Case Title: UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD V. CABALLO COAL COMPANY; and CABALLO COAL COMPANY v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0112

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD V. CABALLO COAL COMPANY; and CABALLO COAL COMPANY v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY2011 WY 24Case Number: No. S-10-0112, S-10-0113Decided: 02/14/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.CABALLO 
COAL COMPANY,Appellee (Defendant).

and

 
 
 CABALLO 
COAL COMPANY,Appellant (Defendant),v.UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
                                                                                    
            

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Union Pacific Railroad Co.:

Howard 
P. Olsen, Jr. and Steven W. Olsen of Simmons Olsen Law Firm, P.C., Scottsbluff, 
Nebraska.  Argument by Mr. Steven W. 
Olsen.

 
 
Representing 
Caballo Coal Co.:

Richard 
A. Mincer and Billie LM Addleman of Hirst Applegate, LLP, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Addleman. 

 
 
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Union Pacific 
Railroad Company (UP) appeals from the district court's order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Caballo Coal Company (CCC) on UP's claim that it was 
entitled to be indemnified for payments it made to one of its employees who was 
injured on CCC property.  In a cross 
appeal, CCC claims the district court erred by granting summary judgment in 
favor of UP on CCC's counterclaim for attorney fees.  

 
 
[¶2]      We conclude the 
district court properly granted summary judgment to CCC because UP did not make 
any showing that CCC's negligence caused its employee's injury.  However, the district court erred by 
granting summary judgment in favor of UP on CCC's claim for attorney fees 
because no motion had been filed and CCC was not given notice or an opportunity 
to be heard on the matter.

 
 
[¶3]      Affirmed in part 
and reversed and remanded in part. 

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶4]      We restate the 
issues presented by UP in Case No. S-10-0112 as follows:

 
 
            
1.         
Whether the court erred in granting Caballo's motion for summary judgment 
on the ground that Caballo had no duty to UP's employee.

 
 
            
2.         
Whether the district court should have granted UP's motion for partial 
summary judgment on the reasonableness of its settlement with Mr. 
Riecke.

 
 
The 
issue presented by CCC in Case No. S-10-0013, as restated, 
is:

 
 
            
1.         
Whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of 
UP on Caballo's claim for attorney fees when UP had not filed a summary judgment 
motion and Caballo had no opportunity to be heard on the 
matter.

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5]      On November 22, 
2004, UP locomotive engineer, Roy Riecke, fell while inspecting the locomotive 
on the train he was operating from a CCC coal mine near Gillette, Wyoming to 
Bill, Wyoming.  Mr. Riecke stated 
that he lost his footing on a thick layer of coal dust covering the ballast and 
fell backwards.  He injured his 
right knee and lower back.    

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Riecke filed 
suit against UP in district court in Nebraska, claiming a right to compensation 
under the Federal Employers Liability Act.  
He claimed damages for his pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, 
lost earnings and other compensatory and consequential damages.  UP notified CCC of the suit and tendered 
the defense, claiming CCC was obligated to indemnify it pursuant to an agreement 
between the parties.  The agreement, 
dated December 10, 2001, supplemented earlier agreements between the parties and 
their predecessors and stated in pertinent part:

 
 
Section 
4.  LIABILITY: 
INDEMNIFICATION

 
 
            
CCC hereby agrees to indemnify and hold harmless UP from any and all 
loss, damage, injury or death arising from the operation of UP delivered trains 
over the Industry Tracks as provided in this Agreement, to the extent that they 
result from any negligence or wrongful act or omission of CCC's officers, 
employees or agents.  UP hereby 
agrees to indemnify and hold harmless CCC from any and all loss, damage, injury 
or death arising from the operation of UP delivered trains over the Industry 
Tracks as provided in this Agreement, to the extent that they result from any 
negligence or wrongful act or omission of UP's officers, employees or 
agents.   

 
 
[¶7]      CCC denied UP's 
request to take over the defense of Mr. Riecke's suit and indemnify UP for its 
costs.  UP settled with Mr. Riecke 
for $400,000 on November 9, 2007.  
UP then filed a complaint against CCC seeking indemnification for the 
amount it paid to settle Mr. Riecke's suit and its attorney fees and costs.  CCC generally denied liability under the 
agreement and counterclaimed under the indemnity provision quoted above for its 
costs and attorney fees associated with defending the pending suit.  UP did not file a timely response to 
CCC's counterclaim and the district court clerk entered a default against 
UP.  UP subsequently requested that 
the entry of default be set aside, and the district court granted its 
request.  UP then answered and 
denied CCC's counterclaim.  

 
 
[¶8]      CCC filed a 
motion for summary judgment on UP's indemnification claim,  arguing that, in order to establish 
liability under the indemnification provision, UP was required to demonstrate 
that CCC was negligent, and CCC did not owe a duty to Mr. Riecke so it could not 
be found to be negligent.  UP also 
filed a motion for partial summary judgment, requesting an order that it had 
made a reasonable, good faith settlement of Mr. Riecke's suit.    

 
 
[¶9]      After a hearing, 
the district court granted CCC's motion for summary judgment and denied UP's 
motion as moot.  UP filed a notice 
of appeal, but we dismissed the appeal because all outstanding issues had not 
been resolved by the district court's summary judgment order.  In particular there had been no ruling 
on CCC's counterclaim, and there was no "indication that the district court 
intended to direct the entry of a final judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(b)."1    

 
 
[¶10]   Back in the district court, the 
court, apparently acting sua sponte, 
ruled that there were no material issues of fact and judgment as a matter of law 
should be granted in UP's favor on CCC's counterclaim.  The district court stated that the 
indemnification language of the contract did not allow CCC to recover its 
attorney fees and costs because those expenses did not arise out of any 
negligence, wrongful act or omission on the part of UP.  UP and CCC both appealed the respective 
judgments against them.  UP's appeal 
was docketed as No. S-10-0112, and CCC's appeal was docketed as No. 
S-10-0113.      
          
     

 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]   Summary judgments are governed by 
W.R.C.P. 56(c):

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
[¶12]   A district court's summary judgment 
ruling is reviewed de novo, using the 
same materials and following the same standards as the district court.  The facts are considered from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  Metz v. Laramie County School Dist. No. 1, 
2007 WY 166, ¶ 17, 173 P.3d 334, 
339 (Wyo. 2007); Cook v. Shoshone First 
Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶13]   In cases involving questions of 
contract interpretation, the following standard of review 
applies:

 
 
            
The initial question of whether the contract is capable of being 
understood in only one way is a question of law for the court. If the court 
determines that the contract is capable of being understood in only one way, 
then the language used in the contract expresses and controls the intent of the 
parties. In such case, the next question, what is that understanding or meaning, 
is also a question of law. When we review the district court's summary judgment 
decisions that a contract is capable of being understood in only one way and 
what that understanding is, we accord no deference to those decisions. 

 
 

M 
& M Auto Outlet v. Hill Inv. Corp., 2010 
WY 56, ¶ 12, 230 P.3d 1099, 1104 (Wyo. 2010), quoting Examination Mgmt. 
Servs., Inc. v. Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 689 (Wyo. 1996) (internal 
citations omitted).

 
 
[¶14]   Interpretation of procedural rules, 
including those governing summary judgments, is a question of law we review de novo.  Kruckenberg v. Ding Masters, Inc., 2008 
WY 40, ¶ 14, 180 P.3d 895, 899 (Wyo. 2008).  

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 

 
 

1.    
Case No. 
S-10-0012  CCC's Obligation to Indemnify UP

 
 
[¶15]   General contract interpretation 
principles apply to indemnity agreements.  
See, e.g., Jacobs Ranch Coal Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal 
Co., 2008 WY 101, ¶ 24, 191 P.3d 125, 133 (Wyo. 2008);  National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Studer 
Tractor and Equip. Co., 527 P.2d 820, 828 (Wyo. 1974).  Our goal in interpreting contracts is to 
discern the parties' intent.  Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 
WY 36, ¶ 22, 226 P.3d 889, 905 (Wyo. 2010); Carlson v. Flocchini Invs., 2005 WY 19, 
¶ 15, 106 P.3d 847, 854 (Wyo. 2005).  
The "language of the parties expressed in their contract must be given 
effect in accordance with the meaning which the language would convey to 
reasonable persons at the time and place of its use."  Moncrief v. Louisiana Land and Exploration 
Co., 861 P.2d 516, 524 (Wyo. 1993).  
"Where there is an express indemnity provision, its parameters are 
derived from the specific language of [the] contract."  Diamond Surface, Inc. v. Cleveland, 963 P.2d 996, 1002 (Wyo. 1998).  

 
 
[¶16]   The district court determined that 
CCC did not owe a duty to Mr. Riecke and, therefore, could not be liable under 
the contract.  UP argues, first, 
that CCC's duty to Mr. Riecke is irrelevant because CCC had a duty to it under 
the indemnity agreement.  It is true 
that CCC owed a contractual duty to indemnify UP.  However, the express terms of the 
contract control whether indemnification is required or not.  Diamond Surface, 963 P.2d  at 1002.  

 
 
[¶17]   Under the terms of their agreement, 
CCC was obligated to indemnify UP for any loss, damages, etc. arising from the 
operation of the trains over the tracks  
"to the extent that they result 
from any negligence or wrongful act or omission of CCC's officers, employees or 
agents."  (Emphasis added). 
 This type of provision, which 
grounds the right to indemnification upon the indemnitor's negligence, is 
common.  By contrast, there are 
indemnification agreements where the indemnitor agrees to indemnify the 
indemnitee for all losses, regardless of fault.  Provisions of this sort that exculpate 
the indemnitee from the consequences of his own negligence are disfavored by the 
courts and strictly construed.  See, e.g., Wyoming Johnson, Inc. v. Stag Industries, 
Inc., 662 P.2d 96, 99 (Wyo. 1983).  
UP's and CCC's agreement did not include an all-inclusive right to 
indemnification and allowed for indemnification only when the indemnitor's 
negligence, wrongful act or omission resulted in the indemnitee's loss.  It is not, therefore, the sort of 
indemnification provision to which the rule of strict construction applies. 

 
 
[¶18]   UP claimed a right to 
indemnification for the "loss" it suffered as a result of Mr. Riecke's 
accident.  UP's loss arose directly 
from the action Mr. Riecke brought against UP, specifically the $400,000 it paid 
to settle his claim and attorney fees and costs.  Under the plain language of the 
indemnification provision, UP had to establish that CCC's negligence, wrongful 
act or omission resulted in that loss.  
In that respect, an allegation of CCC's negligence was a condition 
precedent to its liability under the indemnification agreement.  

 
 
[¶19]   The elements of a negligence action 
are:  

 
 

1) 
the defendant was under a duty of care to protect the plaintiff from injury or 
loss; 2) the defendant breached the duty owed to the plaintiff; 3) the plaintiff 
suffered actual injury or loss; and 4) the defendant's breach of the duty 
proximately caused the plaintiff's injury or loss. Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, 
Inc., 2002 WY 105, ¶ 11, 49 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Wyo. 2002).    

 
 

Sorenson 
v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 2010 
WY 101, ¶ 8, 234 P.3d 1233, 1236 (Wyo. 2010).  

 
 
[¶20]   The district court ruled that CCC 
was entitled to summary judgment because it did not owe a duty to Mr. 
Riecke.  CCC argued that, although 
it owned the premises and UP was transporting coal from CCC's mine, it did not 
owe a duty to Mr. Riecke because he was employed by UP and CCC did not maintain 
any control over him or the safety standards employed by UP or its 
employees.  CCC cited Hittel v. WOTCO, Inc., 996 P.2d 673, 
678-79 (Wyo. 2000) and Franks v. Indep. 
Prod. Co., 2004 WY 97, ¶ 10, 96 P.3d 484, 490 (Wyo. 2004), which state that 
an owner of a premises owes a duty to the employee of an independent contractor 
only if the owner exercises pervasive control over the independent contractor's 
work or assumes affirmative safety duties.  

 
 
[¶21] 
In response to CCC's requests for admission, UP admitted that it trained Mr. 
Riecke on his duties as a locomotive engineer and applicable safety standards; 
it supervised its employees; CCC did not control the work of UP employees, in 
general, or Mr. Riecke, in particular; and CCC "did not control the work of Mr. 
Riecke on November 22, 2004," the date of his accident.  The safety manager at the CCC mine 
averred that he oversees the training of CCC mine employees and the safety 
training of certain independent contractors at the mine; however, UP employees 
are exempt from the safety training requirements.  On this record, it is clear that CCC did 
not exercise control over UP or Mr. Riecke's work and did not assume any 
affirmative safety duties for his work.  
Thus, CCC did not owe a duty to ensure Mr. Riecke's safety, even though 
he was on CCC property.

 
 
[¶22]   For the first time, UP argues on 
appeal that CCC owed a duty to Mr. Riecke because he was a business invitee.2  There are several reasons to reject UP's 
argument.  First, we typically do 
not address arguments that were not raised in, or argued to, the district court 
unless they are fundamental or jurisdictional in nature.  See, e.g., Boyle v. Boyle, 2006 WY 124, ¶ 18, 143 P.3d 368, 373 (Wyo. 2006).  UP's 
argument is neither fundamental nor jurisdictional in nature.  In addition, the cases UP cites pertain 
to situations where customers or patrons were injured on business premises.  See, e.g., Mostert v. CBL & Assocs., 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987); Bluejacket v. Carney, 
550 P.2d 494 (Wyo. 1976); Honan v. 
Moss, 359 P.2d 1002 (Wyo. 1961); Loney v. Laramie Auto Co., 36 Wyo. 339, 
255 P. 350 (Wyo. 1927).  Mr. Riecke 
was not a patron or customer of CCC's and the policies and rules pertaining to 
business invitees do not apply to this situation.  See, e.g., Jones v. Chevron, U.S.A, Inc., 718 P.2d 890, 894-95 (Wyo. 1986) (distinguishing between business invitees and employees 
of independent contractors).  
Instead, the specific rules pertaining to independent contractors and 
owners apply under the facts of this case.

 
 
[¶23]   While we agree with the district 
court's analysis of the duty element in this case, we observe that it was 
unnecessary to undertake that analysis because UP did not allege that CCC's 
negligence caused Mr. Riecke's injuries.  
Moreover, Mr. Riecke never asserted that CCC was at fault in his 
accident.  Wyoming Johnson is instructive in this 
regard.  Wyoming Johnson was the 
general contractor on a construction job; Stag was a subcontractor; and Doyle 
was Stag's employee.  Doyle was 
injured on the job and brought suit against Wyoming Johnson, alleging Wyoming 
Johnson was negligent.  Wyoming Johnson, 662 P.2d  at 97.  Wyoming Johnson and Stag had entered 
into an indemnification agreement and Wyoming Johnson tendered the defense of 
Doyle's claim to Stag under the terms of that agreement.  Stag refused the tender and the case 
between Wyoming Johnson and Doyle settled.  
Wyoming Johnson then brought an action against Stag, seeking 
indemnification.  Id.  
  

 
 
[¶24]   The Wyoming Johnson/Stag 
indemnification agreement had several provisions.  One of them contained language very 
similar to that at issue in the instant case.  It required Stag to indemnify Wyoming 
Johnson from "any and all claims . . . for injuries . . . to persons . . . on 
account of any act or omission of [Stag] . . . ."  Id. at 98.  We stated that Wyoming Johnson's claim 
under that provision of the agreement must fail because the "acts of negligence 
alleged in the Doyle complaint are acts or omissions of Wyoming Johnson, [or] 
its foreman, . . . but are not acts or omissions of Stag."  Thus, there was no claim that Stag was 
negligent and Wyoming Johnson was not entitled to maintain an action under that 
provision of the contract.3

 
 
[¶25]   As in Wyoming Johnson, neither Mr. Riecke in 
his complaint in the underlying case nor UP in its complaint in this case, 
alleged that CCC was specifically at fault for Mr. Riecke's accident.  There is no indication that the $400,000 
paid by UP was for anything but its own potential fault.  Thus, there is no allegation that the 
condition precedent, CCC's negligence, wrongful act or omission, was met in this 
case.  The district court correctly 
granted summary judgment in favor of CCC on UP's indemnification claim.  In light of that ruling, UP's motion for 
summary judgment as to the reasonableness of its settlement, which pertained to 
the damages element of its indemnification claim, is moot.  

 
 
 
 

2.    
Case No. 
S-10-0113  UP's Obligation to Indemnify CCC for its Attorney 
Fees

 
 
[¶26]   CCC claims the district court erred 
by granting summary judgment for UP on its counterclaim for the attorney fees 
and costs it incurred in defending this suit.  A review of the course of proceedings is 
helpful in understanding this issue.  
UP filed its suit seeking indemnification for the expenses it incurred in 
defending and settling Mr. Riecke's suit.  
CCC answered and counterclaimed for its attorney fees and costs in 
defending the instant case.  It 
claimed that it was entitled to recover those expenses under the same 
indemnification provision at issue in UP's action.  In other words, CCC claimed UP must 
indemnify it pursuant to the following language: 

 
 
UP 
hereby agrees to indemnify and hold harmless CCC from any and all loss, damage, 
injury or death arising from the operation of UP delivered trains over the 
Industry Tracks as provided in this Agreement, to the extent that they result 
from any negligence or wrongful act or omission of UP's officers, employees or 
agents.   

 
 
[¶27]   As we have already explained, CCC 
filed a motion for summary judgment on UP's indemnity claim and UP filed a 
motion for summary judgment as to the reasonableness of its settlement.  Neither party filed a motion for summary 
judgment on CCC's counterclaim.  
After the district court granted CCC's summary judgment motion on UP's 
claim, UP appealed to this court.      

 
 
[¶28]   The district court suspended 
further proceedings in the case "pending the outcome of the matters under appeal 
to the Wyoming Supreme Court."  
After reviewing the file, this Court dismissed the appeal because the 
counterclaim had not been resolved and we did not locate "any indication that 
the district court intended to direct the entry of a final judgment pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 54(b)."    

 
 
[¶29]   Back in the district court, CCC 
requested a trial setting on its counterclaim, while UP asked the district court 
to correct the original summary judgment order to state that the judgment was 
final under W.R.C.P. 54(b) and "there is no just reason for delay" in appealing 
the ruling.  Rather than ruling on 
any of the pending motions, the district court, apparently acting sua sponte, entered summary judgment in 
favor of UP on CCC's counterclaim for attorney fees.  In brief, the district court ruled as a 
matter of law that the indemnification provision did not apply because CCC's 
claim for attorney fees and costs in defending this action did not arise out of 
any "negligence or wrongful act or omission" committed by UP.  Both parties then appealed the 
respective summary judgments against them to this Court.      

 
 
[¶30]   CCC claims the district court 
should not have ruled on its counterclaim because there was no pending summary 
judgment motion.  Summary judgments 
are governed by W.R.C.P. 56, which states in pertinent 
part:

 
 
 
 
 
 
 Rule 56. Summary 
Judgment

 
 

            
(a) 
For claimant. 
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to 
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days 
from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a 
summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part 
thereof.

            
(b) 
For defending party. 
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part 
thereof.

            
(c) 
Motion and proceedings 
thereon. 
Unless the court otherwise orders, the motion and any response and other papers 
relating thereto shall be served pursuant to Rule 6(c). The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 

. 
. . .

            
(e) 
Form of affidavits; further testimony; 
defense required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in 
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided in this rule an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse 
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the 
adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against the adverse party.

            
(f) 
When affidavits are 
unavailable. 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the 
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify 
the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be 
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 

 
 
[¶31]   Rule 56 clearly contemplates a 
motion and full adversary proceedings before a summary judgment is granted.  There is no specific provision allowing 
for a district court to grant a summary judgment sua sponte.  The teachings of Kimbley v. Green River, 642 P.2d 443 
(Wyo. 1982), are pertinent here, although the discussion was in the context of a 
sua sponte conversion of a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion.  Quoting Davis v. Howard, 561 F.2d 565, 571-72 
(5th Cir. 1977), we stated that "the 
Rule 56 strictures of notice, hearing and admissibility into evidence are 
strictly required."  Kimbley, 642 P.2d  at 445.  "The concepts of notice, admissibility, 
and opportunity to be heard are ancient primaries. . . . However correct the 
conclusion below may be in the end, we cannot allow the shaving of principles 
for expediency when those precepts assure order and justice."  Id. at 445-46.  

 
 
[¶32]   In a similar vein, we ruled in Abraham v. Great Western Energy, LLC, 
2004 WY 145, ¶ 19, 101 P.3d 446, 455 (Wyo. 2004), that the district court 
abused its discretion by denying the plaintiffs' motion for a continuance of the 
summary judgment hearing when discovery was not yet complete.  "By scheduling the hearing on the 
motions for summary judgment before the deadline for discovery had passed and, 
thus, not allowing the Abrahams adequate time to prepare and file any other 
pertinent materials prior to that hearing, they were deprived of the protections 
to due process afforded by the applicable rules of civil procedure."  Id. at 455.  
See, also, Jenkins v. Miller, 
2008 P.2d 45, ¶ 21, 180 P.3d 925, 932-33 (Wyo. 2008), where we adopted a 
procedure for sua sponte dismissal of 
a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), which requires, among other things, notice of the 
court's intent to dismiss the claim and an opportunity for both parties to 
respond.  Lee v. Board of County Comm'rs of the County 
of Sweetwater, 644 P.2d 189, 190 (Wyo. 1982), stating that a non-moving 
party must be given an opportunity to present evidence and arguments in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment.  

 
 
[¶33]   The basic premise of these holdings 
is to require a full presentation of the issue to the district court before 
judgment is rendered.4  In this case, neither party filed a 
motion for summary judgment or presented any evidence or argument on the issue 
of whether CCC's counterclaim for attorney fees was appropriate.  While we understand that the district 
court had previously considered the indemnification provision in the earlier 
summary judgment proceeding and contract interpretation is often a matter of law 
for the court, the parties did not have the opportunity to present their 
arguments as to whether the provision allowed for recovery of attorney fees or 
to present evidence which may be relevant to interpretation of the 
provision.  Thus, the district court 
violated the procedures set forth in Rule 56 and deprived CCC of its due process 
right to notice and an opportunity to be heard when it granted summary judgment 
on CCC's counterclaim.  We, 
therefore, reverse the summary judgment on the counterclaim and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  

 
 
[¶34]   Affirmed in part and reversed and 
remanded in part.     
     

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Rule 54(b) states:

 
 

            
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims 
or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties 
are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any 
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties.

 
 

2Wyoming law no longer distinguishes between invitees and licensees.  The landowner owes the same duty to 
either, i.e., to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.  See, Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293 (Wyo. 
1993).  

 
 

3The balance of the opinion addresses whether Stag was obligated under the 
parties' agreement to indemnify Wyoming Johnson for any losses Wyoming Johnson 
incurred, regardless of who was at fault.  
As we stated earlier, that type of an all-inclusive indemnification 
provision was not included in UP's and CCC's agreement.   

 
 

4The district court can grant summary judgment on an issue to the party 
who opposes a motion for summary judgment so long as the issue was completely 
presented to the district court.  See, Young v. Hawks, 624 P.2d 235, 239 (Wyo. 
1981). See also, Newman v. American Nat'l Bank, 780 P.2d 336, 341 (Wyo. 1989) (holding that court may grant summary judgment to 
non-moving plaintiff while granting summary judgment to another 
plaintiff).