Case Title: Ortega v. Flaim

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ortega v. Flaim1995 WY 146902 P.2d 199Case Number: 94-266Decided: 09/07/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jacqueline ORTEGA and Floyd Ortega,

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Guido 
FLAIM, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Robert 
W. Horn and Steven D. Olmstead, Jackson, for appellant.

Richard 
H. Honaker, Rock Springs, for appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      A social guest of 
landlord's tenant sustained personal injuries after falling down stairs at the 
tenant's residential dwelling. The social guest sued landlord for damages. 
Relying on the common law's general rule of landlord's immunity from liability, 
however, the district court granted landlord's motion for summary judgment. The 
social guest appealed, presenting this court with the primary issue of whether 
Wyoming will abandon the common law rules governing landlord liability as set 
forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 356-362 (1965) and adopt a duty of 
reasonable care. Alternatively, if the court does not impose a duty of 
reasonable care, appellant social guest invites this court to attach liability 
based on theories of implied warranty of habitability, strict liability, and 
nuisance. Having carefully considered the questions before us, we decline to 
abrogate the common law rule or attach liabilities under the presented 
alternative theories.

[¶2]  We affirm the grant of summary 
judgment.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant social 
guest presents these issues:

I. 
Where the terms of an oral agreement do not speak to whose obligation it is to 
make repairs, must a landlord who is advised by the tenant of a defect in the 
condition of stairs on the premises use ordinary care in repairing the defect or 
averting the danger caused by the defect? 

II. 
Does a duty exist on the part of a landlord who purchases a house sight unseen, 
with the intent of renting that house to a family, to use ordinary care in 
detecting dangers from defects in the structural, electrical, heating or 
plumbing systems of the house and warning of or averting those dangers once they 
are perceived?

III. 
When a landlord rents a home to a family based upon an oral agreement, is there 
an implied warranty of habitability that the home is fit for human habitation 
and has been maintained in a reasonably workmanlike manner?

IV. 
Where there are defects in a stair system does a material question of fact 
exist, precluding summary judgment, as to whether appellant's fall was caused by 
the defects in the stair system?

V. 
Where the owner of a house orally rents it, knowing or having reason to know of 
numerous safety violations in the stair system, does a material question of fact 
exist, precluding summary judgment, as to whether the home is a 
nuisance?

VI. 
May a landlord who fails to inspect a rental house be held strictly liable when 
he rents the house in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to those who 
may be expected to use the premises?

[¶4]      Appellee landlord 
rephrases in this way:

1. 
Under the facts of this case, did Appellee owe a duty of care to the social 
guests of his tenants?

2. 
As a matter of law, have Appellants failed to establish causation?

3. 
Should the Court reject Appellants' requests to radically alter Wyoming premises 
liability law by overruling longstanding precedent and by creating new claims 
for relief?

FACTS

[¶5]      In 1981, Appellee 
Guido Flaim (landlord) purchased seven homes, sight unseen, by contract for deed 
and received the warranty deeds on August 6, 1990. One of those properties, a 
residential home located at 324 "O" Street in Rock Springs, Wyoming, was orally 
leased to Dan and Becky Stroud (tenants). The oral lease was a bare bones 
commitment by the tenants to pay rent of $200.00 per month in return for 
landlord's surrender of possession. The parties did not discuss or make any 
agreements regarding repairs, express warranties of habitability, landlord's 
right to reenter or landlord's retention of any control over the premises. 
Tenants received exclusive possession and control.

[¶6]      Appellant Jackie 
Ortega (Ortega) was a social guest of the tenants on the evening of July 17, 
1992. Ortega had visited at the house before and knew the house contained an 
interior stairway descending to the basement. In the early morning hours of July 
18, 1992, Ortega told several people she was going to the bathroom and left the 
kitchen. A few seconds later others heard a crash and found an injured Ortega at 
the bottom of the staircase. Ortega filed suit against landlord alleging a 
defective staircase caused her injuries and discovery followed.

[¶7]      Discovery 
revealed essential material facts of this case were undisputed, although the 
parties disputed whether the tenants had previously complained to the landlord 
that the stair system was dangerous because it was too steep, its treads too 
narrow and it did not have a handrail. Under the law applicable to landlord 
liability, this factual dispute was relevant only to the issue of whether the 
defects were patent or latent. Accepting the tenants' contention they had 
complained only indicated any defects of the staircase were patent.

[¶8]      Following 
discovery, landlord moved for summary judgment based upon depositions indicating 
the material facts were undisputed and the question faced was a legal question 
of whether the law attached liability to a landlord. The district court held the 
common law rule of landlord nonliability applied and although exceptions to the 
general rule existed, none applied to these facts. The district court summarily 
rejected the other liability theories as being without merit. The landlord's 
motion for summary judgment was granted and this appeal followed.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶9]  Our often stated standard of review for 
summary judgment appeals is well known and need not be repeated here. 

DISCUSSION

Landlord 
Liability

[¶10]   In the landlord and tenant 
relationship, Wyoming follows the common law rules. Lyden v. Winer, 878 P.2d 516 
(Wyo. 1994); Mostert v. CBL & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1099 (Wyo. 1987); 
Medlock v. Van Wagner, 625 P.2d 207, 208 (Wyo. 1981); Matter of Estate of Mora, 
611 P.2d 842, 847 (Wyo. 1980). Under those rules, a landlord owes no greater duty to 
a tenant's guests than the landlord owes to the tenant himself. Clemmons v. 
Fidler, 58 Wn. App. 32, 791 P.2d 257, 260 (1990). Generally, that duty is 
nonexistent since landlords enjoy immunity from tort liability, being one of the 
few classes of defendants who can invoke caveat emptor.

[¶11]   The common law rule as applied 
today actually originated during 16th century feudalism when a tenant leased to 
acquire land. Buildings were simple and their living conditions of little 
concern to the tenant. Tenants' rights were best protected by the common law 
view that a landlord's lease to a tenant was a conveyance of the premises for 
the term of the lease.1 From that view, the tenant was the 
owner and occupier subject to all the responsibilities of one in possession and 
burdened with maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition to protect 
persons who came upon the land. Borders v. Roseberry, 216 Kan. 486, 532 P.2d 1366, 1368-69 (1975). As a general rule, the landlord owed no duty to the tenant 
or the tenant's guests for dangerous or defective conditions of the premises. 
Medlock, 625 P.2d  at 208; Hefferin v. Scott Realty Co., 71 Wyo. 114, 254 P.2d 194, 197 (1953); and see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 335, 356 
(1965).

[¶12]   Over time, the courts created 
exceptions to the rule of landlord nonliability, some of which have been 
recognized in Wyoming:

1. 
Undisclosed conditions known to lessor and unknown to the lessee which were 
hidden or latently dangerous and caused an injury. Medlock, 625 P.2d  at 
208.

2. 
The premises were leased for public use and a member of the public was 
injured.

3. 
Part of the premises was retained under the lessor's control, but was open to 
the use of the lessee. Lyden, 878 P.2d  at 518.

4. 
Lessor had contracted to repair the premises. Hefferin, 254 P.2d  at 
197.

5. 
Negligence by lessor in making repairs. Brubaker v. Glenrock Lodge Int'l Order 
of Odd Fellows, 526 P.2d 52 (Wyo. 1974).

and 
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 356-362 (1965).

[¶13]   In order for social guest Ortega to 
succeed in imposing landlord liability in this case, Wyoming's adherence to the 
common law rule must be abandoned. She points to Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 
308 A.2d 528 (1973), in which the court did abandon the common law rule and 
impose a duty of reasonable care on landlords. Similar to this case, Sargent 
involved a fall down the stairs, but the fall was caused by the landlord's 
negligent construction of the stairs. The resulting defective stairs caused a 
child to fall to her death. The tenants in Sargent had no authority to alter or 
remedy the defective stairs and the court considered that the steepness of the 
stairway could be considered a hidden defect or secret danger in the case of a 
child since the danger and risk may have been obvious to an adult but may have 
been imperceptible to a child. Sargent, 308 A.2d  at 531-32. Despite the 
possibility that this hidden defect exception applied, the court chose to 
abandon the general rule of landlord nonliability and apply ordinary negligence 
principles.

[¶14]   Sargent's conclusion that the 
nonliability rule must be abandoned followed the court's examination of the 
reasons for the landlord nonliability rule. Determining those reasons should be 
reevaluated in light of current needs and principles of law from related areas, 
the court found that stare decisis must yield to the need for responsible growth 
and change in rules that have failed to keep pace with modern developments. 
Sargent, 308 A.2d  at 530, 534.

[¶15]   Other states, either judicially or 
through legislation, have accepted the contention that tenants in today's modern 
society are primarily concerned with acquiring a place to live rather than 
acquiring land to farm and have abrogated the common law rule. New Hampshire's 
lead in the adoption of an independent negligence doctrine for landlords has 
been followed by several other states. Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 91 
Wis.2d 734, 284 N.W.2d 55 (1979); Young v. Garwacki, 380 Mass. 162, 402 N.E.2d 1045 (1980); Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1981); Stephens v. Stearns, 
106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984); Turpel v. Sayles, 101 Nev. 35, 692 P.2d 1290 
(1985); Favreau v. Miller, 156 Vt. 222, 591 A.2d 68 (1991); Newton v. Magill, 
872 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1994). Other states have construed statutes, contracts, or 
an implied warranty of habitability as imposing tort liability upon landlords. 
Since the 1970s, this legal trend has resulted in the majority of states 
abrogating the common law rule of landlord nonliability under various legal 
theories. See Olin L. Browder, The Taming of a Duty - The Tort Liability of 
Landlords, 81 MICH.L.REV. 99, 112-13 (Nov. 1982); and see Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985).

[¶16]   Presently, Wyoming has no legal 
basis for landlord tort liability as it has not enacted legislation on this 
issue, has not judicially recognized an implied warranty of habitability for 
rental premises and has not judicially altered the common law rule. Social guest 
Ortega asserts Wyoming should abandon the common law rule and adopt landlord 
liability under both an independent negligence doctrine and an implied warranty 
of habitability. Landlord argues that when the tenant knows of dangerous 
conditions and is in control of the premises, the tenant is in the best position 
to at least warn social guests of the danger.

[¶17]   The common law "is but the 
accumulated expressions of the various judicial tribunals in their efforts to 
ascertain what is right and just between individuals with respect to private 
disputes." Newton, 872 P.2d  at 1217-18. By this definition, the common law is 
dynamic and a court can modify it to meet changing conditions. Nulle v. 
Gillette-Campbell Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Wyo. 1990); Newton, 872 P.2d  at 
1218. This court has modified or abandoned the common law on the issues of 
interspousal tort immunity, parental tort immunity, recovery for loss of spousal 
and parental consortium, negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
off-premises liability of a lessee, and classifications of tort plaintiffs in 
landowner liability cases.2

[¶18]   Where this court has considered 
whether a duty should be imposed based on a particular relationship, numerous 
factors have been balanced to aid in determining whether a duty should be 
imposed.3 Social guest Ortega does not 
analyze these factors or provide a record for our analysis, but offers only the 
decision of Sargent as argument that modern trends demand abrogation of the 
common law in this instance. We believe such a change cannot be based solely 
upon a trend, but rather must be based upon relevant data and analysis which 
supports the legal, social and/or economic theories behind abrogating the common 
law.

[¶19]   Although most states have 
judicially recognized some type of landlord liability without relevant data, 
this recognition appears to have been driven by a desire to further the social 
policy of improving living conditions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, 
LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 17.6 (1977). In our opinion this is a matter for the 
legislature, and we decline to abrogate the common law in this instance without 
a proper record and insightful analysis of whether conditions in Wyoming warrant 
a change regarding residential leases.

[¶20]   Having held the common law will not 
be abrogated in this case, we apply it to the facts. Generally, when real 
property is leased to a tenant, the landlord's duty as a landowner shifts to the 
tenant as soon as the landlord surrenders possession and control of the premises 
to the tenant. Mostert, 741 P.2d  at 1090. Although the tenants had complained to 
the landlord the staircase was dangerous because it was too steep, the treads 
too narrow and it did not have a handrail, this evidence only indicates the 
defects were patent rather than latent. Absent a contractual provision to 
repair, a landlord has no duty to repair patent defects. The landlord owed no 
duty to social guest Ortega and summary judgment was properly 
granted.

Implied 
Warranty of Habitability

[¶21]   In Wyoming, an implied warranty of 
habitability attaches only to a sale of improved property by the builder. 
Barlage v. Key Bank of Wyoming, 892 P.2d 124, 126 (Wyo. 1995). The warranty is 
to be honored by the builder even as to remote purchasers, but is not applicable 
in sales between a nonbuilder vendor and a vendee. Barlage, 892 P.2d  at 
126.

[¶22]   Social guest Ortega contends 
Wyoming should join the majority of states in adopting the implied warranty of 
habitability for rental premises and then impose a tort duty upon landlords. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 17.6 (1977). For the 
same reasons discussed above, the rule of an implied warranty of habitability 
will not be extended to rental premises under these facts. Barlage, 892 P.2d  at 
126.

Nuisance

[¶23]   Social guest Ortega contends the 
stairs posed a private nuisance as defined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
821 (1965). Landlord contends application of this rule of nuisance requires that 
social guest Ortega have standing to assert this claim. Citing to RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821E, he claims recovery at law for damages or in equity for 
injunctive relief is limited to those who have property rights and privileges 
with respect to the use and enjoyment of the land affected. Landlord identifies 
those persons as including possessors, owners of easements and profits and 
owners of nonpossessory estates in the land who are detrimentally affected by 
interferences with its use and enjoyment.

[¶24]   Relying on this authority, landlord 
contends a social guest is a licensee with no property interest in the land and 
cannot maintain an action for private nuisance; social guest Ortega does not 
address the issue of standing. Although this particular section of the 
Restatement has not been adopted by this court, she does not provide argument or 
authority for its application. This court has generally limited nuisance actions 
to those situations described in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 371 (1965): 

A 
possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to others outside of 
the land caused by an activity carried on by him thereon which he realizes or 
should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of physical harm to them under 
the same conditions as though the activity were carried on at a neutral 
place.

Timmons 
v. Reed, 569 P.2d 112, 124 (Wyo. 1977). Without argument or analysis to support 
a nuisance action on these facts, social guest Ortega's claim for nuisance must 
be rejected as a matter of law. Summary judgment is affirmed on this 
issue.

Strict 
Liability

[¶25]   Social guest Ortega contends 
landlord is strictly liable to her under the rule of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 402A (1965), adopted by this court in Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 
716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986). Section 402A applies strict liability in product 
liability actions. She asserts the California decision of Becker v. IRM Corp., 
38 Cal. 3d 454, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 698 P.2d 116 (1985), extending strict 
liability to landlords should be applied in Wyoming because there is no 
significant difference between current Wyoming law and the rule in Becker. In 
Becker, a tenant injured by broken, untempered glass from his shower door 
recovered from the landlord under § 402A's strict liability rule. The Becker 
court determined the untempered shower door glass was a latently defective 
product since one viewing the glass could not distinguish it from tempered 
glass. The court considered shower door glass a product which the landlord had 
placed in the stream of commerce and, for policy reasons, the court extended 
strict liability to the landlord.

[¶26]   In adopting a strict liability 
cause of action for injuries caused by defective products, this court adopted 
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) definition of product liability. 
Ogle, 716 P.2d  at 341-42.

Special 
Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer

(1) 
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm 
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, 
if

(a) 
the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and

(b) 
it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change 
in the condition in which it is sold.

(2) 
The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

(a) 
the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his 
product, and

(b) 
the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the seller.

Ogle, 
716 P.2d  at 341-42.

[¶27]   The court's expressed policy reason 
for adopting product liability was to permit recovery by plaintiffs who would 
not recover under a negligence theory and distribute the damages among those 
most able to prevent future occurrences or who would pass on the loss to all 
customers. Ogle, 716 P.2d  at 342. This policy is effectuated by strict 
liability's focus on the product itself, and, in the absence of fault, holding a 
seller or distributor liable for injury or loss resulting from a defective 
product that entered the stream of commerce. McLaughlin v. Michelin Tire Corp., 
778 P.2d 59, 64 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶28]   Wyoming adopted product liability 
to afford a cause of action against manufacturers or suppliers of defective 
mass-produced products. To extend product liability to a landlord for a leased 
residential dwelling, or to an integral component of that dwelling, does not 
serve those policy reasons. See generally AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 
Part 11, § 38:15, p. 31, § 38:16, pp. 33-34 (Supp. 1995) (collecting cases 
holding buildings are not products and holding strict liability against 
landlords does not serve policy of § 402A); and see generally Boddie v. Litton 
Unit Handling Systems, 118 Ill. App.3d 520, 74 Ill.Dec. 112, 117-19, 455 N.E.2d 142, 147-49 (1983) (considering when components parts of buildings are products 
within the definition of § 402A). Summary judgment is affirmed on this issue. 

CONCLUSION

[¶29]   The common law rule that a landlord 
owes no duty to the social guest of a tenant unless the injury was caused by a 
latent defect or the landlord has retained control applies in this case and no 
duty was owed to social guest Ortega. A duty was not created by virtue of any 
contractual relationship. Without duty, summary judgment was properly granted to 
landlord in social guest Ortega's action for negligence. No other legal basis 
for recovery for her personal injuries exists in Wyoming. The grant of summary 
judgment is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 
Jean C. Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, 
Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975 WIS.L.REV. 19, 26 (1975).

2 
Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065 (Wyo. 1987) (abrogating common law rule of 
interspousal tort immunity); Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153 (Wyo. 1992) 
(abrogating common law rule of parental tort immunity); Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 (Wyo. 1986) (rejecting common law rule denying recovery for loss of 
spousal consortium); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 
1990) (rejecting common law rule denying recovery for claim for loss of parental 
consortium); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986) (rejecting common law 
rule denying a family member recovery of damages for the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress); Mostert v. CBL & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987) 
(rejecting common law rule that a landowner has no duty to warn an invitee of 
risks off the landowner's premises); and Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293 (Wyo. 
1993) (rejecting the common law classifications of invitee and licensee and 
ruling that landowners owed a duty of reasonable care).

3 
In Mostert, the court analyzed the factors below in concluding movie theater 
lessees owed an affirmative duty to business invitees to warn of off-premises 
danger:

(1) 
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (3) the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the moral blame attached to 
the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy of preventing future harm, (6) the 
extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) the consequences to the community 
and the court system, and (8) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance 
for the risk involved.

Mostert, 
741 P.2d  at 1094, citing to Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d  at 196, quoting 
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22, 551 P.2d 334, 342, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166 (1976). The factors have been 
succinctly summarized in a landlord liability case as:

Factors 
to consider in imposing a duty on a landlord include weighing the relationship 
of the parties against the nature of the risk and the public interest in the 
proposed solution, as well as the likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the 
burden of guarding against it, and the consequences of placing that burden on a 
defendant.

C.S. 
v. Sophir, 220 Neb. 51, 368 N.W.2d 444, 446 (1985) (citations 
omitted).