Case Title: State v. Wilson

Citation: 2011-Ohio-2669

Docket Number: 20100897

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Wilson, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2669.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-2669 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WILSON, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Wilson, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2669.] 
Criminal law — When a cause is remanded to a trial court to correct an allied-
offenses sentencing error, the trial court must hold a new sentencing 
hearing for the offenses that remain after the state selects which allied 
offense or offenses to pursue — A defendant is not barred by res judicata 
from raising objections to issues that arise in a resentencing hearing, 
even if similar issues arose and were not objected to at the original 
sentencing hearing. 
(No. 2010-0897 — Submitted April 5, 2011 — Decided June 8, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 91971, 
2010-Ohio-1196. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. When a cause is remanded to a trial court to correct an allied-offenses 
sentencing error, the trial court must hold a new sentencing hearing for the 
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offenses that remain after the state selects which allied offense or offenses 
to pursue. 
2. A defendant is not barred by res judicata from raising objections to issues that 
arise in a resentencing hearing, even if similar issues arose and were not 
objected to at the original sentencing hearing. 
__________________ 
MCGEE BROWN, J. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Eighth District 
Court of Appeals that vacated a defendant’s sentences and remanded the cause 
with instructions to conduct a new sentencing hearing at which the state would 
elect which of the offenses to pursue for sentencing.  We affirm the judgment of 
the court of appeals and hold that on a remand for resentencing based on an 
allied-offenses error, the trial court is not limited to merely accepting the 
prosecution’s election among allied offenses.  Instead, once the prosecutor makes 
his selection, the trial court is required to hold a new sentencing hearing to impose 
sentences for the remaining offenses. 
Background 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Joseph Wilson, was tried before a jury and found guilty 
on three counts: aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and kidnapping.  The 
offenses arose from an incident in which Wilson and five or six other people 
robbed and beat a man. 
{¶ 3} The trial court imposed a sentence of ten years for the aggravated-
robbery conviction, eight years for the assault conviction, and seven years for the 
kidnapping conviction.  The trial court ordered that the sentences be served 
consecutively, for a total of 25 years. 
{¶ 4} On appeal, Wilson argued to the Eighth District Court of Appeals 
that the three offenses for which he was convicted were allied offenses of similar 
import and thus should have been merged into one offense for sentencing.  Wilson 
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also argued that his sentence was inconsistent with the sentences imposed upon 
his codefendants and that the trial judge’s statements during his sentencing 
hearing indicated judicial bias. 
{¶ 5} Pursuant to R.C. 2941.25 and related jurisprudence from this court, 
the court of appeals held that kidnapping and felonious assault were allied 
offenses of similar import, that kidnapping and aggravated robbery were allied 
offenses of similar import, and that the facts developed at trial indicated that 
Wilson did not have a separate animus for committing the kidnapping.  The court 
of appeals also held that felonious assault and aggravated robbery were not allied 
offenses of similar import and concluded that those two offenses were not subject 
to merger. 
{¶ 6} Relying on this court’s decision in State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio 
St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, the court of appeals vacated Wilson’s 
sentence and remanded the matter for a new sentencing hearing at which the 
prosecutor would have the opportunity to elect which of the allied offenses he 
wanted to pursue for sentencing.  The appellate court dismissed Wilson’s 
assignments of error regarding judicial bias and sentencing disparity as moot, 
given its decision to vacate the sentences imposed for all three of Wilson’s 
convictions and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing.  The appellate 
court noted that judicial bias and proportionality of sentencing were issues that 
could be raised in the trial court during resentencing. 
{¶ 7} We accepted discretionary review of the state’s appeal, 126 Ohio 
St.3d 1544, 2010-Ohio-3855, 932 N.E.2d 338.  The state interprets Whitfield to 
hold that the scope of a resentencing judge’s authority upon a remand to correct 
an allied-offenses sentencing error is limited to accepting the state’s election 
among allied offenses, and it argues that res judicata precludes Wilson from 
requesting the judge’s disqualification and from objecting to the resulting 
sentence as disproportionate.  We reject the state’s interpretation of Whitfield and 
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its res judicata argument.  When a cause is remanded to a trial court to correct an 
allied-offenses sentencing error, the trial court must hold a new sentencing 
hearing for the offenses that remain after the state selects which allied offense or 
offenses to pursue.  A defendant is not barred by res judicata from raising 
objections to issues that arise in a resentencing hearing, even if similar issues 
arose and were not objected to at the original sentencing hearing. 
Analysis 
Scope of a Resentencing Hearing After a Remand for an 
Allied-Offenses Sentencing Error 
{¶ 8} Ohio’s multiple-count statute, R.C. 2941.25, provides the 
following: 
{¶ 9} “(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to 
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or 
information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be 
convicted of only one. 
{¶ 10} “(B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more 
offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses 
of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to 
each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and 
the defendant may be convicted of all of them.” 
{¶ 11} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2941.25 to limit when 
multiple punishments may be imposed for offenses arising from the same 
conduct.  The state concedes that the limitations provided by R.C. 2941.25 apply 
in this case, and that kidnapping and felonious assault, as well as kidnapping and 
aggravated robbery, are allied offenses of similar import, and that there was no 
proof of separate animus.  The state thus concedes that the sentencing decision 
included an allied-offenses error.  The primary issue before this court is whether 
on a remand for an allied-offenses sentencing error, the trial court’s authority is 
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limited to accepting the state’s merger selection, or whether the court can hold a 
new sentencing hearing after the merger is performed.  The state contends that a 
trial court has limited authority on remand, pursuant to Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 
319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182. 
{¶ 12} In Whitfield, one of the questions before this court was the proper 
procedure for an appellate court to follow upon finding a violation of R.C. 
2941.25 in the trial court’s judgment entry of sentence.  The trial court had 
imposed separate sentences for drug-possession and for drug-trafficking offenses, 
and the appellate court found reversible error in the court’s failure to merge the 
two allied offenses.  Whitfield at ¶ 2-3.  As a remedy, the appellate court reversed 
only the portion of the judgment related to the drug-possession charge, and 
instructed the trial court to vacate the drug-possession conviction on remand.  Id. 
at ¶ 4.  On appeal to this court, we noted that “for purposes of R.C. 2941.25, a 
‘conviction’ consists of a guilty verdict and the imposition of a sentence” 
(emphasis sic), id. at ¶ 12, and we explained that the proper remedy for an allied-
offenses sentencing error was for the appellate court to “reverse the judgment of 
conviction and remand for a new sentencing hearing at which the state must elect 
which allied offense it will pursue against the defendant,” id. at paragraph two of 
the syllabus. 
{¶ 13} Whitfield makes clear that it is the state that determines which 
offense to pursue at sentencing and that there is nothing indicating that the 
General Assembly intended to remove the state’s discretionary power upon 
reversal for an allied-offenses sentencing error.  Id. at ¶ 20-21.  Since the remedy 
for an allied-offenses sentencing error requires that the state exercise its 
discretion, Whitfield held, a reviewing court may not unilaterally correct the error 
by modifying the sentence.  Id. at ¶ 22.  Although Whitfield limits a reviewing 
court in this manner, it does not limit it to remanding for the sole purpose of 
vacating the sentence of the state’s choosing.  Instead, the appellate court’s 
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remand requires the trial court to conduct a new sentencing hearing.  At the 
hearing, the trial court must accept the state’s choice among allied offenses, 
“merge the crimes into a single conviction for sentencing, * * * and impose a 
sentence that is appropriate for the merged offense.”  Id. at ¶ 24, citing State v. 
Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 41. 
{¶ 14} The foregoing remedy comports with the requirements of R.C. 
2941.25, as well as the felony-sentencing statutes.  Pursuant to R.C. 
2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may vacate a sentence and remand for a new 
sentencing hearing if the sentence is contrary to law.  State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio 
St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, at ¶ 4.  A sentence that contains an 
allied-offenses error is contrary to law.  R.C. 2953.08(A)(4).  See also State v. 
Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 26.  Thus, the 
Eighth District had the authority to vacate Wilson’s sentences that were affected 
by the allied-offenses error and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing. 
{¶ 15} A remand for a new sentencing hearing generally anticipates a de 
novo sentencing hearing.  R.C. 2929.19(A).  However, a number of discretionary 
and mandatory limitations may apply to narrow the scope of a particular 
resentencing hearing.  For example, the parties may stipulate to the sentencing 
court’s considering the record as it stood at the first sentencing hearing.  State v. 
Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 37.  In a remand 
based only on an allied-offenses sentencing error, the guilty verdicts underlying a 
defendant’s sentences remain the law of the case and are not subject to review.  
Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, at ¶ 26-27.  Further, 
only the sentences for the offenses that were affected by the appealed error are 
reviewed de novo; the sentences for any offenses that were not affected by the 
appealed error are not vacated and are not subject to review.  Saxon at paragraph 
three of the syllabus. 
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{¶ 16} Contrary to the state’s assertions, the decision to order a new 
sentencing hearing for all of Wilson’s offenses is easily reconcilable with this 
court’s precedent in cases such as Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 
846 N.E.2d 824.  Saxon rejected the federal sentencing-package doctrine, which 
allows the modification or vacation of all the sentences imposed for multiple 
offenses, even when there is an appeal from only one of the sentences imposed, 
“due to the interdependency of the sentences for each offense.”  Saxon at ¶ 6, 
citing United States v. Clements (C.A.6, 1996), 86 F.3d 599, 600-601. 
{¶ 17} In Saxon, the trial court exceeded the maximum sentence allowed 
by statute for one offense but not another offense, and the appellant took issue 
with only the former on appeal.  The appellate court vacated both sentences and 
remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing.  Id. at ¶ 3.  This court 
reversed, holding that a reviewing court can vacate only the sentence from which 
an appellant appealed, and cannot vacate “the entire multiple-offense sentence 
based upon an appealed error in the sentence for a single offense.”  Saxon at 
paragraph three of the syllabus.  Our Saxon holding does not affect the outcome 
of the present case.  The issue in Saxon was “whether an appellate court may 
modify or vacate the entire multiple-offense sentence when a defendant assigns as 
error the sentence as to only one or more of those offenses but not the entire 
multiple-offense sentence.”  Id. at ¶ 1.  The same issue could not be raised here, 
because the appealed sentencing error affects Wilson’s sentences for all three 
offenses. 
{¶ 18} The sentences imposed for Wilson’s kidnapping, felonious-assault, 
and aggravated-robbery convictions must be remanded so that the state can select 
which offenses it wants to pursue for sentencing: the counts of felonious assault 
and aggravated robbery, or the count of kidnapping.  Pursuant to Whitfield, 124 
Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, the trial court must accept the 
state’s selection, merge the offenses accordingly for the purposes of sentencing, 
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and impose a sentence that is appropriate for the remaining offense or offenses.  
Given the foregoing, the appellate court properly vacated all three of Wilson’s 
sentences and remanded the matter to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. 
Res Judicata 
{¶ 19} As a secondary issue, the state asserts that the court of appeals 
erred in its determination that sentencing proportionality and judicial bias could 
be raised before the trial court during resentencing proceedings.  We disagree 
with the state. 
{¶ 20} At the close of Wilson’s original sentencing hearing, the trial court 
made the following comments: 
{¶ 21} “This was a — — just a random attack of unusual viciousness in a 
neighborhood known for its tranquility. 
{¶ 22} “Why did this happen [sic], is for many years, people in this 
community have been having children and not raising them. 
{¶ 23} “If you’re not married, you don’t have a high school diploma, and 
you don’t have a job that would support a family, don’t have one. 
{¶ 24} “This is what happens when kids are raised on the streets without 
parents.  They have little concern for themselves and their future, and they have 
no concern for anyone else. 
{¶ 25} “* * * 
{¶ 26} “The knee of Mr. McDermott will never fully recover.  It’s my 
hope that the Ludlow community does. 
{¶ 27} “However, that won’t happen unless people stop having children, 
and not raising them. 
{¶ 28} “* * * 
{¶ 29} “* * * I want this sentence to send a message to all the other little 
punks out there in our county, and in this area of the state, the goonies, the guys 
that shoot policemen, all the other heartless, young, parentless punks like you who 
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might consider doing this to somebody else; I want to send a message that there’s 
going to be a price to pay.” 
{¶ 30} The doctrine of res judicata establishes that “a final judgment of 
conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from 
raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any 
defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been 
raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, 
or on an appeal from that judgment.” State v. Perry (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 39 
O.O.2d 189, 226 N.E.2d 104, at paragraph nine of the syllabus.  The scope of an 
appeal from a new sentencing hearing is limited to issues that arise at the new 
sentencing hearing.  See State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 
942 N.E.2d 332, at ¶ 40.  The doctrine of res judicata does not bar a defendant 
from objecting to issues that arise at the resentencing hearing or from the resulting 
sentence. 
{¶ 31} The scope of Wilson’s new sentencing hearing will include the 
trial court’s consideration of R.C. 2929.11 when fashioning the new sentence.  
Although no specific findings need to be placed on the record by the trial court, 
R.C. 2929.11(B) does require the trial court to consider whether the sentence is 
“consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar 
offenders.”  Once the trial court fashions a new sentence at the resentencing 
hearing, Wilson is not precluded from objecting to that sentence and claiming that 
it is inconsistent with the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants. 
{¶ 32} The doctrine of res judicata also will not preclude Wilson from 
raising the issue of judicial bias.  Pursuant to R.C. 2701.03(A), a defendant may 
raise the issue of judicial bias against a judge that the defendant is about to face in 
a pending proceeding in a court of common pleas.  See Section 5(C), Article IV, 
Ohio Constitution.  Because this case will be remanded for resentencing, the trial 
court will resume jurisdiction over the matter.  Wilson is not prohibited from 
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following the procedures provided by R.C. 2701.03 and filing an affidavit of 
disqualification of his sentencing judge with the clerk of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio.  Whether it will be granted is another matter.  A defendant’s experience 
before an allegedly biased judge in previous proceedings is an important factor to 
be weighed in a bias determination.  See In re Disqualification of O'Grady 
(1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 1240, 1240-1241, 674 N.E.2d 353.  Clearly, then, the fact 
that a defendant had a previous appearance before a judge  does not prohibit the 
defendant from making a claim of judicial bias during a subsequent proceeding 
before that judge. 
{¶ 33} Given the foregoing, any prior issues not successfully challenged 
in Wilson’s appeal are outside the scope of his resentencing remand and will be 
precluded from further review under the principles of res judicata.  Wilson retains 
the right to raise objections to any issues that arise at his resentencing hearing.  
We reject the state’s claims that the appellate court erred in noting that Wilson’s 
claims of disproportionate sentencing and judicial bias could be raised in the trial 
court. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 34} We hold that Whitfield does not limit a trial court to merely 
accepting the state’s election among allied offenses.  Instead, once the cause is 
remanded and the offenses to be merged are selected by the state, the trial court is 
required to hold a new sentencing hearing and impose sentences for the remaining 
offenses.  Res judicata does not preclude a defendant from objecting to issues that 
arise at the new sentencing hearing. 
{¶ 35} In light of our holding, the appellate court was correct to vacate all 
three of Wilson’s sentences and remand the matter to the trial court for a new 
sentencing hearing.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals 
and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs separately. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 36} I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it clarifies State v. 
Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182.  Although the state 
retains the right to elect upon remand the allied offense conviction on which it 
will proceed, R.C. 2929.19 also applies, and the defendant retains the right to 
appeal issues that arise from the resentencing. 
{¶ 37} I wish to emphasize, however, that the court of appeals need not 
necessarily vacate a sentence and remand the case each time it finds a sentencing 
error.  The General Assembly gave the courts of appeals tools other than remand 
when it enacted R.C. 2953.08.  “The appellate court may increase, reduce, or 
otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the 
sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing.”  R.C. 
2953.08(G)(2).  The statute allows the appellate court to correct sentences itself 
and to save remanding for sentences that are vacated and require resentencing 
hearings.  Discretion is explicitly left to the court of appeals. Nevertheless, I fully 
concur that R.C. 2929.19 applies when a court of appeals vacates a sentence and 
remands and that a defendant may appeal from issues that arise from the 
resentencing. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 38}  I concur in the judgment of the majority and in the bulk of the 
majority opinion.  I dissent, however, from any portion of the majority opinion 
that relies on or contains an approving reference to State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 
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176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, for the reasons stated in my dissent in 
Saxon. 
__________________ 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary 
McGrath, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Terrence K. Scott, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellee. 
______________________