Case Title: State Highway Com. v. Efem Whse. Co.

Citation: 207 Or. 237, 295 P.2d 1101

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1956-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Reversed April 11, 1956.
*238 John C. McLean, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs were Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General; C.W. Enfield, Leonard I. Lindas, *239 Charles Peterson, and Ralph Wyckoff, Assistant Attorneys General, all of Salem.
Carmie R. Dafoe, Jr., Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Sabin and Malarkey, Portland.
Before WARNER, Chief Justice, and TOOZE, LUSK and BRAND, Justices.
REVERSED.
TOOZE, J.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff, State Highway Commission of the state of Oregon, from that portion of a final judgment in a condemnation proceeding which awarded to defendant, Efem Warehouse Co., an Oregon corporation, costs and disbursements and an attorney's fee.
Efem Warehouse Co. was the owner of a tract of land in the city of Portland, which was needed for right of way purposes in the construction of the T.H. Banfield Expressway through Sullivan gulch in said city. After negotiating, without success, for the purchase of said land, pursuant to the provisions of ORS 366.370, the plaintiff filed its complaint for condemnation. In its complaint plaintiff alleged that the true value of the real property sought was the sum of $3,700. Defendant in its answer alleged the true value of the property to be the sum of $15,000, and that $2,500 was a reasonable sum to be allowed as an attorney's fee. By its reply plaintiff denied that $15,000, or any sum in excess of $3,700, was the true value of the property, and denied that $2,500 or any other sum was a reasonable attorney's fee to be allowed.
Upon the issues formed by the pleadings, a trial was held. The jury returned a verdict fixing as the fair *240 market value of defendant's property the sum of $4,000. The trial court entered judgment condemning and appropriating the real property, fixing the price therefor as determined by the verdict in the sum of $4,000, and awarded defendant its costs and disbursements, together with the further sum of $750 as a reasonable attorney's fee. It is from that portion of the judgment awarding costs, disbursements, and attorney's fee that plaintiff appeals.
Prior to the filing of plaintiff's complaint in the condemnation proceeding, the State Highway Commission, acting by and through its chief counsel, wrote the following letter to defendant:
According to the stipulated facts, this letter was mailed March 18, 1953, was received by defendant the following day, and plaintiff filed its complaint on March 30, 1953. Defendant made no objections whatever *241 to said offer prior to the commencement of the action.
The sole question for determination is whether or not, in the light of the offer made by plaintiff before action was commenced, defendant was entitled to recover costs, disbursements, and a reasonable attorney's fee.
The Oregon State Highway Commission is a quasi-public corporation, an agency of the state. It is vested with broad powers but, of course, possesses no authority other than that conferred upon it by statute.
ORS 366.380 (7) provides:
Plaintiff contends that in the light of its offer of $4,800 for the property prior to the commencement of the action, defendant is not entitled to recover costs, disbursements, and an attorney's fee, because the amount fixed by the jury was less than that sum, to-wit, $4,000. Answering this contention, defendent asserts several propositions as follows:
In support of its several propositions defendant cites a number of authorities, most, if not all, of which deal with the subject of "tender" in its common-law sense, and not in the light of specific statutes governing the matter. Portland T. & S. Bank v. Lincoln Realty Co., 180 Or 96, 170 P2d 568; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Boothe, 160 Or 679, 86 P2d 960; Dolan v. Continental Casualty Co., 133 Or 252, 289 P 1057; Milton v. Hare et al., 130 Or 590, 280 P 511; Anderson v. Griffith, 51 Or 116, 93 P 934; Welch v. City of Astoria, 26 Or 89, 37 P 66; Holladay v. Holladay, 13 Or 523, 11 P 260, 12 P 821; Hunt on Tender 540, § 478; 486, § 418; 397, § 360; 86 CJS 588, § 58; 583, § 52; 571, § 29.
In 52 Am Jur 214, Tender § 1, it is stated:
1. At common law neither party to a condemnation proceeding could recover costs. Costs and an attorney's fee are strictly matters for statutory regulation. Warm Springs Irr. Dist. v. Pacific L. Co., 89 Or 19, 23, 173 P 265. In condemnation proceedings instituted *243 by the Highway Commission, the matter is governed by ORS 366.380 (7), supra.
In determining the matter now before us, it is necessary to consider other sections of the highway code respecting the powers and duties of the Highway Commission.
ORS 366.360 provides:
ORS 366.370 in part provides:
ORS 366.390 in part provides:
ORS 366.392 provides:
No authority is given the Highway Commission to tender any money into court for any purpose prior to a judgment in condemnation, except as provided in ORS 366.392, supra.
2, 3. It is noted that ORS 366.370, supra, imposes a duty upon the Highway Commission to negotiate for and, if possible, purchase the property necessary for its purposes prior to the institution of condemnation proceedings. The duty is a mandatory one, and a failure to perform it is excusable only if the "owner is at the time concealed within the state or, after reasonable effort by the commission cannot be found within the state." Considering the highway code as a whole, it is manifest that the legislature contemplated that when such property was purchased as the result of negotiations, a fee simple title thereto might be acquired. *245 ORS 366.360, supra, and ORS 366.380 (5), which provides:
4, 5. The offer made by the Highway Commission in its letter of March 18, 1953, was clearly a tender made pursuant to its statutory duty to attempt a purchase without the necessity of condemnation proceedings. Requesting a warranty deed was not improper, nor did it impose a condition upon which the Highway Commission had no right to insist. In fact, it was a condition of purchase contemplated by the highway code. Comstock Mfg. Co. v. Schiffmann et al., 113 Or 677, 684, 234 P 293.
ORS 81.010 provides:
ORS 81.020 provides:
6. As before observed, upon receipt of plaintiff's offer, defendant made no objections to its form or substance; it simply refused to accept the offer. Even *246 if the condition in the offer as to a warranty deed (conveying fee simple title) was improper, under the provisions of ORS 81.020, the objection was clearly waived by defendant. Defendant was afforded ample time within which to consider and accept the offer prior to the time the action was commenced.
7. There is no merit in the contention that plaintiff was required to allege or prove its ability to make its offer good. The good faith and credit of the state is presumed. State v. Mohler et al., 115 Or 562, 575, 237 P 690, 239 P 193.
8. ORS 366.380 (7), supra, does not require that the money offered be tendered into court in the event condemnation proceedings are instituted, in order that liability for costs, disbursements, and an attorney's fee may be avoided. It simply provides for an offer prior to the commencement of the action of an amount in excess of that finally awarded by the jury. Plaintiff made such an offer. It complied with the statute. It had no authority to tender the amount of its offer into court.
9. The allegation in plaintiff's complaint that the real property involved was worth no more than $3,700 has no bearing whatever upon the offer it made on March 18, 1953. The allegation in the complaint as to the value of the property in no sense constituted a new offer for the purchase of the property within the meaning of ORS 366.380 (7), supra.
Under the circumstances of this case defendant was not entitled to recover costs, disbursements, and an attorney's fee.
The portion of the judgment appealed from is reversed and this cause remanded with directions to strike from the judgment the award of costs, disbursements, and an attorney's fee to the defendant.