Case Title: Coyle v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Warren County

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-110-00

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LONG, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The Board of Chosen Freeholders of Warren County (Board) on December 20, 2000, appointed John J. Coyle, Jr., to the position of county counsel for a statutory three-year term. On January 1, 2001, a new Board rescinded Coyle's appointment and replaced him with another lawyer. The Board claimed that it had the right to discharge Coyle under the Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules or RPCs), specifically RPC 1.16, that requires a lawyer to withdraw if he is discharged by the client. Coyle claims that, absent cause, he is entitled to serve out his term of office prescribed by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 40A:9-43. The Board is made up of three members, each elected to a three-year term, and only one member elected each year. At the time of the general election in November 2000, the Board had as its members two Democrats and one Republican. One of the Democrats lost her bid for reelection to Michael Doherty, a Republican, signaling a change in the Board's majority party come January 1, 2001 when Doherty was to take office. On December 20, 2000, the then-current Board passed a resolution appointing Coyle as Warren County counsel for the statutory three- year term. The one Republican Board member, DiMaio, along with the newly-elected Doherty, who was present at the December 20th meeting, opposed the appointment of Coyle and indicated to Coyle that he lacked the trust and confidence of the new Republican majority. DiMaio and Doherty asked Coyle to decline the appointment and indicated that if he accepted it, he would be asked to resign when the Board reorganized in January. Coyle rejected the request and signed an employment agreement with the County. On January 1, 2001, the new Board rescinded the employment agreement with Coyle and enacted a resolution appointing John J. Bell as County Counsel. On January 3, 2001, Coyle filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs, seeking a judgment declaring him to be County Counsel. Because the Board did not allege that there was cause for Coyle's dismissal, there was no factual matter for the trial court to resolve. Instead, the court framed the issue as a legal one: whether RPC 1.16 or N.J.S.A. 40A:9-43 governs the dismissal of county counsel. The trial court ruled that the Appellate Division decision in Pillsbury v. Board of Chosen Freeholders is dispositive and, therefore, the statutory term controls. The trial court emphasized the importance of the public nature of the Office of County Counsel and the Legislature's intention that there be continuity in that office, given that composition of the Board could change annually. The court reinstated Coyle with back pay, and rescinded the Board's appointment of Bell. The Board appealed to the Appellate Division, which reversed, holding that RPC 1.16 permitted the Board to terminate Coyle as County Counsel without cause. The Appellate Division essentially held that the case specifically implicated the ethical obligations of attorneys, thus triggering the court's interest in the vindication of its rules, and that there was no basis for distinguishing between county counsel and private counsel in respect of the applicability of RPC 1.16. The Supreme Court granted certification. HELD: RPC 1.16 was never intended to apply to public counsel with statutory terms. 1. This matter has been rendered moot in view of Coyle's recent judicial appointment. Nevertheless, the Court briefly addresses the legal issues presented. (P. 4) 2. In 1971, the Court adopted the Disciplinary Rules modeled after the American Bar Association (ABA) Code of Professional Responsibility. New Jersey's DR 2-110(B)(4) tracked the language of the identical ABA rule providing that an attorney must withdraw legal representation if discharged by the client. That language remained in effect until the Disciplinary Rules were replaced in 1984. In the interim, the Appellate Division decided Pillsbury. In that case, the court distinguished the lawyer-client relationship in the public sector from the same relationship in the private sector and held that the statutory term, and not DR 2-110(B)(4), governs the dismissal of a county counsel. (Pp. 5-7) 3. In 1979, a committee of the American Bar Foundation published the Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility, which included commentary stating that there is an exception to DR 2-110(B)(4) for public counsel whose office was created by the legislature and whose term of office was fixed by statute. The comment further provided that, unless good cause exists, such counsel could not be removed from office before the end of his or her term. This comment demonstrates the ABF's recognition of the distinction between public and private sector representation enunciated in Pillsbury. Thereafter, the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (the Kutak Commission) published a Proposed Final Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In that draft, the Kutak Commission reiterated the exception found by the ABF. In July 1982, the Court appointed the Debevoise Committee to review the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct and to recommend whether to adopt those rules in New Jersey. The text of former DR 2-110 (B)(4) is now found in RPC 1.16. The introduction to the RPCs refers the reader to the official ABA comments and commentary contained in the Debevoise Report for assistance in interpreting the RPCs. Reference to the public counsel exception can be found in those comments. (Pp. 7-10) 4. From the history of RPC 1.16, it is clear that there was a common understanding on the part of the drafters of the Model Rules that RPC 1.16 does not govern public attorneys for whom the Legislature has established a statutory term of office and has declared the conditions on which discharge can occur. Given the history of RPC 1.16 and Pillsbury's interpretation of an identical disciplinary rule, in addition to the Court's faithful reenactment of that rule, without disavowal of Pillsbury, leads to the conclusion that RPC 1.16 was never intended to apply to public counsel with statutory terms. (Pp. 10) 5. Nothing in this opinion changes the fundamental standards governing resolution of an actual conflict between the RPCs and an action of another branch of government. Such a conflict will be resolved by an assessment of the governmental purpose underlying the legislative or executive action and the nature and extent of its encroachment on judicial prerogatives and interests. Such an assessment is unnecessary here as RPC 1.16 is inapplicable on the facts presented. (Pp. 10-12) 6. The issue involving the timing of Coyle's appointment as County Counsel need not be addressed since it has been rendered moot by Coyle's judicial appointment. (P. 12) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, VERNIERO, LAVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LONG'S opinion. JOHN J. COYLE, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF WARREN COUNTY, JOHN DIMAIO, individually, and MICHAEL DOHERTY, individually, Defendants-Respondents. Argued October 9, 2001 -- Decided January 16, 2002 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 340 N.J. Super. 277 (2001). Michael J. Perrucci argued the cause for appellant (Fischbein, Badillo, Wagner & Harding, attorneys; Maureen A. Coyle, on the brief). John H. Dorsey argued the cause for respondents (Dorsey and Fisher, attorneys). John P. Bender, Assistant Attorney General, submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LONG, J. It would then be fair to say that there was a common understanding on the part of the drafters of the Model Rules that RPC 1.16(a)(3) does not govern public attorneys with respect to whom the Legislature has established a statutory term of office and declared the conditions on which discharge may occur. When it adopted our rules, the Court obviously was aware of that gloss on the Model Rules and, more importantly, of Pillsbury, a case that had been decided eight years previously. There is a long-standing canon of statutory construction that presumes that the Legislature is knowledgeable regarding the judicial interpretation of its enactments. State v. Burford, 163 N.J. 16, 20 (2000). When a statute has received contemporaneous and practical interpretation, and the statute is thereafter amended without any change in the interpreted language, the judicial construction is regarded as presumptively the correct interpretation of the law. Ford Motor Co. v. New Jersey Dept. of Labor & Indus., 7 N.J. Super. 30, 38 (App. Div.) (citing 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 5109 (3rd ed. 1943)), aff'd, 5 N.J. 494 (1950); see also Lemke v. Bailey, 41 N.J. 295, 301 (1963); Harper v. New Jersey Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co., 1 N.J. 93, 98-99 (1948). Moreover, courts will not impute a legislative intention to alter an established judicial interpretation absent a clear manifestation of such intent. State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503, 512 (1981). Those presumptions and rules of statutory construction apply equally to the judicial construction of judicially adopted rules. State v. Vigilante, 194 N.J. Super. 560, 563 (Law Div. 1983) (citing Diodato v. Camden County Park Comm'n, 136 N.J. Super. 324, 327 (App. Div. 1975)). Given the history of RPC 1.16 and Pillsbury's interpretation of an identical disciplinary rule, the Court's faithful re- enactment of that rule, without a disavowal of Pillsbury, leads us to conclude that RPC 1.16(a)(3) never was intended to apply to public counsel with statutory terms, and we so hold. Nothing in this opinion should be viewed as altering, in any way, the fundamental standards governing resolution of an actual conflict between the RPCs and an initiative of another branch of government. As we indicated in Knight v. City of Margate, supra, such a conflict will be resolved by an assessment of the governmental purpose underlying the legislative or executive action and the nature and extent of its encroachment upon judicial prerogatives and interests. 86 N.J. at 392. There was no need for such an assessment here because RPC 1.16(a)(3) is inapplicable on the facts presented. We note finally that this case presented an additional issue involving the timing of Coyle's appointment. We see no reason to grapple with it now that the case has been rendered moot by Coyle's judicial appointment. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LONG's opinion. NO. A-110 JOHN J. COYLE, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF WARREN COUNTY, JOHN DIMAIO, individually, and MICHAEL DOHERTY, individually, Defendants-Respondents. DECIDED January 16, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz