Case Title: Jordan v. Shands

Citation: 

Docket Number: 971316

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
GWENDOLYN L. JORDAN 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 971316 
April 17, 1998 
 
SAMUEL SHANDS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Theodore J. Markow, Judge 
 
I. 
 
 
Gwendolyn L. Jordan filed her amended motion for judgment 
against Samuel Shands, Jerry Oliver, D.L. Wright, Cecil 
Richardson, C.V. Townsend, John Doe, and Mary Doe.  The 
plaintiff alleged the following facts. 
 
On June 21, 1995, the plaintiff was involved in an 
automobile accident in Richmond.  Wright, a City of Richmond 
police officer, investigated the accident.  The plaintiff 
sustained injuries during the accident, and she was 
transported by an ambulance to a hospital. 
 
After the plaintiff arrived at the hospital, a nurse 
informed a physician, in the plaintiff’s presence, that the 
plaintiff “was wanted and would be picked up by the Richmond 
Police Department.”  Subsequently, Richardson, a police 
officer employed by the City of Richmond, arrived at the 
hospital and arrested the plaintiff “on information about an 
outstanding capias” issued by the Dinwiddie County Juvenile 
and Domestic Relations Court.  The plaintiff asked Richardson 
why the capias had been issued, and he responded that “he 
wasn’t sure.”  The plaintiff informed Richardson that “he was 
making a mistake.”  The plaintiff was escorted from the 
hospital and taken to a police station in a “paddy wagon.”  
Subsequently, she was transported to the Richmond City Jail. 
 
When Richardson attempted to place the plaintiff in the 
custody of the jail, the jail personnel refused to accept 
custody because Richardson did not have a warrant.  
“Richardson produced a paper described as a ‘hit’ and the jail 
personnel contacted the Dinwiddie Sheriff’s office and asked 
that [it submit a facsimile of] the warrant to [the Richmond 
City Jail].” 
 
When the Richmond police received the warrant, it 
contained “information from Jordan’s driver’s license inserted 
in a warrant issued for Gwendolyn M. Jordan, [and identified 
her address as] 231-B S. Jefferson Street, Petersburg, 
Virginia 23803.”  The plaintiff’s address is Route 1, Box 128-
C, Blackstone, Virginia 23824.  According to the plaintiff’s 
allegations, a “simple examination of her driver’s license 
should have alerted Richardson to the fact that he had 
arrested the wrong person . . . .”  The plaintiff was 
“searched, fingerprinted and her personal belongings were 
taken.”  After being detained for about four hours, the 
plaintiff was finally released in the custody of her aunt. 
 
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Upon her release from jail, the plaintiff was told to 
report to the Dinwiddie County Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
Court on July 11, 1995.  She later received a letter 
commanding her appearance on that date.  When she appeared in 
the Dinwiddie County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, 
the plaintiff was informed that Gwendolyn M. Jordan did not 
have a social security number and that the Richmond police 
personnel had placed the plaintiff’s social security number on 
the warrant.  The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court judge 
apologized to the plaintiff and dismissed the charges against 
her. 
 
The plaintiff filed her motion for judgment on June 27, 
1996.  She alleged, among other things, that Townsend placed 
the incorrect information on the warrant issued for her arrest 
and that he was acting within the course and scope of his 
employment with Shands, Sheriff of Dinwiddie County.  She also 
alleged that Wright and Richardson were acting within the 
course and scope of their employment with Jerry Oliver, Chief 
of the Richmond Police. 
 
The plaintiff further alleged that Richardson falsely 
imprisoned her “without any sufficient legal excuse” and that 
he made defamatory statements about her.  She alleged that 
Townsend intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her 
by entering her personal and confidential data on a warrant 
 
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that he knew, or should have known, was intended for another 
person.  She alleged that Wright intentionally inflicted 
emotional distress upon her by transferring her personal and 
confidential data from her driver’s license to Townsend, when 
Wright knew or should have known that the plaintiff was not 
Gwendolyn M. Jordan and that this information would be affixed 
to a warrant that would be the basis of a false arrest and 
imprisonment. 
 
The defendants filed responsive pleadings, including 
special pleas of the statute of limitations and demurrers.  
The defendants asserted in their special pleas that the 
plaintiff’s causes of action for false imprisonment and 
defamation were barred by Code § 8.01-248 which, at the time 
the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued, contained a one-year 
statute of limitations.1  The defendants also filed a demurrer 
asserting, among other things, that the plaintiff failed to 
sufficiently plead a cause of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and that the defendants are 
entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
The trial court considered memoranda and argument of 
counsel and entered an order dismissing plaintiff’s alleged 
                     
1 Code § 8.01-248 was amended, effective July 1, 1995, and 
it now provides a two-year statute of limitations for all 
personal actions accruing on or after that date, for which no 
other limitation period is prescribed. 
 
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causes of action for false imprisonment, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and defamation because those 
claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations in 
Code § 8.01-248.  The court also stated in its judgment order 
that even though the plaintiff failed to state a cause of 
action against Chief Oliver or Sheriff Shands, the court would 
not rule on this issue since its rulings on the statute of 
limitations were dispositive of this proceeding. 
 
The plaintiff appeals the judgment, and Chief Oliver and 
Richardson assign cross-error to the trial court’s failure to 
sustain their demurrers.  The plaintiff does not, however, 
assign error to the trial court’s judgment dismissing John Doe 
and Mary Doe. 
II. 
A. 
 
Code § 8.01-243(A) states in relevant part: 
 
“Unless otherwise provided in this section or 
by other statute, every action for personal 
injuries, whatever the theory of recovery . . . 
shall be brought within two years after the cause of 
action accrues.” 
 
Code § 8.01-248, in effect when the plaintiff’s cause of 
action arose, stated:  “[e]very personal action, for which no 
limitation is otherwise prescribed, shall be brought within 
one year after the right to bring such action has accrued.” 
                                                                
 
 
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Plaintiff argues that her cause of action for false 
imprisonment which is asserted against Richardson is an action 
for personal injuries and, thus, this claim is governed by the 
two-year statute of limitations.  Richardson asserts that the 
plaintiff’s claim is a “personal action” for which no 
limitation was prescribed and, thus, is governed by the one-
year statute of limitations. 
 
We agree with the plaintiff.  We have defined false 
imprisonment as “the direct restraint by one person of the 
physical liberty of another without adequate legal 
justification.”  W.T. Grant Co. v. Owens, 149 Va. 906, 921, 
141 S.E. 860, 865 (1928).  We have also observed that “[f]alse 
imprisonment is a wrong akin to the wrongs of assault and 
battery, and consists in imposing by force or threats an 
unlawful restraint upon a man’s freedom of locomotion.”  Id. 
(quoting Gillingham v. Ohio River Ry. Co., 14 S.E. 243, 245 
(W.Va. 1891)). 
 
We are of opinion that the deprivation of an individual’s 
freedom by physical restraint or the threat of such restraint 
is a tort committed against an individual’s body because that 
individual’s body is actually confined to an area and deprived 
of physical liberty.  Accordingly, we hold that an action for 
false imprisonment is an action for personal injuries and, 
 
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thus, subject to the two-year statute of limitations in Code 
§ 8.01-243(A). 
B. 
 
Plaintiff concedes that her cause of action alleging 
defamation is governed by a one-year limitation period, but 
argues that the period did not commence to run on June 21, 
1995, the date she was arrested.2  The plaintiff says that 
Richardson based his arrest on a confirmation response which 
he obtained from Townsend.  This document, which allegedly 
contained false statements that the plaintiff was wanted in 
Dinwiddie County for failure to appear on a non-support 
charge, provided the basis for plaintiff’s defamation count.  
The plaintiff contends that the one-year statute of 
limitations does not bar her defamation action because she 
filed her motion for judgment within one year from July 11, 
1995, the date the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court 
dismissed the charges. 
 
We disagree with the plaintiff’s contentions.  Any cause 
of action that the plaintiff may have had for defamation 
                     
2 Effective July 1, 1995, a cause of action for defamation 
has been governed by a one-year period of limitation 
prescribed by Code § 8.01-247.1.  Before that date, an action 
for defamation was not addressed by a specific limitation 
provision in the Code, and hence was governed by the catch-all 
provisions of § 8.01-248 which, as noted previously, 
prescribed a one-year period for causes of action arising 
before July 1, 1995. 
 
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against any of the defendants accrued on June 21, 1995, which 
is the date she alleges in her motion for judgment that the 
defamatory acts occurred.  We have held that when an injury is 
sustained in consequence of the wrongful or negligent act of 
another and the law affords a remedy, the statute of 
limitations immediately attaches.  Westminster Investing Corp. 
v. Lamps Unlimited, 237 Va. 543, 546, 379 S.E.2d 316, 317-18 
(1989); Caudill v. Wise Rambler, 210 Va. 11, 14-15, 168 S.E.2d 
257, 260 (1969).  According to the plaintiff’s pleadings, the 
alleged acts of defamation occurred on June 21, 1995, and she 
purportedly sustained damages on that date.  Thus, her cause 
of action accrued on June 21, 1995, and she was required to 
file her motion for judgment within one year of that date.  
She failed to do so and, thus, her claim is barred. 
C. 
 
The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by 
holding that her claims for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress were barred by the statute of limitations.  
Responding, Chief Oliver and Richardson state that we need not 
consider this contention because, as these defendants assert 
in their assignment of cross-error, the plaintiff failed to 
allege sufficient facts in her amended motion to support a 
cause of action for emotional distress. 
 
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In Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 
148 (1974), we stated that  
“a cause of action will lie for emotional distress, 
unaccompanied by physical injury, provided four 
elements are shown:  One, the wrongdoer’s conduct 
was intentional or reckless.  This element is 
satisfied where the wrongdoer had the specific 
purpose of inflicting emotional distress or where he 
intended his specific conduct and knew or should 
have known that emotional distress would likely 
result.  Two, the conduct was outrageous and 
intolerable in that it offends against the generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality.  This 
requirement is aimed at limiting frivolous suits and 
avoiding litigation in situations where only bad 
manners and mere hurt feelings are involved.  Three, 
there was a causal connection between the 
wrongdoer’s conduct and the emotional distress.  
Four, the emotional distress was severe.” 
 
In Ely v. Whitlock, 238 Va. 670, 677, 385 S.E.2d 893, 897 
(1989), we held that a plaintiff must allege all facts 
necessary to establish a cause of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
 
We hold that the plaintiff failed to plead a cause of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress with 
the requisite degree of specificity against any of the 
defendants.  Rather, the plaintiff’s allegations are merely 
conclusional. 
D. 
 
Richardson assigns as cross-error the trial court’s 
failure to sustain his demurrer which asserted that the 
plaintiff’s allegations in her amended motion established as a 
 
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matter of law that he acted in good faith when he arrested her 
and that his actions are protected by a qualified immunity.  
We disagree with Richardson’s contentions. 
 
A defendant who asserts the qualified immunity defense, 
not the plaintiff, must allege and prove the elements 
comprising this defense.  See DeChene v. Smallwood, 226 Va. 
475, 479, 311 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1984).  Richardson may not, by 
use of a demurrer, shift his pleading and proof burdens to the 
plaintiff. 
III. 
 
In summary, the plaintiff’s cause for false imprisonment 
is governed by the two-year statute of limitations.  The 
plaintiff failed to plead a cause of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress against any of the 
defendants.  The plaintiff’s purported cause of action for 
defamation is barred by the statute of limitations.   
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court’s judgment 
in favor of Richardson and will remand this proceeding to 
permit the plaintiff to pursue her cause of action for false 
imprisonment against him, and we will affirm the trial court’s 
judgment in favor of the remaining defendants. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
                                          and remanded. 
 
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