Case Title: Ex parte State of Alabama. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Joseph Carl Fleming v. State of Alabama)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1060461

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 05/25/2007 - Ex parte State v. Fleming
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1060461
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Joseph Carl Fleming
v.
State of Alabama)
(Lamar Circuit Court, CC-05-74 and CC-05-81;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-05-0164)
STUART, Justice.
1060461
2
Joseph Carl Fleming pleaded guilty in the circuit court
to two misdemeanors:  attempting to elude a police officer, a
violation of § 32-5A-193, Ala. Code 1975, and reckless
endangerment, a violation of § 13A-6-24, Ala. Code 1975.  The
trial court sentenced him to 60 days in jail on each
conviction, the sentences to run concurrently.  Fleming moved
to withdraw his guilty pleas because, he said, he had not
entered his pleas voluntarily.  Specifically, he maintained:
"[Fleming] was represented by attorney Joel Sogol
....  Attorney Sogol informed [Fleming] that he had
spoken with the District Attorney and, if [Fleming]
'walked a straight line' until the trial date, that
the charges would be dismissed.  Despite having no
further difficulties with law enforcement, the
District Attorney only offered to allow [Fleming] to
plead guilty and serve 60 days in jail. [Fleming],
only twenty-three (23) years old, did not want to
plead guilty but was instead pressured into doing so
by Sogol and only did so under duress."
The trial court denied Fleming's motion.
Fleming appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Before that court, Fleming argued that his convictions should
be reversed because the record did not contain a colloquy of
the guilty-plea proceeding and that the trial court exceeded
the scope of its discretion in summarily denying his motion to
withdraw his pleas of guilty.  Fleming v. State, [Ms. CR-05-
1060461
3
0164, September 29, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2006).  The Court of Criminal Appeals, relying on its decision
in Verzone v. State, 841 So. 2d 312 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002),
held that because a transcript of the colloquy was not
included in the record, the court could not determine whether
Fleming had preserved for review his claim regarding the
voluntariness of his pleas, and it reversed Fleming’s
convictions.
The State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari
to address a conflict between the decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeals that the absence in the record on appeal of
a transcript of the guilty-plea proceeding requires reversal
of the conviction and this Court's decision in Twyman v.
State, 293 Ala. 75, 300 So. 2d 124 (1974).  We granted the
writ.  
Initially, we observe that neither Fleming nor the State
contends that the trial court did not address Fleming to
determine the voluntariness of Fleming's pleas.  Thus, the
issue presented is whether the record in a guilty-plea
proceeding must contain a transcript of the trial court’s
colloquy with the defendant determining the voluntariness of
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4
the plea to permit appellate review of the conviction based on
the guilty plea.
 
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the United
States Supreme Court held that before a trial court can accept
a defendant's plea of guilty, the trial court must determine
that the defendant is entering the plea voluntarily.  See Rule
14.4(a), Ala. R. Crim. P. (providing that the court, in all
cases 
except 
cases 
involving minor misdemeanors, must
personally address a defendant who is pleading guilty  and ask
certain questions to ascertain that the defendant is entering
the plea voluntarily); see also Rule 14.4(d), Ala. R. Crim. P.
(providing that the court may determine the voluntariness of
a defendant's plea and satisfy the requirements of Boykin and
Rule 14.4(a) by personally addressing the defendant and
ascertaining that the defendant has read, or has had read to
him, and understands each item contained in the "Explanation
of Rights and Plea of Guilty" form the defendant executed).
The United States Supreme Court stated in Boykin that the
trial court's determination that the defendant voluntarily
entered his plea of guilty must be affirmatively reflected in
the record.
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5
In Twyman, this Court held that the Boykin requirement
that a record affirmatively reflect that the trial court
determined that the defendant entered his plea of guilty
voluntarily can be satisfied by either a transcript of the
colloquy or written documents or entries in the record
indicating that the trial court personally addressed the
defendant and determined that the guilty plea was entered
voluntarily.  We stated:
"In Boykin, the court said the affirmative showing
must be made, but the court did not say that the
showing 
must 
be 
made 
by 
the 
transcript 
and
certificate of the court reporter.  There is no rule
of law that requires or even suggests that it must
be presumed that the trial judge, the defendant, the
defendant's attorney, or the judgment entry do not
speak the truth. ...  The presumption that the
judgment speaks the truth must prevail under the
rule quoted above from Honeycutt [v. State, 47 Ala.
App. 
640[, 
641], 
259 
So. 
2d 
846[, 
847]
(1972)(stating '[i]t is well settled that the
recitals in the judgment import absolute verity,
unless contradicted by other portions of the
record')]."
293 Ala. at 82, 300 So. 2d at 131.  Therefore, Twyman
establishes that an appellate record is sufficient if it
reflects that the trial court determined that a defendant
voluntarily entered his guilty plea either by a transcript of
the colloquy or by written documents in the record indicating
1060461
"The decisions of the Supreme Court shall govern the
1
holdings and decisions of the courts of appeals, and the
decisions and proceedings of such courts of appeals shall be
subject to the general superintendence and control of the
Supreme Court as provided by Constitutional Amendment No. 328
[now § 139 et seq., Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.)]."
6
that the trial court addressed the defendant to determine that
the defendant entered his plea voluntarily.  The holding in
Twyman is the law of this State, and unless Twyman is
overruled or abrogated by this Court or the United States
Supreme Court or unless this Court has promulgated a rule to
the contrary, the Court of Criminal Appeals is bound by it.
See § 12-3-16, Ala. Code 1975,  and Jones v. City of
1
Huntsville, 288 Ala. 242, 244, 259 So. 2d 288, 290
(1972)(observing that in light of § 12-3-16, the appellate
courts are without authority to overrule the decisions of this
Court).  
In 1991, this Court promulgated Rule 14.4(c), Ala. R.
Crim. P., which requires that "[a] verbatim record of the
proceedings at which the defendant enters a plea of guilty to
a felony shall be made."  Therefore, with regard to a plea of
guilty to a felony offense, the rule set forth in Twyman  has
been superseded by Rule 14.4, Ala. R. Crim. P.  Rule 14.4,
however, does not require a verbatim record of the proceedings
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7
at which a defendant enters a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor
for which the defendant will be punished by a sentence of
imprisonment.  Therefore, the rule set forth in Twyman applies
in such cases, and in such cases the requirements of Boykin
will be satisfied by either a transcript of the colloquy or an
affirmative showing through written documents that the trial
court addressed the defendant and determined the voluntariness
of the plea.  The Court of Criminal Appeals is bound to apply
the holding in Twyman when evaluating appeals from guilty-plea
convictions for misdemeanors.
In this case, Fleming pleaded guilty to two misdemeanors.
As the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly noted, because
Fleming was convicted of misdemeanors for which he was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the trial court was
required to address Fleming to determine the voluntariness of
his pleas.  Fleming, ___ So. 2d at ___.   The Court of
Criminal Appeals held that, because the record did not contain
a transcript of the colloquy, Fleming’s convictions must be
reversed.  The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals
rested upon the reasoning set forth in its decision in
Verzone.  The defendant in Verzone pleaded guilty to third-
1060461
Because the State did not ask this Court to overrule
2
Verzone or to address the propriety of the holding in Verzone,
that determination must await another day.
8
degree robbery, a Class C felony.  See § 13A-8-43, Ala. Code
1975.  Therefore, the facts in Verzone are distinguishable
from the facts in this case, and Verzone is inapplicable
here.  
2
In accordance with Twyman, the record in this case is
sufficient if it contains either a transcript of the colloquy
or an affirmative entry or documents in the record showing
that the trial court personally addressed Fleming and
determined that Fleming entered the guilty pleas voluntarily.
Therefore, to the extent that the Court of Criminal Appeals
held otherwise, it erred. 
A review of the record, however, establishes that
although the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that
reversal of the trial court's judgment was required because
the record did not contain a transcript of the colloquy, the
reversal of the trial court's judgment is nonetheless proper.
The record does not affirmatively establish that the trial
court addressed Fleming and determined that Fleming  entered
his guilty pleas voluntarily.  See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244
1060461
9
(holding that "there was reversible error 'because the record
does not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and
understandingly entered his pleas of guilty'"(quoting Boykin
v. State, 281 Ala. 659, 663, 207 So. 2d 412, 415 (Ala.
1968))).  Although the record does contain "Explanation of
Rights and Plea of Guilty" forms for the two misdemeanors,
which are signed by Fleming, the forms are not signed by the
trial court.  Therefore, these forms do not establish that the
trial court personally addressed Fleming.  Additionally,
neither the sentencing order nor the entries on the case-
action summary indicate that the trial court addressed Fleming
and determined that Fleming entered his pleas voluntarily.
Therefore, the record does not satisfy the requirements of
Boykin and Twyman and is not sufficient to permit appellate
review.  
Fleming appealed the trial court's denial of his motion
to withdraw his guilty pleas, which was based on his
allegation that he did not voluntarily enter his pleas.
Although the record need not contain a transcript of the
colloquy to establish that Fleming 
entered his pleas
voluntarily, to permit appellate review the record must
1060461
10
establish affirmatively that the trial court addressed Fleming
and determined that Fleming entered his pleas voluntarily and
not as a result of "force, threats, or coercion."   The record
before us does not so affirmatively establish; therefore, the
Court of Criminal Appeals' reversal of the judgment of the
trial court is correct.
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.  
See, Woodall, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Murdock, JJ.,
concur.
Lyons, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.
1060461
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LYONS, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the
result).
I concur in all aspects of the main opinion except note
2, as to which I express no opinion.