Case Title: State v. Satter

Citation: 

Docket Number: S069880

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2024-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 14	
May 9, 2024	
273
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE  
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
GENE RAYMOND SATTER,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 09P50867; 20CR42984; 20CR45176)
(CA A175001 (Control); A175002; A175003) (SC S069880)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*	
Argued and submitted May 16, 2023.
Nora E. Coon, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public 
Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the 
briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs was Ernest 
G. Lannet, Chief Deputy Defender.
Joanna L. Jenkins, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 
Also on the brief were Ellen Rosenblum, Attorney General, 
and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett, 
DeHoog, James, and Masih, Justices, and Nakamoto, Senior 
Judge, Justice pro tempore.**
FLYNN, C.J.
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case 
is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
______________
	
*  On review of Court of Appeals Order Denying Reconsideration, Erin C. 
Lagesen, Chief Judge (Sept 7, 2022), of Order of Dismissal, Theresa M. Kidd, 
Appellate Commissioner (July 8, 2022). Appeal from Polk County Circuit Court, 
Diane M. Morse, Judge.
	
**  Bushong, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this 
case. Baldwin, Senior Judge, Justice pro tempore, participated in oral argument 
but did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
274	
State v. Satter
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)	
275
	
FLYNN, C.J.
	
After a jury found defendant guilty of driving under 
the influence of intoxicants, he fled the state. His flight 
delayed by more than ten years the trial court’s ability to 
impose a sentence and enter a judgment of conviction, which 
defendant then asked the Court of Appeals to reverse. The 
case comes to us because the Court of Appeals dismissed 
defendant’s appeal based on concerns that the state would 
suffer delay-based prejudice in any retrial. The court relied 
on its “former fugitive doctrine,” which presumes that an 
appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss a criminal 
defendant’s direct appeal if the defendant formerly was a 
fugitive from justice and the flight “significantly interfered 
with the appellate process.” See Sills v. State of Oregon, 370 
Or 240, 244, 518 P3d 582 (2022) (explaining but not adopting 
doctrine). Although this court has long held that appellate 
courts possess the inherent authority to dismiss an appeal 
when the criminal defendant is a current fugitive, we have 
not endorsed the “former fugitive doctrine,” and we decline 
the state’s request to do so in this context.
	
We share the Court of Appeals’ concerns about the 
consequences of a defendant’s flight from justice in the event 
of a retrial and the disregard that the flight shows for the 
authority of Oregon courts. But because defendant’s flight 
ended before his case moved to an appellate court, and the 
delay has not interfered with the appellate court’s ability 
to address the merits of the appeal, we conclude that defen-
dant’s former fugitive status lacks the kind of connection to 
the appellate process that justifies an appellate court dis-
missing his direct appeal. Instead, concerns about potential 
prejudice that would arise in the trial court in relation to 
a retrial are most appropriately left for the trial court to 
address on any remand, should the Court of Appeals deter-
mine that a reversible error had occurred.
I.  BACKGROUND
	
The facts relevant to our review are undisputed. A 
jury found defendant guilty of driving under the influence 
of intoxicants in 2009, and he failed to appear for his sen-
tencing. He later sent a letter to the trial court announcing 
276	
State v. Satter
that he had left Oregon and did not intend to return unless 
the court dismissed his conviction. However, defendant was 
eventually arrested in Oregon in 2020, permitting the court 
finally to impose sentence and enter the judgment for defen-
dant’s 2009 conviction.
	
Defendant appealed from that judgment, assign-
ing error to the trial court’s failure to caution the jury that 
a defendant’s decision not to testify cannot be considered 
evidence of guilt. In response, the state asked the Court of 
Appeals to dismiss defendant’s appeal under the former fugi-
tive doctrine. Emphasizing that defendant had demanded a 
new trial more than a decade after his conviction, the state 
argued that the “passage of time has undoubtedly preju-
diced the state by making it difficult if not impossible to 
locate witnesses and present evidence” and that “[d]efendant 
should not be allowed to benefit from his choice to flout the 
authority of the court by absconding and absenting himself 
from the jurisdiction for over ten-and-a-half years.”
	
The Appellate Commissioner agreed and dismissed 
defendant’s appeal. Relying on Court of Appeals’ precedent, 
the Commissioner reasoned that the court has “inherent 
judicial authority” to dismiss a former fugitive’s appeal 
when “the defendant’s former fugitive status significantly 
interfered with the appellate process.” The Commissioner 
concluded that dismissal of defendant’s appeal was war-
ranted because “(1) there ha[d] been a significant passage 
of time, caused by defendant, since the incident producing 
the challenged judgment of conviction; (2) that passage of 
time makes it difficult for the state to locate key witnesses; 
and (3) even assuming that those witnesses could be located, 
their memories of the events surrounding the crime at issue 
would have likely diminished.” Defendant unsuccessfully 
sought reconsideration and then petitioned for review in 
this court, which we allowed.
II.  DISCUSSION
	
The Court of Appeals has adopted two related doc-
trines under which it will dismiss a direct appeal to address 
a criminal defendant’s flight from justice. The first is the 
“fugitive dismissal doctrine,” which this court embraced 
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)	
277
nearly a century ago, announcing that “it was ‘unqualifiedly 
committed’ to the rule that, when ‘a convicted criminal has 
fled from the jurisdiction of the court, it is within the power 
of that court to refuse to hear his appeal.’ 
” Sills, 370 Or at 
247 (quoting State v. Broom, 121 Or 202, 210, 253 P 1044 
(1927)); see also State v. Moss, 352 Or 46, 50-54, 279 P3d 
200 (2012) (describing history of the fugitive dismissal doc-
trine). The second is the “former fugitive doctrine,” on which 
the Court of Appeals relied to justify dismissing defendant’s 
appeal. We have described that doctrine as a common-law 
principle “under which an appellate court will dismiss the 
direct appeal of a defendant who is no longer a fugitive if 
the former fugitive status significantly interfered with the 
appellate process.” Sills, 370 Or at 244 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
	
This court has yet to decide whether to embrace that 
common-law doctrine for Oregon appellate courts. See id. at 
245-46 (declining to address “[w]hether to adopt the former 
fugitive doctrine”). But we limited the possible applications 
of the doctrine in Sills. That case involved a statutory claim 
for post-conviction relief filed by a petitioner who had been 
a fugitive from justice during the underlying criminal trial, 
resulting in delay that, the state contended, would prejudice 
it in any retrial. In that context, we held that the state’s 
concerns about delay-based prejudice on retrial did not jus-
tify dismissing the petitioner’s claim for relief, because the 
identified prejudice lacked “the kind of connection to the 
proceedings that would justify the reviewing court refusing 
to carry out a process to which the former fugitive is statuto-
rily entitled.” Id. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted).
	
In reaching that conclusion, however, we noted dif-
ferences between a claim for post-conviction relief and a 
direct appeal, including that the post-conviction relief stat-
utory process contemplates delay. Id. at 252-53; see also id. 
at 254 (emphasizing that the post-conviction court could 
order a retrial only if the petitioner established “such a sub-
stantial denial of constitutional rights that his conviction 
is rendered void” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And 
we expressly did not consider whether a defendant’s former 
fugitive status could ever justify dismissing a direct appeal 
278	
State v. Satter
in order to prevent prejudice in any retrial. Id. at 245-46. 
That question is now squarely presented by the parties’ 
arguments in this case.
	
According to the state, appellate courts have inher-
ent authority to dismiss an appeal under the former fugitive 
doctrine to ensure “the dignity, integrity, and efficient func-
tioning of the appellate process,” a proposition for which it 
relies on the United States Supreme Court’s decision Ortega-
Rodriguez v. U.S., 507 US 234, 113 S Ct 1199, 122 L Ed 2d 
581 (1993), and its progeny. In particular, the state cites cases 
from other jurisdictions that have “relied on the former fugi-
tive doctrine to dismiss appeals where a lengthy flight has 
so delayed the appeal that the state would be prejudiced in 
the event [of] a retrial.” See, e.g., U.S. v. Sudthisa-Ard, 17 F3d 
1205, 1206 (9th Cir 1994). And the state asserts that dis-
missal of defendant’s appeal was similarly justified based on 
“general delay-based prejudice”—that the “passage of time 
has undoubtedly prejudiced the state by making it difficult 
if not impossible to locate witnesses and present evidence.”
	
The state in this court also raises new and more 
specific reasons that, it argues, would cause prejudice in the 
event of a retrial. According to the state, one of the officers 
who testified in the original trial died in 2012, the other 
officer no longer works in law enforcement, and the state 
has been unable to locate the video from the traffic stop 
or the police reports associated with defendant’s case. The 
state also now argues that it is unlikely “that defendant will 
appear for retrial,” which the state contends raises concerns 
that the trial court would be unable to enter an enforceable 
judgment if defendant’s case were sent back for a new trial.
	
Defendant contends that the Court of Appeals erred 
in dismissing his appeal. According to defendant, although 
an appellate court may have inherent authority to take cer-
tain actions necessary to perform its judicial function, that 
authority does not extend to dismissing a direct appeal in 
order to address the appellant’s flight from the jurisdiction 
of the trial court. Alternatively, defendant argues, even if 
this court agrees that appellate courts have some authority 
to dismiss an appeal because of an appellant’s former fugi-
tive status, we should conclude that the Court of Appeals did 
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)	
279
not properly exercise that authority when it dismissed defen-
dant’s appeal to address prejudice that the state claimed 
would arise on remand. According to defendant, if former 
fugitive status is ever a basis to deny a new trial to a defen-
dant whose original trial included reversible error, then that 
decision should be made by the trial court on remand, follow-
ing a hearing at which the state would be required to prove 
that the defendant’s former fugitive status will cause actual 
prejudice to a retrial. See, e.g., State v. Baughman, 361 Or 
386, 410-11, 393 P3d 1132 (2017), abrogated in part on other 
grounds by State v. Jackson, 368 Or 705, 498 P3d 788 (2021) 
(describing a similar process of reversal and remand for a 
post-remand hearing at which the trial court would deter-
mine whether a new trial was “necessary or appropriate”).
	
Given the parties’ framing of the dispute, we 
assume without deciding that the Court of Appeals has 
inherent authority to dismiss a defendant’s appeal when 
the defendant’s former fugitive status “significantly inter-
fered with the appellate process.”1 Sills, 370 Or at 244; see 
also id. at 245-46 (declining to decide whether to adopt that 
formulation of the former fugitive doctrine). And we accept 
the state’s premise that prejudice resulting from a criminal 
defendant’s former flight from justice sometimes will jus-
tify denying the defendant a new trial. As we will explain, 
however, when the fugitive status is confined to the trial 
court and the identified prejudice will arise only on remand, 
the defendant’s flight lacks “ 
‘the kind of connection’ 
” to 
the appellate process that would justify an appellate court 
“refusing to carry out a process to which the former fugitive 
is statutorily entitled.” Id. at 250 (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez, 
507 US at 251).
	
We are persuaded that defendant’s alternative argu-
ment describes the proper exercise of an appellate court’s 
authority in such cases: When confronted with concerns that 
	
1  In defendant’s briefing to this court, he also argued that any inherent 
authority that an appellate court possesses to dismiss a defendant’s appeal 
under the former fugitive doctrine has been constrained by the Oregon Rules of 
Appellate Procedure (ORAPs) and by the defendant’s statutory right to an appeal 
in the Court of Appeals. We understand defendant to have abandoned those argu-
ments at oral argument. And our determination that the Court of Appeals did 
not properly exercise its inherent authority in this case makes it unnecessary to 
determine whether that authority is further limited by rule or statute. 
280	
State v. Satter
a defendant’s former flight from the jurisdiction of the trial 
court would cause actual prejudice in any retrial, or that 
the defendant might again fail to appear for any retrial, the 
Court of Appeals should nevertheless proceed to the merits 
of the appeal, leaving those concerns to be addressed by the 
trial court on any remand, as the trial court will be in a 
superior position to resolve factual disputes and tailor an 
appropriate remedy—including by determining that actual 
prejudice to the state justifies denying the defendant a new 
trial and reinstating the original judgment. Accordingly, we 
reverse the order of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
consideration of the merits of defendant’s appeal.
	
This court recently discussed the origins and justi-
fications of the former fugitive doctrine in Sills. We observed 
that the former fugitive doctrine is sometimes described as 
a “corollary” to the fugitive dismissal doctrine, which to reit-
erate, allows appellate courts to refuse to hear the appeal of 
a defendant who is currently a fugitive from justice. 370 Or 
at 244-45. We also explained that, in extending the fugitive 
dismissal doctrine to defendants whose flight and recapture 
both occurred before they initiated their appeal, the Court of 
Appeals had relied on dicta in the Supreme Court’s Ortega-
Rodriguez decision. Id. at 248. This court likewise relied on 
Ortega-Rodriguez on review in Sills, but for a different pur-
pose: to explain our conclusion that the state’s generic claim 
of delay-based prejudice lacked “ 
‘the kind of connection’ 
” to 
the post-conviction relief “proceedings that would justify the 
reviewing court refusing to carry out a process to which the 
former fugitive is statutorily entitled.” Id. at 250 (quoting 
Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 US at 251). Accordingly, we describe 
Ortega-Rodriguez in detail, and then turn back to Sills.
	
In Ortega-Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that 
the federal circuit court erred in applying a blanket rule of 
dismissal to all appeals filed by former fugitives—those who 
had fled while their case was pending in the trial court but 
had been recaptured before sentencing and appeal. 507 US 
234. The Court began its analysis by discussing the various 
rationales that it had previously offered to justify dismissals 
in cases pursued by defendants who were current fugitives 
while their cases were pending in an appellate court. Those 
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)	
281
rationales included the concern that any judgment that the 
Court issued would be unenforceable against the defendant; 
the theory that flight “disentitles” the defendant to “call 
upon the resources of the Court” such that their flight is con-
strued as “tantamount to waiver or abandonment” of their 
appeal; and the belief that dismissal “serves an important 
deterrent function and advances an interest in efficient, dig-
nified appellate practice.” Id. at 239-42 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
	
The Court then explained that those rationales 
“all assume some connection between a defendant’s fugi-
tive status and the appellate process, sufficient to make an 
appellate sanction a reasonable response.” Id. at 244. And 
the Court explained that those “justifications are neces-
sarily attenuated when * 
* 
* a defendant’s fugitive status at 
no time coincides with [their] appeal.” Id. For example, the 
Court reasoned that a “defendant returned to custody before 
[they] invoke[ 
] the appellate process presents no risk” that 
the judgment of the reviewing court will be unenforceable, 
and a flight that ends before an appeal is filed is unlikely to 
cause delay or otherwise interfere with the appellate pro-
cess. Id. at 244. In addition, the Court observed that, to the 
extent dismissal is justified as a sanction on the theory that 
the defendant’s “flight operates as an affront to the dignity 
of the court’s proceedings,” it is the trial court that “has the 
authority to defend its own dignity, by sanctioning an act 
of defiance that occurred solely within its domain.” Id. at 
246. Finally, to the extent that dismissal is used as a sanc-
tion to deter or punish escape, the court emphasized that 
those goals are better addressed by the trial court, which 
can deter flight “with the threat of a wide range of penalties 
available to” it. Id. at 247.
	
Ultimately, the Court concluded that, “[a]bsent some 
connection between a defendant’s fugitive status and [their] 
appeal, as provided when a defendant is at large during 
the ongoing appellate process, the justifications advanced 
for dismissal of fugitives’ pending appeals generally will 
not apply.” Id. at 249 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). And without “the kind of connection to the 
appellate process that would justify an appellate sanction of 
282	
State v. Satter
dismissal,” the Court concluded, “fugitivity while a case is 
pending before a [trial] court * 
* 
* is best sanctioned by the 
[trial] court itself.” Id. at 251.
	
The Court in dicta, however, allowed for “the possi-
bility that some actions by a defendant, though they occur 
while [their] case is before the [trial] court, might have an 
impact on the appellate process sufficient to warrant an 
appellate sanction.” Id. at 249. The Court offered as an exam-
ple the possibility that “a long escape, even if ended before 
sentencing and appeal, may so delay the onset of appellate 
proceedings that the Government would be prejudiced in 
locating witnesses and presenting evidence at retrial after 
a successful appeal,” which the Court suggested “might, in 
some instances, make dismissal an appropriate response.” 
Id. And the Court declined to “hold that a court of appeals 
is entirely without authority to dismiss an appeal because of 
fugitive status predating the appeal.” Id.
	
As we explained in Sills, that dicta from Ortega-
Rodriguez was the authority to which the Court of Appeals 
pointed in adopting its “former fugitive doctrine.” 370 Or 
at 248. But it was the reasoning and ultimate holding of 
Ortega-Rodriguez that this court relied on in Sills to explain 
our conclusion that the lower courts were not justified in 
applying the former fugitive doctrine to dismiss the peti-
tioner’s claim for post-conviction relief.
	
The petitioner in Sills, like defendant here, fled the 
state immediately after his conviction and had remained in 
fugitive status for a decade before being returned to Oregon 
for sentencing. Id. at 242-43. As mentioned above, when 
that petitioner later pursued a collateral claim for post-
conviction relief, the post-conviction court invoked the for-
mer fugitive doctrine to dismiss that claim, and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed. Id. at 243-44. This court accepted review 
and reversed. Id. at 254.
	
In doing so, we agreed with the Court’s observation in 
Ortega-Rodriguez that the rationales underlying the fugitive 
dismissal doctrine “ 
‘are necessarily attenuated when applied 
[by a reviewing court] to a case in which both flight and 
recapture occur while the case is pending before’ the criminal 
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)	
283
trial court.” Id. at 247-48 (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 US 
at 244 (brackets in Sills)); see also id. at 249 (observing that 
the Court in Ortega-Rodriguez had held that “former fugitive 
status, alone, is insufficient to justify dismissing an appeal”). 
And we emphasized that nothing about the holding of Ortega-
Rodriguez “support[s] extending the fugitive dismissal rule 
to cases filed by former fugitives.” Id.
	
We assumed “that a petitioner’s former fugitive sta-
tus might sometimes justify a post-conviction court refusing 
to carry out the statutorily prescribed post-conviction relief 
process,” but we emphasized an “important caution” from 
the Court in Ortega-Rodriguez: “[N]ot every delay during 
trial court proceedings has ‘the kind of connection to the 
appellate process that would justify an appellate sanction of 
dismissal.’ 
” 370 Or at 246, 250 (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez, 
507 US at 251). We agreed with that caution and rephrased 
it to address the post-conviction relief process, explaining 
that, “[w]hatever merit there may be to dismissing a former 
fugitive’s challenge to a conviction out of concern that the 
state would be prejudiced in any retrial,” the claimed preju-
dice “must have ‘the kind of connection’ to the proceedings 
that would justify the reviewing court refusing to carry out 
a process to which the former fugitive is statutorily enti-
tled.” Id. at 250 (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 US at 251).
	
We allowed for the possibility—as had the Court 
in Ortega-Rodriguez—”that there could be circumstances 
under which a flight that predated the appeal ‘might have 
an impact on the appellate process sufficient to warrant 
an appellate sanction.’ 
” Id. at 245-46, 249 (quoting Ortega-
Rodriguez, 507 US at 249). But we explained that the preju-
dice on which the state had relied in Sills consisted of obsta-
cles to presenting witness testimony in any retrial due to 
fading memories after the passage of 13 years and aging 
of the child victims. Id. at 250. And we concluded that the 
identified prejudice lacked “ 
‘the kind of connection’ to the 
post-conviction process that could justify dismissal without 
reaching the merits of a petition for post-conviction relief.” 
Id.
	
Thus, although both Sills and Ortega-Rodriguez rec-
ognized the possibility that there might be circumstances 
284	
State v. Satter
under which a former fugitive’s flight during trial court 
proceedings has had an impact on the appellate court pro-
ceedings sufficient to justify dismissal of the defendant’s 
appeal, neither court endorsed any particular circumstance 
under which a concluded period of flight would have suffi-
cient impact on the appellate process to justify dismissal 
of the defendant’s appeal. Both opinions emphasized that 
the rationales that justify dismissal when the defendant is 
a current fugitive “are necessarily attenuated” when “both 
flight and recapture occur while the case is pending before” 
the trial court. 370 Or at 247-48; 507 US at 244. And Sills 
specifically concluded that general, “delay-based obstacles to 
the presentation of evidence in a new trial” did not justify 
invoking the former fugitive doctrine to dismiss the peti-
tioner’s claim for post-conviction relief. 370 Or at 252.
	
Nevertheless, the state emphasizes Sills’s acknowl-
edgment of that possibility to argue that dismissal of a direct 
criminal appeal is warranted when the defendant’s former 
fugitive status affects the “dignity, integrity, and efficient 
functioning of the appellate process.” And the state contends 
that those interests are adversely affected in this case in 
ways that are distinguishable from Sills.
	
First, the state argues that the nature of a direct 
appeal makes its general, delay-based claim of prejudice 
more significant than they were in Sills. The state empha-
sizes that this court in Sills described delay-based prejudice 
as “a risk that is inherent” in post-conviction relief proceed-
ings, id. at 252, and described other characteristics of post-
conviction relief that, the state contends, might make the 
risk of retrial prejudice in those cases distinguishable from 
retrial prejudice in a direct appeal. See id. at 254 (emphasiz-
ing “that, in this post-conviction case, retrial could be ordered 
only if petitioner establishes that his criminal trial involved 
such a substantial denial of constitutional rights that his 
conviction is rendered void, and only because the legislature 
has directed that post-conviction relief shall be granted by 
the court to such a petitioner” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). According to the state, those differences between 
direct criminal appeals and the post-conviction relief process 
weigh in favor of an appellate court dismissing an appeal to 
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)	
285
address general delay-based prejudice, especially when the 
state identifies actual prejudice from lost evidence.
	
Second, the state contends that it has identified 
concerns beyond the general, delay-based obstacles that 
were the source of the claim of prejudice in Sills. It empha-
sizes that—in this court—it has offered evidence that a key 
trial exhibit is missing. And it argues that defendant might 
again fail to appear if the original judgment is reversed. 
According to the state, “defendant is no longer in custody 
or under any form of supervision” and has “previously indi-
cated” that “he had no intention of appearing in the case,” 
and thus is likely to prevent entry of an enforceable judg-
ment of conviction if the case is remanded for a new trial.
	
We are not persuaded that those differences 
between this case and Sills permit a different answer for 
defendant. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in 
dismissing defendant’s appeal, because—despite the factual 
and procedural differences between this case and Sills—the 
concerns on which the state relies here similarly lack “ 
‘the 
kind of connection’ 
” to appellate proceedings that justify the 
appellate court “refusing to carry out a process to which the 
former fugitive is statutorily entitled.” Sills, 370 Or at 250 
(quoting Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 US at 251).
	
Although Sills did not decide whether that stan-
dard would govern dismissals of direct appeals, we are 
persuaded by the reasoning of Ortega-Rodriguez that, even 
assuming appellate courts have inherent authority to dis-
miss a former fugitive’s direct criminal appeal, an appellate 
court errs in relying on that authority to dismiss the appeal 
when the defendant’s former fugitive status does not signifi-
cantly interfere with the appellate process. And we conclude 
that neither the generic, delay-based prejudice on which the 
Court of Appeals based its dismissal, nor the state’s new 
assertion of actual prejudice and concerns that defendant 
might again flee, has the kind of impact on the appellate 
process that is required to justify dismissal.2 We reach that 
conclusion for three reasons.
	
2  Like the Court in Ortega-Rodriguez, “[w]e do not ignore the possibility that 
some actions by a defendant, though they occur while [their] case is before the 
[trial] court, might have an impact on the appellate process sufficient to warrant 
286	
State v. Satter
	
First, even the specific prejudice that the state iden-
tifies in this court would arise—if at all—only if the Court 
of Appeals reverses defendant’s conviction and only after 
the case is remanded to the trial court. In other words, the 
state’s assertion that it no longer has access to testimony 
and exhibits that it relied on in the original trial does not 
describe prejudice to the appellate proceedings, because 
defendant’s claim of instructional error will be decided on a 
trial court record that undisputedly is complete. As Ortega-
Rodriguez emphasized in explaining why it was vacating 
the dismissal, there was no “indication in the record below” 
that the “petitioner’s former fugitivity was deemed to pres-
ent an obstacle to orderly appellate review.” 507 US at 251. 
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that defendant’s former 
fugitive status affected the “dignity” or “integrity” of the 
appellate court or that the delay caused by his abscond was 
“sufficiently disruptive of the appellate process that dis-
missal would be a reasonable response.” Id.
	
Second, all of the state’s concerns about enforce-
ability of the judgment are limited to enforceability in the 
trial court; defendant was returned to custody before invok-
ing the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and served his 
sentence while this appeal proceeded. Thus, if the Court of 
Appeals affirms, the punishment for defendant’s conviction 
has already been enforced. More significantly, however, if 
the Court of Appeals reverses and remands, any new fail-
ure to appear would be a flight from the jurisdiction of the 
trial court. Although we emphasize that any flight from jus-
tice—whether a flight that concluded prior to the appeal or 
a potential flight if the case is remanded—evinces a lack 
of respect for judicial authority, that disrespect is aimed 
most directly at the trial court when the defendant fails to 
appear in that court. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 US at 246 
an appellate sanction.” 507 US at 249; see also id. (opining that “a defendant’s 
misconduct at the [trial] court level might somehow make meaningful appeal 
impossible, or otherwise disrupt the appellate process so that an appellate sanc-
tion is reasonably imposed” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). But 
we emphasize, as we did in Sills, that dismissal of a party’s case under the former 
fugitive doctrine requires “ 
‘the kind of connection’ to the proceedings that would 
justify the reviewing court refusing to carry out a process to which the former 
fugitive is statutorily entitled.” Sills, 370 Or at 250 (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez, 
507 US at 251). 
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)	
287
(emphasizing that the “contemptuous disrespect manifested 
by [the defendant’s] flight was directed at the [trial court], 
before which his case was pending during the entirety of his 
fugitive period”).3
	
And third, the trial court is a superior forum to 
resolve and address both the state’s claim of prejudice in 
a retrial and any new failure to appear on remand. In this 
case, for example, the state asserts that it has been unable to 
locate the video or the police reports and that one of the tes-
tifying officers has since died. It also argues that the other 
officer is no longer working as a police officer and likely has 
a diminished memory. Although defendant acknowledges 
that the state may be able to prove its factual claim of actual 
prejudice, he emphasizes that the determination whether 
evidence has disappeared or witness memories faded is “the 
stuff of an evidentiary hearing, which trial courts routinely 
undertake.” We agree. And conversely, appellate courts are 
ill equipped to undertake the factual inquiry necessary to 
determine the extent to which a period of flight will obstruct 
the state’s ability to present evidence in a retrial.
	
Determining how to address actual prejudice to 
the state in a retrial is a task that is “the daily stuff of our 
trial courts.” See Baughman, 361 Or at 410 (explaining that 
“fairly assessing how to ensure a fair trial for all parties” is 
“the daily stuff of our trial courts”). And only the trial court 
can address that prejudice with an appropriately calibrated 
response. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 US at 247 (“While an 
appellate court has access only to the blunderbuss of dis-
missal, the [trial] court can tailor a more finely calibrated 
response.”); see also Sills, 370 Or at 253 (explaining that the 
trial court can use the rules of evidence to “partly amelio-
rate the kind of prejudice that parties can sometimes suffer 
in a retrial years after the original trial”). Addressing prej-
udice with an appropriately calibrated response is critical 
because, as we observed in Sills, “if we assume that there 
is merit” to defendant’s appeal, then dismissing that appeal 
“because of his former fugitive status ‘is tantamount to an 
	
3  We emphasize that defendant’s rejection of the authority of the trial court 
in this case demonstrates the kind of disregard for the rule of law that ultimately 
harms the entire justice system. We in no way condone that conduct in concluding 
that the Court of Appeals is not the appropriate body to address it.
288	
State v. Satter
additional punishment * 
* 
* for the same offense of flight’ 
” 
that may be punishable as a separate crime. 370 Or at 254 
(quoting Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 US at 248); see also ORS 
162.195 (defining crime of second-degree failure to appear); 
ORS 162.155 (defining crime of second-degree escape).
	
The trial court also is uniquely equipped to address 
any new failure of defendant to appear on remand, just as 
it was equipped to address the original failure to appear, 
through its authority to hold a defendant in contempt 
or otherwise impose punitive sanctions. See ORS 33.105 
(describing the contempt sanctions authorized by statute, 
including fines, confinement for up to six months, and proba-
tion or community service); see also Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 
US at 247 (“While a case is pending before the [trial] court, 
flight can be deterred with the threat of a wide range of pen-
alties available to the [trial] court judge.”).
	
Thus, we conclude that neither concerns about the 
prejudice that the state claims will arise in a retrial nor 
a generalized interest in addressing defendant’s flouting of 
judicial authority justified the Court of Appeals dismissing 
defendant’s appeal to address a period of flight that began 
and ended while the case was pending in the trial court. 
Instead, we emphasize, as we have emphasized in other con-
texts, the value of leaving to the trial court on any remand 
those questions that a trial court is in the “best position 
to assess.” See Baughman, 361 Or at 410-11 (concluding, 
in the context of evidentiary error, that the trial court on 
remand should determine “whether a new trial is required 
or appropriate”). In this context as well, it is the trial court 
on remand that should determine whether a defendant’s for-
mer fugitive status caused prejudice that justifies denying 
the defendant a new trial.	
	
Our opinion in Baughman, and an earlier opin-
ion in State v. Cartwright, 336 Or 408, 85 P3d 305 (2004), 
illustrate how an appellate court can instruct a trial court 
that additional remand proceedings are necessary to deter-
mine whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial. In 
Baughman, we concluded that the trial court had erred in 
analyzing whether evidence of the defendant’s uncharged 
acts could be admitted, but we specified that the trial court 
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)	
289
on remand should conduct additional proceedings before 
deciding whether a new trial was “appropriate.” 361 Or at 
406, 410. Accordingly, we reversed the judgment of convic-
tion and “remanded to the circuit court for further proceed-
ings,” consistent with the opinion. Id. at 411. Baughman 
modeled that remand approach on Cartwright, in which 
this court vacated the defendant’s judgment of conviction, 
because we concluded that the trial court had committed 
reversible error by failing to require the state to produce 
evidence, but we remanded with instructions that the trial 
court address the state’s contention that a new trial was 
unnecessary. 336 Or at 420-21. The opinion specifies that 
the trial court on remand would afford an opportunity for 
a hearing on whether there was any chance the evidence 
had affected the verdict and then either order a new trial or 
make findings to support reinstating the original judgment 
of conviction. Id. at 421. 
III.  CONCLUSION
	
In sum, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ order dis-
missing defendant’s appeal, because we conclude that the 
delay caused by defendant’s former fugitive status lacked 
the required connection to the appellate process that would 
justify dismissing the appeal. Although we accept the state’s 
premise that a defendant’s former fugitive status may cause 
such significant prejudice to the state that denying the 
defendant a new trial could be justified, we conclude that the 
trial court on any remand would be the appropriate court to 
make that determination. We emphasize, however, that, if 
the Court of Appeals determines that the trial court com-
mitted reversible error, nothing in this opinion precludes 
the Court of Appeals from remanding with instructions for 
the trial court to determine whether actual prejudice to the 
state in a retrial justifies denying the defendant a new trial 
and reinstating the judgment of conviction.
	
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and 
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further 
proceedings.