, and, in January 1985, he was 
sentenced to death.  The body of the victim, Mary Anne Flynn, was found in a 
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bedroom in her home.  She had been strangled and severely beaten, and sperm was 
found in her mouth and vagina. 
{¶ 2} On direct appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals and this court 
affirmed Apanovitch’s convictions and death sentence.  State v. Apanovitch, 8th 
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 49772, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 8046 (Aug. 28, 1986); State v. 
Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 514 N.E.2d 394 (1987).  Apanovitch unsuccessfully 
pursued a number of avenues for relief, including filing three state postconviction 
petitions, State v. Apanovitch, 70 Ohio App.3d 758, 591 N.E.2d 1374 (8th 
Dist.1991); State v. Apanovitch, 107 Ohio App.3d 82, 667 N.E.2d 1041 (8th 
Dist.1995); State v. Apanovitch, 113 Ohio App.3d 591, 681 N.E.2d 961 (8th 
Dist.1996), and a federal habeas corpus action, see Apanovitch v. Houk, N.D.Ohio 
No. 1:91CV2221, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103985 (Aug. 14, 2009), aff’d sub nom. 
Apanovitch v. Bobby, 648 F.3d 434 (6th Cir.2011). 
{¶ 3} This appeal involves Apanovitch’s fourth postconviction petition, in 
which he asserted claims in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas based 
on DNA testing done on specimens taken from Flynn’s vagina.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, the court acquitted Apanovitch of vaginal rape.  It then 
dismissed the other, identically worded rape charge and granted Apanovitch a new 
trial on the remaining aggravated-murder and aggravated-burglary counts.  The 
Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed.  2016-Ohio-2831, 64 N.E.3d 429. 
{¶ 4} We accepted review of three of the state’s propositions of law.  We 
do not reach those propositions, however, because the General Assembly has not 
authorized a court of common pleas to exercise jurisdiction over a petition for 
postconviction relief in the circumstances presented in this case.  As a result, 
because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant the petition for 
postconviction relief, the trial court’s judgment (and, in turn, the court of appeals’ 
judgment) must be vacated.  We remand this matter for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Investigation, trial, and direct appeals 
{¶ 5} Mary Anne Flynn arrived home on August 23, 1984, at about 10:00 
p.m.  She owned the house—a duplex—and rented out the other unit.  The people 
in the other unit that night heard Flynn’s front door slam soon after she arrived, and 
they heard more noises (a loud thud and a high-pitched sound) from Flynn’s unit 
between 11:30 p.m. and midnight.  No witnesses saw or heard anything after that. 
{¶ 6} When Flynn, a nurse, failed to report for her shift at a nearby hospital 
the next afternoon, a concerned coworker called Flynn’s brother.  They accessed 
Flynn’s unit that evening and discovered Flynn’s body in her bedroom.  She was 
lying face down, naked on the bed with her hands tied behind her back.  A bedsheet 
had been rolled up and was tied around her neck and to the headboard.  She had 
been severely beaten, apparently with a piece of wood broken from a basement 
windowsill.  An autopsy revealed sperm in her mouth and vagina.  She had died 
from asphyxia by cervical compression, i.e., strangulation. 
{¶ 7} Soon after the murder, investigators focused on Apanovitch, whom 
Flynn had hired earlier that summer to paint part of the exterior of her house.  
Circumstantial evidence suggested that he could be the murderer: There was evidence 
that Flynn had argued with a man she had hired to paint her house and that Flynn had 
ended the painting arrangement before the work was finished.  Several witnesses 
testified that Flynn was fearful of a man who had done some painting at her house 
and one of those witnesses identified Apanovitch as the person Flynn feared.  There 
was evidence that Apanovitch had approached Flynn outside of her home the 
afternoon before the murder asking to paint her windowsills.  Following that 
interaction, Apanovitch apparently made sexually suggestive comments about Flynn 
to a coworker.  Also, Apanovitch could not satisfactorily account for his whereabouts 
or for a scratch that he had received on his face the night of the murder.  Finally, 
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based on his blood type, Apanovitch could not be excluded as the source of sperm 
recovered from Flynn’s body. 
{¶ 8} Apanovitch was charged with aggravated murder, aggravated 
burglary, and two counts of rape.  The rape counts were identical, both alleging that 
Apanovitch “unlawfully and purposely engaged in sexual conduct with Mary Anne 
Flynn not his spouse by purposely compeling [sic] her to submit by the use of force 
or threat of force.” 
{¶ 9} After a jury found Apanovitch guilty on all counts, it recommended a 
death sentence, which the trial court imposed.  The court of appeals and this court 
affirmed the convictions and death sentence. 
B. DNA evidence and testing 
{¶ 10} When conducting Flynn’s autopsy, a forensic pathologist with the 
Cuyahoga County Coroner’s office1 created slides that contained specimens 
obtained from Flynn’s mouth and vagina.  DNA testing of the specimens was not 
available at the time of trial in 1984. 
{¶ 11} In 1988, one of Apanovitch’s attorneys asked the coroner’s office 
for records related to Flynn’s death.  At that time, the slides could not be located, 
and it was assumed that they had been lost or destroyed.  But in 1991, three slides 
related to Flynn’s case (one vaginal slide and two oral slides) were located.2 
{¶ 12} In 1991, the coroner’s office sent the slides to Forensic Science 
Associates (“FSA”) in California for DNA testing.  Due to the condition of the 
samples, FSA determined that it could not analyze two of the slides (the vaginal 
slide and one oral slide), but it was able to determine a partial DNA type of the 
                                                 
1 The county official formerly known as the Cuyahoga County Coroner is now known as the 
Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner.  See Cuyahoga County Charter, Section 5.03, effective 
January 1, 2010. 
2 During habeas review, the federal district court found that the chain of custody of those slides had 
not been broken.  Apanovitch v. Houk, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103985 at *24. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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other oral slide (referred to by FSA as “Item 2”).  A sample of Apanovitch’s DNA 
was not available to FSA at that time for comparison. 
{¶ 13} In 2000, an assistant Cuyahoga County prosecuting attorney asked 
the Cuyahoga County Coroner to conduct DNA testing on “any trace evidence or 
samples” related to Flynn’s murder.  The assistant prosecutor’s letter said, “It is the 
intention of this request that the identity of the donor of sperm found in the victim, 
Mary Ann [sic] Flynn, be established to the degree of scientific certainty available.”  
By that time, FSA had returned the vaginal and oral slides to the coroner’s office.  
The coroner’s office tested the slides in late 2000 but concluded that there was not 
sufficient material left on them to obtain a clear DNA profile. 
{¶ 14} In 2006, for reasons that are not clear from the record, FSA further 
analyzed DNA from its Item 2, the specimen from Flynn’s mouth, which it had 
retained and stored frozen in its DNA archive.  This time, FSA developed a more 
complete male DNA profile that occurs in about 1 in 285 million Caucasian males.  
In 2007, the federal district court in Apanovitch’s habeas case ordered Apanovitch, 
a Caucasian male, to provide a sample of his DNA for comparison.  After analyzing 
that sample, FSA concluded that Apanovitch could not be eliminated as the source 
of the sperm taken from Flynn’s mouth.  Apanovitch contests that finding, arguing 
that FSA’s report is unreliable. 
C. Apanovitch’s fourth postconviction petition 
{¶ 15} In 2012, Apanovitch filed his fourth postconviction petition, 
focusing on the coroner’s office’s 2000 test of a specimen taken from Flynn’s 
vagina.  At the postconviction hearing, Dr. Rick Staub, Apanovitch’s expert, 
testified about his review of the results of the testing of that specimen.  Unlike the 
coroner’s office, Dr. Staub concluded that a sample from the vaginal slide had 
provided useful results.  In his opinion, the testing showed that Apanovitch’s sperm 
was not on that slide, but the DNA of at least two other unknown males was on the 
slide; Apanovitch, therefore, was excluded as a contributor of the sperm.  The 
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state’s expert at the postconviction hearing, Dr. Elizabeth Benzinger, testified that 
the vaginal sample contained a low level of DNA and could have been 
contaminated, but she did not testify as to whether Apanovitch was excluded as a 
contributor of the sperm. 
{¶ 16} Because Dr. Benzinger did not contradict Dr. Staub’s opinion that 
Apanovitch was excluded as a contributor to the vaginal sample, the trial court 
acquitted Apanovitch on the vaginal-rape charge.  The trial court also dismissed the 
other rape charge with prejudice “for its lack of specificity or differentiation from 
the other count in violation of [Apanovitch’s] due process rights.”  Based on the 
changes regarding the evidence and to the charges, the trial court granted 
Apanovitch a new trial on the remaining aggravated-murder and aggravated-
burglary counts. 
{¶ 17} In reaching its decision, the trial court found that “there was 
insufficient material to reach any conclusion whether [Apanovitch’s] DNA was 
contained in the materials recovered from the victim’s mouth.”  Because evidence 
of the 2007 report from FSA was not presented at the postconviction hearing, the 
trial court did not consider FSA’s finding in that report that only 1 in 285 million 
Caucasians have the same DNA profile as Apanovitch and the sperm found in 
Flynn’s mouth.  The trial court noted that the state had stipulated prior to the 
postconviction hearing that it would not rely on any evidence generated by Dr. 
Edward Blake, the author of that report, who did not testify at the hearing. 
{¶ 18} On the state’s appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding Apanovitch actually innocent of vaginal rape.  
2016-Ohio-2831, 64 N.E.3d 429, at ¶ 46.  It also affirmed the trial court’s dismissal 
of the second rape charge.  Id. at ¶ 55, 61.  The state did not assert an assignment 
of error concerning the trial court’s decision granting a new trial. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 19} The state appealed to this court, and we accepted review of three of 
the state’s propositions of law.3  150 Ohio St.3d 1407, 2017-Ohio-6964, 78 N.E.3d 
908. 
II. ANALYSIS 
{¶ 20} Upon our review of the record, we ordered supplemental briefing on 
three issues that centered on whether the trial court had lacked jurisdiction to 
consider Apanovitch’s petition for postconviction relief.  152 Ohio St.3d 1439, 
2018-Ohio-1600, 96 N.E.3d 296.  The jurisdictional questions we raised in that 
order relate to the statutory scheme by which the General Assembly has authorized 
offenders to pursue postconviction relief in Ohio courts. 
{¶ 21} When Apanovitch filed his petition in 2012, the statutory deadline 
for filing a timely postconviction petition had long since passed.  See former R.C. 
2953.21(A)(2), 2010 Sub.S.B. No. 77.  Moreover, R.C. 2953.23(A) allows a 
prisoner to file only one postconviction petition in most situations.  The current 
petition is Apanovitch’s fourth postconviction petition.  Apanovitch’s petition, 
therefore, was both untimely and successive. 
{¶ 22} However, R.C. 2953.23(A) permits a prisoner to file an untimely, 
successive petition for postconviction relief only under specific, limited 
circumstances.  R.C. 2953.23 provides: 
 
 
(A) Whether a hearing is or is not held on a petition filed 
pursuant to section 2953.21 of the Revised Code, a court may not 
entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed 
in division (A) of that section or a second petition or successive 
                                                 
3 Apanovitch moves to strike a portion of the state’s brief, arguing that it is beyond the scope of this 
discretionary appeal.  Because we are capable of deciding the issues properly before us without 
striking arguments, see State ex rel. Tam O’Shanter Co. v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections, 151 Ohio 
St.3d 134, 2017-Ohio-8167, 86 N.E.3d 332, ¶ 11, we deny the motion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless division 
(A)(1) or (2) of this section applies: 
 
(1) Both of the following apply: 
 
(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was 
unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the 
petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to 
the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the 
Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States 
Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies 
retroactively to persons in the petitioner’s situation, and the petition 
asserts a claim based on that right. 
 
(b) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence 
that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder 
would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the 
petitioner was convicted or, if the claim challenges a sentence of 
death that, but for constitutional error at the sentencing hearing, no 
reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner eligible for 
the death sentence. 
 
(2) The petitioner was convicted of a felony, the petitioner is 
an offender for whom DNA testing was performed under sections 
2953.71 to 2953.81 of the Revised Code or under former section 
2953.82 of the Revised Code and analyzed in the context of and 
upon consideration of all available admissible evidence related to 
the inmate’s case as described in division (D) of section 2953.74 of 
the Revised Code, and the results of the DNA testing establish, by 
clear and convincing evidence, actual innocence of that felony 
offense or, if the person was sentenced to death, establish, by clear 
and convincing evidence, actual innocence of the aggravating 
January Term, 2018 
 
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circumstance or circumstances the person was found guilty of 
committing and that is or are the basis of that sentence of death. 
 
As used in this division, “actual innocence” has the same 
meaning as in division (A)(1)(b) of section 2953.21 of the Revised 
Code, and “former section 2953.82 of the Revised Code” has the 
same meaning as in division (A)(1)(c) of section 2953.21 of the 
Revised Code. 
 
Thus, R.C. 2953.23(A) is the limited gateway through which only those otherwise-
defaulted postconviction claims that meet its specific terms may proceed. 
{¶ 23} We must decide three questions: First, does the postconviction 
petition satisfy an exception provided in R.C. 2953.23(A)?  Second, if no exception 
applies, did the trial court lack jurisdiction to adjudicate the petition?  And third, if 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the petition, how should we resolve 
this appeal? 
A. The petition does not satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A) 
{¶ 24} The trial court found that Apanovitch’s postconviction petition 
satisfies R.C. 2953.23(A)(2).  Apanovitch argues that we must defer to that 
determination absent an abuse of discretion.  But “the question whether a court of 
common pleas possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain an untimely 
petition for postconviction relief is a question of law, which appellate courts review 
de novo.”  State v. Kane, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-781, 2017-Ohio-7838, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 25} We begin by examining R.C. 2953.23(A)(1).  That exception would 
allow the trial court to consider Apanovitch’s untimely and successive petition if (1) 
Apanovitch was “unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts” upon which 
his claim relies or he is asserting a claim based on a new, retroactively applicable 
federal or state right recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court after his petition 
became untimely and after he had filed earlier petitions, R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a), and 
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(2) he shows by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would 
have found him guilty or eligible for the death sentence but for “constitutional error 
at trial,” R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b). 
{¶ 26} We need not address whether Apanovitch satisfies R.C. 
2953.23(A)(1)(a), because he clearly has not satisfied R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b), which 
requires him to show that his conviction resulted from “constitutional error at trial.”  
In arguing that he satisfied R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b), Apanovitch asserts only that he is 
actually innocent of a rape charge.  The United States Supreme Court has ruled that 
under the United States Constitution, an actual-innocence claim “is not itself a 
constitutional claim,” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 
L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), and this case, therefore, does not involve a “constitutional error 
at trial” under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b).  See State v. Willis, 2016-Ohio-335, 58 N.E.3d 
515, ¶ 15-19 (6th Dist.).  Additionally, Apanovitch does not raise any argument that 
there was a “constitutional error at trial” under the Ohio Constitution.  Apanovitch’s 
petition, therefore, does not qualify under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). 
{¶ 27} That leaves R.C. 2953.23(A)(2), which allows a trial court to 
entertain an untimely and successive petition filed by 
 
an offender for whom DNA testing was performed under sections 
2953.71 to 2953.81 of the Revised Code or under former section 
2953.82 of the Revised Code and analyzed in the context of and 
upon consideration of all available admissible evidence related to 
the inmate’s case as described in division (D) of section 2953.74 of 
the Revised Code. 
 
{¶ 28} The trial court construed this language broadly, stating that a 
postconviction petition “is timely when it involves the testing of DNA.”  (Emphasis 
January Term, 2018 
 
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added.)  The trial court appears to have assumed that Apanovitch satisfied R.C. 
2953.23(A)(2) simply because he was making a claim based on DNA evidence. 
{¶ 29} The statutory language of R.C. 2953.23(A)(2), however, is more 
circumscribed.  It confers jurisdiction over a select class of DNA-based actual-
innocence claims—only those arising from an eligible offender’s application for 
DNA testing under R.C. 2953.71 to 2953.81 or under former R.C. 2953.82.  The 
state asserts—and Apanovitch does not dispute—that the DNA testing at issue here 
was not performed as a result of a request by Apanovitch under R.C. 2953.71 to 
2953.81 or under former R.C. 2953.82.  The parties agree that the state asked the 
Cuyahoga County Coroner to test the vaginal slide and that at the state’s request 
the federal district court ordered Apanovitch to provide his DNA for comparison.  
Thus, Apanovitch’s petition does not satisfy the plain language of R.C. 
2953.23(A)(2). 
{¶ 30} Apanovitch nevertheless argues that his petition qualifies under R.C. 
2953.23(A)(2), first by claiming that he requested DNA testing in 1989.  This 
argument does not help Apanovitch.  Even if he sought DNA testing in 1989, he 
clearly did not do so under R.C. 2953.71 to 2953.81 or under former R.C. 2953.82, 
because those statutes were not enacted until 2003.  Sub.S.B. No. 11, 150 Ohio 
Laws, Part IV, 6498, 6507-6524, 6525. 
{¶ 31} He also argues that notwithstanding R.C. 2953.23(A)(2)’s clear 
reference to DNA testing performed under R.C. 2953.71 to 2953.81 or under former 
R.C. 2953.82, the circumstances under which the DNA was tested are “immaterial.”  
This argument relies principally on R.C. 2953.84, which provides: 
 
 
The provisions of sections 2953.71 to 2953.81 of the 
Revised Code by which an offender may obtain postconviction 
DNA testing are not the exclusive means by which an offender may 
obtain postconviction DNA testing, and the provisions of those 
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sections do not limit or affect any other means by which an offender 
may obtain postconviction DNA testing. 
 
{¶ 32} According to Apanovitch, “DNA testing under R.C. 2953.71 to 
2953.81 is not the exclusive means for supporting a petition for postconviction 
relief,” because “requiring petitions to be based solely on DNA testing under those 
sections would render R.C. 2953.84 superfluous in violation of basic tenets of 
legislative interpretation.”  But Apanovitch disregards the clear language of R.C. 
2953.84, which speaks only of the “means by which an offender may obtain 
postconviction DNA testing.”  (Emphasis added.)  That statute does not address the 
means for supporting an untimely and successive postconviction petition based on 
DNA testing.  Only R.C. 2953.23(A)(2) does that.  If Apanovitch is correct that 
R.C. 2953.84 opens the door for untimely and successive postconviction petitions 
based on any DNA testing, then R.C. 2953.23(A)’s reference to DNA testing 
“performed under sections 2953.71 to 2953.81 of the Revised Code or under former 
section 2953.82 of the Revised Code” would have no meaning. 
{¶ 33} Apanovitch also contends that R.C. 2953.23(A)(2) cannot be strictly 
limited to DNA testing performed under R.C. 2953.71 to 2953.81 or former R.C. 
2953.82, because that would lead to harsh and absurd results.  This argument 
presumes that the procedures established by the General Assembly in R.C. 2953.71 
to 2953.81 and former R.C. 2953.82 serve no legitimate purpose—something 
Apanovitch has not shown.  At most, he makes an equitable argument based on 
what has transpired over the last 30 years.  But even assuming arguendo that the 
equities are in his favor, as Apanovitch maintains, his argument cannot overcome 
the clear requirements established by the General Assembly that give a trial court 
jurisdiction to entertain petitions for postconviction relief only in certain, limited 
situations. 
January Term, 2018 
 
13 
{¶ 34} Finally, Apanovitch contends that strictly applying R.C. 
2953.23(A)(2) would encourage the state to prevent offenders from initiating DNA 
testing under R.C. 2953.71 to 2953.81.  This argument rings hollow because, 
despite his claims, Apanovitch has not shown that he ever tried to pursue—or that 
the state prevented him from seeking—DNA testing under the statutory scheme.  
Indeed, Apanovitch now asserts that he can pursue testing under R.C. 2953.71 to 
2953.81, further undermining his argument. 
B. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the petition 
{¶ 35} We next must decide whether Apanovitch’s failure to qualify for an 
exception under R.C. 2953.23(A) deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over his 
petition.  We start by recognizing that a postconviction proceeding is a collateral 
civil attack on the judgment, State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 281, 714 N.E.2d 
905 (1999), and that the “right to file a postconviction petition is a statutory right, 
not a constitutional right,” State v. Broom, 146 Ohio St.3d 60, 2016-Ohio-1028, 51 
N.E.3d 620, ¶ 28.  A postconviction petitioner therefore “receives no more rights 
than those granted by the statute.”  Calhoun at 281.  This means that any right to 
postconviction relief must arise from the statutory scheme enacted by the General 
Assembly. 
{¶ 36} That includes the right to have one’s claim heard at all: R.C. 
2953.23(A) provides that “a court may not entertain a petition filed after the 
expiration of the period prescribed in [R.C. 2953.21(A)] or a second petition or 
successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless” one of the 
exceptions in R.C. 2953.23(A) applies.  (Emphasis added.)  Therefore, a 
petitioner’s failure to satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A) deprives a trial court of jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the merits of an untimely or successive postconviction petition.  
Ohio’s intermediate appellate courts have all reached the same conclusion.  See, 
e.g., State v. Beuke, 130 Ohio App.3d 633, 636, 720 N.E.2d 962 (1st Dist.1998); 
State v. Greathouse, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24084, 2011-Ohio-4012, ¶ 12; State 
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14 
v. Cunningham, 2016-Ohio-3106, 65 N.E.3d 307, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.); State v. Damron, 
4th Dist. Ross No. 10CA3158, 2010-Ohio-6459, ¶ 19; State v. Brown, 5th Dist. 
Delaware No. 06-CA-A-10-0076, 2008-Ohio-524, ¶ 20; State v. Eubank, 6th Dist. 
Lucas No. L-07-1302, 2008-Ohio-1296, ¶ 6; State v. Flower, 7th Dist. Mahoning 
No. 14 MA 148, 2015-Ohio-2335, ¶ 14; State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 
106012, 2018-Ohio-751, ¶ 9; State v. Harris, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 03CA008305, 
2003-Ohio-7180, ¶ 8; State v. Martin, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-495, 2006-
Ohio-4229, ¶ 22; State v. Noling, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2007-P-0034, 2008-Ohio-
2394, ¶ 37; State v. Gipson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2001-11-103, 2002-Ohio-
4128, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 37} Apanovitch’s arguments for a different result are unpersuasive.  He 
first argues that his failure to meet a statutory exception did not deprive the trial 
court of subject-matter jurisdiction, because trial courts clearly have subject-matter 
jurisdiction over postconviction petitions.  Relatedly, because he maintains that the 
trial court was not deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction, he contends that his 
failure to satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A) is a waivable issue and that the state did, in fact, 
waive the issue by not raising it on appeal. 
{¶ 38} Apanovitch has not shown that the trial court had subject-matter 
jurisdiction over his petition.  Subject-matter jurisdiction “connotes the power to 
hear and decide a case upon its merits.”  Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 290 
N.E.2d 841 (1972), paragraph one of the syllabus.  By providing that a court “may 
not entertain” an untimely or successive postconviction petition except in limited 
circumstances, R.C. 2953.23(A) plainly prohibits a court from hearing and deciding 
on the merits a petition that does not meet one of the exceptions.  Thus, R.C. 
2953.23(A) did not permit the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over Apanovitch’s 
petition, and the state could not waive the issue.  See State v. Davis, 131 Ohio St.3d 
1, 2011-Ohio-5028, 959 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 11 (“Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be 
waived and is properly raised by this court sua sponte”). 
January Term, 2018 
 
15 
{¶ 39} Apanovitch next argues that the trial court had an independent basis 
for exercising jurisdiction—under Crim.R. 33—because the parties stipulated that 
the trial court would consider the relief requested under that rule in addition to R.C. 
2953.21 and 2953.23.  The authority to proceed under Crim.R. 33 empowers a court 
to provide relief only under that rule.  Contrary to Apanovitch’s argument, Crim.R. 
33 did not empower the trial court to “consider and decide the Petition.”  R.C. 
2953.23 provides the only basis upon which the trial court could proceed to decide 
the postconviction petition. 
{¶ 40} Finally, Apanovitch argues that the court should just ignore the 
jurisdictional problem.  In support, he points to Broom, 146 Ohio St.3d 60, 2016-
Ohio-1028, 51 N.E.3d 620, and State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-
6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, cases in which we examined the merits of postconviction 
petitions without addressing whether the petitioners had satisfied R.C. 2953.23(A).  
But now that the jurisdictional question has been briefed and is squarely before us, 
Broom and Gondor do not support the notion that we can or should simply disregard 
it. 
{¶ 41} We recognize that it may seem unduly formalistic or unfair to 
foreclose the trial court from considering a postconviction claim that is based on 
DNA testing that the state itself procured.  But it is the prerogative of the General 
Assembly, not this court, to set the terms by which an offender may pursue 
postconviction relief.  See Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d. at 281, 714 N.E.2d 905 
(postconviction rights are granted by statute); State v. Smorgala, 50 Ohio St.3d 222, 
223, 553 N.E.2d 672 (1990) (the legislature’s valid laws control policy 
preferences).  The legislature in R.C. 2953.23(A) has created a narrow path for an 
offender to bring an untimely and/or successive postconviction claim based on 
DNA evidence.  Because Apanovitch did not satisfy either of the exceptions 
provided in R.C. 2953.23(A), the trial court fundamentally lacked jurisdiction to 
consider his petition or to provide relief under R.C. 2953.21. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
16 
C. We vacate the judgment and remand the cause 
{¶ 42} Because we conclude that the trial court lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction to adjudicate Apanovitch’s postconviction petition brought under R.C. 
2953.23, we must vacate the trial court’s judgment acquitting Apanovitch of 
vaginal rape.  Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941 (1988), 
paragraph three of the syllabus (“A judgment rendered by a court lacking subject 
matter jurisdiction is void ab initio”); Van DeRyt v. Van DeRyt, 6 Ohio St.2d 31, 
36, 215 N.E.2d 698 (1966) (“A court has inherent power to vacate a void judgment 
because such an order simply recognizes the fact that the judgment was always a 
nullity”).  We must also vacate the dismissal of the other rape count and the granting 
of a new trial, because those aspects of the trial court’s judgment were based on the 
improper adjudication.  And because we vacate the trial court’s judgment, it 
necessarily follows that the court of appeals’ judgment must also be vacated. 
{¶ 43} The final issue for consideration is whether to remand the cause for 
further proceedings.  The state joined Apanovitch in stipulating prior to the trial 
court’s hearing in this case that “Rule 33 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure 
appl[ies] to this post-conviction proceeding” and that the trial court “shall refer to 
and rely on said rule * * * during its deliberations and judgment.”  In its posthearing 
brief filed in the trial court, the state at several different places discussed the 
standards for granting a motion for a new trial under Crim.R. 33 and also 
specifically urged that Apanovitch’s “motion for new trial should be denied.”  
However, the state now maintains that because Apanovitch did not file a motion for 
a new trial pursuant to Crim.R. 33, we do not need to remand this cause if we 
determine that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant relief under 
the postconviction statutes.  Moreover, the state argues that even if this court were 
to consider the Crim.R. 33 issue, Apanovitch did not demonstrate that he was 
“unavoidably prevented” from the discovery of the evidence upon which his claim 
is based under Crim.R. 33(B). 
January Term, 2018 
 
17 
{¶ 44} We additionally note that our ability to squarely address any Crim.R. 
33 issues is greatly complicated by the fact that the state did not appeal either the 
trial court’s conclusion of law that Crim.R 33 “is applicable to this proceeding” or 
the trial court’s reliance on Crim.R. 33 as part of its rationale for granting a new 
trial.  Thus, given our vacation of the judgment and the unusual procedural history 
of this case, the trial court should have the first opportunity to determine whether it 
has the authority to take any action beyond dismissing Apanovitch’s postconviction 
petition.  We therefore remand the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose 
of determining if any further proceedings are necessary and, if so, resolving any 
remaining issues in a manner consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment vacated 
and cause remanded. 
FRENCH, DEWINE, and DEGENARO, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined 
by O’CONNOR, C.J. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the judgment to vacate the trial court’s judgment 
acquitting Apanovitch of vaginal rape because the trial court lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the postconviction petition, to vacate the trial court’s 
dismissal of the other rape count and the granting of a new trial, and to vacate the 
judgment of the court of appeals, and dissents from the order to remand. 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 45} I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction over Anthony Apanovitch’s fourth petition for postconviction relief, 
but I dissent from its decision to “remand the matter to the trial court for the limited 
purpose of determining if any further proceedings are necessary and, if so, resolving 
any remaining issues in a manner consistent with this opinion.”  Majority opinion 
at ¶ 44.  The majority concludes that its “ability to squarely address any Crim.R. 33 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
issues is greatly complicated” by the facts of this case and that “given our vacation 
of the judgment and the unusual procedural history of this case, the trial court 
should have the first opportunity to determine whether it has the authority to take 
any action beyond dismissing Apanovitch’s postconviction petition.”  Id.  Based on 
what?  If the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider the fourth postconviction 
petition as the majority has concluded, then there is nothing pending before the trial 
court with respect to this appeal. 
{¶ 46} If the trial court had no such jurisdiction, how can it determine 
“whether it has the authority to take any action * * *”?  Id.  At best, the majority 
opinion is confusing.  This matter should be concluded. 
{¶ 47} Crim.R. 33(A) states, “A new trial may be granted on motion of the 
defendant” for any of the reasons enumerated in the rule, and Crim.R. 33(B) states: 
 
Application for a new trial shall be made by motion which, 
except for the cause of newly discovered evidence, shall be filed 
within fourteen days after the verdict was rendered, * * * unless it 
is made to appear by clear and convincing proof that the defendant 
was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion for a new trial, in 
which case the motion shall be filed within seven days from the 
order of the court finding that the defendant was unavoidably 
prevented from filing such motion within the time provided herein. 
Motions for new trial on account of newly discovered 
evidence shall be filed within one hundred twenty days after the day 
upon which the verdict was rendered * * *.  If it is made to appear 
by clear and convincing proof that the defendant was unavoidably 
prevented from the discovery of the evidence upon which he must 
rely, such motion shall be filed within seven days from an order of 
January Term, 2018 
 
19 
the court finding that he was unavoidably prevented from 
discovering the evidence within the one hundred twenty day period. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 48} In addition, the court in State v. Stansberry, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 
71004, 1997 WL 626063, *3 (Oct. 9, 1997), explained: 
 
A trial court must first determine if a defendant has met his 
burden of establishing by clear and convincing proof that he was 
unavoidably prevented from filing his motion for a new trial within 
the statutory time limits.  If that burden has been met but there has 
been an undue delay in filing the motion after the evidence was 
discovered, the trial court must determine if that delay was 
reasonable under the circumstances or that the defendant has 
adequately explained the reason for the delay. 
 
{¶ 49} The deadlines set forth in Crim.R. 33(B) have long since passed, and 
therefore Apanovitch must seek leave to file a delayed motion for new trial, 
demonstrate by clear and convincing proof that he satisfies the unavoidable 
prevention requirement, and obtain an order from the trial court to that effect.  But 
he has not filed any such motion.  To the extent he seeks a new trial on account of 
newly discovered evidence, such as the results of the DNA testing by the coroner’s 
office which he has admittedly known about since December 2008, he also carries 
the burden to demonstrate the undue delay in moving for leave to file a motion for 
new trial is reasonable.  Notably, when Apanovitch filed his fourth petition for 
postconviction relief in March 2012, he did not request a determination regarding 
unavoidable prevention or reasonableness of delay for purposes of Crim.R. 33 nor 
did he request a new trial pursuant to that rule. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
20 
{¶ 50} Prior to the hearing on the fourth postconviction relief petition, the 
parties stipulated, “Rule 33 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure appl[ies] to 
this post-conviction proceeding and that the Court shall refer to and rely on said 
rule, in addition to all other applicable Ohio law, during its deliberations and 
judgment.”  However, Apanovitch failed to follow the requisite procedure to seek 
relief pursuant to that rule. 
{¶ 51} Based on the trial court’s consideration of postconviction relief, 
which we have concluded was error, the court acquitted Apanovitch of vaginal rape 
and then erroneously predicated its decisions to dismiss the remaining rape charge 
and grant a new trial as to the aggravated murder and aggravated burglary charges 
based on its erroneous acquittal. 
{¶ 52} The majority somehow conflates what it recognizes as an error by 
the trial court in granting postconviction relief as an opportunity for the trial court 
to determine whether it has authority to take any action beyond dismissing the 
postconviction petition.  This is not a method of availing Apanovitch of relief 
because Crim.R. 33 requires adherence to the prerequisites of the rule that 
Apanovitch and all other litigants are required to satisfy.  And the trial court is 
required to assure compliance with the rule. 
{¶ 53} Notably, a motion for new trial must be filed with the trial judge who 
presumably heard the witnesses testify and had an opportunity to assess their 
demeanor.  “The discretionary decision to grant a motion for a new trial is an 
extraordinary measure which should be used only when the evidence presented 
weighs heavily in favor of the moving party.”  State v. Luckett, 144 Ohio App.3d 
648, 655, 761 N.E.2d 105 (8th Dist.2001).  “The deference shown to the trial court 
in such matters is premised in large part upon the familiarity of the trial court with 
the details of the case as a result of having presided over the actual trial.”  Id.  And 
in reviewing the trial court’s decision on such matters, “ ‘[a] more searching inquiry 
is required’ if the new trial is granted than if denied * * * because of ‘the concern 
January Term, 2018 
 
21 
that a judge’s nullification of the jury’s verdict may encroach on the jury’s 
important fact-finding function.’ ”  Id., quoting Tri Cty. Industries, Inc. v. Dist. of 
Columbia, 200 F.3d 836, 840 (D.C.Cir.2000). 
{¶ 54} This case, however, involves a rape and murder of a 33-year-old 
female that occurred more than 34 years ago.  The judge who presided at that trial, 
former Justice Francis E. Sweeney, was familiar with the details of the case and in 
the best position to assess witness credibility and make the serious decision whether 
to 
nullify 
the 
jury’s 
verdict, 
and 
he 
is 
now 
deceased. 
 
See 
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/SCO/formerjustices/sweeney (accessed Nov. 
8, 2018).  Remanding this case for a different trial judge to consider taking action 
beyond dismissing Apanovitch’s fourth postconviction petition makes a mockery 
of the jury trial that former Justice Sweeney conducted in this brutal killing that 
resulted in convictions that have been affirmed on appeal and upheld by this court 
and the federal courts in multiple postconviction proceedings.  This is especially 
true given that no motion for a new trial was ever actually filed in this instance and 
that the time for filing such a motion has long since passed. 
{¶ 55} It is time to finalize this judgment. 
{¶ 56} I therefore concur in the judgment to vacate the ill-considered 
decision of the trial court to entertain a petition for postconviction relief that it 
should not have considered.  But I would not cavalierly remand this case to the trial 
court to determine if it has authority to take action beyond dismissing the 
postconviction petition.  Take action on what? 
{¶ 57} No motions are pending in this matter and the majority rules today 
that the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider the postconviction petition.  
Hence, there is nothing before the trial court for it to consider.  This court should 
bring this matter to a conclusion! 
{¶ 58} To ensure the finality of this nearly 34-year-old judgment that has 
been affirmed on appeal and upheld by this court and the federal courts in several 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
22 
postconviction proceedings, I would reverse the judgment of the appellate court and 
vacate the trial court’s decision to entertain the fourth petition for postconviction 
relief.  There is no reason for a remand of this matter whatsoever. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Christopher D. Schroeder and Katherine E. Mullin, Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorneys, for appellant. 
Berkman, Gordon, Murray & DeVan, Mark R. DeVan, and William C. 
Livingston; and Crowell & Moring, L.L.P., Harry P. Cohen, and Michael K. 
Robles, for appellee. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, 
Samuel C. Peterson, Deputy Solicitor, and Thomas E. Madden, Assistant Attorney 
General, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General. 
_________________