Case Title: Arthur W. Michalk v. Wendi Lee Michalk Child custody

Citation: 

Docket Number: 35221

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2009-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Ada 
County.  Hon. Terry R. McDaniel, Magistrate Judge. 
 
The decision of the magistrate court is affirmed.  Respondent is awarded attorneys 
fees on appeal.  Costs are awarded to Respondent.  
 
Wendi Lee Michalk, pro se for appellant.   
 
Audrey Numbers, Boise, for respondent.   
 
____________________________________ 
 
W. JONES, Justice 
NATURE OF CASE 
 
Pro se Appellant Wendi Michalk (Wendi) appeals directly to the Supreme Court, a 
divorce decree entered by Magistrate Judge Terry R. McDaniel, dissolving her marriage to 
Respondent Arthur William Michalk (Art), dividing the community assets and debts, and 
granting Wendi and Art joint legal and physical custody of their minor child.  Wendi essentially 
argues that she was not afforded a fair trial.  Additionally, Wendi argues that Art’s prior 
conviction for two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor should have precluded the 
magistrate court from granting the parties joint legal and physical custody of their child. 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
Docket No.  35221 
 
 
ARTHUR WILLIAM MICHALK, 
 
                                  Plaintiff/Respondent                                                                                     
v.                                                       
                                                         
WENDI LEE MICHALK 
                                                        
                                 Defendant/Appellant.                                    
                                                       
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Boise, August, 2009 Term 
 
2009 Opinion No.  128 
 
Filed:  October 20, 2009 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Art states that he and Wendi were married on July 17, 1998, but Wendi states that they 
were married on July 16, 1999.  Although Art and Wendi disagree on the date of the wedding, 
their disagreement is immaterial to the case.  They had one child, C.A.M., born on August 26, 
1999.   
 
In early 1998, Art was convicted of two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a 
minor, stemming from incidents1 with his twelve year old daughter from a previous relationship 
and his daughter’s friend.  Art was sentenced to seven years in prison, with the court retaining 
180 days jurisdiction to review whether or not to place Art on probation.  After completing a 
rider in Cottonwood, Idaho, Art was released from custody and placed on probation for seven 
years.  As a condition of his probation, Art was required to participate in Alcoholics Anonymous 
meetings and complete recommendations by SANE Solutions (SANE), a community based 
program that provides treatment to sexual abuse offenders2.   
 
Art met Wendi after his conviction and during his probation at an Alcoholics Anonymous 
meeting in 1998.  In July of 1999, Wendi signed an agreement to act as Art’s supervisor in the 
SANE program.  As his supervisor, Wendi was aware of Art’s conviction and the nature of his 
crime.  In June of 2000, Art’s SANE contract was amended to allow him to have unsupervised 
contact with C.A.M.; it was signed by Art’s SANE counselor, his probation officer, and Wendi.  
Art testified that if Wendi had not signed the addendum, Art would not have been permitted to 
have unsupervised contact with C.A.M.  Pursuant to the addendum, at various times Art has had 
unsupervised contact with C.A.M. since June of 2000.  With knowledge of Art’s prior 
conviction, Wendi allowed Art unsupervised visits with C.A.M. 
 
 Art testified that sometime in 2003 Wendi was experiencing mental problems and 
voluntarily committed herself to the Franklin House for mental health treatment for 14 days.  He 
further testified that Wendi did not inform him that she admitted herself to the Franklin House; 
Art found out only after Wendi’s landlord let Art into her trailer and he found a note she wrote 
stating that she went to the Franklin House and left C.A.M. in the care of a friend.  Art took over 
caring for his son full-time for the remaining 12 days that Wendi was at the Franklin House.   
                                                 
1 The record is unclear whether the two counts stemmed from one incident involving both girls, or whether there 
were two separate incidents.   
2 See http://www.trhs.org/SANESolutions/SANEOverview.aspx (last visited July 8, 2009).   
 
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The parties separated in September of 2003 and Wendi moved to Oregon with C.A.M. to 
be closer to Wendi’s family.  She then returned to Idaho with C.A.M. in June of 2005 and 
resumed living with Art.   
 
From June of 2005 through February of 2007, the parties lived together in the same 
household and jointly cared for C.A.M.  During this time, Wendi attended school and worked 
part-time at the American Red Cross.  Art was the childcare provider when Wendi was at school 
or work.   
 
The parties split for the final time in February of 2007 and they agreed that Art could 
have unsupervised visitation with C.A.M. every other weekend, including overnight visits, and 
every Wednesday afternoon.  Art filed for divorce on April 12, 2007, alleging irreconcilable 
differences and requesting a visitation schedule with C.A.M.  Wendi filed an answer and 
counterclaim on May 21, 2007, with the help of appointed Legal Aid attorney Roderick D. Gere 
(Gere).  Therein, Wendi confirmed Art’s request for joint legal custody of C.A.M., setting out a 
visitation schedule that allowed Art to visit C.A.M. every other weekend, with no overnight 
visitation until Art obtained a separate bed for C.A.M.  Wendi also set out limitations that Art 
was not permitted to sleep or bathe with C.A.M. and was required to provide age-appropriate 
entertainment for him.   
On August 12, 2007, Wendi unilaterally stopped allowing Art to visit C.A.M.  Art 
testified that until this date, with knowledge of Art’s prior conviction, Wendi had never 
expressed concern about Art taking care of C.A.M.; Art has not seen his son since that date.   
On September 6, 2007, Gere filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, alleging that Wendi’s 
conduct had caused a breakdown in their attorney/client relationship.  On the day set for Wendi’s 
attorney’s motion to withdraw, September 25, 2007, Wendi waived her attorney/client privilege 
by demanding that her attorney explain to the court on the record why he wanted to withdraw.  
Gere explained that Wendi would not follow his advice regarding the custody issues, nor did she 
follow his instructions that she not file documents with the court without his knowledge.  The 
court granted Gere’s motion to withdraw and informed Wendi that she had twenty days in which 
to file a written statement with the court specifying whether she was going to proceed in the case 
pro se or through another attorney.  Once Gere withdrew, and throughout the remainder of the 
trial, Magistrate Judge McDaniel took steps to ensure that Wendi’s rights were protected, 
informing her of necessary steps in order to comply with procedural rules.  The court informed 
 
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Wendi that if she did not comply with the requirements set forth in the order of withdrawal that a 
default could be entered against her in the case.  In violation of I.R.C.P. 11(b)(3), Wendi did not 
file the written notice within the twenty day period required by the court.  On October 18, 2007, 
Wendi filed a so-called “Notice to the Court,” wherein she complained the court had violated her 
constitutional rights by not appointing another counsel to represent her after Gere withdrew.   
On October 22, 2007, Art’s attorney, Audrey Numbers (Numbers) filed a three-day 
notice of intent to take default because of Wendi’s failure to follow I.R.C.P. 11(b)(3), and 
Numbers certified that Wendi was sent a copy of such notice.  On October 31, 2007, the court 
entered a default; however, the court did not enter a default judgment against Wendi.  On 
November 13, 2007, Wendi filed an appeal of that decision to this Court; the appeal was 
dismissed because there was no final appealable order.  On November 17, 2007, the day of the 
pre-trial conference, Wendi filed a motion to reconsider default; the court granted the motion and 
set aside the default.  At this pre-trial conference the court informed the parties that they were 
bound by the pleadings as they existed at that time.  The court informed Wendi that in order to 
change the pleadings she would have to request an amendment under the rules.   
On December 24, 2007, Wendi attempted to file an “Amended Counter Complaint,” but 
she did not follow the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure by requesting leave of the court to file an 
amended counterclaim, nor did she send copies of the pleadings to Art’s attorney.  Because the 
rules were not followed, the court declined to consider the Amended Counter Complaint.   
The day before trial, on January 2, 2008, Wendi filed a motion to vacate the trial and to 
extend discovery.  She also filed a motion to issue subpoenas in support of the so-called 
“Counter Complaint.”  Wendi did not send or hand-deliver copies of any of these pleadings to 
Art’s attorney.  On the day of trial, January 3, 2008, the court addressed the motions filed by 
Wendi; Numbers objected because Wendi did not give notice of any of the motions.  The court 
denied Wendi’s motions, finding that Wendi’s failure to do any discovery in the three months 
between the date that Gere withdrew and when the trial commenced was inexcusable; the court 
also found that Art would be extremely prejudiced if trial were delayed because Wendi had 
unilaterally denied him any visitation with C.A.M. since August of 2007.   
At the beginning of trial, Numbers attempted to stipulate to how the property would be 
divided.  Wendi refused to respond to the request and remained silent throughout the remainder 
of the trial proceedings, including but not limited to requests by the court for her opening and 
 
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closing statements, objections to exhibits, cross-examinations of any witnesses, or the 
presentation of any testimony or exhibits on her own behalf during the trial.   
During trial, Art testified that he had a decent home where C.A.M. would stay during 
visits, his extended family has a strong relationship with C.A.M., he spent a lot of time caring for 
C.A.M. without Wendi’s help over the years, and Wendi never expressed any concern about Art 
being alone with C.A.M. until she unilaterally denied him visitation with his son.  Additionally, 
Art testified that he never did anything intentionally to harm C.A.M.  The only times C.A.M. was 
harmed in Art’s care were accidents, including an incident when C.A.M. was wrestling with Art 
and cut his lip and a time when Art needed help getting off the couch and unintentionally hurt 
C.A.M.’s shoulder.   
After the trial concluded, the magistrate court took the case under advisement and issued 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  The court then entered a Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce.  Therein, the court dissolved the parties’ marriage and granted them joint legal and 
physical custody of C.A.M., with Wendi having primary physical custody and Art having 
reasonable visitation upon completing additional counseling and a polygraph.  The court also set 
out child custody payment terms, including giving a credit to Art for child support while Wendi 
and C.A.M. were living with him, and divided the parties’ property and debt.   
After unsuccessfully filing various motions in the district court before Judge Copsey and 
a certified question of law in federal court, Wendi appealed to this Court.  She lists twenty-three 
issues on appeal.  Because Wendi repeated issues, this Court condensed the issues and addressed 
each in a twelve-part analysis.  
Wendi requests attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 35(a)(5) and I.A.R. 
40.  Art requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-121 and 12-123.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Child custody determinations are committed to the sound discretion of the magistrate 
judge.  Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho 929, 934, 204 P.3d 1140, 1145 (2009).  A custody award will 
not be regarded as an abuse of discretion so long as the trial court: (1) recognized the issue as 
one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer limits of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the available choices; and (3) reached its decision through an exercise of 
reason.  Id.  An abuse of discretion occurs when the evidence is insufficient to support a 
magistrate’s conclusion that the interests and welfare of the children would be best served by a 
 
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particular custody award or modification.  Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 713, 170 P.3d 375, 
378 (2007).  A magistrate’s findings of fact, however, will be upheld if they are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence and are not clearly erroneous.  Danti, 146 Idaho at 934, 204 
P.3d at 1145.  If the findings of fact are based on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is 
conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal.  Nelson, 144 Idaho at 713, 170 P.3d at 378. 
This Court freely reviews questions of law.  Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 343, 
179 P.3d 303, 306 (2008).   
ANALYSIS 
Pro se civil litigants are not accorded special latitude merely because they chose to 
proceed through litigation without the assistance of an attorney.  During trial, Magistrate Judge 
McDaniel correctly explained to Wendi that the court was required to hold her to the same 
standard of care that it would any attorney, despite the fact that she was representing herself in 
the proceeding.  “Pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by 
an attorney.”  Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 117 P.3d 120, 123 (2005) (quoting Twin Falls 
County v. Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 445, 80 P.3d 1043, 1046 (2003)).  Moreover, “Pro se litigants 
are not accorded any special consideration simply because they are representing themselves and 
are not excused from adhering to procedural rules.”  Nelson, 144 Idaho at 718, 170 P.3d at 383 
(citing Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 346, 941 P.2d 314, 318 (1997)).  Thus, 
Wendi’s arguments in support of the issues she raises on appeal were analyzed within the same 
standards and rules that every attorney in this jurisdiction is required to follow. 
It is well established that a litigant may not remain silent as to claimed error during a trial 
and later raise objections for the first time on appeal.  Barmore, 145 Idaho at 343, 179 P.3d at 
306.  Additionally, substantive issues will not be considered for the first time on appeal.  Id.  
Accordingly, this Court will not consider any issue on appeal that Wendi failed to properly 
preserve during trial.  Because Wendi chose to remain silent during the entirety of the trial 
proceedings, this Court can consider very few, if any, of the issues that Wendi raises on appeal.  
For the sake of retaining some amount of clarity, each of the twenty-three issues raised by Wendi 
will be repeated verbatim and addressed in turn.   
A. Issues raised by Wendi on appeal3  
1. Idaho judiciary bound by sworn and signed oath  
                                                 
3 Each of the following underlined, numbered statements of issues are in the language used by Wendi in her brief. 
 
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Wendi argues that Magistrate Judge McDaniel ignored the United States Constitution and 
unspecified federal statutes when he “issued several illegal verbal orders,” which she alleges 
amounted to treason.  Wendi did not cite to any portion of the record to support her argument.  In 
fact, many of the issues that Wendi raises on appeal are barred by the Idaho Appellate Rule that 
requires appellants to specify the issues they are raising and provide legal and factual support for 
those arguments.  I.A.R. 35(a)(6), which governs the contents of appellate briefs, requires that 
“[t]he argument . . . contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented 
on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the 
transcript and record relied upon.”  This Court has held that issues on appeal that are not 
supported by propositions of law or authority are deemed waived and will not be considered.  
Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, __, 207 P.3d 988, 997 (2009).  
Because Wendi failed entirely to support her argument with citations to any evidence in the 
record or relevant legal authority, this Court declines to review the argument. 
2. Idaho judiciary bound by Supreme Law of the Land 
Wendi asserts a Supremacy Clause argument, alleging that Magistrate Judge McDaniel 
“IGNORED the Supremacy of the United States Constitution and Codes in outright TREASON 
against the US Constitution, Codes, and Treaties.”  (emphasis in original).  However, Wendi 
failed to cite to any portion of the record to support her argument.  See Wheeler, 147 Idaho at __, 
207 P.3d at 997. 
Thus, this Court declines to review the argument. 
3. Judicial and attorney fraud before the court 
Wendi argues that Art violated I.C. § 32-11-209 because he did not disclose his past 
conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor “within the first pleading or in an 
affidavit attached to the first pleading identify[ing] all issues under subsection (a)(2).”  I.C. § 32-
11-209(a)(2) provides:  
In a child custody proceeding each party, in its first pleading or in an attached 
affidavit, shall give information, if reasonably ascertainable, under oath as to the 
child’s present address or whereabouts, the places where the child has lived 
during the last five (5) years, and the names and present addresses of the persons 
with whom the child has lived during that period. The pleading or affidavit must 
state whether the party: 
. . .  
Knows of any proceeding that could affect the current proceeding, including 
proceedings for enforcement and proceedings relating to domestic violence, 
 
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protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so, identify 
the court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding. 
 
(Emphasis added).  Wendi’s argument fails because I.C. § 32-11-209 only requires a party to 
disclose information about proceedings that could affect the custody proceeding “in its first 
pleading or in an attached affidavit.” 4  Art filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce on April 13, 
2007.  He filed an Affidavit of Arthur Michalk on April 17, 2007, only four days after filing his 
first pleading, wherein he disclosed his prior convictions to Wendi and the magistrate court.  
Wendi did not file an Answer and Counterclaim until May 21, 2007, over a month after Art filed 
the affidavit; Wendi cannot argue that she was prejudiced by Art’s timing in filing the affidavit.  
Finally, Wendi did not raise this issue before the trial court and is barred from doing so now.  “A 
party’s failure to object to action by the trial court precludes a party from challenging that action 
on appeal.”  Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864, 866, 204 P.3d 504, 506 (2009).  For the above 
reasons, this Court declines to review Wendi’s argument. 
4. Deprivation of Equality of Protection under the Law 
Wendi argues that the magistrate court erred because it failed to stay the trial proceedings 
until Art furnished the court with information about his prior convictions, pursuant to I.C. § 32-
11-209(a).  That statute provides: “In a child custody proceeding each party, in its first pleading 
or in an attached affidavit, shall give information . . . [regarding] any proceeding that could affect 
the current proceeding, including proceedings . . . relating to domestic violence.”  However, I.C. 
§ 32-11-209(b) goes on to state: “If the information required by subsection (a) of this section is 
not furnished, the court, upon motion of a party or its own motion, may stay the proceeding until 
the information is furnished.”  (Emphasis added).  Thus, contrary to what Wendi argues on 
appeal, the relevant statutory language is discretionary, not mandatory.  The court was well 
within its discretion to allow the proceedings to continue; Wendi has not shown otherwise.  In 
addition, on his own initiative, Art provided the court with information about his prior 
convictions only four days after filing his complaint.   
                                                 
4 Note that I.C. § 32-11-209(a)(2) appears to limit the information that a party must disclose proceedings related to 
“domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions.”  It is not clear whether Art’s 
prior conviction fits within the limitations set forth in I.C. § 32-11-209(a)(2), as his conviction is wholly unrelated to 
the divorce and custody proceedings at issue and there are no allegations of domestic violence in the present case.  
Thus, Art may not have been required to make the disclosure to the court.  However, neither party raises this issue 
on appeal. 
 
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Moreover, Wendi never raised this issue below and is now barred from doing so because 
“a party’s failure to object to action by the trial court precludes a party from challenging that 
action on appeal.”  Mackowiak, 146 Idaho at 866, 204 P.3d at 506.  Thus, this Court declines to 
review the issue on appeal. 
5. Deprivation of Equality of Protection under the Law 
Wendi argues that the magistrate court erred because it did not order an investigation by 
the Department of Health and Welfare pursuant to I.C. § 32-717C.  That statute requires an 
investigation be conducted when an allegation of child abuse is made during divorce 
proceedings.  I.C. § 32-717C provides:  
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon request for modification of a divorce 
decree, an allegation of child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating 
either party, the court shall order that an investigation be conducted by the 
department of health and welfare. A final award of custody or visitation may not 
be rendered until a report on that investigation is received by the court. That 
investigation shall be conducted by the department within thirty (30) days of the 
court’s notice and request for investigation. 
 
In this case, Wendi failed to make an allegation on the record of child abuse or child 
sexual abuse.  Under the plain language of the statute, Wendi’s argument is barred because she 
did not raise this issue below.  Mackowiak, 146 Idaho at 866, 204 P.3d at 506.  Accordingly, this 
Court declines to review this issue on appeal. 
6. Deprivation of Equality of Protection under the Law 
Wendi argues that the magistrate court erred because it “refused to adhere to the [I.C. §] 
32-717B(5) and [I.C. §] 39-6303 definitions of an habitual sexual and domestic offender,” 
thereby denying Wendi and C.A.M. their “[U.S.] Constitutional civil rights to Equality of 
Protection under the law, due process and substantive due process.”  I.C. § 32-717B(5) provides: 
“There shall be a presumption that joint custody is not in the best interests of a minor child if one 
(1) of the parents is found by the court to be a habitual perpetrator of domestic violence as 
defined in section 39-6303, Idaho Code.”  I.C. § 39-6303(1) defines “domestic violence” in 
relevant part as “the physical injury, sexual abuse or forced imprisonment or threat thereof of a 
family or household member, or of a minor child by a person with whom the minor child has had 
or is having a dating relationship . . . .”  Wendi assigns error to the court’s failure to decide that 
joint custody was not in the best interest of C.A.M. because, according to Wendi, Art is a 
habitual perpetrator of domestic violence.  She stated to the court during a pre-trial hearing that it 
 
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should consider “[Art’s] 1995 conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct with minors, his 1998 
conviction of lewd and lascivious [conduct] with minors, and a child endangerment of 2000.”   
Wendi did not provide the court with any evidence supporting her claims, 
notwithstanding the court’s clear admonition to Wendi:  
[T]he fact that you’ll come in and -- and say, he’s been convicted of this, that’s 
not proof.  I need to have the actual judgment of conviction; okay? . . . [T]hat’s 
the rules of evidence . . . You can’t just come in and say something, I have to have 
evidence of it. 
 
This Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.  Mackowiak, 146 Idaho at 
866, 204 P.3d at 506.  Because Wendi failed to present evidence of her claim that Art is a 
habitual perpetrator of domestic violence to the magistrate court and did not raise any objection 
during trial, she has not preserved this issue for appeal.  Mackowiak, 146 Idaho at 866, 204 P.3d 
at 506.  Therefore, this Court declines to consider her argument.  
 
However, even if Wendi had preserved this issue for appeal, I.C. § 32-717B(5) merely 
provides a “presumption that joint custody is not in the best interests of a minor child” if a parent 
is a “habitual perpetrator of domestic violence.”  Despite Wendi’s failure to raise this issue 
below, Art presented ample evidence during trial to rebut this presumption.  Art testified that he 
had a decent home where C.A.M. would stay during visits, he never did anything intentionally to 
harm C.A.M., his extended family has a strong relationship with C.A.M., he spent a lot of time 
caring for C.A.M. without Wendi’s help over the years, and Wendi never expressed any concern 
about Art being alone with C.A.M. until she unilaterally denied him visitation with his son.  
Wendi, on the other hand, failed entirely to present any evidence whatsoever during trial.  
Accordingly, this Court declines to hold that Art failed to rebut the presumption in I.C. § 32-
717B(5). 
 
Moreover, the record does not support Wendi’s claim that Art’s conduct meets the 
definition of a “habitual perpetrator of domestic violence” pursuant to I.C. § 32-717B(5).  The 
record shows that Art was convicted of two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor; 
one count involved his twelve year old daughter and another count involved his daughter’s 
friend.  “Habitual” is defined as “customary; usual . . . recidivist.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(8th ed. 2004).  “Perpetrator” is defined as “a person who commits a crime or offense.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  Thus, Art must have committed more than one incident of 
domestic violence for the magistrate court to apply the presumption set forth in I.C. § 32-
 
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717B(5).  The definition of “domestic violence” in I.C. § 39-6303(1), as applied in this case, 
would require a showing that Art had sexually abused a family or household member or a minor 
child of a person with whom he had a dating relationship.  Art’s conduct with his twelve year old 
daughter clearly fits within this definition.  However, there is no evidence in the record that his 
daughter’s friend fits within the definition of a person against whom Art could perpetrate 
“domestic violence” as contemplated by the statute.  That is, the record does not show that Art’s 
daughter’s friend was a family or household member or a minor child of a person with whom he 
had a dating relationship.  Thus, the only possible way that Art could be a “habitual perpetrator 
of domestic violence,” as contemplated by I.C. § 32-717B(5), is if there were more than one 
allegation on the record of physical or sexual abuse against his daughter, another family member, 
or the child of someone with whom he had a dating relationship.  Art testified that C.A.M. got 
hurt a few times while he was in Art’s care, but those occurrences appear to be nothing more 
than normal childhood injuries and they certainly did not amount to abuse.  Although Wendi 
contends that Art was charged with child endangerment in 2000, she did not produce evidence to 
support her assertion and this Court cannot merely rely on her word.  Wendi has failed to show 
that Art fits within the definition of “habitual perpetrator of domestic violence” under I.C. § 32-
717B(5).  Even if Wendi had properly preserved this issue for appeal, the magistrate court did 
not abuse its discretion because it recognized its discretion in the case, it acted within the outer 
limits of its discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards, and reached its 
decision through an exercise of reason.  Thus, even if this Court reviews this issue on the merits, 
the magistrate court did not err. 
7. Tampering with the evidence 
Wendi argues that the magistrate court erred in denying her motion requesting to take 
C.A.M. out of state to visit his 104-year-old great-grandmother.  I.A.R. 35(a)(6) requires that 
“[t]he argument . . . contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented 
on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the 
transcript and record relied upon.”  Because the record is bereft of such a motion, Wendi’s 
argument is barred.  See Wheeler, 147 Idaho at __, 207 P.3d at 997.  Thus, this Court declines to 
review this argument. 
 
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8. Unconstitutional creation of law, Trespass outside of jurisdiction, Deprivation of equality 
of access to the courts and protection under the law, Deprivation of due process and 
substantive due process 
Wendi alleges that the magistrate court erred in denying her “right to file co-defensive 
motion and to have heard co-defensive motion . . . stating motion MUST be filed through 
counsel where no such law of restriction exists.”  (emphasis in original).  It is completely unclear 
what Wendi is arguing and she does not cite to any portion of the record to support her argument.  
Under I.A.R. 35(a)(6), Wendi’s argument is barred.  See Wheeler, 147 Idaho at __, 207 P.3d at 
997.  This Court declines to review this argument. 
9. Tampering with the evidence, Altering official documents, Trespass outside of 
jurisdiction, unconstitutional deprivation of the Supremacy of the US Constitution and 
laws, Deprivation of civil rights to equality of access to the courts and protection under 
the law 
Wendi assigns error because the magistrate court did not serve Wendi’s filings upon 
Art’s attorney, a right Wendi claims she was entitled to because the court waived her fees and 
costs as an indigent person pursuant to I.C. § 31-3220(6).  The statute that Wendi cites in support 
of her argument provides:  
The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties 
in cases in which the person is found by the court to be indigent.  Witnesses shall 
attend as in other cases, and the same remedies shall be available in other civil 
cases.  Payment of fees for service of process and witnesses, where required, shall 
be paid out of the district court fund of the county in which the action is filed.    
 
I.C. § 31-3220(6) (emphasis added). 
 
Rule 4 governs service of process, generally meaning the summons and complaint.  See 
I.R.C.P. 4.  Rule 5 governs service of “other papers.”  See I.R.C.P. 5.  Wendi has not specified 
which documents she believes the magistrate court should have served on opposing counsel.  
Thus, this Court has no information as to whether the documents to which she refers are of the 
kind that the officers of the court had the duty to serve.  There is not enough information before 
this Court for it to opine whether the magistrate court erred in failing to serve process. 
Moreover, although there is little to no appellate authority on the issue of cost and fee 
waivers for pro se civil litigants, nothing in the rules indicates that such a waiver relieves a party 
from obtaining copies of its filings and serving those copies on opposing counsel.  See I.C. § 31-
 
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3220.  The statutory language “where required” suggests that the court must specifically enter an 
order for payment of fees for service of process.  I.C. § 31-3220(6).  No such order was entered 
in this case; Wendi did not move the magistrate court to issue and serve all process on opposing 
counsel, nor has she presented this Court with any authority showing that the magistrate court 
was required to enter an order sua sponte requiring the officers of the court to issue and serve all 
process on opposing counsel.  For an issue to be appealable to this Court, there must have been 
an adverse ruling by the lower court.  McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397, 64 P.3d 317, 323 
(2003).  Wendi never moved for the court to complete service of process, so this particular issue 
was not raised below.  Thus, Wendi may not raise this issue on appeal.  See Mackowiak, 146 
Idaho at 866, 204 P.3d at 506.   
10. Fraud before the court 
Wendi argues that the magistrate court should have sanctioned Numbers for making 
allegedly inconsistent statements that she “knew nothing regarding satisfaction of child support 
judgments and adjustments,” and that there was “no evidence that either satisfaction of judgment 
was ever applied to [Art’s] arrears.”  Wendi does not cite to the record in support of this 
contention; there is no indication that Numbers committed fraud, or that the court erred in failing 
to sanction her for the alleged fraud.   
Likewise, Wendi asserts that the magistrate court should have sanctioned Numbers for 
deceiving the court by stating that she “had no understanding of [Wendi’s] income, when in fact 
[Numbers] had been provided pay-stub evidence.”  Again, Wendi does not cite to the record and 
there is no evidence that Numbers was deceitful or that the court erred in failing to sanction her 
for the alleged deceitfulness.  Because Wendi fails to support both her arguments with citations 
to any relevant legal authority, this Court declines to review the arguments.  See Wheeler, 147 
Idaho at __, 207 P.3d at 997. 
11. Mental incapacity and extreme emotional prejudice  
Wendi alleges that Magistrate Judge McDaniel acted “solely out of emotional mental 
imbalance and illegal prejudice.”  Again, Wendi does not provide support for her argument, 
except to claim that the judge’s actions resulted in “multiple direct violations of Idaho statute, 
multiple actions in direct defiance of the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the United 
States of America.”  Because Wendi fails to support her argument with citations to evidence in 
 
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the record or relevant legal authority, this Court declines to review this argument.  See also 
Wheeler, 147 Idaho at __, 207 P.3d at 997. 
12. Unconstitutional creation of law, Trespass outside of jurisdiction, Deprivation of equality 
of access to the courts and protection under the law, Deprivation of due process and 
substantive due process, Tampering with the evidence, Altering official documents, 
Trespass outside of jurisdiction, unconstitutional deprivation of the Supremacy of the US 
Constitution and laws, Deprivation of civil rights to equality of access to the courts and 
protection under the law, Judicial and attorney fraud before the court, Mental and 
extreme emotional prejudice 
Wendi calls for “legislative impeachment” of Magistrate Judge McDaniel for allegedly, 
among other things, “conducting war against the US Constitution,” “enact[ing] multiple acts of 
clear, indefensible, unmitigated and inarguable outright treason,” and engaging in conduct 
deserving of “criminal indictment and prosecution.”  Indeed, Magistrate Judge McDaniel is to be 
commended for his demeanor and temperament in dealing with the outrageous and irrational 
arguments made by Wendi as well as with her contentious and outrageous behavior.  His 
restraint and actions to help Wendi were remarkable.  Wendi provides absolutely no support for 
any of these claims.  In accordance with I.A.R. 35(a)(6), her claim is barred.  See Wheeler, 147 
Idaho at __, 207 P.3d at 997.  More importantly, this Court does not have authority to commence 
legislative impeachment proceedings against Judge McDaniel.  “The court for the trial of 
impeachments shall be the senate.”  IDAHO CONST. art. V § 3.  “The powers of the government of 
this state are divided into three distinct departments . . . and no person or collection of persons 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall 
exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others . . . .”  IDAHO CONST. art. II § 1.  
Accordingly, this Court declines to review this argument. 
B.  Attorney fees on appeal 
 
Wendi requests attorney fees pursuant to I.A.R. 35(a)(5) and costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40.  
This Court denies her request on three grounds.  First, Wendi has not cited to any statutory 
provision authorizing an award of attorney fees.  See Commercial Ventures, Inv. v. Rex M. & 
Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 219, 177 P.3d 955, 966 (2008); Gilman v. Davis, 138 
Idaho 599, 603, 67 P.3d 78, 82 (2003).  Second, even if she had properly requested attorney fees, 
Wendi is not the prevailing party in this action.  See Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 866, 187 
 
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P.3d 1234, 1241 (2008).  Third, this Court has long held that pro se litigants are not entitled to 
attorney fees.  See Barbee v. WMA Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 397, 146 P.3d 657 (2006); 
Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 377, 973 P.2d 142, 148 (1999); Curtis v. Campbell, 
105 Idaho 705, 707, 672 P.2d 1035, 1037 (1983).  For the reasons stated, Wendi is not entitled to 
attorney fees or costs on appeal. 
 
Art requests attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.C. § 12-123.  An award of 
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 is not a matter of right to the prevailing party, but is 
appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the case was 
brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.  McGrew v. 
McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003).  When deciding whether attorney fees 
should be awarded under  I.C. § 12-121, the entire course of the litigation must be taken into 
account and if there is at least one legitimate issue presented, attorney fees may not be awarded 
even though the losing party has asserted other factual or legal claims that are frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation.  Id.  When Wendi failed to properly amend her pleadings, 
she left the magistrate court with only her answer and counterclaim to consider.  In those 
pleadings Wendi requested joint physical and legal custody of C.A.M., with Wendi having 
primary physical custody and Art having reasonable visitation.  It is frivolous for her to argue on 
appeal that Art should not have been granted joint custody when that is the only request that 
Wendi properly made before the magistrate court.  Accordingly, this Court grants Art’s request 
for attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-121.  Attorney fees are not available on appeal 
under I.C. § 12-123.  See Bird v. Bidwell, 147 Idaho 350, __, 209 P.3d 647, 650 (2009).   
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the decision of the magistrate court.  Respondent is awarded attorney fees on 
appeal.  Costs are also awarded to Respondent. 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.