Case Title: STATE v BRINER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 13394

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13394 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1977 THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, / ' D O N A L D E. BRINER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Ninth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R. D. McPhillips, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Kampfe and Perhacs, Red Lodge, Montana D. Frank Kampfe argued, Red Lodge, Montana For Respondent: Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Dennis Moreen argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana R a e V. Kalbfleisch, County Attorney, argued, Shelby, Montana Submitted: June 9, 1977 M r . Chief J u s t i c e Paul G. Hatfield delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant Donald E. Briner was charged and convicted of burglary i n the d i s t r i c t court, Toole County. From the jury verdict and subsequent sentence of 8 years, with 6 years sus- pended, defendant seeks t h i s Court's review of four issues: I ) Whether the d i s t r i c t court erred i n denying defendant's various motions t o suppress and dismiss. 2) Whether the testimony of the accomplice had the s u f f i c i e n t independent corroboration required by section 95-3012, R.C.M. 1947. 3) Whether t h e Information f i l e d against defendant was s u f f i c i e n t t o inform defendant of the nature of the charges against him. 4 ) Whether the d i s t r i c t court erred i n f a i l i n g t o grant defendant's motion f o r a new t r i a l based upon newly discovered evidence. The charges against defendant Briner arose i n Sunburst, Montana from the burglary of the Farmers Co-op O i l Co. between the hours of 6:15 p.m., July 11, 1975 and 6:45 a.m., July 12, 1975. Three individuals were charged with the burglary-- Donald E. Briner, George Cain, and 'William Felton. Briner and co-defendants were stopped on July 13, 1975 out- side Shelby, Montana by deputies possessing t h i s information: [ I ) Three hours p r i o r t o defendant's a r r e s t , s h e r i f f deputies responded t o a burglary i n progress a t the Co-op i n Devon, Montana; (2) on reaching Devon a highway patrolman observed the pickup defendant was l a t e r driving when arrested; (3) t h i s pickup had l e f t the v i c i n i t y by the time the deputies reached the Devon Co-op; (4) a t the Co-op the phone lfnes were c u t , a window broken, and a door l e f t open; (5) the dEputies observed footprints leading from the Co-op t o and across a creek i n the direction where the pickup had been parked. The footprints were similar t o those found a t t h e Sunburst Co-op the previous evening. The t i r e tracks observed a t both Co-ops were similar; and (6) the deputies had information the pickup defendant was driving was equipped with a radio scanner tuned t o police frequencies. O n July 13, 1975 upon stopping the Briner vehicle, the deputies examined the pickup t i r e s and determined they were similar i n design t o t h e tracks found a t the Devon and Sunburst Co-ops. Deputies a l s o observed defendant's and Cain's pant legs were wet; t h a t a p a i r of wet waffle stomper boots was on the pickup's floor- board; and t h a t a radio scanner was present. Arrest was made without a warrant, the pickup was seized. O n the same day a search warrant was issued t o search the vehicle defendant was driving. This warrant was r'eturned on the same day, together with the waffle stompers and gloves. Later, on July 25, 1975, deputies removed the v e h i c l e ' s radio scanner and on July 26, 1975, the vehicle's t i r e s . The defendant was charged by Information on September 4, 1975 with t h e burglary of the Farmers Co-op O i l Company of Sunburst, Montana, !'on o r about July 12, 1975". Evidence presented t o the jury showed: 1 ) . Footprints from waffle stompers were found inside and outside the Co-op a f t e r the burglary; defendant owned a p a i r of waffle stompers which was i n h i s pickup a t the time of h i s a r r e s t ; expert opinion found the p r i n t s t o be made by boots with a similar tread design and wear pattern a s those of defendant. 2). The vehicle defendant was driving was seen parked on t h e I n t e r s t a t e highway ramp overlooking the Co-op during the early morning hours a f t e r t h e night of the burglary; f r e s h t i r e tracks were found a t the Co-op; expert opinion found the t i r e tracks and the t i r e s from the pickup defendant was driving t o be of similar t i r e design and tread wear. 3). Defendant's vehicle was equipped with a radio scanner tuned t o the major law enforcement frequencies. 4). A n accomplice of defendant t e s t i f i e d t o the participa- t i o n of defendant i n the burglary. From t h i s evidence the jury convicted defendant of burglary. O n the f i r s t day of t r i a l , a f t e r the jury had been voir dired and passed f o r cause by the county attorney, the attorney f o r defendant attempted t o f i l e various motions t o suppress evidence and t o dismiss. The d i s t r i c t court recessed and took testimony and argument on the motions; l a t e r it denied a l l motions. From t h a t denial defendant r a i s e s h i s f i r s t issue on appeal. Counsel f o r defendant argues it i s h i s c l i e n t ' s constitu- t i o n a l r i g h t t o use the exclusionary r u l e a t any time. I n S t a t e v. Dess, 154 Mont. 231, 235, 462 P.2d 186, t h i s Court reviewed the exclusionary rule: "The exclusionary r u l e fashioned i n Weeks v. United S t a t e s , 232 U.S.383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed 652 (1914), and Mapp v , Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961) excludes from a criminal t r i a l any evi- dence seized from the defendant i n v i o l a t i o n of h i s 4 t h Amendment rights. I n Mapp and Weeks the defendant against whom the evidence was held t o be inadmissible was the victim of the search. I n the recent case of Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969) the Supreme Court rejected any expansion of the 4th Amendment and the exclusionary r u l e t o include those who a r e aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence, o r those whose r i g h t s were not violated by the search i t s e l f . * * *I1 L n a recent case the United States Supreme Court r e i t e r a t e d t h a t the exclusionary rule was not a personal constitutional r i g h t of the aggrieved party and again rejected the fourth and most c r i t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the exclusionary r u l e enunciated in Mapp. I n United States v. J a n i s , 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L ed 2d 1046, 1056, the Court said: "The debate within the court on the exclusionary r u l e has always been a warm one. * * * The Court, however, has established t h a t the 'prime purpose' of the r u l e , i f not the sole one, ' i s t o deter future unlawful police conduct! [Cited cases omitted] "Thus " ' [1]n sum, the rule i s a j u d i c i a l l y created remedy designed t o safeguard Fourth Amendment r i g h t s generally through i t s deterrent e f f e c t , rather than a personal constitutional r i g h t of the party aggrieved. I United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. a t 348, 38 L Ed 2d 561, 94 S.Ct. 613, 66 Ohio Ops.2d 320.'' 49 L ed 2d 1056. The question of "timeliness" i s well defined i n Montana. Section 95-1806, R.C.M. 1947, s e t s f o r t h the procedure f o r f i l i n g motions t o suppress evidence i l l e g a l l y seized and provides i n p a r t : " (a) A defendant aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the court t o suppress a s evidence anything so obtained. "(b) The motion s h a l l be made before t r i a l unless f o r good cause shown the court s h a l l otherwise d i r e c t . "(c) The defendant s h a l l give a t l e a s t ten (10) daysi notice of such motion t o the attorney prosecuting o r such other time a s the court may d i r e c t . The de- fendant s h a l l serve a copy of the notice and motion upon the attorney prosecuting. In S t a t e v. Gotta, 71 Mont. 288, 290, 229 P. 405, t h i s Court, speaking t o the issue of "timeliness" stated: " : k * * One wishing t o preclude the use of evidence obtained through a violation of h i s constitutional r i g h t s must protect himself by timely action, I f he has had opportunity to suppress the evidence before t r i a l and has failed to take advantage of h i s remedy, objection t o the evidence upon t r i a l w i l l not avail him. * * *" 7 1 Mont. 290. See also: State v. Gallagher, 162 Mont. 155, 509 P.2d 852. I n the instant case defendant was aware of the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest and the possibility of the introduction of certain evidence, long before the f i r s t day of t r i a l . Upon f i l i n g of defendant's various motions t o suppress, no offer of evidence nor showing of good cause was given which prevented defendant from f i l i n g h i s motions before t r i a l . I f under section 95-1806, we assume the evidence was obtained by an unlawful search and seizure, it ?was necessary for the accused, who desired t o exclude such evidence from h i s t r i a l , t o make a timely objection t o i t s introduction. Such was not the fact i n t h i s case, as the t r i a l judge found. Also a review of the record would allow the evidence i n any event. Defendant's second issue concerns whether the testimony of William J. Felton, an accomplice, was sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence. Defendant and p l a i n t i f f agree section 95-3012, i s the applicable statute and the numerous prior opinions of t h i s Court concerning requirements for corroboration of an accomplice's testimony have continued validity. Section 95- 3012 replaces section 94-7220, R.C.M. 1947. The only difference between the present provision and i t s predecessor i s the substitu- tion of the words "one responsible or legally accountable for the same offense, a s defined by section 94-2-106'1 for the term "an acc~mplice'~. The -question whether there i s sufficient, independent corroboration of an accomplice's testimony, tending t o connect a defendant with the commission of a crime i s one of law and must be decided by the t r i a l court. State v. Spielmann, 163 Mont. 199, 207, 516 P.2d 617. See also: State v. Moran, 142 Mont. 423, 452, 384 P.2d 777; State v. Dess, supra. The requirements of section 94-7220 the predecessor of sec- tion 95-3012, are well established i n Montana. This Court i n Spielmann repeats the requirements of section 94-7220 as ex- plained i n Dess: "'* * * Appellant suggests that the evidence, independent of the testimony of an accomplice, must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This i s not the law i n Montana, however. Though there must be some independent evidence connecting the defendant t o the crime, it .need not be sufficient alone t o sustain a conviction. The jury can consider the testimony of the accomplice and give the t e s t i - mony whatever weight they desire. In State v. Donges, 126 Mont. 341, 251 P.2d 254,(1952), the Court stated a t page 347, 251 P.2d a t page 257: " "'The evidence which corroborated Bungard could be furnished by the defendants. It could be circumstan- t i a l , It need not extend t o every f a c t t o which Bungard t e s t i f i e d and need not be sufficient t o justify a con- viction or establish a prima facie case of g u i l t ; it being sufficient i f it tends t o connect defendants with the commission of the crime. Whether it tends t o do so i s a question of law, while i t s weight-its efficacy t o f o r t i f y the testimony of Eungard and render h i s story trustworthy - i s a matter for the consideration of the jury. State v. Cobb, 76 Mont. 89, 245 P. 265."'" 163 Mont. 207,208. I n t h i s case there i s sufficient corroborating evidence in the record for the d i s t r i c t court judge, as a matter of law, t o warrant the submission of the case to the jury: (a) waffle stomper footprints were discovered inside and outside the Co-op a f t e r the burglary; (b) defendant owned a pair of waffle stomper boots seized on the same day as h i s a r r e s t ; (c) expert comparison of defendant's boots to footprints found a t the Co-op demonstrated the prints were made by boots similar t o defendantis; (d) the pickup defendant was driving was seen parked on the Sunburst Interstate 15 exit ramp overlooking the Co-op i n the early morning hours following the night of the burglary; (e) fresh t i r e tracks were found a t the Co-op a f t e r the burglary; (f) expert comparison of the t i r e tracks found a t the Co-op and the t i r e s on the pickup defendant was driving determined the tracks were made by t i r e s with similar tread design and wear as those of the pickup; (g) eyewitnesses who saw the pickup defendant was driving on the Sunburst e x i t ramp, observed the pickup proceed down the ramp and repark a t the Texaco station across the s t r e e t from the Co-op; (h) waffle stomper footprints led from the ramp towards the Co-op; and ( i ) the pickup defendant was driving was equipped with a radio scanner tuned t o Montana law enforcement channels. Defendant's third issue claims the time alleged i n the Information was not sufficiently definite t o inform defendant of the nature of the charge against him. This Court finds t h i s issue without merit. Defendant's motion t o dismiss, which challenged the sufficiency of 'the Information, was properly denied as untimely filed. Defendant's fourth issue contends the court erred i n denying h i s motion for a new t r i a l , based on newly discovered evidence. This Court i n State v. Gallagher, supra, s e t forth requirements for t h i s motion: "* * * (1) That the evidence must have come t o the knowledge of the applicant since the t r i a l ; (2) that it was not through want of diligence that it was not discovered e a r l i e r J ; * *." 162 Mont. 161. B y raising t h i s issue, defendant requires t h i s Court t o review the discretion of the t r i a l court. Section 95-2101, R.C.M. 1947, states i n part: "(b) Motion for a N e w T r i a l "(1) Following a verdict or finding of guilty the court may grant the defendant a new t r i a l i f required in the interest of justice." The t r i a l court using sound discretion must decide i f a new t r i a l i s required "in the interest of justice". Where the t r i a l court acts within i t s discretion, t h i s Court has no right of review. State v. Laughlin, 105 Mont. 490, 497, 73 P.2d 718; State v. Quigg, 155 Mont. 119, 147, 467 P.2d 692. Here defendant supported h i s motion for new t r i a l with four affidavits. Three were from a l i b i witnesses who purportedly saw defendant on the night in question, and one was from John S. Lindsey Jr., an investigator, who knew of and t r i e d t o locate one a l i b i witness before t r i a l . This affidavit from Lindsey shows the a l i b i witness was known before t r i a l . State v. Gallagher, supra. The t r i a l judge was i n the best position to weigh the merits of the other three affidavits. State v. Quigg, supra. W e find there was no abuse of discretion by the t r i a l court i n denying the motion for a new t r i a l . The judgment i s affirmed. Chief Just ice A W e Concur: Justices. - . g - M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea specially concurring: I agree with the r e s u l t of t h i s case but I do not agree with a l l t h a t i s s a i d i n r e l a t i o n t o the search and seizure question. The t r i a l court did not find the motion t o suppress was untimely. After the motion t o suppress was f i l e d the t r i a l judge heard t h e evidence and denied the motion without s t a t i n g h i s reasons. H e l e f t it f o r t h i s Court t o speculate a s t o the reasons he denied the motion. I do agree however, t h a t the evidence was not i l l e g a l l y seized. With regard t o the exclusionary r u l e and i t s application t o searches and seizures, I f e e l t h i s Court i s paying too much a t t e n t i o n t o the United States Supreme Court i n interpreting the 4th Amendment t o the United States Constitution, and not paying enough a t t e n t i o n t o A r t . 11, Section 11, of Montana's 1972 Constitution which provides: "The people s h a l l be secure i n t h e i r persons, papers, homes and e f f e c t s from unreasonable searches and seizures. N o warrant to search any place, o r seize any person o r thing s h a l l issue without describing the place t o be searched o r the person o r thing t o be seized, o r without probable cause, supported by oath o r a f f irmation reduced t o writing ." Undoubtedly we a r e bound by the United States Supreme Court i n i t s interpretations of the United States Constitution but we a r e not bound by it when we implement and give meaning t o Montana's Constitution. W e certainly can reach a contrary r e s u l t by interpreting similar provisions of ~ o n t a n a ' s Constitution. Without specifically referring t o the Montana Constitution t h i s Court seems t o be holding t h a t the exclusionary r u l e i s not a personal r i g h t of the accused, although the right t o be f r e e from unreasonable searches and seizures i s h i s personal right. Without the exclusionary rule the right t o be free from un- reasonable searches and seizures would be meaningless. I would hold the exclusionary rule i s part and parcel of A r t . 11, Section 1 1 of the 1972 Montana Constitution and accordingly i s a personal right of the defendant. This does not mean that a defendant can f e e l free t o raise the issue a t any time during the proceedings. But it does mean that a defendant must be informed, in sufficient time ahead of t r i a l , that he has a right t o make a motion t o suppress, I f a defendant f i l e s no motion t o suppress, the court should obtain an informed, intelligent waiver. Here, the defendant has shown no prejudice however, because the t r i a l court did hear the motion to suppress and a review of the evidence clearly shows the motion was properly denied.