Case Title: McGlothlin v. First Alabama Bank

Citation: 599 So. 2d 1137

Docket Number: 1910371

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1992-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
599 So. 2d 1137 (1992)
Michael D. McGLOTHLIN and Mary L. McGlothlin
v.
FIRST ALABAMA BANK.
1910371.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 29, 1992.
Marshall H. Sims, Trussville, for appellants.
Hewitt L. Conwill, Roy M. Johnson III, and Joel C. Watson of Conwill, Justice & Johnson, Columbiana, and Joel C. Watson, Alabaster, for appellee.
SHORES, Justice.
This appeal arises out of a complaint for redemption filed by First Alabama Bank (as junior mortgagee) against Michael David McGlothlin and Mary McGlothlin and Guaranty Federal Savings and Loan Association in the Shelby County Circuit Court. The trial court entered an order of summary judgment on June 11, 1990, in favor of First Alabama. Almost one year later, Joel Watson, who had represented the McGlothlins in negotiations prior to the filing of the complaint for redemption, filed a motion to intervene and a "motion for new trial/motion to reconsider order on summary judgment." These motions followed the filing of a malpractice suit by the McGlothlins against Watson.
*1138 By order of July 8, 1991, the trial court allowed Watson's intervention for purposes of his "motion for new trial/motion to reconsider order on summary judgment," and found that its order on summary judgment was not final and that the case could have been further litigated had the parties not chosen to settle it. Having found that the parties to the redemption case had voluntarily settled following a pretrial order, the court dismissed the case. The McGlothlins appeal the order of dismissal and the trial court's failure to alter, amend, or vacate it. We affirm.
There are two issues presented on appeal: (1) Whether the trial court's order on summary judgment was a final judgment, and (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing intervention.
The order on summary judgment reads as follows:
The trial court's order dated July 8, 1991, states in pertinent part:
Rule 54(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
An order as to fewer than all parties, or dealing with fewer than all claims, does not terminate the action as to any parties or claims. Rule 54, supra; see, e.g., Bowman v. Integrity Credit Corp., 507 So. 2d 104 (Ala.Civ.App.1987). Although the Bank sought a judicial determination that the Bank had the legal right to redeem the property in question, the trial court's order on summary judgment does not speak to this point or ever actually say that the Bank is granted the right to redeem, or is entitled to redeem, nor does the trial court say that redemption has occurred or is accomplished, nor is there an entry of judgment. Also, although the Bank sought a judicial determination that the McGlothlins *1140 should transfer all of their rights, title, and interest in the property to the Bank, the trial court's order on summary judgment does not end or divest the McGlothlins' interests in the property, nor does it transfer the McGlothlins' rights in the property to the Bank. Guaranty did not file a motion for summary judgment for the trial court to rule upon, nor did it have a motion for summary judgment filed against it for the trial court to rule upon. The trial court's order on summary judgment does not dispose of the question whether Guaranty is entitled to any of the interest that was ordered paid and what amount of the $55,136.03 it was due. The trial court entered an order requiring payment to Guaranty without Guaranty's having shown any legal right to any amount, and there was no determination of the McGlothlins' rights against Guaranty as to that sum. We have repeatedly stated that the significance of an order relating to fewer than all of the parties or to fewer than all the claims is that the order does not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and that the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. Rule 54(b), A.R.Civ.P.; see Hallman v. Marion Corp., 411 So. 2d 130 (Ala.1982). Where an action involves multiple claims or parties, any adjudication that adjudges fewer than all of the claims or parties is interlocutory, absent a Rule 54(b) order determining that there is no just reason for delay and expressly directing the entry of a judgment. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Carmichael, 383 So. 2d 539 (Ala.1980). The trial court did not dispose of all issues and parties in its order on summary judgment, and, therefore, the order was not a final judgment.
The McGlothlins further contend that because they settled after the trial court's order of June 11, 1990, that order should be deemed final. However, an agreement of the parties, as well as responsive pleadings, not reduced to a court order, does not constitute an adjudication of a pending claim. Rudolph v. First Southern Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 414 So. 2d 64 (Ala.1982). We hold that the order on summary judgment was not a final order, and, therefore, that it was within the trial court's discretion to permit the intervention.
For the reasons stated, the judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, KENNEDY and INGRAM, JJ., concur.