Case Title: Lerch v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lerch v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div1986 WY 43714 P.2d 754Case Number: 85-209Decided: 02/19/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
WILLIAM LERCH, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
STATE OF WYOMING EX REL. WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
court, TetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Robert W. Horn, Jackson, for 
appellant.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

A.G. McClintock, Atty. 
Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen. and Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The district court 
denied a claim for worker's compensation benefits to a ski area employee who 
sustained a work-related injury, by holding that employment on the ski race crew 
was not extrahazardous as defined by § 27-12-106(a)(lv), W.S. 1977 (1983 
Replacement). We disagree.

 
 

[¶2.]     The parties jointly 
presented one question to the district court:

 
 
"Where an employee's 
duties require skiing to provide a public service but do not include guiding 
clients for compensation is such employee a covered employee within the meaning 
of § 27-12-196, W.S. 1977 [sic] [§ 27-12-106(a)(lv), W.S. 
1977]."

 
 

[¶3.]     The appellant, by 
brief, also raised an equal-protection issue in the district court, and submits 
that issue again on appeal.

 
 

[¶4.]     William Lerch was 
employed by the Jackson Hole Ski Corporation as a crew member of the 
recreational race department. That department sets race courses and supervises 
races for NASTAR,1 Bartender's League, Super NASTAR, 
and the daily Marlboro Ski Challenge. Specifically, crew members organize slalom 
poles, set race courses, tie flags, transport batteries to the race course, set 
up timing equipment, establish communications between the start and finish 
lines, set up warning signs and safety fences, and operate the timing 
equipment.

 
 

[¶5.]     On December 12, 1984, 
while skiing down to the Marlboro Ski Challenge race course, Lerch hit a rock 
which caused him to collide with a tree and resulted in treatment at 
St. John'sHospital in Jackson for a broken femur. Lerch was 
temporarily totally disabled and filed a claim for worker's compensation 
benefits and the extensive medical bills incurred. The Worker's Compensation 
Division, but not the employer, objected to payment of his claim after initial 
approval and payment of the first bills, on the ground that his occupation was 
not extrahazardous by statutory definition. Lerch requested a hearing before the 
district court, wherein the parties stipulated that the injury was suffered 
within the scope of his duties, in the regular course of employment, and not due 
to culpable negligence. After hearing, the court denied the worker's 
compensation claim in finding that the worker failed to prove that his 
occupational responsibility came within the statutory definition.2

 
 

[¶6.]     The statute which we 
are asked to interpret in this appeal provides:

 
 
"The extrahazardous 
occupations and employees to which this act * * * applies 
are:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(lv) Recreational guides 
employed and actively engaged in service to clients for compensation and 
involved in hazardous outdoor guiding and public service activities including 
skiing, mountain climbing, river floating, hunting, fishing, backcountry trips 
and horseback riding." Section 27-12-106(a), W.S. 1977.

 
 

[¶7.]     The paragraph is now 
interpreted in this court in the first instance.3

 
 

[¶8.]     Recreational guides 
were added to the list of extrahazardous occupations during the 1983 general 
session of the legislature. Senator John Turner (Sublette-Teton Counties), whose 
constituents include the claimant and the employer in this case, proposed the 
language in question in identical terminology as a committee-of-the-whole 
amendment to a Senate File which passed the Senate but died in the House Labor, 
Health and Social Services Committee. Digest of Senate Journal of the 47th State 
Legislature, General Session, 1983, SF No. 0071, p. 92. Senator Turner later 
that session located a House Bill regarding worker's compensation benefits, and 
piggybacked the language under consideration onto the House Bill. It passed the 
Senate, and the House of Representatives concurred with the Senate amendment. 
Digest of House Journal of the 47th State Legislature of Wyoming, General Session, 
1983, HB No. 0178, pp. 163, 165. The composite bill became Ch. 106 § 1, S.L. of 
Wyoming 1983.

 
 

[¶9.]     We interpret the 
statute in question ever mindful of this court's

 
 
"* * * policy of 
liberally construing statutes relating to worker's compensation in light of 
their beneficent purpose." Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction Company, 
Wyo., 668 P.2d 649, 652 (1983).

 
 

[¶10.]  There are four categories of ski-slope 
employees at Jackson Hole Ski Corporation which potentially may fall within the 
definition of extrahazardous in § 27-12-106(a)(lv). Each employee of the ski 
instruction, ski guide, ski patrol, and recreatioal race departments must ski in 
order to serve the clientele of Jackson Hole Ski Corporation.4

 
 

[¶11.]  Our inquiry is directed in this case to 
the race crew members as one of the four slope job categories. An insufficient 
record is available to tell how the other categories are treated by the 
Division.5 See Rocky Mountain Tank and Steel Co. v. 
Rager, Wyo., 423 P.2d 645 (1967); In re Gimlin, Wyo., 403 P.2d 178 
(1965).

 
 

[¶12.]  The apparent objection by the Division to 
the present payment for the injury to this employee addresses three criteria for 
inclusion in the definition of extrahazardous under the particular statutory 
section, which include: (1) employment as a recreational guide; (2) service for 
clients; and (3) involved in outdoor guiding. The State then contends that Lerch 
did not comply in required responsibility.

 
 

[¶13.]  The cases cited which involved 
compensable injuries and scope of work are not necessarily relevant to the issue 
here of covered employment. See Matter of 
Van Matre, Wyo., 657 P.2d 815 (1983); Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, Wyo., 
566 P.2d 219 (1977).

 
 

[¶14.]  A major mistake can be made in not 
recognizing the proper scope of the third criteria, which 
is,

 
 
"* * * involved in 
hazardous outdoor guiding and public 
service activities including skiing, mountain climbing, river floating, 
hunting, fishing, backcountry trips and horseback riding." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶15.]  In a realistic effort to apply the 
section to the activities of the Jackson Hole Ski Corporation, it would appear 
that the question is whether Lerch (1) qualified as a recreational guide; (2) 
provided a service to clients for compensation and not as a volunteer; and (3) 
was involved in outdoor guiding and public service 
activities.

 
 

[¶16.]  This employee was not a ski guide under 
the differentiated job descriptions of the Jackson Hole Ski Corporation. Titles, 
however, are not determinative. The question is job responsibilities and 
occupational hazard, as far as coverage under worker's compensation laws is 
concerned. In re Gimlin, supra; 81 
Am.Jur.2d Workmen's Compensation § 100, pp. 99-100: "The question is to be 
determined, however, independently of the contractual or colloquial designation 
of the duties or position of the employee."

 
 

[¶17.]  We hold that ski-racing personnel, under 
the job descriptions afforded by the record, qualify as recreational guides by 
nature of the work and kind of responsibility which exists and service afforded. 
See Rocky Mountain Tank and Steel Co. v. 
Rager, supra.

 
 

[¶18.]  The second question is qualification as 
"employed and actively engaged in service to clients for compensation." We do 
not find the terminology to relate exclusively to individual fee relationships. 
The terminology, with reason, excludes nonpaid volunteers or guests who are not 
"hiring" services. A restricted definition for coverage of only the guide who 
gets the commission-type compensation is not justified under the broad scope of 
the law required. Conn v. Ed Wederski 
Construction Company, supra; Wyoming 
State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Department v. Boston, Wyo., 
445 P.2d 548 (1968). See Nimmo v. 
State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 386 (1979). See also Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State 
Board of Control, Wyo., 578 P.2d 557 
(1978).

 
 

[¶19.]  Practical analysis supports this 
conclusion. At the Jackson Hole Ski Corporation, ski instructors were on a fee 
basis 9:00 to 10:00 a.m., and 12:00 noon to 2:00 p.m., and hourly wages 10:00 
a.m. to 12:00 noon and 2:00 to 4:00 p.m. Surely this system could not determine 
coverage at separate times during the day. Ski guides were solely commissioned, 
and undoubtedly the most dangerous and important group, the ski patrol, with 
safety responsibilities, were never paid commissions. Reason requires that 
compensation of the employee and not individually paid commissions is the 
determinative factor for this criteria.

 
 

[¶20.]  Consider the effect of the rule of Rocky Mountain Tank and Steel Co. v. 
Rager, supra, or a differentiated-day schedule. See rules for statutory 
interpretation in State Board of 
Equalization v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., Wyo., 611 P.2d 805 (1980); and School Districts Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9 and 10, in 
Campbell County v. Cook, Wyo., 424 P.2d 751 (1967).

 
 

[¶21.]  Since the Jackson Hole Ski Corporation 
receives fees for racing activities, we hold that the personnel responsible 
therefor as salaried employees fall within the statutory criteria as a member of 
the racing crew. Consequently, the second criteria is 
satisfied.

 
 

[¶22.]  Compliance with the third criteria is 
determinable by its complete statement:

 
 
"* * * involved in 
hazardous outdoor guiding and public service activities * 
*."

 
 
Clearly, William Lerch 
was involved in a hazardous, outdoor guiding and public-service activity 
involving, in this case, skiing, as compared with the other possible activities 
as separately enumerated in the statute.

 
 

[¶23.]  We conclude that the race-crew member's 
responsibility for setting up race courses, warning signs, and safety fences 
reasonably brings him within the auspices of the statute.

 
 

[¶24.]  We cannot find a proper difference among 
the four categories of ski-slope employees so that whatever group or groups may 
be covered by injury compensation eligibility as differentiated from premium 
collection by the Division can be distinguished so that William Lerch, in his 
job responsibility, was not also covered.

 
 

[¶25.]  As noted, the Jackson Hole Ski 
Corporation has four categories of employees who ski on a daily basis in 
performance of their duties. Only one category is labeled "ski guides." This 
category may be covered by worker's compensation. Two other categories, ski 
instructor and ski patrol, may or may not be covered by worker's compensation, 
and are not labeled as guides. One of the enumerated duties of the ski patrol is 
to give assistance or guidance to skiers who are confused or in trouble; thus 
the ski patrol can and should logically be included in the statutory definition 
of hazardous outdoor guide with little difficulty. Any distinction within the 
categories is particularly inapposite in light of this court's policy to 
deliberately construe worker's compensation provisions so 
that

 
 
"`[w]here reasonably 
possible the industry and not the individual workman should, to a large extent, 
bear the burdens of accidents suffered within it.' In re Sikora, 57 Wyo. 57, 112 P.2d 557, 563." In re Gimlin, supra, 403 P.2d  
at 180.

 
 

[¶26.]  Since the facts come to the trial court 
by a stipulated statement, an analysis of those facts is equally available to 
this court to determine whether a covered occupation existed. Wendling v. Cundall, Wyo., 
568 P.2d 888 (1977).

 
 

[¶27.]  The status of employment did not raise a 
factual question, since the duties and responsibilities of the employee were 
submitted to the court by stipulation. Consequently, only a question of law 
remained for application of the facts to the principles of law involved. Wendling v. Cundall, supra. See also 
Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas 
Service, Wyo., 468 P.2d 969 (1970); Wyoming Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
May, Wyo., 
434 P.2d 507 (1967); 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 845, p. 
288.

 
 

[¶28.]  The district court stated that the 
legislature did not consider whether skiing is extrahazardous activity, and that 
the statute does not cover skiing in and of itself. We agree that a ski-related 
injury alone is not enough to bring that injury within the purview of the 
statute. Compensable service and hazardous guiding and public service activities 
are required. We hold that Lerch was required to perform duties which bring him 
within the § 27-12-106(a)(lv) definition of extrahazardous employment.6

 
 

[¶29.]  The judgment denying worker's 
compensation coverage for the accident to William Lerch is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for entry of an order in conformity 
herewith.

1 We are told that NASTAR 
stands for National Association of Amateur Skiers.

2 Claim payment objection 
came only from the state Worker's Compensation Division, and the employer noted 
approval for each item claimed. Inquiry was made in oral argument before this 
court whether payments for the insurance premium had been made by the employer 
to the Worker's Compensation Division in behalf of the specific injured worker. 
Neither counsel was able to answer. The employer's report of injury, signed and 
filed by the employer, provided on the front "If the Employer disputes the 
Worker's Claim he must set forth in detail on the back of this report his 
reasons therefor." No objection was taken on the reverse of the 
form.

 
 
Furthermore, in large 
legend and capital letters on the reverse the following was 
included:

 
 
"NOTICE

 
 
"DO NOT FILE THIS INJURY 
REPORT WITH WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DEPT. OR CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT 
UNLESS THE INJURED WORKER IS REPORTED ON YOUR WYOMING PAYROLL REPORTS AND YOU 
ARE PAYING PREMIUM FOR THIS WORKER TO WYOMING. FILE ONLY WITH WYOMING DEPT. OF LABOR 
AND STATISTICS."

 
 
The space below for 
disputing the worker's claim was blank.

 
 
In the face of the 
uniform approval of payment by employer, initial payment and approval from the 
fund and the form submitted, it would be reasonable to determine that premium 
payments were made by the employer and accepted by the department, and that an 
estoppel argument could be afforded. Neither the fact nor the argument was 
presented to the trial court or briefed here, and consequently will not be an 
issue for decision by this court. Although some medical bills and compensation 
were paid by the department, the present unpaid medical bills include a hospital 
bill of over $6,000.

 
 
It is apparent that 
something less than a fully developed record was presented by either counsel for 
district court resolution.

3 We are aware that a 
joint legislative committee is again considering the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act. The confusion, complexity and inequalities in rational result 
as afforded by § 27-12-106(a), would be fruitful matter for analysis so that 
this court does not have to consider a due-process or equal-protection argument 
in some later challenge. Any number of invidious comparisons are possible, as 
related to the hazardous nature of compared job 
responsibilities.

4 Included at the ski 
facility as covered by definition would be janitors and groundskeepers, 
paragraph (xxxvi); laundry workers, paragraph (xxvi); kitchen employees and 
waiters, paragraph (xxvii); delivery and motor vehicle operators, paragraphs 
(xix) and (xviii), and possibly the ticket-takers and helpers employed at the 
tram and chairlift arrival and departure areas; bartenders, paragraph (liv); 
building maintenance, paragraph (xli); any medical staff, paragraph (xxxviii). 
It is plausible to contend that the racing personnel would come within the 
criteria of either paragraph (xliii), telephone, telegraph, electric light, 
power plants or lines, or paragraph (xxxi), engineering works. The activity is 
also not that far removed from dude ranching in a generic 
evaluation.

5 A premium payment status 
letter of the Division dated June 11, 1982, addressed to the employer, was 
offered as an original exhibit in the Supreme Court. Division objection was 
made. The information had not been provided to the trial court and consequently 
cannot be considered in this court, and admission was rejected by this 
court.

6 Our interpretation of 
the statute dispenses with any need to address the equal-protection issue raised 
by the claimant. Reno Livestock Corp. v. 
Sun Oil Co. (Delaware), Wyo., 638 P.2d 147 
(1981).

 
 

BROWN, J., 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶30.]  The majority holds that appellant is 
entitled to worker's compensation benefits under § 27-12-106(a)(lv), W.S. 1977, 
(June 1983 Replacement) which provides in part:

 
 
"(a) The extrahazardous 
occupations and employees to which this act * * * applies 
are:

 
 
"* * 
*

 
 
"(lv) Recreational guides employed and 
actively engaged in service to 
clients for compensation and involved hazardous outdoor guiding and public 
service activities including skiing * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶31.]  Appellant admits that he is not a 
recreational guide nor does he engage in a service to clients, but rather he 
serves only his employer, the Jackson Hole Ski Corporation. In my view, 
appellant's job description does not come within the ambit of § 
27-12-106(a)(lv). In order to bring appellant within the statute it must be 
expanded and stretched. We have said numerous times that we will not do this. Weyerhaeuser Company v. Walters, 
Wyo., 707 P.2d 733 (1985); Matter of Estate of Reed, Wyo., 672 P.2d 829, 42 A.L.R.4th 167 (1983); Saffels v. Bennett, Wyo., 
630 P.2d 505 (1981).

 
 

[¶32.]  The majority observes in footnote 2 that 
"* * * it would be reasonable to determine that premium payments were made by 
the employer * * *." This is speculation, and there is nothing in the record in 
support of this observation. The majority also notes that the employer approved 
appellant's claim. I attach no significance to this. It is not surprising that 
the employer did not object in that payment of the claim would have negligible, 
if any, financial impact to the employer.

 
 

[¶33.]  The majority opinion is a well-reasoned 
logical argument that appellant should be covered by the Worker's Compensation 
Act. I do not disagree that appellant should be covered; however, the 
legislature should correct the deficiency in the law rather than this 
court.

 
 

[¶34.]  I would affirm the district 
court.