Case Title: Galea v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC-2022-0906

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2023-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: June 23, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0906 
_________________________ 
 
Alex C. Galea and Jane Galea  
 
v. 
 
Secretary of Veterans Affairs 
 
 
 
Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court 
(CV-20-900016) 
 
MITCHELL, Justice. 
 
Alex C. Galea and Jane Galea fell behind on the mortgage payments 
for their house in Tuscaloosa ("the property"); as a result, the property 
SC-2022-0906 
2 
 
was sold at a foreclosure sale.  The property was eventually conveyed to 
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs ("SVA"), which sent formal notice to the 
Galeas demanding they vacate the property.  After the Galeas refused to 
do so, SVA initiated an ejectment action in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court.  
The trial court ultimately entered a summary judgment in favor of SVA.  
The Galeas appealed.  We affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
In October 1998, the Galeas purchased the property.  To finance the 
purchase, they obtained a loan from New South Federal Savings Bank 
secured by a mortgage on the property.  In the years that followed, the 
Galeas' mortgage was conveyed to EverBank and then to Green Tree 
Servicing, LLC.  Green Tree Servicing later merged with Ditech 
Financial, LLC.   
 
In early 2019, the Galeas defaulted on their loan.  Ditech notified 
the Galeas that it was initiating foreclosure proceedings, and a 
foreclosure sale was conducted in October 2019.  Ditech was the highest 
bidder at the sale and obtained a foreclosure deed to the property.  Seven 
weeks later, Ditech conveyed the property to SVA. 
SC-2022-0906 
3 
 
 
In December 2019, SVA mailed formal notice to the Galeas 
demanding that they vacate the property.  After the Galeas failed to do 
so, SVA initiated this ejectment action.  For reasons that are not clear 
from the record, nothing appears to have happened in the case for the 
next 21 months, but, in October 2021, the Galeas filed a handwritten 
answer alleging that the foreclosure was illegal and that they had 
evidence to support their position.   
 
Six months later, SVA moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
it held legal title to the property and was entitled to immediate 
possession.  SVA additionally argued that the Galeas had waived their 
redemption rights by refusing to vacate the property.  See § 6-5-251(c), 
Ala. Code 1975.  In support of its summary-judgment motion, SVA 
submitted an affidavit from an SVA employee detailing her knowledge of 
the relevant facts.  The exhibits to that affidavit included copies of (1) the 
deed conveying the property to the Galeas; (2) the mortgage and 
promissory note executed by the Galeas in conjunction with their 
purchase of the property; (3) various documents memorializing the 
assignment of the Galeas' mortgage over the years; (4) the letter notifying 
the Galeas that Ditech was initiating foreclosure proceedings; (5) the 
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foreclosure-sale notice published in The Northport Gazette; (6) the 
foreclosure deed conveying the property to Ditech; (7) the warranty deed 
conveying the property to SVA; and (8) the letter SVA sent to the Galeas 
demanding that they vacate the property.  The trial court set SVA's 
summary-judgment motion for a hearing. 
 
Six days before the hearing, Jane filed a handwritten motion to 
continue, stating that she had just learned of the hearing and that she 
needed more time to hire an attorney.  She also repeated her claim that 
the underlying foreclosure sale was improper.  The trial court granted 
the motion to continue, and the rescheduled hearing was held seven 
weeks later.  Jane appeared at that hearing without an attorney and 
again asked the trial court to continue the matter so that she could have 
more time to find one.  The trial court granted her request. 
 
Another three weeks went by without an attorney filing an 
appearance on behalf of the Galeas. SVA then moved the trial court to 
set another date for the summary-judgment hearing.  The trial court 
granted SVA's motion and set a hearing date five weeks later.  At that 
hearing, Jane again appeared without an attorney.  No transcript of the 
hearing is contained in the record, but the trial court's judgment notes 
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that the Galeas "did not offer any valid testimony or evidence" to dispute 
the facts put forth by SVA.  Accordingly, the trial court granted SVA's 
motion and entered a summary judgment holding that SVA was entitled 
to possession of the property and directing the circuit clerk's office to 
issue a writ of possession in SVA's favor.  The trial court further ordered 
the Galeas to vacate the property immediately and held that they had 
waived their redemption rights by refusing to vacate the property within 
the time allowed by § 6-5-251.  Continuing to proceed pro se, the Galeas 
appealed. 
Standard of Review 
 
When a party "appeals from a summary judgment, our review is de 
novo."  Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. DPF Architects, P.C., 792 So. 
2d 369, 372 (Ala. 2000).  We therefore apply the same standard the trial 
court used -- we must determine whether there is substantial evidence 
establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that must 
be resolved by the fact-finder.  Id.  "Substantial evidence" is "evidence of 
such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of 
impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought 
to be proved."  West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 
SC-2022-0906 
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2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).  We further note that, in reviewing a summary 
judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant and entertain such reasonable inferences as the jury would 
have been free to draw.  Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n v. ECO Pres. Servs., 
L.L.C., 788 So. 2d 121, 127 (Ala. 2000). 
 
Analysis 
 
As the party asserting an ejectment claim, SVA had the ultimate 
burden of establishing (1) that it held legal title to the property and (2) 
that the Galeas were nonetheless withholding possession of it.  Steele v. 
Federal Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 69 So. 2d 89, 93 (Ala. 2010).  SVA submitted 
evidence tracing the chain of title to the property from the time the 
Galeas purchased it in 1998 to when it was purchased by Ditech at a 
foreclosure sale in 2019 and then conveyed to SVA by warranty deed 
seven weeks later.  SVA additionally submitted evidence showing that 
the Galeas had refused its demand to vacate the property.  That evidence 
was sufficient to make a prima facie showing that SVA was entitled to a 
writ of possession.  The burden therefore shifted to the Galeas to put forth 
substantial evidence to rebut that showing.  See Lands v. Ward, 349 So. 
3d 219, 222 (Ala. 2021) ("[I]f the moving party establishes the absence of 
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a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party 
to present substantial evidence that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists."). 
 
The Galeas could have met their burden by submitting evidence 
showing that there were irregularities in the foreclosure process that 
were sufficient to render the foreclosure sale void.  See, e.g., Tidmore v. 
Citizens Bank & Trust, 250 So. 3d 577, 582 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).  But 
even though the Galeas stated in their answer that they had evidence to 
prove that the foreclosure sale here was illegal, they apparently never 
submitted that evidence to the trial court.  Indeed, as the trial court noted 
in its judgment, the Galeas "did not offer any valid testimony or evidence" 
that would refute the evidence submitted by SVA.  (Emphasis added.)  As 
this Court has previously explained, "[b]are allegations, unsupported by 
affidavits or other evidentiary showings, do not create triable issues of 
fact when the party moving for summary judgment has supported its 
motion with affidavits or other probative, admissible evidence."  McGee 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 554 So. 2d 1023, 1024 (Ala. 1989).  Accordingly, 
in the absence of any evidence to refute SVA's showing that it had a right 
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to possess the property, the trial court properly entered summary 
judgment in its favor. 
Conclusion 
 
The Galeas lost their property in a foreclosure sale after they 
defaulted on a loan secured by a mortgage on the property; they then 
refused to vacate the property after its new owner SVA demanded they 
do so.  SVA brought an ejectment action against the Galeas, and, after 
they failed to submit any evidence countering SVA's showing that it had 
a legal right to take immediate possession of the property, the trial court 
entered a summary judgment in favor of SVA.  On appeal, the Galeas 
have not identified any error in that judgment.  It is therefore affirmed. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., 
concur.  
 
Sellers and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.