Case Title: State v. Wilkinson

Citation: 178 Vt. 174, 2005 VT 46, 879 A.2d 445

Docket Number: 2003-363

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Wilkinson (2003-363); 178 Vt. 174; 879 A.2d 445

2005 VT 46

[Filed 08-Apr-2005]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2005 VT 46

                                No. 2003-363

  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Bennington Circuit

  Ricky N. Wilkinson	                         October Term, 2004

  David T. Suntag, J.

  William D. Wright, Bennington County State's Attorney, and Brian K.
    Marthage, Deputy State's Attorney, Bennington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Allison N. Fulcher of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ., and 
            Allen, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       ¶  1.  REIBER, J.  Defendant appeals from a conviction of
  first-degree aggravated domestic assault.  Defendant contends that the
  trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the victim, a
  convicted perjurer, and his due process rights by barring the victim's
  testimony at trial and by admitting into evidence an excited utterance the
  victim made after the assault.  We affirm.       
        
                                     I.

       ¶  2.  The State charged defendant with first-degree aggravated
  domestic assault for pointing a gun at and threatening to kill his
  step-son, Tom.  See 13 V.S.A. § 1043(a)(2) (criminalizing the use or
  attempted use of a deadly weapon against a family or household member). The
  charge arose from events that took place at defendant's home while he was
  intoxicated.  Defendant and his wife had an argument that escalated to the
  point where defendant threatened to kill the family dog.  Someone present
  in the home at the time called the police, and defendant fled.  The police
  arrived and eventually took defendant's wife to the police station so that
  she could give a statement.  When the wife returned home, she saw Tom and a
  friend outside.  The friend warned her that defendant had a gun.  At some
  point, Tom and defendant's daughter went inside the home and found
  defendant with a gun, yelling, "[s]omebody's going to die today." 
  Defendant pointed the gun at Tom.  The police were summoned again and
  arrived shortly thereafter.

       ¶  3.  Before trial, the State informed the court that Tom had been
  convicted of perjury, and therefore he was incompetent to testify pursuant
  to 13 V.S.A. § 2907, which provides that "[t]he oath of a person convicted
  of perjury . . . shall not be received in a proceeding in court."  The
  State intended to introduce Tom's statements about the events through
  defendant's cousin.  Tom visited defendant's cousin after defendant
  threatened him.  Tom apparently told the cousin that: (1) he was afraid;
  (2) defendant had pulled a gun on him; (3) he had never been so scared in
  his whole life; and (4) he thought defendant was going to kill him. 
  Defendant's counsel objected to the State's proffer and argued that
  admitting Tom's hearsay statements would violate defendant's Sixth
  Amendment right to confront his accuser.  The trial court concluded that §
  2907 precluded Tom from testifying in court and deferred ruling on the
  admission of Tom's statements as the trial proceeded. 
   
       ¶  4.  Ultimately, the trial court determined that Tom's statement
  to defendant's cousin was admissible as an excited utterance.  The court
  concluded that an excited utterance falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
  exception, and therefore the admission of Tom's statement did not violate
  defendant's constitutional right to confront his accuser.  At the
  conclusion of the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of aggravated
  domestic assault, and the court sentenced him to a prison term of ten to
  fifteen years.  Defendant appealed.  

                                     II.

       ¶  5.  On appeal, defendant argues that admitting Tom's excited
  utterance violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. 
  Defendant also argues that the court should have excluded Tom's statement
  because convicted perjurers are barred by 13 V.S.A. § 2907 from testifying
  in court.  Finally, defendant argues that he was deprived of his right to
  present a defense.  We address each claim in turn.
   
       ¶  6.  The Confrontation Clause states that "[i]n all criminal
  prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with
  the witnesses against him."  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  After the trial
  court's decision in this case, the United States Supreme Court decided
  Crawford v. Washington, which held that "[w]here testimonial evidence is at
  issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:
  unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination."