Case Title: FITZGERALD v FITZGERALD

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-08-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-46 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 CYNTHIA A. FITZGERALD, Plaintiff and Appellant, -vs- TIMOTHY P. FITZGERALD, 111, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal From: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and for the County of Lewis & Clark, The Honorable Peter G. Meloy, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant: Leaphart Law Firm, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Page Wellcome, Bozeman, Montana Submitted on Briefs: June 25, 1980 Decided : RUG 6 - 1380 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal by p l a i n t i f f from a n order of t h e .strict Court denying her p e t i t i o n t o f i n d respondent g u i l t y of contempt and f o r payment of $4,400 i n support payments t h a t a r e i n a r r e a r s . This matter began i n t h e District Court of Lewis and Clark County, F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , when t h e Honorable Victor H. F a l l entered a decree of divorce awarding custody of t h e minor c h i l d t o t h e mother on A p r i l 30, 1971. The c o u r t made t h e following provision a s t o c h i l d support: " 3 . That t h e defendant s h a l l n o t have t h e r i g h t t o v i s i t t h e c h i l d , unless and u n t i l , he pays t o t h e p l a i n t i f f through t h e c l e r k of t h i s c o u r t , t h e s u m of f i f t y d o l l a r s ($50) p e r month a s and f o r support of t h e minor c h i l d of t h e p a r t i e s . I f and when defendant begins t o make s a i d support payment t o p l a i n t i f f , t h e c o u r t may, i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n , modify t h i s decree t o permit defendant t h e r i g h t t o v i s i t t h e c h i l d a t a l l reasonable t i m e s and places." I n addition, t h e c o u r t found i n Finding of Fact No. 7: "Defendant earns s u f f i c i e n t income t o pay f i f t y d o l l a r s ($50) p e r month f o r t h e support of t h e minor c h i l d of t h e p a r t i e s hereto. " Conclusion of Law No. 3 s t a t e d : "The defendant s h a l l have no r i g h t t o v i s i t s a i d c h i l d , unless and u n t i l , he pays t o t h e p l a i n t i f f t h e sum of f i f t y d o l l a r s ($50) per month through t h e c l e r k of t h i s c o u r t f o r t h e support and maintenance of t h e minor c h i l d of t h e p a r t i e s hereto. " Respondent d i d n o t make any support payments between A p r i l 1971 and September 1979. The records of t h e c l e r k of t h e c o u r t i n d i c a t e t h a t he i s i n a r r e a r s i n t h e amount of Respondent d i d n o t see the minor c h i l d between April 1971 and t h e summer of 1979, except f o r a s h o r t period when t h e c h i l d was a t respondent's p a r e n t s f home i n 1978. A f t e r t h a t meeting with h i s son, a v i s i t a t i o n w a s established i n 1979 a t t h e request of appellant, respondent's ex-wife. When v i s i t a t i o n was established i n 1979, respondent commenced paying c h i l d support. He contends t h a t he w i l l continue t o pay c h i l d support and wants t o see h i s minor son on a permanent basis. Following the v i s i t a t i o n i n 1979 a p p e l l a n t f i l e d an a f f i d a v i t i n support of arrearage which i s the b a s i s of t h e c u r r e n t action. Appellant had n o t previously made any attempt t o modify t h e o r i g i n a l judgment o r maintain any a c t i o n t o c o l l e c t t h e arrearage under t h e Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act f o r some e i g h t years. Respondent contends t h a t the o r i g i n a l judgment d i d n o t r e q u i r e the payment of c h i l d support without h i s being a b l e t o see and v i s i t h i s minor child. Since such v i s i t a t i o n was n o t established during t h e eight-year period, nor requested by appellant, he argues t h a t it would be unconscionable and contrary t o the judgment t o require him t o pay the arrearage set f o r t h i n the a f f i d a v i t . The D i s t r i c t Court substan- t i a l l y agreed with respondent i n denying a p p e l l a n t r e l i e f . Two i s s u e s a r e presented f o r review: 1. Does t h e divorce decree r e q u i r e t h a t respondent pay c h i l d support? 2. Does t h e doctrine of laches apply a s a defense t o t h e s u i t t o enforce a c h i l d support o b l i g a t i o n i n t h i s case? I n denying h i s obligation t o pay t h e arrearage, respon- dent contends he had no obligation t o support the c h i l d under t h e decree unless and u n t i l he exercised h i s r i g h t of v i s i t a t i o n . This argument must be considered with t h e finding of Judge F a l l t h a t respondent w a s capable a t t h e t i m e of t h e divorce of paying $50 per month i n support. The provision on v i s i t a t i o n has no bearing whatsoever upon respondent's l e g a l and moral obligations t o support h i s c h i l d . The decree d i d n o t and could n o t condition the support obligation on the exercise of t h e r i g h t of v i s i t a - tion. See Paterson v. Paterson (1976), 73 Wis.2d 150, 242 N.W.2d 907; Refer v. Refer (1936), 102 Mont. 121, 56 P.2d 750; S t a t e ex rel. Lay v. D i s t r i c t Court (1948), 1 2 2 Mont. I n e a r l i e r cases t h i s Court has spoken o u t on the moral o b l i g a t i o n of parents, and p a r t i c u l a r l y f a t h e r s , t o support t h e i r children. Refer v. Refer, supra; S t a t e ex rel. Lay v. D i s t r i c t Court, supra. I n Lay, t h i s Court, c i t i n g ear- lier opinions, noted: ". . . It i s t h e l e g a l as w e l l a s t h e moral duty of a parent t o support h i s minor children and t h e f a t h e r i s n o t absolved from t h e duty by a divorce from t h e i r mother. [Citations omitted.] Thus defendant's obligation t o pay t h e required money f o r the support of h i s i n f a n t daughter i s n o t simply an outgrowth of t h e divorce s u i t nor i s it a mere i n c i d e n t t h e r e t o , b u t it i s a s o c i a l and a p a r e n t a l obligation imposed by l a w . . ." 122 Mont. a t 71-72, 198 P.2d a t 767. This view was r e c e n t l y c i t e d and supported i n Woolverton v. Woolverton (1976), 169 Mont. 490, 549 P.2d 458. Respondent f a i l s t o take i n t o account t h e well-settled p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e law imposes upon c i v i l i z e d men--the duty t o provide food and s h e l t e r arrangements f o r h i s own. It i s one of the conditions upon which Adam was bounced o u t of t h e garden, and it has been t h e law ever since. Courts have an inherent j u r i s d i c t i o n t o p r o t e c t i n f a n t s . They are wards of t h e government, and t h e c o u r t s a r e t o p r o t e c t t h e i r bread and b u t t e r . When doing so, they do n o t take t h e i r c l u e from E l i j a h and the ravens, b u t draw it from t h e earnings of t h e f a t h e r . W e f i n d t h e c o u r t i n c o r r e c t l y applied t h e r u l e i n t h i s case, and i t s judgment must be reversed. Concerning t h e second i s s u e , t h e d o c t r i n e of laches, it appears t h a t t h e order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court of January 24, 1980, f i n d s , i n e f f e c t , t h a t a p p e l l a n t i s foreclosed from recovering t h e back c h i l d support by t h e d o c t r i n e of laches o r estoppel. Several matters a r e of import here. F i r s t of a l l , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s order assumes matters n o t i n evidence, i . e . , t h a t a p p e l l a n t made no request f o r back support u n t i l respondent sought v i s i t a t i o n and commenced paying support. The record i s t o t h e contrary. Respondent commenced h i s support payments i n September 1979, only a f t e r receiving a demand letter from a p p e l l a n t ' s counsel. Second, r e g a r d l e s s of when o r why respondent commenced making h i s c h i l d support payments, he i s n o t r e l i e v e d of h i s p a s t c h i l d support o b l i g a t i o n by t h e d o c t r i n e of laches o r estoppel. While t h i s Court has n o t considered t h i s question previously, s e v e r a l of our sister s t a t e s have. W e adopt t h e i r well-reasoned opinions f o r our holding on t h i s i s s u e . The Supreme Court of Kansas, i n Strecker v. Wilkinson (1976), 220 Kan. 292, 552 P.2d 979, noted t h a t support of c h i l d r e n , l i k e t h e i r custody, i s a matter of s o c i a l concern. I t i s an o b l i g a t i o n t h a t t h e f a t h e r owes t h e s t a t e as w e l l as t o h i s children. The c o u r t noted: ". . . The p a r e n t a l duty t o provide f o r t h e support and maintenance of a c h i l d continues through t h e c h i l d ' s minority, and t h e obliga- t i o n t o support may be enforced by an a c t i o n a t any t i m e during t h e c h i l d ' s minority." 552 P.2d a t 984. The c o u r t then went on t o hold t h a t t h e defendant could n o t "invoke t h e defense of laches a s a bar t o enforce h i s moral and l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n t o support h i s c h i l d . " I n a case on almost a l l f o u r s t o t h i s case, t h e Wiscon- s i n c o u r t i n Paterson v. Paterson, supra, addressed i t s e l f t o t h e i s s u e of laches a s a defense t o a claim f o r back support. I n Paterson, t h e defendant had f a i l e d t o make h i s $50 a month payment f o r a period of nine years and t h e mother d i d n o t take any l e g a l a c t i o n f o r a period of t h i r - teen years, a t which t i m e she obtained an order t o show cause why t h e defendant should n o t be held i n contempt f o r f a i l u r e t o pay a r r e a r a g e . The defendant pleaded laches and f u r t h e r t h a t he had been misled t o h i s detriment by t h e mother's inaction. The Wisconsin c o u r t held t h a t t h e doc- t r i n e of laches does n o t apply t o the enforcement of c h i l d support o r d e r s : "However, w e would f u r t h e r hold t h a t t h e de- fense of laches i s n o t a v a i l a b l e i n an a c t i o n o r proceeding brought t o secure enforcement of a c h i l d support order i n a divorce a c t i o n . " Paterson, 242 N.W.2d a t 910. The Wisconsin c o u r t noted t h a t even though one might reasonably expect t h e custodian t o promptly seek t h e enforce- ment of a support order, f a i l u r e of t h e custodian t o do s o does n o t i n u r e t o t h e b e n e f i t of t h e person choosing n o t t o make t h e payments and s t a t e d : ". . . It may be reasonable t o expect t h a t when c h i l d support payments a r e n o t made, t h e cus- todian, e n t i t l e d t o receive such payments, w i l l seek compliance with t h e c h i l d support order . . . However, i f t h e c o u r t o r custodian do n o t promptly proceed so t o do, the person choosing n o t t o make t h e c h i l d support payments i s n o t t o p r o f i t o r b e n e f i t thereby. . ." 242 N.W.2d a t 910. The Paterson c o u r t f u r t h e r noted t h a t t h e r i g h t s and t h e welfare of t h e c h i l d r e n are a t s t a k e and cannot be s a c r i f i c e d by t h e i r c u s t o d i a n ' s i n a c t i o n . The c o u r t s a i d : "The reason i s t h a t , j u s t a s a divorce i n t h i s s t a t e does n o t involve only t h e divorcing spouses, j u s t so an order f o r t h e c h i l d sup- p o r t does n o t involve only t h e p a r e n t required t o make such payments and t h e custodian e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e them. Under t h e s t a t u t e such pay- ments a r e made f o r t h e 'support, maintenance and education of t h e minor c h i l d r e n ' of t h e par- t i e s . I n t h i s s t a t e such c h i l d r e n a r e ' i n t e r - e s t e d and a f f e c t e d p a r t i e s ' i n t h e divorce a c t i o n involving t h e i r parents. The r i g h t s of such c h i l d r e n are t o be served and protected . . . Once a c h i l d support o b l i g a t i o n terminates, t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s begins t o run, b u t , then and earlier, t h e d o c t r i n e of laches does n o t apply." 242 N.W. 2d a t 910. For t h e above-stated reasons, w e f i n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n holding t h a t laches applied here. F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t i n her b r i e f before t h e D i s t r i c t Court, requested t h a t i n t e r e s t be awarded with regard t o t h e back c h i l d support o b l i g a t i o n . This Court i n t h e r e c e n t case of W i l l i a m s v. Budke (1980), - Mont. , 606 P.2d 515, 37 St.Rep. 228, held: "We hold t h e r e f o r e t h a t when t h e m a r i t a l d i s - s o l u t i o n decree i s s i l e n t a s t o i n t e r e s t , such i n t e r e s t is automatically c o l l e c t i b l e by the judgment c r e d i t o r spouse on past-due payments f o r support money o r maintenance, t h e same a s any o t h e r money judgment under s e c t i o n 25-9- 205, MCA." 606 P.2d a t 519, 37 St.Rep. a t 234. O n t h e b a s i s of Williams a p p e l l a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e i n t e r e s t on c h i l d support payments which were due and owing s i n c e A p r i l 1971. The decision of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s reversed and t h e cause i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r e n t r y of judg- ment c o n s i s t e n t with t h i s opinion. R /i-[-Ylr - w J u s t i c e W e concur: /