Case Title: Utah State Road Commission v. Johnson

Citation: 550 P.2d 216

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1976-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
550 P.2d 216 (1976) UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Carlos JOHNSON et al., Defendants and Respondents. No. 14225. Supreme Court of Utah. May 20, 1976. Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Donald S. Coleman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. Brant H. Wall, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents. ELLETT, Justice: This is a condemnation matter. The jury awarded damages to the landowner in the amount of $95,000. The trial court ordered a new trial unless the owner would consent to a remittitur in the amount of $3,000. *217 The Road Commission appeals claiming that the trial court had no authority to grant a new trial conditionally. There is no merit to this claim. The appellant has the same right to appeal which he would have had, had the court denied the motion for a new trial outright. The fact that the landowner consented to a reduction of $3,000 does not harm the appellant it has no effect on the chances of reversal; and if it loses the appeal it is $3,000 better off by reason of the remittitur. The law is set out in 25A C.J.S. Damages § 201 as follows: (See also 66 C.J.S. New Trial § 209.) Utah follows the rule set out above. In the case of Duffy v. Union Pacific R. Co.,[1] this court said: The appellant also claims it was error for the court to allow the landowner to testify that the property was worth $120,000 to $125,000. The basis he gave for the value was: "Well, it is my life's work and it provided me a good living... . I know what it is worth to me." Counsel then asked the witness: "And is that what your testimony is based on, Mr. Johnson, is that what the subject property is worth to you?" and the witness answered, "yes." The basis upon which the owner stated the value of the property was not permitted by law. What the property is worth to a seller is not a correct basis for an opinion,[2] and the motion to strike the answer should have been granted. An expert witness for the landowner testified that the value of the taking was $92,000, while the expert for the appellant placed the value at $54,000. The jury awarded $95,000 showing that the testimony of the landowner had an influence on the verdict. The court refused to grant a new trail if the landowner would consent to a $3,000 remittitur. The remittitur was agreed to by the respondent and this appeal followed. This court has said: However, in the case of Utah State Road Commission v. Steele Ranch[4] an exception to the rule announced in the Provo River case was noted. The case of State v. Larson[5] shows the trend of the recent decisions and we think it correctly sets forth the law: Another case in point is that of Commonwealth, etc. v. Hopson[6] which holds: Another case of interest on the point is that of Rotge v. Murphy,[8] wherein the court stated: Because the court permitted the testimony of the owner to be given over objection and failed to strike it on motion it committed error which clearly had an improper effect on the jury. The reduction of the verdict to the figure testified to by the respondent's expert witness does not cure the error. No one knows what the verdict would have been without the evidence given by the owner. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. Costs are awarded to the appellant. HENRIOD, C.J., and CROCKETT, J., concur. MAUGHAN, Justice (dissenting): Under the law and the facts the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The defendant landowner testified extensively as to the history of his property. He described the physical layout of the property, its use, including the connection to the utilities, and the relevant zoning laws. He explained he erected a structure on the property in 1955 which he utilized as a cafe and tavern. He operated the cafe for a period of two years, and thereafter rented it; his tenant had paid him $200 per month for the past 12 years. The tavern he operated for many years. In 1971, a nonprofit private club occupied the tavern area, which defendant initially managed. Thereafter, he rented the tavern area for $500 per month to the club; in addition, he procured parttime employment with the club. After establishing the landowner's intimate knowledge of his property and its uses, his counsel queried: On cross-examination, the State, by counsel, queried: On redirect examination, defense counsel asked: This court has consistently adhered to the rule as set forth in 5 Nichols On Eminent Domain (3rd Edition), Section 18.4[2], pp. 18-106 to 18-114: In the note following Rule 56, Utah Rules of Evidence, it is stated: "... It is understood that this rule does not affect the right of the owner to testify as to its value."[2] In the recent case of State Road Commission v. Steele Ranch,[3] this court cited a sentence of modification to the general rule in 5 Nichols On Eminent Domain (3rd Edition), Section 18.4[2], pp. 18-114, ". . However, it has been held that mere ownership does not render a person competent to render an opinion as to value, unless he is in fact familiar with facts which give the property value... ." This court explained that such an exception to the general rule that an owner may testify to the value of his property was limited to specific circumstances, such as, "a person may come into ownership of property by inheritance, or otherwise, who may not have any realistic idea of its value. If it should so appear, the evidence would have no probative use and should be deemed incompetent; ..." However, the statement of this exception is obiter dicta, since that opinion says: "In our case it does appear that Dr. Steele had had considerable experience in dealings in property." The majority opinion in the instant case appears to hold that the trial court erred (a) by permitting the testimony of the owner to be given over objection and (b) by failing to grant the motion to strike the testimony. As to (a) the ruling represents a radical departure from Utah law for it would mean that a landowner is not competent to be a witness and render an opinion as to the value of his land, until it has been affirmatively shown that he has knowledge of property values. The majority cites Commonwealth v. Fister.[4] In the Fister case, the landowner did not disclose any familiarity with property values in the neighborhood; he disclaimed knowledge of comparable sales. His estimates were to some extent based on how the condemnation would affect his business. The court acknowledged that generally an owner of property, either real or personal, is ipso facto qualified to give his opinion of its market value. The court stated that it was unable to find a persuasive reason for the arbitrary rule that mere ownership of realty automatically qualifies such owner to render a valid opinion concerning its market value at any given time. The court observed that other lay witnesses are required to have a knowledge of property values generally or be acquainted with property values in the vicinity before expressing an opinion as to values. The view was expressed that an owner should meet the same qualifications required of his neighbors, i.e., the qualifications of the owner witness "must be affirmatively shown before his opinion of market values is expressed." Thus, the court departed from the general rule, and enunciated a principle of its creation: "... the owner of real estate shall not be presumed adequately qualified to express an opinion of market values by reason of ownership alone." The other case cited in the majority opinion, Rotge v. Murphy,[5] to sustain the view that the property owner is not qualified as a witness to give an opinion as to *221 value involved only a collateral attack upon a tax judgment. It had nothing whatever to do with condemnation. However, in Texas, in condemnation suits the opinion of the owner as to value of his property is admissible.[6] The majority opinion is of the view that the trial court erred in its denial of the motion to strike the landowner's testimony. To sustain the opinion, the court cites State v. Larson.[7] A review of the Larson decision, in fact, sustains the ruling of the trial court in the instant case. In Larson, it was stated to be improper to arrive at a conclusion concerning the value of property containing minerals, by multiplying the assumed number of cubic yards of material available, by a given price per unit. The landowner, Mr. Larson, based his opinion on such a calculation. His testimony was stricken. Affirming on appeal, the court stated: In State v. Wilson,[9] the ruling of the trial court, striking the valuation testimony of the owner, was sustained because the owner based his valuation solely on replacement cost without considering depreciation. The court relied on State v. Larson,[10] and said: In City of Wichita v. May's Company Incorporated,[12] the condemning authority urged the court to rule that a landowner to qualify as a witness must establish a foundation for his testimony by affirmative proof that he has knowledge developed from buying and selling real estate or an acquaintanceship and familiarity with land values in the neighborhood. The court responded: In the instant action, defendant, Johnson, as owner of the property, was qualified to be an opinion witness. His statement concerning his evaluation must be placed within the context of his other testimony. He had explained the uses to which the property had been devoted and the rentals he had derived therefrom. His statement on cross-examination that his evaluation *222 was based on what it was worth to him must be related to all his other testimony. Considered in this light, his evaluation testimony cannot be deemed of such a nature as to be inappropriate proof or incompetent evidence as to the fact in issue. TUCKETT, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of MAUGHAN, J. [1] 118 Utah 82, 218 P.2d 1080 (1950). [2] U.S. v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 66 S. Ct. 596, 90 L. Ed. 729 (1946). [3] Provo River Water Users Assn. v. Carlson et al., 103 Utah 93, 133 P.2d 777 (1943). [4] 533 P.2d 888 (Utah 1975). [5] 54 Wash. 2d 86, 338 P.2d 135 (1959). [6] 396 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1965). [7] 373 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1963). [8] 198 S.W.2d 932 [Court of Civil Appeals (Texas 1946)]. [1] See State Road Commission v. Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P.2d 507 (1970); Provo River Water Users' Assn. v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 104, 133 P.2d 777 (1943), wherein it is stated: "An owner of property is always entitled to testify as to its value, and to express an opinion as to its value in condemnation proceedings. An owner does not have to qualify as an expert, nor be engaged in buying and selling real estate." [2] Our esteemed Justice Crockett was Chairman of the Committee. [3] 533 P.2d 888, 891 (Utah 1975). [4] C.A.Ky., 373 S.W.2d 720 (1963). [5] Tex.Civ.App., 198 S.W.2d 932 (1946). [6] City of Rockwall v. Mitchell, Tex.Civ.App., 497 S.W.2d 378 (1973). [7] 54 Wash. 2d 86, 338 P.2d 135 (1959). [8] At p. 136 of 338 P.2d. [9] 6 Wash. App. 443, 493 P.2d 1252 (1972). [10] Note 8, supra. [11] At pp. 1257-1258 of 493 P.2d. [12] 212 Kan. 153, 510 P.2d 184, 187 (1973).