Case Title: SIMON v. TETON BD. OF REALTORS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
SIMON v. TETON BD. OF REALTORS2000 WY 894 P.3d 197Case Number: 99-129Decided: 04/11/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
BRUCE SIMON, d/b/a PRIME 
PROPERTIES OF JACKSON HOLE, Appellant (Plaintiff), v.TETON 
BOARD OF REALTORS, Appellees (Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Teton County, The Honorable D. Terry Rogers, 
Judge.

Clay D. 
Geittmann of James K. Lubing Law Offices, Jackson, Wyoming, Representing 
Appellant.Andrea L. Richard of Rothgerber, Johnson & Lyons, LLP, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing Appellees.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] The 
resolution of this case requires this Court to rule upon the efficacy of a 
provision for procedural review, found in the National Association of Realtors 
Code of Ethics and Arbitration Manual (the manual), and the ninety-day period 
for filing an application to vacate an arbitration award set forth in the 
Uniform Arbitration Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-36-101 through 1-36-119 (Lexis 
1999). Bruce Simon, d/b/a Prime Properties of Jackson Hole (Simon), acknowledges 
that his claimed application to vacate the award (actually an action for 
declaratory judgment) was not filed within the ninety-day period provided in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-114(b). Simon contends, however, that the statutory 
period was tolled by the filing of a request for procedural review in accordance 
with the manual, which was used by the Teton Board of Realtors (the Board). We 
agree with the ruling of the district court that the request for procedural 
review did not enlarge the time provided in the statute for an application to 
vacate the award. The Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, entered in 
the district court, is affirmed.

[¶2] This 
statement of the issues is found in the Brief of 
Appellant:

1. Did the Trial Court 
Err when it granted Appellee's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Appellant 
failed to timely file his claim under the Wyoming Uniform Arbitration Act, W.S. 
§ 1-36-114(b)?

2. Did the Trial Court 
Err when it granted Appellee's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Appellant's 
Complaint and Amended Complaint failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court 
pursuant to the Wyoming Uniform Arbitration Act, W.S. § 1-36-101 et 
seq.?

3. Did the Trial Court 
Err when it granted Appellee's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Appellant's 
Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted?

[¶3] This 
Statement of the Issues is found in the Brief of Appellee:

I. The district court 
correctly concluded that the Arbitration Act did not provide jurisdiction over 
appellant's claims

II. The district court 
properly concluded that appellant failed to state any claim upon which relief 
could be granted

III. The district court 
correctly concluded that appellant's claim was untimely and precluded by Wyo. 
Stat. 1-36-114(b)

[¶4] In December 
1997, Simon, acting as a broker, received a commission for the sale of a lot 
located at the Jackson Hole Golf and Tennis Estates. After the sale was 
completed, Jackson Hole Realty claimed it was entitled to a portion of Simon's 
commission. Simon's agreement with the Board provided that such a dispute would 
be submitted to binding and mandatory arbitration. Neither Simon nor the Board 
objected to the panel of arbitrators that was selected, and at the conclusion of 
the hearing, held on August 6, 1998, both parties confirmed they had been 
afforded adequate opportunity to testify, present evidence and witnesses, and 
conduct cross-examination. The arbitrators, governed by the manual, decided that 
Simon owed Jackson Hole Realty $22,620.00, to be paid to the Board within 
twenty-one days from the August 6, 1998, written decision. According to the 
procedures established by the National Association of Realtors, the award was to 
be final, binding, and not reviewable.

[¶5] Under the 
terms of the manual, a party in binding arbitration may not obtain any 
reconsideration of the arbitration award. However, the manual, in Section 53,1 does provide for a limited 
procedural review of deficiencies or irregularities to ensure due 
process:

(a) * * * Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, a party to an arbitration proceeding may appeal to the Board of 
Directors only with respect to such alleged irregularities occurring in the 
conduct of the proceeding as may have deprived the party of fundamental "due 
process".

(b) After the award has 
been served upon each of the parties, they have twenty (20) days to request 
procedural review of the arbitration hearing procedure by the Board of 
Directors. If no such review is requested, the award becomes final and binding 
following the twenty (20) day period. However, if procedural review is 
requested, the award is not considered final and binding until after the Board 
of Directors has concluded that the hearing was conducted in a manner consistent 
with the Board's procedures and the parties have been afforded due 
process.

(c) The nonprevailing 
party shall have twenty (20) days following receipt of the award to request 
procedural review of the arbitration hearing procedure or to have legal counsel 
notify the Board Secretary or Executive Officer that a legal challenge to the 
validity of the award had been initiated.

[¶6] On August 
26, 1998, which can logically be inferred to be the twentieth day after the 
award was served upon him, Simon requested such a procedural review, asserting 
that he was denied due process in the arbitration proceeding. On November 13, 
1998, the procedural review panel met to consider Simon's claim, and the panel 
determined that the arbitration proceeding complied with due process in all 
respects.

[¶7] Simon was 
not satisfied with the result of the arbitration, and, on November 30, 1998, he 
filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in an endeavor to overturn the 
arbitration award. On December 14, 1998, Simon filed an Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment. The Board moved to dismiss the complaint on December 18, 
1998. Both parties submitted briefs and, after a hearing on the Motion to 
Dismiss, the district court entered its Order Granting Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. That order recited as findings:

1. Plaintiff's Complaint 
and Amended Complaint fail to invoke the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to the 
Wyoming Uniform Arbitration Act. Wyo. Stat. § 1-36-113;2 

2. To the extent 
Plaintiff's Complaints contain allegations based on the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgment Act, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
and therefore dismissal is appropriate pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6);

3. More than 90 days have 
passed since delivery of the arbitration award to Plaintiff and therefore his 
claim is untimely and precluded under the terms of the Wyoming Uniform 
Arbitration Act. Wyo. Stat. § 1-26-114(b).

[¶8] Simon has 
appealed to this Court from the Order Granting Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss.

[¶9] When 
reviewing a motion to dismiss presented under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, we accept as true the facts 
alleged in the complaint, and consider them in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing dismissal. Giacchino v. Estate of Stalkup, 908 P.2d 983, 985 
(Wyo. 1995); Feltner v. Casey Family Program, 902 P.2d 206, 207 (Wyo. 1995); 
Martinez v. Associates Financial Services Co. of Colorado, Inc., 891 P.2d 785, 
787 (Wyo. 1995); Veile v. Board of County Com'rs of Washakie County, 860 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Wyo. 1993); Park County v. Cooney, 845 P.2d 346, 349-50 (Wyo. 1992), 
cert. Denied, 510 U.S. 813 (1993); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 734 (Wyo. 1979). Dismissal under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is a drastic remedy, 
which should be granted sparingly, and is appropriate only when it is certain 
the plaintiff cannot assert any facts that would entitle him to relief. Duncan 
v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 742 (Wyo. 1999); Gillis v. F & A Enterprises, 
934 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Wyo. 1997); Kautza v. City of Cody, 812 P.2d 143, 145 (Wyo. 
1991); Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wyo. 1987). We have 
said, with respect to dismissal when an action is barred by the statute of 
limitations:

Although dismissal is a 
drastic remedy which should be granted sparingly, a dismissal is proper where 
the complaint reflects that the action is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. Feltner v. Casey Family Program, 902 P.2d 206, 208 (Wyo. 1995); 
Boller v. Western Law Associates, P.C., 828 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶10] Gillis, 
934 P.2d  at 1254. The proper application and interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law that we review de novo. French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 
1027 (Wyo. 1998); Pecha v. Smith, Keller & Associates, 942 P.2d 387, 390 
(Wyo. 1997); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 918 P.2d 980, 983 (Wyo. 
1996).

[¶11] The 
district court dismissed Simon's complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction because he failed to file an application to vacate the award within 
ninety days. The requirement for filing such an application is found in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-36-114(b), which provides:

(b) An application for 
vacating an award shall be made within ninety (90) days after delivery of a copy 
of the award to the applicant, or if predicated upon corruption, fraud or other 
undue means it shall be made within ninety (90) days after the grounds are known 
or should have been known.

[¶12] The Board 
maintains that because more than ninety days passed between August 6, 1998, when 
the arbitration hearing panel entered its award, and November 30, 1998, the day 
Simon filed his complaint in the district court, Simon exceeded the statutory 
time limit, and the district court, therefore, did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction.

[¶13] Simon 
counters that the arbitration award was not final until the Board ruled on his 
request for a procedural review of the decision. First, Simon contends that the 
lack of a definition of "award" or "final award" in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-36-114(b) permits this conclusion. To qualify as an award, all that is 
required is that it "be in writing and signed by the arbitrators joining in the 
decision." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-110(a). The record is clear that such an 
award, clearly entitled "Award of Arbitrators," was received by Simon on August 
6, 1998.

[¶14] In T & 
M Properties v. ZVFK Architects and Planners, 661 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 1983), this 
Court had before it a situation in which the grounds to vacate an award were 
raised in an answer to the petition for recognition of award and judgment 
presented by the prevailing party in the arbitration proceeding. In that 
opinion, this Court said:

On November 6, 1981, 
appellants were mailed a copy of the award. On January 28, 1982, appellee filed 
a petition for recognition of award and judgment in district court under § 
1-36-113, supra. Appellants contend that since appellee filed a petition under § 
1-36-113, supra, then they are allowed to assert affirmative defenses regardless 
of the 90-day time proscriptions of § 1-36-114(b), supra. Appellee argues that 
the time limits of this statute apply.

[¶15] Courts 
have ruled differently on this issue, but we think the better reasoned rule is 
that the time limits set out in § 1-36-114(b), supra, are applicable. It seems 
that the majority of jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform Arbitration 
Act (7 Uniform Laws Annotated, 1978) follow this rule. In Chauffeurs, Teamsters, 
Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 135 v. Jefferson Trucking Company, 
Inc., 628 F.2d 1023 (7th Cir. 1980), the court decided the question under an 
Indiana statute which provided:

"`Confirmation of an 
award. - Upon application of a party, but not before ninety [90] days after the 
mailing of a copy of the award to the parties, the court shall confirm an award, 
unless within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for vacating 
or modifying or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed as 
provided in sections 13 and 14 of this act. * * *'" 628 F.2d  at 
1026.

[¶16] The fact 
that a party opposing an award delays in complying with it and effectively 
forces the other party into court to enforce the award should not accrue to the 
delaying party's benefit.

[¶17] "* * * As 
the district court observed, this policy [of requiring a motion to vacate or an 
answer filed within the original 90-day period] would seem to condemn the 
conduct of the defendant who ignored an award disfavorable to it, failed to move 
to vacate the award, and then sought to be given its day in court when the 
plaintiff brought its suit in frustration to have the arbitration award 
enforced. If the defendant's defenses were of such vital importance to it, the 
defendant nevertheless had an opportunity to raise them in the manner 
contemplated by statute." Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 
Union No. 135 v. Jefferson Trucking Company, Inc., supra, at 
1027.

[¶18] 
Arbitration provides for voluntary settlement of disputes in an inexpensive and 
expeditious manner without resort to a tribunal and conducted without the rigid 
formality of strict rules of law. Riverton Valley Electric Association v. 
Pacific Power and Light Company, Wyo., 391 P.2d 489 (1964). Arbitration is 
embedded in the public policy of Wyoming and is favored by this court. Matter of 
Town of Greybull, Wyo., 560 P.2d 1172 (1977). The short time period set out in § 
1-36-114(b), supra, gives the arbitration award finality by forcing a party who 
opposes to petition the courts within 90 days.

[¶19] Appellants 
here, through their answer, were asking for the affirmative relief of having the 
arbitration award vacated. There are two ways in which a party may present 
reasons for vacating an award: (1) by filing a petition with the trial court to 
vacate the award; or (2) by raising reasons supporting vacation in an answer to 
the other party's petition to confirm. However, the answer itself must be filed 
within the 90-day time limit.

[¶20] "* * * 
Although the answer is not framed as a counterclaim, the `defenses' raised 
therein constitute a request for affirmative relief, namely, vacation of the 
arbitration award. A counterclaim for affirmative relief may not be asserted if 
barred by the statute of limitations. [Citation.]" Chauffeurs, Teamsters, 
Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 135 v. Jefferson Trucking Company, 
Inc., supra at 1027.

[¶21] The filing 
of a petition to confirm thus does not extend the 90-day statutory time period 
within which a request for vacation of the award must be presented. [Citations 
omitted.]

[¶22] T & M 
Properties, 661 P.2d  at 1042-43.

[¶23] Simon's 
request for procedural review is analogous to the motion to alter or amend the 
judgment under W.R.C.P. 59 filed in Sherman v. Rose, 943 P.2d 719 (Wyo. 1997). 
In that case, we held that Sherman's motion to reconsider did not qualify as a 
motion to alter or amend the judgment which would toll the period for filing the 
notice of appeal, saying:

A motion styled as a 
motion for reconsideration, if filed within the ten day period, generally could 
be considered a motion to alter or amend a judgment under W.R.C.P. 59(e). See 
Waye v. First Citizen's Nat. Bank, 846 F. Supp. 310, 313 (M.D.Pa. 1994). A 
determination, however, as to whether a motion to reconsider should be deemed a 
motion to alter or amend the judgment depends upon the contents of the motion, 
not its title. See Davis v. Lukhard, 106 F.R.D. 317, 318 (E.D.Va. 1984). In 
order to qualify for treatment as a motion to alter or amend a judgment, the 
motion must articulate a new ground which could not have been brought before the 
court during the action and upon which the trial court should utter a different 
ruling. The motion to alter or amend cannot be invoked simply to argue matters 
already presented and disposed of by the trial court. See Lukhard, 106 F.R.D.  at 
318; Fontenot v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207, 1219 (5th Cir. 1986). 
Appropriate new grounds are: 1) an intervening change in controlling law; 2) the 
availability of new evidence not available at the time the case was originally 
heard; or 3) the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest 
injustice. See Waye, 846 F. Supp.  at 313; Atkins v. Marathon LeTourneau Co., 130 F.R.D. 625, 626 (S.D.Miss. 1990). A motion that does not contain any of these 
new grounds is not a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and the time for 
filing a notice of appeal runs from the date of the judgment. See Frito-Lay of 
Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Ca±as, 92 F.R.D. 384, 390 (D.C.Puerto Rico 1981). The 
filing of a motion that is not to be treated as a motion to alter or amend the 
judgment will not stay the time for appeal. See Lukhard, 106 F.R.D.  at 
318.

[¶24] Sherman, 
943 P.2d  at 721 (footnote omitted). Like the situation in Sherman, the 
procedural review that Simon sought could not adjust the merits of the award by 
the arbitrators in any way. Simon was not entitled to raise an intervening 
change in controlling law; the availability of new evidence not available at the 
time the case was originally heard; or the need to correct a clear error of law 
or prevent manifest injustice.

[¶25] 
Consequently, the requested procedural review could not stay the time for 
pursuing the statutory remedies relating to the award of the arbitrators, any 
more than the pleading of the affirmative defenses in T & M Properties could 
extend the ninety-day requirement in the statute. As this Court said in Jackson 
State Bank v. Homar, 837 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Wyo. 1992): 

Arbitration is strongly 
embedded in the public policy of this state and is favored by this court as a 
voluntary method to settle disputes in an inexpensive and expeditious manner 
without resort to strict rules of law and the rigid formality of a tribunal. Hot 
Springs [Hot Springs Co. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Strube Constr. Co., 715 P.2d 540 
(Wyo. 1986)], 715 P.2d  at 547; T & M Properties, 661 P.2d  at 1043; Am. Nat'l 
Bank [Am. Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Cheyenne Housing Authority, 562 P.2d 1017 
(Wyo. 1977), 562 P.2d  at 1020; Matter of Town of Greybull, 560 P.2d 1172, 1175 
(Wyo. 1977); Riverton Valley Elec. Ass'n v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 391 P.2d 489, 495 (Wyo. 1964).

[¶26] We hold 
that Simon's claim of lack of finality is erroneous because it would be 
antithetical to the articulated public policy of Wyoming and incompatible with 
the ruling in T & M Properties. This holding resolves this 
case.

[¶27] We turn 
our attention only briefly to the other grounds for dismissal invoked by the 
district court and challenged in the second and third issues asserted by Simon. 
He filed an action for declaratory judgment, and initially requested the 
district court to intervene because the arbitration award was "arbitrary and 
capricious and not supported by fact or law." The original Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment is couched in language that makes it appear to be a 
strained effort to invoke judicial review of the award under the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act. Judicial review of an arbitration award 
specifically is limited by the Uniform Arbitration Act. The appropriate remedy, 
of course, was an application to vacate the award pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-36-114, or to modify or correct the award in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-36-115.3

[¶28] As to the 
failure to state a claim for relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 
(Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-101 through 1-37-114 (Lexis 1999)), we do not 
understand that Simon contends that he has such a remedy. If that is his 
understanding of the law, he is correct. A declaratory judgment action cannot 
substitute for an appeal. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Wyo. 1982). No more would it be appropriate to permit it to be 
substituted for another specific statutory remedy. See M & B Drilling and 
Const. Co., Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 706 P.2d 243, 246 (Wyo. 1985). 
The purpose of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act "is to settle and to afford 
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to legal relations, and is 
to be liberally construed and administered." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-114. There 
is no uncertainty regarding the legal relationship of Simon and the Board; they 
agreed to arbitrate all disputes. The Declaratory Judgment Act cannot be 
construed to extend a new right to challenge final and binding arbitration 
awards when such a right is foreclosed under the Uniform Arbitration 
Act.

[¶29] We 
understand, instead, that Simon argues the sufficiency of the Amended Complaint 
for Declaratory Judgment to allege a claim to vacate the award of the 
arbitrators. He relies upon the liberal construction of pleadings under the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure do apply 
in actions relating to arbitration; yet it is necessary that the pleading give 
the adversary fair notice of the claim against him. Jackson State Bank, 837 P.2d  
at 1085-86. We have compared carefully the allegations of the Amended Complaint 
for Declaratory Judgment with the statutory grounds for vacating, modifying or 
correcting the award of the arbitrators as they appear in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
1-36-114(a) and 1-36-115. The closest match to any of the statutory grounds is 
the articulation of Simon's belief that the arbitrators were biased and he was 
not allowed to present his case as intended, alleged in the context of his 
request for procedural review, and a conclusional allegation that Simon was 
deprived of due process. We hold that these allegations were not sufficient to 
furnish the Board with fair notice of a claim to vacate, modify or correct the 
award as required by Jackson State Bank. Consequently, the rulings of the 
district court that Simon failed to invoke jurisdiction under the Uniform 
Arbitration Act and that the Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment did not 
suffice to state a claim upon which relief could be granted also are 
correct.

[¶30] The 
Uniform Arbitration Act was adopted to provide parties with a quick and 
efficient means to resolve disputes other than through litigation. If this Court 
were to allow parties to bring a declaratory judgment action solely because they 
are unhappy with the decision of the arbitrators, the very purpose of the 
Uniform Arbitration Act would be frustrated. Similarly, an application for 
procedural review cannot extend the ninety-day statutory period for filing an 
application in the district court to vacate, modify, or correct the award. That 
also would frustrate the policy of the Uniform Arbitration 
Act.

[¶31] We affirm 
the district court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss.

Footnotes

1 The record 
does not include a copy of the manual, and in this regard the Court relies upon 
apparently undisputed statements and quotations set forth by the parties in 
their several pleadings and briefs.

2 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-36-113 provides:

Upon 
application of a party the court shall confirm the award unless within the time 
limits allowed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying the 
award.

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-36-114 provides:

(a) Upon 
application of a party the court shall vacate an award 
where:

(i) The 
award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue 
means;

(ii) There 
was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption of 
any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any 
party;

(iii) The 
arbitrators exceeded their powers;

(iv) The 
arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown, 
refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise conducted the 
hearing as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; 
or

(v) There 
was no arbitration agreement, the issue was not adversely determined by a court 
as provided by law and the applicant did not participate in the arbitration 
hearing without raising the objection. The fact that the relief was such that it 
could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not a ground 
for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.

(b) An 
application for vacating an award shall be made within ninety (90) days after 
delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant, or if predicated upon 
corruption, fraud or other undue means it shall be made within ninety (90) days 
after the grounds are known or should have been known. (c) In vacating the award 
on grounds other than stated in subsection (a)(v) the court may order a 
rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the agreement or by the 
court in accordance with W.S. 1-36-105. If the award is vacated on grounds set 
forth in paragraph (a)(iii) or (iv) of this section the court may order a 
rehearing before the arbitrators who made the award or their successors 
appointed in accordance with W.S. 1-36-105. The time within which the agreement 
requires the award to be made is applicable to the rehearing and commences from 
the date of the order.

(d) If the 
application to vacate is denied and no motion to modify or correct the award is 
pending, the court shall confirm the award.

3 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-36-115 provides:

(a) Upon 
application made within ninety (90) days after delivery of a copy of the award 
to the applicant, the court shall modify or correct the award 
where:

(i) There 
was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the 
description of any person or property referred to in the 
award;

(ii) The 
arbitrators awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and the award may be 
corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues 
submitted; or

(iii) The 
award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the 
controversy.

(b) If the 
application is granted, the court shall modify and correct the award as to 
intent and shall confirm the award as so modified and corrected. Otherwise the 
court shall confirm the award as made.

(c) An 
application to modify or correct an award may be joined in the alternative with 
an application to vacate the award.