Case Title: Jones v. Parrish

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-11-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Larry JONES v. James D. PARRISH and Hope
Parrish

97-350                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 13, 1997


1.   Jury -- trial court gave AMI Civ. 3d 306 -- no argument given
     concerning why instruction insufficient. -- While appellant
     acknowledged that the trial court gave AMI Civ. 3d 306, which
     sets out the authority of auxiliary officers under Ark. Code
     Ann.  12-9-303, he offered no argument why 306 was not
     sufficient to cover the theory of his case; the supreme court
     found that the initial added language underscored in
     appellant's modified AMI Civ. 911 instruction was already
     covered in 306, which defines when an auxiliary officer shall
     and shall not have the authority of a police officer.

2.   Jury -- instructions -- language appellant attempted to add to
     instruction not supported by law -- argument need not be
     considered on appeal. -- Where some of the added language in
     appellant's 911 instruction suggested that his truck, when
     equipped with a red rotating light, could be an authorized
     vehicle; however, appellant cited no legal authority for this
     proposition, and the existing AMI Civ. 911 defined an
     emergency vehicle as being an ambulance, fire truck, or police
     car, and made no mention of a police officer's private
     vehicle, appellant failed to articulate his reason or cite any
     law to the trial court in support of the giving of AMI Civ.
     911, as modified; for these reasons alone the supreme court
     did not need to consider his argument on appeal.  

3.   Jury -- court need not give instruction that needs
     explanation, modification, or qualification -- trial court
     correctly rejected appellant's modified instruction. -- A
     trial court need not give an instruction which needs
     explanation, modification, or qualification, but to the
     contrary, the instruction offered must be simple, impartial,
     and free from argument; here, appellant's proffered 911
     instruction was confusing and was clearly not free from
     argument; the trial court correctly rejected appellant's
     modified 911 instruction.

4.   Civil procedure -- proffered interrogatory dependent upon 911
     instruction -- trial court correctly refused interrogatory --
     no abuse of discretion found. -- Because appellant's proffered
     interrogatory argument was dependent upon his 911 instruction,
     the trial court was correct in refusing his interrogatory;
     there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal
     to submit the interrogatory, especially since appellant never
     fully explained the trial court's error in its finding that
     the five interrogatories that had been agreed upon were
     sufficient to cover the parties' respective cases; although
     there may have been another appropriate or possible
     instruction to warrant an interrogatory such as the one
     proffered by appellant, no such clear and simple instruction
     was proffered. 

5.   Jury -- trial court has broad discretion to decide what
     information to give to jury -- no abuse of discretion found in
     judge's carefully worded response. -- Where the trial court
     carefully worded its answer to correlate to the jury's
     question, and, in doing so, limited its response so the jury
     would understand that appellee had no future recourse as far
     as this particular claim was concerned, the appellant failed
     to show the trial court abused its discretion in giving the
     narrow and carefully worded response it made to the jury; the
     trial court has broad discretion to decide what information
     should be given to the jury.  

6.   Negligence -- liability exposure of company separate from
     appellant's -- company and its insurer had right to allocate
     their liability in manner of their choosing. -- Appellant's
     argument that the trial court erred when it failed to give him
     full credit for the $15,000 pretrial settlement amount his
     company paid for being dismissed from the lawsuit was without
     merit; because of the considerable confusion surrounding who
     was to be credited the settlement monies, the supreme court
     found that the trial court properly resolved the matter; since
     the liability exposure of appellant's company and its
     insurance company was separate from appellant's, those
     entities had a right to agree to limit and allocate their
     liability against the claims of the appellees and the injured
     passenger in any manner they chose.


     Appeal from Crawford Circuit Court; John G. Holland, Judge;
affirmed.
     Benson & Robinson, P.L.C., by:  Jon Robinson, for appellant.
     Ray Hodnett and Jones Law Firm, by:  Robert L. Jones III, for
appellees.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.  
     Appellee James D. Parrish initiated this litigation, by suing
Larry Jones, Jones's Warehouse Sales grocery store, and Eric Donald
for negligence that caused injury to Parrish.  The events leading
to Parrish's injuries began at Jones's store where Donald and a
friend, Timothy Branson, tried to purchase some groceries.  When
Donald presented a check with someone else's name printed on it,
Jones asked for identification, and while Jones was attempting to
verify the check, Donald and Branson departed the store, got in
Donald's vehicle and drove away.  Jones, who was an auxiliary
police officer and auxiliary fireman for the City of Clarksville,
saw the two men leave, so he got in his truck and followed them. 
From his truck, Jones called the police dispatcher, and told her
that he was following two men in their vehicle because the men had
just attempted to cash a forged check at Jones's store.  Sometime
during Jones's pursuit, Donald accelerated his car, and Jones
responded in kind.  While trying to keep Donald's car in sight,
Jones turned on his four-way flashers and a red bubble light which
he kept in his truck, pursuant to his duties as an auxiliary
fireman.  Both vehicles were speeding.  Jones was about one-quarter
of a mile behind Donald's car when it skidded out of control and
collided with a Missouri Pacific Railroad vehicle.  The Railroad
vehicle in turn struck Parrish, who was standing nearby.  Parrish
was thrown twenty-five feet into the air before falling to the
ground.  Parrish brought this suit for injuries allegedly sustained
and caused by Jones's and Donald's negligence.    
     This case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for
Parrish in the amount of $150,000.00 and $5,000.00 for Parrish's
wife.  The jury assigned Donald to be eighty percent at fault and
Jones twenty percent at fault.  Because a pretrial settlement had
been entered between Jones's business, Warehouse Sales, its
insurance carrier (Argonaut Great Central Insurance Company),
Timothy Branson, and Mr. and Mrs. Parrish, the trial court reduced
the jury award, but not in accordance with Jones's request.  Since
the Warehouse Sales's insurance company paid $15,000.00 in
settlement of the store's possible liability, Jones claimed he
should have received full credit in that amount against the amount
he owed under the jury award.  Instead, the trial court determined
the $15,000.00 was to be divided equally between the Parrishes and
Branson.  Jones assigns this and two other errors he claims warrant
reversal on appeal.
     In his first argument, Jones urges the trial court erred in
rejecting an interrogatory which he requested be given to the jury. 
That interrogatory was proffered during the trial court's
conferencing of jury instructions.  While that conference is
abstracted, the abstract skips parts of the record, making it
difficult to determine what exactly took place.  Thus, since we are
affirming this case, the record has been definitively read to be
sure the parties' relevant objections and proffered documents are
set forth.
     In conferencing with counsel, the trial court first considered
AMI3d 306 which was based on Ark. Code Ann.  12-9-303 (Repl.
1993), and reads as follows:
                        AMI CIVIL 3d, 306
          When I use the word "fault" in these instructions,
     I mean negligence.
          12-9-303 AUTHORITY OF OFFICERS
          (a)  An auxiliary law enforcement officer shall have
     the authority of a police officer as set forth by
     statutes of this state when the auxiliary law enforcement
     officer is performing an assigned duty and is under the
     direct supervision of a full-time certified law
     enforcement officer.
          (b)  When not performing an assigned duty and when
     not working under the direct supervision of a full-time
     certified law enforcement officer, an auxiliary law
     enforcement officer shall have no authority other than
     that of a private citizen.
Parrish objected to the court's giving AMI 306, stating the
instruction was untimely.  He also complained that AMI 306 was
misleading because Jones offered no instructions on the statutes
generally referenced in AMI 306.  The trial court disagreed and
overruled Parrish's objection.
     The next relevant matter raised was Jones's proffer of a
modified AMI 911 instruction which provides as follows:
          One issue you must decide is whether Larry Jones was
     acting as an auxiliary policeman at the time and place of
     the occurrence.  If you find that Larry Jones was in the
     immediate pursuit of an actual and suspected law violator
     and was operating a red rotating emergency light on his
     vehicle which he was driving, then his vehicle may be
     considered an authorized emergency vehicle, and he was
     entitled to operate the vehicle in accordance with the
     following traffic laws applicable only to emergency
     vehicles:
               (a)  Relieved of the obligation to obey speed
          limits, and
               (d)  Emergency vehicles have the right of way
          over other vehicles.
          It does not relieve Larry Jones of the duty to
     exercise ordinary care for the safety of others.  It is
     for you to decide if Larry Jones was an auxiliary police
     officer and whether he was operating an authorized
     emergency vehicle.
     After the trial court refused the foregoing modified
instruction, Jones then proffered the following interrogatory:
          Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
     Larry Jones was acting within the course and scope of his
     authority as an auxiliary police officer for the City of
     Clarksville at the time of the occurrence?  Answer yes or
     no.
Parrish again objected, stating the interrogatory is an entirely
new issue to be submitted to the jury upon which there has been no
previous instruction offered.  He continued that, even if the jury
were to find that he was an auxiliary police officer, that did not
give Jones the authority to exceed the speed limits because he was
not in an authorized vehicle.  The trial court sustained Parrish's
objection, saying, "I think that interrogatories number one through
[five] that already have been agreed upon cover the situation."
     Although Jones offered no argument or explanation to the trial
court below concerning why he believed he was entitled to the
interrogatory above, he argues on appeal that, at the time of
Donald's accident, Jones, as an auxiliary police officer, was
obeying a direct order from his supervisor, the city chief of
police, to keep Donald's car in sight.  Based on giving an
instruction and interrogatory, concerning whether Jones was acting
as an auxiliary officer at the time of the accident, he submits the
jury could have found he was not negligent.
     We find the record confusing when comparing the argument at
trial with the one Jones now puts forth.  Adding to that confusion
is the manner by which Jones frames his legal issue on appeal.  In
this respect, Jones solely attacks the trial court's refusal to
give his proffered interrogatory, but asks no reversal for the
trial court's failure to give his proffered instruction.  While
Jones acknowledges the trial court gave AMI 306, which sets out the
authority of auxiliary officers under  12-9-303, he offers no
argument why 306 was not sufficient to cover the theory of his
case.  
     Moreover, assuming Jones is also challenging in this point for
reversal the trial court's refusal to give his modified 911
instruction, that proffered instruction raises other questions. 
One, Jones modified AMI 911 by adding language such as "You must
decide . . . whether Larry Jones was acting as an auxiliary
policeman" and "if you find Larry Jones was in pursuit of [a]
violator and was operating a red rotating emergency light on his
vehicle . . . then his vehicle may be considered an authorized
emergency vehicle . . .."  The initial added language underscored
in Jones's 911 instruction is already covered in 306 which defines
when an auxiliary officer shall and shall not have the authority of
a police officer.  Also, the other underscored, added language in
Jones's 911 instruction suggests Jones's truck, when equipped with
a red rotating light, could be an authorized vehicle; however,
Jones cites no legal authority for this proposition.  Rather, we
point out that the existing AMI 911 defines an emergency vehicle as
being an ambulance, fire truck, or police car, and makes no mention
of a police officer's private vehicle.  
     While AMI 911's note on use and comment refer to Ark. Code
Ann.  27-37-202 (Repl. 1994) and 27-49-219(d) (Repl. 1994), which
cover flashing lights on emergency vehicles and define "authorized
emergency vehicle," Jones made no mention of these statutes at
trial when offering his modified 911 instruction.  In defining
"authorized emergency vehicle,"  27-49-219(d) includes (1) motor
vehicles equipped with blue rotating or flashing emergency lights
used by governmental police agencies; (2) vehicles equipped with
red rotating or flashing emergency lights owned and used by
volunteer firefighters while engaged in official duties, and (3)
vehicles equipped with amber flashing or rotating emergency or
warning lights and owned by private individuals whose use is
determined by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, in accordance
with regulations to prevent abuses thereof, to be for extra
hazardous service.  (Emphasis added.)  Although these statutory
provisions do not appear to help Jones, Jones presents no other
argument regarding how his truck could even be considered an
authorized emergency vehicle as he asserts in his 911 instruction.
     In sum, we reiterate that Jones failed to articulate his
reason or cite any law to the trial court in support of the giving
of AMI 911, as modified.  For these reasons alone we need not
consider his argument on appeal.  
     We add, somewhat in the same vein, that a trial court need not
give an instruction which needs explanation, modification, or
qualification, but to the contrary, the instruction offered must be
simple, impartial, and free from argument.  Pineview Farms, Inc. v.
Smith Harvestore, Inc., 298 Ark. 78,