Case Title: Holaday v. Fraker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95-90-9

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Terry HOLADAY and Sandra HOLADAY v. Roberta
FRAKER, et al.

95-909                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 19, 1996
          Substituted opinion delivered March 18, 1996


[NOTE TO PRINTER: THIS OPINION REPLACES THE OPINION DELIVERED ON
FEBRUARY 19, 1996; PLEASE INSERT IT AT 323 ARK. 522; THE SAME
HEADNOTES SHOULD BE PLACED ABOVE THE SUBSTITUTED OPINION; DO NOT
PRINT THIS NOTE.]MARCH 18, 1996.  ADD TO ADV. REP. AFTER PCs * #2
SUBSTITUTRED OPINION * SAME PAGINATION AS ORIGINAL 
REPLACES 323 ARK. 522 (FEB. 19, '96)









TERRY HOLADAY AND SANDRA
HOLADAY,
                    APPELLANTS,

V.

ROBERTA FRAKER, ET AL.,
                    APPELLEES,







95-909



APPEAL FROM THE BENTON COUNTY
CHANCERY COURT,
NO. E-94-1600-2,
HON. DONALD R. HUFFMAN, JUDGE,
SUBSTITUTED OPINION.



AFFIRMED.


                   JUSTICE ANDREE LAYTON ROAF

     This appeal arises from a chancellor's order finding that
appellants had violated a restrictive covenant which prohibited use
of their property for other than residential purposes, and
requiring that appellants remove a shop building they constructed
on the property.  Appellants assert the chancellor erred in 1)
interpreting the restrictive covenant to apply to the building
erected by appellants and; 2) granting injunctive relief which
required that appellants remove the building.  We find no error and
affirm.
     Appellants Terry and Sandra Holaday purchased a lot with a
house and two car garage in the Willow Oak Place subdivision in
Rogers, Arkansas.  A protective covenant and a bill of assurances
encumbered the lot, and provided that "all lots in Willow Oak Place
subdivision shall be used exclusively for residential purposes." 
The bill of assurances, which was adopted by all homeowners in the
subdivision in 1988, also stated that "no structure of a temporary
character, trailer, basement, tent shack, barn, or other
outbuilding shall be used on any lot at any time as a residence
either temporarily or permanently. "  The warranty deed to the
property in question also contained the requirement that "all lots
in FRAKER SUB-DIVISION #1 shall be used exclusively for residential
purposes."  The warranty deed further provided that "no dwelling
shall be erected . . . in said subdivision other than a detached,
single family dwelling, not to exceed two and one-half stories in
height and a one, two or three car garage."  This subdivision was
initially created by appellee Roberta Fraker.  Appellants purchased
the lot in question by warranty in 1989, and were fully aware of
the protective covenant and bill of assurances.
     In April, 1993, appellants constructed a blue metal shop
building approximately thirty (30) feet by fifty (50) feet with
fourteen (14) foot high walls on the property.  Appellants claim to
have gotten permission from appellee Fraker before building the
shop.  On September 19, 1994, appellee Fraker filed a complaint in
chancery court alleging that appellants had violated the bill of
assurances and protective covenants of the subdivision.  Fraker
subsequently filed an amended complaint adding other appellees, who
also are residents of the Willow Oak Subdivision, further alleging
that appellants undertook to perform commercial automobile repairs
in the outbuilding and also boat repairs, both for compensation.
     Appellants filed a counterclaim against appellee Fraker
alleging appellants had contacted Fraker to seek assurances that
the proposed outbuilding would not violate the bill of assurances
and protective covenants.  Appellants alleged that during their
conversation with Fraker the appellants disclosed to Fraker the
type, size and location of the shop building, and that appellee
Fraker represented to appellants that this type of building would
not be in violation of the restrictive covenants.  Appellants
further made estoppel, false representation, and negligence
arguments for recovery against Fraker.  The lower court dismissed
appellants' action against Fraker pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.
     The appellees' cause of action was tried on May 3, 1995.  The
Chancellor found that appellants had violated the restrictive
covenant by erecting a building of the size suitable for commercial
purposes.  The court further ordered appellants to remove the
building from their property within six months.  An order for stay
of judgment was granted to allow appellants to appeal the lower
court's decision.        
     Appellants first argue that they have not violated any of the
restrictions contained in the covenant, bill of assurances, or
warranty deed.  Although we try chancery cases de novo on the
record, we do not reverse a finding of fact by the chancellor
unless it is clearly erroneous. Welchman v. Norman, 311 Ark. 52,