Case Title: Matter of Sullivan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 116, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
IN THE MATTER OF A 
MEMBER OF THE BAR OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF DELAWARE: 
 
JOHN J. SULLIVAN, JR. 
 
Petitioner. 
§ 
§   No. 116, 2002 
§ 
§   Board Case No. 46, 2001 
§    
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: May 7, 2002 
  Decided: June 27, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
Upon Review of the Report of the Board on Professional Responsibility.  
Findings Affirmed.  Petitioner Reinstated with Conditions. 
 
 
Bruce A. Rogers, Esquire, Georgetown, Delaware, for Petitioner. 
 
 
Andrea L. Rocanelli, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for the Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Per Curiam: 
 
 
 
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The petitioner, John J. Sullivan, Jr., has filed an application for 
reinstatement to active practice as a Delaware lawyer.  This Court had 
suspended Sullivan from the practice of law for a period of eighteen months 
beginning September 1, 1998 for numerous violations of the Delaware Lawyers’ 
Rules of Professional Conduct (DLRPC), including making false statements to 
clients, failing to act with diligence, and failing to provide competent 
representation.1  Sullivan filed his petition for reinstatement with the Board on 
Professional Responsibility on September 26, 2001.   
After a hearing on December 10, 2001, a Panel of the Board (the Panel) 
issued a report, dated March 6, 2002, recommending that Sullivan be reinstated 
to active practice, subject to a three year period of public probation with 
conditions. The Panel adopted all of the probationary conditions recommended 
by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) except for two. The Panel 
specifically rejected the ODC=s recommendations that (i) Sullivan make a 
formal offer for repayment of a $76,000 debt to a client, which previously had 
been discharged in bankruptcy; and (ii) Sullivan be required to carry malpractice 
insurance.  Sullivan raised no objections to the Panel’s Report.  The ODC filed 
                                                           
1In re Sullivan, 727 A.2d 832 (Del. 1999). 
 
 
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objections to the Panel=s Report with respect to the two probationary conditions 
that the Panel rejected. 
Reinstatement Hearing 
 
Pursuant to DLRPC Rule 22, a lawyer petitioning for reinstatement to 
active practice after a suspension in excess of six months must be able to 
demonstrate to the Board, by clear and convincing evidence, the lawyer’s 
professional rehabilitation and current professional competence.2  In support of 
his petition, Sullivan presented the testimony of several witnesses. 
 
Dr. Carol Tavani testified before the Panel that she first met Sullivan in 
1997 when he was referred to her by Victor Battaglia, Esquire, in his role as a 
member of the Professional Guidance Committee.  Dr. Tavani diagnosed 
Sullivan as suffering from profound major depression and anxiety disorder with 
severe phobia.  Dr. Tavani stated that Sullivan has continued to treat with her 
and has made excellent progress.  She testified that, although Sullivan will need 
to continue taking medication indefinitely to treat his disorders, he is fully able 
                                                           
2 DEL. L. R. PROF. RESPONSIBILITY 22(g) (2002).  Rule 22(g) provides, in part, that the 
petitioning lawyer must demonstrate: (1) professional rehabilitation, including rehabilitation 
from any drug or alcohol problem; (2) compliance with all applicable disciplinary orders, 
including restitution orders; (3) fitness to practice; (4) overall competence and current 
awareness of developments in the law; (5) no professional misconduct since the suspension; 
(6) recognition of the wrongfulness of the prior misconduct; (7) honesty and professional 
integrity; and (8) resumption of the lawyer’s practice of law will not be detrimental to the 
administration of justice. 
 
 
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to return to the practice of law.  She opined that Sullivan presents a very low 
risk for recidivism and that he does not represent a danger to the public. 
 
Dr. Neal Shore, who testified on behalf of the ODC, concurred with Dr. 
Tavani’s diagnosis.  Dr. Shore also stated that, as long as Sullivan continues to 
remain in active treatment, a recurrence of his professional misconduct was 
unlikely.  In sum, Dr. Shore opined that Sullivan “is currently able and fit to 
return to the practice of law.” 
 
Sullivan testified on his own behalf.  He testified about the misconduct 
that had led to his eighteen month suspension and his subsequent treatment for 
the depression and anxiety that had precipitated the misconduct.  He 
acknowledged that three of the seven client matters that had resulted in his 
suspension had also resulted in malpractice claims against him.  While two of 
those matters remain in litigation, one matter, involving a client named Robert 
Smith, had been settled and had resulted in a judgment against Sullivan for 
$76,000.  One of the conditions of the settlement was that Smith’s judgment 
would not be dischargeable in bankruptcy.  Notwithstanding this agreement, 
Sullivan testified that, upon the advice of counsel, he listed Smith’s obligation as 
a dischargeable debt in his bankruptcy petition.  Ultimately, the $76,000 
obligation was compromised to $25,000.  Sullivan testified that he feels a moral 
 
 
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obligation to Smith to repay the full $76,000, although he cannot afford to do it 
at this time. 
 
The final witness to testify was Joseph Wahl, Esquire.  Wahl testified that 
his law practice is limited to domestic relations.  Sullivan has been working in 
his office as a paralegal since 1999.  Wahl testified that Sullivan’s work product 
is outstanding, and he intends to expand Sullivan’s duties incrementally if 
Sullivan is reinstated.  Wahl stated that he would be willing to act in the capacity 
of Sullivan’s practice monitor.  Wahl testified that he does not maintain 
malpractice insurance but that his personal assets are significant enough to cover 
any successful malpractice claim against his firm. 
Panel’s Findings and Recommendation 
 
After considering all of the testimony, the Panel found that Sullivan had 
proven his rehabilitation and his current professional competence by clear and 
convincing evidence and concluded that Sullivan should be reinstated, subject to 
a three year period of probation upon reinstatement.  The Panel then considered 
the conditions for Sullivan’s probation, which were proposed by the ODC.  
Sullivan consented to all of the conditions but the following two:  (i) that he be 
required to make a formal offer of payment to Mr. Smith for the $76,000 debt; 
and (ii) that he be required to carry malpractice insurance in limits to be 
 
 
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approved by the ODC.  After careful consideration, the Panel rejected the two 
disputed conditions, stating: 
The Panel did not agree with two conditions offered by the ODC.  
The first condition is that Petitioner be required to contact Mr. Smith and 
to make a formal offer for repayment of $76,000.00.  The Panel was 
concerned that Petitioner was already discharged of this obligation by a 
court of competent jurisdiction.  The Panel was also impressed with 
Petitioner’s sworn statement during the proceeding that he treats this as a 
moral obligation and intends to make complete payment to Mr. Smith.  
Likewise, the Panel did not adopt the requirement that Petitioner be 
required to carry malpractice insurance.  Petitioner, by the terms of his 
probation, is prohibited from engaging in the solo practice of law.  His 
current employer, Mr. Wahl, has indicated under oath and as an officer of 
the Court and member of the Delaware Bar that he would intend to make 
good any client wronged with his personal assets.  While the panel 
recognizes that the Court imposed such an obligation in the matter of In 
re Solomon, it appears that the Court required Respondent in that action 
“to continue to carry malpractice insurance commensurate with her 
current coverage.”  In re Solomon, Del. Supr., 745 A.2d 892 (1999). 
 
ODC’s Objections 
 
The ODC filed objections to the Panel’s Report limited to the Panel’s 
rejection of the two disputed probationary conditions.  The ODC argues that the 
primary purpose of the disciplinary system is to protect the public.  Given 
Sullivan’s history of prior misconduct, which resulted in three malpractice 
actions and Sullivan’s suspension from the practice of law for eighteen months, 
the ODC argues that malpractice insurance is necessary because it is the only 
effective method to protect the public in the event of Sullivan’s future 
 
 
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malpractice. 
 
The ODC points out that this Court, albeit in a different context, has 
required a lawyer to carry malpractice insurance as a condition of disciplinary 
probation.3  Furthermore, given Sullivan’s own financial situation and his 
apparent inability to cover any future legal malpractice claims with his own 
resources,4 the ODC argues that it is necessary for Sullivan’s employer to have 
sufficient malpractice insurance to cover any successful claims of malpractice by 
Sullivan. 
 
The ODC asserts, and Sullivan conceded at the hearing, that his former 
clients would have had no recourse for his previous misconduct if his former 
employer had not had malpractice insurance.  Sullivan’s current employer does 
not maintain malpractice insurance, and the ODC argues that his current 
employer’s representations about his ability to satisfy any malpractice judgment 
with personal resources are not adequate for two primary reasons.  First, there 
was no evidence at the hearing concerning the extent of the employer’s 
resources in order for the Panel to determine whether those resources indeed 
                                                           
3 See In re Solomon, 745 A.2d 892 (Del. 1999) (lawyer who already had malpractice 
insurance was ordered to continue carrying commensurate coverage during the period of 
disciplinary probation). 
4 The ODC states that two checks Sullivan paid toward the costs of the proceedings 
were returned for insufficient funds. 
 
 
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were adequate.  Second, even assuming the adequacy of the employer’s personal 
resources, Sullivan is not required to remain in his current position.  He is free to 
change employers at any time, which means that his clients may not have 
adequate malpractice protection from a subsequent employer.   
 
With respect to the second disputed condition, the ODC asserts that 
Sullivan should be required to make a formal agreement to repay the full 
$76,000 debt to Mr. Smith as a condition of his reinstatement.  The ODC argues 
that there is precedent for requiring a suspended lawyer, as a condition of 
reinstatement, to repay debts discharged in bankruptcy.5  The ODC argues that 
such a condition is particularly appropriate in Sullivan’s case because Sullivan 
breached his explicit agreement with Mr. Smith that the debt would not be 
discharged in bankruptcy. 
Reinstatement with Probationary Conditions 
We have reviewed the Panel=s Report and Recommendation carefully, as 
well as the ODC’s objections thereto.  We agree with the Panel’s factual 
findings and its recommendation that Sullivan be reinstated as an active member 
of the Delaware Bar.  We also agree with the ODC, however, that Sullivan’s 
reinstatement should be subject to a three year period of probation with all of the 
                                                           
5 See In re Flynn, Del. Supr., No. 431, 2001, Walsh, J. (Sept. 21, 2001). 
 
 
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proposed conditions, including the conditions of malpractice insurance and 
Sullivan’s formal agreement to repay in full the $76,000 debt to Mr. Smith.  
 
The primary goal of the lawyer disciplinary system is to protect the 
public.6  Although legal malpractice insurance is not mandatory for all members 
of the Delaware Bar,7 there is precedent in this jurisdiction8 and other 
jurisdictions9 to require a lawyer, in an appropriate case, to have malpractice 
insurance.   
 
We commend Sullivan for his efforts at treatment for the issues that 
precipitated his previous misconduct, and we accept his doctor’s opinion that 
future professional misconduct is unlikely as long as Sullivan remains in active 
treatment.  Nonetheless, we conclude that it would be a breach of our duty to the 
public if we were to permit a lawyer with Sullivan’s history of malpractice to be 
reinstated as an active member of the Bar without adequate malpractice 
insurance coverage.  Moreover, given Sullivan’s earlier agreement that Smith’s 
debt would not be dischargeable in bankruptcy, we find it entirely appropriate to 
                                                           
6 Cf.  In re Hull, 767 A.2d 197, 201 (Del. 2001). 
7 But see OR. REV. STAT. § 9.080 (requiring malpractice insurance for all lawyers 
licensed in the State of Oregon). 
8  See In re Solomon, 745 A.2d 892 (Del. 1999).  
9 See, e.g., Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 854 P.2d 280 (Id. 1993); People 
v. Convery, 758 P.2d 1338 (Colo. 1988). 
 
 
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require Sullivan, as a condition of his reinstatement, to acknowledge his debt to 
Smith in writing and to make appropriate payments toward this debt. 
Conclusion 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, effective immediately, that 
Sullivan be REINSTATED as a member of the Bar of this Court subject to a 
three year probationary period.  During his probation, Sullivan shall be subject 
to the following conditions: 
 
a. 
Sullivan shall be prohibited from engaging in the solo practice of 
law. 
 
b. 
Sullivan shall be directly supervised by a Delaware attorney. 
 
c. 
Sullivan shall notify his employer of the terms and conditions of his 
reinstatement. 
d. 
Sullivan shall have a practice monitor approved by the ODC.  
Sullivan shall meet at least monthly with his practice monitor with whom he 
shall discuss his work and practice. During the first year of probation, the 
practice monitor shall report at least monthly to the ODC to advise of Sullivan=s 
compliance with the terms of his probation. During the second and third years of 
probation, the practice monitor shall report at least quarterly to the ODC to 
advise of Sullivan=s compliance with the terms of his probation.   
 
 
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e. 
Sullivan shall remain in active psychiatric treatment and remain on 
medication prescribed by his treating psychiatrist. 
f. 
Sullivan shall authorize the release of reports from his psychiatrist 
to the ODC documenting (i) the absence of phobic or depressive symptoms; (ii) 
the absence of any emergence of denial on Sullivan’s part of his mental illness; 
and (iii) compliance with medication. 
 
g.  
Sullivan shall provide monthly reports directly to the ODC by the 
treating professionals each month for the first year of the probation and quarterly 
reports due for the second and third years of probation. 
 
h. 
Sullivan shall submit to independent psychiatric examinations, if 
requested by the ODC.  Sullivan shall authorize the release of any psychiatric 
evaluations directly to ODC. 
 
i. 
Sullivan shall provide written self-reports to the ODC outlining 
compliance/non-compliance with the terms of probation.  Monthly reports must 
be provided directly to the ODC each month during the first year of the 
probation and quarterly reports during the second and third years. 
 
j. 
Sullivan shall reimburse the outstanding costs of the disciplinary 
proceedings as determined by the ODC and upon the terms set by the ODC.   
k
.
 
Sullivan shall contact Robert N. Smith with whom a settlement was 
 
 
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reached for a legal malpractice action.  Sullivan shall make a formal offer for 
repayment of $76,000 and make payments toward this debt as negotiated with 
Mr. Smith. 
 
l. 
Sullivan shall complete appropriate credit hours of Mandatory 
Continuing Legal Education on or before December 31, 2002 with a focus in the 
area of family law. 
 
m. 
Sullivan shall cooperate fully with the ODC in its efforts to monitor 
compliance with the probation.  Sullivan shall cooperate with the ODC=s 
investigation of any allegations of unprofessional conduct that may come to the 
attention of the ODC. Upon request of the ODC, Sullivan shall authorize the 
release of information and documentation to verify compliance with the terms of 
his probation.  
 
n. 
Sullivan shall carry malpractice insurance with limits to be 
approved by the ODC. 
o. 
If the ODC concludes, after giving Sullivan an opportunity to 
respond, that Sullivan has violated the terms of his probation or had a recurrence 
of mental illness, the ODC may file a petition directly with this Court requesting 
that the Court suspend Sullivan on an interim basis or, if appropriate, transfer 
Sullivan to disability inactive status.