Case Title: Doe v. Hewson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2022 ME 60

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2022 ME 60 
Docket: 
Oxf-22-35 
 
Submitted 
On Briefs:  September 21, 2022 
Decided: 
 December 13, 2022 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ. 
 
 
PAT DOE 
 
v. 
 
THOMAS HEWSON 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  Pat Doe1 appeals the dismissal with prejudice of her protection from 
abuse (PFA) case by the District Court (South Paris, Ham-Thompson, J.).  Doe 
asserts that the trial court erred in determining that she had agreed to a 
dismissal with prejudice if Thomas Hewson did not violate the temporary PFA 
order for two years and in finding that Hewson had not violated the temporary 
PFA order.2  We affirm the judgment. 
 
1  Pursuant to federal law, we do not identify the plaintiff because of a protection from abuse order 
between the parties, and we limit our description of events and locations to avoid revealing “the 
identity or location of the party protected under [a protection] order” as required by 18 U.S.C.S. 
§ 2265(d)(3) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-214).  See Doe v. Tierney, 2018 ME 101, n.1, 
189 A.3d 756. 
 
2  Doe also alleges that the trial court erred in allowing extensions of the PFA order rather than 
holding a final evidentiary hearing, contending that such a hearing is required by statute and is not 
within the court’s discretion.  We disagree.  The record supports the court’s finding that Doe 
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  On October 22, 2018, Doe filed a complaint for protection from 
abuse on behalf of herself and her two minor children against Thomas Hewson.  
The court (Oram, J.) issued a temporary order that same day.  At the time, the 
parties were in the midst of a divorce proceeding and the two cases were 
eventually consolidated.  The temporary PFA order was extended and modified 
several times with the consent of both parties.  As the final hearing for the 
divorce approached, the PFA case was included in the divorce settlement 
negotiations. 
[¶3]  As of December 10, 2019, the parties had negotiated a future 
dismissal with prejudice of the PFA case, as part of their full and final settlement 
of all pending matters, the terms of which were accepted and adopted by the 
court on December 12, 2019.  The negotiated language reads: 
The Amended Temporary Order dated 11/8/18 shall remain 
in full force and effect for a period of two years from 
[December 12, 2019].  All provisions related to parental rights and 
responsibilities, including parent-child contact and contact 
between the parties concerning the minor children shall be 
governed by and amended by the presiding Judge in the parties’ 
Family Matter.  Pending the hearing, the temporary order will 
remain in full force and effect.  Unless there have been incidents that 
violate this Order, this case shall be dismissed with prejudice at the 
end [of] the two-year period. 
 
consented to the numerous extensions of the order and explicitly agreed that the case would be 
dismissed with prejudice if Hewson did not violate the temporary order for two years. 
 
 
3 
(Emphasis added.) 
[¶4]  On November 19, 2021, on the eve of the expiration of the 
agreed-upon, self-terminating Order, Doe filed a motion for a hearing in which 
she requested a final evidentiary hearing in the PFA case, asserting that she did 
not agree with the negotiated language.3  Doe alleged that Thomas “continued 
to exhibit a pattern of behavior which could be characterized as abuse within 
the meaning of 19-A M.R.S. § 4002(3-B).”4  Thomas objected, arguing the 
language regarding the dismissal of the PFA case was part of a settlement 
agreement to which Doe had agreed and that the PFA case should be dismissed 
with prejudice because he had not violated the order in the preceding two 
years.  On December 17, 2021, the court held an evidentiary hearing on Doe’s 
motion for a hearing. 
[¶5]  After considering the evidence presented at the hearing, the court 
entered a judgment dismissing the PFA order with prejudice.  The court found 
that Doe was heavily involved in negotiating the PFA language that was 
accepted by the court.  The court rejected Doe’s assertion that she did not 
 
3  The final divorce judgment was issued on January 21, 2020.  No further activity had occurred in 
the PFA case between the entry of the order and Doe’s motion on November 19, 2021. 
 
4  19-A M.R.S. § 4002(3-B) (2022) was not effective until September 2019, almost a year after the 
PFA was entered.  The PFA was not amended to include protection from economic abuse, which was 
the subject of section 4002(3-B). 
 
 
4 
understand what “dismissed with prejudice” meant, finding that Doe’s claim 
was “lacking in veracity” and that Doe had “proven herself to be an active, 
engaged litigant with more than a cursory understanding of the legal process.”  
The court concluded that “[Doe] understood and agreed with the language of 
the extended temporary order, including the provision that the PFA complaint 
would be dismissed with prejudice following two years without violation.” 
[¶6]  The court also found there had been no violations of the PFA order.  
Doe had alleged four instances of abuse: one in which Thomas mailed Doe, via 
U.S. Mail, documents in violation of the order prohibiting Thomas from having 
any contact with Doe; and three in which she claimed that Thomas committed 
economic abuse as defined in 19-A M.R.S. § 4002(3-B).  The allegations of 
economic abuse included Thomas’s failure to contribute to the children’s 
extracurricular activities,5 his failure to pay for the children’s dinner at a local 
restaurant, and his failure to give Doe her portion of an IRS refund check 
resulting from their 2018 taxes.6  The court did not find any of Doe’s assertions 
 
5  The divorce judgment required both parents to contribute to the children’s extracurricular 
activities. 
 
6  For the first time on appeal, Doe argues that Thomas’s retention of the 2018 IRS refund check is 
a conversion of her property “in violation of the order prohibiting Thomas from taking, converting, 
or damaging property in which [Doe] may have a legal interest.”  This assertion was not preserved 
for appeal and is not addressed further.  See Warren Const. Gr. v. Reis, 2016 ME 11, ¶ 9, 130 A.3d 969. 
 
 
5 
of wrongdoing credible but did find credible Thomas’s explanation of those 
incidents. 
[¶7]  In sum, the court found the negotiated agreement to dismiss the PFA 
case that was accepted and adopted by the court in its Order was fully 
enforceable as written and that no violation of the Order had occurred; 
consequently, it dismissed the PFA case with prejudice.  Doe timely appealed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶8]  Doe argues that the trial court erred in finding she had accepted and 
understood the negotiated terms of the settlement of the PFA case.  She asserts 
that she was not aware that “dismissed with prejudice” meant the court would 
dismiss the PFA case without a finding of abuse if there were no further 
violations of the PFA order within two years, and that such language is 
ambiguous and should be construed in her favor.  Doe also argues that the trial 
court committed clear error in finding Thomas had not violated the PFA order. 
A. 
Language Requiring Dismissal of the PFA Case 
[¶9]  “A settlement agreement is analyzed as a contract and the existence 
of a binding settlement agreement is a question of fact reviewed for clear error.”  
Doe v. Lozano, 2022 ME 33, ¶ 13, 276 A.3d 44.  “A court’s finding is clearly 
erroneous when there is no competent evidence in the record to support it.”  
 
 
6 
In re Children of Danielle H., 2019 ME 134, ¶ 8, 215 A.3d 217.  When parties 
dispute whether an enforceable settlement was reached, “findings of fact 
regarding the terms of the agreement and the parties’ intent may be required.”  
Muther v. Broad Cove Shore Ass’n, 2009 ME 37, ¶ 6, 968 A.2d 539. 
[¶10]  The evidentiary record provides more than ample competent 
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the parties knowingly 
negotiated a final dismissal with prejudice of Doe’s PFA complaint conditioned 
upon no violations of the order having occurred during the two year period 
following the issuance of the order.  The record supports the trial court’s 
express findings that Doe understood the terms of the settlement language and, 
indeed, that the language was a negotiation point in her divorce settlement.  
The court did not commit clear error in determining there was no ambiguity in 
the settlement language, and that Doe intended to enter into a binding 
settlement agreement that would be incorporated in the court’s order. 
B. 
Alleged PFA Order Violations 
[¶11]  Doe asserts that the trial court clearly erred in finding that Thomas 
did not violate the terms of the PFA Order.  “We review a trial court’s finding of 
abuse for clear error and will affirm a trial court’s findings if they are supported 
by competent evidence in the record.”  Boulette v. Boulette, 2016 ME 177, ¶ 10, 
 
 
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152 A.3d 156.  “The deferential standard of clear error is particularly 
appropriate in actions for protection from abuse where the trial court’s ability 
to observe the witnesses invariably plays a part in its assessments of the impact 
a particular person’s words and actions had upon another person.”  Smith v. 
Hawthorne, 2002 ME 149, ¶ 16, 804 A.2d 1133. 
[¶12]  Doe asserts that three of the four alleged violations of the PFA 
order are based upon acts of economic abuse within the meaning of 19-A M.R.S. 
§4002(3-A).  However, protection from economic abuse was not a condition of 
this PFA order.  The trial court rejected Doe’s assertion that Thomas violated 
the PFA order by sending her a piece of mail.  On this record, the court’s finding 
that “[Thomas] has not violated the terms of the extended temporary order” 
was well supported and did not constitute clear error.  See Violette v. Violette, 
2015 ME 97, ¶ 15-16, 120 A.3d 667. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pat Doe, appellant pro se 
Elliott L. Epstein, Esq., Andrucki & King, Lewiston, for appellee Thomas Hewson 
 
 
South Paris District Court docket number PA-2021-37 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY