Case Title: J.B. v. Florida Dept. Of Children & Family Services

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC95-890

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-09-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
1See Harreld v. Harreld, 682 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Montgomery v. Cribb, 484 So.
2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Henzel v. Golstein, 349 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Reynolds v.
Reynolds, 187 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC95890
____________
J.B.
Petitioner,
vs.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Respondent.
[September 28, 2000]
HARDING, J.
We have for review J.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services, 734
So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), on the basis of express and direct conflict with a
number of other district court cases which hold that important rights cannot be
adjudicated when a party has received only twenty-four hours’ notice of the
hearing.1  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
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FACTS
As stated in the First District’s opinion, the facts of this case are as follows:
The history of this controversy dates back to
November 15, 1988, when the state filed a petition to
declare each of the natural father's five children
dependent.  At that time, the father consented to a finding
of dependency, and all of the children were placed in the
custody of their grandmother.  The dependency file was
closed in September of 1990, and the children remained
with their grandmother.
In May of 1993, the father surrendered his parental
rights to one of his children, T.B., with the advice of
appointed counsel.  The remaining four children were
removed from their grandmother's home on August 9,
1995, and placed in foster care.  From that point forward,
there were seven hearings on various matters, six of
which the father failed to attend.  One of the hearings he
missed was a hearing on May 22, 1996, to discuss a
change in the goal from reunification to a termination of
parental rights.
The Department of Children and Family Services
filed a petition on October 21, 1996, to terminate the
father's rights to the four remaining children.  This
petition was served on the father by personal service in
Tallahassee on October 29, 1996, at 7:55 a.m., along with
a summons informing the father that he was to attend an
advisory hearing on October 30, 1996, at 9:00 a.m. in
Tallahassee.  Because the father did not attend the
advisory hearing or call to explain why he could not
attend, the trial court entered a consent on his behalf
under the provisions of section 39.462(1)(d), Florida
Statutes [(1995)].
The first hearing the father attended in the course
of the termination proceeding was the adjudicatory
hearing in December 1996.  At that time, the trial court
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explained that a consent had been entered at the advisory
hearing but allowed the father to participate in the hearing. 
The father informed the court that he had only received
twenty-four hours' notice of the prior hearing, that he had
not read the petition until later in the week, that he had
been sick on the day of the advisory hearing, and that he
had only a ninth grade education.  He asked the court to
appoint counsel on his behalf.  The trial court denied this
request and declined to continue the case.
Following the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court
rendered a final order terminating the father's parental
rights.  This order was appealed and reversed.  In J.B. v.
Department of Children and Family Services, 703 So. 2d
1208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), this court remanded the case
to the trial court, allowing the father to "attempt to set
aside the consent by default and present evidence at an
adjudicatory hearing."  Id. at 1210.
A hearing was held in the trial court on March 23,
1998, at which time the court considered the father's
request to set aside the consent.  The father argued that
he had not received reasonable notice of the advisory
hearing and that the hearing was fatally flawed because an
attorney was not appointed for him.  The trial court
denied the father's motion because he did not offer any
valid excuse for his failure to appear.  The court then
rendered a second final order terminating the father's
parental rights to the children.
J.B., 734 So. 2d at 499-500 (footnote omitted).
The father appealed the second final order terminating parental rights to the
district court, arguing that his due process rights were violated because he did not
receive adequate notice of the advisory hearing.  The district court concluded that
although the notice should have been served further in advance, the twenty-four
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hours’ notice was sufficient to meet minimum due process requirements:
An advisory hearing in a termination of parental rights
case is merely a preliminary step in the process, at which
no right is finally adjudicated.  A parent is not required to
prepare for an advisory hearing or to retain counsel in
advance.  All that is required of the parent is to appear at
the hearing or to inform the court of the need for a
postponement.  In the present case, the father received
the notice of the advisory hearing but did not inform the
court that he would be unable to attend.  Nor did he seek
to excuse his absence at the advisory hearing at any point
in the process before the final hearing. 
Id. at 500.  Accordingly, the district court held that there was no violation of the
father’s due process rights and affirmed the lower court’s ruling.  Id. at 502.
On review, the father asserts that his parental rights were terminated without
full substantive and procedural due process protections.  Specifically, he argues
that (1) twenty-four hours’ notice of the advisory hearing was insufficient to protect
his due process rights; (2) the consent by default provision contained in section
39.462(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1995), is facially unconstitutional; and (3) the trial
court’s failure to appoint  counsel during the December 11, 1996, adjudicatory
hearing was in error.  For the reasons expressed below, we hold that twenty-four
hours’ notice of an advisory hearing is insufficient to satisfy minimum due process
requirements.  We also find that the trial judge was in error for failing to appoint
counsel during the adjudicatory hearing, which likewise resulted in a violation of the
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father’s due process guarantees.  However, we do not agree with the father’s
contention that the consent by default provision is facially unconstitutional.
ANALYSIS
Due Process
As stated by this Court in Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property,
588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991): 
The basic due process guarantee of the Florida
Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 
Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.  Substantive due process under
the Florida Constitution protects the full panoply of
individual rights from unwarranted encroachment by the
government.  To ascertain whether the encroachment can
be justified, courts have considered the propriety of the
state's purpose; the nature of the party being subjected to
state action; the substance of that individual's right being
infringed upon; the nexus between the means chosen by
the state and the goal it intended to achieve; whether less
restrictive alternatives were available; and whether
individuals are ultimately being treated in a fundamentally
unfair manner in derogation of their substantive rights. . . .
Procedural due process serves as a vehicle to
ensure fair treatment through the proper administration of
justice where substantive rights are at issue.  Procedural
due process under the Florida Constitution 
guarantees to every citizen the right to have that
course of legal procedure which has been
established in our judicial system for the protection
and enforcement of private rights.  It contemplates
that the defendant shall be given fair notice[] and
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afforded a real opportunity to be heard and
defend[] in an orderly procedure, before judgment
is rendered against him.  
The manner in which due process protections apply vary
with the character of the interests and the nature of the
process involved.  There is no single, inflexible test by
which courts determine whether the requirements of
procedural due process have been met.
Id. at 960 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The significance of the rights at issue here cannot be overstated.  In
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), the United States Supreme Court
considered termination of parental rights procedures under New York law.  At issue
in Santosky was whether the “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard
prescribed by the New York Family Court Act for the termination of parental rights
violated the parents’ due process rights.  455 U.S. at 747.  The Santosky Court
made it clear that state intervention to terminate parental rights must be
accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of due process.  As the
Santosky Court explained, it is
“plain beyond the need for multiple citation” that a natural
parent’s “desire for and right to ‘the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children’” is
an interest far more precious than any property right. . . .
“A parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of the
decision to terminate his or her parental status is,
therefore, a commanding one.”
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455 U.S. at 758 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18,
27 (1981)).  Moreover, the Supreme Court stated that the fundamental liberty
interest a parent has in the custody and care of his or her child “does not evaporate
simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody
of their child to the State.”  Id. at 753. 
While there is no laundry list of specific procedures that must be followed to
protect due process guarantees, an analysis of the United States Supreme Court’s
prior decisions identifies certain procedures that are typically required before an
individual can be deprived of a property or liberty interest.  In all situations, the
Court has required fair procedures and an unbiased decisionmaker.  Additionally,
the Court has also required notice of the government’s action and an opportunity to
respond before termination of the interest.  See id.; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (holding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior
to the termination of welfare assistance because termination “may deprive an
eligible recipient of the very means by which to live”).  However, in some instances
the Court has allowed a post-deprivation hearing in situations where a
predeprivation hearing would be impracticable.  See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976).
2Specifically, section 39.462(1)(a) requires:
The document containing the notice to respond or appear must contain,
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Statutory Scheme
The statutory framework governing this case is found in chapter 39, Florida
Statutes (1995), which includes provisions concerning termination of parental
rights.  Chapter 39 was enacted “[t]o provide judicial and other procedures to
assure due process through which children and other interested parties are assured
fair hearings . . . and the recognition, protection, and enforcement of their
constitutional and other legal rights.”  §  39.001, Fla. Stat. (1995).  Pursuant to
chapter 39, parental rights can only be terminated under certain circumstances.  See
§ 39.464, Fla. Stat. (1995) (stating grounds for termination of parental rights include
voluntary relinquishment, abandonment, severe or continuing abuse or neglect, and
egregious abuse).  
Additionally, the Legislature has provided certain procedural safeguards to
termination proceedings:  Affected parties must be served notice and a copy of the
petition for termination of parental rights.  § 39.462(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995).  This
section also requires that the notice contain cautionary language warning the
recipient that his or her failure to respond or appear will result in consent by
default.2   Section 39.466, Florida Statutes (1995), requires that the trial court first
in type at least as large as the balance of the document, the following or
substantially similar language: “FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THIS
NOTICE OR TO APPEAR AT THIS HEARING CONSTITUTES
CONSENT TO THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
OF THIS CHILD (OR THESE CHILDREN).”
§ 39.462(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995).
3Amended by chapter 99-193, § 42, Law of Florida, the consent by default provision now states:
If the person served with notice under this section fails to personally
appear at the advisory hearing, the failure to personally appear shall
constitute consent for termination of parental rights by the person given
notice.  If a parent appears for the advisory hearing and the court orders
that parent to personally appear at the adjudicatory hearing for the petition
for termination of parental rights, stating the date, time, and location of said
hearing, then failure of that parent to personally appear at the adjudicatory
hearing shall constitute consent for termination of parental rights.
§ 39.801(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added).
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hold an advisory hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights.  This hearing is
held to inform the parties of their rights under section 39.465, Florida Statutes
(1995), and to set a date for the adjudicatory hearing.  See § 39.466, Fla. Stat.
(1995).  There is no requirement that service of process be made within a certain
time prior to the advisory hearing, although section 39.466 does require that the
advisory hearing “must be held as soon as possible after all parties have been
served.”  A person’s failure to respond or appear at the advisory hearing
constitutes that person’s consent to the termination of parental rights.  See §
39.462(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (1995).3  Within forty-five days after the advisory hearing,
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an adjudicatory hearing must be held where the “court shall consider the elements
required for termination as set forth in s. 39.4611,” and “[e]ach of these elements
must be established by clear and convincing evidence before the petition is
granted.”  § 39.467(1) - (2), Fla. Stat. (1995).  At the conclusion of the adjudicatory
hearing, the judge must enter a written order explaining the relevant findings of fact
and conclusions of law.  See § 39.467(5), Fla. Stat. (1995).  Any party affected by
the order of the court may appeal to the appropriate district court of appeal.  See § 
39.473, Fla. Stat. (1995).  Further, the court is required to advise the parent,
guardian, or custodian of the right to counsel at each stage of the proceeding.  See
§ 39.465(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995).  Therefore, it is clear that Florida law does not
take lightly the termination of parental rights and provides due process safeguards.
In its opinion, the district court correctly recognizes that unwarranted delay is
an evil that should be avoided in termination of parental rights proceedings.  See
J.B., 734 So. 2d at 501.  As a result of the backlog inherent in termination cases,
many children are left in legal limbo as their custody status is argued in the courts. 
Additionally, these proceedings place a tremendous cost and hardship on the State. 
In response, the Legislature has attempted to resolve this monumental burden by
enacting legislation which swiftly moves these cases toward resolution, while at the
same time guarding the rights and liberties of the parties involved.  
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Twenty-four Hours’ Notice
Section 39.466(1) attempts to facilitate termination proceedings by requiring
that the advisory hearing be held “as soon as possible after all parties have been
served.”  While this section does not specify how much time is required for service
of process prior to the advisory hearing, we must construe the statute to require
constitutionally reasonable notice.  See, e.g., Dawson v. Saada, 608 So. 2d 806,
808 (Fla. 1992); Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d
957, 959-60 (holding statute constitutional provided it is applied consistent with
minimum due process requirements).  See also Van Bibber v. Hartford Accident  &
Indem. Ins. Co., 439 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1983); State v. Stalder, 630 So. 2d 1072
(Fla. 1994).
The district court focused on the fact that an “advisory hearing . . . is merely
a preliminary step in the process, at which no right is finally adjudicated,”   and
concluded that “[g]iven the nature of an advisory hearing, . . . the notice in this case
was sufficient.”  J.B., 734 So. 2d at 500-01.  However, the court acknowledged
that its “decision would surely be different if the notice had been a notice of a final
hearing or any other hearing that could reasonably require preparation.”  Id. at 501.
Given that the father’s failure to appear at the advisory hearing resulted in the
trial court’s entering a consent by default pursuant to section 39.462(1)(d), the
4It is clear from the facts of this case that the father did not read the notice until well after the
advisory hearing, nor did he contact the court in an effort to obtain a continuance.  The father’s inattention
and failure to act is troublesome; nonetheless, we hold that 24 hours’ notice is insufficient as a matter of law.
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advisory hearing in this case was in effect a de facto adjudicatory hearing, which
resulted in the termination of his parental rights.  There is no evidence that such
short notice was necessitated by any emergency or potential danger to the children. 
The district court also suggests that any harm caused by the insufficient
notice was cured by the fact that the father was given an appeal to contest the
consent:  “When this case was remanded to the trial court, the father had an
opportunity to present evidence and argument in support of his request to withdraw
the consent.”  J.B., 734 So. 2d at 502.  However, according to the district court’s
opinion, the father’s motion to set aside the consent by default was denied because
the father “did not offer any valid excuse for his failure to appear.”  Id. at 500
(emphasis added).  Therefore, it appears that the only issue the father was able to
address during appeal was his failure to attend the advisory hearing, and he  never
received a meaningful opportunity to contest the termination of parental rights issue. 
Under these circumstances, we cannot agree with the district court’s
conclusion that twenty-four hours’ notice was sufficient.4  Instead, we are
persuaded by Judge Benton’s dissenting opinion, wherein he stated that “[t]he [trial
5See Montgomery v. Cribb, 484 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (holding two days' notice of
hearing on motion to strike unreasonable); Henzel v. Golstein, 349 So. 2d 824, 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
(holding 24 hours’ notice of hearing on motion to dismiss inadequate);  Reynolds v. Reynolds, 187 So. 2d
372, 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (holding plaintiff had been denied due process of law by only 24 hours’
notice of a hearing on an order to show cause why she should not be held in contempt). 
6For termination of parental rights proceedings in other states, those states’  statutes specify that
notice must be given a minimum number of days prior to a proceeding at which parental rights are
terminated.  See Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 8-863(A) (West 1998) (requiring service at least 10 days before
initial hearing on petition to terminate parental rights);  Cal.  Welf. & Inst.Code § 366.23(a) (West 1998)
(requiring state agency to provide 45 days' notice of hearing and 15 days' notice of any recommendation
to terminate parental rights);  Conn.  Gen.Stat. § 45a-716(c) (1998) (requiring service at least 10 days
before the hearing on termination of parental rights);  Ga.Code Ann. § 15-11-83(c) (1998) (at least 30
days' notice);  Haw.Rev.Stat. § 571-61(b)(3) (1998) (at least 20 days' notice);  Idaho Code § 16-1607(a)
& (f) (1998) (at least 48 hours' notice); § 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405/2-15 (2000) (Illinois statute requiring
at least 3 days' notice);  Ind.Code § 31-35-2-6.5(b) (2000) (at least 10 days' notice);  Iowa Code §
232.112 (1998) (requiring not less than seven days' notice for personal service, and 14 days’ notice for
service by certified mail);  La.  Child.  Code art.  1021 (West 1998) (at least five days' notice);
Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit.  22 § 4053 (West 1998) (10 days);  Mich.  Comp. Laws § 712A.19b(2) (1998)
(14 days);  Minn.Stat. § 260C.307 (2000) (10 days);  Miss.Code Ann. § 93-15-105(1) (1998) (30 days);
Mont.Code. Ann. § 41-3-401(4) (1998) (five  working days);  Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-268(3) (1998)
(requiring personal service at least 72 hours before the hearing with the proviso that, upon cause shown,
the court shall grant additional time to prepare for the hearing);  N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 170-C:7 (1998)
(stating that the hearing cannot take place sooner than 20 days after service of notice);  N.M. Stat.  Ann.
§ 32A-4-29(H) (Michie 1998) (at least 30 days' notice);  N.Y. Fam.  Ct. Act § 617(a) (McKinney 1998)
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court’s] failure to construe the statute to require more notice, while treating the
father’s non-appearance as a default, deprived the father of rights to procedural due
process guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.”  J.B., 734 So. 2d at 503-
04 (Benton, J. dissenting).  In that one or two days’ notice has been held
insufficient when much less important interests were at stake,5 we hold that the
fundamental rights involved here demand more than a mere twenty-four hours’
notice.6  
(at least 20 days' notice);  Okla.  Stat. tit. 10 § 7006-1.2(A)(1) (1998) (at least 15 calendar days' notice);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-406(2) (1998) (stating a hearing can be held no sooner than 10 days after
service is complete);  W. Va.Code § 49-3-1(c)(1) (1998) (at least 20 days' notice).
7In fact, the 1999 amendment to this statute provides even more precautions to ensure that the
parent is clearly advised of the consequences of his or her failure to appear.  Amended by chapter 99-193,
§ 42, Laws of Florida, the notice is now required to contain the following cautionary language:
“FAILURE TO PERSONALLY APPEAR AT THIS ADVISORY
HEARING CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO THE TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THIS CHILD (OR CHILDREN).  IF
YOU FAIL TO APPEAR ON THE DATE AND TIME SPECIFIED,
YOU MAY LOSE ALL LEGAL RIGHTS AS A PARENT TO THE
CHILD OR CHILDREN NAMED IN THE PETITION ATTACHED
TO THIS NOTICE.”
§ 39.801(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added).
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Consent by Default
By this decision we are not, however, holding that a consent by default can
never be entered at an advisory hearing.  As the First District stated:
This provision is necessary to ensure that the object of
the petition is not defeated by the parent’s neglect of the
proceeding.  It enables the trial court to bring a
termination of parental rights case to conclusion even if
the parent has chosen not to participate.
J.B., 734 So. 2d at 501.  Furthermore, section 39.462(1)(a) requires that the notice
of advisory hearing clearly inform affected persons that their failure to appear at the
advisory hearing constitutes a consent to the termination of parental rights.7 
Therefore, had adequate notice been given in this case, the entering of a consent by
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default would not have been in error.
Right to Counsel
According to the record, the father indicated that he wanted representation
during the December 11, 1996, hearing but was not provided representation until
the appeal.  This Court has required the appointment of counsel for indigent
parents when permanent termination of parental rights may result.  See In re D.B.,
385 So. 2d 83, 90-91 (Fla. 1980).  See also Department of Children & Family
Servs. v. Natural Parents of J.B., 736 So. 2d 111, 113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
(holding that “[p]arents are entitled to appointed counsel at public expense in
[termination of parental rights] proceedings”), review granted, No. SC96171 (Fla.
Feb. 16, 2000); In re D.F., 622 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (finding
that at each stage of a dependency proceeding the trial court shall advise the
parents of the right to counsel and, if indigent, the right to court-appointed
counsel).  Likewise, section 39.465(1)(a) and Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure
8.320 clearly provide that a parent is entitled to the assistance of counsel. 
Moreover, rule 8.320(b)(3) clearly states:  
If a waiver is accepted at any stage of the proceedings,
the offer of assistance of counsel shall be renewed by the
court at each subsequent stage of the proceedings at
which the party appears without counsel.
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(Emphasis added.)
The right to counsel in termination of parental rights cases is part of the
process designed to ensure that the final result is reliably correct.  See Department
of Children & Family Servs. v. Natural Parents of J.B., 736 So. 2d 111, 117 (4th
DCA 1999).  The father should have been provided counsel before the court
proceeded with the adjudicatory hearing.  In fact, section 39.467(2) provides for a
continuance for the purpose of procuring counsel.  As the United States Supreme
Court stated in Eldridge, “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ”  424
U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).  See also
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).   While the father may have waived
his right to counsel by not appearing at the advisory hearing, it was clear from his
testimony during the December 11, 1996, hearing that he expressed a desire to have
counsel appointed at that time.  Therefore, for the adjudicatory hearing it cannot be
said that the father “knowingly and intelligently” waived his right to counsel as
required by section 39.465(1)(a).
In order to adhere to the principles of due process, the trial court should
have advised the father of his right to counsel and had counsel appointed before
proceeding with the hearing.  Therefore, we hold that the trial court’s failure to do
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so was in error and a violation of the father’s due process rights.
CONCLUSION
This case provides a particularly cogent example of the fact that there is a
great deal at stake in termination of parental rights cases.  It is troublesome to this
Court that these children have been in legal limbo since 1988.  During this time, the
children have been deprived of the stability that might come with reunification or a
chance to be adopted.  Even though the father has not been a model parent, he
retains a vital interest in preventing the termination of his parental rights:  “If
anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more
critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention
into ongoing family affairs.”  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.  Therefore, we conclude
that by providing a mere twenty-four hours’ notice for the advisory hearing and
failing to appoint counsel for the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court deprived the
father of the due process of law guaranteed by the Florida and federal
constitutions.  However, we do not find that the consent by default provision
contained in section 39.462(1)(d) is unconstitutional.  
Accordingly, we quash the decision of the district court of appeal and
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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It is so ordered.
LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only.
WELLS, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW, J., concurs.
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., dissenting.
Although I certainly agree that the rights at stake in this proceeding are
fundamental and precious, I conclude that the district court’s majority reached the
correct decision for the right reasons.  I cannot agree that due process requires
courts to ignore the plain reality so as to benefit a neglectful parent and keep
children’s family status in litigation endlessly.
The litigation involving this father’s five children had been ongoing for
almost eight years when this father was served with the notice on October 29, 1996. 
Four of the children had been placed in foster care more than a year earlier.  Since
August 1995, there had been seven hearings in respect to these children; the father
had missed six of them.  Surely these children had a right to expect their father,
when served with notice of another hearing concerning them, to read it and act
upon it.  To this date, the father has provided no excusable reason that he did not
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do so.  To now continue this litigation because of this father’s demonstrated
inexcusable neglect is detrimental on its face to these children and to all other
children who are similarly situated in legal limbo.
Judge Padovano made essential points in his district court opinion:
There is certainly a great deal at stake in a termination of
parental rights case, but the parents are not the only participants who
have an important interest.  While the termination proceeding is
pending, the child must remain in a temporary home, usually foster
care or a relative placement.  During this time, the child is deprived of
the stability that might come by reunification or a chance to be
adopted.  It would be unfair to the parent if the court were to make a
decision in such an important matter without proper notice.  It would
be equally unfair to the child, however, if the court were to delay this
important decision in the child’s life merely because the parent has
ignored the process.
In this case, the father not only ignored the notice when it was
served, but he also failed to notify the court of his desire to contest the
petition at any time during the forty-two days that elapsed between the
advisory hearing and the adjudicatory hearing.  He could have asked
the court to withdraw the consent at a much earlier time when it would
not have disrupted the orderly progress of the case.  If the father had
responded to the petition and notice within a reasonable time before
the final hearing, the trial court would likely have allowed him to
withdraw the consent.  However, the trial court could not easily grant
such a request made for the first time at the final hearing.
When this case was remanded to the trial court, the father had
an opportunity to present evidence and argument in support of his
request to withdraw the consent.  He offered no evidence or argument
except to rely on his earlier position that he was sick and that he had
not read the notice.  We conclude that the trial court acted within its
discretion in denying the request to withdraw the consent on this
ground.  If the failure to read the notice could excuse a parent’s
attendance at an advisory hearing, there would be little point in sending
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the notice in any case.
J.B. v. Department of Children & Family Servs., 734 So. 2d 498, 501-02 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1999) (emphasis added).  I would approve this decision by the district court
majority, which is composed of judges who have substantial experience and widely
respected expertise in family law and indigency issues, and the final order of the
trial judge, who likewise has substantial experience and expertise in family law.
SHAW, J., concurs.
PARIENTE, J. dissenting.
I would approve Judge Padavono's majority opinion.  I would also point out
that in the future, changes in the statutes governing dependency proceedings should
eliminate the problem that arose in this case.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Statutory Validity
First District - Case No. 1D98-1310
(Leon County)
Joyce Sibson Dove, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
-21-
Charles A. Finkel, District Legal Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent