Case Title: Jones v. State

Citation: 357 Md. 408

Docket Number: 35/99

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2000-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Circuit Court for Prince George's County
Case # CT97-1636X
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 35
September Term, 1999
________________________________________
DONALD ANTHONY JONES
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
 
JJ.
_______________________________________
Opinion by Harrell, J.
________________________________________
      Filed:   February 7, 2000
  Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.), Article 27, § 12A-2, in
1
pertinent part, provides:
§ 12A-2. Reckless endangerment.
(a) Creation of substantial risk of death or serious physical
injury; penalties. —  (1) Any person who recklessly engages in
conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious
physical injury to another person is guilty of the misdemeanor
of reckless endangerment and on conviction is subject to a fine
of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5
years or both.
  (2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section,
any person who recklessly discharges a firearm from a motor
vehicle in such a manner that it creates a substantial risk of
death or serious physical injury to another person is guilty of the
misdemeanor of reckless endangerment and on conviction is
subject to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not
exceeding 5 years or both.
  (b) Applicable conduct. —  (1) Subsection (a) (1) of this
section does not apply to any conduct involving:
  (i) Except as provided in § 120 (a)(2) of this Article, the use of
a motor vehicle as defined in § 11-135 of the Transportation
Article; or
  (ii) The manufacture, production, or sale of any product or
commodity.
  (2) Subsection (a) (2) of this section does not apply to any
conduct involving:
  (i) A law enforcement officer or security guard in the
performance of the officer's or security guard's official duty; or
  (ii) An individual acting in defense of a crime of violence.
 
Donald Anthony Jones, Petitioner, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for
Prince George’s County of one count of second degree assault, Maryland Code (1957, 1996
Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 12A, and four counts of reckless endangerment, Maryland Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.), Article 27, § 12A-2(a)(1).   On direct appeal, the Court
1
of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments.  Jones v. State, 125 Md. App. 168, 724 A.2d 738
(1999).    We issued a writ of certiorari to determine whether the trial court erred by refusing
  Concurrently, we denied the State’s conditional cross-petition questioning whether
2
Jones has preserved for appellate review “his proposed jury instruction on reckless
endangerment?”  Id.  
2
to instruct the jury that self-defense applied to the reckless endangerment charges.   Jones
2
v. State, 354 Md. 330, 731 A.2d 439 (1999).  We hold that common law self-defense is a
viable defense to a charge of the statutory crime of reckless endangerment under § 12A-
2(a)(1) and, consequently, we reverse the judgments of the Circuit Court and the Court of
Special Appeals as to the reckless endangerment convictions. 
I.
As our holding in this case turns on a purely legal analysis, we adopt, with slight
modifications, the facts as stated by the Court of Special Appeals: 
“On [6 July 1997], Carmen Reavis met several of her friends for an afternoon of fun
at Adventure World [now Six Flags], a water amusement park located in Prince George's
County.  Among them were Tracy Barber, Gerald Goode, Walter Stokes, Reginald Davis,
and William Brown.  The group collected inside the park at around 1:30 p.m. and spent the
next several hours together.  [Petitioner] and Rashad Friday, his friend, arrived at Adventure
World at around 5:30 p.m. the same day.  About ten minutes later, Friday spotted Reavis,
whom he did not know, and, thinking she was attractive, approached her.
“[Petitioner] testified in his own defense.  He explained that Friday ‘reached over to
touch [Reavis'] arm to get her attention so she could hear him....’  When Reavis did not
respond, Friday ‘touched’ her arm again.  This time, ‘[s]he responded immediately with
3
cursing and fussing.’  Friday then ‘put his hands up and like okay, no problem.’   [Petitioner]
turned away momentarily to speak with some friends who were standing nearby;  when he
looked back he saw that ‘approximately seven to nine guys [had] surrounded [Friday] in a
confrontation.’  Among them were Goode, Stokes, Brown, and Davis.  [Petitioner]
approached the men and said to Friday, ‘[l]et's walk.’   He and Friday then walked together
toward the front gate, ‘where we had seen some safety, the only place I [had] seen security.’
 The group followed.  At that point, [Petitioner] became scared.
“[Petitioner] further testified that as he and Friday crossed over a narrow bridge, he
looked to his right and saw three of the pursuers attack Friday.  He watched Friday ‘go
down’ as his attackers ‘stomp[ed] on him’ and kicked him in the head and chest.
Immediately thereafter, someone grabbed [Petitioner] from behind, threw him into a railing
and repeatedly hit his head against it.  [Petitioner] remembered being accosted by three
assailants:  one who stood behind him and restrained his arms and two others who alternated
striking him in the head and chest.  [Petitioner] explained that, ‘[w]hen I got one of my arms
released I reached in my right pocket, pulled out a knife, opened it up’ and ‘cut each of them
until they let me go.’
“The State's witnesses offered a very different version of events.  Reavis testified that
as she and her friends were walking toward the ‘Mind Eraser’ roller coaster, Friday grabbed
her arm.  She did not want to speak with him, so she continued walking.  Friday approached
her again a few minutes later and this time reached over and touched her breast.  When
Goode learned what had happened, he confronted Friday and warned him to keep his hands
4
to himself.  According to Reavis, ‘it wasn't like a crowd of people, you know, around or
nothing.  It was just like basically us three, and it was a couple people around, but they was
like a little distance back.’   Friday made disparaging remarks to Reavis and she found him
to be belligerent, not apologetic.  Reavis heard [Petitioner] ask Goode if he wanted to ‘take
it outside,’ but Goode refused.  About five minutes later, [Petitioner] and Friday suddenly
attacked Goode on the bridge.  Brown, Williams, and Davis got involved in the brawl to help
Goode.  Reavis saw [Petitioner] ‘swinging his arms wildly.’
“Stokes testified that [Petitioner] had a knife and that during the brawl, [Petitioner]
stabbed him in the leg.  Brown testified that during the commotion, [Petitioner] was
‘swinging’ and then spun around and stabbed him.  When the dust cleared, Stokes, Brown,
Goode, and Davis had been wounded.”  Jones, 125 Md. App. at 170-71, 724 A.2d at 739.
The State charged Petitioner with one count each of attempted second degree murder,
attempted voluntary manslaughter, first degree assault, second degree assault, and reckless
endangerment for the injuries to Walter Stokes.  The State also charged Petitioner with three
counts of second degree assault and three counts of reckless endangerment for the injuries
inflicted upon William Brown, Gerald Goode, and Reginald Davis. 
Petitioner’s jury trial commenced in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on
21 January 1998.  Before the trial concluded on 23 January 1998, Petitioner’s trial counsel
presented, in writing, to the trial judge his requested jury instructions.  Among these
instructions, Petitioner included the following regarding the reckless endangerment charges:
  The version of §12A-2 relied on by Petitioner, Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.
3
Vol.), Article 27, § 12A-2, provided:
 
§ 12A-2.  Reckless endangerment
.
(a) Creation of substantial risk of death or serious physical
injury; penalties. —  (1) Any person who recklessly engages in
conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious
physical injury to another person is guilty of the misdemeanor
of reckless endangerment and on conviction is subject to a fine
of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5
years or both.
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section,
any person who recklessly discharges a firearm from a motor
vehicle in such a manner that it creates a substantial risk of
death or serious physical injury to another person is guilty of the
misdemeanor of reckless endangerment and on conviction is
subject to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not
exceeding 5 years or both.
(b) Applicable conduct. —  This section does not apply to any
conduct involving:
(1) The use of a motor vehicle as defined in § 11-135 of the
5
If an individual is acting in defense of a crime of violence, he
cannot be guilty of reckless endangerment.  It is the State’s
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was not acting in defense of a crime of violence.  If you are not
so convinced, you must find the defendant not guilty of all
counts charging reckless endangerment.    
To this, Petitioner’s trial counsel appended a supporting footnote which referenced Maryland
Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 12A-2(b)(4).  Unfortunately, Petitioner’s
statutory support referred to a superceded subsection of the reckless endangerment statute.
Section 12A-2(b)(4), in the version cited by Petitioner and that was effective prior to 8 April
1997, provided that the prohibitions of the reckless endangerment statute generally did not
apply to “an individual acting in defense of a crime of violence.”   The record does not
3
Transportation Article;
(2) The manufacture, production, or sale of any product or
commodity;
(3) A law enforcement officer or security guard in the
performance of the officer's or security guard's official duty;  or
(4) An individual acting in defense of a crime of violence.
(c) More than one person endangered. —  If more than one
person is endangered by the conduct of the defendant, a separate
charge may be brought for each person endangered.
 
  We find no statement in the record regarding the basis of the trial judge’s refusal
4
to give the written instructions submitted by Petitioner. 
  Based on the imprecision of defense counsel’s articulation of the exception and the
5
requested jury instruction, the trial judge easily could have concluded that Petitioner failed
to raise the issue that self-defense, as a matter of common law, applied to the statutory
6
reflect that Petitioner, the State, or the court acknowledged or were aware of the superceded
status of the statutory provision cited by Petitioner in support of the requested instruction.
The trial judge did not give Petitioner’s relevant jury instruction.4
The trial judge did instruct the jury that self-defense applied to all the charges against
Petitioner, except the reckless endangerment counts.  Following the judge’s delivery of the
jury instructions, Petitioner’s trial counsel excepted to certain omissions from the
instructions.  Among the exceptions, his counsel asked the trial judge to instruct that self-
defense applied to the reckless endangerment charges.  Defense counsel stated, “if an
individual is acting in defense of a crime of violence he cannot be guilty of reckless
endangerment . . . I think the jury should know that, that it’s akin to self-defense.”  Defense
counsel again referred to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 12A-2(b)(4)
in support of his oral request.   The trial judge overruled Petitioner’s exception.           
5
6
charge of reckless endangerment.  In this case of first impression, however, we have granted
certiorari on the issue and thus we have elected nonetheless to exercise our discretion to
address this important issue of Maryland law. See Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 150, 729
A.2d 910, 919 (1999).  
  The only articulated basis appearing on the record given by the trial judge for
6
overruling Petitioner’s relevant exception was the comment “I would point out again reckless
endangerment does not require specific intent.”
  Unless otherwise provided, all subsequent statutory references are to Maryland
7
Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, § 12A-2.  
7
As noted supra, the record does not reflect that either party or the judge was aware
expressly that defense counsel was relying on a superceded version of § 12A-2(b),  as the
7
basis of the request for the relevant jury instruction.  The General Assembly amended § 12A-
2, and specially subsection (b), with the new version taking effect on 8 April 1997,
approximately three months before Petitioner’s altercation at Adventure World.  In the
amended version, § 12A-2(b) no longer provides a defense for individuals acting in defense
of a crime of violence to a charge under § 12A-2(a)(1), which served as the basis of the
reckless endangerment charges against Petitioner.  
The jury found Petitioner not guilty of attempted second degree murder, attempted
voluntary manslaughter, and first degree assault.  It convicted Petitioner of second degree
assault against Stokes and all four counts of reckless endangerment.  At sentencing, the
reckless endangerment conviction as to Stokes was merged into the related assault
conviction.  The trial court sentenced Petitioner to ten years in prison with all but four years
suspended for the second degree assault conviction as to Stokes and three concurrent four-
year sentences in prison for the remaining reckless endangerment convictions. 
8
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions.  Jones v. State, 125 Md. App.
168, 724 A.2d 738 (1999).  The intermediate appellate court determined that Petitioner’s
requested jury instruction was based on a superseded statutory provision and that under the
correct version of the statute, the self-defense provision which Petitioner relied upon
(“defense of a crime of violence”) applied only to a § 12A-2(a)(2) charge (“recklessly
discharges a firearm from a motor vehicle”).   Because the court resolved that Petitioner’s
jury instruction was based on an inaccurate statement of the law (as to the statute), it held
that the trial judge properly refused to give the requested self-defense jury instruction as to
the reckless endangerment counts premised on §12A-2(a)(1)(general reckless endangerment
conduct).  Jones, 125 Md. App. at 177, 724 A.2d at 742.  The court did not address whether
common law self-defense applied to the reckless endangerment charges.  
II.
Before we turn to the substantive issue for which certiorari was granted, we put to rest
the State’s renewed non-preservation argument.  The State asserts in its brief that, at trial,
Petitioner failed to request adequately a self-defense instruction in connection with the
reckless endangerment charges.  The State points to a trial record excerpt wherein
Petitioner’s trial counsel, at one point, seemingly acknowledged, during exceptions to the
instructions as given, that “self defense applies to all the counts with the exception of
reckless endangerment.”  It also highlights Petitioner’s proposed jury instruction that was
premised expressly on a superceded version of the reckless endangerment statute.  Relying
  Md. Rule 4-325(e) states, in pertinent part:
8
Objection.  No party may assign as error the giving or the failure
to give an instruction unless the party objects on the record
promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the
matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the
objection.   
9
on Maryland Rule 4-325(e),  the State contends that due to Petitioner’s express
8
acknowledgment that self-defense did not apply to reckless endangerment and his erroneous
reliance on a superceded statutory provision, he failed to preserve for appellate review the
issue of whether common law self-defense is applicable to a charge of reckless
endangerment.   
We decline to entertain the State’s non-preservation contention further.  The State’s
analysis is a reiteration of the issue and argument advanced in its conditional cross-petition
for writ of certiorari which, as previously stated, we denied.  Under our certiorari process,
this Court will only consider matters on appeal raised in a petition for writ of certiorari that
we have granted.  See Walston v. Sun Cab Co., 267 Md. 559, 568, 298 A.2d 391, 397 (1973).
The certiorari process serves an important function in Maryland’s system of jurisprudence.
It allows this Court to select and review cases that we deem to be “desirable and in the public
interest.”  Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Cts. and Jud. Proc. § 12-305; See also
Walston, 267 Md. at 565, 298 A.2d 395.  In exercising this broad discretion, we limit the
issues that we elect to review by denying petitions for certiorari in whole or in part, so that
we may deal directly with the issues selected.  See Streater v. State, 352 Md. 800, 802-03,
724 A.2d 111, 127, n.1 (1999).  When this Court denies review of an issue in a petition for
10
certiorari or a conditional cross-petition, a party ordinarily is foreclosed from rearguing that
issue before us.  See Streater, 352 Md. at 805-06, 724 A.2d at 127, n.4; Dempsey v. State,
277 Md. 134, 143, 355 A.2d 455, 459 (1976); Walston, 267 Md. at 565, 298 A.2d at 395.
In Dempsey, we explained the effect of an order from this Court limiting certiorari, by
stating:
[w]here this Court’s order granting certiorari limits the issues to
be considered, no additional questions will ordinarily be dealt
with even if such additional questions were raised in the petition
or in a cross-petition.  
Dempsey, 277 Md. at 143, 355 A.2d at 459 (citations omitted).  
Recently in Streater v. State, 352 Md. 800, 724 A.2d 111 (1999), we dealt with an
analogous situation to the present case.  In Streater, the trial court admitted in evidence a
protective order which contained factual findings by a district court judge regarding prior
criminal acts committed by the petitioner, Streater.  Streater’s counsel objected generally to
the admission of the protective order, but failed to raise a specific objection to the admission
of the evidence of prior criminal acts.  Despite Streater’s apparent failure to preserve the
specific evidentiary issue for which appellate review was sought subsequently, we rejected
a waiver argument previously presented in the Respondent State’s denied conditional cross-
petition for writ of certiorari and renewed in its brief.  We explained that 
“[g]iven our denial of that petition for certiorari, we must
assume that Petitioner’s objection was properly preserved . . .
the dissent’s protestations are more properly directed at our
denial of certiorari on the preservation issue . . . [r]aising
contentions concerning an issue on which we expressly denied
certiorari risks undermining our certiorari process.”
11
Id. at 805-06,  724 A.2d at 128, n.4. 
In the case at hand, the State’s waiver/non-preservation argument was settled when
we denied certiorari on that question.  We shall not undermine the appellate review process
by digressing from our chosen course.  Id.     
III.
As we explained, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions.  The
court’s holding focused on its interpretation of the proper version of § 12A-2.  The court
reasoned that:
As the language of § 12A-2(b)(2)(ii) makes plain, an individual
who is acting in defense of a crime of violence and who engages
in the conduct specified in § 12A-2(a)(2), i.e., ‘recklessly
discharg[ing] a firearm from a motor vehicle ...’ is not
committing the crime of reckless endangerment.  That exception
is narrowly written, however, and does not apply to the more
general conduct set forth in § 12A-2(a)(2)[sic], i.e., ‘recklessly
engag[ing] in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or
serious physical injury to another person ...’
In this case, appellant was charged with reckless
endangerment under § 12A-2(a)(1).  The jury instruction that he
requested would have been a correct statement of the law if he
had been charged with recklessly discharging a firearm from a
motor vehicle under § 12A-2(a)(2).  It was not a correct
statement of the law under the circumstances of this case,
however, and the trial court properly refused to grant it.  
Jones, 125 Md. App. at 177, 724 A.2d at 742.  We agree with the Court’s conclusion to the
extent that it resolves the question of whether Petitioner was entitled to a self-defense jury
  Although we do not base our holding in the present case on an interpretation of §
9
12A-2, we note that one could argue with considerable force that a plain meaning
interpretation and application of current § 12A-2 (a)(2) and (b)(2)(ii) yields an absurd result.
It is difficult to comprehend why the General Assembly would permit a statutory defense to
a reckless endangerment charge when an individual discharges a firearm from a motor
vehicle “in defense of a crime of violence,” but withdraw the availability of such a defense
to that same individual if he or she steps out of the car before discharging the weapon.  A
review of the legislative history of the 1997 Md. Laws, ch. 32, § 1, is unenlightening as to
the underpinning for this curious distinction.  
12
instruction based on § 12A(b)(2)(ii).   This, however, does not end our inquiry.
9
Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a self-defense instruction under the common
law.  In support of this alternate theory Petitioner posits that Maryland Code (1957, 1996
Repl. Vol.), Article 27 § 12A-3 recognizes his right to assert common law self-defense as a
defense to the statutory reckless endangerment charges under § 12A-2(a)(1).  Section 12A-3,
entitled “Defenses,” states:
A person charged with an offense under this subheading
[“Assault,” which includes reckless endangerment] is entitled to
assert any judicially recognized defense.  
Therefore, Petitioner reasons that he should be permitted to assert self-defense as “a
judicially recognized defense.”  We agree.  
A.
To completely review Petitioner’s argument we begin with an examination of the
common law doctrine of self-defense in Maryland.  When facts are adduced establishing
perfect self-defense to a charge of criminal homicide or assault, the defendant’s actions are
said to be justifiable or excusable and the direct result is the acquittal of the defendant.  See
13
Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 210-11, 571 A.2d 1251, 1254 (1990); Faulkner v. State, 301
Md. 482, 485, 483 A.2d 761, 764 (1983).  See also Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 718, 415
A.2d 830, 842 (1980).  Complete, or perfect, self-defense requires that:
(1) the defendant actually believed that he or she was in
immediate or imminent danger of bodily harm;
(2) the defendant’s belief was reasonable;
(3) the defendant must not have been the aggressor or provoked
the conflict; and
(4) the defendant used no more force than was reasonably
necessary to defend himself or herself in light of the threatened
or actual harm.
See State v. Martin, 329 Md. 351, 357, 619 A.2d 992, 995 (1993); Dykes, 319 Md. at 211,
571 A.2d at 1254; Faulkner, 301 Md. at 485-86, 483 A.2d at 764; Tichnell v. State, 287 Md.
at 718, 415 A.2d at 842 (1980); Guerriero v. State, 213 Md. 545, 549, 132 A.2d 466, 467
(1957).  
The vast majority of our appellate opinions developing the law of self-defense have
been in the context of the proper application of perfect and imperfect self-defense in murder
cases.  Imperfect self-defense differs from perfect self-defense in its effect in that the
establishment of imperfect self-defense does not result in an acquittal.  Martin, 329 Md. at
558, 619 A.2d at 996.  If established, imperfect self-defense negates the element of malice
in a charge of murder and the defendant may be convicted of the lesser crime of voluntary
manslaughter.  Faulkner, 301 Md. at 500, 483 A.2d at 769.  Imperfect self-defense results
when a fact-finder concludes that a defendant committed criminal homicide in an honest, but
14
unreasonable belief that he or she was threatened with death or serious bodily harm.  Id.  The
doctrine of imperfect self-defense applies only to “criminal homicide and its shadow forms,
such as attempted murder.” Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 223, 233, 623 A.2d 630, 634-35
(1993)(citations omitted).  It has no applicability to other assaultive crimes.  Bryant v. State,
83 Md. App. 237, 245, 574 A.2d 29, 33 (1990).  While the complexities of perfect and
imperfect self-defense are not at issue in this case, these cases are instructional.
  
In Corbin v. State, 94 Md. App. 21, 614 A.2d 1329 (1992), the Court of Special
Appeals dealt with the question of whether a defendant was entitled to perfect and imperfect
self-defense instructions in a group attack context.  In Corbin, the defendant stabbed the
victim during a dispute inside of a car.  After the initial attack ended, another person
intervened and initiated a second confrontation with the defendant.  The defendant testified
that the victim joined in the second confrontation and that during the second attack the
defendant stabbed the victim for a second time.  The victim died from the second stab
wound.  The trial court denied the defendant’s request for a self-defense instruction because
it found that both incidents constituted one continuing affray and that the defendant was the
initial aggressor in the incident. Corbin, 94 Md. App. at 26-27, 614 A.2d at 1332.  The
defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. 
The court reversed the murder conviction.  The court held that when a defendant
offers some evidence to show that the second attack was an independent confrontation in
which the defendant was not the aggressor, the defendant was entitled to jury instructions
regarding the law of perfect and imperfect self-defense. Id. at 31-32, 614 A.2d at 1333.  In
15
reaching its conclusion the court stated:
‘[W]here several persons are acting together aggressively
toward another, and, because of their acts or the acts of either of
them, it reasonably appears to him that his life is in danger, or
he is in danger of great bodily harm, he may slay any of such
persons or all of them, if it reasonably appears to him to be
necessary so to do to protect himself from death or great bodily
harm.  And when a person is called upon to act under such
circumstances, he is not bound to decide as to which one of the
persons made the actual hostile demonstrations and refrain from
injuring the others.’
Id. at 28-29, 614 A.2d at 1332 (footnotes omitted)(quoting Francis Wharton, The Law of
Homicide § 240 at 396-97 (Frank H. Bowlby ed., 3d ed. 1907)).  
The court added that: 
'Where, in a trial for murder, there is competent evidence
tending to show that the accused believed, and had reasonable
grounds to believe, that he was in danger of losing his life or
suffering great bodily harm at the hands of several assailants
acting together, he may defend against any or all of said
assailants, and it is reversible error for the trial court to refuse
to instruct the jury to that effect.'
Id. at 30, 614 A.2d at 1333. (citations omitted)(quoting State v. Foley, 35 S.E.2d 854, 855
(W.Va 1945).    
Aside from its application to a charge of murder, Maryland appellate courts have
applied common law self-defense to other assaultive crimes.  See Bussie v. State, 115 Md.
App. 324, 693 A.2d 49 (1997); Bryant v. State, 83 Md. App. 237, 574 A.2d 29 (1990).
Bryant was the result of a brutal and bloody altercation between two men.  The facts relating
to which party started the fight were in dispute, but when the fight ended one party was
16
hospitalized with forty stab wounds.  The defendant was charged and convicted of attempted
first degree murder, statutory maiming, assault with intent to disable, and assault and battery.
See Bryant, 83 Md. App. at 239, 574 A.2d at 30.  The trial judge gave a jury instruction on
perfect and imperfect self-defense as it related to the attempted murder charge, but the judge
refused to instruct the jury on self-defense as a defense to the maiming or assault charges.
The defendant appealed on the basis of the trial judge’s refusal to instruct and the Court of
Special Appeals reversed, concluding that “the simple and frequently neglected truth is that
the defense of self-defense applies to assaultive crimes generally.”  Id.  at 245, 574 A.2d at
33.  In support of its holding, the court explained the applicability of self-defense to all
assaultive crimes:  
"[i]t is only just that one who is unlawfully attacked by another,
and who has no opportunity to resort to the law for his defense,
should be able to take reasonable steps to defend himself from
physical harm.   When the steps he takes are reasonable, he has
a complete defense to such crimes against the person as murder
and manslaughter, attempted murder, assault and battery and the
aggravated forms of assault and battery.   His intentional
infliction of (or, if he misses, his attempt to inflict) physical
harm upon the other, or his threat to inflict such harm, is said to
be justified when he acts in proper self-defense, so that he is not
guilty of any crime." 
Id. at 246, 574 A.2d at 33 (quoting W. Lafave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 5.7 (2d ed. 1986))
(emphasis in original).  The court added that because self-defense could exculpate the
defendant from the underlying assault charges, the necessary implication was that self-
defense could be a complete defense to the aggravating forms of assault.  See id. at 246, 574
A.2d at 34.  
17
With respect to the statutory maiming charge, the court reasoned that if the victim’s
maiming injuries were caused by a necessary self-defense to an attack which threatened the
defendant with death or serious bodily injury, then the trial judge should have given a self-
defense instruction to maiming charges.  Id.  See also Bussie v. State, 115 Md. App. 324, 693
A.2d 49 (1997)(self-defense instruction is appropriate to a charge of assault with intent to
disable).  
In sum, we think it clear that when an individual reacts, in an honest and reasonable
belief, to a threat of imminent danger that may cause his or her death or serious bodily harm
and uses no more force than the situation requires, that individual is legally exonerated from
the criminal liability his or her actions may create, regardless of whether the State charges
him or her with one of the various types of criminal homicide or assault under Maryland
common law.  See Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 211, 571 A.2d 1251, 1254 (1990); Faulkner
v. State, 301 Md. 482, 485, 483 A.2d 759, 761 (1984);  Redcross v. State, 121 Md. App. 320,
327, 708 A.2d 1154, 1157 (1998); Bussie, 115 Md. App at 346, 693 A.2d at 60.  Bryant, 83
Md. App. at 245, 574 A.2d at 33.  With the previously declared applicability of self-defense
in mind, we next turn to examine the body of law dealing with the statutory crime of reckless
endangerment.  
B.
The crime of reckless endangerment, not recognized as a distinct crime at common
law, is codified in Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.), Article 27 §
12A-2.  The statute provides, in pertinent part:
18
(a) Creation of substantial risk of death or serious physical
injury; penalties.
--(1) Any person who recklessly engages in conduct that creates
a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another
person is guilty of the misdemeanor of reckless endangerment
and on conviction is subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or
imprisonment for not more than 5 years or both.
Section 12A-2 is a relatively new addition to the arsenal of criminal statutes used to deter
criminal conduct.  In 1989, the General Assembly enacted the statute with a clear policy goal
in mind.  It focused on deterring reckless behavior that posed a risk of serious injury or death
before the injury or death occurred.  See State v. Albrecht,  336 Md. 475, 500-01, 649 A.2d
336, 348 (1994)(citing Minor v. State, 326 Md. 436, 442, 605 A.2d 138, 141 (1992)).   It was
clear to us in Minor that the underlying purpose of the statute was aimed toward deterrence.
We explained that:
it is readily evident from the plain language of [the reckless
endangerment statute] that it was enacted to punish, as criminal,
reckless conduct which created a substantial risk of death or
serious physical injury to another person.  It is the reckless
conduct and not the harm caused by the conduct, if any, which
the statute was intended to criminalize.
Minor, 326 Md. at 141, 605 A.2d at 141.  See also Williams v. State, 100 Md. App. 468, 481,
641 A.2d 990, 996 (1994)(reckless endangerment is directed at inhibiting criminal conduct
before it goes too far).  
The elements of a prima facie case of reckless endangerment are: 1) that the defendant
engaged in conduct that created a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to
another; 2) that a reasonable person would not have engaged in that conduct; and 3) that the
defendant acted recklessly.  See Albrecht, 336 Md. at 501, 649 A.2d at 348-49.  The
19
predominant issue in the Maryland cases dealing with the crime of reckless endangerment
has been the question of defining the requisite mental state of recklessness required to sustain
a reckless endangerment conviction.  
In Minor v. State, 326 Md. 436, 605 A.2d 138 (1992), we were called upon to
determine whether a defendant who handed his intoxicated brother a loaded shotgun, dared
him to play “Russian Roulette,” and watched his brother shoot himself had the required
mental state to violate the reckless endangerment statute.  The defendant argued that he did
not act recklessly because he subjectively believed that his brother was not going to pull the
trigger of the gun.  He urged us to adopt the Model Penal Code definition of “reckless”
which defined that mental state as a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk.  Minor, 326 Md at 440, 605 A.2d at 140 (citing Model Penal Code, § 211.2).  We
rejected the defendant’s argument, instead opting for an objective definition.  We stated that:
guilt under the statute does not depend upon whether the
accused intended that his reckless conduct create a substantial
risk of death or serious injury to another.   The test is whether
the appellant's misconduct, viewed objectively, was so reckless
as to constitute a gross departure from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe, and thereby create the
substantial risk that the statute was designed to punish.
Id. at 443, 605 A.2d 141.  
We later applied this test in Albrecht, 336 Md. at 501, 649 A.2d at 348-49.  The
defendant in Albrecht was a Montgomery County police officer.  In an arrest confrontation
with a group of suspects, the police officer aimed his self-customized shotgun at a young
woman and unintentionally pulled the trigger.  The woman was killed instantly.  The police
  Because the defendant in Albrecht was a police officer, we adjusted the
10
recklessness standard to that of a ordinary prudent police officer under similar circumstances.
Albrecht, 336 Md. at 501, 649 A.2d at 349.  
20
officer was charged and convicted of involuntary manslaughter and multiple counts of
reckless endangerment.  One issue in our inquiry was whether the police officer’s conduct
“constituted a gross and wanton deviation from reasonable conduct” such that would support
the reckless endangerment convictions.  Albrecht, 336 Md. at 487-88, 649 A.2d at 341.  We
reaffirmed our holding in Minor, explaining that the trier of fact is to measure the accused’s
conduct against that of “an ordinary prudent citizen similarly situated.”   We ultimately held,
10
under the objective standard, that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the trial court’s
convictions.   
From the foregoing, we glean two points that are of particular significance to the case
at hand.  First, it is clear from our case law that the legislature enacted §12A-2 to deter or
inhibit behavior.  The statute criminalizes reckless behavior that creates a substantial risk of
death or serious bodily harm.  Second, to evaluate whether the behavior is reckless under
§12A-2, the trier of fact must evaluate the defendant’s conduct from the standpoint of an
ordinary, law-abiding citizen under similar circumstances.  
With these points in mind, we come to the ultimate inquiry in this case: whether self-
defense is appropriate to be judicially recognized as a defense to a charge of general reckless
endangerment.  For reasons we shall explain below, we hold that when a defendant is
charged with the statutory crime of reckless endangerment under §12A-2(a)(1) and evidence
  Maryland Rule 4-325 addresses the procedural guidelines governing instructions
11
to the jury.  Based on this rule, we have set forth the threshold requirements for a party’s
entitlement to a jury instruction as follows:
(1) the requested instruction must be a correct statement of the law;
(2) the requested instruction is applicable under the facts of the case; and
(3) the content of the requested instruction was not fairly covered by the other
instructions given by the court.
See Patterson v. State, 356 Md. 667,___, 741 A.2d 1119, 1122 (1999)(quoting Ware v. State,
348 Md. 19, 58, 702 A.2d 699, 718 (1997)).    
21
is presented to generate an issue of common law perfect self-defense, the defendant is
entitled to have the jury instructed regarding the application of self-defense to the charge of
reckless endangerment, assuming the other necessary instructional elements are in place.11
 
In murder and assault contexts, a person who protects himself or herself from an
imminent attack is excused from the criminal liability that his or her defense may create.
Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 210-11, 571 A.2d 1251, 1254 (1990); Bussie, 115 Md. App.
at 347, 691 A.2d at 60; Corbin, 94 Md. App. at 28-29, 614 A.2d at 1332; Bryant, 83 Md.
App. at 246, 574 A.2d at 33.  Although we do not encourage people to defend themselves
when they have the time and the ability to get help from a law enforcement authority or
retreat to safety, our law does not dictate that a person stand idly by and become a victim of
assaultive aggression. Bryant, 83 Md. App. at 246, 574 A.2d at 33. 
In this case, the State charged Petitioner with attempted second degree murder,
attempted voluntary manslaughter, first degree assault, four counts of second degree assault,
and four counts of reckless endangerment.  The charges stemmed from the series of actions
taken by Petitioner at Adventure World.  Petitioner’s evidence generated the issue of self-
22
defense, but the trial judge instructed the jury on self-defense only as it related to the murder
and assault charges.  We cannot reconcile the conflict between potentially excusing conduct
based on common law self-defense to charges of attempted murder and assault while not
making available a similar defense to the statutory reckless endangerment charges.
Therefore, we shall recognize, pursuant to § 12A-3, the applicability of common law self-
defense to the statutory crime of reckless endangerment under § 12A-2(a)(1).
In every reckless endangerment case where the fact finder believes the evidence
generating self-defense, the fact finder is foreclosed from finding the three elements of
reckless endangerment.  A required element of reckless endangerment is that a reasonable
person would not have engaged in the conduct at issue in the case.  See Minor, 326 Md. at
443, 605 A.2d at 141.  In every case where a defendant shows that his or her actions were
taken in an honest and reasonable belief that he or she was in imminent danger of serious
bodily harm from an assaultive attack, and used no more force than necessary in light of the
attack, as matter of logic, it cannot be said that the defendant engaged in conduct that a
reasonable person would have abstained from under the circumstances.  As the elements of
self-defense necessarily negate a required element of reckless endangerment, a self-defense
instruction, if generated, is relevant to a charge of reckless endangerment.  
Our holding today comports with the policy underlying § 12A-2.  The General
Assembly obviously enacted the reckless endangerment statute to deter reckless conduct.
Minor, 85 Md. App. at 314, 583 A.2d at 1106.  The test that we use to determine if a
defendant’s conduct was reckless is whether the conduct, viewed objectively, constitutes a
23
gross departure from the type of conduct that an law-abiding citizen would observe under
similar circumstances.  Albrecht, 336 Md. at 501, 649 A.2d at 348.  Viewed objectively, an
act taken in self-preservation, that otherwise satisfies all the elements of self-defense, is not
a gross departure from the conduct of a law-abiding citizen under the circumstances.  Rather,
reasonable steps taken to avoid death or serious injury to one’s self are justifiable under our
law.  Dykes, 319 Md. at 210-11, 571 A.2d at 1254; Faulkner, 310 Md. at 485, 483 A.2d at
761.  The legislature sought to deter reckless behavior.  It did not intend expressly to
abrogate the common law right of a person to defend himself or herself when faced with an
imminent, assaultive attack.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED IN PART;  CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
DIRECTIONS 
TO 
REVERSE 
THE
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AS TO THE
R E C K L E S S  
E N D A N G E R M E N T
CONVICTIONS AND REMAND THE CASE
TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR A NEW
TRIAL 
ON 
THE 
RECKLESS
ENDANGERMENT COUNTS ONLY;  COSTS
TO BE PAID BY PRINCE GEORGE’S
COUNTY.    
             
     
24
Donald Anthony Jones v. State of Maryland, No. 35, September Term 1999.
CRIMINAL LAW — RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT — DEFENSES — COMMON LAW
SELF-DEFENSE — Common law self-defense is a viable defense to the statutory crime of
reckless endangerment under Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.),
Article 27, § 12A-2(a)(1).