Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Charles A. Boyle

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2012AP002322-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 90 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2322-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Charles A. Boyle 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST BOYLE 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
September 16, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, ABRAHAMSON, J.J., dissent. (Opinion 
Filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 90
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP2322-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Charles A. Boyle, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Charles A. Boyle, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
SEP 16, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report of the referee, 
Attorney Michael F. Dubis, recommending that Attorney Charles A. 
Boyle's license to practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for a 
period of 90 days and that he be required to pay the full costs 
of this disciplinary proceeding, which were $15,453.40 as of 
February 4, 2014.  Because no appeal has been filed, we proceed 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
2 
 
with our review of the referee's report and recommendation 
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.17(2).1 
¶2 
The standard we employ to review a referee's report 
and recommendation in an attorney disciplinary case is well-
established.  We affirm a referee's findings of fact unless they 
are found to be clearly erroneous, but we review the referee's 
conclusions of law on a de novo basis.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 
740 N.W.2d 125. 
 
We 
determine 
the 
appropriate 
level 
of 
discipline to impose given the particular facts of each case, 
independent of the referee's recommendation, but benefiting from 
it.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 
¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶3 
Given Attorney Boyle's failure to answer or otherwise 
respond in a timely manner to the amended complaint filed by the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and the referee's resulting 
declaration of a default, we conclude that Attorney Boyle 
committed the five counts of misconduct arising out of his 
actions in attempting to represent a widow in a Racine County 
civil action.  We choose, however, not to address at this time 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) provides:   
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
3 
 
the other five counts alleged in the OLR's amended complaint 
arising out of Attorney Boyle's actions in a case that was 
litigated in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois (the Northern District Court).  We 
therefore dismiss those counts.  In light of the unique facts of 
this case, Attorney Boyle's lack of prior discipline in this 
state, and the reduced number of ethical violations, we believe 
that a public reprimand is sufficient to convey to Attorney 
Boyle the seriousness of his misconduct and to deter him from 
similar actions in the future.  Finally, in light of the facts 
that the drafting of the amended complaint was required due to 
the OLR's error and that there should have been no need for an 
extensive "prove-up" hearing after a declaration of default, we 
reduce the requested cost amount that Attorney Boyle must pay by 
40%, which will result in a cost assessment of $9,272.04. 
¶4 
Attorney Boyle was admitted to the practice of law in 
Illinois in November 1966.  According to one of his filings, 
which the OLR did not dispute, beginning in 1967 Attorney Boyle 
served for a number of years as an Assistant United States 
Attorney in the Northern District Court, which included trying 
cases on behalf of the United States.  He was admitted to the 
general bar of the Northern District Court in 1974.  He has 
subsequently engaged in the private practice of law in Chicago.     
¶5 
Attorney Boyle was granted admission to the practice 
of law in Wisconsin in June 1985.  He has never been the subject 
of discipline in this state, although his Wisconsin license has 
been administratively suspended on a few occasions.  The last 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
4 
 
two administrative suspensions (for failure to report continuing 
legal education (CLE) credits and for failure to pay bar dues) 
took effect in 2006.  As will be discussed in more detail below, 
Attorney Boyle's license was reinstated in April 2012.  His 
license to practice law in this state currently remains active 
and in good standing.   
¶6 
On 
October 
24, 
2012, 
the 
OLR 
initiated 
this 
disciplinary proceeding by filing a complaint alleging nine 
counts of professional misconduct.  Attorney Boyle ultimately 
responded to the complaint by filing a motion to dismiss.  The 
referee denied the motion to dismiss and set a date for a 
telephonic scheduling conference.  Pursuant to the referee's 
order, Attorney Boyle filed an answer to the OLR's initial 
complaint.     
¶7 
Attorney Boyle failed to appear for the telephonic 
scheduling conference.  At this conference the OLR requested the 
ability to file an amended complaint.  The referee subsequently 
entered a written order allowing the OLR to file an amended 
complaint by June 30, 2013, and requiring Attorney Boyle to file 
an answer to the amended complaint within 20 days after service.   
¶8 
Before the OLR filed its amended complaint, however, 
Attorney Boyle filed a second motion to dismiss.  During a 
subsequent telephonic conference, the referee asked Attorney 
Boyle whether he would withdraw his second motion to dismiss 
since the amended complaint had not yet been filed, which 
rendered the motion to dismiss premature.  Attorney Boyle 
responded that he would not withdraw the second motion.  He 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
5 
 
stated during the telephone conference that the referee should 
do whatever he wanted with the second motion to dismiss.  When 
asked whether he intended to file a new answer to the amended 
complaint, Attorney Boyle indicated that he did not intend to do 
so.  Following the telephonic conference, the referee issued a 
written order denying Attorney Boyle's second motion to dismiss 
and directing him to file an answer to the amended complaint 
within 20 days after service.   
¶9 
The OLR filed its amended complaint on June 27, 2013.  
The amended complaint contained essentially the same allegations 
as the original complaint.  The primary difference related to 
the ethical rules which Attorney Boyle was alleged to have 
violated in the case in the Northern District Court.  The 
original complaint had alleged in connection with that case that 
Attorney Boyle had violated certain provisions of the Wisconsin 
Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys (the Wisconsin 
ethical rules).  Because the alleged misconduct had occurred in 
a federal court in another state, the amended complaint alleged 
violations of the Northern District Court's ethical rules rather 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
6 
 
than the Wisconsin ethical rules.2  Because of the change in the 
applicable law, the amended complaint also broke out some 
allegations into an additional count.  Thus, the amended 
complaint contained ten counts of alleged misconduct rather than 
the nine counts contained in the original complaint.3   
¶10 The OLR alleged and the referee found that the OLR had 
served a copy of the amended complaint on Attorney Boyle via 
email and first-class mail to the Chicago address he had listed 
on his earlier filings.  Attorney Boyle subsequently alleged 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:8.5(a) provides in part that a lawyer licensed to 
practice law in this state is subject to this court's 
disciplinary authority regardless of where the lawyer's conduct 
occurs.  SCR 20:8.5(b) contains rules for determining which 
jurisdiction's ethical rules apply to an attorney's conduct.  
Where the conduct at issue occurred in connection with a matter 
pending before a tribunal, the proper ethical rules to apply are 
those of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal is located, 
unless the tribunal itself has promulgated rules specifying what 
ethical rules apply to conduct that is connected to a matter 
pending before it.  SCR 20:8.5(b)(1).  In this instance, the 
Northern District Court has at all times established rules of 
professional conduct for attorneys appearing before it.  Thus, 
for most of the counts relating to the Northern District Court 
matter, the amended complaint alleges violations of the ethical 
rules adopted by the Northern District Court. 
3 The preparation and filing of the amended complaint took 
several months to complete because counsel for the OLR believed 
that since the amended complaint would be alleging violations of 
different rules of professional conduct, each of the modified 
counts containing references to the Northern District Court 
ethical rules required a new finding of probable cause to 
proceed by the Preliminary Review Committee (PRC).  Thus, the 
OLR's counsel waited until the PRC met and approved the modified 
counts before filing the amended complaint.   
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
7 
 
that he never received the amended complaint at the time it was 
filed.    
¶11 On July 29, 2013, the OLR filed a motion for default 
against Attorney Boyle.  Shortly after the filing of the default 
motion, Attorney Boyle asked counsel for the OLR to send a copy 
of the amended complaint to him, but that did not occur for 
several weeks. 
¶12 The referee then sent out a notice of a "prove-up" 
hearing 
on 
the 
OLR's 
default 
motion 
to 
take 
place 
on 
September 23, 2013.  Although Attorney Boyle did not file an 
answer or other response to the amended complaint, he did file 
two motions between the filing of the OLR's default motion and 
the "prove-up" hearing.  The first motion was a motion for 
summary judgment.  The second motion, served four days and filed 
three days prior to the "prove-up" hearing, sought to vacate any 
finding of default and to strike the hearing on the OLR's 
default motion.  In this second motion, Attorney Boyle asserted 
that he had never received a copy of the OLR's amended complaint 
and therefore had not responded to it.  Attorney Boyle at this 
time also served a voluminous document request on the OLR, 
asking for the OLR to provide the requested documents within 
three days (i.e., prior to the "prove-up" hearing).   
¶13 At the hearing on September 23, 2013, there was an 
extended dialogue between the referee and counsel regarding what 
had occurred in the case over the preceding few months and what 
would transpire at the hearing.  While counsel for the OLR 
acknowledged that Attorney Boyle had communicated to him in 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
8 
 
early August that he had not received a copy of the amended 
complaint and that counsel had not sent a copy of the amended 
complaint until the Friday before the hearing, he asserted that 
the amended complaint had been properly served via both email 
and first-class mail.  Nonetheless, counsel for the OLR informed 
the referee that he was prepared to proceed with an evidentiary 
hearing on the merits without a declaration of default.   
¶14 The referee denied both of Attorney Boyle's motions.  
He concluded that the summary judgment motion should be denied 
because it was not supported by sufficient affidavits and 
because it was filed before Attorney Boyle had joined issue on 
the amended complaint by filing an answer.  Despite the OLR's 
offer to proceed with an unconditional hearing on the merits of 
its allegations, the referee also denied Attorney Boyle's motion 
to vacate or avoid a declaration of default and to cancel the 
hearing on the OLR's default motion.   
¶15 Although the referee concluded at that point that 
Attorney Boyle did not have a basis for avoiding a declaration 
of default, he nonetheless invited the OLR to proceed with 
witness 
testimony. 
 
Consequently, 
the 
OLR 
presented 
the 
testimony of five witnesses, and Attorney Boyle was allowed to 
cross-examine those witnesses.  There was confusion, however, as 
to what precisely the nature of this evidentiary hearing was and 
as to the scope of Attorney Boyle's participation.  
¶16 At the end of the hearing, the referee indicated that 
he thought Attorney Boyle was in default due to his failure to 
answer or otherwise respond to the amended complaint in a timely 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
9 
 
manner.  Nonetheless, he asked the OLR to submit another set of 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which he said 
the OLR might need to modify based on the testimony that had 
been given during the hearing.  He also asked the OLR once more 
to state its recommendation regarding the proper level of 
discipline.  Despite his conclusion or at least his belief that 
Attorney Boyle was in default, the referee also gave Attorney 
Boyle an opportunity to respond to the OLR's proposed findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation as to discipline 
and to file his own findings, conclusions, and recommendation.   
¶17 Ultimately, after receiving the parties' post-hearing 
submissions, the referee issued a written order memorializing 
his denial of Attorney Boyle's two motions and also granting the 
OLR's default motion.  At the same time, he also issued a report 
and recommendation.  Although the report indicated that it was 
based on a review of the entire record in the case, including 
the testimony taken at the September 23, 2013 hearing, the 
referee included a conclusion of law that the OLR was entitled 
to a declaration of default and a subsequent conclusion that all 
of the allegations of the amended complaint had been admitted.  
The findings of fact in the referee's report tracked the 
allegations of the amended complaint.   
¶18 The first set of factual findings relate to Attorney 
Boyle's representation of L.S., who worked for Attorney Boyle 
and his wife.  On August 8, 2008, L.S.'s husband died as a 
result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred near the border 
of Racine and Kenosha counties.  L.S., who spoke only limited 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
10 
 
English, initially was represented by Attorney Thomas Durkin, 
who filed a "Notice of Circumstances of Claim" with the Kenosha 
County Clerk.  Attorney Durkin, however, informed L.S. in August 
2009 that he would not represent her in asserting claims arising 
out of the death of her husband.   
¶19 L.S. apparently encountered problems finding another 
attorney who would represent her.  Ultimately, at some point 
prior to March 23, 2011,4 Attorney Boyle began to represent L.S., 
which he asserts he did on a pro bono basis after his wife urged 
him to take on the case to help out L.S.   
¶20 On August 5, 2011, Attorney Boyle made a telephone 
inquiry to the Board of Bar Examiners (BBE) about what he needed 
to do to represent L.S. in a Wisconsin civil action.  On that 
same date the OLR mailed a letter to Attorney Boyle regarding 
the procedure for petitioning for the reinstatement of his 
Wisconsin law license, which at the time remained subject to an 
administrative suspension.  It is undisputed that Attorney Boyle 
subsequently had multiple discussions, both over the telephone 
and in person, with the BBE director regarding his situation and 
the ways to address it.   
                                                 
4 On or about March 23, 2011, a translator, who had been 
working with L.S. and had been informed by L.S. that Attorney 
Boyle was working on her behalf, had a conversation with 
Attorney Boyle about obtaining documents from Attorney Durkin.  
The OLR therefore used this evidence as the basis for alleging 
that Attorney Boyle had begun to provide legal services to L.S. 
prior to that date.  Due to the default, the referee has adopted 
that allegation as a finding of fact.  
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
11 
 
¶21 Attorney Boyle also communicated with representatives 
of the OLR.  As a result of those communications, an OLR 
representative either sent to Attorney Boyle a form for a 
petition for admission pro hac vice or advised him where he 
could download such a petition form from the OLR's website.   
¶22 On August 8, 2011, just before 4:56 p.m., Attorney 
Boyle began faxing a document entitled "Complaint" on behalf of 
L.S. to the office of the Racine County Clerk of Circuit Court.  
The clerk's office received only a partial document, however.  
Finally, at 5:19 p.m., after the closing time for the clerk's 
office, Attorney Boyle was able to send a complete document 
consisting of a 19-page "Complaint" and a facsimile cover sheet.  
The clerk's office did not make either of the two documents 
received on August 8th a part of the official court record.   
¶23 The next day the Racine County Clerk of Circuit Court 
spoke with Attorney Boyle over the telephone.  She asked him 
whether time lines were being blown, and Attorney Boyle stated 
that they were not.   
¶24 On August 12, 2011, Attorney Boyle filed via facsimile 
transmission a document designated as an amended complaint with 
the Racine County clerk's office.  This was the first document 
that the clerk's office included in the official court record.  
Attorney Boyle did not pay the filing fee for the civil action 
he was attempting to file until August 15, 2011.   
¶25 On September 6, 2011, nearly a month after he had 
first attempted to file a complaint via facsimile transmission, 
Attorney Boyle filed a copy of a September 2, 2011 letter that 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
12 
 
Attorney Boyle had sent to the OLR.  Enclosed with the letter 
was a completed Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice, in which 
Attorney Boyle requested permission to be admitted pro hac vice 
in order to represent L.S. in the Racine County action.     
¶26 In the second half of September and early October, the 
defendants in the Racine County action filed motions to dismiss 
the complaint and amended complaint filed by Attorney Boyle.  
The grounds for these motions included the fact that Attorney 
Boyle had not been licensed to practice law in Wisconsin at the 
time the complaint and amended complaint had been filed and the 
lack of a signature by a Wisconsin-licensed attorney under 
Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1), as well as the complaint being filed 
after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.   
¶27 On October 11, 2011, Attorney Boyle filed a petition 
with the clerk of this court for the reinstatement of his 
Wisconsin law license from his administrative suspensions.   
¶28 On October 17, 2011, the Racine County circuit court 
held a hearing on the defendants' motions to dismiss.  The 
hearing was conducted by Reserve Judge Dennis Costello.  During 
the hearing Attorney Boyle admitted that his license to practice 
law in Wisconsin had not been reinstated and that he was 
currently suspended.  He stated, however, that he had petitioned 
for pro hac vice admission to represent L.S.  He asserted that 
he had spoken with the BBE director, who indicated that the BBE 
and this court would have no problem if he filed an application 
to appear pro hac vice.  He also claimed that he had fulfilled 
the necessary CLE requirements for reinstatement, but that he 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
13 
 
had not been able to file the reinstatement petition in time for 
it to be granted before the hearing.  He further stated that the 
BBE director had suggested he should speak to the chief judge in 
the circuit so he had spoken to Judge Allan Torhorst, who 
indicated that he would have no problem with the pro hac vice 
petition, but the petition would have to be considered by the 
judge assigned to the case.  In addition, Attorney Boyle stated 
that he had also called the OLR, which had sent him a copy of 
the petition form.  He asserted that he had filed that pro hac 
vice petition by early September.  He concluded his statement 
regarding the pro hac vice petition with the following purported 
summary of events: 
I believe that's the chronology with respect to the 
pro hac vice.  The Office of Lawyer Regulation 
approved it, the Office of Attorney Registration5 
approved it, Judge Torhorst said he would approve it 
subject to the trial judge's discretion, which you 
know you have, and we've paid the fees. 
¶29 Judge Costello, however, responded that he could not 
in good conscience allow Attorney Boyle to appear pro hac vice 
in the matter.  He noted that Attorney Boyle's Wisconsin law 
license had been suspended when he had filed the complaint and 
amended complaint and was still suspended as of the time of the 
motion hearing.  He therefore indicated that Attorney Boyle had 
initiated a lawsuit without being either reinstated to the 
practice of law in this state or being granted pro hac vice 
                                                 
5 Attorney Boyle often used this term when speaking of the 
BBE. 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
14 
 
status and was now asking the court to authorize his actions 
after the fact.   
¶30 After Judge Costello indicated that he would not grant 
the pro hac vice petition, Attorney Boyle continued to argue the 
issue and again asserted that the BBE director and the OLR 
director had signed off on his pro hac vice application and this 
court had stamped the application.  At one point during the 
ensuing colloquy between Attorney Boyle and the court, Attorney 
Boyle went so far as to ask what authority the circuit court had 
to deny his pro hac vice petition.    
¶31 Despite Attorney Boyle's continuing argument, Judge 
Costello was unmoved.  He again noted that Attorney Boyle had 
been licensed to practice law in Wisconsin, but that license was 
now suspended, and that, in any event, Attorney Boyle had acted 
before receiving any permission to do so.  Judge Costello 
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because the complaint 
had been filed by someone who had no authority to practice law 
in this state.   
¶32 The law firm of Weigel, Carlson, Blau and Clemens SC 
(the Weigel firm) then filed a notice of appearance on behalf of 
L.S. and filed a motion seeking reconsideration of a portion of 
the circuit court's order dismissing L.S.'s case.   
¶33 Although the Weigel firm had now appeared on L.S.'s 
behalf in the Racine County action, Attorney Boyle personally 
filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his pro hac 
vice petition.  In the affidavit accompanying his personal 
reconsideration motion, Attorney Boyle stated that the BBE 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
15 
 
director had advised him that by filing a pro hac vice petition 
he could represent L.S. even though his Wisconsin law license 
was currently suspended.  The affidavit further stated that 
during 
a 
subsequent 
telephone 
conversation 
with 
the 
BBE 
director, he learned that the supreme court rules contain no 
provision that precludes administratively suspended lawyers from 
seeking pro hac vice admission on particular cases.   
¶34 The circuit court heard the reconsideration motion 
filed by the Weigel firm on January 13, 2012.  This hearing was 
conducted by Judge Michael Nieskes.     
¶35 At the beginning of the hearing, Judge Nieskes asked 
Attorney Boyle if his license to practice law in Wisconsin had 
been 
reinstated. 
 
Attorney 
Boyle 
responded 
that 
his 
reinstatement petition was still pending.  Judge Nieskes then 
allowed Attorney Boyle to sit at counsel table, but informed him 
that he was not counsel of record on the case.   
¶36 After 
granting 
the 
Weigel 
firm's 
reconsideration 
motion, Judge Nieskes allowed Attorney Boyle to address the 
court.  Ultimately, Attorney Boyle asked for a date on which his 
personal reconsideration motion could be heard.  Judge Nieskes 
responded that because Attorney Boyle was not licensed to 
practice law in this state, he had no legal authority to file 
motions and the court would not accept filings from him or give 
him a date to hear any motion until his license had been 
reinstated.   
¶37 Later that same day, counsel for one of the defendants 
submitted a draft order memorializing the circuit court's oral 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
16 
 
ruling.  On January 18, 2012, Attorney Boyle sent a facsimile 
transmission to Judge Nieskes proposing an amendment to the 
draft order.  Attorney Boyle's proposed amendment included 
additional paragraphs that addressed Attorney Boyle's motion for 
reconsideration of the denial of his pro hac vice petition.  
Specifically, the proposed amendment stated that Attorney Boyle 
had been advised by the BBE to file a pro hac vice petition, 
which was approved and filed by the OLR; that Attorney Boyle's 
motion for reconsideration had been scheduled for hearing on 
January 6, 2012, and then rescheduled for January 13, 2012; and 
that on January 13, 2012, the circuit court summarily denied the 
reconsideration motion without hearing argument.   
¶38 Judge Nieskes refused to amend the draft order as 
proposed by Attorney Boyle.  The written order that he 
ultimately entered stated that Attorney Boyle had requested the 
court to schedule a hearing on his reconsideration motion and 
the court had stated that the reconsideration motion would not 
be scheduled for hearing until Attorney Boyle's license to 
practice law in Wisconsin had been reinstated.   
¶39 On April 24, 2012, this court issued an order granting 
Attorney Boyle's petition for the reinstatement of his license 
to practice law in Wisconsin. 
¶40 When the OLR subsequently asked Attorney Boyle to 
respond to its investigation of his conduct in representing 
L.S., he specifically denied making any misrepresentations and 
again claimed that his actions in filing the complaint and 
subsequently seeking pro hac vice admission had been authorized 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
17 
 
or recommended by representatives of both the BBE and the OLR.  
Attorney Boyle also made a false statement regarding the 
sequence of events, stating that at the time he had filed his 
pro hac vice petition, his petition for reinstatement from his 
administrative suspensions had been pending before this court.   
¶41 On the basis of these facts, the referee concluded 
that the OLR had proven five counts of misconduct.  First, by 
drafting and filing the complaint and amended complaint, by 
making appearances in hearings before the circuit court, by 
filing a motion to reconsider the denial of his pro hac vice 
application, and by submitting a proposed amendment to the draft 
order arising from the January 13, 2012 hearing, Attorney Boyle 
engaged in the practice of law while his license to practice law 
in this state was administratively suspended, in violation of 
SCRs 10.03(6),6 31.10(1),7 22.26(2),8 and 20:8.4(f)9 (Count 1).  
                                                 
6 SCR 10.03(6) provides:  
Penalty for nonpayment of dues.  If the annual 
dues or assessments of any member remain unpaid 120 
days after the payment is due, the membership of the 
member may be suspended in the manner provided in the 
bylaws; and no person whose membership is so suspended 
for nonpayment of dues or assessments may practice law 
during the period of the suspension. 
7 SCR 31.10(1) provides: 
If a lawyer fails to comply with the attendance 
requirement of SCR 31.02, fails to comply with the 
reporting requirement of SCR 31.03(1), or fails to pay 
the late fee under SCR 31.03(2), the board shall serve 
a notice of noncompliance on the lawyer.  This notice 
shall advise the lawyer that the lawyer's state bar 
membership 
shall 
be 
automatically 
suspended 
for 
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
18 
 
The referee also found that Attorney Boyle had violated 
SCR 20:3.3(a)(1)10 by making multiple false statements of fact to 
the Racine County circuit court, including that he had begun 
representing L.S. only two months prior to the expiration of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
failing to file evidence of compliance or to pay the 
late fee within 60 days after service of the notice.  
The board shall certify the names of all lawyers so 
suspended under this rule to the clerk of the supreme 
court, all supreme court justices, all court of 
appeals and circuit court judges, all circuit court 
commissioners appointed under SCR 75.02(1) in this 
state, all circuit court clerks, all juvenile court 
clerks, all registers in probate, the executive 
director of the state bar of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin 
State Public Defender's Office, and the clerks of the 
federal district courts in Wisconsin.  A lawyer shall 
not engage in the practice of law in Wisconsin while 
his or her state bar membership is suspended under 
this rule. 
8 SCR 22.26(2) provides:  
An attorney whose license to practice law is 
suspended or revoked or who is suspended from the 
practice of law may not engage in this state in the 
practice 
of 
law 
or 
in 
any 
law 
work 
activity 
customarily done by law students, law clerks, or other 
paralegal personnel, except that the attorney may 
engage in law related work in this state for a 
commercial employer itself not engaged in the practice 
of law. 
9 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
10 SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) 
provides 
that 
a 
lawyer 
shall 
not 
knowingly "make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal 
or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law 
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer." 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
19 
 
applicable statute of limitations on August 8, 2011, that the 
BBE director had recommended and advised him to file a pro hac 
vice petition as the way to allow him to represent L.S. while 
his Wisconsin law license was suspended, and that his pro hac 
vice petition had been endorsed and approved by agencies of this 
court (Count 3).  The referee also found that Attorney Boyle had 
made a number of other misrepresentations, in violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c),11 including telling the Racine County Clerk of 
Circuit Court that time limits were not an issue, submitting a 
proposed amendment to a draft order that contained findings 
never made by the court, and implying to the OLR that his 
reinstatement petition was all but granted at the time he filed 
the complaint on behalf of L.S. (Count 4).  By continuing to 
argue with Judge Costello at the October 17, 2011 hearing after 
Judge Costello had ruled that he would not grant the pro hac 
vice petition and by questioning the circuit court's authority 
to deny that petition, Attorney Boyle failed to maintain proper 
respect due to courts and judicial officers, in violation of the 
Attorney's Oath (SCR 40.15)12 and SCR 20:8.4(g)13 (Count 5).  
                                                 
11 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
12 SCR 40.15, Attorney's Oath, provides, in part:  "I will 
maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial 
officers." 
13 SCR 20:8.4(g) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate the attorney's oath." 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
20 
 
Finally, the referee concluded that Attorney Boyle had violated 
SCRs 22.03(6)14 and 20:8.4(h)15 by making false statements to the 
OLR during its investigation, including that he had begun 
representing L.S. only two months before the statute of 
limitations expired, that he had been advised, recommended, and 
directed by the BBE director to file the pro hac vice petition 
as a way to represent L.S. while his Wisconsin law license was 
administratively 
suspended, 
and 
that 
his 
petition 
for 
reinstatement was pending at the time he filed his pro hac vice 
petition (Count 7). 
¶42 We first affirm the referee's declaration of default 
due to Attorney Boyle's failure to respond to the amended 
complaint.  Although Attorney Boyle claimed before the referee 
that he had not received a copy of the OLR's amended complaint 
until after the deadline for a response had passed, the amended 
complaint was emailed and sent via first-class mail to addresses 
that Attorney Boyle had previously provided to the OLR and its 
counsel.  There was no indication that those communications did 
                                                 
14 SCR 22.03(6) provides that "[i]n the course of the 
investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
15 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
21 
 
not reach their intended destinations.  Thus, a default judgment 
is appropriate in this instance, and the referee properly relied 
on the allegations of the amended complaint, which were deemed 
admitted.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Coplien, 
2010 WI 109, ¶10, 329 Wis. 2d 311, 788 N.W.2d 376.  We therefore 
accept the referee's findings of fact based on the allegations 
of the amended complaint.  We also agree with the referee that 
those findings of fact adequately support the legal conclusions 
of professional misconduct with respect to the five counts that 
relate to the Racine County civil action and the resulting OLR 
investigation. 
¶43 We next consider the appropriate level of discipline 
that should be imposed for the five counts of misconduct arising 
out of the Racine County action and the resulting OLR 
investigation.  The OLR sought a 60-day suspension for all ten 
counts of misconduct alleged in its amended complaint.  It 
believed that a 60-day suspension was necessary because, in its 
view, there had been a pattern of false statements by Attorney 
Boyle, the misconduct had occurred despite Attorney Boyle's 
lengthy experience as an attorney, there had been multiple 
offenses in two separate matters, and Attorney Boyle had refused 
to acknowledge his wrongdoing.  The referee generally agreed 
with the OLR's reasons, but he recommended a 90-day suspension 
due to what he saw as inappropriate conduct by Attorney Boyle 
during the disciplinary case, including that Attorney Boyle had 
failed to appear for a telephonic conference, that he had become 
frustrated and had hung up during another teleconference, and 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
22 
 
that during the "prove-up" hearing Attorney Boyle had indicated 
that he would take the same actions in the Racine County matter 
all over again, which the referee viewed as a lack of remorse by 
Attorney Boyle. 
¶44 The purpose of imposing professional discipline is to 
impress upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct, to 
deter other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct, and 
to protect the public, the courts, and the legal system from a 
repetition of the misconduct.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Grogan, 2011 WI 7, ¶17, 331 Wis. 2d 341, 
795 N.W.2d 745. 
¶45 Under the particular circumstances of this case, we 
disagree with the OLR and the referee that a suspension is 
required and conclude that a public reprimand is sufficient to 
accomplish these goals.  As an initial matter, we are basing our 
decision upon the five counts of misconduct arising out of the 
Racine County matter rather than the ten counts the OLR and the 
referee were considering.  While reducing the number of counts 
by one-half does not automatically mean that there should be a 
lower level of discipline, we determine that the misconduct in 
the only remaining matter here warrants a public reprimand. 
¶46 While we accept the referee's findings of fact, 
including that Attorney Boyle engaged in the practice of law in 
this state while he was not authorized to do so and made some 
statements that were not true, those actions must be considered 
in their proper context to fashion a proper response.   Here, 
the OLR acknowledged before the referee that there was no 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
23 
 
evidence of a dishonest or selfish motive.  In the Racine County 
matter, the only one relevant to the issue of a sanction, 
Attorney Boyle was acting on a pro bono basis to assist a person 
with limited English skills, who had been unable to find another 
attorney willing to take on her case after her husband had been 
killed.  While some of the time pressure he was under may have 
been of his own making, Attorney Boyle was attempting to 
investigate and file a claim for this widow before the statute 
of limitations expired.  His goal of helping a person facing 
difficult obstacles does not excuse his misconduct, but it 
should be a factor in fashioning the proper response to the 
misconduct.  We are not dealing here with a lawyer who is acting 
improperly for his own benefit, but rather with someone who 
acted overzealously and improperly while trying to help a 
disadvantaged person without compensation. 
¶47 In addition, it is important to note that Attorney 
Boyle did make multiple attempts to contact the relevant 
agencies, both over the telephone and even in person, to 
determine how he could properly represent L.S. and get her case 
filed before the expiration of the statute of limitations 
despite his administrative suspension.  While he ultimately 
chose the wrong path of filing a complaint and an amended 
complaint before obtaining any order authorizing him to engage 
once more in the practice of law in this state and before even 
petitioning for such an order, his attempts to seek guidance 
from the regulatory agencies demonstrate that he was not acting 
with complete disregard for the law and the ethical rules.  He 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
24 
 
subsequently overstated what he had been told by those agencies, 
claiming that they had approved his course of action, but he did 
initially try to do the right thing. 
¶48 Further, even the OLR's own investigative notes state 
that the BBE director, while not "approving" of the course of 
action as Attorney Boyle subsequently claimed to the circuit 
court, "probably planted the seed of admission pro hac vice in 
his mind."  It is difficult to suspend an attorney who believed 
that he was following a course of action that had been at least 
proposed by a regulatory official and was never repudiated, even 
though he falsely claimed that the suggestion of a possibility 
constituted approval by the official when trying to convince a 
trial court to grant his pro hac vice petition.   
¶49 We also comment on the referee's concern with Attorney 
Boyle's statement during the "prove-up" hearing that he would do 
it all over again as an expression of a lack of remorse.  The 
context of that remark is important.  It was not a blanket 
statement by Attorney Boyle that he would do everything the same 
way if the situation arose again.  The statement that he would 
do it all over again occurred just after he said that he was 
"absolutely responsible for filing that complaint to save the 
statute of limitations."  He was therefore expressing that he 
acknowledged that he was responsible for the ramifications of 
his actions, but would be willing to suffer the consequences if 
it helped to protect his client's legal rights.  The time and 
expense of this proceeding and the public reprimand that we are 
imposing are the ramifications that he must now endure.  
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
25 
 
¶50 In addition, it is worth noting that this is the first 
time in the approximately three decades since his admission to 
the practice of law in Wisconsin that Attorney Boyle has been 
the subject of professional discipline in this state.  While the 
OLR may contend that as an experienced attorney Attorney Boyle 
should have known better, the length of his admission to 
practice in this state without prior discipline also means that 
he has not created a reason thus far to believe that the public 
must be protected from the risk of his misconduct.  On the other 
hand, Attorney Boyle should understand that his experience as a 
lawyer should not be used as an excuse to ignore the 
particularities of the ethical rules and the local court rules 
that govern his conduct or to stretch the truth in an effort to 
pursue what he believes is a just outcome. 
¶51 Attorney Boyle should also not construe this opinion 
as a vindication of his conduct.  He violated the ethical rules 
governing his conduct, and deserves to be disciplined for that 
misconduct.  We simply conclude that while Attorney Boyle 
violated his ethical obligations as an attorney, a public 
reprimand will be sufficient to impress upon him the seriousness 
of his misconduct and to deter him from similar future ethical 
violations.  
¶52 We turn now to the issue of costs.16  The OLR has filed 
a 
statement 
showing 
total 
costs 
for 
this 
proceeding 
of 
                                                 
16 The OLR is not seeking any restitution award in this 
matter.  It notes that the misconduct did not involve Attorney 
Boyle's possession of funds that should be returned to anyone.   
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
26 
 
$15,453.40 and recommending that this court impose the full 
amount of costs on Attorney Boyle.  While we agree that Attorney 
Boyle should be responsible for the costs of the proceeding 
because it was his misconduct that caused this proceeding, we do 
not believe it is appropriate to impose the full amount of costs 
on him.  The OLR filed an original complaint, to which Attorney 
Boyle ultimately responded.  It then had to delay the proceeding 
and draft an amended complaint because it had relied on the 
incorrect ethical rules for some of the counts that arose out of 
the Northern District Court matter.  The OLR's need to draft an 
amended complaint because of its error should not be Attorney 
Boyle's responsibility.  Moreover, it was the filing and service 
of an amended complaint that led to additional disputes that 
ultimately resulted in the OLR filing a motion for a declaration 
of default.  Further, because we have decided not to adjudicate 
the five counts arising from the Northern District Court matter 
at this time, it appears that there should be some reduction of 
the costs connected with those counts. 
¶53 In addition, for unknown reasons, the referee believed 
that it was necessary to have an evidentiary "prove-up" hearing.  
Although it is not clear from the record what the referee 
thought such a hearing would entail, the OLR was apparently 
supposed to offer testimony and/or documentary exhibits to prove 
the elements of the various counts in its complaint.  That 
hearing ultimately resulted in substantial preparation and an 
evidentiary hearing that lasted for the better part of a day, as 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
27 
 
well as the filing of additional sets of proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law by counsel for the OLR. 
¶54 We see no need for a "prove-up" hearing in this case.  
When a motion for default is granted in a civil action, a court 
often holds a hearing for the plaintiff to prove the damages 
that result from the defendant's conduct.  Such a hearing, 
however, does not require testimony and documentary evidence on 
the merits of the elements of liability.  Those elements are 
satisfied or not based on the allegations of the complaint, 
which are accepted as true due to the defendant's default.  
Moreover, the "prove-up" hearing that ultimately occurred in 
this case went well beyond even allowing the OLR to present 
evidence to support the allegations of the amended complaint. 
¶55 We think that the need for an amended complaint and 
the occurrence of a "prove-up" hearing on a default constitute 
"[o]ther relevant circumstances" that support a reduction of the 
cost amount in this case.  See SCR 22.24(1m)(f).  Rather than 
require more litigation about what specific cost amounts should 
be eliminated, we conclude that it would be appropriate simply 
to reduce the requested cost amount by 40%, which will result in 
Attorney Boyle being required to pay costs of $9,272.04. 
¶56 IT IS ORDERED that Charles A. Boyle is publicly 
reprimanded for his professional misconduct. 
¶57 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Charles A. Boyle shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation costs in the amount of $9,272.04. 
No. 
2012AP2322-D   
 
28 
 
¶58 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation shall advise the court if there has not 
been full compliance with all conditions of this order. 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP2322-D.awb 
 
1 
 
¶59 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
OLR 
requested a 60-day suspension of Attorney Boyle's license to 
practice law in Wisconsin for his misconduct in this case.  
Following 
a 
hearing, 
the 
referee 
recommended 
a 
90-day 
suspension.  Nevertheless, the per curiam opinion imposes only a 
public reprimand.  Because I determine that a public reprimand 
is not sufficient discipline to address the gravity of the 
conduct, I respectfully dissent.  
¶60 I believe the per curiam understates Attorney Boyle's 
misrepresentations.  I consider making false statements to a 
circuit court a grievous matter.  See SCR 20:3.3 ("A lawyer 
shall not knowingly [] make a false statement of fact or law to 
a tribunal. . . .") 
¶61 Attorney Boyle told a circuit court judge that both 
the Board of Bar Examiners (BBE) director and the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation (OLR) director had signed off on his pro hac 
vice application.  He specifically stated ". . . when we have 
the Supreme Court’s Attorney Registration Director, when we have 
the Director of the Lawyers Regulation, okay, signing off on 
this . . . ."  Attorney Boyle further asserted that "[t]he 
Office of Lawyer Regulation approved it, [and] the Office of 
Attorney Registration approved it . . . ." 
¶62 He told a second circuit court judge that he had been 
advised by the BBE to file a pro hac vice petition, which was 
approved and filed by the OLR.  Additionally, Attorney Boyle 
stated that he had begun representing L.S. only two months 
No.  2012AP2322-D.awb 
 
2 
 
before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations 
on August 8, 2011, when in fact it was more than four months.  
¶63 There may be some confusion about what representatives 
of BBE told Attorney Boyle.  Yet, there is nothing in the record 
to indicate that the director of OLR had any conversation about 
pro hac vice admission with Attorney Boyle.  It is also 
uncontroverted that he began his representation of L.S. more 
than two months before August 8, 2011.  He began representing 
her on or about March 23, 2011.  
¶64 The 
per 
curiam 
attempts 
to 
mitigate 
the 
above 
misrepresentations by relying on Boyle’s prior clean discipline 
record.  However, this is only partially correct. 
¶65 The per curiam rests its sanction determination, in 
part, on its finding that "this is the first time in the 
approximately three decades since his admission to the practice 
of law in Wisconsin that Attorney Boyle has been the subject of 
professional discipline in this state."  Admittedly that is an 
accurate statement, but it does not reflect the whole picture. 
¶66 Although Attorney Boyle has not previously been 
disciplined in this state, he has been disciplined elsewhere.  
This court was recently informed that the Illinois Supreme Court 
suspended Attorney Boyle's license in that state for 60 days, 
effective June 4, 2015, for conversion of settlement funds in a 
medical malpractice case.    
¶67 The discipline had not been imposed at the time the 
OLR filed its complaint, or at the time of the hearing before 
the referee, but it has come to our attention during the 
No.  2012AP2322-D.awb 
 
3 
 
pendency of the case before this court.  The per curiam should 
not justify imposing a lesser sanction on its statement that no 
prior discipline has been imposed in this state, when it is now 
aware of the Illinois suspension.   
¶68 The per curiam also fails to fully reflect the whole 
picture regarding Attorney Boyle's conduct in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.  His 
conduct came to OLR's attention during its investigation in this 
case.  Allegations related to that conduct were included in the 
OLR's amended complaint and considered by the referee.  I 
believe an explanation of those allegations is necessary to 
understand the recommendations made by both the OLR and the 
referee.   
¶69 The OLR's amended complaint alleged and the referee 
considered five counts arising out of Attorney Boyle's actions 
in a civil case in the Northern District Court, in addition to 
the five counts relating to L.S.  The per curiam dismisses the 
Northern District counts, and uses the dismissal as further 
support for its determination that a public reprimand is 
appropriate.  In light of the fact that those counts were 
considered by the OLR and the referee in making their sanction 
recommendations, I believe there should be more than a cursory 
reference to those counts.  
¶70 Essentially, in the Northern District matter, the OLR 
alleged that Attorney Boyle had falsely stated in an appearance 
form that he held membership in the Northern District Court's 
trial bar, which was necessary under that court's rules for him 
No.  2012AP2322-D.awb 
 
4 
 
to appear by himself on behalf of the client in a bench trial.  
When the federal court informed him during the bench trial, 
however, that he was not listed as a member of the trial bar, 
Attorney Boyle responded that he was not aware of that fact and 
that he believed he was indeed a member of the trial bar.  
Attorney Boyle explained that he had been appointed as lead 
counsel in certain Northern District Court cases following his 
stint as an Assistant United States Attorney and that he had 
also handled a four-and-a-half month trial in the Northern 
District Court.  In subsequently arguing against an adjournment 
of the trial, Attorney Boyle became quite heated, refusing to 
accept the judge's ruling and at one point suggesting that the 
judge had a personal animus against him.  Ultimately, the judge 
decided to adjourn the trial.  Attorney Boyle submitted his 
application to the trial bar, which the judge granted a few days 
later.   
¶71 In addition, the OLR alleged that when the trial 
reconvened, Attorney Boyle offered an exhibit that had been 
previously excluded from evidence under a different exhibit 
number without alerting the court and opposing counsel to that 
fact.  When the OLR asked Attorney Boyle to provide a written 
explanation as to how this had occurred, he failed to provide a 
meaningful response.  From these facts, the OLR brought five 
counts of misconduct against Attorney Boyle.   
¶72 Although this court has jurisdiction to adjudicate 
disciplinary cases involving lawyers licensed to practice in 
this state regardless of where the alleged misconduct occurred, 
No.  2012AP2322-D.awb 
 
5 
 
see SCR 20:8.5(a), the per curiam chooses not to exercise that 
jurisdiction in this case.  The per curiam states that the 
alleged misconduct took place in a federal court located within 
the state of Illinois, but that it does not appear that either 
the Northern District Court nor the Illinois state regulatory 
authorities pursued discipline against Attorney Boyle for his 
apparent failure to understand that the rules regarding trial 
appearances in the Northern District Court had changed during 
the decades he had been in practice and for his improper 
behavior when that matter was brought to his attention.  The per 
curiam does not believe it is necessary or advisable in this 
instance for this court to take upon itself the primary role of 
adjudicating 
alleged 
misconduct 
that 
occurred 
in 
another 
jurisdiction and dismisses the five counts relating to that 
misconduct.   
¶73 Because I consider making false statements to a court 
a grievous matter and given his prior discipline imposed by the 
Illinois Supreme Court, I conclude that a public reprimand 
imposed by the per curiam is inadequate discipline for Attorney 
Boyle’s conduct.  Additionally, because the OLR and referee's 
recommendations were based, in part, on the five Northern 
District Court counts, I believe more than a cursory reference 
to 
those 
counts 
is 
necessary 
to 
understand 
their 
recommendations.   
¶74 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
¶75 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
No.  2012AP2322-D.awb 
 
 
 
1