Case Title: Vogel v. Onyx Acceptance Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0061

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
JEFFREY C. VOGEL, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE WYOMING UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE v. ONYX ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION2011 WY 163Case Number: S-11-0061Decided: 12/19/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
JEFFREY 
C. VOGEL, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE WYOMING UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT 
CODE,Appellant (Respondent),v.ONYX ACCEPTANCE 
CORPORATION,Appellee (Petitioner).
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County
The 
Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney 
General; Ryan Schelhaas, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. Schelhaas.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
C. Dyekman, Dray, Dyekman, Reed & Healy, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming; Michael H. 
Gottschlich, Barnes, & Thornburg, LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana.  Argument by Mr. 
Dyekman.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]  The Wyoming Division of Banking 
(Division) performed a Wyoming Uniform Consumer Credit Code (WUCCC or Code) 
compliance examination of Onyx Acceptance Corporation (Onyx) and determined it 
was improperly charging its Wyoming customers fees for making payments by 
telephone or internet.  The Division 
ordered Onyx to stop charging the fees and refund the fees collected.  Onyx appealed the order and the Office 
of Administrative Hearings (OAH) scheduled a contested case hearing.  Onyx and the Division each submitted 
motions for summary judgment.  The 
OAH issued a recommended decision granting the Division’s motion.  Consistent with the recommended 
decision, Jeffrey C. Vogel, the Administrator of the WUCCC (Administrator), 
issued an order finding that Onyx violated the Code when it charged the 
fees.
 
[¶2]  Onyx filed a petition for review in the 
district court.  After briefing and 
a hearing, the district court issued a decision letter in which it concluded the 
fees were not covered by the WUCCC and, therefore, Onyx did not violate the Code 
by charging them to customers who opted to pay by phone or internet.  The district court reversed the OAH 
decision and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment for Onyx.  The Administrator appealed to this 
Court.  We hold that Onyx did not 
violate the WUCCC and summary judgment in its favor is appropriate.     
 
ISSUES
 
[¶3]  The Administrator contends Onyx violated 
the WUCCC by charging customers a fee, that was not disclosed when credit was 
extended, for making payments by telephone or internet; therefore, the OAH 
properly entered summary judgment for the Division.  Onyx maintains the district court 
correctly concluded the WUCCC does not prohibit it from charging a fee for 
optional payment methods it offers to its customers after credit had been 
extended.  
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]  Prior to submitting their summary 
judgment briefs to the OAH, the parties stipulated to certain facts, which we 
rephrase as follows.  Onyx was 
subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the WUCCC, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
40-14-101 through 702 (LexisNexis 2011), and the Administrator of the Code with 
respect to consumer credit sales contracts that it purchased from Wyoming 
automobile dealers.  The contracts 
Onyx purchased were originally executed by automobile dealers and their 
customers who purchased automobiles on credit.  When Onyx purchased the contracts, the 
dealers assigned them to Onyx and the customers then made the payments on their 
contracts directly to Onyx.
 
[¶5]  Onyx offered customers the option to 
make payments on their contracts by phone or internet.  For customers choosing to make payments 
in one of those ways, Onyx charged a fee of $9.50 per phone payment and $5.00 
per internet payment.  The fees were 
not mentioned in the credit sales contracts nor were they otherwise disclosed to 
customers at the time the dealer extended credit.  Customers who chose to pay Onyx by phone 
or internet incurred the fees after credit had been extended and after the 
automobile dealer had assigned the contract to Onyx.  The customers had the option not to pay 
by phone or internet and not to incur the fee by making their payments by 
regular mail or another expedited method such as Federal Express or Western 
Union.
 
[¶6]  On May 2, 2005, the Division began an 
examination to determine whether Onyx was in compliance with the WUCCC and the 
Administrator’s rules and regulations.  
The Division reviewed a random sample of consumer credit contracts for 
all of Onyx’s consumer credit programs then available.  It concluded Onyx had violated the Code 
by improperly charging fees for payment by phone or internet on some of the 
consumer credit sales contracts it had purchased.  The Division issued a report containing 
its findings.  Onyx subsequently 
eliminated the internet payment fee but continued to offer customers the option 
of paying by internet.  

 
[¶7]  In August of 2006, the Division sent out 
a notice of intent to issue an order requiring Onyx to cease and desist from 
charging the payment fees to its customers.  In September of 2006, Onyx appealed from 
the notice of intent.  The OAH 
issued a briefing schedule and set the matter for argument.  The Division filed its motion for 
summary judgment and supporting brief, arguing that the fees Onyx charged for 
payment by phone and internet had not been contracted for or disclosed to its 
customers as required by the WUCCC; therefore, they were in violation of the 
Code.  Onyx responded and filed a 
cross motion for summary judgment, contending the fees did not violate the 
WUCCC.  Onyx attached to its motion 
the affidavit of its corporate operations manager stating that Onyx’s policy was 
to assure that customers who opted to pay by phone or internet were fully aware 
of the amount of the applicable fee before the payment transaction was 
initiated; if a customer did not want to pay the fee, it was company policy not 
to go forward with the payment transaction.    
 
[¶8]  After a hearing, the OAH concluded the 
fees violated the WUCCC and issued a recommended order granting summary judgment 
for the Division.  The Administrator 
issued an order consistent with the OAH’s recommendation.  Onyx sought review in the district court 
which, after considering the parties’ positions, concluded the fees were not 
covered by the WUCCC because they were voluntarily incurred by customers well 
after credit had been extended.  The 
district court entered an order reversing the OAH and the Administrator appealed 
to this Court.  We uphold the 
reversal of the Administrator’s order.               

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶9]  We review an appeal from a district 
court’s review of an administrative agency’s decision as if it had come directly 
from the administrative agency.  Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 
84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 2008).  
Our review of an administrative agency’s action is governed by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2011), which provides that the reviewing court 
shall:
 
(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:
            
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;
            
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;
            
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or 
lacking statutory right;
            
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or
            
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute.  

 
[¶10]  The OAH resolved this dispute by 
granting summary judgment in favor of the Division.  Rule 56 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure governing summary judgments applies to administrative cases.  Rollins v. Wyo. Tribune-Eagle, 2007 WY 
28, ¶ 6, 152 P.3d 367, 369 (Wyo. 2007).  
W.R.C.P. 56(c) provides:
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.
 
We 
review summary judgment rulings de 
novo, using the same materials and following the same standards as the 
OAH.  The parties have stipulated to 
the facts in this case; therefore, we review de novo the OAH’s conclusions of 
law.
 
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶11] 
We begin with an overview of the WUCCC, a legislative enactment that has not 
received extensive consideration by this Court.  The Code was the result of an effort on 
both the federal and state level to promote the informed and fair use of credit 
by requiring meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that consumers would have 
an understanding of the cost of credit.  
In 1968, Congress enacted the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1601 et seq.  Title I of that Act 
contains the Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) the stated purpose of which is 
to promote the informed use of credit.  

 
[¶12]  That same year, the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code (UCCC) with the intent of replacing existing consumer credit laws with “a 
single new comprehensive law providing a modern, theoretically and pragmatically 
consistent structure of legal regulation designed to provide an adequate volume 
of credit at reasonable cost under conditions fair to both consumers and 
creditors.”  Uniform Laws Annotated, 
Vol. 7 Part III 88 (2002).  In 1971, 
Wyoming became one of several states to enact the 1968 version of the UCCC.  Id. at 89.   
 
[¶13]  The UCCC as adopted in Wyoming contains 
seven articles.  Article 2 applies 
to consumer credit sales.1  Section 40-14-202.  The term “consumer credit sale” is 
defined as “a sale of goods, services, or an interest in land in 
which:
 
(i)            
Credit 
is granted by a person who regularly engages as a seller in credit transactions 
of the same kind;
(ii)          
The 
buyer is a person other than an organization;
(iii)         
The 
goods, services or interest in land are purchased primarily for a personal, 
family or household purpose;
(iv)         
Either 
the debt is payable in installments or a credit service charge is made; and 

(v)          
With 
respect to a sale of goods or services, the amount financed does not exceed 
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) or the debt is secured by a dwelling, as 
defined in W.S. 40-14-640(a)(iv), located in Wyoming.”      

 
Section 
40-14-204(a).  Pursuant to this 
provision, transactions such as occurred here between automobile dealers and 
their customers are consumer credit sales, i.e. the dealers regularly engage as 
sellers in granting credit to customers who purchase automobiles for personal or 
family use with the debts payable in installments or imposition of a credit 
service charge. 
 
[¶14]  Section 40-14-207 provides that the term 
“seller” as used in the WUCCC includes “an assignee of the seller’s right to 
payment;” however, “use of the term does not in itself impose on an assignee any 
obligation of the seller with respect to events occurring before the 
assignment.”  There is no question 
that Onyx, as the assignee of the dealers’ rights to payment under the consumer 
credit sales contracts, is a seller within the meaning of the WUCCC; however, 
use of the term does not impose on Onyx any of the automobile dealers’ 
obligations with respect to events occurring before the assignment.    
 
[¶15]  Section 40-14-212(a) provides that a 
seller involved in a consumer credit sale may contract for and receive a “credit 
service charge” as provided in subsection (b).  Subsection (b) provides generally that 
the credit service charge may not exceed either 21% or 36% per year depending 
upon the amount financed.  The term 
“credit service charge” is defined in § 40-14-209(a) in relevant part as the sum 
of:
 
(i)            
All 
charges payable directly or indirectly by the buyer and imposed directly or 
indirectly by the seller as an incident to the extension of credit, including 
any of the following types of charges which are applicable:  time price differential, service, 
carrying or other charge however denominated, premium or other charge for any 
guarantee or insurance protecting the seller against the buyer’s default or 
other credit loss[.]
 
Pursuant 
to § 40-14-209(b), the term “credit service charge” does not 
include:
 
(i)            
 Charges as result of 
default;
(ii)          
 Additional charges pursuant to W.S. 
40-14-213;
(iii)         
Delinquency 
charges specified by W.S. 40-14-214;
(iv)         
Deferral 
charges pursuant to W.S. 40-14-215;
(v)          
A 
discount not in excess of five percent (5%) offered by a seller for purposes of 
inducing payment by cash, check or other means not involving the use of a seller 
or lender credit card, if the discount is offered to all prospective buyers and 
its availability is disclosed clearly and conspicuously in accordance with 
regulations of the administrator; or
            
(vi)       
Reasonable credit application fees whether or not credit is 
extended.
 
[¶16]  Section 40-14-213(a) provides that in 
addition to the credit service charge, a seller may contract for and receive the 
following charges in connection with a consumer credit 
sale:
(i)            
Official 
fees and taxes;
(ii)          
Charges 
for insurance as described in subsection (b) of this section; and 

            
(iii)    Charges for other benefits, including 
insurance, conferred on the buyer, if the benefits are of value to him and if 
the charges are reasonable in relation to the benefits, are of a type which is 
not for credit, and are excluded as permissible additional charges from the 
credit service charge by rules adopted by the 
administrator.
 
[¶17]  In addition to the credit service charge 
and the additional charges enumerated in the foregoing paragraphs, the WUCCC 
provides that parties to a consumer credit sale may contract for delinquency, 
deferral and limited default charges:
§ 
40-14-214.  Delinquency charges. 

(a)  
 With respect to a consumer credit sale . 
. . , the parties may contract for a delinquency charge on any installment not 
paid in full within ten (10) days after its scheduled due date in an amount not 
exceeding the greater of:
            
(i) Five percent (5%) of the unpaid amount of the          installment; 
or
            
(ii) Ten dollars ($10.00).
            
. . . .
 
§ 
40-4-215.  Deferral 
charges.
 
(a)  
 With respect to a consumer credit sale . 
. . , the parties before or after default may agree in writing to a deferral of 
all or part of one (1) or more unpaid installments, and the seller may make and 
collect a charge which the buyer expressly agrees to pay as consideration for 
the deferral.  A deferral charge may 
be collected at the time it is assessed or at any time 
thereafter.
(b)  
 The seller, in addition to the deferral 
charge, may make appropriate additional charges (W.S. 40-14-213), and the amount 
of these charges which is not paid in cash may be added to the amount deferred 
for the purpose of calculating the deferral charge.
. 
. . .
 
§ 
40-14-248.  Limitation on default 
charges.
 
            
Except for reasonable expenses incurred in realizing on a security 
interest, the agreement with respect to a consumer credit sale may not provide 
for any charges as a result of default by the buyer other than those authorized 
by this act.  A provision in 
violation of this section is unenforceable.
 
§ 
40-14-259.  Limitation on default 
charges in consumer related sales.
 
(a)  
 The agreement with respect to a consumer 
related sale may provide for only the following charges as a result of the 
buyer’s default:
            
(i) Reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable expenses incurred in 
realizing on a security interest;
            
(ii)  Deferral charges not in 
excess of eighteen percent (18%) per year of the amount deferred for the period 
of deferral; and
            
(iii) Other charges that could have been made had the sale been a 
consumer credit sale.
 
[¶18]  With this overview in mind, we turn to 
the issue before us.  In granting 
summary judgment for the Administrator, the OAH concluded that the WUCCC is an 
“authorizing statute,” meaning that it enumerates all fees a seller may charge 
in connection with a consumer credit sale.  
Under this interpretation, a seller may charge only a credit service 
charge and contracted for additional, delinquency, deferral, and limited default 
charges as those terms are defined in the Code.  Because the fees Onyx charged customers 
for payment by phone or internet were not contracted for and disclosed to the 
customers as a credit service charge in the consumer sales contracts and do not 
fall within the definition of additional, delinquency, deferral or default 
charges authorized by the Code, the OAH concluded Onyx violated the statute in 
charging the fees to its customers.   

 
[¶19]  Onyx asserts the legislature did not 
intend to prohibit all charges not mentioned; rather, it intended to regulate 
only those charges mentioned.  Onyx 
further contends the fees for payment by phone or internet were not credit 
service charges covered by the WUCCC because they were not imposed as part of 
the extension of credit to customers; rather, some customers voluntarily chose 
to incur the fees when they were disclosed as part of the optional payment 
methods after the automobile dealer had already extended credit to the 
customer.  Onyx further asserts that 
as the assignee of the credit sales contracts it had no obligation to disclose 
credit service charges incident to the dealer–purchaser contracts.  The Administrator contends the OAH 
correctly concluded that Onyx violated the WUCCC by offering the phone and 
internet payment methods and charging a fee to customers who opted to make 
payments in one of those ways because the fees were not disclosed as credit 
service charges in the consumer sales contract and do not fall within the 
definition of other charges authorized by the Code.  
 
[¶20]  Neither party asserts that the fees for 
payment by phone or internet were contracted for additional charges (§ 
40-14-213), delinquency charges (§ 40-14-214), deferral charges (§ 40-14-215) or 
default charges (§ 40-14-248).  The 
dispute centers on whether the fees are credit service charges within the 
meaning of § 40-14-209(a).  If so, 
we are asked to decide whether they are prohibited by the WUCCC because they 
were not mentioned in the consumer credit sales contract or otherwise disclosed 
to the customer at the time credit was extended.  If the fees are not credit service 
charges, we must decide whether they are prohibited by the Code because they do 
not fall within the definition of charges authorized by the statute.     
 
[¶21]  When interpreting statutory 
language:
 
[T]he 
paramount consideration is to determine the legislature’s intent, which must be 
ascertained initially and primarily from the words used in the statute.  We look first to the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the words to determine if the statute is ambiguous.  A statute is clear and unambiguous if 
its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning 
with consistency and predictability.  
Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or 
uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.  
 
Office 
of State Lands and Invs. v. Mule Shoe Ranch, Inc., 
2011 WY 68, ¶ 13, 252 P.3d 951, 954-55 (Wyo. 2011), quoting  Dorr v. Smith, Keller & Associates, 
2010 WY 120, ¶ 11, 238 P.3d 549, 552 (Wyo. 2010).  As part of the process of determining 
whether particular statutory language is ambiguous, we consider all parts of the 
statute in pari materia.  Mountain Cement Co. v. South of Laramie 
Water & Sewer Dist., 2011 WY 81, ¶ 40, 255 P.3d 881, 896 (Wyo. 
2011).  In ascertaining the meaning 
of a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same 
general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony.  Id., ¶ 13, 255 P.3d  at 885.  Ultimately, whether a statute is 
ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court.  Office of State Lands, ¶ 13, 252 P.3d  at 
955.  
 
[¶22]  Onyx asserts the fees for payment by 
internet or phone are not credit service charges because they were not “incident 
to the extension of credit” within the meaning of § 40-14-209(a)(i).  Rather, the credit had been extended to 
customers before Onyx ever became involved.  Onyx maintains that its subsequent 
decision to offer customers the alternative payment options for a fee had 
nothing to do with the extension of credit to the automobile buyers.  The administrator interprets the phrase 
“incident to the extension of credit” more broadly as including any fee charged 
in connection with the extension of credit and not excluded from the term 
“credit service charge” by the WUCCC or rule.  
 
[¶23]  The ordinary meaning of the word 
“incident” is:  

 
1a:  occurring or likely to occur esp. as a 
minor consequence or accompaniment [incident] to a quick change : associated or 
naturally related or attaching the privileges [incident] to increased rank  . . .  3 law:  dependent on or appertaining to another 
thing:  directly and immediately 
relating to or involved in something else though not an essential part of 
it.
 
Webster’s 
Third New Int’l Dictionary 
1142 (2002).  We cannot say the fees 
for the payment options Onyx offered to customers occurred or were likely to 
occur as a consequence of, or accompanied, the dealers’ extension of credit to 
those customers or that the fees were naturally related to the extension of 
credit.  Nor can we conclude the 
fees were dependent on or directly or immediately related to the extension of 
credit.  Interpreted more broadly, 
however, the fees would not have arisen without the extension of credit and in 
that sense were associated with the extension of credit.  Either of these varying interpretations 
is reasonable; therefore, we conclude the phrase “incident to the extension of 
credit” is ambiguous.2  
 
[¶24] 
When statutory language is not clear or is ambiguous, we apply accepted rules of 
construction to ascertain the legislature’s intent.  Daves v. State, 2011 WY 47, ¶ 15, 249 P.3d 250, 256 (Wyo. 2011).  We look 
to the mischief the statute was intended to cure, the historical setting 
surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of 
law, and other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances.  Id.  
 
[¶25]  The mischief the WUCCC was intended to 
cure is clearly set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-14-102 (LexisNexis 2011), 
which provides in relevant part:
 
            
(a)  This Act shall be 
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and 
policies.
            
(b)  The underlying purposes 
and policies of this act are:
(i) 
To simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing . . . consumer credit . . . 
;
(ii) 
To provide rate ceilings to assure an adequate supply of credit to 
consumers;
(iii) 
To further consumer understanding of the terms of credit transactions and to 
foster competition among suppliers of consumer credit so that consumers may 
obtain credit at reasonable cost;
(iv) 
To protect consumer[s] . . . against unfair practices by some suppliers of 
consumer credit, having due regard for the interests of legitimate and 
scrupulous creditors;
(v) 
To permit and encourage the development of fair and economically sound consumer 
credit practices;
(vi) 
To conform the regulation of consumer credit transactions to the policies of the 
federal Consumer Credit Protection Act [citation omitted]; 
and
(vii) 
To make uniform the law, including administrative rules, among the various 
jurisdictions.
 
Pursuant 
to subsections (a) and (b)(ii) through (v), this Court is required to liberally 
construe the WUCCC so as to promote its underlying purposes of making credit 
transactions more understandable to consumers, fostering competition among 
creditors, making credit available to consumers at a reasonable cost, protecting 
consumers from unfair practices, and encouraging the development of fair and 
economically sound consumer credit practices.  Of equal importance, in accordance with 
subsection (b)(i), (vi) and (vii), we must construe the statute in a way that 
simplifies and brings clarity and uniformity to consumer credit law and conforms 
the regulation of consumer credit transactions to the policies of the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act.
 
[¶26]  Viewed in light of the purposes set 
forth in subsections (a) and (b)(ii) through (v), we are not convinced the fees 
for payment by phone or internet are “credit service charges” covered by the 
WUCCC.  Even if the dealers had 
foreseen the fees at the time they extended credit to the customers, disclosure 
would not have made the credit transaction more understandable to the 
customer.  Given that the fees were 
optional, we are not persuaded disclosure would have fostered competition among 
the dealers.  Customers could simply 
choose not to make their payments by phone or internet.  Likewise, the fees were not related to 
the cost of credit because credit had been made available to the customer before 
Onyx became involved and offered customers the optional payment methods.  The fees simply were not terms of the 
transaction in which the dealers extended credit to customers.  Finally, we are unable to see how an 
offer made by an assignee of the consumer credit contract after the consumer 
credit sale was completed allowing customers the option of paying by phone or 
internet for a fee would hinder the development of fair and economically sound 
consumer credit practices.  
Construed liberally to promote the purposes and policies of the WUCCC, we 
conclude the fees are not credit service charges within the meaning of § 
40-14-209(a)(i) because they were not “imposed directly or indirectly by the 
seller as an incident to the extension of credit.” 
 
[¶27]  Section 40-14-207 provides support for 
this conclusion.  Pursuant to that 
provision, an assignee of the seller’s right to payment (such as Onyx) is a 
“seller” within the meaning of the WUCCC; however, an assignee is not subject to 
any obligation of the seller with respect to events occurring before the 
assignment.  Thus, the dealer’s obligation to disclose 
charges “imposed as an incident to the extension of credit” cannot be imposed on 
Onyx because the credit transaction occurred before the contract was assigned to 
Onyx.                    

 
[¶28]  In concluding that the fees at issue 
here are not credit service charges, we have also considered the legislative 
directive that we are to construe the WUCCC liberally to simplify, bring clarity 
and make uniform consumer credit law and “to conform the regulation of consumer 
credit transactions to the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act.”  Section 40-14-102(b)(i), (vi) and 
(vii).  As mentioned in paragraph 12 
above, the WUCCC resulted from an effort to create a uniform law governing 
consumer credit sales transactions and, in enacting our statute, the Wyoming 
legislature expressly intended the regulation of consumer credit transactions in 
this State to conform to the policies of the Consumer Credit Protection 
Act.  In accordance with this 
intent, § 40-14-604, which sets out the powers and duties of the WUCCC 
Administrator, states in pertinent part:
 
  (b)  The administrator shall adopt rules not 
inconsistent with the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act and rules and 
regulations of the federal reserve board adopted under it . . . .  
  (c)  To keep the administrator’s rules in 
harmony with the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act [citation omitted] and 
the regulations prescribed from time to time pursuant to that act by the board 
of governors of the federal reserve system and with the rules of administrators 
in other jurisdictions which enact the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the 
administrator, so far as is consistent with the purposes, policies and 
provisions of this act, shall:
            
(i)  Before adopting, 
amending, and repealing rules, advise and consult with administrators in other 
jurisdictions which enact the Uniform Consumer Credit Code; 
and
            
(ii)  In adopting, amending, 
and repealing rules, take into consideration:
                        
(A)  The regulations so 
prescribed by the board of governors of the federal reserve system; 
and
                        
(B) The rules of administrators in other jurisdictions which enact the 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code.   

 
From 
these provisions, it is clear that conformity with federal law and uniformity 
with other jurisdictions in which the UCCC has been enacted were important 
considerations in the decision to adopt the WUCCC.    
 
[¶29]  Acting in accordance with the 
legislature’s directive, the Administrator has adopted rules and regulations to 
implement the WUCCC.  Among those 
rules is the following:
 
CHAPTER 
2
DISCLOSURE 
AND ADVERTISING
 
Section 
1.  Authority, Purpose, and 
Enforcement.  

 
(a)          
 Authority.  W.S. 40-14-102(b)(vi) and (c), 
40-14-222(f), 40-14-320(e), and 40-14-604(b) and (c) evidence the clear intent 
and purpose of the legislature to, whenever practicable, maintain consistency 
and conform the Code and Rules issued thereunder to the Federal Consumer Credit 
Protection Act and Regulation Z issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System.  

(b)          
This 
Chapter implements the Code, a purpose of which is to assure that every customer 
who has need for consumer credit is given meaningful information with respect to 
the cost of that credit which, in most cases, must be expressed in the dollar 
amount of finance charge, and as an annual percentage rate computed on the 
unpaid balance of the amount financed.  
Other relevant credit information must also be disclosed so that the 
customer may readily compare the various credit terms available to him from 
different sources and avoid the uninformed use of credit.  * * * The Code encompasses many aspects 
of consumer credit; this Chapter relates primarily to disclosures and 
advertising for consumer credit necessary to preserve consistency between the 
Code and the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act and regulations issued 
thereunder referred to in Section 2 of this Chapter.
 
            
Section 2.  Adoption of Regulation 
Z.
 
            
(a)       
Regulation Z, as issued and amended as of October 1, 2011, by the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to implement the Federal Truth in 
Lending Act, which is contained in Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act 
(15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) is hereby adopted as if fully set forth herein, except 
as otherwise set forth in the Chapter.3
 
Again, 
these rules reflect a clear mandate to construe the WUCCC, whenever practicable, 
in a manner consistent with and in conformity with federal law. 

 
[¶30]  Accordingly, in construing the WUCCC, we 
must consider the Consumer Credit Protection Act.  As we have said, the federal Act was 
enacted for much the same purposes as the UCCC.  Section 1601 
provides:
 
(a)  
 Informed use of 
credit
 
The 
Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competition 
among various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of 
consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit.  The informed use of credit results from 
an awareness of the cost therefore by consumers.  It is the purpose of this subchapter to 
assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able 
to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the 
uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and 
unfair credit billing and credit card practices.
 
The 
Act requires creditors to make “clear and accurate disclosures of terms dealing 
with things like finance charges, annual percentage rates of interest, and the 
borrower’s rights.”  Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 
412, 118 S. Ct. 1408, 1410, 140 L. Ed. 2d 566 (1998).
 
[¶31]  Section 1605(a) is the federal 
counterpart to the WUCCC’s § 40-14-209, although it uses the term “finance 
charge” rather than “credit service charge.”  Under the federal act, a “finance 
charge” in connection with consumer credit transactions is “the sum of all 
charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom credit is 
extended, and imposed directly or 
indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the extension of credit.”  15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (emphasis 
added.)  Thus, the definition of 
“finance charge” in the federal law is identical to the definition of “credit 
service charge” in the WUCCC.  

 
[¶32]  Just as the Administrator has authority 
to promulgate rules to carry out the provisions of the WUCCC, Congress has 
delegated broad authority to the Federal Reserve Board (Board) to enact 
regulations to advance the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s purposes of 
promoting the informed use of credit by consumers and ensuring meaningful 
disclosure of credit terms.  15 
U.S.C. § 1601(a) and § 1604(a).  The 
Board enacted Regulation Z in part to clarify that the term “finance charge” as 
used in the Act means “the cost of consumer credit as a dollar amount” and 
“includes any charge payable directly or indirectly by the consumer and imposed 
directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or a condition of the extension of 
credit.”  12 CFR § 226.4(a) (2004) 
(emphasis added.)  Applying this 
definition to the circumstances before us, it is clear that the fees for the 
optional payment methods Onyx offered after the credit transaction between the 
automobile dealers and their customers was completed were not a condition of the 
extension of credit.4      

 
[¶33]  Having concluded the fees are not credit 
service charges within the meaning of the WUCCC, we turn to consideration of the 
Administrator’s contention that the fees were impermissible because they are not 
among the charges enumerated and, by enumerating specific allowable charges, the 
legislature intended to prohibit the imposition of any other charges.  This contention suffers from the same 
difficulty as the claim that the fees are credit service charges.  The WUCCC, like its federal counterpart, 
was intended to promote the informed use of credit and to protect consumers from 
unfair credit practices by requiring meaningful disclosure of credit terms.  Put simply, the consumer is entitled to 
know the terms on which a lender will extend him credit.  The ordinary meaning of the word “terms” 
is:  “provisions that determine the 
nature and scope of an agreement:  
conditions.”  Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 
2358 (2002).  The fees Onyx 
charged those customers opting to pay by phone or internet were not provisions 
of the credit transaction that determine the nature and scope of the agreement; 
they were not conditions of the credit transaction.   
 
[¶34]  In Pfennig, 541 U.S.  at 243, 124 S. Ct.  at 
1749, the Court stated as follows:
 
The 
[Federal Reserve] Board adopted [Regulation Z] to emphasize “disclosures that are relevant to credit 
decisions, as opposed to disclosures related to events occurring after the 
initial credit choice. . . .” 45 Fed. Reg. 80649 (1980).  The Board’s decision to emphasize disclosures that are most relevant to a 
consumer’s initial credit decisions reflects an understanding that “meaningful disclosure does not mean more 
disclosure,” but instead describes the balance between 'competing 
considerations of complete disclosure . . . and the need to avoid . . . 
[information overload].   

 
(emphasis 
added).
 
[¶35]  Pfennig involved a regulation expressly 
excluding from the term “finance charge” fees assessed on credit card holders 
for exceeding their credit limits.  
The question there was whether the regulation excluding from the term 
“finance charge” fees for exceeding credit card limits was inconsistent with the 
statutory definition of finance charge.  
Here, there is no rule or regulation expressly excluding fees for payment 
by phone or internet from the definition of “credit service charge” and we are 
not asked to resolve an alleged inconsistency between a regulation and a 
statute.  To that extent Pfennig is different from the case 
before this Court.  That difference 
aside, we are persuaded, as the Pfennig court was, that the effort to 
promote the informed use of credit was focused on requiring disclosure of 
information “most relevant to a consumer’s initial credit decisions, as opposed 
to disclosures related to events occurring after the initial credit 
choice.”  We agree that “meaningful 
disclosure does not mean more disclosure,” and some fees are “less relevant to 
determining the true cost of credit.”  
The fees for optional payment methods at issue in this case are among 
those less relevant to determining the true cost of 
credit.
 
[¶36]  Other courts have reached this same 
conclusion.  In McGee v. Kerr-Hickman Chrysler Plymouth, 
Inc., 93 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 1996), for example, a used car buyer purchased 
optional insurance to avoid the risk of having to pay the difference between the 
balance owed on the credit sale contract and the car’s cash value if it was 
stolen or destroyed.  In determining 
whether the dealer should have disclosed the cost of the insurance as part of 
the finance charge pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a), the court concluded it was 
not a charge payable “as an incident to the extension of credit” because it did 
not affect the terms of the credit deal between the buyer and seller.  Id. at 383.  The Court reasoned that the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act’s purpose of “assuring consumers an opportunity for 
meaningful comparison of different available credit terms is not undermined 
unless the argued-for disclosure actually involves credit terms.”  Id. at 385.  Applying this reasoning to the fees at 
issue here, they were not incident to the extension of credit because they were 
not credit terms; they did not affect the terms of the credit deal between the 
dealerships and their customers.    
 
[¶37]  In reaching this result, we do not 
blindly follow federal precedent.  
We are appreciative that consistency and conformity are desirable 
“whenever practicable.”  Wyoming 
Rules of the Administrator, Chapter 2, § 1(a).  However, “when the words of a statute 
[or rule] are materially the same and where the reasoning of another court 
interpreting the statute [or rule] is sound, we do not sacrifice sovereign 
independence, nor undermine the unique character of Wyoming law, by relying upon 
the precedent of [another] jurisdiction.”  
Iberlin v. TCI Cablevision, 
855 P.2d 716, 726 (Wyo. 1993).  This 
is particularly true when we are asked to interpret or construe a statue that 
was intended to bring consistency and uniformity to the area of law 
addressed.
 
[¶38]  In considering the WUCCC, we have not 
limited our research to federal cases but have looked to court decisions from 
other states in which the UCCC has been adopted.  Although we have found no case involving 
fees like those at issue here, it seems clear that state courts generally have 
interpreted the UCCC as requiring meaningful disclosure of terms relevant to the 
cost of credit.  In Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548 P.2d 1014 
(Okla. 1976), for example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had before it the question 
of whether a loan fell within Oklahoma’s version of the UCCC and, if so, whether 
the interest rate the lender charged exceeded the maximum allowable amount.  Addressing the OUCCC generally the court 
stated:  
 
The 
delineation of exact charges by the legislature was deemed appropriate in 
consumer lending transactions in the exercise of a legislative desire to 
regulate practices by lenders active in the areas of consumer finance where an 
individual borrower is without the bargaining power to adequately discover the interest rate 
being charged or bargain for charges which are reasonable under the 
circumstances.           

 
Id. 
at 1017 (emphasis added).  These 
considerations do not come into play where, as here, the consumers knew the 
interest rate being charged and had the power to decline the fees for payment by 
phone or internet if they found the fees unreasonable. 
 
[¶39]  Other state courts have interpreted the 
UCCC as requiring disclosure of the amount of the loan or debt, together with 
the charges imposed on the consumer as terms of the credit transaction.  Among those terms, courts have 
included:  the annual percentage 
rate of interest, Knox v. Thomas, 512 P.2d 664 (Utah 1973), Strader v. 
Beneficial Finance Co., 534 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1975); the right to rescind the 
transaction, Varady v. White, 661 P.2d 284 (Colo. 1982); a written description of insurance when it is part of the 
agreement, including the type and amount of coverage and, if a separate charge 
is made for the insurance, the amount of that charge, Bair v. Public Service Employees Credit 
Union, 709 P.2d 961, 962 (Colo. 1985), Means v. Indiana Financial Corp., 416 N.E.2d 896 (Ind. 1981).  We have 
found no court decision interpreting the UCCC to require disclosure of fees such 
as those at issue here, which were not terms or conditions of the extension of 
credit and were offered after the credit sales contracts were consummated and 
assigned to Onyx. 
 
[¶40]  As support for his position, the 
Administrator cites Lutteneger v. Conesco 
Fin. Serving Corp., 671 N.W.2d 425 (Iowa 2003), which involved a consumer 
loan transaction under Part 3 of the UCCC rather than a consumer credit sale 
under Part 2.  The definition of 
“loan finance charge” in Part 3 is identical in all relevant respects to the 
definition of “credit service charge” in Part 2.  The consumers alleged the creditor 
charged a loan origination fee, loan processing fee and a courier fee not 
permitted by the Iowa Uniform Consumer Credit Code. (IUCCC).  The creditor responded that the fees 
were allowable as part of the finance charge.  The consumers countered that the fees 
were not part of the finance charge because they were not specifically mentioned 
in the definition of finance charge and the IUCCC allowed only those fees 
expressly enumerated.
 
[¶41]  The Iowa Supreme Court held that the 
IUCCC did not prohibit the fees; rather, they were included within the term 
“finance charge” even though they were not expressly mentioned in the 
statute.  In reaching this result, 
the Court considered the definition of finance charge—“the sum of all charges 
payable directly or indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly or 
indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or as a condition of the extension 
of credit . . ., including any of the following types of charges which are 
applicable:  [list of four 
charges].”  Iowa Code § 537.1301(21)(a).  None of the disputed fees were 
listed among those included within the definition of finance charge.  
 
[¶42]  The Court interpreted the provision to 
mean that the term “finance charge” included but was not limited to the charges 
listed; that is, the Court concluded, the list was intended to be 
non-exclusive.  As long as the 
finance charge did not exceed 21% per year on the unpaid balance of the amount 
financed, the amount allowed under § 537.2401(1), such other fees as those in 
dispute were to be treated as part of the finance charge.  Because the finance charge combined with 
the three disputed fees did not exceed the amount allowed, the Court held the 
IUCCC was not violated.             

 
[¶43]  The Administrator asserts Lutteneger supports its position that 
the WUCCC authorizes only the charges expressly enumerated.  In order to be permissible under the 
WUCCC, he contends, fees must be either credit service charges, and disclosed as 
such, or they must be contracted for additional, delinquency, deferral or 
default charges.  Again, no one 
contends the fees for payment by phone or internet were contracted for 
additional, delinquency, deferral or default charges.  Therefore, under the Administrator’s 
interpretation, our conclusion that the fees also are not credit service charges 
would seem to lead to the conclusion that they are not authorized by the 
WUCCC.          

 
[¶44]  Lutteneger involved fees that were 
imposed as part of the loan transaction.  
Stated differently, they were incurred by the debtor “for the privilege 
of obtaining the loan.”  Id. at 432, quoting Robert L. Jordan 
& William D. Warren, The Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code, Colum. L. Rev., 382, 396 (1968).  They were not fees associated with 
optional offers made to customers after the credit transaction had been 
consummated and the creditor had assigned the contract to someone else.  Lutteneger, therefore, is 
distinguishable.  To reiterate, the 
fees at issue here are not among those most relevant to “a consumer’s initial 
credit decision.”  Pfennig, 541 U.S.  at 243, 225 S. Ct.  at 
1749.  We hold they are not the sort 
of charges the legislature intended the WUCCC to address.            

[¶45]  Onyx did not violate the WUCCC in 
charging fees to consumers who opted to make payments on their consumer credit 
contracts by phone or internet.  The 
district court properly ordered summary judgment in favor of Onyx.  We remand the case to the district court 
with instructions to remand the case to the Administrator for entry of a summary 
judgment order for Onyx.                
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1Article 1 contains general provisions and definitions.  Article 3 pertains to loans.  Article 4 addresses insurance in 
relation to consumer credit sales and consumer loans.  Article 5 sets out the remedies and 
penalties available under the WUCCC.  
Article 6 provides for the administration of the WUCCC.  Article 7 sets forth the effective date 
and addresses the Code’s application to transactions entered into before the 
effective date. 
 
 
2We are not alone in concluding the words “incident to” are 
ambiguous.  In Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 124 S. Ct. 1741, 158 L. Ed. 2d 450 (2004), the Court considered the 
definition of “finance charge” in 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a), which is identical to the 
definition of credit service charge in the WUCCC.  The question before the Court was 
whether, in excluding fees a creditor imposed when credit card holders exceeded 
their credit limit, 12 CFR § 226.4(a) (2004) (Regulation Z) was an unreasonable 
interpretation of § 1605 of TILA.  Id. at 235, 124 S. Ct.  at 1744.  Looking at the definition of “finance 
charge” in 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a), the Court stated the over-limit fee could be 
characterized as a finance charge because there was at least some connection 
between it and the extension of credit; however, the fee could also be 
characterized as a penalty imposed for violating the credit agreement.   Id. at 240, 124 S. Ct.  at 1747.  Given these different meanings, the 
Court concluded the words “incident to” did not make clear whether a substantial 
connection between the extension of credit and a fee is required for the fee to 
constitute a finance charge that must be disclosed when credit is extended.  Id. at 241, 124 S. Ct.  at 1748.  Thus, it concluded, the term finance 
charge was ambiguous.  Id.   
3The only exception identified is as follows:
 
Section 3.  Provisions of Regulation Z modified or not 
adopted.
 
(a)    The following sections of 
Reg. Z are hereby modified:
(i)     
The disclosures required under Section 226.13 of Reg. Z are not adopted 
by these Rules because Wyoming had not adopted the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 
U.S.C. 1666.
412 C.F.R. Ch. II § 226.29 allows a State to apply to the Board to exempt 
a class of transactions within the State from the requirements of the credit 
transactions and billing provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act and 
corresponding regulations.  The 
Board is required to grant an exemption if it determines 
that:
(1)    The State law is 
substantially similar to the Federal law or, in the case of [credit billing], 
affords the consumer greater protection than the Federal law; 
and
(2)     There is adequate 
provision for enforcement.
     Wyoming applied for 
and received an exemption from the credit transactions provisions of the federal 
act in 1982.  12 C.F.R. Ch. II, Pt. 
226, Supp. 1, Section 226.29, p. 738.  The exemption means creditors in Wyoming 
are subject to the requirements of the WUCCC rather than the federal act. The 
idea behind allowing States to be exempted was to create a uniform law 
administered by the States.  
Ives v. 
W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 755 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
 The exemption does not affect the close 
connection between the federal act and the WUCCC nor does it mean federal law is 
no longer relevant in interpreting the WUCCC.  To the contrary, interpretations of the 
federal act remain highly persuasive in interpreting the WUCCC. As demonstrated 
in the regulation quoted above, the very reason the Board granted the exemption 
is because it found the WUCCC to be substantially similar to, or “generally the 
same as” the federal law.  Id. at 737.  The substantial similarity is shown 
in Wyoming’s adoption and incorporation of Regulation Z in its own rules.