Case Title: State v. Leonard

Citation: 2004-Ohio-6235

Docket Number: 20011589

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. LEONARD, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 2001-1589 — Submitted July 20, 2004 — Decided December 8, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, No. B0005891. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} On July 29, 2000, Patrick T. Leonard, defendant-appellant, 
followed Dawn Flick, his former fiancée, while she was driving her car, forced 
her to a stop, and ordered her to return to her home.  Leonard followed Flick to 
her house, and, once inside, Leonard handcuffed Flick, attempted to rape her, and 
then shot her three times in the head.  Leonard was convicted of the aggravated 
murder, attempted rape, and kidnapping of Flick and was sentenced to death. 
{¶ 2} Leonard and Flick became engaged in the fall of 1995.  During 
their engagement, Leonard fathered a son by Penny McBride.  Leonard and Flick 
ended their engagement in 1998 but continued to date.  Leonard also continued 
his relationship with McBride.  Approximately nine months before Flick was 
murdered, a second child was born to Leonard and McBride.  Leonard tried to 
conceal from Flick and others that he was the child’s father. 
{¶ 3} The evidence presented at Leonard’s trial indicated that Flick had 
intended to end her relationship with Leonard.  In his confession, Leonard stated 
that he had a “broken heart” because he was losing Flick.  On Friday, July 28, 
2000, the day before the murder, Leonard told Alvie Woods, a friend of Leonard’s 
and Flick’s, that if he caught Flick “fooling around” with anyone, Leonard would 
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kill somebody.  According to Woods, Leonard had said, “[I]f I can’t have her, no 
one can.” 
{¶ 4} Flick tended bar at her family’s restaurant, Les Flick’s Home Like 
Inn, on the evening of July 28 and early morning of July 29.  After the restaurant 
closed for the night, Flick drove to Snow’s Lake Bar to meet some friends.  
Leonard followed Flick and, according to his confession, “got her to pull over.”  
Leonard then confronted Flick about her earlier statement that she would be 
staying home for the evening.  Leonard left Flick alone after she agreed to call 
him when she returned home.  When she arrived at Snow’s, Flick appeared upset, 
according to Woods, Deborah Schroeder, and Reva Ketterer, and she told them 
that Leonard had just run her car off the road. 
{¶ 5} When Snow’s closed for the night, Flick planned to go to the house 
of her friend, Ryan Gries.  Leonard followed Flick as she drove to Gries’s house 
and again stopped her car.  Leonard ordered Flick to return to her home, and he 
followed her there.  Once inside, Leonard handcuffed her wrists.  Leonard then 
pointed a gun at Flick as she called to tell Gries that she was not coming to his 
house.  During their telephone conversation, Gries was able to elicit from Flick 
that she was with Leonard and was in danger. 
{¶ 6} Gries and his friend Frank Minges rushed to Flick’s house.  When 
Leonard heard Gries’s truck drive up, he shot Flick three times in the head.  He 
then fired through the door, striking Gries in the chest.  Gries and Minges left to 
call the police, and Leonard fled in his truck. 
{¶ 7} Leonard then called a friend, Sergeant Nick Chaplin, a deputy 
sheriff in Campbell County, Kentucky.  Leonard told Chaplin that he had shot and 
killed Flick, and he agreed to surrender to Chaplin.  Leonard drove to Kentucky, 
where he was taken into custody. 
{¶ 8} After being advised of his Miranda rights, Leonard gave a taped 
statement confessing to Flick’s murder.  In his confession, Leonard admitted that 
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before shooting Flick, he had restrained her with handcuffs.  Leonard said that he 
and Flick had talked about “making love [and had] decided to do that on the 
floor.”  Leonard said that when he had heard Gries’s truck drive up, he jumped up 
off of Flick, pulled his pants up, and shot Flick three times in the head.  Leonard 
also admitted having shot at Gries and Minges through Flick’s front door. 
{¶ 9} Police officers investigating the shooting found Flick’s partially 
clothed body lying in a pool of blood in her living room.  Flick’s panties were 
down to her thighs, one pant leg was completely off, the other pant leg was 
around her calf, and one shoe was off.  Her wrists were bound by handcuffs. 
{¶ 10} Dr. Robert Pfalsgraf, chief deputy coroner, determined that the 
cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head.  Flick had been shot once in the 
face, once in the back of the head, and once in the back of her neck at the hairline.  
The shot to the back of Flick’s head was fatal. 
{¶ 11} Pfalsgraf found no injuries to Flick’s vagina or anus and no semen 
in those areas.  Pfalsgraf noted, however, that this lack of evidence did not 
preclude a finding that Leonard had penetrated Flick. 
{¶ 12} Pfalsgraf also testified that the pattern of bruising on Flick’s wrists 
corresponded to the handcuffs found on her wrists.  Petechiae were found on her 
face and neck, indicating ruptured blood vessels caused by strangulation.  Flick 
also had ligature bruising on her neck that matched the pattern of the necklace she 
was wearing.  Based on these injuries, the coroner concluded that Flick had been 
strangled and had struggled with her assailant while she was handcuffed. 
{¶ 13} Leonard was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder.  The 
first count charged Leonard with purposely causing Flick’s death while 
committing or attempting to commit rape.  R.C. 2903.01(B).  The second count 
charged Leonard with purposely and with prior calculation and design causing 
Flick’s death.  R.C. 2903.01(A).  Leonard was also indicted for attempted murder 
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in Counts Three and Four (R.C. 2903.02 and 2923.02), rape in Count Five (R.C. 
2907.02[A][2]), and kidnapping in Count Six (R.C. 2905.01[A][2]). 
{¶ 14} The aggravated-murder counts each contained two death-penalty 
specifications.  The first specification charged aggravated murder as part of a 
course of conduct to kill or attempt to kill two or more persons.  R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5).  The second specification charged aggravated murder during a 
rape or an attempted rape.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  Gun specifications were included 
with all counts except Count Six, kidnapping. 
{¶ 15} At trial, the defense presented testimony from five witnesses and 
other documentary evidence.  Leonard did not testify.  During defense counsel’s 
opening statement, counsel conceded that Leonard had shot Flick.  However, the 
defense’s theory was that Leonard had been trying to salvage his relationship with 
Flick, had not intended to kill her, and had not acted with prior calculation and 
design.  The defense also contested the charges of rape and kidnapping and denied 
that Leonard had attempted to murder Gries and Minges. 
{¶ 16} The defense introduced evidence to show that Leonard had 
purchased a planter with flowers from Renck’s Garden Center and had given it to 
Flick as a gift on the afternoon before the murder. 
{¶ 17} Eddie Sayers, an employee of Sam’s Corner Store in New 
Baltimore, Ohio, testified that both Leonard and Flick had been in the store the 
day before the murder: Leonard in the morning, and Flick in the afternoon.  
Sayers testified that Leonard had not seemed upset and that Flick had appeared 
happy.  On cross-examination, Sayers stated that he had not seen Leonard and 
Flick together that day and admitted that he did not know how Leonard acted later 
that day. 
{¶ 18} Rick Schoeny, a life-long friend of Leonard’s, testified that 
Leonard always had guns and carried a gun in his jacket.  Leonard’s brother Ted 
testified that Leonard had sometimes threatened to kill people when he was upset.  
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Ted noted, however, that this was “the way [Leonard] always voiced his opinion” 
and that these threats were never taken seriously. 
{¶ 19} Other testimony indicated that Leonard and Flick had spent time 
together in the days leading up to the murder and had plans to go horseback riding 
the following day.  In his confession, Leonard claimed that he and Flick had 
begun to engage in consensual sex before he shot her.  He also said that he “went 
blank” just before shooting her. 
{¶ 20} Leonard also confessed to having shot at Flick’s front door to keep 
Gries and Minges from entering the home.  Evidence at trial indicated that 
Leonard had fired only one shot at the door. 
{¶ 21} The jury convicted Leonard of the two aggravated-murder counts 
(Counts One and Two) and kidnapping (Count Six).  The jury found Leonard not 
guilty of the two attempted-murder counts (Counts Three and Four) but guilty of 
the lesser included offense of felonious assault.  Leonard was also found not 
guilty of rape (Count Five) but was found guilty of attempted rape. 
{¶ 22} As to the capital specifications, the jury found Leonard guilty of 
committing murder during a rape or attempted rape.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  He was 
found not guilty of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) course-of-conduct specification.  
Leonard was also found guilty of all gun specifications. 
{¶ 23} After the penalty phase of the trial, the jury recommended death.  
Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Leonard to death, consecutive sentences of 
eight years each for his two felonious-assault convictions and his attempted rape 
conviction, and ten years for kidnapping.  Three-year sentences were imposed for 
each of the gun charges.  Because several of the firearm specifications merged, 
the prison term imposed for the noncapital offenses was 40 years. 
{¶ 24} The matter is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
I. Pretrial Issues 
A. Failure to Fund or Appoint Defense Experts 
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{¶ 25} In his first proposition of law, Leonard alleges that a lack of funds 
prevented defense counsel from hiring an investigator, a coroner, a crime-scene 
investigator, and an expert on sexual abuse or rape.  In his eighth proposition of 
law, Leonard claims that his death sentence must be reversed because a 
pathologist was not provided to assist trial counsel in either the guilt-
determination or penalty phase. 
{¶ 26} R.C. 2929.024 requires the trial court to grant funds in aggravated 
murder cases for investigative services and experts when “reasonably necessary 
for the proper representation” of indigent defendants.  In State v. Mason (1998), 
82 Ohio St.3d 144, 694 N.E.2d 932, syllabus, we held that due process “requires 
that an indigent criminal defendant be provided funds to obtain expert assistance 
at state expense only where the trial court finds, in the exercise of a sound 
discretion, that the defendant has made a particularized showing (1) of a 
reasonable probability that the requested expert would aid in his defense and (2) 
that denial of the requested expert assistance would result in an unfair trial.  (State 
v. Broom [1988], 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 533 N.E.2d 682, approved and followed.)”  
See, also, Ake v. Oklahoma (1985), 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53. 
{¶ 27} In this case, Leonard retained private counsel.  Nevertheless, on 
the defense’s motion, the trial court declared Leonard indigent and indicated 
before trial that it would consider any defense request for funds.  However, 
Leonard did not request funding for any of the experts that he now claims were 
necessary to his defense.  In fact, Leonard’s trial counsel informed the court that 
defense experts were not necessary.  We need not consider an error that a 
defendant neglected to bring to the trial court’s attention.  See State v. Williams 
(1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  Thus, any error is cognizable only if it amounts to plain error.  Crim.R. 
52(B). 
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7 
{¶ 28} Leonard offers only a conclusory argument that he was prejudiced 
by a lack of funds.  In this case, however, the time, place, and cause of death are 
not in dispute, and Leonard does not explain how the failure to provide an 
investigator, a coroner, and a crime-scene investigator would have aided his 
defense.  See, e.g., State v. Nields (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 6, 12, 752 N.E.2d 859.  
While the defense did vigorously contest the rape charge, it is unclear what value 
a sexual-abuse or rape expert would have been to the defense.  No semen was 
found at the crime scene, the coroner did not detect vaginal or anal trauma to 
Flick, and Leonard was found not guilty of rape. 
{¶ 29} Moreover, we find that the evidence supported Leonard’s 
attempted-rape conviction.  Flick’s body was found in her living room, partially 
nude and handcuffed.  Leonard told police that he had begun to have sex with 
Flick before shooting her.  Thus, Leonard has failed to show a particularized need 
for these experts or that the failure to employ defense experts denied him a fair 
trial.  Cf. State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d at 152, 694 N.E.2d 932; State v. Clemons 
(1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 438, 443, 696 N.E.2d 1009. 
{¶ 30} Similarly, we conclude that Leonard has not established a 
particularized need for an independent pathologist, nor has he shown how the lack 
of such an expert hindered his defense.  Leonard asserts that an independent 
pathologist was necessary to conduct an independent investigation and testing and 
to contest the “coroner’s methodology and findings in regard to the cause, 
manner, and timing of death, especially the allegations of strangulation by the 
State.”  But the cause, manner, and time of death are not in dispute.  Although 
defense counsel challenged the coroner’s conclusion that Flick was strangled, 
strangulation was not the cause of death, and Leonard offers no explanation of 
how expert testimony on this issue would have aided his defense.  See, e.g., State 
v. Tibbetts (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 151, 749 N.E.2d 226.  Moreover, the record 
indicates that the coroner performed the autopsy in a competent and professional 
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manner and thoroughly documented his findings.  See, e.g., State v. Nields, 93 
Ohio St.3d at 12, 752 N.E.2d 859.  Because no error occurred, plain or otherwise, 
Leonard’s first and eighth propositions of law are overruled. 
B. Voluntariness of Confession 
{¶ 31} Leonard claims in proposition of law five that the trial court erred 
in failing to suppress his confession.  Leonard contends that his waiver of his 
rights and his confession to police were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
because, at the time, he was “suicidal, heartbroken, and exhausted.” 
{¶ 32} In determining whether a pretrial statement is voluntary, a court “ 
‘should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, 
and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency 
of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the 
existence of threat or inducement.’ ”  State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d at 154, 694 
N.E.2d 932, quoting State v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 3 O.O.3d 18, 358 
N.E.2d 1051, paragraph two of the syllabus.  The same considerations apply to 
whether a defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights.  
State v. Eley (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 174, 178-179, 672 N.E.2d 640; State v. Clark 
(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 261, 527 N.E.2d 844. 
{¶ 33} After Leonard surrendered, Campbell County (Kentucky) officers 
advised him of his Miranda rights.  Hamilton County detectives gave a second 
Miranda warning.  Leonard waived his rights each time, and he signed a waiver-
of-rights form.  Leonard now asserts that the trial court erred in admitting his 
confession into evidence because his emotional instability affected his ability to 
make a valid waiver and a voluntary confession.  Evidence introduced at the 
suppression hearing indicated that Leonard had killed Flick because he was 
heartbroken and exhausted and that he had contemplated killing himself after he 
shot her. 
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{¶ 34} However, a defendant’s mental condition is only one factor in the 
totality of circumstances to be considered in determining voluntariness.  A 
defendant’s mental condition may be a “significant factor in the ‘voluntariness’ 
calculus.  But this fact does not justify a conclusion that a defendant’s mental 
condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion, should ever 
dispose of the inquiry into constitutional ‘voluntariness.’ ”  (Citation omitted.)  
Colorado v. Connelly (1986), 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473.  
Issues of voluntariness have always turned on the presence or absence of police 
coercion or overreaching.  Id. at 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473.  See, also, 
State v. Eley, 77 Ohio St.3d at 178, 672 N.E.2d 640. 
{¶ 35} We have reviewed the suppression-hearing transcript and find no 
evidence suggesting that Leonard’s “will was overborne and his capacity for self-
determination was critically impaired because of coercive police conduct.”  See 
State v. Otte (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 555, 562, 660 N.E.2d 711; Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473.  No threats or 
inducements were made, and both Campbell County and Hamilton County police 
officers conducted themselves with professionalism.  After he was taken into 
custody, Leonard was cooperative and calm.  According to Sergeant Chaplin, 
Leonard’s friend of eight years, Leonard “appeared normal, like nothing was 
bothering him.” 
{¶ 36} Although Leonard claimed that one of the reasons he had killed 
Flick was his lack of sleep, he did not appear to police to be tired.  Cf., State v. 
Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d at 154-155, 749 N.E.2d 226 (claim of grogginess from 
medication did not render defendant’s statements involuntary).  Leonard did not 
appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs.  Hamilton County detectives 
interviewed Leonard for approximately one hour, and during questioning, 
Leonard was offered water and cigarettes. 
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{¶ 37} Based on the totality of the circumstances, we have determined 
that Leonard’s confession was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and was 
admissible.  See State v. Eley, 77 Ohio St.3d at 178-179, 672 N.E.2d 640; State v. 
Clark, 38 Ohio St.3d at 261, 527 N.E.2d 844; State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 
3 O.O.3d 18, 358 N.E.2d 1051, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Therefore, we 
overrule Leonard’s fifth proposition of law. 
C. Failure to Reduce Bail 
{¶ 38} In his ninth proposition of law, Leonard argues that the trial court’s 
failure to set reasonable bail infringed upon his constitutional right to assist 
counsel in preparing his defense.  Leonard’s argument is without merit. 
{¶ 39} Leonard’s bail was set at $2 million cash.  Leonard asserts that the 
trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a 
lower bail should be set.  However, at arraignment, defense counsel stated that he 
did not wish to be heard on the bail issue.  Thus, this issue has been waived.  State 
v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of 
the syllabus; State v. Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St.3d 365, 2003-Ohio-4121, 792 
N.E.2d 1081, at ¶34.  Moreover, following conviction, “ ‘any error concerning the 
issue of pretrial bail is moot.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 35, quoting  State v. Patterson (1996), 
110 Ohio App.3d 264, 271, 673 N.E.2d 1001.  Leonard’s ninth proposition of law 
is overruled. 
D. Grand-Jury Issues 
{¶ 40} Leonard argues in proposition of law ten that he was indicted “by 
an improperly constituted grand jury and upon inadequately presented evidence.”  
In proposition 24, Leonard argues that his constitutional rights were violated 
because the “process utilized in Hamilton County to select the foremen of grand 
juries that return capital indictments is biased geographically, racially, culturally, 
and socio-economically.” 
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{¶ 41} Leonard failed to raise these issues in the trial court and has thus 
waived all but plain error.  State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 
N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Joseph (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
450, 455, 653 N.E.2d 285; State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 23, 676 
N.E.2d 82.  Leonard has failed to demonstrate plain error.  Moreover, we rejected 
identical grand-jury arguments in State v. Issa (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 61-62, 
752 N.E.2d 904, and State v. Nields, 93 Ohio St.3d at 18-20, 752 N.E.2d 859.  
Accordingly, we overrule Leonard’s 10th and 24th propositions of law. 
E. Improper Indictment 
{¶ 42} Leonard contends in his 17th proposition of law that the trial court 
erred by allowing him to be tried, convicted, and sentenced on an indictment that 
charged two separate death-penalty specifications in a single specification.  
Leonard claims that he was deprived of his right to a unanimous verdict because 
the jury did not specify whether he had been the principal offender in the 
aggravated murder or whether he had committed the aggravated murder with prior 
calculation and design.  Leonard failed to object to this issue at trial and has 
waived all but plain error.  Crim.R.52(B).  For the following reasons, we conclude 
that no error, plain or otherwise, occurred. 
{¶ 43} First, Leonard is mistaken in stating that the indictment included 
specifications that charged that he had been the principal offender “and/or” that he 
had committed the murder with prior calculation and design.  The specifications 
at issue (Specification Two to Counts One and Two) tracked the language of R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) and alleged that “either [Leonard] was the principal offender in the 
commission of the Aggravated Murder, or, if not the principal offender, 
committed the Aggravated Murder with prior calculation and design.”  Thus, 
there was no error because the elements of R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) were charged 
disjunctively.  See State v. Cook (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 527, 605 N.E.2d 70. 
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{¶ 44} Second, prior to submitting the case to the jury, the trial court 
amended the indictment to delete the prior-calculation-and-design element.  See 
Crim.R. 7(D).  Thus, the jurors unanimously determined that Leonard was the 
principal offender. 
{¶ 45} Finally, no evidence suggested another offender.  See State v. 
Chinn (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 548, 558, 709 N.E.2d 1166; State v. Nields, 93 Ohio 
St.3d at 30, 752 N.E.2d 859.  Therefore, Leonard’s 17th proposition of law is 
overruled. 
F. Prejudicial Publicity 
{¶ 46} In proposition of law 11, Leonard argues that prejudicial publicity 
deprived him of his right to a fair trial and a fair and reliable sentencing 
determination.  We reject Leonard’s claim for several reasons. 
{¶ 47} First, several months prior to trial, Leonard requested a change of 
venue.  See Crim.R. 18(B); R.C. 2901.12(K).  The trial court overruled the motion 
as premature but permitted Leonard to raise the issue again during jury selection.  
Leonard failed to raise the venue issue again and did not raise the prejudicial-
publicity issue again in the trial court.  As a result, Leonard waived this issue.  
See State v. Campbell (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 336, 738 N.E.2d 1178; State v. 
Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 48} Second, Leonard makes blanket assertions about extensive media 
coverage, but the record contains no specific evidence of adverse publicity.  Thus, 
we need not consider his claims of prejudice.  See State v. Montgomery (1991), 61 
Ohio St.3d 410, 413, 575 N.E.2d 167; State v. Nields, 93 Ohio St.3d at 20, 752 
N.E.2d 859. 
{¶ 49} Third, nothing in the record of voir dire supports Leonard’s 
argument that prejudicial publicity denied him a fair and impartial jury.  The 
examination of jurors during voir dire affords the best test as to whether adverse 
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publicity necessitates a change of venue.  State v. Swiger (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 
151, 34 O.O.2d 270, 214 N.E.2d 417, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. 
Montgomery at 413, 575 N.E.2d 167. 
{¶ 50} During voir dire, several prospective jurors disclosed that they had 
been exposed to media coverage of the case.  But all stated that they knew nothing 
specific about the crimes and would not be influenced by what they had heard.  In 
fact, Leonard’s trial counsel extensively questioned several of these prospective 
jurors but declined to challenge any for cause based on their media exposure. 
{¶ 51} Finally, during voir dire and throughout the trial, the judge 
repeatedly admonished prospective and seated jurors to avoid exposure to 
information about the case outside the courtroom and to advise the court of any 
incidents of exposure.  See State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 117, 559 
N.E.2d 710.  No incidents were reported, and nothing in the record indicates that 
jurors did not follow the judge’s instructions.  Accordingly, we overrule 
proposition of law 11. 
G. Voir Dire 
{¶ 52} Leonard argues in his 21st proposition of law that he was denied 
his right to a fair trial by an impartial and unbiased jury.  Leonard contends that 
the trial court erred in failing to excuse two prospective jurors who indicated that 
they believed that death was the appropriate penalty in every murder case.  See, 
generally, Morgan v. Illinois (1992), 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 
492.  Leonard asserts that his trial counsel were forced to peremptorily challenge 
these “automatic death penalty jurors.” 
{¶ 53} A prospective juror in a capital case may be excused for cause if 
his views on capital punishment would “ ‘prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his 
oath.’ ”  Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 
841, quoting Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 
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581.  See, also, State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174, 17 OBR 414, 478 
N.E.2d 984, paragraph three of the syllabus, death penalty vacated on other 
grounds (1985), 474 U.S. 1002, 106 S.Ct. 518, 88 L.Ed.2d 452.  A trial court’s 
ruling on a challenge for cause will not be overturned on appeal “unless it is 
manifestly arbitrary and unsupported by substantial testimony, so as to constitute 
an abuse of discretion.”  State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 8, 679 N.E.2d 
646; accord State v. Wilson (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 203, 211, 58 O.O.2d 409, 280 
N.E.2d 915. 
{¶ 54} Leonard claims that prospective jurors Gunther and Dubarry 
should have been dismissed for cause.  Gunther strongly favored the death penalty 
in most murder cases, with very few exceptions.  But Gunther accepted that, 
under Ohio law, the death penalty is not appropriate in all cases and agreed to put 
aside her views and follow the judge’s instructions.  When questioned by defense 
counsel, Gunther responded that if there is a purposeful killing, then the death 
penalty is deserved.  Defense counsel then challenged Gunther for cause. 
{¶ 55} The trial court individually questioned Gunther to clarify her 
views.  When the trial judge asked if she would automatically vote for the death 
penalty after a guilty verdict, Gunther stated, “I cannot imagine any mitigating 
factors that would sway my decision [to impose the death penalty].”  She also 
informed the court that she had previously served as a juror on a capital case in 
Hamilton County.  When questioning continued, Gunther indicated that her death-
penalty views would not substantially impair her ability to fairly and impartially 
listen to all the evidence and go through the sentencing-phase weighing process. 
{¶ 56} Gunther then equivocated.  In response to the question whether she 
would enter the weighing process “with preconceived ideas that the death penalty 
must be imposed,” Gunther said, “I’m not sure [b]ecause I do feel pretty strongly 
about if you take somebody’s life then the death penalty should be imposed.”  
Yet, when asked if she could “assure” the court that she could “fairly and 
January Term, 2004 
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impartially consider both the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating factors 
before reaching a determination * * * whether or not the death penalty would be 
an appropriate verdict,” Gunther answered, “Yes.” 
{¶ 57} Gunther revealed a strong disposition toward imposing the death 
penalty.  But she agreed to put aside her views and follow the judge’s instructions.  
She also assured the court that she could fairly and impartially weigh the 
mitigation evidence before deciding on the appropriate penalty.  Even when a 
juror shows a predisposition in favor of imposing the death penalty, the trial court 
does not abuse its discretion in denying a challenge for cause if the juror states 
that she will follow the law and the court’s instructions.  State v. Mack (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 502, 510, 653 N.E.2d 329; State v. Treesh (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 
468, 739 N.E.2d 749. 
{¶ 58} Here, the trial judge obviously believed Gunther when she said that 
she would follow the law and put aside her views on the death penalty.  Deference 
must be paid to the trial judge, who sees and hears the juror.  Wainwright v. Witt, 
469 U.S. at 425-426, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841; State v. Williams, 79 Ohio 
St.3d at 8, 679 N.E.2d 646. 
{¶ 59} Prospective 
juror 
Dubarry 
also 
strongly 
favored 
capital 
punishment.  But he believed he could put aside those views and be fair and 
impartial.  Dubarry, however, voiced concern in voting for a life sentence without 
the possibility of parole, calling this sentence “almost too severe.”  Upon further 
questioning, Dubarry responded that his views would not substantially impair his 
ability to fairly consider all sentencing options.  The trial judge denied a challenge 
for cause. 
{¶ 60} Dubarry agreed to follow the court’s instructions and stated that his 
views would not interfere with his duties as a juror.  Under these circumstances, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse Dubarry for cause.  
See State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d at 9, 679 N.E.2d 646. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
{¶ 61} Moreover, the jury’s composition was not affected by the trial 
court’s decision not to remove Dubarry.  After 12 jurors had been seated, Leonard 
exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude Dubarry as an alternate juror.  
Because no alternate jurors participated in the verdict, Leonard cannot claim that 
he wasted a peremptory challenge on Dubarry that he could have used to remove 
a venireman who sat on the jury.  Thus, no prejudice could have resulted.  See 
State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 31-32, 553 N.E.2d 576. 
{¶ 62} Leonard also raises several other issues under proposition of law 
21.  Leonard argues that the trial court placed unreasonable limitations on defense 
counsel during voir dire.  The record does not support Leonard’s claims. 
{¶ 63} “The manner in which voir dire is to be conducted lies within the 
sound discretion of the trial judge.”  State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 
418, 613 N.E.2d 212.  The trial court granted Leonard’s counsel extensive leeway 
to question prospective jurors.  Although the court attempted to keep voir dire 
moving, counsel were rarely limited in questioning potential jurors.  The trial 
court allowed counsel to individually question all prospective jurors regarding 
their views on capital punishment and further permitted counsel to address other 
issues that arose during individual questioning. 
{¶ 64} Leonard complains that the trial court would not allow his counsel 
to use hypothetical questions to determine a juror’s death-penalty position.  The 
trial court did admonish defense counsel’s use of a hypothetical question in one 
instance.  Leonard’s counsel asked a prospective juror who was adamantly 
opposed to capital punishment whether he could impose the death sentence in a 
case like Timothy McVeigh’s. 
{¶ 65} We determine that the trial court did not err in precluding this 
question.  A trial court has “ ‘great latitude in deciding what questions should be 
asked on voir dire.’ ”  State v. Wilson (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 381, 386, 659 N.E.2d 
292, quoting Mu’Min v. Virginia (1991), 500 U.S. 415, 424, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 
January Term, 2004 
17 
L.Ed.2d 493.  Moreover, “[a]lthough R.C. 2945.27 affords the prosecution and 
defense the opportunity to conduct a reasonable examination of prospective 
jurors, * * * the trial court reserves the right and responsibility to control the 
proceedings of a criminal trial pursuant to R.C. 2945.03, and must limit the trial to 
relevant and material matters with a view toward the expeditious and effective 
ascertainment of truth.”  State v. Durr (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 568 N.E.2d 
674.  A review of the voir dire reveals that Leonard’s counsel were permitted to 
thoroughly explore prospective jurors’ views.  Leonard has not shown that the 
trial court unreasonably or arbitrarily restricted counsel’s examination. 
{¶ 66} The trial court also denied defense counsel’s request for 
sequestered voir dire.  But “ ‘[t]here is no requirement that voir dire in a capital 
case must be conducted in sequestration.’ ”  State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 
227, 2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 96, quoting State v. Fears (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 329, 338, 715 N.E.2d 136.  The trial court did permit counsel to 
individually question prospective jurors.  And although prospective jurors were 
not sequestered, the trial court gave all jurors the opportunity to be questioned in 
private if they were uncomfortable discussing their views in a group setting.  We 
find that there was no error in not allowing sequestered voir dire. 
{¶ 67} Leonard’s remaining arguments under this proposition are also 
without merit.  Leonard contends that during voir dire, the trial court “improperly 
commented upon the effect of convicting Leonard of the aggravating factors.”  
Leonard failed to object during trial and waived all but plain error.  Crim.R. 
52(B).  Moreover, we have reviewed the transcript and find that the trial court’s 
comments were not improper; they merely outlined the proper procedures 
employed during a capital trial. 
{¶ 68} Similarly, we conclude that no error occurred when the trial court 
failed to inform prospective jurors during voir dire that “parole eligibility is 
determined after [Leonard] serves a full sentence, that is to say, no good time 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
credit.”  Further, contrary to Leonard’s contention, the trial court did not err when 
it referred to aggravating “circumstances,” as opposed to “factors.”  The trial 
court’s reference to “circumstances” tracks the language in R.C. 2929.04.  We 
also reject Leonard’s claim regarding the juror questionnaire.  Leonard has not 
shown how the questionnaire was flawed, nor has he identified which questions 
he claims were prejudicial. 
{¶ 69} Finally, Leonard claims ineffective assistance of counsel occurred 
during voir dire.  We will address this claim under proposition of law four.  Based 
on the foregoing, we overrule Leonard’s 21st proposition of law. 
{¶ 70} In proposition of law 22, Leonard contends that the trial court 
improperly excused for cause prospective jurors Gooding, Dignan, Ison, and 
Crockett.  Leonard’s assertions lack merit. 
{¶ 71} Prospective juror Gooding initially stated that she could follow the 
court’s instructions and the law and consider imposing the death penalty.  But 
Gooding later stated, “I’m not against [the death penalty] but personally I don’t 
think I could make that decision. * * * I personally could not decide someone’s 
fate, if they are going to live or die.”  When questioned further, Gooding agreed 
that her views would substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror.  
Leonard’s counsel and the trial court attempted to rehabilitate her.  Gooding, 
however, reiterated that she could not consider imposing a death sentence. 
{¶ 72} Prospective juror Dignan also stated that she could consider 
imposing a death sentence.  Dignan later said, “I feel that it’s not a right that we 
have to deliberately take the life of another * * * [e]xcept in self-defense.”  When 
asked if she could ever impose the death penalty, she could not answer yes or no 
but said she “would find it very difficult.”  Dignan then stated that her views 
against capital punishment were strongly held and that she is opposed to it in all 
cases, including this case.  Finally, she agreed that she would not be able to sign a 
verdict imposing the death sentence.  After defense counsel tried to rehabilitate 
January Term, 2004 
19 
her, Dignan declared that “there are no circumstances” in which she could impose 
a death sentence. 
{¶ 73} Prospective juror Ison also initially declared that she could 
consider imposing a death sentence.  After further questioning, she stated that she 
is not against the death penalty, but she “didn’t feel comfortable being the one to 
do it.”  Ison later reiterated, “I just don’t want to be the one to do it.  Now, if I 
could, say, sentence him to life in jail, maybe yes.  But to say give him the chair, I 
don’t want to do that.”  Ison equivocated when the trial court questioned her, but 
she ultimately decided that she did not believe she could sign a death verdict. 
{¶ 74} Prospective juror Crockett said that she did not think that the death 
penalty was appropriate in any case but that she could consider imposing a death 
sentence “because that’s the law that we live by in America.”  Crockett admitted 
that her views could prevent or substantially impair her ability to be fair and 
impartial.  When defense counsel questioned Crockett, she stated, “I believe [I 
could consider imposing a death sentence].  But I can’t 100 percent say that in the 
back of my mind that my views wouldn’t allow that.”  Crockett could not assure 
the court that her beliefs would not impair her ability to serve as a juror and 
finally told the trial judge, “I guess, in all honesty, I don’t think I could” sign a 
death verdict. 
{¶ 75} We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing 
these four prospective jurors.  The record reflects that their views on the death 
penalty would have prevented or substantially impaired their ability to serve as 
fair and impartial jurors.  See, e.g., State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 
315, 652 N.E.2d 988; State v. Rogers, 17 Ohio St.3d 174, 17 OBR 414, 478 
N.E.2d 984, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Therefore, Leonard’s 22nd 
proposition of law is overruled. 
II. Guilt-Determination-Phase Issues 
A. Sufficiency/Manifest Weight of Evidence 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
{¶ 76} In his sixth proposition of law, Leonard claims that the evidence 
was insufficient to support his aggravated-murder convictions.  We disagree. 
{¶ 77} In reviewing a record for sufficiency, “[t]he relevant inquiry is 
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 
574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia 
(1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560. 
{¶ 78} Leonard was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder:  
purposely causing the death of Flick while committing, attempting to commit, or 
fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit rape, and the 
purposeful killing of Flick with prior calculation and design.  See R.C. 
2903.01(B) and (A). 
{¶ 79} We conclude that sufficient evidence was introduced at trial to 
support these convictions.  On the night of the murder, Leonard twice followed 
and stopped Flick in her car.  After stopping her car the second time, Leonard 
ordered Flick to return to her house.  Leonard followed Flick to her home, where 
he handcuffed her and held her at gunpoint.  Leonard confessed to firing three 
shots into Flick’s head from close range.  Leonard also told police that just before 
he shot Flick, he had been on top of her with his pants down because they had 
“decided to [have sexual intercourse] on the floor.” 
{¶ 80} Although Leonard’s confession suggests that Flick had consented, 
there was substantial evidence of forcible sexual conduct, and a rational trier of 
fact could find Leonard guilty of attempted rape.  See, e.g., State v. Williams 
(1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 576, 660 N.E.2d 724; State v. Scudder (1994), 71 Ohio 
St.3d 263, 274-275, 643 N.E.2d 524.  But cf. State v. Davis (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 
107, 114-115, 666 N.E.2d 1099 (holding that evidence that victim’s body was 
found naked, that victim had been seen pushing the defendant away before she 
January Term, 2004 
21 
was shot, and that there were possible finger marks on one of the victim’s thighs 
was insufficient evidence to support attempted-rape conviction).  Police found 
Flick’s body lying in a pool of blood on her living room floor, partially nude.  She 
had been shot three times in the head, her panties had been pulled down to her 
thighs, one pant leg had been pulled off, the other had been pulled down to her 
calf, and one shoe had been removed.  Her hands were bound by handcuffs, and 
bruising on her wrists indicated that she had struggled while handcuffed.  Marks 
on her neck and petechiae on her face indicated that she had been strangled. 
{¶ 81} Leonard also contends under this proposition that his aggravated 
murder convictions are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.  The 
question to be answered when a manifest-weight issue is raised is whether “there 
is substantial evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that all the 
elements have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State v. 
Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 193-194, 702 N.E.2d 866, citing State v. Eley 
(1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 169, 10 O.O.3d 340, 383 N.E.2d 132, syllabus.  In 
conducting this review, we must examine the entire record, weigh the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and 
determine whether the jury “ ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial 
ordered.’ ”  State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, 
quoting State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 20 OBR 215, 485 
N.E.2d 717. 
{¶ 82} At trial, defense counsel conceded that Leonard had killed Flick 
but argued that the state had failed to prove that Leonard was guilty of aggravated 
murder under R.C. 2903.01.  Specifically, counsel maintained that the state had 
not proven rape or attempted rape under R.C. 2903.01(B) or prior calculation and 
design under section (A). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
{¶ 83} This is not, however, the “ ‘exceptional case in which the evidence 
weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ”  Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 
N.E.2d 541, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App3d at 175, 20 OBR 215, 485 N.E.2d 
717.  Substantial evidence existed to support convictions on both counts of 
aggravated murder.  Therefore, Leonard’s sixth proposition of law lacks merit and 
is overruled. 
B. Gruesome Photographs 
{¶ 84} In the 12th proposition of law, Leonard contends that the trial court 
erred by admitting into evidence gruesome and cumulative photographs of the 
victim.  Leonard’s pretrial motion in limine to preclude admission of photographs 
of the victim was overruled, as were counsel’s objections at trial. 
{¶ 85} In capital cases, nonrepetitive photographs, even if gruesome, are 
admissible as long as the probative value of each photograph outweighs the 
danger of material prejudice to the accused.  State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio 
St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph seven of the syllabus; State v. 
Morales (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 257, 513 N.E.2d 267.  Decisions on the 
admissibility of photographs are “left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”  
State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 601, 605 N.E.2d 916. 
{¶ 86} Leonard challenges the admission of five crime-scene photographs.  
These photos illustrated the testimony of the police officers who discovered 
Flick’s body and illustrated the crime scene and the body’s condition.  See, e.g., 
State v. Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St.3d 365, 2003-Ohio-4121, 792 N.E.2d 1081, at 
¶72. 
{¶ 87} None of these photos is duplicative or cumulative.  Each depicts a 
different view or angle of the victim’s body and her injuries.  State’s Exhibit 1-E 
is a partial view of Flick’s body as first seen by police looking through a window 
from outside her house.  State’s Exhibit 1-I shows a full view of Flick’s body and 
depicts how the body was positioned in the home.  State’s Exhibit 1-J shows Flick 
January Term, 2004 
23 
with her panties at midthigh, with one pant leg down around her calf and the other 
pant leg completely off.  State’s Exhibit 1-K depicts bruising on her thighs.  
State’s Exhibit 1-L shows that Flick was handcuffed.  These photos, although 
gruesome, were probative of issues of intent, premeditation, and the manner and 
circumstances of Flick’s death, including whether Leonard had attempted to rape 
her.  We determine that the probative value outweighed the danger of unfair 
prejudice.  See, e.g., State v. Biros (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 444-445, 678 
N.E.2d 891. 
{¶ 88} Leonard also objected to 11 autopsy photographs, claiming that 
they are gruesome and repetitive.  Autopsy photos serve a purpose different from 
the crime-scene photographs.  See State v. Reynolds (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 
676-677, 687 N.E.2d 1358.  Two photos showed the three gunshot wounds to the 
head from different angles.  These photos illustrated the coroner’s testimony and 
helped show Leonard’s intent.  The coroner also used autopsy photos in his 
testimony to explain injuries to Flick’s neck and wrists.  State’s Exhibits 20-K, J, 
and I are different angles of Flick’s right hand and wrist, portraying bruising that 
corresponds to the handcuffs that had been on her wrists.  State’s Exhibit 20-H 
portrays similar bruising to the left wrist.  State’s Exhibit 20-G depicts Flick’s 
face and shows petechiae, small reddish marks indicating ruptured blood vessels 
that are caused by compression to the neck.  State’s Exhibit 20-D demonstrates 
ligature bruising on the neck caused by Flick’s necklace.  This photo also shows 
more petechiae around the neck and stippling, an injury to the skin caused by 
unburned particles of gunpowder.  State’s Exhibit 20-B is a close-up of the 
ligature mark on the neck.  These photos supported the coroner’s conclusions that 
Flick had been strangled and had struggled while handcuffed.  Finally, State’s 
Exhibit 20-E demonstrates a gunshot injury to Flick’s left index finger, and 20-F 
shows a gunshot wound to the lower lip and also illustrates stippling.  None of the 
autopsy photos were duplicative or cumulative, and the value of each photo 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
outweighed any prejudicial impact.  Thus, we conclude that no abuse of discretion 
occurred in admitting the photos. 
{¶ 89} Leonard also complains that photos of the victim were displayed 
on a “big screen television.”  During the state’s case, photos of Flick were on a 
screen, but the record does not indicate what size screen was used.  Moreover, 
Leonard did not object to displaying the photos on screen.  Nothing in the record 
demonstrates that the method of presenting this evidence prejudiced Leonard by 
inflaming the jury’s passions.  See, e.g., State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d at 444-445, 
678 N.E.2d 891.  See, also, State v. Gumm (1995) 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 425, 653 
N.E.2d 253 (the size of a photo alone does not increase the prejudicial aspect of 
the evidence to the extent that it becomes inadmissible).  Thus, no plain error 
occurred. 
{¶ 90} Finally, Leonard objects to the prosecutor’s use of photographs 
during closing argument.  It appears that the prosecutors referred to the 
photographs only twice in their closing arguments, and Leonard failed to object 
both times.  Again, we find there was no plain error.  Accordingly, we overrule 
proposition of law 12. 
C. Hearsay 
{¶ 91} In his 23rd proposition of law, Leonard argues that the admission 
of several hearsay statements violated his right to confront his accuser and denied 
him a fair trial. 
{¶ 92} Leonard first claims that Ryan Gries was allowed to testify that on 
the night of the murder Flick had said she was going to Gries’s house to play 
pool.  But the trial court sustained an objection and precluded any testimony from 
Gries as to what Flick had said in this regard.  Further, any testimony from Gries 
that Flick had intended to go to his house that night would have been merely 
cumulative of evidence in Leonard’s confession. 
January Term, 2004 
25 
{¶ 93} Leonard also challenges Gries’s testimony regarding his telephone 
conversation with Flick the night she was killed.  Over objection, the trial court 
admitted testimony from Gries that Flick had told him on the telephone that she 
was not coming to his house.  According to Gries, Flick kept repeating that she 
was “not coming down tonight.”  Gries eventually was able to elicit from Flick, 
through her responses to his questions, that Leonard was at her house and was 
hurting her. 
{¶ 94} Flick’s statements to Gries were admissible under the excited-
utterance exception of Evid.R. 803(2), which allows a hearsay statement to be 
admitted into evidence if it relates “to a startling event or condition made while 
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition.”  According to Leonard’s confession, when Flick was on the phone 
with Gries, Leonard had a gun pointed at her.  Further, Gries testified that during 
their phone conversation, Flick was very upset, she was crying, and she had a 
tremendous amount of fear in her voice.  The evidence thus reflects that Flick’s 
statements were made while she was in fear and under the stress of a startling 
event.  See, e.g., State v. O’Neal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 402, 410-411, 721 N.E.2d 
73. 
{¶ 95} Moreover, the fact that Flick’s statements were made in response 
to Gries’s questions does not preclude their admission as an excited utterance.  
“The admission of a declaration as an excited utterance is not precluded by 
questioning which: (1) is neither coercive nor leading, (2) facilitates the 
declarant’s expression of what is already the natural focus of the declarant’s 
thoughts, and (3) does not destroy the domination of the nervous excitement over 
the declarant’s reflective faculties.”  State v. Wallace (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 87, 
524 N.E.2d 466, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 96} Gries’s questions were not coercive or leading.  Gries asked 
simple, straightforward questions:  “[W]hat happened?”  “What’s the matter?”  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
When Flick repeatedly responded, “I’m not coming down tonight,” Gries asked, 
“Is [Leonard] there? * * * Is he beating you?”  The questions were not designed to 
elicit a particular response or to obtain information that Flick tried to withhold.  
Gries’s inquiries merely facilitated Flick’s expressions.  Certainly, under these 
circumstances, Flick’s statements were made while she was under the stress of 
excitement of Leonard’s pointing a gun at her and were not the product of 
reflective thought. 
{¶ 97} Leonard additionally claims that the trial court improperly allowed 
Gries’s testimony that during the same phone call, Flick had told Gries not to 
come to her house and not to call the police.  According to Gries’s testimony, 
Flick responded negatively when Gries told her to call the police and when he 
said that he was going to come to her house.  But these responses do not fall 
within the definition of hearsay, because they are not assertions.  See Evid.R. 
801(A) (defining a hearsay “statement” as “an oral or written assertion.” 
Emphasis added).  “An ‘assertion’ for hearsay purposes ‘simply means to say that 
something is so, e.g., that an event happened or that a condition existed.’ 
(Emphasis sic.) ”  State v. Carter (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 549, 651 N.E.2d 
965, quoting 2 McCormick on Evidence (4th Ed.1992) 98, Section 246.  The 
communication challenged by Leonard is not an assertion, because it cannot be 
proved true or false.  Thus, it is incapable of being offered to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted, and, as such, the expression falls outside the definition of 
hearsay pursuant to Evid.R. 801(C).  See, e.g., State v. Young (May 16, 2001), 
Cuyahoga App. No. 78058, 2001 WL 370460. 
{¶ 98} Leonard also argues that Flick’s statement that Leonard had forced 
her car off the road was inadmissible hearsay.  On the night of her murder, Flick 
had planned to meet friends at Snow’s Lake Bar.  Leonard followed Flick as she 
headed for Snow’s and, as he claims in his confession, “got her to pull over.”   
Three witnesses, Alvie Woods, Deborah Schroeder, and Reva Ketterer, testified 
January Term, 2004 
27 
that when Flick arrived at Snow’s, she told them that Leonard had just run her car 
off the road.  Based on the following, Flick’s statement was admissible as an 
excited utterance. 
{¶ 99} For an excited utterance to be admissible, “[t]he central 
requirements are that the statement must be made while the declarant is still under 
the stress of the event and the statement may not be the result of reflective 
thought.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State v. Taylor (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 295, 303, 612 
N.E.2d 316.  The evidence indicated that Flick lived five to ten miles from 
Snow’s and that during her drive, Leonard stopped her car.  When Flick first 
arrived at Snow’s, she was “upset,” “scared,” “very shaken,” and “anxious.”  
Ketterer and Schroeder both testified that upon entering Snow’s, Flick 
immediately stated: “That son of a bitch [Leonard] ran me off the road.”  Flick’s 
statement was not the result of reflective thought and was made under the stress of 
excitement caused by Leonard’s having just forced her car from the road.  See, 
e.g., State v. Huertas (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 22, 31, 553 N.E.2d 1058 (affirming 
finding that a statement made 45 minutes after event but while the declarant was 
still agitated and in serious pain and had not calmed down to be an excited 
utterance). 
{¶ 100} Leonard further complains of hearsay elicited through the 
testimony of Sabrina Frye.  Leonard first complains of Frye’s testimony that four 
days before the murder, Flick had said she intended to end her relationship with 
Leonard because he had fathered a second child by Penny McBride.  But Frye’s 
testimony was admissible as a statement of Flick’s then existing mental condition.  
Evid.R. 803(3) allows for introduction of a “statement of the declarant’s then 
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, 
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health).”  This testimony 
was probative of Flick’s intent to end her relationship with Leonard.  See, e.g., 
State v. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d at 158-159, 749 N.E.2d 226. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
{¶ 101} However, the state-of-mind exception does not permit witnesses 
to relate why the declarant held a particular state of mind.  See State v. 
Apanovitch (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 21, 514 N.E.2d 394, citing United States v. 
Cohen (C.A.5, 1980), 631 F.2d 1223, 1225.  Therefore, Frye’s testimony 
regarding Flick’s statement as to why she intended to end the relationship was 
inadmissible. 
{¶ 102} Nevertheless, any error was harmless.  Leonard stipulated at trial 
that he had fathered two children by McBride.  In his confession, he stated that he 
had believed that his relationship with Flick was ending and that he had shot Flick 
because she had broken his heart. 
{¶ 103} Leonard also argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay 
testimony from Frye regarding statements Leonard allegedly had made to Flick 
during conversations to which Frye was not a party.  Specifically, Frye testified 
that Flick had told her that Leonard had said that if he could not have her, no one 
else could; and that if he ever saw Flick with another man, Leonard would kill 
him.  Defense counsel’s objection was overruled. 
{¶ 104} We conclude that the trial court should have sustained counsel’s 
objection because Frye’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay.  The testimony was 
not admissible under Evid.R. 803(3), because it did not reflect Flick’s then 
existing state of mind.  Instead, Frye merely restated a threat that Leonard had 
allegedly made to Flick.  Even if it were admitted to show Flick’s state of mind 
(e.g., that she was afraid of Leonard), Frye’s testimony goes beyond the scope of 
the exception because it encompasses the underlying basis for Flick’s mental 
state.  See State v. Awkal (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 324, 330-331, 667 N.E.2d 960, 
citing State v. Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d at 21-22, 514 N.E.2d 394.  Thus, the 
trial court erred in admitting this testimony. 
{¶ 105} However, we conclude that the error was harmless.  Leonard had 
told Alvie Woods the same thing directly that he had allegedly told Flick, and 
January Term, 2004 
29 
during Woods’s testimony, the trial court properly admitted the statement under 
Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(a) (a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and 
is the party’s own statement).  Therefore, this evidence was cumulative.  See, e.g., 
State v. O’Neal, 87 Ohio St.3d at 411, 721 N.E.2d 73. 
{¶ 106} Finally, we find that Frye’s testimony regarding Flick’s 
statement explaining why she had permitted Leonard to stay at her house the night 
before the murder was inadmissible.  Frye testified that Flick had said that she had 
allowed Leonard to spend the night because Leonard “had continued to call and 
harass her and she was afraid that he would hurt himself.”  Defense counsel 
objected, but the trial court admitted the testimony under Evid.R. 803(3). 
{¶ 107} Evidence may be admitted under Evid.R. 803(3) when it 
concerns the declarant’s present state of mind or to show that the declarant 
subsequently acted in accordance with that state of mind.  2 Giannelli & Snyder, 
Evidence (2d Ed.2001) 102, Section 803.17.  However, Evid.R. 803(3) excludes a 
statement of “memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it 
relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant’s will.” 
{¶ 108} According to Frye’s testimony, Flick made this statement to Frye 
on Friday, July 28, 2000.  It concerned an event — Leonard’s spending the night 
at Flick’s house — that took place the previous evening.  Statements under 
Evid.R. 803(3) “must point towards the future rather than the past.”  State v. 
Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d at 21, 514 N.E.2d 394.  See, also, Shepard v. United 
States (1933), 290 U.S. 96, 105-106, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 (hearsay 
statements that relate past events are not admissible under the state-of-mind 
exception); Weissenberger, Ohio Evidence (2004) 463, Section 803.30 (“Where 
the statement does not pertain to a ‘then existing’ condition, it must be viewed as 
a narrative account of a past event formulated after time for reflection, and it is 
not admissible under Rule 803[3]”).  Because Flick’s statement related to past 
conduct, it does not fall within the state-of-mind exception under Evid.R. 803(3).  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
But the error of admitting the testimony was harmless.  Leonard confessed to the 
murder, and there was substantial evidence to support his attempted-rape 
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.  See, e.g., State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio 
St.3d 111, 120, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383.  Based on the foregoing, we 
overrule Leonard’s 23rd proposition of law. 
D. Admission of Police Reports 
{¶ 109} Leonard argues in proposition of law 30 that his Confrontation 
Clause rights were violated by the admission of two police investigative reports.  
After police had taken Leonard into custody, Leonard confessed to Flick’s murder 
during an interview with Hamilton County Sheriff’s Detectives Schweinefus and 
Diersing.  The following day, Schweinefus prepared a written investigation report 
summarizing Leonard’s tape-recorded confession.  Approximately five months 
later, Schweinefus prepared a supplemental report that purported to summarize 
other, unrecorded statements that Leonard had made during the interview.  Over 
defense’s objection, the trial court admitted both police reports into evidence.  
Schweinefus’s original report was admitted in redacted form, so that only the 
detective’s summary of Leonard’s statements could be seen, and his supplemental 
report was admitted in its entirety.  The trial court also permitted Schweinefus, 
over objection, to rely extensively on his reports while testifying on direct 
examination. 
{¶ 110} Leonard’s claim that the trial court admitted these police reports 
in violation of his right of confrontation is without merit.  Both the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause, and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses 
who testify against him.  See, e.g., State v. Self (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 73, 78, 564 
N.E.2d 446, citing Henderson v. Maxwell (1964), 176 Ohio St. 187, 188, 27 
O.O.2d 59, 198 N.E.2d 456.  Schweinefus’s testimony on direct examination 
essentially mirrored the contents of his investigative reports.  Leonard’s counsel 
January Term, 2004 
31 
extensively and effectively cross-examined Schweinefus regarding the reports.  
The admission of hearsay does not violate the Confrontation Clause if the 
declarant (here, Schweinefus) testifies at trial.  See California v. Green (1970), 
399 U.S. 149, 157-158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489; State v. Keenan (1998), 
81 Ohio St.3d 133, 142, 689 N.E.2d 929.  Thus, the trial court did not violate 
Leonard’s constitutional right of confrontation. 
{¶ 111} Nevertheless, we find that the trial court erred in admitting the 
reports.  The police reports are inadmissible hearsay and should not have been 
submitted to the jury.  In criminal cases, Evid.R. 803(8)(b) excludes from the 
public-records-and-reports exception to hearsay police reports that “recite an 
officer’s observations of criminal activities or observations made as part of an 
investigation of criminal activities.”  State v. Ward (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 355, 
358, 15 OBR 477, 474 N.E.2d 300.  These investigative reports recite Detective 
Schweinefus’s observations made during his investigation into Leonard’s criminal 
activity.  The trial court also erred in allowing Schweinefus to rely on his reports 
during direct examination because the prosecutor failed to first establish that the 
reports were necessary to refresh the detective’s recollection.  However, for the 
following reasons, these errors were harmless.  Crim.R. 52(A). 
{¶ 112} First, the Rules of Evidence permitted Schweinefus to testify at 
trial as to matters contained in his investigative reports.  In these reports, 
Schweinefus purported to have summarized statements, both recorded and 
unrecorded, that Leonard had made during his confession.  A defendant’s own 
out-of-court statements, offered against him at trial, are not hearsay.  Evid.R. 
801(D)(2)(a).  Thus, while the investigative reports were inadmissible hearsay, 
the trial court properly admitted Schweinefus’s in-court testimony regarding 
statements that Leonard had made. 
{¶ 113} In State v. Jackson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 29, 565 N.E.2d 549, we 
found harmless error under almost identical circumstances.  In Jackson, the trial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
court allowed into evidence a police officer’s written summary of statements that 
the defendant had made during a police interview.  The trial court also let the 
officer read his written summary to the jury, even though the prosecutor did not 
first establish, as required by Evid.R. 803(5), that the officer’s recollection 
prevented him from testifying fully and accurately.  We held that any error was 
harmless because the defendant’s statements made during his police interview 
were admissible under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(a) through the police officer’s 
testimony and no prejudice arose from the officer’s recitation of his written 
summary.  Jackson, 57 Ohio St.3d at 37, 565 N.E.2d 549. 
{¶ 114} Second, the jury’s verdict undercuts Leonard’s assertion that he 
was prejudiced by the admission of the reports.  The state’s primary purpose in 
offering these investigative reports was to provide conclusive evidence (i.e., 
evidence of sexual penetration) that Leonard had raped Flick before killing her.  
See R.C. 2907.02 and 2907.01(A).  But the jury acquitted Leonard of rape.  Thus, 
the record does not support Leonard’s contention that the jury placed undue 
weight on the reports.  Based on the foregoing, we overrule proposition of law 30. 
E. Guilt-Determination-Phase Jury Instructions 
{¶ 115} Leonard contends in proposition of law 25 that the trial court 
committed numerous errors in instructing the jury during the guilt-determination 
phase.  Leonard first argues that the trial court improperly included an instruction 
on attempted rape.  He also contends that the trial court “expanded the definition 
of the term ‘attempt’ from the definition listed in Ohio Revised Code § 
2923.01(A) [sic, 2923.02].”  Defense counsel objected to both instructions.  
However, we find that no error occurred. 
{¶ 116} Attempted rape is a lesser included offense of rape, and the 
evidence at trial supported the trial court’s decision to instruct on that offense.  
See State v. Williams, 74 Ohio St.3d at 578, 660 N.E.2d 724.  See, also, State v. 
Thomas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286, paragraph two of the 
January Term, 2004 
33 
syllabus.  Also, the trial court did not erroneously expand the definition of 
“attempt” set forth in R.C. 2923.02.  The trial court’s definition substantially 
conformed to the definition of “attempt” set forth in State v. Green (1991), 58 
Ohio St.3d 239, 240, 569 N.E.2d 1038.  See, also, State v. Woods (1976), 48 Ohio 
St.2d 127, 2 O.O.3d 289, 357 N.E.2d 1059, paragraph one of the syllabus 
(construing R.C. 2923.02[A]), which was cited with approval in Green. 
{¶ 117} Leonard next challenges the trial court’s instruction on 
reasonable doubt.  The reasonable-doubt instruction in the guilt-determination 
phase was in accord with R.C. 2901.05(D), and we have previously rejected 
complaints against the statutory definition.  See, e.g., State v. Van Gundy (1992), 
64 Ohio St.3d 230, 232, 594 N.E.2d 604; State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d at 202, 702 
N.E.2d 866. 
{¶ 118} Leonard also argues that the trial court erred in its instructions on 
causation and prior calculation and design, but Leonard failed to object to these 
instructions at trial.  No error, plain or otherwise, occurred.  See State v. Gross, 97 
Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, at ¶97-99 (in which a 
substantially identical causation instruction was upheld); State v. Jones (2001), 91 
Ohio St.3d 335, 348, 744 N.E.2d 1163 (in which a similar prior-calculation-and-
design instruction was upheld). 
{¶ 119} Leonard’s claim that the trial court instructed the jury “on 
making an inference based on an inference” is not supported by the record.  He 
also asserts that the trial court’s instruction that “a good motive is not a defense” 
negated the court’s instruction on purpose.  But the trial court instructed the jury 
that while proof of motive is not required, “[t]he presence or absence of motive is 
one of the circumstances bearing upon purpose.”  A single jury instruction may 
not be judged in artificial isolation but must be viewed in the context of the 
overall charge.  State v. Price (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 14 O.O.3d 379, 398 
N.E.2d 772, paragraph four of the syllabus.  Leonard failed to object to the trial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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court’s “good motive” instruction, and plain error has not been shown.  State v. 
Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of 
the syllabus. 
{¶ 120} We also reject Leonard’s argument that the trial court’s 
“purpose” instruction, which is a standard instruction, created a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption.  See State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 100, 656 
N.E.2d 643; State v. Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d at 392, 659 N.E.2d 292. 
{¶ 121} Finally, Leonard asserts that the jury was instructed during the 
guilt-determination phase “as to how they would reach the mitigation phase of the 
case,” but he does not explain how he was prejudiced.  To the extent that Leonard 
contends that the trial court improperly injected the issue of punishment into the 
guilt-determination phase, we rejected similar arguments in State v. Phillips, 74 
Ohio St.3d at 100-101, 656 N.E.2d 643, and State v. Durr, 58 Ohio St.3d at 90, 
568 N.E.2d 674.  Cf. R.C. 2929.03(B) (“The instruction to the jury shall * * * not 
mention the penalty that may be the consequence of a guilty or not guilty verdict 
on any charge or specification”).  Accordingly, Leonard’s 25th proposition of law 
is overruled. 
F. Reading Back of Portions of Witness Testimony 
{¶ 122} In his 31st proposition of law, Leonard claims that the trial court 
erred when it allowed portions of testimony to be read to the jury.  After 
beginning deliberations, the jury requested that the testimony of Kelly Fenech and 
Alvie Woods be read.  The trial court, over defense counsel’s objection, said to 
the jury, “I’m going to ask you all to go back into the jury room and to discuss 
whether you could be more specific in your request as to what portions of the 
testimony you are looking for.  We do have the testimony available.  And if you 
want to hear the whole thing, I could provide that.”  The jury responded by 
requesting that the testimony of Fenech “describing her driving by the flower 
shop on July 28, 2000,” and the testimony “of Alvie Woods concerning all 
January Term, 2004 
35 
conversations and interactions” with Leonard on July 28, 2000, be read.  
Thereafter, the trial court had those portions of testimony read to the jury. 
{¶ 123} It is well settled that a trial court, upon a request from the jury, 
“may cause to be read all or part of the testimony of any witness.”  State v. Berry 
(1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 255, 54 O.O.2d 374, 267 N.E.2d 775, paragraph four of the 
syllabus.  Moreover, the trial court has broad discretion in this regard.  Id.  See, 
also, State v. Carter (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 560, 651 N.E.2d 965; State v. 
Davis (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 340, 581 N.E.2d 1362.  Leonard has failed to 
show that the trial court abused its discretion and offers a purely speculative claim 
of prejudice.  Moreover, no abuse of discretion is apparent from the record.  
Therefore, we overrule Leonard’s 31st proposition of law. 
G. Changing of Verdict Forms 
{¶ 124} Leonard argues in proposition of law 32 that he was denied a fair 
trial when the trial court asked the jurors to submit a corrected verdict form in 
relation to the charge in Count Five.  For the following reasons, we conclude that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
{¶ 125} At the end of the guilt-determination phase, the jury found 
Leonard not guilty of the charge of rape in Count Five but guilty of the lesser 
included offense of attempted rape.  During the penalty phase, the trial court 
learned that the verdict form signed by the jury contained a reference to R.C. 
2907.05, the code section for gross sexual imposition, instead of the section 
numbers for attempted, R.C. 2923.02, and rape, R.C. 2907.02.  The remaining 
language of the verdict form accurately reflected the jury’s guilty verdict on the 
charge of attempted rape. 
{¶ 126} To correct the error, the trial judge explained the error to the jury 
and provided the jury with a corrected verdict form, along with the other verdict 
forms for Count Five, and asked the jury to choose and complete the appropriate 
form.  At defense counsel’s request, the corrected form was not submitted to the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
jury until after it had returned its sentencing verdict.  The jurors thereafter 
completed and signed the corrected verdict form. 
{¶ 127} An analogous situation occurred in State v. Davie (1997), 80 
Ohio St.3d 311, 686 N.E.2d 245, in which the verdict form for aggravated robbery 
inadvertently contained the word “kidnapping.”  The trial court in that case 
granted the state’s motion to amend the verdict forms.  Although we did not find 
prejudicial error in Davie, we noted that “[t]he better practice * * * would have 
been for the trial court to reconvene the jury to redeliberate” on the count at issue.  
Id. at 326, 686 N.E.2d 245. 
{¶ 128} In the instant matter, the trial court followed the exact procedure 
set forth in Davie.  See, also, State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d at 249, 15 OBR 379, 
473 N.E.2d 768, citing Hurley v. State (1890), 4 Ohio C.C. 425, 428, 1890 WL 
324.  Thus, no error occurred. 
{¶ 129} Leonard also claims that he was denied a fair trial because of an 
error in the “Not Guilty” verdict form for Count Five.  This form did mistakenly 
contain the word “Guilty” in the upper right-hand corner.  Nevertheless, prejudice 
is lacking.  The trial court explained this error to the jury and provided it with a 
corrected “Not Guilty” verdict form, along with the other verdict forms for Count 
Five.  But Leonard was found guilty of attempted rape, and neither the original 
nor the corrected “Not Guilty” verdict form was ever used.  Thus, we overrule 
proposition of law 32. 
III. Sentencing Issues 
A. Victim-Impact Statements 
{¶ 130} In his second proposition of law, Leonard argues that by 
allowing victim-impact statements from Flick’s family and friends, the trial court 
weighed an invalid aggravating circumstance when deciding whether to sentence 
Leonard to death.  Contrary to appellate counsel’s assertion, the trial court had 
already accepted the jury’s penalty verdict and had sentenced Leonard to death 
January Term, 2004 
37 
before hearing any victim-impact statements.  Therefore, there is no merit to the 
contention that the trial court considered and weighed these statements in making 
its determination as to the death sentence.  Leonard’s second proposition of law is 
overruled. 
B. Penalty-Phase Instructions 
{¶ 131} Leonard contends in proposition of law 15 that the trial court 
erred by instructing the jury during the penalty phase using the statutory definition 
of “reasonable doubt” contained in R.C. 2901.05(D).  The instruction given in the 
penalty phase was consistent with the instruction suggested in State v. Goff 
(1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 132, 694 N.E.2d 916.  Therefore, we overrule 
Leonard’s 15th proposition of law. 
{¶ 132} In proposition 26, Leonard challenges the trial court’s penalty-
phase instructions, including another challenge to the court’s reasonable-doubt 
instruction.  We have rejected Leonard’s reasonable-doubt-instruction arguments 
in the discussions relating to propositions of law 25 and 15.  We reject Leonard’s 
remaining claims under this proposition of law for the following reasons. 
{¶ 133} There was no error in the trial court’s instructions regarding 
imposing a life sentence.  A verdict of life imprisonment is required to be 
unanimous, and that requirement is constitutional.  State v. Davis, 62 Ohio St.3d 
at 351, 581 N.E.2d 1362. 
{¶ 134} The trial court also did not err by refusing to instruct on specific 
R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) mitigating factors that defense counsel believed were 
supported by the evidence.  The trial court instructed the jury to consider “any 
other factors that support a penalty less than death or lessen the appropriateness of 
the death penalty” and permitted defense counsel to argue any nonstatutory 
mitigating factors raised by the evidence.  See State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 89, 109-110, 684 N.E.2d 668. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
{¶ 135} The trial court’s reference to aggravating “circumstances” 
tracked the language in R.C. 2929.04 and was not error.  In addition, an 
instruction that a recommendation of death is reviewable by the trial court is not 
reversible error.  See State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d at 559, 651 N.E.2d 965; State 
v. Woodard (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 70, 77, 623 N.E.2d 75; and R.C. 
2929.03(D)(2).  Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that its sentencing 
recommendation should be made as if it “is absolute and will be carried out.”  The 
record also reflects that the trial court correctly identified the single aggravating 
circumstance for the jury’s consideration. 
{¶ 136} Finally, the trial court’s instruction prohibiting the jury’s 
consideration of sympathy was proper.  State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 
164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph three of the syllabus; State v. 
Lorraine, 66 Ohio St.3d at 417-418, 613 N.E.2d 212.  For the reasons stated, we 
overrule proposition of law 26 in its entirety. 
C. Double Jeopardy 
{¶ 137} In his 18th proposition of law, Leonard argues that the trial court 
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by sentencing him on both the felony-
murder charge and the underlying kidnapping and rape charges.  But Leonard is 
mistaken that he was convicted of capital murder based on both attempted rape 
and kidnapping.  Kidnapping was not charged as a death-penalty specification.  In 
addition, the Double Jeopardy Clause “does not preclude a defendant from being 
separately punished for an aggravated murder and for felonies involved in that 
murder.”  State v. Coley (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 264, 754 N.E.2d 1129.  See, 
also, State v. Nields, 93 Ohio St.3d at 31, 752 N.E.2d 859; State v. Reynolds, 80 
Ohio St.3d at 681-683, 687 N.E.2d 1358; State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d at 117, 
684 N.E.2d 668.  Therefore, Leonard’s 18th proposition of law is overruled. 
D. Proportionality 
January Term, 2004 
39 
{¶ 138} Leonard contends in proposition of law 19 that his death 
sentence is excessive and disproportionate when compared with other cases in 
which the death penalty has been imposed.  We will address this argument during 
our independent review of Leonard’s death sentence.  R.C. 2929.05. 
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
{¶ 139} In his fourth proposition of law, Leonard makes various claims 
relating to ineffective assistance of counsel.  Reversal of a conviction or sentence 
based upon ineffective assistance of counsel requires satisfying the two-pronged 
test set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674.  Strickland requires that the defendant show, first, that counsel’s 
performance was deficient and, second, that counsel’s deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.  Id. at 687, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
{¶ 140} Leonard raises several claims of ineffective assistance during the 
guilt-determination phase.  He first contends that counsel was deficient for failing 
to request defense experts.  But as we discussed in relation to Leonard’s 
propositions of law one and eight, the record does not reveal any need for experts.  
Thus, no basis exists to find deficient performance. 
{¶ 141} Similarly, we reject Leonard’s claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel raised in propositions of law 17 and 21.  Leonard has not shown that 
counsel’s performance was either deficient or prejudicial.  State v. Bradley 
(1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of the syllabus, 
following Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
{¶ 142} Leonard also claims that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s 
lack of experience in capital cases and that lead counsel was not certified pursuant 
to Sup.R. 20 (formerly C.P.Sup.R. 65).  However, during arraignment, the trial 
court advised Leonard of his right to have counsel appointed who was certified in 
capital cases.  Leonard, instead, chose to retain private counsel.  In State v. Keith 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
(1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 534, 684 N.E.2d 47, we declined to “impose a rule that 
creates a presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel has been 
retained by or for a defendant and is not qualified under C.P.Sup.R. 65.” 
{¶ 143} Leonard next argues that counsel was deficient in calling two 
witnesses in the guilt-determination phase who offered damaging testimony.  
Leonard claims that testimony from his brother Ted and from Rick Schoeny 
prejudiced his defense.  “Generally, counsel’s decision whether to call a witness 
falls within the rubric of trial strategy and will not be second-guessed by a 
reviewing court.”  State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d at 490, 739 N.E.2d 749.  We 
conclude that trial counsel’s decision to call these witnesses represented 
reasonable trial strategy. 
{¶ 144} Schoeny testified that it was common for Leonard to have guns 
and that he always carried a gun in his jacket.  This testimony was apparently 
offered to rebut the state’s claim that the murder was premeditated.  Ted Leonard 
testified that Leonard had previously threatened to kill people but that he had 
never taken his brother’s threats seriously.  This testimony was apparently 
intended to diminish the impact of the state’s evidence that Leonard had 
previously threatened Flick.  And Ted’s testimony that Leonard was a good shot 
supported the defense theory that Leonard did not intend to kill Gries and Minges 
when he shot at them through the door of Flick’s residence.  This strategy was 
ultimately successful: Leonard was acquitted of both attempted-murder counts.  
Finally, Ted’s testimony that Leonard had admitted killing Flick was not 
prejudicial in light of Leonard’s confession. 
{¶ 145} Leonard also claims deficient performance in trial counsel’s 
failure to request a continuance when three subpoenaed defense witnesses failed 
to appear at the guilt-determination phase of the trial.  Defense counsel explained 
to the court that the witnesses “were not eyewitnesses or anything of that nature” 
but were subpoenaed to offer “background” information.  Leonard has not 
January Term, 2004 
41 
explained how the failure to ask for a continuance was prejudicial.  Moreover, the 
trial court asked Leonard whether his counsel had consulted with him in regard to 
the absence of these witnesses, and Leonard said that they had and that he agreed 
with counsel’s decision to proceed without them. 
{¶ 146} Leonard also argues that counsel failed to effectively cross-
examine Gries and Minges.  The extent and scope of cross-examination clearly 
fall within the ambit of trial strategy, and debatable trial tactics do not establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  See State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d at 339, 
738 N.E.2d 1178; State v. Otte, 74 Ohio St.3d at 565, 660 N.E.2d 711; accord 
State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 142-144, 538 N.E.2d 373.  Leonard claims that 
there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of Gries and Minges and that 
more effective cross-examinations could have bolstered the defense’s argument 
that Flick had consented to having sex with Leonard.  But Leonard does not 
explain what the alleged inconsistencies are or how they could have shown that 
Flick had consented.  Nor are the inconsistencies clear from the record.  Thus, we 
reject Leonard’s argument. 
{¶ 147} Leonard also claims that counsel were ineffective during the 
penalty phase of his trial.  He first contends that he was prejudiced by the lack of 
a mitigation expert.  But trial counsel did employ a licensed psychiatrist, who 
presented mitigation evidence in Leonard’s behalf.  Moreover, Leonard does not 
explain how an additional mitigation expert would have aided his defense.  See, 
e.g., State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 542, 747 N.E.2d 765. 
{¶ 148} Leonard also questions his counsel’s using Dr. James Hawkins, a 
licensed psychiatrist, as his mitigation expert.  Leonard claims that Dr. Hawkins 
did not understand his role as mitigation expert and his testimony damaged 
Leonard’s chance of receiving a life sentence. 
{¶ 149} Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 
deferential, and “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689-690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Dr. Hawkins’s testimony was a 
key component of the defense theory that Leonard’s actions were extremely out of 
character.  Dr. Hawkins explained how Leonard, the product of a loving, 
supportive family, with a strong religious upbringing, and a person of good 
character with no prior criminal history, could commit such violent crimes.  We 
determine that the decision to call Dr. Hawkins reflected reasonable professional 
judgment.  See, e.g., State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 439, 2003-Ohio-4164, 793 
N.E.2d 446, at ¶ 85-89. 
{¶ 150} Moreover, we find that Leonard has not shown how Dr. 
Hawkins’s lack of knowledge regarding specific details of the charged crimes was 
prejudicial.  In fact, Dr. Hawkins explained that this information would not have 
aided his diagnosis that Leonard suffered from a personality disorder.  Leonard 
has also not shown how Dr. Hawkins’s use of the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory amounted to deficient performance by trial counsel.  Dr. 
Hawkins was the expert in this area, and he determined which tests to administer.  
See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d at 340, 738 N.E.2d 1178.  Leonard has 
presented no sound rationale to conclude that defense counsel’s mitigation 
strategy was unreasonable.  State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 151} Leonard raises other ineffective-assistance claims related to the 
penalty phase.  Leonard contends that during opening statement, counsel reversed 
the penalty-phase balancing test, saying that the life that Leonard had led until the 
murder outweighed the aggravating factor and that the jury’s penalty verdict was 
only a recommendation.  However, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on 
the legal standards.  Thus, any misstatement by counsel was nonprejudicial.  See 
State v. Stallings (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 286, 731 N.E.2d 159. 
January Term, 2004 
43 
{¶ 152} In addition, Leonard argues that counsel were deficient by (1) not 
giving the jury complete information about Leonard’s learning disabilities, (2) 
failing to develop the fact that Leonard’s family had cared for foster children 
while he was growing up, and (3) not adequately developing Leonard’s religious 
beliefs and feelings of remorse.  But trial counsel did present testimony in regard 
to these issues.  Leonard’s claims that trial counsel were deficient by failing to 
pursue these facts to a greater extent are based on speculation. 
{¶ 153} Finally, Leonard has failed to show how he was prejudiced by 
trial counsel’s requesting a presentence investigation report and court-clinic 
evaluation.  Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court relied on irrelevant 
or incompetent evidence in sentencing Leonard.  See, e.g., State v. Clemons, 82 
Ohio St.3d at 450, 696 N.E.2d 1009.  In fact, the trial court specifically noted that 
the psychological evaluation was of no value because Leonard refused to be 
interviewed by the court clinic.  Based on the foregoing, we overrule Leonard’s 
proposition of law four and his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in 
propositions of law 17 and 21. 
{¶ 154} Leonard argues in proposition of law 28 that trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase by failing to investigate 
all available mitigating factors.  But the record does not support that claim.  See 
State v. Dixon, 101 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-1585, 805 N.E.2d 1042, at ¶ 59-
62.  See, also, Wiggins v. Smith (2003), 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 
L.Ed.2d 471 (in which the court found ineffective assistance of counsel when the 
record revealed that the defendant had had a terrible childhood and that his 
defense counsel had failed to present evidence of it to the jury).  Therefore, we 
overrule Leonard’s 28th proposition of law. 
V. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
{¶ 155} In propositions of law three, 20, and 27, Leonard argues that he 
was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct.  To determine 
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whether a prosecutor’s remarks at trial constituted misconduct, we must 
determine (1) whether the remarks were improper and (2) if so, whether the 
remarks prejudicially affected the accused’s substantial rights.  State v. Smith 
(1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 14 OBR 317, 470 N.E.2d 883.  The touchstone of 
the analysis “is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”  
Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78. 
{¶ 156} In his third proposition of law, Leonard complains about 
comments that the prosecutor made during opening statements and closing 
arguments of both phases of the trial.  Leonard first complains that the prosecutor 
mentioned certain facts in his guilt-determination-phase opening statement that 
were not subsequently supported by evidence.  His trial counsel objected a 
number of times to these allegedly improper comments.  We find that this claim 
lacks merit. 
{¶ 157} During opening statement, counsel is accorded latitude and 
allowed fair comment on the facts to be presented at trial.  See Maggio v. 
Cleveland (1949), 151 Ohio St. 136, 38 O.O. 578, 84 N.E.2d 912, paragraph two 
of the syllabus.  See, also, e.g., State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-
2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, at ¶ 126.  Each of the prosecutor’s comments at issue here 
was supported by evidence subsequently offered at trial.  Thus, Leonard has failed 
to establish that any error occurred.  See, e.g., State v. Davis, 62 Ohio St.3d at 
337, 581 N.E.2d 1362.  Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that it must 
decide the case on the evidence and that opening statements and closing 
arguments are not evidence.  We presume that the jury followed the court’s 
instructions.  State v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 79, 641 N.E.2d 1082. 
{¶ 158} Leonard next complains about comments that the prosecutor 
made during the guilt-determination-phase closing argument.  Leonard contends 
that the prosecutor expressed a personal opinion as to whether Flick had 
consented to having sex with Leonard before her death, whether Leonard and 
January Term, 2004 
45 
Flick had struggled, and whether Leonard had planned to kill Flick.  Leonard’s 
failure to object to these comments waived all but plain error.  State v. Slagle, 65 
Ohio St.3d at 604, 605 N.E.2d 916. 
{¶ 159} We determine that no error, plain or otherwise, occurred.  A 
prosecutor may state an opinion if based on evidence presented at trial.  State v. 
Watson (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 1, 9-10, 572 N.E.2d 97; State v. Tyler, 50 Ohio 
St.3d at 41, 553 N.E.2d 576; State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 496, 709 
N.E.2d 484.  The state presented evidence supporting each of the contested 
statements. 
{¶ 160} Leonard also claims that on two separate occasions, the 
prosecutor misinformed the jury that it could automatically find Leonard guilty of 
Specification Two to Counts One and Two (that the aggravated murder occurred 
during a rape or attempted rape).  Again, Leonard’s failure to object waived all 
but plain error.  Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d at 604, 605 N.E.2d 916. 
{¶ 161} Only once did the prosecutor refer to the jury’s findings in regard 
to these specifications as “automatic.”  Admittedly, the prosecutor’s choice of 
words was unfortunate.  But isolated comments by a prosecutor are not to be 
taken out of context and given their most damaging meaning.  See Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo (1974), 416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431; State v. 
Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 204, 661 N.E.2d 1068. 
{¶ 162} Here, the prosecutor was merely arguing that a guilty verdict on 
Count One would logically result in the same verdict as to Specification Two to 
Counts One and Two.  Statements made by counsel in closing arguments do not 
govern the law that should be applied.  State v. Loza, 71 Ohio St.3d at 79, 641 
N.E.2d 1082.  The trial court properly charged the jury on all factual issues as to 
each count and specification charged in the indictment.  Thus, plain error is 
absent. 
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{¶ 163} Leonard further claims that he was prejudiced by the 
prosecutor’s remark that Leonard “deserves no break.”  He also claims that the 
prosecutor improperly referred to the penalty phase during his guilt-
determination-phase closing arguments.  Trial counsel did not object to the 
prosecutor’s “no break” comment, and no outcome-determinative plain error 
occurred as a result of the remark.  See, e.g., State v. Bies (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 
320, 326, 658 N.E.2d 754, citing State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 
372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 164} We find, however, that the prosecutor erred by referring to 
Leonard’s penalty during the guilt-determination phase.  See State v. Brown, 38 
Ohio St.3d at 316, 528 N.E.2d 523.  The prosecutor’s specific comments were as 
follows: 
{¶ 165} “The defense has asked you to find the defendant guilty of Count 
One and Two, of murder and gun [specification], but not of either of the 
specifications that would take us to the second part of the trial where you would 
decide what the appropriate penalty is as we talked about in voir dire. 
{¶ 166} “By finding the defendant guilty of murder and a gun 
specification and felonious assault, we would not get to that second part where 
more evidence would be presented, and then you would deliberate again to decide 
what the appropriate penalty is. 
{¶ 167} “Remember, only by finding Patrick Leonard guilty of either 
Count One or Count Two, and either Specification One or Specification Two to 
either of those counts, will we even get to the penalty phase where his future will 
be decided.” 
{¶ 168} The prosecutor’s comments could be interpreted as urging the 
jury to convict Leonard solely to impose the death sentence.  See Brown; State v. 
Hicks (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 72, 75, 538 N.E.2d 1030.  But Leonard failed to 
January Term, 2004 
47 
object, and for the following reasons, we find that the prosecutor’s comments did 
not rise to the level of plain error. 
{¶ 169} First, the trial court instructed the jurors to decide the case on the 
evidence alone and explained that arguments of counsel were not evidence.  
Second, the weight of the evidence against Leonard, including his confession, was 
substantial and “reduced the likelihood that the jury’s decision was influenced by 
argument.”  See Darden v. Wainwright (1986), 477 U.S. 168, 182, 106 S.Ct. 
2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144.  Third, as was the case in Darden, the prosecutor’s 
comments did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor did they implicate 
other specific rights of the accused.  Id.  Finally, the prosecutor’s comments 
should not be taken out of context and given their most damaging meaning.  
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431.  
After setting forth the state’s case, the prosecutor urged the jury to carefully 
consider the evidence before reaching a determination regarding guilt.  When 
viewed in this light, the remarks of the prosecutor did not deprive Leonard of a 
fair trial and did not result in outcome-determinative plain error. 
{¶ 170} Leonard next contends that the record is replete with the 
prosecutor’s personal attacks against him.  Leonard cites three specific instances: 
one in which the prosecutor said that Leonard had lied to Flick, another in which 
he said that Leonard is a liar, and a third in which Leonard claims that the 
prosecutor said that Leonard is a bad father and is manipulative and controlling.  
Leonard failed to object to these and other similar comments by the prosecutor.  
We conclude that plain error is absent. 
{¶ 171} The prosecutor never referred to Leonard as a “bad father” but 
did refer to him on several occasions as a liar and as manipulative and controlling.  
A prosecutor’s characterization of defendant as a liar or by other derogatory terms 
is generally improper.  See, e.g., State v. Clemons, 82 Ohio St.3d at 452, 696 
N.E.2d 1009; State v. Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d at 317, 528 N.E.2d 523.  But we have 
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permitted such comments when they fall short of being “purely abusive” or were 
based on evidence presented at trial.  See, e.g., id.; Clemons at 452, 696 N.E.2d 
1009; State v. Nields, 93 Ohio St.3d at 37-38, 752 N.E.2d 859; State v. Hill, 75 
Ohio St.3d at 204, 661 N.E.2d 1068; State v. Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d at 399, 659 
N.E.2d 292.  In this case, the prosecutor’s characterizations of Leonard amounted 
to fair comment based on the evidence at trial.  None of the comments were so 
egregious that they materially prejudiced Leonard or deprived him of a fair trial.  
Cf. State v. Keenan (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 613 N.E.2d 203. 
{¶ 172} Leonard also claims that prosecutorial misconduct occurred 
during the penalty phase.  He first contends that during opening statement, the 
prosecutor gave his personal opinion by stating, “One thing I do feel confident in, 
is that no matter what [the defense] produce[s] for you in mitigation, it will come 
nowhere close to the heavy weight that [the prosecutors] feel that you should 
attach to the aggravating circumstances.”  Leonard failed to object to this 
comment.  A similar opening statement was found to be nonprejudicial in State v. 
Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d at 680-681, 687 N.E.2d 1358, in which we held, “The 
general rule is that ‘where personal opinions of guilt are predicated upon the 
evidence, though frowned upon, they are not deemed to be prejudicially 
erroneous.’ * * * It is difficult for prosecutors to argue vigorously for the death 
penalty without making statements that can be arguably construed as statements 
of personal opinion.”  Id., quoting State v. Stephens (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 76, 83, 
53 O.O.2d 182, 263 N.E.2d 773.  Thus, we reject Leonard’s argument. 
{¶ 173} Leonard also contends that the prosecutor misstated the penalty-
phase weighing process.  We find any error harmless.  Leonard did not object, and 
the trial court instructed on the proper standard to apply in the weighing process.  
See State v. Smith (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 424, 444, 721 N.E.2d 93. 
{¶ 174} Leonard further contends that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by referring to the jury’s penalty-phase verdict as a recommendation.  
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49 
But the prosecutor’s comments “neither reduced the jury’s sense of responsibility 
nor increased the possibility of a recommendation of death in reliance upon the 
appellate process.”  State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 124, 529 N.E.2d 
913; accord State v. Woodard, 68 Ohio St.3d at 77, 623 N.E.2d 75. 
{¶ 175} We also reject Leonard’s argument regarding the prosecutor’s 
commenting on Leonard’s unsworn statement.  See State v. Smith, 87 Ohio St.3d 
at 444, 721 N.E.2d 93, and State v. Davis, 76 Ohio St.3d at 119-120, 666 N.E.2d 
1099. 
{¶ 176} Leonard makes several additional claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  In each instance, Leonard failed to object and waived all but plain 
error.  State v. Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d. at 604, 605 N.E.2d 916.  The prosecutor’s 
comments regarding the victim’s mental anguish and his asking the jury to be fair 
to the victim were improper but not prejudicial.  See, e.g., State v. Combs (1991), 
62 Ohio St.3d 278, 282-283, 581 N.E.2d 1071; State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d at 
158, 661 N.E.2d 1030.  None of the remaining statements that Leonard complains 
about constituted misconduct, let alone plain error.  See State v. Wilson, 74 Ohio 
St.3d at 399, 659 N.E.2d 292 (prosecutors can urge the merits of their cause).  
Based on the foregoing, we overrule Leonard’s third proposition of law. 
{¶ 177} In proposition of law 20, Leonard claims that he was denied a 
fair trial by “discriminatory charging and prosecution actions.”  But Leonard fails 
to explain how the prosecutor acted improperly by charging him with capital 
murder or how he was denied a fair trial as a result of the prosecutor’s actions.  In 
any event, “the existence of discretion in the charging stage of a capital 
prosecution does not violate the Constitution.”  State v. Nields, 93 Ohio St.3d at 
38, 752 N.E.2d 859; see, e.g., State v. Coleman (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 308, 
544 N.E.2d 622; Gregg v. Georgia (1976), 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 
L.Ed.2d 859.  Leonard’s 20th proposition of law is overruled. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 178} Leonard argues in proposition 27 that he was denied a fair trial as 
a result of prosecutorial misconduct that occurred throughout his trial.  Except in 
two instances, Leonard merely restates the claims of prosecutorial misconduct set 
forth in his third proposition of law.  As to the new claims raised in this 
proposition, the transcript pages cited do not reflect any misconduct.  
Furthermore, to the extent that Leonard is contending that the cumulative effect of 
misconduct impaired the overall fairness of his trial, this argument is without 
merit as well.  See, e.g., State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 113, 559 N.E.2d 710; 
State v. Smith, 87 Ohio St.3d at 444-445, 721 N.E.2d 93.  Cf., State v. Keenan, 66 
Ohio St.3d 402, 613 N.E.2d 203; State v. Fears (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 715 
N.E.2d 136.  Proposition of law 27 is overruled. 
VI. Constitutionality/Settled Issues 
{¶ 179} Leonard claims in proposition of law seven that Ohio’s death-
penalty statutes violate various international laws.  We overrule this claim on the 
authority of State v. Ashworth (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 70, 706 N.E.2d 1231, and 
State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 103-104, 656 N.E.2d 643. 
{¶ 180} Leonard’s argument in proposition of law 13 challenging the 
constitutionality of the requirement that mitigating factors be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence is without merit.  State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 
171-172, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264; Delo v. Lashley (1993), 507 U.S. 272, 
275-276, 113 S.Ct. 1222, 122 L.Ed.2d 620. 
{¶ 181} In his 16th proposition of law, Leonard raises various 
constitutional challenges to Ohio death-penalty statutes.  We reject these 
challenges.  Ohio’s capital-sentencing scheme is constitutional.  See, e.g., State v. 
Clemons, 82 Ohio St.3d at 454, 696 N.E.2d 1009; State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio 
St.3d 231, 253-254, 586 N.E.2d 1042; State v. Smith (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 284, 
294, 574 N.E.2d 510; State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 170, 555 N.E.2d 
293; State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d at 32, 676 N.E.2d 82; State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio 
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51 
St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264; and State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 
684 N.E.2d 668.  Leonard also argues that Ohio’s death-penalty laws violate 
international treaties.  We rejected the same argument under proposition of law 
seven.  Therefore, we summarily overrule propositions of law 13 and 16. 
VII. Other Issues 
A. Incomplete Record 
{¶ 182} Leonard contends in proposition 14 that his conviction and 
sentence must be reversed because the trial court failed to maintain a complete 
record of all proceedings as prescribed by Crim.R. 22.  Off-the-record 
conferences were held during the proceedings.  However, Leonard failed to object 
or ask that these conferences be recorded and has waived this issue.  State v. 
Brewer (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 50, 60-61, 549 N.E.2d 491; State v. Grant (1993), 
67 Ohio St.3d 465, 481, 620 N.E.2d 50. 
{¶ 183} “The requirement of a complete, full, and unabridged transcript 
in capital trials does not mean that the trial record must be perfect for purposes of 
appellate review.”  State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 687 N.E.2d 685, 
syllabus.  Moreover, a reversal will not occur as a result of unrecorded 
proceedings when the defendant failed to object and fails to demonstrate material 
prejudice.  Id. at 554, 687 N.E.2d 685.  See, also, State v. Goodwin (1999), 84 
Ohio St.3d 331, 340, 703 N.E.2d 1251. 
{¶ 184} Leonard speculates that crucial rulings were made during these 
unrecorded conferences.  Significantly, appellate counsel failed to invoke the 
procedures of App.R. 9(C) or 9(E) to reconstruct the off-the-record conferences or 
to establish their importance.  In fact, the subjects discussed during many of these 
unrecorded conferences are clear from the transcript, and it is clear that they were 
not crucial.  As to the remaining unrecorded conferences identified under this 
proposition, Leonard has not shown, nor does the record reveal, that these 
conferences concerned matters vital to appellate review.  See, e.g., State v. 
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Brewer, 48 Ohio St.3d at 60-61, 549 N.E.2d 491; State v. Nields, 93 Ohio St.3d at 
26-27, 752 N.E.2d 859.  Accordingly, we overrule proposition of law 14. 
B. Cumulative Error 
{¶ 185} In proposition 29, Leonard contends that his death sentence is 
inappropriate and must be reversed.  Leonard argues that the cumulative effect of 
errors committed at trial undermine the reliability of his sentence.  However, the 
errors committed at this trial do not compel invocation of the cumulative-error 
doctrine set forth in State v. DeMarco (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 191, 31 OBR 390, 
509 N.E.2d 1256, paragraph two of the syllabus.  See, e.g., State v. Moore (1998), 
81 Ohio St.3d 22, 41, 689 N.E.2d 1.  Leonard received a fair trial; the errors 
committed during trial were harmless or nonprejudicial, cumulatively as well as 
individually.  See, e.g., State v. Goff, 82 Ohio St.3d at 140, 694 N.E.2d 916.  
Leonard’s 29th proposition of law is overruled. 
VIII. Independent Sentence Evaluation 
A. Penalty Phase 
{¶ 186} During the penalty phase, Leonard called ten mitigation 
witnesses, made an unsworn statement, and introduced documentary evidence. 
{¶ 187} Dr. James Hawkins, a licensed psychiatrist, interviewed Leonard 
on two occasions, consulted with a psychologist who performed some 
psychological tests on Leonard, examined various records relating to Leonard and 
this crime, and conducted a psychiatric evaluation. 
{¶ 188} Psychological testing showed that Leonard has a performance IQ 
score of 117, and a verbal IQ score of 93.  Leonard has a full-scale IQ of 103, 
which is average.  Dr. Hawkins noted that Leonard has “a learning disability and 
had some special-educational experiences to compensate for that.”  Test results 
showed that Leonard is “a loner, that he is sensitive to criticism, and that he’s 
sensitive to humiliation and rejection.”  Leonard also “tends to bottle up his 
emotions, [and] feels somewhat personally inadequate.” 
January Term, 2004 
53 
{¶ 189} Dr. Hawkins concluded that Leonard is not mentally ill but that 
he does suffer from a personality disorder.  Dr. Hawkins characterized Leonard’s 
personality disorder as an inability to manage anger and control his rage.  In Dr. 
Hawkins’s opinion, Leonard was experiencing a “disassociative reaction” when 
he killed Flick.  Leonard felt betrayed by Flick and became enraged to such a 
degree that he lost the ability to control himself.  Dr. Hawkins also testified that 
Leonard’s personality disorder would benefit from anger-management group 
therapy. 
{¶ 190} On cross-examination, Dr. Hawkins identified Leonard as 
suffering from a schizoid-personality disorder.  Dr. Hawkins also agreed that 
Leonard is not legally insane and can distinguish right from wrong. 
{¶ 191} Several of Leonard’s family members and friends also testified 
regarding Leonard’s history, character, and background.  Leonard was the product 
of loving and supportive parents.  Leonard’s parents instilled discipline and 
responsibility in their children, and the entire family was actively involved with 
the Catholic church.  Leonard was one of ten children, and the Leonard family 
also raised several foster children.  Leonard was described as gentle, caring, and 
nurturing and as being devoted to his family.  Leonard was also described as 
being a good father to his son. 
{¶ 192} While growing up, Leonard liked to play sports, especially 
soccer, and was good with horses.  He attended summer camp, where he was a 
counselor and excelled as a leader.  Leonard struggled in school but worked hard 
and graduated from high school.  After high school, Leonard went to work with 
his brothers as a carpenter and eventually became a master carpenter. 
{¶ 193} People who had known Leonard and his family for years 
described him as a good person from a good family who was always helpful to 
others.  Leonard did not drink alcohol, smoke, or take drugs.  Prior to this 
incident, Leonard was not considered violent and had not been in trouble with 
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police.  The fact that Leonard had committed these crimes was described as 
shocking and extremely out of character. 
{¶ 194} Father David duPlantier, a minister and long-time friend of the 
Leonard family, began giving spiritual guidance to Leonard shortly after the 
murder.  Father duPlantier testified that Leonard had talked openly with him 
about his relationship with God and had expressed remorse for his actions.  He 
also observed that Leonard seemed to have a rapport with the guards and other 
prisoners and that it seemed to him that the guards considered Leonard to be a 
well-behaved and respectful person.  Finally, several witnesses testified that there 
is a lot of good left in Leonard and that he can help people and become a useful 
member of society. 
{¶ 195} In his unsworn statement, Leonard told the jury that he was sorry 
for what he had done and that he accepted full responsibility.  He expressed 
sorrow that his children would one day “understand what I did.”  He also said that 
he and Flick had loved each other and had been trying to work things out and that 
he had “no excuse for taking [Flick’s] life.”  Leonard indicated that if he “had 
been thinking clearly, this would not have happened.”  Finally, Leonard said, “I 
will spend the rest of my life devoted to my children, to be a positive influence on 
them and anyone else I come in contact with. * * * And I will spend the rest of 
my life trying to make up for [the murder].” 
B. Sentence Evaluation 
{¶ 196} For purposes of independent review, the two counts of 
aggravated murder of a single victim must be merged.  State v. Lawson (1992), 64 
Ohio St.3d 336, 351, 595 N.E.2d 902.  After independent assessment, we find that 
the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt the single R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) 
aggravating circumstance proven against Leonard.  Leonard murdered Flick 
during the commission of an attempted rape, and he was the principal offender in 
the aggravated murder. 
January Term, 2004 
55 
{¶ 197} We find nothing in the nature and circumstances of the offenses 
that is mitigating.  Leonard held Flick at gunpoint, handcuffed her, and attempted 
to rape her.  Leonard then shot Flick three times in the head at close range. 
{¶ 198} In contrast, Leonard’s history, character, and background provide 
several mitigating features.  Numerous witnesses attested to Leonard’s good 
character, moral upbringing, dedication to his family, support of his son, 
leadership ability, service to the community, and his desire to help others.  
Additionally, evidence was introduced regarding Leonard’s history of steady 
employment since high school and his skills as a master carpenter.  Therefore, his 
history, character, and background are entitled to weight in mitigation.  See, e.g., 
State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 194, 631 N.E.2d 124; and State v. Brewer, 
48 Ohio St.3d at 64, 549 N.E.2d 491. 
{¶ 199} As to the statutory mitigating factors, Leonard’s lack of a prior 
criminal record is entitled to significant weight in mitigation.  R.C. 2929.04(B)(5).  
See State v. White (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 454, 709 N.E.2d 140.  Leonard’s 
personality disorder, the love and support of his family, his ability to adjust to 
confinement, and his ability to train others in carpentry qualify as “other factors” 
under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) and are entitled to some weight.  See, e.g., State v. Fox, 
69 Ohio St.3d at 194-195, 631 N.E.2d 124.  Leonard’s confessing to the murder is 
also entitled to weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), but its weight is limited.  
Leonard admitted killing Flick, but certain aspects of his version were 
inconsistent with the evidence.  See, e.g., State v. White, 85 Ohio St.3d at 456, 
709 N.E.2d 140.  Finally, Leonard’s expression of remorse in his unsworn 
statement is entitled to limited weight.  See State v. Keene (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 
646, 671, 693 N.E.2d 246. 
{¶ 200} The remaining statutory mitigating factors are inapplicable:  R.C. 
2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement); (B)(2) (duress, coercion, or strong 
provocation); (B)(3) (mental disease or defect); (B)(4) (youth of the offender); 
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and (B)(6) (accomplice only).  Leonard was 30 years old at the time of the 
murder. 
{¶ 201} Based on the evidence, we find that the aggravating circumstance 
of this murder, attempted rape, outweighs Leonard’s combined mitigating factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, we conclude that the death penalty is 
appropriate in this case. 
{¶ 202} Finally, in proposition of law 19, Leonard contends that his 
sentence is excessive and disproportionate when compared with other cases in 
which the death penalty has been imposed.  Based on our independent review, we 
overrule this argument and find that the penalty imposed here is not excessive 
when compared with similar cases in which death sentences have been approved.  
See, e.g., State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 552 N.E.2d 191; State v. 
Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 656 N.E.2d 643; State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 
694 N.E.2d 932; State v. Scudder, 71 Ohio St.3d 263, 643 N.E.2d 524. 
{¶ 203} Accordingly, Leonard’s convictions and sentences, including the 
sentence of death, are affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
_______________ 
 
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. 
Springman Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Faulkner & Tepe, L.L.P., A. Norman Aubin and Herbert E. Freeman, for 
appellant. 
__________________