Case Title: Omar Wilson v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC01-2083

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
______________________________
Nos. SC01-2083 & SC01-2333
______________________________
OMAR WILSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
DEXTER BYRD,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
[April 10, 2003]
PARIENTE, J.
We have for review Byrd v. State, 794 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), and 
Wilson v. State, 792 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), which expressly and directly
1.  For purposes of oral argument, on our own motion, we consolidated
these two cases.  On our own motion, we now consolidate these cases for
disposition in this opinion.
-2-
conflict on the issue of whether a presumption of judicial vindictiveness should
arise whenever the trial judge participates in an unsuccessful plea discussion and the
defendant subsequently receives a harsher sentence from the same judge after a trial
or hearing.1  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  
FACTS
(1)  Byrd v. State
Before the jury was brought into the courtroom for trial, the following
exchange took place on the record:
COURT:  Anything else before we bring in the jury?
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  As I indicated to the court, Mr. Byrd
asked me what the court's inclination would be for a plea to the bench,
and your honor indicated 30 years.
COURT:  From what I understand from the State, and I haven't
seen the score sheet, but apparently he's not pure driven snow and his
score sheet comes out to more than 15 years.
So I think 30 years is a fair offer, considering what you would
do is over 100 years, and this isn't your first robbery. Frankly, I think--
Good God, he's got numerous armed robberies.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  They all arise out of one plea.
COURT:  Well, there you go.  They all count, though.  I think
30 years is a steal.  He certainly won't get that low if he goes to trial. 
His record is horrendous.
(Emphasis supplied.)  Byrd rejected the offer and proceeded to trial, after which he
-3-
was sentenced to seventy-five years in prison.
On appeal, Byrd argued that "when the defendant rejects the court's offer
and is subsequently convicted, if the court exceeds its former offer, a presumption
of vindictiveness arises and such presumption was not overcome in this case." 
Byrd, 794 So. 2d at 672.  A majority of the Fifth District's three-judge panel agreed,
reasoning as follows:     
In McDonald v. State, 751 So. 2d 56, 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999),
the court held that "when the judge has been involved in the plea
negotiations and then later imposes a harsher sentence, the sentence is
presumed to be vindictive."  That is a reasonable method of dispelling
a defendant's legitimate fear of retribution should he exercise his
constitutional right to a jury trial.  The supreme court may well have
had such a presumption in mind when it required that "[a] record must
be made of all plea discussions involving the court."  See [State v.]
Warner, 762 So. 2d [507, 514 (Fla. 2000)].  During the discussion
leading up to the offer the court should state the facts relied on by it in
making the offer.  Those facts can then be compared with any
"additional facts emerging prior to sentencing" to see if the harsher
sentence is justified.  In any event, if the trial court elects to sentence
more harshly based on additional facts which may emerge prior to
sentencing, should the judge not at least put on record what the
additional facts are and how those facts changed the judge's view?  If
the judge can change his or her mind merely by saying that after
hearing the testimony he or she is convinced that a harsher sentence is
justified, then there is no protection against vindictiveness in rejection
of plea cases.
Whether we call it an unrebutted presumption or merely hold
that the court has failed to explain on the record what information it
had at sentencing that it did not have at the time of the plea offer and
how such information would have made a difference, the result is the
same.  The State suggests that the court was concerned about the
-4-
timing of the offense in connection with the defendant's release from
prison and was also concerned about the number of offenses.  But
this information was before the court at the time of its offer.  It is less
a reason than an excuse.
Id. at 672-73 (footnote omitted).  The Fifth District then considered several
remedies, including setting the sentence itself, remanding to the trial judge to make
findings supportive of the more severe sentence, or remanding for resentencing
before a different judge.  See id. at 673.  Ultimately, the Fifth District concluded
that the proper remedy was to "reverse and remand to the trial court to sentence the
defendant in accordance with its prior plea offer."  Id.  
Judge Griffin concurred specially, agreeing with the result but rejecting the
"'presumption of vindictiveness' analysis."  Byrd, 794 So. 2d at 673 (Griffin, J.,
concurring specially).  Judge Griffin concluded that the resentencing was required
because the trial judge's actions appeared to violate one of the restrictions imposed
by this Court in Warner, that "a judge must neither state nor imply alternative
sentencing possibilities which hinge upon future procedural choices, such as the
exercise of a defendant's right to trial."  Id. (quoting Warner, 762 So. 2d at 514).   
(2)  Wilson v. State
In Wilson, the State alleged that Wilson violated his community control.  See
792 So. 2d at 601.  At his final hearing, Wilson indicated that he wished to enter an
-5-
open plea and admission to the violation.  See id. at 601.  The following exchange
then occurred:
THE COURT:  Has anyone promised you anything other than
the fact [the] court would revoke your probation, adjudicate you guilty
if you haven't been previously adjudicated guilty, sentences you to 128
months Florida state prison with credit for time served.  Do you
understand that?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, before you pronounce
sentence, I would like the court to hear from Mr. Wilson and hear
from his fiancé.
THE COURT:  What is the purpose of that since this is the
bottom of the guidelines and I can't go any lower than the bottom?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Well, your Honor, what we would be
asking, for you to reinstate Mr. Wilson.
THE COURT:  I thought there was an agreement.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  It's an open plea, your Honor.
THE COURT:  No.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  He still wants to admit to the
violation.
THE COURT:  No. Go to a final hearing.  Set it down for a
final hearing.  Let's proceed.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Could I have a moment, your Honor?
THE COURT:  That's all right.  Court withdraws the offer.
 * * * * *
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Good morning again.  Emilio Benitez
on behalf of Mr. Wilson on page 3 [of the court's docket].
THE COURT:  Are you ready to proceed to final hearing?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Yes, your honor.
Before that, I'd like to address Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson, that's what you want to do?   You want to go to a final
hearing; is that correct?
[WILSON]:  Yes, sir.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  You don't want to accept the court's
2.  In Heggs, we held unconstitutional a statute that included a new version of
the sentencing guidelines, thus requiring resentencing of certain defendants who
were sentenced under the unconstitutional version.  See 759 So. 2d at 628. 
-6-
offer of 128 months; is that correct?
[WILSON]:  No.
THE COURT:  And my advice to you was the court's offer was
the bottom of the guidelines and in my opinion you should have taken
it.  Is that--
[WILSON]:  Excuse me?
THE COURT:  Okay.  Let's proceed.  Let's swear in the
defendant.
Id. (alterations in the original) (emphasis supplied).
At the end of the hearing, the trial judge found that Wilson wilfully violated his
community control and sentenced him to a mid-range guideline sentence of 150
months in prison.  See id.  On direct appeal, the Fourth District held that the case
should be remanded for resentencing as a result of our decision in Heggs v. State,
759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000),2 but rejected Wilson's argument that his "original
sentence was vindictive and, therefore, he should, on remand, be resentenced by a
different trial judge."  Wilson, 792 So. 2d at 603.  
The Fourth District acknowledged that "[a] defendant may not be subjected
to a more severe punishment for exercising his constitutional right to stand trial."  Id. 
However, the Fourth District also referred to its earlier decision in Mitchell v. State,
521 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), where it had previously explained:
-7-
Absent a demonstration by the defendant of judicial vindictiveness or
punitive action, a defendant may not complain simply because he
received a heavier sentence after trial.  A disparity between the sentence
received and the earlier offer will not alone support a finding of
vindictiveness. . . .  Having rejected the offer of a lesser sentence, [the
defendant] assumes the risk of receiving a harsher sentence.  Were it
otherwise, plea bargaining would be futile.  
Wilson, 792 So. 2d at 603 (quoting Mitchell, 521 So. 2d at 190) (alterations in the
original).  Based on Mitchell and the facts in Wilson's case, the Fourth District
concluded that a presumption of vindictiveness did not arise:
Here, the plea offer was given and was voluntarily rejected.  The
trial judge made no remarks which would give any indication that the
harsher sentence was being imposed as a punitive measure for rejecting
the previous offer.  Although the judge reiterated the plea offer at the
start of the hearing, he did not refer to it again at sentencing, or even at
the resentencing.
Wilson, 792 So. 2d at 603. 
PRESUMPTION OF VINDICTIVENESS
The legal principle referred to as a presumption of judicial vindictiveness has
constitutional roots and developed through a line of United States Supreme Court
decisions beginning with North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).  In Pearce
and its companion case, Simpson v. Rice, the Supreme Court considered "what
constitutional limitations there may be upon the general power of a judge to impose
upon reconviction a longer prison sentence than the defendant originally received." 
-8-
Id. at 719.  The defendant in Pearce was convicted after trial and sentenced to a
term of imprisonment, while the defendant in Rice pled guilty to several charges. 
See id. at 713-14.  Both defendants' judgments were later reversed and both
defendants were then retried, convicted, and sentenced to longer terms than
previously imposed.  See id.  
The Supreme Court first held that "neither the double jeopardy provision nor
the Equal Protection Clause imposes an absolute bar to a more severe sentence
upon reconviction."  Id. at 723.  However, the Supreme Court concluded that it
would be a "flagrant violation" of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment "for a state trial court to follow an announced practice of imposing a
heavier sentence upon every reconvicted defendant for the explicit purpose of
punishing the defendant for his having succeeded in getting his original conviction
set aside."  Id. at 723-24.  Noting that the "existence of a retaliatory motivation
would . . . be extremely difficult to prove in any individual case," id. at 725 n. 20,
the Court held: 
[W]henever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant
after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. 
Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning
identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the
time of the original sentencing proceeding.  And the factual data upon
which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record,
so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be
-9-
fully reviewed on appeal.
Id. at 726 (emphasis supplied). 
As explained by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions, Pearce and its
progeny established "a presumption of vindictiveness, which may be overcome only
by objective information in the record justifying the increased sentence." United
States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374 (1982).  However, the presumption does not
apply unless there is a "realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness,'" or, in other words,
"the opportunities for vindictiveness . . . [must] impel the conclusion that due
process of law requires a rule analogous to that of the Pearce case."  Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974).  Accordingly, not every increase in sentence justifies
the imposition of the prophylactic rule announced in Pearce.  See Blackledge, 417
U.S. at 26.
In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), the Supreme Court considered a
challenge to Kentucky's two-tier system for adjudicating misdemeanor offenses,
which provided that these lesser crimes could be tried by an "inferior court" with the
accused entitled to a de novo trial in a court of general jurisdiction if convicted after
trial or a guilty plea.  See 407 U.S. at 112-13.  The defendant argued that this system
violated the Due Process Clause as interpreted by Pearce, because the trial judge
conducting the de novo trial was not bound by the sentence imposed by the inferior
-10-
court.  See Colton, 407 U.S. at 114.  In rejecting the defendant's argument, the
Supreme Court concluded: 
Our view of the Kentucky two-tier system of administering
criminal justice . . . does not lead us to believe . . . that the hazard of
being penalized for seeking a new trial, which underlay the holding of
Pearce, also inheres in the de novo trial arrangement.  Nor are we
convinced that defendants convicted in Kentucky's inferior courts
would be deterred from seeking a second trial out of fear of judicial
vindictiveness.  The possibility of vindictiveness, found to exist in
Pearce, is not inherent in the Kentucky two-tier system. 
Id. at 116 (emphasis supplied).  The Supreme Court also indicated its concern that
the restraints called for in . . . Pearce . . . might, to the detriment of
both defendant and State, diminish the likelihood that inferior courts
would impose lenient sentences whose effect would be to limit the
discretion of a superior court judge or jury if the defendant is retried
and found guilty. 
Id. at 119.
In Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989), upon which the State relies in this
case, the Supreme Court again considered the situation where a harsher sentence
was imposed after a trial and the initial sentence was the product of a guilty plea. 
With Smith, the Supreme Court overruled its prior decision in Rice and qualified the
Pearce decision, stating:
While the Pearce opinion appeared on its face to announce a rule
of sweeping dimension, our subsequent cases have made clear that its
presumption of vindictiveness "do[es] not apply in every case where a
convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial."  As we
-11-
explained in Texas v. McCullough, "the evil the [Pearce] Court sought
to prevent" was not the imposition of "enlarged sentences after a new
trial" but "vindictiveness of a sentencing judge."  Because the Pearce
presumption "may operate in the absence of any proof of an improper
motive and thus . . . block a legitimate response to criminal conduct,"
we have limited its application, like that of "other 'judicially created
means of effectuating the rights secured by the [Constitution],'" to
circumstances "where its 'objectives are thought most efficaciously
served.'"  Such circumstances are those in which there is a "reasonable
likelihood," that the increase in sentence is the product of actual
vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.  Where there is
no such reasonable likelihood, the burden remains upon the defendant
to prove actual vindictiveness.
Smith, 490 U.S. at 799 (citation omitted) (alterations in the original).
The Supreme Court in Smith reasoned that "[e]ven when the same judge
imposes both sentences, the relevant sentencing information available to the judge
after the plea will usually be considerably less than that available after a trial."  Id. at
801.  Therefore, a greater sentence imposed after trial than imposed after a guilty
plea "is not more likely than not attributable to" judicial vindictiveness, but rather
due to the greater relevant sentencing information available to the judge after a trial. 
Id.  The Supreme Court also noted "some important developments in the
constitutional law of guilty pleas" since the Rice decision, including that "[a] guilty
plea may justify leniency," that a prosecutor may offer to recommend a more lenient
sentence or reduction in charges during the plea negotiation process, and that a
prosecutor may threaten a defendant with increased charges if he or she does not
3.  For this reason the Fourth District's reliance only on Smith in Morales v.
State, 819 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), for rejecting a presumption of
vindictiveness is misplaced. 
-12-
enter a plea.  Smith, 490 U.S. at 802-803.
We conclude that Smith is not dispositive of the issue before us because that
case involved a plea offer made by the prosecutor with no judicial participation in
the plea discussions.  Smith was not a case like Byrd or Wilson in which the trial
judges participated in unsuccessful plea discussions.3  Further, although the
Supreme Court broadly held that no presumption of vindictiveness applies in cases
where the first sentence was imposed as the result of a guilty plea, the facts of Smith
as recited by the Supreme Court indicate that the trial judge had stated the reasons
for the increased sentence on the record.  See 490 U.S. at 796-97.
We also recognize that the constitutional right at issue in this case is not the
defendant's right to appeal his conviction or sentence but, rather, the defendant's
constitutional right to a jury trial.  However, just as a trial judge cannot punish a
defendant for exercising his or her appellate rights, see Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723-24,
"[t]he law is clear that any judicially imposed penalty which needlessly discourages
assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and deters the exercise of
the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial is patently unconstitutional.  United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S. Ct. 1209, 20 L. Ed.2d 138 (1968)." City of
-13-
Daytona Beach v. Del Perico, 476 So. 2d 197, 205 (Fla. 1985) (quoting Gillman v.
State, 373 So. 2d 935, 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)).  Therefore, although a guilty plea
may justify leniency, see Smith, 490 U.S. at 802, an "accused may not be subjected
to more severe punishment for exercising . . . [the] constitutional right to stand trial." 
Mitchell v. State, 521 So. 2d 185, 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). 
Thus, the question we must confront is whether due process principles
compel us to adopt a presumption of vindictiveness that arises whenever the trial
judge participates in the plea negotiations and the defendant subsequently receives a
harsher sentence after a trial or hearing.  Byrd and Wilson assert that this
presumption logically follows from our opinion in State v. Warner, 762 So. 2d 507
(Fla. 2000).  We disagree.
JUDICIAL PARTICIPATION IN PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
In Warner, we considered whether it was permissible for the trial judge to
participate in plea negotiations and, if so, what restrictions apply.  The specific
question before the Court was whether a sentence was "per se invalid where the trial
court, over the State's objection, advise[d] a defendant regarding what sentence
would be imposed pursuant to a plea of guilty, and accept[ed] the defendant's
subsequent guilty plea."  Warner, 762 So. 2d at 509. 
After noting that several states, the federal system, and the American Bar
4.  The Court identified several advantages to allowing judicial participation
in plea bargaining negotiations, including directness, simplicity, decorum, and
procedural uniformity.  See Warner, 762 So. 2d at 512. 
5.  The concerns noted by the Court included those that "are inherent in the
plea bargaining model itself, but may be magnified when the powerful 'neutral' in the
system becomes embroiled in the negotiation process" (i.e., the defendant's
perception of coercion) and those that "appear to be unique to judicial involvement
beyond that contemplated by rule 3.171, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure" (i.e.,
perception that the trial judge will not be able to fairly rule on the voluntariness of
the plea).  Warner, 762 So. 2d at 511.   
-14-
Association's Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to Guilty Pleas have expressly
prohibited judicial participation in plea negotiations, and considering the pros4 and
cons5 of allowing judicial participation in plea negotiations, we ultimately decided to
permit limited judicial participation with certain safeguards adopted by the Michigan
Supreme Court in People v. Cobbs, 505 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1993).  See Warner,
762 So. 2d at 513.  Therefore, although we did not prohibit judicial participation in
plea negotiations, we imposed several limitations on that participation, which we
concluded were necessary "to minimize the potential coercive effect on the
defendant, to retain the function of the judge as a neutral arbiter, and to preserve the
public perception of the judge as an impartial dispenser of justice."  Id.  (emphasis
supplied). 
The first restriction we placed on judicial participation is that the trial judge
could not initiate the plea dialogue.  See Warner, 762 So. 2d at 513.  However, the
-15-
judge "may . . . participate in such discussions upon request of a party" and "[o]nce
involved, the court may actively discuss potential sentences and comment on
proposed plea agreements."  Id. at 513-14.  The question from the defendant's
perspective for the court's consideration is:  "Knowing what you know today, what
do you think the sentence would be if the defendant pled guilty, as charged?"  Id. at
514 (emphasis supplied).
Second, we made clear that the judge must "neither state nor imply alternative
sentencing possibilities which hinge upon future procedural choices, such as the
exercise of a defendant's right to trial."  Id. (emphasis supplied).   Further, although
the preliminary evaluation made by the judge is not binding, the defendant who
pleads guilty or nolo contendere in reliance on that evaluation has the absolute right
to withdraw the plea if the judge later determines that a greater sentence must be
imposed.  See id.  Finally, we required that a record be made of all plea negotiations
involving the trial judge.  See id.  
We also briefly addressed the situation where a plea was either not entered or
was withdrawn.  Recognizing that "[a] judge's candid statement of how a case
appears at an early stage of the proceeding does not prevent the judge from deciding
the case in a fair and evenhanded manner later, when additional facts become
known," we concluded that "the judge who participated in the plea bargaining
-16-
process will not automatically be subject to recusal."  Id. (emphasis supplied).  
It was with these restrictions and caveats that we sought to "accommodate[]
the competing interests involved" and allow for the benefits of judicial participation
while protecting the integrity of the judicial system and the rights of defendants.  Id.
at 512-13.  We emphasized that although the delineated safeguards "apply in those
cases where a trial court agrees to be an active participant in plea bargaining
discussions, the court may decline to assume such a role."  Id. at 514. 
Our decision in Warner was not the first time this Court addressed the issue
of judicial participation in plea negotiations.  More than twenty years before Warner,
this Court decided Davis v. State, 308 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1975), in which we declined
to condemn judicial participation in plea bargaining "per se" due to our confidence
"that the trial judges of this state [would] take all necessary precautions to assure
that defendants' rights are protected by appropriate safeguards."  Davis, 308 So. 2d
at 29.  
The Warner decision was a refinement of Davis, in which we delineated
certain minimum procedural safeguards, applicable prospectively to such
participation.  See Warner, 762 So. 2d at 510.  Therefore, Warner did not, as Byrd
and Wilson contend, implement a new policy in this State with respect to judicial
participation in plea negotiations.  Instead, Warner involved a very narrow holding
-17-
that permits a trial judge to respond to a request from a defendant as to what
sentence the judge would impose in exchange for a guilty plea.  Warner was never
intended to create a constitutional right to the sentence offered by the judge or to
give the defendant an expectancy that the sentence would be no higher if the
defendant decided not to plead guilty.  Accordingly, we do not agree with Byrd and
Wilson that our opinion in Warner mandates that a presumption of vindictiveness
arise in all cases where a higher sentence is imposed after the judge has participated
in the plea discussions.  We conclude that "[t]he possibility of vindictiveness, found
to exist in Pearce," is not "inherent" in the process set forth in Warner.  See Colten,
407 U.S. at 116.  
Further, we recognize that it is to the defendant's advantage, in a case where
there are no plea negotiations with the State, to ascertain from the judge what the
sentence would be if the defendant pleaded guilty.  Thus, we are mindful that
imposing a presumption of vindictiveness in cases where the Warner procedures
have been followed, "might, to the detriment of . . . [the] defendant . . . diminish the
likelihood" that the trial judge would participate in plea discussions at a defendant's
request.  Colten, 407 U.S. at 119. 
Nevertheless, imposition of a harsher sentence, without explanation on the
record after judicial participation in the plea negotiations, does raise concerns that
-18-
were not present in the United State Supreme Court opinion in Smith.  As previously
noted, in Smith there was no judicial participation in the plea negotiations and the
trial judge stated reasons on the record for the harsher sentence.  See 490 U.S. at
796-98.  Therefore, we now face the question of the appropriate analysis to utilize in
determining when a presumption of vindictiveness arises.  In answering this
question, it is instructive to review the relevant decisions of the district courts of
appeal issued both before and after Warner.
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES
Consistent with the United States Supreme Court cases that address the
presumption of vindictiveness, the district courts of appeal were considering a
totality of the circumstances analysis in determining whether the presumption arose,
even before our decision in Warner.  In Mitchell v. State, 521 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1988), defense counsel asked the judge about the possibility of a plea after the
first witness testified at trial.  See 521 So. 2d at 186.  The trial judge asked about the
defendant's record and questioned the defendant about his parole status, and the
State offered to forgo filing for habitual offender status and seeking a departure
from the guidelines if the defendant pled.  See id.  The defendant rejected the trial
judge's offer of seven to nine years and elected to proceed with the trial.  See id. 
The trial judge then made the following comments on the record:
-19-
[T]he offer made was based upon entry of a plea at this time and based
upon the state's indication that they would not be seeking--if he entered
a plea now that they would not be seeking any aggravation and not be
seeking a habitual offender status.  Obviously, the court's position
would be--could very well be entirely different at the conclusion of the
trial should appropriate motions be filed. 
Id.
After the defendant was convicted, the trial judge imposed an upward
departure sentence of twelve years, with written reasons supporting the departure. 
See id.  The defendant appealed, arguing that the harsher sentence should be
presumed vindictive.  The Fourth District rejected the defendant's argument,
concluding that nothing in the record supported a presumption of vindictiveness. 
See id. at 190.  The Fourth District further found that a disparity between the
sentence imposed and the earlier offer did not alone support a finding of
vindictiveness, and that there were no comments on the record that on their face
would support a presumption of vindictiveness.  See id.  
In contrast to Mitchell, the facts presented in Stephney v. State, 564 So. 2d
1246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), led the Third District to apply the presumption of
vindictiveness and vacate the defendant's sentence in that case.  Stephney involved a
plea offer of 364 days plus placement in a drug rehabilitation program made by the
judge at the defendant's arraignment.  See 564 So. 2d at 1247.  The defendant
-20-
rejected the plea, a jury was sworn for the trial, and the trial judge then offered the
defendant three and one-half years in exchange for a guilty plea.  See id.  The
defendant responded by asking the judge to renew its offer of 364 days.  See id. 
The Third District's opinion recites the following exchange that then occurred
between the trial judge and defense counsel:
THE COURT:  I guess he should have taken it [the original plea
offer].  No.  It's not available now.
MR. KUPER [defense counsel]: Well, at this time he would be
willing to ask Your Honor if you would consider some type of
community control with a drug program outside– 
THE COURT: No.
MR. KUPER:  –due to the fact that he may have a drug problem.
THE COURT: No.  He had the same drug problem the day of
arraignment.
MR. KUPER: In lieu of the fact that he would have been out by
now, anyway–
THE COURT:  Even more so.  The next time he will know to
take it when I offer it at arraignment.
. . . .
THE COURT:  . . . I only wish that the guys that sit next to the
ones at arraignment, that give them all the legal advice, would be here at
times like this.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
The State then presented the rest of its case, after which the trial judge again
offered the defendant three and one-half years.  See id.  The defendant again asked
for a shorter sentence in light of his drug addiction.  The trial judge responded:
"Absolutely not.  I offered him three and a half.  I will, as a gesture of goodwill,
-21-
leave it open right now before you have to decide if your client is testifying, for
about fifteen seconds."  Id.  The trial judge withdrew the offer, the jury returned a
guilty verdict, and the judge imposed a nine-year sentence, the highest permissible
sentence under the guidelines.  See id. at 1248.  After reviewing the record and the
transcript, the Third District concluded that there was no reason why the harshest
possible sentence was rendered.  See id.  The Third District further found that the
comments on the record "on their face support[ed] a presumption of judicial
vindictiveness which was in no way dissipated by record evidence."  Id.  
The Second District has also confronted the issue of when a presumption of
vindictiveness arises.  See, e.g., McDonald v. State, 751 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2d DCA
1999).  In McDonald, the defendant rejected the State's plea offer of 42 months'
imprisonment prior to the trial.  See id. at 58.  The following exchange appeared in
the record:
THE DEFENDANT:  No, sir, I don't want it.  I didn't do it.
THE COURT:  You know that the police officers are going to
come in here and testify that you did it?
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.
THE COURT:  They're going to testify they took the money
from you with the serial numbers; do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:  They didn't get the money.
THE COURT:  Well, all right.  Do you understand ma'am, that if
you're convicted, if the jury finds you guilty, that you are potentially,
you are facing 30 years in Florida State Prison; do you understand
that?
-22-
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.
Id.
During the State's case, testimony revealed that the police officers never
recovered the money.  See id.  During a recess in the proceedings, McDonald
agreed to plead guilty to all counts charged in exchange for a forty-eight month
sentence.  See id.  When the terms of the agreement were presented, the judge
rejected the agreement without explanation.  See id.  After the jury returned a guilty
verdict, the trial judge imposed concurrent maximum sentences, totaling thirty years
in prison.  See id.  
The Second District reviewed the record and concluded that it "simply [did]
not undermine the presumption that the extreme disparity between" the plea offer
and sentence imposed was, "at least in part, the product of judicial vindictiveness." 
Id. at 59.  In reaching this conclusion, the Second District noted that "the pretrial
colloquy plainly reflect[ed] the judge's attempt to convince McDonald to accept the
State's" plea offer.  The Second District also noted that even though the trial judge
had "learned some other things about McDonald which in his discretion reasonably
might have caused him to temper her punishment," he nevertheless imposed
maximum sentences.  Id.  
Although McDonald involved a plea offer from the State, McDonald shows
-23-
that similar concerns regarding judicial vindictiveness may arise where the trial judge
does not make the offer itself but, rather, becomes actively involved in an
unsuccessful plea bargaining discussion between the State and the defendant.  In
fact, the Second District expressly rejected the State's argument that there was no
judicial participation because the State made the plea offer:
Here, the State contends that the trial judge did not participate in
the plea negotiation, pointing out that the 42-month offer was made by
the prosecutor.  But given the purpose of the rule--to ensure that
defendants are not intimidated by fear of judicial reprisal when weighing
whether to waive their constitutional rights--the source of the plea offer
was not as important as the fact that the judge advocated it. 
Id. (emphasis supplied).
Since Warner, the Third District has continued to apply a totality of the
circumstances analysis in reviewing claims of judicial vindictiveness.  For example,
in Charles v. State, 816 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), the Third District examined
all the circumstances surrounding a rejected plea and the sentence imposed after
trial, and concluded that the sentence was presumptively vindictive.  The factors
considered by the Third District included: (1) that the judge initiated the plea
discussions; (2) that the sentence imposed was four times more severe than the
original offer; (3) that at the time of the offer the judge heard all of the evidence
presented by both sides, inquired as to the defendant's criminal history, asked
-24-
whether anyone had been injured during the offense, and asked whether the
defendant had carried a firearm; and (4) that the record in the case was devoid of
any factors that may have come out during sentencing that warranted the significant
increase.  See id. at 735.  Further, the Third District indicated that the comments
made by the trial judge, which included statements such as that the defendant made
the "biggest mistake of his life" by rejecting the offered sentence, contributed to a
finding that the presumption was appropriately applied in this case.  See id. at 733-
734.
On the same day Charles was decided, the Third District also decided Prado
v. State, 816 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).  As did McDonald, Prado involved
a plea offer from the State and again demonstrates that similar concerns regarding
judicial vindictiveness may arise regardless of whether the initial plea offer comes
from the State or the trial judge.  In Prado, prior to the start of a second trial, the
trial judge "initiated a lengthy exchange with Prado regarding the benefits of
accepting the state's four-year prison plea offer, in lieu of proceeding to trial."  816
So. 2d at 1156.  Prado rejected the State's offer, was found guilty by the jury and
was sentenced to forty years in prison.  See id.  The Third District reviewed the
transcript, noted that the sentence imposed was a tenfold increase from the plea
offer, and concluded that the trial judge's comments on their face supported a
6.  Judge Sorondo's concurring opinion contains a lengthy recitation from
the pertinent parts of the trial transcript.  See Prado, 816 So. 2d at 1159-62
(Sorondo, J. concurring).  At one point during the discussion of the State's plea
offer, Prado stated that he did not believe the trial judge could sentence him to forty
years if he was found guilty.  See id. at 1160.  The judge replied:  "Don't be so
sure."  Id.  A few moments later the trial judge stated:  "If you feel you're a gambler
and a player and want to take a chance, knock yourself out.  We'll give you a trial. 
And once the dice are thrown--."  Id.  After trial, during the sentencing proceeding,
the trial judge reiterated that Prado made a mistake by choosing to proceed to trial:  
Going to trial is something that we do here but the consequences, of
course, are if you lose, you might lose big.  In this particular case the
defendant made an enlightened choice that was not a particularly good
one.  He turned down the fairly reasonable plea. . . .
And, he made another life choice when he said to me you will
not give me 40 years in state prison.  He was wrong about going to
trial; he was wrong about that sentence because that's exactly what
he's going to get. 
Id. at 1162.
-25-
presumption of vindictiveness.  See id. at 1157.6
The above cases illustrate the tension between the realistic expectation
recognized in Smith that "a guilty plea may justify leniency," 490 U.S. at 802, and
the constitutional imperative that a defendant should not be penalized by the judicial
system for not accepting a plea and exercising his or her constitutional right to
proceed to trial.  See Del Perico, 476 So. 2d at 205.  In order to balance these
competing constitutional principles, we decline to adopt a rigid rule, as urged by
Byrd and Wilson.  We conclude that a totality of the circumstances review, as the
7.  Although Warner dealt only with a case where the trial judge, over the
State's objection, advised the defendant regarding the sentence that would be
imposed pursuant to a plea of guilty, the principles and concerns of Warner
expressed in these first two factors have broader application any time the trial judge
participates in plea discussions.
-26-
Third District applied in Charles and Prado, is the more appropriate analysis to
employ to determine whether a defendant's constitutional right to due process of law
was violated by the imposition of an increased sentence after unsuccessful plea
discussions in which the trial judge participated.
Judicial participation in plea negotiations followed by a harsher sentence is
one of the circumstances that, along with other factors, should be considered in
determining whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the harsher sentence was
imposed in retaliation for the defendant not pleading guilty and instead exercising his
or her right to proceed to trial.  See Smith, 490 U.S. at 799.  The other factors that
should be considered include but are not limited to:  (1) whether the trial judge
initiated the plea discussions with the defendant in violation of Warner; (2) whether
the trial judge, through his or her comments on the record, appears to have departed
from his or her role as an impartial arbiter by either urging the defendant to accept a
plea, or by implying or stating that the sentence imposed would hinge on future
procedural choices, such as exercising the right to trial;7 (3) the disparity between
the plea offer and the ultimate sentence imposed; and (4) the lack of any facts on the
8.  Where the totality of the circumstances does not give rise to a
presumption of vindictiveness, the burden remains upon the defendant to prove
actual vindictiveness.  See Smith, 490 U.S. at 799.
9.  However, as Judge Sorondo correctly observed, Warner does not 
forbid[] a judge from becoming involved in a discussion wherein the
-27-
record that explain the reason for the increased sentence other than that the
defendant exercised his or her right to a trial or hearing.8  
As regards factors (1) and (2), if the judge participates in the plea negotiations
beyond what is contemplated by Warner, or by his or her comments appears to
have departed from the role of a neutral arbiter, then these actions alone may give
rise to a presumption of judicial vindictiveness that would shift the burden to the
State to produce affirmative evidence on the record to dispel the presumption.  We
recognize that when the judge indicates a likely sentence in response to a request by
the defendant and later imposes a harsher sentence after a trial or hearing, there is
always potential for the appearance of vindictiveness.  Simply put, the same
flexibility that prosecutors have to actively engage in plea negotiations does not
extend to judges.  That is why the requirements of Warner must always be strictly
followed. 
Furthermore, as a general rule it is not the judge's role to advocate for a plea
offer.9  When the trial judge becomes an advocate for a plea--either one offered by
accused is asked whether he is aware of the state's pending plea offer
and his or her maximum exposure if convicted at trial. . . .  A recurring
post-conviction claim is that trial counsel was ineffective in that he or
she failed to communicate a plea offer made by the state or failed to
advise the defendant of his full exposure if convicted at trial.  In order
to address this potential problem, many trial judges have adopted the
practice of asking the attorneys immediately before trial, in the
defendant's presence, whether a plea offer has been extended and
whether the same has been communicated to the defendant.  
Prado, 816 So. 2d at 1158 n.2 (Sorondo, J., concurring).
-28-
the judge or by the State--the trial judge runs the risk of departing from its critical
role as a neutral arbiter.  The trial judge must make clear that the sentence is based
on what the judge presently has before him or her, and must caution that there is no
guarantee that this same sentence will be imposed if the defendant elects to go to
trial.  Further, if the defendant elects not to accept the offer and the judge later
imposes a harsher sentence, the trial judge should consider placing the reasons for
the greater sentence on the record.  As Judge Sorondo explained in Prado:
[T]he fact that a trial judge expresses an inclination to accept a state
plea offer, does not mean that he or she will be bound to impose the
same sentence after hearing the trial, if the evidence raises concerns that
were not perceptible from the usually abbreviated representations made
to the court during the plea bargaining process.  Factors such as the
nature of the defendant's prior convictions, the degree of violence
employed by the defendant during the commission of the crime, the
sophistication with which the charged offense was committed, and/or
the physical or psychological suffering endured by the victim(s), are
some factors that might lead the court to increase what it originally
considered to be an acceptable sentence.  Nevertheless, a judge who,
-29-
having been advised of the details of the case and having been actively
involved in an unsuccessful plea bargaining discussion, wishes to
impose a post-trial sentence more severe than that contemplated by his
or her plea negotiations, would be wise to explain his or her reasons for
the greater sentence in order to dispel any appearance of vindictive
sentencing.
816 So. 2d at 1164 (Sorondo, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).  These additional
precautions will serve to dispel any "apprehension of . . . a retaliatory motivation on
the part of the sentencing judge," Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725, thereby protecting the
integrity of the judicial system and the rights of the defendants.  See Warner, 762
So. 2d at 512-13.
APPLICATION OF THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
ANALYSIS TO BYRD AND WILSON
Because Byrd involves a trial judge who participated in the plea discussions,
the first factor to consider is whether the judge complied with the requirements of
Warner.  The record in this case indicates that the trial judge did not initiate the plea
discussions, but simply responded to a question from Byrd about a possible plea. 
However, we conclude, as did the Fifth District, that the trial judge exceeded the
limits of Warner by both urging Byrd to accept the plea offer of thirty years and
stating that if Byrd chose to go to trial he "certainly" would not get that low.  See
Byrd, 794 So. 2d at 672.  These comments implied that the sentence imposed would
hinge on future procedural choices, specifically Byrd's exercise of his right to trial.  
-30-
Further, there is an extremely large disparity between the offered thirty-year
sentence and the seventy-five year sentence imposed.  See id.  Finally, the Fifth
District's opinion indicates that the trial judge had "shown no reason why its pre-trial
evaluation of the appropriate sentence . . . was in error."  Id. at 673.  These factors,
taken together under a totality of the circumstances analysis, give rise to a
presumption of judicial vindictiveness that the State failed to rebut.  
Turning to Wilson, this case involves a violation of probation where the trial
judge offered to sentence Wilson to 128 months if he pled guilty.  When Wilson
indicated that he wanted to put on testimony from his fiancée before the judge
imposed sentence, the trial judge withdrew the "offer."  Subsequently, the trial judge
commented before the start of the revocation hearing, that "the court's offer was the
bottom of the guidelines and in my opinion you should have taken it."  Wilson, 792
So. 2d at 602.  This comment indicates that the judge may have unintentionally
stepped outside the bounds of Warner and departed from the role as a neutral
arbiter.  This comment also implies that the judge had already decided that Wilson
was not going to receive the bottom of the guideline sentence previously offered no
matter what occurred during the hearing, and that Wilson would be penalized for
exercising his right to a hearing on his violation of probation charge.  This
implication is heightened by the fact that immediately after the hearing, which was
-31-
held shortly after the plea discussions, the judge imposed a 150-month sentence
without explanation.  Moreover, the record lacks any facts that explain the increased
sentence.  
In Wilson's case, it is not simply the increased sentence that gives rise to an
unrebutted presumption of vindictiveness.  Rather, it is the judge's comment that
Wilson should have accepted the offer, coupled with the increased sentence
imposed shortly thereafter, and the absence of any explanation for the increase that
give rise to the unrebutted presumption of vindictiveness.
REMEDY
The Fifth District held that the appropriate remedy in Byrd was to enforce the
rejected plea offer.  The Fifth District considered several options including
resentencing Byrd to an appropriate sentence itself, remanding to the trial judge to
make findings supportive of the more severe sentence, or remanding for
resentencing before a different judge, but found each of these options lacking in
some respect.  Byrd, 794 So. 2d at 673.  We agree that neither setting Byrd's
sentence itself nor remanding to the trial judge to make findings on the record was
appropriate once Byrd's sentence was found to be presumptively vindictive. 
However, we disagree that Byrd should be resentenced in accordance with the prior
plea offer.  Once Byrd rejected the plea offer, he had no constitutional right to the
-32-
offered sentence.
We are aware that the Fifth District was concerned that remanding for
resentencing before a different judge "would ignore the problem created by the initial
[plea] offer" because the resentencing "judge would not know what prompted the
original offer and thus would not know what new facts may have been discovered
after the plea offer which might justify a harsher sentence."  Byrd, 794 So. 2d at
673.  However, the reason for the original plea offer and any "new facts" that may
have come to light are relevant only when considering the defendant's claim that the
sentence imposed was vindictive and should be vacated.  The information has no
bearing on a resentencing proceeding because the resentencing places the defendant
in the same position he or she would have been in if the plea discussions had never
occurred--before a neutral arbiter to receive a lawful sentence.  Further, this remedy
is consistent with our decision in Warner, in which we anticipated that failed plea
discussions may, under some circumstances, require the recusal of the trial judge
who participated in the discussions.  See 762 So. 2d at 514 (stating that when a plea
is not entered "the judge who participated in the plea bargaining process will not
automatically be subject to recusal").  Accordingly, in cases where an unrebutted
presumption of judicial vindictiveness arises, we conclude that the appropriate
10.  The trial judge presiding over the resentencing should comply with
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700(c)(1) by becoming "acquainted with what
transpired at the trial, or the facts, including any plea discussions, concerning the
plea and the offense."
-33-
remedy is resentencing before a different judge.10 
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we approve in part and quash in part the
Fifth District's decision in Byrd.  We approve the Fifth District's decision to the
extent that it holds that an unrebutted presumption of vindictiveness arose in that
case.  However, we quash the Fifth District's decision to the extent that it holds that
Warner requires a presumption of vindictiveness in all cases where the trial judge
participates in an unsuccessful plea discussion and the defendant subsequently
receives a harsher sentence from the same judge after a trial or hearing, and to the
extent it holds that the proper remedy is to remand for sentencing in accordance
with the rejected plea offer.  Rather, we conclude that resentencing before a different
judge is the appropriate remedy when a presumption of vindictiveness is unrebutted.
In Wilson, we conclude that a presumption of vindictiveness arose that was
unrebutted.  Accordingly, we quash the Fourth District's decision in Wilson to the
extent that it holds that no unrebutted presumption of vindictiveness arose.  As in
Byrd, the appropriate remedy is a resentencing before a different judge.
-34-
We remand these cases to the district courts of appeal for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., QUINCE, J., and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur.
QUINCE, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which LEWIS,
J., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs in result in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
QUINCE, J., concurring specially.
I concur in the conclusions reached by the majority because the presumption
of vindictiveness is the natural result when judges are allowed to initiate or
participate in plea bargaining with the defendants.  I concurred in the result only in
our decision in State v. Warner, 762 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2000), because it is my firm
belief that trial judges should not participate in the plea bargaining process.  The
prosecutor is charged with the responsibility of determining whom to prosecute and
what charges should be brought against particular defendants.  See Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1986).    The
determination of the charges will in turn determine the defendant's sentencing
exposure.  
-35-
Plea bargaining often involves a give and take between the defendant and the
prosecuting authority concerning the issue of the final charges that the defendant will
be held to answer for.  Thus, it is the prosecutor who should be bargaining with the
defendant.  Once a bargain has been reached, the trial judge must then determine
whether, under the facts of a given case, the agreed upon bargain should be
accepted.
These cases are prime examples of what happens when the trial judge, the
neutral arbiter, enters into the plea bargaining process.  
WELLS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Byrd v. State, 794 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), only as to the
resentencing.  I find that, under the specific facts of this case, the defendant should
be resentenced because the trial judge’s statements do appear to be in conflict with
this Court’s decision in State v. Warner, 762 So. 2d 507, 514 (Fla. 2000).  As
recognized by Judge Griffin in her concurring opinion in the district court, “In
fairness to the trial court, Warner had not been issued at the time of the taking of
Mr. Byrd’s plea.”  I would remand to the trial judge for a resentencing with an
explanation of the harsher sentence if the trial judge continues to find that sentence
appropriate.  I see no reason to substitute another trial judge.
-36-
I dissent from the majority’s adoption of a presumption of vindictiveness. 
Clearly, there is no constitutional requirement for such a presumption.  I believe that
the majority’s decision will severely undermine the reasoning of the Warner decision
and will result in trial judges wisely not making any pre-plea statements.  This will be
to the detriment of defendants.
I dissent from disapproving Wilson v. State, 792 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA
2001).
LEWIS, J., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.
LEWIS, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the result the majority presents with regard to Byrd v. State, 794
So. 2d 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), only as to resentencing.  I respectfully dissent with
all other aspects.  In my view, the majority opinion becomes involved unnecessarily
with presumptions and the single concurring opinion misconstrues this Court's
holding in State v. Warner, 762 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2000).  In Warner, we held: 
[J]udicial involvement [in the plea bargaining process] must be limited
to minimize the potential coercive effect on the defendant, to retain the
function of the judge as a neutral arbiter, and to preserve the public
perception of the judge as an impartial dispenser of justice.  The trial
court must not initiate a plea dialogue; rather, at its discretion, it may
(but is not required to) participate in such discussions upon request of
a party.
-37-
  
Id. at 513 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Under Warner, while
judges may have limited participation in the plea bargaining process, they may not be
a party to the actual plea the defendant must weigh.  Judges are to act as information
centers only.  The limited Warner holding was intended to allow a judicial officer to
provide information to a defendant and answers to his or her questions.  Clearly, the
judge may not initiate the bargaining process or make statements that could in any
way be construed as actual negotiation.  The judge must, at all times, remain a
neutral arbiter of justice. 
The majority relies upon a presumption of vindictiveness test, applicable
when a judge becomes involved in plea negotiations and the defendant is
subsequently sentenced to a more extensive term of imprisonment than he would
have received under the terms of the original plea agreement.  See majority op. at 26-
27.  I assert that such a test is unnecessary because following the rule pronounced in
Warner, a judicial officer may not actually be involved in plea negotiations.  Any
involvement beyond answering a defendant's questions and providing information is
a clear violation of Warner.  The concurring opinion adopts the presumption theory
and proceeds to state, "[T]he presumption of vindictiveness is the natural result
when judges are allowed to initiate or participate in plea bargaining with the
-38-
defendants."  Concurring op. at 35.  However, under Warner, unquestionably,
judges may not initiate or participate in plea bargaining with a defendant.  Judges
must only play a limited informational role in any negotiation process that unfolds.  
Two Cases Consolidated:
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict
Fourth District - Case No. 4D99-3398
(Broward County)
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Allen J. DeWeese, Assistant Public
Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Michael J. Neimand, Division Chief, and
Barbara A. Zappi, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and Belle
B. Schumann, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict
Fifth District - Case No. 5D99-2203
(Orange County)
-39-
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Belle B. Schumann, Assistant Attorney
General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Rosemarie Farrell, Assistant Public
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent