Case Title: IMPORTANTNOTICIE THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CI VIL PR OCED URE PR OMUL GA TED B Y THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2004-SC-000388-WC

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IMPORTANTNOTICIE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINIONISDESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATEDBYTHE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USED ASAUTHORITYINANYOTHER CASE INANYCOURTOF THIS STATE. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION V ,,$uyrtttr (gourf of i!o APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS 2003-CA-01913-WC WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO . 77-14300 RANDALL WEBB ; WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD ; WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUNDS/SPECIAL FUND ; AND HON . WILLIAM BRUCE COWDEN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 2004-SC-0388-WC MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING RENDERED : MARCH 17, 2005 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AirE<3 --as-o~- q ~ c APPELLANT APPELLEES This appeal is from a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed an opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board, which in turn had affirmed an award by the Administrative Law Judge of maximum workers' compensation benefits, but declining to apportion liability between United States Steel Corporation and Workers' Compensation Funds/Special Fund . United States Steel presents as the sole question, the failure of the ALJ to apportion liability between USS and the Special Fund . It frames the question presented in five sections as follows : whether it was an abuse of discretion by the ALJ to fail to base his decision on the report of Dr . Patrick ; whether it was an abuse of discretion to rely on the report from Dr . Noelker ; whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that USS cannot argue the abuse of discretion in relying on Dr. Noelker ; whether the findings of fact of the ALJ are erroneous as a matter of law ; and whether the Special Fund is liable for all compensation payable because of the disability resulting from the traumatic arousal . Webb suffered a work-related injury to his right ankle on February 19, 1977, when he was employed as a coal miner. He was 27 years old at the time of the injury . USS began paying temporary total disability benefits on February 20, 1977 . Webb filed an action for adjustment of a claim concerning his ankle injury in 1978, and the Board granted a motion by USS to hold the case in abeyance until one of the parties requested a hearing . A hearing was conducted in 1981 . Subsequently, Webb amended his application for adjustment of claim to include traumatic neurosis and injury to his knee and back caused by the alteration of his gait and posture resulting from the ankle injury . The Board ordered the Special Fund joined as a party . It also granted another motion by USS to hold the case in abeyance until the termination of the TTD benefits, or until one of the parties requested that the case be removed from abeyance . Throughout the decade of the 1980s, Webb attempted to have his case removed from abeyance based on evidence indicating that he had received maximum medical improvement . USS successfully opposed all such efforts . In July 2000, the Chief ALJ, on her own motion, removed the case from abeyance . In 2003, the ALJ granted an award in favor of Webb, finding him to be totally disabled as a result of the ankle injury and associated psychological problems caused by the injury. The ALJ assigned all liability to the employer, USS . The Board affirmed the decision of the ALJ, and the Court of Appeals did likewise . This appeal followed . Webb waived the filing of a brief because the issues presented are between USS and the Workers' Compensation Funds/Special Fund . He stated that the amount of his benefits would not be affected by a decision in this case . The Special Fund did not file a brief . The essence of the complaint presented by USS on appeal relates to the apportionment of that part of the disability award due to psychological problems . The ALJ found that the psychological disability of Webb was caused by his physical injury and was not due to the arousal of a preexisting, previously dormant personality or psychological disorder. Accordingly, the ALJ assigned all liability for the disability to the employer, USS . In this appeal, USS essentially repeats the arguments it made before the Court of Appeals and the Board . It contends that the work-related incident aroused a preexisting personality disorder into disabling reality, thus making the Special Fund liable for all compensation attributable to the psychological disability . It also asserts that the findings of the ALJ were erroneous and not supported by any substantial evidence . It maintains that the Board and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the ALJ. We disagree . In circumstances where the party having the burden of proof is unsuccessful before the ALJ, the question on appeal is whether the evidence compels a different result . KRS 342 .285(2) limits the review by the Board of the ALJ decision, and where the initial award is in favor of the claimant, the standard of review is whether the initial determination is supported by substantial evidence of probative value . Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1985). The ALJ, as finder of fact, has the sole authority to determine the weight, credibility, substance and inference to be drawn from the evidence . Where the evidence is conflicting, the ALJ may choose whom and what to believe . Pruitt v. Bugg Bros . , 547 S.W .2d 123 (Ky. 1977). Additionally, the ALJ may choose to believe part of the evidence and disbelieve other parts. Pruitt , supra . The function of the Board is to decide whether the evidence is sufficient to support a particular finding made by the ALJ, or whether such evidence as there was before the ALJ should be viewed as uncontradicted and compelling a different result . See Western Baptist Hosp . v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1992). It is not enough for USS to demonstrate that other evidence might support a different decision of the ALJ . McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp . , 514 S.W .2d 46 (Ky. 1974). Upon a careful review of this entire matter, we must conclude that the evidence does not compel a finding in favor of USS . As long as the opinion by the ALJ is supported by any evidence of substance, then it cannot be said that the evidence compels a different result . Special Fund v. Francis , 708 S.W .2d 641 (Ky. 1986) . KRS 342.285(2) provides that the Board may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ in matters involving the weight to be afforded the evidence on questions of fact . KRS 342.120, the statute in effect in 1977 when Webb was injured, provided that the Special Fund could be made a party to a compensation proceeding when the employee is found to have a dormant, nondisabling disease or condition which was aroused or brought into disabling reality by reason of a subsequent compensable injury by accident or occupational disease . See KRS 342.120(1)(b) . We recognize that the statute provided that if the subsequent compensable injury or occupational disease resulted in a permanent disability which is greater than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury or occupational disease alone, the employer is responsible only for the disability which would have resulted from the injury or occupational disease if there had been no preexisting dormant disease or condition, and the Special Fund is liable for the remaining disability . See Whittaker v . Troutman , 7 S.W.3d 363 (Ky . 1999) . When considering apportionment, it does not matter whether the preexisting disease or condition is a physical condition or a mental condition . Whittaker , supra . Whether any liability for the psychological disability should be apportioned to the Special Fund depends on two things : 1) whether Webb had a preexisting dormant nondisabling disease or condition which was brought into disabling reality by his work- related injury, and 2) whether this previous dormant disease or condition resulted in a greater disability than the injury alone otherwise would have . Here, we cannot say that the Board erred in applying controlling law . The same is true for the Court of Appeals . There was substantial evidence to support the decision of the ALJ that the psychological condition was not due to a preexisting previous dormant condition and his decision to assign all liability to USS was valid . The evidence for the psychological condition came from the medical reports of Dr . Robert Noelker, a licensed clinical psychologist and the medical report and deposition of Dr . Patrick, a general surgeon . Dr. Noelker evaluated Webb on August 7, 1981, and Dr . Patrick examined Webb on November 16, 2002 . The Noelker report indicated that Webb suffered from a severe reactive depression, post-traumatic anxiety and somatization disorder, which were related to the work-related injury . Dr . Patrick, in his testimony and report, indicated that the work-related injury was the cause of Webb's complaints . He did not consider the issue of apportionment . Counsel for the employer asked Dr . Patrick on cross-examination, to address the aggregate impairment and the appropriate apportionment . Dr . Patrick answered that if you apportioned the total disability, you would apportion 68% to the physical condition of the ankle and 32% to the traumatic arousal of the psychiatric or dormant personality disorder . The AU determined that the psychological disability was not due to the arousal of a preexisting, previously dormant, psychological disease or disorder which resulted in a disabling reality, but rather evolved from the work-related ankle injury. USS continues to complain that it was an abuse of discretion for the AU to rely on the Noelker report because Noelker did not establish his qualifications in compliance with 803 KAR 25 :010 § 10(4) . USS did not timely object to the filing of the Noelker medical report, but now argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the AU to consider the report because of the omitted qualifications . The employer did raise the question before the Board . However, the issue had been previously waived by the failure to object to the AU within the ten days required by the regulation . The failure to raise an issue before an administrative body precludes the assertion of that issue in any action for judicial review . Urella v . Ky . Bd . of Medical Licensure , 939 S.W.2d 869 (Ky . 1997) . The statutory definition of physician, for the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act, includes psychologists acting within the scope of their licenses . KRS 342 .0011(32) . Other than the claim of an abuse of discretion, the employer presents no evidence to show that Noelker is anything other than a licensed clinical psychologist acting within the scope of his license . The ALJ noted that Dr . Patrick is a general surgeon, not a clinical psychologist, thereby further supporting reliance on Dr . Noelker's medical conclusions . Accordingly, there is no evidence that compels a contrary result to the decision of the ALJ to accept the medical report of Noelker . The fact that the ALJ believed the Noelker report rather than the Patrick report is within the discretion and authority of the ALJ . The employer does not present any evidence that there was a change in the psychological condition between 1981 and 2002 . All such matters are decided by the ALJ . Here, the determination by the ALJ and the review by the Board and the Court of Appeals demonstrate that the award of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence and there is no evidence that compels a different result . The opinion of the Court of Appeals is affirmed . All concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : William A . Rice RICE, HENDRICKSON & WILLIAMS P .O . Drawer 980 398 Woodland Hills Harlan, KY 40831 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Mark D . Goss GOSS & GOSS ATTORNEYS 208 Central Street P .O . Box 897 Harlan, KY 40831 David W. Barr Workers Compensation Funds Special Fund 1047 US HWY 127 South, Ste 4 Frankfort, KY 40601-9979