Case Title: BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF SHERIDAN COUNTY v. MARTIN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-40

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-01-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF SHERIDAN COUNTY v. MARTIN2003 WY 160 P.3d 1273Case Number: 02-40Decided: 01/06/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                

 

 

BOARD 
OF TRUSTEES OF MEMORIAL

HOSPITAL 
OF SHERIDAN COUNTY,

 

Appellant(Respondent) 
,

 

v.

 

LESLIE 
MARTIN,

 

Appellee(Petitioner) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Jay 
A. Gilbertz of Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Greg 
L. Goddard of Goddard, Perry and Vogel, Buffalo, Wyoming.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, Board 
of Trustees of Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County (Board), brings an appeal to 
this Court, challenging the order of the district court, which remanded 
Appellee's, Leslie Martin's (Martin), employment termination case to the Board 
for additional proceedings.

 

[¶2]      We will dismiss 
the appeal on the basis that the district court's order remanding to the Board 
for further proceedings is not an appealable order, as contemplated by W.R.A.P. 
1.05, and send the matter back to the district court for enforcement of the 
remand order.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      The Board posits 
these issues:

 

I.          
Was there substantial evidence to support the Trustees' conclusion that 
Leslie Martin was given a pre-termination meeting with her 
supervisors?

 

II.          
What procedure should be used to correct a clerical error in the findings 
of fact of an administrative agency which misidentified the date of a meeting, 
but is otherwise supported by the record?

 

Martin 
couches the issues in these terms:

 

1.  Whether Memorial Hospital of Sheridan 
County followed the procedures set forth in its Employee Manual when terminating 
Appellee.

 

2.  Whether the Board of Trustees for the 
Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County's decision upholding Appellee's termination 
was supported by substantial evidence in the record.

 

In 
its reply brief, the Board addresses two additional 
issues:

 

I.          
Whether the Appellee, having failed to cross-appeal, can attack the 
district court's order and request relief greater than that granted by the 
district court.

 

II.          
If properly before this court, whether there is substantial evidence to 
support the Board's decision upholding Martin's 
termination.

 

 

[¶4]      The facts 
pertinent to this appeal are relatively brief, though the facts relevant to the 
determination of the validity of the Board's action approving the termination of 
Martin's employment are considerably more complex.  As background, we will simply note that 
Martin was a pediatric nurse at the hospital and was fired from her job on the 
basis that she revealed confidential patient information about an individual 
identified in the record as "J.W."  
The hospital's personnel manual authorizes termination for a violation of 
patient confidentiality.  J.W. was a 
neighbor of Martin's, and they had considerable differences between them as 
neighbors, principally because of Martin's dogs.  Martin had a sled dog team, and she 
kenneled 18 dogs on her property.  
On January 22, 2001, Martin was interviewed by Larque Richter, a friend 
to J.W. and a reporter for KOTA Territory, a television broadcast news 
organization.  The subject of the 
interview was Martin's sled dogs and an upcoming sled dog race.  When Richter asked Martin if her dogs 
had caused problems with her neighbors, Martin told of her problems with J.W. 
and further stated that J.W. "was a drunk in my opinion and she was a detox 
case, meaning she ought to be in detox because she acts like 
it."

 

[¶5]      A week or so 
later, Richter reported that information to J.W. and J.W., in turn, reported it 
to the hospital, demanding action.  
As a first step in the disciplinary process Martin was asked to attend a 
"meeting" with her supervisors.  At 
that meeting, the supervisors concluded that Martin admitted that she violated 
patient confidentiality.  Martin was 
permitted to prepare her thoughts on the matter and had a second meeting with 
her supervisors.  The thrust of 
Martin's presentation at that meeting was to document the details of the 
disagreements she had experienced with J.W.  The second meeting was brief, and 
Martin's supervisors did not consider her materials relevant to the breach of 
patient confidentiality.  It is now 
Martin's contention that had she received notice of the purpose of the initial 
meeting, she would have been prepared to better explain that she knew of J.W.'s 
alcohol/drug problems from sources other than hospital records.  Thus, while she did say the things 
attributed to her by Richter, that information was gleaned from contacts with 
J.W. that were unrelated to her duties as a nurse at the 
hospital.

 

[¶6]      To a large 
extent, the termination was based upon the impression hospital personnel had 
that Martin admitted to a violation of the confidentiality policy.  However, the record reflects that this 
impression actually may have been a conclusion reached by hospital personnel, 
rather than an actual confession to such a violation by Martin.1  Martin denied that she had revealed 
confidential hospital information.  
J.W. had, in fact, been a detox patient at the hospital on several 
occasions, but Martin had never been involved in her treatment, and so far as 
the hospital knew, Martin had never had access to J.W.'s hospital/medical 
records.  In addition, Martin 
testified, and the record bears out, that she did not have notice of the subject 
of the meeting to which she was called until she arrived at that meeting, which 
resulted in her dismissal.  It is 
this phase of the termination proceedings that caused concern for the district 
court.  Martin had an otherwise 
unblemished record during her employment with the hospital.  The Board approved the action 
terminating Martin's employment.

 

[¶7]      A petition to 
review that administrative action was filed in the district court under W.R.A.P. 
12.   The district court 
determined that the findings of fact in paragraph 122 of the Board of Trustees' April 16, 
2001 order were not supported by the record, and that Martin may not have had a 
sufficient opportunity to present defenses that she might have had to her 
termination, prior to the termination decision being made (and in some senses, 
then cast in concrete).  For these 
reasons, it remanded the matter to the Board "for the limited purposes of 
allowing  Martin to submit documents or statements in addition to those already 
part of the record in defense of her termination."  Clearly, the remand is for a limited 
purpose, but the transcript of the proceedings fleshes out the terse language of 
the remand order:

 

            
THE COURT:  On behalf of the trial court, I'm determined not to 
substitute my judgment for the administrative agency who saw and heard 
applicable witnesses with respect to sufficiency of evidence; but I am still 
troubled by the procedure that the hospital followed, particularly in light of 
the statement from one of the witnesses that if an employee had presented 
evidence on February 14, 2001 that  
--  and I'm paraphrasing  --  
but to the effect that if she had not used her position at the hospital 
to gain information and divulge confidential information that it could have made 
a difference at that point.  And, 
yet, it appears that the hospital had already made up its mind as to what it was 
going to do.

            
And in terms of the employee's ability to appeal or question the 
termination, she apparently has still not received the written statement of the 
reasons for termination after the decision was made.  And the hospital was arguing that, well, 
we really  --  -- all we did was make the 
recommendation that she would be fired as of February 16th, unless, 
of course, she changed our minds on February 14th.  She didn't change our minds, so the 
decision stands.  That's not really 
the way it's supposed to work under the rules.

            
Counsel, the Court believes that there have been a couple of errors in 
the administrative proceedings that resulted in the termination of this 
employee.  One, when you look at the 
Board of Trustees' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law signed April 16, 2001 
by chair Evelyn Ebzery, Finding 12, you see the determiniation that employee was 
given a pre-termination hearing with her supervisors on January 9th, 
2001 and given an opportunity to explain the situation.

            
Aside from the obvious error that any meeting with the employee could not 
have been on January 9th but, rather, was February 9th, 
there's a problem in designating that hearing as a pre-termination hearing.  The pre-termination hearing is one 
contemplated in Subsection D on Page 26 of the handbook, not the investigation 
hearing.  So making a conclusion at 
that point that the employee was given an opportunity to explain the situation 
is somewhat misleading in terms of analyzing whether or not personnel policies 
were followed.

            
There was a meeting on February 9th for purposes of conducting 
an investigation.  The employee was 
not notified on that date that there had been a recommendation that she be 
terminated.  The hospital did make a 
recommendation of termination at sometime prior to February 14 and did advise 
the employee on February 14th of their recommendation and provided 
some opportunity for explanation by employee, albeit brief, and basically 
telling employee that she was fired effective February 16th.  So, the Court finds that she did not 
have sufficient opportunity to present any defenses that she might have had at 
that time.

            
What's causing my hesitation and is troublesome to me, counsel, is that 
I'm not sure that this is going to make any difference, because even when 
questioned by counsel, employee did not give me any indication as to the type of 
new information she might be able to submit for the board's 
consideration.

            
But based on the failure to follow their own personnel policies,[3] the Court is going to remand this case to the 
hospital board  or the hospital's administrative staff designated by the 
administrator for purposes of allowing employee an opportunity to submit 
documents or statements in addition to those already part of the record in 
defense of termination.

 

[¶8]      The Board filed a 
notice of appeal seeking further review in this Court and challenging the 
district court's remand order.

JURISDICTION

 

[¶9]      The parties do 
not directly raise the matter, but we have determined that it is necessary for 
us to revisit the question of whether or not an order of the district court 
remanding an administrative agency case for further evidentiary proceedings is 
an appealable order under the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure as they are 
currently formulated.  W.R.A.P. 1.05 
defines "appealable order" as follows:

 

            
An appealable order is:

            
(a) An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such 
order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment; 
or

            
(b) An order affecting a substantial right made in a special 
proceeding; or

            
(c) An order made upon a summary application in an action after 
judgment; or

            
(d) An order, including a conditional order, granting a new trial on 
the grounds stated in Rule 59(a)(4) and (5), Wyo. R. Civ. P.; if an appeal is 
taken from such an order, the judgment shall remain final and in effect for the 
purposes of appeal by another party; or

            
(e) Interlocutory orders and decrees of the district courts 
which:

            
(1) Grant, continue, or modify injunctions, or dissolve injunctions, 
or refuse to dissolve or modify injunctions; or

                        
(2) Appoint receivers, or issue orders to wind up receiverships, or 
to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or 
other disposition of property.

            
(See Rule 13 for additional guidance on review of interlocutory 
orders.)

 

[¶10]   In Big Horn County Commissioners 
v. Hinckley, 593 P.2d 573, 577 (Wyo. 1979) (citing Arp v. State Highway 
Commission, 567 P.2d 736, 738-39 (Wyo. 1977) and W.R.A.P. 1.05), we 
opined:

 

            
Turning first to Hinckley's jurisdictional contentions, this court 
previously denied Hinckley's motion to dismiss.  This motion, which is renewed here, is 
premised on the belief that the district court's order--remanding the case to 
the Board for a hearing on necessity and other issues--is not a final order 
under Rule 1.05, W.R.A.P., and our holding in Arp v. State Highway 
Commission, Wyo., 567 P.2d 736 (1977).  
We determined previously, and now hold, that the district court's order 
affects a substantial right of the Board and prevents a judgment in favor of the 
Board's establishment of a road by prescription under § 24-1-101, supra.  It is, therefore, a final appealable 
order under Rule 1.05(1), W.R.A.P.

 

[¶11]   At the time the Hinckley 
decision was published, the mission of W.R.A.P. 1.05 was to define a "final 
order" and it provided:

 

            
A final order is:  (1) an order affecting a substantial right 
in an action, when such order in effect determines the action and prevents a 
judgment; (2) an order affecting a substantial right, made in a special 
proceeding, or upon a summary application in an action, after judgment; (3) an 
order, including a conditional order, granting a new trial on the grounds stated 
in Rule 59 (a) (4) and (5), W.R.C.P.; if an appeal is taken from such an order, 
the judgment shall remain final and in effect for the purposes of appeal by 
another party.

 

572-577 
Wyo. Reporter, Rules Section, XXXV (1978).

 

[¶12]   The 1992 amendments to the 
appellate rules discontinued the long-established reliance on the concept of a 
"final order" in favor of reliance on the more flexible concept of an 
"appealable order."  In addition, 
those amendments gave full recognition to the Court's practice of granting writs 
of certiorari by adopting Rule 13.  
The comments, which accompanied the initial publication of that rule, 
were these:

 

Comment:  This 
rule represents a major departure from the former rules.  It encompasses former Rule 13, but it 
also provides for interlocutory appeals.  
It does reflect the practice of the Supreme Court with respect to Writs 
of Certiorari, but specific procedures are provided for accomplishing the 
petition.  The discretion is vested 
in the reviewing court as distinguished from the certification procedure in 
which the discretion of the trial court is addressed 
initially.

 

823-832 
Wyo Reporter, Rules Section, CII-CIII (1992).

 

[¶13]   It is our conclusion that our state 
system is now different from that instituted in the federal courts where remand 
orders similar to those at issue here are appealable as "final orders."  See Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266, 118 S. Ct. 1984, 1986-88, 141 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1998).  However, because of the delay caused by 
such appeals, they are rare even in the federal system.  III Richard J. Pierce Jr., 
Administrative Law Treatise, §18.1 at 1324 (4th ed. 2002).

 

[¶14]   W.R.A.P. 12.09(d) 
provides:

 

            
(d) The district court may, in its discretion, remand the case to the 
agency for proceedings in accordance with the direction of the court.  The district court shall enter judgment 
reversing, vacating, remanding or modifying the order for errors appearing on 
the record.

 

[¶15]   That rule invests the district 
court with discretion to remand an administrative action to the agency for 
additional proceedings if that is the appropriate remedy under the 
circumstances.  We conclude that the 
district court exercised its discretion prudently in this 
matter.

 

[¶16]   We hold that a judgment of the 
district court remanding an administrative proceeding to the agency for further 
proceedings is not an appealable order under W.R.A.P. 1.05.  In those rare instances where review is 
deemed necessary because of the spectre of "irreparable harm" (or something of 
similar magnitude), Rule 13 is available as a safety valve, within the sound 
discretion of this Court.  In this 
instance we will dismiss the appeal, but at the same time we have undertaken to 
treat the appeal as a petition for writ of review under Rule 13, which we 
deny.  The only harm the Board might 
suffer is an enlargement of a back pay award should Martin succeed in the review 
process.  The matter is remanded to 
the district court for further proceedings consistent with the district court's 
judgment/order.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

   1Hospital 
personnel took notes during the meeting(s) that supervisors had with 
Martin.  Those notes were identified 
and discussed at the hearing, but were not made a part of the record on 
appeal.

 

   2That paragraph 
provides:

 

            
12.  Martin was given a 
pre-termination hearing with her supervisors, Denise Karjewski and Linda Benth, 
on January 9, 2001 and given an opportunity to explain the situation.  During the pre-termination hearing, 
Martin admitted that she had revealed confidential patient information relating 
to J.W. to Larque Richter during her interview with 
Richter.

   3Our examination 
of the record reveals that the district court's assessment of the hospital's 
personnel rules is correct, and we need not burden this opinion with a verbatim 
recitation of those policies.  We 
also acknowledge that those policies are clear beyond cavil that the 
unauthorized release of confidential patient information is a basis for 
immediate termination of an employee.