Case Title: Club Members v. Sierra Club

Citation: 45 Cal. 4th 309 original opinion

Docket Number: S143087

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 12/15/08 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
CLUB MEMBERS FOR AN HONEST 
) 
ELECTION,  
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S143087 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/1 A110069 
SIERRA CLUB, et al.,                 
) 
 
) 
San Francisco County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
 
 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 04-429277 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,1 commonly referred to as the anti-
SLAPP statute,2 provides that a civil cause of action may be dismissed as a 
strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).  Section 425.17, 
subdivision (b) (section 425.17(b)) provides an exception to the anti-SLAPP 
statute by exempting some actions from dismissal.  Here, we hold the exception 
applies only when the entire action is brought in the public interest.  If any part of 
the complaint seeks relief to directly benefit the plaintiff, by securing relief greater 
                                              
1 
Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.   
2   
Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) provides, “A cause of action against a 
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of 
petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in 
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless 
the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that 
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”   
 
 
2
than or different from that sought on behalf of the general public, the section 
425.17(b) exception does not apply.  
 
Accordingly, we reverse a contrary judgment by the Court of Appeal.  
However, we affirm that part of the judgment holding that the trial court properly 
struck parts of the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute because its order 
established that plaintiffs did not show a probability of prevailing. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3 
 
The Sierra Club (Club), the nation’s largest environmental organization, is 
governed by a 15-member board of directors (Board), who are elected for three-
year staggered terms.  The Club holds elections for five directors each year.  A 
nominating committee chooses a slate of candidates, but other candidates may be 
nominated by member petition.   
 
While total Club membership exceeds 700,000, member participation in 
annual elections is generally low.4  As a result, the vote of a small number of 
members may disproportionately influence the outcome.  In 2003, there was a rift 
among the Board members.  A majority favored current policies, while a minority 
sought to take the Club in a different direction.  Ballots for the 2004 election were 
to be mailed in February.  On January 30, 2004, in response to a perceived threat 
posed by candidates favoring the minority view, the Board held a meeting and 
took the actions that led to this litigation.   
 
First, the Board voted to disseminate an article to all chapter newsletters.  
Written by Drusha Mayhue, it cautioned that low member participation in 
                                              
3  
These background facts have been taken largely from the Court of Appeal 
opinion. 
 
4 
Between 1999 and 2003, the percentage of members participating in the 
vote ranged from 8.7 percent to 10.1 percent.  
 
3
elections made the Club vulnerable to takeover efforts by those whose agenda 
differed from that of the majority.     
 
Second, the Board also directed that an “urgent election notice” be attached 
to the front of voting materials.  The notice warned of  “an unprecedented level of 
outside involvement and attention” to the Club’s election and named a number of 
outside groups that “may be attempting to intervene” in the election.  Though the 
notice itself did not refer to specific candidates, ballot materials included 
statements of three candidates who disclaimed any personal interest in being 
elected.  Instead, those three candidates’ statements urged members to vote for the 
Club’s nominating committee slate or against candidates supported by outside 
groups.5   
 
Plaintiff and candidate Robert van de Hoek, and a group supporting him, 
Club Members for an Honest Election (CMHE), objected to the Club’s distribution 
of this material and sought injunctive relief.  As amended, the complaint alleged 
that the Club had distributed information supporting some candidates and 
opposing others.  It also alleged that candidates opposed by the Club were not 
given an opportunity to present contrasting views and challenged the inclusion of 
statements by “three fake Board candidates.”  The Club defeated plaintiffs’ 
requests for temporary and preliminary restraining orders.  Using the anti-SLAPP 
statute, it successfully urged the court to strike a portion of the complaint seeking 
to enjoin or censor future speech.  Plaintiffs did not appeal the order to strike.  The 
election went forward; van de Hoek was not among those elected to the Board.   
 
Several months after the election, van de Hoek and CMHE filed a second 
amended complaint against the Club and added six individual directors as 
                                              
5 
The ballot materials also included a one-page general discussion on the 
election, a list of candidates, and 10 pages of candidates’ statements about the 
election.   
 
4
defendants.  The complaint alleged four causes of action:  (1) a challenge to the 
validity of the election under Corporations Code section 5617; (2) a petition for 
declaratory relief; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; and (4) violation of Business and 
Professions Code section 17200.  The third cause of action was aimed, in part, at 
directors Nick Aumen and Jan O’Connell, who ran successfully on the nominating 
committee slate.  It alleged that they breached their fiduciary duty by voting for 
the Board actions taken at the January 30, 2004 meeting.  The complaint sought 
extensive injunctive relief, including the removal of five elected or appointed 
Board members and the installation of van de Hoek and four other unsuccessful 
candidates.  It sought both to bar those removed directors from running for the 
Board in the 2005 election and to bar Aumen and O’Connell from ever running for 
the Board again.       
 
Again relying on the anti-SLAPP statute, the Club moved to strike the 
second amended complaint.  The parties also filed competing motions for 
summary judgment.  With regard to the anti-SLAPP motion, the court held that 
voting as a director is protected under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution (First Amendment.)  Thus, it struck the third cause of action alleging 
that the votes of Aumen and O’Connell breached a fiduciary duty.  It also struck a 
paragraph of the first cause of action that referred to the votes of the directors.  
The balance of the motion to strike was denied.  The court went on to deny 
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and to grant that of the defendants.  The 
complaint was then dismissed in its entirety.  In connection with the Club’s 
partially successful anti-SLAPP motions, the court awarded fees and costs in the 
amount of $37,010.76.   
 
Plaintiff van de Hoek did not appeal.  CMHE did not challenge the 
summary judgment rulings, but did appeal the anti-SLAPP rulings and related fee 
and cost awards.  The Club cross-appealed from the partial denial of the motion to 
 
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strike, arguing that the entire complaint arose from defendants’ protected 
activities.     
 
The Court of Appeal held that plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty cause of 
action arose from protected First Amendment activity, and was thus subject to the 
Club’s motion to strike.     
 
The Court of Appeal also held that certain causes of action fell under 
section 425.17(b), the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP statute, and that 
those particular causes of action should not have been struck.  The Court of 
Appeal concluded that the first, second and fourth causes of action were exempt 
from the anti-SLAPP statute under the public interest exception.  Because CMHE 
challenged the Club’s election procedures on the ground that they constituted an 
unfair manipulation of an election to defeat candidates advancing views at odds 
with those of the existing board of directors, the Court of Appeal held that the 
“principal thrust or gravamen” of these causes of action were consistent with a 
public interest action.  The Court of Appeal relied in large measure on case law 
interpreting section 1021.5, the private attorney general statute, which awards 
attorney fees to a party whose action has resulted in the enforcement of an 
important right affecting the public interest.  By analogy, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that, even when a plaintiff has a personal stake in a case, the litigation 
could still involve an important legal issue of public interest, the resolution of 
which could benefit the public as a whole and transcend the plaintiff’s personal 
interest.  In applying the “principal thrust or gravamen” test, the Court of Appeal 
erred.     
DISCUSSION 
 
The statutory scheme 
 
In 1992, the Legislature enacted section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, to 
provide for the early dismissal of unmeritorious claims filed to interfere with the 
 
6
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the 
redress of grievances.  (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 
Cal.App.4th 181, 186.)  The Legislature authorized the filing of a special motion 
to strike such claims, (§ 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (f)), and expressly provided that 
section 425.16 should “be construed broadly.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (a); see Briggs v. 
Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1119.)  Such a 
motion requires a two-step process.  First, the defendant must make a prima facie 
showing that the “cause[s] of action . . . aris[e] from” the defendant’s actions “in 
furtherance of that [defendant’s] right of . . . free speech . . . in connection with a 
public issue.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)  If a defendant meets this threshold 
showing, the plaintiff must establish “a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on 
the claim[s].”  (Ibid.)  
 
In 2003, the Legislature enacted section 425.17 to curb the “disturbing 
abuse” of the anti-SLAPP statute.  (§ 425.17, subd. (a).)  This exception statute 
covers both public interest lawsuits, under subdivision (b), and “commercial 
speech,” under subdivision (c).  This case involves only the application of 
subdivision (b), which provides:  “Section 425.16 does not apply to any action 
brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public if all of the 
following conditions exist:  [¶] (1) The plaintiff does not seek any relief greater 
than or different from the relief sought for the general public or a class of which 
the plaintiff is a member. . . . [¶] (2) The action, if successful, would enforce an 
important right affecting the public interest, and would confer a significant benefit, 
whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, on the general public or a large class of 
persons.  [¶] (3) Private enforcement is necessary and places a disproportionate 
financial burden on the plaintiff in relation to the plaintiff’s stake in the matter.”  
(Italics added.)  If a complaint satisfies the provisions of the applicable exception, 
it may not be attacked under the anti-SLAPP statute. 
 
7
 
By incorporating the “principal thrust or gravamen” test, the Court of 
Appeal’s analysis failed to adhere to the plain meaning of section 425.17(b).  “In 
construing any statute, we first look to its language.  [Citation.]  ‘Words used in a 
statute . . . should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use.  [Citations.]  If 
the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it 
necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature . . . .’  [Citation.]  ‘If 
the language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, however, the court 
looks “to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be 
achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, 
contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which 
the statute is a part.”  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]”  (S. B. Beach Properties v. Berti 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 374, 379.)  In addition, because section 425.17(b) is a statutory 
exception to section 425.16, it should be narrowly construed.  (City and County of 
San Francisco v. Ballard (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 381, 400 (Ballard).)   
Section 425.17(b)’s exception applies only to actions brought “solely in the 
public interest or on behalf of the general public.”  Use of the term “solely” 
expressly conveys the Legislative intent that section 425.17(b) not apply to an 
action that seeks a more narrow advantage for a particular plaintiff.  Such an 
action would not be brought “solely” in the public’s interest.  The statutory 
language of 425.17(b) is unambiguous and bars a litigant seeking “any” personal 
relief from relying on the section 425.17(b) exception.6   
                                              
6  
Accordingly, we reject CMHE’s argument that insertion of the word “or” in 
section 425.17(b) (“[Anti-SLAPP statute is not applicable to] any action brought 
solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public” (italics added)) 
means that section 425.17 protects suits brought on behalf of the general public 
even if the suit is not exclusively in the public interest.  It makes little sense for the 
Legislature to provide that an action brought “in the public interest” must be 
brought solely for that purpose, while an action brought “on behalf of the general 
public” would allow a plaintiff to seek personal relief.  Such an interpretation 
Footnote Continued on Next Page 
 
8
  
Section 425.17(b) is not applicable because plaintiffs’ suit did not seek 
relief solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public 
The Court of Appeal correctly observed that there was “no doubt” that 
portions of the prayer for relief sought a personal advantage7 by advancing 
plaintiffs’ own interests.  Under the Court of Appeal’s own analysis, CMHE 
sought “relief greater than or different from the relief sought for the general 
public.”  (§ 425.17(b)(1).)  For example, it asked the court to order the Club to 
install van de Hoek and four other unsuccessful candidates on the Board; publish, 
at its own expense, “an article by Plaintiffs of equal length to that of the Mayhue 
editorial;” and disseminate an “Urgent Election Notice” written by plaintiffs along 
with ballots for the 2005 election.  CMHE asked the court to order the Club to 
“place an introduction written by Plaintiffs in the ballot for the 2005 Board 
election that is equal in length to the introduction in the 2004 ballot that extolled 
the virtues of the [Club’s] Nominating Committee Candidates.”  It also sought to 
bar directors Aumen, Karpf, O’Connell, Ranchod, and Restrom from running in 
the Club’s 2005 election.  The Court of Appeal concluded that such orders would 
have assisted the candidacy of van de Hock and other CMHE-sponsored 
candidates.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged that “portions of the prayer. . . 
were calculated to give plaintiffs and their allies an advantage in intra-club 
politics” and there was “no doubt” that plaintiffs sought a “personal advantage” in 
the Club’s elections.        
                                                                                                                                      
 
Footnote Continued From Previous Page 
would render the first phrase useless because a plaintiff would simply invoke the 
second phrase, as CMHE attempts to do so in this case. 
7  
The use of the term “personal advantage” includes an individual or 
particular advantage sought by a group, such as CMHE.   
 
9
The Court of Appeal unduly relied on sections 425.16 and 1021.5 
Notwithstanding its observations, the Court of Appeal gave the phrase 
“public interest” in section 425.17(b) the same expansive meaning as it has in 
section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute.  Under section 425.16, a defendant may 
move for dismissal under the anti-SLAPP statute if the defendant’s underlying 
speech activities are “in connection with a public issue or an issue of public 
interest.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4); see id., subd. (e)(3).)  The Legislature has also 
directed that section 425.16 “shall be construed broadly” given that the anti-
SLAPP statute protects speech about important public issues.  (§ 425.16, subd. 
(a).) 
The “public interest” referred to in section 425.17(b), does not simply 
describe topics that members of the public might find interesting.  Instead the term 
“public interest” is used to define suits brought for the public’s good or on behalf 
of the public.  To qualify under section 425.17(b)’s exception, suits must be 
brought solely to secure this public benefit.    
In reaching its contrary conclusion the Court of Appeal relied on case law 
involving section 1021.5, the private attorney general statute.  Section 1021.5 
awards attorney fees to a party whose action has resulted in the enforcement of an 
important right affecting the public interest.8  The Court of Appeal referred to 
section 1021.5 because the Legislature, when drafting section 425.17(b), stated 
                                              
8  
Section 1021.5 provides, in part:  “Upon motion, a court may award 
attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any 
action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the 
public interest if:  (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has 
been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity 
and financial burden of private enforcement . . . are such as to make the award 
appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the 
recovery, if any.”   
 
 
10
that it was borrowing from section 1021.5 and noted that the two statutes were 
similar.  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 515 (2003-2004 
Reg. Sess.), pp. 11-12.)  Analogizing to section 1021.5, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that when a plaintiff has a personal stake in the litigation, such as 
having his or her statement included in the voters’ pamphlet, the litigation could 
still include an important legal issue of public interest that transcends the 
plaintiff’s personal stake and would benefit the public interest as a whole.   
While section 425.17 is similar to section 1021.5 in certain respects, the two 
statutes are also different in significant ways.  First, unlike the private attorney 
general statute, the text of section 425.17(b) requires that an action be brought 
“solely in the public interest,” and cannot seek “any” relief greater than or 
different from the relief sought for the general public.  (§ 425.17(b)(1).)  Section 
1021.5 does not contain these limitations.   
The two statutes also involve different functions.  Section 1021.5 is an 
attorney fees statute.  It authorizes a trial court at the end of litigation to determine 
whether attorney fees should be awarded to a prevailing party.  Section 425.17(b) 
comes into play at the outset of litigation and pertains to a special motion to strike.  
The viability of the underlying action itself is at issue in an anti-SLAPP motion 
and in the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP statute.  Attorney fees are 
separately available to a prevailing party in such instances under the anti-SLAPP 
statute.  (§ 425.16, subd. (c).)  Because of these functional differences, section 
425.17(b) cannot simply be intended to parallel the private attorney general 
statute. 
The plain language of section 425.17(b) is dispositive here.  The Court of 
Appeal erred in reaching beyond it to interpret the language in a contrary fashion.  
Even if the statute’s language were ambiguous, reliance on the private attorney 
general fee statute and cases is flawed because of the disparities noted above. 
 
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Application of the “principal thrust or gravamen” test was error 
The Court of Appeal’s application of the “principal thrust or gravamen” test 
also fails because it contravenes the statutes’ plain meaning and confuses the 
broad interpretation called for under section 425.16 with the narrow reading 
required for the section 425.17(b) exception.  The “principal thrust or gravamen” 
test has been used to determine whether an action fits within the scope of the anti-
SLAPP protection provided by section 425.16 when a pleading contains 
allegations referring to both protected and unprotected activity.  (See, e.g., 
Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 188.)  The 
Court of Appeal incorrectly concluded that the same approach should govern here.     
The “principal thrust or gravamen” test serves the Legislative intent that 
section 425.16 be broadly interpreted.  Thus, a plaintiff could not deprive a 
defendant of anti-SLAPP protection by bringing a complaint based upon both 
protected and unprotected conduct.  The anti-SLAPP statute specifically permits 
the striking of a “cause of action.”  The exception provided for in section 425.17 
operates in the opposite manner.  As an exception, it is to be narrowly interpreted 
(Ballard, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 400), lest it swallow the rule found in the 
anti-SLAPP statute.  The Legislature also made this general rule of construction 
explicit in the language it chose.  It requires that, under section 425.17(b) an 
action, as opposed to a cause of action, must be brought solely in the public 
interest.  The Court of Appeal’s analysis of section 425.17(b) renders the term 
“solely” as surplusage, a result cautioned against by the rules of statutory 
construction.  (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 980-981.)     
An examination of section 425.17, subdivision (c), dealing with commercial 
speech, reveals that the choice of words was intentional.  Subdivision (c) provides 
for the exemption of a “cause of action,” rather than an “action” as a whole, as 
required under subdivision (b).  The Legislature clearly distinguished between an 
 
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“action” and a “cause of action” in drafting subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 
425.17, and treated them differently.  (See also § 425.17, subds. (d)(2) & (e).)  It 
expressly provided that the public interest exception only applies if the entire 
action is brought solely in the public interest.  If individualized relief is sought, a 
plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of the anti-SLAPP statute in order for the 
action to proceed.  (Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc. (2005) 
129 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1067;  cf. Northern Cal. Carpenters Regional Council v. 
Warmington Hercules Associates, (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 296, 300.)   
Other issues 
Because of our holding we need not address the Club’s contention that its 
“urgent election notice” constituted a political work under section 425.17, 
subdivision (d)(2).9  We note also that this argument was not advanced in the trial 
court, nor was it addressed by the Court of Appeal.  Because we hold that section 
425.17(b) applies to actions as a whole, we also do not address the Club’s 
contention that the fiduciary duty claim did not fall under the public interest 
exception.   
We also reject CMHE’s contention that it met its burden under the second 
prong of the anti-SLAPP statute by showing a probability of success on its breach 
of fiduciary duty claim.  In separate orders, the trial court partially granted the 
Club’s motion to strike.  It also granted the Club’s motion for summary judgment 
and dismissed CMHE’s complaint.  CMHE did not appeal the order of dismissal.  
The Court of Appeal held that the trial court’s dismissal after the grant of 
summary judgment “actually adjudicated this issue by ordering dismissal of the 
                                              
9  
Section 425.17, subdivision (d)(2) excepts from the “public interest” 
exemption of section 425.17(b)(2), “[a]ny action against any person or entity 
based upon the creation, dissemination . . . or other similar promotion of any . . . 
political . . . work.”   
 
 
13
second amended complaint.”  Because CMHE failed to challenge the order of 
dismissal, the Court of Appeal concluded that CMHE could not challenge the 
propriety of this determination.  We agree.   
 
DISPOSITION 
 
The Court of Appeal's judgment is reversed.  The matter is remanded to the 
Court of Appeal with directions to affirm the trial court's order insofar as it granted 
the anti-SLAPP motion, to reverse the trial court's order insofar as it denied that 
motion, and to remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 137 Cal.App.4th 1166 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S143087 
Date Filed: December 15, 2008 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: James L. Warren 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Law Offices of Ian B. Kelley, Ian B. Kelley, Conrad Wu; Law Office of Jeff D. Hoffman and Jeff D. 
Hoffman for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Davis Wright Tremaine, Thomas R. Burke, Rochelle L. Wilcox and Susan E. Seager for Defendants and 
Appellants. 
 
Law Offices of James Wheaton and James R. Wheaton for Senator Sheila Kuehl as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Ian B. Kelley 
Law Offices of Ian B. Kelley 
885 Bryant Street, Suite 202 
San Francisco, CA  94103 
9415) 581-0885 
 
Thomas R. Burke 
Davis Wright Tremaine 
505 Montgomery Street, 8th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94111 
(415) 276-6500