Case Title: Redden v. Delaware

Citation: 

Docket Number: 529, 2015

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2016-10-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
  
TYRONE A. REDDEN, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 529, 2015 
 
Defendant Below-  
 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
§ 
Superior Court of the 
 
 
 
§ 
State of Delaware 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
§ 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0701015161 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
 
 
§ 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:   October 5, 2016 
Decided:   
October 27, 2016 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and VALIHURA, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.   AFFIRMED. 
John A. Barber, Esquire, Law Office of John A. Barber, Wilmington, Delaware for 
Appellant. 
Gregory E. Smith, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for Appellee.  
 
VALIHURA, Justice: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant below, Tyrone Redden (“Redden”), seeks review of the Superior 
Court’s September 1, 2015 Order1 denying his Amended Motion for Postconviction 
Relief (the “Amended Motion”).  At issue in this appeal are two out-of-court statements 
introduced at Redden’s trial pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 3507.  In his Motion, Redden argued 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Section 3507 statements 
after the State failed to ask each witness whether his or her out-of-court statement was 
truthful.  Redden further argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise the same issue on direct appeal.  The Superior Court denied the Amended Motion, 
holding that Redden’s claims were procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(1) and (i)(2). 
As set forth below, we agree with the Superior Court that Redden’s claims are 
procedurally barred and therefore AFFIRM the Superior Court’s Order denying Redden’s 
Motion.  
II. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 
Redden’s convictions stem from a series of burglaries and attempted burglaries 
that occurred at four homes between January 3 and January 17, 2007.3  During these 
incidents, the suspects were seen in a white minivan and a Chrysler 300.  On January 17, 
2007, Redden was arrested when the police stopped a Chrysler 300 matching the 
                                                          
 
1 State v. Redden, 2015 WL 5168123 (Del. Super. Sept. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Redden IV, 2015 
WL 5168123, at __”]. 
2 Although additional evidence was presented at Redden’s trial, this Opinion details only those 
facts necessary to understanding the witness testimony at issue in this appeal.   
3 See Redden v. State, 2009 WL 189868, at *1 (Del. Jan. 14, 2009) [hereinafter “Redden I, 2009 
WL 189868, at __”]. 
 
3 
 
description of the suspects’ vehicle.4  In the glove box, police found a rental agreement 
signed by Redden and his sister, Desarie Dennis (“Dennis”).   
At trial, Dennis testified that she rented a Chrysler 300 at Redden’s request.  
However, she claimed not to remember whether she also rented a white minivan, even 
after being shown a receipt with her signature on it.  The State introduced Section 3507 
testimony concerning a statement Dennis made to the police that she had rented both 
vehicles.  Dennis then testified that she did in fact rent the minivan.  Redden’s trial 
counsel challenged the voluntariness of Dennis’s statement,5 but not the State’s failure to 
ask Dennis whether her statement to the police was truthful.  
Another witness, Eugene Lai (“Lai”), testified that he woke from a nap to discover 
a man attempting to pry open his door while another man stood nearby.  Lai further 
testified that the police presented him with a photo array, on which he identified one of 
these men as Redden’s codefendant, James Ross (“Ross”).  The State introduced the prior 
identification pursuant to Section 3507 without eliciting testimony concerning the prior 
statement’s truthfulness.  Redden’s counsel did not object.   
On October 24, 2007, a jury found Redden guilty of three counts of Burglary 
Second Degree, three counts of Theft Over $1,000, three counts of Conspiracy Second 
Degree, one count of Possession of Burglar’s Tools, one count of Theft of a Firearm, and 
one count of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited.  On December 21, 
                                                          
 
4 Id. at *1. 
5 A79 (Tr. 177:17-20) (“I’m pretty sure I heard her say it was not a voluntary statement.  
Therefore, I don’t think it complies with the 3507 requirements and he shouldn’t be allowed to 
introduce the statement at this point.”). 
 
4 
 
2007, the State moved to declare Redden a habitual offender.  On January 25, 2008, the 
Superior Court declared him a habitual offender and sentenced him to 43 years of 
incarceration. 
On January 14, 2009, this Court affirmed Redden’s convictions.6  On June 3, 
2009, Redden filed a motion for a new trial, which the Superior Court denied.7  On 
appeal, this Court found that the Superior Court addressed only one of Redden’s two 
claims and remanded for a ruling on the second claim.  On remand, the Superior Court 
found the second claim to be without merit,8 and this Court affirmed on June 25, 2010.9  
On August 20, 2013, Redden filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief.  On July 10, 
2014, Redden’s court-appointed counsel filed the Amended Motion.10  The Superior 
Court denied the Amended Motion on September 1, 2015,11 and this appeal followed. 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. 
Contentions of the Parties 
Redden contends that the Superior Court erred in holding that his claims were 
procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(1) and (i)(2), arguing that these procedural bars do 
not apply pursuant to former Rule 61(i)(5)’s “miscarriage of justice” exception.12  He 
argues that this exception contemplates his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  The 
                                                          
 
6 Redden I, 2009 WL 189868, at *2. 
7 See Redden v. State, 2010 WL 2560041, at *1 (Del. June 25, 2010) [hereinafter Redden III, 
2010 WL 2560041, at __”]. 
8 Redden v. State, 2010 WL 893685, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Redden II, 
2010 WL 893685, at __”], aff’d, Redden III, 2010 WL 2560041. 
9 Redden III, 2010 WL 2560041, at *2. 
10 Redden IV, 2015 WL 5168123, at *1. 
11 Id. at *3. 
12 The Superior Court did not address whether Rule 61(i)(5)’s “miscarriage of justice” exception 
applied.  See Redden IV, 2015 WL 5168123. 
 
5 
 
State responds that ineffective assistance of counsel alone does not satisfy the exception 
set forth in former Rule 61(i)(5).  Alternatively, the State argues that Redden failed to 
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.   
B. 
Standard and Scope of Review 
This Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion for postconviction relief for 
abuse of discretion.13  “Constitutional questions and other questions of law are reviewed 
de novo.”14 
C. 
Redden’s Claims Are Procedurally Barred Under Rule 61 
Before reaching the merits of Redden’s Amended Motion, this Court must 
determine whether his claims are procedurally barred, applying the version of Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 61 that was in effect at the time Redden filed his pro se motion.15   
The Superior Court determined that Redden’s Amended Motion was time barred 
under Rule 61(i)(1) and procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(2).16  Pursuant to Rule 
61(i)(1), a motion for postconviction relief must be filed within one year after the 
judgment of conviction is final, which occurs “when the Supreme Court issues a mandate 
or order finally determining the case on direct review.”17  Redden filed his pro se motion 
                                                          
 
13 Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724, 728 (Del. 2014) (citing Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935, 941 (Del. 
2013)).  
14 Id. (italics added) (citing Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013)). 
15 See Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748, 757 n.24 (Del. 2016) (noting that this Court applies the 
version of Rule 61 in effect at the time a defendant files a motion for postconviction relief).  All 
citations to Rule 61 in this Opinion refer to the version in effect on August 20, 2013, the date 
Redden filed the pro se motion.  See A13, at DI 131. 
16 Redden IV, 2015 WL 5168123, at *2. 
17 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(2). 
 
6 
 
on August 20, 2013, more than a year after his conviction became final.18  Accordingly, 
the Superior Court properly held that the Amended Motion was time barred. 
 
Rule 61(i)(2) bars consideration of issues asserted in subsequent motions for 
postconviction relief that were not asserted in a prior motion.19  The Supreme Court 
denied Redden’s 2009 motion for a new trial under Rules 33 and 61.20  Therefore, the 
Superior Court determined that the Amended Motion was Redden’s second motion for 
postconviction relief.21  Because Redden did not raise the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims in his 2009 motion, these claims are now barred under Rule 61(i)(2). 
D. 
Redden Has Not Demonstrated a Colorable Claim That There Was a 
Miscarriage of Justice Pursuant to Rule 61(i)(5) 
At the time of Redden’s Amended Motion, Rule 61(i)(5) provided that the bars to 
relief in Rule 61(i)(1)-(3) did not apply “to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage 
of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, 
reliability, integrity[,] or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of 
conviction.”22  The petitioner “bears the burden of proving the existence of a 
constitutional violation under Rule 61(i)(5).”23 
“A meritorious ineffective assistance of counsel claim that demonstrates a 
                                                          
 
18 A13, at DI 131.  This Court’s mandate issued on February 6, 2009.   
19 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).  
20 Redden III, 2010 WL 2560041, at *1. 
21 Redden IV, 2015 WL 5168123, at *2. 
22 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
23 Summers v. State, 2014 WL 3559688, at *1 (Del. July 17, 2014) (citing Gattis v. State, 955 
A.2d 1276, 1290 (Del. 2008)). 
 
7 
 
constitutional violation may be considered an exception under Rule 61(i)(5).”24  To 
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy two requirements.  
First, the defendant must establish that his or her “counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.”25  Doing so requires overcoming a “strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”26  
Second, the defendant must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”27  A 
reasonable probability requires more than a showing “merely that the conduct ‘could 
have or might have or it is possible that [it would have]’ led to a different result.”28  “A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”29 
Here, any failure of Redden’s trial counsel to object to the introduction of Dennis 
and Lai’s Section 3507 statements does not satisfy Rule 61(i)(5)’s “miscarriage of 
justice” exception.  Section 3507 provides that “the voluntary out-of-court prior statement 
                                                          
 
24 Flowers v. State, __ A.3d __, 2016 WL 6196304, at *5 (Del. Oct. 21, 2016) (en banc)); see 
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 555 (Del. 1990) (suggesting that the Court would consider an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim collaterally if “a constitutional violation has occurred”); 
cf. State v. Wilmer, 2003 WL 751181, at *5 (Del. Super. Feb. 28, 2003) (“Because [the 
defendant] cannot establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, Rule 61(i)(5) does 
not apply . . . .”). 
25 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).  
26 Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  
27 Id. at 694.  
28 Neal, 80 A.3d at 942 (quoting Ploof, 75 A.3d at 867).  
29 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
 
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of a witness who is present and subject to cross-examination may be used as affirmative 
evidence with substantive independent testimonial value.”30  The statement is admissible 
“regardless of whether the witness’ in-court testimony is consistent with the prior 
statement or not.”31  Such statements are also admissible irrespective of the witness’s 
response to the prosecutor’s foundational questions.32  Further, there is a distinction 
between defense counsel’s right to insist that the State establish the truthfulness of the 
statement and defense counsel’s right to “make a professional judgment not to object” if 
the State fails to do so.33 
At Redden’s trial, the State did not ask either Dennis or Lai whether their prior 
out-of-court statements were truthful,34 and Redden’s trial counsel did not object on that 
basis.  Redden’s trial counsel stated that he could “see why [he] wouldn’t have[,]” 
because Dennis’s testimony did not appear credible, and the prosecutor “would have had 
a field day” if Dennis testified that her statement to the police was untruthful.35  As to 
Lai’s statement, trial counsel, although his current memory of the testimony had faded, 
noted that Lai’s testimony “appears to have been credible” and that he “probably figured 
there was nothing to gain” by objecting.  In addition, Lai testified that he “basically just 
                                                          
 
30 11 Del. C. § 3507(a).  
31 11 Del. C. § 3507(b). 
32 See Flowers, 2016 WL 6196304, at *4 (“Our decision in Moore explained, ‘[u]nder § 3507, 
there is no requirement that the witness either affirm the truthfulness of the out-of-court 
statement, or offer consistent trial testimony.’” (quoting Moore v. State, 1995 WL 67104, at *2 
(Del. Feb. 17, 1995))). 
33 Id. at *3. 
34 A78 (Tr. 175:13-177:9); A141-42 (Tr. 216:11-218:7). 
35 Aff. of Jerome M. Capone at B2, State v. Redden, I.D. No. 0701015161 (Del. Super. Dec. 5, 
2014), available at B1-3. 
 
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told [the police] the story right now that I told you.”36  There is no basis on this record to 
doubt that Redden’s trial counsel’s failure to object was “within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance[.]”37  As such, trial counsel’s conduct was objectively 
reasonable. 
Additionally, Redden has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that an 
objection to the Section 3507 statements would have changed the outcome of his trial.  
Objecting would have resulted in the State inquiring about the truthfulness of the prior 
statements, but the statements would have been admissible regardless of whether Dennis 
and Lai denied or affirmed their truthfulness.  Accordingly, an objection at trial would 
not have affected the evidence heard by the jury.   
Similarly, Redden has not demonstrated that his appellate counsel was ineffective.  
Redden’s appellate counsel stated that he “used [his] best judgment, and strategic 
reasoning, in selecting the issues most likely to succeed on appeal.”38  He further noted 
that raising a claim reviewed only for plain error “can have the effect of weakening what 
otherwise may be strong arguments.”39  This appellate strategy was not objectively 
unreasonable,40 particularly given the rigor of plain error review.41   
                                                          
 
36 A141 (Tr. 216:16-17). 
37 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  
38 Aff. of Andrew W. Gonser at B4, State v. Redden, No. 0701015161 (Del. Super. Mar. 18, 
2015), available at B4-5. 
39 Id. at B5. 
40 See Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 758 (Del. 1990) (“A strategy, which structures appellate 
arguments on ‘those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of incompetence, is the 
hallmark of effective appellate advocacy.’” (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536, 
(1986))). 
 
10 
 
Because Redden has not established ineffective assistance of trial or appellate 
counsel, he has not demonstrated a “colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of 
justice” such that Rule 61’s bars to relief should not apply.  Accordingly, the Superior 
Court properly held that his Amended Motion was barred under Rule 61(i)(1) and (i)(2). 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Redden’s claims are procedurally barred by Rule 61. 
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Superior Court’s Order.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
41 See Hoskins, 102 A.3d at 735 (“Under the plain error standard of review, the error must be so 
clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial 
process.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).