Case Title: Martone v. Martone

Citation: 

Docket Number: 980558

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
STEPHANIE GALE MARTONE, a minor 
who sues by her mother and next 
friend, Monique R. Martone 
 
v. Record No. 980558 
 
JOAN D. MARTONE 
        OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    January 8, 1999 
ALAN D. ALBERT, Guardian Ad Litem 
for the Unborn and Unknown Issue and  
Heirs of Alexander L. Martone, Deceased 
 
v. Record No. 980581 
 
JOAN D. MARTONE 
 
 
JOSEPH C. MARTONE, ET AL. 
 
v. Record No. 980582 
 
JOAN D. MARTONE 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Charles E. Poston, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, the primary issue concerns the meaning of 
the term “person interested” as used in Code § 64.1-90.  
Because some of the proponents of a decedent’s prior will had 
a mere expectancy under that will and not a legally 
ascertainable, pecuniary interest, they are not “person[s] 
interested.”  Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court dismissing this action. 
I. 
This suit was commenced on behalf of nine-year-old 
Stephanie Gale Martone by her mother and next friend.  
Stephanie filed a bill in equity for issue devisavit vel non 
to determine which of three documents is the last will and 
testament of her grandfather, Dr. Alexander L. Martone.  She 
named Dr. Martone’s widow, Joan D. Martone (Mrs. Martone), Dr. 
Martone’s children from his first marriage, his grandchildren, 
great-grandchildren, and all unknown or unborn issue or heirs 
of Dr. Martone (unknown heirs) as defendants.1
 
Pursuant to Code § 64.1-90, Stephanie asserts that she is 
a “person interested” in the probate of her grandfather’s will 
and that she was “not otherwise . . . before the court” in a 
prior probate proceeding.2  This section provides, in pertinent 
part: 
 
[T]hat any person interested who has not otherwise been 
before the court and who, at the time of the decree or 
order, is under the age of eighteen years or of unsound 
mind may file a bill in equity to impeach or establish 
                     
1  Dr. Martone’s children are Joseph C. Martone, Peter W. 
Martone, Alexander L. Martone, Jr., and Sharon M. Nelson; his 
grandchildren, in addition to Stephanie, are Jeffrey Martone, 
Lisa Martone, Susan Kelly Martone, Peter W. Martone, Jr., 
Michael V. Martone, Justin A. Martone, David R. Nelson, Jr., 
Bridgete M. Nelson, Jennifer E. Nelson, Christopher A. Nelson, 
and Bradford P. Nelson; and his great-grandchildren are Megan 
Martone, Amanda Martone and Kavin Nelson, all of whom are 
minors. 
 
2  Stephanie did not specifically allege in her bill in 
equity that she was proceeding under Code § 64.1-90, although 
she does so on brief and orally before this Court. 
 
 
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the will within one year after he becomes of age or is 
restored to capacity . . . and that any person interested 
who has been proceeded against by order of publication 
may, unless he actually appeared as a party or was 
personally summoned, file such bill within two years 
after such decree or order. 
 
Code § 64.1-90. 
The prior probate proceeding to which Stephanie refers 
was commenced on June 24, 1996, when Mrs. Martone filed an 
application in the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk for 
quasi inter partes probate of Dr. Martone’s will dated March 
3, 1995.3  Mrs. Martone named Dr. Martone’s four adult children 
as parties in that proceeding.  On September 6, 1996, at the 
request of the children, the court entered a decree converting 
the quasi inter partes probate to an inter partes proceeding 
pursuant to Code § 64.1-80.  The court also ordered that all 
interested persons be made parties to the proceeding and that 
all testamentary documents of Dr. Martone be filed.  In 
response to the court’s decree, two testamentary documents 
dated April 10, 1991, and February 6, 1995, respectively, were 
filed, in addition to the March 3, 1995 will that Mrs. Martone 
had originally submitted for probate.  However, no other 
persons were added as parties, nor was a guardian ad litem 
appointed to represent the interests of any minors or unknown 
heirs. 
                     
3  Dr. Martone died on June 6, 1996. 
 
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The parties to that probate proceeding submitted the 
issue devisavit vel non to a jury.  That jury, in special 
interrogatories, found that Dr. Martone possessed testamentary 
capacity when he executed the March 1995 will and that he was 
not acting under the undue influence of Mrs. Martone.  
Accordingly, the court entered judgment on the verdict on 
March 14, 1997, and admitted the March 1995 will to probate.  
That will expressly revoked all prior wills, devised and 
bequeathed Dr. Martone’s estate to Mrs. Martone, and named her 
as executor of his estate.4
In the present case, Stephanie is a proponent of the 1991 
document.  In that writing, Dr. Martone devised and bequeathed 
his estate to his trustee, Peter W. Martone, to be 
administered pursuant to the terms of a trust agreement also 
dated April 10, 1991.  The only provision in that will for his 
grandchildren and great-grandchildren is found in Article 
V(b), which states in pertinent part: 
Any net income collected from assets held by my Executor 
[Peter W. Martone] during the period of administration of 
my estate may, in whole or in part, in the sole 
discretion of the Executor, be distributed to any one or 
more person or persons, to the permissible exclusion of 
any one or more of them, within a class consisting of my 
wife and my issue, or may be accumulated and added to the 
principal of my residuary estate, or may be applied by my 
Executor to the payment of debts, funeral expenses, 
                     
4  The February 1995 document contained essentially the 
same provisions as the March 1995 will. 
 
 
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administration costs and/or taxes payable out of my 
estate . . . . 
 
 
In Article VIII of the trust established by Dr. Martone 
on the same day that he executed the 1991 will, he directed 
that the trust property “shall be held and/or distributed as 
[he] shall have designated in written instructions addressed 
to [the trustee] . . . .”  In the same article, Dr. Martone 
also provided that, if he failed to leave instructions for any 
portion of the trust estate, the trustee shall distribute that 
property “to such person or persons as would inherit personal 
property from [Dr. Martone] in accordance with, and in the 
proportions provided by, the laws of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia as if [he] had died intestate, unmarried and owning 
such part or portion of the trust estate.”  Thus, the 1991 
will and trust are the only instruments in which Dr. Martone 
provided for his children, grandchildren, and great-
grandchildren. 
 
In response to Stephanie’s bill in equity, all the 
defendants (including the guardian ad litem appointed by the 
court for the unknown heirs), except Mrs. Martone, filed 
answers and cross-bills seeking the same relief as Stephanie, 
i.e., to have the 1991 document probated as the last will and 
 
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testament of Dr. Martone.5  Stephanie and these cross-
plaintiffs assert that Dr. Martone was acting under the undue 
influence of Mrs. Martone when he executed the March 1995 
will.  This position is the same one that Dr. Martone’s 
children advanced in the prior probate proceeding. 
Mrs. Martone demurred to the bill in equity and cross-
bills.  In a decree dated December 19, 1997, the circuit court 
sustained the demurrer and dismissed this action.  In a letter 
opinion, the court discussed the nature of the interest 
created in Dr. Martone’s 1991 will for the benefit of his 
grandchildren and great-grandchildren: 
 
[T]he grandchildren and great-grandchildren will take 
under the 1991 will only from the income from the estate 
while in the hands of the executor before he transfers 
the assets to the trustee.  However, there is a further 
qualification.  They will take only if the executor, in 
his sole discretion, decides to make such distributions, 
and even then he may distribute to some, but not all, in 
such amounts and proportions as he, in his sole 
discretion, deems appropriate.  There is no mandate for 
the executor to make any distributions at all. 
 
The court concluded that the interest that these parties may 
have “cannot rise above the level of a mere expectancy.” 
 
The court further determined that all the parties in the 
present action who were not named as parties in the prior 
probate proceeding were, nevertheless, fully represented in 
                     
5  Like Stephanie, these cross-plaintiffs did not state in 
their cross-bills under which statutory provision they were 
proceeding. 
 
6
that proceeding by Dr. Martone’s children.  Thus, by applying 
the doctrines of res judicata and virtual representation, the 
court concluded that the grandchildren, great-grandchildren, 
and unknown heirs are precluded from proceeding under Code 
§ 64.1-90 to establish the 1991 document as the last will and 
testament of Dr. Martone.  The court likewise found that Dr. 
Martone’s four children are barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata from relitigating the probate of the March 1995 will.6  
Stephanie and the cross-plaintiffs appeal. 
II. 
 
To impeach or establish a will pursuant to Code § 64.1-
90, a party must, inter alia, be a “person interested.”  Title 
64.1 pertaining to wills and decedents’ estates does not 
define the term “person interested” although it is used in 
several sections of that title.7  See e.g., Code §§ 64.1-80, -
81, -82, -83, -88, and –90.  However, we believe that the term 
 
 
6  On brief, the children state that the validity of their 
cross-bills in this action is immaterial as long as Stephanie 
or one of the other cross-plaintiffs is allowed to proceed 
under Code § 64.1-90. 
7  Although Code § 64.1-90 is the focus of the arguments 
presented to this Court, the cross-plaintiffs who cannot 
utilize Code § 64.1-90 because they are over 18 years of age 
suggest that they could commence their own actions under some 
other section because the prior probate was never properly 
converted to an inter partes proceeding as ordered by the 
circuit court.  However, our analysis of the term “person 
interested” applies to the phrase as it is used in other 
sections of Title 64.1. 
 
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means that an individual must have a legally ascertainable, 
pecuniary interest, which will be impaired by probating a will 
or benefited by setting aside the will, and not a mere 
expectancy.  See Ames v. Reeves, 553 So.2d 570, 572 (Ala. 
1989) (“To maintain a will contest, it is essential that the 
contestant have a real, beneficial interest, not simply an 
expectancy or an inchoate right.”); Estate of Keener, 521 
N.E.2d 232, 234 (Ill. App. 1988) (“[A]n interested person[] 
needs to have a direct, pecuniary, existing interest which 
would be detrimentally affected by the probate of the 
proferred will.”); Bloor v. Platt, 84 N.E. 604, 605 (Ohio 
1908) (“Any person who has such a direct, immediate, and 
legally ascertained pecuniary interest in the devolution of 
the testator’s estate as would be impaired or defeated by the 
probate of the will, or be benefited by setting aside the 
will, is ‘a person interested.’”); Washington & Lee Univ. v. 
Dist. Court of Okla. County, 492 P.2d 320, 324 (Okla. 1971), 
cert. dismissed, 406 U.S. 951 (1972) (“[T]he term ‘any person 
interested’ . . . means any person having such a direct 
pecuniary interest in the devolution of a testator’s estate 
that his interest would be impaired or defeated if the will 
were admitted to probate, or his interest would be benefitted 
if the will were denied admission to probate.”); see also 
 
 
 
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Fitzgibbon v. Barry, 78 Va. 755, 760 (1884) (“[I]n no case 
. . . is it necessary to make those persons parties who are 
entitled ‘only to future and very uncertain and contingent 
interests.’”). 
 
The interest that the grandchildren, great-grandchildren, 
and unknown heirs assert in order to qualify as a “person 
interested” is found in Article V(b) of Dr. Martone’s 1991 
will.8  In that provision, Dr. Martone authorized his executor 
to distribute any net income from assets held during the 
administration of the estate to any one or more persons in a 
class consisting of Dr. Martone’s wife and his issue.9  
However, the executor has absolute discretion in deciding 
whether to accumulate income and add it to the principal of 
the residuary estate; to apply it to the payment of debts, 
taxes, and other expenses of the estate; or to distribute it 
to members of the designated class.  Even if the executor 
chooses to disburse income, he also has complete discretion as 
to the amount of any distribution and to whom it will be paid.  
                     
8  Since all of Dr. Martone’s children were living at the 
time of his death, Article V(b) of the 1991 will is the only 
provision under which his grandchildren and great-
grandchildren could receive a distribution from his estate. 
 
9  For the purposes of this case, we assume, without 
deciding, that the term “issue” as used in the 1991 will 
includes Dr. Martone’s grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and 
unknown heirs. 
 
 
9
In other words, he can disburse income to some members of the 
class and exclude others.  We have stated that “equity will 
not compel or control . . . [the] discretion or exercise” of 
“a mere naked power [of disposal among the members of a class 
that is] purely discretionary with the donee.”  Daniel v. 
Brown, 156 Va. 563, 571, 159 S.E. 209, 211 (1931). 
 
Thus, we conclude that the interest created by Article 
V(b) of the 1991 will is a mere expectancy, not a legally 
ascertainable right.  It is, therefore, not sufficient to 
satisfy the requirement of a “person interested” under Code 
§ 64.1-90 with regard to the grandchildren, great-
grandchildren, and unknown heirs.  Under the 1991 will, only 
Dr. Martone’s four children are “person[s] interested.”  
However, as already noted, they litigated their claim in the 
prior probate proceeding when they attempted to establish the 
1991 document as Dr. Martone’s last will and testament. 
 
Contrary to arguments made by Stephanie and the cross-
plaintiffs, the decision in Gaddess v. Norris’ Ex’rs, 102 Va. 
625, 46 S.E. 905 (1904), does not compel a different result.  
In that case, the decedent’s will established a trust for his 
six children.  The decedent directed his trustee to distribute 
a portion of the income each year to his children during their 
respective lives.  The will further granted a power of 
appointment to each child to dispose of his or her share of 
 
10
the trust by will in favor of any of his or her issue.  If any 
child died without having exercised the power of appointment, 
his or her share passed to his or her issue.  Because of the 
nature of the grandchildren’s interests, we concluded that 
they had to be named as parties to a suit to construe the 
decedent’s will.  Unlike the interest in the present case, the 
grandchildren in Gaddess had more than a mere expectancy.  
Some or all of them would receive a portion of the decedent’s 
estate either by exercise of the power of appointment or as 
takers in default.  Id. at 630, 46 S.E. at 907. 
 
Similarly, we held in NationsBank of Va., N.A. v. Estate 
of Grandy, 248 Va. 557, 560, 450 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1994), that 
“the interests of the potential beneficiaries [of a trust 
were] too remote to require the joinder of those potential 
beneficiaries as necessary parties.”  The interests of the 
potential beneficiaries were contingent interests that could 
be defeated by any future issue of Grandy, the beneficiary of 
the trust. 
We next consider the children’s contention that the 
circuit court erred by applying the doctrine of res judicata 
to dismiss their cross-bills.  They argue that the court had 
no basis for that ruling because the record of the prior 
probate proceeding was not before the court, in particular, 
the final decree entered in that proceeding.  We do not agree. 
 
11
The same judge presided over both the instant action and 
the prior probate proceeding.  Moreover, the court was 
entitled to take judicial notice of the record in that case 
when ruling on Mrs. Martone’s demurrer since Stephanie and the 
cross-plaintiffs referred to the prior probate proceeding in 
their cross-bills.  See Fleming v. Anderson, 187 Va. 788, 794-
95, 48 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1948) (“[W]here the plaintiff refers 
to another proceeding or judgment, and specifically bases his 
right of action, in whole or in part, on something which 
appears in the record of the prior case, the court, in passing 
on a demurrer to the complaint, will take judicial notice of 
the matters appearing in the former case.”). 
Finally, we address the claim that the circuit court 
erred by allowing Mrs. Martone to contest the right of the 
grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and unknown heirs to bring 
this action after she endorsed the September 6, 1996 order as 
“Agreed.”  That order directed that all interested persons be 
made parties to the inter partes probate proceeding.  But 
neither Mrs. Martone nor Dr. Martone’s children named any 
additional parties, nor was a guardian ad litem appointed to 
represent the interests of minors or unknown heirs. 
 
We find no merit in this argument.  That order did not  
identify any persons who needed to be made parties, nor did it 
adjudicate whether any particular individual was a “person 
 
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interested” in the proceeding.  Thus, we conclude that Mrs. 
Martone has not taken a position in this case that is 
inconsistent with the one that she took when she endorsed that 
order. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court.10
Record No. 980558 — Affirmed. 
Record No. 980581 — Affirmed. 
Record No. 980582 — Affirmed. 
                     
10 Since the grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and 
unknown heirs are not “person[s] interested,” we need not 
address whether they were otherwise before the court in the 
prior probate proceeding through “virtual representation.” 
 
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