Case Title: Commonwealth v. Gomes

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11537

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11537 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JEREMY D. GOMES. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     September 2, 2014. - January 12, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Identification.  Evidence, Identification.  Practice, Criminal, 
Request for jury instructions, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 24, 2011. 
 
 
The cases were tried before by John A. Agostini, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
John Fennel, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the 
defendant. 
 
John Bossé, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Daniel F. Conley, District Attorney, & Cailin M. Campbell, 
Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the 
Suffolk District. 
 
Lisa J. Steele for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers. 
 
David W. Ogden, Daniel S. Volchok, Francesco Valentini, & 
Nathalie F.P. Gilfoyle, of the District of Columbia, & John C. 
Polley for American Psychological Association & another. 
2 
 
 
M. Chris Fabricant & Karen Newirth, of New York, Joshua D. 
Rogaczewski & Johnny H. Walker, of the District of Columbia, & 
Kevin M. Bolan for the Innocence Network. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In the early morning of September 10, 2011, 
the defendant slashed the face of the victim, Zachary Sevigny, 
with a box cutter while the victim was sitting in the driver's 
seat of his vehicle.  A Superior Court jury found the defendant 
guilty of mayhem, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 14; assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, in violation of 
G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); and breaking and entering a vehicle in 
the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony, in violation 
of G. L. c. 266, § 16.1  On appeal, the defendant claims that the 
judge erred by giving the model jury instruction regarding 
eyewitness identification that we adopted in Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 310-311 (Appendix) (1979), rather than 
the instruction he requested, which would have informed the jury 
about various scientific principles regarding eyewitness 
identification.  We conclude that the judge did not err by 
declining to instruct the jury about these principles where the 
defendant offered no expert testimony, scholarly articles, or 
treatises that established that these principles were "so 
                                                     
 
 
1 The judge sentenced the defendant to concurrent State 
prison terms of from eight to twelve years on the mayhem 
conviction, from seven to ten years on the conviction of assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and from three to 
five years for breaking and entering a vehicle in the nighttime 
with intent to commit a felony. 
3 
 
generally accepted that . . . a standard jury instruction 
stating [those principles] would be appropriate."  Commonwealth 
v. Santoli, 424 Mass. 837, 845 (1997), citing Commonwealth v. 
Hyatt, 419 Mass. 815, 818-819 (1995).  Therefore, we affirm the 
convictions of mayhem and of breaking and entering.2 
 
However, now that we have the benefit of the Report and 
Recommendations of the Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on 
Eyewitness Evidence (Study Group Report),3 and the comments in 
                                                     
 
 
2 We vacate the defendant's conviction and sentence on the 
charge of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.  
The defendant contends on appeal that his convictions of mayhem 
and for assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon were 
based on the same conduct, the defendant's slashing of the 
victim's face, and that the convictions are duplicative because 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon is a lesser 
included offense of the theory of mayhem presented to the jury.  
The Commonwealth agrees that the convictions are duplicative, 
and so do we.  "A crime is a lesser-included offense of another 
crime if each of its elements is also an element of the other 
crime."  Commonwealth v. Martin, 425 Mass. 718, 722 (1997), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Perry, 391 Mass. 808, 813 (1984).  
"Mayhem (second theory) is essentially an assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon, with the additional aggravating 
factors of a specific intent to maim or disfigure, and certain 
forms of resultant physical injury.  Therefore, the latter is a 
lesser included offense of the former."  Martin, supra.  See 
Commonwealth v. Ogden O., 448 Mass. 798, 808 (2007).  "The 
appropriate remedy for the imposition of duplicative convictions 
is to vacate both the conviction and sentence on the lesser 
included offense, and to affirm the conviction on the more 
serious offense."  Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 398 
(1995). 
 
 
3 See Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on Eyewitness 
Evidence:  Report and Recommendations to the Justices (July 25, 
2013) (Study Group Report), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/eyewitness-evidence-
4 
 
response to it,4 we conclude that there are scientific principles 
regarding eyewitness identification that are "so generally 
accepted" that it is appropriate in the future to instruct 
juries regarding these principles so that they may apply the 
principles in their evaluation of eyewitness identification 
evidence.  We include as an Appendix to this opinion a 
provisional jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification 
evidence, and we invite comments regarding its content and 
clarity before we declare it a model instruction.5  This 
provisional instruction should be given, where appropriate, in 
trials that commence after issuance of this opinion until a 
model instruction is issued. 
 
Background.  At approximately 1:30 A.M. on September 10, 
2011, the defendant, who appeared intoxicated, walked into a 
gasoline station convenience store in Pittsfield, bumped into a 
customer, Lindsay Holtzman, and asked the employee who was 
working the cash register, Jordan Wilson, for a box of matches.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
report-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/WY4M-YNZN] (last visited Jan. 
8, 2015). 
 
 
4 The comments in response to the Study Group Report can be 
found at http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/eyewitness-
evidence-report-comments.pdf [http://perma.cc/UF62-STVZ] (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2015). 
 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Innocence Network; the American Psychological Association and 
the Center for Law, Brain & Behavior; the District Attorney for 
the Suffolk District; and the Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
5 
 
Wilson asked the defendant to apologize to Holtzman.  In 
response, the defendant cursed and stared at Wilson, and 
challenged him to a fight.  Wilson laughed and gave the 
defendant a box of matches.  The defendant left the store, but 
continued to yell at Wilson to meet him outside to fight. 
 
When the defendant left the store, the victim and his 
friend, Gerald Mortensen, were sitting in the victim's 
automobile, parked in a well-lit portion of the store's parking 
lot, approximately ten to fifteen feet from the front door of 
the store.  The victim was in the driver's seat with the window 
down.  After the victim and the defendant made eye contact, the 
defendant approached the vehicle and said to the victim, "What 
the fuck are you looking at, tough guy?"  The victim responded, 
"I'm not looking at anything."  The defendant then pulled a box 
cutter from his back pocket, reached inside the vehicle with his 
left arm, and slashed the victim with the blade behind the 
victim's ear and down his face. 
 
Mortensen, who was sitting on the passenger's side, ran 
inside the store, said that his friend had been cut, and told a 
store clerk to call for help.  Mortensen and Holtzman then left 
the store and watched as the defendant walked backwards toward a 
corner of the parking lot, still staring at the victim.  The 
victim was taken to a hospital where he received approximately 
thirty stitches. 
6 
 
 
On September 15, Wilson went to the Pittsfield police 
station to meet with Detective Timothy Koenig.  Wilson said that 
he had seen the person who injured the victim before and could 
identify him.  Detective Koenig created a pool of 975 archived 
photographs that fit Wilson's description of the person.  Wilson 
used a computer, which displayed twelve photographs per page, to 
look through the pool.  He eventually selected the defendant's 
photograph.  When he made the identification, he reported that 
he was "110 per cent positive." 
 
Detective Koenig then created a simultaneous array 
containing eight photographs, one of which depicted the 
defendant, and presented the array that same day to Mortensen 
and the victim separately.6  Mortensen stated that none of the 
                                                     
 
 
6 Before presenting the array to both Gerald Mortensen and 
the victim, Detective Timothy Koenig read nine advisements to 
the witnesses:  (1) "I am going to show you a group of photos 
that are in random order"; (2) "[t]he person who committed the 
crime may or may not be included, so you should not feel 
compelled to make an identification"; (3) "[i]t is just as 
important to clear innocent people as it is to identify possible 
perpetrators"; (4) "[w]hether or not you identify someone, the 
police will continue to investigate"; (5) "[a]fter you are done, 
I will not be able to provide you with any feedback or comments 
on the results of the process"; (6) "[p]lease do not discuss 
this identification procedure, or the results, with other 
witnesses in this case or with the media"; (7) "[p]eople may not 
appear exactly as they did at the time of the event, because 
features such as clothing or head/facial hair are subject to 
change"; (8) "[a]s you look at each photo, if you see someone 
that you recognize, please tell me how you know the person, and 
in your own words, how sure you are of the identification"; and 
(9) "[i]f you identify someone, I will ask you to place your 
7 
 
photographs showed the assailant.  The victim said that he did 
not think the assailant "[wa]s anyone in these photos," but 
added that if he had to choose somebody, it would be the man 
with a chin similar to that of the assailant; that man was the 
defendant.  Holtzman did not view a photographic array, although 
Detective Koenig attempted to reach her by telephone more than 
once to do so. 
 
On September 18, Holtzman, Mortensen, and the victim were 
driving together, and stopped for gasoline at a different 
service station in Pittsfield.7  Holtzman and the victim entered 
the convenience store while Mortensen stayed inside the victim's 
vehicle.  The victim testified that he briefly left the store to 
retrieve exact change from his automobile to purchase drinks and 
cigarettes.  When he reentered the store, he immediately saw the 
defendant and recognized him as the assailant.  After he put 
down his change, the victim and Holtzman left the store 
together, and confirmed with each other that the man in the 
store was the assailant.  The victim then told Mortensen that 
the defendant was inside the store.  When the defendant left the 
store, Mortensen agreed that the defendant was the assailant and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
initials and the date on a form I will give you, clearly marking 
your selection." 
 
7 Lindsay Holtzman did not know the victim or Mortensen 
before the incident on September 10. 
 
8 
 
the victim called the police on his cellular telephone.8 
 
As the victim spoke with the police, the defendant left the 
gasoline station in someone's automobile.  The victim and 
Mortensen followed the defendant to an apartment complex in 
Pittsfield, with the victim communicating the defendant's 
location to the police as he was driving.  Shortly thereafter, 
the police arrived at the apartment complex and asked the victim 
and Mortensen to perform a showup identification; they 
identified the defendant as the assailant.  After the 
defendant's arrest, Detective Koenig interviewed Holtzman, who 
confirmed that the person in the convenience store on September 
18 had been the same person she saw at the other convenience 
store on September 10. 
 
Before trial, the defendant filed motions to suppress 
Holtzman's and the victim's pretrial identification of the 
defendant.9  The trial judge denied the motions.  At trial, the 
defendant argued that he had been mistakenly identified as the 
assailant, and offered the testimony of his father, Earl 
                                                     
 
 
8 Holtzman's recollection of this event differed slightly 
from that of the victim.  She testified that she recognized the 
defendant standing three or four feet behind her in the store.  
She said something to the victim and may have nudged his arm to 
alert him to the defendant's presence.  The victim then left the 
store while she waited in line and finished making her 
purchases.  After leaving the store, she walked over to the 
vehicle as the victim was telephoning the police. 
 
 
9 No motion was filed with respect to Mortensen. 
9 
 
Kirchner, who said that he lived with the defendant and that the 
defendant did not leave his apartment on the evening of the 
attack. 
 
Discussion.  1.  The defendant's requested eyewitness 
identification instruction.  The defendant requested that the 
judge provide a jury instruction regarding eyewitness 
identification that essentially mirrored a model instruction 
that had become effective in New Jersey approximately one week 
before the defendant's trial commenced.10  The proffered jury 
instruction was considerably longer and more detailed than the 
                                                     
 
10 In State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 219, 228-229 (2011), 
the New Jersey Supreme Court, having earlier remanded the case 
to a special master who considered more than 200 published 
scientific studies on human memory and eyewitness identification 
during a ten-day hearing, rendered a landmark decision regarding 
eyewitness identification where it concluded that "the court 
system should develop enhanced jury charges on eyewitness 
identification for trial judges to use."  The court delegated to 
its criminal practice committee and committee on model criminal 
jury charges the task of drafting the revised model jury 
instructions.  Id. at 298-299.  On July 19, 2012, the court 
released the model instructions, which became effective on 
September 4, 2012.  See Press Release, Supreme Court Releases 
Eyewitness Identification Criteria for Criminal Cases (July 19, 
2012), available at 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2012/pr120719a.htm 
[http://perma.cc/VQF3-SXH4] (last visited Jan. 8, 2015).  The 
New Jersey model instructions can be found at 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/criminal/charges/idinout.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/4BE2-F79V] (last visited Jan. 8, 2015).  
Although the defendant cited the Henderson opinion in his 
request for a jury instruction, the defendant did not inform the 
judge that the instruction he proffered was a model jury 
instruction in New Jersey; his attorney merely told the judge 
that the proffered instruction "seem[ed] to be an appropriate 
instruction in New Jersey." 
10 
 
Rodriguez instruction.  It would have instructed the jury on 
various principles regarding eyewitness identification and human 
memory, most importantly that (1) human memory does not operate 
like a video recording that a person can replay to recall what 
happened;11 (2) a witness's level of confidence in an 
identification may not indicate its accuracy;12 (3) high levels 
of stress can reduce the likelihood of making an accurate 
identification;13 (4) information from other witnesses or outside 
                                                     
 
11 The defendant's proffered jury instruction provided: 
 
 
"Human memory is not foolproof.  Research has revealed 
that human memory is not like a video recording that a 
witness need only replay to remember what happened.  Memory 
is far more complex. . . .  The process of remembering 
consists of three stages:  (1) acquisition -- the 
perception of the original event; (2) retention -- the 
period of time that passes between the event and the 
eventual recollection of a piece of information; and (3) 
retrieval -- the stage during which a person recalls stored 
information.  At each of these stages, memory can be 
affected by a variety of factors."  (Citation omitted.) 
 
12 The proffered jury instruction provided: 
 
"Although nothing may appear more convincing than a 
witness's categorical identification of a perpetrator, you 
must critically analyze such testimony.  Such 
identifications, even if made in good faith, may be 
mistaken.  Therefore, when analyzing such testimony, be 
advised that a witness's level of confidence, standing 
alone, may not be an indication of the reliability of the 
identification."   
 
13 The proffered jury instruction provided: 
 
"Even under the best viewing conditions, high levels 
of stress can reduce an eyewitness's ability to recall and 
make an accurate identification." 
11 
 
sources can affect the reliability of an identification and 
inflate an eyewitness's confidence in the identification;14 and 
(5) viewing the same person in multiple identification 
procedures may increase the risk of misidentification.15 
 
The judge denied the request and gave an identification 
instruction consistent with the Rodriguez instruction.  The 
judge reasoned that the principles included in the defendant's 
request were more appropriate for expert testimony or for 
closing argument.16  Furthermore, the judge explained: 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
14 The proffered jury instruction provided: 
 
"You may consider whether the witness was exposed to 
opinions, descriptions, or identifications given by other 
witnesses, to photographs or newspaper accounts, or to any 
other information or influence, that may have affected the 
independence of his/her identification.  Such information 
can affect the independent nature and reliability of a 
witness's identification and inflate the witness's 
confidence in the identification." 
 
 
15 The proffered jury instruction provided: 
 
 
"When a witness views the same person in more than one 
identification procedure, it can be difficult to know 
whether a later identification comes from the witness's 
memory of the actual, original event or of an earlier 
identification procedure.  As a result, if a witness views 
an innocent suspect in multiple identification procedures, 
the risk of mistaken identification is increased.  You may 
consider whether the witness viewed the suspect multiple 
times during the identification process and, if so, whether 
that affected the reliability of the identification." 
 
16 Before trial, the judge allowed the defendant's motion 
for funds to obtain an expert on the reliability of eyewitness 
identification evidence.  The judge denied the Commonwealth's 
12 
 
"[T]his [proposed instruction] adds facts in.  The process 
of remembering consists of three stages.  That may be true.  
That may not be true.  I have no idea myself but there is 
no information given to the jury that that is in fact 
accurate.  So I cannot instruct them as a matter of law 
that that's what the law is." 
 
The defendant objected to the omission of that part of his 
requested instruction, which recited these five scientific 
principles, so we review for prejudicial error.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005). 
 
The issue before us is not whether the judge had the 
discretion to give the proffered instruction, but whether he 
abused his discretion by refusing to do so.  See Hyatt, 419 
Mass. at 818-819 (no error in declining to instruct on cross-
racial identification, but giving proposed instruction "may be 
appropriate in the judge's discretion").  We conclude that, 
given the record before him, the judge did not abuse his 
discretion in denying the defendant's proposed jury instruction. 
 
We have long recognized that "a principle concerning 
eyewitness identifications may become so generally accepted 
that, rather than have expert testimony on the point, a standard 
jury instruction stating that principle would be appropriate."  
Santoli, 424 Mass. at 845.  See Hyatt, supra ("We recognize 
that, based on a trial record or on the published results of 
studies, or both, some new principle concerning the process of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
motion to exclude expert testimony, but the defendant never 
called an expert at trial. 
13 
 
eyewitness identification may become sufficiently reliable so as 
to justify formulating a jury instruction that should be given 
in particular circumstances on request, in addition to those 
instructions that we identified in [Rodriguez, 378 Mass. at 310-
311,] and Commonwealth v. Pressley, 390 Mass. 617, 619-620 
[1983]").  The defendant here did not provide the judge with any 
expert testimony, scholarly articles, or treatises that would 
reasonably have enabled the judge to determine whether the 
principles in the defendant's proposed instruction were "so 
generally accepted" that it would be appropriate to instruct the 
jury regarding them.17  Where the defendant failed to furnish 
such information, and where there was an instruction approved by 
this court that was not erroneous but, at worst, inadequate and 
incomplete, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying 
the proffered instruction and charging the jury in accordance 
with the Rodriguez instruction.  See Cruz, 445 Mass. at 595 n.4, 
598, 600 (no error in judge's refusal to give jury instruction 
that "there is no proven relationship between a witness'[s] 
confidence in his identification and the accuracy of the 
witness'[s] identification" where defendant did not call expert 
                                                     
 
17 The only citations to scientific studies in the record 
are located in the disclosure of the defendant's proffered 
expert witness on eyewitness identification, regarding the 
subject matter of his proposed testimony.  The defendant made no 
reference to this document in requesting his proposed jury 
instruction on identification testimony. 
14 
 
witness and "there was no hearing or testimony regarding the 
reliability of these scientific studies or their general 
acceptance in scientific community"); Hyatt, 419 Mass. at 818 
("The defendant points to no relevant empirical study that 
assessed the relative reliability of cross-racial and non-cross-
racial identifications in confrontations of the sort involved 
here"). 
 
Although we conclude that the judge in this case did not 
abuse his discretion, and therefore affirm the defendant's 
convictions of mayhem and of breaking and entering a vehicle in 
the nighttime with intent to commit a felony, we take this 
opportunity to revisit our jurisprudence regarding eyewitness 
identification jury instructions in general and the Rodriguez 
instruction in particular.  In Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 
590, 604 n.16 (2011), we recognized that "eyewitness 
identification is the greatest source of wrongful convictions 
but also an invaluable law enforcement tool in obtaining 
accurate convictions," and declared our intention to convene the 
Study Group to consider, among other matters, "whether existing 
model jury instructions provide adequate guidance to juries in 
evaluating eyewitness testimony."  We noted that our creation of 
the Study Group reflected "our willingness to revisit our 
jurisprudence" regarding eyewitness identification evidence.  
Id. at 606.  With the Study Group Report completed and the 
15 
 
comments to that report received, it is now time to do what we 
declared we were willing to do with respect to eyewitness 
identification jury instructions.18 
 
2.  Model jury instruction.  The Rodriguez instruction 
derives from the model set forth in United States v. Telfaire, 
469 F.2d 552, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1972), which recognized the 
"special problems" with the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications and the need for an identification instruction 
that "emphasizes to the jury the need for finding that the 
circumstances of the identification are convincing beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  See Rodriguez, 378 Mass. at 302.  We adopted 
the Telfaire model "to assist a jury in evaluating the 
reliability of a positive identification of the defendant as the 
perpetrator of the crime by a witness."  Commonwealth v. 
Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 910 (2013).  Over time, we have 
modified and supplemented it.  See Commonwealth v. Cuffie, 414 
Mass. 632, 640 (1993) (removing language that risked suggesting 
that witness's first sighting of offender was always accurate); 
Santoli, 424 Mass. at 845 (omitting language emphasizing 
"strength of the identification").  See also Pressley, 390 Mass. 
at 620 (establishing supplemental instruction on "possibility of 
                                                     
 
 
18 We thank the Study Group for its thorough review of the 
research regarding eyewitness identification and its thoughtful 
recommendations.  We also thank those who submitted comments 
regarding the Study Group Report. 
16 
 
an honest but mistaken identification"); Franklin, 465 Mass. at 
912 (judge should provide, on request, identification 
instruction where eyewitness gave partial identification).  At 
its core, though, the Rodriguez instruction delineates factors 
for the jury to consider when evaluating an eyewitness 
identification, such as (1) the opportunity the witness had to 
observe the offender; (2) the length of time between the crime 
and the identification; (3) the witness's prior familiarity with 
the offender; (4) the circumstances surrounding any 
identification procedure; (5) whether the identification 
procedure was a lineup or photographic array rather than a 
single-person showup; (7) whether the witness failed to make an 
identification or made an inconsistent identification before 
identifying the defendant; and (8) the credibility of the 
witness.19  It focuses the jury on factors they "should consider" 
                                                     
 
 
19 The instruction, as set forth in Commonwealth v. 
Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 910 n.24 (2013), states: 
 
 
"One of the most important issues in this case is the 
identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the 
crime. The Government has the burden of proving identity 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  It is not essential that the 
witness himself be free from doubt as to the correctness of 
his statement.  However, you, the jury, must be satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the 
identification of the defendant before you may convict him.  
If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was the person who committed the crime, you must 
find the defendant not guilty. 
 
17 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
"Identification testimony is an expression of belief 
or impression by the witness.  Its value depends on the 
opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the 
time of the offense and to make a reliable identification 
later. 
 
 
"In appraising the identification testimony of a 
witness, you should consider the following: 
 
 
"Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity 
and an adequate opportunity to observe the offender? 
 
 
"Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to 
observe the offender at the time of the offense will be 
affected by such matters as how long or short a time was 
available, how far or close the witness was, how good were 
lighting conditions, whether the witness had had occasion 
to see or know the person in the past. 
 
 
"In general, a witness bases any identification he 
makes on his perception through the use of his senses. 
Usually the witness identifies an offender by the sense of 
sight -- but this is not necessarily so, and he may use 
other senses. 
 
 
"Are you satisfied that the identification made by the 
witness subsequent to the offense was the product of his 
own recollection?  You may take into account the 
circumstances under which the identification was made. 
 
 
"If the identification by the witness may have been 
influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant 
was presented to him for identification, you should 
scrutinize the identification with great care. 
 
 
 
"You may also consider the length of time that lapsed 
between the occurrence of the crime and the opportunity of 
the witness, some time after the occurrence of the crime, 
to see and identify the defendant as the offender, as a 
factor bearing on the reliability of the identification. 
 
 
 
"You may also take into account that an identification 
made by picking the defendant out of a group of similar 
individuals is generally more reliable than one which 
results from the presentation of the defendant alone to the 
witness. 
18 
 
that may affect the accuracy of an eyewitness's positive 
identification of the defendant, and poses questions the jury 
should ask themselves.  It generally does not instruct the jury 
as to how those factors may affect the accuracy of the 
identification. 
 
The New Jersey model instruction, as earlier noted, goes 
well beyond the Rodriguez instruction by telling the jury what 
principles have emerged from the research regarding eyewitness 
identification.  We now consider, first, what it means for a 
principle of eyewitness identification to be "so generally 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
"You may take into account any occasions in which the 
witness failed to make an identification of [the] 
defendant, or made an identification that was inconsistent 
with his identification at trial. 
 
 
 
"Finally, you must consider the credibility of each 
identification witness in the same way as any other 
witness, consider whether he is truthful, and consider 
whether he had the capacity and opportunity to make a 
reliable observation on the matter covered in his 
testimony. 
 
 
 
"I again emphasize that the burden of proof on the 
prosecutor extends to every element of the crime charged, 
and this specifically includes the burden of proving beyond 
a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the 
perpetrator of the crime with which he stands charged.  If 
after examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt 
as to the accuracy of the identification, you must find the 
defendant not guilty." 
 
 
In addition, "[f]airness to a defendant compels the trial 
judge to give an instruction on the possibility of an honest but 
mistaken identification when the facts permit it and when the 
defendant requests it."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Pressley, 
390 Mass. 617, 620 (1983). 
19 
 
accepted" that it is appropriate to include in a model 
instruction, and, second, whether the five principles at issue 
in this case are "so generally accepted" that it is appropriate 
that they now be included in a revised model jury instruction. 
 
a.  "So generally accepted."  The phrase "so generally 
accepted" sounds like the test in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 
1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), for the admissibility of expert 
testimony based on scientific knowledge, which asks "whether the 
community of scientists involved generally accepts the theory or 
process," Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 24 (1994), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 222 (1991), and 
which was once the exclusive test governing the admissibility of 
expert testimony.  See Lanigan, supra at 25-26 (adopting 
standard in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
[1993], while maintaining Frye standard as alternative means to 
establish reliability of expert testimony).  But satisfaction of 
the Frye test meant only that expert testimony would be 
admissible in evidence.  It did not mean that the jury were 
required to accept the scientific principles that had gained 
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hinds, 450 Mass. 1, 12 n.7 (2007) (model 
instruction on expert testimony, stating, "it is completely up 
to [the jury] to decide whether [they] accept the testimony of 
an expert witness, including the opinions that the witness 
20 
 
gave").  In contrast, where a principle is included in a jury 
instruction, it becomes part of a judge's instructions of law, 
which the jury generally must accept.  See Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 441 Mass. 1, 7 (2004); Commonwealth v. Watkins, 425 
Mass. 830, 840 (1997) ("We presume that a jury follow all 
instructions given to [them] . . .").  Therefore, the Frye test 
cannot define "so generally accepted" in this context; the 
standard for including a principle of eyewitness identification 
in a model jury instruction must be higher than a standard that 
would simply permit a judge to admit expert testimony.20 
                                                     
 
 
20 Nor can we look to the standard for judicial notice to 
define the meaning of "so generally accepted" in this context.  
A court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts that are 
"not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial 
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by 
resort to resources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned."  Mass. G. Evid. § 201(b) (2014).  Matters of common 
knowledge may be judicially noticed, see Commonwealth v. Hartman 
404 Mass. 306, 313 n.9 (1989), but "[f]acts which ordinarily are 
not known without the aid of expert testimony or other proof 
cannot be said to be matters of common knowledge."  Id., quoting 
Mady v. Holy Trinity Roman Catholic Polish Church, 223 Mass. 23, 
26 (1916).  The principles at issue in eyewitness identification 
are not matters of common knowledge.  Nor can these principles 
be readily looked up in an authoritative source; rather, they 
require review of the considerable scientific literature and 
published research studies regarding eyewitness identification.  
Therefore, these principles, no matter how well accepted they 
may be in the relevant scientific community, are not the type of 
adjudicative facts of which a court generally may take judicial 
notice.  Moreover, "[i]n a criminal case, the court shall 
instruct the jury that they may, but are not required to, accept 
as conclusive any fact which the court has judicially noticed."  
Mass. G. Evid. § 201(e) (2014).  See Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 
378 Mass. 751, 755 (1979). 
21 
 
 
To determine when a principle of eyewitness identification 
is "so generally accepted" that it is appropriate to incorporate 
into a model instruction, we focus on the instruction's 
underlying purpose and the concerns it is intended to alleviate.  
The accuracy of an eyewitness identification is often the 
critical issue in a criminal case, the difference between a 
conviction and an acquittal.  See State v. Cabagbag, 127 Haw. 
302, 313 (2012) ("Without appropriate instructions from the 
court, the jury may be left without sufficient guidance on how 
to assess critical testimony, sometimes the only testimony, that 
ties a defendant to an offense").  We have long recognized that 
the mistaken eyewitness identification of a defendant whom the 
witness had never seen before the crime "is the primary cause of 
erroneous convictions, outstripping all other causes combined."  
Commonwealth v. Martin, 447 Mass. 274, 293 (2006) (Cordy, J., 
dissenting).21  See Franklin, 465 Mass. at 909; Irwin v. 
                                                     
 
 
21 According to the Innocence Project, "Eyewitness 
misidentification is the single greatest cause of wrongful 
convictions nationwide, playing a role in 72% of convictions 
overturned through [deoxyribonucleic acid] testing").  Innocence 
Project, Eyewitness Misidentification, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-
Misidentification.php [http://perma.cc/XAQ2-4QJG] (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2015).  The National Registry of Exonerations has 
recorded 522 known exonerations of persons whose cases involved 
at least one witness who mistakenly identified the exoneree as 
the perpetrator of the crime.  See National Registry of 
Exonerations, Exoneration Detail List, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.as
px [http://perma.cc./DPD3-BJBB] (last visited Jan. 8, 2015).  
22 
 
Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 834, 848-849 (2013); Commonwealth v. 
Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 100 (1983). 
 
Our jury instructions are intended to provide the jury with 
the guidance they need to capably evaluate the accuracy of an 
eyewitness identification.  See Francis, 390 Mass. at 101 ("We 
permit, indeed require, the judge to instruct the jury 
concerning factors that bear on the reliability of eyewitness 
identification"); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 
738, 742 (1978), S.C., 378 Mass. 296 (1979).  If we were to 
define "so generally accepted" so narrowly that none of the 
scientific principles regarding eyewitness identification could 
                                                                                                                                                                           
See also Connors, Lundregan, Miller, & McEwen, U.S. Department 
of Justice, Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science:  Case 
Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After 
Trial 15-17, 24 (1996), at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/RUA3-8NKW] (last visited Jan. 8, 2015) 
("[E]yewitness testimony was the most compelling evidence" in 
majority of twenty-four sexual assault cases reviewed where 
defendants were convicted and later exonerated); B.L. Garrett, 
Convicting the Innocent:  Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong 
48 (2011) (analyzing 250 wrongful convictions and finding 190 
involved eyewitness misidentification).  There have been forty 
exonerations in Massachusetts since 1990, and twenty of those 
cases involved mistaken eyewitness identification.  See National 
Registry of Exonerations, supra.  See also Irwin v. 
Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 834, 849 n.25 (2013), citing Fisher, 
Convictions of Innocent Persons in Massachusetts:  An Overview, 
12 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 1, 64 & n.278 (2002) ("A summary of 
several studies of erroneous convictions in Massachusetts 
concluded that, in over half of the cases where convicted 
defendants were later officially exonerated, the convictions 
involved mistaken identifications by eyewitnesses, including by 
multiple eyewitnesses who had had ample opportunity to observe 
the perpetrator"). 
23 
 
survive the test, we would continue to use the Rodriguez 
instruction, which generally identifies factors a jury may 
consider in applying their common sense, and would require the 
results of the relevant research to be communicated to the jury 
solely through expert testimony, where such testimony is 
offered.  The problem with this approach is that the research 
makes clear that common sense is not enough to accurately 
discern the reliable eyewitness identification from the 
unreliable, because many of the results of the research are not 
commonly known, and some are counterintuitive.  See State v. 
Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218, 234-235 (2012) (there is "near perfect 
scientific consensus" that "eyewitness identifications are 
potentially unreliable in a variety of ways unknown to the 
average juror"); Henderson, 208 N.J. at 274 (juror surveys and 
mock-jury studies "reveal generally that people do not 
intuitively understand all of the relevant scientific 
findings").  See also Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 
739 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Study after study 
demonstrates that eyewitness recollections are highly 
susceptible to distortion by postevent information or social 
cues; that jurors routinely overestimate the accuracy of 
eyewitness identifications; that jurors place the greatest 
weight on eyewitness confidence in assessing identifications 
even though confidence is a poor gauge of accuracy; and that 
24 
 
suggestiveness can stem from sources beyond police-orchestrated 
procedures" [footnotes omitted]).22  If the research regarding 
eyewitness identification could be communicated to the jury only 
through expert testimony, very few juries would hear it, because 
expert testimony is not often proffered in cases where 
eyewitness identification is at issue, and because the admission 
of expert testimony is left to the sound discretion of the trial 
judge.  See Commonwealth v. Watson, 455 Mass. 246, 257 (2009) 
("[E]xpert testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness 
identification is not admissible as of right, but is left to the 
discretion of the trial judge"). 
 
Having balanced the importance of instructing juries about 
the generally accepted principles that can inform their 
understanding of eyewitness identification with the risks of 
requiring them to accept principles that may still be suspect or 
in flux, we conclude that a principle is "so generally accepted" 
that it is appropriate to include in a model eyewitness 
                                                     
 
22 See Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, & Bradshaw, 
Eyewitness Memory Is Still Not Common Sense:  Comparing Jurors, 
Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 Applied 
Cognitive Psychol. 115, 119 (2006) (survey found that jurors and 
experts differed on eighty-seven per cent of survey's statements 
about eyewitness identification); Schmechel, O’Toole, Easterly, 
& Loftus, Beyond the Ken?  Testing Jurors' Understanding of 
Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 Jurimetrics 177, 204 (2006) 
("a substantial number of jurors come to each trial with basic 
misunderstandings about the way memory works in general and 
about specific factors that can affect the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications"). 
25 
 
identification instruction where there is a near consensus in 
the relevant scientific community adopting that principle. 
After reviewing the scholarly research, analyses by other 
courts, amici submissions, and the Study Group Report and 
comments, we conclude that there are various principles 
regarding eyewitness identification for which there is a near 
consensus in the relevant scientific community and that it is 
appropriate to revise the Rodriguez instruction to include them.  
See Study Group Report, supra at 17 ("The scientific studies 
have produced a consensus among experts about the . . . 
variables that have been shown to affect the reliability of 
eyewitness identification").  See also Guilbert, 306 Conn. at 
234-236; Cabagbag, 127 Haw. at 310-311; State v. Lawson, 352 Or. 
724, 740 (2012); State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1108 (Utah 
2009); Report of the Special Master, State vs. Henderson, N.J. 
Supreme Ct., No. A-8-08, at 14 (June 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/henderson%20final%20br
ief%20.pdf%20%2800621142%29.pdf [http://perma.cc/EA3S-453F] 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2015) (Special Master's Report).23,24 
                                                     
 
23 In a 2001 survey of experts in the field of psychology, 
researchers found that at least eighty-seven per cent of experts 
believed the following principles were reliable enough to be 
presented in court:  "[a]n eyewitness's confidence can be 
influenced by factors that are unrelated to identification 
accuracy" (ninety-five per cent), "[e]xposure to mug shots of a 
suspect increases the likelihood that the witness will later 
choose that suspect in a lineup" (ninety-five per cent), 
26 
 
 
We are not alone in concluding that certain scientific 
principles should be incorporated into a model jury instruction 
on eyewitness identification.  New Jersey has done so most 
comprehensively, promulgating a ten-page model instruction after 
concluding that its previous model, which was similar to the 
Rodriguez instruction, see Henderson, 208 N.J. at 226-227, 
"overstate[d] the jury's inherent ability to evaluate evidence 
offered by eyewitnesses who honestly believe their testimony is 
accurate."  Id. at 218, 298-299.  See National Research Council 
                                                                                                                                                                           
"[e]yewitness testimony about an event often reflects not only 
what they actually saw but information they obtained later on" 
(ninety-four per cent), and "an eyewitness's confidence is not a 
good predictor of his or her identification accuracy" (eighty-
seven per cent).  Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, On the "General 
Acceptance" of Eyewitness Testimony Research:  A New Survey of 
the Experts, 56 Am. Psychol. 405, 407-412 (2001).  See Malpass, 
Ross, Meissner, & Marcon, The Need for Expert Psychological 
Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, in Expert Testimony on 
the Psychology of Eyewitness Identification 15 (2009) ("[I]t 
would be very difficult to sustain the position that many of the 
findings in research on eyewitness memory lack general agreement 
within the scientific community"). 
 
24 We note that the instruction we adopted in Commonwealth 
v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 310-311 (Appendix) (1979), already 
essentially includes two principles on which there is at least 
near consensus in the relevant scientific community, that is, 
"that an identification made by picking the defendant out of a 
group of similar individuals is generally more reliable than one 
which results from the presentation of the defendant alone to 
the witness," and that where the "identification by the witness 
may have been influenced by the circumstances under which the 
defendant was presented to him for identification, [the jury] 
should scrutinize the identification with great care."  
Therefore, it is more accurate to say that we are adding 
scientific principles to our eyewitness identification 
instruction rather than incorporating such principles into our 
instruction for the first time. 
27 
 
of the National Academies, Identifying the Culprit:  Assessing 
Eyewitness Identification 28 (2014) (pending publication) 
(National Academies) ("The New Jersey instructions adopted, 
following the Henderson decision, are by far the most detailed 
set of jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification 
evidence").  Other States have also incorporated scientific 
principles of eyewitness identification into model jury 
instructions.  See, e.g., Cabagbag, 127 Haw. at 314; Connecticut 
Criminal Jury Instruction 2.6-4 Identification of Defendant 
(2013), available at 
http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part2/2.6-4.htm 
[http://perma.cc/B9PS-DS8X] (last visited Jan. 8, 2015); 1-6 
Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 6-22A (4th ed. 2012); Model Utah 
Jury Instructions, Second Edition, CR404 Eyewitness 
Identification (2014), available at 
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/muji/index.asp?page=crim&view=
all_crim [http://perma.cc/X9V3-2759] (last visited Jan. 8, 
2015). 
 
We recognize that even a principle for which there is near 
consensus is subject to revision based on further research 
findings, and that no principle of eyewitness identification 
should be treated as if set in stone.  Therefore, we acknowledge 
the possibility that, as the science evolves, we may need to 
28 
 
revise our new model instruction's description of a principle.25  
We also recognize the possibility that a party may offer expert 
testimony at trial that properly may persuade a trial judge to 
depart from the model instruction.  See Lawson, 352 Or. at 741 
("[A]cknowledgment of the existence of th[is] research . . . is 
not intended to preclude any party in a specific case from 
validating scientific acceptance of further research or from 
challenging particular aspects of the research described in this 
opinion"). 
 
b.  Five generally accepted principles regarding eyewitness 
identification.  We turn now to the five principles at issue in 
this case that we determine to have achieved a near consensus in 
the relevant scientific community and therefore are "so 
generally accepted" that it is appropriate that they now be 
included in a revised model jury instruction regarding 
eyewitness identification.  We also summarize the research that 
informed our conclusions as to each generally accepted 
principle.26 
                                                     
 
25 We will look to our newly reconstituted Supreme Judicial 
Court Committee on Eyewitness Identification to assist us in 
recognizing the need for such revision. 
 
 
26 This list of generally accepted principles is not 
intended to be exhaustive, as we only address the principles 
most relevant to the case before us.  Therefore, the exclusion 
of a principle should not be construed to suggest that it is not 
so generally accepted as to be worthy of inclusion in a model 
jury instruction on eyewitness identification.  In fact, the 
29 
 
 
i.  Human memory does not function like a video recording 
but is a complex process that consists of three stages: 
acquisition, retention, and retrieval.  The central principle 
that has emerged from over 2,000 published studies over the past 
thirty years is that "memory does not function like a videotape, 
accurately and thoroughly capturing and reproducing a person, 
scene or event. . . .  Memory is, rather[,] a constructive, 
dynamic and selective process."  Study Group Report, supra at 
15, quoting Special Master's Report, supra at 9.  See E.F. 
Loftus, J.M. Doyle, & J.E. Dysart, Eyewitness Testimony:  Civil 
and Criminal § 2-2, at 14 (5th ed. 2013); Brigham, Wasserman, & 
Meissner, Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence:  
Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36 Ct. Rev., no. 2, 1999, 
at 13.  Rather, memories are made through a three-stage process:  
"acquisition -- 'the perception of the original event'; 
retention [or storage] -- 'the period of time that passes 
between the event and the eventual recollection of a particular 
piece of information'; and retrieval -- the 'stage during which 
a person recalls stored information.'"  Study Group Report, 
supra at 16, quoting Henderson, 208 N.J. at 245. 
 
ii.  An eyewitness's expressed certainty in an 
identification, standing alone, may not indicate the accuracy of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
provisional jury instruction we include in the Appendix to this 
decision incorporates principles beyond the five addressed here. 
30 
 
the identification, especially where the witness did not 
describe that level of certainty when the witness first made the 
identification.  We have long questioned the reliability of a 
witness's certainty as a reflection of accuracy.  See 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 423 Mass. 99, 110 n.9 (1996); Santoli, 
424 Mass. at 846 ("[T]here is significant doubt about whether 
there is any correlation between a witness's confidence in her 
identification and the accuracy of her recollection"); Cruz, 445 
Mass. at 597-600 (court stated it was prepared to consider in 
future whether weak confidence-accuracy relationship warrants 
instruction).  Our doubts are now supported by the research.  
"[S]tudies show that, under most circumstances, witness 
confidence or certainty is not a good indicator of 
identification accuracy."  Lawson, 352 Or. at 777 (Appendix).  
See Study Group Report, supra at 19.27 
 
This does not mean that eyewitness certainty is never 
correlated with accuracy; it means simply that the existence and 
strength of the correlation depends on the circumstances.  After 
                                                     
 
 
27 See Commonwealth v. Crayton, ante 228, 239 n.15 (2014), 
quoting Wells, Memon, & Penrod, Eyewitness Evidence:  Improving 
Its Probative Value, 7 Psychol. Sci. in the Pub. Interest 45, 66 
(2006) ("Even among 'highly confident witnesses, [studies] 
indicate that 20 to 30% could be in error'"); Crayton, supra, 
quoting Wells & Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification 
Procedures and the Supreme Court's Reliability Test in Light of 
Eyewitness Science:  30 Years Later, 33 Law & Hum. Behav. 1, 11-
12 (2009) ("the less-than-perfect correlation between height and 
gender in humans is 'considerably greater' than the correlation 
between certainty and accuracy in eyewitness identifications"). 
31 
 
viewing the crime but before the identification procedure, an 
eyewitness's expressed level of certainty does not correlate 
with accuracy.  See Study Group Report, supra; Henderson, 208 
N.J. at 254 n.7.28  Where an eyewitness makes a positive 
identification and expresses a level of certainty immediately 
after the identification procedure, there is some correlation 
between certainty and accuracy, but there is not yet a near 
consensus regarding the strength of that correlation.29  There 
is, however, a near consensus in the research that, where an 
eyewitness during an identification procedure did not express 
certainty when first asked to make an identification, a 
subsequent claim of certainty by that witness deserves little 
weight in evaluating the accuracy of that identification.  See 
                                                     
 
 
28 See Cutler & Penrod, Forensically Relevant Moderators of 
the Relation Between Eyewitness Identification Accuracy and 
Confidence, 74 J. Applied Psychol. 650, 652 (1989) (meta-
analysis showing that pre-lineup confidence "certainly should 
not be used in the evaluation of eyewitness identification 
accuracy"). 
 
 
29 Compare Study Group Report, supra at 19, quoting Report 
of the Special Master, State vs. Henderson, N.J. Supreme Ct., 
No. A-8-08, at 34 (Special Master's Report) ("confidence 
expressed immediately after making an identification has only a 
low correlation to the accuracy of the identification"), with 
Wells & Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 277, 
283 (2003) (more recent studies "indicate that the 
certainty-accuracy relation is stronger" if analysis is 
restricted to witnesses who actually made identifications, 
thereby excluding witnesses who did not identify anyone).  See 
also Sporer, Read, Penrod, & Cutler, Choosing, Confidence, and 
Accuracy:  A Meta–Analysis of the Confidence–Accuracy Relation 
in Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118 Psychol. Bull. 315, 
322 (1995). 
32 
 
Henderson, 208 N.J. at 254 ("Confirmatory feedback can distort 
memory.  As a result, to the extent confidence may be relevant 
in certain circumstances, it must be recorded in the witness'[s] 
own words before any possible feedback"); Lawson, 352 Or. at 745 
("Retrospective self-reports of certainty are highly susceptible 
to suggestive procedures and confirming feedback, a factor that 
further limits the utility of the certainty variable").30,31 
 
Although the research regarding the correlation (or lack of 
correlation) between eyewitness certainty and accuracy is 
complex and still evolving, it is necessary to inform a jury 
                                                     
 
 
30 See Wells & Bradfield, Distortions in Eyewitnesses' 
Recollections:  Can the Postidentification–Feedback Effect Be 
Moderated?, 10 Psychol. Sci. 138, 138 (1999) ("The idea that 
confirming feedback would lead to confidence inflation is not 
surprising.  What is surprising, however, is that confirming 
feedback that is given after the identification leads 
eyewitnesses to misremember how confident they were at the time 
of the identification").  See also Commonwealth v. Collins, ante 
255, 263 n.10 (2014), quoting National Research Council of the 
National Academies, Identifying the Culprit:  Assessing 
Eyewitness Identification 75 (2014) (pending publication) 
("[I]n-court confidence statements may . . . be less reliable 
than confidence judgments made at the time of an initial out-of-
court identification . . . . The confidence of an eyewitness may 
increase by the time of the trial as a result of learning more 
information about the case, participating in trial preparation, 
and experiencing the pressures of being placed on the stand"). 
 
 
31 "Because 'a witness's confidence in the accuracy of his 
identification grows once he learns that the police believe he 
made the correct identification,' we have previously announced 
that we 'expect' police to use protocols for photographic arrays 
that include a 'procedure requir[ing] the administrator to ask 
the witness to state, in his or her own words, how certain he or 
she is of any identification.'" Collins, supra at 263 n.11, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 791, 798 
(2009). 
33 
 
about this tenuous relationship because there is a near 
consensus that jurors tend to give more weight to a witness's 
certainty in evaluating the accuracy of an identification than 
is warranted by the research.  See Commonwealth v. Collins, ante 
255, 264 n.14 (2014), quoting Study Group Report, supra at 20 
("Studies show that eyewitness confidence is the single most 
influential factor in juror determinations regarding the 
accuracy of an eyewitness identification"); Cabagbag, 127 Haw. 
at 311; Clopten, 223 P.3d at 1108 ("Indeed, juries seemed to be 
swayed the most by the confidence of an eyewitness, even though 
such confidence correlates only weakly with accuracy").32  
Therefore, it is necessary to inform the jury that an 
eyewitness's expressed certainty in an identification, standing 
alone, may not indicate the accuracy of an identification, and 
that this is especially true where the witness did not describe 
that level of certainty when the witness first made an 
identification. 
                                                     
 
 
32 See Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, Juror Sensitivity to 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 185, 
190 (1990) (mock-jury experiment showed jurors "gave 
disproportionate weight to the confidence of the witness"); 
Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror 
Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. Applied Psychol. 
440, 446 (1979) ("The data indicate that although jurors' 
decisions to believe the witness are highly related to their 
ratings of the witnesses' confidence, the confidence-accuracy 
relationship is very poor"). 
34 
 
 
iii.  High levels of stress can reduce an eyewitness's 
ability to make an accurate identification.  "[A]n eyewitness 
under high stress is less likely to make a reliable 
identification of the perpetrator."  Special Master's Report, 
supra at 43.  "[H]igh levels of stress significantly impair a 
witness's ability to recognize faces and encode details into 
memory."  Lawson, 352 Or. at 769 (Appendix).  There is 
"considerable support for the hypothesis that high levels of 
stress negatively impact both accuracy of eyewitness 
identification as well as accuracy of recall of crime-related 
details."  Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & McGorty, A Meta-
Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness 
Memory, 28 Law & Hum. Behav. 687, 699 (2004) (Deffenbacher et 
al.).  See Study Group Report, supra at 29 n.27, citing 
Deffenbacher et al., supra at 695 (thirty-nine per cent of 
participants under high-stress conditions correctly identified 
suspect in target-present lineups compared to fifty-nine per 
cent of participants under low-stress conditions).33  This 
                                                     
 
 
33 In another experiment, 509 active duty military personnel 
in military survival school training were subjected to high- or 
low-stress interrogations.  See Morgan, Hazlett, Doran, Garrett, 
Hoyt, Thomas, Baranoski, & Southwick, Accuracy of Eyewitness 
Memory for Persons Encountered During Exposure to Highly Intense 
Stress, 27 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 265, 267-268 (2004).  When 
subjects were asked to identify the interrogator in a lineup or 
photographic array, "the accuracy of eyewitness recognition 
. . . for the interrogator appeared to be greater for the low-, 
compared to the high-stress condition."  Id. at 272.  "These 
35 
 
principle is counterintuitive to the "common misconception that 
faces seen in highly stressful situations can be 'burned into' a 
witness's memory."  Lawson, 352 Or. at 770 (Appendix).  See 
Morgan, Hazlett, Doran, Garrett, Hoyt, Thomas, Baranoski, & 
Southwick, Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for Persons Encountered 
During Exposure to Highly Intense Stress, 27 Int'l J.L. & 
Psychiatry 265, 274 (2004) (rejecting "popular conception that 
most people would never forget the face of a clearly seen 
individual who had physically confronted them and threatened 
them").  Therefore, it is important to inform the jury of this 
principle lest they evaluate an identification made under high 
stress based on the "common misconception." 
 
iv.  Information that is unrelated to the initial viewing 
of the event, which an eyewitness receives before or after 
making an identification, can influence the witness's later 
recollection of the memory or of the identification.  "An 
extensive body of studies demonstrates that the memories of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
data provide robust evidence that eyewitness memory for persons 
encountered during events that are personally relevant, highly 
stressful, and realistic in nature may be subject to substantial 
error."  Id. at 274.  See Morgan, Southwick, Steffian, Hazlett, 
& Loftus, Misinformation Can Influence Memory for Recently 
Experienced, Highly Stressful Events, 36 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 
11, 16 (2013) (similar study of military personnel at survival 
school found that "human memory for realistic, recently 
experienced stressful events is subject to substantial error.  
In addition,  . . . memories for stressful events are also 
highly vulnerable to modification by exposure to 
misinformation"). 
36 
 
witnesses for events and faces, and witnesses' confidence in 
their memories, are highly malleable and can readily be altered 
by information received by witnesses both before and after an 
identification procedure."  Special Master's Report, supra at 
30-31.  See B.L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent:  Where 
Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong 48-49 (2011) (reviewing trial 
records for 161 wrongful convictions involving eyewitness 
misidentification and finding that seventy-eight per cent 
involved police contamination of identification).  This outside 
information, known as "feedback," affects witnesses' memory 
differently depending on whether the witness receives feedback 
before or after making an identification.  See Study Group 
Report, supra at 21-22; Henderson, 208 N.J. at 253.  "Jurors, 
however, tend to be unaware of . . . how susceptible witness 
certainty is to manipulation by suggestive procedures or 
confirming feedback."  Lawson, 352 Or. at 778 (Appendix). 
 
Preidentification feedback may contaminate the witness's 
memory.  For instance, suggestive wording and leading questions 
prior to participating in an identification procedure can 
influence the process of forming a memory.  See Study Group 
Report, supra at 21; Lawson, 352 Or. at 786-788 (Appendix).34  
                                                     
 
 
34 See also Loftus & Zanni, Eyewitness Testimony:  The 
Influence of the Wording of a Question, 5 Bull. Psychonomic 
Soc'y 86, 88 (1975) (changing wording of question from "[d]id 
you see a broken headlight" to "[d]id you see the broken 
37 
 
Postidentification feedback is information unrelated to the 
witness's actual memory that suggests to the witness that he or 
she correctly identified the suspect.  See Study Group Report, 
supra at 22; Henderson, 208 N.J. at 255; Lawson, 352 Or. at 744.  
This confirmatory information may boost the witness's level of 
certainty without increasing the likelihood of an accurate 
identification.  See Lawson, supra; Special Master's Report, 
supra at 33 ("A number of studies have demonstrated that 
witnesses' confidence in their identifications, and their 
memories of events and faces, are readily tainted by information 
that they receive after the identification procedure").35 
                                                                                                                                                                           
headlight" led to more false recognitions [emphasis added]); 
Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report, 7 Cognitive 
Psychol. 560, 566 (1975) (after watching videotape of vehicle 
driving on road where there was no barn, 17.3 per cent of 
participants who were asked to estimate vehicle's speed "when it 
passed the barn" claimed to see barn, compared to 2.7 per cent 
of participants whose question did not mention barn). 
 
 
35 In one experiment, witnesses who made false 
identifications at a target-absent lineup were given either 
confirming feedback ("Good.  You identified the actual 
suspect"), disconfirming feedback ("Actually, the suspect was 
number _"), or no feedback.  Wells & Bradfield, "Good, You 
Identified the Suspect":  Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts 
Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. Applied 
Psychol. 360, 363 (1998).  Not only did confirmatory feedback 
affect witness reports of how certain they were at the time of 
the identification, but it also distorted "their reports of the 
witnessing experience."  Id. at 367.  Witnesses receiving 
confirming feedback reported "a better view of the culprit, a 
greater ability to make out details of the face, greater 
attention to the event, [and] a stronger basis for making an 
identification," compared to witnesses receiving no feedback.  
Id. at 366.  Additionally, a meta-analysis of ten published and 
38 
 
 
Although police officers are common potential sources of 
feedback, feedback from cowitnesses and other private actors can 
also influence a witness's memory.  "When a witness is permitted 
to discuss the event with other witnesses or views another 
witness's identification decision, the witness may alter his or 
her own memory or identification decision to conform to that of 
the cowitness."  Lawson, 352 Or. at 788 (Appendix).  See 
Henderson, 208 N.J. at 268-271.36 
                                                                                                                                                                           
four unpublished studies, totaling approximately 2,400 
participants, showed that participants who received confirming 
feedback "expressed significantly more retrospective confidence 
in their decision compared with participants who received no 
feedback" and "significantly inflate[d] their reports to suggest 
better witnessing conditions at the time of the crime, stronger 
memory at the time of the lineup, and sharper memory abilities 
in general."  Douglass & Steblay, Memory Distortion in 
Eyewitnesses:  A Meta–Analysis of the Post-identification 
Feedback Effect, 20 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 859, 863–865 
(2006).  See Crayton, supra at 239 n.15, quoting Wells & 
Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and 
the Supreme Court's Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness 
Science:  30 Years Later, 33 Law & Hum. Behav. 1, 12 (2009) 
(suggestive confirmatory effect "is stronger for mistaken 
eyewitnesses than it is for accurate eyewitnesses, thereby 
making inaccurate eyewitnesses look more like accurate 
eyewitnesses and undermining the certainty-accuracy relation"). 
 
 
36 When pairs of subjects viewed a crime and discussed who 
they believed was the culprit, researchers concluded that "post-
identification feedback does not have to be presented by the 
experimenter or an authoritative figure (e.g. police officer) in 
order to affect a witness'[s] subsequent crime-related 
judgments."  Skagerberg, Co–Witness Feedback in Line-
Ups, 21 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 489, 494 (2007).  When the 
cowitnesses agreed with one another, they reported having better 
views of the culprit, higher certainty, and more willingness to 
testify compared to cowitnesses who disagreed on the culprit's 
39 
 
 
v.  A prior viewing of a suspect at an identification 
procedure may reduce the reliability of a subsequent 
identification procedure in which the same suspect is shown.  A 
prior viewing of a suspect in an identification procedure raises 
doubts about the reliability of a subsequent identification 
procedure involving the same suspect.  See Study Group Report, 
supra at 25, citing Special Master's Report, supra at 27-28.  
"[S]uccessive views of the same person can make it difficult to 
know whether the later identification stems from a memory of the 
original event or a memory of the earlier identification 
procedure."  Henderson, 208 N.J. at 255.  See Collins, supra at 
262 n.9, citing Study Group Report, supra at 78-79 ("An 
eyewitness may recall the defendant's face, but not recall that 
the source of the eyewitness's memory was the defendant's 
presence in a pretrial lineup or photographic array rather than 
the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime"); 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 826 (1990) ("danger of 
misidentification is increased if the photograph of the same 
individual is included in different arrays"); Lawson 352 Or. at 
784 (Appendix). 
 
One form of this source memory problem is "mugshot 
exposure," where a witness's viewing of an innocent suspect's 
                                                                                                                                                                           
identity -- even though none of the photographic arrays showed 
the actual suspect.  Id. at 493-495. 
40 
 
mugshot can heighten the chances of a later misidentification.  
See Study Group Report, supra at 25, citing Henderson, supra at 
256.  A meta-analysis of eleven published articles showed that 
"prior mugshot exposure decreases accuracy at a subsequent 
lineup, both in terms of reductions in rates for hits and 
correct rejections as well as in terms of increases in the rate 
for false alarms."  Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, Mugshot 
Exposure Effects:  Retroactive Interference, Mugshot Commitment, 
Source Confusion, and Unconscious Transference, 30 Law & Hum. 
Behav. 287, 306 (2006).  See id. at 299 (fifteen per cent of 
subject witnesses misidentified innocent person in lineup when 
seeing person for first time, while thirty-seven per cent of 
witnesses with mugshot exposure misidentified innocent person).37 
                                                     
 
 
37 "Unconscious transference" is a similar phenomenon that 
occurs "when a witness confuses a person seen at or near the 
crime scene with the actual perpetrator."  Study Group Report, 
supra at 31, quoting Special Master's Report, supra at 46.  In 
one experiment, witnesses were asked to identify the assailant 
from a target-absent lineup containing an innocent bystander 
they had seen previously near the crime scene; witnesses "were 
nearly three times more likely to misidentify the bystander than 
were control subjects."  Ross, Ceci, Dunning, & Toglia, 
Unconscious Transference and Mistaken Identity:  When a Witness 
Misidentifies a Familiar but Innocent Person, 79 J. Applied 
Psychol. 918, 923 (1994). "Regardless of the content of the 
lineup (bystander present or assailant present), a majority of 
the transference subjects thought the assailant and the 
bystander were the same person who was seen in two different 
places."  Id. at 924.  However, we recognize that there is less 
conclusive support for unconscious transference, and it is not 
clear still how or why it occurs.  Id. at 919, 929-930. 
41 
 
 
c.  Provisional model jury instruction.  After evaluating 
the scientific evidence and concluding that the aforementioned 
principles are so generally accepted that they may be stated in 
a model jury instruction, we propose in the Appendix to this 
opinion a new provisional jury instruction regarding eyewitness 
identification.  We have made the jury instruction provisional 
to allow for public comment and possible future revision before 
we declare it a model, but it should be given, where 
appropriate, in trials that commence after issuance of this 
opinion until a model instruction is issued.  We intend the new 
instruction to have no retroactive application.  See Santoli, 
424 Mass. at 845 (declining retroactively to apply new rule to 
omit "strength of the identification" language).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Ashley, 427 Mass. 620, 628 (1998) (declining 
retroactively to apply Santoli); Commonwealth v. Payne, 426 
Mass. 692, 698 (1998) (same). 
 
Our provisional instruction updates the Rodriguez 
instruction with principles relevant to the evaluation of 
eyewitness testimony for which there is at least a near 
consensus in the relevant scientific community.  It will provide 
juries with more comprehensive guidance to evaluate and weigh 
eyewitness identifications, but we recognize that not every 
principle regarding eyewitness identification that has attained 
a near consensus in the relevant scientific community is 
42 
 
included; nor are the included principles set forth in great 
detail.  We aspired in drafting the instruction for clarity, 
brevity, and balance, recognizing that an eyewitness 
identification instruction is only one of many instructions in a 
jury charge.  We also understand that the longer the jury 
instruction, the greater the risk that it will implicitly 
communicate the message that all eyewitness identifications 
should be viewed as unreliable rather than simply evaluated with 
caution and care, so we have balanced this risk with the need to 
educate jurors.38  See National Academies, supra at 29 (noting 
concern that "jury instructions cause jurors to become more 
suspicious of all eyewitness identification evidence").  The 
provisional instruction is longer than the Rodriguez 
                                                     
 
 
38 A recent experimental study of the New Jersey model jury 
instructions revealed that they did not improve jurors' ability 
to distinguish between "weak" and "strong" eyewitness testimony; 
rather, the enhanced instructions "caused jurors to 
indiscriminately discount testimony."  Papailiou, Yokum, & 
Robertson, The Novel New Jersey Eyewitness Instruction Induces 
Skepticism But Not Sensitivity, Arizona Legal Studies Discussion 
Paper No. 14-17, at 22 (Aug. 2014).  "[U]se of the novel New 
Jersey instruction substantially reduced the likelihood that the 
defendant would be found guilty, but its reducing effect was the 
same regardless of whether the eyewitness identification 
testimony was weak or strong." Id. at 12-13.  See also Vermont 
Model Criminal Jury Instructions, Reporter's Note (Aug. 2012), 
available at http://vtjuryinstructions.org/?page_id=662 
[http://perma.cc/8WFD-42AF] (last visited Jan. 8, 2015) 
(drafters of Vermont model instructions recognized that "the 
general approach to eyewitness identification may be evolving" 
but cautioned "against using a longer instruction on eyewitness 
identification").  Our provisional jury instruction is 
approximately 1,000 words shorter than the comparable New Jersey 
model jury instruction. 
43 
 
instruction, but it will be the rare case where the entirety of 
the instruction need be given, because a judge need only give 
the portions of the provisional instruction that are relevant to 
the eyewitness identification evidence involved in the case. 
 
We expect the new model instruction will provide at least 
one source of reliable information in cases where expert 
testimony is not offered.  Jury instructions offer certain 
advantages over expert testimony:  "they are focused and 
concise, authoritative (in that juries hear them from the trial 
judge, not a witness called by one side), and cost-free; they 
avoid possible confusion to jurors created by dueling experts; 
and they eliminate the risk of an expert invading the jury's 
role or opining on an eyewitness'[s] credibility."  Henderson, 
208 N.J. at 298.  See United States v. Jones, 689 F.3d 12, 19 
(1st Cir. 2012).  But see Clopten, 223 P.3d at 1110 (research 
"has shown that a cautionary instruction does little to help a 
jury spot a mistaken identification"). 
 
Nevertheless, our provisional instruction is not intended 
in any way to preclude expert testimony regarding eyewitness 
identification or to discourage judges from exercising their 
discretion to permit such expert testimony.  Cf. Clopten, supra 
at 1107 ("It was never the intent of this court to establish 
cautionary instructions as the sole means for educating juries 
about eyewitness fallibility").  Expert testimony may be 
44 
 
important to elaborate on the generally accepted principles in a 
model instruction and to explain how other variables relevant to 
the particular case can affect the accuracy of the 
identification.  A judge may also allow an expert to challenge 
the generally accepted principles we incorporated, and, where 
the judge finds the expert's challenge to be persuasive, the 
judge may modify the model instruction accordingly.  See part 
2.a, supra. 
 
Conclusion.  In the circumstances of this case, based on 
the record before him, the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
declining to give the New Jersey model jury instruction 
regarding eyewitness identification and instead giving the 
Rodriguez instruction.  Therefore, we affirm the defendant's 
judgments of conviction of mayhem and breaking and entering a 
motor vehicle in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony.  
We remand the case to the Superior Court to vacate the 
defendant's judgment of conviction and sentence for assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon as duplicative of the 
mayhem conviction.  Because the sentence to be vacated was less 
than the sentence of mayhem, and was ordered to be served 
concurrent with that sentence, we do not order resentencing of 
the defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Appendix.1 
One of the most important issues in this case is whether 
the defendant is the person who committed [or participated in 
the commission of] the crime[s].  The Commonwealth has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that this defendant 
was in fact the perpetrator of the crime[s] alleged in the 
indictment[s]. 
 
The identification of the defendant as the person who 
committed [or participated in the commission of] the crime[s] 
may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence, or 
by some combination of direct and circumstantial evidence, but 
it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  If you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the 
person who committed [or participated in the commission of] the 
crime[s], you must find the defendant not guilty. 
 
In evaluating eyewitness identification testimony, it is 
not essential that a witness be free from doubt as to the 
correctness of his or her identification of the defendant.  
However, you, the jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt, based on all of the credible evidence, that this 
                                                     
 
 
1 The following jury instruction has not been adopted as an 
official model.  Rather, it is a provisional instruction that 
trial courts should use until we adopt a model instruction after 
soliciting comments from the public. 
2 
 
defendant is the person who committed [or participated in the 
commission of] the crime[s] before you may convict him/her. 
As with any witness, you must determine the credibility of 
a witness identifying the defendant as the offender.  If you 
conclude that the witness is not telling the truth regarding the 
person's identification, you shall disregard that testimony.  If 
you conclude that the witness intended to tell the truth, you 
must also consider the possibility that the witness made a good 
faith error in identification.  That is, you should consider 
whether the witness could be honestly mistaken in his or her 
identification of the defendant. 
Human beings have the ability to recognize other people 
from past experiences and to identify them at a later time, but 
research has shown that people sometimes make mistakes in 
identification.  That research has focused on the factors that 
may affect the accuracy of an identification, including the 
nature of human memory. 
Research has shown that human memory is not like a video 
recording that a witness need only replay to remember what 
happened.2  Memory is far more complex.  The process of 
                                                     
 
 
2 See Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on Eyewitness 
Evidence:  Report and Recommendations to the Justices 15 (July 
25, 2013), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/eyewitness-evidence-
report-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/WY4M-YNZN] (last visited Jan. 
8, 2015) (Study Group Report), quoting Report of the Special 
3 
 
remembering consists of three stages:  first, a person sees or 
otherwise acquires information about the original event; second, 
the person stores in the brain the information about the event 
for a period of time until, third, the person attempts to recall 
that stored information.3  At each of these stages, memory can be 
affected by a variety of factors.4 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Master, State vs. Henderson, N.J. Supreme Ct., Docket No. A-8-08 
(June 10, 2010), at 9 (Special Master's Report) ("The central 
precept is that memory does not function like a videotape, 
accurately and thoroughly capturing and reproducing a person, 
scene or event. . . .  Memory is, rather[,] a constructive, 
dynamic and selective process"); State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 
208, 245 (2011); State v. Lawson, 352 Or. 724, 771 (2012) 
(Appendix).  See also E.F. Loftus, J.M. Doyle, & J.E. Dysart, 
Eyewitness Testimony:  Civil and Criminal § 2-2, at 14 (5th ed. 
2013) (Loftus et al.); Brigham, Wasserman, & Meissner, Disputed 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence:  Important Legal and 
Scientific Issues, 36 Ct. Rev., no. 2, 1999, at 13. 
 
 
3 See Study Group Report, supra at 16, quoting Henderson, 
208 N.J. at 245 ("Three stages are involved in forming a memory: 
stages:  'acquisition -- "the perception of the original event"; 
retention -- "the period of time that passes between the event 
and the eventual recollection of a particular piece of 
information"; and retrieval -- the "stage during which a person 
recalls stored information"'"). 
 
 
4 For a detailed discussion of the three stages of memory 
and how those stages may be affected, see Study Group Report, 
supra at 16; National Research Council of the National 
Academies, Identifying the Culprit:  Assessing Eyewitness 
Identification 40-46 (2014) (pending publication) (National 
Academies) ("Encoding, storage, and remembering are not passive, 
static processes that record, retain, and divulge their contents 
in an informational vacuum, unaffected by outside influences").  
See also State v. Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218, 235-236 (2012); 
Henderson, 208 N.J. at 247; Loftus et al., supra at § 2-2, at 15 
("Numerous factors at each stage affect the accuracy and 
completeness of an eyewitness account"). 
4 
 
Relying on some of the research that has been done in this 
area, I am going to list some specific factors you should 
consider in determining whether the identification testimony is 
accurate.  By instructing you on the factors to consider, I am 
not expressing any opinion about the accuracy of any specific 
memory of any particular witness.  You, the jury, must decide 
whether the witness's identification is accurate. 
(1)  The witness's opportunity to view the event.  You 
should consider the opportunity the witness had to observe the 
offender at the time of the offense, how good a look the witness 
had of the offender, the degree of attention the witness was 
paying to the offender at that time, the distance between the 
witness and the offender, how good the lighting conditions were, 
and the length of time the witness had to observe the offender; 
ADD ONLY IF RELEVANT TO THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE: 
[IF DISGUISE WAS INVOLVED OR FACE WAS OBSCURED] whether the 
offender was disguised or had his/her features obscured in some 
way;5 
                                                     
 
 
5 See Study Group Report, supra at 30, quoting Lawson, 352 
Or. at 775 (Appendix) ("[S]tudies confirm that the use of a 
disguise negatively affects later identification accuracy.  In 
addition to accoutrements like masks and sunglasses, studies 
show that hats, hoods, and other items that conceal a 
perpetrator’s hair or hairline also impair a witness’s ability 
to make an accurate identification"); Henderson, 208 N.J. at 266 
("Disguises and changes in facial features can affect a 
witness'[s] ability to remember and identify a perpetrator"); 
State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1108 (Utah 2009) ("[A]ccuracy 
5 
 
[IF PERPETRATOR HAD DISTINCTIVE FACE OR FEATURE] whether 
the perpetrator had a distinctive face or feature;6 
[IF A WEAPON WAS INVOLVED] and whether the witness saw a 
weapon during the event -- the visible presence of a weapon may 
reduce the reliability of an identification if the crime is of 
short duration, but the longer the event, the more time the 
witness has to adapt to the presence of the weapon.7 
                                                                                                                                                                           
is significantly affected by factors such as the amount of time 
the culprit was in view, lighting conditions, use of a disguise, 
distinctiveness of the culprit's appearance, and the presence of 
a weapon or other distractions"); Wells & Olson, Eyewitness 
Testimony, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 277, 281 (2003) (Wells & Olson) 
("Simple disguises, even those as minor as covering the hair, 
result in significant impairment of eyewitness identification").  
See also Cutler, A Sample of Witness, Crime, and Perpetrator 
Characteristics Affecting Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 4 
Cardozo Pub. L. Pol'y & Ethics J. 327, 332 (2006) ("In data from 
over 1300 eyewitnesses, the percentage of correct judgments on 
identification tests was lower among eyewitnesses who viewed 
perpetrators wearing hats [44%] than among eyewitnesses who 
viewed perpetrators whose hair and hairlines were visible 
[57%]"); Patterson & Baddeley, When Face Recognition Fails, 3 J. 
Experimental Psychol. 406, 410 (1977). 
 
 
6 See Study Group Report, supra at 30-31, quoting Lawson, 
352 Or. at 774 ("Witnesses are better at remembering and 
identifying individuals with distinctive features than they are 
those possessing average features"); Clopten, 223 P.3d at 1108; 
Wells & Olson, supra at 281 ("Distinctive faces are much more 
likely to be accurately recognized than nondistinctive faces"); 
Shapiro & Penrod, Meta–Analysis of Facial Identification 
Studies, 100 Psychol. Bull. 139, 140, 145 (1986) (meta-analysis 
finding that distinctive targets were "easier to recognize than 
ordinary looking targets"). 
 
 
7 See Study Group Report, supra at 29, quoting Henderson, 
208 N.J. at 262-263 ("'Weapon focus' can . . . impair a 
witness's ability to make a reliable identification and describe 
what the culprit looks like if the crime is of short duration"); 
6 
 
(2)  Characteristics of the witness.  You should also 
consider characteristics of the witness when the observation was 
made, such as the quality of the witness's eyesight, whether the 
witness knew the offender, and, if so, how well,8 and whether the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Guilbert, 306 Conn. at 253; Lawson, 352 Or. at 771-772 
(Appendix).  See also Kassin, Hosch, & Memon, On the "General 
Acceptance" of Eyewitness Testimony Research:  A New Survey of 
the Experts, 56 Am. Psychol. 405, 407-412 (2001) (Kassin et al.) 
(in 2001 survey, eighty-seven per cent of experts agree that 
principle that "[t]he presence of a weapon impairs an 
eyewitness's ability to accurately identify the perpetrator's 
face" is reliable enough to be presented in court); Maass & 
Köhnken, Eyewitness Identification:  Simulating the "Weapon 
Effect," 13 Law & Hum. Behav. 397, 405-406 (1989); Steblay, A 
Meta–Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 Law & Hum. 
Behav. 413, 415–417 (1992) (meta-analysis finding "weapon-absent 
condition[s] generated significantly more accurate descriptions 
of the perpetrator than did the weapon-present condition"); id. 
at 421 ("To not consider a weapon's effect on eyewitness 
performance is to ignore relevant information.  The weapon 
effect does reliably occur, particularly in crimes of short 
duration in which a threatening weapon is visible"); Wells & 
Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and 
the Supreme Court's Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness 
Science:  30 Years Later, 33 Law & Hum. Behav. 1, 11 (2009).  
But see National Academies, supra at 64 (recent meta-analysis 
"shows that the effect of a weapon on accuracy is slight in 
actual crimes, slightly larger in laboratory studies, and 
largest for simulations"). 
 
 
8 See Study Group Report, supra at 135 (recommending 
instruction stating, "If the witness had seen the defendant 
before the incident, you should consider how many times the 
witness had seen the defendant and under what circumstances"); 
Commonwealth v. Adams, 458 Mass. 766, 770-771 (2011) 
("Traditional identification procedures such as photographic 
arrays, showups, and lineups were designed primarily for 
witnesses who had never before seen a particular individual, or 
who may have seen the individual previously but on a limited 
basis.  They are not normally used, and are not required, for 
witnesses who know an individual well").  See also Commonwealth 
v. Pressley, 390 Mass. 617, 619 (1983) ("There may be cases in 
7 
 
witness was under a high degree of stress -- high levels of 
stress, compared to low to medium levels, can reduce an 
eyewitness's ability to accurately perceive an event;9 
ADD ONLY IF RELEVANT TO THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE: 
                                                                                                                                                                           
which the parties are so well known to each other or so closely 
related that under sufficient lighting and with appropriate 
physical proximity, the identification by the victim is either 
true or the victim is lying"); Commonwealth v. Stoddard, 38 
Mass. App. Ct. 45, 48 (1995) (no error in omitting "honest but 
mistaken" language where "victim knew the defendant as a regular 
customer of the [gasoline] station and had encountered him 
numerous times over a year and one-half").  But see Pezdek & 
Stolzenberg, Are Individuals' Familiarity Judgments Diagnostic 
of Prior Contact?, 20 Psychol. Crime & L. 302, 306 (2014) 
(twenty-three per cent of study participants misidentified 
subjects with unfamiliar faces as familiar, and only forty-two 
per cent correctly identified familiar face as familiar). 
 
 
9 See Study Group Report, supra at 29, quoting Special 
Master's Report, supra at 43 ("The scientific literature reports 
that, while moderate levels of stress improve cognitive 
processing and might improve accuracy . . . , an eyewitness 
under high stress is less likely to make a reliable 
identification of the perpetrator"); Lawson, 352 Or. at 769 
(Appendix).  See also Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & 
McGorty, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on 
Eyewitness Memory, 28 Law & Hum. Behav. 687, 699 (2004) (finding 
"considerable support for the hypothesis that high levels of 
stress negatively impact both accuracy of eyewitness 
identification as well as accuracy of recall of crime-related 
details"); Morgan, Hazlett, Doran, Garrett, Hoyt, Thomas, 
Baranoski, & Southwick, Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for 
Persons Encountered During Exposure to Highly Intense Stress, 27 
Int'l J. L. & Psychiatry 265, 272-274 (2004).  But see Study 
Group Report, supra, quoting Henderson, 208 N.J. at 262 ("There 
is no precise measure for what constitutes 'high' stress, which 
must be assessed based on the facts presented in individual 
cases"). 
8 
 
[IF DRUGS OR ALCOHOL WERE INVOLVED] whether the witness at 
the time of the observation was under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs, and if so, to what degree; 
[IF WITNESS AND OFFENDER ARE OF DIFFERENT RACES] and 
whether the witness and the offender are of different races -- 
research has shown that people of all races may have greater 
difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race 
than they do in identifying members of their own race.10 
(3)  The time elapsed.  You should consider how much time 
elapsed between the event observed and the identification.  
                                                     
 
10 See Study Group Report, supra at 31 ("A witness may have 
more difficulty identifying a person of a different race or 
ethnicity"); Kassin et al., supra at 407-412 (in 2001 survey, 
ninety per cent of experts agree that principle that 
"[e]yewitnesses are more accurate when identifying members of 
their own race than members of other races" is reliable enough 
to be presented in court); Meissner & Brigham, Thirty Years of 
Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces:  A Meta-
Analytic Review, 7 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y, & L. 3, 15 (2001) 
(meta-analysis of thirty-nine research articles concluding that 
participants were "1.4 times more likely to correctly identify a 
previously viewed own-race face when compared with performance 
on other-race faces" and "1.56 times more likely to falsely 
identify a novel other-race face when compared with performance 
on own-race faces"); Wells & Olson, supra at 280-281.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 441 Mass. 146, 154-155 (2004) (Cordy, 
J., concurring); State v. Cabagbag, 127 Haw. 302, 310-311 
(2012); Lawson, 352 Or. at 775 (Appendix); National Academies, 
supra at 66, citing Grimsley, Innocence Project, What Wrongful 
Convictions Teach Us About Racial Inequality, Innocence Blog 
(Sept. 26, 2012, 2:30 P.M.), at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/What_Wrongful_Conviction
s_Teach_Us_About_Racial_Inequality.php [http://perma.cc/KX2J-
XECN] (last visited Jan. 9, 2015) ("Recent analyses revealed 
that cross-racial [mis]identification was present in 42 percent 
of the cases in which an erroneous eyewitness identification was 
made"). 
9 
 
Generally, memory is most accurate right after the event and 
begins to fade thereafter.11 
(4)  Witness's expressed certainty.  Research shows that a 
witness's expressed certainty in an identification, standing 
alone, may not be a reliable indicator of the accuracy of the 
identification,12 especially where the witness did not describe 
that level of certainty when the witness first made the 
identification.13 
                                                     
 
 
11 See Study Group Report, supra at 31-32, quoting Lawson, 
352 Or. at 778 (Appendix) ("The more time that elapses between 
an initial observation and a later identification procedure [a 
period referred to in eyewitness identification research as a 
'retention interval'] . . . the less reliable the later 
recollection will be. . . . [D]ecay rates are exponential rather 
than linear, with the greatest proportion of memory loss 
occurring shortly after an initial observation, then leveling 
off over time"); National Academies, supra at 11 ("For 
eyewitness identification to take place, perceived information 
must be encoded in memory, stored, and subsequently retrieved.  
As time passes, memories become less stable"). 
 
 
12 See Study Group Report, supra at 19 ("Social science 
research demonstrates that little correlation exists between 
witness confidence and the accuracy of the identification"); 
Lawson, 352 Or. at 777 (Appendix) ("Despite widespread reliance 
by judges and juries on the certainty of an eyewitness's 
identification, studies show that, under most circumstances, 
witness confidence or certainty is not a good indicator of 
identification accuracy"); Clopten, 223 P.3d at 1108.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 597-600 (2005); 
Commonwealth v. Santoli, 424 Mass. 837, 845-846 (1997); 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 423 Mass. 99, 110 n.9 (1996). 
 
 
13 See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 239 (2014) 
("Social science research has shown that a witness's level of 
confidence in an identification is not a reliable predictor of 
the accuracy of the identification, especially where the level 
of confidence is inflated by its suggestiveness"); Henderson, 
10 
 
(5)  Exposure to identification information from others.  A 
person's memory may be affected by information the person 
received between the incident and the identification,14 as well 
as after the identification,15 and the person may not realize 
                                                                                                                                                                           
208 N.J. at 254 ("Confirmatory feedback can distort memory.  As 
a result, to the extent confidence may be relevant in certain 
circumstances, it must be recorded in the witness'[s] own words 
before any possible feedback"); Lawson, 352 Or. at 745 
("Retrospective self-reports of certainty are highly susceptible 
to suggestive procedures and confirming feedback, a factor that 
further limits the utility of the certainty variable"); Wells & 
Bradfield, Distortions in Eyewitnesses' Recollections:  Can the 
Postidentification–Feedback Effect Be Moderated?, 10 Psychol. 
Sci. 138, 138 (1999) ("The idea that confirming feedback would 
lead to confidence inflation is not surprising.  What is 
surprising, however, is that confirming feedback that is given 
after the identification leads eyewitnesses to misremember how 
confident they were at the time of the identification"). 
 
 
14 See Study Group Report, supra at 21-22; Special Master’s 
Report, supra at 30-31 ("An extensive body of studies 
demonstrates that the memories of witnesses for events and 
faces, and witnesses' confidence in their memories, are highly 
malleable and can readily be altered by information received by 
witnesses both before and after an identification procedure"); 
Lawson, 352 Or. at 786 (Appendix) ("The way in which 
eyewitnesses are questioned or converse about an event can alter 
their memory of the event"). 
 
 
15 See Study Group Report, supra at 22, quoting Henderson, 
208 N.J. at 255 (postidentification feedback "affects the 
reliability of an identification in that it can distort memory, 
create a false sense of confidence, and alter a witness'[s] 
report of how he or she viewed an event"); Special Master's 
report, supra at 33 ("A number of studies have demonstrated that 
witnesses' confidence in their identifications, and their 
memories of events and faces, are readily tainted by information 
that they receive after the identification procedure").  See 
also Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 263 (2014) ("Where 
confirmatory feedback artificially inflates an eyewitness’s 
level of confidence in his or her identification, there is also 
11 
 
that his or her memory has been affected.16  You may consider 
whether the witness was exposed to identifications made by other 
witnesses, to opinions or descriptions given by others, 
including police officers, or to any other information or 
influence.17  Such exposure may affect the independence and 
reliability of a witness's identification, and may inflate the 
witness's confidence in the identification.18 
                                                                                                                                                                           
a substantial risk that the eyewitness's memory of the crime at 
trial will 'improve'"). 
 
 
16 See Study Group Report, supra at 117, 136 n.4, citing 
Principles of Neural Science, Box 62-1, at 1239 (Kandel, 
Schwartz, & Jessell eds., 2000); Clark, Marshall, & Rosenthal, 
Lineup Administrator Influences on Eyewitness Identification 
Decisions, 15 J. Experimental Psychol.:  Applied 63, 72 (2009) 
("Most witnesses appeared to be unaware of the influence" of 
lineup administrator in staged experiment). 
 
 
17 See Henderson, 208 N.J. at 253 ("Confirmatory or post-
identification feedback presents the same risks.  It occurs when 
police signal to eyewitnesses that they correctly identified the 
suspect"); Lawson, 352 Or. at 777-778 (Appendix); Hope, Ost, 
Gabbert, Healey, & Lenton, "With a Little Help from My Friends 
. . .":  The Role of Co–Witness Relationship in Susceptibility 
to Misinformation, 127 Acta Psychologica 476, 481 (2008); 
Skagerberg, Co–Witness Feedback in Line-ups, 21 Applied 
Cognitive Psychol. 489, 494 (2007) ("post-identification 
feedback does not have to be presented by the experimenter or an 
authoritative figure [e.g. police officer] in order to affect a 
witness' subsequent crime-related judgments"). 
 
 
18 See Study Group Report, supra at 21-22; Henderson, 208 
N.J. at 255; Lawson, 352 Or. at 744.  See also Douglass & 
Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses:  A Meta–Analysis of 
the Post-Identification Feedback Effect, 20 Applied Cognitive 
Psychol. 859, 863–65 (2006) (participants who received 
confirming feedback "expressed significantly more retrospective 
confidence in their decision compared with participants who 
received no feedback"); Wells & Bradfield, "Good, You Identified 
12 
 
An identification that is the product of some suggestive 
conduct by the police or others should be scrutinized with 
special caution and care.  The risk that suggestion will affect 
the identification is greater where the witness did not get so 
good a look at the offender, because a witness who got a good 
look is less likely to be influenced by suggestion.19 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the Suspect":  Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports 
of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. Applied Psychol. 360, 366-
367 (1998) (witnesses receiving confirming feedback reported "a 
better view of the culprit, a greater ability to make out 
details of the face, greater attention to the event, [and] a 
stronger basis for making an identification" compared to 
witnesses receiving no feedback); Wells & Bradfield, Distortions 
in Eyewitnesses' Recollections:  Can the Postidentification–
Feedback Effect Be Moderated?, 10 Psychol. Sci. 138, 138 (1999); 
National Academies, supra at 64 ("Research has . . . shown that 
. . . if an eyewitness hears information or misinformation from 
another person before law enforcement involvement, his or her 
recollection of the event and confidence in the identification 
can be altered . . ."). 
 
 
19 See Steblay, Wells, & Douglass, The Eyewitness Post 
Identification Feedback Effect 15 Years Later:  Theoretical and 
Policy Implications, 20 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. 1, 10 (2014) 
(significant but smaller postidentification feedback effect on 
accurate eyewitnesses compared to inaccurate eyewitnesses).  See 
also Allan, Midjord, Martin, & Gabbert, Memory Conformity and 
the Perceived Accuracy of Self Versus Other, 40 Memory & 
Cognition 280, 285 (2011) (study participants with least amount 
of time to view initial event, and who were told that their 
partner had twice as long to view same event, were most likely 
to conform their memory to their partner's recollection); 
Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, Mugshot Exposure Effects:  
Retroactive Interference, Mugshot Commitment, Source Confusion, 
and Unconscious Transference, 30 Law & Hum. Behav. 287, 288 
(2006) (bias from mugshot exposure "is all the more problematic 
when viewing of the perpetrator has occurred under less than 
optimal viewing conditions").  Cf. Wells & Olson, supra at 283 
(when accuracy is low due to poor witnessing conditions, 
certainty-accuracy relationship is less correlated). 
13 
 
ADD ONLY IF RELEVANT TO THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE: 
[IF THERE WAS A PHOTOGRAPHIC ARRAY OR LINEUP] An 
identification may occur as part of the police investigation 
through the showing of an array of photographs or through a 
lineup of individuals.  You may take into account that any 
identification that was made by picking the defendant out of a 
group of similar individuals is generally more reliable than one 
which results from the presentation of the defendant alone to a 
witness. 
You should consider whether the police in conducting the 
photographic array or lineup followed established or recommended 
procedures that are designed to diminish the risk of 
suggestiveness.20  If there was evidence that any of those 
procedures were not followed, you should evaluate the 
identification with particular care and consider whether the 
                                                     
 
 
20 See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 797-
798 (2009) ("What is practicable in nearly all circumstances is 
a protocol to be employed before a photographic array is 
provided to an eyewitness, making clear to the eyewitness, at a 
minimum that he will be asked to view a set of photographs; the 
alleged wrongdoer may or may not be in the photographs depicted 
in the array; it is just as important to clear a person from 
suspicion as to identify a person as the wrongdoer; individuals 
depicted in the photographs may not appear exactly as they did 
on the date of the incident because features such as weight and 
head and facial hair are subject to change; regardless of 
whether an identification is made, the investigation will 
continue; and the procedure requires the administrator to ask 
the witness to state, in his or her own words, how certain he or 
she is of any identification"). 
14 
 
failure to follow the procedure affected the reliability of the 
identification. 
Where a witness identified the defendant in a photographic 
array [or in a lineup], you should consider the number of 
photographs in the array [or individuals in the lineup],21 
whether there was anything about the defendant's photograph [or 
the defendant's appearance in the lineup] that made him/her 
stand out from the others,22 whether the person administering the 
photographic array [or lineup] did not know who was the suspect 
and therefore could not influence the witness's identification,23 
                                                     
 
 
21 See Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 604 (2011) 
("Unless there are exigent or extraordinary circumstances," 
photographic array should not contain fewer than five fillers 
for every suspect).  See also Henderson, 208 N.J. at 251 (live 
lineups should also employ minimum of five fillers). 
 
 
22 See Wells & Olson, supra at 287 ("Ideally, lineup fillers 
would be chosen so that an innocent suspect is not mistakenly 
identified merely from 'standing out,' and so that a culprit 
does not escape identification merely from blending in"); Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. at 795, quoting Commonwealth v. Melvin, 399 
Mass. 201, 207 n.10 (1987) ("we 'disapprove of an array of 
photographs which distinguishes one suspect from all the others 
on the basis of some physical characteristic'").  See also 
Henderson, 208 N.J. at 251; Lawson, 352 Or. at 781; Malpass, 
Tredoux, & McQuiston-Surrett, Lineup Construction and Lineup 
Fairness, in 2 Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology 156 (2007) 
("Decades of empirical research suggest that mistaken eyewitness 
identifications are more likely to occur when the suspect stands 
out in a lineup"). 
 
 
23 See Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 797 ("we acknowledge 
that [a double-blind procedure] is the better practice because 
it eliminates the risk of conscious or unconscious suggestion"); 
Guilbert, 306 Conn. at 237-238 (courts across country accept 
that "identifications are likely to be less reliable in the 
15 
 
and whether anything was said to the witness that would suggest 
that the suspect was among the persons shown in the photographic 
array [or lineup], or that would suggest that the witness should 
identify the suspect.24 
[IF THERE WAS A SHOWUP]  An identification may occur as 
part of the police investigation through what is known as a 
showup, where a suspect is shown alone to a witness.  An 
identification procedure in which a witness selects a person 
                                                                                                                                                                           
absence of a double-blind, sequential identification 
procedure"); Henderson, 208 N.J. at 249 ("The consequences are 
clear:  a non-blind lineup procedure can affect the reliability 
of a lineup because even the best-intentioned, non-blind 
administrator can act in a way that inadvertently sways an 
eyewitness trying to identify a suspect").  See also National 
Academies, supra at 18 ("As an alternative to a 'double-blind' 
array, some departments use 'blinded' procedures.  A blinded 
procedure prevents an officer from knowing when the witness is 
viewing a photo of the suspect, but can be conducted by the 
investigating officer"); id. at 73 ("The committee recommends 
blind [double-blind or blinded] administration of both photo 
arrays and live lineups and the adoption of clear, written 
policies and training on photo array and live lineup 
administration.  Police should use blind procedures to avoid the 
unintentional or intentional exchange of information that might 
bias an eyewitness"). 
 
 
24 See Clark, Marshall, & Rosenthal, Lineup Administrator 
Influences on Eyewitness Identification Decisions, 15 J. 
Experimental Psychol. Applied 63, 74 (2009) (subtle, 
nondirective statements by lineup administrator "can lead a 
witness to make an identification, particularly when the 
perpetrator was not present"); Malpass & Devine, Eyewitness 
Identification:  Lineup Instructions and the Absence of the 
Offender, 66 J. Applied Psychol. 482, 486-487 (1981) (where 
subject witnesses were asked to identify assailant in staged 
experiment, "[c]hanging the instruction from biased [suspect is 
present in lineup] to unbiased [suspect may or may not be 
present] resulted in fewer choices and fewer false 
identifications without a decrease in correct identifications"). 
16 
 
from a group of similar individuals in a photographic array or a 
lineup is generally less suggestive than a showup, which is to 
some degree inherently suggestive.25  You should consider how 
long after the initial event the showup took place, as a fresh 
memory of an event that occurred only a few hours earlier may 
reduce the risks arising from the inherently suggestive nature 
of a showup.26 
                                                     
 
 
25 See Study Group Report, supra at 26, citing Special 
Master's Report, supra at 29 (showups carry their own risks of 
misidentification "due to the fact that only one person is 
presented to the witness"); Lawson, 352 Or. at 742-743 ("A 
'showup' is a procedure in which police officers present an 
eyewitness with a single suspect for identification, often [but 
not necessarily] conducted in the field shortly after a crime 
has taken place.  Police showups are generally regarded as 
inherently suggestive -- and therefore less reliable than 
properly administered lineup identifications -- because the 
witness is always aware of whom police officers have targeted as 
a suspect"); Dysart & Lindsay, Show-up Identifications:  
Suggestive Technique or Reliable Method?, in 2 Handbook of 
Eyewitness Psychology 141 (2007) ("Overall, show-ups [fare] 
poorly when compared with line-ups.  Correct identification 
rates are equal and false identification rates are about two to 
three times as high with show-ups compared with line-ups").  See 
also Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 797; Commonwealth v. Martin, 
447 Mass. 274, 279 (2006) ("One-on-one identifications are 
generally disfavored because they are viewed as inherently 
suggestive"). 
 
 
26 See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 235-236 ("there is generally 
'good reason' [to conduct showup] where the showup 
identification occurs within a few hours of the crime, because 
it is important to learn whether the police have captured the 
perpetrator or whether the perpetrator is still at large, and 
because a prompt identification is more likely to be accurate 
when the witness's recollection of the event is still fresh"); 
Study Group Report, supra at 141 n.30, quoting Special Master's 
Report, supra at 29 ("The research shows, in fact, that the risk 
of misidentification is not heightened if a showup is conducted 
17 
 
You should consider whether the police, in conducting the 
showup, followed established or recommended procedures that are 
designed to diminish the risk of suggestiveness.  If any of 
those procedures were not followed, you should evaluate the 
identification with particular care and consider whether the 
failure to follow the procedure affected the reliability of the 
identification. 
ADD ONLY IF RELEVANT TO THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE: 
[IF THERE WERE MULTIPLE VIEWINGS BY THE SAME WITNESS]  You 
should consider whether the witness viewed the defendant in 
multiple identification procedures or events.  When a witness 
views the same person in more than one identification procedure 
or event, it may be difficult to know whether a later 
identification comes from the witness's memory of the actual, 
original event, or from the witness's observation of the person 
at an earlier identification procedure or event.27 
                                                                                                                                                                           
immediately after the witnessed event, ideally within two hours:  
the benefits of a fresh memory seem to balance the risks of 
undue suggestion").  See also Dysart & Lindsay, The Effects of 
Delay on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy:  Should We Be 
Concerned?, in 2 Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology 370 (2007) 
(showups become particularly unreliable after twenty-four hours, 
rather than two hours). 
 
 
27 See Study Group Report, supra at 25, quoting Special 
Master's Report, supra at 27-28 ("The problem is that successive 
views of the same person create uncertainty as to whether an 
ultimate identification is based on memory of the original 
observation or memory from an earlier identification 
procedure"); Henderson, 208 N.J. at 255; Deffenbacher, 
18 
 
 
(6)  Failure to identify or inconsistent identification.  
You may take into account whether a witness ever tried and 
failed to make an identification of the defendant, or made an 
identification that was inconsistent with the identification 
that such witness made at trial. 
(7)  Totality of the evidence.  You should consider all the 
relevant factors that I have discussed, viewed in the context of 
the totality of the evidence in this case, in evaluating the 
accuracy of a witness's identification testimony.  Specifically, 
you should consider whether there was other evidence in the 
case, direct or circumstantial, that tends to support or not to 
support the accuracy of an identification.  If you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the 
person who committed [or participated in the commission of] the 
crime[s], you must find the defendant not guilty. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Bornstein, & Penrod, Mugshot Exposure Effects:  Retroactive 
Interference, Mugshot Commitment, Source Confusion, and 
Unconscious Transference, 30 Law & Hum. Behav. 287, 306 (2006) 
("prior mugshot exposure decreases accuracy at a subsequent 
lineup, both in terms of reductions in rates for hits and 
correct rejections as well as in terms of increases in the rate 
for false alarms").  See also Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 
377, 383-384 (1968); Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 826 
(1990).