Case Title: In Re Estate of Cohen

Citation: 105 Ariz. 337, 464 P.2d 620

Docket Number: 9766-PR

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1970-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
105 Ariz. 337 (1970) 464 P.2d 620 In the Matter of the ESTATE of Willie Hale COHEN, Deceased. Jackie COLE, Appellant, v. Max A. COHEN, Appellee. No. 9766-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. January 30, 1970. *338 John J. Dickinson, Phoenix, for appellant. Lewis, Roca, Beauchamp & Linton, by Charles Crehore and John P. Frank, Phoenix, for appellee. McFARLAND, Justice: The appellant, Jackie Cole, petitioned the Maricopa County Superior Court to vacate an order of distribution of the estate of Willie Hale Cohen. The beneficiary of the order is the appellee, Max Cohen. The Superior Court dismissed the petition and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Cole v. Cohen, 9 Ariz. App. 560, 454 P.2d 878. Appellant now petitions this Court for review. The sole question presented is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition to vacate. Willie Hale Cohen died on October 11, 1964. Her original will, dated September 14, 1960, gave substantially her entire estate to her husband, Max A. Cohen, the appellee. However on June 29, 1964, the decedent executed a handwritten document, dividing her estate equally between the appellee and Jackie Cole, the appellant. Max Cohen was designated executor in both documents and he tendered both documents to the court asking that the proper one be admitted to probate. Jackie Cole, through her attorney, filed a petition for probate of the 1964 will and Max Cohen, by his attorney, filed a contest of the later will, claiming undue influence. The parties then entered into private negotiations for the purpose of settlement. Jackie Cole was represented by an attorney other than the one she originally employed, but on her orders he was excluded from the negotiations and his work was limited to reviewing the various settlement papers. An agreement was nearly reached but there arose a dispute as to legal fees for Jackie Cole's original attorney and, as *339 a result, she refused to execute the final papers. With the matter in this posture, Max Cohen petitioned the Superior Court for a hearing to determine the proper disposition of the case. In addition to the points of mutual agreement and the one disputed item, the petition contained the following paragraph: On December 18, 1964, a hearing was held which resulted in a settlement, Jackie Cole receiving $55,000, a diamond ring valued at $7,000, payment of her original attorney's fees and an agreement by Max Cohen that he would pay any tax liability if such was incurred by Jackie Cole. At the hearing Max Cohen gave the following testimony, which was uncontradicted: His testimony that he made no representations to Jackie Cole was verified by her own testimony: As a result of this hearing the Court, on December 30, 1964, entered the following Order: On January 7, 1965, the second will was admitted to probate and an order for distribution was filed on March 25, 1966. On August 17, 1966, Jackie Cole filed her petition to vacate the order of distribution, a year and eight months after the order terminating her rights in the estate. Her grounds for opposing distribution are that her assignment to Max Cohen was made under duress and that Cohen had defrauded her by misrepresenting the value of the estate and by concealing assets. Although the petition, from which this appeal is taken, is entitled as being directed against the 1965 order for distribution, its main thrust and objective is to set aside the settlement agreement and order. Therefore it is, in fact, a motion to vacate the order of settlement under Rule 60(c), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., and has been briefed as such by counsel. This Court, on numerous occasions, has held that the grant or denial of such motions "* * * is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its action will not be disturbed by this court except for a clear abuse of discretion. Brown v. Beck, 64 Ariz. 299, 169 P.2d 855; Thomas v. Goettl Bros. Metal Products, 76 Ariz. 54, 258 P.2d 816." Eldridge v. Jagger, 83 Ariz. 150, 317 P.2d 942. Jackie Cole seeks to repudiate her own sworn testimony, given at the 1964 hearing, that neither Cohen nor his attorney made any representations to her and that she was aware that they had no way of knowing the true value of the estate until an appraisal could be made. In Adams v. Bear, 87 Ariz. 288, 294, 350 P.2d 751, 755, this Court stated that it is "* * * a general rule that a party is bound by his judicial declarations and may not contradict them in a subsequent proceedings [sic] involving the same parties and questions." This is the doctrine of judicial estoppel which is thoroughly discussed in Martin v. Wood, 71 Ariz. 457, 229 P.2d 710, where we held: This doctrine has been worded as follows: It is true that duress may vitiate the effect of the doctrine, Cagle v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (Tex.), 386 S.W.2d 149, writ of error den., 389 S.W.2d 945, but the allegations of duress here are woefully weak. Most of her allegations are subjective beliefs. For example, from conversations with others she knew Max Cohen to be a man of violence; that she believed he had once shot a woman; that she believed he had served time in jail; that she believed he had once been in the "rackets" and that he had stated to her "We don't want you in Wilco; that's a family company", in such a tone of voice that she believed it to be a threat to her well-being. On another occasion he said to her: This statement is equally consistent with a threat of a legal fight as with a physical confrontation. In Dunbar v. Dunbar, 102 Ariz. 352, 429 P.2d 949, this Court adopted the Restatement definition of duress. We there said: There isn't the slightest indication that either of the two statements by Cohen were "wrongful" other than Jackie Cole's own conclusion that his tone of voice was threatening. The other allegations were her own subjective beliefs. It is apparent that the duress alleged here consists of the appellant's state of mind rather than hard facts. A somewhat similar case, In re White's Estate, 182 Misc. 223, 46 N.Y.S.2d 917, aff'd In re Bishop's Estate, 268 App.Div. 759, 49 N.Y.S.2d 275, appeal dismissed, 293 N.Y. 767, 57 N.E.2d 845, also involved an attempt to set aside an estate settlement agreement on the grounds of fraud and duress. As in the instant case, the movant set *342 forth statements made to her by third persons which put her in fear of the party charged with the duress. The court peremptorily disposed of these saying: The court continued: It is significant that nowhere is there any showing that Jackie Cole, in the many months from the inception of settlement discussions to the filing of her petition, made any attempt to convey her fears to the court or to her attorneys. Petitioner was represented by able counsel of her own choice who would have been able to protect her against any unfair tactics. Instead, she excluded her attorneys from any active participation in settlement negotiations. Moreover, at the hearing, she proceeded to conclude the settlement against the better judgment of her attorney as indicated by this testimony: In summary, Jackie Cole personally negotiated a settlement with Max Cohen, testified in open court that no representations had been made to her, without mentioning duress, concluded the settlement contrary to her attorney's advice and accepted the benefits. She then waited for some twenty months before bringing the matter to the attention of the court and then based on flimsy allegations. Every equitable consideration militates against granting her relief. In fact, to do so would set a precedent virtually destroying the sanctity of judgments, decrees and orders of the court. In view of the foregoing we are satisfied that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in dismissing the petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated. The Order of the Superior Court is affirmed. LOCKWOOD, C.J., STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and UDALL and HAYS, JJ., concur.