Case Title: State v. Salhus

Citation: 220 N.W.2d 852

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1974-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
220 N.W.2d 852 (1974) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Raymond SALHUS, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. No. 467. Supreme Court of North Dakota. June 26, 1974. Rehearing Denied August 26, 1974. *854 Thomas F. Kelsch, State's Atty. for Burleigh County, Bismarck, for plaintiff and appellee. Lundberg & Nodland, Bismarck, for defendant and appellant. VOGEL, Judge. Defendant appeals from a conviction in the Burleigh County court of increased jurisdiction for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating beverage. The facts are as follows: At about 12:20 a. m. on April 27, 1973, defendant's pickup truck was stopped by Officer Schultz of the North Dakota Highway Patrol because the truck had no functioning tail lights. When the defendant got out of his truck to look at the tail lights he staggered and put his hand on the side of the truck. When the officer asked the defendant for his driver's license, defendant went through his billfold but went past his driver's license twice before the officer assisted him by pointing out the driver's license. The officer then informed the defendant that he was aware that the defendant had been drinking, and asked the defendant if he would perform a few tests. Defendant agreed and performed certain items of a field sobriety test, the results of which are not indicated in the record. The officer then placed defendant under arrest for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Officer Herbert Elter arrived at the scene shortly thereafter and took the defendant to the Bismarck police station where Elter proceeded to perform a breath-alcohol test on defendant, using a Breathalyzer testing device. Defendant presents three issues on appeal: 1. Was there probable cause to arrest? 2. Can a conviction for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor be upheld where there is no evidence of driving impairment? 3. Was there foundation for the admission of any blood-alcohol test and of opinion evidence? *855 We shall first take up the issue as to probable cause for arrest. N.D.C.C. 29-06-15 provides, in pertinent part: The term "reasonable cause," used in N.D.C.C. 29-06-15, is synonymous with the term "probable cause." See, e.g., Smestad v. Ellingson, 191 N.W.2d 799 (N. D.1971) [terms used interchangeably]. See also Fisher, Laws of Arrest (1967), at p. 150. In Smestad v. Ellingson, supra, we found probable cause for an arrest for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor when the testimony of the arresting officer who arrived at the scene of an accident was that the "petitioner's speech was slurred, that he walked in an unsteady manner, that he had difficulty in responding to the officer's questions, that his eyes were glazed and bloodshot and that he had a strong odor of alcohol about him." The State seems to contend that probable cause for arrest may be established by showing what happened after the time of the arrest. This argument is untenable. In State v. Chaussee, 138 N.W.2d 788, 792 (1965), we quoted the Supreme Court of the United States as follows: In the instant case, the arresting officer had observed that the defendant 1. Failed to stop when the arresting officer was following him with his red light blinking; 2. Staggered when he got out of the truck; 3. Steadied himself by putting his hand on the truck after he got out; and 4. Had difficulty finding his driver's license. We hold that these facts taken together constitute probable cause for arrest on a charge of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor since these "`facts and circumstances ... [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man *856 of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar v. United States, supra. The defendant's second argument is that a conviction for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor cannot be upheld where there is no evidence of driving impairment. He relies on State v. Hanson, 73 N.W.2d 135 (N.D.1955), in support of that proposition. In that case, which also involved a defendant charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, we approved the following jury instruction: Defendant argues that it is the effect and not the amount of intoxicating liquor consumed that determines whether a person is "under the influence" to a degree affecting his ability to operate a motor vehicle, within the meaning of the statute. He seems to put forth the proposition that since the sole testimony shows that he was driving in a normal manner, the prosecution is unable to show that he was "under the influence" of intoxicating liquor. Defendant apparently has overlooked our definition of the phrase "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" as set forth in State v. Hanson, supra: The same definition was applied in State v. Glavkee, 138 N.W.2d 663 (N.D.1965), and a similar one was given in State v. Neset, 216 N.W.2d 285 (N.D.1974). Defendant misapprehends the nature of the charge against him, since he argues that there must be objective and direct evidence that his driving ability was affected by an intake of intoxicating liquor. However, only two elements must be proved in order to sustain a conviction on such a charge: 1. That he was driving a motor vehicle on a public way; and 2. That while so driving a motor vehicle he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor so as "not to possess that clearness of intellect and control of himself that he would otherwise have." The question to be answered, baldly stated, is not whether defendant was able to drive safely, but whether he was "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" while driving, as defined in State v. Hanson, supra. Impairment of driving ability need not be proved if the two elements above stated are proved. Defendant urges as a third ground for reversal that there was insufficient foundation for the admission of a blood-alcohol test and of opinion evidence. N.D.C.C. 39-20-07 provides that "evidence of the amount of alcohol in [a] person's blood ... as shown by a chemical analysis of his ... breath... is admissible" and that: Defendant urges that the foundational requirements of approval of the State Toxicologist have not been met for the reason that the State Toxicologist is an officer of the State whose authority to issue rules and regulations is limited by N.D.C.C. Sections 28-32-01 and 28-32-02, of the Administrative Agencies Practice Act. Section 28-32-01 provides that an "administrative agency" includes any officer "having state-wide jurisdiction and authority to make any order, finding, determination, award, or assessment which has the force and effect of law and which by statute is subject to review in the courts of this state." N.D.C.C. 28-32-02 provides that proposed rules and regulations of administrative agencies must be submitted to the Attorney General for his opinion as to their legality, prior to adoption. In First American Bank & Trust Co. v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84, 93 (N.D.1972), we held that the State Examiner was not an "officer," as defined in the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, for the reasons: The above reasons are equally applicable here and we hold that the State Toxicologist is not subject to the provisions of the Administrative Agencies Practice Act. In the instant case, a certificate qualifying Officer Elter to administer Breathalyzer tests was admitted into evidence over objection. This certificate, which was signed by the Acting State Toxicologist, also certifies that the Breathalyzer is a device certified by him to meet "the requirements of Section 39-20-07 of NDCC, for the analysis of breath to determine blood alcohol concentration, ..." The certificate was objected to at the trial level as hearsay and at the appellate level for lack of foundation. The certificate was not admissible, although it could readily have been made admissible by compliance with Rule 44(a)(1), North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, setting forth the requirements for authentication of records and copies of records. Section 39-20-07 provides another prerequisite as to admissibility of chemical tests, and that is a showing "that the test was fairly administered." In State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 199 A.2d 809, 823 (1964), the New Jersey Supreme Court said, in regard to Breathalyzer tests: We think that this is the essence of what is meant by a "showing that the test was fairly administered" and that such a showing is required to establish foundation for admissibility. In the instant case, Officer Elter testified as to the procedure he used to test the appellant. In addition, the procedural checklist he used was admitted into evidence. It is entitled "BREATHALYZER *858 OPERATIONAL CHECK LIST/State Toxicology Laboratory/Form 106 (1 July 1971)." The following colloquy occurred on direct examination of Officer Elter: The objections of the defendant were well taken and amply provided the prosecution with opportunities to correct the deficiencies in the foundation regarding the purported "known solution." However, no further testimony regarding the origin, spot-checking, or safeguarding of the "known solution" was elicited from the witness before the objections were overruled. In State v. Miller, 146 N.W.2d 159, 163 (N.D.1966), we said: In State v. Miller, supra, the foundational evidence was supplied by the State Toxicologist, an acknowledged expert, who had supervised the spot-checking of the ampoules. Here, the only evidence offered by the patrolman was hearsay. We conclude that the foundational requirements for admissibility of the test with the "known solution" have not been met. As to the importance of the test with the "known solution," Officer Elter testified further as follows: This testimony, coupled with the total lack of foundation regarding the integrity of the "known solution," falls far short of the foundational requirement for admissibility of the chemical test of "full proof that the equipment was in proper order." State v. Johnson, supra. We therefore hold that the results of the Breathalyzer test were improperly admitted into evidence over proper objection because of the lack of a full showing that "the test was fairly administered" as required by N.D.C.C. 39-20-07. As was said in State v. Conners, 125 N. J.Super. 500, 311 A.2d 764, 767 (1973): At the close of all the testimony in this case, the trial judge stated: Officer Elter's opinion that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor was based upon his observation that he smelled the aftereffect of alcohol on the defendant's breath and, apparently, upon other observations not made a part of the record. The officer's opinion, without facts to support it, is insufficient to sustain the conviction. We hold that the erroneous admission of the results of the Breathalyzer test into evidence substantially prejudiced the rights of the defendant-appellant. The decision of the trial court is reversed. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and TEIGEN, PAULSON and KNUDSON, JJ., concur.