Case Title: Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' School, State of Wyo.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' School, State of Wyo.1991 WY 89813 P.2d 185Case Number: 89-235Decided: 06/12/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming

REGINA MEKSS, APPELLANT 
(PETITIONER),

v.

WYOMING GIRLS' SCHOOL, STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (RESPONDENT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Jane A. Villemez, Graves, 
Santini & Villemez, P.C., Cheyenne, and Stephen L. Pevar, American Civil 
Liberties Union, Denver, Colo., for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. 
Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen., for appellee.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal involves 
the delicate balance between a governmental employee's right of free speech and 
the authority of government officials to manage their offices. The court must 
decide whether the appellant, Regina Mekss (Mekss), was discharged unlawfully 
from her position as a bookkeeper at the Wyoming Girls' School (School) because 
of the exercise of her right of free speech, or whether she was discharged 
lawfully for conduct that was not protected. After she was discharged by the 
School, Mekss appealed to the Personnel Review Board. The Personnel Review Board 
approved the discharge as lawful, but it ordered that Mekss be paid her salary 
and benefits for five months, a period that coincides with the time during which 
the review was pending. Mekss then appealed to the district court, and the 
School filed a cross-appeal. The district court affirmed the action of the 
Personnel Review Board with respect to the discharge, but reversed the award of 
five months pay and benefit. In her appeal to this court, Mekss seeks reversal 
so that she will be reinstated and also will receive the back pay. We affirm the 
order of the district court with respect to the affirmance of the action of the 
Personnel Review Board in approving the discharge. We reverse that portion of 
the order of the district court that reversed the award of back pay on the 
ground that the district court had no jurisdiction because the School had no 
right to take its cross-appeal from the decision of the Personnel Review 
Board.

[¶2.]     In her Brief of 
Appellant, Mekss states these issues:

"1. Whether a public 
employee has the right to speak, without reprisal upon a matter of public 
concern to the government agency empowered to investigate and resolve the 
subject of that concern.

"2. Whether Wyoming Girls' School 
violated Wyoming Personnel Rules in terminating Regina Mekss' employment when it 
did not follow the successive steps of discipline required by the 
Rules.

"3. Whether the Wyoming 
Girls' School lacked standing under the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act to 
appeal the decision of the Personnel Review Board, which awarded Regina Mekss 
five months back pay."

The School, in its Brief 
of Appellee, sets forth the issues in this way:

"I. Whether a state 
employee can be dismissed from employment for circumventing established lines of 
authority and refusing to accept the disciplinary measures imposed?

"II. Whether the Wyoming 
Girls' School followed the procedures of the Wyoming Personnel Rules in 
terminating appellant?

"III. Whether the Wyoming 
Girls' School had standing as a party to cross-petition the decision of the 
personnel review board?"

[¶3.]     The Wyoming Girls' 
School is the state institution created by statute to provide educational, 
vocational, and rehabilitative services to adolescent girls committed by the 
state's district courts. Sections 25-4-101 to -103, W.S. 1977. It is one of the 
state charitable, reformatory, and penal institutions described in Wyo. Const. 
art. 7, § 18, which establishes the general supervision of the Board of 
Charities and Reform over such institutions. The governor, the secretary of 
state, the state treasurer, the state auditor, and the state superintendent of 
public instruction compose the Board of Charities and Reform (Board). Section 
25-1-101, W.S. 1977. The Board then appoints an executive secretary who is 
responsible for evaluating and reporting the condition of all institutions under 
the Board's control. Section 25-1-103(a) and (b)(ii), W.S. 1977. The executive 
secretary coordinates the activities of the Board and assists in the general 
supervision of operation of the state's correctional, mental health, nursing 
home and children's institutions. The direct supervision of the day to day 
operations of the School are the responsibility of a superintendent who also is 
appointed by the Board. Section 25-1-201(b)(i) and (c), W.S. 1977. The 
superintendent, Jack Geisler (Geisler), was charged with primary authority to 
employ and assign all personnel necessary to manage and carry out the mission of 
the school. Section 25-1-201(c), W.S. 1977.

[¶4.]     Mekss initially was 
employed at the school in 1984 as a night dormitory attendant. In 1985, she was 
transferred to the business office where she worked as a bookkeeper. This 
assignment permitted Mekss to utilize her training and her degree in accounting. 
Her employment evaluations indicate that her job performance in that position 
was in the competent to outstanding range. Mekss held this bookkeeping position 
until her dismissal in December of 1988. Because of the significance of this 
case and the very fine balance to be drawn, a detailed chronology of the events 
leading to her discharge is appropriate.

[¶5.]     Beginning in 1987, the 
School experienced some problems with a few employees, particularly those who 
worked on the night shift. Those problems included employee dissatisfaction, 
intimidation of newer employees, and disregard for school policies. In March of 
1988, Geisler became aware that a group of employees had held a meeting off 
campus to discuss concerns about conditions at the School. Geisler then issued a 
memorandum that invited members of the staff to come and discuss their concerns 
with him or with Assistant Superintendent Gary Kopsa (Kopsa).

[¶6.]     Through the spring and 
summer of 1988, the problems continued and, on June 25, 1988, two employees sent 
an anonymous letter to K. Gary Sherman (Sherman), Executive Secretary of the Board of 
Charities and Reform. That letter set forth in detail concerns about staff 
morale, discriminatory promotion practices, the use of corporal punishment, and 
criticism of management at the school. Sherman advised Geisler about this letter and 
requested Geisler to submit a response. On July 26, Geisler sent his response to 
the Board, and copies were circulated among all employees at the School. 
Sherman found 
Geisler's response to be a satisfactory explanation of conditions at the School 
and an exoneration of any wrongdoing on the part of management.

[¶7.]     After that, the Board 
received several more anonymous letters that included one written by Mekss on 
August 12, 1988. Statements in the anonymous letter authored by Mekss that are 
relevant to this proceeding include the following:

"There are grave problems 
in administration here at the Wyoming Girls' School which are growing 
progressively worse and which are very negatively affecting the morale and 
performance ability of the staff and, ultimately, quality of service rendered by 
this agency.

* * * * * *

"There is a vast 
difference between executive prerogative in favoring those who one perceives as 
hard-working (as Mr. Geisler states in his letter) and outright harassment of 
those who question, express a difference of perception, or offer suggestions 
(which is what Mr. Geisler actually does). I reiterate that many staff members 
would reinforce stated concerns and add many more if they were not totally 
intimidated. But precedents already exist of Girls' School employees who have 
been relentlessly harassed into submission, some even to the point of (early) 
retirement.

* * * * * *

"None of us cares for the 
unpleasantness of the situation nor for dealing with the problems via anonymous 
letters. I, myself, have had moments of delusion almost yearning to go to Jack 
Geisler offering a proposal of what the problem might be and possible 
suggestions so that this entire mess could be cleared up simply, quickly, 
finally, but one has only to sit through one or two uncensored staff meetings (a 
stinted event in the words of one teacher), attempt to resolve a problem in a 
supervisors' meeting (and we are talking very non-threatening language here), or 
be involved in some crisis before it becomes undeniably crystal clear that Jack 
Geisler will listen to the input of only a select few `fair haired boys' and 
members of the `Boys' Club' without question and that he consistently will not 
even allow for presentation of another point of view or the other side of the 
story. * * * It seems that Mr. Geisler thinks there is no need for correction or 
room for improvement in this position ever! (Emphasis in 
original.)

* * * * * *

"It is not appropriate to 
have an administrator incapable of offering feedback to or correcting staff in a 
dignified manner.

* * * * * *

"Even favored members of 
the "Boys' Club" have questioned Jack's judgment in several instances. I think 
most staff members would agree that the man has lost his objectivity, that 
perhaps he has grown tired or lazy after all these years, that he looks for the 
easy way out, that we are working with tools from the Dark Ages.

* * * * * *

"I do not know how these 
problems could have been dealt with in any other fashion in the current system. 
The grievance process is not workable in this situation. What subordinate can 
ever go to a boss and tell them they are making a mistake and especially in this 
situation where Mr. Geisler has made it abundantly clear that he does not take 
suggestions well, even those couched in the most non-threatening 
language?"

[¶8.]     Sherman and the Board 
then concluded that it would be necessary to have an investigation at the School 
to verify the existence of any of the alleged improprieties. The corrections 
administrator for the state, who was Geisler's immediate supervisor, and the 
warden at the Women's Center were assigned to conduct a two-day investigation. 
That investigation was conducted on August 24 and 25, 1988, and each employee at 
the School was allocated fifteen minutes to meet individually with the 
investigators and present any concerns.

[¶9.]     The results of the 
confidential investigation were summarized in a letter from Sherman to Geisler dated 
August 26, 1988. In part, that letter advised Geisler:

"As you know you have 
been the target of several anonymous letters sent to the five elected officials 
and myself.

"To settle the issues 
raised by the allegations in those letters, I asked * * * [the] corrections 
administrator, and * * * [the] Warden of the Wyoming Women's Center to conduct a 
confidential interview with each employee at the Wyoming Girls' 
School.

"The results of this 
investigation indicate the following:

". You have the 
overwhelming support of your staff.

". Your staff to a person 
believe that this program is beneficial to the girls it serves.

". No one admitted 
writing the anonymous letters. (Emphasis in original.)

". No one demonstrated 
any proof of the anonymous allegations. There were six (6) employees who 
expressed universal dissatisfaction."

Sherman's conclusion was that 
"the allegations were spurious, mean spirited and without substance." As a 
product of the investigation, however, several changes were made in schedules 
for the night shift staff. Sherman did request that Geisler post copies of 
his letter so that the staff of the School would be aware of the results of the 
investigation.

[¶10.]  On September 9, 1988, a scheduled staff 
meeting was held for all of the employees at the School, and Mekss attended that 
meeting. At the meeting, Geisler presented a speech that he had prepared 
emphasizing the mission of the School, the importance of honesty, harmony, 
trust, and mutual respect among employees, and he reminded everyone of his 
memorandum dated in March that invited the staff to discuss their ideas and 
concerns with him.

[¶11.]  In the month of November, the Board met 
at the School, pursuant to the statutory duty of the Board to make personal 
inspections of all state institutions at least once every year. Section 
25-1-104(b), W.S. 1977. During the course of this visit, Secretary of State 
Kathy Karpan met with Mekss and several other disgruntled employees. At that 
meeting, the employees expressed concern that the investigation had not been 
fair and complete and that the results were inaccurate. Karpan's response to 
their concerns was the suggestion that the employees contact Sherman about their 
complaints. On November 23, 1988, Mekss, apparently following up that 
suggestion, attempted to call Sherman to discuss the investigation. Sherman was not able to 
talk with Mekss when she called, but he asked the corrections administrator to 
return her call. When he called, Mekss refused to discuss her concerns with the 
corrections administrator since he had conducted the investigation that she was 
calling to complain about. After their conversation, the corrections 
administrator called Geisler to inform him of Mekss' call to Sherman and the return of 
that call to Mekss.

[¶12.]  On November 30, 1988, Mekss, Geisler, 
Kopsa, and Mekss' immediate supervisor in the business office met to discuss the 
Mekss telephone conversation with the corrections administrator. Mekss was asked 
if she had tried to call Sherman about a school matter, and her reply 
was that her call did not concern school matters. After the meeting, Mekss and 
the other participants signed a memorandum, prepared by Geisler's secretary that 
memorialized the essence of the meeting. The concluding statement 
was:

"Jack Geisler stated that 
if there were concerns about the Girls' School, that they should FIRST be 
expressed to * * * [Mekss' immediate supervisor], Gary Kopsa or himself. 
Regina stated 
that she had, in fact, stated her concerns through the proper channels." 
(Emphasis in original.)

After that meeting, but 
also on November 30, 1988, Mekss did succeed in contacting Sherman to discuss her 
concerns about the investigation.1 In the course of that telephone 
conversation, Mekss, for the first time, disclosed to Sherman that she had 
written one of the anonymous letters. At some point in that conversation, 
Sherman told 
Mekss that she was at risk for violating the chain of command and that he 
intended to inform Geisler of her call.2 The next day, Sherman did telephone 
Geisler to inform him of the conversation with Mekss.

[¶13.]  On December 5, 1988, Geisler and Mekss 
met to discuss the most recent telephone call from Mekss to Sherman. Geisler again 
asked Mekss about her concerns with respect to the School. There is a 
discrepancy as to Geisler's and Mekss' several perceptions of her response. 
Geisler said that Mekss told him only that she wished to make things better and 
that her call to Sherman had to do with the investigation. In 
her testimony, Mekss stated that she told Geisler about her concerns with staff 
morale and that he was receptive to this information. In any event, Geisler 
advised Mekss that she would be disciplined for insubordination. He presented 
Mekss with three options: (1) she would resign from her position; (2) she would 
accept a two-week suspension and write a letter of apology addressed to those 
people who had received and who had been affected by her anonymous letter; or 
(3) she would be dismissed. Mekss elected to pursue the second option, and she 
wrote a letter of apology that she submitted to Geisler the same day. The letter 
of apology drafted by Mekss was addressed to the governor, Sherman, the other 
members of the Board of Charities and Reform, and the School staff, and it 
said:

"I am the writer of one 
of five anonymous letters by as many different authors written to the Board 
about the Girls' School last summer. My intention in writing was to convey 
problems which I had experienced personally, been witness to, and about which 
many Girls' School staff had shared common concern or frustration.

"I am sorry:

"1). that things came to 
such a sorry state of affairs that I felt I could not in good conscience let go 
unchallenged, 2). that I thought I could do anything to help fix it, 3). for any 
personal suffering Jack Geisler might have experienced in this, 4). that Girls' 
School staff members as a whole might have experienced intensified upheaval; 

"but, 

"1). I saw no other 
avenues, and 2). I know that the upheaval had already been affecting us for at 
least several years and that it still appears to be with us.

"It was never my hope to 
see Jack's `head roll' or that he be publicly smeared. My only hope was that the 
Board, being in a position to do so, would seek comprehensive information and 
make quiet improvement or correction through objective adjustment. I think that 
it would be safe to say the same about the other writers as well.

"I still do not, to this 
day, believe that I could have approached this situation from within this agency 
without reprisal and I challenge the conclusion of this summer's investigation 
that no allegations were found to be substantiated because it directly 
contradicts information which I know I presented.

"I acknowledge that the 
tone of my letter was nasty in a few places - and for this I apologize - but 
still assert that its substance was true."

The following day, 
Geisler returned the letter advising Mekss that it was not an acceptable 
apology.

[¶14.]  On December 7, 1988, Geisler and Mekss 
met one more time to discuss her letter of apology and the status of her 
disciplinary options. They were unable to resolve their differences, and Mekss 
indicated that dismissal seemed to be the only alternative. Geisler then wrote 
Mekss a letter of notification of dismissal and suspended her with pay for ten 
working days. On December 21, 1988, Geisler advised Mekss' attorney of her 
dismissal effective upon that date.

[¶15.]  The notice of termination that was 
furnished to Mekss listed two reasons for her dismissal. They were (1) attempts 
to endanger the peace and safety of others by writing unsubstantiated 
accusations that are disruptive to the good of the service; and (2) 
insubordination by circumventing established lines of authority while refusing 
attempts to counsel and refusal to accept disciplinary measures imposed. The 
misconduct set forth as the grounds for Mekss' dismissal in Geisler's December 
7, 1988 notice of intention for dismissal were "circumventing established lines 
of authority and refusing to accept disciplinary measures imposed." In 
responding to Mekss' petition for review before the Personnel Review Board, the 
School gave these two reasons for dismissal:

"(a) circumventing 
established lines of authority.

"(b) refusing to accept 
disciplinary measures imposed."

[¶16.]  In testifying about the first reason for 
dismissal in the December 21 notice of termination, Geisler said that "attempts 
to endanger the peace and safety of others by writing unsubstantiated 
accusations that are disruptive to the good of the service" was inserted at the 
suggestion of the Wyoming Attorney General's office. That ground was not 
something Geisler was concerned with when he wrote the December 7 letter of 
notification of dismissal. Geisler also testified that Mekss' telephone call to 
Sherman shortly 
after the November 30, 1988 meeting between himself and Mekss circumvented 
established lines of authority and was the specific event that justified 
dismissal. Geisler further stated that, in his view, Mekss' failure to provide 
an acceptable letter of apology constituted refusal to accept "disciplinary 
measures imposed."

[¶17.]  Mekss then requested a hearing before a 
"personnel review board," pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, 
§ 16-3-101 to -115, W.S. 1977. Such personnel appeal hearings for state 
employees are conducted by a three-member personnel review board panel pursuant 
to § 9-2-1019(a), W.S. 1977. The personnel review board, by definition, is an 
"agency" within the Department of Administration and Fiscal Control (§ 
9-2-1002(a)(i), W.S. 1977), and, consequently, such proceedings must be 
conducted in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. The 
request for a hearing before a personnel review board was granted by the School, 
and the two-day hearing was held in May, 1989. After the hearing, the Personnel 
Review Board filed its decision with the personnel division of the Department of 
Administration and Fiscal Control.

[¶18.]  The findings of fact and conclusions of 
law made by the Personnel Review Board are:

"Findings of 
fact:

"1. Ms. Mekss had a good 
to excellent work record as a Fiscal Control Technician. She appeared to have 
good rapport with and be liked by her fellow workers.

"2. Ms. Mekss was 
apparently self-appointed to call attention to the issues set forth in the 
anonymous letters, one of which she authored.

"3. Ms. Mekss failed to 
exhaust the normal personnel system options by taking issues directly to Mr. 
Geisler prior to proceeding in the manner in which she did.

"4. Ms. Mekss should have 
immediately ended the 11/30/88 telephone conversation with Mr. K. Gary Sherman 
once she was advised she was at risk in pursuing the issues as she was, even 
though that avenue had initially been invited by Ms. Kathy Karpan.

"5. Mr. Geisler applied 
some sort of discipline in some manner to Ms. Mekss between March and December, 
1988.

"6. Both Ms. Mekss and 
Mr. Geisler failed to allow the issues to be aired directly and failed to weigh 
the full consequence of their actions. Both parties at times acted hastily and 
improperly and directly contributed to the dismissal.

"Conclusions:

"1. Ms. Mekss created 
disharmony in the function of the Wyoming Girls' School and circumvented 
established lines of authority.

"2. Mr. Geisler did not 
fully comply with the DAFC Personnel Rules and Regulations in his application by 
consistent, well-defined, and progressive disciplinary measures prior to his 
dismissal of Ms. Mekss.

"3. Ms. Mekss' request 
for reinstatement as Fiscal Control Technician is denied as not being in the 
best interests of either party or the overall functioning of the Wyoming Girls' 
School.

"4. The Wyoming Girls' 
School should remunerate Ms. Mekss five (5) months salary (and associated 
benefits). The remuneration should be based upon Ms. Mekss' salary at the time 
of her dismissal. This compensation should constitute full and complete 
settlement.

"5. Mr. Geisler and Ms. 
Mekss should accept the above Conclusions, refrain from further actions related 
to these Conclusions and allow the dedicated and competent staff of the Wyoming 
Girls' School to concentrate on activities which are of direct service to the 
School's residents and which are in direct fulfillment of the mission of the 
Wyoming Girls' School."

Even though the Personnel 
Review Board ruled against Mekss' request for reinstatement, the Board did 
decide that Mekss was entitled to receive five months back pay and associated 
benefits.

[¶19.]  Mekss petitioned the district court for 
review of the Board's decision pursuant to § 16-3-114, W.S. 1977. In addition to 
asserting the erroneous nature of the Board's decision, Mekss also asserted that 
the decision failed to set forth specifically detailed findings of fact to 
support the ultimate facts and the Board's conclusions of law. The School in 
turn sought review of the award of the five months back pay asserting that the 
award was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, in excess of the 
Board's statutory authority, and unsupported by substantial evidence. The 
district court heard arguments, reviewed the record, and entered an order 
affirming Mekss's termination, but reversed the decision of the Personnel Review 
Board to remunerate Mekss' with five months back pay and benefits. Mekss then 
appealed to this court.

[¶20.]  The primary focus of Mekss' appeal is 
whether her dismissal constituted an infringement of her "constitutionally 
protected interest in freedom of expression." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1687, 
75 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1983). The First Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United 
States guarantees freedom of speech to all 
citizens as a fundamental right.3This constitutional limit upon 
restricting free speech is applied to state agencies and state officials by 
virtue of the "privileges or immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States.4 Article 1, Section 20, of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming also guarantees to every person the 
right of freedom of speech.5 In Cheyenne Airport Board v. 
Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 726 (Wyo. 1985), appeal dismissed 476 U.S. 1110, 106 S. Ct. 1961, 90 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1986), this court, citing PruneYard Shopping Center v. 
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741 (1980), recognized the 
principle that:

"State constitutions may 
add to [United 
States constitutional] limitations and may be 
more protective of individual liberties. They may not, however, under the 
dictates of supremacy, be less protective."

The constitutional right 
of free speech, however, is not an absolute right. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15, reh. denied 417 U.S. 977, 94 S. Ct. 3187, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1148 (1974); Allen v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 283 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶21.]  We turn first to the constitutional 
claims asserted by Mekss. It is our duty to review the action of the Board and, 
if it is found to be contrary to a constitutional right, we must set aside the 
Board's decision. Section 16-3-114(c)(ii)(B), W.S. 1977. The Personnel Review 
Board heard testimony, received evidence, and was briefed by counsel from both 
sides on the constitutional issues present in the case.6 The Board, of course, was 
foreclosed from a determination as to the constitutionality of the dismissal by 
the School. See Belco Petroleum Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 587 P.2d 204 (Wyo. 
1978). Essentially, its review was limited to a determination as to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to justify the discharge by the School. The 
circumstances of this case demonstrate the wisdom of the rule because this Board 
consisted of non-attorneys who were acting without the benefit of legal counsel. 
It, indeed, would be hazardous to afford to such a body the authority to decide 
sensitive questions of constitutional law, which this question indeed 
is.

[¶22.]  The Supreme Court of the 
United 
States has discussed the role of an appellate 
court in reviewing a determination of first amendment issues by a trial court 
and said:

"`* * * [W]e are 
compelled to examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances 
under which they are made to see whether or not they * * * are of a character 
which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect.'" Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 150, n., 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, n., 
quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335, 66 S. Ct. 1029, 1031, 
90 L. Ed. 1295 (1946).

 

The following year, the 
Supreme Court of the United 
States supplemented this concept in this 
way:

"* * * [I]n cases raising 
First Amendment issues we have repeatedly held that an appellate court has an 
obligation to `make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to 
make sure `that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the 
field of free expression.' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. [254], at 284-286, 84 S.Ct. 
[710], at 728-729 [11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964)]." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of 
United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1958, 
80 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1984).

We accept these 
principles as applicable to our review of the action of the Personnel Review 
Board.

[¶23.]  Mekss relies upon a series of cases from 
the Supreme Court of the United States that address a public 
employee's right of free speech. In the course of these cases, a sequential test 
has been developed and refined to assist in the determination as to whether a 
public employer has impermissibly infringed upon the constitutional right to 
free expression enjoyed by an employee. Recently, that test was summarized in 
Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 494-95 (10th Cir. 1990):

"First, the court must 
decide whether the speech at issue touches on a matter of public concern. 
Connick, 461 U.S.  at 146, 103 S. Ct.  at 1689; Melton [v. City of Oklahoma City], 879 F.2d [706] at 713 [(10th 
Cir. 1989)]. If it does, the court must balance the interest of the employee in 
making the statement against the employer's interest `in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.' Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 
88 S. Ct. 1731, 1735, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968). Third, if the preceding 
prerequisites are met, the speech is protected, and plaintiff must show her 
expression was a motivating factor in the detrimental employment decision. Mount 
Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S. Ct. 568, 576, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). Finally, if the plaintiff sustains this burden, the employer 
can still prevail if it shows by a preponderance of the evidence that it would 
have made the same decision regardless of the protected speech."

We are satisfied that 
this sequential test is useful to us in deciding whether Mekss' constitutionally 
protected right of free speech was infringed by her dismissal from employment at 
the school.

[¶24.]  Before applying the sequential test, we 
differentiate between two separate, but related, instances of expression by 
Mekss. The first is found in the anonymous letter written to the Governor and 
other members of the Board. That letter set forth Mekss' perception of 
conditions at the School with regard to alleged mismanagement, poor morale, 
discriminatory employment practices, and improper use of corporal punishment. 
That letter was instrumental in convincing the Board to conduct an investigation 
at the School. After that investigation was completed and the results released, 
a second communication was initiated by Mekss. She contacted the executive 
secretary of the Board and expressed her dissatisfaction with the results of the 
investigation. It was following her complaints to Sherman that Mekss was dismissed for 
insubordination. The charge of insubordination was based upon Mekss' 
circumvention of established lines of authority and her failure to comply with 
disciplinary measures imposed by Geisler.

[¶25.]  Mekss has argued that both the letter and 
the telephone calls constituted protected free speech. She contends that, as a 
"whistle blower," she is entitled to the highest level of constitutional 
protection. We have reviewed this record in detail as well as the cases relating 
to the constitutional principles, and we conclude that these two instances of 
expression are different and justify separate analysis.

[¶26.]  We agree with, and accept, Mekss' 
contention that she was "blowing the whistle" when she directed her anonymous 
letter to the Board of Charities and Reform.

"When balancing the 
rights of the employee against those of the employer, an employee's First 
Amendment interest is entitled to greater weight where he is acting as a whistle 
blower in exposing government corruption. See Foster v. Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142, 
1149 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Speech that seeks to expose improper operations of the 
government or questions the integrity of governmental officials clearly concerns 
vital public interests." Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 797 (10th Cir. 
1988).

It would overstate the 
matter to suggest that Mekss was "exposing government corruption" per se, but 
she was attempting to draw attention to "improper operations" at the School. We 
conclude that the anonymous letter should be afforded the highest level of 
constitutional protection in accordance with the applicable principles of 
law.

[¶27.]  Continuing to address the anonymous 
letter, we, for purposes of this opinion, assume, without deciding and only for 
the purpose of this opinion, that Mekss' letter deals with a matter of public 
concern and that her interest in making the statement outweighs the interest of 
the School in preventing the statement. This brings us to the third step in the 
constitutional analysis. At this juncture, Mekss must accept the burden of 
establishing that her letter was a "substantial or motivating factor" in her 
dismissal. Mt. Healthy CitySchool District Board of Education v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). Geisler testified, on cross-examination, that he dismissed Mekss not 
for writing the anonymous letter, but rather for her telephone calls to 
Sherman and for 
her subsequent refusal to comply with disciplinary proceedings. We quote from 
the cross-examination of Geisler by Mekss' attorney at the hearing:

"Q. Excuse me. Let me 
clear that up. Would you tell us the precise reason why Regina Mekss was 
dismissed?

"A. For circumventing 
lines of authority, for ignoring agency guidelines, for refusing to accept 
counsel and discipline.

"Q. And, sir, the 
circumventing established lines of authority, that would be the telephone call 
to Gary Sherman, correct? That's the specific act?

"A. Yes.

"Q. The phone call around 
December 1st, to give it a date?

"A. After we had had our 
first talk.

* * * * * *

"Q. * * * And the refusal 
to accept disciplinary measures imposed, * * * that's her failure to give you 
the correct letter of apology, to put it in a nutshell; isn't it?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And you have nothing 
else to add to those two points; do you?

"A. No.

"Q. And, sir, the charge 
of circumventing established lines of authority is based upon your perception 
that she should have brought concerns that she had through proper channels; is 
that correct?

"A. Yes, yes.

"Q. And because, in your 
perception, she did not, she was fired? Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"[Counsel]: That's all 
the questions I have of Mr. Geisler."

There is no evidence in 
the record to refute Geisler's testimony.

[¶28.]  The reason stated in the notice of 
dismissal and an analysis of the findings and conclusions of the Personnel 
Review Board persuade us that Mekss was not dismissed for writing an anonymous 
letter. Mekss vigorously argues for a contrary inference, but that contrary 
inference was not adopted by the finder of fact, the Personnel Review Board. 
Since no other evidence was presented that refutes Geisler's testimony, Mekss 
failed to satisfy her burden under Mt.Healthy.

[¶29.]  If we assume, for the sake of argument, 
that the anonymous letter was one of several factors contributing to Mekss' 
dismissal, the factually similar case of Warner v. Town of Ocean City, 81 Md. 
App. 176, 567 A.2d 160 (1989), becomes pertinent. Warner, an OceanCity police officer, wrote an anonymous 
letter to the mayor and city council urging an investigation of the newly 
appointed police captain's alleged unethical and illegal activities. After 
Warner's identity was disclosed, an administrative hearing board made findings 
of fact and determined that Warner was "guilty" of insubordination. Upon review 
of the administrative proceeding, the lower court reversed all but two of the 
five "charges" against the officer, but it did affirm the board's determination 
that the officer had been insubordinate. The issues on appeal to the appellate 
court were substantially similar to those in this case.

[¶30.]  In Warner, the appellate court addressed 
the constitutional question under the four-step test set forth above. The court 
noted that the issue had not been litigated before the administrative board and, 
like this case, that issue was decided for the first time on appeal. The court 
recognized the considerable importance of discipline, harmony, and loyalty in a 
law enforcement organization, and it concluded that Warner's right to free 
speech had not been violated. The language of the Maryland court is 
especially instructive:

"[W]e think it 
significant that Lieutenant Warner * * * had access to legitimate procedural 
mechanisms for airing his grievances. Had he utilized the appropriate channels, 
of which he admits he was aware, he could have brought Major Crone's alleged 
misconduct to light without exposing himself to the risk of disciplinary action. 
In this regard, we agree with Judge Eshenburg, the trial judge, who stated, in a 
well reasoned discussion on the constitutional aspects of this case: `It was not 
the contents of the letter that resulted in [Warner's] demotion, rather [it was] 
the means employed * * * in the letter's publication and his admitted violation 
of Rules and Regulations.' Warner's punishment resulted from `the place, means 
and unusual manner in which he chose to speak.'" Warner, 567 A.2d  at 
168.

The School here is much 
like the police department in Warner, and the same degree of discipline, 
harmony, and loyalty on the part of its employees is a justified expectation in 
order for the School to accomplish its mission.

[¶31.]  Turning to Mekss' claim that the 
telephone calls to Sherman deserve "whistle blower" status, we 
first consider the level of constitutional protection afforded at that juncture. 
Mekss' contentions are premised upon her perception that the anonymous letter 
and the telephone calls were indistinguishable ways of expressing essentially 
the same information. Thus, she concludes they should be entitled to the same 
constitutional consideration. We do not accept that contention.

[¶32.]  In marked contrast to the assertions set 
forth in her anonymous letter, Mekss did not have the same necessary degree of 
personal knowledge about the investigation to justify her claimed "whistle 
blower" status in making her phone calls. See Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407, 
1423 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Hughes v. Hoffman, 465 U.S. 1023, 104 S. Ct. 1275, 79 L. Ed. 2d 680 (1984). She presented no evidence that the results of the investigation were 
incomplete or inaccurate. While Mekss had personal knowledge of those things she 
addressed in her anonymous letter, she had, at the most, only slight personal 
knowledge of how the results of the investigation interviews were tabulated. She 
argues that as many as eighteen of her fellow employees agreed the investigation 
was a "whitewash," but the fact that the investigation was flawed is simply 
speculation on her part. The results indicated that six employees were 
"universally dissatisfied" with conditions at the School. Regardless of what her 
fellow employees told her about their comments to the investigators, Mekss 
simply was not in a position to know with any degree of reliable certainty that 
the reported results were not correct. In the absence of other evidence, her 
speculation is not adequate to overcome the presumption that the investigation 
was properly conducted and reported.

[¶33.]  We conclude that Mekss' telephone calls 
to Sherman did not acquire automatic "whistle blower" protection and, in that 
light, we apply the sequential test summarized in Schalk, 906 F.2d 491. In 
determining the extent of the constitutional protection afforded Mekss, we first 
consider whether the speech touches on a matter of public concern. Our 
evaluation of that question demands analysis of the "content, form, and context" 
of the statement as revealed by the whole record. Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1689. 
If the content of the speech focuses on disclosing public officials' wrongdoing, 
it is more likely to be considered a matter of public concern. Wulf v. City of 
Wichita,883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989). Conversely, speech is not entitled to protection as a 
general matter if the point is simply to air grievances of a purely personal 
nature. The pertinent inquiry in this regard becomes whether the employee is 
speaking as a citizen about a matter of public concern or as an employee 
addressing a matter of personal interest. Connick.

[¶34.]  In relation to the telephone calls, the 
United States Supreme Court recognized in Connick, 461 U.S. 138 at 146, 103 S. Ct. 1684 at 1690 that:

"* * * When employee 
expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, 
social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy 
wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the 
judiciary in the name of the First Amendment."

It is arguable here as to 
whether these telephone calls touched upon matters of public concern. Mekss' 
position is that the product of any investigation of a state institution is a 
matter of public concern since the entire state has an interest in an 
institution like the School. The School argues, to the contrary, that Mekss' 
telephone calls to Sherman did not involve a legitimate matter of 
public concern. The record demonstrates that, before these telephone calls were 
made, the issues that had been raised in Mekss' anonymous letter had been 
examined in what the record discloses to have been a thorough and comprehensive 
investigation. The summarized results of the investigation by the Board of 
Charities and Reform had been publicized. The telephone calls that Mekss made as 
a follow up reflect her personal disagreement with the way the investigation was 
pursued and with its results.

[¶35.]  The record also demonstrates that the 
interview process by which the investigation was pursued was standardized, and 
the same questions were asked of each School employee. All of the School 
employees were involved; the interview process was not a sample of the 
employees. The reliability and validity of such a process generally is quite 
high, and it should be given substantial weight. The results of that 
investigation do not indicate that everything was perfect at the School; in 
fact, the report noted six "universally dissatisfied" employees. Mekss, however, 
did not have firsthand knowledge of what other employees told the investigators. 
Certainly, the possibility exists that they reported something entirely 
different to Mekss than what they actually told the investigators.7 Examined in the light of these 
factors, there is little in the record to indicate that the information Mekss 
wanted to convey to Sherman in the telephone calls actually touched 
upon a matter of public concern. Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684. Other than Mekss' contention, which is not objectively supported, 
there is no substantive evidence in the record that the results of the 
investigation were inaccurate or that the investigative process was flawed.8

[¶36.]  Whether speech involves a matter of 
public concern ultimately is a question of law. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 97 L. Ed. 2d 315, reh'g denied 483 U.S. 1056, 108 S. Ct. 31, 97 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1987). One interpretation of this record is that Mekss' phone calls were 
not based on public-spirited concern but, instead, were motivated by her 
personal displeasure with the results of the investigation or even some other 
motive. See Leiphart v. North 
CarolinaSchool of the Arts, 80 N.C. App. 339, 342 S.E.2d 914 (1986), cert. denied 318 N.C. 507, 349 S.Ed.2d 862 (1986). It is 
equally unclear whether the point of Mekss' telephone calls was to bring 
wrongdoing to light or to further a purely private interest. Hesse v. Board of 
Education of Township High School District No. 211, Cook County, Illinois, 848 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 489 U.S. 1015, 109 S. Ct. 1128, 103 L. Ed. 2d 190; reh'g denied 490 U.S. 1059, 109 S. Ct. 1973, 104 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1989). 
It is a close decision as to whether the telephone calls pass the first 
constitutional hurdle.

[¶37.]  On this score, also, we will assume, 
without deciding, that Mekss did satisfy her burden and that the calls do meet 
the requirements of the first step in the constitutional analysis that a matter 
of public concern be involved. In part, this benefit of the doubt is afforded 
because Mekss was constrained by the requirements of the Personnel Review Board 
from presenting evidence concerning inaccuracies in the investigation. We also 
note that there is no record of whether this issue was argued and decided by the 
district court. Having conceded for purposes of this case that the telephone 
calls involved a matter of public concern, we then pursue the second step in the 
analysis, the Pickering balance.

[¶38.]  The balance described in Pickering requires that 
the interests of an employee as a citizen commenting upon matters of public 
concern be weighed with the interests of the State as an employer in promoting 
the efficiency of the public service it performs to its employees. Pickering v. 
Board of Education of Township High School District 205, Will County, Illinois, 
391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968). The United States Supreme 
Court discussed this balancing test in Rankin, 483 U.S.  at 384, 107 S. Ct.  at 2896-97, in this way:

"The determination 
whether a public employer has properly discharged an employee for engaging in 
speech requires `a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a 
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees.' Pickering v. 
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, [1734-35] 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140, 103 S. Ct. 1684, [1686] 
75 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1983). This balancing is necessary in order to accommodate the 
dual role of the public employer as a provider of public services and as a 
government entity operating under the constraints of the First Amendment. On the 
one hand, public employers are employers, concerned with the efficient function 
of their operations; review of every personnel decision made by a public 
employer could, in the long run, hamper the performance of public functions. On 
the other hand, `the threat of dismissal from public employment is * * * a 
potent means of inhibiting speech.' Pickering, 
391 U.S., at 574, 88 S.Ct., at 1737. 
Vigilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over 
employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions but 
simply because superiors disagree with the content of employees' speech." 
(Emphasis in original.)

The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has described other pertinent balancing 
considerations including:

"* * * `Whether the 
statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a 
detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and 
confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or 
interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise.' Rankin v. McPherson, 
483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2899, 
97 L. Ed. 2d 315 (1987). The Rankin court also considered the manner, time, and 
place of the employee's expression, as well as the context in which the dispute 
arose." Schalk, 906 F.2d  at 496.

[¶39.]  It is our conclusion that the balancing 
of the interests in connection with Mekss' telephone calls to Sherman, in the light of Pickering, tips in favor of the School. The 
School is a publicly-funded state institution, and it is charged with providing 
educational, vocational, and rehabilitative services to troubled adolescent 
girls. In some respects, it may resemble a penal institution, but the School 
places a much stronger emphasis on the positive aspects of rehabilitation and 
education. That emphasis is reflected in the institutional atmosphere which the 
School administration endeavored to maintain. One goal of the School has been to 
teach its residents that the best way to solve a problem is to meet the 
situation and deal with it in a direct and honest way; not to endeavor to 
circumvent authority and evade responsibility. A trusting staff, able to impose 
confidence in co-workers and their intentions, and working toward a common 
purpose, is an essential prerequisite to the attainment of the goal and ultimate 
institutional success. The adolescent residents at the School create an inherent 
potential of physical danger to School staff, and the need of the staff to rely 
with confidence upon co-workers is vital. The School has a valid and important 
interest in maintaining discipline and esprit de corps. Crain v. Board of Police 
Com'rs of Metropolitan Police Dept. of City of St. Louis, 920 F.2d 1402 (8th Cir. 1990); 
Hughes, 714 F.2d 1407. The chain-of-command rule applied by the School in this 
case is designed and intended to protect that very interest. Perry v. City of 
Kinloch, 680 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D.Mo. 1988). If suspicion of co-workers or uncertainty as to 
trustworthiness is present, those factors are disruptive and counterproductive. 
The goal of the School is to establish a wholesome environment with individual 
role models for the residents; not to demonstrate distrust or 
hypocrisy.

[¶40.]  In light of these factors, we hold that 
Mekss' telephone calls to Sherman directly impaired Geisler's authority 
and ability to discipline the staff. When Mekss told him that her first call to 
Sherman had nothing to do with the School, and then promptly called Sherman 
again to complain about the investigation, there was deception that was 
deliberate, if not an intentional untruth. Those calls did have a direct and 
detrimental impact on Geisler's confidence in Mekss' loyalty to the School and 
to him. It is true that Mekss' ability to perform her duties might not have been 
affected, but the potential of her calls interfering with regular School 
operations is obvious. See generally Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706 (10th Cir. 1989), on reh'g vacated and remanded on other grounds 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1991). The School's interest in maintaining good working 
relationships within the staff and a stable public image weighs more heavily in 
the light of Pickering than Mekss' interest in 
repeatedly attempting to tell Sherman her views about the results of the 
investigation. Rankin, 483 U.S. 378, 107 S. Ct. 2891.

[¶41.]  This case is like that envisioned by the 
United States Supreme Court in Arnett, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S. Ct. 1633. The discipline administered to Mekss was not directed "at speech as 
such, but at employee behavior, including speech, which [was] detrimental to the 
efficiency of the employing agency." Arnett, 416 U.S.  at 162, 94 S. Ct.  at 1648. See Battiste v. Department of Social Services, 154 Mich. App. 486, 398 N.W.2d 447 (1986). We hold that the School's dismissal of Mekss is permitted 
because her actions undermined Geisler's managerial authority. Length of service 
and an unblemished work record do not suffice to justify open insubordination. A 
limited First Amendment interest involved in connection with the telephone calls 
to Sherman does 
not require that the School tolerate this action which reasonably could be 
expected to disrupt operations, undermine authority, and destroy close working 
relationships. Because Mekss' actions already have undermined, and indeed 
enhanced the potential for undermining, Geisler's authority, she does not 
survive the balancing test required by Pickering. Huber v. Leis, 704 F. Supp. 131 
(S.D.Ohio 1989). There is no reason to set aside the Personnel Review Board's 
decision because of a violation of Mekss' First Amendment rights.

[¶42.]  While the parties do not debate the 
sufficiency of the decision of the Personnel Review Board and the record, we 
recognize a duty to be satisfied in that regard. That duty flows from Rule 
12.09, W.R.A.P., and § 16-3-114(c), W.S. 1977 (July 1990 Repl.).9 Under our cases, the duty to review 
the record is a tandem process. First, we review the record as a whole to 
determine whether the agency's findings of fact are supported by substantial 
evidence. Holding's Little America v. Board of County Commissioners of 
LaramieCounty, 670 P.2d 699 (Wyo. 1983), appeal after remand 712 P.2d 331 (1985); Toavs 
v. State By & Through Real Estate Commission, 635 P.2d 1172 (Wyo. 1981). Substantial 
evidence in this context means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." State ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation v. Ohnstad, 802 P.2d 865 (Wyo. 
1991); Shenefield v. Sheridan County School District No. 1, 544 P.2d 870, 874 
(Wyo. 1976), quoting from Howard v. Lindmier, 
67 Wyo. 78, 
214 P.2d 737, 740 (1950). Findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence 
if, from the evidence preserved in the record, we can discern a rational premise 
for those findings. ANR Production Co. v. Wyoming Oil & Gas, 800 P.2d 492 (Wyo. 1990); Employment Security Commission of Wyoming v. Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866 
(Wyo. 1990). 
The second step is a determination as to whether the conclusions of law made by 
the agency are in accordance with law. Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 
1988). Conclusions of law are affirmed if they are in accord with the law. 
Department of Revenue and Taxation of State of Wyoming v. Casper Legion Baseball Club, Inc., 767 P.2d 608 
(Wyo. 1989). 
If conclusions of law are not in accord with applicable rules, they are 
corrected. Employment Security Commission.

[¶43.]  In accomplishing our review, we are not 
bound to accept any of the determinations of the district court and are not 
required to afford those determinations deference but, instead, we are obligated 
to review the appeal as if it came directly to this court from the agency. 
Sellers v. Wyoming Board of Psychologist 
Examiners, 739 P.2d 125 (Wyo. 1987). Deference is afforded to the 
determinations of fact made by the agency and not to the decisions of the 
district court. Zezas Ranch, Inc. v. Board of Control, 714 P.2d 759 (Wyo. 1986). See Palmer v. 
Board of Trustees of Crook County School Dist. No. 1, 785 P.2d 1160 (Wyo. 1990). We are 
entitled to rely upon and afford deference to any agency expertise in weighing 
the evidence, and we do not disturb the determination by the agency unless it is 
"clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence on record." State 
ex rel. Workers' Compensation v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830, 833 (Wyo. 1991); 
Employment Security Commission, 786 P.2d  at 871, quoting from Southwest Wyoming 
Rehabilitation Center v. Employment Security Commission of Wyoming, 781 P.2d 918, 921 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶44.]  On review, the burden is assigned to the 
appellant to demonstrate that the agency's findings and conclusions are not 
supported by substantial evidence. Westates Construction Co. v. Sheridan County School District No. 2, Board of Trustees, 
719 P.2d 1366 (Wyo. 1986). If substantial evidence is found, 
the fact that two different conclusions may be drawn from the evidence does not 
inhibit a holding that the conclusion drawn by an administrative agency was 
supported by substantial evidence. Vandehei Developers v. Public Service 
Commission of Wyoming, 790 P.2d 1282 
(Wyo. 
1990).

[¶45.]  Our law requires a degree of detail in 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by an administrative agency. 
One of the fundamental purposes of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act is 
to assure that controverted issues involved in any contested case will be fully 
developed before the agency as a finder of fact. "A record of material and 
substantial evidence must be created so that a reviewing court can determine 
whether such factual development occurred or whether, instead, the agency's 
actions were based on unwarranted or undeclared assumptions." Jackson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 786 P.2d 874, 877 
(Wyo. 1990). 
Section 16-3-110, W.S. 1977 (July 1990 Repl.), supports this proposition by 
requiring that:

"* * * Findings of fact 
if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and 
explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings."

Our rule is that this 
statutory provision demands findings of basic facts upon all material issues in 
the proceeding and upon which the ultimate findings of fact or conclusions are 
based. FMC v. Lane, 773 P.2d 163 (Wyo. 1989). In Cook v. Zoning Board of 
Adjustment for the City of Laramie, 776 P.2d 181, 
185 (Wyo. 
1989), we stated:

"It is insufficient for 
an administrative agency to state only an ultimate fact or conclusion, but each 
ultimate fact or conclusion must be thoroughly explained in order for a court to 
determine upon what basis each ultimate fact or conclusion was reached. The 
court must know the why." Geraud v. Schrader, 531 P.2d 872, 879 (Wyo.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Wind River Indian Education Association, Inc. v. Ward, 423 U.S. 904, 96 S. Ct. 205, 46 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1975).

In Jackson, 786 P.2d 874, 
878, we set forth this statement of the rule:

"We have held it 
essential to surviving judicial review that the record of a contested agency 
action contain such factual findings as would permit a court to follow the 
agency's reasoning from the evidentiary facts on record to its eventual legal 
conclusions. Larsen v. Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 569 P.2d 87, 90-91 
(Wyo. 1977); Powell v. Board of Trustees, 
CrookCountySchool 
District No. 1, 550 P.2d 1112, 1120 (Wyo. 1976). Similarly, we 
have held that a contested case hearing must provide, and the record of that 
proceeding must document, information sufficient to the making of a reasonable 
decision. Absent such information, the agency decision must be set aside as 
arbitrary. Western Radio Communications, Inc. v. Two-Way Radio Service, Inc., 
718 P.2d 15, 20 (Wyo. 1986); Monahan v. Board 
of Trustees, Elementary School District No. 9, 486 P.2d 235, 237 (Wyo. 1971). The need for 
such strict compliance with statutory provisions relating to the content of the 
agency record derives largely from a need to ascertain whether contested case 
hearings actually provide statutorily mandated procedural protections. To assure 
the due process protections inherent in the [Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act's] statutory scheme will be given effect, this court requires strict 
compliance with those procedural provisions."

[¶46.]  In the process of judicial review, no 
presumption attaches to a general finding because of the specific requirements 
of § 16-3-110, W.S. 1977, quoted above. If any agency action is premised upon a 
decision entered without observance of the procedure required by law, that 
decision must be held unlawful and set aside. FMC, 773 P.2d 163. If the findings 
do not adequately reflect the justification for the agency position that is 
adopted, then the case must be remanded to the agency so that requisite 
supplemental findings can be made. A decision that does not comply with these 
requirements is subject to attack as being arbitrary, capricious, and contrary 
to law. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming, 662 P.2d 878 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶47.]  In the course of her argument, Mekss 
asserts that the decision of the Personnel Review Board that affirmed her 
dismissal failed to meet the foregoing standards by incorporating specifically 
detailed findings to support the ultimate facts and conclusions. In considering 
this contention, we will scrutinize the findings and conclusions of the 
Personnel Review Board and arrive at the determination as to whether they are 
sufficiently supported to justify an affirmance. The Board incorporated five 
conclusions, but we think that its first conclusion:

"1. Ms. Mekss created 
disharmony in the function of the Wyoming Girls' School and circumvented 
established lines of authority."

is the significant basis 
for the Board's decision. One of the reasons stated in the notice of termination 
furnished to Mekss involved insubordination based upon circumventing established 
lines of authority. The first conclusion of the Board addresses this matter. 
Insubordination is cause for dismissal according to the personnel rules, and a 
factual finding by the Board that Mekss was insubordinate would justify the 
dismissal in accordance with this conclusion.10

[¶48.]  We then examine only that finding of fact 
that relates to this particular conclusion. Finding No. 3 states:

"3. Ms. Mekss failed to 
exhaust the normal personnel system options by taking issues directly to Mr. 
Geisler prior to proceeding in the manner in which she did."

This finding relates 
specifically to insubordination by Mekss and her circumvention of established 
lines of authority. Our examination of this finding requires a determination as 
to whether it sufficiently articulates the reasons for the Board's affirmation 
of Mekss' dismissal pursuant to § 16-3-110, W.S. 1977, and, secondly, whether it 
is supported by substantial evidence. It is our conclusion that Finding No. 3 is 
sufficient to meet the statutory requirement set forth in the statute. In 
Westates, 719 P.2d 1366, 1371, we said:

"While perhaps not a 
model of perfection, the findings of fact by the Board in this case are 
sufficiently definite to permit judicial review of the Board's action, and they 
satisfy the test of our earlier cases."

It follows that this 
single, viable finding of basic fact, sufficient to support one valid and 
legally correct conclusion, justifies affirming Mekss' dismissal.

[¶49.]  We then turn to the requirement of 
substantial evidence to support the finding that Mekss was guilty of 
insubordination in the context of the personnel rules. The record adequately 
discloses that Mekss failed to exhaust available administrative procedures prior 
to sending the anonymous letter and prior to making the telephone calls to 
Sherman. We are 
not completely certain what is connoted by the Board's reference to "normal 
personnel system options," but we would understand this phrase to relate to 
face-to-face communication with supervisory personnel and the use of traditional 
internal grievance procedures. There is no question that all employees 
repeatedly were encouraged to bring problems and concerns to Geisler and other 
members of the School administration staff. Mekss did not follow this recourse, 
and she also told Geisler, during their meetings on November 30 and December 5, 
that her attempts to contact Sherman did not involve School matters. 
Effective operation of a governmental function permits the employer to require 
honesty and loyalty from employees. In a state institutional setting that is 
designed to fulfil rehabilitative and educational purposes, honesty, loyalty, 
harmony, and efficiency become even more critical. The desirable effect of 
positive role modeling on impressionable residents at the School becomes a vital 
and necessary attribute for all employees. We understand that Mekss' attempts to 
draw a distinction between matters involving the School and the 
underlying investigation of the School, but this is simply a semantic affect in 
Mekss' argument. What is easy to see is that Geisler could interpret these 
actions by Mekss as dishonest and disloyal.

[¶50.]  As we have held earlier, the anonymous 
letter qualifies as protected speech in the context and manner in which it was 
used. Mekss' telephone calls, as we also have held earlier, are not similarly 
protected. Finding No. 2 of the Personnel Review Board does mention anonymous 
letters, but we find no support in the record for the contention that the reason 
the Personnel Review Board affirmed Mekss' dismissal was because she had written 
an anonymous letter. We do find substantial evidence in the record to 
demonstrate that Mekss violated an obligation to her employer to exhaust "normal 
personnel system options" before calling Sherman with complaints about the 
investigation. There is no question that substantial evidence does support 
Finding No. 3, and this finding identifies the behavior relied on by the 
Personnel Review Board to justify dismissal based on 
insubordination.

[¶51.]  We do modify Conclusion No. 1 so that it 
should read:

"Ms. Mekss was 
insubordinate in circumventing established lines of authority."

As drafted by the Board, 
Conclusion No. 1 also had incorporated that Ms. Mekss created disharmony in the 
function of the Wyoming Girls' School. There is no finding of fact by the 
Personnel Review Board that justifies this conclusion, and we are not persuaded 
that substantial evidence in the record supports the actual creation of 
disharmony by Mekss. See Schalk, 906 F.2d 491. We, therefore, correct the 
conclusion of law in accordance with our rule found in Employment Security 
Commission, 786 P.2d 866.

[¶52.]  As modified and corrected, this 
conclusion of the Personnel Review Board is supported by an appropriate finding 
of fact that is supported by substantial evidence. It justifies Mekss' 
dismissal. She had access to internal grievance procedures available under the 
personnel rules, and she chose not to use them. Her own testimony discloses 
knowledge of Geisler's repeated verbal and written efforts to invite employee 
input, but she did not comply with those efforts. On the basis of our conclusion 
that substantial evidence supports Finding No. 3 which is the justification for 
Conclusion No. 1, as modified, we hold that it is unnecessary to remand the case 
to the district court for further remand to the Personnel Review Board for 
additional findings and conclusions. The rule adopted in FMC, 773 P.2d 163, is 
satisfied. 

[¶53.]  As the second issue raised in this case, 
Mekss urges that the School violated the state personnel rules by failing to 
pursue successive levels of discipline prior to her dismissal. Mekss finds 
support for this argument in Conclusion No. 2 of the decision of the Personnel 
Review Board, which states:

"2. Mr. Geisler did not 
fully comply with the DAFC Personnel Rules and Regulations in his application by 
consistent, well-defined, and progressive disciplinary measures prior to his 
dismissal of Ms. Mekss."

[¶54.]  This record demonstrates that Mekss knew 
of Geisler's emphasis and insistence upon bringing concerns about School 
operations to his attention or to that of other administrators. Geisler sent 
memoranda to the staff and addressed specific remarks to them relating to the 
importance of internal communication. On November 30, 1988, Geisler met with 
Mekss after her first telephone call to Sherman. He then asked whether she had concerns 
about the School, and she advised that she did not. Geisler then reminded Mekss 
of her responsibility to come to him with complaints or concerns, but he did not 
initiate other formal disciplinary action.

[¶55.]  After Mekss' second telephone call to 
Sherman, Geisler 
met with her on December 5, 1988 to impose discipline for her behavior. That 
meeting and the fact that Geisler issued a ten-day suspension and required Mekss 
to write a letter of apology reasonably could be perceived as a disciplinary 
"step" prior to dismissal. We conclude that we need not decide whether such 
discipline satisfies the "successive step" requirement under the personnel rules 
because a plain reading of those rules allows for immediate dismissal of a 
permanent employee for flagrant conduct. The pertinent portion is found in 
Chapter XII, Discipline, State of Wyoming Personnel Rules, in effect at the time 
of Mekss' dismissal, and it states:

"Section 2. 
Determination of Appropriate Discipline.

"(a) Agency heads should, 
except in cases of flagrant employee behavior, attempt to administer 
employee discipline in progressive stages so as to seek corrective results. * * 
*" (Emphasis added.)

* * * * * *

"Section 3. Types of 
Discipline.

* * * * * *

"(c) 
Dismissal.

"(i) Dismissal of 
Permanent Employees. If previous disciplinary action has not served to achieve 
corrective results, or if the nature and extent of the just cause is such 
that other disciplinary action is not appropriate, the agency head may 
dismiss a permanent employee for the good of the service." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶56.]  We affirm the reversal by the district 
court of Conclusion No. 2 of the Personnel Review Board which reads as 
follows:

"2. Mr. Geisler did not 
fully comply with the DAFC Personnel Rules and Regulations in his application by 
consistent, well-defined, and progressive disciplinary measures prior to his 
dismissal of Ms. Mekss."

The Personnel Review 
Board did not provide findings of fact to support Conclusion No. 2. Our 
examination of the record did not develop substantial evidence to support a 
conclusion that Geisler did not fully comply with the personnel rules because 
those rules explicitly grant authority to dismiss a permanent employee for 
flagrant behavior without going through successive steps of discipline. For this 
reason, Geisler was not obligated to impose progressive discipline prior to 
dismissing Mekss, particularly in view of her refusal to write an appropriate 
apology. The circumstances in this case were sufficient to justify summary 
dismissal when Mekss, after repeated attempts to contact Sherman, failed to accept 
discipline that would have involved a reasonable letter of apology. Her letter 
was only a continuation of the crusade relating to the School that could not be 
constitutionally protected once the investigation had been 
accomplished.

[¶57.]  The last issue in Mekss' brief is whether 
the School was without standing to appeal the decision of the Personnel Review 
Board that awarded her the five months back pay and benefits. As we have noted, 
the School took a cross-appeal to the district court from the decision of the 
Personnel Review Board, claiming that the award of the back pay was arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, in excess of the Board's statutory 
authority, and unsupported by substantial evidence. In our judgment, this issue 
is controlled by statute and by our holding in Pritchard v. State, Division of 
Vocational Rehabilitation, Department of Health and Social Services, 540 P.2d 523 (Wyo. 1975). In Pritchard, we analyzed the statutory terms "person" and 
"agency" in light of the definitions in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act. We held that an agency is without the right to appeal an adverse 
administrative decision to the district court, saying:

"The conclusion we reach 
here is bottomed in the plain English language reading of the rules and statutes 
and represents the overwhelming weight of authority under statutes and rules 
identical with or similar to our Administrative Procedure Act and Rule 72.1, 
W.R.C.P.

* * * * * *

"* * * [I]f an `agency' 
is given a specific right to appeal to the courts, such a grant is within the 
power of the legislature and must be honored. But there must be an applicable 
appeal procedure spelled out in the statute. It cannot be inferred and, as here, 
where the statute specifically excludes an agency's right of appeal, there 
cannot be any question but that the agency enjoys no such appellate privileges." 
(Emphasis in original.) Pritchard, 540 P.2d  at 527, 529.

This rule was reiterated 
in Hupp v. Employment Security Commission of Wyoming, 715 P.2d 223, 224 n. 1 
(Wyo. 1986), 
when we stated:

"The agency itself cannot 
bring an appeal to the district court because it is not a `person aggrieved or 
adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency in a contested 
case.' Section 16-3-114(a), W.S. 1977; Pritchard v. State, Division of 
Vocational Rehabilitation, Department of Health and Social Services, Wyo., 540 P.2d 523, 526 (1975)."

[¶58.]  The School argues that Pritchard is not 
applicable in this case. It contends that Mekss raised the question of standing 
for the first time before this court. This argument can be resolved 
expeditiously because standing in this context essentially is a jurisdictional 
issue concerning the power of the court to hear and decide a case. In that 
context, standing can be raised at any time in a judicial 
proceeding.

[¶59.]  The School then argues that once Mekss 
petitioned for review, the School became a proper and aggrieved party. The State 
endeavors to avoid the definitional barrier in light of Pritchard and the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act by arguing that Pritchard should be 
modified to allow an agency to cross-appeal. Although the State presents a 
concise and forceful argument in this regard, it still must be recognized that 
it is within the province of the legislature to consider and, if necessary, 
redefine whether an administrative agency may appeal or cross-appeal to the 
district court. We note in passing that there is no inhibition upon the right of 
an agency to appeal an adverse decision from the district court to the Supreme 
Court. See Safety Medical Services, Inc. v. Employment Security Commission of 
Wyoming, 724 P.2d 468 (Wyo. 1986). In our view, 
Pritchard and the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act should be construed to 
inhibit cross-appeals brought by an agency at the district court level like a 
direct appeal is inhibited.

[¶60.]  Ultimately, the School argues that the 
Personnel Review Board was without authority and jurisdiction to order the 
payment of public funds from the state treasury. The State argues that the 
remuneration "ordered" by the Board violates state personnel rules and the 
Wyoming 
constitution.11 As a matter of logic, the State 
presents the proposition that, if the Personnel Review Board found substantial 
evidence to justify Mekss' termination, then the award of remuneration is 
antithetical to its affirmation of her discharge. Certainly, this contention may 
have a good deal of merit.

[¶61.]  We do not need to decide that question in 
this case, however. The application of the rule in Pritchard leads to a 
conclusion that the School did not have standing to cross-appeal to the district 
court. For that reason, the district court was without jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the issues presented by the cross-appeal.

[¶62.]  The School is not without recourse. A 
conclusion that the Personnel Review Board's award of five months back pay and 
benefits cannot be addressed in this proceeding does not require the State to 
make the payment. If the State refuses to pay, Mekss could sue for the money or, 
alternatively, the School could seek a declaratory judgment with respect to the 
authority of the Personnel Review Board to "order" remuneration. Since we 
conclude that the district court did not have jurisdiction over this issue, we 
reverse that portion of the district court order that reverses the award of back 
pay.

[¶63.]  In summation, we hold that Mekss' 
constitutional right of free speech was not infringed with respect to any matter 
of public concern when she was dismissed from her position as a bookkeeper at 
the School. We have recognized her constitutionally protected right of free 
speech to the extent that it was exercised appropriately but, with respect to 
those actions which do not manifest a constitutionally protected right, we have 
approved their use as a premise for a valid discharge. We hold that there was no 
violation of the state personnel rules by the School, and we affirm the order of 
the district court that affirmed the decision of the Personnel Review Board in 
turn approving the dismissal of Mekss by the School. We reverse that portion of 
the order of the district court that reversed the award of remuneration on the 
ground that the district court was without jurisdiction over the cross-appeal by 
the School.

[¶64.]  Affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.

CARDINE, 
J., 
files a specially concurring opinion.

URBIGKIT, 
C.J., 
files a dissenting opinion in which GOLDEN, J., 
joins.

FOOTNOTES

1 There is a discrepancy 
in the record as to whether Mekss called Sherman the same day, November 30, or the 
following day, December 1. Hearing Exhibit A-13, consisting of Geisler's notes 
of a December 1, 1988 phone call from Sherman 
indicate that Mekss called Sherman on the evening of November 30. Mekss 
testified that she called Sherman the following day, December 1. 
Regardless of whether the call was made on November 30 or December 1, the fact 
that the call occurred shortly after Mekss' November 30 meeting with Geisler is 
significant.

2 Sherman insisted in his 
hearing testimony that he informed Mekss of her "risk" in violating the 
chain-of-command at the very outset of their conversation. Mekss testified that 
the warning came much later in the hour-long conversation.

3 The First Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States provides, in pertinent 
part:

"Congress shall make no 
law * * * abridging the freedom of speech. * * *."

4 The Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States provides:

"All persons born or 
naturalized in the United 
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws."

5 Article 1, § 20, of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming reads:

"Every person may freely 
speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of 
that right; and in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, 
when published with good intent and [for] justifiable ends, shall be a 
sufficient defense, the jury having the right to determine the facts and the 
law, under direction of the court."

6 In opening statements to 
the Personnel Review Board, both counsel framed the basis for Mekss' dismissal 
in terms of protected or unprotected speech. Counsel indicated that the Board 
would be instructed on the constitutional issues and law during closing 
arguments after it had heard the evidence. At the end of the hearing, however, 
both sides waived their opportunity to make closing arguments to the 
Board.

7 An example of how 
different communications may be made in different contexts is shown by Mekss' 
own performance evaluations. One of her complaints about the School was the lack 
of communication and the unresponsiveness of management to employee concerns. 
This issue was raised numerous times in the course of the hearing. Yet, the two 
formal performance evaluations admitted into evidence at her hearing contain 
these comments from Mekss under the heading "Employee Comments":

"An atmosphere of open 
communication and high degree of accessibility to my superiors has greatly 
enhanced my ability to perform and is greatly appreciated." Mekss' Performance 
Appraisal dated January 29, 1987.

"This evaluation is very 
generous. I do not believe that I could do my job as well if not for the 
openness, honesty, direct communication, expertise, understanding & 
encouragement of my supervisor." Mekss' Performance Review Report dated August 
23, 1988. [This was written by Mekss eleven days after she wrote her anonymous 
letter to the Board of Charities and Reform and during the same period of time 
that the Wyoming Girls' School investigation was going on!]

These comments which were 
part of the record before the Personnel Review Board, even though they were not 
discussed at that hearing, do not manifest complaints from someone who, in 
another context, claimed harassment, intimidation, and total lack of managerial 
openness. Mekss herself was sending mixed signals with respect to her job 
satisfaction and the conditions at the School.

8 The Personnel Review 
Board established a rather strict and quite narrow forum for the parties to 
argue the merits of Mekss' dismissal. The Board clearly stated that it was not 
inclined to hear testimony or examine evidence that did not tie directly to 
whether there was due cause for dismissal and whether proper dismissal 
procedures were followed. Thus, Mekss' counsel may have been dissuaded from 
presenting whatever evidence Mekss had regarding inaccuracies or improprieties 
in the product of the investigation. Still, counsel had the obligation to the 
client to attempt to present such evidence if it was perceived as relevant, and 
to make a timely objection should the Board have refused its 
admission.

9 Rule 12.09, W.R.A.P., 
provides, in pertinent part:

"The review [of an 
administrative action] shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall 
be confined to the record as supplemented pursuant to Rule 12.08, W.R.A.P., and 
to the issues raised before the agency. The court's review shall be limited to a 
determination of the matters specified in § 16-3-114(c)."

Section 16-3-114(c), W.S. 
1977 (July 1990 Repl.), provides, in pertinent part:

"(c) To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of 
the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

* * * * * *

"(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

"(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

"(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

"(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

"(D) Without observance 
of procedure required by law; or

"(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute."

10 We take judicial notice 
of the State of Wyoming Personnel 
Rules in effect at the time of Mekss' dismissal. Chapter 
XII, Discipline, Section 1, Reasons for Discipline, states:

"(a) An agency head may 
discipline an employee for cause including, but not limited to, the following 
reasons:

* * * * * *

"(vi) Insubordination; * 
* *."

11 Appellees rely on 
Chapter XIII, Grievances and Appeals, State of Wyoming Personnel Rules:

"Section 6. Dismissal 
Appeals.

* * * * * *

"(e) Hearing Authority 
Purpose and Authority.

"(i) The purpose of the 
hearing is to determine whether there exists good cause for the dismissal. The 
Hearing Authority shall decide, based upon all of the evidence produced at the 
hearing and upon no other basis, whether the allegations made in support of the 
dismissal are true and, if true, whether they fairly and reasonable constitute 
grounds for dismissal under the Personnel Rules.

"(ii) The Hearing 
Authority shall affirm or reverse the dismissal and/or recommend other 
personnel actions so long as the decisions and recommendations are not in 
conflict with Personnel Rules and State Statutes." (Emphasis added.)

Appellees also find 
support in Article 3, § 35, of the Wyoming Constitution which states in 
part:

"* * * [M]oney shall be 
paid out of the treasury only on appropriations made by the legislature, and in 
no case otherwise than upon warrant drawn by the proper officer in pursuance of 
law."

CARDINE, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶65.]  I concur in the opinion of the court 
affirming the dismissal of appellant. I concur also in the reversal of the 
district court order denying appellant five months' pay awarded by the personnel 
review board because of the precedent established by Pritchard v. State, Div. of 
Vocational Rehabilitation, Dep't of Health and Social Serv., 540 P.2d 523 (Wyo. 
1975). I must, however, express my opinion that there is no logical or sound 
reason for denying the State of Wyoming a right of appeal. The present state 
of law makes final a board decision against the State no matter how absurd or 
wrong it may be. It is possible that in the future the State may be the victim 
of an unwarranted multimillion dollar award and powerless to do other than pay. 
When that case comes before us, we will be hard pressed to continue the rule of 
Pritchard. Perhaps the legislature will look at this state of the law before the 
hard case comes along. At a minimum, I would hold that when the "person" 
aggrieved by the board's decision initiates an appeal, the State is then in 
court and may respond to the appeal by cross-claim or otherwise.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.

INTRODUCTION

[¶66.]  This is a public employee termination 
case. Regina Mekss was discharged from her employment with the Wyoming Girls' 
School (a juvenile confinement facility) because she went outside the School's 
chain of command by a telephone call to the Executive Secretary of the Board of 
Charities and Reform to challenge the sufficiency of the Board's investigation 
into reports of management problems at the institution. Violating the chain of 
command was characterized as insubordination and justification for her dismissal 
by the School.

[¶67.]  This court holds that her dismissal does 
not violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because the 
School's "interest in maintaining discipline and esprit de corps" outweighs her 
right to freedom of speech. Because her efforts and the telephone call addressed 
a matter of public concern and did not adversely affect the operation of either 
the School or the Board, I dissent.

[¶68.]  By demonstrating that it is again the 
messenger who is at risk, this whistleblower case does not suit my sense of 
either justice or justification to approve Mekss' termination from public 
employment. As Justice Thurgood Marshall observed in dissent, denial of, or 
discharge from, public employment is "a serious blow to any citizen * * * [w]hen 
something as valuable as the opportunity to work is at stake, the government may 
not reward some citizens and not others without demonstrating that its actions 
are fair and equitable." Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2715, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972).

[¶69.]  Although whistleblowers are recognized as 
a "vital element of our democratic process" serving as "an early-warning system 
against fraud and deception within the government," reprisals against 
whistleblowers are often "swift and harsh." E. Slavin and T. Devine, The 
Government's Secret War on Whistleblowers, 18 ABA Barrister 12, 15, 36 (Spring 1991). Public 
employees who speak out should now fear that they will lose their jobs, forfeit 
salary increases, or be denied promotions. When faced with such consequences, 
self-imposed censorship is often the most prudent choice. This self-imposed 
censorship is of profound consequence not only to the millions1 who work for the government, but 
also to the public who may have an interest in hearing their unexpressed views. 
See Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector 
Workplace, 61 S.Cal.L.Rev. 3 (1987). Professor Chafee has observed:

"The number of federal, 
state, and municipal employees is a substantial part of the working population. 
Add workmen in factories with government contracts and professors teaching in 
universities with a R.O.T.C. or a government grant for scientific research or an 
assigned unit from the Army or the Navy, and hardly anybody is left out. If 
millions of Americans lose freedom of speech and assembly by the mere act of 
earning a living, the First Amendment becomes a mockery."

Massaro, supra, 61 
S.Cal.L.Rev. at 6 n. 15 (quoting Z. Chafee, The Blessings of Liberty 94 (2d ed. 
1956)).

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
FREE SPEECH

[¶70.]  For more than twenty years, the law has 
been firmly established that a governmental entity cannot condition employment 
on any limitation that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected 
interest in freedom of expression. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 
103 S. Ct. 1684, 1687, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1983) and Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1990). The School impermissibly violated Mekss' constitutional 
right to speak on matters of public concern when it fired her for expressing her 
views and opinions to the Board and its Executive Secretary. Schalk, 906 F.2d 491.

THE SEQUENTIAL 
TEST

[¶71.]  This majority correctly adopts a 
sequential test to determine whether the School's action of dismissal 
impermissibly infringed upon Mekss' constitutionally protected right of free 
speech, as recently summarized in Schalk. In its analysis and application of the 
sequential test, the majority distinguishes two separate instances of 
communication initiated by Mekss: the first being the anonymous letter written 
to the Governor and the other members of the Board, and the second being a 
telephone call to the Executive Secretary of the Board regarding the 
investigation.2 For purposes of applying the test, 
the majority assumes, without deciding, that each instance of communication 
addressed a matter of public concern.

THE ANONYMOUS 
LETTER

[¶72.]  The majority accepts Mekss' contention 
that the anonymous letter constituted whistleblowing speech and that it should 
be given the highest level of constitutional protection. It further agrees with 
Mekss that her interest in making the statement outweighed the interest of the 
School in stifling the speech. However, the majority then concludes that she 
failed to meet her burden of proving that the letter was a substantial or 
motivating factor in her dismissal. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S. Ct. 568, 576, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977).

[¶73.]  Although I disagree with the majority and 
suspect that the anonymous letter was a substantial or motivating factor in 
Mekss' dismissal, the record shows that the supervisor at the School testified 
that he did not dismiss Mekss for writing the anonymous letter, but for 
"circumventing established lines of authority" by making the one telephone call 
to the Executive Secretary of the Board. The majority modified the Personnel 
Review Board's Conclusion No. 1 to state that "Ms. Mekss was insubordinate in 
circumventing established lines of authority", thereby accepting the 
supervisor's testimony that Mekss was not dismissed for writing the anonymous 
letter but rather for making the telephone call. I will apply the sequential 
test to the telephone call to demonstrate that the School impermissibly 
infringed upon Mekss' right to free speech by dismissing her for making that 
telephone call. Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, 
Will County, Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968). See 
also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972), 
which held that a college professor's public criticism of the Board of Regent's 
opposition to a proposal that the college be elevated to four-year status was 
constitutionally protected speech about a matter of public concern. Therefore, I 
find it unnecessary to further address the matter of the anonymous 
letter.

PUBLIC CONCERN 
ANALYSIS

[¶74.]  The United States Supreme Court in 
Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684 held that a public employee's work-related 
speech is not covered by the First Amendment unless it addresses a matter of 
public concern and will not disrupt the workplace. Thus, the threshold inquiry 
in determining whether a governmental employer's employment decision violates 
the First Amendment rights of an adversely affected employee is whether the 
speech at issue "may be `fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter 
of public concern.'" Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2897, 97 L. Ed. 2d 315, reh'g denied 483 U.S. 1056, 108 S. Ct. 31, 97 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1987) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S.  at 146, 103 S.Ct. at 1690). 
Speech on a matter of public concern is generally defined as speech "fairly 
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to 
the community * * *," Connick, 461 U.S.  at 146, 103 S. Ct.  at 1690, in contrast 
to speech "as an employee upon matters only of personal interest * * *." 
Id. at 147, 
103 S. Ct.  at 1690. Thus, the purpose of the inquiry is to weed out a narrow 
range of employee speech which addresses purely personal disputes and is not 
entitled to First Amendment protection. Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 
(4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S. Ct. 2278, 90 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1986).

[¶75.]  "Whether an employee's speech addresses a 
matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form and context of 
a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Connick, 461 U.S.  at 147-48, 103 S. Ct.  at 1690. 
This inquiry focuses on "the extent to which the content of the employee speech 
was calculated to disclose wrongdoing or inefficiency or other malfeasance on 
the part of governmental officials in the conduct of their official duties." 
Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1445 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied 488 U.S. 909, 109 S. Ct. 262, 102 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1988). "`The focus is 
on the role the employee has in advancing the particular expressions: that of a 
concerned public citizen, informing the public that the state institution is not 
properly discharging its duties * * *; or merely as an employee, concerned only 
with internal policies or practices which are of relevance only to the employees 
of that institution.'" Id. at 1445 (quoting Cox v. Dardanelle Public 
School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1986)). See also Wulf v. City of 
Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 857 (10th Cir. 1989) and Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 796-97 (10th 
Cir. 1988).

[¶76.]  This record justifies my conclusion that 
the telephone call was made as a public employee speaking as a citizen and did 
indeed address a matter of public concern. Rankin, 483 U.S. 378, 107 S. Ct. 2891; Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684. It was 
addressed directly to the sufficiency of the investigation which was a function 
and duty of the Board. Mekss had nothing personal to gain by airing her 
concerns. Her motive was to improve the education and treatment of the 
institutional clientele and to improve the working conditions of the employees. 
From her perspective, Mekss had sufficient reasons to view the investigation as 
superficial and inadequate because what she had reported and what she believed 
others had reported had not been sufficiently documented or considered in the 
official report.

[¶77.]  The content of her statements, if true, 
suggest that the Board (or the School) was not properly discharging its duties. 
This falls into the category of "[s]peech that seeks to expose improper 
operation of the government or questions the integrity of governmental 
officials" which "clearly concerns vital public interests." Conaway, 853 F.2d  at 
797.

[¶78.]  The majority erroneously concludes that 
because her telephone call addressed issues that had been discussed in the 
anonymous letter and the subsequent investigation, any further discussion on her 
part was in the nature of a personal grievance or complaint. Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684. The 
majority fails to recognize that her speech at this juncture did not address the 
operation of the School per se, but rather the Board and the manner in which 
they conducted their investigation into matters concerning the School. To 
substantiate Mekss' view that the investigation was inadequate necessarily 
required that she reiterate specific statements she had made to the 
investigators, which of course reflected her concerns about the operation of the 
institution. Her concerns and resulting statements cannot be fairly or 
accurately characterized as merely personal complaints concerning internal 
policies and practices of relevance only to Mekss as an employee. Connick, 461 U.S.  at 148, 103 S. Ct.  at 1690; Cox, 
790 F.2d  at 673.

[¶79.]  For the sake of argument, assuming that 
the telephone call was purely critical of the School and not critical of the 
Board's investigation, it would still touch on a matter of public concern for 
essentially the same reasons the majority concludes that the anonymous letter 
touched on a matter of public concern.3 Conaway, 853 F.2d 789; Wren v. 
Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1085, 107 S. Ct. 1287, 94 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1987).

[¶80.]  As the majority points out, the record 
does not support the veracity of Mekss' concerns as she was not permitted to 
present evidence concerning inaccuracies in the investigation to the Personnel 
Review Board. Whether her concerns were well founded is not significant since 
the strong interest in protecting this type of speech determines that the 
whistleblower need not be absolutely accurate to be protected by the courts. 
This court, in Board of Trustees, Laramie County School Dist. No. 1 v. Spiegel, 
549 P.2d 1161 (Wyo. 1976), held that the school district erred in discharging 
its tenured teacher for making and publishing statements critical of the 
school's administrator and of schools generally. This court concluded that 
absent proof that the employee knowingly or recklessly made false statements, 
his criticism could not furnish a lawful basis for dismissal. Id. at 1176. See also 
Pickering, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731.

[¶81.]  The majority also determines that the 
speech did not touch on a matter of public concern in part because Mekss did not 
have sufficient personal knowledge about the investigation. It is true she did 
not know how the results were tabulated. However, it is not necessary that she 
have intimate knowledge of how the investigation was conducted before her speech 
is protected by the courts. The courts have provided protection even though the 
speaker had no firsthand knowledge of the reported incidents. Hughes v. Whitmer, 
714 F.2d 1407, 1423 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1023, 104 S. Ct. 1275, 79 L. Ed. 2d 680 (1984).

[¶82.]  The next inquiry is whether the 
communication disrupted the workplace. The United States Supreme Court in Givhan 
v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 99 S. Ct. 693, 58 L. Ed. 2d 619 
(1979) held that a teacher's series of private communications to her supervisor 
regarding racial discrimination at the school was protected speech. The court 
noted that when an employee expresses a grievance in a private meeting, courts 
can consider the time, place, and manner of the confrontation in evaluating 
whether it impeded institutional efficiency. Id. at 415 n. 4, 99 S. Ct.  at 696 n. 4. It 
would follow that speech that occurs away from the workplace, such as Mekss' 
telephone call to the Executive Secretary, poses an even less significant threat 
to the authority and efficiency of the institution than a private personal 
confrontation with a supervisor. Likewise, the majority concedes that there is 
insufficient evidence in the record to support a disruption in the 
workplace.

THE PICKERING BALANCING 
TEST

[¶83.]  The function of the Pickering test is 
to "balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees." Pickering, 391 U.S.  at 568, 88 S. Ct.  at 1734-35. 
Balancing the competing interests of the employee and the employer requires 
consideration of "`whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or 
harmony among coworkers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships 
for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the 
performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation of 
the enterprise.'" Wulf, 883 F.2d  at 861 (quoting Rankin, 483 U.S.  at 388, 107 
S.Ct. at 2899). See also Pickering, 391 U.S.  at 570-73, 88 S. Ct.  at 
1735-37.

[¶84.]  In determining that the scales of justice 
tip in favor of the public institution for this case, the majority relied upon 
the educational, vocational and rehabilitative nature of the services provided 
to the troubled adolescent girls combined with its "valid and important interest 
in maintaining discipline and esprit de corps." The majority concludes the chain 
of command rule was adopted to protect this interest and that by violating the 
chain of command, the School had just cause to dismiss Mekss from employment on 
grounds of insubordination. However, "[p]hrases like `esprit de corps' or 
`insubordination' should not lull judges into uncritical deference to public 
employers' decisions." Massaro, supra, 61 S.Cal.L.Rev. at 68.

[¶85.]  The majority analogizes the School to a 
police force and stressed the importance of discipline, harmony, and loyalty in 
a law enforcement organization and holds that Mekss' telephone calls to the 
Executive Secretary of the Board "directly impaired Geisler's authority and 
ability to discipline the staff" and had a "direct and detrimental impact on 
Geisler's confidence in Mekss' loyalty to the School and to him." However, it 
then modifies the Personnel Review Board's conclusions by eliminating the 
conclusion that Mekss created disharmony in the function of the school by 
stating, "we are not persuaded that substantial evidence in the record supports 
the actual creation of disharmony by Mekss."

[¶86.]  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
addresses the issue of disruption of the working environment in Conaway, 853 
F.2d at 797-98:

Disruptions in the 
working relationship between Conaway and his supervisors, and general disharmony 
in the office, are foreseeable consequences when an employee reports improper 
activities of co-workers or supervisors. We recognize, as did Justice Powell in 
his concurring opinion in Rankin, "that a public employer must have authority to 
maintain the efficiency as well as the integrity of his office." Rankin, 107 S. Ct.  at 2899 n. *. We also recognize, however, the vital interest the public 
has in the integrity of those who administrate their government. Brockell v. 
Norton, 732 F.2d [664] at 668. [(8th Cir. 1984)] It would be anomalous to hold 
that because the employee's whistle blowing might jeopardize the harmony of the 
office or tarnish the integrity of the department, the law will not allow him to 
speak out on his perception of potential improprieties or department corruption. 
See Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1979).

[¶87.]  Another consideration under Pickering is whether 
Mekss' speech interfered with the performance of her daily job responsibilities. 
Conaway, 853 F.2d  at 798. It is uncontested that Mekss was a valued employee up 
to the time of her discharge and her job performance was consistently evaluated 
as good to excellent. Furthermore, under Pickering, the danger to an agency's successful 
function due to an employee's speech is minimal where the employee serves no 
confidential, policy making or public contact role. Rankin, 483 U.S. 378, 107 S. Ct. 2891. Mekss 
worked as a fiscal control officer and served in no confidential, policy making 
or public contact role and therefore posed a minimal threat to the smooth 
function of the School. Her remarks did not interfere with the performance of 
her duties nor the ability of her co-workers to perform their 
duties.

[¶88.]  Mekss was dismissed for the content of 
her speech. "Vigilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use 
authority over employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers public 
functions but simply because superiors disagree with the content of employees' 
speech." Rankin, 483 U.S.  at 384, 107 S. Ct.  at 2897 
(emphasis added). She would not have been dismissed for circumventing the lines 
of authority had she contacted the Board with praise for their investigation or 
to commend the School's operation.

[¶89.]  The majority has determined that the 
manner of Mekss' communication violated the School's chain of command. The 
majority, in upholding Mekss' dismissal, places undue emphasis on this issue. 
Once again, the majority fails to recognize that her speech at this juncture did 
not address the operation of the School per se, but rather the Board and the 
manner in which they conducted their investigation into matters concerning the 
School. Therefore, it would have been wholly inappropriate for Mekss or any 
citizen to address concerns about the investigation through the established 
lines of authority at the School. She had a criticism of the Board and went 
directly to that Board. Further, she went directly to the Executive Secretary 
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of State, Kathy Karpan.

[¶90.]  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
upholding the right of a police department dispatcher to anonymously report, 
outside the department's chain-of-command, the perceived misconduct of a police 
officer, held that "[t]he enforcement of [a chain-of-command] rule against an 
employee seeking to criticize the very superior empowered to review [the 
employees' complaints] would impermissibly chill first amendment rights. 
Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058, 1063 n. 5 (8th Cir. 1979)." Brockell v. 
Norton, 732 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir. 1984). See also Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 803, 106 S. Ct. 36, 88 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1985) 
and Anderson v. Central Point School Dist. No. 6, 746 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1984), 
upholding the lower court's injunction barring enforcement of any policy which 
prohibits direct communication by teachers on matters of public concern with 
members of the school board.

[¶91.]  In a case where an employee was 
disciplined for violation of a government department's "chain-of-command" policy 
by speaking at a public meeting of the county's government board about 
deficiencies in the department, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals said in 
Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 106 (3d Cir. 1983):

A policy which would 
compel public employees to route complaints about poor departmental practices to 
the very officials responsible for those practices would impermissibly chill 
such speech. * * * It would deter "whistle blowing" by public employees on 
matters of public concern. It would deprive the public in general and its 
elected officials in particular of important information about the functioning 
of government departments. We do not read the "efficiency of public services" 
factor referred to in Pickering to extend to a chain-of-command 
policy as interpreted and applied by the defendants.

See also the post-Connick 
case of Jurgensen v. Fairfax 
County, Va., 745 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1984), Butzner, J., dissenting.

[¶92.]  Finally, Mekss has the burden of showing 
that her speech was a substantial or motivating factor in her dismissal by the 
School to establish a prima facie case. Doyle, 429 U.S.  at 287, 97 S. Ct.  at 576; Conaway, 853 F.2d  at 795. Once her prima facie case is 
established, the burden then shifts to the School to show it was not a 
motivating factor in the dismissal, that it would have terminated her employment 
anyway. Wulf, 883 F.2d  at 857; Koch, 847 F.2d  at 1440 n. 11. Because both the 
School and the Personnel Review Board cite the employee's protected conduct as 
one of the specific acts of insubordination causing her dismissal, it is not 
necessary to analyze whether either party carried their burden of 
proof.

[¶93.]  Perhaps another motivating factor in 
Mekss' dismissal was the affect her "insubordination" had on Geisler's ego as 
illustrated by the incident involving the "letter of apology." In order to 
resolve their dispute and as an attempt to impose discipline, Geisler 
presented Mekss with three options: resignation, dismissal, or writing a letter 
of apology. Responsively, she opted to draft the letter of apology. However, 
Geisler promptly deemed it unacceptable because, although she apologized, she 
did not recant her earlier criticisms.

[¶94.]  Mekss spoke on a matter of public 
concern. Her First Amendment interests, as a citizen, outweighed any slight 
impairment in the efficient and harmonious operation of the School. Pickering, 
391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731. A public 
employee should have the right to speak on matters of public concern without 
fear of being discharged. Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684; Schalk, 906 F.2d 491. She was a good employee and the state has an interest in retaining 
such employees. Competent management should have been able to address her 
concerns and control any insubordinate behavior without (almost summarily) 
dismissing her. Under the circumstances of this case, termination was neither 
fair nor the least restrictive alternative available to the School. The 
government's violent reaction to employee dissent is clearly not justified in 
this case.

[¶95.]  There is an even more oppressive message 
of danger for the public employee who is concerned about the services which are 
being provided by his or her public agency. The concurrence in part and dissent 
in part in Leonard v. Converse County School Dist. No. 2, 788 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 
1990) was emphatically motivated by the same concern for employment if 
management has an unprincipled right to attack non-conforming performance, Wulf, 
883 F.2d 842, as "insubordination" or "disloyalty." History leaves no doubt that 
a singular cause of the destruction of empires and national governments has 
followed the "three blind mice" syndrome with disregard of the message and 
execution of the messenger. Equally apparent from this decision, we retell state 
government employees: "Ignore agency problems or management misconduct since the 
only one to be fired will probably be you." Compare, however, the current Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Considine v. Board of County Com'rs of 
County of Adams, State of Colo., 910 F.2d 695 (10th Cir. 1990).

[¶96.]  Attacking whistleblowers where a sincere 
purpose to improve government is the goal by the subterfuge of claimed 
disharmony or insubordination will inevitably result in bad government and 
irresponsible management. Like Leonard, 788 P.2d 1119 and Doidge v. State, Bd. 
of Charities and Reform, 789 P.2d 880 (Wyo. 1990), Urbigkit, J., dissenting, we 
separate state employees from due process and their constitutional rights, 
Schalk, 906 F.2d 491, since, in the exercise of those rights, we then justify 
employment termination.

[¶97.]  This case again demonstrates the use of 
the dual foot soldiers of disharmony and non-conformity who then become prison 
wardens to guard against bothersome conduct or troubling criticism by denying 
the employee his or her constitutional right to speak out about government and 
its operation.

[¶98.]  Accordingly, I dissent.

ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING

[¶99.]  This case came on before the court upon 
the Petition for Rehearing and Brief in Support of Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing filed herein on June 27, 1991 on behalf of Appellant, and the court, 
having reviewed the file, the record, the opinion of the court, the Petition for 
Rehearing and the Brief in Support of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, and 
having carefully considered the matters presented therein, finds that the 
Petition for Rehearing should be denied, and it, therefore, is

[¶100.]            
ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing be, and the same hereby is, 
denied.

[¶101.]            
URBIGKIT, C.J., and GOLDEN, J., would grant the Petition for 
Rehearing.

FOOTNOTES

1 See, for statistics, D. 
Westman, Whistleblowing: The Law of Retaliatory Discharge 45 (1991).

2 The record clearly shows 
that the telephone call by Mekss to K. Gary Sherman, Executive Secretary of the 
Board, was the result of a suggestion from Ms. Kathy Karpan, Secretary of State, 
who was a member of the Board by whom Sherman was employed. Mekss followed that 
suggestion and was then terminated. The factual superficiality and obviousness 
of this case is hardly subject to question. Notes of the facility director, 
Superintendent Jack Geisler, reveal an apparent warning by Sherman to Mekss that "she 
should get on [the] right side or get out."

     Subsequent to the 
occurrence of these events, the superintendent of the facility retired and, at a 
later date, the institution itself was transferred from the Board (confinement) 
to the Department of Family Services (social welfare and family support). No one 
will ever know how much contribution to public benefit this one strong-willed 
employee may have actually made.

3 The judiciary, in 
requirement to confine female juveniles, has a high interest in the performance 
of this institution with no other facility except the women's prison in 
Lusk, Wyoming available when something must be done 
with the individual. This controversy consequently involved the one available 
state institution for judicial commitment of the uncontrolled or criminally 
inclined juvenile females. Wulf, 883 F.2d 842. Nothing in this record shows that 
the judiciary was asked about agency performance when the Personnel Review Board 
rendered the decision adverse to the employee. The issue of institutional 
performance within its assigned mission of unquestionable importance to the 
state got lost in managerial ego and the "I am right, shut up" syndrome. The 
record realistically provides no compelling evidence to demonstrate that this 
employee was either right or wrong about the substance of employee concerns for 
the facility's basic operation.

     Directly presented in 
the first sequence of these events was contention of mismanagement. The second 
sequence invoked the question of whitewash of that mismanagement. Nothing 
provided in this record permits or justifies determination whether either or 
both were the result of an unjustified, unprincipled, factually untrue malicious 
activity of the employee, or just a cover-up where the whistleblower is 
terminated so that problems will not be uncovered or publicly 
considered.

     Attachments to Mekss' 
brief, which consisted of contemporary news stories from a statewide newspaper, 
were attacked by a motion to strike by the Attorney General's office. The motion 
was sustained by order of this court determining that "various news articles 
from the Casper Star-Tribune be stricken and shall be disregarded by the 
court."