Case Title: Murdock v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 48S02-1406-CR-415

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2014-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
Anthony C. Lawrence 
Anderson, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Richard C. Webster 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana   
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 48S02-1406-CR-415 
 
 
 
DONALD MURDOCK,  
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant), 
 
v. 
 
 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court, No. 48C06-1107-FC-1358   
The Honorable Dennis Carroll, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 48A02-1306-CR-565 
_________________________________ 
 
June 27, 2014 
 
Dickson, Chief Justice. 
 
Donald Murdock was found to have violated the terms of his probation when he 
committed a new offense: Resisting Law Enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor.  His appeal 
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the revocation of his probation.  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the revocation.  Murdock v. State, 5 N.E.3d 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).  
We grant transfer and likewise find the evidence sufficient to prove the elements of Resisting 
Law Enforcement—but we do so based on the reasoning used in our decision today in Gaddie v. 
State, No. 49S02-1312-CR-789, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. 2014), where we found the evidence 
insufficient.     
Jun 27 2014, 10:30 am
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On May 9, 2013, the State filed a notice of probation violation, alleging in part that the 
defendant violated the terms of his probation by committing Resisting Law Enforcement as a 
Class A misdemeanor.  The notice did not specify the subsection of the statute alleged to have 
been committed.  An evidentiary hearing was held on June 10, 2013, during which Indianapolis 
Metropolitan Police Officer Vincent Stewart testified that he came into contact with the 
defendant at approximately 10:00 p.m. on April 3, 2013 in Marion County after another officer, 
Officer Richard Weaver, radioed that a white male wearing a white t-shirt was running from him.  
Officer Stewart did not know the nature of the contact between Officer Weaver and the 
defendant.  Officer Stewart was in uniform and in a marked car.  Officer Stewart testified that 
after Weaver's call, he and several other officers set up a perimeter in the apartment complex, 
which he described as ten to fifteen percent occupied and located in a high-crime area.  He and 
the other officers began canvassing the area and checking vacant apartments.  While in a vacant 
apartment, Stewart heard a noise and then saw the defendant—matching the physical description 
of the suspect—run out the back of the apartment.  Officer Stewart gave chase, identifying 
himself as a police officer and ordering the defendant to stop, but the defendant continued 
running.  After about fifteen to twenty feet, Stewart caught up with the defendant in a creek and 
tried to grab him.  The defendant pushed Stewart away, causing injury and pain to Stewart's left 
knee.  The defendant continued to resist, so Officer Stewart sprayed him with pepper spray and 
took him into custody.   
 
The trial court found by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant violated the 
conditions of his probation by committing Resisting Law Enforcement as a class A misdemeanor 
by fleeing.  The court ordered that the defendant serve three-and-one-half years of his previously 
suspended sentence.  On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the trial court's decision to revoke his probation.   
 
"Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal 
defendant is entitled."  Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (explaining that: "Once 
a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge 
should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.  If this discretion were not afforded 
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to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less 
inclined to order probation to future defendants.").  A probation hearing is civil in nature, and the 
State must prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.  Braxton v. 
State, 651 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 1995); see Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f) (2012).  When the 
sufficiency of evidence is at issue, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the 
judgment—without regard to weight or credibility—and will affirm if "there is substantial 
evidence of probative value to support the trial court's conclusion that a probationer has violated 
any condition of probation."  Braxton, 651 N.E.2d at 270.   
 
In relevant part, the resisting statute provides: "A person who knowingly or 
intentionally . . . (3) flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or 
audible means . . . identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop; commits resisting 
law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor . . . ."  Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) (2013).1  In 
Gaddie, we held that this statute must be construed to require that a law enforcement officer's 
order to stop be based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause of criminal activity.  
No. 49S02-1312-CR-789, slip op. at 8, ___ N.E.3d at ___.  The defendant does not dispute that 
he fled after Officer Stewart identified himself and ordered the defendant stop; rather, he 
contends that the State failed to prove that Officer Stewart had either a warrant for the 
defendant's arrest or the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  We disagree.   
 
The evidence most favorable to the trial court's judgment shows the police officer had the 
requisite reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.  The State presented the following 
evidence: A police officer responded to a report of a suspect running away from another officer 
at nighttime.  The officer then helped establish a perimeter around a largely unoccupied 
apartment complex in a high-crime area.  While inspecting a vacant apartment, the officer saw 
the defendant, who matched the description of the fleeing suspect, run out the back of the 
apartment.  When the officer caught up with the defendant, the defendant resisted arrest and 
caused injury to the officer.  In contrast, the police officer in Gaddie responded to a disturbance 
report.  When the officer arrived, a number of people were standing in the front area of a private 
                                                 
1 This statute has been recodified.  It was previously listed under Indiana Code section 
35-44-3-3(a)(3) (2011) and amended in ways immaterial to this opinion. 
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residence, but the defendant was walking away from the scene, towards the backyard, and 
continued walking away after the officer's order to stop.  The officer in Gaddie testified that he 
had not seen the defendant or anyone else commit a crime prior to ordering the defendant to stop.  
While a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective 
justification needed for a detention or seizure, "nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in 
determining reasonable suspicion."  Gaddie, No. 49S02-1312-CR-789, slip op. at 7, ___ N.E.3d 
at ___ (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570, 
576 (2000)); see State v. Atkins, 834 N.E.2d 1028, 1033–34 (Ind. 2005) (holding that the 
investigatory stop lacked reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot but adding that 
"[t]his case might have been different if [the defendant] had fled, engaged in furtive activity, and 
was uncooperative, or if [the officer] had a description of the suspect that was corroborated upon 
seeing [the defendant].").   
 
In this case, the defendant ran when the officer appeared, engaged in furtive and evasive 
activity in a high-crime area, was uncooperative, and matched the description of the suspect.  
Cf. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25, 120 S.Ct. at 676, 145 L.Ed.2d at 576–77 (concluding that a 
suspect's unprovoked flight upon noticing the police in an area known to have a high incidence 
of drug trafficking supported a finding of reasonable suspicion).  As a condition of probation, the 
defendant was, by statute, required not to commit any crimes.  The evidence and its reasonable 
inferences clearly established that the defendant knowingly or intentionally fled from a law 
enforcement officer’s order to stop that was based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
and thus committed the offense of Resisting Law Enforcement.  Substantial evidence of 
probative value supports the trial court's decision that the defendant violated the terms of his 
probation.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, we now grant transfer and affirm the trial court's revocation of the 
defendant's probation.   
 
Rucker, David, Massa, Rush, JJ., concur.