Case Title: Anthony Long v. Robert Bryant

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1060515

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-01-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:01/18/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1060515
_________________________
Anthony Long
v.
Robert Bryant
Appeal from Perry Circuit Court
(CV-04-94)
BOLIN, Justice.
Anthony Long appeals the decision of the Perry Circuit
Court ordering a new election in this challenge to the mayoral
election for the City of Marion, brought by mayoral candidate
Robert Bryant.  The issues in this election contest concern
mainly the validity of several votes cast by absentee ballots.
1060515
2
Facts and Procedural History
In the August 24, 2004, mayoral election for the City of
Marion, three candidates qualified and ran: Robert Bryant,
Herb Tucker, and Anthony Long, the incumbent.  A total of
2,156 votes were cast for the office of mayor.  After the
votes were tallied on election day, Long received 1,120 votes,
Bryant received 997 votes, and Tucker received 39 votes.  On
August 26, 2004, Long was declared the winner.  On August 30,
2004, Bryant contested the election on the grounds that
illegal absentee-ballot votes were cast by: (1) persons not
registered to vote; (2) persons registered to vote, but voting
in the wrong ward or district; (3) persons not residents of
the City; (4) persons convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude; (5) persons whose ballots were illegal because of
insufficient witnesses; (6) persons who had not lived in the
City long enough to participate in the election; (7) persons
who gave fraudulent or fictitious addresses; (8) persons who
were dead; and (9) persons who had been fraudulently induced
to vote for Long.
On September 3, 2004, Long filed an answer.  On September
22, 2004, Long amended his answer and filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds that Bryant had failed to file a
1060515
3
verified petition in accordance with § 17-15-29, Ala. Code
1975.  That same day, the trial court entered an order denying
Long's motion to dismiss. On September 27, 2004, Long filed a
petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court seeking an
order directing the trial court to, among other things,
dismiss Bryant's complaint for failure to file a verified
petition.  This Court stayed all proceedings pending a
decision on Long's petition.  On January 7, 2005, we denied
the petition for a writ of mandamus without an opinion.  Ex
parte Long, 924 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 2005)(table).
On July 26, 2005, trial began and lasted until August 5,
2005.  After the trial, both parties submitted posttrial
briefs to the court.  A year and a half later, on December 19,
2006, the trial court entered the following order:
"This cause came to be heard before this court
on July 26, 2005 and ended on August 5, 2005. The
Court, after considering the testimony, evidence and
arguments presented, makes the following findings,
conclusions and judgment:
"BACKGROUND
"On August 24, 2004, the City of Marion,
Alabama, 
located 
in 
Perry 
County, 
held 
its
quadrennial general election. The offices up for
election were Mayor and all five (5) of the city
council districts. Each seat was contested. Relevant
to this cause was the Office of Mayor. Three
candidates were on the ballot. They were Robert
1060515
4
Bryant, the Contestant (Bryant), Anthony 'Tony'
Long, the Contestee (Long), and Herb Tucker, a non-
party to this action. A total of 2,156 votes were
cast for the Office of Mayor. This was 38 more votes
than cast in the race for the council district as
2,118 votes were cast.
"The relevant vote totals showed Bryant with 640
(64%) of his total of 997 votes from voters who cast
their ballot at the polls, and 357 (36%) of his
total from absentee ballot votes. Of Bryant's
absentee ballot votes, 95 were challenged and 8 were
I.D. challenged. Long received 649 (58%) of his
total of 1,120 votes from voters who cast their
ballots at the polls, and 471 (42%) of his total
from absentee ballot votes. Of Long's absentee
ballot votes, 246 were challenged and 12 were I.D.
challenged. The non-party challenger, Herb Tucker,
received a total of 39 votes. Neither party offered
any evidence to challenge or dispute Mr. Tucker's
votes. Therefore, 39 votes will be listed as his
final vote total to be discussed at the conclusion
of this order.
"On August 26, 2004, the results of the election
were canvassed and Long was declared the winner by
a margin of 41 votes in avoiding a run-off. Of the
2,156 votes cast, 1,078 votes plus 1 vote, for a
total of 1,079 would be needed for an outright
victory. Long exceeded that total by 41 votes.
"Bryant timely filed his election contest on
August 30, 2004. Various pre-trial motions were
filed and ruled upon, including a Motion to Dismiss
and [a petition for a] Writ of Mandamus, which the
Alabama Supreme Court ultimately denied. The case
was thereupon scheduled for discovery and the
resulting trial.
"LEGAL STANDARDS
"Statutes providing for election contest are to
be strictly construed. Parker v. Mt. Olive Fire &
1060515
5
Rescue Dist., 420 So. 2d 31 (Ala. 1982). Contest of
municipal elections are governed under the authority
of Alabama Code § 11-46-69, which included Articles
2 and 3 of Chapter 15, Title 17. This includes § 17-
15-20 through -63 [now § 17-16-47 through -76]. The
requirements of § 17-15-29 [now § 17-16-56] are to
be read and followed together with § 11-46-69 to
institute the contest. The requirements of § 11-46-
70 - 74 are also relevant here.
"FINDINGS
"The court received evidence from both parties
concerning the legality of Absentee Ballots and took
the 
issues 
and 
procedural 
questions 
under
advisement. Neither party offered any evidence to
dispute the votes cast at the polls. Thus, those
vote totals for each respective party are retained.
"The court heard arguments concerning whether
both parties complied with § 17-15-21 [now § 17-16-
48], Notice of Nature of Evidence. The court finds
that Bryant did comply with the statute. However,
Long arguably did not comply with the statute. Long
failed to openly tender the requisite notice, even
while having time to do so during trial and having
the 
court 
to 
continue 
the 
proceedings 
when
necessary. However, the court finds his proffer
sufficient. Thus, Long's relevant evidence will be
considered in the final results.3
"BRYANT'S ARGUMENTS
"1.
No Reason Indicated on the Application.
"Exhibits 13, 29, 90, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107,
108, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 143, 354 and 355 all
failed to indicate a reason for voting absentee on
the application. Such ballots should not have been
sent or counted. Each vote was for Long. The number
is seventeen (17). Thus, seventeen (17) votes are
deducted from Long.
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6
"2.
No Reason Indicated on the Affidavit.
"Exhibits 70, 86, 100, 101, 109, 110 and 142
fail to indicate a reason for voting absentee on the
ballot affidavit. Each was a vote for Long. Such
votes should not have been counted. The number is
seven (7). Thus, seven (7) votes are deducted from
Long.
"3.
No Reason Requested on the Application or Affidavit.
"Exhibits 46 and 106 do not indicate a reason
for voting on the application or affidavit. Each was
a vote for Long. These votes should not have been
cast or counted. Thus, two (2) votes are deducted
from Long.
"4.
Inconsistent Reason For Voting.
"The following were votes cast for Long and the
reason for voting on the affidavit was inconsistent
with the initial request on the application. These
votes should not be counted. Four voters applied by
stating they will be out of the county, but averred
that they are physically incapacitated. They are
Exhibits 52, 64, 306 and 331. Four votes applied by
stating they were physically incapacitated, but
averred that they will be out of the county. They
are Exhibits 77, 78, 135 and 350. Three voters
applied by stating they will be out of the county,
but averred they will be working a conflicting 10-
hour work shift. They are Exhibits 96, 302, and 323.
One voter, Exhibit 69, stated in her application
that she would be working a conflicting work
schedule, but avers she will be out of the county.
"Thus, this category totals twelve (12) votes.
These votes should be subtracted from Long.
"5.
Disqualifying Convictions.
"They found seven (7) voters who cast ballots
for 
Long 
to 
be 
disqualified 
due 
to 
felony
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7
convictions. Bryant presented some evidence of two
(2) others, but the Court only found seven (7) to be
disqualified; 
there 
was 
no 
evidence 
of 
any
restoration of voting rights or pending appeal or
court-ordered 
reversal 
regarding 
these 
votes.
Exhibit 40 had a Possession of Controlled Substance
conviction and was sentenced on January 5, 2004. He
also had an improper non-government-issued I.D.
Exhibit 41 had an Arson 2nd conviction and was
sentenced March 4, 1996. Exhibit 43 had a Possession
of 
Forged 
Instrument 
2nd 
conviction 
and 
was
sentenced on November 1, 1997. Exhibit 44 had an
Unlawful Imprisonment 1st and Arson 2nd conviction
and was sentenced on May 4, 1998. Exhibit 49 had an
Unlawful 
Distribution 
of 
Controlled 
Substances
conviction and was sentenced on March 12, 2003.
Exhibit 152 had a Vehicular Homicide conviction and
was sentenced on February 23, 2004. Exhibit 206 had
a Burglary 3rd conviction and was sentenced on
November 13, 2000. Thus, seven (7) votes are
deducted from Long.
"6.
Improper Identification.
"In addition to Exhibits 40, 225 and 238,  seven
4
(7) other voters were presented with improper
identification pursuant to  § 17-10A-1 [now § 17-10-
1]. Bryant argued more voters; however, the Court's
review of the exhibits showed the following:
Improper identification submitted for Exhibits 151,
238, 225, 242, 243, 244, 245, 247, 248 and 249. Each
of these voters, and Exhibit 40, have a non-
governmental generated I.D. that does not fall
within the acceptable forms of I.D. listed in § 17-
11A-1 [now § 17–9-30 and § 17-17-28]. Long's
arguments are considered and failed. Thus, ten (10)
votes from Long are taken.
"7.
Votes Changed or Altered on Ballots.
"Bryant presented three (3) instances in which
a voter's ballot was changed or altered. Each ballot
had whiteout or correction fluid on them. The Court
1060515
8
could clearly see that Bryant's name was marked,
then whiteout was used to mark Long. The voter could
have received another ballot and marked the ballot
as spoiled. This was not done. This involved
Exhibits 118, 209 and 341. Exhibit 118 bears an
initial which could very well be that of the voter.
The initial is next to Long's name in addition to
the mark. These ballots go beyond the integrity of
the votes and really trouble the Court. They should
be referred to the District Attorney. However, the
Court will give Exhibit 118 the benefit of the
doubt, as there is credible initial beside the
change. No vote is deducted for Exhibit 118. No
evidence was offered to cure these problems, nor any
of the problems mentioned in this Order. In fact, no
voters were called to cure any defects found thus
far.
"In light of the evidence, the Court finds that
two (2) votes are due to be taken from Long and two
(2) votes added to Bryant.
"8.
Improper Address on Application.
"Title 17-10-5 gives the procedure for delivery
of absentee ballots to a voter. Pertinent to the
Court's inquiry is the requirement of ballots being
sent to '... the address where the voter regularly
receives 
mail 
...' 
Several 
applications 
were
requested to be sent to obvious addresses where the
voter did not regularly receive mail. The statute
directs that applications mailed to a fraudulent
address may be suspect and should be turned over to
the District Attorney. The Absentee Election Manager
sought to assist the voters by determining alternate
addresses to send the ballots. This Good Samaritan
act runs afoul of the statute, as it was the
District Attorney's responsibility after the fraud
was suspected. Yes, there are circumstances in § 17-
10-5 [now § 17-11-5] which the Absentee Election
Manager makes inquiry when there is a continuous
absentee voting pattern. It was the District
Attorney's responsibility to further continue with
1060515
9
the applications. Thus, the ballots should not have
been sent out and the votes not counted. This
conduct jeopardizes the integrity of the system.
"This situation involves a request for several
applications to be mailed at the same post office
box. This runs afoul of the statute and was the
driving force behind revisions of the statute. All
votes cast concerning these voters were for Long.
They should have not been cast.
"These votes involve:
"P.O. Box 515 - Exhibits 5, 7, 32, 38, 76, 118, 145,
168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177,
178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 201, 203, 211,
227A, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236,
237, 238, 238A 239, 240, 241, 250, and 251, a total
of forty-five (45) votes to be deducted from Long.
"P.O. Box 536 - Exhibits 4, 6, 23, 31, 66, 67, 68,
119, 120, 126, 141, 144, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189,
190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199,
213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222,
223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 300 and 327, a total of
forty-four (44) votes to be deducted from Long.
"P.O. Box 1148 - Exhibits 36, 39, 55, and 146, a
total of four (4) votes to be deducted from Long.
"P.O. Box 1149 - Exhibits 30, 34 and 37, a total of
three (3) votes to be deducted from Long.
"Bryant 
offered 
several 
more 
voters 
and
addresses. However, the Court concluded only the
above. Thus, ninety-six (96) votes are deducted from
Long for this category.
"9.
Other Concerns.
"Bryant argued several forgeries and improper
signatures, but presented no expert testimony to
assist the Court. The Court can review and note
1060515
10
variances in signatures. However, that is not
persuasive, as people at times can write differently
depending on the circumstances and conditions. The
Court did find some obvious signature variances,
which the Court finds were not from the same writer.
They are Exhibits 67, an obvious variance; 76,
signature on application acknowledged by someone
else; 120, an obvious variance altogether; 223, an
obvious print on the application; and 250, an
obvious variance. However, these voters are already
included on other deletions.
"Bryant offered other evidence and arguments
concerning the residency of various students. Such
arguments are not accepted. Also, the vote of an
under-age person is also not accepted as the
application 
concludes 
otherwise 
and 
no 
other
evidence was presented.
"LONG'S ARGUMENTS.
"10.
Improper Discovery.
"The Court denied these arguments raised by Long
during the proceedings. Long participated in the
discovery process and had copies of the documents
produced in a manner to keep the ballots with the
applications so the Court could determine the actual
votes. To cry foul again is unwarranted.
"11.
Applications and Affidavits Improper.
"Long raised the argument that certain exhibits
failed to meet the captioned requirements. Exhibits
35, 36, 37, 40 and 42 all failed to indicate a
reason for voting absentee on the affidavit. So did
Exhibits 39 and 41. Exhibit 38 was not made
available to the Court. Exhibit 9 listed an
inconsistent 
reason 
on 
the 
application 
and
affidavit. Exhibits 71 and 112 were sufficient and
Long's arguments are incorrect and fail. All of the
above were votes for Bryant. Thus, eight (8) votes
are deducted from Bryant.
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11
"12.
Improper Signatures.
"Long failed to submit sufficient evidence on
improper signatures or other persons signing for
another as he argued. However, Exhibits 28 and 29 do
not contain a reason or signature on the affidavit.
However, the Exhibits do not show who received the
voter's vote. Long failed to submit expert testimony
to assist the Court. The lay witness was not helpful
and from a review of the ballots, an apparent bias
witness as she was a candidate who received votes
just like Bryant. However, the Court viewed the
Exhibits and could only conclude two (2) obvious
variances in the signatures, Exhibits 65 and 68.
Each vote was for Bryant. Thus, two (2) votes are
deducted from Bryant.
"13.
P. O. Box Addresses.
"Long argues that voters for Bryant who used
P.O. Boxes should be excluded. However, the P.O. Box
is not the litmus test. It is the fraud aspect of a
place a voter does not regularly receive mail or is
not registered at. Long has not submitted any
evidence to disqualify the votes he argues against.
In fact, the exhibits show the P.O. Box addresses to
be consistent on the application and affidavit in
many instances. There was no evidence of wholesale
request to be mailed to a certain P.O. Box as raised
by Bryant. In fact, Exhibits 6, 18, 62, 63, 64, 65,
66, 67, 68, 69 and 70 are all consistent. Long's
arguments are without foundation and fail.
"14.
Non-Residents.
"Like Bryant, Long's arguments and evidence on
this issue are not persuasive.
"15.
Bad Faith.
"Long presents no credible evidence to support
his 'bad faith' arguments as to Exhibits 27A, 31,
1060515
It appears that the trial court has counted three ballots
1
–- exhibits number 40, number 225, and number 238 –- twice.
Although it noted in category 6 that these three ballots were
covered elsewhere, the total for category 6 –- 10 –- seems to
include them. According to our calculations, the total votes
for category 6 should be 7, making the total number of votes
for Long 970.
12
34, 42, 71, 72, 86, 87, 89, 114, 115, 116, 117 and
118. The arguments fail.
"Tally
"After a review of the findings, the court
tallies the vote as follows:
Category
Bryant
Long
Tucker
Certification  997
1,120
39
1.
-17
2.
-7
3.
-2
4.
-12
5.
-7
6.
-10[1]
7.
+2
-2
8.
-96
9.
0
10.
-8
11.
-2
12.
0
13.
0
14.
0
"Net Total
989
967
39
[1]
"Total Legal Votes Cast - 1,995
"Total votes needed for victory - 998 + 1 = 999.
No winner is declared. A run-off election is needed.
1060515
13
"CONCLUSION
"There was certain testimony which gravely
concerns the Court and warrants investigation by the
District Attorney's Office and other agencies. Voter
H.L.K., a black male, testified, he completed his
application for an absentee ballot with J.E. After
his ballot did not arrive, H.L.K. said he contacted
J.E. J.E. told him he needed to come to Mr. Long's
office. After arriving and a confrontation, H.L.K.
stated he was given his ballot.
"Voter V.G., a white male, at _____ Street,
Marion, Alabama, testified that A.K.H., R.H. and
T.J.H. came from Selma to live with him a few days
before the election. He stated they registered to
vote, voted in the election, and then returned to
Selma shortly after the election. Voter D.G., the
wife of V.G., verified these facts and stated she
was present when the children voted.
"There appeared to be a voter virus which caused
several others to move into the city limits just
before the election. For instance, voter B.W.N.
testified she had lived in Sprott and Bibb County
prior to the election. However, she was renting a
place from Mr. Long during the election cycle. Voter
L.C.H. testified he currently lives in Uniontown,
but intended to have the address on Centreville
Street in Marion as his home. Voter P.W.P. testified
his utilities were off at the time and he had to
live in the city limits with his father-in-law. He
stated he had lived in Scott Station with his
grandmother. Voter B.H.P. testified she moved into
the city limits with her father because her power
was off. Voter D.S.H., who had lived and currently
lives in Sprott, testified she moved into the city
limits from July to October, 2004 because she was
going through a divorce. Voter C.R.H. testified she
lived in town for convenience during the election
cycle. Further, she stated as of October 2004, she
moved back to Sprott. Voter F.M., who had lived and
is currently with his father in Sprott, moved into
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14
the city limits from May 2004 to December 2004
because of family problems. Voter C.N. testified he
moved into the city limits with his uncle and stayed
from June 2004 to September 2004. He stated he never
intended to live there but it was just a place to
stay. Further, he said he changed his voting
location to the city for the election. The Court
rejects these votes and declare them ineligible
voters.
"Furthermore, there were numerous instances
where the voter testified the signature on the
Application for an Absentee Ballot was not their
signature, i.e., C.R.H., J.R.L.C., D.W., H.L.K., and
B.M.M.. 
Additionally, 
J.R.L.C. 
testified, 
the
signature on his wife's application was not his
wife's signature.
"More particularly, there were applications
which requested ballots be sent to a P.O. Box. There
was no evidence offered to support who owned the
P.O. Box or who authorized the request. This
included approximately forty-one (41) applications
for P.O. Box 536, forty-one (41) for P.O. Box 515,
and seven (7) applications for P.O. Box 1148.
"JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
"Pursuant to Alabama Code [1975,] § 11-46-70
...,  the Court declares that no person (candidate)
has the requisite number of votes to be declared a
winner. Such fact is certified to the City of
Marion, Alabama that a vacancy exists in the Office
of Mayor and a run-off election, pursuant to § 11-
46-55(d) is so Ordered.
____________________
" Long offered evidence of alleged illegalities
3
of some 50 ballots specifically and other generally.
" Exhibit 40 is also covered under disqualifying
4
convictions and Exhibits 225 and 238 are covered
under improper P.O. Boxes."
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15
(Some footnotes omitted.) Long appeals.
Standard of Review
An election contest is a statutory matter, and the
statute governing the election must be strictly observed and
construed.  Watters v. Lyons, 188 Ala. 525, 66 So. 436 (1914).
"In reviewing a  trial court's findings of fact in an election
contest, we apply the same standard used by appellate courts
when the trial court in a nonjury case has taken a material
part of the evidence through ore tenus testimony; that is, we
will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact unless
those findings are plainly and palpably wrong and not
supported by the evidence."  Williams v. Lide, 628 So. 2d 531,
534 (Ala. 1993).
Analysis
Long argues that the trial court did not have subject-
matter jurisdiction over the case because Bryant did not file
a properly verified petition or statement of contest as
required by § 17-15-29 (now § 17-16-56).  Specifically, Long
contends that Bryant's statement was not verified because
Bryant failed to swear before a notary public or someone
1060515
16
authorized to administer oaths that the facts and allegations
in the statement were true.
Section 11-46-69(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[t]he
election of any person declared elected to any office of a
city or town may be contested by any person who was at the
time of the election a qualified elector of such city or town
...."  Section 11-46-69(b) provides that such contest shall be
instituted in the manner set out in § 17-15-29.  Section 17-
15-29 provided, in pertinent part, that "the party contesting
must file in the office of the circuit clerk of the county in
which the election was held, a statement in writing, verified
by affidavit, of the grounds of the contest as provided in
this article ...." (Section 17-16-56 contains this same
language.) 
In Washington v. Hill, 960 So. 2d 643 (Ala. 2006), the
defeated candidate filed an election contest in a mayoral
race.  The candidate who had been declared the winner argued
that the trial court exceeded its discretion by allowing the
election contest to proceed even though the defeated candidate
had not complied with § 17-15-29.  The candidate argued, among
other things, that the defeated candidate had failed to swear,
1060515
17
as part of her affidavit, that the statements contained in the
complaint were true.  This Court stated:
"[T]he applicable statute does not require the
statement in an election contest to, as [the
candidate] asserts, include specific reference to
the date and time of the election being contested or
specific wording in an affidavit averring that the
statement is true.  What the text of the statute
requires is language that makes sufficiently clear
which election is being challenged and some form of
an affidavit by the contestant that communicates the
grounds of the contest.  As a result, we conclude
that the trial court did not err by failing to
require stricter adhesion to the form of the
election-contest statement than is required by the
text of the statute."
960 So. 2d at 648.  
In the present case, Bryant completed a "notice of
contest" complaint that contained the relevant information
regarding the election.  The complaint was signed in the
presence of a notary public, even though the notary public
refers to the complaint as a "conveyance" and states that the
complaint was voluntarily signed "for the purposes therein
contained."  We cannot say that Bryant's election-contest
statement failed to comply with § 17-15-29.  Bryant's
complaint sets out which election is being challenged and
contains an affidavit setting out the grounds of the contest.
1060515
Section 177(b), Ala. Const. 1901, provides: "No person
2
convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude, or who is
mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote until
restoration of civil and political rights or removal of
disability."  Whether the felonies at issue involved crimes of
moral turpitude has not been raised.   
18
   Long contends that the trial court erred in discounting
votes for Long on the basis that the votes were cast by
persons with a felony record.   Seven votes were cast by
persons convicted of a felony, but two of those person's names
had not been removed from the voter-registration list. Long
urges this Court to overrule Williams v. Lide, supra, and
allow the two persons whose names had not been removed from
the voter registration list to have their votes counted.   
2
In Williams, a losing candidate for county office
contested the election on the ground that eight persons who
had been convicted of a felony for which they were sentenced
to time in a penitentiary and whose voting rights had not been
restored had been allowed to vote.  The competing candidate
argued that the eight persons were entitled to vote because
the board of registrars had not notified them that their names
had been removed from the voter-registration list as required
in § 17-4-132 (now repealed).  This Court held:
1060515
Article VIII, § 182, Ala. Const. 1901, was repealed by
3
Amendment No. 579, which also repealed former § 177 and added
current § 177.
19
"We determine that the legislative intent for
requiring notice, by certified mail, of the board's
intention to strike a person's name from the
registration list is two-fold: (1) to provide an
elector with a reasonable opportunity to prevent his
disfranchisement by offering proof that he had not
been convicted of the disqualifying offense, and (2)
to 
apprise 
an 
elector 
of 
the 
fact 
of 
his
disqualification, thus providing him an incentive to
seek the restoration of his right to vote. See
generally § 17-3-10 [now § 17-3-31] ('restoration of
right to vote upon pardon'; specific statutory
provision for reinstatement of voting rights upon
submission of a copy of the pardon document).
"However, there is no authority for [the
competing candidate's] contention that parties who
are disqualified from voting under § 182[, Ala.
Const. 1901,] nonetheless retain their right to vote
until they are notified pursuant to § 17-4-132 that
the board intends to remove their names from the
registration list. Section 182 appears to be the
sole authority for determining who has a right to
vote.  Section 17-4-132 merely provides the board of
registrars with a method of purging the voter
registration list that complies with due process;
specifically, it protects those citizens whose names
the board has selected, erroneously, for removal
from the voter registration list, by giving those
citizens an opportunity to contest the removal of
their names. The presence or absence of a person's
name on the voter registration list does not
necessarily determine the right to vote."3
628 So. 2d at 533-34 (footnote omitted).  Justice Maddox
concurred specially in Williams, writing that persons whose
1060515
20
names appear on a voter's list should be entitled to vote
until the procedure set forth in § 17-4-132 for removing names
have been followed, because § 17-4-132, by setting up a
procedure to remove a person's name from a voter's list
because of a felony conviction, is designed to guarantee a
registered voter who has been convicted of a felony that
measure of due process required by the United States
Constitution. Justice Adams dissented, writing:
"The primary purposes of the notice requirement
are to provide an elector with a reasonable
opportunity to prevent his disenfranchisement and to
apprise 
an 
elector 
of 
the 
fact 
of 
his
disqualification, thus providing him an incentive to
seek the restoration of his right to vote. One does
not seek a remedy until he is made aware of a
deprivation. It is not unreasonable to assume that
a significant number of voters are unaware of this
particular consequence of a felony conviction --
especially when they are not apprised of it, as the
statute requires. The board, in failing to provide
either prepurgation or postpurgation notice -– in
patent violation of the provisions and purpose of
the statute -- discourages the discovery of the
deprivation and the pursuit of a remedy."
628 So. 2d at 539-40.  Although Long urges this Court to adopt
the views of the special writings in Williams, we believe the
majority in Williams was correct.  The reason behind
disenfranchising convicted felons is to preserve the purity of
the ballot box, rather than to inflict an additional injury on
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21
a person convicted of a felony.  A "criminal record" is one of
the "factors which a State may take into consideration in
determining the qualifications of voters."  Lassiter v. North
Hampton 
County 
Bd. 
of 
Election, 
360 
U.S. 
45, 
51
(1959)(comparing 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
literacy
requirements with the constitutionality of disenfranchising
voters based on criminal records).  The principle "that a
convicted felon may be denied the right to vote" remains
"unexceptionable."  Roper v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634
(1996)(although 
some 
voting 
restrictions 
are 
unconstitutional,
a person convicted of a felony can be excluded from voting).
Alabama has the right to deny a convicted felon the right to
vote, and the mere presence of a person's name on a voter-
registration list does not necessarily determine the right to
vote. 
Long argues that the trial court erred in throwing out
what he says were numerous legal absentee ballots cast for
him.  Specifically, Long contends that the trial court erred
in throwing out 38 votes on the grounds that certain absentee
voters did not properly complete the application or affidavit
or that the voters gave inconsistent reasons for voting by
absentee ballot.  Long also contends that the trial court
1060515
22
erred in discounting 96 absentee ballots based on an improper
address.  Long fails to cite to any portion of the 18-volume
record in support of the underlying facts regarding these
absentee ballots.  Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., requires
that an argument in an appellant's (or cross-appellant's)
brief contain "citations to the cases, statutes, other
authorities, and parts of the record relied on."  Long cites
Eubanks v. Hale,  752 So. 2d 1113 (Ala. 1999), in support of
this argument, for the proposition that a person must not be
disenfranchised when he has made an honest effort to comply
with the law and in that effort has substantially complied
with the statutory mandates.  It is not the duty of this Court
to  undertake to link Long's legal argument with the bare
factual allegations he offers in support of that argument.
"'[W]here no legal authority is cited or argued, the effect is
the same as if no argument had been made.'" Steele v.
Rosenfeld, LLC, 936 So. 2d 488, 493 (Ala. 2005)(quoting
Bennett v. Bennett, 506 So. 2d  1021, 1023 (Ala. Civ. App.
1987)).  "[I]t is neither this Court's duty nor its function
to perform an appellant's legal research."  City of Birmingham
v. Business Realty Inv. Co., 722 So. 2d 747, 752 (Ala. 1998).
1060515
23
Last, Long argues that the trial court lacked the
authority to order a runoff election because the time for
holding a "runoff," i.e., the third Tuesday following the
regular election, § 11-46-55, Ala. Code 1975, has passed.
Long states in his brief:
"Needless to say, the third Tuesday after the
general election has long since passed.  In fact,
that date was over two years ago.  Therefore the
statute does not allow a 'run-off' under these
circumstances. ... [I]t is not established what is
to take place when there is not a majority vote when
judgment is rendered concerning the outcome of an
election 
contest 
2 
years 
after 
the 
regular
election."
(Long's brief pp. 17-18.)   
"The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that
this Court is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative
intent as expressed in the statute. ... In this ascertainment,
we must look to the entire Act instead of isolated phrases or
clauses ...."   Darks Diary, Inc. v. Alabama Dairy Comm'n, 367
So. 2d 1378, 1380 (Ala. 1979).  In construing statutes, we may
glean legislative intent from the language used, the reason
and necessity for the legislative act, and the purpose sought
to be obtained.  Bama Budweiser of Montgomery, Inc. v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 611 So. 2d 238 (Ala. 1992).   Courts do
not interpret statutory provisions in isolation, but consider
1060515
Section 11-46-55 was amended effective April 13, 2006;
4
among nonsubstantive changes, the amendment substituted
"sixth" for "third" in two places.
24
them in the context of the entire statutory scheme.  Siegelman
v. Alabama  Ass'n of School Boards, 819 So. 2d 568 (Ala.
2001).  Where more than one Code section is involved, each
should be construed in harmony with the other Code sections
then in effect, so far as is practical.  Kinard v. Jordan, 646
So. 2d 1380 (Ala. 1994).
At the time pertinent to the appeal, § 11-46-55(d), Ala.
Code 1975, provided:
"d) If no candidate receives a majority of all
the votes cast in such election for any one office
or offices for the election to which there were more
than two candidates, then the municipal governing
body shall order a second or 'runoff' election to be
held 
on 
the 
third
 
Tuesday 
next 
thereafter
[4]
following the regular election, at which election
the two candidates having received the most and the
second 
most 
votes, 
respectively, 
shall 
be
candidates, and the person receiving the highest
number of votes for that office in the runoff
election shall be declared elected. If only two
candidates are standing for election for any one
office or offices and neither candidate receives a
majority, then the municipal governing body shall
order a second or 'runoff' election to be held on
the third
 Tuesday next thereafter following the
[4]
regular 
election, 
at 
which 
election 
the 
two
candidates shall be candidates, and the person
receiving the highest number of votes for that
office in the runoff election shall be declared
elected. In the event one of the candidates for a
1060515
Following the enactment of Act No. 2006-570, Ala. Acts
5
2006, §§ 17-15-20 through -35 have been reordered as §§ 17-16-
47 through -62; §§ 17-15-50 through -63 have been reordered as
§§ 17-16-63 through -76.
25
particular office in the runoff election withdraws,
then there need not be a second election to fill the
office nor shall the name of either the party so
withdrawing or the remaining candidate be printed on
the ballot of any second election held under this
article. This second election shall be held by the
same election officers who held the first election
and at the same places the first election was held.
If there should be a tie vote cast at any runoff
election, then in that event the tie shall be
decided by the municipal governing body. A vote for
a particular candidate by a majority of those
members eligible to vote of the governing body shall
be necessary to decide the election in his or her
favor. The municipal clerk shall file a copy of each
certificate of election in the office of the judge
of probate of the county in which the city or town
is 
situated, 
and 
the 
judge 
shall 
file 
the
certificate in the same manner that he or she files
the declaration of the result of elections to county
offices."
Section 11-46-69(b) provides that any municipal-election
contest  must be commenced within five days after the result
of the election is declared and that the contest must be
instituted in the manner prescribed in § 17-15-29 (now § 17-
16-56), and except as otherwise provided, all proceedings
relative to municipal-election contests shall be governed by
the provisions of §§ 17-15-20 through -35 and §§ 17-15-50
through -63.   
5
1060515
26
Section 11-46-70 addresses the trial of a municipal-
election contest.  Section 11-46-70 contains four parts, each
setting out a scenario involving a contested election: 
"If, on the trial of the contest of any
municipal election, it shall appear that any person
other than the one whose election is contested,
received or would have received, had the ballots
intended for him and illegally rejected been
received, 
the 
requisite 
number 
of 
votes 
for
election, judgment must be entered declaring such
person duly elected, and such judgment shall have
the force and effect of investing the person thereby
declared elected with full right and title to have
and to hold the office to which he is declared
elected.
"If it appears that no person has or would have
had, if the ballots intended for him and illegally
rejected had been received, the requisite number of
votes for election, judgment must be entered
declaring this fact, and such fact must be certified
to the municipal governing body and the vacancy in
the office, election to which had been contested,
shall be filled in the manner prescribed by law for
filling the vacancy in such office.
"If the person whose election is contested is
found to be ineligible to the office, judgment must
be entered declaring the election void, and the fact
must be certified to the municipal governing body.
The vacancy in such office shall be filled in the
manner prescribed by law.
"If the party whose election is contested is
found to have been duly and legally elected,
judgment must be entered declaring him entitled to
1060515
We note that the first and second parts of § 11-46-70
6
contain the phrase "illegally rejected" votes.  Although § 11-
46-70 uses the phrase "illegally rejected" votes, an election
contest would include both "illegal votes" that were received
and the "rejection of any legal votes."  See § 17-15-21 (now
§ 17-16-48)(addressing the testimony permitted in election
contests).  This is so because § 11-46-70 should be read in
pari materia with § 17-15-21, as § 11-46-69(b) provides that
contests in municipal-election proceedings are governed by
"Articles 2 and 3, Chapter 15, Title 17 of this Code," except
as otherwise provided. 
27
have and to hold the office to which he was so
elected."  
6
 
Part one of § 11-46-70 involves a situation in which two
candidates are involved in an election contest, and following
the trial the judge determined that the candidate who had been
declared the winner did not receive the highest number of
votes.  Part two applies to those situations where, in an
election contest, the judge ultimately determines that, after
tallying the legal votes cast in an election that a tie vote
results.  See Jacobs v. Ryals, 401 So. 2d 776 (Ala. 1981).
Part two also applies where more than two candidates are
involved, and no one candidate receives a majority of the
votes.  See Ex parte Vines, 456 So. 2d 26 (Ala. 1984).  Part
three involves ineligibility to hold the office to which a
candidate has been elected, and part four applies in an
1060515
28
election contest where the trial judge determines that the
declared winner did receive the majority of legal votes cast.
In the present case, the original mayoral election was
held on August 24, 2004, and Long was declared the winner on
August 26, 2004.  Subsequently, Bryant timely filed a contest
of the election, pursuant to § 11-46-69, on August 30, 2004.
Three candidates were involved in the election, and no
candidate received a majority of the votes following the trial
of the election contest.  Long appears to argue that the mere
passage of time as a result of the election contest prevents
a runoff election.  However, an election contest is part of
the statutory election process as set out by the legislature,
and the statutes address deficiencies or irregularities that
may occur in casting ballots.  Following the correct count of
votes, a runoff election between the top two of the three
candidates involved is properly ordered after "no person has
or would have had, if the ballots intended for him and
illegally rejected had been received, the requisite number of
votes for election" under § 11-46-70.  We note it would render
an election contest meaningless if the three-week time limit
for holding a runoff election set out in § 11-46-55(d), as it
read at the time of the election here, barred a runoff
1060515
In 2006, the legislature increased the time for a runoff
7
election from three weeks to six weeks.  See note 4. However,
six weeks is still not enough time in which to contest an
election result, conduct discovery, and complete a trial.   
29
election following an election contest where no one candidate
received a majority of the votes.  In a three-week time limit,
there would never be enough time to contest an election,
conduct discovery, and complete a trial.  Under Long's
7
argument, any time an election was contested and no one
candidate had a majority of the votes, there would be a
vacancy in the office and a vacancy in a class 8 municipality,
like Marion, would be filled by the city council.  Certainly,
that result was not the intent of the legislature when it
provided for timely runoff elections in § 11-46-55(d).      
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court ordering a runoff
election between Long and Bryant is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith,
Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.