Case Title: COOK v COOK

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 79-27 VIVIAN I N T H E S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1980 COOK, P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent, -vs- ALFRED C. COOK, Respondent and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of G a l l a t i n , The Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Ann L. Smoyer, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Keller, Reynolds, Drake, Sternhagen and Johnson, Helena, Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : May 27, 1980 1 ~ 1 - 1 7 1980 Decided: A Filed: . q- j \ 7 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This appeal a r i s e s o u t of a proceeding f o r a dissolu- t i o n of marriage and t h e e q u i t a b l e apportionment of a s s e t s of a m a r i t a l e s t a t e f i l e d i n the D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , t h e Honorable W. W. Lessley presiding. Appellant husband appeals from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s apportionment of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . Appellant husband and respondent wife w e r e married i n Bozeman, Montana, on December 11, 1955. On October 18, 1977, a f t e r twenty-two years of marriage, wife p e t i t i o n e d t h e c o u r t f o r a d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage and t h e e q u i t a b l e apportionment of a s s e t s of t h e i r m a r i t a l e s t a t e . A t t h e time of t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n , husband was 45 y e a r s o l d and wife was 4 2 y e a r s o l d . Husband had a c o l l e g e education and worked i n various occupations during the marriage: foreman and ranch hand, insurance agent, teacher, and auto- mobile salesman. Wife had approximately two years of col- l e g e and worked primarily a s a housewife, although she was employed a t d i f f e r e n t t i m e s throughout t h e marriage a s a w a i t r e s s , newspaper r e p o r t e r , and r e t a i l c l e r k . Five childre.? were born t o t h e p a r t i e s during t h e i r mzrriage. One c h i l d , Kevin, i s a minor who p r e s e n t l y l i v e s with wife i n Helena, Montana. Three c h i l d r e n have a t t a i n e d t h e age of majority, and t h e remaining c h i l d died i n an a c c i d e n t during t h e marriage. The a s s e t s accumulated by t h e p a r t i e s during t h e mar- r i a g e include a family home i n Bozeman, two c a r s , a motor- c y c l e , s e v e r a l shares of corporate stock, a boat, home furnishings, c l o t h i n g and o t h e r i n c i d e n t a l i t e m s of personal property. I n 1965, wife a l s o received an i n h e r i t a n c e from her grandmother, Ada Smith. The i n h e r i t a n c e consisted of a cash bequest, which was used f o r family expenses, and a remainder i n t e r e s t i n c e r t a i n farm and ranch land near Saco, Montana ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e Smith Ranch). The value of t h e land was s t i p u l a t e d by t h e p a r t i e s a s being be- tween one and two m i l l i o n d o l l a r s before taxes. The i n t e r e s t i s s u b j e c t t o a l i f e e s t a t e held by w i f e ' s f a t h e r , Hugh C. Smith. From t h i s i n t e r e s t , t h e p a r t i e s have received approxi- mately $39,554.15 i n t h e form of mineral r o y a l t y payments and l i f e e s t a t e p r i n c i p a l and income d i s t r i b u t i o n . These proceeds have a l s o been applied toward family l i v i n g expenses. During t h e marriage, husband l e f t a $5,500 teaching c o n t r a c t i n White Sulphur Springs i n 1958, and the p a r t i e s moved t o t h e Smith Ranch, where husband worked a s foreman and ranch hand. Husband continued i n t h i s capacity f o r s i x years a t a s a l a r y of $250 p e r month p l u s housing. During t h i s t i m e an a d d i t i o n a l 100 a c r e s of wheat were p u t i n t o production. I n 1964, because of f i n a n c i a l reasons, t h e p a r t i e s moved from t h e ranch i n t o t h e town of Saco, where husband taught vocational a g r i c u l t u r e i n t h e public school system. I n 1971, because of w i f e ' s d e s i r e t o leave Saco, t h e p a r t i e s moved t o Bozeman. Husband cashed h i s t e a c h e r ' s r e t i r e m e n t fund and some smaller l i f e insurance p o l i c i e s t o finance t h e move. Wife p r e s e n t l y works a s a c l e r k i n s t a t e government i n Helena, Montana. Husband i s p r e s e n t l y unemployed, having been terminated from h i s job i n e a r l y 1977 and working f o r only four months i n 1978. Husband has suffered both emo- t i o n a l and physical problems s i n c e t h e p a r t i e s ' s e p a r a t i o n and has incurred s u b s t a n t i a l medical and h o s p i t a l expenses. The marriage of t h e p a r t i e s was dissolved by t h e D i s - t r i c t Court on A p r i l 1 0 , 1978. The c o u r t apportioned t h e assets of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e on February 15, 1979. Several of t h e a s s e t s w e r e d i s t r i b u t e d pursuant t o a s t i p u l a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s . An agreement was made between t h e p a r t i e s t o equally s p l i t t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e proceeds which represented e q u i t y r e s u l t i n g from t h e sale of t h e i r Bozeman residence. That f i g u r e amounted t o approximately $11,200. With r e s p e c t t o t h e o t h e r a s s e t s , t h e p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d , with t h e excep- t i o n of a few i t e m s , who was t o r e c e i v e each asset, b u t l e f t t h e p a r t i c u l a r v a l u a t i o n of each a s s e t t o t h e court. The property was d i s t r i b u t e d and valued by t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n t h e following manner: Wife was awarded a 1967 model c a r (less than $1,000); a wedding r i n g ($800); home f u r n i s h i n g s (unvalued) ; china c l o s e t (unvalued) ; c l o t h i n g and o t h e r i n z i d e n t a l items of personal property. Husband received a 1977 Buick Riviera automobile ($3,500); a Honda 90 ($150); a boat ($2,700); corporate shares of stock funvalued); home f u r n i s h i n g s (unvalued); clothing and o t h e r i n c i d e n t a l i t e m s of personal property i n h i s possession. I t should be men- tioned t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court noted i n i t s f i n d i n g s t h a t husband paid remaining purchase money mortgages on t h e 1977 c a r and t h e boat o u t of t h e proceeds received from t h e sale of t h e house. The District Court f u r t h e r found t h a t husband had n o t \ contributed t o t h e maintenance of w i f e ' s remainder i n t e r e s t and awarded her s o l e ownership of t h e i n t e r e s t on t h e b a s i s of t h e property d i s t r i b u t i o n and a s a n a l t e r n a t i v e t o main- tenance. The D i s t r i c t Court ordered husband t o assume the remaining debts of t h e marriage, pay $110 per month f o r t h e support of t h e p a r t i e s ' minor c h i l d u n t i l he reached t h e age of majority and pay w i f e ' s a t t o r n e y f e e s . W e consider t h r e e i s s u e s on appeal: 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d o r abused its d i s c r e t i o n i n apportioning t h e a s s e t s of t h e marital e s t a t e ? 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n awarding wife s o l e ownership of t h e remainder i n t e r e s t as a n a l t e r n a t i v e t o maintenance? 3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n ordering hus- band t o pay w i f e ' s a t t o r n e y fees? The f i r s t i s s u e r a i s e s t h e question of whether it i s necessary f o r a D i s t r i c t Court i n a d i s s o l u t i o n proceeding t o f i r s t place a value upon a l l of t h e a s s e t s within a m a r i t a l e s t a t e and determine the n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s before d i s t r i b u t i n g property within t h a t m a r i t a l e s t a t e . I n t h i s case, t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i s t r i b u t e d t h e m a r l t ~ ~ l e s t a t e without determining t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s o r valuing t h e following i t e m s of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e : t h e china c l o s e t , t h e corporate shares of stock, and t h e home furnishings received by husband and wife. Husband contends it was e r r o r f o r t h e c o u r t t o appor- t i o n t h e a s s e t s without undertaking such preliminary matters. Husband r e l i e s upon s e v e r a l cases i n which this Court has s t r e s s e d t h e importance of valuing a s s e t s and determining t h e n e t worth of p a r t i e s i n d i s s o l u t i o n proceedings before d i s t r i b u t i n g property within t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . See Herring v. Herring (19791, Mont. - , 602 P.2d 1006, 36 St.Rep. 2052; I n R e Marriage of Brown (1978), - Mont . , 587 P.2d 361, 35 St.Rep. 1733; Martinez v. Martinez (1978), 175 Mont. 280, 573 P.2d 667, 35 St-Rep. 61. Wife argues t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d not err i n apportioning t h e a s s e t s of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . She asserts t h e r e was no need f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o concern i t s e l f with t h e valuation of c e r t a i n a s s e t s o r with t h e determina- t i o n of t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s because t h e r e was a s t i p u l a t i o n entered i n t o between t h e p a r t i e s regarding t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of a s s e t s . Wife contends, because of t h e s t i p u l a t i o n , t h a t t h i s case i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e a u t h o r i t y r e l i e d upon by husband. Further, on t h e b a s i s of Penn v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (1980), Mont. I 605 P.2d 600, 37 St.Rep. 93, wife contends t h a t husband i s precluded from r a i s i n g any i s s u e s r e l a t i n g t o the s t i p u l a - t i o n on appeal. I n Penn both p a r t i e s agreed t h a t c e r t a i n documentary evidence d i d n o t need t o be introduced a t t r i a l i f t h e r a i l r o a d would admit t h a t it had n o t i c e of t h e dangerous n a t u r e of a r a i l r o a d crossing. The r a i l r o a d admitted n o t i c e , and t h e p l a i n t i f f d i d n o t attempt t o introduce t h e documents f o r o t h e r purposes a t t r i a l . On appeal, however, t h e p l a i n t i f f argued t h a t t h e evidence was r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e of n o t i c e and p u n i t i v e damages. W e refused t o con- s i d e r t h a t i s s u e , however, because of t h e s t i p u l a t i o n . The t r a n s c r i p t very c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s i n t h i s case t h a t t h e r e was a s t i p u l a t i o n entered i n t o between t h e p a r t i e s . However, t h e t r a n s c r i p t f u r t h e r i n d i c a t e s , unlike Penn, t h a t t h e s t i p u l a t i o n was l i m i t e d i n nature. The p a r t i e s h e r e agreed only as t o which p a r t y would r e c e i v e p a r t i c u l a r a s s e t s and n o t t o a p a r t i c u l a r valuation. The v a l u a t i o n of a s s e t s wzs l e f t t o t h e c o a r t . The following colloquy oc- curred a t t h e beginning of the trial: "THE COURT: This i s t h e time set by t h e Court and Counsel of Record i n 2 4 0 4 1 t o hear t h e m a t t e r of property d i v i s i o n and gentlemen you may pro- ceed. "MR. K O M M E R S : Thank you, your Honor, I r e p r e s e n t t h e p e t i t i o n e r and I have some proposed f i n d i n g s f o r t h e Court and I r e a l i z e t h a t some of these w i l l have t o be changed, b u t I submit t h a t now. The P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent i n t h i s matter have reached agreements with r e s p e c t t o s e v e r a l matters i n d i s p u t e here, and w e would s t i p u l a t e f o r the record t h a t t h e following i t e m s are t r u e and need no proof. With r e s p e c t t o t h e personal p r o p e r t i e s acquired by t h e couple during t h e t e r m of t h e marriage, property has been divided and t h e P e t i - t i o n e r i s i n possession of a 1967 automobile, home furnishings, and a wedding r i n g , and t h e Respondent i s i n possession of a 1977 Buick Riviera automobile, a Honda 90, a c e r t a i n number of L i f e and Montana corporate shares, a boat, and c e r t a i n home furnishings. The evaluation of -- t h e property could -- n o t be agreed t o b~ t h e p a r t i e s and w i l l be --- provided - i n t e s t i m o n y b e f o r e t h e Court today. "With r e s p e c t t o r e a l e s t a t e acquired by t h e par- ties during t h e term of t h e marriage, it i s agreed t o be t r u e and r e q u i r e s no f u r t h e r proof t h a t t h e home consisted of r e a l e s t a t e . The family home consisted of r e a l estate acquired by them which was s o l d f o r t h e f a i r market value of $55,400 a t which P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent share equally i n t h e n e t proceeds i n t h e amount of approximately $11,458.86. That with r e s p e c t t o o t h e r sources of income of t h e p a r t i e s and it i s a t i s s u e today with r e s p e c t t o t h e f u t u r e i n t e r e s t of P e t i t i o n e r , t h e p a r t i e s have agreed on a v a l u a t i o n of monies received from t h e e s t a t e of Ada Smith, and t h a t t h e s e monies w e r e received and used by t h e couple equally during t h e t e r m of t h e marriage . . ." (Emphasis added.) Here, counsel d i d n o t agree t o an overbroad s t i p u l a t i o n . There was no agreement, f o r example, t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of a s s e t s would remain t h e same i f t h e value of t h e estates received by each i n d i v i d u a l p a r t y w e r e i n e q u i t a b l e and disproportionate. To t h e contrary, t h e s t i p u l a t i o n was well-defined and l i m i t e d . Assuming t h a t t h e c o u r t would undertake a d i v i s i o n of property t h a t was e q u i t a b l e , t h e p a r t i e s only agreed a s t o who would r e c e i v e p a r t i c u l a r a s s e t s and l e f t t h e v a l u a t i o n of t h e a s s e t s t o the c o u r t . Under t h e s e circumstances, w e f i n d t h a t husband i s n o t precluded from r a i s i n g h i s arguments on appeal. This Court has held i r , many 1)revious cases t h a t , before a t r i a l c o u r t may properly apportion t h e a s s e t s of a m a r i t a l e s t a t e , it must f i r s t determine t h e n e t worth of the par- ties. Herring, supra; Brown, supra; Martinez, supra. W e have a l s o s t r e s s e d t h e importance of valuing each a s s e t of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . I n Herrinq, where t h e D i s t r i c t Court made no findings a s t o t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s o r a s t o t h e present f a i r market value of t h e s u b s t a n t i a l a s s e t s of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e , we remanded and s t a t e d : "We have held i n a number of cases t h a t , before t h e r e may be a proper d i s t r i b u t i o n of m a r i t a l property, t h e D i s t r i c t Court must f i r s t deter- mine t h e n e t worth of the p a r t i e s . [Citations omitted.] H e r e , the D i s t r i c t Court made no such finding. While t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e only s i g n i f i c a n t a s s e t s w e r e t h e dia- mond r i n g s and t h e l o t and the home, t h e r e was no attempt t o place a present, f a i r market value - upon these items -- o r t o determine t h e n e t worth -- of t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e time of t h e i r divorce." -- ---- Herring, 602 P.2d a t 1007, 36 St.Rep. a t 2054. (Emphasis added.) I n Martinez, where it was argued t h a t w e should take j u d i c i a l notice of c e r t a i n property values by looking t o s t a t e a p p r a i s a l s because no evidence was introduced regard- ing property values a t t r i a l , w e s t a t e d : "Whether o r n o t i n r e t r o s p e c t these f i g u r e s pro- vide an accurate indication of f a i r market value of the B i l l i n g s property, however, begs the i s s u e . Section 48-321, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r e s the t r i a l judge t o consider t h e property values. Neither t h e appraised valuation nor t h e assessed valua- t i o n w e r e introduced a s evidence a t t r i a l ; nothing i n t h e judge's findings of f a c t o r conclusions of -- --- law shows t h a t he ever considered t h e assessed or --- appraised value --- of t h e land p r i o r c h i s --- property d i s p o s i t i o n order. "Respondent a l s o maintains t h a t t h e Mexican prop- p e r t y i s i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e property d i s p o s i t i o n because it i s of negligible value and because a Montana D i s t r i c t Court i s of no e f f e c t i n Mexico. The record - i s s i l e n t as t o t h e value of the Mexican --- -- property. The Mexican property i s relevant t o a property d i s t r i b u t i o n because, although Montana Court orders encumbering o r t r a n s f e r r i n g t i t l e t o Mexican property may be of no l e g a l e f f e c t i n Mexico, t h a t Mexican property s t i l l i s of value t o t h e owner, i s p a r t of the owner's e s t a t e , w i l l a f f e c t the owner's f u t u r e needs and therefore must be considered under section 48-321." Martinez, 573 P.2d a t 669-670, 35 St.Rep. a t 64. (Em- phasis added. ) W e f i n d i n t h i s case t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court erred i n n o t placing a value upon the aforementioned i t e m s of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e and i n n o t determining t h e n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s a t the t i m e of t h e i r divorce. The valuation of a s s e t s and the determination of n e t worth a r e two important s t e p s which must be made by D i s t r i c t Courts i n the appor- tionment process, regardless of whether p a r t i e s e n t e r i n t o any s t i p u l a t i o n s concerning t h e i r m a r i t a l e s t a t e . From these determinations, a b a s i s is provided from which a ~ i s t r i c t Court may make, o r an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t may decide, t h a t an apportionment i s equitable. Without these d e t e r - minations, the equitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of m a r i t a l assets amounts only t o guesswork. This case must, therefore, be remanded t o the D i s t r i c t Court so t h a t the p a r t i e s ' m a r i t a l e s t a t e may be d i s t r i b u t e d on t h i s b a s i s . By our decision today, w e mean i n no way t o discourage p a r t i e s i n d i s s o l u t i o n proceedings from entering i n t o stipu- l a t i o n s such a s the case here. To t h e contrary, s t i p u l a t i o n s provide an economical and e f f i c i e n t way t o handle such proceedings. W e intend only t o reemphasize the importance of taking c e r t a i n preliminary s t e p s before property i s d i s t r i b u t e d . Where p a r t i e s cannot agree a s t o t h e value of a p a r t i c u l a r a s s e t , we f u r t h e r encourage counsel t o provide ample testimony f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court regarding values. Despite t h e statements of counsel, t h a t was not done here. The remaining i s s u e s i n t h i s case a r e d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by and intertwined with our holding regarding husband's f i r s t issue. The second i s s u e concerns whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n awarding wife s o l e ownership of the remainder i n t e r e s t on t h e b a s i s of t h e property d i s t r i b u t i o n and as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o maintenance. The District Court found: "The Court concludes t h a t t h e respondent has made no c o n t r i b u t i o n s which have f a c i l i t a t e d mainten- ance o r [ s i c ] t h e property s u b j e c t t o t h e l i f e e s t a t e and p e t i t i o n e r ' s remainder i n t e r e s t , and t h e r e f o r e , has no claim f o r any p o r t i o n of p e t i - t i o n e r ' s remainder i n t e r e s t . P e t i t i o n e r should r e t a i n s o l e ownership of the remainder i n t e r e s t . This award c o n s t i t u t e s a portion of t h e property d i s p o s i t i o n and a s an a l t e r n a t i v e t o maintenance arrangements i n favor of p e t i t i o n e r which would otherwise be required from t h e respondent." Husband's primary argument i s t h a t he i s e n t i t l e d t o a p o r t i o n of t h e remainder i n t e r e s t because of h i s contribu- t i o n s while working on t h e Smith Ranch and h i s s a c r i f i c e s i n surrendering employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o accommodate h i s w i f e ' s d e s i r e t o move. W e d e c l i n e t o r u l e upon t h i s i s s u e i n view of our holding i n t h e f i r s t i s s u e and leave husband's arguments t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r consideration on remand. Whether wife is e n t i t l e d t o s o l e ownership of t h e remainder i n t e r e s t , e s p e c i a l l y a s an a l t e r n a t i v e t o maintenance, depends upon t h e property d i s t r i b u t i o n . Maintenance i s properly awarded only a f t e r t h e property i s apportioned between t h e p a r t i e s . I n R e Marriage of Herron (1980), Mont. , 608 P.2d 97, 102, 37 St-Rep. 387, 394; Vivian v. Vivian (1978), Mont. , 583 P.2d 1072, 1075, 35 St.Rep. 1359, 1362. The spouse seeking maintenance must lack s u f f i c i e n t property t o provide f o r his/her reasonable needs and be unable t o support himself/herself through appropriate employment o r be t h e custodian of a c h i l d whose conditions o r circumstances make it a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t t h e custodian n o t be required t o seek employment o u t s i d e t h e home. Section 40-4-203(1), MCA. Conceivably, on remand, when t h e D i s t r i c t Court places a value upon a l l of t h e a s s e t s of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e and determines the n e t worth of t h e p a r t i e s , t h e findings may r e v e a l t h a t a d i f f e r e n t apportionment is appropriate. I n this connection, if the court finds that the award of the remainder interest to wife is appropriate partly as ac al-ternative to maintenance, it should make findings pursuant to section 40-4-203(1), MCA. Those findings are not present here. The third issue in this case concerns whether the District Court erred in ordering husband to pay wife's attorney fees. For attorney fees to be awarded in dissolu- tion proceedings, necessity must be shown. In Re Marriage of Kaasa (1979), Mont. , 591 P.2d 1110, 1114, 36 St.Rep. 425, 430. Here again, whether wife is able to demonstrate necessity for an award of attorney fees depends to some extent upon the court's apportionment of marital assets. In this regard, we also note that while husband was terminated from his job in 1977 and worked for only four months in 1978, wife is presently employed. We leave this issue to the District Court for consideration on remand. This cause is remanded to the District Court to proceed in accordance with this opinion. We concur: Chief Justice Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy and Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly dissent and will file a written dissent later. DISSENT N o . 79-27 ............................................................... COOK V. COOK ............................................................... Opinion handed down J u l y 17, 1980 and authored by M r . J u s t i c e John C. Harrison--Dissent authored by M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy and M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly ............................................................... D A T E D : November 7, 1980 - &LED:( OF SUPREME C O U a '\ STATE. OE NOO-!aEd6 Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy and Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly dissenting: What does Alfred Cook hope to accomplish by this appeal? He hopes to receive a portion of Vivian's inheritance. He recites in his brief: "Thus, Vivian's inheritance, received during the pendency of her marriage to Al, was a marital asset to be apportioned equitably as required by 48-321, R.C.M. 1947--40-4-202, MCA. It should also be noted that this section also requires a valuation of the wife's estate at the time of the divorce, even though a portion of the estate may be subject to distribution by her death." What inheritance of the wife is Alfred Cook talking about? Under the terms of the probated Will of Ada Smith, the grandmother of Vivian Cook, Ada Smith left her residuary estate to her son, Hugh C. Smith, during his natural life, and upon his death to his five children, including Vivian Smith Cook, the respondent here. We are told that the total estate has a value of between $1 to $2 million and it is obvious that Vivian's share is one- fifth of whatever value the estate may eventually have, - pre- supposing that Vivian Cook outlives her father -- Hugh C. Smith. At the time of the dissolution of the marriage, and the order of the court dividing the property, although Vivian Cook was the vested remainderman in a one-fifth interest in the estate, subject to the life estate of her father, she has absolutely no right in the estate until his death and if she predeceases her father, her share will descend to her children by virtue of other provisions in the Will of Ada Smith. By any ability tJ~c?.t we have to judge, the value of her remainder estate at the time of the dissolution of the marriage ----- -- was nil. She had no right to dispose of any of the underlying assets comprising the remainder estate unless she had met someone who had recently purchased the Brooklyn Bridge. -12- This is not a case which requires the application of section 40-4-202, MCA, regarding the factors to be considered by the court in the determination of a fair division of property. The reason is that in this case, the parties had stipulated between them as to the respective spouses to whom their items of property would go. In Morse v. Morse (1977), Mont . , 571 P.2d 1147, 34 St.Rep. 1334, this Court stated that the possibility of receiving future monies by a spouse could not be considered by the courtand specifically the court refused to consider the possibility that the wife would receive an inheritance from her mother sometime in the future. The District Court specifically found in finding of fact no. 13 that "the respondent has made no contributions which have facilitated maintenance of the properties subject to the life estate of Hugh Smith and the remainder interest of the petitioner." The value of the remainder interest therefore, if it had any, was quite beside the point. The District Court did Alfred Cook a favor when it provided that the wife should receive no maintenance from Alfred Cook in view of her possible remainder interest. The remaining unvalued items are a china closet, household furnishings and corporate stock which was awarded to Alfred Cook. His dissatisfaction arises, if we may believe his brief, from the situation that "here the wife's inheritance may exceed the worth of all other material assets combined and it is certainly a major asset whether it is considered a marital asset or part of her estate. Thus, 'to deny the husband a share of the wife's inheritance would stand on the same footing as denying the wife a share of the large sum in windfall profits from the husband's business or investments acquired just prior to the divorce.'" Alfred Cook's premise is groundless. He may not count a marital asset a future conditional interest not in the possession of his wife at the time of the marital dissolution. The majority has failed to grasp at this point. -13- The futility of remand here is manifest. The District Court on reconsideration will assign a minimum value to the future interest, award that future interest to the wife because it has no other legal option and provide that such future inter- ests shall be in lieu of maintenance for the husband. We have assigned to the District Court the performance of a useless task. Under Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P., the findings of the District Court should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. We do not see any error in the way this matter was handled by the District Court, in view of the stipulation that the parties adopted respecting the distribution of the property. A factor which makes the decision of the majority seem even worse is that Alfred Cook made no effort to bring before the District Court a valuation of the future interest, although he now complains that the District Court made no such valuation. This is the trial testimony from Alfred Cook respecting that point: "Q. Did you obtain an appraisal of the property that is covered by the future interest? A. I did not. "Q. And what was the reason for not obtaining the appraisal? A. Really, when this first started, I saw no need for it, and the provisions and what was promised by me, I didn't see any need for an appraisal. Later, I could see no need for it and probably because of the expense, it was not deemed unnecessary to have it appraised as that is not what is important." The position of the majority in this case is inexplicable. b f e w o ' i l L d af firm on all counts. A Justice / Justice 1