Case Title: CLONTZ v CLONTZ

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1974-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. 12658 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 19 74 JOHN J . C L O N T Z , SR. , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS - E L E N A C L O N T Z , ~ e f e n d a n t and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R e D o McPhillips, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Hoyt, Bottomly and Gabriel, Great F a l l s , Montana Richard V. Bottomly, argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent : Church, Harris, Johnson and Williams, Great F a l l s , Montana Douglas C. Allen and Robert P. Groff, argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: November 15, 1974 Decided : FEB 1 4 1 9 7 5 ~ i l e d : FEE ! 4 ! 9 F M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment of the d i s t r i c t court, H i l l County. The judgment appealed amends a judgment entered by t h e same court on October 16, 1973, which modified alimony provisions of an o r i g i n a l decree entered January 5, 1971. The o r i g i n a l action was commenced i n the f a l l of 1970 by p l a i n t i f f husband who sought a divorce. He alleged mental cruelty a s g r d s and requested a division of property. Defendant wife answered by a general denial and crossclaimed f o r separate mainten- ance and attorney fees. She too requested a division of property. On January 5 , 1971, the d i s t r i c t court held t h a t each party was g u i l t y of extreme mental c r u e l t y and each was e n t i t l e d t o a divorce; but, since the husband was the only party who petitioned f o r divorce, he was granted t h e divorce. In the division of property, the husband was awarded the j o i n t l y owned farm and was required t o pay the wife f o r her i n t e r e s t i n the land which was found t o be $19,350. She was paid $3,000 down and the remaining amount was t o be paid i n 120 monthly in- stallments with i n t e r e s t a t the r a t e of 6% per annum on the unpaid balance. She was a l s o given a l i f e e s t a t e i n the mineral i n t e r e s t on the farm land. The d i s t r i c t court further vested t i t l e t o a l o t i n Flathead County i n the husband. The court gave the wife her choice of household furniture; one half of the proceeds of the s a l e of c e r t a i n Burlington Railway stock; a 1968 Volkswagen; and, awarded her $125 per month alimony. The wife on January 15, 1971, petitioned f o r a modification of the decree seeking f u r t h e r r e l i e f a s t o the value of the property settlement. After f u r t h e r hearings, the court on March 3, 1971, modified t h e decree by r a i s i n g the wife's i n t e r e s t i n the farm land from $19,350 t o $20,276.50. O n February 28, 1973, the wife f i l e d her p e t i t i o n f o r modifica- t i o n of the decree requesting an increase i n alimony payment, divi- sion of property, and attorney fees alleging a change of circum- stances since the granting of the o r i g i n a l decree. A t t h e time t h e o r i g i n a l action was f i l e d the p a r t i e s had been married thirty-three years. Husband i s employed a s a r a i l r o a d engineer and earned $17,783 gross earnings i n 1971; $19,200 gross earnings i n 1972; $1,700 i n January 1973; and, $1,568 i n February 1973. When the f i r s t two months of 1973 a r e averaged f o r the balance of t h e year it would amount t o a yearly income of approximately $19,600 f o r t h a t year. The farm yielded 1,000 bushels of wheat i n 1973, but generally harvests 2,000 bushels a year. The husband has remarried. He and h i s wife a r e l i v i n g on the farm. H i s present wife has a son and the husband i s helping put him through college. The wife, on the other hand, was never employed during the marriage of t h i r t y - t h r e e years and has no s k i l l s f o r employment. Out of necessity she i s presently l i v i n g with her mother, receiving f r e e r e n t and u t i l i t i e s , a n d i s sharing the cost of the monthly groceries with her mother. She claimed she lacked privacy and desired t o get her own apartment but was unable t o do so because the alimony payments she received were too low. She a l s o had s i g n i f i c a n t medical expenses and had paid her own medical insurance. After a hearing on the p e t i t i o n f o r modification the court on October 16, 1973, denied the change i n property valuation, awarded the wife an increase of $35 per month i n alimony and ordered t h e husband t o pay $400 of the $1,200 attorney fees owed by the wife. In addition, the court ordered the husband t o carry the wife on h i s medical and hospitalization insurance program, i f permissible under h i s program. Both p a r t i e s took exception t o the new order. In h i s p e t i t i o n t o amend t h e amended decree new attorneys appeared f o r the husband. The wife challenged the new decree a s awarding an i n s u f f i c i e n t amount of alimony t o support herself. The husband challenged the increase i n alimony a s being unconstitutional since section 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, provides f o r alimony only f o r the wife and thereby discriminates against the husband which i s i n violation of A r t . 11, Sec. 4 of the 1972 Montana Constitution which prohibits discrimina- tion on the basis of sex. He also challenges the award of attorney fees as being unconstitutional, since section 21-137, R.C.M. 1947, allows only the wife to recover attorney fees, it is in violation of the same Art. 11, Sec. 4 of the 1972 Montana Constitution. Finally, the husband challenges the original granting of alimony as being beyond the jurisdiction of the court since section 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, provides alimony can only be granted to a wife who has been granted a divorce for an offense of her husband and, since the husband in this case was granted the divorce, the court could not award alimony. The district court on February 28, 1974, after a hearing on the petitions, found the increase in alimony and the award of attorney fees to the wife to be unconstitutional and therefore void. It found, however, that since the husband had failed to appeal from the award of alimony and has paid alimony to the wife since the original award in 1971, it would be against public policy to allow the husband, after the passage of this amount of time, to set aside the alimony award. These preceding facts depict the case it stands before this Court. The wife and husband present three issues to be resolved by this Court: 1 ) Was the increase in alimony from $125 to $160 per month so insufficient as to constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court? 2 ) Was the district court without jurisdiction to award alimony and later to increase the award of alimony, since the husband was granted the divorce and the divorce was not granted to the wife for an offense of the husband? 3 ) Are sections 21-137 and 21-139, R . C . M . 1947, unconstitutional under the 1972 Montana Constitution which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex? Issue number 3 w i l l not be decided by t h i s Court a s i t i s improperly before the Court. Rule 38, M.R.App.Civ.P., s t a t e s : "It s h a l l be the duty of counsel who challenges the con- s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of any Act of the Montana l e g i s l a t u r e i n any s u i t o r proceeding i n the supreme court t o which the s t a t e of Montana, o r any agency thereof, o r any o f f i c e r o r employee thereof, a s such o f f i c e r o r employee, i s not a party, upon the f i l i n g of the record t o give immediate notice i n writing t o the court of the existence of said question, specifying the section of the Code or the chapter of the session law t o be construed. The c l e r k s h a l l thereupon c e r t i f y such f a c t t o the attorney general of the s t a t e of Montana. I I Here, Rule 38 was not followed r e s u l t i n g i n no notice t o the attorney general. The attorney general must be given an opportunity under the circumstances s e t f o r t h i n Rule 38, t o appear i n defense of a l e g i s l a t i v e a c t which i s being challenged on constitutional grounds. Issue number 2--whether the d i s t r i c t court was without j u r i s d i c t i o n t o award alimony and l a t e r t o increase t h a t award of alimony since the divorce was not granted t o the wife f o r an offense of the husband. Section 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, provides i n pertinent p a r t : "Where a divorce i s granted f o r an offense of the husband, the court may compel him t o * * * make such s u i t a b l e allowance t o the wife f o r her support during her l i f e , o r f o r a shorter period, a s the court may deem j u s t * * *." The husband argues t h a t since the divorce was granted t o him, the court was without jurisdiction t o award alimony and c i t e s Grush v. Grush, 90 Mont. 381, 3 P.2d 402. H e acknowledges i n h i s b r i e f t h a t the f a c t s of Grush a r e distinguishable from the case here. The divorce i n t h a t case was granted on the grounds of desertion, although the husband and wife were l i v i n g together a t the time the divorce was i n i t i a t e d . The wife agreed not t o challenge the divorce upon the agreement t h a t he pay her alimony. The court ruled t h a t i n a divorce granted t o the husband f o r an offense of the wife, alimony could not be awarded. The agreement was held collusive and against public policy. The court, however, held i n e f f e c t t h a t the husband was awarded the decree, accepted the benefits of a divorce, and he i s estopped from seeking r e l i e f from i t s burdens, agreed t o by him i n writing. The i n s t a n t case can be brought under the same exception. The husband took the benefit of the divorce and agreed t o pay alimony a s p a r t of a property settlement proposal. This proposal i n the o r i g i n a l action, was a proposed property settlement i n the form of a communication dated October 8, 1970, from husband's counsel t o wife's. This case can a l s o be further distinguished from Grush i n t h a t the d i s t r i c t court found i n i t s finding of f a c t No. IV and conclusion of l a w No. I t h a t both p a r t i e s were g u i l t y of extreme mental cruelty and both were e n t i t l e d t o a divorce. Therefore, had the wife requested a divorce she would have been granted one. She f a i l e d t o do so; instead she f i l e d f o r separate maintenance which was denied. According t o the husband's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of section 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, the only factor which prevents the wife from receiving alimony is t h a t she f a i l e d t o ask f o r a divorce, but r a t h e r asked f o r separate maintenance. W e find such interpretation much too harsh. Neither do we f e e l t h a t it properly r e f l e c t s t h e i n t e n t of the l e g i s l a t u r e when it enacted t h e s t a t u t e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view of the doctrine t h a t where a divorce i s granted t o both husband and wife, t h i s Court has allowed an award of alimony t o the wife. Burns v. Burns, 145 Mont. 1, 400 P.2d 642. The f i n a l issue f o r discussion, issue No. 1, i s whether the d i s t r i c t court abused i t s discretion i n i t s award of $160 per month alimony t o the wife. She urges t h a t $160 is an i n s u f f i c i e n t amount. After reviewing the f a c t s , we find no abuse of discretion on t h e part of the d i s t r i c t court. W e considered a l l the evidence concerning both p a r t i e s ; the amount of money the wife i s receiving i n payment f o r her share of the land; her royalty i n t e r e s t i n the land; her alimony payments; the assumption by the husband of responsibility f o r her health insurance policy payments; and the finding of the d i s t r i c t court t h a t the wife was capable of some employment t o help pay f o r her own l i v i n g costs. The judgment entered on February 26, 1974 and appealed t o t h i s Court is reversed. The judgment entered by the t r i a l court on October 16, 1973, i s reinstated i n i t s entirety. Each party t o bear h i s o r her own costs on appeal. Justice W e Concur: Chief ~ u s ' t i c e ................................ Justices. Mr. Justice Wesley Castles concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the result here; which, if I can read reinsta tes the judgment of October 16, 1973. However, I dissent as to the reasons given. Again, I have to wonder if I really understand the reasons. The majority first considers Issue No. 3; that is, the district court's ruling that sections 21-137 and 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, are unconstitutional. We refuse to rule on the issue because the attorney general was not notified. Aside from any view of the meaning of Rule 38 of this court's Appellate Rules, what effect is our holding to have? We refuse to review the district court's holding of uncon- stitutionality---which as applied here affirms the holding. Or, have we reversed the holding? I just do not know, but my basis for dissenting is that I believe this Court should rule on the constitutionality of these statutes.