Case Title: Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv.

Citation: 1995-Ohio-206

Docket Number: 19940564

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1995-09-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos, Attorneys, Appellee, v. Administrator, 
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, Appellant. 
[Cite as Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. 
Serv.(1995), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Unemployment compensation -- Appellate court may reverse the 
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review’s “just cause” 
determination, when -- Fault on behalf of employee is an 
essential 
component 
of 
a 
just 
cause 
termination 
-- 
Unsuitability for a position constitutes fault sufficient to 
support a just cause termination -- Employer may properly 
find an employee unsuitable for the required work, and thus to 
be at fault, when. 
1. An appellate court may reverse the Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review’s “just cause” determination only if 
it is unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the 
evidence. 
2. Fault on behalf of the employee is an essential component 
of a just cause termination. 
3. Unsuitability for a position constitutes fault sufficient to 
support a just cause termination  
 
2
4. An employer may properly find an employee unsuitable for 
the required work, and thus to be at fault, when: (1) the employee 
does not perform the required work, (2) the employer made known 
its expectations of the employee at the time of hiring, (3) the 
expectations were reasonable, and (4) the requirements of the job 
did not change substantially since the date of the original hiring for 
that particular position. 
(No. 94-564 -- Submitted April 26, 1995 -- Decided September 
13, 1995.) 
Certified by the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. CA-
9371. 
Claimant Denise L. Hammad worked as a word processor for 
the appellee law firm, Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos (“the firm”), from 
October 18, 1990 until July 23, 1991. Hammad’s duties included 
processing legal documents and letters which were dictated by the 
various attorneys in the office.  When she was hired, the firm 
expected that Hammad would perform rapid and errorless typing. 
The quality and quantity of Hammad’s work product failed to 
meet the firm’s expectations.  Hammad persistently made serious 
typing errors, which were compounded by her failure to proofread 
her work product.  There were times when simple documents would 
 
3
go through three or four drafts in order to correct errors which 
could have been corrected at the outset by a competent word 
processor. 
The firm reprimanded Hammad on two occasions, notifying 
her that her job was in jeopardy and that she needed to improve.  
Although 
the 
firm’s 
office 
manager 
noted 
that 
Hammad’s 
performance had improved somewhat at the time of the second 
reprimand, Hammad was never able to improve enough to meet her 
employer’s expectations. 
That fact is best exemplified by Hammad’s last day on the job.  
An attorney in the firm requested Hammad to prepare six form 
notices, which required Hammad only to type in names, dates, and 
times.  The assignment had to be returned to Hammad for 
corrections three or four times, and still the notices were sent out 
containing mistakes. 
Based upon these facts, on July 23, 1991, the firm discharged 
Hammad for failing to adequately perform her job duties.  On 
August 1, 1991, Hammad applied for unemployment compensation 
benefits, and her application was allowed by the Administrator of 
the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services (“administrator”) on 
 
4
September 18, 1991.  On reconsideration, that decision was 
affirmed on November 8, 1991.   
The firm appealed that decision, but on March 23, 1992, 
following an oral hearing with both parties present, a referee Of the 
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (“the board”) 
affirmed the administrator’s decision allowing the benefits.  The 
referee ruled that absent evidence of willful or wanton misconduct 
by Hammad, the firm did not discharge her for just cause in 
connection with work. 
On April 10, 1992, the firm instituted a further appeal to the 
board.  On July 24, 1992, the parties had a hearing before another 
board referee.  The board, on September 4, 1992, found that 
Hammad’s inability, not her unwillingness, to improve her typing 
skills, led to the firm’s firing of her.  The board concluded that 
Hammad’s inability to perform her job did not constitute fault and 
that she was therefore discharged without just cause, for 
unemployment compensation purposes. 
The firm appealed the board’s decision to the Court of 
Common Pleas of Stark County.  On April 30, 1993, the court 
affirmed the board’s decision.  The court determined that there was 
no fault on the part of Hammad and that she was merely incapable 
 
5
of performing her job.  The court found that that inability did not 
constitute fault, and that an employee can be found at fault only 
upon a “willful or heedless disregard of duty or violation of 
[employer] instructions.” 
On May 28, 1993, the firm appealed to the Stark County Court 
of Appeals.  On December 30, 1993, the appellate court reversed 
the decision of the trial court.  The court determined that as an 
appellate court, it had the same duty as the common pleas court to 
determine whether the board’s decision was unlawful, unreasonable, 
or against the manifest weight of the evidence.  The court rejected 
the lower court’s and the board’s fault-based analysis and 
developed in its place a “totality of the circumstances test.”  Based 
upon that test, the court determined that “[Hammad’s] inability to 
perform said tasks, while not her or anyone else’s fault, served as a 
sufficient justification for her dismissal.” 
On January 31, 1994, the administrator filed a motion to 
certify a conflict.  On February 17, 1994, the appellate court, 
finding that certain aspects of its December 30, 1993 decision 
conflicted with other Ohio appellate court decisions, certified the 
record of the case to this court for review and final determination.  
Specifically, the appellate court found a conflict regarding its 
 
6
standard of review in unemployment compensation appeals, and a 
conflict regarding its rejection of fault-based analysis. 
____________ 
Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos, Beth A. Raies and David L. 
Dingwell, for appellee. 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, James A. Barnes and 
Stefan J. Schmitt, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant. 
____________ 
Pfeifer, J.  In this case we resolve three issues : (1) the scope 
of an appellate court’s review of unemployment compensation 
cases, (2) whether an employee must be at fault in order for a 
termination to be made for just cause, and (3) whether unsuitability 
for required work constitutes fault sufficient to support a just cause 
termination.  On the first issue, we find that appellate courts may 
reverse a board decision if it is unlawful, unreasonable or against 
the manifest weight of the evidence.  On the second issue, we find 
that fault is required for a termination to be made with just cause.  
Finally, unsuitability for a position constitutes fault sufficient to 
support a just cause termination. 
I 
 
7
In Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review (1985), 19 Ohio 
St.3d 15, 17-18, 19 OBR 12, 15, 482 N.E.2d 587,590, this court 
held that reviewing courts may reverse “just cause” determinations 
“if they are unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight 
of the evidence.”  This court noted that while appellate courts are 
not permitted to make factual findings or to determine the 
credibility of witnesses, they do have the duty to determine whether 
the board’s decision is supported by the evidence in the record. Id. 
at 18, 19 OBR at 15, 482 N.E.2d at 590.  This duty is shared by all 
reviewing courts, from the first level of review in the common pleas 
court, through the final appeal in this court. 
Former 
R.C. 
4141.28(O), 
now 
renumbered 
R.C. 
4141.28(O)(1), the statute setting forth the appeals process for 
unemployment compensation cases, does not create distinctions 
between the scope of review of common pleas courts and appellate 
courts.  To apply the same standard at each appellate level does not 
result in a de novo review standard.  As this court stated in Irvine, 
“[t]he fact that reasonable minds might reach different conclusions 
is not a basis for the reversal of the board’s decision.” Irvine at 18, 
19 OBR at 15, 482 N.E.2d at 590.  The board’s role as factfinder is 
intact; a reviewing court may reverse the board’s determination 
 
8
only if it is unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight 
of the evidence. 
II 
To be eligible for unemployment compensation benefits in 
Ohio, claimants must satisfy the criteria established pursuant to 
R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), which provides: 
“(D) * * * [No] individual may * * * be paid benefits * * * : 
“* * * 
“(2)For the duration of his unemployment if the administrator 
finds that: 
“(a) He quit his work without just cause or has been 
discharged for just cause in connection with his work * * * .” 
In Irvine, supra, this court stated that “‘[t]raditionally, just 
cause, in the statutory sense, is that which, to an ordinarily 
intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a 
particular act.’” Irvine at 17, 19 OBR at 14, 482 N.E.2d at 589, 
citing Peyton v. Sun T.V. (1975), 44 Ohio App.2d 10, 12, 73 
O.O.2d 8, 9, 335 N.E.2d 751, 752.  Just cause determinations in the 
unemployment compensation context, however, also must be 
consistent 
with 
the 
legislative 
purpose 
underlying 
the 
Unemployment Compensation Act.  The Act exists “‘to enable 
 
9
unfortunate employees, who become and remain involuntarily 
unemployed by adverse business and industrial conditions, to 
subsist on a reasonably decent level and is in keeping with the 
humanitarian and enlightened concepts of this modern day.’”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Irvine at 17, 19 OBR at 14, 482 N.E.2d at 589, 
citing Leach v. Republic Steel Corp. (1964), 176 Ohio St. 221, 223, 
27 O.O.2d 122, 123, 199 N.E.2d 3, 5.  “‘The [A]ct act was intended 
to provide financial assistance to an individual who had worked, 
was able and willing to work, but was temporarily without 
employment through no fault or agreement of his own.’” Irvine at 
17, 19 OBR at 14, 482 N.E.2d at 589, citing Salzl v. Gibson 
Greeting Cards (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 35, 39, 15 O.O.3d 49, 52, 399 
N.E.2d 76, 79.  Thus, while a termination based upon an employer’s 
economic necessity may be justifiable, it is not a just cause 
termination when viewed through the lens of the legislative purpose 
of the Act. 
The Act does not exist to protect employees from themselves, 
but to protect them from economic forces over which they have no 
control.  When an employee is at fault, he is no longer the victim of 
fortune’s whims, but is instead directly responsible for his own 
predicament.  Fault on the employee’s part separates him from the 
 
10
Act’s intent and the Act’s protection.  Thus, fault is essential to the 
unique chemistry of a just cause termination. 
While this court did hold in Irvine that “[t]he determination of 
whether just cause exists necessarily depends upon the unique 
factual considerations of the particular case,” Irvine at 17, 19 OBR 
at 15, 482 N.E.2d at 590, that does not compel the appellate court’s 
abandonment of fault-based just cause analysis in favor of a 
“totality of the circumstances” examination.  Instead, Irvine 
recognizes that the question of fault cannot be rigidly defined, but, 
rather, can only be evaluated upon consideration of the particular 
facts of each case.  If an employer has been reasonable in finding 
fault on behalf of an employee, then the employer may terminate the 
employee with just cause.  Fault on behalf of the employee remains 
an essential component of a just cause termination. 
III 
In this case, the question is whether Hammad’s unsuitability 
to perform the work required by the firm constituted fault for which 
the firm may have discharged her for just cause.  The common pleas 
court held that an employee satisfies the fault requirement only 
upon a “willful or heedless disregard of duty or violation of 
[employer] instructions.”  To rule that way is to ignore that ability 
 
11
is relevant in the workplace.  There is little practical difference 
between an employee who will not perform her job correctly and 
one who cannot perform her job correctly.  In either case, the 
performance of the employee is deficient.  That deficiency, which 
does not result from any outside economic factor, constitutes fault 
on the employee’s behalf. 
To find that an employee is entitled to unemployment 
compensation when she is terminated for her inability to perform 
the job for which she was hired would discourage employers from 
taking a chance on an unproven worker.  Most employees need an 
employer to take a leap of faith when initially hiring them.  An 
employer relies upon an employee’s representations that she can 
adequately perform the required work.  Likewise, an employee 
relies upon an employer’s description of what the job will entail.  
The party that fails to live up to those expectations is at fault. 
Unsuitability for a position constitutes fault sufficient to 
support a just cause termination.  An employer may properly find an 
employee unsuitable for the required work, and thus to be at fault, 
when: (1) the employee does not perform the required work, (2) the 
employer made known its expectations of the employee at the time 
of hiring, (3) the expectations were reasonable, and (4) the 
 
12
requirements of the job did not change since the date of the original 
hiring for that particular position. 
In this case, there is no dispute that Hammad continually made 
serious typing and proofreading errors requiring duplicative efforts 
by her and by attorneys at the firm.  At every level in this case, 
Hammad was found to be unsuitable for the required work.  The 
record establishes that the firm made reasonable efforts to avoid 
terminating Hammad, including verbal reprimands and warnings 
that she would be discharged unless her performance improved.  
Second, Hammad never claimed that she was unaware of the 
requirements of her job or of the demanding performance expected 
of her as a normal part of her employment.  Third, testimony at the 
board hearing shows that a word processor hired at the same time as 
Hammad had fulfilled the firm’s expectations and continued to be 
employed by the firm, demonstrating the reasonableness of the job’s 
requirements.  Finally, Hammad was not the victim of downsizing at 
the firm, nor was her original job description changed to a position 
different from the one she originally accepted.  
That Hammad wished to perform better cannot obviate the 
plain fact that she could not fulfill the minimum standards the firm 
required of her.  She was simply terminated because she could not 
 
13
do the required work.  While that may not be her fault in a moral 
sense, it does constitute fault in a legal sense sufficient for her 
termination to have been made with just cause. 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of 
appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F. E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
 
WRIGHT and COOK, JJ., separately concur. 
 
 
WRIGHT, J., concurring.   I concur in paragraphs one, two, and three of 
the syllabus and the judgment only. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion.