Case Title: In Interest of KDJ

Citation: 163 Wis. 2d 90, 470 N.W.2d 914

Docket Number: 89-0816

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1991-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Decided June 25, 1991.
*92 For the appellant-petitioner there were briefs and oral argument by Donald T. Lang, assistant state public defender.
For the respondent there was a brief and oral argument by Mark D. Biller, Polk county district attorney.
Guardian ad Litem brief was filed by David L. Grindell and Grindell Law Offices, Frederic, for K.D.J.
Amicus Curiae brief was filed by Anne Marie Abell and Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Milwaukee.
DAY, J.
This is a review of a decision of the court of appeals, 153 Wis. 2d 249, 450 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1989) affirming an order of the circuit court for Polk county terminating the parental rights of B.L.J. (mother) to K.D.J. (child), Honorable James R. Erickson, Judge. The mother petitioned this court for review and the petition was granted. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
The issue on review as framed by counsel for the mother is:
We conclude the answer is "no" and that sec. 48.424(4) 1987-88 Stats., is constitutional and comports with due process as applied in this case. We also conclude *93 that J.L.W. requirements as to what constitutes parental unfitness in this case has been codified by the legislature and that what warrants termination of parental rights is left by the statutory scheme to the discretion of the circuit court.
The statute, 48.424(4), 1987-88[1] in question here, reads as follows:
It is the underlined portion that saves its constitutionality. Section 48.427(2) Stats., provides:
*94 This action for termination of parental rights (TPR) was brought pursuant to sec. 48.415(2), Stats.[2] 1985-86:
*95 On October 3, 1988, the order of the Circuit Court for Polk County, James R. Erickson, Judge, was entered terminating the parental rights of B.L.J. to her son, K.D.J. Among other things, the court found her to be unfit as a parent; the child was in good health and adoptable and that adoption was in the child's best interest. It is this order, affirmed by the court of appeals, that is the subject of this review. The order followed a jury trial in which it was established by the jury findings that the child was in "continuing need of protection or services," a prerequisite for termination under sec. 48.415(2), Stats.
The child was born October 21, 1982 and the first CHIPS (child in need of protection or services) petition was filed in May 1983, and was not contested by the mother. On June 7, 1983, a dispositional order was entered placing the child in foster care until the mother completed an inpatient alcohol treatment program. On July 5, 1983, he was returned to the mother by court order after she successfully completed the treatment. The court also ordered the mother to abstain from alcohol or drugs. The child was returned to foster care in October, 1983, after the mother was hospitalized following an automobile accident in which she was cited for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The child was with her at the time of the accident. The child was continued in foster care following an *96 uncontested hearing held on January 12, 1984. On April 17, 1984, the mother entered a "halfway house" in Shell Lake, Wisconsin. On June 15, 1984, the CHIPS order was extended. A year later, June 17, 1985, because of an apparent "commitment to sobriety" by the mother, the child was returned to her custody pursuant to order. From then until March of 1986, there was no further legal action. In April, 1986, the mother voluntarily agreed to a foster home placement for the child so she could obtain inpatient treatment for her alcohol problem. On June 9, 1986, an order was entered placing the child in foster care for six weeks after which he was to be returned to his mother. She successfully completed the program.
However, on October 22, 1986, an order was entered returning the child to foster care. On March 2, 1987, the court extended the dispositional order as well as his foster placement. The mother failed to comply with the conditions imposed. The child has remained in foster care since that time. On March 1, 1988, the CHIPS dispositional order was again extended for one year.
On November 30, 1987, the Department of Social Services for Polk county petitioned the circuit court for termination of the mother's parental rights pursuant to sec. 48.415(2), Stats. The hearing, before a jury, took place on June 16th and 17th, 1988.
In addition to the facts cited above, at the trial and subsequent dispositional hearing there was testimony that the mother had been repeatedly warned that continued failure to abide by the court's requirements that she abstain from alcohol and drugs, attend counseling and therapy sessions, attend AA (Alcoholics Anonymous) meetings on a regular basis, Al-Anon (alcoholic support group) meetings and cooperate with the Social Services Department, could result in termination of her parental *97 rights. Such warnings were given pursuant to sec. 48.356(1) and (2), Stats. 1987-88.[4]
All of these orders and attempts to aid the mother by the Department were designed to help her to overcome her alcohol problem and to function as a parent for her child. She acknowledged that she was an alcoholic. But the record of her cooperation and compliance with the requirements designed to help her remedy the problems that caused the child to be placed in foster homes was very poor. She said there were periods when she refrained from alcohol, once for as long as three months. But her history of failure to cooperate and repeated lapses was amply supported by the evidence.
The jury was made fully aware at the termination of parental rights hearing, both by the District Attorney representing the Polk County Department of Social Services, and the Public Defender, representing the mother, and by the guardian ad litem, representing the child, that the Department was asking the court to terminate the mother's parental rights. It was made clear in the opening and closing statements by counsel. It was also made clear that whether or not that termination would take place was first of all dependent on how they, the jury, answered the special verdict questions.
*98 At the beginning of the hearing, the court advised the jury:
In his opening statement to the jury, the District Attorney, Keith O. Jones, representing the Polk County Department of Social Services said:
The district attorney then listed the elements that later were encompassed in the special verdict questions.
Attorney David Grindell, the guardian ad litem for the child, told the jury:
Mr. Michael Tobin, Assistant State Public Defender, counsel for the mother, told the jury:
After the jury heard five witnesses for the Department of Social Services and five witnesses for the mother, including her own testimony, in final argument to the jury, the District Attorney told the jury:
Mr. Grindell, the guardian ad litem, said:
The mother's attorney, Mr. Tobin, again told the jury:
The Judge instructed the jury, and among other things said:
The judge submitted seven questions to the jury. This was a six person jury and five-sixths were required to answer affirmatively all questions before there could be a finding that K.D.J. was a child in need of protection or services. The court on the basis of the evidence answered the first four. The jury answered questions five, six and seven:
One juror dissented to question seven but the necessary five answered affirmatively to all of the questions. It is interesting to note that the jury was out from 5:18 p.m. to 5:59 p.m., it took only forty-one minutes to reach its verdict.
The statute, sec. 48.424(4), is the provision challenged here, to wit: "If grounds for the termination of parental rights are found by the court or jury, the court shall find the parent unfit." The sentence immediately following says: "A finding of unfitness shall not preclude a dismissal of a petition under sec. 48.427(2)." Section 48.427(2) provides: "The court may dismiss the petition if it finds that the evidence does not warrant the termination of parental rights."
[1]
This means that even though the jury finds the "facts" that would constitute "grounds" for termination, the court may still dismiss the petition if the court finds either that the evidence does not sustain any one of the jury's individual findings or that even though the findings may be supported by the evidence, the evidence of unfitness is not so egregious as to warrant termination of parental rights. This conclusion follows from the wording of sec. 48.427(2), Stats., that the evidence "does not *104 warrant the termination of parental rights." Thus, it seems clear that in spite of what the evidence may show, whether such evidence warrants termination, is a matter within the discretion of the court. This is so because the word "warrant" implies an overview of the evidence, the findings, and also the implication of what is in the best interest of the child.
The legislature has in effect put a "spin" on the word "unfit" by giving the court the discretion to dismiss a petition if the circuit court "finds that the evidence does not warrant the termination of parental rights."
Thus, even if the court accepts the fact finder's "findings," it is not bound to terminate parental rights. "Warrant" is a very broad word.[5] There are obviously degrees of unfitness and some "unfit" parents may be more or less unfit than others. It is the fact of degrees of unfitness that has caused the legislature to allow the court, in the exercise of discretion, to evaluate a "finding" of "unfitness" even though the grounds of termination may be found by a jury or the court itself.
[2]
The court evaluates not just the fact that "grounds" for termination have been found but the court evaluates the quantity, quality, and persuasiveness of the evidence. The court may conclude the evidence does not warrant termination of parental rights. One cannot imagine a more definitive rejection of a statutory label of unfitness than dismissal of a termination petition. But that is the authority the legislature has given the court in its recognition *105 that technical findings of grounds for termination do not necessarily add up to termination.
[3]
It is also clear that where a jury finds all of the grounds for termination and the court enters its mandatory finding of unfitness pursuant to sec. 48.424, Stats., if the court determines the evidence for any one of the seven findings does not support the jury finding, that would be reason to dismiss the petition because a "finding" of unfitness cannot be sustained if one of the seven required findings is not, in the court's opinion, supported by "clear and convincing evidence."
[4]
The legislature in secs. 48.424(4) and 48.427(2), Stats., by using the word "warrant" (a word similar in meaning to "justify") gave the court broad discretion to dismiss a petition even if grounds for termination are found by the factfinder, in this case, the jury.
While it is obvious from the record that the circuit court concluded that a finding of unfitness had to be entered following his receipt of the jury verdict, it is equally obvious that the court was of the opinion the unfitness conclusion was such as to "warrant" termination.
At the disposition hearing, the court made various observations that demonstrated that the court did in fact conclude that the mother was "unfit." The finding was supported by the mother's unwillingness or inability to sufficiently respond to court orders and social service agency efforts to help her overcome her alcohol problem that left the six-year old in an untenable situation at the time of the termination of parental rights hearing. Of the sixty-eight months of this child's life, forty-two months were spent in foster care because of the mother's alcoholism. Merely because she did not physically abuse the *106 child or neglect him during the intervals when she had physical custody, or visited him while he was in foster care, does not negate her other deficiencies as a parent. Those other deficiencies resulted in the child's frequent placements in foster care.
Even at the time of the hearing, she was not in any program to try and correct her deficiencies as a parent.
The judge at the disposition hearing summed it up quite well. After stating the desirability of home stability in a child's life, the circuit court said, "There is no way of guaranteeing any continuity" in a foster home placement. "That can change from month to month. Certainly from year to year and young [K.D.J.] has been in foster homes a significant portion of his life ... it is simply not fair to [K.D.J.] that he should go through the rest of his young years being bounced from one foster home to another ..." (32:113). The court found termination in the child's best interest and that he was healthy and adoptable. The court said that if the mother "doesn't step forward and do the job in the first 6 years there is just absolutely no reason for the court to believe that she would be willing or able to do so the next six years and the 6 years following that ... but I'm wondering if it's a significant parent/child relationship ... it's more like a pleasant aunt who's available on occasion to visit with a youngster ... [K.D.J.] deserves more than that."
What the court clearly implied was that the mother has not functioned as a parent for most of the prior six years and that he agrees with the jury that "there is a substantial likelihood that in the future ... [she] will not remedy the conditions which resulted in the removal of the child ... from her physical custody." (Question 7, special verdict.)
*107 At the dispositional hearing, the mother was called to the stand by her attorney. She said she was staying with a "boyfriend" and had just started a job for minimum wage that she hoped would go to piece work. She was satisfied with the care K.D.J. was getting at the foster home. She asked the court through questions put to her by her attorney about "sustaining care, foster home" placement, whereby she could make arrangements for visitation but could not apply for custody, and K.D.J. would be there until age eighteen.
The court, with her attorney's acquiescence, questioned her:
It was clear that three and one-half months after the termination of parental rights hearing that nothing had changed, she still drank, no attempt had been made to solve the problem that caused the termination hearing, only a hope that someone else would do the "mothering" and she could occasionally visit, as the "pleasant aunt" the court described.
Counsel for the mother says that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the statute, sec. 48.424(4), as it was applied in this case and this court's holding in In the Interest of J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981). We disagree for several reasons. In J.L.W., this *109 court stated, "we hold that termination of [the mother's] parental rights, without a finding of unfitness, constituted a denial of her fundamental rights, protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, sec. 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution." 102 Wis. 2d at 119. This court in J.L.W. did not define unfitness.
Counsel for the mother in this case argued at the termination of parental rights hearing, at the dispositional hearing, and in this court that J.L.W. requires the circuit court to make an independent finding of parental unfitness. We disagree. Such finding was mandated by the statutes when the child was found by the jury to be in continuing need of protection or service and the judge so found. From the comments of the circuit court it is clear that the court was convinced her unfitness was sufficiently egregious to warrant termination. There would be no point in sending this case back to the circuit court for a specific, declaration to that effect. As the court of appeals said in Englewood Apartments Partnership v. Grant & Co., 119 Wis. 2d 34, 39, 349 N.W.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1984):
We agree. The circuit court here made "unmistakable but implicit findings" of parental unfitness such as to warrant termination of parental rights.
In the case before us, there was a finding of parental unfitness pursuant to the statute entered by the circuit court. It is true that the judge entered the finding pursuant to statutory direction as a result of the jury findings *110 of all the elements that were required by the statute establishing "continuing need of protection or services."
The legislature has determined that where those facts are established, it shows that a parent is unfit.
There is a sharp contrast between the statute the court dealt with in J.L.W. and the one before us.[6] The statute in J.L.W. provided that only one of the statutory grounds was needed to terminate and did not require a finding of unfitness. "Unfitness" is an absolute requirement before parental rights may be terminated.
In J.L.W., the court, after the jury findings, proceeded to determine "whether termination would promote the best interest of the child." This "puts the cart before the horse." Parental rights may only be terminated if the parent is unfit. Then a disposition looking to the best interest of the child takes place. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) and Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
*111 J.L.W. was a case of a mother of two teenage children bearing a child out of wedlock. Facing financial and personal problems she turned to her family for help. Her sister took the child and they discussed, and at times, agreed that the sister could adopt the baby. When the mother, Mrs. R., decided she did not want to go through with any adoption, her sister and brother-in-law sought to terminate her parental rights. The jury found "grounds" and the circuit court terminated the mother's rights to her child.
This court reversed saying, "[i]n this case, no finding was made that Mrs. R. was an unfit parent, nor could such a finding be sustained on this record." J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d at 137.
This court said, "[w]hile her actions may have constituted statutory grounds for termination, they do not demonstrate her unfitness as a parent." 102 Wis. 2d at 137.
The evidence as to parental fitness in J.L.W. is in sharp contrast to the record here. In J.L.W., this court set forth the evidence in detail. This court quoted at length the findings of a court appointed psychologist, who among other things, said:
J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d at 138.
This court said:
Id. at 137.
In contrast, the testimony adduced at the trial in this case before us, and again at the disposition hearing, did show such a failure to come to grips with an alcoholic problem, that the child was left in an untenable situation. There seemed no reasonable chance of a turnaround, leading to a meaningful mother-child relationship in the foreseeable future. Such failure does constitute and demonstrate a lack of fitness as a parent.
Counsel for the mother raises the specter of children being taken from parents on statutory grounds falling short of unfitness if the decision of the court of appeals is left to stand. Counsel argues, at p. 2 of his Reply Brief:
But other cases of inability to parent must be decided on their own facts.
It is clear from this record that the mother's parental rights were not terminated because she is an alcoholic but because of the effect her particular alcohol problem has on her ability to function as a parent. Her persistent refusal to cooperate in any sustained or meaningful way *113 with attempts made to help her cope with her alcoholic problem, has had a serious effect on her relationship with her child for six years. Whatever may be the merits of the argument that alcoholism is a "disease" (and most present day authorities seem to so classify it) or whether it is lack of moral strength, the facts here seem to show a strong element of volition; a volition that has systematically refused help. It is probably true that there are people whose amount and frequency of consumption of alcohol would medically classify them as alcoholics, but who seem to function on the job and in their professions. Some even manage to function as adequate parents. B.L.J. is not one of them.
Counsel calls our attention to a court of appeals decision, In Re Termination of Parental Rights to A.M.K., 105 Wis. 2d 91, 312 N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1981), "[t]hat a finding of unfitness is a determination that further contact between parent and child will be seriously detrimental to the child." Lemmin v. Lorfeld, 107 Wis. 264, 83 N.W. 259 (1900), that termination "is not merely better for the children, but essential to their safety or to their welfare, in some very serious and important respect." We agree these are the standards to be applied in the exercise of discretion in terminating parental rights.
To condemn this child to go from foster home to foster home, waiting for a parental relationship to come into existence for which the mother seems unwilling to take steps to make possible, is, it seems to us, "seriously detrimental to the child." In the Interest of C.E.W., 124 Wis. 2d 47, 65, 368 N.W.2d 47 (1985), cited by counsel for the mother, this court said:
Which of those "rights" are fulfilled in the present relationship to any meaningful degree? The answer unfortunately is practically none.
We recognize, as did the Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 24-32 (1981) and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982), that "state intervention to terminate the relationship between [a parent] and [the] child must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause." The Due Process Clause would be offended "`[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest.'" Quillion, 434 U.S.  at 255 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-863 (1977).
In the case before us the parent was given warning of the possibility of termination whenever the court had to change custody from the parent to others. Notice of the termination hearing was given, counsel was provided, and witnesses were called on behalf of the mother and the county. The jury heard the evidence and made its findings which were supported by the record. There was further testimony at the dispositional hearing. Finally, the judge through his exercise of discretion, determined that the evidence of unfitness was so egregious that the termination of parental rights was warranted. All through the six year period, the court and the welfare agency tried to help this parent solve her problem. There is no showing of any procedural due process violations in this record.
*115 Even if the jury finds all of the grounds for termination of parental rights, and the judge thereby enters the statutory finding of unfitness, the evidence must still support the jury findings. If not, the judge may dismiss the petition for lack of clear and convincing evidence. If the evidence supports the jury's findings, the judge, pursuant to Lemmin, makes a determination of whether termination of contact between the parent and the child is essential to the child's safety or welfare, in a very serious and important respect. If it does not then the judge may determine, pursuant to the statute, that termination is not warranted and may dismiss the petition. The discretion that the statute vests in the court to dismiss the petition for termination if it finds termination is not warranted under the standards assures full, substantive due process.
[5]
The circuit court on this record could, and obviously did, conclude that termination was "essential to (the child's) welfare in some serious and important respect." If the circuit court had felt that termination was not warranted it could have dismissed the petition under the statute. The existence of this statute was called to the court's attention by counsel before the order of termination was signed.
We conclude that B.L.J. was accorded due process by the statute as applied in this case.
We also conclude there was no abuse of discretion in this matter.
By the Court.The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
[1]  This statute became effective May 3, 1988. The hearing on termination was held June 16 and 17, 1988. The court followed this statute. Both parties assumed in their briefs and arguments that this statute applied.
[2]  The court in the questions submitted to the jury followed the criteria in sec. 48.415(2)(c) 1985-86, Stats. The parties do not dispute the jury findings based on the use of these criteria.
[3]  Section 48.415(2)(c) of the statute was amended effective May 3, 1988, to read:

Grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights ...
(2) CONTINUING NEED OF PROTECTION OR SERVICES. Continuing need of protection or services may be established by a showing of all of the following: ...
(c) That the child has been outside the home for a cumulative total period of one year or longer pursuant to such orders, the parent has substantially neglected, wilfully refused, or been unable to meet the conditions established for the return of the child to the home and there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not meet these conditions in the future.
[4]  of court to warn. (1) Whenever the judge orders a child to be placed outside his or her home because the child has been adjudged to be in need of protection or services under s. 48.345, 48.357, 48.363 or 48.365, the judge shall orally inform the parent or parents who appear in court of any grounds for termination of parental rights under s. 48.415 which may be applicable and of the conditions necessary for the child to be returned to the home including any changes required in the parent's conduct, the nature of the home and the child's conduct.
(2) In addition to the notice required under sub. (1), any written order which places a child outside the home under sub. (1) shall notify the parent or parents of the information specified under sub. (1).
[5]  1. Authorization or certification; sanction, as given by a superior. 2. Justification for an action; grounds. 3. Something that assures, attests to, or guarantees some event or result; proof. The American Heritage Dictionary, 1364 (2nd ed. 1982).
[6]  In J.L.W., the statute at issue was sec. 48.40, which provided:

48.40 Grounds for termination of parental rights. The court may, upon petition, terminate all rights of parents to a minor in any of the following cases: ...
(2) If it finds that one or more of the following conditions exist: (Emphasis added.)
(a) That the parents have abandoned the minor; or
(b) That the parents have substantially or continuously or repeatedly refused or neglected or are unable for a prolonged indeterminate period to give the minor the parental care and protection necessary for his health, morals or well-being; or
(c) That, although the parents are financially able, they have substantially and continuously neglected to provide the minor with necessary subsistence, education or other care necessary for his health or well-being or have neglected to pay for such subsistence, education or other care when legal custody is lodged with others; or ....