Case Title: Key-El v. State

Citation: 349 Md. 811

Docket Number: 5/97

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1998-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
 MARYLAND
No.  5 
September Term, 1997
PHILIP KEY-EL
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
           Raker
Smith, Marvin H.
(Retired, specially assigned)
Karwacki, Robert L.
 
(Retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
Opinion by Karwacki, J.
Bell, C.J., Eldridge and Raker, JJ., dissent
      Filed:   May 26, 1998
We issued a writ of certiorari in this criminal case to determine whether the trial court
properly admitted rebuttal evidence regarding the defendant’s pre-arrest silence when his
wife, in the presence of a police officer,  accused the defendant of battering her.  We shall
hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting that evidence as a tacit admission
by the defendant under the circumstances present in the instant case.
I.
On August 19, 1994, at approximately 10 p.m. a telephone call was placed to the
emergency telephone number, 911, but the caller hung up before speaking with the operator.
Nevertheless, the operator was able to determine from her terminal the name of the
subscriber to the telephone used for the call and that telephone’s number.  The operator then
called that number.  A woman answered and the operator heard a man’s voice yelling in the
background.  Concerned by what she heard, the operator dispatched both the police and an
ambulance to the address where the woman to whom she had spoken was located.
Officer John Johnson of the Baltimore County Police Department was the first to
arrive.  Philip Key-El, the Petitioner, answered Officer Johnson’s knock on his door.  The
officer “asked if anybody had called 911 from this location [and] if there was a problem.”
Petitioner answered “no”, but a woman in the next room, later identified as Petitioner’s wife,
answered “yes”.  The officer walked into the room where Mrs. Key-El was standing.  She
was crying and her left eye was bruised and swollen.  With the Petitioner standing an “arm’s
length away”, Officer Johnson asked Mrs. Key-El what had happened to her, and she
-2-
responded that she had gotten into an argument with her husband and that he pulled her by
her hair and punched her in the face.  Despite the fact that she spoke with enough volume
for the Petitioner to hear her statement, “he didn’t say anything at all” according to Officer
Johnson. Subsequently, Officer Johnson decided to arrest the Petitioner.
At trial, however, Mrs. Key-El changed her story.  Testifying for the defense, she
denied that Petitioner had struck her but blamed her injury of August 19, 1994, on a
girlfriend of her husband’s.  Mrs. Key-El testified that when she returned to their apartment
that evening, she found her husband with a girlfriend.  She claimed that she and the
unidentified girlfriend argued and then exchanged blows.  She further stated that after the
Petitioner was successful in getting his friend out of the apartment, she continued to argue
with him.  According to Mrs. Key-El, when Petitioner refused to identify his girlfriend and
explain what she was doing in their apartment, she called the police and accused Petitioner
of battering her.   She further testified that she falsely accused her husband that night in order
to hurt Petitioner “the way that he hurt me.”
On cross examination, Mrs. Key-El admitted that after August 19, 1994, she had
received a letter from the Office of the State’s Attorney requesting that she complete a victim
impact statement.  When Petitioner saw the letter, he became angry and threw it away.  She
testified that later, however, she wrote a letter to the person who had corresponded with her
from the State’s Attorney’s office in which she repeated her accusation that Petitioner struck
her in the eye with his fist on August 19, 1994.
The State recalled Officer Johnson as a rebuttal witness.  The following testimony was
-3-
offered and admitted:
“Q.  When you asked Mrs. Key-El what happened to her and
she told you that her husband struck her where was the
defendant standing then?
A.  When she said that he struck her?
Q.  Yes.
A.  She was standing in the kitchen.
Q.  She was in the kitchen; where was he?
A.  He was standing behind me in the dining room.
Q.  Again approximately how many feet away from you?
A.  From me?  Maybe three or four.
Q.  Did you have any difficulty hearing what she said?
A.  No.
Q.  Was it said with enough volume that a person in the position
of the defendant would have been able to hear that statement?
A.  Yes.
MR. KATZ:  Objection.
THE COURT:  Overruled.
A.  Yes.
Q.  When she said my husband hit me did the defendant deny
that statement?
MR. KATZ:  Objection.  May we approach?
THE COURT:  Anything new than what we already argued?
-4-
MR. KATZ:  No, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Objection is overruled but noted for the record.
A.  He didn’t say anything at all.”
The Petitioner was found guilty by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
of battery and was sentenced to five years imprisonment consecutive to a sentence which he
was already serving for an unrelated crime.  After the Court of Special Appeals affirmed that
judgment, we issued our writ of certiorari on the petition of Mr. Key-El.
Petitioner contends that evidence of his pre-arrest silence in the presence of a police
officer should be per se inadmissable under the law of evidence of this State; and if not, then
this evidence when admitted on the issue of guilt or innocence impermissibly infringes upon
his right against compelled self-incrimination protected by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Article 22 of our Declaration of Rights.  We shall address those contentions
separately.
II.
Maryland has long recognized so called “tacit admissions” by a party-opponent in
both  civil and criminal actions as an exception to the hearsay rule under common law.  See
Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 242, 596 A.2d 1024 (1991); Briggeman v. Albert, 322 Md. 133,
138, 586 A.2d 15 (1991); Miller v. State, 231 Md. 215, 218, 189 A.2d 635 (1963); Ewell v.
State, 228 Md. 615, 618, 180 A.2d 857 (1962); Secor v. Brown, 221 Md. 119, 124, 156 A.2d
225 (1959); Zink v. Zink, 215 Md. 197, 202-03, 137 A.2d 139 (1957); Barber v. State, 191
-5-
Md. 555, 564-65, A.2d 616 (1948); Kelly v. State, 151 Md. 87, 97, 133 A. 899  (1926);
Brandon v. Molesworth, 104 Md. App. 167, 198, 655 A.2d 1292 (1995); Burgess v. State,
89 Md. Md. App. 522, 536-37, 598 A.2d 830 (1991); Willis v. State, 82 Md. App. 669, 677,
537 A.2d 80 (1990); Ducan v. State, 64 Md. App. 45, 51, 494 A.2d 235 (1985); Ellison v.
State, 56 Md. App. 567, 582, 468 A.2d 413 (1983); Williams v. State, 4 Md. App. 342, 348,
242 A.2d 813 (1968).  Barnes and Burgess v. State , 1 Md. App. 123, 125, 227 A.2d 763
(1967).  This common law was codified as Maryland Rule 5-803(a)(2) which took effect on
July 1, 1994.  In our order adopting the rules of evidence as Title 5 of the Maryland Rules,
we provided:
“the Rules in Title 5 and the other rules changes hereby adopted
by this Court shall govern the courts of this State and all parties
and their attorneys in all actions and proceedings therein, except
as otherwise provided in such Rules; they shall take effect July
1, 1994 and shall apply in all trials and hearings commenced on
or after that date; provided, however, that (1) any trial or
hearing commenced prior to July 1, 1994 shall continue to be
governed by the law and Rules in effect on June 30, 1994, and
(2) no evidence shall be admitted against a defendant in a
criminal action in proof of a crime committed prior to July 1,
1994, unless that evidence would have been admissible under
the law and Rules in effect on June 30, 1994 . . . .”  See Graves
The petitioner was tried on February 6 and 7, 1995, for the offense giving rise to this case which occurred
1
on August 19, 1994.  Consequently, the admission of the evidence at issue in the instant case is governed by Md. Rule
5-803(a)(2).
-6-
v. State, 334 Md. 30, 36-7 n. 2, 637 A.2d 1197, 1201 n.2
(1994).1
We have observed that “[a] tacit admission occurs when one remains silent in the face
of accusations that, if untrue, would naturally rouse the accused to speak in his or her
defense.”  Henry v. State, 324 Md. at 241, 596 A.2d at 1043.  We also explained in Henry:
“In order for the other’s statement to be considered the party’s
tacit admission, the following prerequisite must be satisfied:  (1)
the party heard and understood the other person’s statement; (2)
at the time, the party had an opportunity to respond; (3) under
the circumstances, a reasonable person in the party’s position,
who disagreed with the statement, would have voiced that
disagreement.  The party must have had first-hand knowledge of
the matter addressed in the statement.”
Id. at 241-42  (quoting Lynn McLain, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, see  801(4).3 at 312-13 (1987).
 Petitioner does not assert that he did not hear or understand his wife’s accusation that
he pulled her hair and struck her or that he did not have the opportunity to respond.  Rather,
he contends that whenever a police officer is present, pre-arrest silence of a person who is
the subject of an incriminating statement is at best ambiguous because of the wide spread
knowledge of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.  Alternatively, he asserts that even
if we should hold that no per se rule be adopted, we should conclude that under the
circumstances of the instant case the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence because his
-7-
silence was too ambiguous such that its slight probative value was clearly outweighed by
possible prejudice to him.
When considering the limits placed upon the use of a defendant’s silence as evidence,
the Supreme Court of the United States, this Court and the Court of Special Appeals have
distinguished between pre-arrest and post-arrest silence.  Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,
100 S. Ct. 2124, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1980) (The Court held that the use of pre-arrest silence of
the defendant to impeach his testimony at trial did not improperly burden his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent nor deny him the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);  Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96
S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976) (Federal due process guarantees violated by using
defendant’s silence for impeachment purposes where defendant had been arrested and
advised of his right to remain silent); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S. Ct.
1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965) (Comment by prosecution on defendant’s election not to
testify at trial and instruction that such election is evidence of guilt violated Fifth
Amendment);  Williams v. State, 4 Md. App. 342, 242  A.2d 813 (1968) (Pre-arrest silence
admitted as evidence of a tacit admission when defendant remained silent in the face of an
accusation by a third party in the presence of a police officer); Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233,
244-45, 322 A.2d 211 (1974) (Where there is custodial interrogation, silence in face of
accusations is presumed to be exercise of privilege against compelled self incrimination);
Zemo v. State, 101 Md. App. 303, 316, 646 A.2d 1050 (1994) (Error to advise jury that
defendant remained silent after he was advised of his right to remain silent pursuant to
-8-
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602,  16  L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); Wills v. State,
82 Md. App. 669, 677, 573 A.2d 80 (1990) (Improper to admit evidence of defendant’s post-
arrest, pre-Miranda advice silence for impeachment purposes because potential for prejudice
outweighs probative value).
The uncontradicted evidence in the instant case shows that at the time of Petitioner’s
silence from which his tacit admission was inferred, he had every opportunity to respond to
his wife’s accusation, he was  not in custody, he was not being interrogated by Officer
Johnson, he had not been arrested and he had not been told of his Miranda right to remain
silent.  This is a text-book example of the wisdom of judging the effect of pre-arrest silence
on a case by case basis.  As a threshold question for the trial court, the admissibility of such
silence should depend on an evaluation of the required prerequisites for the use of the tacit
admission that have been established over the years by this Court, i.e., did the defendant hear
and understand the other party’s statement, did the defendant have the opportunity to
respond; and under the circumstances would a reasonable person in the defendant’s position,
who disagreed with the statement, have voiced that disagreement.  These same factors would
then be evaluated by the jury and the tacit admission given the weight that the jury believes
it to be worth.  Where such an evaluation by the court discloses that the police officer’s
presence together with the other circumstances demonstrate that a reasonable person in the
-9-
defendant’s position would not be expected to deny or explain the accusation, then the
defendant’s silence would be excluded from evidence.
The Court of Special Appeals has approved the admission of a tacit admission of a
defendant where his pre-arrest silence in the face of an accusation by a third party occurred
in the presence of a police officer.  Williams v. State, 4 Md. App. 342, 242  A.2d 813 (1968).
In that case the defendant and another were standing on a public sidewalk showing garments
which they carried in shopping bags to a woman.  A police officer approached them and
asked what was going on.  The woman said that she was going to buy one of the garments
from the defendant.  The defendant remained silent.  When the defendant admitted that he
had no peddler’s license, he was arrested.  At his trial, defendant asserted that he did not
have to say anything when the woman made the statement accusing him of selling goods on
the street.  Emphasizing that the defendant was not in custody, the court held that his silence
as a tacit admission that he was engaged in selling goods was substantive evidence of his
guilt of peddling without a license.
The appellate courts of our sister states have not agreed on the issue of whether pre-
arrest  silence  in response to an accusation can ever give rise to a tacit admission by the
accused where a police officer is present.  In State v. Helgeson, 303 N.W.2d 342 (N.D.,
1981) and Commonwealth v. Ferraro, 582 N.E.2d 961 (Mass. App. Ct., 1991) the courts
upheld the admission of such evidence.  In People v. DeGeorge, 541 N.E. 11 (N.Y., 1989),
and Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 227 A.2d 904, 1040 (Conn. App., 1989) the use of the
accused’s tacit admission was held to be reversible error.  The rule in Michigan is not clear.
Article 22 of our Declaration of Rights also protects against compelled self-incrimination.  It has generally
2
been held to be in pari materia with the Fifth Amendment, Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 586 n.3 (1995) and the
Petitioner makes no argument that the issue in the case sub judice should be resolved any differently under Art. 22 of
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Cf. People v. Cetlinski, 460 N.W.2d  534 (Mich., 1990); People v. Bobo, 212 N.W.2d 190
(Mich., 1973), and People v. Schollart, 486 N.W.2d 312 (Mich., 1992).
Furthermore, we reject Petitioner’s alternative argument under Maryland evidence law
that we should hold that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence as a
tacit admission.  We noted earlier that of all of the threshold factors the court was required
to consider in determining admissibility, the only factor contested was whether the Petitioner
would have been expected to deny his wife’s accusation made in the presence of a police
officer.  Considering the fact that Petitioner was in his own home at the time that his wife
made what she later testified was a false accusation of battery against him, the accusation
could very well be construed as that kind of statement which naturally should have provoked
an immediate denial from the Petitioner.  The fact that Petitioner remained silent was
possibly highly probative in the eyes of the jury when reaching a conclusion as to whether
or not the story that Pamela Key-El told at trial was credible.  The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in allowing the jury to determine the weight to be accorded the tacit admission.
III.
Finally, the Petitioner contends that the use of his pre-arrest silence as a tacit
admission impermissibly burdens his right against compelled self-incrimination protected by
the Fifth Amendment.   The Supreme Court of the United States has never decided the
2
the Declaration of Rights.
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question presented to us in the instant case, but the Court has considered evidence of an
accused’s silence in other situations which provides assistance in the resolution of the issue.
In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed.2d  106 (1965) the
Court held that the Fifth Amendment forbids either comment by the prosecutor on the
accused’s failure to testify at his trial or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence
of guilt.  Nevertheless, in United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 108 S. Ct. 864, 99 L. Ed.
2d 23 (1988), the Court declined to extend its holding in Griffin to prevent a prosecutor from
referring to the defendant’s silence at trial where defense counsel argued in his closing
argument that the defendant had not been allowed by the Government to give his side of the
story.  The Court explained in Robinson:
“The broad dicta in Griffin to the effect that the Fifth
Amendment ‘forbids . . . comment by the prosecution on the
accused’s silence,’ . . . must be taken in the light of the facts of
that case.  It is one thing to hold, as we did in Griffin, that the
prosecutor may not treat a defendant’s exercise of his right to
remain silent at trial as substantive evidence of guilt; it is quite
another to urge, as defendant does here, that the same reasoning
would prohibit the prosecutor from fairly responding to an
argument of the defendant by adverting to that silence.  There
may be some “cost” to the defendant in having remained silent
in each situation, but we decline to expand Griffin to preclude
-12-
a fair response by the prosecutor in situations such as the
present one.”
Id. 485 U.S. at 33-4, 108 S. Ct. at 869-70, 99 L. Ed. 2d. at 32.
In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976), the Supreme
Court considered whether the prosecution could permissibly use the defendant’s silence after
he had received his Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest in cross examination of the
defendant about his exculpatory story, told for the first time at trial.  The Court held that such
use of post-arrest and Miranda warnings silence was fundamentally unfair and prohibited
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court reasoned:
“The warnings mandated by that [Miranda] case, as a
prophylactic means of safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights, see
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 433-444 (1974), require that
a person taken into custody be advised immediately that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used
against him, and that he has a right to retained or appointed
counsel before submitting to interrogation.  Silence in the wake
of these warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee’s
exercise of these Miranda rights.  Thus, every post-arrest
silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is
required to advise the person arrested.  See United States v.
Hale, supra, at 177.  Moreover, while it is true that the Miranda
warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no
penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who received
the warnings.  In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally
unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested
person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation
subsequently offered at trial.”  (Footnote omitted).
Nevertheless, in Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86
(1980) the Court held that the use of pre-arrest silence of the defendant to impeach his
testimony at trial did not improperly burden his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent nor
Petitioner in the present case only asserts that the use of his pre-arrest pre-Miranda warnings silence as
3
substantive evidence from which a tacit admission could be inferred impermissibly burdened his Fifth Amendment
right against compelled self-incrimination.  No fundamental unfairness resulting in a denial of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment is claimed.
-13-
deny him the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Concluding that there was no Fifth Amendment violation the Court reasoned:
“It can be argued that a person facing arrest will not
remain silent if his failure to speak later can be used to impeach
him.  But the Constitution does not forbid ‘every government-
imposed choice in the criminal process that has the effect of
discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights.”’ . . . The
“‘threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs
to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights
involved.’”
447 U.S. at 236, 100 S. Ct. at 2128, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 93.  And in explaining why it held that
there was no breach of Fourteenth Amendment due process, the Court said:
“In this case, no governmental action induced petitioner
to remain silent before arrest.  The failure to speak occurred
before the petitioner was taken into custody and given Miranda
warnings.  Consequently, the fundamental unfairness present in
Doyle is not present in this case.  We hold that impeachment by
use of prearrest silence does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.”
Id. 447 U.S. at 240, 100 S. Ct. at 2130, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 96.   Also in Fletcher v. Weir, 455
3
U.S. 603, 102 S. Ct. 1309, 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1982), the Supreme Court ruled that a State
court did not deny an accused due process in permitting cross-examination of him as to his
-14-
post-arrest silence in the absence of Miranda warnings or similar assurances as to his right
to remain silent.
The federal circuit courts have not agreed on the issue of permissible use of pre-arrest,
pre-Miranda warnings silence as substantive evidence against the accused.  It was not
permitted in United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-1 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 997, 112 S. Ct. 1702, 118 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1992); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562,
1567-68 (1st. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S. Ct. 418, 107  L. Ed. 2d 383 (1989);
and United States ex rel. Savoy v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir. 1987).  The Seventh
Circuit has since limited its holding in Lane and permitted comment by the prosecutor upon
an accused’s pre-arrest silence when the accused selectively responded to an investigator’s
questions.  The Eleventh Circuit, United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.
1991) and the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Zanabrin, 74 F.3rd 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996)
have permitted prosecutorial comment upon accused’s pre-arrest silence.
When silence of a defendant in response to an incriminatory accusation is used by the
prosecution as the basis for an inference of a tacit admission, the defendant can not validly
assert that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination has been violated.  As Justice
Stevens wrote in his concurring opinion in Jenkins v. Anderson:
“When a citizen is under no official compulsion whatever,
whether to speak or to remain silent, I see no reason why his
voluntary decision to do one or the other should raise any issue
under the Fifth Amendment. []  For in determining whether the
privilege is applicable, the question is whether petitioner was in
a position to have his testimony compelled and then asserted his
privilege, not simply whether he was silent.  A different view
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ignores the clear words of the Fifth Amendment. . . .
Consequently, I would simply hold that the admissibility of
petitioner’s failure to come forward with the excuse of self-
defense shortly after the stabbing raised a routine evidentiary
question that turns on the probative significance of that evidence
and presented no issue under the Federal Constitution.”
447 U.S. at 243-44, 100 S. Ct. at 2132, 65 L. Ed. 2d  at 98.  See also Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986) (“The sole concern of the Fifth
Amendment on which Miranda was based, is government coercion); Illinois v. Perkins, 496
U.S. 292, 297, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1990) (Rationale behind Miranda is that
danger of coercion results from “interaction of custody and official interrogation); United
States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. at 31-32, 108 S. Ct. at 868, 99 L. Ed. 2d  at 31 (declining to
give Griffin “broad reading” because that “would be quite inconsistent with the Fifth
Amendment, which protects against compulsory self-incrimination.”)  Petitioner in the
instant case was not  in custody and was not being interrogated when he remained silent
despite his wife’s accusation.  Although a police officer was present, Petitioner was under
no official compulsion to speak or remain silent.  His silence gave rise to a permissible
inference.  The use of it in evidence did not burden his Fifth Amendment privilege.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.
Raker, J., dissenting:
We granted certiorari to consider the following question:
  It is important to keep in mind that the issue presented
1
in this case involves evidence of pre-arrest silence when used
as substantive evidence, i.e., when used to imply that the
defendant is guilty, and not when used to impeach a defendant’s
testimony if he testifies in his own defense. 
In this case, Petitioner did not testify.  Evidence of
Petitioner’s pre-arrest silence was introduced in rebuttal, in
apparent response to Mrs. Key-El’s testimony that her husband
had not caused her injuries.  The majority concludes that
Petitioner’s silence was highly probative in rendering Mrs.
Key-El’s in-court testimony unworthy of belief and would aid
-1-
Should a defendant’s silence in the face of incriminating
accusations be admissible against him as substantive evidence
of guilt when those accusations were made prior to his arrest but
in the presence of the police?
 
The Court of Special Appeals held that as a matter of Maryland evidence law, evidence of
Petitioner’s silence falls within an exception to the hearsay rule and was admissible as a tacit
admission by silence.  The majority of this Court agrees, and affirms the intermediate
appellate court.  Both courts concluded that Petitioner’s silence was highly probative in
rendering Pamela Key-El’s in-court testimony unworthy of belief and would aid the jury
“when reaching a conclusion as to whether or not the story that Pamela Key-El told at trial
was credible.”  I disagree, and would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals
on the ground that a tacit admission in the presence of police officers is too ambiguous to
have any probative value and ordinarily should not be admissible in evidence as substantive
evidence of guilt.  
1
the
story 
n
actual
 the evidence was used as substantive evidence of
etitioner’s guilt.  Although the prosecutor argued before the
 court that the evidence was admissible both as a tacit
mission and as “critical impeachment evidence” that “bear
on the c
n
closing he argued to the jury that: 
 reason [Key-El] remained silent i
because he struck her. . . . A person i
the position of the defendant, trul
innocent, who did not do th
have been expected to protest . 
defendant does not do that.  
that because he was, in fact, the perso
who struck her.  
S
nce was used as substantive
e
in the certiorari petition,
t
th whether the evidence was
pro
 of Petitioner’s guilt, not whether it bears on the
-2-
T
 generally accepted as an exception to the hearsay rule.  If
a
taining assertions of facts which, if untrue, the
p
e expected to deny, then the failure to speak
has
tionally been admissible in evidence against the party as an admission.  Ewell v
State,
see also M CORMICK  O EVIDENCE
 160, at 648-53 (J. Strong, ed., 4th ed. 1992); L
MC AIN, MARYLAND 
VIDENCE §
01(4).3, 
 (1987); 4 W
, VIDENCE § 1071, at 102-06 (Chadbourn 
  
 
 Maryland, certain prerequisites must be satisfied before this kind of evidence i
admitted.
e
  Professor Wigmore observed that: 
2
“Qui tacit consentire videtur,” “silence gives
consent,” are ancient maxims, which have ever
been taken to be unquestioned and have a
larger scope than their application in the law
of Evidence.  But, like all maxims, they
merely sum up a broad principle, and cannot
serve, without decided qualification, as
practical and precise rules. . . . The general
principle of Relevancy tells us that the
inference of assent may safely be made only
when 
no 
other 
explanation 
is 
equally
consistent with silence.
4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1071, at 102 (Chadbourn rev. 1972) (emphasis
added).
-3-
following:  (1) that the statement was actually made, (2) that the defendant must have heard
and understood the accusatory statement, (3) that at that time, the defendant had an
opportunity to deny the accusatory statement, and (4) that under the circumstances calling
for a reply, the defendant remained silent.  Zink v. Zink, 215 Md. 197, 202, 137 A.2d 139,
142-43 (1957).  A tacit admission must be made “in an environment and in the presence of
actors such that a reply might naturally have been expected.”  Ewell, 228 Md. at 619, 180
A.2d at 860; see also Secor v. Brown, 221 Md. 119, 123, 156 A.2d 225, 227 (1959); Zink,
215 Md. at 202, 137 A.2d at 142; Barber v. State, 191 Md. 555, 565, 62 A.2d 616, 620
(1948).  A tacit admission may be used against a defendant “only when no other explanation
is equally consistent with silence.”  Zink, 215 Md. at 202, 137 A.2d at 142; see also
MCCORMICK, supra, § 160, at 649-50; WIGMORE, supra, §1071, at 103.   “If a failure to deny
2
may be more naturally explainable on some inference other than that of belief in the truth of
-4-
the statement, the testimony as to the occurrence should not be received.”  Ewell, 228 Md.
at 618, 180 A.2d at 859. 
The premise underlying the tacit admission rule is that silence in the face of an
accusation is probative of guilt, since an innocent individual who is falsely accused will deny
the accusation.  Courts and commentators have often suggested that such evidence be
received with caution, “an admonition that is especially appropriate in criminal cases.”
MCCORMICK, ON EVIDENCE § 270, at 800 (E. Cleary, ed., 3d ed. 1984); see also, D. Todd
McLeroy, Tacit Admissions, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 151, 154 (1990); State v. Garcia, 199 A.2d
860, 865 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1964).  Criticism of the tacit admission rule is not new.  See, e.g.,
Garcia, 199 A.2d at 863-65; see also People v. Todaro, 240 N.W. 90, 93 (Mich. 1932)
(Weist, J., dissenting).  Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), more courts are now questioning the premise of
the rule and have begun to rethink and modify the tacit admission rule.  See Charles W.
Gamble, The Tacit Admission Rule:  Unreliable and Unconstitutional—A Doctrine Ripe For
Abandonment, 14 GA. L. REV. 27 (1979).  Although Miranda addressed the constitutional
aspect of silence, the decision has had an impact on courts’ evidentiary approach to the tacit
admission problem.  Judge Wilner, then Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals, and
now a member of this Court, commented on the impact of the Miranda decision in his
concurring opinion below.  He wrote: 
[I]t seems clear to me that anyone of average intelligence who
has had even the slightest exposure to popular literature or
television knows that incriminating statements made by an
-5-
accused suspect may, unless otherwise excludible, be used
against him or her in a subsequent criminal trial.  Although the
Supreme Court has required that the police give such a warning
directly when engaging in custodial interrogations, the public at
large, I expect, assumes that incriminating statements made at
any time may come to haunt the accused.
I have no problem with the tacit admission rule where
there is no one else present, other than the accuser and the
suspect, or even when the other witnesses who may be present
are not likely to be perceived by the suspect as a threat to him.
When the accusation is made in the presence of law
enforcement officers, however, silence is, at best, ambiguous.
In the absence of evidence on the point, we really can do no
more than speculate as to why the accused did not respond.
There may be several plausible reasons for his or her silence
other than acquiescence in the truth of the accusation.
The premise of the tacit admission rule has been questioned, and, in some cases,
outright rejected, in part due to the recognition that silence is increasingly ambiguous now
that people are aware of their right to remain silent.  See Ex parte Marek, 556 So.2d 375, 382
(Ala. 1989) (abolishing the tacit admission rule).  Some state courts have concluded that
because there are several reasons an individual may remain silent, pre-arrest silence in the
presence of police officers does not have sufficient probative value to be admissible.   See,
e.g., State v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Iowa 1972) (recognizing the ambiguity of pre-
arrest silence, the court proscribed the use of tacit admissions against an accused in a
criminal proceeding); Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 227 A.2d 904, 906-09 (Pa. 1967)
(proscribing the applicability of the tacit admission rule when defendant is in police custody
or in the presence of a police officer); State v. Daniels, 556 A.2d 1040, 1046 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1989) (concluding that the presence of the police and the emotional state of the victim
-6-
rendered defendant*s choice to remain silent ambiguous). 
Other courts have concluded, on constitutional grounds, that the prosecution is
precluded from introducing evidence of a defendant’s pre-arrest silence in response to any
question from a police officer, or to any statement made in the presence of the police, to
imply guilt.  See United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10  Cir. 1991)
th
(concluding that defendant’s non-custodial, pre-arrest silence was invocation of privilege
against self-incrimination, and as such was inadmissible, regardless of whether he was
advised of his privilege against self-incrimination), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997, 112 S.Ct.
1702, 118 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1567-68 (1  Cir.)
st
(holding that defendant’s refusal to answer questions in a pre-arrest, pre-custodial context
was an invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination and was inadmissible in case-in-
chief as substantive evidence of guilt), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 418, 107
L.Ed.2d 383 (1989); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 2017-18 (7  Cir.
th
1987) (holding that use of defendant’s pre-arrest refusal to answer police questions as
substantive evidence of guilt violated defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent);
Commonwealth v. Cull, 656 A.2d 476, 481, n. 5 (Pa. 1995) (noting that tacit admission rule
is inapplicable in criminal cases where defendant in police custody or in the presence of
police officers because contrary policy would effectively vitiate defendant’s constitutional
right against self-incrimination); State v. Villarreal, 617 P.2d 541, 542 (Ariz. App. 1980)
(holding that defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda “admission by silence” not admissible in
state’s case-in-chief when made to a police officer); see also Comment, Should the
In Ex Parte Marek, 556 So.2d 375 (Ala. 1989), the
3    
Alabama Supreme Court went beyond a discussion of common law
evidentiary 
grounds, 
and 
also 
addressed 
the 
possible
constitutional implications of the substantive use of pre-
arrest, pre-Miranda silence.  Rejecting the distinction between
the use of tacit admissions occurring after a person has been
given Miranda warnings and those cases where the individual has
-7-
Prosecution Be Allowed to Comment on a Defendant*s Pre-Arrest Silence in Its Case-in-
Chief, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 181 (1997).
The underlying premise that an innocent person objects when confronted with a
baseless accusation was analyzed and rejected by the Supreme Court of Alabama.  Ex Parte
Marek, 556 So.2d at 381.  The court said:
That underlying premise, that an innocent person always objects
when confronted with a baseless accusation, is inappropriately
simple, because it does not account for the manifold motivations
that an accused may have when, confronted with an accusation,
he chooses to remain silent.  Confronted with an accusation of
a crime, the accused might well remain silent because he is
angry, or frightened, or because he thinks he has the right to
remain silent that the mass media have so well publicized.
Furthermore, without that premise that silence in the face of an
accusation means that the accused thinks he is guilty, the tacit
admission rule cannot withstand scrutiny, because the
observation that the accused remained silent could not
necessarily lead to the inference that the accused knew that he
was guilty; without the premise that silence in the face of
accusation necessarily results from guilt, the tacit admission rule
merely describes two concurrent events, accusation and silence,
without giving the reason for the concurrence of the two events.
Accordingly, neither logic nor common experience any longer
supports the tacit admission rule, if, indeed, either ever
supported it.
Id. at 381.    
3
not been given warnings, the Alabama court concluded that “the
right to remain silent is effective for both of the accuseds,
and, regardless of whether the accused is advised of that
right, the right nevertheless exists.”  Id. at 381.  The court
recognized that although the constitutional restraints of the
Fifth Amendment may not apply to the use of pre-arrest silence,
“the fundamental logical problems with the rule remain.”  Id.
 
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reasoned that the rule lacks a solid foundation,
is founded on a wholly false premise, and rests on a “spongey maxim” that silence gives
consent.  Justice Musmanno, writing for the court, examined the tacit admission rule and
declared:
This rule, which has become known as the tacit admission rule,
is too broad, wide sweeping, and elusive for precise
interpretation, particularly where a man’s liberty and his good
name are at stake.  Who determines whether a statement is one
which “naturally” calls for a denial?  What is natural for one
person may not be natural for another.  There are persons
possessed of such dignity and pride that they would treat with
silent contempt a dishonest accusation.  Are they to be punished
for refusing to dignify with a denial what they regard as wholly
false and reprehensible?
Dravecz, 227 A.2d at 906.  Denouncing the rule, the court quoted Robert G. Ingersoll’s
funeral oration for Roscoe Conkling in which he said:  “‘He was maligned, misrepresented
and misunderstood, but he would not answer.  He was as silent then as he is now—and his
silence, better than any form of speech, refuted every charge.’”  Id. at 906, n.1.  Noting that
proverbs, maxims and axioms do not necessarily represent universal truths, the court
recounted vigorous opponents to the proverb Silence is Golden:  “Closed lips hurt no one,
speaking may; Speech is of time, silence is of eternity; For words divide and rend, but
-9-
silence is most noble till the end; And silence like poultice comes to heal the blows of sound;
Be silent and safe, silence never betrays you.”  Id. at 907 (emphasis in the original).  The
court concluded that the tacit admission rule is “not rule by reason but by unrestrained
babblement.”  Id. at 908.
New York has also decided that pre-arrest silence does not have sufficient probative
value to be admissible in evidence as an admission of guilt, or, for that matter, for
impeachment purposes.  In People v. DeGeorge, 541 N.E.2d 11, 13 (N.Y. 1989), the New
York Court of Appeals held that pre-arrest silence in the presence of police officers is
inadmissible because silence is the natural reaction of many people in the presence of law
enforcement officers.  The court observed:
Silence in these circumstances is ambiguous because an
innocent person may have many reasons for not speaking.
Among those identified are a person’s awareness that he is
under no obligation to speak or to the natural caution that arises
from his knowledge that anything he says might later be used
against him at trial, a belief that efforts at exoneration would be
futile under the circumstances, or because of explicit
instructions not to speak from an attorney.  Moreover, there are
individuals who mistrust law enforcement officials and refuse
to speak to them not because they are guilty of some crime, but
rather because they are fearful of coming into contact with those
whom they regard as antagonists.  In most cases it is impossible
to conclude that a failure to speak is more consistent with guilt
than with innocence.
Moreover, despite its lack of probative value the evidence
undoubtedly affects a witness’s credibility.  Jurors, who may not
be sensitive to the wide variety of alternative explanations for a
defendant’s pretrial silence, may assign much more weight to it
than is warranted and thus the evidence may create a substantial
risk of prejudice. 
-10-
Id. (quotation marks and internal citations omitted).
In my view, silence in the presence of law enforcement is ambiguous, and its
probative value minimal, because an innocent person may have many reasons for not
speaking out.  The chief reason is that today, following the commonly known Miranda
decision, most people are aware that they are not required to speak, and they also know that
anything they say might be used against them at a trial.  As the Supreme Court recently
noted, “[a]nd as for the possibility that the person under investigation may be unaware of his
right to remain silent:  In the modern age of frequently dramatized ‘Miranda’ warnings, that
is implausible.”  Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. ___, ___, 118 S.Ct. 805, 810, 139
L.Ed.2d 830 (1998).  In addition, some citizens harbor a mistrust for police and may choose
to avoid communication with them, even when it would be in their best interest to do so.  See
Davis v. State, 344 Md. 331, 350-53, 686 A.2d 1083, 1092-93 (1996) (Raker J., concurring);
id. at 353-58, 686 A.2d at 1093-96 (Eldridge J., dissenting).  Since an individual who is
accused of a criminal act in front of a police officer may choose to remain silent based on
a general awareness of the popularized right to remain silent, or even out of suspicion or
mistrust of the police, silence in the presence of law enforcement officers is ambiguous.  As
the Alabama Supreme Court concluded, without the premise that silence in the face of an
accusation necessarily results from guilt, the tacit admission rule merely describes two
concurrent events, accusation and silence, without giving the reason for the concurrence of
the two events.  Ex Parte Marek, 556 So.2d at 391.  Based on Maryland evidentiary grounds,
the tacit admission rule should be inapplicable in the context of accusations made in the
  Based on the well-settled principle that courts should not
4
decide constitutional issues unnecessarily, I would not reach the
constitutional question lurking in the bushes.  See Professional Nurses v.
Dimensions, 346 Md. 132, 139, 695 A.2d 158, 161 (1997); Middleman v. Md.-Nat. Comm., 232 Md.
285, 289, 192 A.2d 782, 782 (1963).
-11-
presence of law enforcement officers.  
4
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge have authorized me to state that they join in the
views expressed in this dissenting opinion.