Case Title: Bristol Asphalt, Co., Inc. v. Rochester Bituminous Products, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13460

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2024-02-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13460 
 
BRISTOL ASPHALT, CO., INC., & another1  vs.  ROCHESTER BITUMINOUS 
PRODUCTS, INC., & others.2 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     October 2, 2023. - February 29, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ.3 
 
 
"Anti-SLAPP" Statute.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss.  
Constitutional Law, Right to petition government.  Zoning, 
Site plan approval, Wetlands.  Municipal Corporations, 
Conservation commission.  Massachusetts Environmental 
Policy Act. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
August 17, 2020. 
 
A special motion to dismiss was heard by Thomas F. McGuire, 
Jr., J. 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
1 Edgewood Development Company, LLC. 
 
 
2 Albert A. Todesca and Paul Todesca, individually and as 
trustees of Todesca Realty Trust. 
 
3 Justice Lowy participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
Michael S. Rabieh for the defendants. 
Brian M. Hurley (Lauren C. Galvin also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
Robert C. Ross, for NAIOP Massachusetts, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
Jeffrey J. Pyle, for New England First Amendment Coalition, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  In this case, along with another opinion issued 
today, Columbia Plaza Assocs. v. Northeastern Univ., 493 
Mass.     (2023), we revisit the analytic framework of a statute 
that has played an increasingly prominent, and complex, role in 
civil litigation over the last thirty years.  General Laws 
c. 231, § 59H, more commonly known as the "anti-SLAPP" statute, 
establishes a procedure for obtaining the early dismissal of a 
claim that seeks to impose liability on individuals for 
exercising their constitutional right of petition.  This 
procedure, referred to as a "special motion to dismiss," has 
become a frequent subject of our jurisprudence since § 59H was 
first enacted.  This is largely attributable to the open-ended 
language of the statute, which reaches any claim "based on" a 
broadly defined category of petitioning activity, and the 
advantages afforded to a party who successfully invokes it -- 
including the dismissal of adverse claims and an award of 
attorney's fees.  Indeed, the mere act of filing such a motion 
serves to automatically stay discovery and prioritize the 
resolution of the motion over other matters in the case. 
3 
 
Although these powerful procedural protections were 
designed to target meritless suits brought to discourage 
individuals from exercising their constitutional right of 
petition, the statute has been regularly invoked in attempts to 
dismiss a wide array of other claims concerning conduct far 
afield of the petitioning activity that the Legislature 
originally sought to protect.  To align the statutory language 
and purpose, and address its potential misapplication, in 
Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167-168 
(1998) (Duracraft), we adopted a construction of the anti-SLAPP 
statute that would exclude its applicability to claims with a 
substantial basis other than or in addition to an individual's 
exercise of the right of petition. 
The Duracraft framework governed our jurisprudence for 
nearly twenty years.  However, out of concern that the 
"problematic sweep of the statute" had continued to invite its 
misapplication to meritorious claims, this court in Blanchard v. 
Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477 Mass. 141, 155, 159 (2017) 
(Blanchard I), and Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 483 
Mass. 200, 206-207 (2019) (Blanchard II), substantially 
augmented the Duracraft framework, requiring that the factual 
allegations supporting challenged claims be parsed, so as to 
allow portions of such claims to be dismissed, and inserting an 
4 
 
additional multifactor test to evaluate the subjective 
motivation of those bringing the challenged claims. 
The resulting complexity of this augmented framework, which 
also strays from the statutory language, has led to additional 
time and expense for litigants seeking to bring, or defend 
against, special motions to dismiss and has placed an enormous 
burden on motion judges in their efforts to decide such motions.  
These pragmatic difficulties detract from one of the principal 
purposes of § 59H:  to obtain the expeditious dismissal of 
meritless claims that are based on petitioning alone. 
The nature, scope, duration, and complexity of the instant 
case exemplify the need to clarify and simplify decision-making 
in this area.  It concerns various claims arising out of the 
unsuccessful efforts of the Todesca litigants (the defendants 
and proponents of the special motion to dismiss in this case), 
before various administrative and judicial bodies, to block the 
Bristol litigants (the plaintiffs and opponents of the special 
motion to dismiss) from obtaining approval to construct and 
operate an asphalt plant that would rival their own.  After the 
last of these challenges failed in 2020, the Bristol litigants 
brought suit, asserting that the Todesca litigants' legal 
maneuvers amounted to abuse of process and violated G. L. 
c. 93A, §§ 4 and 11.  In response, the Todesca litigants filed a 
special motion to dismiss under § 59H, asserting that their 
5 
 
legal efforts to block a competitor's asphalt plant constituted 
a legitimate exercise of their right of petition under the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, for which they 
could not be sued.  The special motion was denied, and the 
Todesca litigants pursued an interlocutory appeal.  The matter 
is now before us three and one-half years after this lawsuit 
first began.   
Recognizing that our existing framework for analyzing 
special motions to dismiss under § 59H has not provided an 
efficient or practical solution to the problem it was designed 
to address, we thus conclude that a simplification of our 
existing anti-SLAPP framework, and one that hews to the 
statutory language, is necessary to ensure that the legislative 
intent behind the statute is not undermined by its 
misapplication.  Toward that end, we set forth a revised anti-
SLAPP framework in the instant opinion, along with an Appendix 
designed to provide guidance on its practical administration. 
Under this simplified anti-SLAPP framework, we eliminate 
the additional analysis set forth in Blanchard I and 
Blanchard II and return to the traditional approach set out in 
Duracraft.  We also seek to provide more detail on how to 
determine whether petitioning activity is devoid of any 
reasonable factual support or arguable basis in law.  Finally, 
we clarify that the appropriate standard of review for a ruling 
6 
 
on a special motion to dismiss is de novo, rather than for an 
abuse of discretion.  Applying this simplified framework to the 
instant case, we conclude that the Todesca litigants' 
petitioning activities were not entitled to the procedural 
protections of § 59H.4 
 
1.  Factual background.  We summarize the facts as derived 
from the pleadings and attached documentary evidence before the 
Superior Court, reserving certain facts for our discussion 
below.  See G. L. c. 231, § 59H; Dickey v. Warren, 75 Mass. App. 
Ct. 585, 588 n.5 (2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 926 (2010). 
The Todesca litigants -- the special motion proponents in 
the instant suit -- own and/or operate an asphalt plant at 83 
Kings Highway in the town of Rochester (town), within an area 
that has been zoned for industrial uses since 1969.5  The area 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs concerning the anti-SLAPP 
framework submitted in this case, as well as the companion case 
decided by this court today, by the Massachusetts Employment 
Lawyers Association, GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, 
Brazilian Women's Group, La Colaborativa, Dominica Development 
Center, Massachusetts Coalition for Occupational Safety and 
Health, and MetroWest Worker Center; JACE Boston, LLC, and 
Arthur Leon; New England First Amendment Coalition; NAIOP 
Massachusetts; and American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts, Inc. 
 
5 More specifically, the asphalt plant is owned by Rochester 
Bituminous Products, Inc. (RBP), which was incorporated by 
members of the Todesca family.  Albert and Paul Todesca have 
served in various executive and consulting capacities for RBP, 
although the parties dispute the extent of their current 
involvement in the company.  For simplicity, we refer to them 
7 
 
where the asphalt plant is located also houses a concrete block 
manufacturing plant, a building material deconstruction 
facility, and several waste facilities.  The Bristol 
litigants -- the special motion opponents in this suit -- are 
business competitors who sought to open their own asphalt plant 
on an adjacent parcel of land in the same industrial zone, 
beginning in late 2010.6  The Todesca litigants subsequently 
launched a series of administrative and legal challenges to the 
Bristol litigants' efforts to obtain regulatory approval for the 
construction and operation of the proposed plant.  Each one is 
outlined, in turn, below. 
 
a.  Challenges to site plan approval.  In late 2010, the 
Bristol litigants submitted a site plan review application to 
the town's planning board (planning board) for their proposed 
asphalt plant.  On May 24, 2011, the planning board issued a 
unanimous written decision in which it determined that the 
 
collectively as the Todesca litigants, except where otherwise 
specified. 
 
6 Most of the actions relevant to the instant suit were 
taken prior to 2019, when Bristol Asphalt, Co., Inc. (Bristol 
Asphalt), was first incorporated to follow up on the efforts of 
related entities, including Edgewood Development Company, LLC 
(Edgewood), to obtain permits necessary to construct and operate 
the proposed asphalt plant on behalf of its developer, Lorusso 
Corporation.  The complaint indicates that any claims for 
economic loss suffered by Edgewood have been assigned to Bristol 
Asphalt.  For simplicity, we refer to them collectively as the 
Bristol litigants throughout this opinion. 
8 
 
proposed plant was a permitted use in the industrial district, 
and approved the site plan subject to forty-three conditions 
designed to regulate anticipated noise, dust, fumes, and visual 
and traffic impacts relating to the project.  Paul Todesca and 
abutters to the site appealed from the planning board's decision 
to the town's zoning board of appeals (zoning board).  The 
zoning board unanimously affirmed the site plan approval.  
Albert and Paul Todesca (Todescas), as trustees of Todesca 
Realty Trust, along with abutters, then pursued a further appeal 
in the Land Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17.   
In the Land Court, the Todescas argued that the site plan 
approval did not comply with local bylaws because of the 
anticipated effect that the proposed plant would have on noise 
levels, property values, and traffic in the area.  Upon the 
parties' cross motions for partial summary judgment concerning 
the Todescas' noise-related arguments, the Land Court judge 
ruled in favor of the Bristol litigants, concluding that the 
noise issue had reasonably been addressed by conditions 
contained within the site plan approval.   
After a trial on the Todescas' remaining claims, the Land 
Court judge issued a written memorandum of decision containing 
various findings of fact and entered judgment in favor of the 
Bristol litigants.  The judge concluded that the proposed 
asphalt plant constituted a permitted use in the industrial 
9 
 
district and that the evidence did not "support a finding that 
there are problems with the site plan that have not been 
reasonably addressed or that require conditions beyond those" 
already imposed by the planning board. 
Thereafter, the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment of the 
Land Court in an unpublished decision.7  See D'Acci v. Board of 
Appeals of Rochester, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 1118 (2017).  Upon 
conducting de novo review of the issue disposed on summary 
judgment, the Appeals Court concluded that the noise conditions 
contained within the site plan approval had been reasonable and 
that partial summary judgment had been properly entered in favor 
of the Bristol litigants.  See id.  The Appeals Court further 
concluded that the Land Court judge did not err in ruling in 
favor of the Bristol litigants on the remaining claims because 
the asphalt plant was a permitted use in the industrial district 
and the conditions imposed by the planning board had been 
reasonable.  In so doing, the Appeals Court observed, inter 
alia, that there was "no evidence to support the conclusion that 
the addition of the [Bristol litigants' asphalt plant] would 
cause property values across the industrial district to 
decrease," nor any evidence that the harms anticipated by the 
Todescas were "inherent to the [Bristol litigants' asphalt 
 
7 The Todescas apparently did not join in the appeal of the 
site plan approval to the Appeals Court. 
10 
 
plant] in particular, 'as opposed to any other industrial use.'"  
Id. 
 
b.  Challenges to extension of order of conditions.  As 
part of their efforts to obtain regulatory approval for the 
proposed asphalt plant, the Bristol litigants also filed a 
notice of intent with the town's conservation commission 
(commission), pursuant to the Wetlands Protection Act, G. L. 
c. 131, § 40, and a municipal wetlands bylaw.  After holding 
public hearings on the matter, the commission issued an order of 
conditions approving the proposed asphalt plant, subject to at 
least twenty-six special conditions, in 2011.8  In light of the 
delays in construction caused by the Todesca litigants' legal 
challenges to the site plan approval, the Bristol litigants 
sought a three-year extension of the order of conditions in 
2018, pursuant to 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.05(8)(a) (2014).  
After conducting a public hearing, a site visit, and a review of 
aerial photographs, as well as soliciting input from the town's 
conservation agent, the commission voted unanimously to approve 
the extension request.   
The Todesca litigants (specifically, Rochester Bituminous 
Products, Inc. [RBP]), along with other abutters, filed a 
 
8 The Bristol litigants' amended complaint makes reference 
to twenty-six special conditions, while the recommended final 
decision of the office of appeals and dispute resolution refers 
to twenty-nine special conditions. 
11 
 
complaint in the Superior Court seeking judicial review of the 
extension of the order of conditions, pursuant to G. L. c. 249, 
§ 4.  RBP argued that the commission erred in granting the 
extension request without first conducting a new delineation 
(i.e., assessment) of the boundaries of nearby wetlands or 
confirming that the prior delineation remained accurate, and 
without considering changes in the area since the original order 
of conditions had issued. 
On the parties' cross motions for judgment on the 
pleadings, a judge in the Superior Court affirmed the decision 
of the commission.  The judge concluded that "a review of the 
administrative record does not show [RBP], or anyone else, 
presented any evidence of changes to the area" and that there 
was "nothing in the administrative record to support a finding 
that any resource area delineation was no longer accurate."  RBP 
filed a notice of appeal, and the Appeals Court affirmed on the 
same basis in an unpublished decision.  See Rochester Bituminous 
Products, Inc. v. Conservation Comm'n of Rochester, 98 Mass. 
App. Ct. 1118 (2020).9 
 
9 The Bristol litigants' complaint also makes reference to a 
separate set of unsuccessful administrative appeals submitted by 
a group of residents to the Department of Environmental 
Protection (department) and, later, to the department's office 
of appeals and dispute resolution.  The appeals were denied on 
the basis that the order of extension was not appealable to the 
department.  Albert Todesca initially sought judicial review of 
12 
 
 
c.  Fail-safe petitions for MEPA review.  While the 
challenges to the order of extension mentioned supra were still 
ongoing, Todesca Realty Trust also obtained signatures from town 
residents and, through counsel, submitted a so-called "fail-safe 
petition" requesting that the Executive Office of Energy and 
Environmental Affairs (EOEE) conduct a review of the proposed 
plant under the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, G. L. 
c. 30, §§ 61-62H (MEPA).10  The EOEE issued an order denying the 
fail-safe petition, concluding that it did not meet the 
regulatory standards for review under 301 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 11.04(1) (2008).  Todesca Realty Trust subsequently filed a 
second fail-safe petition for MEPA review on January 22, 2020.  
The EOEE issued an order denying this petition as well, noting 
that it alleged "virtually identical facts" to the first, 
unsuccessful fail-safe petition. 
 
2.  Procedural history.  On September 2, 2020, the Bristol 
litigants filed a three-count amended complaint against the 
Todesca litigants, alleging that the above-mentioned legal 
challenges constituted unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
 
these decisions in the Superior Court, but subsequently chose to 
dismiss the complaint. 
 
10 Pursuant to 301 Code Mass. Regs. § 11.04(1) (2008), ten 
or more citizens may file a petition requesting review of a 
project that does not otherwise meet or exceed any thresholds 
for review under the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, 
G. L. c. 30, §§ 61-62H, provided certain requirements are met. 
13 
 
the conduct of trade or commerce, in violation of G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 11; conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, in violation 
of G. L. c. 93A, § 4; and abuse of process.  The Todesca 
litigants filed an answer, asserting the anti-SLAPP statute as 
an affirmative defense, and later filed a special motion to 
dismiss under G. L. c. 231, § 59H, or, in the alternative, a 
motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 
(1974), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted.11  In support of the filing, the Todesca litigants 
attached an affidavit from Albert Todesca asserting that he had 
"good faith legal and factual bases" for each of the legal 
challenges that the Todesca litigants had pursued.  The Bristol 
litigants filed an opposition, attaching two affidavits, along 
with over one hundred pages of exhibits, consisting of 
deposition excerpts and administrative and judicial decisions 
arising out of the prior legal challenges. 
After a hearing, a judge in the Superior Court denied the 
special motion to dismiss.12  The motion judge acknowledged that 
 
11 It appears that the special motion to dismiss was filed 
more than sixty days after the amended complaint.  See G. L. 
c. 231, § 59H ("Said special motion to dismiss may be filed 
within sixty days of the service of the complaint or, in the 
court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems 
proper"). 
 
12 The motion judge did allow the motion to dismiss the 
abuse of process claim, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 
14 
 
all of the challenged claims sought to impose liability on the 
Todesca litigants based solely on their petitioning activities 
(i.e., their legal challenges to regulatory approval for the 
proposed asphalt plant).  However, the motion judge went on to 
conclude that because the Todesca litigants' petitioning 
activities had been a "sham," they were not entitled to 
dismissal of the claims filed against them.   
The Todesca litigants pursued an interlocutory appeal from 
the denial of their special motion to dismiss.  See Fabre v. 
Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 521-522 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 (2004) 
(holding that litigants have right to pursue interlocutory 
appellate review from denial of special motion to dismiss).  A 
majority of the Appeals Court affirmed the denial of the Todesca 
litigants' motion, after engaging in a detailed discussion and 
analysis of each one of the Todesca litigants' petitioning 
activities.  See Bristol Asphalt Co. v. Rochester Bituminous 
Prods., Inc., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 522, 538 (2023). 
In a separate opinion dissenting in part, a justice of the 
Appeals Court concluded that the Todesca litigants' challenge to 
the site plan approval was not a sham insofar as it was based on 
anticipated traffic impacts from the proposed asphalt plant.  
See id. at 541 (Englander, J., dissenting).  The dissent further 
 
Mass. 754 (1974), insofar as it alleged abuse of process based 
on administrative proceedings. 
15 
 
noted that it was error to review the resolution of a special 
motion to dismiss only for abuse of discretion, as the nature of 
the inquiry necessitated de novo review.  Id. at 544.  The 
dissent also highlighted other difficulties posed by our 
existing anti-SLAPP framework, particularly the additional 
analysis required by Blanchard I and Blanchard II.  Id. at 547-
548.  We subsequently allowed the Todesca litigants' application 
for further appellate review. 
 
3.  Anti-SLAPP framework for assessing special motions to 
dismiss.  a.  Legislative history and development of current 
framework.13  The acronym "SLAPP," which stands for "Strategic 
Litigation Against Public Participation," was coined in the 
1980s to refer to "meritless suits brought by large private 
interests to deter common citizens from exercising their 
political or legal rights or to punish them for doing so" 
 
13 We recognize from the outset that it can be difficult to 
follow a discussion of the conceptual framework set forth in 
G. L. c. 231, § 59H, particularly because the statute focuses on 
the legitimacy of the prior petitioning activity by the party 
filing the special motion to dismiss, rather than on the 
elements of the claims that the party is seeking to have 
dismissed.  This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that 
§ 59H may be invoked not only by a defendant seeking to dismiss 
civil claims, but also by a plaintiff seeking to dismiss cross 
claims or counterclaims, as the case may be.  Accordingly, in a 
particular case, the movant or proponent of the special motion 
to dismiss may not necessarily be the defendant.  In the 
discussion that follows, we have elected to use the terms 
"special motion proponent" and "special motion opponent" to 
facilitate readers' conceptual understanding of the framework. 
16 
 
(citations omitted).  Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 160 n.7, 161.  
Although such suits may fail on the merits, they send a message 
to average citizens that the price for speaking out is "a 
multimillion-dollar lawsuit and the expenses, lost resources, 
and emotional stress such litigation brings."  Pring, SLAPPs: 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 Pace Envtl. 
L. Rev. 3, 6 (1989).  In response to growing concerns about 
large developers filing SLAPP suits to silence local residents, 
the Commonwealth enacted its own so-called anti-SLAPP statute, 
G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  See Duracraft, supra at 161.  The statute 
creates a procedural vehicle -- known as the special motion to 
dismiss -- intended to secure the early dismissal of a meritless 
SLAPP claim, along with attorney's fees, before significant 
discovery has occurred.  Id. at 161-162. 
The statute delineates the following procedure for filing 
and analyzing special motions to dismiss: 
"In any case . . . in which a party asserts that the civil 
claims, counterclaims, or cross claims against said party 
are based on said party's exercise of its right of petition 
under the constitution of the United States or of the 
commonwealth, said party may bring a special motion to 
dismiss.  The court shall advance any such special motion 
so that it may be heard and determined as expeditiously as 
possible.  The court shall grant such special motion, 
unless the party against whom such special motion is made 
shows that:  (1) the moving party's exercise of its right 
to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or 
any arguable basis in law and (2) the moving party's acts 
caused actual injury to the responding party.  In making 
its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings 
17 
 
and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts 
upon which the liability or defense is based." 
 
G. L. c. 231, § 59H, first par.  The statute goes on to define 
the phrase "a party's exercise of its right of petition," used 
in the above-quoted provision, to include 
"any written or oral statement made before or submitted to 
a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other 
governmental proceeding; any written or oral statement made 
in connection with an issue under consideration or review 
by [such body]; any statement reasonably likely to 
encourage consideration or review of an issue by [such 
body]; any statement reasonably likely to enlist public 
participation in an effort to effect such consideration; or 
any other statement falling within constitutional 
protection of the right to petition government." 
 
G. L. c. 231, § 59H, sixth par.  As illustrated by the multitude 
of appellate cases interpreting § 59H since its enactment in 
1994, the Legislature's broad conceptualization of petitioning 
and prioritization of its protection within this statutory 
formulation have led to a number of difficulties.  
First, while the statute's applicability turns on the 
special motion proponent's constitutional rights of petition, 
the statute does not "rely solely on these rights, as defined by 
the United States Supreme Court or this court, to determine the 
scope of protected activity, and instead provides its own 
express -- and broad -- definition of 'petitioning.'"  
Commonwealth v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 489 Mass. 724, 727 n.3 (2022) 
(Exxon).  See, e.g., Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 150-151 
(statements to newspaper about decision to fire nurses 
18 
 
constituted petitioning under § 59H, because definition includes 
any statement made "in connection with" issue under 
consideration or review by governmental agency, and statements 
had been made in manner "that was likely to influence or, at the 
very least, reach" Department of Mental Health).  Thus, a large 
body of case law has developed construing the meaning and scope 
of this statutory definition.  See id. at 153 n.19 (collecting 
cases).  And unlike many other States' anti-SLAPP statutes, this 
definition does not limit the applicability of the statute to 
matters of public concern.  See Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 163 
n.12.  As a result, a party may seek to invoke the powerful 
protections of the anti-SLAPP statute to protect speech even if 
it "involves a commercial motive," with only a limited 
relationship to issues of public concern.  See, e.g., North Am. 
Expositions Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852, 863 
(2009) (attempts to persuade foundation not to sponsor competing 
events); Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 113, 122-123 
(2002) (communications about purchase of condominium units owned 
by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).  See also Kobrin v. 
Gastfriend, 443 Mass. 327, 331 (2005) (statute "applies to 
matters of both public and private concern").  This has "led to 
a significant expansion of [the statute's] application" beyond 
the original problem it aimed to correct.  Exxon, supra at 728 
n.5. 
19 
 
In addition to defining petitioning expansively, the 
statute goes on to immunize this broad category of conduct from 
suit, except where it is "devoid of any reasonable factual 
support or any arguable basis in law."  G. L. c. 231, § 59H, 
first par.  That is, unless the opponent to a special motion to 
dismiss can show that the petitioning activity was "devoid" of 
"any" reasonable basis in fact or law, the opponent's claims -- 
regardless of their underlying merits -- must be dismissed.  Id.  
Indeed, the proponent of the special motion is presumptively 
entitled to dismissal of these claims, along with a mandatory 
award of attorney's fees.  See id.  Because this statutory test 
is focused exclusively on the petitioning activity, without 
considering whether there is support for the contentions put 
forward in the special motion opponent's claims, the statute 
"makes no provision for a [special motion opponent] to show that 
its own claims are not frivolous."  Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 164-
165.  This approach differs from most States' anti-SLAPP 
statutes, which permit special motion opponents to defeat such a 
motion, and thereby preserve their claims, by demonstrating that 
their claims are likely to succeed on the merits.14  See id. at 
166 n.18. 
 
14 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-751; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 
§ 425.16(b)(1); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-1101(3)(a); Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 52-196a(e)(3); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8137; Ga. Code. 
Ann. § 9-11-11.1(b)(1); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634G-6; Kan Stat. Ann. 
20 
 
By failing to consider the merits of the claims that are 
subject to presumptive dismissal, § 59H raises a paradoxical 
conundrum that "has troubled judges and bedeviled the statute's 
application," and one that we highlighted in Duracraft:  "[b]y 
protecting [the special motion proponent]'s exercise of its 
right of petition, unless it can be shown to be sham 
petitioning, the statute impinges on the [special motion 
opponent]'s exercise of its right to petition, even when it is 
not engaged in sham petitioning."  Id. at 166-167. 
To address this constitutional problem and paradox, in 
Duracraft we adopted a strict construction of § 59H's reference 
to claims "based on" a party's petitioning activity.  
Specifically, we construed the term "based on" so as to "exclude 
motions brought against meritorious claims with a substantial 
basis other than or in addition to the petitioning activities 
implicated."  Id. at 167.  Accordingly, our holding in Duracraft 
placed a threshold burden upon the proponent of a special motion 
to dismiss to show that each of the claims it was moving to 
dismiss had "no substantial basis other than or in addition to 
[its] petitioning activities."  Id. at 167-168.  The sufficiency 
 
§ 60-5320(d); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 454.472; Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 25-21,245; Nev. Rev Stat. § 41.660; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g); 
Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 1434(C); Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.150(3); Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 20-17-105(b); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 
§ 27.005(c).  See also D.C. Code § 16-5502(b). 
21 
 
of the special motion proponent's threshold showing was to be 
evaluated count by count.  See Ehrlich v. Stern, 74 Mass. App. 
Ct. 531, 536 (2009).  If a count was based substantially on 
conduct other than petitioning activity, it survived.  See id.  
If, and only if, a count had no substantial basis other than 
petitioning did the burden then shift to the special motion 
opponent to demonstrate, per the statutory language, that its 
claim should not be dismissed because the petitioning activity 
forming the basis of the claim "was devoid of any reasonable 
factual support or any arguable basis in law" and caused it 
"actual injury."  G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  See Duracraft, supra. 
In Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 155-156, 159-161, and 
Blanchard II, 483 Mass. at 206-207, in an attempt to more 
precisely protect petitioning and more clearly permit other 
lawsuits not based on "classic" petitioning activity to proceed, 
this court chose to revisit the anti-SLAPP framework in two 
significant and complex ways.  First, we held that a special 
motion proponent may seek to dismiss the portion of a special 
motion opponent's claim that is based on petitioning activity, 
so long as that petitioning activity could have independently 
served as the sole basis for the claim.  See Blanchard I, supra 
at 155-156; Reichenbach v. Haydock, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 567, 574 
(2017) (clarifying that revised threshold burden depends upon 
nature of claim and theory of liability).  That is, while a 
22 
 
claim based on a mix of petitioning and nonpetitioning activity 
would not be subject to a special motion to dismiss under our 
prior Duracraft framework, this court's holding in Blanchard I, 
supra at 155-156, now required that a claim based on both types 
of conduct be "carefully parsed" by the motion judge, with the 
portion based on petitioning activity subject to possible 
dismissal, while the remainder of the claim is allowed to 
proceed.  See Haverhill Stem LLC v. Jennings, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 
626, 634 (2021).   
This change from the Duracraft framework called for motion 
judges to sift through each individual count, with an eye toward 
the type of claim at issue, in order to identify whether the 
petitioning activity could, standing alone, support the 
underlying cause of action.  See Reichenbach, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 574.  Doing so has proven to be a difficult and onerous task, 
and one that is not a traditional judicial function, as judges 
are not ordinarily expected to redraft parties' pleadings.  See, 
e.g., id. at 575-576.  See also Mmoe v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 
617, 620 (1985) (observing that "[p]leadings must stand or fall 
on their own," as courts do not have "the power to fashion 
procedures in disregard of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil 
Procedure"); Granahan v. Commonwealth, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 617, 
620 (1985).  This difficulty remains even where the factual 
allegations are relatively simple, as the analysis called for 
23 
 
under Blanchard I may vary depending on the nature of the claim 
at issue and the theory of liability advanced in the complaint.  
See Reichenbach, supra. 
The second major change set forth in Blanchard I, 477 Mass. 
at 159-161, articulated an alternative means by which a special 
motion opponent could defeat the special motion, and has proven 
to be even more difficult to apply and controversial in its 
application.  See Nyberg v. Wheltle, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 639, 
654-655 (2022).  Under this so-called "second path," the 
opponent must show, "such that the motion judge may conclude 
with fair assurance," that the opponent's claims are "colorable" 
and were not raised for the primary purpose of chilling the 
special motion proponent's legitimate petitioning activity.  
Blanchard I, supra at 160-161.  Making this determination "rests 
within the exercise of the judge's sound discretion" and is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion or error of law.  Blanchard 
II, 483 Mass. at 203, 207. 
In assessing an opponent's showing under this second path, 
we stated that "the judge may consider whether the case presents 
as a 'classic' or 'typical' SLAPP suit, i.e., whether it is a 
'lawsuit[ ] directed at individual citizens of modest means for 
speaking publicly against development projects'" (citation 
omitted).  Id. at 206.  We also identified numerous other 
factors that may be relevant: 
24 
 
"by way of example, whether the lawsuit was commenced close 
in time to the petitioning activity; whether the anti-SLAPP 
motion was filed promptly; the centrality of the challenged 
claim in the context of the litigation as a whole, and the 
relative strength of the [special motion opponent]'s claim; 
evidence that the petitioning activity was chilled; and 
whether the damages requested by the [special motion 
opponent], such as attorney's fees associated with an abuse 
of process claim, themselves burden the [special motion 
proponent]'s exercise of the right to petition" (footnotes 
omitted).  
  
Id. at 206-207.   
As demonstrated by the briefing in this appeal, the 
submissions from all the amici, and the feedback by way of 
recent jurisprudence from appellate justices concerning the 
second path, it has become clear that the second path presents 
numerous problems.  It strays from the statutory language.  See 
G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  It shifts the focus to the motives of the 
special motion opponent, which must be determined based on 
documentary evidence alone.  See Nyberg, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 
654-655 (pointing out difficulty motion judge will have 
"discern[ing] a party's primary motivation" for bringing suit, 
on basis of documentary evidence alone, and without "a more 
complete evidentiary record scrutinized through cross-
examination").  And it involves consideration of an open-ended 
list of factors, thereby inviting subjective, if not 
unpredictable, decision-making.  See, e.g., id. at 656 
(upholding allowance of special motion to dismiss, despite 
25 
 
observing that "a different judge may have reached a different 
result" in conducting "second path" analysis). 
This additional complexity further serves to lengthen the 
amount of time it takes for parties to litigate a special motion 
to dismiss, and for motion judges to rule on them.  See 
Krimkowitz v. Aliev, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 47 (2022) 
("Typically, rulings on special motions to dismiss under the 
anti-SLAPP statute run many pages and require difficult legal 
analysis").  Thus, the resolution of these motions may span 
years and result in significant attorney's fees.  See Exxon, 489 
Mass. at 728 n.5, and cases cited.  All the while, discovery in 
the case is automatically stayed.  See G. L. c. 231, § 59H, 
third par.  And because the statute requires that the resolution 
of such motions must be prioritized, the current anti-SLAPP 
framework has a significant impact on a trial court's ability to 
manage its docket in an orderly and efficient manner.  See 
Exxon, supra.  In short, while special motions to dismiss were 
designed to "be resolved quickly with minimum cost to citizens 
who have participated in matter of public concern," resolution 
under the augmented framework has become anything but.  
Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161, quoting 1994 House Doc. No. 1520.  
Accordingly, for all these reasons we eliminate the second path 
set out in Blanchard I and Blanchard II.    
26 
 
We also overrule the additional requirement set forth in 
Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 155-156, and further explicated in 
Reichenbach, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 574, that the motion judge 
parse the factual allegations underlying each claim to determine 
whether a portion of the opponent's cause of action could be 
construed as being based on the proponent's petitioning alone.  
We begin with the recognition that "the statute does not create 
a process for parsing counts to segregate components that can 
proceed from those that cannot."  Ehrlich, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 
536.  Engaging in such parsing has likewise significantly 
complicated and delayed the resolution of these cases.  
Furthermore, as this court cautioned in Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 
166-167, we must always be aware that both proponents and 
opponents of special motions to dismiss are engaged in 
petitioning activity, requiring courts to proceed cautiously 
when the protection of a proponent's petitioning activity 
interferes with an opponent's own legitimate petitioning 
rights.15   
 
15 Both sides have a right to file suit, i.e., petition, for 
the redress of grievances.  See Sahli v. Bull HN Info. Sys., 
Inc., 437 Mass. 696, 700–701 (2002) (acknowledging 
"constitutional right to seek judicial resolution of disputes 
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights" [footnotes 
omitted]). 
27 
 
Mixed claims, that is, those based on a proponent's 
petitioning along with substantial conduct other than or in 
addition to the petitioning activities, inevitably involve an 
inquiry into both sides' legitimate petitioning rights.  See id.  
And any citizen, including an opponent of a special motion to 
dismiss, certainly has a right to sue over matters not involving 
the proponent's petitioning rights.  Such suits are exercises of 
the opponents own right of petition.  See Sahli v. Bull HN Info. 
Sys., Inc., 437 Mass. 696, 700–701 (2002).  Thus, as we explain 
in more detail below, the parsing of claims involving a mixture 
of petitioning and other matters is best addressed in the course 
of ordinary litigation, where both sides' claims and defenses 
can be fully analyzed based on a more complete record, not 
special motions to dismiss.  
 
b.  Simplified anti-SLAPP framework.  As we seek to clarify 
the anti-SLAPP framework, we recognize, as always, that our 
primary duty is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.  
See Exxon, 489 Mass. at 726.  We seek to discern this intent, in 
the first instance, from the words contained in the statute, 
"construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished" (citation omitted).  Id.  At the same time, a 
statute must be construed, "when possible, to avoid 
28 
 
unconstitutionality, and to preserve as much of the legislative 
intent as is possible in a fair application of constitutional 
principles" (citation omitted).  Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 167. 
 
i.  Stage one:  scope of applicability of special motion to 
dismiss.  As is apparent from the plain language of § 59H, the 
special motion to dismiss is strong medicine.  It offers a party 
the prospect of having the claims filed against it dismissed -- 
regardless of the merits of those claims and regardless that the 
filing of those claims is itself a petitioning activity -- as 
well as a mandatory award of attorney's fees, under a very 
favorable statutory standard:  presumptive entitlement to 
dismissal, unless the opposing party can prove a negative.  See 
G. L. c. 231, § 59H ("The court shall grant such special motion, 
unless the party against whom such special motion is made shows 
that . . . the moving party's exercise of its right to petition 
was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable 
basis in law . . .").  And irrespective of the outcome, the mere 
act of filing the special motion stays discovery and prioritizes 
resolution of the motion over the rest of the case.  See id.   
We thus conclude, as we originally did in Duracraft, 427 
Mass. at 166-168, that these powerful procedural protections 
were intended to be employed in a limited context:  to ensure 
the expeditious elimination of meritless lawsuits based on 
petitioning activities alone.  To prevent the misapplication of 
29 
 
§ 59H, this court in Duracraft adopted a necessarily narrow and 
strict construction of the statute, which we return to today.  
In particular, the narrow construction of the term "based on" 
articulated in Duracraft appropriately established a threshold 
showing that remains a necessary part of a simplified anti-SLAPP 
framework, and ensures that an opponent's own petitioning 
activity is not infringed by the allowance of a special motion 
to dismiss.  See id. at 167.   
Accordingly, under the simplified framework we set forth 
today (and as was the case prior to Blanchard I), a proponent of 
a special motion to dismiss under § 59H must "make a threshold 
showing through the pleadings and affidavits that the claims 
against it are 'based on' the [party's] petitioning activities 
alone and have no substantial basis other than or in addition to 
the petitioning activities."  Id. at 167-168.  Thus, to survive 
this first stage, the proponent must show that the challenged 
count has no substantial basis in conduct other than or in 
addition to the special motion proponent's alleged petitioning 
activity.  If the proponent cannot make the requisite threshold 
showing, the special motion to dismiss is denied.  If the 
threshold showing is made, the second stage of analysis follows 
(more on this below). 
Importantly, this return to the traditional analysis at the 
threshold stage does not mean that a special motion proponent 
30 
 
will be held liable for exercising his or her constitutional 
right to engage in legitimate petitioning activity merely 
because the special motion opponent advances a claim that is 
based only in part on said petitioning activity.  Such 
petitioning may still be entitled to protection from liability 
under the State and Federal Constitutions16 as the case proceeds 
according to the ordinary litigation process.  See Sahli, 437 
Mass. at 702–703 (concluding, upon review of summary judgment 
ruling, that "although the interest in remedying discrimination 
is weighty, it is not so weighty as to justify what amounts to 
an absolute restriction on an employer's right to petition the 
courts").  See also Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. 
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 57 (1993) (holding 
that petitioning activity with objectively reasonable basis is 
immunized from antitrust liability).  Cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 
U.S. 443, 451-452, 458 (2011) (defendants could not be held 
civilly liable for picketing because statements involved matter 
of public concern and were therefore entitled to special 
protection under free speech clause of First Amendment).   
Rather, returning to the traditional Duracraft analysis at 
the threshold stage, which denies special motions to dismiss for 
 
16 Both the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provide 
a right to petition.  See Sahli, 437 Mass. at 700-701.  See also 
Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 158 n.24, and cases cited. 
31 
 
claims that have a substantial basis in addition to petitioning 
activity, and addresses the legitimacy of the petitioning 
activity implicated therein later on, in the ordinary course of 
litigation, simply ensures that the incredibly powerful 
procedural protections of the special motion to dismiss are 
appropriately reserved for the narrow category of meritless 
SLAPP claims that the Legislature sought to target -- namely, 
those based solely on legitimate petitioning activity.  See 
Ehrlich, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 537.17  Such an approach better 
serves to eliminate meritless SLAPP claims quickly, "removes the 
unwarranted intimidation or punishment produced by the claim's 
very existence," and "leaves to substantive law," and the 
ordinary course of litigation, "the task of sorting out rights 
and responsibilities bound up in any surviving counts."  Id. 
 
ii.  Stage two: standard for determining whether special 
motion opponent has met burden to defeat special motion to 
dismiss.  Where a special motion proponent has met this 
threshold burden, the statute requires allowance of the special 
motion to dismiss, "unless the [special motion opponent] shows" 
 
17 In light of our holding, the appellate jurisprudence 
prior to Blanchard I concerning mixed claims remains sound.  See 
Ehrlich v. Stern, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 536 (2009).  In setting 
forth a simplified anti-SLAPP framework, we similarly do not 
upend our jurisprudence concerning other aspects of the 
threshold inquiry.  See Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 153 & n.19 
(summarizing existing threshold burden under Duracraft and its 
progeny and citing relevant cases). 
32 
 
that the special motion proponent's exercise of its right of 
petition "was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any 
arguable basis in law" and (2) "caused actual injury to the 
[special motion opponent]."  G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  We have thus 
far provided relatively limited guidance on the practicalities 
of how to determine whether petitioning activity is devoid of 
any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law when 
assessing a special motion to dismiss.  See 477 Harrison Ave., 
LLC v. Jace Boston, LLC, 477 Mass. 162, 173 (2017) (Harrison), 
S.C., 483 Mass. 514 (2019) (characterizing determination as 
"little-discussed second-stage burden"). 
We begin with the recognition that proving petitioning is 
"devoid" of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis 
in law is a difficult task and one that the statute imposes on 
the special motion opponent.  In Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 
543, 553-554 (2001), we expressly held that the special motion 
opponent "is required to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the [special motion proponent] lacked any reasonable 
factual support or any arguable basis in law for its petitioning 
activity."  The difficulty of making this showing was further 
clarified in Benoit v. Frederickson, 454 Mass. 148, 149-151 
(2009), where the petitioning activity consisted of the 
reporting of an alleged rape to police, and the record contained 
competing affidavits as to whether the rape had, in fact, 
33 
 
occurred.  In discussing the nature of the special motion 
opponent's burden, we explained:  
"The question to be determined by a judge in deciding a 
special motion to dismiss is not which of the parties' 
pleadings and affidavits are entitled to be credited or 
accorded greater weight, but whether the [special motion 
opponent] has met its burden (by showing that the 
underlying petitioning activity by the [special motion 
proponents] was devoid of any reasonable factual support or 
arguable basis in law, and whether the activity caused 
actual injury to the [special motion opponent])." 
 
Id. at 154 n.7.  We emphasized that the "mere submission of 
opposing affidavits by the [special motion opponent] could not," 
in this case involving conflicting affidavits as to whether a 
rape had occurred, "have established that the [special motion 
proponents'] petitioning activity," i.e., her report of the rape 
to police, was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any 
arguable basis in law.  See id.18  See also Blanchard I, 477 
Mass. at 156 n.20 (proving that petitioning activity was 
illegitimate presents "high bar" for special motion opponent).   
As material, disputed credibility issues may not be 
resolved in the special motion opponent's favor, see Baker, 434 
Mass. at 553, the evidentiary support in favor of the special 
motion proponent's petitioning activity must be quite limited in 
 
18 To the extent we suggested otherwise in Baker v. Parsons, 
434 Mass. 543, 553 (2001), we clarify that the mere existence of 
an isolated "untrue" or "misleading" statement would not, in and 
of itself, mean that the petitioning activity was devoid of any 
reasonable factual support or arguable basis in law. 
34 
 
order for a special motion opponent to satisfy the "devoid of 
any reasonable factual support" standard.  The legal basis for a 
special motion proponent's petitioning activity likewise need 
only be "arguable."  See G. L. c. 231, § 59H. 
That being said, when the special motion opponent has 
submitted evidence and argument challenging the reasonableness 
of the factual and legal basis of the petitioning, a special 
motion proponent cannot merely rely on speculation, conclusory 
assertions, or averments outside of its personal knowledge for 
the court to identify reasonable support.  See, e.g., Gillette 
Co. v. Provost, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 133, 138 (2017) (no reasonable 
basis where special motion opponent provided detailed 
evidentiary support, and, "[t]o counter [opponent's] evidentiary 
proffer, [proponent] submitted a single declaration" with 
conclusory assertion that petitioning activity had been filed 
for legitimate, good-faith purpose).   
The cases in which we have determined that no reasonable 
factual support or arguable legal basis existed for the 
petitioning provide helpful guidance on this point.  In 
Harrison, 477 Mass. at 174, for example, this court held that 
there was no reasonable basis for an application for a criminal 
complaint alleging trespass where the complaint was dismissed 
for lack of probable cause and had been filed "after a Superior 
Court judge explicitly granted the [special motion opponent] the 
35 
 
affirmative right to trespass on the [special motion 
proponent's] property to protect it from damage."  We determined 
that "[t]he combination of the lack of probable cause finding 
and the Superior Court order supplies the requisite 
preponderance of the evidence in favor of the conclusion that 
the criminal complaint lacked any reasonable basis in fact or 
law."  Id.   
We reached a similar conclusion in Van Liew v. Stansfield, 
474 Mass. 31, 39–40 (2016), where the special motion proponent's 
petitioning activity consisted of an application for a 
harassment prevention order.  Because this application did not 
contain three or more acts of harassment, as required under 
G. L. c. 258E, §§ 1 and 3, the special motion proponent was not 
entitled to issuance of the harassment prevention order.19  As a 
result, and as the special motion opponent showed in accordance 
with his burden to do so, we concluded that the petitioning 
activity (i.e., the application for a harassment prevention 
order) was "devoid of any reasonable factual support or any 
arguable basis in law."  Id. at 39, quoting G. L. c. 231, § 59H.   
 
19 The special motion proponent had sought a harassment 
prevention order on the specific basis of alleging that the 
special motion opponent had engaged in "three or more acts of 
willful and malicious conduct," as defined in G. L. c. 258E, 
§ 1.  See Van Liew v. Stansfield, 474 Mass. 31, 36-39 (2016). 
36 
 
Various other cases provide additional examples of this 
analysis.  See Gillette Co., 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 138-139; 
Maxwell v. AIG Dom. Claims, Inc., 72 Mass. App. Ct. 685, 696 
(2008) (no reasonable factual support for allegation of workers' 
compensation fraud was provided by innocuous observations or 
assertions that "record shows was flatly incorrect"); Garabedian 
v. Westland, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 427, 434 (2003) (special motion 
proponents' efforts to prevent special motion opponent from 
bringing fill onto his land were devoid of reasonable factual 
support or arguable legal basis where there "was no showing of a 
basis, in the by-laws of Southborough or elsewhere, to regulate 
the kind of land filling" that opponent was conducting).   
Analogous case law is also informative on how to apply the 
no "reasonable factual support or arguable basis in law" 
standard.  Most notably, our jurisprudence has tended to "equate 
the standard under the anti-SLAPP statute with the concept of 
frivolousness."  Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc. v. Ryan, 70 Mass. 
App. Ct. 259, 267 (2007), and cases cited ("Though we 
acknowledge that the two statutory standards are not linguistic 
mirrors of each other, we are persuaded that they resolve the 
same essential question").  And as we explained in Fronk v. 
Fowler, 456 Mass. 317, 329 (2010), "[a] claim is frivolous if 
there is an absence of legal or factual basis for the claim, and 
if the claim is without even a colorable basis in law" 
37 
 
(quotations and citations omitted).20  Compare Baker, 434 Mass. 
at 555 n.20, citing Donovan v. Gardner 50 Mass. App. Ct. 595, 
600 (2000) (mere fact that petitioning activity was not resolved 
in special motion proponent's favor "does not mean no colorable 
basis existed" to support petitioning).  Cf. Marengi v. 6 Forest 
Rd. LLC, 491 Mass. 19, 29-30 (2022) (construing bond provision, 
which prohibits award of costs "unless" court determines 
appellant "acted in bad faith or with malice" in bringing 
appeal, to require showing that appeal "appears to be so devoid 
of merit as to allow the reasonable inference of bad faith or 
malice" [citation omitted]). 
 
iii.  Standard of review.  Finally, we take this 
opportunity to clarify the appropriate standard of review on 
appeal.  Although we have previously stated, in passing, that 
rulings on special motions to dismiss are reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion or error of law, see Baker, 434 Mass. at 550; 
McLarnon v. Jokisch, 431 Mass. 343, 348 (2000), subsequent 
decisions have effectively engaged in de novo review, at least 
as to the special motion proponent's threshold burden, see 
Reichenbach, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 572; Blanchard v. Steward 
Carney Hosp., Inc., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 97, 112-113 (2016) 
 
20 We further explained in Fronk v. Fowler, 456 Mass. 317, 
329 (2010), that "[t]he proper vantage point for evaluating 
whether a claim is frivolous is from the time the claim was 
brought and over the course of the litigation." 
38 
 
(Sullivan, J., concurring in the result), S.C., 477 Mass. 141 
(2017), and 483 Mass. 200 (2019), and cases cited.  We now 
conclude that de novo review is required for both stages of our 
inquiry.  We do so because both stages of our framework require 
resolution of legal questions based entirely on a documentary 
record, for which "no special deference" is owed to a motion 
judge.  Board of Registration in Med. v. Doe, 457 Mass. 738, 742 
(2010).  Cf. Dartmouth v. Greater New Bedford Regional 
Vocational Tech. High Sch. Dist., 461 Mass. 366, 373 (2012). 
At the first stage, a court need only conduct a facial 
review of a special motion opponent's pleading to identify which 
factual allegations serve as the basis for a particular claim.21  
Compare Dartmouth, 461 Mass. at 373 ("In reviewing the allowance 
of a motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 [b] [6], we 
examine the same pleadings as the motion judge and therefore 
 
21 We recognize that a motion judge may need to look to 
other documents in the anti-SLAPP record to determine whether 
these factual allegations fall within the statutory definition 
of petitioning activity.  This is an objective assessment to be 
made based upon the documents before the motion judge, without 
resort to judicial fact finding.  Compare Blanchard I, 477 Mass. 
at 149-151 (content of statements, and manner in which they were 
issued, established "plausible nexus" between statements and 
government proceeding, so as to constitute petitioning 
activity), with Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 448 Mass. 242, 250-
252 (2007) (party's "self-serving characterization" of website 
did not alter court's analysis of whether statements on website 
constituted petitioning activity where "[t]here is nothing in 
the record to refute" conclusion that website had been created 
to generate business). 
39 
 
proceed de novo"), with Reichenbach, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 572 
("Because the first stage of the Duracraft analysis is, like the 
analysis of an ordinary motion to dismiss . . . directed to 
examining the allegations of the complaint, our review is fresh 
and independent, i.e., de novo" [quotation and citation 
omitted]). 
At the second stage, a motion judge likewise relies on a 
documentary record, without resolving credibility disputes, and 
thus, as with the first stage, no deference is required.  See 
Doe, 457 Mass. at 742.  Cf. Adams v. Schneider Elec. USA, 492 
Mass. 271, 288-289 (2023) (rulings on motions for summary 
judgment are subject to de novo review, requiring court to 
"determine judgment as a matter of law based on all uncontested 
evidence, that is, evidence favoring the nonmovant and 
'uncontradicted and unimpeached' evidence favoring the movant"). 
Both stages thus involve application of a legal standard to 
documentary evidence alone.  See Harrison, 477 Mass. at 176 n.15 
(ruling on special motion to dismiss, which concerns whether 
petitioning activity "falls within the protective ambit of the 
anti-SLAPP statute," presents question of law).  This is a 
decision ordinarily subject to de novo appellate review.  See 
Robinhood Fin. LLC v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 492 Mass. 
696, 707 (2023) (questions of law are subject to de novo review 
on appeal).  See also Commissioner of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 
40 
 
453 Mass. 293, 302 (2009).22  The substantive legal questions 
being decided are also not comparable to prototypical examples 
of issues that we review for an abuse of discretion, such as the 
resolution of evidentiary decisions, or trial management 
judgment calls.  See, e.g., Matter of Brauer, 452 Mass. 56, 73 
(2008) (decision whether to grant continuance generally lies 
within sound discretion of trial judge); Carrel v. National Cord 
& Braid Corp., 447 Mass. 431, 446 (2006) (general evidentiary 
determinations, such as whether evidence is relevant or whether 
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative 
value, are questions left to sound discretion of trial judge); 
Goldstein v. Gontarz, 364 Mass. 800, 814 (1974) ("Permission to 
use a blackboard as a graphic aid is discretionary with the 
trial judge . . .").  Accordingly, we conclude that rulings on 
anti-SLAPP motions are appropriately subject to de novo review. 
 
4.  Application of simplified anti-SLAPP framework to 
instant case.  Having clarified the relevant standards for our 
 
22 We further note that, where a party seeks appellate 
review of a decision concerning the award of fees and costs 
under G. L. c. 231, § 6F, for the advancement of frivolous 
claims, the single justice conducts de novo review of whether 
the claims at issue were frivolous.  See Fronk, 456 Mass. at 
327.  But see id. at 336 (award of appellate fees under G. L. 
c. 211A, § 15, and Mass. R. A. P. 25, which is not mandatory in 
same way as award under § 6F, receives more discretionary review 
on appeal). 
41 
 
anti-SLAPP framework going forward, we now apply it to the 
circumstances of the instant case. 
 
a.  Todesca litigants' threshold burden.  Here, there is no 
dispute that the special motion proponents in this case, the 
Todesca litigants, have met their threshold burden.  All of the 
claims at issue are based solely on the Todesca litigants' 
administrative and legal challenges to regulatory decisions 
approving the Bristol litigants' proposed asphalt plant.23  This 
is quintessential petitioning activity.  See Duracraft, 427 
Mass. at 161–162; Dever v. Ward, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 175, 179 
(2017).   
The Bristol litigants do not contest this, but argue that 
the anti-SLAPP statute should nonetheless be deemed inapplicable 
because the Todesca litigants are not citizens of modest means, 
but business competitors who have invoked the special motion to 
dismiss as one additional strategic tactic in a larger series of 
anticompetitive legal maneuvers.  However, neither a special 
motion proponent's identity, nor the motive behind its decision 
to engage in petitioning activity (or to file a special motion 
 
23 Although not all the Todesca litigants appear to have 
been involved in each of the petitioning activities, the Bristol 
litigants have not argued that any particular special motion 
proponent lacks sufficient connection to the petitioning at 
issue to be able to invoke the statute's protections.  See 
generally Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 443 Mass. 327, 338 (2005).  
Accordingly, we do not address the issue. 
 
42 
 
to dismiss), is relevant to the threshold inquiry.  See Office 
One, Inc., 437 Mass. at 121–122.   
 
b.  Bristol litigants' burden to show petitioning activity 
was devoid of reasonable support.  Because the Todesca litigants 
met their threshold burden, we now consider whether the Bristol 
litigants have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
petitioning activities lacked any reasonable factual support or 
arguable legal basis.  See G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  We assess each 
petitioning activity in turn. 
 
i.  Legitimacy of challenges to site plan approval.  We 
first consider the basis for the Todescas' challenges to the 
site plan approval.  To meet their burden as special motion 
opponents, the Bristol litigants provided the motion judge with 
the memorandum of decision of the Land Court as well as the 
unpublished decision of the Appeals Court concerning the site 
plan approval.  Looking to the contents of these materials, they 
reveal that the Todescas' challenges were premised upon two 
legal theories:  (1) that the proposed asphalt plant did not 
constitute a use that was permitted "as of right" in the 
industrial district; and (2) that, regardless of whether the 
asphalt plant was permitted as of right, operation of the plant 
would create problems so significant as to violate the standards 
for site plan approval under the town's zoning bylaws. 
43 
 
 
A.  Arguments that proposed asphalt plant was not use 
permitted as of right in industrial district.  We evaluate the 
Todescas' first basis for challenging the site plan approval -- 
the contention that the asphalt plant was not a use permitted as 
of right -- by turning to the applicable town zoning bylaw.  As 
indicated, the proposed site of the asphalt plant was located 
within an industrial district, which the bylaws define as 
permitting the following uses as of right:  "[m]anufacturing, 
industrial or commercial uses including processing, fabrication, 
assembly and storage of materials," provided that "no such use 
is permitted which would be detrimental or offensive or tend to 
reduce property values in the same or adjoining district."  
Rochester bylaws § IV(D)(1), as amended May 18, 2009.  
Accordingly, an industrial use of the land would not be 
considered a use permitted "as of right" under this definition 
if such a use would necessarily carry with it effects that are 
"detrimental," "offensive," or tending to reduce property values 
in the area.   
The Land Court judge's memorandum of decision indicates 
that the Todescas presented "no evidence" of any detrimental or 
offense effects "inherent in an asphalt plant use as opposed to 
any other industrial use" (emphasis in original).  Nor did the 
Todescas present "any evidence" that an asphalt plant would tend 
to reduce property values in the industrial district, or in an 
44 
 
adjoining district.  Indeed, the Todescas' own asphalt plant was 
approved under the very same bylaws in the very same industrial 
district, on an adjacent parcel of land.  And, as the Land Court 
judge noted, there was "no evidence that the Asphalt Plant 
proposed by [the Bristol litigants] would be appreciably 
different, or more intense in character," than any of the 
existing industrial uses in the area, including the operation of 
Todescas' own asphalt plant.  To the contrary, "the evidence 
indicate[d] that the [Bristol litigants'] proposed Asphalt Plant 
would be a smaller and less intense bituminous processing use" 
than the Todescas' neighboring plant.  Accordingly, we conclude, 
as did the Appeals Court, that this challenge to the site plan 
approval was advanced without reasonable factual support or an 
arguable legal basis.  See SCIT, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of 
Braintree, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 101, 105 n.12 (1984) ("if the 
specific area and use criteria stated in the by-law were 
satisfied, the board did not have discretionary power to deny a 
permit, but instead was limited to imposing reasonable terms and 
conditions on the proposed use"). 
 
B.  Arguments that, insofar as use was permitted as of 
right, site plan nonetheless violated applicable bylaws.  The 
remaining basis for the Todescas' challenge was the theory that, 
even to the extent that the site plan involved a use permitted 
as of right in the industrial district, the proposed asphalt 
45 
 
plant would create noise and traffic problems so significant as 
to necessitate denial of the site plan under the town's zoning 
bylaws.  See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Board of Appeals of 
Westwood, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 278, 283 (1986) (where site plan 
approval involved use permitted as of right, inquiry was limited 
to whether proposal created problem that was "so intractable 
that it could admit of no reasonable solution").  To evaluate 
whether this argument was colorable, we look first to the 
applicable bylaws governing site plan approval and denial.   
The town's zoning bylaws specify that site plans involving 
building construction shall be designed, inter alia, to 
"[m]aximize pedestrian and vehicular safety both on the site and 
egressing from it" and "[c]onform with State and local sound 
regulations."  Rochester bylaws § XVI(1.4)(7),(14), as amended 
Oct. 24, 2005.  The bylaws further authorize the planning board 
to impose conditions to ensure that these considerations "have 
been reasonably addressed" by the site plan applicant.  Id.  A 
site plan will be denied if it "has not met these standards for 
review and reasonably addressed the conditions" contained 
therein, or is otherwise "so intrusive on the needs of the 
public in one regulated aspect or another" that "no form of 
reasonable conditions can be devised to satisfy the problem with 
the [site] plan."  Rochester bylaws § XVI(1.3)(3),(4), as 
amended Oct. 24, 2005.   
46 
 
With regard to noise, the Todescas supplied a study they 
had commissioned from a private consultant that projected that 
the plant would generate noise levels in excess of State 
regulations.  With regard to traffic, the Todescas offered 
testimony, from an expert who had never previously studied the 
operations of a bituminous facility, that it was possible a 
queue of up to seven trucks could develop in the driveway of the 
asphalt plant.  Based on an assumption supplied by the Todescas 
that every truck entering the site would be fifty-two feet long, 
rather than an independent study of proposed site conditions, 
the expert opined that the last truck in the queue would spill 
over onto Kings Highway, "causing a potentially unsafe traffic 
condition."  The expert further opined that the Bristol 
litigants' plan for addressing possible spillover by maneuvering 
trucks to the rear of the site was "unworkable."   
The question now before us is whether this amounted to 
reasonable factual support or an arguable legal basis for 
challenging the site plan approval.  We conclude that it did 
not.  Here, the planning board's approval of the site plan was 
already squarely conditioned on addressing the very concerns 
about noise and traffic that the Todescas later asserted had not 
been, and could not be, reasonably addressed.  The planning 
board not only conditioned site plan approval on the requirement 
that the asphalt plant comply with State and local noise 
47 
 
restrictions, but also required that the Bristol litigants hire 
a noise monitoring consultant to submit seasonal reports to 
ensure compliance.  Further, irrespective of the testimony 
offered by the Todescas' expert that the queue of driveway 
traffic could potentially result in one truck lacking sufficient 
space to join the queue on the property, which was based on 
unsupported assumptions, the planning board had already 
conditioned approval of the site plan on prohibiting trucks from 
parking along Kings Highway.  The planning board further 
required that the Bristol litigants "coordinate with the [t]own 
to install the necessary signage to enforce this restriction," 
along with imposing numerous other traffic-related conditions.24  
Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that a single truck found itself 
unable to enter the driveway, it would not be permitted to idle 
on Kings Highway, obviating the basis for the Todescas' 
contention about an "intractable" traffic problem.  See 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 283. 
 
24 Other traffic-related conditions imposed by the planning 
board included the installation of a "No Right Turn" sign 
opposite the exit driveway on Kings Highway; the construction of 
the driveway at an angle to accommodate traffic entering from 
the north; the installation of "Trucks Entering" and "No Jake 
Breaks" signs along Kings Highway; and the provision of copies 
of the rules regarding truck operation to the planning board, as 
well as all drivers, contractors, and clients of the Bristol 
litigants.   
48 
 
Finally, while the bylaws contemplate that a site plan may 
be denied if an applicant has not "reasonably addressed the 
conditions" imposed by the planning board, there is nothing in 
the memorandum of decision by the Land Court or the unpublished 
decision by the Appeals Court to indicate that the Todescas 
presented any evidence suggesting that the Bristol litigants 
would not or could not comply with the above-mentioned 
conditions imposed by the board.  The only additional evidence 
we have before us, offered by the Todesca litigants in support 
of their special motion to dismiss, is Albert Todesca's 
affidavit stating that he had "good faith legal and factual 
bases" for challenging the site plan approval.  This conclusory 
averment fails to supply reasonable factual support.  See 
Gillette Co., 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 138.  Accordingly, the 
Bristol litigants have met their burden of showing that this 
petitioning activity was a sham.  See Garabedian, 59 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 434.   
 
ii.  Legitimacy of challenges to extension of order of 
conditions.  Next, we examine the legal challenges to the 
extension of the order of conditions for the proposed asphalt 
plant.  The regulatory authority to extend or deny an order of 
conditions is set forth in 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.05(8).  
Pursuant to that provision, the commission "may deny the request 
for an extension" in one of five enumerated circumstances.  See 
49 
 
310 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.05(8)(b).  The record before us 
indicates that RBP provided no evidence as to the presence of 
any of the five circumstances set forth in § 10.05(8)(b).  RBP's 
assertion that the commission retained the authority to deny the 
extension request even if none of these circumstances applied -- 
without identifying any legal source from which this authority 
would derive -- did not constitute an "arguable legal basis" for 
challenging the commission's decision to extend the order of 
conditions.  Cf. Fronk, 456 Mass. at 335 ("Claims that are so 
unmoored from law or fact are the very definition of 'frivolous' 
. . .").  The Bristol litigants have thus met their burden of 
showing that this petitioning activity was a sham as well.25   
 
iii.  Legitimacy of fail-safe petitions.  Finally, we 
address the two fail-safe petitions filed by the Todesca 
litigants under 301 Code Mass. Regs. § 11.04(1).26  The 
 
25 As noted, Albert Todesca apparently sought to challenge 
the order of extension in a separate set of unsuccessful 
administrative appeals, and later sought judicial review of the 
denial of those administrative appeals.  See note 8, supra.  In 
their briefing before this court, the parties mention these 
appeals only in passing.  In light of our conclusion that the 
defendants lacked a reasonable basis to challenge the order of 
extension, the Bristol litigants have similarly met their burden 
as to these administrative appeals. 
 
26 We note that the motion judge was provided with only the 
EOEE orders denying the MEPA petitions, and not the MEPA 
petitions themselves.  The Todesca litigants have provided the 
petitions in the addendum to their appellate brief, and in light 
of the de novo standard of review discussed supra, we consider 
50 
 
applicable regulation permits ten or more citizens to file a 
petition requesting "fail-safe review" of a project that does 
not otherwise meet or exceed any thresholds for MEPA review, 
provided certain requirements are met.  See id.  The decision 
whether to grant such a request is left to the discretion of the 
Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs.  See id. 
(Secretary "may require" MEPA review upon making certain 
findings).  See also Ten Persons of the Commonwealth v. Fellsway 
Dev. LLC, 460 Mass. 366, 376 (2011) (citing 301 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 11.03 and 11.04 as regulations that call for Secretary to 
make "a purely discretionary determination").  Thus, the mere 
fact that a fail-safe petition was denied, without more, would 
not signify that it lacked legitimacy.  See Wenger v. Aceto, 451 
Mass. 1, 7 (2008).  Nonetheless, the Bristol litigants have 
sustained their burden in the circumstances of the instant case. 
A fail-safe petition for MEPA review is required to "state 
with specificity the Project-related facts" that the Todesca 
litigants believe warrant MEPA review, including facts 
indicating that such review is "essential to avoid or minimize 
Damage to the Environment."  301 Code Mass. Regs. § 11.04(1).  
Far from doing so, the first fail-safe petition relied on vague 
assertions that the proposed plant would exacerbate the negative 
 
them ourselves, rather than remanding the matter back to the 
trial court.   
51 
 
impacts of other, unspecified "development in the area."  By 
failing to provide support that could meet the relatively low 
threshold requirements of 301 Code Mass. Regs. § 11.04(1), the 
first fail-safe petition lacked a reasonable basis.  It is 
readily apparent that this was also the case for the second 
fail-safe petition, which, apart from identifying an existing 
incineration facility in the area, relied on "virtually 
identical" assertions as the first petition.  Accordingly, 
neither fail-safe petition constituted legitimate petitioning 
activity.27 
 
5.  Conclusion.  The denial of the Todesca litigants' 
special motion to dismiss is affirmed, and the matter is 
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered.
 
27 On appeal, the Todesca litigants do not appear to contest 
that the Bristol litigants have met their burden of showing that 
the petitioning activity caused actual injury.  And indeed, the 
Bristol litigants have met this burden by supplying an affidavit 
from the manager and chief executive officer of Edgewood, Gerard 
Lorusso, averring that the Bristol litigants have incurred over 
$200,000 in legal expenses relating to the petitioning 
activities between 2018 and 2020, and that the delays in opening 
the asphalt plant have resulted in an estimated $11.9 million in 
lost profits.  See Van Liew, 474 Mass. at 40 (special motion 
opponent's evidence that he incurred legal expenses to defend 
against improper petitioning activity was sufficient to 
demonstrate actual injury).  See also Garabedian v. Westland, 59 
Mass. App. Ct. 427, 434 (2003) (special motion opponent's delays 
in completion of project to bring fill onto property constituted 
actual injury). 
Appendix. 
 
Stage one: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Has special motion proponent  
shown that it was engaged in the 
exercise of its own right of 
petition, under G. L. c. 231, 
§ 59H? 
No 
DENY 
proponent's 
special 
motion to 
dismiss 
opponent's 
claim. 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
Has special motion proponent  
shown that the opponent's claim 
is based on this petitioning 
activity alone, with no 
substantial basis other than or 
in addition to said petitioning 
activity? 
No 
DENY 
proponent's 
special 
motion to 
dismiss. 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage two: 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Has special motion opponent  
shown, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that proponent's 
petitioning activity was devoid 
of any reasonable factual 
support or any arguable basis in 
law? 
No 
ALLOW 
proponent's 
special 
motion to 
dismiss. 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
Has special motion opponent  
shown, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that petitioning 
activity caused the opponent 
actual injury? 
No 
ALLOW 
proponent's 
special 
motion to 
dismiss. 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
DENY proponent's  
special motion to dismiss.