Case Title: Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Capital, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11756

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11756 
 
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, trustee,1  vs. 
FITCHBURG CAPITAL, LLC, & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 5, 2015. - April 15, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Mortgage, Real estate, Discharge, Foreclosure, Dragnet clause.  
Real Property, Mortgage.  Limitations, Statute of.  
Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Statute of limitations.  
Statute, Retroactive application, Construction.  Due 
Process of Law, Retroactive application of statute, Statute 
of limitations.  Constitutional Law, Contract clause. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on July 
2, 2012.  
 
 
A motion for partial summary judgment was heard by Robert 
B. Foster, J., and entry of separate and final judgment was 
ordered by him.   
 
                     
 
1 Of Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-backed 
Pass-through Certificates, Series 2004-R11 under the Pooling and 
Service Agreement dated as of December 1, 2004. 
 
 
2 Lee Bourque; Federal National Mortgage Association; and 
John Burdick, trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Bernard 
Saulnier. 
 
2 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Jeffrey T. Angley (Robert K. Hopkins with him) for 
Fitchburg Capital, LLC. 
 
Jeffrey B. Loeb for the plaintiff. 
 
Thomas O. Moriarty, for Real Estate Bar Association for 
Massachusetts, Inc., & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Philip F. Coppinger, for Ry-Co International, Ltd., amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  Under a 2006 amendment to the so-called 
"obsolete mortgage" statute, a mortgage becomes unenforceable 
after a certain number of years:  a mortgage in which the term 
or maturity date is stated becomes unenforceable five years 
after the expiration of the term and a mortgage in which the 
term or maturity date is not stated becomes unenforceable 
thirty-five years after recording.3  G. L. c. 260, § 33, as 
amended by St. 2006, c. 63, § 6.  The defendant Fitchburg 
Capital, LLC (Fitchburg), foreclosed on two mortgages at a time 
when both mortgages would be unenforceable under the amended 
statute if the five-year statute of limitations was applicable.  
In this appeal, we interpret the amended statute to determine 
whether a mortgage stating only the term or maturity date of the 
underlying debt is a "mortgage in which the term or maturity 
date of the mortgage is stated" under G. L. c. 260, § 33, and 
                     
 
3 The limitations periods may be extended by recording an 
extension or an affidavit or acknowledgment of nonpayment.  
G. L. c. 260, §§ 33-34. 
3 
 
whether the retroactive application of § 33 to mortgages 
recorded before the effective date of the amendment is 
constitutional. 
 
The plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as 
trustee of Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-backed 
Pass-through Certificates, Series 2004-R11 under the Pooling and 
Servicing Agreement dated as of December 1, 2004 (Deutsche 
Bank), filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a 
declaration that the mortgages are discharged under the obsolete 
mortgage statute and the foreclosure auction conducted on the 
property securing those mortgages is null and void.4  In a well-
reasoned opinion, a Land Court judge granted partial summary 
judgment for Deutsche Bank, concluding that reference in the 
mortgages to the term of the underlying debt was sufficient to 
state the "term or maturity date of the mortgage"; that the 
mortgages became obsolete pursuant to G. L. c. 260, § 33; and, 
                     
 
4 Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee of 
Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-backed Pass-through 
Certificates, Series 2004-R11 under the Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement dated as of December 1, 2004 (Deutsche Bank), also 
sought summary judgment on its equitable subrogation claim, 
arguing that the mortgages held by Fitchburg Capital, LLC 
(Fitchburg), should be equitably subordinated to the mortgage 
held by Deutsche Bank because the Fitchburg mortgages were 
junior liens when granted and that the priority liens were paid 
off from proceeds from loans from Deutsche Bank's predecessors 
in title.  Because of his conclusion that the mortgages were 
discharged, the judge did not reach Deutsche Bank's equitable 
subrogation claim.  We affirm and therefore decline to reach 
Deutsche Bank's equitable subrogation claim. 
 
4 
 
therefore, that the foreclosure sale conducted by Fitchburg was 
null and void.  The judge rejected Fitchburg's constitutional 
challenge to the statute.  We transferred Fitchburg's appeal to 
this court on our own motion and now affirm.5 
 
1.  Background.  The following facts, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, are drawn from the 
summary judgment record.  On or about April 30, 2012, Fitchburg 
conducted a foreclosure auction purporting to sell a property 
located at 11 Nutting Street, Fitchburg (property).  Lee 
Bourque, a defendant, held record title to the property at all 
relevant times. 
 
At the time of the purported foreclosure sale, Fitchburg 
held two mortgages secured by the property:  (1) a mortgage 
dated April 13, 1999, from Lee Bourque to John Christiano, 
recorded May 14, 1999 (Christiano mortgage);6 and (2) a mortgage 
dated December 16, 2002, from Lee Bourque to Bourque Development 
                     
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Real Estate 
Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., and Abstract Club; and 
by Ry-Co International, Ltd. 
 
 
6 The Christiano mortgage states, "Lee Bourque . . . 
grant[s] to John Christiano . . . with mortgage covenants, to 
secure the payment of $9,722.00 . . . in one year with twenty 
percent interest per annum, payable in one year . . . , as 
provided in the promissory note of even date, the [property]." 
 
 
 
5 
 
Corp., recorded December 18, 2002 (BDC mortgage).7  There is no 
evidence that any party recorded an extension for either 
mortgage, an acknowledgement or affidavit that either of the 
mortgages was not satisfied, or a discharge of either mortgage.  
The original mortgagee assigned the BDC mortgage to Fitchburg by 
agreement dated March 19, 2010.  The Christiano mortgage was 
assigned to Fitchburg on August 5, 2011, by the then-current 
holder and prior assignee, the estate of Jack Rosenblit. 
 
The obligation underlying the Christiano mortgage is a note 
dated April 13, 1999, with a maturity date of May 1, 2000.  The 
only obligation indicated in the record as underlying the BDC 
mortgage is a note dated December 16, 2002, with a maturity date 
of December 31, 2003.  Fitchburg asserts that the maturity date 
of the loan underlying the BDC mortgage was extended to December 
1, 2007, but the agreement extending the note was never 
recorded. 
                     
 
7 The BDC mortgage states: 
 
"Lee Bourque . . . the 'Mortgagor' . . . HEREBY GRANTS to 
Bourque Development Corporation . . . with MORTGAGE 
COVENANTS, to secure the payment of . . . $88,958.65 . . . 
with interest thereon, as provided in the Mortgagor's note 
of even date, . . . and all other debts, covenants and 
agreements of or by the Mortgagor to or for the benefit of 
the Mortgagee now existing or hereafter accruing while this 
mortgage is still undischarged of record, [the property and 
other properties not at issue here].  Mortgagor has 
promised to pay the debt under this note in full not later 
than December 31, 2003." 
6 
 
 
Deutsche Bank holds a mortgage dated September 10, 2004, 
granted by Lee Bourque to Ameriquest Mortgage Company and 
recorded October 1, 2004 (Ameriquest mortgage).  The mortgage 
was assigned to Deutsche Bank by agreement dated March 5, 2007. 
 
On April 20, 2011, Lee Bourque filed a Chapter 13 petition 
for bankruptcy, which was later converted to Chapter 7.  During 
bankruptcy proceedings, the parties discussed the relative 
priority of the mortgages and Deutsche Bank's counsel 
represented to Fitchburg's counsel that Fitchburg's mortgages 
held first and second priority on the property and that Deutsche 
Bank's mortgage was third priority.  On September 26, 2011, 
Deutsche Bank filed a motion for relief from automatic stay to 
allow it to commence foreclosure proceedings, which acknowledged 
Fitchburg's first and second priority positions.  Fitchburg did 
not oppose the motion, and asserts that it did not oppose 
because of the acknowledgment in the motion and conversation 
with Deutsche Bank's counsel in which the counsel recognized 
Fitchburg's first and second priority positions.  On October 24, 
2011, Fitchburg filed a motion for relief from automatic stay to 
allow it to commence foreclosure proceedings, which was granted 
on February 21, 2012.  Fitchburg conducted an auction purporting 
to foreclose on the property on April 30, 2012.  Fitchburg was 
the high bidder at the auction and recorded a foreclosure deed 
purporting to grant fee simple title to itself on that date. 
7 
 
 
2.  Statutory background.  The obsolete mortgage statute 
was enacted in 1957 to create a statute of limitations on 
foreclosures against mortgages that had been recorded for fifty 
years or more, unless either an extension or a document 
asserting nonsatisfaction of the mortgage was recorded in the 
ten years preceding the end of the fifty-year period.  G. L. 
c. 260, § 33, inserted by St. 1957, c. 370.  In 2006, the 
statute was amended to create two different limitations periods, 
one for any "mortgage in which the term or maturity date of the 
mortgage is stated" and one for any "mortgage in which no term 
of the mortgage is stated."  G. L. c. 260, § 33, as amended by 
St. 2006, c. 63, § 6.  The limitations period for stated term 
mortgages is five years after expiration of the term or maturity 
date, and the limitations period for nonstated term mortgages is 
thirty-five years from the recording of the mortgage.8  Id.  The 
                     
 
8 General Laws c. 260, § 33, as amended by St. 2006, c. 63, 
§ 6, provides as follows: 
 
"A power of sale in any mortgage of real estate shall not 
be exercised and an entry shall not be made nor possession 
taken nor proceeding begun for foreclosure of any such 
mortgage after the expiration of, in the case of a mortgage 
in which no term of the mortgage is stated, [thirty-five] 
years from the recording of the mortgage or, in the case of 
a mortgage in which the term or maturity date of the 
mortgage is stated, [five] years from the expiration of the 
term or from the maturity date, unless an extension of the 
mortgage, or an acknowledgment or affidavit that the 
mortgage is not satisfied, is recorded before the 
expiration of such period.  In case an extension of the 
mortgage or the acknowledgment or affidavit is so recorded, 
8 
 
amended statute allows enforcement of the mortgage if an 
extension or a document asserting nonsatisfaction of the 
mortgage had been recorded, but reduced the ten-year period in 
the prior statute to five years.  Id.  The amended statute also 
became self-executing so that any mortgage rendered obsolete by 
the terms of the statute is discharged without further legal 
action.  Id. 
 
3.  Standard of review.  We review a grant of summary 
judgment de novo.  Twomey v. Middleborough, 468 Mass. 260, 267 
(2014), citing Ritter v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 439 Mass. 
214, 215 (2003).  "Summary judgment is appropriate where there 
are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Twomey, supra, citing 
Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 
                                                                  
the period shall continue until [five] years shall have 
elapsed during which there is not recorded any further 
extension of the mortgage or acknowledgment or affidavit 
that the mortgage is not satisfied.  The period shall not 
be extended by reason of non-residence or disability of any 
person interested in the mortgage or the real estate, or by 
any partial payment, agreement, extension, acknowledgment, 
affidavit or other action not meeting the requirements of 
this section and [G. L. c. 260, §§] 34 and 35.  Upon the 
expiration of the period provided herein, the mortgage 
shall be considered discharged for all purposes without the 
necessity of further action by the owner of the equity of 
redemption or any other persons having an interest in the 
mortgaged property and, in the case of registered land, 
upon the payment of the fee for the recording of a 
discharge, the mortgage shall be marked as discharged on 
the relevant memorandum of encumbrances in the same manner 
as for any other mortgage duly discharged." 
9 
 
(1991).  Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 
(2002). 
 
4.  Limitations period applicable to Fitchburg's 
foreclosure under obsolete mortgage statute.  The judge allowed 
partial summary judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank after 
concluding that Fitchburg's purported foreclosure was void 
because the BDC and Christiano mortgages had been discharged as 
a matter of law before foreclosure.9  Although neither mortgage 
expressly contained the "term or maturity date" of the mortgage 
itself, the judge reasoned that "the dates and terms [of the 
underlying debt] set forth in the Christiano Mortgage and the 
BDC Mortgage are statements of 'the term or maturity date of the 
mortgage' that make these two mortgages subject to the five-year 
period."  We agree. 
 
We answer the question presented by applying well-settled 
rules of statutory construction.  When the meaning of a statute 
is at issue, "[w]e begin with the canon of statutory 
construction that the primary source of insight into the intent 
of the Legislature is the language of the statute."  
                     
 
9 We assume without deciding that Fitchburg invoked its 
rights under both the BDC and Christiano mortgages.  The 
foreclosure deed recorded by Fitchburg stated that it foreclosed 
on the property under the powers granted to it by the BDC 
mortgage and "every other power."  The resolution of this 
question is not pertinent to the issue on appeal because both 
the BDC mortgage and the Christiano mortgage were discharged as 
a matter of law prior to Fitchburg's purported foreclosure. 
10 
 
International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 853 
(1983).  The language is interpreted in accordance with its 
plain meaning, and if the language is clear and unambiguous, it 
is conclusive as to the intent of the Legislature.  Commissioner 
of Correction v. Superior Ct. Dep't of the Trial Court, 446 
Mass. 123, 124 (2006), citing Commonwealth v. Clerk-Magistrate 
of the W. Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 439 Mass. 352, 
355-356 (2003). 
 
When interpreting the phrase, "mortgage in which the term 
or maturity date of the mortgage is stated," that triggers the 
five-year statute of limitations, "[w]ords and phrases shall be 
construed according to the common and approved usage of the 
language."  G. L. c. 4, § 6, Third.  According to Black's Law 
Dictionary 478, 1163 (10th ed. 2014), "maturity date" means 
"[t]he date when a debt falls due, such as a debt on a 
promissory note or bond," and "mortgage" means "[a] conveyance 
of title to property that is given as security for the payment 
of a debt or performance of a duty and that will become void 
upon payment or performance according to the stipulated terms."  
Thus, the common meaning of the "maturity date of the mortgage" 
is the date on which the underlying debt is due because a 
mortgage derives its vitality from the debt that it secures. 
 
This definition comports with the treatment of mortgages 
under our common-law principles.  Although a mortgage and a note 
11 
 
are separate entities in Massachusetts that can be split, it has 
long been recognized that "a mortgage ultimately depends on the 
underlying debt for its enforceability."  Eaton v. Federal Nat'l 
Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 576, 578 n.11 (2012), citing Crowley 
v. Adams, 226 Mass. 582, 585 (1917), Wolcott v. Winchester, 15 
Gray 461 (1860), and Howe v. Wilder, 11 Gray 267, 269-270 
(1858).  By its nature, a mortgage does not mature distinctly 
from the debts or obligations that it secures.  See Eaton, supra 
at 577-578 ("the basic nature of a mortgage [is] security for an 
underlying mortgage note"); Barnes v. Lee Sav. Bank, 340 Mass. 
87, 90 (1959) ("The debt having been extinguished, a bond or 
mortgage given as security for the debt is necessarily 
discharged").  Accordingly, a mortgage is a device for providing 
security for a loan, but it does not generally have a binding 
effect that survives its underlying obligation.10  See Piea 
Realty Co. v. Papuzynski, 342 Mass. 240, 246 (1961), quoting 
Pineo v. White, 320 Mass. 487, 489 (1946) (unless other 
equitable considerations apply, "payment of the mortgage note . 
. . terminates the interests of the mortgagee without any formal 
                     
 
10 "Equitable considerations . . . may affect the questions 
whether mortgage security has been discharged or (if discharged) 
will be reinstated and whether, by subrogation or upon analogous 
principles, it still remains available to a mortgage creditor."  
Piea Realty Co. v. Papuzynski, 342 Mass. 240, 246, 250 (1961) 
(remanding for consideration whether principles of unjust 
enrichment or other equitable considerations should reestablish 
mortgage otherwise discharged by parties). 
12 
 
. . . discharge and revests the legal title in the mortgagor").  
Therefore, the judge's interpretation of the statute corresponds 
to the plain meaning of the language chosen by the Legislature. 
 
Fitchburg argues that the judge's interpretation conflicts 
with the language of the statute by citing the definition of 
"mortgage" provided in G. L. c. 260, § 35.  Under this 
provision, a "mortgage," for the purposes of the obsolete 
mortgage statute, "includes any deed of trust or other 
conveyance made for the purpose of securing performance of a 
debt or obligation."  G. L. c. 260, § 35.  Fitchburg argues that 
the definition in § 35 requires that the applicable maturity 
date be tied directly to the mortgage and not to the underlying 
obligation.  Fitchburg also cites language in Eaton, 462 Mass. 
at 575, "A real estate mortgage in Massachusetts has two 
distinct but related aspects:  it is a transfer of legal title 
to the mortgage property, and it serves as security for an 
underlying note or other obligation," to support its argument 
that the maturity date of the note may not be exported to the 
mortgage because a mortgage and a note each have separate legal 
significance in Massachusetts.  Fitchburg's argument is 
unavailing for several reasons. 
 
The flaw in Fitchburg's argument is the misconception that 
considering the maturity date of the note to be the maturity 
date of the mortgage requires the note and the mortgage to lose 
13 
 
any independent properties.  The question, rather, is whether 
the term or maturity date of the underlying obligation is 
commonly understood as the term or maturity date of the mortgage 
when that date is stated on the face of the mortgage.  To this 
question, the definition in § 35 is unhelpful.  Not only is the 
definition inclusive instead of limiting, it only sets forth the 
types of security applicable to the obsolete mortgage statute; 
it does not define the particularities of a mortgage's 
provisions.  See G. L. c. 260, §§ 33-35.  Moreover, we noted in 
Eaton that the "essential nature and purpose of a mortgage [i]s 
security for a debt."  Eaton, 462 Mass. at 584.  As noted above, 
because the scope of a mortgage is necessarily tied to the reach 
of the underlying obligation, considering the term or maturity 
date of the underlying obligation to be the term or maturity 
date of the mortgage comports with the common-law understanding 
of the words "mortgage" and "note."  See Barnes, 340 Mass. at 
90. 
 
Fitchburg also argues that the judge's interpretation was 
erroneous because the title of the act modifying the statute, 
"An Act providing remedies to consumers for clearing title after 
payoff of mortgages," signifies that the Legislature only 
intended the five-year limitations period to apply to mortgages 
where the underlying obligations have been paid in full.  
St. 2006, c. 63.  The title of the act, however, is ineffective 
14 
 
to modify the language of the statute because that language is 
clear.  "Although we have recognized that the title of an act or 
statutory provision may be helpful in clarifying ambiguity, 
. . . or identifying the act's 'proper limitations,' . . . the 
title may not replace or limit otherwise clear language in the 
act itself" (citations omitted).  Olmstead v. Department of 
Telecommunications & Cable, 466 Mass. 582, 589 n.12 (2013).  
Because the ordinary meaning of "term or maturity date of the 
mortgage" is clear based on common usage of that language, the 
title of the act cannot control.  American Family Life Assur. 
Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 388 Mass. 468, 474, cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 850 (1983) ("title of an act cannot control the plain 
provisions of the act").  Even if we took the title into 
account, the language of the title comports with the common 
usage of mortgage and note.  The Legislature chose the words, 
"after payoff of mortgages," for the title.  However, a mortgage 
cannot be paid off; only its underlying obligation can be paid 
off.  Accordingly, the Legislature referred to the mortgage in 
the title as possessing characteristics of underlying 
obligations similar to the phrase, "maturity date of the 
mortgage," used in the statute. 
 
Furthermore, although our conclusion yields a workable 
result and thus ends our inquiry, review of the entire act that 
modifies the obsolete mortgage statute would not provide a 
15 
 
contrary result.  Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 454 
(2008), quoting Bronstein v. Prudential Ins. Co., 390 Mass. 701, 
704 (1984) ("When the use of the ordinary meaning of a term 
yields a workable result, there is no need to resort to 
extrinsic aids such as legislative history").  The revisions to 
the obsolete mortgage statute were contained within an act 
comprising nine sections and affecting multiple statutes.11  
Although the title references mortgages "after payoff," review 
of the entire act demonstrates an over-all scheme to streamline 
conveyancing and provide remedies to clear title blemished by 
mortgages in various levels of standing, including mortgages 
whose obligations have been satisfied, St. 2006, c. 63, §§ 2-4; 
mortgages granted by mortgagors who have been in possession of 
the secured property for a specified period without recognizing 
the mortgage as valid, St. 2006, c. 63, § 5; and mortgages that 
have become obsolete, St. 2006, c. 63, §§ 6-7.12  Accordingly, 
                     
 
11 A search of legislative history has not produced any 
detailed official purpose of St. 2006, c. 63 (act), or its 
various sections. 
 
 
12 Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the act expanded the statutes 
regulating mortgage discharges, G. L. c. 183, §§ 54B, 54C, 54D, 
and 55, and provided specific timeframes in which a discharge 
must be recorded after payoff.  Sections 4A and 4B of the act 
updated the disclosures required during the mortgage application 
process by amending G. L. c. 184, § 17B, and repealing §§ 17C 
and 17D.  Section 5 of the act amended the statute governing 
actions to quiet title, G. L. c. 240, § 15, and provides 
additional avenues for discharging a mortgage when the 
underlying obligation has been satisfied or when a mortgagor 
16 
 
although the Legislature used the words "after payoff" in the 
title of the act, it is clear from review of the entire act that 
the Legislature did not intend to limit all changes in the act 
to affect only mortgages where the underlying obligations had 
been paid off or satisfied. 
 
In that regard, Fitchburg does not argue that applicability 
of the revised limitations period for mortgages in which the 
term is not stated depends on satisfaction of the underlying 
obligations.  The obsolete mortgage statute created a 
limitations period for bringing foreclosure actions against 
mortgages.  G. L. c. 260, § 33.  Under the amendment, the 
statute requires the holder of a mortgage to foreclose on the 
mortgage, record a document asserting nonsatisfaction, or record 
an extension before the mortgage has been on record for thirty-
five years or before the secured debt is overdue by five years 
(and the due date is stated on the face of the mortgage).  See 
St. 2006, c. 63, § 6.  The statute has never been interpreted to 
require satisfaction of a mortgage's underlying obligations 
before the mortgage becomes unenforceable.  Conversely, the 
statute provides a mortgagee options to preserve its rights 
under a mortgage that has not been satisfied by recording an 
acknowledgment or affidavit asserting nonsatisfaction, or by 
                                                                  
claims that the mortgage is invalid and that claim is not 
contested. 
17 
 
recording an extension of term.  G. L. c. 260, § 33, as amended 
by St. 2006, c. 63, § 6.  Discharge under the obsolete mortgage 
statute has never rested on satisfaction of a mortgage's 
underlying obligations, and we decline to adopt a contrary 
position today. 
 
Determining that the term or maturity date of an underlying 
obligation, when stated on the face of the mortgage, can become 
the term or maturity date of the mortgage does not end our 
inquiry.  We must still review the actual language used in the 
Christiano and BDC mortgages.  The BDC mortgage states, 
"Mortgagor has promised to pay the debt under this note in full 
not later than December 31, 2003," and the Christiano mortgage, 
dated April 13, 1999, states that the mortgage is granted to 
"secure the payment of $9,722.00 . . . in one year with twenty 
percent interest per annum, payable in one year . . . as 
provided in the promissory note of even date."   Based on the 
reasoning above, we read the quoted language in each mortgage to 
state the term or maturity date of that mortgage, making each 
subject to the five-year statute of limitations. 
 
Beyond the language quoted above, the BDC mortgage also 
contains a dragnet clause, in which "all other debts, covenants 
and agreements of or by the Mortgagor to or for the benefit of 
the Mortgagee now existing or hereafter accruing while this 
mortgage is still undischarged of record" become secured by the 
18 
 
mortgage in addition to the original underlying obligation.  
Dragnet clauses are mortgage provisions that provide security 
for future advances and "are usually held valid in 
Massachusetts, at least where such advances are made prior to 
the intervention of other liens."  Everett Credit Union v. 
Allied Ambulance Servs., Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 346 
(1981), citing Barnard v. Moore, 8 Allen 273, 274 (1864).  
Fitchburg argues that the presence of the dragnet clause 
indicates that the parties intended the BDC mortgage to outlive 
the underlying note for an indefinite duration.  This argument, 
however, conflicts with the nature of a mortgage as being tied 
to the life of its underlying obligations.  See Piea Realty Co., 
342 Mass. at 246; Barnes, 340 Mass. at 90.  Although Fitchburg 
asserts a pattern of frequent lending between the original 
mortgagee of the BDC mortgage and the mortgagor that culminated 
in the creation of the BDC mortgage,13 Fitchburg does not assert 
the presence of any debts incurred after the date of the BDC 
mortgage that would have been secured under its dragnet clause, 
and thus possibly extend the term of the mortgage beyond the 
term of the original note.   Without holding that a dragnet 
                     
 
13 The mortgagor, Lee Bourque, is the brother of the 
principal of Bourque Development Corporation and of Fitchburg, 
Paul Bourque.  Paul, through his company, made a series of loans 
to his brother to be used in real estate development activities.  
These loans culminated in the BDC mortgage. 
 
19 
 
clause may never extend the term or maturity date of a mortgage, 
we conclude that the dragnet clause here did not extend the term 
of the BDC mortgage or take that mortgage out of the realm of 
mortgages in which the term is stated.14 
 
5.  Constitutionality of retroactive application of 
limitations period.  After determining that the Christiano and 
BDC mortgages were discharged under the obsolete mortgage 
statute, the judge rejected Fitchburg's constitutional challenge 
to the retroactive application of the shortened statute of 
limitations, reasoning that there were no constitutional 
infirmities where the Legislature allowed sufficient time after 
enacting St. 2006, c. 63, § 6, for affected parties to bring a 
foreclosure and where G. L. c. 260, § 33, as amended, does not 
totally abrogate existing property rights.  Fitchburg argues 
that, assuming we agree that the judge correctly interpreted the 
obsolete mortgage statute, we must reverse because the 
application of the statute in this case violates due process and 
                     
 
14 Under Massachusetts case law, the dragnet clause would 
only have provided security for new debt incurred before the 
presence of an intervening lien.  Debral Realty, Inc. v. 
Marlborough Coop. Bank, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 92, 94 (1999).  In 
this case, the next lien following the BDC mortgage was incurred 
April 13, 2004.  Accordingly, even if the dragnet clause were 
operative to extend the term of the mortgage separate from the 
term of the original note, the dragnet clause would only extend 
the mortgage's maturity date from December 31, 2003, to April 
13, 2004, and the five-year statute of limitations would still 
have expired before Fitchburg's purported foreclosure sale on 
April 30, 2012. 
20 
 
contracts clause protections under the Massachusetts and Federal 
Constitutions.  In that connection, Fitchburg argues that 
retroactive application of the five-year limitations period to 
the BDC and Christiano mortgages is unreasonable and 
unconstitutional. 
 
"There are constitutional limitations on the Legislature's 
power to enact retroactive statutes -- in brief, such statutes 
must 'meet the test of "reasonableness."'"  Anderson v. BNY 
Mellon, N.A., 463 Mass. 299, 307 (2012), quoting American Mfrs. 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 374 Mass. 181, 189 
(1978).  "A statute is presumed to be constitutional and every 
rational presumption in favor of the statute's validity is 
made."  Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 441 Mass. 188, 193 
(2004), citing Leibovich v. Antonellis, 410 Mass. 568, 577 
(1991).  The challenging party bears the burden to prove that 
the statute is irrational in its application.  Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 
780, 788 (2008).  Where the applicable statute is one affecting 
a limitations period, a "shortened statute of limitations may be 
applied to causes of action already accrued 'if sufficient time 
be allowed, between the passing of the act and the time fixed 
for the limitation, to afford a full and ample time to all 
persons, having such causes of action, to commence their 
21 
 
suits.'"  Cioffi v. Guenther, 374 Mass. 1, 3 (1977), quoting 
Loring v. Alline, 9 Cush. 68, 71 (1851). 
 
Here, the act revising the obsolete mortgage statute was 
approved April 13, 2006, and the Legislature extended the 
effective date of the operative section until October 1, 2006.15  
St. 2006, c. 63, §§ 6, 9.  Accordingly, the Legislature 
determined that five and one-half months was a reasonable time 
for mortgagees to enforce their rights under mortgages that 
would be deemed obsolete under the revised statute or to record 
one of the other documents permitted by statute to preserve the 
mortgagee's rights.16  G. L. c. 260, §§ 33-34.  We have 
considered shorter periods of time before the effective date of 
a shortened statute of limitations to be reasonable.  See, e.g., 
Cunningham v. Commonwealth, 278 Mass. 343, 346 (1932); Mulvey v. 
Boston, 197 Mass. 178, 183-185 (1908) (thirty days).  See also 
Evans v. Building Inspector of Peabody, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 805, 
805-806 (1977) (ninety days). 
                     
 
15 The Legislature provided an additional extension for 
enforceability of mortgages affected by §§ 5 and 6 of the act, 
where the term would expire during the one year following the 
effective date, so that those mortgages would be enforceable 
through October 1, 2007.  St. 2006, c. 63, § 8. 
 
 
16 As previously noted, a mortgagee may record an extension 
or affidavit or acknowledgment that the underlying obligation 
has not been satisfied in order to extend the time before a 
mortgage is deemed obsolete under G. L. c. 260, § 33. 
22 
 
 
We conclude that the period of five and one-half months 
provided by the Legislature is reasonable in light of the fact 
that a mortgagee is provided other options under the statute, 
other than commencing foreclosure, to extend its rights under a 
mortgage.  "What shall be considered a reasonable time must be 
settled by the judgment of the Legislature, and the courts will 
not inquire into the wisdom of its decision in establishing the 
period of legal bar, unless the time allowed is manifestly so 
insufficient that the statute becomes a denial of justice."  
Mulvey, 197 Mass. at 183, quoting Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 
55, 63 (1902).  Fitchburg contends that the statute is a denial 
of justice as it applies to its mortgages, both commercial in 
nature, with unsatisfied underlying obligations and an 
unrecorded extension agreement.  While this contention has some 
force, it should be addressed to the Legislature, because the 
time allotted by the Legislature for mortgagees to preserve 
their rights makes retroactive application of the 2006 amendment 
constitutional.  See Cioffi, 374 Mass. at 4.  There is no denial 
of justice in this case because Fitchburg was entitled to record 
an extension or an affidavit or acknowledgment that the 
underlying obligation had not been satisfied in order to extend 
the time before its mortgages were deemed obsolete under G. L. 
c. 260, § 33.  Fitchburg's failure to follow these clear 
23 
 
directives does not make the statute unconstitutional.  Cioffi, 
supra. 
 
6.  Conclusion.  The order allowing in part Deutsche Bank's 
motion for partial summary judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.