Case Title: Harris v. Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0144

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
LEROY FRANCIS HARRIS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 70Case Number: No. S-10-0144Decided: 04/22/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 
LEROY 
FRANCIS HARRIS,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel, and Kirk A. 
Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender 
Program.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Stewart M. 
Young, Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Jessica Y. Frint, 
Student Director, Prosecution Assistance Program.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Leroy 
Francis Harris (Harris), challenges that portion of the district court's 
Sentence which required him to pay, as a portion of the costs of prosecution, 
the fees paid by the State to some of the witnesses who testified against 
him.  Harris was charged with 
aggravated assault and battery, and the victim of that charged crime was Diane 
Hampton.  Harris was acquitted by 
the jury of that felony count.  
Harris also faced trial on a second count, a misdemeanor, which was 
interference with a peace officer, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(a) (LexisNexis 
2009).  As a part of his sentence, 
Harris was required to pay a portion of the costs of prosecution (witness fees 
and costs) in the amount of $548.16.  
Harris contends that he should not have to pay witness fees for witnesses 
whose testimony was primarily related to the felony count for which he was 
acquitted, as well as because the State failed to present any evidence to 
support its claim for the witness fees at issue herein.  We will affirm the Judgment but reverse 
and remand the Sentence with directions that the district court amend the 
Sentence imposed so as to remove the provision that Harris be required to pay 
the witness fees at issue in this appeal.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Harris poses his 
issue this way:

 
 
Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion when it assessed costs of prosecution fees 
associated with the State's witnesses without an adequate showing by the 
State?

 
 
The 
State rephrases that somewhat:

 
 
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion by assessing the appropriate costs of 
prosecution associated with the State's witnesses?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      The crimes at 
issue here occurred during a time when the Hampton family was erecting a fence 
that separated the parties' abutting land parcels.  The district court pronounced sentence 
at an initial sentencing hearing on April 15, 2010.  That hearing was continued on April 20, 
2010, and Harris was satisfied with the sentence imposed except for the witness 
fees portion of it  and he vehemently objected to that both in his own words 
and through his defense counsel.  
The only indication of what the witness fees were in the case came before 
the court in the form of argument by the prosecutor in favor of a maximum 
sentence, as well as for witness fees and other usual sentence provisions.  The only provision of the sentence in 
contest here is the witness fees, although that was not the case at the 
sentencing hearings.  This is all 
there is in the record about witness fees:

 
 
            
[Prosecutor]:  Additionally, 
your Honor I would place on the record that the county attorney's office paid 
out the following witness and mileage and meal fees:  Cody McGuffin, $564.15.  Mr. McGuffin did not testify at 
trial.  He was brought here.  He was kept here until we decided that 
we did not need him any longer.  
Steve Hampton, $150.48.  He 
did testify, and I believe he testified in matters relevant to the conviction in 
this case.

            
Wonita Diane Hampton [victim in the aggravated assault case], $90.  I believe she did testify in matters 
relevant to the conviction in this case.  
We paid Shane Hampton $51.  I 
have no recollection if he testified regarding interference or not.  Debra Larsen, we paid her $103.68 in 
witness fees and mileage.  She did 
testify of matters relevant to the conviction.

            
We paid Victor Arriaza $51.  
He did testify.  We paid 
Chance Hampton $153.00.  He did not 
testify.  The total amount was 
$1,163.31, and we'd ask that the Court impose some or all of those costs against 
the defendant.

 
 
[¶4]      The district 
court specifically did not allow the witness fees for witnesses Arriaza and 
McGuffin, but did allow all other witness fees to be taxed against Harris.  For purposes of clarity and context, we 
note that it was accepted at the trial that a defendant could not be taxed with 
costs for witnesses who testified only about a crime of which the defendant was 
not convicted.  It was also accepted 
that a witness need not necessarily testify for such costs to be taxed, as long 
as there is some showing the witness was called for a proper purpose.  It was also accepted that such costs 
could be taxed if the witness's testimony was at least in part related to a 
crime for which a defendant was convicted.  
None of those generally accepted principles are at issue here.  However, in any event, the district 
court retains the discretion to allow or disallow such costs depending on all 
the facts and circumstances of the case.  
Steve Hampton, Diane Hampton, and Debra Larson each testified a little 
bit about the interference count.  
Shane Hampton did not testify about the interference count, and Chance 
Hampton did not testify at all.  The 
root of Harris' objection to paying these costs is that all of the witnesses who 
were allowed fees were on the Hamptons' side of the fence, which was the issue 
between the Hamptons and Harris.  
The Hamptons' testimony concerning the misdemeanor charge was only 
incidental to that charge.  The crux 
of their testimony went to the aggravated assault charge.  The detailed evidence concerning the 
interference charge was given by the police officer who was the subject of 
Harris' interference.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶5]      Perhaps the 
source of some of the difficulties in this case can be traced to our statutes 
which govern this subject.  They are 
something of a hodgepodge and, secondarily, these sorts of matters have come up 
only seldom in our cases over the years.  
Moreover, to the extent there is pertinent case law and treatise law in 
point, that law has evolved over the years so that the readily available 
precedents are not dispositive of the circumstances that are before us in this 
case.

 
 
[¶6]      In pertinent part 
W.R.Cr.P. 17(c)(1) provides:

 
 
(c)   
Allowable fees and expenses. 
--

            
(1)  Non-expert Fees. -- In addition to actual costs of travel, 
meals and lodging each non-expert witness shall be paid a witness fee of $30.00 
for each full day and $15.00 for each half day necessarily spent traveling to 
and from the proceeding and in attendance at the proceeding.1

 
 
[¶7]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-505 (LexisNexis 2009) provides:

 
 
§ 
7-11-505.  Payment of costs of 
prosecution.

 
 
            
Payment of the costs of prosecution may be added to and made a part of 
the sentence in any felony or misdemeanor case if the court determines that the 
defendant has an ability to pay or that a reasonable probability exists that the 
defendant will have an ability to pay.

 
 
[¶8]      In Bruckner v. State, 972 P.2d 141, 142-43 
(Wyo. 1999) we held:

 
 
            
Bruckner contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
ordered him to pay the costs of litigation.  The state counters that the costs which 
were imposed by the trial court are authorized under Wyoming 
law.

 
 
A 
court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances.  
Raymond v. Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 331 (Wyo. 1998).  In 
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we must decide the 
ultimate issue of whether or not the court could have reasonably concluded as it 
did.  Id.

 
 
            
The prosecutor filed an itemized statement of costs with the trial court 
on the day of the sentencing, listing airfare for a witness from Dallas, Texas, 
and airfare for a witness from Kansas City, Missouri.  He also listed mileage for a witness 
from Worland.  In addition, he 
included the costs of lodging and meals for these 
witnesses.

 
 
            
Costs of prosecution are allowed under Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 7-11-505 (Michie 
1997):

 
 
      Payment of the 
costs of prosecution may be added to and made a part of the sentence in any 
felony or misdemeanor case if the court determines that the defendant has an 
ability to pay or that a reasonable probability exists that the defendant will 
have an ability to pay.

 
 
            
The trial court found that Bruckner had an ability to pay, and Bruckner 
does not argue otherwise.  Instead, 
he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay for 
the witnesses' meals and lodging and by ordering him to pay the witnesses' 
travel costs which were in excess of the amount that would have been permitted 
if the statutory mileage rate specified under Rule 501(b)(1) of the Uniform 
Rules for District Courts of the State of Wyoming had been 
used.

 
 
            
Bruckner relies on Kaess v. 
State, 748 P.2d 698 (Wyo.1987), for his proposition that travel costs must 
be awarded on a "mileage basis or actual costs of airline ticket, whichever is 
less."  748 P.2d  at 703.  After comparing the amount which would 
have been permitted had the travel expenses been determined on the basis of 
mileage rates to the costs of the airline tickets, Bruckner contends that the 
cost would have been less if the mileage rate had been used and that, under Kaess, the costs of litigation award 
should be reduced to reflect the difference.  Bruckner also asserts that, under Kaess, the motel rooms and meals for the 
witnesses should not have been included in the costs of 
litigation.

 
 
            
Bruckner's reliance on Kaess 
is outdated.  That case was decided 
before W.R.Cr.P. 17 was amended in 1993.  
Because Bruckner was convicted in May of 1996, W.R.Cr.P. 17(c)(1) 
governed the amount which was allowed for the witnesses' travel expenses in his 
case.  W.R.Cr.P. 17(c)(1) 
provides:

 
 
(c)  Allowable 
fees and expenses.

 
 
      
(1)  Non-expert Fees.--In addition to actual costs of travel, 
meals and lodging each non-expert witness shall be paid a witness fee of $30.00 
for each full day and $15.00 for each half day necessarily spent traveling to 
and from the proceeding and in attendance at the 
proceeding.

 
 
            
The trial court properly ordered Bruckner to pay the witnesses' actual 
travel costs and for their meals and lodging.

 
 
            
Additionally, Rule 501(b)(1) of the Uniform Rules for District Courts 
dictates the amount of compensation which is to be paid to each witness.  It also establishes a mileage rate of 
twenty-three cents per mile, not to exceed the costs of common carrier 
transportation rates.  Contrary to 
Bruckner's argument, this rule is not adverse to what the trial court 
did.

 
 
            
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed 
the costs of litigation and that this imposition was supported by Wyoming 
law.

 
 
[¶9]      Uniform Rules for 
District Courts of the State of Wyoming, Rule 501(b) 
provides:

 
 
            
(b)  Criminal Cases. 
--

                        
(1)  Allowable Costs.

                        
(A)  Non-expert witness fees as set forth in Rule 17(c)(1), 
W.R.Cr.P., are allowed:  $30.00 for 
each full day and $15.00 for each half day necessarily spent traveling to and 
from the proceeding and in attendance at the proceeding.  Mileage is allowed as provided in Rule 
501(a)(3)(B)(i), U.R.D.C.

                        
(B)  Expert witness fees are allowed as set forth in W.S. § 
1-14-102(b).

                        
(C)  The general standards as applicable to costs in civil 
cases will be applied, including witness fees, service fees, and fees for 
depositions when actually used.

            
(2)  Assessment of Costs Upon Defendant. -- Payment of the 
costs of prosecution may be added to and made a part of the sentence in any 
felony case if the court determines that the defendant has an ability to pay or 
that a reasonable probability exists that the defendant will have an ability to 
pay.

 

[¶10]   In Juarez v. State, 791 P.2d 287, 289 (Wyo. 
1990) we held:

 
 
Assessing 
the Costs of Prosecution

            
Juarez claims that the trial court erred in requiring him to repay the 
costs of the prosecution.  We 
agree.  During the sentencing 
hearing, the prosecution offered no evidence to establish the costs of 
prosecution, and the trial court's oral imposition of judgment and sentence did 
not include these particular costs to be repaid by Juarez.  When the costs appeared in the written 
judgment and sentence five days after the sentencing hearing, they appeared as a 
lump sum with no identification or itemization of specific costs.  On review, we have no way of knowing 
what particular costs are being imposed and whether the lump sum includes 
improper institutional costs.  Kaess v. State, 748 P.2d 698, 702-03 
(Wyo.1987).  We find that the trial 
court erred in the manner in which it imposed costs of the prosecution as part 
of Juarez's sentence, and we strike those costs from the judgment and sentence 
without remand.  Keller v. State, 771 P.2d  at 
387.

 
 
Also 
see Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. Ninth Jud. 
Dist. Court, 735 P.2d 709, 712 (Wyo. 1987) (costs were not supported by 
evidence of reasonableness or by any evidence at all); and State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d. 1, 12-13 
(Wyo. 1985).

 
 
[¶11]   We resolve this case based upon the 
above-cited authority.  We conclude 
that the prosecution failed to introduce evidence of any sort that could serve 
to sustain the district court's imposition of the witness fees and costs on 
Harris.  Although this is 
dispositive of this case, we will briefly comment on the other issues Harris 
raised because some additional guidance in this area of the law appears to be 
worthy of mention.

 
 
[¶12]   The first matter is Harris' 
contention that the district court could not have awarded members of the Hampton 
family witness fees because the jury acquitted Harris of the crime he was 
alleged to have committed wherein Diane Hampton was the victim.  The district court rested its decision, 
in part, on the circumstance that some small part of some of the testimony for 
which witness fees were awarded was relevant to the misdemeanor conviction.  We take note that all of the witnesses 
who received witness fees were the subjects of Harris' allegedly assaultive 
conduct, but he was charged with only one count of aggravated assault and 
battery.  Because the Hamptons 
anticipated problems with Harris as they constructed a fence that was being put 
in a "disputed area" where their properties abutted one another, all of them 
were armed with one sort of firearm or another.  Ms. Larson, who was helping the Hamptons 
with the fence work, was there mainly to film what took place, in case Harris 
did become a problem.  Both still 
and video photography collected by the Hampton group was introduced as evidence 
in support of the felony charge for which Harris was acquitted.  However, all but Shane Hampton offered 
only minor corroborative evidence of the resisting arrest misdemeanor.  The gravamen of that crime was supported 
principally by the police officer who was the subject of Harris' resistance (and 
in some respects entirely so because much of it took place where the Hampton 
group could not see it at all or at least not clearly).  Our jurisprudence is consonant with that 
of most jurisdictions in that witness fees may not be imposed "in any case in 
which the defendant is acquitted."  
State v. Faulkner, 75 Wyo. 
104, 292 P.2d 1045, 1051 (1956).  
However, witness fees and costs could have been taxed to Harris for the 
misdemeanor conviction, but we are hesitant to intimate that the entirety of 
those costs could be assessed even though there was an acquittal on the primary 
offense.  As with all aspects of 
sentencing, the district court is accorded wide discretion and assessment of 
100% of the witness fees for the misdemeanor conviction, given the circumstances 
of this case, appears to exceed that discretion.  Finally, we note that one witness gave 
no testimony regarding the misdemeanor and one witness gave no testimony at 
all.  The prevailing law suggests 
that witness fees may be taxed to a party even though the witness(es) did not 
testify if "the witness was ready to testify but extrinsic circumstances 
rendered his or her testimony unnecessary."  20 Am.Jur.2d Costs § 48 (Witnesses subpoenaed but not 
called to testify) (2005).  There is 
nothing in the record on appeal that could serve to verify that there were such 
qualifying circumstances in this case.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶13]   The Judgment of the district court 
is affirmed.  The Sentence is also 
affirmed, with the exception of that portion of paragraph 6 of the Judgment and 
Sentence which ordered Harris to pay costs of prosecution in the amount of 
$548.16.  This matter is remanded to 
the district court for such proceedings as are necessary to accomplish that 
result.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 
  1We note that the 
allowable fees and expenses for witnesses were set in 1993 and have not been 
reconsidered since.