Case Title: Arcoren v. Westburne Drilling

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Arcoren v. Westburne Drilling1986 WY 218730 P.2d 128Case Number: 86-205Decided: 12/29/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
KEITH ARCOREN, APPELLANT 
(EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT),

v.

WESTBURNE DRILLING, 
APPELLEE (EMPLOYER), 

v. 

STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, 
APPELLEE (OBJECTOR).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

K. Craig 
Williams of Williams, Kelly & Waldrip, Rawlins, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Josephine T. Porter, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Patrick J. Crank, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee 
(objector).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an award of worker's compensation benefits. Appellant Keith Arcoren claimed 
disability benefits after sustaining a back injury. After a hearing on the 
matter, the trial court awarded appellant a twenty percent permanent partial 
disability pursuant to § 27-12-403, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement). Appellant 
urges a single issue on appeal:

"The District Court erred 
in disallowing evidence of the employee's prior earnings and not considering 
loss of earning capacity."

[¶2.]     We will affirm. 

[¶3.]     Appellant injured his 
back on August 17, 1984, when he fell while standing on a barrel painting the 
substructure of a drilling rig owned by his employer, appellee Westburne 
Drilling, Inc. Appellant was employed as a roughneck, but, since the rig was not 
operating, he was performing the duties of a "dry watcher" on the day of the 
injury. The duties of a "dry watcher" include watching the rig 24 hours per day 
so that no one steals parts from the rig.

[¶4.]     Appellant received 
worker's compensation benefits after the injury. On January 15, 1986, he applied 
for a temporary total disability award. AppelleeState of Wyoming, Worker's Compensation Division, 
objected to the award of further temporary total disability benefits. After a 
hearing, the district court denied additional temporary total disability 
benefits finding that appellant had failed to prove an increase in incapacity 
due solely to the injury.

[¶5.]     Thereafter on March 17, 
1986, appellant filed an "Application for Increase in Permanent Partial 
Disability Benefits." The application stated that appellant's treating 
physician, Dr. John A. Whipp, had assigned appellant a ten percent permanent 
partial disability rating based solely on physical impairment and the rating 
failed to account for any vocational disability as required under § 
27-12-403(h), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement). The application went on to 
state that an additional hearing was necessary in order to correct the ten 
percent permanent partial disability award which was alleged to be erroneous. 
Another hearing was held on June 6, 1986, and the district court awarded an 
additional ten percent permanent partial disability rating. The district court's 
final order stated that appellant's total permanent partial disability rating of 
twenty percent for his back injury was to compensate him "for any and all 
vocational impairment and physical functional impairment."

[¶6.]     We begin by stating our 
applicable standards of review. On appeal, we accept the evidence of the 
prevailing party as true, leaving out of consideration the evidence presented by 
the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, giving every favorable inference 
which may fairly and reasonably be drawn from the prevailing party's evidence. 
Matter of Abas, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1153 (1985); and 
Stockton v. Sowerwine, Wyo., 690 P.2d 1202 (1984). A trial court's 
findings are presumed correct and such will not be disturbed unless they are 
inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous or contrary to the great 
weight of the evidence. Palmeno v. Cashen, Wyo., 
627 P.2d 163 (1981).

[¶7.]     Appellant raises only 
one issue on appeal asking whether the district court erred in refusing to admit 
evidence of appellant's prior earnings and refusing to consider appellant's loss 
of earning capacity.

[¶8.]     At the June 6, 1986, 
hearing, appellant's counsel attempted to introduce evidence of appellant's 
prior earnings on four occasions. The admission was refused by the trial court 
each time. Apparently, counsel for appellant attempted to introduce a check stub 
from a prior paycheck as evidence of appellant's prior 
earnings.

[¶9.]     We recognized in 
McCarty v. Bear Creek Uranium Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 93 (1985), that in appropriate 
cases it may be proper for a trial court to consider loss of income. However, we 
also recognized that there may be other factors which are relevant in 
determining the cause of the lack of available jobs to the worker. We cited with 
approval the following authority on the subject:

"* * * [T]he wages or 
earnings of a workman may be evidence, varying in its probative value according 
to the circumstances, of his earning power or capacity, it is obvious that the 
extent, if any, to which the workman's earning capacity is affected by the 
injury complained of is not necessarily measured by the difference between his 
earnings before and after the injury, since the amount of his actual earnings 
may be affected by various extraneous matters. Ordinarily, any loss of earnings which is 
not attributable to the injury, as, for example, loss due to the workman's 
fault subsequent to the accident, or to his illness not connected with the 
accident, or to a general business 
depression, is not to be considered in determining the amount of 
compensation. Loss of earnings due to inability to obtain work is to be 
considered in determining the amount of compensation insofar, but only insofar, 
as such inability is attributable to the injury." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 95, citing 82 
Am.Jur.2d Workmen's Compensation § 347, p. 145 (1976).

See also 2 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 57.63, p. 10-164.135 
(1986).

[¶10.]  In this case, two witnesses testified as 
to the poor economic conditions in appellant's area and the effect upon 
appellant. It appears that the primary factor in appellant's failure to obtain 
work is the depressed economy in CarbonCounty and the surrounding environs. 
Therefore, we can find no error in the district court's denial of the admission 
of the proposed evidence.

[¶11.]  Furthermore, we think a single check stub 
from a past pay check would be insufficient to properly establish loss of 
income. The burden rests upon the claimant in a worker's compensation case to 
establish every essential element of his claim through a preponderance of the 
evidence. McCarty v. Bear Creek Uranium Company, supra; and Alco of Wyoming v. 
Baker, Wyo., 
651 P.2d 266 (1982). It is incumbent upon the claimant to show the extent of his 
injury, the disability or the loss of earning power, Jennings v. C.M. & W. 
Drilling Company, 77 Wyo. 69, 307 P.2d 122 (1957), and that he is entitled to 
the award he seeks. Matter of Hasser, Wyo., 
647 P.2d 66 (1982).

[¶12.]  Questions regarding the extent and 
duration of a claimant's disability are questions of fact to be determined by 
the trial court and shall be reviewed as such. Matter of Abas, supra; and 
Pacific Power and Light v. Parsons, Wyo., 692 P.2d 226 
(1984).

[¶13.]  Based on the evidence presented, we can 
find no reversible error in the trial court's award in this 
case.

[¶14.]  Affirmed.

MACY, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion, with whom URBIGKIT, J., 
joined.

MACY, Justice, specially 
concurring, with whom URBIGKIT, 
Justice, joins.

[¶15.]  I concur in the result for the reason 
that even if the check had been received in evidence, it would not have been 
sufficient by itself to show a reduction of income. My reading of McCarty v. 
Bear Creek Uranium Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 93 (1985), however, is that evidence 
of preinjury work-related income is material to the question of earning 
capacity, and it is entitled to whatever weight the finder of fact may give it. 
If the court refuses to admit such evidence, it cannot be weighed.