Case Title: Matter of Everheart

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Everheart1998 WY 58957 P.2d 847Case Number: 97-109Decided: 04/24/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
In 
the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of Edward S. EVERHEART, an 
Employee of S & L Industrial. Edward S. EVERHEART, Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

S & L INDUSTRIAL, and 
State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety And Compensation Division, 
Appellees (Respondents).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Albany County, Jeffrey A. Donnell, J.

 

Scott E. 
Kolpitcke of Cook and Associates, P.C., Laramie, for 
Appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney 
General, for Appellee State of Wyoming.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The hearing 
examiner denied the claim for worker's compensation benefits which was submitted 
by Appellant Edward Everheart (the employee). The employee filed a petition with 
the district court for a review of the hearing examiner's decision, and the 
district court certified the case to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

[¶2]      We affirm the 
hearing examiner's decision.

ISSUES

[¶3]      The employee 
presents the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the 
Office of Administrative Hearings acted arbitrarily and capriciously by 
incorrectly applying the law to the facts of this case with regard to the burden 
of proof and by disregarding expert medical testimony?

II. Whether the 
Office of Administrative Hearings' decision that the [employee] did not meet his 
burden of proof is supported by substantial evidence?

III. Whether the 
Office of Administrative Hearings acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it 
denied worker['s] compensation benefits to the [employee] without providing an 
opportunity for [the employee] to appear in person to resolve issues of 
credibility as the Office agreed to do?

FACTS

[¶4]      The employee 
worked for Appellee S & L Industrial (the employer) as a traffic flagger for 
construction that was ongoing in Telephone Canyon. He claims that on September 
6, 1996, his shoulder was injured when a truck hit a traffic barrel and the 
barrel hit him and knocked him to the ground. The employee went to the emergency 
room where he was given pain medication and a sling. He subsequently visited 
Michael Wasser, M.D., who diagnosed him with having an acromioclavicular joint 
separation. Dr. Wasser thereafter surgically repaired the employee's 
shoulder.

[¶5]      The employee 
filed a claim for worker's compensation benefits on September 16, 1996. The 
employer objected to the claim, and the case was referred to the Office of 
Administrative Hearings for a contested case hearing. At the outset of the 
hearing, the hearing examiner remarked that the employee's credibility seemed to 
be a major issue. She asked the employee if he would object to the hearing being 
conducted by telephone. The employee agreed to proceed by telephone "with the 
one stipulation . . . that if any questions of credibility remain, we could 
leave these proceedings open for further questioning in person." The hearing 
examiner agreed to leave the proceedings open for in-person questioning if 
questions regarding the employee's credibility remained at the end of the 
hearing.

[¶6]      During the 
hearing, the parties presented conflicting testimony about what occurred on 
September 6, 1996. The employee testified in the following manner about the 
alleged incident: He signaled a truck to slow down because it was traveling at 
approximately sixty miles per hour. In response, the truck driver "flipped [him] 
off" and swerved the truck so that the trailer whipped and hit a traffic barrel. 
The barrel flew up and hit the employee in his mid-section, knocking him down on 
his shoulder. Although he was injured and on the ground, he managed to pivot 
himself so that he could read the letters "ABF" and the number "53113" on the 
back of the truck even though he was not wearing his eyeglasses at the time. 
Upon regaining his composure, he got up, replaced the barrel, and continued 
flagging until he was relieved one to two hours later.

[¶7]      The employee 
further testified that, on the night before the incident, he and his foreman 
went to the Buckhorn Bar where he drank Pepsi-Cola. The next morning, his 
foreman woke him and took him to work. He also testified that, as a result of 
being knocked to the ground, he ripped the shoulder and elbow of his jacket and 
that he was crying when he spoke with his foreman after the incident. He said 
that, after the incident, his foreman took him to his vehicle which was in 
Laramie and that, on the way, the foreman advised the employee to get a 
lawyer.

[¶8]      The foreman 
offered a substantially different account. He testified that he and the employee 
went to the Buckhorn Bar on the night before the alleged incident occurred and 
that they both consumed a couple of beers. He stated that the employee did not 
ride to work with him the next day but, rather, that he asked the employee to 
come to work when he realized he was shorthanded. He also said that he did not 
notice torn clothing and that the employee was not crying when he reported the 
alleged incident to him. Finally, he denied having advised the employee to get 
an attorney.

[¶9]      A co-worker who 
saw the employee after the alleged incident testified that she did not notice 
torn clothing, dirt, or anything which would indicate that the employee was 
knocked to the ground and injured. Another co-worker testified that the employee 
initially informed her that the truck was traveling sixty-five miles per hour 
but that he later told her the truck was going only forty-five miles per hour. 
She further stated that she discovered the employee had submitted two employment 
applications to the company and that the applications included conflicting 
information.

[¶10]   The employee presented an affidavit 
from Dr. Wasser which stated that the employee's injury was consistent with his 
description of the incident and that it was "unlikely that [the employee] could 
have suffered this injury prior to reporting to work on September 6, 1996, due 
to the amount of pain [the employee] suffered from this injury." Dr. Wasser 
based his opinion on the employee's version of how his injury occurred. He also 
felt that the employee would not have been able to report to work if the injury 
had occurred before then because he would not have been able to tolerate the 
pain.

[¶11]   The employee also presented the 
testimony of the highway patrolman who investigated the incident. The highway 
patrolman stated that, upon completing his investigation, he issued a reckless 
driving citation to the truck driver. He testified that he had less than a year 
of experience at the time of the incident and admitted under cross-examination 
that he relied largely on the employee's version of the incident in reaching his 
conclusions. He also admitted that, although the barrel had scuff marks on it, 
he did not conduct tests to determine their age; that it was not uncommon for 
barrels to be hit at the worksite; and that the barrel could have been hit on a 
different day.

[¶12]   The truck driver testified that, 
during his thirty-two years of driving a truck, he had never been in an accident 
and that he had received annual safety awards. He also testified that he was 
driving approximately twenty-five miles per hour through the canyon. He 
explained that he was not angry or aggravated and that he did not "flip [anyone] 
off" or swerve toward anyone. He also stated that he absolutely did not hit a 
barrel.

[¶13]   The parties stipulated to the 
admission of the written statement of a second truck driver who was following 
the first truck through Telephone Canyon on September 6, 1996. The second truck 
driver stated that he was traveling at a speed of approximately twenty to 
twenty-five miles per hour and that the distance between his truck and the first 
truck seemed to stay the same. He also stated that he was about one-half to 
three-fourths of a mile behind the first truck and that he did not see the first 
truck swerve and hit a traffic barrel or anyone lying on the 
ground.

[¶14]   The truck driver's supervisor 
testified that he had known the truck driver since 1984. He said that the truck 
driver had a perfect record with ABF and that he had not had an accident or 
citation. He also explained that, assuming the truck was traveling at sixty 
miles per hour, it would have been about eighty feet away from the employee one 
second after it passed him. He also said that the letters and numbers on the 
back of the truck are four inches high and that it would be difficult for 
someone to read them at that distance.

[¶15]   In her order, the hearing examiner 
concluded that the employee failed to meet his burden of proof and denied his 
request for benefits:

14. Because of 
the wide divergence in the testimony presented in this case, it is incumbent 
upon this Office to assess the credibility of the witnesses in order to 
determine if Claimant has met his burden of proof. Based upon a review of all 
the evidence and testimony, this Office finds that the testimony of [the 
foreman, both truck drivers, and the truck drivers' supervisor] is the more 
credible and that Claimant has therefore failed to meet the required burden of 
proof. The numerous inconsistencies occurring in this case seriously jeopardizes 
the credibility of the Claimant. The Claimant's testimony that the semi was 
travelling in excess of 65 miles per hour, that the driver intentionally swerved 
his 80,000 pound rig at him and that this action did not result in tragic 
consequences is incredible. The Claimant's testimony that he could read the 
numbers on a truck travelling 88 feet per second, without his glasses, and after 
being knocked to the ground, is even more incredible. Couple this with a truck 
driver who has been driving for a living for 32 years without so much as a 
citation, greater doubt is created in Claimant's version of the events in this 
case. Add the testimony of [the foreman] who contradicted Claimant's testimony 
from the events of the evening before the accident all the way to the Claimant 
getting to work and later going to the hospital, and little is left to redeem 
Claimant's credibility. Although the doctor's affidavit states with medical 
certainty that Claimant suffered injuries from a work-related accident, that 
statement is based upon an acceptance of Claimant's version of the facts. 
Claimant's incredible version was also relied upon by [the highway patrolman] 
during his investigation of the accident as reported by 
Claimant.

15. Based on the 
above facts this Office finds that Claimant's version of his alleged September 
6, 1996, accident and injury is not credible or believable and he has thus 
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a 
work-related injury.

The employee 
filed a petition for review with the district court, and the district court 
certified the case to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b).

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶16]   W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) provides that 
judicial review of administrative decisions is limited to a determination of the 
matters which are specified in WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1997). Section 
16-3-114(c) provides in pertinent part:

(c) . . . . The 
reviewing court shall:

. . 
.

(ii) Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

. . 
.

(E) Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

DISCUSSION

A. Abuse of 
Discretion

[¶17]   The employee asserts that the 
hearing examiner acted arbitrarily and capriciously when she incorrectly applied 
the law to the facts of this case with regard to the burden of proof and when 
she disregarded the expert testimony.

A compensable 
injury is defined as:

any harmful change in the 
human organism other than normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any 
artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the course of employment 
while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the 
employer and incurred while at work in places where the employer's business 
requires an employee's presence and which subjects the employee to 
extra-hazardous duties incident to the business.

WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) (1997). The employee carries the burden of establishing every 
essential element of a claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Goddard v. 
Colonel Bozeman's Restaurant, 914 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Wyo. 1996). As a part of his 
burden, he must show that his injury arose out of and in the course of his 
employment. Cabral v. Caspar Building Systems, Inc., 920 P.2d 268, 269 (Wyo. 
1996). To prove that the injury arose out of and in the course of his 
employment, the employee must show that a causal connection existed between the 
injury and the employment. Johnson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division, 798 P.2d 323, 325 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶18]   Sufficient conflicting evidence was 
presented with regard to whether a work-related accident occurred to trigger the 
process of weighing the evidence and assessing the witnesses' 
credibility.

The testimony in 
this record may be subject to varying interpretations, but we will not usurp the 
function of the [trier of fact] in making factual findings with respect to this 
case. It is the duty of the trier of fact to weigh and evaluate the testimony of 
the witnesses, including that given by experts. . . . "[The trier of fact] was . 
. . the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and was entitled to 
interpret the evidence."

Creek v. Town of 
Hulett, 657 P.2d 353, 357 (Wyo. 1983) (quoting Ward v. Yoder, 355 P.2d 371, 374 
(Wyo. 1960)) (citation omitted). See also Hepp v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 881 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶19]   The hearing examiner was in the 
best position to judge the employee's credibility. Latimer v. Rissler & 
McMurry Co., 902 P.2d 706, 711 (Wyo. 1995). Because of the numerous 
inconsistencies in the employee's report and his improbable account of the 
events surrounding the alleged incident, we defer to the hearing examiner's 
determination that the employee was not credible and that he did not show his 
injury arose out of and in the course of his duties as a flagger for the 
employer.

[¶20]   The hearing examiner was also in 
the best position to judge the weight to be given to the medical evidence. Id. 
"[T]he opinion of an expert may be disregarded if the trier of fact finds it to 
be unreasonable or not adequately supported by facts upon which the opinion is 
based." Krause v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 803 P.2d 81, 83 (Wyo. 1990). The doctor based his opinion upon an assumption that the 
employee would not have been able to tolerate the pain if he had come to work 
with the injury. The employee, however, admitted that he was able to work for 
one to two hours after the alleged injury occurred. Furthermore, the doctor 
relied upon events that the employee was obliged to prove. When the employee 
failed to prove that those events actually occurred, the doctor's opinion became 
questionable.

[¶21]   Although the employee's account of 
what caused his injury indicated that his injury arose out of and in the course 
of his employment, he had the burden to establish that this version was true by 
a preponderance of the evidence. He did not meet that burden. The testimony of 
each credible witness was candid, straightforward, and consistent with the 
testimony from the other witnesses, and, when the testimony was examined as a 
whole, it supported the suspicion that the events as the employee described them 
did not occur.

B. Burden of 
Proof

[¶22]   The employee contends that he met 
his burden of proof by presenting substantial evidence to support his claim and 
that the hearing examiner misconstrued the record and relied on evidence which 
was outside of the record.

[¶23]   Whether an employee's injury 
occurred in the course of his employment is a question of fact. Cabral, 920 P.2d  
at 269.

We review an 
administrative agency's findings of fact by applying the substantial evidence 
standard. Our task is to examine the entire record to determine whether 
substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's findings. We will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the hearing examiner when substantial 
evidence supports his decision. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which 
a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.

Latimer, 902 P.2d  at 708-09 (citations omitted). We reiterate that it is the trier of fact's 
duty to weigh and evaluate the witnesses' testimony including the testimony 
given by experts. Latimer, 902 P.2d  at 711. The reviewing court is foreclosed 
from reweighing the evidence. Id.

[¶24]   The hearing examiner was the sole 
judge of the witnesses' credibility and was entitled to analyze the evidence on 
the basis of her credibility determinations. Given our concurrence with the 
hearing examiner's conclusion that the employee's evidence was not believable or 
credible, we cannot conclude that the employee presented substantial evidence to 
support his claim.

[¶25]   Turning to the employee's claim 
that the hearing examiner misconstrued the record and relied on evidence which 
was outside of the record, we again do not detect a reason to disturb the 
hearing examiner's decision. The employee specifically challenges the emphasized 
sentences in the following paragraph of the order:

4. Claimant's 
application for S & L Industrial asks whether the applicant had ever been 
convicted of a crime. Claimant admitted that he lied on the application when he 
denied having any previous felony convictions to his employer. Claimant admitted 
that he had previous convictions for issuing bad checks and for forgery. Other 
impeachment included Claimant testifying at the contested case hearing, as well 
as at a deposition hearing, that he had filed two previous workers' compensation 
claims and had never filed any other claims or suits in the past. At the 
contested case hearing Claimant was presented with evidence demonstrating an 
additional workers' compensation case filed by Claimant in 1994, as well as a 
lawsuit filed by Claimant in the U.S. District Court in Washington against 
Greyhound Bus Lines in 1994. Both claims revolved around an alleged right ankle 
injury. The employer in the previous workers' compensation case initially 
contested that case stating that she believed Claimant was acting in a way that 
he was faking the injury. The claim was subsequently paid. Claimant stated that 
he had forgotten about these cases.

(Emphasis 
added.) The employee contends that the hearing examiner improperly relied on a 
forgery conviction that he never admitted happened. He also argues that he did 
not testify at the hearing that he had filed only two prior worker's 
compensation claims and no other lawsuits as indicated in the order. Finally, he 
complains that the evidence of his prior deposition testimony was irrelevant and 
inadmissible pursuant to W.R.E. 608(b) and WYO. STAT. § 16-3-108(a) 
(1997).

[¶26]   A hearing examiner in a worker's 
compensation hearing is not bound by the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. Casper Oil 
Company v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 227 (Wyo. 1995). Instead, "irrelevant, 
immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence" is excluded. Section 16-3-108(a). The 
decision regarding admissibility of evidence is committed to the sound 
discretion of the hearing examiner. Goddard, 914 P.2d  at 1238. A hearing 
examiner abuses his discretion when his decision "shocks the conscience of the 
court." Id.

[¶27]   The hearing examiner based her 
finding that the employee admitted he had previously been convicted of forgery 
upon an investigation report which was admitted for impeachment purposes and 
which listed the employee's felony convictions. The report included a 1993 
forgery charge, and it indicated that a judgment was entered against the 
employee. Furthermore, when the hearing examiner opined that the forgery 
conviction was proper impeachment evidence, the employee did not challenge her 
choice of words.

[¶28]   The employee also disapproves of 
the hearing examiner's finding that he testified at the hearing and at his 
deposition "that he had filed two previous workers' compensation claims and had 
never filed any other claims or suits in the past." He maintains that, to reach 
this conclusion, the hearing examiner "pasted together pieces of inadmissible 
deposition testimony out of context, and filled in the gaps with incorrect 
assumptions."

[¶29]   At the hearing, the employee 
admitted that, during his deposition, he mentioned the two prior work-related 
burns, and he denied being involved in any other claims. When he was asked at 
the hearing why he did not mention the worker's compensation claims for a 1994 
ankle and knee injury and a 1995 hand injury, he maintained that those claims 
slipped his mind. Also, during his deposition, he neglected to disclose a 1994 
lawsuit against Greyhound for an ankle injury until the attorney for the Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division reminded him of it. We conclude that 
this evidence was relevant to the employee's credibility and that the hearing 
examiner did not err in interpreting or considering it.

C. In-Person 
Testimony

[¶30]   The employee contends that the 
hearing examiner acted arbitrarily and capriciously when she denied his claim 
for worker's compensation benefits without allowing him to testify in person 
after the telephonic hearing concluded. Because of bad weather conditions, the 
employee's attorney agreed to participate in a telephonic hearing "[a]s long as 
there's no prejudice to my client." Because everyone agreed that the employee's 
credibility was the major issue, the hearing examiner offered to continue the 
hearing to allow the employee to appear in person. The employee's attorney 
declined, stating:

I guess I told 
[counsel for the Workers' Safety and Compensation Division] yesterday I wouldn't 
object to doing it this way, and I agree, I would hate to put it off at this 
point too. I guess I agreed to . . . it with the one stipulation or one factor 
that if any questions of credibility remain, we could leave these proceedings 
open for further questioning in person.

At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the hearing examiner announced her intention to 
render a decision within thirty days. The employee's attorney did not request an 
opportunity to present in-person testimony, and the hearing examiner 
subsequently entered her order without conducting further proceedings, 
concluding that the employee's version of the alleged incident was "not credible 
or believable."

[¶31]   The employee's request was that he 
be afforded an opportunity to present in-person testimony if, at the end of the 
hearing, a question remained with regard to his credibility. We do not detect 
anything in the hearing examiner's order which indicates that a question 
remained in her mind about whether the employee's testimony was credible. The 
fact that the hearing examiner decided the credibility issue against the 
employee does not mean that she harbored questions about his credibility. In 
fact, the record reveals the opposite; it reveals that the hearing examiner 
decided the employee was not credible. When the employee agreed to the hearing 
being conducted over the telephone, he necessarily knew that the issue would be 
determined one way or the other, and he agreed to abide by the hearing 
examiner's decision. We refuse to require further proceedings because the 
employee came out on the losing side of a risk that he agreed to 
take.

CONCLUSION

[¶32]   The hearing examiner did not abuse 
her discretion when she denied the employee's claim for worker's compensation 
benefits or when she rendered her decision without having the benefit of 
in-person testimony.

[¶33]   The hearing examiner's decision is 
affirmed.