Case Title: Lindt v. Murray

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-160

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lindt v. Murray1995 WY 71895 P.2d 459Case Number: 94-160Decided: 05/17/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

John 
LINDT and Gladys Lindt, Appellants (Respondents),

v.

Edward F. MURRAY, Jr. and William J. Edwards, 
Appellees (Petitioners).

 

Appeal 
from District Court of Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

Robert T. Moxley of Gage 
& Moxley, Cheyenne, for 
appellants.

John B. Rogers of Rogers, 
Blythe & Lewis, Cheyenne, for 
appellees.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      We review an 
order of the district court which affirmed the action of the Board of 
Commissioners of Laramie County (Board) establishing a private road and 
assessing damages.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand for an amended determination of damages, but otherwise 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellants, John 
and Gladys Lindt (Lindts), have set out a detailed statement of their 
issues:

I.          
Is the county commissioner's grant of a private road, upheld by the 
district court, contrary to law?

A.        Does the 
administrative determination of the Laramie County Commissioners (hereinafter 
the "Board") fail for lack of jurisdiction, in that the private road petitioners 
* * * did not prove the jurisdictional fact of being 
"landlocked?"

B.        In the 
absence of necessity for a private road, i.e., where the private road applicants 
already had a legally enforceable access, is the private road statute * * * 
unconstitutional as applied to Appellants * * *?

C.        Have the 
Appellees * * * failed to pursue their appropriate remedy, by failure to perfect 
legal proceedings to obtain recognition of their preexisting access to the 
North, which they have stated to be "preferable?"

D.        Did the 
Board * * * commit prejudicial and reversible legal error in the private road 
action below, by failing to join the landowners to the North, over whose land 
the private road applicants had a prior vested right to an easement (sometimes 
known as a way of necessity) by implication?

II.          
Has the district court committed legal error in its articulation of the 
standard to be applied by the Board * * *, in the assessment of reasonable 
damages for the taking of a private road?

A.        Should this 
court reinstate the previous award granting damages in the amount of $33,600.00, 
which the District Court reversed, because there was no error in the 
award?

B.        Did the 
Board * * *, on remand from the District Court, violate the law of the remand 
order by awarding only the "per-acre value" ($436) of the land taken in the 
grant of the private road petition, without consideration of other items of 
damage?

C.        Did the 
District Court err, in first remanding for a damages determination under a 
different legal standard, and then in upholding a determination which did not 
apply the different standard? 

III.         Is 
the modified private road order herein on appeal void for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction in the tribunals below?

A.        Did this 
court have the power sua sponte to revive the instant action, which had been 
appealed, cross-appealed, and dismissed by both parties?

B.        As an 
"agency" with severely limited jurisdiction, may a Board of County Commissioners 
issue a valid order without the articulation of the underlying jurisdiction and 
jurisdictional facts?

C.        Should the 
unappealed prior damages award of $33,600 be reinstated as a final and 
unappealed order?

IV.        Is there a 
basis in law or fact for the award of attorneys fees made below to the 
appellees?

A.        Was it 
necessary for the Appellants to perfect the issues presented herein, via the 
second appeal of this action to the District Court?

B.        Did the 
second appeal of this matter to the District Court have a reasonable basis in 
law and fact?

[¶4]      Appellees, Edward 
F. Murray and William J. Edwards (Murray and Edwards), rephrase those issues, 
thus:

A.        Whether a 
petitioner for a statutory way of necessity pursuant to W.S. 24-9-101 et seq. is 
required, as a condition precedent to the statutory remedy, to first proceed in 
a civil action to enforce an alleged implied easement?

B.        Whether the 
Laramie County Commissioners correctly concluded that appellees * * * were 
persons whose land had no outlet to, nor connection with, a public road and that 
a private road was necessary?

C.        Whether the 
factual findings of the Laramie County Commissioners were supported by 
substantial evidence?

D.        Whether 
there are jurisdictional defects in the proceedings before either the Laramie 
County Commissioners or the reviewing courts?

E.        Whether the 
Laramie County Commissioners on remand correctly determined damages based upon 
the fair market value of the land being taken?

F.         
Whether the district court correctly assessed costs, including attorney's 
fees, against appellants?

[¶5]      In their reply 
brief, the Lindts offer this additional set of questions:

I.          
Should this court repeal the case law requirement that a private road 
petitioner must show himself to be without "legally enforceable" 
access?

II.          
Is the question of "necessity" a question of fact or a question of 
law?

III.         What 
deference, if any, does this court owe to the legal rulings of the tribunals 
below?

IV.        Can the 
previous denial of an extraordinary writ by this court be seen as an 
adjudication on the merits?1

V.        Can the 
damages rule used below be correct when it ignores damages to the land not 
taken?

VI.        Can the 
"conclusive" ruling of the most inferior tribunal - the Board of County 
Commissioners - be made the basis for the argument that this appeal was without 
a good faith basis?

[¶6]      Pursuant to WYO. 
STAT. §§ 24-9-101 -104 (1993), Murray and Edwards initiated the process to 
obtain a private road in October 1987. By order dated August 15, 1988, the Board 
determined Murray and Edwards were entitled to such a road and assessed damages 
at $33,600. Murray and Edwards sought review in the district court and the 
Lindts cross-petitioned. On July 25, 1989, Murray and Edwards asked that their 
petition for review be dismissed because there had been "substantial changes" in 
their plans for use of their land and their "current plans for use of their 
property suggests that access from the North would be preferable to access from 
the South." The Lindts voiced no objection to dismissal of the petition for 
review and the district court entered an order to that effect on August 1, 1989. 
Murray and Edwards then sought to establish a common law "way of necessity" 
across the lands of the party from whom they had acquired their land-locked 
property. On appeal, we held that an action for a common law way of necessity 
was no longer available because it had been supplanted by the private road 
statute. Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 290 (Wyo. 
1991).

[¶7]      As a part of our 
decision in Ferguson, we directed that the petitions for review which the 
district court had dismissed could be reinstated. Ferguson, 811 P.2d  at 291. 
Within the time allowed by our decision, the Lindts, as well as Murray and 
Edwards, reinstated their petitions for review. The district court affirmed that 
portion of the Board's order which found that a road should be established, but 
remanded for a new hearing on the issue of damages.

[¶8]      On April 2, 1993, 
the Board issued an amended order which revised the damages for the private road 
to $436.00. By petition filed on April 23, 1993, the Lindts sought review of 
that order in the district court. The district court affirmed; this appeal 
followed.

[¶9]      The foundation 
for our examination of the issues presented is found in WYO. STAT. § 24-9-101 
(1993):

Any person whose land has no outlet to, nor 
connection with a public road, may apply in writing to the board of county 
commissioners of his county for a private road leading from his premises to some 
convenient public road. * * * At the hearing, all parties interested may appear 
and be heard by the board as to the necessity of the road and all matters 
pertaining thereto. Upon the hearing of the application, whether the owner or 
others interested appear or not, if the board finds that the applicant has 
complied with the law and that the private road is necessary, the board shall 
appoint three (3) disinterested freeholders and electors of the county, as 
viewers and appraisers, and shall cause an order to be issued directing them to 
meet on a day named in the order on the proposed road, and view and locate a 
private road according to the application therefor, and to assess damages to be 
sustained thereby. * * * The proposed road shall not exceed thirty (30) feet in 
width from a certain point on the premises of the applicant to some certain 
point on the public road, and shall be located so as to do the least possible 
damage to the lands through which the private road is located. The viewers shall 
also at the same time assess the damages sustained by the owner over which the 
road is to be established and make full and true returns, with a plat of the 
road to the board of county commissioners.2

[¶10]   The Lindts' first argument is that 
the existence of a potential claim for an implied easement across the lands of 
Ferguson Ranch requires a finding that a private road across the Lindts' land is 
not "necessary." We decline to so hold, recognizing there is authority to the 
contrary. Although decided in a somewhat different context, we have held that 
convenience and reason should prevail in the establishment of roads, which was, 
in our view, what the legislature intended when it enacted the private road 
statute. See McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1286 (Wyo. 1980); JON W. BRUCE 
AND JAMES W. ELY, JR., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land, ¶ 4.02[4], pp. 
4-30 - 4-32 (1995). We also hold that there is substantial evidence, given our 
holding above, to support the Board's finding that a private road was necessary 
and its location is convenient, as well as the least damaging to the 
Lindts.

[¶11]   The Lindts contend the lower 
tribunals should have considered the potential remedy of an implied easement in 
weighing the question of necessity. Our holding above disposes of that 
contention, i.e., the potential remedy of an implied easement is not relevant to 
the determination of whether a private road is necessary.

[¶12]   The Lindts contend the Board failed 
to ascertain facts essential to exercise of its authority under the private road 
statute. In particular, they assert the Board failed to even consider a route 
located in Albany County. The statute does not require that alternative routes 
in an adjoining county be considered and we find no error.

[¶13]   The Lindts challenge our remand, or 
perhaps "resuscitation," of the parties' appeal from the Board to the district 
court and ask that we utilize our supervisory powers to compel adjudication of 
the quiescent implied easement. In view of our holdings above, we decline to 
provide such relief.

[¶14]   The Lindts claim the damage award 
is improper. It is evident from the proceedings before the Board that the 
directions given the Board by the district court in its remand order were not 
observed or understood. Therefore, we remand to the district court with 
directions that the district court remand to the Board and the Board reassemble 
the viewers and appraisers, or if necessary a different body of viewers and 
appraisers, and those viewers and appraisers assess damages as follows: (1) 
determine the value of the entirety of the Lindts' affected land before the 
private road was established; then, (2) determine the value of the Lindts' 
remaining land after the private road is in place; (3) subtract the "after" 
value from the "before" value, which then equals the damages due the Lindts. 
Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423, 433 (Wyo. 1982); and see generally 
Mettee v. Kemp, 236 Kan. 781, 696 P.2d 947, 949 (1985) (discussing Kansas 
statute which enumerates factors which may be considered in the "before-after" 
analysis).

[¶15]   Under the circumstances of this 
case which involves complex and troublesome questions of fact and law3, and especially in view of our 
decision to remand for a proper determination of damages, we vacate the district 
court's assessment of attorney's fees against the Lindts. We do not agree with 
the district court's conclusion that there was no reasonable cause for the 
Lindts' appeal. WYO.R.APP.P. 10.05 (1992).

[¶16]   The case is remanded to the 
district court for the purpose set out above. In all other respects, the order 
of the district court and the decision of the Board is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The answer to this question is, of 
course, no.

2 Although some of the notice and 
procedural requirements of this statute have been changed (in 1901 and 1985), 
the gist of the private road statute has remained the same since its passage in 
1895. We have had cause to review proceedings under this statute in only a 
handful of cases, although it is apparent that the procedure is used with 
considerable frequency. It is obvious that this statute is not up to its 
assigned task. Legislative reassessment is imperative. A review of similar 
statutes in other states, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-1713-1731 (1993), reveals 
that Wyoming needs a statute capable of dealing with the complexities associated 
with development and progress in an essentially rural 
state.

3 See VANCE T. COUNTRYMAN AND DREW A. 
PERKINS. COMMENT, Death of the Dark Ages? The Troubled Law of Easements in 
Wyoming, XXVII LAND & WATER L.REV. 151 (1992).