Case Title: DYSTHE v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
DYSTHE v. STATE2003 WY 2063 P.3d 875Case Number: 01-125Decided: 02/19/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

KILEN 
PATRICK DYSTHE,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; 
and Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; T. Alan Elrod, 
Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance 
Program; and Hugh J. Linnehan and Meri Ramsey, 
Interns.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Kilen Patrick 
Dysthe (Dysthe) appeals his conviction for delivery of a controlled substance, 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001), a 
felony.  The district court 
sentenced Dysthe to the custody of the Department of Corrections for a period of 
eighteen to thirty-six months.  We 
reverse.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The issues 
presented on appeal are:

 

I.          
Did the trial court err in excluding two of [Dysthe's] named witnesses, 
thereby denying him his right to a fair trial and his right to compulsory 
process?

 

II.          
Did the trial court err in excluding evidence relating to the State's 
witness, Eric Stone?

 

III.         
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct in closing 
argument?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Dysthe was 
charged with selling cocaine to Daniel Luke Jacquot (Jacquot) in June 2000.  Eric Stone (Stone), a mutual friend, 
testified that he processed the cocaine into a smokeable form and Jacquot 
testified that Dysthe, Jacquot, Stone, and Jacquot's brother, John, smoked the 
cocaine.1  Jacquot was a participant in drug court, 
and Jacquot's urine tested positive for cocaine the day after the group 
allegedly smoked the cocaine.  
Jacquot testified that he was booked into jail after telling drug court 
personnel that he had used cocaine.  
Jacquot told a Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) agent that Dysthe 
had sold him the cocaine.  An 
Information charged Dysthe with one count of delivery of a controlled substance, 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii).

 

[¶4]      The district 
court entered a scheduling order on September 8, 2000, that required the parties 
to list witnesses and exhibits by November 13, 2000.  On November 9, 2000, Dysthe listed his 
mother and Stone as witnesses.  The 
State filed a notice of additional witnesses on December 5, 2000, listing a 
former drug court employee, Bob Green, as a witness.  The defense filed its notice of 
additional witnesses on January 25, 2001, naming Ray Olson and Jodie Bear, drug 
court employees, as witnesses.  
These witnesses were to testify about Jacquot's conduct in drug court, 
specifically that he conspired with other drug court participants to deliver 
hallucinogenic mushrooms.  The next 
day, the State listed Honorable J. John Sampson as a witness, to counter any 
defense accusations concerning Jacquot's conduct in drug court.  The district court held a hearing on the 
day of trial regarding the various notices and motions related to the additional 
witnesses.  The district court 
prohibited either party from calling additional witnesses because it was not 
notified of these witnesses by the court's November 13th 
deadline.  The matter proceeded to 
trial and a jury found Dysthe guilty.  
This appeal followed.

 

DISCUSSION

 

            
Witness 
Exclusion

 

[¶5]      Dysthe first 
argues that the district court erred in precluding the testimony of two defense 
witnesses, Ray Olson and Jodie Bear, Sheridan drug court personnel, thereby 
denying him his right to present a defense.  Dysthe presents the issue as one of 
constitutional magnitude, implicating the right to present a defense as 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution,2 and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10.3  A violation of the compulsory process 
clause of the Sixth Amendment occurs when a defendant is arbitrarily deprived of 
testimony that would have been relevant, material, and vital to his defense. 
 United States v. 
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193 
(1982).  In Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 407-09, 108 S. Ct. 646, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1988), 
a case involving the violation of a pre-trial discovery order, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the compulsory process clause is not merely a guarantee 
that the accused shall have the power to subpoena witnesses, but confers on the 
accused the fundamental right to present witnesses in his own defense.  Taylor further held, however, 
that although a trial court may not ignore a defendant's fundamental right to 
present witness testimony in his favor, the mere invocation of that right cannot 
automatically and invariably outweigh countervailing public interests.  Id. at 410-16.  The factors to be weighed in the balance 
include, but are not limited to the "integrity of the adversary process, which 
depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of 
unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and efficient administration of 
justice, and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the 
trial process . . .."  Id. at 
414-15.

 

[¶6]      In Lawson v. 
State, 994 P.2d 943, 946-47 (Wyo. 2000), 
we adopted the Taylor factors and held that the exclusion of 
alibi testimony was an abuse of discretion where the district court failed to 
consider any factor other than the defendant's failure to comply with the filing 
date requirement of W.R.Cr.P. 12.1(a)4 and failed to consider the factors 
articulated in Taylor.5  We have defined judicial discretion as 
"a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.'"  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236, 1238 
(1985)).

 

[¶7]      In the instant 
case, the district court required the parties to name their witnesses by 
November 13, 2000.  On January 25, 
2001, defense counsel named the two Sheridan drug court personnel as additional 
witnesses.  The State objected to 
the two witnesses, but also listed Judge Sampson for potential rebuttal.  The district court held a hearing on the 
matter just prior to jury selection, inquired as to the purpose of the proposed 
testimony, and following counsels' arguments, ruled as 
follows:

 

            
THE COURT:  All right.  Well, counsel, this is the way the Court 
is going to handle this.  Both of 
you are precluded from using Bob Green, Ray Olson, Jody [sic] Bear, Judge 
Sampson in your cases in chief.  I'm 
not going to get into the merits of the arguments.  But 
it will be the ruling of the Court that the late filing precludes their use in 
the case in chief.  If it turns out that, you know, one of 
you thinks that they are necessary for some sort of proper rebuttal, I'll 
consider it at that time.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶8]      This ruling 
barred Dysthe from calling the drug court witnesses in his case-in-chief, but it 
left the door open to their use in rebuttal.  Despite this ruling, when defense 
counsel tried to impeach the credibility of Jacquot, a witness for the State, 
with questions that would have made such rebuttal appropriate, the district 
court sustained the State's objection:

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  . . . 
[Jacquot], you just testified that you haven't made any deals with the 
prosecutor, right?

 

            
[JACQUOT:]  
Correct.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  Isn't it 
true that you'vethat just within the last month you were in some fairly serious 
trouble?

 

            
[PROSECUTOR:]  Objection, 
Your Honor.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Trouble?

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  Trouble 
in Drug Court.

 

            
[PROSECUTOR:]  It's improper 
specific acts.  Improper under 404, 
improper under 401, improper under 403, improper under 608 and 
609.

 

            
THE COURT:  Counsel, if you 
want to approach the bench.

 

            
. . .

 

            
THE COURT:  A couple of 
questions that you've attempted have incited a narrative response.  They haven't been specific enough to 
limit the testimony to those items required by the rule, and they really haven't 
been specific enough for me to properly rule on an objection, so if you want to 
give me an offer of proof as to where you're headed outside the hearing of the 
jury, maybe I can rule on [the prosecutor's] objection.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  I want to 
ask him if he has been, if he has been threatened with prosecution by Drug Court 
personnel; and isn't it true that when you or your father objected to the 
prosecutor's office, the problems were taken care of.

 

            
And I don't care if [the prosecutor] did anything or not; this kid thinks 
that that happened.  I want to know 
his perception of that.

 

            
THE COURT:  As we talked 
about before we started the trial, I don't think it's improper for you to ask if 
someone threatened him withspecifically with respect to his testimony in this 
case.  But both of you are talking 
generally about drug use and Drug Court.  
It may have to do with other cases involving other people.  It may be other times.  I don't have any idea where you're 
at.  If you make it very specific to 
testimony in this case, you may inquire.  
If not, I'm going to sustain the objections.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  I can't 
even get intoI'm not allowed to even ask a question.  I get objections all the 
time.

 

            
THE COURT:  Did you hear what 
I just said, though, about making itwell, see you apparently want to inquire as 
to whether or not he received any pressure that affects his testimony in this 
case.  That's okay.  But

 

            
[PROSECUTOR:]  Your Honor, 
I'm sorry to interrupt the Court.  
He already testified that he did not from my office.  If he's going to talk about the 
otherabout these alleged things with Drug Court, which had nothing to do with 
this case, there's going to be an objection before [defense counsel] is 
expecting to get the question out, because I don't think it's proper to be in 
front of the jury and to have all of the innuendos about Drug 
Court.

 

            
THE COURT:  That's why it's 
got to be specific.  That's why it's 
got to be specific about the testimony that he is offering in this case.  He has said I don't have any reason to 
lie; [the prosecutor's] office didn't make a deal with me.  Okay.

 

            
And so if you say, for example, "Has anyone threatened you regarding your 
testimony in this case," that's probably appropriate.  But these vague generalities about Drug 
Court and other people using drugs and testifying at other times and all that, 
it's too confusing; and I'm going to sustain objections to that.  So it's up to you.

 

[¶9]      The drug court 
witnesses were essential to Dysthe's defense in order to attempt to discredit 
Jacquot, but he was precluded from presenting this evidence in his case-in-chief 
because of an arbitrary date set by the district court, and he was precluded 
from presenting it in rebuttal by the district court's decision not to allow 
counsel to pursue that line of questioning.  Because there was no physical evidence, 
the State's case was based solely on the credibility of its witnesses, and its 
primary witness had potential credibility issues.  The district court did not consider any 
Taylor 
factors in enforcing its pre-trial deadline.  We conclude that the evidence of 
Jacquot's drug court troubles and the possibility of favorable treatment was 
relevant, material, and vital to the defense in order to attack Jacquot's 
credibility.  The district court 
abused its discretion in excluding Dysthe's witnesses.6

 

[¶10]   W.R.A.P. 9.04 states that "[a]ny 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded by the reviewing court."  W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.E. 103(a) 
contain similar provisions.  The 
test for harmless error stated in the reverse is as 
follows:

 

"An 
error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might 
have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred.  To demonstrate harmful error, the 
defendant must show prejudice under "circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play."'  Johnson 
v. State, 
790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo.1990)."

 

Lancaster 
v. State, 
2002 WY 45, ¶ 28, 43 P.3d 80, 93 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting 
Skinner v. State, 
2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 767 (Wyo. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1554 (2002)).

 

"Before a federal constitutional error can be held 
harmless, the court must be able to declare its belief that the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  In determining whether reversible error 
occurred, we ask if the defendant's absence created any reasonable possibility 
of prejudice.  
The State must show that an error can pass muster under this 
standard."

 

Skinner, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 23, 33 P.3d  at 766 (quoting Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 178 (Wyo. 1998)).

 

[¶11]   Nothing in the record indicates that 
Dysthe ever admitted to selling, using, or even discussing cocaine with any of 
the State's witnesses.  When we consider that no drugs were retrieved 
or placed into evidence at trial, leaving the State's case totally dependent 
upon the credibility of its witnesses, we cannot conclude that the error in 
excluding this testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

 

            
Exclusion of Evidence

 

[¶12]   Dysthe next argues that the district 
court erred when it excluded evidence relating to the State's witness, 
Stone.  The 
State did not present any drugs into evidence.  To prove that the controlled substance Dysthe 
allegedly sold to Jacquot was in fact cocaine, the State called Stone, an 
admitted drug user, to testify.  Stone testified that he considered himself an 
"expert" on "certain aspects" of cocaine and that the substance he cooked on the 
day in question was "consistent with [his] familiarity of cocaine . . .."

 

[¶13]   To show that the substance in question 
may not have been cocaine, but could have been methamphetamine, defense counsel 
attempted to ask Stone about his experience with methamphetamine:

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  Don't they [methamphetamine and cocaine] have 
the same effect?

 

            
[STONE:]  
I'm not sure.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  So I take it you haven't done any 
methamphetamine?

 

            
[STONE:]  
I don't think that's relevant.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  Well, you get to answer the question.

 

            
[STONE:]  
Excuse me?

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  I take it you haven't done 
methamphetamine?

 

            
[STONE:]  
That's not relevant.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  Would you answer the question?  Have you done 
methamphetamine to be able to distinguish the two?

 

            
[STONE:]  
No, I will not answer that question.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  You have to answer that question.

 

            
THE COURT:  
You know, counsel, this exceeds the scope of the direct and is into a 
totally different area.

 

[¶14]   The district court then allowed counsel 
to approach the bench and make an offer of proof out of the hearing of the jury 
panel.  The 
district court stated that the trial was about cocaine, and Stone had testified 
that cocaine and methamphetamine were different.  Defense counsel pointed out the earlier 
testimony of a DCI agent who testified that cocaine and methamphetamine have 
virtually similar effects.  From the record, we discern that defense 
counsel was referring to the following:

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  You said that speedor meth or cocaine is a 
powerful central nervous system stimulant, right?

 

            
[AGENT:]  
Yes.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  Speed is, too, isn't it, methamphetamine?

 

            
[AGENT:]  
Yes, it is.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  You said that coke speeds up your heart?

 

            
[AGENT:]  
Yes.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  Meth speeds up your heart, as well, does it 
not?

 

            
[AGENT:]  
Yes, it does.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  You said that cocaine creates a sense of 
euphoria?

 

            
[AGENT:]  
Yes.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  And speed does exactly the same thing, 
doesn't it?

 

            
[AGENT:]  
Yes, essentially.

 

            
. . .

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  To know the difference between speedwell, it 
would take a chemist or somebody trained in chemistry or pharmacology to be able 
to answer that question, wouldn't it?

 

            
[AGENT:]  What was the question?  I'm sorry.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  The chemical, the chemical relationship 
between speed and cocaine.

 

            
[AGENT:]  
I would assume so, yes.

 

[¶15]   After defense counsel reminded the 
district court about this testimony, the following exchange occurred:

 

            
THE COURT:  
The trial is about cocaine.  The witness testified that cocaine and 
methamphetamine are different.  I don't see any reason why you need to 
continue with this line of questioning.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  Your Honor, the police officer testified that 
they have virtually identical effects.  They speed up the heart; they make people 
feel good.

 

            
THE COURT:  
What does methamphetamine have to do with this trial?

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  This substance may very well be 
methamphetamine and not cocaine.  How do we prove it's not 
methamphetamine?  
There's no chemical result.  We have three little drug addicts who are 
saying it's cocaine, and there's no proof.  We have a police officer who say [sic] they 
are identical in their effect; and if he wants to distinguish the two, this 
expert, I should be able to inquire about his expertise in methamphetamine.

 

            
THE COURT:  
He didn't say he was an expert in methamphetamine.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  The State is offering him as an expert.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Not in methamphetamine.  And I don't think they are offering him as an 
expert.  He's 
testifying as to his personal experience, certainly not as an expert in the 
legal sense of the word.

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  Okay.  I made my objection.

 

            
THE COURT:  
Okay.  
So discontinue the line of inquiry referencing methamphetamine.

 

[¶16]   An evidentiary ruling of the district 
court is reviewed pursuant to the following standard:

 

Such decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.  
. . .  Determining whether the trial court abused 
its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary or capricious 
manner.  . . 
.

 

            
A trial court's evidentiary rulings "are entitled to considerable 
deference,'" and will not be reversed on appeal so long as "there exists a 
legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling . . ..'"

 

Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 11, 43 P.3d  at 87 (quoting Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 367 (Wyo. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980 (2001)).

 

[¶17]   W.R.E. 103 provides:

 

            
(a)       Effect of erroneous ruling.    Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and

 

            
. . .

 

            
(2)  
Offer of Proof.    In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, 
the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by an offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions were asked.

 

W.R.E. 611(b) provides:

 

Scope of cross-examination.    Cross-examination should be limited to the 
subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility 
of the witness.  
The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into 
additional matters as if on direct examination.

 

[¶18]   This Court has stated that the State 
may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove the identity of a controlled 
substance because "unlawful distribution of a substance, which by its nature is 
to be consumed, should not escape prosecution because the state could not seize 
a sample of the substance.'"  Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Lobatos v. State, 875 P.2d 716, 720 (Wyo. 1994)).  One of the circumstances relied upon by the 
State in that regard was the fact that Stone believed the substance to have been 
cocaine.  
Defense counsel's cross-examination of both the DCI agent and Stone 
concerning the similarity between cocaine and methamphetamine clearly was meant 
to show that the two substances are so similar in effect that they may be 
confused by a user.  
The State did not object during the cross-examination of either 
witness.  Yet 
the district court, on its own initiative, halted the cross-examination of Stone 
on the ground that it was beyond the scope of the direct examination.

 

[¶19]   The general rule that evidentiary 
decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court applies to 
decisions made under W.R.E. 611(b).  Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1285-86 (Wyo. 1983); Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 814 (Wyo. 1980).  The exercise of that discretion must, 
however, be guided by recognized principles of law.  One of those 
principles is that wide latitude should be permitted in the cross-examination of 
an adverse witness.  
In re Morton's Estate, 428 P.2d 725, 733 (Wyo. 1967).  Further, when a matter is raised during 
direct examination, the adverse party may then explore that matter on 
cross-examination.  
Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033, 1046 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Wyo. 1979)).  Once a party opens the door to a line of 
questions, "he cannot complain that the [adverse party] asked . . . 
similar questions."  
Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 343 (Wyo. 1995).  In some cases, the constitutional right to 
confront witnesses may even require the trial court to allow cross-examination 
that goes beyond the scope of direct examination to test credibility.  Jones v. State, 735 P.2d 699, 702 (Wyo. 1987); Lindsey v. State, 725 P.2d 649, 658 (Wyo. 1986); Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1034 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 836 (1990).

 

[¶20]   It has also been held:

 

It is well established that the scope of proper 
cross-examination may extend to the whole transaction of which the witness has 
testified, or it may be employed to elicit any matter which may tend to 
overcome, qualify or explain the testimony given by a witness on his direct 
examination.

 

People v. Dotson, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875, 879 (1956).

 

[A party] cannot adopt a strategy and at the same time 
preclude the [adverse party] from testing its validity by cross-examination . . 
..

 

Com. v. Williams, 227 Pa.Super. 103, 323 A.2d 135, 140 (1974).  See also Roby v. State, 587 P.2d 641, 650 (Wyo. 1978) (Raper, J., dissenting, 
with whom Thomas, J., joins).  The district court violated these rules in 
this case when it sua sponte declared defense counsel's questions to be beyond the 
scope of direct examination.  Stone testified that it was his opinion that 
the drug involved was cocaine.  Through his questions about the similarity 
between the effects of cocaine and methamphetamine, defense counsel attempted to 
test the basis for that opinion.  Those questions certainly were not beyond the 
scope of Stone's direct examination.  The State's strategy was to prove one element 
of the crimethat Dysthe had delivered cocainethrough the opinion testimony of 
one of the users.  
The State certainly could not then object because Dysthe attempted to 
test that opinion.  
Perhaps that is why the State did not object.

 

[¶21]   We conclude that the district court's 
ruling constituted an abuse of discretion.  As we have previously stated, because no drug 
was retrieved and entered into evidence, the State's case was based solely on 
the credibility of its witnesses.  In testing Stone's credibility, defense 
counsel was entitled to explore the foundation for his opinion.  Furthermore, this 
was not harmless error due to the importance of Stone's opinion to the State's 
case.

 

            
Prosecutorial Misconduct

 

[¶22]   Dysthe's last argument is that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing argument.  Allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed

 

"by reference to the entire record and hinge on whether a 
defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute denial of a fair 
trial.  
Similarly, the propriety of any comment within a closing argument is 
measured in the context of the entire argument.  . . .  [R]eversal is not warranted unless a 
reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that the appellant may have 
enjoyed a more favorable verdict."

 

Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 1999)).  The burden of proof is assigned to the 
defendant.  
Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339, 346 (Wyo. 1990).

 

[¶23]   Because no objection to the 
prosecutor's closing argument was made at trial, we review the claim under our 
plain error standard.  
Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 723-24 (Wyo. 1999).  "Plain error exists when 1) the record is 
clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was 
denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him.'"  Mazurek, 10 P.3d at 535 (quoting Yetter v. State, 987 P.2d 666, 668 (Wyo. 1999)).  Prejudice results if Dysthe can show that he 
was not allowed a trial on its own merits.  Mazurek, 10 P.3d  at 536.  Where the plain error elements are met, we 
may correct the error if it ""seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings."'  . . ."  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469-70, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718 
(1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 
(1993), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 931 (1996)).

 

[¶24]   Closing arguments must be based upon 
the evidence submitted to the jury.  The purpose of closing argument is to allow 
counsel to offer ways of viewing the significance of the evidence.  Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 145 (Wyo. 1981).  Prosecutors, just like defense counsel, may 
review the evidence and suggest to the jury inferences based thereon.  Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 5 n.2, 44 P.3d 22, 24 n.2 (Wyo. 2002) 
(quoting Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 893 (Wyo. 1982)). There are limits, however, 
on prosecutor's closing arguments that are designed to insure the fairness of 
the trial and prevent compromise of the judicial system.  We have recently 
adopted the broad guidelines found in I A.B.A., Standards for Criminal Justice 
3-5.8 at 3.87 to 3.88 (2d ed. 1980):

 

"(a) The prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences 
from evidence in the record.  It is unprofessional conduct for the 
prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the 
inferences it may draw.

 

(b) It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to 
express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any 
testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant.

 

(c) The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to 
inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury.

 

(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would 
divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting 
issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling 
law, or by making predictions of the consequences of the jury's verdict."

 

Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 27, 49 P.3d 975, 986-87 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶25]   Because the goal of the criminal 
justice system is the attainment of justice, the role of the prosecuting 
attorney differs from that of an advocate in a civil case.  The prosecutor's 
special role has been described in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 79 L. Ed. 1314 
(1935):

 

The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, 
but that justice shall be done.  As such, he is in a peculiar and very 
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt 
shall not escape or innocence suffer.  He may prosecute with earnestness and 
vigorindeed, he should do so.  But, while he may strike hard blows, he is 
not at liberty to strike foul ones.  It is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use 
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.

 

[¶26]   The first element of the plain error 
standard is met as to the first allegation of prosecutorial misconduct in the 
instant case because the record clearly reveals the alleged misconduct.  During closing 
argument, the prosecutor stated:

 

            
So this is after, after all  after all of the evidence, a case about 
this Defendant making a very, very bad choice.  And it is a case about him trying to avoid 
responsibility for that choice.

 

            
You can hold him responsible.  And based on the evidence and the law, you 
must hold him responsible.  You have given an oath to do that, to follow 
the law and listen to the evidence.  I would ask that you follow your oath.  You consider the 
evidence.  You 
consider the law and you return a guilty verdict against the Defendant, Kilen 
Dysthe, for delivery of a controlled substance, cocaine.

 

[¶27]   At first glance, it might appear that 
the second element of plain error analysis is also met.  When a portion of 
the prosecutor's argument is taken out of context, it could be argued that the 
prosecutor told the jurors that the way to follow their oath was to "hold him 
responsible."  
Such would violate the clear and unequivocal rule of law that "[i]t is . 
. . improper for the prosecutor to state that the duty of the jury is to find 
the defendant guilty."  United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 
1999).  But while we find the continued use of such 
arguments by prosecutors troublesome, we are unable to distinguish this 
argument, in context, from the one we recently found not to be prosecutorial 
misconduct in Wilks.7 

 

[¶28]   Dysthe next argues that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct by vouching for the credibility of witnesses.  Referring to the 
State's witnesses, the prosecutor said:

 

            
These witnesses, despite the fact that they are users, were 
credible.  They 
were very credible.  
They were more credible because of the very fact that they have a 
relationship with this Defendant.  More credible because, if you couldn't tell, 
I certainly could; they didn't like me asking them questions.  They didn't want to 
be telling me anything.

 

The prosecutor also stated that he worked with the 
investigators on the case and he could "guarantee" that their investigations 
were not "arbitrary."  
He told the jury that the witnesses had no reason to lie.

 

[¶29]   "It is improper for the prosecuting 
attorney, even in responding to defense arguments, to personally vouch for the 
credibility of the state's witnesses."  Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1065 (Wyo. 2000).  The rationale for this rule has been stated 
as follows:

 

            
"When the prosecutor asserts his credibility or personal belief, an 
additional factor is injected into the case.  This additional factor is that counsel may be 
perceived by the jury as an authority whose opinion carries greater weight than 
their own opinion; that members of the jury might be persuaded not by the 
evidence, but rather by a perception that counsel's opinions are correct because 
of his position as prosecutor, an important state official entrusted with 
enforcing the criminal laws of a sovereign state.  While the prosecutor is expected to be an 
advocate, he may not exploit his position to induce a jury to disregard the 
evidence or misapply the law."

 

Id. (quoting Barela v. State, 787 P.2d 82, 83-84 (Wyo. 1990)).  See also Mazurek, 10 P.3d  at 542 (quoting Browder, 639 P.2d at 893) ("unprofessional conduct for the 
prosecutor to express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or 
falsity of any testimony or evidence of the guilt of the defendant.'").

 

[¶30]   Given these guidelines, we cannot 
conclude other than that the prosecutor's comments in the present case crossed 
the line between legitimate argument and illegitimate vouching for the 
credibility of the State's witnesses.  While he did not directly state that it was 
his opinion that the witnesses were credible, he certainly gave that 
impression.  
Further, he did not suggest that the determination was to be made by the 
jurors; instead, he offered his own observation that the witnesses were "more 
credible" because "if you couldn't tell, I certainly could [that] they didn't 
like me asking them questions."  And finally, his personal guarantee that the 
investigation was not arbitrary certainly amounted to a personal attestation of 
fact.

 

[¶31]   The third element of plain error 
analysis is that the error must "affect substantial rights."  This is the same 
language found in W.R.Cr.P. 52(b), and it means that the error or defect must 
adversely affect some substantial right of the accused to avoid a conclusion of 
harmless error.  
Hampton v. State, 558 P.2d 504, 507 (Wyo. 1977); Hopkinson, 632 P.2d  at 145.  The question in the instant case is whether 
the prosecutor's misconduct affected Dysthe's right to a fair trial.  We conclude that it 
did.  As we 
mentioned repeatedly above, the State's case depended entirely on the jury 
finding its witnesses credible.  It is impossible in this case to know whether 
the conviction resulted from the jury's independent evaluation of the evidence 
or from the jury's having been swayed by the prosecutor's improper 
arguments.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶32]   The district court abused its 
discretion when it precluded the testimony of two defense witnesses and when it 
foreclosed the cross-examination of one of the State's witnesses.  In addition, 
prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument adversely affected Dysthe's 
right to a fair trial.

 

[¶33]   We reverse and remand for a new 
trial.

 

FOOTNOTES

  
1Both Stone and Jacquot were granted 
transactional immunity for their testimony.

  
2U.S. Const. amend. VI states:  "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . .."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV reads:  "[N]or shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . .."

  3Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 states:  "In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to . . . have compulsory process 
served for obtaining witnesses . . .."

  
4W.R.Cr.P. 12.1(a) requires that "the defendant 
shall serve within 10 days, or at such different time as the court may direct, 
upon the attorney for the state a written notice of defendant's intention to 
offer a defense of alibi."

  
5Because even an error of constitutional 
proportion is subject to harmless error analysis, that analysis was applied in 
Lawson and the conviction was affirmed.  Lawson, 994 P.2d  at 947.

  
6Dysthe's counsel argued to the district court, 
prior to jury selection, that the prosecutor, as an incentive for Jacquot's 
testimony

 

file[d] a motion and basically ha[d] the whole thing 
quashed and ha[d] the kid taken out of Drug Court, period.  . . .  The issue in this 
case is what did that kid think.  I think it is very important to show that 
he's mighty beholden to the prosecutor for coming basically to his rescue, in 
his eyes.

 

No doubt, this was the limited subject to which counsel 
referred during the bench conference when he said, "I want to ask him if he has 
been, if he has been threatened with prosecution by Drug Court personnel; and 
isn't it true that when you or your father objected to the prosecutor's office, 
the problems were taken care of."

7The prosecutor's argument in Wilks was:

 

"Read the law.  Please follow the law.  It's all there for 
you.  I don't 
want you to twist it.  
I don't want you to turn it.  Just read it as it is and apply the facts to 
the law.

 

There is no triumph greater than the ascertainment of the 
truth.  That's 
your job.  Do 
your duty, please, and find the Defendant guilty of First Degree Murder."

 

Wilks, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 28, 49 P.3d  at 987.  See also Hart v. State, 2003 WY 12, ¶ 14, 62 P.3d 566 (Wyo. 2003).