Case Title: TIMOTHY J. and JANET R. BRITT V. FREMONT COUNTY ASSESSOR

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-55

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
TIMOTHY J. and JANET R. BRITT V. FREMONT COUNTY ASSESSOR2006 WY 10126 P.3d 117Case Number: 05-55Decided: 01/18/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 
2005

 

 
TIMOTHY J. and JANET R. 
BRITT,
 
 
Appellants

 
 
(Petitioners),
 
 
v.
 
 

FREMONT COUNTYASSESSOR,

 
 
Appellee

 
 
(Respondent).
 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofFremontCounty

 
 
The Honorable Norman E. 
Young, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

 
 
Beverly J. 
Scott, of James and Scott, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
James 
Whiting, Deputy Fremont County Attorney, Lander, Wyoming.

 
 
Before HILL, C.J., and 
GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      Appellants, 
Timothy J. Britt and Janet R. Britt, challenged the ad 
valorem 
tax assessment of their cabin located on federal land in FremontCounty.  The Fremont County Board of Equalization 
granted the Britts relief.  The 
CountyAssessor appealed to the 
State Board of Equalization which reversed the decision of the county board and 
upheld the assessment.  The Britts 
filed a petition for review of administrative action, and the district court 
affirmed the decision of the state board.  
Upon our review, we affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. and Mrs. 
Britt present several issues:

 
 

I.                     
Did the 
trier of facts in the first instance, the Fremont County Board of Equalization, 
correctly find that Appellants presented substantial evidence sufficient to 
overcome the presumption that the Fremont County Assessor's valuation of their 
personal property was correct and to find that the sales price of a mountain 
cabin located on federal land includes the value of the right to the federal 
lease?

 
 

II.                   
Did the 
Fremont County Assessor correctly assess the valuation on Appellants' cabin 
according to applicable law as promulgated by the Wyoming Department of Revenue 
in its Rules and Regulations, and is her assessment contrary to constitutional 
right and privilege?

 
 

III.                  
Did the 
Wyoming State Board of Equalization and the Ninth Judicial District Court fail 
to correct errors of law and fail to properly defer to the Findings of Fact, 
Decision and Order of the trier of facts in the first instance, the Fremont 
County Board of Equalization?

 
 
Appellee, Fremont County 
Assessor, rephrases the issues as follows:

 
 

1.                  
Was the 
decision of the Fremont County Board of Equalization supported by substantial 
evidence or in the alternative was the decision of the Fremont County Board of 
Equalization arbitrary and capricious for other reasons?

 
 

2.                  
Did the 
Fremont County Assessor fail to follow applicable Wyoming Department of Revenue 
rules and regulations?

 
 

3.                  
Does the 
assessment violate a constitutional right or privilege?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In 1995, Mr. and 
Mrs. Britt purchased a cabin in the ShoshoneNational 
Forest west of Dubois, Wyoming for 
$80,000.  The cabin is located on 
approximately one quarter of an acre of United States Forest Service land, 
identified as Lot D of the PinnacleHeights tract.  The cabin was built in 1944. The main 
structure is 690 square feet (23 x 30).  
It has two porches.  The 
cabin has electricity, wood fueled heat, and running water during warm 
weather.

 
 
[¶4]      The Britts hold a 
special use permit with the Forest Service which allows them to have a 
recreational residence where their cabin is located.1  The permit includes a number of 
restrictions on the use of the cabin and the area.  The Britts' permit is for a term of ten 
years and is scheduled to expire in 2008.  
They previously renewed the permit without difficulty.  In 2003, the Britts paid an annual fee 
to the Forest Service of $2,349.53 for the special use permit.  

 
 
            

 
 
[¶5]      For the 2003 tax 
year, the Fremont County Assessor (Assessor) valued the cabin at $87,200.  This assessment was based upon use of 
the Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal (CAMA) system.  The assessment notice was sent to the 
Britts on April 23, 2003.  The 
estimated taxes for 2003 of $644.91 were noticeably higher than the taxes 
assessed in the preceding years.  
For the years 2000, 2001, and 2002, the assessed taxes were $395.09, 
$413.38, and $417.12, respectively. 

 
 

[¶6]      On May 23, 2003, 
the Britts filed a pro se statement contesting the 
assessment, which provided, in part:

 
 
We met with the assistant 
assessor and the assessor on May 20, in protest of the 52% increase in the 
property taxes we were paying on a cabin we owned that is located on a special 
use permit in the ShoshoneNational 
Forest.  Initially, we felt that the increase was 
far too much, but after talking with the assessor, we feel we should not be 
assessed ANY PROPERTY TAXES at all on this lease. We own NO property; rather we 
have the right to lease a lot on the ShoshoneNational 
Forest and we pay a large yearly 
lease fee.  Our lease comes up for 
renewal on a ten year basis and we may loose [sic] the right to use the lot in 
2008.  We were told there was no 
record of our 1995 purchase of the cabin because it was NOT A PROPERTY 
TRANSACTION.  That is true.  We purchased the right to have a special 
use permit assigned from Bev Jones to Tim and Janet Britt. The price we paid, 
$80,000, was primarily for the consent by the US Forest Service to amend the 
special use permit to allow the Britt family the right to use the Lot D, 
Pinnacle Heights Recreation Area.  
When we purchased the cabin, it was a one room cabin with partitions for 
bedrooms, heated by a wood stove and no bathroom facilities and would be 
appraised for a minimal amount as a stand alone building.  We are in the process of having the cost 
of a replacement cabin figured.  If 
we are assessed taxes at all, it should be on the personal property value of the 
cabin, not on the fact that the cabin is located in a scenic 
area.

 
 
Additionally, the special 
use permit which covers the recreational use of the cabin is very restrictive 
and bears no resemblance to the rights of a person who owns land and buildings 
in fee has.  We cannot increase the 
size of the cabin larger than 1200 square feet including porches; we cannot rent 
the cabin; we cannot live in the cabin as a home, we cannot paint the cabin nor 
have anything done to the cabin without the express permission of the forest 
service, the owner of the land.  Our 
decision to spend $80,000 in 1995 to purchase the right to the recreational 
lease on Lot D, PinnacleHeights was based on the 
value judgment that the area around the cabin would not be subject to massive 
subdivision, roading, habitat degradation, conversion or major human 
intrusion.  The cabin itself is a 
minimal structure of very little monetary value and assessing its value based on 
what the assessment of a similar cabin on fee land in the Dubois area would be 
worth is not a valid assessment and is not comparable in any 
manner.

 
 
The Britts based their 
challenge on the belief that they were being taxed for their special use permit: 
 

 
 
. . . We do NOT own the 
land; we lease it.  You cannot 
charge us property taxes on land we don't own nor base the value of personal 
property (the cabin) on where it happens to be located.  You can only base personal property 
taxes on the intrinsic value of that object, whether it is a desk, table or 
cabin that may be moved.

 
 
[¶7]      The county board 
held a hearing on July 14, 2003.  At 
the hearing, the Britts and the Assessor submitted exhibits in support of their 
positions.  The Britts provided a 
copy of their special use permit along with a summary of the restrictions 
imposed, a 1997 Forest Service appraisal of the value of that permit, their 
estimated calculation of the present value of the permit, a construction 
estimate for a new cabin, and a summary of their position.  The Assessor provided exhibits regarding 
comparable properties used for sales comparison, a realty listing for the 
Britts' cabin with an asking price of $149,000, the Wyoming Department of 
Revenue regulation defining fair market value, and a summary of the Assessor's 
methodology and position.

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Britt 
testified at the hearing and presented several challenges to the Assessor's 
valuation.  He asserted that a 
significant portion of the purchase price of his and similar cabins was 
attributable to the permit and should not be taxed.  He estimated that when he purchased the 
cabin for $80,000, that $50,000 of that amount was attributable to the 
permit.  Mr. Britt also emphasized 
the limited rights associated with his permit.  He argued that the cabin was a structure 
not tied to the land and contended that its location should not be a 
consideration in the value.  He also 
claimed that the Assessor erred by failing to consider the recent sale of a 
nearby cabin in her valuation and asserted that the cost approach was a more 
appropriate valuation method.

 
 
[¶9]      Deputy County 
Assessor Tara 
Berg, a certified property tax appraiser, also testified.  She described three sales of cabins in 
the area which were used as comparable sales.  She testified: 

 
 
The above sales that 
we've just talked about indicate the market for cabins on forest service leases. 
We do not assess any of the leases that go with this property; they are 
separate.  We assess the market 
value of the cabin as it would sell on the open market.  If the cabin owners owned the land that 
the cabin was sitting on, the market value would likely be higher.  In other words, if their . . . bundle of 
rights was complete, . . .  their 
market value would increase.

 
 
[¶10]   Berg emphasized the definition of 
fair market value and testified, "In this instance, buyers are willing to 
purchase a cabin only on a forest service lease and . . . that's denoted by the 
sales there . . . for between $80,000 and $215,000.  These sales establish a fair market 
value for these cabins.  These 
properties are value[d] as all other improvements in FremontCounty."  Regardless of the ownership of the land, 
she clarified that through the CAMA system, all buildings attached to land are 
valued as improvements.  She further 
stated, "The location of the property is a very important factor when 
determining market value."  She 
explained that proximity to recreational areas within the county tends to 
increase market value. 

 
 
[¶11]   Moreover, Berg explained that fair 
market value was preferable to replacement cost value because, as the Britts' 
efforts to sell the cabin through a realtor and advertising demonstrated, an 
open and active market exists for these cabins.  Berg also explained why the limited 
rights associated with use of the cabin should not detract from the fair market 
value.  She asserted that buyers are 
very aware of the limitations, and a transfer of the permit requires that the 
transferee of the cabin receive a copy of those 
restrictions.

 
 
[¶12]   The county board also heard from 
the CountyAssessor, Eileen Oakley, 
who reiterated many of the points asserted by Berg.  The Assessor stated that she did not 
factor in the amounts paid to the Forest Service for the permit in arriving at 
the cabin's fair market value.  She 
agreed with the Britts that they were paying a great deal to the Forest Service 
for their permit, but she maintained that those fees established a value for the 
permit distinct from the cabin structure.  
The Assessor also emphasized that the value of the permit was not being 
taxed. 

 
 
[¶13]   The county board issued a brief 
written decision which provided:

 
 
FINDINGS OF 
FACT

 
 

1.      
The taxpayer 
testified that a cabin adjacent to his land had been sold within the last year 
for $50,000.

 
 

2.      
The taxpayer 
testified that he did not believe the comparable sales used by the Fremont 
County Assessor were realistic.

 
 

3.      
The subject 
property is a cabin located on a Forest Service lease. The cabin is a 23 x 30 
foot structure with a porch approximately 10 x 23. There is no heat, water or 
electricity.

 
 

4.      
The 
taxpayers purchased the cabin for $80,000.00.

 
 

5.      
At hearing a 
debate ensued over whether the Assessor was taxing the value of the lease as 
well as the value of the cabin itself.

 
 

6.      
The 
Fremont County 
Assessor testified that the value of the lease with the United States Forest 
Service was not being taxed.  
However, the Assessor further testified that one of the reasons the value 
was high was due to the location of the cabin.

 
 

7.      
The Board 
finds that but for the location of the cabin, the fair market value of the cabin 
would be minimal as it is a very old cabin in very poor 
shape.

 
 

8.      
The Board 
believes the taxpayer is being assessed in part for the value of the Forest 
Service lease which is valuable because of the location of the cabin as a 
vacation spot.

 
 

9.      
The taxpayer 
testified that this cabin is used on a limited basis.

 
 

10. The Board finds that the 
taxpayer has presented sufficient, credible evidence to overcome the presumption 
that the Assessor's valuation was valid.

 
 
DECISION AND 
ORDER

 
 
The Board finds generally 
in favor of the taxpayers, Janet and Tim Britt, and finds they should be given 
relief consistent with this decision.

 
 
[¶14]   The Assessor appealed to the State 
Board of Equalization (state board).  
The state board, in its appellate capacity, reviewed the record of the 
hearing and the decision of the county board.  The Britts did not submit a brief in 
support of the county board's decision.  
The state board issued its Decision and Order on April 6, 2004, reversing 
the county board's decision and reinstating the Assessor's valuation.  The state board determined that the 
findings and the decision of the county board were not supported by substantial 
evidence and that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance 
with law.

 
 
[¶15]   The Britts then filed a petition 
for writ of review of administrative action in the district court in FremontCounty.  The district court affirmed the decision 
of the state board.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶16]   We 
review administrative action pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2005) of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, which provides in 
pertinent part: 

 
 
(c) To the 
extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall: 

 
 
. . .   

 
 
(ii) Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be: 

 
 
(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law; 

 
 
. . .  

 
 
(C) In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 
 
. . .  or

 
 

(E)  Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 
 

[¶17]   We recently described the 
principles guiding our review in BP America 
Production Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 2005 WY 60, ¶¶ 10-13, 112 P.3d 596, 602-603 
(Wyo. 2005):

 
 
We review 
both the agency's findings of fact and law: 

 
 
"Considerable 
deference is accorded to the findings of fact of the agency, and this Court does 
not disturb them unless they are contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence. Amoco Production Co. v. WyomingState Bd. of 
Equalization, 12 P.3d 668, 671 (Wyo. 2000). An agency's conclusions of law can be affirmed only if 
they are in accord with the law. Id. at 
672. Our function is to correct any error that an agency makes in its 
interpretation or application of the law."

 
 

EOG 
Resources, Inc. v. Wyoming Dep't of 
Revenue, 2004 WY 35, ¶ 12, 86 P.3d 1280, [1284] (Wyo. 
2004). 

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
"The 
district court and this Court are charged with reviewing an agency's decision 
for substantial evidence. That duty requires a review of the entire record to 
determine if there is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept in 
support of the agency's decision.  . 
. . " 

 
 

McTiernan 
v. Scott, 2001 WY 87, ¶ 16, 31 P.3d 749, [756] (Wyo. 
2001) (citations and footnote omitted).

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
Findings of 
ultimate fact are reviewed de novo: 

 
 
"When an 
agency's determinations contain elements of law and fact, we do not treat them 
with the deference we reserve for findings of basic fact. When reviewing an 
ultimate fact,' we separate the factual and legal aspects of the finding to 
determine whether the correct rule of law has been properly applied to the 
facts. We do not defer to the agency's ultimate factual finding if there is an 
error in either stating or applying the law."

 
 

Basin Elec. 
Power Co-op., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, State of Wyo., 970 P.2d 841, 850-51 (Wyo. 
1998) (citations omitted). 

 
 

The party asserting an 
improper valuation method bears the burden of proof.  Amoco 
Production Co. v. WyomingState Bd. of 
Equalization, 899 P.2d 855, 858 
(Wyo. 1995). In 
reviewing a valuation method, the task of the appellate court is not to 
determine which of various appraisal methods is best or most accurately 
estimates fair market value. The reviewing court only determines whether 
substantial evidence exists to support use of the chosen method.  Id.

 
 

Additionally, we afford 
no deference to the appellate review conducted by the state board or by the 
district court. Laramie 
CountyBd. of 
Equalization v. WyomingState Bd. of 
Equalization, 915 P.2d 1184, 1188 
(Wyo. 1996).  We conduct an independent inquiry into 
the matter, just as if it had proceeded directly to us from the agency. 
Wyoming Dept. of 
Revenue v. Guthrie, 2005 WY 79, ¶ 11, 115 P.3d 1086, 1091 (Wyo. 2005). 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶18]   Generally, challenges to the 
valuation of property for the purpose of ad 
valorem 
tax assessment are rooted in Wyo. Const. art. 15, § 11.  Holly Sugar 
Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 839 P.2d 959, 963-964 
(Wyo. 1992).  That provision, as amended, provides in 
relevant part:

 
 
(a) All property, 
except as in this constitution otherwise provided, shall be uniformly valued at 
its full value as defined by the legislature, in three (3) classes as 
follows:

 
 
(i) Gross production of 
minerals and mine products in lieu of taxes on the land where 
produced;

 
 
(ii) Property used 
for industrial purposes as defined by the legislature; and

 
 
(iii) All other 
property, real and personal.

 
 
. . . 

 
 
(d) All taxation shall be 
equal and uniform within each class of property.

 
 

We have interpreted Wyo. 
Const. art. 15, § 11 to require only a rational method of appraisal, equally 
applied to all property, which results in essential fairness.  Holly Sugar 
Corp., 
839 P.2d  at 964.

 
 
[¶19]   The legislature has directed that 
"[a]ll property within Wyoming is subject to taxation as provided by 
this act except as prohibited by the United 
States or Wyoming constitutions 
or expressly exempted by W.S. 39-11-105." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-11-103(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005).  
For ad valorem taxes, taxable 
property is to be valued annually at its fair market value. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-13-103(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005).  
Fair market value is defined as "the amount in 
cash, or terms reasonably equivalent to cash, a well informed buyer is justified 
in paying for a property and a well informed seller is justified in accepting, 
assuming neither party to the transaction is acting under undue compulsion, and 
assuming the property has been offered in the open market for a reasonable time 
. . . ." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-11-101(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2005).  
The Department of Revenue is required to "prescribe by rule and 
regulation the appraisal methods and systems for determining fair market value 
using generally accepted appraisal standards."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-103(b)(ii). 
 

 
 
[¶20]   Pursuant to that 
statutory direction, the Department of Revenue has promulgated regulations 
providing for four appraisal methodologies: the sales comparison approach, the 
cost approach, the income or capitalized earnings approach, and the computer 
assisted mass appraisal (CAMA) automated system approach.  DOR Rules and Regs, Chap 9, § 6.   The CountyAssessor is required to 
"[f]aithfully and diligently follow and apply the orders, procedures and 
formulae of the department of revenue . . . for the appraisal and assessment of 
all taxable property." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-204(a)(ix) (LexisNexis 
2005).

 
 
[¶21]   The Forest Service land where the 
cabin is located is exempt from taxation as federal land used primarily for a 
governmental purpose. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-11-105(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005).  
However, improvements placed on federal lands for private use do not fall 
within this exemption.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-11-105(a)(i)(A) (LexisNexis 2005).  
Of particular concern in this case is the special use permit which the 
parties agree is not taxable. See DOR Rules and Regs, 
Chap. 14, § 14(e) (leaseholds on exempt government property are not 
taxable to the lessee).

 
 
Evidentiary basis for the 
county board's findings

 
 
[¶22]   The Britts claim that the county 
board's decision in their favor was supported by substantial evidence.  Most of the county board's findings are 
not pertinent to our review because they are inaccurate, incomplete, or merely 
restate testimony or issues without explaining how these items impacted the 
county board's decision.2  The county board's resolution of the 
matter is essentially found in findings No. 7 and 8, and its ultimate conclusion 
in finding No. 10.   With 
regard to these findings, the Britts assert that the county board's conclusion 
that their special use permit was being taxed was supported by substantial 
evidence.  They also claim that 
substantial evidence supported the determination that they overcame the 
presumption that the Assessor's valuation was correct.  We disagree and find that substantial 
evidence did not support the finding that the permit was taxed or the ultimate 
finding that the Britts had presented sufficient credible evidence to merit 
relief.

 
 

[¶23]   A strong presumption favors the 
Assessor's valuation.  "In the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the officials charged with 
establishing value exercised honest judgment in accordance with the 
applicable rules, regulations, and other directives that have passed public 
scrutiny, either through legislative enactment or agency rule-making, or both." 
Amoco Production Co. v. Dept. of 
Revenue, 
2004 WY 89, ¶ 7, 94 P.3d 430, 435 (Wyo. 
2004).   The Britts had the 
initial burden of presenting evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption. 
Id., ¶ 8.  If the Britts successfully overcame the 
presumption, then the county board was "required to equally weigh the evidence 
of all parties and measure it against the appropriate burden of proof."  CIG v. 
Wyoming Dept. of 
Revenue, 
2001 WY 34, ¶ 10, 20 P.3d 528, 531 (Wyo. 2001).  The 
burden of going forward would then have shifted to the Assessor to defend her 
valuation.  Id.  Above all, the Britts bore "the ultimate 
burden of persuasion to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
valuation was not derived in accordance with the required constitutional and 
statutory requirements for valuing . . . property."  Id.  

 
 
a)  Taxation of the Forest Service special 
use permit

 
 
[¶24]   Mr. Britt's chief complaint was 
that the Assessor's value improperly included the value of the rights under the 
special use permit.  He asserted 
that the value of improvements should not be related in any way to the location 
of those improvements.  The Britts 
contend that because the Assessor admitted that location was a factor in her 
valuation, the special use permit was impermissibly subject to taxation.  

 
 
[¶25]   The Assessor, however, was able to 
draw a distinction between location and land ownership. According to the 
Assessor, location is an appropriate consideration in determining fair market 
value.  The Assessor presented 
testimony that the permit was not being taxed and that if the Britts actually 
owned the land, that the assessment would have been much higher.  Berg explained that the value of 
improvements is affected by location and such variations in value, due to 
location, are not unusual.  Other 
than their opinion that location should not be a factor in valuing their cabin, 
the Britts did not present any evidence which would have allowed the county 
board to find that the Assessor's consideration of the location of the cabin was 
inappropriate.  

 
 
[¶26]   Mr. Britt also claimed that the 
Assessor erred in failing to subtract the value of the federal permit from the 
assessed valuation. He attributed $50,000 of his original $80,000 paid for the 
cabin to the value of the special use permit.  He offered an exhibit detailing payments 
to the Forest Service since their purchase of the cabin in 1995.  The permit fee increased over time, from 
$937.02 in 1995 to $2,349.53 in 2003.  
Based upon the increase in the permit fee, the Britts estimated the 
permit value at $52,955 for the 2003 tax year.  Mr. Britt suggested that this amount 
should be deducted from the Assessor's valuation to arrive at the real taxable 
value of his cabin, which he claimed was $34,245.  

 
 
[¶27]   On appeal, the Britts urge us to 
accept their estimated real taxable value as evidence sufficient to uphold the 
county board's decision in their favor.  
However, the county board did not expressly adopt the Britts' suggested 
approach, nor did it find that the taxable value of the cabin was $34,245.  We simply cannot tell from its findings 
whether the county board intended to follow this rationale.  The county board did not make a finding 
about the fair market value of the cabin, other than to say its value was 
"minimal."  Also lacking is any 
finding about the value of the special use permit.  In the absence of such findings, and 
without any explanation from the county board about the relief it intended to 
grant, we cannot assume that its relief was based upon the cabin being valued at 
$34,245.

 
 

[¶28]   The county board's statement that 
it believed the permit was being taxed was contrary to the weight of the 
evidence.  In their testimony, Berg 
and the Assessor denied that the special use permit was being taxed. Without 
explanation, the county board apparently disregarded this testimony.  The only conflicting evidence presented 
was the Britts' opinion that the permit was being taxed.  A mere difference of opinion as to value 
does not amount to substantial evidence.  
Amoco Production Co., ¶¶ 7-8.  The county board erroneously concluded 
that the Assessor's valuation was improper because it included the value of the 
permit.

 
 
b) Presumption favoring 
Assessor's valuation

  

[¶29]   At the hearing, the Britts 
attempted to prove that the value of the cabin was much lower than the 
Assessor's valuation.  They 
questioned the methodology used by the Assessor and offered alternative means of 
valuing the cabin.  The Assessor 
countered each challenge and explained why her valuation should stand.  The county board ruled generally in 
favor of the Britts and found that they had presented sufficient evidence to 
overcome the presumption that the Assessor's valuation was valid.  

 
 

[¶30]   From its limited findings, we 
cannot tell which, if any, of Mr. Britt's challenges supplied the basis for the 
county board's decision.  The county 
board did not make the requisite findings to allow deferential review of this 
ultimate conclusion.  CIG, ¶ 8 (recognizing that 
we do not give the same deference afforded for basic fact findings if an 
agency's determinations involve elements of law and fact, or ultimate 
facts).  Based upon our review of 
the evidence presented, we conclude that the Assessor successfully defended her 
valuation and the Britts failed to overcome the presumption that her valuation 
was proper.

 
 
[¶31]   The Britts challenged the 
Assessor's use of comparable sales.  
Mr. Britt did not deny that sales of other cabins had taken place or that 
those cabins were comparable to his cabin.  
He merely asserted that the market had slowed since those transactions 
had occurred. As an example, Mr. Britt identified a recent transaction which he 
thought should have been considered.  
However, that cabin sale resulted from a lien foreclosure.  Mr. Britt acknowledged that, because of 
those circumstances, the price of $50,000 was much lower than the amount 
previously paid for the same property. He also recognized that his cabin was in 
better condition.  Berg explained 
that the transaction referenced by Mr. Britt was not used because the condition 
of that cabin was not comparable to the Britts' cabin and to the other cabin 
sales used as comparables.  
Additionally, Mr. Britt emphasized that his use of the cabin was severely 
limited by the terms of the permit.  
However, the Assessor stated that those limitations were considered. All 
of the comparables used were likewise located on U.S. Forest Service land, 
involved the same type of permit, and were subject to similar limitations.  

 
 
[¶32]   Mr. Britt also suggested that the 
Assessor should have utilized the cost replacement method.  He submitted a construction estimate in 
an effort to demonstrate that the replacement cost of the cabin was 
approximately $65,000.  He 
acknowledged that the information used for the estimate differed from the 
cabin's actual dimensions.  The 
estimate was based upon construction of a 650 square foot cabin without 
including the cost of any porches, while the main structure of the Britts' 
cabin, exclusive of the porches, measured 690 square feet.  As the Assessor explained, this $65,000 
figure is only a base cost figure, which must be depreciated and adjusted for 
specific characteristics of the structure, in order to arrive at the cost 
value.  Mr. Britt did not provide 
information beyond the base cost figure.  
He did not offer any depreciation schedule or suggest a value which 
represented the replacement cost minus depreciation, pursuant to the cost 
approach method authorized by Department of Revenue regulation.  DOR Rules and Regs, Chap. 9, § 6.  

 
 
[¶33]   More significantly, the appraisal 
method used by the Assessor did take into account the replacement cost value of 
the cabin.  She testified that the 
cost value was considered as a component of the CAMA value.  In further defense of her use of CAMA, 
the Assessor also presented testimony that the CAMA approach was uniformly used 
to value all buildings in FremontCounty, regardless of 
ownership of the underlying property.    

 
 

[¶34]   Based upon the record, the Britts' 
asserted challenges to the assessment value did not establish by a preponderance 
of evidence that the Assessor's valuation was improper.  The presumption of validity that 
attached to the Assessor's valuation could only be overcome by credible 
evidence.  Amoco 
Production Co., ¶¶ 7-8. The Britts 
failed to present sufficient credible evidence to show that the Assessor's 
valuation was invalid.  Their mere 
difference of opinion as to the value of their cabin was not sufficient to 
satisfy their burden.  Id.  Although the burden of persuasion did 
not rest with the Assessor, we find that she presented ample evidence in defense 
of her valuation.  Accordingly, the 
county board's decision in favor of the Britts was erroneous and the Assessor's 
valuation was properly reinstated by the state board.  

 
 
Appraisal method 
authorized by law

 
 
[¶35]   Alternatively, the Britts assert 
that the Assessor's valuation should have been set aside because her methodology 
was contrary to applicable law.  
They argue that the Assessor should have used the cost approach and that 
her use of the comparable sales approach under the circumstances was not a 
rational method, was not uniformly applied, and was not essentially fair.  

 
 
[¶36]   The Britts claim that the Assessor 
was not authorized to use the comparable sales approach pursuant to Section 6(a) 
of Chapter 9 of the Department of Revenue's regulations, which provides in 
pertinent part:

 
 
The comparable sales 
approach is an appropriate method of valuation when there is an adequate number 
of reliable arms-length sales and the properties subject to such sales are 
similar to the property being valued.  
Comparable sales shall be adjusted to reflect differences in time, 
location, size, physical attributes, financing terms or other differences which 
affect value.  The use of this 
approach to value depends upon:

 
 

(i)                 
The 
availability of comparable sales data;

 
 

(ii)               
The 
verification of the sales data;

 
 

(iii)             
The degree 
of comparability or extent of adjustment necessary for time differences; 
and

 
 

(iv)             
The absence of 
non-typical conditions affecting the sales price.

 
 
DOR 
Rules and Regs, Chap 9, § 6(a) (emphasis added).  Additionally, the Britts claim that the 
Assessor failed to select an appropriate appraisal method, citing the following 
principles: 

 
 
Each approach used shall 
be an appropriate method for the type of property being valued; that is, the 
property shall fit the assumptions inherent in the appraisal method in order to 
calculate or estimate the fair value of the property. Each approach used shall 
also consider the nature of the property or industry, and the regulatory and 
economic environment within which the property operates. For personal property, 
the valuation methodology selected shall reflect the trade level at which 
personal property is found, and shall 
account for factors influencing the value in place including utility, usefulness 
to the owner or the actual income produced.

 
 
DOR 
Rules and Regs, Chap 9, § 6 (emphasis added).  

 
 
[¶37]   The Britts argue that, under these 
regulations, two circumstances were present which precluded the use of the 
comparable sales method: 1) non-typical factors affecting sales price and 2) the 
limited usefulness to the owner.  
First, the Britts claim that the Assessor failed to consider the value of 
the special use permit which they contend was a major non-typical factor.  Second, they assert that the Assessor 
failed to consider the limited usefulness of the cabin resulting from the 
restrictions under the special use permit.  
Consequently, the Britts conclude that the Assessor should have used the 
cost approach.  

 
 

[¶38]   It is not a function of our review 
process to consider, among several valid appraisal approaches, which method 
might be most favorable to the taxpayer. CIG, ¶ 13.  As we have already noted, the Britts 
failed to present sufficient evidence at the hearing which would support 
application of the cost approach pursuant to the Department's Rules and 
Regulations.  The Britts' 
construction estimate provided only the first step in determining cost value, 
and they provided no information about depreciation or deductions.3  Furthermore, the 
Britts' estimate was not based upon "accurate, pertinent physical data regarding 
the property" as required by the regulations.  DOR Rules and Regs, Chap 9, § 
6(b)(ii).  Their estimate for a new 
structure was based upon less square footage and did not account for the two 
porches on the existing cabin.

 
 

[¶39]   More significantly, however, the 
Britts fail to recognize that the comparable sales approach was not the method 
used by the Assessor.  Instead, she 
used CAMA, which automates the comparable sales and replacement cost 
methods.  Gray v. 
Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 896 P.2d 1347, 1350, f.n.2 
(Wyo. 1995).  We have approved of the CAMA system as a 
rational method which can be uniformly and fairly applied. Id. at 1351.  The Britts do not challenge the CAMA 
method, nor do they clearly assert that the Assessor employed CAMA improperly.4  

 
 
[¶40]   Insofar as the Britts' complaints 
about the comparable sales approach translate to complaints about the CAMA 
valuation, we find no error in the comparable sales component of the Assessor's 
CAMA analysis.  The comparable sales 
used by the Assessor were limited to cabins similarly situated on nearby Forest 
Service land without fee ownership, subject to similar use restrictions.  Thus, the value of the right to have a 
cabin located on Forest Service land was a factor which was typical, not 
atypical.     

 
 
[¶41]   The Assessor did consider the 
utility of the cabin and applied a factor in the CAMA analysis.  The Britts do not explain how their 
claimed limited usefulness of the cabin impacts its value in a way which was not 
considered by the Assessor.  The 
evidence indicates that buyers of cabins located on Forest Service special use 
permits are aware of the limitations and restrictions, and, as the Assessor 
observed, there is an active market for these cabins with buyers willing to pay 
for even limited use. 

 
 
[¶42]   The Assessor 
presented evidence that she considered actual market conditions and weighed that 
information against other indications of value before selecting the assessment 
value. This was consistent with her obligation pursuant to Section 7 of Chapter 
9 of the Department's Rules and Regulations, which provides: 

 
 
The appraiser shall weigh 
the relative significance, applicability and appropriateness of the indications 
of value derived from the approaches to value or methods outlined above, and 
will place the most weight and reliance on the value indicator which, in his 
professional judgment, best approximates the value of the subject property. The 
appraiser shall evaluate all alternative conclusions and reconcile the value 
indicators to arrive at a final estimate of value. For market value, the final 
estimate is that value which most nearly represents what the typical, informed, 
rational purchaser would pay for the subject property and a rational seller 
would accept if it were available for sale on the open market as of the date of 
the appraisal, given all the data utilized by appraisers in their 
analyses.

 
 
We 
conclude that the Assessor demonstrated that she considered all necessary 
factors and exercised professional judgment in accordance with applicable 
law.  We, therefore, will not 
substitute our judgment by finding that a different appraisal method would have 
been more suitable.

 
 

[¶43]   The Britts also claim that the 
Assessor's method of valuation was contrary to constitutional right and 
privilege.  We disagree.  CAMA conforms to the equal and uniform 
taxation requirements of the Wyoming Constitution.  Gray, 896 P.2d  at 1351.  Nevertheless, the Britts claim that 
their valuation was the result of an irrational method, not uniformly applied, 
which is not essentially fair.  
Their argument is basically a reiteration of their arguments addressed 
above -- that the value of the special use permit was assessed and that the cost 
approach was more suitable.  We have 
rejected these assertions, and we conclude that the Assessor's valuation was not 
constitutionally infirm.  

 
 
Deference to the fact 
finder

 
 
[¶44]   In their final issue on appeal, the 
Britts argue that the state board and district court failed to defer to the 
county board as the initial finder of fact.  Having conducted our own appellate 
review and concluding that the county board's findings were not supported by 
substantial evidence, we need not address any perceived errors in the methods or 
reasoning of the state board or district court.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶45]   In the absence of substantial 
evidence to support it, the county board's decision cannot be upheld.  The county board's finding that the 
federal special use permit was being taxed was clearly contrary to the evidence 
presented at hearing. Likewise, substantial evidence did not support its finding 
that the Britts overcame the presumption of correctness of the Assessor's 
valuation.  We conclude that the 
Assessor's appraisal methodology was authorized by law and was in accordance 
with constitutional guidelines.  
Accordingly, the state board correctly reversed the county board's 
decision, and the district court properly upheld the decision of the state 
board.

 
 
[¶46]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The right of the Britts to have 
their cabin located on Forest Service land is also referred to as a lease by the 
parties and the county board.   
For purposes of this opinion, the terms "special use permit" and "lease" 
are interchangeable.  We use the 
former term because that is the term which appears in the agreement with the 
Forest Service.

 
 

2Finding 
No. 1 describes Mr. Britt's testimony about a recent nearby sale.  Mr. Britt did state that a cabin next to 
his had sold within the past year for $50,000.  Standing alone, this finding accurately 
represents a portion of Mr. Britt's testimony.  However, what is lacking from the county 
board's finding is Mr. Britt's further explanation of the circumstances of that 
adjacent cabin sale.  He explained 
that the neighboring cabin had previously sold for $87,000 right before the 
Britts had purchased their cabin.  
He acknowledged that the recent sale resulted from bankruptcy proceedings 
and that the lienholder sold that cabin for much less than the purchase price 
previously paid.  Furthermore, he 
described that cabin, at the time of the recent sale, as being in a cosmetically 
poor condition. 

 
 
Finding 
No. 2 also describes Mr. Britt's testimony.  Mr. Britt did not clearly state that the 
comparable sales used by the Assessor were unrealistic.  Rather, he suggested that the recent 
adjacent cabin sale would be more realistic than the comparables used by the 
Assessor because of the impact the events of September 11, 2001 recently had on 
the economy.  This is simply a 
statement of the taxpayer's opinion, and the county board fails to describe how 
this opinion bore upon its decision.   
 

 
 
Likewise, 
Finding No. 9 describes Mr. Britt's testimony that the cabin was used on a 
limited basis, but this fact was not disputed by the Assessor.  The condition, desirability, and utility 
in the market place were factors specifically incorporated into her 
appraisal.

 
 
Finding 
No. 3 describes the physical features of the cabin but it is not entirely 
accurate.  Mr. Britt testified that 
the cabin was 23 feet by 30 feet, with a porch on the south measuring 8 feet by 
23 feet.  However, Mr. Britt also 
stated there was a screened in porch on the front of the cabin measuring 8 feet 
by 10 feet.  The front porch is not 
mentioned by the county board.  
Moreover, Mr. Britt testified that the cabin does have electricity and 
also has water on a seasonable basis.  
Thus, the county board's finding that "[t]here is no . . . water or 
electricity" clearly contradicts the evidence presented.

 
 
Finding No. 4 omits the date when 
the cabin was purchased, but the purchase price of the cabin was not in 
dispute.  Even if the date had been 
included, however, it does not appear that this finding was influential in the 
county board's decision.  

 
 
Findings No. 5 and 6 simply 
summarize the main dispute at the hearing.

 
 

3We note that the 
cost-per-square-foot estimate submitted by the Britts represents a less reliable 
method of estimating replacement cost.  
DOR Rules and Regs, Chap 9, § 
6(b)(v)(C).

 
 

4CAMA is authorized by Section 6(d) 
of Chapter 9 of the Department's Rules and Regulations which is not cited by the 
Britts.