Case Title: In re M.C.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12481

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12481 
 
IN THE MATTER OF M.C. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 1, 2018. - February 5, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Incompetent Person, Commitment.  Practice, Civil, Civil 
commitment, Transcript of testimony, Recording of 
proceedings, Moot case.  Moot Question.  Due Process of 
Law, Fair trial.  Fair Trial.  Constitutional Law, Fair 
trial.  Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior 
courts. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Central Division of the 
Boston Municipal Court Department on January 20, 2017. 
 
 
The case was heard by Robert J. McKenna, Jr., J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Debra Kornbluh (Anne Kealy also present) for M.C. 
 
Suleyken D. Walker, Assistant Attorney General, for 
Department of Mental Health. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Susan Stefan for Aaron Needle & others. 
 
Brian Almeida, Michael Boyne, Jessica Deratzian, James T. 
Hilliard, & Michael Porter for Massachusetts Psychiatric 
Society, Inc., & others. 
2 
 
 
 
Elizabeth B. McCallum, of the District of Columbia, & Mark 
I. Bailen for Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health 
Law & others. 
 
Karen Owen Talley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & 
Robert D. Fleischner, Jennifer Honig, & Stanley J. Eichner for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services & others. 
 
Wayne Ramsay, pro se. 
 
Thomas F. Schiavoni, pro se. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  After being charged with misdemeanor breaking 
and entering and wanton destruction of property, M.C. was found 
incompetent to stand trial.  He was committed temporarily to a 
psychiatric facility pending a civil commitment hearing, to be 
held pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 5; during that time, M.C. was 
diagnosed as having schizophrenia.  Although he sought to have 
it conducted at a court house, the hearing on M.C.'s civil 
commitment was held in a hearing room at the facility.  Toward 
the beginning of the proceeding, the court-owned recording 
equipment malfunctioned.  Two different alternate recording 
devices were used to record the remainder of the hearing, with 
the result that the transcript of the proceedings is in places 
incomplete.  At the end of the hearing, M.C. was civilly 
committed for a period of two months.  Ultimately, after an 
unsuccessful motion to vacate and a recommitment for an 
additional period of three months, he was released. 
 
We are asked to determine whether conducting the hearing at 
the hospital rather than at a court house violated M.C.'s right 
to due process, particularly in light of the malfunctioning 
3 
 
 
recording equipment.  In addition, we must decide whether his 
right to due process was violated when the Appellate Division of 
the Boston Municipal Court denied M.C.'s motion to vacate the 
commitment order, in particular given the irregular recording 
procedures and the absence of a complete, verbatim transcript. 
 
We conclude that the available transcript provides an 
adequate basis for appellate review and contains evidence 
sufficient to support M.C.'s involuntary commitment.  On this 
record, we conclude that M.C. was not denied due process of law.  
At the same time, however, we emphasize that a judge presiding 
over a civil commitment hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 5, 
retains the discretion to determine the location of the hearing 
on a case-by-case basis.  All civil commitment hearings, 
wherever conducted, must be recorded and must operate as open, 
public proceedings.  These protections are critical to ensuring 
that civil commitment hearings safeguard individuals' rights to 
due process and equal access to the courts.1 
                     
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs of Aaron Needle, Benjamin 
Levy, the Western Massachusetts Recovery Learning Community, and 
the National Association for Rights Protection and Advocacy; the 
Massachusetts Psychiatric Society, Inc., Massachusetts 
Association of Behavioral Health Systems, Massachusetts Hospital 
Association, and Massachusetts Ambulance Association; Wayne 
Ramsay on behalf of the Law Project for Psychiatric Rights, 
Inc.; Thomas F. Schiavoni; the Judge David L. Bazelon Center for 
Mental Health Law, the American Association of People with 
Disabilities, the Association of University Centers on 
Disabilities, and the National Council on Independent Living; 
and the Committee for Public Counsel Services, Center for Public 
4 
 
 
 
1.  Background.  The following facts are not disputed.  In 
May 2016, M.C. was arraigned in the District Court on charges of 
breaking and entering and misdemeanor wanton destruction of 
property.  He was released on personal recognizance.  When M.C. 
appeared in court in August 2016, a competency hearing pursuant 
to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a), was ordered to determine whether M.C. 
was able to stand trial.  That same day, the court ordered that 
M.C. be temporarily committed without bail and sent to the 
Worcester Recovery Center and Hospital for evaluation, pursuant 
to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b).  Ultimately, M.C. was released with 
the condition that he abstain from drugs and alcohol and report 
to the probation department in person twice a week.  In late 
August 2016, he failed to report to the probation department, as 
was required under the terms of his release.  When M.C. appeared 
in court in December 2016, on a default warrant, the court again 
ordered that he be evaluated pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a), 
for competency to stand trial.  The defendant was found 
incompetent and was hospitalized at the Solomon Carter Fuller 
Mental Health Center (Solomon Carter), pursuant to G. L. c. 123, 
§ 16 (a). 
 
In January 2017, M.C. again was found incompetent to stand 
trial.  That same day, the Commonwealth filed a petition under 
                     
Representation, Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, and 
Disability Law Center. 
5 
 
 
G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b), to extend the prior order of commitment.  
Later that month, a District Court judge yet again found M.C. 
incompetent to stand trial, further extended the order of 
commitment, and granted a request to change venue to the Boston 
Municipal Court.  Solomon Carter also filed a petition for 
authorization to treat M.C. medically (administer 
antipsychotics) pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 8B, based on the 
prior diagnosis of schizophrenia.  A commitment hearing was 
scheduled for later that month, within the statutorily mandated 
fourteen-day window.2  See G. L. c. 123, § 7 (c); Hashimi v. 
Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 609-610 (1983) (language of G. L. c. 123, 
§ 7 [c], is mandatory and jurisdictional).  Two days before the 
hearing was to take place, M.C. filed a motion for a 
continuance.  The motion was allowed, and the commitment hearing 
was rescheduled, to a date two days before the statutory 
deadline. 
 
The day before the rescheduled hearing, M.C. filed a motion 
to conduct the hearing at the Boston Municipal Court rather than 
at Solomon Carter.  See G. L. c. 123, § 5 ("The court may hold 
the hearing [at a court house or] at the facility or said 
                     
2 General Laws c. 123, § 7 (c), provides in part:  "The 
hearing on a petition brought for commitment pursuant to [§ 15 
(e)] and [§§] 16 and 18 . . . shall be commenced within 
[fourteen] days of the filing of the petition, unless a delay is 
requested by the person or his counsel." 
6 
 
 
hospital").3  As grounds for the motion, M.C. asserted that civil 
commitment hearings implicate an important liberty interest; 
that he was aware of no other class of litigants for whom 
adjudicatory court hearings were "routinely held in a non-
neutral, segregated court setting such as a psychiatric 
hospital"; that a respondent who seeks to have a hearing 
conducted at a court house "is merely asserting his right to 
stand on an equal footing with all other non-disabled 
litigants"; that "[e]qual access to the courts is guaranteed as 
a matter of both equal protection and the non-discrimination 
provisions of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA)"; and that "the recordings in most hospital hearings are 
not sufficiently complete or accurate to be transcribed."  He 
did not file a request for an additional continuance and did not 
request to be heard on the motion.  The Department of Mental 
Health (DMH) opposed M.C.'s motion on a number of grounds.  It 
argued that holding the commitment hearing outside the facility 
would require special transportation for M.C. "at considerable 
time and expense" and that he "would pose a safety risk to 
himself and others" in transit to the court or in a holding cell 
at the court house.  DMH also asserted that functioning digital 
                     
3 It is not disputed that the Solomon Carter Health Center 
is a "facility" within the meaning of G. L. c. 123, §§ 1 and 
15 (b). 
7 
 
 
recorders were available at the Solomon Carter facility and that 
"there would be no barrier or hindrance to the Court being able 
to provide a full and accurate copy of the recording if it were 
requested."  In addition, DMC asserted that the ADA would not 
apply, and that, even if the ADA did apply, the safety 
requirements that were asserted with respect to the other claims 
were equally applicable to the ADA claim to prevent "harmful 
behavior [by M.C.] to himself or others."  Noting that the 
"motion [was], inter alia, untimely," a judge of the Boston 
Municipal Court denied the motion. 
 
The Boston Municipal Court judge conducted the hearing on 
civil commitment in a "hearing room" on the seventh floor of the 
Solomon Carter facility.  In an affidavit, M.C.'s hearing 
counsel described the room as follows:4 
"The room provided for the mental health proceeding 
contains two long rectangular tables for counsel, the 
respondent and the attending doctor which faced one 
long rectangular table where the judge sits.  "There 
are 4-5 chairs lined up behind 'counsel tables,' a 
chair at the end of the judge's table for the clerk, 
and a chair approximately diagonal from counsel table 
where the court officer sits.  There is an American 
flag behind the judge's table." 
                     
4 In his brief, M.C. argues that the hearing room 
environment was "inadequate," but does not specify his concerns 
with respect to the room itself.  We note that, to the extent 
described in an affidavit by a mental health attorney, the 
layout described appears to conform largely to standards 
propagated by the District Court.  See Standard 4:00 & 
commentary of the Standards of Judicial Practice:  Civil 
Commitment and Authorization of Medical Treatment for Mental 
Illness (rev. Dec. 2011). 
8 
 
 
 
Initially, the hearing was recorded using a recording device 
whose batteries had not been replaced in some time.  The 
recorder stopped functioning after the hearing began.  When he 
learned of the equipment failure, M.C. moved orally that the 
remainder of the hearing be conducted at a court house.  The 
motion was denied.  Alternate devices then were used to record 
the majority of the hearing.  These devices included an 
assistant clerk-magistrate's personal iPhone cellular telephone 
and a cassette tape recorder. 
 
In combination, the substitute recording devices enabled 
production of a transcript detailing most, but not all, of the 
hearing, punctuated by some breaks and inaudible sections.  The 
recorded portions of the hearing include the testimony of the 
sole witness (an inpatient psychiatrist on the inpatient unit at 
Solomon Carter); the parties' closing statements; and the 
judge's issuance of his ruling. 
 
The inpatient psychiatrist testified that she had observed 
M.C. at Solomon Carter approximately five days per week.  During 
this period, she saw him exhibit disorganized behavior, 
paranoia, and hallucinations.  On four occasions, M.C. engaged 
in violent behavior that required physical and chemical 
restraints.  M.C. was restrained on four different occasions 
after throwing a metal laundry hamper; punching a glass window; 
9 
 
 
punching a glass window and kicking a door; and throwing a tray, 
spitting at staff, and attempting to assault a female patient.  
The psychiatrist testified that, on one occasion during his 
temporary commitment for evaluation, she noticed that M.C. had a 
black eye.  When asked about the injury, M.C. explained that he 
had punched himself. 
 
The psychiatrist testified also that, on one occasion, M.C. 
defecated on himself and then refused to shower.  At other 
times, M.C. had "been throwing coffee and food on the walls of 
his room," and had "thrown coffee at the ceiling."  The 
psychiatrist testified further that M.C. clogged his toilet with 
socks and towels; had "been spitting on the kitchen tables, 
where he knows other patients eat;" and "also [had] been 
spitting into his hand and rubbing the spigot that the water 
comes out of in our water fountain with the spit."  At times, 
M.C. struggled with food and liquid intake.  There was one 
thirty-eight-day period during which he did not shower.  When 
repeatedly told to shower, M.C. informed staff members that he 
did not have a change of clothes.  When staff members brought 
M.C. a change of clothes, M.C. "said that the pants were 
laughing at him." 
 
Overall, the psychiatrist testified that, in her opinion, 
if M.C. were to be discharged on the day of the hearing, he 
would pose a substantial risk of harm to himself as a result of 
10 
 
 
his mental illness.  She based this opinion on M.C.'s 
demonstrated limited ability to care for himself, as evidenced 
by hygiene issues and poor oral intake.  The psychiatrist 
testified further that M.C.'s attempts to assault a female 
patient and demonstrated history of throwing large objects would 
place other people in fear of serious physical harm.  The 
psychiatrist did not believe that there was any less restrictive 
setting than inpatient hospitalization in which M.C. would not 
pose a substantial risk of serious harm to himself or others as 
a result of his mental illness. 
 
At the close of the evidence, the judge found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that M.C. suffered from schizophrenia and that, 
if not committed, he would pose a significant, imminent risk of 
harm to himself or to others.  The judge ordered that M.C. be 
involuntarily committed to Solomon Carter for a period of two 
months, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 8.  The judge noted that 
M.C. was "fearful" of taking medication because of a prior 
history of substance abuse, and accordingly, the judge took no 
action on the petition to treat M.C. with medication.  M.C. 
filed a timely notice of appeal to the Appellate Division, under 
G. L. c. 231, § 108, and Rule 8C(b) of the District/Municipal 
Courts Rules of the Appellate Division of the District Court. 
 
2.  Postcommitment proceedings.  After M.C.'s period of 
commitment expired, he filed a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. 
11 
 
 
P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), for relief from the order of 
commitment.  That motion was denied without a written opinion.  
The following day, a judge of the District Court dismissed the 
criminal charges against M.C.  Thereafter, a Boston Municipal 
Court judge ordered that M.C. be civilly committed pursuant to 
G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), for a period not to exceed three months.  
Subsequently, M.C. filed a timely notice of appeal and an 
amended notice of appeal from the initial order of commitment 
and the denial of his rule 60 (b) motion. 
 
M.C. was discharged in August 2017, before his appeal was 
heard.  Asserting improper service of process and arguing that 
M.C.'s appeal was moot following his release, Solomon Carter 
moved to dismiss the appeal pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 9A.  
After a hearing in September 2017, the Appellate Division of the 
Boston Municipal Court allowed Solomon Carter's motion to 
dismiss, on the ground that M.C.'s appeal was moot because the 
order of commitment had expired.  In November 2017, M.C. filed a 
notice of appeal to the Appeals Court from the Appellate 
Division judgment.  We granted direct appellate review. 
 
3.  Discussion.5  a.  Mootness.  Solomon Carter argues that 
M.C.'s claims should be dismissed as moot because the initial 
                     
5 M.C. contends, without reference to any supporting 
authority, that holding his civil commitment hearing at Solomon 
Carter rather than a court house denied him the equal protection 
of the laws under the United States and Massachusetts 
12 
 
 
commitment resulting from the February 2017, order expired after 
two months, and M.C. was recommitted in May 2017, and discharged 
three months later. 
 
"[L]itigation is considered moot when the party who claimed 
to be aggrieved ceases to have a personal stake in its outcome."  
Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 61 (2014), quoting Blake v. 
Massachusetts Parole Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 703 (1976).  Here, 
notwithstanding that he was discharged from Solomon Carter 
before his appeal was filed, and that he was recommitted to 
Solomon Carter on a subsequent occasion, M.C. retains a 
surviving interest in establishing that the February 2017, order 
of civil commitment was not lawfully issued.  In the context of 
involuntary hospitalization, "[a]lthough an expired or 
                     
Constitutions.  We are unaware of any authority that suggests 
that an individual has an equal protection right to select the 
physical location of a commitment hearing, and we note that the 
statute explicitly contemplates hearings in a hospital.  See 
G. L. c. 123, § 5.  In any event, the record does not contain 
sufficient factual information to enable us to address an equal 
protection argument.  "Where constitutional questions and 
matters of asserted public policy are raised, it is preferable 
to pass on the issues in light of a fully developed trial record 
rather than, as here, in the abstract."  Doe v. Doe, 378 Mass. 
202, 203 (1979).  See McSweeney v. Cambridge, 422 Mass. 648, 655 
(1996) (not deciding equal protection claim due to insufficient 
record).  Although we do not agree with Solomon Carter's 
contention that the issue is waived because it was not raised in 
the trial court, we also do not address M.C.'s Federal claim 
that the decision to hold the civil commitment hearing at 
Solomon Carter's facility rather than at a court house violated 
his rights under the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., owing to an incomplete record 
with respect to this issue. 
13 
 
 
terminated [commitment] order may no longer have operative 
effect, [an] appeal should not be dismissed without considering 
the merits of the underlying [commitment] order."  Matter of 
F.C., 479 Mass. 1029, 1030 (2018).  This is because, "[a]t the 
very least, a person who has been wrongfully committed or 
treated involuntarily has 'a surviving interest in establishing 
that the orders were not lawfully issued, thereby, to a limited 
extent, removing a stigma from his name and record.'"  Id. at 
1029–1030, quoting Seney, supra at 62.  The length of time for 
which an individual is committed is relevant to the stigma 
arising from that commitment.  See Matter of E.A.L., 179 Or. 
App. 553, 556 (2002) ("the stigma that arises from commitment is 
a function not only of the fact of commitment but, also, of its 
duration").  Accordingly, the stigma occasioned by one 
involuntary commitment is not erased by a subsequent 
recommitment.  Therefore, M.C.'s case is not moot, and we decide 
his claims on the merits. 
 
b.  Due process.  M.C. asserts that his rights to a fair 
trial and appeal were violated when the Boston Municipal Court 
judge allowed the civil commitment hearing to proceed after 
learning of the malfunction of the recording device, thereby 
resulting in the use of irregular recording equipment and the 
consequent production of an incomplete transcript. 
14 
 
 
 
We review the denial of a motion under Mass. R. Civ. P. 
60 (b) for abuse of discretion.  See Murphy v. Administrator of 
the Div. of Personnel Admin., 377 Mass. 217, 227 (1979) ("It is 
well established that denial of a motion under Rule 60 [b] will 
be set aside only on a clear showing of an abuse of 
discretion").  We conclude that the existing transcript 
demonstrates a sufficient basis for involuntary commitment, and 
that M.C.'s due process rights were not violated in this case.  
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the motion to vacate the 
order of commitment, on different grounds. 
 
As we have observed, "commitment hearings have been 
increasingly clothed with the procedural protections and 
formality typical of other civil (and criminal) trials."  Kirk 
v. Commonwealth, 459 Mass. 67, 72 (2011).  "The provisions of 
G. L. c. 123 balance the rights of and protections for 
incompetent persons with the Commonwealth's interest in 
'protecting the public from potentially dangerous persons' who 
may be unable to control their actions because of their mental 
condition."  Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 119 (2018), citing 
Commonwealth v. Calvaire, 476 Mass. 242, 246 (2017).  
Accordingly, where the prescribed procedures are followed, "an 
individual's due process rights . . . are protected at a hearing 
under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8."  Matter of E.C., supra at 121.  
The liberty interest at stake in a civil commitment proceeding 
15 
 
 
is "massive."  See, e.g., Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 
(1972) (confinement "for compulsory psychiatric treatment" 
entails "a massive curtailment of liberty"). 
 
An individual facing involuntary commitment under G. L. 
c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, has the right to notice and a hearing, the 
right to an attorney, the right to introduce evidence, the right 
to an independent medical evaluation, and the right to cross-
examine witnesses.  See G. L. c. 123, § 5; Matter of E.C., 479 
Mass. at 121.  Individuals do not, however, have a due process 
right to select the location of a judicial proceeding.  See, 
e.g., Foley v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 496, 500 (1999) (where 
motion judge was authorized by statute "to adjourn the court, 
whenever the public convenience makes it expedient, to the 
Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Bridgewater," judge 
lawfully could hold arraignment sessions outside secured housing 
area of correctional facility without making formal findings of 
fact that public convenience requires such action); Commonwealth 
v. DeBrosky, 363 Mass. 718, 721 (1973) (to enable hospitalized 
witness to complete cross-examination, "[t]he judge had the 
authority to transfer the trial to the auditorium of the 
hospital in the reasonable exercise of his discretion," over 
defendant's objection). 
 
An individual subject to civil commitment proceedings under 
G. L. c. 123, § 16, "is entitled to a 'record of sufficient 
16 
 
 
completeness to permit proper consideration of his claims [on 
appeal].'"  Commonwealth v. Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 577-578 
(2018), quoting Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971).  See 
Standard 4:02 of the Standards of Judicial Practice:  Civil 
Commitment and Authorization of Medical Treatment for Mental 
Illness (rev. Dec. 2011) (Standards of Judicial Practice) 
(commitment hearings must be recorded electronically on 
appropriate recording device, with recording made available to 
parties).  Transcripts of civil commitment proceedings are 
useful for appellate review of questions related to the 
sufficiency of evidence, and to protections of due process 
rights.  At the same time, it is well established that the right 
to a record of sufficient completeness "does not 'translate 
automatically into a complete verbatim transcript.'"  Imbert, 
supra at 578, quoting Mayer, supra. 
 
When portions of a transcript are unavailable or otherwise 
incomplete "through no fault of the parties," then "'rough 
accommodations' in the method in which an appeal is presented 
are constitutionally permissible."  Commonwealth v. Harris, 376 
Mass. 74, 77 (1978).  Alternatives to a complete verbatim 
transcript are "constitutionally adequate if they bring before 
the appellate court an account of the events sufficient to allow 
it to evaluate the defendant's contentions."  Id., citing Britt 
v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971).  Furthermore, "[e]ven if 
17 
 
 
a [party] asserts an appellate claim which requires recourse to 
a transcript, he is not necessarily entitled to the full 
transcript."  Bundy v. Wilson, 815 F.2d 125, 135 (1st Cir. 
1987). 
 
We consider the existing record in this case as sufficient 
to permit appellate review and to enable proper disposition of 
M.C.'s appeal.  There is "enough in the record pertinent to the 
point to enable us to decide [this appeal] without resort to 
speculation."  Commonwealth v. Bottiglio, 357 Mass. 593, 597 
(1970).  The existing record supports the motion judge's finding 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that M.C. was mentally ill 
and that, as a result of his mental illness, "the discharge of 
such person from a facility would create a likelihood of serious 
harm."  See Newton-Wellesley Hosp. v. Magrini, 451 Mass. 777, 
780 n.8 (2008), quoting G. L. c. 123, § 8 (a).  See also 
Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 
271, 276 (1978) (standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt of 
likelihood of serious harm is required in cases of civil 
commitment for mental illness under G. L. c. 123, § 16 [b]). 
 
The record also contains sufficient evidence to support the 
psychiatrist's conclusion that M.C.'s release could pose an 
imminent risk of danger, based on his repeatedly demonstrated 
use of physical force against others and himself.  See 
Commonwealth v. Nassar, 380 Mass. 908, 917 (1980) ("'Immediacy' 
18 
 
 
is linked to the requirement of an enhanced standard of proof in 
the sense that the forecast of events tends to diminish in 
reliability as the events are projected ahead of time").  See 
also Matter of G.P., 473 Mass. 112, 128 (2015) (in context of 
G. L. c. 123, § 35, "what must be shown is a substantial risk 
that the harm will materialize in the reasonably short term -- 
in days or weeks rather than in months"). 
 
Finally, the evidence at the hearing also was sufficient to 
support the judge's determination that "no less restrictive 
alternative to hospitalization is appropriate."  Newton-
Wellesley Hosp., 451 Mass. at 780 n.8, citing Nassar, 380 Mass. 
at 917–918.  See Nassar, supra (in context of civil commitment 
proceedings, all parties should aim "to find the least 
burdensome or oppressive controls over the individual that are 
compatible with the fulfilment of the dual purposes of our 
statute, namely, protection of the person and others from 
physical harm and rehabilitation of the person"). 
 
Overall, the available record demonstrates the existence of 
sufficient evidence to commit M.C. involuntarily pursuant to 
G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b).6 
                     
6 The standard of proof under the Massachusetts Constitution 
is higher than the minimum standard of "clear and convincing" 
evidence under the United States Constitution.  See Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979). 
19 
 
 
 
We do not agree with M.C.'s assertion that the motion judge 
committed legal error in denying M.C.'s motion under Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 60 (b) for relief from judgment after the judge learned 
that M.C. had not received a verbatim transcript of the civil 
commitment hearing. 
 
Here, the incomplete transcript resulted from an equipment 
malfunction that was not the fault of either party.  As the 
motion judge noted, even court houses equipped with new 
recording systems occasionally experience recording equipment 
malfunctions.  Generally, a party seeking to reconstruct 
proceedings must seek relief in the court where the proceeding 
took place, and "where [the party] may try to reconstruct the 
trial proceedings in a manner that will be sufficient for [the 
party] to present his [or her] claims on appeal."  See Drayton 
v. Commonwealth, 450 Mass. 1028, 1029 (2008), citing Harris, 376 
Mass. at 79.  Here, M.C. did not file any pleading under Mass. 
R. A. P. 8 (e), as amended, 378 Mass. 932 (1979), in order to 
correct the record before the motion judge.  See Commonwealth v. 
Woody, 429 Mass. 95, 98 (1999) ("Gaps or inaudible portions of a 
tape recording are most closely governed by Mass. R. A. P. 
8 [e] . . . .  [T]he appellant may determine if the omissions 
are material, in which event the appellant has the burden to 
settle the record as provided in Mass R. A. P. 8 [c] and [e]").  
This clearly is not a case in which the "proceedings cannot be 
20 
 
 
reconstructed sufficiently to present the [petitioner's] 
claims."  See Imbert, 479 Mass. at 578, quoting Harris, supra at 
78.  Indeed, the motion judge underscored that he "know[s] how 
easy it is to get responsible lawyers and a judge to reconstruct 
a three- to four-week trial, let alone an hour-long hearing." 
 
Here, the record is adequate to determine the merits of the 
underlying issue, in other words, to provide the defendant and 
his counsel a sufficient record upon which to challenge the 
findings and rulings.  Neither party disputes the validity of 
the transcription of the testimony that actually was recorded, 
and M.C. does not assert an effort at deliberate concealment of 
a portion of the proceedings.  Beyond pointing out the existence 
of gaps in the recording, M.C. does not establish how the 
unrecorded content prejudiced him in the context of these 
proceedings.  There is no dispute as to the existence of a 
twenty-minute unrecorded segment of the hearing.  With respect 
to this unrecorded segment, however, Solomon Carter agrees that 
"there is no controversy over the items M.C. identifies as 
missing."  Solomon Carter also "agrees that M.C.'s objection to 
continuing the hearing [is] preserved."  The existence of other 
gaps and pauses noted on the transcript do not outweigh the 
strength of the testimony that was recorded, or the validity of 
the result to be drawn from it. 
21 
 
 
 
We discern no error in the Appellate Division's conclusion 
that the steps taken by the motion judge to initiate backup 
recording of the hearing were "appropriate and reasonable."7  The 
judge acted within his discretion to continue the hearing using 
alternate recording devices, which he believed in good faith 
were "effective" and "adequate," and therefore would produce an 
accurate recording.  We defer to the motion judge's finding that 
all recording devices were used with his knowledge and 
authority.  Accordingly, we reject M.C.'s argument that the 
recording devices were "unofficial" within the meaning of 
Special Rule 308(B) of the Boston Municipal Court Department 
Sitting for Civil Business (1989).  As the judge explained at 
the hearing on M.C.'s motion: 
"When it was discovered by the clerk, who alerted me, 
that the new digital recording recorder was not 
operating, the supplementation of that device, first 
by the iPhone and then by the cassette recorder, both 
were done openly and with the sole intent to see to it 
that the proceeding was substantially recorded as best 
as possible under the circumstances." 
 
The judge further explained that the clerk-magistrate had used 
his iPhone at the initial commitment hearing "with [the judge's] 
                     
7 M.C. also argues that the four cassette tapes he received 
containing audio recordings of the hearing do not qualify as "a 
cassette copy of an original recording, or any portion thereof," 
of the hearing on the petition for civil commitment, as provided 
by Special Rule 308(A)(5)(a) of the Boston Municipal Court 
Department Sitting for Civil Business (1989).  This distinction, 
however, is immaterial. 
22 
 
 
authority, in an attempt to keep the hearing progressing," and 
only "because the primary device to record the proceedings had 
failed." 
 
c.  Open proceedings.  There is no evidence in the record 
to indicate that members of the public were prevented, or would 
have been prevented, from attending the civil commitment 
hearing.  There is, however, some suggestion of a misconception 
that civil commitment proceedings are by nature closed and 
hidden from public view.8  Because the liberty interests at stake 
in civil commitment proceedings are great, we exercise our 
discretion to address questions related to the open nature of 
civil commitment proceedings under G. L. c. 123, § 16.  We 
affirm today that civil commitment proceedings under G. L. 
c. 123, § 16 (b), are presumptively open to the public.9 
                     
8 During the April 2017 hearing on M.C.'s motion under Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), months after the civil 
commitment hearing, the motion judge communicated his 
understanding as follows: 
 
"These proceedings are not open to the public.  They 
are held here in a hearing[] room in the hospital 
where the public generally cannot walk into.  They are 
conducted generally with the patient, attorneys, 
family members and needed security and medical 
personnel present." 
 
As noted supra, civil commitment proceedings under to G. L. 
c. 123, § 16 (b), are presumptively open to the public. 
 
9 At the same time, "[a]s is the case in criminal trials, 
the right of the public to attend the hearings is not absolute.  
23 
 
 
 
In Kirk, 459 Mass. at 68, this court held that 
"recommitment proceedings pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), 
are presumptively open to the public."  We noted the "likely 
beneficial effects of public access to such proceedings."  Id. 
at 73.  We also noted that "G. L. c. 123, §§ 5 and 16, the 
provisions governing commitment hearings and the commitment of 
those not guilty by reason of mental illness, with which we are 
concerned, do not speak of closure."  Id. at 75.  While our 
holding in Kirk, supra at 73 n.9, was "limited to the question 
of closure as it regards G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c)," both parties 
read that case to indicate that civil commitment proceedings 
more broadly are presumptively open to the public.  Indeed, 
after our decision in Kirk, the District Court issued revised 
standards of judicial practice interpreting Kirk to suggest that 
the rule of presumptive openness "should be applied in all civil 
commitment proceedings for mentally ill persons."  See Standard 
4:01 & commentary of the Standards of Judicial Practice.  We 
clarify our endorsement of the District Court's interpretation.  
"Openness . . . enhances both the basic fairness of the 
[proceeding] and the appearance of fairness so essential to 
public confidence in the system."  Foley, 429 Mass. at 499, 
quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 
                     
See Kirk v. Commonwealth, 459 Mass. 67, 73 (2011), citing 
Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 107 (2010). 
24 
 
 
(1986).  "The physical layout of the place in which the 
[proceedings] are held and its accessibility to the public are 
important considerations in deciding whether the proceedings 
conducted there are properly public."  Foley, supra. 
 
d.  Superintendence authority.  At present, the Boston 
Municipal Court and District Court standards of judicial 
practice imply a preference for holding civil commitment 
proceedings in health care facilities rather than at court 
houses.  Those courts' Standards of Judicial Practice for Civil 
Commitment and Authorization of Medical Treatment for Mental 
Illness provide that 
"[h]earings may be conducted away from the courthouse 
and at the petitioning mental health facility or 
Bridgewater State Hospital.  G. L. c. 123, § 5.  
Normally it is desirable to do so if appropriate 
decorum, security, recordation and public access are 
available." 
 
Standard 4:00 of the Standards of Judicial Practice.  
Notwithstanding this section of the guidelines, G. L. c. 123, 
§ 5, requires no such baseline preference for holding hearings 
at mental health facilities over court houses.10 
                     
10 General Laws c. 123, § 5, provides, in relevant part: 
 
"Whenever the provisions of this chapter require that 
a hearing be conducted in any court for the commitment 
or further retention of a person to a facility or to 
the Bridgewater state hospital or for medical 
treatment including treatment with antipsychotic 
medication, it shall be held as hereinafter 
provided. . . .  Notice of the time and place of 
25 
 
 
 
General Laws c. 123, § 5, authorizes, but does not require, 
a motion judge to conduct civil commitment hearings under G. L. 
c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, at a mental health facility rather than at a 
court house.  General Laws c. 123, § 5, provides a judge with 
flexibility to determine the location of a civil commitment 
hearing under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8.  The statute obligates 
the court to provide "[n]otice of the time and place of [the] 
hearing . . . to the department, the person, his counsel, and 
his nearest relative or guardian," G. L. c. 123, § 5, and states 
that "[t]he court may hold the hearing at the facility or said 
hospital," id.  "The use of the word 'may' in a statute is 
generally permissive, reflecting the Legislature's intent to 
grant discretion or permission to make a finding or authorize an 
act."  Commonwealth v. Dalton, 467 Mass. 555, 558 (2014).  "It 
is axiomatic in statutory construction that the word 'shall' is 
an imperative and that the word 'may' does not impose a mandate 
but simply authorizes an act."  School Comm. of Greenfield v. 
Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, 385 Mass. 70, 81 (1982).  Accordingly, 
we emphasize that, under G. L. c. 123, § 5, a judge presiding 
over a civil commitment hearing retains discretion to determine 
the location of the hearing on a case-by-case basis. The 
                     
hearing shall be furnished by the court to the 
department, the person, his counsel, and his nearest 
relative or guardian.  The court may hold the hearing 
at the facility or said hospital." 
26 
 
 
language of G. L. c. 123, § 5, does not express a preference for 
any particular location.  Irrespective of the location where a 
hearing may be held, as the Standards of Judicial Practice 
rightfully note, "appropriate decorum, security, recordation and 
public access" are required for such hearings, wherever they 
occur.  See Standard 4:00 of the Standards of Judicial Practice. 
 
Ensuring adequate protection of due process rights of all 
individuals subject to civil commitment hearings is necessary to 
"the furtherance of justice, the regular execution of the laws, 
the improvement of the administration of such courts, and the 
securing of their proper and efficient administration."  See 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  In order to safeguard the due process rights 
of individuals subject to possible civil commitment, civil 
commitment proceedings pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16, must be 
recorded adequately.  It also must be made clear to judges 
presiding over civil commitment hearings that G. L. c. 123, § 5, 
expresses no preference with respect to the location where civil 
commitment hearings are held, but, rather, accords the judge 
discretion. 
 
We expect that the Chief Justice of the Boston Municipal 
Court and Chief Justice of the District Court will modify, as 
appropriate, the Boston Municipal Court and District Court 
Standards of Judicial Practice for Civil Commitment and 
Authorization of Medical Treatment for Mental Illness in 
27 
 
 
accordance with this decision, paying special attention to 
ensuring that civil commitment hearings are open to the public 
and are adequately recorded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.