Case Title: State v. Green

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2021AP000267-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2023-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2023 WI 57 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP267-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Mitchell D. Green, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 401 Wis. 2d 540, 974 N.W.2d 51 
(2022 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 1, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
David L. Borowski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which DALLET, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which DALLET, J., joined. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by John A. Blimling, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by John A. Blimling, assistant attorney general.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
John T. Wasielewski and Wasielewski & Erickson, Milwaukee. There 
was an oral argument by John T. Wasielewski. 
 
 
2023 WI 57 
 NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP267-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2019CF914) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Mitchell D. Green, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2023 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which DALLET, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which DALLET, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
State 
charged 
Mitchell D. Green with trafficking of a child, a class C felony, 
among other offenses.  See Wis. Stat. § 948.051(1) (2017–18).1  
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017–18 version unless otherwise indicated.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 948.051(1) provides:  "Whoever knowingly recruits, entices, 
provides, obtains, harbors, transports, patronizes, or solicits 
or knowingly attempts to recruit, entice, provide, obtain, 
harbor, transport, patronize, or solicit any child for the 
purpose 
of 
commercial 
sex 
acts, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 940.302 (1) (a), is guilty of a Class C felony." 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
2 
 
At trial, the victim, S.A.B., testified that Green had driven 
her to a hotel in Milwaukee, where she was forced to engage in a 
sex act.  After S.A.B. testified, Green called as a witness his 
cousin, Jonathon Cousin, who testified that he, not Green, had 
driven S.A.B. and another man, J.R., to the hotel. 
¶2 
After a recess for lunch, the trial court held a 
hearing to address the State's concerns regarding Cousin's 
testimony.  Specifically, the State argued that Green presented 
a third-party perpetrator defense through Cousin's testimony, 
without notifying the State or seeking a ruling from the court 
regarding the admissibility of that evidence under State v. 
Denny, 
120 
Wis. 2d 614, 
357 
N.W.2d 12 
(Ct. 
App. 
1984) 
(conditioning admissibility of third-party perpetrator evidence 
on a showing of a motive, opportunity, and direct connection 
between the third party and the crime charged).  Green denied 
offering Cousin's testimony for that purpose.  The court 
concluded Cousin's testimony was Denny evidence and therefore 
should not have been presented to the jury without the defense 
notifying the State in advance and the court ruling on its 
admissibility.  Because the jury heard that evidence without 
either precondition being satisfied, the court determined a 
mistrial was necessary.   
¶3 
Green filed a motion to dismiss the case with 
prejudice, arguing retrial would violate his right against 
double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
as 
incorporated 
against 
the 
States 
by 
the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  After the trial court denied Green's 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
3 
 
motion, Green filed a motion for reconsideration, which the 
court also denied.  Green appealed, and the court of appeals 
reversed.  State v. Green, No. 2021AP267-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. March 22, 2022). 
¶4 
Before this court, the State argues retrial would not 
violate Green's right against double jeopardy because the trial 
court exercised sound discretion in deciding manifest necessity 
justified a mistrial.  We agree; accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Prior to trial, Green filed a witness list naming 
Cousin.  Green's counsel had a written statement from Cousin, 
but the State did not demand its production.  In August 2019, 
the State filed pretrial motions in limine, asking the circuit 
court to prohibit Green "from introducing any other-acts 
evidence involving a third-party perpetrator, unless and until 
defendant satisfies his burden and such evidence is ruled 
admissible by the court[.]"  Green did not object to the State's 
motions.  At a final pretrial hearing, the court acknowledged 
the "State had filed their motion in limine[.]"  Milwaukee 
Circuit Court Judge Janet Protasiewicz presided over the case 
until the day of trial.  Nothing in the record indicates the 
court ruled on the State's motion in limine before the trial 
scheduled to commence on January 27, 2020. 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
4 
 
¶6 
On the day of trial, Judge Protasiewicz spun2 the case 
to Judge David Borowski.  Three witnesses testified:  S.A.B.; 
Gerardo Orozco, a Milwaukee police officer; and Cousin.  S.A.B. 
was the prosecution's first witness.  S.A.B. testified she "was 
sex trafficked" between October 30, 2018 and December 4, 2018.  
S.A.B. explained that she was forced to be part of a sex 
trafficking ring and that Green——who S.A.B. knew as Money Mitch—
—was integral to the operation.  
¶7 
S.A.B. testified specifically to Green's involvement 
in one trafficking incident alleged to have occurred during the 
fall of 2018:  "I got a call.  It was a date.  Money Mitch was 
at JR's house, and I told JR that I had a date.  Money Mitch was 
like, well, I got a car.  I can drive you.  I said okay."  After 
that conversation, S.A.B. testified that Green picked her up and 
drove her to a hotel in Milwaukee.  S.A.B. recounted further 
details from the night, testifying she "remember[ed] the date 
because the guy spit in my mouth and I didn't appreciate that, 
so I made him give me more money, and then when I went 
downstairs I gave Money Mitch all the money."   
¶8 
After Officer Orozco testified, Green called his first 
witness, Cousin, who testified Green had "nothing to do with" 
                                                 
2 Courts commonly stack cases for trial on the same day with 
the expectation that parties will reach a plea agreement on the 
scheduled trial date.  When more than one case will proceed to 
trial on the same day, the assigned judge will ask another judge 
to preside over one of the trials to avoid delaying resolution 
of the case.  As in this case, the practice is referred to as 
"spinning." 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
5 
 
the events S.A.B. described; according to Cousin, he and not 
Green had driven S.A.B. that night.  Cousin testified that one 
night in 2018, "I think October," a family member named Delmar 
called Cousin to ask for a ride home.  Cousin agreed to drive 
Delmar home, provided Delmar paid him for gas.  When Cousin 
arrived, Delmar approached the car alone.  Sitting in Cousin's 
passenger seat, Delmar asked if two more people could ride with 
them.  Cousin agreed, "as long as I get my gas money."  Cousin 
denied knowing either S.A.B. or J.R. 
¶9 
With three passengers in Cousin's car, Cousin asked 
Delmar where to take them.  According to Cousin, Delmar told him 
"just drop us off downtown[.]"  Cousin testified "they didn't 
tell me an exact destination.  They just said downtown, and that 
actually made me mad.  I'm like well where are we going."  
Because "they didn't tell me where they were going, I stopped in 
front of the blue building."  S.A.B. and J.R. exited the car, 
but Delmar stayed in the car with Cousin and asked him to remain 
parked until the two returned.  Cousin agreed after Delmar 
offered to give him more gas money.     
¶10 According to Cousin, S.A.B. and J.R. returned to the 
car no more than fifteen minutes later.  While driving, Cousin 
heard S.A.B. and J.R. conversing in the backseat "about a story 
that happened[.]"  Cousin heard S.A.B. say:  "the guy asked me 
to ask if he can spit in my mouth, . . . it's disgusting, I let 
him do it, I threw up."  After hearing this exchange, Cousin 
"turned up [his] radio" because he did not "know what[] [was] 
happening in that back seat."     
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
6 
 
¶11 The State did not object to Cousin's testimony on 
direct examination.  During cross-examination, when the State 
asked Cousin about driving "a sex worker who is underage to a 
hotel," Cousin replied he "had no recognition of what was going 
on that night, so I was just doing it for the gas money."  At 
the conclusion of Cousin's testimony, the trial court recessed 
for lunch.   
¶12 The trial court met in chambers with each party's 
counsel, as well as an attorney from the state public defender's 
office whom the court asked to advocate on Cousin's behalf.  
After an off-the-record discussion, the court recalled the case 
to conduct a hearing on the record regarding the State's 
concerns about Cousin's testimony.  At the outset, the court 
expressed concerns about Cousin's testimony, in which "arguably" 
Cousin "said that he rather than the defendant committed the 
child trafficking" although the court acknowledged "that's open 
to interpretation, and technically [Cousin] denied that[.]"  In 
the court's view, Cousin may have incriminated himself without 
counsel, and Green may have violated Denny by presenting 
Cousin's testimony without notifying the State in advance or 
seeking a ruling on its admissibility. 
¶13 The 
trial 
court 
ultimately 
concluded 
Cousin's 
testimony was "clearly" Denny evidence.  The court characterized 
Cousin's written statement as "literally . . . taking the fall 
for . . . Green."  Reading from Cousin's statement, the court 
noted Cousin said, "JR asked me if I was giving [sic] money 
would I give them a ride.  Them being both of them, the pimp and 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
7 
 
the alleged prostitute."  Green's counsel argued "it never was 
my intent to accuse a known third party who had motive and 
opportunity of the crime that . . . Green is charged with."  The 
court responded, "if he's not being called for that reason, 
counsel, why is he being called?  . . . [T]hat would be 
completely irrelevant."  Addressing Green's counsel, the court 
said "[i]t is Denny evidence clearly.  You're offering him only 
to get your client off."  Although Green's counsel argued Cousin 
"didn't incriminate himself" the court noted that Cousin 
"admitted to every single element of the crime other than 
saying, yeah, I knew it was a prostitute[.]"  In the court's 
view, "the State has enough to arguably get past probable cause 
right now based on what [Cousin] said on the stand." 
¶14 The trial court allowed each party to recommend how to 
proceed, noting "I don't know how I could possibly unring the 
bell. . . .  I would have to tell [the jury] to disregard all 
that testimony completely."  The State argued the solution was 
best left to the "sound discretion" of the court, while defense 
counsel argued Cousin's testimony reflected he "provide[d] a 
perfectly legal ride in exchange for gas money," which was not 
Denny evidence; accordingly, "I don't think it's anything to 
fix.  [Cousin's] testimony is what it is, it's relevant, and the 
jury should be allowed to weigh it."   
¶15 After summarizing Cousin's testimony, the trial court 
concluded it was "impossible to unring that bell."  It reasoned: 
I don't think there's any way that that bell can be 
unrung, because of the gravity of the testimony, 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
8 
 
because of Denny evidence, because there were only 
three witnesses in this case, and clearly at this 
point in time only will be three witnesses, the 
victim——or 
alleged 
victim——[S.A.B], 
the 
officer, 
and . . . Cousin.   
And as the State said, the timing of the evidence was—
—happened to be right before lunch, the jury's now had 
two hours to think about that evidence, and all of 
them, I hope they're following my rules and are not 
discussing the case.  I'm sure they're not, but 
they're all probably thinking in their head, holy cow, 
that testimony . . . Cousin just gave, that's——they're 
thinking one of two things, either, well, . . . Green 
is clearly innocent based on that testimony, or 
they're 
thinking, 
that's 
utter 
garbage 
that . . . Green got his cousin to cover for him and 
take the fall. 
¶16 Consequently, the trial court ordered a mistrial.  
"[I]f it's a Denny issue," the court reasoned, "it needed to be 
vetted before trial."  It continued: 
I would have handled this differently if this had come 
up at 11:00 rather than at 1:30 or 2:00.  I would have 
had the witness speak to an attorney, first of all.  I 
think he probably would not have testified . . . .  
And more importantly, it's clearly Denny evidence that 
the State has the right to know about and the State 
has a right to respond to, and the court has a right 
to know about, and the court is required to make a 
ruling on before it comes out of a witness's mouth 
during the middle of the trial. 
 
¶17 After the court ordered a mistrial, Green filed a 
motion to dismiss the case, arguing a retrial would violate his 
Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy.  The circuit 
court denied Green's motion, as well as his reconsideration 
motion, and the 
court of appeals granted leave for an 
interlocutory appeal. 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
9 
 
¶18 The court of appeals reversed on four grounds.  Green, 
No. 2021AP267-CR.  First, the trial court never held a hearing 
on whether Cousin's testimony was admissible.  Id., ¶18.  
Second, the trial court later concluded Cousin's testimony was, 
in fact, admissible.  Id., ¶19.  Third, the testimony was not 
unfair to the State because the State had the opportunity to 
investigate Cousin before trial and to demand production of his 
statement but did not do so.  Id., ¶20.  Fourth, even if 
Cousin's right to counsel was violated, any remedy would go to 
Cousin, not the State.  Id., ¶23. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶19 In this case, we must determine whether the trial 
court erred in finding manifest necessity for a mistrial, in 
light of the Green's Fifth Amendment protection from double 
jeopardy.  State v. Seefeldt, 2003 WI 47, ¶13, 261 Wis. 2d 383, 
661 N.W.2d 822.  In Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 461 
(1973), the United States Supreme Court applied United States v. 
Perez, 9 
Wheat. 
579 
(1824), 
"the 
fountainhead 
decision 
construing the Double Jeopardy Clause in the context of a 
declaration of a mistrial[.]"  In Perez, Justice Joseph Story, 
on behalf of the Court, formulated the "manifest necessity" 
standard for ensuring retrials do not violate the defendant's 
right against double jeopardy, which is dependent upon the trial 
court exercising "sound discretion" in declaring a mistrial: 
We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law 
has invested Courts of justice with the authority to 
discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in 
their opinion, taking all the circumstances into 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
10 
 
consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the 
act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be 
defeated.  They are to exercise a sound discretion on 
the subject; and it is impossible to define all the 
circumstances, 
which 
would 
render 
it 
proper 
to 
interfere.  To be sure, the power ought to be used 
with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, 
and for very plain and obvious causes . . . .  But, 
after all, they have the right to order the discharge; 
and the security which the public have for the 
faithful, sound, and conscientious exercise of this 
discretion, rests, in this, as in other cases, upon 
the responsibility of the Judges under their oaths of 
office. 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580.   
¶20 "A circuit court's exercise of discretion in ordering 
a mistrial is accorded a level of deference that varies 
depending on the particular facts of the case."  Seefeldt, 261 
Wis. 2d 383, ¶13 (citing State v. Barthels, 174 Wis. 2d 173, 
184, 495 N.W.2d 341 (1993)).  A rigid rule would not take into 
account "all the circumstances" in which manifest necessity may 
arise.  Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580.  The level of 
deference accorded to these judgments therefore exists on a 
spectrum.  Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶25.   
¶21 On one end, appellate courts give "great deference" to 
circuit 
courts' 
judgments 
when 
"the 
jury 
is 
hopelessly 
deadlocked."  Wayne R. LaFave et al., Manifest necessity and 
trial court discretion, 6 Crim. Proc. § 25.2(e) (4th ed. updated 
Nov. 2022).  In this scenario, "the trial judge is best able to 
assess the risk that a verdict may result from pressures 
inherent in the situation rather than the considered judgment of 
all the jurors."  Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶26 (citing Arizona 
v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)).  On the other end of 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
11 
 
the spectrum, appellate courts apply "the strictest scrutiny" to 
a trial court's mistrial order when "critical prosecution 
evidence" is unavailable or when "there is reason to believe 
that the prosecutor is using the State's superior resources to 
harass the defendant or to achieve a tactical advantage."  Id., 
¶25 (citing Washington, 434 U.S. at 508).  
¶22 The 
application 
of 
deference 
does 
not 
end 
the 
appellate inquiry.  Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 775 (2010).  
The trial court must weigh the decision to declare a mistrial by 
also considering the defendant's interest in having the case 
concluded before the jury called to decide it.  Washington, 434 
U.S. at 514 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 
(1971) (plurality)).  "In order to ensure that this interest is 
adequately protected, reviewing courts have an obligation to 
satisfy themselves that, in the words of . . . Justice Story, 
the trial judge exercised 'sound discretion' in declaring a 
mistrial."  Id.  "Perez itself noted that the judge's exercise 
of discretion must be 'sound'" to justify a retrial.  Renico, 
559 U.S. at 775 (quoting Perez, 9 Wheat. at 580).  In  
Washington, the United States Supreme Court explained:  "[i]f 
the record reveals that the trial judge has failed to exercise 
the 'sound discretion' entrusted to him, the reason for such 
deference by an appellate court disappears."  434 U.S. at 510 
n.28.  "Sound discretion means acting in a rational and 
responsible manner."  Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶36; see also 
Washington, 434 U.S. at 
514 ("[I]f a trial judge acts 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
12 
 
irrationally or irresponsibly, his action cannot be condoned."  
(citations omitted)).   
¶23 "The prohibition against retrial is not a mechanical 
rule to be applied to prevent any second trial after the first 
trial 
is 
terminated 
prior 
to 
judgment." 
 
Seefeldt 
261 
Wis. 2d 383, ¶18 (citing Somerville, 410 U.S. at 462).  A 
retrial is permissible "whenever, in [the circuit court's] 
opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there 
is a manifest necessity" supporting a mistrial.  Perez, 22 U.S. 
at 580.  "Manifest necessity" refers not to absolute necessity 
but to a "high degree" of necessity.  Washington, 434 U.S. at 
506; Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶19 (citing Washington, 434 U.S. 
at 505; Barthels, 174 Wis. 2d at 183).    
¶24 A trial court exercises sound discretion in deciding 
manifest necessity justifies a mistrial provided the court: 
 gives "both parties a full opportunity to explain their 
positions and consider[s] alternatives such as a curative 
instruction or sanctioning counsel."  State v. Moeck, 2005 
WI 57, ¶43, 280 Wis. 2d 277, 695 N.W.2d 783;  
 "accord[s] careful consideration to [defendant]'s interest 
in having the trial concluded in a single proceeding."  
Washington, 434 U.S. at 516; and 
 "ensure[s] that the record reflects that there is an 
adequate basis for a finding of manifest necessity."  
Moeck, 280 Wis. 2d 277, ¶43.   
A court does not exercise sound discretion if "the . . . court 
fails to consider the facts of record under relevant law, bases 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
13 
 
its conclusion on an error of law or does not reason its way to 
a rational conclusion."  Id. (quoting Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, 
¶36).   
III.  DISCUSSION 
A. Double Jeopardy Principles 
¶25 The 
right 
against 
double 
jeopardy 
has 
been 
characterized as a "universal maxim" of a fair justice system.  
See State v. Schultz, 2020 WI 24, ¶19, 390 Wis. 2d 570, 939 
N.W.2d 524 (quoting 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *335).  
It is protected by the Fifth Amendment, which provides, in 
relevant part:  "No person shall . . . be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]"  
Jeopardy attaches "in a jury trial when the selection of the 
jury has been completed and the jury is sworn."  Seefeldt, 261 
Wis. 2d 383, ¶16 (citing State v. Comstock, 168 Wis. 2d 915, 
937, 485 N.W.2d 354 (1992)).   
¶26 "[T]here was a time when English judges served 
the . . . monarchs by exercising a power to discharge a jury 
whenever it appeared that the Crown's evidence would be 
insufficient to convict," and "the prohibition against double 
jeopardy as it evolved in this country was plainly intended to 
condemn this 'abhorrent' practice."  Washington, 434 U.S. at 
507–08.  As the United States Supreme Court has explained: 
Even if the first trial is not completed, a second 
prosecution may be grossly unfair.  It increases the 
financial 
and 
emotional 
burden on 
the 
accused, 
prolongs the period in which he is stigmatized by an 
unresolved accusation of wrongdoing, and may even 
enhance the risk that an innocent defendant may be 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
14 
 
convicted.  The danger of such unfairness to the 
defendant exists whenever a trial is aborted before it 
is completed.  Consequently, as a general rule, the 
prosecutor 
is 
entitled 
to 
one, 
and 
only 
one, 
opportunity to require an accused to stand trial. 
Id. at 503–05 (citations omitted); see also Seefeldt, 261 
Wis. 2d 383, ¶17.  Provided the trial court exercises sound 
discretion, retrial after declaring a mistrial based on manifest 
necessity will not violate the defendant's double jeopardy 
right. 
B.  The Trial Court Exercised Sound Discretion in Ordering a 
Mistrial. 
¶27 We need not pinpoint where this case falls on the 
spectrum 
of 
deference 
to 
be 
accorded 
the 
trial 
court's 
conclusion that manifest necessity existed.  Applying even a 
strict scrutiny, we conclude the record demonstrates the trial 
court exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial based 
on manifest necessity.  The court ordered a mistrial because 
"the State has the right to know about and . . . respond to" 
testimony implicating a third-party perpetrator "and the court 
is required to make a ruling on it before it comes out of a 
witness' mouth during the middle of the trial."  At the time the 
court ordered a mistrial, Green did not dispute advance notice 
of such Denny evidence was required.  Rather than informing the 
court that no rule or order barred the introduction of Denny 
evidence, defense counsel maintained Cousin's testimony was not 
Denny evidence at all.  Under those circumstances, it was 
reasonable for the trial court to believe a pretrial order had 
been violated.  All factors established under precedent support 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
15 
 
the trial court's discretionary decision.  We address them in 
turn. 
¶28 First, the record demonstrates the trial court gave 
"both parties a full opportunity to explain their positions and 
consider[ed] alternatives such as a curative instruction or 
sanctioning counsel."  Moeck, 280 Wis. 2d 277, ¶43 (citing 
Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶36).  During the lunch recess, the 
court conferred in chambers with Green's counsel and the 
prosecutor to discuss the issues presented by Cousin's surprise 
testimony.  The court then conducted a hearing to address the 
State's concerns.   
¶29 After hearing from both parties, the trial court 
identified alternatives to mistrial.  Although the court 
explicitly considered issuing a curative instruction or striking 
Cousin's testimony, it explained why those remedies could not 
"unring the bell": 
I don't know how I could possibly unring the bell.  I 
can give them——I would have to tell them to disregard 
all that testimony completely.  Because there was 
nothing in there that wasn't Denny evidence.  There 
was nothing in there that didn't put him in the place 
of . . . Green on the day in question. 
. . . .  
Candidly it's impossible to unring that bell.  I would 
have to tell the jury to completely ignore . . . 25 
minutes 
of 
pretty 
compelling 
testimony 
where . . . Cousin literally tries to take the fall 
for his cousin. . . .  That would be impossible. 
. . . .  
And most importantly, I don't think there's any way 
that that bell can be unrung, because of the gravity 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
16 
 
of the testimony, because of Denny evidence, because 
there were only three witnesses in this case, and 
clearly at this point in time only will be three 
witnesses, the victim——or alleged victim——[S.A.B.], 
the officer, and . . . Cousin. 
The record establishes the court carefully considered the 
options for remedying the introduction of Denny evidence without 
advance notice to the State or the court first ruling on its 
admissibility.  The court declared a mistrial only after hearing 
arguments of counsel and contemplating alternatives.  Given the 
gravity and timing of Cousin's testimony, the court concluded 
those remedies were inadequate. 
¶30 Next, the trial court "accorded careful consideration 
to [Green]'s interest in having the trial concluded in a single 
proceeding."  Washington, 434 U.S. at 516.  The court did not 
confine its analysis to Denny alone; it also acknowledged each 
party's right to a fair trial:  
[B]oth sides have a right to a fair trial issue, and I 
think the State's basically saying they're literally 
caught by surprise with this testimony and the Denny 
aspect of it, which does change trial strategy 
potentially . . . . 
It would also be unfair to the State.  Both sides have 
a right to a fair trial.  The defendant, . . . Green, 
has a right to a fair trial, and the State also has a 
right to a fair trial.   
With each party's fair trial rights in mind, the court explained 
at length its decision to order a mistrial and why it rejected a 
curative instruction as insufficient. 
 
¶31 The record also "reflects that there is an adequate 
basis for a finding of manifest necessity" to order a mistrial.  
Moeck, 280 Wis. 2d 277, ¶43.  As the trial court emphasized, 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
17 
 
Cousin finished testifying "immediately before lunch."  The 
court considered the timing of Cousin's testimony to be 
impactful:   
[T]he timing of the evidence was——happened to be right 
before lunch, the jury's now had two hours to think 
about that evidence, and all of them, I hope they're 
following my rules and are not discussing the case.  
I'm sure they're not, but they're all probably 
thinking 
in 
their 
head, 
holy 
cow, 
that 
testimony . . . Cousin 
just 
gave, 
that's——they're 
thinking one of two things, either, well, . . . Green 
is clearly innocent based on that testimony, or 
they're 
thinking, 
that's 
utter 
garbage 
that . . . Green got his cousin to cover for him and 
take the fall. 
The court determined a mistrial was manifestly necessary because 
the testimony and its timing precluded the effectiveness of a 
curative jury instruction.  In the court's estimation, the 
prolonged 
break 
immediately 
following 
Cousin's 
testimony 
unavoidably altered the jurors' take on the case and prejudiced 
the State.  The court observed the jurors as Cousin delivered 
what the court deemed "pretty compelling" testimony.  Appellate 
courts cannot weigh the credibility of a witness much less 
observe or gauge the jury's reaction to his testimony.  Only the 
trial court could assess the effect of the testimony on the 
jury.  In this case, the record reflects an adequate basis for a 
finding of manifest necessity to order a mistrial. 
¶32 Lastly, the trial court considered the relevant facts, 
based its conclusion on applicable law, and reasoned its way to 
a rational conclusion.  See id.  After hearing each party's 
arguments, the court concluded Cousin's testimony was "clearly" 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
18 
 
Denny evidence because the defense offered third-party testimony 
to absolve Green of any wrongdoing.  The record shows the 
court's 
consideration 
of 
Denny 
and 
its 
applicability, 
acknowledging factual nuances possibly distinguishing this case 
from Denny: 
[Denny] certainly is a different situation.  That was 
a homicide case and the presentation of how that issue 
arose was different than this case.  But Denny 
discusses 
motive 
and 
opportunity 
and 
presenting 
basically a——to the jury a plausible alternative——
that's my language——as to who committed a crime, or a 
plausible theory of another person that committed a 
crime. 
The court proceeded to summarize Cousin's testimony in detail, 
concluding 
its 
"only 
purpose" 
was 
"to 
take 
the 
fall 
for . . . Green[.]"  Before ultimately classifying Cousin's 
testimony as within Denny's scope, the court emphasized "I would 
have needed [Cousin's testimony] to be vetted [a] bit more.  I 
would have wanted to hear more of an argument and briefing from 
both sides as to the Denny issues.  It strikes me as very, very 
problematic[.]"  The court also noted it "is required to make a 
ruling" on such evidence "before it comes out of a witness's 
mouth during the middle of the trial." 
 
¶33 Green principally argues the trial court based its 
decision to order a mistrial on an error of law.  Green 
emphasizes the court "later determined that Denny did not 
preclude 
this 
evidence. . . .  
If . . . Green 
were 
to 
be 
retried, a second jury could hear this same testimony.  Thus, 
there was, in fact, no need to 'unring the bell.'"   
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
19 
 
 
¶34 The 
court's 
later 
determination 
on 
Denny 
is 
irrelevant.  On review, we consider whether the court exercised 
sound discretion.  At the time the court declared a mistrial, 
the court believed the effect on the jury of introducing 
unnoticed Denny testimony could not be remedied by a jury 
instruction.  The court demonstrated a reasoning process 
grounded in the law.3     
¶35 Adopting "mechanical rules," such as requiring a 
circuit court to halt a criminal jury trial and hold a full 
evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of evidence the trial 
court determined should have been considered before the trial 
commenced, would be inconsistent with precedent.  The United 
States Supreme Court has recognized that the application of 
governing principles "to any particular set of facts" in 
deciding whether to order a mistrial "entails an element of 
judgment."  See Renico, 559 U.S. at 785.  Although the circuit 
court may have later determined Cousin's testimony was in fact 
admissible, the court nonetheless grounded its mistrial order in 
the law, as applied to the particular facts of the case.  
                                                 
3 Justice Brian Hagedorn claims the trial court "fail[ed] to 
consider whether this evidence was admissible as an alternative 
to ordering a mistrial[.]"  Justice Hagedorn's dissent, ¶75.  
This statement oversimplifies the issue and does not apply the 
legal test established in Perez, which requires "taking all the 
circumstances into consideration" rather than hyper-focusing on 
just one.  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).  The trial court 
considered competing arguments regarding whether the testimony 
was Denny evidence.  It then reasoned the Denny issue needed to 
be vetted ahead of time because the prejudice of "surprise" was 
too great.  See Justice Hagedorn's dissent, ¶74.   
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
20 
 
¶36 Although this court in Seefeldt decided the trial 
court erred in granting a mistrial in part because the trial 
court had not assessed the admissibility of a witness' warrants, 
261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶38, that type of evidence differs materially 
from the Denny evidence introduced at trial in this case.  As 
the State argues, determining the admissibility of Denny 
evidence 
could 
require 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
involving 
testimony from other witnesses.  Additionally, the trial court 
said, "I would have wanted to hear more of an argument and 
briefing 
from 
both 
sides 
as 
to 
the 
Denny 
issues."  
Significantly, Seefeldt's holding was also based on the trial 
court's failure to (1) afford the parties sufficient opportunity 
to argue their positions; (2) take adequate time to consider the 
parties' arguments; and (3) consider alternatives to mistrial.  
Id.  Collectively, those failures fell short of showing an 
adequate basis for a finding of manifest necessity for a 
mistrial.  Id.  None of those failures are present in this case.  
Seefeldt did not impose a rigid rule conditioning the propriety 
of a mistrial on a threshold determination of admissibility of 
the evidence triggering the order.  Appellate courts must apply 
a "flexible standard," under which they "take 'all circumstances 
into account.'"  Somerville, 410 U.S. at 462 (quoting Wade v. 
Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 691 (1949)). 
¶37 After the trial court ordered a mistrial, Green filed 
a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, which the court 
denied.  Green filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that 
the State was not entitled to prior notice of the substance of 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
21 
 
Cousin's testimony absent any demand for discovery by the State 
or an applicable order in limine.  The trial court declined to 
reconsider its denial of Green's motion to dismiss, describing a 
"culture" in the Milwaukee County court system of parties not 
filing discovery demands and a common understanding among 
counsel that certain types of evidence will be disclosed before 
trial regardless.  
¶38 Green contends the State's pretrial motion in limine 
was not operative because, so far as the record shows, the 
pretrial court never ruled on the motion.  This fact is also 
irrelevant.  The trial judge rotated onto this case the morning 
of trial, which was more than ninety days since the state filed 
the motion in limine.  Supreme Court Rule 70.364 requires judges 
to rule on all motions within ninety days of receiving them.  
Under those circumstances, and with neither party requesting a 
ruling on any pending motions, it was not unreasonable for Judge 
Borowski to presume Judge Protasiewicz had granted the motion——
and that Green was prohibited from springing on the State an 
                                                 
4 SCR 70.36(1)(a) provides: 
Every judge of a circuit court shall decide each 
matter submitted for decision within 90 days of the 
date on which the matter is submitted to the judge in 
final form, exclusive of the time the judge has been 
actually disabled by sickness.  If a judge is unable 
to do so, within 5 days of the expiration of the 90-
day period the judge shall so certify in the record of 
the matter and notify in writing the chief judge of 
the judicial administrative district in which the 
matter is pending, and the period is thereupon 
extended for one additional period of 90 days.  This 
subsection applies to an assigned reserve judge. 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
22 
 
alternative perpetrator of the crime.  The trial court noted 
that defense counsel "darn well knows that you can't spring a 
witness on the State, especially a witness of this nature."   
 
¶39 Green also contends Denny does not mandate advance 
notice to the State; therefore, he argues the trial court erred 
in concluding Green should have apprised the State of the 
substance of Cousin's testimony before the trial.  As the court 
explained 
during 
the 
hearing 
on 
Green's 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, however, the parties seemed to be operating 
under the same understanding that is commonly shared among 
attorneys practicing in the criminal court system in Milwaukee:  
"I've seen similar situations, but even on my 17 years on the 
bench, it's very, very rare that you have a situation like this 
blow up in the middle of trial."  Customarily, the court noted, 
parties disclose all evidence before the trial commences: 
You know all of us know that the movie My Cousin Vinny 
was funny because of how ridiculous it was, and 
there's a point in there where the lead actor, the 
defense attorney, is like shocked that the State gave 
him all the evidence.  Well, right, because that's how 
it works. 
Although in retrospect it is clear the State never made a 
discovery demand for Cousin's statement and the pretrial court 
never ruled on the State's pretrial motions in limine, the 
record 
shows 
defense 
counsel 
understood 
there 
were 
some 
constraints on the introduction of Denny evidence.  Instead of 
arguing the absence of any rule or order prohibiting him from 
introducing Denny evidence, defense counsel maintained Cousin's 
testimony was not Denny evidence at all.  Based on this record, 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
23 
 
it was neither irrational nor irresponsible for the trial court 
to believe a pretrial order had been violated, particularly when 
defense counsel did not disabuse the court of that notion.5 
¶40 Green suggests the availability of retrials is limited 
to only certain categories of errors.  In his response brief, 
Green surveys a number of double jeopardy cases in which 
mistrials were granted without the defendants' consent based on 
defense counsel misconduct, concluding: 
A review [of] these cases supports the generalization 
that retrial is allowed only in circumstances where 
either defense counsel's misconduct tainted the jury 
by introducing evidence which the jury never should 
have heard, e.g., Washington; or, the misconduct 
necessitated counsel being a witness, e.g., Fosse 
                                                 
5 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's dissent says this court 
"allows the trial court to simply assume that a motion in limine 
had been granted when the record contains no order or indication 
that that is actually the case."  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's 
dissent, ¶56.  Not so.  The standard of review limits this court 
to determining whether the trial court soundly exercised its 
discretion, which "means acting in a rational and responsible 
manner."  State v. Seefeldt, 2003 WI 47, ¶36, 261 Wis. 2d 383, 
661 N.W.2d 822.  Under the particular circumstances of this 
case, it was neither irrational nor irresponsible for the trial 
judge, to whom the case was spun the morning of trial, to 
presume pretrial orders prohibited Green from introducing 
unnoticed testimony incriminating an alternative perpetrator of 
the crime, particularly when defense counsel did not correct the 
court's presumption.  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley also says the 
court "lends its imprimatur to the trial court's treatment of 
the State's motion in limine" and then accuses the court of "not 
say[ing] on what basis a trial court can simply presume a motion 
has been granted."  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's dissent, ¶¶64, 
66.  Of course, neither of Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's 
assertions is true.  We simply determine the trial court's 
presumption was neither irrational nor unreasonable under the 
circumstances surrounding the trial court's sound exercise of 
its discretion, which we have explained in this opinion in great 
detail. 
 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
24 
 
(defense counsel became witness); Duckett (prosecutor 
became witness). 
Whatever patterns Green may observe, mistrials arise in a 
multitude of situations and retrials are not restricted to 
particular case scenarios.  See, e.g., State v. Russo, 70 
Wis. 2d 169, 171, 233 N.W.2d 485 (1975) (Double Jeopardy Clause 
did not bar retrial of action dismissed after bench trial for 
lack of jurisdiction because of defective information); State v. 
Smith, 244 A.3d 296 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020) (mistrial 
ordered due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic); United 
States v. Garske, 939 F.3d 321 (1st Cir. 2019) (mistrial ordered 
because a juror went missing); State v. Porter, 179 A.3d 1218, 
1229 (R.I. 2018) (mistrial ordered because a spectator yelled 
"How's that?" during defense's opening argument); Fields v. 
State, 626 A.2d 1037, 1043 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (mistrial 
ordered because "a regrettable disagreement between the judge 
and the prosecutor steadily escalated into an angry argument and 
ultimately degenerated into a veritable shouting match of mutual 
insults and displays of uncontrolled temper").   
¶41 Most 
mistrial 
cases 
"escape 
meaningful 
categorization[.]"  Somerville, 410 U.S. at 464.  Because some 
reasons for mistrials dwell in those "secluded but exotic 
corner[s] of the double jeopardy garden," courts have declined 
to adopt categorical rules defining manifest necessity.  Fields, 
626 A.2d at 1038 (quoting West v. State, 52 Md. App. 624, 625, 
451 A.2d 1228 (1982)); Jorn, 400 U.S. at 480 ("[T]his Court has, 
for the most part, explicitly declined the invitation of 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
25 
 
litigants 
to 
formulate 
rules 
based 
on 
categories 
of 
circumstances 
which 
will 
permit 
or 
preclude 
retrial.").  
Flexible rules ensure reviewing courts do not impede circuit 
courts' 
duty 
to 
protect 
"the 
integrity 
of 
the 
trial."  
Washington, 434 U.S. at 513.  As the COVID-19 pandemic made 
clear, a mistrial may be manifestly necessary in "varying and 
often unique situations arising during the course of a criminal 
trial."  See Somerville, 410 U.S. at 462.  We therefore decline 
to adopt any categorical rules governing the permissibility of 
retrials. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
¶42 A thorough review of the record reveals the court 
exercised sound discretion in ordering a mistrial based on 
manifest necessity.  The court responsibly and deliberately 
considered the impact on the jury of third-party perpetrator 
evidence, which the defense introduced without the court first 
ruling on its admissibility.  The court gave both parties a full 
opportunity to argue their positions, and took account of their 
respective fair trial rights.  Additionally, the court weighed 
alternatives to a mistrial, including a curative instruction or 
striking Cousin's testimony.  After considering the facts of 
record under relevant law, the court reasoned its way to a 
rational conclusion.  Although a different judge may have 
handled the matter differently, the standard of appellate review 
compels 
upholding 
the 
trial 
court's 
sound 
exercise 
of 
discretion.  Accordingly, retrial will not violate Green's Fifth 
Amendment right against double jeopardy. 
No. 
2021AP267-CR   
 
26 
 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2021AP267-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶43 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The circuit 
court declared a mistrial after Jonathan Cousin testified that 
he, and not Mitchell Green, drove the victim to a hotel where 
she was forced to perform a sex act.  In the circuit court's 
view, this evidence was potentially inadmissible Denny1 evidence 
that should not have been presented to the jury without prior 
vetting by the court.   
¶44 The circuit court stated that it was "impossible to 
unring that bell," necessitating a mistrial.  Majority op., ¶15.  
But ultimately, Cousin's testimony was found to be admissible in 
any future trial.  In other words, there was no need to "unring" 
any bells.  Still, the majority somehow concludes that the trial 
court exercised sound discretion when it declared a mistrial.   
¶45 The majority's reasoning is a headscratcher.  First, 
it upholds the circuit court's declaration of a mistrial after 
the jury heard admissible evidence.  But how can hearing 25 
minutes of unobjected-to admissible evidence justify a mistrial?   
¶46 And if that isn't perplexing enough, it then proceeds 
to err by reading into the record an order that the trial court 
never made.  Specifically, it premises its determination in part 
                                                 
1 State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 
1984).  "Denny 'created a bright line standard requiring that 
three factors be present' for admissibility of evidence that an 
alleged third-party perpetrator committed the crime."  State v. 
Griffin, 2019 WI App 49, ¶7, 388 Wis. 2d 581, 933 N.W.2d 681.  
Namely, the defendant must demonstrate a "legitimate tendency" 
that the third party committed the crime, that is, that the 
third party had motive, opportunity, and a direct connection to 
the crime.  Id., ¶7. 
No.  2021AP267-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
on a motion in limine that, the record reflects, had not been 
ruled upon.  Yet the majority, without citing any authority, 
forgives this gap in the record with the unwarranted leap that 
"it was not unreasonable for Judge Borowski to presume Judge 
Protasiewicz had granted the motion."  Id., ¶38.   
¶47 The majority's hard-to-square conclusions expose Green 
to double jeopardy,2 subjecting him to a second trial where the 
evidence 
presented 
will 
presumably 
be 
identical 
to 
that 
presented in the first.  Its proffered reasoning should cause 
the reader to pause and ponder how this can be so.  Because it 
certainly causes me to pause, I respectfully dissent.  
I 
¶48 Green was charged with trafficking a child,3 among 
other offenses.  In advance of trial, Green filed a witness 
list, which contained the name Jonathan Cousin.  Majority op., 
¶5.  Although Green possessed a written statement from Cousin, 
the State did not demand that it be produced.  Id. 
¶49 For its part, the State filed motions in limine prior 
to trial.  One of those motions sought a ruling as follows: 
Prohibiting the defense from introducing any other-
acts evidence involving a third-party perpetrator, 
unless and until defendant satisfies his burden and 
such evidence is ruled admissible by the court 
pursuant to State v. Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 595 
N.W.2d 661 (1999), State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 
576 N.W.[2d] 30 (1998) and § 904.04(2) Stats. 
                                                 
2 See U.S. Const. amend. V. 
3 Wis. Stat. § 948.051(1). 
No.  2021AP267-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
Nothing in the record indicates that the circuit court ever 
ruled on this motion before the trial began. 
¶50 At trial, Cousin took the stand and testified that it 
was he, and not Green, who drove the victim to a hotel where she 
was forced to engage in a sex act.  Cousin claimed that he had 
no knowledge regarding the purpose of the excursion, and that he 
was "just doing it for the gas money."  Majority op., ¶11.  The 
State did not object to Cousin's testimony as it occurred, and 
proceeded to cross-examine him.   
¶51 After Cousin's testimony concluded, the court recessed 
for lunch and met in chambers with counsel for Green and the 
State, as well as an attorney the court asked to advocate for 
Cousin.  Id., ¶12.  The court indicated its concern that "Cousin 
may have incriminated himself without counsel, and Green may 
have violated Denny by presenting Cousin's testimony without 
notifying the State in advance or seeking a ruling on its 
admissibility."  Id. 
¶52 Ultimately, the circuit court determined that Cousin's 
testimony was "clearly Denny evidence," as the testimony 
presented someone else "taking the fall" for Green.  Id., ¶13.  
It rejected Green's argument that there wasn't "anything to fix" 
and then turned to the question of remedy.  In the circuit 
court's estimation, it was "impossible to unring that bell" that 
resulted from Cousin's testimony.  Id., ¶15.  Accordingly, it 
ordered a mistrial because it determined that Cousin's testimony 
should not have been heard by the jury and that "it needed to be 
vetted before trial."  Id., ¶16.   
No.  2021AP267-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
¶53 Green subsequently moved to dismiss the case, arguing 
that any retrial would violate his Fifth Amendment right against 
double jeopardy.  The circuit court disagreed and denied the 
motion, and Green sought leave to file an interlocutory appeal, 
which the court of appeals granted. 
¶54 The court of appeals reversed, disagreeing with the 
circuit court on four points.  It determined: 
 The circuit court erred by failing to determine 
whether 
Cousin's 
testimony 
was 
admissible 
before 
declaring a mistrial.  State v. Green, No. 2021AP267-
CR, unpublished slip op., ¶18 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 
2022). 
 At a later hearing, the circuit court determined that 
Cousin's testimony was admissible under Denny, so 
there was no need to "unring the bell" after Cousin 
testified.  Id., ¶19. 
 The State had an opportunity to investigate Cousin 
prior to trial and did not avail itself of that 
opportunity.  Cousin was on Green's witness list five 
months before trial, and the State did not make any 
discovery demand.  Id., ¶20.  Relatedly, the motion in 
limine did not prohibit Cousin's testimony because it 
referenced only unknown-party and other-acts evidence, 
not known-party.  Id., ¶22. 
 The question of whether Cousin should have had counsel 
before his testimony did not create a manifest 
necessity for a mistrial because any remedy for a 
No.  2021AP267-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
violation of Cousin's right to counsel would flow to 
Cousin, not to Green.  Id., ¶23. 
Ultimately, a unanimous court of appeals concluded that "there 
was not a manifest necessity justifying a mistrial, and that a 
new trial would violate Green's constitutional right against 
double jeopardy."  Id., ¶25. 
¶55 The majority now reverses the court of appeals, 
determining that the circuit court "exercised sound discretion 
in ordering a mistrial based on manifest necessity."  Majority 
op., ¶42.   
II 
¶56 The root of the majority's error boils down to two 
main missteps.  First, the majority discounts the clearly 
relevant fact that that Cousin's testimony was ultimately deemed 
to be admissible.  And second, without providing authority for 
doing so, it allows the trial court to simply assume that a 
motion in limine had been granted when the record contains no 
order or indication that that is actually the case.  I will 
address each of these errors in turn. 
A 
¶57 A motion for mistrial is committed to the sound 
discretion of the circuit court and is reviewed for an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  State v. Ford, 2007 WI 138, ¶28, 306 
Wis. 2d 1, 
742 
N.W.2d 61. 
 
This 
standard 
is 
admittedly 
deferential to the circuit court.  See State v. LaCount, 2008 WI 
59, ¶15, 310 Wis. 2d 85, 750 N.W.2d 780.   
No.  2021AP267-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
¶58 Nevertheless, a mistrial is a drastic remedy that must 
be supported by "manifest necessity."  "[G]iven the importance 
of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, the 
State bears the burden of demonstrating a 'manifest necessity' 
for any mistrial ordered over the objection of the defendant."  
State v. Seefeldt, 2003 WI 47, ¶19, 261 Wis. 2d 383, 661 
N.W.2d 822.  A "manifest necessity" is a "high degree" of 
necessity.  Id. (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 
(1978); State v. Barthels, 174 Wis. 2d 173, 183, 495 N.W.2d 341 
(1993)). 
¶59 The majority determines that the trial court exercised 
sound discretion in declaring a mistrial because "[a]t the time 
the court declared a mistrial, the court believed the effect on 
the jury of introducing unnoticed Denny testimony could not be 
remedied by a jury instruction."  Majority op., ¶34.  It claims 
that "[a]dopting 'mechanical rules' such as requiring a circuit 
court to halt a criminal jury trial and hold a full evidentiary 
hearing on the admissibility of evidence the trial court 
determined 
should 
have 
been 
considered 
before 
the 
trial 
commenced, would be inconsistent with precedent."  Id., ¶35.  In 
arriving at this conclusion, the majority seeks to distinguish 
Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, from the present case.  But this 
distinction falls flat and Seefeldt cuts the other way. 
¶60 In Seefeldt, the circuit court declared a mistrial 
after defense counsel discussed other acts evidence in the 
opening statement in violation of a pretrial order prohibiting 
the introduction of such evidence without first seeking a ruling 
No.  2021AP267-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
on its admissibility.  Id., ¶6.  This court determined that the 
circuit court was too hasty in granting a mistrial and did not 
exercise sound discretion for two reasons.  It reasoned that the 
testimony likely would have ultimately been admissible and that 
alternatives to mistrial were not sufficiently considered.  
Specifically, this court concluded:   
First, the existence of Bart's 15 warrants would 
likely have been admissible during trial and the 
record does not reflect that the judge considered 
whether the evidence would ultimately be admissible.  
Second, the trial judge did not provide sufficient 
opportunity for the parties to present, and for the 
judge to consider, arguments regarding whether a 
mistrial 
should 
be 
ordered 
and 
the 
possible 
alternatives to a mistrial.   
Id., ¶38. 
¶61 In the eyes of the majority, "[n]one of those failures 
are present in this case."  Majority op., ¶36.  I disagree and 
conclude that Seefeldt is on all fours with the present case.  
To explain, just as in Seefeldt, the circuit court here did not 
consider during trial whether the evidence would ultimately be 
admissible.  It essentially said that answering such a question 
during the trial was not possible, and that it would have asked 
for additional briefing on the subject, which was not practical 
in the middle of a trial.  And like in Seefeldt, here the 
evidence was ultimately determined to be admissible. 
¶62 In other words, the jury was not tainted by Cousin's 
testimony at all.  The evidence it heard was proper and 
admissible.  For this reason, like in Seefeldt "the record does 
not contain an adequate basis for a finding of manifest 
necessity."  See Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶38. 
No.  2021AP267-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
¶63 I 
recognize 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
was 
in 
a 
challenging position.  Would it have been difficult for the 
circuit court to determine admissibility on a short timeline?  
Perhaps.  But it was certainly possible to reach at least a 
preliminary determination of likely admissibility.  And the 
constitutional protections against double jeopardy create a 
strong enough interest4 that the court should have at least 
tried.5  
B 
¶64 Compounding 
its 
error, 
the 
majority 
lends 
its 
imprimatur to the trial court's treatment of the State's motion 
in limine.  The trial court treated the motion as granted 
despite nothing in the record indicating that the pretrial court 
had decided the motion one way or the other. 
¶65 The majority rejects Green's argument that the motion 
in limine filed by the State was not operative because the 
record does not demonstrate that the circuit court ruled on the 
motion.  "Under those circumstances, and with neither party 
                                                 
4 See State v. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, 675-76, 360 
N.W.2d 43 (1985) (describing the underlying idea behind the 
double jeopardy clause that "the State with all its resources 
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to 
convict an individual for an alleged offense" and stating that 
the clause "assures finality and fairness in the administration 
of the criminal justice system"). 
5  The procedure for which I advocate here is not uncommon.  
Trials are often halted so legal issues can be argued outside 
the presence of the jury, sometimes accompanied by proffered 
witness testimony in the form of an offer of proof.  A Denny 
hearing in the circumstances presented here could have been 
brief and routine. 
No.  2021AP267-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
requesting a ruling on any pending motions, it was not 
unreasonable for Judge Borowski to presume Judge Protasiewicz 
had granted the motion . . . ."  Majority op., ¶38.  Such a line 
of reasoning is unsupported by authority and requires the 
majority to read into the record information that simply isn't 
there. 
¶66 Further, the majority does not say on what basis a 
trial court can simply presume a motion has been granted.  It 
cites no authority that would allow it to conclude that the 
circuit court was not "unreasonable" in assuming a motion had 
been granted where nothing in the record indicates that this was 
the case.  Our review is limited to the record, and we are bound 
by the record.  State v. Aderhold, 91 Wis. 2d 306, 314, 284 
N.W.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1979).  No "presumption" can get around 
this precept.  
¶67 Many questions are raised by the majority's approach.  
How far does this rule extend?  What other motions can a judge 
simply "presume" were granted by another judge?  Would it have 
been similarly "not unreasonable" if the circuit court had 
presumed that the motion was denied?  It may be true that the 
State's motions in limine in a criminal trial are often rote and 
are generally granted.  But there is no indication in this 
No.  2021AP267-CR.awb 
 
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record that it was here, leading the majority to simply read 
something into the record that is not there.6   
¶68 The State's argument on this point plays into its 
larger insinuation that it was taken by surprise by Cousin's 
testimony.  But if it was indeed caught off guard, it was in the 
end no one's fault but its own.  Cousin's name was on Green's 
witness list, and a written statement existed, which the State 
never demanded in discovery.  The State further allowed Cousin's 
initial testimony to pass without objection and completed its 
cross-examination before voicing any concern.  See majority op., 
¶11.  Even then, the State did not actually request a mistrial, 
arguing only that the "solution was best left to the 'sound 
discretion' of the court."  Id., ¶14. 
¶69 Under the circumstances here, a mistrial was not the 
only solution.  And it certainly was not a manifest necessity.   
¶70 The double jeopardy clause demands that "the State 
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make 
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged 
                                                 
6 Even if the motion in limine were operative, the language 
of that motion does not necessarily preclude the admission of 
Cousin's testimony.  Rather than citing Denny, the motion in 
limine cited State v. Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 595 N.W.2d 661 
(1999).  As the court of appeals here recognized, Scheidell 
addressed unknown-third-party evidence, not known-third-party 
evidence, which is governed by Denny.  State v. Green, No. 
2021AP267-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶22 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 
2022).  The Scheidell court was explicit that "Denny simply does 
not apply" to evidence of allegedly similar crimes committed by 
an unknown third party.  Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d at 297.  There 
is thus no apparent overlap between Denny and Scheidell such 
that a citation to Scheidell in the motion in limine would 
somehow encompass Denny evidence. 
No.  2021AP267-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and 
ordeal compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety 
and insecurity."  State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 107-08, 
369 N.W.2d 145 (1985).  By allowing Green to be retried under 
these facts, the majority erodes the manifest necessity standard 
and conducts an end run around the protections afforded by the 
double jeopardy clause. 
¶71 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶72 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2021AP267-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
¶73 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (dissenting).  Our review of a 
circuit 
court's 
decision 
granting 
a 
mistrial 
over 
the 
defendant's objection is generally deferential, but far less so 
than in other areas where we consider whether the court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  See Oregon v. Kennedy, 
456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982); State v. Seefeldt, 2003 WI 47, ¶¶35-
37, 261 Wis. 2d 383, 661 N.W.2d 822.  This is because a 
defendant's constitutional rights are at stake when a mistrial 
is ordered.  Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 671-72 (discussing U.S. Const. 
amend. V).  So the law is that a circuit court should not order 
a mistrial unless a manifest necessity is shown, which is 
defined as a high degree of necessity.  Arizona v. Washington, 
434 U.S. 497, 505-06 (1978); Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶19.  As 
part of this judgment call, a circuit court must consider 
alternatives to a mistrial.  Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶38.  If 
it does not, it has not applied the proper law and has 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  See id. 
¶74 This is a close case, but ultimately I conclude the 
circuit court erred.  The heart of the matter is that Denny1 
evidence was introduced that caught the prosecutor and the court 
by surprise.  The circuit court determined this was too much of 
a surprise because these issues are usually resolved before 
trial.   
¶75 The problem with the circuit court's decision is that 
it did not consider an obvious and highly relevant alternative 
                                                 
1 State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 
1984). 
No.  2021AP267-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
to mistrial:  the possibility that the evidence might actually 
be admissible.  As Justice Ann Walsh Bradley points out in her 
dissent, we have the odd circumstance of a mistrial being 
declared due to the introduction of evidence later deemed 
admissible.  This seems discordant with the command that a court 
should order a mistrial only "with the greatest caution, under 
urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes."  
United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).  
While I do not want to supplant the broad discretion given to 
circuit courts, I conclude that by failing to consider whether 
this evidence was admissible as an alternative to ordering a 
mistrial, the circuit court did not reasonably conclude a 
mistrial was necessary.  For these reasons, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶76 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2021AP267-CR.bh 
 
 
 
1