Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Willie J. Nunnery

Citation: 2007 WI 1

Docket Number: 2004AP002542-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 1 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP2542-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Willie J. Nunnery, Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Willie J. Nunnery, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST NUNNERY 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 4, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BUTLER, JR., J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Daniel W. 
Hildebrand and DeWitt Ross & Stevens, S.C., Madison, and oral 
argument by Daniel W. Hildebrand. 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief by Julie 
M. Falk and the Office of Lawyer Regulation, Madison, and oral 
argument by Julie M. Falk. 
 
 
2007 WI 1
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final   
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP2542-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Willie J. Nunnery, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Willie J. Nunnery, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 4, 2007 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Willie J. Nunnery appeals a 
referee's report and recommendation finding misconduct in 13 of 
14 counts charged in an Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
disciplinary complaint.  The referee recommends that Attorney 
Nunnery's license to practice law be suspended for two months, 
that he pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding, and 
reinstatement be conditioned on proof he paid the sanction 
imposed in the E.J. client matter. 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Attorney Nunnery presents two issues:  (1) whether the 
OLR proved Count 10 of the disciplinary complaint alleging that 
Attorney Nunnery violated SCR 20:1.11 by failing to discover that 
his client's documents were fraudulent; and (2) whether the 
referee's recommended sanctions are appropriate. 
¶3 
We conclude the referee's findings of fact are not 
clearly erroneous and we adopt them.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Polich, 2005 WI 36, ¶4, 279 Wis. 2d 266, 694 
N.W.2d 367.  Following our de novo review of the referee's legal 
conclusions, we determine they are consistent with controlling 
law.  See id.  Consequently, we reject Attorney Nunnery's 
challenge to Count 10.    
¶4 
We also reject Attorney Nunnery's challenge to the 
recommended sanction.  This court may impose whatever sanction 
it deems appropriate regardless of the referee's recommendation.  
Id.  We agree with the referee that the misconduct found 
warrants a two-month suspension, the imposition of costs, and 
the recommended condition for reinstatement.  Therefore, we 
approve the referee's report, conclusions, and recommendation.  
We suspend Attorney Nunnery's license to practice law for two 
months, require he pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding, 
and condition reinstatement on proof he has paid the sanction 
imposed in the E.J. client matter. 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.1 states:  "Competence.  A lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client.  Competent representation 
requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
3 
 
¶5 
Attorney Willie J. Nunnery was admitted to practice 
law in Wisconsin in 1976 and in Louisiana in 1985.  He practices 
in Madison and has not been previously disciplined.  The referee 
found 
that 
Attorney 
Nunnery, 
a 
sole 
practitioner 
who 
concentrated 
on 
plaintiffs' 
civil 
rights 
and 
employment 
discrimination 
matters, 
has 
gained 
the 
reputation 
of 
a 
tenacious, trustworthy, and courteous trial lawyer.  
¶6 
This disciplinary proceeding stems from six client 
matters between 1997 and 2003.  Counts 1 through 5 of the 
disciplinary complaint involve a client, T.T., who retained 
Attorney Nunnery in 1997 to represent her in an employment 
discrimination dispute against her employer.  T.T. and Attorney 
Nunnery reached an agreement as to attorney fees.  Although T.T. 
understood this agreement and it was never changed, it was not 
reduced to writing. 
¶7 
In December 1997 the Wisconsin Equal Rights Division 
(ERD) requested Attorney Nunnery to respond by January 28, 1998, 
to the employer's answer to T.T.'s employment discrimination 
complaint.  Attorney Nunnery requested two extensions.  The 
division granted a final extension until March 6, 1998.  
Attorney Nunnery failed to file a response by the deadline.  On 
March 17, 1998, the ERD sent T.T. a certified letter with a copy 
to Attorney Nunnery providing T.T. an additional 20 days to 
respond to its December 1997 letter.  Neither T.T. nor Attorney 
Nunnery responded.   
¶8 
On April 22, 1998, the ERD dismissed T.T.'s complaint 
due to her failure to respond.  Subsequently, T.T. repeatedly 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
4 
 
attempted to telephone Attorney Nunnery for information, but was 
continually informed he was out of the office.  In May 1998 he 
met briefly with T.T., discussed the dismissal of the complaint, 
and advised the statute of limitations to file a federal lawsuit 
had not expired.  Subsequently, T.T. attempted to telephone 
Attorney Nunnery several times, but was unable to reach him or 
the calls were very brief. 
¶9 
In March 1999 T.T. sent Attorney Nunnery a $200 check 
for the federal lawsuit filing fee.  He did not deposit the 
check into his client trust account, but instead placed it in 
T.T.'s file.  Although Attorney Nunnery never returned the check 
to T.T. and failed to file the federal lawsuit at that time, the 
check was never negotiated and T.T. knew this. 
¶10 Because T.T.'s employer's franchise was sold, Attorney 
Nunnery advised filing a separate complaint with the ERD against 
the new owner.  In July 1999 the second complaint was filed with 
the ERD.  T.T. and Attorney Nunnery discussed the lawsuit in 
person in the summer of 1999; this was the last time they met.   
¶11 The 
employer responded to the second complaint.  
Neither T.T. nor Nunnery submitted a reply.  In November 1999 
the ERD made an initial no probable cause determination based on 
T.T.'s failure to reply to the employer's statements and the 
lack of information on record to verify the complaint's 
allegations.  The referee found that Attorney Nunnery never 
intended to pursue the ERD complaints, but intended only to use 
them to conduct discovery to support a federal court claim and 
that he had conducted additional investigation in the case.   
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
5 
 
¶12 In January 2000 the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission 
sent 
T.T. 
a 
determination 
that 
there 
was 
no 
reasonable cause to believe her charge was true, but said if she 
wished to pursue the matter she could do so by filing a private 
action within 90 days.  Once the 90-day period expired the right 
to sue would be lost.  Attorney Nunnery did not file a private 
action in federal court within 90 days and T.T.'s claims were 
time barred.  
¶13 The referee found that T.T. did not anticipate 
recovery through an ERD proceeding or that she would receive any 
recovery unless a federal court case was commenced.  The referee 
further found there was no showing there would have been merit 
to a federal court suit and no showing that T.T. sustained any 
financial loss through Attorney Nunnery's action or inaction.   
¶14 T.T. filed a grievance against Attorney Nunnery with 
the OLR.  The OLR investigation was completed by December 20, 
2001.  The referee found Attorney Nunnery cooperated fully with 
the OLR investigation and that the OLR's delay until September 
2004 in bringing the present action was detrimental to Attorney 
Nunnery's defense due to his and T.T.'s faded memories with the 
long passage of time. 
¶15 The referee concluded the facts demonstrated Attorney 
Nunnery committed five violations:  
Count 1: By orally agreeing to represent [T.T.] on a 
60/40 contingency basis and failing to reduce that 
agreement 
to 
writing, 
Nunnery 
failed 
to 
put 
a 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
6 
 
contingent fee in writing, in violation of SCR 
[20:1.5(c)];2 
Count 2: By placing [T.T.]'s $200.00 check in the 
client's file, as opposed to his trust account, 
Nunnery failed to hold in trust, separate from his own 
property, that property of a client that is in the 
lawyer's 
possession 
in 
connection 
with 
a 
representation, 
in 
violation 
of 
[former] 
SCR 
20:1.15(a);3  
Count 3: By failing to respond to the ERD deadlines, 
resulting in the dismissal of [T.T.]'s ERD complaint; 
by failing to submit a response to the employer's 
answer to [T.T.]'s second ERD complaint, and by 
failing to provide information supporting [T.T.]'s 
allegations, resulting in a finding of no probable 
                                                 
2 The OLR complaint cites the violation alleged in Count 1 
as SCR 20:1.5(a) although the correct citation is SCR 20:1.5(c).  
There has been no objection raised as to the discrepancy.  
Consequently, we refer to the proper citation.  SCR 20:1.5(c) 
states:  Fees 
(c)  A fee may be contingent on the outcome of 
the matter for which the service is rendered, except in 
a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by 
paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement 
shall be in writing and shall state the method by which 
the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or 
percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event 
of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other 
expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether 
such expenses are to be deducted before or after the 
contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a 
contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the 
client with a written statement stating the outcome of 
the matter and if there is a recovery, showing the 
remittance to the client and the method of its 
determination.  
 
3 Former SCR 20:1.15 applies to misconduct committed prior 
to July 1, 2004.  Former SCR 20:1.15(a) provided in relevant 
part that "[a] lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and third 
persons that is in the lawyer's possession in connection with a 
representation or when acting in a fiduciary capacity." 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
7 
 
cause 
and 
a 
dismissal 
of 
[T.T.]'s 
second 
ERD 
complaint, and by failing to file a federal lawsuit 
within 90 days after the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission issued its determination of no probable 
cause, resulting in [T.T.]'s case being barred, 
Nunnery failed to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.3;4  
Count 4: By 
failing 
to 
communicate 
with 
[T.T.] 
regarding the first ERD complaint's status and the 
complaint's subsequent dismissal; and by failing to 
respond to [T.T.]'s various phone calls and requests 
for information regarding the case and complaint's 
dismissal, Nunnery failed to keep a client reasonably 
informed about the status of a matter and promptly 
comply with reasonable requests for information, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.4(a)5; and 
Count 5: By failing to explain to [T.T.] that he 
never intended to pursue the ERD complaints and only 
intended to use them for discovery purposes, Nunnery 
failed to explain a matter to the extent reasonably 
necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation, in violation 
of SCR 20:1.4(b).6  
¶16 The next matter, Count 6, arose out of the client, 
J.A., matter, and alleged that Attorney Nunnery knowingly 
advanced a claim or defense unwarranted under existing law, 
without a good-faith argument for an extension, modification or 
reversal of the law.  In 1999 J.A. retained Attorney Nunnery to 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
5 SCR 20:1.4(a) states:  "Communication.  A lawyer shall 
keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter 
and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information." 
6 SCR 20:1.4(b) states:  "Communication.  A lawyer shall 
explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit 
the 
client 
to 
make 
informed 
decisions 
regarding 
the 
representation." 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
8 
 
represent her with respect to an order to raze a house she owned 
in Kenosha.  She paid Attorney Nunnery an initial fee of $700 
and a second fee payment of $1750.   
¶17 The time to challenge the raze order expired June 11, 
1999.  Attorney Nunnery filed a petition for judicial review 
after this time expired.  He claimed that he acted immediately 
after receiving the initial contact from J.A. on a Friday.  
Attorney Nunnery subsequently dismissed the petition.  In his 
petition to review the raze order, Attorney Nunnery had not 
addressed the time to appeal the order nor made a good-faith 
argument to extend the time.  The referee concluded that in view 
of the haste and urgency, this oversight was understandable.     
¶18 In November 1999 Attorney Nunnery filed a second 
petition to review the raze order, and again did not address the 
time period to appeal the order nor make a good-faith argument 
for an extension.  The city filed an answer to the second 
petition, asserting the action was time barred.  Attorney 
Nunnery stipulated to voluntary dismissal.   
¶19 After the city raised its time barrier defense, 
Attorney Nunnery admitted neither petition had any basis in law 
or fact.  The city did not, however, assert that either action 
was frivolous or brought in bad faith.  The referee found that 
as a result of Attorney Nunnery's efforts, the city offered J.A. 
the opportunity to fix up the property to avoid being razed.  
J.A., however, eventually decided to abandon efforts to save the 
structure.   
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
9 
 
¶20 The referee determined that by filing the second 
petition for judicial review in November 1999, after the filing 
period had expired and without a good-faith argument to support 
an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, 
Attorney Nunnery knowingly advanced a claim that was unwarranted 
under existing law, contrary to SCR 20:3.1(a)(1),7 as charged in 
Count 6. 
¶21 Counts 7 through 9 alleged three rules violations 
concerning client D.D.  In 1997 D.D. retained Attorney Nunnery 
to represent him in an employment discrimination matter.  
Attorney Nunnery forwarded to D.D.'s former employer a draft of 
a federal employment discrimination complaint and a demand for a 
$30,000 settlement.  Attorney Nunnery did not file the federal 
complaint. 
¶22 In May 1997, based on a discrimination complaint filed 
with the Wisconsin Equal Rights Division (ERD), an initial 
determination of no probable cause was issued.  A notice of 
appeal was filed with the ERD and the case was certified for 
hearing on the probable cause issue.  Attorney Nunnery canceled 
the hearing and dismissed the complaint.  However, he neither 
consulted with D.D. before dismissing the complaint nor informed 
D.D. about the dismissal.  Attorney Nunnery asserted that he 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:3.1(a)(1) states that in representing a client, a 
lawyer shall not "knowingly advance a claim or defense that is 
unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may 
advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good 
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of 
existing law."  
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
10 
 
used the process solely for discovery in the federal lawsuit, 
but did not explain this strategy to D.D. 
¶23 In August 1997 Attorney Nunnery submitted a discovery 
request to D.D.'s former employer resulting in the disclosure 
that D.D. had been fired for violating a company policy.  After 
discovery was completed and during an approximately one and one-
half year period, D.D. attempted to telephone Attorney Nunnery 
to check the status of his claim, but was seldom able to reach 
him.  When D.D. did, he was informed everything was on track.   
¶24 Attorney Nunnery asserted that he placed D.D.'s case 
in abeyance while waiting for a decision in a federal employment 
discrimination case, which Attorney Nunnery claimed had a 
similar legal theory as the D.D. case.  Attorney Nunnery failed 
to inform D.D., however, that his case was on hold. 
¶25 In October 2001 D.D. terminated Attorney Nunnery's 
representation.  After D.D. complained to the OLR, Attorney 
Nunnery met with D.D., showed him work he performed on his file 
and apologized for his lack of communication.  Attorney Nunnery 
offered to refund the $1000 retainer and indicated the check 
would be mailed.  D.D. called Attorney Nunnery three weeks later 
to inquire about the $1000 payment.  Attorney Nunnery told D.D. 
he was busy, his mother had been ill, and the check was in the 
mail.  Attorney Nunnery, however, never sent D.D. the check, but 
asserted he did not do so because he did not want to create the 
impression he was attempting to influence the OLR investigation.   
¶26 Based on these facts, the referee concluded that by 
dismissing the ERD complaint and canceling the hearing without 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
11 
 
discussing this with D.D., and by failing to explain to D.D. 
that he never intended to pursue the complaint other than for 
discovery purposes, Attorney Nunnery failed to explain this 
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client 
to make an informed decision regarding the representation, 
contrary to SCR 20:1.4(b), in support of Count 7.   
¶27 The referee further concluded that by failing to 
perform any work on D.D.'s case from the time he completed 
discovery 
in 
August 
of 
1997 
until 
D.D. 
terminated 
his 
representation in October 2001, Attorney Nunnery failed to act 
with reasonable diligence in representing a client, contrary to 
SCR 20:1.3, as alleged in Count 8.  Also, by failing to respond 
to D.D.'s requests for information and assuring him that 
everything was on track, and by failing to explain to D.D. that 
he intended to place his case on hold and no longer intended to 
refund a portion of his retainer because he did not want to 
create the impression he was trying to influence the OLR's 
investigation, and by informing D.D. that he had mailed the 
refund, Attorney Nunnery failed to keep a client reasonably 
informed and promptly comply with requests for information, 
contrary to SCR 20:1.4(a), as alleged in Count 9. 
¶28 In Counts 10 and 11, the disciplinary complaint 
alleged 
misconduct 
with 
respect 
to 
Attorney 
Nunnery's 
representation of E.J.  Count 10 alleged that Attorney Nunnery 
failed to provide competent representation, contrary to SCR 
20:1.1.  Count 11 alleged that Attorney Nunnery filed a suit and 
took other action on behalf of the client when he knew, or it 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
12 
 
was obvious, that the action would serve merely to harass or 
maliciously injure another, contrary to SCR 20:3.1(a)(3).8  The 
referee concluded the facts supported Count 10, but not Count 
11.   
¶29 In 1997 E.J. retained Attorney Nunnery to represent 
her in a possible employment law action against her employer, a 
technical college.  She alleged she was racially discriminated 
against and sexually harassed by the college personnel.  E.J. 
provided 
Attorney 
Nunnery 
a 
number 
of 
plastic-laminated 
documents to support her claims, assuring him that the documents 
were authentic.  She said she had laminated the documents to 
prevent them from being stolen.  The referee found that this 
"claimed reason for the lamination is absurd."   
¶30 The documents consisted of purported e-mails, letters, 
and memos to E.J. from the college personnel containing racially 
derogatory comments, an apology for terrible sexual assaults, 
harassment and threats, and were found to be "extraordinarily 
damaging" to the college.  The referee found the documents were 
suspicious on their face in that they were laminated and 
contained inconsistent dates.  However, the referee noted the 
discrepancies between the dates and the days of the week would 
not have been readily apparent.  None of the purported 
                                                 
8 SCR 20:3.1(a)(3) states that in representing a client, a 
lawyer shall not "file a suit, assert a position, conduct a 
defense, delay a trial or take other action on behalf of the 
client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such an 
action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure 
another." 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
13 
 
originals, or even copies, was offered into evidence during the 
disciplinary proceedings, but in a U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin opinion and order, they were 
described as obviously fraudulent documents.9 
¶31 The referee found that Attorney Nunnery had failed to 
inquire into the veracity of the e-mails and letters E.J. 
provided.  The college's legal counsel had told Attorney Nunnery 
that the documents' purported authors denied writing them and 
that he would like to arrange a time to review the originals; 
there was, however, no indication defense counsel followed 
through with examining them or with discovery.  
¶32 The referee found that in January 1998 Attorney 
Nunnery filed a federal action against the college in the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, which E.J. 
subsequently moved to dismiss.10  In July 2000 Attorney Nunnery 
filed a second federal court action on behalf of E.J. against 
the college in the U.S. District Court for the Western District 
of Wisconsin.  
¶33 Thereafter, defense counsel informed Attorney Nunnery 
of a 1997 independent medical examination concluding that E.J. 
had 
demonstrated 
malingering 
and 
a 
disorder 
related 
to 
pathological lying.  Defense counsel told Attorney Nunnery that 
                                                 
9 Jimenez v. Madison Area Technical College, No. 00-C-424 
(W.D. Wis. Aug. 13, 2001). 
10 In the U.S. District Court opinion, Judge Crabb stated 
that Attorney Hal Harlowe represented E.J. in the first January 
1998 suit; this discrepancy was not mentioned by either party 
and appears immaterial.  
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
14 
 
a 
medical 
expert 
would 
testify 
E.J. 
was 
falsifying 
her 
conditions and warned Attorney Nunnery that E.J.'s complaint 
might run afoul of Federal Rule 11.11  The referee found, 
however, the independent medical examination suggested merely 
that it was difficult to rule out malingering and failed to show 
defense counsel's claims were reasonable. 
¶34 Attorney Nunnery filed a second amended complaint in 
November 2000 which contained for the first time specific 
details from the laminated documents.  In December 2000 the 
defense counsel sent Attorney Nunnery affidavits from college 
personnel saying that the e-mails, memos, and letters E.J. 
produced were fabrications.  He reiterated that Attorney Nunnery 
had not reasonably inquired as to the truth of the allegations 
under Rule 11.  Attorney Nunnery responded he had spoken to E.J. 
and shared the affidavits with her, but she would not drop the 
lawsuit and he understood the sanction risk. 
¶35 In March 2001 the college moved for sanctions in the 
federal suit.  At the motion hearing, numerous witnesses 
testified 
including 
E.J., 
Attorney 
Nunnery, 
and 
college 
personnel.  Following the hearing the federal district court 
judge found: "This is truly, and without any competition, the 
most blatant case of a Rule 11 violation that I've ever seen.  I 
                                                 
11 Under FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3), by the act of submitting a 
pleading to the court, a lawyer certifies that to the best of 
his information, knowledge and belief, formed after inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances, the allegations of the 
pleading have evidentiary support.  See Jimenez v. Madison Area 
Technical College, 321 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2003). 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
15 
 
think Mr. Nunnery, you have a client who is not truthful, who is 
willing to take any steps to, I don't know, retaliate or hurt 
people she believed retaliated against her or hurt her. . . . 
Both of you share the blame for reliance on these false and 
forged pieces of correspondence."  The district court dismissed 
the complaint and assessed Attorney Nunnery with the college's 
attorney fees, but did not grant its motion for maintaining 
vexatious litigation.   
¶36 Attorney Nunnery did not appeal the order imposing 
sanctions on him, but did appeal the portion dismissing the 
complaint as a sanction against E.J.  In a February 2003 
decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
rejected the appeal as "patently frivolous," and affirmed the 
Rule 11 sanctions against E.J.  It also granted the college's 
motion for appellate sanctions.  The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals wrote: 
The sanction of dismissal meets the requisite 
criteria in this case, given the egregious nature of 
[E.J.]'s conduct.  [E.J.]'s claim was so unmeritorious 
and her behavior so deceptive that the filing of her 
baseless claim amounted to a veritable attack on our 
system of justice.  Although [E.J.] believes the 
district court's order of dismissal was an abuse of 
discretion, the only abuses ascertainable in this case 
were those committed by her counsel and [E.J.] 
herself.  By bringing 'false, fraudulent and salacious 
charges of discrimination' against Defendants . . . 
[E.J.] exploited the judicial process and subjected 
her former colleagues and employer to unnecessary 
embarrassment and mental anguish. 
In light of the willful and malicious nature of 
[E.J.]'s flagrant Rule 11 violation . . . we hold that 
the decision to dismiss [E.J.]'s case, as a sanction 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
16 
 
of her abusive conduct, was within the bounds of the 
trial court's sound discretion.   
Jimenez v. Madison Area Technical College, 321 F.3d 652, 657 
(7th Cir. 2003).  As to the frivolousness of the appeal, the 
court observed Attorney Nunnery cited to the wrong legal 
standard and devoted only one page of his appellate brief to a 
legal argument.  Id. at 658.  
¶37 The referee found that the federal district court's 
2001 order dismissing E.J.'s claims directed Attorney Nunnery to 
pay a portion of the defendants' attorney fees of $16,473 as an 
additional sanction, and this monetary sanction was issued only 
against Attorney Nunnery.  Nonetheless, Attorney Nunnery had not 
made such a payment.  Based on these findings, the referee 
determined the OLR proved Attorney Nunnery failed to provide 
competent client representation, contrary to SCR 20:1.1.   
¶38 The referee concluded: 
By failing to meaningfully inquire into the veracity 
of the suspicious e-mails and letters that his client 
claimed were sent by defendants in the [E.J.] case; by 
blindly 
relying 
on 
his 
client's 
unreasonable 
assurances that the documents were authentic, and that 
their extraordinary contents were actually reduced to 
writing by their alleged authors; by filing the second 
amended 
complaint, 
which 
contained 
material 
allegations 
based 
directly 
upon 
the 
questioned 
documents, 
after 
failing 
to 
investigate 
the 
authenticity of the documents; by essentially ignoring 
sworn statements of the purported authors that the 
documents were fabrications; by making conflicting 
statements to the District Court about the 'original' 
documents 
which 
prompted 
the 
court 
to 
question 
Nunnery's candor toward that tribunal; and by pursuing 
an appeal arguing the wrong legal standard, and 
presenting an appellate brief containing only one page 
of argument . . . . 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
17 
 
Attorney Nunnery failed to provide competent representation to 
his client as charged in Count 10 of the OLR's complaint.  
¶39 With respect to Count 11, the referee ruled that the 
OLR failed to carry its burden to prove Attorney Nunnery's 
subjective intent to assert a position or take an action on 
behalf of a client when he knew, or it was obvious, that the 
action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure 
another.  The referee found that circumstantial evidence bearing 
on Attorney Nunnery's intent was ambiguous.  The referee said 
that opposing counsel's statements could be viewed as a fair 
warning or as an intimidation tactic.  As a result, the referee 
declined to draw any inference that Attorney Nunnery had a bad 
motive or intent to harass or maliciously injure adverse 
parties, but instead that he made an error of judgment in 
utilizing the questioned documents.   
¶40 The referee found true Attorney Nunnery's testimony 
that he had no intention to humiliate, embarrass, or harass 
anyone.  The referee noted that the OLR failed to introduce any 
evidence of the questioned documents, affidavits, any pleadings 
in the E.J. case other than the second amended complaint, the 
so-called independent medical examination of E.J., nor the live 
testimony of any witness other than Attorney Nunnery.  The 
referee determined:  "The Rule 11 violation found in the federal 
court litigation was predicated on a different, and much fuller, 
evidentiary record; a lower burden of proof; and a different 
(objective vs. subjective) standard of evaluation of the 
Respondent's conduct."  Accordingly, the referee concluded that 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
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the OLR did not establish a violation of SCR 20:3.1(a)(3), as 
charged in Count 11.   
¶41 Next, Counts 12 and 13 involved client Y.P. and her 
family.  In December 1997 Y.P. and her ex-husband contacted 
Attorney Nunnery to determine whether to pursue an action 
against the school their son, E.P., attended for failing to 
protect him from harassment after he was bullied by several 
students resulting in being stabbed in the chest with a pencil.   
¶42 Attorney Nunnery sent these clients a letter regarding 
multiple potential claims against the school district and 
agreeing to represent E.P.'s interests on a contingency basis, 
plus a $3000 retainer for up-front costs.  His clients sent 
Attorney Nunnery a $3000 retainer check.  Attorney Nunnery sent 
a letter to the school district's superintendent regarding his 
clients' claims.  On December 30, 1997, the school district's 
insurer requested medical records and reports supporting E.P.'s 
claims.  Attorney Nunnery sent a copy of this letter to his 
clients on January 5, 1998.  This was Attorney Nunnery's last 
communication with Y.P.'s ex-husband.   
¶43 Between February 9, 1998, and January 26, 1999, 
Attorney Nunnery performed various legal services with respect 
to Y.P. and her family's claims.  In February 1999 he sent a 
draft complaint to Y.P. for her review setting forth one claim 
against the school district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1998) for 
denying E.P. his property interest in a public education without 
due process of law.  In July 1999 Y.P. inquired on the status of 
her case, but Attorney Nunnery did not respond.  She wrote again 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
19 
 
on July 26, August 18, and August 30; Attorney Nunnery did not 
respond to her questions.  In September 1999 Attorney Nunnery 
mailed the complaint and filing fee to the U.S. District Court, 
copying Y.P.  On January 5, 2000, Y.P. wrote to Attorney Nunnery 
requesting information and explaining she had heard nothing 
since September.  Attorney Nunnery did not respond, and Y.P. re-
sent the letter on January 18, January 24, and February 1, 2000.  
Attorney Nunnery did not respond until after her February 1, 
2000, letter. 
¶44 On February 8, 2000, the federal court ordered 
Attorney Nunnery to serve the complaint and file proof of 
service within 21 days.  Attorney Nunnery did not serve the 
complaint within 21 days and the case was dismissed on March 7, 
2000.  Attorney Nunnery failed to inform Y.P. of the dismissal. 
¶45 In 
April 
2000 
Y.P. 
wrote 
to 
Attorney 
Nunnery 
indicating she had not heard from him since February 1; she 
offered to retain another attorney; she asked for a refund of 
her $3000 retainer and asked if there was nothing that could be 
done legally to let her know.  Attorney Nunnery telephoned in 
response to this letter.  Between June 2000 to July 2000, Y.P. 
sent Attorney Nunnery four letters requesting information.  He 
did not respond. 
¶46 On July 13, 2000, Attorney Nunnery filed a complaint 
with the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin which named Y.P. as the plaintiff, but her former 
husband was not listed as a party.  Between July 14 and July 18, 
2000, Attorney Nunnery attempted to meet with Y.P., but due to 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
20 
 
short notice she was unable to take off work.  On August 1, 
2000, 
Y.P. 
sent 
Attorney 
Nunnery 
a 
letter 
requesting 
information, but he did not immediately respond.  However, 
between 
August 
and 
November 
2000 
Attorney 
Nunnery 
sent 
information to Y.P.   
¶47 On December 1, 2000, Attorney Nunnery sent Y.P. 
deposition notices.  The morning of the depositions, he met with 
E.P., Y.P., and her former husband and provided brief but 
helpful instructions.  The referee found there was no showing 
that the brevity of the instructions prejudiced the claims, but 
Y.P. was understandably disappointed with the lack of Attorney 
Nunnery's efforts.  Following the depositions, the school 
district offered to settle for $10,000.  Attorney Nunnery 
recommended acceptance of the offer, but Y.P. rejected it. 
¶48 In March 2001 the school district moved for summary 
judgment.  The U.S. District Court granted the school district's 
summary judgment motion in June 2001.  Attorney Nunnery sent a 
copy of the decision with a brief cover letter stating the 
lawsuit had been dismissed and to call at her convenience.  Y.P. 
refused this request to call him. 
¶49 In July 2001 the federal court entered a judgment 
against Y.P. for costs in the sum of $1312.42 and notice of 
entry was sent to all counsel.  Attorney Nunnery did not inform 
Y.P. of the judgment.  The judgment constituted a lien against 
her real estate.  In July 2003 Y.P. received a title report in 
connection with the sale of her residence and became aware for 
the first time of the judgment lien.  In order to clear the lien 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
21 
 
and close the sale, she was put to significant inconvenience, 
additional expense, aggravation, and embarrassment. 
¶50 The referee concluded that these facts demonstrated 
that Attorney Nunnery failed to act with reasonable diligence 
and promptness, contrary to SCR 20:1.3, as charged in Count 12.  
In addition, the referee concluded that by failing to respond to 
Y.P.'s numerous requests and by not keeping her informed, he 
failed to keep a client reasonably informed, contrary to SCR 
20:1.4(a), as charged in Count 13.   
¶51 The final disciplinary matter, Count 14, alleged that 
Attorney Nunnery failed to provide competent representation to 
client V.R., contrary to SCR 20:1.1.  In February 2000 V.R., 
through a different attorney, sought judicial review of a 
decision to terminate his disability benefits.  The case was 
brought before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Wisconsin.  On December 3, 2000, V.R. died and his attorney 
sent a letter informing the court of V.R.'s death.  On December 
20, 2000, the U.S. District Court ordered V.R.'s surviving 
spouse to obtain counsel and move to substitute parties on or 
before February 1, 2001. 
¶52 On January 26, 2001, Attorney Nunnery filed a notice 
of appearance on behalf of "the Plaintiff."  He did not move for 
substitution of parties or identify anyone other than the 
deceased as his client.  A second scheduling order extended the 
deadline for filing substitution of parties to April 1, 2001.  
Attorney Nunnery did not move for substitution of parties within 
that time nor move for an extension of time to do so. 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
22 
 
¶53 On June 18, 2001, the defendant filed a suggestion of 
death on the record, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 25(a)(1), but did 
not file a certificate of service as required.  On August 3, 
2001, the defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment.  
Attorney Nunnery responded, acknowledging the suggestion of 
death, but not admitting service; he did not move to substitute 
parties.  He later signed an affidavit averring he was not 
served with the suggestion of death.  
¶54 On October 12, 2001, Attorney Nunnery moved for leave 
to file a substitution of parties, claiming he had not been 
served with the suggestion of death and that the procedural time 
limits to do so were inapplicable.  The court rejected these 
arguments and denied his motion.  Attorney Nunnery appealed, 
representing himself as counsel for the decedent, V.R.  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court ruling, but it did not, however, rule that his arguments 
were frivolous.  The referee concluded that by failing to file a 
timely substitution of parties, Attorney Nunnery failed to 
provide competent representation, contrary to SCR 20:1.1.  
¶55 Accordingly, the referee concluded the OLR established 
violations in Counts 1 through 10 and 12 through 14.  It noted, 
however, the OLR had not established each of the particulars 
with respect to all of its allegations. 
¶56 The referee concluded that a two-month suspension was 
appropriate to impress upon Attorney Nunnery the seriousness of 
his failures and warn other members of the bar.  The referee 
stated that the OLR had not established Count 11, which he 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
23 
 
termed was the most serious count alleged.  With respect to 
Count 10, the referee determined that "[c]ompetent handling of a 
particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the 
factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods 
and 
procedures 
meeting 
the 
standards 
of 
competent 
practitioners."  The referee explained: "By making only a 
cursory and pro forma effort to validate the documents, after 
substantial doubt had been raised as to their authenticity, the 
Respondent shirked his duty of 'inquiry into an analysis of' 
both the factual and legal ramifications of their continued 
use."  The referee further concluded that Attorney Nunnery 
should be ordered to pay full costs and his reinstatement be 
conditioned on proof that he has paid the sanction in the E.J. 
matter.   
¶57 Attorney 
Nunnery 
advances 
numerous 
arguments 
to 
support his contention that the OLR did not prove Count 10.  He 
submits that the plain language of SCR 20:1.1 fails to impose a 
duty to discover client fraud or to protect clients from frauds 
they perpetrate on the court or on their attorney.  He claims 
case law applies SCR 20:1.1 to an attorney's, not a client's, 
deficiencies.  He argues the referee failed to recognize a 
client's obligation to tell the truth to the court as well as to 
his or her lawyer.  He points out no client has the right to 
testify falsely. 
¶58 Attorney Nunnery argues that absent extraordinary 
circumstances, knowledge that a client intends to testify 
falsely must be based on his or her expressed admission.  He 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
24 
 
emphasizes that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals blamed E.J. 
and not him for the fabricated documents.  He maintains that SCR 
20:3.1 through 20:3.10 govern ethical duties.  Attorney Nunnery 
points out the referee determined he did not violate SCR 
20:3.1(a)(3), charged in Count 11.  He notes the referee 
specifically found he had no intent to humiliate, harass, or 
embarrass anyone and it was only through a misapprehension of 
his duties under Rule 11 that he failed to address the 
questioned 
documents. 
 
He 
further 
argues 
the 
referee's 
determination as to Count 10 is tantamount to holding that a 
Rule 11 violation automatically violates SCR 20:1.1.   
¶59 Attorney Nunnery argues that while judgment errors may 
be properly sanctioned under Rule 11, or Wis. Stat. 802.05, such 
errors should not be considered an ethical rule violation.  
Attorney Nunnery claims the referee's analysis essentially 
permits proof of a violation of SCR 20:1.1, without any proof of 
the knowledge requirements in SCR 20:3.1.  He argues that 
ethical rules violations require a higher standard of proof, 
i.e., that the frivolous claim or defense must be knowingly 
advanced.   
¶60 We are unpersuaded.  The referee found misconduct 
charged in Count 10 not because Nunnery failed to discover his 
client's fraud, but because he failed to make any meaningful 
inquiry into the veracity of the suspicious documents.   The 
comment to SCR 20:1.1 provides:  "Competent handling of a 
particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the 
factual and legal elements of the problem . . . ."  We are 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
25 
 
satisfied the SCR 20:1.1 violation is amply supported by the 
referee's numerous specific findings, including the finding that 
the client's claimed reason for the lamination (to prevent 
theft) was absurd, and that the documents were suspicious on 
their face.  The U.S. District Court described the documents as 
obviously fraudulent and observed that any minimally competent 
lawyer would have subjected his client to rigorous questioning 
and demanded corroboration of details before proceeding.   
¶61 We are not persuaded that Attorney Nunnery was, as he 
implies, merely a hapless victim of an unscrupulous client.  It 
is the attorney's lack of preparation and inquiry that is a 
basis for the violation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Fischer, 176 Wis. 2d 145, 499 N.W.2d 677 (1993) (SCR 
20:1.1 was violated by failing to examine files, seeking to 
discover basis or legal sufficiency of allegations of party on 
whose behalf one is signing documents.).  Attorney Nunnery's 
arguments reflect a misunderstanding of the purpose of SCR 
20:1.1.   
¶62 Attorney Nunnery argues that SCR 20:1.1 does not apply 
because it is intended to protect clients only.  We are 
satisfied that SCR 20:1.1 is intended to protect our system of 
justice as well as individual clients.  The Preamble to SCR 
Chapter 20 describes a lawyer's responsibilities and states that 
"[n]eglect 
of 
these 
responsibilities 
compromises 
the 
independence of the profession and the public interest which it 
serves."  It adds: "Lawyers play a vital role in the 
preservation of society.  The fulfillment of this role requires 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
26 
 
an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal 
system.  The Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly 
applied, serve to define that relationship."   
¶63 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed that 
Attorney Nunnery, along with his client, were responsible for 
abusing our justice system.  See Jimenez, 321 F.3d at 657 
("[T]he filing of her baseless claim amounted to a veritable 
attack on our system of justice, . . . the only abuses 
ascertainable in this case were those committed by her counsel 
and [E.J.] herself.").  This conclusion is consistent with the 
idea that SCR 20:1.1 serves to protect not only an individual 
client, but the system of justice as a whole.  Accordingly, we 
reject Attorney Nunnery's arguments, including his suggestion 
that a client's misdeeds relieve an attorney of his obligations 
under SCR 20:1.1.  
¶64 Next, Attorney Nunnery argues that the facts warrant 
only the imposition of a public reprimand.  Attorney Nunnery 
points to his excellent reputation, full cooperation, lack of 
disciplinary history, and apology.  He claims that a two-month 
suspension is not required to impress upon him the seriousness 
of the misconduct and he has paid a heavy price already.  He 
recognizes he is responsible for the sanction in the E.J. matter 
and objects to its payment as a reinstatement condition.  
Attorney Nunnery also points out that the referee concluded that 
some of the violations caused no harm to the client, such as the 
J.A. matter.  He argues that he admitted many of the complaint's 
allegations, and that many of the violations were years old and 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
27 
 
relatively minor.  He submits he accepts responsibility for his 
misconduct.   
¶65 Attorney Nunnery further objects to being responsible 
for full costs of the proceeding.  He argues the OLR failed to 
prove Count 11, the most serious allegation.  He asserts many 
counts were admitted and in any event, the attorney fees should 
be based on the actual costs, rather than the $70 per hour rate 
the OLR seeks.12   
¶66 We reject Attorney Nunnery's arguments.  We do not 
accord the referee's recommendation as to appropriate discipline 
great weight or consider it conclusive.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686.  This court is entitled to impose discipline more or 
less severe than recommended.  Id.   Here, in light of the 
circumstances of this proceeding, however, we are satisfied that 
the referee's recommendation is appropriate. 
¶67 We are mindful of Attorney Nunnery's cooperation, 
previous lack of discipline, good reputation, and apology.  We 
are not, however, persuaded by his argument that a lack of harm 
resulted.  Given the number and seriousness of the infractions, 
                                                 
12 The OLR filed a statement asserting costs of $8219.97 as 
of September 18, 2006.  Attorney Nunnery objects, arguing that 
the OLR failed to prove Count 11, the most serious allegation.  
He asserts many counts were admitted and that attorney fees 
should not be assessed at the approved rate of $70 per hour, but 
should be based on the actual in-house costs the OLR incurred.  
He further objects to certain witness fees and costs.  We 
conclude the statement of costs is reasonable and reject his 
argument that full costs should not be assessed. 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
28 
 
as well as the need to deter other attorneys from similar 
misconduct, a two-month suspension is appropriate.  We conclude 
that the seriousness of Attorney Nunnery's misconduct warrants 
the imposition of a two-month license suspension.  We further 
conclude that full costs are to be assessed as recommended by 
the referee.  In addition, reinstatement shall be conditioned on 
payment of the sanctions imposed in the E.J. matter. 
¶68 IT IS ORDERED the license of Attorney Willie J. 
Nunnery to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for two months 
commencing February 6, 2007, as discipline for his professional 
misconduct. 
¶69 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Willie J. Nunnery pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation all the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs are 
not paid within the time specified, and absent a showing to this 
court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, the 
license of Willie J. Nunnery to practice in Wisconsin shall 
remain suspended until further order of this court. 
¶70 IT 
IS 
FURTHER 
ORDERED 
that 
reinstatement 
is 
conditioned upon payment of the sanctions imposed in the E.J. 
matter.  If the sanctions are not paid and absent a showing to 
this court of his inability to pay, the license of Willie J. 
Nunnery to practice in Wisconsin shall remain suspended until 
further order of this court. 
¶71 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Willie J. Nunnery comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
29 
 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶72 LOUIS B. BUTLER, J. did not participate. 
 
No. 
2004AP2542-D   
 
 
 
1