Case Title: Commonwealth v. Giddens

Citation: 

Docket Number: 171224

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2018-07-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 171224 
JUSTICE STEPHEN R. McCULLOUGH 
 
 
 
July 19, 2018 
TROY LAMAR GIDDENS, SR. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
H. Vincent Conway, Jr., Judge Designate 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth appeals from a judgment dismissing its petition to have Troy Lamar 
Giddens, Sr., civilly committed as a sexually violent predator.  The Commonwealth argues that 
the trial court misapplied the relevant statute, Code § 37.2-905.1, and, moreover, that the 
evidence does not support dismissal.  For the reasons noted below, we agree with the 
Commonwealth. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Giddens was convicted of carnal knowledge and attempted carnal knowledge, in violation 
of Code §§ 18.2-26 and 18.2-63.  These convictions constitute “sexually violent offenses” under 
the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act (“SVP Act”).  See Code § 37.2-900 et 
seq.  Under the statute in effect at the time, the Director of the Department of Corrections 
(“Director”) was required to forward to the Commitment Review Committee (“CRC”) the name 
of an eligible inmate who “receive[s] a score of five or more on the Static-99.”  See Code §§ 
37.2-903(B), (D) and (E).1  The Static-99 is a test designed to assess the recidivism risk of adult 
male sexual offenders that has long been recognized in the Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth 
                     
 
1 A 2018 amendment to Code §§ 37.2-903(B) removed, among other things, the specific 
reference to the Static-99 in favor of “an evidence-based assessment protocol approved by the 
Director and the Commissioner.”  2018 Acts. ch. 841.  This amendment was not in effect at the 
time of Giddens’ 2016 assessment. 
2 
 
v. Miller, 273 Va. 540, 546, 643 S.E.2d 208, 211 (2007) (observing that “the Static-99 . . . is used 
to predict sex offender recidivism”); Commonwealth v. Garrett, 276 Va. 590, 610, 667 S.E.2d 
739, 750 (explaining that “the Static-99 [is] one of the standardized tests used by mental health 
professionals to determine the likelihood of a sex offender to re-offend”) (Kinser, J., concurring); 
Commonwealth v. Allen, 269 Va. 262, 278, 609 S.E.2d 9, 15 (2005) (noting that “the Static-99 
[is] an actuarial risk assessment test designed to predict sex offender recidivism”).  A score of 
five on this test instrument correlates with a “statistical risk of re-offending [of] 33% within five 
years,” Commonwealth v. Squire, 278 Va. 746, 750, 685 S.E.2d 631, 633 (2009).  Giddens 
scored a five on the Static-99, and, accordingly, the Director of the Department of Corrections 
forwarded his name to the CRC.  Code § 37.2-903(B).  Dr. Glenn Rex Miller, Jr., a licensed 
clinical psychologist, evaluated Giddens and concluded that he met the criteria of a sexually 
violent predator.  Giddens did not cooperate with Dr. Miller, so Dr. Miller relied on available 
records in making his recommendation. 
 
The Commonwealth then filed a petition in the Circuit Court of the City of Newport 
News pursuant to the SVP Act to have Giddens civilly committed as a sexually violent predator.  
Giddens responded with a motion to dismiss in which he contended that he was ineligible for 
referral to the CRC.  He grounded his argument on a claim that the Director incorrectly 
calculated his Static-99 score.  The Static-99 instrument considers, among other things, whether 
the subject of the test has ever, “lived with [a] lover for at least two years.”  If the test subject has 
lived with a lover for two years, no points are assigned; if the subject has not, the test assigns one 
point. Giddens asserted that he lived with a romantic partner for at least two years and, 
therefore, the Director of the Department of Corrections did not properly score the Static-99.  
Giddens claimed that, without the erroneously assigned point, he should have received a score of 
3 
 
four, rather than five, on the assessment.  As a result, he argued, he did not meet the minimum 
Static-99 score mandating evaluation as a sexually violent predator under Code § 37.2-903(B).  
Giddens relied on Shelton v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 121, 645 S.E.2d 914 (2007), in contending 
that his case should be dismissed. 
 
The Commonwealth responded that it had substantially complied with the screening 
provisions of the SVP Act and, further, that the screening statutes are procedural rather than 
substantive or jurisdictional.  Code § 37.2-905.1.  Giddens did not allege that the Commonwealth 
failed to substantially comply with the provisions of Code § 37.2-903, in accordance with Code § 
37.2-905.1.2 
At a hearing on the motion to dismiss, Giddens and his brother testified that Giddens had 
lived with two romantic partners, one of whom was his wife, for more than two years each.  
Neither of the women Giddens claimed to have lived with for this period of time testified, and 
Giddens offered no other witnesses or corroborating evidence.  The Commonwealth challenged 
this testimony as inconsistent with (1) the record of Giddens’s 2012 Sexually Violent Predator 
Evaluation by Dr. Stephen C. Ganderson, including his interview with Dr. Ganderson, (2) the 
records of Dr. Miller, who conducted Giddens’ 2016 Sexually Violent Predator Evaluation, and 
(3) the records before the Director in 2012 and 2016.  The Commonwealth also noted that 
Giddens had been scored on the Static-99 four times in the last five years and had scored at least 
a five on each occasion. 
                     
 
2 We do not resolve in this appeal whether a prisoner seeking the dismissal of 
commitment proceedings must allege, in a pleading, that there was no substantial compliance.  
That question is not before us. 
 
4 
 
Giddens also testified that upon learning that he had scored a five on his most recent 
Static-99 evaluation, he wrote the Sex Offender Screening and Assessment Unit seeking a 
correction of what he contended was an incorrect score.  He did not receive a response.  Giddens 
next filed a formal grievance with the Department of Corrections.  The Department of 
Corrections declined to act on his grievance, telling Giddens it was a matter for the court to 
decide.  Giddens then wrote the Attorney General’s Office asking that office to correct his 
Static-99 score.  It does not appear that office took any action in response.3 
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the burden was on the 
Commonwealth to prove that Giddens is eligible for the sexually violent predator program and 
that the Commonwealth failed to show that the Static-99 was scored correctly.  The 
Commonwealth filed a motion to reconsider, pointing out that, under Code § 37.2-905.1, 
Giddens bears the burden to prove that the Commonwealth failed to substantially comply with 
the screening provisions of the SVP Act and, moreover, Giddens must show gross negligence or 
willful misconduct to prevail.  Following argument of counsel, the court denied the motion for 
reconsideration. 
ANALYSIS 
In Shelton v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 121, 645 S.E.2d 914 (2007), we dismissed with 
prejudice proceedings brought against a prisoner under the SVP Act.  We did so on the basis that 
minimum test scores which were – at that time – specifically enumerated in the text of the SVP 
Act, were statutory requirements, not procedural safeguards, and the prisoner’s score on a test 
fell below the minimum score that qualified an inmate for further evaluation under the SVP Act.  
                     
 
3 Under the Code, the screening decision rests with the Director, not the Attorney 
General.  See Code § 37.2-903. 
5 
 
Id. at 129, 645 S.E.2d at 918.  After Shelton, however, a new provision of the SVP Act went into 
effect.  That amendment, codified at Code § 37.2-905.1, provides as follows: 
The provisions of §§ 37.2-903, 37.2-904, and 37.2-905 are 
procedural and not substantive or jurisdictional.  Absent a showing 
of failure to follow these provisions as a result of gross negligence 
or willful misconduct, it shall be presumed that there has been 
substantial compliance with these provisions. 
 
2007 Acts ch. 876, as revised by 2009 Acts ch. 740.  The enactment of Code § 37.2-905.1 altered 
the applicable standard.  Consequently, Shelton is no longer good law. 
 
Under the plain language of Code § 37.2-905.1, the Director benefits from a presumption 
that he substantially complied with the screening provisions of Code §§ 37.2-903, 37.2-904, and 
37.2-905.  To succeed on a motion to dismiss an SVP proceeding, a defendant must first show 
that the Director failed to follow these screening statutes, and, second, that the failure to follow 
the applicable Code provisions was the “result of gross negligence or willful misconduct.”  Code 
§ 37.2-905.1. 
 
The trial court did not expressly cite or discuss Code § 37.2-905.1 in granting the motion 
to dismiss.  Nevertheless, the Commonwealth relied on the statute at trial.  We will assume that 
the trial court considered the statute in reaching its decision and focus our analysis on whether 
the evidence supports a finding of gross negligence.4  “In reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence, ‘[w]e consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the . . . prevailing party in 
the circuit court, and we accord the [prevailing party] the benefit of all reasonable inferences 
deducible from the evidence.’”  Riley v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 467, 482-83, 675 S.E.2d 168, 
177 (2009) (quoting Britt v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 569, 573, 667 S.E.2d 763, 765 (2008)).  
                     
 
4 Giddens does not claim any willful misconduct. 
6 
 
We will affirm the judgment of a trial court “unless it appears from the evidence that such 
judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”  Code § 8.01-680. 
 
Gross negligence is “a degree of negligence showing indifference to another and an utter 
disregard of prudence that amounts to a complete neglect of the safety of such other person.”  
Cowan v. Hospice Support Care, Inc., 268 Va. 482, 487, 603 S.E.2d 916, 918 (2004). 
It is a heedless and palpable violation of legal duty respecting the 
rights of others which amounts to the absence of slight diligence, 
or the want of even scant care.  Several acts of negligence which 
separately may not amount to gross negligence, when combined 
may have a cumulative effect showing a form of reckless or total 
disregard for another’s safety.  Deliberate conduct is important 
evidence on the question of gross negligence. 
 
Chapman v. City of Virginia Beach, 252 Va. 186, 190, 475 S.E.2d 798, 800-01 (1996) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Gross negligence “requires a degree of negligence that 
would shock fair-minded persons, although demonstrating something less than willful 
recklessness.”  Cowan, 268 Va. at 487, 603 S.E.2d at 918; see also Thomas v. Snow, 162 Va. 
654, 661, 174 S.E. 837, 839 (1934) (“Ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree of 
inattention.” While “[g]ross negligence is a manifestly smaller amount of watchfulness and 
circumspection than the circumstances require of a person of ordinary prudence . . . it is 
something less than . . . willful, wanton, and reckless conduct.”).  Because “the standard for 
gross negligence [in Virginia] is one of indifference, not inadequacy, a claim for gross 
negligence must fail as a matter of law when the evidence shows that the defendants exercised 
some degree of care.”  Elliott v. Carter, 292 Va. 618, 622, 791 S.E.2d 730, 732 (2016) (alteration 
in original). 
“Ordinarily, the question whether gross negligence has been established is a matter of 
fact to be decided by [the factfinder].  Nevertheless, when persons of reasonable minds could not 
7 
 
differ upon the conclusion that such negligence has not been established, it is the court’s duty to 
so rule.”  Frazier v. City of Norfolk, 234 Va. 388, 393, 362 S.E.2d 688, 691 (1987).5 
Giddens argues that the Commonwealth’s failure to investigate his complaint about the 
accuracy of his Static-99 score constitutes gross negligence.  We disagree.  Contrary to Giddens’ 
testimony that he lived with his wife for a period in excess of two years, a pre-sentence report 
from August 10, 2001, indicated that he met his wife in August of 2000 and married her two 
months later in October of 2000.  A Central Classification Services Survey from March 26, 2002, 
indicates that he and his wife lived together for a year and a half.  Giddens never offered the 
testimony of his wife or the other woman Giddens claimed to have lived with in excess of two 
years.  In addition, when scoring the Static-99, the Department had documentary evidence that 
Giddens had previously scored a five or higher on this test four times in the past five years.  In 
short, the Director was not negligent, much less grossly negligent, for rejecting extensive 
                     
 
5 See also City of Lynchburg v. Brown, 270 Va. 166, 171, 613 S.E.2d 407, 410 (2005) 
(reversing the trial court’s judgment because the city’s conduct did not rise to the level of gross 
negligence); Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125, 133, 400 S.E.2d 184, 189 (1991) (affirming a circuit 
court ruling that the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of gross negligence); Meagher 
v. Johnson, 239 Va. 380, 384, 389 S.E.2d 310, 312 (1990) (holding that, “as a matter of law, [the 
defendant’s] acts did not constitute gross negligence, and, therefore, the trial court erred in 
denying [the defendant’s] motion to strike”); Grasty v. Tanner, 206 Va. 723, 729, 146 S.E.2d 
252, 256 (1966) (finding the plaintiff failed to show gross negligence); Laster v. Tatum, 206 Va. 
804, 809, 146 S.E.2d 231, 234 (1966) (reversing the trial court because the evidence was not 
sufficient to support a jury verdict of gross negligence); Finney v. Finney, 203 Va. 530, 534, 125 
S.E.2d 191, 193 (1962) (reversing because the evidence demonstrated negligence but did not rise 
to the level of gross negligence); Dishman v. Pitts, 202 Va. 548, 555, 118 S.E.2d 509, 513 (1961) 
(finding the evidence insufficient to demonstrate gross negligence); Lloyd v. Green, 194 Va. 948, 
956, 76 S.E.2d 190, 195 (1953) (reversing judgment because the evidence did not establish gross 
negligence as a matter of law); Dinges v. Hannah, 185 Va. 744, 747, 40 S.E.2d 179, 181 (1946) 
(reversing the trial court’s verdict because the evidence did not support a finding of gross 
negligence); Richter v. Seawell, 183 Va. 379, 383, 32 S.E.2d 62, 64 (1944) (finding the evidence 
did not show gross negligence was the proximate cause); Carroll v. Miller, 175 Va. 388, 401, 9 
S.E.2d 322, 327 (1940) (finding the evidence did not support a finding of gross negligence). 
8 
 
documentary evidence at the screening stage in favor of the otherwise uncorroborated, 
impeached, and self-interested testimony of an inmate and his brother. 
In addition, the fact that the trial court believed the testimony offered by Giddens and his 
brother does not in hindsight render the Director’s approval of Giddens’ score of five on the 
Static-99 grossly negligent.  The Director’s decision was not grossly negligent at the time he 
made it and his refusal to either alter the Static-99 score or to investigate Giddens’ complaint was 
perfectly sensible under the circumstances.  In short, in relying on the documentary evidence 
before him, the Director exercised due care.  A finding of gross negligence is utterly unjustified 
on this record. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We will reverse the judgment below, vacate the order of dismissal, and remand the case 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.