Case Title: Williams v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC92250

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
ROLLAN WILLIAMS, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC92250 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Respondent.  
) 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS 
The Honorable Bryan L. Hettenbach, Judge 
 
Opinion issued October 16, 2012 
 
 
Rollan Williams appeals from the circuit court's judgment overruling his Rule 
29.15 motion without an evidentiary hearing.  Williams argues the circuit court erred in 
overruling his motion without an evidentiary hearing because his trial counsel was 
ineffective for not calling a witness to testify and because his appellate counsel was 
ineffective in failing to raise a meritorious issue on appeal.  Because the testimony of the 
witness did not negate an element of the crime and would not produce a viable defense 
and because Williams cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome 
would have been different had his appellate counsel raised the sufficiency of the evidence 
claim on appeal, the circuit court's judgment is affirmed. 
Facts 
Williams and D.W. were married more than 10 years, but had separated.  Williams 
came to D.W.'s house to retrieve some of his belongings.  Williams and D.W. began 
arguing in the kitchen.  At some point during the argument, Williams pulled a gun and 
held it to D.W.'s head.  D.W.'s two adult sons, B.Z. and T.R., heard the argument and 
came into the kitchen.  T.R. held a baseball bat.  Williams pointed the gun at T.R.  B.Z. 
asked what it would take for Williams not to kill D.W.  Williams demanded $100.    
Williams left after stating that he was going to kill them all. 
Williams was found guilty by a jury of robbery in the first degree, § 569.0201 
armed criminal action, § 571.015, and unlawful use of a weapon, § 571.030.  Williams 
was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment by the circuit court.  The appellate court 
affirmed his conviction.  Williams timely filed this Rule 29.15 motion, alleging his trial 
counsel failed to call Ernest Basic to testify at trial and alleging his appellate counsel 
failed to raise an insufficiency of evidence claim regarding the weapons charge.  This 
Court granted transfer after opinion by the court of appeals and, therefore, has 
jurisdiction under article V, section 10, of the Missouri Constitution.   
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews a motion court's findings and conclusions on a Rule 29.15 
motion for the limited purpose of determining whether they were clearly erroneous.  
Johnson v. State, 333 S.W.3d 459, 463 (Mo. banc 2011); Rule 29.15(k).  To overrule the 
                                             
 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000, unless stated otherwise. 
judgment of a motion court on a Rule 29.15 motion, this Court must be left with a 
definite and firm impression that the motion court made a mistake.  Baumruk v. State, 
364 S.W.3d 518, 524 (Mo. banc 2012).   
 
"A motion court clearly erred in overruling a Rule 29.15 motion's request for an 
evidentiary hearing only if movant can show 1) that his motion alleged facts, not 
conclusions, warranting relief; 2) the facts alleged were not conclusively refuted by the 
files and records in the case; and 3) the matters complained of . . . resulted in prejudice to 
the movant."  Id. at 525 (internal quotations and citations omitted).   
 
"In order to prove that his counsel was ineffective, a movant must show that 
counsel's performance did not conform to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a 
reasonably competent attorney and that movant was thereby prejudiced."  Johnson, 333 
S.W.3d at 463 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  "To demonstrate prejudice, a movant must show 
that, but for counsel's poor performance, there is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the court proceeding would have been different."  Johnson, 333 S.W.3d at 
463.  "This Court presumes that counsel acted professionally in making decisions and 
that any challenged action was part of counsel's sound trial strategy."  Id. 
FAILURE TO CALL BASIC AS A WITNESS 
 
Williams argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Ernest 
Basic to testify.  Williams stated that Basic was willing and available to testify at trial and 
argues that Basic's testimony would have provided Williams a viable alibi defense 
because it would have impeached the credibility of one of the State's witnesses. 
 
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"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call a 
witness, the following must be shown: 1) [t]rial counsel knew or should have known of 
the existence of the witness; 2) the witness could be located through reasonable 
investigation; 3) the witness would testify; and 4) the witness's testimony would have 
produced a viable defense."  Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 577 (Mo. banc 
2005).  "Counsel's decision not to call a witness is presumptively a matter of trial strategy 
and will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the defendant 
clearly establishes otherwise."  Hutchison v. State, 150 S.W.3d 292, 304 (Mo. banc 
2004).   
 
Williams asserts that Basic was ready, willing, and able to testify at trial regarding 
a prior arrest and an alleged conviction of a witness for the State.  Generally, a witness 
cannot be impeached by an arrest, investigation, or criminal charge that has not resulted 
in a conviction.  State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 179-80 (Mo. banc 1997).  However, 
a party may use such evidence to demonstrate: "(1) a specific interest of the witness; (2) 
the witness's motivation to testify favorably for the state; or (3) that the witness testified 
with an expectation of leniency."  Id. (internal citation omitted).  Here, Williams does not 
allege that any exception applies to the impeachment testimony he argues Basic would 
have provided, nor would it have negated an element of the crime or provided Williams 
with a viable defense. 
FAILURE TO APPEAL SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
 
Williams argues his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting Williams' unlawful use of a weapon conviction.  
 
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Williams argues the State failed to prove the firearm he used was capable of lethal use 
and that this claim had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. 
 
"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the [m]ovant 
must establish that counsel failed to raise a claim of error that was so obvious that a 
competent and effective lawyer would have recognized and asserted it."  Taylor v. State, 
262 S.W.3d 231, 253 (Mo. banc 2008) (internal citation omitted).  To be entitled to relief, 
a movant must demonstrate "that there is a reasonable probability the appeal's outcome 
would have been different."  Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 192 (Mo. banc 2009) 
(internal citation omitted).   
 
Williams argues the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his 
unlawful use of a weapon conviction because the gun was never recovered.  Section 
571.030.1(4) provides that "[a] person commits the crime of unlawful use of weapons if 
he or she knowingly . . . [e]xhibits, in the presence of one or more persons, any weapon 
readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner[.]"  Specifically, Williams 
claims the State failed to meet its burden to prove every element of the unlawful use of a 
weapon charge because it failed to prove the firearm was "readily capable of lethal use."   
 
The standard applied is "whether there was sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable juror might have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."  
State v. Letica, 356 S.W.3d 157, 166 (Mo. banc 2011).  "The evidence and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, disregarding 
any evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict."  State v. Belton, 153 S.W.3d 307, 
309 (Mo. banc 2005).  "This is not an assessment of whether the Court believes that the 
 
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evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but rather a question of 
whether, in light of the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational fact-finder 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."  State 
v. Miller, 372 S.W.3d 455, 458 (Mo. banc 2012).  In reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting a criminal conviction, an appellate court "does not act as a 'super 
juror' with veto powers," but "gives great deference to the trier of fact."  Id.     
A review of the statute and of prevailing case law reveals that challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence proving that the firearm Williams used to threaten D.W. was 
"readily capable of lethal use" would not have led to a different outcome on appeal.   
Section 571.030.1 sets out 10 acts for which "[a] person commits the crime of 
unlawful use of a weapon if he or she [acts] knowingly[.]"  Williams was convicted of the 
unlawful use of a weapon under subdivision 4 of that section.  Subdivision 4 proscribes a 
person knowingly "[e]xhibiting, in the presence of one or more persons, any weapon 
capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner[.]"  Section 571.030.1(4).  
Subdivision 1 of that section proscribes carrying "concealed upon or about his or her 
person a knife, a firearm, a blackjack or any other weapon readily capable of lethal use[.]  
Section 571.030.1(1) (emphasis added).  Subdivision 5 reads, in pertinent part, "[h]as a 
firearm or projectile weapon readily capable of lethal use . . . ."  Section 571.030.1(5) 
(emphasis added).  Subdivision 8 of that section reads, in pertinent part, "[c]arries a 
firearm or any other weapon readily capable of lethal use . . . ."  Section 571.030.1(8) 
(emphasis added).  Subdivision 10 of that section reads, in pertinent part, "[c]arries a 
 
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firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or any other weapon readily capable of lethal use 
...."  Section 571.030.1(10) (emphasis added).   
"[W]hen the same or similar words are used in different places within the same 
legislative act and relate to the same or similar subject matter, then the statutes are in pari 
materia and should be construed to achieve a harmonious interpretation of the statutes."  
State v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Mo. banc 1992) (internal citation omitted).  The 
language of § 571.030.1 in this statutory scheme presumes that a firearm is a "weapon 
readily capable of lethal use" without requiring it also be proven at trial that it was 
functional or loaded.2  Subdivisions 1, 4, 5, 8, and 10 of section 571.030.1 all use the 
term "weapon readily capable of lethal use."  Of those subdivisions, subdivisions 1, 5, 8, 
and 10 all use the language, "a firearm or . . . weapon readily capable of lethal use[.]"  
The motion court quoted subdivision 1 and stated "[t]his language suggests that a knife, 
firearm, or blackjack is necessarily 'a weapon readily capable of lethal use,'" and 
continued to find the State does not "have to prove the gun was loaded."  Further, the 
prevailing case law demonstrates that an appeal of the sufficiency of the evidence in 
Williams' case would not have succeeded.3 
                                             
 
2  In a case decided contemporaneously with this one, State v. Wright, No. SC92257, __ 
S.W.3d__, (Mo. banc Oct. 16, 2012), this Court determined that § 571.030.1(1) does not require 
the state to prove a firearm is "functional" to be convicted under this statute.  Slip. op at 4.  This 
Court further explained the circumstances under which the State would be required to prove a 
firearm's "functionality."  Slip op. at 5.  Williams' sole allegation is that his appellate counsel 
should have argued the State did not introduce evidence sufficient to prove the firearm he used 
was "readily capable of lethal use" and does not allege that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to raise a special negative defense.     
3   State v. Wright, No. SC92257, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Mo. banc Oct. 16, 2012).  Cf. State v. 
Richardson, 886 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Mo. App. 1994); State v. Geary, 884 S.W.2d 41, 44-45 (Mo. 
App. 1994); State v. Lutjen, 661 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Mo. App. 1983). 
 
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Although the gun was not found, the testimony was that Williams knowingly 
exhibited a firearm "in an angry or threatening manner."  The testimony was that he 
threatened the victims with the use of a firearm.  He pointed the firearm at D.W.'s head 
and at her son, T.R.  He threatened to kill them.  Given the facts of this case, there was 
sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury that Williams' use of the firearm 
constituted the charge of unlawful use of a weapon.  No challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence would have been successful if pursued on appeal.  A defendant may not 
escape conviction under § 571.030.1 merely by ensuring the weapon is discarded or 
destroyed.  Therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective, and the motion court's 
findings and conclusions were not clearly erroneous. 
Conclusion 
 
Williams has not demonstrated his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a 
witness or that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal.  The motion court's judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
Teitelman, C.J., Russell, Breckenridge and  
Stith, JJ., concur. Draper, J., not participating.