Case Title: Volodarsky v. Tarachanskaya

Citation: 397 Md. 291

Docket Number: 50/06

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mikhail Volodarsky v. Kira Tarachanskaya, No. 50, September Term, 2006   
STATUTE REQUIRING COURT TO DENY CUSTODY AND RESTRICT VISITATION
RIGHTS TO PARTY IN CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS IF “THE COURT HAS REASONABLE
GROUNDS TO BELIEVE” THAT THE PARTY ABUSED OR NEGLECTED THE CHILD
AND THE COURT DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY FIND THAT THERE IS NO LIKELIHOOD
OF FURTHER ABUSE DOES NOT ESTABLISH A NEW STANDARD OF PROOF; COURT
MUST BELIEVE THAT THE PARTY ABUSED THE CHILD BY AT LEAST A
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE IN ORDER TO HAVE THE REQUISITE
“REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE.”  
In the Circuit C ourt for Ba ltimore Co unty
Case # 03-C-99-002532
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 50 
September Term, 2006
______________________________________
MIKHAIL VOLODARSKY
v.
KIRA TARACHANSKAYA
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
        *Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:    February 9, 2007
*Wilner, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
Maryland Code, § 9-101 of the Family Law Article (FL) requires, in any custody
or visitation proceeding, that, if the court has “reasonable grounds to believe” that a child
has been abused or neglected by a party to the proceeding, the court must determine
whether abuse or neglect is likely to occur if custody or visitation rights are granted to
that party.  The statute goes on to state that, unless the court specifically finds that there is
no likelihood “of further child abuse or neglect by the party,” the court must either deny
custody or visitation rights to that party or approve a supervised visitation arrangement
that assures the safety and physiological, psychological, and emotional well-being of the
child.
In this custody and visitation case emanating from the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County, conflicting evidence was presented as to whether the father of the child had, in
some way, sexually abused the child.  Judge Cox, after considering that evidence and
making certain credibility determinations, announced that she was not persuaded by a
preponderance of the evidence that the father had abused the child, although, for other
reasons not contested in this appeal, she granted custody to the mother and established a
supervised visitation arrangement for the father.  In an appeal by the mother, the Court of
Special Appeals held that Judge Cox erred in applying a preponderance standard in
weighing the evidence of abuse.  It concluded that the statute requires only “reasonable
grounds to believe” that abuse occurred, and that a determination of reasonable grounds
does not require that the court believe it more likely than not that the abuse occurred.  See
1 For convenience, we shall henceforth refer to the parties as Kira and Mikhail.
-2-
Tarachanskaya v. Volodarsky, 168 Md. App. 587, 897 A.2d 884 (2006).  The Court of
Special Appeals was wrong.
BACKGROUND
We would be overly kind to the parents if we characterized this most unfortunate
case, with charges and counter-charges of physical and sexual child abuse, simply as
bitter and hotly contested.  Both of them are emigres from Russia.  The mother, Kira
Tarachanskaya, came to the United States with her husband, Alex, and their pre-teen son,
Arthur, in August, 1996.  In November, 1997, she and Alex separated.  The separation
was accompanied by her seeking a domestic violence protective order against Alex,
accusing him of being abusive to Arthur.  It is not clear what happened with that case.
Ms. Tarachanskaya then commenced an extra-marital affair with Mikhail
Volodarsky.  In March, 1998, she and Arthur moved in with Volodarsky, and not long
thereafter, she became pregnant with Greta, the subject of this case.1  The couple argued
over whether Kira should terminate the pregnancy, which she wanted to do, and they
eventually separated.  As she did upon separating from her husband, Kira sought a
domestic violence protective order against Mikhail, based on complaints of threatening
conduct.  A protective order was issued, apparently by consent.  Greta was born in
2 Although Kira’s last name was Tarachanskaya and Mikhail’s last name was
Volodarsky, the child was given Kira’s mother’s last name, Tonkonogaya.
-3-
January, 1999.  Kira then reconciled with Alex, and she, Arthur, and Greta have since
remained in that household.
This litigation began in March, 1999, when Mikhail filed a complaint seeking joint
legal custody of and liberal visitation with Greta.2  He complained that Kira had
consistently failed to permit reasonable visitation.  Kira answered and filed a counter-
complaint for custody, in which she alleged that Mikhail had engaged in a pattern of
abusive behavior and threats toward her, her mother, Arthur, and Greta (prior to her
birth), that the protective order issued by the District Court in September, 1998, had
directed him not to abuse or make any attempt to contact them, and that she was in fear
for the safety of Greta if the child were left in Mikhail’s care.  It appears that, pending a
hearing, the parties reached an interim agreement for visitation by Mikhail, which the
Circuit Court ultimately found was “honored more in the breach, as [Kira] resisted any
contact between the father and the child.”
At the custody hearing that occurred before Judge Cox in September, 1999, the
evidence demonstrated that Kira was distrustful of Mikhail and evaded all efforts at
contact.  She hid the fact of Greta’s birth from Mikhail and resisted even brief periods of
supervised contact.  Mikhail, on the other hand, had limited parenting skills and no
experience in caring for an infant.  Because the parties had shown no ability to co-parent,
3 There is no reference in the docket entries in this case to the petition or any
proceeding dealing with the name-change, and from the comments made later by Judge
Cox, it would appear that she was not involved.  We assume that the petition was filed as
a separate action and was presented to a different judge.
-4-
the court awarded sole legal and physical custody of Greta to Kira, subject to bi-weekly
visitation for two-hour periods at Mikhail’s apartment, with a friend or relative present to
facilitate the drop-off and supervise the initial part of the visit, and to a review in 90 days
to consider increased access.  Both parents were ordered to participate in parenting
classes, and a home study was requested.  
The home study confirmed a “significant level” of conflict, distrust, and retaliation
between the parties.  It noted Kira’s continued resistance to unsupervised visitation and
Mikhail’s lack of objectivity in assessing his parenting skills and his resentment over the
restrictions on access to Greta.  The report recommended a gradual increase in visitation
and enhanced parenting skill classes for Mikhail.  After a review hearing in January,
2000, an agreement was reached to increase weekend visitation to include an overnight on
Fridays.  In June, 2000, Kira sought to have Mikhail held in contempt for failure to pay
child support.  Mikhail filed petitions to reduce the child support and to have Greta’s last
name changed to Volodarsky.  Apparently, Kira was not notified of the name-change
petition, which was nonetheless granted.3  Mikhail was held in contempt, arrearages were
assessed, and some minor changes were made to the support order.
-5-
Tensions continued to escalate during the Fall of 2000.  Kira complained that
Greta returned from visits hungry, bruised, and smelling of smoke.  On one occasion, in
October, Greta returned with a bruise on her thigh; Kira took her to the hospital, which
led to an investigation by the Department of Social Services (DSS).  While that was
pending, Kira refused to allow any visitation, which resulted in a contempt petition by
Mikhail.  The court ordered interim supervised visitation.  Following a hearing in
December, the court found no evidence of physical abuse and ordered a resumption of
visitation.  The parties submitted an agreed visitation schedule, which, in February, 2001,
the court approved.  
In September, 2001, Mikhail filed a pro se petition for an ex parte protective order,
alleging physical abuse of Greta by Alex.  That proceeding is not in the record before us,
but Judge Cox later determined that the petition had been dismissed by a different judge
because of “a lack of familial relationship between the parties.”  In February, 2002,
Mikhail contacted DSS and charged Alex with sexually abusing Greta.  In April, Kira
filed a complaint with DSS charging Mikhail with sexually abusing Greta and, at the
same time, again unilaterally suspended all visitation.  That produced a contempt petition
and a motion by Mikhail to modify visitation and a counter motion by Kira alleging
sexual abuse by Mikhail.
A hearing on the contempt petition took place in June, 2002, again before Judge
Cox.  By then, the DSS investigation of both abuse complaints had been completed.  The
4 There are three possible findings that can arise from an investigation of alleged
child abuse or neglect – indicated, ruled out, or unsubstantiated.  “Indicated” means “a
finding that there is credible evidence, which has not been satisfactorily refuted, that
abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse did occur.”  FL § 5-701(m).  “Ruled out” means “a finding
that abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse did not occur.”  FL § 5-701(w).  “Unsubstantiated”
means “a finding that there is an insufficient amount of evidence to support a finding of
indicated or ruled out.”  FL § 5-701(y).
-6-
DSS report “ruled out” abuse by Alex and concluded that the allegation of abuse by
Mikhail was “unsubstantiated.”4  The report stated that the repeated allegations of abuse
and neglect made by both parents “are clearly not in the best interest of Greta” and
recommended that independent counsel be appointed for the child.  Following the
hearing, Kira was found in contempt for terminating the court-ordered visitation.  Pending
a modification hearing, overnight visits with Mikhail were suspended, and, to eliminate
the potential for further unsubstantiated claims and to reduce the level of distrust, the
court required that a woman be present at visits.  The court ordered counseling services
for Greta and psychiatric evaluations of the parents by the Court Psychiatrist. 
The psychiatric report was delivered to the court in November, 2002.  It found
nothing in Mikhail’s history to question his fitness as a parent and, although identifying
slight depression and somewhat obsessive qualities, found no evidence of significant
psychopathology that would warrant individualized treatment.  The report stated that Kira
had “little insight into her part in the current situation” but saw all of the difficulties as
related to Mikhail.  It described her as “manipulative to get her own way” but found
nothing to suggest that she was unfit and no significant psychopathology.  The report
-7-
found from the history of the case that Kira’s “use of the Courts will continue” and that
her behavior in that regard was “detrimental to the child.”  The Court Psychiatrist, noting
that both parents had begun videotaping their interactions with the child, recommended
joint counseling services for the parents and that Greta’s attorney evaluate all claims
made by either parent.
Greta’s attorney attempted to arrange an independent assessment and counseling
for the child, but the effort was complicated by the fact that, though three years of age,
Greta did not speak English.  Once again, an interim custody and visitation arrangement
was agreed to by the parties and confirmed by the court.  Overnight visitation with
Mikhail was to resume, joint counseling of the parents was to begin, the parties agreed to
stop taping their interactions with the child, and Greta was to be enrolled in a pre-school
program so that she could learn English.  Trial was postponed until May, 2003.
In December, 2002, Kira’s attorney withdrew his appearance.  Although Kira was
informed of a status conference scheduled in April and the need for her to attend, she
failed to appear.  The court advised her by mail of the need to obtain counsel or appear
personally at all scheduled proceedings, including the trial that was set for the end of
May.  Kira appeared without counsel on the first day of trial but, following a chambers
conference, left the courthouse and did not return.  The trial, before Judge Cox, proceeded
in her absence.  The court heard from Dr. Robert Snow, the clinical social worker who
conducted an evaluation and counseling of Greta at her attorney’s request and received
-8-
input from the attorney.  In his written report, Dr. Snow observed that both parents were
competing for custody of Greta and had placed her in a “loyalty conflicted position.”  He
concluded that further investigation of child sexual abuse was not indicated “as Greta
does not behaviorally present symptoms of sexual abuse and both parents have rescinded
their belief in such.”
Based on the evidence taken at the hearing, Judge Cox, in an order entered in June,
2003, awarded legal custody to Mikhail and split physical custody “on a 4/3 schedule,
alternating weeks, with a shared holiday schedule.”  As Judge Cox subsequently noted in
the memorandum opinion at issue in this appeal, “[a]lmost immediately after the modified
custody Order was entered, [Kira] appeared in District Court for Baltimore County in
Catonsville and filed an Ex Parte Domestic Violence Petition seeking relief on behalf of
her daughter, based upon allegations of sexual abuse by [Mikhail].”  The District Court
entered a temporary protective order, referred the matter to DSS for investigation,
awarded interim custody to Kira, and entered a no-contact order with respect to Mikhail. 
Based on a joint motion by Mikhail and Greta’s attorney, the domestic violence case was
transferred to the Circuit Court and set for hearing before Judge Cox.  After hearing
testimony from Kira, her witness, and witnesses from DSS and the police department,
Judge Cox denied the protective order.
Visitation continued in accordance with the established schedule until March,
2004, when Kira, through new counsel, filed another domestic violence petition alleging
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essentially the same sexual abuse of Greta by Mikhail that had previously been alleged. 
This petition was filed in the Circuit Court, but, notwithstanding that Judge Cox had been
presiding over the custody and visitation proceedings, that Greta had been represented by
counsel since July, 2002, and that Mikhail also had counsel of record, the petition was
presented to another judge and no notice to counsel of record was given.  Their first
awareness of the proceeding was their receipt of an interim protective order signed by the
other judge.  When this came to light, the matter was transferred to Judge Cox, who
conducted a hearing on March 29.  It was then agreed, through counsel, that Greta would
commence regular psychotherapy sessions with Dr. Snow, that the psychologist newly
retained by Kira’s attorney, Dr. Joyanna Silberg, would conduct a separate evaluation of
the sexual abuse allegations, which she felt had not been adequately addressed, and that
visitation would continue pursuant to the June, 2003 order.
At the initial assessment meeting with Drs. Snow and Silberg, Greta made more
graphic sexual disclosures and exhibited significant distress when in Mikhail’s presence,
in contrast to her earlier behavior.  Upon the recommendation of Drs. Snow and Silberg,
Kira then sought to suspend all visitation.  An emergency hearing was scheduled, but just
before that hearing Mikhail, through counsel, agreed to suspend visitation voluntarily
based on the therapists’ recommendation until the sexual abuse investigation was
completed.  
-10-
Dr. Silberg completed her investigation and prepared a report in July, 2004.  She
recounted a variety of disclosures by Greta regarding sexual abuse by Mikhail and
concluded that the child’s ability to describe those events “was of such clear detail, that it
is impossible to imagine a source for this other than direct experience with sexual events
of this type.”  Dr. Silberg’s ultimate conclusions were that Greta was very frightened of
her father, the child’s description was “so vivid and accurate that only real experience
could produce these reports,” Kira was not coaching the child but had acted in Greta’s
best interest, Mikhail was not credible, his behavior fit the pattern of ex-partners who use
intimidation to frighten ex-spouses, on-going contact between Greta and Mikhail would
be psychologically and potentially physically dangerous to the child, and Greta suffered
from post-traumatic stress disorder and would protest any visitation with Mikhail.
In light of this report, the court placed Greta temporarily in the physical custody of
Kira, suspended visitation with Mikhail, and ordered that Greta remain in counseling, all
pending trial on the merits.  A copy of Dr. Silberg’s report was sent to DSS, which
prompted a new investigation by Rosalind Dizard, of its Family Crimes Unit.  Ms. Dizard
issued her report in January, 2005, and came to a very different conclusion than Dr.
Silberg.  She “ruled out” any abuse by Mikhail and concluded that “parental alienation is
the primary dynamic within this family system and that it is more likely that [Greta] was
not sexually abused by [Mikhail].”
-11-
Judge Cox conducted a six-day trial in the matter commencing in February, 2005
and extending into March and May of that year.  Kira was represented by counsel.   Judge
Cox heard testimony from Dr. Snow, Dr. Silberg, Ms. Dizard, and Mikhail, and in July,
2005, filed a 28-page memorandum opinion setting forth the history of the case, a
discussion of the expert opinions, and her findings and conclusions.  She noted that the
specific disclosures by Greta clearly indicated sexual knowledge or exposures well
beyond the normal or appropriate range of experience for a young child and that the
manner in which the child expressed herself did not tend to suggest coaching.  Judge Cox
also observed that the manner of expression, inconsistencies in the child’s reporting, and
different impressions formed by the experts had led them to reach “very different
conclusions concerning the strength of the evidence that sexual abuse occurred, or the
identification of the perpetrator of any such abuse.”  The judge then summarized the
testimony and conclusions of Dr. Silberg, Dr. Snow, and Ms. Dizard and recorded her
own impressions and conclusions.
Dr. Silberg’s ultimate conclusion was that Greta had been sexually abused and
that, although it was possible that someone other than Mikhail was responsible, it was far
more likely that Mikhail had committed the abuse.  She found Kira to be responsive and
protective of Greta and Mikhail to be manipulative, too confident, and inconsistent, and
she attributed Greta’s fear of her father to sexual abuse committed by him.  Judge Cox
found it noteworthy that Dr. Silberg’s initial report, in which she reached those same
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conclusions, was based solely upon a review of records and discussions with Kira,
notwithstanding Dr. Silberg’s acknowledgment of the importance of interviewing the
child prior to making an assessment, and that her initial impression of the abuse
allegations was formed without direct access to Greta.  
Dr. Snow, a psychologist having extensive experience with child trauma victims,
had a different impression.  Initially contacted by Greta’s counsel, he met with both
parents in 2002 and was advised in that first conference that neither believed that sexual
abuse had occurred.  From his early evaluation, Dr. Snow felt that there were high levels
of anxiety and loyalty conflicts between the parents as Greta sought their approval and did
not believe that further investigation of sexual abuse was warranted.  During subsequent
counseling sessions with the parents in 2003, Kira did not express any renewed concern
regarding abuse or Greta’s behavior.  Mikhail, on the other hand, did express concern that
Greta did not act naturally with him in Kira’s presence and would not openly display
affection if her mother was there.  
The first suggestion of renewed concern about abuse came after the March, 2004
ex parte protective order proceeding, at which time Greta did make specific disclosures of
a sexual nature, which Dr. Snow found were conveyed “in a programmed and pressurized
manner.”  Summarizing Dr. Snow’s testimony, Judge Cox noted his impression that Greta
did not appear emotional in relaying the allegations “but was more focused on getting the
story out.”  Dr. Snow found it significant that Greta expressed concern over losing her
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mother and only being allowed to see her father.  She expressed “extreme alliances,
relegating everything associated with her father as bad and her mother as good,” leading
Dr. Snow to believe that “Greta would do what she believed necessary to be with her
mother” and that the child “had discovered that sexual abuse disclosures elicit strong
reactions.”  Significantly, Dr. Snow found that Greta had been exposed to sexual material,
but he was not convinced that she had been the victim of sexual abuse.
Ms. Dizard, a clinical social worker with DSS, also had extensive investigative and
work experience with victims of sexual abuse.  She conducted an independent interview
of Greta at her school.  Greta initially made no disclosures of abuse, but, as described by
Judge Cox:
“Her disclosures to Ms. Dizard only came after ‘Dr. Joy’s’
name was introduced, and Greta recognized this as a reference
to Dr. Silberg, whom Greta characterized as ‘mommy’s
friend.’  Greta then indicated that she had to tell Ms. Dizard a
story, and began to disclose things that happened to her with
‘another daddy.’  While she disclosed digital penetration, she
did not describe other sexual contact, and she also did not
provide consistency or the level of detail conveyed to Dr.
Silberg.”
Consistent with the view of Dr. Snow, Ms. Dizard saw Greta’s loyalty as clearly
with Kira, and, although she believed that the child “had been exposed to something of an
inappropriate sexual nature,” she concluded that the allegations of sexual abuse by
Mikhail “were ruled out.”
-14-
Judge Cox found it difficult to reconcile the conflicting expert opinions.  She
stated that, “[o]verall, the Court is persuaded that this child has been exposed to sexual
behavior,” but that “[t]he Court is not, however, convinced by a preponderance of the
evidence that Greta has been the victim of sexual abuse, or that her father has perpetrated
sexual abuse.”  Judge Cox then set forth the reasons why she was not so convinced.  She
began by observing that Greta had been “enmeshed in high levels of parental conflict
since the day she was born” and that conflicting allegations of physical and sexual abuse
had been made by both parents.  She found it noteworthy that the significant and detailed
abuse allegations occurred after the 2003 change in custody and that they were
“accompanied by the child’s expressions of fear of losing her mother, rather than
concerns relating to continued abuse by her father.”  Once Greta made disclosures, “there
was an immediate alliance with her mother, to the complete exclusion of her father, in
sharp contrast to what occurred before.”
Judge Cox found persuasive as well the fact that the initial abuse claim had been
made by Mikhail against Alex and believed it inconceivable that he would initiate a
sexual abuse investigation at a time when he himself was sexually abusing the child. 
Another factor weighing in the judge’s conclusion was “the lack of documented
symptomology that the child has been a victim of abuse.”  Although Dr. Silberg found
Kira to be a credible source of information, Judge Cox observed that, over the six-year
history of the case, “there have been numerous occasions when I have found [her] fears
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and projections to be without basis . . . .”  Finally, Judge Cox noted the lack of detail in
disclosures made to Ms. Dizard, once Greta had been removed from the tension between
her parents for some period of time.  “For all of these reasons,” she stated, “I simply do
not find, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, that [Mikhail] has sexually abused
his daughter.”
Notwithstanding that finding (or lack of finding), Judge Cox recognized that she
was dealing with a child who, at the time, was totally alienated from her father, which
constituted a change in circumstances since the last (2004) custody order.  Given that the
parents were unable to communicate or reach shared decisions, joint custody was not an
option.  The court therefore entered an order placing Greta in the legal and physical
custody of Kira, requiring Greta to continue in regular therapy with a goal of providing a
plan to repair the damage to her relationship with Mikhail, requiring both parents to
participate in counseling to reduce parental conflict, and precluding visitation with
Mikhail other than in a therapeutic setting.
Kira appealed, complaining, among other things, that based on the weight of the
evidence at trial, the trial court had reasonable grounds to believe that Greta had been
sexually abused by Mikhail and that the court abused its discretion in not making that
finding.  In support of that complaint, she argued that the trial court, in using a
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, applied the wrong burden.  That
argument resonated with the Court of Special Appeals, which regarded a preponderance
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standard as more stringent than “reasonable grounds to believe.”  Under what it regarded
as settled case law, the appellate court concluded that “[n]o logical reason exists, in light
of the explicit language of § 9-101, for us to uphold application, by the lower court of the
more stringent standard.”  Tarachanskaya v. Volodarsky, supra, 168 Md. App. at 609,
897 A.2d at 897.  It vacated the Circuit Court judgment and remanded the case for the
trial court to “reassess the evidence to discern if that evidence satisfies the lower
threshold of reasonable grounds to believe that Greta was sexually abused by [Mikhail],
pursuant to § 9-101.”  Id.
DISCUSSION
The fundamental error committed by the Court of Special Appeals was in
regarding “reasonable grounds to believe” – the statutory language – and preponderance
of the evidence as different standards of proof, one more stringent than the other.  In the
context of FL § 9-101, they are not. 
The two subsections of § 9-101 must be read together.  Subsection (a) requires
that, if, in a custody or visitation proceeding, the court has reasonable grounds to believe
that a child has been abused or neglected by a party to the proceeding, the court must
determine whether abuse or neglect is likely to occur if custody or visitation rights are
granted to the party.  Subsection (b) then states the consequence of the court’s
determination that reasonable grounds for such a belief exist.  In that event, the court
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must deny custody or visitation, except in a secure, supervised setting, unless it
specifically finds “that there is no likelihood of further abuse or neglect by the party.” 
(Emphasis added).  To require a specific finding that “further abuse or neglect” is not
likely clearly implies that there must be some sort of finding or determination by the court
that abuse or neglect likely occurred in the first instance.  The question is whether, at a
minimum, that finding must be made by at least a preponderance of the evidence.
In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L. Ed.2d 323 (1979), the
Supreme Court set forth the function of a standard of proof and explained the three
standards that exist.  Quoting in part from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1076, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 379 (1970), the
Addington Court observed:
“The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is
embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of
factfinding, is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree
of confidence our society thinks he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication.’”
Addington, supra, 441 U.S. at 423, 99 S. Ct. at 1808, 60 L. Ed.2d at 329.
The Court then explained that three standards of proof existed.  At one end of the
spectrum – the low end – is the typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between
private parties, the outcome of which is of minimal concern to society.  In those cases, the
plaintiff’s burden is “a mere preponderance of the evidence,” under which the litigants
“share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.”  Id.  In a criminal case – the high end –
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the interests of the defendant “are of such magnitude that historically and without any
explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof
designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.”  Id. 
That, the Court observed, is accomplished by requiring as a matter of due process that the
State prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The intermediate standard, of clear, cogent,
or convincing evidence, is used in cases, such as fraud, quasi-criminal wrongdoing, or “to
protect particularly important individual interests in various civil cases” where the interest
at stake is “deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money.”  Id. at 424, 99 S. Ct.
at 1808, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 330.  See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893,
47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754-55, 102 S. Ct. 1388,
1395-96, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 607 (1982).
Notably, and understandably, a standard of proof lower than “a mere
preponderance” was not even contemplated by the Supreme Court in any of those cases. 
It defies logic and reason to permit a court to make what is essentially a finding of fact,
especially one that may lead to the deprivation of a Constitutionally-based right of access
to one’s child, when the court is unable to find, even by the slimmest margin, that the fact
is more likely so than not.  How can a court have reasonable grounds for it to believe that
an act occurred if it is not persuaded, from whatever evidence is properly before it, that
the act more likely occurred than not?  Under the Court of Special Appeals rationale, a
court could find reasonable grounds to believe that which, in its own mind, it does not
5 We are not asked in this case to address, and we do not address, whether, under
the principles set forth in Addington, Mathews, or Santosky, a standard higher than
preponderance might be required where the effect of the finding might be to deny a parent 
all right of visitation with his or her child and must be, at a minimum, to place significant
limits on such visitation.
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believe because, in its view, the credible evidence does not support the fact, and that
strikes us as the antithesis of reasonableness.5
A finding of reasonable grounds to believe can involve either or both a subjective
or objective analysis, depending on what is at issue and what the function is of that
finding.  In a case tried by a jury, where it is the jury that must determine the ultimate
facts, a judge considering a motion for judgment engages in a purely objective analysis. 
The judge does not make credibility determinations and does not weigh the persuasive
value of the evidence, for that is not his or her task.  The judge looks only to whether the
evidence in support of the party with the burden of proof is legally sufficient to permit a
rational jury, if it credits that evidence, to find for that party.  
A similar kind of objective analysis is most often used in situations in which only a
preliminary determination need be made, based on incomplete and often non-testimonial
hearsay evidence.  When faced with making a determination of probable cause to justify
an arrest or search warrant, for example, the issuing magistrate usually takes the affidavit
offered in support of the application at face value and determines only whether the facts
alleged are legally sufficient to establish probable cause.  The magistrate is normally not
required to make ultimate credibility determinations or weigh the ultimate persuasiveness
-20-
of the averments in the affidavit and, unless the application or documents offered in
support of the application are deficient or suspiciously ambiguous, usually has no basis
for doing so.  The magistrate asks whether, assuming the averments are true, they are
legally sufficient to justify the warrant.  
In a case like this, however, where ultimate factual decisions are made by a judge
based on conflicting testimonial evidence, the judge must apply a subjective analysis as
well, and, indeed, the subjective analysis may, in large measure, govern the objective
analysis.  If, for example, all of the evidence bearing on Fact X comes from two witnesses
and the judge hearing the testimony credits the testimony of Witness 1 that supports and
is legally sufficient to support Fact X and does not credit the testimony of Witness 2 that
negates Fact X, the judge will have reasonable grounds for believing Fact X to be so,
precisely because the judge will believe, by at least a preponderance of the evidence, that
Fact X is more likely so than not.  Another judge, who hears the same evidence but
credits Witness 2 rather than Witness 1, will come, quite appropriately, to an opposite
conclusion.  That judge will not have reasonable grounds to believe that Fact X is so
because the judge will be unable to find by a preponderance of the evidence that it likely 
is so.  The issue is not whether some other person or entity could reasonably believe Fact
X to be so, but whether that court, from the evidence presented in that proceeding, has
reasonable grounds to believe it is so.
-21-
That is essentially what happened here.  Although Judge Cox was not called upon
to determine whether Mikhail had, in fact, abused Greta, she was required to determine
whether she had reasonable grounds to believe that he did.  Given the statutory function
and effect of that determination, however, it became, for purposes of § 9-101, a finding of
ultimate fact.  The mere finding of reasonable grounds to believe the allegation of abuse
would automatically trigger the need to make a further finding that could result in a total
or partial denial of access to Greta.   In order to make that initial, critical determination,
Judge Cox was required to, and did, sift through the conflicting evidence, make
credibility determinations, and determine the ultimate persuasiveness of the evidence
bearing on the allegation of abuse.  After going through that process, she declared that she
was not persuaded that Greta had been abused by Mikhail.  That necessarily means that
she was unable to find reasonable grounds for believing that such abuse occurred.  
When examined in this manner, there is no conflict between the preponderance
standard and the reasonable ground determination required by § 9-101.  It is by using the
preponderance standard that the judge determines whether reasonable grounds exist. 
Section 9-101(a) does not purport to create some cosmic ethereal standard of reasonable
grounds to believe that is detached from the persuasive value of the evidence admitted on
that issue, nor, as a practical matter, could it do so.  The statute requires further findings
only “if the court has reasonable grounds to believe” that a child has been abused or
neglected.  (Emphasis added). 
-22-
Both parties have alluded to the legislative history of § 9-101, and we have
examined that history.  We are not persuaded that it compels, or even would support, a
different result.
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM JUDGMENT OF
CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY; COSTS
IN THIS COURT AND IN COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.