Case Title: Maestas v. State

Citation: 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 12

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
428 Nev., Advance Opinion |Z.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

sous EYL ED

‘THE STATE OF NEVADA, HAR 29 2012]

Respondent. | a
| *.
BEAU S. MAESTAS, | No, 54080

|

BEAU MAESTAS,
Appellant,

Appellant,

vs,
‘THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.

po

Consolidated appeals from a judgment of conviction of first-
degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, attempted murder with
the use of a deadly weapon, and burglary while in the possession of a
deadly weapon and an order denying a motion for new trial in a death
penalty case. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Donald M.
Mosley, Judge.

Affirmed,

Patti, Sgro & Lewis and Anthony P. Sgro and Erick M. Ferran, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

 

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David Roger,
District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and
Nancy A. Becker, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,

for Respondent.

 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

NIOI

By the Court, CHERRY, J.:
Appellant Beau Maestas pleaded guilty to several charges and
swencow | a jury sentenced him to death for first-degree murder. He subsequently

 

13-0980

 
ye a

 

sought a new penalty trial based on allegations of juror misconduct and
bias, but the district court denied the motion. In these consolidated
appeals, Maestas challenges the judgment of conviction and the order
denying the motion for a new trial. We conclude that none of Maestas’
claims warrant relief and therefore affirm the judgment and order.

In this opinion, we focus principally on two of Maestas’ claims.
First, we consider whether NRS 175.556 violates the Eighth Amendment
because it allows the district court unfettered discretion to choose between
imposing a life-without-parole sentence and impaneling a new jury to
determine the sentence when a jury is unable to reach a unanimous
penalty verdict. We conclude that NRS 175.556 does not violate the
Eighth Amendment because the relevant jurisprudence focuses on
whether a capital sentencing scheme sufficiently channels the sentencer's
discretion to impose a death sentence and NRS 175.556 does not afford the
district court the discretion to impose a death sentence (that
determination is left to the new jury, guided by the requirements set forth
in NRS 175.554). Second, we consider whether the jury foreperson
committed misconduct by expressing her views on the meaning of a life
sentence without the possibility of parole based on her special knowledge
as a 9-1-1 dispatcher and by lying during voir dire to conceal a bias
against Maestas. We hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying the motion for a new trial because no misconduct or
bias was proved.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

‘This case involves an attack on two children in a trailer
located in the CasaBlanca RV Park in Mesquite, Nevada, resulting in the
death of one victim and permanent physical injuries to the other victim.
In the early morning hours of January 22, 2003, Officer Bradley Swanson
responded to a gruesome scene. Outside the trailer, Officer Swanson

2

 
come

 

found three-year-old Kristyanna Cowan lying in her grandmother's arms.
Kristyanna had sustained numerous stab wounds, including a wound to
the left side of her head that penetrated midway through her brain,
wounds to the right side of her head and left side of her neck that
penetrated the jugular vein and caused significant blood loss, and a gaping
wound to her back. Although still alive, Kristyanna was unconscious and
nonresponsive. Swanson found Kristyanna’s 10-year-old sister Brittany
Bergeron inside the trailer. She had suffered at least 20 stab wounds but
‘was still conscious and able to tell Swanson what had happened.

Brittany told Swanson that a male and female in their early
20s had come to the trailer. ‘The male grabbed the girls and put his hand
over their mouths. Brittany attempted to fight back by kicking and biting,
but the male was too strong and everything “went black.”

‘The girls were transported to the hospital. Kristyanna died a
short time later. Brittany survived the attack but was left a paraplegic as
the result of a stab wound that cut through her vertebral column, severing
her spine,

Information received at the crime scene indicated that the
girls’ attackers had some connection to a known drug dealer named
Desiree Towne. ‘Towne informed the police that several hours before the
attacks, Beau Maestas contacted her to arrange a purchase of
methamphetamine. When Towne was unable to secure the drugs from her
source, Maestas inquired about two individuals who drove a white
Firebird with a yellow bumper. ‘Towne determined that Maestas was
referring to Tammy Bergeron (Brittany and Kristyanna's mother) and her
husband Robert Schmidt. Maestas and Towne found Bergeron and
Schmidt at a

 

jino in Mesquite, and Maestas purchased what he believed
to be methamphetamine from Bergeron for $125. ‘The substance turned
out to be salt. Upon discovering this deception, Maestas and Towne
3

 
returned to the casino, where Maestas and Schmidt got into an altereation
and were escorted from the premises. Based on this and other
information, the police issued an attempt-to-locate broadcast to authorities
in Arizona, California, Utah, and Nevada. Maestas was apprehended in
Utah, along with his sister Monique! and his girlfriend, Sabrina Bantam.

Bantam provided a detailed account of the events before and
after the attacks that implicated Maestas and Monique. According to
Bantam, Maestas and Monique arrived at her home after Maestas’
botched drug purchase. They were livid over the counterfeit drugs
purchased from Bergeron. Maestas asked Bantam for a knife, which she
gave to him? Bantam then accompanied Maestas and Monique to the
CasaBlanca RV Park. Maestas parked in the employee parking lot and
instructed Bantam to honk the car horn if she saw a white Firebird
(Bergeron’s vehicle). Maestas exited the car and walked toward the RV
Park, leaving Bantam and Monique in the car.

When Maestas returned to the car approximately 10 minutes
later, he was upset, complaining that the little girls would not let him into
the trailer. Monique became angry and accompanied Maestas back to the
trailer to assist him in gaining entry. Again, Bantam was instructed to
honk the car horn if a white Firebird appeared.

‘Maestas and Monique returned to the car approximately 10 to
15 minutes later. Maestas' hands and clothing were covered in blood.
Bantam drove Maestas and Monique to their grandmother's house to clean
up and get their grandmother's car. During the drive, both siblings made

"Brittany identified Monique in a photographic lineup as the female
attacker,

*Bantam claimed that she believed he needed the knife to cut drugs.

 

 
 

incriminating statements. Monique stated that she tried to stab the little
girl in the organs and kept stabbing. She said, “I should have sliced the
girl's neck then, because I was too scared. I couldn't do it.” Maestas
commented that he “stabbed the little girl in the head.” Maestas,
Monique, and Bantam eventually fled to Utah.

Physical evidence also connected Maestas and Monique to the
attack. With information obtained from Bantam, police located Maestas’
and Monique's bloody clothing and the knives. Blood from both victims
was found on the clothing.

Maestas incriminated himself. He told police that he went to
Bergeron's trailer to get his money back and perhaps to retaliate against
‘Schmidt by “maybe cut{ting] him or stab[bing] him or whatever,” but when
he made his way into the trailer, Brittany and Kristyanna began
screaming, so he stabbed them. He made similar admissions in a letter to
someone named Amy, written while he was incarcerated awaiting
extradition to Nevada. In that letter, which was intercepted by jail
personnel in Utah, Maestas explained the botched drug deal and admitted
that he “fliped [sic] out and killed the lady's youngest daughter and
paralized [sic] the older one.” In a letter he later wrote to Monique while
incarcerated at the Clark County Detention Center, Maestas admitted to
“slaughtering those little pigies [sic],” referring to Brittany and
Kristyanna, and asked Monique to “knock [Bantamy’s teeth out, kick her
lips off, rip her tongue out and wipe your ass with it” when Monique was
released from prison.

‘The charges and trial

‘The State charged Maestas with first-degree murder with the
use of a deadly weapon, attempted murder with the use of a deadly
weapon, and burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon. ‘The State

also filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, alleging two
5

 
aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder occurred in the commission of a
burglary and (2) the victim was under 14 years of age. After Maestas
pleaded guilty to all of the charges, the case proceeded before a jury to
determine the sentence to be imposed for the first-degree-murder charge
as required by NRS 175.552(1)(b). When the jury was unable to reach a
verdict, the district court declared a mistrial and impaneled a second jury
as authorized by NRS 175.556(1).

At the second penalty hearing, the State proceeded on a single
aggravating circumstance—Kristyanna’s age. The State also presented
“other matter evidence,” NRS 175.562(3), including the facts and
circumstances of the crime and the impact on Brittany of her physical and
psychological injuries and the loss of her sister. Regarding the latter,
Brittany's foster mother, Judith Himel, testified that when Brittany came
to live with her about three years before the trial, Brittany was very
apprehensive, needed quite a bit of assistance, and was in a great deal of
pain. During the day, Brittany was generally happy, playing with other
children, swimming, and going to school. But at night, she was frightened
and had difficulty sleeping. She often required a sedative and insisted on
having a light and a television on. On Kristyanna’s birthday and the date
of her death, Brittany releases balloons. Himel testified that Brittany
receives counseling and physical therapy. She also related that Brittany
is an A/B student, on the honor roll, is active in sports, and is about to
enter high school.

In mitigation, Maestas presented six witnesses, including
family members, his former school probation officer, and a psychologist,

and several letters from relatives and friends. The

 

‘tigation case focused
on Maestas’ youth (he was 19 at the time of the attack), abusive and
dysfunctional childhood and relationship with his parents (especially his

 

 
nen

 

mother), character and exposure to illegal substances, cognitive
functioning, admission of guilt, and remorse.

Maestas’ oldest sister, Misty, provided the most compelling
testimony concerning Maestas’ troubled childhood. Misty related that
their father, Harry Maestas, was in prison for murdering several people
but apparently received periodic furloughs on the weekends. Misty
described Harry as violent and threatening. He physically and
emotionally abused Misty and her siblings. For example, when Harry was
home on furlough he would wake the children up at 3 or 4 a.m. to conduct
“closet checks.” If the children’s clothes were not hung or folded properly
or their shoelaces were not tucked in their shoes, he would beat them.
Harry beat Maestas when he was three years old because Maestas could
not tie his shoes. According to Misty, their mother, Marilyn Maestas, was
an equally bad parent. When Misty and her siblings were young, Marilyn,
sold drugs, even taking a job as a truck driver to facilitate her drug
dealing. Marilyn physically and emotionally abused Maestas. She
encouraged Maestas’ use of drugs at an early age—he started using
marijuana when he was 7 years old—and allowed him to consume hard
liquor at the age of 10. Marilyn was present when Maestas started using
methamphetamine at age 13, Marilyn was emotionally abusive to
Maestas, constantly belittling him and calling him horrible and degrading
names. When Maestas returned home after running away, Marilyn beat
him. Marilyn and Harry never displayed any affection toward the
children.

Misty described Maestas as a hyperactive child, who was
angry and confused by the way their parents treated him, She related
positive aspects of Maestas’ life: he held a variety of jobs, was very active
in sports, and was CPR trained and certified. Finally, Misty testified that

 
 

she loved her brother very much and that she would maintain a
relationship with him if he received a life sentence.

Maestas’ stepmother, Linda Maestas, and his stepbrothers,
Christopher and Kevin Buckner, testified about the adverse affect that
‘Marilyn had on her son's life, which they witnessed when Maestas would
stay with them. At the beginning of Maestas' visits, he was troubled,
disobedient, and preoccupied, but in time he relaxed and “would get into
school, into sports, and spend time at home watching movies, playing
games,” acted like a ‘normal kid,” and adjusted well to being in a family.
‘Maestas’ disposition would change, becoming sad and withdrawn, when he
received telephone calls from Marilyn demanding that he return to her.

Maestas’ stepmother and stepbrothers also testified to his
good character and their relationships with him. Kevin described Maestas
as “always looking out for people,” including his family. Linda described
Maestas as a “sweet boy” who wanted to please people, She also related
that she loved Maestas very much and that she was shocked to hear about
his crimes, as Maestas had never displayed violence when he lived with
her.

Maestas’ toxic relationship with his mother was further
illustrated through the testimony of his former school probation officer,
‘Ana Archuleta, who was assigned to Maestas at a high school that he
attended in Utah. On their first visit to her office, Archuleta observed
that Marilyn and Maestas had a very “volatile relationship.” Marilyn was
very angry and aggressive and called Maestas derogatory names.
Although Archuleta recommended that Marilyn participate in counseling
with Maestas, she refused, While under Archuleta's supervision, Maestas
was respectful to her and raised his grades, However, in December 2000,

Maestas violated his probation by not returning home one night and he

was arrested. Marilyn refused to allow Maestas to reside with her, and he

8

 
was placed with his grandmother in Mesquite, Nevada. Other than seeing
Maestas at a court appearance the year before his murder trial, Archuleta
had no contact with Maestas after he went to live with his grandmother.

Letters from relatives and friends expressed shock over the
crimes, stating that Maestas’ actions were out of character for him and
that drugs must have influenced his actions. He was described in the
letters as polite, respectful, helpful, and friendly.

Psychologist David Schmidt testified to Maestas’ cognitive
functioning. He opined that Maestas exhibited impaired fluid reasoning,
which is the capacity to gather information and solve problems. Dr.
‘Schmidt explained that fluid reasoning lessens impulsivity as a person
matures and allows a person to understand the consequences of actions
and stop impulsive responses. Dr. Schmidt explained that although he
supports the death penalty in some cases, he did not here because Maestas
was functioning at a level well below his age at the time of the offenses.?
Dr. Schmidt also opined that Maestas was remorseful for his actions and
suggested that Maestas’ letters referring to “slaughtering those pigies
Isic!” and asking Monique to harm Bantam could be attributed to
posturing and bravado.

Maestas made a statement in allocution. He conveyed his
remorse, apologized to his and the victims’ families, and expressed his
horror at his actions.

‘The jury found that the single aggravating circumstance—
Kristyanna’s age—had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. One or

‘Dr. Schmidt evaluated Maestas at age 22 and determined that he
had the fluid reasoning of a 10-year-old child. According to Dr. Schmidt,
Maestas’ fluid reasoning at the time of the crimes (when he was 19) would
have been either the same or worse.

 

 
os

 

more jurors also found several mitigating circumstances: (1) no significant
history of prior criminal activity, (2) extreme emotional and physical abuse
during childhood, (3) emotional abandonment by parents, (4) lack of any
significant positive male role model during childhood, (6) exposure to
criminal activity throughout childhood, (6) exposure to illegal and harmful
substances throughout childhood, (7) extremely dysfunctional nuclear
family, (8) admission of guilt, and (9) expression of remorse.t The jury
then unanimously found that the “aggravating circumstance outweighs
any mitigating circumstance or circumstances”? and sentenced Maestas to
death. He appealed from the judgment of conviction.
‘The motion for new trial

While that appeal was pending, one of the jurors, Rachel
Poore, approached defense counsel because she was having second
thoughts about her verdict and wanted to help Maestas. As a result of
that contact, Maestas filed a motion for a new trial based on juror
misconduct. The motion relied on Poore’s affidavit regarding comments
made by jury foreperson Tina Ransom. Poore claimed that Ransom told
jurors that (1) she had learned about the sentencing of Nevada inmates

‘Notably, no juror found his age to be a mitigating circumstance.

We note that the quoted language from the verdict form misstates
the weighing calculus set forth in statute. See NRS 175.554(8) (providing
that jury must determine whether there are mitigating circumstances
“sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances
found’); see also NRS 175.554(4). As we recently observed in Nunnery v,
State, this misstatement is of no consequence in most cases and, in any
event, the “error inures to the defendant's benefit.” 127 Nev.__, _ &
1.14, 263 P.3d 235, 253-54 & n.14 (2011).

 

"Maestas was sentenced to three terms of 40 to 180 months in prison
for the other charges,

10

 
one 

 

through her experience as an emergency dispatcher, (2) Maestas would be
released after serving only a few years in prison if he was sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole and that she “had seen this happen on
numerous occasions” and the parole board would undoubtedly release
‘Maestas, and (3) she personally knew of individuals who had been
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole who were “walking the
streets with ankle bracelets.” The State opposed the motion. The district
court conducted an evidentiary hearing. Ten jurors, including Poore and
Ransom, testified during the hearing, and an eleventh juror provided a
voluntary statement but did not testify. ‘The district court also considered
voluntary statements taken by a defense investigator from several of the
jurors who testified.

Poore’s testimony retreated significantly from her affidavit.
She denied two points in the affidavit: (1) that Ransom told the jury that
she had special knowledge about sentencing based on her employment and
(2) that Ransom suggested that the parole board would undoubtedly
release Maestas if he were sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole. She also testified that Ransom never commented on
what might happen to Maestas if he got a life-without-parole sentence.
Poore maintained, however, that Ransom told jurors that she knew of
individuals who had received life-without-parole sentences and were
released to the streets with ankle bracelets. According to Poore, that
general comment was made after the jury's initial nonunanimous vote in
favor of the death penalty and a lengthy discussion of mitigation matters
that occurred before the jury reached its unanimous verdict. Related to
her motivations in contacting defense counsel, Poore acknowledged that
the case had consumed her life and she was in counseling because of it.
She explained that she wanted to undo her verdict and that she signed the
affidavit, which was drafted by Maestas’ counsel, to help Maestas. She

ul

 
os

 

also admitted that she wrote letters to Maestas shortly after the trial,
asking him for forgiveness and indicating that she wanted to get a tattoo
of his name.

Ransom denied Poore's allegations, She testified that she
never told jurors that she: (1) had special knowledge about sentencing
matters based on her job, (2) knew individuals who had received life-
without-parole sentences and were released into society with ankle
bracelets, or (3) believed Maestas would be released by the parole board if
he received a life-without-parole sentence. Ransom testified that she did
mention having once read a news story about a man who was awaiting
trial and had an ankle bracelet on.

‘The remaining nine jurors who testified or provided
statements gave conflicting accounts. Contradicting the testimony from
Poore and Ransom, four jurors (Barker, Morris, Miller, and Schonbrun)
recalled that Ransom indicated that she knew about sentencing based on
her employment, but only one of them indicated she said that she had
“special” knowledge about sentencing and that juror (Barker) contradicted
herself on that point. Five other jurors (Colmenares, Stone, Clark, Misch,
and Torge) agreed with Poore and Ransom on this point, indicating that
they recalled no comments about Ransom having knowledge about
sentencing (special or otherwise) based on her employment, ‘The majority
of the jurors indicated, consistent with Poore’s and Ransom’s testimony,
that Ransom did not suggest that she had any knowledge about what
would happen to Maestas if he received a life-without-parole sentence, but
one juror (Morris) testified that Ransom said that Maestas “could be out
wearing an ankle bracelet" if he got a life-without-parole sentence, another
juror Barker) understood a comment by Ransom to be implying that the

12

 
om

 

parole board would release Maestas if he got a life sentence even though
Ransom did not mention any specific individual,’ and a third juror (Misch)
recalled a general discussion about whether the parole board would
release Maestas if he got a life-without-parole sentence but she could not
attribute the discussion to any specific juror(s). Although four jurors
(Poore, Barker, Morris, and Colmenares) testified that Ransom made
generalized comments that she knew of people who had been sentenced to
life without parole and been released with an ankle bracelet, several other
jurors (Stone, Clark, Misch, Miller, and Torge) could not attribute those
‘comments to Ransom or had no recollection of any such comments, and
one juror (Schonbrun) remembered Ransom making a comment about
ankle bracelets but could not recall whether it was in the context of life-
without-parole sentences.

‘The jurors who remembered any relevant comments by
Ransom generally agreed that the comments occurred during a discussion
in which each juror expressed his or her sentiments about the appropriate
sentence. That discussion occurred after an initial vote in which a
‘majority of the jurors favored the death penalty. The comments were
relatively brief and were made between 20 and 60 minutes before the
unanimous vote.

‘The district court denied the motion for a new trial. Faced
with the conflicting testimony and statements, the district court made a

number of credibility determinations and factual findings in a written

“This testimony about what the juror understood Ransom to have
meant is arguably inadmissible under NRS 50.065(2), as it appears to
reflect the juror's subjective understanding of what Ransom said rather
than overt facts that are open to sight and hearing.

13

 
order denying the motion.* The district court found that Poore’s affidavit
and testimony were not credible for three reasons: (1) Poore admitted that
much of the affidavit prepared by defense counsel was inaccurate, (2)
Poore had an emotional attachment to Maestas, and (3) Poore “admitted
[her] desire to undue [sic] the death sentence to make peace with her
religious beliefs.” ‘The court then made the following findings regarding
the allegations in Poore's affidavit: (1) Ransom commented on her general
Knowledge about sentencing of the type any juror would have from life
experience but she never used the term “special knowledge”; (2)
considering the conflicting testimony, there was insufficient evidence that
Ransom indicated she had special knowledge of sentencing of inmates in
Nevada based on her experience as an emergency dispatcher; (3) Ransom
did not suggest that she had any special knowledge about Maestas or the
case beyond what was presented in court; (4) the allegation that Ransom
commented that Maestas would serve only a few years in prison and then
be released to society if sentenced to life without parole was untrue and
“any remark about what might happen to Maestas in the future was
purely hypothetical speculation, not a factual statement, and that it is
inadmissible for any purpose under NRS 50.065"; (6) the allegation that
Ransom stated that she had seen numerous people with life-without-

"The district court struck portions of the voluntary statements and
testimony that addressed any juror’s thought processes or reactions. See
NRS 50.065(2) (providing that upon inquiry into the validity of a verdict,
“{a] juror shall not testify concerning the effect of anything upon the
juror’s or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to
assent to or dissent from the verdict .. . or concerning the juror’s mental
processes in connection therewith,” and that an affidavit or evidence “of
any statement by a juror indicating an effect of this kind is inadmissible
for any purpose”),

 

 
ne

 

parole sentences released after serving only a few years in prison was
untrue and that “Ransom only made a statement that she had seen or
heard of people who received life sentences being released and that no
specific information beyond that statement was conveyed to the jury”; (6)
Ransom did not state that the parole board would release Maestas and
any remarks about the meaning of life-without-parole were vague, were
not factual statements as they involved hypothetical speculation, and were
inadmissible under NRS 50.065 as evidence of the jury’s thought process;
and (7) Ransom testified credibly that she did not state that she
personally knew of people who had been sentenced to life without parole
and had been released to the streets with ankle bracelets; rather, she
recounted having read a newspaper story about a man awaiting trial for a
murder who was at home with an ankle bracelet and other stories she had
heard about people who had received life sentences, been released, and
then committed other crimes. On the last point the district court
specifically found that Ransom was credible and the jurors who testified
otherwise were not credible.

Based on its findings, the district court concluded that
Maestas had not demonstrated voir dire misconduct, bias, or consideration
of improper information during deliberations. As to voir dire, the court
concluded that Maestas failed to prove that Ransom lied during voir dire
about her ability to be fair and impartial and there was no basis for a
finding of implied or actual bias. The district court further concluded that
the comments made by Ransom were based on life experience and did not
constitute extrinsic information; therefore, there was no juror misconduct,
And even assuming there was misconduct, the district court further
concluded that there was no reasonable probability that it affected the
verdict because: (1) the State did not argue extensively that Maestas posed
a future danger and instead focused on the cold-blooded attack on two

15

 
os

 

young children to avenge a drug deal that had gone bad, the brutality of
the attack, Maestas’ attitude and lack of remorse, and the planning
involved in the attack; (2) the challenged comments did not involve
extrinsic information; (3) the jury carefully considered mitigating
evidence; and (4) the alleged misconduct does not involve the weighing of
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Maestas timely appealed
from the district court's order.
DISCUSSION

As a result of Maestas’ guilty plea, the issues in these
consolidated appeals are focused entirely on the capital penalty
proceedings and the jury's decision to impose a death sentence for the
murder charge, not on Maestas’ guilt. We start by addressing the
constitutional challenge to the statute (NRS 175.556) that allowed the
district court to choose between imposing a life-without-parole sentence
and impaneling a new jury after the initial jury could not reach a
unanimous verdict. We then turn to the issues related to the motion for a
new trial. And finally, we address Maestas’ remaining claims and our
mandatory review of the death sentence under NRS 177.055(2). We
conclude that there were no errors that would warrant a new penalty
hearing and therefore affirm the judgment of conviction and order denying
the motion for a new trial.

Constitutionality of NRS 175.556

NRS 175.556(1) affords the district court discretion to choose
between imposing a life-without-parole sentence and impaneling a new
jury to determine the sentence when the jury is unable to reach a
unanimous penalty verdict in a case in which the death penalty is sought.
Here, the district court elected to impanel a new jury after the initial jury
was unable to reach a unanimous penalty verdict. Maestas argues that

16

 
the statute violates the Eighth Amendment because it allows the district
court unfettered discretion to impose a sentence less than death or expose
the defendant to another penalty hearing with the possibility of a death
sentence, We disagree.

Maestas relies primarily on the general proposition in the
Supreme Court's death-penalty jurisprudence that capital sentencing
schemes must channel the sentencer’s discretion so that it cannot
“wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence.” Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (plurality opinion) (discussing “basic concern
of Furman [v, Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),]” that death penalty was being
applied capriciously and arbitrarily); see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 US
420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion) (holding that states must avoid “the

 

arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty” by “defin{ing] the
crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way that obviates
standardless [sentencing] discretion,” channeling “the _sentencer's
discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and
detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for
imposing a sentence of death” (internal quotations and footnotes omitted)).
NRS 175.556(1) does not violate this proscription. By giving the district
court the discretion to choose to impanel a new jury to determine the
sentence, the statute does not authorize the district court to find a
defendant death eligible or impose a death sentence; that determination is
made by the newly impaneled jury, which also has the option to impose
sentences less than death or life without parole, including sentences of life

with the possibility of parole after 20 years or a definite term of 50 years
with parole eligibility after 20 years, see NRS 200.030(4) (providing

 

 
sentences for first-degree murder).? And the new jury's discretion is
guided by the requirements that it find at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance, consider mitigating circumstances, and weigh those
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, NRS 200.030(4)(a); NRS
200.033; NRS_175.554(2)-(4), consistent with constitutional principles
requiring capital sentencing schemes to appropriately channel the
sentencer's discretion to avoid imposing death in an arbitrary or capricious
manner. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07 (concluding that statutory system
similar to Nevada's does not violate the Eighth Amendment). We conclude
that NRS 175.556(1) is not constitutionally infirm under the Eighth
Amendment; therefore, no relief is warranted in this regard.
‘Motion for a new trial

Maestas sought a new trial based on (1) alleged improper
comments about extrinsic information made by the jury foreperson during
deliberations and (2) the jury foreperson’s alleged concealment of bias
during voir dire. He argues that the district court erred in denying the

motion on its merits.!° We review the district court's decision for an abuse

While the death penalty is no longer a risk if the district court
chooses to impose a life-without-parole sentence under NRS 175.556(1),
the defendant also loses the chance at a sentence that is more favorable
than life without parole.

WMaestas also argues that the district court erred in striking
portions of the juror statements and testimony under NRS 50.065(2),
which provides that a juror is precluded from testifying “concerning the
effect of anything upon the juror’s or any other juror’s mind or emotions a3
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict” or
“concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith.” Having
carefully reviewed those portions of the jurors’ statements and testimony
that were struck, we conclude that Maestas is not entitled to relief. Most
of the information was properly struck under NRS 50.065(2). Mever v.
continued on next page

 

 
nen

 

of discretion, and “[aJbsent clear error,” we will not disturb the district
court's findings of fact. Meyer v. State, 119 Nev. 554, 561, 80 P.3d 447,
453 (2003); see also Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1186, 196 P.3d 465,
475 (2008).

As we have explained, “[jJuror misconduet’ falls into two
categories: (1) conduct by jurors contrary to their instructions or oaths,
and (2) attempts by third parties to influence the jury process.” Meyer,
119 Nev. at 561, 80 P.3d at 453. The allegations in this case—considering
information not admitted during trial and lying during voir dire to conceal
bias—fall within the first category. See id. To obtain a new trial based on
juror misconduct, the defendant must establish that (1) misconduct
occurred and (2) the misconduct was prejudicial. Id, at 563-64, 80 P.3d at
455.

rration of extraneot

 

jon

Maestas asserts that the jury foreperson tainted the jury
deliberations with extraneous information by telling the jury that she had

continued

State, 119 Nev. 554, 563, 80 P.3d 447, 454 (2003) (“Juror affidavits that
delve into a juror's thought process cannot be used to impeach a jury
verdict and must be stricken.”). ‘The few instances in which the district
court may have erred did not prejudice Maestas because the information
was not particularly relevant (jurors' statements reciting the four possible
sentences the jury could impose) or the jurors were allowed to testify to
the same information and the testimony was not struck (Juror Morris’
statement that she recalled Ransom stating that Maestas could be
released from prison wearing an ankle bracelet if sentenced to life without
parole and Juror Misch’s statement that she did not recall Ransom stating
that Maestas could be released from prison in a few years if sentenced to
life without parole but did recall some discussion amongst the jurors along
those lines).

19

 
special knowledge about matters related to sentencing. There are two
problems with Maestas’ argument. First, the district court considered the
conflicting testimony and found that the foreperson did not suggest that
she had special knowledge about sentencing in general or about Maestas
in particular based on her employment but instead made comments that
were based on general knowledge and life experience. The record does not
reveal any clear error in those findings (even the juror whose affidavit
provided the basis for the motion below testified consistent with those
findings). Second, we have indicated that a juror’s opinion based on life
experience, general knowledge, and specialized knowledge or expertise is
not extrinsic information and does not constitute juror misconduct."
Meyer, 119 Nev. at 570-71 & n.64, 80 P.3d at 459 & n.54 (‘The opinion,
even if based upon information not admitted into evidence, is not extrinsic

Maestas suggests that in some circumstances, information
conveyed to a jury based on a juror’s special knowledge may result in the
consideration of improper extraneous information. He discusses our
decision in State v, Thacker, 95 Nev. 500, 596 P.24 508 (1979), as an
example. Thacker, however, is distinguishable. ‘That case involved a
charge of grand larceny of two calves. Id, at 501, 596 P.2d at 508,
Although a key fact at issue in the case was the calves’ size when they
were seized and impounded (the defendants were claiming that the calves
that had been seized from them were not the stolen calves), no evidence
about the calves’ weight or what they had been fed was presented during
the trial. Id. at 502, 596 P.2d at 509. When the question of the calves’
weight and age arose during deliberations, a juror who had been employed
at the ranch where the cattle wore impounded used his special knowledge
to estimate the calves’ weight at the time they were impounded, and he
conveyed that information to the jury. Id, We held that the juror provided
unsworn testimony on a disputed fact that was relevant to the
determination of the issue before the jury. Id. Unlike the juror in
Thacker, the foreperson in this case did not use specialized knowledge to
provide the jury with evidence that was not presented at trial to determine
a disputed fact.

 

 
ome

 

evidence and does not constitute juror misconduct.”). The juror may not,
however, relate “specific information from an outside source, such as
quoting from a treatise, textbook, research results, ete.” Id. at 571, 80
P.3d at 459. Again, the district court found that the foreperson’s
comments involved her personal opinions and were based on her life
experience and general knowledge rather than specific information from
an outside source. The district court’s determination that Maestas had
not demonstrated that the jury considered extraneous information is
supported by the record and consistent with our prior decisions in this
area,

Maestas spends little time on the possibility of intrinsic
‘misconduct, which on its face may be the more troubling aspect of the
allegations: that the foreperson told jurors that she was aware of people
who had been sentenced to life without parole but were later released with
ankle bracelets. Such comments could suggest that the jury did not follow
the court's instructions regarding the meaning of a life-without-parole
sentence. This could constitute an improper discussion among jurors that
would fall into the realm of intrinsic misconduct.! See Meyer, 119 Nev. at

To the extent that the foreperson conveyed information that she
learned from a news story, it was knowledge she obtained long before the
trial and did not involve this case.

18We have observed that intrinsic misconduct is difficult to prove
because of the restriction on juror affidavits or testimony “that delve into
the jury's deliberative process.” Meyer, 119 Nev. at 565, 80 P.3d at 456.
Here, to the extent that the relevant testimony as to what was said during
deliberations addressed “overt conduct without regard to the state of mind
and mental processes of any juror,” it was not subject to NRS 50,065(2)
Id, at 563, 80 P.3d at 454. In this, we note a difference between NRS
50.065(2) and its federal counterpart: Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)
precludes a juror from testifying “about any statement made or incident

continued on next page...

21

 
562, 80 P.3d at 454 (‘[I]ntra-jury or intrinsic influences involve improper
discussions among jurors (such as considering a defendant's failure to
testify), intimidation or harassment of one juror by another, or other
similar situations...) The district court, however, found that the
foreperson testified credibly that she made a comment about a person who
had been released with an ankle bracelet while awaiting trial, but that she
did not make any statements about people who had been sentenced to life
without parole and then been released with an ankle bracelet. How other
jurors interpreted her comments and the impact that the comments or the
jurors’ interpretation of those comments had on the jurors’ thought
processes are not admissible. NRS 50,065(2). Given the conflicting
testimony, the district court's credibility determinations, and the

continued

that occurred during the jury’s deliberations” with an exception for
testimony about “extraneous prejudicial information” or “outside
influence.” NRS 50,065(2) does not include the prohibition against juror
testimony “about any statement made or incident that occurred during the
jury's deliberations.” ‘The Nevada statute is based on the 1969
Preliminary Draft of Rule 606, Barker v, State, 95 Nev. 309, 312, 504 P.2d
719, 721 (1979); 27 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 6071, at 452-53 & n.74 (2007) (identifying
Nevada as one of two states that adopted the version of subdivision (b)
employed in the Preliminary Draft), which was rejected in Congress
because it was too expansive, Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S, 107, 123-
25 (1987); 27 Wright & Arnold, supra, § 6074, at 488 CUnder that
approach [endorsed by the drafters of the Preliminary Draft], jurors are
prohibited only from testifying as to their mental processes while
testimony may be received as to objectively apparent facts or events
occurring during deliberations, such as juror statements or conduct.”). See
amb_v. State, 127 Nev. __, __ n.10, 251 P.3d 700, 712 n.10 (2011)
(noting that “although NRS 50.065 differs from FRE 606(b) in its
phrasing, Meyer .. . does not consider the differences significant”)

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

evidentiary limitations imposed by NRS 50,065(2), there was no proof of
intrinsic misconduct.
Juror bias

Juror misconduct also includes lying during voir dire and
making a decision on the basis of bias. Meyer, 119 Nev. at 561, 80 P.3d at
453. “Where it is claimed that a juror has answered falsely on voir dire
about a matter of potential bias or prejudice,” the critical question is
whether the juror intentionally concealed bias. Lopez v. State, 105 Nev.
68, 89, 769 P.2d 1276, 1290 (1989); Walker v. State, 95 Nev. 321, 323, 694
P.2d 710, 711 (1979). And that determination is left to the trial court's
sound discretion. Lopez, 105 Nev. at 89, 769 P.2d at 1290; Walker, 95
Nev. at 323, 594 P.2d at 711; see McNally v. Walkowski, 85 Nev. 696, 701,
462 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1969) Guror’s intentional concealment of material
fact relating to his or her qualification to be fair and impartial may
require granting of new trial).

Maestas argues that the jury foreperson concealed a bias
against him: she represented during voir dire that she could be fair and
consider all sentencing options but in fact did not do so during
deliberations, as evidenced by her comments and her alleged disregard of
the district court's instruction regarding the meaning of life without
parole. The district court found that the jury foreperson had not lied
during voir dire about her ability to be impartial and follow instructions,
to consider all forms of punishment, and to disregard media coverage
about the case, and that nothing in her alleged comments during
deliberations indicated that she concealed any pretrial determination

regarding sentencing or otherwise harbored any bias against Maestas.

‘The district court's findings on this matter are supported by the evidence,

see Isbell v. State, 97 Nev. 222, 227, 626 P.2d 1274, 1277 (1981), and we

similarly are not persuaded that any of the foreperson’s alleged comments
23.

 
oo ae

 

during deliberations illustrate that she lied or concealed any bias during
voir dire. The voir dire questions posed to the foreperson relating to bias,
or fairness were perfunctory and vague and did not address her job or its
potential effect on her consideration of the case. We are not convinced
that the comments attributed to her, which, if made, were made during
deliberations after the full development of the evidence, indicate that she
lied when answering nonspecific questions about bias and impartiality,
which were posed in a vacuum with little reference to any factual
underpinnings of the case. Because Maestas failed to show that the jury
foreperson intentionally concealed any bias against him, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a
new trial based on this ground.

Remaining claims

Maestas’ remaining claims challenge the death sentence based
on alleged problems with the charging document and notice of intent to
seek the death penalty, the admissibility of evidence presented during the
penalty trial, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and cumulative error.

\Maestas also raises four arguments that we have rejected in prior
cases, First, he urges us to overrule prior decisions holding that neither
the Confrontation Clause nor Crawford v, Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004),
apply to evidence admitted at a capital penalty hearing, see ‘Thomas v.
Stato, 122 Nev. 1361, 1367, 148 P.3d 727, 732 (2006); Johnson v, State,
122 Nev. 1344, 1353, 148 P.3d 767, 773 (2006); Summers v. State, 122
Nev. 1326, 1333, 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006). We decline to do so. In a
related argument, Maestas criticizes Nevada's death penalty scheme
because it does not require bifurcation of the eligibility and selection
determinations in death penalty hearings, although trial courts are not
precluded from doing so. We have refused to require bifurcated penalty
hearings, see Johnson v, State, 118 Nev. 787, 806, 59 P.3d 450, 462 (2002),
overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v, State, 127 Nev. _, __, 263,
P.3d 235, 250-51 (2011); see also McConnell v. State, 120 Nev. 1043, 1061-

continued on next page .

24

 
os

 

We conclude that none of these claims warrants relief from the judgment
of convietion.

Challenge to the information

Relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 630 U.S. 466 (2000), and
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Maestas argues that the information
violates the federal constitution because it did not allege that the
aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating circumstances and the
aggravating circumstance was not subject to a probable-cause
determination. Although the effect of these Supreme Court decisions is
that the aggravating circumstances used to increase the punishment for
murder beyond the statutory maximum absent the aggravating
circumstances must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Ring, 636 U.S. at 609, those
decisions were based on the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and did
not address the question of including the same facts in an indictment,
Ring, 536 U.S. at 598 n.4; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n.3. And although

. continued

62, 102 P.3d_ 606, 619 (2004), and Maestas raises no novel arguments
justifying a fresh look at this matter. Next, Maestas argues that the
district court erred by denying his motion to argue last. We rejected a
similar argument in Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 922-23, 921 P.2d 886,
896 (1996), and Maestas provides no legitimate basis to depart from
Witter. See_also NRS 175.141(6) (requiring prosecution to open and
conclude argument). Finally, Maestas challenges the death penalty as
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. We have
resoundingly rejected that argument, see Gallego v, State, 117 Nev. 348,
370, 23 P.3d 227, 242 (2001), abrogated on other grounds by Nunnery, 127
Nev. at __n.12, 263 P.3d at 258 n.12; Colwell v, State, 112 Nev. 807, 814-
15, 919 P.2d 403, 408 (1996); Shuman v, State, 94 Nev. 265, 269, 578 P.2d
1183, 1186 (1978), and we do so again here.

25

 
om

 

the Court has indicated that in federal prosecutions, facts that must be
submitted to a jury under Apprendi also must be charged in the
indictment, United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 (2002), that
requirement stems from the Fifth Amendment right to “presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury,” which applies only to the federal government
and has not been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n.8; Alexander v,
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972). Nothing in Apprendi and Ring
altered the long-standing rule that the Fifth Amendment indictment
provision does not apply to state prosecutions." Accordingly, we reject
Maestas’ argument that the federal constitution requires that aggravating
circumstances and the balancing of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances be alleged in the charging document in a state
prosecution.! Because the aggravating circumstances are not required to
be pleaded in the charging document, it naturally follows that they are not

subject to a probable-cause determination.

‘Other courts have reached the same conclusion. E.g., McKaney v.
Foreman, 100 P.3d 18, 20-21 (Ariz. 2004); Terrell v. State, 572 8,B,2d 595,
602-03 (Ga. 2002); People v. McClain, 799 N.E.2d 322, 335-36 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003); State v. Hunt, 582 S.K.2d 593, 602-04 (N.C. 2008); State v. Laney,
627 S.E.24 726, 732 (S.C, 2006).

WSuch a charging requirement with respect to the balancing of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances would place an awkward and
unworkable burden on the State at the charging stage given that it
generally is the defendant who presents mitigating circumstances, see
Gallego v, State, 101 Nev. 782, 790, 711 P.2d 856, 862 (1985), and even
when the defendant chooses to present no mitigating circumstances, the
jury may consider any evidence presented at trial that may mitigate the
crime and warrant a sentence less than death, see Hollaway v. State, 116
Nev. 732, 743-44, 6 P.3d 987, 995-96 (2000).

26

 
res

 

Challenges to the notice of intent

Maestas argues that the notice of intent to seek the death
penalty violated the constitution on three grounds: (1) the notice-of-intent
procedures precluded challenges based on duplicity, multiplicity, and fatal
variance; (2) the initial notice of intent did not allege the elements of
capital murder; and (3) the amended notice of intent was untimely, We
conclude that these arguments lack merit.

Contrary to Maestas’ argument, the notice-of-intent procedure
does not result in charges for two separate offenses in one count or one
offense in two separate counts: capital murder (based on the notice of
intent) and non-capital first-degree murder (based on the information).
The notice of intent is not a charging document and therefore does not
charge a separate offense; rather, it provides notice of the aggravating
circumstances that the State alleges and the facts supporting them. ‘The
notice of intent and the charging document (either an indictment or
information) serve different purposes, and together they do not charge
separate offenses in a single count or one offense in several counts.

‘The notice of intent also was not deficient based on its
omission of the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
‘Maestas relies on Ring, which implicates the Sixth Amendment right to
‘trial by jury as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process requirement. 536 U.S. at 609; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
477 n.3. To the extent that due process requires that a defendant receive
adequate notice of the aggravating circumstances, the notice of intent
required under Nevada law, SCR 250(4)(c)-(@), affords sufficient notice of
aggravating circumstances to satisfy that requirement. Cf, MeKaney v,
Foreman, 100 P.3d 18, 21 (Ariz. 2004). Nothing in Ring or the due-process
notice requirement necessitates notice regarding the weighing of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4.
27

 

 
com

 

Finally, the amended notice of intent was not untimely and
the State was not required to demonstrate good cause to file the amended
notice. SCR 250(4)(d) permits the State to file an untimely “amended
notice [of intent] alleging additional aggravating circumstances,” upon a
showing of good cause, within 15 days “after learning of the grounds for
the...amended notice.” The plain language indicates that the rule
applies to amended notices that allege additional aggravating
circumstances. Here, the State did not allege any additional aggravating
circumstances in the amended notice of intent; rather, the State amended
the notice to provide additional factual allegations to support the
aggravating circumstances that were alleged in the original notice of
intent. We conclude that under the circumstances presented, the State
was not required to comply with SCR 250(4)(d).

‘Suppression of police statements

‘Maestas contends that his death sentence is unconstitutional
because the prosecution used statements that were obtained in violation of
his right to remain silent. Maestas moved to suppress his statements in
the district court, and the district court denied the motion after hearing
argument. He challenges that decision.” We will not disturb a district

!”Maestas complains about the district court’s failure to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress. A review of the record
shows that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted because the parties
did not appear to dispute the facts surrounding the taking of Maestas’
statement and instead disputed the legal issue of whether he exercised his
right to remain silent. See U.S. v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir.
2011) (‘District courts are required to conduct evidentiary hearings only
when a substantial claim is presented and there are disputed issues of
material fact that will affect the outcome of the motion [to suppress}.”),

wal in Cortes v, State, 127 Nev. __, _, 260 P.3d 184,

 

 

187-88 (2011).

28

 
 

court's determination of whether a defendant invoked his right to remain
silent if that decision is supported by substantial evidence. See generally
Harte_v, State, 116 Nev. 1054, 1065, 13 P.Sd 420, 427-28 (2000);
‘Tomarchio v. State, 99 Nev. 572, 675, 665 P.2d 804, 806 (1983).

Before interviewing Maestas while he was in custody in Utah,
Nevada police officers advised him of his constitutional rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In response to a police officer's
invitation to “tell us your side,” Maestas stated, “You know I think that Td
like to take the uh silence—but I would say that, ah, the act or crime I did
do alone, I didn't have any help.” ‘The interrogating officer told Maestas,
“If you want to tell us about it and not implicate your sister, that's entirely
up to you,” to which Maestas stated, “I just did, didn’t I.” The police officer
inquired whether Maestas “wantled] to tell us how this came about,” to
which he responded, “I really don't know.” The interrogating officer then
stated, “Why don't you start from the beginning?” Maestas then explained
his involvement in the crimes.

‘The district court found that Maestas’ statement about
remaining silent was equivocal and that he did not invoke the protections
of Miranda. It further found that Maestas was “admonished of his right to
remain silent and waived that right.” We agree with the district court
that nothing in the interview demonstrates the kind of unambiguous
invocation of the right to remain silent that is required by the Supreme
Court, Berghuis v. Thompkins, 660 U.S. __, _, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260
(2010); rather, Maestas initially indicated that he wanted to invoke his
right to remain silent but in the same breath admitted that he alone
committed the crimes, and when asked again if he wished to discuss the
crimes, Maestas equivocated but then proceeded to make incriminating
statements, We further agree with the district court that Macstas’
conduct during the interview indicates an implied waiver of the right to

29

 
10 non

 

remain silent. Id, at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2262. The district court did not err
by admitting Maestas’ statement. !*
Suppression of letter seized by jail personnel

Maestas argues that the district court erred by refusing to
hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress the letter he wrote
to “Amy” while he was in custody in Utah. He argued below that the letter
should be suppressed because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in correspondence sent from jail and had no notice that his outgoing mail
would be confiscated by jail officials. On appeal, Maestas raises the notice
issue and also argues for the first time that confiscation of the letter
violated his First Amendment rights and was not justified by a legitimate
penal interest.

‘The notice argument lacks merit. At a hearing on the motion,
the prosecutor relayed that, according to a Utah jail official, inmates are
provided with a handbook that explains that outgoing mail, except
communications to attorneys, is subject to monitoring. Maestas denied
receiving the handbook. The district court determined that the jail had “a
right to monitor [mail]" for security reasons and that Maestas proffered no
authority suggesting that he was entitled to notice before his mail was
confiscated. We conclude that the district court did not err in this regard.

‘Maestas challenges the voluntariness of his statement based on his
arrest the day before the interrogation, the nature of the crime, his drug
use, and his confinement in a Utah jail. Based on our review of the record,
we conclude that this claim was not preserved for review. We may review
for plain error, see NRS 178.602, but considering the totality of the
circumstances reflected in the record and the factors outlined in Passama
vy, State, 103 Nev. 212, 214, 735 P.2d 321, 323 (1987), we discern no plain
error.

30

 
os

 

Maestas failed to raise his First Amendment claim below.
‘That failure leaves us to consider the claim in the context of plain error.
‘See NRS 178.602. The claim is not amenable to plain-error review for two
reasons,

First, under the circumstances presented, we cannot say that
any error is plain because it is not “so unmistakable that it reveals itself
by a casual inspection of the record.” Patterson v. State, 111 Nev. 1525,
1580, 907 P.2d 984, 987 (1995) (internal quotation omitted). For example,
because the issue was not raised below, the record is not sufficiently
developed for us to determine whether the jail policy regarding outgoing
mail is reasonably related to legitimate penal interests. See Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987) (discussing factors that are relevant in
determining reasonableness of prison regulation). We therefore lack an
adequate basis upon which to review this claim. See Wilkins v, State, 96
Nev. 367, 372, 609 P.2d 309, 312 (1980) (observing that while this court
may consider constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal, “it
will not do so unless the record is developed sufficiently both to
demonstrate that fundamental rights are, in fact, implicated and to
provide an adequate basis for review”).

Second, the alleged error is not “clear under current law.”
Gaxiola v, State, 121 Nev. 638, 648, 119 P.3d 1225, 1282 (2005) (internal
quotation omitted). In particular, there does not appear to be a consensus
as to whether the exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained in
violation of the First Amendment. Compare United States v. Cangiano,
464 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir. 1972) (concluding that “where seizure of
allegedly obscene materials is not preceded by a procedure which affords a
reasonable likelihood that non-obscene materials will reach the public, the
proper remedy is the return of the allegedly obscene materials to those
from whom they were seized, not suppression of these items at a

a1

 
 

subsequent obscenity trial”), vacated on other grounds, 413 U.S. 913
(1973), reaffirmed on remand, 491 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1973), and United
States v, Bush, 682 F.2d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1978) (concluding that in
‘obscenity prosecution appropriate remedy for violation of First
Amendment is return of property, not suppression of evidence at trial),
with United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986)
(concluding that magazine that was basis for child pornography and
obscenity convictions but not specified in search warrant was improperly
seized and subject to exclusion because magazine was arguably protected
by First Amendment at time of seizure), abrogated on other grounds by
New York v. PJ. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875 (1986), as stated in U.S. v.
Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1843 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990), and State v. Bumanglag,
634 P.2d 80, 92 (Haw. 1981) (concluding that in prosecution for promoting
pornography “the suppression of the seized films as evidence would be the
only effective sanction for the relevant infringements of first and fourth
amendment freedoms’).
Prosecutorial misconduct

Maestas contends that extensive prosecutorial misconduct
rendered his penalty hearing unfair. To support his claim, he points to
multiple comments the prosecutor made during opening statement and
closing argument, which essentially fall into four categories of claimed
misconduct: (1) Golden Rule arguments, (2) appeals to passion and
prejudice, (3) prosecutor's expression of personal opinion, (4) Maestas’
failure to express remorse, and (5) holiday arguments. A prosecutor's
improper comments during a capital penalty hearing are prejudicial when
they so infect the proceedings with unfairness as to make the results of
the proceeding a denial of due process. Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 47,

83 P.3d 818, 825 (2004); Blake v, State, 121 Nev. 779, 796, 121 P.3d 567,
578 (2005). Alleged improper statements should be considered in context.
82

 
Browning v. State, 124 Nev. 517, 533, 188 P.3d 60, 72 (2008). And because
Maestas failed to object to all but one of the challenged statements, his
claims are reviewed for plain error affecting his substantial rights. NRS
178.602; Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 47 (2008);
Gallego v, State, 117 Nev. 348, 365, 23 P.3d 227, 239 (2001), abrogated on
other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. _, _n.12, 268 P.3d 285,
258 n.12 (2011). We have carefully reviewed each claim of unpreserved
prosecutorial misconduct and conclude that Maestas has not demonstrated
plain error affecting his substantial rights. With respect to the preserved
challenge, we agree that the prosecutor improperly suggested that
Maestas’ true reason for pleading guilty was to avoid a lengthy trial that
would reveal the details of the crime because the argument referenced
‘matters not in evidence. Nevertheless, the error was harmless considering
the brevity of the comment in a lengthy closing argument and the
overwhelming evidence supporting the death sentence.
Cumulative error

Maestas argues that cumulative error rendered his penalty
hearing unfair. “The cumulative effect of errors may violate a defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial even though errors are harmless
individually.” Hernandez v. State, 118 Nev. 513, 585, 50 P.3d 1100, 1115
(2002). Although Maestas’ penalty hearing was not free from error, no
error considered individually or cumulatively rendered his trial unfair.
‘The quantity and character of any error committed is insignificant when
juxtaposed to the overwhelming evidence supporting the death sentence in
this case.

wry review of the alt

NRS 177.055(2) requires that this court review every death

sentence and consider:

 

 
 

(€ Whether the evidence supports the
finding of an aggravating circumstance or
circumstances:

(@ Whether the sentence of death was
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice
or any arbitrary factor; and

(©) Whether the sentence of death is
excessive, considering both the crime and the

defendant.
‘The evidence sufficiently supports the aggravating circumstance

‘The jury found that Kristyanna was under 14 years of age
when she was murdered, which is an aggravating circumstance under
NRS 200.033(10). Because the evidence shows that Kristyanna was three
years old when she was murdered, the aggravating circumstance was

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The_death sentence was not_imposed under the influence of

‘It is difficult to imagine a more horrendous killing than
Kristyanna’s. But nothing in the record indicates that the jury acted
under any improper influence in imposing a death sentence for that
killing. In fact, the special verdict reflects a deliberate and thoughtful
jury, as one or more jurors found nine mitigating circumstances related to
Maestas’ troubled childhood, his lack of a prior criminal record, his
admission of guilt, and his remorse. Therefore, we conclude that the death
sentence was not imposed under the influence of prejudice, passion, or any
arbitrary factor.

When considering whether the death sentence is excessive, we
ask whether “the crime and defendant before [the court] on appeal [are] of
the class or kind that warrants the imposition of death?” Dennis v. State,

34

 
ome

 

116 Nev. 1075, 1085, 13 P.3d 434, 440 (2000). ‘The evidence shows that
Maestas got a knife and drove to the trailer park bent on getting revenge
for being duped out of $125 in a drug deal with Kristyanna’s mother. He
knew that the girls were alone in the trailer and could have left without
incident; instead, he returned to the trailer with his sister and used
subterfuge to gain entry into the trailer. He then viciously stabbed to
death a defenseless three-year-old child. Afterwards, he cleaned up,
disposed of the murder weapon and his bloody clothing, and fled the state.
Although Maestas expressed remorse at trial and one or more jurors found
remorse as a mitigating circumstance, his musings after the crimes
showed little empathy for the young victim. ‘The mitigation case paints
the picture of a troubled young man who abused controlled substances and
is the product of a dysfunctional, sometimes violent upbringing, but who
was also described as being polite and friendly and not the kind of person
who would commit the crimes that he admitted in this case. That picture
is in stark contrast to the one painted by his actions on the night that
Kristyanna was stabbed to death and her sister was left a paraplegic and
in the immediate aftermath of that night. Despite Maestas’ claim that the
death penalty is excessive due to inflammatory prosecutorial and jury
misconduct, the record simply does not bear that out. Instead, the record
supports the conclusion that the crime and the defendant are of the class
or kind that warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the
death sentence in this case is not excessive.

Having determined that none of Maestas’ claims warrant
relief and that the death penalty was properly imposed, we affirm the

85

 
     
 

judgment of conviction and the order denying the motion for a new trial.
‘)
J.
Cherry
J.
J.
J.
Pickering
— [a Munbeete, ys,
Hardesty
Qn eg — 3
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