Case Title: P. v. Cooper

Citation: 

Docket Number: S092882

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 1/14/02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
)
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
)
)
S092882
v.
)
)
Ct.App. 1/5 A087483
BRUCE EDWARD COOPER,
)
)
San Mateo County
Defendant and Appellant.
)
Super. Ct. No. C43434
__________________________________ )
Defendants sentenced to prison for criminal conduct are entitled to credit
against their terms for all actual days of presentence and postsentence custody
(Pen. Code,1 §§ 2900, subd. (c), 2900.5, subds. (a), (b)) and while in prison
custody, can earn postsentence good behavior/worktime credits (§ 2931) or prison
worktime credits (§ 2933) to shorten the period of incarceration.  Defendants
detained in a county jail, or other equivalent specified facility, “prior to the
imposition of sentence,” may also be eligible for presentence good
behavior/worktime credits (collectively referred to as conduct credits) of up to two
days for every four days of actual custody.  (§ 4019, subds. (a)(4), (b), (c), (e), (f).)
Section 2933.1, subdivision (c), adopted in 1994, limits the authorized award of
presentence conduct credits to a maximum of 15 percent of a defendant’s actual
period of presentence confinement for specified felons, including murderers.  In
                                                
1 
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
this case, a jury convicted defendant for a murder that was committed on May 22,
1998.  We granted review to determine whether the 15 percent limitation on
presentence conduct credits applies to convicted murderers, such as defendant,
who were sentenced under the 1978 version of section 190, which designates the
punishment for murder.2  As explained below, we conclude that section 2933.1
applies to limit defendant’s award of presentence conduct credits.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The information charged that defendant murdered his wife on May 22,
1998.  (§ 187.)  It further alleged that he personally used a dangerous weapon, a
knife, during the commission of the crime.  (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)  The jury
found defendant guilty of second degree murder and found the personal-use
allegation to be true.  The trial court imposed a sentence of 15 years to life on the
murder conviction (§ 190), and a one-year consecutive determinate term on the
personal-use finding.  The court awarded defendant 336 days for actual time
served (§ 2900.5, subd. (a)) and 50 days of presentence conduct credits (§ 4019,
subds. (b), (c)).  In calculating the presentence conduct credits, the court limited
                                                
2 
In June 1998, almost two weeks after the murder in this case, the voters
approved the legislative amendment to section 190 and the legislative enactment
of section 2933.2 by the passage of Proposition 222.  (Stats. 1996, ch. 598, §§ 1,
3-4; Stats. 1997, ch. 413, § 1; Prop. 222, as approved by voters, Primary Elec.
(June 2, 1998); People v. Herrera (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1366-1367.)
Regarding defendants convicted of murder, section 2933.2 expressly prohibits the
award of postsentence prison worktime credits and presentence conduct credits,
while section 190, as amended, expressly prohibits the award of postsentence
prison worktime credits.  (§ 190, subd. (e); 2933.2, subds. (a), (c); People v.
Herrera, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1366-1367.)  Those provisions do not apply
here because the crime in this case occurred before the operative date of
Proposition 222.
3
those credits to 15 percent of the actual time served under section 2933.1,
subdivision (c).3
Defendant appealed and claimed, among other things, that the trial court
miscalculated his presentence conduct credits under section 2933.1.  Agreeing
with defendant that the trial court erred in limiting those credits, the Court of
Appeal awarded defendant full presentence conduct credits, as authorized under
section 4019.   The court modified the judgment by increasing the presentence
conduct credits from 50 days to 168 days, but otherwise affirmed the conviction.
Defendant sought review here on an instructional issue not before us.  The
Attorney General filed a letter, which we deemed to be an answer, contesting the
modification of sentence.  We granted review solely on the credits issue.
DISCUSSION
As in the Court of Appeal, defendant asserts that his murder sentence was
based on the 1978 version of section 190, which had been adopted by the
electorate by the passage of the Briggs Initiative.  He argues that, because section
2933.1 was enacted by the Legislature in 1994 without voter approval, the
limitation of presentence conduct credits against that sentence was an invalid
modification of the Briggs Initiative.  For the reasons stated below, we disagree.
On November 7, 1978, the voters amended section 190 by the passage of
the Briggs Initiative.  The amendment increased the punishment for first degree
murder from an indeterminate term of life imprisonment to a term of 25 years to
                                                
3 
At trial, defendant failed to object to the trial court’s limitation of
presentence conduct credits under section 2933.1.  However, the Attorney General
concedes that defendant did not waive the issue regarding the appropriate formula
for calculating the presentence conduct credits.  (People v. Aguirre (1997) 56
Cal.App.4th 1135, 1139.)
4
life, and for second degree murder from a term of five, six, or seven years to 15
years to life in state prison.  (Prop. 7, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7,
1978); see Note, Deering’s Ann. Pen. Code (1985 ed.) foll. § 190, p. 82; People
v. Bright (1996) 12 Cal.4th 652, 662-663, fn. 7.)  The purpose of the Briggs
Initiative was to substantially increase the punishment for persons convicted of
first and second degree murder.  (In re Jeanice D. (1980) 28 Cal.3d 210, 219.)
Former section 190, as amended by the Briggs Initiative, provided for credits as
follows:  “The provisions of Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) of
Chapter 7 of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Penal Code shall apply to reduce any
minimum term of 25 or 15 years in state prison imposed pursuant to this section,
but such person shall not otherwise be released on parole prior to such time.”
(Prop. 7, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978), reprinted at Deering’s
Ann. Pen. Code, supra, § 190, p. 82 (former § 190.3).)
At the time the Briggs Initiative was approved, article 2.5 contained only
provisions relating to prison conduct credits:  sections 2930 (notice to prisoners
about availability of credits), 2931 (good behavior and participation credits), and
2932 (forfeiture of such credits).  (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 276, pp. 5146-5149; In
re Oluwa (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 439, 442.)  The Legislature had enacted article
2.5 as part of the Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, to provide incentives for
prison inmates to refrain from criminal conduct and to encourage participation in
rehabilitative activities by allowing inmates to reduce their sentences for good
behavior and participation in prison activities.  (People v. Austin (1981) 30 Cal.3d
155, 163.)
In 1988 and 1994, the voters again approved legislative amendments to
section 190 by the passage of Propositions 67 and 179, respectively.  The
amendments increased the penalties for certain designated murders not applicable
here, consistent with the purpose of the Briggs Initiative to increase the
5
punishment for persons convicted of murder.  (Stats. 1987, ch. 1006, § 1, pp.
3367-3368, approved by voters as Prop. 67, eff. June 8, 1988; Ballot Pamp.,
Primary Elec. (June 7, 1988) analysis and text of Prop. 67, pp. 8-9; and see Legis.
Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 402, 4 Stats. 1987, Summary Dig., p. 335; Stats.
1993, ch. 609, § 3, p. 3266, approved by voters as Prop. 179, eff. June 8, 1994;
Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 7, 1994) analysis, text, and argument in favor of
Prop. 179, pp. 22-23, 29; and see Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill. No. 310, 5
Stats. 1993, Summary Dig., pp. 236-237; see Notes, Deering’s Ann. Pen. Code
(2001 supp.) foll. § 190, pp. 38-39.)
At the time of the murder in this case (May 1998), the credits provision in
subdivision (a) of former section 190, as amended effective 1994, read:  “Except
as provided in subdivision (b), Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) of
Chapter 7 of Title 1 of Part 3 shall apply to reduce any minimum term of 15, 20, or
25 years in the state prison imposed pursuant to this section, but the person shall
not otherwise be released on parole prior to that time.”  (Stats. 1993, ch. 609, § 3,
p. 3266.)
In 1994, the Legislature added section 2933.1 to article 2.5 as an urgency
measure.  (Stats. 1994, ch. 713, § 1, p. 3448.)  For specified felons, section 2933.1
limits presentence conduct credits authorized under section 4019.  (People v.
Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 31-32; People v. Aguirre, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1138-1141.)  Section 2933.1 became effective on September 21, 1994
(People v. Camba (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 857, 867), after the passage of
Proposition 179, and states, in relevant part:  “(a) Notwithstanding any other law,
any person who is convicted of a felony offense listed in Section 667.5 shall
accrue no more than 15 percent of worktime credit, as defined in Section 2933.
[¶] . . . [¶]  (c) Notwithstanding Section 4019 or any other provision of law, the
maximum credit that may be earned against a period of confinement in, or
6
commitment to, a county jail, . . . following arrest and prior to placement in the
custody of the Director of Corrections, shall not exceed 15 percent of the actual
period of confinement for any person specified in subdivision (a).”
Murder is one of the qualifying felony offenses specified in section 667.5,
subdivision (c)(1).
Relying on In re Oluwa, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at page 445, defendant
argues that, at the time of his offense, former section 190 incorporated by specific
reference the code sections contained in article 2.5 at the time of the Briggs
Initiative.  Because former section 190 expressly authorized article 2.5 credits to
reduce the minimum term imposed and section 2933.1 later limited the availability
of credits without voter approval, defendant claims that section 2933.1 is
inapplicable to his sentence.  He argues that, instead, he is entitled to presentence
conduct credits under the more favorable section 4019 formula.4  On the other
                                                
4 
Defendant was sentenced under former section 190 as it was amended by
the passage of Proposition 179 in 1994.  He maintains that former section 190
incorporated by specific reference the code sections contained in article 2.5 at the
time of the Briggs Initiative.  Government Code section 9605 supports his
position.  It provides in pertinent part that, “Where a section or part of a statute is
amended, it is not to be considered as having been repealed and reenacted in the
amended form.  The portions which are not altered are to be considered as having
been the law from the time when they were enacted; the new provisions are to be
considered as having been enacted at the time of the amendment; and the omitted
portions are to be considered as having been repealed at the time of the
amendment.”  The voter-approved amendments to former section 190––
Proposition 67 in 1988 and Proposition 179 in 1994––did not substantively change
the credits provision in the 1978 version of the Briggs Initiative.  Because there
were no changes to the credits provision, there were no reenactments.  (In re
Oluwa, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 446-447.)  In any event, even if the 1994
version of former section 190 refers to article 2.5 in effect at the time Proposition
179 was approved, there were no dispositive changes to article 2.5 between the
passages of the Briggs Initiative in 1978 and Proposition 179 in 1994.  Article 2.5,
at the times the Briggs Initiative and Proposition 179 were approved, contained
(footnote continued on next page)
7
hand, the Attorney General argues that former section 190’s reference to article
2.5 in the 1978 Briggs Initiative was “merely a general reference to an entire
system of laws regarding credits” and that any subsequent credits modifications by
the Legislature were to be included in section 190’s general reference to the
credits scheme.  We agree with defendant’s characterization that the reference to
article 2.5 was a specific reference rather than a general one, as asserted by the
Attorney General.  Nevertheless, although we reject the Attorney General’s
underlying analysis, we agree with him that the trial court’s application of the
section 2933.1 credits limitation against his sentence was not an invalid
modification of the Briggs Initiative.
A statute enacted by voter initiative may be changed only with the approval
of the electorate unless the initiative measure itself permits amendment or repeal
without voter approval.  (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c).)  The Briggs Initiative
did not authorize the Legislature to amend its provisions without voter approval.
(In re Oluwa, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 445-446.)  “ ‘It is a well established
principle of statutory law that, where a statute adopts by specific reference the
provisions of another statute, regulation, or ordinance, such provisions are
incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as
subsequently modified . . . .  [Citations.]  [¶] . . .  [¶] . . . [T]here is a cognate rule,
recognized as applicable to many cases, to the effect that where the reference is
general instead of specific, such as a reference to a system or body of laws or to
the general law relating to the subject in hand, the referring statute takes the law or
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
only provisions which authorized the award of postsentence prison conduct
credits.  In addition, Proposition 179 was approved before the effective date of
section 2933.1.
8
laws referred to not only in their contemporary form, but also as they may be
changed from time to time, and . . . as they may be subjected to elimination
altogether by repeal.  [Citations.]’ ”  (Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32
Cal.2d 53, 58-59.)  An amendment is a legislative act designed to change an
existing initiative statute by adding or taking from it some particular provision.
(Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th
1473, 1485; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Cory (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 772, 776.)
In Oluwa, the issue was whether defendant, who was sentenced to 15 years
to life for second degree murder, was entitled to a more favorable credit
calculation for postsentence worktime credits under section 2933.  (In re Oluwa,
supra, 207 Cal.App.3d 439.)  In 1982, after the passage of the Briggs Initiative,
the Legislature enacted section 2933 without voter approval.5  The Court of
Appeal determined that the Briggs Initiative had adopted, by specific reference,
the provisions contained in article 2.5 and incorporated those provisions in the
form they existed at the time of the election and not in the form as subsequently
modified.  The court relied on a legislative analysis accompanying the initiative’s
ballot statement which specifically addressed the availability of conduct credits
and advised voters that defendants sentenced to 15 years to life in prison would
                                                
5 
In 1982, the Legislature expanded the postsentence credits scheme,
contained in article 2.5, by adding sections 2933 (worktime credit), 2934 (waiver
of right to receive good behavior credits), and 2935 (additional reduction of
sentence for heroic act) to that article.  (Stats. 1982, ch. 1234, §§ 4-6, pp. 4551-
4553.)  Section 2933 allows inmates to reduce their sentences by a maximum one-
half for “ ‘performance in work, training or education programs . . . .’ ”  (In re
Oluwa, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 443.)  Section 2934 allows an already
sentenced inmate to waive the right to receive less favorable good behavior credits
under section 2931 (reduction of a sentence by a maximum one-third) and to
receive thereafter the more generous conduct credits allowed by section 2933.  (In
re Oluwa, supra, at p. 443.)
9
have to serve a minimum of 10 years before becoming eligible for parole.  It
concluded that the electorate clearly intended that a second degree murderer serve
10 years before parole consideration and that an application of the more liberal
credits scheme under section 2933 would be contrary to the voter’s intent.  (In re
Oluwa, supra, at pp. 445-446.)  The court reasoned, “The Legislature should not
be permitted to do indirectly that which it cannot do directly.”  (Id. at p. 446.)
In this case, the Court of Appeal recognized that, unlike the expansion of
credits in Oluwa, the limitation of credits by section 2933.1 does not directly
contradict the intention of the electorate in approving the Briggs Initiative.  It
nevertheless concluded that “the limitation of credits effects no less an amendment
of section 190.”
We disagree.  To determine the meaning of a statute, we seek to discern the
sense of its language, in full context, in light of its purpose.  (In re Cervera (2001)
24 Cal.4th 1073, 1077.)  The relevant portion of former section 190, as approved
by the Briggs Initiative, stated:  “The provisions of Article 2.5 (commencing with
Section 2930) of Chapter 7 of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Penal Code shall apply to
reduce any minimum term of 25 or 15 years in state prison imposed pursuant to
this section, but such person shall not otherwise be released on parole prior to such
time.”  (Prop. 7, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978), reprinted at
Deering’s Ann. Pen. Code, supra, § 190, p. 82.)  At the time the initiative was
approved, article 2.5 contained only sections 2930, 2931, and 2932 (In re Oluwa,
supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 445), provisions that only authorized the award of
postsentence prison conduct credits.  (See People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498,
504-506.)  The provisions currently contained in article 2.5 continue to authorize
only postsentence prison conduct credits.  (See People v. Buckhalter, supra, 26
Cal.4th at p. 31; In re Cervera, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1078-1079; People v.
Thomas (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1122, 1125 [under the “Three Strikes” law, statutory
10
language referring to article 2.5 referred to postsentence, not presentence conduct
credits]; People v. Goodloe (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 485, 488-489.)  Sections
2900.5 and 4019, which authorize the award of presentence conduct credits
(People v. Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 30-32; People v. Goodloe, supra,
37 Cal.App.4th at p. 495), were and continue to be in a different article.  (See pt. 3,
tit. 1, ch. 7, art. 1; id., tit. 4, ch. 1; see also Notes, Deering’s Ann. Pen. Code,
supra, foll. § 2900.5, pp. 409-410, 411; id. (2001 supp.) foll. § 2900.5, p. 67; id.
§ 4019, p. 41.)  Although section 2933.1 is currently contained in article 2.5, that
section does not authorize the award of presentence conduct credits.  It simply
limits the presentence conduct credits authorized by section 4019.  (See People v.
Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 31-32; People v. Thomas, supra, 21 Cal.4th at
p. 1126.)
Thus, the first clause, in referring to the availability of credits under
“Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) . . . to reduce any minimum term”
for those defendants sentenced under former section 190, was specifically
referring only to the availability of postsentence conduct credits.  This clause,
authorizing the availability of postsentence conduct credits to reduce a murder
term, when read together with the second clause, “but such person shall not
otherwise be released on parole prior to such time,” reflects the voters’ intent to
establish the absolute minimum prison term a convicted murderer must serve,
after the award of the term-shortening postsentence conduct credits.  (See People
v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 245, fn. 7 [Briggs Initiative established a
minimum prison term a convicted murderer must serve].)  As explained in Oluwa,
the legislative analysis, accompanying the ballot statement, assured the voters that
the award of article 2.5 postsentence conduct credits would reduce a sentence of
15 years to life to a minimum term of 10 years before parole eligibility.  (People v.
Oluwa, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 442-443.)
11
In arguing that the trial court’s limitation of his presentence conduct credits
was an improper legislative amendment, defendant assumes that he is entitled to
full presentence conduct credits under section 4019.  However, in determining
electorate intent, we believe that the language of former section 190 presents an
ambiguity.  On the one hand, the phrase, “but such person shall not otherwise be
released on parole prior to such time” (italics added), can be interpreted to
impliedly prohibit the award of any conduct credits, other than postsentence
conduct credits, to murderers.  Under this construction, defendant is not entitled to
any presentence conduct credits under section 4019.
On the other hand, another reasonable interpretation is that former section
190, in referring specifically to article 2.5 prison conduct credits, was addressing
only the manner in which postsentence conduct credits can apply to reduce a
murder sentence without any reference to presentence conduct credits.  Because
the statute does not preclude the award of presentence conduct credits to
defendants convicted of murder, section 4019, which generally authorizes such
credits, remains operative.  Under this construction, defendant is not precluded
from an award of presentence conduct credits under section 4019.  This
interpretation is consistent with the Attorney General’s position.  He concedes that
convicted murderers whose cases fall into the window period between the
effective dates of section 2933.1 and Proposition 222 are entitled to some
presentence conduct credits.  Moreover, because an ambiguity in the statutory
language should be construed “ ‘as favorably to the defendant as its language and
the circumstances of its application may reasonably permit’ ” (People v. Garcia
12
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 10), we adopt the latter construction.6  Consequently, because
former section 190 does not specifically authorize or prohibit presentence conduct
credits, any limitation of such credits against defendant’s sentence, otherwise
authorized by section 4019, is not an invalid modification of the Briggs Initiative.7
                                                
6  
Allowing section 4019 conduct credits against the sentences of convicted
murderers under former section 190 does not appear to contravene the electorate’s
intent.  Under section 4019, defendant is entitled to a maximum of two additional
days for every four days of actual custody in county jail.  (§ 4019, subds. (a)(4),
(b), (c), (e), (f); People v. Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 30.)  This formula
results in a one-third reduction of the term of confinement (People v. Ramos
(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 810, 820; People v. DeVore (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1316,
1319), similar to the formula used in the award of postsentence conduct credits
under section 2931.  (In re Oluwa, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 442 [§ 2931
authorizes a maximum one-third reduction of the term of confinement].)  Thus,
unlike the more favorable section 2933 postsentence credits scheme at issue in
Oluwa, a prisoner awarded presentence conduct credits under section 4019 is still
required to serve the minimum two-thirds term in actual confinement collectively
in county jail and prison.
7 
Before 1982, section 4019 provided presentence conduct credits for certain
city and county jail detainees, including misdemeanants in jail custody, both
before and after conviction and sentencing (§ 4019, subd. (a)(1)-(3)), but did not
expressly allow such credits to persons detained in jail on felony charges before
conviction and sentencing.  (Stats. 1976, ch. 286, § 4, pp. 595-596; People v. Sage,
supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 504, 507.)  In People v. Sage, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pages
506-509, we held that this discrepancy in the presentence jail treatment of
misdemeanants and felons violated equal protection.  (People v. Buckhalter, supra,
26 Cal.4th at p. 36.)  In 1982, the Legislature codified Sage by the addition of
subdivision (a)(4) to section 4019.  (Stats. 1982 ch. 1234, § 7, pp. 4553-4554;
People v. King (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 882, 885.)
13
Oluwa is distinguishable because it involved the legislative amendment of
article 2.5 postsentence conduct credits.  (See People v. Aguirre, supra, 56
Cal.App.4th at p. 1140 [“[s]ection 2933 [is a] purely postsentence statute”].)
Unlike Oluwa, here the trial court’s restriction of presentence conduct credits
under section 2933.1 is not inconsistent with former section 190 and does not
otherwise circumvent the intent of the electorate in adopting the Briggs Initiative.
(Cf. People v. Jenkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 245, fn. 7; People v. Ruiz (1996) 44
Cal.App.4th 1653, 1659-1661.)  Therefore, the Court of Appeal erred in
determining that the trial court improperly limited defendant’s presentence
conduct credits under section 2933.1.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal relating to the credits issue
and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
CHIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
14
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Cooper
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 84 Cal.App.4th 749
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S092882
Date Filed: January 14, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: San Mateo
Judge: Dale A. Hahn
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Louis Marinus Wijsen, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys
General, Ronald A. Bass, Assistant Attorney General, Michael E. Banister, Christina V. Kuo and Catherine
A. Rivlin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
15
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Louis Marinus Wijsen
909 Marina Village Parkway, No. 181
Alameda, CA  94501-1048
(510) 337-1914
Catherine A. Rivlin
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004
(415) 703-5977