Case Title: Donald Lee Bradley v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC93-373

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2001-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC93373
____________
DONALD LEE BRADLEY,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[March 1, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the
death penalty upon Donald Lee Bradley.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(1),
Fla. Const.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm Bradley’s convictions and
sentence of death.
TRIAL
Bradley was convicted of murder, burglary, and conspiracy, all arising out of
the murder of Jack Jones, which was committed at the request of the victim’s wife,
-2-
Linda Jones.  Testimony at trial indicated that Mrs. Jones became distraught and
incensed when she learned that Mr. Jones had a sexual affair with Carrie Davis, a
teenage girl the Joneses had befriended and taken into their home.  When
unsuccessful in her numerous attempts to break up the affair, and, upon learning of
Mr. Jones’s intent to marry the girl, Mrs. Jones sought Bradley’s assistance, first to
physically intimidate the teenage girl and later to assault and batter Mr. Jones.  
Bradley had a landscaping business and Mrs. Jones prepared his tax returns. 
On October 31, 1995, at the request of Mrs. Jones, Bradley took two of his
employees, Brian McWhite and Patrick McWhite, teenage brothers, and Michael
Clark, a sometime employee, and set out to retrieve a diamond ring Mr. Jones had
given his teenage lover.  Once they arrived at the teenager’s apartment, however,
she refused to open the door.  Frustrated, Bradley directed the employees to break
the teenager’s car windows.
Mrs. Jones then decided to have Bradley assault Mr. Jones, and Bradley and
Mrs. Jones agreed on a plan to make the assault look like a burglary of the Joneses’
house.  On November 7, 1995, at about 8 p.m., Bradley picked up the McWhite
brothers and, while at the McWhite brothers’ house, Bradley directed Patrick
McWhite to pick up a large “zulu war stick” to use on Mr. Jones.  The McWhite
brothers both testified they agreed to help beat Mr. Jones for a hundred dollars
1At one point, Patrick, who thought that Mr. Jones had been beaten enough and wanted to tie
Mr. Jones’s hands as directed by Bradley, begged Mr. Jones, “Please, give me your hand, sir.”  
-3-
each, but that Bradley never mentioned killing Jones.  They also testified to
numerous telephone conversations Bradley had with Mrs. Jones immediately before
and after the home invasion.
As planned, the McWhite brothers, gloved and ski-masked, entered the
Joneses’ home through the front door, while Bradley entered through a side door in
order to obtain a gun Mrs. Jones told him was kept by Mr. Jones in the kitchen. 
Mr. and Mrs. Jones were watching television, and when Mr. Jones noticed the
McWhite brothers, he immediately told them to get out of his home.  When they
refused, he started fighting with them.  
Thereafter, as described by the McWhite brothers, Bradley administered a
brutal and methodical beating to Mr. Jones with the “war stick” and the gun.  
During the beating, Bradley and one of the McWhite brothers duct-taped Mr.
Jones’s hands and feet and dragged him to another room, and Bradley continued
the beating.1  At one point, Bradley attempted to shoot Mr. Jones in the head, but
the gun malfunctioned.  Patrick McWhite testified that Mr. Jones continually
begged Bradley to stop the beating, while Brian testified that he too asked Bradley
to stop, but Bradley refused.  Meanwhile, Mrs. Jones calmly watched the whole
-4-
episode, and Bradley later duct-taped her hands to make it look like she was a
victim.  The “burglars” also removed some items of personal property from the
house.  After they left the house Bradley told the McWhite brothers that he thought
he killed Jones.  Indeed, Jones died as a result of the beating.
After Mrs. Jones called 911 and reported the episode as a burglary and
robbery, Brian McWhite’s fingerprints were found, leading to the arrest of the
McWhite brothers who later confessed to their participation in the events of that
night.  A neighbor of the Joneses also reported seeing Bradley’s van leave the
Joneses’ home at the time of the alleged burglary.  Bradley later admitted that he
had made phone calls to Mrs. Jones on the night of the murder but only about
picking up some tax documents from under Mrs. Jones’s front door and that he
went to the Joneses’ home, but left immediately when he did not find the tax
documents. 
Janice Cole, a long-time friend of Mrs. Jones, testified that a few days before
the murder, Mrs. Jones had told her of her desire to take a gun and kill her husband
and that she, not some other woman, was entitled to the proceeds of Mr. Jones’s
life insurance policies worth some $500,000.  Brian McWhite also testified that
Bradley burned the clothing and the “war stick” involved in Jones’s beating, and
Bradley told him that he was expecting a payoff of between $100,000 to $200,000
2The witnesses presented by Bradley included Detective Waugh, Donald Lee Bradley, Sr.,
Julie J. Witherell (Bradley’s mother), Valerie Bradley (Bradley’s wife), Cynthia Lee Bradley (Bradley’s
sister), Cathy M. Robbins (Bradley’s sister), Pamela J. Bradley (Bradley’s sister), Arthur J. Kurtz (a
former employer), Elizabeth Smith (a former business acquaintance), Katisha Gussman (Bradley’s
niece), Mark Angelo (a business acquaintance and general contractor), Eli F. Robbins (Bradley’s ex-
brother-in-law), Harvey G. Sowers (a fellow church member), and Dean Lohse (Bradley’s orthopedic
surgeon).
-5-
from Mrs. Jones after she received the life insurance proceeds.
The McWhite brothers, Bradley, and Mrs. Jones were all charged with the
murder.  Mrs. Jones was tried, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment for
the murder.  The McWhite brothers entered into a plea arrangement whereby they
received ten-year sentences upon guilty pleas to third-degree murder.  The plea
agreement also required their testimonies in the trials of Mrs. Jones and Bradley. 
Bradley was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary, and conspiracy to commit
murder.
SENTENCING PHASE
At the sentencing phase proceeding, the State presented one witness, and the
defense presented fourteen.2  For the State, Patrick McWhite testified that Mr.
Jones was alive throughout the beating and continuously begged Bradley to stop. 
The trial judge told the jury of the convictions and sentences of Mrs. Jones
and the McWhite brothers.  The jury was also told of Mrs. Jones’s convictions for
two other charges of soliciting others to kill her husband.  A police detective
3The Bradleys had five children, Pamela, Cynthia, Donald, Cathy, and Collins.  Bradley was
somewhere between ten and eleven years old at the time. 
-6-
testified extensively about Mrs. Jones’s solicitations of two other men to kill her
husband, including proposing a fake burglary plan for the murder that was almost
identical to the fake burglary carried out by Bradley during which he killed Mr.
Jones.  During one of these solicitations Mrs. Jones asked for a silencer for a gun
so she could kill herself and her husband’s girlfriend.  In another, she proposed
that the solicited killer kill her husband and the girlfriend.  
The defense presented evidence that Bradley came from a very dysfunctional
family and was subjected to extensive emotional and physical abuse.  The
testimony established that Bradley’s father was constantly cheating on his wife with
the next-door neighbor, Nancy (no last name provided).  As a result, Mr. and Mrs.
Bradley were constantly fighting as Bradley and his siblings routinely witnessed
their father slapping their mother during these confrontations.  Unable to deal with
the father’s infidelity, the mother eventually left the house and moved into an
apartment.  Nancy then moved in with the father and the children.3 
The testimony further revealed that once Nancy moved in, Bradley and his
siblings experienced nothing but sheer misery from their father and Nancy.  First,
the two eldest sisters, Pamela and Cynthia, had to drop out of high school in order
4Cynthia further testified that their father made them lean over a clothes hamper and grab the
bottom of it while he beat them, usually with leather belts, but sometimes with a “switch” he made them
pick themselves.  She also testified to various marks and scars left by the beatings all over their bodies.
-7-
to take care of Bradley and the two younger ones since Mr. Bradley and Nancy
spent little time with them.  The only time spent with Bradley and the siblings
consisted mainly of Nancy telling them how much she hated them and the daily
beatings by either Nancy or Mr. Bradley upon one or all of them.  The beatings
could be triggered by a host of events ranging from Nancy telling the father that one
of the children was lying to the fact of any of the children drinking or eating before
the father got home in the evening.  Occasionally, the father would beat them on
“general principles,” that is, he would beat all of them to ensure that he got the right
one or that they already were beaten for the following week.  Anticipating the
beatings, Bradley and his siblings would cry all night, but as soon as they fell
asleep, the father would wake them up and beat them.4
To complement the beatings, Nancy and the father would play very odd
games with the children.  For instance, Cynthia testified that Nancy would mark the
milk jug and other food containers before leaving the home so she could tell if any
of the children had drunk or eaten anything when she returned; if the food item went
below the mark, everyone would get beaten.  The father hid dirt in the house before
he left and told them they had to find it before he returned; if the dirt was still there,
-8-
they would all get beaten.  Whenever their father and Nancy went out, they would
put the children in their room, then place a piece of paper in the door to help them
determine whether the children had left their room.  They would get a beating for
opening the door for any reason, including going to the bathroom, but one of them
was beaten for urinating in her room out of fear of dropping the paper off of her
room’s door.  
The testimony also revealed that Bradley received the brunt of the abuse as
Nancy and the father took it far beyond the daily beatings.  Bradley had broken his
arm in some accident and could not move it for days.  Nancy, a nurse at the time,
and his father refused to take him to the hospital.  Because of the pain of the
broken arm, Bradley attempted to eat with his left hand but could not and ended up
spilling his drink.  Nancy then picked up the broken arm, slammed it down on the
table and told him the arm was fine.  Bradley was finally taken to the hospital after
the school threatened to contact the authorities.  
In another incident, Bradley was severely suffering from appendicitis, but his
father would not take him to the hospital.  He eventually took him to Bradley’s
mother who then immediately took him to the hospital.  The hospital treated
Bradley and told the mother that Bradley’s appendix had ruptured and could have
easily killed him.  In yet another incident, when Bradley was unable to slice some
-9-
tomatoes as directed by Nancy, she took the knife out of his hand, stabbed his
hand with the knife and asked him, “Now do you know how to cut tomatoes?”
Eventually, after the two older sisters had moved out of the father’s home,
the latter took Bradley and the two younger siblings and dropped them in front of
their mother’s one-bedroom apartment.  The mother took them in when she got
home that evening.  Ultimately, Cathy, the eldest sibling, attempted suicide
numerous times and Bradley, at the age of fifteen, started frequenting a tough
crowd and committing crimes.
Nonetheless, as an adult, Bradley later developed a relationship with his
father and helped his mother financially and otherwise.  Witnesses also testified to
Bradley’s intense commitment to his work and family.  According to former co-
workers and clients, Bradley was an excellent worker.  Witnesses testified in great
detail about how he took care of his family and was very involved in the lives of his
children.  On cross-examination, however, Valerie Bradley, his wife, testified that
Bradley had been arrested for a battery committed upon her.  Bradley also had a
long history of being involved as a member of a Jehovah’s Witnesses congregation
and several times a week attended Bible studies.  He made many friends within the
congregation.
Upon hearing the above evidence, the jury recommended death by a ten-to-
5Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
6The issues raised by Bradley include: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support Bradley’s
conviction for premeditated first-degree murder because there was conflicting evidence regarding his
intent to kill; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for felony-murder (burglary)
because he was allowed entry into the home by one of the occupants; (3) even assuming the finding of
premeditation, he is entitled to a new trial because the jury may have convicted him on a legally
insufficient theory (felony murder/burglary); (4) the evidence was insufficient to prove conspiracy to
commit first-degree murder; (5) the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Bradley vandalized
Carrie Davis’s car on October 31, 1995, where such evidence was not relevant to any material issue
and served only to attack his character; (6) the trial court erred in admitting an out-of-court statement
by Detective Redmond to the effect that Bradley’s van had been detailed five times since the murder;
(7) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on and in finding the CCP aggravator; (8) the sentence
was disproportionate and the trial court erred in instructing the jury on and in finding the burglary
aggravator.
-10-
two vote, and, following a Spencer5 hearing the trial court sentenced Bradley to
death. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Bradley raises eight issues for review,6 first asserting that the evidence was
insufficient to support all three of his convictions.  As to his murder conviction, he
contends the evidence was insufficient to prove premeditated or felony murder.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact
could have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.  See Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065, 1067 n.5 (Fla. 1999).  
Bradley first asserts a lack of evidence of premeditation.  This Court has
-11-
recently reiterated the definition of premeditation in Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d
980, 985 (Fla. 1999):
Premeditation is defined as more than a mere intent to kill;
it is a fully formed conscious purpose to kill.  This
purpose may be formed a moment before the act but
must exist for a sufficient length of time to permit
reflection as to the nature of the act to be committed and
the probable result of that act.
Id.; see also Buckner v. State, 714 So. 2d 384, 387 (Fla. 1998) (“Premeditation
need only exist for such time as will allow the accused to be conscious of the
nature of the act the accused is about to commit and the probable result of the
act.”).  Importantly, however, premeditation may be established by circumstantial
evidence.  See Norton v. State, 709 So. 2d 87, 92 (Fla. 1997).  A trier of fact may
therefore infer premeditation from factors such as "the nature of the weapon used,
the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the
parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and
manner of the wounds inflicted."  Id.  
Upon review of the record, and taking the inferences most favorable to the
State, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of
premeditation by Bradley.  In essence, the State’s theory was that Mrs. Jones had
two strong motives for wanting to kill her husband, first, her anger about Mr.
7The relevant examination of Ms. Cole reflects:
Q.  What did she [Ms. Jones] tell you?
A.  She told me that she was real upset with the situation and
everything that she had been through.  That she knew at this point that
she could just take a gun and kill Jack and get away with it because of
the issues that had come up and she was so upset with him.  
     . . . .
Q.  Okay.  Did she give you any other reason why she could
not get a divorce with Jack?
A.  She said that if she got a divorce from Jack that his new
wife would get his life insurance.  And she told me, and I thought that
the figure was $500,000 at the time, if they got a divorce that she
would not be able to get that life insurance.  And that was one of the
main things, that she was not going to fat and forty and alone.
Record on Appeal at 1434-36.
-12-
Jones’s affair, and second, her desire to collect the substantial proceeds of Mr.
Jones’s life insurance policies; and she was able to convince Bradley to kill Mr.
Jones to carry out her wishes. 
The State’s evidence included: the testimony of Janice Cole to whom Mrs.
Jones suggested her desire to kill Mr. Jones and to receive his life insurance
benefits;7 the testimony of the McWhite brothers and Clark concerning the October
31 incident in which Bradley attempted to retrieve the ring from the teenager and
their subsequent vandalism of the teenager’s car that night; phone records showing
numerous communications between Bradley and Mrs. Jones on October 31, 1995,
November 7, 1995 (the day of the murder), and January 22, 1996 (the day the
-13-
authorities served a warrant on Bradley); the testimonies of the McWhite brothers
of their participation in this act and direct witnessing of Bradley’s brutal and fatal
beating of Mr. Jones; Bradley’s failed attempt at shooting the victim at point-blank
range; and the testimony of Brian McWhite regarding Bradley’s admission that he
was expecting an enormous payoff from Mrs. Jones in a sum ranging from
$100,000 to $200,000.    
Importantly, we note that the nature of the assault and battery, when
combined with the additional evidence of premeditation here, is quite telling.  See
Heiney v. State, 447 So. 2d 210, 214 (Fla. 1984) (“Evidence from which
premeditation may be inferred include the manner in which the homicide was
committed and the nature and manner of the wounds.”).  Both the testimonies of
the McWhite brothers and that of the medical examiner depict a brutal and
methodical beating, resulting in profuse bleeding from the victim’s head, broken
ribs, a fractured skull, and bruising of the victim’s brain, lungs, and other internal
organs.  In the middle of the beating, Bradley and the McWhite brothers taped up
the victim’s hands and legs, dragged him to another room, and continued the
beating.  See Taylor v. State, 583 So. 2d 323, 329 (Fla. 1991) (finding
premeditation where defendant dragged the victim and so severely beat him that his
ribs were broken and internal organs were either torn or bruised).  Despite
-14-
Bradley’s argument to the contrary, this type of beating with its patent consequence
of death, along with all the other evidence, is consistent with premeditation.  See id. 
Bradley contends that the beating only indicates an intent to beat the victim
up and scare some sense into him.  As the McWhite brothers testified, however,
Bradley not only continued to beat the victim to death, but he also attempted to
shoot the victim in the head, an act most would agree would ordinarily contemplate
death as a consequence.  Bradley also points to the testimonies of the McWhite
brothers that they themselves believed that they were going there to beat someone
up.  While it may be true that the McWhite brothers believed so, and were
persuaded to participate on that basis, that does not lessen Bradley’s responsibility
for his own actions in brutally beating the victim to death and attempting to shoot
him with his own gun.  In addition, he admitted to the McWhite brothers that he
indeed was expecting a huge amount of money from Mrs. Jones for his actions,
again an expectation reasonably predicated upon Mrs. Jones’s receipt of life
insurance proceeds that could only come from the death of Mr. Jones.
We find the trial court properly denied Bradley’s motion for judgment of
acquittal as the State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer
premeditation to the exclusion of all other inferences.  See Woods, 733 So. 2d at
8It should be noted that Bradley’s position at trial was that he did not commit the crime, but was
at his home watching television instead.  
9In issue three, Bradley argues that his conviction for murder must be reversed should the Court
find that the verdict may have been based on a legally insufficient ground.  We need not address this
issue as we have found that Bradley is barred from challenging his burglary conviction on direct appeal,
in addition to our finding that the jury properly found the existence of premeditation on Bradley’s part.
-15-
984.8
FELONY MURDER
In issue two, Bradley argues that the evidence was insufficient for a finding
of felony murder.  Specifically, the felony murder in this case was predicated upon
Bradley’s conviction for the burglary of the Joneses’ home.  Bradley contends that
the burglary conviction was improper because he entered the home with the
consent of a co-owner and co-occupant, Mrs. Jones.  Consequently, the burglary
conviction must be reversed.  The State, on the other hand, counters this issue was
not properly preserved and therefore Bradley may not now raise it on appeal.  We
agree with the State inasmuch as the record reveals that Bradley had many
opportunities at trial to object to the submission of the burglary issue but failed to
do so.  Bradley is therefore barred from raising this issue now.9
CONSPIRACY
In issue four, much as in issue one, Bradley argues the State failed to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Bradley and Mrs. Jones conspired to kill
-16-
Mr. Jones.  Therefore, he contends, his conviction for conspiracy must be vacated.
The crime of conspiracy is defined as an agreement, express or implied,
between two or more people to commit an unlawful act.  See Robinson v. State,
610 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); see generally § 777.03(3), Fla. Stat. (1995)
(conspiracy statute); §782.04, Fla. Stat. (1995) (murder statute).  Conspiracy can
be proven by circumstantial evidence and thus a jury may infer that an agreement
existed to commit a crime from all the surrounding and accompanying
circumstances.  See Robinson, 610 So. 2d at 1289.
As earlier discussed, sufficient evidence exists for the finding of
premeditation on Bradley’s part for the killing of Mr. Jones.  Similarly, we conclude
the evidence is sufficient for the finding of conspiracy, that is, an agreement
between Mrs. Jones and Bradley to kill Mr. Jones.  As previously discussed and
established by Janice Cole’s testimony, Mrs. Jones’s frustration with her
husband’s affair had reached a boiling point in the days leading to the murder, and
she wanted him killed perhaps more than ever.  In addition to this testimony and the
evidence of coordination between Bradley and Mrs. Jones around the time of the
murder, Bradley himself, in an attempt to convince the McWhite brothers to keep
quiet, told them that he was expecting a payoff from Mrs. Jones as soon as she
collected from the insurance companies.
-17-
In light of these circumstances, Bradley’s hypothesis of innocence with
regard to conspiracy to murder Mr. Jones is not reasonable here.  See State v.
Spioch, 706 So. 2d 32, 34-35 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (circumstantial evidence
standard was met where evidence of motive, payment to the coconspirator, and
unsatisfactory explanation for the payment was introduced).
WILLIAMS-RULE EVIDENCE
In issue five, Bradley argues that evidence of the October 31 incident was
improperly presented at trial as Williams rule evidence because the sole purpose of
the evidence was to show his bad character and propensity to commit crimes.  We
disagree.
This Court, in Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9 (Fla.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 143
(2000), has recently and extensively addressed the standard for admitting evidence
as follows:
     In Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959), this
Court reiterated the standard rule for admission of
evidence; that is, that any evidence relevant to prove a
material fact at issue is admissible unless precluded by a
specific rule of exclusion.  See § 90.402, Fla. Stat.
(1995).  The Court also said relevant evidence will not be
excluded merely because it relates to facts that point to
the commission of a separate crime, but added the caveat
that “the question of the relevancy of this type of
evidence should be cautiously scrutinized before it is
determined to be admissible.”  110 So. 2d at 662.  This
-18-
rule concerning the admissibility of similar fact evidence
has been codified by the Legislature as section 90.404(2),
Florida Statutes (1995).
     Later, in Bryan v. State, 533 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1988),
we made it clear that the admissibility of other crimes
evidence is not limited to crimes with similar facts.  We
stated that similar fact evidence may be admissible
pursuant to section 90.404, and other crimes or bad acts
that are not similar may be admissible under section
90.402.  We reiterated the distinction between “similar
fact” evidence and “dissimilar fact” evidence in Sexton v.
State, 697 So. 2d 833, 837 (Fla. 1997). 
     Thus, section 90.404 is a special
limitation governing the admissibility of
similar fact evidence.  But if evidence of a
defendant's collateral bad acts bears no
logical resemblance to the crime for which
the defendant is being tried, then section
90.404(2)(a) does not apply and the general
rule in section 90.402 controls.  A trial court
has broad discretion in determining the
relevance of evidence and such a
determination will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion.  Heath v. State, 648 So.
2d 660, 664 (Fla. 1994). 
Thus, whether the evidence of other bad acts complained
of by Zack is termed “similar fact” evidence or
“dissimilar fact” evidence, its admissibility is determined
by its relevancy.  The trial court must utilize a balancing
test to determine if the probative value of this relevant
evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  See §
90.403, Fla. Stat. (1995); Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197
(Fla. 1998).
Id. at 16.
-19-
At trial, the State was permitted to introduce evidence that on the night of
October 31, 1995, one week before Mr. Jones was killed, Bradley, the McWhite
brothers and Clark vandalized the car of Mr. Jones’s teenage girlfriend.  The
McWhite brothers, Clark, and the girl testified about the incident, in which Bradley,
the McWhites, and Clark drove to her apartment to intimidate her and to retrieve the
ring Mr. Jones had given her.  Since Mr. Jones was at the apartment, the men
waited for his departure.  When Mr. Jones left, the four men knocked on the door,
but the girl refused to answer it.  The McWhite brothers then broke her vehicle’s
windows, as directed by Bradley.  For a good part of this episode, according to
the testimony, Bradley was in constant communication with Mrs. Jones through his
cellular phone.   
In Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1996), the Court rejected a similar
claim.  At Foster’s trial for two counts of murder, the State introduced collateral
crime evidence that, on the day of the killings, Foster had earlier robbed three other
individuals.  See id. at 753.  On appeal of his convictions, Foster argued, much as
Bradley presently does, that the trial court erred in admitting this evidence because
it was presented solely to establish his bad character.  See id.  The Court affirmed
the convictions and held that the evidence was relevant to show Foster’s motive
and ultimately his intent.  See id. (“These robberies were all committed in an
-20-
attempt to recoup Booker’s [accomplice] gambling losses.”).
Though different in other respects, Foster is analogous to the current case on
this issue.  Much as in Foster, 647 So. 2d at 753, where the State was trying to
show intent and motive, the State here was attempting to establish Bradley’s intent
and premeditation, a material point at trial.  In order to prove the premeditation
element, the State had to establish the chain of events which tended to show Mrs.
Jones’s initial procurement of Bradley to break up her husband’s romantic
relationship and her subsequent conspiracy with Bradley to kill Mr. Jones.  As to
Bradley’s argument that the October incident did not involve the victim of the
murder and thus should not have been admitted, we note that the victims of the
robbery in Foster were different from the eventual murder victims as well.  See 679
So. 2d at 750-51.  Yet, the evidence was found to have been properly admitted
there.  See id. at 753. 
As this Court stated in Zack, it is permissible to introduce evidence which
helps put the entire case in perspective to the extent, of course, that its relevance is
not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  See 753 So. 2d at 17.  Here,
the October 31 incident provides the necessary coherence to the State’s theory that
Bradley had become the enforcer of Mrs. Jones’s angry wishes, which ultimately
included murdering her husband for his participation in an extramarital affair.  See
10Bradley also argues that the fact that the judge did not allow evidence of Mrs. Jones’s
solicitation of two other individuals to kill Mr. Jones demonstrates that the October 31 incident was
improperly admitted.  This argument, however, fails to recognize that Mrs. Jones’s solicitation of these
two other individuals occurred well before Bradley came on the scene.  Therefore, it would not have
been appropriate to admit this evidence since Bradley was in no way involved at that time.
-21-
State v. Richardson, 621 So. 2d 752, 755 (Fla. 1993) (“Evidence of collateral
crimes may be admissible to establish the entire context out of which the alleged
criminal conduct arose.”).  Therefore, the evidence was relevant to developing the
circumstances leading up to the murder, regardless of whether it is termed similar or
dissimilar evidence.  See Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 738, 742-43 (Fla. 1997)
(evidence of knife threat to victim’s son was relevant to show defendant’s state of
mind on the night of the murder); Ferrell v. State, 686 So. 2d 1324, 1328-29 (Fla.
1996) (evidence of robbery was properly admitted to complete the story of the
crime on trial and to explain defendant's motivation in seeking to prevent retaliation
by the victim).10
PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
In issue six, Bradley argues that the trial court erred in admitting an out-of-
court statement as a prior consistent statement.  We agree with Bradley on this
issue but find the error harmless.
It is well established that prior consistent statements are generally not
admissible to bolster a witness’s testimony at trial.  See Chandler v. State, 702 So.
-22-
2d 186, 197 (Fla. 1997).  In order to be admissible, prior consistent statements, like
any other hearsay statements, must qualify under a hearsay exception.  See id. 
Otherwise, prior consistent statements can be admitted as nonhearsay “if the
following conditions are met: the person who made the prior consistent statement
testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning that statement; and
the statement is offered to ‘rebut an express or implied charge . . . of improper
influence, motive, or recent fabrication.’”  Id. at 197-98; see also § 90.801(2)(b),
Fla. Stat. (1995).
The trial court allowed Detective Steve Leary to testify about a statement
made to him by Detective Redmond regarding whether Bradley had gotten his car
cleaned prior to the car being seized and processed for blood evidence. 
Specifically, Detective Leary testified that Detective Redmond told him that
Bradley’s van had been detailed prior to the seizure of the van by the police.  The
trial court allowed the testimony as a prior consistent statement of Detective Waugh
that Bradley had told him on a January 22 taped interview that he had detailed his
van four or five times since the time of the killing. 
We conclude that the trial court erred in allowing this testimony.  At the
outset, it is questionable whether defense counsel’s cross-examination of Detective
Waugh was an insinuation of recent fabrication.  He merely asked the detective why
-23-
Bradley’s statement relating to the van being detailed was not on the tape like the
rest of the interview.  At no point did he charge the detective with having recently
fabricated the story about the detailing of the van.  Compare Foburg v. State, 744
So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (finding error in trial court’s ruling allowing prior
consistent statement where defense counsel did not allege or imply that witness had
a motive to falsify), and Keffer v. State, 687 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
(same), with Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493, 499 (Fla. 1992) (finding no error
in allowing taped testimony to rebut inference of improper motive to fabricate), and
Chandler, 702 So. 2d at 188 (finding no error in allowing prior consistent statement
of defendant's daughter as rebuttal of suggestion of more recent fabrication).
However, even assuming that defense counsel had in fact insinuated a recent
fabrication by Detective Waugh, Chandler’s first condition was not satisfied.  Here,
Detective Leary testified to a statement made to him by Detective Redmond, not
Detective Waugh.  However, Detective Redmond, the declarant, did not testify and
was not available for cross-examination.  Thus, the statement should not have been
admitted because it remained classic hearsay which fell under no recognized
exception.  See Chandler, 702 So. 2d at 197.
Nevertheless, harmless error analysis governs the improper admission of
prior consistent statements.  See id.  Given that Detective Waugh had in fact
11See § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1995).
-24-
testified that Bradley told him that the van had been detailed, Detective Leary’s
testimony was merely cumulative to that testimony.  When we combine this with the
abundant evidence of Bradley’s guilt, we conclude the trial court’s error was
harmless.  See Moore v. State, 701 So. 2d 545, 550 (Fla. 1997) ("Because there
was direct evidence from other witnesses that Moore possessed a gun on the actual
day of the murder and direct evidence that Moore shot the victim, there is no
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction here.").
PENALTY PHASE
In issue seven, Bradley argues that the trial court erred during the penalty
phase of the case in instructing the jury on and in finding the aggravating
circumstance that the crime was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated
manner (CCP).11  This Court has held that in order to establish the CCP aggravator:
[T]he jury must first determine that the killing was the
product of cool and calm reflection and not an act
prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage
(cold); and that the defendant had a careful plan or
prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal
incident (calculated); and that the defendant exhibited
heightened premeditation (premeditated); and that the
defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification.
Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980, 991 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Gordon v. State, 704
12Brian McWhite testified that when Bradley told him to pick up the stick, he subsequently told
him that they might not need it after all.  The jury could have reasonably inferred that Bradley made the
latter statement because he knew that he was going to find Mr. Jones’s gun in the kitchen, as arranged
by Mrs. Jones.  
-25-
So. 2d 107, 114 (Fla. 1997)).  This aggravator is of a particularly higher degree and
gravity than the premeditation element required to prove first-degree murder.  See
Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994).  
Upon review of the evidence we find sufficient competent substantial
evidence to allow the issue to go to the jury and supporting the finding of the CCP
aggravator.  As mentioned earlier, the McWhite brothers’ testimonies and other
evidence strongly point to a carefully arranged plan between Mrs. Jones and
Bradley to kill Mr. Jones.  Indeed, there was evidence that Mrs. Jones had
unsuccessfully sought to hire another person to kill her husband in the exact manner
that Bradley later, in fact, did kill Mr. Jones.  Pursuant to her plan with Bradley,
Mrs. Jones made sure to have both her front and side doors unlocked to allow
Bradley and the McWhite brothers to enter the home that night.  Bradley and the
McWhite brothers even knew which path to take in order to avoid the motion-
detector lights.  As arranged by Mrs. Jones, Bradley also knew exactly where to
find Mr. Jones’s gun.  He also told the McWhite brothers to bring the stick with
which to beat the victim.12 
13Bradley also argues that there is a possibility that Mr. Jones did not die immediately and Mrs.
Jones finished him off after Bradley left.  The only evidence he provided in support of this contention is
that there is some indication that Mrs. Jones took a shower after Bradley left her home.  He also
contends that Mr. Jones had a head injury which was not consistent with the impact of the stick.  The
jury properly rejected this hypothesis.  See Woods, 733 So. 2d at 986.
-26-
Bradley also argues that there can be no CCP since he only intended to beat
Mr. Jones.  Once again, as discussed earlier, the brutal and methodical nature of the
beating itself and the additional use of a gun indicates an intent to kill.  See Heiney,
447 So. 2d at 214.  It seems that if Bradley only intended to intimidate the victim,
that could have been accomplished well before he landed the fatal blows to the
head or attempted to shoot the victim point-blank.  He could have stopped, for
instance, after the first round of the beating when he tied the victim’s hands and
legs.  Additionally, after the murder he told one of the McWhite brothers that he
was expecting between $100,000 and $200,000 from Mrs. Jones.  This seems to be
an inordinately huge amount of money for a simple beating.  Thus, this theory does
not seem to be reasonable with regard to CCP.13
We conclude that these circumstances considered together support the
finding of CCP.  See Bell v. State, 699 So. 2d 674, 677 (Fla. 1997) (“Cold,
calculated, premeditated murder can be indicated by the circumstances showing
such facts as advance procurement of a weapon, lack of resistance or provocation,
and the appearance of a killing carried out as a matter of course.”) (citing Swafford
-27-
v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 277 (Fla. 1988)).
PROPORTIONALITY
In issue eight, Bradley challenges the proportionality of his death sentence. 
Due to the uniqueness and the finality of death, this Court addresses the propriety
of all death sentences in a proportionality review.  See Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d
1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990).  In conducting this review, this Court makes a
comprehensive analysis in which it determines whether the crime falls within the
category of both the most aggravated and the least mitigated of murders, see
Cooper v. State, 739 So. 2d 82, 85 (Fla. 1999), thereby providing for uniformity in
the application of the sentence.  See Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416-17 (Fla.
1998).  Proportionality review, however, is more than a mere quantitative
comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  See
Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1999), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 93 (2000). 
Rather, it is a review of the totality of all the circumstances in a case as compared
to other cases in which the death penalty had been imposed.  See Robinson v.
State, 761 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1563 (2000).  
The court here found four aggravating circumstances: (1) the capital felony
14See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1995).
15See supra pp. 25-28.
16See § 921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (1995).
17See § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1995).  Bradley argues that this aggravator does not exist. 
As addressed in issue two, see supra p.15, we find otherwise.
-28-
was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC);14 (2) CCP;15 (3) the capital
felony was committed for pecuniary gain;16 and (4) the capital felony was
committed while engaged in the commission of the crime of burglary.17  As to the
statutory mitigating circumstances, the court found but gave very little weight to the
two statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) the defendant had no significant history
of prior criminal activity; and (2) the age of the defendant at the time of the crime
(thirty-six).  The trial court also found and gave “some weight” to certain
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: Bradley overcame a chaotic childhood and
dysfunctional family life to make real achievements in his own life, including
establishing loving relationships in his family and reestablishing a relationship with
his father; he had been a good provider and father for his present wife and his
children, loves his family, and is loved by them; he has maintained a good
employment record; he was helpful to other people inside and outside of his family;
and he has shown sincere religious faith.
We conclude that the death sentence in this case is proportionate to those
-29-
other cases involving many similar circumstances where we have approved death. 
See McDonald v. State, 743 So. 2d 501, 507 (Fla. 1999) (affirming the death
sentence where evidence established four aggravating circumstances of commission
during a robbery/burglary, HAC, CCP, and pecuniary gain, and three nonstatutory
mitigators of the defendant’s good prison behavior, his advanced age at the time of
eligibility for parole, and codefendant’s lighter life sentence); Gordon v. State, 704
So. 2d 107, 117 (Fla. 1997) (finding sentence proportionate where evidence
established four aggravating circumstances of commission during a burglary,
pecuniary gain, HAC, and CCP, and very little in mitigation).  We have even
affirmed death sentences in other cases with less aggravation than the current case. 
See Sliney v. State, 699 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1997) (finding the death penalty
proportionate with the existence of two aggravating circumstances of commission
during a robbery and to avoid arrest, two statutory mitigators (age and lack of
criminal history), and a number of nonstatutory mitigators); Hayes v. State, 581 So.
2d 121 (Fla. 1991) (affirming the death penalty where evidence established two
aggravating circumstances of CCP and commission during a robbery, one statutory
mitigator (age), and other nonstatutory mitigators).
Bradley’s main contention is that the lighter sentence of Mrs. Jones renders
his sentence disproportionate.  This Court has held on numerous occasions that the
-30-
relative culpability of a codefendant and the sentence imposed on such codefendant
are appropriate and important factors in considering whether to impose or approve
a death sentence.  See, e.g., Howell v. State, 707 So. 2d 674, 682 (Fla. 1998). 
However, this Court has also found with some limited exceptions that the defendant
who actually plans and kills the victim is charged with a high level of culpability and
his codefendants’ lesser sentences will not necessarily render his death sentence
disproportionate.  See Sliney v. State, 699 So. 2d 662, 672 (Fla. 1997).
We agree that the record reveals that Mrs. Jones did in fact plan this murder
and was the originator of the idea of killing her husband.  That is evidenced by the
fact that she had contacted two other individuals to commit this murder.  However,
the evidence is also consistent with some level of participation in this planning on
Bradley’s part as well, as shown by the evidence of premeditation and conspiracy
between the two.  The record also establishes that Bradley, with the help of the
McWhite brothers and not Mrs. Jones, actually carried out this brutal beating of the
victim.  
We acknowledge evidence that Mrs. Jones initiated the scheme to kill and sat
and watched approvingly.  However, in addition to Bradley’s culpability as the
actual killer and his participation in the planning, a review of Mrs. Jones’s penalty
phase proceeding also distinguishes her case from Bradley’s and reveals possible
-31-
reasons why her life was spared.  In Mrs. Jones’s case, though the State sought
and argued for death, the State only asserted the existence of two aggravators
(pecuniary gain and CCP).  In addition, defense counsel argued that Mrs. Jones
was under extreme emotional pressure because of the betrayal by her husband and
by his teenage lover, who, despite being treated like a daughter by Mrs. Jones,
proceeded to betray this kindness by having an affair with Mr. Jones.  Counsel also
highlighted Mr. Jones’s blatant disrespect for his wife in flaunting his affair, which,
he argued, also contributed to Mrs. Jones’s emotional breakdown.  That argument
may well have resonated with the jury, resulting in a life recommendation for Mrs.
Jones.  
In contrast to this evidence of mental mitigation for Mrs. Jones, the evidence
reveals no such emotional investment and subsequent emotional devastation on the
part of Bradley.  Rather, Bradley seems to have strictly been motivated by an
expected monetary payoff.  Considering all these circumstances, we conclude the
sentence is not disproportionate.  See McDonald, 743 So. 2d at 506-07 (finding
that codefendant’s life sentence did not render death sentence disproportionate
where codefendant hired defendant to kill her husband); Gordon, 704 So. 2d at
117(same). 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we affirm Bradley’s convictions
-32-
and death sentence.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Clay County,
Peter Dearing, Judge - Case No. 96-1277 CFA
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Nada M. Carey, Assistant Public Defender,
Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Stephen R. White, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee