Case Title: State v. Michael S. Piddington

Citation: 2001 WI 24

Docket Number: 1999AP001250-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 24 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1250-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Michael S. Piddington,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 44 
Reported at:  233 Wis. 2d 257, 607 N.W.2d 303 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 22, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
December 12, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel R. Moeser 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
SYKES, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Michele A. Tjader and Kalal & Associates, Madison, 
and oral argument by Michele A. Tjader. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued 
by Kathleen M. Ptacek, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Keith A. 
Findley, Michele La Vigne and the University of Wisconsin Law 
School, on behalf of the Frank J. Remington Center. 
 
2001 WI 24 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael S. Piddington,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J.   Michael 
Piddington 
seeks 
review of a published court of appeals decision that reversed a 
circuit court order which had suppressed the test results of 
Piddington's blood for alcohol.  State v. Piddington, 2000 WI 
App 44, 233 Wis. 2d 257, 607 N.W.2d 303.  Piddington was tested 
after he was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of an intoxicant (OWI).  The circuit court had 
concluded that Piddington, who has been profoundly deaf since 
birth, needed an American Sign Language interpreter to fully 
understand the field sobriety tests and the information that he 
was to be given pursuant to Wisconsin's implied consent law, 
FILED 
 
      
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 22, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
2 
Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(4)(1995-96).1 
 
The court 
of appeals 
reversed, concluding that the law enforcement officer need only 
"orally 
inform" 
Piddington 
of 
the 
required 
information.2  
Piddington, 2000 WI App 44 at ¶12.  We disagree with the court 
of appeals' approach regarding the implied consent warnings 
                     
1  "Implied consent" refers to the principle that a driver 
"is deemed to have given consent" to chemical tests for alcohol 
as a condition of operating a motor vehicle in Wisconsin.  Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(2)(1995-96).   
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-96 
version unless otherwise noted. 
2 The version of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4)——the 1995-96 
version——that was in effect at the time that Piddington was 
arrested reads as follows: 
(4) Information. At the time a chemical test specimen is 
requested under sub. (3) (a) or (am), the person shall be 
orally informed by the law enforcement officer that: 
(a) He or she is deemed to have consented to tests under 
sub. (2); 
(b) If testing is refused, a motor vehicle owned by the 
person may be immobilized, seized and forfeited or equipped 
with an ignition interlock device if the person has 2 or 
more prior suspensions, revocations or convictions within a 
10-year period that would be counted under s. 343.307 (1) 
and the person's operating privilege will be revoked under 
this section; 
(c) If one or more tests are taken and the results of any 
test indicate that the person has a prohibited alcohol 
concentration and was driving or operating a motor vehicle, 
the person will be subject to penalties, the person's 
operating privilege will be suspended under this section 
and a motor vehicle owned by the person may be immobilized, 
seized and forfeited or equipped with an ignition interlock 
device if the person has 2 or more prior convictions, 
suspensions or revocations within a 10-year period that 
would be counted under s. 343.307 (1); and  
(d) After submitting to testing, the person tested has the 
right to have an additional test made by a person of his or 
her own choosing.  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
3 
contained in § 343.305(4).3  We hold that § 343.305(4) requires 
the arresting officer under the circumstances facing him or her 
at the time of the arrest, to utilize those methods which were 
reasonable, and would reasonably convey the implied consent 
warnings.  In determining whether the arresting officer has used 
reasonable methods which would reasonably convey the necessary 
information in light of the pertinent circumstances, the focus 
rests upon the conduct of the officer.  We thus agree with that 
part of the circuit court's findings that "the attempts of law 
enforcement to communicate with the defendant were reasonable 
under all the circumstances, perhaps even exemplary . . . ."  
(R. at 28:1-2.)  The law enforcement officers here used 
reasonable methods to convey the required implied consent 
warnings, and, accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.  The 
test results should not have been suppressed.  
I 
¶2 
The facts are largely undisputed.  On February 14, 
1998, at approximately 1:00 a.m., a Wisconsin State Patrol 
trooper patrolling U.S. Highway 51 in Madison observed in front 
of him a pickup truck speeding and drifting from lane to lane.  
                     
3 Herein, the term "implied consent warnings" refers to the 
information the legislature has directed law enforcement to 
convey to drivers accused of OWI pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(4). 
 
That 
information 
includes: 
(a) 
a 
brief 
explanation of the nature of implied consent; (b) a warning 
about the consequences of refusing to submit to a chemical test 
to determine alcohol concentration in the blood; (c) a warning 
about the consequences of a prohibited concentration of alcohol 
in the blood; and (d) the right to request an alternative test.  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
4 
When the pickup truck made an abrupt swerve, the trooper stopped 
him.  Piddington, who has been severely deaf since birth, and 
his passenger indicated to the trooper that Piddington was deaf. 
 The trooper told Piddington through the passenger (acting as an 
interpreter) that he was going to have Piddington perform field 
sobriety tests after he checked Piddington’s license.   
¶3 
When the trooper returned, the passenger told the 
trooper that Piddington wanted to know why he had been stopped. 
 The trooper wrote the reason on his pad, and, for the remainder 
of the stop, used notes, gestures and some speaking to 
communicate with Piddington.4  The trooper had contacted dispatch 
to track down a law enforcement officer who knew sign language, 
but was informed that no one was available.  Piddington had 
asked both at the beginning of the stop, and also later during 
the stop, for a sign language interpreter, and the trooper told 
him that no one was yet available.  Piddington, however, had 
also indicated that he could speech-read, colloquially known as 
"reading lips."  
¶4 
Piddington admitted that he had been drinking.  The 
trooper saw that Piddington’s eyes were glassy and that there 
was a strong odor of alcohol about him.  The trooper had 
Piddington perform sobriety tests, including the horizontal gaze 
nystagamus (follow the pen tip with the eyes) test and the walk-
                     
4 The trooper indicated that he had intended to have the 
passenger continue to interpret, but he had the passenger return 
to the car when he found that he did not need the passenger to 
interpret in order to communicate with Piddington.  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
5 
and-turn test.  The trooper instructed Piddington through oral 
and written instructions, as well as demonstrating the tests for 
him.   
¶5 
Based upon Piddington's performance in these two 
tests, the trooper concluded that he was impaired, and had him 
perform a preliminary breath test to determine Piddington’s 
blood alcohol concentration.  Again, the trooper gave both 
written instructions and a demonstration.  The result was 0.27. 
 The trooper then placed Piddington under arrest for OWI.  The 
trooper handcuffed Piddington with his hands in front so that he 
could continue to write notes, and sign, should an officer with 
sign language capability became available.  As the trooper was 
preparing to take Piddington to State Patrol headquarters for a 
breathalyzer test, he learned that a Madison police officer who 
had 
some 
working 
knowledge 
of 
sign 
language 
had 
become 
available, and arranged to meet her at Patrol headquarters.  En 
route to headquarters Piddington requested, through a note, to 
have a blood test.  Consequently, the trooper took him to 
Meriter Hospital, and met the Madison police officer there.  
¶6 
The officer was not a certified American Sign Language 
(ASL) interpreter, but knew some sign language, and she and 
Piddington communicated by sign and orally.  Piddington was 
given an Informing the Accused form,5 and told to read it and 
                     
5 The Informing the Accused form used here was generated by 
the Wisconsin Department of Transportation and based upon 
§ 343.305(4).  It reads in pertinent part as follows:  
When a Law Enforcement Officer requests that you 
submit to a chemical test, pursuant to Wisconsin's 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
6 
initial each paragraph only if he understood it.  (Piddington 
had told the Madison police officer that he graduated from high 
school and could read and write.)  He read it and initialed to 
the left of each applicable paragraph.  The State Patrol trooper 
                                                                  
Implied Consent Law, the officer is required to inform 
you of the following: 
 
Section A 
(applies to everyone) 
 
1. 
You are deemed under Wisconsin's Implied Consent 
Law to have consented to chemical testing of your 
breath, blood or urine at this Law Enforcement 
Agency's expense.  The purpose of testing is to 
determine the presence or quantity of alcohol or other 
drugs in your blood or breath. 
 
2. 
If you refuse to submit to any such tests, your 
operating privilege will be revoked. 
 
3. 
After submitting to chemical testing, you may 
request the alternative test that this law enforcement 
agency is prepared to administer at its expense or you 
may request a reasonable opportunity to have any 
qualified person of your choice administer a chemical 
test at your expense. 
 
4. 
If you take one or more chemical tests and the 
result of any test indicates you have a prohibited 
alcohol concentration, your operating privilege will 
be administratively suspended in addition to other 
penalties which may be imposed. 
 
5. 
If you have a prohibited alcohol concentration or 
you refuse to submit to chemical testing and you have 
two 
or 
more 
prior 
suspensions, 
revocations 
or 
convictions within a 10 year period and after January 
1, 1988, which would be counted under s. 343.307(1) 
Wis. Stats., a motor vehicle owned by you may be 
equipped 
with 
an 
ignition 
interlock 
device, 
immobilized, or seized and forfeited. 
 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
7 
also attempted to read the form aloud to Piddington, but 
Piddington responded by indicating that he could not read his 
lips.6  The Madison police officer read it to Piddington, 
instead, without objection.  The officer told Piddington to 
indicate whether or not he would submit to a blood test and 
initial his response.  Piddington indicated that he would submit 
to a blood test.  The result was 0.206. 
¶7 
Piddington 
was 
subsequently 
charged 
with OWI in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) and with having a 
prohibited alcohol concentration in violation of § 346.63(1)(b).  
¶8 
Piddington made a number of motions to suppress.  At 
the suppression hearing, he testified that he has difficulty 
speech-reading, and that his primary form of communicating is 
ASL.  He also testified that he needed an ASL interpreter to 
fully understand both the trooper’s instructions for the 
sobriety test and the Informing the Accused form. 
¶9 
The State Patrol trooper testified that there were 
times when it was difficult to communicate with Piddington, but 
that he made sure that Piddington understood what the trooper 
was communicating and would not proceed until Piddington 
indicated that he understood.  The trooper also admitted that he 
had been more lenient in evaluating Piddington's performance on 
                     
6 Piddington had indicated earlier in the stop that he could 
read the trooper's lips.  The trooper subsequently testified 
that Piddington had become uncooperative with him when they 
reached the hospital.  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
8 
the sobriety tests than he would have been with hearing drivers 
given the difficulty communicating.   
¶10 Dane County Circuit Court Judge Daniel R. Moeser found 
that there was probable cause for Piddington's arrest, but 
granted the motions to suppress the blood alcohol test and 
statements Piddington made after his arrest.  The circuit court 
found that "the attempts of law enforcement to communicate with 
the defendant were reasonable under all the circumstances, 
perhaps even exemplary."  (R. at 28:1-2.)  However, according to 
the court, those attempts were nonetheless insufficient to meet 
the State’s burden to show that Piddington had been informed 
regarding his right to an alternative test and other information 
contained in the Informing the Accused form.  According to the 
circuit court, "the defendant needed an [ASL] interpreter to 
really understand the information he was being given . . . ."  
(R. at 28:2.) 
¶11 The State appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. 
 Piddington, 2000 WI App 44.  The court of appeals concluded 
that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) "requires nothing more than that an 
arresting officer 'orally inform' an [OWI] arrestee of the 
required information."  Id. at ¶12.  In granting Piddington’s 
petition for review, we additionally ordered the parties to 
address the equal protection issue raised in an amicus brief 
filed in this case by the University of Wisconsin Law School 
Frank J. Remington Center.  
II 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
9 
¶12 Piddington's objections to the court of appeals' 
decision 
are 
based 
in 
both 
statutory 
and 
constitutional 
interpretations.  Piddington contends that the law enforcement 
officer violated Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) because the officer did 
not provide him with an ASL interpreter.  Piddington also 
contends that the absence of an ASL interpreter violated the 
constitutional principles of due process and equal protection.7  
Alternatively, 
according 
to 
Piddington, 
the 
circuit 
court 
correctly suppressed his blood test results because he asked 
for, and did not receive, an alternate test. 
¶13 What Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) required of the State 
Patrol trooper is a question of statutory interpretation.  
"Application of the implied consent statute to an undisputed set 
of facts, like any statutory construction, is a question of law 
that this court reviews de novo."  State v. Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d 
213, 223, 595 N.W.2d 646 (1999).  Similarly, reconciling 
constitutional 
considerations 
of 
due 
process 
and 
equal 
protection with the requirements of the implied consent statute 
involve questions of law, which we also review de novo.  Id.   
A 
                     
7 Connected to his equal protection argument is Piddington’s 
contention that the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, and State Patrol policies 
mandate reasonable accommodation of hearing impaired persons.  
Consequently, according to Piddington, requiring the State to 
provide an ASL interpreter here would not further burden the 
State beyond what it is already required to provide.  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
10
¶14 We address each of Piddington’s contentions in turn, 
starting with considering whether the State Patrol trooper 
complied with, or violated, the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(4).  The focal point of all statutory interpretation 
is discerning the intent of the legislature.  Milwaukee County 
v. DILHR, 80 Wis. 2d 445, 451, 259 N.W.2d 118 (1977).  In 
searching for legislative intent, we start with the language of 
the statute.  Kelley Co. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 247, 493 
N.W.2d 68 (1992).  If the plain meaning of the statute is self-
evident, we look no further.  UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 
274, 281, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).  Where a statute is ambiguous, 
that is, "reasonable minds could differ as to its meaning," the 
court examines further into the scope, history, context, subject 
matter and purpose of the statute in question. Harnischfeger 
Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 662, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995); See 
also UFE, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 282. 
¶15 The term "informed," as in "the person [who is 
requested to submit to a chemical test] shall be orally informed 
by the law enforcement officer," in the introduction of Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(4) is capable of two different meanings.  The 
court of appeals interpreted § 343.305(4) to mean that "an 
arresting officer [need only] 'orally inform[]' an arrestee of 
the correct required information."  Piddington, 2000 WI App 44, 
¶15 
(footnote 
omitted). 
 
The 
State 
agrees 
with 
that 
interpretation here.  Piddington takes the opposite approach, 
contending that § 343.305(4)'s mandate to "inform" requires more 
than merely reading the implied consent warnings to a deaf 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
11
driver, who would be unlikely, based on such an approach, to 
comprehend them. According to Piddington, in this case, law 
enforcement could comply with § 343.305(4) only by providing an 
ASL interpreter.  
¶16 Neither the State's nor Piddington's interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) is unreasonable.  Where "reasonable 
minds could differ as to [the] meaning" of a statute, that 
statute is ambiguous.  Harnischfeger, 196 Wis. 2d at 662.  Here, 
as in State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 45, 403 N.W.2d 427 
(1987), where the State argued that § 343.305 did not provide 
the only means for police to obtain admissible evidence of blood 
alcohol concentration and Zielke argued that it did, "[t]he 
opposing interpretations of the implied consent law advanced by 
the parties demonstrate the ambiguity of the statute."  Because 
precisely what the language of § 343.305(4) requires of law 
enforcement is ambiguous, we look beyond the text to its scope, 
history, context, subject matter, and purpose to determine the 
legislature's intent.  UFE, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 282.  The 
"court . . . presume[s] 
the 
legislature 
intended 
an 
interpretation that advances the purposes of the statute."  
Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 46.  
¶17 The purpose behind the implied consent law is to 
combat drunk driving by "facilit[ating] the gathering of 
evidence against drunk drivers."  State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 
191, 203, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980).  "With this intent in mind we 
proceed to an interpretation of the statute considering the 
 . . . object of the statute, mindful that the court must 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
12
liberally construe the law to effectuate the legislature's 
intent."  Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 47.  The specific objective of 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) within the implied consent statutory 
scheme is to "advise the accused about the nature of the 
driver's implied consent."  Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d at 225.  
Section 343.305(4) warns drivers of the consequences of test 
results indicating an alcohol concentration of greater than 0.10 
as well as the consequences of refusing to submit to testing.  
State v. Muente, 159 Wis. 2d 279, 281-82, 464 N.W.2d 230 (Ct. 
App. 
1990); 
see 
also 
§ 340.01 
(46m)(2). 
 
In 
addition, 
§ 343.305(4)(d) notifies the driver of the right to request a 
second, alternative test to the one requested by the arresting 
officer.  "[T]he legislation requires that an apprehended driver 
be advised of the absolute right to a second test.  This is a 
legislatively conferred right which we will strictly protect."  
State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 527, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984) 
(emphasis added). 
¶18 We turn to how to best ensure that law enforcement 
officers comply with the legislature's mandate requiring that 
apprehended 
drivers 
are 
informed 
about 
their 
rights 
and 
responsibilities under the implied consent law.  Previous 
decisions have addressed the sufficiency of the implied consent 
warnings given to the accused drivers.  See, e.g., Reitter, 227 
Wis. 2d 213; Village of Oregon v. Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d 680, 524 
N.W.2d 635 (1994); State v. Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d 251, 394 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
13
N.W.2d 905 (1986).8  None of these decisions addressed the manner 
in which the law enforcement officer conveyed the information, 
or whether that method reasonably conveyed that information.  
The instant case implicates more than "what must be told persons 
when requesting them to take a breathalyzer test."  Crandall, 
133 Wis. 2d at 259 (emphasis added).  Instead, this case 
implicates how persons are given the implied consent warnings, 
that 
is, 
the 
methods 
used 
to 
convey 
those 
warnings.  
Nonetheless, the previous decisions are "founded on a simple 
premise: the implied consent warnings are designed to inform 
drivers of the rights and penalties applicable to them."  County 
of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269, 279, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. 
App. 1995).  This same principle applies here.  
¶19 The Quelle court concluded that there was a functional 
similarity between the statutory mandate regarding implied 
consent warnings and the 
constitutional mandate 
regarding 
Miranda rights.  Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d at 277-78.  Insofar as the 
objective of both is to inform the accused, "the warnings 
                     
8 This court has also considered the sufficiency of the 
Informing the Accused form, a form developed by the Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation to assist law enforcement officers 
in giving accused drivers the implied consent warnings. See 
Village of Oregon v. Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d 680, 692, 524 N.W.2d 
635 (1994).  We have found that the Informing the Accused forms, 
including 
the 
form 
used 
here, 
"accurately 
informed" 
or 
"adequately alert[ed]" accused 
drivers 
about 
"the testing 
process and the consequences of refusal,"  State v. Reitter, 227 
Wis. 2d 213, 240, 595 N.W.2d 646 (1999) (citing Bryant, 188 
Wis. 2d at 692). 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
14
provided drivers under the implied consent law are analogous to 
those employed in Miranda-type cases."  Id. at 276.  
¶20 In an analogous situation, where a law enforcement 
officer gave an arrestee Miranda warnings in Spanish, this court 
indicated that, in determining whether the arrestee was properly 
advised of his Miranda rights, the pertinent "inquiry is whether 
the warnings reasonably convey the Miranda rights."  State v. 
Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 12 n.6, 556 N.W.2d 687 (1996) 
(citations omitted).9  Yet, even though there is a functional 
similarity between the implied consent and Miranda warnings, 
there are significant distinctions that dictate that an accused 
driver need not comprehend the implied consent warnings for the 
warnings to have been reasonably conveyed.10  In short, "Miranda 
rules do not apply because [the] request to submit to a chemical 
                     
9 In State v. Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 21, 556 N.W.2d 687 
(1996), we concluded that the record was incomplete, and thus we 
could not determine whether the defendant had been "properly 
advised of" or "knowingly and intelligently waive[d] the Miranda 
rights" because of the foreign-language Miranda warnings given. 
10 First, Miranda warnings are based upon the United States 
Constitution (see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 
(2000); the implied consent warnings are based upon Wisconsin 
statutes.  Second, the purpose of Miranda warnings is to ensure 
that the arrestee comprehends his or her constitutional rights 
so that those rights can be knowingly and intelligently waived. 
 Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d at 18-19.  The purpose of the implied 
consent warnings is to inform the accused driver about implied 
consent and alert him or her to the statutory right to request 
an alternative test.  Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d at 225.  The right to 
request an alternative test is not a right that must be waived 
before the officer proceeds with testing; rather, the right to 
request a second test arises after the requested test has been 
completed.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4)(d).     
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
15
test does not implicate testimonial utterances."  Reitter, 227 
Wis. 2d at 225.  Consequently, there are no rights that the 
arrestee can or must knowingly and intelligently waive before 
the chemical testing proceeds, and no concomitant need for the 
accused driver to understand the warnings.  See id.   
¶21 In consideration 
of 
the 
differences 
between the 
implied 
consent 
warnings 
and 
the 
Miranda 
warnings, 
the 
determination of whether the law enforcement officer reasonably 
conveyed the implied consent warnings is based upon the 
objective conduct of that officer, rather than upon the 
comprehension of the accused driver.  This approach ensures that 
the driver cannot subsequently raise a defense of "subjective 
confusion," that is, whether the implied consent warnings were 
sufficiently administered must not depend upon the perception of 
the accused driver.  Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d at 229; Quelle, 198 
Wis. 2d at 280-81.  Whether the implied consent warnings have 
been reasonably conveyed is not a subjective test; it does not 
"require assessing the driver's perception of the information 
delivered to him or her."  Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d at 280 (emphasis 
in original). 
¶22 Despite the significant distinction between Miranda 
and implied consent warnings, they share the common purpose of 
informing the accused.  Considering that similarity, we conclude 
that whether law enforcement officers have complied with Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(4) turns on whether they have used reasonable 
methods which would reasonably convey the warnings and rights in 
§ 343.305(4).  As in Miranda-type cases, the State has the 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
16
burden of proof of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the methods used would reasonably convey the implied 
consent warnings.  See Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d at 19.11  Also, in 
the implied consent setting, as well as in the Miranda setting, 
the onus is upon the law enforcement officer to reasonably 
convey the implied consent warnings.  See id.  
¶23 Whether 
the 
implied 
consent 
warnings 
given 
sufficiently comply with Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) depends upon 
the circumstances at the time of the arrest; correspondingly, 
whether the methods used were reasonable and would reasonably 
convey those warnings also depends upon the circumstances facing 
the arresting officer.  See, e.g., State v. Geraldson, 176 
Wis. 2d 487, 500 N.W.2d 415 (Ct. App. 1993).12  The purpose of 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) to inform an accused driver, is 
fulfilled, rather than undermined, if the law enforcement 
officer must use reasonable methods that reasonably convey the 
                     
11 The initial burden of showing that law enforcement 
officers used those methods which would reasonably convey the 
implied consent warnings rests with the State.  Then, the burden 
shifts to the accused driver to show "one, that the officer 
misstated the warnings, or otherwise misinformed the driver, and 
two, that the officer's misconduct impacted his or her ability 
to make the choice available under the law."  County of Ozaukee 
v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269, 278, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995). 
12 In Geraldson, the implied consent warnings given were 
insufficient because the officer failed to give the accused 
driver those warnings that applied to the driver who held a 
commercial vehicle license.  State v. Geraldson, 176 Wis. 2d 
487, 495, 500 N.W.2d 415 (Ct. App. 1993).  The officer failed to 
take into account a known, pertinent circumstance that affected 
the giving of the implied consent warnings, namely, the 
existence of the commercial vehicle license.  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
17
implied consent warnings, in consideration of circumstances 
facing him or her.  This interpretation ensures that an accused 
driver is properly advised under the implied consent law, 
without 
raising 
the 
specter 
of 
subjective 
confusion.13  
Accordingly, we find that the legislature intended that law 
enforcement officers inform accused drivers of the implied 
consent warnings, and that duty is met by using those methods 
which are reasonable and reasonably convey those warnings under 
the circumstances at the time of the arrest.    
¶24 The legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) 
bolsters the conclusion that the legislature intended that law 
enforcement officers are to convey the implied consent warnings 
using those methods which reasonably assure access to those 
warnings.  In 1985, the pertinent language read "shall inform." 
 In 1987, the legislature substantially revised Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305, and created subsection (4).  1987 Wis. Act 3, § 29.  
Subsection (4) was originally drafted to read that "[a]t the 
time a chemical test specimen is requested . . . the person 
shall be informed."  The Senate amended this phrase to 
substitute "shall be orally informed by the law enforcement 
officer" for "shall be informed," the language at issue here.  
Senate Amendment 2 to 1987 A.B. 30.   
                     
13 Our holding here does not affect the exception to the 
implied consent warning mandate where the driver is unconscious 
or "otherwise not capable of withdrawing consent."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(b).  "A person who is unconscious or otherwise not 
capable of withdrawing consent is presumed not to have withdrawn 
consent under this subsection . . . ."  Id.    
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
18
¶25 In 1994, this court suggested that Informing the 
Accused forms "used by the Department of Transportation could be 
simplified."  Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d at 692.  Given that "the 
recipient of the information, has been determined, to a degree 
of probable cause, to be under the influence of alcohol," 
"reasonableness under the 
circumstances 
dictates 
that the 
directions and warnings to the accused be as simple and 
straightforward as possible."  Id. at 693.  The Department of 
Transportation concurred with this court's observation about the 
implied consent warnings.  
 
The complex instructions that are statutorily required 
has led to the development of a fairly complex form 
that is read to each accused drunk driver . . . .  The 
current Informing the Accused form balances court 
. . . decisions 
in 
an 
attempt 
to 
provide 
the 
statutorily required disclosures in a straight-forward 
manner.  Nonetheless, it is not an easy document for 
sober people to understand, much less a person who is 
intoxicated, such as a person arrested for OWI. 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
19
Memorandum from John J. Sobotik, Assistant General Counsel, 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, to Rep. John La Fave, 
dated November 14, 1995, Re:  Informing the Accused Form.14  
¶26 The year after Bryant, both the executive and the 
legislative branches took steps to simplify the implied consent 
warnings.  "The Governor's 1995 Task Force on OAR/OWI strongly 
recommended that the form be rewritten using simple English."  
Memorandum from Rep. John La Fave to Don Salm, dated February 6, 
1997, Re:  "Informing the Accused" workgroup (emphasis in 
original).  In February 1997, Representative La Fave organized 
an informal committee to examine the Informing the Accused form. 
 Id.  In August 1997, Representative La Fave and others 
introduced legislation that set forth the implied consent 
warnings in plain and direct language.15  
                     
14 Even though the legislature may have considered that the 
implied consent warning forms may not be easy for an intoxicated 
person 
to 
understand, 
there 
is 
no 
indication 
that 
the 
legislature intended that the mental processes of an intoxicated 
driver are to be taken into account in determining compliance 
with Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4).  We agree with the court of 
appeals that "since the statute requires the information to be 
provided only to persons who are probably intoxicated, it is 
unlikely that the legislature intended a persons' understanding 
or comprehension of the information to be determinative of 
compliance with the statute."  State v. Piddington, 2000 WI App 
44, ¶15, 233 Wis. 2d 257, 607 N.W.2d 303.  However, the issue at 
hand is whether an officer has to give deaf persons the same 
opportunity to understand the implied consent warnings as a 
hearing, English-speaking persons, regardless of the extent to 
which their intoxication may interfere with their mental 
processes.  Reasonable methods which reasonably convey the 
implied consent warnings afford that opportunity. 
15 The amended version reads as follows: 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
20
¶27 That legislation, 1997 Assembly Bill 467, was enacted 
as 1997 Wisconsin Act 107 on April 14, 1998, effective August 1, 
1998, after Piddington's arrest. 1997 Wis. Act 107, § 9.  Even 
though the revision is not applicable here, the changes 
elucidate the legislature's intent.  Evident in the amendment to 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) is the legislature's intent to place the 
                                                                  
INFORMATION.  At the time that a chemical test specimen 
is requested under sub. (3) (a) or (am), the law 
enforcement officer shall read the following to the 
person from whom the test specimen is requested: 
  
"You have either been arrested for an offense that 
involves driving or operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, or you are 
suspected of driving or being on duty time with respect to 
a commercial motor vehicle after consuming an intoxicating 
beverage. 
  
This law enforcement agency now wants to test one or more 
samples of your breath, blood or urine to determine the 
concentration of alcohol or drugs in your system.  If any 
test shows more alcohol in your system than the law 
permits while driving, your operating privilege will be 
suspended. If you refuse to take any test that this agency 
requests, your operating privilege will be revoked and you 
will be subject to other penalties. The test results or 
the fact that you refused testing can be used against you 
in court. 
 
If you take all the requested tests, you may choose to 
take further tests. You may take the alternative test that 
this law enforcement agency provides free of charge. You 
also may have a test conducted by a qualified person of 
your choice at your expense. You, however, will have to 
make your own arrangements for that test. 
 
If you have a commercial driver license or were operating 
a commercial motor vehicle, other consequences may result 
from positive test results or from refusing testing, such 
as being placed out of service or disqualified." 
  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
21
onus upon the law enforcement officer to convey the implied 
consent warnings.  That is, "the law enforcement officer shall 
read the following to the person from whom the test specimen is 
requested . . . [etc.]."  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) (1997-98).  
Also evident is the intent to simplify the warnings so as to 
facilitate the officers' delivery of them.  Just as the text 
should facilitate the driver's receipt of the warnings, the 
methods 
employed 
to 
deliver 
those 
warnings 
should 
not 
unreasonably 
obstruct 
their 
comprehension. 
 
Indeed, 
by 
simplifying the implied 
consent warnings, 
the 
legislature 
indicated that every reasonable means should be employed to 
ensure that the warnings are being conveyed——whether that 
requires that the law enforcement officer reads the warnings 
aloud, or uses another method.16 
¶28 That a law enforcement officer must use reasonable 
methods to convey the implied consent warnings does not mean the 
officer must take extraordinary, or even impracticable measures 
to convey the implied consent warnings.  Reasonableness under 
the circumstances also requires consideration of the fact that 
alcohol dissipates from the blood over time, particularly after 
the subject has stopped drinking.  State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 
                     
16 Accordingly, we find no significance in the legislature's 
amendment of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) to replace "shall be orally 
informed" with "shall read."  That amendment changes the verb 
tense from the passive to the active voice.  The more 
significant revision is the clear and direct language of the 
implied consent warnings, indicating the legislature's intent 
that the text should not unreasonably hinder the law enforcement 
officer's dispatch of the warnings.  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
22
529, 533, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993); see also Wis. Stat. § 885.235 
(blood test result is automatically admissible if blood is taken 
within three (3) hours of the stop).  The State cannot be 
expected to wait indefinitely to obtain an interpreter and risk 
losing evidence of intoxication.  Such would defeat, rather than 
advance, the intent of the implied consent law "to facilitate 
the gathering of evidence against drunk drivers in order to 
remove them from the state's highway."  Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 
46.  The approach we adopt today only ensures that barriers 
which may affect the arresting officer's ability to reasonably 
convey the implied consent warnings to an accused driver, such 
as one with impaired hearing, are taken into account and 
accommodated as much as is reasonable under the circumstances.17 
¶29 We now turn to whether, under the circumstances that 
were presented to the State Patrol trooper here on February 14, 
1998, the trooper used those methods which would reasonably 
convey the implied consent warnings to Piddington.  The trooper 
first communicated with Piddington using the passenger as an 
                     
17  As we have indicated before, we do not require that a 
Miranda-like card be developed.  Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d at 692.  
However, as we indicated in Bryant, we encourage law enforcement 
and/or the Department of Transportation officials to adopt 
methods that would assist officers in reasonably conveying the 
implied consent warnings in a variety of circumstances they are 
likely to face.  The legislature assisted by simplifying the 
text, but, as the instant case illustrates, the methods used to 
convey the warnings must also be reasonable.  Such reasonable 
methods could include videos that show the warnings in sign 
language.  Similarly, translations, either by card for those 
fluent in the language to use or, again, videos, could be 
prepared in languages other than English that law enforcement 
officers encounter, such as Spanish and Hmong.  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
23
interpreter.  When Piddington indicated that he could read and 
write notes as well as speech-read, the trooper communicated 
directly with Piddington by speaking to him, and through notes 
passed back and forth.18  A review of the notes between 
Piddington and the trooper reveals that Piddington was aware of 
what was happening, and his questions to the trooper in 
particular, 
reflected 
his 
understanding. 
 
For 
example, 
Piddington wrote a note that "I was just speeding."  At another 
point, he wrote "But did I pass the test as I walked?" 
¶30 During the stop, it was evident that Piddington 
sufficiently 
understood 
what 
was 
communicated 
to 
him.  
Piddington attempted to perform the sobriety tests and, as shown 
by the patrol car video-tape of the stop, he failed them due to 
his intoxication, not because he did not understand how to 
perform the test.  Also, Piddington requested a blood test as 
the State Patrol trooper was preparing to take him to the state 
patrol headquarters for a breath test, exhibiting further his 
comprehension of what was happening to him. 
¶31 Despite his ability to communicate with Piddington, 
the trooper made reasonable efforts to obtain a sign-language 
interpreter.  He contacted his dispatch, who informed him that 
no one was available.  But an officer who was conversational in 
sign language was located at the point in time when it was most 
                     
18 Foregoing use of the passenger as an interpreter was 
reasonable. 
 
Where 
alternative 
methods 
of 
conveying 
the 
necessary information were available, the trooper should not 
have had to rely upon Piddington's companion, who might not have 
been an objective interpreter under the circumstances.  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
24
helpful; namely, to convey the implied consent warnings.  The 
Madison police officer met the trooper and Piddington at the 
hospital, and was informed by Piddington that he could speech-
read and read, and had graduated from high school.  The trooper 
had attempted to read the warnings using an Informing the 
Accused form until Piddington told him that he could not follow 
his lips by speech-reading.  The Madison police officer then 
read the warnings to Piddington without objection.  Piddington 
himself read them, and without asking for clarification or 
explanation, initialed each paragraph, as instructed, in order 
to show his understanding. 
¶32 Even though the Madison police officer was not an ASL-
certified sign language interpreter, through a combined effort 
of using her somewhat limited abilities at sign language, 
speech-reading and the reading of the Informing the Accused 
form, the implied consent warnings were reasonably conveyed to 
Piddington through reasonable methods.  There was no need, as 
Piddington contends, for an ASL-certified interpreter in this 
instance.  As the circuit court determined, the trooper 
performed a commendable job with his various attempts at 
accommodating and communicating with Piddington.19    
                     
19 The circuit court found that Piddington could not "really 
understand" the implied consent warnings, indicating that the  
court was analyzing whether the trooper had complied with Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(4) by viewing the incident from Piddington’s 
perspective.  Whether Piddington subjectively understood the 
warnings is irrelevant.  Rather, whether there was compliance 
with § 343.305 remains focused upon the objective conduct of the 
law enforcement officer or officers involved.  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
25
¶33 The implied consent law requires only substantial 
compliance.  "[S]ubstantial compliance will suffice if it is 
'actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to 
every reasonable objective of the statute.'"  State v. Muente, 
159 Wis. 2d 279, 281 (quoting Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Nicolazzi, 138 Wis. 2d 192, 200, 405 N.W.2d 732 (Ct. App. 
1987)).  The reasonable objective of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) is 
to inform the accused of the implied consent warnings.  It 
follows that the essential aspect of that objective is to use 
those methods reasonably calculated to convey the information 
given the circumstances.  Given that the State Patrol trooper's 
conduct  shows that reasonable methods to convey the implied 
consent warnings to Piddington were used, there was substantial 
compliance with § 343.305(4) here.  
¶34 However, assuming, arguendo, that the trooper did not 
use reasonable methods to reasonably convey the implied consent 
warnings and thus violated Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4), Piddington 
would not necessarily be entitled to suppression of the test 
results. 
 
[E]ven though failure to advise the defendant as 
provided by the implied consent law affects the 
State's position in a civil refusal proceeding and 
results in the loss of certain evidentiary benefits, 
e.g., automatic admissibility of results and use of 
the fact of refusal, nothing in the statute or its 
history permits the conclusion that failure to comply 
with sec. 343.305(3)(a), Stats. [now § 343.305(4)], 
prevents 
the 
admissibility 
of 
legally 
obtained 
chemical test evidence in the separate and distinct 
criminal 
prosecution 
for 
offenses 
involving 
intoxicated use of a vehicle. 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
26
Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 51.20  Apart from suppression, Piddington 
could 
have 
pursued 
an 
order 
prohibiting 
the 
automatic 
admissibility of the blood test result pursuant to § 885.235.  
Instead of relying upon the automatic admissibility of the blood 
test, the State would have to establish the admissibility of the 
blood test, including establishing a foundation. 
 
¶35 There are also other remedies that an accused driver 
may pursue where there is evidence that the methods used were 
not reasonable and would not have reasonably conveyed the 
implied consent warnings.  For example, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(8), 
a 
driver 
could 
challenge 
the 
automatic 
administrative suspension of his or her license.  One of the 
issues that the hearing examiner may consider is "[w]hether the 
person was informed of the options regarding tests under this 
section 
as 
required 
under 
sub. 
(4)." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(8)(b)2.b. 
 
Similarly, 
an 
accused 
driver 
could 
challenge automatic revocation of his or her license for 
refusing to submit to a chemical test under Wis. Stat. 
                     
20 Zielke, driving while intoxicated, caused an accident 
resulting in the death of two persons.  The circuit court found 
that there were exigent circumstances that justified taking 
Zielke’s blood for alcohol testing, and that he consented as 
well. Because the police officer did not give Zielke the 
required implied consent warnings, the circuit court suppressed 
the test results, and the court of appeals affirmed.  This court 
reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding, in part, 
that violation of the implied consent law did not compel 
suppression of the blood test results.  We also concluded that 
where there are exigent circumstances or the accused driver 
consents to a blood test, a warrantless blood seizure is 
constitutionally permissible.  State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 
54, 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987).  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
27
§ 343.305(9).  As an initial matter, the notice of the intent to 
revoke 
must 
include 
"information . . . [t]hat 
the 
officer 
complied with sub. (4)."  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)2.  Then, 
one of the issues for a hearing on the revocation is "[w]hether 
the 
officer 
complied 
with 
sub. 
(4)." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a)5.b.  Both the administrative suspension and 
refusal procedure allow accused drivers to maintain their 
driving privileges while the review is pending.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(8)(a),(10)(a).  
¶36 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) requires that 
a law enforcement officer use those reasonable methods which 
would reasonably convey, in consideration of the circumstances 
at the time of the arrest, the implied consent warnings therein. 
 Here, the state trooper employed reasonable methods, in 
consideration of Piddington's hearing impairment, to reasonably 
convey the implied consent warnings to Piddington.  The trooper 
complied with § 343.305(4), and, accordingly, there was no 
violation of § 343.305(4) that would warrant suppression of 
Piddington's blood test results. 
B 
¶37 Piddington makes a number of other challenges to the 
court of appeals' decision based upon alleged violations of 
constitutional 
and 
policy 
considerations. 
 
For 
example, 
Piddington contends that the court of appeals' approach——law 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
28
enforcement need only read the implied consent warnings——
violates the constitutional guarantee of due process.21  
¶38 In Bryant, this court concluded that the provisions of 
the implied consent statute did not violate due process.  
Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d 692.  There, the defendants claimed that 
they were "either misinformed or the statues were hopelessly 
confused and contradictory."  Id.  We held to the contrary, that 
"[t]he process guaranteed by the statutes is an appropriate one 
and the statutory protections and admonitions were afforded each 
of the defendants in the cases on review."  Id.    
¶39 This court has also found that the implied consent 
warnings, given by way of various Informing the Accused forms, 
do not violate due process.  See, e.g., Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d 692; 
Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d 259.  The forms used to convey the implied 
consent warnings do not violate due process because they 
"adequately alert[] accused drivers to the testing process and 
the consequences of refusal."  Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d at 240 
(citing Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d at 692); see also Crandall, 133 
Wis. 2d at 259 (the Informing the Accused form "adequately 
informed [the defendant] of her rights and responsibilities 
under the Wisconsin implied consent law").   
¶40 In Crandall, Bryant, and Reitter, there were no 
objections to the reasonableness or the adequacy of merely 
reading the implied consent warnings to the defendants, who 
                     
21 According to Article I, Section 8(1) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, "[n]o person may be held to answer for a criminal 
offense without due process of law . . . ."  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
29
apparently were not deaf and understood English.  The issue here 
is not whether the text of the implied consent warnings violates 
due process, but whether the methods used to convey the warnings 
violated due process.  However, we have already determined 
herein that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) is complied with where 
reasonable methods are used to reasonably convey the implied 
consent warnings.  Accordingly, here, as in Bryant, so long as 
the process guaranteed by the statute has been afforded the 
accused driver, whether that process relates to the text of the 
warnings or the manner in which they are conveyed, there is no 
due process violation.  
¶41 Piddington received all the process due under Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(4).  With the assistance of the Madison police 
officer, the State Patrol trooper, as § 343.305(4) requires, 
used those reasonable methods which, under the circumstances at 
the time of the arrest, would reasonably convey the implied 
consent warnings.  Accordingly, there was no violation of due 
process. 
¶42 Piddington also contends that the court of appeals' 
approach 
violates 
the 
constitutional 
guarantee 
of 
equal 
protection under the law because hearing persons will have the 
opportunity to understand the implied consent warnings read to 
them, and deaf persons will not.22  "To withstand equal 
                     
22 Equal protection is guaranteed by Article I, Section 1 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  Article I, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution states: 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
30
protection review, classifications which distinguish between 
deaf persons and others need only be rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest."  Rewolinski v. Morgan, 896 F. 
Supp. 879, 881 (E.D. Wis. 1995).  The implied consent law is 
based upon the legitimate government interest of protecting the 
public welfare, to wit, removing drunk drivers from the road.  
Milwaukee County v. Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 631, 291 N.W.2d 
608 (Ct. App. 1980). 
¶43 There 
is 
no apparent rational justification for 
permitting English-speaking and hearing drivers access to the 
implied consent warnings, and purposefully excluding non-English 
speaking and deaf drivers access to those warnings.  Indeed, we 
have found that deaf persons are entitled to equal access to the 
legal system.  See Wis. Stat. § 885.37 (the deaf and hard-of-
hearing have a right to interpreters in court); see also State 
                                                                  
All people are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent rights; among these are life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed. 
 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws."  We treat the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution as equivalent 
because "there is no substantial difference between" them.  
Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 900-01 n.28, 578 N.W.2d 602 
(1998) (quoting State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 
43, 49-50, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965)).  As such, we refer to cases 
analyzing the Fourteenth Amendment or Article I, Section 1 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution. 
 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
31
v. Neave, 117 Wis. 2d 359, 344 N.W.2d 181 (1984).23  However, in 
light of the purpose of the implied consent law——"to facilitate 
the taking of tests for intoxication and not to inhibit the 
ability of the state to remove drunken drivers from the 
highway"——the arresting officer need not take steps to convey 
the implied consent warnings which would jeopardize his or her 
ability to obtain evidence of intoxication or get the drunk 
                     
23 In Neave, this court held that a criminal defendant has a 
right to an interpreter.   
We do not hold that there is federal constitutional 
right to an interpreter.  We do hold that as a matter 
of judicial administration, and to avoid questions of 
effective assistance of counsel and questions of 
whether inability to reasonably understand testimony 
resulted in a loss of an effective right to cross-
examination, or whether the right had been waived by a 
defendant or his attorney with the defendant's assent 
and how such assent was demonstrated, we adopt the 
rule herein announced. We also conclude that it 
removes the feeling of having been dealt with unfairly 
which is bound to arise when part or all of a trial is 
incomprehensible 
because 
of 
a 
language 
barrier. 
 . . .  Fairness requires that such persons who may be 
defendants in our criminal courts have the assistance 
of interpreters where needed. 
 
State v. Neave, 117 Wis. 2d 359, 365-66, 344 N.W.2d 181 (1984).  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
32
driver off the road.  Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 203-04.24  The 
arresting officer need only ensure that the implied consent 
warnings are reasonably conveyed under the circumstances facing 
the officer at the time of the arrest under Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(4).  Consequently, § 343.305(4) would not treat an 
accused driver who is deaf differently than one who hears.  
Because reasonable methods were used which would reasonably 
convey the implied consent warnings to Piddington, there has 
been no disparate treatment here.  Piddington was not denied 
equal protection under the law. 
¶44 Piddington 
also 
contends 
that 
the 
federal 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the counterpart to the federal 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is applicable here and 
required the State to provide an interpreter.  The rights and 
responsibilities established by the ADA and the Rehabilitation 
Act are nearly identical; the two statutes are, for the most 
part, distinguished by the fact that the Rehabilitation Act 
applies only to entities receiving public funding.  Washington 
                     
24 This court has also noted that time is of the essence in 
obtaining evidence of blood alcohol concentration for both the 
State and defendants.  See State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 
546-47, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993); see also Wis. Stat. § 885.235(1) 
(admissibility of blood alcohol test based upon sample taken 
within 3 hours after the event that allegedly was done under the 
influence of an intoxicant).  Because the passage of time 
impacts the testing for blood alcohol concentration, that an 
arresting 
officer 
employ 
those 
reasonable 
methods 
that 
reasonably convey the implied consent warnings, takes into 
account the time concern.  Accordingly, the approach this court 
develops 
today 
serves 
to 
advance 
a 
rational 
purpose 
of 
§ 343.305, which is to facilitate the gathering of evidence of 
drunk driving.  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
33
v. Central Catholic High Sch., 181 F.3d 840, 845 n.6 (7th Cir. 
1999).  "[T]he standards applicable to one act are applicable to 
the other."  Id.     
¶45 Case law is in conflict as to whether an arrest is a 
"benefit[] of the services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity," and thus covered by the ADA or Rehabilitation Act of 
1973.  See  42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794; see also Rosen 
v. Montgomery County, Maryland, 121 F.3d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 
1997) (arrest is not within the ambit of the ADA); Calloway v. 
Boro of Glassboro Dep't of Police, 89 F. Supp. 2d 543, 555-56 
(D. N.J. 2000) (station-house investigative questioning is 
covered by the ADA and Rehabilitation Act).  Assuming, arguendo, 
that the Rehabilitation Act covers Piddington’s stop and arrest, 
and thus the standards of both acts are applicable, there is 
nothing in the record that establishes that the State Patrol 
receives federal funding, which is a prerequisite to application 
of the Act.  29 U.S.C. § 794.  And, even if there were a 
violation of the Rehabilitation Act here, Piddington’s remedy 
would not be suppression of evidence, but rather an action under 
the Act or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.   
¶46 Nonetheless, the State Patrol trooper followed the 
accommodation 
guidelines 
established 
in 
the 
regulations 
promulgated under the ADA.  See 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (2000).  ADA 
regulations state that public entities "shall take appropriate 
steps to ensure that communications with. . . members of the 
public with disabilities are as effective as communications with 
others," and "furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
34
where 
necessary." 
 
28 
C.F.R. 
§ 35.160(a), 
(b) 
(2000).  
"[P]rimary consideration" is to be given to the disabled 
individual’s 
request. 
 
28 
C.F.R. 
§ 35.160(b)(2) 
(2000).  
However, the pertinent circumstances should be taken into 
account.  
 
Although in some circumstances a notepad and written 
materials 
may 
be 
sufficient 
to 
permit 
effective 
communication, in other circumstances they may not be 
sufficient. For example, a qualified interpreter may 
be necessary when the information being communicated 
is complex, or is exchanged for a lengthy period of 
time. 
 
Generally, 
factors 
to 
be 
considered 
in 
determining whether an interpreter is required include 
the context in which the communication is taking 
place, 
the 
number 
of 
people 
involved, 
and 
the 
importance of the communication. 
56 Fed. Reg. 35694 (July 26, 1991).  Similarly, as provided by 
the parties, State Patrol Policy and Procedures indicate that 
interpreters should be used if possible and whenever practical, 
that is, at the "point the trooper or inspector determines that 
the service of a qualified interpreter is necessary to ensure 
effective communication."  Wisconsin State Patrol Policy and 
Procedure Number 5-10.  Using note-writing or other auxiliary 
aids to communicate is also permitted.  Id. 
¶47 The State Patrol trooper and the Madison police 
officer used various, acceptable, methods to communicate with 
Piddington.  The trooper used auxiliary aids, such as note-
taking and demonstrations, which assisted in his communication 
with Piddington.  According to the notes and the videotape of 
the stop, there is no indication that Piddington questioned or 
objected to the trooper's methods of conveying the necessary 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
35
information.  Piddington continued to communicate with the 
trooper even after he requested an interpreter.  Review of the 
notes and the videotape reveals that Piddington obviously failed 
the sobriety tests not due to a communication error, but because 
he was impaired.  Indeed, an initial test showed that his blood 
alcohol level was almost three times the legal limit.   
¶48 The trooper also repeatedly ensured that Piddington 
was following his instructions, and testified that he took more 
time and was more lenient with Piddington because of the 
impaired hearing barrier. At the most crucial moment, when 
Piddington was provided with the Informing the Accused form, 
there was an officer on hand who knew sign-language.  She was 
not a certified interpreter, but she was conversational in sign-
language.  She reviewed and completed the form with Piddington, 
without objections or questions from Piddington.     
¶49 The trooper complied with both the State Patrol 
Policies and Procedures and federal regulations promulgated 
under the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by using note-
taking and other auxiliary aids, including an officer with 
working knowledge of sign-language, to ensure that the necessary 
information was conveyed to Piddington.  Consequently, contrary 
to Piddington's contention, there was no need for a certified 
sign-language interpreter here. 
III 
¶50 Finally, Piddington contends that suppression of his 
blood test result is justified here, if not based upon an 
alleged violation of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) concerning the 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
36
implied consent warnings, then, based upon the contention that 
Piddington requested, but did not receive, an alternative test 
for blood alcohol concentration.  Piddington relies upon State 
v. Renard, 123 Wis. 2d 458, 367 N.W.2d 237 (Ct. App. 1985) and 
State v. McCrossen, 129 Wis. 2d 277, 385 N.W.2d 161 (1986).  In 
both cases, the circuit court found that the accused driver had 
repeatedly requested an additional chemical test that was not 
given.  Renard, 123 Wis. 2d at 460; McCrossen, 129 Wis. 2d at 
282-83.  Also, in both cases, the circuit court suppressed the 
results of the first tests as "an appropriate sanction" for the 
failure to perform the second requested test.  Renard, 123 
Wis. 2d at 461; McCrossen, 129 Wis. 2d at 287.25  
¶51 Piddington claims that he requested an alternative 
test.  However, unlike Renard and McCrossen, the circuit court 
here made no factual finding that Piddington had requested a 
                     
25 Piddington also relies upon State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 
483, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984).  In Walstad, this court concluded 
that the test ampoule from the breathalyzer machine need not be 
provided to the defendant for re-testing.  Id. at 527-28. The 
defendant had not requested a second test, but only requested to 
test the used ampoule.  There is no dispute that an accused 
driver has a right to request a second test.  Id. at 527.  There 
is, however, no evidence that the defendant here requested a 
second test after he was informed of his right to request a 
second test.  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
37
second, alternative test.26  Piddington requested a blood test as 
the State Patrol trooper was about to take him to State Patrol 
headquarters for a breathalyzer test.  However, this was before 
he had been formally notified of his right to request a second 
test.  After he had been informed of his right to request a 
second test, Piddington did not request such a test.  Unlike in 
Renard and McCrossen, here, Piddington did not request a second 
alternative test after he submitted to the initial test.  
Renard, 123 Wis. 2d at 460; McCrossen, 129 Wis. 2d at 281.  The 
only test he requested, he received, that is, the blood test.27 
¶52 Even if Piddington had requested but did not receive 
an alternative test, he would not be entitled to automatic 
suppression of the results of the test he did have, as he now 
contends.  As discussed earlier, the implied consent law does 
not dictate that a violation thereof requires suppression of a 
                     
26 The circuit court only found that Piddington needed an 
ASL 
interpreter 
to 
understand 
the 
information 
given 
him 
concerning his right to request a second test.  (R. at 28:2.)  
We have concluded, however, that the trooper needed to use 
reasonable methods to reasonably convey the implied consent 
warnings, including the right to request a second test, and, as 
the circuit court also found, the "attempts of law enforcement 
to communicate with the defendant were reasonable under all the 
circumstances."  (R. at 28:1-2).  
27 "The second test affords the defendant the opportunity to 
scrutinize and verify or impeach the results of the. . . test 
administered by enforcement authorities."  Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 
at 527.  The second test may also provide exculpatory evidence. 
 State v. McCrossen, 129 Wis. 2d 277, 294, 385 N.W.2d 161 
(1986).  However, Piddington has not even contended, let alone 
shown, how a second test would have provided impeachment or 
exculpatory evidence.  See id. at 294.  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
38
blood 
test 
as 
a 
remedy. 
 
Zielke, 
137 
Wis. 2d 
at 
51.  
Accordingly, Piddington's reliance upon McCrossen is misplaced. 
 As we explained in Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 55-56: 
 
We acknowledge that in [McCrossen] this court approved 
suppression of a blood alcohol test in a driving while 
intoxicated prosecution.  In that case, unlike the 
instant case, the defendant, who was arrested for 
operating 
under 
the 
influence 
contrary 
to 
sec. 
346.63(1)(a), Stats., specifically asked the arresting 
officer who administered the breathalyzer test if she 
could have another test, either blood or urine, 
because she did not believe the results of the first 
test.  The police told the defendant she would have to 
pay for any alternative test, which is contrary to 
sec. 343.305(5).  The defendant agreed but the police 
never administered the requested alternative test.  In 
addition, she was never informed by police that she 
could be released in order to get an alternative test. 
 In fact, though a friend arrived ready to post bail, 
she was not released until hours later.  On those 
facts, suppression was an appropriate remedy, but it 
is by no means required by the implied consent law.   
(Emphasis added.)28  
¶53 There would be no reason for an automatic suppression 
here, even if Piddington had requested a second test.  The 
conduct of the law enforcement officers with respect to the 
defendants' requests for an alternative test in Renard and 
McCrossen, which supported the circuit court's suppression 
there, is not evident here.  In Renard, the defendant was taken 
to a hospital for injuries following an accident.  123 Wis. 2d 
                     
28 Also, the precise issue before this court in McCrossen 
was "not whether suppression is appropriate, but whether the 
denial 
of 
a 
second 
test 
deprived 
the 
defendant 
of 
constitutionally 
material 
evidence, 
and 
thereby 
required 
dismissal of the charge."  Id. at 287-88.  Piddington does not 
make such a contention here.   
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
39
at 460.  There, an officer arrested Renard for driving while 
intoxicated.  The officer had Renard submit to a blood test, but 
did not give him the breathalyzer test that he requested.  The 
officer could have inquired at the hospital to determine whether 
Renard would have been released in time to give him a 
breathalyzer test.  But the officer left, and yet Renard was 
released in time to take a breathalyzer test.  Id.  In 
McCrossen, the defendant asked for an alternative test, and was 
told she had to pay for it, which was not true.  129 Wis. 2d at 
281.  McCrossen nonetheless agreed to pay for another test, but 
she never got it, nor was she informed that she could be 
released to get the other test.  Id.  "The defendant also was 
never informed that there was an alternative test that the 
police department was prepared to administer at police expense." 
Id.  Here, in contrast, Piddington was not misled; he was 
accurately informed about the alternative test procedure; and, 
he got the test he requested.  
¶54 Piddington did not request an alternative test after 
he was informed of that right.  Accordingly, assuming arguendo, 
that somehow his right to request a second test was violated, 
that is not a reason to suppress the test results of the blood 
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
40
test he did request.29  There are no other circumstances here 
that would warrant suppression of the test results even if 
Piddington had requested an alternative test, after being 
informed of that right.  
IV 
¶55 The legislature's intent regarding the implied consent 
warnings is that accused drivers are to be advised of the 
warnings, which requires law enforcement officers to utilize 
those methods which, according to the circumstances that existed 
at the time of the arrest, were reasonable and would reasonably 
convey the warnings.  Whether the accused driver has actually 
comprehended the warnings is not part of the inquiry, rather the 
focus rests upon the conduct of the officer.  We conclude here 
that the law enforcement officers involved used reasonable 
methods to reasonably convey the implied consent warnings under 
the circumstances existing at the time of the arrest.  In 
addition, there was no evidence that Piddington was denied a 
second test that he requested after the blood test he requested. 
 Accordingly, there was no violation of § 343.305(4) which would 
                     
29 Moreover, "if evidence is otherwise constitutionally 
obtained, there is nothing in the implied consent law which 
renders it inadmissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution," 
even if there was a "failure to advise the defendant as provided 
by the implied consent law."  Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 51-52.  One 
constitutional way for evidence to be obtained is by consent.  
Id. at 52.  Here, Piddington did not merely consent to a blood 
test, he requested it even before he was given the Informing the 
Accused form.  
No. 99-1250-CR 
 
41
warrant suppression of Piddington's blood alcohol concentration 
test results.  We thus affirm the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-1250.ssa 
 
1 
¶56 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  In 
this case, one person who is profoundly deaf has come into 
contact with the legal system.  Many people in this state cannot 
hear, speak, or understand the English language.  For some this 
is because of a hearing impairment, for others because they are 
fluent in languages other than English.  Because language is the 
basic tool of the legal system these people cannot fully 
participate. 
¶57 According to the 2000 census figures, Wisconsin's 
Hispanic and Asian populations roughly doubled in the past 
decade.30  Getting qualified interpreters for our increasingly 
diverse and multicultural population is an urgent issue for law 
enforcement, the courts, social services, and others in the 
legal system.31  Courts should provide interpreters as a basic 
service to ensure fairness of court proceedings.32  As part of 
its 
efforts 
to 
address 
court-related 
interpretation 
and 
                     
30 Larry Sandler and Greg Borowski, Madison, Dane County 
lead growth; Fox Valley grows twice as fast as state's 
southeastern region, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, March 9, 2001, 
at 1A. 
31 See Heather Pantoga, Injustice in Any Language: The Need 
for Improved Standards Governing Courtroom Interpretation in 
Wisconsin, 82 Marq. L. Rev. 601 (1999). 
32 "Fairness requires that [those who speak and understand 
only languages other than English] who may be defendants in our 
criminal courts have the assistance of interpreters where 
needed."  State v. Neave, 117 Wis. 2d 359, 366, 344 N.W.2d 181 
(1984). 
No. 99-1250.ssa 
 
2 
translation 
issues, 
the 
Wisconsin 
court 
system 
recently 
published a report entitled "And Justice for All."33 
¶58 This case illustrates how vital it is for the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of this state to 
work together to provide qualified interpreters and translators 
so that persons who cannot hear, speak, or understand English 
have meaningful access to the legal system.  That's the fair and 
right thing to do. 
 
 
                     
33 Committee to Improve Interpreting & Translation in the 
Wisconsin Courts, And Justice for All: Improving Interpretation 
in 
Wisconsin's 
Courts 
(Oct. 
2000), 
available 
at 
http://www.courts.state.wi.us/circuit/pdf/Interpreter_Report.pdf 
No. 99-1250.dss 
 
1 
 
¶59 DIANE S. SYKES, J. (concurring).  I 
agree 
with the 
majority's rejection of the State's argument, adopted by the 
court of appeals, that the implied consent law requires nothing 
more than an oral, English language reading of the implied 
consent warnings, regardless of whether the drunk driving 
suspect can either hear or understand spoken English.  The 
majority adopts a new test for evaluating an arresting officer's 
compliance with the implied consent statute, one that focuses on 
the reasonableness of the officer's conduct in administering the 
implied consent warnings.  I write separately to express some 
concern about the practical operation of the new test. 
¶60 As I see it, the question in this case is whether Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(4)(1995-96), which requires an arresting officer 
to "orally inform"34 a drunk driving suspect of his rights and 
responsibilities under the implied consent law before obtaining 
a chemical test for intoxication, requires the officer to do so 
in a language the suspect understands.  The circuit court said 
"yes."  The court of appeals said "no."  This court says "maybe 
yes, maybe no."  It depends. 
¶61 The defendant in this case has been profoundly deaf 
since birth and communicates in American Sign Language (ASL).  
                     
34 The current statute says the officer "shall read" the 
implied 
consent 
warnings 
to 
the 
suspect. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(4)(1998-99).  The majority opinion concludes that this 
change in language makes no substantive difference in the 
interpretation of the statute, majority op. at nn.15-16, and I 
agree. 
No. 99-1250.dss 
 
2 
He asked for a sign language interpreter at the time of his 
arrest for drunk driving, but none was available.  The arresting 
officer obtained the assistance of an officer who knew some sign 
language, but was not fluent in ASL.  The officers communicated 
with the defendant partially in writing and partially through 
sign language, and the defendant was given the written Informing 
the Accused form to read.  The form was also read to him orally. 
 The defendant wrote a note asking for a blood test, which 
registered a blood alcohol concentration of 0.206. 
¶62 The defendant moved to suppress the test results, 
arguing that 
he should 
have been 
provided 
with an ASL 
interpretation of the implied consent warnings.  The circuit 
court agreed, and granted the motion.  The court of appeals 
reversed.  The majority affirms the court of appeals, but on 
different grounds.  According to the majority opinion, whether 
an officer has complied with the statute depends upon whether he 
used "reasonable methods" to "reasonably convey" the implied 
consent warnings to the suspect——not, apparently, whether the 
officer used a language the suspect could understand. 
¶63 It is not entirely clear what this new "reasonable 
methods" to "reasonably convey" test requires an officer to do 
when confronted with a drunk driving suspect who does not 
communicate in spoken English, either because he is deaf, or 
because he speaks and understands a foreign language only.  The 
majority does not read the statute to require an interpreter or 
a recorded translation of the warnings in this situation, as 
No. 99-1250.dss 
 
3 
long as the officer's communication "methods" were otherwise 
reasonable and would "reasonably convey" the warnings. 
¶64 I assume that an officer who merely reads the implied 
consent warnings out loud to a deaf person, without more, will 
not have complied with the statute under the "reasonable 
methods" to "reasonably convey" test.  It seems to me that this 
would be considered an unreasonable method of communicating with 
a deaf person, or would not be considered reasonably likely to 
convey the warnings to one who cannot hear.  Similarly, I assume 
that an officer who merely reads the implied consent warnings in 
English to a suspect who speaks only Spanish will not have 
complied 
with 
the 
statute, 
because 
this, 
too, 
would 
be 
considered unreasonable under the test. 
¶65 These conclusions would be consistent with common 
sense and the rule of statutory construction that requires 
courts to avoid interpretations of statutes that lead to absurd 
or unreasonable results.  Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 
Wis. 2d 624, 636, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996);  State v. Williams, 198 
Wis. 2d 516, 532, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996); State v. Zielke, 137 
Wis. 2d 39, 51, 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987).  Indeed, this would be 
the only construction of the statute that "does not produce 
'questionable 
results' 
and 
make 
the 
law 
look 
'silly.'"  
Williams, 198 Wis. 2d at 532.  The notion that the statute 
requires only an oral English language reading of the implied 
consent warnings to a deaf or non-English speaking suspect is 
manifestly unreasonable.  The legislature cannot have intended a 
meaningless or futile exercise such as the State's suggested 
No. 99-1250.dss 
 
4 
construction of this statute would produce in this situation.  
See, 
2A 
Sutherland, 
Statutes 
and 
Statutory 
Construction, 
§ 45:12, at 94 (6th ed.) ("it cannot be presumed that the 
legislature would do a futile thing"). 
¶66 Furthermore, 
"the 
cardinal 
rule 
in 
interpreting 
statutes is that the purpose of the whole act is to be sought 
and is favored over a construction which will defeat the 
manifest object of the act."  Student Ass'n of Univ. of 
Wisconsin-Milwaukee v. Baum, 74 Wis. 2d 283, 294-95, 246 N.W.2d 
622 (1976); see also, Caldwell v. Percy, 105 Wis. 2d 354, 361-
62, 314 N.W.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1981).  This statute has a dual 
purpose: to facilitate the collection of evidence of intoxicated 
driving, and to ensure that persons arrested for drunk driving 
are informed about their rights and obligations under the 
implied consent law.  See majority op. at ¶¶17-18.  The second 
of these purposes would be thoroughly defeated if the statute is 
read to entitle a deaf or non-English speaking suspect to 
nothing more than an oral, English language recitation of the 
warnings, which he has not the slightest hope of comprehending. 
¶67 The majority correctly notes that the implied consent 
law is not the only means by which a law enforcement officer may 
lawfully obtain chemical evidence of intoxication from a drunk 
driving suspect.  Majority op. at ¶34.  The Fourth Amendment 
permits 
the 
warrantless 
seizure 
of 
chemical 
evidence 
of 
intoxication 
based 
upon 
probable 
cause 
and 
exigent 
circumstances.  Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 51-52 (citing Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966)).  Suppression is not 
No. 99-1250.dss 
 
5 
required as a remedy for noncompliance with the implied consent 
law, although the State may lose the evidentiary benefits of 
automatic admissibility and the presumption of intoxication 
specified in Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(5)(d) and 885.235.  Id.  
¶68 Accordingly, I concur in and join the majority's 
decision to affirm,35 with the foregoing observations about the 
practical application of the court's new test for compliance 
with the implied consent statute in the case of deaf and non-
English speaking suspects. 
 
 
                     
35 In particular, I agree with the majority's reiteration 
that 
there 
is 
no 
"subjective 
confusion" 
defense 
to 
the 
admissibility of a chemical test obtained under the implied 
consent law, as well as its treatment of the defendant's due 
process, equal protection, Americans with Disabilities Act and 
Rehabilitation Act arguments. 
No. 99-1250.dss 
 
1