Case Title: Hix v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 042717

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
THOMAS EDWARD HIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 042717 
 
 
 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   September 16, 2005 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Thomas Edward Hix was convicted by a jury in the Circuit 
Court of Stafford County of attempted indecent liberties with a 
minor, Code § 18.2-370 (the "attempted indecent liberties 
statute"), and the use of a computer to solicit a minor, Code 
§ 18.2-374.3 (the "communications statute").1  The Court of 
Appeals denied Hix' petition for appeal, and he timely appealed 
to this Court.  For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
Hix, using the screen name “happyone345,” engaged in 
several electronic communications in an Internet “chat room” 
with a person using the screen name “heather_boon” ("Heather"). 
Heather claimed to be a 13-year-old girl2 but was, in fact, State 
Police Special Agent C.D. Wells. 
                     
1 Hix was indicted on two counts of each charge.  He was 
found guilty of one count of each charge for his conduct on 
November 14, 2001, and acquitted of the remaining two counts 
based upon his conduct on November 27, 2001. 
2 Excerpts from the chatroom transcript read as follows: 
happyone345:  your not a bad girl are you . . . sex and messin 
around 
 
2
 
On November 14, 2001, Hix contacted Heather, but when Hix 
learned Heather’s age, he terminated the internet conversation 
saying that she was too young.  Five minutes later, Hix 
contacted Heather again and wrote that he worked in 
Fredericksburg, lived in Manassas, and worked for the 
government.  The conversation ended with Hix saying again that 
Heather was too young. 
 
Just minutes later, Hix contacted Heather for a third time.  
Agent Wells "captured"3 this third conversation, in which Hix 
asked Heather about her prior sexual experiences and asked her 
to describe her body, with particular reference to her sexual 
characteristics.  Hix also described particular sexual acts that 
he wanted to engage in with her, invited her to "hook up," and 
admitted that he "[could] get 30 years in prison."  Hix ended 
the conversation by instructing Heather to add his contact 
information to her computer "friends" list, and asked her to 
contact him again later. 
                                                                  
heather_boon:  some times i guess but it is hard at 13 
. . . . 
happyone345:  how old are you 
heather_boon:  13 u don’t remember me do ya 
happyone345: 
yes you are the girl that said you where a bad 
girl 
. . . . 
happyone345: 
tell me about you []again . . . 
heather_boon: i am 13 
happyone345: 
oh yea 
[sic] 
 
3
 
On November 27, 2001, Heather observed that Hix was online 
and contacted him.  Hix suggested that he and Heather meet at a 
local McDonald's restaurant, but Heather replied, "today is not 
good I don’t want 2 give u the flu [sic]."  Agent Wells 
testified that he did not have enough information on Hix' 
location to arrange a meeting at that time.  Hix asked Heather's 
age and she again told him she was 13.  He repeated his desire 
to engage in certain sexual acts with her.  Heather ended the 
conversation when Hix was no longer responding. 
 
By March 28, 2002, Agent Wells had determined that Hix was 
using a computer located at the National Guard Armory in 
Fredericksburg, and Heather initiated a third contact with Hix.  
Heather reminded Hix that he had previously "wanted 2 [sic] go 
to lunch."  Hix responded that they could "just ride and mess 
around."  Heather reminded Hix that she was 13 years old, and 
Hix replied, "[S]ee, I'm messed up . . . . [T]hey would put me 
under the jail for messen [sic] with you[,] girl."  
Nevertheless, Hix told Heather he would be at the McDonald’s 
restaurant near the intersection of Routes 3 and 1, driving a 
red Ford Thunderbird coupe. 
 
The police observed a vehicle matching the description Hix 
gave to Heather arrive at the McDonald’s restaurant about 20 
                                                                  
3 When a chat room conversation is "captured," it is saved 
verbatim as a text file. 
 
4
minutes later.  Hix was driving and parked the car near the back 
of the restaurant.  Hix told Lieutenant Bowler, the first law 
enforcement officer to approach him that he was there to meet a 
13 year old girl that he had met on the Internet, that the 
girl's name was Heather Boone and that she was having problems 
and he was there to see if he could help her.  Wells then 
approached Hix and introduced himself as “Special Agent Wells 
with the Virginia State Police . . . also known as Heather 
Boone.”  Hix admitted to the police officers that he had 
participated in the conversations with heather_boon/Agent Wells, 
and further admitted that he believed that the girl he was going 
to meet at the McDonald's was, in fact, 13 years old.  Hix 
identified the computer located in the Bravo Company orderly 
room at the Fredericksburg National Guard Armory as the one he 
used to communicate with Heather. 
 
At trial, however, Hix testified that Agent Wells' 
recollection of their conversation at the McDonald's was 
incorrect and that he, in fact, informed Wells and the other 
officers that he "was there to meet somebody who said that they 
were a thirteen year old that [he] didn't believe."  Hix' own 
signed statement affirmed that he agreed to lunch with Heather 
at her invitation, that he "felt uncomfortable" but "thought 
that she may be in some kinda [sic] trouble as she [said] she 
was skipping school." 
 
5
 
In his own case-in-chief, Hix testified variously that he 
was just curious, that he thought that Heather was not really 13 
years old, but was an adult "role-playing" and alternately that 
he was afraid she was in some kind of trouble and needed his 
help. 
 
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Hix moved 
to strike the attempted indecent liberties charge on grounds the 
crime was a "legal impossibility" as there was no actual 13-
year-old girl with whom the taking of indecent liberties could 
have been accomplished.  He contended that the communications 
statute charge should be struck because the “or has reason to 
believe” standard under Code § 18.2-374.3(B) is an improper 
standard because "[a]ctual knowledge should be the standard." 
The Court denied the motion to strike at that time and when 
later renewed.  The jury found Hix guilty of attempted indecent 
liberties with a child and use of a communication system for 
soliciting sex with children for his conduct on November 14, 
2001.  The jury fixed Hix' punishment at two and one-half years 
imprisonment for each offense, and the trial court set the 
sentences to run concurrently. 
 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Hix argued that the 
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction on either 
charge.  First, he contended it was legally impossible under 
these circumstances to commit the crime of attempted indecent 
 
6
liberties with a child under Code § 18.2-370 because Heather was 
not a real child. Further, Hix argued that his indictment and 
conviction under the communications statute as it existed at the 
time of the offenses was a conviction under only subsection A of 
that statute: "use [of] a communications system . . . [to] 
procur[e] or promot[e] the use of a minor for any activity in 
violation of § 18.2-370" and not subsection B: "use [of] a 
communications system . . . [to] solicit[] any person he knows 
or has reason to believe is a minor for . . . any activity in 
violation of . . . § 18.2-370."  Hix argued that conviction 
under Former Code § 18.2-374.3(A) (1996 & Supp. 2001), 
necessitated the existence of a "real minor" and thus the 
evidence did not support his conviction under the communications 
statute. 
 
The Court of Appeals denied Hix' petition for appeal, 
rejecting Hix' first argument and ruling that his second 
argument was procedurally barred as he did not raise it in the 
trial court. 
 
On appeal to this Court, Hix contends that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion to strike because the evidence was 
insufficient to prove the charges under either statute.  
Additionally, he argues that the Court of Appeals erred in 
deciding that the language of the indictment under the 
communications statute allowed conviction under either 
 
7
subsection of Code § 18.2-374.3, and that Hix had conceded that 
he believed he was communicating with a minor.  Further, Hix 
assigns error to the Court of Appeals' judgment that he was 
procedurally barred from raising the following arguments: (1) 
conviction under the Communications statute required the 
existence of a "real minor," (2) the difference between 
preparation and attempt, and (3) the logical similarity between 
the role of an undercover police officer in certain attempted 
sex crimes and the role of an undercover officer in a drug 
conspiracy. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
A verdict of the jury, upon which the trial court enters 
judgment, settles all conflicts of testimony in favor of the 
prevailing party and entitles that party to all just inferences 
deducible therefrom. Pugsley v. Privette, 220 Va. 892, 901, 263 
S.E.2d 69, 76 (1980).  We view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party, and will 
not set aside the verdict unless it is plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it. Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 
281-82, 427 S.E.2d 411, 421 (1993).  We review questions of law 
de novo.  Simon v. Forer, 265 Va. 483, 487, 578 S.E.2d 792, 794 
(2003). 
A. Code § 18.2-370: Attempted  
Indecent Liberties with a Child 
 
 
8
Hix argues that the crimes described by Code § 18.2-3704, 
whether the completed crime or an attempt, require acts directed 
toward an actual child.  Because the evidence showed that 
Heather was not an actual child, but an adult law enforcement 
officer posing as a child, Hix contends the evidence cannot 
support his conviction for the attempted crime as a matter of 
law. 
Although the issue is framed as one of sufficiency of the 
evidence, Hix' arguments center on the applicability of the 
defense of impossibility.  In considering such a defense, a 
                     
4 Code § 18.2-370 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
A. Any person eighteen years of age or over, who, with 
lascivious intent, shall knowingly and intentionally commit 
any of the following acts with any child under the age of 
fourteen years shall be guilty of a Class 5 felony: 
(1) Expose his or her sexual or genital parts to any child 
. . . or propose that any such child expose his or her 
sexual or genital parts to such person; or 
. . . . 
(3) Propose that any such child feel or fondle the sexual 
or genital parts of such person or propose that such person 
feel or fondle the sexual or genital parts of any such 
child; or 
(4) Propose to such child the performance of an act of 
sexual intercourse or any act constituting an offense 
under § 18.2-361; or 
(5) Entice . . . or invite any such child to enter any 
vehicle . . . or other place, for any of the purposes set 
forth in the preceding subdivisions of this section. 
 
9
distinction must be made between legal impossibility and factual 
impossibility.5 
Legal impossibility occurs when a defendant's actions, 
even if fully carried out exactly as he intends, would 
not constitute a crime.  Factual impossibility occurs 
when the actions intended by a defendant are 
proscribed by the criminal law, but a circumstance or 
fact unknown to the defendant prevents him from 
bringing about the intended result. 
 
Parham v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 
 
 633, 636, 347 S.E.2d 172, 
173-74 (1986) (citing United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 883 
(5th Cir. 1976)). 
 
Hix' explicit communications with Heather and his proposal 
that they "hook up," if fully carried out exactly as he 
intended, would constitute a crime under the indecent liberties 
statute.  Id.  Only the fact that Agent Wells impersonated a 13-
year-old girl "prevent[ed] [Hix] from bringing about his 
intended result."  Id.  Thus, we find that Hix' defense is one 
of factual, not legal impossibility.  As Professor LaFave points 
out, this is an important distinction because 
                     
5 Hix urges this Court to adopt a third kind of 
impossibility defense: "hybrid legal impossibility."  Under this 
theory, a mistake of fact about the legal status of some 
necessary element of the crime nullifies a crime of attempt.  In 
accordance with the large majority of jurisdictions, we decline 
to adopt this position.  See, e.g., United States v. Farner, 251 
F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Darnell, 545 
F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1976); People v. Rojas, 358 P.2d 921, 
923-24 (Cal. 1961); State v. Moretti, 244 A.2d 499, 503 (N.J. 
1968). 
 
 
10
what is usually referred to as "factual impossibility" 
is no defense to a charge of attempt.  That is, if 
what the defendant intends to accomplish is proscribed 
by the criminal law, but he is unable to bring about 
that result because of some circumstances unknown to 
him when he engaged in the attempt, then he may be 
convicted. 
 
2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal 
Law, § 11.5(a)(2), at 233 (2d ed. 2003).  While the distinction 
between factual and legal impossibility is not always 
susceptible to a bright line of demarcation, our precedent 
provides guidance. 
 
Hix argues that the Court of Appeals incorrectly 
characterized his defense as one of factual impossibility and 
contends it is one of legal impossibility.  He cites Collins v. 
Radford, 134 Va. 518, 536, 113 S.E. 735, 741 (1922), and Trent 
v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1128, 1136, 156 S.E. 567 (1931), for 
the proposition that "[i]f there is some factual condition 
necessary to the completion of the crime, then the non-existence 
of that factual condition makes the crime impossible."  Hix 
misreads our decisions. 
 
In Collins, the defendant was charged with attempting to 
transfer "ardent spirits."  Collins, 134 Va. at 523, 113 S.E. at 
737.  He made arrangements with another to hide a gallon of 
whiskey in a haystack for him, but before the defendant could 
retrieve it, a farmer found the whiskey and turned it over to 
 
11
the police.  Id. at 532-33, 113 S.E. at 740.  When the defendant 
returned to retrieve the whiskey, he was arrested.  Id. 
 
We rejected the defendant's defense of impossibility because 
"the impossibility of performance was not of a kind to rob his 
act of its criminal character."  Id. at 536, 113 S.E. at 740.  
We held that a defense of impossibility is applicable only in 
those situations where the impossibility is "inherent . . . and 
not to cases where the impossibility has been brought about by 
outside interference, or grows out of extraneous facts not 
within the knowledge and control of the accused."  Id.  In the 
defendant's case, he did not know that the farmer had removed 
the whiskey from the haystack.  It was only this extraneous 
event not within the defendant's knowledge and control, that 
prevented him from completing the illegal transaction.  As such, 
the transaction was not inherently or legally impossible, but 
only factually impossible.  Had the facts been as the defendant 
intended them to be, he would have completed the criminal act of 
transporting ardent spirits.  Thus, he was guilty of the 
attempted act. 
 
In Trent, the police discovered an illegal still where the 
defendant and others were preparing to manufacture illegal 
spirits.  Trent, 155 Va. at 1130, 156 S.E. at 567.  Before the 
men could complete the process, the police raided the still and 
 
12
apprehended the defendant.  Id.  He argued that because a "worm"6 
was never found, "it [was] impossible to carry out the processes 
of distillation" and that this impossibility was a defense.  Id. 
at 1136, 156 S.E. at 569.  We agreed that if the "worm" were 
proven not to exist, the defendant's defense could stand, 
because consummation of the crime would be "inherently 
impossible."  Id.  While we found that "the conclusion is 
inevitable that [the] 'worm' was . . . immediately available" 
and thus, not proven absent, we rejected the reasoning that the 
absence of the "worm" would justify an impossibility defense as 
an "extraneous fact not within the knowledge or control of [the 
defendant]."  Id. at 1136-37, 156 S.E. at 569, 570.  Read in 
context, a defense of impossibility could only be viable for the 
defendant had he specifically intended to go through the motions 
of working the still without the "worm."  However, if his plans 
to manufacture the spirits were carried out exactly as he 
intended, with the "worm" in place, the defendant could be 
charged with attempting to manufacture illegal spirits, even if 
the "worm" was not currently present.  The fact that his plan 
was interrupted by law enforcement officers could therefore not 
bolster the defendant's effort to assert an impossibility 
defense. 
                     
6 A "worm" is "a spiral condensing tube used in distilling."  
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2636 (1993). 
 
13
Our decisions in Collins and Trent differentiate between 
legal and factual impossibility to the effect that while legal 
or "inherent impossibility" may be a defense, factual 
impossibility based upon "some extraneous fact not within the 
knowledge or control of the accused" is not.  The defendant in 
Collins had no knowledge of or control over the farmer's 
retrieval of the whiskey, and the defendant in Trent did not 
know that the police raid would interrupt the manufacturing 
process at the still.  These cases undergird later decisions of 
the Court of Appeals which plainly state, "[L]egal impossibility 
is a defense; factual impossibility is not."  See, e.g., Bloom 
v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 
 
 364, 372, 542 S.E.2d 18, 21, aff'd, 
262 Va. 84, 554 S.E.2d 84 (2001). 
The Court of Appeals first made this distinction in Parham 
in 1986.  Since that time, the Court of Appeals has continued to 
cite the language in Parham to distinguish between legal and 
factual impossibility. 
In Bloom, the Court of Appeals decided a case nearly 
identical to the case at bar.  The defendant was communicating 
over the internet with an undercover police officer posing as a 
13-year-old girl, and "proposed that [he and the girl] meet and 
have sexual relations."  Id. at 368, 542 S.E.2d at 20.  The 
defendant was apprehended by police when he went to the 
designated meeting place, but contended at trial that he could 
 
14
not "be convicted because it was impossible to entice a child to 
engage in sexual acts when he communicated with [a police 
officer]."  Id. at 369, 372, 542 S.E.2d at 20. The Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument, stating that 
[t]he defendant thought he was communicating with a 
young girl with whom he intended to have sexual 
relations. . . . If the defendant intends to violate 
the law and, but for some impediment, would complete 
the unlawful act, then he is guilty of the attempted 
crime. 
 
Id. at 372, 542 S.E.2d at 22. 
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that a police 
officer posing as a child in an internet chat room is only an 
impediment to the commission of the crime, an extraneous fact 
outside of the knowledge and control of the defendant.  The non-
existence of a "real child" does not make the crime of attempted 
indecent liberties inherently or legally impossible, but only 
factually impossible.  Thus, the fact that Hix and the defendant 
in Bloom were communicating with adult law enforcement officers 
is not a defense to the attempted crime. 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reached a similar 
conclusion in In re Doe, 855 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 2004).  The Court 
determined that a defendant who solicited over the internet and 
arranged to meet a person whom he believed to be 14 years old 
for sex, could be convicted for attempted enticement of a child 
in violation of a District of Columbia statute, even though in 
 
15
fact, he communicated with a law enforcement officer posing as a 
child.  The Court rejected the defendant's impossibility 
defense. 
First, S.D. argues that it is "legally impossible" to 
commit the D.C. offense of attempted enticement of a 
child when . . . the intended victim is (unbeknownst 
to the perpetrator) not a child. This argument 
confuses "legal impossibility" with "factual 
impossibility." Legal impossibility as a defense to an 
attempt offense arises only when the defendant's 
objective is to do something that is not a crime.  
That was not the case here. S.D.'s objective, to have 
sex with a child, was criminal. He made a substantial 
effort to achieve that criminal objective. As it 
turned out, S.D. unwittingly aimed his effort at the 
wrong target – since Ashley5665 was an undercover 
agent, it was factually impossible for S.D. to 
accomplish his objective with "her." But . . . [it is 
not] a defense . . . to a charge of attempted 
enticement of a child that the defendant was fooled 
because his target was in reality an undercover law 
enforcement officer.  Whether the targeted victim is a 
child or an undercover agent, the defendant's conduct, 
intent, culpability, and dangerousness are all exactly 
the same. Hence . . . impossibility is not a defense 
to a charge of criminal attempt when the defendant's 
actual intent[,] not limited by the true facts unknown 
to him[,] was to do an act or bring about a result 
proscribed by law. 
 
Id. at 1106 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Hix solicited and intended to have sex with a 13-year-old 
girl and went to meet her but "was fooled because his target was 
in reality an undercover law enforcement officer," id., an 
extraneous circumstance unknown to him and beyond his control.  
 
16
In such a case, the defense of impossibility is not available 
for a charge of criminal attempt.7  As Professor LaFave notes: 
[I]t is clear as a matter of policy that no reason 
exists for exonerating the defendant because of facts 
unknown to him which made it impossible for him to 
succeed. . . . [T]he defendant's mental state was the 
same as that of a person guilty of the completed 
crime, and by committing the acts in question he has 
demonstrated his readiness to carry out his illegal 
venture. 
 
2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 11.5(a)(2), at 234.  The 
Court of Appeals did not err in its judgment that Hix' claim of 
impossibility was not a defense to the crime of attempted 
indecent liberties.8 
                     
7 Hix also failed to object to jury instruction 5, based on 
Instruction 8.180 of the Virginia Model Jury Instructions–
Criminal and clearly provides factual impossibility is not a 
defense: 
It is no defense that it was impossible for the 
defendant to have committed the intended crime because 
of circumstances unknown to him.  It is sufficient if 
the defendant's actions would have resulted in the 
completed crime if the circumstances had been as he 
believed them to be. 
8 Hix also contends the Court of Appeals erred in holding 
that he conceded in his petition for appeal that he believed he 
was communicating with an actual minor.  Even if we assume the 
Court of Appeals erred in this instance, it is of no effect as 
to the merits of Hix' appeal.  The evidence in the record is 
clearly sufficient to prove that Hix thought he was 
communicating with a minor.  In each conversation with Hix, 
Heather told him she was 13.  Hix' questions and comments to 
Heather show he understood that Heather was a minor: "[W]hat do 
you look like at 13;" "[I']d get 30 years in prison;" "[I]'m 
like 36 . . . they would put me under the jail for messen [sic] 
with you." 
 
 
17
Hix also assigned error to the Court of Appeals' 
determination that he was procedurally barred from arguing (1) 
the difference between preparation and attempt and (2) the 
similarity between an undercover police officer pretending to be 
a minor in the crimes of conspiracy and attempt.  Even if we 
assumed the Court of Appeals erred, it would be of no effect as 
to the merits of Hix' appeal. 
By definition, the crime of attempted indecent liberties 
requires only that Hix make certain proposals or invitations to 
the victim.  The completed crime of attempt does not require any 
sexual touching of or by the victim, nor need the victim agree 
to perform any of the acts.  The simple act of proposing or 
inviting constitutes the completed crime if the offender is over 
the age of 18, the act is done with lascivious intent and the 
victim is under the age of 14. 
Hix fully intended, based upon the evidence in the record, 
to solicit sex from a 13-year-old girl.  In his chat room 
conversation with Heather on November 27, 2001, Hix proposed 
oral sex to Heather after she reminded him of her age, and he 
tried to set up a meeting.  This evidence is sufficient to 
support the jury's verdict and the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Hix' comparison of an attempt defense to that in a 
conspiracy case is not convincing.  Conspiracy requires a shared 
 
18
intent and joint action, whereas attempt does not.  
"[C]onspiracy requires . . . (1) an agreement between two or 
more persons, which constitutes the act; and (2) an intent 
thereby to achieve a certain objective[,] either an unlawful act 
or a lawful act by unlawful means."  Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal 
Law § 12.2, at 621 (4th ed. 2003).  On the other hand, "[a]n 
attempt to commit a crime is composed of two elements: (1) the 
intent to commit it; and (2) a direct, ineffectual act done 
toward its commission."  Barrett v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 153, 
156, 169 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1969).  The absence of the actual 
child in this case thus has no bearing on the crime of attempt. 
B. Code § 18.2-374.3: The Communications Statute 
We next review Hix' conviction under the communications 
statute.9  The indictment upon which Hix was convicted, charged 
him with "us[ing] a communication system . . . for the purposes 
                     
9 Code § 18.2-374.3 provides in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
A. It shall be unlawful for any person to use a 
communications system, . . . or any other electronic 
means for the purposes of procuring or promoting the 
use of a minor for any activity in violation of 
§ 18.2-370 . . . . 
 
19
of procuring or promoting the use of a minor for any activity in 
violation of Section 18.2-370, in violation of § 18.2-374.3 of 
the Code of Virginia."  The indictment does not cite to either 
subsection A or B, but to Code § 18.2-374.3 as a whole.  Hix 
argues, however, he could have been convicted only under 
subsection A of the statute, because the language of the 
indictment tracks only that subsection which requires the 
presence of an actual minor.  He contends that his conduct, if 
proven, could only sustain a conviction under Code § 18.2-
374.3(B) and thus there is an impermissible variance between the 
indictment and the statute under which he was convicted. 
The Court of Appeals determined that (1) Hix was 
procedurally barred from raising this argument for the first 
time on appeal, and (2) the indictment's language was sufficient 
as it "did not allege that the Commonwealth was prosecuting 
[Hix] solely under subsection (A)."  We agree. 
At trial, Hix did not argue that his prosecution was 
limited to subsection A of Code § 18.2-374.3.  Rather, he argued 
                                                                  
B. It shall be unlawful for any person 18 years of age 
or older to use a communications system, . . . or any 
other electronic means, for the purposes of soliciting 
any person he knows or has reason to believe is a 
child less than 18 years of age for . . . (iv) any 
activity in violation of subsection A of § 18.2-370. 
As used in this subsection, "use a communications 
system" means making personal contact or direct 
contact through . . . any electronic communications 
system, or . . . computer . . . system. 
 
20
the language "knows or has reason to believe," found in 
subsection B, "should not be upheld by this Court," but never 
contended that subsection B did not apply.  Instead, he argued 
the court should ignore the "reason to believe" language of 
subsection B and apply an actual knowledge standard because 
"should have known ain't enough . . . . Reason to believe.  The 
statute says it.  The statute shouldn't say it."  Further, Hix 
failed to object to jury instruction 6, which tracks the 
language of subsection B:  
The defendant is charged with the crime of Use of a 
Communications System for Soliciting Sex with 
Children.  The Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt each of the following elements of 
that crime: 
1) 
That the defendant was over the age of 18; 
and  
2) 
That the defendant did use a communication 
system for the purpose of soliciting a 
person who he had reason to believe was a 
minor to engage in sexual acts . . . . 
 
In sum, Hix did nothing to alert the trial court to his current 
position on appeal that the prosecution was limited to Code 
§ 18.2-374.3(A). 
Because Hix' arguments at trial regarding subsection B were 
wholly different from what he argues on appeal, he is barred by 
Rule 5:25 from raising this argument on appeal.  Hix asks us to 
consider this "issue under the ends of justice exception to Rule 
5:25," but we see no basis for its application. 
 
21
Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Hix is 
procedurally barred from challenging his conviction under the 
communications statute based upon the language of the 
indictment.  Having determined that Hix waived his argument on 
variance in the indictment, we find that the evidence is 
sufficient to sustain his conviction under the communications 
statute. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.