Case Title: Barkley v. McKeever Enters., Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC94253

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
DEBORAH BARKLEY, 
) 
 
) 
 
Appellant, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
 
No. SC94253 
 
) 
MCKEEVER ENTERPRISES, INC. D/B/A  ) 
PRICE CHOPPER,  
) 
 
) 
 
Respondent. 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
The Honorable James F. Kanatzar, Judge 
 
Opinion issued February 24, 2015 
 
Deborah Barkley (“Barkley”) sued McKeever Enterprises, Inc. (“Price Chopper”), 
alleging various torts arising out of her 46-minute detention at Price Chopper for 
suspected shoplifting.  At the close of the evidence, Barkley elected to submit only her 
claims for false imprisonment and battery to the jury.  The jury found for Price Chopper 
on both claims.  Barkley appeals, and the judgment is affirmed. 
Background 
On May 24, 2009, Barkley went to Price Chopper in Independence.  While 
shopping, she took various items (e.g., notebooks, a book light, toothpaste, and batteries) 
from the shelves and placed them in a reusable shopping bag she carried next to her 
purse.   In her other hand, Barkley carried other empty reusable shopping bags.  Barkley’s 
husband, who also went shopping with her, placed various items in a grocery cart.  When 
they met to check out, Barkley’s husband unloaded the cart onto the conveyor belt while 
Barkley walked past the register and handed the empty reusable bags to an employee for 
use in bagging their purchases.  Barkley continued to carry the bag concealing her other 
items next to her purse.  She made no effort to pay for the items in that bag, and they had 
not been scanned along with her husband’s purchases.  When the other items were paid 
for, Barkley headed for the exit. 
Two loss prevention employees had been watching Barkley on Price Chopper’s 
surveillance system.  When they saw Barkley head for the exit without paying for the 
items in the bag next to her purse, they stopped her.  They confiscated the bag containing 
the unpurchased items, escorted her to the store’s security office, and told her she was 
being detained on suspicion of shoplifting.  Barkley’s husband waited for her in the 
nearby customer service area. 
Inside the security office, Barkley and the two male loss prevention employees 
were joined by a female employee in accordance with Price Chopper’s policy for female 
shoplifting suspects.  Barkley was told to sit on a bench in the office while the employees 
searched her purse, itemized and photographed the merchandise Barkley had concealed in 
the reusable shopping bag, and began preparing their report.  Approximately four minutes 
after Barkely was first detained, the employees summoned the police when they 
determined that the price of the items in Barkley’s bag exceeded the store’s threshold for 
prosecution.  
 
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As the employees were processing the items and preparing their report, Barkley 
stood and approached two of the employees from behind.  The third employee, who could 
see her approaching, told Barkley to stay seated on the bench.  Barkley refused and 
continued to approach the other employees.  When they turned and saw her, one of them 
moved to handcuff her.  Barkley resisted and, during the scuffle, she was pushed up 
against a file cabinet.  When the employee cuffed one of her hands and started to 
handcuff the other hand behind her back, Barkley complained that this would be too 
painful.  The employee acquiesced and handcuffed Barkley’s hands in the front instead.  
He told Barkley to return to the bench, but she refused again.   
At this point, one of the employees reached out to guide Barkley back to the 
bench.  She evaded this employee and ran for the door.  Barkley was able to open the 
door because her hands were cuffed in front of her.  But, before she could get the door 
open enough to escape, the employees caught up to her.  While one of them pushed the 
door shut and tried to pull Barkley’s hands from the door handle, the other employee 
knocked Barkley’s legs out from under her.  With Barkley on the floor, the employees 
were able to move her handcuffs to the back so she would not be able to use her hands 
again.  Then, they attempted to help Barkley up and over to the bench.  She refused their 
assistance, however, and remained sitting on the floor until the employees completed 
their report. 
When the report was finished, the employees moved Barkley’s handcuffs back to 
the front and, again, tried to help her off the floor.  Barkley did not resist this time, and 
the employees assisted her to the bench.  Approximately eight minutes later, or about 
 
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46 minutes after Barkley was first detained near the store’s exit, the police arrived to 
arrest Barkley and escort her from the store.  She was charged with shoplifting in 
Independence Municipal Court but later was acquitted of this charge. 
Barkley sued Price Chopper for actual and punitive damages arising out of her 
detention in the store.  She alleged that: (1) Price Chopper had been negligent in 
supervising its loss prevention employees; (2) Price Chopper committed malicious 
prosecution by instigating criminal charges that ended in her favor; and (3) Price 
Chopper’s employees invaded her privacy and committed assault, battery, and false 
imprisonment.  Price Chopper pleaded that the merchant’s privilege and section 537.1251 
protected it from all liability to Barkley for the acts alleged. 
In October 2012, the case was tried to a jury.  At the close of the evidence, 
Barkley abandoned all of her claims except false imprisonment and battery.  These were 
submitted to the jury, together with Price Chopper’s affirmative defense to each count.  
The jury found for Price Chopper on both counts.  Barkley sought a new trial on the 
grounds that the trial court erred in submitting an affirmative defense to the charge of 
battery and that the trial court erred in admitting and excluding certain evidence.  Her 
motion was overruled.  Barkley appeals, and this Court has jurisdiction.  See Mo. Const. 
art. V, § 10.   
The Court rejects Barkley’s argument that the merchant’s privilege does not 
extend to claims of battery and her argument that the privilege ends when the merchant’s  
                                              
1   Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 2000. 
 
5 
property is recovered.  Instead, a merchant is privileged to detain a person – in a 
reasonable manner and for a reasonable period – if the merchant has reasonable suspicion 
or probable cause to believe that person is shoplifting.  The merchant is entitled to 
recover the property but may continue the detention to determine whether the person 
actually was shoplifting and – if so – to summon the police and instigate criminal 
proceedings.  This privilege is not limited to claims of false imprisonment.  Instead, as 
long as the detention is conducted in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable time, the 
privilege protects the merchant from all liability to the person detained, civil or criminal, 
including liability for an assault or battery committed to effectuate the detention.  
Accordingly, the judgment in favor of Price Chopper is affirmed. 
Analysis 
The privilege of a merchant to detain a suspected shoplifter has long been 
recognized in Missouri.  At first, the privilege applied only if the suspect in fact was 
guilty of the crime.  See Pandjiris v. Hartman, 94 S.W. 270, 272 (Mo. 1906) (the “only 
plea of justification or excuse is that plaintiff was guilty of the crime for which he was 
arrested”).  As a result, no matter how reasonable the merchant’s suspicion may have 
been, only a subsequent conviction would protect the merchant from civil liability to the 
person detained.  See, e.g., Titus v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 123 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Mo. 
App. 1938) (concluding that, because the employee “acted indiscreetly, or with bad 
judgment, or through mistake, and arrested, restrained and searched a person not guilty, 
her employer is responsible”). 
 
6 
In 1941, however, this Court abandoned this restriction.  Expressly overruling 
Pandjiris, this Court held:  
In an effort to harmonize the individual right to liberty with a reasonable 
protection to the person or property of the defendant, it should be said in 
such a charge of false imprisonment, where a defendant had probable cause 
to believe that the plaintiff was about to injure defendant in his person or 
property, even though such injury would constitute but a misdemeanor, that 
probable cause is a defense, provided, of course, that the detention was 
reasonable. 
 
Teel v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 155 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Mo. 1941) (quoting Collyer v. S. H. 
Kress & Co., 54 P.2d 20, 23 (Cal. 1936)) (quotation marks omitted).  
 
Based on the evidence in that case, Teel holds as a matter of law that there was no 
“unreasonable or unlawful detention of plaintiff … up to the time of obtaining the return 
of the goods.”  Id. at 79.  But, rather than let the plaintiff go when they recovered the 
stolen merchandise, the store employees detained her until she signed a confession 
admitting to the attempted theft.  The Court held that this was actionable.  Id. at 80. 
 
If the employees did not believe plaintiff’s explanation, the Court noted that the 
employees “might have been within their rights if they had called the authorities to take 
[Plaintiff] into custody and preferred charges against [Plaintiff] ….”  Id. at 79.  But Teel 
holds it is “well settled that unreasonable delay in releasing a person, who is entitled to be 
released, or such delay in calling, taking him before or turning him over to proper 
authorities … would thereafter amount to false imprisonment.”  Id.  As a result, the Court 
remanded the case for a new trial because “neither the privilege to restrain plaintiff for 
the purpose of obtaining return of the goods or in order to turn her over to the proper 
authorities … would give [a merchant] any authority to hold plaintiff to compel her to 
 
7 
give a confession in violation of her civil rights under the Constitution of this State.”  Id. 
at 80. 
 
The General Assembly codified Teel in 1961 in what is now section 537.125 (later 
amended in 1985).  Subsection 2 of this statute provides: 
2.  Any merchant, his agent or employee, who has reasonable grounds or 
probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a 
wrongful taking of merchandise or money from a mercantile establishment, 
may detain such person in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable 
length of time for the purpose of investigating whether there has been a 
wrongful taking of such merchandise or money. Any such reasonable 
detention shall not constitute an unlawful arrest or detention, nor shall it 
render the merchant, his agent or employee, criminally or civilly liable to 
the person so detained. 
 
§ 537.125.2 (emphasis added).   
 
The remaining two subsections of section 537.125 expound on the privilege set 
forth in subsection 2.  Subsection 3 explains when that privilege is triggered, i.e., what 
constitutes “reasonable grounds or probable cause to believe that a person has committed 
or is committing a wrongful taking.”  It states: 
3. Any person willfully concealing unpurchased merchandise of any 
mercantile establishment, either on the premises or outside the premises of 
such establishment, shall be presumed to have so concealed such 
merchandise with the intention of committing a wrongful taking of such 
merchandise within the meaning of subsection 1, and the finding of such 
unpurchased merchandise concealed upon the person or among the 
belongings of such person shall be evidence of reasonable grounds and 
probable cause for the detention in a reasonable manner and for a 
reasonable length of time, of such person by a merchant, his agent or 
employee, in order that recovery of such merchandise may be effected, and 
any such reasonable detention shall not be deemed to be unlawful, nor 
render such merchant, his agent or employee criminally or civilly liable. 
 
 
8 
§ 537.125.3 (emphasis added).  Subsection 4 then describes the breadth of the privilege 
and the liabilities from which the merchant is protected: 
4. Any merchant, his agent or employee, who has reasonable grounds or 
probable cause to believe that a person has committed a wrongful taking of 
property, as defined in this section, and who has detained such person and 
investigated such wrongful taking, may contact law enforcement officers 
and instigate criminal proceedings against such person. Any such contact 
of law enforcement authorities or instigation of a judicial proceeding shall 
not constitute malicious prosecution, nor shall it render the merchant, his 
agent or employee criminally or civilly liable to the person so detained or 
against whom proceedings are instigated. 
 
§ 537.125.4 (emphasis added).   
 
Accordingly, under the principles first adopted in Teel and later codified in section 
537.125, a merchant is privileged to detain – in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable 
time – any person the merchant has a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe is 
committing (or has committed) a wrongful taking of the merchant’s property.  The 
merchant may detain such a person for the purpose of recovering the merchandise and 
also for the purpose of investigating whether a wrongful taking actually occurred (or was 
occurring) and, if so, for the purpose of contacting law enforcement and instigating 
criminal proceedings.  Provided this detention is conducted in a reasonable manner and 
for a reasonable time, the merchant is protected from all liability (civil and criminal) to 
the person detained. 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
I. 
Point One 
 
At trial, Barkley argued that Instruction No. 92 (i.e., the verdict director on her 
claim of battery) should be given by itself.  She objected to the proposed “tail” to this 
instruction referring the jury to Instruction No. 103 (i.e., Price Chopper’s affirmative 
defense to the battery claim).  Specifically, Barkley objected that Instruction No. 10: 
… submits inapplicable and inappropriate defenses to plaintiff’s battery 
claim.  It misstates the law with respect to plaintiff’s battery claim and the 
law with respect to defenses to battery.  Further, we object because it is not 
supported by the evidence and misleads the jury as to the law and the 
evidence. 
 
 
In her motion for a new trial, Barkley restated this objection and added a new 
claim that Instruction No. 10 constitutes “prohibited conjunctive submission of multiple 
                                              
2   As given, Instruction No. 9 reads: 
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe: 
First, defendant intentionally pulled plaintiff’s arms behind her back, 
handcuffed her, knocked her to the floor and pulled her to a sitting 
position as her hands were handcuffed behind her back, and 
Second, defendant thereby caused plaintiff bodily harm,  
unless you believe that plaintiff is not entitled to recover by reason of Instruction 
Number 10. 
3   As given, Instruction No. 10 reads: 
Your verdict must be for defendant [Price Chopper] on plaintiff Deborah 
Barkley’s claim for battery if you believe: 
First, plaintiff Deborah Barkley either refused to follow defendant’s loss 
prevention officers’ instructions or attempted to flee the loss prevention 
office, and  
Second, defendant’s loss prevention officers handcuffed and leg swept 
plaintiff for the purpose of resisting plaintiff’s attempt to flee the loss 
prevention office, and 
Third, defendant’s loss prevention officers used only such force as was 
reasonable and necessary to prevent plaintiff from fleeing the loss 
prevention office. 
 
10 
theories of defense all of which are not supported by either the law or the evidence, see 
MAI 1.02.”  She does not raise this unpreserved “multiple theories” claim on appeal, 
however, and that claim is abandoned. 
 
In the court of appeals, Barkley asserted two claims based on Instructions Nos. 9 
and 10.4  Her first point relied on in that brief states: 
Point I:  The Trial Court erred in refusing Plaintiff’s proposed verdict 
directing instruction submitting her battery claim which did not include 
reference to the affirmative defense of resisting invasion of property as 
hypothesized in M.A.I. instruction 32.10 and instead giving, at Defendant’s 
request and over Plaintiff’s objection, Instruction Number 9, which 
included reference to such defense, and Instruction Number 10, submitting 
such defense because such refusal and submissions do not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 70.02 V.A.M.R. in that Plaintiff’s proposed verdict 
directing instruction was applicable to Plaintiff’s battery claim and thus was 
required to be given to the exclusion of any other instructions on the same 
subject and because Instructions Numbers 9 and 10 direct the jury to find 
for Defendant if it believed that Defendant used reasonable force to prevent 
Plaintiff from fleeing the Loss Prevention Office and such facts do not 
constitute a defense to battery under the applicable law and such 
instructions thereby misstated the applicable law, misdirected the jury and 
misled the jury resulting in prejudicial error.  
 
 
Under Rule 84.04(d)(1)(A), an appellant’s point relied on must first identify the 
action of the trial court that is being challenged.  In Point I, Barkley challenges the trial 
court’s decision to reject her verdict director on the battery claim and to give, instead, 
Instructions Nos. 9 and 10, presenting both the battery claim and an affirmative defense 
to that claim.  Next, under Rule 84.04(d)(1)(B), the appellant must use the “because” 
clause to “state concisely the legal reasons for the appellant’s claim of reversible error.”  
                                              
4   Barkley sought to supplement these claims after this Court granted transfer, but, as discussed 
below, Rule 83.08(b) does not permit an appellant to alter the basis of claims raised in the court 
of appeals. 
 
11 
Here, Barkley claims it was error to give Instructions Nos. 9 and 10 because they “do not 
comply with the requirements of Rule 70.02 V.A.M.R.”  Finally, Rule 84.04(d)(1)(C) 
requires the appellant’s point relied on to explain why, “in the context of the case, those 
legal reasons support the claim of reversible error.”   Barkley offers two explanations 
why Instructions Nos. 9 and 10 violate Rule 70.02.  First, she explains that “Plaintiff’s 
proposed verdict directing instruction was applicable to Plaintiff’s battery claim and thus 
was required to be given to the exclusion of any other instructions on the same subject.”  
Second, Barkley explains that there is no affirmative defense allowing Price Chopper to 
use force to prevent her from fleeing, even if the force used was reasonable. 
 
The determination of whether a jury was instructed properly is a question of law, 
which this Court reviews de novo.  Doe 1631 v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 8, 
13 (Mo. banc 2013).  That review considers the evidence “in the light most favorable to 
the submission of the instruction, and if the instruction is supportable by any theory, then 
its submission is proper.”  Bach v. Winfield-Foley Fire Protection Dist., 257 S.W.3d 605, 
608 (Mo. banc 2008).   Even if the giving of a particular instruction was error, however, 
this Court will vacate a judgment based on the jury’s verdict “only if the error resulted in 
prejudice that materially affects the merits of the action.”  Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Med. 
Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 767 (Mo. banc 2010). 
As set out in her first point, Barkley claims that Instruction No. 9 should have 
been given without the “tail,” referring to the affirmative defense in Instruction No. 10.  
She argues that, because Instruction No. 9 is the battery instruction provided in MAI 
23.02, it must be given by itself and without reference to any other instruction.  For 
 
12 
support, Barkley cites Rule 70.02(b), which provides:  “Whenever Missouri Approved 
Instructions contains an instruction applicable in a particular case that the appropriate 
party requests or the court decides to submit, such instruction shall be given to the 
exclusion of any other instructions on the same subject.”  Barkley’s claim fails. 
MAI 23.02, the pattern verdict director on which Barkley relies, specifically 
requires that the following language be added whenever an affirmative defense is 
submitted:  [“unless you believe that plaintiff is not entitled to recover by reason of 
Instruction Number ______ (here insert number of affirmative defense instruction)].”  
The “tail” on Instruction No. 9 complies with this requirement; therefore, the trial court 
did not err in giving Instruction No. 9 in that form.  See Edgerton v. Morrison, 280 
S.W.3d 62, 68 (Mo. banc 2009) (denying a similar claim and holding that the addition of 
the phrase “as submitted by Instruction No. 11” to verdict form “did not mislead the 
jury”). 
Barkley’s alternative argument in Point I is that Price Chopper was not privileged 
to use any force – even reasonable force – to prevent her from fleeing once the store 
employees had recovered the merchandise hidden in her bag.  In other words, she 
contends that the protection of the merchant’s privilege does not extend to claims of 
battery and, even if it does, Barkley contends that the privilege ends as soon as the 
merchant recovers its merchandise.  Both contentions are incorrect. 
First, even though Teel dealt with a claim of false imprisonment, the merchant’s 
privilege is not limited to such claims.  The privilege to detain necessarily includes the 
privilege to use reasonable force (i.e., a battery), or to threaten the use of such force (i.e., 
 
13 
an assault), to accomplish this detention.  As the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts noted, the merchant’s privilege would be “meaningless if reasonable force 
cannot be used.  It makes no sense to assume that shoplifters caught in the act will simply 
comply with a request to wait for the police to arrive.”  Commonwealth v. Rogers, 945 
N.E.2d 295, 306 (Mass. 2011).   
In addition, Barkley’s argument that the merchant’s privilege does not protect 
merchants from claims of battery contradicts the language of section 537.125.  The 
statute explicitly permits the merchant to do several things, including detaining the 
suspect in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable time, investigating whether the 
suspect committed a wrongful taking, and contacting law enforcement to initiate criminal 
proceedings.  But the protection for merchants provided by section 537.125 is not limited 
to the claims most closely associated with those actions, i.e., false imprisonment, slander, 
or malicious prosecution.  Instead, section 537.125 protects the merchant from all 
liability (civil and criminal) to the person detained. 
Barkley’s second contention also fails.  She argues that the only purpose of the 
merchant’s privilege is to recover stolen property and, therefore, the privilege ends as 
soon as that purpose is achieved.  The only basis for her argument is section 537.125.3, 
which states that the merchant is permitted to detain the suspect “in a reasonable manner 
and for a reasonable length of time … in order that recovery of such merchandise may be 
effected.”  But Barkley’s argument ignores the remainder of the statutory language and 
the common law breadth of this privilege.   
 
14 
Teel recognizes that a merchant is allowed to restrain a suspected shoplifter in a 
reasonable manner and for a reasonable time for three purposes, i.e., “for the purpose of 
investigation,” as well as “for the purpose of obtaining return of the goods or in order to 
turn her over to the proper authorities[.]”  Teel, 155 S.W.2d at 79-80.  Section 537.125, 
too, permits reasonable detentions not only for the purpose of recovering the property, as 
noted in subsection 3, but also for the purpose of “investigating whether there has been a 
wrongful taking of such merchandise or money.”  § 537.125.2.  The statute expressly 
authorizes that, once a merchant “has detained such person and investigated such 
wrongful taking, [it] may contact law enforcement officers and instigate criminal 
proceedings against such person[.]”  § 537.125.4.  As a result, not only does section 
537.125 not reject the principle from Teel that a merchant may detain a suspect in a 
reasonable manner and for a reasonable time in order to turn her over to the police, it 
expressly incorporates and reinforces that principle. 
Accordingly, the Court holds that the merchant’s privilege is not extinguished the 
instant the merchandise is recovered.  Instead, the merchant is privileged to detain the 
person to determine whether the person actually was committing (or had committed) a 
wrongful taking and – if so – to detain that person for the purpose of summoning the 
police and initiating criminal proceedings.  As long as the detention is carried out in a 
reasonable manner and for a reasonable time, the merchant cannot be liable to the person 
detained under any theory, civil or criminal, including a claim that the merchant used or 
 
15 
threatened to use reasonable force to accomplish the detention.  Accordingly, Barkley’s 
claim that there is no affirmative defense to her claim of battery is rejected.5 
Barkley also attempts to argue that Instruction No. 10 is not a proper modification 
of the MAI 32.10 instruction because the acts it references (i.e., that Barkley “refused to 
follow defendant’s loss prevention officers’ instructions or attempted to flee the loss 
prevention office”) are not “unlawful acts” of the type referred to in the directions for 
using MAI 32.10.  This argument is not properly before this Court, however. 
Barkley did not claim at trial (or in her new trial motion) that Instruction No. 10 
inaccurately stated the elements of the merchant’s privilege that Price Chopper pleaded 
(and the trial court found adequate proof to submit) as an affirmative defense to battery.  
Instead, she argued that Price Chopper had no affirmative defense to battery.  That is why 
her objection at trial was only that Instruction No. 9 should be given without a “tail” and 
Instruction No. 10 should not be given at all.  In the court of appeals, too, Barkley’s Point 
I did not claim that Instruction No. 10 improperly articulated Price Chopper’s affirmative 
defense.  Instead, as at trial, Point I claimed only that Price Chopper had no affirmative 
defense to her claim of battery and, therefore, the trial court erred by giving Instruction 
No. 10 and by altering Instruction No. 9 to refer to it. 
When this Court granted transfer pursuant to Rule 83.04, Barkley asserted – for 
the first time in this case – that Instruction No. 10 was not properly drafted and/or that the 
                                              
5   Other jurisdictions with statutes similar to section 537.125 have found that the privilege 
includes a right to detain for the police after recovery of the items and an investigation.  See 
Jacques v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 285 N.E.2d 871, 874, 876 (N.Y. 1972); Cooke v. J. J. 
Newberry & Co., 232 A.2d 425, 427-28 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1967). 
 
16 
evidence was insufficient to support the specific factual propositions recited there (rather 
than arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support any affirmative defense to 
battery, which is what Barkley argued in the trial court and the court of appeals).  To 
accomplish this, Barkley used her substitute brief to add three new claims to her Point I.  
Specifically, Barkley added claims that Instruction No. 10:  “(1) hypothesized facts not 
supported by the evidence, (2) included unauthorized deviations from M.A.I. 32.10 by 
failing to hypothesize unlawful conduct as required in M.A.I. 32.10 paragraph 1, [and] 
(3) misstated the law in that they purport to authorize the use of force in response to 
conduct which is not unlawful[.]”  Such new claims are not permitted.   
Rule 84.13(a) unambiguously provides that “allegations of error not presented to 
or expressly decided by the trial court shall not be considered in any civil appeal from a 
jury tried case.”  In addition, Rule 83.08(b) provides that – if an appellant elects to file a 
substitute brief after transfer – it “shall not alter the basis of any claim that was raised in 
the court of appeals brief[.]”  Accordingly, Barkley’s new arguments are not properly 
before the Court and will not be addressed.  See Blackstock v. Kohn, 994 S.W.2d 947, 
953 (Mo. banc 1999) (Court may not review challenge to instruction where appellant “did 
not raise this claim before the court of appeals”). 
Barkley’s new argument, now championed by the dissenting opinion in this Court, 
did not originate with Barkley in the trial court.  It originated with the dissenting opinion 
in the court of appeals.  Absent some constitutional imperative not present here, however, 
it simply is not the role of the court of appeals or this Court to grant relief on arguments 
that were not presented to or decided by the trial court.  This rule abides regardless of the 
 
17 
merits of the new argument.6  “Appellate courts are merely courts of review for trial 
errors, and there can be no review of a matter which has not been presented to or 
expressly decided by the trial court.”  In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793, 814 
(Mo. banc 2011) (quoting Robbins v. Robbins, 328 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Mo. 1959).  See 
also Brown v. Brown, 423 S.W.3d 784, 788 (Mo. banc 2014) (“issue that was never 
presented to or decided by the trial court is not preserved for appellate review”); Smith v. 
Shaw, 159 S.W.3d 830, 835 (Mo. banc 2005).  This is why Rule 84.13(a) unambiguously 
provides that “allegations of error not presented to or expressly decided by the trial court 
shall not be considered in any civil appeal from a jury tried case,” and it is why 
Rule 83.08(b) prohibits appellants from “alter[ing] the basis of any claim that was raised 
in the court of appeals brief[.]”   
II. 
Point Two  
 
Barkley’s second point relied on (both in this Court and the court of appeals) 
states: 
Point II:  The Court erred in giving Instruction No. 10, defendant’s 
affirmative defense to battery, because it was not supported by competent 
and substantial evidence in that Instruction No. 10 hypothesized that all of 
the batteries inflicted upon plaintiff were inflicted after and as a result of 
her alleged attempt to flee the loss prevention office when in fact the 
                                              
6   Because Barkley did not preserve or properly raise any claim regarding the language of 
Instruction No. 10, the Court takes no position on whether it was the best way – or even a proper 
way – to present the merchant’s privilege and section 573.125 as an affirmative defense to a 
claim of battery.  At trial, Price Chopper used MAI 32.13 to present this affirmative defense to 
Barkley’s claim of false imprisonment, and Barkley does not challenge that instruction or the 
jury’s verdict against her in this appeal.  But, perhaps believing that it applied only to claims of 
false imprisonment, Price Chopper did not use MAI 32.13 as the basis for its affirmative defense 
to battery in Instruction No. 10.  Instead, it modified MAI 32.10 (resisting invasion of property) 
in order to present the reasonableness of the force that was used to effect Barkley’s detention. 
 
18 
evidence showed that numerous batteries were inflicted upon her before the 
alleged attempt to flee the loss prevention office. 
 
When read through the rubric of Rule 84.04(d)(1)(C), Point II also challenges the 
trial court’s decision to give Instruction No. 10 as an affirmative defense to battery.  
Here, however, Barkley claims that the legal reason the trial court erred in giving 
Instruction No. 10 is “because” that instruction was not supported by the evidence.  
Barkley then explains Instruction No. 10 was not supported by the evidence “in that” it 
presumes all of the batteries committed by Price Chopper were inflicted after (and, 
therefore, as a result of) her attempt to flee even though the evidence shows that she 
suffered other batteries before attempting to flee.  Because she insists some of the 
batteries came before – and, therefore, did not result from – her attempt to flee, Barkley 
claims that, even if the jury found the facts required by Instruction No. 10, that defense 
would excuse only some – but not all – of the batteries in Instruction No. 9.   
As above, this Court cannot consider Barkley’s Point II because it seeks to assert a 
claim that was never presented to – or ruled on by – the trial court.  Barkley raised this 
same claim in the court of appeals, so – unlike Point I – she did not compound her failure 
to preserve this claim in the trial court by violating Rule 83.08(b), as well.  Nevertheless, 
under Rule 84.13(a), Barkley’s failure to assert her claim in Point II to the trial court 
precludes any review of that claim here.  See Blackstock, 994 S.W.2d at 953 (after 
rejecting one challenge to a jury instruction under Rule 83.08(b) because it was not raised 
in the court of appeals, this Court rejected another challenge to the same instruction under 
 
19 
Rule 84.13(a) because appellant “failed to object on this ground at the instruction 
conference” at trial). 
Barkley’s objection to Instruction No. 10 at trial (and in her motion for a new trial) 
was based on her assertion that the merchant’s privilege ended as soon as the store 
recovered its merchandise and, even if it continued, the privilege did not permit Price 
Chopper to use any force – even reasonable force – to detain her.  Barkley did not argue 
that there were two (or two sets of) batteries, i.e., those occurring prior to her attempted 
flight and those occurring after.  Nor did she argue that Price Chopper’s affirmative 
defense was sufficient to justify only the latter and not the former.  Because Barkley did 
not present these claims to the trial court, Rule 84.13(a) precludes this Court from 
considering them now.  See Giddens v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 29 S.W.3d 813, 823 (Mo. 
banc 2000) (“Where an alleged error on appeal relating to an instruction differs from the 
objections made to the trial court, the error may not be reviewed on appeal.”); Emery v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Mo. banc 1998) (same); Reid v. St. Louis & 
S.F. Ry. Co., 187 S.W. 15, 18 (Mo. 1916) (“What we hold is that, when counsel stated he 
had only a certain objection to make, he thereby limited the trial court's examination of 
the instruction to that one objection, and limits himself to that objection on appeal.”). 
Barkley responds that she raised a general objection at trial that Instruction No. 10 
was “not supported by the evidence” and argues that this should be sufficient to preserve 
her current claim that the trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 10 because that 
instruction erroneously implies that all of the batteries occurred after her attempted flight.  
The Court disagrees.  Nothing in the trial transcript or Barkley’s motion for a new trial 
 
20 
suggests that Barkley made – or that the trial court expressly rejected – the claim that 
Instruction No. 10 failed to distinguish between those batteries which occurred after she 
attempted to flee and those which occurred before she attempted to flee.   Accordingly, 
Barkley’s second point was not preserved and cannot be reviewed in this Court. 
Even if Barkley had preserved this argument, it would fail because the scope of 
the batteries at issue in this case is determined by Instruction No. 9.  The description of 
the batteries in Instruction No. 9 was written by Barkley – not Price Chopper – and it also 
fails to draw any distinction between pre-flight and post-flight batteries.  Barkley cannot 
complain that Instruction No. 10 fails to draw a distinction that she failed to draw in 
Instruction No. 9.  See Outman v. Union News Co., 237 S.W. 800, 801 (Mo. 1922) 
(appellant “cannot complain of defendant’s instruction 8, as it is in harmony with her 
own instruction”); Lange v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 106 S.W. 660, 665 (Mo. 1907) (“party 
cannot complain of an instruction which is in harmony with one given at his own 
request”).   
It was Barkley – not Price Chopper – who decided what batteries to submit to the 
jury and whether to submit them in one count or two.  And it was Barkley – not Price 
Chopper – who chose to describe the single count of battery in Instruction No. 9 as 
follows:  “[D]efendant intentionally pulled plaintiff’s arms behind her back, handcuffed 
her, knocked her to the floor and pulled her to a sitting position as her hands were 
handcuffed behind her back.”  These acts all occurred after Barkley attempted to flee, not 
before.  Barkley admits – in her court of appeals brief and in her substitute brief – that the 
only time her hands were handcuffed behind her, the only time she was knocked to the 
 
21 
floor, and the only time she was “pulled to a sitting position” on the floor, was after she 
ran to the door.  Barkley cannot parse the record on appeal in hopes of finding a version 
of the facts that will contravene the giving of Instruction No. 10 because this “Court 
reviews the record in the light most favorable to submission of the instruction.”  Hayes v. 
Price, 313 S.W.3d 645, 650 (Mo. banc 2010). 
Finally, even if Instruction No. 9 encompasses actions that occurred both before 
and after Barkley attempted to flee, Instruction No. 10 excused any batteries that 
occurred due to her attempted flight or her failure to follow the employees’ commands.  
One way to effect a detention is to tell the detainee to stay put, and then use force when 
the detainee refuses to comply.  As the dissenting opinion points out, the real question in 
this trial was whether the Price Chopper employees’ commands – and their subsequent 
force to compel compliance with those commands – were reasonable.  But that question 
is for the jury, not this Court, to resolve.  Barkley and Price Chopper argued this question 
extensively to the jury, and the jury gave its answer.  Whatever flaws there may (or may 
not) be in Instruction No. 10, it effectively focused the jury’s attention on this central 
question, and there is no basis to reject the answer the jury gave. 
Accordingly, because Barkley’s claim was not preserved in the trial court, and 
because that claim lacks merit even if it had been preserved, this point is denied. 
III. 
Points III and IV 
 
Barkley’s third and fourth points challenge the admission and exclusion of certain 
items of evidence.  The trial court has broad discretion in admitting or excluding 
evidence.  Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 332 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Mo. banc 2011).  A trial 
 
22 
court abuses its discretion only when its ruling is “clearly against the logic of the 
circumstances then before the court and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the 
sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration.”  In re Care & 
Treatment of Donaldson, 214 S.W. 3d 331, 334 (Mo. banc 2007).  Even when an 
evidentiary ruling is in error, this Court will not set aside the jury’s verdict unless that 
error likely changed the outcome of the case.  Rule 84.13(b). 
 
First, Barkley argues that the trial court erred in admitting, over her timely and 
specific objection, letters written by her physician that detail her physical condition in 
2007 and 2011.  Barkley asked her doctor to write these letters in support of her requests 
to be excused from jury duty.  She claims that they are improper character evidence and 
are not relevant to any issue in the case.  Even if the letters are relevant, Barkley contends 
they served only to “alienate and foster resentment by the Jurors who were serving” and, 
therefore, their prejudicial effect outweighed whatever probative value they may have 
had.  Accordingly, Barkley claims the admission of this evidence was reversible error and 
a new trial is required. 
 
At trial, Barkley argued that the letters and related testimony were “not probative 
to any issue” and were “highly prejudicial.”  The trial court ruled that, given the nature of 
the damages Barkley was seeking, evidence of her physical condition both before and 
after the incident at Price Chopper was relevant and the letters would be admitted on that 
basis.  Barkley insisted that she already had conceded substantial preexisting health 
problems and, therefore, there was no need for the 2007 and 2011 letters.  The trial court 
overruled her objections on the ground that Price Chopper was not limited to Barkley’s 
 
23 
evidence of her prior conditions, and it found that the letters were not unduly prejudicial.7  
This ruling was not an abuse of discretion. 
 
In personal injury claims, evidence concerning the plaintiff’s health and physical 
condition that tends to prove or disprove the nature or extent of plaintiff’s alleged injuries 
is admissible.  Eickmann v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 323 S.W.2d 802, 806 (Mo. 1959).  
Accordingly, the letters detailing Barkley’s physical condition both two years before and 
two years after the 2009 incident at Price Chopper were logically relevant.  State v. 
Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 760 (Mo. banc 2002) (evidence is logically relevant if it tends to 
make any fact of consequence more or less likely than it would be without the evidence).   
A plaintiff does not get to decide which evidence will (and will not) be used to prove or 
disprove particular facts, nor is a defendant prohibited from presenting relevant evidence 
merely because the plaintiff already has done so.   
 
Legal relevance, on the other hand, “weighs the evidence’s probative value against 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, 
or cumulativeness.”  Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 902 (Mo. banc 2013) (quotation 
marks omitted).  Here, the probative value of these letters is clear because they detail 
Barkley’s conditions both before and after she allegedly was injured at Price Chopper.  
And, despite her protestations to the contrary, it does not appear there was any unfair 
prejudice in admitting them.  If the statements in these letters are true, and no one argued  
                                              
7   The trial court ordered Price Chopper not to use these letters to challenge Barkley’s veracity 
(e.g., by suggesting Barkley had fabricated or exaggerated her conditions to get out of jury 
service), and Barkley does not claim that this limitation was violated. 
 
24 
they were not, there is no reason to assume that the jury would have held Barkley’s 
requests to be excused from jury duty against her.  Even if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury would misuse this evidence in that way, the proper remedy would 
be a limiting instruction, not exclusion.  Barkley requested no such instruction.  
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the letters (and the 
physician’s testimony concerning them) were admissible.  This point is denied. 
 
Finally, Barkley argues that the trial court erred in excluding: (1) personnel 
records showing that one of Price Chopper’s employees had received reprimands for 
similar conduct both before and after Barkley’s incident; and (2) court records showing 
that a different plaintiff brought a similar claim against Price Chopper in the past.  
Because Barkley argues that these records were relevant solely to her claim for punitive 
damages, this claim cannot succeed.  Even if this Court assumes for the sake of argument 
that the trial court erred in excluding these records, that error cannot have been 
prejudicial to Barkley.  The jury never reached the question of punitive damages, or had 
occasion to consider the evidence relevant to that claim, because the jury found for Price 
Chopper on both Barkley’s battery and false imprisonment claims.  Accordingly, any 
error by the trial court regarding the evidence for or against such damages was harmless.  
This point is denied. 
 
25 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul C. Wilson, Judge 
 
 
 
Russell, C.J., Breckenridge and Fischer, JJ., concur;  
Stith, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed;  
Draper and Teitelman, JJ., concur in opinion of Stith, J. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
DEBORAH BARKLEY,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Appellant, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC94253 
) 
McKEEVER ENTERPRISES, INC.   
) 
D/B/A PRICE CHOPPER,  
 
 
) 
) 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion Concurring in Part and 
Dissenting in Part 
 
I concur in the principal opinion’s holding that section 537.125, RSMo 2000 
permits a merchant to detain a suspected shoplifter “in a reasonable manner and for a 
reasonable length of time for the purpose of investigating whether there has been a 
wrongful taking of such merchandise or money,” § 537.125.2, and “in order that recovery 
of such merchandise may be effected,” § 537.125.3.  Such reasonable detention will not 
subject the merchant to the risk of suit for unlawful arrest or detention.  Id.  But this does 
not answer the key questions in this appeal – what is “a reasonable manner” and “a 
reasonable length of time” for a merchant to detain a person?   
Ms. Barkley would have this Court hold that continued detention is per se 
unreasonable once the store employee reacquires the merchandise from the suspected 
2 
 
shoplifter.  She argues, at that point, the “purpose of investigating whether there has been 
a wrongful taking of such merchandise” has been completed and “recovery of such 
merchandise” has “been effected.”  §§ 537.125.2, .3.  
I agree with the principal opinion that this argument ignores subsection 4 of 
section 537.125.  The latter states in relevant part that a merchant “who has detained such 
person and investigated such wrongful taking, may contact law enforcement officers and 
instigate criminal proceedings against such person” without risk of being liable for 
malicious prosecution or other criminal or civil liability.  I agree with the principal 
opinion that, read together, subsections 2, 3, and 4 permit the merchant to detain the 
suspected shoplifter after the merchandise has been reacquired if the purpose of the 
continued detention is further investigation or contacting law enforcement officers and 
awaiting their arrival for the instigation of criminal proceedings. 
I differ from the principal opinion as to what constitutes a “reasonable manner” of 
detention, however.  In particular, the statute, as just quoted, only authorizes use of 
“reasonable means” of detention for the purpose of investigating the allegedly wrongful 
taking and while awaiting law enforcement authorities.  The principal opinion, by 
contrast, affirms a verdict based on an instruction that permitted the use of physical force 
when Ms. Barkley failed to follow the store employees’ instructions and when she 
attempted to flee the store’s security office.  That instruction did not require the jury to 
find that such physical force was necessary to recover the merchandise or to detain her at 
the store while waiting for authorities to arrive.  In light of Ms. Barkley’s testimony that 
3 
 
she simply wanted to go tell her husband where she was and what was going on, and in 
light of the irrelevance of obedience of employee instructions to any of these statutory 
issues, this distinction could have been dispositive.   
Because of the errors in the submission of these affirmative defenses, I would 
reverse and remand for a new trial under instructions properly submitting the affirmative 
defenses authorized by section 537.125.  
More specifically, as the principal opinion correctly notes, Ms. Barkley was 
detained by two security employees at Price Chopper after they saw her fail to pay for 
some items she had placed in one of the reusable cloth bags she carried with her as she 
shopped.  Although the principal opinion uses the term “concealed” in the cloth bag, 
thereby suggesting that she put the items in the bag to steal them, the jury acquitted her of 
shoplifting.  In light of that verdict, a more appropriate term would be that the items were 
“placed” in the cloth bag.1 
After Ms. Barkley was acquitted of shoplifting, she sued Price Chopper on 
multiple theories including the theories of false imprisonment and battery.  In support of 
these claims, she testified at the trial that she was diabetic, disabled, and on pain 
medication, and carried her medications with her when she went with her husband and 
                                              
1 “Conceal” is defined as, “[t]o keep from being seen, found, observed, or discovered; 
hide.”  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 381 (4th ed. 
2006).  Other definitions include “to prevent disclosure or recognition of,” “avoid 
revelation of,” “refrain from revealing,” “withhold knowledge of,” “draw attention from,” 
“treat so as to be unnoticed,” “to place out of sight,” “withdraw from being observed,” 
and “shield from vision or notice.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 469 (1993).    
4 
 
granddaughters to buy groceries at Price Chopper.  She says she went with one 
granddaughter to look for diabetes test strips while her husband took the cart and other 
granddaughters and collected groceries.  As she shopped separately with the grandchild, 
she said, she picked up a few items and put them in the red cloth bag (her husband having 
the cart) and just forgot about them at checkout.   
As shown on a videotape of the 46-minute detention,2 once Ms. Barkley was 
brought into the security office, the employees emptied everything out of her purse to 
examine it (presumably for stolen property) and took her driver’s license for 
identification.  For reasons not explained in the record, they looked at her prescription 
containers and then left them on the counter when they replaced her other items and 
moved her purse and shopping bags over to the top of a cabinet near where she was 
sitting.  The security employees determined that the value of the items found in the 
shopping bag was sufficiently high that they called law enforcement.  While everyone 
waited for the police, the employees filled out paperwork, Ms. Barkley took her cell 
phone out of her pocket to call her husband to let him know where she was and what was 
going on.  One of the employees grabbed her phone from her and put it on the counter, 
where she could not use or reach it.  She testified that she twice asked the employees to 
contact her husband.  They refused and asked her questions for the paperwork.  At this 
point, Ms. Barkley’s identity was not in question – the employees had her purse, her cell 
                                              
2 The videotape has no sound. 
5 
 
phone, her prescription medicines, her driver’s license, and had mostly filled out the 
paperwork with information about the incident.  After waiting about two minutes, Ms. 
Barkley got up from the bench and walked over to where the employees were standing by 
the counter.  She says she did so because of concern about her medications still being on 
the counter rather than back in her purse and to ask again about contacting her husband, 
but the employees said they did not hear what she said and just saw she had come up to 
stand next to them.  They immediately grabbed her and handcuffed her, she claims while 
one stated, “I didn’t tell you to get up off the f---ing bench” and called her a “druggie” 
and repeatedly used profanity.  She says the employees refused her request that they 
contact her husband who was sitting outside with the grandchildren. 
At this point, as noted by the principal opinion, Ms. Barkley tried to reach the door 
to the office – she says to let her husband know what was going on - the employees say 
so she could flee – and she was grabbed, her legs knocked out from under her, and her 
handcuffs were moved so that her arms were handcuffed behind her rather than in front 
of her.  She was left sitting on her legs on the floor for a long period, before the 
employees finally helped her up and to walk back to the bench, where she sat down and 
the employees removed the handcuffs.  She remained on the bench until a policewoman 
arrived. 
Ms. Barkley ultimately submitted her case to the jury on the theories of false 
imprisonment and battery.  Ms. Barkley attempted to submit her battery claim without a 
tail referring the jury to an instruction submitting the store’s affirmative defense of 
6 
 
reasonable detention.  As noted above, I agree with the principal opinion that the trial 
court properly ruled that section 537.125 does codify a merchant’s privilege to detain a 
suspect for a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, and that the store was entitled 
to submit an affirmative defense based on the statute.  I disagree, however, that the 
affirmative defense submitted was the one authorized by the statute. 
Ms. Barkley’s verdict director submitted that “defendant intentionally pulled 
plaintiff’s arms behind her back, handcuffed her, knocked her to the floor and pulled her 
to a sitting position as her arms were handcuffed behind her back.”  Ms. Barkley’s 
counsel argues on appeal that the first pulling her arms behind her back and handcuffing 
her occurred when she first got up from the bench, and the knocking her to the floor and 
pulling her to a sitting position and handcuffing her behind her back occurred after she 
tried to open the office door, and that the submitted affirmative defenses would not make 
any of this conduct privileged.  I agree.  
Section 537.125, gives a merchant a privilege to “detain such person in a 
reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time for the purpose of investigating 
whether there has been a wrongful taking of such merchandise or money” and so that the 
merchant “may contact law enforcement officers and instigate criminal proceedings.”   
This is not the affirmative defense submitted by Price Chopper in its affirmative 
defense instruction, however.  Because there is no form M.A.I. for submitting such an 
affirmative defense, Price Chopper modified M.A.I. 32.10, titled “Battery Actions – 
Resisting Invasion of Property.”  M.A.I. 32.10 is as follows: 
7 
 
Your verdict must be for defendant if you believe: 
 
First, plaintiff attempted to (here describe unlawful act such as “enter 
defendant's home” or “take defendant's property”) when plaintiff had no 
right to do so, and 
 
Second, defendant (here describe defensive measures such as “struck 
plaintiff”) for the purpose of resisting plaintiff’s attempt, and 
 
Third, defendant used only such force as was reasonable and necessary to 
prevent plaintiff from (here repeat act described in Paragraph First). 
 
This format could not be exactly followed here, because if it were, Price 
Chopper’s instruction would have to submit in paragraph second that it used force to 
resist the taking of its property and in paragraph third that it used only such force as was 
necessary to prevent that taking.  As Price Chopper already had recovered the property 
before it used any force, this would not do.  So it instead needed to submit why it was 
authorized to continue to hold Ms. Barkley after it recovered its merchandise, even 
though it already had her identifying information.  That authorization comes from section 
537.125, which creates a very specific basis on which a merchant may continue to detain 
the suspect without risk of suit – the merchant must have reasonable grounds to believe 
there has been a wrongful taking and the continued detention must be for the purpose of 
investigating whether there had been a wrongful taking or to wait for the arrival of law 
enforcement.   
To apply section 537.125 correctly, therefore, MAI 32.10 had to be modified so 
that it instructed the jury that it should find for defendant if it found that defendant had 
reasonable grounds to believe there was a wrongful taking and that it continued to detain 
8 
 
plaintiff for a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner in order to investigate whether 
there had been a wrongful taking or to await law enforcement.  In other words, unlike in 
the example given in MAI 32.10, it is not the allegedly wrongful taking that justified the 
use of force; rather, it is the desire to continue investigating and await law enforcement.   
One way MAI 32.10 could have been modified to accomplish this purpose that 
would have been in accordance with section 537.125 would have been to add an 
additional paragraph, so that the instruction would read something like the following: 
Your verdict must be for defendant if you believe: 
First, plaintiff attempted to take defendant’s property when plaintiff had no 
right to do so, and 
 
Second, defendant intentionally pulled plaintiff’s arms behind her back, 
handcuffed her, knocked her to the floor and pulled her to a sitting position 
as her arms were handcuffed behind her back, and  
 
Third, defendant did so for the purpose of investigating whether there had 
been a wrongful taking of its property or to detain plaintiff until law 
enforcement officers arrived, and 
 
Fourth, defendant used only such force as was reasonable and necessary to 
investigate whether there had been a wrongful taking of its property or to 
detain plaintiff until law enforcement arrived. 
 
Instead, Price Chopper modified MAI 32.10 so it instructed that the jury should 
find for defendant if it found that plaintiff did not follow its employee’s instructions and 
attempted to flee its security office, stating: 
“First, plaintiff Deborah Barkley either refused to follow defendant’s loss 
prevention officers’ instructions or attempted to flee the loss prevention 
office, and 
 
9 
 
Second, defendant’s loss prevention officers handcuffed and leg swept 
plaintiff for the purpose of resisting plaintiff’s attempt to flee the loss 
prevention office, and  
 
Third, defendant’s loss prevention officers used only such force as was 
reasonable and necessary to prevent plaintiff from fleeing the loss 
prevention office.” 
 
Defendant’s instruction was erroneous.  It told the jury that Ms. Barkley’s 
wrongful conduct was not the taking of property from Price Chopper without paying for 
it but failing to follow defendant’s loss prevention officers’ instructions and attempting to 
flee the loss prevention office.  It told the jury that if the officers handcuffed and leg 
swept her to keep her from fleeing that office or because she failed to follow instructions, 
then the jury had to find for defendant.  It nowhere explained how the failure to follow 
instructions was relevant to its defense but simply posited that it was wrongful and 
somehow connected. 
These submissions are not authorized by section 537.125. Refusing to follow 
defendant’s employees’ instructions is not the same as refusing to await law enforcement.  
Trying to leave a security office is not the same as refusing to await the arrival of law 
enforcement.  And neither of these two acts is the unlawful act that justified the detention 
– that unlawful act, the one that should have been submitted, was the taking of items 
without paying for them, and the jury should have been required to find that this wrongful 
taking occurred before it could consider the alleged privilege.   
This distinction is key to liability, for section 537.125’s defenses only apply for 
the purpose of reacquiring the merchandise and investigating and holding the person for 
10 
 
law enforcement.  Those means may not be used merely to make a person follow 
employee instructions or not leave the security office.  And as the employees already 
knew who Ms. Barkley was and had her purse, ID, and medications, she was not fleeing 
to avoid identification.  Had the jury been properly instructed that force was reasonable 
only if used to investigate or to hold her for law enforcement, it might well have found 
that the force was not used in a reasonable manner when it was used because she failed to 
follow instructions and tried to leave the office to talk with her husband.  
The principal opinion says that even if the instruction were incorrect in submitting 
these defenses, it is simply a matter of incorrect wording and Ms. Barkley did not object 
to the wording of the instruction.  But, the problem with the instruction is not the 
particular words used but the very concept that failing to follow instructions or leaving 
the security office are submissible as affirmative defenses at all.  Counsel for Ms. Barkley 
did adequately make this objection at the instruction conference, stating: 
[Ms. Barkley’s counsel]:  We object to the giving of Instruction 9 in its 
present form with the tail referring to the affirmative defense submitted by 
defendant because that defense submits inapplicable and inappropriate 
defenses to plaintiff's battery claim. It misstates the law with respect to 
plaintiff's battery claim and the law with respect to defenses to battery. 
Further, we object because it is not supported by the evidence and misleads 
the jury as to the law and the evidence. 
…. 
[The Court]:  Moving on to instruction No. 10 submitted by the defendant, 
is there an objection to this instruction? 
[Ms. Barkley’s Counsel]: Yes, Judge, I object to it for the same reasons that 
I stated with respect to Instruction 9. 
…. [Ms. Barkley arguing distinction of case cited by counsel for defendant] 
… and the facts in this case don’t warrant or justify the submission of this 
instruction in this case. 
11 
 
 
While the principal opinion is correct that this objection certainly is not a model, it 
specifically raises the issue that defendant’s affirmative defense instruction “misstates the 
law with respect to plaintiff's battery claim and the law with respect to defenses to 
battery.”  This was minimally adequate under Rule 84.13 to preserve counsel’s point on 
appeal that the affirmative defense instruction did not submit an authorized defense and is 
not authorized by section 537.125.  The objection further was adequate to preserve Ms. 
Barkley’s additional objection that Instruction 10 submitted facts that were not supported 
by the evidence – specifically that the instruction submitted that Ms. Barkley was 
handcuffed to prevent her from fleeing whereas she notes it is undisputed that only the 
second handcuffing allegedly was for that purpose and that the first was because she 
“failed to follow instructions” of Price Chopper’s security officers.3  Counsel was not 
required to tell the court how Price Chopper could improve the instruction by removing 
the reference to employee instructions and making the flight defense apply only to the 
second battery and modifying it to clarify that Ms. Barkley’s intent had to be to flee 
before police arrived, not just to leave the security office.   
Finally, Ms. Barkley’s Point II in the court of appeals did directly and specifically 
raise the impropriety of submitting “fleeing the loss prevention office” as an excuse for 
                                              
3  Contrary to the principal opinion’s statement, instructions 9 and 10 clearly submit both 
batteries, which is why there are two references to handcuffing plaintiff rather than just a 
single reference.  
12 
 
the batteries that occurred prior to her attempt to open the door to the security office.4  
This was adequate to preserve that issue under any application of Rule 83.08.  
For these reasons, I would remand for a new trial at which both parties should 
more carefully follow the statute in preparing the jury instructions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
 
                                              
4 Point II said that Instruction 10 was improper because: 
 
it was not supported by competent and substantial evidence in that 
Instruction No. 10 hypothesized that all of the batteries inflicted upon 
plaintiff were inflicted after and as a result of her alleged attempt to flee the 
loss prevention office when in fact the evidence showed that numerous 
batteries were inflicted upon her before the alleged attempt to flee the loss 
prevention office.