Case Title: Commonwealth v. Denton

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12272

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12272 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SCYPIO DENTON. 
 
 
 
Essex.     March 9, 2017. - June 1, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Entrapment.  Evidence, Prior conviction. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 6, 2014. 
 
 
The case was tried before James F. Lang, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
James E. Methe for the defendant. 
 
Quentin R. Weld, Assistant District Attorney (Elin H. 
Graydon, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  Following a jury trial, the defendant, Scypio 
Denton, was convicted of distribution of heroin, in violation of 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (b).1  At trial, the defendant raised the 
 
1 Following his conviction on the substantive crime, the 
                     
 
2 
 
affirmative defense of entrapment.  The judge permitted the 
Commonwealth to respond by introducing evidence of three prior 
convictions, despite the defendant's objection that they were 
too stale to be probative of his predisposition to commit the 
crime.  The defendant's principal argument on appeal concerns 
the decision to admit this evidence.2  We reverse on that ground. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have found. 
 
1.  2013 distribution.  On December 17, 2013, the defendant 
was approached by an undercover police officer posing as a drug 
addict.3  The officer told the defendant he "was dope sick and 
. . . looking to get hooked up . . . because [he] wasn't feeling 
well."  He asked the defendant for "a forty" of "brown"4 and 
explained that his dealer was not answering his telephone calls 
because he owed the dealer money.  At the time of the undercover 
operation, there was an unwritten rule among drug users that if 
defendant pleaded guilty to being a subsequent offender.  The 
judge sentenced the defendant to from three and one-half years 
to three and one-half years and one day in State prison, the 
mandatory minimum sentence for subsequent drug offenders. 
 
 
2 We transferred the case from the Appeals Court to this 
court on our own motion. 
 
 
3 During his sixteen years working undercover, the police 
officer had made approximately 850 undercover purchases.  On the 
day that the officer approached the defendant, the officer and 
his colleagues were not focused on any one individual, but 
rather on reducing open-air drug sales in the area. 
 
 
4 The officer explained that this was a reference to an 
amount of heroin worth forty dollars. 
                                                                  
3 
 
somebody was "dope sick" from heroin withdrawal, another user 
would help them to find more heroin, as he or she could 
sympathize with the feeling.5  The officer believed that this 
approach for targeting heroin distribution was successful 
approximately twenty to thirty per cent of the time. 
 
The defendant agreed to help, and they got into an unmarked 
motor vehicle driven by another undercover officer.  While they 
were in the vehicle, the defendant used an officer's cellular 
telephone to tell someone that "he wanted to come by and grab a 
bag."  They then proceeded to a destination the defendant gave 
them.  When they arrived, an officer gave the defendant forty 
dollars and took the defendant's cellular telephone as 
collateral.  The defendant entered a building and returned with 
a bag of a tan powdered substance, which he gave to the officer 
who claimed to be "dope sick."  One of the officers gave the 
defendant five dollars in exchange for obtaining the drugs. 
 
5 At trial, the officer explained why other users would help 
when someone claimed to be "dope sick": 
 
 
"[W]hen a user cannot obtain heroin to use, they 
face . . . withdrawals, ranging from sweats, to the 
chills, severe aching in the muscles and joints, 
nausea. . . .  [I]t's . . . quite a bad scene . . . .  
[Drug users] understand . . . the pain and what 
they're suffering through.  And they are going to do 
pretty much anything they can to help you, because at 
some point they may be in that position themselves, 
and they're going to want someone to help them out." 
                     
4 
 
 
The tan powdered substance was later tested and found to be 
a mixture of heroin and caffeine.  A warrant issued for the 
defendant's arrest, which was carried out at a later date to 
protect the identity of the undercover officers. 
 
2.  Prior convictions introduced at trial.  After the judge 
determined that the defendant had raised the issue of 
entrapment, the prosecutor was allowed to present the following 
evidence of three former convictions to show the defendant's 
predisposition to commit the crime. 
 
In 1993, a police officer saw the defendant place a pipe on 
the floor and a bag of marijuana under a door.  The defendant 
stated that he was buying drugs for two other men.  Based on the 
substance found in two other bags that were found on or near the 
defendant, he was ultimately convicted of possession with intent 
to distribute cocaine. 
 
In 1994, an undercover police officer asked the defendant 
to get him twenty dollars' worth of "crack" cocaine.  The 
defendant agreed to help him.  The defendant went to a nearby 
apartment on the officer's behalf to obtain the cocaine.  When 
the defendant returned with a bag containing a substance that 
looked like crack cocaine, he asked for some money for his role 
in the deal.  He was again convicted of possession with intent 
to distribute cocaine. 
5 
 
 
In 1991, the defendant was convicted of possession of a 
class A substance with intent to distribute.6 
 
Discussion.  We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of 
discretion.  Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 400 (2010).  
Although admissible to show motive and modus operandi, and for 
other purposes, evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts, 
including evidence of past crimes, is generally inadmissible to 
show a defendant's propensity to commit the crime with which he 
or she is charged.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b) (2017).  
Cf. Alegata v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287, 300 (1967) ("The 
concept of 'once a criminal always a criminal' is abhorrent to 
our law").  However, when a defendant raises the defense of 
entrapment, the Commonwealth may respond with propensity 
evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Buswell, 468 Mass. 92, 106 
(2014); Mass. G. Evid. § 405(b). 
 
An entrapment defense is, at bottom, a claim by the 
defendant that he or she ordinarily would not have committed the 
charged crime had officers not enticed him or her to do so.  In 
response, the Commonwealth is entitled to refute that claim by 
introducing evidence to show that the defendant was predisposed 
to commit the charged crime because he or she had committed 
similar bad acts in the past; i.e., that police officers did not 
 
6 For this crime, the prosecutor did not present the 
underlying facts. 
                     
6 
 
entice an otherwise innocent person to commit a criminal act.  
See Buswell, supra; Mass. G. Evid. § 405(b).  The bad acts must 
be "sufficiently similar to the crime charged to ensure that 
their probative value outweighs the strong likelihood of 
prejudice."7  Buswell, supra, citing Commonwealth v. Vargas, 417 
Mass. 792, 795 (1994). 
 
In evaluating the admissibility of prior bad act evidence 
in an entrapment case, a judge must also consider whether 
sufficiently similar prior bad acts are recent enough that they 
remain probative of the defendant's predisposition to commit the 
charged crime.  Recent bad acts tend to show that a defendant 
was predisposed to commit a similar crime, so they have strong 
probative value that will likely outweigh the prejudice to the 
defendant.  See Buswell, 468 Mass. at 106-107, citing Vargas, 
417 Mass. at 795.  However, over time, as the defendant has had 
the opportunity to reform himself or herself, the balance 
between probative value and unfair prejudice shifts 
incrementally toward the latter.  See Commonwealth v. Dingle, 73 
 
7 This is similar to the exacting standard we employ for the 
admission of prior bad act evidence by the prosecution where 
there is no defense of entrapment.  See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 
470 Mass. 228, 249 & n.27 (2014) (prior bad act evidence is 
inadmissible "if its probative value is outweighed by the risk 
of unfair prejudice to the defendant"); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 404(b)(2).  Contrast Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (relevant evidence 
that does not concern prior bad acts is admissible unless "its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . 
unfair prejudice" [emphasis added]). 
                     
7 
 
Mass. App. Ct. 274, 284 (2008) (probative value of 
predisposition evidence was outweighed by its prejudice where 
prior bad acts were "old, the most recent dating back more than 
thirteen years"); Commonwealth v. Childs, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 33, 
37-38 (1986), S.C., 400 Mass. 1006 (1987) (when introduced at 
trial in 1984, prejudicial effect of prior convictions from 
1950s and 1960s was more pronounced).  Thus, prior convictions 
must "not be too remote in time" or they lose their probative 
value as to whether the defendant was predisposed to commit this 
most recent crime.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Butler, 445 Mass. 568, 
574 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Barrett, 418 Mass. 788, 794 
(1994) (probative value of prior bad acts decreases over time); 
G. L. c. 233, § 21 (imposing time limits on admission of prior 
convictions to impeach witness credibility). 
 
Here, the parties and the judge discussed at length what 
evidence the prosecutor could introduce to rebut the defendant's 
entrapment defense by showing that he was predisposed to commit 
the crime.  The prosecutor stated her intention to elicit 
testimony that would show the facts and certified convictions of 
two prior cases, as well as a certified conviction from a third 
case, all of which ultimately were introduced at trial.  The 
defendant moved to exclude the proffered evidence of these 
convictions, arguing that their age made them more prejudicial 
than probative.  The judge denied the motion to exclude, 
8 
 
concluding that the possible prejudicial impact of the evidence 
did not outweigh their probative value. 
 
The judge appeared to have given the age of the convictions 
careful consideration.  However, in the circumstances of this 
case it was error to admit the prior bad acts.  Although the 
facts in at least two of the defendant's prior cases bore a 
remarkable similarity to those in this case (i.e., acting as a 
"middleman" in a drug transaction), the initially high probative 
value of the convictions dropped sharply over time.  The acts 
underlying the convictions all took place in or before 
1994, nineteen years before the crime charged in this case.  The 
Commonwealth was unable to identify any case where past crimes 
this old were used as propensity evidence to rebut an entrapment 
defense; nor have we found any.  See Dingle, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 284 (evidence of bad acts from thirteen or more years earlier 
was erroneously admitted).  Here, where the most recent act was 
at least nineteen years old, the probative value regarding 
predisposition no longer outweighed the potential prejudice to 
the defendant.  In addition, the limiting instruction8 to the 
jury was insufficient to mitigate the error given the inherent 
 
8 The judge instructed:  "You may consider this evidence 
solely for whatever light it sheds on the issue of whether the 
[d]efendant was predisposed and ready to commit the offense with 
which he is charged.  You are not to consider it for any other 
purpose." 
                     
9 
 
dangers in admitting evidence of predisposition.  See, 
e.g., Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 
1961) (cautioning that admission of prior convictions "is 
subject to the defects inherent in any retrospective appraisal 
of past conduct"). 
 
Conclusion.  Because the introduction of the prior 
convictions was not harmless error, a new trial is required.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Verdict set aside. 
 
9 The defendant further attributes error to the introduction 
of a statement by a retired police officer who testified 
regarding a prior conviction and to the imposition of a 
mandatory minimum sentence.  He also argues that the prosecutor 
erred in remarking that jurors are average people who would not 
know vernacular drug terms, referring to undercover police 
operations in other types of criminal cases, and stating that 
the Commonwealth did not have sufficient evidence to charge the 
dealer.  Because we conclude that evidence of the defendant's 
prior convictions warrants a new trial, we need not address 
these arguments.