Case Title: Grosskopf v. Grosskopf

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-126

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Grosskopf v. Grosskopf1984 WY 21677 P.2d 814Case Number: 83-126Decided: 02/10/1984JEANNINE MARIE GROSSKOPF, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

LOREN M. GROSSKOPF, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
JEANNINE MARIE GROSSKOPF, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

LOREN M. GROSSKOPF, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofParkCounty, John T. Dixon, 
J.

ARE NOT AN 
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] 

Stephen L. 
Simonton of Simonton & Simonton, Cody, for appellant.

Sharon A. 
Fitzgerald, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from a 
judgment and decree in a divorce action and appellant's objection to its 
provisions for child support, division of property, and denial of alimony and 
attorneys fees. We will affirm.

[¶2.]     The issues as framed by 
appellant are:

"1. Whether the Court 
erred by finding Appellant at fault in determining which party should be granted 
the divorce.

"2. Whether the Trial 
Court abused its discretion to Appellant's prejudice when it considered fault on 
the issues of property division, alimony and child 
support.

"3. Whether the Trial 
Court abused its discretion by refusing to treat Appellee's increased earning 
capacity as `property' under Section 20-2-114, W.S. 1977 subject to equitable 
distribution or to otherwise equitably compensate Appellant for her contribution 
to his education and increased earning capacity.

"4. Whether the Court 
abused its discretion in refusing to grant Appellant adequate maintenance 
alimony or adequate child support.

"5. Whether the Court 
erred in failing to award Appellant's attorney's fees."

[¶3.]     Appellant, Jeannine 
Marie Grosskopf, and appellee, Loren M. Grosskopf, were married August 17, 1968, 
while attending college in Wisconsin. Appellant was a junior and appellee 
was a sophomore at the time of the marriage. Both were employed part time. 
Appellant graduated with a degree in special education one year before appellee 
and went to work full time supporting the family during appellee's senior year. 
After graduation, appellee obtained a teaching assistantship at the University of Wyoming. The parties moved to Wyoming; appellant worked full time and appellee worked 
part time while attending the University of Wyoming and obtained his masters degree in 
accounting.

[¶4.]     Following graduation, 
appellee obtained employment at Cody, Wyoming, 
and the parties established their home there. Three children were born of the 
marriage. At the time of the divorce, the children were 11, 5, and 2 years of 
age. After twelve years, there were marital problems and difficulties which the 
parties were unable to resolve. Considerable testimony was adduced at the trial 
by both parties concerning the problems in their marriage, fault and the cause 
of these difficulties. The evidence established, and the parties generally 
agreed, that the differences existing between them were such that there was no 
prospect for reconciliation.

[¶5.]     On October 12, 1980, 
after a particularly bitter dispute, appellee separated from appellant. Two days 
later this divorce action was initiated by appellee. Appellant took the three 
children of the marriage, traveled to Wisconsin where she could be with relatives 
and friends, and stayed approximately five weeks. She returned to Cody, Wyoming at Thanksgiving time, attempted to 
reconcile and resolve the problems of the marriage, but that was unsuccessful. 
On December 19, 1980, appellant moved with the children to Appleton, Wisconsin, where they presently 
reside.

[¶6.]     Appellee was successful 
in his employment and his career. At the time of filing the divorce, his gross 
annual earnings were approximately $40,500, and, in addition, he received 
bonuses and earned some money in the stock market. His net take-home pay was 
approximately $2,150 per month. The parties owned their family home with an 
equity of approximately $40,577.40, had acquired other assets, including cash 
and stocks of approximately $31,804, and liabilities as of the date of their 
separation in the amount of $44,784. An expert, employed by appellant, testified 
that appellee's masters degree in accounting was marital property, capable of 
division between the parties; that it had a present value of $105,400; and that 
a fair award to each party would be $74,741.50 and child support in the 
approximate amount of $1,359 per month.

[¶7.]     The court entered a 
judgment and decree in which it awarded custody of the children to appellant, 
subject to the right of appellee to have the children on alternate holidays, 
four weeks during the summer until the children became six years of age, and six 
weeks during the summer thereafter. It required appellee to pay $250 per month 
child support per child, or a total of $750 per month, divided the property 
between the parties in such a manner that appellant received $36,190.70 and 
appellee received a like amount but was also required to satisfy the debts of 
the parties existing at the date of separation which resulted in appellee's 
being required to pay $8,593.30. The final result was that appellant was awarded 
$36,190.70 in cash and appellee was left with a net liability of $8,593.30. The 
court declined to award to appellant either alimony or attorneys 
fees.

WAS THERE ERROR IN 
FINDING APPELLANT AT FAULT AND GRANTING DIVORCE TO 
APPELLEE?

[¶8.]     Appellant contends 
that, upon the evidence presented, the court should not have found appellant at 
fault and therefore should not have granted the divorce to appellee. Appellee 
began this action by filing a complaint for divorce. Appellant, in her answer 
and counterclaim, prayed that divorce be granted to her. With respect to grounds 
or causes for divorce, § 20-2-104, W.S. 1977, provides 
that:

"A divorce may be decreed 
by the district court of the county in which either party resides on the 
complaint of the aggrieved party on the grounds of irreconcilable differences in 
the marital relationship."

As to the 
grounds for divorce, the statute requires proof only of "irreconcilable 
differences" to permit the court to award a decree of divorce. It matters not 
which party was at fault in bringing about the differences which cannot be 
reconciled. All that is required is that the irreconcilable differences exist. 

[¶9.]     Section 20-2-104, 
supra, provides that the divorce may be decreed upon "* * * the complaint of the 
aggrieved party * * *." To "aggrieve," is to give pain, sorrow, trouble, or 
inflict injury. Webster's Third International Dictionary 
(1961).

[¶10.]  Both parties may be "aggrieved." Either 
may bring an action for divorce and obtain a decree granting a divorce. However, 
where each party seeks the decree of divorce, the court then must determine to 
whom the divorce should be granted. In making that determination, the court may 
consider the fault of the respective parties, the equities involved, the effect 
of the divorce upon the parties and the children, and all of the other facts and 
circumstances of the case. There is no fixed rule for determining this question, 
which in the final analysis involves a large discretion on the part of the trial 
court.

[¶11.]  Here, the trial court found, and stated 
in its decision letter,

"* * * that the greater 
degree of fault for the breakup of the marriage rests with the Defendant 
[appellant] rather than the Plaintiff [appellee]. * * *"

Appellant 
contends the evidence does not support that finding. In reviewing that 
evidence,

"* * * we must, on 
appeal, assume that the evidence in favor of the successful party is true, 
leaving out of consideration entirely evidence of the unsuccessful party in 
conflict therewith, and give to the evidence of the successful party every 
favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it. * *" Craver v. Craver, Wyo., 601 P.2d 999, 1001 
(1979).

[¶12.]  Reviewing the facts in this light, we 
find that appellee was successful and apparently secure in his employment at 
Cody, Wyoming. Appellant was dissatisfied with their 
lifestyle, was insistent that the parties move from Cody, Wyoming, to a 
metropolitan area or to Wisconsin, where her family and relatives 
resided. She wanted appellee to quit his job. The parties had built a new home 
on a golf course and she was dissatisfied with the home and wanted to sell it. 
She decided to practice celibacy during the last two years of the marriage. 
There were occasions when appellant had packed the car, determined to leave 
appellee, and heated arguments resulted. Appellee's occupation occasionally 
required that he travel. The last time that occurred before separation, 
appellant took the children and traveled to Bozeman, Montana, leaving appellee a note which he 
found when he returned to an empty house. When appellant returned from 
Bozeman, Montana, there was a bitter argument between 
them. Following this argument, appellant took the children out of school, 
traveled to Wisconsin where she stayed five 
weeks, then returned to Cody, Wyoming, 
around Thanksgiving time. There was an effort by the parties to reconcile which 
was unsuccessful. Appellant then decided that it was more important that the 
children live in Wisconsin near their relatives 
than near their father, and she moved with them to Wisconsin and established 
a permanent residence.

[¶13.]  Although appellant offered evidence to 
support a position that she was not at fault for the divorce, that evidence 
cannot, on appeal, be considered by us. To hold for appellant under our rules 
would require that we find that the court was wrong as a matter of law. This we 
cannot do, for here the evidence supporting the court's decision was 
substantial. There was no error in awarding the divorce to 
appellee.

[¶14.]  WAS THERE ERROR IN CONSIDERING FAULT OR 
DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY, AWARD OF CHILD 
SUPPORT, REFUSAL TO AWARD ALIMONY AND ATTORNEYS FEES?

[¶15.]  The court, in its decision letter, makes 
it clear that it considered fault in settling the rights and duties of the 
parties resulting from their marriage and divorce and in dividing their property 
and considering alimony and attorneys fees. In its decision letter of November 
12, 1981, the court stated, 

"* * * it is the Court's 
opinion that the greater degree of fault for the breakup of the marriage rests 
with the Defendant rather than the Plaintiff. * * *"

Considering 
property rights,

"* * * the Court must and 
has taken into consideration the fact that the dissolution of the marriage was 
caused primarily by the Defendant's insistence upon removing herself and her 
children to the state of Wisconsin instead of remaining with her husband in 
Cody, Wyoming. * * *"

"* * * Again the question 
of alimony and Defendant's entitlement to it in light of her actions in leaving 
the family home and the property settlement which the Court has already affected 
[sic] must be taken into consideration. * * *"

[¶16.]  With the enactment of § 20-2-104, W.S. 
1977, supra, parties could obtain a divorce, without regard to fault, upon proof 
of irreconcilable differences. Enactment of this statute changed only the 
grounds for divorce. Although some states, upon adopting no-fault grounds for 
divorce, also adopted legislation providing for no-fault disposition of property 
and determination of other rights, Wyoming declined to do so. The statutes and 
law in existence governing division of property, alimony, and attorneys fees 
prior to the adoption of legislation providing no-fault grounds for divorce, 
therefore, remain in effect today. Section 20-2-114, W.S. 1977,1 provides that in making a just and 
equitable distribution, the court should "consider the merits" of the respective 
parties. "Merits" is defined in Webster's Third International Dictionary (1961) 
as "intrinsic rights and wrongs of a legal case as determined by matters of 
substance in distinction from matters of form." Merit is deservedness, 
goodness.

[¶17.]  The courts are close to being equally 
divided on the question of whether legislation adopting no-fault grounds for 
divorce, without more, also requires that there be a no-fault distribution of 
property and determination of the parties' rights. A small majority, with which 
we agree, holds that the enactment of a no-fault divorce statute which does no 
more than provide no-fault grounds for divorce, does not modify the traditional, 
existing grounds for determining child custody, support, alimony, attorneys 
fees, and division of property. Huggins 
v. Huggins, 57 Ala. App. 691, 331 So. 2d 704 
(1976); Peterson v. Peterson, 308 
Minn. 365, 242 N.W.2d 103 (1976); Novlesky v. Novlesky, N.D., 206 N.W.2d 865 (1973); Kretzschmar v. 
Kretzschmar, 48 Mich. App. 279, 210 N.W.2d 352 
(1973).

[¶18.]  Our prior decisions indicate that fault 
has always been a consideration in adjusting the rights of the parties to a 
marriage being dissolved. Thus, we have said that although the controlling 
element in awarding alimony is the ability of the husband to pay, yet other 
matters may be considered in making the determination. Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, Wyo., 
583 P.2d 1265 (1978). And quoting from another case with approval in 
Storm v. Storm, Wyo., 470 P.2d 367 (1970), we stated that a spouse 
who had chosen to abandon the marriage and all obligations would be entitled to 
be continuously supported in the future only in unusual circumstances. We have 
held that a settlement of the rights of the respective parties must be just and 
equitable, and awarding less than one-half of the property to the wife may be 
just and equitable under the circumstances of a particular case, Beckle v. Beckle, Wyo., 452 P.2d 205 
(1969). Because a spouse has a greater right in jointly owned property acquired 
by the parties during the course of their marriage than in alimony to be paid in 
the future, we hold that, in addition to those factors set forth in the 
applicable statutes, the court may also consider fault of the respective parties 
together with all other facts and circumstances surrounding the dissolution of 
the marriage for purposes of determining division of property, alimony, and 
award of attorneys fees.

[¶19.]  In Paul v. Paul, Wyo., 616 P.2d 707 (1980), 
we held that the trial court might refuse to hear testimony concerning fault in 
the circumstances of that case. There, the trial court advised the parties that 
he would not consider fault in a division involving the large amount of 
property. We said in Paul v. Paul 
that,

"* * * When there are 
adequate assets to comfortably provide for both of the parties, the trial court 
does not abuse its discretion when it refuses to permit the parties to air their 
dirty laundry in court." 616 P.2d  at 715.

We also said 
that,

"* * * The trial judge 
has great discretion in dividing the property and he is not to use the property 
division to punish one of the parties. * * *" 616 P.2d  at 715, citing Storm v. Storm, supra, 470 P.2d 367.

Paul v. 
Paul 
stands for the principle that in certain circumstances the court may, in its 
discretion, refuse to hear evidence of fault; and that, in any event, such 
evidence may not be considered by the court to punish one of the parties, but 
only to insure that the property division is just and equitable under all of the 
facts and circumstances of the case.

[¶20.]  Considering now, first, the division of 
property, we note that,

"* * * As an appellate 
court, we consider that our power to disturb a property settlement fixed by a 
trial judge is limited indeed. There must be a clear abuse of discretion before 
we will upset or adjust such a settlement. We consider `abuse of discretion,' to 
be such abuse as shocks the conscience of the court. It must appear so unfair 
and inequitable that reasonable persons could not abide it." Paul v. Paul, supra, at 714. See also, 
Kane v. Kane, Wyo., 577 P.2d 172 
(1978).

[¶21.]  In this case the parties agreed in 
writing upon a division of their personal property. At the time the decree of 
divorce was entered, their home had been sold. There was received cash from the 
sale of the home in the amount of $40,577.40, the parties had, in addition, cash 
and stocks in the amount of $31,804, and their total indebtedness was $44,784. 
The court awarded each of the parties one-half of the cash received from the 
sale of their home, one-half of the value of the cash and stock they had, and 
ordered appellee to pay the indebtedness of the parties in the amount of 
$44,784. The effect of this decree was an award to appellant of $36,190.70 and 
an imposition of a net liability upon appellee in the amount of 
$8,593.30.

[¶22.]  The division of property was unequal. 
Appellant was left with $36,190.70 in cash; appellee was left with a debt of 
$8,593.30. There was no award of alimony nor an award of attorneys fees. We have 
said that award of attorneys fees is a part of the property division and within 
the discretion of the trial court. Bereman v. Bereman, Wyo., 645 P.2d 1155 
(1982). The allowance or disallowance of alimony is also a matter which lies 
within the discretion of the trial court. Biggerstaff v. Biggerstaff, Wyo., 443 P.2d 524 (1968). In its decision letter considering a request for alimony, the 
court stated,

"* * * Again the question 
of alimony and Defendant's entitlement to it in light of her actions in leaving 
the family home and the property settlement which the Court has already affected 
[sic] must be taken into consideration. In light of these things, the Court can 
neither justify nor can the Plaintiff afford to pay to the Defendant the sums 
requested by her at the time of trial, particularly in light of the property 
division which the Court has made." (Emphasis 
supplied.)

[¶23.]  We recognize that there are cases in 
which alimony is a necessity. However, under ordinary circumstances it should be 
recognized that one spouse should not have a perpetual claim on the earnings of 
the other; that divorce, insofar as possible should sever the ties of the 
parties and they should begin to start their lives anew. Thus, there has been a 
tendency away from alimony, and if some additional sum is necessary to adjust 
equities between the parties, it is better that that be done with an award of 
property. Young v. Young, Wyo., 472 P.2d 784 (1970); Paul v. Paul, supra. 
Here the court awarded appellant a substantial amount of cash while placing the 
burden of an $8,593.30 debt upon appellee. Appellant is a college graduate with 
a degree in special education. She has been employed as a teacher and in other 
occupations and is capable of functioning adequately in the job market. She 
claims she should be allowed to stay home, not be employed, and devote herself 
to raising the children. Yet that is not what occurred when the parties were 
living together. The oldest of the children was with babysitters through most of 
her growing up before entering school. Social reports indicate she suffered no 
impairment as a result of this experience. The court awarded appellant custody 
of the children subject to provisions for visitation by appellee, and awarded 
child support in the sum of $250 for each child or a total of $750 per month. 
Appellee's take-home pay at the time was $2,150 per month, and the court noted 
that appellee's requirements for his living indicated that the amount awarded 
was about all that could be justified. Award of child support also is a matter 
addressed to the discretion of the court and will not be disturbed on appeal 
except for a clear abuse. Chorney v. 
Chorney, Wyo., 383 P.2d 859 (1963).

[¶24.]  Considering all of the facts and 
circumstances of this case, the merits of the parties, their respective 
educations, college degrees and abilities, and all other matters, we cannot find 
an abuse of discretion in the manner in which the court divided the property of 
the parties, awarded child custody and support, and declined to award alimony or 
attorneys fees.

[¶25.]  WAS THERE ERROR IN NOT TREATING 
APPELLEE'S INCREASED EARNING CAPACITY RESULTING FROM HIS ADVANCED DEGREE AS 
PROPERTY TO BE DIVIDED BETWEEN THE PARTIES UNDER § 20-2-114, W.S. 
1977?

[¶26.]  These parties were married while both 
were attending college, appellee being a sophomore and appellant being a junior 
at the time. During the second year of marriage, when both were attending 
college, appellee was employed full time working an 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. 
shift, and testified that he earned five times as much as appellant who was then 
employed part time. The next year, appellant had graduated and she worked full 
time while appellee worked part time. The following year, appellee sought his 
masters degree at the University of Wyoming; and appellant again worked full 
time while appellee had a teaching assistantship which paid his tuition, books, 
and a small amount of money. Appellant claimed that her contribution to 
appellee's education over and above that of appellee was approximately $13,600. 
Appellee testified that with his employment and loans obtained, he would have 
put himself through college without any contribution, had he not been married. 
The court found that appellant's contribution over and above that of appellee 
was, at a maximum, approximately $2,400. There was evidence to support the trial 
court's finding in this regard, and it will not be disturbed on 
appeal.

[¶27.]  The trial court, in its decision letter, 
concerning appellee's advanced degree, stated as follows:

"* * * it is the holding 
of the Court not only does the Plaintiff's masters degree in accounting have 
little or no value according to the testimony presented at the time of trial but 
that the same is not a property right to be divided between the parties * * 
*."

A witness called 
by appellee, employed in the accounting field, testified that a masters degree 
in accounting had value only if the holder of that degree intended to teach or 
work in the academic community. He testified that persons passing the certified 
public accountant examination are employed at the same wage in the private 
sector irrespective of whether their degree is a bachelors or a masters degree. 
The court accepted that testimony, as was its right, and considered the advanced 
degree in appellee's present occupation of little or no 
value.

[¶28.]  The court, in dealing with this question 
further in its decision letter, stated that in considering the educational 
degree, the length of the marriage, and other marital circumstances surrounding 
the same, it

"* * * must acknowledge 
the wife's contribution by way of a settlement agreement which will adjust 
between the two parties * * * and in the Court's opinion the wife has been more 
than compensated for this by reason of the property division [herein]. * * 
*"

Section 
20-2-114, W.S. 1977, requires that the court shall make such disposition of the 
property of the parties as appears 
just and equitable. We have held that,

"* * * With respect to 
future property, we think the rule must be that, when a court divides property 
incidental to the granting of a divorce, the court is limited by the amount of 
property in its hands for division and a mere expectancy is not subject to 
division. * * *" Storm v. Storm, 
supra, 470 P.2d 367, 370.

The court went 
on, stating that an inheritance to be received was future property and 
that,

"[i]n speaking of future 
property, we are referring to a prospective expectancy of an estate which may 
come into being in the future as distinguished from future benefits to be 
derived from an estate already in existence. Courts have frequently 
distinguished between assets earned during coverture and those to be acquired in 
the future." Id. at 370.

[¶29.]  Appellant contends that the advanced 
degree in accounting is property in existence which will result in future 
benefits. The degree itself may or may not result in future benefits. That 
depends upon appellee's abilities, diligence, success, or failure, and whether 
he chooses to work in this field. But, the threshold question is whether the 
degree is property at all that may be subject to division under our 
statute.

[¶30.]  Most courts which have considered this 
question have held, and we agree, that an educational degree is not property 
because,

"* * * [i]t does not have 
an exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is 
personal to the holder. It terminates on death of the holder and is not 
inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed or pledged. An 
advanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous education, 
combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere 
expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual achievement that may 
potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In our view, it has 
none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of that term." In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 
574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978).

[¶31.]  While the college degree and the 
increased earnings that might be derived therefrom in the future are not 
property, yet there are equities to be adjusted between the parties and they 
will vary with the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Thus, the 
parties seeking divorce may be from a marriage that lasted many years in which 
substantial property was accumulated. An equitable division of that property 
should result in each party realizing the benefits of the college degree. On the 
other hand, where the working spouse supports the family while the other attends 
college, obtains an advanced professional degree, and promptly seeks a no-fault 
divorce, there is no property accumulated to divide. The inequity of a divorce 
with no award to the working spouse is obvious. In this situation, an award to 
that spouse which would afford an opportunity to obtain the same degree under 
the same circumstances, or in the alternative, a sum of money equal to that 
benefit seems equitable; and cases falling between these two extremes should be 
adjusted accordingly. In resolving these questions, courts 
are,

"* * * guided by 
equitable principles in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties 
upon a dissolution of the marriage relationship. * * * [And they have] inherent 
power to grant equitable relief `as the facts in each particular case and the 
ends of justice may require.' * * *" DeLa 
Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, Minn., 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (1981).

Some courts have 
awarded the working spouse the amount by which her contribution to the marriage 
in money exceeded that of the spouse attending college, DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, supra, while 
others have awarded something they thought just and equitable in lieu of 
property termed alimony in gross, which was $15,000 in Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978). An Iowa court, after holding that the potential for increased 
earning capacity was an asset for distribution, awarded a wife who had supported 
her husband while he obtained a law degree, the sum of $18,000; and the award 
was upheld on appeal, the court noting that the husband had testified that the 
education had cost at least $14,000. In 
re Marriage of Horstmann, Iowa, 263 N.W.2d 885 (1978).

[¶32.]  Applying the above principles to the 
instant case, we note that these parties were married for twelve years, and the 
wife received some of the benefit from her husband's degree. The wife also has a 
degree; and during her senior year the husband worked full time, earned more 
money than she, and contributed toward her obtaining that degree. During his 
senior year, she worked full time and also during the year that he obtained his 
masters degree, but did not provide all of the support for the family. The 
husband, then also worked part time and contributed to the support of the 
family. As the husband testified, he would have put himself through school with 
his employment and loans, whether married or not. The trial court, in giving its 
decision, stated that it had made allowance for the advanced degree in the award 
of property to the wife. She was awarded in excess of $36,000 in cash, and he 
was left obligated to pay in excess of $8,000 in debt. We have consistently 
said:

"* * * The function of 
this court is not to constitute a reconsideration or retrial of the district 
court's decision unless the same is clearly unjust and inequitable * * *." Kane v. Kane, supra, 577 P.2d 172, 
174.

[¶33.]  The trial court exercises a broad 
discretion in adjusting the rights and obligations of parties upon the 
dissolution of their marriage. We will not disturb the decision of the lower 
court unless we can say that that discretion was abused, that the result was 
clearly unjust and inequitable. We cannot make that finding in this case. The 
judgment, therefore, is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 20-2-114, W.S. 
1977, in existence at the time of filing the complaint in this case, 
provided:

"In granting a divorce, 
the court shall make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears 
just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the parties and 
the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom 
the property was acquired, and the burdens imposed upon the property for the 
benefit of either party and children. The court may decree to the wife 
reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for his ability 
and may order so much of his real estate or the rents and profits thereof as is 
necessary be assigned and set out to either party for life, or may decree a 
specific sum be paid by him."

We note that 
this statute was amended by ch. 20, § 1, Session Laws of Wyoming 1982. The only 
change made was to allow payment of alimony to be decreed to either 
party.