Case Title: State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Whitmore

Citation: 1998-Ohio-180

Docket Number: 19971673

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. BEACON JOURNAL PUBLISHING CO. v. WHITMORE, JUDGE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Whitmore (1998), ___ 
Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Public records — Mandamus to compel common pleas court judge to provide 
relator access to letters the judge received from members of the public 
attempting to influence her sentencing decision in a criminal case — Writ 
denied, when. 
(No. 97-1673 — Submitted May 26, 1998 — Decided August 19, 1998.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
 
Respondent, Summit County Court of Common Pleas Judge Beth 
Whitmore, presided over the criminal case captioned State of Ohio v. Nathaniel 
Lewis.  Following trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Lewis guilty of rape.  
Judge Whitmore then ordered that the probation department prepare a presentence 
investigation report. 
 
Before sentencing, Judge Whitmore received seven letters from members of 
the public attempting to influence her sentencing decision concerning Lewis.  
None of the authors of the letters requested that the letters be considered 
confidential, and all but one of the letters are notarized.  Judge Whitmore neither 
solicited nor required these letters.  The letters were not part of the presentence 
investigation report conducted by the probation department. 
 
Letters addressed to Judge Whitmore are received by her office and placed 
in her in-box, together with other incoming documents and correspondence.  She 
glances through the letters and then places those letters involving sentencing in a 
temporary file to review at the time she receives the applicable presentence 
investigation report.  When she receives the presentence investigation report, any 
correspondence that relates to her sentencing decision in that case is attached to 
 
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the report.  Judge Whitmore then usually reviews the report and the letters the 
night before the sentencing hearing. 
 
Judge Whitmore claimed that she generally never relies on information in 
unsolicited letters she receives from the public regarding a sentencing decision 
and that she specifically did not rely on any of the letters she received to make her 
sentencing decision in Lewis.  Judge Whitmore, however, conceded that she could 
not “absolutely  * * * wipe [her] mind clean of everything [she] receive[d] outside 
of the presentence investigation,” including the letters.  Judge Whitmore also 
noted that if information in a letter might lead to something she wanted to rely 
upon in a sentencing decision, she would ask the probation department to verify 
the information.  But she could not recall ever requesting this supplemental 
information, thus indicating that she did not use the letters in her sentencing 
decision in Lewis. 
 
On July 15, 1997, Judge Whitmore sentenced Lewis to eight years in prison 
for his rape conviction.  After sentencing, Judge Whitmore sent the presentence 
investigation report and all attached materials, including the letters, to the 
probation department.  Judge Whitmore usually does not see the report and letters 
again unless there is a postjudgment motion, i.e., a motion for super shock 
probation. 
 
Shortly following Judge Whitmore’s sentencing decision in Lewis, relators, 
the Beacon Journal Publishing Company and its editor and reporter, Robert 
Paynter, requested access to the seven letters received by Judge Whitmore 
concerning the sentencing of Lewis.  After Judge Whitmore refused relators’ 
requests, they filed a complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition to compel 
Judge Whitmore to provide access to the letters under Ohio’s Public Records Act, 
R.C. 149.43.  We dismissed the prohibition claim, granted an alternative writ of 
 
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mandamus, and issued a schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefs.  79 
Ohio St.3d 1500, 684 N.E.2d 85.  The parties submitted evidence and briefs, and 
Judge Whitmore submitted the letters requested by relators to the court under seal. 
 
This cause is now before the court for a consideration of the merits of 
relators’ claim for a writ of mandamus. 
__________________ 
 
Roetzel & Andress, Ronald S. Kopp and Amie L. Bruggeman, for relators. 
 
Maureen O’Connor, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Christopher 
C. Esker, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
R.C. 149.011(G) and 149.43; Public Records 
 
Relators assert that they are entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the 
disclosure of the requested letters. 
 
Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with Ohio’s 
Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43.  State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson (1994), 70 
Ohio St.3d 420, 426, 639 N.E.2d 83, 89.  A “public record” is “any record that is 
kept by any public office * * *.”  R.C. 149.43(A)(1).  Judge Whitmore’s office is a 
“public office.”  R.C. 149.011(A) and (B).  R.C. 149.011(G) defines “records” 
broadly to include “any document, device, or item, regardless of physical form or 
characteristic, created or received by or coming under the jurisdiction of any 
public office of the state or its political subdivisions, which serves to document the 
organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other 
activities of the office.”  (Emphasis added.)  See, generally, State ex rel. Thomas v. 
Ohio State Univ. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 245, 246-247, 643 N.E.2d 126, 128. 
 
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While it is uncontroverted that Judge Whitmore received the letters and 
placed them in her files, we hold that, for the following reasons, the letters were 
not “records” for purposes of R.C. 149.011(G) and 149.43 because they do not 
serve to document Judge Whitmore’s sentencing decision or any other activity of 
her office. 
 
Judge Whitmore did not use the letters in her decision to sentence Lewis.  
The R.C. 149.011(G) definition of “records” has been construed to encompass “ 
‘anything a governmental unit utilizes to carry out its duties and responsibilities  * 
* *.’ ”  State ex rel. Mazzaro v. Ferguson (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 37, 39, 550 
N.E.2d 464, 466, quoting State ex rel. Jacobs v. Prudoff (1986), 30 Ohio App.3d 
89, 92, 30 OBR 187, 190, 506 N.E.2d 927, 930; see, also, State ex rel. Rea v. Ohio 
Dept. of Edn. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 527, 530, 692 N.E.2d 596, 600.  Judges often 
receive numerous letters from interested parties attempting to persuade the judge 
to their viewpoint or to bring some information to the judge’s attention.  Many 
judges have their staff screen and discard such mail because it constitutes an 
improper ex parte communication, or a judge may, once it becomes apparent what 
the letter involves, cease reading the letter and, preferably discard the same.  Here, 
although Judge Whitmore did not discard the letters, she never utilized the letters 
in her sentencing decision.  Therefore, the letters are not subject to disclosure 
because they do not serve to document the organization, functions, policies, 
decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of Judge Whitmore’s office.  
See State ex rel. Wilson-Simmons v. Lake Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. (1998), 82 Ohio 
St.3d 37, 41, 693 N.E.2d 789, 792-793. 
 
By so holding, we reject relators’ contention that a document is a “record” 
under R.C. 149.011(G) if the public office “could use” the document to carry out 
its duties and responsibilities.  While we noted in Mazzaro that “the Auditor either 
 
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did or could have used Deloitte’s records in furtherance of its responsibility to 
complete the Euclid biennial audit,” we emphasized the Jacobs test of “anything a 
governmental unit utilizes to carry out the duties and responsibilities” to determine 
whether the documents were records under R.C. 149.011(G).  (Emphasis added.)  
Mazzaro, 49 Ohio St.3d at 39, 550 N.E.2d at 466; Jacobs, 30 Ohio App.3d at 92, 
30 OBR at 190, 506 N.E.2d at 930. 
 
Mazzaro involved records prepared by a private auditor based on authority 
delegated by a public officer.  The dictum in Mazzaro does not expand the R.C. 
149.011(G) definition of “records.”  Just as R.C. 149.43(A)(1) “does not define a 
‘public record’ as any piece of paper on which a public officer writes something,” 
State ex rel. Steffen v. Kraft (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 439, 440, 619 N.E.2d 688, 689, 
R.C. 149.43 and 149.011(G) do not define “public record” as any piece of paper 
received by a public office that might be used by that office.  Cf. Tax Analysts v. 
United States Dept. of Justice (C.A.D.C.1988), 845 F.2d 1060,  1068 (“Of course, 
agency possession and power to disseminate a document are still insufficient by 
themselves to make it an ‘agency record.’  * * * Agencies must use or rely on the 
document to perform agency business, and integrate it into their files, before it 
may be deemed an ‘agency record.’ ”).  A contrary conclusion would lead to the 
absurd result that any document received by a public office and retained by that 
office would be subject to R.C. 149.43 regardless of whether the public office ever 
used it to perform a public function.  The plain language of R.C. 149.011(G), 
which requires more than mere receipt and possession of a document in order for it 
to be a record for purposes of R.C. 149.43, prohibits this result.  Wilson-Simmons, 
82 Ohio St.3d at 41, 693 N.E.2d at 792-793. 
 
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Based on the foregoing, the letters are not records under R.C. 149.011(G) 
and are not subject to disclosure as public records under R.C. 149.43.  
Accordingly, we deny the writ. 
Writ denied. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent.  For the following reasons, the 
majority errs by failing to hold that the requested letters are records under R.C. 
149.011(G) and are subject to disclosure as public records under R.C. 149.43. 
Records 
 
First, Judge Whitmore used the letters to carry out her duty to sentence 
Lewis.  As the majority notes, the R.C. 149.011(G) definition of “records” 
includes “ ‘anything a governmental unit utilizes to carry out its duties and 
responsibilities  * * *.’ ”  State ex rel. Mazzaro v. Ferguson (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 
37, 39, 550 N.E.2d 464, 466, quoting State ex rel. Jacobs v. Prudoff (1986), 30 
Ohio App.3d 89, 92, 30 OBR 187, 190, 506 N.E.2d 927, 930.  Although Judge 
Whitmore claims that she did not ultimately rely on the letters in her sentencing 
decision, she nevertheless utilized them in sentencing Lewis by reviewing them 
before sentencing to determine whether further inquiry or verification by the 
probation department was required. 
 
Judge Whitmore also integrated the letters into a probation department file 
that she reviews if a postjudgment motion is filed.  The uncontroverted evidence 
thus establishes that the letters, which Judge Whitmore reviewed, integrated into 
her court and probation department files, and used to determine whether further 
verification before sentencing was required, were records under R.C. 149.011(G).  
 
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The letters “document the  * * * policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or 
other activities” of Judge Whitmore’s office.  See R.C. 149.011(G). 
 
Second, the majority’s conclusion that the letters are not records for 
purposes of the Public Records Act is inconsistent with comparable federal 
precedent.  In Tax Analysts v. United States Dept. of Justice (C.A.D.C.1988), 845 
F.2d 1060, 1069, which is cited in the majority opinion, the federal court of 
appeals held that the four relevant considerations for determining whether a 
document received by a federal agency constitutes an “agency record” for 
purposes of the federal Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) are (1) the intent of 
the document’s creator to retain or relinquish control over the records, (2) the 
ability of the agency to use and dispose of the record as it sees fit, (3) the extent to 
which the agency personnel have read or relied upon the document, and (4) the 
degree to which the document was integrated into the agency’s record system or 
files.  See, also, Gallant v. Natl. Labor Relations Bd. (C.A.D.C.1994), 26 F.3d 
168, 172.  Here, the authors of the letters intended to relinquish control of their 
letters to Judge Whitmore for use in her sentencing decision in Lewis.  Judge 
Whitmore had the authority to use and dispose of the letters as she saw fit.  Judge 
Whitmore reviewed the letters prior to sentencing and used them in her sentencing 
decision to determine whether further inquiry or verification was warranted, and 
she integrated the letters into the probation department file on Lewis. 
 
Third, the majority’s conclusion contravenes our duty to liberally construe 
R.C. 149.43 and 149.011(G) in favor of broad access, with any doubt resolved in 
favor of disclosure of public records.  See, generally, State ex rel. Gannett Satellite 
Info. Network, Inc. v. Shirey (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 400, 401, 678 N.E.2d 557, 559. 
 
Fourth, the majority’s holding does not advance the preeminent purpose of 
R.C. 149.43, i.e., “ ‘to expose government activity to public scrutiny, which is 
 
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absolutely essential to the proper working of a democracy.’ ”  State ex rel. Gannett 
Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Petro (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 261, 264, 685 N.E.2d 
1223, 1227, quoting State ex rel. WHIO-TV-7 v. Lowe (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 350, 
355, 673 N.E.2d 1360, 1364.  The public has an unquestioned interest in knowing 
which individuals or entities are attempting to influence a judge’s decision in a 
pending case when the records documenting such attempts are received, 
considered, and integrated by the judge into her files. 
 
Finally, while I agree with the majority’s rejection of relators’ contention 
that a document is a record under R.C. 149.011(G) if the public office “could use” 
the document to carry out its duties and responsibilities, the fact remains that in 
the case at bar, Judge Whitmore used the letters in conjunction with carrying out 
her duties and responsibilities. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the letters are public records under R.C. 149.011(G) 
and 149.43 and are subject to disclosure unless some exception to disclosure 
applies.  For the reasons that follow, I would also find that none of the exceptions 
raised here is applicable. 
State Law Exemptions; Presentence Investigation Report 
 
R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(p) prohibits the disclosure of “[r]ecords the release of 
which is prohibited by state or federal law.”  State ex rel. The Plain Dealer v. Ohio 
Dept. of Ins. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 513, 518, 687 N.E.2d 661, 668.  R.C. 
2951.03(D) and Crim.R. 32.2(C) provide that presentence investigation reports are 
confidential and therefore not subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43.  See In re 
Special Grand Jury Investigation Concerning Organic Technologies (1995), 74 
Ohio St.3d 30, 32-33, 656 N.E.2d 329, 331; State v. Dietz (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 
69, 73-74, 623 N.E.2d 613, 616. 
 
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Judge Whitmore contends that the letters are excepted from disclosure 
because they are part of the probation department’s presentence investigation 
report on Lewis.  But, as Judge Whitmore conceded in her deposition testimony, 
the letters were not part of the report prepared by the probation department.  See 
R.C. 2951.03(A)(1).  Therefore, the claimed exception to disclosure is 
inapplicable.  State ex rel. James v. Ohio State Univ. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 168, 
169, 637 N.E.2d 911, 912 (“[E]xceptions to disclosure are to be construed strictly 
against the custodian of public records and doubt should be resolved in favor of 
disclosure.”). 
Public Policy 
 
Judge Whitmore finally contends that as a matter of public policy, 
unsolicited letters attempting to influence sentencing decisions that are used by a 
judge to determine whether further investigation prior to sentencing is necessary 
should not be subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43.  Though Judge Whitmore’s 
viewpoint reflects a genuine concern for the privacy of those who send letters to 
judges, I nevertheless cannot agree with her contention. 
 
First, “ ‘the General Assembly has already weighed and balanced the 
competing public policy considerations between the public’s right to know how its 
state agencies make decisions and the potential harm, inconvenience or burden 
imposed on the agency by disclosure.’ ”  State ex rel. Thomas v. Ohio State Univ. 
(1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 245, 249, 643 N.E.2d 126, 130, quoting James, 70 Ohio 
St.3d at 172, 637 N.E.2d at 913-914. 
 
Second, because only letters that are actually used by judges in connection 
with their public duties and integrated into public office files are public records, 
public policy favors the public disclosure of these records.  See, e.g., Tax Analysts, 
845 F.2d at 1069. 
 
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Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, relators are entitled to a writ of 
mandamus to compel Judge Whitmore to provide access to the requested letters.  
Because the majority opinion does not grant relators the relief to which they are 
entitled, I dissent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.