Case Title: State v. Marble

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 157

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-11-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 157 
Docket: 
Cum-18-485 
Argued: 
October 10, 2019 
Decided: 
November 7, 2019 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
DAVID W. MARBLE JR. 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
[¶1]  David W. Marble Jr. appeals from a judgment of conviction of two 
counts of intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. §§ 201(1)(A) (2018), 
1158-A(1)(B) (2015),1 entered by the trial court (Cumberland County, 
Murphy, J.) after a jury trial.2  Marble argues that the court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress evidence of his cell site location information because the 
information was obtained through a search warrant issued without probable 
cause.  We affirm the judgment. 
                                         
1  Title 17-A M.R.S. § 1158-A has since been repealed and replaced.  See P.L. 2019, ch. 113, §§ A-1, 
A-2 (effective May 16, 2019) (to be codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 1504.) 
2  Marble was also convicted of illegal possession of a firearm by a prohibited person (Class C), 
15 M.R.S. § 393(1)(C) (2015), after waiving his right to a jury trial on that count.  See P.L. 2015, 
ch. 470, § 1 (effective July 29, 2016 (amending 15 M.R.S. § 393(1), but not in any way relevant to this 
appeal).  Marble does not challenge this conviction on appeal.   
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  On December 26, 2015, a detective investigating two apparent 
homicides applied for a search warrant for the historical cell site location 
information (CSLI) of seven telephone numbers, including Marble’s, that were 
in contact with the cell phone of one of the victims in the hours before he was 
killed.  The detective’s affidavit supporting the warrant application averred the 
following facts relevant to the existence of probable cause to justify a search of 
Marble’s cell phone records.  See State v. Nunez, 2016 ME 185, ¶¶ 18-20, 153 
A.3d 84. 
[¶3]  At approximately 3:30 a.m. on December 25, 2015, a woman called 
9-1-1 reporting that she had been shot.  The police were able to track the 9-1-1 
call to the area of Summerhaven Road in Manchester, Maine; when the police 
arrived, they found the bodies of one male victim and one female victim in a car 
they later learned belonged to the male victim.  No gun was found at the scene, 
but a cell phone was found in the female victim’s lap.  This cell phone—which 
belonged to the male victim—was the phone used to make the 9-1-1 call.  
[¶4]  Marble was a drug dealer operating in Maine and the male victim 
worked for him.  Two days before the murders, the male victim was supposed 
to collect money from another drug dealer and bring it to Marble but he did not 
 
 
3 
do so.  That same day, Marble obtained two handguns.  On December 24, eight 
calls were made to the male victim’s home phone from Marble’s cell phone 
number.  Just hours before the murders, the male victim and some friends broke 
into Marble’s apartment while Marble was not there and stole televisions, 
backpacks, guns, and drugs.  Sometime after the male victim left Marble’s 
apartment but while the friends were still there, the male victim sent one of the 
friends a text message that read “leave.”  Marble’s cell phone was used to call 
the male victim’s cell phone at 2:14 a.m. on December 25, just eighty minutes 
before the 9-1-1 call.   
[¶5]  Based on the affidavit, a judge (Kennebec County, Dow, J.) issued a 
search warrant authorizing the seizure of records associated with seven cell 
phone numbers, including Marble’s.3  The police executed the warrant and 
obtained, from Marble’s cell phone service provider, Marble’s CSLI.   
[¶6]  On February 18, 2016, Marble was indicted on two counts of 
intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. §§ 201(1)(A), 1158-A(1)(B), for 
both deaths.4  Marble moved to suppress the evidence of his CSLI.  After a 
                                         
3  In addition to the location information, the search warrant authorized the police to obtain 
Marble’s cell phone content, such as text messages, voice mails, and call logs.  Marble challenges only 
the seizure of his CSLI.   
4  Marble was indicted in Kennebec County, but the case was transferred to Cumberland County 
after the court (Murphy, J.) granted Marble’s motion to change venue.   
 
 
4 
testimonial hearing5 held in July of 2018, the court (Cumberland County, 
Murphy, J.) denied Marble’s motion, concluding that the affidavit established 
“sufficient probable cause to believe that Mr. Marble was involved in these 
homicides and further that evidence of the crimes of homicide could be located 
in his phone.”   
[¶7]  Two weeks later, the court conducted an eight-day jury trial.  
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the jury 
rationally could have found the following facts.  See State v. McBreairty, 2016 
ME 61, ¶ 2, 137 A.3d 1012. 
[¶8]  Marble was involved in drug trafficking in the Augusta area and the 
male victim worked for him.  In the early morning hours of December 25, 2015, 
the male victim and some friends decided to burgle Marble’s Augusta 
apartment.  When Marble returned to the apartment, he discovered that the 
apartment had been burgled and expressed a belief that the male victim was 
responsible.  Along with two associates, Marble drove with the victims out to 
Summerhaven Road, where Marble shot and killed each of them.   
                                         
5  At the commencement of the hearing, the court made clear that its determination of whether 
the search warrant was supported by a showing of probable cause would be based on the information 
contained within the four corners of the affidavit.  The court took testimony, however, on some 
terminology used in the affidavit.   
 
 
5 
[¶9]  At the end of the trial, the jury found Marble guilty of both murder 
counts.  On November 9, 2018, the court sentenced Marble to a term of life 
imprisonment for the murder of the female victim and a concurrent term of 
seventy-five years in prison for the murder of the male victim.  Marble timely 
appealed from the resulting judgment.  See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2018); M.R. 
App. P. 2B(b)(1).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶10]  Marble argues that the judge who issued the warrant permitting 
the officers to obtain his CSLI erred in determining that there was probable 
cause supporting the warrant’s issuance.  When a trial court denies a motion to 
suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant, we “review directly 
the finding of probable cause made by the judicial officer who issued the 
warrant, affording that finding great deference.”  State v. Samson, 2007 ME 33, 
¶ 11, 916 A.2d 977.  Our inquiry is limited to the question of “whether there 
was a substantial basis for the single required finding of probable cause,” State 
v. Nickerson, 574 A.2d 1355, 1356 (Me. 1990), and we “must give the affidavit a 
positive reading and review the affidavit with all reasonable inferences that 
may be drawn to support the magistrate’s determination,” State v. Johndro, 
2013 ME 106, ¶ 9, 82 A.3d 820 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
6 
 
[¶11]  Since 2013, in Maine, law enforcement officers seeking 
information about the location of an electronic device like a cell phone have 
been required to obtain a warrant.  16 M.R.S. § 648 (2018).6  Recently, the 
United States Supreme Court held that law enforcement’s acquisition of seven 
days’ worth of an individual’s historical cell site location information from 
wireless carriers constituted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.7  
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).  In reaching its decision, the 
Court reasoned that an individual has a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI.”  Id. at 2217.  The 
officers investigating these murders complied with Carpenter and with 
16 M.R.S. § 648 when they sought a warrant to obtain Marble’s CSLI; our role is 
to determine whether there was a substantial basis for the court’s finding that 
the affidavit they presented in requesting that warrant established “probable 
                                         
6  Title 16 M.R.S. § 648 has since been amended, but not in any way relevant to this appeal.  See 
P.L. 2019, ch. 489, § 13 (effective Sept. 19, 2019) (to be codified at 16 M.R.S. § 648); P.L. 2017, ch. 144, 
§ 5 (effective June 8, 2017) (codified at 16 M.R.S. § 648 (2018)). 
7  The Supreme Court left open the question of whether accessing less than seven days of CSLI 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 
n.3 (2018) (“[W]e need not decide whether there is a limited period for which the Government may 
obtain an individual’s historical CSLI free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, and if so, how long that 
period might be.”).  Here, because law enforcement obtained a search warrant for Marble’s CSLI, we 
do not address that aspect of the Carpenter decision.   
 
 
 
7 
cause to believe that the grounds for the search exist[ed],” such as that the 
records would “constitute[] evidence of the commission of a crime.”  M.R.U. 
Crim. P. 41(c), (f)(1); see Nickerson, 574 A.2d at 1356. 
 
[¶12]  “A finding of probable cause rests on a practical, commonsense 
determination whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, 
there is a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place.”  State v. Simmons, 2016 ME 103, ¶ 11, 143 A.3d 819 (quotation marks 
omitted); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (setting forth the 
“totality-of-the-circumstances” test for probable cause).  To support probable 
cause, a warrant affidavit must “set forth some nexus between the evidence to 
be seized and the locations to be searched.”  Johndro, 2013 ME 106, ¶ 10, 
82 A.3d 820.  Thus, an application to search an individual’s CSLI typically must 
establish some connection between the individual and the crime for which the 
individual’s whereabouts may constitute evidence; that connection, however, 
need not be expressly articulated in the warrant application.  State v. Warner, 
2019 ME 140, ¶¶ 23-26, --- A.3d ---. 
 
[¶13]  Here, the information in the affidavit was sufficient to support the 
judge’s determination that there was probable cause to believe that Marble was 
involved in both homicides and that his CSLI would contain or constitute 
 
 
8 
evidence relevant to that crime.  From the facts in the affidavit, the judge who 
issued the warrant could infer that Marble knew the victims and was in close 
and very recent contact with them—the male victim worked for Marble in the 
local drug trade, and Marble had called him nine times over the course of the 
prior two days, including one call just over an hour before the murders; that 
Marble had the ability to commit the crime—he had recently acquired two 
guns; and that Marble likely had a motive—the male victim appeared to owe 
Marble money and had also burgled Marble’s apartment just hours before the 
murders.  Taken together, these facts are sufficient to support the judge’s 
determination that there was a “fair probability” that Marble’s historical CSLI 
would contain evidence of the murders.8  Johndro, 2013 ME 106, ¶ 10, 82 A.3d 
820. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
8  We are also unpersuaded by Marble’s argument that the trial court erred by instructing the jury 
on accomplice liability; the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a conviction based on either 
principal or accomplice liability.  See 17-A M.R.S. § 57(3)(A) (2018); State v. Pheng, 2002 ME 40, ¶ 9, 
791 A.2d 925; State v. Wright, 662 A.2d 198, 202 (Me. 1995). 
 
 
9 
Tina Heather Nadeau, Esq. (orally), The Law Office of Tina Heather Nadeau, 
PLLC, Portland, for appellant David Marble Jr.  
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen. 
(orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2017-2176 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY