Case Title: MICHAEL PATTERSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0005

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
MICHAEL PATTERSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 33179 P.3d 864Case Number: S-07-0005Decided: 03/27/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
MICHAEL 
PATTERSON,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. 
Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. 
Roden, Assistant Appellate Counsel; Diane E. Courselle, Director, and William 
Elliott, Student Intern, of the Defender Aide Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Elliott.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Pojman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Michael Patterson 
appeals his conviction of being an accessory 
before the fact to second degree murder.1  He claims the evidence was insufficient 
to support a conviction for being an accessory and that the jury was improperly 
instructed on the elements of second degree murder.  Finding Patterson's arguments to be 
without merit, we affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Patterson 
presents two issues for review by this Court:

 
 
I.          
Was the evidence convicting Mr. Patterson of accessory before the fact to 
second-degree murder insufficient because the State failed to establish that Mr. 
Patterson knowingly aided or abetted another person in the commission of the 
crime of second degree murder as there was no evidence that Mr. Patterson 
contributed to, shared in the intent to commit, or encouraged the acts of the 
unidentified principle which caused Mr. Blankenship's 
death?

 
 
II.         
Was the jury incorrectly instructed as to the elements of second-degree 
murder, specifically since the court provided instructions defining "purposely" 
and "maliciously" that left doubt as to under what circumstances second-degree 
murder could be found to have been committed and what circumstances amounted to 
the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter?

 
 

FACTS2

 
 
[¶3]      This case stems 
from a street brawl that resulted in the death of James Blankenship.  On September 17 and the early morning 
hours of September 18, 2005, Patterson had been out partying with Ronterral 
Clark, among others.  Eventually, he 
and some other friends ended up at Ronterral's house.  Ronterral's brother, Urich Clark, had an 
ongoing feud with a man named Kelly Burroughs.  Urich and Burroughs had set up a 
confrontation at a local convenience store.  Ronterral found out about the impending 
fight and decided to go help his brother out.  Patterson and his friends decided to go 
along, also to back up Urich if needed.  

 
 
[¶4]      As it happened, 
numerous men from both Burroughs' side and Urich's side showed up at the 
convenience store.  Blankenship was 
one of the men on Burroughs' side.  
Once both Burroughs and Urich arrived at the convenience store, a 
free-for-all brawl amongst all the men erupted.  At some point in the brawl, Patterson 
was seen choking Blankenship as Blankenship lay on the ground. Patterson was 
yelling at Blankenship that he was going to kill him.  Ronterral testified he pulled Patterson 
off Blankenship and told Patterson that they should "stomp" Blankenship.  Even before Ronterral had completed 
pulling Patterson off Blankenship, a third, unidentified, man began repeatedly 
"stomping" Blankenship in the head.  
Patterson and Ronterral joined him and simultaneously kicked Blankenship 
in the torso.  Blankenship was lying 
on the ground through the entire attack and did not fight back in any way.  

 
 
[¶5]      Blankenship was 
lying unconscious on the ground when one of Burroughs' men saw Patterson, 
Ronterral and the third, unidentified, man "stomping" on Blankenship.  He ran over, pushed one of the men away 
from Blankenship, and threw himself over Blankenship's body.  The fight seems to have broken up 
shortly thereafter and everyone scattered.  
The convenience store clerk called the police and when the police arrived 
they found Blankenship lying unconscious on the ground.  Blankenship ultimately died of head 
injuries.  

 
 
[¶6]      The coroner 
testified at trial that Blankenship was approximately six feet tall and 137 
pounds.  The only life threatening 
injuries suffered by Blankenship were to his head.  The coroner reported markings on the 
side of Blankenship's face consistent with shoe prints.  The other side of Blankenship's head had 
non-specific abrasions and diffused bruising, i.e., road rash type 
injuries.  The coroner testified 
that, based on the observable head injuries, Blankenship was kicked and stomped 
at least five to ten times in the head.  
The coroner opined that the cause of Blankenship's death was "probably a 
combination of kicks and stomps to the left side of the head with the right side 
being down on a relatively firm surface."  

 
 
[¶7]      Patterson was 
eventually tracked down and charged with being an accessory before the fact in 
the "stomping" death of Blankenship.  
Patterson was convicted after a jury trial.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      In order to 
convict Patterson of being an accessory before the fact to second degree murder, 
the State first had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a second degree 
murder had been committed (albeit by an unknown assailant).  See generally Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶ 53, 46 P.3d 298, 308 (Wyo. 2002); Fales v. 
State, 908 P.2d 404, 408 (Wyo. 1995).  Consequently, we will discuss 
Patterson's second issue first.  In 
his second issue, Patterson challenges the jury instructions on the ground that 
they did not clearly distinguish between the elements of second degree murder 
and the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter.  

 
 
[¶9]      Patterson did not 
object to any of the jury instructions before they were given to the jury.  Any objections are thus deemed waived 
pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 30.3  Patterson requests, however, this Court 
exercise its discretion to review his claim of allegedly improper jury 
instructions for plain error.  
W.R.Cr.P. 52(b), W.R.A.P. 9.05.  
Under the facts and circumstances of this appeal, we decline to do 
so.  

 
 
[¶10]   Failure to instruct properly on an 
element of a crime does not constitute plain error where evidence of the 
defendant's guilt is overwhelming.  Iseli v. State, 2007 WY 102, ¶ 9, 160 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Wyo. 2007); Siler v. 
State, 2005 WY 73, ¶ 44, 115 P.3d 14, 36 (Wyo. 2005); Lapp v. State, 2004 WY 142, ¶ 10, 100 P.3d 862, 865 (Wyo. 2004); Wilson v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 916 (Wyo. 
2000).  Second degree murder is 
defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104 (LexisNexis 2007): "[w]hoever purposely and 
maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of 
murder in the second degree."  The 
most pertinent focal point of Patterson's argument on appeal is the definition 
of "maliciously."  The jury was 
instructed that "[m]aliciously' means the state of mind in which an intentional 
act is done without legal justification or excuse.  The term maliciously' conveys the 
meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility toward another."  Patterson argues this Court should 
redefine "maliciously" to require an act that is likely to be attended with 
dangerous or fatal consequences.  
Given the facts of this case, the requested modification is 
immaterial.  

 
 
[¶11]   The State presented overwhelming 
evidence of malice no matter which definition is used.  Multiple men drove to the convenience 
store knowing a fight would take place.  
An unidentified assailant repeatedly and consistently stomped 
Blankenship's head as the slightly built Blankenship was lying on the ground and 
of no threat to anyone.  The 
stomping continued even after Blankenship was rendered unconscious.  These facts unmistakably support a 
finding that the stomping of Blankenship's head was done maliciously even under 
Patterson's proposed definition.  We 
therefore need not engage in the exercise of reviewing further for plain 
error.

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the evidence

 
 
[¶12]   Patterson does not dispute the 
facts per se.  Instead, he claims 
that his actions the night of Blankenship's death do not equate to aiding and 
abetting second degree murder.  He 
argues he was "only" kicking Blankenship in the torso.  His argument continues that since 
Blankenship died of head injuries, and he never kicked Blankenship in the head, 
he "never participated in the acts that resulted in the accomplishment or 
success of the criminal venture  specifically, he did not participate in the 
acts which led to the injuries causing Mr. Blankenship's death." 

 
 
[¶13]   Unsurprisingly, we disagree.  Accomplice liability is inherently 
derivative because the accomplice does not directly perform the acts 
constituting the substantive crime.  
An accessory before the fact is someone who "knowingly aids or abets in 
the commission of a felony, or who counsels, encourages, hires, commands or 
procures a felony to be committed."  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-1-201(a) (LexisNexis 2007).  
In this case, Patterson was specifically charged with "aiding and 
abetting."  Certainly, merely being 
a neutral presence at a crime scene does not constitute aiding and 
abetting.  Rather, as the jury 
properly was instructed, "[t]he State must prove that the defendant knowingly 
associated himself with the crime in some way as a participant  someone who 
wanted the crime to be committed  and not as a mere spectator."  As we have explained: 

 
 
To 
convict a person of aiding and abetting, it must be proved that the crime was 
committed by someone and that the aider and abettor associated himself with and 
participated in the accomplishment and success of the criminal venture.  Fales v. State, 908 P.2d 404, 408 
(Wyo. 1995); Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 693 
(Wyo. 
1995).  We also held in Edge v. State, 647 P.2d 557, 560 (Wyo. 
1982), that it is not necessary to prove that each defendant did that which was 
necessary to establish each element of an offense but that it is sufficient to 
show that they were associated together in doing that which comprises each 
element of the offense.  Further, 
although a defendant's presence at the time and place of the crime does not 
establish guilt as an aider, abettor, or principal, an intent to engage in the 
criminal venture may be shown by the relationship of the parties and by their 
conduct before and after the offense.  
Haight v. State, 654 P.2d 1232, 1238 (Wyo. 1982).

 
 

Black, ¶ 10, 
46 P.3d  at 301.

 
 
[¶14]   Far from being a disinterested 
observer, Patterson irrefutably "associated himself with and participated in the 
accomplishment and success of the criminal venture."  The first information we have of 
Patterson's altercation with Blankenship is Patterson declaring his intent to 
murder Blankenship as he was choking him.  
Patterson was not able to complete the job because Ronterral Clark pulled 
him off Blankenship.  Ronterral 
suggested they "stomp" Blankenship instead.  Patterson quickly adopted the new method 
of injuring Blankenship.  
Immediately upon Ronterral's suggestion, Patterson, Ronterral and a 
third, unidentified, man began stomping Blankenship.  The unidentified man was repeatedly 
stomping Blankenship's head.  
Patterson did not attempt to stop the unidentified man, nor did Patterson 
even walk away.  Instead, knowing 
what the principal was doing, Patterson continued to stomp Blankenship. 

 
 
[¶15]   Patterson's actions conclusively 
associated him with the unidentified man maliciously, purposely, stomping on 
Blankenship's head.  In particular, 
Patterson aided and abetted the unidentified man stomping Blankenship's head by 
initiating the violent attack as Blankenship was lying on the ground and then 
helping prevent Blankenship from rising or otherwise defending himself.  We are satisfied the evidence supports, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury's finding that Patterson intentionally aided 
and abetted the culpable conduct resulting in the second degree murder of 
Blankenship.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
¶16]    The evidence adduced at trial 
overwhelming supports a finding that Patterson aided and abetted in the culpable 
conduct that resulted in the second degree murder of James Blankenship.  Patterson effectively disabled 
Blankenship, kicked Blankenship as Blankenship lay on the ground and continued 
to kick Blankenship as someone else "stomped" multiple times on Blankenship's 
head. Given the viciousness of the attack, Blankenship's death was a virtual 
certainty.  No alteration in the 
jury instructions as proposed by Patterson would change the outcome of this 
case.  Patterson's Judgment and 
Sentence is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-201.  Accessory before the 
fact.

            
 (a) A person 
who knowingly aids or abets in the commission of a felony, or who counsels, 
encourages, hires, commands or procures a felony to be committed, is an 
accessory before the fact.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104.  Murder in the second degree; 
penalty.

            
Whoever purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any 
human being is guilty of murder in the second degree, and shall be imprisoned in 
the penitentiary for any term not less than twenty (20) years, or during 
life.

 
 

2As per our 
usual protocol on review, the evidence favoring the State is accepted as true 
and the evidence in conflict therewith is entirely left out of 
consideration.  The State is given 
the benefit of those inferences which may be fairly and reasonably drawn from 
the evidence.  Kelly v. State, 2007 WY 45, ¶ 11, 153 P.3d 926, 929 (Wyo. 2007); Mendoza v. State, 2007 WY 26, ¶ 3, 151 P.3d 1112, 1113 (Wyo. 2007); Jones v. 
State, 2007 WY 45, ¶ 11, 132 P.3d 162, 165 (Wyo. 
2006).

 
 

3W.R.Cr.P. 
30, in pertinent part, reads:

 
 
No party may 
assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless that 
party objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the 
matter to which the party objects and the grounds of 
objection.