Case Title: Amin v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84-12

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Amin v. State1984 WY 93686 P.2d 593Case Number: 84-12Decided: 08/28/1984ABDULA AMIN, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
ABDULA AMIN, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Sylvia Lee Hackl, Appellate Counsel, and Martin 
J. McClain (argued), Asst. Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender Program, 
for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., and John W. Renneisen (argued), 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from 
appellant Abdula Amin's conviction of first degree sexual assault pursuant to § 
6-2-302(a)(ii), W.S. 19771 for which he was sentenced to a 
term of not less than eight nor more than twenty years. We will 
affirm.

[¶2.]     The question presented 
to us in this case is whether appellant was denied the right to confront a 
witness against him when the trial court refused to allow cross-examination 
concerning the witness's prior juvenile court record.

[¶3.]     On July 20, 1983, the 
victim, age seventeen, arrived in downtown Cheyenne en route to his home in Sioux City, Iowa. As he was awaiting a bus scheduled to 
depart Cheyenne 
later that morning, appellant Amin approached and offered to sell him marijuana. 
The victim testified that after the two had smoked marijuana, he agreed to sell 
some of it for appellant. They then drove off in appellant's car on the pretense 
of obtaining a quarter pound of marijuana to be sold. The victim testified that 
he was driven to a deserted area and forced to submit to sexual penetration when 
the appellant threatened him with a gun.

[¶4.]     During trial 
appellant's counsel was permitted extensive cross-examination on matters 
relating to the victim's possible bias and prejudice. When, however, counsel 
sought to cross-examine the victim concerning a prior juvenile adjudication and 
certain charges pending against him as a juvenile in Iowa, the State's 
objection was sustained. The trial court first found that, under Rule 609(d), 
W.R.E.2, the prior adjudication would not 
be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult, and that such evidence was 
not necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence in the 
case. Second, with respect to the admissibility of the pending charges, the 
trial court found that, under Rule 608(b), W.R.E.3, such evidence was not material or 
relevant to the proceedings at bar and, in addition, was unduly prejudicial. 
Appellant asserts that the trial judge's refusal to extend the scope of 
cross-examination to questions concerning the witness's juvenile record was 
error in light of Davis v. Alaska, 
415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974).

[¶5.]     The right of an accused 
to confront the witnesses against him is protected by the Sixth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965). The right to effective cross-examination incorporated in the 
confrontation right is equally protected. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 1079, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965). It is also well settled that the extent to which a witness 
may be cross-examined is a matter to be determined by the trial court in the 
exercise of its sound discretion. Alford 
v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S. Ct. 218, 75 L. Ed. 624 
(1931); United 
States v. Baker, 494 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 
1974).

[¶6.]     In Davis v. Alaska, supra, 94 S. Ct.  at 
1111, the prosecution's key witness, a juvenile, was on probation at the time of 
the crime and trial. The witness was anxious to protect his probationary status 
and was apprehensive about being a possible suspect himself. The Court held that 
the cross-examination permitted defense counsel was inadequate to properly 
develop the issue of bias; that the State's policy of protecting the 
confidentiality of the juvenile offender's record must, in these circumstances, 
give way to the constitutional right to effective cross-examination; and that 
limitations upon cross-examination which prevent a defendant from placing before 
the jury facts from which bias, prejudice, or lack of credibility of the 
prosecution witness might be inferred constitutes denial of the right to 
confrontation.

[¶7.]     The Davis case does 
not confer a general right of cross-examination concerning a prior juvenile 
record, but is limited by its own facts. Thus, when Rule 609(d), W.R.E., was 
adopted, the Wyoming committee noted:

"* * * The claim in 
Davis * * * was 
narrower than a general claim of a right to impeach credibility by prior 
conviction. The juvenile conviction was introduced to show bias or prejudice in 
that the witness was then on probation and was acting out of fear or concern of 
a possible jeopardy to his probation. The committee believes that the rule 
[609(d), W.R.E.] conforms to the narrower view of the Davis 
holding."

[¶8.]     Prior to the adoption 
of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, this court had established a policy of 
permitting the use of a prior juvenile record in proper circumstances to 
demonstrate bias or prejudice in accordance with the view of Davis in holding 
that:

"* * * in certain factual 
situations it is permissible to inquire into the juvenile record of a witness in 
face of the statute making these records confidential. However, the scope of 
this inquiry must be limited to facts tending to disclose interest, bias or 
prejudice and not impeachment by contradictory testimony, Salaz v. State, [Wyo., 561 P.2d 238 
(1977)] at 241." Hernandez v. State, 
Wyo., 587 P.2d 1094, 1097 (1978). See also, Connor v. 
State, Wyo., 537 P.2d 715 
(1975).

That policy was 
reaffirmed with the adoption of Rule 609(d), W.R.E., 
supra.

[¶9.]     Three critical factors 
which should be considered in determining whether to permit use of a prior 
juvenile record for the purpose of showing bias are:

"(1) the probationary 
status of the witness, (2) some suspicion focusing on the witness, and (3) the 
witness's motives to please the prosecution." Commonwealth v. Santos, 376 Mass. 920, 384 N.E.2d 1202, 1205 
(1978).

When, in 
addition to the above factors, the witness is either the chief prosecution 
witness, the only eye-witness to the crime, or the only witness whose testimony 
connects the defendant with the crime, courts generally ought to allow 
cross-examination concerning the juvenile record and its introduction into 
evidence. McKinzy v. Wainwright, 719 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. 
Bowman, Colo., 669 P.2d 1369 (1983); Burr v. Sullivan, 618 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 
1980).

[¶10.]  The trial court must know all of the 
facts concerning the witness's present or past conflicts with the law before 
ruling on the scope of cross-examination, and where such is unknown, a remand to 
the

"* * * district court for 
a full evidentiary hearing to evaluate the relationship between this juvenile 
witness and the state authorities * * * [is required 
because]

"* * * the facts learned 
on remand may show that the requested cross-examination would not have been 
relevant to suggest bias to the jury. If so, then the questions were properly 
prohibited. As Davis suggests, the sixth amendment does not 
unseat state confidentiality laws absent a showing of relevancy." McKinzy v. Wainwright, supra, 719 F.2d 1530.

[¶11.]  Here, the facts concerning the victim's 
prior juvenile conviction and the charges pending against him were before the 
court.

[¶12.]  The three critical factors, however, 
which generally lead to allowing evidence of the juvenile record to be 
introduced were not present. The witness was not on probation at the time the 
crime occurred or at the time of trial. He was not an accomplice or a possible 
suspect of the crime for which appellant was on trial. Although he was the 
victim, he was not the State's only witness.

[¶13.]  Outside the presence of the jury, 
appellant's counsel questioned the witness regarding his prior juvenile 
conviction in Iowa of operating a motor vehicle without the 
owner's consent and the pending charges. The juvenile conviction was a completed 
incident. The witness had been off of probation for over two years. There was 
nothing pending from that conviction. The witness could gain nothing by his 
testimony with respect to the same.

[¶14.]  The charge pending against the victim in 
juvenile court in Iowa was unknown to the State 
of Wyoming. 
The prosecutor had never been in contact with the Iowa authorities where 
that charge was pending, and there was not a scintilla of evidence that the 
witness might benefit in any way with respect to that 
charge.

[¶15.]  He testified as follows concerning that 
matter:

"Q. Has anyone told you 
that you would receive any leniency on [that charge] if you came here to 
testify?

"A. 
No."

[¶16.]  Although evidence of the prior juvenile 
proceedings was excluded, the court allowed extensive cross-examination 
concerning the witness's possession and use of marijuana and his knowledge 
concerning immunity from prosecution upon drug charges for possession of the 
marijuana used by the witness. Appellant's counsel was permitted also upon 
cross-examination to suggest that the witness intended to "rip off the 
appellant," steal the marijuana, and transport it across state lines. The fact 
that the witness may not have been credible because of a self interest, immunity 
from prosecution, or was unreliable because of drug use was fully explored and 
developed.

[¶17.]  Salaz v. State, Wyo., 561 P.2d 238 
(1977), is similar to the case at bar. It was distinguished from Davis in that the witness 
was not on probation or on parole. She was not subject to loss of freedom or 
other punishment due to the previous juvenile adjudication in California and she was 
not concerned about being prosecuted in connection with the crime for which 
Salaz was on trial. We found:

"Direct and 
cross-examination clearly established [the witness's] possible bias and 
prejudice against appellant and generally demonstrated her unsavory character. 
Voluminous evidence was presented to the jurors from which they may have 
concluded that the witness * * * was biased and prejudiced against the 
defendant. The introduction of [the witness's] prior juvenile record in 
California 
could have contributed little or nothing to the evidence produced at Salaz' 
trial as to her bad character and at best was cumulative. The proceedings in 
California 
would show nothing affecting [the witness's] prejudice or bias. Accordingly, 
Salaz was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness." Salaz v. State, supra at 
241.

[¶18.]  The trial judge in this case, in 
excluding the evidence of the juvenile conviction and the pending juvenile 
charge, found that there was

"* * * no showing * * * 
that any of these acts would form the basis for making a determination as to the 
ability of this witness and character of this witness to testify truthfully * * 
*.

"Thus, * * * the jury 
would be receiving [evidence] that would [be] unduly prejudicial, and in 
addition, not material or relevant to this proceeding."

[¶19.]  Under the circumstances, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination by 
excluding evidence of juvenile court proceedings. Other relevant evidence 
relating to the witness's credibility and possible bias or prejudice was 
explored on cross-examination in great detail and emphasized again in closing 
argument. While recognizing the validity of the Davis exception providing for 
admissibility of relevant evidence of prior juvenile crimes, we find that, for 
the reasons stated, it does not apply in this case. Appellant's conviction, 
therefore, is

[¶20.]  Affirmed.

1 Section 6-2-302(a)(ii), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) Any actor who 
inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first 
degree if:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) The actor causes 
submission of the victim by threat of death, serious bodily injury, extreme 
physical pain or kidnapping to be inflicted on anyone and the victim reasonably 
believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these 
threats."

2 Rule 609(d), W.R.E., 
provides:

"Evidence of juvenile 
adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. The court may, 
however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a 
witness (other than the accused) if conviction of the offense would be 
admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that 
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of 
guilt or innocence."

3 Rule 608(b), W.R.E., 
provides:

"Specific instances of 
the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his 
credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be 
proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, 
if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on 
cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness 
or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being 
cross-examined has testified.

"The giving of testimony, 
whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of 
his privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters 
which relate only to credibility."