Case Title: In re M.M.D.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97537

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 97537-Agenda 21-May 2004.
In re M.M.D., a Minor (Christopher R. Johnson, Appellant, v. 							Christopher Duncan et al., Appellees).
Opinion filed November 18, 2004.
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this case is whether Wickham v. Byrne, 199 Ill. 2d 309
(2002), which declared Illinois' grandparent visitation statute to be
unconstitutional, invalidated a preexisting agreement approved by the
circuit court of Peoria County granting visitation rights to a child's
grandparents. The circuit court held that it did not. On a permissive
interlocutory appeal brought under Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill.
2d R. 308), the appellate court reached the same conclusion and
affirmed. 344 Ill. App. 3d 345. One justice dissented. We granted
leave to appeal from the appellate court's judgment. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315. For the reasons that follow, we now affirm.
	The facts are not in dispute. Roxanna L. Duncan died on
September 30, 1996, while giving birth to her daughter, M.M.D.
M.M.D. survived. Roxanna's parents, Christopher and Sue Duncan
(the Duncans) subsequently petitioned the circuit court of Peoria
County to be appointed M.M.D.'s guardians. While the guardianship
proceedings were pending, the circuit court entered an interim order
pursuant to section 11a-4 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS
5/11a-4 (West 1996)), granting the Duncans temporary guardianship
of M.M.D. and giving them temporary custody of her.
	Several months after M.M.D.'s birth, Christopher Johnson
brought an action in the circuit court of Peoria County under the
Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 1996))
to establish that he was her father. In April of 1999, when M.M.D.
was approximately 2½ years old, the circuit court entered an agreed
order declaring that Johnson was M.M.D.'s father. With consent of
the parties, Johnson's parentage action was then consolidated with the
Duncans' guardianship proceedings, which remained pending. Johnson
requested and received the right to visit M.M.D. At the same time, he
was ordered to pay 20% of his income to the Duncans for child
support.
	M.M.D. is not Johnson's only child. According to the record,
Johnson is also the father of C.T.J., born three months after M.M.D.;
C.J., born March 11, 1991; C.K.J., born July 18, 1990; B.F., born
March 3, 1986; and Nakeitha Tyler, born May 9, 1983. M.M.D. was
likewise not Roxanna's only child. Roxanna also had a son, I.N.D., by
a man named Gaylord Ford. Following Roxanna's death, the court
granted temporary guardianship of I.N.D. to Ford.
	C.T.J., C.J., and C.K.J. all resided with Johnson and his wife,
Roshawn. The family's financial circumstances were strained.
According to a financial affidavit filed by Johnson in this matter, his
monthly income was less than $2,300. His monthly expenses,
including health insurance, housing, food, child-care and other costs,
and payments stemming from bankruptcy exceeded $7,400.
	Faced with this imbalance, Johnson failed to make the child
support payments to the Duncans ordered by the circuit court. On
Christopher Duncan's motion, the court ordered Johnson to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. Johnson's
attorneys then sought and obtained leave to withdraw from the case.
The reason for their withdrawal was that Johnson had not paid them.
	Johnson retained replacement counsel. In April of 2000,
Johnson's new lawyer filed a petition on his behalf asking that he be
awarded custody of M.M.D. and that the Duncans' guardianship of
her be terminated. Johnson's motion was opposed by the Duncans,
who argued that permanent custody of M.M.D. should be awarded to
them.
	The litigation continued for over a year. Finally, on July 17, 2001,
Johnson and the Duncans reached an agreement under which the
Duncans' temporary guardianship of M.M.D. was to terminate and
Johnson was to obtain permanent custody of the child. The agreement
further provided that the Duncans were to receive specific and
detailed visitation rights, telephone access to the child, information
about the child's education and medical care, and authorization to
speak with the child's teachers, school personnel, counselors and
physicians regarding her progress and circumstances. This agreement
was executed by the parties, their attorneys and the child's guardian
ad litem, and incorporated into an order filed by the court.
	In October of 2001, the circuit court found that Johnson owed
Christopher Duncan $1,961.61 in arrearages and ordered him to pay
that sum in installments of $400 per month. Less that two months
after that, Christopher Duncan petitioned for a rule to show cause
why Johnson should not be held in contempt for violating the terms of
the July 17, 2001, visitation agreement incorporated into the order
filed by the circuit court.
	An order to show cause was entered by the circuit court on
December 6, 2001. On April 18, 2002, this court filed its opinion in
Wickham v. Byrne, 199 Ill. 2d 309 (2002). Wickham involved two
consolidated cases in which a child had lost a parent and the deceased
parent's parents (the child's grandparents) were granted visitation by
the court, over the objection of the surviving parent, pursuant to the
so-called grandparent visitation statute set forth in section 607(b) of
the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS
5/607(b) (West 2000)).
	Section 607(b) stated, in pertinent part:
			"(b)(1) The court may grant reasonable visitation
privileges to a grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling of
any minor child upon petition to the court by the
grandparents or great-grandparents or on behalf of the
sibling, with notice to the parties required to be notified
under Section 601 of this Act, if the court determines that it
is in the best interests and welfare of the child, and may issue
any necessary orders to enforce such visitation privileges.
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection (b), a
petition for visitation privileges may be filed under this
paragraph (1) *** if one or more of the following
circumstances exist:
				(A) the parents are not currently cohabiting on a
permanent or an indefinite basis;
				(B) one of the parents has been absent from the marital
abode for more than one month without the spouse
knowing his or her whereabouts;
				(C) one of the parents is deceased;
				(D) one of the parents joins in the petition with the
grandparents, great-grandparents, or sibling; or
				(E) a sibling is in State custody.
* * *
			(3) When one parent is deceased, the surviving parent shall
not interfere with the visitation rights of the grandparents."
750 ILCS 5/607(b) (West 2000).
	The surviving parents in the two consolidated cases in Wickham
challenged the constitutionality of the foregoing provisions, arguing
that they impermissibly infringed on a parent's fundamental right to
make decisions concerning the care, custody and control of his or her
children. After considering relevant authority from the United States
Supreme Court and from this court, we found the surviving parents'
arguments to be meritorious. We wrote:
		"Section 607(b)(1) exposes the decision of a fit parent to the
unfettered value judgment of a judge and the intrusive
micromanaging of the state. Because we can conceive of no
set of circumstances under which section 607(b)(1) of the
Act would be valid, we hold that it is unconstitutional on its
face. For the same reasons, we hold that section 607(b)(3) is
facially unconstitutional." Wickham, 199 Ill. 2d  at 320-21.
	Four months after we decided Wickham, Johnson petitioned the
circuit court to modify the grandparent visitation agreement reached
by the parties on July 17, 2001, and incorporated into the court's
order. Johnson predicated his petition on section 607(c) of the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/607(c) (West
2002)), which authorizes a court to "modify an order granting or
denying visitation rights of a parent whenever modification would
serve the best interest of the child."(1)
	As grounds for seeking modification of the visitation agreement,
Johnson claimed that after the agreement was reached, the Duncans
"continually and repeatedly interfere[d] with [his] ability to establish
and maintain a parent child relationship." Fourteen specific examples
were alleged. Among these were an insistence by the Duncans that
M.M.D. refer to them as "mom" and "dad"; calling the principal of
M.M.D.'s school in an attempt to obtain her school records; coming
to Johnson's house when M.M.D. missed school to inquire as to the
reason for her absences; constantly questioning M.M.D. regarding the
Johnson's household procedures; and "repeatedly and continually"
questioning Johnson and M.M.D. regarding M.M.D.'s clothing.
Johnson's motion asked that the Duncans be restrained from referring
to themselves as M.M.D.'s parents; that they be prohibited from
"calling and harassing Johnson, his family and M.M.D.'s schools; that
they not be allowed to take M.M.D. without his express permission;
and that their visitation be curtailed to one weekend per month.
	In addition to seeking modification of the visitation agreement,
Johnson's petition argued, in the alternative, that the visitation
agreement should be terminated. Johnson based that argument on this
court's decision in Wickham. Although the visitation agreement
between Johnson and the Duncans did not invoke the provisions of the
grandparents visitation statute struck down in Wickham, Johnson
asserted that Wickham and the authorities on which Wickham was
based rendered the agreement void and unenforceable as a matter of
law.
	Johnson's petition was heard December 2, 2002. After
considering counsel's arguments, the circuit court concluded that
Wickham did not nullify the parties' visitation agreement. In an order
dated December 16, 2002, the court held that the visitation agreement
remained valid and enforceable. It therefore denied Johnson's petition
to terminate that agreement. Johnson's alternative claim that the
Duncans' conduct warranted modification of the agreement was not
reached.
	Johnson filed a motion to reconsider. Christopher Duncan, in
turn, filed a new motion for a rule to show cause why Johnson should
not be held in contempt for failing to meet his court-ordered support
obligations. The motion for a rule to show cause was allowed on
March 5, 2003. One week later, the court denied Johnson's motion to
reconsider the denial of his petition to terminate. In so doing, the
court made a written finding under Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (155
Ill. 2d R. 308(a)) that its order denying Johnson's petition involved a
question of law as to which there are substantial grounds for
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from that order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The
specific question of law identified by the circuit court was
		"whether [the] Court has jurisdiction to enforce a visitation
order entered on July 17, 2001 based on common law
jurisdiction, or whether, due to the courts' recent decisions
of Wickham v. Byrne, *** the visitation agreement is now
void as a matter of law and therefore terminated."
	The appellate court granted Johnson's petition for leave to bring
an interlocutory appeal under Rule 308(a). With one justice dissenting,
the appellate court subsequently affirmed the judgment of the circuit
court. It agreed with the trial judge that the judicial decisions declaring
the grandparent visitation provisions of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act to be unconstitutional did not render the
Duncans' visitation rights under the agreement here void and
unenforceable as a matter of law. The court ruled, however, that the
circuit court's order granting visitation to the Duncans "must pass
scrutiny under the principles articulated in Wickham." The court
expressed no view on whether the order comported with Wickham.
Rather, it held that the issue should be addressed by the circuit court
in the first instance and that the matter could be raised in the context
of proceedings to modify the visitation order. 344 Ill. App. 3d at 349.
	Johnson petitioned this court for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R.
315), which we allowed. Johnson subsequently elected to have his
petition stand as his brief (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(g)) and waived oral
argument. Oral argument was also waived by the Duncans. The matter
is now before us for a decision on the merits. Because the appeal
concerns a question of law certified by the circuit court pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 308, our review is de novo. Feltmeier v.
Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d 263, 266 (2003).
	Parents have a fundamental right to make decisions regarding the
care, custody and control of their children. Encompassed within that
right is the right to determine when, under what conditions and with
whom their children associate. Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 470-76
(2000). Whether a child should have visitation with his or her
grandparents is therefore a matter for the child's parents, not a judge.
The decision by a fit parent regarding the child's visitation with
grandparents cannot be overridden by the courts, even if that decision
appears arbitrary or is motivated by reasons which seem wrong.
Wickham, 199 Ill. 2d  at 320-22. That is why Wickham declared the
grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional. As indicated earlier in
this opinion, the statute was found to be invalid because it exposed the
decision of fit parents regarding visitation to "the unfettered value
judgment of a judge and the intrusive micromanaging of the state."
Wickham, 199 Ill. 2d  at 320.
	The need to shield parental decisionmaking from second-guessing
by the state is not implicated in the case before us today. The order
regarding grandparent visitation at issue here was not imposed by the
court against the parent's wishes. It was entered pursuant to an
agreement negotiated between Johnson, the child's father, and the
Duncans, the child's grandparents. It is a consent decree. See Burchett
v. Goncher, 235 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1094 (1991). It must therefore be
evaluated according to principles governing consent decrees.
	A consent decree is based upon the agreement of the parties and
is contractual in nature. Filosa v. Pecora, 18 Ill. App. 3d 123, 127
(1974). It is a recordation of the parties' private agreement, not an
adjudication of their rights. Once such a decree has been entered, it is
generally binding on the parties and cannot be amended or varied
without the consent of each party. Burchett, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 1094.
	An exception to this rule applies where the contract is void as
contrary to public policy. Whether an agreement is contrary to public
policy depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the case.
O'Hara v. Ahlgren, Blumenfeld & Kempster, 127 Ill. 2d 333, 341-42
(1989). The courts are reluctant to restrict the freedom of citizens to
make their own agreements. Declaring a contract void and
unenforceable is a power the courts therefore exercise sparingly. An
agreement will not be held void, as being contrary to public policy,
unless it is
		" 'clearly contrary to what the constitution, the statutes or the
decisions of the courts have declared to be the public policy
or unless [it is] manifestly injurious to the public welfare.' "
H&M Commercial Driver Leasing, Inc. v. Fox Valley
Containers, Inc., 209 Ill. 2d 52, 57 (2004), quoting
Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 330 (1927).
	The visitation agreement here does not meet that stringent
standard. Grandparents often play a uniquely positive role in a child's
upbringing. For a parent to permit visitation between the child and the
child's grandparents is a time-honored, often cherished aspect of
family life. In no sense can such arrangements be regarded as
"manifestly injurious to the public welfare." Moreover, there is
nothing in the record before us to suggest that the agreement at issue
here was anything but beneficial for everyone concerned at the time
it was adopted. The Duncans had cared for and nurtured the child for
many years and had an obvious desire to maintain their relationship
with her. Johnson was taking the commendable step of assuming his
paternal obligations with respect to the child and wished to make her
a part of his existing family. The child was able to experience the love
and support of both her grandparents and her father as she made the
transition from one household to the other. The agreement advanced
all these interests.
	The agreement was also not "clearly contrary to what the
constitution, the statutes or the decisions of the courts have declared
to be the public policy." The constitution prohibits the state from
forcing fit parents to yield visitation rights to a child's grandparents
when the parents do not wish to do so merely because a trial judge
believes that such visitation would be appropriate. See Wickham, 199 Ill. 2d  at 320-22. There is no corresponding constitutional prohibition
against a fit parent's decision to voluntarily bestow visitation
privileges on his child's grandparents. To the contrary, the very
constitutional principles that required us to strike down the
grandparent visitation statute in Wickham require that a parent's
voluntary visitation decision be honored. If fit parents have a
fundamental right to make decisions regarding the care custody and
control of their children, as Wickham and the cases on which it was
based held, they must likewise have the fundamental right to agree to
visitation by the children's grandparents if they wish to do so. To hold
otherwise would require us to fashion a rule under which a parent's
right to choose the persons with whom a child associates somehow
stops at the grandparents' front door. We can see no possible
justification for imposing such a limitation. The constitutional
protections afforded parenthood therefore obligate the courts to
uphold voluntary visitation agreements made by fit parents, not
declare them invalid. As a result, the circuit and appellate courts were
correct to conclude that the voluntary visitation agreement into which
Johnson entered with the Duncans was not void and unenforceable.
	Johnson's petition to terminate alleges that he would not have
entered into the visitation agreement with the Duncans had he known
that the grandparent visitation statute would subsequently be declared
unconstitutional. In making that claim, Johnson appears to be arguing
that this dispute falls within the line of cases holding that a party may
avoid a contract, as a matter of equity, based on mistake. Without
reaching the merits of Johnson's argument, we note simply that it does
not provide an adequate basis for reversing the judgments of the
circuit and appellate courts in this case. Even if the conditions
necessary to avoid a contract based on mistake could be established
here, the circuit court did not err in rejecting Johnson's claim that the
agreement was a nullity as a matter of law. A mutual mistake as to a
basic assumption on which an agreement was made does not render
the agreement void. At most, the agreement is merely voidable by the
injured party. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §152 (1981);
Diedrich v. Northern Illinois Publishing Co., 39 Ill. App. 3d 851, 857
(1976).
	Although the circuit and appellate courts were therefore correct
in rejecting Johnson's claim that the visitation agreement was void as
a matter of law, there is one aspect of the appellate court's disposition
with which we do not agree. In reaching the result it did, the appellate
court invoked common law principles governing a court's right to
award grandparents visitation privileges beyond those granted by the
child's parents. Those principles are inapplicable here. As we have
pointed out at several points in this opinion, the case before us
involves a consent decree. The Duncans' visitation rights under that
decree were conferred voluntarily by Johnson. They were not imposed
by the court and did not exceed the limits to which Johnson agreed.
Accordingly, the common law authority of courts to award
grandparent visitation beyond that allowed by the child's parents is of
no relevance.
	Because the Duncans' visitation rights were conferred by Johnson
pursuant to a voluntary agreement, we must likewise reject the
appellate court's determination that those rights are subject to scrutiny
under the principles articulated by our court in Wickham. The trial
judge in this case did not seek to substitute his judgment regarding
grandparent visitation for the judgment of the child's parent. The
order he entered merely gave effect to the parent's own wishes.
Because Wickham was not addressed to that situation, the order
before us now need not be reviewed on remand to see if it is in accord
with the views we expressed in Wickham.
	In reaching this conclusion, we hasten to add that the scope of
our opinion today is narrow. This appeal reached the appellate court
pursuant to our Rule 308, and our decision is addressed solely to the
question of whether, under Wickham, the consent decree is void as a
matter of law. As indicated earlier in this disposition, however, that
was not Johnson's only claim in the trial court. He also asserted, in the
alternative, that because of events which transpired after the decree
was entered, modification of the visitation arrangements was
necessary in order to serve M.M.D.'s best interests.
	That claim has not yet been considered by the circuit court, and
nothing in this opinion precludes the circuit court from taking it up on
remand should Johnson elect to pursue it. The contractual nature of
the consent decree limits when and under what circumstances the
parties to the agreement may seek to alter its terms. As our appellate
court has correctly recognized, however, provisions regarding child
support and visitation, including those embodied in a consent decree,
are always subject to modification by a court upon changed
circumstances when necessary to promote the child's best interests.
See Dull v. Dull, 73 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 1017 (1979); Golden v.
Braunfeld, 22 Ill. App. 3d 344 (1974).
	Should the circuit court ultimately determine that modification is
necessary in this case to serve M.M.D.'s best interests, it must adhere
to the principles we articulated in Wickham when fashioning its order.
In particular, we would direct the circuit court to the following
language from Wickham, which we believe has special meaning here:
		"In most cases, the relationship between a child and his or her
grandparents is a nurturing, loving relationship that provides
a vital connection to the family's history and roots. However,
as with all human relationships, conflicts may arise between
a child's parents and grandparents. In many cases, this
conflict will concern disagreements about how a parent is
raising his or her children. Yet, this human conflict has no
place in the courtroom. This is true even where the intrusion
is made in good conscience, such as the request for visitation
to preserve the child's only connection to a deceased parent's
family. Parents have the constitutionally protected latitude to
raise their children as they decide, even if these decisions are
perceived by some to be for arbitrary or wrong reasons. The
presumption that parents act in their children's best interest
prevents the court from second-guessing parents' visitation
decisions. Moreover, a fit parent's constitutionally protected
liberty interest to direct the care, custody, and control of his
or her children mandates that parents-not judges-should be
the ones to decide with whom their children will and will not
associate." Wickham, 199 Ill. 2d  at 321-22.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
1.               
            
          
             
           
         
Johnson invoked 
the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. 
(West 2002)) because modification of an order for support, custody or visitation 
entered under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, as the order here was, must be 
made in accordance with the relevant factors specified in that statute. 750 ILCS 
45/16 (West 2002); see DeBilio v. Rodgers, 337 Ill. App. 3d 614, 617 
(2002).