Case Title: Czechorowski v. State

Citation: 178 Vt. 524, 2005 VT 40, 872 A.2d 883

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Czechorowski v. State  (2003-086); 178 Vt. 524; 872 A.2d 883

2005 VT 40

[Filed 22-Mar-2005]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2005 VT 40

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-086

                             OCTOBER TERM, 2003

  Koshen Henri Czechorowski     }     APPEALED FROM:
                                }
                                }
       v.                       }     Chittenden Superior Court
                                }     
  State of Vermont, et al.      }
                                }     DOCKET NO. S0599-99 CnC

                                      Trial Judge: Matthew I. Katz

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter

       ¶ 1.      Plaintiff Koshen Czechorowski appeals from a summary
  judgment dismissing his tort claims against the State of Vermont and Dena
  Monahan, an attorney for the Department of Aging and Disabilities. 
  Plaintiff contends the court erred holding that the claims were barred on
  the basis of sovereign and official immunity.  We affirm in part, reverse
  in part, and remand for further proceedings.

       ¶ 2.     The material facts may be summarized as follows.  Plaintiff
  served as a care giver and painting instructor for L.B., an adult male
  diagnosed as mentally retarded, schizophrenic, and autistic.  L.B. is
  unable to verbalize more than a few words at a time, but in 1996, through a
  technique known as "facilitated communication" (FC), L.B. alleged that
  plaintiff had raped and sexually abused him.(FN1)   The allegations were
  reported to the Department of Aging and Disabilities, which launched an
  immediate investigation.  See 33 V.S.A. § 6906 (commissioner shall cause an
  investigation to commence within forty-eight hours of report of abuse). 
  
       ¶ 3.     After completing the interviews and site visits prescribed by
  statute, the Department investigator, Jody Blinn, initially recommended
  that the report of abuse be found unsubstantiated.  See id. § 6906(c) (upon
  completion of investigation, written report "recommending a finding of
  substantiated or unsubstantiated" shall be submitted to commissioner). 
  Although a copy of Blinn's initial report was not produced, she
  acknowledged in her discovery responses that she had initially recommended
  a finding that the alleged abuse was unsubstantiated, having concluded that
  the information obtained during the investigation was inconclusive.  She
  based that opinion on certain inconsistencies in L.B.'s statements, the
  lack of physical evidence of rape from a medical exam conducted shortly
  after the allegations surfaced, plaintiff's positive history as a foster
  parent, and concerns about L.B.'s credibility due to a prior incident
  involving similar allegations against another individual which, after
  investigation, had been found to be unsubstantiated.  Blinn admitted,
  however, that her supervisor had instructed her to re-write the report to
  find that the allegation was substantiated. 

       ¶ 4.            Blinn's revised report of February 25, 1997, omitted
  reference to the specific exculpatory factors cited above, except for a
  description of plaintiff's positive history as a foster parent.  In
  addition, the revised report emphasized the inculpatory evidence and the
  consistencies among the incriminating facts.  While omitting, for example,
  reference to certain inconsistencies in two of the six FC sessions, the
  revised report noted the consistencies among the other four FC sessions
  where L.B. described the alleged assaults.  In another example, the report
  summarized the report of the medical doctor, Dr. Brown, who had examined
  L.B., stating that according to his medical examination, the doctor
  believed there was evidence "that L.B. was sexually abused."  The revised
  report did not specifically state, however, that Dr. Brown found no
  physical evidence of abuse, but rather based his conclusions on "eye
  contact" and L.B.'s "direct response to the examiners [sic] questions." 

       ¶ 5.     The Department notified plaintiff that it intended to
  substantiate the allegation of abuse and provided him with a copy of the
  revised report. Plaintiff, in response, requested an administrative hearing
  before the Commissioner. See 33 V.S.A. § 3306(c) (if recommendation of
  investigative report is for finding of substantiation, person may request
  hearing before Commissioner to dispute recommendation).  The Department's
  general counsel, defendant Dena Monahan, then reviewed the report and
  supporting documents in preparation for the Commissioner's hearing. 

       ¶ 6.     Following the administrative hearing, Monahan discussed the
  case with the Commissioner, and prepared a draft decision at his request. 
  The final decision, signed by the  Commissioner on June 13, 1997,
  substantiated the report that plaintiff had sexually abused L.B. Plaintiff
  appealed that decision to the Human Services Board.  See id. § 6906(d)
  (within thirty days of notice that report has been substantiated, person
  may apply to Board for relief on ground that it is unsubstantiated, and
  Board shall hold a fair hearing under 3 V.S.A. § 3091).  Plaintiff
  requested additional discovery prior to the Board hearing. Monahan, in
  response, declined to disclose the records of any complaints made by L.B.
  against other care providers on the basis of confidentiality, but complied
  with the hearing officer's order to produce Dr. Brown's medical report and
  lab results and Jody Blinn's case notes and other evidence.

       ¶ 7.     The parties disputed L.B.'s competence to testify and the
  admissibility of his prior FC statements. Monahan attempted to demonstrate
  L.B.'s ability to communicate via FC at the fair hearing.  All parties
  agreed that the demonstration was a failure, and the proceedings were
  continued.  Shortly thereafter, Monahan informed the Board that the
  Department  had decided to withdraw the substantiated-abuse finding.  The
  Board later granted-over the Department's opposition-plaintiff's motion to
  reverse the Department decision and destroy the Department's  records
  pursuant to 33 V.S.A. §§  6906(e), (g).(FN2)  The State did not appeal this
  decision.
   
       ¶ 8.     Plaintiff subsequently filed this civil suit against the
  State, the Department's investigator Jody Blinn, the Department's general
  counsel and prosecuting attorney Dena Monahan, and five other parties,
  including L.B.'s doctor and other care givers.  The claims against Blinn
  and Monahan alleged malicious prosecution and intentional and reckless
  infliction of emotional distress.  The claim against the State alleged
  liability for Blinn and Monahan's acts and omissions under the Vermont Tort
  Claims Act. See 12 V.S.A. § 5601(a) (establishing state liability for
  negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of state employees made within
  scope of their employment).  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the
  trial court dismissed all of plaintiff's claims, holding that: (1) the
  State had sovereign immunity; (2) Blinn had qualified immunity; and (3)
  Monahan had absolute  immunity. Monahan, the court concluded, had "acted in
  a manner analogous to that of a public prosecutor" and therefore was
  absolutely immune from suit for "all her actions before the Commissioner,
  her in-court conduct [before the Board], and her reliance on Ms. Blinn's
  investigation report." Plaintiff settled out of court with the other
  defendants.  The claims against Blinn were apparently discharged in
  bankruptcy without final resolution. Plaintiff's appeal is thus limited to
  the decision in favor of the State and Monahan. 

       ¶ 9.     In reviewing a summary judgment, we use "the same standard as
  the trial court, and affirm the granting of a motion for summary judgment
  if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
  entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Springfield Hydroelectric Co. v.
  Copp, 172 Vt. 311, 313-14,