Case Title: Dynan v. Rocky Mountain Federal Sav. and Loan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-92

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dynan v. Rocky Mountain Federal Sav. and Loan1990 WY 48792 P.2d 631Case Number: 89-92Decided: 05/08/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN 
DYNAN,

 APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN FEDERAL 
SAVINGS AND LOAN; ROCKY MOUNTAIN CAPITAL CORPORATION; AND BILL LUCAS, 

APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

 

Harold F. Buck 
and Nicholas Vassallo, Buck & Lewis, Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

George E. 
Powers, Jr., Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne, for 
appellees.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The focus of this 
case is upon the question of whether a claim for wrongful discharge by an 
officer of a federal savings and loan institution appropriately is foreclosed by 
summary judgment on the ground that any genuine issues of fact lack materiality 
because of the preemptive effect of federal law. Two collateral issues are 
injected into this major theme. The first of those is whether the termination of 
employment must be held to be wrongful because it was contrary to public policy. 
The second is whether the individual who terminated the employment, also an 
officer and employee of the federal savings and loan institution, can be liable 
for tortious interference with a contract or prospective economic advantage. The 
trial court granted the motion for summary judgment presented by the federal 
savings and loan institution, essentially ruling that any issues of fact were 
not material because of the preemptive effect of federal law. It also held that 
there was no violation of public policy, as a matter of law, and invoked the 
rule that an agent is not liable for tortious interference with a contract with 
his principal. To the extent that the trial judge relied upon absolute federal 
preemption in this case, we are not in accord with his interpretation of the 
law, but we agree that, in the circumstances of this case, the employment 
contract was an employment at will as a matter of law and, therefore, any issues 
of fact relating to cause for termination are not material. We also agree that 
there was no violation of any public policy as a matter of law, and that an 
agent, an employee of a corporation, is not liable for tortious interference 
with a contract or prospective economic advantage relating to an employment 
contract made with his principal. We also are in accord with the trial court's 
disposition of an additional procedural question relating to the propriety of 
the denial of a motion to amend the complaint with respect to allegations of 
fraud. We affirm the summary judgment entered by the trial court, but justify 
that disposition in a somewhat different fashion.

[¶2]      In his Brief of 
Appellant, John Dynan (Dynan), the discharged employee, states only a single 
issue which is:

"Whether the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 
appellees."

Dynan expands 
upon the single issue in his argument by asserting the following 
contentions:

"A. The evidence before 
the district court presented genuine issues of material fact concerning 
appellant's breach of contract claim and appellees were not entitled to summary 
judgment on that claim as a matter of law.

"B. The district court 
erred in granting summary judgment on appellant's claim of termination against 
public policy.

"C. The district court 
erred in denying appellant's motion for leave to amend his 
complaint.

"D. The record presents 
genuine issues of material fact on appellant's claim of tortious interference 
with a contract or prospective economic advantage."

In their Brief 
of Appellees, Rocky Mountain Federal Savings and Loan (RMF), Rocky Mountain 
Capital Corporation (RMC), and Bill Lucas (Lucas) restate the issues, as they 
perceive them, in this way:

"I. Are there any issues 
of material fact which would preclude the district court from entering summary 
judgment against plaintiff's claims for breach of 
contract?

"A. Are plaintiff's 
claims for breach of contract under state law preempted by the rules of the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board? 

"B. Did the plaintiff 
raise an issue of material fact with respect to his status as a probationary 
employee based upon submission of evidence that would be admissible at 
trial?

"II. Are there any 
material facts in dispute which would support plaintiff's recovery based upon a 
cause of action for termination against public policy?

"III. Did the district 
court abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend his 
complaint?

"IV. Are there any issues 
of material fact which would preclude the district court from entering summary 
judgment with respect to plaintiff's claims for tortious interference with 
contract or prospective economic advantage?"

[¶3]      The operative 
facts, as they are gleaned from the record submitted to the district court both 
in support of and in opposition to motions for summary judgment by both parties, 
start with Dynan's employment at Barclay's Mortgage Corporation in Colorado. 
While so employed, he was contacted by Executive Resources, an employee 
recruiting firm, with respect to a possible position with the Wyoming division 
of RMF. This contact led to meetings with various officers and executives from 
RMF, and he was offered employment with that firm. Dynan accepted that offer on 
June 11, 1985 and was appointed a vice president of RMF on June 26, 1985. At the 
same time, he also was made an officer of RMC, which is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of RMF.

[¶4]      There is no 
discrete writing that demonstrates the details of Dynan's employment. At the 
time he was hired, he was advised of certain personnel policies that applied to 
all employees of RMF. Among these policies was a ninety-day probationary term 
during which a new employee could be terminated without cause. The probationary 
term extended to 180 days in the case of management positions. Dynan, by 
deposition, testified that he requested a waiver of this probationary period 
because he was leaving a secure job to work for RMF. He testified that an 
officer of RMF agreed to this request, but that allegation was directly 
controverted by deposition testimony of the officer whom Dynan asserts agreed to 
the waiver, another officer of RMF, and Lucas.

[¶5]      Dynan also 
testified that he accepted the position with RMF, and worked in that position, 
pursuant to the terms of the employee handbook. That handbook, in addition to 
the probationary periods described previously, provides in part as 
follows:

"PROGRESSIVE 
DISCIPLINE

"Discipline is defined as 
training that develops self control and character. It is necessary for the 
orderly and efficient operation of any organization. Because of the need for 
orderliness and self control, certain rules and regulations contained in this 
handbook have been developed and others may be issued from time to time so that 
we know what is expected in our relationships with one another and toward our 
customers.

"There are some things 
which cannot be condoned. Theft of Association or employee property, willful 
destruction of Association or employee property, fighting, using nonprescribed 
narcotics, being intoxicated while on the job, sleeping on the job, gross 
misconduct and gross negligence are things that can result in immediate 
suspension or discharge.

"Occasionally, an 
employee may fall into poor personal or work habits. Counselling by the 
supervisor usually will be enough, but if counselling fails, a disciplinary 
procedure may be necessary, and if necessary. . . .

"First Step: The 
employee will be orally notified by the supervisor of the problem. The 
supervisor will work with the employee to correct the problem. If the employee 
continues without improvement, the supervisor will go to the next 
step.

"Second Step: The 
employee will be given a written reprimand by the immediate supervisor, and that 
reprimand becomes a part of the employee's record. If the employee continues 
without improvement, the supervisor will use the next 
step.

"Third Step: The 
employee will be suspended without pay for a period not to exceed three work 
days. * * * If * * * the employee still makes no improvement, the supervisor 
will resort to the final step.

"Final Step: The 
Employee will be discharged. * * * An employee subjected to the discipline 
procedure, who feels unfairly treated, has a right to the full use of the 
company's grievance procedure. Depending upon the seriousness of a problem or in 
cases of chronic offenders, the steps in this disciplinary procedure may be 
bypassed resulting in immediate termination."

[¶6]      The depositions 
in the file indicate that RMF had a reputation within the savings and loan 
industry for producing "poor quality loans" and that Dynan's primary duty with 
the firm, and the reason for which he was hired, was to alleviate this problem. 
Dynan stated that he was "essentially given carte blanche to straighten out the 
mess." Dynan's understanding is given additional support by the deposition 
testimony of the senior vice president of RMF, whom Dynan asserted had agreed to 
waive the probationary term. Dynan proceeded to accomplish his duties in 
accordance with that understanding of his assignment, and he attempted to 
implement a policy of strict adherence to National Standards for Loan 
Underwriting in lieu of the existing corporate policy with respect to making 
loans. According to Dynan, however, the controlling management of RMF was 
content with the existing loan policy and resisted changes that he proposed. He 
testified that this attitude was demonstrated by several "questionable" loans, 
one of which was the Steve Rosen loan that ultimately, according to Dynan, led 
to his dismissal.

[¶7]      In the spring of 
1985, Rosen, a resident of Colorado, contacted RMF with respect to a home loan 
in the amount of $175,000. He was referred to a Colorado employee who, 
apparently, committed the firm to a loan in this amount. Rosen, acting upon what 
he perceived to be a commitment, obtained a bridge loan from another source and 
proceeded to close his home purchase. Because of its size, the loan that he had 
requested would not qualify for normal marketing procedures carried out under 
the Federal National Mortgage Act or Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
guidelines. When this problem was brought to the attention of a vice president 
of RMC, that officer decided that the best plan was to place the loan on the 
secondary market where, hopefully, a private investor could be found to purchase 
it. If this did not occur, the only alternative, assuming that the commitment 
was to be honored, was for RMF to carry the loan in its own 
portfolio.

[¶8]      The management at 
RMF was agreeable to the latter resolution, but Dynan was not. He believed that 
the loan was questionable and should not be approved unless an investor could be 
found on the secondary market. This difference in opinion matured on August 14, 
1985 when Rosen telephoned Dynan to ask about the status of his loan. Dynan 
advised him that the loan could not be extended under the existing 
circumstances. Dynan testified that Rosen became irate and advised him that he, 
Rosen, was a friend of Lucas and would see to it that Dynan was fired for 
refusing the loan. Rosen then did telephone Lucas and did discuss the situation 
directly with him.

[¶9]      Dynan alleges 
that the telephone call coupled with his reluctance to approve the questionable 
Rosen loan precipitated his discharge. In his deposition, Rosen denied making 
any such threats, and RMF asserts that Dynan's termination was due to other 
reasons and was not the result of any conflict regarding the Rosen loan. The 
record does disclose that Lucas confronted Dynan and discharged him soon after 
the Rosen telephone call to Lucas.

[¶10]   Dynan brought this suit against 
RMF, Lucas, and Rosen alleging breach of contract, termination against public 
policy, fraud, libel and slander, and a claim of intentional interference with a 
contract or prospective economic advantage. He asserted damages resulting from 
loss of reputation, lost wages, and emotional distress. He also included a 
demand for exemplary, or punitive, damages against all defendants. Subsequently, 
a stipulation was entered into that resulted in all claims against Rosen being 
withdrawn, and Rosen was dismissed from the case. Even though RMF contended that 
its employee handbook did not prescribe any terms and conditions of Dynan's 
employment, it asserted that he could be terminated without cause because he was 
discharged within the probationary term described in the employee handbook. That 
essentially was a fall back position for RMF because its primary contention was 
that Dynan's employment was an employment at will as a matter of federal 
regulatory law, which RMF asserts preempts the application of any rules of state 
law.

[¶11]   After discovery, the remaining 
defendants moved for summary judgment on all remaining issues. At the same time, 
Dynan filed a motion for a partial summary judgment on the issue of breach of 
contract. Not long after that, Dynan withdrew his claims of libel and slander. 
At the hearing on all pending motions, including those for summary judgment, 
Dynan made an oral motion to the court for leave to amend his complaint to 
include allegations that RMF and Lucas induced him to accept employment by false 
promises of job security through the use of the employee handbook and that he 
relied on those false promises to his detriment. That hearing was not reported. 
On February 28, 1989, the district court entered its order denying Dynan's 
motions and granting the motions of RMF and Lucas for summary judgment. This 
appeal is taken from that order.

[¶12]   Dynan's primary contention is that 
the materials furnished to the district court with respect to his claims of 
breach of contract demonstrate genuine issues of material fact and that RMF and 
Lucas were not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The factual 
issues asserted relate to whether the probationary period was waived and whether 
the RMF employee handbook, with its sequential discipline provisions leading to 
termination, constituted an employment contract that should have been applied in 
this instance. RMF and Lucas contend that these asserted factual issues are not 
material because, as a matter of federal regulatory law relating to the savings 
and loan industry, Dynan was an employee at will and subject to termination at 
any time without cause. See Berry v. American Federal Savings, 730 P.2d 905 
(Colo. App. 1986). They then argue that, by virtue of the employment at will, 
they are free from any liability to Dynan. See Siebken v. Town of Wheatland, 700 P.2d 1236 (Wyo. 1985); Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 1985). 
We recognize as legally correct the claim of RMF and Lucas that even genuine 
issues of fact are immaterial if those issues have no relevance in light of a 
controlling rule of law.

[¶13]   The resolution of these opposing 
arguments requires a consideration of whether rules of state law are preempted 
by federal law in this context and, if so, whether that preemption leads to a 
conclusion that an officer employed in the savings and loan industry is an 
employee at will under all circumstances. We begin with the fundamental 
principle that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States, 
art. VI, cl. 2, invalidates all state laws that either "`interfere with or are 
contrary to' federal law." Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical 
Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712, 105 S. Ct. 2371, 2375, 85 L. Ed. 2d 714 
(1985), quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211, 22 U.S. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824). 
There is more than one way in which the doctrine of preemption can be 
demonstrated. The most direct method is for Congress to establish federal 
preemption by stating its intention to do so in express terms. Hillsborough; 
Jones v. Rath Packing Company, 430 U.S. 519, 97 S. Ct. 1305, 51 L. Ed. 2d 604, reh. 
denied 431 U.S. 925, 97 S. Ct. 2201, 53 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1977). If that demonstration 
of intention is not present, preemption can be inferred when the scheme of 
federal regulation so comprehensively pervades the area of law that no room is 
left for supplementary state regulation. Hillsborough; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corporation, 331 U.S. 218, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 91 L. Ed. 1447 (1947). Federal 
preemption also will be inferred where "the federal interest is so dominant that 
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the 
same subject." Rice, 331 U.S.  at 230, 67 S. Ct.  at 1152.

[¶14]   If preemption is determined to be 
present, "state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with 
federal law." Hillsborough, 471 U.S.  at 712, 105 S. Ct.  at 2375. "Such a conflict 
arises when `compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility,'" Hillsborough, 471 U.S.  at 712, 105 S. Ct.  at 2375, quoting 
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 1217-1218, 10 L. Ed. 2d 248, reh. denied 374 U.S. 858, 83 S. Ct. 1861, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1082 (1963), "or when state law `stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" 
Hillsborough, 471 U.S.  at 712, 105 S. Ct.  at 2375.

[¶15]   Congress has not expressly 
articulated preemption in the area of employment practices in the savings and 
loan industry. It has, however, manifested its intention to empower a regulatory 
board, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Board), with requisite authority to 
promulgate regulations concerning the savings and loan industry. See Berry, 730 P.2d 905. Section 5(a) of the Homeowners Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1989 
Supp.), provides:

"In order to provide 
thrift institutions for the deposit or investment of funds and for the extension 
of credit for homes and other goods and services, the Board is authorized, under 
such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organization, 
incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associations to be 
known as Federal savings and loan associations, or Federal savings banks, and to 
issue charters therefor, giving primary consideration to the best practices of 
thrift institutions in the United States."

[¶16]   The Board has invoked this 
authority and promulgated regulations expressly evidencing an intent to control 
the savings and loan industry to the degree that there is no opportunity for 
state regulation. Title 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (1989) provides:

"Sec. 545.2 Federal 
preemption.

"The regulations in this 
Part 545 are promulgated pursuant to the plenary and exclusive authority of the 
Board to regulate all aspects of the operations of Federal associations, as set 
forth in section 5(a) of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1464, as 
amended. This exercise of the Board's authority is preemptive of any state law 
purporting to address the subject of the operations of a Federal 
association."

As is true of 
federal statutes, properly promulgated federal regulations preempt state law, 
and our Wyoming law, if contrary to such regulations, has no effect. See 
Hillsborough, Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 73 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1982); U.S. v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 
81 S. Ct. 1554, 6 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1961); People of State of California v. Coast 
Federal Savings and Loan Association, 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D.Cal. 1951). See also 
Cole v. Cartaret Savings Bank, P.A., 540 A.2d 923 (N.J.Super.L. 1988). There is 
no denial of the proposition that pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 545.2, the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board regulations covered "all aspects of every federal savings 
and loan association from its cradle to its corporate grave." People, 98 F. Supp.  at 316. There is no disagreement in this case that RMF is a federal 
savings and loan association subject to the rules promulgated by the 
Board.

[¶17]   RMF and Lucas invoke 12 C.F.R. § 
544.5(b)(11)(b) (1989) to establish that Dynan was an employee at will. The 
cited provision provides:

"(b) The following 
requirements are applicable to Federal mutual 
associations:

* * * * * 
*

"11. Powers of the 
Board. The board of directors [trustees] shall have the 
power.

* * * * * 
*

"(b) To fix the 
compensation of directors [trustees], officers, and employees; and to remove any 
officer or employee at any time with or without cause; * * 
*."

Standing alone, 
this regulation indicates that Dynan was an employee at will subject to removal 
by the board of directors of RMF. It also implies, if construed in accord with 
our Wyoming precedent, that any such removal would result in no liability to 
Dynan. See Siebken, 700 P.2d 1236; Allen, 699 P.2d 277; Rompf v. John Q. Hammons 
Hotels, Inc., 685 P.2d 25 (Wyo. 1984); Lukens v. Goit, 430 P.2d 607 (Wyo. 1967); 
Long v. Forbes, 58 Wyo. 533, 136 P.2d 242, 158 A.L.R. 224 
(1943).

[¶18]   In addition, RMF and Lucas direct 
our attention to 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.122 and 563.39, 
providing:

"12 C.F.R. § 
545.122

"A Federal association, 
upon specific approval of its board of directors, may enter into employment 
contracts with its officers and other employees in accordance with § 563.39 of 
this chapter.

"12 C.F.R. § 
563.39

"(a) General. An 
insured institution may enter into an employment contract with its officers and 
other employees only in accordance with the requirements of this section. All 
employment contracts shall be in writing and shall be approved specifically by 
the institution's board of directors. An institution shall not enter into an 
employment contract with any of its officers or their employees if such contract 
would constitute an unsafe or unsound practice. The making of such an employment 
contract would be an unsafe or unsound practice if such contract would lead to 
material financial loss or damage to the institution or could interfere 
materially with the exercise by the members of its board of directors of their 
duty or discretion provided by law, charter, bylaw or regulation as to the 
employment or termination of employment of an officer or employee of the 
institution.

"(b) Required 
provisions. Each employment contract shall provide 
that:

"(1) The institution's 
board of directors may terminate the officer or employee's employment at any 
time, but any termination by the institution's board of directors other than 
termination for cause, shall not prejudice the officer or employee's right to 
compensation or other benefits under the contract. The officer or employee shall 
have no right to compensation or other benefits for any period after termination 
for cause. Termination for cause shall include * * *."

RMF and Lucas 
assert that these provisions also support the trial court's ruling that, as a 
matter of law, Dynan was an employee at will.

[¶19]   We are not so certain that these 
provisions manifest a federal rule that an employee, such as Dynan, is, without 
exception, an employee at will. They do not serve to demonstrate that a 
termination without cause can be effected without liability in the usual context 
of the rights of an employer in an employment at will. A federally regulated 
institution, with the approval of its board of directors, may enter into 
contracts defining the terms of employment. Such contracts conceptually can 
include procedures for discharge, and the institution may be liable for 
compensation or other benefits under the contracts in the event of a termination 
without cause. The result is that an employment under such a contract is not an 
employment at will in the classic sense, notwithstanding the provision of the 
federal regulations that an employee can be terminated at any time. Liability, 
or the absence of liability, as a consequence of discharge is the real question 
in this case. The question is not whether Dynan can be terminated at any time, 
but whether, if he is terminated, there is no financial liability on the part of 
the appellees.

[¶20]   We recognize an ambiguity within 
these federal regulations. They appear to authorize termination without cause, 
but in another place, they say that termination without cause shall not 
prejudice the employee's contractual rights to compensation or other benefits. 
Recognition of this ambiguity constitutes an application of state law, but we do 
not perceive a problem with respect to federal preemption in this instance 
because our resolution is compatible with the federal regulations. See 
Hillsborough, 471 U.S. 707, 105 S. Ct. 2371, 85 L. Ed. 2d 714. Our application of 
state law does not conflict with the federal regulatory scheme. A different 
resolution than the one we invoke would require a change in either the federal 
statute or the federal regulation, which does not come within our 
province.

[¶21]   We still must support the 
determination of the district court, however. Dynan's employment was not an 
employment at will foreclosing liability for termination without cause as a 
matter of federal preemption, but we must still determine whether the 
termination was permissible in accordance with state law. Both parties, in 
varying degree, rely upon the personnel handbook of RMF. There is no question 
that the employment handbook contained a ninety-day probationary term for all 
employees, which was extended to 180 days for management positions. Dynan was 
terminated within the ninety-day period and, unless there was a valid waiver of 
that provision of his employment contract, his termination without cause was not 
wrongful.

[¶22]   At this juncture, we are required 
to return to the federal regulations because, while our rules of state law might 
justify an oral waiver of the probation in the employee's personnel manual, that 
rule could not control if in conflict with a provision of the federal 
regulations. Title 12 C.F.R. § 563.39 speaks directly to this situation. It 
provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) General. An 
insured institution may enter into an employment contract with its officers and 
other employees only in accordance with the requirements of this section. All 
employment contracts shall be in writing and shall be approved specifically by 
the institution's board of directors." (Emphasis 
supplied.)

There is nothing 
in the record that would serve to demonstrate a written waiver of the 
probationary term. We are constrained to apply that requirement of the federal 
regulation, and the result is that Dynan could not establish a lawful and valid 
waiver of the probationary term at trial. The consequence is that invocation of 
the contractual terms, upon which Dynan relies in part, demonstrates that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Dynan's discharge 
without cause is permitted by the contract. The employment relationship is a 
classic employment at will under Wyoming law, and no liability flows for the 
termination itself.

[¶23]   Dynan urges very strongly, however, 
that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because of his claim 
that the termination of the employment contract, if it was an employment at 
will, was contrary to public policy. Dynan's claim is that he was terminated 
because he refused to approve the Rosen loan, a loan that, in his judgment, was 
"bad" and could end up costing RMF and, ultimately, the public because savings 
and loan losses are underwritten by a federally sponsored insurance program. 
Dynan cites 12 C.F.R. § 563.17 for the proposition that it is contrary to public 
policy for such federally chartered savings and loan institutions to make 
unsound loans. He argues that his discharge, under the circumstances that he 
alleges, is contrary to public policy because terminations for failure to 
approve loans that are bad, in the judgment of the employee, chills his 
commitment to act in the best interests of his employer and the public. The 
employee might well prefer maintaining his job to acting in the best interests 
of the institution or others. See Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134 (D.R.I. 1988).

[¶24]   RMF and Lucas concede that a cause 
of action against an employer for termination of an employment at will contract 
in violation of public policy may lie. See Allen, 699 P.2d 277. Their response 
to Dynan's claim is the allegation that his discharge was not contrary to public 
policy and that, as a matter of fact, he was not discharged for refusing to 
approve the Rosen loan. The position of RMF and Lucas is that the Rosen 
transaction was merely the culmination of an ongoing dispute over professional 
judgment. They imply that Dynan, in fact, was terminated for other unstated 
reasons. At a superficial level, this dispute might well demonstrate a genuine 
issue of material fact with respect to whether Dynan was terminated in violation 
of a valid public policy and, thus, preclude summary judgment. 

[¶25]   This court has said, however, 
quoting with approval from Wehr v. Burroughs Corporation, 438 F. Supp. 1052, 
1055 (E.D. Pa. 1977):

"`It is clear then that 
the whole rationale undergirding the public policy exception is the vindication 
or the protection of certain strong policies of the community. If these policies 
or goals are preserved by other remedies, then the public policy is sufficiently 
served. Therefore, application of the public policy exception requires two 
factors: (1) that the discharge violate some well-established public policy; and 
(2) that there be no remedy to protect the interest of the aggrieved employee or 
society.'" Allen, 699 P.2d  at 284.

We perceive 
these factors to be sequential. First the "well-established public policy" must 
be demonstrated, and, if it is, then the court must consider whether another 
remedy can be found. The first element that Dynan must demonstrate is that the 
discharge did, in fact, violate some "well-established public policy." Allen. 
The absence of this element is the foundation for the flaw in Dynan's claim. 
"Generally, the specific expression of public policy arises from 
well-established legislative, judicial, or administrative mandate." Cummins, 690 F. Supp.  at 138. The federal regulations completely govern the federal savings 
and loan industry, and their mandates, therefore, articulate the parameters of 
public policy within the industry according to the intent of Congress. The loan 
policies of the member firms in this industry are regulated and scrutinized. See 
12 U.S.C. § 1464. Public policy does not depend upon the protection of the 
industry by the unfettered judgment of employees of firms in the industry. The 
parameters also include employment practices and employee termination, and the 
regulations permit discharge without cause. Protection of the public policy 
interests well may depend as much upon the power to terminate an ineffective or 
injudicious employee without cause as upon the unfettered judgment of an 
employee. This reasoning leads to the conclusion that it is not against public 
policy to act in accordance with the regulations. For that reason, we are unable 
to conclude that Dynan's discharge was contrary to public policy. The summary 
judgment in favor of RMF and Lucas on this claim must be 
affirmed.

[¶26]   Dynan next contends that the 
district court erred in denying him leave to amend his complaint. A decision 
such as that is discretionary with the court, however, and we do not disturb 
that ruling in the absence of clear evidence that there was an abuse of 
discretion. Bush v. Duff, 754 P.2d 159 (Wyo. 1988); Elder v. Jones, 608 P.2d 654 
(Wyo. 1980); Rose v. Rose, 576 P.2d 458 (Wyo. 1978); Breazeale v. Radich, 500 P.2d 74 (Wyo. 1972). The responsibility for presenting that evidence is assigned 
to Dynan. In this instance, he provides nothing to support his claim. His motion 
was an oral motion, and there is no written document for us to analyze. The 
hearing at which it was made was not reported, and we have no way of 
scrutinizing the reasons the district court may have invoked for its refusal of 
the motion. We have no way of weighing the question of the abuse of discretion 
in this case and, in the absence of a showing that would assist us in this 
regard, the denial of the motion by the district court must be 
affirmed.

[¶27]   As a final matter, we turn to 
Dynan's contention that the record does show genuine issues of material fact 
with respect to his claim of tortious interference with his contract or 
prospective economic advantage. When he presented this claim to the lower court, 
Dynan focused on the motivation of Lucas for discharging him, including 
allegations that Lucas acted out of personal gain. Without presenting tangible 
evidence of such conduct, however, Dynan goes directly to the conclusion that a 
mere finding of questionable motive supports the claim. He also alleged that 
Lucas acted beyond the scope of Lucas' employment in discharging him. Dynan 
refers us to no supportive authority, but he now attempts to persuade the court 
that unresolved questions surrounding these allegations present genuine issues 
of material fact. 

[¶28]   The following elements must be 
demonstrated to sustain a cause of action for tortious interference with a 
contract or prospective economic advantage:

"(1) the existence of a 
valid contractual relationship;

"(2) knowledge of the 
relationship on the part of the interferor;

"(3) intentional and 
improper interference inducing or otherwise causing a breach of termination of 
the relationship; and

"(4) resultant damage to 
the party whose relationship has been disrupted."

Dehnert v. Arrow 
Sprinklers, Inc., 705 P.2d 846, 850 (Wyo. 1985); Kvenild v. Taylor, 594 P.2d 972 
(1979); Board of Trustees of Weston County School District No. 1 v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009, reh. denied 587 P.2d 203 (Wyo. 1978). The third element is the 
critical one in this case because it demands that the plaintiff demonstrate that 
the defendant's actions were both intentional and improper. Without offering an 
explanation, the district court ruled that Lucas' actions were not improper. Our 
review of the materials submitted in support of, and in opposition to, the 
motion for summary judgment discloses nothing that justifies a contrary ruling. 
We defer to the judgment of the district court and affirm its 
ruling.

[¶29]   Without a determination that Lucas' 
actions in discharging Dynan were improper, as a matter of law, Dynan's claim of 
tortious interference with a contract or prospective economic advantage fails. 
The burden of providing that evidence is assigned to Dynan once the moving party 
has supported a motion through affidavit and other admissible evidence. Baldwin 
v. Dube, 751 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 1988); Connaghan v. Eighty-Eight Oil Company, 750 P.2d 1321 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶30]   The district court, again without 
offering an explanation, concluded that Lucas was not beyond the scope of his 
authority. This contention is crucial to Dynan's theory because, so long as 
Lucas was acting within the scope of his employment, his action may be justified 
as a matter of law. See Basin Electric Power Co-op. - Missouri Basin Power 
Project v. Howton, 603 P.2d 402 (Wyo. 1979) and the cases and authorities there 
cited. Again, we discover no information that would lead us to a different 
ruling. If Lucas indeed acted beyond the scope of his employment in discharging 
Dynan, in the absence of ratification by RMF, logic dictates that Dynan never 
was discharged. That conclusion is antithetical to Dynan's theory of wrongful 
termination. A contention that undercuts another theory lacks cogency as a 
matter of logic. Since Lucas cited no authority to us in support of this theory, 
we are justified in disposing of it in accordance with our rule that we will not 
consider issues that are not supported by citation of authority and cogent 
argument. Johnston v. Conoco, Inc., 758 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 1988); Smith v. Ensley, 
752 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1988); Osborn v. Manning, 685 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 1984). Were 
the issue directly posed, reason dictates that an action of wrongful 
interference directed against an employee or an agent of one of the parties to 
the contract must merge into any action for breach of the contract because the 
act of the agent must be attributed to the principal.

[¶31]   We conclude that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact with respect to Dynan's claim of breach of an 
employment contract and that RMF and Lucas were entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. With respect to the claim that, in any event, the termination was 
contrary to public policy, we agree with the trial court that this is not a 
valid contention as a matter of law. There are no genuine issues of material 
fact with respect to the claim of tortious interference with a contract or 
prospective economic advantage because, as a matter of law, Dynan was foreclosed 
from recovery against Lucas. There was no abuse of discretion demonstrated by 
the record on the part of the district court in denying Dynan leave to amend his 
complaint, and the district court's ruling on that matter is correct. The 
district court is affirmed on all of the issues asserted by 
Dynan.

GOLDEN, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶32]   Because there is a distinction 
between a public policy and the laws or regulations that reflect that policy, I 
specially concur on the question whether a public policy exception 
applies.

[¶33]   I cannot agree that the firing of 
employees for refusing to perform acts counter to a public policy does not 
implicate public policy concerns where regulations governing the industry 
authorize at-will employment. The parameters of public policies are not set by 
industry regulations. This approach puts the caboose before the engine. The 
regulations are evidence of the public policy, in this instance maintaining a 
stable lending industry by requiring sound lending practices. But the 
regulations are not, and do not somehow become, the policy. They are simply an 
administrative reflection of it.

[¶34]   Here, the underlying social policy 
is maintenance of a sound lending industry, not maintenance of a sound lending 
industry with at-will employment. Retaliatory discharge for refusing to make bad 
loans would violate that well-established public policy and satisfy the first 
factor required to invoke the public policy exception. By any line of reasoning, 
permitting at-will employment regulations to automatically negate the exception 
renders it meaningless in these circumstances.

[¶35]   However, I concur in the result 
because Dynan's circumstances will not satisfy the second required factor, that 
there be no remedy to protect the interest of the aggrieved employee or society. 
Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 284 (Wyo. 1985). While Dynan has no 
personal remedy, federal laws and regulations do protect society's interests by 
providing for regulatory scrutiny of lending practices. See U.S.C. § 1464(d) 
(1982).

[¶36]   This is where Dynan's situation 
differs from that of the school counselor in Leonard v. Converse County School 
District No. 2, 788 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 1990). In that case I said in dissent that 
the public policy of combatting child abuse would be thwarted by penalizing 
teachers who performed their statutory duty to report and assist in 
investigation of suspected child abuse. If Leonard's contract was not renewed 
because she performed a statutory duty, then not only was Leonard herself 
treated unfairly, but society's interest in protecting children from abuse was 
compromised. In this case it is not necessary that a lending industry employee 
act in a similarly unfettered manner, not because there was no violation of 
public policy, but because the public interest is otherwise adequately 
protected.

[¶37]   When deciding whether the public 
policy exception may apply we must keep our focus on the ball, which is the 
social goal itself, and not the regulations developed to further it. If 
employees are fired for acts consistent with that goal, public policy may be 
violated. The key question then becomes, does the individual or society have 
another way to vindicate the public policy? Here, the answer is yes.