Case Title: Eley v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 417, 2000

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
LINWOOD ELEY, III,
)
)  No. 417, 2000
Defendant Below,
)
Appellant,
)  Court Below:  Superior Court
)  of the State of Delaware in
v.
)  and for Sussex County
)
STATE OF DELAWARE,
)  Cr. A. Nos. S99-11-0047 &
)  S99-10-0048 thru 53
Plaintiff Below,
)
Appellee.
)
Submitted:  October 24, 2001
Decided:  November 1, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 1st day of November, 2001, it appears to the Court that:
1.
On August 25, 2000, the appellant filed a notice of appeal from an
Order of the Superior Court dated July 28, 2000.  Appellant Eley raises the
following three issues in this appeal: 1) that the Superior Court erred in admitting
and considering testimony from two witnesses who claimed to have seen Eley in
possession of a handgun one month before the crime in question; 2) that the court
erred in considering the testimony of two officers because they were not qualified
to render an opinion as experts concerning the caliber of bullet that penetrated a car
at the crime scene; and 3) that the testimony of several key witnesses lacked
credibility and thus the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.
2
2.
Eley cites Farmer v. State1 as support for his position that the earlier
sighting of the gun should be excluded on the basis of relevancy.  In Farmer we
found error in the admission of evidence of gun possession in a jury trial because
there was no nexus between the gun being introduced and the crime at issue and
thus the admission would be unduly prejudicial.  In this case, the trial judge was
satisfied that the similarities between the gun viewed a month earlier in Eley’s
possession and the one tied to the indictment were sufficient to admit it.
Moreover, because this was a bench trial, the trial judge’s training and experience
allows him to overcome any undue prejudice that might attach and give the
testimony its due weight.  The trial judge also relied on other facts in reaching his
conclusion that Eley possessed a firearm.  Therefore, even if the trial judge should
not have considered this evidence, its admission constitutes harmless error.
3.
The trial judge relied on opinion testimony, elicited through sua
sponte questioning, that likely required a ballistics expertise that the officers did
not have.  However, Appellant failed to object to this testimony at trial or to the
officers’ qualifications as experts on this subject.  Any error caused by relying on
the “expert ballistics” testimony does not rise to the level of plain error given
defense counsel’s failure to object.  We presume for tactical reasons that defense
                                          
1 Del. Supr. 698 A.2d 946 (1997).
3
counsel chose not to object and therefore the defendant waived any right to raise
this issue on appeal.2  Furthermore, it is readily apparent from the trial judge’s
carefully stated findings of fact that this testimony was not dispositive in any
event.
4.
Determinations of the credibility of witnesses are clearly within the
purview of the trier of fact.  The trial judge’s detailed factual findings set forth the
reasons for his decision and are substantially supported by the record.  Because
these findings appear to be the product of an orderly and logical deductive process,
this claim is without merit.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Myron T. Steele___________________
Justice
                                          
2United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993).