Case Title: State ex rel. J.J. Detweiler v. Warner

Citation: 2004-Ohio-4659

Docket Number: 20032234

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. J.J. Detweiler v. Warner, 103 Ohio St.3d 99, 2004-Ohio-4659.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. J.J. DETWEILER ENTERPRISES, INC., APPELLANT, v. 
WARNER, AUD., ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. J.J. Detweiler Enterprises, Inc. v. Warner, 103 Ohio St.3d 
99, 2004-Ohio-4659.] 
Mandamus — Judgments — Civ.R. 56 — Courts generally not authorized to enter 
summary judgment in favor of a nonmoving party — Genuine issues of 
material fact exist, when. 
(No. 2003-2234 — Submitted July 20, 2004 — Decided September 15, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Noble County, No. 301, 2003-Ohio-6283. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellant, J.J. Detweiler Enterprises, Inc. (“Detweiler”), owns 
certain real property in Noble County, Ohio.  On April 18, 2001, Detweiler 
requested appellee Noble County Auditor Alice L. Warner to transfer two general 
warranty deeds from Detweiler, one to William and Barbara DeLuca and one to 
George and Barbara Dillon.  According to Detweiler, the transfers would enable 
appellee Noble County Recorder Phyllis Stritz to record the deeds. 
{¶2} 
In the deed dated January 2, 2001, Detweiler transferred Tract 19 
to the DeLucas and specified that the tract would “be conveyed to adjoining 
parcel # 36-210-91-007.”  Tract 19 is adjacent to Tracts 6, 18, and 20. 
{¶3} 
In a March 15, 2001 general warranty deed, Detweiler conveyed 
Tract 20 to the Dillons and stated that the tract would “be conveyed to adjoining 
parcel # 36-21091.008.”  Tract 20 is adjacent to Tracts 7 and 19. 
{¶4} 
The auditor and recorder refused to transfer and record the deeds. 
{¶5} 
Detweiler claimed that the plat of the property set forth in the 
deeds was presented to appellees Noble County Engineer John Foreman and the 
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Noble County Regional Planning Commission, but the engineer and the planning 
commission refused to approve the plat.  Appellees asserted that the plat was 
never submitted to the planning commission for approval and was never 
approved. 
{¶6} 
On July 17, 2002, Detweiler filed a complaint for a writ of 
mandamus and a declaratory judgment in the Court of Appeals for Noble County.  
Detweiler requested a writ of mandamus to compel the engineer and planning 
commission to approve the plat and to compel the auditor and recorder to transfer 
and record the deeds for Tracts 19 and 20.  Detweiler also requested a judgment 
declaring that the plat presented to the engineer and the planning commission 
satisfied all legal requirements, that they were required to approve the plat, and 
that the auditor and recorder were required to transfer and record the deeds.  
Appellees answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim. 
{¶7} 
On November 15, 2002, Detweiler moved for summary judgment 
and filed a supporting affidavit and exhibits.  The affiant stated that the plat and 
deeds complied with Ohio law, including local zoning ordinances.  The affiant 
further expressly asserted that the plat and descriptions pertinent to the general 
warranty deeds had been submitted to the engineer and the planning commission, 
but that they did not approve them. 
{¶8} 
On November 27, 2002, appellees filed a memorandum opposing 
summary judgment.  Appellees attached affidavits of the present and former 
chairpersons of the planning commission, who stated that Detweiler’s plat of the 
property including Tracts 19 and 20 was never submitted to or approved by the 
planning commission.  Appellees also attached an affidavit of the zoning 
inspector for the township board, who said that he had never received any request 
for a zoning variance for the property. 
{¶9} 
Nearly one year later, on November 24, 2003, the court of appeals 
denied Detweiler’s summary judgment motion and entered judgment in favor of 
January Term, 2004 
3 
appellees because of Detweiler’s “failure * * * to prove any of the elements for 
the issuance of a writ of mandamus.”  The court of appeals further dismissed 
Detweiler’s complaint and denied appellees’ counterclaim. 
{¶10} This cause is now before the court upon Detweiler’s appeal of the 
denial of its mandamus claim.  Because Detweiler does not assert that the 
dismissal of his declaratory judgment claim was erroneous, we do not consider 
that claim in this appeal. 
{¶11} Detweiler asserts that the court of appeals erred in denying its 
summary judgment motion and entering judgment in favor of appellees.  The 
court of appeals considered the parties’ summary judgment evidence before 
determining that Detweiler had failed to establish any of the elements for the 
issuance of the writ of mandamus.  In essence, the court of appeals granted 
summary judgment for appellees although they had not moved for summary 
judgment.  See Chamberlain v. Luckey Farmers, Inc. (June 24, 1994), Ottawa 
App. No. 93OT039, 1994 WL 318768 (“By ruling that no issues are present 
between the parties, the trial court in effect granted summary judgment for the 
appellee even though no motion for summary judgment was pending”); McCourt 
Constr. Co. v. Coventry Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals (June 18, 1986), Summit 
App. No. 12453, 1986 WL 6884 (“by granting judgment in favor of the Board as 
to McCourt’s declaratory judgment action, the lower court in effect granted 
summary judgment on that claim to the Board, a non-moving party”). 
{¶12} The court of appeals erred in sua sponte entering summary 
judgment in favor of appellees.  “Civ.R. 56 does not authorize courts to enter 
summary judgment in favor of a non-moving party.”  Marshall v. Aaron (1984), 
15 Ohio St.3d 48, 15 OBR 145, 472 N.E.2d 335, syllabus; Bowen v. Kil-Kare, 
Inc. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 84, 94, 585 N.E.2d 384 (“We agree with the court of 
appeals’ determination that since appellees never moved for summary judgment 
on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claims * * * , appellees were not 
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entitled to summary judgment on these claims”); see, also, L & W Supply Co., Inc. 
v. Constr. One, Inc. (Mar. 31, 2000), Hancock App. No. 5-99-55, 2000 WL 
348990, following Marshall, but citing later federal precedent permitting sua 
sponte entry of summary judgment in certain circumstances.  Id. at fn. 1. 
{¶13} Nor does this case invoke the exception to the general prohibition 
against courts sua sponte entering summary judgment in favor of a nonmoving 
party.  “While Civ.R. 56 does not ordinarily authorize courts to enter summary 
judgment in favor of a non-moving party, * * * an entry of summary judgment 
against the moving party does not prejudice his due process rights where all 
relevant evidence is before the court, no genuine issue as to any material fact 
exists, and the non-moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  State 
ex rel. Cuyahoga Cty. Hosp. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. (1986), 27 Ohio 
St.3d 25, 28, 27 OBR 442, 500 N.E.2d 1370; State ex rel. Lowery v. Cleveland 
(1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 126, 128, 616 N.E.2d 233 (“the court’s summary judgment 
for relator neither prejudiced the city’s procedural rights nor denied the city an 
opportunity to submit evidence”). 
{¶14} Entry of judgment in favor of appellees was erroneous because 
genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Detweiler’s mandamus claim and 
appellees are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The court of appeals 
found that Detweiler had “not submitted sufficient evidence conclusively 
demonstrating that [it] complied with R.C. 711.10 in submission of the plat to the 
Regional Planning Commission, or that its approval was obtained by operation of 
law through inaction of the Commission.”  A party, however, need not 
“conclusively demonstrate” its case to withstand summary judgment; it need only 
produce evidence to show that there remains a genuine issue of material fact.  See, 
e.g., Bukky v. Painesville Tel. & Lake Geauga Printing Co. (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 
45, 22 O.O.3d 183, 428 N.E.2d 405.  And because appellees never moved for 
summary judgment, Detweiler had no reciprocal burden under Civ.R. 56(E) to set 
January Term, 2004 
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forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.  See Civ.R. 56(E); cf. Norris 
v. Budgake (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 208, 209, 729 N.E.2d 758. 
{¶15} A genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether R.C. 
711.10, which the court of appeals relied upon, applies.  R.C. 711.001(B)(1) 
exempts “the sale or exchange of parcels between adjoining lot owners, where 
such sale or exchange does not create additional building sites” from the 
definition of “subdivision” and the attendant requirements for subdivisions in 
R.C. 711.001 to 711.38.  See 1998 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 98-011 (“The 
meaning of the term ‘subdivision’ [in R.C. 711.001(B)(1)] is important because 
the subdivision and platting provisions of R.C. Chapter 711, and local regulations 
adopted thereunder, are applicable only to a division of land that first qualifies as 
a subdivision”); State ex rel. Gundler v. Teeters (Sept. 10, 1981), Highland App. 
No. 406, 1981 WL 6017.  Detweiler’s summary judgment evidence was sufficient 
to raise an issue concerning whether its transfers of Tracts 19 and 20 were to 
adjoining lot owners and did not create additional building sites. 
{¶16} Moreover, even assuming that further evidence would support 
appellees’ contention that Detweiler’s intended conveyances constituted a 
subdivision under R.C. 711.001(B)(1), the parties introduced conflicting affidavit 
evidence concerning whether Detweiler had submitted its proposed plat to the 
planning commission for approval.  See R.C. 711.10 (“The approval of the 
planning commission or the refusal to approve shall be endorsed on the plat 
within thirty days after the submission of the plat for approval * * * ; otherwise 
that plat is deemed approved”).  This raises another genuine issue of material fact. 
{¶17} Therefore, the court of appeals erred in entering judgment in favor 
of appellees on Detweiler’s mandamus claim.  Appellees did not move for 
summary judgment, and genuine issues of material fact remain.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings, including the 
submission of more evidence and argument on the claim.  This advances one of 
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the preeminent goals of Civ.R. 56:  to provide “fundamental fairness to all 
litigants, given the high stakes involved when summary judgment is sought.”  
Hooten v. Safe Auto Ins. Co., 100 Ohio St.3d 8, 2003-Ohio-4829, 795 N.E.2d 648, 
¶ 34. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
 
Wiles, Boyle, Burkholder & Bringardner Co., L.P.A., Michael L. Close 
and Mark C. Melko, for appellant. 
 
Clifford N. Sickler, Noble County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
____________________