Case Title: State v. Daniels.

Citation: 109 Haw. 1

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAWLIBRARY
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

CLIFFORD DANIELS, Defendant-Appellant.

oats

 

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(FC-CR NO. 01-1-1371)

OCTOBER 21, 2005

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBR, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.

 

endant-appellant Clifford Daniels (hereifiafter
“paniels”) appeals from the July 31, 2001 judgment of the family
court of the first circuit, the Honorable Michael D. Wilson
presiding, convicting Daniels of abuse of a family or household
member in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 709-906
(1999), sentencing him to serve a term of 90 days’ imprisonment
and placing him on probation for two years. On appeal, Daniels
argues that: (1) the trial court erred in (a) failing to require
the prosecution to present facially non-discriminatory reasons
for its peremptory challenges and (b) denying Daniels’ motion for
a mistrial due to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges

by the State of Hawai'i (hereinafter “the prosecution”) (a so-

HRS § 709-806 (3999) provides, in relevant part, that [i]t shall be
unlawful for say person, singly er in concert, to physically abuse @ family or
household nenber. . for the purposes of this section, ‘fenily or hovseholé
Reaber" means. . .persone jointly residing in the same unit.”

 

 

 
 

   

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called Batson violation, per Batson v, Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986) and State v, Batson, 71 Haw. 300, 788 P.2d 841 (1990)17

(2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury to clarify its

 

verdict rather than acquitting Daniels when the jury returned
both “guilty” and “not guilty” verdict forms, inasmuch as Daniels
vshould have been acquitted because there was no objective
evidence as to which verdict was rendered first; and (3) double
jeopardy bars a retrial (a) due to the erroneously denied Batson
motion and (b) because the jury erroneously returned both
“guilty” and “not guilty” verdict forms. Upon review of the
record, we conclude that (1) the trial court erred in failing to
require the prosecution to present facially non-discriminatory
reasons for its peremptory challenges, and (2) reprosecuting
Daniels would not constitute double jeopardy. Accordingly, we
vacate the family court's July 31, 2001 judgment of conviction
and remand the matter for a new trial.
I. BACKGROUND

The present case arises out of a donestic dispute
between Daniels, a caucasian male, and Joyce George,
(hereinafter “complainant” or “George”) occurring between
February 28 and March 1, 2001. The incidents were reported to
the police and Daniels was arrested. The prosecution filed a
complaint charging Daniels with one count of abuse of = family or
household menber in violation of HRS § 709-906, see supra note 1.
Evidence was adduced at Daniels’ jury trial, which commenced
May 24, 2001 and concluded on May 28, 2001, providing factual

support for the charge, i.e. that George and Daniels were joint

 
+ FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

residents in the same unit and Daniels abused George.
In the course of jury selection, the prosecution
exercised its three peremptory challenges against three caucasian

mall

 

‘Two of the challenged jurors, John Olson and John Morgan,

were among the original twelve; the other, Arnold Schulmeister,

 

was drawn to replace a juror perenptorily challenged by the
defense.” All three jurors were passed for cause, and the
answers of at least two of the veniremen, Morgan and Olson,
contained nothing to suggest any prejudice or lack of
understanding of a juror's duties.‘ Daniels’ attorney made @
Batson challenge and moved for a mistrial.

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, we'd Like to make a
Batson chellenge at this tine end nove for a mistrial. The
Prosecutor has stricken (sic) -- a1 three persons are male
anc caucasian, and Defendant 1s male and caucasian. And she
Strock tr. olson, Mr. Schuineister, ang Mr. Morgan

‘the ‘coure’’ Me: Suzuki

(Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (DPA)}: Your Honor, that
Ae not the reason way 1 struck those particular people.

 

 

 

‘complainant testified that Deniels kept clothes in her apartment, would
spend the night, and wae domiciled with her at the time of the incidents in
Questions “Complainant further testified that in the course of an argument on
Fobroary 22, 2003, bansele grabbed the complainant from behind, placed his
fara under her arms, then Brought his hands together behind her head, forcing
her head Gown towerds her chest (2 grappling technique knows as @ “EULl
heison"), st which point she bit hin, Daniels then pushed her against a wall
Tepestedly and struck her on both sides of ner face.” The complainant found
herself of the ground with Daniels holding her mouth and pinching her nose,
preventing her fron breathing. Daniels subsequently released her end began to
Choke ner by placing one arm around her neck and pulling that arm with Ale
‘other arm.

 

 

 

othe racial categorizations at issue are subjective and based on the
attorneys" impressions. Daniels’ sttorney characterized the three challenged
Surore ae caucasian and neither the court nor the prosecution offered any
Geament "on the characterization,

 

 

‘the answers of the third perenptorily challenged caucasian male, Arnold
Schuineister, arguably reflect sone degree of confusion, though not
necessarily prejudice cf lack of understanding of » juror’s duties, and not

 

pecessarily toa 9
Jurors not challenged

 

ter degree than the answers provided by other prospective
 

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—____* FOR PUBLICATION "97

me Court: All right. Your motion is denied. You
can return to your seat.

baniels’ attorney later revisited the Batson challenge during a

recess following jury selection:

[Defense counsel): Your Honor, as a preliminsry
matter, 1 would Iike to revisit lenge, Your
Honor, According to =~ ay unders sony f make &
prelininary showing and then the State is supposed to makt
Fes (eic) neutral statements as to why they challenged e
of the three Jurors.

‘and. ail the prosecutor indicated at cide bar wag that
that woan't the resson shy she excluded then. We don't know
sihet_ the reasons are and whether or not they are res {eic]
nevtral

‘The Court: 1 leave to the government their response
vo your motion. I have denied it

tier Susuki, if you want to supplement your record, you
nay do'so et thig time. Otherwise, we'll move along. is
There anything elee you'd like to add at this tine?

{DPA}: “No, Your Honor, except for the fact that there
a-"Pinse of ails strenuously deny that ie was based on
ioe as the reason why 1 excluded the three jurors. In
fect, ene of == 80 that's not the feason behing it. And in
fact, even the last busp for the alternete, he was Asien,
Race se not a factor, Your Nonor, There also is a caucasian
Suror who is on the -- in the Sury.[*)

The Court: Thank you. We'll move on now to the
2 motion in liminer

   

 

 

   

    

 

 

ste

 

‘The trial proceeded. At the conclusion of the trial,
the jury foreman signed both the “guilty” and “not guilty”
verdict forms and returned them to the court. The court excused
the jury, explained the situation to counsel, permitted counsel
to review the forms, and said “So, counsel, what I will do is
return these forms to the jury and instruct them to clarify what
their verdict is.” Defense counsel signified his assent to this

procedure. At the conclusion of this procedure, the jury
ch menber

 

returned a guilty verdict. The jury was polled and

confirmed that they agreed with the verdict.

 

Sthe remaining caucasian juror referred to was @ female.

 
 

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Judgment was entered on July 31, 2001. Daniels was
sentenced to serve a term of 90 days’ imprisonment and placed on
probation for two years. Notice of appeal from the judgment, as
authorized by HRS §§ 641-11 and 571-54, which allow an appeal
from the judgment in a family circuit court criminal case, was
timely filed on August 20, 2001, within the thirty-day period for
appeal prescribed by Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule
4b) (1).

IZ, STANDARDS OF REVIEW

In reviewing an appeal based on a criminal defendant’ s
denied Batson motion, where such motion was denied without the
trial court compelling the prosecution to proffer a non-
discriminatory explanation for the disputed peremptory challenge,
we step into the trial court’s position, review the same trial
record, and redecide the issue; because our determination of
‘whether the trial record indicates that the criminal defendant
had established 2 prima facie case of discriminatory purpose’ is
a question of law, the review is de novo. See State v. Batson,
71 Haw. 300, 301-02, 788 P.2d 841, 842 (1990)7 see also Dan v
State, 76 Hawai's 423, 427, 879 P.2d 528, $32 (1994).*

When the trial court is faced with an incomplete or

‘although federal courts have described the trial court's determination
whether the opponent of a peremptory challenge party hes made © prima facie
Cece of Giscrisinetory purpose a%, in general, 3 finding to be reviewed

Geferentialiy, ane, @1ac, Tolbert v, page, 162 F.3d 677, 681-85 (9th, Cir
$$58], the standard of feview applicable here is'the de’ nove standerd applied

in sane S. Hargen. In Etase Bataan, we disregarded the trial court's
Hodinge evamined the record, end, with particular attention to certain
Gromerated factors, nade a de novo determination with respect to whether the
Erie! seecrd indicsted that the defendant had raised an inference that the
prosecoticn’s exercise of its peremptory challenge was motivates by an
Papermissitie discriminatory purpose. 11 Maw, at 301-02, 708 P.2d at 642,

 

 

   

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ambiguous verdict and reinstructs the jury to complete the
verdict, we review the trial court’s actions for an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Maninon, 70 Haw. 175, 177, 765 P.2d
1091, 1093 (2989).

III, DISCUSSION

A. The trial court erred by failing to require the prosecution
to offer non-discriminatory explanations for its exercise of
its peremptory challenges to remove three caucasian males
from the jury.

 

Daniels argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion fora mistrial due to the facially discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges by the prosecution. Daniels is correct.
our precedent demonstrates that the trial court erred in not
requiring the prosecution to offer non-discriminatory
explanations for ite exercise of its peremptory challenges.

It ig impermissible to exercise peremptory challenges
in a manner which discriminates on the basis of such categories
as race, religion, ancestry, or gender. See generally State ve
Batson, 71 Haw. 300, 788 P.2d 841 (1990); State v. Levinson, 71
Haw. 492, 795 P.2d 845 (1990). A trial court’s constitutional
review of peremptory strikes follows a three-step procedure.

First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case
by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to
an inference of discriminatory purpose. Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. at 93-94, To establish the prima facie case, the defendant
must make @ showing that the challenged juror is a member of a
protected group, that the opposing party exercised a peremptory

challenge to remove the juror, and that the facts and
   

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circumstances surrounding the exercise of the peremptory
challenge raise an inference of discrimination. Cooperwood vw.
Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
900 (2001), The rule in Hawai'i, announced in State v, Batson,
is that whenever the prosecution exercises its peremptory
challenges so as to exclude entirely from the jury all persons
who are of the same protected group’ as the defendant, and that
exclusion is challenged by the defense, there will be an
inference that the exclusion was motivated by an impermissible
discriminatory purpose," and the prosecutor must, to the
satisfaction of the court, provide a category-neutral
explanation’ for the peremptory challenges. 71 Haw. at 302-03,
788 P.2d at 842. In other words, if the effect of the
prosecution's exercise of its peremptory challenges is to exclude
from the jury all members of the same protected group as the
defendant, and the defense raises a Batson challenge, the
defendant's prima facie case is automatically established. Id.
Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the State to explain the exclusion by
offering permissible category-neutral justifications for the
strikes, Batson v, Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 94, See alse Levinson,
71 Haw. at 499, 795 P.2d at 850 ("[W]hen a prima facie case of

the use of peremptory challenges by the defense to discriminate

 

‘in State v. Batson, “ethnics! minority,” bot the rule in Batson hes
been expanded beyond Yace and ethnicity by subsequent controlling precedent,

   

‘in State v. Baten, “racially motivated.”
Yin State v. gatzon,

 
   

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against potential jurors because of their race, religion, sex, or
ancestry is established, it is incumbent upon the court to
require a non-discriminatory explanation of the challenge, which
satisfies it that the challenge is not based on a prohibited
discriminatory basis, before excusing the juror.”). At this
second step, a prosecutor cannot satisfy his or her burden of
production by merely denying that he/she had 2 discriminatory

“motive or by merely affirming his/her good faith. Burkett ve
Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995). As the United States Suprene
Court explained earlier this year, “when illegitimate grounds
like race are in issue, a prosecutor simply has got to state his
reasons as best he can and stand or fall on the plausibility of

the reasons he gives.” Miller-E] v, Dretke, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.

 

ct. 2317, 2332 (2005). Where the prosecutor refuses to answer,
which the Court has described as “an unlikely hypothetical,”

the evidence before the Judge would consist not only of the
original facts from which the prima facie case was
Getablished, but also the prosecutor’ s refusal to justity
hie strike in light of the court's request. Such 2 refusel
would provide additional support for the inference of
OiscrEination raised by 2 defendant’ s prima facie case."

 

 

dJohnson v, California, $45 U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2417 2.6
(2005) (citing United States ex rel, Vaitauer v. Commissioner of
Immiaration, 273 U.S. 103, 111 (1927) (stating that “*{c]onduct

which forms a basis for inference is evidence. Silence is often

evidence of the most persuasive character.’”) (quoting United

 
 

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States ex rel, Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923))).
Hawai'i law goes further: we have held that, where the inference
has been established, if the prosecutor refuses to offer a
category-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge, and
the trial judge fails to compel an answer, any resulting
conviction must be vacated. State v, Batson, 71 Haw. at 302, 788
P.2d at 842.

‘Third, if a category-neutral explanation is tendered,
the trial court must then decide whether the opponent of the
strike has proved purposeful discrimination. Burkett, 514 U.S.
at 767 (citations omitted); Levinson, 71 Haw. at 499, 795 P.2d
850.

In determining whether an inference that the challenge
was motivated by an impermissible discriminatory purpose has been
raised, we consider (1) the answers given by the juror to the
questions put to him, (2) the delay in exercising the challenge,
(3) the colloquy between the court and counsel when the challenge
was exercised, (4) the refusal of the prosecutor despite the

citation to the court of [either] the United States Supreme

Court’s opinion in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) [or our
opinion in State v. Batson, 71 Haw. 300, 788 P.2d 841 (1990)], to

give 2 reason for the exercise of the peremptory challenge, and
(5) whether the effect of the challenge is to exclude from the

panel menbers of [a category] that includes the opponent of the
 

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strike. State v, Batson, 71 Haw. at 301-02, 788 P.2d B41, 842;
see also Levinson, 71 Haw. at 499, 795 P.2d at 850. The remedy
for a Batson violation is vacatur of the judgment of conviction
and remand to the trial court for anew trial. State v, Batson,
71 Haw. at 301, 788 P.2d at 942.

In this case, the prosecution exercised its peremptory
challenges to entirely exclude caucasian males from the jury.
Daniels, 2 caucasian male, challenged the prosecution's exercise
of its peremptory challenges on the grounds that the challenged
jurors, like the defendant, were caucasian males. The
prosecution does not dispute that caucasian males constitute a
cognizable Batson group. Daniels thus satisfied all of the
conditions necessary to trigger the mandatory inference of a
discriminatory purpose pursuant to the rule announced in State v
Batson. The trial court was therefore required to compel the

 

“me bolded, bracketed language is net in State v. Batson, but is
either more consistent with current United States Supress Court case law (de,
the Use of "a category” rather than “black") or serves a necessary pragmatic
Purpose (dug, permitting citation to the decision in the Hawai case State va
Batson in eadition to that in the Suprese Court case Batson v. Kentucky

 

Mother state courts have recognized combined race-gender groups for
purposes of the Batson analysis. See, s.a., Comonwealch v. Jordan, 765
N.tv2d 366, 377-81 (Hass. 2003) (collecting cases and holding that caucssian
males ares cognizable group)? State ¥ shesherd, 989 P-2d 503, 511 n-¢ (Utah
Ct. App. 1899) (calling tril judge's assumption that caucasian males are not
a protected group "erreneous"); pacole vw. Garcia, 217 A.D.2d 113, 120 (N.Y.
app. Div. 1998), opinion after xemand, 23e A.D.cd 605 (1997), and appeal,
denied, 686 N.E.2d-229 {Nv¥. 1987] (nolding that african-anerican wonen “are
Protected from being perenpiorily challenged on 2 discriminatory basis"):
Becple ‘. Matton, 704 F.2d 176, 18i-€2 (Cal- 1965) (holding african-american
women fo bes "eognizabie group"). But see People ¥, Msshington, 626 N-E-23
381, 355-56 (r11, Ce. App. 1993), ‘Genieg, s1¢ U.S. €75 (1395) (refusing
to fecognize african-american males as a cognizable group) (relying in part on
2 series of cases subsequently overruled by J.f.8, vy Alsbans ex rel, TiS,
521'U,5. 127° (1994) (banning gender-based discriminatory challenges TT

 

 

 

 

    

 

 

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prosecutor to provide a category-neutral explanation for the

peremptory challenges. Id. The trial court's failure to do so
was error; as in State v. Batson, the prosecution's rejection of
the chance to explain the suspect challenges necessitates a new
trial. Id, We therefore vacate the judgment of conviction and

remand the matter for a new trial. Id.

B, The trial court's procedure upon receiving inconsistent
verdict forms from the jury was not in error.

Daniels argues that the trial court erred when, upon
receiving both “guilty” and “not guilty” verdict forms from the
jury, rather than accepting the “not guilty” verdict the court
instead instructed the jury to return to the jury room and
clarify their verdict. Daniels’ argument is without merit, as
our precedent demonstrates that the trial court’s procedure was
not in error.

“as long as the jury remains under the direction of the
trial court, it is within the court's province to have them
render a correct verdict.” State vs Manipon, 70 Haw. 175, 177,
765 P.2d 1091, 1092 (1989). “The office of the juror is not
discharged until the acceptance of the verdict by the court.” Id.
at 178, 765 P.2d at 1093. See also State vs Lemalu, 72 Haw. 130,
135, 809 P.2d 442, 445 (1981). In the face of an incomplete or
ambiguous verdict, the trial court does not abuse its discretion
in instructing the jury to complete the verdict to reflect its

decision. Manivon, 70 Haw. at 177, 765 P.2d at 1093.

In this case, at the conclusion of the trial, the jury

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foreman signed both the “guilty” and “not guilty” verdict forms
and returned then to the court. The court excused the jury,
explained the situation to counsel, permitted counsel to review
the forms, and said “So, counsel, what I will do is return these
forms to the jury and instruct then to clarify what their verdict
Ss.” Defense counsel signified his assent to this procedure.

At the conclusion of this procedure, the jury returned a guilty
verdict. The jury was polled and each member confirmed that they
agreed with the verdict.

The court did not exr in finding the return of two
coextensive mutually-exclusive verdict forms to be incomplete or
ambiguous, nor vas its instruction to the jury in error. As in
Manipon, the trial court refused to accept an ambiguous verdict,
and reinstructed the jury to the satisfaction of counsel. The
jury's return of a guilty verdict, with which all twelve polled
jury members agreed, strongly suggests that even if error
occurred, there is no real possibility that such error could have

contributed to the defendant’s conviction.
C. Reprosecuting Daniels would not constitute double jeopardy.

Daniels argues that to reprosecute him would constitute
double jeopardy. This argument is wholly without merit. As the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania explains:

“since the Batson decision, hundreds of state and
federal courts have applied Batson, and, when Batson
violations have occurred after jeopardy has attached, those
Courts have remanded cases for Further evidentiary
Proceedings, reversed convictions, and remanded for new
Erials. No state or federel court has ever held that 3
Prosecutor's Batson vielation, no matter the circunst
Constitutes prosecutorial misconduct of such @ degree

 

 

 

 

 

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implicate double jeopardy principles.”

Commonwealth v. Basemore, 875 A.2d 350, 353 & n. 7 (Pa. Sup. Ct.
2005) (discussing the interplay between discriminatory peremptory
challenges and double jeopardy, and collecting cases).

: Nor does a trial court's nonacceptance’ of the verdict
form and subsequent re-instruction to the jury violate a
defendant's protections against double jeopardy. Manipon, 70
Haw, at 177-78, 765 P.2d at 1093. As in Maninon, the trial court
refused to accept an anbiguous verdict, and reinstructed the jury
to the satisfaction of counsel. This procedure did not violate

Daniels’ protections against double jeopardy.
IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the family court’s July 31,
2001 judgment of conviction is vacated and the matter remanded

for a new trial.

on the vette Oro

'T. Stephen Leong :

for the defendant-appellant EH Lerman
Clifford Daniels

Mark Yuen, Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney,

for the plaintiff-appellee
State of Hawai'i