Case Title: Dinkins v. Massachusetts Parole Board

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12882

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12882 
 
WILLIAM DINKINS, JR., & another1  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS PAROLE 
BOARD. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 10, 2020. - January 19, 2021. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.2 
 
 
Parole.  Imprisonment, Parole.  Regulation.  Statute, 
Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 25, 2018. 
 
 
After transfer to the Superior Court Department, the case 
was heard by Anthony M. Campo, J., on motions for summary 
judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Ryan M. Schiff for the plaintiffs. 
 
Jennifer K. Zalnasky, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Jeffrey G. Harris for Committee for Public Counsel Services 
& another. 
                     
 
1 Eugene Ivey. 
 
 
2 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
James R. Pingeon for Prisoners' Legal Services of 
Massachusetts. 
 
Patricia Garin for Northeastern University School of Law 
Prisoners' Assistance Project & others. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The issues presented on appeal are whether 120 
Code Mass. Regs. § 200.08(3)(c) (2017) (regulation), which 
concerns parole eligibility for inmates sentenced to a prison 
term that runs consecutive to a life sentence, conflicts with 
the statutory framework governing parole, violates due process 
or separation of powers principles, or, as applied to prisoners 
serving life sentences for offenses committed as a juvenile, 
violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
or art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights by failing 
to ensure that the inmate has a parole hearing at which he or 
she has a meaningful opportunity to obtain release.  We conclude 
that the regulation is contrary to the plain terms of the 
statutory framework governing parole and thus is invalid.  
Accordingly, we decline to reach the constitutional issues 
raised by the plaintiffs.3 
 
Background.  1.  William Dinkins, Jr.  Dinkins was 
convicted on two counts of murder in the first degree stemming 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services and the Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Prisoners' Legal 
Services of Massachusetts; and Northeastern University School of 
Law Prisoners' Assistance Project, Boston College Lifer Parole 
Clinic, and Harvard Law School Prison Legal Assistance Clinic. 
3 
 
 
from two separate and distinct incidents that occurred when he 
was seventeen years old.  See Commonwealth v. Dinkins, 440 Mass. 
715 (2004); Commonwealth v. Dinkins, 415 Mass. 715 (1993).  In 
the first case tried, the trial judge imposed a sentence of life 
without parole on the murder charge and concurrent sentences on 
charges of assault with intent to murder while armed, for a term 
of from nine to twelve years, and unlawfully carrying a firearm, 
for a term of from three to five years.  In the other case, the 
trial judge imposed a sentence of life without parole, ordering 
it to run consecutively to the other life sentence.  In 2000, 
Dinkins was convicted of assault and battery on a correction 
officer and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, and was 
sentenced to two concurrent terms of from seven to ten years to 
be served consecutively to the prior sentences.  In 2019, as a 
result of this court's decision in Diatchenko v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (2013), both of 
Dinkins's sentences of life without parole became sentences of 
life with the possibility of parole after fifteen years. 
 
2.  Eugene Ivey.  Ivey was convicted of murder in the 
second degree for an incident that occurred when he was 
seventeen years old.  See Commonwealth v. Ivey, 68 Mass. App. 
Ct. 1116 (2007).  The judge imposed a sentence of life with the 
possibility of parole after fifteen years.  In 2002, Ivey was 
convicted of three counts of assault and battery on a correction 
4 
 
 
officer and one count of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon.  He was sentenced to terms of from four to 
five years on each count, to be served concurrently with each 
other and consecutively to the life sentence.  In 2009, Ivey was 
denied parole at his initial parole hearing.  He waived his 2014 
parole hearing; in March 2020, he was granted parole from his 
life sentence to begin serving his sentences for the counts of 
assault and battery on a correction officer. 
 
3.  Procedural history.  In May 2018, the plaintiffs filed 
a complaint in the county court, seeking declaratory relief 
invalidating the regulation.  In October 2018, a single justice 
transferred the case to the Superior Court, as "the matter would 
benefit from consideration by a judge of the Superior Court in 
the first instance."  The plaintiffs then filed an amended 
complaint.  In July 2019, a judge of the Superior Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the parole board 
(board), finding the regulation to be valid.  The plaintiffs 
filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was entered in the 
Appeals Court in September 2019.  The plaintiffs then filed an 
application for direct appellate review, which we allowed. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  We are asked to 
determine the validity of the regulation.  Where a regulation is 
duly promulgated, it is "presumptively valid."  Buckman v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 484 Mass. 14, 23 (2020), quoting 
5 
 
 
Craft Beer Guild, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 481 
Mass. 506, 520 (2019).  However, an agency "does not have the 
authority to promulgate a regulation for the . . . 
administration of a statute that 'is contrary to the plain 
language of the statute and its underlying purpose.'"  Buckman, 
supra, quoting Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement Sys. v. 
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 466 Mass. 292, 301 (2013). 
 
In determining the validity of a regulation, we first look 
to the language of the controlling statute, see Buckman, supra 
at 24, to determine "whether the Legislature has spoken with 
certainty on the topic in question."  New England Power 
Generators Ass'n v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 480 Mass. 
398, 404 (2018), quoting Goldberg v. Board of Health of Granby, 
444 Mass. 627, 632-633 (2005).  Where a statute speaks clearly 
on the issue, "we determine whether the regulation is consistent 
with or contrary to the statute's plain language," Buckman, 
supra, in an effort to "give effect to the Legislature's intent" 
(citation omitted), New England Power Generators Ass'n, supra.  
Where a regulation does not speak clearly on the issue, "we 
accord substantial deference to the agency charged with 
interpreting and administering the statute in question, and do 
not invalidate regulations unless their provisions cannot by any 
reasonable construction be interpreted in harmony with the 
legislative mandate" (quotations and citation omitted).  Craft 
6 
 
 
Beer Guild, LLC, 481 Mass. at 520.  However, "[a]n incorrect 
interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency is not 
entitled to deference."  Kszepka's Case, 408 Mass. 843, 847 
(1990). 
 
Additionally, the regulation here must be interpreted 
within the context of the larger statutory framework governing 
parole.  "[W]here two or more statutes relate to the same 
subject matter, they should be construed together so as to 
constitute a harmonious whole consistent with the legislative 
purpose."  Young v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 486 
Mass. 1, 11 (2020), quoting Sebago v. Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc., 
471 Mass. 321, 339 (2015). 
 
2.  Statutory framework governing parole.  The board is 
tasked with the duty to "determine which prisoners in the 
correctional institutions of the commonwealth or in jails or 
houses of correction may be released on parole, and when and 
under what conditions, and the power within such jurisdiction to 
grant a parole permit to any prisoner."  G. L. c. 27, § 5.  The 
Legislature has not defined parole by statute.  However, this 
court previously has stated, "Parole provides prisoners with the 
opportunity to serve the balance of their term of imprisonment 
outside a prison provided that they comply with the conditions 
established by the parole board . . ." (emphasis added).  
Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 298 (2014).  This court 
7 
 
 
also approvingly has referred to parole as "conditional release 
of a prisoner from imprisonment before the full sentence has 
been served . . . on the condition that the parolee regularly 
report to a supervising officer for a specified period."  See 
id., quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1227 (9th ed. 2009).  This 
definition is in line with the statutory framework established 
by the Legislature, as laid out in G. L. c. 127, § 130, which 
governs the granting of parole permits: 
"Permits shall be granted only if the board is of the 
opinion, after consideration of a risk and needs 
assessment, that there is a reasonable probability that, if 
the prisoner is released with appropriate conditions and 
community supervision, the prisoner will live and remain at 
liberty without violating the law and that release is not 
incompatible with the welfare of society. . . .  A prisoner 
to whom a parole permit is granted shall be allowed to go 
upon parole outside prison walls and inclosure upon such 
terms and conditions as the parole board shall 
prescribe . . . ." 
 
See 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 300.04(1) (2017).  Pursuant to its 
statutory authority, then, the board "has the power only to 
permit a defendant to serve the balance of his term of 
imprisonment outside the prison walls . . . and the power to 
revoke the parole permit and return the [parolee] to prison or 
jail for the balance of his term of imprisonment."  Cole, supra 
at 299. 
 
Once an inmate has served the minimum term of his or her 
sentence, the inmate may be eligible for parole.  See G. L. 
c. 127, § 133.  When an inmate receives two or more sentences 
8 
 
 
that run consecutively, the inmate becomes eligible for parole 
at the time of his or her parole eligibility date.  General Laws 
c. 127, § 133, requires the board to establish a single parole 
eligibility date and provides, in part: 
"Where an inmate is serving two or more consecutive or 
concurrent state prison sentences, a single parole 
eligibility shall be established for all such sentences.  
Prisoners who are granted parole permits shall remain 
subject to the jurisdiction of the board until the 
expiration of the maximum term of sentence or, if a 
prisoner has two or more sentences to be served otherwise 
than concurrently, until the aggregate maximum term of such 
sentence, unless earlier terminated by the board under the 
provisions of [§ 130A]." 
 
 
Pursuant to the board's regulations, that parole 
eligibility date is calculated by aggregating the minimum parole 
eligibility dates for each component sentence and using the 
latest date as the parole eligibility date -- a process often 
referred to as "aggregation" or the "aggregation rule."  See 120 
Code Mass. Regs. § 200.08(2). 
 
The board has established three exceptions to the 
aggregation rule, as laid out in 120 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 200.08(3).4  Exception (c), the regulation at issue in this 
                     
 
4 The parties do not argue -- and we do not hold -- that the 
other two exceptions codified at 120 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 200.08(3)(a) and (b) suffer the same invalidity as the 
regulation at issue here.  These two exceptions to the 
aggregation rule relate to (a) crimes committed while on parole 
and (b) split sentences.  The statutory support for these 
exemptions is questionable.  See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 482 
Mass. 366, 372-373 (2019) (discussing enactment of "truth-in-
sentencing" act in 1993 that eliminated split prison sentences, 
9 
 
 
case, states:  "A sentence for a crime committed on or after 
January 1, 1988 which is ordered to run consecutive to a life 
sentence shall not be aggregated with the life sentence for 
purposes of calculating parole eligibility on the consecutive 
sentence."5  Thus, for an inmate serving a sentence consecutive 
to a life sentence, the board does not calculate a single parole 
eligibility date.  Rather, the inmate must first serve the 
minimum term of the life sentence and be granted parole from the 
life sentence.  Once that occurs -- if it ever does -- the 
inmate then begins to serve the consecutive sentence.  It is 
only after the inmate serves the minimum term of the consecutive 
sentence that the inmate may be eligible for parole and 
potentially may be released from confinement.6 
 
3.  The regulation.  The board argues that the regulation 
is a valid exception to the aggregation rule because parole 
eligibility for life sentences is governed exclusively by G. L. 
                     
which are exempted from aggregation rule in 120 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 200.08[3][b]).  Regardless, we emphasize that our holding 
today is limited to the validity of 120 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 200.08(3)(c). 
 
 
5 All the crimes in this case occurred after January 1, 
1988. 
 
 
6 The same process is used if the inmate has received 
multiple life sentences, multiple consecutive sentences, or 
both.  In such a case, the inmate must be paroled from the life 
sentence(s) before he or she can begin to serve any subsequent 
consecutive sentences. 
 
10 
 
 
c. 127, § 133A, and thus the sole parole eligibility date 
requirement of G. L. c. 127, § 133, does not apply to sentences 
ordered to run consecutive to a life sentence.  The board reads 
into § 133A a requirement that the inmate be paroled first from 
his life sentence before beginning to serve a consecutive 
sentence. 
 
We conclude that the Legislature has "spoken with 
certainty" on the topic of parole and the establishment of a 
single parole eligibility date.  See New England Power 
Generators Ass'n, 480 Mass. at 404.  The regulation, by 
exempting sentences consecutive to a life sentence from the 
aggregation rule, contravenes the plain meaning of G. L. c. 127, 
§§ 130 and 133.7 
                     
 
7 "Significance in interpretation may be given to a 
consistent, long continued administrative application of an 
ambiguous statute . . . especially if the interpretation is 
contemporaneous with the enactment."  Connery v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 414 Mass. 1009, 1010 (1993), quoting Cleary v. 
Cardullo's, Inc., 347 Mass. 337, 343 (1964).  The parties 
disagree as to whether the regulation represents a long 
continued practice of the board.  Specifically, the parties 
disagree on whether the board applied the aggregation rule to 
sentences consecutive to a life sentence prior to this court's 
decision in Henschel v. Commissioner of Correction, 368 Mass. 
130 (1975).  The board relies on Hamm v. Latessa, 72 F.3d 947, 
950 (1st Cir. 1995), to argue that prior to 1977, it was the 
practice of the board not to aggregate consecutive sentences to 
a life sentence.  The plaintiffs rely on Hamm v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 1011 (1991), to argue the 
opposite.  Because we hold that the board's interpretation of 
the statute and resulting regulation are contrary to the plain 
meaning of the statutory framework governing parole, the 
11 
 
 
 
The regulation contravenes the plain meaning of § 130.  
While the Legislature has not defined the term "parole" within 
the statutory framework at issue here, we are required to 
"ascertain the intent of a statute from all its parts and from 
the subject matter to which it relates, and must interpret the 
statute so as to render the legislation effective, consonant 
with sound reason and common sense."  Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 
(2006).  "[S]tatutory language should be given effect consistent 
with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the 
Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result."  
Commonwealth v. Wassilie, 482 Mass. 562, 573 (2019), quoting 
Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).  See 
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 415 Mass. 697, 700 (1993), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977) ("We 
derive the words' usual and accepted meaning from sources 
presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in 
other legal contexts and dictionary definitions").  General Laws 
c. 127, § 130, requires that an inmate who is granted a parole 
permit "shall be allowed to go upon parole outside prison walls 
and inclosure upon such terms and conditions as the parole board 
shall prescribe."  This plain language evidences the 
                     
interpretation is not entitled to deference, see Kszepka's Case, 
408 Mass. at 847, and we need not reach this issue today. 
12 
 
 
Legislature's intent that, once granted parole, an inmate should 
be released from confinement subject to conditions of parole.  
However, under the regulation here, an inmate who is granted 
parole from a life sentence is not truly released; rather, he or 
she remains incarcerated while serving the consecutive sentence.8  
Such a result is contrary to the plain language of the statute. 
 
The regulation also contravenes the plain meaning of G. L. 
c. 127, § 133.  General Laws c. 127, § 133A, states, in part: 
"Every prisoner who is serving a sentence for life in a 
correctional institution of the commonwealth . . . where 
                     
 
8 The board argues, and the lower court judge agreed, that 
the regulation does not violate G. L. c. 127, § 130, by granting 
an inmate parole from the life sentence, but keeping him or her 
incarcerated on the consecutive sentence, because it is 
analogous to a situation in which an inmate is paroled from a 
sentence imposed in Massachusetts, but transferred to another 
State or into Federal custody to serve a sentence imposed by a 
different jurisdiction.  This argument ignores the status of the 
Commonwealth as a separate sovereign from both the Federal 
government and the governments of other States.  See Heath v. 
Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985) ("[T]he States are separate 
sovereigns with respect to the Federal Government because each 
State's power to prosecute is derived from its own 'inherent 
sovereignty,' not from the Federal Government. . . .  The States 
are no less sovereign with respect to each other than they are 
with respect to the Federal Government").  The Commonwealth has 
the power "independently to determine what shall be an offense 
against its authority and to punish such offenses."  Id., 
quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978).  
Such power inherently extends to the ability of the Commonwealth 
to establish how parole eligibility is determined within its 
jurisdiction.  The fact that an inmate, once paroled by the 
Commonwealth, may be subject to confinement by a separate 
sovereign does not alter our understanding of parole in this 
State or the statutory obligations of the board to allow an 
inmate granted parole to "to go upon parole outside prison walls 
and inclosure."  G. L. c. 127, § 130. 
 
13 
 
 
the second offense occurred subsequent to the first 
conviction, shall be eligible for parole at the expiration 
of the minimum term fixed by the court under [G. L. c. 279, 
§ 24].[9]  The parole board shall, within [sixty] days 
before the expiration of such minimum term, conduct a 
public hearing before the full membership . . . ." 
 
The board reads "expiration of the minimum term fixed by the 
court under [G. L. c. 279, § 24,]" and "such minimum term" as 
the minimum term of the life sentence only, as established by 
the court in accordance with G. L. c. 279, § 24.  Thus, to 
fulfill the statute's requirements, the board contends, it is 
required to hold the parole hearing within sixty days before the 
expiration of the minimum term of the life sentence.  If the 
life sentence was aggregated with the consecutive sentence for 
purposes of establishing parole eligibility, the public hearing 
necessarily would occur later than sixty days before the 
expiration of the minimum term of the life sentence and the 
board would have, it argues, violated the statutory requirement.  
However, "expiration of the minimum term fixed by the court 
under [G. L. c. 279, § 24,]" is more naturally read to signify 
the aggregation of the minimum terms established under G. L. 
                     
 
9 General Laws c. 279, § 24, states:  "If a convict is 
sentenced to the state prison, except as an habitual criminal, 
the court shall not fix the term of imprisonment, but shall fix 
a maximum and a minimum term for which he [or she] may be 
imprisoned. . . .  In the case of a sentence to life 
imprisonment . . . where the second offense occurred subsequent 
to the first conviction, the court shall fix a minimum term 
which shall be not less than [fifteen] years nor more than 
[twenty-five] years." 
14 
 
 
c. 279, § 24, rather than solely the minimum term of the life 
sentence.  This plain language reading of the statute is also in 
harmony with the other statutes governing parole, such as G. L. 
c. 127, § 133. 
 
Put simply, we are not persuaded by the board's 
interpretation of § 133A.  General Laws c. 127, § 133, plainly 
requires that "a single parole eligibility shall be established" 
for inmates serving "two or more consecutive or concurrent state 
prison sentences."  The statute does not explicitly or 
implicitly create an exception for sentences occurring 
consecutively to a life sentence.  Rather, the mandatory 
language of § 133 -- "shall be established" and "for all such 
sentences" -- clearly requires the board to calculate a single 
parole eligibility date for all inmates serving two or more 
consecutive or concurrent sentences.  Contrary to the board's 
assertions, there is no legislative history that we have found, 
nor any indication in the statutory language, that the 
Legislature intended the clear, mandatory language of § 133 to 
be supplanted by a hidden insinuation in § 133A that the phrase 
"all such sentences" did not truly mean "all," but meant "all 
but those occurring consecutively to a life sentence."  We 
presume the Legislature, if it desired to exempt those serving a 
sentence consecutive to a life sentence from § 133's aggregation 
rule, would have included language in the statutory framework to 
15 
 
 
that effect.  Cf. Sisson v. Lhowe, 460 Mass. 705, 720 (2011) 
(Spina, J., dissenting) ("The Legislature knows how to write 
exceptions . . .").  "[W]e may not rewrite the . . . statute to 
contain language the Legislature did not see fit to include."  
Commonwealth v. Newberry, 483 Mass. 186, 195 (2019). 
 
The board also argues that § 133A would be rendered 
meaningless if we hold that aggregation is required.  We are not 
persuaded.  In essence, the board contends that the Legislature 
intended § 133A to disallow the aggregation of a consecutive 
sentence with a life sentence, as parole eligibility for life 
sentences are solely governed by § 133A, and that section 
requires the board to hold an inmate's parole hearing within 
sixty days before the expiration of the minimum term of the life 
sentence.  The board argues that by reading "such minimum term" 
in the statute as denoting the expiration of the minimum term of 
the aggregated sentences, we would render the timing mandates 
and other portions of § 133A meaningless.  However, interpreting 
the broad mandate of § 133 to require that the parole 
eligibility for a consecutive sentences be aggregated with a 
life sentence would not render § 133A meaningless.  The statute 
provides procedural rules for granting parole to those serving 
16 
 
 
life sentences, and retains purpose within the statutory 
framework.10 
 
We also note that our holding today produces the most 
practical result for both the board and the inmates serving 
these sentences who seek parole.  To illustrate the inefficiency 
of the current system, consider one of the defendants in this 
case.  Dinkins received a life sentence, as well as another life 
sentence to be served consecutively.  If these sentences were 
aggregated, Dinkins would become eligible for parole after 
serving at least thirty years -- the aggregation of the minimum 
term of fifteen years for both life sentences.11  After thirty 
years, Dinkins may be granted parole and released from 
                     
 
10 For example, § 133A still would exclude certain classes 
of inmates serving life sentences from parole eligibility, 
provide a statutory right to a public parole hearing before the 
board as soon as an inmate serving a life sentence is eligible, 
and describe additional procedures to be used by the board in 
hearings for an inmate serving a life sentence. 
 
 
11 Although we decline to reach the argument made by the 
plaintiffs under art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, we take this opportunity to reiterate that while we 
previously have held that a juvenile's sentence of three 
consecutive life terms with the possibility of parole after 
forty-five years was proportional to the crimes committed and 
the juvenile's particular characteristics as an offender under 
art. 26, see Commonwealth v. LaPlante, 482 Mass. 399, 406 
(2019), "a constitutional sentencing scheme for juvenile 
homicide defendants must . . . avoid imposing on juvenile 
defendants any term so lengthy that it could be seen as the 
functional equivalent of a sentence of life without parole," 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676, 691 n.11 (2013), and cases 
cited. 
17 
 
 
confinement.  If he is not granted parole at his first parole 
hearing because the board does not believe he satisfies the 
standard articulated in G. L. c. 127, § 130, Dinkins would be 
eligible for a parole hearing at least every five years 
thereafter.  However, under the current regulation, Dinkins's 
sentences are not aggregated for parole eligibility purposes, so 
he became eligible for a parole hearing on the first life 
sentence after serving fifteen years.  If the board determines 
that there is a reasonable probability that Dinkins "will live 
and remain at liberty without violating the law and that [his] 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society," then 
Dinkins may be granted parole at that hearing, but would 
continue to be incarcerated.  G. L. c. 127, § 130.  Dinkins then 
would serve the fifteen year minimum term of the second life 
sentence, at which point he becomes eligible for another parole 
hearing, with the same standard and procedures as the first, at 
which he may be paroled and released from confinement.  If 
Dinkins is not granted parole at either hearing, he becomes 
eligible for a new parole hearing every five years.  Thus, under 
the current system, Dinkins is entitled to at least two 
identical parole hearings before he truly can be released.12  If 
                     
 
12 The amicus brief submitted by the Committee for Public 
Counsel Services and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers aptly describes the time and resources that go 
into holding a parole hearing for an inmate serving a life 
18 
 
 
Dinkins does not meet the appropriate standard for parole, the 
board would be required to hold even more parole hearings to 
determine Dinkins's eligibility every five years. 
 
Were we to hold in favor of the board, we would be 
requiring excessive and repetitive parole hearings for those 
serving sentences consecutive to a life sentence.  As we stated 
more than forty years ago, "requir[ing] the board to make a 
series of decisions granting parole from one sentence to the 
next rather than a single decision on the basis of one parole 
eligibility date for all sentences" would "make[] little sense 
since the decision to grant parole is to be based on whether the 
board believes the prisoner can live freely outside of prison 
without violating the law."  Henschel v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 368 Mass. 130, 136 (1975).  We now reiterate that 
such a result would make little sense, be wasteful of the 
board's limited time and resources, and create additional 
burdens on the inmates seeking parole.  We also note the 
additional stress and burden placed on the victims and the 
families of the victims, who under the current regulation are 
faced with the choice to attend and speak at more parole 
hearings that occur sooner to the time of the crime than if the 
                     
sentence, which often are more intensive than those held for 
inmates serving a sentence for a term of years. 
19 
 
 
sentences were aggregated.  It cannot have been the intent of 
the Legislature to require such a result. 
 
4.  Constitutional claims raised by the plaintiffs.  In 
addition to arguing that the regulation is unlawful, the 
plaintiffs raise three constitutional claims:  (1) the 
regulation violates the due process provisions of the 
Massachusetts and United States Constitutions; (2) the 
regulation violates art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights by infringing on the separation of powers; and (3) as 
applied to inmates serving life sentences for offenses committed 
as juveniles, the regulation violates art. 26 and the Eighth 
Amendment.  "Where a particular construction of a statute is the 
premise of a constitutional claim, [the court] must resolve any 
issues of statutory interpretation . . . prior to reaching any 
constitutional issue" (quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Robertson, 467 Mass. 371, 381 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Suave, 460 Mass. 582, 586 (2011).  "We do not decide 
constitutional questions unless they must necessarily be 
reached."  Manor v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., 
Cedar Junction, 416 Mass. 820, 824 (1994).  Because we hold that 
the regulation is contrary to the plain terms of the statutory 
framework governing parole, we do not reach the constitutional 
questions raised by the plaintiffs. 
20 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  The order allowing the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment and denying the plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.