Case Title: State v. Perry

Citation: 

Docket Number: S48330

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed: October 9, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
	v.
MORGAN JOEL PERRY,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 98-01-40848; CA A102784; SC S48330)
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted May 7, 2003.
	Leland R. Berger, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioner on review. 
	Erika L. Hadlock, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
	Daniel M. Zavadil, Fairfax, Virginia, filed the brief for
amicus curiae National Rifle Association of America Civil Rights
Defense Fund.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
and Balmer, Justices.**
	BALMER, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Ellen F. Rosenblum, Judge. 165 Or App 342, 996 P2d 995 (2000).
	** De Muniz and Kistler, JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case. 
		BALMER, J.
		Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a
firearm, ORS 166.250, for carrying a concealed weapon without a
license while working as an employee at a convenience store.  As
a defense to that charge, defendant argued that his actions fell
within the statutory "place of business" exception to the general
requirement that persons carrying concealed weapons must have a
license.  The trial court rejected that argument, concluding that
the exception did not apply to defendant because he was not the
owner of the convenience store.  The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
State v. Perry, 165 Or App 342, 996 P2d 995 (2000).  We allowed
defendant's petition for review and now affirm the decision of
the Court of Appeals. (1) 
		The facts pertinent to the legal issue on review are
not in dispute.  Defendant was employed at Elias Grocery, a
convenience store in Portland.  Karamanos, the owner of the
store, worked part-time and entrusted his employees with full
authority to operate the business when he was away from the
store.  On January 11, 1998, defendant was working alone at the
store.  Responding to a report of a firearm, police entered the
store and asked defendant if he was carrying a gun.  Police
secured a handgun from defendant without incident.  Defendant
admitted that he did not have a license to carry the gun and was
charged with violating ORS 166.250. (2)  As noted, the trial court
rejected defendant's argument that ORS 166.250(2)(b), which
provides that a person may possess a handgun within that
"person's * * * place of business" without a license, applied to
him because he was at his "place of business" when working alone
at the store.  Thereafter, defendant was convicted following a
trial to the court, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
		On review, defendant and amicus curiae National Rifle
Association of America Civil Rights Defense Fund argue that the
"place of business" exception to the licensing requirement
applies to defendant's possession of a firearm at the convenience
store where he was employed.  He also argues that his conviction
violates Article I, sections 20 and 27, of the Oregon
Constitution and the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.  We first consider defendant's
statutory argument.  State v. Stevens, 319 Or 573, 579, 879
P2d 162 (1994) (court considers statutory arguments before
constitutional arguments).
		Defendant argues that the "place of business" exception
applies to him because a "person's * * * place of business" is
the place where that individual is employed.  According to
defendant, the wording of the statute is unambiguous, and nothing
in that wording expressly or impliedly requires an ownership
interest in the business.  If the wording is ambiguous, defendant
continues, then the court should resolve that ambiguity by
applying rules of statutory construction and by considering how
the legislature at the time would have resolved the ambiguity. 
Defendant asserts that examining the statute in that manner will
lead to the conclusion that the phrase "person's * * * place of
business" as used in ORS 166.250(2)(b) includes the place where
the person is employed. 
		The question presented in this case, whether the
exception in ORS 166.250(2)(b) for persons in their "place of
business" applies to nonowner employees, requires us to construe
that statute.  In doing so, we seek to discern the intent of the
legislature that passed that statute.  PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  The
legislature enacted the original version of the statute in 1925,
Or Laws 1925, ch 260, § 5, and this court previously has not
construed the specific provision in question, ORS 166.250(2)(b).
		In interpreting the words of a statute enacted many
years ago, we may seek guidance from dictionaries that were in
use at the time.  See Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 530, 931
P2d 770 (1997) (using "dictionary relevant to that time" in
interpreting constitutional provision); see also Tipperman v.
Tsiatsos, 327 Or 539, 964 P2d 1015 (1998) (using contemporaneous
dictionary to interpret words in 1909 deed).  If the words in a
statute have a well-defined legal meaning, as is the case here
with respect to the phrase at issue, then we will give those
words that meaning in construing the statute.  Gaston v. Parsons,
318 Or 247, 253, 864 P2d 1319 (1994).  
		Legal dictionaries that were used around the time that
ORS 166.250(2)(b) was enacted indicate that the phrase "place of
business" was not synonymous with "place of employment."  Rather,
the phrase referred to a location where a person conducted that
person's own, independent business, rather than to a location
where a person was an employee engaged in the business of another
person.  Benjamin Pope's 1920 collection of definitions used by
courts defined "place of business" as:
	"A place actually occupied, either continually or at
regular periods, by a person or his clerks, or those in
his employment."
Benjamin W. Pope, 2 Legal Definitions: A Collection of Words and
Phrases as Applied and Defined by the Courts, Lexicographers and
Authors of Books on Legal Subjects 1181 (1920).  Similarly, the
1930 edition of Ballentine's Law Dictionary defined "place of
business" as
	"A place actually occupied, either continually or at
regular periods, by a person or his clerks, in the
pursuit of a lawful employment which occupies his time,
attention, and labor."
James A. Ballentine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations 970
(1930).  Those definitions distinguish between the "person" who
pursues his occupation at "his" place of business and "his
clerks" or employees who work at the same location to further the
"person's" business.  Moreover, the word "clerk" was used, at the
time, synonymously with the word "employee" (3) and referred to a
person who was not "carrying on a business." (4)  To the same
effect, Bouvier's Law Dictionary defined "place of business" as
"the place where a man usually transacts his affairs or
business."  Francis Rawle, Bouvier's Law Dictionary 2596 (8th ed
1914) (emphasis added). (5)  
		Thus, in 1925, a "person's * * * place of business" was
understood to mean the place where a person conducted his or her
own business, and it was not the "place of business" of a clerk
or employee who worked at that location on behalf of another. 
The wording of ORS 166.250(2)(b), therefore, suggests that the
legislature intended the exception to the prohibition against
carrying an unlicensed concealed weapon "within the person's * * * place of business" to apply to only the owner of the "place
of business."  
The historical background of ORS 166.250 and related
statutes regulating the carrying of concealed weapons provide
further context that is useful in determining legislative intent
regarding the scope of the "place of business" exception.  See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 322 Or 406,
908 P2d 300 (1995) (relying on historical context of statute to
determine legislative intent).  Two aspects of the statutory
scheme support the conclusion that the "place of business"
exception was intended to apply to one who owns a business and
not to an employee of a business.  First, the sequence of
legislation that led to the 1925 enactment of what is now ORS
166.250(2)(b) suggests that the exception to the comprehensive
prohibition of concealed weapons was intended to be a narrow one. 
In 1885, the legislature enacted a statute making it unlawful for
any person to carry a concealed weapon.  Or Laws, p 33, § 1 (1885).  That law provided a limited exception for law
enforcement officials only (6) and included not only firearms, but
also "any instrument by the use of which injury could be
inflicted upon the person or property of any other person."  Id. 
In 1917, the legislature passed a law similar to the 1885 law,
but did not repeal the 1885 law. (7)  Or Laws 1917, ch 377, § 1.  The 1917 law provided, in part:
	"No person shall carry in any city, town or municipal
corporation of this State any pistol, revolver or other
firearm concealed upon his or her person, or of a size
which may be concealed upon his or her person, without
a license or permit therefor * * *."
The 1917 law made an exception, similar to that in the 1885 law,
for "sheriffs and their deputies, constables, marshals, police
officers, [and] any other duly appointed police officers * * *." 
Id.  The 1917 statute was narrower in some respects than the 1885
law in that it applied to only firearms and was limited to
cities, towns, and municipal corporations.  However, it was
broader in other respects, because it included not only concealed
firearms, but also firearms capable of being concealed.  That
1917 statute also allowed a person to carry such a weapon if the
person obtained a permit.  In 1925, the statute now codified as
ORS 166.250 superseded the 1917 law. (8)
		That history demonstrates the legislature's ongoing
concern with concealed weapons up to 1925.  First, in 1885, the
legislature imposed an outright ban on the carrying of concealed
weapons by persons other than law enforcement officers.  By later
enactment, the legislature allowed for the carrying of concealed
weapons on receiving a license.  The 1925 statute created an
exception to the general license requirement for persons in their
place of residence or place of business.  Those statutes, read
together, reveal the intent of the legislature to carve out a
limited and specific exception to the requirement of obtaining a
license to carry a concealed weapon.  Construing the "place of
business" exception to apply to employees as well as to owners of
businesses would defeat the legislature's intent, because such a
construction would allow any person with a job to carry a
concealed weapon on the job without a license.  We agree with the
state that it is not likely "that the legislature first would
have banned nearly all unlicensed carrying of concealed weapons
and then, only eight years later, would create an exception for
every person who had some kind of job -- an exception so broad
that it would swallow the general prohibition."
A second aspect of ORS 166.250(2)(b) also supports the
conclusion that the "place of business" exception does not apply
to the place where a nonowner employee works.  As part of the
1925 law that created the "person's * * * place of business"
exception, the legislature created several other exceptions to
the license requirement.  Or Laws 1925, ch 260, § 6, former OC
72-206, renumbered as ORS 166.260 (1953). (9)  Those exceptions
cover, among other persons, law enforcement officials (ORS
166.260(1)(a)), members of the military when on duty (ORS
166.260(1)(d)), and sellers of firearms, as to firearms possessed
as merchandise (ORS 166.260(1)(c)).  If the "place of business"
exception extended to any person at his or her place of
employment, then there would be no need for some of those
exceptions.  The fact that the legislature enacted an exception,
for example, that permits a merchant of firearms to possess
unloaded weapons as merchandise demonstrates that the legislature
did not intend that the place of business exception permit an
employee of a business to possess a concealed weapon at work,
unless the employee has a concealed weapon license.
		For the reasons set out above, we hold that the "place
of business" exception in ORS 166.250(2)(b) applies to only the
owner of a business.  We reject defendant's argument to the
contrary.
		Defendant also argues that his conviction violates
certain provisions of the state and federal constitutions. 
First, he argues that his conviction infringes on his right to
bear arms, as guaranteed by Article I, section 27, of the Oregon
Constitution and by the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution. (10)  As the state notes, defendant does not contend
that the requirement in ORS 166.250(1)(a) that a person obtain a
license to carry a concealed weapon violates those provisions. 
The Court of Appeals stated:
	"As a logical matter, if the general prohibition
against possessing a concealed firearm without a
license is constitutional, then it follows that ORS
166.250(2)(b), which allows greater freedom to possess
firearms, cannot be unconstitutional."
165 Or App at 351.  We agree.
		Defendant also argues that an interpretation of ORS
166.250(2)(b) that excludes him from that exception violates the
privileges and immunities clause of Article I, section 20, of the
Oregon Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (11) 
Although defendant concedes that, as a nonowner employee of a
business, he is not a member of a suspect class, he argues that
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that "it is rational for the
legislature to generally require Oregon citizens * * * to obtain
a license, while * * * allowing business owners to possess a
weapon at their place of business," 165 Or App at 352, is wrong
when applied to the facts of this case.  Defendant, however, does
not articulate any specific reason to support his assertion that
the Court of Appeals' conclusion is wrong.  Again, we agree with
the Court of Appeals.  Our discussion of ORS 166.250 demonstrates
that the legislature intended to create licensing requirements,
with exceptions, for the possession of concealed weapons. 
Drawing a distinction between business owners and employees for
purposes of one of the exceptions to the license requirement is
not irrational.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.



1. 	Defendant also argues that there was insufficient
evidence for the trial court to conclude that the handgun that he
possessed was readily capable of use as a weapon.  The Court of
Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient, and we agree.

2. 	ORS 166.250 provides, in part:
		"(1) [A] person commits the crime of unlawful
possession of a firearm if the person knowingly:
		"(a) Carries any firearm concealed upon the
person;
		"* * * * *
		"(2) This section does not prohibit:
		"* * * * *
		"(b) Any citizen of the United States over the age
of 18 years * * * from owning, possessing or keeping
within the person's place of residence or place of
business any handgun, and no permit or license to
purchase, own, possess or keep any such firearm at the
person's place of residence or place of business is
required of any such citizen."

3. 	Ballentine's Law Dictionary includes several
definitions of the word "clerk":
	"[A]n assistant in a shop or store who sells goods,
keeps accounts, etc. * * * a person in the employ of a
merchant, who attends to any part of his business,
while the merchant himself superintends the whole; or a
person employed in an office to keep accounts or
records. * * * In business law, an assistant employed
to aid in any business, mercantile or otherwise,
subject to the advice and direction of his employer."  
Ballentine, Law Dictionary at 224 (internal citations omitted).

4. 	"A clerk is not a 'person carrying on a business.'" 
Irving Browne, Legal Recreations: Judicial Interpretations of
Common Words and Phrases 56 (1883).

5. 	That definition continues as follows:
		"When a man keeps a store, shop, counting-room, or
office, independently and distinctly from all other
persons, that is deemed his place of business; and when
he usually transacts his business at the counting-house, office, and the like, occupied and used by
another, that will also be considered his place of
business, if he has no independent place of his own. 
But when he has no particular right to use a place for
such private purpose, as in an insurance-office, an
exchange room, a banking room, a postoffice, and the
like, where persons generally resort, these will not be
considered as the party's place of business, although
he may occasionally or transiently transact business
there."
Rawle, Bouvier's Law Dictionary at 2596 (emphasis added).

6. 	"Nothing in this act shall be construed to apply to any
sheriff, constable, police, or other peace officer, whose duty it
is to serve process or make arrests."  Or Laws, p 33, § 3 (1885).

7. 	The 1885 law is now codified at ORS 166.240, although
it has been modified substantially. 

8. 	As noted, the 1925 version of that statute, currently
codified at ORS 166.250, did not repeal the 1917 law.  The
legislature repealed that statute during the next session.  Or
Laws 1927, ch 154, § 1.  Also, despite several amendments, ORS
166.250 remains substantively unchanged in regard to applying the
"place of business" exception.

9. 	ORS 166.260 provides:
		"(1)	ORS 166.250 does not apply to or affect:
			"(a)	Sheriffs, constables, marshals, police
officers, whether active or honorably
retired, parole and probation officers
or other duly appointed peace officers.
			"(b)	Any person summoned by any such officer
to assist in making arrests or
preserving the peace, while said person
so summoned is actually engaged in
assisting the officer.
			"(c)	The possession or transportation by any
merchant of unloaded firearms as
merchandise.
			"(d)	Active or reserve members of the Army,
Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard or Marine
Corps of the United States, or of the
National Guard, when on duty.
			"(e)	Organizations which are by law
authorized to purchase or receive
weapons described in ORS 166.250 from
the United States, or from this state.
			"(f)	Duly authorized military or civil
organizations while parading or the
members thereof when going to and from
the places of meeting of their
organization.
			"(g)	A corrections officer while transporting
or accompanying an individual convicted
of or arrested for an offense and
confined in a place of incarceration or
detention while outside the confines of
the place of incarceration or detention.
			"(h)	A person who is licensed under ORS
166.291 and 166.292 to carry a concealed
handgun.
		"(2)	Except for persons who are otherwise
prohibited from possessing a firearm under
ORS 166.250(1)(c) or 166.270, ORS 166.250
does not apply to or affect:
			"(a)	Members of any club or organization, for
the purpose of practicing shooting at
targets upon the established target
ranges, whether public or private, while
such members are using any of the
firearms referred to in ORS 166.250 upon
such target ranges, or while going to
and from such ranges.
			"(b)	Licensed hunters or fishermen while
engaged in hunting or fishing, or while
going to or returning from a hunting or
fishing expedition.
		"(3)	The exceptions listed in subsection (1)(b) to
(h) of this section constitute affirmative
defenses to a charge of violating ORS
166.250."

10. 	Article I, section 27, of the Oregon Constitution
provides:
		"The people shall have the right to bear arms for
the defence (sic) of themselves, and the State, but the
Military shall be kept in strict subordination to the
civil power[.]"
		The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
		"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."

11. 	Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution
provides:
		"No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or
class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which,
upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens."
		The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in part:
		"[No State shall] deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."