Case Title: State v. Steven R. Fortin

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-112-05

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 112 September Term 2005 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN R. FORTIN, Defendant-Respondent. Argued September 26, 2006 Decided March 28, 2007 On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division, Middlesex County. Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Bruce J. Kaplan, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney). Michael A. Priarone, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Priarone and Cathy L. Waldor, Designated Counsel, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. In the retrial of defendant Steven Fortin for the capital murder of Melissa Padilla, the State intends to prove defendant s guilt by showing that he committed the crime in such a distinctive way that it may be said to bear his signature. The State seeks to introduce as other crimes evidence pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b) defendant s sexual assault of Maine State Trooper Vicki Gardner, whom he vaginally and anally penetrated, strangled, and bit on both the left breast and chin. The State argues that the peculiar bite marks to the left breast and chin found on Padilla s battered body, combined with injuries inflicted from anal penetration and manual strangulation, were akin to a signature that identified defendant as Padilla s killer. The State submits that jurors, relying on their common experience and general knowledge, need no expert testimony to conclude that the trademark bite injuries in both the Gardner and Padilla cases had a singular author -- defendant. To bolster that conclusion, the State offers the results of a computer search of the FBI s Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (ViCAP), a national database of reported violent crimes that yielded three crimes with strikingly similar features -- the Gardner and Padilla sexual assaults, and a sexual crime committed in Washington State. In ruling on pretrial motions, the motion judge he ld that determining whether the Gardner and Padilla sexual assaults are signature crimes is beyond the general experience and knowledge of an ordinary juror and therefore requires expert testimony to explain those features that uniquely tie the two crimes together. The judge determined that the State could present the expert testimony of a medical examiner and forensic odontologist to establish the uniqueness of the bite marks suffered by both victims, provided those experts produce a reliable database to support their opinions. With regard to the attack on Trooper Gardner, the motion judge limited the State to the signature-crime evidence -- the bite marks -- finding that other details of the assault would be irrelevant and unnecessarily inflammatory. Last, the judge concluded that because law enforcement authorities inserted the details of the Maine crime into the ViCAP database solely for the purpose of making an inexorable link between the Gardner and Padilla crimes, the ViCAP search results would not be admissible. The motion judge did allow the use of the ViCAP database, absent the Maine crime, as a means for supporting or attacking the reliability of the expert testimony. We granted the State s motion for leave to appeal and now affirm the motion judge s ruling with the following modifications. The State must be permitted to present the bite-mark evidence in context and therefore material details of the Gardner sexual assault cannot be censored. Testimony describing that assault, however, is subject to specific jury instructions explaining the limited use of other crimes evidence under N.J.R.E. 404(b). Finally, because the State s experts have not relied on the ViCAP database to form their opinions, the ViCAP database should not be admissible to bolster those opinions. [N.J.R.E. 404(b).] Other-crime evidence may not be admitted for the purpose of showing a defendant s propensity or predisposition to commit criminal acts; such evidence may only be offered to prove a material issue in dispute. Ibid. Consistent with N.J.R.E. 404(b), other-crime evidence may be presented to establish the identity of Padilla s killer. The State is permitted to prove that the crimes were committed in so distinctive and unusual a manner that they may be said to be the handiwork of the same person. See Fortin I, supra, 162 N.J. at 532 (citing State v. Reldan, 185 N.J. Super. 494, 502 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 91 N.J. 543 (1982)). The State maintains that because the sexual assaults were carried out in so nearly identical a method, leaving almost identical injuries on the victims, the two crimes bear defendant s unique signature. See ibid. (quoting Reldan, supra, 185 N.J. Super. at 502). The State argues that whoever authored the brutal assault on Trooper Gardner must therefore be the perpetrator of the Padilla murder. Courts have admitted signature-crime evidence to prove identity when the bizarre quality of the crime was self-evident. See, e.g., State v. Porambo, 226 N.J. Super. 416, 421-23 (App. Div. 1988) (noting that defendant gained entry wearing beard and mustache disguise, posing as firefighter in one assault and police officer in other); State v. Sempsey, 141 N.J. Super. 317, 323-24 (App. Div. 1976) (explaining that assailant taped victims eyes, wore headgear, was unable to obtain erection, smelled of grease, and on leaving, instructed victims to count or he would shoot), certif. denied, 74 N.J. 272 (1977); see also State v. Roscoe, 700 P.2d 1312, 1317-18 (Ariz. 1984) (finding unique modus operandi in following circumstances: unclothed bodies found in remote areas, shoes placed side by side, blouses torn open in front, victims gagged by socks, hands tied behind back with articles of clothing, and indications of vaginal and oral sex), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094, 105 S. Ct. 2169, 85 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1985). Conversely, when it is not obvious that the characteristics of a crime are unique, a court will not admit the other-crime evidence. See, e.g., Reldan, supra, 185 N.J. Super. at 503 (commenting that use of force to victims throat, standing alone, is not distinctly indicative of one person s handiwork); Martin v. State, 722 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. App. 1986) (explaining that grabbing victims from behind and attempting to remove their clothes is not signature-crime evidence). In this case, the question is whether jurors using their common experience and general knowledge, without the assistance of expert testimony, can determine if the crimes committed against Gardner and Padilla are so distinctive that they bear defendant s unmistakable signature. Stated differently, without specialized knowledge or training, how would jurors know whether bite marks to the chin and breast of a female sexual assault victim are unremarkable or highly unusual? The motion judge held that an ordinary juror would not be able to decipher the significance of specific injuries inflicted on Gardner and Padilla. In reaching that conclusion, she noted that Agent Safarik testified that the ability to analyze the uniqueness of violent and bizarre crimes is often beyond the capacity of an ordinary street detective. The judge allowed that with the expert testimony of Dr. Levine, an odontologist, and Dr. Natarajan, a medical examiner, a jury could find that the chin and breast bite marks on the two victims to be so similar and unique that they may be said to be the equivalent of a signature. Although jurors may draw rational inferences from the evidence, they are not permitted to speculate or connect the dots on mere surmise. The average juror cannot be expected to have the knowledge or experience to discern whether bite marks are a common or highly distinctive feature of violent sexual assaults. The primary justification for permitting expert testimony is that the average juror is relatively helpless in dealing with a subject that is not a matter of common knowledge. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 209 (1984); see N.J.R.E. 702 (permitting expert testimony when scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist jury in understanding evidence or making factual determination). New Jersey courts have required expert testimony to explain complex matters that would fall beyond the ken of the ordinary juror. See Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 526-27 (1981) (requiring in medical malpractice case expert testimony to explain that injury to plaintiff s bladder during medical procedure raised inference of physician negligence); Mullarney v. Bd. of Review, 343 N.J. Super. 401, 408 (App. Div. 2001) (requiring expert testimony to explain effect of mental illness on behavior and judgment); State v. Jones, 308 N.J. Super 174, 184-85 (App. Div.) (holding that in murder case in which victim s hyoid bone was not fractured in assault, expert testimony necessary to support inference that defendant applied minimal pressure to victim s neck), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 380 (1998). Thus, when the signature-like aspect of a crime would not be apparent to the trier of fact, expert testimony may be necessary to explain the significance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Crowder, 87 F.3d 1405, 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting defendants method of packaging drugs as signature crime and stating that the Government presented no evidence, expert or otherwise, that the mode of packaging was distinctive to [defendant] or even unusual in the drug trade ), vacated o.b. on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1087, 117 S. Ct. 760, 136 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1997). Similarly, when confronting signature-crime evidence, prosecutors or defendants may offer expert testimony in recognition that jurors are likely unfamiliar with arcane features of the crime. See, e.g., United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 1995) (describing expert testimony offered by State and defendant on similarities and dissimilarities between bombs allegedly made by defendant); State v. Russell, 882 P.2d 747, 776 (Wash. 1994) (affirming trial court s decision to permit expert testimony on rarity of killer posing dead bodies in seemingly distinctive ways due to jury s lack of specialized knowledge ), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1129, 115 S. Ct. 2004, 131 L. Ed. 2d 1005 (1995). We do not presume that the ordinary juror would have knowledge of the typical injuries inflicted during a violent sexual assault. Here, we do not have injuries that are so clearly distinctive or unusual that the signature-quality of the crimes would be self-evident to the untrained eye of the average juror. See, e.g., Porambo, supra, 226 N.J. Super. at 421-23; Sempsey, supra, 141 N.J. Super. at 323-24. For that reason , the State is required to provide expert testimony, such as the testimony offered by Dr. Levine and Dr. Natarajan, to explain the unique aspects of the Gardner and Padilla sexual assaults that would permit a jury to conclude that both crimes are the handiwork of the same person. A trial court s determination on the admissibility of evidence in general and other-crime evidence in particular is entitled to great deference and ordinarily should not be disturbed unless it is wide of the mark. See State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). We cannot find that the motion judge abused her discretion by conditioning the signature-crime evidence on the presentation of expert testimony. [Fortin, supra, 318 N.J. Super. at 608-09.] Ultimately, it is better that the jury know not only the similarities, but also the differences between the Gardner and Padilla crimes. Moreover, to limit the entirety of the sexual assault on Trooper Gardner to the bite marks will likely lead the jury to speculate, perhaps to defendant s detriment, about the true nature of the crime. We thus conclude that screening from the jury material details of the Gardner assault that will make sense of the relevant signature-crime evidence will disserve the interests of a fair trial. If any law enforcement agency would have been expected to fill out the ViCAP form on the Gardner assault, it would have been the Maine State Police at or about the time of the crime. Here, Agent Safarik completed the form at the request of the Middlesex County Prosecutor s Office with defendant s trial in mind. See State v. Garthe, 145 N.J. 1, 9 (1996) (noting the official or business records exception is founded upon the theory that records which are properly shown to have been kept as required normally possess a circumstantial probability of trustworthiness, and therefore ought to be received in evidence (quoting Mahoney v. Minsky, 39 N.J. 208, 218 (1963)). Finally, Dr. Levine and Dr. Natarajan did not rely on the ViCAP database to either form or support their opinions, and therefore the database (whether hearsay or not) cannot be used to bolster these opinions. See N.J.R.E. 703. Agent Safarik testified that the ViCAP database is not available to defense counsel and is exempted from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. In Fortin I and Fortin II, we required the production of the underlying data supporting the opinion testimony of the State s expert investigative profiler. The purpose was to give defense counsel a fair opportunity to test [the expert s] methods and credibility in the crucible of cross-examination. Fortin II, supra, 178 N.J. at 584. In this case, none of the State s experts relied on ViCAP to support his or her opinion on the uniqueness of the bite marks. Both Dr. Levine and Dr. Natarajan relied on their own professional experiences as an odontologist and medical examiner, respectively, when referring to the extraordinarily unusual nature of the bite-mark evidence. Unlike the motion judge, we do not know how the State could test the opinions of their experts against the ViCAP database. That database has not been reviewed by the State s experts and, apparently, is unavailable to them. Furthermore, the State could not use ViCAP as a reliable database to support its experts without making that database equally available to the defense. Last, we acknowledge ViCAP s usefulness as an investigatory tool. See footnote 14 The New Jersey Legislature has recognized that ViCAP has an important role to play in assisting law enforcement agencies in identifying and apprehending dangerous criminals. N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.10. Nonetheless, law enforcement authorities frequently rely on investigative techniques and devices (e.g., polygraph examinations) and information obtained during investigations (e.g., anonymous tips) that are not admissible at trial. See State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 310-314 (2006) (affirming that polygraph evidence is inadmissible absent stipulation); State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 268, 271 (1973) (holding that hearsay tip explaining police officer s action not admissible unless declarant testifies). See generally Trenkler, supra, 61 F.3d at 57-59 (prohibiting introduction of database comprised of reports of bombings and arsons as hearsay even though relied on by law enforcement agencies). Ultimately, in conducting a fair trial, courts must ensure that only reliable evidence is submitted to our juries consistent with our evidentiary rules. As presented, ViCAP does not meet the standards for admissibility of evidence. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN R. FORTIN, Defendant-Respondent. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, concurring in part and dissenting in part. In large measure, I concur with the majority in this case, most notably in respect of the result reached. There are, however, differences in both analysis and scope that prevent me from fully joining the majority. I address our points of similarity and divergence separately. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-112 SEPTEMBER TERM 2005 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN R. FORTIN, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED March 28, 2007 Justice Long PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto DISSENTING OPINION BY