Case Title: Darby v. A-Best Products Co.

Citation: 2004-Ohio-3720

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Darby v. A-Best Products Co., 102 Ohio St.3d 410, 2004-Ohio-3720.] 
 
 
DARBY, APPELLANT, v. A-BEST PRODUCTS COMPANY ET AL.;  
VIAD CORPORATION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Darby v. A-Best Products Co., 102 Ohio St.3d 410, 2004-Ohio-3720.] 
Appellate review — Civ.R. 15 and 21 — Decision on motion for leave to add new 
parties subject to abuse-of-discretion standard — Federal preemption of 
state law — Federal Boiler Inspection Act, Section 20701 et seq., Title 49, 
U.S.Code, 
preempts 
state-law 
asbestos-injury 
claims 
against 
manufacturers of railroad locomotives. 
(No. 2003-0300 — Submitted December 3, 2003 — Decided July 28, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 81270, 2002-Ohio-
7070. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. Review of a trial court decision on a motion seeking leave to add new parties, 
whether filed pursuant to Civ.R. 15 or 21, is subject to an abuse-of-
discretion standard of review. 
2. The Federal Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act, Section 20701 et seq., Title 
49, U.S.Code, preempts state-law tort claims against the manufacturers of 
railroad locomotives asserting injury caused by exposure to asbestos 
contained in railroad locomotives. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶1} 
Forest L. Darby, appellant, along with multiple other plaintiffs, 
filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas against nearly 
60 named defendants and against additional defendants identified only as “John 
Does 1-100, Manufacturers, Sellers or Installers of Asbestos-Containing 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
Products.”  Although the claims of the plaintiffs were filed in a single “master 
consolidated complaint,” each plaintiff’s action proceeded under a separate case 
number.  Darby and the other plaintiffs alleged that they had been exposed to 
asbestos during their employment in Ohio, causing them to contract asbestos-
related diseases.  They asserted that the defendants had produced, sold, or 
otherwise put into the stream of interstate commerce asbestos and asbestos-
containing materials.  The plaintiffs sought punitive damages and damages based 
on multiple state-law theories of recovery.1 
{¶2} 
Nearly two years after the filing of the complaint, Darby and 
numerous other plaintiffs (collectively, “Darby”) moved to amend the complaint 
pursuant to Civ.R. 15(A) 2 and 20(A) 3 to add 11 new party-defendants, among 
them Viad Corporation, Vapor Corporation, and Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton, Inc. 
(“BLH”).  Viad, BLH’s alleged successor-in-interest, filed a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion.  Vapor did not appear.  No previously named defendant 
opposed the motion. 
{¶3} 
The trial court held an oral hearing on Darby’s motion to amend 
and add party-defendants and permitted counsel for Viad to participate.  Counsel 
for both Darby and Viad agreed that Darby was representative of approximately 
                                                 
1.  Darby alleged that the defendants (1) breached their implied warranty of good and 
merchantable quality and fitness for the particular intended use, (2) manufactured and sold 
defective and unreasonably dangerous products, and (3) did not give adequate warning about the 
products’ dangers.  Darby further asserted a claim of enterprise liability, alleging that the 
defendants represent a substantial share of the asbestos-containing product market, and claiming 
that the defendants are severally liable to the plaintiffs based upon their pro rata market share 
within the market.   
2.  Civ.R. 15(A) provides, “A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time 
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is 
permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any 
time within twenty-eight days after it is served.  Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only 
by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party.  Leave of court shall be freely given 
when justice so requires.”  
3.  Civ.R. 20(A) provides, “All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is 
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or 
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or succession or series of transactions or 
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” 
January Term, 2004 
3 
2,000 plaintiffs in similar suits pending in the trial court.  Darby’s counsel further 
asserted, without producing evidence, that these plaintiffs had been railroad 
employees, the vast majority working in railroad repair shops and in locomotives, 
cars, and cabooses of trains that contained asbestos.  Counsel for Viad 
represented, again without proof, that BLH was a “long defunct corporation” that 
had manufactured locomotives until the mid-1950s, and that Viad is the alleged 
successor-in-interest to BLH.  It argued that the Federal Locomotive Boiler 
Inspection Act, Section 20701 et seq., Title 49, U.S.Code (“BIA”), preempted the 
plaintiffs’ state-law tort claims against it and that Darby’s motion to add Viad as a 
defendant should therefore be denied because “there is no possibility, statutory or 
common law, that plaintiffs could allege a valid cause of action, a cause of action 
that could withstand attack as a matter of law against these defendants.” 
{¶4} 
The trial court overruled Darby’s motion for leave to add Viad, 
Vapor, and BLH as new party-defendants without opinion but granted leave to 
add the remaining entities named in Darby’s motion.  In its order, the court 
expressly determined that there was no just reason for delay. 
{¶5} 
Darby appealed, presenting a single assignment of error in the 
court of appeals.  He claimed that the trial court had erred in denying his motion 
to amend and add new party-defendants “because the Locomotive Boiler 
Inspection Act, Title 49 of the United States Code, Section 20701 et seq., does not 
pre-empt plaintiff’s state law claims.” 
{¶6} 
Subsequently 
another 
company, 
Old 
Orchard 
Industrial 
Corporation, appeared for the first time when it filed a brief purportedly as a 
defendant-appellee.  It described itself as the successor-in-interest to Vapor 
Corporation and argued that the court of appeals should affirm the trial court’s 
order refusing to allow the addition of the three new party- defendants.   
 
{¶7} 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of leave to 
amend the complaint to add the three new parties.  It concluded that Darby’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
state-law claims against Viad, BLH, and Old Orchard (purportedly the successor 
to Vapor) were barred because “the BIA completely preempted state law on 
requirements imposed upon locomotive parts, or materials used in such parts.” 
{¶8} 
This cause is now before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal.  We are called upon to resolve a single issue — did the court 
of appeals err in affirming the interlocutory decision of the trial court refusing to 
allow the addition of Viad, BLH, and Vapor as new party-defendants?  We hold 
that the court of appeals did not err. 
I 
Procedural Considerations 
{¶9} 
Before considering the parties’ arguments concerning the federal 
preemption doctrine, we review the procedural posture of this case to determine 
whether that substantive legal issue is properly before us. 
{¶10} Darby grounded his motion to add new party-defendants on Civ.R. 
15 and 204 even though Civ.R. 21 expressly governs initial nonjoinder and 
subsequent addition of parties.  It provides: “Parties may be dropped or added by 
order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of 
the action and on such terms as are just.”  Civ.R. 21 requires a plaintiff to receive 
leave of court, while Civ.R. 15(A) requires such leave once a responsive pleading 
has been served. 
{¶11} In federal practice, plaintiffs have, however, successfully invoked 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 not only to add new claims against existing parties, but also, as 
here, to add completely new parties.  2 Moore, Vestal & Kurland, Moore’s 
Manual: Federal Practice and Procedure (2001) 14-52, Section 14.41[2]. Federal 
courts have recognized that a trial court has broad discretion to grant leave to add 
                                                 
4.  Counsel for Darby did, however, represent at the oral hearing held on his motion that he sought 
to amend the complaint to add new parties “based on the Civil Rules, Rule 15 and 21, in addition 
to Rule 20.” (Emphasis added.)  
January Term, 2004 
5 
or dismiss parties whether proceeding under either Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 or 21.  In 
either case, the court’s decision should be guided by principles of fundamental 
fairness and judicial efficiency as well as by related considerations of timeliness 
and prejudice. Moore, id. at 14-46, Section 14.26[1][b] (in ruling upon a motion 
for joinder by amendment of the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, “the 
court will deny joinder that might have been proper in the original complaint if 
the plaintiff has delayed excessively in making a motion for the new joinder, or if 
the joinder would prejudice the interests of an existing party”); id. at 14-52.1, 
Section 14.42 (Fed.R.Civ.P. 21 “has been held to provide the trial court with 
considerable discretion in determining whether to add or dismiss parties, or to 
order severance.  While each case must be addressed on its particular facts and 
circumstances, the court in exercising its discretion must consider principles of 
fundamental fairness and judicial efficiency”).  See, also, Health Research Group 
v. Kennedy (D.D.C.1979), 82 F.R.D. 21, 29. 
{¶12} Similarly, Ohio courts of appeals have recognized that the decision 
to add or drop a party pursuant to Civ.R. 21 is within the discretion of the trial 
court.  Bill Gates Custom Towing, Inc. v. Branch Motor Express Co. (1981), 1 
Ohio App.3d 149, 150, 1 OBR 460, 440 N.E.2d 61; Picciuto v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs. (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 789, 797, 591 N.E.2d 1287.  We today hold that 
review of a trial court decision on a motion seeking leave to add new parties, 
whether filed pursuant to Civ.R. 15 or 21, is subject to an abuse-of-discretion 
standard of review. 
{¶13} “Abuse of discretion” connotes more than a mere error of law or 
judgment, instead requiring a finding that the trial court’s decision was 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.  In re Consol. Mtge. Satisfaction 
Cases, 97 Ohio St.3d 465, 2002-Ohio-6720, 780 N.E.2d 556, ¶ 5, citing 
Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5 OBR 481, 450 N.E.2d 
1140.  Accordingly, the decision of the trial court denying leave to add Viad, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
BLH, and Vapor as party-defendants may be reversed only if Darby can 
demonstrate that the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
unconscionable. 
{¶14} Darby argues that the proposed new party-defendants’ assertion of 
a federal preemption bar to recovery is legally unfounded.  He seeks reversal of 
the trial court’s decision based solely on his disagreement with the proposed 
defendants’ substantive legal assertion that they have an unassailable defense to 
the claims Darby proposes to make against them. 
{¶15} In Wilmington Steel Products, Inc. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. 
(1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 120, 573 N.E.2d 622, we held that a trial court does not 
abuse its discretion by refusing to allow amendment of a complaint to add new 
claims against existing parties where a plaintiff is unable to make a prima facie 
showing of support for the new matters sought to be pleaded.  Id. at syllabus.  In 
interpreting the federal counterpart to Civ.R. 21, however, it has been held that a 
court should not consider the merits of the claim or defense of the person to be 
added in deciding a motion to join parties. 7 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure (2001) 483, Section 1683, citing, e.g., Stanley Works v. 
Haeger Potteries, Inc. (D.C.Ill.1964), 35 F.R.D. 551.  We have not previously 
considered this issue.  Nevertheless, both federal and Ohio courts have denied 
joinder of new parties if the applicable statute of limitations has expired with 
respect to the parties to be joined. Copsey v. Swearingen (C.A.5, 1994), 36 F.3d 
1336, 1348; Picciuto v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 69 Ohio App.3d at 797-800, 
591 N.E.2d 1287. 
{¶16} We acknowledge that a trial court has discretion in ruling upon a 
motion for leave to add new parties.  We believe, however, that, in most cases, the 
merit of substantive legal defenses that may be asserted by potential parties, as 
opposed to existing parties, are better resolved after a decision to grant leave to 
add new parties has been made independently.  Unless it is apparent on the face of 
January Term, 2004 
7 
the pleadings that all claims against the proposed defendant are wholly futile, the 
better practice is for the trial court to rule on a motion to add parties based on 
traditional grounds, including timeliness and prejudice to existing parties, 
independent of the merits of substantive legal defenses that a proposed defendant 
may have.  If leave is granted, properly served new defendants will then have the 
opportunity to appear and assert their substantive defenses through established 
procedures, i.e., an answer filed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(A) or a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B).  Cf. Wolfson v. Lewis (E.D.Pa.1996), 168 F.R.D. 530; 
Expoconsul Internatl., Inc. v. A/E Sys., Inc. (S.D.N.Y.1993), 145 F.R.D. 336. 
{¶17} Had such a procedure been followed in this case, and assuming 
that the trial court had granted Darby’s motion to add Viad, BLH, and Vapor, 
those new defendants would have been in the same position as if they had been 
joined initially.  Assuming proper service of summons and the complaint, they 
would have had full opportunity to file a responsive pleading in the form of either 
an answer or a motion seeking dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12.  
Had they chosen to file a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, the trial court could have 
accepted evidence and considered the motion under the summary-judgment 
standards of Civ.R. 56, thereby allowing the development of a factual record.  See 
Petrey v. Simon (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 154, 4 OBR 396, 447 N.E.2d 1285. 
{¶18} Instead, in the instant cause we have a record of “facts” that were 
never formally pleaded and are supported solely by the representations of counsel.  
We have litigants (one of whom appeared first in the court of appeals and two of 
whom appear to be defunct corporate entities) purporting to be appellees although 
they have never been properly served or recognized as parties in the cause before 
us. 
{¶19} Darby argues that the trial court in effect treated the appellees’ 
memorandum in opposition to his motion to add new parties as a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  In so doing, Darby implies that a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
nonparty to an action has standing to file such a motion.  We are aware of no 
authority or precedent for such a premise.  Moreover, such an approach 
inappropriately encourages trial courts to bypass the traditional criteria by which a 
motion to add parties should be judged. 
{¶20} In considering a plaintiff’s request for leave to amend, “a trial 
court’s ‘primary consideration is whether there is actual prejudice to the 
defendants because of the delay.’ ”  Helman v. EPL Prolong, Inc. (2000),  139 
Ohio App.3d 231, 251, 743 N.E.2d 484, citing Schweizer v. Riverside Methodist 
Hosp. (1996), 108 Ohio App.3d 539, 546, 671 N.E.2d 312.  Although we have 
held in a case involving the assertion of a new claim against an existing defendant 
that the plaintiff must make “ ‘at least a prima facie showing [of] support for the 
new matters sought to be pleaded,’ ”  that consideration is meant to aid in 
determining whether the amendment is ‘“simply a delaying tactic, [or] one which 
would cause prejudice to the defendant.’ ” Wilmington Steel Products, 60 Ohio 
St.3d at 122, 573 N.E.2d 622, quoting Solowitch v. Bennett (1982), 8 Ohio 
App.3d 115, 117, 8 OBR 169, 456 N.E.2d 562.  Indeed one federal court has 
refused to allow a proposed new party, yet unserved, to appear at all, even as an 
amicus, in opposition to a motion to add it as a party-defendant in an existing 
action. Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Walters Diving & Marine, Inc. (E.D.La.1999), No. 
98-1617, 1999 WL 232669.  See, also, In re Everfresh Beverages, Inc. (1999), 
238 B.R. 558, 569, fn. 8 (observing in ruling on a motion to add additional 
defendants pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) that “[t]he Proposed Additional 
Defendants’ rights, including objecting to the Plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground 
of timeliness” were not before the court). 
{¶21} In arguing only the legal merits of the proposed defendants’ 
substantive federal preemption defense, Darby implies that, if he is correct that 
federal preemption does not bar his state-law claims, the trial court had no choice, 
in the exercise of a sound discretion, but to grant him leave to add these parties. 
January Term, 2004 
9 
The flaw in that implication is that the trial court might well have agreed with 
Darby that the preemption defense had no merit, but nevertheless denied leave 
based on traditional rationales for refusing to add new parties, e.g., untimeliness, 
prejudice to existing parties, or bad faith on the part of the movant.  As in any 
appeal challenging the exercise of trial court discretion, it is the burden of the 
party asserting abuse of discretion, here Darby, to affirmatively identify it.  Thus, 
assuming, arguendo, that Darby is legally correct on the merits of the federal 
preemption issue, we could nevertheless dismiss this appeal based on Darby’s 
failure to identify a reversible abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
{¶22} Nevertheless, in the case at bar, no existing defendant objected to 
Darby’s request to add parties.  The proposed new defendants who did appear, 
with the permission of the court, in opposition to the motion objected to their 
addition as parties based solely on the federal preemption doctrine.  In addition, 
the trial court allowed the addition of eight other proposed defendants who did not 
assert a federal preemption defense, and all of the litigants at this stage have 
affirmatively represented to us that the trial court had no justification for refusing 
to add the new parties as defendants other than the applicability of a valid federal 
preemption defense. 
{¶23} On this record we see no justification for the trial court’s decision 
to discriminate between the other entities enumerated in Darby’s motion, which it 
added as parties, and Viad, BLH, and Vapor, which it did not, other than the 
conclusion that Darby could not overcome a federal preemption defense asserted 
by those three entities.  In view of this circumstance, we will proceed to resolve 
the substantive legal issue presented to us. In doing so, we assume the 
unchallenged representations of fact made by counsel to be true.  That is, we 
accept as fact that Darby and the other plaintiffs joining in his motion were 
exposed to asbestos either within railroad equipment manufactured by the 
proposed party-defendants or while working on that equipment in repair and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
maintenance facilities.  We further accept as true that Viad, BLH, and Vapor were 
manufacturers or suppliers of locomotive products containing asbestos to which 
Darby was exposed. 
II 
Federal Preemption 
{¶24} The substantive legal issue presented is whether Darby’s state-law 
tort claims are preempted by the BIA.  We agree with the court of appeals that 
Darby’s claims are preempted by this federal law. 
{¶25} The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides 
that “the Laws of the United States * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land;  * 
* * any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”  Clause 2, Article VI, United States Constitution.  Consistent 
with precedent established by the Supreme Court of the United States, this court 
has long recognized that the Supremacy Clause allows Congress to deprive the 
states of power to regulate in a field of commerce that Congress intended to 
occupy exclusively, a principle commonly designated the federal preemption 
doctrine.  See Jones Metal Products Co. v. Walker (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 173, 
176-177, 58 O.O.2d 393, 281 N.E.2d 1, citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul (1963), 373 U.S. 132, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248. 
{¶26} In the past, we have resolved numerous cases in which it was 
argued that the federal preemption doctrine invalidated state regulations, 
including cases in which it was argued that the doctrine precluded courts from 
providing state common-law tort remedies to plaintiffs.5  In some cases, we have 
                                                 
5.  See, e.g., Statler v. Internatl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers Loc. Union No. 71 (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 
36, 5 O.O.3d 20, 364 N.E.2d 874; Ohio Dept. of Energy v. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. (1979), 
60 Ohio St.2d 21, 14 O.O.3d 167, 396 N.E.2d 748; In re Miamisburg Train Derailment Litigation 
(1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 255, 626 N.E.2d 85;  Minton v. Honda of Am. Mfg, Inc. (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 62, 684 N.E.2d 648, abrogated in part by Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2000), 529 
U.S. 861, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914;  Pinchot v. Charter One Bank, F.S.B. (2003), 99 Ohio 
St.3d 390, 792 N.E.2d 1105.   
January Term, 2004 
11 
determined that federal law invalidates Ohio law. See, e.g., J.A. Croson Co. v. 
J.A. Guy, Inc. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 346, 691 N.E.2d 655 (unanimously finding 
that an Ohio prevailing wage statute and regulation were preempted by the 
National Labor Relations Act, Section 151 et seq., Title 29 U.S.Code, to the 
extent that they interfered with federal job-targeting programs).  In other cases we 
have found that the federal preemption doctrine does not invalidate Ohio law.  
See, e.g., Pinchot v. Charter One Bank, F.S.B., 99 Ohio St.3d 390, 2003-Ohio-
4122, 792 N.E.2d 1105 (unanimously finding that federal regulations enacted to 
implement the Home Owners’ Loan Act, Section 1461 et seq., Title 12, U.S.Code, 
did not preempt a state law providing a $250 civil damage award for failure to 
record satisfaction of a residential mortgage within 90 days of payment). 
{¶27} It is unnecessary to survey the law of federal preemption in depth, 
as we have done so previously.  See, e.g., Minton v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. 
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 62, 684 N.E.2d 648.  Instead, we reiterate the controlling 
principles that govern this case: (1) the critical question is whether Congress 
intended state law to be superseded by federal law — the historic police powers of 
the states are not to be superseded by federal law unless that is the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress, (2) a presumption exists against preemption of 
state police-power regulations, and (3) federal law preempts state law where 
Congress has occupied the entire field, i.e., where a federal scheme of regulation 
is “ ‘sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 
“left no room” for’ ” a claim under state law. Id. at 69-70 and 76, 684 N.E.2d 648, 
quoting California Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Guerra (1987), 479 U.S. 272, 281, 107 
S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613. 
{¶28} The BIA provides as follows: 
{¶29} “A railroad carrier may use or allow to be used a locomotive or 
tender on its railroad line only when the locomotive or tender and its parts and 
appurtenances 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
{¶30} “(1) are in proper condition and safe to operate without 
unnecessary danger of personal injury.”  Section 20701, Title 49, U.S.Code. 
{¶31} Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line RR. Co. (1926), 272 U.S. 605, 47 
S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432, is the seminal case in the area of federal preemption 
based on the BIA.  The court there recognized that Congress indeed had 
manifested the intention to “occupy the entire field of regulating locomotive 
equipment” by delegating authority to a federal regulatory body extending “to the 
design, the construction, and the material of every part of the locomotive and 
tender and of all appurtenances.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 611, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 
L.E. 432.  See, also, Law v. Gen. Motors Corp. (C.A.9, 1997), 114 F.3d 908, 910, 
quoting S. Pacific Transp. Co. v. Oregon Pub. Util. Comm. (C.A.9, 1993), 9 F.3d 
807, 811  (“This broad preemptive sweep is necessary to maintain uniformity of 
railroad operating standards across state lines” so that “ ‘locomotive companies 
need only concern themselves with one set of equipment regulations’ ”). 
{¶32} In considering whether Darby’s state-law tort claims are preempted 
by the BIA, the court of appeals noted that “case law is overwhelmingly 
supportive of an interpretation that the BIA completely preempted state law on 
requirements imposed upon locomotive parts, or materials used in such parts.”  
This view is supported by the highest court of the state of West Virginia, which 
observed that “an overwhelming body of case law” exists supporting the 
conclusion that “through passage of the Boiler Inspection Act, Congress has 
occupied the field of railroad safety so pervasively” as to justify a finding of 
preemption of that field.  In re W. Virginia Asbestos Litigation (2003), 215 W.Va. 
39, 592 S.E.2d 818, 822. Indeed, it found “any other path blocked by an 
avalanche of adverse authority from other jurisdictions, both state and federal.”  
Id. 
{¶33} The West Virginia court enumerated ten cases from multiple 
jurisdictions finding that the BIA preempts state common-law actions against both 
January Term, 2004 
13 
locomotive operators and locomotive manufacturers.  Id., 215 W.Va. 39, 592 
S.E.2d at 823-824.  Three of those cases involved claims nearly identical to those 
made by Darby against manufacturers of locomotives containing asbestos 
materials.  Gen. Motors Corp. v. Kilgore (Ala.2002), 853 So.2d 171; Scheiding v. 
Gen. Motors Corp. (2000), 22 Cal.4th 471, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 993 P.2d 996; 
Seaman v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc. (2000), 184 Misc.2d 603, 606, 707 N.Y.S.2d 
299 (noting that “with the exception of the Viad [Corp. v. Los Angeles Cty. 
Superior Court, (1997), 55 Cal.App.4th 330, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 136] court, every 
federal and state appellate court that has considered the issue has found that the 
BIA entirely preempts the field of locomotive safety and bars state tort claims”). 
{¶34} It is not legally significant that Darby’s claims are directed against 
the manufacturers of locomotives as opposed to railroad companies themselves.  
“Imposing tort liability on railroad equipment manufacturers would * * * forc[e] 
them to conform to design and construction standards imposed by the states.  This 
would transfer the regulatory locus from the Secretary of Transportation to the 
state courts — a result the BIA was clearly intended to foreclose.”  Law, 114 F.3d 
at 911-912. 
{¶35} The Ninth Circuit concluded in Law: “Through the BIA, the 
federal  government has established a comprehensive, national regime of 
locomotive regulation.  This regime — enforced by [the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act, Section 51 et seq., Title 45, U.S.Code] and the threat of heavy civil 
penalties — preempts every state effort to establish independent standards for the 
design, construction and material of locomotives.”  (Footnote omitted.)  Id. at 
913. 
{¶36} We agree, and similarly hold that Darby’s claims against 
locomotive manufacturers are wholly futile.  The Federal Locomotive Boiler 
Inspection Act, Section 20701 et seq., Title 49, U.S.Code, preempts state-law tort 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
claims against the manufacturers of railroad locomotives asserting injury caused 
by exposure to asbestos contained in railroad locomotives. 
{¶37} Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to allow the addition of Viad, Vapor, and BLH as new party-defendants.  We 
therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and YOUNG, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, J., dissents. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
FREDERICK N. YOUNG, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for 
O’DONNELL, J. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶38} Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line RR. Co. (1926), 272 U.S. 605, 47 
S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432, concerned Georgia and Wisconsin statutes that required, 
respectively, firebox doors and cab curtains in locomotives.  As such, those 
statutes were directly at odds with the authority Congress delegated to federal 
agencies under the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act, Section 20701 et seq., Title 
49, U.S.Code, over the design, construction, and material of every part of the 
locomotive and tender and all appurtenances.  Had the court allowed states to 
impose their own safety regulations as to locomotives, travel on the nation’s 
railways might have been disrupted due to differing regulations.  Clearly, the 
Congress enacted the BIA to achieve uniformity, and it drew upon its powers 
enumerated in the Commerce Clause to do so. 
{¶39} This case is not Napier.  Here, we are not dealing with legislative 
regulation of specific equipment.  We are dealing with tort liability for injuries 
allegedly caused by a product that is no longer in use.  The effect on interstate 
commerce is nil.  The “runaway train” theory of the effects of state regulation — 
January Term, 2004 
15 
“If each state were to adopt different liability-triggering standards, manufacturers 
would have to sell locomotives and cars whose equipment could be changed as 
they crossed state lines, or adhere to the standard set by the most stringent state,” 
Law v. Gen. Motors Corp. (C.A.9, 1997), 114 F.3d 908, 910-911 — is not at 
issue.  The industry itself has moved away from asbestos.  The Federal Railroad 
Administration reported in a 1996 report that “friable asbestos has not been used 
as a material in the construction of locomotives for ten years or more.”  The FRA 
further reported: 
{¶40} “Locomotive builders are careful to avoid the use of asbestos in 
new and rebuilt locomotives.  Asbestos remaining in older units is believed to be 
encapsulated in individual components or systems.  FRA could find no evidence 
of asbestos being a health problem for crews of older locomotives.”  FRA, Report 
to Congress, Locomotive Crashworthiness and Cab Working Conditions (Sept. 
1996), at 12-9. 
{¶41} Since plaintiffs’ tort action for injuries allegedly caused by 
asbestos exposure would have no effect on the design, construction, or material of 
locomotives now in use, there is no danger of state common law intruding into the 
federal domain.  The preemption doctrine exists to protect the federal 
government’s niche, not to protect a certain industry from the common law of 
states. 
__________________ 
 
Kelley & Ferraro, L.L.P., Michael V. Kelley and Anthony Gallucci, for 
appellant. 
 
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Bruce P. Mandel and Timothy M. Fox; Mound, 
Cotton, Wollan & Greengrass, Daniel Markewich and Ellen G. Margolis, for 
appellee Viad Corp. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Bruce P. Mandel and Timothy M. Fox; Baker, 
Lancianese & Conaty and Jon B. Orndorff, for appellee Old Orchard Industrial 
Corp., individually and as successor-in-interest to Vapor Corp. 
 
Roetzell & Andress, Susan S. Box and Stephen D. Jones, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae General Motors Corp. 
__________________