Case Title: Ellingsworth v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 200, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GENE ELLINGSWORTH, 
 
§ 
§ 
No. 200, 2002 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below–Superior Court 
§ 
of the State of Delaware, in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
and for Sussex County in Cr. 
§ 
 ID No. 0104000752. 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
Plaintiff  Below, 
 
 
§ 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: July 22, 2002 
Decided: 
November 4, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 4th day of November 2002, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the State’s motion to affirm, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
In September 2001, the appellant, Gene Ellingsworth, entered a 
 nolo contendere plea to Burglary in the Second Degree, Burglary in the Third 
Degree and two counts of Theft of a Firearm.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, 
Ellingsworth was declared an habitual offender as to the second degree burglary 
offense and was immediately sentenced to a total of twenty years at Level V, 
 
 
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suspended after thirteen years, for one year at Level IV Work Release, followed 
by six years at Level III probation.  Ellingsworth did not file a direct appeal.  He 
did, however, file a motion for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his 
guilty plea.  On March 21, 2002, the Superior Court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing and, at the conclusion of the hearing, denied Ellingsworth’s 
postconviction motion.  This appeal followed. 
(2) 
In his postconviction motion and now on appeal, Ellingsworth 
contends that, because of psychiatric problems, he was legally incompetent in 
September 2001 to plead guilty.1  In his opening brief on appeal, Ellingsworth 
alleges that his trial counsel was aware of, and yet failed to inform the Superior 
Court of, Ellingsworth’s past and present psychiatric problems and of 
Ellingsworth’s requests for a psychiatric examination and a competency hearing.  
Moreover, Ellingsworth alleges that his trial counsel “lied under oath” at the 
                                                 
1In his opening brief, Ellingsworth states that he had “symptoms of paranoia and 
delusional effects” on “several occasions” prior to the September 2001 guilty plea proceeding, 
and that he was “disoriented and confused” at the guilty plea proceeding. 
 
 
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evidentiary hearing.  Finally, Ellingsworth argues that the Superior Court was 
obligated to appoint counsel to represent him at the evidentiary hearing. 
(3) 
To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
Ellingsworth must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have 
been different.2  Although not insurmountable, the standard is highly 
demanding and leads to a strong presumption that the representation was 
professionally reasonable.3 
                                                 
2Strickland v.  Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
3Flamer v.  State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del.  1990). 
 
 
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(4) 
The test for determining a defendant’s competence to plead guilty is 
whether the defendant had a “‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and . . . a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’”4  In this case, there is 
nothing in the record that suggests that Ellingsworth was unable to consult with 
his trial counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or was 
unable to understand the proceedings against him.  To the contrary, the 
transcript of the guilty plea hearing indicates that Ellingsworth communicated in 
a meaningful way with his trial counsel and understood the guilty plea 
proceedings in which he actively participated.  Moreover, the transcript of the 
guilty plea proceedings and the guilty plea form clearly indicate that 
Ellingsworth’s waiver of his constitutional rights was knowing and voluntary. 
                                                 
4Weeks v.  State, 653 A.2d 266, 270 (Del. 1995) (quoting Dusky v.  United States, 362 
U.S. 402 (1960)). 
 
 
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(5) 
We agree with the Superior Court that Ellingsworth’s incompetency 
claim is without merit.  Accordingly, Ellingsworth cannot establish that he was 
prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to inform the Superior Court that he had 
requested a psychiatric examination and a competency hearing.  Ellingsworth’s 
claim to the contrary is without merit.   
(6) 
Ellingsworth’s remaining 
claims, i.e., that his trial counsel “lied under oath” at the evidentiary hearing, and 
that the Superior Court was obligated to appoint counsel to represent him at the 
evidentiary hearing, are also without merit.  Ellingsworth’s claim that his trial 
counsel “lied under oath” is conclusory and not supported by the record.  
Ellingsworth is incorrect that the Superior Court was obligated to appoint 
counsel to represent him at the evidentiary hearing.  There is no right to court-
appointed counsel in postconviction proceedings.5  The Superior Court will 
appoint counsel to pursue postconviction relief “only in the exercise of discretion 
and for good cause shown, but not otherwise.”6  
                                                 
5Pennsylania v.  Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). 
6Super.  Ct.  Crim.  R.  61(e). 
 
 
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(7) 
After hearing testimony at the evidentiary hearing, reviewing the 
plea agreement, the guilty plea form and the transcript of the plea colloquy, the 
Superior Court ruled that Ellingsworth was not incompetent to plead guilty in 
September 2001, was educated and articulate, and had accepted the 13-year 
sentence deal that had been negotiated by the parties.  We agree with the 
Superior Court that Ellingsworth has not demonstrated an error in the entry and 
acceptance of his guilty plea, and his  claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
are without merit.  
(8) 
It is manifest on the face of Ellingsworth’s opening brief that this 
appeal is without merit.  The issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled 
Delaware law, and to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly there 
was no abuse of discretion. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm 
is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ E.  Norman Veasey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Chief Justice