Case Title: Clarence Jones v. Michael W. Moore

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC00-660

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-660
____________
CLARENCE JONES,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, etc.,
Respondent.
[July 5, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
Clarence Jones, a state prisoner under sentence of death, petitions this Court
for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla.
Const.  We deny the petition.
BACKGROUND
Jones was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1988 first-degree
shooting murder of Tallahassee police officer Ernest Ponce de Leon.  The facts are
as follows:
1We have previously stated that counsel Davis, at the time of Jones’s trial, “had
been a member of The Florida Bar for seventeen years and had substantial experience
in practicing criminal defense law.  Additionally, Davis had previously tried twelve to
fifteen capital cases, with approximately six of those cases reaching penalty phase
-2-
On July 7, 1988 Tallahassee police officers Greg Armstrong and
Ernest Ponce de Leon responded to a call regarding a car parked
behind a laundromat.  They found Henry Goins, Clarence Jones, and
Irvin Griffin, escapees from a Maryland prison, and Beverly Harris, a
woman traveling with the trio, seated in the car.  While Armstrong
checked on the driver's identification and Ponce de Leon tried to run a
computer check on the car's license tag, one of the car's passengers
fired two shots at Ponce de Leon.  Armstrong then engaged the car's
occupants in a gun battle.  Jones picked up Ponce de Leon's service
weapon, and he and Griffin, both of whom were wounded, fled the
scene on foot.  They broke into a nearby home, where police captured
them a short time later.  Officer Ponce de Leon was dead at the scene
from two gunshot wounds to the chest.
The state indicted Goins, Jones, and Griffin for, among other
things, first-degree murder.  Goins negotiated a guilty plea to
second-degree murder in exchange for a thirty-year prison sentence,
and the state conducted a joint trial of Jones and Griffin.  Harris
testified at trial for the state and identified Jones as the person who
shot Ponce de Leon.  Jones testified on his own behalf that an
unknown drug dealer who met them at the laundromat shot the officer. 
The jury convicted both Jones and Griffin as charged.  At separate
penalty proceedings Griffin received a sentence of life imprisonment,
while the court agreed with the jury's eleven-to-one recommendation
and sentenced Jones to death.
Jones v. State, 580 So. 2d 143, 144-45 (Fla. 1991) (footnotes omitted), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 878 (1991) (Jones I).
Jones’s trial counsel and appellate counsel were the same individual, Clifford
L. Davis.1  This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal. 2  See
verdict.”  Jones v. State, 732 So. 2d 313, 316 (Fla. 1999) (Jones II).
2Jones alleged on direct appeal that the trial judge:  (1) erred in excusing
unnamed prospective jurors for cause on account of their opposition to the death
penalty; (2) improperly restricted Jones’s cross-examination of two state witnesses,
Beverly Harris and Sidney Earle, regarding their use and knowledge of drugs, drug
dealers, and possible drug purchases; (3) failed to allow the defendant to impeach
Harris and Earle with prior convictions for drug-related offenses and violence towards
police officers; (4) improperly refused to allow Harris’s original statement that Jones
shot the victim with a “silver” handgun to be introduced; (5) erred in admitting
evidence against Griffin, in contravention of Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.
1959), that Griffin previously attempted to murder a police officer; (6) improperly
found aggravating circumstances, including that the murder was committed during the
course of a robbery; and (7) failed to find certain statutory and nonstatutory mitigation.
See Jones I, 580 So. 2d at 145-146.  We rejected each of Jones’s contentions except
issue seven.  See id.  There, we agreed with Jones that the trial judge improperly found
the robbery aggravator, but we found that reversal was not required because the trial
judge had made an alternative finding that this aggravator was not determinative of its
decision to impose the death penalty.  See id. at 146.  We upheld the trial judge’s
decisions regarding the other aggravators and mitigators.  See id.
3Then Circuit Judge Philip Padovano presided over Jones’s trial.  Judge
Padovano agreed to preside over the hearing on Jones’s 3.850 motion after Judge
Padovano was appointed to the First District Court of Appeal.
4Jones alleged on appeal of the denial of his rule 3.850 motion:  (1) ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for his failure to (a) investigate, develop and present
mitigation, (b) obtain a competent mental health examination for Jones, and (c) explain
to the jury Jones’s positive HIV status; and (2) the State withheld exculpatory material
-3-
id.  Jones subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 for postconviction relief.  The trial judge3 denied
the motion.  We affirmed.  See Jones v. State, 732 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1999) (Jones
II).4  Jones now files this habeas corpus petition raising seven issues challenging the
in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  See Jones II, 732 So. 2d at
315, 321.
5Jones alleges:  (1) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing present error
regarding the admission of details surrounding Jones’s prison escape and certain
photographic evidence; (2) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present
the trial judge’s denial of severance; (3) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to present the denial of Jones’s request to exclude autopsy photographs; (4) his
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present improper prosecutorial
comments constituting fundamental error; (5) this Court applied the incorrect standard
when reviewing Jones’s mitigation; (6) this Court improperly upheld the trial judge’s
instruction to the jury of two legally inapplicable aggravators; and (7) this Court erred
by applying an incorrect harmless error review after striking an aggravator.
6We find issues five and seven to be procedurally barred because these issues
were adversely decided against Jones on direct appeal.  See Parker v. Dugger, 550 So.
2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989) (habeas is not proper to relitigate issues that could have been
or were raised on direct appeal).
7Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
-4-
legality of his conviction and death sentence.5  We find several issues to be
procedurally barred without the need of elaboration.6  We find the remaining issues
either procedurally barred or meritless.
PRISON ESCAPE AND PHOTOGRAPH EVIDENCE
Our habeas corpus standard of review for ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel mirrors the Strickland7 standard for trial counsel ineffectiveness.  See
Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000).  We said in Rutherford:
[T]his Court’s ability to grant habeas relief on the basis of appellate
counsel’s ineffectiveness is limited to those situations where the
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petitioner establishes first, that appellate counsel’s performance was
deficient because “the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance” and
second, that the petitioner was prejudiced because appellate counsel’s
deficiency “compromised the appellate process to such a degree as to
undermine confidence in the correctness of the result.
Id. at 643 (quoting Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000)).
With regard to evidentiary objections which trial counsel made during the trial
and which appellate counsel did not raise on direct appeal, this Court evaluates the
prejudice or second prong of the Strickland test first.  In doing so, we begin our
review of the prejudice prong by examining the specific objection made by trial
counsel for harmful error.  A successful petition must demonstrate that the
erroneous ruling prejudiced the petitioner.  If we conclude that the trial court’s
ruling was not erroneous, then it naturally follows that habeas petitioner was not
prejudiced on account of appellate counsel’s failure to raise that issue.  If we do
conclude that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling was erroneous, we then consider
whether such error is harmful error.  If that error was harmless, the petitioner
likewise would not have been prejudiced.
Jones argues that appellate counsel should have pursued on direct appeal
objections to the admission of details of his prison escape in Maryland.  The
gravamen of Jones’s prison escape contention is that appellate counsel erred in not
8Garrett testified that escaped inmate Robinson was captured the same day.
Garrett’s testimony does not reveal when the fifth escaped inmate was captured.
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raising objections made by trial counsel to those portions of Antonie Garrett’s
testimony regarding the Maryland prison escape.  Garrett, a Maryland correctional
officer, testified that while he was working yard duty at the Maryland House of
Corrections on June 25, 1988, inmate Griffin threatened Garrett with a knife.  His
testimony revealed that Griffin prevented him from moving or sounding an alarm
while inmate Goins cut a hole in the prison fence.  Garrett watched as a total of five
inmates went through the hole Goins cut in the fence.8  Trial counsel objected to
this testimony and argued that it was not relevant, and even if relevant, the
prejudicial effect far outweighed its probative value.
By the time Garrett testified, other witnesses had testified without objection
that Jones had escaped from prison.  Officer Berkley Clayton testified that he had
received flyers concerning a Maryland prison escape.  Officer Clayton testified that
from these flyers he identified Jones, Griffin, and Goins as three individuals who
had escaped from the Maryland prison.  Traveling companion Harris testified that
Jones, Griffin, and Goins told her that the trio had escaped from prison and that
they were not going to go back.  Thus, at the time Garrett testified, the jury had
9Jones did not pursue a claim in his rule 3.850 motion that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of Clayton and Harris regarding the
prison escape.
-7-
been exposed to Jones’s prison escape.9
On direct appeal, objections under section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2000),
are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  See Williamson v. State, 681
So. 2d 688, 696 (Fla. 1996).  In Williamson, we said:
Almost all evidence introduced during a criminal trial
prosecution is prejudicial to a defendant.  In reviewing testimony about
a collateral crime that is admitted over an objection based upon
section 90.403, a trial judge must balance the import of the evidence
with respect to the case of the party offering it against the danger of
unfair prejudice.  Only when the unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs the probative value of the evidence should it be excluded.
(Citations omitted.)
The trial judge, after viewing Garrett’s proffer, specifically ruled that
Garrett’s testimony was relevant and found that the probative value was not
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  The trial judge reasoned that
Garrett’s testimony was relevant because the escape, when considering the
closeness in time to the murder (approximately two weeks) and the fact the victim
was a police officer, went to show Jones’s state of mind.  The trial judge
specifically prohibited the State from exploring the reasons why Jones was in
custody in Maryland.
-8-
Based on our review of the trial record regarding this issue, we conclude that
the trial court’s determination that the evidence could be admitted was not error. 
We agree with the trial judge’s ruling that Garrett’s testimony had relevance to
show the escapees’ states of mind at the time of the criminal episode involving the
shooting in Tallahassee.  We further agree with the trial judge in his overruling the
section 90.403 objection in the context of the evidence already admitted in the trial. 
Moreover, the trial judge did not allow the details of the escape to become a focus
of the trial.  Thus, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying this objection.  Accordingly, we determine that Jones has failed to
demonstrate prejudice.  Even if we were to accept that the trial judge’s section
90.403 ruling was erroneous and appellate counsel’s performance was deficient for
failing to raise this point, the other evidence in the record, including Harris’s
eyewitness testimony, would have made such error harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.  See Atkins v. Dugger, 541 So. 2d 1165, 1167 (Fla. 1989) (appellate counsel
not ineffective for failing to raising an issue with little or no merit on appeal).
Similarly, we find meritless Jones’s next contention that appellate counsel
should have raised as an appellate point the admission of various photographs
found at the crime scene.  The trial judge allowed into evidence photographs found
in the car used by the escapees that displayed Jones, Griffin, and Goins together
10Harris would later testify that she saw Jones, Griffin, and Goins with “guns
and a lot of ammunition.”  She also testified that they always took these guns wherever
they went, either on their person or in a tote bag.
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with guns and money.  Trial counsel objected to the photos on relevance and unfair
prejudice grounds and raised an objection to one photo on the added ground that
the photo suggested other crimes.  The trial judge admitted the photos, determining
that the guns depicted in the photos were similar to guns that were used in the
murder and found in or near the car in which Jones was riding at the time of the
murder.10  The trial judge excluded the writings on the photos.  The trial judge also
excluded photos that contained what appeared to be machine guns, finding that the
prejudicial value of these photos substantially outweighed any probative value.
As with the prior evidentiary issue, we conclude that the trial judge did not
commit harmful error in admitting the photos.  The trial judge made a reasoned
choice when he excluded some of the photos.  Those which were admitted were
relevant to the issues concerning whether it was the escapees who shot Officer
Ponce de Leon rather than another assailant, as contended by Jones.  Even if the
admission of the photos were considered to be error, the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, Jones is unable to successfully
demonstrate that habeas relief is warranted on this issue.
SEVERANCE
11Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
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Jones claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue
the trial judge’s denial of Jones’s severance motions.  During trial, Jones’s trial
counsel moved for severance three times, the first coming after codefendant
Griffin’s opening argument.  The trial judge reserved his ruling until the State
presented Williams11 rule evidence against Griffin.  Over Jones’s objection, the
State presented evidence that Griffin has previously attempted to murder a police
officer.
In respect to this last motion for severance we agree with the State that this
issue was within Jones’s issue on direct appeal concerning admission of this
evidence as to Griffin.  Appellate counsel challenged the trial judge’s decision to
admit this evidence by arguing on the direct appeal the “prejudicial effect” to Jones
stemming from being a codefendant in the case with Griffin, who had evidence
about the prior attempted murder of another police officer admitted against him. 
See Jones I, 580 So. 2d at 146.  We affirmed the trial judge, stating:  “The [trial]
court carefully instructed the jury that this evidence went solely to Griffin and had
nothing to do with Jones.  On the totality of the circumstances we see no error
regarding this issue.”  Jones I, 580 So. 2d at 146.
Jones’s direct appeal argument on this point was at its core an argument for
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severance.  On direct appeal, appellate counsel argued Crum v. State, 398 So. 2d
810 (Fla. 1981), and Rowe v. State, 404 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), in
support of appellate counsel’s point on appeal.  These cases concern severance. 
See Crum, 398 So. 2d at 811-12; Rowe, 404 So. 2d at 1176-77.  In this habeas
petition, Jones argues the same Crum and Rowe cases to support collateral
counsel’s argument that Jones’s appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
the severance claim on direct appeal.  This Court previously has made clear that
habeas is not proper to argue a variant to an already decided issue.  See Thompson
v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 657 n.6 (Fla. 2000).
As to the other motions for severance, we conclude that the trial judge did
not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to sever.  A trial judge’s ruling
regarding a severance motion is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.  See
Coleman v. State, 610 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Fla. 1992).  Jones’s reliance in the
present petition on Crum is misplaced.  This case is factually distinguishable from
Crum in the same way Crum was distinguished in Dean v. State, 478 So. 2d 38
(Fla. 1985):
Petitioner in [McCray v. State, 416 So. 2d 804 (1982)] had also
relied on Crum to support his argument that  a severance was required. 
We distinguished Crum in the following manner:
In that case, two brothers, Preston and Marvin Crum,
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were charged with murder.  Prior to trial, counsel for
appellant Preston obtained a statement from codefendant
Marvin which was in total accord with Preston’s version
of the incident.  After the jury was sworn, Preston learned
that Marvin had changed his story and intended to accuse
Preston, at trial, of committing the murder.  Marvin was
not required to give the statement, but once he did so,
Preston was entitled to rely on that statement.  When
codefendant Marvin changed his story after the jury was
sworn, we determined that, on a proper motion,
severance was necessary because Preston was, under
these circumstances, denied a fair trial.
The problem in Crum was not simply that the
codefendants had antagonistic defenses.  The problem
was that one codefendant induced the other to believe
that their defenses would be completely consistent and
then, after jeopardy attached, decided to change his
story, thereby prejudicing the proper preparation of the
case for trial.  The circumstances would have been
different had there been no prior statement or had there
been sufficient notice before trial of the change in
Marvin’s position.
Dean, 478 So. 2d at 43 (quoting McCray, 416 So. 2d at 807) (alteration in original).
In Dean, we relied upon our statement in McCray in which we stated:
[T]he question of whether severance should be granted must
necessarily be answered on a case by case basis.  Some general rules
have, however, been established.  Specifically, the fact that the
defendant might have a better chance of acquittal or a strategic
advantage if tried separately does not establish the right to a severance. 
Nor is hostility among defendants, or an attempt by one defendant to
escape punishment by throwing the blame on a codefendant, a
sufficient reason, by itself, to require severance.  If the defendants
engage in a swearing match as to who did what, the jury should
resolve the conflicts and determine the truth of the matter. 
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McCray, 416 So. 2d at 806 (citations and footnote omitted).
Based upon McCray and Dean, the evidence to which Jones points in this
habeas petition did not require the trial judge to grant the severance motion. 
Simply, Griffin argued a lack of evidence against him and not that Jones committed
the crime.  Under these circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying the motions to sever.  Accordingly, this issue does not form a basis for
habeas relief as Jones is unable to demonstrate prejudice.
AUTOPSY PHOTOGRAPHS
Jones next argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to seek
review of certain autopsy photographs admitted during the guilt phase.  This Court
does not disturb a trial judge’s ruling regarding the admissibility of photographic
evidence absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., Wilson v. State,
436 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1983).  Further, autopsy photographs are relevant to
show the manner of death, location of wounds, and identity of the victim, and to
assist the medical examiner.  See Larkins v. State, 655 So. 2d 95, 98 (Fla. 1995);
see also Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 648 (Fla. 2000) (upholding
admissibility of autopsy photos depicting mutilation of victim’s genitalia and brain). 
Photos that are relevant are admissible so long as their shocking nature does not
defeat their relevance.  See, e.g., Czubak v. State, 570 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990).
12There was no argument in Jones’s rule 3.850 motion that trial counsel was
ineffective for allowing these autopsy photos to be admitted without objection.
13The shooting occurred at 1918 Lake Bradford Road.
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There were graphic autopsy photos entered into evidence without an
objection from Jones that the prejudicial value substantially outweighed the
probative value.  Moreover, several of the photographs to which Jones now objects
were introduced at trial without objection.12  To the extent that the autopsy photos
were introduced into evidence without objection, appellate counsel cannot be
ineffective for not raising unpreserved claims.  See Medina v. Dugger, 586 So. 2d
317, 318 (Fla. 1991); Suarez v. Dugger, 527 So. 2d 190, 193 (Fla. 1988).
Jones’s habeas claim, therefore, must rely on three photographs in which trial
counsel did preserve error, and that purported error was not argued in the direct
appeal.  Testimony from trial reveals that these three autopsy photographs include a
photo of:  (1) Officer Ponce de Leon’s left hand with “1918 Lake” written on the
hand;13 (2) Officer Ponce de Leon’s back depicting a bluish, bruised-looking area
under which rested a bullet; and (3) Officer Ponce de Leon’s back with an incision
in it to display the location of the bullet.  The trial record reflects that the trial judge
viewed all the autopsy photographs and determined that the probative value of each
of the photos was not substantially outweighed by an unfair prejudicial effect. 
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Again, we conclude Jones has failed to demonstrate that the trial judge abused his
discretion in admitting these photographs.  See Larkins, 655 So. 2d at 98;
Mansfield, 758 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2000).  Furthermore, in respect to what is depicted
in these photos to which there was objection, any error in their admission would be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, this issue cannot be a basis for
habeas relief as Jones has failed to show prejudice flowing from appellate counsel’s
failure to raise this issue on direct appeal.
PROSECUTORIAL COMMENTS
Jones next argues that the prosecutor made three separate improper
comments during the penalty phase closing argument to which trial counsel did not
object and which appellate counsel should have raised on direct appeal.  Jones
raised in his eighth claim to his rule 3.850 motion submitted to the trial judge that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to these comments.  See Jones II,
732 So. 2d at 314, n.1.  The trial judge held this issue to be procedurally barred and
denied relief.  See id. at 314-15.  When appealing the trial judge’s denial of his
3.850 motion to this Court, Jones did not pursue this claim.  See id.
Jones maintains in this habeas petition that these comments constitute
fundamental error and that therefore appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
argue in the direct appeal that the comments were fundamental error.  “In order to
14Jones complains that the prosecutor commented on Jones’s due process
rights, argued future dangerousness, and denigrated mitigation evidence.
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constitute fundamental error, improper comments made in the closing arguments of
a penalty phase must be so prejudicial as to taint the jury’s recommended
sentence.”  Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 985 n.10 (Fla. 1999).  In this habeas,
Jones alleges three different arguments14 that singularly or in toto amount to
fundamental error.
During the penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury:
Now, I guess, of course, the first question is shall we give this
defendant the same justice that he gave Ernie Ponce de Leon?  And, of
course, the answer to that is no.  Because what he gave Ernie Ponce
de Leon was not justice but murder.  And that’s not what we’re here
about.  That’s not what our system is about.  But wouldn’t it have
been nice if Ponce de Leon had had the opportunity to plead his case? 
Wouldn’t it be nice if there had been a judge and jury to determine
what it was that he had done wrong in order for him to be killed like
that?  Wouldn’t it be nice if he could have called witnesses on his
behalf or a psychologist to talk about his early childhood?  Wouldn’t
that have been nice?
But, of course, that didn’t happen and it couldn’t happen
because this defendant wasn’t interested in doing what was right.  This
defendant was interested in killing this man right here.
I want to show you two pictures, and I don’t show you this for
shock effect.  I know you have seen these before.  But this is what we
are here about today.  Here is Ernie Ponce de Leon when he was alive. 
Here he is on the coroner’s table on the morning of July 8, 1988. 
Dead because this man decided on his own that it was time for Ernie
Ponce de Leon to die.  That’s why this picture is here.  Because this
man made a judgment and he killed Ernie Ponce de Leon, and he killed
him by putting two bullets into his chest.  And I was going to show
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you that photograph but I know you have seen that before.  There’s
really no need to.  You can take it back with you if you wish.  But I
don’t really suspect any one of you will ever forget the size of those
two bullet holes in his chest or the testimony of the doctor that
examined him and said his heart was destroyed.  That he was dead like
that (snapping fingers), because that man, that man decided it was time
for Ernie Ponce de Leon to leave us.  No judge, no jury, no witnesses,
nothing.  This is time to go.  They didn’t give him a warning.  He had
no idea it was his time to go.  They didn’t give him due process like
we’re giving him.  They didn’t give him a chance to argue his case. 
They didn’t even take any lesser possibilities.  There was no question. 
When that man popped out of the car, death was on his mind, and it
wasn’t his own death.  It was the death of Ernie Ponce de Leon.
. . . .
How many is enough, I guess is the question.  How many times
do people have to be put at risk?  How many times is it okay for
Clarence Jones to threaten people with weapons and then to kill them?
. . . .
[Dr. Anis] told you also that the defendant has told him that
basically he had a hard life; that his parents had divorced when he was
young, that he lived with his father and his father dies, his mother dies,
and some brothers died.  Ladies and gentlemen, ask yourself the
question.  What right does that give anybody to take the life of a good
man that didn’t have to die.  Because Clarence Jones says that he had
some misfortune in life?  That gives him the right to take the life of a
good man? . . . .
. . . .
You know, he gives you those certificates concerning his past. 
I think he got his GED.  He got a certificate in woodworking course.  I
think he got a prison ministries certificate; he got a couple of
certificates from the PTL Club signed by Mr. Bakker.  You know,
we’re not interested in his past.  What we’re interested in is July 8,
1988, because that has the most effect.
We have considered allegations of fundamental error stemming from closing
argument in a habeas petition.  See Robinson v. Moore, 773 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla.
15The trial judge in his sentencing order did not find the “great risk to many”
aggravator.
16This Court struck the “committed during a robbery” aggravator on direct
appeal.  See Jones I, 580 So. 2d at 146.
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2000).  However, we have not done so in an instance in which, as here, the issue
was raised in the rule 3.850 motion, denied by the trial court, and then not pursued
on appeal of the denial of the 3.850 motion.  We do not reach in this case whether
failure to pursue that denial bars raising the issue in this habeas petition because we
do not find the comments reached the level of fundamental error.  Thus, we come
to the same conclusion we reached in Robinson.  Accordingly, this issue does not
form the basis of habeas relief.
INAPPLICABLE AGGRAVATORS
Jones next argues that this Court, in light of Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S.
1079 (1992), erred in upholding the death sentence even though the advisory jury
was instructed upon two aggravators that later were either not found by the trial
judge15 or struck by this Court on direct appeal. 16  We find this claim to be
procedurally barred.
In Espinosa, the Supreme Court held that in capital cases neither sentencing
authority (advisory jury or trial judge) may weigh an invalid aggravator.  See id. at
1082.  There, the Supreme Court held that the “especially wicked, evil, atrocious or
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cruel” aggravator was unconstitutionally vague.  See id. at 1081.  In this habeas
petition, Jones does not claim that the two aggravators were unconstitutionally
vague or otherwise invalid; rather, Jones argues that instructing the jury on
aggravators later found to not be supported by the evidence is impermissible. 
Thus, there is no Espinosa error.
In Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1996), this Court made clear that a
jury is presumed not to have weighed properly instructed aggravators that
subsequently are found not to exist.  See id. at 754.  Clearly, Jones’s argument
concerning Espinosa error is merely an attempt to use habeas to reargue the
wisdom of the death sentence in this case.  This issue was adversely decided
against Jones on direct appeal; thus, this issue is procedurally barred.  See Parker
v. Dugger, 550 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, we deny all relief in this petition for writ of
habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
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IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding -  Habeas Corpus
Steven L. Seliger of Garcia & Seliger, Quincy, Florida; Gregory C. Smith, Capital
Collateral Regional Counsel - Northern Region, Tallahassee, Florida; and Gail E.
Anderson, Special Assistant CCC-NR, Greensboro, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Curtis M. French, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent