Case Title: State v. Olmo

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014 ME 138

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2014 ME 138 
Docket: 
Ken-13-532 
Argued: 
September 9, 2014 
 
Decided: 
December 9, 2014 
Corrected: 
January 22, 2015 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.* 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
HAVIER OLMO 
 
 
SAUFLEY, C.J. 
[¶1]  This appeal requires us to consider the circumstances in which the 
joinder of criminal charges is unfairly prejudicial to a defendant.  Havier Olmo 
appeals from a judgment of conviction of two counts of aggravated trafficking of 
scheduled drugs (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(E)(1) (2013); three counts of 
unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1-A)(A) 
(2013); escape (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 755(1-D)(A) (2013); unlawful possession 
of scheduled drugs (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 1107-A(1)(C) (2013); and unlawful 
possession of synthetic hallucinogenic drugs (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 1119(1) 
(2013), entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Mills, J.) following a jury 
trial.  The charges arise from events that occurred on four different dates—three 
                                         
*  Silver, J. sat at oral argument and participated in the development of the opinion but retired before 
the corrected opinion was published. 
 
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dates in mid-July and early August 2012, and one date in late September 2012.  
Olmo raises several arguments on appeal.  We focus on his argument that the court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever the counts stemming from the 
July and August events from the counts stemming from the September events, see 
M.R. Crim. P. 8(d), and we affirm the judgment.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the 
following facts were established at trial.  See State v. Haag, 2012 ME 94, ¶ 17, 
48 A.3d 207. 
[¶3]  In July 2012, Detective Duane Cloutier of the Waterville Police 
Department enlisted two confidential informants to make controlled purchases of 
illegal substances from individuals in Waterville.  On July 17 and 19, 2012, 
Cloutier observed each confidential informant make a controlled purchase of 
oxycodone from the same seller.  On August 6, 2012, Cloutier observed one of the 
confidential informants make a controlled purchase of a gram of crack cocaine 
from the same seller.   
[¶4]  On September 28, 2012, Waterville Police Officer Todd Burbank 
executed an arrest warrant for Olmo for charges unrelated to this appeal.  Olmo 
broke free from Burbank and fled; Detective David Caron, however, drew his 
weapon and ordered Olmo to the ground, and Olmo complied.  Burbank searched 
 
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Olmo and found on Olmo’s person what was later confirmed by visual and/or 
chemical testing as methylenedioxymethcathinone (commonly known as bath 
salts), a bag containing ninety-four and one-half thirty-milligram oxycodone pills, 
a second bag containing two and one-half eight-milligram suboxone pills, and one 
eight-milligram suboxone sublingual strip.  Of the ninety-four and one-half 
oxycodone pills, ten were marked by a “V” on one side and the numbers 
forty-eight and twelve on the opposite side, and sixty-seven were marked as 
“A-215” on one side; these manufacturer’s markings matched the markings on the 
pills purchased by the confidential informants on July 17 and 19.   
[¶5]  On October 1, 2012, Olmo was charged by a ten-count indictment.  
The State alleged that Counts I, II, III, and IV (collectively, the small-quantity 
counts) arose from the events of July 17, July 19, and August 6, 2012, when Olmo 
was alleged to have sold small quantities of oxycodone and crack cocaine.  Counts 
V, VII, VIII, IX, and X (collectively, the large-quantity counts) arose from the 
events of September 28, 2012, when Olmo was arrested, briefly absconded from 
custody before being caught, and was then searched.1  The court held a three-day 
jury trial in April of 2013.  Before the presentation of witnesses, Olmo moved to 
sever the small-quantity counts from the large-quantity counts on the ground that 
                                         
1  The State dismissed Count VI before trial. 
 
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the two sets of counts involved allegations of drug trafficking based on different 
and entirely unrelated evidence, and because joinder would be unfairly prejudicial 
to Olmo.2  The State argued that, because the evidence involving the large-quantity 
counts would be admissible in a trial involving the small-quantity counts to show 
intent, identity, and a common scheme, joinder was appropriate.  The court denied 
Olmo’s motion to sever.   
[¶6]  During the trial, the State presented testimony from seven witnesses.  
Cloutier and each of the confidential informants identified Olmo as the seller from 
the small-quantity sales. After the State rested its case, Olmo moved pursuant to 
M.R. Crim. P. 29(a) for a judgment of acquittal on all counts.  The court partially 
granted the motion as to Count II for aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs by 
reducing it to a Class B offense, but denied it as to all other counts.  Olmo 
exercised his right not to testify and did not call any witnesses.   
[¶7]  After closing arguments and instructions, the jury returned a verdict of 
not guilty on Count X (theft by receiving stolen property) and guilty on all 
remaining counts.  The court sentenced Olmo to ten years of incarceration on 
Counts I and III (aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs); five years of 
                                         
2  During the trial, Olmo’s counsel carefully preserved his challenge to the joinder.  He renewed his 
motion to sever and also moved for a mistrial on the same grounds; the court denied both motions.  After 
the State rested its case and after the jury verdict, Olmo renewed his motions to sever and for a mistrial.  
The court also denied these motions.  Finally, Olmo moved for a mistrial during the sentencing hearing on 
the same grounds, which the court again denied.   
 
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incarceration on Counts II, IV, and V (unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs), to 
be served concurrently; and six months of incarceration on Counts VII (escape), 
VIII (unlawful possession of scheduled drug), and IX (unlawful possession of 
synthetic hallucinogenics), also to be served concurrently; no portions of the 
sentences were suspended.  The court also ordered Olmo to pay $3,200 in fines.   
[¶8]  Olmo timely appealed from the conviction and the sentence pursuant to 
15 M.R.S. §§ 2115, 2151 (2013) and M.R. App. P. 2(b)(2)(A).  On January 8, 
2014, the Sentence Review Panel denied Olmo leave to appeal from the sentence.  
See 15 M.R.S. § 2152 (2013). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶9]  We are unpersuaded by Olmo’s contentions that the evidence at trial 
was insufficient to sustain his convictions, see State v. McFarland, 369 A.2d 227, 
229 (Me. 1977), and that the court erred in denying his request for an instruction 
on criminal attempt with respect to the escape charge, see State v. Jones, 2012 ME 
88, ¶ 6, 46 A.3d 1125.  We do not discuss these arguments further.   
[¶10]  We focus on Olmo’s contention that the court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion to sever the small-quantity counts from the large-quantity 
counts, which Olmo argues resulted in unfair prejudice.  “[W]e review the court’s 
decision to deny a motion for severance for an abuse of discretion and will not 
vacate a decision to deny a motion ‘unless the case is one in which the potential for 
 
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confusion or prejudice is obviously serious.’”  State v. Lemay, 2012 ME 86, ¶ 22, 
46 A.3d 1113 (quoting State v. Pierce, 2001 ME 14, ¶ 12, 770 A.2d 630 (citation 
omitted)).     
[¶11]  Pursuant to Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a),  
 
Two or more crimes should be charged in the same indictment . . . in a 
separate count for each crime if the crimes charged . . . are of the same 
or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on 
two or more acts or transactions which are connected or which 
constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.  
 
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, “[i]f the [criminal] offenses charged are connected in any 
reasonable manner, they are properly joinable.”  State v. Pierce, 474 A.2d 182, 184 
(1984).   
[¶12]  Joinder of connected charges may, however, create a danger of undue 
prejudice to the defendant.  Id.  To protect against this danger, Maine Rule of 
Criminal Procedure Rule 8(d) provides,  
If it appears that a defendant . . . is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses 
against a single defendant . . . the court may order an election or 
separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide 
whatever other relief justice requires, including ordering multiple 
simultaneous trials.   
 
See Lemay, 2012 ME 86, ¶ 22, 46 A.3d 1113 (holding that a court may order 
separate trials of offenses “if it appears that the defendant is prejudiced by an 
otherwise-appropriate joinder of offenses”).  Nonetheless, joinder is the rule rather 
than the exception; the party moving for severance bears the significant burden of 
 
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showing that joinder is so prejudicial that it outweighs the benefits associated with 
joinder—namely, judicial economy and swift resolution of the charges.  See id. 
¶ 23; State v. Boucher, 1998 ME 209, ¶ 9, 718 A.2d 1092; see also United States v. 
Richardson, 515 F.3d 74, 81 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Garden variety prejudice . . . will 
not, in and of itself, warrant severance.  The defendant must demonstrate that the 
prejudicial joinder likely deprived him of a fair trial.” (citation omitted)); United 
States v. Baltas, 236 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that reversal is only 
appropriate where the defendant makes a “strong showing of evident prejudice” 
(citation omitted)).   
[¶13]  We have identified three types of prejudice that can result from a 
joinder of charges: 
(1) the defendant may become embarrassed or confounded in 
presenting separate defenses; (2) proof that defendant is guilty of one 
offense may be used to convict of him of a second offense, even 
though such proof would be inadmissible in a separate trial for the 
second offense; and (3) a defendant may wish to testify in his own 
behalf on one of the offenses but not another, forcing him to choose 
the unwanted alternative of testifying as to both or testifying as to 
neither.  
 
Lemay, 2012 ME 86, ¶ 23, 46 A.3d 1113 (quoting United States v. Jordan, 112 
F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1997)).  Olmo frames his severance argument in terms of the 
second type of prejudice—an argument based on a theory of “evidentiary 
spillover.”  Richardson, 515 F.3d at 82.  Thus, the primary issue before us is 
 
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whether evidence from the large-quantity counts would have been inadmissible in 
a separate trial for the small-quantity counts.   
[¶14]  Olmo argues that Maine Rule of Evidence 404(b) makes evidence of 
the drugs found on his person after he was arrested and searched in September (the 
basis for the large-quantity counts) inadmissible propensity evidence that would 
not have been admissible in a separate trial concerning Olmo’s alleged drug 
trafficking in mid-July and early August (the basis for the small-quantity counts).  
Alternatively, Olmo argues that the probative value of the evidence from the 
large-quantity counts is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice 
pursuant to Maine Rule of Evidence 403.  We disagree.3   
[¶15]  The court correctly concluded that the evidence found on Olmo’s 
person in September would have been admissible evidence of “other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts” to demonstrate Olmo’s identity and common scheme of drug 
trafficking in mid-July and early August.  See M.R. Evid. 404(b).  The theory of 
the State’s case was that Olmo was engaged in an ongoing business of selling 
oxycodone, suboxone, and bath salts—a common scheme.  See U.S. v. Dominguez, 
226 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Regardless of whether both sets of charges 
involve the presentation of the same evidence, the fact that one illegal activity 
                                         
3  Because we conclude that the evidence in this case would have been admissible in separate trials, we 
do not reach the question of whether the admission in a joint trial of evidence that would be inadmissible 
in separate trials always creates the type of unfair prejudice that would compel severance.    
 
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provides the impetus for the other illegal activity is sufficient to constitute a 
common scheme for joinder purposes.”).  Although the large- and small-quantity 
offenses vary in several respects, they are connected by details that are probative of 
a common scheme of trafficking in specific types of controlled substances.  The 
State presented evidence that when he was arrested in September, Olmo had on his 
person ninety-four and one-half oxycodone pills and that seventy-seven of those 
pills matched—in chemical composition or manufacturer’s markings—the pills 
that were sold to the informants in July.  Further, Olmo contested whether the State 
established his identity as the seller for purposes of the small-quantity counts.  
Olmo’s possession of identical tablets less than two months later was probative of 
the fact that Olmo was the seller on the July and August dates.   
[¶16]  Olmo separately insists pursuant to Rule 403 that joinder was unfairly 
prejudicial to him because there was a substantial risk that the jury would convict 
him on the small-quantity counts simply based on the evidence relating to the 
large-quantity counts.  We recognize that “[s]ome risk of confusion of the 
factfinder may be present in any case where somewhat similar offenses are 
prosecuted in one proceeding.”  State v. Doody, 434 A.2d 523, 527 (Me. 1981).  
See also Lemay, 2012 ME 86, ¶ 24, 46 A.3d 1113 (“[T]he sheer number of charges 
or the possibility of juror confusion is not inherently prejudicial.”).  Here, the 
court’s limiting instruction to the jury to consider the evidence separately as to 
 
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each count substantially alleviated any risk of unfair prejudice to Olmo.  See 
Baltas, 236 F.3d at 34 (noting that an appropriate limiting instruction provides an 
adequate safeguard against evidentiary spillover prejudice).  “In some egregious 
case the potential for jury confusion may be so obvious that [the court] would 
abuse [its] discretion by refusing to grant a . . . motion for severance.”  State v. 
Bradley, 414 A.2d 1236, 1239 (Me. 1980).  This is not such a case. 
[¶17]  Under these circumstances, Olmo has failed to make the necessary 
showing of unfair prejudice required to warrant severance.  The court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying Olmo relief from joinder pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 8(d).  
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Verne E. Paradie, Jr., Esq., Paradie, Sherman, Walker & Worden, 
Lewiston, for appellant Havier Olmo 
 
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Fernand LaRochelle, 
Dep. Dist. Atty., Kennebec County District Attorney, Augusta, for 
appellee State of Maine 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Verne E. Paradie, Jr., Esq., for appellant Havier Olmo 
 
Fernand LaRochelle, Dep. Dist. Atty., for appellee State of Maine 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number CR-2012-799 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY