Case Title: Strack v. Pelton

Citation: 1994-Ohio-107

Docket Number: 19931070

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1994-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Strack, Appellant, v. Pelton, f.k.a. Strack, Appellee.                           
[Cite as Strack v. Pelton (1994),     Ohio St.3d    .]                           
Civil procedure -- Motion for relief from judgment pursuant to                   
     Civ.R. 60(B) is not timely when filed more than one year                    
     after judgment, and more than one year after the new                        
     evidence upon which it is based became admissible.                          
     (No. 93-1070 -- Submitted May 25, 1994 -- Decided August                    
31, 1994.)                                                                       
     Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Ashtabula County, No.                  
92-A-1751.                                                                       
     On October 19, 1977, appellant, David A. Strack, filed a                    
complaint for a divorce from his wife, appellee, Donna M.                        
Strack (now Pelton).  David alleged in the complaint that no                     
children were born as issue of the marriage.  Donna alleged in                   
her answer that she was pregnant with a child of the marriage.                   
Blood-grouping tests were conducted on the parties and revealed                  
that David could not be excluded as father of the child in                       
question.                                                                        
     In June 1978, the trial court entered its judgment                          
granting the parties a divorce.  This divorce decree stated                      
that one child had been born as issue of the marriage and                        
ordered David to pay $40 per week in child support until the                     
child reached the age of eighteen.                                               
     In October 1987, nine years after the judgment of divorce,                  
appellant filed a motion for a human leukocyte antigen ("HLA")                   
genetic test to determine conclusively his paternity of the                      
child in question.  The results of the HLA test excluded                         
appellant as the father of the child.                                            
     On January 22, 1990, David filed a motion pursuant to                       
Civ.R. 60(B) for relief from certain aspects of the divorce                      
decree as it related to paternity and child support of the                       
parties' child.                                                                  
     David testified at a hearing on the motion that the                         
parties had not engaged in sexual intercourse at all during the                  
1977 calendar year.  Donna admitted that towards the end of                      
April 1977, while she was intoxicated, she had a sexual                          
"incident" (but not intercourse) with an unknown man named                       
"Jim."  The child in question was born nine months later on                      
January 18, 1978.  The trial court overruled David's motion,                     
and the court of appeals affirmed.                                               
     The cause is now before this court pursuant to an                           
allowance of a motion to certify the record.                                     
                                                                                 
     Bobulsky & Grdina and Samuel L. Altier, for appellant.                      
     Robert S. Wynn, for appellee.                                               
                                                                                 
     Moyer, C.J.    This case presents the question whether a                    
motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) is                      
timely when filed more than one year after judgment, and more                    
than one year after the new evidence upon which it is based                      
became admissible.  For the following reasons, we hold that it                   
is not.                                                                          
     Civ.R. 60(B) provides in part:                                              
     "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may                   
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final                         
judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)                     
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly                  
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been                   
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B);                     
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or                           
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse                  
party; (4) the judgment is satisfied, released or discharged,                    
or a prior judgment upon which it has been based has been                        
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable                      
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (5)                    
any other reason justifying relief from judgment.  The motion                    
shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1),                     
(2) and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or                  
proceeding was entered or taken.  A motion under subdivision                     
(B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its                    
operation."                                                                      
     In order for a party to prevail on a motion for relief                      
from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate                    
the following:                                                                   
     "(1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to                        
present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to                       
relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1)                        
through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable                      
time, and, where the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1),                      
(2), or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order                    
or proceeding was entered or taken."  GTE Automatic Elec. v.                     
ARC Industries, Inc. (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 1 O.O.3d 86,                     
351 N.E.2d 113, paragraph two of the syllabus.                                   
     These requirements are independent and in the conjunctive;                  
thus the test is not fulfilled if any one of the requirements                    
is not met.  Id. at 151, 1 O.O.3d at 88, 351 N.E.2d at 116.                      
The standard by which we review a decision on a Civ.R. 60(B)                     
motion is abuse of discretion.  See Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v.                      
Adams (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 520 N.E.2d 564, 566.                         
     Appellant alleges his claim is meritorious because the                      
results of an HLA blood test disqualify him as the father of                     
the child in question.  The test results are admissible to                       
determine paternity pursuant to R.C. 3111.09 and 3111.10.                        
Thus, Strack argues, he may have a "meritorious claim" for the                   
purpose of Civ.R. 60(B) analysis.                                                
     Second, appellant argues he is entitled to relief under                     
one of the provisions of Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5) because he                  
has come forward with new evidence, a proper ground under                        
Civ.R. 60(B)(2).                                                                 
     Appellant asserts that his claim falls under Civ.R.                         
60(B)(4) and (5), and not the more specific provision that                       
deals with newly discovered evidence.  We disagree.  The basis                   
of Strack's motion is test results that were not available at                    
the time of the divorce decree.  The results are evidence; they                  
are newly discovered.  A straightforward and logical reading of                  
Civ.R. 60(B)(2) dictates that it applies.                                        
     Civ.R. 60(B)(5) applies only when a more specific                           
provision does not apply.  Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman                         
(1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 64, 66, 5 OBR 120, 122, 448 N.E.2d 1365,                    
1367.  Here, Civ.R. 60(B)(2) specifically addresses newly                        
discovered evidence; thus, there is no reason to invoke the                      
less specific catchall provision, Civ.R. 60(B)(5).  The claim                    
under Civ.R. 60(B)(4) fails for similar reasons.  We hold,                       
therefore, that Civ.R. 60(B)(2) is the provision of the rule                     
that applies to Strack's claim.                                                  
     The third prong of the Civ.R. 60(B) test is that the                        
motion must be made within a reasonable time, and where the                      
grounds for relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more                     
than one year after judgment.  See GTE, supra.  Strack filed                     
his Civ.R. 60(B) motion in 1987, approximately nine years after                  
the judgment of divorce and five years after the results of                      
genetic testing became admissible in this state.  R.C. 3111.09                   
and 3111.10.  This filing delay falls far outside the one-year                   
time limitation imposed by Civ.R. 60(B)(2).  The fact that                       
Strack filed his motion shortly after he received the results                    
of the genetic testing is not legally relevant.  The time                        
limits of Civ.R. 60(B) refer to the judgment from which relief                   
is sought, and not to the time of discovery of the new                           
evidence.  Strack bears some responsibility to assert timely                     
his new evidence.  The law cannot assume lack of knowledge of                    
the admissibility of HLA test results.  We decline the                           
invitation to alter the clear meaning of Civ.R. 60(B).                           
     Even if we were to apply Civ.R. 60(B) loosely and allow                     
extra time not provided for by the rule, we would have to look                   
to the time when the evidence became admissible to determine                     
paternity, in this case 1982.  Because Strack asserts that he                    
has contested paternity of the minor child from before the time                  
of the divorce decree, we may impute to him the knowledge of                     
the newly developed technology to support his claim.  For these                  
reasons, we concur with the trial court's determination that                     
Strack did not file his Civ.R. 60(B) motion in a timely manner.                  
     We are not unaware that our decision in effect declares as                  
static a state of facts that reliable scientific evidence                        
contradicts.  Nonetheless, there are compelling reasons that                     
support such a decision.  A claim under Civ.R. 60(B) requires                    
the court to carefully consider the two conflicting principles                   
of finality and perfection.  In Knapp v. Knapp (1986), 24 Ohio                   
St.3d 141, 144-145, 24 OBR 362, 364, 493 N.E.2d 1353, 1356,                      
this court declared, "[f]inality requires that there be some                     
end to every lawsuit, thus producing certainty in the law and                    
public confidence in the system's ability to resolve disputes.                   
Perfection requires that every case be litigated until a                         
perfect result is achieved.  For obvious reasons, courts have                    
typically placed finality above perfection in the hierarchy of                   
values."  Finality is particularly compelling in a case                          
involving determinations of parentage, visitation and support                    
of a minor child.                                                                
     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the                    
court of appeals.                                                                
                                    Judgment affirmed.                           
     A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright, Resnick and F.E. Sweeney,                    
JJ., concur.                                                                     
     Pfeifer, J., dissents.                                                      
     Pfeifer, J., dissenting.  Civ. R. 60(B)(4) is the                           
applicable provision in this case.  The judgment against Strack                  
in 1978 placed a continuing obligation upon him, an obligation                   
that it is inequitable, even ridiculous, to continue to apply,                   
given that the facts upon which it was based have been                           
unmistakably disproved.                                                          
     The character of the judgment against Strack is                             
specifically addressed in Civ. R. 60(B)(4), in that it has                       
continuing, prospective application.  The judgment in this case                  
need not be retroactively undone -- but its prospective,                         
inequitable application can be stopped easily.                                   
     Since Civ. R. 60(B)(4) is the applicable provision, a                       
motion thereunder must be made "within a reasonable time."  In                   
paternity cases, the extent of the relationship between the                      
wrongly identified "father" and the child will be the key                        
factor in the determination.  If the child has come to rely                      
upon the "father" for both financial and emotional support, the                  
reasonable time period has expired.                                              
     In the present case, however, the lack of a relationship                    
between Strack and the child is evidence that Strack did file                    
his motion within a reasonable time.  Strack has not seen the                    
child, who is now sixteen years old, for twelve years.  He has                   
grown up without Strack's support and guidance.  In fact, the                    
child already has a father figure with whom he and his mother                    
live, who presumably provides what the family needs.  In short,                  
Strack serves no function to the child, and their legal                          
separation would do no emotional harm to the child.                              
     There is no reason for this court to indulge in a legal                     
fiction which forces the parties involved to continue living a                   
lie.  Strack should not be refunded any of the payments he made                  
prior to the filing of his motion, but he should not be forced                   
to continue to pay child support where he has no biological or                   
psychological connection with the child.  Certainly, Rule                        
60(B)(4) provides the means to correct a continuing mistake.