Case Title: James A. Mentek, Jr. v. David H. Schwarz

Citation: 2001 WI 32

Docket Number: 1999AP000182

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 32 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0182 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. James A. Mentek, Jr.,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
David H. Schwarz, Administrator Division of 
Hearing and Appeals,  
 
Respondent-Respondent.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 96 
Reported at:  235 Wis. 2d 143, 612 N.W.2d 746 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 4, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
March 1, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Mary Kay Wagner-Malloy 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence. 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there 
were briefs by Stephen M. Compton and Stephen M. Compton, S.C., 
Delavan, and oral argument by Stephen M. Compton. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent the cause was 
argued by William C. Wolford, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2001 WI 32 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0182 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. James A.  
Mentek, Jr.,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
David H. Schwarz, Administrator, Division  
of Hearing and Appeals,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.  
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State ex 
rel. Mentek v. Schwarz, 2000 WI App 96, 235 Wis. 2d 143, 612 
N.W.2d 746.  The court of appeals affirmed an order of the 
Circuit Court for Kenosha County, Mary K. Wagner-Malloy, Judge. 
 The circuit court order dismissed the petition for a writ of 
certiorari filed by James A. Mentek, Jr. seeking judicial review 
of a March 6, 1998, order of the Department of Hearings and 
Appeals revoking his probation.  The circuit court dismissed the 
petition on the grounds that Mentek failed to exhaust his 
FILED 
 
APR 4, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0182 
 
 
2 
administrative remedies before filing the petition as required 
by Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(1995-96).1  The court of appeals also 
concluded 
that 
Mentek's 
administrative 
remedies 
were 
not 
exhausted pursuant to § 801.02(7).2 
¶2 
The issue on review is whether Mentek was required to 
exhaust his administrative remedies under § 801.02(7) or any 
other rule of law in order to petition the circuit court for 
writ of certiorari.  We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7) 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise noted. 
2 On appeal to the court of appeals, and before this court, 
Mentek argued that his due process right to effective assistance 
of counsel was violated.  Mentek asserts that Wis. Admin. Code 
§ HA 2.05(3)(f) (Jan., 1992) grants him the right to counsel on 
administrative appeal.  In State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 
201 Wis. 2d 246, 253, 548 N.W.2d 45 (1996), the court determined 
that "[w]here a statutory right to counsel exists, we have held 
that the right includes the right to effective counsel" 
(citation omitted).   
Mentek further asserts that he requested that counsel 
appointed 
for 
the 
probation 
revocation 
hearing 
file 
an 
administrative appeal; that his counsel indicated he would file 
the appeal; and that after the time to file the appeal expired 
his counsel advised that he had not filed an appeal because an 
appeal was meritless and that Mentek could file a petition for 
writ of certiorari.   
The court of appeals concluded that no right to counsel 
exists on administrative appeal, that a problem arises when an 
attorney promises to file an appeal and then fails to do so, and 
that it did not have the authority to fashion a remedy. 
Because we conclude that the cause is remanded to the 
circuit court for consideration of the petition for writ of 
certiorari, we need not and do not address the issue of the 
right to assistance of counsel.  Mentek's motion to supplement 
the record with a letter from counsel stating counsel's intent 
to file an appeal is denied. 
No. 
99-0182 
 
 
3 
(1995-96) does not apply to a petition for a writ of certiorari 
seeking judicial review of a probation revocation by the 
Department of Administration.  We further hold that this case 
falls within recognized exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion 
of administrative remedies.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand 
Mentek's petition to the circuit court for consideration.  
¶3 
This review centers on Mentek's probation revocation 
on March 6, 1996, which apparently stemmed from two 1993 
convictions.  The facts are not fully developed or clear, but 
the facts relevant to this proceeding can be simply stated.  
Probation revocation hearings were held before an administrative 
law judge during October 1997 and February 1998, at which Mentek 
was represented by appointed counsel.  On March 6, 1998, 
Mentek's probation was revoked.  Mentek alleges that his counsel 
agreed to file an administrative appeal following the probation 
revocation.  Under Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(8) (Sept., 1995), 
an administrative appeal must be filed within ten working days 
of the decision.  The deadline for Mentek's administrative 
appeal therefore expired on March 20, 1998.  In a letter dated 
March 25, 1998, counsel informed Mentek that he would not be 
filing an administrative appeal.  The letter further instructed 
Mentek that he could seek judicial review through a writ of 
certiorari. 
No. 
99-0182 
 
 
4 
¶4 
Mentek's petition for a writ of certiorari, filed pro 
se on August 24, 1998,3 alleged numerous procedural violations 
before and during his revocation hearing.  Mentek alleged, among 
other matters, violations of the statutory time frames and 
notification requirements set forth for probation revocation 
proceedings, 
violations 
of 
his 
right 
to 
counsel 
at 
the 
revocation hearings, and violations of court orders dismissing 
the revocation hearings and ordering Mentek's release.   
¶5 
The State made no substantive response to Mentek's 
legal or factual allegations.  Instead, the State moved to 
dismiss the petition on the grounds that Mentek "failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.02(7)(b)."  In a hearing on November 10, 1998, Judge 
Wagner-Malloy granted the State's motion to dismiss Mentek's 
petition 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.02(7)(b), 
over 
Mentek's 
objections.4  The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, 
                     
3 Mentek apparently first filed a petition in forma pauperis 
in late July or early August 1998, which was returned to him 
because the circuit court denied his in forma pauperis status. 
4 There is no explanation in the record as to why the 
petition was before Judge Wagner-Malloy.  The court of appeals 
described the situation as confusing.  Mentek had filed a 
request for a substitution of judge on August 26, 1998, and 
according to the record, the case was assigned to Judge S. 
Michael Wilk.  
No. 
99-0182 
 
 
5 
concluding that Mentek's failure to appeal administratively 
barred his petition under Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(b). 
¶6 
The State now concedes that Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(b) 
does not apply to Mentek's petition for a writ of certiorari.5  
We agree with the State.  Section 801.02(7) governs a court 
action commenced after an administrative decision by the 
Department of Corrections.  Probation revocation hearings are 
held before the Division of Hearings and Appeals in the 
Department of Administration.  Administrative appeals may be 
made to the administrator of that division.  Judicial review of 
an administrative revocation of probation is by writ of 
                                                                  
Wisconsin Stat. § 801.58(2)(1995-96) provides that when a 
request is properly submitted, "the judge named in the request 
has no further jurisdiction and the clerk shall request the 
assignment of another judge under s. 751.03."  In discussing 
this confusing record, the court of appeals concluded that the 
substitution claim is moot because Mentek did not have a viable 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim as a matter of law.  
Because we remand the cause to the circuit court, the issue of 
what judge should be assigned to this case on remand is not 
moot. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.02(7)(b) (1995-96), provided: 
No prisoner . . . may commence a civil action or 
special proceeding against an officer, employe or 
agent of the department of corrections in his or her 
official capacity or as an individual for acts or 
omissions committed while carrying out his or her 
duties as an officer, employe or agent or while acting 
within the scope of his or her office, employment or 
agency 
until 
the 
person 
has 
exhausted 
any 
administrative 
remedies 
that 
the 
department 
of 
corrections has promulgated by rule (emphasis added). 
 
This statute was subsequently amended by 1997 Act 133, 
§§ 11, 44(1). 
No. 
99-0182 
 
 
6 
certiorari and the division administrator of the Division of 
Hearings and Appeals in the Department of Administration is the 
respondent.  The certiorari action in the present case is not a 
civil action against an officer, employee, or agent of the 
Department of Corrections and therefore Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7) 
does not apply.  
¶7 
The State contends, however, that even in the absence 
of a statutory bar, Mentek's petition should be dismissed for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies before initiating 
judicial action.  The regulations of the Division of Hearings 
and Appeals governing probation revocation proceedings establish 
a process to appeal the decision of the administrative law judge 
to the administrator of the division.6  The notes to the 
regulations state that the administrator's decision is the 
"final decision and is not subject to further administrative 
review."7 
¶8 
The law is well established that "judicial relief will 
be denied until the parties have exhausted their administrative 
remedies; 
the 
parties 
must 
complete 
the 
administrative 
proceedings before they come to court."8  The rule requiring 
exhaustion of administrative remedies before initiating judicial 
proceedings is a doctrine of judicial restraint justified by 
                     
6 Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(8) and (9) (Sept., 1995). 
7 Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05, note to subsection (8). 
8 Nodell Inv. Corp. v. Glendale, 78 Wis. 2d 416, 424, 254 
N.W.2d 310 (1977). 
No. 
99-0182 
 
 
7 
good policy reasons.  To prevent premature judicial incursions 
into agency activities, a state agency should be given the 
opportunity to correct its own error, thus applying its special 
competence and expertise to the matter.  The exhaustion doctrine 
also promotes judicial efficiency by allowing conflicts to be 
resolved 
at 
the 
administrative 
level 
without 
resort 
to 
litigation.  In addition, the process of agency review may 
provide a court with greater clarification of the issues if a 
matter is not resolved before the agency.9   
¶9 
The law is also clear that a court "need not apply the 
exhaustion doctrine in a rigid, unbending way."10  A court may 
"assume jurisdiction of a case, notwithstanding a party's 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, where the court 
finds that the reasons supporting the exhaustion rule are 
lacking."11  In exercising its discretion in deciding whether to 
apply the exhaustion doctrine, the court must look at the 
circumstances under which the doctrine arises and the reasons 
for 
the 
doctrine, 
and 
then 
balance 
the 
advantages 
and 
disadvantages of applying the doctrine in a particular case, 
including the litigant's need for judicial review, the agency's 
                     
9 Kramer v. Horton, 128 Wis. 2d 404, 418, 383 N.W.2d 54 
(1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 918, overruled on other grounds 
by Casteel v. Vaade, 167 Wis. 2d 1, 481 N.W.2d 476 (1992). 
10 County of Sauk v. Trager, 118 Wis. 2d 204, 214, 346 
N.W.2d 756 (1984). 
11 Nodell Inv. Corp., 78 Wis. 2d at 425-26.  See also 
Trager, 118 Wis. 2d at 210 (citing Nodell Inv. Corp., 78 Wis. 2d 
at 424-26). 
No. 
99-0182 
 
 
8 
interest in precluding litigation, and the public's interest in 
the sound administration of justice.12 
¶10 Applying these principles, we examine whether the 
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should be 
applied in the present case. 
¶11 First, we consider Mentek's need for judicial review. 
 Mentek appeals the administrative revocation of his probation, 
which directly impacts his liberty interest.  Mentek has been 
incarcerated under protest since 1997.  The record suggests that 
he has made credible legal arguments in his pro se filings in 
the circuit court and the court of appeals, and the documents 
filed with Mentek's petition provide factual support for his 
allegations.  We therefore conclude that Mentek's need for 
judicial review is substantial. 
¶12 Second, 
we 
consider 
the 
agency's 
interest 
in 
precluding this litigation.  The Division of Hearings and 
Appeals, like other administrative agencies, has substantial 
interest in exhaustion of administrative procedures.  We 
described these policy interests above. 
¶13 The facts of the present case, however, suggest that 
the Division of Hearings and Appeals' interest in precluding 
Mentek from litigation is weak.  Mentek alleges that he was not 
permitted to argue various due process and other constitutional 
rights during the probation revocation proceedings and that he 
                     
12 Trager, 118 Wis. 2d at 210, 214. 
No. 
99-0182 
 
 
9 
was instructed to pursue these issues on writ of certiorari.13  
Thus 
the 
administrative 
proceedings, 
including 
the 
administrative appeal, apparently would not provide Mentek with 
a forum to state his objections.   
¶14 Furthermore, 
the 
official 
communication 
from 
the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals dated March 6, 1998, informing 
Mentek of his probation revocation and advising him of his right 
to appeal administratively and to seek judicial review through 
writ of certiorari, does not expressly state that the right to 
seek judicial review is contingent upon first filing an 
administrative appeal.  If it is the Division's position that an 
administrative appeal is a condition precedent to judicial 
review, the Division has not so advised Mentek (or Mentek's 
counsel) in its written instruction form.  When counsel wrote 
Mentek after the probation revocation decision and informed him 
of his rights, counsel apparently interpreted the revocation 
form as allowing Mentek the right to seek judicial review 
without filing an administrative appeal.  Counsel advised Mentek 
that "failure to file an administrative appeal does not bar you 
from filing a Writ of Certiorari in the circuit court in which 
you were convicted."  
¶15 Under these circumstances, the agency's interest in 
precluding litigation, which the State contends is strong, is 
                     
13 This allegation appears in an affidavit from Jerold 
Breitenbach, Mentek's attorney during the initial revocation 
proceedings, submitted as part of Mentek's petition for a writ 
of certiorari.  The State has not challenged this allegation. 
No. 
99-0182 
 
 
10
not supported by the Division's communications with Mentek.  To 
the contrary, the Division's interest in precluding litigation 
in the present case appears weak.  
¶16 Third, we consider the public interest in the sound 
administration of justice.  This court recently considered a 
constitutional 
challenge 
to 
administrative 
probation 
revocations, a practice that at the time was unique to 
Wisconsin.14  We upheld the constitutionality of this practice, 
concluding that affected individuals would receive meaningful 
judicial review through writ of certiorari.15  Despite nearly 
three years of legal efforts remarkable for a pro se litigant 
filing from behind bars, Mentek has yet to receive meaningful 
judicial review of any of his allegations.  In contrast, the 
State has thus far avoided the merits of Mentek's challenges by 
relying on a statute that on its face is inapplicable to the 
facts of the present case.  We conclude that the public interest 
in the sound administration of justice would suffer if we denied 
Mentek meaningful judicial review under the circumstances. 
¶17 Considering the purposes of the doctrine of exhaustion 
of administrative remedies and balancing the three interests 
this court has identified, we conclude that the circuit court 
should exercise jurisdiction over Mentek's petition for a writ 
of certiorari, notwithstanding his failure to exhaust his 
                     
14 See State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 652, 594 N.W.2d 772 
(1999). 
15 See Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 652. 
No. 
99-0182 
 
 
11
administrative remedies.  We therefore remand to the circuit 
court 
for 
consideration 
of 
Mentek's 
legal 
and 
factual 
allegations, including his request for substitution of judge.  
On remand, the circuit court should be mindful of the standards 
governing pro se litigants.  See State ex rel. McMillian v. 
Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 279, 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1986) 
("[W]e follow a liberal policy when judging the sufficiency of 
pro se pleadings by prisoners."). 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded. 
 
 
No. 99-0182.ssa 
 
1 
¶18 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  
Although it is not necessary to the court's holding today, which 
is grounded narrowly on this court's conclusion that exhaustion 
of administrative remedies was not required in the present case, 
I would also conclude that Mentek had the right to assistance of 
counsel established by Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(3)(f) (Jan., 
1992) for the administrative appeal of the decision revoking his 
probation.  When an individual has a right to counsel, counsel 
must be effective.16 
¶19 The court of appeals focused on the issue of effective 
assistance of counsel and determined that the right to counsel 
authorized in the regulations of the Division of Hearing and 
Appeals applies only to the probation revocation hearing, not to 
the administrative appeal.  Absent a right to counsel on 
administrative appeal, the court of appeals concluded that 
Mentek could not argue that he had been denied effective 
assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to file his 
appeal.  I disagree with this reasoning.  I agree with the 
position set forth by Judge Richard Brown in his dissent in the 
court of appeals.17 
¶20 The Division's regulations set forth the rights of an 
individual who faces probation revocation.  Wisconsin Admin. 
                     
16 See State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 
252-53, 548 N.W.2d 45 (1996). 
17 State ex rel. Mentek v. Schwartz, 2000 WI App 96, ¶25, 
235 Wis. 2d 143, 612 N.W.2d 746. 
No. 99-0182.ssa 
 
2 
Code § HA 2.05, entitled "Revocation hearing," enumerates the 
client's rights at the hearing as follows:  
 
(3) CLIENT'S RIGHTS.  The client's rights at the 
hearing include: 
 
  (a) The right to be present; 
 
  (b) The right to deny the allegation; 
 
(c) The right to be heard and to present 
witnesses; 
 
  (d) The right to present documentary evidence; 
 
  (e) The right to question witnesses; 
 
  (f) The right to the assistance of counsel; 
 
  (g) The right to waive the hearing; 
 
(h) The right to receive a written decision 
stating the reasons for it based upon the 
evidence presented; and 
 
(i) The right to appeal the decision in 
accordance with sub. (8).  
¶21 The State points out that this subsection specifies 
the client's rights "at the hearing."  The State then argues 
that the words "at the hearing" should be read into each of the 
enumerated rights, including "the right to the assistance of 
counsel" set forth in provision (f).  The State urges us to 
conclude that the regulations limit a probationer's right to 
counsel to the revocation hearing itself. 
¶22 However, as Judge Brown's dissent explains, several of 
the rights enumerated in subsection (3) are not limited to the 
hearing itself.  For example, (3)(g), the right to waive the 
No. 99-0182.ssa 
 
3 
hearing, is a pre-hearing right.  Provisions (3)(h) and (3)(i), 
granting the rights to "receive a written decision stating the 
reasons for it based upon the evidence presented" and to "appeal 
the decision in accordance with sub. (8)," are post-hearing 
rights.  The right to assistance of counsel expressed in (3)(f) 
seems applicable to before, during, and after a revocation 
hearing.  Consequently, the dissent concluded that statutory 
interpretation does not require the words "at the hearing" to be 
read into each of the enumerated rights.  I agree.  It does not 
make sense to add the words "at the hearing" to (3)(f), (g), 
(h), or (i). 
¶23 Furthermore, Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05 is entitled 
"Revocation hearing," but it governs both pre- and post-hearing 
matters.  Thus, the term "revocation hearing" as used in Wis. 
Admin. Code § HA 2.05 encompasses pre-hearing matters such as 
notice before the hearing18 and post-hearing matters such as 
appeal,19 as well as the hearing itself.   
¶24 Additional assistance for our task of interpreting the 
scope of the right to counsel in Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(3)(f) 
comes from subsection (8), governing appeal of the administrative 
law judge's decision.  Subsection (8)(a) provides: 
 
The client, the client's attorney, if any, or the 
department 
representative 
may 
appeal 
the 
administrative 
law judge's decision by 
filing 
a 
written 
appeal 
with 
arguments 
and 
supporting 
                     
18 Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(1) (Jan., 1992). 
19 Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(8) (Sept., 1995). 
No. 99-0182.ssa 
 
4 
materials, if any, with the administrator within 10 
days of the date of the administrative law judge's 
written decision (emphasis added). 
The State suggests that the phrase "the client's attorney, 
if any" means that the regulations do not require the right to 
assistance of counsel on appeal.  However, this interpretation 
is unconvincing, since the same phrase, "the client's attorney, 
if any," appears throughout Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05, 
including the subsections governing the revocation hearing 
itself, at which the client unquestionably has the right to the 
assistance of counsel.  See, e.g., Wis. Admin. Code § HA 
2.05(6)(g) and (6)(h). 
¶25 Another aspect of subsection (8) that is helpful to 
our interpretive task is the fact that it establishes a time 
period of ten working days for filing a written administrative 
appeal "with arguments and supporting materials, if any."20  
Judge Brown's dissent considered this short administrative 
appeal time frame relevant, reasoning that it would not make 
sense to hold that the regulations give an individual a right to 
counsel at the hearing, but that the client is on his or her own 
for an appeal, which must be filed within ten days.21  As a 
                     
20 Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(8)(a). 
21 At oral argument, the attorney for the State suggested 
that this ten-day deadline is not enforced in a Draconian 
manner, stating: 
If somebody is concerned about a deadline, a pro se or 
probably even an attorney, they say just file something. 
 Just get it in on time and then we'll give you a certain 
amount of time to supplement it.  So it's not like they 
always have to have everything in within the ten-day 
working period. 
No. 99-0182.ssa 
 
5 
result, the dissent concluded that the right to the assistance 
of counsel set forth in Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(3)(f) extends 
to the administrative appeal. 
¶26 The most reasonable interpretation of Wis. Admin. Code 
§ HA 2.05(3)(f) is that the probationer has the right to the 
assistance of counsel for filing an administrative appeal.22  
This is the interpretation I would adopt. 
¶27 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶28 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
 
While I appreciate the Division's efforts to provide 
flexibility, 
information 
regarding 
the 
Division's 
informal 
practices 
is 
not 
relevant 
to 
our 
interpretation 
of 
the 
regulation.  The regulation sets forth an unambiguous ten-day 
time frame for an appeal alongside a right to the assistance of 
counsel that is ambiguous.  Therefore, we consider this ten-day 
time frame relevant to interpreting the right to counsel in Wis. 
Admin. Code 2.05(3)(f). 
22 This analysis is consistent with the analysis used to 
support an individual's right to counsel on filing a petition 
for review in this court.  See Schmelzer, 201 Wis. 2d at 252-53, 
in which this court concluded that an accused's right to counsel 
extends through the filing of a petition for review, and, if the 
petition 
is accepted, 
includes representation 
through the 
subsequent proceedings in this court. 
No. 99-0182.ssa 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-0182.ssa 
 
1