Case Title: Antisdel v. Ashby

Citation: 

Docket Number: 082475

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
 
BEA ANTISDEL, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
OF PETER ANTISDEL, DECEASED 
 
v.   Record No. 082475 
 
 
 
    OPINION BY  
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
                           January 15, 2010 
JEFFREY A. ASHBY, M.D., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SHENANDOAH COUNTY 
Dennis Lee Hupp, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court erred 
in holding that an administrator of an estate appointed solely for 
the purpose of bringing a wrongful death action under Code § 8.01-
50 lacked standing to assert survival claims on behalf of the 
estate. 
 
Peter Antisdel died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound in 
August 2003.  In 2005, his mother, Bea Antisdel (Antisdel), sought 
appointment as administrator of Peter’s estate.  Antisdel swore an 
“oath of fiduciary” stating that she would “perform the duties of 
[administrator] for the purposes allowed in Virginia Code § 8.01-
50.”  The clerk of the circuit court (the clerk), consistent with 
that oath, entered an order appointing Antisdel administrator “for 
purposes established under Code of Virginia section 8.01-50 et 
seq.” 
Before seeking the appointment order, Antisdel had filed a 
wrongful death action against certain doctors who treated Peter, 
and against the manufacturers and distributors of medications 
prescribed to Peter for the treatment of acne and anxiety-like 
symptoms.  The circuit court later granted Antisdel leave to amend 
this complaint to include survival claims for personal injuries 
suffered by Peter during his lifetime.  Antisdel ultimately 
nonsuited this action, and also nonsuited a second action in which 
she alleged both wrongful death and survival claims. 
In November 2006, Antisdel filed the complaint from which 
this appeal arises.  In this third action, Antisdel asserted only 
survival claims.  Antisdel alleged that her son suffered severe 
physical and mental harm because of certain undisclosed side 
effects and interactions of the several prescription medications. 
In response, the defendants1 filed pleas in bar asserting 
that Antisdel lacked standing to bring the personal injury 
survival claims, because the order appointing her as administrator 
expressly limited her appointment to the initiation of a wrongful 
death action under Code § 8.01-50.2  The circuit court held a 
hearing on the pleas in bar during which Antisdel made several 
                     
1 The defendants to the third action in the circuit court 
were Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Harrisonburg Family Practice 
Associates, P.C., Jeffrey A. Ashby, M.D., Michael J. Syptak, M.D., 
Harrisonburg Dermatology, PLC, Jerri A. Alexiou, M.D., Sandoz, 
Inc., and Eli Lilly & Company, Inc.  Eli Lilly & Company, Inc. 
settled its claims with Antisdel and is not a party to this 
appeal.  After this appeal was granted, Sandoz, Inc. and Watson 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. also settled their claims with Antisdel. 
2 The defendants also filed pleas in bar asserting that the 
statute of limitations barred Antisdel’s action.  However, the 
circuit court did not reach that issue. 
 
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arguments, including that the circuit court should “reform” the 
appointment order nunc pro tunc to include the authority to bring 
survival claims. 
The circuit court granted the pleas in bar, holding that the 
clerk’s appointment order expressly limited the scope of 
Antisdel’s appointment to the pursuit of a wrongful death action 
and that, therefore, Antisdel did not have standing to assert 
survival claims on behalf of Peter’s estate.  The circuit court 
also declined to enter an order nunc pro tunc to expand 
retroactively Antisdel’s administrative authority.  The circuit 
court dismissed the case with prejudice, and Antisdel appeals from 
the circuit court’s judgment. 
Antisdel observes that under the plain language of Code 
§ 64.1-75.1, a circuit court clerk may appoint an administrator 
for the purpose of litigating two separate types of suit, wrongful 
death actions and survival actions.  Thus, Antisdel asserts that 
the clerk lacked authority to limit Antisdel’s appointment to only 
one of these types of action.  Antisdel argues that a contrary 
position would deny an administrator the right to assert claims in 
the alternative, which expressly is permitted by Code §§ 8.01-272 
and -281, and would thereby prematurely force an administrator to 
an election of remedies. 
Antisdel also contends that the defendants have waived their 
argument regarding her authority to bring a survival action, 
 
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because they did not raise this objection in the second action 
before the circuit court entered its nonsuit order.  Additionally, 
Antisdel argues that even if the clerk had the authority to limit 
her appointment to the initiation of a wrongful death action, the 
circuit court erred when it refused to “reform” the appointment 
order nunc pro tunc to expand Antisdel’s authority as 
administrator. 
 
In response, the defendants contend that the circuit court 
did not err in denying Antisdel’s untimely request for expanded 
administrative powers made over two years after her appointment.  
While the defendants concede that circuit courts have the power to 
correct a court clerk’s errors or omissions by entry of a nunc pro 
tunc order, they argue that this case does not present a question 
of error or oversight by the clerk.  The defendants assert that 
Antisdel received in the clerk’s order precisely the limited 
authority that she requested. 
Addressing the issue of waiver, the defendants assert that 
they are entitled to raise the issue of Antisdel’s standing in the 
present action, because this action is wholly distinct from the 
second nonsuited action.  We agree with the defendants’ arguments. 
Initially, we find no merit in Antisdel’s assertion that the 
defendants did not timely object to Antisdel’s standing to bring a 
survival action.  The defendants’ failure to raise that objection 
in the second nonsuited action does not bar their present 
 
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objection.  A defendant is not limited in a new action to raising 
only the defenses asserted in a previously nonsuited action, 
because the new action stands independently of any prior nonsuited 
action.  See Daniels v. Warden, 266 Va. 399, 402, 588 S.E.2d 382, 
383 (2003); see also Winchester Homes, Inc. v. Osmose Wood 
Preserving, Inc., 37 F.3d 1053, 1058 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying 
Code § 8.01-380). 
We next consider the merits of Antisdel’s appeal.  The issue 
of her standing to bring the present survival claims involves a 
purely legal question of statutory interpretation that we review 
de novo.  See Miller v. Highland County, 274 Va. 355, 364, 650 
S.E.2d 532, 535 (2007); Young v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 528, 533, 
643 S.E.2d 491, 493 (2007); Conyers v. Martial Arts World of 
Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007).  We 
resolve this issue by applying established principles of 
statutory construction. 
When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound 
by the plain meaning of the words used.  Smit v. Shippers’ 
Choice of Virginia, Inc., 277 Va. 593, 597, 674 S.E.2d 842, 844 
(2009); Hicks v. Mellis, 275 Va. 213, 218, 657 S.E.2d 142, 144 
(2008); Shelor Motor Co. v. Miller, 261 Va. 473, 479, 544 S.E.2d 
345, 348 (2001).  We recognize that the General Assembly 
carefully selects the words contained in a statute, and we will 
not read a legislative enactment in a manner that renders any 
 
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portion of that enactment useless.  Lynchburg Div. of Soc. 
Servs. v. Cook, 276 Va. 465, 483, 666 S.E.2d 361, 370 (2008); 
Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P’ship, 255 Va. 335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 
335, 338 (1998); Jones v. Conwell, 227 Va. 176, 181, 314 S.E.2d 
61, 64 (1984).  Instead, we will apply an act of the legislature 
by giving reasonable effect to every word used.  Jones, 227 Va. 
at 181, 314 S.E.2d at 64.  Additionally, in a dispute that 
involves a number of related statutes, we will read and construe 
them together in order to give full meaning, force, and effect 
to each.  Lynchburg, 276 Va. at 480-81, 666 S.E.2d at 368-69; 
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 263 Va. 78, 84, 557 S.E.2d 
209, 212 (2002); City of Virginia Beach v. Siebert, 253 Va. 250, 
252, 483 S.E.2d 214, 216 (1997). 
 
The issue of Antisdel’s standing to bring the present action 
requires us to consider two statutes.  The first statute, Code 
§ 64.1-75.1, addresses the appointment of an administrator and 
provides in relevant part: 
In any case in which it is represented that an action at 
law for personal injury or death by wrongful act upon a 
cause of action arising within this Commonwealth is 
contemplated against or on behalf of the estate or the 
beneficiaries of the estate of a resident or nonresident of 
this Commonwealth who has died within or without this 
Commonwealth and for whose estate an executor has not been 
appointed, an administrator of such person may be 
appointed, solely for the purpose of prosecution of said 
suit, by the clerk of the court having jurisdiction for the 
probate of wills in the county or city in which 
jurisdiction and venue would have been properly laid for 
 
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such action in the same manner as if the person for whom 
the appointment thereof is sought had survived. 
 
The second statute we consider, Code § 26-12.2, provides an 
exception to the inventory and settlement duties of a personal 
representative.  That statute states: 
An inventory under § 26-12 or a settlement under § 26-17 
shall not be required of a personal representative who 
qualifies for the sole purpose of bringing an action under 
§ 8.01-50. However, if there be no surviving relative 
designated as a beneficiary under § 8.01-53 and the court 
directs that the funds recovered in such action be paid to 
the personal representative for distribution according to 
law, such personal representative shall file the inventory 
required in § 26-12 and the statement required under § 26-
17. 
 
The language of Code § 64.1-75.1 plainly permits a circuit 
court clerk to appoint an administrator for the purpose of 
bringing both personal injury survival actions and wrongful 
death actions.  Administrators appointed for both purposes may 
assert wrongful death and personal injury survival claims in the 
alternative, although they may only recover once for the same 
injury.  See Code § 8.01-56; Centra Health, Inc. v. Mullins, 277 
Va. 59, 77-79, 670 S.E.2d 708, 717-18 (2009).  Additionally, 
administrators who assert both types of claims cannot be forced 
to elect between them before they have had a full opportunity to 
develop their case.  Id. at 77-79, 670 S.E.2d at 717-18. 
The present situation, however, is not one in which an 
administrator with authority to assert alternative claims has 
been prevented from doing so.  Instead, the present situation is 
 
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one in which an administrator appointed solely for one purpose 
asserts that, by operation of Code § 64.1-75.1, she has standing 
to pursue a different type of claim not specified in her written 
order of appointment. 
The two statutes quoted above, when considered together, 
directly refute Antisdel’s contention.  The plain language of 
Code § 64.1-75.1 authorizes a circuit court clerk, when an 
executor has not been appointed for an estate, to appoint an 
administrator solely for the purpose of bringing an action for 
personal injury or wrongful death.  Nothing in the language of 
this statute, however, requires that a circuit court clerk 
always authorize an administrator seeking to file one particular 
type of action to bring both types of actions. 
 
The fact that an administrator may be appointed solely for 
the purpose of bringing a wrongful death action is confirmed by a 
reading of Code § 26-12.2.  This statute specifically exempts a 
personal representative who has qualified for the “sole purpose” 
of bringing a wrongful death claim from the inventory and 
settlement filing requirements applicable to the administration 
of an estate.  Moreover, if the appointment of an administrator 
solely for purposes of bringing a wrongful death action, as 
referenced in Code § 26-12.2, were prohibited by implication in 
Code § 64.1-75.1, the filing exceptions created by Code § 26-
12.2 would be rendered meaningless.  We will not read this 
 
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statute in a manner that would eliminate an entire provision 
crafted by the General Assembly.  See Lynchburg, 276 Va. at 483, 
666 S.E.2d at 370; Hubbard, 255 Va. at 340, 497 S.E.2d at 338; 
Jones, 227 Va. at 181, 314 S.E.2d at 64. 
 
We also observe that that this statutory exception provided 
in Code § 26-12.2 is reflective of the more limited duties of an 
administrator appointed solely for the purpose of bringing a 
wrongful death action.  Unlike the proceeds from a personal 
injury survival action, sums recovered in a wrongful death 
action generally are awarded directly to a decedent’s 
beneficiaries, are unaffected by the decedent’s debts and 
liabilities, and do not pass through the decedent’s estate.  See 
Bagley v. Weaver, 211 Va. 779, 782, 180 S.E.2d 686, 689 (1971); 
Cassady v. Martin, 220 Va. 1093, 1101, 266 S.E.2d 104, 108 
(1980).  Therefore, as provided by Code § 26-12.2, an 
administrator appointed for the sole purpose of bringing a 
wrongful death claim involving designated beneficiaries is not 
required to comply with inventory and settlement requirements 
applicable to an administrator of an estate. 
 
Contrary to Antisdel’s contention, our reading of these two 
statutes does not force a premature election of remedies or 
place any limitation on the ability of a duly-appointed 
administrator to pursue all actions within the scope of his or 
her appointment power.  Thus, an administrator appointed for the 
 
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purposes of filing both a wrongful death action and a personal 
injury survival action may assert both causes of action and 
plead them in the alternative.  See Code §§ 8.01-272 and -281; 
Centra Health, 277 Va. at 77-79, 670 S.E.2d at 717-18. 
 
We also disagree with Antisdel’s contention that the circuit 
court erred in refusing to “reform” the appointment order nunc 
pro tunc to grant her retroactively the authority to bring 
survival claims.  The purpose of an order entered nunc pro tunc 
is to correct mistakes or omissions in the record so that the 
record properly reflects the events that actually took place.  
Brake v. Payne, 268 Va. 92, 100, 597 S.E.2d 59, 64 (2004); 
Council v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 288, 292-93, 94 S.E.2d 245, 248 
(1956).  Orders entered nunc pro tunc cannot retroactively record 
an event that never occurred, or have the record reflect a fact 
that never existed.  Brake, 268 Va. at 100, 597 S.E.2d at 64; 
Council, 198 Va. at 292-93, 94 S.E.2d at 248. 
 
The entry of an order nunc pro tunc is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the circuit court.  Jefferson v. 
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 136, 140, 607 S.E.2d 107, 110 (2005); 
Council, 198 Va. at 293, 94 S.E.2d at 248.  Nunc pro tunc entry 
should be made only if “the evidence constituting the basis for 
the correction of the record [is] clear and convincing” and when 
“the errors to be corrected are proved beyond all doubt.”  
Council, 198 Va. at 293, 94 S.E.2d at 248. 
 
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Here, at the time Antisdel sought the appointment order from 
the clerk, the only action pending in the circuit court was her 
wrongful death claim.  Antisdel swore an oath of fiduciary 
declaring that she would perform her duties as administrator for 
the sole purpose of bringing a wrongful death action under Code 
§ 8.01-50.  The clerk’s appointment order accurately reflected 
that declaration and, consistent with the declaration and 
appointment order, the clerk exercised her authority to waive 
the inventory and fees associated with a broader grant of 
administrative authority.  Therefore, Antisdel’s request for 
appointment, her oath of fiduciary, and the appointment order 
accurately reflected the events that transpired.  Under these 
facts, entry of the nunc pro tunc appointment order requested by 
Antisdel improperly would have created a fiction, establishing 
the granting of a fiduciary power that never existed. 
Antisdel may not have received the qualification authority 
that she intended but, on this record, the responsibility for 
that mistake lies with Antisdel and not with the clerk.  
Antisdel asked to qualify for the limited purpose stated in Code 
§ 8.01-50, and the clerk’s order was consistent with Antisdel’s 
oath.  Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
err in granting the defendants’ pleas in bar because Antisdel 
lacked standing to bring the present action. 
 
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For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment. 
Affirmed. 
 
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