Case Title: Commonwealth v. Thompson

Citation: 351 A.2d 280, 466 Pa. 15

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1976-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
466 Pa. 15 (1976) 351 A.2d 280 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Charles Edward THOMPSON. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted November 8, 1973. Decided January 29, 1976. *16 *17 Francis X. Nolan, Philadelphia, for appellant. Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., Richard A. Sprague, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Milton M. Stein, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Philadelphia, for appellee. Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ. NIX, Justice. On November 29, 1972, appellant Charles Thompson pleaded guilty to the charge of murder generally which the Commonwealth certified to be no higher than murder of the second degree. Approximately one year later a direct appeal was filed in this Court which we allowed nunc pro tunc. Appellant's sole contention is that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because the colloquy pursuant to which he entered it was deficient. Specifically, he contends this deficiency resulted from the fact that his plea was accepted in the face of an affirmative defense, that the elements of the offense were never explained to him and that certain rights attendant upon a jury trial were inadequately explained. Since we agree with appellant's first contentions, we need not reach the merits of his final claim. At the guilty plea hearing, appellant's counsel conducted the guilty plea colloquy with the court's approval. During the course of this dialogue, no attempt was made to elicit specifically from appellant those acts surrounding the shooting which he intended to admit by the entry of the plea other than the single unchallenged fact that he fired the shot which caused the death of Mr. Andrews. The record contains the following questions and answers which represent the entire information ascertained as to those acts to which appellant admitted responsibility prior to the acceptance of the plea. BY MR. GOTTLIEB: Thus, the first deficiency in this colloquy is that the judge failed to have elicited from appellant the facts he was admitting in pleading guilty. From this colloquy it is not clear that any criminal liability should attach. Murder requires more than the mere act of killing, it is essential that the killing be accompanied by malice. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 461 Pa. 557, 337 A.2d 545 (1975); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 461 Pa. 17, 334 A.2d 610 (1975); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 455 Pa. 508, 318 A.2d 716 (1974); Commonwealth v. McFadden, 448 Pa. 277, 292 A.2d 324 (1972). When the judge accepted the plea of guilt, she was only certain that appellant admitted causing the death of the victim. There was, however, absolutely no basis to make any determination as to whether he was admitting a malicious killing. *20 The second deficiency in this colloquy is the judge's acceptance of appellant's guilty plea when appellant's version of the killing included facts which suggested that he had a defense of self-defense. The only recorded account of appellant's version of the facts surrounding the killing is contained in a statement which he gave to police authorities upon his arrest. This was introduced into evidence in the degree of guilt hearing immediately following the entry of appellant's plea of guilt. In the statement, although appellant admitted causing the death of Mr. Andrews, appellant asserted that he did so in an attempt to defend himself against Andrews' threat to kill him. At this juncture, after having its attention drawn to the possibility of a self-defense claim, the court made no effort to ascertain whether or not appellant was, in fact, admitting criminal responsibility. In a similar factual setting in Commonwealth v. Roundtree, 440 Pa. 199, 202-203, 269 A.2d 709 (1970), we stated: The judge, in her opinion, attempted to discount the possibility of a valid plea of self-defense on the part of appellant by analyzing other portions of his statement and suggesting reasons why, under appellant's version, a jury would have been entitled to reject the defense. While these factors might properly form a basis for a trier of fact to reject the claimed defense, this is not the critical issue to be resolved in the question presented here. Before accepting the plea, the lower court must be satisfied that the accused is admitting guilt and is not asserting a claim (whether or not it would eventually prove successful) of defense, justification or excuse. The third deficiency in the instant colloquy is that once the judge learned of the existence of the statement and its contents, it then became incumbent upon her, not only to advise appellant that the defense, if established, would entitle him to an acquittal, but also that his act of entering a plea precluded any further opportunity of asserting his defense. We articulated the reasons for this rule in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 452 Pa. 316, 320-321, 305 A.2d 354, 356 (1973): Judgment of sentence reversed and a new trial awarded. JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, J., concur in the result. POMEROY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which MANDERINO, J., joins. POMEROY, Justice (concurring). I agree that the guilty plea colloquy which preceded the trial court's acceptance of appellant's plea of guilty was inadequate under the standards prevailing at the time the plea was entered. I am also of opinion that the Court properly reaches the merits of appellant's challenge to his guilty plea, despite the fact that no petition to withdraw the plea was filed in the trial court. See my concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 465 Pa. 379, 386, 350 A.2d 815 (1974). Accordingly, I concur in the reversal of the judgment of sentence and in the remanding of the case for a new trial. MANDERINO, J., joins in this concurring opinion. [1] In this case the absence of any explanation of the elements of the offense compounded the deficiency. In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1968), the United States Supreme Court discussed the requirements of a voluntary and knowing guilty plea and noted: "`A majority of criminal convictions are obtained after a plea of guilty. If these convictions are to be insulated from attack, the trial court is best advised to conduct an on the record examination of the defendant which should include, inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, . . . the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged . . . .' Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 105-106, 237 A.2d 196, 197-198 (1968)." 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1713, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 n. 7. In the instant case appellant was not apprised of the most fundamental element of murder, malice. Thus, from this record it cannot be established either that appellant was admitting to a killing under circumstances that would amount to legal malice or that he was aware that such circumstances were necessary before he could be found guilty of the charge to which he was offering the plea.