Case Title: Marshall v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Marshall v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp.1997 WY 84941 P.2d 42Case Number: 96-178Decided: 06/25/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

In the Matter of the Driver'S License Suspension of: 
DANIEL LEN MARSHALL,  

Appellant (Petitioner), 

 

v. 

 

STATE OF WYOMING ex rel., DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION,  

Appellee(Respondent).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Sheridan County  

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Brian N. 
Beisher, argued of Hart & Reiter, Sheridan.

 Representing 
Appellee:

William U. 
Hill, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and 
Lawrence A. Bobbitt, III, argued, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]      Campus police 
arrested Daniel Len Marshall off campus for driving while intoxicated. Marshall 
refused chemical testing and, as a result, the Wyoming Department of 
Transportation (DOT) suspended his license pursuant to Wyoming's implied consent 
statute. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension, 
finding that the campus police officer had statewide jurisdiction and therefore 
the authority to make the off-campus stop and arrest. Marshall seeks review of 
the hearing examiner's order.

 

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

 

[¶3]      Appellant 
Marshall poses the following issues:

 

A.                 
Whether the Hearing Examiner 
ruled contrary to law in deciding that the campus peace officer in this case did 
not exceed his jurisdiction due to the fact that campus peace officers have 
"statewide jurisdiction."

B.                 
 

C.                
Whether the fresh pursuit 
doctrine operates to make legal the campus peace officer's arrest of 
Appellant.

D.                
 

C.                
Whether consideration of the 
Appellant's refusal to submit to chemical testing as required by Wyoming Statute 
Section 31-6-102, is precluded due to the unlawful stop and arrest, and the 
exclusionary rule.

D.                
 

 

[¶4]      Appellee, Wyoming 
Department of Transportation, responds with the following 
issue:

 

Does the record contain substantial evidence to 
establish compliance with the implied consent statute? In particular, does the 
record establish that the officer made a lawful arrest, that the officer 
obtained probable cause to believe that Appellant had been driving under the 
influence on a public street or highway, and that Appellant refused to submit to 
a chemical test?

 

[¶5]      Marshall reframed 
the issues in his reply brief as:

 

A.                 
Whether the fresh pursuit 
doctrine operates to make legal the campus peace officer's arrest of 
Appellant.

 

B.        Whether, if 
the fresh pursuit doctrine does not make legal the campus peace officer's arrest 
of Appellant, the campus peace officer's arrest of Appellant was a legal 
citizen's arrest.

 

FACTS

 

[¶6]      On February 4, 
1996, Sheridan College Police Officer John R. Burch heard a broadcast on his 
police radio, reporting a stolen 1994 burgundy Oldsmobile Ciera with a Sheridan 
Motors plate on the front and a dealer plate on the back. Later that morning, 
Officer Burch spotted Marshall driving past the Sheridan College campus on U.S. 
Highway 87 in a maroon 1984 Oldsmobile. Officer Burch was unable to clearly see 
Marshall's license plates, but because of the similarity in the color and model 
of Marshall's automobile to the car reported stolen, Officer Burch pulled onto 
Highway 87 behind Marshall. After following Marshall for approximately one mile, 
Officer Burch pulled him over. At that time Marshall was not on the Sheridan 
College campus, nor had he previously ventured on to the 
campus.

 

[¶7]      Once Marshall was 
stopped, Officer Burch realized that Marshall's vehicle was not the stolen car. 
However, he became suspicious that Marshall was driving under the influence of 
alcohol because he detected a strong odor of alcohol and noted that Marshall's 
speech was slurred and he was unsteady on his feet. After conducting field 
sobriety tests, Officer Burch placed Marshall under arrest for driving while 
under the influence (DWUI). Based on Marshall's refusal to undergo chemical 
testing after his arrest, DOT suspended his license pursuant to W.S. 31-6-102 
(1994).

 

[¶8]      Marshall 
requested a contested case hearing, which the OAH conducted on March 18, 1996. 
The hearing examiner determined that the stop and subsequent arrest of Marshall 
were supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion and that Officer Burch 
acted within his jurisdiction. As a result, the examiner found that the arrest 
was lawful and that DOT had authority to suspend Marshall's license. Marshall 
filed a Petition for Review of Administrative Action with the district court. 
The district court certified the appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶9]      This appeal is 
based solely on the hearing examiner's conclusions of law; no factual matters 
are at issue. We afford no deference to an agency's conclusions of law, and 
shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found 
to be * * * [a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law[.]" W.S. 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 896 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Wyo. 1995).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶10]   Marshall's license was revoked 
pursuant to Wyoming's implied consent statute, which requires suspension of a 
driver's Wyoming license if that person is arrested for DWUI and refuses 
chemical testing. W.S. 31-6-102(a)(ii)(A). The statute provides that chemical 
testing must be incidental to a lawful arrest, given promptly after the arrest, 
and administered by a peace officer who had probable cause. W.S. 
31-6-102(a)(i)(A)-(C). Marshall takes issue with the hearing examiner's 
conclusion that campus police officers have statewide jurisdiction. He contends 
that Officer Burch had no authority outside his territorial jurisdiction to 
arrest Marshall. Marshall argues that, as a result, the arrest was unlawful and 
the implied consent statute was improperly invoked as a basis to suspend his 
license.

 

[¶11]   The hearing examiner reasoned that 
campus police officers derive their authority from the legislature and, had the 
legislature intended to limit their jurisdiction, it would have done so 
expressly, as it did with state park officials in W.S. 7-2-101(iv)(G) (1995) and 
capitol security personnel in W.S. 9-1-612(c) (1995). Absent such a limitation, 
the hearing examiner determined that campus police enjoy statewide jurisdiction. 
We disagree.

 

[¶12]   Wyoming has no statute which 
specifically addresses the jurisdictional reach of a peace officer, and the 
hearing examiner is correct in stating that the statutes contain no express 
limits on the jurisdiction of campus police. This court, however, has recognized 
limitations on the jurisdictional authority of municipal police officers under 
the common law. State v. Stahl, 838 P.2d 1193 (Wyo. 1992); see also Van Horn 
v. State, 802 P.2d 883 (Wyo. 1990) (municipal police officer cannot lawfully 
execute a municipal bench warrant outside municipal boundaries). In Stahl, a 
municipal police officer responded to a call eight miles outside the city 
limits. The officer found a parked car with a man slumped over the steering 
wheel and, after conducting field sobriety tests, arrested him for having 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The driver 
argued that he was the subject of an unlawful extrajurisdictional arrest. We 
articulated the common law rule of confined jurisdiction:

[A] peace officer's authority to make a warrantless 
arrest was confined at common law to the boundaries of the governmental 
subdivision in which he held office. The doctrine of "fresh pursuit" provided 
the only exception. * * *

* * * Thus, under common law, a municipal peace 
officer's authority to make a warrantless arrest for [a misdemeanor] offense 
would be limited to the municipal boundaries.

 

Stahl, 
838 P.2d  at 1195. We concluded that a municipal police officer acting without a 
warrant may not lawfully arrest an individual for DWUI outside the boundaries of 
the municipality which he serves unless such arrest is the result of fresh 
pursuit. Stahl, 838 P.2d  at 
1197.

 

[¶13]   We have little difficulty applying 
this common law rule of confined jurisdiction to campus police. Wyoming Statute 
7-2-101(a)(iv) defines "peace officer." Subsection (B) includes "[a]ny duly 
authorized member of a municipal police force, a college or university campus 
police force or the Wyoming highway patrol who has qualified pursuant to W.S. 
9-1-701 through 9-1-707[.]" Our well established rules of statutory 
interpretation require us to look to the ordinary and obvious meaning of the 
words employed according to their arrangement and construction. Newton v. State ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation Div., 922 P.2d 863, 865 (Wyo. 1996). The structure of the 
statute, which groups campus police with municipal police and highway patrol, 
leads to the logical conclusion that those officers should be treated similarly. 
The legislature has not sought to abrogate the common law rules we adopted in Stahl, nor to differentiate campus 
police from municipal police in the statute. Accordingly, we hold that a campus 
police officer acting without a warrant may not lawfully arrest an individual 
for DWUI outside the boundaries of the campus he serves, unless such arrest is 
the result of fresh pursuit.

 

[¶14]   DOT argues that the arrest was, in 
fact, the result of fresh pursuit. Under the fresh pursuit doctrine, a peace 
officer can lawfully make an extrajurisdictional arrest when acting in fresh 
pursuit of an individual known to have or reasonably suspected to have committed 
a felony within the officer's jurisdiction. Stahl, 838 P.2d  at 
1195.

 

The fresh pursuit doctrine requires that the officer 
begin the chase in his or her own jurisdiction and continue it until the suspect 
is caught. If the crime is committed outside the jurisdiction of the arresting 
officer, then the doctrine does not apply.

 

5 AM.JUR.2D, Arrest § 72 (1995). The crime Marshall 
was suspected of, grand theft auto, was not committed within the boundaries of 
the Sheridan College campus. Marshall drove past the campus, but at no time 
drove his vehicle on campus. Therefore, the doctrine of fresh pursuit, in its 
traditional formulation, does not apply.

 

[¶15]   DOT claims the requirement that the 
crime be committed within the pursuing officer's jurisdiction is unnecessarily 
restrictive. In each of the cases cited by DOT to support its position, save 
one, the crime was committed within 
the peace officer's jurisdiction; it was the arrest that took place elsewhere, 
and the issue was whether the particular pursuit occurred timely enough to be 
considered "fresh." See People v. 
Sandoval, 65 Cal. 2d 303, 54 Cal. Rptr. 123, 419 P.2d 187 (1966); Charnes v. Arnold, 198 Colo. 362, 600 P.2d 64 (1979); Glover v. State, 88 Md. App. 393, 594 A.2d 1224 (1991). In People v. Nazaroff, 266 Cal. App. 2d 229, 
72 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1968), the crime was not committed in the officer's 
jurisdiction, but the suspected felon was within the officer's territorial 
boundaries, and the officer had attempted to stop him there. DOT has not 
convinced us that we should expand the fresh pursuit rule.

 

[¶16]   DOT also contends that even if we 
determine that Officer Burch was without authority as a peace officer to arrest 
Marshall, the arrest qualified as a citizen's arrest pursuant to W.S. 7-8-101(a) 
(1995) because Officer Burch had probable cause to believe that a felony was in 
progress. Section 7-8-101(a) provides:

 

(a) A person who is not a peace officer may arrest 
another for:

(i) A felony committed in his 
presence;

(ii) A felony which has been committed, even though 
not in his presence, if he has probable cause to believe the person to be 
arrested committed it; or

(iii) The following misdemeanors committed in his 
presence:

(A) A misdemeanor larceny offense defined by W.S. 
6-3-402(a) or (e); or

(B) A misdemeanor property destruction offense 
defined by W.S. 6-3-201.

 

The plain language of the 
first phrase would appear to render the statute inapplicable to Officer Burch. 
However, DOT argues that in the situation where a peace officer is outside his 
jurisdiction, the officer can make a warrantless arrest as a private citizen 
pursuant to W.S. 7-8-101. We need not address this argument because the arrest 
in this case clearly falls outside the reach of the statute in another respect. 
Officer Burch initially suspected that Marshall had committed a felony but, 
prior to Marshall's arrest, he determined that Marshall had not committed a 
felony. The officer arrested Marshall for a misdemeanor DWUI. The statute 
authorizes citizens to make arrests only for felonies or enumerated 
misdemeanors. DWUI is not an enumerated misdemeanor and, as a result, the arrest 
could not have been a valid citizen's arrest under the statute. Stahl, 838 P.2d  at 1194 n. 
1.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶17]   Campus police officers, like 
municipal police officers, do not have authority to make arrests outside their 
territorial boundaries absent fresh pursuit. The fresh pursuit exception applies 
to permit a peace officer to pursue a suspect fleeing the officer's 
jurisdiction. Here, Marshall was never within the officer's jurisdiction, so the 
exception does not apply. The citizen's arrest statute applies only to felonies 
or enumerated misdemeanors, which do not include DWUI. Officer Burch had no 
authority to arrest Marshall. As a result, the arrest was unlawful and the 
provisions of the implied consent statute do not apply. Because the hearing 
examiner's conclusions of law are not in accordance with law, we reverse and 
remand to the hearing examiner with directions to enter an order in accordance 
with this opinion.