Case Title: Naveda v. Ahumada

Citation: 381 So. 2d 147

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1980-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
381 So. 2d 147 (1980) Dianna Angelic NAVEDA, by Next Friend, Annie Mae Lane et al. v. Barbara Jean Naveda AHUMADA. No. 51642. Supreme Court of Mississippi. February 20, 1980. As Corrected On Denial of Rehearing April 2, 1980. Laurel G. Weir, Terry L. Jordan, Philadelphia, for appellants. Robert L. McHaney, Jr., Starkville, for appellee. Before ROBERTSON, WALKER and LEE, JJ. LEE, Justice, for the Court: Petition for adoption was filed in the Chancery Court of Neshoba County by Annie Mae Lane, Next Friend of Dianna Angelic Naveda, Annie Mae Lane, Individually, and John Bryant Lane, Jr., seeking to adopt Dianna Angelic Naveda, eight-year-old child, to Annie Mae Lane and John Lane, Jr., maternal grandparents of said child. Decree was entered ordering the adoption on December 19, 1975. Barbara Jane Naveda Ahumada, mother of the child, subsequently filed a petition to set aside the adoption decree and, after a full hearing, the chancellor granted the prayer of said petition and vacated the decree. Thereafter, a hearing was held in the cause to determine custody of the child and same was granted to the mother with visitation rights to the Lanes. They appealed the *148 order setting aside the adoption decree and Mrs. Ahumada cross-appeals from that part of the decree granting the Lanes two (2) months visitation rights (custody) in the summer time. Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss the direct appeal for the reason that Mrs. Lane spirited away the child and concealed her since rendition of the decree in the lower court. We overrule that motion since the interest and welfare of the minor child, who is a party to this proceeding, is involved. The sole question on direct appeal is whether or not the lower court erred in setting aside the adoption decree and in granting custody of the child to her mother. In order to resolve the question presented, it is necessary for this Court to determine whether or not the Chancery Court of Neshoba County acquired jurisdiction of the person of appellee in the adoption proceeding. The sworn petition for adoption averred that Upon the foregoing averment that the petitioners did not know the place of residence, post office address and street address of appellee and the father of the child, publication was made for them. (Appellee and Luis Naveda were divorced and appellee was granted custody of the child). The petition for adoption was filed November 24, 1975. On, and prior to, that date, appellee had been, and was, a student at the University of Southern Mississippi. For some period of time, Dianna lived there with her mother and, during other times, when she was residing with her grandparents (appellants), appellee visited her and communicated with her. Appellee testified that, while a student at the University of Southern Mississippi, she left Hattiesburg on the 14th of November, 1975, for the purpose of going to Mexico to act as godmother to a friend's child. She returned to Hattiesburg on November 29, 1975 and immediately communicated with the Lanes, inquiring as to the welfare of the child. She also testified that while in Mexico, she telephoned the Lanes to inform them that she had arrived there safely, but the Lanes declined to talk with her. She stated that she wanted to see the child, that Mrs. Lane told her not to come to Neshoba County, since the Lanes were leaving town, and Mrs. Lane suggested that they and Dianna meet her in Jackson at another daughter's home on December 6, 1975. That meeting occurred, appellee spent the day with the child, and Mrs. Lane never told her that an adoption petition had been filed by them, that publication had been made in the paper for her to answer the petition, and that the trial date on the petition had been set for December 19, 1975. Appellee did not learn of the adoption until some time after December 19, 1975, and she began taking steps to obtain legal representation for the purpose of setting aside the adoption decree and to obtain custody of Dianna. Appellants argue that the lower court erred in setting aside the adoption decree in that Mississippi Code Annotated Section 93-17-15 (1972) bars the action after the elapse of a six-month period. The section states: Mississippi Code Annotated Section 93-17-17 (1972) provides: Appellants cite Walter v. August, 186 Cal. App. 2d 395, 8 Cal. Rptr. 778, 83 A.L.R.2d 941 (1960), which was decided on a five-year statute of limitations under California law. That case is not authority here, particularly since there is no provision in the California statutes that an adoption may be set aside because of jurisdictional defects. The opinion of the lower court in the present case stated: We hold that the chancellor must be affirmed on the issue of whether or not the Lanes knew the whereabouts, place of residence, post office and street addresses of appellee, which goes directly to the jurisdiction of the lower court, since he was not manifestly wrong in his finding of fact. Further, the lower court was eminently correct in exercising its power to set aside the adoption decree. Krohn v. Migues, 274 So. 2d 654 (Miss. 1973); City of Starkville v. Thompson, 260 So. 2d 191 (Miss. 1972); Whiteway Finance Co. v. Parker, 226 So. 2d 903 (Miss. 1969); Bunkley & Morse, Amis on Divorce and Separation in Mississippi, § 12.20, at 256 (1957). The next question presented is whether or not the chancellor erred in granting custody of the child to appellee and, on cross-appeal, whether or not the court erred in granting visitation rights to the Lanes. Again, the first part of the question is controlled by the chancellor's finding on conflicting evidence. We cannot say he was manifestly wrong in granting custody to the mother, who, unless unfit to have custody of the child, was entitled thereto. The second part of the question as to whether or not the chancellor erred in granting visitation rights to the Lanes of two (2) months during the summer vacation is controlled by applicable law. In 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 41(c), at 296 (1978), the general law is stated as follows: In 59 Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child § 45, at 130 (1971), it is stated: This Court set forth the rule in Mississippi in Gray v. Gray, 121 Miss. 541, 83 So. 726 (1920) as follows: Most cases involving custody between parents and grandparents arise through habeas corpus proceedings, which deal solely with right of custody as stated above. We recognize that the chancery court has the authority and duty to grant children's custody to those individuals, where the best interest of the child requires, but always preferring parents, if possible. Without question, the Lanes were concerned with the welfare of their grandchild, loved her very much and desired to care for, support and look after her. However, in Turner v. Turner, 331 So. 2d 903 (Miss. 1976), quoting from Pace v. Barrett, 205 So. 2d 647 (Miss. 1968), this Court said: And, further, quoting from Rodgers v. Rodgers, 274 So. 2d 671 (Miss. 1973): We conclude that the chancellor erred in granting visitation rights, or part-time custody, of Dianna Naveda to the Lanes, and that the judgment of the lower court in that respect should be reversed and judgment rendered here in favor of appellee/cross-appellant. AFFIRMED ON DIRECT APPEAL, REVERSED ON CROSS-APPEAL AND RENDERED. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, BOWLING, and COFER, JJ., concur.