Case Title: Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc.1987 WY 9731 P.2d 1195Case Number: 85-241Decided: 01/30/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
CLARENCE E. SHORT AND 
JANET SHORT, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

 
 
v.

 
 
SPRING CREEK RANCH, INC., 
AND CARROLL ESTERHOLT, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Robert W. Horn, Jackson, for appellants.

 
 
R. Michael Mullikin, 
Mullikin, Larson & Swift, Jackson, for appellees.

 
 
Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

 
 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     In this appeal from an 
adverse jury verdict in a personal injury action Clarence and Janet Short assert 
as an initial issue the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury that 
violation of a statute regulating traffic constitutes negligence per se, and 
they argue that an instruction that such a violation is evidence of negligence 
is improper. The other issue raised by the Shorts is a contention that the trial 
court committed reversible error when it refused to reread portions of the trial 
testimony to the jury after a request for such assistance had been made by the 
jury during the course of its deliberations. We hold that the trial court did 
not commit error in either respect, and we affirm the judgment of the trial 
court.

 
 

[¶2.]     This action was 
commenced by a complaint filed by the Shorts seeking damages from Spring Creek 
Ranch, Inc. (Spring Creek) and Carroll Esterholt, an employee of Spring Creek.1 The Shorts alleged that Spring 
Creek had a duty to construct and maintain roadways within the boundaries of its 
properties and that it was negligent in failing to perform this duty. More 
specifically, the Shorts alleged that Spring Creek had failed to maintain the 
roadway and repair defects in it and had failed to properly plow snow off the 
roadway. The Shorts alleged that the failure to perform these duties caused a 
collision between the Shorts' vehicle and a snowplow driven by Esterholt 
resulting in numerous injuries to each of the appellants. Esterholt was charged 
with negligence in his operation of the snowplow. Spring Creek and Esterholt 
contended that any injuries suffered by the Shorts were attributable to the 
negligence of Clarence Short which was alleged to be at least equal to or 
greater than the negligence of Spring Creek and Esterholt. In its verdict the 
jury apportioned negligence as 50 per cent to the Shorts and 50 per cent to 
Spring Creek and Esterholt. Apparently there was no contention that Janet Short 
was not bound by any negligence of Clarence. Following the verdict a judgment 
was entered that the Shorts take nothing by virtue of their claims. Their appeal 
is taken from that judgment.

 
 

[¶3.]     The Shorts have not 
provided a statement of issues on appeal in their brief as required by Rule 
5.01, W.R.A.P. They have set forth two arguments which articulate the issues in 
the following language:

 
 
"Where there is evidence 
produced at trial from which a jury could conclude that there has been a 
violation of a statute concerning operation of a motor vehicle should the trial 
court adopt the legislative standard of care and instruct the jury that such 
violation is negligence per se?

 
 
"May the trial court 
properly refuse the request of a jury which, during deliberation, asks that 
specific critical trial testimony be reread to them?"

 
 
The statement of the 
issues submitted by the appellees is:

 
 
"A. Whether the trial 
judge properly refused appellant's Proposed Instruction No. 
3.

 
 
"B. Whether the trial 
judge properly refused to rehash testimony for the jury after the jury retired 
for deliberation."

 
 

[¶4.]     In submitting the case 
to the jury the trial court instructed:

 
 
"Violation of a statute 
is evidence of negligence. If you determine that a party violated a statute on 
the occasion in question and that the violation was a proximate cause of the 
occurrence, then you may consider that fact together with all the other facts 
and circumstances in evidence in determining whether or not the party was 
negligent at the time of the occurrence."

 
 
The Shorts' initial 
contention is that this instruction is erroneous. They rely on Distad v. Cubin, 
Wyo., 633 P.2d 167 (1981), and the instruction which the Shorts submitted in this regard 
reads:

 
 
"Now these statutes were 
passed for the protection of the driving public. Each of the statutes 
establishes a standard of conduct that must be met by each and every driver of a 
motor vehicle for the safety and protection of other users of the 
road.

 
 
"If you find, from a 
consideration of all the evidence before you, that one or more of these statutes 
were violated then you can conclude that the standard of conduct established by 
that statute was not met.

 
 
"Violation of one or more 
of these statutes under the circumstances of this case is negligence per se. 
Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1981); Restatement, Torts 2d, §§ 286, 
287, 288, 288A, 288B and 288C.

 
 
"If you find that either 
Defendant violated any of the statutes that I have read to you in these 
instructions and that the violation was a proximate cause of Plaintiff Lee Short 
and Janet Short's injuries, then you must find for the Plaintiffs on the issue 
of liability and proceed to assess damages in accordance with my instructions to 
you."

 
 

[¶5.]     The appellants read far 
too much into this court's opinion in Distad v. Cubin, supra. That decision 
cannot be interpreted as the adoption of a negligence per se standard by this 
court. We there held that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct 
the jury that violations of state or federal regulations constituted negligence 
per se, and we approved an instruction to the effect that the failure to comply 
with such regulations is evidence of negligence. We did adopt the view of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) [hereinafter cited as Restatement 
2d].

 
 
"We accordingly conclude 
that, as to questions of negligence, the effect of a violation of statute, 
ordinance, or regulation which defines a standard of conduct will be resolved 
under the Restatement, Torts 2d. The pertinent sections of the Restatement, 
Torts 2d, include §§ 286, 287, 288, 288A, 288B, and 288C." Distad v. Cubin, 
supra, 633 P.2d  at 175.

 
 

[¶6.]     If we were to resolve 
this case in accordance with the provisions of the Restatement 2d, we would 
focus first upon § 286 which provides:

 
 
"The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of 
a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an 
administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in 
part

 
 
"(a) to protect a class 
of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, 
and

 
 
"(b) to protect the 
particular interest which is invaded, and

 
 
"(c) to protect that 
interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and

 
 
"(d) to protect that 
interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results." (Emphasis 
added).

 
 
We recognized in Distad 
v. Cubin, supra, that this provision relies upon judicial discretion "by its use 
of the words `may adopt as the standard of conduct * * *.'" Distad v. Cubin, 
supra, at 176. See Restatement 2d § 286 comment d. We followed that point by 
stating a later conclusion that "[w]hen the facts represent a conglomeration of 
circumstances such as here in order to reach application of the statutory or 
regulatory violation, use of the negligence per se doctrine is not desirable." 
Distad v. Cubin, supra, at 179.

 
 

[¶7.]     What this court said in 
Distad v. Cubin, supra, is consistent with a choice which is compelled in any 
given case by the policy tension that exists between the so-called negligence 
per se and the so-called evidence of negligence rules. The thrust of the 
negligence per se rule is that a legislative or administrative rule fixes a 
standard for all members of the community which does not require a specific 
interpretation by the jury, and thus certainty is promoted. The advantages of 
the evidence of negligence rule are perceived to be that not all statutes and 
rules are appropriate, and some are obsolete; it may be unrealistic to conclude 
that all reasonable people will blindly obey all statutes or administrative 
rules in all circumstances; and the law should not prevent the jury from 
assuming its usual and historic function of determining whether, in the light of 
their common experiences, the person charged with negligence failed to act as a 
reasonable person would act. See F. Harper, F. James and O. Gray, The Law of 
Torts, § 17.6 (2d ed. 1986). These conflicting policy arguments prompted 
Professor Morris to say:

 
 
"Often, after the duty 
problem is settled, a criminal proscription operates as a desirable, more exact 
standard that smooths up civil procedure. Nevertheless there are many situations 
in which substitution of the criminal proscription for the 
reasonably-prudent-man criterion effects substantive change - either because the 
particular case entails special facts or because the judgment of the legislature 
is misguided. Then use of the proscription will warp the policy of basing 
liability on fault. * * *" The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 
49 Columbia 
L.Rev. 21 at 47 (1949).

 
 

[¶8.]     Courts should refrain 
from an inflexible application of the negligence per se rule because of the 
impact that may have upon the traditional policy of premising liability on 
fault. The approach of the Restatement 2d is consistent with such restraint. See 
Reporter's Notes in Appendix to the Restatement 2d, § 286, at 346-347 (1966). 
Following the Restatement 2d approach we find: (1) the standard defined by 
legislation or administrative rule should only be adopted when the four criteria 
of § 286, Restatement 2d, are met; (2) the excused violation of the legislative 
enactment or administrative rule is not negligence (a non-exclusive list of 
excused violations is encompassed in § 288A, Restatement 2d); and (3) even if 
the court finds that the criteria of § 286 are met, it is not required to adopt 
the legislative enactment as the standard of conduct because of the permissive 
language of the Restatement 2d. Distad v. Cubin, supra.

 
 

[¶9.]     In Distad v. Cubin, 
supra, this court referred to decisions by the Supreme Court of Alaska. That 
court first adopted the Restatement 2d approach in Ferrell v. Baxter, Alaska, 
484 P.2d 250 (1971), but it has since modified the expansive application of any 
rule of negligence per se. Clabaugh v. Bottcher, Alaska, 545 P.2d 172 (1976). 
The court in Alaska has recognized that it is appropriate 
in the normal situation to adopt the statutory command as the standard of 
reasonableness, but that should not be done if the traffic law is so obscure, 
oblique, or irrational that it could not be said as a matter of law to provide 
an appropriate standard. Furthermore, that court has said that the statutory 
standard should not be substituted if the statute is somewhat obscure or unknown 
to the general public. McLinn v. Kodiak Electric Association, Inc., Alaska, 546 P.2d 1305 
(1976). In other contexts that court has followed the analysis of the Ohio 
Supreme Court in Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367, 119 N.E.2d 440 (1954), 
and held that in order to invoke the statute or regulation as a standard the 
statute or regulation must prescribe or proscribe specific conduct. Using the 
statute or regulation as a standard is not appropriate if it sets out only a 
general or abstract standard of care. Clabaugh v. Bottcher, supra; Northern 
Lights Motel, Inc. v. Sweaney, Alaska, 561 P.2d 1176, aff'd on reh. 563 P.2d 256 (1977).

 
 

[¶10.]  It is important to recognize that the 
labels "negligence per se" and "evidence of negligence" address this issue much 
too broadly. All that those labels describe is the duty element of a cause of 
action for negligence. The Restatement 2d approach does not in any way treat 
with the question of the causal connection between a violation of the statute or 
regulation and harm to the plaintiff, nor any defense of negligence on the part 
of the plaintiff. Furthermore, it does not really describe the breach of duty 
element of the cause of action. These questions as well as others are within the 
province of the jury's prerogative to determine the facts. In this instance, 
however, the essential reason that the Restatement 2d approach would not be 
helpful to the appellants is because of our holding in Distad v. Cubin, supra, 
that in those cases in which the facts represent a conglomeration of 
circumstances it is not appropriate to invoke a statutory standard as the 
standard of care.

 
 

[¶11.]  We said earlier that if we were to 
resolve this case in accordance with the provisions of the Restatement 2d we 
would address the issue in a particular way. We do not decide it in the context 
of the Restatement 2d, however, because the Shorts' reliance upon Distad v. 
Cubin, supra, cannot be accepted in the light of the deficiency of the record in 
this case.

 
 

[¶12.]  Our rule is that a party is entitled to 
have a jury instruction upon its theory of the case but only if such theory is 
supported by competent evidence and a proper request for the instruction is 
made. Langdon v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation, Wyo., 494 P.2d 537 
(1972). The appellant must present a record upon which this court can base a 
decision, and the failure to provide a transcript of the evidence presented at 
the trial limits this court to addressing those allegations of error which do 
not require an inspection of the transcript. Salt River Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Heiner, Wyo., 
663 P.2d 518 (1983); Matter of Manning's Estate, Wyo., 646 P.2d 175 (1982); Minnehoma Financial Company v. 
Pauli, Wyo., 565 P.2d 835 (1977); Scherling v. Kilgore, Wyo., 599 P.2d 1352 (1979); Wydisco, Inc. v. McMahon, Wyo., 520 P.2d 218 (1974). Appellants' 
argument in this case depends upon the presence of competent evidence to support 
the request for an instruction on negligence per se. An examination of the 
evidence is critical in determining whether there was an abuse of the discretion 
vested in the trial court with respect to the giving of such an instruction. The 
appellants have not included a transcript of the evidence in this record, and 
without the transcript we are unable to address the claimed instructional error. 
Appellants simply have failed to meet their burden of establishing error with 
respect to this issue.

 
 

[¶13.]  In addition, our rule requires that 
proper instructions should be clear declarations of the law, and an instruction 
which is offered but which is subject to a construction which is not consistent 
with the law should be refused. Edwards v. Harris, Wyo., 
397 P.2d 87 (1964). The instruction which the appellants offered in this case 
refers only to violations of traffic statutes by the defendants, and states that 
if such a violation is a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries, then the 
jury must find for them. The pleadings suggest that Clarence Short may have 
violated some of the same traffic statutes. Any breach of the same statute by 
the Shorts must be given the same effect as a breach by the defendants. Even if 
an unexcused violation of a statutory enactment is labeled negligence per se 
that means only that a statutory duty has been recognized, and a violation if 
found is a breach of the duty. "There will still remain open such questions as 
the causal relation between the violation and the harm to the plaintiff, and, in 
the ordinary case, the defenses of contributory negligence, * * *." Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 36 at 230 (5th ed. 1984). It is clear that the 
instruction offered by the Shorts was incorrect and incomplete, and the trial 
court properly refused to give it for those reasons.

 
 

[¶14.]  The Shorts' other claim of error relates 
to the refusal of the trial court to reread portions of the trial testimony to 
the jury when request was made. The Shorts contend that the court may not refuse 
to respond to a request by the jury that specific trial testimony be 
reread.

 
 

[¶15.]  Section 1-11-209, W.S. 1977, sets forth 
the basic rule:

 
 
"After the jurors have 
retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement between them as to any part 
of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed as to any part of the law 
arising in the case, they may request the officer to conduct them to the court 
where information upon the matter of law shall be given. The court may give its 
recollection as to the testimony on the points in dispute, in the presence of or 
after notice to the parties or their counsel."

 
 
This court stated in 
Hoskins v. State, Wyo., 552 P.2d 342, reh. denied 553 P.2d 1390 
(1976), cert. denied 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1977), that 
while the trial court may refresh the memory of jurors pursuant to the statute 
it is not required to do so. We said there that the decision of the trial court 
to refuse to again present testimony under the statute, "is not ground for 
reversal except in the case where it is clear that an injustice had been done." 
Hoskins v. State, supra, at 349, citing State v. Riggle, 76 Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349, 
reh. denied 76 Wyo. 1, 300 P.2d 567 (1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 981, 77 S. Ct. 384, 1 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1957). Other states have statutes which 
direct that the trial court must give the information requested, but other forms 
of statute, like the one in Wyoming, permit the trial court to invoke its 
discretion with respect to whether it should grant or deny a request by the 
jury. See 76 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1043 (1975). Given a statute like ours the denial 
by the court of a request for rereading testimony is subject to review under an 
abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., United 
States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375 (11th Cir. 1983) cert. denied 
465 U.S. 1034, 104 S. Ct. 1304, 79 L. Ed. 2d 703 (1984); State v. Jones, 47 N.C. App. 554, 268 S.E.2d 6 (1980). Denials which 
are premised on the possibility of undue emphasis being placed on some testimony 
or on the breadth of the jury's request have been held not to constitute any 
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364 
(5th Cir. 1977), and cases cited therein.

 
 

[¶16.]  The record in this case demonstrates that 
the jury sought a number of items including "exact width of the Scout," "Buzz's 
testimony," "direct on Barbara Thacker," as well as other testimony. These 
requests were made after a few hours of deliberation. The trial judge responded 
by acknowledging that the jury could receive such testimony, but he advised that 
he had never made testimony available, and that he would give further 
explanation if the jury so desired. It was at this juncture that the jury 
attached some specificity to the aspects of the testimony it wished to have 
repeated. The trial judge then explained that he believed the selection of 
portions of the testimony placed undue emphasis on those portions. He also 
explained the procedures that would be involved in furnishing the testimony, and 
he addressed the possibility of the jury requesting numerous portions and in 
this way relying upon the judge to settle questions of fact. After giving this 
explanation the jury's request was refused.

 
 

[¶17.]  The Shorts argue that the denial was 
based only on time considerations, but the trial judge furnished a number of 
other reasons for his decision. Again, we are inhibited in addressing the issue 
because we cannot determine the extent of the testimony requested or its 
importance to any of the key issues. In the absence of a transcript of the 
evidence we cannot possibly conclude that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying this request. We understand a trial court should not be 
arbitrary in denying such requests. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 396 Mich. 109, 240 N.W.2d 202 
(1976). The request for review of testimony should be considered and granted or 
denied in the sound exercise of the trial court's discretion in the light of the 
particular circumstances involved in the case. We cannot assess the 
circumstances of this case without a transcript of the 
evidence.

 
 

[¶18.]  The thrust of the Short's appeal is two 
claims of abuse of discretion. They have failed to demonstrate an abuse of 
discretion in the refusal to give an instruction on negligence per se arising 
out of the violation of a statutory standard. They also have failed to 
demonstrate an abuse of discretion in denying the jury's request for rereading 
of testimony.

 
 

[¶19.]  The judgment entered by the trial court 
upon the jury's verdict is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 In defining the issues 
in the district court and describing the proceedings reference is made to the 
pleadings only because the Shorts did not designate the transcript of the trial 
proceedings, except for the dialogue relating to the request to have testimony 
read again, as a part of the record on appeal.

 
 

BROWN, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶20.]  I agree that this case should be 
affirmed.

 
 

[¶21.]  I believe that this court should clearly 
state that "violation of a statute or ordinance is evidence of negligence". It 
seems that a holding or suggestion that either an "evidence of negligence" or a 
"negligence per se" instruction may be appropriate depending on the 
circumstances causes uncertainty in the law.

 
 

[¶22.]  I agree with that said in Justice 
Urbigkit's concurring opinion in that Wyoming traditionally has been regarded as an 
"evidence of negligence" jurisdiction.

 
 

[¶23.]  If we have optional rules, the bar and 
the courts will be confused, and additional issues to litigate will 
result.

 
 

[¶24.]  I concur in the 
result.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, specially 
concurring, with whom MACY, Justice, 
joins.

 
 

[¶25.]  For years in Wyoming, without required 
count, the state bar, trial bench, and law school faculty classified this state 
as an evidence-of-negligence jurisdiction for application of statutory-violation 
rules for jury instruction. But then came Distad v. Cubin, Wyo., 633 P.2d 167 
(1981).

 
 

[¶26.]  One is almost led to conclude that 
sometimes architectural proclivities overwhelm adjudicatory 
necessities.

 
 

[¶27.]  It was my opinion then, which remains 
unchanged, that Distad says everything and means nothing, or says nothing 
definable and means everything in cultivating and nursing to fruition in 
Wyoming the 
Restatement confusion on evidence of negligence versus the per-se rules for 
violation of statutes or promulgated regulatory regiment. Restatement of Torts 
2d, §§ 286 and 288.

 
 

[¶28.]  Alaska 
courts quickly amplified from Ferrell v. Baxter, 
Alaska, 484 P.2d 250 (1971), to Breitkreutz v. 
Baker, Alaska, 514 P.2d 17 (1973), to Clabaugh 
v. Bottcher, Alaska, 545 P.2d 172 (1976), as the latter 
case is now noted in the opinion of this court as it has "modified the expansive 
application of any rule of negligence per se."1

 
 

[¶29.]  I am faced with the dual quandary of why 
the issue should be addressed in this case, and whether we affirm a complex, 
convoluted, and imprecise standard created by the Restatement, so that trial and 
appellate courts may then spend the next couple of decades devising case 
motivated exceptions and exclusions. This is explicitly demonstrable from the 
text of Restatement 2d of Torts § 286, "The court may" and § 288, "The court 
will not." One can easily be confused by the substantive concern of what happens 
between the "may" and the "will not," in wonderment whether this means that you 
may not or will. Additionally, the confusion is magnified where the appellate 
court does not resolve whether the trial court or the appellate court is solely 
granted the undefined discretion to determine the rule to be applied for the 
substantive decision as in many cases may constitute a directed verdict result. 
This indeterminate confusion of authority and standard invades the entire 
litigative process from initial interview analysis to final appellate court 
pronouncement.

 
 

[¶30.]  If the unspoken exception for use of the 
Restatement approach is motor vehicle cases, then we should say so, and why. Two 
quick examples illustrate the Scylla and Charybdis status which we consequently 
create for the practicing bar and the trial bench:

 
 
A long-haul truck driver 
is over-hour in driving time in violation of federal law, traveling at least ten 
miles in excess of federal regulations and state law, driving while drinking, 
and then passes without an audible signal. Failing to keep the vehicle under 
control, that driver now causes an accident.

 
 

[¶31.]  Under Distad and this case, do we apply 
per se to any, each or all of these well-defined and clearly expressed 
criminal-law violations? See Alaska cases, supra fn. 1. At least I would 
contemplate that the purpose of the legislative enactment is found exclusively 
or in part (a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose 
interest is invaded; (b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded; 
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which resulted; and (d) to 
protect that interest from the particular hazard from which the harm 
results.

 
 

[¶32.]  I could easily find that regulations 
involving driving time, speed, driving while drinking, passing, and keeping a 
vehicle under control, are intended to protect others who may choose to be upon 
the highway.

 
 

[¶33.]  The second example 
is:

 
 
A truck driver, moving 
slowly on a dusty county road, drives in the middle of the road, intentionally 
blocking the passage of a following vehicle desiring to pass. At least three 
state statutes are violated, each of which was adopted specifically to protect 
the class of persons whose interests were invaded. Summary judgment was granted 
against the injured party, whose misadventure resulted directly from the 
proscribed activity. England 
v. Simmons, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1137, 1143 (1986), Urbigkit, 
J., dissenting.

 
 

[¶34.]  I agree with the court that this case 
affords an insufficient record upon which to send §§ 286 and 288 of the 
Restatement back to the law professors, and consequently I specially concur in 
the decision of the trial court.

 
 

[¶35.]  Unfortunately, this court's undesired 
approval of Distad will only serve to confuse the practicing attorney, and 
create a burdensome and uninstructed gambling requirement for the trial judges 
in courtroom decision on the applied evidentiary standard. There may be a case 
where a per-se judicial determination is necessary or even appropriate, but not 
having ever seen one, I suspect that the trial jury can recognize the 
significance of statutory violation under general-evidence and proximate-cause 
instructions.

 
 

[¶36.]  I would not address the subject, but, if 
addressed, I would inter Distad v. Cubin, supra, and the Restatement which it 
adopted. I specially concur because our discussion in this case may only 
constitute dicta. See Dangel v. State, Wyo., 724 P.2d 1145 (1986). The subject can 
more forcefully and exhaustively be addressed in a case where the issue is 
dispositive.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Clabaugh v. Bottcher, 
supra, which involved a decision that speeding did not invoke a per-se rule, was 
called into question by Bachner v. Rich, Alaska, 554 P.2d 430 (1976), wherein 
the general safety code was adopted as the per-se standard of care as involving 
a safe place to work. This necessitated some moderate review by me to try to 
determine what might occur if it is considered that we are following the 
Alaska law 
precedent development.

 
 
Lopez v. Bowen, Alaska, 
495 P.2d 64 (1972) (trial court evidence of negligence instruction in automobile 
case; reversed for retrial); Fruit v. Schreiner, Alaska, 502 P.2d 133 (1972) 
(traffic case per-se instruction was not required in affirming the verdict); 
Spruce Equipment Co. v. Maloney, Alaska, 527 P.2d 1295 (1974) (truck struck road 
gravel; apparent per-se rule applied, although plaintiff's verdict reversed on 
basis of mitigation); Adkins v. Lester, Alaska, 530 P.2d 11 (1974), reh. denied 
532 P.2d 1027 (1975) (per se indicated as a proper test in traffic case in the 
absence of exception excuse or justification); Wilson v. Sibert, Alaska, 535 P.2d 1034 (1975) (auto case; sudden emergency; used excuse rule to obviate per 
se); Leigh v. Lundquist, Alaska, 540 P.2d 492 (1975) (stop light apparent per-se 
rule; cited with approval Breitkreutz v. Baker, supra, and Ferrell v. Baxter, 
supra; however, the instruction was not necessary since the pedestrian was not 
within the protected class under the facts); Kaatz v. State, Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037 (1975) (highway road-sanding case, with the appellate court stating that an 
unexcused violation of administrative regulation may be negligence itself, or 
only evidence of negligence; however, verdict reversed for retrial in 
plaintiff's favor, on damages only); McLinn v. Kodiak Electric Association, 
Inc., Alaska, 546 P.2d 1305 (1976) (approved denial of per-se instruction when 
pedestrian hit vehicle where defendant was engaged in construction work 
involving noncompliance of administrative regulation); Morris v. City of 
Soldotna, Alaska, 553 P.2d 474 (1976) (safe place to work; act did not invoke a 
per-se standard upon violation); Northern Lights Motel, Inc. v. Sweaney, Alaska, 
561 P.2d 1176 (1977) (building code violation required a per-se instruction and 
adopted even if provision was unknown or obscure; see State Mechanical, Inc. v. 
Liquid Air, Inc., Alaska, 665 P.2d 15 (1983)); Barton v. Lund, Alaska, 563 P.2d 875 (1977), overruled by Alesna v. LeGrue, Alaska, 614 P.2d 1387 (1980) (dram 
shop case where the appellate court in footnote did not express an opinion on 
per se in approving summary judgment on another basis); Ferriss v. Texaco, Inc., 
Alaska, 599 P.2d 161 (1979) (violation of the national electric code did not 
invoke a per-se status); Farnsworth v. Steiner, Alaska, 601 P.2d 266 (1979) (FAA 
regulation justified a per-se instruction); Coffel v. Steward, Alaska, 611 P.2d 543 (1980) (in reversing, and citing Ferrell v. Baxter, supra, held that 
violation of statute did not abrogate a contract); Godfrey v. Hemenway, Alaska, 
617 P.2d 3 (1980) (failure to give per-se instruction in speeding case was 
reversible error); Bailey v. Lenord, Alaska, 625 P.2d 849 (1981) (illegal auto 
racing is negligence per se); Johnson v. State, Alaska, 636 P.2d 47 (1981) 
(utility road maintenance standard is not sufficiently applicable to a bicycle 
accident to invoke per se); Nazareno v. Urie, Alaska, 638 P.2d 671 (1981), 
overruled by Kavorkian v. Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc., Alaska, 711 P.2d 521 (1985) 
(automobile collision invokes per-se status in the dram-shop context; 
defendant's verdict reversed); Grothe v. Olafson, Alaska, 659 P.2d 602 (1983) 
(Federal Mine Safety Act can invoke per se at work site as a required specific 
conduct rather than a general or abstract duty); Harned v. Dura Corporation, 
Alaska, 665 P.2d 5 (1983) (noncompliance with design standards of American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers was negligence per se; affirmed after retrial at 
703 P.2d 396 (1985)); State Mechanical, Inc. v. Liquid Air, Inc., supra, 665 P.2d 15 (Compressed Gas Association pamphlet; violation justified a per-se 
instruction); Osborne v. Russell, Alaska, 669 P.2d 550, 554 (1983) (contact with 
electrical wire in restaurant invoked per se through National Electric Code by 
comment that the "discretion to refuse instruction was confined to the highly 
unusual cases in which the law may be so obscure or irrational as not to provide 
a standard as a matter of law"; vague or arcane rule); Lundquist v. Department 
of Public Safety, Alaska, 674 P.2d 780 (1983) (governmental duty to remove drunk 
drivers did not subject the municipality to the Baxter rule); Vance v. United 
States, 355 F. Supp. 756 (D.Alaska 1973) (dram shop violation invoked a per-se 
liability).

 
 
It may not be proper for me to conclude that the 
course of cases has modified the expansive application of the rule of negligence 
per se.