Case Title: City of West Allis v. Patrick T. Sheedy

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP003579-OA

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3579-OA 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
City of West Allis, Village of Greendale,  
Village of Bayside and City of Oak Creek,  
          Petitioners, 
     v. 
Honorable Patrick T. Sheedy, Chief Judge,  
First Judicial District,  
          Respondent. 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 20, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 29, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioners, there was a brief by Michael 
J. Sachen and Scott E. Post, West Allis and oral argument by 
Scott E. Post. 
 
 
For the respondent, the cause was argued by James 
H. McDermott, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
                                                   No. 96-3579-OA 
 
1 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3579-OA 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
City of West Allis, Village of Greendale, 
Village of Bayside, and City of Oak Creek, 
 
  
Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
Honorable Patrick T. Sheedy, Chief Judge, 
First Judicial District, 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
Jun 20, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION for declaratory judgment.  Rights Declared. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   In this original action, the 
Cities of West Allis and Oak Creek, and the Villages of 
Greendale and Bayside (West Allis) ask this court to determine 
whether the Honorable Patrick T. Sheedy, Chief Judge, First 
Judicial 
District 
of Milwaukee County, 
exceeded 
statutory 
authority when he issued Directive 96-14 (the Directive).  The 
Directive 
provides 
that 
when 
a 
municipal 
court 
case 
is 
transferred because of a substitution of judge, the case is 
prosecuted by, and fines and forfeitures which result from the 
action stay with, the municipality in which the new judge sits. 
 Judge Sheedy contends that he issued the Directive pursuant to 
the exercise of his administrative duties and powers as stated 
in SCR 70.20 and SCR 70.19(3), and under the authority of Wis. 
                                                   No. 96-3579-OA 
 
2 
Stat. § 800.05(3)(1995-96). While we commend Judge Sheedy’s 
continuing efforts to responsibly administer his duties, we 
conclude that the Directive exceeds his statutory authority.  
Accordingly, we declare the Directive invalid. 
¶2 
The undisputed facts are as follows:  On May 3, 1996, 
Judge Sheedy issued Directive 96-14 which provides: 
 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, effective May 3, 1996, when 
a 
case 
is 
transferred 
on 
a 
substitution/disqualification, 
the 
receiving 
court 
treats the case as if it had originated there and the 
sending court has nothing more to do with it.  The 
forfeiture and court costs stay with the receiving 
court and its prosecutor prosecutes. 
¶3 
In July of 1996, West Allis commenced an action in 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court challenging this directive.  
Judge Lee Wells accepted jurisdiction of the case, but urged 
West Allis to seek relief in this court.  In February of 1997, 
we granted West Allis’ petition for leave to commence an 
original action. 
¶4 
At the threshold, Judge Sheedy contends that West 
Allis  cannot challenge the Directive.  Relying upon this 
court’s opinion in Marshfield v. Cameron, 24 Wis. 2d 56, 127 
N.W.2d 809 (1964), Judge Sheedy argues that it is the well-
established law of Wisconsin that “’[m]unicipal corporations, 
being creatures of the state, are not permitted to censor or 
supervise the activities of their creator.’”  Respondent’s brief 
at 23 (quoting Marshfield, 24 Wis. 2d at 63.  Judge Sheedy 
incorrectly applies Marshfield to this case.  While Judge Sheedy 
correctly states the general rule of state immunity, there is a 
critical exception to that rule: 
 
                                                   No. 96-3579-OA 
 
3 
A general exception to the rule of state immunity for 
agencies or arms of the state, however, is that courts 
may entertain suits to enjoin state officers and state 
agencies from acting beyond their constitutional or 
jurisdictional authority.  These suits are permitted 
because they are suits against individuals acting in 
excess of their authority. 
Kenosha v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 317, 323-24, 151 N.W.2d 36 
(1967)(citation omitted).  If Judge Sheedy acted in excess of 
his statutory authority, then his action was not an act of the 
state because the state had not granted him the authority to so 
act.  See Berlowitz v. Roach, 252 Wis. 61, 65, 30 N.W.2d 256 
(1947). 
¶5 
West Allis’ challenge falls within this exception.  
West Allis is not arguing that the statute upon which Judge 
Sheedy based the Directive is unconstitutional. Rather, West 
Allis argues that the statute does not authorize the issuance of 
the 
Directive 
and, 
therefore, 
Judge 
Sheedy 
exceeded 
his 
statutorily granted authority when he issued the Directive.  
This it may challenge. 
¶6 
Concluding that West Allis has standing to raise the 
issue, we turn our attention to whether Judge Sheedy had the 
authority to issue Directive 96-14.  More specifically, we 
consider whether, by directing that “the forfeiture and court 
costs 
stay 
with 
the 
receiving 
court 
and 
its 
prosecutor 
prosecutes,” Judge Sheedy exceeded the authority granted to him 
by the legislature and by this court. 
¶7 
The issue requires us to interpret a Supreme Court 
Rule and a statute to determine whether they confer the 
authority to issue the Directive on the Chief Judge.  Rule 
interpretation and statutory interpretation present questions of 
                                                   No. 96-3579-OA 
 
4 
law which this court reviews de novo.  Jadair Inc. v. United 
States Fire Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 2d 187, 562 N.W.2d 401, 404 
(1997).  The goal of rule interpretation, like that of statutory 
interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the enacting 
body.  
¶8 
Judge Sheedy contends that the legislature conferred 
the power to issue the Directive on the court by Wis. Stat. 
§ 800.05(3), and this court accorded the duty and the authority 
to administer the provisions of the statute to the chief judge 
in SCR 70.20 and SCR 70.19(3).  He finds further support for the 
Directive in the Municipal Judges Manual.   
¶9 
The issue is whether Judge Sheedy exceeded his 
statutory authority by issuing the Directive.   
¶10 Judge Sheedy was acting pursuant to his administrative 
powers as chief judge pursuant to SCR 70.19(3) and SCR 70.20.  
Although 
there 
are 
significant 
differences 
between 
administrative agencies and the chief judge, in this case, the 
rules governing administrative agency rulemaking are helpful.  
The general rule is that an administrative agency has only those 
powers as are expressly conferred upon it or which may be fairly 
implied from the statutes under which it operates, and as a 
consequence, it cannot promulgate any rule which is not 
expressly or impliedly authorized by the legislature.  Brown 
County, 103 Wis. 2d at 48. 
¶11 Supreme Court Rule 70.19 states that one of the chief 
judge’s duties is the establishment of “a system for the 
equitable distribution and allocation of categories of cases and 
case loads within the district, subject to the approval of the 
                                                   No. 96-3579-OA 
 
5 
supreme court.”  Supreme Court Rule 70.20 provides the chief 
judge with the authority to carry out this duty: 
 
The chief judge shall exercise within the judicial 
administrative district the full administrative power 
of the judicial branch of government subject to the 
administrative control of the supreme court.  The 
chief judge may order that his or her directives, 
policies and rules be carried out. 
SCR 70.20.  This rule gives the chief judge broad administrative 
powers.  Thus, if Wis. Stat. § 800.05(3) authorizes the 
Directive, Judge Sheedy acted within the authority granted to 
him, as chief judge, by this court. 
¶12 Wisconsin Statute § 800.05(3) authorizes the court to 
transfer a case from one municipality to another when a case is 
reassigned to a different judge.  Section § 800.05(3) provides: 
 
800.05  Substitution of municipal judge. 
 
. . .  
 
 
(3) In municipal court, upon receipt of the 
written request, the original judge shall have no 
further jurisdiction in the case except as provided in 
sub. (1) and except to determine if the request was 
made timely and in proper form.  If no determination 
is made within 7 days, the court shall refer the 
matter to the chief judge for the determination and 
reassignment of the action as necessary.  If the 
request is determined to be proper, the case shall be 
transferred as provided in s. 751.03(2).  Upon 
transfer, the municipal judge shall transmit to the 
appropriate court all the papers in the action and the 
action shall proceed as if it had been commenced in 
that court. 
Wis. Stat. § 800.05(3)(emphasis added). 
¶13 Judge Sheedy contends that Wis. Stat. § 800.05(3) 
authorizes the Directive.  Specifically, he relies on the last 
sentence in § 800.05(3).  He reasons that if the transferred 
case had been commenced in the receiving court, the case would 
                                                   No. 96-3579-OA 
 
6 
have been commenced by the municipality which serves the 
receiving 
court. 
He 
further 
explains 
that 
the 
receiving 
municipality would act through its municipal attorney, and that 
any fines or forfeitures resulting from judgment would go into 
the coffers of the receiving municipality. 
¶14 While Judge Sheedy’s interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 800.05(3) may fairly be drawn from the statute, we conclude it 
was not the legislature’s intent to so provide. 
¶15 To interpret Wis. Stat. § 800.05 in the manner in 
which Judge Sheedy suggests would be to deny municipalities 
participation in their own lawsuits - lawsuits that interpret 
and enforce their own ordinances.  Under Judge Sheedy’s 
interpretation, whenever a judge is substituted in a case, the 
municipality that commenced the action, though remaining a party 
in the action, would, in effect, be appointed an attorney - the 
prosecuting attorney of the municipality in which the substitute 
judge sits.  This would occur despite the municipality’s ability 
to choose and pay for its own attorney.  Furthermore, fines and 
forfeitures 
resulting 
from 
the 
violation 
of 
the 
party 
municipality’s ordinances would go into the coffers of the 
municipality in which the substitute judge sits - not into the 
coffers of the municipality where the violation occurred.   
¶16 In sum, the interpretation Judge Sheedy asks us to 
give to Wis. Stat. § 800.05(3) would not allow the party 
municipality to choose its own attorney for the prosecution of 
its ordinances, and if those ordinances were found to have been 
violated, would not allow the party municipality to retain the 
fines and forfeitures resulting from the violations.  This 
                                                   No. 96-3579-OA 
 
7 
cannot be the result intended by the legislature.  If the 
legislature 
had 
intended 
§ 800.05(3) 
to 
deprive 
a 
party 
municipality of its own attorney, to allow another municipality 
to prosecute an ordinance which it may or may not have an 
interest in prosecuting, and to deprive a party municipality of 
the revenues derived from ordinance violations occurring in the 
municipality, it would have clearly stated such an intent.  It 
did not.  These are not insignificant effects.  Therefore, we 
conclude that § 800.05(3) does not authorize the Directive.
1  
Accordingly, we declare that the Directive was issued without 
authority. 
 
By the Court.—Rights declared. 
 
 
 
                     
1 Because Wis. Stat. § 800.05(3) does not authorize the 
Directive, it is of no consequence that the Municipal Judges 
Manual suggests the procedures required by the Directive.