Case Title: Protecting Our Water & Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus

Citation: 

Docket Number: S251709

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCES et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S251709 
 
Fifth Appellate District 
F073634 
 
Stanislaus County Superior Court 
2006153 
 
 
August 27, 2020 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred.   
 
1 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCES v. COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
S251709 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA or the 
Act; Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.)1 regulates activities 
carried out, funded, or approved by the government.  Any 
government action that may directly or indirectly cause a 
physical change to the environment is a “project.”  (§ 21065; see 
§ 21060.5 [“ ‘[e]nvironment’ ” defined].)  Generally, the issuance 
of a permit is a project (§ 21065, subd. (c)) because it could 
authorize a physical environmental change.  Projects can be 
either discretionary or ministerial actions.  Unless exempted, 
discretionary projects require some level of environmental 
review; ministerial projects do not.  (§ 21080, subds. (a), (b)(1).)  
This case involves the distinction between discretionary and 
ministerial projects.   
Stanislaus County (County) issues well construction 
permits under an ordinance that incorporates state well 
construction standards.  It categorically classifies a subset of 
those projects as ministerial.  Plaintiffs2 challenge that 
classification practice, alleging the permit issuances are 
actually discretionary projects requiring CEQA review.  They 
                                        
1  
Unless noted, all statutory references are to the Public 
Resources Code.   
2  
Plaintiffs are Protecting Our Water and Environmental 
Resources and the California Sportfishing Protection Alliance.  
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
seek declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the classification 
practice.  The trial court found the permit issuances are 
ministerial and the Court of Appeal reversed.  We hold the 
blanket classification of all these permit issuances as 
ministerial is unlawful.  County may be correct that many of its 
decisions are ministerial.  However, as we explain, under the 
ordinance authorizing the issuance of these permits, some of 
County’s decisions may be discretionary.  Accordingly, 
classifying all issuances as ministerial violates CEQA.  
Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration to that effect.  But they 
are not entitled to injunctive relief at this stage, because they 
have not demonstrated that all permit decisions covered by the 
classification practice are discretionary.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The CEQA Framework  
CEQA was enacted to (1) inform the government and 
public about a proposed activity’s potential environmental 
impacts; (2) identify ways to reduce, or avoid, those impacts; (3) 
require project changes through alternatives or mitigation 
measures when feasible; and (4) disclose the government’s 
rationale for approving a project.  (California Building Industry 
Assn. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2015) 62 
Cal.4th 369, 382 (Building Industry).)  CEQA embodies a central 
state policy requiring “state and local governmental entities to 
perform their duties ‘so that major consideration is given to 
preventing environmental damage.’ ”  (Friends of the Eel River 
v. North Coast Railroad Authority (2017) 3 Cal.5th 677, 711, 
quoting § 21000, subd. (g).)  Accordingly, CEQA prescribes how 
governmental decisions will be made whenever an agency 
undertakes, approves, or funds a project.  (Union of Medical 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019) 7 Cal.5th 
1171, 1185 (Medical Marijuana Patients).)   
Under CEQA, an agency uses “a multistep decision tree.”  
(Medical Marijuana Patients, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1185; see 
also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15002, subd. (k).)3  Once an 
activity is determined to be a project, the next question is 
whether the project is exempt.  (CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15002, 
subd. (k)(1), 15061, subd. (a).)  Many types of projects, as well as 
all ministerial ones, are exempted.  (§ 21080, subd. (b)(1) 
[exemption for ministerial projects]; CEQA Guidelines, § 15268, 
subd. (a) [same]; see generally §§ 21080, subd. (b), 21080.01–
21080.07; CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15300–15333.)   
If an agency concludes a particular project is exempt, it 
may file a notice of exemption, citing legal and factual support 
for its conclusion.  (§ 21152, subd. (b); CEQA Guidelines, 
§ 15062, subd. (a).)  If the project is discretionary and does not 
qualify for any other exemption, the agency must conduct an 
environmental review.  (Medical Marijuana Patients, supra, 7 
Cal.5th at p. 1186.)  A required environmental review proceeds 
in stages.  The agency conducts an initial study to assess 
potential environmental impacts.  (CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15002, 
subd. (k)(2), 15063, subd. (a).)  If there is no substantial evidence 
that the project may significantly affect the environment, the 
agency prepares a negative declaration and environmental 
                                        
3  
CEQA is “implemented by an extensive series of 
administrative regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the 
Natural Resources Agency.”  (Medical Marijuana Patients, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1184.)  These regulations can be found at 
title 14, division 6, chapter 3 of the California Code of 
Regulations, and will be referred to as the “CEQA Guidelines.” 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
review ends.  (§ 21080, subd. (c)(1); CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15002, 
subd. (k)(2), 15063, subd. (b)(2), 15070, subd. (a).)  If potentially 
significant environmental effects are discovered, but the project 
applicant agrees to changes that would avoid or mitigate them, 
the agency prepares a mitigated negative declaration (§ 21080, 
subd. (c)(2); CEQA Guidelines, § 15070, subd. (b)), which also 
ends CEQA review.  (Medical Marijuana Patients, at pp. 1186–
1187.)  Finally, if the initial study reveals substantial evidence 
that the project may have a significant environmental impact 
and a mitigated negative declaration is inappropriate, the 
agency must prepare and certify an environmental impact 
report (EIR) before approving the project.  (§ 21080, subd. (d); 
CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15002, subd. (k)(3), 15063, subd. (b)(1); 
Medical Marijuana Patients, at p. 1187.)   
B.  Rules Regarding Project Classification 
A permit issuance decision can be discretionary or 
ministerial depending on the circumstances.  Those terms are 
defined in the CEQA Guidelines.  A project is discretionary 
when an agency is required to exercise judgment or deliberation 
in deciding whether to approve an activity.  (CEQA Guidelines, 
§ 15357.)  It is distinguished from a ministerial project, for 
which the agency merely determines whether applicable 
statutes, ordinances, regulations, or other fixed standards have 
been satisfied.  (Ibid.)  Ministerial projects are those for which 
“the law requires [an] agency to act . . . in a set way without 
allowing the agency to use its own judgment . . . .”  (CEQA 
Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (i)(1).)  They involve “little or no 
personal judgment by the public official as to the wisdom or 
manner of carrying out the project.  The public official merely 
applies the law to the facts as presented but uses no special 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
discretion or judgment in reaching a decision.”  (CEQA 
Guidelines, § 15369.)   
The CEQA Guidelines encourage agencies to classify 
ministerial projects on either a categorical or individual basis.  
(CEQA Guidelines, § 15268, subds. (a), (c).)  That classification 
may be challenged for abuse of discretion.  (Sierra Club v. 
County of Sonoma (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 11, 23 (County of 
Sonoma).)  As explained below, the nature and scope of judicial 
review under this standard depends on whether the 
determination being evaluated is factual or legal in character.  
(See post, Pt. II.B.) 
C.  County Well Permitting Ordinances 
Two chapters of the Stanislaus County Code govern well 
permit issuance.  Chapter 9.36 regulates the location, 
construction, maintenance, abandonment, and destruction of 
wells that might affect the quality and potability of 
groundwater.  (Stanislaus County Code, § 9.36.010.)  Chapter 
9.37 regulates the extraction and export of groundwater.  
(Stanislaus County Code, § 9.37.040.)4 
 
1.  Chapter 9.36 
Chapter 9.36, enacted in 1973, requires a permit from the 
county health officer to construct, repair, or destroy a water 
well.  (Stanislaus County Code, § 9.36.030.)  The chapter sets 
standards for each activity and conditions permit approval on 
compliance.  (Stanislaus County Code, § 9.36.030.)  Here, we 
                                        
4  
All designated references to Chapter 9.36 and Chapter 
9.37 are to title 9 of the Stanislaus County Code.   
 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
consider only well construction permits.  Many permit 
standards are incorporated by reference to a state Department 
of Water Resources bulletin.5   
Four of these incorporated state standards are relevant 
here.  Section 8.A of the bulletin (Standard 8.A) addresses the 
distance between proposed wells and potential sources of 
contamination.  It requires that all wells “be located an adequate 
horizontal distance” from those sources.6  The standard lists 
                                        
5  
Section 9.36.150 of the Stanislaus County Code provides 
that, except as otherwise provided, standards for well 
construction “shall be as set forth in Chapter II of the 
Department of Water Resources Bulletin No. 74.”  The bulletin 
referred to in this section was first published in 1968, as 
Department of Water Resources Bulletin No. 74, Water Well 
Standards:  State of California.  (Dept. of Water Resources, 
Bulletin No. 74-90, June 1991, p. 3 [detailing the publication 
history of Bulletin No. 74].)  In 1981, a revised version was 
published as Bulletin No. 74-81.  In 1991, a supplement was 
issued as Bulletin No. 74-90.  The bulletin and its supplement 
(collectively, Bulletin No. 74) have been described as “a 90-page 
document filled with technical specifications for water wells.”  
(California Groundwater Assn. v. Semitropic Water Storage 
Dist. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1469.)  Under Water Code 
section 13801, subdivision (c), counties are required to adopt 
well construction ordinances that meet or exceed the standards 
in Bulletin No. 74.  Many counties have incorporated the 
bulletin’s standards for well design and construction into their 
well permitting ordinances.   
6  
Potential contamination sources include: storm sewers; 
septic tanks; sewage and industrial waste ponds; barnyards and 
stable areas; feedlots; solid waste disposal sites; and pipelines 
and storage tanks for petroleum and other chemicals, pesticides, 
and fertilizers.   
 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
separation distances that are generally considered adequate for 
specific situations.  For example, it notes that a well should be 
located at least 50 feet from any sewer line; 100 feet from any 
watertight septic tank or animal enclosure; and 150 feet from 
any cesspool or seepage pit.  However, the standard makes clear 
that the distances are not intended to be rigidly applied.  It notes 
that:  “[m]any variables are involved in determining the ‘safe’ 
separation distance;” “[n]o set separation distance is adequate 
and reasonable for all conditions;” and “[d]etermination of the 
safe separation distance for individual wells requires detailed 
evaluation of existing and future site conditions.” It also 
provides that “[c]onsideration should . . . be given to adequate 
separation from sites or areas with known or suspected soil or 
water pollution or contamination.”  Significantly, it allows the 
agency to increase or decrease suggested distances, depending 
on attendant circumstances.   
The other relevant state standards are taken from 
Sections 8.B, 8.C, and 9 of Bulletin No. 74.7  Standard 8.B 
provides that, “[w]here possible, a well shall be located up the 
ground water gradient from potential sources of pollution or 
contamination.”  Under Standard 8.C, “[i]f possible, a well 
should be located outside areas of flooding.”  Standard 9 requires 
that a well’s “annular space” be “effectively sealed” and 
establishes minimum surface seal depths.   
Chapter 9.36 also allows for variance permits.  The county 
health officer “may authorize an exception to any provision of 
this chapter when, in his/her opinion, the application of such 
provision 
is 
unnecessary.” 
 
(Stanislaus 
County 
Code, 
                                        
7  
These will be referred to as Standards 8.B, 8.C, and 9.   
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
§ 9.36.110.)  When authorizing a variance, the health officer 
may prescribe “such conditions as, in his or her judgment, are 
necessary to protect the waters of the state.”  (Stanislaus County 
Code, § 9.36.110.)   
 
2.  Chapter 9.37 
In 2014, County’s board of supervisors amended Chapter 
9.37 to prohibit the unsustainable extraction and export of 
groundwater.  (Stanislaus County Code, § 9.37.040, subd. A.)  
The amendment requires that future permit applications satisfy 
both Chapter 9.36 and Chapter 9.37, unless exempt from the 
latter.8  (Stanislaus County Code, § 9.37.045, subd. A.)   
D.  County’s Classification of Well Construction Permits 
In 1983 County adopted its own CEQA regulations which 
generally classified issuance of all well construction permits as 
ministerial projects unless the county health officer granted a 
variance.  A variance permit was designated as a discretionary 
project, triggering environmental review.  As enacted, County’s 
regulations provided that the issuance of a nonvariance well 
construction permit was presumed to be ministerial “[i]n the 
absence of any discretionary provision contained in the relevant 
ordinance.”  The parties stipulated that County’s practice has 
been to treat all nonvariance permit issuances as ministerial.  
This practice ignores the quoted clause, which mirrors language 
in CEQA Guidelines, section 15268, subdivision (b).  We address 
County’s practice here.   
                                        
8  
Chapter 9.37 exempts, inter alia, wells that extract two 
acre-feet or less per year.  (Stanislaus County Code, §§ 9.37.050, 
subd. A.2, 9.37.030, subd. 10.)   
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
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Since 2014, County has evaluated permit applications as 
follows.  First, it determines whether an application is exempt 
from Chapter 9.37.  If not exempt, approval or denial is classified 
as discretionary.  Second, if the application is exempt from 
Chapter 9.37, County determines whether it seeks a variance 
under Chapter 9.36.  Third, if the application is exempt from 
Chapter 9.37 and does not seek a variance, its approval or denial 
is classified as a ministerial project.  This third classification is 
challenged here.  Plaintiffs argue that even if an application is 
exempt from Chapter 9.37 and seeks no variance under Chapter 
9.36 its approval is still a discretionary project.   
E.  This Litigation 
In January 2014, plaintiffs filed this action alleging “a 
pattern and practice” of approving well construction permits 
without CEQA review.  They assert that all permit issuance 
decisions are discretionary projects because County can “deny 
[a] permit or require changes in the project as a condition of 
permit approval to address concerns relating to environmental 
impacts.”  For example, a permit application could be denied or 
ordered modified if the distance between the proposed well and 
a potential contamination source is deemed inadequate 
(Standard 8.A) or if the proposed well is situated in a flooding 
area when it could be located elsewhere (Standard 8.C).  
Plaintiffs urge that, because determining compliance with 
Chapter 9.36’s standards requires the exercise of subjective 
judgment, the projects are discretionary.  Plaintiffs seek a 
declaration that County’s practice of approving misclassified 
permits without environmental review is “unlawful,” and seek 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
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to enjoin County from issuing any more permits until it changes 
its policy.9   
The case was submitted on stipulated facts.  The trial 
court ruled that County’s approval of all nonvariance permits 
was ministerial.  The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that 
“issuance of well construction permits is a ‘discretionary’ 
decision.”  The appellate court acknowledged that many of the 
decisions County might make under Chapter 9.36 would be 
ministerial. 
 
Specifically, 
it 
concluded 
that 
County’s 
determinations under Standards 8.B, 8.C, and 9 were all 
ministerial acts.  However, it found that County’s compliance 
determination 
under 
Standard 
8.A 
involved 
sufficient 
discretionary authority to make the issuance of all permits 
under Chapter 9.36 discretionary.   
We granted County’s petition for review.  Plaintiffs have 
asked us to also reconsider the Court of Appeal’s conclusions 
regarding Standards 8.B and 8.C.  We decline to do so as we 
explain below.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
Whether County’s issuance of the challenged permits is 
discretionary or ministerial depends on the circumstances.  As 
a result, County may not categorically classify all these projects 
as ministerial.  For the same reason, plaintiffs have not 
demonstrated that all issuance decisions are properly 
designated as discretionary.   
                                        
9  
In a separate action, plaintiffs sought writs of mandate to 
invalidate 60 individual well construction permits issued by 
County without environmental review.  That litigation 
ultimately settled, and plaintiffs dismissed the action.    
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
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A.  Discretionary v. Ministerial Projects 
Distinguishing discretionary projects from ministerial 
ones turns on whether the exercise of judgment or deliberation 
is required in making the decision.  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15357.)  
The “key question is whether the public agency can use its 
subjective judgment to decide whether and how to carry out or 
approve [the] project.”  (Ibid.; see also CEQA Guidelines, 
§ 15002, subd. (i).)  “Whether an agency has discretionary or 
ministerial controls over a project depends on the authority 
granted by the law providing the controls over the activity.”  
(CEQA Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (i)(2).)   
Ministerial projects are those in which the agency merely 
determines “conformity with applicable statutes, ordinances, 
regulations, or other fixed standards.”  (CEQA Guidelines, 
§ 15357; see also CEQA Guidelines, § 15369.)  If the law requires 
an agency “to act on a project in a set way without allowing the 
agency to use its own judgment,” the project is ministerial.  
(CEQA Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (i)(1).)  Under the guidelines, 
certain actions, including the issuance of a building permit, are 
presumed to be ministerial “[i]n the absence of any discretionary 
provision contained in the local ordinance or other law 
establishing the requirements for the permit, license, or other 
entitlement for use.”  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15268, subd. (b).)  As 
noted, County used this same quoted language when 
articulating its own CEQA regulations in 1983.   
Courts have developed a functional test to further refine 
this distinction.  (Friends of Juana Briones House v. City of Palo 
Alto (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 286, 302 (Friends of Juana Briones 
House).)  Like the CEQA Guidelines, the functional test focuses 
on the scope of an agency’s discretion.  The “ ‘touchstone’ ” is 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
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whether the relevant “approval process . . . allows the 
government to shape the project in any way [by requiring 
modifications] which could respond to any of the concerns which 
might be identified” by environmental review.  (Friends of 
Westwood, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 259, 
267 (Friends of Westwood); see also Mountain Lion Foundation 
v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 117.)  If so, the 
project is discretionary.  On the other hand, a project is 
ministerial “when a private party can legally compel approval 
without any changes in the design of its project which might 
alleviate adverse environmental consequences.”  (Friends of 
Westwood, at p. 267.)  “The statutory distinction between 
discretionary and purely ministerial projects implicitly 
recognizes that unless a public agency [is authorized to] shape 
the project in a way that would respond to concerns raised in an 
EIR, or its functional equivalent, environmental review would 
be a meaningless exercise.”  (Mountain Lion, at p. 117.)   
Under the functional test, a decision is ministerial if the 
agency has no discretionary authority to deny or shape the 
project.  (Leach v. City of San Diego (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 389, 
393; see also Health First v. March Joint Powers Authority 
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1144–1145.)  Further, even if a 
statute grants an agency some discretionary authority over an 
aspect of a project, the project is ministerial for CEQA purposes 
if the agency lacks authority to address environmental impacts.  
In McCorkle Eastside Neighborhood Group v. City of St. Helena 
(2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 80, for example, the agency’s power to 
conduct an aesthetic design review did not make a project 
discretionary because the agency “lack[ed] . . . any discretion to 
address environmental effects.”  (Id. at p. 94; see also Friends of 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
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Juana Briones House, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 308 
[discretionary authority to delay a project did not render its 
approval discretionary].)   
Conversely if the agency is empowered to disapprove or 
condition approval of a project based on environmental concerns 
that might be uncovered by CEQA review, the project is 
discretionary.  In a ministerial decision, the laws, regulations, 
and other standards are policy decisions made by the enactors.  
The agency’s role is to apply those standards as adopted.  If an 
agency refuses to approve a ministerial project, an affected 
party may seek a writ of mandate, ordering that approval be 
granted because the enacted standards have been satisfied.  For 
discretionary decisions, on the other hand, the policy makers 
have empowered the agency to make individualized judgments 
in light of the particular circumstances involved.   
Friends of Westwood, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d 259 held the 
issuance of a building permit for a major construction project 
was discretionary.  (Id. at p. 262.)  Under its code the city could 
require project modifications to ensure adequate ingress and 
egress for public streets, and to minimize interference with 
traffic flow.  (Id. at p. 274.)  The city also had discretion to allow 
departures from certain standards established by the city 
council, and exempt the project from conforming to the city’s 
general plan.  (Id. at pp. 274–275.)  Finally, the city exercised 
its discretion by treating a proposed tower as two separate 
structures to satisfy area density ratios.  (Id. at p. 275.)   
Similarly, Miller v. City of Hermosa Beach (1993) 13 
Cal.App.4th 1118 held that issuing a hotel building permit was 
a discretionary project.  As part of the permit approval process, 
the applicant was required to obtain analyses of traffic impacts, 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
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soil settlement, and effects on a downstream sewer line.  (Id. at 
p. 1141.)  The court concluded that the applicant could not have 
legally compelled approval without making changes to alleviate 
adverse environmental consequences revealed during the 
permitting process.  (Id. at p. 1142.)  Thus, the project was 
discretionary.  (Ibid.)   
These Courts of Appeal have employed the functional test 
to help determine whether individual project approvals were 
ministerial or discretionary.  The question before us is slightly 
different.  It is not whether a specific decision was ministerial, 
but instead whether, in at least some circumstances, Standard 
8.A requires County to exercise discretion, and whether its 
classification of all such permits as ministerial is permissible in 
light of this possibility.  Because we are not called upon to rule 
on the status of any individual permit, the functional test has 
no direct application here.  Nevertheless, the factors set forth by 
the Courts of Appeal will be helpful in evaluating the propriety 
of County’s categorical classification. 
B.  Standard of Review 
In general, judicial review of agency actions for CEQA 
compliance extends to “whether there was a prejudicial abuse of 
discretion.”  (§ 21168.5; see Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County 
Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 381.)  “Abuse of 
discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a 
manner required by law or if the determination or decision is 
not supported by substantial evidence.”  (§ 21168.5.)  An 
agency’s declaration of a ministerial exemption is reviewed for 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
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abuse of discretion.  (County of Sonoma, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 23.)   
In a CEQA case, the appellate court’s review “is the same 
as the trial court’s: [It] reviews the agency’s action, not the trial 
court’s decision; in that sense appellate judicial review under 
CEQA is de novo.”  (Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible 
Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 
427.)  The reviewing court independently determines whether 
the record “demonstrates any legal error” by the agency and 
deferentially considers whether the record “contains substantial 
evidence to support [the agency’s] factual determinations.”  
(Ibid.)  When an agency concludes an activity is exempt based 
on factual considerations, a court reviews for substantial 
evidence.  If the agency’s determination “involves pure questions 
of law, we review those questions de novo.”  (County of Sonoma, 
supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 24.)   
As mentioned, CEQA encourages agencies to identify 
which projects are ministerial on either a categorical or case-by-
case basis.  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15268, subds. (a), (c).)  Here, 
County categorically classifies the permits as ministerial.  
Unlike a case-by-case approach, County’s categorical treatment 
does not take into account whether judgment was exercised in 
deciding to issue a particular permit.  County’s position is that 
the permits are ministerial regardless of the circumstances.  
This argument rests on County’s legal interpretation of Chapter 
9.36.  We review that interpretation de novo.   
C.  Analysis 
In determining whether County’s issuance of these 
permits is a discretionary project, we are guided by the principle 
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that CEQA must be interpreted “to afford the fullest possible 
protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the 
statutory language.”  (Friends of Mammoth v. Board of 
Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 259; see also Sierra Club v. 
County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 511.)  We also consider 
the Legislature’s objectives: to reduce or avoid environmental 
damage by requiring project changes when feasible.  (Building 
Industry, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 382.)  Against this backdrop, 
we conclude County’s practice of categorically classifying all the 
permits as ministerial violates CEQA. 
The plain language of Standard 8.A authorizes County to 
exercise “judgment or deliberation when [it] decides to approve 
or disapprove” a permit.  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15357.)  Although 
the standard sets out distances that are generally considered 
adequate, it makes clear that individualized judgment may be 
required.  It notes that an “adequate horizontal distance” may 
depend on “[m]any variables” and “[n]o set separation distance 
is adequate and reasonable for all conditions.”  (Standard 8.A.)  
The determination for each well “requires detailed evaluation of 
existing and future site conditions.”  (Ibid.)  The standard does 
provide a list of minimum suggested distances that are 
“generally considered adequate,” but notes that “[l]ocal 
conditions may require greater separation distances.”  (Ibid.)  
Where, “in the opinion of the enforcing agency adverse 
conditions exist,” the standard requires that the suggested 
distance be increased, or special means of protection be 
provided.  (Ibid.)  While, under the standard, lesser distances 
“may be acceptable,” approval of all lesser distances requires 
agency approval “on a case-by-case basis.”  (Ibid.) 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
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This language confers significant discretion on the county 
health officer to deviate from the general standards, allowing 
either relaxed or heightened requirements depending on the 
circumstances.  If he or she determines the distance between a 
proposed well and a contamination source is inadequate, the 
officer may deny a permit or condition approval on project 
modifications.  (Stanislaus County Code, § 9.36.030.)  The 
permit approval process allows County to shape a well 
construction project in response to concerns that could be 
identified by an environmental review.  (See Friends of 
Westwood, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 267.)  A permit issuance 
in which County is required to exercise independent judgment 
under Standard 8.A cannot be classified as ministerial. 
County argues against this conclusion.  Acknowledging 
that Standard 8.A affords some flexibility, it maintains that the 
standard’s suggested minimum distances and other technical 
criteria are objective guideposts constraining its discretion.  
When read as a whole, it claims Standard 8.A calls for the 
exercise of “little or no judgment” in reviewing separation 
distances.   
The argument fails.  County’s position would be much 
stronger if the objective minimum distances were the only 
criteria the agency was authorized to consider in making the 
issuance decision.  But, as pointed out, that is not the case.  Read 
as a whole, the minimum distances are a starting point, but one 
around which there is considerable latitude.   
Next, County argues that, even if Standard 8.A admits of 
some discretion, its “well-separation standard is only one part of 
[a] much larger regulatory scheme.”  County points out that 
Chapter 
9.36 
contains 
numerous 
provisions, 
including 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
Standards 8.B, 8.C, and 9, all of which the Court of Appeal found 
to involve ministerial decisions.  Considering the process as a 
whole, County argues that the decision to issue a permit under 
Chapter 9.36 is ministerial.  County urges that “CEQA is not 
triggered just because the agency exercises judgment” as to one 
aspect of a project and that a holding to the contrary will create 
a “hair trigger” for CEQA review.   
This argument is inconsistent with the CEQA Guidelines, 
which provide that, when a project “involves an approval that 
contains elements of both a ministerial action and a 
discretionary action, the project will be deemed to be 
discretionary.”  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15268, subd. (d).)  It cannot 
be reconciled with judicial declarations that a project is 
discretionary if the government can “shape the project in any 
way which could respond to any of the concerns which might be 
identified” during an environmental review (Friends of 
Westwood, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 267, italics added), and 
that any “doubt whether a project is ministerial or discretionary 
should be resolved in favor of the latter characterization.”  
(People v. Department of Housing & Community Dev. (1975) 45 
Cal.App.3d 185, 194.)   
Next, County argues that permit issuance is ministerial 
because it has only limited options under Chapter 9.36 to 
mitigate potential environmental damage.  According to County, 
all it can do under Standard 8.A is adjust the location of a well 
to prevent groundwater contamination.  Chapter 9.36 does not 
allow County to address other environmental concerns, like 
groundwater depletion, nor does it allow County to impose other 
measures that might prevent contamination, such as regulating 
the use of pesticides or fertilizers.  County argues that, if 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
environmental review is required for these permits, it may have 
to consider environmental impacts that it will have no authority 
to minimize or mitigate.   
The significance of these purported limitations is unclear.  
Just because the agency is not empowered to do everything does 
not mean it lacks discretion to do anything.10  County concedes 
it has the authority, under some circumstances, to require a 
different well location, or deny the permit.  This is sufficient 
latitude to make the issuance of a permit discretionary, at least 
when particular circumstances require County to exercise that 
authority.  While Chapter 9.36 does not also empower County to 
impose other mitigation measures, that circumstance does not 
mean the issuance of a permit is not subject to CEQA.  If a 
project is neither ministerial nor exempt, the agency must 
comply with the Act.  (§§ 21002, 21002.1, 21081.)   
The CEQA Guidelines do recommend that a public agency 
identify its actions “deemed ministerial under the applicable 
laws and ordinances.”  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15268, subd. (c).)  
The agency is encouraged to do so in “its implementing 
regulations or on a case-by-case basis.”  (CEQA Guidelines, 
§ 15268, subd. (a).)  But the CEQA Guidelines also provide that 
projects should be labelled as ministerial when they are the sort 
“over which the agency has only ministerial controls.”  (CEQA 
Guidelines, § 15022, subd. (a)(1)(B), italics added.)  Read 
together, the guidelines provide that an agency may 
                                        
10  
The question here is a narrow one: whether a decision to 
issue these permits without environmental review is ministerial 
or discretionary.  We are not called upon here to determine the 
scope of County’s authority once an environmental review 
process begins.  We express no view on that issue.   
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
categorically classify approvals as ministerial only when its 
conferred authority is solely ministerial.  The agency may 
classify other types of project approvals as ministerial on a 
“case-by-case basis.”  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15268, subd. (a).)   
County argues that its interpretations of Chapter 9.36 and 
Bulletin No. 74 are entitled to deference.  It notes the CEQA 
Guidelines, which provide that the “determination of what is 
‘ministerial’ can most appropriately be made by the particular 
public agency involved based upon its analysis of its own laws.”  
(CEQA Guidelines, § 15268, subd. (a).)  It also relies on Friends 
of Davis v. City of Davis (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1015, which 
held that “an agency’s view of the meaning and scope of its own 
ordinance is entitled to great weight unless it is clearly 
erroneous or unauthorized.”  (See also Sierra Club v. Napa 
County Bd. of Supervisors (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 162, 178.)  
County’s reliance on these authorities is misplaced.  In those 
cases, the agencies were interpreting their own ordinances.  
That is not the case here.  When it enacted Chapter 9.36, County 
explicitly incorporated standards from Bulletin No. 74.  It is the 
legal interpretation of those state standards that is at issue 
here. 
It is true that when reviewing a particular issuance 
decision for abuse of discretion the agency’s legal conclusions are 
reviewed de novo, while its factual determinations are reviewed 
deferentially for substantial evidence.  When an agency 
determines a particular project is ministerial, it would typically 
rely on one or more factual determinations.  But County is not 
claiming the ministerial exemption applies to a particular 
permit.  Instead, it claims the exemption applies to an entire 
category of permits, as a matter of law.   
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
Of 
course, 
we 
do 
not 
simply 
ignore 
County’s 
interpretation.  It is one of the several tools available to us in 
determining the legal effect of the incorporated state standards.  
(Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 
Cal.4th 1, 7.)  But, as we said in Yamaha, the amount of 
deference due is “situational.”  (Id. at p. 12.)  It depends on 
factors indicating that the agency has a comparative 
interpretive advantage over courts and that its interpretation is 
“ ‘probably correct.’ ”  (Ibid.; see also Irvin v. Contra Costa 
County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 162, 
172–173 [warning that according deference to a local agency’s 
interpretation of state law may result in the inconsistent 
interpretation of that law].)  County fails to establish that those 
factors warrant adopting its interpretation here.  It is ultimately 
for the courts to determine the scope and meaning of an 
ordinance as a matter of law.   
D.  Categorical v. Individual Classification 
Based on the above analysis, we reject County’s argument 
that the issuance of the permits in question is always 
ministerial.  Because Standard 8.A gives County sufficient 
authority, at least in some cases, to render those issuances 
discretionary, County’s blanket classification violates CEQA.  It 
enables County to approve some discretionary projects while 
shielding them from CEQA review.   
However, we disagree with the Court of Appeal that the 
issuance of a permit under Chapter 9.36 is always a 
discretionary project.  The fact that an ordinance contains 
provisions that allow the permitting agency to exercise 
independent judgment in some instances does not mean that all 
permits issued under that ordinance are discretionary.  County 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
of Sonoma, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th 11, illustrates this principle.  
There, the plaintiff argued that the issuance of a permit was 
discretionary because many of the governing ordinance’s 
provisions were “broad and vague and . . . allow[ed] the [county’s 
Agricultural] Commissioner to exercise discretion.”  (Id. at p. 
18.)  The Court of Appeal rejected this argument.  It reasoned 
that most of the provisions potentially conferring discretion did 
not actually apply to the issuance of the particular challenged 
permit (id. at pp. 18, 25–27), and that the few applicable 
provisions did not authorize the imposition of meaningful 
modifications (id. at pp. 18–19, 27–31).  The relevant question 
was “not whether the regulations granted the local agency some 
discretion in the abstract, but whether the regulations granted 
the agency discretion regarding the particular project. . . .  [A] 
regulation cited as conferring discretion must have been 
relevant to the project.”  (Id. at p. 25.)  Because the discretionary 
provisions were not relevant to the permit at issue, the court 
held that the agency properly classified its issuance as 
ministerial.  (Id. at p. 32; see also Prentiss v. City of South 
Pasadena (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 85, 97.)  Permits issued under 
an ordinance are not necessarily discretionary simply because 
the ordinance contains some discretionary provisions.   
The CEQA Guidelines support this conclusion.  A 
discretionary project is one that “requires the exercise of 
judgment or deliberation” when the agency decides to approve 
or disapprove it.  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15357, italics added.)  If 
the circumstances of a particular project do not require the 
exercise of independent judgment, it is not discretionary.  
Additionally, the CEQA Guidelines specifically allow “case-by-
case” classifications, indicating that projects approved under a 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
particular ordinance can be either discretionary or ministerial 
depending on the circumstances.  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15268, 
subd. (a).)   
Chapter 9.36 incorporates a number of standards that 
may never come into play in the issuance of a particular permit.  
Standard 8.A only applies when there is a contamination source 
near a proposed well.  If no contamination source is identified 
during the permit approval process, the discretion conferred by 
Standard 8.A will not be involved in that individual issuance 
decision.  As a result, all well construction permits are not 
necessarily discretionary projects.  The same principle would 
apply to Standards 8.B and 8.C.  We have declined to determine 
whether those provisions confer discretionary authority in some 
instances.  We need not do so here, in light of our analysis of the 
authority granted by Standard 8.A.  Even if Standards 8.B and 
8.C might be understood to grant discretionary authority in 
some cases, we could not conclude that they would always do so.  
Standard 8.B only applies when a proposed well is downhill from 
a contamination source.  Standard 8.C is only implicated when 
a proposed well is in a flood area.  In other words, like Standard 
8.A, Standards 8.B and 8.C may or may not be involved in the 
issuance of a particular permit.11  
                                        
11  
Plaintiffs have also asked us to review whether (1) any 
other standards in Bulletin No. 74 are incorporated into Chapter 
9.36 and (2) the inclusion of those standards makes permit 
issuance discretionary.  The Court of Appeal declined to address 
these questions because it found that the discretion conferred by 
Standard 8.A made permit issuance a discretionary project.  
These questions should be answered by the Court of Appeal on 
remand in the first instance. 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
County’s final argument is that a decision for plaintiffs 
will result in increased costs and delays in the issuance of well 
construction permits.  But CEQA cannot be read to authorize 
the categorical misclassification of well construction permits 
simply for the sake of alacrity and economy.  It bears repeating 
that an individual permit may still be properly classified as 
ministerial.  Moreover, the fact that an individual project is 
classified 
as 
discretionary 
does 
not 
mean 
that 
full 
environmental review, including an EIR, will always be 
required.  The project may qualify for another CEQA exemption 
or the agency may be able to prepare either a negative 
declaration or a mitigated negative declaration after its initial 
study.  Any of these circumstances would obviate the need for 
an EIR.     
In summary, when an ordinance contains standards 
which, if applicable, give an agency the required degree of 
independent judgment, the agency may not categorically classify 
the issuance of permits as ministerial.  It may classify a 
particular permit as ministerial (CEQA Guidelines, § 15268, 
subd. (a)), and develop a record supporting that classification.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeal holding that all permit issuances 
under Chapter 9.36 of the Stanislaus County Code are 
discretionary is reversed.  Plaintiffs are not entitled to a judicial 
declaration to that effect nor to an injunction requiring County 
to treat all such permit issuances as discretionary.   
However, plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that 
County’s blanket ministerial categorization is unlawful.  The 
Court of Appeal holding that plaintiffs were entitled to such 
PROTECTING OUR WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
relief is affirmed.  The matter is remanded to the Court of 
Appeal for it to evaluate the questions it declined to answer and 
to reassess plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Protecting Our Water and Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 8/24/18 – 5th Dist.  
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted   
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S251709 
Date Filed:  August 27, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Stanislaus 
Judge:  Roger M. Beauchesne      
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Law Offices of Thomas N. Lippe and Thomas N. Lippe for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Law Offices of Stephan C. Volker, Stephan C. Volker, Alexis E. Krieg, Stephanie L. Clarke and Jamey 
M.B. Volker for North Coast Rivers Alliance as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.  
 
Law Office of Babak Naficy, Babak Naficy; M. R. Wolfe & Associates and Mark R. Wolfe for California 
Water Impact Network, California Wildlife Foundation and Landwatch Monterey County as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, Matthew D. Zinn, Sarah H. Sigman, Lauren M. Tarpey, Peter J. Broderick; 
John P. Doering and Thomas E. Boze, County Counsel, and Robert J. Taro, Assistant County Counsel, for 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Dennis Bunting, County Counsel (Solano), Peter R. Miljanich, Deputy County Counsel; Jennifer Henning; 
and Laura E. Hirahara for the California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Herum\Crabtree\Suntag, Steven A. Herum and Jeanne M. Zolezzi for Association of California Water 
Agencies and California Special Districts Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Holland & Knight, Jennifer L. Hernandez, Daniel R. Golub and Emily Lieban for California Building 
Industry Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
June Babiracki Barlow and Jenny Li for California Association of Realtors as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Miller Starr Regalia, Arthur F. Coon and Matthew C. Henderson for League of California Cities as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
Rita L. Neal, County Counsel (San Luis Obispo), Erica A. Stuckey, Deputy County Counsel; Roll Law 
Group, Courtney Vaudreuil; Stoel Rives, Timothy M. Taylor, Allison C. Smith; Adamski Moroski Madden 
Cumberland & Green, Thomas D. Greene and Michelle L. Gearhart for County of San Luis Obispo, 
JUSTIN Vineyards and Winery LLC, Lapis Land Company, LLC, Paso Robles Vineyards, Inc., and 
Moondance Partners, LP, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Matthew D. Zinn 
Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger LLP 
396 Hayes Street 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 552-7272 
 
Thomas N. Lippe 
Law Offices of Thomas N. Lippe, APC 
201 Mission Street, 12th Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94105 
(415) 777-5604