Case Title: Whitehall ex rel. Wolfe v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm.

Citation: 1995-Ohio-302

Docket Number: 19941156

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1995-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
City of Whitehall ex rel. Wolfe, Mayor, Appellant, v. Ohio Civil Rights 
Commission et al., Appellees. 
[Cite as Whitehall ex rel. Wolfe v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1995),   Ohio St.3d    
.] 
Prohibition -- Writ to prevent Ohio Civil Rights Commission from proceeding 
further in a pending matter -- Writ denied when commission’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over the unlawful discrimination charges is appropriate, and 
relator has adequate remedies at law in the commission’s proceeding and 
a further appeal to common pleas court. 
 
(No. 94-1156 -- Submitted October 10, 1995 -- Decided November 22, 
1995.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 93APD12-
1719. 
 
The city of Whitehall Department of Public Safety, Division of Fire, 
employed appellee, Betty R. Jones, as a communications operator.  In January 
1992, Whitehall Mayor John A. Bishop notified Jones that she would be laid off 
effective February 14, 1992 due to funding problems.  While the layoff was 
pending, Jones was given a disciplinary hearing on allegations that she had been 
asleep while on duty in January 1992.  By letter dated February 13, 1992, the 
 
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director of public safety notified Jones that she was being discharged effective 
February 14, 1992 because of her admitted failure to stay awake on the job.   
 
Jones appealed her layoff and termination to the Whitehall Civil Service 
Commission, which affirmed the orders.  The Franklin County Court of Common 
Pleas subsequently affirmed the decision of the civil service commission.   Jones 
did not institute any further appeal.   
 
On July 1, 1992, Jones filed a written charge with appellee, Ohio Civil 
Rights Commission (“OCRC”), claiming that she had been laid off and discharged 
due to unlawful racial and sexual discrimination.  Following a preliminary 
investigation and failed attempts at conciliation, OCRC found probable cause to 
believe that Whitehall had engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices and 
issued a complaint and notice of hearing in June 1993.  Whitehall filed an answer 
to the OCRC complaint claiming, inter alia, that it was immune and the OCRC 
proceedings were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.   
 
In December 1993, appellant, Mayor John A. Wolfe, on behalf of the city, 
filed a petition in the court of appeals seeking a writ of prohibition preventing 
OCRC from proceeding further in the pending matter.  The court of appeals 
granted OCRC’s motion for summary judgment and denied the writ.   
 
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The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
____________________ 
 
Dennis J. Fennessey, Whitehall City Attorney, and Timothy S. Rankin, 
Assistant City Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Duffy Ja, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Ohio Civil Rights Commission. 
 
Daniel K. Friend, for appellee Betty R. Jones. 
____________________ 
 
 Per Curiam.  In his propositions of law, Wolfe asserts that the court of 
appeals erred in denying the writ of prohibition.  In order to be entitled to a writ of 
prohibition, Wolfe had to establish (1) that OCRC was about to exercise judicial 
or quasi-judicial power, (2) that the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, 
and (3) that denying the writ will result in injury for which no other adequate 
remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Ruessman v. Flanagan 
(1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 464, 465, 605 N.E.2d 31, 33.  As the court of appeals 
correctly determined, OCRC is about to exercise quasi-judicial authority in 
proceeding upon the complaint.  See State ex rel. Republic Steel Corp. v. Ohio 
Civ. Rights Comm. (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 178, 184-185, 73 O.O.2d 478, 481, 339 
 
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N.E.2d 658, 662; R.C. 4112.05.  Thus, the dispositive issues are whether OCRC’s 
exercise of quasi-judicial authority is unauthorized, and if denying the writ will 
result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of 
law. 
 
Wolfe claims entitlement to extraordinary relief in prohibition because of 
res judicata, collateral estoppel, immunity, the law-of-the-case, and the civil 
service commission’s initial exercise of concurrent jurisdiction.  Wolfe contends 
that Jones’s prior civil service appeal precluded OCRC from exercising quasi-
judicial authority over her unlawful discrimination charges. 
 
As to Wolfe’s claims that the prior civil service appeal acted to divest  
OCRC of jurisdiction based upon res judicata and the included concept of 
collateral estoppel, res judicata is an affirmative defense which does not divest  
the jurisdiction of the second tribunal to decide the validity of that defense.  See 
State ex rel. Flower v. Rocker (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 160, 162, 6 O.O.3d 375, 376, 
370 N.E.2d 479, 480 (prohibition did not lie since court had jurisdiction to rule on 
affirmative defense of res judicata); see, generally, 63 American Jurisprudence 3d 
(2 Ed.1984) 180, Prohibition, Section 47 (“The fact that the defense of res 
judicata based on a decision in a former action is available in a second action 
 
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involving the same issues does not deprive the court in which the second action is 
brought of jurisdiction to try the case again, so as to warrrant the issuance of a writ 
of prohibition to prevent such court from proceeding with the suit, and the only 
remedy is to set up the res judicata plea as a defense in that suit and to appeal 
from an adverse decision.” Footnote omitted.).   
 
In addition, res judicata has no application to the proceeding before OCRC.  
OCRC was not named as a party to the prior civil service proceeding and did not 
participate in that action.  OCRC was also not in privity with either Jones or the 
city, the parties to the civil service proceeding.  Therefore, res judicata, which 
requires mutuality of the parties, does not operate to bar OCRC from proceeding 
on the unlawful discriminatory practice charges.  Broz v. Winland (1994), 68 Ohio 
St.3d 521, 523-524, 629 N.E.2d 395, 397; Dublin School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 
Limbach (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 255, 257-258, 631 N.E.2d 604, 606.   
 
Second, the issues involved in a civil service appeal before either the State 
Personnel Board of Review or a municipal civil service commission and an 
unlawful discriminatory practice charge before OCRC are different.  See 
Cincinnati v. Dixon (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 164, 169-170, 604 N.E.2d 193, 196-
197 (municipal civil service commissions are restricted to determining whether the 
 
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appointing authority’s employment action is consistent with the tenure provisions 
provided in R.C. 124.34 whereas OCRC is given the statutory authority to 
determine whether an employment action constituted religious discrimination); 
Jackson v. Franklin Cty. Animal Control (Oct. 6, 1987), Franklin App. No. 86AP-
930, unreported (determination by State Personnel Board of Review that employee 
was discharged for just cause did not collaterally estop OCRC from proceeding on 
unlawful discrimination claim regarding discharge); R.C. 4112.08 (“This chapter 
[which includes OCRC’s powers and duties] shall be construed liberally for the 
accomplishment of its purposes, and any law inconsistent with any provision of 
this chapter shall not apply.”). 
 
Wolfe also contends that OCRC lacked jurisdiction to proceed on the 
unlawful discrimination charges because the action of the city director of public 
safety in discharging Jones was quasi-judicial and made him immune from 
liability under R.C. 2744.03(A)(1) (“The political subdivision is immune from 
liability if the employee involved was engaged in the performance of a judicial, 
quasi-judicial, 
prosecutorial, 
legislative, 
or 
quasi-legislative 
function.”).  
However, this immunity is inapplicable.  See R.C. 2744.09(B) and (C).  Further, 
the R.C. 2744.03(A)(1) immunity is an affirmative defense, which must be raised 
 
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and proven, and does not affect the jurisdiction of the tribunal.  See State ex rel. 
Koren v. Grogan (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 590, 594, 629 N.E.2d 446, 450, setting 
forth the general rule. 
 
Wolfe next contends that he is entitled to a writ of prohibition because of 
the law-of-the-case doctrine.  Absent extraordinary circumstances, such as an 
intervening decision by the Supreme Court, an inferior court has no discretion to 
disregard the mandate of a superior court in a prior appeal in the same case.  Nolan 
v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 11 OBR 1, 462 N.E.2d 410, syllabus.  A writ of 
prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prevent a lower court from proceeding 
contrary to the mandate of a superior court.  State ex rel. Smith v. O’Connor 
(1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 660, 662, 646 N.E.2d 1115, 1117.  Here, OCRC is not 
acting contrary to the mandate of any superior tribunal in proceeding on its 
complaint. 
 
Wolfe additionally claims that the Whitehall Civil Service Commission 
possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings because its jurisdiction was 
the one initially invoked.  “‘As between [state] courts of concurrent jurisdiction, 
the tribunal whose power is first invoked by the institution of proper proceedings 
acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other tribunals, to adjudicate upon the 
 
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whole issue and to settle the rights of the parties.’”  State ex rel. Sellers v. Gerken 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 115, 117, 647 N.E.2d 807, 809, quoting State ex rel. Racing 
Guild of Ohio v. Morgan (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 54, 56, 17 OBR 45, 46, 476 
N.E.2d 1060, 1062.  Generally, it is a condition of the operation of the state 
jurisdictional priority rule that the claims or causes of action be the same in both 
cases.  Id.  Here, the claims involved in the two proceedings are not the same.  As 
noted previously, they involve distinctly different issues. 
 
In sum, the errors raised by Wolfe do not attack the jurisdiction of OCRC, 
and OCRC’s exercise of quasi-judicial authority is not unauthorized.  The 
extraordinary remedy of prohibition may not be employed before trial on the 
merits, as a substitute for appeal to review mere errors or irregularities of a court 
having jurisdiction.  State ex rel. Enyart v. O’Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656, 
646 N.E.2d 1110, 1112. 
 
Further, absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a tribunal 
having general subject matter of a case possesses authority to determine its own 
jurisdiction, and a party challenging its jurisdiction has an adequate remedy via 
appeal from its holding that it has jurisdiction.  Goldstein v. Christiansen (1994), 
70 Ohio St.3d 232, 235, 638 N.E.2d 541, 543.  OCRC has basic statutory 
 
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jurisdiction to consider Jones’s charges of unlawful racial and sexual 
discrimination because Whitehall is an “employer” and Jones is a “person” as 
those terms are used in R.C. 4112.02(A) and 4112.05(B).  See State ex rel. 
Natalina Food Co. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 562 
N.E.2d 1383, 1385; see, also, R.C. 4112.01(A)(1) and (2).  Therefore, even 
assuming that Wolfe’s various contentions possessed some merit, prohibition still 
would not lie because OCRC does not patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction over Jones’s unlawful discriminatory practice claims. 
 
Wolfe’s claims that the OCRC proceeding and any appeal under R.C. 
4112.06 to a common pleas court from any adverse OCRC decision would be 
inadequate due to time and expense are also without merit.  See State ex rel. 
Gillivan v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 196, 200, 638 N.E.2d 74, 77; 
State ex rel. Casey v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 429, 432, 575 
N.E.2d 181, 184.   
 
Based on the foregoing, OCRC’s exercise of jurisdiction over the unlawful 
discrimination charges is appropriate and Wolfe has adequate remedies at law in 
the OCRC proceeding and a further appeal to common pleas court.  The court of 
 
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appeals properly granted summary judgment and denied the writ.  Accordingly, the 
judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
CONCUR. 
 
WRIGHT, J., not participating.