Case Title: Porter v. Board of Bar Examiners

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13062

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-04-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13062 
 
LIONEL PORTER  vs.  BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS. 
 
 
April 22, 2022. 
 
 
Board of Bar Examiners.  Attorney at Law, Admission to practice.  
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
After the Board of Bar Examiners (board) reported that 
Lionel Porter was not qualified for admission to the 
Massachusetts bar because of certain character and fitness 
concerns, Porter petitioned a single justice of this court for 
review.  The single justice dismissed Porter's petition and 
denied his application for admission to the bar.  Porter now 
appeals.  We affirm. 
 
 
1.  Procedural background.  Porter graduated from an 
accredited law school in 1985.  He has applied for admission to 
the Massachusetts bar multiple times, most recently in December 
of 2013, and, on the bar examination administered in February of 
2014, he earned for the first time a passing score.  Upon 
reviewing the information in Porter's application, however, the 
board determined that an inquiry into his character and fitness 
to practice law was necessary.  The board first interviewed 
Porter informally, and later appointed a special counsel to 
conduct a more detailed investigation.  After the special 
counsel submitted his report, the board held a formal 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Porter "is of good 
moral character and sufficient acquirements and qualifications" 
to warrant a recommendation for admission to the bar.  G. L. 
c. 221, § 37.  See S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 5.1, as appearing in 478 
Mass. 1301 (2018); Rule V.2 of the Rules of the Board of Bar 
Examiners (2018). 
 
 
Porter, who was represented by counsel at the formal 
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hearing, was the sole witness.  The board determined that Porter 
had not met his burden of establishing that he was qualified for 
admission.  It filed a report of nonqualification with this 
court containing its factual findings and recommendation that 
Porter's application be denied.  See Rule V.2.7 of the Rules of 
the Board of Bar Examiners.  Porter then petitioned this court 
for review.  See S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 5.3; Rule V.2.8 of the 
Rules of the Board of Bar Examiners.  A single justice of this 
court considered the record and Porter's challenges to the 
board's report and rejected Porter's arguments.  Accordingly, 
the single justice denied Porter's application for admission to 
the bar, dismissed his petition for review of the board's 
report, and denied his motion for reconsideration. 
 
 
2.  Factual background.  The single justice accepted the 
board's factual findings.  In summary, the evidence established 
that Porter earned a bachelor's degree in 1966, obtained a 
master's degree in 1970, and made progress toward a Ph.D.  He 
entered law school in 1981, and graduated in May of 1985. 
 
 
Following graduation from law school, Porter worked in a 
variety of capacities.  For several years, he worked as a pro 
bono advocate for the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP).  While at the NAACP, he reviewed, 
drafted, and filed discrimination complaints at the 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD).  See 
Matter of Hrones, 457 Mass. 844, 845 (2010).  In 2001, Porter 
was introduced to attorney Stephen Hrones.  As Porter described, 
the two reached a "mutually-beneficial business arrangement," 
whereby they would solicit prospective clients who had matters 
pending at the MCAD and share the fees that were generated by 
that work.  But see Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.4 (a), as appearing in 
430 Mass. 1303 (1999). 
 
 
Although he had not been admitted to the bar, Porter 
represented that while he worked at Hrones's law firm, he 
handled all the discrimination cases himself, without assistance 
from Hrones.1  He acknowledged that he was "perceived as a 
 
 
1 See Matter of Hrones, 457 Mass. 844, 845 n.1 (2010), 
citing 804 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.10(1)(c) (1999) (complaints with 
MCAD may be filed by nonprofit organizations "whose purposes 
include[] the elimination of the unlawful practice[s]") and 804 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.13(5)(b) (1999) (claimant may be 
accompanied to informal investigative conference "by his/her 
attorney or other representative").  Porter's work at Hrones's 
 
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'member of the firm' both perceptually and in practice."  This 
arrangement, as well as other misconduct, eventually led to 
disciplinary proceedings against Hrones, as a result of which 
Hrones was suspended from the practice of law in the 
Commonwealth.  See Matter of Hrones, 457 Mass. at 845.  In 2003, 
a default entered against Porter's client in one of the cases 
that Porter was handling at the MCAD and, as a result, 
allegations of case mismanagement and the unauthorized practice 
of law were leveled against Porter.  In addition, Porter missed 
filing deadlines in other cases and kept client retainer funds 
for his own personal use.  After complaints were filed with the 
Board of Bar Overseers, Hrones terminated the arrangement with 
Porter.  Porter, however, reported on his 2013 bar application 
that he had left the firm on his own volition. 
 
 
Porter's 2013 application also disclosed that he has been a 
party to a number of civil and criminal matters.  Among other 
things, in 2007, Porter pleaded guilty to operation of an 
unregistered motor vehicle and admitted to sufficient facts on a 
charge of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon 
arising out of an attempt to repossess Porter's motor vehicle; 
he also admitted to sufficient facts in another assault case in 
1996.  More recently, in 2012, a harassment prevention order was 
issued against him.  In addition, Porter did not disclose a 
bankruptcy petition that he had filed while his most recent bar 
application was pending, notwithstanding a board rule that 
requires disclosures of that sort.  See Rule V.1.2 of the Rules 
of the Board of Bar Examiners. 
 
 
3.  Discussion.  While we give due deference to the board's 
determination, "this court retains ultimate authority to decide 
a person's fitness to practice law in the Commonwealth."  
Strigler v. Board of Bar  
Examiners, 448 Mass. 1027, 1029 (2007), 
quoting Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 91 (1996).  Here, both 
the board and the single justice discussed their consideration 
of Porter's involvement in civil and criminal complaints against 
him, retention of client funds for personal use, and mishandling 
of client matters, as well as the incomplete and inconsistent 
disclosures on his multiple applications for admission to the 
bar.  We, too, have carefully reviewed the record.  The board 
concluded, the single justice accepted, and we agree that in the 
face of his history of misconduct, Porter has not met his burden 
 
"firm was not covered under the regulation regarding nonprofit 
organizations, as he was not acting on behalf of a qualified 
organization."  Matter of Hrones, supra at 851. 
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of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he has 
sufficiently rehabilitated himself such that he "currently 
possesses the necessary moral character to be admitted to the 
bar of the Commonwealth."  Matter of Prager, supra at 92. 
 
 
To be clear, our focus is on Porter's present fitness to be 
admitted to the bar, and not his prior conduct.  No history of 
misconduct "is so grave as to preclude a showing of present 
moral fitness."  Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. at 91.  The 
question is whether the applicant has "rehabilitated himself by 
'lead[ing] a sufficiently exemplary life to inspire public 
confidence once again, in spite of his previous actions'" 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 92.  Thus, at this juncture, we 
focus on Porter's "current attitudes toward this past conduct."  
See Matter of an Application for Admission to the Bar of the 
Commonwealth, 431 Mass. 678, 679-680 (2000). 
 
 
A significant focus of concern for the board, for the 
single justice, and for us is Porter's conduct while he worked 
as a paralegal at Hrones's law firm.  As Porter points out, he 
was not a party to the disciplinary case against Hrones, and 
therefore he was not precluded from showing that he did not in 
fact engage in the unauthorized practice of law and other 
misconduct described in Matter of Hrones, 457 Mass. at 851, 853-
854.  That said, many of the central facts that were described 
in the Hrones decision were left undisputed by Porter after the 
hearing in this case.  Porter affirmatively acknowledged, for 
example, that he signed Hrones's name on an affidavit, accepted 
clients, negotiated fees, filed complaints, drafted pleadings, 
conducted discovery, advised clients as to their legal rights, 
settled cases, and performed other legal work.  See id. at 846.  
There was ample support for the board's determination that 
Porter's mishandling of clients' cases at Hrones's law firm led 
to adverse consequences for clients.  In addition, on at least 
one occasion, Porter kept client retainer funds for personal 
use.  In his testimony before the board, he explained that he 
kept portions of client retainers:  "[B]ecause I was not getting 
a salary or anything else, there were times when I would use the 
retainer.  I didn't have any money."  He also did not dispute 
that he had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  In 
short, Porter did not satisfy the board or the single justice, 
nor has he satisfied us, that he appreciates the wrongfulness of 
his earlier misconduct and presently has an understanding of the 
norms of professional conduct for Massachusetts lawyers and the 
ability and desire to conform to them. 
 
 
Moreover, as the board found, Porter has been involved in a 
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number of criminal and civil matters that he did not fully and 
accurately disclose on his multiple bar applications, and the 
disclosures he has made in these applications have not been 
consistent.  See Rule V.1 of the Rules of the Board of Bar 
Examiners ("There shall be a rebuttable presumption that 
nondisclosure of a material fact . . . is prima facie evidence 
of the lack of good character").  Nothing in the record assures 
us that Porter now eschews this lack of candor or would not 
repeat it in the future.2 
 
 
We recognize that some, perhaps most, of the criminal 
charges appear to have been dismissed, and the underlying facts 
on which they were based are not entirely clear from the record.  
The incidents also are all more than ten years old at this 
point.  Nonetheless, as the board found, Porter pleaded guilty 
to at least one crime and admitted to sufficient facts with 
respect to a charge of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon, involving an attempt to repossess his motor 
vehicle.  In part because Porter described the victim as 
"contributing to his own harm," the board concluded that Porter 
did not fully understand and accept responsibility for the 
gravity of his actions in that case.  The single justice agreed 
with that assessment, as do we.  Porter's behavior at the time 
of those events, however, is inconsistent with the conduct 
expected of attorneys, who "must conduct themselves in such a 
way that they dedicate themselves to the peaceful settlement of 
disputes."  Matter of an Application for Admission to the Bar of 
the Commonwealth, 444 Mass. 393, 398 (2005).  See Rule V.1 of 
the Rules of the Board of Bar Examiners.  Porter's recounting of 
the events in his testimony before the board provides no 
assurance that he has been sufficiently rehabilitated, casting 
doubt on his character in the present.  See Strigler, 448 Mass. 
at 1028-1130. 
 
 
In Porter's favor, we acknowledge, as did the board and the 
 
 
2 The single justice also was troubled by Porter's failure 
fully to disclose on his applications for admission to the bar 
the circumstances surrounding his unauthorized practice of law.  
The single justice noted Porter's explanation on his 2013 
application, i.e., that he referred to the fact that one of his 
earlier recommenders had retracted his letter of recommendation 
after the recommender read a newspaper account of the events 
described in the Hrones decision.  In the circumstances, 
Porter's argument that the single justice improperly considered 
the newspaper article is misplaced. 
6 
single justice, his efforts to demonstrate rehabilitation.  
Those efforts included participating in continuing legal 
education programs and reading various treatises and appellate 
court decisions.  Those steps, however, are not sufficient to 
tip the balance in this case.  Only where an applicant 
establishes "by clear and convincing evidence his or her current 
good character and fitness to be admitted to practice of law in 
the Commonwealth," Rule V.2.2 of the Rules of the Board of Bar 
Examiners, can we "be confident that allowing an applicant to 
practice law would not be detrimental to the public interest," 
Matter of an Application for Admission to the Bar of the 
Commonwealth, 444 Mass. at 411.  On the record before us, we are 
left with substantial doubt about Porter's present character and 
fitness to practice law.  Because admission to the bar amounts 
to an "endorsement that the applicant is worthy of the public 
trust," Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. at 93, "[w]e resolve that 
doubt 'in favor of protecting the public by denying admission,'" 
Desy v. Board of Bar Examiners, 452 Mass. 1012, 1014 (2008), 
quoting Matter of Prager, supra at 100.3 
 
 
4.  Conclusion.  The judgment of the single justice, 
dismissing Porter's petition for review of the board's 
determination of nonqualification and denying his application 
for admission to the bar, is affirmed.  The single justice's 
denial of Porter's request for reconsideration likewise is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
Lionel Porter, pro se. 
Matthew C. Welnicki for Board of Bar Examiners. 
 
 
3 Porter also alleges that the attorney who represented him 
at the formal hearing before the board provided ineffective 
assistance in various respects.  There is no constitutional or 
statutory right to counsel, and hence no right to the effective 
assistance of counsel, in bar discipline cases.  See Matter of 
Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. 448, 454-455, cert. denied sub nom. 
Eisenhauer v. Massachusetts Bar Counsel, 524 U.S. 919 (1998) 
("the constitutional right to counsel has not been applied to 
bar disciplinary matters").  We see no reason to hold that any 
such right exists in bar admission matters.