Case Title: Coats v. Ayers

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC-2023-0134, SC-2023-0816

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2024-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: June 14, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0134 
_________________________ 
 
Stacy G. Coats and Kendall Coats  
 
v.  
 
Sandra F. Ayers, Tommy J. Ayers, and J. Jason Ayers 
 
 
Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court 
(CV-16-75) 
 
 
SHAW, Justice. 
 
 
Stacy G. Coats and her husband Kendall Coats, the plaintiffs in this 
private right-of-way condemnation case, appeal from a summary 
SC-2023-0134 
2 
 
judgment in favor of the defendants, Sandra F. Ayers, Tommy J. Ayers, 
and J. Jason Ayers.  We reverse and remand.  
Facts and Procedural History 
 
The Ayerses own several adjoining parcels of real property 
(collectively referred to as "the Ayers property") that, together, are 
generally bordered to the west by Old Moores Bridge Road and to the east 
by a parcel of land that was once owned by Billy Guin, Stacy's father, and 
is now owned by Stacy.  Jason resides on the Ayers property, part of 
which is also leased to others as farmland.  A private, dirt "farm road" 
crosses the middle of the Ayers property from Old Moores Bridge Road 
on the property's western boundary to the property's eastern boundary.  
That road is used by the Ayerses and their lessees to access portions of 
the Ayers property.     
 
Stacy's property that lies to the east of the Ayers property ("the 
section 15 property") is a large, 543-acre parcel of land.  It stretches from 
the Ayers property on its western border east to New River Road, which 
runs along a portion of the section 15 property's northeastern border.  The 
section 15 property is bisected from north to south by a meandering 
stretch of the Sipsey River.  The section 15 property is low-lying wetland 
SC-2023-0134 
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that is often flooded.  It is used for hunting and fishing and is unsuitable 
for any other use. 
 
A third parcel of land that is approximately 160 acres ("the section 
10 property") lies to the north of, but does not border, both the Ayers 
property and the section 15 property.  The section 10 property was once 
owned by James Prewitt, Stacy's uncle, and is currently owned by Stacy.  
It is also low-lying wetland that is often flooded and is used for hunting 
and fishing.  
 
The property between the section 10 property and the Ayers 
property and the section 15 property, which various maps in the record 
indicate is owned by "T.H. Robertson & Sons, Inc.," is an intervening 
fourth parcel of land ("the Robertson property").   
 
In the late 1980s, when Guin owned the section 15 property and 
Prewitt owned the section 10 property, the two were given permission to 
use the farm road to access the western portion of the section 15 property, 
where Guin kept a boat.  Both were given keys to a gate on the farm road, 
and certain conditions were imposed, such as prescribing when the farm 
road could be used during hunting season and directing that others would 
not be allowed to use it unaccompanied by Guin or Prewitt.  It appears 
SC-2023-0134 
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from the record that Prewitt used the farm road to access the section 15 
property and then crossed from it over the Robertson property on foot or 
by boat to access the section 10 property.   
 
In 2011, Prewitt transferred the section 10 property to Stacy, and 
she began using the farm road to access the western portion of the section 
15 property and, in turn, the section 10 property to the north.  In 2014, 
she used the farm road with two friends to go hunt on the section 10 
property.  She was confronted by Jason and Tommy, who indicated that 
she did not have permission to use the farm road.  Stacy apparently 
believed that, because she owned the section 10 property, she could use 
the farm road as Prewitt had, and she had been doing so since 2011.   
 
In 2015, Guin transferred to Stacy an 80-acre portion of the section 
15 property ("the 80-acre portion").  The 80-acre portion, on the western 
edge of the section 15 property, borders the eastern boundary of the Ayers 
property, including where the farm road on the Ayers property meets the 
section 15 property.  The 80-acre portion lies to the west of the Sipsey 
River.    
The Coatses filed in the Tuscaloosa Probate Court an "Application 
for Condemnation of Right-of-Way and Request for Injunctive Relief" 
SC-2023-0134 
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pursuant to § 18-3-1, Ala. Code 1975.1  That application sought a right-
of-way across the Ayers property to provide access to the "nearest public 
road," that is, Old Moores Bridge Road.    
The probate court ultimately concluded that the Coatses had 
established that Stacy's property was landlocked and granted them "a 
convenient right-of-way not exceeding thirty feet in width, over [the 
Ayers] property from Old Moores Bridge Road."  The probate court's order 
appointed a local surveying company to suggest a location for, and to 
survey, a right-of-way, and the surveying company concluded that "the 
only logical means" of accessing Stacy's property was the farm road.  The 
probate court subsequently entered an order granting the Coatses the 
right of reasonable and lawful use of the described right-of-way over the 
farm road. 
 
The Ayerses timely appealed the probate court's judgment to the 
Tuscaloosa Circuit Court.  Following discovery, the Ayerses filed a motion 
for a summary judgment in their favor on the ground that Stacy's 
property "is no longer landlocked."  Focusing on the 80-acre portion, the 
 
1It is unclear why Kendall Coats was named as a plaintiff; he does 
not appear to own any of the properties at issue in this case. 
 
SC-2023-0134 
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motion alleged that, as the result of Guin's death on May 1, 2022, Stacy 
had inherited or was due to inherit the remaining section 15 property.  
As a result, the Ayerses argued, the 80-acre portion "merged" with the 
remaining section 15 property from which it had previously been carved 
out, resulting in Stacy's ownership of "one singular plot of land" that 
touches New River Road.  Thus, according to the Ayerses, the right-of-
way previously requested by the Coatses was, as a result of the above-
described events, no longer a necessity because the 80-acre portion was 
"no longer landlocked."  
The Ayerses specifically relied on, among other evidence, Stacy's 
deposition testimony, in which she confirmed both Guin's recent death 
and the contents of his will, pursuant to which, as his only heir, she stood 
to inherit his entire estate, which included the remaining section 15 
property.  She also conceded that the inherited property abutted New 
River Road.  She denied, however, that she had "complete access" to the 
80-acre portion and to the section 10 property because, she said, to get to 
them from New River Road, she would have to cross the Sipsey River.  
Stacy further indicated that the 80-acre portion is the driest portion of 
the section 15 property, explaining that it is not underwater "all through 
SC-2023-0134 
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the year."  Stacy also reiterated in her deposition testimony that the 
section 10 property was landlocked and confirmed that, despite the fact 
that the section 10 property is neither adjacent nor contiguous to the 
Ayers property, she had previously used the farm road to reach it, 
presumably from the section 15 property.  When asked about the 
Robertson property, which she would also have to cross to access the 
section 10 property, Stacy answered as follows:  "Well, … that property 
is owned by the bank but we've … got verbal permission from them to 
cross that." 
The Ayerses further submitted the deposition testimony of Guin, 
taken before his death.  Guin explained that he had given the 80-acre 
portion to Stacy, in part because she otherwise had no access to the 
section 10 property and because, he said, she needed a place to park 
vehicles "because she can't carry a vehicle to her land."  He described the 
80-acre portion as the driest portion of his original 543-acre parcel and 
noted that he also had chosen it because it "was the closest" to the farm 
road across the Ayers property.  His testimony also suggested that, 
because of flooding, a boat is often necessary to access the section 15 
property from New River Road. 
SC-2023-0134 
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In opposition to the Ayerses' summary-judgment motion, the 
Coatses relied on the deposition testimony of Stacy and Guin regarding 
the swampy topography of the section 15 property and the fact that the 
section 10 property remained landlocked.  More specifically, they argued:  
"It is undisputed that the Sipsey River runs down the middle of [the 
section 15 property], thus creating a 'landlocked' portion to the west of 
the Sipsey River."  Thus, the Coatses maintained that, although a portion 
of the section 15 property "touches a public roadway, there is no 
reasonably adequate means to access the western portion of the property" 
across the Sipsey River or to access the section 10 property.  As to the 
Robertson property, Stacy's affidavit indicated that she had "never been 
denied permission to cross this property to access the [section 10] 
property." 
The Coatses also provided affidavit testimony from Keith Andrews, 
the owner of a "construction company that specializes in building 
highways, bridges and civil infrastructure."  According to Andrews, the 
construction of a road and an elevated bridge across the Sipsey River to 
allow the western portion of the section 15 property to be accessed from 
the eastern portion "would not be feasible" because of the extensive 
SC-2023-0134 
9 
 
permitting process and that "the cost of construction, if ever permitted, 
would vastly exceed the value of the property."  He estimated a total 
project cost of "at least two to five million dollars, depending on the 
materials to be used, to construct a bridge over the Sipsey River on [the 
section 15 property] and to construct access to the bridge." 
 
During the ensuing hearing on the Ayerses' summary-judgment 
motion, the Coatses' counsel identified both the section 10 property and 
the 80-acre portion as the properties to which they sought access.  
Counsel further noted that the section 10 property was still "landlocked."  
The Ayerses, on the other hand, pointed out that the section 10 property 
was not contiguous to their property and that there was no access to it 
from the farm road:  "So [Stacy is] not gaining access to the [section 10 
property by way of the farm road] if a condemnation [is] allowed."  
Further, they argued that, because Stacy, owing to Guin's death, now 
owns the entire section 15 property, including the 80-acre portion, she 
has access to the section 15 property from New River Road.  
 
Subsequently, the circuit court entered a judgment granting the 
Ayerses' summary-judgment motion.  That judgment states, in pertinent 
part: 
SC-2023-0134 
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"In Southern Railway Company v. Hall, [267 Ala. 143,] 
100 So. 2d 722 (Ala. 1958), the Alabama Supreme Court 
explained [the predecessor to § 18-3-1, Ala. Code 1975] as 
follows: 
 
"'The obvious purpose of the statute is to 
provide a means whereby a landowner, enclosed 
on all sides by lands of others and unable to get to 
his land from a public road or highway, can get 
relief by condemning a right of way to it across 
intervening land.  However, if such landowner 
already has a reasonably adequate way to and 
from his land, there is no field of operation for the 
statute. … If an existing access is reasonably 
adequate for the purpose of giving the landowner 
an outlet to a public road or highway, there is no 
basis under the statute for condemning another 
outlet across the intervening land. …  
 
"'…. 
 
"'"… 
The 
statute 
does 
not 
contemplate granting one citizen or 
corporation a right of way through the 
property 
of 
another 
citizen 
or 
corporation as a matter of mere 
convenience or as a mere matter of 
saving expense.  … The right to the 
control and use of one's property is a 
sacred right, not to be lightly invaded 
or disturbed.  When property may be 
taken from a citizen for any purpose by 
law, the method for so doing must be 
strictly pursued, and the party seeking 
to take the property of another must 
SC-2023-0134 
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come squarely within the statute."' 
 
"[267 Ala. at 146-47,] 100 So. 2d at 724, 725 [(quoting Roberts 
v. Prassenos, 219 Miss. 486, 69 So. 2d 215, 216, 217 (1954))] 
(emphasis added). 
 
 
"Here, the death of Mr. Guin and [Stacy's] inheritance 
of the remaining 463 acres [of the section 15 property] 
provided [the Coatses] with access.  The evidence is 
undisputed that [the inherited] property connects to New 
River Road.  … New River Road … gives them reasonable 
access to their property.  The fact that the [Coatses] are 
limited on how deep they can go into their property before 
coming to swampy land, or the Sipsey River, is a separate 
issue from their ability to access the property from a public 
road. 
 
 
"As stated by the Alabama Supreme Court, 'the party 
seeking to take the property of another must come squarely 
within [§ 18-3-1, Ala. Code].'  The [Coatses] here do not come 
squarely within the statute.  Accordingly, the court 
determines from the undisputed evidence that the [Ayerses'] 
motion is due to be and [is] hereby GRANTED, and that 
judgment is entered in favor of [the Ayerses]." 
 
(Capitalization and emphasis in original.) 
 
 
The Coatses subsequently filed a postjudgment motion in which 
they contended that a factual dispute remained as to the reasonableness 
of their available access to both the section 10 property and the 80-acre 
portion.  They further argued that the circuit court's judgment failed to 
address the section 10 property, which their predecessors in interest had 
SC-2023-0134 
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historically accessed by first using the farm road to access the section 15 
property.  Following the denial of their postjudgment motion, the Coatses 
appealed. 
Standard of Review 
"'"This Court's review of a summary 
judgment is de novo.  Williams v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003).  We 
apply the same standard of review as the trial 
court applied.  Specifically, we must determine 
whether the movant has made a prima facie 
showing that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists and that the movant is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.  Rule 56(c), Ala. R. 
Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. 
Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala. 2004).  In 
making such a determination, we must review the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant.  Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758 
(Ala. 1986).  Once the movant makes a prima facie 
showing that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to 
produce 'substantial evidence' as to the existence 
of a genuine issue of material fact.  Bass v. 
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 
794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-
12. '[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such 
weight and quality that fair minded persons in the 
exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably 
infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.'  
West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Fla., 547 So. 
2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)."' 
 
SC-2023-0134 
13 
 
"Prince v. Poole, 935 So. 2d 431, 442 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Dow 
v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 
2004))." 
 
Brown v. W.P. Media, Inc., 17 So. 3d 1167, 1169 (Ala. 2009). 
 
Discussion 
I. 
 
On appeal, the Coatses contend that genuine issues of material fact 
exist as to whether they are entitled to a right-of-way under § 18-3-1, 
thus precluding summary judgment.  Section 18-3-1 provides, in 
pertinent part: 
 
"The owner of any tract or body of land, no part of which 
tract or body of land is adjacent or contiguous to any public 
road or highway, shall have and may acquire a convenient 
right-of-way … over the lands intervening and lying between 
such tract or body of land and the public road nearest or most 
convenient thereto …." 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
 
"Section 18-3-1 gives owners of land that is not adjacent 
or contiguous to any public road or highway the right to obtain 
a right-of-way to the nearest or most convenient public road. 
Our supreme court has held that 'under § 18-3-1, a landowner 
is not entitled to condemn a right-of-way across a neighbor's 
intervening land if the landowner has an existing, reasonably 
adequate means of access to his property, or if he could 
construct such access without prohibitive expense.' Ex parte 
Cater, 772 So. 2d [1117] at 1121 [(Ala. 2000)] (emphasis 
SC-2023-0134 
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supplied); see also Southern Ry. Co. v. Hall, 267 Ala. 143, 100 
So. 2d 722 (1957). To determine whether a landowner has a 
reasonably adequate means of access, this court considers 
whether the access is unobstructed and unquestioned.  
Section 18-3-1 does not authorize 'the taking of lands of 
another as a mere matter of convenience,' and 'the burden is 
on the petitioner for a right of way to show that he has no 
reasonably adequate outlet.' Southern Ry. Co., 267 Ala. at 
147, 146, 100 So. 2d at 725." 
 
Key v. Ellis, 973 So. 2d 359, 365-66 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (footnote 
omitted).  When an owner's property is not adjacent to a public road or 
highway, which is often referred to as the property being "landlocked," § 
18-3-1 allows the property owner to seek a right-of-way over the 
intervening lands of another if there exists no other reasonably adequate 
means of access to the property or if such access could not otherwise be 
constructed without prohibitive expense.   
 
There appear to be two theories to the Coatses' claim below; they 
assert that they are entitled to a right-of-way over the farm road either 
(1) to access the section 15 property or (2) to access the section 10 
property.  We address each theory in turn.   
II. 
 
On appeal, the Coatses first contend that the portion of the section 
15 property lying west of the Sipsey River, including the 80-acre portion, 
SC-2023-0134 
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is "landlocked" or otherwise has no access to a public road.   
 
The primary issue is whether the section 15 property, including the 
80-acre portion, constitutes a single "tract or body of land."  If so, then a 
part of it "is adjacent or contiguous to [a] public road or highway," namely 
New River Road on its eastern border, and, thus, under the plain 
language of § 18-3-1, the Coatses cannot seek a right-of-way under that 
Code section.  The Ayerses argued, and the circuit court essentially held, 
that the 80-acre portion and the remaining section 15 property "merged" 
into a single tract or body of land when Stacy became the owner of both, 
and that single tract or body of land is adjacent or contiguous to a public 
road.  On appeal, the Coatses do not argue that the 80-acre portion and 
the remaining section 15 property were not "merged."  Instead, they 
contend that, because of the swampy nature of the property and the fact 
that it is bisected by the Sipsey River, not all of the section 15 property 
can be accessed from New River Road.  Thus, they assert, they have no 
reasonable means to access the western portion of the section 15 property 
and the acquisition of a right-of-way under § 18-3-1 over the Ayers 
property is, therefore, appropriate in these circumstances.   
 
In support of their position, the Coatses cite this Court's decision in 
SC-2023-0134 
16 
 
Ex parte Cater, 772 So. 2d 1117 (Ala. 2000).  In Cater, the plaintiff, Etoile 
Nichols, owned a 191-acre parcel of property that was bisected by a creek.  
No portion of Nichols's property abutted a public road.  772 So. 2d at 
1118.  The portion to the east of the creek was accessible from a public 
road by a private road.  Nichols claimed that the portion to the west of 
the creek was "landlocked."  It, however, could be accessed by a private 
gravel road that ran west from that portion of Nichols's property, across 
the property of a third party, and then across the property of the 
defendant, Lula Dell Cater, to a public road.  Further, the western 
portion of Nichols's property was once accessed by another private road 
that ran south to Highway 21.  That second private road was in disrepair 
and impassible during the winter.  772 So. 2d at 1118.  Nichols 
commenced an action under § 18-3-1, seeking a right-of-way over the 
private gravel road across Cater's property so that she could access the 
western portion of her property.     
 
The trial court found that the right-of-way that Nichols sought was 
the "'nearest and most convenient means of access to her'" property.  772 
So. 2d at 1119.  Other means of access to the western portion of her 
property would require the construction of roadbeds and would not be 
SC-2023-0134 
17 
 
readily suitable for use in the winter; further, accessing the western 
portion of her property from the eastern portion would require the 
construction of a bridge over the creek.  Therefore, the trial court 
concluded that the burden that would be imposed on Cater by creating a 
right-of-way over the private gravel road on her property was less than 
the burden that would be imposed on Nichols by constructing and using 
another means of access.  772 So. 2d at 1119. 
 
On appeal, Cater argued that the trial court had erred in granting 
Nichols a right-of-way when she had two other "reasonably adequate 
means of access," namely, building a bridge over the creek or repairing 
the other private road to Highway 21.  In support, she cited this Court's 
decision in Southern Railway Co. v. Hall, 267 Ala. 143, 100 So. 2d 722 
(1958).  This Court quoted extensively from Southern Railway, including 
the following passage: 
 
"'The obvious purpose of the statute is to provide a 
means whereby a landowner, enclosed on all sides by lands of 
others and unable to get to his land from a public road or 
highway, can get relief by condemning a right of way to it 
across intervening land.  However, if such landowner already 
has a reasonably adequate way to and from his land, there is 
no field of operation for the statute. …  If an existing access is 
reasonably adequate for the purpose of giving the landowner 
an outlet to a public road or highway, there is no basis under 
SC-2023-0134 
18 
 
the statute for condemning another outlet across the 
intervening land.  … We do not think the purpose of the 
statute was to do more than to assure that land which is not 
adjacent or contiguous to a public road or highway can be 
reached from such a road or highway.'" 
 
Cater, 772 So. 2d at 1120 (quoting Southern Ry., 267 Ala. at 146, 100 So. 
2d at 724-25) (emphasis added).  In addressing this language, the Court 
in Cater stated: "[U]nder § 18-3-1, a landowner is not entitled to condemn 
a right-of-way across a neighbor's intervening land if the landowner has 
an existing, reasonably adequate means of access to his property, or if he 
could construct such access without prohibitive expense."  772 So. 2d at 
1121.  The Court ultimately held that, because Nichols had not 
demonstrated that building a bridge over the creek or improving and 
using the private road to Highway 21 "would be prohibitive," Nichols had 
not established that she was entitled to a right-of-way over Cater's 
property under § 18-3-1.  Id.  Therefore, the trial court's decision was 
reversed.   
 
In this case, the Coatses argue that the western portion of the 
section 15 property, including the 80-acre portion, is "landlocked" like the 
property at issue in Cater and that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact, thus precluding summary judgment, regarding whether there is an 
SC-2023-0134 
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existing, reasonably adequate means to access that property other than 
the proposed right-of-way over the farm road.  The Coatses argue that, 
unlike Nichols in Cater, who did not demonstrate that building a bridge 
or improving and using the alternative private road would be prohibitive, 
they have submitted substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding whether constructing a bridge over the Sipsey 
River is a feasible means to access the western portion of the section 15 
property. 
 
In Cater, it was undisputed that the property at issue was 
"landlocked" and not adjacent to any public road.  772 So. 2d at 1118.  In 
addressing whether Nichols had an "existing, reasonably adequate 
means of access to [her] property," id. at 1121, the Court was not applying 
a test to determine whether the property was "landlocked" or was not 
"adjacent or contiguous to any public road or highway," which is the 
prerequisite to the application of § 18-3-1.  Instead, the Court relied on 
that language in determining whether Nichols, the owner of landlocked 
property, had another means to access her property without the need to 
SC-2023-0134 
20 
 
acquire a right-of-way in the first place.2  The plain language of § 18-3-1 
does not allow landowners to seek a right-of-way over the property of 
another simply because they have no reasonable, adequate means to 
access parts of their property; instead, one may seek to acquire a right-
of-way when "no part" of their "tract or body of land is adjacent or 
contiguous to any public road or highway."  In this case, the section 15 
property, which, without dispute, includes the "merged"  80-acre portion, 
is adjacent to New River Road, which is a public road.3 
 
The Coatses argue that, in Cater, the western portion of Nichols's 
property was allegedly "landlocked" because it was separated from the 
eastern portion of her property by a creek.  This Court, however, did not 
address whether this fact meant that, for purposes of § 18-3-1, either 
portion of Nichols's property was disconnected from property that was 
"adjacent or contiguous to any public road or highway."  Instead, none of 
 
2The same was true in Southern Railway, supra, and Key, supra; 
the plaintiffs in those cases each sought a right-of-way to access land that 
undisputedly was not adjacent to a public road. 
 
3The result might be different if a parcel of land, because of its 
physical features, may be deemed a separate "tract" or "body" as those 
terms are used in § 18-3-1.  However, there is no argument on appeal as 
to the meaning of those terms.  Therefore, we do not address that issue.     
SC-2023-0134 
21 
 
the property at issue abutted a public road.  Thus, the threshold 
circumstance upon which § 18-3-1 is premised -- that the property is not 
adjacent to a public road -- was not disputed in that case.  Because the 
Coatses have not established the existence of a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding whether the section 15 property, including the 80-acre 
portion, which is a single tract or body of land, is not adjacent or 
contiguous to any public road or highway, § 18-3-1 does not supply a 
means to acquire a right-of-way to that property.     
III. 
 
The Coatses also contend that they established the existence of a 
genuine issue of material fact, thus precluding summary judgment, 
regarding whether they were entitled to the proposed right-of-way over 
the farm road to provide access to the section 10 property.  As noted 
above, the section 10 property lies to the north of both the Ayers property 
and the section 15 property and is separated from those properties by the 
Robertson property.  Stacy, and her predecessor in title, Prewitt, 
previously used the farm road to access the western portion of the section 
15 property (at the 80-acre portion) and then cross over the Robertson 
property to the section 10 property.  The Coatses contend that the section 
SC-2023-0134 
22 
 
10 property is undisputedly not adjacent or contiguous to any public road 
or highway, that the farm road can be used to provide access from a public 
road to the section 10 property, and that the circuit court failed to address 
this theory in its judgment.4      
 
The Ayerses contend, however, that, because the farm road does not 
lead to the section 10 property, the Coatses "will still have to cross the 
land of another" -- that is, the Robertson property -- "to access" the section 
10 property and, thus, that the proposed right-of way "will not afford the 
Coats[es] reasonably adequate access."  Ayerses' brief at 24.  They 
contend that there is no right to seek a right-of-way for "'almost access' 
to landlocked property," id. at 25, and they note that the Coatses did not 
commence an action to acquire a right-of-way over the Robertson 
property.  
 
A similar issue was addressed in Tate v. Loper, 459 So. 2d 892 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1984).  In that case, the Lopers owned a parcel of land that, like 
 
4In their response to the summary-judgment motion, the Coatses 
alleged that, even though Stacy now owns all of the section 15 property, 
including the 80-acre portion, the section 10 property "was and still 
remains landlocked."  In their postjudgment motion, the Coatses noted 
that the circuit court "did not address this particular parcel of property[,] 
which is also the subject of ... [their] action." 
SC-2023-0134 
23 
 
the section 10 property, was not adjacent or contiguous to a public road 
or highway.  459 So. 2d at 894.  They sought a right-of-way over what 
was described as the "old woods road," which ran across the Tates' 
neighboring property and then over the property of a third party to a 
public highway.  The trial court awarded a right-of-way over the "old 
woods road" on the Tates' property.  On appeal, the Tates challenged 
whether a right-of-way could be awarded on only a portion of the route 
that would provide access to landlocked property: 
 
"The Tates ... contend that condemnation is improper 
because there is a landowner whose land intervenes between 
the public highway and the [Tates' land]. In other words, the 
Lopers must go through the Tates' land and then the 
intervening landowner's land before reaching the highway. ... 
The Tates contend that the statute does not provide for 
condemning only a portion of the land between the public 
highway and the [Lopers' land]."   
 
459 So. 2d at 895.   
 
The Court of Civil Appeals found this argument to be without 
"merit," stating: 
 
"As mentioned earlier, § 18-3-1 has no field of operation 
where a landowner already has reasonable access to the 
public highway.  In the present case, the Lopers have 
permission from the intervening landowner to cross his land 
on the 'old woods road,' the very road that runs through the 
Tates' land and was condemned as a right-of-way. Obviously, 
SC-2023-0134 
24 
 
the Lopers have reasonably adequate access through this land 
to the highway so that any attempt to condemn for a right-of-
way under § 18-3-1 would appear to be futile." 
 
Id. (emphasis added; citation omitted).   
 
In this case, Stacy testified in her deposition that she had "verbal 
permission" to cross the Robertson property from the western portion of 
the section 15 property, and she testified in an affidavit that she had 
never been denied permission to cross the Robertson property.  The 
Coatses further presented substantial evidence demonstrating that they 
have no "existing, reasonably adequate means of access" to this 
landlocked property, Key, 973 So. 2d at 366 (emphasis omitted), because 
they have presented evidence indicating that they cannot travel from 
New River Road across the section 15 property to where they can in turn 
access the section 10 property from it over the Robertson property.  There 
is substantial evidence, however, demonstrating that the farm road could 
provide the access that they need.  Because there is substantial evidence 
demonstrating that the Coatses have permission to cross the Robertson 
property, Tate indicates that there is no requirement that they seek a 
right-of-way over it.  Thus, the circuit court erred in entering a summary 
judgment in favor of the Ayerses.      
SC-2023-0134 
25 
 
Conclusion 
 
Because the section 10 property is "landlocked" for purposes of § 18-
3-1, and because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether the Coatses have an existing, reasonable means to access that 
property, the circuit court's judgment is reversed and the case is 
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
   
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Bryan, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.