Case Title: Hodges & Company v. Albrecht

Citation: 259 So. 2d 829

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1972-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
259 So. 2d 829 (1972)
HODGES & COMPANY, Inc., a Corporation
v.
Mrs. Maybelle M. ALBRECHT.
7 Div. 902.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 23, 1972.
*830 Lusk, Swann, Burns & Stivender and George B. White, Jr., Gadsden, for appellant.
James W. Garrett, James W. Garrett, Jr., Montgomery, for appellee.
BLOODWORTH, Justice.
This is a suit for damages for personal injury brought by plaintiff as the result of a collision between an automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger and a truck driven by defendant Billy Jack Ray. In addition to Ray, plaintiff joined as defendants J. B. Scott and Hodges & Company, Inc., alleging that at the time of the collision Ray was acting as the agent, servant or employee of both Scott and Hodges.
Following completion of plaintiff's case, defendant Hodges requested the general affirmative charge with hypothesis on grounds that the evidence did not show defendant Ray to be its agent, servant or employee. The trial court refused to give this charge and the case was submitted to the jury on one count alleging simple negligence. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against all three defendants for the sum of $15,000 and judgment was entered thereon. Defendant Hodges moved for a new trial on grounds, inter alia, that the verdict of the jury was not sustained by the great preponderance of the evidence in that, under the evidence, Ray was not shown to be its agent, servant or employee. Motion for new trial was denied.
Of the three defendants, only Hodges has appealed. The errors assigned are the refusal to give the affirmative charge and the denial of the motion for new trial. We have concluded that both rulings were correct and that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
On this appeal, Hodges' contention is that the evidence shows J. B. Scott to have been an independent contractor who had contracted to haul material for Hodges & Company, Inc.; that Billy Jack Ray was hired by Scott and therefore could not be the agent, servant or employee of Hodges & Company, Inc.
The test by which to determine whether the relationship, between a workman and those for whom he is rendering service, is that of employee-employer or independent contractor is well settled in Alabama.
Therefore, the crux of the inquiry is whether Hodges & Company, Inc. reserved sufficient right of control over Ray's activities to create the relationship of employer and employee.
As this is largely a factual issue, we will set out the facts pertinent to Ray's employment. Hodges & Company, Inc. is a contractor primarily engaged in the business of highway construction, although it also engages in the construction of gas, water and sewer lines. Hodges owns an asphalt plant and a sand pit, and is also in the business of supplying and transporting these materials to other contractors. Hodges contracts with the State Highway Department on State highway projects, and *831 with the Federal government on interstate highway projects. At the time of the accident Scott had an oral agreement with Hodges to haul materials for it. Scott owned two trucks, one which he operated himself and the other which was operated by Ray. Hodges paid Scott on the basis of the number of units he hauled and the distance he hauled them. Scott paid Ray twenty-five per cent of the per unit payment which Scott received from Hodges. According to testimony for Hodges, when it was working on a federally funded project each driver had to be listed on its payroll to insure compliance with the federal requirement that all drivers be paid at least the minimum wage. When Ray worked on a federal project, Hodges paid Ray directly and deducted his pay from the amount paid to Scott. If the amount Hodges paid to Ray was less than Ray's usual percentage, Scott made up the difference. The work which Ray did was the same whether he was on Hodges' payroll or not. Significantly, during the week of the accident Ray was on Hodges' payroll every day except the day the accident occurred. On the day of the accident, Ray was hauling sand from the sand pit owned by Hodges to the Hodges' asphalt plant. A Hodges' foreman loaded Ray's truck at the sand pit, and another Hodges' foreman told him where to dump the sand at the asphalt plant. A Hodges' foreman told Ray what to haul and where to haul it on any given day. If changes in the weather or the requirements of the job demanded it, a Hodges' foreman would direct Ray to stop hauling one substance and begin hauling another. Although Hodges could not fire Ray as an individual when he was not on their payroll, it did have the right to "fire the truck," according to the testimony. Ray hauled for Hodges exclusively during the entire six months he had been driving Scott's truck. During this period, Ray "followed their [Hodges'] instructions, as to where to load and unload and how to do it, and what have you," according to Scott's testimony.
The first assignment of error argued is that the trial court erred in refusing to give the general affirmative charge. Hodges insists that there was insufficient evidence that Ray was its employee to justify submission of that issue to the jury. We find no merit in this assignment.
Reviewing the tendencies of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff and allowing for such reasonable inferences as the jury was free to draw, we conclude that there was unquestionably a scintilla of evidence indicating that Hodges had actual control, as well as the "reserved right of control," over Ray's activities so as to constitute the relationship of employer-employee or master-servant.
*832 The second assignment of error argued is that the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial. New trial was sought on grounds that the jury's verdict was not sustained by the great preponderance of the evidence. Hodges insists that, even if there was a scintilla of evidence that it had control over Ray, the verdict is not supported by the great weight of the evidence. We acknowledge that,
However, we also point out that,
See, 15A Ala.Dig., New Trial.
Moreover, this court has held that,
See, 2A Ala.Dig., Appeal and Error.
We have reviewed the pertinent evidence in this case, and concede that it presents a close case on the facts. However, in view of the presumptions in favor of the trial court's ruling, as well as the jury's verdict, we cannot say that "the preponderance of the evidence against the verdict is so decided as to clearly convince" this court that the verdict was wrong and unjust.
Defendant Hodges cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions in which draymen, truckmen and cartmen have been held to be independent contractors. On the other hand, plaintiff cites cases in which persons operating their own trucks, and paying the costs of operation, have been held to be employees of the one to whom they render service. We have carefully considered these cases and find none of them to be controlling in the fact situation before us. Indeed, it is doubtful if any one case can be binding precedent on the issue as to whether or not a workman in a given situation is an employee or an independent contractor. As this court has previously observed:
While we are in full accord with the observation that "no one feature of the relation is determinative," we think it highly significant, in the instant case, that Ray received his instructions and directions from Hodges, and it periodically listed him on its payroll and paid him wages as its employee. In none of the cited cases do both of these two features appear.
We conclude that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Affirmed.
HEFLIN, C.J., and COLEMAN, MADDOX and McCALL, JJ., concur.