Case Title: VANVORST v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
VANVORST v. STATE2000 WY 591 P.3d 1223Case Number: 98-154Decided: 03/27/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
JOHN F. VANVORST a/k/a 
JOHN F. LUMBRA, Appellant (Defendant), v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Albany County, Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, 
Judge.

Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, State Public Defender, and Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming 
Public Defender's Office; Diane Courselle, Director, and Julia Tyson, Student 
Intern, of the Wyoming Defender Aid Program, representing 
appellant.Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Theodore E. Lauer, Director, and John N. O'Brien, Student Intern, of the 
Prosecution Assistance Program, representing 
appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] John F. 
Vanvorst a/k/a John F. Lumbra (Lumbra) presents several issues to be resolved in 
this case. He contends the evidence was not sufficient to permit the jury to 
find him guilty of concealment of stolen property in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-403(a)(i) (LEXIS 1999) or to justify giving an instruction on the 
inference to be drawn from possession of recently stolen property. Lumbra also 
maintains testimony by the arresting officer included improper hearsay testimony 
consisting of the officer's radio conversations with his dispatcher. Further, 
Lumbra claims the officer's testimony that he arrested Lumbra because he 
believed Lumbra was lying to him improperly commented on Lumbra's credibility. 
Our examination of this record and the pertinent authorities persuades the Court 
that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Lumbra's conviction; the evidence 
justified the giving of an instruction on the inference to be drawn from the 
possession of recently stolen property; the officer's hearsay testimony properly 
was admitted; and no error occurred when the arresting officer testified that he 
believed Lumbra had lied to him. The Judgment, Sentence, and Order of 
Incarceration entered by the trial court are affirmed.

ISSUES

[¶2] This 
statement of the issues is found in the Brief of 
Appellant:

1. Did the District Court 
err in allowing the jury to convict John Lumbra of concealment of stolen 
property where the evidence of his possession of a car stolen as much as a month 
earlier was not sufficient to support the jury's inference that Mr. Lumbra knew 
the car was stolen? 

2. Did the District Court 
commit per se reversible error and violate due process when it instructed the 
jury that it could infer Mr. Lumbra's knowledge that the car was stolen from the 
fact that he was in possession of the car?

3. Did the District Court 
abuse its discretion in allowing [the arresting officer] to provide inadmissible 
hearsay evidence of information he allegedly received from the police dispatch 
when those hearsay statements did not contain "circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness?"

4. Did the District Court 
err in allowing [the arresting officer] to testify to his opinion that Mr. 
Lumbra had lied to him?

[¶3] This 
Statement of the Issues is found in the Brief of Appellee:

I. Did the State present 
sufficient evidence to permit the jury to convict appellant of concealing 
property which appellant knew, believed or had reasonable cause to believe was 
obtained in violation of law, in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 
6-3-403?

II. Did the district 
court properly submit Instruction No. 9 to the jury, instructing the jury that 
it might draw a permissive inference from appellant's possession of recently 
stolen property and other evidence that appellant knew the property had been 
stolen?

III. Did the district 
court abuse its discretion in allowing [the arresting officer] to testify 
regarding information he received from the police 
dispatcher?

IV. Did the district 
court err in denying a mistrial when [the arresting officer] testified that he 
handcuffed appellant for safety reasons and because he believed appellant had 
lied to him?

FACTS

[¶4] On the 
afternoon of July 16, 1997, a Wyoming State Patrol officer stopped Lumbra for 
speeding on Highway 287 south of Laramie. When the officer asked Lumbra for his 
driver's license and registration, Lumbra told the officer that the car, a 1997 
red Dodge Intrepid, belonged to his girlfriend. Lumbra began looking around the 
car and in the trunk for his wallet. He was unable to locate the wallet and told 
the officer he must have left it at a gas station in Laramie. Although Lumbra 
did not know the name of the station, he described the location and the 
attendant working there. A subsequent search in Laramie found no attendant 
matching this description, and Lumbra's license was never 
found.

[¶5] The officer 
asked Lumbra his name and date of birth. The officer ran a driver's license 
check in Colorado where Lumbra claimed to have a valid license, but the check 
revealed no record of a Colorado license. While the officer was reconfirming the 
information with Lumbra, Lumbra took a driver's license out of the center 
console and told the officer the license belonged to his girlfriend, the owner 
of the car. When the officer asked what the name on the license was, Lumbra was 
unable to provide the correct last name, at which time the officer asked Lumbra 
to get out of the car and placed him in handcuffs. The officer said he arrested 
and handcuffed Lumbra for safety because he "believed he was lying" to 
him.

[¶6] The officer 
proceeded to run a VIN number check to determine whether the vehicle was stolen 
or registered in another state. The search did not reveal any information, and 
no paperwork existed in the car to prove ownership. Based on the dealer's decal 
on the back of the car, the officer requested dispatch to contact the 
Denver-based dealership to determine whether this vehicle was missing from the 
lot. Based upon the dispatcher's response, the officer assumed the vehicle was 
stolen. This was later confirmed by the sales manager who determined that a new 
1997 Dodge Intrepid was stolen from the dealer's lot between June 20, 1997, and 
July 16, 1997. The VIN number of the missing vehicle matched the one Lumbra was 
driving. The officer transported Lumbra to the Albany County Detention Center, 
and the car was towed to a towing company lot until the owner claimed 
it.

[¶7] A jury 
convicted Lumbra for violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-403(a)(i), and he was 
sentenced to four to six years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. The district 
court entered this judgment and sentence on March 6, 1998. Lumbra timely appeals 
the judgment, sentence, and order of incarceration.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of 
Evidence

[¶8] We review 
sufficiency of evidence claims to determine "whether or not the evidence could 
reasonably support such a finding by the fact finder." Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo. 1985). Our role is to assess

whether all the evidence 
which was presented is adequate enough to form the basis for a reasonable 
inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact 
when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. . . . We 
will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this 
rule; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury 
actually did.

Martinez v. 
State, 943 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 823-24 (Wyo. 1996)).

[¶9] Lumbra was 
charged with and convicted of violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-403(a)(i) (LEXIS 
1999), which prohibits concealment of stolen property. Under the statute, "[a] 
person who buys, receives, conceals or disposes of property which he knows, 
believes or has reasonable cause to believe was obtained in violation of law is 
guilty of . . . a felony . . . if the value of the property is five hundred 
dollars ($500.00) or more." The State has the burden of proving, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that Lumbra (1) bought, received, concealed, or disposed of 
property (2) which he knew, believed, or had reasonable cause to believe was 
obtained in violation of law, and (3) that the value of the property was more 
than $500. Capshaw v. State, 737 P.2d 740, 745 (Wyo. 
1987).

[¶10] Lumbra 
maintains the State failed to prove he knew, believed or had reasonable cause to 
believe he was driving a stolen vehicle. Relying on Tageant v. State, 673 P.2d 651, 654 (Wyo. 1983), Lumbra argues the State had the burden of proving that he 
received or concealed the vehicle knowing that it had been recently stolen. 
Writing for a unanimous court in Tageant, Justice Cardine explained 
that

[¶11] proof of 
mere naked possession of recently stolen property not aided by other proof that 
the accused received it with knowledge that it was stolen, is insufficient to 
show guilty knowledge. We have aligned ourselves with the majority, holding that 
although naked possession of stolen property alone is a dominant, powerful, near 
conclusive circumstance, yet it is not enough by itself to give rise to an 
inference that the possessor held the requisite guilty knowledge. There must be 
some other evidence of circumstances surrounding possession of stolen property 
of sufficient weight and credibility from which, when considered with the fact 
of unexplained possession of recently stolen property, a reasonable juror could 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew the property was stolen at 
the time it was received or concealed by him.

Tageant, 673 P.2d  at 654 (citations omitted).

[¶12] During its 
deliberations, the jury may consider a variety of surrounding circumstances to 
determine whether the defendant possessed the requisite guilty knowledge.1 Possession of recently stolen 
property coupled with "admissions or contradictory or evasive statements by the 
accused" is "corroborative of and sufficient to support a finding of guilty 
knowledge." Tageant, 673 P.2d  at 655. Lumbra asserts that neither his possession 
nor any corroborating circumstances reasonably support an inference that he knew 
he was driving a recently stolen car. We disagree. He lied about his identity, 
his date of birth, and the validity of his driver's license. Lumbra also told 
the officer the license he found in the vehicle belonged to his girlfriend, yet 
proceeded to improperly describe her physical appearance, her name and age, her 
location, and her ownership of the vehicle. We find this corroborating evidence 
sufficient to support an inference that Lumbra knew the car was recently 
stolen.

[¶13] Lumbra 
also relies heavily upon factual similarities in Wayt v. State, 809 P.2d 802 
(Wyo. 1991), to defend his position. In Wayt, five days after receiving it, the 
defendant sold a stolen drill bit for $1,400 when the retail price of the new 
bit was $5,138. When asked where he obtained the bit, Wayt gave an ambiguous 
answer that he obtained it on a trip to Texas. The majority concluded that 
neither the sale of the bit for significantly less nor an unresponsive answer as 
to the bit's origin was sufficient to corroborate the inference of knowledge. 
Wayt, 809 P.2d  at 805-806.

[¶14] We find 
Wayt distinguishable from Lumbra's situation. First, when found in possession of 
the vehicle, Lumbra made several false statements as to the owner, her identity, 
her location, and his relationship with her. This information is sufficient to 
support the jury's conclusion that he illegally obtained the vehicle. Second, he 
concealed the vehicle not less than one day and not more than twenty-six days 
after it was stolen. Lumbra maintains that because no one, including the 
dealership where the car was stolen from, was able to specify the exact time of 
theft, the lapse of time between the theft of the vehicle and his possession 
negates any rational inference that he knew the car was recently stolen. He 
claims that if the five days between when the bit was last seen and the sale of 
the bit was not enough to establish Wayt's guilty knowledge, then the gap in 
time in his case was insufficient evidence for the jury to determine he 
possessed a recently stolen vehicle. We reject this claim as well. "[T]he 
surrounding circumstances of the defendant's unexplained possession of the 
[vehicle] in the case before us, based only upon the State's evidence at the end 
of its case-in-chief, tell us that the defendant must have known or been aware 
that the [vehicle] was stolen." Russell v. State, 583 P.2d 690, 697 (Wyo. 1978). 
In Russell, we held that possession of the manifold stolen between December 15, 
1975, and mid-January 1976, was recent. Id. at 697. Lumbra's evasive behavior 
and numerous lies to the arresting officer provide the necessary corroborating 
evidence for the jury to determine he had the requisite knowledge that the 
vehicle was recently stolen.

[¶15] Lumbra's 
final complaint on the sufficiency of the evidence was that it was 
circumstantial, thus insufficient. "Guilty knowledge may be established by 
direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or by both types of evidence. No 
distinction is made between direct and circumstantial evidence. The weight to be 
given such evidence, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, 
is for the jury, as is the question of the existence of guilty knowledge on the 
part of the accused." Tageant, 673 P.2d  at 654. The State presented ample 
evidence for the jury to determine Lumbra possessed a recently stolen vehicle 
beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jury 
Instruction

[¶16] We 
traditionally analyze challenges to jury instructions for reversible error and 
will not reverse "as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the 
entire set of instructions sufficiently covers the issues which were presented 
at the trial." Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1126 (Wyo. 1997). However, where 
the defendant complains about an instruction he offered, we will review it under 
a more stringent standard. We review the trial court's use of a defendant's 
proposed version of an instruction under the invited error 
standard.

[¶17] Under the 
doctrine of invited error, if a party induces action by a court, the party 
cannot argue error because the court took such action. Invited errors will not 
normally be grounds for reversal unless they go beyond a pertinent reply or are 
necessarily prejudicial.

[¶18] Engle v. 
State, 821 P.2d 1285, 1287 (Wyo. 1991) (citations omitted). Lumbra fails to 
demonstrate how the instructions, which defined "recently" and "inference of 
knowledge" as he requested, so prejudiced him as to require the court to 
overlook invited error.

[¶19] The State 
originally proposed an instruction that possession of stolen property, if not 
satisfactorily explained, gave rise to an inference of knowledge that property 
has been stolen. Lumbra proposed two additional instructions to define the terms 
"recently" and "inference of knowledge." After the district court added two 
paragraphs, counsel for Lumbra stated, "I should state for the record that with 
those additions, we don't have any objection to the jury instructions." This 
concluded the instruction conference and the following instruction, Instruction 
Number 9, based on Wayt v. State, 809 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 1991), was read to the 
jury:

Possession of recently 
stolen property is not of itself sufficient to permit a finding that the 
Defendant is guilty of the crime charged. However, possession of recently stolen 
property, if not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from 
which the Jury may reasonably draw the inference and find, in the light of 
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that the person in 
possession knew the property had been stolen, and, is also a circumstance from 
which the jury may reasonably draw the inference that the person in possession 
not only knew it was stolen property, but also participated in some way in the 
theft of the property.

[¶20] However, 
you are never required to make this inference. It is the exclusive province of 
the jury to determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence 
in this case warrant any inference which the law permits the jury to draw from 
the possession of stolen property.

[¶21] Although 
possession is a strong circumstance tending to show guilt, there must be 
corroborative evidence tending to prove Defendant's guilt. However, this 
corroborative evidence need only be slight and may include: Whether the 
Defendant had the opportunity to commit the crime charged, his conduct, his 
false or contradicting statements, if any, or other statements he may have made 
with reference to the property and any other evidence which tends to connect him 
with the crime.

[¶22] If you 
find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence that the property was stolen, 
and that, while recently stolen, the property was in the possession of the 
Defendant, you may, from those facts, draw the inference that the property was 
possessed by the Defendant with knowledge that it was stolen unless such 
possession by the Defendant is explained to the satisfaction of the Jury by 
other facts and circumstances in evidence of the case.

[¶23] In 
considering whether possession of recently stolen property has been 
satisfactorily explained, you are reminded that in the exercise of 
constitutional rights the accused need not take the witness stand and 
testify.

[¶24] Possession 
may be satisfactorily explained through other circumstances, other evidence, 
independent of any testimony of the accused.

[¶25] 
Instruction Number 9A stated:

The term "recently" is a 
relative term, and has no fixed meaning. Whether property may be considered as 
recently stolen depends upon the nature of the property, and all the facts and 
circumstances shown by the evidence in the case. The longer the period of time 
since the theft the more doubtful becomes the inference which may reasonably be 
drawn from unexplained possession.

[¶26] Lumbra 
distinguishes his situation from Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 840 n.3, 
93 S. Ct. 2357, 2360, 37 L. Ed. 2d 380 (1973), arguing that there can only be a 
weak inference of his "knowledge" because of the long period of time since the 
theft as well as little corroborative evidence and facts of insufficient weight 
and credibility. A closer review of Barnes reveals evidence no stronger than 
that in the case before us. Barnes possessed stolen checks, lied to the postal 
inspector about his possession of the checks, and then endorsed the names of the 
payees on two of the checks. Here, Lumbra offered a false name, invalid driver's 
license, and the false identity of his girlfriend who supposedly owned the car. 
Under the standard enunciated in Barnes, we find sufficient evidence to instruct 
the jury and allow it to infer that Lumbra possessed the requisite guilty 
knowledge.

[¶27] Lumbra 
further contends the instruction confused and misled the jury as to its burden 
of proving both possession and the corroborative facts. Relying on Russell, 583 P.2d  at 698, Lumbra claims that "naked possession of stolen property alone [does 
not] establish[] a prima facie case. It is a dominant, powerful, near-conclusive 
circumstance but needs some other incriminating `surrounding circumstances' to 
bring it into play." Lumbra maintains that the jury was not properly instructed 
as to its responsibility to find "corroborative evidence." However, we find the 
fourth paragraph in Instruction 9 to be substantially identical to the 
instruction approved in Barnes, which we adopted in Russell, 583 P.2d  at 697, 
and cases thereafter. Moreover, jury instructions are to be reviewed in their 
entirety and read together. Ostowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 487 (Wyo. 1983). 
Since we do not single out or consider instructions independently, considering 
the instructions as a whole, the jury was well informed about its duty to find 
"corroborative evidence."

[¶28] Although 
he is in a feeble position to complain, Lumbra also challenges the instruction 
as a due process violation because it permitted the jury to infer the element of 
guilty knowledge without the State proving that knowledge beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Brooks v. State, 706 P.2d 664, 668 (Wyo. 1985). He relies heavily upon a 
nearly identical instruction in Barnes, 412 U.S.  at 840 n. 3, to analyze the due 
process implications of the instruction. The Supreme Court determined that 
although due process was not violated, "the evidence necessary to invoke the 
inference [must be] sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Barnes, 412 U.S.  at 843, 93 S. Ct.  at 
2362.

[¶29] We agree 
with Lumbra that a jury instruction cannot shift the burden to the accused to 
disprove an element of the crime. We do not, however, find Sandstrom v. Montana, 
442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979), controlling in this situation 
as Lumbra argues. Sandstrom is distinguishable because it involved a mandatory 
inference instruction, where the jury was told that it must find, based on the 
fact that Sandstrom voluntarily stabbed the victim, that he intended to kill 
her. In contrast, the instruction at issue instructs the jury that it may draw 
the inference that Lumbra knew he was driving a stolen vehicle. "The inference 
encompassed by this instruction was one that a reasonable juror would conclude 
to be permissive in the context of the instructions as a whole." Harley v. 
State, 737 P.2d 750, 755 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶30] While the 
language of the instruction is stated in permissive rather than mandatory terms, 
Lumbra maintains it allowed the jury to convict him upon proof of his 
concealment of the car "and of additional facts not themselves establishing the 
element of" knowledge. He asserts that this instruction shifts the burden of 
proof to him to explain possession. Lumbra confuses the burden of production 
with the burden of persuasion, or proof. The burden of proof, as announced in 
Sandstrom, and the burden of production or going forward with evidence, as in 
Barnes, are not interchangeable. "If the provisions of Rule 303(c), W.R.E.,2 are complied with in giving a jury 
an instruction with respect to an inference, the constitutional problem of 
relieving the state of its burden of proof or shifting that burden to the 
defendant is avoided." Harley, 737 P.2d  at 755. Shifting of the burden of 
production, as the instruction did in this case, does not violate due process. 

[¶31] Lumbra's 
final attack on the instruction is that it infringed upon his fundamental right 
not to testify or present any evidence whatsoever at trial. U.S. Const. amend. 
V; Wyo. Const. Art. 1 § 11. He maintains this instruction, in effect, requires 
him to testify or present exculpatory evidence to disprove his guilt. The basis 
of his argument is "that the jury may infer the defendant's guilt unless they 
are convinced otherwise by evidence explaining the defendant's possession of 
stolen property." Lumbra complains the reminder to the jury that "[p]ossession 
may be satisfactorily explained through other circumstances, other evidence, 
independent of any testimony of the accused," does little to cure the first part 
of the instruction.

[¶32] This 
argument has been rejected outright in Barnes, where the Supreme Court 
stated:

Petitioner also argues 
that the permissive inference in question infringes his privilege against 
self-incrimination. The Court has twice rejected this argument. Turner v. United 
States, [396 U.S. 398, 417-18, 90 S. Ct. 642, 652, 24 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1970)]; Yee 
Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 185, 45 S. Ct. 470, 472, 69 L. Ed. 904 (1925), 
and we find no reason to re-examine the issue at length. The trial court 
specifically instructed the jury that petitioner had a constitutional right not 
to take the witness stand and that possession could be satisfactorily explained 
by evidence independent of petitioner's testimony. Introduction of any evidence, 
direct or circumstantial, tending to implicate the defendant in the alleged 
crime increases the pressure on him to testify. The mere massing of evidence 
against a defendant cannot be regarded as a violation of his privilege against 
self-incrimination. Yee Hem v. United States, supra, 268 U.S., at 185, 45 S. Ct. 
at 472.

Barnes, 412 U.S. 
at 846-47, 93 S. Ct.  at 2363 (footnotes omitted). We quoted this language with 
approval in Russell, 583 P.2d  at 696.

[¶33] While we 
hold true the privilege against self-incrimination we adopted many years ago, we 
find implausible Lumbra's argument that the only way to thwart the jury's 
inference of knowledge would be to testify or present exculpatory evidence. 
Under this theory, if a defendant chose not to testify, the State would be 
precluded from using testimony from a victim or any valid inferences drawn from 
that testimony. As a result, prosecution of criminal cases would be nearly 
impossible. So long as the State "introduces evidence on its case-in-chief from 
which the jury may properly infer the essential elements of the crime, the State 
has then made out a `prima facie case'" which clearly satisfies the reasonable 
doubt standard. Russell, 583 P.2d  at 695. It is the defendant's option whether 
to testify but the State may present evidence and use inferences drawn from that 
evidence without violating his constitutional rights.

Hearsay

[¶34] Lumbra 
maintains the district court further abused its discretion by allowing the 
arresting officer to testify regarding information he learned from the police 
dispatcher. Decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence are 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Humphrey v. State, 962 P.2d 866, 
870 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Rigler v. State, 941 P.2d 734, 737 (Wyo. 1997)). 
Evidentiary rulings, thus, remain undisturbed unless the appellant demonstrates 
the court abused its discretion and acted in a manner which exceeded the bounds 
of reason under the circumstances. Burgos-Seberos v. State, 969 P.2d 1131 (Wyo. 
1998).

[¶35] The 
testimony Lumbra challenges is the highway patrolman's discussion with the 
police dispatcher in reference to the validity of Lumbra's Colorado driver's 
license:

Prosecutor: Did you 
attempt to verify [Lumbra's date of birth]?

Officer: Yes, I 
did.

Prosecutor: 
How?

Officer: I went back and 
did a driver's license check to Colorado.

Prosecutor: Okay. These 
are done per every stop? Or tell us how you do a driver's license 
check.

Officer: Just about every 
stop, check to see if somebody has a valid driver's license, I'll call into our 
dispatch, and I'll give them the first name, the last name and the middle 
initial along with the date of birth, and if somebody has a driver's license, it 
will come up just with that information.

Prosecutor: Okay. What 
came up?

Defense: I object to this 
answer, Your Honor. That's going to be hearsay.

* * 
*

Court: 
Overruled.

Prosecutor: What did he 
come back and tell you?

Officer: They told me 
that they could not find a driver's license for that name and date of birth out 
of Colorado.

Prosecutor: All right. 
Now, did you attempt to make - to verify this story about the wallet? Did you 
attempt to - I think you stated you had called dispatch on that. Or maybe you 
hadn't told me that.

Officer: I radioed to 
dispatch, and I asked them to call that station that I assumed it was and see if 
they, one, found a wallet; two, if they had a heavy set blonde male clerk that 
was working there; and three, if they remembered a red Dodge 
Intrepid.

Prosecutor: Okay. Were 
you able to verify any of the Defendant's story?

Defense: Your Honor, at 
this particular point again I'll raise an objection. That is hearsay. * * 
*

* * 
*

Court: Well, I think it 
is probably proper as far as it goes to show why the officer did what he did. Do 
you want a limiting instruction on that?

Defense: Yes, I 
do.

* * 
*

Court: Ladies and 
gentlemen, the Court is going to allow the officer to testify with respect to 
information he received from the dispatch center, but you're advised that that 
information is to be considered by you only as evidence relating to the 
officer's motivations and actions in this matter. It is not evidence of the 
truth of those assertions. . . . It is simply to be considered by you in 
determining - or in laying out the officer's motivations for his actions in this 
matter. All right?

* * 
*

Prosecutor: Did you make 
any attempt to verify this story about the wallet?

Officer: Yes, I 
did.

Prosecutor: What did you 
do?

Officer: I - I thought we 
already covered this. I had her call the gas station.

Prosecutor: I wanted to 
go back and find out who, in fact, you discussed this with. You talked over at 
dispatch. Who had they talked to?

Officer: At first they 
called the gas station that I had said that I thought it 
was.

Defense: Well, I'm going 
to object to whatever dispatch did, because he wasn't even privy to that 
conversation.

[¶36] Lumbra 
maintains that under Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo. 1990), the 
dispatcher's statements to the officer were inadmissible hearsay because they 
were untrustworthy: no evidence corroborated how the license check was done, 
whether the dispatcher actually called the gas stations, and whether the report 
back to the officer was actually accurate. As the State aptly points out, the 
district court limited the purpose for which the jury could use the officer's 
testimony; it could only be used "to show why the officer did what he did" and 
not for the truth of the assertions, which would make the testimony inadmissible 
hearsay. Such testimony is not considered hearsay because it shows why the 
action was taken by the officer, not that the statement is true. Olson v. State, 
698 P.2d 107, 114 (Wyo. 1985). In addition, "[a] police officer is permitted to 
say he had the necessary information concerning possible criminal activity 
providing the statements are simply background information indicating that a 
police officer did not act without reason." Id. at 114 (citing United States v. 
Vitale, 596 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1979)). The arresting officer was doing exactly 
this during his testimony about his investigation concerning Lumbra's driver's 
license.

[¶37] Even if 
admissible for a limited purpose, Lumbra asserts the district court improperly 
allowed the State, in its summation, to argue the truth of this evidence. A 
review of the prosecutor's summation consisted of the officer's observations at 
the scene and statements Lumbra made at the scene, neither of which referred to 
the conversation the officer had with dispatch. We do not find the district 
court to have acted in a manner which exceeded the bounds of reason under the 
circumstances; thus we find no abuse of discretion, and the officer's statements 
were properly admitted into evidence.

Opinion 
Testimony

[¶38] Lumbra's 
final argument is that the district court erred in allowing the jury to consider 
the arresting officer's statement that in his opinion he believed Lumbra was 
lying to him. During the trial when the officer recounted the events surrounding 
Lumbra's arrest, the officer testified:

Officer: I asked [Lumbra] 
if he would step out of the car, which he did, and then I told him to turn 
around and put his hands behind his back, and I placed him in 
handcuffs.

Prosecutor: And the 
purpose of that was?

Officer: For my 
safety.

Prosecutor: Okay. 
Why?

Officer: Because at that 
time I believed he was lying to me.

* * 
*

Defense: Your Honor, may 
we approach the bench.

* * 
*

Defense: Your Honor, at 
this particular point I would like to interpose an objection to the last answer 
the police officer gave, that he was - the police officer made a statement that 
he believed that the Defendant was, in fact, lying.

* * 
*

Court: Ladies and 
gentlemen, for the record, [the officer], in response to a question a second ago 
concerning officer's safety and why he handcuffed the Defendant, made a 
statement to the effect that he believed the Defendant was lying. You're 
instructed to disregard that remark. This is not to be considered by you as 
evidence or in your deliberations in this matter.

[¶39] According 
to Lumbra, the officer's opinion about Lumbra's veracity provided a critical 
piece to the State's case on the knowledge element of the crime. Without this, 
Lumbra argues, the State would not have had the requisite corroborating 
circumstances to support an inference of knowledge. "Testimony elicited by a 
prosecutor which offers an opinion as to the defendant's guilt must be presumed 
prejudicial rather than treated as a question of plain error because it is 
impossible to determine whether the jury may have relied on the opinion in 
reaching its verdict." Dudley v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Wyo. 1998). Thus, 
Lumbra contends it was error per se to allow in such 
testimony.

[¶40] Lumbra 
claims his situation is analogous to three cases in which we reversed 
convictions based upon opinion testimony which resulted in error per se. In 
Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 64-66 (Wyo. 1989), child sexual abuse experts 
opined about the defendant's guilt. In Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 882-83 
(Wyo. 1990), the investigating officer recounted the factual basis for his 
opinion that defendant was a drug dealer, including prior uncharged drug 
transactions. In Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1337 (Wyo. 1992), the 
sheriff's deputy investigating the scene stated, "I listened to her story and 
made a determination that she had been raped." Lumbra maintains the officer's 
testimony that he was "lying" amounts to an opinion of guilt and is error per 
se.

[¶41] We find 
these cases inapplicable to Lumbra's situation. First, in Whiteplume, we did not 
analyze the alleged error as error per se because the prosecutor only asked the 
witness what he did next in his investigation. "Absent the direct solicitation 
by the prosecutor of the erroneous testimony and an express opinion as to the 
guilt of the defendant, we found that the effect of the testimony must be 
determined against `the factual backdrop' of the case using `the most careful 
exercise of the delicate judicial judgment.'" Dudley, 951 P.2d  at 1179 (citing 
Whiteplume, 841 P.2d at 1340-41). Second, as in Dudley, the prosecutor here did 
not ask the officer's opinion of Lumbra's guilt; rather, the officer offered an 
unsolicited personal observation. Dudley, 951 P.2d  at 1180. It is not error per 
se where the prosecutor's question does not request an opinion as to the guilt 
of the defendant. Id. at 1179. The district court correctly observed that the 
officer's statement did not go directly to the defendant's credibility at the 
point it was raised, nor was it an opinion of guilt. Instead, it explained the 
officer's actions.

[¶42] Because we 
find the comment was not error per se, we review the statement for prejudicial 
error. We distinguished our review of error per se from review of other types of 
error in Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 67 (citations omitted):

[¶43] Even 
though error is found, it still is necessary, in most instances, to determine 
whether the error was prejudicial. Unless the situation reaches the level of 
error per se, or is perceived to be constitutional error, error is prejudicial 
only if the defendant can establish a reasonable possibility that, in the 
absence of the error, the verdict might have been more 
favorable.

[¶44] Even if it 
was error for the officer to make the comment, the evidence against Lumbra was 
overwhelming; thus the jury's determination did not hinge solely upon the 
officer's testimony. He was not materially prejudiced by the officer's comments 
because we cannot say that, "without this statement, there is a reasonable 
possibility that the verdict might been more favorable to [Lumbra]." Dudley, 951 P.2d  at 1180. Moreover, the district court cured any alleged error based on the 
jury's possible misconception when it instructed the jury to disregard the 
remark.

CONCLUSION

[¶45] Lumbra's 
situation involves a combination of factors which led to his conviction: he lied 
about his identity, the loss of his wallet, how he came to possess the vehicle, 
the owner of the vehicle and his relationship with her. Further investigation 
revealed Lumbra did not have a valid driver's license and the car was stolen. We 
are satisfied the State met its burden by demonstrating, through corroborating 
evidence, that Lumbra knew the vehicle he was driving was recently stolen. We 
also reject that the officer's remark was error per se. Therefore, we affirm 
Lumbra's conviction in every respect.

Footnotes

1 While not 
an exhaustive list, we have enumerated seven factors which, when combined with 
an unexplained possession of stolen property, are sufficient to support a 
finding of guilty knowledge: (a) attempts to dispose of the property at an 
amount considerably below its fair value; (b) an unusual manner of acquisition 
or dealing with the property; (c) knowledge of the accused beforehand of the 
location, nature, or value of the property later stolen; (d) prior possession of 
other stolen property by the accused; (e) the relative length of time between 
the theft and fact of possession; (f) admissions or contradictory or evasive 
statements by the accused; and (g) other incriminating evidence and 
circumstances surrounding the entire incident. Tageant, 673 P.2d  at 
655.

2 W.R.E. 
303(c) states:

Whenever the 
existence of a presumed fact against the accused is submitted to the jury, the 
court shall instruct the jury that it may regard the basic facts as sufficient 
evidence of the presumed fact but is not required to do so. In addition, if the 
presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a 
defense, the court shall instruct the jury that its existence, on all the 
evidence, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.