Case Title: Collins v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 24/16

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ruben Arnez Collins v. State, No. 24, September Term, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CRIMINAL LAW — VOIR DIRE — PROCEDURE — Maryland law grants broad 
discretion to trial judges in their conduct of voir dire.  While informing the venire that 
sensitive questions may be answered at the bench rather than in open court is good practice, 
it is not an abuse of discretion for a judge to question the venire in open court without 
providing that instruction.  
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 24 
 
September Term, 2016 
 
______________________________________ 
 
RUBEN ARNEZ COLLINS 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Barbera, C.J. 
______________________________________ 
 
                   Filed: April 21, 2017 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Wicomico County 
Case No. 22-K-13-000746 
Argued: November 3, 2016 
 
 
“Voir dire,” the French phrase meaning “to say the truth,” describes the preliminary 
examination of prospective jurors to determine whether they are qualified and suitable to 
serve as jurors.  The voir dire process is critical to ensuring that the courts honor the 
defendant’s right to an impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.1 
We decide in this case whether the voir dire process reasonably assured that 
Petitioner, Ruben Arnez Collins, was tried before an impartial jury.  We conclude that the 
constitutional standard was satisfied and therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.  We 
use this opportunity, though, to encourage trial judges to adopt certain best practices to 
help achieve the constitutionally-mandated goal of an impartial jury.  
I 
The Background and Procedural History  
 
The issue before us does not require an extensive rendition of the factual and 
procedural underpinnings of this case.  It is enough to note that Collins was tried before a 
jury in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County on charges related to the robbery of a 
convenience store in Delmar, Maryland.  The evidence presented to the jury permitted it to 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Collins entered the convenience store brandishing a 
box cutter, demanded money from the store clerk, and fled with over $100 in cash.  The 
                                              
1  The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to     
. . . trial, by an impartial jury.”  Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: 
“That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to . . . trial by an impartial jury.” 
 
2 
 
jury found Collins guilty of armed robbery, robbery, second degree assault, theft under 
$1000, and wear, carry, and transport of a weapon with intent to injure.  The court 
sentenced Collins to twenty years imprisonment for armed robbery and merged the 
remaining offenses. 
 
Collins noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing, among other 
claims, that the trial judge had abused his discretion in conducting the voir dire of the 
prospective jurors.  The Court of Special Appeals rejected that argument and in an 
unreported opinion affirmed the judgment of conviction.  We granted Collins’s petition for 
writ of certiorari to review that holding of the Court of Special Appeals. 
II 
The Voir Dire Process in the Present Case 
 
After the prospective jurors were sworn,2 the trial judge began the voir dire process 
with the following: “All right, ladies and gentlemen [of the venire], I’m going to ask you a 
                                              
2  Maryland Rule 4-312(e)(1) addresses the requirement that the prospective jurors’ 
responses to questions posed during voir dire “be under oath.”  That rule provides: 
 
(1) Examination.  The trial judge may permit the parties to conduct an 
examination of qualified jurors or may conduct the examination after 
considering questions proposed by the parties.  If the judge conducts the 
examination, the judge may permit the parties to supplement the examination 
by further inquiry or may submit to the jurors additional questions proposed 
by the parties.  The jurors’ responses to any examination shall be under oath.  
On request of any party, the judge shall direct the clerk to call the roll of the 
array and to request each qualified juror to stand and be identified when 
called. 
The Maryland Rules do not prescribe a particular oath.  One example can be found in 
Montgomery v. State, 206 Md. App. 357, 368 (2012).  The oath given in that Baltimore 
City case, delivered by the courtroom clerk, reads:  “Do you and each of you solemnly 
promise and declare that you shall true answers make to such questions, as the Court shall 
demand of you?  If so please answer I do.” 
3 
 
series of questions; I’ll ask them to you as a group.  If your answer to any question is yes, 
please stand up so I may ask you some additional questions.”  The judge then described 
the nature of the case to the venire, listing the charges and the name and location of the 
convenience store where the robbery occurred.  The judge did not indicate whether follow-
up questions would be asked in open court or at the bench, and did not inform venire 
members that they could request to answer follow-up questions in relative privacy at the 
bench. 
 
  No member of the venire responded affirmatively to Questions One through Five.  
Those questions addressed prior knowledge of the case, predetermined views on guilt, 
relationship to Collins, relationship to the attorneys, and previous involvement “in the 
criminal justice system either as the victim of, a witness to or a person accused of a crime 
such as that with which the Defendant is charged.”   
 
Question Six asked whether any member of the venire or his or her immediate 
family was employed currently or in the past by a law enforcement agency or a prosecutor’s 
office.  That question elicited eleven affirmative responses from the venire.  The judge 
advised those who responded in the affirmative that he would be asking follow-up 
questions of each of them, individually.  At that point, defense counsel asked, “Your Honor, 
we’re not going to the bench?”  The court replied, “No.”  Twice thereafter, as the judge 
questioned other venirepersons who had answered Question Six in the affirmative, defense 
counsel asked the judge “that we be permitted to have these answers at the bench.”  The 
judge denied both requests. 
 
The first venireperson to be questioned in open court was Juror 582.  The judge 
4 
 
asked whether he or a family member was employed by law enforcement.  Juror 582 replied 
that he had been employed with the New York City Police Department from 1984 to 2004.  
The judge then asked: “Would that affect in any way your ability to fairly and impartially 
decide a criminal case such as this?”  Juror 582 answered “no,” and the judge directed him 
to take his seat.  The judge questioned in the same way the ten other venirepersons who 
had indicated an affirmative answer to Question Six, asking in some instances for 
additional detail.  Save for Juror 538, each of the others who had responded affirmatively 
to Question Six advised the judge that, notwithstanding the connection with law 
enforcement, he or she could fairly and impartially decide the case.  The judge brought 
Juror 538 to the bench for further questioning, asked follow up questions, and, in light of 
his responses, informed him that he was struck for cause and, once the jury had been 
picked, he would be dismissed.  Juror 538 was dismissed at the conclusion of jury selection. 
As voir dire progressed, the judge asked additional questions of the full venire, 
including whether any of the prospective jurors would be more or less inclined to believe 
a person was guilty because of his race; whether any of them had such strong feelings about 
the charges in the case that they could not fairly weigh the evidence; whether any of them 
had religious, moral, or other reasons that would prevent them from deciding the guilt or 
innocence of another human being; whether any of them knew the possible witnesses in 
the case; and a final catch-all question asking whether there was any other reason they 
could not serve. 
The judge received affirmative responses to two of these questions: whether venire 
members had religious, moral, or other reasons they could not judge another person; and 
5 
 
whether members knew any of the possible witnesses.  The judge had those prospective 
jurors approach the bench for follow-up questions.  Thus, only those prospective jurors 
who responded affirmatively to Question Six, concerning connections with law 
enforcement or prosecution agencies, were asked follow-up questions in open court.  
III 
Discussion 
A. The Parties’ Arguments 
 
Collins argues that the trial judge abused his discretion in his handling of the voir 
dire process and thereby violated Collins’s right to a fair and impartial jury.  He claims that 
the violation stemmed from the judge’s decision not to invite all venirepersons who 
provided affirmative responses to approach the bench for follow-up questions, and the 
judge’s failure to inform the venirepersons that they could request to answer at the bench.  
Collins argues that this procedure discouraged the venirepersons from completely and 
honestly answering the questions asked of them.  He claims that, because many of the 
questions asked during voir dire could be embarrassing to venirepersons, the trial court’s 
method does not provide the “reasonable assurance that prejudice would be discovered if 
present,” as our jurisprudence requires in order to satisfy the constitutional guarantee of an 
impartial jury.  See, e.g., White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 242 (2003). 
 
The State argues in response that the trial judge acted within the bounds of his 
discretion in conducting voir dire, which is the standard by which the appellate courts 
assess the propriety of the trial court’s chosen process.  In support of that argument, the 
State notes the following: the judge posed “single-topic questions” that were read one at a 
6 
 
time; he engaged in individual voir dire of the prospective jurors who indicated an 
affirmative response by asking them single questions; and he brought to the bench jurors 
who gave an “affirmative response to any remotely ‘sensitive’ topics.”  The State further 
argues that the standard we have set for review of the conduct of voir dire “is not that there 
be no possibility of undiscovered prejudice.”  Rather, as Collins recognizes, “the standard 
is that the procedures created a ‘reasonable assurance’ that prejudice will be discovered.” 
B.  The Law 
We have described the voir dire process as “critical” to assuring that the federal and 
state constitutional “guarantees of a fair and impartial trial [are] honored.”  Stewart v. State, 
399 Md. 146, 158 (2007).  “Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility 
to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court’s 
instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.”  Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 
451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981). 
Voir dire is a flexible process in this state, not bound by statutory prescriptions, see 
Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 34 (1993), but instead built over time through our case law.3  
We have made plain that, in this state, “the sole purpose of voir dire is to ensure a fair and 
impartial jury by determining the existence of cause for disqualification, and not as in many 
other states, to include the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges.”  Stewart, 399 
                                              
3  While the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article contains some guidance on matters 
such as the authority of the trial judge to excuse for cause or upon exercise of a party’s 
peremptory challenge, the process and substance of voir dire in Maryland has been 
developed through the common law.  See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 8-404, 8-
420 (2013, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.). 
7 
 
Md. at 158; see also Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 356-57 (2014); Dingle v. State, 361 
Md. 1, 13-14 (2000); Davis, 333 Md. at 35-36 (stating that voir dire covers “two areas of 
inquiry that may uncover cause for disqualification: (1) an examination to determine 
whether prospective jurors meet the minimum statutory qualifications for jury service; or 
(2) an examination of a juror conducted strictly within the right to discover the state of 
mind of the juror in respect to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable 
to unduly influence him” (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and citation omitted)). 
We grant to the trial court significant latitude in the process of conducting voir dire 
and the scope and form of questions presented to the venire.  “[N]o formula or precise 
technical test exists for determining whether a prospective juror is impartial.”  White, 374 
Md. at 241.  And we have said repeatedly that the trial judge is vested with broad discretion 
in the conduct of voir dire, subject to reversal for an abuse of discretion.  Pearson, 437 Md. 
at 356; see also Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 293 (1997); Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 218 
(1996); Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 279 (1995).  Yet, “[u]ndergirding the voir dire 
procedure and, hence, informing the trial court’s exercise of discretion regarding the 
conduct of the voir dire, is a single, primary, and overriding principle or purpose: to 
ascertain the existence of cause for disqualification.”  Dingle, 361 Md. at 10 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  “[W]e do not require perfection in its exercise.”  Wright 
v. State, 411 Md. 503, 514 (2009).  The “trial court reaches the limits of its discretion only 
when the voir dire method employed by the court fails to probe juror biases effectively.”  
Id. at 508. 
8 
 
We have made equally clear that voir dire should not be “cursory, rushed, and 
unduly limited,” White, 374 Md. at 241, but instead should be “a comprehensive, 
systematic inquiry that is reasonably calculated, in both form and substance, to elicit all 
relevant information from prospective jurors.”  Wright, 411 Md. at 514.  The broad 
discretion that we accord judges in the conduct of voir dire “and the rigidity of the limited 
voir dire process are tempered by the importance and preeminence of the right to a fair and 
impartial jury and the need to ensure that one is empaneled.”  Dingle, 361 Md. at 14.  We 
therefore would not fulfill our duty as a reviewing court if we were to grant “rote deference 
to the trial court’s decision based on the numerous cases in which we have held that a voir 
dire was properly within a trial court’s discretion.”  Wright, 411 Md. at 512.  In the end, 
“[t]he standard for evaluating a court’s exercise of discretion during the voir dire is whether 
the questions posed and the procedures employed have created a reasonable assurance that 
prejudice would be discovered if present.”  White, 374 Md. at 242. 
 Regardless of the leeway we grant trial courts in the process of conducting voir 
dire, we require that certain substantive elements be incorporated.  If relevant to the case 
and requested by one of the parties, we have held that it is reversible error for a trial court 
not to question the venire regarding racial, ethnic, cultural or religious bias; whether more 
or less credence would be given to a police officer simply because of that officer’s position; 
and whether the venire harbors an unwillingness to convict a defendant of a capital crime.  
See Hernandez v. State, 357 Md. 204, 232 (1999) (holding trial judge erred by failing to 
inquire into prospective jurors’ possible racial or ethnic bias after being requested to do so 
by defendant); Hill, 339 Md. at 285 (same); Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 15 (1991) (same); 
9 
 
Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Balt., 217 Md. 595, 606-07 (1958) (holding that 
the trial judge erred by failing to inquire into prospective jurors’ possible religious bias); 
Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 348-49 (1977) (holding that trial courts must inquire into 
undue weight given to police officer testimony).4  Yet, even for these mandatory subjects 
of inquiry, generally, “neither a specific form of question nor procedure is 
required.”  Bowie, 324 Md. at 13. 
That said, trial judges are not given carte blanche in determining how to pose 
questions, and in several instances, we have identified reversible error.  We held in Wright 
that the trial court committed reversible error by posing seventeen voir dire questions in 
quick succession, and then requiring the venirepersons to answer all seventeen questions 
at once, “result[ing] in substantial delay between presentation of the questions and the 
answers.”  See 411 Md. at 512-13.  In Dingle, we held that the trial judge committed 
reversible error in posing compound questions, the second part of which instructed the juror 
to decide whether he or she could be fair and impartial.  361 Md. at 21.  By allowing the 
prospective jurors to decide their ability to be fair, the process supplanted a key role of the 
trial judge.  Id.  In Pearson, we held that the trial judge committed reversible error in 
phrasing a “strong feelings” question such that each juror was required to evaluate his or 
her own potential bias.  437 Md. at 361-62. 
                                              
4  Before the abolition of the death penalty in Maryland, in 2013, we had long required that 
in a capital case the State has the right to challenge a prospective juror for cause based 
upon that juror’s conscientious scruples against capital punishment or unwillingness to 
convict based on circumstantial evidence in a capital case.  See Corens v. State, 185 Md. 
561, 564 (1946). 
10 
 
C.  The Present Case 
Collins relies upon Wright, Dingle, and Pearson to support his contention that the 
voir dire procedure employed in the case at bar resulted in reversible error, as in each of 
those cases.  We disagree.  Unlike in Dingle, the trial judge in this case did not compound 
his questions,5 neither did the method employed by the trial judge improperly abdicate the 
judge’s role to the venire members as in Dingle.  Nor is this case like Wright.  Unlike in 
that case, the trial judge’s method, here, did not impose upon the prospective jurors a 
challenge to memory and understanding that most, if not all, people cannot reasonably be 
expected to meet.  
In those cases where we have reversed based on an error in voir dire, the failure to 
investigate critical substantive matters or the procedure employed by the trial judge in some 
way directly prevented the judge from receiving information necessary to assess 
impartiality.  In Hernandez, the trial judge failed to ask the venire about a critical subject 
area—the venire members’ potential bias related to the defendant’s race.  357 Md. at 225.  
In Dingle, the court asked compound questions, the structure of which likely concealed 
some positive responses.  361 Md. at 21.  In Wright, the court bundled every question into 
one lengthy discourse and asked follow-up questions of the venire members after an 
                                              
5  We note that, as we have recognized in the past, a voir dire process that involves 
compound questions is not automatically invalid.  “A review of the trial court’s rulings 
should be undertaken only on the record of the voir dire examination as a whole.”  White, 
374 Md. at 243.  In White, the trial judge initially asked the venire compound questions, 
but she followed that with an exhaustive, two-day long, individual voir dire process, which 
this Court found to be procedurally sufficient.  Id. at 248. 
11 
 
extended delay, without the benefit of printed material to refresh their memories.  411 Md. 
at 512-13.  The problems identified in the cases above are not present here. 
Collins argues that the potential embarrassment that venire members may anticipate 
from answering questions in open court is, on its own, such a serious procedural problem 
that questions in open court should constitute an abuse of discretion.  He contends that the 
mere presence of the other venire members should be considered sufficient to prevent 
necessary information from reaching the judge—that potential embarrassment is so 
powerful a force that it should be reversible error to question a venire as a group.  But 
Collins’s argument asks for a much higher bar than we have set through our prior cases on 
this matter, based in a deferential standard of review that seeks only “reasonable assurance 
that prejudice would be discovered if present,” White, 374 Md. at 242 (emphasis added), 
and grants broad latitude to the trial judge in the scope and form of questioning.6   
Collins points out that the trial judge did not assure the venire that, should they have 
an embarrassing response to any question, they might discuss the response in relative 
privacy with the judge, in the presence of counsel and Collins, rather than in open court.  
But, neither did the judge tell the venire that he would engage in public discussion of their 
                                              
6  The standard we have set for a trial judge’s performance of voir dire also has roots in 
matters of judicial economy, acknowledging that the judge is charged with efficiently 
conducting voir dire while pressed with an active docket of pending cases.  Judges in this 
State make various decisions based in judicial economy, recognizing that “[i]n a world of 
finite resources, if the fabled ‘day in court’ is permitted casually to multiply into twenty 
days in court, the inevitable consequence is that, by the inexorable law of mathematics, 
nineteen other litigants are denied any time in court at all.”  Davis, 333 Md. at 42 (quoting 
Davis v. State, 93 Md. App. 89, 94 (1992)). 
12 
 
responses—he said merely that, “[i]f your answer to any question is yes, please stand up 
so I may ask you some additional questions.” 
We agree with Collins that a better method is to inform the jury that follow-up will 
occur at the bench.  Yet, use of a different process, such as the one in the present case, is 
not automatic grounds for reversal.  Maryland law does not require the trial judge to 
question the venire at the bench.  Instead, “[i]n Maryland, unlike some of our sister 
jurisdictions, the trial judge may, at his or her discretion, conduct individual voir dire out 
of the presence of other jurors but is not required to do so.”  White, 374 Md. at 241.  In 
addition, the trial judge here asked follow-up questions in open court in regards to only one 
question—the non-sensitive inquiry into whether any member of the venire was employed 
or had close relatives employed in law enforcement.  For all other questions that elicited 
affirmative initial responses, including the more sensitive religious and moral concern 
question, the judge conducted follow-up inquiry at the bench.7 
                                              
7  Collins has endeavored to establish that the trial judge’s process was flawed because of 
the contrast between the complete lack of response in this case to the question regarding 
involvement in the criminal justice system, and the multitude of responses recorded in other 
criminal cases in the same county and same year.  Collins, through counsel, performed an 
extensive review, examining the procedure and responses in twenty-nine criminal cases 
tried in Wicomico County in 2014.  He found that, in every case except this one, the trial 
judge invited venire members to the bench for questioning, and that in every other case 
examined, affirmative responses were recorded regarding involvement in the criminal 
justice system. 
 
Collins’s thorough research of these practices is laudable, but that other judges 
employ a different approach to voir dire in a criminal case does not alter our decision on 
whether the process here violated the legal standard.  We also note that the trial judge in 
this case phrased his question as follows:  “Have you or has any member of your immediate 
family ever been involved in the criminal justice system either as the victim of, a witness 
to or a person accused of a crime such as that with which the Defendant is charged?” 
(emphasis added).  It would not be particularly surprising if no member of the venire or 
13 
 
We review a judge’s conduct of voir dire for abuse of discretion and, when a judge’s 
approach provides reasonable assurance that prejudice will be discovered, the judge has 
acted within his or her discretion.  Id. at 242.  Here, the trial judge asked the questions 
required by our jurisprudence and in an acceptable form.  This Court has never held that 
failing to inform jurors they may respond in private is an abuse of discretion, and we 
decline to do so now.   
IV 
 A Note on Best Practices 
We sympathize with the position of any trial judge conducting voir dire—the circuit 
court judges of this state often have a potentially lengthy trial ahead and many other cases 
queued behind, let alone the immediate issue of the multi-part jury selection process.  We 
understand, too, the urge to adopt a methodology for conducting voir dire in a manner that 
expends the least amount of time to select a jury, while remaining compliant with the 
dictates of our jurisprudence on the subject.  We therefore take this opportunity to comment 
on a best practice for conducting voir dire to provide guidance to judges seeking an 
efficient, yet thorough jury selection process that seeks to uncover cause for 
disqualification. 
                                              
their family had been previously involved in an armed robbery.  This question may have 
elicited responses if the trial judge had dropped the emphasized clause; it is also possible 
that some or even all responses Collins’s counsel identified in other Wicomico County 
cases may have been in response to such a broader question.  Still, that such is possible 
does not dictate a modification of our current standard of review for abuse of discretion, 
nor does it alter the outcome in the present case. 
 
14 
 
As Collins has argued, we have expressed concern regarding questions posed to the 
venire in open court.  In Davis, we acknowledged that: 
[E]ven where the scope of the proposed voir dire questioning is otherwise 
permissible but potentially embarrassing or humiliating, the trial judge 
should exercise discretion in structuring the questions in a manner which 
would avoid unnecessarily embarrassing the venire panel.  Such questions 
should be worded in a way that potentially embarrassing responses should be 
given at the bench, rather than before open court.   
 
333 Md. at 36 n.1.  We also have recognized that “there may be, and often is, a conflict 
between keeping the voir dire process limited and the goal of ferreting out cause for 
disqualification.”  Dingle, 361 Md. at 14.  
 
Research has produced concerning findings regarding the voir dire process.  Those 
findings support the adoption of procedures that encourage disclosure to the greatest extent 
practicable.8  We appreciate that the voir dire process does not require a “one size fits all” 
                                              
8  In one study, researchers observed voir dire in thirty-one criminal cases in the trial courts 
of the District of Columbia, then conducted post-trial interviews of 190 of the prospective 
jurors that had been empaneled, and compared their voir dire answers to their post-trial 
answers.  Richard Seltzer et al., Juror Honesty During the Voir Dire, 19 J. CRIM. JUST. 451 
(1991).  The researchers found that nearly twenty-five percent of jurors who admitted post-
trial that they or members of their family had been victims of crime did not come forward 
when questioned during voir dire.  Id. at 455.  The researchers also found that nearly thirty 
percent of the jurors interviewed should have, but did not, come forward in response to 
questions regarding their employment or friends and family’s employment in law 
enforcement.  Id. at 456.  Many other troubling studies of potential bias and nondisclosure, 
intentional or subconscious, have been recorded in the academic literature.  See, e.g., Dale 
W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (1965) 
(conducting post-trial interviews of 225 jurors and finding numerous instances of 
nondisclosure); Neal Bush, The Case for Expansive Voir Dire, 2 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 9, 
13-14 (1976); Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and 
Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1989) (explaining the 
concept of implicit bias—those biases, sometimes including racial biases, that jurors hold 
without conscious awareness and control of its impacts on their perception and judgment). 
 
15 
 
in all cases throughout Maryland.  Nevertheless, attention should be paid to how best, in 
every case, to reasonably ensure the federal and state constitutional guarantee of an 
impartial jury.  “While we have every confidence in our jurors’ abilities to respond 
intelligently and effectively to inquiries posed during voir dire, we are also duty-bound to 
eliminate any doubt or error in the process, inasmuch as is possible.”  Wright, 411 Md. at 
512. 
 Guidance on how best to achieve that goal has been further developed by the 
Maryland State Bar Association’s Special Committee on Voir Dire.  The Committee’s 
Model Jury Selection Questions for Criminal Trials provides a flexible script with 
committee notes as a tool for judges in the voir dire process.  See MARYLAND STATE BAR 
ASS’N, 
MODEL 
JURY 
SELECTION 
QUESTIONS 
FOR 
CRIMINAL 
TRIALS, 
http://www.msba.org/committees/voirdire/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/SCG4-4XAK] 
s(last visited on April 17, 2017).  We recommend the procedure outlined in the following 
committee note: 
 
Before proceeding, judges should advise counsel whether the judge 
will ask all general questions before asking any follow-up questions.  If the 
judge will take follow-up responses during the general questioning, the judge 
should also advise counsel whether they may ask follow-up questions 
directly to prospective jurors or must request that the judge ask specific 
follow-up questions. 
 
Judges (and counsel) must conduct all juror questioning on the 
record—both general questions of the full jury panel and follow-up questions 
of individual prospective jurors.  Follow up questioning of a prospective 
juror should usually be conducted out of the hearing of the full panel. 
 
To improve the efficiency of juror questioning and to accommodate 
persons who may have difficulty walking or standing, judges may choose to 
ask all general questions first, noting affirmative responses for follow-up 
questions after the general question period.  Judges may conduct individual 
16 
 
questioning at the bench or in a conference room where the record and 
security will be maintained. 
 
The Committee’s document also offers useful model language explaining to the 
prospective jurors why the voir dire process is important to securing a fair and impartial 
jury, and outlining how the process will proceed, including that the members of the venire 
will be sworn—that they will be asked to declare under the penalty of perjury to answer 
truthfully all questions asked of them.  The model provides as well that, if the answer is 
“yes” or “maybe” the prospective juror should stand until the judge calls upon him or her, 
and when called upon, to give only the juror’s number.9   
The proposed practice further suggests that the trial judge should choose one of the 
following alternatives for handling follow-up questions, and inform the jurors that follow-
up questions may be asked at the bench: 
Alternative 1:  If the judge will ask all general questions before individual 
follow-up responses, continue: 
 
After I finish asking all general questions, I will ask you to come to the bench 
[conference room] to explain your response out of the hearing of your fellow 
prospective jurors. 
 
Alternative 2:  If the judge will ask follow-up questions immediately after 
initial responses, continue: 
 
After you tell me your number, I may ask you to explain or discuss your 
response.  If you do not wish to answer in open court, please let me know.  I 
may ask you to come to the bench at that time, or at a later time. 
 
                                              
9  We agree with the recommendation that the court ask jurors to indicate an affirmative 
response to a question, even if the answer is “maybe”, as it is more likely to resolve the 
potential for confusion or uncertainty among the prospective jurors. 
17 
 
 
No one can deny that open court is a formal, public place, staffed with authority 
figures.  Persons called for jury service are among strangers and—except for the rare 
individual who is familiar with a courtroom setting and the trial process—may be confused 
by the process or substance of voir dire, much less its importance to the constitutional 
guarantee of a trial by an impartial jury.  The setting alone is likely to intimidate many 
venirepersons.  It is also likely that many prospective jurors have little or no experience 
speaking in public, much less in answer to a judge’s questions, in the formality of a 
courtroom, and in the presence of a crowd.  Finally, it goes almost without saying that the 
more intimidating the process, the greater the chance that a prospective juror will simply 
refuse to answer or shy from responding with complete candor. 
 
Of the two alternatives proposed by the Committee, we prefer the former because it 
suggests an approach that provides all venirepersons the greatest degree of privacy while 
decreasing anxiety and encouraging full disclosure of information relevant to cause for 
disqualification.  Alternative 1 calls for public disclosure, through non-verbal assent only, 
by those prospective jurors who believe the answer to any given question is “yes” or 
“maybe”, followed at the appropriate time by subsequent communication with the judge or 
lawyers at the bench.  This alternative avoids both the requirement that the responding juror 
speak in public as well as the possibility that the juror, wittingly or otherwise, 
communicates to other venirepersons information that could adversely affect their 
qualification to serve on the jury.  Alternative 1 also eliminates any anxiety that might 
attend a prospective juror’s having to request to respond at the bench, as is contemplated 
by Alternative 2.  
18 
 
 
We appreciate the good work of the Committee and commend to bench and bar alike 
a review of the model questions in their entirety.10  The thoughtful commentary and 
recommendations in the report should make it as easy as practicable for venire members to 
disclose information fully and with candor.  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED.  
COSTS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
PETITIONER. 
 
 
 
                                              
10  In that vein, we also agree with the Committee’s suggestion that, early in the judge’s 
introductory comments, the judge include the following:  “If you have a mobile phone or 
device with you, you must turn it off now, and you may not turn it on again until I give you 
permission to do so.”  This direction not only reduces distraction, but helps prevent 
prospective jurors from obtaining information about the case they may be asked to decide.