Case Title: Murray County v. Homesales, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2014-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
MURRAY COUNTY v. HOMESALES, INC.2014 OK 52Case Number: 111,663Decided: 06/24/2014THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. 
UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. 

MURRAY COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ex rel. MURRAY 
COUNTY, OKLAHOMA and JOHNSTON COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ex rel. 
JOHNSTON COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, Plaintiffs/Respondents,v.HOMESALES, INC., JP 
MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. (for itself and as successor by merger to CHASE HOME 
FINANCE, LLC), and EMC MORTGAGE, LLC f/k/a EMC MORTGAGE CORPORATION, 
Defendants/Petitioners,andWELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS (MERS), HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORP, III, US BANK NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION, FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB, WACHOVIA BANK, N.A., AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC, 
HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL NETWORK, LLC, BELVEDERE TRUST FINANCE, DEUTSCHE BANK 
NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, and MILLENNIUM STATE BANK OF TEXAS, Defendants.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI OF CERTIFIED INTERLOCUTORY ORDER FROM 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF MURRY COUNTY, HONORABLE AARON DUCK, TRIAL JUDGE
¶0 Defendants Homesales, Inc., (Homesales), JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) 
and EMC Mortgage, LLC, f/k/a EMC Mortgage Corporation1 appeal a certified 
interlocutory order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs 
Murray County, Oklahoma, County Commissioners ex rel. Murray County, Oklahoma 
and Johnston County, Oklahoma, County Commissioners ex rel. Johnston County, 
Oklahoma (the Counties). This case concerns the Documentary Stamp Tax Act 
(DSTA), Title 68 O.S. 2011 §§ 
3201 through 3206, and its applicability to conveyances in four mortgage 
foreclosure actions prosecuted by Chase. The grantees claimed that the 
conveyances were exempt from documentary taxes. The Counties disagreed and sued 
to collect the taxes they claimed were due. The district court granted partial 
summary judgment to the Counties finding that the conveyances were not exempt 
from the DSTA, and that the Counties could sue to enforce the provisions of the 
DSTA and collect the documentary taxes that were not paid on these transactions. 
We hold that the Counties are not authorized to prosecute violations of the 
DSTA. However, the Counties do have standing to challenge the exemptions from 
the documentary tax claimed for these conveyances. Nonetheless, based on the 
record provided to the district court in the summary judgment proceeding, the 
Counties have not established that the challenged transfers are subject to 
documentary taxes. We reverse the order granting partial summary judgment and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; CERTIFIED INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS.
Clyde A. Muchmore, Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 
Defendants/Petitioners.Kenneth M. Kliebard, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 
LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Defendant/Petitioners.Darryl F. Roberts and 
Jason D. May, P.O. Box 1568, Ardmore, Oklahoma, for 
Plaintiffs/Respondents.
FISCHER, S.J.:
¶1 In this appeal, we must determine whether a transfer of real property 
between affiliated business entities constitutes a "sale" for purposes of the 
Documentary Stamp Tax Act. We hold that the transfer of real property between 
affiliated corporations or transfers on behalf of the beneficial owner of real 
property are not taxable if any consideration paid does not exceed $100.
FACTS
¶2 This case involves the conveyance of title to real property as a result of 
four real estate foreclosure proceedings. Chase filed each foreclosure case and 
was the successful bidder at each sheriff's sale. Therefore, Chase was entitled 
to a sheriff's deed to each of the properties. However, Chase did not take 
title. Instead, sheriff's deeds were granted to Chase's affiliated entities. The 
deeds were recorded with the respective county clerks. The grantees noted on the 
conveyances that the deeds were exempt from documentary taxes. And, no 
documentary taxes were paid.
¶3 The Counties contend the conveyances involved in this case are not exempt 
and filed this suit to collect the applicable documentary taxes. On November 28, 
2011, the Counties filed their First Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. In its 
response, Chase argued that the Counties did not have standing to enforce the 
provisions of the DSTA and that the deeds at issue were exempt from documentary 
taxes. The district court granted the Counties' motion for partial summary 
judgment on February 11, 2013, and then certified "that an immediate appeal 
would materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation." 
See Okla. Sup. Ct. R. 1.50, 12 O.S.2011, ch. 15, app. 1. We granted the 
Defendants' petition for certiorari to review the district court's interlocutory 
order.2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4 The Defendants argue in this appeal that the order granting partial 
summary judgment should be reversed for two reasons: (1) the Counties lack 
standing to enforce the provisions of the DSTA; and (2) the post-foreclosure 
conveyances are exempt from documentary taxes. The district court's order 
granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Carmichael v. 
Beller, 1996 OK 
48, ¶ 2, 914 P.2d 1051, 1053. That review requires examination of the pleadings and evidentiary 
materials submitted by the parties to determine whether there exists a genuine 
issue of material fact. Id. This Court bears "an affirmative duty to test 
all evidentiary material tendered in summary process for its legal sufficiency 
to support the relief sought by the movant." Copeland v. The Lodge Enters., 
Inc., 2000 OK 
36, ¶ 8, 4 P.3d 695, 699.
¶5 Legal questions involving the district court's statutory interpretation of 
the DSTA are also subject to de novo review. Fulsom v. Fulsom, 
2003 OK 96, ¶ 2, 81 P.3d 652, 654. The primary goal of statutory 
construction is to ascertain and apply the intent of the Legislature that 
enacted the statute. Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 
2001 OK 71, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d 302, 307.
ANALYSIS
¶6 The Documentary Stamp Tax Act imposes a tax on certain transfers of real 
property: 
A tax is hereby imposed on each deed, instrument or writing by which any 
lands, tenements, or other realty sold shall be granted, assigned, transferred, 
or otherwise conveyed to or vested in the purchaser . . . when the consideration 
or value of the interest or property conveyed . . . exceeds One Hundred Dollars 
($100.00).
68 O.S.2011 § 3201(A). "'Sold' means a 
transfer of an interest for a valuable consideration, which may involve money or 
anything of value." 68 O.S.2011 § 3201(C)(1). "Consideration" is 
defined as "the actual pecuniary value exchanged or paid . . . for the transfer 
or conveyance of an interest of realty . . . ." 68 O.S.2011 § 3201(C)(3). When a sale of 
real property occurs, a documentary tax is levied on "the privilege of executing 
a 'deed, instrument or writing' that effects transfers of 'land, tenements and 
other realty.'" Johnston v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 1972 OK 88, ¶ 9, 497 P.2d 1295, 1297. The tax is collected through the 
sale of documentary stamps provided by the Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC) and 
sold by the county clerks. 68 O.S.2011 §§ 3203 and 3204. The county 
clerk is authorized to retain and deposit in the county general fund five 
percent of the first $0.55 of every $0.75 collected and the remaining $0.20 of 
each $0.75 collected. 68 O.S.2011 § 3204(B)(1) and (C). The 
balance is forwarded to the OTC. 68 O.S.2011 § 3204. However, certain 
transfers of real property are exempt from the documentary tax. See 
68 O.S.2011 § 3202; Okla. Admin. Code § 
710:30-1-9. 
¶7 The facts dispositive of this appeal are established from two sources, the 
judgments in the foreclosure cases and the summary judgment record. The 
judgments in the foreclosure proceedings are now final and are not subject to 
collateral attack in this case "in the absence of fraud, mistake or collusion," 
none of which have been asserted with respect to the those judgments.3 Chandler v. 
Denton, 1987 OK 109, ¶ 10, 747 P.2d 938, 941. Further, those judgments are 
presumed to include a finding of every fact required to support the judgment. 
Gage v. Estep, 1966 OK 52, 422 P.2d 449. The facts and the inferences drawn from 
the summary judgment record "must be taken in favor of the party opposing the 
motion." Hargrave v. Canadian Valley Elec. Co-op., Inc., 1990 OK 43, ¶ 14, 792 P.2d 50, 56. So viewed, the record establishes 
that at the time each of the four foreclosure actions was filed, Chase was the 
holder of a promissory note and mortgage securing repayment of the note on the 
real property being foreclosed or that it was the party entitled to enforce 
those instruments. After the borrowers defaulted, Chase successfully sued to 
collect the unpaid balance of the notes and foreclose its mortgages. Each case 
resulted in a judgment in favor of Chase for the note balance. The judgments 
also foreclosed Chase's mortgages and directed the sheriff to sell the property 
secured by the mortgages. Chase was the successful bidder at the sheriff's sale 
in each case and subsequently filed a motion to confirm the sales.
¶8 The district court orders confirming the sales recite that the properties 
were sold to Chase, that the sales were made in conformity with the statutes of 
Oklahoma and that at the hearing on the motions to confirm the sales Chase 
assigned all of its right, title and interest in the properties. In three of the 
proceedings, Chase assigned its interest to Homesales. Homesales is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Chase. In the fourth foreclosure action involving property 
previously owned by Linda Gentry, Chase assigned its interest to the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (FNMA). FNMA was the beneficial owner of the 
Gentry property and Chase was acting as FNMA's agent in that foreclosure. At the 
direction of the district court and Chase, the sheriff executed deeds to 
Homesales and FNMA. The deeds state that they are exempt from documentary stamp 
tax pursuant to section 3202(13): "Any deed executed pursuant to a foreclosure 
proceeding in which the grantee is the holder of a mortgage on the property 
being foreclosed . . . ." The Counties contend that no exemption from 
documentary stamp tax is available for the conveyances subsequent to Chase's 
oral assignment of its interest in the properties at the confirmation hearings. 
They filed this suit to enforce section 3201 and collect the documentary taxes 
they contend are due.
I.THE COUNTIES DO NOT HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO 
PROSECUTE VIOLATIONS OF THE DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX ACT
¶9 The initial issue raised by Chase is whether the Counties have standing to 
sue to collect unpaid documentary taxes. "Taxation is an exclusively legislative 
function that can be exercised only under statutory authority and in the manner 
specified by statute." State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texaco 
Exploration & Prod., Inc., 2005 OK 52, ¶ 7, 131 P.3d 705, 707 (citing Gay v. Thomas, 
1896 OK 67, 46 P. 578). Chase contends that only the OTC has 
statutory authority to enforce the DSTA and, therefore, the Counties do not have 
standing to prosecute this action. Chase specifically points to section 3205 of 
the DSTA: "The Oklahoma Tax Commission through the Documentary Stamp Tax Unit 
shall be responsible for the administration and enforcement of the taxes as 
imposed by Section 3201 of this title." Chase's argument depends on the 
construction of this language. "When the Legislature has clearly expressed its 
intent, the use of additional rules of construction are almost always 
unnecessary and a statute will be applied as written." Samman v. Multiple 
Injury Trust Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d  at 307 (citations omitted). 
Here, the plain language of the statute states that the OTC is "responsible for 
the administration and enforcement" of the DSTA through the OTC's Documentary 
Stamp Tax Unit. 68 O.S.2011 § 
3205. The Counties argue, however, that nothing in the DSTA expressly states 
that the OTC is solely responsible for administration and enforcement or that 
county clerks are prohibited from filing enforcement actions. Construction of 
the DSTA is necessary to resolve these questions.
¶10 The Counties do not address the effect of section 3205 of the DSTA. They 
rely on their general authority to "sue and be sued." 19 O.S.2011 § 1. From this, the Counties conclude that 
they may exercise this authority and initiate judicial proceedings to prosecute 
violations of the DSTA because they are the governmental entities charged with 
collecting documentary taxes. Section 3204(A) does provide that "the county 
clerks shall have the responsibility of selling [documentary] stamps and shall 
have the further duty of accounting for the stamps to the Oklahoma Tax 
Commission on the last day of each month." And, general principles of statutory 
construction require parts of a legislative enactment to be construed so as to 
"harmonize [each provision] with all the others." Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. 
State ex rel. Vassar, 1940 OK 137, ¶ 10, 101 P.2d 793, 796. Even so, the construction of 
individual provisions of a statutory scheme must be consistent with the 
overriding policy of the entire enactment as intended by the Legislature. 
Id. We find the Counties' argument unpersuasive.
¶11 First, it is the policy of this State, "to provide, so far as possible, 
uniform procedures and remedies with respect to all state taxes." 
68 O.S.2011 § 201 (describing the purpose 
of the Uniform Tax Procedure Code). Unless expressly provided otherwise, the 
Uniform Tax Procedure Code "shall control and shall be exclusive." Id. 
The Legislature has vested in the OTC the authority to "enforce the provisions 
of [the Uniform Tax Procedure Code] and to promulgate and enforce any reasonable 
rules with respect thereto." 68 O.S.2011 § 203. Although the OTC is 
required to "coordinate with city and county governments to increase state and 
local sales and use tax collections through joint enforcement efforts," the OTC 
maintains "central administration" of such efforts. 68 O.S.2011 § 281. As later discussed in 
this Opinion, it does not appear the OTC and the Counties share the same view 
regarding the taxability of the conveyances at issue in this case. Uniform 
procedures and remedies for the assessment and collection of documentary taxes 
cannot be achieved if the results depend on the county in which the transaction 
occurred. "The construction placed on a statute by officers in the discharge of 
their duties . . . which has been long acquiesced in, is a just medium for its 
judicial interpretation." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & 
Trust Co., 1955 OK 208, ¶ 0, 289 P.2d 388 (syllabus 1). Only the OTC has been 
charged by the Legislature with developing and implementing uniform tax 
policy.
¶12 Second, the Counties' position conflicts with the general statutory 
procedure established by the Legislature for collecting unpaid taxes. That 
procedure begins with an administrative determination by the OTC that taxes are 
due and on certification of the debt, the entry of, in effect, a judgment for 
the taxes due. 68 O.S.2011 §§ 
221 and 230. The OTC may also issue a tax warrant for unpaid taxes to a 
county sheriff. 68 O.S.2011 § 
231. In either instance, the county clerk is charged with the ministerial 
task of filing the OTC's certification or warrant. Generally, the OTC's 
administrative process is a prerequisite to litigation. State ex rel. 
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 
2005 OK 52, 131 P.3d 705 (OTC may not bypass the administrative 
process and file suit in district court except where a false or fraudulent 
report is filed with intent to evade taxes). When litigation is necessary, the 
Legislature requires that suit be filed "in the name of the State of Oklahoma, 
on relation of the Oklahoma Tax Commission." 68 O.S.2011 § 215(a). In none of these 
statutes is any authority granted to county clerks to sue to collect unpaid 
taxes.
¶13 The only governmental officer other than the general counsel of the OTC 
who is statutorily authorized to file suit to recover unpaid taxes is the 
Attorney General. 68 O.S.2011 § 
250. If the Legislature has authorized the Attorney General to do so, it 
could have also provided similar authorization for county clerks. The fact that 
it did not supports the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend for 
counties to have direct enforcement authority to collect unpaid taxes. See 
McSorley v. Hertz Corp., 1994 OK 120, ¶ 19, 885 P.2d 1343, 1350-51 (omission of self-insurers from 
the list of those statutorily required to offer uninsured motorist coverage was 
evidence of legislative intent not to require self-insurers to offer uninsured 
motorist coverage). Nor can we conclude that this omission was inadvertent, at 
least with respect to the DSTA. The Legislature specifically addressed the 
county clerk's enforcement role in that context. If a county clerk becomes 
"aware" that a taxpayer has not or might not have paid the correct amount of 
documentary tax, the clerk must "immediately report the facts to the Oklahoma 
Tax Commission." 68 O.S.2011 § 
3206(D). No provision of the DSTA authorizes county clerks to take any 
further action. "The law-making body is presumed to have expressed its intent in 
a statute's language and to have intended what the text expresses." Yocum v. 
Greenbriar Nursing Home, 2005 OK 27, ¶ 9, 130 P.3d 213, 219. The enforcement authority of the OTC 
and the role of the county clerks in that process are specifically addressed in 
the DSTA. County clerks are required to sell documentary stamps, account for the 
proceeds and report any suspected violation to the OTC. Although the Counties' 
have general authority to sue granted in Title 19 O.S.2011 § 1, they have not been granted any similar 
authority in the specific DSTA statutes at issue here. "Where a matter is 
addressed by two statutes, one specific and the other general, the specific 
statute governs over the general provision." Jones v. State, 
2011 OK 105, ¶ 14, 268 P.3d 72, 76. Cf., Dowell v. Pletcher, 
2013 OK 39, 304 P.3d 735 (affirming dismissal of county clerk in 
action by bail bondsman challenging the "Ten Bond Rule" finding clerk had no 
enforcement authority because Legislature implemented detailed procedure giving 
Insurance Commissioner "full power and authority" to enforce the rule).
¶14 Third, rules promulgated by the OTC for the administration and 
enforcement of the DSTA confirm that county clerks do not have direct 
enforcement authority. See 68 O.S.2011 § 3205: "The Oklahoma Tax 
Commission shall prescribe such rules and regulations as it may deem necessary 
to carry out the purpose of Sections 3201 through 3206 of this title." Pursuant 
to this authority, the OTC promulgated rules "to facilitate the administration, 
enforcement, and collection of taxes and other levies enacted by the Oklahoma 
Legislature with respect to documentary stamps." Okla. Admin. Code § 710:30-1-1 
(codified Dec. 30, 1991). Those rules were adopted by the Legislature and now 
"have the force of law" (75 O.S.2011 § 308.2(C)), subject to judicial 
review. 75 O.S.2011 § 
306(C) ("Rules promulgated pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative 
Procedures Act are presumed to be valid until declared otherwise by a district 
court of this state or the Supreme Court."); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-20 of 
Muskogee County v. Okla. State Dep't of Educ., 2003 OK 18, 65 P.3d 612 (agency rule may be challenged pursuant to 
the declaratory judgment provision of 75 O.S. § 306). The OTC's rules very clearly describe 
the different roles of the OTC and the county clerks with respect to the 
collection of documentary taxes. Rule 710:30-1-10 sets out the "Duties and 
responsibilities of the county clerk." The Rule states: "County clerks are 
responsible for selling Documentary Stamps to the taxpayers and have the duty of 
accounting for the stamps to the Oklahoma Tax Commission." The county clerk's 
role in the enforcement of the DSTA is limited to two functions. "In order to 
make a correct determination of tax due, the county clerks have the duty to 
request taxpayers to produce satisfactory documentation which correctly 
discloses the value of the property." Okla. Admin. Code § 710:30-1-10(2). "If 
the taxpayer claims exemption from the payment of the documentary stamp tax, and 
there is no notation on the deed indicating the reason for the claiming of the 
exemption, the county clerk shall make a brief notation on the face of the deed 
indicating the reason for claiming the exemption." Okla. Admin. Code § 
710:30-1-10(5). Rule 710:30-1-7 provides that if a taxpayer does not pay the 
necessary amount of documentary taxes "the Commission shall" send a proposed tax 
assessment to the taxpayer. The taxpayer can challenge that assessment by filing 
a protest with the Commission. However, no authority is provided in the OTC's 
rules for county clerks to decide a taxpayer's protest. Any protest "will be 
forwarded to the General Counsel's Office of the Oklahoma Tax Commission for 
disposition." Id. 
¶15 The rules promulgated by the OTC and adopted by the Legislature for the 
enforcement of the DSTA provide that the county clerks have a subordinate and 
ministerial role in that process. "For the purpose of collecting the 
[documentary] stamp tax, the county clerks act as agents of the Oklahoma Tax 
Commission." Okla. Admin. Code § 710:30-1-10. The essential factor in any agency 
relationship is the principal's right to control the conduct of the agent. 
Enterprise Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 
1988 OK 91, ¶ 6, n.13, 
768 P.2d 359, 362. And, an agent 
cannot unilaterally expand the scope of authority specified by the principal. 
Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Thornburgh, 1940 OK 424, 106 P.2d 511. The Counties have cited no rule by which 
the OTC has delegated to them the authority to file suit to collect unpaid 
documentary taxes, much less any authorization from the OTC to file this law 
suit.4 In all of the applicable statutory provisions, only the 
OTC is specifically charged with "enforcement of the taxes as imposed by Section 
3201." 68 O.S.2011 § 
3205. No provision of the DSTA similarly authorizes a county to do so. "[T]he 
general rule is that nothing may be read into a statute which was not within the 
manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the language of the act." 
Stemmons, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 1956 OK 221 ¶ 19, 301 P.2d 212, 216. We will not read into the DSTA 
authority for the Counties to prosecute violations of the Act when the 
Legislature has declined to do so. 
II.THE COUNTIES HAVE STANDING TO SEEK DECLARATORY 
RELIEF
¶16 Even though we find that the Counties do not have statutory authority to 
prosecute violations of the DSTA, that does not necessarily mean that they do 
not have standing to bring this case. Although the OTC has primary 
responsibility for administration and enforcement of the DSTA, it does not have 
ultimate authority to determine when documentary taxes are due. This Court is 
the final arbiter of disputed tax matters. Okla. Const. art. VII, § 4; 
68 O.S.2011 § 225 (taxpayer aggrieved by 
any order of the Tax Commission may appeal to Supreme Court), and § 3027(final 
orders from the Court of Tax Review may be appealed to the Supreme Court); 
Turner v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n, 1993 OK 77, 858 P.2d 433 (Legislature has made the Supreme Court 
the final arbiter of the meaning of tax statutes). Further, this Court has 
previously recognized the standing of parties to invoke this Court's 
jurisdiction and determine disputed tax matters even in the absence of statutory 
authority to do so. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Smith, 1980 OK 74, 610 P.2d 794 (potential taxpayer could sue for 
declaratory relief where statutory remedy to sue for refund of tax paid was not 
available to challenge constitutionality of taxing statute before tax was due); 
Independent School District No. 9 v. Glass, 1982 OK 2, 639 P.2d 1233 (abrogated in part by constitutional 
amendment) (school district could seek injunction preventing payment of tax 
refund and challenge exemption claimed by a taxpayer). Finally, this Court has 
long-recognized the availability of its equitable powers to protect the public 
treasury from unlawful dissipation or management by those officially charged 
with the care and custody of public funds. Fent v. Contingency Review 
Bd., 2007 OK 
27, ¶ 8, 163 P.3d 512, 519 (citing Kellogg v. School Dist. No. 10 of Comanche County, 
1903 OK 81, 74 P. 110). The question, therefore, is whether the 
Counties have demonstrated their standing to invoke the jurisdiction of Oklahoma 
courts in this case. 
¶17 "'Standing' is the right to commence litigation, to take the initial step 
that frames legal issues for ultimate adjudication by a court or jury." State 
ex rel. Bd. of Regents v. McCloskey Bros., Inc., 2009 OK 90, ¶ 18, 227 P.3d 133, 144. The doctrine of standing identifies 
those disputes that are appropriately resolved through the judicial process. 
Fent, 2007 OK 
27, ¶ 7, n.20, 163 P.3d  at 519 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992)). Standing requires 
proof of:
(1) a legally protected interest which must have been injured in fact- i.e., 
suffered an injury which is actual, concrete and not conjectural in nature, (2) 
a causal nexus between the injury and the complained-of conduct, and (3) a 
likelihood, as opposed to mere speculation, that the injury is capable of being 
redressed by a favorable court decision.
Fent, 2007 OK 
27, ¶ 7, 163 P.3d  at 519 (citing Cities Serv. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 
1999 OK 16, ¶ 3, 976 P.2d 545, 547, and Toxic Waste Impact Group, 
Inc. v. Leavitt, 1994 OK 148, ¶ 8, 890 P.2d 906, 910). "The appropriate inquiry on a 
standing question is whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered injury to a 
legally protected interest as contemplated by statutory or constitutional 
provisions." Leavitt, 1994 OK 148, ¶ 9, 890 P.2d  at 911. Standing is an 
aspect of justiciability, and "focuses on the party seeking to get [a] complaint 
before the court and not on the issues tendered for determination. In standing 
problems the inquiry posed is whether the party invoking the court's 
jurisdiction has a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the tendered 
controversy." Application of State ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 
1982 OK 36, ¶ 6, 646 P.2d 605, 609. 
¶18 This Court dealt with a similar issue in Independent School District 
No. 9 v. Glass, 1982 OK 2, 639 P.2d 1233. Glass involved a suit by a school 
district challenging a refund payable as the result of a tax exemption claimed 
by a taxpayer. The taxpayer's property was located in the school district and 
granting the exemption would directly reduce the revenue received by the 
district. Cf., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 5 of Tulsa County v. Spry, 
2012 OK 98, 292 P.3d 19 (school districts lacked standing to 
challenge voucher program where funds at issue were part of legislative 
appropriation rather than taxes paid by school district taxpayers). The board of 
tax-roll corrections granted the taxpayer's request and the school district sued 
to enjoin payment of the refund. As in this case, the taxing statute in 
Glass did not authorize enforcement by the school district. That remedy 
was available only to the taxpayer or the county assessor. See 
68 O.S. Supp. 1974 § 
2479. Nonetheless, this Court held that injunctive relief was available 
because the statutory remedy was not. "We agree with the District that it has 
standing to seek injunctive relief. The District has an interest in the subject 
matter, the capacity to sue, and the power to protect and prevent the wrongful 
disposition of revenues." Glass, ¶ 11, 639 P.2d  at 1238.
¶19 Even though the school district in Glass was ultimately 
unsuccessful in preventing the tax refund, as relevant to the standing issue in 
this case, Glass is indistinguishable. The Counties have the capacity to 
sue. The statutory remedy for direct enforcement of the DSTA is not available to 
the Counties. However, the relief sought by the Counties is not limited to 
collection of the allegedly unpaid documentary taxes. The Counties also seek an 
"[a]djudication by the Court that documentary stamp taxes are due pursuant to 
68 O.S. § 3201 [and] . . . that 
exemptions from the purchase of documentary stamps made by the defendants 
pursuant to 68 O.S. § 
3201 were [not] lawful." When statutory relief is inadequate, equitable 
relief may be available. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Smith, 
1980 OK 74, 610 P.2d 794. The non-monetary relief sought by the 
Counties in this case is authorized by Oklahoma's declaratory judgment law, 
Title 12 O.S.2011 §§ 
1651 to 1657. "A determination of rights, status, or other legal relations 
may be obtained by means of a pleading seeking that relief alone or as incident 
to or part of a petition, counterclaim, or other pleading seeking other relief . 
. . ." 12 O.S.2011 § 
1652.
¶20 The proof required for the Counties' to establish their right to pursue 
declaratory relief is set out in Gordon v. Followell, 1964 OK 74, ¶ 8, 391 P.2d 242, 245: 
The requisite precedent facts or conditions which the courts generally hold 
must exist in order that declaratory relief may be obtained may be summarized as 
follows: (1) there must exist a justiciable controversy; that is to say, a 
controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an 
interest in contesting it; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose 
interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a 
legal interest in the controversy, that is to say, a legally protectible 
interest; and (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for 
judicial determination.
Here, the Counties are entitled to $0.2275 of each $0.75 in documentary 
stamps sold. 
The exemptions claimed with respect to the conveyances at issue in this case 
deprive the Counties of the documentary tax related to the transactions involved 
in this appeal. And, a determination that the Defendants are claiming the 
exemptions in violation of the DSTA is likely to result in the Counties' receipt 
of the taxes for which they filed this case. "A violation of a state statute is 
an injury to the State and its citizens. A continuing violation is an 
irreparable injury for which injunctive relief is available." Glass, ¶ 
10, 639 P.2d  at 1237. We agree with the Counties; they have a "legally 
cognizable" interest in the outcome of this litigation and have established 
their standing to pursue declaratory relief. "If standing exists, the case must 
proceed on the merits." Id.5
III.THE DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX ACT
¶21 The judgments in the foreclosure cases establish that Chase was the 
holder of the promissory note and mortgage in each of the four foreclosure 
proceedings or a person entitled to enforce those instruments. Therefore, it is 
clear that if the sheriff's deeds in each case had conveyed the property to 
Chase, Chase would have been entitled to the mortgage foreclosure exemption and 
no documentary taxes would be due. "The tax imposed by Section 3201 of this 
title shall not apply to: . . . Any deed executed pursuant to a foreclosure 
proceeding in which the grantee is the holder of a mortgage on the property 
being foreclosed . . . ." 68 O.S.2011 § 3202(13). The Counties do not 
argue otherwise. Their claim to documentary taxes is based on the fact that the 
sheriff's deeds were not granted to Chase but to its corporate subsidiary, 
Homesales, or in the case of the Gentry property to Chase's principal, FNMA. To 
prove that documentary taxes are due as a result of these conveyances, the 
Counties must first show that the properties were "sold," which requires proof 
that there was a "transfer of an interest for a valuable consideration." 
68 O.S.2011 § 3201(C)(1). Second, the 
Counties must prove that the sales are not exempt. Our disposition of the first 
issue makes consideration of the second unnecessary.
¶22 Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. County Clerk of Okfuskee County, 
1986 OK CIV APP 35, 734 P.2d 849 (approved for publication by the Supreme 
Court), cited by the district court, addressed similar issues.6 The Court of Appeals held 
that a homebuilder's exchange of a foreclosure judgment for a sheriff's deed at 
the confirmation hearing constituted "consideration," therefore a sale of the 
property occurred that was not exempt from documentary tax. As authority for its 
holding regarding the exchange of consideration, the Court cited Railroad 
Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 135 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1943). 
That case held that a mortgagor's waiver of the right to pursue a deficiency 
constituted consideration for a deed in lieu of foreclosure and was subject to 
documentary tax. The Court of Appeals noted that reliance on federal case law 
was appropriate because Oklahoma's documentary tax statutes "were taken from 
long-standing federal statutes . . . [and] there are numerous cases which have 
interpreted 26 U.S.C. § 4361, which contains the exact language of our statute." 
Jim Walter Homes, 1986 OK CIV APP 35, ¶ 8, 734 P.2d  at 851. 
Although the federal statute at issue in Railroad Federal is identical to 
section 3201(A), the tax on the transaction was imposed pursuant to a United 
States Treasury regulation providing that a conveyance by a defaulting mortgagee 
in consideration for cancellation of the debt is taxed based on the amount of 
the debt plus accrued interest. As Judge Learned Hand's dissent in Railroad 
Federal points out, the effect of the regulation was to tax not only the 
value of any equity paid to the mortgagee but also the remaining amount of the 
debt without deducting the value of the land for which the mortgagor had 
originally loaned the purchase price. Railroad Federal, 135 F.2d  at 293 
(Hand, J. dissenting). Deeds in lieu of foreclosure are now exempt from 
documentary taxes in Oklahoma. 68 O.S.2011 § 3202(13).
¶23 Closer to the analysis required to resolve this case is Berkeley Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n of Newark N.J. v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 22 
(D.C.N.J.1969), also interpreting the Federal Documentary Stamp Tax Act. In 
Berkeley, the savings and loan argued that a conveyance from the Veterans 
Administration (VA) of legal title to property securing repayment of installment 
contracts it purchased from the VA did not trigger the federal documentary tax 
imposed on deeds by which real property is sold because the installment 
contracts required the savings and loan to convey that title to the equitable 
owner, the installment contract obligor, after payment of a certain amount of 
the installment contract balance. The Court agreed.
[N]ot all deeds, instruments, or writing[s] conveying land or other realty 
are to have stamps affixed to them; only those deeds, instruments, or writings 
conveying land or other realty sold need have stamps affixed. Necessary, then, 
is an examination of the transaction being considered to see if there is a sale 
of realty; whether or not there is a sale depends, in the court's view, on 
whether or not the transfer of title was for consideration, and on the intention 
of the parties and the purpose for which the 'purchasing' party desires the 
property. 
Berkeley, 301 F. Supp.  at 25. Cf., United States v. Niagara Hudson 
Power Corp., 53 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D.N.Y.1944) (transfer of legal title 
from one wholly owned subsidiary corporation to another wholly owned subsidiary 
as the result of a merger of the two subsidiary corporations did not require 
federal documentary stamp taxes). Like the Jim Walter Homes Court, we 
find these federal cases helpful in determining when a sale occurs for purposes 
of documentary taxes. 
¶24 However, there are two reasons why Jim Walter Homes does not 
resolve the issues in this case. First, the taxable transaction in Jim Walter 
Homes was based on the sheriff's deed to the homebuilder. According to the 
Counties, the potentially taxable transaction in this case is not between the 
sheriff and deed grantee, Homesales or Gentry, but between the entity entitled 
to receive a tax exempt sheriff's deed, Chase, and the entity that was granted 
the deed, its wholly owned subsidiary, Homesales, or in the case of the Gentry 
property, Chase's principal, FNMA. Second, the Court of Appeals holding that 
exchange of a foreclosure judgment for the sheriff's deed constitutes 
consideration for a taxable sale cannot be extended to this case. Although the 
definition of "sold" in the version of the DSTA applied in Jim Walter 
Homes is identical to the definition in section 3201, the Court of Appeals 
did not address the meaning of the statutory definition of "consideration" added 
in 1983 and now part of the current version of the DSTA.
"Consideration" means the actual pecuniary value exchanged or paid or to be 
exchanged or paid in the future, exclusive of interest, whether in money or 
otherwise, for the transfer or conveyance of an interest of realty, including 
any assumed indebtedness.
68 O.S. Supp. 1983 § 
5101(C)(3), renumbered from § 5101 by Laws 1988, ch. 162, § 160. 
¶25 This Court has not previously determined what constitutes "consideration" 
and a sale of real property for purposes of the DSTA. We have, however, 
interpreted other provisions of the Oklahoma Tax Code involving taxes on 
transfers of real property. In the case of In re Assessments for the Year 
2005 of Certain Real Property, 2007 OK 25, 161 P.3d 303, this Court held that a quit claim deed by 
trust beneficiaries as co-trustees to a limited liability company of which they 
were the only members transferred legal title only and, therefore, did not 
constitute a transfer requiring an assessment of the property at its current 
value for purposes of ad valorem taxes pursuant to Okla. Const. art. 10 § 8(B): 
"When only legal title is transferred but the equitable ownership is in the same 
two persons both before and after a deed is executed concerning the property we 
do not believe the intent of [section 8(B) was to lift] the five percent (5%) 
fair cash value cap." Id. ¶ 13, 161 P.3d  at 311. The Court noted that 
holding was consistent with previous decisions involving related tax issues, 
citing Bowls v. Oklahoma City, 1909 OK 149, 104 P. 902 (holder of the equitable title to land 
pursuant to an executory contract of sale is the owner for the purpose of 
taxation); State ex rel. Cartwright v. Dunbar, 1980 OK 15, 618 P.2d 900 (ownership of property rather than legal 
title determines the applicability of the constitutional exemption from ad 
valorem taxes for property of the state). Accord, In re Assessments for 
the Year 2003 of Certain Properties, 2006 OK CIV APP 147, 150 P.3d 399 (deed from one limited liability company 
to another to obtain refinancing did not constitute a transfer triggering ad 
valorem assessment at current value where both LLC's were owned and 
controlled by the same third LLC).
¶26 This Court's focus on the substantive nature of the underlying 
transaction has been followed by the OTC in its administration and enforcement 
of the DSTA as well. In Documentary Stamp Tax, P-92-222, 1995 WL 557131 (Okla. 
Tax Comm'n 1995), the OTC found that a quit claim deed granted by a former 
husband to effectuate the terms of a divorce decree awarding property to his 
former wife was not a sale as defined in 68 O.S.1991 § 3201(B) because it conveyed no 
interest beyond the wife's beneficial ownership already established by the 
divorce decree. A similar result was reached in 1994 interpreting the definition 
of "sold" in the 1985 version of the documentary tax statutes. See 
Documentary Stamp Tax, P 9200060, 1994 WL 848080 (Okla. Tax Comm'n Jan. 6, 
1994). In Documentary Stamp Tax, P 8800313, 1989 WL 251450 (Okla. Tax Comm'n 
Sept. 28, 1989), a partnership owned by family members transferred real property 
to the individuals at the request of their lender and in order to obtain 
refinancing. After the refinancing was obtained the members transferred the 
properties back to the partnership. The OTC concluded no sale occurred because 
no consideration was exchanged, the intent of the transfers was to effectuate 
the purpose of the partnership not to conclude a sale, therefore, the 
partnership did not purchase the properties and no documentary tax was due. The 
OTC relied on Berkeley Savings & Loan, supra, to reach that 
result. Finally, by rule, the OTC has determined that conveyances "from a 
constituent corporation to the new or continuing corporation" as the result of a 
merger or consolidation are exempt from documentary taxes. Okla. Admin. Code § 
710:30-1-9(7).7 
¶27 An interest in real property is "sold" for purposes of the DSTA if the 
grantee of a "deed, instrument, or writing" pays "actual pecuniary value" for 
the conveyance. 68 O.S.2011 § 
3201. If that consideration is paid, documentary taxes are due on the 
conveyance unless otherwise exempt. In the absence of such consideration, the 
transfer of legal title alone is not taxable. In determining whether "actual 
pecuniary value" is paid in the foreclosure context, we note that a sheriff's 
sale "seldom brings a property's fair market value. The predictable built-in 
loss is the difference between the fair market value of the property and the 
foreclosure sale proceeds." Founders Bank & Trust Co. v. Upsher, 
1992 OK 35, ¶ 12, n.23, 
830 P.2d 1355, 1362. If that difference 
is $100 or less, there can be no sale for documentary tax purposes. 
68 O.S.2011 § 3201(A). As stated by the OTC 
in its Rule 9, a conveyance of real property "without consideration" is not 
subject to documentary taxes. Okla. Admin. Code § 710:30-1-9(1).
IV.THE COUNTIES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT
¶28 Consequently, evidence that the consideration for the conveyances at 
issue in this case exceeded $100 is essential to the Counties' claim that the 
properties were "sold" and that documentary taxes are due. Therefore, the fact 
that Homesales and FNMA were granted deeds in these foreclosure proceedings does 
not resolve the documentary tax issue. Nor is that issue resolved by the fact 
that certain post-foreclosure conveyances were made in the Gentry case. Further 
examination of each transaction is required to determine whether the interest 
conveyed was "sold" for purposes of the DSTA. Without proof that a sale 
occurred, the Counties cannot demonstrate, in the first instance, that 
documentary taxes were due and that they are entitled to judgment. If the moving 
party has not addressed all material facts, or if one or more of such facts is 
not supported by acceptable evidentiary material, summary judgment is not 
proper. Spirgis v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 1987 OK CIV APP 45, ¶ 10, 743 P.2d 682, 685 (approved for publication by the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court). 
A. The Homesales Deeds
¶29 In three of the foreclosure cases, Chase assigned its interest to 
Homesales during the confirmation hearings. The order confirming the sheriff's 
sale in each of those cases recites that Chase "in open court acknowledged 
receipt from Homesales, Inc. of good and valuable consideration. . . ." The 
summary judgment record shows that Homesales was a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Chase at the time of the transfer. The record does not show the amount of the 
"good and valuable consideration" exchanged between the parent corporation and 
its subsidiary. Because there is nothing in the summary judgment record to show 
whether the consideration paid by Homesales exceeded the statutory minimum, the 
district court could not, and we cannot determine whether the property involved 
in these transactions was "sold" for purposes of section 3201(A) of the 
DSTA.
An appellate court cannot take notice of any document or evidentiary material 
which the trial court did not have. . . . In addition, it is not the duty of the 
appellate court on review to make first instance determinations of disputed law 
or fact issues. 
Evers v. FSF Overlake Assocs., 2003 OK 53, ¶ 18, 77 P.3d 581, 587 (citations omitted). Because the 
Counties have not established that the properties conveyed to Homesales were 
"sold," they have not shown that documentary taxes are due and that they are 
entitled to judgment with respect to these conveyances. 
B. The FNMA Deed
¶30 Based on the documents in the summary judgment record, Chase is entitled 
to the inference that FNMA purchased the Gentry loan from the loan originator, 
Irwin Mortgage Corporation, that Chase acquired the rights to service this loan 
from FNMA and that Chase acted as FNMA's agent in the foreclosure action. At the 
confirmation hearing in the Gentry foreclosure, Chase also assigned its interest 
in the property to FNMA "for good and valuable consderations [sic]." However, 
the summary judgment record regarding the Chase/FNMA transaction suffers from 
the same defect discussed with respect to the Homesales deeds. The Counties have 
failed to show that FNMA paid Chase more than $100 for this conveyance. Further, 
according to OTC Rule 9, a conveyance from an agent to its principal "conveying 
realty purchased for and with funds of the principal" is not subject to 
documentary tax. Okla. Admin. Code § 710:30-1-9(3).
It is a well settled rule that the contemporaneous construction of a statute 
by those charged with its execution and application, especially when it has long 
prevailed, while not controlling, is entitled to great weight and should not be 
disregarded or overturned except for cogent reasons, and unless it be clear that 
such construction is erroneous. 
Oral Roberts Univ. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 1985 OK 97, ¶ 10, 714 P.2d 1013, 1015 (citing McCain v. State Election 
Bd., 1930 OK 
323, 289 P. 
759). This Court followed that well-settled rule in Johnston v. Oklahoma 
Tax Comm'n, supra, adopting the OTC's practice of calculating 
documentary taxes on the cash paid plus the amount of any purchase money 
mortgage granted as consideration for a conveyance of real property. And, we do 
so again here with respect to the OTC's Rule regarding conveyances between 
agents and principals. The Counties have failed to show that the Gentry property 
was not purchased with FNMA's money and that Chase did not assign its interest 
at the confirmation hearing as agent for its principle, FNMA. Consequently, the 
Counties are not entitled to judgment based on the Chase/FNMA transaction.
C. The Gentry Deeds
¶31 Subsequent to taking title to the Gentry property, FNMA executed a 
Special Warranty Deed transferring the property to Homesales. Homesales then 
executed a Quit Claim Deed conveying the property to Irwin Mortgage. Both of 
these deeds recite that the consideration was "TEN Dollars ($10.00) and other 
good and valuable consideration." The deeds also state that the transactions are 
exempt from documentary taxes pursuant to Title 68 O.S. §3202(3): "Deeds which without additional 
consideration, confirm, correct, modify or supplement a deed previously 
recorded." Chase argues that Homesales acted as an intermediary to facilitate a 
repurchase of the Gentry loan by Irwin Mortgage pursuant to a preexisting 
agreement with FNMA. Cf., Berkeley, 301 F. Supp. 22, (regarding 
obligation to repurchase loan in case of default as reflecting the parties' 
intent not to affect a sale). That agreement, however, is not in the record. 
More importantly, the summary judgment record does not show the amount of the 
"other good and valuable consideration" paid for these conveyances. In the 
absence of that evidence, the Counties have failed to address all material facts 
necessary to establish their right to judgment based on the special Warranty 
Deed and Quit Claim Deed.
CONCLUSION
¶32 Although the Counties are not authorized to prosecute violations of the 
Documentary Stamp Tax Act, they do have standing to challenge the exemptions 
from documentary taxes claimed in this case. However, because the Counties have 
failed to prove that consideration in excess of $100 was paid for any of the 
conveyances the district court found were taxable, they have failed to prove 
that any of the properties subject to those conveyances was "sold" for purposes 
of section 3201 of the Documentary Stamp Tax Act. Absent proof that a sale 
occurred, the Counties are not entitled to judgment. Because the Counties have 
failed to prove that a sale occurred, we do not address the validity of any 
exemption claimed with respect to the conveyances at issue in this case.8 The interlocutory order 
appealed is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this Opinion.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; CERTIFIED INTERLOCUTORYORDER 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED FORFURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS.
¶33 REIF, V.C.J., WATT, EDMONDSON, GURICH, and FISCHER, S.J., 
concur.
¶34 KAUGER, J., concurs in part; dissents in part.
¶35 WINCHESTER, TAYLOR, and COMBS (by separate writing), JJ., 
dissent.
¶36 COLBERT, C.J., recused.
FOOTNOTES
1 After this Court granted 
certiorari, and in response to offers of judgment made pursuant to 
12 O.S.2011 §1101.1, the trial court entered 
judgment in favor of Murray County and Johnston County against district court 
defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Flagstar Bank, FSB and Aurora Loan Services, 
LLC. None of these entities are parties to this appeal. 
2 The Defendants previously filed with this Court an 
Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Writ of Mandamus or 
Prohibition on July 11, 2012, case no. 110,868. This Court denied the 
application and declined to assume jurisdiction. 
3 The Counties contend that, in part, their suit is based 
on fraudulent representations made by the Defendants. The Counties argue that 
the fraud occurred when the Defendants misrepresented to the County Clerks that 
they were entitled to exemptions for the conveyances made subsequent to the 
entry of the judgments in the foreclosure actions in violation of the DSTA. The 
Counties do not alleged any fraud by Chase in procuring the foreclosure 
judgments. Further, our determination in Part I of this Opinion that the 
Counties do not have authority to prosecute violations of the DSTA disposes of 
the Counties' argument that they are permitted to assert a "fraud claim" in this 
litigation. One convicted of violating the DSTA is subject to the fines and 
penalties set out in 68 O.S.2011 § 3206. A county clerk's role in 
that process is specifically defined in paragraph D of that statute: "Should the 
county clerk become aware that the provisions of the documentary stamp law have 
or might have been violated, he or she shall immediately report the facts to the 
Oklahoma Tax Commission." 
4 The transcript of the Hearing on the Motion to Dismiss 
held on May 16, 2012, provides at p. 21-22:
THE COURT: Well, no, 3206 says any person who willfully fails to purchase or 
affix the exact amount of stamps upon conviction be convicted of a thousand 
dollar fine and one year in jail and then it has - section D it says, "should 
the County Clerk become aware of the provisions of the documentary stamp law 
have or might have been violated, he or she shall immediately report the facts 
to the Oklahoma Tax Commission."
MR. ROBERTS: And that's been done.
THE COURT: That's been done. Is the Tax Commission -
MR. ROBERTS: The District Attorney -- 
THE COURT: -- reviewing that?
MR. ROBERTS: Excuse me. The District Attorney prior to filing this action and 
prior to my being hired by the counties, with approval of the District Attorney, 
did make that contact. They have taken no action, but there's nothing -- there's 
been no citation law that says, the exclusive remedy is a criminal prosecution. 
. . . 
5 As Chase points out, the Oklahoma Tax Code provides an 
administrative remedy for it to resolve this tax issue that is bypassed by the 
Counties' prosecution of this case. Nonetheless, this Court has recognized that 
in limited circumstances, exhaustion of the OTC's administrative process is not 
always required. See, e.g., Glass, Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. 
Smith. 
6 The documentary tax statutes applied in Jim Walter 
Homes were renumbered by Laws 1988, ch. 162, § 160, eff. Jan. 1, 1992: Laws 
1991, ch. 338, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1992, and are essentially identical to the DSTA 
statutes at issue in this case with two exceptions: the addition of a definition 
of "consideration" to section 3201 and the expansion of the mortgage foreclosure 
deed exemption in section 3202(13) to included "holders" of the mortgage in 
addition to "original grantors." 
7 Other state courts construing similar or identical 
definitions of "consideration" in documentary tax statutes have reached the same 
result. Crescent Miami Ctr., LLC v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 903 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 2005) (grantor's wholly owned limited liability company was not 
"purchaser" for purposes of documentary tax regarding transfer of real property 
where no consideration was exchanged and beneficial ownership was not changed); 
ZIRP-IC, LLC v. Hennepin County, Nos. 31282, 04-02759, 2005 WL 937432 
(Minn. Tax Ct. Regular Div. April 21, 2005) (no documentary tax due on deed in 
lieu of foreclosure because the value of the property was less than the mortgage 
balance, therefore the consideration for the transfer, a negative number, did 
not exceed the statutory minimum for imposing documentary tax); Real Estate 
Transfers -- Documentary Tax, TAM-88-15, 1988 WL 232627 (S.C. Tax. Comm'n) (deed 
conveying real property from one corporation to another corporation not subject 
to documentary tax where both corporations were owned by the same individual and 
no consideration was paid). 
8 We also do not address Chase's argument, raised for the 
first time in this appeal, that the Counties' attempt to collect documentary 
taxes is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Generally, this Court 
does not reach issues the appealing party fails to raise in the trial court and 
we decline to do so here. Bottles v. State ex rel. Oklahoma State Bd. of Med. 
Licensure and Supervision, 1996 OK 59, ¶ 4, 917 P.2d 471 , 472. See also, Jackson v. 
Jackson, 2002 OK 
25, ¶ 12, n.12, 45 P.3d 418, 425. But, we do so without prejudice to 
Chase's assertion of this argument in the district court on remand. 

COMBS, J., with whom TAYLOR, J., joins, dissenting:
¶1 In this cause concerning alleged violations of the Documentary Stamp Tax 
Act (DSTA), 68 O.S. 2011 §§3201-3206, the majority determines that although the 
plaintiffs do not have authority to enforce the provisions of the DSTA, the 
plaintiffs have standing to seek declaratory relief under Oklahoma's declaratory 
judgment statute, 12 O.S. 2011 §§1651-1657. Because I disagree with the 
majority's assertion that the plaintiffs possess standing in this cause, I 
respectfully dissent.
I.The Plaintiffs Do Not Have Standing Because Their Injury 
Cannot be Redressed by a Favorable Court Decision.
¶2 The question of whether a party possesses standing has traditionally been 
formulated by this Court as whether a party has sufficient interest in an 
otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that 
controversy. Indep. School Dist. No. 5 of Tulsa v. Spry, 2012 OK 98, ¶2, 292 P.3d 19; Estate of Doan v. First Nat'l Bank and 
Trust Co. of Tulsa, 1986 OK 15, ¶7, 727 P.2d 574; Indep.School Dist. No. 9 of Tulsa 
County v. Glass, 1982 OK 2, ¶8, 639 P.2d 1233. At a minimum, standing is composed of 
three elements, which are: 1) a legally protected interest which must have been 
injured in fact, i.e., an injury which is actual, concrete and not 
conjectural in nature; 2) a causal nexus between the injury and the complained 
of conduct; and 3) a likelihood, as opposed to mere speculation, that 
the injury will be redressed by a favorable court decision. J.P. Morgan 
Chase Bank, Nat'l Assoc. v. Eldridge, 2012 OK 24, ¶7, 273 P.3d 62; Cities Services Co. v. Gulf Oil 
Co., 1999 OK 
16, ¶3, 976 P.2d 545. This Court has also phrased the standing requirement in other terms, 
noting that:
A party whose standing is challenged must show (1) actual or threatened 
injury, (2) for which relief can be given, and (3) the interest to be 
protected is "within a statutorily or constitutionally protected zone".
Oklahoma Public Employees Ass'n v. Oklahoma Dept. of Central Services, 
2002 OK 71, ¶16, 55 P.3d 1072 (quoting In Re Initiative Petition 
No. 363, 1996 OK 
122, ¶13 n. 29, 927 P.2d 558).
¶3 I do not dispute that the plaintiffs have alleged sufficient injury to a 
protected interest and a causal nexus to the defendants' conduct exists to 
satisfy the first and second required elements of standing. The loss of revenue 
to the plaintiffs due under 68 O.S 2011 §3204 and caused by defendants' claimed 
exemptions from the purchase of documentary stamps results in actual, pecuniary 
harm. However, I do not believe that the plaintiffs have demonstrated the third 
requirement: redressability. 
¶4 The specific harm to the plaintiffs is pecuniary. Due to the actions of 
the defendants, the plaintiffs are not getting the share of revenue from the 
sale of documentary stamps they believe they are owed pursuant to the DSTA, 
68 O.S. 2011 §3204, because the defendants 
allegedly wrongly claimed an exemption. As the majority's opinion states, the 
plaintiffs "filed this suit to enforce section 3201and collect the documentary 
taxes they contend are due." Majority Opinion, at ¶8. 
¶5 However, the first section of the majority's opinion is dedicated to a 
discussion of why the plaintiffs are not entitled to enforce the provisions of 
the DSTA, because the authority to do so lies with the Oklahoma Tax Commission. 
The majority lists several reasons justifying its position, including: 1) state 
policy provides for uniform procedures and remedies with respect to all state 
taxes; 2) the plaintiffs' position on enforcement conflicts with the 
Legislature's general statutory procedure for collecting unpaid taxes; and 3) 
rules promulgated by the Oklahoma Tax Commission confirm that the plaintiffs 
lack direct enforcement authority. The majority concludes: "[w]e will not read 
into the DSTA authority for the Counties to prosecute violations of the Act when 
the Legislature has declined to do so." Majority Opinion, at ¶15. 
¶6 Fundamentally, an assessment of standing is not a decision on the case's 
merits. Rather, it is a determination whether the plaintiff is the proper party 
to seek adjudication of the asserted issue. Gulf Oil. Corp., 
1999 OK 16, ¶5; Toxic Waste 
Impact Group v. Leavitt, 1994 OK 148, ¶9, 890 P.2d 906. The asserted issues in this cause are 
whether taxes are due pursuant to the DSTA and whether exemptions from those 
taxes were validly claimed. Based on the majority's analysis in part one of its 
opinion, the plaintiffs are not the proper party to seek 
adjudication of these issues. The proper parties to enforce the tax statutes are 
the Oklahoma Tax Commission (Title 68 O.S. 2011 §§221 to 230) and the Attorney 
General (Title 68 O.S. 2011 § 
250). 
II.This Cause is Distinguishable from Independent School 
Dist. No. 9 of Tulsa County v. Glass, 1982 OK 2, 639 P.2d 1233.
¶7 The majority asserts that the plaintiffs inability to sue to enforce the 
DSTA, and hence, their inability to receive the monetary relief they desire by 
doing so, does not defeat their standing to seek some other form of relief. 
Specifically, the majority likens this cause to Indep. School Dist. No. 9 of 
Tulsa County v. Glass, 1982 OK 2, 639 P.2d 1233. In Glass, a school district 
challenged a refund payable as the result of a tax exemption claimed by a 
taxpayer whose taxable personal property was located in the district. 
1982 OK 2, ¶¶1-3. The school 
district sought a temporary and permanent injunction to prevent payment of the 
refund to the taxpayer, after the refund request was granted by the Tulsa County 
Board of Tax-Roll Corrections. Glass, 1982 OK 2, ¶6. The taxpayer argued that the school 
district lacked standing to sue, as 68 O.S. Supp. 1974 §2479 authorized only the 
taxpayer and the County Assessor to seek review of the Board's decision. 
Glass, 1982 OK 
2, 
¶8.
¶8 This Court determined that the school district possessed standing to seek 
an injunction to protect the wrongful disposition of its revenues, though in the 
end the Court also determined the school district was not entitled to an 
injunction. Glass, 1982 OK 2, ¶11. The majority in this cause asserts 
that Glass supports the position that the plaintiffs have standing, if 
not to enforce the DSTA, then to seek some other form of relief. However, 
Glass is distinguishable from the instant cause in more than one 
respect.
¶9 First, the school district in Glass never sought a statutory remedy 
it was not entitled to invoke. Rather, the school district in Glass 
prevailed on the question of standing because it sought equitable relief in the 
form of an injunction. This Court specifically stated that had the school 
district attempted to invoke 68 O.S. Supp. 1974 §2479, the taxpayer's position 
that the district did not have standing would have merit. This Court stated:
Ford contends that the School District lacks standing to enjoin the 
refund because 68 O.S.Supp. 1974 § 
2479 authorizes only the taxpayer and the County Assessor to seek review of 
the Board's decision. Ford's position would be tenable if the District sought 
to avail itself of the statutory remedy of a trial de novo. The issue is not 
under-assessment or non-assessment. The District is not appealing the decision 
of the Board, nor is it seeking a trial de novo. Rather, it seeks to prevent 
what it characterizes as an illegal refund of public funds which has been 
erroneously authorized by the Board. 
Glass, 1982 OK 
2, 
¶8 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
¶10 Second, the equitable remedy sought by the school district in 
Glass would have been fully sufficient to remedy the injury it suffered. 
By granting the school district's request for an injunction to prevent the 
illegal payout of a refund, the court would have been able to prevent the loss 
of revenue to which the school district claimed it was entitled. It is here that 
redressability is an issue: "[i]t is not necessary to decide whether a litigant 
will ultimately be entitled to any relief in order to hold that the party has 
standing to seek judicial redress for his/her grievance" but the relief 
being sought must, if granted, be capable of remedying the injury. Glass, 
1982 OK 2, ¶10. In this cause, the 
plaintiffs have not sought injunctive relief but instead seek enforcement of the 
DSTA in order to obtain the revenue to which they claim they are 
entitled.
III.Because the Plaintiffs Cannot Sue to Enforce the DSTA, 
They Cannot Pursue a Declaratory Judgment that Serves No Purpose Other than 
to Further That Goal.
¶11 Having determined in this cause that the plaintiffs do not have authority 
to sue to enforce the provisions of the DSTA, the majority circumvents the 
problem of redressability by determining that the plaintiffs have standing to 
seek non-monetary relief pursuant to Oklahoma's declaratory judgment statute, 12 
O.S. 2011 §§1651-1657, noting that when statutory relief is inadequate, 
equitable relief may be available. 
¶12 Title 12 O.S. 2011 
§1651 sets the parameters for the issuance of declaratory judgments in 
Oklahoma, and provides:
District courts may, in cases of actual controversy, determine rights, 
status, or other legal relations, including but not limited to a determination 
of the construction or validity of any foreign judgment or decree, deed, 
contract, trust, or other instrument or agreement or of any statute, municipal 
ordinance, or other governmental regulation, whether or not other relief is or 
could be claimed, except that no declaration shall be made concerning liability 
or nonliability for damages on account of alleged tortious injuries to persons 
or to property either before or after judgment or for compensation alleged to be 
due under workers' compensation laws for injuries to persons. The determination 
may be made either before or after there has been a breach of any legal duty or 
obligation, and it may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; 
provided however, that a court may refuse to make a determination where the 
judgment, if rendered, would not terminate the controversy, or some part 
thereof, giving rise to the proceeding. 
A declaratory judgment is merely a type of remedy, not an independent cause 
of action, and it does not extend the jurisdiction of a court where it would not 
otherwise exist. Conoco, Inc. v. State Dept. of Health of State of OK, 
1982 OK 94, ¶18, 651 P.2d 125. Specifically, this Court stated in 
Conoco, Inc.:
Such relief [a declaratory judgment] is especially useful in a case where a 
justiciable controversy between the parties exists and the plaintiff would be 
required to do or refrain from doing some action at his legal peril. It is 
merely a type of remedy which may be granted where a court already has 
jurisdiction over a particular cause. It cannot extend the jurisdiction of a 
court where it would not exist otherwise; and if a court lacks jurisdiction over 
a case, it cannot enter any rightful judgment.
Conoco, Inc., 1982 OK 94, ¶18. 
Declaratory actions are meant to supplement rather than supersede other types 
of litigation. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 33, comment C (1981).
¶13 This Court has long relied upon the axiom that what may not be done 
directly should not be allowed to be done indirectly. In Re Oklahoma Capitol 
Imp. Authority, 2012 OK 99, ¶12, 289 P.3d 1277; Large v. Acme Engineering and Mfg. 
Corp., 1990 OK 
34, ¶8, 790 P.2d 1086; Reherman v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 1984 OK 12, ¶15, 679 P.2d 1296. A determination by this Court that the 
plaintiffs can seek a declaratory judgment that documentary stamp taxes are due 
from the defendants pursuant to 68 O.S. § 3201 and that the exemptions claimed by the 
defendants were unlawful is nothing more than an end-run around the basic 
determination that the plaintiffs are not permitted to sue to enforce the DSTA. 
Having determined that the plaintiffs cannot enforce the DSTA, it does not 
make sense to allow them to seek declaratory relief that could lead to nothing 
else but subsequent action by the plaintiffs to enforce the DSTA. 
¶14 Declaratory relief serves no purpose other than to aid the plaintiffs in 
their quest to redress their original harm caused by alleged violations of the 
DSTA. Since the plaintiffs cannot sue to enforce the DSTA, a declaratory 
judgment that the DSTA has in fact been violated by the defendants does not help 
the plaintiffs.1 Further, 12 O.S. 2011 § 1651 specifically indicates 
that a court may refuse to issue a declaratory judgment where the judgment, if 
rendered, would not terminate the controversy, or some part thereof, giving rise 
to the proceeding. 
¶15 Pursuant to the majority opinion, the plaintiffs will not be permitted to 
enforce the DSTA even if they received a declaratory judgment that the DSTA was 
violated by the defendants. This leads back to the redressability of the 
underlying harm giving rise to the plaintiffs cause: there is no likelihood that 
the plaintiffs' injury (their loss of revenue) will be redressed by a favorable 
court decision; there is only speculation. See J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, Nat'l 
Assoc. v. Eldridge, 2012 OK 24, ¶7, 273 P.3d 62; Cities Services Co. v. Gulf Oil 
Co., 1999 OK 
16, ¶3, 976 P.2d 545.
¶16 Because the plaintiffs' harm is not redressable through declaratory 
relief or otherwise, they do not have standing to sue to enforce the DSTA, and 
they do not have standing to seek a declaratory judgment the only purpose of 
which is to further that end. The majority opinion would remand this cause back 
to the district court for a determination on the merits of the applicability of 
the DSTA, placing a heavy evidentiary burden on the plaintiffs to prove that the 
properties in question were sold within the meaning of 68 O.S. 2011 §3201. The resulting further 
litigation and expense is unnecessary and should be avoided, because the 
plaintiffs cannot attain the relief they seek. Because the plaintiffs lack 
standing to enforce the DSTA and lack standing to seek a declaratory judgment in 
furtherance of that end, it is not necessary to address the merits of the 
controversy. For this reason, I respectfully dissent. 
FOOTNOTES
1 Declaratory relief might 
be beneficial to the Oklahoma Tax Commission, but the Commission has never been 
made a party to this litigation.