Case Title: In re I.R.M.B.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91A20

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-27 
No. 91A20 
Filed 19 March 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: I.R.M.B. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) (2019) from an order entered on 
21 November 2019 by Judge Elizabeth T. Trosch in District Court, Mecklenburg 
County. This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 11 
February 2021 but determined on the record and briefs without oral argument 
pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
No brief for petitioner-appellee mother. 
 
J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
BARRINGER, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-father appeals from the trial court’s order entered on 21 November 
2019 terminating the parental rights of respondent-father to I.R.M.B. (Isabel).1 After 
a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact 
support the trial court’s conclusion to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2019). Therefore, we affirm. 
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
                                            
1 The pseudonym Isabel is used to protect the identity of the juvenile and for ease of 
reading. 
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¶ 2 
 
In December 2013, Isabel was born to petitioner-mother and respondent-father 
in California. Petitioner-mother and respondent-father were never married but had 
an “on and off relationship” from the time Isabel was about three months old until 
she was a year old. 
¶ 3 
 
During their relationship, respondent-father committed at least eight acts of 
intimate partner violence against petitioner-mother and threatened bodily harm to 
petitioner-mother before and after Isabel was born. On 10 November 2014, petitioner-
mother obtained a temporary restraining order from the Superior Court of California, 
County of Los Angeles, against respondent-father after he hit her in the face while 
she was driving with Isabel in the back seat. Later in November, respondent-father 
was incarcerated on charges unrelated to petitioner-mother and was not released 
until April 2017. 
¶ 4 
 
On 2 December 2014, the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, 
issued a three-year restraining order. The restraining order prohibited respondent-
father from, among other things, directly or indirectly contacting petitioner-mother 
or Isabel. The court also issued a child custody and visitation order granting 
petitioner-mother sole legal and physical custody of Isabel and prohibiting 
respondent-father from having visitation with Isabel. 
¶ 5 
 
On 26 December 2014, petitioner-mother and Isabel moved from California to 
North Carolina. Petitioner-mother and Isabel entered North Carolina’s address 
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confidentiality program, which shielded their physical address from respondent-
father, and petitioner-mother discontinued her digital footprint. 
¶ 6 
 
On 14 October 2015, respondent-father, through counsel, filed a “Petition to 
Establish Parental Relationship” in California, seeking joint legal custody of Isabel 
and reasonable, supervised visitation with Isabel. On 3 December 2015, petitioner-
mother filed a response to respondent-father’s petition opposing joint custody and 
visitation. 
¶ 7 
 
On 20 June 2016, petitioner-mother filed a petition to terminate respondent-
father’s parental rights in District Court, Mecklenburg County. Petitioner-mother 
alleged that respondent-father had never exercised visitation with Isabel pursuant to 
an informal agreement between the parties, willfully failed to provide any financial 
support to Isabel and petitioner-mother, failed to provide consistent care to Isabel or 
petitioner-mother, never provided any emotional support to Isabel, and willfully 
abandoned Isabel. 
¶ 8 
 
On 12 October 2016, respondent-father filed a motion to dismiss the petition 
to terminate his parental rights pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. He argued that North Carolina did not have 
subject-matter jurisdiction, because the child custody order was still in effect in 
California and respondent-father’s motion to modify the child custody order was still 
pending. On 23 May 2017, the District Court, Mecklenburg County issued an order 
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staying the termination of parental rights proceeding “pending the complete 
adjudication of the subject-matter jurisdiction issue” in the California custody 
proceeding. Respondent-father was released from incarceration in April 2017. In 
September 2017, petitioner-mother obtained a five-year extension of the California 
restraining order. 
¶ 9 
 
On 13 June 2018 and 13 September 2018, hearings were held in the Superior 
Court of California, County of Los Angeles, on petitioner-mother’s request for an 
order finding California a forum non-conveniens. On 23 October 2018, the California 
Superior Court ordered that California was an inconvenient forum for custody and 
visitation and ordered that all future proceedings should be filed in North Carolina. 
The parties’ case was stayed pending North Carolina’s determination of jurisdiction. 
¶ 10 
 
On 15 March 2019, petitioner-mother filed a motion to vacate District Court, 
Mecklenburg County’s 23 May 2017 order staying the termination of parental rights 
proceeding and requested the trial court enter judgment assuming jurisdiction over 
the termination of parental rights proceeding. On 3 June 2019, the District Court, 
Mecklenburg County found that petitioner-mother and Isabel reside in North 
Carolina and have significant ties to the State and concluding that it had jurisdiction 
over the subject matter and parties. Petitioner-mother’s motions were granted; the 
trial court lifted the stay and assumed jurisdiction. 
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¶ 11 
 
Hearings for the petition to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights were 
held on 10 and 11 October 2019. On 21 November 2019, the trial court entered an 
order concluding that grounds existed to terminate respondent-father’s parental 
rights to Isabel pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). The court also determined that 
it was in Isabel’s best interests that respondent-father’s parental rights be 
terminated. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). Respondent-father appealed. 
II. 
Standard of Review 
¶ 12 
 
Our Juvenile Code provides for a two-step process for the termination of 
parental rights—an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-
1109, 1110. At the adjudicatory stage for termination of parental rights under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), the petitioner bears the burden of proving by clear, cogent, 
and convincing evidence the existence of one or more grounds. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e), 
(f). If the trial court finds the existence of one or more grounds to terminate the 
respondent’s parental rights, the matter proceeds to the dispositional stage where the 
court must determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best 
interests. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). 
¶ 13 
 
We review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 “to determine 
whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the 
findings support the conclusions of law.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984). 
“The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on appeal.” In re C.B.C., 
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373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019). Unchallenged findings are deemed to be supported by the 
evidence and are binding on appeal. In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437 (2019). 
III. 
Analysis 
¶ 14 
 
On appeal, respondent-father contends that (1) the trial court made findings 
of fact that were not supported by the evidence; and (2) the trial court’s findings were 
insufficient to support its conclusion that respondent-father willfully abandoned 
Isabel pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). 
¶ 15 
 
Termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) requires proof that “[t]he parent 
has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately 
preceding the filing of the petition[.]” As used in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7), 
abandonment requires a “purposeful, deliberative and manifest willful determination 
to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to [the child].” In re 
A.G.D., 374 N.C. 317, 319 (2020). The existence of willful intent “is an integral part 
of abandonment” and is determined according to the evidence before the trial court. 
Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501 (1962). “[A]lthough the trial court may consider a 
parent’s conduct outside the six-month window in evaluating a parent’s credibility 
and intentions, the ‘determinative’ period for adjudicating willful abandonment is the 
six consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition.” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 
77 (2019) (quoting In re D.E.M., 257 N.C. App. 618, 619 (2018)). 
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¶ 16 
 
In support of its conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondent-
father’s parental rights based on willful abandonment, the trial court made the 
following pertinent findings of fact: 
19. During 
the 
course 
of 
[petitioner-mother 
and 
respondent-father’s relationship], at least from pregnancy 
until approximately 6 November 2014, Respondent[-
father] committed at least eight acts of intimate partner 
violence against Petitioner[-mother]. 
. . . . 
35. Respondent[-father]’s statements and conduct during 
that period of time [from Isabel’s birth to August 2014] 
demonstrate that he was not only unwilling to initiate 
action to establish a relationship and bond with the 
juvenile, but that he would use power and control tactics to 
intimidate and threaten Petitioner[-mother]. Oftentimes 
his contact with Petitioner[-mother], while shrouded in a 
motivation to visit with juvenile, ultimately served the 
purpose of threatening and intimidating her. 
. . . . 
41. Respondent[-father] continued to initiate contact with 
Petitioner[-mother] by text message cursing her, and 
denigrating her actions . . . . 
. . . . 
44. In response, Petitioner[-mother] again stated in a text 
message that she didn’t feel safe and felt that the juvenile 
was at risk of exposure to the violence. 
45. Ultimately, 
on 
or 
about 
November 
10, 
2014, 
Petitioner[-mother] sought and obtained a temporary 
restraining order; Respondent[-father] was served with 
same on November 11, 2014. 
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46. A hearing was held on December 2, 2014, but 
Respondent[-father] did not attend because he was 
incarcerated and in the custody of law enforcement at the 
time of that hearing. 
47. Petitioner[-mother] obtained a permanent restraining 
order that remained and was in effect for a period of three 
years. 
48. Pursuant to that restraining order, Respondent[-
father] was prohibited from having any contact with 
Petitioner[-mother] or with the juvenile. Respondent[-
father] was also prohibited from having visitation with the 
juvenile. 
49. While the order prohibited third-party efforts to obtain 
Petitioner[-mother]’s address or to establish contact with 
her, the order did not, or would not have prohibited 
Respondent[-father] from initiating court proceedings or 
seeking the assistance of legal counsel to establish a 
custody arrangement, or visitation with the juvenile. 
50. On or about December 26, 2014, Petitioner[-mother] 
moved from the State of California where she and 
Respondent[-father] both lived, and where the juvenile was 
born; she did this in order to establish a safe home for the 
juvenile and also to establish herself in a location where 
she would have family support and be able to seek 
employment free from Respondent[-father]’s harassment 
and threats to disrupt her employment. She also sought 
and was granted protection through a victim protection 
program that shielded her address from Respondent[-
father]. 
51. Respondent[-father] voluntarily submitted himself to a 
law enforcement entity to serve a prison sentence and he 
was incarcerated from November 2014 until sometime in 
April of 2017. 
52. During the time while incarcerated, on or about 11 
February 2015, Respondent[-father] sent Petitioner[-
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mother] and the juvenile a Valentine’s Day card. It was 
sent to Petitioner[-mother]’s previous address she had in 
the State [of] California prior to moving in December 2014, 
and the card was forwarded to Petitioner[-mother]’s 
address in Charlotte, NC. That [was] the only attempt 
Respondent[-father] made to establish contact with the 
juvenile, or to facilitate a parental bond and relationship 
with her. 
53. Respondent[-father], through legal counsel during and 
while incarcerated in the State of California, initiated an 
action for custody and to establish paternity in November 
2015 in the State of California. 
54. Petitioner[-mother] was served with a Summons and 
other legal documents from that action. She retained legal 
counsel and provided her address both to her legal counsel, 
to the court, and to Respondent[-father]’s legal counsel. 
55. The question of whether the State of California could 
or should exercise jurisdiction over this custody matter was 
at issue; but nevertheless Respondent[-father] through 
legal counsel made no efforts to inquire about the juvenile’s 
wellbeing; to request an opportunity to establish a bond or 
relationship with her either through letters, photographs, 
or to provide support for the juvenile directly or through a 
third-party. There was no evidence that Respondent[-
father] was unable to provide any kind of emotional or 
material support to the juvenile from November 2015, 
when he initiated the paternity and custody action in the 
State of California, until the petition to terminate his 
parental rights was filed in the State of North Carolina. 
56. The court finds that Respondent[-father]’s conduct 
even after the petition to terminate his parental rights was 
filed is relevant because it infers willfulness in his failure 
to initiate contact, inquire about the wellbeing, to attempt 
to provide any kind of material or emotional support to the 
juvenile during the 6 months immediately preceding the 
filing of the petition. 
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57. Even after the petition to terminate parental rights 
was initiated and continuing until the date of trial, 
Respondent[-father] has never made any effort in any way 
to seek information about juvenile’s wellbeing—i.e., about 
what she does, what she’s interested in, whether she’s in 
school, to understand her personality, to ascertain her 
needs. Indeed, he has made no effort to provide any kind of 
emotional support to her and/or any kind of material 
support to the juvenile, or to Petitioner[-mother]. 
58. Nor has Respondent[-father] demonstrated any efforts 
since his release from prison in 2017 that shows a desire to 
seize the opportunity to be in a relationship that inures to 
the biological connection that Respondent[-father] has with 
the juvenile. 
59. Respondent[-father]’s conduct, even since his release 
from custody in 2017, demonstrates his failure to inquire 
about, his failure to seek a bond and connection with, or to 
provide any kind of emotional and material support for the 
juvenile during the six months immediately preceding the 
filing of the petition evinces a willfulness and that he 
willfully 
abandoned 
his 
opportunity 
to 
seize 
the 
parent/child relationship, and his duties to provide for her 
emotionally and materially. 
Respondent[-father]’s Objection 
60. Respondent[-father], through his attorney of record, 
objects to the court’s findings that Respondent[-father] 
willfully refused to communicate or seek information about 
the juvenile while the Permanent Restraining Order was 
in effect. 
Specific Finding in Response to Noted Objection 
61. Respondent[-father]’s constraints to establishing a 
bond or maintaining contact with the juvenile were erected 
and created as a result of his own unlawful misconduct. 
Specifically, Respondent[-father] committed repeated acts 
of 
violence, 
harassment 
and 
intimidation 
against 
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Petitioner[-mother] in [the] year 2014. And, as a result, 
Petitioner[-mother] sought a[nd] received a permanent 
domestic violence protective order against him. In addition, 
Respondent[-father]’s other criminal conduct resulted in 
his incarceration from November 2014 through April 2017. 
But, despite those constraints which were created as a 
result of his own misconduct, there were things 
Respondent[-father] could have done either through legal 
counsel or by pursuing other litigation to inquir[e] about or 
seek a bond with the juvenile that he did not do. 
62. And, so this court finds and concludes as a matter of 
law that Petitioner[-mother] has proven by clear cogent 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
grounds 
to 
terminate 
Respondent[-father]’s 
parental 
rights 
by 
willful 
abandonment pursuant to N.C.G.[S.] § 7B-1111(a)(7). 
¶ 17 
 
First, we address respondent-father’s preliminary argument that a portion of 
finding of fact 59 and finding of fact 62 are improperly characterized as findings of 
fact. We agree as to finding of fact 62. However, the challenged portion of finding of 
fact 59, stating that respondent-father’s conduct “evinces a willfulness and that he 
willfully abandoned his opportunity to seize the parent/child relationship, and his 
duties to provide for [Isabel] emotionally and materially” is a finding of fact. This 
Court has recognized that when addressing termination of parental rights appeals, 
“[t]he willfulness of a parent’s actions is a question of fact for the trial court.” See In 
re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50, 53 (2020). 
¶ 18 
 
Next, we consider whether the unchallenged findings of fact support the trial 
court’s conclusion to terminate his parental rights based on willful abandonment 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Because we conclude the unchallenged findings 
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of fact support the trial court’s conclusion to terminate respondent-father’s rights 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7), we need not consider respondent-father’s 
challenge to findings of fact 56, 57, 58, and 59. Additionally, all the challenged 
findings of fact address respondent-father’s action or inaction outside the 
determinative period—after the filing of the petition for termination of rights. 
¶ 19 
 
While respondent-father contends his conduct did not evince a settled purpose 
to forego all parental duties or to relinquish all parental claims to Isabel given that 
the restraining order precluded contact with Isabel and petitioner-mother, this 
argument is unavailing given the unchallenged findings of fact before the Court. As 
in In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 394 (2019), the findings of fact show that respondent 
was aware of his ability to seek legal custody and visitation rights as Isabel’s father 
and how to obtain such relief despite the limitations of the restraining order and his 
incarceration. He filed such a petition before the determinative period began on 20 
December 2015 but took no further action during the determinative period.2 He also 
did not provide any emotional or material support during the determinative period 
even though he could have. A respondent’s action before the determinative period 
                                            
2 While respondent-father argues his “actions of maintaining and pursuing the 
parentage, custody and visitation action he filed in October 2015 demonstrated his desire to 
have a relationship with his daughter,” he has neither contested the relevant trial court 
findings of fact nor cited evidence presented at trial or testimony that support this argument. 
Petitioner-mother’s undisputed testimony is that while respondent-father filed the 
referenced petition in California, it was taken off calendar and respondent-father took no 
further action to get the case back on the calendar or resolved. Petitioner-mother explained 
that all actions to reach a resolution were initiated by her. 
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“are also relevant in interpreting whether his conduct during the window signified 
willful abandonment.” In re E.B., 375 N.C. 310, 320 (2020). Respondent-father’s 
actions as found by the trial court, which led to the entry of the restraining order, 
further supports a reasonable inference of willfulness for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(7). As a result, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent-
father’s parental rights. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
¶ 20 
 
The trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact supported the trial court’s order 
terminating respondent-father’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(7). Accordingly, we affirm. 
AFFIRMED.