Case Title: Commonwealth v. Overmyer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11481 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MATTHEW W. OVERMYER. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     March 3, 2014. - July 9, 2014. 
 
Present: Ireland, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Narcotic Drugs.  Constitutional Law, 
Narcotic drugs, Search and seizure, Reasonable suspicion, 
Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  Search and Seizure, Motor 
vehicle, Reasonable suspicion, Probable cause. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Pittsfield Division 
of the District Court Department on May 21, 2012. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Jacklyn 
M. Connly, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Cordy, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to 
the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court on its own 
initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
John P. Bossé, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Janet H. Pumphrey for the defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Ester J. Horwich & Justin R. Dashner for Committee for 
Public Counsel Services. 
2 
 
 
Steven S. Epstein & Marvin Cable for National Organization 
for the Reform of Marijuana Laws. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 472 
(2011) (Cruz), we held that, in the wake of the 2008 ballot 
initiative decriminalizing possession of one ounce or less of 
marijuana (2008 initiative), "the odor of burnt marijuana alone 
cannot reasonably provide suspicion of criminal activity."  This 
case requires us to resolve a question not explicitly answered 
in Cruz, supra:  whether the smell of unburnt, as opposed to 
burnt, marijuana suffices to establish probable cause to believe 
that an automobile contains criminal contraband or evidence of a 
crime.1  Here, where police searched the defendant's vehicle 
after seizing a "fat bag" of marijuana from the glove 
compartment, and after perceiving an odor of unburnt marijuana, 
we hold that such odor, standing alone, does not provide 
probable cause to search an automobile.  Because it is not clear 
on this record, however, whether police had probable cause to 
arrest the defendant for criminal possession of marijuana on the 
basis of the marijuana seized from the glove compartment, we 
remand the matter to the District Court for further proceedings 
on that issue. 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services and the National 
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Law on behalf of the 
defendant. 
 
                                                          
 
3 
 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts found by the judge 
after an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to 
suppress marijuana found in his vehicle and statements made to 
police, supplemented by uncontested facts in the record.  See 
Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 
Mass. 818 (2008).  Two Pittsfield police officers testified at 
the hearing. 
 
On May 19, 2012, at approximately 4:30 P.M., Officers Sean 
Klink and James McIntyre of the Pittsfield police department 
responded to the scene of a motor vehicle collision.  They 
observed that the vehicle operated by the defendant, a Volvo, 
had rear-ended a minivan.  After seeking to assure the well-
being of the occupants of the minivan, the officers turned their 
attention to the defendant, who was seated at the side of the 
road. 
 
Both officers noticed a very strong odor of unburnt 
marijuana near the location of the Volvo, and Klink asked the 
defendant if any was present in his vehicle.  Acknowledging that 
there was marijuana in the Volvo, the defendant gave Klink the 
keys to the glove compartment.  Klink found what he described as 
a "fat bag" of marijuana, which was "rather large," inside the 
glove compartment.2 
 
2 There was no evidence before the judge as to the actual 
weight of the marijuana found in the "fat bag." 
                                                          
 
4 
 
 
After retrieving the bag from the glove compartment, the 
officers still perceived a strong smell of marijuana, and, based 
on their training and experience,3 believed that an unspecified 
amount of marijuana remained present in the Volvo.  The officers 
 
 
In cases where the weight of seized marijuana is not 
immediately evident, we note that the Executive Office of Public 
Safety and Security has advised that, if 
 
"portable scales are not available, [police] have the 
option of taking the suspect's information and 
releasing him while also instructing him that he will 
receive something in the mail.  When police return to 
the station, they may weigh the marijuana.  If the 
weight is more than an ounce, the suspect may be 
summonsed to court on a criminal complaint.  If the 
weight is an ounce or less, a citation may be mailed 
to the suspect within [fifteen] days of the offense." 
 
Question 2 Law Enforcement Q&A, Executive Office of Public 
Safety and Security (2014), at 
http://www.mass.gov/eopss/law-enforce-and-cj/law-
enforce/question-2-law-enforcement-q-and-a.html (last 
viewed July 7, 2014). 
 
 
3 Pittsfield police Officer James McIntyre testified that he 
had been exposed to the odors of both burnt and unburnt 
marijuana during training at the police academy, and that he had 
completed two three-week assignments with the Pittsfield police 
drug enforcement unit during his twenty-five years as a police 
officer.  He also had assisted with at least one dozen arrests 
involving marijuana, and is familiar with the smell of the 
substance based on the proximity of his desk at the police 
station to the drug evidence lockers. 
 
 
Pittsfield police Officer Sean Klink testified that he had 
completed drug training at the police academy as well as 
training with the Pittsfield police department that consisted of 
"go[ing] inside [the] drug evidence locker with drug detectives 
and learn[ing] about the different drugs."  In his five years as 
a police officer, Klink had participated in the execution of 
about ten search warrants involving marijuana and had carried 
out more than twenty "arrests in general." 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 
 
did not observe anything else indicating the presence of 
marijuana.  Klink gave the defendant Miranda warnings before 
asking whether the vehicle contained additional marijuana.  The 
defendant denied that it did, but eventually admitted that there 
was more marijuana in the Volvo after Klink "intimat[ed] that a 
[canine] unit would be on its way."  Klink later placed the 
defendant under arrest and took him into custody; the 
defendant's vehicle was towed to the police station. 
 
At some point,4 McIntyre located a backpack on the back seat 
of the vehicle.  The backpack contained two large freezer bags, 
which in turn contained smaller, individually wrapped packages 
of marijuana.  A criminal complaint issued against the defendant 
two days later, charging him with possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a), and commission of 
this offense within a school or park zone, G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. 
 
The judge determined that the strong odor of unburnt 
marijuana initially perceived by police "triggered a suspicion" 
that more than one ounce was present in the vehicle, such that 
Klink was warranted in asking the defendant whether he possessed 
 
4 The record is unclear whether the officers searched the 
back seat of the Volvo before or after the defendant's admission 
that the vehicle contained more marijuana, or his eventual 
arrest.  The judge noted that it was "unclear from [the 
officers'] testimony when the defendant admitted there was more 
marijuana in relation to when McIntyre went into the car, but it 
[was] clear [the defendant] was detained further after the 
marijuana in the glove box was found." 
                                                          
 
6 
 
marijuana, and in retrieving the "fat bag" from the glove 
compartment at the defendant's direction.  Therefore, the judge 
denied the defendant's motion to suppress as to the "fat bag." 
 
The judge also ruled that, once the defendant turned over 
the "fat bag" from the glove compartment, the officers were not 
justified in searching the back seat of the defendant's vehicle.  
"There [were] no other articulable facts to base a reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity, 
or that there were other drugs present"; the defendant made no 
suspicious gestures, and there were no other indicia of the sale 
or manufacturing of marijuana.5  Thus, the judge decided that the 
officers' disbelief of the defendant's denials that there was 
additional marijuana in the vehicle was a "hunch," invalidating 
the ensuing search of the back seat of the vehicle.  As a 
result, she ordered suppressed the bags of marijuana found in 
the backpack, as well as the defendant's statements to police 
after the discovery of the backpack. 
 
The single justice allowed the Commonwealth's application 
for leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal to the Appeals 
Court, and we transferred the matter to this court on our own 
motion. 
 
5 The judge made no findings whether the officers reasonably 
believed that the "fat bag" contained more than one ounce of 
marijuana. 
                                                          
 
7 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  The Commonwealth argues that the smell of 
marijuana supported probable cause to search the back seat of 
the defendant's vehicle, rendering the search proper under the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement.6  The 
Commonwealth contends that these circumstances differ from those 
in Cruz, supra, because that case involved the smell of burnt 
marijuana, whereas the officers in this case perceived an odor 
of unburnt marijuana. 
 
Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, 
a warrantless search of an automobile is constitutionally 
permissible if the Commonwealth proves that officers had 
probable cause to believe that there was contraband or specific 
evidence of a crime in the vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. Daniel, 
464 Mass. 746, 750-751 (2013); Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 
117, 122 (1997).  However, the "'ultimate touchstone' of both 
the Fourth Amendment [to the United States Constitution]and art. 
14 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights] is 
reasonableness," Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 213 
(2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 945 (2013), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Townsend, 453 Mass. 413, 425 (2009).  We have 
 
6 Because reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard 
than probable cause, see Commonwealth v. Smigliano, 427 Mass. 
490, 492 (1998), implicit in the judge's finding that the 
officers lacked a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was 
engaged in criminal activity is that they also lacked probable 
cause to search the vehicle under the automobile exception to 
the warrant requirement. 
                                                          
 
8 
 
determined that "[i]t is unreasonable for the police to spend 
time conducting warrantless searches for contraband when no 
specific facts suggest criminality."  Cruz, supra at 477.  
Because the 2008 initiative reclassified possession of one ounce 
or less of marijuana as a civil violation, and abolished the 
attendant criminal consequences, we held in Cruz, supra at 469-
472, that the odor of burnt marijuana alone no longer 
constitutes a specific fact suggesting criminality.  
Accordingly, such an odor alone does not constitute probable 
cause to believe that a vehicle contains a criminal amount of 
contraband or specific evidence of a crime, such that the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement may be invoked.  
See Commonwealth v. Daniel, supra at 750-752; Cruz, supra at 
475-476. 
 
Here, the judge found that the odor of unburnt marijuana 
did not justify the officers' search of the back seat of the 
vehicle.  The judge determined that, once the defendant 
surrendered the "fat bag" of marijuana from the glove 
compartment, the officers' belief that there was more to be 
found in the vehicle was merely a "hunch."  There was nothing to 
suggest that the marijuana in the "fat bag" did not itself 
account for the smell the officers perceived.  Although the 
Commonwealth argues, quoting Commonwealth v. Skea, 18 Mass. App. 
Ct. 685, 690 n.8 (1984), that "[i]t is widely accepted that the 
9 
 
discovery of some controlled substances gives probable cause to 
search for additional controlled substances in the vicinity," 
our decisions since 2008 have rejected that proposition as to 
marijuana.  See Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 464 Mass. 768, 771-772 
(2013) (presence of less than one ounce of marijuana in vehicle 
did not give rise to probable cause to search it for additional 
marijuana); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 464 Mass. 758, 766 (2013) 
(observation of defendant with marijuana cigarette did not give 
rise to probable cause to search person); Commonwealth v. 
Daniel, supra at 751-752 (defendant's surrender of two small 
bags of marijuana totaling less than one ounce did not give rise 
to probable cause to search vehicle);. 
 
Massachusetts cases since 2008 also have recognized the 
dubious value of judgments about the occurrence of criminal 
activity based on the smell of burnt marijuana alone, given that 
such a smell points only to the presence of some marijuana, not 
necessarily a criminal amount.7  See Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 
supra at 771-772; Commonwealth v. Daniel, supra at 750-752; 
Cruz, supra at 472; Commonwealth v. Fontaine, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 
 
7  General Laws c. 94C, § 32L, provides in relevant part: 
 
 
"Notwithstanding any general or special law to 
the contrary, possession of one ounce or less of 
marihuana shall only be a civil offense, subjecting an 
offender who is eighteen years of age or older to a 
civil penalty of one hundred dollars and forfeiture of 
the marihuana, but not to any other form of criminal 
or civil punishment or disqualification." 
                                                          
 
10 
 
699, 706 (2014).  Although the odor of unburnt, rather than 
burnt, marijuana could be more consistent with the presence of 
larger quantities, see Cruz, supra at 469 n.15, citing 
Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 459 Mass. 148, 150-153 (2011), it 
does not follow that such an odor reliably predicts the presence 
of a criminal amount of the substance, that is, more than one 
ounce, as would be necessary to constitute probable cause.  See 
Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 56 n.2 (1974) ("The 
foundation of probable cause must be specific data, the 
reliability of which could be judged by a magistrate"). 
 
The officers in this case detected what they described as a 
"strong" or "very strong" smell of unburnt marijuana.  However, 
such characterizations of odors as strong or weak are inherently 
subjective; what one person believes to be a powerful scent may 
fail to register as potently for another.  See Doty, Wudarski, 
Marshall, & Hastings, Marijuana Odor Perception:  Studies 
Modeled from Probable Cause Cases, 28 Law & Hum. Behav. 223, 232 
(2004) (identifying traits such as gender and age that may 
influence ability to smell).  Moreover, the strength of the odor 
perceived likely will depend on a range of other factors, such 
as ambient temperature, the presence of other fragrant 
substances, and the pungency of the specific strain of marijuana 
present.  See State v. Pollman, 286 Kan. 881, 894 (2008) ("the 
strength of the smell is subjective and also depends on factors 
11 
 
such as masking agents [chewing gum, mints, tobacco products] 
and the environment where the odor is detected"); Doty, 
Wudarski, Marshall, & Hastings, supra at 231-232 (participants 
in experiment displayed weaker ability to detect odor of 
immature female marijuana plant as compared to that of mature 
plant, and ability to discern smell was affected by presence of 
diesel exhaust fumes; temperature also can influence potency of 
odor perceived).  As a subjective and variable measure, the 
strength of a smell is thus at best a dubious means for reliably 
detecting the presence of a criminal amount of marijuana. 
 
Although it is possible that training may overcome the 
deficiencies inherent in smell as a gauge of the weight of 
marijuana present, see Doty, Wudarski, Marshall, & Hastings, 
supra at 232, there is no evidence that the officers here had 
undergone specialized training that, if effective, would allow 
them reliably to discern, by odor, not only the presence and 
identity of a controlled substance, but also its weight.  
Indeed, in somewhat related cases that turn on the sense of 
smell, such as those involving canine alerts and canine tracking 
evidence, we have required that a sufficient foundation be laid 
as to the canine's ability before the evidence may be admitted 
at trial.  See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 426 Mass. 189, 197-198 
(1997) (canine tracking evidence properly admitted where 
appropriate foundation established its reliability); 
12 
 
Commonwealth v. LaPlante, 416 Mass. 433, 440 n.10 (1993) 
(sufficient foundation for consideration of canine tracking 
evidence includes qualifications of handlers and canines, their 
training, and number of successful tracks).  Similarly, Federal 
courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have required 
that probable cause determinations based on canine alerts be 
supported by evidence of the canine's reliability.  See Florida 
v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057-1058 (2013) (court can presume 
that dog's alert provides probable cause to search "[i]f a bona 
fide organization has certified a dog after testing his 
reliability in a controlled setting," but defendant must be 
given opportunity to challenge evidence of dog's reliability); 
United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 749 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 894 (1999), citing United States v. Race, 529 
F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1976) ("The existence of probable cause 
based on an alert by a drug dog depends upon the dog's 
reliability"). 
 
In sum, we are not confident, at least on this record, that 
a human nose can discern reliably the presence of a criminal 
amount of marijuana, as distinct from an amount subject only to 
a civil fine.  In the absence of reliability, "a neutral 
magistrate would not issue a search warrant, and therefore a 
warrantless search is not justified based solely on the smell of 
13 
 
marijuana," whether burnt or unburnt.  Commonwealth v. Daniel, 
supra at 751, citing Cruz, supra at 475-476. 
 
The judge correctly determined, therefore, that the odor of 
unburnt marijuana did not justify the search of the back seat of 
the defendant's vehicle under the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement.  However, she did not specifically address 
whether the seizure of the "fat bag," if reasonably thought to 
weigh more than one ounce, would support probable cause to 
arrest the defendant, thereby providing an independent basis for 
the warrantless search.  See Commonwealth v. Perkins, 465 Mass. 
600, 605 (2013), quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346 
(2009) (police may search automobile incident to arrest of its 
driver where arrestee "is within reaching distance of the 
vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the offense of arrest").  In this regard, the judge 
did not make findings necessary to a determination whether there 
was probable cause to arrest the defendant for possession of the 
"fat bag," including whether the officers had a reasonable 
belief that the "fat bag" contained more than one ounce of 
marijuana.8 
3.  Conclusion.  The order allowing the defendant's motion 
to suppress is vacated.  The case is remanded to the District 
Court for a determination, after any hearings the judge deems 
 
8 See note 2, supra. 
                                                          
 
14 
 
necessary, whether the officers had probable cause to arrest the 
defendant on the basis of the marijuana seized from the glove 
compartment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.