Case Title: Walton v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC11-153

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2011-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-153 
____________ 
 
JASON DIRK WALTON,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[December 1, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying a second 
successive motion to vacate a judgment of conviction of three counts of first-
degree murder and sentences of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.851.  The order concerns postconviction relief from sentences of death, and this 
Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida 
Constitution.  We affirm.   
Procedural Posture  
 
 
Jason Dirk Walton was convicted on three counts of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to death on each count.  See Walton v. State, 481 So. 2d 1197, 1197-98 
 
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(Fla. 1985).  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions but vacated the 
death sentences because the trial court failed to afford Walton an opportunity to 
confront two codefendants whose confessions and statements were presented 
during the penalty phase.  See id. at 1198-1201.  The trial court conducted a second 
penalty phase and the jury again recommended death on all three convictions.  See 
Walton v. State, 547 So. 2d 622, 623 (Fla. 1989).  The trial court again imposed 
the death penalty on all three convictions, and this Court affirmed those sentences 
on appeal.  See id. at 626.  The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari 
review.  See Walton v. Florida, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990).  
 
Walton filed his initial postconviction motion pursuant to Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.850, in which he alleged that trial counsel was ineffective.  
See Walton v. Dugger, 634 So. 2d 1059, 1060-61 (Fla. 1993).  After an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court denied the motion.  See id.  Walton appealed that denial to 
this Court and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.  See id.  This Court initially 
relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court for resolution of a public records request 
by Walton.  See id. at 1062.  On remand, Walton amended his previously filed rule 
3.850 motion to add claims based upon information discovered in the public 
records and newly adduced evidence.  See Walton v. State, 847 So. 2d 438, 442-43 
(Fla. 2003).  One such claim was that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to 
adequately investigate and prepare for trial.  See id. at 442 n.2.  The trial court 
 
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again denied all of Walton‟s claims.  See id. at 443.  Walton appealed that denial to 
this Court and again petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  See id.  This 
Court affirmed the denial of Walton‟s postconviction motion and denied habeas 
relief.  See id. at 460.  We also denied a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus filed by Walton pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  See 
Walton v. Crosby, 859 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 2003).    
 
Walton thereafter filed a successive postconviction motion pursuant to 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  See Walton v. State, 3 So. 3d 1000, 
1002 (Fla. 2009).  The trial court summarily denied relief.  See id. at 1002.  Walton 
appealed that denial to this Court, and this Court affirmed the order of the 
postconviction court.  See id. 
Proceeding Below 
 
In the current proceeding, Walton filed a second successive motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to rule 3.851.  He now claims that he was deprived 
of effective trial counsel during the penalty phase because that phase was 
conducted before a jury that returned a death recommendation in violation of 
Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009).  Walton asserts that the Porter decision 
established that the previous denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
was premised on this Court‟s misreading and misapplication of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  In relying on Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 
 
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1980), Walton argues that Porter represents a fundamental repudiation of this 
Court‟s Strickland jurisprudence, that it represents a fundamental change in law, 
and that, as a result, Porter‟s holding with regard to ineffective assistance of 
counsel is retroactively cognizable in a successive postconviction motion.  More 
specifically, Walton contends that Porter has created new law that permits him to 
revisit and relitigate his previous postconviction claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective due to a failure to uncover and submit mitigating evidence that related 
to Walton‟s dysfunctional family experience, his childhood drug abuse and drug 
therapy, the failure to call a mental health expert to testify, a failure to contact and 
interview Walton‟s family members, and a failure to present his school, medical, or 
military records.    
The postconviction court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing and 
summarily found Walton‟s motion to be untimely, successive, and procedurally 
barred.  The court found that rule 3.851 requires a postconviction motion to be 
filed within one year after a judgment and sentence of death becomes final, that 
Walton‟s motion exceeded that time limit, and that his claim did not fall within one 
of the few, specific exceptions to the time limitation.  The court also concluded 
that Porter does not create a new constitutional right to be applied retroactively, but 
rather, provides a mere application of Strickland and does not represent a 
fundamental change to the Strickland analysis.  The postconviction court thereafter 
 
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denied Walton‟s motion based on the failure to file a timely, cognizable claim.  
This appeal followed.   
Rule 3.851 and the Applicable Standard of Review 
 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 controls the filing of 
postconviction motions in capital cases.  See Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194 (Fla. 
2009).  Rule 3.851(d)(1) prohibits the filing of a postconviction motion more than 
one year after a judgment and sentence of death become final.  Rule 3.851(d)(2) 
provides that no postconviction motion filed beyond that time limitation shall be 
considered unless it alleges that:   
(A) the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the 
movant or the movant‟s attorney and could not have been ascertained 
by the exercise of due diligence, or 
 
(B) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not 
established within the period provided for in subdivision (d)(1) and has 
been held to apply retroactively, or 
 
(C) postconviction counsel, through neglect, failed to file the 
motion. 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2) (emphasis added).   
Rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) permits the denial of a successive motion without an 
evidentiary hearing “[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively 
show that the movant is entitled to no relief,” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B), or if 
the motion or a particular claim by the defendant is legally insufficient, see 
Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 403 (Fla. 2005).  A postconviction motion is 
 
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defined by rule 3.851(e)(2) as successive “if a state court has previously ruled on a 
postconviction motion challenging the same judgment and sentence.”  A 
postconviction court‟s decision to deny an evidentiary hearing for a successive rule 
3.851 motion must be based on the written materials before the court.  See id.  For 
all practical purposes, such a ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law, which 
this Court reviews de novo.  See id.  When this Court reviews a trial court‟s 
summary denial of postconviction relief, it must accept the allegations of the 
defendant as true to the extent that they are not refuted by the record.  See Ventura, 
2 So. 3d at 198.   
Decision in Witt and Principles of Retroactivity  
 
In Witt, this Court confronted the seminal question of when and what 
changes in the law apply retroactively to a final judgment and sentence.  See Witt, 
387 So. 2d at 924.  The defendant in that case, by way of a postconviction motion, 
asserted six issues that had been or could have been presented on direct appeal.  
See id.  The defendant predicated his appeal on alleged changes in the law that 
occurred subsequent to his direct appeal.  See id.   
 
In examining the potential retroactive application of changes in the law, this 
Court examined the implications that such application would have on the doctrine 
of finality.  See id. at 925.  The essential purpose of the doctrine of finality is to 
bring final resolution to disputes, create certainty in the criminal justice system, 
 
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and utilize judicial resources fairly and efficiently.  See id.  The Court held that this 
doctrine should be abridged only when a more compelling objective appears, such 
as fairness and uniformity in individual adjudications, or a sweeping change in the 
law that so drastically alters substantive or procedural underpinnings of a final 
judgment and sentence that retroactive application of the law is necessary to avoid 
an obvious injustice.  See id.  Thus, a determination with regard to the retroactive 
application of a change in law is evaluated by balancing the considerations of 
individual fairness and justice against the interests of decisional finality.  See id. at 
926.   
 
This Court in Witt held that only major constitutional changes will be 
cognizable in connection with a claim seeking retroactive application of the law.  
See id. at 929.  We rejected the use of successive postconviction relief in the 
absence of a fundamental and constitutional law change because to permit such 
relief would render dubious the veracity or integrity of the original trial 
proceedings.  See id.  It would also permit a dual system of trial and appeal, the 
first of which would be tentative and nonconclusive.  See id.  Instead, this Court 
held that constitutional changes that are equivalent to a jurisprudential upheaval in 
criminal law warrant retroactive application—not evolutionary refinements in 
criminal law.  See id.   
 
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This Court then delineated the “essential considerations” of a court in its 
determination of whether retroactive application of a change in constitutional law 
is necessary, which are (1) the purpose of the new rule, (2) the extent of previous 
reliance on the old rule, and (3) the purported effect that the retroactive application 
of the new rule would have on the administration of justice.  See id. at 926.  If a 
new constitutional rule is of sufficient magnitude given these considerations, this 
Court held that it may be applied retroactively.  See id. at 929.  A change in 
constitutional law that might also warrant retroactive application is a change that 
places beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain behavior or to 
impose certain penalties.  See id.   
Finally, this Court outlined the three overarching parameters to be 
considered when determining the retroactivity of a change in law as follows:   
To summarize, we today hold that an alleged change of law will 
not be considered in a capital case under Rule 3.850 unless the 
change: (a) emanates from this Court or the United States Supreme 
Court, (b) is constitutional in nature, and (c) constitutes a development 
of fundamental significance.   
 
Id. at 931 (emphasis added).1 
 
                                         
1.  The defendant in Witt filed a postconviction motion pursuant to Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  Walton, on the other hand, filed his successive 
postconviction motion pursuant to rule 3.851.  This Court decided Witt before the 
adoption of rule 3.851, which, after October 1, 2001, was to be used for 
postconviction or collateral motions filed by capital defendants.  See Fla. R. Crim. 
P. 3.851(1).  Thus, rule 3.851 merely supplanted 3.850, and the principles of Witt 
apply equally to motions filed under either rule.   
 
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Decision in Porter 
 
In Porter, the defendant was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder 
and sentenced to death on one of those counts.  See Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 448.  After 
the defendant‟s direct appeal, in which this Court upheld the defendant‟s judgment 
and sentence of death, the defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief in a 
Florida circuit court in which he alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
under Strickland.  See id.  The defendant claimed that trial counsel was ineffective 
in connection with his failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence during 
the penalty phase that would have described Porter‟s abusive childhood, his heroic 
military service and the trauma he suffered while serving, his long-term substance 
abuse, and his impaired mental health and capacity.  See id. at 449.  The circuit 
court denied relief and this Court affirmed that denial, holding that the defendant 
failed to meet the prejudice requirement of Strickland.  See id. at 448.   
 
After this Court‟s decision, the defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in federal district court in which he alleged that trial counsel‟s failure to 
adduce the evidence in mitigation during the penalty phase violated his right to 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  See id.  
The federal district court agreed with the defendant and granted his petition.  See 
id.  The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court‟s grant 
of the defendant‟s petition and held that this Court‟s conclusion that trial counsel‟s 
 
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deficient performance did not prejudice the defendant was a reasonable application 
by this Court of the law announced in Strickland.  See id.  However, the United 
States Supreme Court, on certiorari review, held that this Court‟s decision and 
analysis were incorrect because trial counsel‟s failure to investigate and present the 
evidence in question during the penalty phase satisfied the prejudice prong under 
Strickland.  See id. (“Like the District Court, we are persuaded that it was 
objectively unreasonable to conclude there was no reasonable probability the 
sentence would have been different if the sentencing judge and jury had heard the 
significant mitigation evidence that Porter‟s counsel neither uncovered nor 
presented.”).   
Analysis 
The trial level postconviction court here properly denied Walton‟s second 
successive postconviction motion because the decision in Porter does not constitute 
a fundamental change in the law that mandates retroactive application under Witt.  
Walton filed his motion well after the one-year deadline for postconviction 
motions under rule 3.851.  Walton‟s claim that Porter applies retroactively is 
incorrect and insufficient as a matter of law for a successive motion because the 
decision in Porter does not concern a major change in constitutional law of 
fundamental significance.  Rather, Porter involved a mere application and 
evolutionary refinement and development of the Strickland analysis, i.e., it 
 
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addressed a misapplication of Strickland.  Porter, therefore, does not satisfy the 
retroactivity requirements of Witt.  See generally Witt, 387 So. 2d at 924-31. 
Further, in the proceedings below, collateral counsel essentially asked the 
postconviction trial court to reevaluate Walton‟s claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel that had been litigated in his prior postconviction motion in light of the 
decision in Porter.  This is not a permitted retroactive application as articulated in 
Witt, which allows a limited retroactive application only to changes in the law that 
are of fundamental constitutional significance.   
Therefore, we affirm the postconviction court‟s denial of Walton‟s second 
successive postconviction motion.   
 
It is so ordered.   
CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., specially concurs with an opinion. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, J., specially concurring. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009), 
does not represent a fundamental change in the law, but rather merely applied 
Strickland to the facts of that case.  However, I write to express my disagreement 
with the manner in which the majority sets forth the Strickland standard.  In my 
 
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view, it is extremely important to emphasize that the prejudice prong of Strickland 
is an inquiry of whether there is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).  In fact, the 
United States Supreme Court in Porter ended its short opinion reversing this 
Court‟s conclusion of no prejudice by reiterating that the defendant does not need 
to “show „that counsel‟s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the 
outcome‟ of his penalty proceeding, but rather that he establish „a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in [that] outcome.‟ ”  Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 455-
56 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94). 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,  
William Douglas Baird, Judge - Case No. 521983CF000630XXXXNO 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, William M. Hennis, III, 
Litigation Director, and Roseanne Eckert, Assistant CCR Counsel, South Region, 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Katherine V. 
Blanco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee