Case Title: STATE v WEAVER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 81-089

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 81-89 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . DAN D W A L WEAVER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Felt and Martin, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana Submitted on briefs: October 15, 1981 Decided: Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s is an a p p e a l from a c o n v i c t i o n o f f e l o n y t h e f t i n a c a s e t r i e d i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , S t a t e of Montana, i n and f o r t h e County of Yellowstone. The c a s e was t r i e d t o a j u r y and a p p e l l a n t a p p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n . I n t h i s c a s e t h e a p p e l l a n t was charged w i t h f o u r counts: Count I , t h e f t , a f e l o n y ; Count 11, c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f , a f e l o n y ; Count 111, an a t t e m p t ; and Count I V , d e c e p t i v e p r a c t i c e s , a f e l o n y . A t a p r e t r i a l h e a r i n g Count I1 was dismissed f o r l a c k of p r o b a b l e cause and a t t h e same time a p p e l l a n t was g r a n t e d s e p a r a t e t r i a l s on each of t h e c o u n t s . A p p e l l a n t was t r i e d on June 1 4 , 1980, on Count I11 and a f t e r n i n e hours of c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e j u r y was unable t o r e a c h a v e r d i c t . On J u l y 1 7 , 1980, a t t h e time of t h e S t a t e ' s motion t o s e t a t r i a l d a t e f o r Count I , t h e t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d a r e q u e s t f o r a continuance because of a l l e g e d l y p r e j u d i c i a l a r t i c l e s i n t h e B i l l i n g s G a z e t t e . S e v e r a l c o n t i n u a n c e s were g r a n t e d , and t h e c a s e went t o t r i a l on October 7 , 1980, a t which t i m e o t h e r c o u n t s a g a i n s t t h e a p p e l l a n t were excluded from t h e t r i a l . Following h i s c o n v i c t i o n of f e l o n y t h e f t t h e D i s t r i c t Court, on motion of t h e county a t t o r n e y , d i s m i s s e d Counts I11 and I V of t h e amended i n f o r m a t i o n i n view of t h e f a c t he had been c o n v i c t e d of Count I. On September 21, 1979, Michael Watts, a t r u c k d r i v e r , r e p o r t e d t o t h e B i l l i n g s p o l i c e t h a t h i s f l a t - b e d t r a i l e r , l o a d e d w i t h 6 , 0 7 2 e i g h t - f o o t , 2 x 4 s t u d s , w i t h t h e Bur kland Lumber Company of L i v i n g s t o n , Montana, marks on same, had b e e n s t o l e n f r o m t h e B i l l i n g s E a s t Parkway t r u c k s t o p . Watts had loaded t h i s lumber a t L i v i n g s t o n , Montana, and had d r i v e n it t o B i l l i n g s on t h e evening of September 19. H e parked it a t t h e E a s t Parkway Truckstop t h a t evening and went t o h i s home. The f o l l o w i n g day he checked and found t h e t r u c k i n p l a c e and t h e day a f t e r , t h e 2 1 s t , when he went o u t t o g e t h i s f l a t - b e d t r a i l e r , he found it m i s s i n g . The t r a i l e r , equipped w i t h fold-down g r a i n s i d e s , t r a p s , t a i l b o a r d , headboard, and t a r p s , was owned by Watts who had been h i r e d t o h a u l t h e Burkland lumber t o Winona, Minnesota. The lumber had been loaded according t o s t a n d a r d Burkland Lumber procedures i n steel-banded bundles and was worth about one d o l l a r a board wholesale or a t o t a l of a b o u t $6,135 a t m i l l p r i c e . Each board of wood bore a d i s t i n c t i v e Burkland m i l l stamp on both ends, and each was stamped w i t h an e x c l u s i v e Burkland m i l l number, 161. Watts t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h e time t h e timber was loaded it was s e c u r e d w i t h r e d t a r p s , which belonged t o him and were t i e d down w i t h yellow nylon rope. The Watts s t o l e n t r a i l e r was recovered twenty-five days l a t e r , f i f t e e n o r twenty m i l e s from B i l l i n g s i n what is known a s t h e Pryor Creek a r e a . A t t h e t i m e it was recovered, it was m i s s i n g t h e lumber, a t a i l b o a r d , t a r p s , and o t h e r equipment. S e v e r a l weeks l a t e r i n October 1979, while i n t h e c o u r s e of i n v e s t i g a t i n g a f i r e on t h e premises of a p p e l l a n t , o f f i c e r s of t h e Yellowstone County S h e r i f f ' s Department observed l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s of new lumber s t a c k e d on t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s Dry Creek meat packing p l a n t . The lumber was a l l e i g h t - f o o t , 2 x 4 s t u d s , each b e a r i n g t h e d i s t i n c t i v e Burkland Lumber markings and stamped w i t h t h e Burkland mill stamp, 161. When asked by Deputy Sheriff George Jensen on October 25, 1979, about the lumber that was stacked on his property, appellant told Jensen that some of the stacked lumber was his and some of it belonged to a friend. He told the deputy that he was using the stacked lumber for remodeling his sausage shop in Billings and his meat packing plant in Lockwood. Upon later investigation Mike Boyett, a detective with the sheriff 's department who was aware of the theft of the lumber, thought that the lumber on the Dry Creek property might be the lumber which had been reported stolen. The Burkland stamps, the mill number 161 on each stud, identified Burkland as the place of manufacture and this had been reported stolen approximately a month earlier. An investigation by Detective Boyett revealed that according to Ed Carroll, Burkland's superintendent, Burkland had not sold any lumber in Montana to any Montana retail outlet during the period of time involved herein and that the last lumber sold by Burkland to a Montana retail outlet had been in January 1977. Carroll told Boyett also that he was unaware of any retail purchases in small quantities from the mill by any Montana buyer during August or September 1979. The appellant testified that he had no idea that the Burkland lumber was stolen. His story was that on the evening of September 20, 1979, he received an anonymous phone call from someone asking to store lumber on his property. He testified that he thought he recognized the voice on the phone but on reflection realized he did not. When asked about the lumber by Boyett he said that he agreed to store the lumber for a fee. Later he testified at the t r i a l t h a t he agreed t o s t o r e t h e lumber a s a f a v o r f o r t h e m y s t e r i o u s c a l l e r , b u t t h a t he d i d n o t d i s c u s s w i t h t h e m y s t e r i o u s c a l l e r t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e f e e f o r s t o r a g e . Weaver t e s t i f i e d t h a t sometime on September 21, 1979, a s e m i - t r a i l e r load of e i g h t - f o o t , 2 x 4 s t u d s appeared i n h i s yard a t t h e meat packing p l a n t j u s t s o u t h of Lockwood. An unseen t r a c t o r brought it t h e r e and an unseen t r a c t o r would haul t h e empty t r a i l e r away l a t e r t h a t day. A p p e l l a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he went t o work t h e morning of September 21, he was s u r p r i s e d t o s e e t h e amount of lumber t h a t was s t o r e d . H e s a i d when he looked a t t h e l o a d , he n o t i c e d f i v e or s i x boards were wedged o u t from t h e t r a i l e r i n t h e f r o n t p a r t of t h e load and when he attempted t o push t h e o f f e n d i n g boards i n t o alignment, t h e r e s t r a i n i n g s t r a p broke and some of t h e lumber f e l l t o t h e ground. I t t h e n was n e c e s s a r y t o unload t h e lumber remaining on t h e t r a i l e r and have it s t a c k e d . By t h e end of t h e day on t h e 2 1 s t , t h e r e were about n i n e s t a c k s of lumber on t h e p r o p e r t y , c a r e f u l l y cross-hatched, behind o r near t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s l o a d i n g dock. A p p e l l a n t t e s t i f i e d he removed t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e wood from t h e t r a i l e r by u s i n g a front-end l o a d e r and i n a d d i t i o n p a i d s i x p e r s o n s t o h e l p s t a c k t h e wood. The i n d i v i d u a l s employed t o do t h i s were t o l d t o work f a s t and t h e y would be p a i d w e l l . They were p a i d more t h a n t h e going r a t e f o r t h e i r a f t e r n o o n ' s work. Sometime d u r i n g t h a t day Robert Young, an a s s o c i a t e of a p p e l l a n t , came i n t o t h e yard and helped himself w i t h a p p e l l a n t ' s b l e s s i n g s t o a pickup load of 2 x 4 s t u d s f o r a house a p p e l l a n t was b u i l d i n g f o r Young. No payment was made by Young t o a p p e l l a n t f o r t h i s amount of wood. A p p e l l a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t sometime d u r i n g t h e day a f t e r unloading t h e t r a i l e r and s t a c k i n g t h e lumber, he r e c e i v e d a m y s t e r i o u s phone c a l l from t h e person who had c a l l e d him t h e n i g h t b e f o r e . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t no arrangements f o r removal of t h e t r a i l e r were made nor was t h e r e anything s a i d about t h e s a f e k e e p i n g of t h e lumber. I n a d d i t i o n , no s e r v i c e f e e was d i s c u s s e d . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was t o l d t o s e l l t h e lumber a t a p r i c e between s i x t y - f i v e and e i g h t y c e n t s per board t o u n s p e c i f i e d p e r s o n s who would p i c k up t h e wood and t o anyone a p p e l l a n t knew who m i g h t b e i n t e r e s t e d . A p p e l l a n t ' s testimony was t h a t a s a b u i l d e r he was aware t h a t t h e r e t a i l p r i c e of a 2 x 4 s t u d was i n e x c e s s of one d o l l a r p e r board. According t o a p p e l l a n t , he was t o l d t o keep a r e c o r d of s a l e s and a f t e r a t h r e e o r f o u r minute c o n v e r s a t i o n t h e c a l l t e r m i n a t e d and he never heard from t h e c a l l e r a g a i n . During t h e n e x t two months t h e a p p e l l a n t d i s p o s e d of t h e lumber by s e l l i n g it; by g i v i n g it t o h i s employees i n l i e u of wages; and by t a k i n g it t o keep f o r h i m s e l f . He s o l d an undetermined q u a n t i t y of lumber t o p e r s o n s whose "names were c a l l e d t o him" and whom he d i d n o t know. H e f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he c o l l e c t e d no money from t h e p u r c h a s e s because t h e a l l e g e d m y s t e r i o u s c a l l e r had n o t i n s t r u c t e d him on t h i s d e t a i l . A p p e l l a n t s o l d some of t h e lumber t o Robert Young a t e i g h t y - f i v e c e n t s per board, which was t a k e n t o t h e B u l l Mountains and used t o b u i l d Young's house. There is no showing t h a t he c o l l e c t e d any money f o r t h e s e purchases. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e a p p e l l a n t h e a l l o w e d a T r a c y S t a n d i f e r and J e f f Moll t o t a k e some of t h e lumber. I n M o l l ' s c a s e , a p p e l l a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t n e i t h e r he nor Young wanted to pay Moll for his labor on Young's house, and to resolve this dispute, appellant told Moll to take his wages out in lumber from the stacks of 2 x 4 studs and sell it for whatever he could get. Moll sold about 200 studs under this arrangement . According to his 1 testimony, appellant thought that perhaps the owner or someone else might pick up the lumber at the meat packing plant without his knowledge and that as a result he would have nothing to show for the time and money he had expended in storing the lumber. He therefore took 230 of the studs for himself, storing them in his garage and sausage shop to protect his interest. During the investigation, when it was determined by the sheriff's department that perhaps this was the stolen Burkland lumber, Deputy Sheriff Boyett removed a total of 3,144 of the studs from the meat packing yard. A total of 1,684 studs were taken from stacks on three locations in the yard. During that period of time, a neighbor informed the deputy there was more lumber in a shed where it could not be seen on the property, and the deputy and an assistant removed 1,460 studs on November 28 and 29. In addition to the Burkland lumber recovered by the sheriff's department at the Dry Creek plant, a detective, Robert Hirschi of the Billings police department, recovered some 500 of the studs from other locations in and around Billings. This included 63 studs from the residence of Jeff Moll, an employee of appellant; 137 studs from the garage of appellant's Billings residence; 97 studs from inside the appellant's sausage shop in Billings. After obtaining a search warrant later in December, Detective Hirschi recovered a s t a c k of 230 s t u d s from t h e r e s i d e n c e of Robert Young, who l i v e d i n t h e B u l l Mountains s o u t h of Roundup, Montana. He observed a t t h e time he g o t t h e s e s t u d s t h a t a deck, a shed, and t h e framing of t h e upper p o r t i o n s of a house being b u i l t a t t h e B u l l Mountain s i t e was e n t i r e l y c o n s t r u c t e d of t h e Burkland 2 x 4 s t u d s , and he photographed a l l of t h i s . These photographs were submitted a t t h e time of t r i a l . D u r i n g t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n H i r s c h i d i s c o v e r e d on December 13, 1979, p o r t i o n s of t h e t a i l b o a r d and t h e r e d t a r p s between a l o a d i n g dock and a h o l d i n g pen on t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s Dry C r e e k p r o p e r t y . T h i s p r o p e r t y was i d e n t i f i e d by Watts, t h e t r u c k d r i v e r , a s h i s t a i l b o a r d and t a r p s and a s t h e equipment used by him on t h e t r a i l e r t h a t was loaded w i t h t h e Burkland s t u d s which had been s t o l e n from t h e B i l l i n g s t r u c k s t o p . T r i a l commenced on October 7 , 1980, and t h e f o l l o w i n g day, t h e B i l l i n g s G a z e t t e , t h e l o c a l newspaper, p r i n t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g a r t i c l e c o n c e r n i n g t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e a p p e l l a n t : "BUSINESSMAN RETURNS TO COURT "Dan Weaver was never charged w i t h a r s o n f o r t h e f i r e t h a t d e s t r o y e d Dry Creek Meat Co. l a s t Oct. 25. The law s a y s t h a t a man cannot be charged w i t h a r s o n f o r s e t t i n g a f i r e h i s own p r o p e r t y . " I n s t e a d , he was charged w i t h c r i m i n a l m i s - c h i e f i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e b l a z e t h a t d e s t r o y e d h i s meat packing b u s i n e s s . Those c h a r g e s were dropped f o r l a c k of s u f f i c i e n t evidence l i n k i n g him t o t h e crime. " L a s t summer h e was t r i e d f o r a t t e m p t e d t h e f t , a c c u s e d o f t r y i n g t o d e f r a u d h i s i n s u r a n c e company by c l a i m i n g f i r e - l o s s e s r e s u l t i n g from t h e i n c i d e n t t h a t he d i d n ' t d e s e r v e . A f t e r n i n e days of testimony and a 10-hour d e l i b e r a t i o n t h e j u r y d e c l a r e d i t s e l f hung. Informed s o u r c e s s a y t h a t c a s e may [be] t o o expensive t o r e - t r y . "Weaver, however, found himself back i n c o u r t t h i s week t h i s time charged with p o s s e s s i n g 3 , 4 0 0 p i e c e s o f s t o l e n l u m b e r , i n i t i a l l y found by i n v e s t i g a t o r s near t h e burned meat packing p l a n t . "County Prosecutor David Gor t o n t o l d t h e j u r y Tuesday t h a t he wouldn't a t t e m p t t o prove t h a t 34-year-old Weaver s t o l e t h e two-by-four boards, valued a t one d o l l a r a p i e c e , from a f ully-loaded s e m i - t r a i l e r t r u c k parked a t a Heights t r u c k s t o p S e p t . 21, 1979. "But Weaver knew t h e lumber was s t o l e n Gorton t o l d t h e j u r y i n h i s opening remarks, and he attempted t o c o n c e a l t h e lumber a t a number of l o c a t i o n s i n c l u d i n g Dry Creek Meat, a sausage shop he had n o t y e t opened and h i s Eldorado Drive home. "Attorney Ken F r a z i e r t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t h i s c l i e n t , whom he d e s c r i b e d a s an ' u n s o p h i s t i - c a t e d b u s i n e s s m a n ' , r e c e i v e d a n anonymous phone c a l l l a t e l a s t September from a man a s k i n g him t o s t o r e some lumber f o r him. Weaver, he s a i d , was noncommittal b u t t h e f o l l o w i n g morning d i s c o v e r e d a f u l l y - l o a d e d s e m i - t r a i l e r a t Dry Creek Meat, 2752 Highway 87. "When t h e businessman n o t i c e d t h a t t h e lumber was l o o s e l y s t a c k e d and attempted t o t i g h t e n t h e bands, h a l f of t h e t r u c k l o a d f e l l on t h e g r o u n d . H e l a t e r a s k e d s e v e r a l o f h i s employees t o h e l p him s t a c k t h e lumber near t h e b u i l d i n g and i n a s t o r a g e shed nearby, h i s lawyer s a i d . "The f o l l o w i n g n i g h t Weaver g o t a n o t h e r phone c a l l a s k i n g him t o s e l l some of t h e lumber, which he d i d . P a r t of t h e l o a d was hauled t o t h e home of William Robert Young s o u t h of Roundup, which Weaver was h e l p i n g t o b u i l d . "Young is expected t o t e s t i f y today when Weaver's c a s e c o n t i n u e s . " A t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e on October 8, 1979, a p p e l l a n t moved f o r a m i s t r i a l on t h e grounds o f p o s s i b l e p r e j u d i c e c r e a t e d by t h e a r t i c l e and t h i s motion was d e n i e d . Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r review: 1. Was a p p e l l a n t denied a f a i r t r i a l because of a newspaper a r t i c l e p u b l i s h e d t h e second day of t h e t r i a l ? 2. Did t h e S t a t e f a i l t o produce s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o e s t a b l i s h a p p e l l a n t ' s knowledge t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y was s t o l e n ? A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l , which is g u a r a n t e e d by t h e S i x t h Amendment of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and by A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 4, of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , was v i o l a t e d i n t h i s c r i m i n a l proceeding. E s t e s v. Texas ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543; I r v i n v. Dowd ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 366 U.S. 717, 722, 8 1 I n denying t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s c o u n s e l ' s motion f o r a m i s t r i a l t h e c o u r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t it f e l t it was b e s t t o admonish t h e j u r y and a c c o r d i n g l y , t h i s was done j u s t p r i o r t o t h e evening r e c e s s on October 8 , 1980: "THE COURT: L a d i e s and Gentlemen, you w i l l r e c e s s a t t h i s time. L e t m e c a u t i o n very s t r o n g l y t h a t you a r e t o r e f r a i n from r e a d i n g t h e B i l l i n g s G a z e t t e , now u n t i l you t a k e t h i s m a t t e r f o r d e l i b e r a t i o n . I want you t o r e f r a i n f r o m l i s t e n i n g t o t h e t e l e v i s i o n b r o a d c a s t s b e c a u s e I d o n ' t want you t o i n a d v e r t e n t l y be exposed t o any a c c o u n t s t h a t may be on t h e news concerning t h i s c a s e . I d o n ' t want you t o be i n f l u e n c e d i n any way by any m a t t e r o t h e r t h a n what you s e e and hear i n t h i s courtroom d u r i n g t h i s t r i a l . There have been r e p o r t e r s p r e s e n t from time t o t i m e d u r i n g t h i s c a s e . They have n o t been h e r e c o n t i n u o u s l y l i k e you have. You a r e t h e ones t h a t know more about t h i s c a s e t h a n anyone e l s e a t t h i s time and I d o n ' t want you t o be i n f l u e n c e d by news a c c o u n t s or anything e l s e u n t i l a f t e r you h a v e t h i s c a s e f o r d e l i b e r a t i o n and make your own d e l i b e r a t i o n on i t , s o p l e a s e r e f r a i n from e x p o s i n g y o u r s e l f i n a d v e r t e n t l y t o any a c c o u n t s t h a t may o r may n o t occur on t e l e v i s i o n o r i n t h e newspapers u n t i l you a r e through w i t h your d e l i b e r a t i o n s . W e w i l l r e c e s s now u n t i l 10:OO tomorrow morning and I a n t i c i p a t e t h a t t h e c a s e w i l l b e g i v e n t o you f o r d e l i b e r a t i o n sometime around noon tomorrow. So you c a n p r e p a r e your p r i v a t e d o i n g s a c c o r d i n g l y . You w i l l be i n d e l i b e r a t i o n tomorrow a f t e r n o o n . W e w i l l r e c e s s now u n t i l 10:OO tomorrow morning." A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n its f a i l u r e t o g r a n t a m i s t r i a l ; and i n t h e v e r y l e a s t , t h a t t h e c o u r t should have i n t e r r o g a t e d t h e members of t h e j u r y c o n c e r n i n g t h e i r e x p o s u r e t o t h e i n f l a m m a t o r y and p r e j u d i c i a l newspaper a r t i c l e p u b l i s h e d by t h e B i l l i n g s G a z e t t e on t h e second day of t r i a l . T h i s Court h a s n o t gone a s f a r a s t h e c a s e r e l i e d upon by a p p e l l a n t and urged f o r a d o p t i o n i n t h i s c a s e , Margoles v . United S t a t e s ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 6 9 ) , 407 F.2d 727, c e r t . d e n i e d , ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 396 U.S. 833, wherein t h e c o u r t s e t down t h e r u l e f o r t h a t c i r c u i t i n holding: ". . . t h e procedure r e q u i r e d by t h i s C i r c u i t where p r e j u d i c i a l p u b l i c i t y is brought t o t h e c o u r t ' s a t t e n t i o n d u r i n g a t r i a l is t h a t t h e c o u r t must a s c e r t a i n i f any j u r o r s who had been exposed t o such p u b l i c i t y had read o r heard t h e same. Such j u r o r s who respond a f f i r m a t i v e l y must t h e n be examined, i n d i v i - d u a l l y and o u t s i d e t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e o t h e r j u r o r s , t o d e t e r m i n e t h e e f f e c t o f t h e p u b l i c i t y . " 407 F.2d a t 735. See a l s o , United S t a t e s v. Hankish ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 7 4 ) , 502 F.2d 71; United S t a t e s v. Jones ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) , 542 F.2d 186, c e r t . d e n i e d , ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 426 U.S. 922; S t a t e v. K e l i i h o l o k a i ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 58 Haw. 356, 569 P.2d 891. T h i s Court r e c e n t l y i n S t a t e v. Kirkland ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 602 P.2d 586, 36 St.Rep. 1963, s u s t a i n e d t h e c o n v i c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t had e r r e d i n n o t allowing him t o i n t e r r o g a t e members o f t h e j u r y c o n c e r n i n g t h e i r e x p o s u r e t o a l l e g e d l y i n f l a m a t o r y and p r e j u d i c i a l news r e l e a s e s . W e r e f u s e d t o adopt t h e r u l e p r e v i o u s l y mentioned which r e q u i r e d t h e t r i a l judge, i n e v e r y c a s e where p r e j u d i c i a l news r e l e a s e s were brought t o h i s a t t e n t i o n d u r i n g t h e t r i a l , t o examine t h e j u r o r s t o determine whether any of them had read t h e p r e j u d i c i a l news r e l e a s e , and i f s o , t h e e f f e c t of t h e p u b l i c i t y . W e h e l d t h a t ". . . w e p r e f e r t o l e a v e t h a t t o t h e t r i a l j u d g e ' s judgment and d i s c r e t i o n , s u b j e c t t o h i s l a t e r review a f t e r v e r d i c t on a p p r o p r i a t e motion, and our review on a p p e a l . " I n Kirkland w e noted t h a t t h e abuse of d i s c r e t i o n s t a n d a r d had been c l e a r l y set f o r t h i n numerous c a s e s d e a l i n g with a change of venue i s s u e . Such m a t t e r s a r e addressed t o t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t , and u n l e s s t h e r e h a s been a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n , its r u l i n g w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d . See a l s o S t a t e v. Williams ( 1979 I - Mont . , 604 P.2d 1224, 36 St.Rep. 2328; S t a t e v . Hoffman ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 94 Mont. 573, 23 P.2d 972; S t a t e v . L e w i s ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 290, 546 P.2d 518. A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t even under t h e r u l e s e t down i n Kirkland t h e r e was h e r e a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i n t h a t under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e c o u r t should have i n t e r r o g a t e d t h e j u r o r s . H e a r g u e s t h a t i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e (1) t h e t r i a l c o u r t had p r o p e r l y continued t h e t r i a l d a t e due t o p r e v i o u s p r e j u d i c i a l news r e p o r t s and t h e r e f o r e was c o g n i z a n t of t h e p o t e n t i a l l y p r e j u d i c i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of f u r t h e r news r e p o r t s ; ( 2 ) t h a t t h e response from some of t h e veniremen d u r i n g v o i r d i r e i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e p u b l i c i t y s u r r o u n d i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t was known t o some o f t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s and one had been excused f o r c a u s e ; ( 3 ) t h e d e f e n s e counsel had s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u e s t e d p r i o r t o t h e t r i a l t h a t no mention be made of t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s p r e v i o u s c r i m i n a l charges; ( 4 ) t h e c o u r t admonished t h e j u r y t o refrain from exposing themselves to the reports on only one occasion which was late in the afternoon of the day the article was published; and (5) contrary to Kirkland, the record in this case indicates continuous and massive publicity in the community. On the record in this case the appellant was convicted of a felony theft following a fair trial by an impartial jury. There are no indications on the record that the appellant's right of fair trial was in peril at any stage by a massive publicity pervading the entire community and there are no specific instances of failure of the jurors' impartiality. The United States Supreme Court has held that in order to reverse a conviction on the ground of prejudicial publicity there must be an inherent lack of due process in the proceedings. Estes, supra, 381 U.S. at 532; Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966), 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600. Or, there must be a showing by the defendant of "the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality." Murphy v. Florida (1975), 421 U.S. 794, 800, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2036, 44 L.Ed.2d 589, 595; Irvin v. D o w ~ , supra, 366 U.S. at 723. In Marshall v. United States (1959), 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250, the Supreme Court of the United States held: "A bare fear respecting the true state of the juror's mind has no place here. Error will not be presumed; after verdict the defendant has the laboring oar. " This has long been the law in Montana. Kirkland, supra. Here the appellant has failed to make the requisite showing of a prejudice on record. In addition we note that the sole existence of the p u b l i c i t y - - t h a t is, t h e a r t i c l e of October 8 which r e f e r s t o two p r e v i o u s c h a r g e s brought a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t - - a l s o n o t e s t h a t t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h o s e c h a r g e s was i n h i s f a v o r . The i s s u e s of t h e t r i a l on t h e f t were t h e n i n p r o c e s s . The a r t i c l e i s a s i n g l e , f a c t u a l , n o n e d i t o r i a l i z e d a c c o u n t a p p e a r i n g i n t h e middle of page B-1 of t h e paper; n o t h i n g d i s t i n g u i s h e s it from r e p o r t s of o t h e r c o u r t c a s e s t h a t appear on t h a t page. The a r t i c l e s t a t e d f a c t s f a v o r a b l e t o t h e a p p e l l a n t , t h a t i s , o n e o f t h e c h a r g e s had been dismissed f o r l a c k of p r o b a b l e cause and t h e o t h e r was t r i e d r e s u l t i n g i n a hung j u r y . T h i s Court observed long ago i n S t a t e v. Jackson ( 1 8 9 0 ) , 9 Mont. 508, 523, 24 P. 213, 217: "The day h a s passed when blank ignorance and s t u p i d i t y i n a juryman were h i s b e s t q u a l i f i - c a t i o n s f o r s e r v i c e . There is more i n t e l l i - gence on t h e modern j u r y ; and i n t e l l i g e n t p e r s o n s , t h e s t a t u t e contemplates, a r e a b l e t o r e a d c o n t e m p o r a r y h i s t o r y , and s t i l l p r e s e r v e t h e i r mental b a l a n c e . On t h e t r i a l of a c a s e , h i g h l y improper and incompetent testimony may a c c i d e n t a l l y f a l l from t h e l i p s of a sworn w i t n e s s on t h e s t a n d . T h i s o c c u r s i n n e a r l y e v e r y t r i a l . Such evidence is s t r i c k e n o u t by t h e c o u r t , and t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t e d t o d i s r e g a r d it. The c o u r t h e r e i n had e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o r r e c t any p o s s i b l e e v i l i n f l u e n c e of t h e newspapers." I n a l a t e r c a s e , S t a t e v. Board ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 135 Mont. 139, 143, 337 P.2d 924, 927, t h e Court c o n s i d e r e d t h e c o n t e n t of an a r t i c l e which d i d n o t r e v e a l a p r e j u d i c e s o g r a v e a s t o deny t h e d e f e n d a n t a f a i r t r i a l by i t s e f f e c t s . The a r t i c l e was n o t one c a p a b l e of a r o u s i n g community f e e l i n g s o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a community o p i n i o n . Applying t h i s r a t i o n a l e t o t h e e x t e n s i v e p u b l i c i t y on r e c o r d i n t h e c a s e o f S t a t e v. Armstrong ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 616 P.2d 341, 350, 37 St.Rep. 1563, 1572, t h i s Court noted: "We have no i n d i c a t i o n h e r e t h a t t h e p u b l i s h e d a c c o u n t s w e r e s o p a s s i o n a t e a s t o e x c i t e undue p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t t h e defendant. S t a t e v. Logan ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 156 Mont. 48, 473 P.2d 833." W e have p r e v i o u s l y found t h a t newspaper p u b l i c i t y which is n o t e d i t o r i a l i z e d , which a p p e a r s t o be f a c t u a l l y done, and which does n o t c o n t a i n i n f l a m a t o r y s t a t e m e n t s w i l l n o t c o n s t i t u t e a showing of p r e j u d i c e upon which t o base an abuse of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v. Bashor ( 1 9 8 0 ) 1 - Mont . , 614 P.2d 470, 475, 37 St.Rep. 1098, 1102; S t a t e v . B i s c h e r t ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1 Mont. 152, 156, 308 P.2d 969, 971. A s p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , a b s e n t any i n d i c a t i o n on t h e record of p r e j u d i c e t o a p p e l l a n t s o g r a v e a s t o deny him a f a i r t r i a l , w e f i n d t h e c o u r t below p r o p e r l y e x e r c i s e d its d i s c r e t i o n by denying t h e motion f o r a m i s t r i a l . Here t h e a d m o n i t i o n t o t h e j u r y was s u f f i c i e n t t o c o r r e c t a n y damaging i n f l u e n c e one news a r t i c l e might have had under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The second i s s u e is d i r e c t e d a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t evidence upon which t h e j u r y could r e a c h a v e r d i c t c o n v i c t i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t o f t h e f t , a f e l o n y , p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 4 5 - 6 - 3 0 1 ( 3 ) ( c ) , MCA. The amended i n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g e s t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t " p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly o b t a i n e d c o n t r o l o v e r s t o l e n p r o p e r t y , to-wit: 3,400 2"x4" wood s t u d s , of a v a l u e of more t h a n $150.00, owned by Burkland S t u d s , I n c . , and/or Lampert Lumber Co., and/or Western Trucking Company, knowing t h e p r o p e r t y t o have been s t o l e n by a n o t h e r and used, concealed o r abandoned t h e p r o p e r t y knowing such u s e , concealment o r abandonment probably would d e p r i v e t h e owner of t h e p r o p e r t y A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t d u r i n g t h e t r i a l t h e S t a t e made a c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t t o i n t r o d u c e a s much evidence a s p o s s i b l e t e n d i n g t o show t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t had p o s s e s s i o n of t h e a l l e g e d l y s t o l e n lumber and t h a t he used o r concealed t h e lumber. H e argues t h a t i n reviewing t h e r e c o r d t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f y t h e elements of t h e crime of t h e f t a s charged by n e g l e c t i n g t o produce any e v i d e n c e , d i r e c t or c i r c u m s t a n t i a l , showing t h a t a p p e l l a n t knew t h e lumber had been s t o l e n a t t h e time he took p o s s e s s i o n . Appellant a r g u e s t h a t he t e s t i f i e d how he came i n t o p o s s e s s i o n of t h e a l l e g e d l y s t o l e n lumber and never knew t h a t it was s t o l e n u n t i l a f t e r t h e p o l i c e came o u t t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e f i r e a t h i s p l a n t . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e S t a t e had t h e burden of proving, beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , t h a t a p p e l l a n t knew t h e p r o p e r t y was s t o l e n a t t h e time he r e c e i v e d it and t h a t it f a i l e d t o c a r r y t h a t burden. A p p e l l a n t r e l i e s on t h e f a c t t h a t mere p o s s e s s i o n of s t o l e n p r o p e r t y is n o t i n and of i t s e l f a c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e . S t a t e v . P e t e r s ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 146 Mont. 188, 405 P.2d 642; S t a t e v. J i m i s o n ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 1 8 , 540 P.2d 315. A s t o t h e knowledge element of t h e o f f e n s e t h e S t a t e ' s burden is set f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 45-2-101(27), MCA, which s t a t e s : "Knowingly -- a p e r s o n a c t s knowingly w i t h r e s p e c t t o c o n d u c t o r t o c i r c u m s t a n c e d e s c r i b e d by a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g an o f f e n s e when he is aware of h i s conduct o r t h a t t h e circumstance e x i s t s . A person a c t s knowingly w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e r e s u l t o f c o n d u c t d e s c r i b e d by a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g an o f f e n s e when he is aware t h a t it is h i g h l y probable t h a t s u c h r e s u l t w i l l b e c a u s e d by h i s conduct. When knowledge of t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t is a n e l e m e n t o f a n o f f e n s e , such knowledge is e s t a b l i s h e d i f a person is aware of a high probability of its existence. Equivalent terms such as ' knowing' or ' with knowledge' have the same meaning. " To reach the verdict, the trier of fact had to conclude that appellant knowingly obtained control of the stolen lumber, knowing it to be stolen by another, and that he used, concealed or abandoned the lumber knowing that the owner would thereby probably be deprived of the lumber. Here there existed substantial credible evidence, consistent with appellant's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence, which persons of reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support their conclusions. See State v. Armstrong (19801, - Mont . , 616 P.2d 341, 346, 37 St.Rep. 1563. In this case, the State first had to establish that appellant "knowingly" obtained control of the lumber. Under the statute above cited, this element was proved by establishing that he "was aware of his conduct in doing the act." Secondly, the State had to establish that he obtained control "knowing" the property to have been stolen. Under the statute this element was established by showing that appellant was "aware of a high probability" that the wood was stolen. Last, the State had to establish that appellant used the lumber "knowing" his use would probably deprive the owner of the property. This element was proved by showing that it was "highly probable that the result caused by his conduct" would deprive the owner of his property. All of these elements were clearly proved in this case. Intent may be inferred by the jury from what the defendant says and does and from all the facts and circumstances involved in the transaction. State v. Jackson (19791, - Mont . - , 589 P.2d 1009, 36 St.Rep. 169, 176; State v. Hardy (1980), - Mont . , 604 P.2d 792, 37 St.Rep. 1. The facts and circumstances here established by the State are inconsistent with any conclusion other than the appellant was fully aware that he was exerting control over obviously stolen property and disposing of it in such a manner as to deprive the rightful owner of its use. The appellant erroneously contends his denial of knowledge and his explanation were unrefuted, and that as a consequence, the evidence supporting the requisite element of knowledge amounts only to suspicious circumstances insufficient to sustain the verdict are in error. Here, appellant's explanations were not unrefuted. The testimony of witnesses and the testimony of appellant himself placed in evidence an abundance of facts and circumstances which contradicted all explanations given by him. Whether appellant's explanations were more credible than the evidence to the contrary, or whether they were merely incredible, was a question of fact for the jury to determine. The credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony are solely matters for the jury to determine. State v. Hart (1981), - Mont . - , 625 P.2d 21, 27, 38 St.Rep. 133, 138. With respect to the elements of knowledge, the evidence here is circumstantial. Circumstantial evidence need not be regarded as inferior evidence; if it is of such a quality and quantity as to legally justify a jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Cor (1964), 144 Mont. 323, 326, 396 P.2d 86, 88; State v. Proctor (1969), 153 Mont. 90, 94, 454 P.2d 616, 618. In determining the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to make a case for the jury and to sustain a conviction all of the facts and circumstances must be taken into consideration collectively. State v. DeTonancour (1941), 112 Mont. 94, 98, 112 P.2d 1065, 1067. We find under the circumstances here that there are facts consistent with appellant's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the appellant's conviction. Affirmed. We concur: Chief Justice