Case Title: Maquoit Bay LLC v. Department of Marine Resources

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2022 ME 19

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2022-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2022 ME 19 
Docket: 
Cum-21-113 
Argued: 
November 3, 2021 
 
 
Decided: 
 March 31, 2022 
 
Panel: 
STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
MAQUOIT BAY, LLC, et al. 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF MARINE RESOURCES et al. 
 
 
STANFILL, C.J. 
[¶1]  Maquoit Bay, LLC, and its sole members, Paul and Kathleen Dioli, 
(collectively, the Diolis) appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court 
(Cumberland County, McKeon, J.) affirming the Department of Marine 
Resources’ (DMR) decision to grant an aquaculture lease to Mere Point Oyster 
Company, LLC (MPOC) in Maquoit Bay.  We affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  In February 2018, MPOC applied for a ten-year standard 
aquaculture lease for a site in Maquoit Bay located approximately 1,250 feet 
from the Diolis’ shorefront property on Mere Point in Brunswick.  The Diolis 
participated as limited intervenors in DMR’s review of MPOC’s application.  
 
2 
See 13-188 C.M.R. ch. 2, § 2.20(3)(B) (effective Oct. 17, 2013).1  The Diolis 
argued to DMR that the proposed lease would unreasonably interfere with the 
ingress to and egress from their property as well as their navigation routes in 
the bay.  After a public hearing, DMR approved MPOC’s application in 
December 2019 over the objections of the Diolis and other community 
members, finding that the lease would not unreasonably interfere with the 
ingress and egress of riparian owners or with navigation, fishing, and other 
existing uses in and around the lease site.  See 12 M.R.S. § 6072 (7-A) (2021); 
13-188 C.M.R. ch. 2, § 2.37(1)(A).   
[¶3]  The Diolis filed a Rule 80C petition requesting review of DMR’s 
decision and joining independent claims that challenged various aspects of 
MPOC’s application and the regulations that DMR followed in reviewing and 
approving it.  See M.R. Civ. P. 80C(a), (i).  They also joined a claim against MPOC 
owner and Brunswick Harbormaster Dan Devereaux individually.  DMR moved 
to dismiss the Diolis’ independent claims and to sever the claim against 
Devereaux.  On April 17, 2020, the court ordered that the case would proceed 
 
1  DMR regulations governing aquaculture leases, currently codified at 13-188 C.M.R. ch. 2 (2022), 
have been amended in various ways since 2018.  In this opinion, we interpret the aquaculture lease 
regulations as they existed when MPOC submitted the contested lease application to DMR in 
February 2018 and generally do not discuss the regulations as they are now codified. 
 
 
3 
as an administrative appeal and deferred judgment on DMR’s motion to dismiss 
until after oral arguments.   
[¶4]  The court affirmed DMR’s approval of MPOC’s lease application on 
January 14, 2021.  The court also dismissed all independent claims joined with 
the Rule 80C petition except for the claim against Devereaux. M.R. Civ. P. 80C(i).  
The Diolis filed consented-to motions for final partial judgment, M.R. Civ. P. 
54(b)(1), and to stay further proceedings on the claim against Devereaux 
during the pendency of their anticipated appeal to us.  M.R. Civ. P. 62(e).  The 
court granted those motions on March 22, 2021, certifying the partial judgment 
as a final judgment,2 directing entry of judgment against the Diolis on their Rule 
80C petition and the six independent counts that had been dismissed, and 
staying the claim against Devereaux.  The Diolis timely appealed.  See M.R. App. 
P. 2B(c)(1); 5 M.R.S. § 11008(1) (2021). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶5]  In an appeal from a Superior Court judgment on a Rule 80C petition, 
we review the underlying administrative agency decision directly for abuse of 
discretion, errors of law, or findings unsupported by substantial evidence in the 
 
2  The court properly certified the partial final judgment because it made specific findings and 
provided a reasoned statement explaining its decision.  See Guidi v. Town of Turner, 2004 ME 42, 
¶¶ 8-10, 845 A.2d 1189; M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1).  
 
4 
record.  Somerset Cnty. v. Dep’t of Corr., 2016 ME 33, ¶ 14, 133 A.3d 1006.  The 
party challenging the agency decision bears the burden of persuasion on 
appeal.  Id. 
A. 
“Riparian Owner” 
[¶6]  The Diolis contend that DMR exceeded its authority by adopting a 
definition for “riparian owner” that conflicts with the plain language of 
12 M.R.S. § 6072(7-A)(A) and is illogical in the context of the broader statutory 
scheme.  That definition, the Diolis argue, led DMR to improperly disregard 
their concerns when considering whether MPOC’s proposed lease would 
unreasonably interfere with the ingress and egress of riparian owners.  Though 
DMR’s regulatory definition is inconsistent with 12 M.R.S. § 6072(7-A)(A), we 
affirm because the agency’s decision ultimately complied with the statute.   
[¶7]  We begin our review of an administrative agency’s interpretation of 
a statute by determining de novo whether the plain meaning of the underlying 
statute is ambiguous.  NextEra Energy Res., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2020 
ME 34, ¶ 22, 227 A.3d 1117.  Section 6072(7-A) establishes conditions that a 
proposed lease must meet before DMR may grant an aquaculture lease 
application, including the following: 
 
 
5 
A. The lease will not unreasonably interfere with the ingress and 
egress of riparian owners. 
 
B. The lease will not unreasonably interfere with navigation. 
 
C. The lease will not unreasonably interfere with fishing or other 
uses of the area. . . . 
 
D. The lease will not unreasonably interfere with significant 
wildlife habitat and marine habitat or with the ability of the lease 
site and surrounding marine and upland areas to support existing 
ecologically significant flora and fauna. 
 
E. The applicant has demonstrated that there is an available source 
of organisms to be cultured for the lease site. 
 
F. The lease does not unreasonably interfere with public use or 
enjoyment within 1,000 feet of a beach, park or docking facility 
owned by the Federal Government, the State Government or a 
municipal governmental agency or certain conserved lands. . . . 
 
G. The lease will not result in unreasonable impact from noise or 
light at the boundaries of the lease site. 
 
12 M.R.S. § 6072(7-A).  The statute does not define the scope of “riparian 
owner,” but the meaning of section 6072(7-A)(A) is clear: DMR cannot approve 
a lease that will unreasonably interfere with the ingress and egress of any 
riparian owner. 
[¶8]  Although our review of agency action generally ends by applying an 
unambiguous statute’s plain meaning, NextEra Energy Res., LLC, 2020 ME 34, 
¶ 22, 227 A.3d 1117, our inquiry in this case continues because section 
 
6 
6072(7-A) also authorizes DMR to make rules further defining the conditions a 
proposed lease must meet, including what constitutes unreasonable 
interference with the ingress and egress of riparian owners.  12 M.R.S. 
§ 6072(7-A); see also id. § 6072(13)(F) (authorizing DMR to make rules for 
“defining [lease] application requirements, an application review process and 
decision criteria”).  But DMR’s rulemaking authority is not limitless; the agency 
cannot adopt a rule that “is not in accord with the underlying statute.”  Cent. Me. 
Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 458 A.2d 739, 741 (Me. 1983).  Pursuant to its 
statutory authority, DMR defines “riparian owner” for all purposes under 
section 6072 as a “shorefront property owner whose property boundaries are 
within 1000 feet of the proposed lease boundaries.”  13-188 C.M.R. ch. 2, 
§ 2.05(1)(C). 
[¶9]  The Legislature used the term “riparian owner” (and, alternatively, 
“owners of riparian land”) throughout section 6072,3 often with explanatory or 
limiting language.  Indeed, there are several instances in which the statute 
expressly limits the class of riparian owners to those within 1,000 feet of a lease 
 
3  The Legislature amended this statute after MPOC submitted its application, but we apply the 
version in effect at the time of the application and decision.  See P.L. 2021, ch. 52, §§ 1-9 (effective 
Oct. 18, 2021) (to be codified at 12 M.R.S. § 6072(6)(A)-(C), (11), (12), (12-A), (12-A)(C), (12-C), (13), 
(15)).   
 
7 
site.  See, e.g., 12 M.R.S. § 6072(5) (notice to riparian owners when an 
application is complete and a hearing is scheduled); id. § 6072(11-A)(D) (notice 
to riparian owners before DMR assigns a lease); id. § 6072(12-A) (notice to 
riparian owners when an application for a lease transfer is complete).  Applying 
DMR’s “riparian owner” definition to these provisions is redundant.4 
[¶10]  In other parts of section 6072, DMR’s “riparian owner” definition 
is superfluous because the statutory language itself limits the class of riparian 
owners to which it applies.  See 12 M.R.S. § 6072(4)(F) (requiring lease 
applications to include written permission from every riparian owner whose 
land to the low-water mark will be used); id. § 6072(12-C)(A)(3) (same with 
respect to applications for lease expansion); id. § 6072(8)(C), (E) (establishing 
an order of preference when multiple applicants seek to lease the same area, 
including “[f]ourth, to the riparian owner of the intertidal zone in which the 
leased area is located” and “[s]ixth, to the riparian owner within 100 feet of 
leased coastal waters”). 
 
4  Other provisions in section 6072 refer to “known riparian owners.”  See 12 M.R.S. § 6072(4)(G) 
(requiring lease applications to identify “known riparian owners as listed in the municipal tax 
records”); id. § 6072(6)(A) (requiring DMR to personally notify “known riparian owners” of hearings 
on lease applications); id. § 6072(12-C)(A)(4) (requiring that applications to expand a lease identify 
“known riparian owners as listed in the municipal tax records”).  We do not decide whether DMR’s 
“riparian owner” definition conflicts with those statutory provisions; it is possible that some 
limitation or definition may be appropriate in parts of the statute other than section 6072(7-A)(A).  
 
8 
[¶11]  In contrast, DMR’s rule limiting the class of riparian owners to 
those within 1,000 feet of the proposed lease site is inconsistent with the plain 
language of the statutory provision central to the Diolis’ appeal: 12 M.R.S. 
§ 6072(7-A)(A).  A property’s distance from a proposed lease site has little 
bearing on the question of whether a lease will unreasonably interfere with the 
ingress and egress of riparian owners.  The class of riparian owners to whom 
the statute could apply is finite but could easily include owners whose 
shorefront property is more than 1,000 feet from the lease site.  For example, if 
a proposed lease were located near the entrance to a long but narrow inlet, the 
lease, if granted, could effectively block ingress and egress for any riparian 
owner in the inlet regardless of the distance between the lease site and the 
shorefront properties.  The Legislature did not say that DMR must consider 
whether the lease will unreasonably interfere with the ingress and egress of 
only some riparian owners, and DMR cannot do so by rule.  See Cent. Me. Power 
Co., 458 A.2d at 741 (“[R]ules promulgated by subordinate authority [that] tend 
to contravene the provisions of controlling law . . . are of no effect and will be 
promptly declared invalid.” (quotation marks omitted)). 
[¶12]  Relying on its definition of “riparian owner,” DMR found that 
MPOC’s proposed lease would not unreasonably interfere with the ingress and 
 
9 
egress of any riparian owners solely because no one, including the Diolis, 
owned property within 1,000 feet of MPOC’s proposed lease boundaries.  
Nonetheless, DMR’s ultimate decision complied with section 6072(7-A) even if 
its “riparian owner definition” was inconsistent with the statute.  See Kurzon v. 
U.S. Postal Serv., 539 F.2d 788, 796 (1st Cir. 1976) (“While agency decisions 
must be sustained, if at all, on their own reasoning, this principle does not 
mechanically compel reversal when a mistake of the administrative body is one 
that clearly had no bearing on . . . the substance of the decision reached.” 
(quotation marks and citation omitted)); cf.  Me. Motor Rate Bureau, 357 A.2d 
518, 527 (Me. 1976) (limiting judicial review of administrative action solely to 
whether the agency’s grounds for decision were proper).  
 
[¶13]  Specifically, despite finding that no individuals fit its “riparian 
owner” definition, DMR addressed the concerns that the Diolis and other 
shorefront property owners on Mere Point raised “about their ability to 
navigate to their docks and moorings” when the agency analyzed whether the 
lease would unreasonably interfere with navigation.  See 12 M.R.S. 
§ 6072(7-A)(B); 13-188 C.M.R. ch. 2, § 2.37(1)(A)(2).  Those concerns 
prompted DMR to move the proposed lease site one hundred feet westward to 
“provide[] additional navigable area between the proposed site and Merepoint 
 
10 
Neck.”5  DMR concluded that the adjusted lease site would not unreasonably 
interfere with navigation even though “the proposed site may prompt some 
vessels to alter their traditional course.”   
[¶14]  Because the lease decision reflects that DMR specifically 
considered how the proposed lease would affect the Diolis’ ingress to and 
egress from their property, albeit in the context of analyzing the lease’s effects 
on navigation, DMR complied with section 6072(7-A)(A)’s substantive 
requirements.  See 13-188 C.M.R. ch. 2, § 2.37(1)(A)(1) (directing DMR to 
“examine whether the riparian owners can safely navigate to their shore” when 
determining whether a proposed lease would unreasonably interfere with the 
ingress and egress of riparian owners (emphasis added)).  In other words, 
DMR’s reliance on its “riparian owner” definition did not ultimately affect its 
analysis.   
B. 
Practicable Alternatives 
 
[¶15]  The Diolis next contend that DMR erred as matter of law by not 
requiring MPOC to assess whether there were practicable alternatives to the 
proposed lease site that would have a lesser impact on existing uses.  
 
5  The lease site is also bisected by a four-hundred-foot, gear-free navigational corridor that gives 
Mere Point residents an option to access Maquoit Bay by navigating through the lease site in addition 
to navigating around it.   
 
11 
Specifically, the Diolis argue that the existence of practicable alternative 
locations must be considered to meet section 6072’s “no unreasonable 
interference” standard.  They also argue that DMR’s refusal to require a 
practicable-alternatives analysis violates the public trust doctrine.  Finding 
neither argument persuasive, we affirm this aspect of the judgment. 
1. 
Statutory Requirements 
[¶16]  The Diolis rely on Uliano v. Bd. of Env’t Prot. (Uliano I), 2005 ME 88, 
876 A.2d 16, to support their argument that lease applicants must analyze 
practicable alternatives.  In Uliano I, we vacated a Board of Environmental 
Protection decision after holding that the Board misapplied the Department of 
Environmental Protection’s (DEP) rule that “‘no activity shall be permitted if 
there is a practicable alternative to the project that would be less damaging to 
the environment.’”  2005 ME 88, ¶¶ 9, 16-17, 876 A.2d 16 (quoting 06-096 
C.M.R. ch. 310, § 5(A) (2002).6  Here, by contrast, section 6072 neither expressly 
nor impliedly requires DMR to consider practicable alternatives when making 
a lease decision, and DMR has no separate rule of its own analogous to any 
 
6  At the time of the Uliano I decision, section 5(A) required DEP to deny applications for projects 
in wetland areas whenever a practicable alternative existed that would be less damaging to the 
environment.  DEP has since amended section 5(A) such that the agency can now deny applications 
only when a practicable alternative with lesser environmental impacts exists and “the activity will 
cause a loss in wetland area, functions, or values.”  06-096 C.M.R. ch. 310, § 5(A) (effective Nov. 11, 
2018). 
 
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version of DEP’s practicable-alternatives standard.  Moreover, the particular 
procedure that the Diolis say is necessary—“an alternatives analysis 
demonstrating that no other lease area exists with a lesser impact on existing 
and surrounding uses”—would be impracticable for applicants to follow and 
for DMR to administer.  (Emphasis added.)  Neither Uliano I nor the statues and 
regulations governing aquaculture leases compel such an analysis.  See Uliano I, 
2005 ME 88, ¶¶ 10-11, 876 A.2d 16 (assessing practicable alternatives to a 
proposed pier—not alternative locations for the pier—for accessing a boat at 
all tides).  Therefore, DMR did not err by approving the lease application 
without requiring MPOC to consider practicable alternatives. 
2. 
Public Trust Doctrine 
[¶17]  With regard to the public trust doctrine, the Diolis assume, 
incorrectly, that DMR lease decisions are quasi-legislative acts that demand a 
balancing of public and private interests beyond what section 6072 requires.  
Unlike quasi-legislative acts such as rulemaking, DMR lease decisions are not 
“focused on policy matters of general applicability.”  Forest Ecology Network v. 
Land Use Reg. Comm’n, 2012 ME 36, ¶ 46, 39 A.3d 74.  Rather, when approving 
or denying an aquaculture lease application, DMR adjudicates individual rights 
based on the statutory framework and evaluation criteria that the Legislature 
 
13 
devised.  See 12 M.R.S. § 6072(6) (characterizing as an “adjudicatory 
proceeding” the public hearing that DMR must hold prior to granting a lease); 
5 M.R.S. § 8002(1) (2021) (defining “adjudicatory proceeding” as “any 
proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of 
specific persons are required by . . . statute to be determined after an 
opportunity for hearing”). 
[¶18]  When, as here, DMR approves an application, the leased 
submerged lands remain “subject to the public trust” because the public retains 
certain rights such as fishing and navigation.  Norton v. Town of Long Island, 
2005 ME 109, ¶ 32, 883 A.2d 889.  DMR considered those rights by evaluating 
whether MPOC’s prospective lease would unreasonably interfere with existing 
uses, including public uses, as it was required to do.  See 12 M.R.S. 
§§ 6072(7-A)(B), (C), (F).  The public trust doctrine does not impose any 
additional burden on DMR to protect the public’s interest in submerged lands, 
and DMR did not err by balancing the interests of MPOC and the public pursuant 
to section 6072’s express requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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C. 
Burden Shifting 
 
[¶19]  The Diolis argue that DMR improperly shifted the burden from 
MPOC to a group of limited intervenors to prove that MPOC’s proposed lease 
would not unreasonably interfere with commercial fishing.  See 12 M.R.S. 
§ 6072(7-A)(C).  We disagree.  DMR’s lease decision reflects that the agency 
relied on information from multiple sources—DMR staff, three harbormaster 
questionnaires, and several commercial fishermen, including members of a 
limited intervenor group—in finding no unreasonable interference with 
commercial fishing.  That reliance is consistent with DMR’s standard practice 
for developing the record that it uses to evaluate lease applications.  See 13-188 
C.M.R. ch. 2, § 2.37(1); see e.g. 12 M.R.S. § 6072(5-A) (requiring DMR to assess 
the proposed site and surrounding areas before a public hearing on a lease 
application to determine the possible effects of the lease on commercially 
significant fauna and traditional fisheries); 13-188 C.M.R. ch. 2, § 2.31(4)-(7) 
(permitting a broad range of people to testify at public hearings on lease 
applications); id. § 2.27(2) (requiring DMR to request information from the 
municipal harbormaster about a proposed lease’s impact on existing uses, 
including fishing).  The Diolis have not met their burden of showing that DMR’s 
finding that the lease would not unreasonably interfere with commercial 
 
15 
fishing was made upon unlawful procedure.  See 5 M.R.S. § 11007(4)(C)(3) 
(2021); Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2014 ME 56, ¶ 19, 90 A.3d 451. 
D. 
“Non-discharge” Designation 
 
[¶20]  We also disagree with the Diolis’ contention that DMR erred by 
designating MPOC’s lease proposal as a “non-discharge” application.  See 
13-188 C.M.R. ch. 2, § 2.10(3)(C) (classifying applications for standard 
aquaculture leases as either “discharge” or “non-discharge”).  DMR defines 
“discharge” for the purpose of its aquaculture lease regulations as “any spilling, 
leaking, pumping, pouring, emptying, dumping, disposing or addition of any 
pollutant including, but not limited to, the addition of feed, therapeutants or 
pesticides to the waters of the State.”  13-188 C.M.R. ch. 2, § 2.05(1)(G).  Because 
DMR’s discharge designation raises a mixed question of fact and law and the 
designation was reasonable, we defer to DMR’s determination and affirm.  
Cf. LaMarre v. Town of China, 2021 ME 45, ¶ 16, n.6, 259 A.3d 764.  The Diolis’ 
argument that the generators, power washers, and seafood-processing 
equipment that MPOC plans to use at the lease site will “inevitably” result in 
discharges is speculative and does not persuade us to disturb DMR’s 
conclusion.  See id. 
 
 
 
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E. 
Notice to DEP 
[¶21]  We also reject the Diolis’ argument that DMR failed to properly 
give notice to DEP about MPOC’s completed lease application.  See 12 M.R.S. 
§ 6072(6)(C) (2018)7.  The record reflects that DMR notified DEP about MPOC’s 
completed application on February 15, 2018, which defeats both the Diolis’ 
notice argument and their related contention that the allegedly improper notice 
undermined DEP’s ability to consider the application of the Natural Resources 
Protection Act.8   
F. 
Conflict of Interest 
 
[¶22]  Finally, contrary to the Diolis’ contention that Devereaux’s 
involvement compromised the fairness of the proceedings, we see no conflict 
of interest arising from Devereaux’s dual roles as an MPOC owner and as 
Brunswick Harbormaster.  Though Devereaux acted in both capacities when 
MPOC initially approached DMR about securing an aquaculture lease, he 
recused himself as harbormaster—at DMR’s insistence—sixteen days after the 
pre-application meeting, the first step in what amounted to a two-and-a-half-
 
7  Since the submission of MPOC’s application, this section of the statute has been amended to 
require notice to the DEP only of “applications that involve activities that have a discharge into the 
waters of the State.”  P.L. 2021, ch. 52, § 3 (effective Oct. 18, 2021).   
8  We also note that the Diolis’ argument about the applicability of the Natural Resources 
Protection Act fails because they raise it for the first time on appeal.  See Cyr v. Cyr, 432 A.2d 793, 797 
(Me. 1981).  
 
17 
year process.  See 13-188 C.M.R. ch. 2, § 2.07(1).  Competent evidence supports 
the conclusion that Deveraux’s prompt recusal removed him from a position of 
influence over the lease decision-making process and effectively eliminated the 
opportunity for him to taint the proceedings by placing his personal pecuniary 
interests over his duties as a public servant.  See Tuscan v. Smith, 130 Me. 36, 
46, 153 A. 289 (1931). 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
David M. Kallin, Esq. (orally), and Amy K. Olfene, Esq., Drummond Woodsum, 
Portland, for appellants Maquoit Bay, LLC, Paul C. Dioli, and Kathleen M. Dioli 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Mark Randlett, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Marine 
Resources 
 
Patrick W. Lyons, Esq, and P. Andrew Hamilton, Esq., Easton Peabody, Bangor, 
for appellee Mere Point Oyster Company, LLC 
 
Jonathan W. Brogan, Esq., and Trevor D. Savage, Esq., Norman, Hanson & 
DeTroy, LLC, Portland, for appellee Daniel R. Devereaux 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number AP-2020-04 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY