Case Title: MacDonald v. Gutierrez

Citation: 

Docket Number: S111253

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2004-01-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 1/8/04 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
DANIEL L. MacDONALD, 
 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
 
) 
 
 
 
) 
S111253 
 
v. 
 
) 
 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B152695 
CHON GUTIERREZ, as Interim Director, etc. ) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BS061075 
______________________________________) 
 
 
Upon arresting someone for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, 
the arresting officer is required to make a sworn statement to the Department of 
Motor Vehicles (DMV) setting out all of the relevant information.1  In Lake v. 
                                             
 
1 
“If a peace officer . . . arrests any person for a violation of Section 23140, 
23152, or 23153 [driving under the influence], the peace officer shall immediately 
forward to the department a sworn report of all information relevant to the 
enforcement action, including information that adequately identifies the person, a 
statement of the officer’s grounds for belief that the person violated [the statute], a 
report of the results of any chemical tests that were conducted on the person . . . , a 
copy of any notice to appear under which the person was released from custody, 
and, if immediately available, a copy of the complaint filed with the court.  For the 
purposes of this section, . . .‘immediately’ means on or before the end of the fifth 
ordinary business day following the arrest . . . .  [¶]  (b)  The peace officer’s sworn 
report shall be made on forms furnished or approved by the department.  [¶]  (c)  
For the purposes of this section, a report prepared pursuant to subdivision (a) and 
received pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 1801, is a sworn report when it 
bears an entry identifying the maker of the document or a signature that has been 
affixed by means of an electronic device approved by the department.”  (Veh. 
Code, § 13380, italics added; hereafter all further statutory references are to the 
Vehicle Code unless otherwise indicated.) 
 
 
 
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Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448 (Lake), we held that, notwithstanding the predecessor 
statute to section 13380, an unsworn statement by a nonarresting officer is 
admissible, pursuant to the public employee record exception to the hearsay rule, 
at an administrative per se review hearing conducted by the DMV.  (Lake, at 
p. 461.)  The question presented by this case is whether, at such a hearing, the 
DMV may, in addition to considering the arresting officer’s sworn statement, also 
consider an unsworn statement by the arresting officer.  The DMV, we conclude, 
may properly do so, for section 13557 provides in pertinent part:  “The department 
shall consider the sworn report submitted by the peace officer pursuant to Section 
23612 or 13380 and any other evidence accompanying the report.”  (Italics 
added.)  
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 
 
A California Highway Patrol (CHP) officer observed Daniel L. 
MacDonald, who was driving in the No. 5 lane on a freeway, encroach two feet 
into the No. 4 lane, and then slowly drift five feet onto the shoulder.  When the 
officer stopped MacDonald, he observed that MacDonald’s eyes were red and 
watery, his speech thick and slurred, and an odor of alcohol was emanating from 
his breath.  MacDonald admitted he had been drinking.  He failed several standard 
field sobriety tests, and upon being transported to a police station, his blood-
alcohol concentration twice tested at .11 percent.3  The officer issued an 
administrative per se suspension order, confiscated MacDonald’s driver’s license, 
and issued him a temporary license. 
                                             
 
2 
This statement of the factual and procedural background is largely drawn 
from the opinion below.  Neither party petitioned for rehearing to suggest that the 
Court of Appeal omitted or misstated any material fact.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
28(c)(2).) 
3 
A blood-alcohol concentration of .08 percent is a ground for suspension of 
the driving privilege.  (§ 13353.2, subd. (a)(1).)   
 
3
 
On the date of the incident, the arresting officer completed a sworn report 
on DMV form 367.  With respect to the facts and circumstances which led to the 
stop, he wrote:  “OBS, S/V [subject vehicle] DRIVING W/B 101 DESOTO TO 
TOPANGA WEAVING SIDE TO SIDE IN W-1 LANE—STOP MADE.” 
 
On the same date, the officer completed a “Driving Under the Influence 
Arrest/Investigation Report” (CHP form 202) and the narrative/supplement report 
(CHP form 556).  These two reports, which we will refer to collectively as the 
“unsworn report,” and which we have summarized in the first paragraph of this 
statement of the factual and procedural background, provided a more detailed 
narrative of the circumstances leading to the stop and arrest, but were not sworn. 
 
MacDonald requested an administrative hearing to review his license 
suspension.  (§ 13558, subd. (a).)  At the hearing, MacDonald’s counsel objected 
to the unsworn report, contending an unsworn report by the arresting officer is 
inadmissible hearsay.  The hearing officer overruled the objection and sustained 
the license suspension.   
 
MacDonald petitioned for writ of mandate to set aside the suspension.  
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.)  The petition was granted.  Relying on Solovij v. 
Gourley (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1229 (Solovij), the superior court held the unsworn 
report was inadmissible under section 13380, and the sworn report alone failed to 
provide reasonable cause for the stop.   
 
Concluding Solovij was wrongly decided, the Court of Appeal reversed 
with directions to reinstate the suspension.  “Solovij erred in fashioning an 
exclusionary rule which precludes the DMV from considering an arresting 
officer’s unsworn report on the ground the arresting officer’s sworn report was 
inadequate.  Although section 13380 requires the arresting officer to send the 
DMV a sworn report of all information relevant to the enforcement action 
(§ 13380, subd. (a)), the statute does not specify a penalty or consequence for the 
 
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officer’s failure properly to fill out the sworn report (see ibid.), and specifically 
does not require the result reached in Solovij, a decision which appears to be 
contrary to the intent and spirit of the administrative per se law.”  
 
We agree with the Court of Appeal, and, accordingly, we affirm its 
judgment. 
DISCUSSION 
 
In Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th 448, we described in detail the statutory 
framework of the administrative per se law, and we will briefly reiterate that 
discussion insofar as it is required for understanding the related issue presented by 
this case.   
 
Under the administrative per se law, the DMV must immediately suspend 
the driver’s license of a person who is driving with .08 percent or more, by weight, 
of alcohol in his or her blood.  (§ 13353.2, subd. (a)(1).)  The procedure is called 
“administrative per se” because it does not impose criminal penalties, but simply 
suspends a person’s driver’s license as an administrative matter upon a showing 
the person was arrested for driving with a certain blood-alcohol concentration, 
without additional evidence of impairment.  (Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 
p. 454, fn. 1.)  The express legislative purposes of the administrative suspension 
procedure are:  (1) to provide safety to persons using the highways by quickly 
suspending the driving privilege of persons who drive with excessive blood-
alcohol levels; (2) to guard against erroneous deprivation by providing a prompt 
administrative review of the suspension; and (3) to place no restriction on the 
ability of a prosecutor to pursue related criminal actions.  (Id. at p. 454; Gikas v. 
Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 847.) 
 
The administrative per se laws were deemed necessary due to the time lag 
that often occurs between an arrest and a conviction for driving while intoxicated 
or with a prohibited blood-alcohol concentration.  During this interim period, 
 
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arrestees who would eventually be convicted of an intoxication-related driving 
offense were permitted to continue driving and, possibly, endangering the public.  
Moreover, without administrative per se laws, persons with extremely high blood-
alcohol concentration levels at the time of arrest could escape license suspension 
or revocation by plea bargaining to lesser crimes or entering pretrial diversion.  
Thus, by providing for an administrative license suspension prior to the criminal 
proceeding, the law affords the public added protection.  (Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th 
at pp. 454-455.) 
 
Under the administrative per se law, when a person is arrested for driving 
under the influence and is determined to have a prohibited blood-alcohol 
concentration, the arresting officer or the DMV serves the person with a notice of 
order of suspension.  (§§ 13353.2, subds. (b), (c), 13382; Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th 
at p. 455.)  The notice informs the driver the license suspension will be effective 
30 days from the date of service, states the reason and statutory grounds for the 
suspension, and explains the driver’s right to seek an administrative hearing.   
(§§ 13353.2, subd. (c), 13353.3, subd. (a).) 
 
After the arresting officer serves a driver with the notice of order of license 
suspension, the DMV conducts an automatic internal review of the merits of the 
suspension.  (§ 13557, subd. (a); Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 455.)  In its review, 
the DMV considers the sworn report submitted by the peace officer and any other 
evidence accompanying the report.  (§ 13557, subd. (a).) 
 
In addition to the automatic internal review, the driver may request a 
hearing, in which case the DMV holds a contested review hearing on its decision 
to suspend a license.  (§ 13558, subd. (a).)  “The rules potentially governing the 
evidence available for use in such hearings are set forth in division 6, chapter 3, 
article 3 of the Vehicle Code, commencing with section 14100.  [Citation.]  Two 
provisions are especially relevant.  First, section 14104.7 states in pertinent part:  
 
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‘At any hearing, the department shall consider its official records and may receive 
sworn testimony.’  Second, for all matters not specifically covered by division 6, 
chapter 3, article 3 of the Vehicle Code, section 14112 incorporates the provisions 
of the Administrative Procedures Act governing administrative hearings 
generally.”  (Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 458.) 
 
Government Code section 11513 addresses the admissibility of evidence in 
administrative hearings.  It states in relevant part:  “The hearing need not be 
conducted according to technical rules relating to evidence and witnesses, except 
as hereinafter provided.  Any relevant evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort of 
evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of 
serious affairs, regardless of the existence of any common law or statutory rule 
which might make improper the admission of the evidence over objection in civil 
actions.”  (Gov. Code, § 11513, subd. (c).) 
 
In Solovij, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 1229, the DMV suspended Solovij’s 
license for driving with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or more.  The 
administrative hearing officer considered both sworn and unsworn reports 
submitted by the arresting officer.  The trial court granted Solovij’s petition for 
writ of mandate on the ground there was no competent evidence in the sworn 
report to justify the initial stop and detention.  The Court of Appeal affirmed, 
concluding that “without a sworn report containing competent evidence the 
officer’s unsworn report cannot supply the missing competent evidence.”  (Id. at 
p. 1231.) 
 
The Solovij court distinguished Lake.  “Here the question is whether the 
DMV properly considered the unsworn report of the arresting officer.”  (Solovij, 
supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1234, italics added.)  The Solovij court acknowledged 
that the DMV’s “reliance on the arresting officer’s unsworn report does not 
involve the hearsay rule.  The unsworn report of the arresting officer is just as 
 
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much a public employee record as the unsworn report of the nonarresting officer 
found admissible in Lake.”  (Ibid.)  “The problem,” in the Solovij court’s view, 
was that “section 13380 expressly requires the arresting officer to file a sworn 
report containing ‘all information relevant to the enforcement action . . . .’  We 
presume that when the Legislature said the arresting officer must include ‘all 
information’ in a sworn report, it meant what it said.  An unsworn report will not 
suffice.  [¶]  It is true that at the hearing, the DMV is not limited to a consideration 
of the arresting officer’s sworn report.  But the DMV cannot evade the statutory 
requirement that the arresting officer must include all information in a sworn 
report simply by categorizing the arresting officer’s unsworn report as additional 
evidence.  [¶]  Our Supreme Court said in Lake:  ‘[P]ermitting the department’s 
hearing officer to consider and rely on [the nonarresting officer’s] unsworn police 
report does not unfairly evade the requirement . . . that the arresting officer file a 
sworn report.’  (Lake v. Reed, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 460.)  Permitting the 
department’s hearing officer to consider and rely on the arresting officer’s 
unsworn report would unfairly evade that requirement.”  (Solovij, at p. 1234.) 
 
This Court of Appeal declined to follow Solovij.  “Here, although section 
13380 provides the arresting officer ‘shall’ send the DMV a sworn report of all 
information relevant to the enforcement action, the statute does not specify a 
consequence for the officer’s failure to properly complete the sworn report.  The 
consequence fashioned by Solovij for the arresting officer’s failure to perfect the 
sworn report is at odds with the rest of the statutory scheme, which does not limit 
the DMV’s review to the information contained in the sworn report and allows the 
DMV to consider an officer’s unsworn report which meets the conditions for 
admissibility.  (Lake v. Reed, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 461.)  [¶]  Further, the Solovij 
interpretation of section 13380 thwarts, rather than advances, the express 
legislative purpose of the administrative per se law to protect the public 
 
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‘ “by quickly suspending the driving privilege of persons who drive with excessive 
blood-alcohol levels.” ’  (Lake v. Reed, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 454.)  [¶]  Finally, 
our determination that the DMV may consider the unsworn report of an arresting 
officer does not prejudice the interests of the arrestee.  Regardless of whether 
information relevant to the enforcement action is set forth in a sworn report or an 
unsworn report, the statutory scheme guards against an erroneous deprivation by 
providing a prompt administrative review of the suspension.”   
 
In Dibble v. Gourley (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 496 (Dibble), the same Court 
of Appeal that decided Solovij, Division Six of the Second District, reaffirmed its 
holding in that case, while rejecting the contrary holding in this case by Division 
Three of the same district.  (Dibble, at p. 501.)  The Dibble court rejected “our 
colleagues’ criticism that our interpretation of section 13380 ‘thwarts, rather than 
advances, the express legislative purpose of the administrative per se law to 
protect the public “ ‘by quickly suspending the driving privilege of persons who 
drive with excessive blood-alcohol levels.’ ” ’  (. . . [Q]uoting Lake v. Reed, supra, 
16 Cal.4th at p. 454.)  If a person successfully objects to an arresting officer’s 
unsworn report at an administrative hearing and the sworn report is insufficient to 
meet the DMV’s burden of proof, the DMV can call the officer to testify.  (Lake, 
at p. 458; §§ 13558[,] subd. (b), 14104.7.)  Although it may be more practical to 
allow consideration of the arresting officer’s unsworn reports, the power to fashion 
such a rule lies exclusively with the Legislature.  Of course, all of this is rendered 
moot and the purpose of the law satisfied if all of the relevant information is 
included in the officer’s sworn report.”  (Dibble, at p. 502.) 
 
The Dibble court is quite correct in observing that “all of this” could easily 
have been rendered moot.  (Dibble, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 502.)  As the 
Dibble court points out, one simple means of rendering it moot would have been 
by training officers to attach additional pages to their sworn DMV reports and to 
 
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expressly incorporate the additional pages by reference.  Section 13380, 
subdivision (b) calls for the arresting officer’s sworn report to be made “on forms 
furnished or approved by [the DMV].”  The problem is that the form designed by 
the DMV gives the arresting officer only two and one-half lines to “[d]escribe in 
detail the facts and circumstances that led to the stop or contact.”  Instead of 
attaching additional pages to the sworn DMV form, as the form suggests, the 
officers in these cases have been providing the detailed information on separate 
unsworn CHP forms.  If, as we conclude, the plaintiffs in these cases elevate form 
over substance, the DMV and the CHP have themselves to blame.  “Those who 
craft such forms―like those who prepare instructions for the assembly of 
children’s toys or mail-order furniture―should themselves be required to use the 
form before imposing it on the intended user.”  (Dibble, at p. 504, fn. omitted.) 
 
To resolve this case we must strike a balance between the two pertinent 
statutory provisions. While section 13380 provides that an officer making an arrest 
for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs shall immediately forward to 
the DMV “a sworn report of all information relevant to the enforcement action” 
(italics added), section 13557 provides that the DMV “shall consider the sworn 
report submitted by the peace officer . . . and any other evidence accompanying 
the report” (italics added).  
 
The conclusion reached by the Courts of Appeal in Solovij, supra, 87 
Cal.App.4th 1229, and Dibble, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 496—that the DMV may 
not consider an unsworn report by the arresting officer―is certainly arguable.  
However, given our conclusion in Lake that the DMV may consider an unsworn 
report by a nonarresting officer, it would be anomalous if it could not also 
consider an unsworn report by the arresting officer that is intended to supplement 
the officer’s sworn report.  Again, in an administrative hearing, “[a]ny relevant 
evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort of evidence on which responsible 
 
10
persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs . . . .”  (Dibble, at 
p. 458, quoting Gov. Code, § 11513, subd. (c).)  “A police officer’s report, even if 
unsworn, constitutes ‘the sort of evidence on which responsible persons are 
accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs.’ ”  (Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 
p. 461.)  Again, too, we must not lose sight of the reason for the “slight relaxation 
of the rules of evidence applicable to an administrative per se review hearing,” a 
rationale we reiterated in Lake:  “[T]he administrative per se laws are intended to 
provide an efficient mechanism whereby those persons who drive after consuming 
dangerous amounts of alcohol can have their driver’s licenses quickly suspended 
so as to ensure they will not endanger the public by continuing to drive.  
[Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 462.) 
 
To summarize:  Section 13380 provides the arresting officer’s sworn report 
will contain “all information relevant to the enforcement action.”  Therefore, the 
Legislature clearly anticipates the sworn report will contain all or nearly all of the 
information necessary to remove the offender’s license.  In light of this legislative 
intent, the sworn report cannot be wholly devoid of relevant information.  
However, so long as a sworn report is filed, it is consistent with the relaxed 
evidentiary standards of an administrative per se hearing that technical omissions 
of proof can be corrected by an unsworn report filed by the arresting officer.  In 
this case, the arresting officer filed a sworn report. 
 
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and we 
disapprove of Solovij, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 1229, and Dibble, supra, 103 
Cal.App.4th 496, insofar as they are inconsistent with the views expressed herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion MacDonald v. Gutierrez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 102 Cal.App.4th 568 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S111253 
Date Filed: January 8, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Dzintra I. Janavs 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Andrea Lynn Hoch, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jacob A. 
Appelsmith, Assistant Attorney General, Elizabeth Hong and Michelle Logan-Stern, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Law Offices of Ronald A. Jackson and Ronald A. Jackson for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michelle Logan-Stern 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1000 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-5745 
 
Ronald A. Jackson 
Law Offices of Ronald A. Jackson 
2100 Goodyear Avenue, Suite 11 
Ventura, CA  93003 
(805) 650-8588