Case Title: In re Page

Citation: 

Docket Number: S44396

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  March 26, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of the Reciprocal

Discipline of:

GIMI D. PAGE,

										    Accused.

(OSB 97-28; SC S44396)

	On review of the recommendation of the State Professional
Responsibility Board. 

	Submitted on the record September 24, 1997; reassigned
February 3, 1998.

	Christopher R. Hardman, Portland, filed the answer for the
accused.

	Jeffrey D. Sapiro, Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego, filed
the reply for the Oregon State Bar. 

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Graber, Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.*

	PER CURIAM

	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 30 days commencing on the effective date of this
decision.

	*Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision.

		PER CURIAM

		This is a reciprocal lawyer discipline proceeding
governed by Rule of Procedure (BR) 3.5.  The accused, who is
admitted to practice in both Oregon and Washington, entered into
a stipulation for discipline with the Washington State Bar
Association (WSBA).  Under that stipulation, based upon agreed
facts, the accused was formally reprimanded.  The State
Professional Responsibility Board of the Oregon State Bar (the
Bar) considered the matter, pursuant to BR 3.5(a), and has
recommended that this court suspend the accused from the practice
of law in Oregon for 180 days.

		The accused filed an answer in this court, BR 3.5(c),
contending that she should not be subject to any further
discipline in Oregon.  Alternatively, she asks that we impose a
sanction no more severe than a public reprimand.(1)  For the
reasons stated below, we conclude that, under Oregon law, a   
30-day suspension is the appropriate sanction in this case.

		The stipulated facts are as follows.  The accused
represented husband in a marital dissolution proceeding in
Washington.  At a settlement conference in 1991, the parties
agreed to most of the issues in dispute, including that husband
owed wife about $3,600 in unpaid child support.  In 1993, the
accused drafted several documents to finalize the dissolution and
sent them to opposing counsel for approval and signature.  The
accused was not available when opposing counsel called her to
discuss some changes.  She conveyed a message to opposing
counsel, however, that he should make the appropriate changes and
return the documents.  Opposing counsel made the changes, and he
and wife signed the documents.  He then returned the signed
documents to the accused with a letter stating that she should
call him if she had any questions about the changes.

		Upon receipt of the signed documents, the accused
discussed opposing counsel's changes with husband, who told her
to change the documents back to their original wording.  The
accused then made several changes to the signed documents, using
white correction fluid in one instance to avoid disturbing
opposing counsel's signature.  Her changes consisted of the
following:  (1) changing the child support arrearage figure from
$5,308.50 to $3,602; (2) adding a paragraph to one document
requiring wife to notify husband if she changed their child's
residence; and (3) changing wording in the final decree relating
to husband's ability to take the child out of the jurisdiction.

		The accused did not notify opposing counsel about her
changes.  Instead, she submitted the signed, altered documents to
the court, which approved the documents and entered a dissolution
judgment.  Upon receipt of a conformed copy of the altered
documents and dissolution judgment, opposing counsel notified the
accused that he disagreed with her changes and that he had
prepared a stipulated order to set aside the judgment.  The
accused signed the stipulated order, the court approved it, and
the case was set for retrial.  A fee dispute later arose
concerning opposing counsel's fees incurred in connection with
the altered documents.  The trial court ordered each side to pay
its own fees.

		The accused admitted in the stipulation that she had
changed the documents without notifying opposing counsel and had
presented them to the court as containing agreed terms, without
opposing counsel's approval.  In the accused's view, her changes
more accurately reflected the parties' original agreement. 

		The stipulation described the accused's misconduct as
follows:

	"19.  By presenting the changed orders to the court as
agreed orders, [the accused] made a false statement of
material fact and violated [Washington Rule of
Professional Conduct] RPC 3.3(a)(1) and RPC 8.4(c) and
(d).

	"20. [The accused's] conduct in not informing the
tribunal that she had made changes to the pleadings
after the opposing counsel signed them violated     
RPC 3.3(f)."(2)

As relevant, Oregon's disciplinary rules do not vary
significantly from the Washington rules.  See DR 7-102(A)(5) (in
representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false
statement of fact); DR 1-102(A)(3) and (4) (it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, or conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice).  See also   
ORS 9.460(2) (a lawyer never shall seek to mislead the court by
false statement of fact).  There is no precise Oregon equivalent
to RPC 3.3(f), however.(3)

		As this court explained in In re Devers, 317 Or 261,
264-65, 855 P2d 617 (1993), a reciprocal discipline case differs
from an ordinary discipline case, in that the accused lawyer
cannot challenge the underlying factual findings entered by
another state concerning the misconduct at issue.  See also BR
3.5(b) ("A copy of the judgment, order or determination of
discipline [from another jurisdiction] shall be sufficient
evidence for the purpose of this rule that the attorney committed
the misconduct described therein.").  When determining whether
discipline is warranted in Oregon, however, this court treats a
reciprocal discipline case the same as any other discipline case:

"In the usual reciprocal discipline case, the acts of
an accused violate the disciplinary rules of both
jurisdictions.  In determining an appropriate sanction,
however, this court focuses on the accused's misconduct
under the Oregon disciplinary rules.  We do so because
our choice of a sanction vindicates the judicial
authority of this jurisdiction, not of the one in which
the earlier discipline occurred."  Devers, 317 Or at
265. 

		When conducting a reciprocal discipline proceeding,
this court has two choices:  It can proceed solely upon the basis
of the record made in the other state, or it can direct that a
different factual record be made in Oregon.(4)  If the court
follows the former course -- as we have in this case -- it
generally accepts the other state's factual findings.  That is
particularly true when the accused lawyer has entered into a
stipulation with the other state, as the accused did here.  In
this case, then, our task is to determine the appropriate
sanction in Oregon, if any, based upon the stipulation entered in
Washington.

		In all lawyer discipline cases, when determining the
appropriate sanction, we consider the American Bar Association's
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992)
(ABA Standards) and Oregon case law.  In re Leonhardt, 324 Or
498, 509, 930 P2d 844 (1997); Devers, 317 Or at 267.  The ABA
Standards require consideration of the following factors:  (1)
the lawyer's mental state at the time of the misconduct; (2) the
nature of the ethical duty violated; (3) the injury caused by the
lawyer's misconduct; and (4) the existence of any aggravating or
mitigating factors.  ABA Standard 3.0.

		The central issue here is the accused's mental state at
the time of her misconduct.  The stipulation did not specifically
state whether the accused acted with intent, knowledge, or
negligence when she engaged in the misconduct at issue.  See ABA
Standards at 5 (identifying the possible mental states).(5) 
However, by citing the following standards from the American Bar
Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1986), the
stipulation impliedly assumed that the accused acted with either
"knowledge" or "negligence" when she engaged in the misconduct at
issue:

	"6.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer
is negligent either in determining whether statements
or documents are false or in taking remedial action
when information is being withheld, and causes injury
or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding,
or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on
the legal proceeding. * * *

	"5.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in any other conduct that involves
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and
that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice law."  (Emphasis added.)(6)

		Before this court, the accused admits that she
knowingly altered the signed documents, but argues that she
negligently filed the altered documents with the court for
approval.  In our view, however, the accused's actions
demonstrate that she acted with knowledge when she altered the
documents and when she filed them with the court.  The accused
purposefully made three material alterations to the documents,
over the signatures of opposing counsel and his client, with the
clear understanding that opposing counsel did not concur in those
changes.  Despite opposing counsel's request that the accused
contact him if she had any questions, she filed the altered
documents with the court for approval without notifying opposing
counsel.  As noted earlier, the accused thought that her changes
better reflected the parties' original agreement.  In filing the
documents, however, the accused represented to the court that the
documents contained terms agreed upon by both parties, when she
knew that to be false.  In short, given the accused's actions, we
conclude that she acted, at the least, with "knowledge" under the
ABA Standards.

		The stipulation was silent as to the nature of the duty
violated and the injury caused by the accused's misconduct.  We
conclude that the accused violated her duty to the legal system
when she knowingly filed the altered documents with the court. 
See ABA Standard 6.1 (discussing that duty); see also In re
Jones, 326 Or 195, 199, 951 P2d 149 (1997) (a lawyer who filed
documents containing false statements violated his duty to the
legal system).  As to injury, the accused's misconduct harmed the
legal system, in the form of time and expense required to set
aside the original dissolution judgment.  See In re Hawkins, 305
Or 319, 326, 751 P2d 780 (1988) (litigation resulting from the
lawyer's misconduct harmed the legal system by resulting in
expense to the system and to taxpayers).  The accused also harmed
opposing counsel's client because the client had to pay the
additional attorney fees incurred as a result of the accused's
misconduct.

		The accused and the WSBA stipulated that no aggravating
factors applied to the accused's misconduct.  See ABA Standard
9.2 (listing aggravating factors).  They further stipulated that
two mitigating factors applied:  The absence of a prior
disciplinary record and inexperience in the practice of law.(7) 
ABA Standards 9.32(a) and (f).  An additional mitigating factor,
which always will exist in a reciprocal discipline proceeding, is
that the accused already has been disciplined in another state
for the same misconduct at issue here.  ABA Standard 9.32(k).

		The ABA Standards suggest that, in the absence of any
aggravating or mitigating factors, a suspension would be the
appropriate sanction here:

"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knows that false statements or documents are being
submitted to the court * * * and takes no remedial
action, and causes injury or potential injury to a
party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or
potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding." 
ABA Standard 6.12.

A suspension also is appropriate under this court's case law when
a lawyer knowingly misrepresents facts to a court.  Just
recently, this court imposed a 120-day suspension upon a lawyer
who, among other misconduct, knowingly altered a signed document
and filed that document with the court, in violation of        
DR 1-102(A)(3) and (4), and DR 7-102(A)(5).  In re Morris, 326 Or
493, ___ P2d ___ (1998).  This court also has imposed a 45-day
suspension upon a lawyer who violated DR 1-102(A)(3) and (4) when
he knowingly had his client sign blank documents that contained
perjury clauses and then filed the completed documents with the
court.  Jones, 326 Or 195.  In Jones, this court noted that a 30-day suspension would have been appropriate, had it not been for
the lawyer's prior disciplinary record.  326 Or at 202. 
Similarly, in In re Walker, 293 Or 297, 647 P2d 468 (1982), this
court imposed a 30-day suspension upon a lawyer who knowingly
misrepresented the status of a probate estate to the court. 

		Our case law further demonstrates the gravity with
which this court views a lawyer's misrepresentation to a court. 
In In re Greene, 290 Or 291, 297, 620 P2d 1379 (1980), which
involved a lawyer's intentional failure to disclose relevant
facts, this court stated:

	"We view the violation of the disclosure
requirements of ORS 9.460[(2)] and [DR] 1-102(A)[(3)]
as a serious matter, particularly in the context of an
ex parte presentation to the judge. * * * Our
experience has been [that] all judges regularly rely
upon the candor, honesty and integrity of the lawyer in
handling ex parte matters which are presented to them. 
* * * Judges must be able to rely upon the integrity of
the lawyer." 

After noting that the lawyer in Greene had family problems and
had acted without a selfish motive, the court imposed a 60-day
suspension.  Id. at 298-99.  

		Consistent with the foregoing analysis under the ABA
Standards and Oregon case law, we conclude that a suspension,
rather than a reprimand, is appropriate in this case.  Given all
the relevant considerations, the suspension here should be the
same length as the suspension imposed in Walker.  Accordingly, we
suspend the accused for 30 days.

		The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 30 days commencing on the effective date of this
decision.

1. 	In her answer, the accused did not raise a procedural
challenge to the disciplinary proceeding in Washington, as
permitted by BR 3.5(c)(1).  See generally In re Devers, 317 Or
261, 263-64, 855 P2d 617 (1993) (addressing such a procedural
challenge).

2. 	RPC 3.3(a) provides, in part:

	"A lawyer shall not knowingly:

	"(1) Make a false statement of material fact or
law to a tribunal[.]"

RPC 8.4 provides, in part:

	"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

	"* * * * *

	"(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

	"(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice[.]"

RPC 3.3(f) provides:

	"In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform
the tribunal of all relevant facts known to the lawyer
that should be disclosed to permit the tribunal to make
an informed decision, whether or not the facts are
adverse."

3. 	The accused cites DR 7-106(B)(1) (a lawyer shall
disclose controlling legal authority) as somewhat analogous to
RPC 3.3(f); the Bar cites DR 7-110(B) (governing ex parte
communications).  In our view, neither of those rules precisely
speaks to the same type of misconduct contemplated by RPC 3.3(f),
which is substantially identical to the American Bar
Association's Model Rule 3.3(d).  See American Bar Association's
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 307 (3d ed 1996)
(setting out Model Rule 3.3(d)). We do note, however, that the
broad prohibition against misrepresentation set out in DR 1-102(A)(3), which is identical to RPC 8.4(c), as well as the text
of ORS 9.460(2), encompass misrepresentation in the ex parte
context.  See In re Greene, 290 Or 291, 620 P2d 1379 (1980) (a
lawyer who engaged in misrepresentation in an ex parte proceeding
violated former DR 1-102(A)(4), now DR 1-102(A)(3), and former
ORS 9.460(4), now ORS 9.460(2)).

4. 	BR 3.5(e) provides, in part, that this court, "in its
discretion, may refer the matter to the Disciplinary Board * * *
for the purpose of taking testimony on the issues set forth in    
BR 3.5(c)(1) and (2) [i.e., challenges to the other state's
disciplinary procedure and the imposition of discipline in
Oregon]." 

5. 	The ABA Standards define the three mental states as
follows:

	"'Intent' is the conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result.

	"'Knowledge' is the conscious awareness of the
nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but
without the conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result.

	"'Negligence' is the failure of a lawyer to heed a
substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a
result will follow, which failure is a deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would
exercise in the situation."  ABA Standards at 7.

6. 	The findings of guilt contained in the stipulation do
not illuminate fully whether the WSBA and the accused stipulated
that the accused acted with a particular mental state.  For
example, by stipulating to the violation of RPC 3.3(a), which
requires that a lawyer knowingly make a false statement of
material fact, the accused agreed that she knowingly made such a
statement.  However, RPC 8.4(c) does not require that a lawyer
knowingly engage in misrepresentation.  See Matter of Petersen,
120 Wash 2d 833, 850, 846 P2d 1330 (1993) (a lawyer who engaged
in negligent misrepresentation violated RPC 8.4(c)).  Compare In
re Jones, 326 Or 195, 198, 951 P2d 149 (1997) (misrepresentation
under DR 1-102(A)(3) requires, at the least, that a lawyer act
with knowledge).

7. 	The accused had been practicing law for about two years
when she engaged in the misconduct at issue here.