Case Title: JC Carlile Corporation v. Antaki

Citation: 426 P.2d 549

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1967-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
426 P.2d 549 (1967) J. C. CARLILE CORPORATION and the Travelers Insurance Company, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Alice R. ANTAKI, Robert Ruhl Antaki, Richard Francis Antaki, Ronald James Antaki, Jeannette Marie Antaki, Fredric Joseph Antaki, Victor Nadum Antaki, Jr., and the Industrial Commission of Colorado, Defendants in Error. No. 22219. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. April 17, 1967. Rehearing Denied May 8, 1967. *550 Wood, Ris & Hames, Denver, for plaintiffs in error. Zarlengo, Mott & Carlin, Denver, for defendants in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error Industrial Commission. MOORE, Chief Justice. The writ of error issued in this action brings before this court for review the proceedings which resulted in a district court judgment affirming an award of benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Facts pertinent to the issues herein are substantially as follows: Prior to June 7, 1962, one Victor N. Antaki was Vice President and Chief Engineer of the J. C. Carlile Corporation. He died in an accident which occurred sometime between 8:15 P.M. on June 7, 1962, and 6:00 A.M. the following morning, at which time his body was found in an automobile owned by his employer submerged in about five feet of water in the Platte river. His surviving wife and six children filed a claim before the Industrial Commission for benefits provided by law for a death allegedly arising out of and in the course of employment of the decedent. The only question presented for our determination on this writ of error is *551 whether there is sufficient support for the finding of the commission that the death of Antaki was "* * * the result of an accident arising out of and within the scope of his employment * * *." The findings of the referee, which were adopted by the Industrial Commission, contain the following: There is ample evidence in the record to support the above findings relating to the activities of the decedent during the late afternoon and evening of June 7, 1962. There was also evidence to the effect that a blood alcohol test was made from a sample of blood withdrawn from the body of decedent. This test resulted in a finding of .173 mgs%. The "Employer's First Report of Accident * * *" which was filed by the J. C. Carlile Corporation, contains the following: *552 Mr. Antaki sustained a broken left arm and a severe head injury. * * * * * * There was evidence that Antaki frequently returned to the office after normal business hours, and worked at night. His widow testified that the employer provided him with an automobile which was used mainly for the purpose of transportation to and from his work. On cross-examination in this connection the following appears: The general rule applicable to a large percentage of cases in which injuries occur to an employee while going to and from work is that such injuries are not compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Special circumstances found in numerous cases have developed exceptions to this rule and under variable conditions this court has recognized exceptions to the general rule. Electric Mutual Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission of Colorado, 154 Colo. 491, 391 P.2d 677; State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Walter, 143 Colo. 549, 354 P.2d 591; Alexander Film Co. v. Industrial Commission of Colorado, 136 Colo. 486, 319 P.2d 1074. For a lengthy discussion of these exceptions see Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 15.52, at 242-243, where citations to numerous cases will be found. It is argued that the benefits otherwise payable to the claimants should in any event be reduced by fifty per cent due to the evidence relating to the presence of alcohol in the blood of the deceased. The persuasiveness of this defense evidence was effectively minimized on cross-examination, and under the circumstances became a matter for the consideration of the trier of the facts. We cannot say as a matter of law that error was committed in this connection. There is no evidence in the record to require a finding, as a matter of law, that intoxicants caused or contributed to the accident. No one knows what caused the accident. The judgment is affirmed. DAY and PRINGLE, JJ., dissent. SUTTON, J., not participating.