Case Title: Florida House Of Representatives, Et Al. v. The Honorable Charles J. Crist, Jr., Etc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC07-2154

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Supreme Court of Florida  
No. SC07-2154 
FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al., 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
THE HONORABLE CHARLES J. CRIST, JR., etc., 
Respondent. 
[July 3, 2008] 
CANTERO, J. 
After almost sixteen years of sporadic negotiations with four governors, in 
November 2007 the Seminole Indian Tribe of Florida signed a gambling 
―compact‖ (a contract between two sovereigns) with Florida Governor Charles 
Crist.  The compact significantly expands casino gambling, also known as 
―gaming,‖ on tribal lands.  For example, it permits card games such as blackjack 
and baccarat that are otherwise prohibited by law. In return, the compact promises 
substantial remuneration to the State. 
The Florida Legislature did not authorize the Governor to negotiate the 
compact before it was signed and has not ratified it since.  To the contrary, shortly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
after the compact was signed, the Florida House of Representatives and its  
Speaker, Marco Rubio, filed in this Court a petition for a writ of quo warranto 
disputing the Governor‘s authority to bind the State to the compact.  We have 
exercised our discretion to consider such petitions, see art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. 
Const., and now grant it on narrow grounds.  We hold that the Governor does not 
have the constitutional authority to bind the State to a gaming compact that clearly 
departs from the State‘s public policy by legalizing types of gaming that are illegal 
everywhere else in the state. 
In the remainder of this opinion, we describe the history of Indian gaming 
compacts in general and the negotiations leading up to the compact at issue.  We 
then explain our jurisdiction to consider the petition.  Finally, we discuss the 
applicable constitutional provisions, statutes, and cases governing our decision. 
I.  THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
We analyze the compact in the context of the federal regulations authorizing 
it as well as the background of the negotiations in this case.  We first review the 
statutory foundation for the compact: the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000) (IGRA).  Next, we detail the history of the Tribe‘s 
attempts to negotiate a compact with the State.  Finally, we explain the compact‘s 
relevant terms. 
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A. IGRA  
Indian tribes are independent sovereigns. The Indian Commerce Clause of 
the United States Constitution grants only Congress the power to override their 
sovereignty on Indian lands.  U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (―The Congress shall 
have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with . . . the Indian Tribes.‖); see also 
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987) (noting 
that tribal sovereignty is subordinate only to the federal government).  Before 
IGRA, states had no role in regulating Indian gaming. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 
202. 
Congress enacted IGRA in 1988.  Among other things, the statute provides 
―a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of 
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal 
governments.‖ 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).  IGRA divides gaming into three classes: 
Class I includes ―social games solely for prizes of minimal value.‖ Id. § 2703(6). 
Class II includes ―the game of chance commonly known as bingo‖ and ―non­
banked‖ card games—that is, games in which participants play against only each 
other; the host facility (the ―house‖) has no stake in the outcome. Id. § 2703(7). 
Class III—the only type relevant here—comprises all other types of gaming, 
including slot machines, pari-mutuel wagering (such as horse and greyhound 
racing), lotteries, and ―banked‖ card games—such as baccarat, blackjack (twenty­
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one), and chemin de fer—in which participants play against the house. Id. §  
2703(6)-(8). 
IGRA permits Class III gaming on tribal lands, but only in limited 
circumstances. It is lawful only if it is (1) authorized by tribal ordinance, (2) 
―located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, 
organization, or entity,‖ and (3) ―conducted in accordance with a Tribal-State 
compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State . . . that is in effect.‖ Id. § 
2710(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
IGRA provides for tribes to negotiate compacts with their host states.  Upon 
a tribe‘s request, a state ―shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter 
into such a compact.‖ Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (emphasis added).  If the parties 
successfully negotiate a compact and the Secretary of the Department of the 
Interior (Department) approves it, the compact takes effect ―when notice of 
approval by the Secretary‖ is published in the Federal Register. Id. § 
2710(d)(3)(B), (8). 
If negotiations fail, IGRA allows a tribe to sue the state in federal court. If 
the state continues to refuse consent, the Secretary may ―prescribe . . . procedures‖ 
permitting Class III gaming. See id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).  The United States 
Supreme Court has held, however—in a case involving the Seminole Tribe‘s 
attempts to offer Class III gaming in Florida—that IGRA did not abrogate the 
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states‘ Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517  
U.S. 44, 47 (1996). Therefore, states need not consent to such lawsuits.  The 
Department later created an alternative procedure under which, when a tribe cannot 
negotiate a compact and a state asserts immunity, the Secretary may prescribe 
Class III gaming. See Class III Gaming Procedures, 64 Fed. Reg. 17535-02 (Apr. 
12, 1999) (codified at 25 C.F.R pt. 291 (2007)).  At least one federal court, 
however, has held that the Secretary lacked authority to promulgate such 
regulations. See Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 493 (5th Cir. 2007), 
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas v. Texas, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3471 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2008) (No. 07-1109).  Therefore, their validity 
remains questionable. 
B.  The Negotiations Between the Tribe and the State 
With this statutory framework in mind, we briefly describe the protracted 
history of the Seminole Tribe‘s efforts to negotiate a compact for conducting Class 
III gaming in Florida. These negotiations spanned sixteen years and four different 
governors. 
The Seminole Indian Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe whose 
reservations and trust lands are located in the State.  The Tribe currently operates 
Class II gaming facilities, offering low stakes poker games and electronically aided 
bingo games.  The Tribe first sought a compact allowing it to offer Class III 
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gaming in 1991.  That January, the Tribe and Governor Lawton Chiles began  
negotiations, but they ultimately proved fruitless.  That same year, the Tribe filed 
suit in federal court alleging that the State had failed to negotiate in good faith.  As 
noted earlier, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the State could assert 
immunity, and it did. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47, aff‘g Seminole Tribe of 
Fla. v. Fla., 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994). 
Over the next several years, the Tribe repeatedly petitioned the Department 
to establish Class III gaming procedures.  In 1999, the Department did so.  It found 
the Tribe eligible for the procedures and called an informal conference, which was 
held in Tallahassee that December.  At the State‘s suggestion, however, the Tribe 
agreed to suspend the conference, though only temporarily.  In January 2001, the 
Secretary issued a twenty-page decision allowing the Tribe to offer a wide range of 
Class III games.  When the State requested clarification, however, the Secretary 
withdrew the decision.  The delay continued.  Finally, five years later—in May 
2006—the Department reconvened the conference in Hollywood, Florida, and in 
September of that year warned that if the Tribe and the State did not execute a 
compact within 60 days, the Department would issue Class III gaming procedures. 
Despite the parties‘ failure to negotiate a compact, however, the Department never 
issued procedures. 
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Apparently exasperated with the slow progress of the procedures, in March  
2007 the Tribe sued the Department in federal court. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. 
United States, No. 07-60317-CIV (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 6, 2007).  The Department 
then urged Governor Crist to negotiate a compact, warning that if a compact was 
not signed by November 15, 2007, the Department would finally issue procedures. 
Under the proposed procedures, the State would not receive any revenue and 
would have no control over the Tribe‘s gaming operations.  The Tribe would be 
authorized to operate slot machines and ―card games,‖ defined as ―a game or series 
of games of poker (other than Class II games) which are played in a nonbanking 
manner.‖ (Emphasis added.)  Notably, the alternative procedures would not have 
permitted the Tribe to operate banked card games such as blackjack.1 
On November 14—the day before the deadline—the Governor agreed to a 
compact with the Tribe (Compact).  Five days later, the House and its Speaker, 
Marco Rubio, filed this petition disputing the Governor‘s authority to bind the 
1.  During this period, two separate but identical bills designating the 
Governor to negotiate and execute a compact and submit it for ratification by the 
legislature were not voted on by the House of Representatives. See Fla. SB 160 
(2007); Fla. HB 209 (2007). 
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State to the Compact without legislative authorization or ratification.  We allowed  
the Tribe to join the action as a respondent.2 
On January 7, 2008, upon publication of the Secretary‘s approval, the 
Compact went into effect. See Notice of Deemed Approved Tribal-State Class III 
Gaming Compact, 73 Fed. Reg. 1229 (Jan. 7, 2008).  The parties agree, however, 
that the Secretary‘s approval does not render the petition moot.3 
C.  The Compact 
The Compact recites that the Governor ―has the authority to act for the State 
with respect to the negotiation and execution of this Compact.‖  It covers a period 
of twenty-five years and allows the Tribe to offer specified Class III gaming at 
seven casinos in the State.  It establishes the terms, rights, and responsibilities of 
the parties regarding such gaming.  We discuss only its more relevant provisions. 
The Compact authorizes the Tribe to conduct ―covered gaming,‖ which 
includes several types of Class III gaming: slot machines; any banking or banked 
card game, including baccarat, blackjack (twenty-one), and chemin de fer; high 
2. We also allowed other organizations to file briefs as amici curiae in 
support of the House: the Florida Senate, the Gulfstream Park Racing Association, 
and the City of Hallandale Beach. 
3.  The federal district court, however, concluded that such approval did 
render the Tribe‘s suit moot. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. United States, No. 07­
60317-CIV (S.D. Fla. order filed June 20, 2008).  The court dismissed the Tribe‘s 
case and noted that the Tribe already had begun operating under the Compact‘s 
terms. 
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stakes poker games; games and devices authorized for the state lottery; and any  
new game authorized by Florida law. The Compact expressly does not authorize 
roulette- or craps-style games.  The gaming is limited to seven casinos on tribal 
lands in six areas of the state: Okeechobee, Coconut Creek, Hollywood (two), 
Clewiston, Immokalee, and Tampa.  Compact pt. IV.B., at 7-8. 
The Compact grants the Tribe the exclusive right to conduct certain types of 
gaming.  That is, the Tribe may conduct some Class III gaming, such as banked 
card games, that is prohibited under state law.  Based on that ―partial but 
substantial exclusivity,‖ the Tribe must pay the State a share of the gaming 
revenue.  That share is based in part on amounts that increase at specified 
thresholds: when the Compact becomes effective, the State receives $50 million. 
Over the first twenty-four months of operation, it will receive another $175 
million.  Thereafter, for the third twelve months of operation the State will receive 
$150 million, and for each twelve-month cycle after that, a minimum of $100 
million.  If the State breaches the exclusivity provision, however—by legalizing 
any Class III gaming currently prohibited under state law—the Tribe may cease its 
payments.  The Compact (attached as an appendix to this opinion) is thirty-seven 
pages long and contains several other provisions we need not detail here.4 
4.  For example, Part V provides that the Tribe will establish rules, 
regulations, and minimum operational requirements of gaming facilities under the 
Compact.  The ―State Compliance Agency‖—which is earlier defined as ―the 
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II.  JURISDICTION  
Before discussing the issue presented, we first address our jurisdiction.  The 
House and Speaker Rubio have filed in this Court a petition for writ of quo 
warranto.  The Governor contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction because the 
House does not seek either to remove him from office or to enjoin the future 
exercise of his authority. We conclude, however, that these are not the only 
grounds for issuing such a writ. 
The Florida Constitution authorizes this Court to issue writs of quo warranto 
to ―state officers and state agencies.‖  Art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.  The term ―quo 
warranto‖ means ―by what authority.‖  This writ historically has been used to 
determine whether a state officer or agency has improperly exercised a power or 
right derived from the State. See Martinez v. Martinez, 545 So. 2d 1338, 1339 
(Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.  Here, the Governor is a state 
Governor or his designee unless and until an SCA has been designated by the 
Legislature,‖ see Compact at 7—―may propose additional rules and regulations 
consistent with and related to the implementation of this Compact . . . .‖  Compact 
at 9.  In addition, ―the State may secure an annual independent financial audit of 
the conduct of Covered Games subject to this Compact,‖ may request meetings 
with the Tribe regarding the audit, and may select the independent auditor. 
Compact at 11-12. Part VI addresses tort claims and remedies for patrons and 
provides that employee claims will be addressed under the Tribe‘s workers‘ 
compensation regulation.  Compact at 15. Part VII places regulation of the 
activities governed by the Compact exclusively with the Tribe.  Compact at 17. 
Part VIII addresses the State‘s power, through the State Compliance Agency, to 
monitor the gaming, specifying the terms for the Agency‘s visits to gaming 
facilities.  Compact at 19. 
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officer.  The House challenges the Governor‘s authority to unilaterally execute the  
Compact on the State‘s behalf. 
The Governor argues that because he already has signed the Compact, quo 
warranto relief is inappropriate.  But the writ is not so limited.  In fact, petitions for 
the writ historically have been filed after a public official has acted. See, e.g., 
Chiles v. Phelps, 714 So. 2d 453, 455 (Fla. 1998) (holding that the Legislature and 
its officers exceeded their authority in overriding the Governor‘s veto); State ex 
rel. Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So. 2d 404, 406 (Fla. 1998) (issuing the writ after 
the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel had filed a federal civil rights suit, 
concluding that it had no authority to file it).  The Governor‘s execution of the 
Compact does not defeat our jurisdiction. 
The concurring-in-result-only opinion expresses concern that by considering 
a more narrow issue than the Governor‘s authority to execute IGRA compacts in 
general—that is, whether the Governor has the authority to bind the State to a 
compact that violates Florida law—we are expanding our quo warranto jurisdiction 
to include issues normally reserved for declaratory judgment actions. In prior quo 
warranto cases, however, we have considered separation-of-powers arguments 
normally reviewed in the context of declaratory judgments, such as whether the 
Governor‘s action has usurped the Legislature‘s power, ―where the functions of 
government would be adversely affected absent an immediate determination by 
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this Court.‖  Phelps, 714 So. 2d at 457; see also Martinez, 545 So. 2d at 1339  
(holding quo warranto appropriate to test the governor's power to call special 
sessions); Orange County v. City of Orlando, 327 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1976) (holding 
that the legality of city's actions regarding annexation ordinances can be inquired 
into through quo warranto). 
In this case, the Secretary has approved the Compact and, absent an 
immediate judicial resolution, it will be given effect.  In fact, according to news 
reports, the Tribe already has begun offering blackjack and other games at the 
Seminole Hard Rock Hotel and Casino. See Amy Driscoll, ―Casino Gambling: 
Amid glitz, blackjack‘s in the cards,‖ The Miami Herald, June 23, 2008, at B1. 
Thus, if indeed the Governor has exceeded his constitutional authority, a compact 
that violates Florida law will, nevertheless, become effective in seven casinos 
located on tribal lands located in the state.  As in Phelps, therefore, the importance 
and immediacy of the issue justifies our deciding this matter now rather than 
transferring it for resolution in a declaratory judgment action. 
III.  DISCUSSION OF LAW 
We now discuss the law that applies to this inter-branch dispute.  In deciding 
whether the Governor or the Legislature has the authority to execute a compact, we 
first define a ―compact‖ and its historical use in Florida.  We then discuss how 
other jurisdictions have resolved this issue.  Next, we review the relevant 
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provisions of our own constitution.  Finally, we explain our conclusion that the 
Governor lacked authority under our state‘s constitution to execute the Compact 
because it changes the state‘s public policy as expressed in the criminal law and 
therefore infringes on the Legislature‘s powers. 
A. Compacts and their Use in Florida 
A compact is essentially a contract between two sovereigns. Texas v. New 
Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987); see Black‘s Law Dictionary 298 (8th ed.1999) 
(defining a compact as ―[a]n agreement or covenant between two or more parties, 
esp[ecially] between governments or states‖).  The United States Supreme Court 
has described compacts as ―a supple device for dealing with interests confined 
within a region.‖ State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27 (1951). The United 
States Constitution provides that ―[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress 
. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign 
Power.‖  U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.  IGRA establishes the consent of Congress to 
execute gaming compacts, but requires federal approval before they become 
effective. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8). 
Like many states, Florida has executed compacts on a range of subjects, 
including environmental control, water rights, energy, and education—more than 
thirty in all.  The vast majority were executed with other states.  In most cases, the 
Legislature enacted a law. See, e.g., § 372.831, Fla. Stat. (2007) (―The Wildlife 
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Violator Compact is created and entered into with all other jurisdictions legally  
joining therein in the form substantially as follows[.]‖); § 257.28 (Interstate 
Library Compact); § 252.921 (Emergency Management Assistance Compact); § 
322.44 (Driver License Compact).  In others, the Legislature authorized the 
Governor to execute a compact in the form provided in a statute. See, e.g., § 
370.19, Fla. Stat. (2007) (―The Governor of this state is hereby authorized and 
directed to execute a compact on behalf of the State of Florida with any one or 
more of [the following states] . . . legally joining therein in the form substantially 
as follows[.]‖); § 370.20 (containing the same authorization and establishing the 
terms for the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Compact); § 403.60 (using the same 
authorization language for the Interstate Environmental Control Compact, 
establishing its terms, and ―signif[ying] in advance‖ the Legislature‘s ―approval 
and ratification of such compact‖).  In a few—including a compact among the 
State, the Tribe, and the South Florida Water Management District regulating 
water use on Tribal lands—the Legislature by statute approved and ratified the 
compact.  § 285.165, Fla. Stat. (2007).  Thus, by tradition at least, it is the 
Legislature that has consistently either exercised itself or expressly authorized the 
exercise of the power to bind the State to compacts.  We have found no instance in 
which the governor has signed a compact without legislative involvement. 
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Although tradition bears some relevance, it does not resolve the question of  
which branch actually has the constitutional authority to execute compacts in 
general and gaming compacts in particular. As explained above, the Compact here 
governs Class III gaming on certain tribal lands in Florida.  The issue is whether, 
regardless of whether the Governor bucked tradition, he had constitutional 
authority to execute the Compact without the Legislature‘s prior authorization or, 
at least, subsequent ratification. 
B.  How Other Courts Have Answered the Question 
Although Florida has not addressed a governor‘s authority to bind a state to 
an IGRA compact, other states have.  We examine but a few. In State ex rel. 
Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1182 (Kan. 1992), the governor executed the 
compact.  In deciding his authority to do so, the Kansas Supreme Court examined 
the ―the nature of the obligations undertaken‖ by the executed IGRA compact. 
The court noted that many of the compact‘s provisions were ―clearly legislative in 
nature,‖ such as creating a state agency and assigning new duties to extant state 
agencies, and concluded that many provisions ―would operate as the enactment of 
new laws and the amendment of existing laws.‖ Id. at 1185.  The court therefore 
held that, although the governor had authority to negotiate the compact, ―the 
Governor ha[d] no power to bind the State to the terms thereof.‖ Id. 
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The New York Court of Appeals has arrived at the same conclusion.  After  
examining IGRA‘s list of several permissible areas of negotiation for a tribal-state 
compact, see 25 U.S.C. § 1071(d)(3)(C), the court concluded that ―these issues 
necessarily make fundamental policy choices that epitomize ‗legislative power.‘‖  
Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047, 1060 
(N.Y. 2003).5 Further, like the Kansas Supreme Court, the court found that the 
compact‘s designation of an agency to oversee the gaming and the authority of the 
agency to promulgate rules ―usurped the Legislature‘s power.‖ 798 N.E.2d at 
5. IGRA lists several permissible subjects for negotiation: 
(i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations 
of the Indian tribe or the State that are directly related to, and 
necessary for, the licensing and regulation of such activity; 
(ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the 
State and the Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws 
and regulations; 
(iii) the assessment by the State of such activities in such 
amounts as are necessary to defray the costs of regulating such 
activity; 
(iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity in amounts 
comparable to amounts assessed by the State for comparable 
activities; 
(v) remedies for breach of contract; 
(vi) standards for the operation of such activity and maintenance of 
the gaming facility, including licensing; and 
(vii) any other subjects that are directly related to the operation of 
gaming activities. 
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C). 
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1061.  The court held that the governor ―lack[ed] the power unilaterally to  
negotiate and execute tribal gaming compacts under IGRA.‖ Id. 
Applying the test of ―whether the Governor‘s action disrupts the proper 
balance between the executive and legislative branches,‖ the New Mexico 
Supreme Court similarly found a gaming compact unduly disruptive of the 
legislature‘s powers. State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 23 (N.M. 1995). 
The court found that the compact granted extended gaming rights, authorized 
gaming in contravention of legislative policy, and assigned the roles of the state 
and the tribe with respect to gaming regulation and civil and criminal jurisdiction. 
Id. at 23-24.  Stating that ―[r]esidual governmental authority should rest with the 
legislative branch rather than the executive branch,‖ id. at 24, the court held that 
the ―Governor lacked authority under the state Constitution to bind the State by 
unilaterally entering into the compacts and revenue-sharing agreements in 
question.‖ Id. at 25; see also Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666, 698, 700 (Wis. 
2004) (where a state statute authorized the governor to execute a gaming compact, 
holding that the governor exceeded his power by permitting the tribes to engage in 
certain games prohibited by state law and to waive state sovereign immunity). 
Federal courts, too, have concluded that a state‘s governor did not have the 
authority to bind the state to a gaming compact. In Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 
104 F.3d 1546, 1548 (10th Cir. 1997), the circuit court held that the Secretary‘s 
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approval of a compact could not cure an ultra vires act by the state‘s governor, and  
the question of ―whether a state has validly bound itself to a compact‖ must be 
decided under state law. Id. at 1557.  Noting the New Mexico Supreme Court‘s 
―thorough and careful analysis of state law‖ in Clark, the Tenth Circuit accepted it 
as determinative on the question of whether its governor had authority to bind the 
state to the compacts. Id. at 1559. 
In all these cases, to determine which branch had the authority to bind the 
state to the compact, courts analyzed the nature and effect of the IGRA compact at 
issue and compared it to the powers the state constitution delegated to the 
respective branches. The courts found the compacts within the legislative power 
because they created or assigned new duties to agencies, conflicted with state law, 
changed state law, or restricted the legislature‘s power.  Finally, recognizing that 
state legislative power is limited only by the state and federal constitutions, several 
courts have ascribed to the legislature, rather than the executive, any residual 
power on which the state constitutions were silent. See Clark, 904 P.2d at 25; 
Pataki, 798 N.E.2d at 1061 n.11.  We now review our own state constitution in the 
context of IGRA‘s provisions and the Compact signed in this case. 
C.  Florida Constitutional Provisions 
The House contends that several of the Compact‘s provisions encroach on 
the Legislature‘s law- and policy-making powers.  To answer the question, we first 
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review the separation-of-powers provisions of the Florida Constitution and our  
interpretations of it.  We then discuss one specific provision on which the 
Governor relies: the ―necessary business‖ clause. 
1. The Florida Constitution’s Delegation and Separation of Powers 
The Florida Constitution generally specifies the relative powers of the three 
branches of government.  Article II, section 3 provides innocuously that ―[t]he 
powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and 
judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers 
appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.‖  In 
construing our constitution, we have ―traditionally applied a strict separation of 
powers doctrine.‖ Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 329 (Fla. 2004) (quoting State 
v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 353 (Fla. 2000)). 
These provisions are not specific, however.  In fact, as we first noted 100 
years ago, the state constitution does not exhaustively list each branch‘s powers. 
State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 47 So. 969, 974 (Fla. 1908).  Both the 
Governor and the House concede that the state constitution does not expressly 
grant either branch the authority to execute compacts. 
We must therefore expand our analysis beyond the plain language of the 
constitution.  We have held that the powers of the respective branches ―are those so 
defined . . . or such as are inherent or so recognized by immemorial governmental 
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usage, and which involve the exercise of primary and independent will, discretion, 
and judgment, subject not to the control of another department, but only to the 
limitations imposed by the state and federal Constitutions.‖ Id. at 974.  A branch 
has ―the inherent right to accomplish all objects naturally within the orbit of that 
department, not expressly limited by the fact of the existence of a similar power 
elsewhere or the express limitations in the constitution.‖ Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. 
Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 742 (Fla. 1961) (quoting In re Integration of Neb. State Bar 
Ass‘n, 275 N.W.2d 265, 266 (1937)).  As we noted over seventy-five years ago, 
what determines whether a particular function is legislative, executive, or judicial 
―so that it may be exercised by appropriate officers of the proper department‖ is 
not ―the name given to the function or to the officer who performs it‖ but the 
―essential nature and effect of the governmental function to be performed.‖ 
Florida Motor Lines v. Railroad Comm‘rs, 129 So. 876, 881 (Fla. 1930). 
The House argues that, precisely because the state constitution does not 
expressly grant the governor authority to execute compacts, such authority belongs 
to the Legislature.  In other words, the ―residual‖ power—that is, powers not 
specifically assigned to the governor—belongs to the Legislature.  Albeit many 
years ago and under different circumstances, we have implied as much. See State 
ex rel. Green v. Pearson, 14 So. 2d 565, 567 (Fla. 1943) (―The legislative branch 
looks to the Constitution not for sources of power but for limitations upon power. 
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But if such limitations are not found to exist, its discretion reasonably exercised  
may not be disturbed by the judicial branch of the government.‖); State ex rel. 
Cunningham v. Davis, 166 So. 289, 297 (Fla. 1936) (―The test of legislative power 
is constitutional restriction; what the people have not said in their organic law their 
representatives shall not do, they may do.‖). And, as we noted above, other state 
courts have ascribed to their legislatures any residual power on which the state 
constitutions were silent. See Clark, 904 P.2d at 25; Pataki, 798 N.E.2d at 824 
n.11. 
We need not decide, however, whether the authority to bind the state to 
compacts always resides in the legislature.  Although the line of demarcation is not 
always clear, we have noted that ―the legislature‘s exclusive power encompasses 
questions of fundamental policy and the articulation of reasonably definite 
standards to be used in implementing those policies.‖ B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 
987, 993 (Fla. 1994); see also Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 
925 (Fla. 1978) (stating that under the nondelegation doctrine, ―fundamental and 
primary policy decisions shall be made by members of the legislature‖).  
Therefore, even if the Governor has authority to execute compacts, its terms cannot 
contradict the state‘s public policy, as expressed in its laws. 
- 21 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  IGRA and the “Necessary Business” Clause  
The Governor argues that his authority to execute the Compact derives from 
article IV, section 1 of the Florida Constitution.  That provision states in part that 
―[t]he governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed . . . and transact 
all necessary business with the officers of government.‖  Art. IV, § 1(a), Fla. 
Const.  The Governor submits that the phrase ―transact all necessary business with 
the officers of government‖ includes negotiating with the Tribe and that he cannot 
ignore the federal directive to ―negotiate‖; therefore, negotiating the Compact was 
―necessary business‖ under IGRA. 
IGRA provides that a tribe seeking to offer Class III gaming must ―request 
[that] the State . . . enter into negotiations‖ for a compact and that the ―State shall 
negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith.‖  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).  The 
Governor is therefore correct that IGRA requires states to negotiate.  As other 
courts have recognized, however, nowhere does IGRA equate ―the state‖ with ―the 
governor.‖ See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75 n.17 (contrasting IGRA‘s 
―repeated[] refer[ences] exclusively to ‗the State‘‖ with other federal statutes 
directed at a state‘s governor and concluding that ―the duty imposed by the Act . . . 
is not of the sort likely to be performed by an individual state executive officer or 
even a group of officers‖); Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1029 (―IGRA uniformly 
addresses itself to ‗the State‘; not once does it impose duties or responsibilities on 
- 22 -
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a particular officer of the state (e.g., the governor, the legislature, etc.).‖).6 In 
addition, when a state fails to negotiate, a tribe must sue the state, not the governor. 
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at  74-75 (holding that Congress intended § 2710(d)(3) 
to be enforced against the state, not the governor); Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1029 
(―[T]hese suits are not against officials in an attempt to force them to follow 
federal law.‖). 
More importantly, a State‘s ―duty to negotiate‖ under IGRA cannot be 
enforced.  A state may avoid its duty, as Florida has effectively done, by asserting 
its immunity. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.  Therefore, although IGRA requires 
a state to negotiate, it does not impose any duty on a state‘s governor.  Moreover, 
IGRA does not prescribe the terms of a compact, see 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d), and it 
does not confer on the governor the authority to bind the state to a compact or act 
in contravention to state law.  In other words, IGRA does not grant a governor, or 
any state actor, any powers beyond those provided by the state‘s constitution and 
laws. See Clark, 904 P.2d at 26 (―We do not agree that Congress, in enacting the 
IGRA, sought to invest state governors with powers in excess of those that the 
governors possess under state law.‖). 
6.  IGRA contains a solitary reference to a state‘s governor—in an unrelated 
section addressing the Secretary‘s authority to permit gaming on specific lands. 
See 25 U.S.C. § 2719. Congress knew how to refer to a ―governor‖ when it 
wanted to do so. 
- 23 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We express no opinion on whether the ―necessary business‖ clause may ever  
grant the governor authority to bind the State to an IGRA compact.7 We do 
conclude, however, that the clause does not authorize the governor to execute 
compacts contrary to the expressed public policy of the state or to create 
exceptions to the law. Nor does it change our conclusion that ―the legislature‘s 
exclusive power encompasses questions of fundamental policy and the articulation 
of reasonably definite standards to be used in implementing those policies.‖ B.H., 
645 So. 2d at 993. 
We now discuss why, in authorizing conduct prohibited by state law, the 
Governor exceeded his authority. 
D.  The Compact Violates the Separation of Powers 
The House claims that the Compact violates the separation of powers on a 
number of grounds.8 We find one of them dispositive.  The Compact permits the 
7. We note that the Governor relies on Dewberry v. Kulongoski, 406 F. 
Supp. 2d 1136 (D. Or. 2005), in which Oregon citizens argued that the governor 
lacked authority to bind the state to an IGRA compact.  Despite dismissing the case 
on procedural grounds, the judge noted that a state constitutional provision 
conferring authority on the governor to ―transact all necessary business with the 
officers of government‖ authorized the governor to execute the gaming compact. 
Id. at 1154-55.  We do not find this dictum persuasive. Id. at 1142. 
8.  The House argues that the Compact significantly changes Florida law and 
policy in a number of ways: it authorizes Class III slot machines outside of 
Broward County; it allows blackjack and other banked card games that are 
currently illegal throughout Florida; it provides for collection of funds from tribal 
casinos for State purposes under a revenue-sharing agreement and penalizes the 
- 24 -
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                                                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tribe to conduct certain Class III gaming that is prohibited under Florida law.  
Therefore, the Compact violates the state‘s public policy about the types of 
gambling that should be allowed.  We hold that, whatever the Governor‘s authority 
to execute compacts, it does not extend so far.  The Governor does not have 
authority to agree to legalize in some parts of the state, or for some persons, 
conduct that is otherwise illegal throughout the state. 
We first discuss whether state laws in general, and gaming laws in 
particular, apply to Indian tribes.  We next discuss Florida law on gaming.  We 
then address the House‘s argument that IGRA prohibits compacts from expanding 
the gaming allowed under state law. Finally, we explain why the Governor lacked 
authority to bind the State to a compact, such as this one, that contradicts state law. 
1.  State Gaming Laws Apply to the Tribe 
Generally, state laws do not apply to tribal Indians on Indian reservations 
unless Congress so provides. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm‘n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 
164, 170 (1973).  Therefore, the extent to which a state may enforce its criminal 
State for any expansion of non-tribal gaming; it allows an exception to Florida‘s 
substantive right of access to public records for information dealing with Indian 
gaming; it changes the venue of litigation dealing with individual disputes with the 
tribal casinos; it sets procedures for tort remedies occurring in certain 
circumstances; it waives sovereign immunity to the extent that it creates 
enforceable contract rights between the State and the Tribe; and it establishes a 
regulatory mechanism to be undertaken by the Governor or his designee.  Because 
of our resolution of this case, we need not consider whether these other provisions 
encroach on the legislature‘s policy-making authority. 
- 25 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
laws on tribal land depends on federal authorization. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.  
Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 1981).  Congress has, however, conferred 
on the states the authority to assume jurisdiction over crimes committed on tribal 
land, see Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280 § 6, 67 Stat. 588, 590 (1953), and 
Florida has assumed such jurisdiction. See ch. 61-252, §§ 1-2, at 452-53, Laws of 
Fla. (codified at § 285.16, Fla. Stat. (2007)); see also § 285.16(2), Fla. Stat. (2007) 
(―The civil and criminal laws of Florida shall obtain on all Indian reservations in 
this state and shall be enforced in the same manner as elsewhere throughout the 
state.‖); Op. Att‘y Gen. Fla. 94-45 (1994) (discussing the state‘s jurisdiction over 
Indian reservations). The state‘s law is therefore enforceable on tribal lands to the 
extent it does not conflict with federal law. See Op. Att‘y Gen. Fla. 94-45 (1994); 
see also Hall v. State, 762 So. 2d 936, 936-38 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that the 
circuit court had jurisdiction over a vehicular homicide on an Indian reservation); 
State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d 889, 892-95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (holding that a 
Seminole Indian was properly charged under state criminal law with killing a 
Florida panther on tribal land).  In regard to gambling in particular, federal law 
provides that, except as provided in a tribal-state compact, state gambling laws 
apply on tribal lands. See 18 U.S.C. § 1166(a) (2000). 
- 26 -
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Based on these state and federal provisions, what is legal in Florida is legal  
on tribal lands, and what is illegal in Florida is illegal there.  Absent a compact, 
any gambling prohibited in the state is prohibited on tribal land. 
2.  Florida’s Gaming Laws 
It is undisputed that Florida permits limited forms of Class III gaming.  The 
state‘s constitution authorizes the state lottery, which offers various Class III 
games, and now permits slot machines in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties. See 
art. X, §§ 7, 15, Fla. Const.  For a long time, the State also has regulated pari­
mutuel wagering—for example, on dog and horse racing. See ch. 550, Fla. Stat. 
(2007) (governing pari-mutuel wagering). 
It is also undisputed, however, that the State prohibits all other types of 
Class III gaming, including lotteries not sponsored by the State and slot machines 
outside Miami-Dade and Broward Counties.  Florida law distinguishes between 
nonbanked (Class II) card games and banked (Class III) card games.9 A ―banking 
game‖ is one ―in which the house is a participant in the game, taking on players, 
9. Chapter 849, Florida Statutes (2007), regulates most gaming.  It prohibits 
playing ―any game at cards, keno, roulette, faro or other game of chance, at any 
place, by any device whatever, for money or other thing of value,‖ designating it a 
second-degree misdemeanor. § 849.08, Fla. Stat. (2007).  Certain ―penny-ante 
games‖ are exempted when ―conducted strictly in accordance‖ with the law. 
§ 849.085, Fla. Stat. (2007) (―‗Penny-ante game‘ means a game or series of games 
of poker, pinochle, bridge, rummy, canasta, hearts, dominoes, or mah-jongg in 
which the winnings of any player in a single round, hand, or game do not exceed 
$10 in value.‖). 
- 27 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
paying winners, and collecting from losers or in which the cardroom establishes a  
bank against which participants play.‖  § 849.086(2)(b); see § 849.086(1), Fla. 
Stat. (deeming banked games to be ―casino gaming‖).  Florida law authorizes 
cardrooms at pari-mutuel facilities for games of ―poker or dominoes,‖ but only if 
they are played ―in a nonbanking manner.‖ § 849.086(2), Fla. Stat.; see 
§ 849.086(1)-(3).  Florida law prohibits banked card games, however. See 
§ 849.086(12)(a), (15)(a).  Blackjack, baccarat, and chemin de fer are banked card 
games.  They are therefore illegal in Florida. 
3.  Does IGRA Permit Compacts to Expand Gaming? 
Contrary to Florida law, the Compact allows banked card games such as 
blackjack, baccarat, and chemin de fer.  The House argues that the Compact 
therefore violates IGRA itself, which permits Class III gaming only if the state 
―permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity.‖ 25 
U.S.C. 2710(d)(1).  The Governor, on the other hand, contends that, once state law 
permits any Class III gaming, a compact may allow all Class III gaming. 
The meaning of the phrase ―permits such gaming‖ has been heavily litigated. 
The question is whether, when state law permits some Class III games to be 
played, a tribe must be permitted to conduct only those particular games or all 
Class III games. See Kathryn R. L. Rand, Caught in the Middle: How State 
Politics, State Law, and State Courts Constrain Tribal Influence Over Indian 
- 28 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gaming, 90 Marq. L. Rev. 971, 983 (2007) (citing cases).  The Secretary‘s  
interpretation of this provision supports the House‘s argument. See Class III 
Gaming Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. 3289, 3293 (Jan. 22, 1998) (Proposed Rules) 
(―IGRA thus makes it unlawful for Tribes to operate particular Class III games that 
State law completely and affirmatively prohibits.‖). So do a majority of federal 
courts. See, e.g., Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 
1250, 1258 (9th Cir. 1994) (―[A] state need only allow Indian tribes to operate 
games that others can operate, but need not give tribes what others cannot have.‖); 
see also Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 279 (8th Cir. 
1993) (stating that IGRA ―does not require the state to negotiate with respect to 
forms of gaming it does not presently permit‖); but see Lac du Flambeau Band of 
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 F. Supp. 480, 486 (W.D. Wis. 
1991) (―Congress did not intend the term ‗permits such gaming‘ to limit the tribes 
to the specific types of gaming activity actually in operation in a state.‖). Our 
Attorney General has agreed with the majority interpretation. See Op. Att‘y Gen. 
Fla. 2007-36 at 3 (2007) (―[I]n light of the greater weight of federal case law and 
the Department of the Interior‘s interpretation of IGRA, Class III gaming activities 
subject to mandatory negotiations between a state and an Indian tribe do not 
include those specifically prohibited by state law.‖). 
- 29 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Whether the Compact violates IGRA, however, is a question we need not 
and do not resolve. Given our narrow scope of review on a writ of quo warranto, 
the issue here is only whether the Florida Constitution grants the Governor the 
authority to unilaterally bind the State to a compact that violates public policy. We 
conclude that even if the Governor is correct that IGRA permits the expansion of 
gaming on tribal lands beyond what state law permits, such an agreement 
represents a significant change in Florida‘s public policy.  It is therefore precisely 
the type of action particularly within the Legislature‘s power. We now discuss that 
issue. 
4.  The Compact Violates Florida’s Public Policy on Gaming 
Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution prohibits the executive 
branch from usurping the powers of another branch.  Enacting laws—and 
especially criminal laws—is quintessentially a legislative function. See State v. 
Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 433 (Fla. 1972) (―The lawmaking function is the chief 
legislative power.‖).  By authorizing the Tribe to conduct ―banked card games‖ 
that are illegal throughout Florida—and thus illegal for the Tribe—the Compact 
violates Florida law. See Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 
264 (Fla. 1991) (―This Court has repeatedly held that, under the doctrine of 
separation of powers, the legislature may not delegate the power to enact laws or to 
declare what the law shall be to any other branch.‖). The Governor‘s action 
- 30 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
therefore encroaches on the legislative function and was beyond his authority. Nor  
does it matter that the Compact is a contract between the State and the Tribe. 
Neither the Governor nor anyone else in the executive branch has the authority to 
execute a contract that violates state criminal law. Cf. Local No. 234, United 
Assoc. of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry v. 
Henley & Beckwith, Inc., 66 So. 2d 818, 821 (Fla. 1953) (―[A]n agreement that is 
violative of a provision of a constitution or a valid statute, or an agreement which 
cannot be performed without violating such a constitutional or statutory provision, 
is illegal and void.‖); City of Miami v. Benson, 63 So. 2d 916, 923 (Fla. 1953) 
(―The contract in question, that is, the acceptance by the City of the proposal made 
by its agent, employee or advisor, to purchase the bonds, is contrary to public 
policy and is, therefore, void.‖). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the Governor‘s execution of a compact authorizing types 
of gaming that are prohibited under Florida law violates the separation of powers. 
The Governor has no authority to change or amend state law.  Such power falls 
exclusively to the Legislature.  Therefore, we hold that the Governor lacked 
authority to bind the State to a compact that violates Florida law as this compact 
does.  We need not resolve the broader issue of whether the Governor ever has the 
authority to execute compacts without either the Legislature‘s prior authorization 
- 31 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
or, at least, its subsequent ratification. Because we believe the parties will fully  
comply with the dictates of this opinion, we grant the petition but withhold 
issuance of the writ. 
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, C.J., concurs in result only.  
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only with an opinion.  
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND  
IF FILED, DETERMINED.  
LEWIS, J., concurring in result only.  
I concur in result only based upon two aspects of the majority opinion which 
cause concern.  First, I would conclude that the majority‘s analysis and discussion 
with regard to the Governor‘s power to enter into a compact is overly restrictive. 
Second, I question whether the writ of quo warranto is the appropriate remedy for 
the relief the majority grants today. 
10
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNOR
I cannot agree with the analysis of the majority, which is unduly restrictive 
with regard to the constitutional powers of the Governor as the chief executive 
10.  Since the majority assumes that we possess quo warranto jurisdiction, I 
address the merits of this case; however, I am concerned that we may lack quo 
warranto jurisdiction to address the issue as reframed by the majority. 
- 32 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
officer of the State of Florida.  The general thrust of the majority opinion indicates 
that the ―necessary business‖ clause of article IV, section 1(a) of the Florida 
Constitution does not authorize the Governor to bind the State to an IGRA 
compact, and the opinion relies upon foreign cases which suggest similar 
limitations upon the actions of governors in other jurisdictions.  I disagree and 
instead conclude that, if the Compact had not granted and authorized certain types 
of Class III gaming that are specifically prohibited by state law, the Governor 
would have been authorized—pursuant to the necessary-business clause—to enter 
into a compact on behalf of the State without either legislative authorization or 
ratification under the circumstances presented by the instant case. See Dewberry 
v. Kulongoski, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1154 (D. Or. 2005) (determining that the 
execution of a gaming compact was ―necessary business‖ that the governor was 
authorized to transact under an identical constitutional provision).  To the extent 
the majority suggests otherwise, I disagree. 
While I agree that the Governor may not bind the State to a compact that 
specifically conflicts with existing state law, in my view the constitutional 
provision does afford the Governor a field of operation to enter into a binding 
compact under circumstances in which the other branches of government have 
ignored a problem or neglected to act and have thereby created a void by 
governmental inaction or a total vacuum in an area that will likely create or 
- 33 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
produce a negative impact for Florida and the citizens of this State.  This power is  
particularly applicable when that void or vacuum has existed with regard to a 
known problem or issue for an extensive period of time and adverse consequences 
are reasonably imminent.  Here, despite the fact that this gaming issue existed and 
the Tribe actively sought to negotiate resolution in a compact for almost sixteen 
years, the Legislature—having full access to the information and issues—did not 
act.  In an effort to protect Florida and the citizens of this State from the results of 
the federal Department‘s clear statement that it would issue Class III gaming 
procedures (under which the State would receive no revenue and possess no 
control over the Tribe‘s gaming operations) and the pending legal action, the 
Governor negotiated a compact.  Under these imminent circumstances, the 
Governor‘s action constituted ―necessary business,‖ which that office was required 
to address in an attempt to protect the public interest.  To hold otherwise would 
strip the necessary-business clause of any meaningful field of operation. See 
Broward County v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 480 So. 2d 631, 633 (Fla. 1985) (―[A] 
construction of the constitution which renders superfluous, meaningless or 
inoperative any of its provisions should not be adopted by the courts.‖). 
In my view, the Governor generally possesses the authority to act under a 
broad range of circumstances where the failure of the other branches of 
government to act for an extended period of time imminently threatens harm.  This 
- 34 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                          
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
may conceivably address matters such as the quality of life, health, or welfare of  
the citizens of Florida.  For example, an emergency that threatens imminent harm 
to the quality of air or water in Florida may constitute ―necessary business‖ for the 
Governor depending on the circumstances presented. Further, the Governor is 
bound by our state Constitution to ―take care that the laws be faithfully executed.‖ 
Art. IV, § 1(a), Fla. Const. In my view, this duty includes the negotiation of inter-
sovereign compacts that (1) are consistent with preexisting state law and (2) further 
the interests of the State of Florida.11 These constitutional provisions should be 
11.  Through the IGRA, Congress neither claims to—nor may it—determine 
who possesses the power to act on behalf of the State of Florida. The State is not 
an independent sentient being—it may only act through its officers.  The fact that 
the IGRA consistently refers to ―the State‖ when addressing the negotiation of 
compacts, does not foreclose state law from enabling the Governor to so negotiate. 
The issue of who may act on behalf of the State of Florida is an issue of state law, 
not federal law.  Therefore, interpretation of the IGRA‘s use of the noun ―the 
State‖ is not a proper means of determining whether the Governor may negotiate 
and consummate inter-sovereign compacts under the necessary-business clause of 
the Florida Constitution. See art.  IV, § 1(a), Fla. Const. Compare Dewberry, 406 
F. Supp. 2d at 1154-55 (finding that the governor was a proper state officer to 
negotiate and execute an IGRA inter-sovereign compact pursuant to the necessary-
business clause of the Oregon constitution), Langley v. Edwards, 872 F. Supp. 
1531, 1535 (W.D. La. 1995) (―IGRA does not specify which branch of state 
government should negotiate with the Indian Tribe.‖ (emphasis supplied)), aff‘d, 
77 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 1996), and Willis v. Fordice, 850 F. Supp. 523, 527 (S.D. 
Miss. 1994) (―One issue which the IGRA does not address, and which is the 
ultimate issue in this case, is which branch of a state government should negotiate 
the Tribal-State compact with the Indian tribe.‖ (emphasis supplied)), aff‘d, 55 
F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1995), with majority op. at 22-23 & n.5 (―[N]owhere does IGRA 
equate ‗the state‘ with ‗the governor. . . .‘ [A]lthough IGRA requires a state to 
negotiate, it does not impose any duty on a state‘s governor. . . .  Congress knew 
how to refer to a ‗governor‘ when it wanted to do so.‖). 
- 35 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
interpreted to afford the Governor the power and authority to negotiate with  
another sovereign concerning those issues that significantly impact this State and 
the general well-being of the State even without legislative authorization or 
ratification under certain circumstances.12 
QUO WARRANTO 
I have concerns with the manner in which the majority has framed the issue 
presented by this case because it appears to expand the writ of quo warranto to 
circumstances in which it was never intended to apply. Historically, this Court has 
interpreted the writ of quo warranto as a means to challenge the authority or power 
of a public officer or agency to act in an official capacity. See, e.g., Martinez v. 
Martinez, 545 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. 1989) (challenge to the constitutional 
authority of the Governor to call more than one legislative special session); State 
ex rel. Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So. 2d 404, 406 (Fla. 1998) (challenge to the 
authority of capital collateral regional counsel to file extraneous actions); State ex 
rel. Smith v. Jorandby, 498 So. 2d 948, 950 (Fla. 1986) (challenge to the authority 
of public defenders to file actions that do not address an indigent defendant‘s 
liberty interest); State ex rel. Smith v. Brummer, 443 So. 2d 957, 958-59 (Fla. 
1984) (challenge to the authority of the public defender to accept appointment 
12.  However, such negotiations and the compacts they produce are subject 
to the dictates of article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution. 
- 36 ­
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
from federal court to represent defendants during federal habeas-corpus  
proceedings); Austin v. State ex rel. Christian, 310 So. 2d 289, 291 (Fla. 1975) 
(challenge to the Governor‘s authority to assign state attorneys to other circuits). 
The writ compels a public officer or agency to establish the authority by which it 
takes official action. See, e.g., State ex rel. Watson v. City of Holly Hill, 46 So. 2d 
498, 499 (Fla. 1950) (challenge to the power of a city to levy and collect taxes on 
lands).  Most recently, we have explained: 
Quo warranto is ―[a] common-law writ used to inquire into the 
authority by which a public office is held or a franchise is claimed.‖ 
Black‘s Law Dictionary 1285 (8th ed. 2004).  It is the proper vehicle 
to challenge the ―power and authority‖ of a constitutional officer, such 
as the Governor. Austin v. State ex rel. Christian, 310 So. 2d 289, 290 
(Fla. 1975). 
Crist v. Fla. Ass‘n of Crim. Defense Lawyers, 978 So. 2d 134, 138 n.3 (Fla. 2008). 
A number of other jurisdictions have noted that quo warranto is available to 
address whether a public official is vested with a power under statutory or 
constitutional law, rather than (1) how that officer exercises those powers which 
have been granted or (2) the details surrounding such action. See, e.g., State ex 
rel. Johnson v. Consumers Pub. Power Dist., 10 N.W.2d 784, 793-94 (Neb. 1943) 
(―The general rule is that quo warranto will not lie for a mere irregular exercise of 
a conferred power although such irregularity may be sufficient when tested by 
other remedies to vitiate or render void the act done. If the power attaches the 
manner of its exercise cannot be challenged by information in quo warranto.‖ 
- 37 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
(emphasis supplied)); State ex rel. Lommen v. Gravlin, 295 N.W. 654, 655 (Minn.  
1941) (quo warranto is improper as a remedy for official misconduct and cannot be 
employed to test the legality of the official action of public or corporate officers 
where the underlying power or authority to act exists); State ex rel. McKittrick v. 
Murphy, 148 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Mo. 1941) (noting that the writ of quo warranto ―is 
not to be used to prevent an improper exercise of power lawfully possessed‖); 
Mora v. Genova, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2258, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 1998) 
(unpublished decision) (―Quo warranto is not the proper proceeding to test the 
Constitutional legality of the official acts of public officers.‖ (emphasis supplied) 
(citing People ex rel. Chillicothe Township v. Bd. of Review of Peoria County, 167 
N.E.2d 553, 553 (Ill. 1960); City of Highwood v. Obenberger, 605 N.E.2d 1079, 
1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 612 N.E.2d 511 (Ill. 1993))). 
The United States Supreme Court has similarly observed that a quo warranto 
action ―must be brought against the person who is charged with exercising an 
office or authority without lawful right,‖ and that ―[t]he possession of power is one 
thing; the propriety of its exercise in particular circumstances is quite a different 
thing.‖ Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 502, 504 (1933) (emphasis 
supplied).  A relevant treatise outlines that the claims of public officers to 
particular powers can be tested in quo warranto, although it is not available to 
question the validity of acts within that power. See 2 Chester J. Antieau, The 
- 38 -
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Practice of Extraordinary Remedies: Habeas Corpus and the Other Common Law  
Writs § 4.03, at 593, § 4.34, at 663 (1987); see also 43 Fla. Jur. 2d Quo Warranto § 
18 (―Quo warranto cannot be used to test the legality of official actions of public or 
corporate officers.‖). 
Based upon consideration of these proceedings, I have questions with regard 
to whether we act with proper jurisdiction.  If, as I believe, the Governor possesses 
the authority and power to negotiate and enter into inter-sovereign compacts and 
has simply invalidly exercised that authority because there is a contractual term 
that violates preexisting state law (i.e., the ban on certain types of Class III 
gaming), it is most questionable whether quo warranto constitutes a proper 
procedural mechanism to challenge the Governor‘s actions.  Within the context of 
a petitioner‘s challenge to the authority of a state officer or agency to act, this 
Court should only grant a writ of quo warranto where the officer or agency lacks 
the authority to act, not where the officer or agency has improperly exercised its 
authority.  Other remedies exist and are appropriate under such circumstances.13 
13.  A more appropriate remedy to challenge an allegedly erroneous or 
legally invalid decision of the Governor or an agency in an authorized capacity 
could be a declaratory-judgment action.  The purpose of such an action is ―to 
afford relief from insecurity and uncertainty with respect to rights, status, and other 
equitable or legal relations, and it should be liberally construed.‖ Martinez v. 
Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 1991) (emphasis supplied) (citing § 86.101, 
Fla. Stat. (1989)).  For example, litigants have used declaratory-judgment actions 
to challenge the validity of statutes. See id.; see also N. Fla. Women‘s Health & 
Counseling Servs. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 615 (Fla. 2003) (clinics providing 
- 39 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
                                                                                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
If not so limited, the door has been opened in this Court for judicial examination 
and questioning of the details of the exercise of that valid power. 
In this sense, the common-law writ of quo warranto is analogous to the writ 
of prohibition (and arguably other extraordinary writs) in that its application should 
be greatly limited.  This Court has held that the writ of prohibition is intended to be 
―very narrow in scope, to be employed with great caution and utilized only in 
emergencies.‖ English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 1977) (emphasis 
supplied).  Further, ―[p]rohibition lies to prevent an inferior tribunal from acting in 
excess of jurisdiction but not to prevent an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.‖ 
Mandico v. Taos Constr., 605 So. 2d 850, 854 (Fla. 1992) (emphasis supplied). 
Quo warranto is also an extraordinary writ, and therefore the strict interpretation 
applicable to the writ of prohibition is similarly applicable to this prerogative 
remedy. 
abortion services and women‘s rights organizations sought declaratory judgment 
that Parental Notice of Abortion Act was unconstitutional).  Further, declaratory-
judgment actions have been utilized to challenge executive orders issued by the 
Governor. See Bass v. Askew, 342 So. 2d 145, 146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (county 
commissioner sought declaration that executive order of suspension by the 
Governor was insufficient and Governor lacked the right to amend the order of 
suspension).  Under each circumstance, the plaintiffs challenged the legal 
correctness of the relevant law or executive order, rather than the authority of 
either the Legislature to enact the law or the Governor to issue the executive order. 
Since the majority does not address the question of whether the Governor may 
enter into a compact, this appears to be a case in which we have chosen to address 
the legal correctness of the Governor‘s action instead of his ultimate authority to 
negotiate and enter into inter-sovereign compacts on behalf of the State. 
- 40 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this case, the House of Representatives and Speaker Rubio clearly  
understood these limitations upon the writ of quo warranto because they expressly 
and precisely framed their challenge as whether the Governor possesses the 
authority vel non to negotiate and enter into any Indian-gaming compact without 
legislative approval or ratification. See Pet. at 6, 28-29 (requesting that this Court 
―issue a Writ of Quo Warranto to direct the Respondent to justify his authority to 
bind the State in a Compact with the Seminole Tribe without legislative 
authorization or ratification, and to issue any order necessary to clarify that the 
Compact is not binding and enforceable unless and until it is ratified by the 
Legislature‖ and ―issue a Writ of Quo Warranto declaring that legislative 
authorization or ratification is necessary for any compact governing gaming on 
Indian lands to be valid in this State.‖ (emphasis supplied)).  Thus, the House and 
Speaker Rubio challenged the constitutional authority of the Governor to bind the 
State of Florida to any Indian-gaming compact in the absence of legislative 
approval or ratification. 
In contrast, the majority today reframes the issue as whether the Florida 
Constitution grants the Governor the authority to bind the State to this Compact, 
see majority op. at 30, and then relies upon discrete details of this specific 
Compact to redefine the proffered claim and issue.  The majority focuses entirely 
upon the unlawful nature of one aspect of the Compact rather than addressing the 
- 41 -
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
question of whether the Governor possesses the authority to bind the State to any  
IGRA compact without the approval or ratification of the Legislature.  In essence, 
the majority has created an as-applied constitutional challenge to the specific 
details of this Compact, thereby avoiding the jurisdictionally based question of 
whether the Governor possesses the power and authority to enter into any Indian-
gaming compact in the absence of legislative endorsement.  I do acknowledge 
application of the principle of deciding the case as narrowly as possible, but that 
detail-based analysis opens expanded quo warranto jurisdictional issues. 
A question arises with regard to whether the rephrasing of the issue by the 
majority, along with its resulting decision, has altered this Court‘s quo warranto 
jurisdiction and expanded the writ beyond its intended purpose of determining 
whether the Governor or other state officers and agencies possess the authority or 
power to act vel non.  The majority approaches the position that our quo warranto 
jurisdiction, and the writ itself, constitute a proper means of challenging either (1) 
the details surrounding an exercise of authority, or (2) alleged errors in official 
judgment.  However, in circumstances such as these, the proper function of the 
writ is to provide the petitioner with the ability to challenge the state officer‘s 
authority to act without regard to the question of whether the officer properly 
exercised the authority he or she possesses. Even the cases the majority relies 
upon in response to my concern involve challenges to the authority of a 
- 42 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
government official or entity to act, not the details or merits of the matters within 
the action taken. See Martinez, 545 So. 2d at 1338 (challenging the authority of 
the Governor to call more than one special session to discuss the same subject, not 
the propriety or the wisdom of the subject); Phelps, 714 So. 2d at 455 (challenging 
the authority of the Legislature to override a veto, not the merits of the decision to 
override).14 
The restructuring of the issue presented by the House and Speaker Rubio 
causes concern that dissatisfied individuals or entities may seek quo warranto relief 
whenever a public official or agency acts in a manner which is perceived to be 
unwise or erroneous.  This has never been the objective of the extraordinary writ of 
quo warranto.  Interpreting the writ and affording relief in such a manner leads to 
the establishment of the writ as a routine avenue through which challenges to 
allegedly erroneous official acts or judgments may be presented, rather than a 
14. In Orange County v. City of Orlando, 327 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1976), the 
district court decision reviewed by this Court on the basis of express and direct 
conflict involved a challenge by Orange County to the annexation of property by 
the City of Orlando. See City of Orlando v. Orange County, 309 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 
4th DCA 1975).  The Fourth District expressly noted that ―[t]he proper method of 
seeking relief where a municipality has undertaken to exercise jurisdiction or 
control over land should be through a quo warranto proceeding.‖  Id. at 16-17 
(quoting Caldwell v. Losche, 108 So. 2d 295, 296 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)). However, 
this Court may only issue writs of quo warranto to state officers and state agencies. 
See Art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.  Since the availability of the writ in the district 
and circuit courts is not similarly limited, see article V, section 4(b)(3), 5(b), 
Florida Constitution, the reliance of the majority on Orange County to justify its 
conclusion that quo warranto review is proper here is dubious at best. 
- 43 -
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
means through which the threshold question of whether the officer possesses the  
power to act is presented.  I am concerned that the majority has altered the nature 
of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto when it applies this remedy to address 
the details of the actions of the Governor or the Legislature, as opposed to 
addressing the actual jurisdictionally based question of whether the Governor or 
the Legislature possesses the authority to act with regard to the challenge 
presented. Cf. O‘Donnell‘s Corp. v. Ambroise, 858 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2003) (Sawaya, J., specially concurring) (―[T]o allow the use of prohibition 
in the instant case would, in my view, completely vitiate the limitations placed 
upon use of the writ and convert it from an extraordinary writ to a commonly used 
method to appeal any erroneous order.‖). I am concerned with such a reinvention 
of the writ of quo warranto.  The majority may protest that it has not done so, but 
its actions undermine those words.  Simply saying it does not make it so, and the 
decisions upon which it relies do not support the statement. 
If a court reframes the proceeding as an action challenging the legal 
correctness of the action of a state officer or agency, rather than the power and 
authority of the officer or agency to act, the proper procedural device is arguably a 
declaratory-judgment action, not a petition for writ of quo warranto. See supra 
- 44 -
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
note 13.15 Moreover, this Court generally lacks original jurisdiction to consider 
declaratory-judgment actions.  The circuit and county courts are usually the proper 
forums in which to seek declaratory relief. Compare art. V, § 3, Fla. Const., with § 
86.011, Fla. Stat. (2007); but see art. III, § 16(c), Fla. Const. (providing for original 
declaratory-judgment actions in this Court with regard to legislative-apportionment 
resolutions). 
CONCLUSION 
The jurisdictionally based question framed by the House and Speaker Rubio 
should be answered.  The Governor possesses the authority under the Florida 
Constitution to enter into Indian-gaming compacts.  Here, however, he erroneously 
exercised that authority because the Compact impermissibly included authorization 
of Class III gaming specifically prohibited under state law.  It is undisputed that the 
Legislature has acted in this area, and for this reason, I concur in the result of the 
majority.  However, I disagree with the overly restrictive suggestion of the 
majority and generally conclude that where inaction by the other branches of 
government for an extended period of time has produced a vacuum under 
circumstances such as these, the Governor is constitutionally authorized to act 
15.  The majority claims that the urgency of the instant situation mandates 
that we resolve this dispute by way of quo warranto.  However, we should not 
permit parties to define this Court‘s jurisdiction by generating a false emergency. 
This issue of a compact with the Seminole Tribe has been known for sixteen years. 
What the majority fails to recognize is that the Legislature created the urgency 
when it failed to act during those years. 
- 45 -
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
under the necessary-business clause to protect the well-being of the State of 
Florida. 
Original Proceeding – Quo Warranto 
Jeremiah H. Hawkes, General Counsel, Florida House of Representatives, 
Tallahassee, Florida, and Jon L. Mills and Timothy McLendon, Gainesville, 
Florida, 
for Petitioners 
Christopher M. Kise and James A. McKee of Foley and Lardner, Tallahassee, 
Florida, and Paul C. Huck, Jr., General Counsel, Gerald B. Curington, Deputy 
General Counsel, and Erick M. Figlio, Assistant General Counsel, Executive 
Office of the Governor, Tallahassee, Florida, 
for Petitioner, Charles J. Crist, Jr., in his capacity as Governor of Florida 
Barry S. Richard and Glenn T. Burhans, Jr. of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., 
Tallahassee, Florida, and Jerry C. Straus, F. Michael Willis, and Joseph H. Webster 
of Hobbs, Straus, Dean, and Walker, LLP, Washington, DC, 
for Petitioner, The Seminole Tribe of Florida 
Jason Vail, Special Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of The Florida Senate; 
Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Marc W. Dunbar, and Brandice D. Dickson of Pennington, 
Moore, Wilkinson, Bell, and Dunbar, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of 
Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc.;  and Andre McKenney and David Jove, 
Hallandale Beach, Florida, on behalf of City of Hallandale Beach, 
as Amici Curiae 
- 46 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPACT BETWEEN THE SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA  
AND THE STATE OF FLORIDA  
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
Page 
Part I.  
Title
 
1 
 
Part
 
II.  
Recitals
 
1
 
 
Part
 
III.
 Definitions
 
3
 
 
Part IV. 
Authorization and Location of Covered Games 
7  
Part V. 
Rules and Regulations; Minimum Requirements for Operations 
8  
Part VI. 
Patron Disputes, Tort Claims; Prize Claims; Limited 
15  
Consent to Suit  
Part VII. 
Enforcement of Compact Provisions 
17  
Part VIII. 
State Monitoring of Compact 
19  
Part
 
IX.
 
Jurisdiction
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23
 
 
Part
 
X.  
Licensing
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23
 
 
Part XI. 
Payments to the State of Florida 
23  
Part XII. 
Reduction of Tribal Payments Because of Loss of 
25  
   Exclusivity or Other Changes in Florida Law  
Part XIII. 
Dispute Resolution 
28 
 
Part XIV. 
Construction of Compact; Severance; Federal Approval 
31  
Part
 
XV.
 
Notices
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33
 
 
Part XVI. 
Effective Date and Term
 
34 
 
Part XVII. 
Amendment of Compact and Appendices 
34  
Part XVIII. 
Miscellaneous 
34 
 
Part
 
XIX.
 
Execution
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37
 
 
 
 
   
Compact Between the Seminole Tribe of Florida 
and the State of Florida  
This Compact is made and entered into by and between the Seminole Tribe of 
Florida, a federally recognized Indian Tribe ("Tribe"), and the State of Florida ("State"), 
with respect to the operation of Covered Games (as defined herein) on the Tribe's Indian 
lands as defined by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 25; U.S.C. Section 2701, et seq. 
("IGRA"). 
Part I. TITLE 
This document shall be referred to as the "Seminole Tribe of Florida and State of 
Florida Gaming Compact." 
Part II. RECITALS 
A. 
The Tribe is a federally recognized tribal government possessing 
sovereign powers and rights of self-government. 
B. 
The State is a state of the United States of America possessing the 
sovereign powers and rights of a state. 
C. 
The Governor of Florida is the chief executive officer of the State and has 
authority to act for the State with respect to the negotiation and execution of this 
Compact.    
D. 
The State and the Tribe maintain a government-to-government 
relationship. 
E. 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the right of an 
Indian Tribe to regulate activity on lands within its jurisdiction, but the IGRA gives states 
a role in the conduct of tribal gaming in accordance with negotiated tribal-state compacts. 
  
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 2 
F. 
The Tribe desires to offer the play of Covered Games, as defined in Part 
III of this Compact, as a means of generating revenues for purposes authorized by the 
IGRA, including without limitation the support of tribal governmental programs, such as 
health care, housing, sewer and water projects, police, fire suppression, general assistance 
for tribal elders, day care for children, economic development, educational opportunities, 
per capita payments to tribal members and other typical and valuable governmental 
services and programs for tribal members. 
G. 
The State has been directed by the federal government to enter into 
compact negotiations, with the alternative being the issuance of procedures by the U.S. 
Department of Interior. The Department of Interior has already circulated proposed 
procedures that would allow the Tribe to operate Class III gaming, including unlimited 
slot machines, at all of its current locations without the State receiving any revenue or 
ability to ensure consumer protection.  The Governor therefore believes that it is in the 
best interests of the State to enter into a Compact with the Tribe, rather than be subjected 
to federally authorized gambling as set forth in the proposed procedures. 
H. 
The State recognizes that the positive effects of this Compact will 
generally benefit all of Florida, by increased tourism, local spending, job growth and 
related economic development activities.  The State also recognizes that the significant 
revenue participation pursuant to the Compact in exchange for its exclusivity provisions 
provide an opportunity to increase and enhance the dollars available to spend on 
governmental programs that benefit the citizens of Florida, such as the education of 
Florida's children. 
  
 
 
  
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 3 
Part III. DEFINITIONS 
As used in this Compact and the Appendices thereto: 
A. 
"Annual Oversight Assessment" means the assessment described in Part 
XI., Section C of this Compact. 
B. 
"Class III gaming" means the forms of Class III gaming defined in 25 
U.S.C. § 2703(8) and by the regulations of the National Indian Gaming Commission. 
C. 
"Commission" means the Seminole Tribal Gaming Commission, which is 
the tribal governmental agency that has the authority to carry out the Tribe's regulatory 
and oversight responsibilities under this Compact; 
D. 
"Compact" means this Seminole Tribe of Florida and State of Florida 
Gaming Compact; 
E. 
"Covered Game" or "Covered Gaming Activity" means the following 
Class III gaming activities: 
1. 
(a) Slot machines, meaning any mechanical or electrical 
contrivance, terminal that may or may not be capable of downloading slot 
games from a central server system, machine, or other device that, upon 
insertion of a coin, bill, ticket, token, or similar object or upon payment of 
any consideration whatsoever, including the use of any electronic payment 
system, except a credit card or debit card, is available to play or operate, 
the play or operation of which, whether by reason of skill or application of 
the element of chance or both, may deliver or entitle the person or persons 
playing or operating the contrivance, terminal, machine, or other device to 
receive cash, billets, tickets, tokens, or electronic credits to be exchanged 
     
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
Seminole Compact  
Page 4 
for cash or to receive merchandise or anything of value whatsoever, 
whether the payoff is made automatically from the machine or manually. 
The term includes associated equipment necessary to conduct the 
operation of the contrivance, terminal, machine, or other device.  Slot 
machines may use spinning reels, video displays, or both.  
(b) If at any time, State law authorizes the use of electronic 
payments systems utilizing credit or debit card payment for the play or 
operation of slot machines for any person, the Tribe shall be authorized to 
use such payment systems.   
2. 
Any banking or banked card game, including baccarat, chemin de fer, and 
blackjack (21);  
3. 
High stakes poker games, as provided in Part V., Section L;   
and  
4. 
Any devices or games that are authorized under State law to the Florida 
State Lottery, provided that the Tribe will not offer such games through the 
Internet unless others in the State are permitted to do so. 
5. 
Any new game authorized by Florida law for any person for any purpose.  
Except as provided in Section 5 above, nothing in this definition provides the 
Tribe the ability to conduct roulette, craps, roulette-styled games, or craps-styled games; 
however, nothing herein is intended to prohibit the Tribe from operating slot machines 
that employ video displays of roulette, wheels or other table game themes.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 5 
F. 
"Covered Game Employee" or "Covered Employee" means any individual 
employed and licensed by the Tribe whose responsibilities include the rendering of 
services with respect to the operation, maintenance or management of Covered Games, 
including, but not limited to, the following:  managers and assistant managers; accounting 
personnel; Commission officers; surveillance and security personnel; cashiers, 
supervisors, and floor personnel; cage personnel; and any other employee whose 
employment duties require or authorize access to areas of the Facility related to the 
conduct of Covered Games or the technical support or storage of Covered Game 
components.  This shall not apply to the Tribe's elected officials provided that such 
individuals are not directly involved in the operation, maintenance, or management of 
Covered Games or Covered Games components;   
G. 
"Documents" means books, records, electronic, magnetic and computer 
media documents and other writings and materials, copies thereof, and information 
contained therein; 
H. 
"Effective Date" means the date on which the Compact becomes effective 
pursuant to Part XVI.A. of this Compact; 
I. 
"Facility" or "Facilities" means any building of the Tribe in which the 
Covered Games authorized by this Compact are conducted on Indian lands as defined by 
the IGRA. Subject to the terms of this Compact, the Tribe shall have the ultimate 
responsibility for ensuring that the operation of each Facility conforms to the Compact as 
required herein; 
  
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 6 
J. 
"Guaranteed Minimum Payment" means the minimum Payment the Tribe 
agrees to make to the State as provided by Part XI of the Compact; 
K. 
"IGRA" means the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. 100-497, Oct. 
17, 1988, 102 Stat. 2467, codified at 25 U.S.C. Section 2701 et seq. and 18 U.S.C. 
Sections 1166 to 1168; 
L. 
"Net Poker Income" means the total revenue from all hands played, 
including buy-ins and rebuys, less overhead and operating costs.  Operating costs include, 
but are not limited to, all tournament prizes, amenities, gifts, advertising, comps, labor, 
surveillance, television production and, rooms, food and beverage provided to celebrities 
and previously rated players as part of a tournament. 
M. 
"Net Win" means the total receipts from the play of all Covered Games 
less all prize payouts and participation fees. 
N. 
"Participation fees" means payments made to suppliers on a periodic basis 
by the Tribe for the right to lease or otherwise offer for play gaming devices that the 
Tribe does not own. Participation fees can be royalty payments, or lease payments.  The 
Tribe assures that it holds no current interest in any company that supplies gaming 
devices and that if it acquires such an interest in the future, that it will forego the 
deduction of such fees with respect to that supplier in which it holds an interest. 
O. 
"Patron" means any person who is on the premises of a Facility, or who is 
entering the Tribe's Indian lands for the purpose of playing Covered Games authorized by 
this Compact; 
P. 
"Revenue Share" means the periodic payment by the Tribe to the State 
provided for in Part XI of this Compact; 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 7 
Q. 
"Revenue Sharing Cycle" means the annual (12-month) period of the 
Tribe's operation of Covered Games in its Facilities and whose first annual Cycle shall 
commence on the day the Tribe makes Covered Games available for public play in its 
Facilities; 
R. 
"Rules and regulations" means the rules and regulations promulgated by 
the Commission for implementation of this Compact; 
S. 
"State" means the State of Florida; 
T. 
"State Compliance Agency" ("SCA") means the state agency that has the 
authority to carry out the State's oversight responsibilities under this Compact, which 
may be any agency designated by the Legislature for this purpose.  The SCA shall be the 
Governor or his designee unless and until an SCA has been designated by the Legislature; 
provided, however, that nothing in this Compact is intended to empower the Governor to 
engage in any act not authorized by the Florida Constitution or Florida Statutes; 
U. 
"Tribe" means the Seminole Tribe of Florida. 
Part IV. AUTHORIZATION AND LOCATION OF COVERED GAMES 
A. 
 The Tribe and State agree that the Tribe is authorized to operate Covered 
Games on its Indian lands, as defined in the IGRA, in accordance with the provisions of 
this Compact.  However, except for the provisions in Part XI (A) below, nothing in this 
Compact shall limit the Tribe's right to operate any game that is Class II under the IGRA. 
B. 
The Tribe is authorized to conduct Covered Games under this Compact at 
only the following existing gaming Facilities on Tribal lands: 
Seminole Indian Casino - Brighton  
Highway 721 – Brighton Indian Reservation, Route 6 Box 611  
Okeechobee, FL 34974  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 8 
Seminole Indian Casino - Coconut Creek  
5550 NW 40th St.  
Coconut Creek, FL 33073  
Seminole Indian Casino - Hollywood  
4150 N. St. Rd. 7  
Hollywood, FL 33021  
Seminole Indian Casino - Immokalee  
506 S. 1st Street  
Immokalee, FL 34142  
Seminole Indian Casino - Big Cypress  
30013 Josie Billie Hwy.  
Clewiston, FL 33440  
Seminole Hard Rock Hotel & Casino - Hollywood  
1 Seminole Way  
Hollywood, FL 33314  
Seminole Hard Rock Hotel & Casino - Tampa  
5223 N. Orient Rd.  
Tampa, FL 33610  
C. 
Any of the identified Facilities in Section B (above) may be expanded or 
replaced by another Facility on the same reservation with advance notice to the State of 
sixty (60) calendar days, subject to the understanding that the number of existing 
Facilities on each reservation shall remain the same as provided in Section B (above).   
Part V. RULES AND REGULATIONS; MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR 
OPERATIONS 
A. 
At all times during the Term of this Compact, the Tribe shall be 
responsible for all duties which are assigned to it and the Commission under this 
Compact.  The Tribe shall promulgate any rules and regulations necessary to implement 
this Compact, which at a minimum shall expressly include or incorporate by reference all 
provisions of Part V of this Compact and the procedural requirements of Part VI of this 
  
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 9 
Compact.  Nothing in this Compact shall be construed to affect the Tribe's right to amend 
its rules and regulations, provided that any such amendment shall be in conformity with 
this Compact.  The SCA may propose additional rules and regulations consistent with and 
related to the implementation of this Compact to the Commission at any time, and the 
Commission shall give good faith consideration to such suggestions and shall notify the 
SCA of its response or action with respect thereto. 
B. 
All Facilities shall comply with, and all Covered Games approved under 
this Compact shall be operated in accordance with, the requirements set forth in this 
Compact, including, but not limited to, those set forth in Sections C and D of this Part 
and Appendix E. In addition, all Facilities shall be operated in strict compliance with 
tribal internal control standards that provide a level of control that equals or exceeds 
those set forth in the National Indian Gaming Commission's Minimum Internal Control 
Standards (25 C.F.R. Part 542) as set forth in detail in Appendix D, as the same may be 
amended or supplemented from time to time. 
C. 
The Tribe and the Commission shall retain all records in compliance with 
the requirements set forth in Appendix F.  
D. 
Compulsive Gambling. 
The Tribe will continue and maintain its extensive and award-winning program to 
combat problem gambling and curtail compulsive gambling, including work with the 
Florida Council on Compulsive Gambling or other organization dedicated to assisting 
problem gamblers.  The Tribe will continue to maintain the following safeguards against 
problem gambling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 10 
1. 
The Tribe will provide a comprehensive training program designed in 
cooperation with the Florida Council on Compulsive Gambling (or other 
organization dedicated to assisting problem gamblers) to every new gaming 
employee.   
2. 
The Tribe will make printed materials available to Patrons, which include 
contact information for the Florida Council on Compulsive Gambling 24-Hour 
Helpline (or other hotline dedicated to assisting problem gamblers), and will work 
with the Florida Council on Compulsive Gambling (or other organization 
dedicated to assisting problem gamblers) to provide contact information for the 
Florida Council on Compulsive Gambling (or other organization dedicated to 
assisting problem gamblers), and to provide such information on the Facilities' 
internet website.  The Tribe will continue to display all literature from the Florida 
Council on Compulsive Gambling (or other organization dedicated to assisting 
problem gamblers) within the Facilities. 
3. 
The Commission shall establish a list of the Patrons voluntarily excluded 
from the Tribe's Facilities, pursuant to paragraph 5. 
4. 
The Tribe shall employ its best efforts to exclude Patrons on such list from 
entry into its Facilities; provided that nothing in this Compact shall create for 
Patrons who are excluded but gain access to the Facilities, or any other person, a 
cause of action or claim against the State, the Tribe or the Commission or any 
other person, entity, or agency for failing to enforce such exclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 11 
5. 
Patrons who believe they may be playing Covered Games on a compulsive 
basis may request that their names be placed on the list of the Patrons voluntarily 
excluded from the Tribe's Facilities.   
6. 
All Covered Game employees shall receive training on identifying players 
who have a problem with compulsive gambling and shall be instructed to ask 
them to leave.  Signs bearing a toll-free help-line number and educational and 
informational materials shall be made available at conspicuous locations and 
ATMs in each Facility, which aim at the prevention of problem gaming and which 
specify where Patrons may receive counseling or assistance for gambling 
problems.  Nothing in this Section shall create for Patrons, or any other person, a 
cause of action or claim against the State, the Tribe or the Commission or any 
other person, entity, or agency for failing to identify a Patron or person who is a 
compulsive gambler and/or ask that person to leave. 
7. 
The Tribe shall follow the rules for exclusion of Patrons set forth in 
Article XI of the Tribe's Gaming Code (Appendix I). 
8. 
The Tribe shall make diligent efforts to prevent underage individuals from 
loitering in the area of each Facility where the Covered Games take place. 
9. 
The Tribe shall assure that advertising and marketing of the Covered 
Games at the Facilities contain a responsible gambling message and a toll-free 
help-line number for problem gamblers, where practical, and that they make no 
false or misleading claims. 
E. 
The State may secure an annual independent financial audit of the conduct 
of Covered Games subject to this Compact.  The audit shall examine revenues in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 12 
connection with the conduct of Covered Games and shall include only those matters 
necessary to verify the determination of Net Win and the basis of, and right to, the 
Payments made to the State pursuant to Part XI of this Compact and as defined by this 
Compact. A copy of the audit report for the conduct of Covered Games shall be 
submitted to the Commission within thirty (30) calendar days of completion.  
Representatives of the SCA may, upon request, meet with the Tribe and its auditors to 
discuss the audit or any matters in connection therewith; provided, such discussions are 
limited to Covered Games information.  The annual independent financial audit shall be 
performed by an independent accounting firm, with experience in auditing casino 
operations, selected by the State, subject to the consent of the Tribe, which shall not be 
unreasonably withheld. The Tribe shall pay the accounting firm for the costs of the 
annual independent financial audit. 
F. 
Summaries of the rules for playing Covered Games and promotional 
contests shall be visibly displayed in the Facilities.  Complete sets of rules shall be 
available in the Facilities upon request.  Copies of all such rules shall be provided to the 
SCA within thirty (30) calendar days of their issuance or their amendment. 
G. 
The Tribe shall provide the Commission and SCA with a chart of the 
supervisory lines of authority with respect to those directly responsible for the conduct of 
Covered Games, and shall promptly notify those agencies of any material changes 
thereto. 
H. 
The Tribe engages in and shall continue to maintain proactive approaches 
to prevent improper alcohol sales, drunk driving, underage drinking, and underage 
gambling.  These approaches involve intensive staff training and certification, Patron 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Seminole Compact  
Page 13 
education, and the use of security personnel and surveillance equipment in order to 
enhance Patrons' enjoyment of the Facilities and provide for Patron safety.  Staff training 
includes specialized employee training in nonviolent crisis intervention, driver's license 
verification and the detection of intoxication.  Patron education is carried out through 
notices transmitted on valet parking stubs, posted signs in the Facilities and in brochures.  
Roving and fixed security officers, along with surveillance cameras, assist in the 
detection of intoxicated Patrons, investigate problems, and engage with Patrons to de-
escalate volatile situations.  To help prevent alcohol-related crashes, the Tribe operates 
the "Safe Ride Home Program," a free taxi service.  Additionally, to reduce risks of 
underage gambling and underage drinking, the Tribe prohibits entry onto the casino floor 
of anyone under 18 years of age. The Tribe's programs and policies related to these 
matters are attached as Appendix P, and the Tribe shall maintain these (or stricter and/or 
more extensive) programs and policies for the duration of this Compact.  The Tribe shall 
provide the State with written notice of any changes to the programs and policies in 
Appendix P, which notice shall include a copy of such changes and shall be sent on or 
before the effective date of the change. Nothing in this Section shall create for Patrons, 
or any other person, a cause of action or claim against the State, the Tribe or the 
Commission or any other person, entity, or agency for failing to fulfill the requirements 
of this Section. 
I. 
No person under the age of twenty-one (21) shall be allowed to play 
Covered Games. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 14 
J. 
The Tribe may establish and operate Facilities that operate Covered 
Games only on its Indian lands as defined by the IGRA and as specified in Part IV of this 
Compact. 
K. 
The Commission shall keep a record of, and shall report at least quarterly 
to the SCA, the number of Covered Games in each Facility, by the name or type of each 
and its identifying number. 
L. 
The Tribe presently conducts and shall continue to conduct poker in each 
of its Facilities in compliance with provisions of Florida law, including provisions that 
limit wagers and pot sizes.  However, the Tribe may hold up to six (6) celebrity/charity 
poker tournaments per year in each of its Facilities that are not subject to the 
limitations/restrictions imposed by Florida law, provided that a minimum of seventy 
percent (70%) of the Net Poker Income from each poker tournament is donated to a 
charitable organization organized pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code. The maximum number of days a celebrity/charity tournament will be played is 
eight (8) calendar days during the month a tournament is hosted.  Any payments made to 
charitable organizations pursuant to this part shall not be calculated as Net Win for 
purpose of payments to the State under Part XI. 
M. 
The Tribe and the Commission shall make available a copy of the 
following documents to any member of the public upon request:  the minimum internal 
control standards of the NIGC; the Tribal gaming ordinance; this Compact; the rules of 
each Covered Game operated by the Tribe; and the administrative procedures for 
addressing Patron tort claims under Part VI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 15 
PART VI. PATRON DISPUTES, TORT CLAIMS; PRIZE CLAIMS; LIMITED 
CONSENT TO SUIT 
A. 
All disputes will be resolved in accordance with the procedures 
established in Article XI of the Tribe's Gaming Code (Appendix I).    
B. 
Tort claims by employees of the Tribe's Facilities will be handled pursuant 
to the provisions of the Tribe's workers compensation ordinance, which shall provide 
workers the same or better protections as set forth in Florida's workers compensation 
laws. The Tribe's workers compensation ordinance is included as Appendix M.   
C. 
Disputes by employees of the Tribe's Facilities will be handled pursuant to 
the provisions of the Tribe's policy for gaming employees, which is included in Appendix 
Q. 
D. 
Tort remedies for Patrons.   
1. 
A Patron who claims to have been injured in the area of the Facility where 
Covered Games are played is required to provide written notice to the Tribe's Risk 
Management Department or the Facility, in a reasonable and timely manner, but 
in no event later than six months after the date of the incident giving rise to the 
claimed injury occurs, or the claim shall be forever barred. 
2. 
When the Tribe responds to an incident alleged to have caused a Patron's 
injury or illness, the Tribe shall provide a claim form to the Patron. It is the 
Patron's responsibility to complete the form and forward the form to the Tribe's 
Risk Management Department within a reasonable period of time, and in a 
reasonable and timely manner, but in no event later than six months after the date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 16 
of the incident giving rise to the claimed injury occurs or the claim shall be 
forever barred. 
3. 
Upon receiving written notification of the claim, the Tribe's Risk 
Management Department shall forward the notification to the Tribe's insurance 
carrier. The Tribe will use its best efforts to assure that the insurance carrier 
contacts the Patron within a reasonable period of time following receipt of the 
claim. 
4. 
The insurance carrier will handle the claim to conclusion.  If the Patron 
and the insurance carrier are not able to resolve the claim, the Patron may bring a 
tort claim against the Tribe in any court of competent jurisdiction in Broward 
County Florida, subject to the exhaustion of tribal remedies, as provided in this 
Compact, and subject to a four year statute of limitations, which shall begin to run 
from the date of the incident of the alleged claimed injury.  
5. 
In no event shall the Tribe be deemed to have waived its tribal immunity 
from suit beyond $100,000.00 for an individual tort claim and $200,000.00 for the 
tort claims of all persons or entities claiming injury in tort arising out of a single 
event or occurrence.  These limitations are intended to include liability for 
compensatory and punitive damages, as applicable, as well as any costs, pre­
judgment interest and attorneys fees arising out of any claim brought or asserted 
against the Tribe, its subordinate governmental and economic units as well as any 
Tribal officials, employees, servants or agents in their official capacities. 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 17 
6. 
Notices explaining the procedures and time limitations with respect to 
making a tort claim shall be prominently displayed in the Facilities, posted on the 
Tribe's website, and provided to any Patron for whom the Tribe has notice of the 
injury or property damage giving rise to the tort claim.  Such notices shall explain 
the method and places for making a tort claim, that this procedure is the exclusive 
method of making a tort claim, and that claims that do not follow this procedure 
shall be forever barred. 
Part VII. ENFORCEMENT OF COMPACT PROVISIONS 
A. 
The Tribe and the Commission shall be responsible for regulating 
activities pursuant to this Compact.  As part of its responsibilities, the Tribe has adopted 
or issued standards designed to ensure that the Facilities are constructed, operated and 
maintained in a manner that adequately protects the environment and public health and 
safety.  Additionally, the Tribe and the Commission shall ensure that:  
1. 
Operation of the conduct of Covered Games is in strict compliance with  
(i) the gaming ordinance duly adopted by the Tribe and approved in accordance 
with the IGRA, (ii) all rules, regulations, procedures, specifications, and standards 
lawfully adopted by the National Indian Gaming Commission and the 
Commission, and (iii) the provisions of this Compact, including, but not limited 
to, the standards and the Tribe's rules and regulations set forth in the Appendices; 
2. 
Reasonable measures are taken to: 
(a) assure the physical safety of Facility Patrons, employees, and any other 
person while in the Facility;  
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 18 
(b) prevent illegal activity at the Facilities or with regard to the operation of 
Covered Games, including, but not limited to, the maintenance of employee 
procedures and a surveillance system; 
(c) ensure prompt notification is given to appropriate law enforcement 
authorities of persons who may be involved in illegal acts in accordance with 
applicable law; 
(d) ensure that the construction and maintenance of the Facilities comply 
with the standards of the Florida Building Code, the provisions of which the Tribe 
has adopted as the Seminole Tribal Building Code (Appendix K);  
(e) ensure adequate emergency access plans have been prepared to ensure 
the health and safety of all Covered Game Patrons (Appendix J); 
B. 
All licenses for members and employees of the Commission shall be 
issued according to the same standards and terms applicable to Facility employees.  The 
Commission's compliance officers shall be independent of the Tribal gaming operations, 
and shall be supervised by and accountable only to the Commission.  A Commission 
compliance officer shall be available to the Facility during all hours of operation upon 
reasonable notice, and shall have immediate access to any and all areas of the Facility for 
the purpose of ensuring compliance with the provisions of this Compact.  The 
Commission shall investigate any such suspected or reported violation of this Part and 
shall officially enter into its files timely written reports of investigations and any action 
taken thereon, and shall forward copies of such investigative reports to the SCA within 
thirty (30) calendar days of such filing.  The scope of such reporting shall be determined 
by a Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and the SCA as soon as 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 19 
practicable after the Effective Date of this Compact.  Any such violations shall be 
reported immediately to the Commission, and the Commission shall immediately forward 
the same to the SCA.  In addition, the Commission shall promptly report to the SCA any 
such violations which it independently discovers. 
C. 
In order to develop and foster a positive and effective relationship in the 
enforcement of the provisions of this Compact, representatives of the Commission and 
the SCA shall meet, not less than on an annual basis, to review past practices and 
examine methods to improve the regulatory scheme created by this Compact.  The 
meetings shall take place at a location mutually agreed to by the Commission and the 
SCA. The SCA, prior to or during such meetings, shall disclose to the Commission any 
concerns, suspected activities, or pending matters reasonably believed to possibly 
constitute violations of this Compact by any person, organization or entity, if such 
disclosure will not compromise the interest sought to be protected. 
Part VIII. STATE MONITORING OF COMPACT 
A. 
The SCA may, pursuant to the provisions of this Compact, monitor the 
conduct of Covered Games to ensure that the Covered Games are conducted in 
compliance with the provisions of this Compact.  In order to properly monitor the 
conduct of Covered Games, agents of the SCA without prior notice shall have reasonable 
access to all public areas of the Facilities related to the conduct of Covered Games as 
provided herein. 
1. 
While the Commission will act as the regulator of the Facilities, 
the SCA may take reasonable steps to assure that operations at the Facilities comply 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 20 
with the terms of this Compact and may advise on such issues as it deems 
appropriate. 
2. 
In order to fulfill its oversight responsibilities, the State has 
identified specific oversight testing procedures, set forth below in paragraph 3, 
subsections (a) (b) and (c), which the SCA may perform on a routine basis. 
3. 
(a) 
The SCA may inspect any Covered Games in operation at 
the Facilities on a random basis not to exceed four (4) times annually at each 
Facility to confirm that the Covered Games operate and play properly pursuant to 
the manufacturer's technical standards.  Such random inspections shall occur during 
normal business hours.  The SCA shall provide notice to the Commission of such 
inspection at or prior to the commencement of the random inspections, and a 
Commission agent may accompany the inspection.   
(b) 
For each Facility, the SCA may perform one annual review 
of the slot machine compliance audit. 
(c) 
At least on an annual basis, the SCA may meet with the 
Tribe's Internal Audit Department for Gaming to review internal controls 
and violations of same by the Facilities.    
4. 
The SCA will seek to work with and obtain the assistance of the 
Commission in the resolution of any conflicts with the management of the 
Facilities, and the State and the Tribe shall make their best efforts to resolve 
disputes through negotiation whenever possible.  Therefore, in order to foster a 
spirit of cooperation and efficiency, the parties hereby agree that when disputes 
arise between the SCA staff and Commission regulators from the day-to-day 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 21 
regulation of the Facilities, they should generally be resolved first through meeting 
and conferring in good faith. This voluntary process does not proscribe the right of 
either party to seek other relief that may be available when circumstances require 
such relief. In the event of a dispute or disagreement between Tribal and SCA 
regulators, the dispute or disagreement shall be resolved in accordance with the 
dispute resolution provisions of Part XIII of this Compact;  
5. Access to each Facility by the SCA shall be during the Facility's normal 
operating hours only, provided that to the extent such inspections are limited to 
areas of the Facility where the public is normally permitted, the SCA agents may 
inspect the Facility without giving prior notice to the Tribe or the Commission; 
6. Any suspected or claimed violations of this Compact or law shall be 
directed in writing to the Commission; the SCA agents, in conducting the functions 
assigned them under this Compact, shall not unreasonably interfere with the 
functioning of any Facility; and 
7. Before the SCA agents enter any nonpublic area of a Facility, they shall 
provide proper prior notice and photographic identification to the Commission.  The 
SCA agents shall be accompanied in nonpublic areas of the Facility by a 
Commission officer.  Notice of at least two (2) hours by the SCA to the 
Commission is required to assure that a Commission officer is available to 
accompany the SCA agents at all times.  
B. 
Subject to the provisions herein, agents of the SCA shall have the right to 
review and request copies of documents of the Facility related to its conduct of Covered 
Games.  The review and copying of such documents shall be during normal business 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 22 
hours unless otherwise allowed by the Tribe at the Tribe's discretion.  The Tribe cannot 
refuse said inspection and copying of such documents, provided that the inspectors 
cannot require copies of documents in such volume that it unreasonably interferes with 
the normal functioning of the Facilities or Covered Games.   
To the extent that the Tribe provides the State with information which the Tribe 
claims to be confidential and proprietary, or a trade secret, the Tribe shall clearly mark 
such information with the following designation:  "Trade Secret, Confidential and 
Proprietary." If the State receives a request under chapter 119, Florida Statutes that would 
include such designated information, the State shall promptly notify the Tribe of such a 
request and the Tribe shall promptly notify the State about its intent to seek judicial 
protection from disclosure.  Upon such notice from the Tribe, the State shall not release 
the requested information until a judicial determination is made.  This designation and 
notification procedure does not excuse the State from complying with the requirements of 
the State's public records law, but is intended to provide the Tribe the opportunity to seek 
whatever judicial remedy it deems appropriate.  Notwithstanding the foregoing 
procedure, the SCA may provide copies of tribal documents to federal law enforcement 
and other State agencies or State consultants that the State deems reasonably necessary in 
order to conduct or complete any investigation of suspected criminal activity in 
connection with the Tribe's Covered Games or the operation of the Facilities or in order 
to assure the Tribe's compliance with this Compact.   
C. 
At the completion of any SCA inspection or investigation, the SCA may 
forward a written report thereof to the Commission, containing all pertinent, 
nonconfidential, nonproprietary information regarding any violation of applicable laws or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 23 
this Compact which was discovered during the inspection or investigation unless 
disclosure thereof would adversely impact an investigation of suspected criminal activity.  
Nothing herein prevents the SCA from contacting tribal or federal law enforcement 
authorities for suspected criminal wrongdoing involving the Commission. 
D. 
Except as expressly provided in this Compact, nothing in this Compact 
shall be deemed to authorize the State to regulate the Tribe's government, including the 
Commission, or to interfere in any way with the Tribe's selection of its governmental 
officers, including members of the Commission. 
Part IX. JURISDICTION 
The obligations and rights of the State and the Tribe under this Compact are 
contractual in nature, and this Compact shall not alter tribal, federal or state civil 
adjudicatory or criminal jurisdiction in any way.  
Part X. LICENSING 
The Tribe and the Commission shall comply with the licensing and hearing 
requirements set forth in 25 C.F.R. Part 556 and Part 558, as well as the applicable 
licensing and hearing requirements set forth in Articles IV-VI of the Tribe's Gaming 
Code (Appendix I). 
Part XI. PAYMENTS TO THE STATE OF FLORIDA 
A. 
The parties acknowledge and recognize that this Compact provides the 
Tribe with partial but substantial exclusivity and other valuable consideration consistent 
with the goals of the IGRA, including special opportunities for tribal economic 
development through gaming within the external boundaries of Florida with respect to the 
play of Covered Games.  In consideration thereof, the Tribe covenants and agrees, subject 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 24 
to the conditions agreed upon in Part XII of this Compact, to make Payments to the State 
derived from Net Win as set forth in Exhibit A (Payment Schedule).  The Tribe further 
agrees to convert eighty percent (80%) of its Class II video bingo terminals (or their 
equivalents) to Class III slot machines within forty-eight (48) months from the Effective 
Date of this Compact.  Within sixty (60) months from the Effective Date of this Compact, 
all Class II video bingo terminals (or their equivalents) shall be converted to Class III slot 
machines, or the Payment to the State shall be calculated as if the conversion has been 
completed, whether or not the Tribe has fully executed its conversion.  The Tribe further 
agrees that it will not purchase or lease any new Class II video bingo terminals (or their 
equivalents) after the Effective Date of this Compact.   
B. 
Payments pursuant to Section A above shall be made to the State via 
electronic funds transfer in a manner directed by the SCA.  Payments will be due in 
accordance with the Payment Schedule set forth in Exhibit A.  The appropriation of any 
Payments received by the State pursuant to this Compact lies within the exclusive 
prerogative of the Legislature.  The Governor, however, recognizes that the operation of 
the Florida Lottery and the operation of slot machines in the pari-mutuel facilities in 
Broward County have provided the State an opportunity to increase and enhance the 
dollars available to spend on the education of Florida's children.  Recognizing the 
importance of those benefits while also taking into account the local impact from the 
operation of Covered Games at the Facilities, the Governor recommends that (1) ninety-
five percent (95%) of these Payments received by the State be appropriated to the State's 
Educational Enhancement Trust Fund and (2) five percent (5%) of these Payments 
received by the State be distributed, as provided for by the Legislature, to those local 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 25 
governments (including both counties and municipalities) in Florida affected by the 
Tribe's operation of Covered Games. 
C. 
The Annual Oversight Assessment to reimburse the State for the actual 
costs of the operation of the SCA to perform its monitoring functions as defined in this 
Compact shall be determined and paid in quarterly installments within thirty (30) 
calendar days of receipt by the Tribe of an invoice from the SCA.  The Tribe reserves the 
right to audit the invoices on an annual basis, a copy of which will be provided to the 
SCA, and any discrepancies found therein shall be reconciled within forty-five (45) 
calendar days of receipt of the audit by the SCA.  Out-of-pocket expenses to be incurred 
by the Governor or his designee performing functions of the SCA unless and until the 
SCA is designated by the Legislature shall be advanced by the Tribe upon submission of 
properly documented requests. 
D. Except as expressly provided in this Part, nothing in this Compact shall be 
deemed to require the Tribe to make payments of any kind to the State or any of its 
agencies. 
Part XII. REDUCTION OF TRIBAL PAYMENTS BECAUSE OF LOSS OF 
EXCLUSIVITY OR OTHER CHANGES IN FLORIDA LAW 
The intent of this section is to provide the Tribe with the right to operate Covered 
Games on an exclusive basis throughout the State, subject to the exceptions and 
provisions set forth below. 
A. If Class III gaming as defined in this Compact, or other casino-style gambling 
where the results of such games are determined through the use of a random number 
generator, that is not presently authorized by or under Florida law is authorized for any 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 26 
location within the State of Florida that is under the jurisdiction of the State, including 
but not limited to (1) electronically-assisted bingo or pull-tab games or (2) video lottery 
terminals (VLTs) or any similar games that allow direct operation of the games by 
customers of the Florida Lottery, any successor entity or any licensee of the Florida 
Lottery or any successor entity, and such gambling begins to be offered for public or 
private use, the Payments due the State pursuant to Parts XI.A and B of this Compact 
shall cease until such gambling is no longer operated, in which event the Payments due 
the State pursuant to Parts XI.A and B of this Compact shall resume.    
B. Exceptions: The following are exceptions to the exclusivity provisions of 
Section A above. 
1. Any Class III gaming authorized by a compact between the State and 
any other federally recognized tribe pursuant to IGRA will not be a breach or other 
violation of the exclusivity provisions set forth in Section A above. 
2. (a) If a local referendum is passed by the voters of Miami-Dade County 
implementing the authority for operation of slot machines by pari-mutuels located within 
that County and after any pari-mutuel in that County begins to offer slot machine play or, 
(b) if at any time there is an expansion of Class III gaming in either 
Broward or Miami-Dade Counties, 
and 
(c) the Tribe's annual Net Win plus revenues from its remaining Class II 
video bingo terminals (or their equivalents) within its Facilities statewide drops below 
$1.37 billion, the Payments due the State pursuant to Part XI. Sections A and B of this 
Compact shall cease.  If the Tribe's annual Net Win plus revenues from its remaining 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 27 
Class II video bingo terminals (or their equivalents) within its Facilities statewide again 
reaches or exceeds $1.37 billion, the Payments due the State pursuant to Part XI, Sections 
A and B of this Compact shall resume, but may be reduced again under the provisions set 
forth above. 
3. The conduct of illegal or otherwise unauthorized Class III gaming 
within the State shall not be considered a breach or other violation of the exclusivity 
provisions set forth in Section A above, unless such gaming is conducted in multiple 
locations in more than one county and its operation is sanctioned, tacitly or otherwise, by 
action or inaction of State and/or local officials if, after notice from the Tribe to the SCA, 
the State has evidenced a lack of good faith and failed to take reasonable measures to stop 
the conduct of illegal gaming activities. 
C. To the extent that the exclusivity provisions of this Part are breached or 
otherwise violated and the Tribe's ongoing Payment obligations to the State pursuant to 
Part XI, Sections A and B of this Compact cease, any outstanding Payments that would 
have been due the State from the Tribe's Facilities prior to the breach/violation shall be 
made within thirty (30) business days after the breach/violation.     
D. The breach of this Part's exclusivity provisions and the cessation of Payments 
pursuant to Part XI, Sections A and B of this Compact shall not excuse the Tribe from 
continuing to comply with all other provisions of this Compact, including continuing to 
pay the State the Annual Oversight Assessment as set forth in Part XI, Section C of this 
Compact. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 28 
E. Nothing in this Compact is intended to affect the ability of the State 
Legislature to enact laws either further restricting or expanding gambling on non-tribal 
lands. 
Part XIII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
In the event that either party to this Compact believes that the other party has failed 
to comply with any requirements of this Compact, or in the event of any dispute 
hereunder, including, but not limited to, a dispute over the proper interpretation of the 
terms and conditions of this Compact, the goal of the Parties is to resolve all disputes 
amicably and voluntarily whenever possible.  In pursuit of this goal, the following 
procedures may be invoked: 
A. 
A party asserting noncompliance or seeking an interpretation of this 
Compact first shall serve written notice on the other party.  The notice shall identify the 
specific Compact provision alleged to have been violated or in dispute and shall specify 
in detail the asserting party's contention and any factual basis for the claim.  
Representatives of the Tribe and State shall meet within thirty (30) calendar days of 
receipt of notice in an effort to resolve the dispute, unless they mutually agree to extend 
this period; 
B. 
A party asserting noncompliance or seeking an interpretation of this 
Compact under this Section shall be deemed to have certified that to the best of the 
party's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the claim of 
noncompliance or the request for interpretation of this Compact is warranted and made in 
good faith and not for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or the needless incurring of the cost of resolving the dispute;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 29 
C. 
If the parties are unable to resolve a dispute through the process specified 
in Sections A and B of this Part, either party can call for mediation under the Commercial 
Mediation Procedures of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), set forth as 
Appendix R, or any such successor procedures, provided that such mediation does not 
last more than sixty (60) calendar days, unless an extension to this time limit is negotiated 
by the parties. The disputes available for resolution through mediation are limited to 
matters arising under the terms of this Compact and its Appendices;   
D.
 If the parties are unable to resolve a dispute through the process specified 
in Sections A, B, and C of this Part, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the State 
may bring an action against the Tribe  in federal district court ("federal court") regarding 
any dispute arising under this Compact in a district in which the federal court has venue.  
If the federal court declines to exercise jurisdiction, or federal precedent exists that rules 
that the federal court would not have jurisdiction over such a dispute, the State may bring 
the action in the Courts of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, 
Florida. The State is entitled to all rights of appeal permitted by law in the court system 
in which the action is brought. 
E. 
For purposes of actions based on disputes between the State and the Tribe 
that arise under this Compact and the enforcement of any judgment resulting therefrom, 
the Tribe expressly waives its right to assert sovereign immunity from suit and from 
enforcement of any ensuing judgment, and further consents to be sued in federal or state 
court, including the rights of appeal specified above, as the case may be, provided that (i) 
the dispute is limited solely to issues arising under this Compact, (ii) there is no claim for 
monetary damages (except that payment of any money required by the terms of this 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 30 
Compact, as well as injunctive relief or specific performance enforcing a provision of this 
Compact requiring the payment of money to the State may be sought), and (iii) nothing 
herein shall be construed to constitute a waiver of the sovereign immunity of the Tribe 
with respect to any third party that is made a party or intervenes as a party to the action.  
In the event that intervention, joinder, or other participation by any additional party in 
any action between the State and the Tribe would result in the waiver of the Tribe's 
sovereign immunity as to that additional party, the waiver of the Tribe provided herein 
may be revoked.  
F. 
The State may not be precluded from pursuing any mediation or judicial 
remedy against the Tribe on the grounds that the State has failed to exhaust its Tribal 
administrative remedies. 
G. 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Part, any failure of the 
Tribe to remit the Payments pursuant to the terms of Part XI will entitle the State to seek 
injunctive relief in federal or state court, at the State's election, to compel the Payments 
after exhausting the dispute resolution process in Sections A and B of this Part. 
H. 
If the parties are unable to resolve a dispute involving a claim by the Tribe 
against the State through the process specified in Sections A, B, and C of this Part, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Tribe may invoke arbitration of the 
dispute under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association 
as set forth in Appendix S. The arbitrators' decision may not be enforced in any court.  If 
the arbitrators find that the State is not in compliance with the Compact, the State shall 
have the opportunity to challenge the decision of the arbitrators by bringing an 
independent action against the Tribe in federal district court ("federal court") regarding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 31 
the dispute underlying the arbitration in a district in which the federal court has venue.  If 
the federal court declines to exercise jurisdiction, or federal precedent exists that rules 
that the federal court would not have jurisdiction over such a dispute, the State may bring 
the action in the Courts of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, 
Florida. The State is entitled to all rights of appeal permitted by law in the court system 
in which the action is brought. The State shall be entitled to de novo review of the 
arbitrators' decision under this Section.  For the purpose of this Section, the Tribe agrees 
to waive its immunity as provided in Section E of this Part. 
I. 
If the arbitrators find that the State is not in compliance with the Compact 
and the State fails to file suit as provided above within sixty (60) calendar days of the 
arbitrators' decision or fails to maintain the suit through final judgment, including 
appeals, without the agreement of the Tribe, the Tribe may suspend Payment under Part 
XI until the State comes into compliance with the arbitrators' decision.   
J. 
If the State files suit as provided above and a final judgment is rendered by 
the court, the failure of the State to comply with the judgment shall constitute grounds for 
the Tribe to suspend Payment under Part XI until the State comes into compliance with 
the court's judgment. 
PART XIV. CONSTRUCTION OF COMPACT; SEVERANCE; FEDERAL 
APPROVAL 
A. 
Each provision, section, and subsection of this Compact shall stand 
separate and independent of every other provision, section, or subsection.  In the event 
that a federal district court in Florida or other court of competent jurisdiction shall find 
any provision, section, or subsection of this Compact to be invalid, the remaining 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 32 
provisions, sections, and subsections of this Compact shall remain in full force and effect, 
provided that severing the invalidated provision, section or subsection does not 
undermine the overall intent of the parties in entering into this Compact.  However, if 
either Part III (E), Part XI or Part XII is held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be 
invalid, this Compact will become null and void.  If any provision, section, or subsection 
of this Compact is determined by a federal district court in Florida or other court of 
competent jurisdiction to impose a mandatory duty on the State of Florida that requires 
authorization by the Florida Legislature, the duty conferred by that particular provision, 
section or subsection shall no longer be mandatory but will be deemed to be a matter 
within the discretion of the Governor or other State officers, subject to such legislative 
approval as may be required by Florida law. 
B. 
It is understood that Part XII of this Compact, which provides for a 
cessation of the Payments to the State under Part XI, does not create any duty on the State 
of Florida but only a remedy for the Tribe if gambling under state jurisdiction is 
expanded. 
C. 
This Compact is intended to meet the requirements of the IGRA as it reads 
on the Effective Date of this Compact, and where reference is made to the IGRA, or to an 
implementing regulation thereof, the reference is deemed to have been incorporated into 
this document as if set in full.  Subsequent changes to the IGRA that diminish the rights 
of the State or Tribe may not be applied retroactively to alter the terms of this Compact, 
except to the extent that Federal law validly mandates that retroactive application without 
the respective consent of the State or Tribe.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 33 
D. 
Neither the presence in another State/Tribal compact of language that is 
not included in this Compact, nor the absence in this Compact of language that is present 
in another State/Tribal compact shall be a factor in construing the terms of this Compact. 
E. 
Each party hereto agrees to defend the validity of this Compact. 
F. 
The parties shall cooperate in seeking approval of this Compact from the 
Secretary of the Interior and the parties further agree that, upon execution, the Tribe shall 
submit the Compact to the Secretary forthwith. 
Part XV. NOTICES 
All notices required under this Compact shall be given by (i) certified mail, return 
receipt requested, (ii) commercial overnight courier service, or (iii) personal delivery, to 
the following persons: 
Governor 
The Capitol  
Tallahassee, Florida 32301  
General Counsel to the Governor  
The Capitol  
Tallahassee, Florida 32301  
Chairman 
Seminole Tribe of Florida  
6300 Stirling Road  
Hollywood, Florida 33024  
General Counsel  
Seminole Tribe of Florida   
6300 Stirling Road  
Hollywood, Florida 33024  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 34 
PART XVI. EFFECTIVE DATE & TERM 
A. This Compact shall become effective upon its approval by the Secretary of the 
Interior as a tribal-state compact within the meaning of the IGRA either by publication of 
the notice of approval in the Federal Register or by operation of law under 25 U.S.C.  
§ 2710(d)(7)(C). 
B. This Compact shall have a term of 25 years (300 months) beginning on the first 
day of the month following the month in which the Compact becomes effective under 
Section A of this Part.  This Compact shall remain in full force and effect until the sooner 
of expiration of its terms or until terminated by mutual agreement of the parties.  
PART XVII. AMENDMENT OF COMPACT AND APPENDICES 
Amendment of this Compact may only be made by written agreement of the 
parties, subject to approval by the Secretary either by publication of the notice of 
approval in the Federal Register or by operation of law under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(C). 
Changes in the provisions of tribal ordinances, regulations and procedures set forth in the 
Appendices to this Compact may be made by the Tribe with thirty (30) calendar days 
advance notice to the State.  If the State has an objection to any change to the tribal 
ordinance, regulation or procedure which is the subject of the notice on the ground that its 
adoption would be a violation of the Tribe's obligations under this Compact, the State 
may invoke the dispute resolution provisions provided in Part XIII of this Compact. 
PART XVIII. MISCELLANEOUS 
A. 
 Except to the extent expressly provided in this Compact, this Compact is 
not intended to, and shall not be construed to, create any right on the part of a third party 
to bring an action to enforce any of its terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 35 
B. 
If, after the Effective Date of this Compact, the State enters into a 
Compact with any other Tribe that contains more favorable terms with respect to any of 
the provisions of this Compact and the U.S. Secretary of the Interior approves such 
compact, either by publication of the notice of approval in the Federal Register or by 
operation of law under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(C), upon tribal notice to the State and the 
Secretary, this Compact shall be deemed amended to contain the more favorable terms, 
unless the State objects to the change and can demonstrate, in a proceeding commenced 
under Part XIII, that the terms in question are not more favorable.    
C. 
Upon the occurrence of certain events beyond the Tribe's control, 
including acts of God, war, terrorism, fires, floods, or accidents causing damage to or 
destruction of one or more of its Facilities or property necessary to operate the 
Facility(ies), (i) the Tribe's obligation to pay the Guaranteed Minimum Payment 
described in Part XI shall be reduced pro rata to reflect the percentage of the total Net 
Win lost to the Tribe from the impacted Facility(ies) and (ii) the Net Win specified under 
Part XII, section B, for purposes of determining whether the Tribe's Payments described 
in part XI shall cease, shall be reduced pro rata to reflect the percentage of the total Net 
Win lost to the Tribe from the impacted Facility(ies), with the proviso that if Payments to 
the State have already stopped under the provisions of  Part XII, section B, the provisions 
of this Section shall not trigger a resumption of payments under that Part. The foregoing 
shall not excuse any obligations of the Tribe to make Payments to the State as and when 
required hereunder or in any related document or agreement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 36 
D. 
Smoking 
The Tribe and the State recognize that opportunities to engage in gaming in 
smoke-free or reduced-smoke environments provides both health and other  benefits to 
Patrons, and the Tribe has already instituted a non-smoking section at its Seminole Hard 
Rock Hotel & Casino – Hollywood Facility. As part of its continuing commitment to this 
issue, the Tribe will: 
1.
 install and utilize a ventilation system at all new construction at its 
Facilities, which system exhausts tobacco smoke to the extent reasonably feasible 
under existing state-of-the-art technology;   
2. 
designate a smoke-free area for slot machines at all new 
construction at its Facilities; and 
3. 
install non-smoking, vented tables for table games installed in its 
Facilities sufficient to reasonably respond to demand for such tables.   
E. 
The annual average minimum pay-out of all slot machines in each Facility 
shall not be less than eighty-five percent (85%).  
F. 
Nothing in this Compact shall alter any of the existing memoranda of 
understanding, contracts, or other agreements entered into between the Tribe and any 
other federal, state, or local governmental entity. 
G. 
Fair Employment Practices 
The Tribe currently has as set forth in Appendix Q, and agrees to maintain, 
standards that are comparable to the standards provided in federal laws and State laws 
forbidding employers from discrimination in connection with the employment of persons 
working at the Facilities on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, gender, age, 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seminole Compact  
Page 37 
disability/handicap, or marital status.  Nothing herein shall preclude the Tribe from 
giving preference in employment, promotion, seniority, lay offs or retention to members 
of the Tribe and other federally recognized tribes. 
PART XIX. EXECUTION 
By signing this Compact, the Governor of the State of Florida affirms that he has 
authority to act for the State in this matter and no further action by the State or any State 
official is necessary for this Compact to take effect upon approval by the Secretary of the 
Interior and publication of the notice of approval in the Federal Register or by operation 
of law under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(C).  The Governor also affirms that he will take all 
appropriate steps to effectuate its purposes and intent.  The undersigned Chairman of the 
Tribal Council of the Seminole Tribe of Florida affirms that he is duly authorized and has 
the authority to execute this Compact on behalf of the Tribe.  The Chairman also affirms 
that he will take all appropriate steps to effectuate its purposes and intent. 
APPROVED: 
State of Florida 
_____________________________ 
Date: November 14, 2007        
Charlie Crist  
Governor 
Seminole Tribe of Florida 
____________________________ 
Date: November 14, 2007 
Mitchell Cypress  
Chairman of the Tribal Council 
     
 
 
 
Exhibit A  
Payment Schedule  
Subject to the provisions in Part XI of the Compact, and subject to the limitations 
agreed upon in Part XII of the Compact, the amounts paid by the Tribe to the State shall 
be calculated as follows: 
(a) 
Upon the Effective Date of this Compact, the Tribe will pay to the 
State a sum of Fifty Million Dollars ($50,000,000), as an advance against the Guaranteed 
Payment of One Hundred Million Dollars ($100,000,000) from the first Revenue Sharing 
Cycle. 
(b) 
For the first Revenue Sharing Cycle, the Tribe shall pay an 
additional Fifty Million Dollars ($50,000,000).  Twenty-Five Million Dollars 
($25,000,000) of that amount shall be paid in equal installments over the course of the 
twelve (12) months of the first Revenue Sharing Cycle, and the remaining Twenty-five 
Million Dollars ($25,000,000) shall be paid in equal installments over the course of the 
twelve (12) months of the second Revenue Sharing Cycle. 
(c) 
For the second Revenue Sharing Cycle, in addition to the carry-over 
payments from the first Revenue Sharing Cycle, the Tribe shall pay One Hundred and 
Twenty-Five Million Dollars ($125,000,000) in equal installments over the course of the 
twelve (12) months of the second Revenue Sharing Cycle. 
(d) 
For the third Revenue Sharing Cycle, the Tribe shall guarantee a 
minimum Payment of not less than One Hundred and Fifty Million Dollars 
($150,000,000), if the Revenue Share calculated for that Revenue Sharing Cycle under 
Section (g), below, is less than the Guaranteed Minimum Payment. 
 
 
 
 
 
(e) 
For every subsequent Revenue Sharing Cycle, the Tribe agrees to 
pay not less than a Guaranteed Minimum Payment of One Hundred Million Dollars 
($100,000,000.00) if the Revenue Share calculated for that Revenue Sharing Cycle under 
Section (g), below, is less than the Guaranteed Minimum Payment.  
(f) 
All Guaranteed Minimum Payments shall be deducted from and 
credited toward the Revenue Share in each Revenue Sharing Cycle set forth below in 
Section (g). 
(g) 
For the third through twenty-fifth Revenue Sharing Cycles, to the 
extent that the Revenue Share exceeds the Guaranteed Minimum Payment for each 
Revenue Sharing Cycle, the Tribe agrees, as further provided in Section (h), to pay a 
Revenue Share for that Revenue Sharing Cycle equal to the total amount calculated 
pursuant to this Section as follows:  
(i) Ten percent (10%) of all amounts up to Two Billion Dollars 
($2,000,000,000) of Net Win received by the Tribe from the operation and play of 
Covered Games from each Revenue Sharing Cycle;  
(ii) Twelve percent (12%) of all amounts between Two Billion and 
One Dollar ($2,000,000,001) and Two and one half Billion Dollars 
($2,500,000,000) of Net Win received by the Tribe from the operation and play of 
Covered Games from each Revenue Sharing Cycle; 
(iii) Fifteen percent (15%) of all amounts between Two and one 
half Billion and One Dollars ($2,5000,000,001) and Three Billion Dollars 
($3,000,000,000) of Net Win received by the Tribe from the operation and play of 
Covered Games from each Revenue Sharing Cycle; 
2  
 
 
 
   
   
    
 
 
 
(iv) Twenty percent (20%) of all amounts between Three Billion 
and One Dollar ($3,000,000,001) and Four Billion Dollars ($4,000,000,000) of 
Net Win received by the Tribe from the operation and play of Covered Games 
from each Revenue Sharing Cycle; 
(v) Twenty-two and one half (22.5%) of all amounts between  Four 
Billion and One Dollar ($4,000,000,001) and Four and one half Billion Dollars 
($4,500,000,000) of Net Win received by the Tribe from the operation and play of 
Covered Games from each Revenue Sharing Cycle; 
(vi) Twenty-five percent (25%) of all amounts over Four and one 
half Billion Dollars ($4,500,000,000) of Net Win received by the Tribe from the 
operation and play of Covered Games from each Revenue Sharing Cycle. 
(h) 
Monthly Payment  
(i) 
On or before the fifteenth (15th) day of the month following 
the first month of the Revenue Sharing Cycle, the Tribe will remit to the State the 
greater amount of eight and one-third percent (8.3%) of the estimated annual 
Revenue Share or eight and one-third percent (8.3%) of the Guaranteed Minimum 
Payment ("the monthly payment").  
(ii) 
The Tribe will make available to the State at the time of the 
monthly payment the basis for the calculation of the Payment.  
(iii) 
Each month the Tribe will internally "true up" the calculation 
of the estimated Revenue Share based on the Tribe's un-audited financial 
statements related to Covered Games. 
3  
   
(i) 
Payment Verification  
(i) 
On or before the Forty-fifth (45th) day after the third month, 
sixth month, ninth month, and twelfth month of Revenue Sharing Cycles three 
through twenty-five (provided that the twelve (12) month period does not 
coincide with the Tribe's fiscal year end date as indicated in subsection (iii) 
below), the Tribe will provide the State with an audit report by its independent 
auditors as to the accuracy of the annual Revenue Share calculation.  
(ii) For each quarter of these Revenue Sharing Cycles the Tribe 
agrees to engage its independent auditors to conduct a review of the un-audited 
net revenue from Covered Games.  On or before the one hundred and twentieth 
(120th) day after the end of the Tribe's fiscal year, the Tribe agrees to require its 
independent auditors to provide an audit report to verify Net Win for Covered 
Games and the related Payment of the annual Revenue Share to the SCA for State 
review. 
(iii) If the twelfth (12th) month of the Revenue Sharing Cycle does 
not coincide with the Tribe's fiscal year, the Tribe agrees to require its 
independent auditors to deduct Net Win from Covered Games for any of the 
months that are outside of the Revenue Sharing Cycle and to include Net Win 
from Covered Games for those months which fall outside of the Tribe's audit 
period but fall within the Revenue Sharing Cycle, prior to issuing the audit report.  
(iv) No later than thirty (30) calendar days after the day the audit 
report is issued, the Tribe will remit to the State any underpayment of the annual 
Revenue Share, and the State will either reimburse to the Tribe any overpayment 
4  
 
of the annual Revenue Share or authorize the overpayment to be deducted from 
the next monthly payment. 
5