Case Title: YOAK v. IDE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
YOAK v. IDE2004 WY 3286 P.3d 872Case Number: 03-57, 03-68Decided: 03/25/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

KARIN 
YOAK,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

DAVID 
IDE; and THE CITY OF

GREEN 
RIVER,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

DAVID 
IDE,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

KARIN 
YOAK,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Karin Yoak:

 

            
John P. LaBuda of Palmer & LaBuda, P.C., Rock Springs, 
Wyoming.

 

 

Representing 
City of Green River:

 

            
Richard Rideout of the Law Offices of Richard Rideout, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

Representing 
David Ide:

 

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; and John D. Rossetti, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      The primary issue 
in these combined appeals is the validity of a governmental claim.  We affirm the district court's order 
granting summary judgment to the appellees and dismissing the appellant's 
complaint, and we find the appellees' collateral estoppel and res judicata 
issues to be moot.1

 

ISSUES

 

1.         
Did the appellant's Notice of Claim meet the constitutional requirements 
for a valid governmental claim?

 

2.         
Is the appellant's Notice of Claim saved by the doctrine of substantial 
compliance?

 

3.         
Does an invalid Notice of Claim deprive the district court of subject 
matter jurisdiction?

 

4.         
Under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, did the 
district court err when it denied the appellees' motion for summary 
judgment?

 

FACTS

 

[¶2]      On November 27, 
1999, the appellant was a passenger in a vehicle being driven by her 
husband.  During a traffic stop 
initiated by a Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper, the appellant was physically 
restrained by David Ide, a Green River police officer, who had responded to the 
scene in a back-up capacity.  On 
January 6, 2000, the appellant filed with the City of Green River a Notice of 
Claim asserting negligence on Ide's part during the November 27, 1999, 
incident.  The Notice of Claim was 
not signed by the appellant, but by her attorney, and it was not certified to 
under penalty of perjury.  On June 
9, 2000, the appellant filed suit in federal district court against the 
appellees and the city police chief alleging both federal and state law claims, 
including negligence.  The federal 
district court later granted the appellees' motion for summary judgment on the 
federal claims, finding that Ide's conduct during the incident was "objectively 
reasonable."  The pendent state law 
claims were dismissed without prejudice.

 

[¶3]      On July 25, 2001, 
the appellant filed a second Notice of Claim with the city.  This second notice, like the first, was 
signed by the appellant's attorney, rather than by the appellant, and likewise, 
it was not certified to under penalty of perjury.  On August 29, 2001, the appellant filed 
a complaint in state district court, reasserting her negligence cause of action 
against the appellees.  Attached to 
and referenced in the complaint was a copy of the July 25, 2001, Notice of 
Claim.

 

[¶4]      In their separate 
answers, the appellees raised as an affirmative defense the legal insufficiency 
of the Notice of Claim.  Prior to 
any discovery, both appellees filed motions for summary judgment and the City of 
Green River also filed a motion to dismiss.  After a hearing, the district court 
denied the motions for summary judgment on the ground that the federal court had 
not determined the state law negligence claim.  However, the district court granted the 
motion to dismiss, as to both appellees, on the ground that the Notice of Claim 
was not certified to under penalty of perjury.  The district court did find that the 
signature of a governmental claimant's attorney, as opposed to the signature of 
the claimant, herself, was sufficient.

 

DISCUSSION

 

            
Motion to 
Dismiss

 

[¶5]      The motion to 
dismiss stated that it was presented "pursuant to Rule 12 of the Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure," without identifying a particular subsection of that rule or 
underlying legal theory.  Reference 
in the motion to the district court's lack of jurisdiction might suggest a 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but 
that reference was supported by citation to Allen v. Lucero, 925 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1996), 
where an order granting a motion for summary judgment under W.R.C.P. 56 was 
affirmed.2  Interestingly, the three cases cited in 
the City of Green River's appellate brief as supporting a standard of review 
whereby this Court is to "focus on the pleading to determine if it states a 
claim upon which relief can be granted" are all W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) cases.  See Garnett v. Brock, 2 P.3d 558, 
562 (Wyo. 2000); 
Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 741-42 (Wyo. 1999); 
and Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 769-70 (Wyo. 
1993).  In its decision letter, the district 
court raised yet a third subsection of W.R.C.P. 12, treating the motion as if it 
were a motion for judgment on the pleadings under subsection (c).  The district court then relied upon 
Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 575 (Wyo. 1996), 
for the proposition that such motions should only be granted where it is shown 
on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under 
any set of facts.

 

[¶6]      We find that this 
imprecision is not material in the instant case, inasmuch as dismissal would 
have been appropriate under any of the referenced sections of W.R.C.P. 12.  The district court granted the motion to 
dismiss on the single ground that the appellant's Notice of Claim was not 
certified to under penalty of perjury.  
We affirm that decision for the reasons set forth in Beaulieu v. 
Florquist, 2001 WY 33, 20 P.3d 521 (Wyo. 2001) (Beaulieu 
I) and in Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 
WY 31, ___ P.3d ___ (Wyo. 2004) (No. 02-276, published 3/25/04) (Beaulieu 
II).  We clearly held in those cases that a 
notice of claim filed pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act must meet 
the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7specifically, signature by the 
claimant certified to under penalty of perjury.3  The district court's holding that such 
claims may be signed by the claimant's attorney was in error, but that error 
does not affect the affirmance on the separate issue of the signature being 
certified to under penalty of perjury.

 

            
Substantial 
Compliance

 

[¶7]      The appellant 
contends that, should this Court find her Notice of Claim to be technically 
insufficient, we should apply the doctrine of substantial compliance and reverse 
the district court's dismissal order.  
We begin discussion of this issue by pointing out that the district court 
did not directly address substantial compliance, but that the effect of its 
decision is a holding that a governmental claim cannot comply with the 
requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 unless it is certified to under penalty 
of perjury.  In other words, 
non-compliance is not substantial compliance.  We agree.  We recently stated in Beaulieu II, 
2004 WY 31, ¶ 25, ___ P.3d at ___, slip op. at 11:  "[w]hether viewed under a strict 
compliance standard or a substantial compliance standard, the fact remains that 
the primary purpose for the constitutional requirementsto make sure that 
governmental claims be sworn to by the claimantsimply cannot be accomplished 
through an attorney's signature."  
The same is true of the requirement that the claim be certified to under 
penalty of perjury.  One does not 
substantially comply with a certification requirement by failing to certify or 
to do anything resembling a certification.

 

            
Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction

 

[¶8]      We have 
affirmed dismissal of the appellant's complaint because her underlying 
governmental claim did not meet the constitutional signature and certification 
requirements.  Consequently, we need 
not address her additional argument that the failure to allege in her complaint 
compliance with the constitution did not deprive the district court of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  We note, 
however, that in Beaulieu II, 2004 WY 31, ¶ 15, __ P.3d at ___, slip op. 
at 7, 
we held that such failure in future complaints will, indeed, have that 
effect.

 

            
Res Judicata and Collateral 
Estoppel

 

[¶9]      The appellees 
contend that the federal district court's dismissal of the appellant's federal 
law claims should bar litigation in state court of the appellant's state law 
claims.  This issue is moot, given 
affirmance of the state court dismissal on the grounds set forth 
above.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶10]   The appellant's Notice of Claim did 
not meet the constitutional requirements for a valid claim under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act because it was not signed by the claimant and it was not 
certified to under penalty of perjury.  
We affirm dismissal of the appellant's complaint.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1For simplicity's sake, the 
plaintiff, Karin Yoak, will be referred to throughout this opinion as the 
appellant, and the defendants, David Ide and the City of Green River, will be 
referred to as the appellees.

 

  2Although denominated a summary 
judgment, the order in Allen was, in effect, an order of dismissal based 
on a lack of jurisdiction.  
Allen, 925 P.2d  at 230-31.

 

  3Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 
states:

 

No 
money shall be paid out of the state treasury except upon appropriation by law 
and on warrant drawn by the proper officer, and no bills, claims, accounts or 
demands against the state, or any county or political subdivision, shall be 
audited, allowed or paid until a full itemized statement in writing, certified 
to under penalty of perjury, shall be filed with the officer or officers whose 
duty it may be to audit the same.