Case Title: Com. v. Murray

Citation: 392 A.2d 317, 481 Pa. 201

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1978-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
481 Pa. 201 (1978) 392 A.2d 317 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Solomon MURRAY, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted May 22, 1978. Decided October 5, 1978. *202 *203 Bruce D. Foreman, Harrisburg, for appellant. Marion E. MacIntyre, 2nd Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee. Before EAGEN, C.J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ. O'BRIEN, Justice. Appellant, Solomon Murray, was convicted by a jury of murder of the first degree. Post-verdict motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, we affirmed the judgment of sentence by a per curiam order. Commonwealth v. Murray, 473 Pa. 317, 374 A.2d 534 (1977). Appellant then filed a pro se petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA).[1] Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed. Appellant's requested relief was denied without an evidentiary hearing and this appeal followed. *204 Appellant believes he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel for (1) failing to call four defense witnesses; (2) failing to cross-examine a majority of the Commonwealth's witnesses; and (3) failing to object to comments about appellant's silence at the time of his arrest. We do not reach the merits of appellant's claims, as they have not been properly preserved for appellate review. The facts are as follows. At trial, appellant was represented by private counsel. On direct appeal to this court, appellant was represented by the Dauphin County Public Defender's Office. When appellant filed his pro se PCHA petition, a different private counsel was appointed to assist him in the PCHA proceedings. Appellant is represented by this third attorney on this appeal. In Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95, 331 A.2d 435 (1975), we held that trial counsel's effectiveness must be challenged on direct appeal where appellate counsel was not trial counsel. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of that claim. The Post Conviction Hearing Act provides: Appellate counsel on direct appeal did not challenge trial counsel's effectiveness, thus waiving the issue. For this claim to be cognizable at this time, appellant is required to have challenged direct appeal counsel's effectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Com. ex rel. Neal v. Myers, 424 Pa. 576, 227 A.2d 845 (1967). In Paragraph 4 of appellant's pro se petition, he checked the block stating he was entitled to relief because of "the denial of my constitutional right to representation by competent counsel" with appellant adding "both at trial and on *205 appellate review." However, § 5 of the PCHA, 19 P.S. 1180-5 provides: Nowhere in either the pro se petition or the amended counseled petition are any facts averred in support of the allegation of appellate counsel's ineffectiveness. In Commonwealth v. Fox, 448 Pa. 491, 295 A.2d 285 (1972), we recognized that prison-drawn pro se PCHA petitions must be read with liberality. Here, however, counsel was appointed to assist appellant and he did file an amended petition which contained no facts in support of the allegation that appellate counsel was ineffective. Counsel never sought leave to amend his petition to satisfy the specificity requirements of § 5 of the PCHA. In appellant's brief submitted to our court, present counsel claims that appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness. We believe this fact cannot cure the failure to state sufficient facts in the PCHA petition. The Post Conviction Hearing Act further provides: POMEROY, J., concurs in the order of affirmance, being of the opinion that the PCHA court committed neither an error of law nor an abuse of discretion in its disposition of the case. ROBERTS and MANDERINO, JJ., file dissenting opinions. NIX, J., dissents. ROBERTS, Justice, dissenting. Under the guise of the waiver doctrine, the majority denies appellant review of his PCHA allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and violation of the right against self-incrimination because of a technical defect in appellant's PCHA petition. This nineteenth century view of pleading violates the Post-Conviction Hearing Act[*] and distorts principles of waiver. Section 1180-5(a)(1) of the Act requires a petitioner to state "all facts in support of the alleged error on which the petition is based." Because appellant did not set forth in his petition facts in support of his allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, the majority concludes that appellant has waived his allegations. To the contrary, waiver occurs only when a party fails to raise an issue at the appropriate *207 time. See Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974) (trial error waived if not objected to at trial); Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975) (trial error waived if not raised on post-verdict motions as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(a)); Post Conviction Hearing Act, § 1180-4 (issues not raised properly on direct appeal or in PCHA petition deemed waived). In his petition, appellant raised the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel; what he failed to do was allege underlying facts. His omission was therefore not a waiver but a failure to comply with the pleading requirement of § 1180-5 of the PCHA. In denying appellant review, the majority ignores section 1180-7 of the PCHA, which provides: Accord, Commonwealth v. Satchell, 430 Pa. 443, 243 A.2d 381 (1968); Commonwealth v. Gates, 429 Pa. 453, 240 A.2d 815 (1968); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 426 Pa. 265, 232 A.2d 193 (1967). The purpose of the requirement that a petitioner state underlying facts is to alert the PCHA court and the Commonwealth to the nature of the allegations raised. Appellant's allegation that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel apparently satisfied this purpose, because the Commonwealth defended on the merits rather than seek dismissal for want of particularity. Indeed, had the Commonwealth sought dismissal of the petition on this basis, the PCHA court would have been obliged under PCHA § 1180-7 to permit appellant to clarify his position. Yet the majority now finds appellant's petition fatally defective without granting him the opportunity to clarify as required by statute. Where neither the PCHA court nor the Commonwealth detected any prejudice in appellant's recitation of facts, it certainly exalts notions of technical sufficiency of pleadings over substance to hold that appellant waived his right to review by neglecting to support his allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. *208 I dissent and would reach the merits of appellant's allegations. MANDERINO, Justice, dissenting. After giving lip service to this Court's duty to read pro se PCHA petitions liberally, the majority finds appellant's petition defective based on a myopic and unjustifiably narrow reading of that petition. I dissent. As the majority notes, appellant's petition claimed ineffectiveness of both trial and appellate counsel. The facts underlying appellant's claim of ineffective trial counsel are clear. The majority now holds that the claim of ineffective appellate counsel is waived because no facts were alleged to support it. It is common sense that appellant's claim of ineffective appellate counsel was that appellate counsel did not raise an issue he should have raised trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Holding appellant's ineffective appellate counsel claim waived under these circumstances can hardly be called a liberal reading of this pro se PCHA petition. I respectfully dissent. [1] Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580, § 1, 19 P.S. § 1180-1 et seq. (Supp. 1977-78). [*] Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. (1965), 1580, §§ 1 et seq., 19 P.S. §§ 1180-1 et seq. (Supp. 1978).