Case Title: GERALD D. HUTCHINSON, TRUSTEE OF THE VERA J. HUTCHINSON REVOCABLE TRUST DATED OCTOBER 28, 1999 v. CARA J. TAFT, TRUSTEE OF THE TAFT LIVING TRUST DATED AUGUST 19, 1983, and BARBARA JO HARNEY COCKRELL and ROBERTA ANNE HARNEY CAUSEY, co-Executrices of the ESTATE OF LEON THOMSON HARNEY ; GERALD D. HUTCHINSON, TRUSTEE OF THE VERA J. HUTCHINSON REVOCABLE TRUST DATED OCTOBER 28, 1999 v. CARA J. TAFT, TRUSTEE OF THE TAFT LIVING TRUST DATED AUGUST 19, 1983, and BARBARA JO HARNEY COCKRELL and ROBERTA ANNE HARNEY CAUSEY, co-Executrices of the ESTATE OF LEON THOMSON HARNEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0028

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
GERALD D. HUTCHINSON, TRUSTEE OF THE VERA J. HUTCHINSON REVOCABLE TRUST DATED OCTOBER 28, 1999 v. CARA J. TAFT, TRUSTEE OF THE TAFT LIVING TRUST DATED AUGUST 19, 1983, and BARBARA JO HARNEY COCKRELL and ROBERTA ANNE HARNEY CAUSEY, co-Executrices of the ESTATE OF LEON THOMSON HARNEY ;  GERALD D. HUTCHINSON, TRUSTEE OF THE VERA J. HUTCHINSON REVOCABLE TRUST DATED OCTOBER 28, 1999 v. CARA J. TAFT, TRUSTEE OF THE TAFT LIVING TRUST DATED AUGUST 19, 1983, and BARBARA JO HARNEY COCKRELL and ROBERTA ANNE HARNEY CAUSEY, co-Executrices of the ESTATE OF LEON THOMSON HARNEY  2010 WY 5222 P.3d 1250Case Number: No. S-09-0028, S-09-0067Decided: 01/14/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
GERALD 
D. HUTCHINSON, TRUSTEE OF THE VERA J. HUTCHINSON REVOCABLE TRUST DATED OCTOBER 
28, 1999,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.CARA J. TAFT, 
TRUSTEE OF THE TAFT LIVING TRUST DATED AUGUST 19, 1983, and BARBARA JO HARNEY 
COCKRELL and ROBERTA ANNE HARNEY CAUSEY, co-Executrices of the ESTATE OF LEON 
THOMSON HARNEY,Appellees(Defendants).

GERALD 
D. HUTCHINSON, TRUSTEE OF THE VERA J. HUTCHINSON REVOCABLE TRUST DATED OCTOBER 
28, 1999,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.

 CARA 
J. TAFT, TRUSTEE OF THE TAFT LIVING TRUST DATED AUGUST 19, 1983, and BARBARA JO 
HARNEY COCKRELL and ROBERTA ANNE HARNEY CAUSEY, co-Executrices of the ESTATE OF 
LEON THOMSON HARNEY,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant in Case No. S-09-0028:

Matthew 
H. Romsa, John M. Kuker and James M. Peterson of Romsa & Kuker, LLC, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Romsa.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees in Case No. S-09-0028:

James 
R. Salisbury of Riske, Salisbury & Kelly, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Gerald D. Hutchinson's predecessors in 
interest (the Hutchinsons) leased property owned by Josephine Taft.  After leasing the property for about ten 
years, the Hutchinsons ceased making the lease payments but continued to use the 
property.  When a trustee of the 
Taft Living Trust and co-executrices of the estate of one of Josephine Taft's 
heirs (the Tafts) later listed the Taft property for sale, the Hutchinsons filed 
a claim to quiet title to the property in them on the theory of adverse 
possession.

                                                        

[¶2]  During a trial to the court, the 
Hutchinsons presented their witnesses and rested.  The Tafts moved for judgment on partial 
findings.  The district court 
granted the motion and entered a judgment and order for the Tafts.  On appeal, the Hutchinsons claim the 
district court erred in granting the motion for judgment on partial findings, 
denying admission of an exhibit and denying their motions to amend the findings 
or for a new trial.  We affirm.       

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]  The Hutchinsons present the issues for 
this Court's review as follows:

 
 
            
I. Did the Trial Court [err] in granting Appellees' Rule 52 (c) motion? 

 
 
            
II. Did the Trial Court [err] in denying admission of Appellant's Exhibit 
9? 

 
 
            
III. Did the Trial Court [err] in denying Appellant's motion to amend the 
findings and motion for a new trial?

 
 
Although 
stated differently, the Tafts present essentially the same issues. 

 
 
FACTS

            

[¶4]  Josephine Taft took title to the Taft 
property in 1931.  Darrold and Vera 
Hutchinson purchased the Hutchinson property in 1961.  The Hutchinson property surrounds the 
Taft property on the north, east and south sides.  The same year the Hutchinsons purchased 
their property, they entered into a lease agreement with Josephine Taft in which 
they agreed to pay her $50 per year in exchange for use of her property.  From that time forward, the Hutchinsons 
used the Taft property primarily for grazing and some farming.  

 
 
[¶5]  Josephine Taft died in 1967 and her two 
heirs inherited the property as tenants in common.  The Hutchinsons continued to use the 
Taft property and paid the rent until the early 1970s.  Between 1970 and 1975, they stopped 
paying the rent but continued to use the property.   

 
 
[¶6]  In 1992, Darrold Hutchinson conveyed his 
interest in the Hutchinson property to his wife, Vera, who later conveyed all of 
the property to Gerald Hutchinson, trustee of the Vera J. Hutchinson Revocable 
Trust.  In 1996, Josephine Taft's 
heirs died, and their respective interests in the Taft property were distributed 
to their spouses, Cara J. Taft and Leon Thomson Harney.  Through these deaths and conveyances, 
the Hutchinsons, and their third party lessees, continued to use the Taft 
property primarily for grazing and some farming.

 
 
[¶7]  In July of 2003, the Tafts listed their 
property for sale.  The Hutchinsons 
filed a complaint to quiet title to the property in them, claiming they had 
adversely possessed the property since the early 1970s when they stopped paying 
rent.  The Tafts denied the 
claim.  Both parties filed motions 
for summary judgment.  The district 
court denied the respective motions and set the matter for a bench trial.  

 
 
[¶8]  On the day of trial, the parties 
presented opening statements and the Hutchinsons presented their witnesses and 
rested their case.  The Tafts moved 
for judgment on partial findings pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52(c), which 
provides:

 
 
            
(c)  Judgment on partial findings.  If 
during a trial without a jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and the 
court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment as 
matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot 
under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding 
on that issue, or the court may decline to render any judgment until the close 
of all the evidence.  That party 
against whom entry of such a judgment is considered shall be entitled to no 
special inference as a consequence of such consideration, and the court may 
weigh the evidence and resolve conflicts.  
Such a judgment shall be supported by findings as provided in subdivision 
(a) of this rule.

 
 
In 
support of the motion, the Tafts asserted the Hutchinsons had not shown that 
their possession of the Taft property was adverse.  After hearing argument from both 
parties, the district court granted the motion.  

 
 
[¶9]  The district court subsequently entered 
a judgment and order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
accordance with Rule 52(c).  The 
Hutchinsons filed motions for a new trial pursuant to W.R.C.P. 59 and for 
amendment to the district court's findings or additional findings.  After a hearing, the district court 
denied the motions.  The Hutchinsons 
timely appealed the district court order to this Court.           

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
1.         
Order Granting Motion on Partial Findings

 
 
[¶10]  The Hutchinsons contend they met their 
burden of showing adverse possession; therefore, the district court erred in 
granting the Rule 52(c) motion.  
Citing Kimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303 (Wyo. 1999) and Davis v. 
Chadwick, 2002 WY 157, 55 P.3d 1267 (Wyo. 2002), they assert that they were 
required to show, and did show, that from the early 1970s when they stopped 
paying rent to the present their possession of the Taft property was actual, 
open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, hostile and under claim of right or 
color of title.  Furthermore, the 
Hutchinsons assert they proved that they enclosed the Taft property in a fence 
and that evidence alone was sufficient under Wyoming law to establish adverse 
possession.     

 
 
[¶11]  The Tafts respond that the district 
court correctly granted their motion because the Hutchinsons did not prove their 
use of the property was adverse, rather, the evidence showed that their use 
continued to be permissive even after they stopped paying rent.  The Tafts point to evidence presented 
during the Hutchinsons' case showing they:  
used the Taft property as tenants pursuant to a lease allowing them to 
graze livestock and farm; never paid the taxes on the property; made no 
substantial improvements to the property; executed a disclaimer in 1964 
acknowledging that they were tenants of Josephine Taft and claimed no other 
right to the property; had notice when the Tafts entered into oil and gas leases 
for the property in 1989 and did not assert that they owned the property; and 
had notice and did not assert ownership when in 2003 the Tafts negotiated and 
sold part of the property to the State of Wyoming for purposes of widening the 
county road and converting it to a state highway.          

 
 
[¶12]  Like Rule 50(a)(1) allowing the entry of 
judgment as a matter of law at the close of a plaintiff's case in a jury trial, 
Rule 52(c) allows the district court to enter judgment during a bench trial 
after a party has presented all of his or her evidence and it is clear under 
controlling law the claim cannot be maintained.  We review an order granting judgment as 
a matter of law under Rule 50(a)(1) de 
novo, giving no deference to the district court's decision.  Conner v. Bd. of Co. Comm'rs, Natrona 
Co., 2002 WY 148, ¶ 8, 54 P.3d 1274, 1279 (Wyo. 2002).   It is appropriate that we review a 
district court's Rule 52(c) order granting judgment on partial findings under 
the same standard.  We view the 
plaintiff's evidence as true and afford it all favorable and reasonable 
inferences.  Mountain View/Evergreen Improv. and Serv. 
Dist. v. Casper Concrete Co., 912 P.2d 529, 531 (Wyo. 1996).  When the plaintiff's proof has failed in 
some aspect, the motion is properly granted; when the plaintiff's proof is 
overwhelming or when the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case, the motion is properly 
denied.  True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781, 795 (Wyo. 1989), citing Fuller 
v. Fuller, 606 P.2d 306, 307-308, (Wyo. 1980).  

 
 
[¶13]  As the Hutchinsons state, to prove that 
they adversely possessed the Taft property, they were required to show actual, 
open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of the Taft property and 
that such possession was hostile, under claim of right or color of title and 
continued for the statutory ten year period.   Kimball, 993 P.2d  at 305.  Absent a clear showing to the contrary, 
a person who has occupied the land for the statutory period, in a manner plainly 
indicating that he has acted as the owner thereof, is entitled to a presumption 
of adverse possession and the burden shifts to the opposing party to explain 
such possession.  Id.  If, however, a claimant's use of the 
property is shown to be permissive, he cannot acquire title by adverse 
possession.  Id. at 306.  

 
 
[¶14]  The Hutchinsons concede that initially 
they used the property permissively as tenants pursuant to the lease granted by 
the Tafts and, in accordance with the lease, paid rent of $50 per year from 1961 
until the early 1970s.  For that 
period of time, they do not contend their use of the property was adverse.  They assert, however, that when they 
stopped paying rent sometime between 1970 and 1975 and continued to openly use 
the land for pasturing livestock and farming, their use was no longer 
permissive.  They claim the action 
of ceasing to make rental payments was a declaration of hostility so manifest 
and notorious that actual notice of adverse use must be presumed.  They further claim that the evidence 
that their property and the Taft property were enclosed together inside a fence, 
with no fence separating the two properties from each other, established adverse 
possession.  For the latter 
proposition, they cite Davis, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d  at 1270, in which we reaffirmed the principle that, "In some circumstances, 
enclosing land in a fence is sufficient to raise the flag' of an adverse 
claimant."  Id., citing Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 343 (Wyo. 
1966).

 
 
[¶15]  At trial, the evidence was undisputed 
that the Hutchinsons stopped paying rent in the early 1970s and continued to use 
the Taft property.  From 1961 until 
the Hutchinsons began leasing their property to third parties in 1997, they used 
the majority of their property and the Taft parcel for pasturing cattle and a 
smaller part, including 150 feet of the Taft parcel, for wheat farming. They 
used the property for these same purposes before and after they stopped paying 
rent.  Since 1997, when the 
Hutchinsons leased their property to third parties, the Taft parcel has been 
used along with the Hutchinson property primarily for pasture.  Thus, the use of the property has not 
changed materially since the Hutchinsons began renting it in 1961. 

 
 
[¶16]  The evidence was also undisputed that 
the Hutchinson and Taft properties were enclosed by a perimeter fence when the 
Hutchinsons purchased the property in 1961.  Although they maintained the fence 
enclosing the properties, the fence was built before they purchased their 
property; therefore, their claim that they enclosed the property inside a fence 
was not supported by the evidence.  
The evidence also showed that the Hutchinsons re-drilled a well that was 
located on the Taft parcel; however, the well was drilled by someone else prior 
to the time they purchased their property and began leasing the Taft parcel. 
Other than maintaining the fence and re-drilling the well, no evidence was 
presented that the Hutchinsons made substantial improvements on the Taft 
parcel.

 
 
[¶17]  In 1964, when the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers sought permission to construct a cable line across the Taft parcel, 
Josephine Taft gave them permission and signed the easement deed.  As part of the transaction, the 
Hutchinsons signed a disclaimer stating that they occupied the parcel as tenants 
of Josephine Taft and claimed no right, title, lien or interest in the premises 
by reason of the tenancy.  
Additionally, Josephine Taft, as owner, and the Hutchinsons, as tenants, 
signed an agreement in which they agreed to accept payment of $15 to them 
jointly for damage to the Hutchinsons' crops resulting from the easement.  

 
 
[¶18]  The evidence presented at trial showed 
the Tafts, not the Hutchinsons, paid the property taxes on the Taft parcel.  The evidence also showed that when the 
Tafts entered into oil and gas leases on their parcel in 1989, the division 
orders and other documentation relating to those leases were signed by, and the 
royalties were paid to, the Tafts as owners.  Likewise, when the State sought to 
purchase a strip of the Hutchinson and Taft properties in order to widen the 
county road and convert it to a state highway, the State transacted with and 
paid the Hutchinsons for their property and separately transacted with and paid 
the Tafts for their strip of property.  
Although the Hutchinsons had notice of the Tafts' transactions with the 
State and the oil companies, they did not challenge the Tafts' title to the 
property or assert that they owned the property.  

 
 
[¶19]  A permissive user may change his 
possession into adverse title with a clear, positive, and continuous disclaimer 
and disavowal of the title of the true owner brought home to the latter's 
knowledge.  Kimball, 993 P.2d  at 306.  "[T]here must be either actual notice of 
the hostile claim or acts or declarations of hostility so manifest and notorious 
that actual notice will be presumed in order to change a permissive or otherwise 
non-hostile possession into one that is hostile."  Id.  We have applied these principles in a 
number of cases to reach varying results.  
See Kimball, upholding rulings that one 
claimant did not establish hostile use by showing use of property for pasture 
that was enclosed inside a fence off the property line but another claimant 
established hostile use by showing she built a home on one acre of property 
inside the fence and erected a fence to keep cattle from grazing around the 
home; Davis, ¶ 12, 55 P.3d  at 1271, 
upholding a finding of hostile use where the claimant had used the property for 
grazing purposes continuously for thirty years and the property was enclosed 
with his property inside a boundary fence separating it from the record title 
owner's property; Addison v. 
Dallarosa-Handrich, 2007 WY 110, ¶ 7, 161 P.3d 1089, 1090-91 (Wyo. 2007), 
upholding a finding of no hostile use where property was enclosed inside fence 
of convenience and claimant used it to grow trees; Cook v. Eddy, 2008 WY 111, ¶ 8, 193 P.3d 705, 708-09 (Wyo. 2008) upholding a finding of hostile use where the property 
was enclosed with the claimant's property inside a boundary fence and the 
claimant put up "No Trespassing" signs.  
None of these cases involved the situation we are presented with here, 
where the initial use was permissive pursuant to a rental agreement and the 
claimant asserts it became hostile upon cessation of the rental payments.  Absent Wyoming case law, we look to 
other jurisdictions for guidance.

 
 
[¶20]  In Glover v. Glover, 92 P.3d 387 (Alaska 
2004), the court addressed a similar issue.  Billy Glover's predecessor in interest 
owned Lot 9 and allowed Dan Snyder to build a house on it and live there.  After the lot was conveyed to Mr. 
Glover, he sold it in 1965 to a third party who later conveyed it back to Mr. 
Glover.  When Mr. Glover's successor 
in interest tried to sell the lot, Mr. Snyder's successor in interest, who had 
continued to live in the house, claimed ownership on the basis of adverse 
possession.  The district court 
determined that Mr. Snyder's use of the lot was permissive until Mr. Glover sold 
it in 1965 and at that point it became adverse.  

 
 
[¶21]  The Alaska Supreme Court disagreed, 
holding there was insufficient evidence of adverse use to support the district 
court's determination.  The Court 
stated:

 
 
[W]hen 
possession begins with the true owner's permission, it cannot become hostile 
unless the presumption of permission "is rebutted by proof of a distinct and 
positive assertion of a right hostile to the owner of the 
property.'"

 
 

Id. 
at 392.  Addressing the issue of 
cessation of rental payments, the Court stated:

 
 
[T]he 
fact that no rent was paid after [a specified date], cannot defeat the 
permissive nature of the [tenant's] possession.  Nonpayment of rent does not establish 
hostility.  The passive failure to 
make payments is not a "distinct and positive assertion" of ownership.  If nonpayment terminated the lease, it 
only turned [the tenant's] interest in the land into a tenancy at 
sufferance.  "An estate at 
sufferance is an interest in land which exists when a person who had possessory 
interest in land by virtue of an effective conveyance, wrongfully continues in 
the possession of the land after the termination of such interest, but without 
asserting a claim to superior title."  
A tenancy at sufferance is a permissive interest and cannot be the basis 
for adverse possession.  
Furthermore, we decline to establish a rule that gives tenants an 
incentive to stop paying rent in the hope of establishing an adverse possession 
claim.  

 
 

Id. 
at 393.  

 
 
[¶22]  The Alaska court concluded that to 
become an adverse possessor, a tenant must openly and explicitly disclaim and 
disavow any and all holding under his former landlord and unreservedly and 
steadily assert that he himself is the owner of the true title. 

 
 
[W]hen 
a claimant started out occupying land permissively, it is essential that his 
new, hostile interest in the property be made clear to the true owner.  . . .   [I]f a tenant merely acts as he always 
did, the owner will not be on notice of his new, hostile claim. 

 
 

An 
adverse claimant who entered land as a tenant must usually show some distinct 
act, like an open announcement of his claim or a change in his use of the land, 
sufficient to serve as a distinct and positive assertion of his claim to 
own[ership of] the property.

 
 

Id. 
at 394.

 
 
[¶23] 
The Alaska court's reasoning is consistent with our jurisprudence requiring that 
one  claiming his use of another's 
property is no longer permissive and has become hostile must establish that he 
clearly, positively, and continuously disavowed the true owner's title with the 
latter's knowledge.  Under this 
standard, it would not be enough for a tenant to show merely that he stopped 
paying rent.  Rather, he must 
establish that he took affirmative steps, such as an open announcement or a 
change in use, to repudiate the true owner's title and claim the land as his 
own.  The Hutchinsons took no such 
affirmative steps.  Their use of the 
Taft parcel remained essentially the same the entire time and they did not 
disavow the Tafts' ownership when to do so would have been consistent with their 
present claim.  In particular, their 
adverse possession claim is undermined by the fact that they signed 
documentation in 1964 acknowledging the Tafts' ownership of the property and did 
nothing to repudiate the Tafts' title when the Tafts entered into oil and gas 
leases on their parcel in 1989 for which they received royalty payments and sold 
part of their parcel to WYDOT in 2003.1    

  

[¶24]  In concluding that the evidence did not 
establish adverse possession, we note that some jurisdictions have adopted a 
less stringent approach than the Alaska court.  In Tex-Wis Co. v. Johnson, 534 S.W.2d 895, 
899 (Tex. 1976), for example, the Court held that adverse possession is 
established by evidence showing a tenant's long continued possession of the land 
and the true owner's non-assertion of ownership.  Even under that standard, however, the 
Hutchinsons' claim would fail.  The 
Texas court defined "non-assertion of ownership" as the absence of any overt act 
of ownership on the part of the true owner that is inconsistent with adverse 
possessor's claim.  The Tafts' 
actions in entering into oil and gas leases on the property and selling a 
portion of the property to the State constituted overt acts of ownership 
inconsistent with the Hutchinsons' adverse possession claim.  Viewing the evidence the Hutchinsons 
presented as true, we find no error in the district court's ruling granting 
judgment for the Tafts. 

 
 

2.                    
Exhibit 
9

 
 

[¶25]  On 
the day of trial before opening statements, the Tafts objected to the 
Hutchinsons' Exhibit 9.  The 
district court did not rule on the objection.  The trial proceeded and when the 
Hutchinsons rested the district court entered judgment on partial findings in 
favor of the Tafts without ever ruling on the admissibility of Exhibit 9. 
The 
Hutchinsons assert the district court abused its discretion in failing to admit 
Exhibit 9 when they requested its admission prior to trial.  Exhibit 9 consisted of Cara Taft's and 
Mr. Harney's discovery responses in which they stated:

 
 
The 
Taft family has owned the subject property since December of 1909.  [Cara Taft and Leon Harney] have known 
Josephine Taft since 1939.  They 
knew of her semiannual trips to Wyoming to inspect the vacant grassland she 
owned and knew she intended to keep the grassland vacant.  Josephine Taft rented the land only 
once.  She rented the land to 
Darrold K. Hutchinson for grazing purposes, and that rental agreement ended on 
June 23, 1964.  At that time, 
Darrold K. and Vera Hutchinson signed, with witnesses, a disclaimer to further 
use as tenants.2  Josephine Taft also signed the document 
as owner.

 
 
[¶26]  The Hutchinsons assert Exhibit 9 was 
admissible under W.R.E. 801(d) and 804(b)(3), which provide in pertinent part as 
follows:

 
 
Rule 
801.  
Definitions.

 
 
The 
following definitions apply under the article:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
(d) 
Statements which are not hearsay.  A 
statement is not hearsay if:

 
 
                        
. . . .

(2)  Admission by Party-Opponent.The 
statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his 
individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has 
manifested his adoption or belief in its truth[.]  

 
 
Rule 
804.  Hearsay exceptions; declarant 
unavailable.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
(b)Hearsay exceptions.The following are 
not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a 
witness:

 
 
   . . . .

(3)  Statement Against Interest.A statement 
which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary 
or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal 
liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a 
reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he 
believed it to be true.  

 
 
The 
Hutchinsons contend Exhibit 9 was admissible under Rule 801 as an admission by 
Cara Taft that as of June 23, 1964, the permissive use ended.  They further contend it was admissible 
under Rule 804 as a statement against interest by Leon Harvey who died prior to 
trial and was, therefore, unavailable as a witness.3  

 
 
[¶27]  We review claims of error concerning the 
admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion.  City of Gillette v. Hladky Constr., 
Inc., 2008 WY 134, ¶ 84, 196 P.3d 184, 207 (Wyo. 2008).  We will not disturb such rulings absent 
a clear abuse of discretion.  Id.  In determining whether there has been an 
abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the district court 
could reasonably conclude as it did.  
Id.  

 
 
[¶28]  Here, there is no "ruling" to 
consider.  The district court, in 
fact, did not rule on the Tafts' motion to exclude Exhibit 9.  Rather, upon hearing the motion the 
morning of trial, the district court deferred ruling and moved ahead with 
opening statements.  The issue was 
not addressed again because the Hutchinsons rested their case without offering 
the exhibit.  While it is apparent 
from the record that the Hutchinsons intended to offer, or at least to rely 
upon, Exhibit 9 during the Tafts' presentation of their case, the opportunity 
never arose because the district court granted judgment for the Tafts at the 
close of the Hutchinsons' case.  We 
find nothing unreasonable in the district court's decision to defer ruling on 
the motion to exclude Exhibit 9.  
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.   

 
 

3.                    
Denial 
of Motions to Amend Findings and For New Trial

 
 
[¶29]  The Hutchinsons' final contention is 
that the district court erred in denying their motion to amend the findings or 
grant a new trial.  They assert they 
were entitled to either a new trial or amended findings because an irregularity 
in the proceedings occurred, denying them a fair trial, when the district court 
entered judgment for the Tafts halfway through the trial and they did not have 
the opportunity to examine Cara Taft and offer Exhibit 9 into evidence.  

 
 
[¶30]  W.R.C.P. 59, governing new trials and 
amendment of judgments, provides in relevant part:

 
 

(a)          
 Grounds.  A new trial may be granted to 
all or any of the parties, and on all or part of the issues.  On a motion for a new trial in an action 
tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment, if one has been entered, 
take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make 
new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment.  Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a 
new trial may be granted for any of the following causes:

(1)  Irregularity in the proceedings of the 
court . . . or prevailing party, or any order of the court . . ., or abuse of 
discretion, by which the party was prevented from having a fair trial;4  

 
 
We 
review a district court's ruling on motion for new trial or to amend its 
findings for abuse of discretion.  
Befumo v. Johnson, 2005 WY 
114, ¶ 18, 119 P.3d 936, 943 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
[¶31]  The Hutchinsons argue the irregularity 
in the proceedings that prevented them from having a fair trial occurred when 
the Tafts moved for, and the district court granted, judgment in their favor 
after the Hutchinsons had reserved the right to call Cara Taft.  The Hutchinsons suggest it was improper 
for the Tafts' counsel to represent that he intended to call Cara Taft, allow 
them to rest and then move for judgment on partial findings.  They further suggest that it was unfair 
under the circumstances for the district court to grant the motion without 
allowing them to present the witness they had reserved the right to call. 

 
 
[¶32]  In denying the Hutchinsons' post-trial 
motions, the district court found that the Hutchinsons had not presented 
sufficient evidence to show that what began as permissive use became hostile 
use.  Implicit in the district 
court's finding is the conclusion that neither the admission of Exhibit 9 nor 
Cara Taft's anticipated testimony would have changed that result.  That evidence would not have satisfied 
the Hutchinsons' obligation to show a clear, positive, and continuous disavowal 
of the Tafts' title to the property.  
Given the evidence presented, we cannot conclude the district court's 
determination was unreasonable.  To 
reiterate, the Hutchinsons' use of the Taft parcel remained essentially the same 
from the time they rented it in 1961 to the time of trial.  As occasions arose when they could have 
disavowed the Tafts' ownership and asserted their own, the Hutchinsons did 
neither.  In the face of division 
orders and royalty payments to the Tafts as owners of the property, the 
Hutchinsons did nothing; in the face of the State's efforts to purchase a strip 
of the Taft property, the Hutchinsons did nothing.  The Hutchinsons' evidence, with or 
without Exhibit 9 and Cara Taft's testimony, simply was insufficient to 
establish adverse use. The district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the post-trial motions.      

 
 
[¶33]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1At one point in their brief, the Hutchinsons assert that they were 
prevented from notifying the true property owner of their adverse possession 
claim because the Tafts' ownership was not recorded in Laramie County until very 
recently.  The Hutchinsons state 
that from 1930 until 2005 the record owner of the Taft property was D.J. 
Miller.  Although a receipt endorsed 
by a Kansas probate judge purported to convey the property from Mr. Miller to 
Josephine Taft in 1931, her ownership of the property was never recorded in 
Laramie County.  Apparently, the 
Tafts' ownership of the property was not recorded in Laramie County until 2005 
when, during probate proceedings, title to the property was quieted in Cara 
Taft, trustee of the Taft Living Trust, and Leon Harney.  The Hutchinsons claim these facts 
effectively prevented them from knowing the Tafts owned the property and 
notifying them of their adverse possession. The Hutchinsons' trial testimony did 
not give the slightest hint that they were uncertain about who owned the Taft 
property.  Even assuming some 
uncertainty, the Hutchinsons knew who they rented the property from, and who the 
Corps of Engineers, the oil companies and the State treated as the true 
owner.  Under these circumstances, 
their claim that they were prevented from notifying the true owner has little 
merit.    

 
 

2The only "Disclaimer" contained in the record is the one discussed in 
paragraph 17 above in which the Hutchinsons averred that they were "occupying 
the [Taft parcel] as the tenants of Josephine Taft" and "claim[ed] no right, 
title, lien or interest in and to" the property on which she granted an easement 
to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  
Rather than disclaiming further use of the Taft parcel as tenants as 
suggested in the Exhibit 9 discovery response, the Hutchinsons acknowledged in 
the disclaimer that they were using the property as tenants.  The disclaimer is signed by the 
Hutchinsons, not by Josephine Taft.  
Her signature does appear, however, on the agreement in which she and the 
Hutchinsons agreed to accept the $15 payment in lieu of requiring the Corps of 
Engineers to restore any crop damage caused by the 
easement.

 
 

3As reflected in the case caption, after Mr. Harvey's death, the 
co-executrices of his estate were substituted as 
parties.

 
 

4W.R.C.P. 
61, referenced in Rule 59, provides as follows:

Rule 
61.  Harmless 
error.

 
 
            
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no 
error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the 
court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting 
aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or 
order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with 
substantial justice.  The court at 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties.