Case Title: State v. Ritchie

Citation: 

Docket Number: S057701

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2011-01-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: January 6, 2011
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review/
Cross-Respondent on Review,
v.
GREGG BRYANT RITCHIE,
Respondent on Review/
Cross-Petitioner on Review.
(CC
CR0401509; CA A129591; SC S057701 (Control), S057705)
(Consolidated by Order September 1, 2010)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 14, 2010.
Ryan Kahn, Assistant
Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner
on review/cross-respondent on review.  With him on the briefs were John R.
Kroger, Attorney General, David B. Thompson, Interim Solicitor General, and
Erika L. Hadlock. Senior Assistant Attorney General.
Kendra M. Matthews,
Ransom Blackman LLP, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for
respondent on review/cross-petitioner on review.  With her on the briefs was
Marc D. Blackman.
Before De Muniz, C.
J., and Durham, Balmer, Kistler, Walters, and Linder, J.J., and Gillette, J. pro
tempore.**
GILLETTE, J. pro tempore
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the
circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court with
instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal.
De Muniz, C. J.,
concurred and filed an opinion.
Kistler, J., dissented
and filed an opinion, in which Linder, J., joined.
*Appeal from Clackamas
County Circuit Court, Thomas J. Rastetter, Judge. 228 Or App 412, 208 P3d 981
(2009).
**Landau, J., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J. pro tempore
This case is a companion to State
v. Barger, 349 Or ___ , ___ P3d ___ (2010) (decided this date).  Like the
defendant in Barger, defendant was convicted of multiple (in defendant's
case, 20) counts of Encouraging Child Abuse in the Second Degree, ORS 163.686,
based on the presence of sexually explicit digital images of children on the
hard drives of his computers.  Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things,
that the state had failed to prove that he "possesse[d] or control[led]"
any of the images within the meaning of the Encouraging Child Abuse statute,(1) and that it also had failed to prove venue
with respect to some of the charges.  The Court of Appeals rejected defendant's
argument with respect to the "possess[ion] or control[]" element of
the charges, but agreed that the state had failed to prove venue with respect
to 10 of the counts -- Counts 11 through 20.  The court therefore reversed defendant's
convictions on Counts 11 through 20 and otherwise affirmed.  State v.
Ritchie, 228 Or App 412, 423, 208 P3d 981 (2009).  Defendant and the state
both petitioned for review by this court and we allowed both petitions.  On
review, we hold that, in view of the disposition that we make today, we need
not -- and do not -- decide whether the evidence presented by the state was
sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that the conduct at
issue occurred in the county where defendant was tried.  Rather, we hold that
the evidence presented by the state was insufficient to allow a rational trier
of fact to conclude that defendant "possesse[d] or control[led]" any of
the images at issue (including those associated with the counts for which venue
was an issue), within the meaning of the relevant section of ORS 163.686.(2)
In September 2004, while defendant was
working as a music teacher in an elementary school in Clackamas County,
officers from the Clackamas County Sheriff's Department went to the school to
interview him about a report involving a former student.  In the course of the
interview, defendant consented to a forensic examination of both his laptop
computer, which he had with him at the school, and his desktop computer, which
he kept in his home.  Defendant turned over his laptop to the officers on the
spot and gave the officers permission to enter his home and take the desktop
computer.(3)
A police computer specialist, White, examined
the desktop computer and discovered 600 pornographic images, most of which were
of children, in unallocated space(4)
on the computer's hard drive.  White repeated the procedure with the laptop and
found about 500 pornographic images, again primarily of children, in unallocated
space in that computer's hard drive.  Virtually all of the images that White
discovered were accessible only by means of special data recovery software that
forensics experts like White used, but that was not commonly used by ordinary
computer users.  
The state subsequently charged
defendant in Clackamas County Circuit Court with 20 counts of Encouraging Child
Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree by "possess[ing] and control[ling] a
photograph of sexually explicit conduct involving a child."  Counts 1 through
10 were based on 10 sexually explicit digital images of young boys that had
been recovered from unallocated space on the desktop computer's hard drive, and
Counts 11 through 20 were based on 10 similar digital images that had been
recovered from unallocated space on the laptop's hard drive.  
Defendant waived his right to a jury
trial and the case was tried to the court.  The state's primary witness was
White.  White described his examination of defendant's laptop and desktop computers
and his discovery of the images that formed the basis of the charges in "unallocated
space" in the computers' hard drives.  He explained that "unallocated"
space "is basically clusters on the hard drive that may or may not have
information written to them.  If there's information written there, it is * * *
a file that was deleted."  White then described the process by which
deleted files are retained in unallocated space -- that, when a "file"(5)
is created, the operating system "allocates" the file to a certain
location in the hard drive, that a master file table keeps track of that
location, and that, when a file is deleted, the data in the file remains in the
physical location that originally was allocated, but the master file table is altered
to indicate that that location now is "unallocated," i.e.,
available to be overwritten by new files.  Finally, White explained that,
although files in unallocated space generally are not available to a user through
ordinary means, they can be recovered with special forensic software like the
software that he had used.  
White then went on to describe some
of the characteristics of the images that he had discovered on the two hard
drives, and how he was able to tell that certain of the images had been sent to
defendant's computer by another user while others may have come to the computer
from ordinary Internet sites.  At some point, the parties announced that they would
stipulate that four of the images -- those associated with Counts 1, 2, 3, and
4 -- had been sent to defendant's desktop computer in a "zipped folder"(6)
through an Internet chat room by another chat room user, "rasputinlives978,"
and that, when the folder reached defendant's desktop computer, the folder was
unzipped in some manner, so that the images within were available for viewing. 
The parties were not willing to stipulate as to whether the unzipping was an
intentional act by defendant or an automatic function of the chat room program. 
White could not determine whether anyone had ever used defendant's desktop
computer to view the images in that folder.  (That was important because, as
noted elsewhere, the state's theory of the case was that defendant had
possessed or controlled the digital images in Counts 1 through 4 by displaying them
on a computer screen.)
White then testified to some
additional matters that were relevant to the parties' "chat room"
stipulation.  He testified that the folder at issue was sent to defendant's
desktop computer at 9:24 p.m. on July 7, 2002, and was deleted by midnight of
the same day.  He also testified that, to receive a zipped folder offered by
another Internet chat room user, a computer user generally must affirmatively accept
the folder or file.  White also produced data collected from defendant's
desktop showing that, in September 2002, defendant's laptop had received a file
entitled "youngyoungboys.mpg" by instant messaging in an apparent
swap for another file entitled "13suckbrother.jpg." Finally, White produced
fragments of online "chat" found in unallocated space on defendant's
desktop computer, which suggested that defendant had solicited and received
child pornography from other chat room users.  In one of those fragments,
someone using one of defendant's acknowledged screen names appeared to be
responding favorably to material that a user had shared with him ("I'm
taking off my clothes for this one").   In another fragment, a person
using one of defendant's screen names appeared to be inquiring about how to
obtain videos ("u have videos?") that had been mentioned.   
The parties also announced that they
had entered into a stipulation concerning the digital images taken from the
desktop computer that corresponded to Counts 5 through 10 and the images taken
from the laptop computer that corresponded to Counts 11 through 20. 
Specifically, they stipulated that all those digital images were the product of
"web browsing," i.e., searching the Internet.  White also provided
technological background evidence that was relevant to that stipulation.  He explained
how files accessed through web browsing might end up in unallocated space: 
that, when a computer user accesses a web page, the browser creates a copy of
the page and stores it in a temporary Internet file cache; that the next time
the user calls up the same web page, the browser pulls up the copy from the
temporary Internet file cache, rather than accessing and downloading the same
information from the web page; that files held in the temporary Internet file
cache may be deleted from the cache in a number of ways, some of which occur
automatically and some of which require intentional action by a computer user;
and that files that are deleted from the temporary Internet file cache remain
in unallocated space unless and until they are overwritten by a new file.  
In his testimony, White acknowledged
that there was no way of knowing, with respect to any of the files associated
with Counts 5 through 20, whether the files had been deleted from the temporary
Internet file cache intentionally or by some automatic process.  He suggested,
however, that the temporary Internet file cache appeared to have been emptied
or cleaned more thoroughly and more often than would have occurred by purely automatic
processes.
Because of the limitations of his forensic
software, White was not able to provide further detail about when and from what
website the images associated with Counts 11 through 20 (which had been found
on defendant's laptop) had been accessed.  He was able, however, to provide a
more detailed analysis of the six image files associated with Counts 5 through
10, which had been discovered in unallocated space on defendant's desktop
computer.  White testified that, insofar as his forensic software enabled him
to see at least some dates, file names, and path histories associated with
those images, he could determine that all six of the images came from a "photo
album" on a single website, that they initially had appeared on the
desktop computer's screen as a series of "thumbnail" images,(7)
that they had been accessed under one of defendant's user names on December 8,
2002, and that the user had "clicked" on the thumbnail images to
enlarge them, but had not printed, saved, or taken other actions concerning
them.
After White completed his testimony,
defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts, arguing that there
was no evidence that he had knowingly "possessed or controlled" the
images at issue within the meaning of ORS 163.686(1)(a)(A)(i).  Defendant also
moved for a judgment of acquittal on Counts 11through 20, i.e., the
counts associated with images found on defendant's laptop, on the ground that
the evidence would not support, beyond a reasonable doubt, a finding that those
crimes had been committed in Clackamas County.  The trial court denied
defendant's motions and, after hearing the remaining evidence, found defendant
guilty on all 20 counts.  
On defendant's appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The court opined that, for
purposes of ORS 163.686(1)(a)(A)(i), a person "controls" a visual
recording when the person "discovers the presence of that recording on the
Internet and causes that recording to appear on a specific computer monitor." 
228 Or App at 419.  The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence in
the record to demonstrate that defendant exercised control in that sense over the
images associated with Counts 1 through 10, and affirmed the trial court's
findings of guilt with respect to those counts.  Id. at 419-20.  The
court then addressed defendant's venue argument, which related to the images
discovered on defendant's laptop computer (Counts 11-20).  It concluded that the
state was required to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt and that the state's
evidence -- that defendant's home and work were located in Clackamas County,
that he had broadband Internet access in his home, and that he generally was
logged on to instant-messaging services when at home -- was insufficient to
support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant and his laptop
were in Clackamas County when he downloaded, viewed, and deleted those images. 
Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's convictions on Counts 11-20.  Id.
at 420-23.
As noted, both the state and
defendant petitioned for review, and we allowed both petitions.  As it turns
out, however, we need not address the Court of Appeals holding respecting
venue, and we express no opinion concerning it.  We turn directly to questions
about defendant's "possess[ion] or control[]" of the images in
question. 
As noted, the Court of Appeals held
that defendant "controlled" the visual recordings of child sexual
abuse that were discovered on his desktop computer, within the meaning of ORS
163.686(1)(a)(A)(i), by "discover[ing] the presence of [such] recording[s]
on the Internet and caus[ing them] to appear on a specific computer monitor." 
228 Or App at 419.(8)  
Defendant contends that, contrary to the Court of Appeals' logic, one cannot "knowingly
control" an Internet image in that manner, because the act of "discovering"
the image and "causing [it] to appear" are simultaneous.   Defendant
argues that the Court of Appeals is applying the statutory concept of "possess[ion]
or control[]" to the mere viewing of child pornography on the
Internet, and that the legislature did not intend, when it enacted ORS 163.686,
to criminalize mere viewing of such images.
The state responds that a rational
trier of fact could conclude from the evidence that defendant "possessed
or controlled" each of the images associated with the 20 charges.  The
state argues that, when a person opens a web page and displays images on that
page on his or her own computer screen, the person possesses or controls the
images that appear on his screen in the course of such browsing in a variety of
senses -- he physically possesses them insofar as he can move the
computer screen and control the way the images are displayed; he constructively
possesses them insofar as he has the latent ability to save, forward, or
otherwise manipulate them; and he actually controls them by bringing
them to his computer screen in the first instance.  The state argues, in a
nearly identical vein that, when a person accepts a zipped folder sent to him
or her through a chat room and, by inference, displays the images contained
therein on his or her computer, he or she "possesses or controls" the
images in the same three senses -- by physically controlling the way they are
displayed, by having a latent ability to manipulate them, and by accepting and,
thus, actually controlling the transfer.(9)
In State v. Barger, ___ Or ___
, ___ P3d ___ (decided this date), we addressed the same explanations for why a
user "possesses or controls" any image accessed in the course of web
browsing.  In Barger, the defendant was charged with "knowingly
possess[ing] or control[ling]" eight images of child sexual abuse that
were discovered in his computer's temporary Internet file cache.  The evidence indicated
that the images were the product of the defendant's web browsing, but there was
no evidence that he had printed, saved, forwarded, or in any other way done
anything beyond accessing the images (and, by inference, looking at them).  The
case thus posed the following question:  "Can a computer user be found to
have knowingly 'possess[ed] or control[led]' digital images of child sexual
abuse, within the meaning of ORS 163.686(1)(a)(A)(i), based solely on evidence
showing that, at some time in the past, he intentionally accessed those digital
images using his computer's Internet browser and -- by reasonable inference -- looked
at them?"  Barger, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 5). 
This court ultimately answered that
question in the negative.  We concluded that the theories of possession and
control that the state had offered, which are identical to the ones that the
state asserts here, were either illogical in and of themselves or inconsistent
with what, in our judgment, the legislature intended by the statutory phrase "possesses
or controls."  Id., ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 11-16).  We
particularly derived our conclusions about the intended meaning of the phrase "possesses
or controls" from contextual evidence showing that the legislature did not
intend to criminalize the mere viewing of child pornography.(10) 
We also were persuaded by certain cases -- notably State v. Casey, 346 Or
54, 203 P3d 202 (2009), State v. Daniels, 348 Or 515, 234 P3d 976 (2010),
and State v. Weller, 263 Or 132, 501 P2d 794 (1972) -- that discussed
common- law notions of physical and constructive possession and the relevant
statutory definition of the term "possess," which incorporates those
common-law notions.  Because those cases indicate that a person's constructive
possession of a thing (i.e., his or her dominion or control over it)
cannot be established merely by showing that the person has a practical ability
to manipulate or direct the item, we concluded that something more than a
latent ability to save, e-mail, or otherwise manipulate a digital image that
appears on a computer user's screen is required to "possess[] or control[]"
the image within the meaning of ORS 163.686(1)(a)(A)(i).  Barger, ___ Or
at ___ (slip op at 10-16).  
Barger appears to control our
disposition of the present case.  It rejects the state's central idea -- that,
to the extent that a digitalized image is displayed on a computer screen and,
presumably, is viewed by the computer's user, the computer user "possesses
or controls" the image.
That is not to say that the facts in
the present case are identical in every way to the facts in Barger.   For
example, in Barger, there was no evidence that the defendant had taken
any intentional action with respect to the images at issue after they appeared
on his computer screen; the only inference that could be drawn from the
evidence was that the defendant had at some point viewed the images.  In the
present case, however, there is evidence indicating that defendant enlarged the
two images involved in Counts 8 and 9 after he initially accessed the website
where they were displayed, and there also is evidence that might support an
inference that defendant attempted to remove all traces of the images from his
computer's hard drive.  Moreover, while the images in Barger all had
been obtained through web browsing, it appears that certain of the images in
the present case came to defendant's computer from a different source.  Those
images -- which are associated with Counts 1 through 4 -- apparently were
transferred to defendant's desktop computer through an instant messaging
service by another user of the messaging service.   
But the state chose not to make a
separate issue out of those factual differences.  In the proceedings below and
before this court, it has never suggested that Counts 1 through 4, or Counts 8
and 9, should be analyzed any differently than the other counts.  With regard
to all 20 counts, the state's position has been no different than its position
in Barger -- that defendant "possess[ed] or control[led]" the
image at issue as long as the image appeared on his computer screen, because he
could change the location where the image was displayed, because he had the
capacity to save, forward, and manipulate it, and because he controlled it, in
the first instance, by taking affirmative steps to bring it to his screen.(11)
 We rejected those arguments in Barger and, applying Barger, we
reject them here as well.  We conclude, in short, that the evidence presented
at trial, with respect to all 20 counts, was insufficient to support a finding
of possession or control under any theory of possession or control that the
state has urged in this proceeding.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court with instructions to
enter a judgment of acquittal.
DE MUNIZ, C. J., concurring.
For the reasons expressed in m
concurring opinion in State v. Barger, 349 Or ___, ___ P3d ___ (January 6, 2011), I
agree with the majority's conclusion in this case.
KISTLER, J., dissenting.
Today, the majority holds that a
person who goes onto the Internet, purposefully searches out pictures of child
pornography, and displays those pictures on a computer for as long as he or she
wishes does not possess or control the pictures.  Not only are the factual and
legal premises on which the majority's opinion rests suspect, but the
majority's decision fails to recognize that today's iPhone is yesterday's
photograph.  There is no difference between a person who uses his iPhone to
pull an image of child pornography off the Internet and then passes that image,
displayed on his iPhone, around for his friends to see and a person who passes
a photograph of the same image to his friends.  Both persons possess or control
the image.  The fact that the person has not saved the image to his iPhone does
not mean that the person does not possess or control it.  The majority errs in
holding otherwise.
The relevant facts can be summarized
briefly.  Defendant taught music to elementary school children.  As a result of
an investigation involving one of defendant's students, the Clackamas County
Sheriff's office analyzed the contents of defendant's laptop and home
computers.  Although defendant volunteered that the officers would find
"no porn" on his computers, it turned out that defendant was overly
optimistic.  The forensic expert who analyzed defendant's computers found
approximately 600 pornographic images in the unallocated space on defendant's
home computer and approximately 500 pornographic images in the unallocated
space on his laptop.(1) 
Almost all of the 500 pornographic images on defendant's laptop involved children,
as did approximately 450 of the 600 pornographic images on defendant's home
computer.
The state charged defendant with 20
counts of encouraging child sexual abuse in the second degree, based on 10 of
the 500 images of child pornography found on his laptop and on 10 of the 450
images of child pornography found on his home computer.  See ORS
163.686(1)(a)(A)(i).(2) 
To prove those charges, the state needed to establish that defendant (1)
knowingly (2) possessed or controlled (3) a visual recording of sexually
explicit conduct involving a child (4) for the purpose of arousing or
satisfying his or someone else's sexual desires and (5) that defendant knew, or
was aware of and consciously disregarded the fact, that the creation of the
visual recording involved child abuse.  Id.  In this case, there is no
dispute that the trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, reasonably could
find that each of the 20 images found on defendant's computers was a visual
recording of sexually explicit conduct involving children; that defendant knew
that fact; that, if he possessed or controlled the images, he did so for the
purpose of arousing or satisfying his own sexual desires; and that he knew that
the creation of each visual recording involved child abuse.  Given the volume
and content of the images that the police found on defendant's computers,
defendant would be hard pressed to argue otherwise.
The majority concludes, however, that
the evidence was not sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find
one element of the offense -- that defendant "possesse[d] or
control[led]" the pictures of child pornography that he had sought out on
the Internet.  According to the majority, all that the evidence permitted the
trial court to find was that defendant "viewed" child pornography,
and that, the majority reasons, is no crime.  At bottom, the majority's opinion
rests on the proposition that going onto the Internet and pulling up pictures
of child pornography is no different from visiting a museum and viewing the paintings
displayed there.  In both situations, the majority reasons, the person views
but does not possess or control the pictures.
I have no disagreement with the
general proposition that a person does not possess or control every image that
he or she sees.  Nor do I disagree with the specific example that the majority
uses -- that a person who goes to a museum and views a painting does not
possess or control the painting.  The majority errs, however, in assuming that
a computer user stands in the same position as a visitor to a museum.  This
case arises on defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal, and the question
is whether the trier of fact reasonably could have inferred that defendant
possessed or controlled the images that he sought out on the Internet and
displayed on his computer screen.
On that point, the trier of fact
reasonably could have found that, when a person uses a computer to display an
image from an Internet website, the data is transferred from the website to the
person's computer.  The person's computer automatically saves a copy of the
data from the website to a temporary Internet file on the computer, and the
computer displays on the computer screen a graphic image of that data (whether
text or a picture).  Put in lay terms, the person's computer copies the data
from the website and uses that data to recreate on the person's computer screen
the image that exists (or existed) separately as data on the website's server.(3)
A computer user is not passively
viewing a picture as a museum patron does, or so the trier of fact could find.(4) 
Rather, a computer user is free to search out and select the images that he or
she wishes to display on the computer screen.  The computer copies the data
from the website and, using that copied data, recreates the image from the
website on the user's screen, giving a computer user the ability to keep that
image on the screen as long as he or she wishes.  And, when the computer
displaying the image is portable, as an iPhone, iPad, or Droid is, then the user
can take that displayed image with him or her, move the image from one place to
another, and show it to others in different locations, all without ever saving
the image to the user's hard drive.(5)
In the same vein, if a computer user
watches a child pornography video on the Internet, as one would watch a video
on YouTube, the computer user can start the video, stop it, go back and look at
a particularly interesting scene a second time, move forward through some
activity that does not interest the user, or replay the video completely.  It
is difficult to see how the majority could say that the user does not
"control" an Internet video, even though the data that allows the
user to manipulate the video is maintained on the user's computer in the same
way as the data that gave rise to the pictures that defendant viewed in this
case.  Nor is it any answer to say that this case involves Internet
photographs, not Internet videos.  There is no difference in principle between
an Internet video and Internet photographs.  Control exists in both instances. 
It is simply more evident with a video.
Admittedly, the images from the
Internet that are displayed on a computer screen (whether a photograph or a
video) are not permanent, but we have never suggested that permanence is
necessary to establish either possession or control.  See State v.
Fries, 344 Or 541, 546-47, 185 P3d 453 (2008) (observing that only
momentary or fleeting contacts may be insufficient as a matter of law to
establish control); cf. State v. Hall, 269 Or 63, 65-66, 68, 523 P2d 556
(1974) (a person who temporarily sat on a bag of marijuana when the police
entered a room possessed the marijuana).  It also may be true that a computer
user does not have exclusive possession or control over images (whether
photographs or movies) taken from the Internet.  But, again, the court has
never held that possession or control must be exclusive; rather, it has
recognized that two persons may possess property jointly.  See State v.
Downing, 185 Or 689, 698, 205 P2d 141 (1949) (jury reasonably could infer
that the defendant and his accomplice jointly possessed a stolen watch).  And
the fact that one person who jointly possesses property has the power to
dispose of the property completely (as when a person with joint possession of a
bank account spends all the money) does not mean that both persons did not have
joint possession of the property while it existed.
Ultimately, the majority appears to
acknowledge that analogizing a computer user to a museum visitor may not be
completely accurate.  It appears to recognize that, once a person accesses an
image on the Internet, "the image in fact exists, in digital form, in the
user's computer."  ___ Or ____ n 10 (slip op at 12 n 10).  The
majority reasons, however, that
"from the user's point of view, the experience of
viewing images on the web is not different from viewing images in a
museum:  The ordinary computer user speaks of visiting or 'going to' web sites,
and has no sense that web images are 'in' the user's own computer until the
user affirmatively saves them."
Id. (emphasis in original).
The majority's reasoning fails to
distinguish two related but separate issues.  It is certainly true that, on
this record, no reasonable trier of fact could find that defendant knew why, as
a technical matter, he was able to control the images of child pornography that
he drew from the Internet and displayed on his computer screen.(6) 
But there was ample evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find
that defendant could and did control those images.  More specifically, there
was evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that defendant
had downloaded and played child pornography videos, that he had exchanged
photographs of child pornography with others, that he had enlarged pornographic
"thumbnail" images so that he could study the pictures depicted in
the thumbnails more closely, and that he had maintained images of child
pornography on his computer screen, at least long enough "for the purpose
of arousing or satisfying [his own] sexual desires."  See ORS
163.686(1)(a)(A)(i) (stating one element of the offense).
Even if, as the majority reasons, the
evidence was insufficient to permit the trier of fact to find that defendant
knew why he could control the images he accessed, it was more than
sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find that defendant could and did
exercise control over those images.  The level of control over the Internet
images that defendant displayed on his computer screen made his relationship to
those images markedly different from that of a person who goes, say, to the
Brancacci Chapel so that he can view (from a distance) Masaccio's frescos.  Put
differently, the factual premise on which the majority's opinion rests -- that defendant's
relationship to the images on his computer was the same as that of a museum
patron to the paintings displayed there -- is not the only inference that the
trier of fact reasonably could have drawn. 
Beyond that, the legal premise
underlying the majority's opinion is suspect.  In analyzing what the statutory
phrase "possesses or controls" means, the majority reasons that an
alternative way of proving the crime of second-degree encouraging child sexual
abuse demonstrates that a person who searches the Internet for child
pornography and displays those images on his or her computer screen does not
"posses[s] or contro[l]" the images.  Specifically, the majority
notes that a person may commit the crime of second-degree encouraging child sexual
abuse in one of two ways.  ORS 163.686 makes it a crime if, with the requisite
mental state, a person either (1) "possesses or controls" a visual
recording of child pornography or (2) "pays, exchanges or gives anything
of value to obtain or view" a visual recording of child pornography.  ORS
163.686(1)(a)(A)(i) and (ii).
Given those alternative ways of
committing second-degree encouraging child sexual abuse, the majority reasons:
"Whatever 'knowingly possess[ing] or control[ling]'
recordings of child sexual abuse might mean in subparagraph (1)(a)(A)(i), it
involves something different than simply 'obtain[ing]' or 'view[ing]' digital
images:  The legislature clearly has chosen to criminalize the act of
'view[ing]' or 'obtain[ing]' visual recordings of sexually explicit conduct
involving children under ORS 163.686(1)(a)(A)(ii) only if that act is
accompanied by the payment, exchange, or giving of something 'of value,'
an element that is not required under ORS 163.686(1)(a)(A)(i)."
State v. Barger, 349 Or ___,  ___, ___ P3d ___ (2011)
(emphasis and brackets in original) (slip op at 9-10).
Later in Barger, the majority
recognizes that other jurisdictions have held that a person who searches the
Internet for child pornography and displays those images on his or her computer
possesses or controls those images.  Id. at ___ n 13 (slip op at 17
n 13); see, e.g., People v. Josephitis, 914 NE2d 607, 616-17
(Ill App Ct 2009) (so holding); Commonwealth v. Diodoro, 970 A2d 1100,
1108 (Pa 2009) (same); United States v. Kain, 589 F3d 945, 950 (8th Cir
2009) (same).  The majority, however, reasons that those decisions have no
persuasive value in interpreting the phrase "possesses or controls,"
as used in ORS 163.686, because Oregon's statutory scheme is different.  Barger,
___ Or at ___ n 13 (slip op at 17 n 13).   Returning to the contextual
point it made earlier, the majority reasons that our statutes except
"viewing" child pornography from the prohibition against possessing
or controlling it, rendering Oregon's prohibition narrower than superficially
identical prohibitions found in other jurisdictions.  Id. (explaining
that "none of the cases [from other jurisdictions] involves statutes that
effectively announce that 'viewing' child pornography is not, by itself,
unlawful").
The majority misperceives the
statutory context that informs its understanding of the phrase "possesses
or controls."  Subparagraph (ii) of ORS 163.686(1)(a)(A) provides that a
person commits the crime of encouraging child sexual abuse in the second degree
if the person "[k]nowingly pays, exchanges or gives anything of value to
obtain or view * * * [a] visual recording of sexually explicit
conduct involving a child * * *."  Textually, the act that the statute
prohibits is "pay[ing], exchang[ing] or giv[ing] anything of value"
for a particular purpose.  The crime is complete when a person pays to obtain
or view child pornography, without regard to whether the person in fact ever
obtains or views it.  It is the payment, not the receipt of the bargained-for
consideration, that subparagraph (ii) prohibits.  Cf. ORS 167.007
(similarly providing that a person who pays to engage in sexual conduct commits
the crime of prostitution without regard to whether that person ever gets the
benefit of the bargain).
The fact that a would-be purchaser
never obtains or views child pornography is immaterial to proving a violation
of subparagraph (ii) of ORS 163.686(1)(a)(A).  For that reason, the context on
which the majority relies is equally immaterial to determining what the phrase
"possesses or controls" means in subparagraph (i) of that statute. 
Were there any doubt about the matter, the majority's conclusion reveals the
difficulty with its interpretation.  As noted, relying on the alternative
method of proving second-degree encouraging child sexual abuse, the majority
distinguishes cases from other jurisdictions (holding that behavior like
defendant's constitutes possession or control) by explaining that "none of
th[os]e cases involve[d] statutes that effectively announce that 'viewing'
child pornography is not, by itself, unlawful."  Barger, ___ Or at
___ n 13 (slip op at 17 n 13). 
Subparagraph (ii), of course, makes
it a crime to pay "to obtain or view" visual recordings of
child pornography.  ORS 163.686(1)(a)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).  If the
majority's statutory interpretation were correct, then our statutes also would
"effectively announce that ['obtaining'] child pornography is not, by
itself, unlawful."  However, "obtain" means "to gain or attain
possession or disposal of usu. by some planned action or method."  Webster's
Third New Int'l Dictionary 1559 (unabridged ed 2002).  Under the majority's
reasoning, obtaining -- i.e., possessing -- child pornography "is
not, by itself, unlawful."  Not only is that conclusion antithetical to
the rest of the statute, but it also demonstrates that the majority misreads
the statutory context, from which it "particularly derive[s]" its
understanding of the phrase "possesses or controls."  See Ritchie,
___ Or at ___ (so stating) (slip op at 12).
Properly interpreted, the prohibition
against second-degree encouraging child sexual abuse is directed at two
separate acts:  (1) possessing or controlling visual recordings of child
pornography and (2) paying, exchanging, or giving anything of value in order to
obtain or view visual recordings of child pornography.  The legislature
intended to cast a broad net in prohibiting the abuse of children resulting
from the creation and dissemination of child pornography.  The majority errs in
reading the legislature's effort to reach a broader range of conduct (paying to
obtain or view child pornography) as a way of narrowing a related but separate
type of conduct (possessing or controlling child pornography) that the statute
also prohibits.  In sum, I disagree with both the factual and legal premises on
which the majority's holding rests.  I would hold that the trial court and the
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statutory prohibition against
possessing or controlling child pornography.
The remaining question is whether a
reasonable trier of fact could find that defendant possessed or controlled 10
of the approximately 450 images of child pornography recovered from his home
computer and 10 of the approximately 500 images of child pornography recovered
from his laptop.  The 10 images from defendant's home computer divide into
three types:  (1) four images received in a zip file; (2) four thumbnail
images; and (3) two thumbnail images that defendant selected and enlarged.
Regarding the four zip file images,
the trial court reasonably could find that another person sent defendant a zip
file containing images of child pornography, that defendant received the file
on his home computer, that he was aware that the zip file contained child
pornography, and that he accepted the zip file.  Given that evidence, I would
hold that, in accepting the zip file, defendant exercised possession or control
of both the file and its contents.  In that respect, defendant's receipt of the
zip file was no different from a person who receives a package in the mail
knowing its contents.  That evidence was sufficient for a reasonable trier of
fact to find that defendant possessed both the file and its contents.(7)
The four images contained on a
thumbnail page present a more difficult issue, but not because of any question
whether defendant possessed or controlled those images.  Typically, a thumbnail
page displays several rows of small pictures or thumbnails.  The page functions
much like a menu in a restaurant.  It displays a series of offerings, only some
of which a user may wish to select.  If a user wants to see a larger image of a
particular thumbnail, he or she can click on the thumbnail and cause a larger
image to appear on the computer screen.  For the reasons discussed above, I
would hold that, when a computer user displays a thumbnail page on the
computer, he or she possesses or controls all the images or thumbnails on the
page.
To be sure, there may be factual
questions regarding the computer user's state of mind:  A user may not act
knowingly regarding every thumbnail that appears on a web page.  And, if a user
does not select and enlarge a particular thumbnail, then it may be that the
user did not possess or control that thumbnail "for the purpose of arousing
or satisfying the [user's or someone else's] sexual desires * * *[.]"  See
ORS 163.686(1)(a)(A)(i) (requiring proof of that state of mind).  But those
are questions for the trier of fact regarding defendant's state of mind.  They
have no bearing on whether a reasonable trier of fact could find that defendant
"possesse[d] or control[led]" the thumbnail images that he displayed
on the computer screen.  As to that issue, I would hold that the evidence was
sufficient to go to the trier of fact.
Regarding the remaining two images
from defendant's home computer, the evidence would permit a reasonable trier of
fact to find that defendant selected two of the thumbnails so that he could see
a larger image.  For the reasons explained above, I would hold that defendant's
ability to manipulate and maintain those images on his computer screen
constituted "control" within the meaning of ORS 163.686.  Cf.
State v. Blake, 348 Or 95, 102, 228 P3d 560 (2010) (explaining that
"[t]he ability to manipulate a bank account using a computer is sufficient
to constitute 'dominion and control * * *.'").
The 10 images found on defendant's
laptop present two issues.  The first is whether a reasonable trier of fact
could find that defendant possessed or controlled them.  All 10 pictures were
images that defendant purposefully retrieved from the Internet, or so a
reasonable trier of fact could find, and I would hold for the reasons explained
above that defendant possessed or controlled those images.  The only remaining
issue is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find that the state had
established venue in Clackamas County.(8)
On that issue, the evidence at trial
showed that defendant bought his laptop computer approximately six to eight
months before the officers seized it.  During that time, defendant lived and
worked in Clackamas County.  Defendant told the officers that he almost always
kept his laptop with him and that, after he bought it, he hardly ever used his
desktop computer at home.  Finally, there is no evidence in this record that
defendant ever left Clackamas County between the time that he purchased the
laptop and the time that the officers seized it.  Having considered that
evidence, the Court of Appeals held that it was not sufficient to prove venue. 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the fact that defendant lived and worked in
Clackamas County was not sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant used his laptop computer solely
in Clackamas County to get access to the Internet.  See State v. Ritchie,
228 Or App 412, 421-23, 208 P3d 981 (2009).
On review, the state argues that
venue is not an element of an offense that the state has to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt but that, even if it is, there was sufficient evidence from
which the trial court could have found that defendant accessed all 10 images on
his laptop while in Clackamas County.  There is no need to reach the larger
question that the state raises.  In my view, the evidence was sufficient for a
reasonable trier of fact to find that venue lay in Clackamas County.
Specifically, a reasonable trier of
fact could find that, after defendant bought the laptop, he used that computer
instead of his home computer; that is, that the laptop took the place of the
computer that defendant had used exclusively at his home.  A reasonable trier
of fact also could find that, given the nature of the subject matter, it was
unlikely that defendant would have used his laptop computer to access child
pornography outside the privacy of his home or perhaps a motel (or some other
private place) if he were travelling.  There is, however, no evidence that
defendant ever strayed outside of Clackamas County during the six to eight
months that he owned the laptop, much less that he went to some secluded place
outside of Clackamas County where he could have used his laptop to privately
access child pornography.  Given that evidence, a reasonable trier of fact
could find that defendant accessed the Internet from his home in Clackamas County
to search for the 10 images of child pornography that the officers later found
on his laptop.  See State v. Cervantes, 319 Or 121, 125-26, 873 P2d 316
(1994) (inferring from circumstantial evidence that the crime at issue had
occurred in Coos County). 
Defendant argues, however, that he
could have left Clackamas County while he owned the laptop, that he could have
taken the laptop with him, that he could have found a private place somewhere
outside the county, and that, while outside the county, he could have used his
laptop to access child pornography on the Internet.  Without any evidence that
defendant ever left Clackamas County during the time that he owned the laptop
and without any evidence that, even if defendant had left Clackamas County, he
went to some secluded place where he could use his laptop to look for child
pornography, defendant's argument reduces to nothing more than speculation. 
But, even if a trier of fact reasonably could have drawn all the inferences
that defendant urges, that is not the only reasonable inference that the trier
of fact could draw on this record.
Beyond that, ORS 131.325 provides, in
part, that, "[i]f an offense is committed within the state and it cannot
readily be determined within which county the commission took place,
* * * [the] trial may be held in the county in which the defendant
resides * * *."  Under that statute, even if one assumed that defendant
might have gone to Multnomah, Lane, or Malheur County to access child
pornography on his laptop, venue still would be appropriate in Clackamas County
if it could not readily be determined which county defendant was in when he
went on the Internet.  Venue in Clackamas County would be defeated only if a
trier of fact were willing to speculate that defendant had gone outside the
state during the time he owned the laptop and accessed child pornography in
some state other than Oregon.  Without some evidence that defendant in fact
left the state, it is difficult to see how a trier of fact reasonably could
draw that inference.  But, even if that were a permissible inference, nothing
in this record compels it.  In my view, the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the state had failed to establish venue in Clackamas County.
I would uphold the trial court's
rulings both as to venue and as to possession or control.  Accordingly, I would
affirm all defendant's convictions and respectfully dissent from the majority's
contrary holding.
Linder, J., joins in this dissenting
opinion.
1. The relevant part of ORS 163.686 provides:
"(1) A person commits the crime of
encouraging child sexual abuse in the second degree if the person:
"(a)(A)(i) Knowingly possesses or controls
any photograph, motion picture, videotape or other visual recording of sexually
explicit conduct involving a child for the purpose of arousing or satisfying
the sexual desires of the person or another person; [and]
"* * * * *
"(B) Knows or is aware of and consciously
disregards the fact that creation of the visual recording of sexually explicit
conduct involved child abuse[.]"
2. Defendant also raises several constitutional challenges to his
convictions:  He argues that, on its face, ORS 163.686 violates Article I,
section 8, of the Oregon Constitution and that the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the
Oregon and United States constitutions preclude prosecutions under ORS 163.686
when the digital images of child sexual abuse that are involved depict abuse
that occurred before the effective date of the statute.  In light of our
disposition of this case, we need not address those issues.  
3. As the case comes to this court, there is no issue concerning either
the validity of defendant's consent or the lawfulness of the subsequent
examination of the two computers by the police.
4. The meaning of the term "unallocated space" is described
below, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 4).
5. White's testimony was in terms of "files," and we therefore
report it that way.  But the testimony was, in a sense, abstract:  The state's
theory of the case was (and has continued throughout to be) that defendant
"possessed or controlled" the 20 digital images in question by
displaying them on his computer screen, not by having one or more
"files" of the images in his computers.  A case in which the state
asserted that defendant illegally possessed or controlled forbidden digital
images by having files of them on his computer that he could potentially
access would raise different interpretive problems under ORS 163.686 than those
that we address today.
6. A "zipped" file or folder is one that contains data that
has been compressed using a mathematical algorithm.  The "zipping"
process renders the material in the file unreadable until the file is
"unzipped" by the recipient.  The value of a zipped file or folder is
that it can be transmitted from one computer to another more quickly.  
7. "Thumbnail" images are small images that usually are
presented in groups.  Larger versions of the thumbnails may be obtained by
clicking on the thumbnail images.
8. The full text of ORS 161.686(1)(a)(A)(i) is set out above, ___ Or at
___ n 1 (slip op at 1 n 1).
9. Before this court, the state observes generally that the crime of
Encouraging Child Sexual Abuse under ORS 163.686(1)(a)(A)(i) also can be proved
by showing that the defendant understands that files containing sexually
explicit images continue to be stored in temporary Internet files or in
unallocated space in his or her computer.  The state at the same time expressly
states that it is not pursuing that "storage" theory on review in
this case -- in spite of the fact that the trial court alluded to that theory
when it denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal.  We assume that
the state is not pursuing that theory here because there is no evidence in the
record to support it:  The images that are associated with all of the charges
were discovered in unallocated space on defendant's computers and there was no
evidence presented that suggested that defendant knew or had reason to believe
that the digital images might be retained there (although there was
evidence that defendant knew or suspected that the digital images might be
retained in the temporary Internet file cache). 
10. The dissent contends that Barger is incorrect insofar as it
treats the act of accessing and "viewing" digitalized images drawn
from the web as similar to an act of viewing art in a museum.  The dissent
argues, in that regard, that images displayed on a computer screen are portable
(because a person who has called up an image from a website can move the image
from one place to another by moving his or her computer) and controllable (as,
for example, when a person replays a specific part of an online video, or skips
over uninteresting parts) in a way that art in a museum is not.  That argument
is unpersuasive for two reasons:  First, it depends on the proposition that a
mere unexercised ability to move or otherwise physically manipulate something
is sufficient to establish possession or control -- a proposition that we
rejected in Barger.  __ Or at __ (slip op at 14).  Second, it ignores
the fact that our holding in Barger was premised on the absence of any
evidence that the defendant there had done anything other than call the images
up to his computer screen.  If there had been evidence that defendant had, for
example, gone back and looked at particular scenes in a video, etc., or that he
had passed around his computer screen while an image of child pornography was
displayed on the screen, we would have faced a different interpretive task.   
The dissent also find significance in the facts
that images accessed through web browsing involve an actual transfer of data
from a website to a person's computer and the automatic saving in a
temporary Internet file of a copy of the data on the person's computer. The
dissent suggests that that fact makes an analogy to ordinary viewing (as of
pictures in a museum) inapt, because the image in fact exists, in digital form,
in the user's computer.  But what the dissent fails to acknowledge is that, from
the user's point of view, the experience of viewing images on the web is not
different from viewing images in a museum:  The ordinary computer user
speaks of visiting or "going to" websites, and has no sense that web
images are "in" the user's own computer until the user affirmatively
saves them.  The computer user's vision of what is happening when he or she is
web browsing is relevant, of course, because the statute criminalizes "knowing
possession and control" of child pornography.
11. In fact, it appears that the state's primary concern in the trial court
was with convincing the court that it was possible to infer from other evidence
that defendant had actually opened and viewed the images associated with
Counts 1 through 4, which had been sent to defendant in a zipped folder through
an Internet chat room.  The state had to persuade the trial court that such an
inference was permissible in order to prevail on those counts under the theory
of possession and control that it was advancing. 
1. As
this court explained in State v. Bray, 342 Or 711, 715 n 3, 160 P3d 983
(2007), a hard drive contains both allocated and unallocated space.  Allocated
space contains data that has been saved to the hard drive.  Id.  When
files are deleted from the allocated space, the deleted files remain on the
unallocated space on the computer's hard drive and, depending on whether the
computer later writes over that data, can be recovered.  Id.
2. ORS
163.686(1) provides, in part:
"A person commits the crime of encouraging
child sexual abuse in the second degree if the person:
"(a)(A)(i) Knowingly possesses or controls
any photograph, motion picture, videotape or other visual recording of sexually
explicit conduct involving a child for the purpose of arousing or satisfying
the sexual desires of the person or another person * * *
"* * * and
"(B) Knows or is aware of and consciously
disregards the fact that creation of the visual recording of sexually explicit
conduct involved child abuse[.]"
3. The
state's expert did not explain whether, when a computer user first accesses the
Internet, the image displayed on the screen reflects data stored in the
computer's temporary memory or whether the image reflects the data saved to a
temporary Internet file on the computer's hard drive.  For the purposes of this
case, the difference is irrelevant.  In both circumstances, the image displayed
on the computer screen exists as a result of data maintained in the computer
separately from the data available on the Internet.
4. Possession
involves the question of a person's relation to an object, which ordinarily is
determined both by legal definitions of property and societal conventions.  See
State v. Casey, 346 Or 54, 61, 203 P3d 202 (2009) (considering the usual
relationship between a homeowner and a guest in determining whether the
homeowner constructively possessed property that the guest temporarily left in
the house).  In a museum, not only does the museum have exclusive possession of
the objects displayed there, but a visitor to a museum typically is governed by
a set of rules that strictly limit the visitor's ability to do anything other
than passively view the objects on display.  Put differently, the analogy on
which the majority's opinion rests is not an apt one. 
5. The portability of an iPhone, iPad, or Droid simply illustrates the
control that a computer user possesses over an Internet image displayed on a
computer screen.  The control arises from the fact, which the trier of fact
could have inferred from this record, that the data generating the image is
copied to and resides independently in the user's computer.  Maintaining an
image on the screen, as in the example, does not evidence a greater degree of
control than exists when a person calls the image to the screen in the first
place.  In both situations, the image remains on the screen until the person
chooses to navigate away from the web page.
6. As the majority notes, the record is not sufficient to permit a
reasonable trier of fact to find that defendant knew that his computer saved
every web page that he visited to a temporary Internet file and maintained
those saved files in the allocated space on his computer until those files were
either manually or automatically deleted.  But that proposition matters only if
possession or control is limited to saved files.
7. To be sure, the state's expert was not able to say whether defendant
purposefully opened the zip file or whether defendant's software did so
automatically.   The state's expert was also not able to say whether, assuming
that the file contained 70 images of child pornography, defendant would have in
fact looked at all of them.  But both those factual issues are immaterial to
whether defendant possessed or controlled the file once he received it.
8. Given the majority's holding that defendant did not possess or control
these images, the majority does not reach the question whether the evidence is
also insufficient to find venue.  Because I would hold that the evidence was
sufficient to find possession or control, it is necessary to reach venue.