Case Title: Commonwealth v. Buttimer

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12085

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12085 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  THOMAS BUTTIMER. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     February 8, 2019. - August 7, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  
Armed Assault with Intent to Murder.  Larceny.  Firearms.  
Evidence, Third-party culprit.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 23, 2013. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Cornelius J. Moriarty, II, J. 
 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan also present) 
for the defendant. 
 
Nathaniel Kennedy, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Angry about being asked to move out of the 
victim's home, the defendant broke into a locked gun safe, stole 
one of the weapons, shot and killed the victim, and aimed the 
gun at first responders.  A jury convicted the defendant of 
murder in the first degree with deliberate premeditation; 
2 
 
assault by means of a dangerous weapon under G. L. c. 265, § 15B 
(b); armed assault with intent to murder under G. L. c. 265, 
§ 18 (b); one count of larceny of a firearm under G. L. c. 266, 
§ 30; and four counts of possession of a firearm without a 
firearm identification card under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (1).  
He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of 
parole for the murder conviction, with terms of imprisonment for 
the other convictions to run concurrently with the life 
sentence. 
 
This appeal focuses on the operability of firearms and the 
effect of an inoperable gun on the charges of armed assault with 
intent to murder and assault by means of a dangerous weapon.  
More particularly, the defendant contends (1) the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain his murder conviction because it did not 
connect the ".22 caliber class projectile" that killed the 
victim with a .223 caliber cartridge casing shown to have been 
fired from the .32-40 caliber Winchester rifle recovered from 
his person; and these deficiencies and other evidence supported 
the existence of a third-party culprit (the victim's husband's 
brother); (2) a required finding of not guilty should have been 
entered as to the charges of armed assault with intent to murder 
and assault with a dangerous weapon because when the defendant 
aimed the Winchester rifle at the first responders it was not 
operable; (3) a new trial should be granted because the judge 
3 
 
gave conflicting and confusing operability instructions with 
respect to armed assault by means of intent to murder and 
assault with a dangerous weapon; and (4) we should grant a new 
trial pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
For the reasons stated infra, we conclude that there was no 
reversible error.  The evidence was sufficient to prove that the 
defendant shot and killed the victim with a ".22 caliber class 
projectile" fired from a .32-.40 caliber Winchester rifle.  We 
also clarify that a firearm or other gun need not be operational 
to prove either assault by means of a dangerous weapon or armed 
assault with intent to murder.  It is enough for assault by 
means of a dangerous weapon that the weapon appear dangerous to 
the victim of the assault; the weapon does not actually have to 
be operational.  Armed assault with intent to murder requires 
that the defendant think his or her weapon is operational -- 
otherwise the defendant lacks the specific intent to murder -- 
but not that the weapon actually be operational.  Although the 
instructions were not correct in this regard in the instant 
case, the defendant here was the beneficiary of the error, as 
the judge needlessly required the firearm to be operational for 
armed assault with intent to murder.  The jury so found, and the 
evidence supported such a finding, because the gun fired when it 
killed the victim and a jury could infer that it was operational 
after that.  Finally, after a thorough review of the record, we 
4 
 
also find no reason to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 
278, § 33E, to grant a new trial or to reduce or set aside the 
verdict of murder in the first degree.  We therefore affirm the 
defendant's convictions. 
 
1.  Facts.  We recite the facts that the jury could have 
found, viewing them in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, and reserving some details for later discussion.  
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).  The 
victim and her husband lived in a home in a rural part of 
Middleborough.  In 2011, the husband's brother moved into the 
home.  Between them, the husband and the brother owned 
approximately ten guns for hunting, mostly rifles, which were 
kept in closets in their bedrooms or locked in a metal gun safe 
in the basement. 
 
The defendant was an acquaintance and occasional coworker 
of the brother.  In mid-June 2013, the defendant began 
temporarily staying at the victim's home to be close to a repair 
job he and the brother had at a hotel.  Near the end of June, 
the victim invited the defendant to remain at the home.  The 
defendant continued living at the home to work with the brother 
on another job.  The brother and the defendant also worked on a 
house the victim owned to prepare it for sale. 
On the morning of Thursday, July 11, 2013, the brother 
found a note that the victim had left for him requesting that he 
5 
 
and the defendant move out.1  Later that day, when the brother 
told the defendant about the note, the defendant grew angry and 
upset.  He asked, "What's wrong with that bitch?" and expressed 
unhappiness that he had to continue performing repairs on the 
victim's home that weekend.  The defendant remained upset 
through the afternoon about having to work on the victim's house 
that weekend despite being asked to move out.  At dinner with 
the husband and brother, he still "wasn't pleased" that he had 
to leave, even though the brother told him that he had begun 
looking for apartments for them to move into together. 
At 9:30 P.M., the brother went to bed in his bedroom on the 
second floor, while the defendant and the husband watched 
television in the living room on the first floor.  The brother 
was asleep by 10 P.M. At some point the husband also went to 
bed. 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), fingerprint, footprint, blood, 
and hair evidence showed that, sometime that evening, the 
defendant went into the basement of the house.  He used a shovel 
to force open the gun safe and remove several rifles, injuring 
himself in the process.  He left his DNA on the shovel and his 
                                                          
 
 
1 The note was admitted in evidence, over the defendant's 
objection that it was hearsay, to show the effect of the note on 
the defendant.  It stated:  "[Brother], Luv u!  Go to nascar do 
what u want to do But find a place for u and [defendant] Killing 
my relationship with [husband].  Too easy to live here!  Looking 
for a Caretaker not to be one!" 
6 
 
fingerprint, a footprint, blood, and hair on the gun safe (and 
blood and hair on the surrounding floor).  He then used a pair 
of pliers to cut the gun lock off a .32-.40 caliber Winchester 
rifle (the Winchester rifle) that belonged to the husband, and 
loaded it with ammunition, leaving his DNA on the pliers, a box 
of ammunition, and two .22 caliber rifles. 
The victim had been having dinner with her daughter that 
evening and returned home after 11 P.M.  A neighbor heard a 
single gunshot coming from the direction of the home at 
approximately 11:45 P.M. 
After shooting the victim, the defendant returned to the 
basement and struck the rifle against the floor to remove the 
spent .223 caliber Remington cartridge casing.  In the process, 
he broke the rifle's wooden stock.  Fragments of wood from the 
Winchester rifle were subsequently discovered on the basement 
floor.  The defendant then left the basement through the 
bulkhead, which investigating officers later found open, and 
went into the woods. 
 
At around midnight on July 12, the husband woke up the 
brother,2 who came out of his room to see the victim on the 
                                                          
 
 
2 The brother did not hear a gunshot, but he testified that 
he had lifelong hearing issues, in addition to closing the 
bedroom door and sleeping with a fan.  The husband could not 
testify because he died before trial. 
 
7 
 
landing of the staircase covered in blood, not conscious, and 
bleeding from her nose and mouth.  The brothers could not tell 
what was causing the victim's bleeding.  The husband telephoned 
911 to report a medical emergency and then attempted to apply 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation.  The brother also tried to tend 
to the victim. 
 
The brother subsequently went downstairs, where he noticed 
more blood on the stairs and in the living room and the kitchen.  
In the kitchen, he washed the victim's blood off his hands and 
obtained a flashlight that he took to the end of the dark 
driveway to help direct emergency personnel.  Firefighters 
arrived at the home within minutes to attend to the victim, 
followed shortly by an ambulance service and two police 
officers.3 
 
A police officer and a paramedic, as well as the brother, 
were outside the home when the defendant emerged from the woods 
carrying the Winchester rifle.  The paramedic saw the defendant 
pull the lever action of the weapon down and back, suggesting 
that the rifle was being readied for firing.4  The paramedic 
                                                          
 
 
3 The emergency personnel believed they were responding to 
an accident involving someone who had fallen on the stairs.  It 
was nonetheless the practice for Middleborough police to respond 
to medical 911 calls along with other emergency personnel. 
 
4 A lever action rifle is loaded by pulling the lever down 
to load a cartridge into the chamber and then fired by bringing 
the lever back up and pulling the trigger.  After the rifle is 
8 
 
immediately began running toward the house; to alert the police 
officer, he shouted words to the effect of, "Does that guy have 
a fucking gun?"  While running, he turned around and saw the 
defendant raise the gun to firing position and aim it at him and 
the police officer. 
 
Alerted by the paramedic, the police officer saw the 
defendant aiming the rifle at him from approximately thirty 
yards away.  The officer attempted to move out of the way, but 
the defendant "tracked" him with his rifle, causing the officer 
to fear for his life.  The officer shouted to the defendant to 
"drop [his] gun" and then fired his service weapon at the 
defendant.5  The defendant fell to the ground but attempted to 
raise his rifle again, causing the officer to fire further shots 
until the defendant was no longer moving and the gun was 
completely on the ground.  The officer fired a total of ten 
shots at the defendant, striking him three times. 
 
A second police officer disarmed the defendant by kicking 
the rifle away and then throwing it out of the defendant's 
reach.  The lever of the defendant's rifle was open, a live 
                                                          
 
fired, the empty cartridge case remains inside until it is 
ejected by pulling the lever down. 
 
 
5 The police officer's service weapon was a Sig Sauer 
semiautomatic handgun equipped with .40 caliber Smith and Wesson 
ammunition.  Ten cartridge casings were recovered corresponding 
to this type of ammunition. 
9 
 
round of .223 caliber ammunition was on the ground nearby, and 
the defendant had three additional live rounds of .223 caliber 
ammunition in his pockets.  However, the stock of the 
defendant's rifle was broken, and a police ballistics expert 
later determined that the rifle could not fire without certain 
repairs.6  As discussed supra, there was evidence that the 
defendant struck his rifle against the floor of the basement 
before confronting the first responders. 
 
After the defendant had been subdued, two firemen began 
treating the defendant for his gunshot wounds.  The defendant 
was visibly angry and said, "Next time I'll come back with a 
bigger gun." The defendant was handcuffed and transported to a 
hospital, where, in addition to receiving medical treatment, his 
clothes were seized by the State police.  The brother and the 
victim's husband were also handcuffed and placed in separate 
police cars.  They were later interrogated at the police station 
before being released early in the morning. 
 
The medical examiner who performed the autopsy subsequently 
estimated that the victim had died within minutes due to a 
                                                          
 
 
6 The ballistics expert explained that, even after 
reattaching the missing stock, the .32-.40 caliber Winchester 
rifle was not firing because the lever was not properly hitting 
the "trigger stop."  To make the rifle fire again, the 
ballistician had to use a vice, hammer, and screwdriver to (1) 
loosen one of the rear screws on top of the "tangs" or metal 
protrusions that attach the rifle stock; (2) straighten out one 
of the tangs; and (3) put one of the "links" back into place. 
10 
 
bullet that pierced her lung, penetrated her pulmonary artery 
and vein, and lodged itself in her spine.  Based on gunpowder 
residue around the wound, the medical examiner estimated that 
the victim was shot from no more than two feet away. 
 
At trial, a police ballistics expert employed various 
forensic ballistics techniques to try to determine whether the 
bullet recovered from the victim and the cartridge casing in the 
basement were fired by the Winchester rifle recovered from the 
defendant's person.  The expert testified that the bullet 
recovered from the victim's body was a ".22 caliber class 
projectile" that was in "very good condition" but only had 
"rifling" in trace amounts on its base, and no rifling on its 
sides.7  The expert concluded that the bullet had been fired from 
a larger barreled gun than the kind for which it was designed, 
although, due to the lack of rifling, he was "inconclusive" 
about whether the bullet came from the Winchester rifle. 
 
However, based on a comparison between the unique firing 
pin marks on the cartridge8 and those of bullets test-fired from 
                                                          
 
 
7 Rifling refers to the marks imparted on a bullet as a gun 
is fired by grooves placed in the barrel of a rifle or handgun 
in order to give stability to the bullet in flight.  Ballistics 
experts use rifling as a "class characteristic" to determine 
whether a particular bullet is consistent with being fired from 
a particular gun. 
 
8 According to the expert, firing pin analysis is based on 
recognizing a pattern of "microscopic marks that are unique to 
each weapon" left by the firing pin of a gun on a section of the 
cartridge known as the primer.  A discharged cartridge casing 
11 
 
the rifle,9 the ballistics expert was able to conclude to a 
"reasonable degree of ballistics certainty" that the .223 
caliber cartridge casing found in the basement "was fired by the 
.32-.40 Winchester lever action rifle."  The expert also 
testified that the physical condition of the cartridge "was 
consistent with being fired out of a larger caliber weapon than 
a .223 Remington," such as the Winchester rifle.10 
 
From the testimony and physical evidence presented at 
trial, the Commonwealth argued as follows:  the defendant was 
angry at the victim for asking him to move out.  He broke into 
the gun safe in the basement using the shovel, injuring himself 
in the process.  He then cut the gunlock off the Winchester 
                                                          
 
retains the primer with these unique marks.  The firing pin 
marks on a test-fired cartridge are then compared to determine 
whether the cartridges were fired from the same gun. 
 
 
9 The expert test-fired the Winchester rifle three times, 
once using a ".38 special caliber primed cartridge" with no 
gunpowder to see if the rifle had been correctly repaired, and 
twice using .32-.40 caliber ammunition.  He did not test-fire 
the rifle using .223 caliber ammunition because he thought it 
would be dangerous to do so. 
 
 
10 The primer of the casing was bulging out of the base, 
there was a large tear in the wall of the casing, and the 
"shoulders" of the casing -- the area of the casing that narrows 
to the "neck," where the projectile is held -- had been "blown 
out".  The expert concluded that these features were "not 
consistent with [the cartridge] having been fired from a weapon 
chambered with .223 Remington ammunition."  He testified, 
however, that the size of the .223 caliber cartridge was 
consistent with having expanded to fit the size of the chamber 
of the Winchester rifle. 
12 
 
rifle, loaded it with ammunition, and shot the victim on the 
first floor of the home.  The victim attempted to climb the 
stairs and collapsed on the landing, where she was discovered by 
her husband.  After shooting the victim, the defendant returned 
to the basement, struck the rifle against the floor to remove 
the spent cartridge casing (breaking the rifle's wooden stock in 
the process), and reloaded the rifle.  The defendant went out of 
the basement through the open bulkhead and into the woods before 
aiming his rifle at the emergency personnel as described supra. 
 
The jury convicted the defendant on all charges.11  This 
appeal followed. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  On 
appeal, the defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to 
present sufficient evidence that he shot the victim.  First, he 
argues that no evidence permitted the jury to connect the ".22 
caliber class projectile" extracted from the victim's body to 
the .223 caliber Remington cartridge casing that was found in 
the basement and shown by firing pin analysis to have been fired 
from the Winchester rifle in his possession.  Second, he argues, 
in effect, that the evidence was insufficient to convict him 
                                                          
 
 
11 The defendant had initially been charged with three 
counts of larceny of a firearm, but the Commonwealth dismissed 
two of them.  Additionally, before instructing the jury, the 
judge granted the defendant's motion for a required finding of 
not guilty with respect to a charge of threatening to commit a 
crime under G. L. c. 275, § 2. 
13 
 
because there was greater evidence of a third-party culprit, 
namely, the brother.  In reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence, "[w]e consider whether, after viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, any rational trier 
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 
46, 51 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. at 
677-678.  We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to find 
the defendant guilty of the victim's murder beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
 
Because no one witnessed the murder, the Commonwealth's 
case largely relied on the testimony of the brother concerning 
the conduct of the defendant on July 11 and on expert analysis 
of circumstantial physical evidence connecting the defendant to 
the shooting.  "A conviction may rest exclusively on 
circumstantial evidence, and, in evaluating that evidence, we 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth."  
Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 32 (2017).  Although we 
will not let a conviction stand if it is "based entirely on 
conjecture or speculation," Ayala, 481 Mass. at 51, 
"[i]nferences drawn from circumstantial evidence 'need only be 
reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or 
inescapable,'" Commonwealth v. Webster, 480 Mass. 161, 167 
(2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Beckett, 373 Mass. 329, 341 
14 
 
(1977).  "To the extent that conflicting inferences may be drawn 
from the evidence, it is for the jury to decide which version to 
credit" (quotations omitted).  Webster, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 666 (2017).  We consider 
the defendant's arguments concerning the sufficiency of the 
evidence in turn. 
 
i.  Evidence that the defendant was the shooter.  Here, 
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was the shooter.  In 
particular, it was reasonable and possible for the jury to find 
that the ".22 class projectile" with which the victim was shot 
came from the spent .223 cartridge casing fired by the 
Winchester rifle in the defendant's possession. There was a .223 
caliber live round found near the rifle when the defendant was 
apprehended, and three more in his pockets.  As discussed, the 
Commonwealth's ballistics expert testified that (1) the 
cartridge was seriously deformed and the projectile lacked the 
expected rifling; (2) these features provided sufficient 
evidence that both the cartridge and the projectile had been 
fired from a gun larger than the kind for which they were 
designed; and (3) the Winchester rifle could have been the 
larger gun in question with respect to both the cartridge and 
the projectile.  The expert further testified that, based on 
firing pin analysis, he concluded with a "reasonable degree of 
15 
 
ballistics certainty" that the Winchester rifle fired the .223 
caliber cartridge.12  The jury also reasonably could have 
inferred that the cartridge that was fired by the Winchester 
rifle corresponded to the bullet found in the victim's body that 
was compatible with the Winchester rifle.  This reasonable 
inference of compatibility was sufficient for the jury to 
identify the defendant as the shooter, at least in concert with 
the other evidence of the defendant's motive and opportunity 
discussed infra.  See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 449 Mass. 343, 
345, 351, 358 (2007) (evidence sufficient to conclude beyond 
reasonable doubt that defendant shot victim when defendant seen 
in possession of two weapons from either of which fatal bullet 
"could have been fired"); Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 442 Mass. 135, 
139 n.5 (2004) (shell casings found at scene "tend to prove that 
the victims were shot" with gun possessed by defendant that 
could have fired shell casings, even when no definitive match 
between gun and casings); Commonwealth v. Doucette, 408 Mass. 
454, 460, 461 (1990) ("although the evidence was far from 
overwhelming, it was sufficient to warrant a rational trier of 
                                                          
 
 
12 In Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 837-838, 
845 (2011), we concluded that forensic ballistics testimony 
based on the theory "that all firearms possess distinctive 
features that in turn impart distinctive markings or 'toolmarks' 
onto projectiles and cartridge casings when the weapon is fired" 
was sufficiently reliable to be admissible in a murder trial.  
See id. at 839, n.19 (firing pin analysis). 
16 
 
fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
murdered" victim when defendant was seen with "gun capable of 
firing the kind of bullets that were found in [victim's] head"). 
 
Furthermore, the only reasonable candidate for the gun that 
fired both the ".22 caliber class projectile" and the .223 
caliber cartridge was the Winchester rifle found on the 
defendant at the scene of the crime.  The jury could have 
inferred that only a single shot was fired on the night of July 
11, most likely from the rifle in the defendant's possession:  
they received testimony that (1) a neighbor heard a single 
gunshot at 11:45 P.M., shortly before emergency services arrived 
at the property; (2) the .223 caliber  cartridge casing was the 
only spent cartridge casing recovered at the scene that was not 
connected to the ten shots fired by the police officer; and (3) 
no other gun in the home seemed to have been fired that night 
other than the Winchester rifle that produced the .223 caliber 
cartridge case.13  It was thus reasonable to infer that the 
projectile came from the .223 caliber cartridge casing 
                                                          
 
 
13 When police searched the property at 7 A.M. on the 
morning of July 12, the only rifles not in their expected places 
were the Winchester rifle in the defendant's possession and two 
.22 caliber rifles that had been removed from the gun safe.  
Indeed, the one other rifle that, according to the ballistics 
expert, could definitely fire .223 caliber ammunition was a 
commemorative John Wayne rifle found in a closet and covered in 
dust.  Furthermore, the jury heard testimony that the .22 
caliber rifles could not fire .223 caliber ammunition. 
 
17 
 
discharged by that gun, particularly because the jury heard 
expert testimony about the components of ammunition that would 
have allowed them to determine through physical inspection that 
the bullet was smaller than and thus compatible with the .223 
caliber cartridge.14 
 
We also "must look at the evidence as a whole and not 
examine exhaustively each piece of evidence separately."  
Commonwealth v. Salim, 399 Mass. 227, 233 (1987).  Here, the 
jury heard testimony that the defendant immediately grew angry 
at the victim for asking him to leave the home.  He harbored 
this resentment throughout the day of the victim's death.  He 
was at the location of the crime, the home where he was staying, 
several hours before the victim was shot.  There was 
considerable DNA and other physical evidence that, on the night 
of the crime, the defendant violently broke into the gun safe in 
the basement, cut the trigger lock off a rifle, and took the 
rifle and ammunition.  The defendant was presumably on the 
property when a shot was heard at 11:45 P.M., but he was nowhere 
to be seen when the victim was discovered bleeding on the stairs 
                                                          
 
14 The jury received a visual explanation from the 
ballistics expert of the different components of a generic piece 
of ammunition.  They were told that the bullet or projectile was 
a component within the cartridge casing, i.e., that a cartridge 
is bigger than the bullet that it contains.  Here, the bullet 
appears to be approximately one-half the diameter of the 
cartridge casing. 
18 
 
at around midnight, until he emerged from the woods carrying the 
Winchester rifle and pointed it at the emergency personnel.  As 
discussed supra, the rifle and ammunition found on the 
defendant's person when he was subdued by police shortly after 
the victim's shooting were compatible with the bullet that 
killed the victim.  Finally, the defendant's comment to the 
police after he was shot ("Next time I'll come back with a 
bigger gun") suggested that the defendant had earlier been using 
his gun.  "This evidence, when taken together, formed a mosaic 
of evidence such that the jury could conclude, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant was the shooter" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Ayala, 481 Mass. at 53.  See id. 
(sufficient circumstantial evidence that defendant was shooter 
where jury could have found that defendant had gun, was angry at 
victim, and was in vicinity when shooting occurred).  Cf. 
Morgan, 449 Mass. at 351 (sufficient evidence to convict 
defendant when his statements showed hostility to victim, he 
possessed potential murder weapon, and he behaved suspiciously 
the evening victim disappeared). 
 
ii.  Evidence of a third-party culprit.  The defendant 
argues that in light of evidence that the brother was a third-
party culprit, no rational jury could have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant murdered the victim. 
Specifically, he points to evidence indicating that (1) the 
19 
 
brother shared the defendant's motive because the victim also 
asked him to move out; (2) a bloodstain containing the brother's 
DNA was found on the wall at the top of the stairs to the 
basement; (3) the brother could have removed gunshot residue 
from his hands when he washed them in the kitchen sink.  The 
defendant further argues that the brother was not a credible 
witness due to inconsistencies between his testimony and those 
of other witnesses.15  We conclude that this evidence does not 
affect the sufficiency of the evidence of the jury's verdict. 
 
As discussed supra, the Commonwealth provided sufficient 
evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant shot the victim.  "[T]he Commonwealth does not have 
the burden of proving no one else may have committed the 
murder," but rather its "burden is to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the murder" -- a burden that 
it satisfied.  Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 208 (2011).  
See Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 412 (2014) 
("Commonwealth does not have the burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that some third party is not guilty of the 
charged crime").  The alleged inconsistencies in the brother's 
                                                          
 
15 In particular, the brother testified that he was not 
drunk when he fell asleep at 10 P.M., but a police officer 
testified that he appeared intoxicated shortly after midnight. 
Furthermore, the brother testified that both police officers 
never entered the house, but the officers testified that they 
had in fact gone inside. 
20 
 
testimony and certain supposed "problems" with his conduct on 
the night of the murder were aired through cross-examination and 
closing argument and are matters concerning the "weight and 
credibility of the evidence" that are the "province of the 
jury."  Commonwealth v. Gomez, 450 Mass. 704, 711 (2008).  See 
Commonwealth v. Mendez, 476 Mass. 512, 524 (2017) ("The 
credibility of a witness is for the jury to decide").  In any 
case, the evidence much more strongly demonstrated the 
"defendant's culpability as the perpetrator such that a jury 
could reasonably infer that the defendant was the shooter beyond 
a reasonable doubt."  Morgan, 449 Mass. at 350–351. 
 
b.  Challenges to the convictions of assault by means of a 
dangerous weapon (G. L. c. 265, § 15B) and armed assault with 
intent to murder (G. L. c. 265, § 18 [b]).  The defendant argues 
that his convictions of assault by means of a dangerous weapon 
under G. L. c. 265, § 15B, and armed assault with intent to 
murder under G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b), should be vacated because 
the Commonwealth failed to prove the operability of his rifle at 
the time of the offenses.  The defendant also contends it was 
error for the judge not to give an operability instruction with 
respect to the charge of assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon.16 
                                                          
 
 
16 The defendant raised the defense of inoperability only 
with respect to the charges of unlawful possession of a firearm 
21 
 
The indictments alleged that the defendant "did assault 
[the paramedic] by means of a dangerous weapon, to wit:  RIFLE" 
and that "being armed with a dangerous weapon, to wit, A RIFLE, 
[the defendant] did assault [the police officer] with intent to 
murder him."  Whether G. L. c. 265, § 15B or 18 (b), requires a 
"dangerous weapon" or "rifle" to be operational is a matter of 
law that we review de novo.  See Commonwealth v. Moffat, 478 
Mass. 292, 298 (2017) (de novo review where claim involves 
statutory interpretation).  We conclude that neither statute 
contains an operability requirement.17  We nonetheless analyze 
                                                          
 
or ammunition without a firearm identification card under G. L. 
c. 140, § 129C.  He also did not object to any of the jury 
instructions as given by the judge, although he did object to 
the Commonwealth's request to include the example of a broken 
firing pin in the operability instruction; the judge did not 
include the Commonwealth's requested instruction regarding the 
firing pin.  We therefore review the defendant's claim that he 
was entitled to an operability instruction for a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. The Ngoc 
Tran, 471 Mass. 179, 183-184 (2015). 
 
 
17 We further reject the defendant's argument that the 
operability instruction given with respect to armed assault with 
intent to murder became the "law of the case" and thus an 
element that the Commonwealth was required to prove.  A jury 
instruction that "add[s] elements to the government's burden of 
proof beyond those required by statute . . . may not become the 
law of the case" if it is "patently incorrect."  United States 
v. Zanghi, 189 F.3d 71, 79 (1st. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 1097 (2000).  See Hohenleitner v. Quorum Health Resources, 
Inc., 435 Mass. 424, 433 (2001), citing Zanghi, supra ("patently 
incorrect" jury instruction does not become "law of the case").  
See also Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709, 715 (2016) 
("when a jury instruction sets forth all the elements of the 
charged crime but incorrectly adds one more element, a 
sufficiency challenge should be assessed against the elements of 
22 
 
the two statutes separately, as an element of armed assault with 
intent to murder under G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b), is a specific 
intent to murder that requires proof that the defendant believed 
the firearm to be operational. 
i.  Assault by means of a dangerous weapon (G. L. c. 265, 
§ 15B).  In relevant part, G. L. c. 265, § 15B (b), states: 
"Whoever, by means of a dangerous weapon, commits an 
assault upon another shall be punished by imprisonment in 
the state prison for not more than five years or by a fine 
of not more than one thousand dollars or imprisonment in 
jail for not more than two and one-half years." 
 
The elements of assault by means of a dangerous weapon are that 
a defendant committed an assault, the defendant intended to 
commit an assault, and that the assault was committed by means 
of a dangerous weapon.  See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 
616, 633 (2012); Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 530 
                                                          
 
the charged crime, not against the erroneously heightened 
command in the jury instruction"); Commonwealth v. White, 475 
Mass. 724, 731 n.12 (2016), citing Commonwealth v. David, 365 
Mass. 47, 55-56 (1974) ("We do not accept the defendant's claim 
that, because the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury 
that they needed to find 777 days of tolling, rather than four 
months, this higher number controls for purposes of our 
sufficiency review"); Commonwealth v. Bruneau, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 
858, 858 (1979), citing David, supra ("The judge's erroneous 
instruction to the effect that the defendant's bomb would not 
fall within the prohibition of G. L. c. 148, § 35, if it were 
not of a 'high explosive' variety was unduly favorable to the 
defendant, who could not have been prejudiced by the error.  
There is nothing to the contention that the erroneous ruling 
became the law of the case, requiring that the evidence conform 
to the requirements of the instruction rather than those of the 
statute"). 
23 
 
(2010); Commonwealth v. Melton, 436 Mass. 291, 295 (2002).  The 
Commonwealth must prove the "existence of every element of the 
crime charged" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 
Mass. 840, 844 (2010).  See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 95 Mass. 
App. Ct. 1, 4 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 385 Mass. 
863, 869 (1982) ("crimes must be 'proved as charged'"). 
 
We have explained that "[u]nder the common law, an assault 
may be perpetrated in either of two ways.  The crime may consist 
of 'an attempted battery' or 'an immediately threatened 
battery.'"  Commonwealth v. Melton, 436 Mass. 291, 294 (2002), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Gorassi, 432 Mass. 244, 247 (2000).18  
Furthermore, with respect to either the "attempted battery" or 
"immediately threatened battery" form of assault, the defendant 
                                                          
 
 
18 The judge erred when he stated that, under the 
immediately threatened battery theory of assault, the 
"Commonwealth must demonstrate that as a result of the 
threatened conduct, the victim did, in fact, experience a 
reasonable fear of immediate physical harm."  To convict under 
the immediately threatened battery theory, the "victim need not 
actually be in fear but must apprehend the risk of an imminent 
battery."  Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 531 (2010).  
See Commonwealth v. Musgrave, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 519, 523 (1995), 
S.C., 421 Mass. 610 (1996) ("proof of an intent to cause fear or 
apprehension" of immediate battery was required for conviction 
of assault by means of dangerous weapon [emphasis added]); 
Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407 Mass. 340, 349 (1990), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Delgado, 367 Mass. 432, 437 (1975) ("Under the 
common law, 'it is well established . . . that an act placing 
another in reasonable apprehension that force may be used is 
sufficient for the offense of criminal assault'" [emphasis 
added]).  As this error benefited the defendant, however, we 
conclude that it was harmless. 
 
24 
 
need only have the "apparent ability" to do bodily harm or carry 
out his or her threat.  See Commonwealth v. Henson, 357 Mass. 
686, 692 (1970) ("Where an assault may be committed either by an 
attempt to commit a battery or by an unlawful act placing the 
other in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate 
battery, it is clear that apparent ability will suffice 
[quotation and citation omitted]").19  The "'relevant conduct 
. . . is an outward demonstration of force,' and requires 'only 
apparent ability to injure.'"  Mattei, 455 Mass. at 845, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 305 (1980). 
 
The "required element" of G. L. c. 265, § 15B, that raises 
questions here is whether the defendant made "use of a dangerous 
weapon to commit the assault."  Commonwealth v. Muller, 461 
Mass. 1009, 1010 (2012).  "[I]n assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon, whether the weapon is actually used to inflict harm is 
largely irrelevant.  Rather, as we have stated, the "relevant 
                                                          
 
 
19 Consistent with Commonwealth v. Henson, 357 Mass. 686, 
692 (1970), the judge instructed the jury with respect to the 
"attempted battery" form of assault that "the Commonwealth must 
. . . prove that the defendant had the actual or apparent 
ability to inflict bodily harm.  This means that the 
Commonwealth need not show the defendant possessed the actual 
ability to do bodily harm.  Apparent ability will suffice."  
With respect to the "immediately threatened battery" form of 
assault, he likewise correctly instructed that, "similar to the 
first type of assault, the Commonwealth need not demonstrate 
that the defendant had the actual ability at the time of the 
alleged assault to carry out the threat.  Apparent ability will 
suffice." 
25 
 
point is the 'objectively menacing conduct of the defendant 
. . . [producing] the fear of harm which it was intended to 
produce, with the same consequential tendency to provoke a 
breach of the peace.'"  Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 367 Mass. 411, 
415 (1975), quoting Commonwealth v. Slaney, 345 Mass. 135, 140 
(1962).  See Henson, 357 Mass. at 692.  See also J.R. Nolan & 
L.J. Sartorio, Criminal Law § 324 (3d ed. 2001) ("The question 
is whether the object has the apparent ability to inflict harm 
if used as threatened, the secret intent of the defendant being 
immaterial"). 
 
In Henson, 357 Mass. at 687-688, 693, we held that a gun 
that only had the apparent ability to injure because it could 
only fire "blank" cartridges or "BB shot" was sufficient for a 
conviction of assault by means of a dangerous weapon under G. L. 
c. 265, § 15B.  There, we explained: 
"The fundamental reason for permitting a conviction for 
simple assault on proof of apparent ability of the 
assailant to accomplish the attempted or threatened battery 
is that the public peace and order is affected by and 
dependent upon what is reasonably apparent, and not upon 
secret fact or reason rendering the assailant incapable of 
accomplishing the battery.  The reason applies with even 
greater force to a case of apparent ability to accomplish a 
battery attempted or threatened by means of a firearm.  The 
threat to the public peace and order is greater, and 
natural reactions thereto by the intended victim and others 
may be more sudden and violent than in cases where no 
weapon is involved." 
 
Id. at 693.  Applying the "apparent ability" test, we thus held 
that the "mere fact that a firearm brandished by an assailant is 
26 
 
known by him to be unloaded, or to be loaded with blank 
cartridges, does not entitle him to an acquittal on a charge of 
the aggravated offence of assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon."  Id. at 693-694. 
 
Under Henson, it is clear that a weapon need not actually 
be capable of inflicting death or serious harm to be a 
"dangerous weapon" so long as it has the apparent ability to do 
so.  Consequently, there is no merit to the defendant's argument 
that he was entitled to an operability instruction with respect 
to the charge of assault by means of a dangerous weapon:  such 
an instruction would conflict with the apparent ability rule 
explicated in Henson because a weapon may have the apparent 
ability to harm regardless of whether it is operable.20  We do 
                                                          
 
 
20 The defendant bases his argument on Commonwealth v. 
Bartholomew, 326 Mass. 218, 219 (1950), where we considered 
whether a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm under 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (Ter. Ed.), should be vacated on the ground 
that the defendant's "gun was not a machine gun within the 
meaning of [G. L. c. 140, § 121 (Ter. Ed.),]" because it was not 
able to fire in the absence of a firing pin.  There, we 
explained that a "weapon designed for firing projectiles" cannot 
be deemed a "rifle" as a matter of law if it requires more than 
a "relatively slight repair, replacement, or adjustment" to 
"make it an effective weapon."  Id. at 220.  General Laws 
c. 269, § 10 (a), however, incorporates the definitions of 
firearms, rifles, and other weapons contained in G. L. c. 140, 
§ 121.  The latter statute defines a "firearm" as a "pistol, 
revolver or other weapon of any description, loaded or unloaded, 
from which a shot or bullet can be discharged" and a "rifle" as 
a "weapon having a rifled bore with a barrel length equal to or 
greater than [sixteen] inches and capable of discharging a shot 
or bullet for each pull of the trigger" (emphases added).  Thus, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10, contains an operability requirement, whereas 
27 
 
recognize, however, the potential for jury confusion arising out 
of the "dangerous weapon" aspect of the instruction regarding 
assault by means of a dangerous weapon in cases where the 
firearm may not be working or is otherwise not dangerous 
because, for example, it is loaded with blanks.  In such cases, 
a jury cannot simply be instructed that a firearm is dangerous 
per se, as was done by the judge here.  Rather, a jury should be 
instructed using the following language drawn from Commonwealth 
v. Powell, 433 Mass. 399, 401 (2001): 
"Dangerous weapons include those displayed in a way such 
that they reasonably appear capable of causing serious 
injury or death.  An object that is, on closer inspection, 
incapable of inflicting serious injury or death can still 
be a dangerous weapon if, at the time of the offense, it 
                                                          
 
the language of G. L. c. 265, §§ 15B and 18 (b), does not.  
Furthermore, G. L. c. §§ 15B and 18 (b), are statutes that cover 
assault, while G. L. c. 269, § 10, does not.  Cf. Cepulonis v. 
Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 501 n.5 (1981) ("The Commonwealth 
need not have introduced the description of a machine gun 
contained in G. L. c. 140, § 121 [an element of proof needed to 
obtain a conviction for unlawful possession of a machine gun] to 
support the offense under G. L. c. 265, [§] 15A"). 
 
 
An instruction based on Bartholomew is appropriate in the 
context of unlawful possession of a firearm under G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h) (1), as was in fact given in this case.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 461 Mass. 821, 828 (2012) (sufficient 
evidence for jury to find that, for purposes of charges of 
unlawful possession of a firearm, revolver requiring "slight 
repair with pair of pliers" was "firearm" within meaning of 
G. L. c. 140, § 121).  See also Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 21 Mass. 
App. Ct. 968, 969 (1986) ("An essential element of the offense 
against G. L. c. 269, § 10 [a], is that the firearm carried be a 
working one;" pistol requiring replacement of "sear bar" to fire 
again not firearm within meaning of G. L. c. 140, § 121). 
28 
 
would have been reasonable to believe that it was capable 
of inflicting such injury."21 
 
 
In the instant case, there was sufficient evidence for the 
jury to find that the defendant committed assault by means of a 
dangerous weapon because he had the apparent ability to 
seriously injure or kill the paramedic.22  The paramedic, who was 
familiar with lever action rifles, saw the defendant pull the 
lever action of the rifle down and back, raise the gun to firing 
position, and point it in his direction.  The paramedic shouted 
"he's got a gun," coupled with an obscenity, and immediately ran 
away.  He fled inside the home and took cover "in a secure 
place."  The paramedic's actions reveal that the rifle had the 
apparent ability to cause death or serious injury and thus that 
the rifle fulfilled the dangerous weapon element of G. L. 
c. 265, § 15B. 
 
ii.  Armed assault with intent to murder (G. L. c. 265, 
§ 18 [b]).  In relevant part, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b), states: 
"Whoever, being armed with a dangerous weapon, assaults 
another with intent to  . . . murder shall be punished by 
                                                          
 
 
21 Although Commonwealth v. Powell, 433 Mass. 399, 401 
(2001), involved a conviction of armed robbery under G. L. 
c. 265, § 17, we conclude the "standard definition" of dangerous 
weapon announced there is applicable to the "dangerous weapon" 
element of G. L. c. 265, § 15B. 
 
 
22 "Because attempted battery and threatened battery are 
closely related, . . . we do not require that a jury be 
unanimous as to which theory of assault forms the basis for 
their verdict."  Commonwealth v. Boodoosingh, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 
902, 903 (2014), quoting Porro, 458 Mass. at 534. 
29 
 
imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty 
years.  Whoever, being armed with a firearm, shotgun, 
rifle, machine gun or assault weapon assaults another with 
intent to . . . murder shall be punished by imprisonment in 
state prison for not less than five years and not more than 
[twenty] years" (emphasis added). 
 
"The elements of armed assault with intent to murder are 'that 
the defendant committed an assault, that he was armed with a 
dangerous weapon, and that he had the specific intent of 
murdering the victim in assaulting him.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Bolling, 462 Mass. 440, 453 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Lopez, 383 Mass. 497, 500 (1981).  We discern no reason to treat 
the armed assault aspect of G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b), any 
differently from assault by means of a dangerous weapon under 
G. L. c. 265, § 15B.  The rationale articulated in Henson, 357 
Mass. at 693, concerning the objectively menacing aspect of an 
assault with a firearm and the heightened threat to "public 
peace and order" applies equally to both forms of armed 
assault.23 
This offense contains an additional element, however:  the 
intent to murder.  Thus, it is a specific intent crime.  
Bolling, 462 Mass. at 453.  If a defendant lacks the specific 
                                                          
 
 
23 An instruction based on the definition of "dangerous 
weapon" (if there is a question regarding the operability or 
dangerousness of the firearm) set forth in the Powell case is 
appropriate with respect to both assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon and armed assault with intent to murder.  See Powell, 433 
Mass. at 401. 
30 
 
intent to kill because he or she believes his or her gun is not 
operable, the defendant cannot be convicted of armed assault 
with intent to murder.  See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 41 Mass. 
App. Ct. 459, 462 (1996) ("critical question" for conviction of 
armed assault with intent to murder is whether defendant knew 
pistol was jammed and hence inoperable when he pointed it at 
police officers).  For these purposes, the issue is not whether 
the gun is operable, but whether the defendant thinks it is. 
 
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a jury 
to find all the elements of armed assault with intent to murder.  
There was overwhelming evidence that the defendant had the 
apparent ability to seriously injure or kill the police officer 
and sufficient evidence that he had the specific intent to do 
so.  The officer saw the defendant point the raised rifle at him 
and "track" him with the rifle.  He even believed that the 
defendant might be shooting him and thought "I'm dead."  This 
conduct revealed "an outward demonstration of force" and an 
"apparent ability to injure" (citation omitted).  Mattei, 455 
Mass. at 845.  The defendant's rifle thus remained a "dangerous 
weapon" for purposes of both G. L. c. 265, §§ 15B and 18 (b). 
 
Although a closer question, there was sufficient evidence 
for the jury to infer that the defendant assaulted the police 
officer with a rifle with the intent to murder him, i.e., by 
shooting him with the rifle, particularly because it was not 
31 
 
clear whether the rifle had become inoperable before or after 
the defendant pointed it at the first responders, as discussed 
infra.  The rifle had earlier been used to kill the victim.  
There was evidence to support the Commonwealth's argument that 
the rifle had been reloaded at the time of the assault, namely 
the presence of a live .223 caliber round found near the open 
rifle.  The jury thus could infer that, despite the fact that 
the defendant's rifle was later shown to be incapable of firing, 
the defendant believed it was operational at the time of the 
assault.  This inference is supported by the defendant's 
conduct, for example his pulling the lever action of the rifle 
down and back (indicating that he was reloading the rifle), and 
by the presence of several rounds of live ammunition, of the 
sort that he had previously used to shoot the victim, in the 
defendant's pockets.  Additionally, the defendant held onto the 
rifle even after he had been shot and the police had to take it 
away from him.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 126 
(2013) (defendant's "persistence in pointing a loaded gun at the 
man who had just wounded him with lethal force [was] 
circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that, at 
that juncture, the defendant had formed a specific intent to 
kill" police officer).  In short, there was sufficient evidence 
for the jury to infer the defendant's specific intent to murder 
the police officer.  See id. (sufficient evidence for jury to 
32 
 
convict defendant of armed assault with intent to murder despite 
his never having fired his gun). 
 
We thus hold that the defendant was properly convicted of 
both assault by means of a dangerous weapon under G. L. c. 265, 
§ 15B, and armed assault with intent to murder under G. L. 
c. 265, § 18 (b). 
 
iii.  Jury instructions.  The judge's instruction on armed 
assault with intent to murder under G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b), was 
incorrect on the issue of operability, but the error did not 
rise to the level of a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.24  With respect to that charge, the judge erroneously 
                                                          
 
 
24 We review convictions of crimes other than murder (except 
for the predicate felony in a felony-murder conviction) for a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth 
v. Bolling, 462 Mass. 440, 452 (2012) ("Because the defendant 
did not object to the judge's omission of the [jury] 
instruction, and because the instruction relates to a crime 
other than murder in the first degree [i.e., armed assault with 
intent to murder], we review for a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice"); Commonwealth v. Durand, 457 Mass. 574, 
592 n.24 (2010), S.C., 475 Mass. 657 (2016), cert. denied, 138 
S. Ct. 259 (2017) ("we are reviewing the introduction of the 
involuntary statement only in relation to the conviction of 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.  
Accordingly, the defendant is not entitled to the more 
deferential standard that applies pursuant to G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E," but rather court reviews for substantial risk of 
miscarriage of justice); Commonwealth v. Shine, 398 Mass. 641, 
655 (1986) (for "conviction of a crime other than one of murder 
in the first degree . . . test is whether there is a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice").  See also Commonwealth v. 
Jewett, 442 Mass. 356, 368–369 (2004) (where defendant convicted 
of both murder in first degree and rape, applying "substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice" standard to rape conviction); 
Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 417 Mass. 592, 597 (1994) (where 
33 
 
instructed the jury that they had to find that the defendant's 
weapon was operational and met the "definition" of a "rifle," 
specifically that it was in fact "capable of discharging a shot 
or bullet" or at least doing so with only a "slight repair, 
replacement or adjustment."  Because the defendant did not 
object, we review for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  We conclude that there was none.  As explained, the 
instruction was patently incorrect and did not become the law of 
the case.  See note 17, supra.  The defendant also benefited 
from the instruction, as the judge needlessly required the 
firearm to be operational in order to obtain a guilty verdict on 
the charge of armed assault with intent to murder.  Finally, 
based on the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the jury could have found that the rifle was 
operational at the time the defendant aimed it at the police 
officer and only became inoperable when another police officer 
kicked and threw it after taking it from the defendant. 
 
With respect to the charge of assault by means of a 
dangerous weapon under G. L. c. 265, § 15B, the judge did not 
give an operability instruction.  Rather, he stated that the 
"final element the Commonwealth must prove is that the assault 
                                                          
 
defendant convicted of both murder in first degree and 
kidnapping and unarmed robbery, applying "substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice" standard to nonmurder convictions). 
34 
 
was committed with a dangerous weapon.  A dangerous weapon is an 
item which is capable of causing serious injury or death.  I 
instruct you, as a matter of law, that a rifle is a dangerous 
weapon."  For the reasons discussed supra, this instruction was 
confusing when the operability of the rifle was in question.  The 
judge instead should have given an instruction drawn from our 
decision in Powell, 433 Mass. at 401, set forth supra. 
 
There was, however, no objection, and we discern no 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice arising from this 
instruction.  The evidence that the weapon was brandished and 
aimed in a way that reasonably made it appear capable of causing 
serious injury or death was overwhelming.  The jury also found 
the defendant guilty of armed assault with intent to murder 
where the judge had imposed the additional requirement that the 
weapon be operational.  The jury thus found that the weapon not 
only appeared capable of causing serious injury or death but 
actually was capable of causing injury or death.  In these 
circumstances, there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice due to the erroneous instruction. 
 
c.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After a thorough 
review of the record, we find no reason to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a new trial or to 
reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.