Case Title: In re C.N.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87519

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 87519-Agenda 7-September 2000.
In re C.N., A Minor (The People of the State of Illinois,
								 Appellant, v. Diane N. et al., Appellees).
Opinion filed May 24, 2001.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following an evidentiary hearing in the circuit court of Kane
County, the circuit court found that respondents, Diane N. and
Mark N., were unfit parents under section 1(D)(m) of the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1996)), because they
failed to make "reasonable progress" toward the return of their
daughter, C.N., within 12 months of her adjudication as a
neglected minor. The circuit court subsequently terminated
respondents' parental rights to C.N., and respondents appealed.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the circuit court's
finding of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Nos. 2-98-0565, 2-98-0674 cons. (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23). We reverse the judgment of the
appellate court, and affirm the judgment of the circuit court
terminating respondents' parental rights to C.N.
BACKGROUND
	On October 17, 1994, the Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) took protective custody of S.S. (born August 2,
1990) and her half-sister, C.N. (born May 15, 1994).(1) Two days
later, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship as to
both minors, naming Diane N. as the minors' mother, and Diane's
reported husband, Marin N., as C.N.'s father. The State alleged
that Diane and Marin physically abused S.S., or allowed such
abuse to occur, and that C.N. was at risk. According to the State's
petition, S.S. was hospitalized with two skull fractures, a
laceration to the forehead, and bruises to the head, chest, and
buttocks. The State further alleged that C.N. and S.S. were
neglected in that their environment was injurious to their welfare.
	On January 3, 1995, Diane admitted that the minors'
environment was injurious to their welfare. As to Diane only, the
court adjudged S.S. and C.N. neglected. The court found that it
was in the minors' best interests that they be made wards of the
court, and appointed DCFS guardian. S.S. and C.N. were placed
in foster care, but S.S. was later placed in a residential treatment
center. The court ordered Diane to cooperate with DCFS and its
contracting agencies; comply with all aspects of the client service
plan; submit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow all
recommendations; undergo a psychological evaluation and follow
all treatment recommendations; and complete parenting classes.
	On January 31, 1995, the State filed a "petition II" for
adjudication. The State alleged that Marin committed aggravated
criminal sexual assault against S.S.; that C.N. showed signs of
sexual abuse; and that Diane failed to protect S.S. and C.N. from
sexual abuse.
	During the course of the circuit court proceedings, the parties
learned that Diane was not divorced from her first husband at the
time she married Marin. Accordingly, Diane's first husband,
whom she married in 1990, would have been the presumptive
father of C.N. Amid claims by respondents, however, that Mark,
Marin's brother, is C.N.'s father, on August 8, 1995, the circuit
court ordered paternity testing. The November 1995 test results
confirmed that Mark is C.N.'s father. On May 6, 1996, the State
filed an amended petition for adjudication, and an amended
petition II for adjudication, naming Marin as C.N.'s uncle and
Mark as C.N.'s father. Shortly thereafter, Mark filed a petition
seeking a determination of paternity as to C.N. The court ruled on
that petition on May 21, 1996, finding Mark to be C.N.'s father.
	On June 5, 1996, Diane and Mark stipulated that S.S. and
C.N. were sexually abused by Marin, that S.S. was physically
abused by Marin, and that Diane caused or allowed such physical
abuse. Accordingly, the circuit court adjudged C.N. a neglected
and abused minor as to both respondents. For a second time, the
circuit court found that it was in the best interest of the minors that
they be made wards of the court, and again placed guardianship in
DCFS.
	The circuit court ordered Diane to cooperate with DCFS, its
agents, and the client service plan; begin counseling at Sinnissippi
Centers and follow all treatment recommendations; continue to
participate in in-home parent education classes until she
consistently exhibited appropriate parenting and nurturing
behavior; and cooperate with the psychological evaluation and
sexual offenders assessment. The circuit court ordered Mark to
continue participating in in-home parenting classes until he
consistently exhibited appropriate parenting and nurturing
behavior; participate in a psychological evaluation; participate in
a drug and alcohol assessment; participate in a comprehensive
social assessment; and cooperate with DCFS, its agents, and the
client service plan. Although the circuit court also ordered Mark
to participate in counseling for sexual offenders, that portion of the
order was stricken and Mark was, instead, ordered to participate
in counseling for the family of sexual offenders.
	Sixteen months later, on October 7, 1997, the State filed a
petition to terminate respondents' parental rights to C.N. The State
alleged, in relevant part, that respondents were unfit under section
1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act because they failed "to make
reasonable progress towards the return of the child within 12
months after an adjudication of neglected minor, abused minor or
dependent minor." An evidentiary hearing on the State's petition
commenced on February 3, 1998. The State called several
witnesses.
Peggy Everling
	DCFS investigator Peggy Everling testified that she responded
to a hot line call on July 11, 1994, informing her that S.S. and C.N.
were at risk, and that S.S. had been injured by Marin, the putative
father. At the time of the hot line call, Diane, Marin, and the two
minors were living together at the Maple Park Motel. S.S. told
Everling that she had been lying in bed with Marin, became sick,
and vomited in the bed. Marin became upset and "whacked" her
on the head. When Diane returned home, S.S. told her what had
happened, and Diane confronted Marin. Marin grabbed a steel pipe
and, in the course of trying to hit Diane, hit S.S. in the mouth,
chipping her tooth. Diane disputed S.S.'s account of how the
injuries occurred, but told Everling that she was aware that Marin
had a temper and that he had previously hit S.S.
	Mark told Everling that he, too, had seen Marin hit S.S. on
prior occasions. Mark also witnessed the July 1994 incident, and
in response had called the police. Mark signed the complaint
against Marin in connection with that incident because Diane
refused to do so. Although Mark appeared concerned about the
children and was cooperative, Everling was concerned that Mark
had failed to intervene when Marin became abusive. Diane was
minimally cooperative and appeared more concerned about Marin
than the children. Diane did not want to keep Marin away from
S.S. and C.N. during the DCFS investigation, and posted Marin's
bail following his arrest.
Lynn Appelt
	DCFS investigator Lynn Appelt responded to another hot line
call in October 1994, informing DCFS of certain injuries to S.S.
Appelt testified that in a telephone conversation on October 17,
1994, Diane advised Appelt that Marin was no longer living with
her, that Marin was staying with a friend whose name and address
she could not remember, and that she wanted nothing to do with
him. Diane told Appelt that C.N. was with a baby-sitter, and that
she wanted to give guardianship of C.N. to her brother.
	Investigation by DCFS revealed that C.N. was with Marin at
the baby-sitter's home. Appelt determined that the baby-sitter was
not an appropriate caregiver in light of the baby-sitter's prior
contact with DCFS due to an injurious home environment. Appelt
eventually located Diane, Marin, and C.N. at the Oregon, Illinois,
home of Diane's father, where Appelt took C.N. into protective
custody. Appelt later learned that the brother with whom Diane
wished to place C.N. had sexually abused Diane, making
placement with him inappropriate.
	Appelt also testified that she spoke to S.S. at her foster home
in early November 1994, and observed an injury to the child's
forehead, with 20 to 25 stitches. S.S. told Appelt that she had been
hit on her feet with a stick, that she had been hit with a "Mr. Big
Stick," and that her mother had slapped her in the face. S.S. also
stated that Marin would leave her and C.N. at home alone, and that
she had told her mother this was happening. Diane denied slapping
S.S., and told Appelt that Marin did not abuse S.S. Diane admitted
that S.S. had been hit and sexually abused, but implicated a former
husband and other men with whom Diane had been involved.
	Appelt testified that she took C.N. into protective custody
because of the current injuries to S.S., the past history of abuse,
Diane's lack of cooperation with DCFS, Diane's lack of judgment
in suggesting placement for the minors with her brother, Diane's
inability to protect her children, and Diane's inability to appreciate
the dangerous situations in which she placed her children. Mark
had not been implicated in the abuse and was not a subject of
Appelt's investigation at that time.
Rich Maier
	Rich Maier, a DCFS child welfare specialist, testified that
DCFS received another hot line call during November 1994,
indicating that S.S. and C.N. had been sexually abused.
	Maier drafted the initial client service plan that month, which
was directed to Diane and Marin. Under the plan, Diane was to
obtain a substance abuse evaluation and a psychological
evaluation; participate in counseling and parenting classes; and
obtain and maintain appropriate housing. The permanency goal of
the initial service plan was "return home." In early February 1995,
Maier rated Diane's progress toward this goal satisfactory. Maier
testified that Diane had started counseling with Amy Unterborn at
St. Charles Family Center; she had obtained a substance abuse
evaluation; and she was either attending or about to begin
parenting classes at the Four C's (Community Coordinated Child
Care). Although the substance abuse evaluation revealed no
alcohol or substance abuse by Diane, based on Diane's family
history and Diane's own drinking pattern, the evaluator
recommended alcohol education.
	Maier also drafted the February 1995 service plan. By this
time, Mark and Diane had advised Maier that Mark may be C.N.'s
father. The February 1995 service plan, however, was directed
only to Diane and Marin because Mark's paternity was not yet
established. Under the plan, Diane was required to participate in
counseling to examine her role in the removal of her children and
to receive the recommended alcohol education. She was also
required to participate in parenting classes and set up a stable
housing situation. On his own accord, Mark accompanied Diane
to all six parenting classes at the Four C's, successfully completing
the program.
Tim Rezash
	Tim Rezash, an intern at the Ben Gordon Community Mental
Health Center, completed a psychological assessment of Diane in
early 1995. Rezash testified that, normally, parents in Diane's
situation blame themselves for the abuse of their children and ask
themselves what they could have done differently. Diane did not
exhibit this behavior. She did not feel responsible in any way for
the abuse of her daughters and did not empathize with them.
Rezash did not consider Diane a good candidate for insight-oriented therapy and, instead, recommended behavior and
cognitive therapies. His prognosis for success was poor to
guarded.
Amelia Apperson
	Amelia Apperson, a DCFS child welfare specialist, was the
primary case worker between March 1995 and September 1996. At
the time she assumed responsibility for the case, Mark and Diane
resided together.
	In August 1995, Apperson evaluated Diane's progress with
respect to the February 1995 service plan goal of "return home."
Apperson rated Diane's progress unsatisfactory. Apperson testified
that Diane was uncooperative and failed to complete tasks and
objectives set forth in the client service plan. Diane failed to attend
counseling on a regular basis, continued to deny any responsibility
for the abuse of her children, and, notwithstanding her completion
of a parenting class, failed to exhibit appropriate parenting skills
during visits with C.N. Based on Apperson's own observations,
and a recommendation from Amy Unterborn, Diane's counselor,
Apperson suggested in-home parenting classes involving both
Diane and Mark. Apperson explained to them the specific
behaviors with which she was concerned. Although at this point
paternity testing had not yet been completed, Mark told Apperson
that he knew he was C.N.'s father. The August 1995 service plan
was therefore directed to Diane, Marin, and Mark. In drafting the
August 1995 service plan, Apperson took into account an
assessment of C.N. which indicated that she was developmentally
delayed by six months due to a prior lack of stimulation and
nurturing. The plan specified that, during supervised visits, Diane
spend more time interacting with C.N., rather than with the visit
supervisor.
	Apperson further testified regarding a September 8, 1995,
visit by respondents with C.N. at the DCFS office. Apperson's
supervisor terminated the visit after respondents became visibly
angry in response to a parenting suggestion made by the visit
supervisor. Diane raised her voice and hit a wall outside the
visiting room. Mark commented that it was "bullshit" and a
"Gestapo regime." Apperson testified that this visit was the first
in a long line of visits which appeared to cause C.N. great stress.
C.N. would cry, bite herself, pull her hair out, and bang her head.
	During the period November 1995 to January 1996, Apperson
felt that respondents had failed to make progress toward the goal of
"return home." Although Diane consistently attended counseling
sessions, the couple's progress in the in-home parenting classes was
inconsistent. In addition, visits with C.N. were still going poorly.
	In late February 1996, Apperson rated respondents' progress
unsatisfactory. Apperson cited Diane's lack of cooperation with
DCFS service providers, her failure to be present for all in-home
appointments, her inconsistent attendance at counseling, her
failure to address the past abuse, her failure to keep rent and
utilities current, and her poor judgment in allowing various
individuals to live with her and Mark. Apperson's written
evaluation reflected many of the same concerns about Mark.
Apperson also testified that respondents failed to complete in-home parenting classes. In the February 1996 service plan,
Apperson changed the permanency goal from "return home" to
"foster parent placement," but testified that the goal could be
changed at any time, based on the cooperation and progress of the
parents.
	In March 1996, Apperson had discussions with Mark
concerning his plan to obtain custody of C.N. Apperson was
concerned about Mark's understanding of C.N.'s emotional health.
Other than regaining custody, Mark had no plan to deal with
C.N.'s emotional needs.
	Apperson further testified that sometime during the period
March 1996 through May 1996, Amy Unterborn discharged Diane
from counseling. Diane's attendance was poor and her efforts in
therapy were sporadic. Believing that the commute to Unterborn's
office may have been a problem for Diane, Apperson referred
Diane to the Sinnissippi Centers, an agency closer to Diane's
home. Diane did not complete the initial assessment at Sinnissippi,
explaining to Apperson that she would not discuss her personal
life with a counselor.
	Apperson was also concerned about the stability in
respondents' present home because they continued to allow other
persons to live with them. Diane reported that one of the women
who lived with them had stolen from her, and that a cousin had
taken one of respondents' vehicles to Arkansas without their
permission. Mark also reported an incident in which he discovered
one of the persons who was living with them going through their
belongings.
	Following the circuit court's determination that Mark is
C.N.'s father, Apperson did not explore the possibility of returning
C.N. to Mark because he continued to live with Diane. Apperson
was also concerned about Mark's judgment and ability to care for
C.N. Mark admitted that he had been involved in C.N.'s life
before she had been placed in foster care. C.N., however, was
developmentally delayed due to a lack of stimulation and
nurturing. In addition, Mark continued to minimize the impact of
the abuse on C.N. Mark felt that if he simply brought C.N. home
and loved her, she would get better. Apperson explained that C.N.
had special needs, requiring "serious therapy, serious structure,
serious care."
	In August 1996, Apperson evaluated respondents' progress
under the February 1996 service plan. Apperson rated Diane's
cooperation and completion of tasks unsatisfactory, citing Diane's
unsuccessful discharge from counseling with Amy Unterborn;
Diane's failure to complete the assessment at Sinnissippi Centers;
and her failure to advise Apperson at one point that she was
homeless. Apperson rated Mark's cooperation unsatisfactory,
noting the adversarial role he took with her and his failure to sign
certain releases, thus preventing referrals for counseling. Apperson
also rated respondents' progress in demonstrating adequate
parenting skills unsatisfactory. Apperson relied on her own
observations, as well as reports from the visit supervisor and the
in-home educator. Apperson testified that during the August 1996
administrative case review, as she discussed the reduced visitation
schedule with respondents, they became belligerent and the
reviewer asked them to leave.
Amy Unterborn
	Amy Unterborn, a licensed social worker at Therapeutic
Solutions, Inc., an affiliate of St. Charles Family Center, began
counseling Diane individually in November 1994. Unterborn
testified that the focus of the counseling was on parenting skills
relative to establishing a safe environment, anger management,
problem solving, and appropriate child development expectations.
	From November 1994 to June 1995, Diane missed two
appointments. During this time, Diane had difficulty processing
issues involving the creation of a safe environment in the home
and how her actions might impact safety and stability in the home.
Diane also did not recognize that her children would suffer long-term consequences due to the abuse.
	From June 1995 through July 1995, Diane missed one
appointment. During this period, therapy continued to focus on the
establishment of a safe environment for Diane's children,
problem-solving skills, and appropriate child development
expectations.
	From July 1995 through October 1995, Unterborn had
sessions with Diane and C.N. Unterborn testified that Diane
expected C.N. to use logic and reason that a child of C.N.'s age
would not possess. Diane expressed her lack of understanding of
C.N.'s special needs, and admitted that she had exposed S.S. and
C.N. to an inadequate environment. According to Unterborn, this
understanding is the first step in taking responsibility and
establishing new behaviors. During this period, Diane had
difficulty expressing anger in appropriate ways; she did not
internalize the concepts that were worked on in therapy; and did
not demonstrate the skills necessary for a safe environment.
Unterborn was also concerned about miscommunication Diane
created, which frustrated the efforts of professionals to coordinate
care for Diane and her children. Unterborn testified that Diane's
prognosis was guarded.
	From October 1995 through January 1996, Diane missed four
appointments, one of which was an excused absence. During this
period, Diane's life was chaotic with respect to employment and
housing, and she made no progress toward stability. She was not
responding constructively to daily stressors. Diane also made little
progress in her ability to empathize with C.N. in that she failed to
recognize the impact of the emotional distress stemming from the
abuse. Diane did not demonstrate a mature relationship with Mark
focused on child rearing. Diane disclosed that she had frequent
transient house guests with whom she had verbal and physical
altercations. In therapy, Diane focused on her anger at DCFS,
rather than focusing on the skills she needed to develop. Diane's
progress was minimal and the prognosis was guarded.
	Between January 1996 and April 1996, Diane had one
unexcused absence and three excused absences. Diane told
Unterborn that she was confident that once her children were
returned to her that they would then be able to get the care they
needed. Unterborn testified, however, that Diane's home was not
stable enough to handle the emotional disturbances that C.N. was
exhibiting. Diane was not able, in therapy, to articulate possible
ways of dealing with C.N.'s self-mutilating behavior or instances
where C.N. acted out sexually. Diane did not indicate that she
could set limits for C.N. or handle a crisis. Diane also continued
to have relationships with individuals who were adversarial and
often unstable.
	In May 1996, Unterborn discharged Diane from therapy
because of her failure to keep the attendance contract. Unterborn
did not feel that Diane was making a reasonable effort to get to
counseling. Unterborn testified that Diane had not made
reasonable progress, given the length of therapy, and, at discharge,
Diane's prognosis remained guarded. According to Unterborn,
Diane could have made more progress had she spent more time
focusing on counseling rather than how to manipulate the system.
Patty Klapperich
	Patty Klapperich, a homemaker for DCFS, supervised visits
between respondents and C.N. during the latter part of 1995.
Klapperich testified that Mark generally engaged in the child care
to a greater degree than Diane, who would tell Mark what to do.
	During a visit on September 8, 1995, Klapperich, who was
instructed to do parent education during the visits, made several
parenting suggestions regarding the feeding of C.N. Klapperich
testified that Mark became increasingly aggravated and furious.
Both Mark and Diane were yelling. A supervisor terminated the
visit. According to Klapperich, C.N. had a difficult time with
subsequent visits, most of which ended early because Diane did
not have the endurance to work with C.N.
Andy Thompson
	Andy Thompson, a child care advocate at Sinnissippi Centers
in Rochelle, Illinois, testified that DCFS referred respondents for
participation in the parenting program. Beginning in late August
1995, and continuing for a period of about nine months,
Thompson worked with respondents once or twice a week in their
home. Thompson first spoke to respondents by telephone on
August 30, 1995. When Thompson identified herself, Mark
became angry and told Thompson that DCFS was harassing him.
Respondents' dissatisfaction with DCFS came up at almost every
session.
	Thompson testified that, overall, respondents were not
cooperative and their attendance at the parenting sessions was
sporadic. On five or six occasions, respondents were not home. On
approximately four occasions, respondents were home, but said
they had forgotten about the session. On other occasions, Diane
did not arrive home until after the session had already started. On
yet another occasion, Diane said her time was limited because she
had an appointment elsewhere. Finally, on one occasion Diane did
not participate because she was asleep on the couch and Mark's
efforts to wake her were unsuccessful. Thompson also testified
that one session was delayed by 20 minutes while respondents
searched for jewelry supposedly stolen by a house guest.
	According to Thompson, respondents made little progress in
the parenting classes. Although respondents scored high on a
pretest and understood the book material, they did not put into
practice the concepts they learned. Respondents continued to
display negative behaviors discussed in prior sessions. Sinnissippi
terminated services when respondents moved out of the area.
James Jorgenson
	James Jorgenson, owner of Taking Control, a psychological
counseling facility, testified that in 1995 DCFS referred Diane to
him to evaluate the degree of bonding between her and C.N.
During the assessment, Jorgenson observed very little interaction
between Diane and C.N. Diane tried to coax a positive reaction
from C.N., but C.N. became increasingly upset. Jorgenson decided
to terminate C.N.'s involvement and continued the assessment
with Diane alone; Diane appeared relieved.
	Jorgenson testified that Diane displayed little emotion in
regard to her children; she focused on what had been done to her,
rather than what had been done to them. Diane expressed only a
perfunctory concern for the safety of her children and spoke about
them as possessions. Jorgenson believed that unresolved issues
from Diane's past, including her own abandonment and abuse as
a child, and her combative way of dealing with the world, reduced
her effectiveness as a parent. He testified that Diane is unable to
set limits and boundaries for her children, which impacts her
ability to protect them. Jorgenson concluded that Diane was not
able to deal with C.N.'s needs at that time, and would not be able
to do so in the near future. Jorgenson recommended that C.N. not
be returned to Diane until further rehabilitative measures were
taken, but that if Diane was not cooperative, DCFS should
consider pursuing the termination of Diane's parental rights.
According to Jorgenson, Diane displayed combativeness and
vindictiveness toward DCFS.
Patricia Kozlowski
	Patricia Kozlowski, a homemaker with Colton Health Care,
worked with respondents from November 1995 to May 1997. As
a homemaker she supervised weekly visits with C.N. and
transported C.N. to visits. Typically, visits took place at a Target
store or at the park. Although Kozlowski was not to give parenting
instructions, she was required to stop anything that was
inappropriate. Kozlowski testified regarding several visits in
which respondents engaged, or attempted to engage, in conduct
she considered inappropriate. Such conduct by Diane included
giving C.N. a plastic serrated knife to play with, instead of a
plastic spoon, and failing to wash her hands after changing C.N.'s
diaper. Conduct by Mark that Kozlowski considered inappropriate
included offering C.N. a dirty pacifier and discussing a horror
movie in graphic detail in front of C.N., who was two years old at
the time. Kozlowski also testified that both respondents repeatedly
smoked while holding C.N.; placed food directly on the table or
highchair, instead of using a plate; gave C.N. too much food at one
time, in pieces that were too large; and failed to check C.N. for
other marks after noticing red dots on her neck. Kozlowski also
testified that Diane had ended a visit early because C.N. was
"boring" in that she was withdrawn and would not walk or talk.
Jennifer Saleuckyj
	DCFS caseworker Jennifer Saleuckyj testified that, in
February 1997, she evaluated the August 1996 client service plan
that Amy Apperson drafted. Saleuckyj rated the progress of
respondents unsatisfactory. Respondents did not feel they should
have been "indicated"(2) and did not see the need for services.
Respondents did not participate in any parenting classes from
August 1996 to the time of Saleuckyj's evaluation. Although
Diane completed a psychological evaluation, it took her five
months to do so. Mark was not participating in any counseling,
with the exception of an "on-call" service of which DCFS had no
information, and did not complete alcohol and psychological
assessments until the latter part of January 1997.
	Notwithstanding the unsatisfactory rating in February 1997,
Saleuckyj felt that respondents could still work toward regaining
custody of C.N. Saleuckyj created a new service plan with the
same tasks as the August 1996 plan. Based on the issues that
brought the family to the attention of DCFS, the main component
of the service plan was counseling. Respondents agreed to follow
through on a referral to Family Advocate to address issues of child
protection and how to care for children who have been sexually
abused. Respondents also agreed to participate in in-home
parenting services.
John Larson
	DCFS caseworker John Larson was assigned the case in
March 1997. In August 1997, he evaluated the service plan of
February 1997. One objective under the plan was that Diane
participate in a counseling assessment at Family Advocate. Larson
rated Diane unsatisfactory on this objective, and other objectives
regarding counseling, because Diane had made no attempt to
attend the counseling services. Similarly, Larson rated Mark
unsatisfactory on the objectives of the service plan dealing with
counseling. The only counseling in which Mark was involved was
a telephone counseling service.
	Under the service plan, Mark was also required to have
adequate housing for all family members. Larson rated Mark
unsatisfactory on this objective because respondents' residence
had been found unfit for habitation by the City of Rockford.
Larson testified, however, that Mark subsequently obtained
acceptable housing with the help of DCFS. Larson also testified
that Mark successfully completed a psychological assessment and
a drug and alcohol assessment, and that further services in this
area were not indicated.
	Larson rated respondents unsatisfactory with respect to parent
training, in that they failed to follow through on Larson's referral
to Catholic Charities. Larson was not aware that respondents had
completed an academic parenting class. Larson also testified that
respondents later attended parenting classes at a different service
provider, but that the classes were not comparable in depth or
length to the classes at Catholic Charities.
Amy Butt
	Amy Butt, an employee of Family Advocate, testified that her
agency specializes in the treatment of sexual abuse and offers
counseling to address issues relating to the parenting of a child
who was abused. Through DCFS, respondents were referred to
Family Advocate for an assessment, which requires five sessions.
Respondents did not attend any of the five initial sessions
scheduled for them in March and April 1997. Another
appointment was scheduled in May 1997. Ultimately, the agency
closed the file without services being provided to respondents.
Elaine Gaither
	Elaine Gaither, the parenting coordinator at Catholic Charities
of Rockford, testified that she received a referral from DCFS to
involve respondents in parenting classes. Respondents attended an
orientation class in July 1997, but failed to attend their first
scheduled class in early August, apparently due to transportation
and child care problems. Gaither tried to work with respondents on
child care issues, and tried to accommodate their schedules,
switching their class time. She also gave Diane referrals to
alternate parenting programs in the community. During one
telephone call in which Diane indicated that she had failed to
follow up on Gaither's recommendation for child care, Diane
became angry and argumentative. Ultimately, respondents were
discharged from the program for lack of attendance.
	The State rested. Respondents each moved for a "directed
finding," which the trial court denied. Respondents did not testify.
They, however, called three witnesses.
Elaine Goodwin
	Elaine Goodwin, a parent educator at the Four C's, testified
that, beginning on January 17, 1995, respondents attended a group
of six parenting classes. The key topics included child
development, parent-child communication, parent and child self-esteem, stress management, child guidance, behavior management,
and appropriate disciplinary techniques. Respondents satisfactorily
completed homework assignments and participated in class
discussions. Mark scored 83% on a pretest and 89% on a post-test.
Diane scored 87% on a pretest and 91% on a post-test. Goodwin
did not observe respondents with their children.
Julie Thompson
	Julie Thompson, a licensed clinical social worker with Family
Consultation Services, testified that she met respondents in
September 1997, in conjunction with their attendance at a small
group parenting class that she taught. The focus of the class, which
consisted of three sessions, was behavior management. Although
respondents expressed their anger at the system, their attitude
toward the class was positive. Thompson testified that
respondents' participation in class discussion indicated a
knowledge of child development and parenting skills greater than
the average participant, which suggested that they had attended
parenting classes prior to her class. Although Thompson never
observed respondents with their children, based on their class
participation, it appeared to her that respondents were applying
their knowledge of parenting skills. Thompson testified that a
child who has special needs requires "more intense parenting," and
that a parent may have trouble parenting a child with special
needs, but no trouble parenting a child without special needs.
Marcia Shaw
	Marcia Shaw, a licensed clinical social worker with Family
Consultation Service, testified that she met respondents in
November 1997. Diane attended 14 or 15 counseling sessions with
Shaw; Mark attended an unspecified number of sessions.
According to Shaw, Diane has "book knowledge" of parenting, but
does not apply it. Mark, however, applied the parenting skills he
learned, and due to Diane's job, did the bulk of the parenting.
	Shaw testified that, in terms of dealing with the sexual abuse
of S.S. and C.N., Diane made progress in that she verbalized her
responsibility for the abuse, acknowledging that she failed to
protect her child. Mark also made progress in that his initial anger
over the removal of C.N. was replaced with sadness and
compassion, which Shaw believed was "more real." The
counseling sessions did not address how to parent a child who was
a victim of sexual or physical abuse.
	Shaw testified that, as a result of the removal of S.S. and
C.N., Diane was depressed, and that such depression interfered
with Diane's ability to be responsible. According to Shaw, Diane
is less depressed with medication and more able to accept
responsibility. Diane is working less hours and is able to be at
home more of the time. Mark, who is a cook by profession, has
assumed the role of a "house husband." Respondents' anger with
DCFS has lessened.
	Respondents rested.
	Following argument, on April 28, 1998, the circuit court ruled
that the State had proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that
respondents were unfit in that they failed to make reasonable
progress toward the return of C.N. within 12 months of the neglect
adjudication. As set forth in its written order, the circuit court
found, inter alia, that respondents failed to accept responsibility
for the abuse sustained by C.N. and her sibling; respondents
focused energy on hostility toward DCFS and its agents and not on
attaining reunification with C.N.; respondents repeatedly failed to
comply with the court's directives regarding services which
needed to be completed in order to accomplish reunification; and
respondents repeatedly refused to attend services, or attended
sporadically, resulting in termination of the services. The court
also found that evidence of respondents' ability to parent two
later-born children was irrelevant.(3)
	The matter was continued for a hearing to determine whether
termination of respondents' parental rights was in the best interests
of C.N. Following that hearing, on May 8, 1998, the court entered
an order terminating respondents' parental rights to C.N.
Respondents appealed, and the appellate court reversed. Nos.
2-98-0565, 2-98-0674 cons. (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal.
See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
ANALYSIS
I. Indian Child Welfare Act
	We consider first the argument of respondent-father, Mark,
that the appellate court erred by failing to remand this cause to the
circuit court for a determination on the record as to the
applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.
§1901 et seq. (1994)). Whether the circuit court was required,
under the facts and circumstances of this case, to make such a
determination is a legal issue which we review de novo. See
Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 516 (1998) (where appeal presents
issue of law review is de novo).
	The ICWA was enacted by Congress in 1978 in response to
the growing concern over the consequences to Indian children,
families and tribes of abusive welfare practices which separated
large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes
through adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian
homes. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32, 104 L. Ed. 2d 29, 36, 109 S. Ct. 1597, 1599-1600
(1989). The ICWA sets forth minimum federal standards for the
removal of an Indian child from his or her family. 25 U.S.C.
§1902 (1994). At the heart of the ICWA are its provisions relating
to jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings. Holyfield,
490 U.S.  at 36, 104 L. Ed. 2d  at 38, 109 S. Ct.  at 1601. Under
section 1911(a) of the ICWA, the tribal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian
child who resides or is domiciled within the tribe's reservation or
who is a ward of a tribal court. 25 U.S.C. §1911(a) (1994). Under
section 1911(b), the state courts and the tribal courts enjoy
concurrent jurisdiction over proceedings for the foster care
placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child
not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian
child's tribe. 25 U.S.C. §1911(b) (1994); Holyfield, 490 U.S.  at
36, 104 L. Ed. 2d  at 38-39, 109 S. Ct.  at 1601-02. In such cases,
however, the state court must transfer the proceeding to the tribal
court upon the petition of the tribe or a parent, absent "good
cause," objection by either parent, or declination of jurisdiction by
the tribal court. 25 U.S.C. §1911(b) (1994); Holyfield, 490 U.S.  at
36, 104 L. Ed. 2d  at 38-39, 109 S. Ct.  at 1601-02.
	The ICWA further provides that "[i]n any involuntary
proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason
to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the
foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an
Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the
Indian child's tribe *** of the pending proceedings and of their
right of intervention." 25 U.S.C. §1912(a) (1994). For purposes of
the ICWA, "Indian child" means "any unmarried person who is
under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or
(b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe." 25 U.S.C.
§1903(4) (1994). A violation of sections 1911 or 1912 of the
ICWA may be cause to invalidate the child custody proceeding.
See 25 U.S.C. §1914 (1994). The Bureau of Indian Affairs has
promulgated nonbinding guidelines to aid state courts in the
appropriate application of the ICWA. Guidelines for State Courts:
Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 (1979)
(hereafter Guidelines); Holyfield, 490 U.S.  at 51 n.26, 104 L. Ed. 2d  at 48 n.26, 109 S. Ct.  at 1609 n.26.
	Mark contends that, despite evidence that C.N. may be an
"Indian child," the circuit court failed to make a determination as
to the applicability of the ICWA. Mark argues that the absence of
such a determination can create jurisdictional issues, rendering the
termination proceeding and any subsequent adoption proceeding
void. The appellate court rejected this argument. The appellate
court held that Mark, as the party asserting the applicability of the
ICWA, had the burden to produce the necessary evidence for the
circuit court to determine if C.N. is an "Indian child," that Mark
failed to satisfy this burden, and that the circuit court did not err by
failing to apply the act. See In re A.G.-G., 899 P.2d 319, 322
(Colo. App. 1995). We agree that the circuit court did not err.
	Mark never asserted the applicability of the ICWA before the
circuit court, and on appeal, cites only two brief references in the
record touching on the subject of his alleged Indian heritage. The
first reference is found in the testimony of DCFS caseworker
Amelia Apperson. During the termination hearing, the State asked
Apperson on direct examination to describe Mark's "focus" during
discussions with him. Apperson testified that, at one point, Mark
was concerned because, according to him, he was part of a Native
American tribe. Mark asked Apperson to pursue the matter of
whether his family was registered with the tribe. Apperson
testified that she "had to pursue" the matter, which she did. Mark
did not testify at the termination hearing, and no other witness
testified on this subject.
	The second reference in the record cited by Mark is found in
a 14-page psychological assessment prepared by consulting
psychologist Donald R. Pearson. Pearson's assessment is part of
a 125-page report DCFS filed with the circuit court 10 months
prior to the termination hearing. Pearson states that Mark
identified himself as the son of a "full-blooded Blackfoot Indian."
Although not cited by Mark, Pearson later states in his assessment
that Mark "claimed to be an American Indian (although the
collateral information provided by the caseworker indicated this
was not the case)."
	We conclude that the brief references in the record to Mark's
unsubstantiated statements concerning his alleged Indian heritage
were simply insufficient to implicate the provisions of the ICWA.
The circuit court had no reason to believe that C.N. may be an
Indian child and no reason to raise the issue. Accordingly, the
circuit court did not err in failing to make a determination on the
record as to the applicability of the act and properly exercised
jurisdiction over this matter. See In re M.S., 302 Ill. App. 3d 998,
1001-02 (1999) (holding that circuit court properly exercised
jurisdiction over a proceeding to terminate parental rights where
the court was presented, in an eleventh-hour motion, with only the
unsubstantiated assertion by respondent-mother that children were
of Native American heritage); In re M.N.W., 577 N.W.2d 874,
876-77 (Iowa App. 1998) (holding that, in view of the scant
evidence of the father's Native American heritage, trial court did
not err in failing to determine at the outset of the proceedings
whether the ICWA applied); In re Appeal in Maricopa County
Juvenile Action No. A-25525, 136 Ariz. 528, 532 n.3, 667 P.2d 228, 232 n.3 (1983) (noting that the court is not required to make
a finding regarding the status of the child as Indian or non-Indian
in every child custody proceeding, but only where the court has
reason to believe that an Indian child may be involved);
Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67586, par. B.1(c) (setting forth
circumstances under which a state court has reason to believe a
child involved in a custody proceeding is an Indian child).
	Mark's reliance on In re C.H., 510 N.W.2d 119 (S.D. 1993),
and In re J.W., 498 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa App. 1993), is misplaced.
In C.H., the South Dakota Department of Social Services
admitted, in its original neglect petition, that the ICWA may be
applicable because respondent-mother "is believed to be one-half
Choctaw," a tribe federally recognized in Mississippi, and that her
and her children, therefore, may be eligible for membership in the
tribe. C.H., 510 N.W.2d  at 123. In the instant case, there is no
similar admission as to the applicability of the ICWA, no
admission as to C.N.'s eligibility for membership in a recognized
tribe, and no asserted belief in Mark's alleged Indian heritage.
	In J.W., there was undisputed evidence that the children were
"Indian children" under the ICWA, and the trial court ruled that
the act applied to the proceedings. In the State's subsequent
petition for termination of parental rights, the State alleged that the
children were Indian children within the meaning of the act. The
only issue decided on appeal was whether the State complied with
the notice provisions of the ICWA. The Iowa court of appeals held
that the State had not complied, and remanded the matter for
further proceedings. J.W., 498 N.W.2d  at 421-22. Here, there is no
such undisputed evidence that C.N. is an "Indian child," and no
allegation by the State, or any other party to the circuit court
proceedings, that the ICWA applies. Further, Mark does not argue
on appeal that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the
State ran afoul of the notice provisions of the ICWA. See 25
U.S.C. §1912(a) (1994).
	For the foregoing reasons, we reject Mark's argument that a
remand to the circuit court is necessary to consider the
applicability of the ICWA, and agree with the appellate court's
decision on this issue.
II. Parental Unfitness
	We next consider the State's contention that the appellate
court erred in reversing the judgment of the circuit court
terminating respondents' parental rights to C.N. The circuit court
found that respondents were unfit under section 1(D)(m) of the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1996)), in that they
failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of C.N.
within 12 months of the adjudication of neglect, and that it is in
C.N.'s best interests that respondents' parental rights be
terminated.
	The termination of parental rights constitutes a permanent and
complete severance of the parent-child relationship. See Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 610, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982); In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 274
(1990); 750 ILCS 50/17 (West 1998). Accordingly, proof of
parental unfitness must be clear and convincing. Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 
at 275; In re Enis, 121 Ill. 2d 124, 129-31 (1988); 705 ILCS
405/2-29(2) (West 1998); 750 ILCS 50/8(a)(1) (West 1998). In
order to reverse a trial court's finding that there was clear and
convincing evidence of parental unfitness, the reviewing court
must conclude that the trial court's finding was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Syck, 138 Ill. 2d  at 274. A finding
is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite
conclusion is clearly evident. Ceres Illinois, Inc. v. Illinois Scrap
Processing, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 133, 141-42 (1986).
	The appellate court in the instant case held that it was clearly
evident that respondents made reasonable progress toward the
return of C.N. and, therefore, the circuit court's finding of
unfitness under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act was contrary
to the manifest weight of the evidence. The State maintains that
the appellate court applied the wrong standard in measuring
respondents' progress, and that under the appropriate standard, the
State presented clear and convincing evidence of respondents'
unfitness. Our determination of the appropriate standard for
measuring progress under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act
necessarily involves statutory interpretation, a question of law.
Review of this issue, therefore, proceeds de novo. See Michigan
Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503
(2000).
	The Adoption Act expressly provides that it "shall be
construed in concert with the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 [705
ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 1998)]." 750 ILCS 50/2.1 (West
1998). The Juvenile Court Act sets forth, among other things, the
procedures to be followed in cases, such as the present one,
involving abused, neglected or dependent minors. 705 ILCS
405/2-1 through 2-33 (West 1998). The overriding purpose of the
Juvenile Court Act is to ensure that the best interests of the minor,
the minor's family, and the community are served. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 320 (1995); 705 ILCS 405/1-2 (West 1998).
	Under section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act, where a court
finds that it is in the minor's best interest to do so, a court may
terminate parental rights "after finding, based upon clear and
convincing evidence, that a parent is an unfit person as defined in
Section 1 of the Adoption Act." 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West
1998). At the time of the circuit court proceedings in this case,
section 1 of the Adoption Act provided in relevant part:
			"D. 'Unfit person' means any person whom the court
shall find to be unfit to have a child, without regard to the
likelihood that the child will be placed for adoption. The
grounds of unfitness are any one or more of the following:
* * *
				(m) Failure by a parent to make reasonable efforts to
correct the conditions that were the basis for the
removal of the child from the parent, or to make
reasonable progress toward the return of the child to
the parent within 12 months after an adjudication of
neglected minor, abused minor or dependent minor
under Juvenile Court Act or the Juvenile Court Act of
1987." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West
1996).(4)
	In the present case, a panel of the Second District of the
appellate court held that a parent's progress toward the return of
the child is measured from the situation that gave rise to the
child's removal, and not whether the parent meets goals outlined
by DCFS. The court explained that placing undue emphasis on
compliance with DCFS service plans would unfairly elevate
administrative means over statutory ends, and could result in the
termination of parental rights based only on the parent's failure to
complete tasks in the DCFS service plan that were not necessarily
related to the previously established parental shortcoming. The
appellate court further held that, in light of the conditions which
existed when C.N. was removed, rather than the recommendations
made by DCFS, it is clearly evident that respondents made
reasonable progress toward C.N.'s return. The appellate court
reversed the trial court's order terminating respondents' parental
rights.
	The State maintains that the Second District appellate court
construed section 1(D)(m) too narrowly, by focusing solely on the
conditions that gave rise to the removal of C.N. and ignoring other
parental deficiencies, as addressed in the DCFS service plans and
the circuit court's directives. The State argues that the correct
standard by which to measure a parent's progress is the standard
adopted by another district of the appellate court. That court has
held that the measure of reasonable progress encompasses those
conditions which could give rise to a finding of abuse or neglect,
not merely those conditions which led to the initial removal of the
minor, and that the standard by which progress should be
measured is parental compliance with the court's directives, the
DCFS service plan, or both. In re C.S., 294 Ill. App. 3d 780, 792
(4th Dist. 1998).
	Our analysis begins, as it must, with the language of the
statute. See In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000). The grounds for
unfitness set forth in section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act are
phrased in the disjunctive. Thus, section 1(D)(m) provides two
independent bases for a finding of unfitness: (1) the failure by a
parent to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that
were the basis for the removal of the child, or (2) the failure to
make reasonable progress toward the return of the child. See
People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 349 (1992) (ordinary
disjunctive use of "or" indicates a choice between alternatives); In
re S.G., 216 Ill. App. 3d 668, 670 (1991) ("as the language of
subsection 1 D(m) is in the disjunctive, either a failure to make
reasonable efforts or reasonable progress can be grounds for an
adjudication of unfitness" (emphasis in original)); accord In re
Drescher, 91 Ill. App. 3d 658, 666 (1980). We examine the
"reasonable progress" provision in this case.
	The Adoption Act does not define "progress." In the absence
of a statutory definition indicating a different legislative intent, we
ascribe to a word its ordinary and popularly understood meaning.
Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,
183 Ill. 2d 470, 477-78 (1998); People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom
Systems Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (1991). "Progress" ordinarily
denotes movement or advancement toward a goal. Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 1813 (1993). The goal set forth in
the statute is "the return of the child." Consistent with the statutory
language, our appellate court has repeatedly read this provision of
section 1(D)(m) to require "demonstrable movement toward the
goal of reunification." See, e.g., In re J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d 553,
565 (2000); In re K.P., 305 Ill. App. 3d 175, 180 (1999); In re
L.N., 278 Ill. App. 3d 46, 50 (1996); In re M.C., 201 Ill. App. 3d
792, 798 (1990); In re Allen, 172 Ill. App. 3d 950, 956 (1988).
Under the statute's express language, a parent's progress toward
this goal is judged under the familiar "reasonableness" standard.
	The statute, however, does not expressly set forth how
progress is actually made or measured. That is, the statute does not
explain what steps are necessary to reach the goal of "the return of
the child." There must be a yardstick or, as some courts have
called it, a "benchmark," against which to measure a parent's
progress. See, e.g., L.N., 278 Ill. App. 3d at 50-51; In re A.P., 277
Ill. App. 3d 592, 598 (1996); In re S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d 88, 119
(1992). Without such a benchmark, it is impossible to determine
whether any progress-reasonable or otherwise-has been made.
	Decisions from our appellate court are not in agreement as to
the appropriate benchmark. Some appellate court decisions, like
the one in this case, have measured progress by looking at the
degree to which a parent has corrected the situation which
triggered the minor's initial removal or the conditions existing at
the time custody is taken. See L.N., 278 Ill. App. 3d at 50-51; S.G.,
216 Ill. App. 3d at 669-70; In re M.W., 199 Ill. App. 3d 1050,
1056 (1990); In re Henry, 175 Ill. App. 3d 778, 790-91 (1988);
Allen, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 956; In re Bennett, 80 Ill. App. 3d 207,
212 (1980). Other appellate court decisions have held that once the
court, or an authorized agency like DCFS, decides what steps a
parent must take to achieve the return of the child, subsequent
inquiry into a parent's progress should focus on the parent's
compliance with the DCFS service plan, the court's directives, or
both. According to these decisions, the steps outlined for the
parents in the service plan and/or the court's orders should be
designed to remedy not only the parental deficiency which was the
basis for the child's removal, but other parental deficiencies later
identified which would prevent return of the child. See C.S., 294
Ill. App. 3d at 787-88; In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 463-64
(1991). Still other decisions have attempted to reach a middle
ground. In S.J., for example, the appellate court held that the
"crucial consideration is the actual progress made from the
conditions at the time of the neglect adjudication," but explained
that a parent's failure to follow DCFS service plans or the court's
directives is not necessarily irrelevant to an evaluation of whether
the parent made "substantial progress" under the statute. S.J., 233
Ill. App. 3d at 120-21. See also In re D.D., 309 Ill. App. 3d 581,
586-88 (2000), appeal allowed, 189 Ill. 2d 658 (2000) (holding
that the focus must remain on the respondents' abilities as parents
relative to the needs of the children, and rejecting an approach
which focuses solely on whether the respondent complied with
DCFS service plans).
	We reject the narrow view that a court may only look to the
situation that triggered the minor's initial removal, or the
conditions existing at the time custody is taken, in measuring a
parent's progress under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act. As
noted earlier, section 1(D)(m) sets forth two independent grounds
for a finding of unfitness. The first ground is "[f]ailure by a parent
to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the
basis for the removal of the child from the parent." (Emphasis
added.) 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1996). Had the legislature
also intended the "reasonable progress" ground to be limited to the
"conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from
the parent," the legislature could have included this language. It
did not do so, and we will not read such a limitation into the
statute. See Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999) (court will not read into a statute exceptions,
limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express).
	We reject this narrow view of the reasonable progress ground
for the additional reason that it erroneously assumes that the
condition which triggered removal of the child is the only
condition a parent need ever address in order to achieve the goal
of reunification. The parent-child relationship, the environment in
the home, and the precise conditions which triggered State
intervention do not remain static over time. Thus, the relevant
issues are not "frozen" at the moment custody of the child is taken.
See C.S., 294 Ill. App. 3d at 793.
	In addition, other serious conditions, existing at the time the
child is removed, may become known only after removal,
following further investigation of the child, parent and family
situation. As one court observed, "[W]hat may appear to be a
momentary lapse in parental judgment can turn out to be a
symptom of more profound emotional, psychological, or even
psychiatric problems which impair the performance of parental
duties," but which come to light only with further investigation.
C.S., 294 Ill. App. 3d at 789.
	The necessity of considering other conditions that later come
to light is reflected in the broad scope of the investigation
authorized under the Juvenile Court Act. Under section 2-21,
following a court's determination of abuse, neglect or dependency,
the court may order an investigation concerning the "minor's
physical and mental history and condition, family situation and
background, economic status, education, occupation, history of
delinquency or criminality, personal habits, and any other
information that may be helpful to the court" at the dispositional
hearing. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 1998). We note, too, that
under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (325 ILCS
5/1 et seq. (West 1998)), service plans prepared by DCFS are not
limited to addressing the condition which triggered the minor's
removal. Rather, the service plans must reasonably relate to
"remedying a condition or conditions that gave rise or which could
give rise to any finding of child abuse or neglect." (Emphasis
added.) 325 ILCS 5/8.2 (West 1998).
	In construing section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act, we also
reject the equally narrow view that, in measuring a parent's
progress toward the return of the child, a court should focus solely
on the parent's compliance with DCFS service plans.
	We recognize that the service plans are an integral part of the
statutory scheme. Indeed, at the adjudicatory hearing, "[i]f the
court finds that the child has been abused, neglected or dependent,
the court shall admonish the parents that they must cooperate with
the Department of Children and Family Services, comply with the
terms of the service plan, and correct the conditions that require
the child to be in care, or risk termination of parental rights." 705
ILCS 405/2-21(1) (West 1998). See also 705 ILCS 405/2-22(6)
(West 1998) (requiring essentially the same admonishment at the
dispositional hearing). Had the legislature, however, intended a
parent's progress toward the return of the child to be measured by
looking only to the parent's compliance with the service plans, the
legislature could have included language to that effect in the
statute. It did not do so.
	Moreover, in construing section 1(D)(m), we must assume the
legislature did not intend to produce an unjust result. See Baker v.
Miller, 159 Ill. 2d 249, 262 (1994). Although service plans, by
statute, must reasonably relate to "remedying a condition or
conditions that gave rise or which could give rise to any finding of
child abuse or neglect" (325 ILCS 5/8.2 (West 1998)), mechanical
application of a rule that measures a parent's progress only in
terms of compliance with the service plans could produce unjust
results.
	First, to the extent a service plan deviates from this statutory
requirement, a parent could be found unfit merely for failing to
comply with administrative directives unrelated to remedying a
condition which would prevent return of the child. Second, even
where the service plan satisfies the statutory requirements, a parent
could be found unfit simply for failing to complete individual
service plan tasks which, standing alone, would be insufficient to
prevent return of the child. A parent could also be found unfit
where, although the parent attained the goal established by DCFS,
the parent did not follow the specific directives set forth in the
service plan. This cannot be what the legislature intended.
	We do not suggest that the service plans routinely deviate
from the statutory requirements; we have no reason to so conclude.
Nor do we suggest that a parent's compliance with individual
service plan tasks is unimportant; the statutory scheme
demonstrates otherwise. We emphasize only that, in light of the
"deep human importance" of parental rights and responsibilities
(In re Paul, 101 Ill. 2d 345, 351-52 (1984)), and the fundamental
liberty interest at stake (Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at
606, 102 S. Ct. at 1394-95), courts must take care to ensure that
the statutory requirements for service plans are met in every case,
and that the overall focus in evaluating a parent's progress toward
the return of the child remains, at all times, on the fitness of the
parent in relation to the needs of the child.
	As the foregoing discussion indicates, the benchmark for
measuring a parent's progress under section 1(D)(m) of the
Adoption Act must take into account the dynamics of the
circumstances involved; the reality that the condition resulting in
removal of the child may not be the only, or the most severe,
condition which must be addressed before custody of the child can
be returned to the parent; the appropriate role of service plans in
addressing these conditions; and the overriding concern that a
parent's rights to his or her child will not be terminated lightly.
Accordingly, we hold that the benchmark for measuring a parent's
"progress toward the return of the child" under section 1(D)(m) of
the Adoption Act encompasses the parent's compliance with the
service plans and the court's directives, in light of the condition
which gave rise to the removal of the child, and in light of other
conditions which later become known and which would prevent
the court from returning custody of the child to the parent. We
believe this result is consistent with the overriding purpose of the
Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-2 (West 1998)), and
naturally follows from the language of section 1(D)(m), when read
in conjunction with the other statutory provisions discussed above.
	This result is also consistent with recent amendments to
section 1(D)(m). The statute now additionally provides that, "[i]f
a service plan has been established as required under Section 8.2
of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act to correct the
conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from the
parent and if those services were available, then, for purposes of
this Act, 'failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of
the child to the parent' includes *** the parent's failure to
substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service plan
and correct the conditions that brought the child into care ***."
750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West Supp. 1999). Although we are not
called upon to construe this statutory language, we note that it
underscores what we hold here: namely, that compliance with
DCFS service plans is intimately tied to a parent's progress toward
the return of the child, so much so, that where a service plan has
been established to correct the conditions that were the basis for
the removal of the child from the parent, the failure to make
reasonable progress now includes the failure to "substantially"
fulfill the terms of that service plan.
	As indicated earlier, the appellate court in the present case
held that progress is measured from the situation which gave rise
to the child's removal, and not whether the parent meets goals
outlined by DCFS. In light of our holding above, we conclude that
the appellate court, in reviewing the circuit court's finding of
unfitness, erred in its statement of the law. Although we disprove
of the appellate court's decision, before deciding whether to
reverse the same and, consequently, to affirm the decision of the
trial court terminating respondents' parental rights, we must
consider the evidence introduced at the termination hearing and
whether the circuit court's finding of unfitness was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. See Syck, 138 Ill. 2d  at 278
(where appellate court misconstrued its role in reviewing
correctness of unfitness finding, review of the evidence was
necessary before determining whether appellate court decision
required reversal).
	Preliminarily, we note that this court, in In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (2000), held that section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act limits
the evidence that may be considered, with respect to this ground
of unfitness, to matters concerning the parent's conduct in the 12
months after the applicable adjudication of neglect, abuse or
dependency. In D.L., however, we did not consider the unusual
situation present here, where, based on the stipulations of the
parents, the minor was adjudged neglected on two separate dates.
	On January 3, 1995, the circuit court adjudged C.N. a
neglected minor as to Diane only. This adjudication related to the
allegations of physical abuse contained in the State's original
petition for adjudication of wardship. The State later filed a second
petition containing allegations of sexual abuse. At the time the
State filed its first and second petitions, Marin was the reported
father of C.N. After test results established paternity in Mark, the
State amended both petitions to name Mark as C.N.'s father.
Shortly thereafter, on June 5, 1996, Diane and Mark stipulated
that, as alleged in the State's amended petitions, S.S. and C.N.
were sexually abused by Marin, S.S. was physically abused by
Marin, and Diane caused or allowed such physical abuse to occur.
Based on these stipulations, the circuit court adjudged C.N. a
neglected and abused minor as to both Diane and Mark.
	The termination hearing in this case took place long before
our decision in D.L., and the circuit court allowed the introduction
of evidence of Diane's conduct during the entire three-year period
from the first neglect adjudication on January 3, 1995, through the
commencement of the termination hearing on February 3, 1998.
Under D.L., we may only consider evidence of Diane's conduct
during the 12-month period following the relevant adjudication of
neglect or abuse. D.L., 191 Ill. 2d  at 10. Although C.N. was
adjudged neglected, as to Diane, on two occasions, the State's
petition for termination of parental rights expressly refers only to
the first neglect adjudication on January 3, 1995. We need not
decide, however, whether the relevant 12-month period began on
January 3, 1995, or on June 5, 1996, the date of the second neglect
adjudication. As discussed below, whether we consider the
evidence of Diane's conduct during either or both of these periods,
we hold that the circuit court's determination that Diane was unfit
is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.(5)
	As to Mark, it is clear that under D.L. we may consider only
evidence of Mark's conduct during the 12-month period following
the second neglect adjudication on June 5, 1996. Although the
State's petition for termination of parental rights did not
specifically refer to this date, the record of the circuit court
proceedings reveals that the parties and the court were well aware
that C.N. was not adjudged neglected, as to Mark, until June 5,
1996. In addition, we note that Mark raised no issue before this
court related to the State's failure to clarify, in its petition for
termination of parental rights, that only the June 5, 1996, neglect
adjudication was applicable to him.
	With these strictures in mind, we begin our review of the
evidence by turning to the DCFS service plans. The appellate court
concluded that, although the service plans may have contained
goals designed to improve the general conditions of respondents'
home, the record did not establish that the service plan goals
corrected the conditions that were the basis of the removal of C.N.
Underlying this conclusion is the appellate court's view that once
Marin ceased to reside with respondents, the condition that
triggered C.N.'s removal was resolved. We disagree.
	The condition or conditions which led to the physical abuse
of S.S., which placed C.N. at risk, and which led to the sexual
abuse of both minors, encompass more than Marin's presence in
the home. Three adults were involved, and two of
them-respondents-failed to protect S.S. and C.N. from abuse.
Respondents told a DCFS investigator that they had each
witnessed Marin hit S.S. prior to the first hot line call in July 1994.
Diane admitted to a DCFS investigator that S.S. had been sexually
abused, and stipulated that she failed to protect S.S. Respondents
both stipulated that C.N., who was five months old at the time
DCFS took her into protective custody, had been sexually abused.
Under the circumstances of this case, we believe the service plans
and the court's orders, which required respondents to participate
in sexual abuse counseling and exhibit appropriate parenting
skills, were reasonably related to remedying the conditions which
led to the removal of C.N.
	In addition, the record indicates that at the time of C.N.'s
removal, the family was living in a small motel room. There was
also evidence that Marin abused alcohol. We believe, therefore,
that the service plan requirement that respondents obtain alcohol
and substance abuse evaluations and maintain an appropriate
residence were also reasonably related to remedying conditions
existing at the time of C.N.'s removal.
	We turn now to the evidence of respondents' conduct during
the relevant post-adjudication periods. Although the evidence is
set out in considerable detail earlier in this opinion, we provide a
brief overview.
Diane N.
	Following the establishment of the initial service plan and the
January 3, 1995, adjudication, Diane initially complied with the
court's orders and the service plan tasks. By February 1995, Diane
had obtained a substance abuse evaluation, started counseling, and
was attending, or about to attend, parenting classes. Diane also
obtained a psychological evaluation, with a recommendation that
she continue in counseling to address issues of poor judgment and
parenting style. Diane's attendance in counseling, however, was
inconsistent, and by July 1995, Diane was taking an adversarial
role with DCFS.
	In August 1995, DCFS caseworker Amelia Apperson rated
Diane's progress toward the service plan goal of "return home"
unsatisfactory. Diane was uncooperative; she was not regularly
participating in counseling; she continued to deny any
responsibility for the abuse of her children; and although she
completed a parenting class, she failed to exhibit appropriate
parenting skills during visits with C.N.
	Diane made little progress in in-home parenting classes which
began in late August 1995. Diane was not cooperative, her
attendance was sporadic, and she failed to put into practice
concepts learned in class. Diane's dissatisfaction with DCFS was
an issue at almost every session.
	During late 1995, Diane's visits with C.N. were going poorly,
and Diane frequently terminated the visits early. According to the
DCFS supervisor, Diane did not have the endurance to work with
C.N.
	Psychologist James Jorgenson testified that Diane expressed
only a perfunctory concern for the safety of C.N. Similarly, Amy
Unterborn, Diane's counselor during 1995, testified that Diane did
not demonstrate the skills necessary to create a safe environment
for her children. In addition, Unterborn testified that although
Diane admitted she had exposed S.S. and C.N. to an inadequate
environment, Diane failed to recognize the emotional impact of
the abuse on C.N. and that her daughters would suffer long-term
consequences due to the abuse. According to Unterborn, Diane
could have made more progress in counseling, had she focused
more on developing necessary skills and less on her anger with
DCFS and her desire to manipulate the system.
	Following the development of the August 1996 service plan,
Diane continued to resist DCFS intervention. Although she
subsequently agreed to participate in counseling, in March and
April of 1997, she failed to follow through with an assessment at
Family Advocate, an agency specializing in the treatment of sexual
abuse and which provides counseling to address issues related to
the parenting of a child who has been abused.
	The record evinces a failure by Diane, during the 12 months
following the January 3, 1995, adjudication, to comply with the
terms of the service plan, as ordered by the circuit court, and
participate meaningfully in available services. Diane focused upon
her anger and hostility toward DCFS, all the while disclaiming any
responsibility for the abuse of C.N. Even after the second
adjudication of abuse and neglect, Diane continued to oppose
DCFS intervention and failed to follow through on sexual abuse
counseling. Based on this record, we conclude that the circuit
court's finding that Diane was unfit for failure to make reasonable
progress toward C.N.'s return is not against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
	Diane maintains that the trial court erred in admitting the
testimony of psychologist James Jorgenson, who conducted a
bonding assessment in late 1995. Diane argues that Jorgenson's
testimony related only to the issue of whether the continued
existence of the parent-child relationship was in C.N.'s best
interests-a consideration irrelevant in determining Diane's fitness.
See Syck, 138 Ill. 2d  at 276. Jorgenson's testimony was relevant to
the issue of Diane's ability to parent C.N. and provide a safe
environment. Thus, we disagree with Diane's characterization of
his testimony, and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
considerable discretion in admitting Jorgenson's testimony. See
Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche Ross
& Co., 159 Ill. 2d 137, 169 (1994) (admission of evidence is
within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be
reversed on review absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion).
Mark N.
	Although Mark participated in some services prior to the
establishment of paternity, we focus only on Mark's conduct in the
year following the June 5, 1996, neglect adjudication.
	During this period, the record indicates that DCFS caseworker
Amelia Apperson was concerned about Mark's ability to parent
C.N. By his own admission, he had been involved in C.N.'s life
prior to DCFS involvement. C.N., however, was developmentally
delayed due to a prior lack of stimulation and nurturing. Mark
minimized the impact of the abuse on C.N. and took a simplistic
view of her needs, not appreciating that C.N. required serious
therapy, structure, and care. In August 1996, Apperson rated
Mark's progress in demonstrating adequate parenting skills
unsatisfactory. Apperson's rating was based on her own
observations and reports from the visit supervisor and the in-home
educator. Apperson also noted, in her written evaluation, that
Mark "has not cooperated with DCFS," that he has, "at times ***
become verbally abusive to DCFS workers, the foster parents and
other service providers," and that he has not signed any releases of
information, including those necessary "to make referrals for ***
counseling for family members whose children have been sexually
abused." The circuit court had ordered Mark to participate in
counseling for family members of sexual offenders.
	The adversarial role Mark assumed with DCFS continued
beyond the immediate post-adjudication period into 1997. Mark
persisted in his belief that he and Diane should not have been
"indicated," and was reluctant to engage in recommended services.
Although Mark eventually obtained alcohol and psychological
assessments, he failed to attend any appointments at Family
Advocate, notwithstanding his prior agreement and the circuit
court's order. The only counseling in which Mark participated was
a telephone service of which DCFS had no information and had
not approved.
	In light of this evidence, we conclude that the trial court's
determination that Mark was unfit for failing to make reasonable
progress toward the return of C.N. is not against the manifest
weight of the evidence; the opposite conclusion is not clearly
evident. We reject Mark's argument that the trial court penalized
him for Diane's conduct. We believe the record sufficiently
demonstrates Mark's lack of progress, independent of Diane's
conduct.
	As a final matter, we note that the parties have not raised any
issues involving the "best interests" hearing, the second stage of
the proceeding to terminate respondents' parental rights. See 705
ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 1998); Syck, 138 Ill. 2d  at 276-77.
Therefore, in light of our conclusion that the circuit court's finding
of unfitness is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we
reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the
judgment of the circuit court terminating respondents' parental
rights to C.N.
CONCLUSION
	For the above reasons, we reverse the appellate court
judgment, which reversed the circuit court's order terminating
respondents' parental rights to C.N., and affirm the circuit court
judgment.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
1.      1This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights only as to
C.N.

2.      2Under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act, if an
investigation determines that credible evidence of the alleged abuse or
neglect exists, an "indicated report" is made. 325 ILCS 5/3 (West 1998).

3.      3During the course of the circuit court proceedings, Diane and Mark
became parents of two more daughters, M.N. and L.N. Any issues
involving M.N. and L.N. are not before this court.

4.      4Although the legislature has amended section 1(D)(m) multiple
times, the statute retains the "reasonable progress" language. See 750
ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West Supp. 1999).

5.      5Subsequent amendments to section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act
have shortened the relevant post-adjudication period to nine months,
and have added language indicating that unfitness includes the failure
to make reasonable progress "during any 9-month period after the end
of the initial 9-month period." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)
(West Supp. 1999).