Case Title: In re Estate of Mason

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13439

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13439 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF FRANCES R. MASON. 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     September 13, 2023. - December 13, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Medicaid.  MassHealth.  Lien.  Executor and Administrator, 
Claims against estate.  Uniform Probate Code.  Repose, 
Statute of.  Statute, Construction, Retroactive 
application. 
 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Barnstable Division of the Probate 
and Family Court Department on June 7, 2017. 
 
 
A motion to strike was heard by Angela M. Ordonez, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Christine Fimognari, Assistant Attorney General, for 
Executive Office of Health and Human Services. 
Matthew J. Dupuy for the petitioner. 
Patricia Keane Martin, Clarence D. Richardson, Jr., & C. 
Alex Hahn, for the Massachusetts Chapter of the National Academy 
of Elder Law Attorneys, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Brian E. Barreira, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  Through a cooperative Federal and State 
regulatory scheme, eligible Massachusetts residents (members) 
may have their medical costs covered by the State-administered 
health insurance program for low-income residents (MassHealth), 
which is overseen by the Executive Office of Health and Human 
Services (EOHHS).1  Under this regulatory scheme, MassHealth is 
prohibited from recovering Medicaid benefits it has paid except 
in the case of certain categories of members.  And even with 
regard to these members, MassHealth generally is prohibited from 
commencing recoupment efforts before a member's death and must 
seek recovery only from the member's probate estate. 
In limited circumstances, however, Federal and State 
statutes permit MassHealth to act during the member's lifetime.  
Relevant here, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p and G. L. c. 118E, § 34, permit 
MassHealth to impose a lien prior to a member's death (TEFRA 
lien2) against the member's property if the member is permanently 
institutionalized, having been admitted to a medical facility 
from which she is not reasonably expected to return home.  If, 
while living in the facility, the member sells the property 
against which MassHealth has imposed a TEFRA lien, MassHealth 
 
1 The parties refer to the State Medicaid program and EOHHS 
as "MassHealth."  For consistency, we do the same. 
 
2 We refer to these liens by the name of the Federal act 
that permits them, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act 
of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97–248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982). 
3 
 
may seek to recover Medicaid benefits paid, so long as 
protections for certain of the member's relatives are not 
applicable.  See G. L. c. 118E, § 31 (d).  In other words, in 
this limited circumstance, MassHealth need not wait until the 
member's death to recoup Medicaid benefits paid. 
This case presents the question whether, in Massachusetts, 
the Legislature has limited the State's implementation of the 
TEFRA lien program to allow enforcement of a TEFRA lien only if 
the encumbered property is sold during the member's lifetime.  
We conclude that it has. 
 
Separate from MassHealth's authority to enforce a TEFRA 
lien during a member's lifetime, MassHealth may assert a timely 
claim against a member's probate estate to seek to recover 
Medicaid expenses after the member's death.  The timing of such 
a claim presents the second question we must address in this 
case:  whether the three-year statute of repose of the 
Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code (MUPC), G. L. c. 190B, § 3-
108, applies retroactively to bar MassHealth's claim to recoup 
Medicaid benefits paid for the medical care of a member who died 
prior to the effective date of the MUPC.  We conclude that it 
does not. 
Applying these conclusions in the present matter, we affirm 
the order of the Probate and Family Court judge insofar as it 
struck MassHealth's lien against the home of the decedent, 
4 
 
Frances R. Mason, who was permanently institutionalized in a 
medical facility in the last months of her life, and we reverse 
the order insofar as it dismissed MassHealth's claim against her 
estate.3 
 
1.  Factual background.  The relevant facts are undisputed.  
From January to August 2008, MassHealth provided Medicaid funds 
to cover Mason's care in a residential nursing facility.  On 
May 2, 2008, MassHealth, having determined that Mason would be 
institutionalized permanently, recorded a TEFRA lien against 
Mason's home in South Yarmouth (property).  As expected, Mason 
lived her remaining days in the facility, and on August 18, 
2008, Mason died testate,4 at the age of eighty-eight.  The 
property was not sold during Mason's lifetime while it was 
subject to the TEFRA lien. 
2.  Procedural history.  In June 2017, nearly nine years 
after Mason's death, Maryann Fells (petitioner), the named 
executor of Mason's will, filed a petition in the Probate and 
Family Court to open formal probate proceedings to settle 
Mason's estate.5  A personal representative was appointed, and 
 
3 We acknowledge the briefs of amici curiae Massachusetts 
Chapter of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys and Brian 
E. Barreira. 
 
4 Mason executed a will in 2005. 
 
5 See G. L. c. 190B, § 3-401 ("A formal testacy proceeding 
may be commenced by an interested person filing a petition as 
5 
 
the personal representative's bond was approved on July 20, 
2018. 
The petition and Mason's death certificate were sent to 
MassHealth.6  On August 13, 2018, MassHealth filed a notice of 
claim to recover the Medicaid benefits paid for Mason's care.7  
On September 27, 2021, the property was sold, and the proceeds 
of the sale were held in escrow. 
The personal representative did not object to MassHealth's 
claim;8 however, the petitioner filed a motion to strike both 
MassHealth's lien against the property and MassHealth's claim 
against Mason's estate.9  On March 4, 2022, the judge allowed the 
 
described in [§] 3–402 [a] in which that person requests that 
the court enter an order probating a will . . ."). 
6 See G. L. c. 118E, § 32 (a) ("a petition for admission to 
probate of a decedent's will or for administration of a 
decedent's estate shall include a sworn statement that copies of 
said petition and death certificate have been sent to" 
MassHealth). 
 
7 See G. L. c. 118E, § 32 (b) (permitting MassHealth to 
"present claims against a decedent's estate . . . within four 
months after approval of the official bond of the personal 
representative"). 
 
8 See G. L. c. 118E, § 32 (d) (personal representative must 
respond to MassHealth's claim within sixty days). 
 
9 On appeal, the petitioner asserts that she, along with 
Nicole Fells, filed the motion; however, the record indicates 
only that Nicole, to whom a Probate and Family Court judge 
referred as a "party-in-interest" in Mason's estate, was named 
in the filing.  MassHealth does not raise any issues with the 
designation of the petitioner as the appellee, and nothing in 
our opinion turns on the distinction. 
6 
 
motion.  She concluded that the TEFRA lien against the property 
became invalid upon Mason's death because the property had not 
been sold "during her lifetime," which the judge determined was 
required to trigger MassHealth's right to enforce the lien.  In 
addition, the judge ruled that, although Mason died before the 
effective date of the MUPC, MassHealth's claim against Mason's 
estate was barred by the MUPC's three-year statute of repose, 
G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108 (4).  MassHealth timely appealed.  We 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
3.  Discussion.  This case presents two questions of 
statutory construction, which we review de novo.  Conservation 
Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 488 Mass. 325, 331 (2021).10  First, we 
address whether a TEFRA lien that has been imposed against a 
permanently institutionalized member's home is enforceable after 
the member's death.  Second, we consider whether the MUPC's 
three-year statute of repose applies to MassHealth's claim for 
recovery of Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of a member who 
died prior to the MUPC's effective date. 
 
10 A final decree in this matter has not been entered in the 
Probate and Family Court; nonetheless, this appeal properly is 
before us.  See, e.g., Marcus v. Pearce Woolen Mills, Inc., 353 
Mass. 483, 484-485 (1968) (creditor's appeal of order to vacate 
creditor's appearance in opposition to allowance of will 
immediately appealable despite lack of finality in settlement of 
estate). 
7 
 
In construing a statute, we begin with its plain language.  
Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc., 492 Mass. 676, 681 (2023). 
"[A] statute must be interpreted according to the intent of 
the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by 
the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered 
in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief 
or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers 
may be effectuated" (citation omitted). 
 
Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 
445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006).  "Ordinarily, where the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to 
legislative intent."  Sharris v. Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 586, 
594 (2018), quoting Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 
444 (2008).  "Where the statutory language is not conclusive, we 
may 'turn to extrinsic sources, including the legislative 
history and other statutes, for assistance in our 
interpretation.'"  HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris, 490 Mass. 322, 
332-333 (2022), quoting Chandler v. County Comm'rs of Nantucket 
County, 437 Mass. 430, 435 (2002).  We "look to the statutory 
scheme as a whole . . . so as to produce an internal consistency 
within the statute" (quotations and citations omitted).  
Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 
483 Mass. 600, 605 (2019). 
We construe "[a] properly promulgated regulation . . . in 
the same manner as a statute."  Harvard Crimson, Inc., 445 Mass. 
at 749.  Where an agency construes a statute, "[w]e give 
8 
 
deference to agency interpretations in areas where the 
Legislature has delegated decision-making authority to the 
agency when the 'interpretation is not contrary to the plain 
language of the statutes or their underlying purposes.'"  
Metcalf, 492 Mass. at 681, quoting Mullally v. Waste Mgt. of 
Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 526, 533 (2008).  However, deference is 
"not abdication, and this court will not hesitate to overrule 
agency interpretations of statutes or rules when those 
interpretations are arbitrary or unreasonable."  Armstrong v. 
Secretary of Energy & Envtl. Affairs, 490 Mass. 243, 247 (2022), 
quoting Moot v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 448 Mass. 340, 
346 (2007), S.C., 456 Mass. 309 (2010). 
a.  Enforcement of a TEFRA lien after the member's death.  
With these principles in mind, we turn to the first question on 
appeal:  whether, having placed a TEFRA lien against the 
property of a member who is permanently institutionalized, 
MassHealth may enforce the TEFRA lien after the member's death.  
Because TEFRA liens are creatures of Federal and State statutes, 
our analysis begins with a review of these statutes.   See, 
e.g., City Elec. Supply Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 481 Mass. 784 
(2019) (analyzing statute governing mechanic's liens to resolve 
dispute involving mechanic's lien); Drummer Boy Homes Ass'n v. 
Britton, 474 Mass. 17 (2016) (analyzing statute governing 
condominium liens to resolve dispute involving condominium 
9 
 
lien); Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 454 Mass. 407 (2009) 
(analyzing statute governing attorney's liens to resolve dispute 
involving attorney's lien); Luchini v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
436 Mass. 403 (2002) (analyzing statute governing tax lien to 
resolve dispute involving tax lien). 
i.  Statutory framework.  The Federal Medicaid Act11 
"created a cooperative State and Federal program to provide 
medical assistance to individuals who cannot afford to pay for 
their own medical costs."  Daley v. Secretary of the Executive 
Office of Health & Human Servs., 477 Mass. 188, 189 (2017).  The 
act, and regulations promogulated under it by the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), set parameters 
that States participating in Medicaid must follow.  See Dermody 
v. Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., 491 Mass. 223, 225 
(2023), petition for cert. filed, U.S. Supreme Ct., No. 22-957 
(Mar. 31, 2023).  Within these parameters, Federal law gives 
States flexibility to design and operate their individual State 
plans.  See Matter of the Estate of Kendall, 486 Mass. 522, 533 
(2020) (Kendall). 
 
11 The Medicaid Act was enacted as Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act of 1965 and codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. 
 
10 
 
The Massachusetts Medicaid statutes, G. L. c. 118E,12 
expressly require MassHealth to operate "pursuant to and in 
conformity with the provisions of [the Medicaid Act]."  G. L. 
c.  118E, § 9.  See Daley, 477 Mass. at 199, quoting Cruz v. 
Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 395 Mass. 107, 112 (1985) ("When 
there is a conflict between State and Federal regulations, the 
Legislature intended that [MassHealth] comply with the Federal 
rule"); Haley v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 
472 (1985) (Legislature "intended the [State Medicaid] benefits 
program to comply with the Federal statutory and regulatory 
scheme"). 
To be eligible for Medicaid benefits, applicants generally 
must show that their income and assets fall below a defined 
level, thereby reserving the program's resources for those in 
most need.  See G. L. c. 118E, § 9A (2) (d); 130 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 520.003(A) (2019) (MassHealth eligibility requires that 
"[t]he total value of countable assets owned by or available to" 
applicant may not exceed defined threshold).  See also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(10) (prescribing eligibility rules for State plans).  
Applicants are expected to "deplete their own resources" before 
MassHealth will pay their medical expenses.  Lebow v. 
 
12 Massachusetts's Medicaid plan first was enacted in 1969, 
see St. 1969, c. 800, and was restructured in 1993, see St. 
1993, c. 161. 
11 
 
Commissioner of the Div. of Med. Assistance, 433 Mass. 171, 172 
(2001).  But pertinent to the present matter, an applicant's 
ownership interest in his or her primary residence is not 
included in the eligibility calculus unless the equity interest 
exceeds a threshold amount.  See 130 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 520.008(A) (2013).  See also Office of Assistant Secretary for 
Policy and Evaluation, United States Department of Health and 
Human Services, Medicaid Treatment of the Home:  Determining 
Eligibility and Repayment for Long-Term Care, at 1-2 (Apr. 
2005). 
ii.  Imposition of TEFRA liens.  Because an individual's 
ownership interest in his or her home generally is not counted 
for purposes of determining eligibility for Medicaid coverage, 
"[i]t is . . . possible . . . for an elderly individual who 
anticipates needing nursing home care to give his[ or ]her home 
to a family member or friend without fear of losing or being 
denied [M]edicaid eligibility . . . assur[ing] that the home 
will not be . . . subject to any recovery action."  S. Rep. No. 
97-494, at 38 (1982).  In part to address this potential avenue 
to thwart a State plan's efforts to recover Medicaid benefits 
paid, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
of Act of 1982 (TEFRA), codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(a)(1)(B). 
12 
 
Specifically, TEFRA authorizes a State Medicaid agency to 
place a lien13 against the real property of a permanently 
institutionalized member, defined as an eligible individual 
(1) who is an inpatient of a medical institution; and (2) whom 
the State Medicaid agency has determined, after notice and an 
opportunity for hearing in accordance with the State's 
established administrative procedures, "cannot reasonably be 
expected to be discharged from the medical institution and to 
return home."14  42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(1).  See 42 C.F.R. 
§ 433.36(g)(2).  If, contrary to expectations, the permanently 
institutionalized member is discharged from the medical 
institution and returns home, a TEFRA lien "shall dissolve."  42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(3).  See 42 C.F.R. § 433.36(g)(4).  
 
13 A lien "is a claim or charge on the property of an owner 
as security for the payment of a debt or obligation owed."  M. 
Pill, Real Estate Law § 11:1 (2022-2023 ed. 2022) (Pill).  
Black's Law Dictionary 1107 (11th ed. 2019) (lien is "[a] legal 
right or interest that a creditor has in another's property, 
lasting usu[ally] until a debt or duty that it secures is 
satisfied").  For a TEFRA lien, the "debt" comprises the 
Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of a member.  See G. L. 
c. 118E, § 34 (TEFRA lien secures "Medicaid benefits paid or to 
be paid on [a member's] behalf"). 
 
14 A State Medicaid agency's ability to impose a TEFRA lien 
is circumscribed further to protect certain family members.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(2) (prohibiting imposition of TEFRA lien 
against individual's home while individual's spouse; child under 
age twenty-one or blind or disabled child of any age; or sibling 
with equity interest in home who was residing there for at least 
one year immediately before date of individual's admission to 
medical institution is "lawfully residing" in home).  See also 
42 C.F.R. § 433.36(g)(3). 
13 
 
Significantly, TEFRA liens comprise an exception to the Medicaid 
Act's general prohibition barring State Medicaid agencies from 
imposing a lien against the property of an individual "prior to 
his death on account of medical assistance paid or to be paid on 
his behalf under the State plan."  42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(1). 
The Medicaid Act provides that States are not required to 
use TEFRA liens as part of their efforts to recover Medicaid 
benefits paid.15  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(1) (setting forth 
conditions pursuant to which State plan "may" impose TEFRA 
lien); 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(A) (providing that States shall 
seek recovery of medical assistance paid on behalf of individual 
either "from the individual's estate or upon sale of the 
[encumbered] property" [emphasis added]).  See also Office of 
Assistant Secretary for Policy and Evaluation, United States 
Department of Health and Human Services, Medicaid Liens, at 10 
(Apr. 2005) (HHS Policy Brief No. 4) (surveys conducted in late 
1990s indicated that eighteen of forty-six reporting States 
employed TEFRA liens).16 
 
15 Because the Medicaid Act does not require States to 
impose TEFRA liens, MassHealth's contention that the Medicaid 
Act requires State agencies to enforce TEFRA liens after a 
member's death is unfounded. 
 
16 Agency policy briefs "do not carry the force of 
regulations and are not entitled to the deference that we give 
to regulations that reflect an agency's interpretation of a 
statute it is obliged to enforce."  Daley v. Secretary of the 
Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., 477 Mass. 188, 200 
14 
 
In Massachusetts, the Legislature has codified the general 
prohibition against imposing liens during a member's lifetime 
other than as expressly authorized by the Medicaid Act; 
accordingly, it permits MassHealth to impose TEFRA liens.  See 
G. L. c. 118E, § 34 ("No lien or encumbrance of any kind except 
as permitted by the Secretary [of HHS], shall be required from 
or imposed against the property of any individual prior to his 
death because of Medicaid benefits paid or to be paid on his 
behalf . . ."); 130 Code Mass. Regs. § 515.012(A) (2023) ("A 
real estate lien enables . . . MassHealth . . . to recover the 
cost of medical benefits paid or to be paid on behalf of a 
member.  Before the death of a member, . . . MassHealth . . . 
will place a lien against any property in which the member has a 
legal interest, subject to" member being permanently 
institutionalized and inapplicability of protections for certain 
family members).  And because the Medicaid Act requires that a 
TEFRA lien dissolve upon the discharge of the individual from 
the medical facility and return home, TEFRA liens in 
Massachusetts dissolve upon that occurrence.  See 130 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 515.012(E) (MassHealth "will discharge a [TEFRA] lien 
 
(2017).  Instead, "we consider such guidance carefully for its 
persuasive power."  Id., citing Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 
568 U.S. 627, 643 (2013). 
15 
 
. . . if the member is released from the medical institution and 
returns home"). 
MassHealth maintains that G. L. c. 118E, § 34, which, as 
discussed supra, governs the imposition and dissolution of TEFRA 
liens in Massachusetts, also governs the scope of MassHealth's 
authority to enforce a TEFRA lien; in particular, MassHealth 
asserts that, because § 34 does not limit enforcement of TEFRA 
liens (other than requiring dissolution upon the return home of 
the permanently institutionalized member), TEFRA liens, like 
liens generally,17 run with the encumbered property until the 
underlying debt is satisfied, allowing MassHealth to enforce the 
lien even after the member's death. 
We disagree.  While § 34 sets forth the circumstances 
pursuant to which a TEFRA lien may be imposed and one event 
pursuant to which the lien shall dissolve, the enforcement 
 
17 In general, a lien encumbers the underlying property 
until the obligation it secures is satisfied.  See generally, 
L.A. Jones, The Law of Liens (3d ed. 1914).  See also Black's 
Law Dictionary 1107 (11th ed. 2019) (liens last usually "until a 
debt or duty that it secures is satisfied").  Additionally, "a 
lien on real property [generally] runs with the land and is 
enforceable against subsequent purchasers."  Permanent Mission 
of India to the United Nations v. New York, 551 U.S. 193, 198 
(2007).  See Restatement of Property § 540 (1944) ("a lien is 
enforceable against the successors in title or possession").  
See also Pill, supra at § 11:1 (lien "usually continues even 
though the ownership of the property is transferred to a third 
person who does not owe the debt").  TEFRA liens, however, are 
governed by the Federal and State statutes pursuant to which 
they are permitted. 
16 
 
authority of MassHealth is delineated expressly in the recovery 
provisions of the Medicaid Act and the cognate State provisions.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b); G. L. c. 118E, § 31.  In the face of 
these express provisions, to which we now turn, MassHealth's 
reliance on § 34 and general principles governing real estate 
liens is misplaced. 
iii.  Estate recovery.  Prior to 1993, when Congress 
enacted a recovery mandate for States participating in the 
Medicaid program, the Medicaid Act did not require State 
Medicaid plans to recoup Medicaid benefits paid.  See Pub. L. 
No. 97-248, § 132(b), 96 Stat. 370 (1982) (setting forth that 
State Medicaid recovery "may be made").  In 1993, however, 
Congress conditioned Federal funding on the States' adoption of 
estate recovery programs designed, inter alia, to attempt to 
recoup the costs of Medicaid benefits paid for the care of 
certain categories of members, including permanently 
institutionalized members.  See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1993 (OBRA '93), Pub. L. No. 103-66, Title XIII, § 13612, 
107 Stat. 627 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p[b][1]).  
Massachusetts complies with this requirement, allowing 
MassHealth to recover Medicaid assistance paid on behalf of a 
permanently institutionalized member from, inter alia, the 
17 
 
member's estate.18  See G. L. c. 118E, § 31 (a) (1), (b) (1) 
(prohibiting MassHealth from recovering Medicaid benefits paid 
except "[f]rom the estate of an individual . . . who was an 
inpatient in a nursing facility or other medical institution 
when he or she received such assistance"); 130 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 515.011 (2023). 
Under the Medicaid Act, however, a State plan's recovery 
efforts are strictly circumscribed; tellingly, in detailing the 
conditions that permit recovery, the act starts with language of 
prohibition.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) ("No adjustment or 
recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of 
an individual under the State plan may be made, except . . .").  
Generally, a State must wait until the individual's death to 
recoup Medicaid benefits paid, at which time recovery is 
permitted from the decedent's estate subject to certain 
additional protections.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b). 
In Massachusetts, as the Medicaid Act requires, the 
Legislature carefully circumscribes MassHealth's authority to 
recoup Medicaid benefits paid, and generally prohibits 
 
18 The Legislature has authorized Medicaid estate recovery 
since 1969.  See St. 1969, c. 800, § 1 ("There shall be no 
adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid, 
except from the estate of an individual who was sixty-five years 
of age or older . . .").  After the passage of OBRA '93, the 
Legislature reorganized and expanded the estate recovery 
program.  See St. 1993, c. 161; St. 1995, c. 38, § 133; St. 
1997, c. 43, §§ 94-95. 
18 
 
MassHealth from recovering Medicaid expenditures until after the 
member's death.19  See G. L. c. 118E, § 31 (a), (b) ("There shall 
be no adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly 
paid except . . . [f]rom the estate . . ."); 130 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 515.011(A)(1) (MassHealth "will recover the amount of 
payment for medical benefits correctly paid from the estate of a 
deceased member").  This prohibition against predeath recovery 
efforts by MassHealth generally also applies to a member who was 
a "[p]ermanently [i]nstitutionalized . . . inpatient in a 
nursing facility or other medical institution when he or she 
received such assistance."  G. L. c. 118E, § 31 (b) (1).  See 
130 Code Mass. Regs. § 515.011(A)(1)(b). 
iv.  Enforcing a TEFRA lien.  One exception to this general 
prohibition against predeath recovery concerns a State agency's 
ability to recover Medicaid expenses incurred on behalf of a 
permanently institutionalized member whose real property is 
subject to a TEFRA lien.  For such a member, the Medicaid Act 
gives State Medicaid agencies an option; they "shall seek 
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate or upon sale 
of the property" (emphasis added).  42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(A).  
 
19 Consistent with the Medicaid Act, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(b)(2), G. L. c. 118E, § 31 (b) (3), further provides:  
"Any recovery may be made only after the death of the surviving 
spouse, if any, and only at a time when he or she has no 
surviving child who is under age twenty-one or is blind or 
permanently and totally disabled." 
19 
 
See 42 C.F.R. § 433.36(h)(1)(ii).  Thus, if a State agency 
imposes a TEFRA lien against a permanently institutionalized 
member's property, which the member thereafter sells, the agency 
need not wait until the member's death to recoup its Medicaid 
expenditures; it may enforce a TEFRA lien upon the sale of the 
encumbered property.20  Alternatively, the State agency may 
attempt to recoup its Medicaid expenses following the member's 
death, from the member's estate.  See 42 C.F.R. § 433.36(h) 
(agency "may make an adjustment or recover funds . . . [f]rom 
the estate or upon sale of the property subject to a [TEFRA] 
lien"); State Medicaid Manual, Health Care Financing 
Administration Pub. No. 45-3, Transmittal 75, § 3810(A)(1) (Jan. 
2001) ("Recoveries must be made from the individual's estate 
(after death) or from the proceeds of the sale of the property 
on which a lien has been placed"). 
Because the Medicaid Act specifies that a State agency may 
enforce a TEFRA lien "upon sale" of the encumbered property, see 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(A), the Medicaid Act permits a State to 
allow a State agency to enforce the lien either before or after 
the member's death -- whenever the property is sold.  HHS has 
 
20 As discussed in part 3.a.ii, supra, the TEFRA lien 
dissolves if the permanently institutionalized member is 
discharged and returns home.  See G. L. c. 118E, § 34; 130 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 515.012(E). 
20 
 
concluded that a TEFRA lien generally may be enforced after the 
member's death, stating: 
"If the home owner dies with a TEFRA lien still on the 
property, Medicaid recovery occurs as part of the estate 
settlement process.  If the property is conferred as part 
of the recipient's estate to someone without a protected 
interest in it (e.g., an adult child), the transferee must 
pay off Medicaid's claim in order to receive a clear title 
to the property" (emphasis added). 
 
HHS Policy Brief No. 4, supra at 7.  Thus, under the Medicaid 
Act, unless the permanently institutionalized member is 
discharged from the medical facility and returns home (at which 
time the TEFRA lien shall dissolve), a State may opt to allow a 
TEFRA lien to run with the encumbered property until the 
underlying debt it secures is paid.  The question in this case 
is whether the Legislature has opted to take advantage of this 
available option. 
A.  Massachusetts's lifetime sale requirement.  In 
Massachusetts, as permitted by the Medicaid Act, the Legislature 
has authorized MassHealth not only to attempt to recover 
Medicaid expenditures from the estate of a permanently 
institutionalized member, but also to commence recovery efforts 
prior to such a member's death under certain conditions.  
Specifically, G. L. c. 118E, § 31 (d), provides that MassHealth 
is "also authorized during [the member's] lifetime to recover 
all assistance correctly provided . . . if property against 
21 
 
which [MassHealth] has a lien or encumbrance under [§] 34 is 
sold" (emphases added). 
Importantly, unlike the Medicaid Act, under which a State 
agency's authority to enforce a TEFRA lien can be triggered 
"upon sale" of the encumbered property regardless of whether 
that sale occurs before or after the member's death,  see 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(A), in Massachusetts, the Legislature has 
narrowed MassHealth's enforcement authority.  Specifically, 
under the plain language of G. L. c. 118E, § 31 (d), 
MassHealth's authority to enforce the lien arises "during the 
[member's] lifetime" if the encumbered property "is sold."21 
This plain language construction is buttressed by 
MassHealth's regulation in effect at the time MassHealth placed 
a TEFRA lien against Mason's home, which expressly reflected 
that MassHealth's authority to enforce a TEFRA lien arose during 
the member's lifetime.  See 130 Code Mass. Regs. § 515.012(B) 
 
21 Section 31 (d) further provides that the subsection 
"shall not limit [MassHealth's] ability to recover . . . as 
otherwise provided under any under general or special law."  
MassHealth contends that this savings clause permits it to 
enforce a TEFRA lien after a member's death.  As we discussed in 
part 3.a.ii, supra, however, G. L. c. 118E, § 34, permits 
MassHealth to impose a TEFRA lien and sets forth a condition 
requiring the lien to dissolve.  By contrast, MassHealth's 
authority to enforce TEFRA liens is delineated expressly in 
§ 31 (d).  Accordingly, § 34 is not a "general . . . law" that 
"otherwise provide[s]" MassHealth an "ability to recover" 
following a member's death.  G. L. c. 118E, § 31 (d). 
 
22 
 
(1997) ("If property against which [MassHealth] has placed a 
lien under 130 [Code Mass. Regs. §] 515.012[A] is sold during 
the member's lifetime, [MassHealth] may recover all payment for 
services provided on or after April 1, 1995" [emphasis added]).22  
And while not dispositive, see note 16, supra, HHS has 
concluded: 
"In Massachusetts, TEFRA liens . . . give the State 
authority to recover Medicaid payments for a member's long-
term care expenses if his or her property is sold while the 
member is alive. . . . 
 
". . . 
 
"If there was a [TEFRA] lien on the member's real property, 
[MassHealth] must release it after they have received 
notification of the member's death and a copy of the death 
certificate" (emphasis added). 
 
Office of Assistant Secretary for Policy and Evaluation, United 
States Department of Health and Human Services, Medicaid Liens 
 
22 After Mason had died, after her estate had been submitted 
to probate, and after MassHealth had already filed its notice of 
claim, MassHealth amended the regulation to omit the phrase 
"during the member's lifetime."  See 130 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 515.012(B) (2021).  MassHealth's authority is limited by G. L. 
c. 118E, § 31 (d); to the extent MassHealth purports to expand 
its authority through the amended regulation, it cannot do so.  
See Armstrong v. Secretary of Energy & Envtl. Affairs, 490 Mass. 
243, 247 (2022) ("When an agency acts beyond the scope of 
authority conferred to it by statute, its actions are invalid 
and ultra vires"); Atlanticare Med. Ctr. v. Commissioner of the 
Div. of Med. Assistance, 439 Mass. 1, 14 (2003) ("The division 
has no inherent authority to issue regulations . . . or 
promulgate rules that conflict with the statutes or exceed the 
authority conferred by the statutes by which the agency was 
created" [quotations and citation omitted]). 
 
23 
 
and Estate Recovery in Massachusetts, at 3, 13 (Apr. 2005) (HHS 
Policy Brief No. 5).23 
We reject MassHealth's assertion that while G. L. c. 118E, 
§ 31 (d), governs when MassHealth may enforce a TEFRA lien 
during a member's lifetime, the statute's silence as to whether 
a TEFRA lien also may be enforced as part of the estate recovery 
program implicitly permits such recovery.  Such a construction 
 
23 Contrary to MassHealth's assertion that the policy brief 
is unsupported, the policy brief's conclusions apparently were 
based on information provided by MassHealth.  See HHS Policy 
Brief No. 5, at 2 n.4 (noting that information for policy brief 
was "obtained from two operational divisions of MassHealth, the 
Taunton MassHealth Enrollment Center and the MassHealth Estate 
Recovery Unit," and that "[a]dditional supporting data and 
documentation were provided by administrative units within the 
Office of MassHealth –- the Policy and Implementation Unit, 
Information Systems, Publications, and the Division of Specialty 
Programs").  This information is consistent with an audit 
report, "Office of Medicaid (MassHealth) -- Review of Estate 
Recovery," published by the Office of the State Auditor on June 
28, 2021.  In a paragraph concerning TEFRA liens, also referred 
to as "pre-death" or "living liens," the report stated, "After a 
member dies, MassHealth may file a claim in probate court to 
recover the member's paid Medicaid costs" (emphasis added).  It 
says nothing about enforcing a TEFRA lien after the member's 
death.  Similarly, a form notice provided by MassHealth to a 
permanently institutionalized member against whose home a TEFRA 
lien is imposed, titled "Notice of Intent to Place a Lien," 
fails to notify the member that MassHealth may enforce the lien 
after the member's death.  Instead, consistent with G. L. 
c. 118E, § 31 (d), it provides:  "If the property is sold during 
your lifetime, you must repay MassHealth from your share of the 
proceeds for the cost of all medical services provided on or 
after April 1, 1995" (emphasis added).  In fact, in its brief, 
MassHealth acknowledges its long-standing "practice" to enforce 
a TEFRA lien "if the property is sold during the member's 
lifetime," and instead to recover from the "assets -- commonly 
real property -- of the probate estate[]" following the member's 
death. 
24 
 
is at odds with the Medicaid Act and cognate Massachusetts 
statutes that narrowly circumscribe the ability of MassHealth to 
recoup its Medicaid expenses.  As discussed supra, both the 
Medicaid Act and Massachusetts's statutory recovery schemes are 
crafted in restrictive terms, generally prohibiting MassHealth 
from seeking to recover Medicaid benefits paid except from 
certain individuals and pursuant to carefully delineated 
circumstances expressly set forth in the statutes.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) ("No adjustment or recovery . . . may be 
made, except . . ."); G. L. c. 118E, § 31 (a), (b) ("There shall 
be no adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly 
paid except . . ."). 
That structure evinces a legislative intent to cabin 
narrowly MassHealth's authority to recover from members, 
precluding any means of recovery except as affirmatively 
provided.  See Department of Pub. Welfare v. Anderson, 377 Mass. 
23, 27 n.3 (1979) ("The primary purpose of both the Federal and 
State statutes is to bar recovery . . . .  In both statutes, the 
clause permitting recovery from the estate . . . appears as an 
exception and therefore should be construed narrowly").24  In 
 
24 Anderson concerned a prior version of the Massachusetts 
estate recovery statute; however, the structure of the prior 
statute was, in relevant respects, identical to the current 
statute.  See G. L. c. 118E, § 16, as inserted by St. 1969, 
c. 800, § 1, repealed and replaced by St. 1993, c. 161, § 17 
25 
 
light of the statutory scheme's restrictive structure, and 
absent a provision affirmatively authorizing MassHealth to 
enforce a TEFRA lien after a member's death, "[w]e will not read 
into the statute a provision which the Legislature did not see 
fit to put there" (quotation and citation omitted).25  Chin v. 
 
("There shall be no adjustment or recovery of medical assistance 
correctly paid, except from the estate . . ."). 
 
25 Relying on the legislative history of G. L. c. 118E, 
§ 31, MassHealth maintains that the Legislature's use of the 
term "also" and reference to the date "April 1, 1995," in 
§ 31 (d) signal its intent to allow MassHealth to enforce the 
TEFRA lien both during the member's life and after the member's 
death.  MassHealth's argument ostensibly is founded on the 1995 
amendment to § 31 (c), which defined the recoverable estate as 
the probate estate, see St. 1995, c. 38, § 133.  MassHealth 
claims that the 1995 amendment limiting the definition of 
"estate" to the probate estate created confusion as to 
MassHealth's ability to enforce a TEFRA lien during a member's 
life.  According to MassHealth, the Legislature added § 31 (d) 
in 1997 to clarify that the TEFRA lien "also" may be enforceable 
during life.  See St. 1997, c. 43, § 94.  But, MassHealth 
further contends, the Legislature did not mean to limit 
MassHealth's preexisting ability to enforce TEFRA liens "also" 
after a member's death pursuant to its authority under § 34. 
 
As discussed in part 3.a.ii, supra, § 34 sets forth terms 
concerning the imposition and dissolution of a TEFRA lien, not 
the enforcement of TEFRA liens.  We decline to adopt 
MassHealth's posited inference as to the Legislature's intent to 
preserve its purported ability to enforce a TEFRA lien after a 
member's death under § 34 in view of, inter alia, the plain 
language of § 31 (d), as well as the general prohibition on 
recovery efforts except as expressly authorized.  See Sharris v. 
Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 586, 594 (2018) ("where the language of 
a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to 
legislative intent" [citation omitted]).  Indeed, from 1995 
until 2021, MassHealth's regulations regarding TEFRA liens 
specifically triggered its enforcement authority only upon a 
sale during the member's lifetime.  See 130 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 502.910(C) (1995) (permitting enforcement of TEFRA lien if 
26 
 
Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 537 (2015).  Indeed, such a construction 
would be at odds with the Legislature's decision to limit the 
scope of MassHealth's authority to enforce TEFRA liens beyond 
that required under the Medicaid Act, as evinced by the 
Legislature's decision to include the phrase "during [the 
member's] lifetime" in the enforcement provision, G. L. c. 118E, 
§ 31 (d), rather than mirroring the language of the Federal 
statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(A).  See discussion, supra. 
 
Our construction of MassHealth's authority to enforce a 
TEFRA lien also finds support in the purpose that gave rise to 
the TEFRA lien program, discussed in part 3.a.ii, supra, to 
thwart efforts by a permanently institutionalized member to 
evade estate recovery by transferring his or her home, which is 
usually the member's only significant asset, to a family member.  
By expressly limiting MassHealth's authority to enforce a TEFRA 
lien to "during [the member's] lifetime," the Legislature 
narrowly targeted the estate recovery avoidance tactic that 
Congress sought to foreclose.  See St. 1997, c. 43, § 94 
(enacting G. L. c. 118E, § 31 [d]). 
The broad authority MassHealth advocates also runs counter 
to the Legislature's decision to limit the scope of the 
 
property "is sold during the recipient's lifetime"); 130 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 515.012(B) (1997) (permitting enforcement of TEFRA 
lien if property "is sold during the member's lifetime"); 130 
Code Mass. Regs. § 515.012(B) (2020) (same). 
27 
 
recoverable estate to the "probate" estate.26  See G. L. c. 118E, 
§ 31 (c).  Significantly, a TEFRA lien may be attached to 
ownership interests that may not pass through probate.  See 130 
Code Mass. Regs. § 515.012(A) (MassHealth "will place a lien 
against any property in which the member has a legal interest").  
See also A Practical Guide to Estate Planning in Massachusetts, 
Nonprobate Transfers § 3.2 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 5th ed. 
2022) (identifying ownership interests that pass outside of 
probate, such as inter vivos trusts, joint tenancies with rights 
of survivorship, and life estates and remainders).  A 
 
26 Consistent with the restrictive structure of the over-all 
statutory scheme, this definition of the recoverable estate 
reflects the narrowest scope permissible under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(b)(4).  Under the Medicaid Act, a State either may 
delineate the recoverable estate as the probate estate "as 
defined for purposes of State probate law," or the State may 
elect to define the estate more broadly to include 
 
"any other real and personal property and other assets in 
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the 
time of death (to the extent of such interest), including 
such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other 
arrangement." 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4).  In 2003, Massachusetts briefly 
expanded the recoverable estate to the broader permissible 
definition, before reverting to the narrow probate-only 
definition the following year.  See St. 2003, c. 26, § 329; St. 
2004, c. 149, § 167.  This choice, in conjunction with the 
restrictive language of G. L. c. 118E, § 31, evinces a 
legislative intent to restrict MassHealth's ability to pursue 
recovery outside of the probate estate, through other 
mechanisms, such as liens. 
28 
 
construction that would allow MassHealth to enforce a TEFRA lien 
after a member's death would expand the estate against which 
MassHealth could recover beyond the probate estate.  Such a 
construction would be at odds with the legislative decision to 
limit estate recovery to the probate estate.  See Plymouth 
Retirement Bd., 483 Mass. at 605 (in construing statutes, we 
"look to the statutory scheme as a whole . . . so as to produce 
an internal consistency within the statute" [quotations and 
citations omitted]). 
Further, a construction that would permit MassHealth to 
enforce a TEFRA lien after the member's death contravenes the 
Legislature's specific delineation of the relative priorities of 
various creditors, including MassHealth, in connection with the 
disposition of a probate estate.  See G. L. c. 190B, § 3-805 (a) 
("If the applicable assets of the estate are insufficient to pay 
all claims in full, the personal representative shall make 
payment in the following order:  . . . [6] debts due to the 
division of medical assistance").  If a TEFRA lien survives a 
member's death, the lien might upset the MUPC's express priority 
of claims provision.27  See Metcalf, 492 Mass. at 681 (we 
 
27 The MUPC grants lienholders additional rights beyond 
those available to unsecured estate creditors.  See G. L. 
c.  190B, §§ 3-104, 3-803, 3-809, 3-812, 3-814.  See also 
Tisbury v. Hutchinson, 338 Mass. 514, 516 (1959) (lien gave 
lienholder priority over estate administration expenses and 
other estate creditors). 
29 
 
interpret statutes "in harmony with prior enactments to give 
rise to a consistent body of law" [quotation and citation 
omitted]). 
B.  Limited post-death enforcement authority.  Relying on 
G. L. c. 118E, § 32 (j), MassHealth contends that the 
Legislature broadly contemplated the disposition of TEFRA liens 
in connection with the member's estate.  Section 32 (j) 
provides: 
"If the personal representative wishes to sell or transfer 
any real property against which [MassHealth] has filed a 
lien or claim not yet enforceable because circumstances or 
conditions specified in [G. L. c. 118E, § 31,] continue to 
exist,[28] [MassHealth] shall release the lien or claim if 
the personal representative agrees to (1) either set aside 
sufficient assets to satisfy the lien or claim, or to give 
bond to [MassHealth] with sufficient surety or sureties and 
(2) repay [MassHealth] as soon as the circumstances or 
conditions which resulted in the lien or claim not yet 
being enforceable no longer exist.  Notwithstanding the 
foregoing provision or any general or special law to the 
contrary, [MassHealth] and the parties to the sale may by 
agreement enter into an alternative resolution of 
[MassHealth]'s lien or claim." (Emphases added.) 
 
 
28 Section 32 (j)'s cross reference to the protections for 
certain family members addressed in G. L. c. 118E, § 31, 
indicates that the "lien" referenced in § 32 (j) is the TEFRA 
lien of § 31 (d).  In fact, a TEFRA lien is the only type of 
lien that MassHealth may impose, except in the case of a court-
ordered lien for improperly paid benefits, in which case no 
protections for family members apply.  See HHS Policy Brief No. 
5, at 7 ("in Massachusetts a lien is only filed while the member 
is still alive" and is "never placed . . . once the member has 
died").  See also G. L. c. 118E, § 16C (a), as inserted by St. 
1990, c. 150, § 300, repealed by St. 1992, c. 133, § 470, 
(briefly authorizing postdeath liens). 
30 
 
While the interrelationship between § 31 (d) and § 32 (j) 
is not a model of clarity, we do not construe the latter as 
impliedly expanding the unequivocally narrow authority to 
enforce a TEFRA lien expressly set forth in the former.  See 
Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 489 Mass. 356, 364 (2022), quoting 
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) 
("the Legislature 'does not, one might say, hide elephants in 
mouseholes'"). 
Instead, we construe § 32 (j) to address only the specific 
circumstance in which MassHealth is prohibited under § 31 (d) 
from enforcing the lien while the member is living, despite a 
lifetime sale of the encumbered property, because of the 
continued presence of protected relatives.29  In this 
 
29 Under § 31 (d), even after MassHealth's authority to 
enforce the lien is triggered by a lifetime sale, "[r]epayment 
shall not be required" while certain protected family members 
lawfully reside in the property.  The protected family members 
are: 
 
"(1) a sibling who had been residing in the property for at 
least one year immediately prior to the individual being 
admitted to a nursing facility or other medical 
institution; or (2) a child who (i) had been residing in 
the property for at least two years immediately prior to 
the parent being admitted to a nursing facility or other 
medical institution; and (ii) establishes to the 
satisfaction of [MassHealth] that he provided care which 
permitted the parent to reside at home during that two year 
period rather than in an institution; and (iii) has 
lawfully resided in the property on a continuous basis 
while the parent has been in the medical institution." 
 
31 
 
circumstance, MassHealth's right to enforce a TEFRA lien ripens 
upon the sale of the encumbered property during the member's 
lifetime, but the lien is "not yet enforceable."30  G. L. 
c. 118E, § 32 (j).  If the member then dies, § 32 (j) permits 
the lien to be resolved as part of the estate recovery process.31  
 
G. L. c. 118E, § 31 (d).  See also 130 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 515.012(D)(1).  These restrictions also are embodied in the 
Medicaid Act.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2)(B); 42 C.F.R. 
§ 433.36(h)(2)(iii). 
 
30 If recovery is deferred, § 31 (d) provides several 
options for MassHealth to preserve its ability to recover 
Medicaid benefits paid: 
 
"If repayment is not yet required because a relative 
specified above is still lawfully residing in the property 
and the individual wishes to sell the property, the 
purchaser shall take possession subject to the lien or 
[MassHealth] shall release the lien if the [permanently 
institutionalized member] agrees to (1) either set aside 
sufficient assets to satisfy the lien or give bond to the 
division with sufficient sureties and (2) repay 
[MassHealth] as soon as the specified relative is no longer 
lawfully residing in the property.  Notwithstanding the 
foregoing or any general or special law to the contrary, 
[MassHealth] and the parties to the sale may by agreement 
enter into an alternative resolution of [MassHealth's] 
lien." 
 
G. L. c. 118E, § 31 (d).  Notably, § 32 (j) gives the personal 
representative seeking to sell an encumbered property the same 
options previously available to the member.  See G. L. c. 118E, 
§ 32 (j). 
 
31 Section 31 (d) is triggered only if the member sells the 
encumbered property during his or her lifetime, and so 
presumably the property generally would no longer be in the 
member's estate, making the reference in § 32 (j) to a personal 
representative's authority to dispose of the encumbered property 
nugatory.  But that may not be true always.  Section 32 (j) 
captures this limited circumstance. 
32 
 
In such a circumstance, MassHealth may enforce the lien after 
the member's death as set forth in § 32 (j).32  Thus, we conclude 
that MassHealth generally is not authorized to enforce a TEFRA 
lien after the member's death, except in the very narrow 
circumstance addressed by § 32 (j), as discussed supra. 
b.  Applicability of the MUPC time limit.  We turn to the 
second question on appeal -- whether the "ultimate time limit" 
provision of the MUPC, G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108, which became 
effective as of 2012, bars MassHealth's claim33 against Mason's 
estate.  The ultimate time limit provision34 precludes a creditor 
 
 
32 Fearing that assets available for estate recovery may 
dissipate before MassHealth is permitted to open probate, see 
G. L. c. 118E, § 32 (i), MassHealth urges us to conclude that it 
may enforce a TEFRA lien after a member's death to enhance its 
estate recovery efforts.  Such policy arguments are best 
directed to the Legislature; they do not control our 
construction of the statute. 
33 As discussed supra, regardless of whether a TEFRA lien is 
enforceable after a member's death, MassHealth may recover its 
Medicaid expenses by asserting a timely claim against a member's 
estate through the estate recovery procedures authorized by 
G. L. c. 118E, § 31 (b), and prescribed in § 32 (a)-(i). 
 
34 The ultimate time limit provision, G. L. c. 190B, § 3-
108, states, in relevant part: 
 
"No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal 
testacy or appointment proceeding . . . may be commenced 
more than [three] years after the decedent's death, except 
that:  . . . (4) an informal appointment or a formal 
testacy or appointment proceeding may be commenced 
thereafter if no proceedings relative to the succession or 
estate administration has occurred within the [three] year 
period after the decedent's death, but the personal 
representative shall have no right to possess estate assets 
33 
 
from bringing a claim against an estate more than three years 
after a decedent's death.  See Kendall, 486 Mass. at 527-528.35  
However, under the statute in effect when Mason died, MassHealth 
has fifty years from the date of Mason's death -- a period of 
time that had commenced to run prior to the MUPC's effective 
date -- to press its claim.  See G. L. c. 193, § 4, inserted by 
St. 1951, c. 163, § 1, repealed by St. 2008, c. 521, § 13 
(generally requiring administration of estates within fifty 
years).36  Thus, the ultimate time limit bars MassHealth's claim 
only if it applies retroactively. 
Absent a clear indication of legislative intent, a statute 
presumptively operates prospectively only.  See Sliney v. 
Previte, 473 Mass. 283, 288 (2015); Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. 
 
as provided in [§] 3–709 beyond that necessary to confirm 
title thereto in the successors to the estate and claims 
other than expenses of administration shall not be 
presented against the estate" (emphases added). 
 
35 Contrary to the petitioner's contention, Kendall does not 
address the question whether § 3-108 applies retroactively to 
bar claims against the estate of a decedent who died before the 
effective date.  See generally Kendall, 486 Mass. at 527-528.  
The petitioner also mistakenly asserts that Department of Pub. 
Welfare v. Anderson, 377 Mass. 23 (1979) -- a case that predates 
the MUPC -- controls the outcome here. 
36 The petitioner contends that MassHealth surrendered its 
claim by waiting nine years after Mason's death, until the 
petitioner opened probate proceedings, to assert it.  The 
petitioner relies on G. L. c. 118E, § 32 (i), which permits 
MassHealth to commence probate proceedings itself if no petition 
for probate has been filed within one year of the decedent's 
death.  Section 32 (i) is permissive, however, not mandatory. 
 
34 
 
Nunez, 460 Mass. 511, 516 (2011) ("As a general matter, all 
statutes are prospective in their operation . . . and [have] no 
retroactive effect" [quotation and citation omitted]).  This 
presumption applies to statutes of repose such as § 3-108.  See 
In re Granderson, 214 B.R. 671, 675-676 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997), 
cited with approval by First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Napoleon, 
428 Mass. 371, 373-374 (1998) (concluding statute applied only 
prospectively because it was statute of repose not statute of 
limitations).37 
Here, the Legislature expressed its intent that the current 
version of the ultimate time limit, G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108, as 
amended by St. 2012, c. 140, § 14, apply prospectively.  
Specifically, St. 2012, c. 140, § 66 (b), provides: 
"If a right is acquired, extinguished or barred upon the 
expiration of a prescribed period that has commenced to run 
under any other statute before the effective date of this 
act, that statute shall continue to apply to the right even 
if it has been superseded."38 
 
 
37 Section 3-108 is a statute of repose.  Kendall, 486 Mass. 
at 528, 529, 533. 
38 The petitioner contends that § 66 (b) applies only to the 
trust code, and not to the probate code, because § 66 (a) 
addresses the trust code.  However, § 66 (b) references the 
"act" as a whole, referring clearly to "An Act further 
regulating the Probate Code and establishing a trust code" 
(emphasis added).  Indeed, § 14 of the act amended G. L. 
c. 190B, § 3-108. 
 
35 
 
Similarly, St. 2008, c. 521, § 43 (4), which applies to the 
MUPC's original enabling act, and thus to the original version 
of the ultimate time limit, provides: 
"[A]n act done before the effective date [of the MUPC] in 
any proceeding and any accrued right is not impaired by 
this act.  If a right is acquired, extinguished or barred 
upon the expiration of a prescribed period of time which 
has commenced to run by the provisions of any statute 
before the effective date, the provisions shall remain in 
force with respect to that right."39 
 
 
Because Mason died on August 18, 2008, prior to the July 8, 
2012, effective date of G. L. c. 190B, § 3-108, pre-MUPC time 
limits control MassHealth's claim against her estate.  See 
Massachusetts Probate Manual, Formal Probate § 4.2.4 (Mass. 
Cont. Legal Educ. 5th ed. 2022) ("Estates of decedents dying 
before the effective date of the MUPC are not governed by this 
time limit for filing").  In other words, following Mason's 
 
39 Notably, the specific preservation language of § 43 (4), 
preserving accrued rights that were acquired, extinguished, or 
barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that has 
commenced to run before the effective date, controls our 
analysis despite the more general provision of the act, St. 
2008, c. 521, § 43 (2), which provided that the MUPC applied to 
court proceedings commenced after the act's effective date.  See 
Wing v. Commissioner of Probation, 473 Mass. 368, 373 (2015) 
("where statutes deal with the same subject, the more specific 
statute controls the more general one").  In addition, § 43 (2) 
addressed procedure, while the ultimate time limit provision, as 
a statute of repose, addressed substantive rights.  See 
Bridgwood v. A.J. Wood Constr., Inc., 480 Mass. 349, 352 (2018) 
(noting that statutes of limitations are "a procedural defense" 
whereas statutes of repose provide "a substantive right to be 
free from liability" [quotations and citation omitted]). 
 
36 
 
death in 2008, MassHealth's "right" to make a claim under G. L. 
c. 118E, § 32 (b), would be "extinguished or barred upon the 
expiration of a prescribed period of time which has commenced to 
run by the provisions of [former G. L. c.  193, § 4,] before the 
effective date" of the MUPC.  Additionally, MassHealth's claim 
against Mason's estate is a "right" that "accrued" on Mason's 
death in 2008, when it became enforceable.40  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p; G. L. c. 118E, § 31 (b) (1).  In sum, MassHealth's 
right to file a claim against the decedent's estate falls within 
the nonretroactive language of St. 2012, c. 140, § 66 (b), and 
St. 2008, c. 521, § 43 (4), and is unaffected by the MUPC's 
ultimate time limit.41  Therefore, we conclude that MUPC's three-
year ultimate time limit provision does not extinguish 
MassHealth's claim against Mason's estate.42 
 
40 See Black's Law Dictionary 1582 (11th ed. 2019) (defining 
"accrued right" as "[a] matured right; a right that is ripe for 
enforcement [as through litigation]"). 
41 Our decision in American Family Life Assur. Co. v. 
Parker, 488 Mass. 801 (2022), is not to the contrary.  That case 
concerned G. L. c. 190B, § 2-804.  See id. at 807-810. 
 
42 The petitioner contends that our construction frustrates 
the "speedy and efficient" settling of estates.  G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 1-102.  Here, the Legislature expressly has indicated its 
intent not to apply the ultimate time limit to claims like 
MassHealth's in this case, as set forth supra.  Moreover, simply 
because "retroactive application of a new statute would 
vindicate its purpose more fully . . . is not sufficient to 
rebut the presumption against retroactivity" (citation omitted).  
Smith v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 462 Mass. 370, 377 
(2012). 
37 
 
 
4.  Conclusion.  So much of the order of the Probate and 
Family Court judge as dismissed MassHealth's claim against the 
decedent's estate is reversed; the order is otherwise affirmed, 
and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.