Case Title: State v. Williams

Citation: 363 N.C. 689

Docket Number: 506A07

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2009-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 506A07 
FILED: 11 DECEMBER 2009
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
v.
EUGENE JOHNNY WILLIAMS
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from 
judgments imposing a sentence of death entered by Judge Thomas H.
Lock on 1 May 2007 in Superior Court, Cumberland County, upon 
jury verdicts finding defendant guilty of two counts of first-
degree murder.  Heard in the Supreme Court 8 September 2009.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Daniel P. O’Brien and
William B. Crumpler, Assistant Attorneys General, for
the State.
Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Daniel Shatz,
Assistant Appellate Defender; and Ann B. Petersen for
defendant-appellant.
BRADY, Justice.
On 8 December 2004, defendant Eugene Johnny Williams
was convicted of the first-degree murders of Nicholas Gillard and
Cedric Leavy.  Following these convictions, the trial court
declared a mistrial only as to the penalty proceedings.  New
counsel was appointed for defendant, and on 1 May 2007, a
different jury returned a binding recommendation that defendant
be sentenced to death for both murders.  We find no error in
defendant’s convictions or sentences.
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BACKGROUND
Defendant was detained pursuant to a possession of
stolen goods charge from 4 June 2001 until 5 October 2001. 
Defendant was unable to raise the bail money to be released. 
Defendant informed another inmate, Jimmy Locklear, that he could
not raise the bail money because an unnamed person had not paid
for a motorcycle that defendant had stolen and sold to him. 
Inmates who spent time with defendant that summer heard defendant
say that upon release he was going to “get” the person who owed
him money and “f*** him up.”
Robin Gillis, an inmate who spent time with defendant
in the Cumberland County Detention Center, had worked for Gillard
pressure washing houses and trucks.  On one occasion, Gillis had
observed money passing between defendant and Gillard.  Defendant
told Gillis that he had been trying to contact Gillard to collect
the $1400 owed so that he could make his $1100 bail.  Defendant
appeared outraged that Gillard would not communicate with him
while he was in the detention center.  Defendant told Gillis he
was going to kill Gillard when he was released.
Upon his release on 5 October 2001, defendant visited
Diana Powell.  Powell testified that defendant made a telephone
call from her residence to Gillard’s residence.  Telephone
records confirm this testimony, and also show that defendant
attempted to contact Gillard seven more times over the next
several days.  A message left by defendant on Gillard’s voice
mail was retrieved by law enforcement.  The message said:
Hey, Nick, this is J.  I got your ZX-12. 
It’s brand new.  I got the paperwork and the
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keys to it.  Just call or come by the crib
Saturday night.  I’ll let you check it out. 
It’s still in the “m*****-f******” crate. 
Come by yourself, and don’t bring nobody to
my crib.  
On Tuesday morning, 9 October 2001, Gillard telephoned
his friend Cedric Leavy and drove to Leavy’s residence to pick
him up.  Gillard honked the horn and Leavy went out to meet him,
leaving his mobile telephone on the table.  Sharon Cogdell,
Leavy’s fiancée, attempted to contact Leavy by calling Gillard’s
mobile telephone.  Gillard informed her that they were busy and
Leavy would call her back.  Telephone records indicate that
Cogdell’s call to Gillard was placed at 10:13 a.m., and that
Gillard’s mobile phone was within a three-mile radius of the
cellular tower closest to defendant’s residence.  The signal from
the tower to Gillard’s telephone traveled through the southwest
panel of the tower, the quadrant in which defendant’s residence
was located.  Cogdell attempted many other calls late into the
night, but they were not answered.  On 10 October 2001, she
informed the police that Leavy and Gillard were missing. 
Also on 10 October 2001, Esther Locklear noticed an
unfamiliar vehicle in her neighborhood in rural Cumberland
County.  After her son observed a body covered with a blanket in
the backseat of the vehicle, Ms. Locklear contacted law
enforcement.  The vehicle was a burgundy Chevrolet Malibu four-
door sedan with a plate registered to Gillard.  Law enforcement
secured the area and began an investigation.  There were no
prints on the ground or tire tracks that were thought to be of
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any evidentiary value; however, a white crystalline substance on
the exterior of the vehicle appeared to be dried soap suds.
The body in the backseat was an African-American male
who was six feet, two inches tall and weighed 430 pounds.  It
appeared from ropes tied around his wrists and then tightly
secured around the front seat that his body had been winched in
the vehicle.  The body was determined to be that of Leavy.  Law
enforcement found Gillard’s body in the trunk.  The autopsies
showed that both men had suffered contact and near-contact bullet
wounds to the head.  Gillard sustained three gunshot wounds, and
Leavy received six.  Three projectiles recovered from the bodies
were determined to have been fired from the same weapon, a nine
millimeter caliber firearm with a barrel containing nine lands
and grooves with a left-hand twist.  Only one manufacturer made
such a firearm, and the murder weapon was either a Highpoint nine
millimeter Model C pistol or a Model 995 carbine rifle.
A search of defendant’s residence revealed five spent
nine millimeter shell casings in the dirt driveway and yard.  In
the backyard, near the patio, law enforcement observed two areas
of roughly twenty to thirty square feet each where fresh soil had
been spread over burned grass.  The ground smelled of gasoline
and putrid blood.  Two blood-stained pieces of concrete were
found buried several inches in the ground at the burn sites. 
Testing revealed the blood to be human.
Investigators also found two spent nine millimeter
projectiles in the burned ground.  It was determined that the two
projectiles had been fired through a barrel with a left-hand
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twist and with nine lands and grooves; that is, they had been
fired from a Highpoint nine millimeter Model C pistol or Model
995 carbine rifle, as had the projectiles found in the victims’
bodies.  Luminol spraying revealed two tracks of blood coming
from the burned areas to the right and running through the yard,
where they abruptly stopped.
Jerard Vinson testified that in October 2001 defendant
asked him to pawn a ring because defendant did not have
identification.  Vinson pawned the ring, which was gold and had a
black onyx stone, on 17 October 2001.  Law enforcement later
recovered the ring from the pawnshop.  Gillard’s ex-girlfriend
testified the ring looked like the one Gillard wore and was
wearing on the morning of his disappearance.  The pawnshop
manager testified that the retail portion of the store was the
area’s sole distributor of this brand of ring, and that Gillard
had originally bought a gold and onyx ring there on 10 February
2001 for three hundred dollars.
Defendant presented no evidence at the guilt phase of
his trial.  The jury returned verdicts of guilty of first-degree
murder of both Gillard and Leavy, but returned a verdict of not
guilty as to defendant’s alleged robbery of Gillard.  The trial
court dismissed the robbery charge as to Leavy.
Following the verdicts, both of defendant’s attorneys,
Carl Ivarsson and George Franks, were allowed to withdraw as
counsel following defendant’s physical attack on Franks.  The
trial court then declared a mistrial as to the penalty
proceeding.
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In 2007 a new jury was empaneled for the sentencing
proceeding of defendant’s trial.  The State offered substantially
the same evidence as it had presented in the guilt phase.  In
addition, the State offered victim impact evidence from Pamela
Leavy, who was Leavy’s older sister, and Sharon Cogdell, Leavy’s
girlfriend.  Victim impact evidence as to Gillard’s death was
presented through testimony of Toni Washington, Gillard’s former
girlfriend, and Gillard’s friends Michael and Vanessa Burden.
Defendant presented mitigation evidence tending to show
that he had a difficult childhood.  Defendant’s father physically
abused his children, sexually abused defendant’s sisters, and
physically abused defendant’s mother.  On one occasion defendant
stood up to his father, who then shot him in the leg. 
Defendant’s ex-girlfriend testified about how defendant was
caring, how he took care of his brother and parents, and how he
also helped her take care of her infant daughter.  Defendant’s
nephew testified that defendant’s mother burned trash and scraps
in the yard of the residence.  On rebuttal, Detective Sterling
McClain testified that investigators had discovered and examined
a conventional burn pile separate and distinct from the two burn
piles that smelled of blood and fuel.
Following closing arguments by counsel and the trial
court’s instructions to the jury, the jury deliberated and
returned a binding recommendation that defendant be sentenced to
death.  As to both murders, the jury found that they were part of
a course of conduct in which defendant engaged and which included
the commission by defendant of other crimes of violence against
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another person.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11) (2007).  One or more
jurors found that defendant had no significant history of prior
criminal activity, id. § 15A-2000(f)(1) (2007), along with
several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  The jury
determined that the mitigating circumstances were insufficient to
outweigh the aggravating circumstance and that the aggravating
circumstance was sufficiently substantial, when considered with
the mitigating circumstances, to impose the death penalty.  The
trial court then entered judgment accordingly.      
ANALYSIS
The Reappointment of Attorney George Franks
Defendant’s first argument is that the trial court
erred in not removing George Franks as his counsel or, in the
alternative, by not holding a hearing to determine whether there
was a conflict of interest between defendant and Franks.  We
disagree.
Following defendant’s arrest, Ray Colton Vallery was
appointed by Indigent Defense Services (IDS) to represent
defendant on 22 October 2001.  Following a Rule 24 conference
held on 16 September 2002, IDS appointed George Franks as second
chair on 19 September 2002.  On 23 September 2002, defendant
filed a pro se motion requesting that Vallery be withdrawn as
counsel, stating that Vallery had failed to communicate with
defendant and had not been diligent in his investigation of the
case.  The trial court heard argument on the motion on 10 October
2002.  After defendant was asked whether he wanted both Vallery
and Franks to be removed, the following colloquy took place:
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THE DEFENDANT:  I barely know him.
MR. FRANKS:  Your Honor, I prefer to be
removed as well so if he has counsel, he can
have a clean slate, Your Honor.  I have
worked with Mr. Vallery, known him for years. 
He is a good attorney.
THE COURT:  Yes, sir.
MR. FRANKS:  If he’s going to have
trouble with Mr. Vallery, he’s going to have
trouble with me.  I’m getting too old for
trouble.
The trial court allowed defendant’s motion and removed both
attorneys, stating that IDS would need to make new appointments. 
IDS appointed Carl Ivarsson on 8 November 2002 and reappointed
Franks as second chair on 19 December 2002.
Around the date of defendant’s February 2003
arraignment, defendant wrote two letters, one to the clerk of
court and the other addressed to Superior Court Judge Weeks. 
Defendant’s 10 February 2003 letter to Judge Weeks stated:
My name is Eugene Johnny Williams and
the reason why I’m writting you is we seem to
have a problem.  My O.C.A. File record is
#2001-14056, and Mr. Williams is charged with
two counts of First Degree Murder and in
September 2002, Mr. Williams filed a motion
for attorney to be withdrawn from his case. 
In October 2002 Mr. Williams was brought back
in front of you and my motion was granted,
but now it seems to have another issue, One
of two lawyers, “Mr. Franks” was present at
Mr. Williams court hearing on 02/02 And he
said he was still one of my attorneys.  But
in October 2002, he stated in front of Mr.
Weeks the Judge overlooking the case, and
said, “He and protege Mr. Vallery, he wanted
to step down from my case since Mr. Williams
didn’t want Mr. Vallery to represent him.” 
But now he only said three words to me while
I was in court a few days ago, and the other
attorney, “Judge Weeks” Mr. Williams doesn’t
even know his name or nothing at all about
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him.  The main reason why Mr. Williams is
writting this letter is because this is my
life that is on the line.  Mr. Williams truly
understand that a court-appointed attorney
will only go by his guidelines on jailed
clients.  But at the same time my life is on
the line, or another words in someone’s
elses’ hands.  But Judge Weeks I never
received a copy of any judgement on your
ruling for new attorneys, and I am writting
to Bar association so Mr. Williams can
receive a pair of attorneys that will truly
represent Mr. Williams in his case.  Mr.
Williams will receive the fair shake of the
judicial system if attorneys and clients
don’t work together.  Then last but not less
none of my attorneys keep in touch no matter
that the case may be. . . . [sic] 
Defendant’s 18 February 2003 letter to the Clerk of Court read:
I Eugene Johnny Williams, hereby state
and request the following.  That on or about
the 24, day of October 2002, the Honorable
Judge Greg Weaks pursuant to GS15A-144,
granted Mr. Williams request for removal of
counsel.  at said hearing Judge Weaks allowed
Attorney Raymond Vallery to redraw as counsel
for Mr. William, at which point Mr. Williams
co counsel Mr. Franks, requested that he also
be allowed to withdrawl, This Too was
granted.
I hereby contend, that Judge Weaks at
this time guranteed Mr. Williams new
appiontment of counsel, whereby Mr. Franks
was reinstated, as co-counsel aginst Mr.
Williams request.  Co-counsel along with Mr.
Franks was never made knowne To Mr. Williams. 
It is hereby requested That due To The
severity of the charges charged aginst Mr
William, it is most important That he contact
counsel appointed by This court, whereby Mr.
William Respectfully request the name address
and phone number, of counsel and co-counsel
for Mr. Williams pursuant To File # OCA 2001-
14056.  Now before This court. [sic]
Judge Weeks wrote defendant, informing him that Ivarsson was
appointed as first chair and Franks was reappointed as second
chair.  Judge Weeks indicated that he had spoken to Ivarsson and
Franks and also was providing them a copy of the letter sent by
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defendant requesting that his attorneys “keep in touch” with him. 
Defendant asserts the trial court erred by not removing Franks
once again or conducting a hearing on whether defendant was
entitled to substitute counsel.  We disagree.
Defendant argues that two legal principles compel us to
rule in his favor.  First, defendant argues that “once a Superior
Court Judge has issued a ruling in a case, the ruling becomes the
law of the case.”  Thus, defendant asserts that IDS’s
reappointment of Franks as second chair counsel violated Judge
Weeks’s order to have IDS appoint new counsel in the case.  To
the contrary, Judge Weeks’s order consisted solely of the
following: “All right.  Motion is allowed.”  Judge Weeks simply
allowed defendant’s motion to have counsel removed from his case. 
After the order allowing the motion, Judge Weeks began to address
who would be appointed to represent defendant, and Franks
indicated that the decision would go to IDS.  The trial court
agreed and simply stated as fact to defendant that “[i]t goes
back to IDS which means your case is going to be further delayed
which means this case has to go back up to them and they have to
make new appointments.”  Judge Weeks’s order allowing defendant’s
motion to remove counsel did not, implicitly or explicitly, order
that Franks not be reappointed as counsel.  Thus, we cannot agree
that IDS violated the trial court’s order.  
Second, defendant argues that “when faced with a
request for substitute counsel, a trial court has an obligation
to conduct a sufficient inquiry to determine if the defendant is
entitled to the appointment of substitute counsel.”  Defendant
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relies on State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 271 S.E.2d 252 (1980),
for this proposition.  In Thacker this Court stated: “[W]hen
faced with a claim of conflict and a request for appointment of
substitute counsel, the trial court must satisfy itself only that
present counsel is able to render competent assistance and that
the nature or degree of the conflict is not such as to render
that assistance ineffective.”  Id. at 353, 271 S.E.2d at 256
(emphasis added).  We do not agree with defendant that his letter
to the trial court “clearly constitutes a request for substitute
counsel.”  Instead, defendant’s letter indicates uncertainty on
his part regarding why Franks was still his attorney.  Had
defendant wished to have Franks removed as counsel, defendant
could have filed another motion to have his attorney replaced. 
Defendant obviously possessed the ability to do so, as evidenced
by his prior pro se motion that was allowed by Judge Weeks. 
Thus, in the absence of a request for the appointment of
substitute counsel, the trial court was not required to hold any
hearing.  
Even if we were to conclude that a hearing should have
been held, we are not persuaded that any alleged conflict of
interest would have been sufficient to remove Franks from the
case.  The issue would have been whether Franks was “able to
render competent assistance and that the nature or degree of the
conflict is not such as to render that assistance ineffective.” 
Id.  Defendant was not entitled to counsel of his choice, 301
N.C. at 351-53, 271 S.E.2d at 255, nor was he constitutionally
entitled to second chair counsel, State v. Locklear, 322 N.C.
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349, 357, 368 S.E.2d 377, 382 (1988) (explaining that the right
to the “appointment of additional counsel in capital cases is
statutory, not constitutional”).  Even had defendant been
constitutionally entitled to a second attorney, there is no
indication that any conflict with Franks would rise to the level
of rendering Franks’s “assistance ineffective.”  Defendant never
asked for Franks to be removed, but rather, Franks was initially
removed on his own request.  Defendant did not make any formal
motion or inform the trial court in any way that he had a
potential conflict of interest with Franks.  We do not agree with
defendant that any potential conflict that existed between
defendant and Franks would have been apparent to the trial court,
such as to compel the trial court to ex mero motu conduct a
hearing on the matter.  We also disagree with defendant’s
alternative argument that he is entitled to present his concerns
to the trial court on remand to establish his allegations if this
Court finds that a new trial is not warranted.  Accordingly,
defendant’s assignments of error are overruled.   
Defendant’s Pro Se Speedy Trial Motion
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by
“summarily denying” his pro se motion to dismiss on speedy trial
grounds.  We disagree.  Defendant was represented by appointed
counsel and was not allowed to file pro se motions on his behalf. 
“A defendant has only two choices--‘to appear in propria persona
or, in the alternative, by counsel.  There is no right to appear
both in propria persona and by counsel.’”  State v. Thomas, 331
N.C. 671, 677, 417 S.E.2d 473, 477 (1992) (citations omitted)
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(quoting State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 61, 277 S.E.2d 410, 415
(1981), disavowed on other grounds by State v. Freeman, 314 N.C.
432, 437-38, 333 S.E.2d 743, 746-47 (1985)).  “Having elected for
representation by appointed defense counsel, defendant cannot
also file motions on his own behalf or attempt to represent
himself.  Defendant has no right to appear both by himself and by
counsel.”  State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 61, 540 S.E.2d 713, 721
(2000) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 838 (2001).
Defendant asserts that these cases do not apply to his
pro se motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds because defense
counsel “adopted” these motions.  We disagree.  Before the trial
court considered the motion at issue, defense counsel stated: 
“The defendant filed some pro se motions.  We need rulings on
those.”  The trial court informed defendant that he had no right
to file motions on his own behalf and that he could not continue
to file pro se motions while being represented by counsel.  The
trial court then declined to rule on the pro se motions. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not ruling on his
pro se motions because the trial court erroneously believed that
counsel had filed motions covering the issues raised by defendant
in his pro se motions.  That the trial court might have been
mistaken as to whether defense counsel had filed similar motions
is inapposite.  Defendant was not entitled to file pro se motions
while represented by counsel, and the statement to the trial
court by defense counsel that the pro se motions needed to be
ruled on hardly represents counsel’s adoption of defendant’s
motion.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to
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rule on defendant’s pro se speedy trial motion.  Defendant’s
assignments of error are overruled.       
Defendant’s Pro Se Motion to Suppress
Likewise, defendant argues that the trial court erred
in “summarily denying” his pro se motion to suppress.  This
motion was addressed by the trial court during the same
discussion that related to defendant’s pro se motion to dismiss
on speedy trial grounds.  For the reasons previously stated,
defendant was not entitled to a ruling from the trial court on a
pro se motion filed while he was represented by appointed
counsel.  Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to rule
on defendant’s pro se motion to suppress.  Accordingly,
defendant’s assignment of error is overruled.
The Testimony of Lieutenant Ray Wood
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in
admitting some of the testimony of Lieutenant Ray Wood of the
Cumberland County Sheriff’s Office.  Defendant argues that the
testimony was “inadmissible lay opinion testimony” received in
violation of his right to due process and a fair trial. 
Defendant’s objections at trial were not based on constitutional
grounds, and as a consequence, these claims are not reviewable on
appeal and defendant does not contend plain error.  See N.C. R.
App. P. 10(b); id. 10(c)(4); see also State v. Raines, 362 N.C.
1, 16, 653 S.E.2d 126, 136 (2007), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 129
S. Ct. 2857 (2009).  While we decline to review defendant’s
constitutional arguments, we will address his assertion that the
testimony was inadmissible lay opinion testimony.
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Rule 701 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence
states: 
If the witness is not testifying as an
expert, his testimony in the form of opinions
or inferences is limited to those opinions or
inferences which are (a) rationally based on
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful
to a clear understanding of his testimony or
the determination of a fact in issue.
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 701 (2007).  The State never tendered Wood
as an expert witness, but informed the trial court that it would
offer his testimony regarding his personal observations and as a
lay opinion consistent with Rule 701.  We review the trial
court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion,
looking to whether “the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported
by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the
result of a reasoned decision.”  State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279,
285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988) (citation omitted).  “In our
review, we consider not whether we might disagree with the trial
court, but whether the trial court’s actions are fairly supported
by the record.”  State v. Lasiter, 361 N.C. 299, 302, 643 S.E.2d
909, 911 (2007) (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 434
(1985)).  We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in any of the five instances about which defendant
complains, as the testimony was either not opinion testimony or
was admissible as a lay opinion.
First, defendant asserts the trial court erred in
overruling his objection to Wood’s testimony that the “white
crystal powdery-type substance” found on the vehicle in which the
victims were discovered “looked like as far as the size and how
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it was distributed over the vehicle, is taking your car into a
car wash and the car wash mechanism spraying the suds . . . and
the car not being rinsed.  That’s what it looked like.”  Here,
Wood was not offering his opinion that defendant attempted to
wash the vehicle without rinsing it, but was explaining his
observations about the size and distribution of the spots found
on the vehicle.  Thus, this testimony was not opinion testimony.
Second, defendant argues the trial court erred in
permitting Wood to testify that it was his opinion that the
victims were not shot in the vehicle in which their bodies were
found.  This opinion was based upon Wood’s observations that
there was no pooling of blood in or around the vehicle, no shell
casings found in the car or around the car, very little blood
spatter in the vehicle, and no holes or projectiles found in the
vehicle or outside the vehicle.  Thus, Wood’s opinion was
rationally based on his perception.  Additionally, the location
of the murders was a key issue linking defendant to the crime. 
Wood’s opinion whether the victims were murdered in the location
where the vehicle was found or were killed inside the vehicle was
helpful to the determination of a fact of the case and was thus
admissible under Rule 701.  The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in overruling defendant’s objection.
Third, defendant objected to Wood’s testimony that it
was his opinion that Leavy had been “winched in” the vehicle by
the use of the rope found inside the vehicle.  Wood’s testimony
was based upon his perception of blood patterns, the location of
the vehicle, and the positioning of and tension on the rope on
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the seat and Leavy’s hands.  Moreover, his opinion was helpful in
determining how defendant, acting alone, would have been able to
move Leavy’s large body from defendant’s residence to the
vehicle.  Accordingly, the testimony was admissible lay opinion
testimony, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting it.
Fourth, defendant argues that the trial court erred in
allowing Wood to testify that a blanket seized from defendant’s
home was the “same type blanket” as that covering one of the
decedents.  Defendant did not object to this testimony at trial
and has not argued in his brief that admission of this evidence
amounts to plain error.  Accordingly, we will not review this
contention.  See N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4).
Finally, defendant argues the trial court erred in
allowing Wood to testify that it was his opinion that the victims
were dragged through the grass at defendant’s residence.  This
testimony was based upon Wood’s observations at defendant’s
residence and his experience in luminol testing.  Additionally,
this testimony was helpful to the determination of how the
victims’ bodies may have been moved from defendant’s residence
into the vehicle and ultimately to the place where they were
discovered.  The testimony was admissible.  Defendant’s
assignments of error are overruled.
Pretrial Statements of Sharon Cogdell and Jimmy Locklear
Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting the
pre-trial statements of Sharon Cogdell and Jimmy Locklear for the
purpose of corroborating their testimony.  Although defendant
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raises this as a constitutional issue on appeal, he did not
object on constitutional grounds at trial and does not contend
plain error; accordingly, we will not review these assignments of
error on constitutional grounds.  See id. 10(b); id. 10(c)(4);
see also Raines, 362 N.C. at 16, 653 S.E.2d at 136.  We will
review defendant’s assignments of error only for alleged
violations of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, and we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the statements for corroborative purposes. 
“‘Corroborative testimony is testimony which tends to
strengthen, confirm, or make more certain the testimony of
another witness.’”  State v. Harrison, 328 N.C. 678, 681, 403
S.E.2d 301, 303 (1991) (quoting State v. Rogers, 299 N.C. 597,
601, 264 S.E.2d 89, 92 (1980)).  “Deciding whether to receive or
exclude corroborative testimony, so as to keep its scope and
volume within reasonable bounds, is necessarily a matter which
rests in large measure in the discretion of the trial court.” 
State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 39-40, 678 S.E.2d 618, 637
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied,
__ U.S. __, 78 U.S.L.W. 3252 (2009).  Indeed, 
prior statements of a witness can be admitted
as corroborative evidence if they tend to add
weight or credibility to the witness’ trial
testimony.  New information contained within
the witness’ prior statement, but not
referred to in his trial testimony, may also
be admitted as corroborative evidence if it
tends to add weight or credibility to that
testimony.
State v. Davis, 349 N.C. 1, 28, 506 S.E.2d 455, 469-70 (1998)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied,
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526 U.S. 1161 (1999).  “[I]f the testimony offered in
corroboration is generally consistent with the witness’s
testimony, slight variations will not render it inadmissible. 
Such variations affect only the credibility of the evidence which
is always for the jury.”  State v. Warren, 289 N.C. 551, 557, 223
S.E.2d 317, 321 (1976) (citations omitted).  When determining
whether the trial court abused its discretion, we look to whether
“the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so
arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned
decision.”  Hennis, 323 N.C. at 285, 372 S.E.2d at 527.  “In our
review, we consider not whether we might disagree with the trial
court, but whether the trial court’s actions are fairly supported
by the record.”  Lasiter, 361 N.C. at 302, 643 S.E.2d at 911.
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when
Detective Robert Gilford of the Cumberland County Sheriff’s
Office was allowed to testify that Sharon Cogdell told him that
Leavy had received a telephone call from Gillard on 9 October
2001 and that Gillard asked Leavy to go somewhere with him. 
While Cogdell did not testify at trial that Leavy had received a
telephone call from Gillard, she did testify that Leavy received
a telephone call at her residence, that about fifteen minutes
later a car came to her residence and Leavy left in the car, and
that she called Gillard a short while later, asking to talk to
Leavy, and was told they would return her call.  The trial court
instructed the jury to disregard Detective Gilford’s testimony
insofar as it did not corroborate Cogdell’s testimony.  Gilford’s
testimony generally tracked Cogdell’s testimony and was not
-20-
contrary to or inconsistent with it.  We cannot say that the
trial court’s decision to allow the testimony was manifestly
unsupported by reason.
Defendant also argues the trial court erred when
Detective Charles Disponzio of the Cumberland County Sheriff’s
Office gave corroboration testimony detailing a statement
allegedly made by defendant to his cellmate Jimmy Locklear before
the murders.  At trial, Locklear testified that defendant was
upset with an unidentified person because that person owed him
money and was “ducking” him.  Defendant told Locklear that he was
going to “f*** him up.”  Locklear also testified that the
unidentified man had only paid a portion of the sales price and
that he still owed defendant $1500 to $2000.  Locklear testified
that defendant was involved in the stealing and selling of
motorcycles and that defendant had mentioned a “nine millimeter”
at one time.  Detective Disponzio’s testimony regarding
Locklear’s statement was that defendant said about the man who
owed him money that “[h]e was going to kill him and f*** him --
or f*** him up, in other words.”  While Locklear testified that
defendant did not use the word “kill,” we note that Detective
Disponzio made only a fleeting mention of the word, which could
certainly be a reasonable interpretation of “f*** him up.”  Any
prejudicial effect of the admission of this portion of the
detective’s testimony is mitigated by Gillis’s testimony that
defendant “said he was going to kill” Gillard upon defendant’s
release from the detention center.  Additionally, the trial court
properly instructed the jury on the corroborative purposes of
-21-
Disponzio’s testimony.  Defendant also argues the trial court
erred in allowing Disponzio to testify that the unnamed person
with whom defendant was angry had given him the “runaround,” that
defendant recruited Locklear to help him “boost” motorcycles, and
that defendant had “talked a lot about nine millimeters and a
Glock and stuff and all that -- Rugers, nine millimeters.” 
Detective Disponzio’s testimony generally tracked the testimony
given by Locklear and was not in any way inconsistent with
Locklear’s testimony.  We cannot say the trial court’s decision
to allow the testimony exceeded the bounds of reason. 
Accordingly, defendant’s assignments of error are overruled.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant argues that the evidence presented was
insufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find defendant
guilty of the murders beyond a reasonable doubt.  Additionally,
because the evidence of guilt was allegedly insufficient,
defendant contends the evidence was insufficient for the jury to
find the aggravating circumstance as to each murder, namely, that
defendant engaged in a course of conduct which included the
commission of another crime of violence; here, the first-degree
murder of another person.  We disagree.
“When considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” 
State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 161, 604 S.E.2d 886, 904 (2004)
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 830 (2005).  “If
substantial evidence exists to support each essential element of
-22-
the crime charged and that defendant was the perpetrator, it is
proper for the trial court to deny the motion.”  Id. (citation
omitted).  “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”  State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96, 99, 678 S.E.2d 592,
594 (2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The State’s evidence was sufficient.  Witnesses
testified that defendant bragged while in jail that he was going
to “f*** him [Gillard] up” for not paying money owed, money that
would have allowed defendant to be released from the detention
center.  In the days following defendant’s release, he attempted
to make telephone contact with Gillard at least eight times,
leaving a message on Gillard’s voice mail inviting him to see a
motorcycle and ordering him to come alone.  Shortly before his
death, Gillard told others that he was going to purchase a
motorcycle.  On 9 October 2001, Gillard and Leavy left Leavy’s
residence together, and Leavy’s girlfriend later called Gillard’s
mobile phone and was told that they were busy and would return
her call later.  This call was routed through the southwest panel
of the cellular phone tower nearest defendant’s residence. 
Moreover, certain evidence indicated that the murders did not
occur in the vehicle containing the bodies or in the area where
the vehicle was found.  In defendant’s yard there were two areas
of roughly twenty to thirty square feet each where fresh soil was
spread over the grass.  Under the soil, the ground smelled of
gasoline and putrid blood.  During the 2007 sentencing hearing,
evidence was presented that a part of the soil tested positive
-23-
for blood.  A piece of concrete found several inches in the
ground tested positive for human blood.  Two spent nine
millimeter projectiles were found in the ground at defendant’s
residence, along with spent nine millimeter casings.  The
projectiles recovered from the victims’ bodies and from
defendant’s yard were fired from a weapon with a left-hand twist
and nine lands and grooves.  Approximately one week after the
murders, defendant asked a friend to pawn a gold ring with a
black onyx stone.  The ring was similar to one owned by Gillard
and purchased by him several months earlier from the same
pawnshop.
Defendant basically attempts to interpret the evidence
in a light most favorable to him, detailing other plausible
explanations for the evidence presented by the State at trial. 
“However, ‘[w]hen ruling on a motion to dismiss for insufficient
evidence . . . . [a]ny contradictions or conflicts in the
evidence are resolved in favor of the State and evidence
unfavorable to the State is not considered.’”  State v.
Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382, 427-28, 683 S.E.2d 174, 202 (2009)
(quoting Miller, 363 N.C. at 98, 678 S.E.2d at 594 (alterations
in original) (citations omitted by court)).  These assignments of
error are overruled.
Jurisdictional Issues
Following the guilt phase of defendant’s trial in 2004,
counsel for defendant, Ivarsson and Franks, met with him in a
classroom at the Cumberland County Detention Center.  Defendant
immediately became aggressive, shouting at counsel, cursing at
-24-
them, and hurling racially-charged vulgar epithets at them. 
Defendant then slammed his fists on a table, threw the table at
Franks, and then pushed the table on Franks, knocking him to the
ground.  Employees of the detention center heard the commotion
and entered the room.  They immediately stood between defendant
and his counsel and asked counsel to leave.  Counsel then filed a
motion to withdraw, which the trial court granted.  Judge Weeks
declared a mistrial as to the penalty proceeding and dismissed
the jury.  In 2007 Judge Lock presided over defendant’s penalty
proceeding, and a new jury was empaneled.  Defendant argues the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a sentence of death
against him because (1) Judge Lock did not preside over the guilt
phase of defendant’s trial; (2) the jury that recommended a
sentence of death was not the same jury that returned the guilty
verdicts in the guilt phase; and (3) the sentencing judgment was
entered out-of-session and out-of-term.
We disagree with defendant that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to enter a judgment sentencing him to death. 
Defendant has taken issues of procedure and attempted to recast
them as jurisdictional issues.  While N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(a),
which governs penalty proceedings after a finding of guilt in
capital cases, does envision the same trial judge presiding over
a defendant’s guilt phase and penalty proceeding, the statute
also envisions the proceeding being held immediately or soon
after the defendant has been found guilty of a capital offense. 
Such a scenario was impossible in this case because of
defendant’s unprovoked attack on one of his attorneys.  No
-25-
 Defendant argues that Harris v. Lee, No. 91-CRS-16272
1
(Super. Ct. Onslow County Oct. 22, 2001) (unpublished order),
cert. denied, 559 S.E.2d 802 (N.C. 2002) is persuasive in this
case.  We do not find defendant’s analogies to this case to be
compelling.  We also note that we are not bound by decisions of a
superior court and that this Court’s denial of certiorari has no
precedential value.  Jenkins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 324 N.C.
394, 400, 378 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1989).    
binding statute or case law prohibits a superior court judge
other than the one who presided over the guilt phase from
presiding over the penalty proceeding.   Defendant’s reading of
1
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2003 is unduly narrow, and that statute is not
applicable in this case.  The superior court’s jurisdiction over
the subject matter of this case was established when defendant
was indicted for a felony, and jurisdiction over the penalty
phase was established when defendant was convicted of a capital
offense.  See N.C.G.S. § 7A-271 (2007).  The trial court was not
divested of its subject matter jurisdiction because Judge Lock,
instead of Judge Weeks, presided over the penalty proceeding.
Moreover, we reject defendant’s argument that the
sentencing jury lacked jurisdiction to recommend a sentence of
death.  We note again that N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(a)(2) sets out
procedure, not jurisdiction.  Moreover, section 15A-2000(a)(2)
addresses occasions when the guilt phase jury is unable to sit
for the penalty phase.  Defendant argues there was no indication
that the guilt phase jury would have been unable to reconvene
three years later to sit for his penalty proceeding.  The
likelihood of all jurors who served on the guilt phase jury to be
available and qualified to serve three years later is a practical
impossibility.  In order for the trial jury to sit as the
-26-
sentencing jury, no juror could have moved outside the district
during the three-year gap between defendant’s conviction and the
penalty proceeding.  The jurors would have been expected to not
speak to others, for a period of three years about a high-profile
double murder case on which they had served.  Moreover, the
jurors also would have been expected to shield themselves from
all media reports on the case.  We cannot say that it was an
abuse of discretion for Judge Weeks to declare a mistrial or for
Judge Lock to convene a new jury.
Finally, we do not agree with defendant that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction because the judgments were entered out-
of-term and out-of-session.  The principles articulated by this
Court in State v. Boone, 310 N.C. 284, 311 S.E.2d 552 (1984) and
State v. Trent, 359 N.C. 583, 614 S.E.2d 498 (2005) are simply
not relevant in this case.  In Boone and Trent, both orders at
issue pertained to suppression motions on which the trial court
did not rule until after the session ended and the terms at which
the motions were heard had expired.  In this case, a mistrial was
declared because of defendant’s physical attack on his appointed
counsel.  Following this assault, both attorneys were allowed to
withdraw, and new counsel needed to be appointed.  The time
required for defendant’s new counsel to become prepared to defend
him necessitated the delay in beginning the penalty proceeding. 
Even had some procedural error been committed, defendant would
not have been prejudiced by it.  “A defendant is not prejudiced .
. . . by error resulting from his own conduct.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-
-27-
1443(c) (2007).  Accordingly, we overrule defendant’s assignments
of error.
Jury Pool Selection Outside Defendant’s Presence
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his
right under Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina
Constitution to be present at all proceedings of his capital
trial when the deputy clerk selected forty-eight prospective
jurors from the pool in the jury assembly room, outside
defendant’s presence.  A defendant’s right to be present at all
proceedings of his capital trial under Article I, Section 23 is
unwaivable.  State v. Boyd, 332 N.C. 101, 105, 418 S.E.2d 471,
473 (1992) (citations omitted).  Thus, even though defendant did
not object--and actually consented to the actions of the jury
clerk--we will still consider his argument.  
When defendant’s 2007 penalty proceeding began, the
trial court informed the parties that it appeared a civil trial
would be occurring concurrently in another courtroom. 
Approximately eighty prospective jurors had reported for duty and
were being held in the jury assembly room.  The trial court
proposed that forty-eight jurors be selected by the jury clerk
for possible service in this case.  There was no objection to
this plan of action.  Following some discussion on administrative
matters, the trial court informed the parties that the clerk had
anticipated “what we were going to do, based upon my comments a
moment ago” and had “already communicated that to the courtroom -
- excuse me, to the jury clerk who is working with the venire,
and she has already drawn out 48 people and will call those
-28-
names.”  A few days later, as the jury was still being selected,
the trial court informed the parties:  “Friday afternoon, I
discussed with . . . the Trial Court Administrator, the process
of selecting additional jurors for this week.  And tentatively
decided that the best thing to do would be to select a number of
jurors from the venire first thing this morning and have just
those jurors fill out questionnaires since they certainly need
other jurors for other matters going on here in the courtroom or
the courthouse this week.”  There was no objection by either
party to the jury clerk’s selecting thirty prospective jurors at
random in this manner.
Defendant asserts that he had a constitutional right to
be present when the prospective jurors were being chosen.  Jurors
are selected in the courtroom pursuant to section 15A-1214(a),
which provides in pertinent part:  “The clerk, under the
supervision of the presiding judge, must call jurors from the
panel by a system of random selection which precludes advance
knowledge of the identity of the next juror to be called.” 
N.C.G.S. § 154-1214(a) (2007).  The purpose of random selection
in the courtroom is to ensure that neither party knows the
identity of the next prospective juror to be questioned.  
To the extent defendant is challenging the initial
organization of the entire venire into separate panels that were
later sent sequentially to the courtroom, such a process was a
purely administrative matter and not a “proceeding” at which
defendant is entitled to be present.  We find State v. Workman,
344 N.C. 482, 476 S.E.2d 301 (1996), instructive even though
-29-
defendant’s case had been called for trial.  In Workman this
Court stated: “Defendant’s right to be present at all stages of
his trial does not include the right to be present during
preliminary handling of the jury venires before defendant’s own
case has been called.”  Id. at 498, 476 S.E.2d at 309 (citations
omitted).  Likewise, in the instant case, the random segregation
of the entire jury pool so that it could be split among
defendant’s proceeding and other matters being handled at the
courthouse that day was a preliminary administrative matter at
which defendant did not have a right to be present.  See State v.
McNeill, 349 N.C. 634, 642-43, 509 S.E.2d 415, 420 (1998)
(stating that defendant did not have the right to be present when
prospective jurors were sworn in by a deputy clerk in the jury
assembly room and the jurors “were subject to assignment in any
one of six superior courts in session as well as any number of
district courts”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838 (1999).  Moreover,
to march a defendant who had been shackled because of a physical
assault of his attorney and who had been recently convicted of
two counts of first-degree murder through the courtroom halls
into a jury room in order for him to be present during the random
drawing of names of prospective jurors is impractical and most
likely an administrative impossibility.  Because defendant’s
right to be present at all proceedings does not extend to the
jury assembly room, we disagree with defendant’s contention that
his right to be present was violated.  Defendant’s assignment of
error is overruled.    
-30-
Admission of Evidence from Guilt Phase at Penalty Proceeding
Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting
during the penalty proceeding evidence that defendant, following
the murders, possessed items that belonged to the victims. 
Defendant contends admission of this evidence was erroneous
because he was acquitted of robbery of the victims.  We disagree.
Although defendant did file a motion in limine to
exclude evidence that defendant possessed Gillard’s ring and
watch and Leavy’s ring, defendant did not object when the
evidence was admitted.  While we generally would not review
defendant’s claims on the merits, we elect to do so under Rule 2
of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Defendant’s
argument is that State v. Scott, 331 N.C. 39, 413 S.E.2d 787
(1992), controls here rather than State v. Agee, 326 N.C. 542,
391 S.E.2d 171 (1990).  We disagree and find Agee to be on point.
While the North Carolina Rules of Evidence that
controlled in Agee and Scott are not binding in a capital penalty
proceeding, they do provide this Court guidance.  See State v.
Duke, 360 N.C. 110, 124, 623 S.E.2d 11, 21 (2005) (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 855 (2006).  In Scott this Court
concluded that evidence of a prior rape of which the defendant
had been acquitted was inadmissible as a matter of law in a
subsequent case in which the defendant was charged with the rape
of another woman.  331 N.C. at 42, 413 S.E.2d at 788.  In Agee
this Court held that evidence that the defendant possessed
marijuana, a charge of which the defendant had been acquitted,
was admissible against the defendant in a subsequent case
-31-
involving the same transaction in which the defendant was charged
with possession of LSD.  326 N.C. at 546-50, 391 S.E.2d at 173-
76.  In distinguishing Agee, the Court in Scott wrote:  “The
‘chain of circumstances’ link that arguably made [the marijuana]
evidence probative in Agee by virtue of its temporal relevance to
the crime for which the defendant was on trial is absent here.” 
331 N.C. at 46, 413 S.E.2d at 790-91.
As in Agee, the evidence presented during the penalty
proceeding here was not offered to prove that defendant had
robbed his victims.  Instead, the State used the evidence to
prove its single aggravating factor for each murder--that
defendant had engaged in a course of conduct that involved a
crime of violence against another person or persons, namely the
murder of another.  Defendant’s possession of the victims’ items
in and of itself would not be sufficient to prove robbery beyond
a reasonable doubt.  However, evidence that defendant possessed
these items was relevant to linking defendant to both victims. 
Moreover, as in Agee, defendant’s possession of the items was
temporally relevant to the chain of circumstances surrounding
defendant’s crimes.  The trial court did not err in admitting the
evidence.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(a)(3) (2007) (stating, inter
alia, that in the penalty proceeding, “[a]ny evidence which the
court deems to have probative value may be received”). 
Defendant’s assignments of error are overruled.    
PRESERVATION ISSUES
Defendant raises as preservation issues (1) that the
trial court erred by denying his motion for a bill of particulars
-32-
detailing the State’s theory of the case; (2) that the short-form
indictment used was insufficient to charge first-degree murder;
(3) that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motions to
strike the death penalty from consideration because the death
penalty is cruel and unusual punishment and is administered in an
arbitrary and capricious manner; and (4) that the trial court
erred in refusing to give his requested jury instruction on
mitigating circumstances.  We have rejected these arguments in
the past, and decline to revisit them today.  See State v.
Elliott, 360 N.C. 400, 421-24, 628 S.E.2d 735, 749, cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1000 (2006); State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 387-90, 423-
25, 597 S.E.2d 724, 731-33, 752-53 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
1156 (2005); State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 532-34, 536, 453
S.E.2d 824, 852-55, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884 (1995).
PROPORTIONALITY
Because we have concluded that defendant’s trial and
capital sentencing proceeding were free from prejudicial error,
we now consider:  (1) whether the record supports the aggravating
circumstances found by the jury; (2) whether the death sentences
were entered under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any
other arbitrary factor; and (3) whether the death sentences are
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the facts of the crime and the defendant.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (2007).
The jury found only one aggravating circumstance in
each murder, the section 15A-2000(e)(11) aggravating circumstance
that the murder was part of a course of conduct in which
-33-
 Defendant argues that the proportionality review as set
2
out by statute and this Court is unconstitutional.  We reviewed
and rejected these arguments in Garcia, and decline to revisit
them here.  358 N.C. at 429, 597 S.E.2d at 756. 
defendant engaged and that course of conduct included the
commission by defendant of other crimes of violence against
another person.  We have previously noted that sufficient
evidence was presented that defendant murdered both Gillard and
Leavy.  Accordingly, we find that the evidence supports the
aggravating circumstances found by the jury.  Additionally,
nothing in the record indicates that the sentences were imposed
under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
factor.
Finally, we determine whether defendant’s sentences
were proportional, considering both the crime and defendant.   In
2
determining proportionality, we consider “all cases which are
roughly similar in facts to the instant case, although we are not
constrained to cite each and every case we have used for
comparison.”  State v. McNeill, 360 N.C. 231, 254, 624 S.E.2d
329, 344 (citing State v. Al-Bayyinah, 359 N.C. 741, 760-61, 616
S.E.2d 500, 514 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1076 (2006)),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 960 (2006).  “Although we ‘compare this
case with the cases in which we have found the death penalty to
be proportionate . . . we will not undertake to discuss or cite
all of those cases each time we carry out that duty.’”  Garcia,
358 N.C. at 429, 597 S.E.2d at 756 (quoting State v. McCollum,
334 N.C. 208, 244, 433 S.E.2d 144, 164 (1993), cert. denied, 512
U.S. 1254 (1994) (alteration in original)).  “[O]nly in the most
-34-
clear and extraordinary situations may we properly declare a
sentence of death which has been recommended by the jury and
ordered by the trial court to be disproportionate.”  State v.
Chandler, 342 N.C. 742, 764, 467 S.E.2d 636, 648 (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 875 (1996).  The determination
of proportionality of an individual defendant’s sentence is
ultimately dependent upon the sound judgment and experience of
the members of this Court.  See McNeill, 360 N.C. at 253, 624
S.E.2d at 344 (citing Garcia, 358 N.C. at 426, 597 S.E.2d at
754).
There have been eight cases in which this Court has
determined that a defendant’s sentence was disproportionate:  
State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 573 S.E.2d 870 (2002); State v.
Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319
N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341
S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled in part on other grounds by State v.
Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900
(1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373
(1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985);
State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v.
Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); and State v.
Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).
In all these cases, there was a single victim, but
here, defendant murdered two people.  “[W]e have never found a
death sentence disproportionate in a double-murder case.”  State
v. Sidden, 347 N.C. 218, 235, 491 S.E.2d 225, 234 (1997) (citing
State v. Conner, 345 N.C. 319, 338, 480 S.E.2d 626, 635, cert.
-35-
denied, 522 U.S. 876 (1997)), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1097 (1998). 
We decline to do so here.  In terms of the aggravating
circumstances found, this case is very similar to State v.
Williams, 305 N.C. 656, 292 S.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1056 (1982), in which this Court found the defendant’s sentence
to be proportionate when the only aggravating circumstance found
was the (e)(11) aggravator.  Id. at 684, 690, 292 S.E.2d at 260,
263.
In this case, the facts are more similar to those cases
in which a defendant has needlessly taken the lives of two human
beings, as opposed to one.  We found the death penalty not
disproportionate in State v. Raines, 362 N.C. at 26, 653 S.E.2d
at 142, in which the defendant killed a husband and wife, id. at
7, 653 S.E.2d at 130.  Likewise, in Duke, 360 N.C. at 144, 623
S.E.2d at 33, we noted how the defendant’s murder of two men was
significant in a finding of proportionality.  See also Sidden,
347 N.C. at 235, 491 S.E.2d at 234; Conner, 345 N.C. at 338, 480
S.E.2d at 635.     
The evidence here indicated that defendant lured his
victims to his residence by telling Gillard that he had another
motorcycle for him.  Defendant instructed Gillard to come alone. 
Defendant had been angry with Gillard for failing to pay him in
full for his last motorcycle deal and had made threats against
Gillard while in jail.  Defendant’s killing of Gillard appeared
to be motivated by revenge for Gillard’s failure to pay, which
prevented defendant from being able to make bail during his
incarceration.  Moreover, defendant was convicted of both murders
-36-
on the basis of premeditation and deliberation.  “The finding of
premeditation and deliberation indicates a more cold-blooded and
calculated crime.”  State v. Watts, 357 N.C. 366, 380, 584 S.E.2d
740, 750 (2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied, 541 U.S. 944 (2004).  We can conclude that
defendant’s sentences are proportionate.
CONCLUSION
Defendant has made other assignments of error, but has
not provided any argument or supporting authority for these
assignments in his brief.  Consequently, we consider those
assignments of error abandoned, and they are dismissed.  See N.C.
R. App. P. 28(b)(6); Raines, 362 N.C. at 26, 653 S.E.2d at 142
(citation omitted).
We conclude defendant received a fair trial and
sentencing proceeding, and we find no error in his convictions or
sentences.  Moreover, we conclude that defendant’s sentences of
death are not disproportionate and should remain undisturbed.
NO ERROR.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.