Case Title: State v. Carroll D. Watkins

Citation: 2002 WI 101

Docket Number: 2000AP000064-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 101 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-0064-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Carroll D. Watkins,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 103 
Reported at:  244 Wis. 2d 205, 628 N.W.2d 419 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 4, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Mel Flanagan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Steven P. Weiss, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
2002 WI 101 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  00-0064-CR   
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 2009) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Carroll D. Watkins,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified and 
affirmed and, as modified, cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals that reversed Carroll Watkins' 
conviction for second-degree intentional homicide.  State v. 
Watkins, 2001 WI App 103, 244 Wis. 2d 205, 628 N.W.2d 419.  
Watkins was prosecuted for first-degree intentional homicide.  
He acknowledged that he pointed a loaded handgun at Glenn Malone 
and that the gun discharged.  He asserted, however, that he was 
acting in self-defense when he initially pointed the gun and 
that the shooting was an accident, occurring as he and Malone 
struggled for the gun.  After a trial to the bench, the circuit 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
2 
 
court for Milwaukee County, Mel Flanagan, Judge, determined that 
Watkins "did intentionally kill the victim while believing that 
he was in danger but used more force than was reasonably 
necessary in the situation."  The court found Watkins guilty of 
second-degree intentional homicide and sentenced him to 30 years 
in prison. 
¶2 
The court of appeals reversed Watkins' conviction in a 
split decision authored by Judge Schudson.  The court determined 
that the state had not presented sufficient evidence at trial to 
disprove Watkins' defense that the shooting was accidental.  Id. 
at ¶1.  In dissent, Judge Fine disagreed with the determination 
that there was insufficient evidence to convict but asserted 
that the case should be remanded to the circuit court for 
resentencing because Watkins' sentence was "shockingly not 
'right and proper under the circumstances.'"  Id. at ¶¶28, 35 
(Fine, J., dissenting).  
¶3 
We granted the State's petition for review, and now 
affirm the court of appeals reversal of Watkins' conviction, on 
different grounds.  We conclude, after a thorough examination of 
the record and the circuit court's findings, that the real 
controversy in this case was not fully and fairly tried.  We 
therefore 
exercise 
our 
statutorily-recognized 
power 
of 
discretionary reversal under Wis. Stat. § 751.06 (1999-2000),1 to 
reverse the judgment of conviction.  Accordingly, we modify and 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
3 
 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals and remand the case 
to the circuit court for a new trial. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The facts of this case are drawn in large part from 
the trial record, especially the testimony of Watkins and 
Detective Andre Antreassian, who interviewed Watkins shortly 
after the shooting and prepared a lengthy report which he 
recounted at trial. 
¶5 
In April 1998 Carroll Watkins was 46 years old.  Glenn 
Malone was 43 years old.  The two were employees of a Nebraska 
company that sent crews of workers to different locations 
throughout the Midwest to clean industrial sites.  In mid-April 
Watkins and Malone were part of a crew dispatched to Oak Creek 
to clean the air heaters at a power plant.  Watkins and Malone 
shared a room in an Oak Creek motel but seldom saw each other 
because they worked different shifts.  Watkins said he knew 
Malone for a year-and-a-half and described the two as "close 
acquaintances" but not friends. 
¶6 
The crew finished its work at the power plant on April 
19, 1998 at around noon, and expected to leave the next day.  
Late that afternoon, Watkins was gathering his dirty clothes 
from the truck he had driven to Oak Creek when he noticed that a 
pair of his work gloves was missing from the truck.  On his way 
to the motel laundry room, Watkins saw Malone and mentioned that 
someone had taken his gloves.  According to Watkins, Malone 
admitted that he had taken the gloves and said he would return 
them.  When Watkins got to the laundry room he saw the crew 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
4 
 
supervisor, Gerald Dorr, and told Dorr about Malone taking his 
gloves.2 
¶7 
When Watkins returned to the motel room, Malone had 
returned the gloves and the two did not talk about them.  Later 
that afternoon, Watkins and Malone went to a store to buy beer, 
and that evening the two, along with Dorr and another crew 
member, Gallen Null, sat in their room "drinking beer, smoking 
cigarettes and laughing, joking, talking about everything under 
the sun."  The four did not discuss the gloves.  Null and Dorr 
left the room at around 10:30.  Watkins and Malone remained in 
the room, Watkins sitting in a chair in the corner of the room, 
Malone in a chair a few feet from the door. 
¶8 
Shortly after Dorr and Null left the room, Watkins 
decided to speak to Malone about the gloves.3  After Watkins and 
Malone began talking, Malone became angry and confronted 
Watkins.  Watkins claims that Malone came over to him, grabbed 
                                                 
2 Malone entered the laundry room shortly thereafter, but 
neither Watkins nor Dorr knew whether he heard them talking 
about the gloves. 
3 Watkins testified that he began the conversation by 
talking to Malone about Malone's decision not to wear a shirt 
while Null and Dorr were in the room.  He claimed that he said 
that Malone "didn't have to sit there without his shirt on 
showing his muscles off in front of the supervisor." 
Detective Antreassian's report does not indicate that 
Watkins told him about a discussion of Malone's not wearing a 
shirt. 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
5 
 
his sweatshirt,4 and shook him.  Malone then let go, walked away, 
and sat down on his bed. 
¶9 
According to Watkins, Malone returned a short time 
later and again grabbed Watkins' sweatshirt and shook him.  
After Malone released Watkins, he again went back to his bed, 
but returned a third time and again grabbed Watkins' sweatshirt 
and shook him.  Malone allegedly held an empty beer bottle by 
the neck as "an implied threat" during at least one of the three 
confrontations.5  After shaking Watkins for the third time, 
Malone again returned to his bed.  Watkins testified that Malone 
did not physically harm him during any of these three incidents. 
¶10 Watkins claimed that after the third confrontation, he 
continued to speak to Malone in an attempt to calm him down.  
Malone, 
however, 
approached 
him 
for 
a 
fourth 
time, 
and 
confronted him in a manner more violent than during the previous 
confrontations.  The specifics of the fourth confrontation are 
very much disputed. 
¶11 Detective Antreassian's report indicates that Watkins 
said Malone "grabbed Watkins with both of his hands around the 
front 
part 
of 
the 
hooded 
sweatshirt 
and 
lifted 
Watkins 
completely off the chair, throwing him back in the chair, saying 
                                                 
4 Watkins was wearing a hooded sweatshirt with a vertical 
zipper in the front. 
5 Detective Antreassian's report indicates that Watkins 
stated that Malone carried a beer bottle the first time he 
confronted Watkins, brandishing it as though he would hit 
Watkins with it.  Watkins testified that Malone threatened him 
with the bottle during the second and third confrontations. 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
6 
 
he was going to fuck him up."  The report further states, 
"Watkins stressed that at no time did [Malone] physically punch 
him or assault him."  Watkins testified, however, that Malone: 
 
grabbed me by the sweatshirt, and he just literally 
pulled me out of my chair so hard that I was off my 
feet, but he slammed his fist into my jaw, which 
loosened my lower plate and ended up cutting my gum 
pretty bad.  He said I ought to fuck you up, I could 
kill you, and he just hurled me backwards in the 
chair, chair went over, I slammed into the wall. 
Watkins explained that his head hit the wall, and that while he 
didn't immediately notice any injury, the next day he had "a 
pretty good size goose egg." 
¶12 Malone returned to his bed and sat down.  Watkins now 
very angry, reached into his briefcase and pulled out his gun.6  
Watkins testified that he took the gun out of its case, "slid it 
back, popped a round in the chamber, let him know that the gun 
was loaded, and I pointed it at him."7  Watkins told Detective 
Antreassian that he attempted to calm the situation by pointing 
the gun at Malone.  Watkins testified that he said, "that's it, 
man, I've had enough of this shit."  He then told Malone that 
one of them had to get out of the room.  With the gun pointed at 
Malone, Watkins moved towards the phone which was about four 
                                                 
6 Malone knew that Watkins had a gun in his briefcase.  
Watkins had taken the gun out that afternoon when Null had been 
in the room.  Malone examined the gun at that time. 
7 Detective Antreassian's report indicates that the gun was 
already loaded when it was in the briefcase.  It states that 
Watkins, "reached into his briefcase and got out his gun and 
pointed it at [Malone]," and that Watkins "definitely knew his 
gun had been loaded." 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
7 
 
feet from the foot of Malone's bed.  Watkins testified that when 
he got to the phone, Malone was 10 or 12 feet away.  Watkins 
called Dorr, who was in bed and nearly asleep.  Dorr testified 
that he answered the phone just before 11:15 and that Watkins 
was agitated and told him "you better get down here, I'm going 
to kill him."  Dorr, who thought from the tenor of the phone 
call that he "was going to come down there and break up a 
fight," got dressed and started towards the room occupied by 
Watkins and Malone. 
¶13 Watkins continued to point the gun at Malone, holding 
it in his right hand, his finger on the trigger.  Malone got up 
and started towards him.  Watkins told Malone that he would get 
another room and that Dorr was on his way.  Watkins testified 
that he told Malone not to move, but that Malone kept 
approaching until he got to the foot of the bed, face to face 
with Watkins.  Watkins said that he looked away, towards the 
door to see if Dorr was coming in. 
¶14 What occurred after Watkins looked away led to 
Malone's 
death 
and 
Watkins' 
conviction 
for 
second-degree 
intentional homicide, and is greatly disputed.  According to 
Detective 
Antreassian's report, "Watkins stated 
that 
when 
[Malone] got a couple of feet away from Watkins, [Malone] 
grabbed for Watkins' gun arm and Watkins let his instincts go 
and every thing happened so fast, he just heard a boom and saw 
[Malone] go down.  Watkins stated that he did not intentionally 
shoot [Malone], it just went off by instincts." 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
8 
 
¶15 Watkins testified at trial that when he looked away to 
see if Dorr was coming: 
 
I felt [Malone] grab my right hand, right wrist, and 
that I had the gun in.  My gun arm.  I turned back 
around real quick, something hit me in the face, I 
jump, I realize he's grabbed my arm, I jump for his 
arm, and I grabbed his wrist. 
Once the two had grasped each other's arms: 
 
There is a struggle for possession of the gun.  We 
were trying to keep it away from us.  I went to get in 
tight so I could have some control over it, he reaches 
and grabs it with his other arm or other hand, and 
we're swinging back and forth, and it goes off. 
¶16 Watkins testified that he did not allow Malone to take 
the gun because he thought Malone would shoot him with it.  He 
described his action of grabbing Malone's wrist to keep control 
of the gun as "instinctive."  Watkins testified that he did not 
intentionally pull the trigger but that his hand instinctively 
tightened up and the gun fired when Malone grabbed the gun and 
tried to wrestle it away. 
¶17 After the shot went off, hitting Malone in the face, 
Malone fell sideways.  Watkins bent over Malone and "hollered, 
Glenn, Glenn" and then ran to the door to see if Dorr was 
approaching. 
¶18 When Dorr arrived, Watkins was outside the room.  Dorr 
testified that Watkins was "screaming at the top of his lungs, 
why didn't you stop, why didn't you stop?"  Dorr asked Watkins 
what had happened and Watkins said, "oh man, I killed him, I 
killed him."  Dorr looked into the room and saw Malone on the 
floor, and then entered the room.  Dorr testified that Watkins 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
9 
 
remained outside the room, saying, "I told him to stop, to leave 
me alone."  Dorr left the room, returned to his own room, and 
called the police. 
¶19 When police arrived, Watkins was taken into custody 
and interviewed by Detective Antreassian, who wrote the report 
referenced above.8  Watkins was then arrested and charged with 
first-degree 
reckless 
homicide, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.02(1), with a penalty enhancer for allegedly committing a 
crime 
while 
armed 
with 
a 
dangerous 
weapon, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 939.63.  The State later amended the complaint, 
charging Watkins with first-degree intentional homicide, while 
armed, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1) and 939.63. 
¶20 Watkins waived his right to a jury trial, opting for a 
bench trial that lasted two days, October 20 and 30, 1998.  
Watkins' defense at trial was that he was acting in self-defense 
when he pointed the gun at Malone, and that Malone was shot 
accidentally when the two struggled for possession of the gun.  
The 
State, 
conversely, 
argued 
that 
Watkins 
had 
acted 
intentionally, shooting Malone in the face at point-blank range, 
with no struggle. 
                                                 
8 Officers videotaped the scene of the shooting, but did not 
record the questioning of Watkins on videotape or audiotape.  
Detective Antreassian took notes as he questioned Watkins and 
wrote his report from those notes.  He did not preserve his 
notes after writing the report.  Watkins did not sign any 
statement. 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
10 
 
¶21 At trial, Detective Antreassian recounted Watkins' 
statement and testified that he had written down essentially 
everything Watkins said to him.9 
¶22 The court also heard uncontroverted testimony from 
three expert witnesses.  Dr. Jeffrey Jentzen, the medical 
examiner for Milwaukee County who supervised the autopsy 
performed on Malone, testified that in his opinion, Malone was 
shot in the right cheek from a distance of one to three inches, 
Malone was standing when he was shot, and the shot was fired 
slightly upward.  Dr. Jentzen further testified that Malone had 
an abrasion on his forehead that could have been consistent with 
                                                 
9 Detective Antreassian's written report of April 20, 1998, 
is different in some details from the criminal complaint he 
signed on April 21.  For instance, the April 20 report reads: 
"Watkins stated that he brought up the glove incident to Glenn 
and Glenn became very upset and got loud and went to his bed, 
talking about racial prejudice [sic] and his reply to Glenn was, 
'Glenn you know I'm not prejudice [sic].'" 
The 
criminal 
complaint 
states: "Carroll 
Watkins 
then 
brought up the fact that the gloves had been stolen.  Glenn 
Malone got upset and Carroll Watkins stated that Glenn Malone 
then went to his [Glenn Malone's] bed, but that Glenn Malone was 
still upset.  Glenn Malone was upset because Carroll Watkins was 
accusing him of being a thief for stealing his work gloves." 
In the report, Detective Antreassian also wrote that he 
"observed that there had been a cut to the forehead of Watkins, 
as well as a cut on his nose."  He "could observe that there had 
been a scratch mark to Watkins' left chest near the throat area, 
and also a scratch to the right of his chest."  The report 
stated that Detective Antreassian "wanted to verify what type of 
story Watkins had before questioning him on where the actual 
scratches and cuts had come from."  Nothing in the remainder of 
the report or in Detective Antreassian's testimony indicates 
that he ever asked Watkins about his cuts or scratches. 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
11 
 
being scraped by the end of a gun barrel and an abrasion on 
Malone's hands that occurred contemporaneously with the gunshot 
wound and was consistent with his having been scratched by 
another person's fingernails gripping or gouging Malone's hand.  
Finally, Dr. Jentzen testified that blood on Malone's hands 
could indicate that Malone's hands had been raised in a 
defensive position when he was shot, or could indicate that his 
hands had been gripping the gun when the gun was fired. 
¶23 Susan Sanders, a forensic scientist at the Wisconsin 
State Crime Laboratory, testified that the DNA sample taken from 
under one of Malone's fingernails included both Malone's and 
Watkins' DNA. 
¶24 Finally, Monty Lutz, a forensic scientist, fire and 
tool 
mark 
examiner, 
with 
the 
State 
of 
Wisconsin 
Crime 
Laboratory, testified that the gun with which Malone was shot 
would fire only if the hammer was moved back and the trigger was 
pulled.  He also testified that firing the gun required an 
average pull, but that the gun could be fired if the person 
holding it had his or her finger on the trigger and the gun was 
pulled away from that person. 
¶25 On November 12, 1998, the circuit court issued an oral 
decision finding Watkins guilty of second-degree intentional 
homicide, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 940.05.  The court stated: 
 
[T]he State has proven the charge of second degree 
intentional homicide where privilege of self-defense 
is an issue, and further I will find that the 
defendant did intentionally kill the victim while 
believing that he was in danger but used more force 
than was reasonably necessary in the situation. 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
12 
 
¶26 On December 11, 1998, the circuit court sentenced 
Watkins to 30 years in prison.  Watkins filed a postconviction 
motion; the circuit court denied it without a hearing. 
¶27 Watkins then filed a direct appeal, alleging that: (1) 
the State had failed to disprove his defense that the shooting 
was accidental; (2) his trial counsel had provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to find and present evidence at critical 
points regarding Malone's background; (3) the case was not fully 
or fairly tried; (4) his 30-year sentence was excessive; and (5) 
he was entitled to resentencing so that the circuit court could 
consider newly obtained evidence about Malone's character.  
Watkins, 2001 WI App 103, ¶1. 
¶28 The court of appeals reversed Watkins' conviction, 
determining that "the evidence did not disprove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Watkins' defense that the shooting was 
accidental."10  Id. at ¶2.  It stated that,"[A]ccepting the 
evidence the trial court believed and relied upon to support its 
verdict, we conclude that the evidence, viewed most favorably to 
the State and to the verdict, did not disprove Watkins' accident 
defense beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. at ¶17.  The court of 
appeals did not address the remainder of the issues.  Id. at ¶2. 
                                                 
10 The court of appeals reversed Watkins' conviction and 
remanded the case to the circuit court, but did not explain 
whether Watkins was subject to retrial or was simply acquitted.  
In his brief to this court, Watkins seemingly believed that the 
court of appeals decision would result in a new trial.  In oral 
argument, however, the parties acknowledged that the court of 
appeals opinion would likely result in an acquittal with no 
retrial.  
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
13 
 
¶29 The State petitioned for review, and we granted the 
petition.  The State now asserts that this court should reverse 
the court of appeals' decision.  It argues that: (1) Watkins did 
not have a valid claim of accident because such a defense 
requires that the actor be performing a lawful act and Watkins 
was unlawfully pointing a loaded gun at Malone; (2) in finding 
that Watkins killed Malone intentionally, the court found that 
the State had disproved Watkins' accident defense; (3) the court 
of 
appeals 
applied 
an 
improper 
standard 
of 
review——the 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence——when assessing the circuit 
court's findings; (4) there is sufficient evidence in the record 
to support Watkins' conviction; and (5) the controversy was 
fully and fairly tried and Watkins is not entitled to a new 
trial.   
¶30 Watkins contends that this court should affirm the 
court of appeals or grant a new trial.  He asserts that: (1) he 
was engaged in a lawful act of self-defense when Malone attacked 
him and they struggled for the gun; (2) the shooting was an 
accident; (3) the court of appeals properly reviewed the circuit 
court's findings and properly determined that the circuit court 
did not find that the State disproved Watkins' accident defense; 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
14 
 
or (4) he is entitled to a new trial in the interest of 
justice.11 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶31 Watkins asserted at trial that he was acting in lawful 
self-defense when he pointed the gun at Malone.  He did not, 
however, claim that he shot Malone while acting in self-defense.  
He insisted that he did not intentionally pull the trigger, even 
in self-defense, but that the shooting occurred accidentally 
while he and Malone struggled for possession of the gun. 
¶32 The court of appeals decided this case on the issue of 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
evidence, 
determining 
that 
there 
was 
insufficient evidence admitted at trial to disprove Watkins' 
accident defense.  Id. at ¶17.  An understanding of the 
interplay among accident, intent, and self-defense is necessary 
to review this case.  We therefore begin our review by examining 
the accident defense and its relationships to intent and self-
defense. 
A.  Accident and Intent 
¶33 "Accident" is a defense to homicide recognized at 
common law and specifically recognized in Wisconsin statutes 
                                                 
11 The parties also disagree as to whether Watkins' trial 
counsel was ineffective in not presenting evidence of Malone's 
character 
to 
show 
that 
he 
acted 
consistently 
with 
that 
character, whether the 30-year prison sentence was excessive, 
and whether the circuit court erred in sentencing Watkins 
without considering information regarding Malone's character and 
history of violence.  None of these issues was addressed in the 
court of appeals majority opinion, and we need not reach them 
here. 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
15 
 
dating back to 1849.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 133, §§ 6-7 (1849).  
The 1849 statutes divided homicides into four categories: 
murder, 
manslaughter, 
justifiable 
homicide, 
and 
excusable 
homicide.  Wis. Stat. ch. 133, § 1 (1849).  Homicides committed 
by accident were deemed "excusable." 
 
Such homicide is excusable when committed, by 
accident and misfortune . . . or in doing any other 
lawful act by lawful means with usual and ordinary 
caution, and without any unlawful intent; or by 
accident and misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon 
any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a 
sudden combat without any undue advantage being taken, 
and without any dangerous weapon being used, and not 
done in a cruel or unusual manner. 
Wis. Stat. ch. 133,  § 6 (1849) (emphasis added). 
¶34 Excusable 
homicides 
were 
distinguished 
from 
justifiable homicides, which consisted of homicides committed 
under various circumstances, including by a person: 
 
When committed in the lawful defence of such 
person, or of his or her husband, wife, parent, child, 
master, mistress, or servant, when there shall be a 
reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a 
felony, or to do some great personal injury, and there 
shall 
be 
imminent 
damage 
of 
such 
design 
being 
accomplished. 
Wis. Stat. ch. 133, § 5.2 (1849) (emphasis added). 
¶35 The excusable homicide statute remained in virtually 
identical form until 1956.12  Section 340.30 (1953) provided in 
part: 
 
                                                 
12 These statutes were renumbered several times.  In 1925 
they became Wis. Stat. §§ 340.30 and 340.31.  See ch. 4, Laws of 
1925. 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
16 
 
Excusable homicide.  Such homicide is excusable when 
committed by accident and misfortune . . . or in doing 
any other lawful act by lawful means with usual and 
ordinary 
caution 
and 
without 
any 
unlawful 
intent. . . . 
¶36 When 
the 
legislature 
substantially 
revised 
the 
Wisconsin Criminal Code, it repealed § 340.30.  See § 63, ch. 
696, Laws of 1955; see also State v. Seifert, 155 Wis. 2d 53, 
63, 454 N.W.2d 346 (1990); William A. Platz, The Criminal Code, 
1956 Wis. L. Rev. 350.  The new criminal code established 
affirmative 
defenses 
to 
criminal 
liability, 
specifically: 
intoxication, mistake, privilege, coercion, necessity, self-
defense and defense of others, and defense of property and 
protection against retail theft.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 939.42, 
939.43, 939.44, 939.45, 939.46, 939.47, and 939.49 (1955-56). 
¶37 Accident was not an enumerated defense.  However, two 
reports of the Judiciary Committee, one from 1950 and another 
from 
1953 
make 
clear 
that 
the 
legislature, 
in 
enacting 
Wis. Stat. § 939.45(6) 
(privilege), 
intended 
to 
incorporate 
excusable homicide by accident or misfortune into the statute.  
See V Wisconsin Legislative Council, Judiciary Committee Report 
on the Criminal Code, at 34 (1950); VII Wisconsin Legislative 
Council, Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal Code, at 39 
(1953).  Section 939.45 established that "the defense of 
privilege can be claimed" for various enumerated reasons, 
including: "When for any other reason the actor's conduct is 
privileged by the statutory or common law of this state."  
Wis. Stat. § 939.45(6) (1955-56).  The text of § 939.45(6) has 
remained unchanged since 1956. 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
17 
 
¶38 The parties disagree as to whether accident is truly 
an affirmative defense.  Watkins contends that accident is an 
affirmative defense and that it works as any other affirmative 
defense——once the accused produces some evidence of accident, 
the State must disprove accident beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Conversely, 
the 
State 
asserts 
that 
accident 
is 
not 
an 
affirmative defense, but rather operates only to negative the 
elements of intentional, reckless, or criminally negligent 
conduct. 
¶39 We conclude that accident is not a true affirmative 
defense.  An "affirmative defense" is defined in Black's Law 
Dictionary as "a defendant's assertion raising new facts and 
arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff's or 
prosecution's claim even if all allegations in the complaint are 
true."  Black's Law Dictionary 151 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis 
added).  To illustrate, a defendant who successfully raises the 
affirmative defense of perfect self-defense may be found not 
guilty even if the State proves that the defendant killed a 
person intentionally. 
¶40 This court has long viewed affirmative defenses in 
precisely 
this 
manner: 
"An 
affirmative 
defense 
does 
not 
implicate proof of elements of the crime."  State v. Stoehr, 134 
Wis. 2d 66, 84 n.8, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986) (citing V Wisconsin 
Legislative Council, Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal 
Code, at 54 (1953)).  In State v. Schulz, this court 
differentiated between an affirmative defense and "an element of 
the crime," stating that "[an] affirmative defense . . . does 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
18 
 
not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is 
to prove in order to convict."  102 Wis. 2d 423, 429, 307 N.W.2d 
151 (1981) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-07 
(1977)). 
¶41 Accident is a defense that negatives intent, and may 
negative lesser mental elements.  In State v. Bond, a case in 
which a defendant attempted to invoke the accident defense, we 
stated: 
 
[The defendant] claims the most the state proved 
was homicide by misadventure.  This is a legalistic 
way 
of 
stating 
the 
killing 
was 
an 
accident.  
Misadventure is described as an excusable homicide 
such as when a person unfortunately kills another in 
doing a lawful act without any intent to kill and 
without criminal negligence. 
41 Wis. 2d 219, 228, 163 N.W.2d 601 (1969) (emphasis added).  If 
a person kills another by accident, the killing could not have 
been intentional.  As the court of appeals has stated, "All 
reasonable persons know that intent is the antithesis of 
accident."  State v. Ambuehl, 145 Wis. 2d 343, 352, 425 
N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1988).  Because accident negatives intent, it 
cannot truly 
be an affirmative defense to 
a 
charge of 
intentional homicide.  See Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d at 84 n.8. 
¶42 In theory, as the defendant argues, accident may also 
negative causation.  See Hall v. State, 431 A.2d 1258, 1259 
(Del. 1981).  However, this objective is usually subsidiary to 
negativing intent, because an accident defense cannot succeed if 
the state proves intent.   
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
19 
 
¶43 The State recognizes that although accident is not an 
affirmative defense, the court must still disprove accident 
beyond a reasonable doubt when a defendant raises it as a 
defense.13  It contends, however, that when the State proves 
intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt, it necessarily 
disproves accident.  We agree.  The accident defense prevails in 
a homicide case only 
in 
situations 
in which 
"a 
person 
unfortunately kills another in doing a lawful act without any 
intent to kill and without criminal negligence."  Bond, 41 
Wis. 2d at 228 (emphasis added); see also Wis. Stat. § 340.30 
(1953) 
(defining 
"excusable 
homicide" 
as 
"homicide . . . committed by accident and misfortune . . . in 
doing any . . . lawful act by lawful means with usual and 
ordinary 
caution 
and 
without 
any 
unlawful 
intent").  
Consequently, the State disproves accident in a case of first- 
or second-degree intentional homicide if it proves intent to 
kill beyond a reasonable doubt.  It disproves accident in other 
homicides if it proves all the elements of the respective 
                                                 
13 We stated in Moes v. State that: 
[P]rior to the codification of the criminal code in 
1955, the state was required to disprove beyond 
reasonable doubt statutory defenses of excuse or 
justification 
presented 
by 
the 
defense. 
 
These 
defenses were redefined in the 1955 criminal code as 
"privilege," and the precodification allocation of 
burden 
of 
proof 
was 
expressly 
preserved. . . . [Section] 
939.70, 
Stats. 
indicates 
that the state must still bear the burden of proof 
once a defense of excuse or justification is raised. 
91 Wis. 2d 756, 764-65, 284 N.W.2d 66 (1979). 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
20 
 
homicide or it disproves that the defendant was acting lawfully 
or that the defendant was acting without criminal negligence.   
B.  Accident and Self-Defense  
¶44 Watkins asserted at trial that he was acting in self-
defense when he pointed a gun at Malone, and that the gun fired 
because of an accident.  Although self-defense permits the 
threat of force or intentional use of force, and although 
accident negatives intent, the parties agree that a claim of 
self-defense is not necessarily inconsistent with a concurrent 
claim of accident.  In State v. Gomaz, 141 Wis. 2d 302, 313, 414 
N.W.2d 626 (1987), this court found no inconsistency when a 
defendant who wielded a knife claimed that she acted in self-
defense and also asserted that the stabbing of the victim 
occurred 
because 
the 
victim 
"overtook 
[the 
defendant's] 
intentions by forcing himself upon her."  The court noted that, 
"Other jurisdictions have similarly held that assertions of 
self-defense and accident are not always inconsistent, such as 
to require rejection of one in order to accept the other."  Id. 
at 313 n.7. 
¶45 The 
parties 
cite 
various 
cases 
from 
other 
jurisdictions, and other sources, for the proposition that self-
defense and accident are not necessarily inconsistent.  In Gunn 
v. State, 365 N.E.2d 1234, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977), the court 
stated that "[B]ecause the proper exercise of the right to 
defend oneself is a lawful act, such an act may satisfy the 
requirement that the accused be engaged in a lawful act when a 
killing occurs accidentally."  In Commonwealth v. Turner, 506 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
21 
 
N.E.2d 151, 153 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987), the court stated, "[T]he 
principles of self-defense may be involved in an accident 
defense, not for purposes of establishing the defense of self-
defense but to show that the defendant was engaged in a lawful 
act."  Similarly, an "accused is entitled to be acquitted where 
he was lawfully acting in self-defense and his assailant's death 
resulted from misadventure or accident, such as the accidental 
discharge of a weapon in the struggle over its possession."  A 
Treatise on the Law of Crimes (Clark & Marshall) § 7.02, at 476 
(Callaghan & Company 7th ed., 1967).  We agree with the cited 
decisions and treatises that self-defense and accident are not 
mutually exclusive.  We agree also that a defendant may 
demonstrate that he or she was acting lawfully——a necessary 
element of an accident defense——by showing that he or she was 
acting in lawful self-defense. 
¶46 Watkins contends that he was acting in lawful self-
defense "in drawing the gun and pointing it at Malone in self-
defense, to keep Malone at bay until Supervisor Dorr arrived."   
¶47 By contrast, the State contends that Watkins cannot 
assert an accident defense because he pointed the gun at Malone, 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(c), Endangering safety by 
use of a dangerous weapon.14  According to the State's theory, 
the evidence at trial established that: 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 941.20 provides in part: 
(1) Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a 
Class A misdemeanor: 
 . . . . 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
22 
 
 
Watkins was not acting in self-defense when he pointed 
the gun at Malone.  Because Watkins was not acting in 
self-defense, his pointing a gun at Malone was an 
unlawful act; and, even if Malone was killed during a 
struggle for the gun, the defense of accident does not 
apply since the killing would have occurred while 
Watkins was engaged in an unlawful act of pointing a 
gun. 
The State further asserts that, "Because the evidence supported 
the trial court's conclusion that Watkins was not acting in 
self-defense, the evidence was sufficient to disprove the 
defense of accident." 
¶48 Watkins counters that in finding him guilty of second-
degree intentional homicide, imperfect self-defense, "the trial 
court did indeed find that Watkins was acting lawfully in self 
defense, at least up to the instant when Malone was shot." 
¶49 The circuit court in this case found that Watkins' 
actions 
constituted 
imperfect 
self-defense, 
but 
did 
not 
specifically address the issue of whether he was acting lawfully 
in pointing the gun at Malone. 
¶50 The court of appeals did address this issue, and 
rejected the State's position, which it characterized as 
"Watkins, having introduced a loaded gun into a volatile 
situation, could not claim that the shooting was accidental."  
Watkins, 2001 WI App 103, ¶24.  The court of appeals stated, "We 
cannot conclude . . . as a matter of law, that a person, fearing 
further attack, who arms himself with a loaded gun, points it at 
the aggressor, warns him to stay away, and calls for help has 
                                                                                                                                                             
(c) Intentionally points a firearm at or toward another. 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
23 
 
precluded the invocation of an accident defense to a shooting 
that occurs when the aggressor struggles for the gun."  Id. at 
¶25.  We agree. 
¶51 The text of the self-defense statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.48, answers the question.  We examine the text to 
ascertain under what circumstances the privilege of self-defense 
may authorize a person to lawfully point a gun at another 
person. 
¶52 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.48(1) 
consists 
of 
three 
sentences.15  The first sentence establishes the privilege to 
threaten or intentionally use force to prevent or terminate what 
the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference 
with his or her person. 
¶53 The second sentence limits the use or threat of force 
to only that force which the person reasonably believes is 
necessary to prevent or terminate the unlawful interference. 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.48(1) provides: 
Self-defense and defense of others.  (1) A person 
is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force 
against another for the purpose of preventing or 
terminating what the person reasonably believes to be 
an unlawful interference with his or her person by 
such other person. The actor may intentionally use 
only such force or threat thereof as the actor 
reasonably 
believes 
is 
necessary 
to 
prevent 
or 
terminate 
the 
interference. 
The 
actor 
may 
not 
intentionally use force which is intended or likely to 
cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor 
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself 
or herself. 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
24 
 
¶54 The third sentence limits the use of deadly force, 
restricting its use to situations in which the person reasonably 
believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent 
death or great bodily harm.  The third sentence does not limit 
the threat of deadly force, only the use of deadly force. 
¶55 Reading all three sentences together, it is clear that 
under the plain language of § 939.48(1) a person may use deadly 
force only when the person reasonably believes that the use of 
deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great 
bodily harm.  But the person may threaten to use deadly force if 
the person reasonably believes that the threat is necessary to 
prevent or terminate an unlawful interference. 
¶56 One 
who 
violates 
Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(c) 
by 
"intentionally point[ing] a firearm at or toward another," 
threatens the use of force.  It follows that under the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1) a person is privileged to 
point a gun at another person in self-defense if the person 
reasonably believes that such a threat of force is necessary to 
prevent or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be an 
unlawful interference. 
¶57 This reading is confirmed by Wis. Stat. § 939.45, 
which provides in part: "The fact that the actor's conduct is 
privileged, although otherwise criminal, is a defense to 
prosecution for any crime based on that conduct" (emphasis 
added).  The section continues:  "The defense of privilege can 
be claimed under any one of the following circumstances: . . . . 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
25 
 
(2) When the actor's conduct is in defense of persons . . . 
under any of the circumstances described in s. 939.48 . . . ."16 
¶58 As noted above, the defense of accident is a defense 
to a charge of intentional homicide only if the person who 
caused the death was acting lawfully and with no criminal 
intent.  We conclude that pointing a gun at another person as a 
threat of force does not necessarily preclude the possibility of 
asserting the accident defense so long as the person reasonably 
believes that such a threat of force is necessary to prevent or 
terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be an unlawful 
interference.  See State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___, and State v. Camacho, 176 Wis. 2d 860, 865, 872, 
501 N.W.2d 380 (1993) for a discussion of the objective 
reasonable threshold necessary to assert perfect self-defense. 
C.  Claims of Self-Defense in Intentional Homicide Prosecutions 
¶59 Watkins 
was 
tried 
on 
a 
charge 
of 
first-degree 
intentional homicide, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 940.01, but was 
convicted of second-degree intentional homicide, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 940.05.  We therefore turn next to the relationship 
between first-degree intentional homicide and second-degree 
intentional homicide, in cases involving claims of self-defense.  
¶60 Wisconsin 
Stat. § 940.01, 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide, has two elements:  (1) the causing of death, (2) with 
intent to kill.  Section 940.01 provides in relevant part: 
 
                                                 
16 For a discussion of privilege, see State v. Dundon, 226 
Wis. 2d 654, 594 N.W.2d 780 (1999). 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
26 
 
(1) OFFENSES.  (a) Except as provided in sub. 
(2), whoever causes the death of another human being 
with intent to kill that person or another is guilty 
of a Class A felony. 
 
 . . . . 
 
(2) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.  The following are 
affirmative defenses to prosecution under this section 
which mitigate the offense to 2nd-degree intentional 
homicide under s. 940.05: 
 
(a) Adequate provocation. . . .  
 
(b) Unnecessary defensive force.  Death was 
caused because the actor believed he or she or another 
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm 
and that the force used was necessary to defend the 
endangered person, if either belief was unreasonable. 
 
(c) Prevention of felony. . . .   
 
(d) Coercion; necessity. . . .   
 
(3) BURDEN OF PROOF.  When the existence of an 
affirmative defense under sub. (2) has been placed in 
issue by the trial evidence, the state must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts constituting 
the defense did not exist in order to sustain a 
finding of guilt under sub. (1). 
¶61 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.05, 
second-degree 
intentional 
homicide, has the same two elements:  (1) the causing of death, 
(2) with the intent to kill.  The difference between the two 
degrees of intentional homicide is that with first-degree 
intentional homicide, there are no circumstances which mitigate 
the offense to second-degree intentional homicide.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 940.05, second-degree intentional homicide, provides in 
relevant part: 
 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
27 
 
(1) Whoever causes the death of another human 
being with intent to kill that person or another is 
guilty of a Class B felony if: 
 
(a) In prosecutions under s. 940.01, the state 
fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01(2) did 
not exist as required by s. 940.01(3); . . .   
¶62 The mitigating factors that can reduce first-degree 
intentional homicide to second-degree intentional homicide are 
adequate provocation, unnecessary defensive force, prevention of 
a felony, and coercion or necessity.  Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(a)-
(d).  The state is not obligated to disprove all possible 
mitigating 
circumstances 
every 
time 
it 
prosecutes 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.01.  It must disprove a mitigating circumstance 
beyond a reasonable doubt only when the mitigating circumstance 
is placed in issue by the trial evidence.  To be placed in 
issue, there must be "some" evidence in the trial record. See 
Head, 2002 WI 99; State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 511, 329 
N.W.2d 161 (1983). 
¶63 The mitigating circumstance at issue in this case is 
unnecessary defensive force, the equivalent of imperfect self-
defense.  Wisconsin Stat. § 940.01(2)(b) provides in part:  
 
(b) Unnecessary defensive force.  Death was 
caused because the actor believed he or she or another 
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm 
and that the force used was necessary to defend the 
endangered person, if either belief was unreasonable. 
¶64 Unnecessary 
defensive 
force 
mirrors 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.48, self-defense and defense of others, which provides: 
 
(1) A person is privileged to threaten or 
intentionally 
use 
force 
against 
another 
for the 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
28 
 
purpose of preventing or terminating what the person 
reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference 
with his or her person by such other person.  The 
actor may intentionally use such force or threat 
thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary 
to prevent or terminate the interference.  The actor 
may not intentionally use force which is intended or 
likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the 
actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary 
to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to 
himself or herself (emphasis added). 
¶65 The present jury instruction on self-defense, Wis JI——
Criminal 1014 explains "the effect of the law of self-defense" 
in a situation in which a person uses or threatens to use force 
in a defensive manner:  
 
[I]f the defendant. . . reasonably believed the 
force used was necessary to prevent imminent death or 
great bodily harm to himself, the defendant is not 
guilty of either first or second degree intentional 
homicide. 
 
If the defendant . . . actually but unreasonably 
believed the force used was necessary to prevent 
imminent death or great bodily harm to himself, the 
defendant is guilty of second degree intentional 
homicide. 
 
If the defendant . . . did not actually believe 
the force used was necessary to prevent imminent death 
or great bodily harm to himself, the defendant is 
guilty of first degree intentional homicide. 
¶66 Having discussed the workings of accident, intent, and 
self-defense, and the relationship between first and second-
degree intentional homicide, we examine the circuit court's 
findings and decision in this case.  We first address the proper 
standards for our review. 
D.  Standards for Determining Sufficiency of Evidence 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
29 
 
¶67 The 
standard 
for 
determining 
whether 
sufficient 
evidence supports a finding of guilt by a jury or a circuit 
court is complicated, but well established.  In State v. 
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990), we addressed 
the standards applicable to circumstantial as opposed to direct 
evidence, and the standards applied by the circuit court in 
finding sufficient evidence for a conviction.  We stated that, 
"Regardless of whether the evidence presented at trial to prove 
guilt is direct or circumstantial, it must be sufficiently 
strong and convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis 
consistent with the defendant's innocence in order to meet the 
demanding standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."17  Id. at 
                                                 
17 Review of a circuit court's decision on sufficiency of 
evidence is made complicated because appellate courts do not 
independently apply the "reasonable hypothesis" test. 
'The burden of proof is upon the state to prove every 
essential 
element 
of 
the 
crime 
charged 
beyond 
reasonable doubt.  The test is not whether this court 
or any of the members thereof are convinced [of the 
defendant's 
guilt] 
beyond 
reasonable 
doubt, 
but 
whether this court can conclude the trier of facts 
could, acting reasonably, be so convinced by evidence 
it 
had 
a 
right 
to 
believe 
and 
accept 
as 
true. . . . The credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight of the evidence is for the trier of fact.  In 
reviewing the evidence to challenge a finding of fact, 
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the finding.  Reasonable inferences drawn from the 
evidence can support a finding of fact and, if more 
than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the 
evidence, the inference which supports the finding is 
the one that must be adopted. . . .'  
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
30 
 
502 (citing Schwantes v. State, 127 Wis. 160, 176, 106 N.W. 237 
(1906)).  Under this standard, a defendant must be acquitted at 
trial unless the evidence which the jury believes and relies 
upon to support its verdict cannot be reconciled to support any 
reasonable theory consistent with the innocence of the accused.  
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 502. 
¶68 Poellinger 
also 
discussed 
standards 
used 
by 
an 
appellate court in reviewing the judge or jury's determination.  
We said: 
 
[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a conviction, an appellate court may not 
substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact 
unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the 
state and the conviction, is so lacking in probative 
value and force that no trier of fact, acting 
reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
153 Wis. 2d at 507 (citing State v. Wilson, 149 Wis. 2d 878, 
894, 440 N.W.2d 534 (1989)).  Under this standard, a reviewing 
court may overturn a verdict on grounds of insufficiency of the 
evidence only if the trier of fact could not possibly have drawn 
the appropriate inferences from the evidence adduced at trial to 
find the requisite guilt.  It may not overturn a verdict "even 
if it believes that the trier of fact should not have found 
guilt based on the evidence before it."  Id. 
 
E. 
The Circuit Court's Findings and Decision in Light of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 503-04, 451 N.W.2d 752 
(1990) (quoting Johnson v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 144, 147, 197 
N.W.2d 760 (1972) (quoting Bautista v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 218, 
223, 191 N.W.2d 725 (1971))). 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
31 
 
Standards for Accident, Intent, and Self-Defense 
¶69 The circuit court in this case found Watkins guilty of 
second-degree intentional homicide.  To reach this conclusion, 
the court first had to determine that the State proved that (1) 
Watkins killed Malone, and (2) Watkins intended to kill Malone.  
When the statute uses the phrase "with intent to," it means that 
the actor "has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result 
specified, or is aware that his . . . conduct is practically 
certain to cause that result."  Wis. Stat. § 939.23(4).  Hence, 
the circuit court had to determine, in effect, that Watkins had 
a purpose to kill Malone.  The court then had to determine 
whether self-defense was placed in issue by the trial evidence.   
¶70 Charged 
with 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide, 
Watkins was entitled to conviction of the mitigated charge of 
second-degree intentional homicide if the State failed to 
disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually believed 
that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm or 
that he actually believed that he had used the amount of force 
necessary to protect himself, even if one of those beliefs was 
unreasonable.  Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b).  He was entitled to be 
found not guilty unless the State disproved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that one of those beliefs was reasonable.  Head, 2002 WI 
99. 
¶71 In finding Watkins guilty of second-degree intentional 
homicide, the circuit court stated: 
 
[T]he Court finds that the State has proven the charge 
of second degree intentional homicide where privilege 
of self-defense is an issue, and further I will find 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
32 
 
that the defendant did intentionally kill the victim 
while believing that he was in danger but used more 
force than was reasonably necessary in the situation.   
¶72 The circuit court found that Watkins caused Malone's 
death: "That [Watkins] caused the death of [Malone] is really 
not in dispute.  It was supported by the testimony of the 
medical examiner and the defendant himself." 
¶73 The circuit court found that the State proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Watkins intended to kill Malone.  It 
stated: 
 
[H]is intent was made, clearly, by his taking the gun 
out, putting the clip in the gun, pulling the slide 
back and loading the bullet in the chamber, moving 
toward the victim, his statements of——to his foreman, 
get down here before I kill him, he then discharged 
the weapon within one to three inches of the victim, 
and his statement afterwards, I killed him, I do 
believe forms a more than adequate basis to find that 
the State has proven that element beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
 
I don't believe that the defendant formed the 
intent well in advance of the action or even minutes 
in advance, but the evidence supports that when the 
victim approached him and reached for the gun, whether 
you call it instinct or not, he formed the requisite 
intent and acted upon it and rejected other available 
options. 
¶74 The circuit court also found that Watkins "used more 
force than was necessary in the situation."  More specifically, 
it found that: 
 
[T]he defendant did not reasonably believe that the 
force used was necessary to prevent the imminent death 
or great bodily harm to himself.  A reasonable person 
in circumstances of the defendant would not have 
believed that the amount of force used by the 
defendant was necessary to prevent imminent death or 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
33 
 
great bodily harm.  A reasonable person might fear the 
victim's anger, and I think this defendant did. 
 
And the injuries to [Watkins'] head and chest, as 
well as the DNA under [Malone's] fingernails, support 
the testimony that a struggle did take place, but the 
statement [Watkins] made to Detective Antreassian on 
the same day was that at no time did [Malone] 
physically punch or assault him, and during the 
testimony of the trial, [Watkins] stated that he never 
thought of leaving the room because he was not that 
scared, and even after the third confrontation, his 
testimony was that he was a little afraid, but things 
were not out of control.   
 
The situation that he described does not support 
a belief that it was reasonable that he could be in 
fear of imminent death or great bodily harm. . . . 
¶75 As quoted above, the court made clear that it found 
Watkins not to have reasonably believed that he was in imminent 
danger of danger of death or great bodily harm, and not to have 
reasonably believed that he needed to take the steps he took and 
to use the force he used to prevent death or great bodily harm. 
¶76 Under 
the 
standard 
of 
review 
established 
in 
Poellinger, we must draw any required inferences in favor of the 
verdict reached by the circuit court.  153 Wis. 2d at 504.  In 
addition, we may assume that any finding of fact not made by the 
circuit court can be "determined in a manner that supports the 
circuit court's ultimate decision."  State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 
5, ¶31, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552. 
¶77 It is vitally important to maintain this standard of 
review.  An appellate court should not sit as a jury making 
findings of fact and applying the hypothesis of innocence rule 
de novo to the evidence presented at trial.  Poellinger, 153 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
34 
 
Wis. 2d at 505-06.  "It is not the role of an appellate court to 
do that."  Id. at 506.  Because there are echoes of the 
hypothesis of innocence rule in the court of appeals decision, 
we are reluctant to reverse the defendant's conviction and 
affirm the court of appeals on grounds that the evidence was not 
sufficient to sustain the conviction.  We conclude that the 
record contains sufficient evidence to support the conviction.   
¶78 At the same time, we share the court of appeals' 
concern that something in this case is seriously amiss.  
Consequently, we reverse the defendant's conviction pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 751.06, and remand the case to the circuit court 
for a new trial.   
F.  Discretionary Reversal 
¶79 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.06 recognizes our authority to 
reverse a judgment or order appealed from "if it appears from 
the record that the real controversy has not been fully tried, 
or it is probable that justice has for any reason miscarried."  
We 
understand 
that 
this 
discretionary 
reversal 
power 
is 
formidable.  It should be exercised sparingly and with great 
caution.  Graff v. Roop, 7 Wis. 2d 603, 606, 97 N.W.2d 393 
(1959).  We are convinced that it should be applied here. 
¶80 There are several reasons for our decision: 
¶81 First, the circuit court did not provide a clear 
analysis of its thinking on the legal issues surrounding self-
defense and accident.  When a case is tried to a jury, all the 
players——judge, 
jury, 
prosecutor, 
defense 
attorney, 
and 
defendant——should understand the parameters of the jury verdict.  
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
35 
 
The preparation of jury instructions forces the parties to 
clarify the issues on the record and identify what charges and 
defenses may be considered by the jury.  When a case is tried to 
the court, the court may reach the same conclusion a jury would 
reach but fail to articulate the operative legal principles for 
its decision.  
¶82 Here, the court determined that the defendant was 
guilty of second-degree intentional homicide.  A fact finder 
should not be permitted to find a defendant guilty of second-
degree intentional homicide unless self-defense has been placed 
in issue by the trial evidence.  In his closing argument, 
Watkins' trial counsel made clear that Watkins did not claim to 
have believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily 
harm at the time he armed himself.  He noted that in Wisconsin, 
a person may threaten the use of force to repel an attack, and 
then stated: 
 
We do not claim that Carroll Watkins felt himself to 
be in danger of sustaining death or great bodily harm 
in the hands of Mr. Malone such that he had the right 
to use deadly force. 
 
What we are saying is that he had a right to 
threaten use of deadly force, a measure of response to 
the series of attacks from which he had to be 
protected, . . . . (emphasis added). 
¶83 The prosecution, in rebuttal to Watkins' closing 
argument, made abundantly clear that it did not think Watkins 
had adequately raised the issue of self-defense:  
 
I believe that if this case was a jury trial, 
that the Court would not be giving any type of self-
defense instruction, that based on the incident that 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
36 
 
happened here there was absolutely no right for this 
defendant to use a gun.  There was no threat of great 
harm to this defendant or there was no threat of death 
to this defendant.  He did not have a right to 
introduce a gun into this argument.  So I don't think 
there should be any theory of self-defense in this 
matter. 
¶84 Thereafter, the court found the defendant guilty of an 
offense that conflicted with the arguments of both counsel.  
There is evidence in the record to support the court's 
determination, but both sides could claim an element of 
surprise.  The defendant's counsel would not have been arguing 
that, "We do not claim that Carroll Watkins felt himself to be 
in danger of sustaining death or great bodily harm" if he knew 
the court would respond by saying that, "The defendant did not 
reasonably believe that the force used was necessary to prevent 
imminent death or great bodily harm." 
¶85 It is not clear from the record exactly how the court 
evaluated the defendant's accident defense at trial.  Accident 
is not mentioned in the court's oral decision.  Had the court 
submitted instructions to the jury, the court and the parties 
could have agreed upon legal principles to work from or at least 
identified 
points 
of 
disagreement. 
 
In 
retrospect, 
the 
defendant's reliance on the accident defense may have been 
grounded on assumptions that would not have survived a jury 
instruction conference.  In a trial to the court, the parties 
and the court must work to assure that all parties share an 
understanding of the principles that will govern the court's 
decision. 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
37 
 
¶86 Second, Watkins complains that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate Glenn Malone's criminal 
history and reputation for violence, and to proffer such 
evidence either at trial or at sentencing.  We have no need here 
to resolve issues about the admissibility of such evidence, but 
we are concerned that counsel appears not to have been aware of 
such evidence, for whatever value it might have been to the 
defendant's case.   
¶87 The defense counsel's preparation contrasts with the 
prosecutor's uncompromising attack on Watkins.  For instance, 
during the trial, the defendant raised questions about his 
Miranda warnings.  He was cross-examined by the prosecutor who 
asked: 
 
Q: 
You've been through Miranda rights before; is 
that correct? 
 
A: 
Been a long, long time, but yes. 
 
Q: 
Well -- You've -- were arrested for assault, is 
that correct, in the State of -- in the State of 
Nebraska; is that correct? 
 
A: 
I believe, yes, sir. 
 
Q: 
And you were advised of your Miranda rights when 
you were arrested for assault; is that right? 
 
A: 
Yes, sir. 
 
Q: 
And you were advised of your Miranda rights in 
the State of Nebraska for disorderly conduct and 
resisting arrest; is that correct? 
 
A: 
Yes. 
 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
38 
 
Q: 
So you had been through this before, is that 
correct? 
 
A: 
Probably fifteen some years ago, yes, sir. 
A jury would not have been permitted to hear this damaging 
information, which Watkins' counsel should have challenged as 
inadmissible.  See Wis. Stat. § 906.09. 
¶88 Third, the court decided against the defendant on 
virtually every point in contention.  It wrote, in response to 
the motion for post-conviction relief, that "the Court did 
consider the defendant's assertion of accident and found it not 
credible in light of all of the evidence."  It apparently 
dismissed the defendant's testimony of a fourth confrontation, 
in which Watkins claimed that Malone "slammed his fist into my 
jaw, which loosened up my lower plate and ended up cutting my 
gum pretty bad," and that Malone hurled him backwards in his 
chair, slamming his head against the wall.  The court never 
mentioned that incident in its oral decision, even though 
Detective Antreassian had reported that Watkins had told him, 
shortly after the shooting, that "all of a sudden Glenn got up 
again from his bed for the fourth time and he approached 
Watkins, who was still seated in the chair, and he grabbed 
Watkins with both hands around the front part of the hooded 
sweatshirt and lifted Watkins completely off the chair, throwing 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
39 
 
him back in the chair, saying he was going to fuck him up."18  
The court was impressed with a seemingly contradictory statement 
in the police report, to the effect that "at no time did Glenn 
physically punch or assault" Watkins, but the court left out the 
second half of the sentence: "but did grab him by the front of 
the sweatshirt and shook him intensely."  This same sentence 
fragment  is used to rebut the defendant's claim of a struggle.  
The court briefly acknowledges "testimony that a struggle did 
take place," but the court never discussed any struggle for the 
gun.  
¶89 We have difficulty reconciling these findings with the 
court's necessary but unstated finding that Watkins had an 
actual belief in an unlawful interference with his person and an 
actual but unreasonable belief that the force he used was 
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.  These 
findings are implicit in a finding of second-degree intentional 
homicide based upon unnecessary defensive force.  The court 
minimized any struggle but emphasized that Watkins' gun was 
discharged "within one to three inches of the victim."  The 
court said that the proximity of the weapon was evidence of 
intent to kill.  Nonetheless, the court found mitigating 
circumstances, imperfect self-defense.   
                                                 
18 The 
criminal 
complaint, 
sworn 
to 
by 
Detective 
Antreassian, summed up the fourth confrontation as follows: 
"Carroll Watkins stated that Glenn Malone then stomped off and 
went back to bed.  Carroll Watkins became upset.  Carroll 
Watkins stated that he was upset because Glenn Malone had lifted 
him up more forcefully." 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
40 
 
¶90 Fourth, the court so heavily emphasized retreat that 
it raises questions about its analysis of the evidence.  The 
court said: 
(1) The defendant "formed the requisite intent and acted 
upon it and rejected other available options." 
(2) "A reasonable person would probably want to get the 
heck out of that room. . . . [T]he door was always a 
reasonable option.  The defendant was closest to the 
door and went for the gun instead . . . ." 
(3) "[E]ven though he had no duty to retreat from the 
room, I can't find that lethal force would be 
necessary if he could have taken just a few steps and 
been free and away from the victim."   
(4) "He had the opportunity to retreat with safety.  
Retreat seems, clearly, to have been a viable option 
and 
one 
that 
he 
knew 
about 
during 
the 
entire 
confrontation, but according to his testimony, never 
considered."   
(5) A reasonable person would not take the steps that the 
defendant took in the circumstances that he found 
himself in . . . never retreating . . . ." 
¶91 The rule on retreat was stated by this court in Miller 
v. State, 139 Wis. 57, 75-76, 119 N.W. 850 (1909):   
 
[The common law rule of retreat] has been superseded 
by a doctrine in harmony with the divine right of 
self-defense; the doctrine that when one is where he 
has a right to be and does not create the danger by 
his own wrongful conduct, he may stand his ground, if 
assailed by another, and in case of his honestly and 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
41 
 
reasonably believing himself to be in imminent danger 
of losing his life or receiving some great bodily harm 
at the hands of such other, he may use such means as, 
presently to him, reasonably, seem necessary to avert 
the impending danger, even to taking the life of his 
assailant. 
¶92 More recently, the rule was discussed in such cases as 
State v. Herriges, 155 Wis. 2d 297, 455 N.W.2d 635 (Ct. App. 
1990), and State v. Wenger, 225 Wis. 2d 495, 593 N.W.2d 467 
(1999).  Wenger discusses Wis JI——Criminal 810, entitled "Self-
Defense:  Retreat," which reads:   
 
 
There is no duty to retreat.  However, in 
determining whether the defendant reasonably believed 
the amount of force used was necessary to prevent or 
terminate the interference, you may consider whether 
the defendant had the opportunity to retreat with 
safety, whether such retreat was feasible, and whether 
the defendant knew of the opportunity to retreat 
(emphasis added). 
¶93 As part of his closing argument, the prosecutor said: 
 
Mr. Watkins did not have to introduce a gun into this 
event.  This was basically a fairly nonserious type of 
argument prior to this defendant introducing the gun 
into the event.  There were many alternatives, 
certainly. 
 
 
The jury instruction says that in a self-defense 
case that the defendant does not have a -- does not 
have a duty to retreat, though it's something that the 
Court should consider in making its finding, and I 
think here it's clear that there was not even close to 
the need for the type of force that this defendant 
used to stop whatever minor skirmish that was going on 
between the defendant and Mr. Malone. 
¶94 It is clear that the court was persuaded by the 
argument that the defendant had better options than getting his 
gun.  The court's reliance on the principles in the instruction 
in analyzing the mere introduction of the gun, gives the 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
42 
 
appearance of nullifying the retreat rule.  Watkins was arguably 
in a room where he had a right to be, was not the aggressor, and 
did not use deadly force when he threatened Malone with a gun.  
¶95 Fifth, 
the 
defendant 
received 
a 
30-year 
prison 
sentence.  This sentence shocked Judge Fine, who sided with the 
State in voting to uphold the conviction.  Judge Fine wrote:  
"Given Watkins's concededly exemplary life prior to this tragic 
shooting, I believe that the sentence is shockingly not 'right 
and proper under the circumstances.'"  Watkins, 244 Wis. 2d at 
228 (Fine, J., dissenting).  The court's lengthy sentence simply 
adds to this court's conclusion that the conviction should be 
reversed in the interest of justice.  
¶96 Although we reverse the defendant's conviction on 
grounds different from the grounds stated by the court of 
appeals, we recognize and commend the meticulous review of the 
evidence embodied in the court's opinion. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶97 To order a new trial because the real controversy has 
not been fully tried, this court need not determine that a new 
trial would likely yield a different result.  We stated in 
Vollmer v. Luety that:  
 
[U]nder 
the 
first 
category, 
when 
the 
real 
controversy has not been fully tried, an appellate 
court may exercise its power of discretionary reversal 
without finding the probability of a different result 
on retrial.  Under the second category [justice has 
miscarried], however, an appellate court must first 
find a substantial probability of a different result 
on 
retrial 
before 
exercising 
its 
discretionary 
reversal power. 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
43 
 
156 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990) (citing State v. Wyss, 
124 Wis. 2d 681, 735, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1985)). 
¶98 In this case it is far from clear whether a new trial 
will result in a different verdict, or in precisely the same 
verdict previously rendered.  However, for the reasons stated 
above, we conclude that this case has not been fully and fairly 
tried.  Accordingly, we modify and affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals reversing Watkins' conviction.  We further 
remand the case to the circuit court for a new trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified and affirmed and, as modified, the cause is remanded to 
the circuit court. 
¶99 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No. 00-0064-CR 
 
 
 
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