Case Title: Dade County v. MARCA, SA

Citation: 326 So. 2d 183

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1976-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
326 So. 2d 183 (1976)
DADE COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
MARCA, S.A., a Panama Corporation, Respondent.
No. 46769.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 21, 1976.
Stuart Simon, Dade County Atty., and Stanley B. Price, Asst. County Atty., for petitioner.
John G. Fletcher, Coconut Grove, for respondent.
ROBERTS, Justice.
This cause is before us on certiorari granted to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, reported at 304 So. 2d 461 (Fla.App.3, 1974), which purportedly conflicts with DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957), Bloomfield v. Mayo, 119 So. 2d 417 (Fla. App. 1960), Dade County v. Carmichael, 165 So. 2d 227 (Fla.App. 1964), and Metropolitan Dade County v. Jennings Construction Co., 196 So. 2d 33 (Fla.App. 1967). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b) (3), Constitution of Florida.
The factual situation and questions of law appear in the decision of the District Court of Appeal under review and for the sake of brevity will not be repeated here.
The question posited by petitioner is whether the District Court erred in reversing the order of the Circuit Court refusing to allow the supplementation of the record before it in a certiorari proceeding brought to review action of Dade County Commission denying respondent's request to rezone certain properties located in Dade County. Respondent requested that the Circuit Court supplement the record of the proceedings on certiorari to reflect actions of the County Commission in re-zoning another tract subsequent to its denial of respondent's request. The petition for writ of certiorari was ultimately denied by the Circuit Court, the merits of which denial the District Court did not reach in its decision sub judice.
Although recognizing the general rule as enunciated by the above cited cases to be that a proceeding in certiorari contemplates that the reviewing court's consideration shall be confined strictly and solely to the record of the proceedings conducted by the administrative agency on which its questioned order is based, the District Court of Appeal reversed the order of the Circuit Court refusing supplementation of the record and held that the Circuit Court has the authority and should have included *184 the supplemental evidence in the record in order to have a thorough understanding of the situation before it.
Petitioner posits and we agree that the proceeding to review the zoning decision of the Board of County Commissioners contemplates that the Circuit Court's determination be confined to the record of the proceedings conducted before the County Commissioners. We do not find justification in this cause to warrant deviation from the well established rule applicable to this certiorari proceeding that the reviewing court's consideration shall be confined strictly and solely to the record of proceedings by the agency or board on which the questioned order is based. Cf. Dade County v. Carmichael, supra. Section 33-316 prescribes the method for review of a decision of the Board of County Commissioners relating to zoning matters to be the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court in and for Dade County.
In DeGroot v. Sheffield, supra, this Court explained:
Dade County, in the case of Dade County v. Carmichael, supra, sought review of a final order of the Circuit Court granting the petitioners' application for certiorari and ordering a re-zoning. Therein, upon certiorari review to the Circuit Court of the order of denial by the Dade County Board of County Commissioners, the Circuit Court permitted the appointment of a referee and the taking of additional testimony which evidence dehors the transmitted record of the proceedings below, constituted the basis for the Circuit Court's reversal of the Commission, and order that the county re-zone. Appellant's meritorious point on appeal related the proposition that in certiorari proceedings to review a zoning decision, additional testimony outside the record of the proceedings below cannot be received by the court. The appellate court agreed and reversed and remanded to the trial court for a determination based upon consideration only of the record of the proceedings before the Zoning Appeals Board and the County Commission. As this Court stated in City of Pensacola v. Maxwell, 49 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 1950),
Cf. Osceola Fruit Distributors v. Mayo, 115 So. 2d 760 (Fla.App.2, 1959). In Bloomfield v. Mayo, supra, this Court opined:
Accordingly, having determined no justification for a deviation from the traditional nature of certiorari proceedings to exist sub judice, we hereby quash the decision of the District Court and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent herewith and for disposition of any other questions which were brought before that court for review.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C.J., and ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.