Case Title: Foster v. Foster (Opinion - Leave Granted)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 157705

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
FOSTER v FOSTER
 
Docket No. 157705.  Argued October 3, 2019 (Calendar No. 3).  Decided April 29, 2020. 
 
 
Deborah L. Foster brought an action in the Dickinson Circuit Court, Family Division, 
against Ray J. Foster, seeking to enforce a consent judgment of divorce (the consent judgment) 
between the parties that provided that defendant would pay plaintiff 50% of his military disposable 
retired pay accrued during the marriage or, if defendant waived a portion of his military retirement 
benefits in order to receive military disability benefits, that he would continue to pay plaintiff an 
amount equal to what she would have received had defendant not elected to receive such 
supplemental disability benefits (the offset provision).  Defendant retired from the United States 
Army in September 2007 after more than 22 years of service.  Because defendant was injured 
during combat, he was eligible for combat-related special compensation (CRSC) under 10 USC 
1413a, and defendant applied for CRSC around the time of his retirement.  In February 2008, 
defendant received notice that he was eligible for CRSC retroactive to October 2007.  Plaintiff had 
filed for divorce in November 2007, and the consent judgment was entered in December 2008.  
Plaintiff was receiving slightly more than $800 per month under the consent judgment until 
February 2010.  When defendant began receiving CRSC, his disposable retirement benefit amount 
had been reduced, and plaintiff’s monthly payment was reduced to a little more than $200 per 
month.  Beginning in February 2010, defendant failed to pay plaintiff the difference between the 
reduced amount of retirement pay she was receiving and the amount that she had received shortly 
after entry of the consent judgment.  Numerous hearings took place to compel defendant to pay 
plaintiff the difference between the amount plaintiff would have been entitled to under the consent 
judgment had defendant not received CRSC and the amount plaintiff actually received after the 
government commenced paying defendant CRSC.  The trial court, Thomas D. Slagle, J., entered 
an order finding defendant in contempt of court for failure to pay plaintiff in compliance with the 
consent judgment.  Defendant appealed in the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred 
by not finding plaintiff’s attempts to enforce the consent judgment preempted by federal law.  The 
Court of Appeals, MARKEY, P.J., and MURPHY and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ., concluded that the 
matter was not preempted by federal law and affirmed the trial court’s contempt order in an 
unpublished per curiam opinion issued on October 13, 2016 (Docket No. 324853).  Defendant 
sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court.  In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme 
Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that Court for 
reconsideration in light of Howell v Howell, 581 US ___; 137 S Ct 1400 (2017).  501 Mich 917 
(2017).  On remand, the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished per curiam opinion issued on March 
22, 2018 (Docket No. 324853), again affirmed the trial court’s finding of contempt, concluding 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Bridget M. McCormack 
Chief Justice Pro Tem: 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Brian K. Zahra 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
 
 
that Howell did not overrule the Court of Appeals’ decision in Megee v Carmine, 290 Mich App 
551 (2010).  Defendant again sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court 
granted the application.  503 Mich 892 (2018). 
 
 
In a unanimous opinion by Justice ZAHRA, the Supreme Court held: 
 
 
Megee, which had held that the portion of retirement pay that the plaintiff waived to receive 
CRSC was compensable to the defendant in the division of assets pursuant to divorce proceedings, 
was overruled.  Under 38 USC 1101 et seq., veterans who became disabled as a result of military 
service are eligible for disability benefits.  However, in order to prevent veterans from receiving 
double payment in the form of retirement pay and disability benefits, federal law typically insists 
that, to receive disability benefits, a retired veteran must give up an equivalent amount of 
retirement pay.  And since retirement pay is taxable while disability benefits are not, the veteran 
often elects to waive retirement pay in order to receive disability benefits.  An exception to the 
typical bar against receipt of both retirement pay and disability benefits—and the one most relevant 
to the instant matter—is CRSC, which is separate from standard disability benefits.  Under the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, 10 USC 1408 et seq., state courts were 
authorized to treat “disposable retired pay” as divisible community property in a divorce.  Under 
Howell, however, federal law completely preempts the states from treating waived military 
retirement pay as divisible community property.  Howell held that a state court may not order a 
veteran to indemnify a former spouse for any loss in a former spouse’s share of the veteran’s 
retirement pay caused by the veteran’s waiver of retirement pay to receive service-related disability 
benefits.  Disability pay cannot become divisible marital property through the use of an order 
requiring the veteran to “reimburse” or “indemnify” the spouse, rather than an order dividing a 
portion of waived retirement pay outright.  To the extent that Howell was not concerned with 
CRSC specifically, the United States Supreme Court has signaled that Howell is nevertheless 
applicable to such benefits: on the basis of its decision in Howell, the United States Supreme Court 
has vacated state-court decisions ruling that veterans could be forced to reimburse former 
nonveteran spouses in divorce proceedings if they had waived retirement pay in order to receive 
CRSC under 10 USC 1413a, and those types of benefits were the very same kind at issue in this 
case.  Accordingly, Howell and Mansell v Mansell, 490 US 581 (1989), preclude any provision of 
a divorce judgment requiring that a nonveteran former spouse receive payments in an amount equal 
to what he or she would have received if the veteran former spouse had not waived his or her 
retirement pay in order to obtain CRSC.  A “reimbursement” or “indemnification” to compensate 
for the reduction of payments resulting from the nonveteran spouse’s share of partially waived 
military retirement pay is effectively no different than a direct division of the disability benefits 
themselves.  Furthermore, because CRSC is not “retired pay” under 10 USC 1413a(g), it would 
not be subject to division as a marital asset under 10 USC 1408(c).  Any amounts waived that lead 
to the receipt of CRSC would likewise not be divisible in this manner.  Additionally, the parties’ 
agreement under the offset provision of the consent judgment that plaintiff continue to receive 
funds equal to those she would have received had defendant not elected to receive CRSC 
constituted an impermissible assignment under 38 USC 5301(a)(3)(A).  Accordingly, the trial 
court was preempted under federal law from including the offset provision in the consent 
judgment.  Plaintiff also argued that defendant’s appeal was an impermissible collateral attack on 
the divorce judgment, and the Court of Appeals agreed.  But the Court of Appeals analyzed the 
issue in a conclusory fashion.  That portion of the Court of Appeals judgment had to be vacated 
and the case remanded for the Court of Appeals to address the effect of preemption on the trial 
 
 
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the consent judgment of divorce containing the offset 
provision and to address defendant’s ability to challenge the consent judgment on collateral 
review. 
 
 
Court of Appeals opinion and judgment concluding that defendant’s contentions amounted 
to an improper collateral attack on the consent judgment vacated; remainder of the Court of 
Appeals opinion and judgment reversed.  Case remanded to the Court of Appeals to address the 
effect of this holding on defendant’s ability to challenge the terms of the consent judgment. 
 
 
Justice VIVIANO, concurring, fully agreed with the majority’s reasoning and holding that 
the trial court was preempted under federal law from including the offset provision in the consent 
judgment and also agreed that the case should be remanded to the Court of Appeals so that the 
Court of Appeals may consider whether defendant may challenge the offset provision on collateral 
review.  Justice VIVIANO wrote separately to properly frame the inquiry, to clarify caselaw, and to 
point to some of the pertinent authorities that might aid the Court of Appeals as it addresses 
whether the particular type of preemption at issue in this case is jurisdictional.  Defendant’s 
assertion of federal preemption as a defense to a contempt proceeding brought to enforce the offset 
provision in the parties’ divorce judgment is a collateral attack on a final judgment.  Therefore, in 
order to modify his divorce judgment in this collateral proceeding, defendant must establish that 
the type of federal preemption at issue deprives state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.  
However, contrary to defendant’s assertion, not all federal preemption deprives state courts of 
subject-matter jurisdiction; state courts are only deprived of jurisdiction when Congress has 
designated a federal forum for resolution of the class of disputes at issue.  Furthermore, a majority 
of state courts have found that federal law does not deprive them of subject-matter jurisdiction 
over the type of veterans’ and military disability benefits at issue in this case, instead holding that 
military benefits can be divided under the law of res judicata. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2020 State of Michigan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FILED  April 29, 2020 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
DEBORAH LYNN FOSTER, 
 
 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-
Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 157705 
 
RAY JAMES FOSTER, 
 
 
 
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-
Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
 
ZAHRA, J. 
This case involves a dispute between former spouses who entered into a consent 
judgment of divorce (the consent judgment), which provided that defendant would pay 
plaintiff 50% of his military retirement benefits.  Beyond that, the parties agreed that if 
defendant waived a portion of his military retirement benefits in order to receive military 
disability benefits, he would continue to pay plaintiff an amount equal to what she would 
have received had defendant not elected to receive such supplemental disability benefits.  
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Bridget M. McCormack  
 
Chief Justice Pro Tem: 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Brian K. Zahra 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
Defendant elected to increase his disability benefits when he applied for Combat-Related 
Special Compensation (CRSC), a form of military disability benefits, pursuant to 10 USC 
1413a.  He started receiving CRSC shortly after the divorce.  As a result, defendant’s 
retirement benefits decreased, which in turn decreased the share of the retirement benefits 
payable to plaintiff.  When defendant failed to reimburse plaintiff for the reduced payment 
she received in connection with defendant’s lowered military retirement benefits, plaintiff 
sought relief in the Dickinson Circuit Court, asking that the consent judgment be enforced.  
The trial court and the Court of Appeals enforced the plain terms of the consent judgment 
and required defendant to reimburse plaintiff for the reduction in her interest in defendant’s 
retirement benefits.  Defendant argues that federal law preempts state law in regard to the 
division of veteran benefits and, thus, the consent judgment is unenforceable.  
We conclude that federal law preempts state law such that the consent judgment is 
unenforceable to the extent that it required defendant to reimburse plaintiff for the 
reduction in the amount payable to her due to his election to receive CRSC.  Although the 
Court of Appeals indicated its agreement with plaintiff’s assertion that defendant was 
engaging in an improper collateral attack against the consent judgment, the panel did not 
discuss the effect of federal preemption on the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction or 
defendant’s ability to challenge the terms of the consent judgment outside of direct appeal.  
Because these questions remain important, we vacate that portion of the Court of Appeals’ 
opinion agreeing with plaintiff that defendant was engaging in an improper collateral attack 
and reverse the balance of the Court of Appeals’ opinion in this case.  Moreover, we 
overrule the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Megee v Carmine, which held that a veteran is 
obligated to compensate a former spouse in an amount equal to the share of retirement pay 
 
 
 
 
 
3
that the nonveteran spouse would have received, pursuant to a divorce judgment, had the 
veteran not elected to waive military retirement pay in favor of CRSC.1  This case is 
remanded to the Court of Appeals so that the panel may address the effect of our holdings 
on defendant’s ability to challenge the terms of the consent judgment. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant, Ray Foster, commenced service in the United States Army in 1985, prior 
to his marriage to plaintiff, Deborah Foster.  During the marriage, defendant was deployed 
in the Iraq war and suffered serious and permanently disabling combat injuries.  Thereafter, 
defendant continued his military career and, after more than 22 years of service, he retired 
in September 2007.  Because defendant was injured during combat, he was eligible for 
CRSC under 10 USC 1413a, and defendant applied for CRSC around the time of his 
retirement.  In February 2008, defendant received notice that he was eligible for CRSC 
retroactive to October 2007.   
Plaintiff filed for divorce in November 2007, and a final consent judgment of 
divorce was entered in December 2008.  Before entering that judgment, the trial court 
conducted a hearing regarding the proposed consent judgment.  Defendant testified that he 
was receiving both military retirement pay and military disability benefits based on his 
combat-related injuries.  The litigants, through counsel, agreed that defendant’s disability 
benefits were not subject to division by the court because they were not marital property 
under federal law.  At the time of the divorce, plaintiff was gainfully employed as a 
registered nurse. 
                                              
1 Megee v Carmine, 290 Mich App 551, 574-575; 802 NW2d 669 (2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
4
The proposed property settlement awarded plaintiff 100% of any interest she 
acquired in retirement and pension benefits as a result of her employment during the 
marriage.  Additionally, plaintiff was to receive 50% of defendant’s disposable retirement 
pay that accrued during the marriage.2  The parties also agreed to the inclusion of the 
following provision (the offset provision) in the proposed consent judgment: 
 
If Defendant should ever become disabled, either partially or in 
whole, then Plaintiff’s share of Defendant’s entitlement shall be calculated 
as if Defendant had not become disabled.  Defendant shall be responsible to 
pay, directly to Plaintiff, the sum to which she would be entitled if Defendant 
had not become disabled.  Defendant shall pay this sum to Plaintiff out of his 
own pocket and earnings, whether he is paying that sum from his disability 
pay or otherwise, even if the military refuses to pay those sums directly to 
Plaintiff.  If the military merely reduces, but does not entirely stop, direct 
payment to Plaintiff, Defendant shall be responsible to pay directly to 
Plaintiff any decrease in pay that Plaintiff should have been awarded had 
Defendant not become disabled, together with any Cost of Living increases 
that Plaintiff would have received had Defendant not become disabled.  
Failure of Defendant to pay these amounts is punishable through all contempt 
powers of the Court. 
At the divorce hearing, the trial court inquired as to why the language of this 
provision suggested that defendant was not currently receiving any disability benefits 
when, in fact, he was.  Counsel explained that it was intended to apply in the event that 
defendant was offered an increase in disability benefits because such an increase would 
diminish the retirement benefits owed to plaintiff under the proposed settlement.  The trial 
court inquired into defendant’s understanding of this provision: 
                                              
2 The consent judgment provided that plaintiff would receive 50% of defendant’s 
disposable retirement pay based on that portion of the retirement that accrued during the 
course of the marriage.  Plaintiff understood that this meant she would receive something 
slightly less than a 50/50 split because defendant was employed in the military before the 
marriage.   
 
 
 
 
 
5
 
The Court: . . . Mr. Foster, you do acknowledge that if you were to 
defer any of your current military retirement pay or convert it to disability 
pay, or if your military retirement pay were reduced because the level of your 
disability pay was increased, you acknowledge this Court’s ability to enforce 
payment to Ms. Foster [of] the level of benefits that she would be entitled 
[to] presently from your retirement pay? 
 
[Defendant]: Yes. 
No specific amounts were mentioned at the hearing or in the actual consent judgment.  
Suffice it to say, however, that plaintiff received slightly more than $800 per month until 
February 2010.  When defendant began receiving CRSC,3 his disposable retirement benefit 
amount was reduced, and plaintiff’s monthly payment was reduced to a little more than 
$200.4  
Defendant nonetheless failed to pay plaintiff the difference between the reduced 
amount of retirement pay she received beginning in February 2010 and the amount that she 
had received shortly after entry of the consent judgment.  Consequently, numerous hearings 
took place in the trial court over several years, all of which were designed to compel 
defendant to pay plaintiff the difference between the amount plaintiff would have been 
entitled to under the consent judgment had defendant not received CRSC and the amount 
                                              
3 Retirement pay is taxable, whereas disability benefits are not, and so defendant was 
economically incentivized to waive retirement pay in favor of disability benefits.  See 
Howell v Howell, 581 US ___, ___; 137 S Ct 1400, 1403; 197 L Ed 2d 781 (2017), citing 
McCarty v McCarty, 453 US 210, 211-215; 101 S Ct 2728; 69 L Ed 2d 589 (1981). 
4 The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant became eligible to receive CRSC after 
entry of the consent judgment.  This is contrary to defendant’s testimony, and we have 
found nothing in the record to support this conclusion.  Defendant testified at the 
September 30, 2010 show-cause hearing that he applied for CRSC when he applied to retire 
and that he received correspondence from the Veteran’s Administration that he was 
approved to receive those benefits retroactive to October 2007.  Defendant claimed that he 
shared this correspondence with his lawyer.   
 
 
 
 
 
6
plaintiff actually received after the government commenced paying defendant CRSC.  
These proceedings culminated in the order from which defendant appeals that found him 
in contempt of court for failure to pay plaintiff in compliance with the consent judgment.  
The court ordered him to pay plaintiff $1,000 per month, with $812 credited as current 
payments due under the consent judgment and $188 to be credited against the arrearage of 
$34,398 until the arrearage was paid in full.  Defendant has been paying plaintiff in monthly 
installments since the contempt order was entered.  Payments were guaranteed by an 
“appearance bond” in the amount of $9,500 and secured with a lien on his mother’s home. 
Defendant appealed in the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by not 
finding plaintiff’s attempts to enforce the consent judgment preempted by federal law.  The 
Court of Appeals concluded that the matter was not preempted by federal law and affirmed 
the trial court’s contempt order.5  Defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court.  In lieu 
of granting leave to appeal, we vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded 
the case to that Court for reconsideration in light of the opinion of the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Howell v Howell.6  On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed 
the trial court’s finding of contempt, concluding that Howell did not overrule the Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Megee.7  The panel reasoned that Howell was distinguishable because 
it involved general service-connected disability benefits and because the Howell opinion 
                                              
5 Foster v Foster, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 
13, 2016 (Docket No. 324853), pp 1, 5 (Foster I), vacated 501 Mich 917 (2017). 
6 Foster v Foster, 501 Mich 917 (2017), citing Howell, 581 US ___; 137 S Ct 1400. 
7 Foster v Foster (On Remand), unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, 
issued March 22, 2018 (Docket No. 324853) (Foster II), pp 1, 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
7
rested squarely on the language in former 10 USC 1408(a)(4)(B), which provided—and 
still provides in 10 USC 1408(a)(4)(A)(ii)—that “disposable retired pay” means a 
member’s total monthly retired pay less amounts that “are deducted from the retired 
pay . . . as a result of . . . a waiver of retired pay required by law in order to receive 
compensation under title 5 or title 38[.]”8  The Court of Appeals also observed that the 
Megee decision distinguished CRSC from general service-connected disability pay found 
in Title 38 on the basis of CRSC’s status as Title 10 compensation.9  Given that CRSC is 
at issue in the instant case, and that Howell did not concern or analyze a waiver of 
retirement pay in favor of CRSC, the Court of Appeals concluded that Megee was on point 
and remained binding precedent.10  Defendant again sought relief in this Court, and we 
granted his application for leave to appeal to consider the federal-preemption question, the 
continuing viability of Megee, and the propriety of the contempt order entered against 
defendant.11 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Defendant argues that under federal law as outlined in Howell, veterans’ disability 
benefits are—and always have been—nondisposable, indivisible benefits that constitute a 
personal entitlement free from state legal process.  He contends that CRSC is categorically 
precluded from being considered disposable retired pay under the Uniformed Services 
Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA) and that federal law thus preempts the states 
                                              
8 Id. at 7, citing Howell, 581 US at ___; 137 S Ct at 1402-1404. 
9 Foster II, unpub op at 7. 
10 Id., citing MCR 7.215(J)(1). 
11 Foster v Foster, 503 Mich 892 (2018). 
 
 
 
 
 
8
from an exercise of authority that would result in the division of such benefits.  This 
remains true, defendant asserts, even when a consent judgment of divorce uses language 
effectively “indemnifying” or “reimbursing” a nonveteran spouse for payments that would 
have been received if retirement pay had not been waived in order to receive disability 
benefits, as opposed to language dividing received disability benefits outright.   
A.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Background information on the framework providing for military retired pay and 
military disability benefits, including CRSC, is useful to review before assessing the merits 
of the parties’ arguments.  “Members of the Armed Forces who serve for a specified period, 
generally at least 20 years, may retire with retired pay.”12  Retirement pay is calculated on 
the basis of the years served and the rank attained by the retiring veteran.13   
In McCarty v McCarty, the Supreme Court of the United States held that federal law 
precludes state courts from treating military retirement pay as divisible marital property in 
divorce proceedings.14  Specifically, the Supreme Court interpreted federal statutes 
governing retirement benefits and concluded that it was the intent of Congress that military 
                                              
12 Mansell v Mansell, 490 US 581, 583; 109 S Ct 2023; 104 L Ed 2d 675 (1989) (citations 
omitted). 
13 Id.  Additional retired pay may be warranted when a service member is recalled to active 
duty.  McCarty, 453 US at 223 n 16, citing 10 USC 1402. 
14 McCarty, 453 US at 223-232.   
 
 
 
 
 
9
retired pay “actually reach the beneficiary.”15  Thus, under McCarty, “[r]etired pay [could 
not] be attached to satisfy a property settlement incident to the dissolution of a marriage.”16 
Congress responded with the enactment of the USFSPA.17  Under the new statutory 
scheme, state courts were authorized to treat “disposable retired pay” as divisible 
community property in a divorce.18  The pertinent statutory text reads:  
 
Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat disposable 
retired pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 
1981, either as property solely of the member or as property of the member 
and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court.[19] 
The Act defines “disposable retired pay” as follows: 
[T]he total monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled less amounts 
which— 
 
(i) are owed by that member to the United States for previous 
overpayments of retired pay and for recoupments required by law resulting 
from entitlement to retired pay; 
 
(ii) are deducted from the retired pay of such member as a result of 
forfeitures of retired pay ordered by a court-martial or as a result of a waiver 
of retired pay required by law in order to receive compensation under title 5 
or title 38; 
 
(iii) in the case of a member entitled to retired pay under chapter 61 
of this title, are equal to the amount of retired pay of the member under that 
chapter computed using the percentage of the member’s disability on the date 
                                              
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 228. 
17 10 USC 1408 et seq.  See also Mansell, 490 US at 584; King v King, 149 Mich App 495, 
498; 386 NW2d 562 (1986). 
18 10 USC 1408(c)(1).  See also Mansell, 490 US at 584. 
19 10 USC 1408(c)(1). 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
when the member was retired (or the date on which the member’s name was 
placed on the temporary disability retired list); or 
 
(iv) are deducted because of an election under chapter 73 of this title 
to provide an annuity to a spouse or former spouse to whom payment of a 
portion of such member’s retired pay is being made pursuant to a court order 
under this section.[20] 
Nearly eight years after the USFSPA was enacted, the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Mansell v Mansell confirmed that the USFSPA “does not grant state courts the 
power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has been 
waived to receive veterans’ disability benefits.”21  Mansell concluded that McCarty had 
not been abrogated by the USFSPA, leaving in place the general rule that state-court 
authority over veterans’ benefits is preempted by federal law.22   
“Veterans who became disabled as a result of military service are eligible for 
disability benefits.”23  Nonetheless, in order to prevent veterans from receiving double 
payment in the form of retirement pay and disability benefits, “federal law typically insists 
that, to receive disability benefits, a retired veteran must give up an equivalent amount of 
retirement pay.  And, since retirement pay is taxable while disability benefits are not, the 
veteran often elects to waive retirement pay in order to receive disability benefits.”24 
An exception to the typical bar against receipt of both retirement pay and disability 
benefits—and the one most relevant to the instant matter—is CRSC, which is separate from 
                                              
20 10 USC 1408(a)(4)(A). 
21 Mansell, 490 US at 594-595.   
22 Id. at 588-594. 
23 Id. at 583. 
24 Howell, 581 US at ___; 137 S Ct at 1403, citing McCarty, 453 US at 211-215. 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
standard VA disability benefits.25  “To be eligible for CRSC, a person must be a member 
of the uniformed services who is entitled to retired pay and who has a combat-related 
disability.”26  CRSC is calculated as the amount of monthly retirement pay the veteran 
would be entitled to under Title 38, “determined without regard to any disability of the 
retiree that is not a combat-related disability.”27  The maximum amount of allowable CRSC 
is “the reduction in retired pay that is applicable to the retiree for that month under sections 
5304 and 5305 of title 38.”28 
B.  FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
We now turn to defendant’s contention that the offset provision of the consent 
judgment was preempted by federal law.  Whether federal law preempts state action is a 
question of law that this Court reviews de novo.29  Likewise, the interpretation of a statute 
is a question of law that we review de novo.30  A court’s refusal to enter a stay is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion,31 as is the decision to impose a security bond.32  A court abuses 
                                              
25 10 USC 1413a. 
26 10 USC 1413a(c).   
27 10 USC 1413a(b)(1). 
28 10 USC 1413a(b)(2). 
29 Ter Beek v City of Wyoming, 495 Mich 1, 8; 846 NW2d 531 (2014). 
30 Walters v Nadell, 481 Mich 377, 381; 751 NW2d 431 (2008). 
31 Larion v Detroit, 149 Mich App 402, 410; 386 NW2d 199 (1986). 
32 In re Surety Bonds for Costs, 226 Mich App 321, 331; 573 NW2d 300 (1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled 
outcomes.33 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides:  
 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution 
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.[34]   
Federal law may preempt state law in multiple ways, one of which has come to be known 
as “field preemption.”35  This type of preemption recognizes that “Congress may have 
intended ‘to foreclose any state regulation in the area,’ irrespective of whether state law is 
consistent or inconsistent with ‘federal standards.’ ”36  Where applicable, the duly enacted 
laws passed by Congress effectively forbid the states from taking action in the field 
preempted.37  In assessing defendant’s claims, we are mindful of guidance provided by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, which stated that “ ‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone’ in every preemption case”38 and that “Congress may indicate its 
preemptive intent in two ways: ‘explicitly . . . in a statute’s language’ or, by implication, 
                                              
33 Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006).   
34 US Const, art VI, cl 2.   
35 Oneok, Inc v Learjet, Inc, 575 US 373, 377; 135 S Ct 1591; 191 L Ed 2d 511 (2015).  
See also Mich Canners & Freezers Ass’n, Inc v Agricultural Mktg & Bargaining Bd, 467 
US 461, 469; 104 S Ct 2518; 81 L Ed 2d 399 (1984).   
36 Oneok, Inc, 575 US at 377, quoting Arizona v United States, 567 US 387, 401; 132 S Ct 
2492; 183 L Ed 2d 351 (2012). 
37 Oneok, Inc, 575 US at 377. 
38 Arbuckle v Gen Motors LLC, 499 Mich 521, 532; 885 NW2d 232 (2016), quoting Retail 
Clerks Int’l Ass’n v Schermerhorn, 375 US 96, 103; 84 S Ct 219; 11 L Ed 2d 179 (1963). 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
through a statute’s ‘structure and purpose.’ ”39  In determining whether field preemption 
functions as a bar to state law, we must examine whether the trial court’s order in this case 
obstructs “the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”40 
In Howell v Howell, the Supreme Court of the United States reiterated its conclusion 
from Mansell, stating that “federal law completely pre-empts the States from treating 
waived military retirement pay as divisible community property.”41  From this, the Howell 
Court broadly held that a state court may not order a veteran to indemnify a former spouse 
for any loss in a former spouse’s share of the veteran’s retirement pay caused by the 
veteran’s waiver of retirement pay to receive service-related disability benefits.42  Further, 
it makes no difference whether a military veteran waives retirement pay postjudgment or 
prejudgment as part of an overall divorce settlement.43  Disability pay cannot become 
divisible marital property through the use of an order requiring the veteran to “reimburse” 
or “indemnify” the spouse, rather than an order dividing a portion of waived retirement pay 
outright.44 
                                              
39 Arbuckle, 499 Mich at 532, quoting Jones v Rath Packing Co, 430 US 519, 525; 97 S Ct 
1305; 51 L Ed 2d 604 (1977). 
40 See Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67; 61 S Ct 399; 85 L Ed 581 (1941). 
41 Howell, 581 US at ___; 137 S Ct at 1405. 
42 Id. at ___; 137 S Ct at 1402, 1406. 
43 Id. at ___; 137 S Ct at 1405. 
44 Id. at ___; 137 S Ct at 1406.  The Howell Court was not ignorant of the hardship that this 
holding might work on divorcing spouses.  Id. at ___; 137 S Ct at 1406.  Indeed, the Court 
noted that state courts remained free to account for the waiver of military retirement pay 
when calculating or recalculating the need for spousal support.  Id. at ___; 137 S Ct at 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
To the extent that Howell was not concerned with CRSC specifically, the Supreme 
Court has signaled that Howell is nevertheless applicable to such benefits.  For example, 
in Merrill v Merrill, the Supreme Court of Arizona addressed the application of a state law 
to a divorce involving a veteran and a nonveteran former spouse.45  The statute stated that 
in dividing property in a proceeding for the dissolution of a marriage, Arizona state courts 
could not: 
 
1. Consider any federal disability benefits awarded to a veteran for 
service-connected disabilities pursuant to 10 United States Code § 1413a or 
38 United States Code chapter 11. 
 
2. Indemnify the veteran’s spouse or former spouse for any 
prejudgment or postjudgment waiver or reduction in military retired or 
retainer pay related to receipt of the disability benefits. 
 
3. Award any other income or property of the veteran to the veteran’s 
spouse or former spouse for any prejudgment or postjudgment waiver or 
reduction in military retired or retainer pay related to receipt of the disability 
benefits.[46] 
In cases of postdecree reductions of military retirement pay caused by the veteran spouse’s 
election to receive CRSC, however, the Arizona Supreme Court held that, so long as the 
decree was entered before the statute’s effective date, the statute did not preclude entry of 
an order indemnifying the nonveteran spouse to compensate for the lesser payments that 
resulted from the reduction.47  Similarly, in In re Marriage of Cassinelli, the California 
                                              
1406, citing Rose v Rose, 481 US 619, 630-634, 632 n 6; 107 S Ct 2029; 95 L Ed 2d 599 
(1987); 10 USC 1408(e)(6). 
45 Merill v Merill, 238 Ariz 467, 468; 362 P3d 1034 (2015), vacated 581 US ___; 137 S Ct 
2156 (2017). 
46 Ariz Rev Stat Ann 25-318.01. 
47 Merrill, 238 Ariz at 470. 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
Court of Appeals upheld an order forcing a retired and disabled veteran to reimburse his 
former spouse for the reduction of her share of his retirement pay in a community property 
settlement resulting from his waiver of retirement pay to receive disability pay that 
included CRSC.48  Specifically, the California Court of Appeals held that a state court 
“could properly order [the veteran spouse] to reimburse [the nonveteran spouse] for her 
lost community property interest” without violating “either federal law or finality 
principles.”49  
 
In both cases, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and vacated 
the judgments of the state courts before remanding for reconsideration in light of Howell.50  
That is, on the basis of its decision in Howell, the Supreme Court vacated state court 
decisions ruling that veterans could be forced to reimburse former nonveteran spouses in 
divorce proceedings if they had waived retirement pay in order to receive CRSC under 10 
USC 1413a.  Such benefits are of the very same kind at issue in this case. 
Applying these principles to the matter at hand, we conclude that Howell and 
Mansell preclude any provision of a divorce judgment requiring that a nonveteran former 
spouse receive payments in an amount equal to what he or she would have received if the 
                                              
48 In re Marriage of Cassinelli, 4 Cal App 5th 1285, 1291, 1297; 210 Cal Rptr 3d 311 
(2016), vacated sub nom Cassinelli v Cassinelli, 583 US ___; 138 S Ct 69 (2017). 
49 Cassinelli, 4 Cal App 5th at 1291.  See also id. at 1299 (“[A] state court can order a 
military spouse who has waived retired pay to reimburse a civilian spouse for the latter’s 
loss of a community property interest in the retired pay without violating Mansell.”). 
50 Merrill, 581 US ___; 137 S Ct 2156; Cassinelli, 583 US ___; 138 S Ct 69. 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
veteran former spouse had not waived his or her retirement pay in order to obtain CRSC.51  
The Howell Court broadly stated that, in the wake of Mansell, “federal law completely pre-
empts the States from treating waived military retirement pay as divisible community 
property.”52  A “reimbursement” or “indemnification” to compensate for the reduction of 
payments resulting from the nonveteran spouse’s share of partially waived military 
retirement pay is effectively no different than a direct division of the disability benefits 
themselves.53 
Plaintiff asserts that, under the plain language of 10 USC 1408(a)(4)(A)(ii), only 
those reductions in retired pay stemming from waivers required in order to receive 
compensation under Title 5 or Title 38 are excluded from “disposable retired pay.”  This 
implies that reductions in funds resulting from waivers to receive benefits under Title 10, 
like CRSC, may not be excluded from “disposable retired pay.”  Therefore, maintains 
plaintiff, the reduction can be accounted for in a marital-asset division under 10 USC 
1408(c)(1).  The Court of Appeals was apparently persuaded by this logic.54  But plaintiff 
and the panel below ignored the language of 10 USC 1413a(g) stating that “[p]ayments 
                                              
51 Plaintiff does not appear to argue that Howell is inapplicable to the instant case simply 
because it was decided more than eight years after the parties entered into the consent 
judgment at issue.  To assuage any doubt as to the applicability of Howell to this matter for 
this reason, however, it is important to note that Howell is merely a clarification of Mansell.  
See Howell, 581 US at ___; 137 S Ct at 1405 (“This Court’s decision in Mansell determines 
the outcome here.”).  Because Mansell was decided in 1989—long before the parties were 
divorced—the date of the Howell opinion’s issuance is of no matter. 
52 Howell, 581 US at ___; 137 S Ct at 1405 (emphasis added). 
53 Id. at ___; 137 S Ct at 1405-1406.   
54 See Foster II, unpub op at 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
under this section[, which provides for CRSC payments,] are not retired pay.”  Pursuant to 
10 USC 1408(a)(4)(A), disposable retired pay is calculated, prior to accounting for 
reductions (including those resulting from waivers of retired pay), by totaling the amount 
of “monthly retired pay” to which a veteran is entitled.  Because CRSC is not “retired pay” 
under Title 10, it would not be subject to division as a marital asset under 10 USC 1408(c).  
Any amounts waived that lead to the receipt of CRSC would likewise not be divisible in 
this manner.55 
This analysis is not undone by plaintiff’s insistence that this case is distinguishable 
from Howell because the parties consented to plaintiff’s continued receipt of funds equal 
to those she would have received had defendant not elected to receive CRSC.  Under 38 
USC 5301(a)(1): 
                                              
55 The Court of Appeals misunderstood the nature of CRSC benefits in this regard.  See id. 
(distinguishing the case from Howell because Howell “did not concern or analyze a waiver 
of retirement pay in favor of CRSC disability pay”); Megee, 290 Mich App at 565 
(distinguishing the case from Mansell because the “plaintiff here did not waive his right to 
retirement pay in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38, but to receive title 
10 compensation”).  Defendant’s election of CRSC did not directly require a waiver of 
retired pay.  Rather, defendant’s election to receive CRSC benefits would have been 
contingent on receiving disability benefits, 10 USC 1413a(b), and the increase in disability 
benefits was what would have legally triggered the decrease in retirement pay.  See 38 USC 
5304; 38 USC 5305.  A letter dated April 14, 2010, from the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service to plaintiff confirms that the reduction in the amount paid to plaintiff 
“was due to the increase in [defendant’s] Va Disability” benefits. 
Moreover, it makes sense that 10 USC 1408(a)(4)(A)(ii) would not include language 
allowing for the deduction of amounts waived to receive CRSC under Title 10 because the 
limitation to consideration of amounts waived in order to receive compensation under Title 
5 or Title 38 was enacted in 1982.  PL 97-252, § 1002; 96 Stat 718.  The provision in Title 
10 allowing for CRSC, 10 USC 1413a, was not enacted until 20 years later, in 2002.  PL 
107-314, § 636; 116 Stat 2458. 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
Payments of benefits due or to become due under any law 
administered by the Secretary shall not be assignable except to the extent 
specifically authorized by law, and such payments made to, or on account of, 
a beneficiary shall be exempt from taxation, shall be exempt from the claim 
of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under 
any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the 
beneficiary.  The preceding sentence shall not apply to claims of the United 
States arising under such laws nor shall the exemption therein contained as 
to taxation extend to any property purchased in part or wholly out of such 
payments.  The provisions of this section shall not be construed to prohibit 
the assignment of insurance otherwise authorized under chapter 19 of this 
title [38 USC 1901 et seq.], or of servicemen’s indemnity.  
Subsection (a)(3)(A) further states that 
in any case where a beneficiary entitled to compensation . . . enters into an 
agreement with another person under which agreement such other person 
acquires for consideration the right to receive such benefit by payment of 
such compensation, pension, or dependency and indemnity compensation, as 
the case may be, . . . such agreement shall be deemed to be an assignment 
and is prohibited. 
“A consent judgment is in the nature of a contract, and is to be construed and applied as 
such.”56  Among the key elements of any contract in Michigan is consideration.57  Thus, 
the consent judgment in this case effectively amounted to “an agreement . . . under which 
agreement . . . [plaintiff] acquire[d] for consideration the right to receive” an amount 
equivalent to what she would have received had defendant not waived retirement pay to 
receive CRSC.58  This is, under federal statute, an impermissible “assignment.”59 
                                              
56 Laffin v Laffin, 280 Mich App 513, 517; 760 NW2d 738 (2008). 
57 McInerney v Detroit Trust Co, 279 Mich 42, 46; 271 NW 545 (1937). 
58 See 38 USC 5301(a)(3)(A). 
59 See id. 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
C.  EFFECT ON MEGEE v CARMINE 
With the preceding analysis in mind, it is appropriate to conclude that Howell 
overruled the Michigan Court of Appeals’ judgment in Megee v Carmine.  In Megee, the 
veteran spouse (the plaintiff) elected to receive CRSC, which resulted in a diminution of 
his retirement pay and the nonveteran spouse’s (the defendant’s) 50% award stemming 
from that amount.60  The Megee panel held: 
[A] military spouse remains financially responsible to compensate his or her 
former spouse in an amount equal to the share of retirement pay ordered to 
be distributed to the former spouse as part of a divorce judgment’s property 
division when the military spouse makes a unilateral and voluntary 
postjudgment election to waive the retirement pay in favor of disability 
benefits contrary to the terms of the divorce judgment.  Conceptually, and 
consistently with extensive caselaw from other jurisdictions, we are dividing 
waived retirement pay in order to honor the terms and intent of the divorce 
judgment.  Importantly, we are not ruling that a state court has the authority 
to divide a military spouse’s CRSC, nor that the military spouse can be 
ordered by a court to pay the former spouse using CRSC funds.  Rather, the 
compensation to be paid the former spouse as his or her share of the property 
division in lieu of the waived retirement pay can come from any source the 
military spouse chooses, but it must be paid to avoid contempt of court.  To 
be clear, nothing in this opinion should be construed as precluding a military 
spouse from using CRSC funds to satisfy the spouse’s obligation if 
desired.[61] 
This is, however, exactly the conduct that Howell and Mansell endeavored to preclude.  
Regardless of the voluntary nature of the waiver or the temporal relation of the waiver to 
the consent judgment, the Megee panel ultimately held that the portion of retirement pay 
that the plaintiff waived to receive CRSC was compensable to the defendant in the division 
of assets pursuant to divorce proceedings.  We therefore overrule Megee. 
                                              
60 Megee, 290 Mich App at 561. 
61 Id. at 566-567, 574-575. 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
D.  PROCEEDINGS ON REMAND 
Plaintiff argues that the instant appeal constitutes an impermissible collateral attack 
on the consent judgment.  The panel below agreed with her in this regard (before ruling on 
the merits of the parties’ contentions), but did so in a conclusory fashion, stating that 
“defendant is engaging in an improper collateral attack on the divorce judgment” and citing 
Kosch v Kosch, a 1999 decision of the Court of Appeals.62  But Kosch merely held that the 
defendant’s failure in that case to file an appeal from the original judgment of divorce 
categorically precluded a collateral attack on the merits of that decision.63  This is ordinarily 
true except in cases concerning jurisdictional error.64  The Kosch opinion did not discuss 
this particular nuance.  With this in mind, we leave it to the Court of Appeals on remand 
to address the effect of our holdings today on the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to 
enter the consent judgment of divorce containing the offset provision at issue and to address 
defendant’s ability to challenge the consent judgment on collateral review. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The trial court was preempted under federal law from including in the consent 
judgment the offset provision on which plaintiff relies.  The broad language of Howell 
precludes a provision requiring that plaintiff receive reimbursement or indemnification 
payments to compensate for reductions in defendant’s military retirement pay resulting 
                                              
62 Foster II, unpub op at 2, 6, citing Kosch v Kosch, 233 Mich App 346, 353; 592 NW2d 
434 (1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
63 Kosch, 233 Mich App at 353. 
64 See Pettiford v Zoellner, 45 Mich 358, 361; 8 NW 57 (1881); Jackson City Bank & Trust 
Co v Fredrick, 271 Mich 538, 544; 260 NW 908 (1935); Couyoumjian v Anspach, 360 
Mich 371, 386; 103 NW2d 587 (1960). 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
from his election to receive any disability benefits, including CRSC as provided for under 
Title 10.   
 
Nevertheless, we express no opinion on the effect our holdings have on defendant’s 
ability to challenge, on collateral review, the consent judgment.  The Court of Appeals did 
not substantively review this point or the effect of federal preemption on the trial court’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  We therefore vacate that portion of the March 22, 2018 opinion 
and judgment of the Court of Appeals concluding that defendant’s contentions amounted 
to an improper collateral attack on the consent judgment, and we reverse the balance of the 
panel’s opinion.  We remand the case to the Court of Appeals so that the panel may address 
the effect of our holdings on defendant’s ability to challenge the terms of the consent 
judgment. 
 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
DEBORAH LYNN FOSTER, 
 
 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-
Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 157705 
 
RAY JAMES FOSTER, 
 
 
 
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-
Appellant. 
 
 
 
VIVIANO, J. (concurring). 
I concur fully in the reasoning of the majority opinion and its holding that the trial 
court was preempted under federal law from including the offset provision on which 
plaintiff relies in the consent judgment of divorce.1  I also agree with the majority’s decision 
to remand this case to the Court of Appeals so that it may consider whether defendant may 
challenge this provision of the consent judgment on collateral review.  I write separately to 
more fully address questions that will arise on remand and that are, in my view, 
inadequately developed by the parties’ briefs. 
                                              
1 I believe a more precise way to state the Court’s holding is that MCL 552.18, the statute 
that provides the trial court’s authority to divide pension, annuity, or retirement benefits as 
part of the marital estate in a divorce judgment, is preempted by federal law to the extent 
it otherwise permits division of the type of veterans’ and military disability benefits at issue 
in this case. 
 
 
 
 
2
I.  THE PARTIES’ DIVORCE JUDGMENT IS FINAL AND MAY NOT BE 
MODIFIED UNLESS THE FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT-MATTER 
JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES’ DIVORCE ACTION 
Although some portions of a divorce judgment are subject to modification, such as 
alimony or child support, the property-settlement provisions of a divorce judgment “are 
final and, as a general rule, cannot be modified.”  Colestock v Colestock, 135 Mich App 
393, 397; 354 NW2d 354 (1984), citing Boucher v Boucher, 34 Mich App 213; 191 NW2d 
85 (1971).  Thus, “[a] judgment of divorce dividing marital property is res judicata and not 
subject to collateral attack, even if the judgment may have been wrong or rested on a 
subsequently overruled legal principle.”  Colestock, 135 Mich App at 397-398, citing 
McGinn v McGinn, 126 Mich App 689; 337 NW2d 632 (1983). 
In Buczkowski v Buczkowski, 351 Mich 216, 222-223; 88 NW2d 416 (1958), this 
Court examined whether a spouse could move to vacate a separate-maintenance decree 
when the moving spouse did not appeal the decree, had already accepted money under the 
settlement, and waited four years after entry of the decree to assert defects with it.  The 
sole challenge to the decree was that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter it because it 
contained a legally invalid provision.  Id. at 220-221.  The Court declined to vacate the 
decree, explaining as follows: 
We are cited to no authority to support this contention and it is manifestly in 
error.  The court had jurisdiction of the parties and it had jurisdiction of the 
subject matter of the suit, that is, support and maintenance.  Having such 
jurisdiction it also had jurisdiction to make an error if, indeed, it did. . . . 
The failure to distinguish between “the erroneous exercise of 
jurisdiction” and “the want of jurisdiction” is a fruitful source of confusion 
and errancy of decision.  In the first case the errors of the trial court can only 
be corrected by appeal or writ of error.  In the last case its judgments are 
void, and may be assailed by indirect as well as direct attack. * * * The 
judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, with the parties before it, and 
 
 
 
 
3
with power to grant or refuse relief in the case presented, though (the 
judgment is) contrary to law as expressed in the decisions of the supreme 
court or the terms of a statute, is at most only an erroneous exercise of 
jurisdiction, and as such is impregnable to an assault in a collateral 
proceeding. 
The loose practice has grown up, even in some opinions, of saying 
that a court had no “jurisdiction” to take certain legal action when what is 
actually meant is that the court had no legal “right” to take the action, that it 
was in error.  If the loose meaning were correct it would reduce the doctrine 
of res judicata to a shambles and provoke endless litigation, since any decree 
or judgment of an erring tribunal would be a mere nullity.  It must constantly 
be borne in mind, as we have pointed out in Jackson City Bank & Trust Co v 
Fredrick, 271 Mich 538, 544[; 260 NW 908 (1935)], that: 
There is a wide difference between a want of 
jurisdiction, in which case the court has no power to adjudicate 
at all, and a mistake in the exercise of undoubted jurisdiction, 
in which case the action of the trial court is not void although 
it may be subject to direct attack on appeal.  This fundamental 
distinction runs through all the cases. 
[Buczkowski, 351 Mich at 221-222 (cleaned up).] 
We have often cited Jackson City Bank for this proposition, including most recently 
last term in In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 22; 934 NW2d 610 (2019), in which we quoted the 
very next paragraph from that case: 
“[W]hen there is a want of jurisdiction over the parties, or the subject-matter, 
no matter what formalities may have been taken by the trial court, the action 
thereof is void because of its want of jurisdiction, and consequently its 
proceedings may be questioned collaterally as well as directly.  They are of 
no more value than as though they did not exist.  But in cases where the court 
has undoubted jurisdiction of the subject matter, and of the parties, the action 
of the trial court, though involving an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, 
which might be taken advantage of by direct appeal, or by direct attack, yet 
the judgment or decree is not void though it might be set aside for the 
irregular or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction if appealed from.  It may not 
be called in question collaterally.”  [Ferranti, 504 Mich at 22, quoting 
Jackson City Bank, 271 Mich at 544-545.] 
 
 
 
 
4
In McGinn, a case also involving military pensions, the Court of Appeals explained 
the importance of finality in the context of divorce judgments: 
Public policy demands finality of litigation in the area of family law 
to preserve surviving family structure.  To permit divorce judgments which 
have long since become final to be reopened so as to award military pensions 
to the husband as his separate property would flaunt the rule of res judicata 
and upset settled property distributions upon which parties have planned their 
lives.  The consequences would be devastating, not only from the standpoint 
of the litigants, but also in terms of the work load of the courts.  [McGinn, 
126 Mich App at 693 (citation omitted).] 
As defendant appears to concede, these finality concerns are certainly implicated in this 
case because defendant’s assertion of federal preemption as a defense to a contempt 
proceeding brought to enforce the offset provision in the parties’ divorce judgment is a 
collateral attack on a final judgment.  See generally Kirby v Mich High Sch Athletic Ass’n, 
459 Mich 23, 40; 585 NW2d 290 (1998) (noting that “[a] party must obey an order entered 
by a court with proper jurisdiction, even if the order is clearly incorrect, or the party must 
face the risk of being held in contempt”). 
Therefore, in order to modify his divorce judgment in this collateral proceeding, 
defendant must establish that the type of federal preemption at issue deprives state courts 
of subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Hillsdale Co Senior Servs, Inc v Hillsdale Co, 494 Mich 
46, 51 n 3; 832 NW2d 728 (2013) (“[T]he [l]ack of jurisdiction of the subject matter may 
be raised at any time and the parties to an action cannot confer jurisdiction by their conduct 
or action nor can they waive the defense by not raising it.”) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  But instead of focusing his analysis on whether the federal statutes governing 
veterans’ and military disability benefits deprive the state courts of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, defendant makes the sweeping assertion that all types of federal preemption 
 
 
 
 
5
deprive state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.2  Although I believe defendant’s 
assertion is demonstrably incorrect, some of our precedents do appear at first glance to 
support it.  And, as defendant acknowledges, the issue could also have implications far 
beyond this case if the entire spectrum of federal-preemption claims could potentially be 
raised to mount collateral attacks on final judgments in myriad types of cases.  See 
Defendant’s Brief on Appeal (February 27, 2019) at 6 (“There should be no doubt that an 
order . . . preempted by federal law is void and may be attacked, challenged, and nullified 
at any time, even on appeal, indeed, even after the time for appeal has passed.”).  Therefore, 
before addressing the precise legal issue in this case, I will first explain why defendant’s 
assertion that all types of federal preemption deprive state courts of subject-matter 
jurisdiction is wrong as a matter of law. 
II.  CONTRARY TO DEFENDANT’S SWEEPING ASSERTION, NOT ALL TYPES OF 
FEDERAL PREEMPTION DEPRIVE STATE COURTS OF SUBJECT-MATTER 
JURISDICTION 
The law in this area has been aptly summarized as follows: 
                                              
2 See Defendant’s Brief on Appeal (February 27, 2019) at 2 (“As a prima facie 
jurisdictional matter, this Court has long held where federal law preempts state law, as it 
absolutely does in this case, the courts of this state lack subject matter jurisdiction to enter 
an order contrary to the prevailing federal rule.”); id. (“Where subject-matter jurisdiction 
is lacking due to federal preemption, any judgments and orders entered in contravention of 
the prevailing federal law are void and subject to collateral attack, notwithstanding consent 
of the parties or the length of time that has passed since such judgments or orders were 
entered.”); id. at 33 (“Where federal pre-emption applies to bar a state court’s actions, a 
reviewing court must address the preemptive effect of the federal law on the lower court’s 
jurisdiction because state courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter orders 
contrary to the federal mandate.”); id. (“A state court that rules incorrectly on a matter 
preempted by federal law acts in excess of its jurisdiction.  Such rulings, and the judgments 
they spring from, are void ab initio and exposed to collateral attack.”). 
 
 
 
 
6
State courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over federal preemption 
defenses.  The preemption doctrine does not deprive state courts of subject 
matter jurisdiction over claims involving federal preemption unless Congress 
has given exclusive jurisdiction to a federal forum. 
Accordingly, where state and federal courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over a federal cause of action, and a state proceeding on such 
cause of action presents a federal preemption issue, the proper course is to 
seek resolution of that issue by the state court.  Similarly, there are some 
cases in which a state law cause of action is preempted by federal law, but 
only a state court has jurisdiction to so rule.  A finding of preemption will 
generally not remove the case from the jurisdiction of the state court but will 
only alter the law applied by that court.  [21 CJS Courts, § 272 (emphasis 
added; citations omitted).] 
It is well settled that “[s]tate courts are adequate forums for the vindication of federal 
rights.”  See Burt v Titlow, 571 US 12, 19; 134 S Ct 10; 187 L Ed 2d 348 (2013).  See id. 
(“The States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject 
only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause.  Under this system of dual 
sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are 
thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United 
States.”) (cleaned up).  See also Office Planning Group, Inc v Baraga-Houghton-
Keweenaw Child Dev Bd, 472 Mich 479, 493; 697 NW2d 871 (2005) (“It has long been 
established that, so long as Congress has not provided for exclusive federal-court 
jurisdiction, state courts may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over federal-law claims 
whenever, by their own constitution, they are competent to take it.  State courts possess 
sovereignty concurrent with that of the federal government, subject only to limitations 
imposed by the Supremacy Clause.  Thus, state courts are presumptively competent to 
assume jurisdiction over a cause of action arising under federal law.  If concurrent 
 
 
 
 
7
jurisdiction otherwise exists, subject-matter jurisdiction over a federal-law claim is 
governed by state law.”) (cleaned up). 
Notably, these same principles apply when federal courts are analyzing whether a 
preemption claim deprives the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.  In Violette v 
Smith & Nephew Dyonics, Inc, 62 F3d 8, 11 (CA 1, 1995), cert den 517 US 1167 (1996), 
the defendant argued for the first time on appeal that the plaintiff’s state-law products-
liability claims were preempted by certain provisions of a federal statute.  Relying upon 
Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v Davis, 476 US 380; 106 S Ct 1904; 90 L Ed 2d 
389 (1986), the defendant argued that “preemption is a jurisdictional matter which cannot 
be waived and may be raised at any time.”  Violette, 62 F3d at 11.  Distinguishing between 
“choice-of-forum” and “choice-of-law” preemption, the federal court explained: 
[W]here Congress has designated another forum for the resolution of a 
certain class of disputes, such as the National Labor Relations Board in 
Davis, such designation deprives the courts of jurisdiction to decide those 
cases.  Where, however, the question is whether state tort or federal statutory 
law controls, preemption is not jurisdictional and is subject to the ordinary 
rules of appellate adjudication, including timely presentment and waiver.  
[Id. at 11-12 (citation omitted).] 
Since the type of preemption at issue in Violette presented a “choice-of-law” question, it 
was “not . . . jurisdictional, and was waived when not presented in the district court.”  Id. 
at 12. 
Our Court of Appeals correctly explained the two-part preemption inquiry as 
follows: 
Where preemption exists, . . . state courts will not always be prevented from 
acting.  A litigant may still enforce rights pursuant to the Federal law in state 
courts unless the Constitution or Congress has, expressly or impliedly, given 
a Federal court exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter.  Mondou v New 
 
 
 
 
8
York, N H & H R Co, 223 US 1; 32 S Ct 169; 56 L Ed 327 (1912); Claflin v 
Houseman, 93 US 130; 23 L Ed 833 (1876).  See Hart and Wechsler, The 
Federal Courts and The Federal System (2d ed), pp 427-438.  Thus, we must 
determine whether Congress has preempted states from legislating or 
regulating the subject matter of the instant case, and, if it has, whether it has 
also vested exclusive jurisdiction of that subject matter in the Federal court 
system.  [Marshall v Consumers Power Co, 65 Mich App 237, 244-245; 237 
NW2d 266 (1976).] 
Defendant cites Henry v Laborers’ Local 1191, 495 Mich 260; 848 NW2d 130 
(2014), for the proposition that federal preemption deprives state courts of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  In Henry, after observing that the defendants first raised the issue of 
preemption in the Court of Appeals, we stated that “preemption is a question of subject-
matter jurisdiction” and that, “[a]s such, this Court must consider it.”  Id. at 287 n 82.  
Although our statement that “preemption is a question of subject-matter jurisdiction” was 
made without qualification, the above statements were supported by the following 
quotation from Davis, 476 US at 393: “A claim of Garmon pre-emption is a claim that the 
state court has no power to adjudicate the subject matter of the case, and when a claim of 
Garmon pre-emption is raised, it must be considered and resolved by the state court.”  Thus, 
our assertion was made in the context of Garmon preemption and was indisputably correct 
in that context since Congress has established an exclusive federal forum, the National 
Labor Relations Board, to adjudicate certain claims under the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA).3  And, even if the Court purported to make such a broad holding, it would be 
                                              
3 The term “Garmon preemption” was coined after the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in San Diego Bldg Trades Council v Garmon, 359 US 236; 79 S Ct 773; 3 L Ed 
2d 775 (1959).  See id. at 245 (“When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the 
[NLRA], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of 
the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy 
is to be averted.”).  Our Court and the Court of Appeals have found preemption under 
 
 
 
 
9
dicta since it was “not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case . . . .”  
See Wold Architects & Engineers v Strat, 474 Mich 223, 232 n 3; 713 NW2d 750 (2006) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted).  For these reasons, I do not believe that Henry may 
properly be read as supporting defendant’s sweeping assertion that all types of preemption 
deprive the state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.4 
Defendant also cites Ryan v Brunswick Corp, 454 Mich 20, 40; 557 NW2d 541 
(1997), in which after finding that plaintiff’s common-law products-liability claims were 
preempted under the Federal Boat Safety Act (FBSA), 46 USC 4301 et seq., this Court 
                                              
Garmon in a number of cases.  See, e.g., Henry, 495 Mich 260; Bebensee v Ross Pierce 
Electric Corp, 400 Mich 233; 253 NW2d 633 (1977); Calabrese v Tendercare of Mich, 
Inc, 262 Mich App 256, 266; 685 NW2d 313 (2004); Sargent v Browning-Ferris Indus, 
167 Mich App 29, 33-36; 421 NW2d 563 (1988); Bescoe v Laborers’ Union Local No 334, 
98 Mich App 389, 395-409; 295 NW2d 892 (1980).  See also Town & Country Motors, Inc 
v Local Union No 328, 355 Mich 26; 94 NW2d 442 (1959) (holding before Garmon was 
decided that the circuit court had no jurisdiction over the case because the NLRA 
preempted the area of labor law at issue). 
4 The same analysis applies to other “choice-of-forum” federal-preemption cases.  In Ass’n 
of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity v Pub Serv Comm, 192 Mich App 19, 24; 480 
NW2d 585 (1992), the Court of Appeals held that “the issue of federal preemption is one 
of jurisdiction, and questions of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even 
if not raised before the appeal is taken.”  (Citation omitted.)  However, as in Henry, this 
broad assertion was made in the context of a choice-of-forum preemption question, i.e., 
whether the Public Service Commission lacked jurisdiction to disallow recovery of costs 
approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under the Natural Gas 
Act, 15 USC 717 et seq., which gives exclusive authority to FERC to set interstate natural 
gas rates.  See also Mississippi Power & Light Co v Mississippi ex rel Moore, 487 US 354, 
377; 108 S Ct 2428; 101 L Ed 2d 322 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is common ground 
that if FERC has jurisdiction over a subject, the States cannot have jurisdiction over the 
same subject.”). 
 
 
 
 
10 
held that “summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (C)(8) was proper.”5  In 
reciting the applicable legal principles, the Court stated that “[w]here the principles of 
federal preemption apply, state courts are deprived of subject matter jurisdiction.”  Id. at 
27.  However, the Court did not cite any authority whatsoever for this assertion.  Nor did 
we address whether Congress had designated a federal forum for resolution of these types 
of disputes.  And, in any event, our preemption holding in Ryan was abrogated by 
Sprietsma v Mercury Marine, 537 US 51; 123 S Ct 518; 154 L Ed 2d 466 (2002), which 
                                              
5 After finding that the plaintiff’s tort claim was preempted by federal law, the trial court 
explained its ruling as follows: 
[T]he Court necessarily lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter and, 
accordingly, partial summary disposition is appropriate under (C)(4) for the 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and also as I think correctly argued by the 
defendant, it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because 
the failure to equip its product with a propeller guard or to warn of its absence 
is something that the manufacturer of an outboard or inboard outdrive boat 
propulsion unit cannot be held liable for.  Since that is the case, I grant the 
defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition under both (C)(4) and 
(C)(8) for those reasons I’ve indicated.  [Id. at 22 n 3 (quotation marks 
omitted).] 
The Court of Appeals affirmed on both grounds, Ryan v Brunswick Corp, 209 Mich App 
519, 526; 531 NW2d 793 (1995), and, as mentioned above, so did this Court.  Since the 
referenced court rules provide alternate grounds for summary disposition (under (C)(4) for 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and under (C)(8) for failure to state a claim on which 
relief can be granted), it is unclear which of these holdings is precedentially binding.  The 
ambiguity in the Court’s holding can perhaps best be explained by the fact that the Court 
did not need to focus on whether the preemption at issue was jurisdictional—for example, 
to decide if preemption could be raised for the first time on appeal or in a collateral attack 
on a final judgment.  Thus, to the extent that the Court erred by affirming summary 
disposition under (C)(4)—which, in the absence of an exclusive federal forum for 
resolution of claims under the FBSA, seems apparent—it was only a labeling error since 
dismissal under (C)(8) was the proper way to dispose of the case after finding the type of 
preemption at issue. 
 
 
 
 
11 
held that the FBSA does not expressly or implicitly preempt state common-law claims.  In 
light of the ambiguous nature of our holding (noted above), the lack of authority for it, and 
its abrogation by the United States Supreme Court, I do not think the jurisdictional assertion 
in Ryan carries much precedential weight.6  Finally, and perhaps most significantly, such 
                                              
6 The broad assertion from Ryan—that “[w]here the principles of federal preemption apply, 
state courts are deprived of subject matter jurisdiction”—has been cited on a number of 
occasions.  In two cases, the Court of Appeals cited Ryan but found no preemption and 
thus did not need to apply Ryan’s broad assertion.  See, e.g., People v Kanaan, 278 Mich 
App 594; 751 NW2d 57 (2008) (holding that 42 USC 1320a-7b does not preempt the 
Medicaid False Claim Act, MCL 400.601 et seq.); Konynenbelt v Flagstar Bank FSB, 242 
Mich App 21; 617 NW2d 706 (2000) (holding that the plaintiff’s state-law claims were not 
preempted by the Home Owners’ Loan Act, 12 USC 1461 et seq., or the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, 12 USC 1735f-7a).  In a third case, 
the Court of Appeals cited Ryan and found preemption but remanded to the trial court for 
entry of summary disposition in favor of the defendant without specifying whether the 
dismissal was for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Martinez v Ford Motor Co, 224 
Mich App 247; 568 NW2d 396 (1997) (holding that the plaintiff’s state-law tort claim was 
preempted by the National Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 USC 1381 et seq.). 
But in Packowski v United Food & Commercial Workers Local 951, 289 Mich App 
132; 796 NW2d 94 (2010), citing Ryan, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s 
order granting summary disposition for defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(4) on the ground 
that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim.  In that case, the Court of Appeals 
determined that the trial court correctly held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over 
plaintiff’s wrongful-discharge claim since it was preempted by the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 USC 401 et seq.  Id. at 149.  But the Court of Appeals 
did not ground its holding on a designation by Congress of an alternate federal forum for 
resolution of these types of disputes.  Moreover, it is not entirely clear on which basis the 
circuit court granted summary disposition, since defendant’s motions were brought under 
MCR 2.116(C)(4), (C)(8), and (C)(10), and since on reconsideration, the trial court 
clarified that “summary disposition of plaintiff’s claim had been granted under the 
substantive-preemption doctrine, not the jurisdictional-preemption doctrine.”  Id. at 138.  
Finally, although the Court of Appeals noted that Ryan had been “overruled in part on other 
grounds,” id. at 140, the majority did not discuss whether the broad assertion from Ryan 
remained good law once its operative preemption holding was abrogated by the United 
States Supreme Court.  Like in Ryan, the ambiguity in the Court’s holding in Packowski is 
perhaps best thought of as a labeling error since the Court did not need to focus on the issue 
 
 
 
 
12 
a broad reading of this one statement in Ryan would conflict with the holding and basic 
jurisdictional principles set forth in Office Planning Group and other cases finding that our 
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over certain claims governed by federal law.7  It 
would also leave Michigan citizens without any forum to enforce federal laws when 
Congress has conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon state courts to enforce them.8 
Thus, contrary to the sweeping assertions in defendant’s brief, not all federal 
preemption deprives state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Instead, state courts are 
only deprived of jurisdiction when Congress has designated a federal forum for resolution 
of the class of disputes at issue.  Although two of our cases might have caused some 
confusion on this point, I do not believe that they may fairly be read as supporting the 
demonstrably incorrect proposition of law for which defendant cites them. 
                                              
of whether the preemption at issue was jurisdictional—for example, to decide if preemption 
could be raised for the first time on appeal or in a collateral attack on a final judgment. 
7 See, e.g., Arbuckle v Gen Motors LLC, 499 Mich 521, 533-534; 885 NW2d 232 (2016) 
(holding that since state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving collective-
bargaining agreements under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 USC 
185(a), a state court had jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case even though § 301 
preempts state substantive law); Betty v Brooks & Perkins, 446 Mich 270, 287 n 21; 521 
NW2d 518 (1994) (same); Flanagan v Comau Pico, 274 Mich App 418, 429-431; 733 
NW2d 430 (2007) (same); Local 495 UAW v Diecast Corp, 52 Mich App 372, 377-379; 
217 NW2d 424 (1974) (same).  See also In re Lager Estate, 286 Mich App 158, 164; 779 
NW2d 310 (2009) (noting that “federal courts generally have subject-matter jurisdiction 
over ERISA claims” but that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought 
by a beneficiary to recover benefits due under a personal savings plan).   
8 See, e.g., Wade v Blue, 369 F3d 407, 410 (CA 4, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
13 
III.  FOLLOWING UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT, A 
MAJORITY OF OUR SISTER STATE COURTS HAVE HELD THAT FEDERAL 
LAW DOES NOT DEPRIVE STATE COURTS OF SUBJECT-MATTER 
JURISDICTION OVER THE TYPE OF VETERANS’ AND MILITARY DISABILITY 
BENEFITS AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE 
As the majority notes, in McCarty v McCarty, the United States Supreme Court held 
that “upon the dissolution of a marriage, federal law precludes a state court from dividing 
military nondisability retired pay pursuant to state community property laws.”  McCarty v 
McCarty, 453 US 210, 211; 101 S Ct 2728; 69 L Ed 2d 589 (1981).  In response, Congress 
passed the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 USC 1408, 
which permits state courts to treat veterans’ “disposable retired pay” as divisible property 
during divorce proceedings.  10 USC 1408(c). 
In Mansell v Mansell, 490 US 581; 109 S Ct 2023; 104 L Ed 2d 675 (1989), the 
United States Supreme Court addressed whether the USFSPA allows state courts to treat 
retirement pay waived by a retired service member in order to receive disability benefits as 
property divisible upon divorce.  The Court rejected the civilian spouse’s argument that the 
USFSPA was intended to broadly reject McCarty and completely restore to state courts the 
authority they had prior to McCarty.  Id. at 588, 593-594.  Instead, the majority found that 
the USFSPA only partially superseded McCarty, holding that “the Former Spouses’ 
Protection Act does not grant state courts the power to treat as property divisible upon 
divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans’ disability 
benefits.”  Id. at 594-595.  Importantly, in a footnote, the Mansell Court discussed the state 
court’s application of the doctrine of res judicata: 
In a supplemental brief, Mrs. Mansell argues that the doctrine of res 
judicata should have prevented this pre-McCarty property settlement from 
being reopened.  McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 
 
 
 
 
14 
L.Ed.2d 589 (1981).  The California Court of Appeal, however, decided that 
it was appropriate, under California law, to reopen the settlement and reach 
the federal question.  5 Civ. No. F002872 (Jan. 30, 1987).  Whether the 
doctrine of res judicata, as applied in California, should have barred the 
reopening of pre-McCarty settlements is a matter of state law over which we 
have no jurisdiction.  The federal question is therefore properly before us.  
[Mansell, 490 US at 586 n 5.] 
On remand in Mansell, the California Court of Appeal rejected the veteran spouse’s 
argument that the “judgment was void for want of subject matter jurisdiction.”  In re 
Marriage of Mansell, 217 Cal App 3d 219, 227; 265 Cal Rptr 227 (1989).  The California 
Court of Appeal characterized the McCarty holding as merely “that state courts were bound 
to apply federal law in determining the character of military pension benefits.  There was 
no divestiture of jurisdiction.”  Id. at 228.  The United States Supreme Court subsequently 
denied the petition for certiorari.  Mansell v Mansell, 498 US 806 (1990). 
One prominent commentator describes the denial of the second petition for certiorari 
as “one of the most important facts in all of the Mansell litigation,” explaining as follows:  
It shows that footnote 5 in the Mansell opinion is more than mere words.  The 
Court did not merely state in the abstract that division of military benefits 
under state law principles of res judicata was outside the scope of federal 
appellate jurisdiction; it refused to reverse or even review on the merits a 
state court decision applying those principles.  It reached this result even 
though the net effect of the second California decision was to reach (under a 
different supporting theory) the exact same end result as the first California 
decision—a decision which the Supreme Court had reversed in a published 
decision.  Together with footnote 5 in the published opinion, the Court’s 
denial of review is a very strong statement that division of military benefits 
on a theory of res judicata is not prohibited by federal law. 
*   *   * 
If McCarty and Mansell did involve subject matter jurisdiction, the 
husband in Mansell would have been right; the original order dividing 
benefits outside the scope of the USFSPA would have been void.  The 
Supreme Court’s unanimous refusal to hear the case a second time, and its 
 
 
 
 
15 
sudden acquiescence in a result which it had so recently reversed, combined 
with the language of footnote 5 of the published opinion, suggest strongly 
that the Supreme Court agreed with the courts of California.  McCarty and 
Mansell state a rule of substantive federal law, and not a rule of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  [2 Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property (4th ed), § 6:6, 
pp 54-55.][9] 
Shortly after McCarty was decided, the United States Supreme Court was presented 
with an issue similar to that in the present case.  In In re Marriage of Sheldon, the California 
Court of Appeal declined to apply McCarty retroactively.  In re Marriage of Sheldon, 124 
Cal App 3d 371, 376-384; 177 Cal Rptr 380 (1981).  The military spouse filed a petition 
for certiorari.  See Sheldon v Sheldon, 456 US 941 (1982).  Specifically, one of the issues 
raised was: 
Does federal preemption of state community property laws regarding 
division of military retirement pay render state judgments void for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction where such judgments were entered after 
Congress had preempted area of law?  [Turner, § 6:6, p 49.] 
The United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal “for want of a substantial federal 
question.”  Sheldon, 456 US at 941.  Unlike denial of a petition for certiorari, “[a] dismissal 
for want of a substantial federal question is an adjudication on the merits, and it carries the 
same precedential value as a full opinion.”  Turner, § 6:6, p 49, citing Hicks v Miranda, 
                                              
9 See also Turner, State Court Treatment of Military and Veteran’s Disability Benefits: A 
2004 Update, 16 Divorce Litig 76, 80 (2004) (“Because Mansell ultimately permitted the 
division of the benefits at issue, it is clearly wrong to hold, as a few decisions have held, 
that federal law deprives state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over veteran’s and 
military disability benefits.  Mansell is not a rule of subject-matter jurisdiction; rather, it is 
a rule of substantive law.  When no prior order and no prior agreement exists, federal law 
requires that disability benefits be awarded to the owning spouse, and it preempts any state 
law to the contrary.  When a prior order exists, however, federal law permits state courts 
to divide military and veteran’s disability benefits, as they were actually divided in the 
Mansell litigation.”). 
 
 
 
 
16 
422 US 332, 344; 95 S Ct 2281; 45 L Ed 2d 223 (1975) (emphasis omitted).10  Therefore, 
according to the author, Sheldon “establish[es] that the ruling in McCarty does not apply 
retroactively and that decisions which erroneously divide preempted benefits are not void 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”  Turner, § 6:6, p 49 (emphasis omitted). 
As the author explains, because McCarty is not retroactive and thus does not void 
final state court orders, military benefits can be divided by state courts under the law of res 
judicata: 
Initial division of military benefits must be made under federal substantive 
law, which requires that the benefits be awarded only to the service member 
and not to the former spouse.  If the service member requests that the state 
court apply federal substantive law, and the state court instead applies state 
substantive law, McCarty requires that the state court decision be reversed.  
But if the service member never raises the issue—if he or she allows the state 
court to enter an erroneous order dividing military benefits under state 
substantive law, as happened in most of the pre-McCarty cases—Sheldon 
recognizes that McCarty does not support reversal of the state court 
judgment.  Federal substantive law controls the issue, but under either federal 
or state procedural rules, a decision which is based upon the wrong 
substantive law cannot be collaterally attacked after it becomes final.  [Id. at 
50.] 
The author notes that “[a] strong majority of state courts have recognized, often in 
reliance upon postremand history of Mansell, that the doctrine of McCarty and Mansell is 
a rule of federal substantive law only.”  Id. at 55.11  And, perhaps of even more relevance 
here, “[a] strong majority of state court cases likewise hold that military benefits of all sorts 
                                              
10 See also White v White, 731 F2d 1440, 1443 (CA 9, 1984); Evans v Evans, 75 Md App 
364, 374; 541 A2d 648 (1988). 
11 See id. at n 24 (listing cases).  The author also notes that “[a] minority of state courts 
persist in holding to the contrary.”  Id. at 55.  See also id. at n 25 (listing cases). 
 
 
 
 
17 
can be divided under the law of res judicata.”  Id. at § 6:9, p 72.12  The issue of res judicata 
was not presented in Howell v Howell, 581 US ___; 137 S Ct 1400; 197 L Ed 2d 781 
(2017), and therefore, Howell does not appear to provide any guidance on this issue.13 
One case exemplifies the difficulty our courts have had in applying the law in this 
complex area.14  In Biondo v Biondo, 291 Mich App 720; 809 NW2d 397 (2011), the Court 
of Appeals allowed the defendant to challenge enforcement of the Social Security 
equalization provision in his divorce judgment on federal-preemption grounds, even 
                                              
12 See id. at 72-73 n 4 (listing cases).  Again, the author notes that a minority of state courts 
hold to the contrary.  See id. at 74 n 9 (listing cases) and text accompanying.  However, he 
observes that “[n]one of these decisions cite either Sheldon or footnote 5 in Mansell,” and 
“[n]one have showed any awareness of the postremand history of Mansell[.]”  Id. at 74. 
13 See Turner, § 6:9, p 72 (“The issue of res judicata was not presented on the facts in the 
most recent Supreme Court decision on division of military service benefits, Howell v. 
Howell.  The author sees nothing in that decision which questions the strong statement in 
footnote 5 of Mansell that division of military benefits under the law of res judicata would 
not violate federal law.”) (citation omitted).  The subsequent orders from the United States 
Supreme Court vacating two state court decisions for further consideration in light of 
Howell also do not shed any further light on this issue.  In Merrill v Merrill, 238 Ariz 467, 
468; 362 P3d 1034 (2015), vacated 581 US ___; 137 S Ct 2156 (2017), the original divorce 
judgment split only the veteran spouse’s retirement pay, and the non-veteran spouse 
petitioned for an award in the amount of the reduced share once the veteran spouse started 
receiving combat-related special compensation.  In In re Marriage of Cassinelli, 4 Cal App 
5th 1285, 1292; 210 Cal Rptr 3d 311 (2016), vacated sub nom Cassinelli v Cassinelli, 583 
US ___;138 S Ct 69 (2017), the non-veteran spouse had “filed a motion to modify the 
judgment by ordering [the veteran spouse] to pay the amount of her share of his retired pay 
as ‘non-modifiable spousal support.’ ”  In other words, both cases involved a later attempt 
to modify a divorce judgment, not a situation like the present case, in which a provision in 
the original divorce judgment violated federal law but was not challenged on direct appeal 
and instead was challenged later in response to a motion to hold the veteran-spouse in 
contempt for failing to comply with that judgment. 
14 See Turner, § 6:2, p 4 (boldly asserting that “[t]he complexity of classifying, valuing, 
and dividing [retirement] plans is unmatched by any other issue in any area of modern 
law”). 
 
 
 
 
18 
though it rejected his claim—similar to the one appellant is making here—that 42 USC 407 
of the Social Security Act, 42 USC 301 et seq., divests the state courts of subject-matter 
jurisdiction in divorce cases.  The Court stated as follows: 
In reaching this conclusion, we specifically reject James Biondo’s 
suggestion that the circuit court did not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to 
enter the terms of the parties’ consent judgment of divorce.  That federal law 
has preempted a portion of the parties’ consent judgment of divorce in no 
manner deprives the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction in this divorce 
matter.  The Social Security Act simply does not divest state courts of 
subject-matter jurisdiction in divorce cases.  Rather, the Supremacy Clause 
preempts state laws regarding the division of marital property only to the 
extent they are inconsistent with 42 USC 407(a).  The Michigan Supreme 
Court has explained this distinction as follows: 
The loose practice has grown up, even in some opinions, 
of saying that a court had no “jurisdiction” to take certain legal 
action when what is actually meant is that the court had no legal 
“right” to take the action, that it was in error.  If the loose 
meaning were correct it would reduce the doctrine of res 
judicata to a shambles and provoke endless litigation, since 
any decree or judgment of an erring tribunal would be a mere 
nullity.  [Buczkowski v Buczkowski, 351 Mich 216, 222; 88 
NW2d 416 (1958).] 
Although the circuit court erred by ordering the social security equalization, 
it did not exceed its subject-matter jurisdiction in doing so.  Const 1963, art 
6, § 13; MCL 552.6(1).  [Biondo, 291 Mich App at 727-728.] 
Apparently not recognizing the finality implications of its finding that the trial court 
had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the parties’ divorce judgment, the Court held that, 
on remand, the circuit court could modify the property-settlement provisions of the divorce 
judgment on the ground that inclusion of the Social Security equalization provision was a 
mutual mistake.  However, the court did not cite or discuss the applicability of MCR 2.612, 
the court rule that governs requests for relief from a final judgment, or explain why, if that 
 
 
 
 
19 
rule was applicable, the one-year limitations period for requests on the ground of mistake 
did not apply.  See MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a) and (C)(2).  Nor did the Court discuss Sheldon, 
footnote 5 in Mansell, or the other authorities noted above holding that federal retirement 
benefits may be divided on a theory of res judicata. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Contrary to defendant’s sweeping assertion, it is clear that not all federal preemption 
deprives state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.  On remand, the Court of Appeals will 
have an opportunity to address whether the particular type of preemption at issue in this 
case is jurisdictional.  The purpose of my concurrence is to properly frame the inquiry, to 
clarify our caselaw, and to point to some of the pertinent authorities that may aid the Court 
of Appeals in resolving this complex and jurisprudentially significant issue. 
 
 
David F. Viviano