Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF BABY BOY L.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 99815

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF BABY BOY L.  IN THE MATTER OF BABY BOY L. 2004 OK 93 103 P.3d 1099 Case Number: 99815 Decided: 12/07/2004 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA In the Matter of Baby Boy L., a minor child. TIFFANY LEATHERMAN, Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER YANCEY, Appellant. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I Honorable Barbara Swinton, Trial Judge ¶0 The appellee, Tiffany Leatherman (mother) placed her newborn baby for adoption. She filed an application in the district court, seeking an order determining that the child was eligible for adoption without the consent of the appellant, Christopher Yancey (father). The mother alleged that consent to the adoption was unnecessary because the father had neglected to contribute to the support of the mother to the extent of his financial ability during the pregnancy. The father objected to the adoption. He argued that: 1) because he was a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Indian Nation, the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §1901 et seq. (federal Act/Act) and the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act, CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED. Gerald E. Kelley, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellee. Jerry L. Colclazier, Amie Rose Colclazier, Seminole, Oklahoma, for Appellant. KAUGER, J: ¶1 We granted certiorari to determine: 1) whether a judicially developed exception to the Federal and Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Acts ---- known as the "existing Indian family exception" ---- remains viable; and 2) whether evidence of the refusal to support the mother during the pregnancy is sufficient to warrant adoption without the father's consent under 10 O.S. 2001 §7505-4.2. FACTS ¶3 The appellee, Tiffany Leatherman (mother), was sixteen years old when she became pregnant in January of 2002. ¶4 The mother and maternal grandmother moved in with the father and the fraternal grandmother near the end of February, 2002, and remained there until approximately the end of April. The fraternal grandmother provided support for the household. While the mother remained in school, the father quit school and began working at a local restaurant. After an altercation between the two, the mother moved and lived with her grandmother, later with her brother, and eventually returned to live with her father. Sometime around the time that the mother moved, she led the father to believe that she had miscarried the baby. The father insists that the mother told him she had miscarried the baby. The mother denies that she ever specifically told him that she miscarried. ¶5 In the summer of 2002, the mother decided to place the baby for adoption, and through her church, she found a couple from another state who wanted to adopt the baby. After meeting with an attorney for the adoptive parents, the mother was advised to notify the father immediately that she was still pregnant. In July of 2002, the mother told the father that she had not miscarried and that she planned to put the baby up for adoption. The father protested the adoption. ¶6 On October 4, 2002, the child was born in Shawnee, Oklahoma. The father attempted to see the mother and child at the hospital after the birth, but the mother and the hospital staff refused to let him have any contact with the baby. On October 14, 2002, the father employed a lawyer to represent him in seeking custody of the child and in preventing the adoption. ¶7 On December 26, 2002, the mother sought an order in Cleveland County that the child was eligible for adoption without the father's consent and for termination of his parental rights. ¶8 On January 17, 2003, notice of the mother's application and adoption proceedings were given to the father, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. The father objected to the adoption. The Nation filed a motion to intervene on January 23, 2003, acknowledging that the child was eligible for membership and insisting that the Acts applied to the proceeding. The motion to intervene was granted the next day. On March 25, 2003, the Nation filed a motion to dismiss the mother's adoption proceeding, seeking compliance with placement preferences of the Acts. ¶9 On September 5, 2003, the trial court entered an order, determining that: 1) the "existing Indian family exception" to the Acts controlled; 2) the father had neglected to contribute to the support of the mother to the extent of his financial ability during the pregnancy thus failing to establish his parental rights; and 3) the child was eligible for adoption without the consent of the father. I. ¶10 THE "EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY EXCEPTION" IS NO LONGER A VIABLE DOCTRINE IN OKLAHOMA INSOFAR AS INDIAN CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS ARE CONCERNED. A. Applicability of the Federal and Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Acts ¶11 The mother argues that because this proceeding does not involve the dissolution of an Indian family or the removal of custody from the Indian parent, it falls under the "existing Indian family exception" to the Acts. The federal Act ¶12 The federal Act governs Indian child custody proceedings, including termination of parental rights and adoptions. standards. ¶13 The watershed opinion was rendered in 1989, when the United States Supreme Court decided Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, ¶14 In discussing the purpose and meaning of the Act, the Holyfield Court recognized that Congress was concerned not only about the interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes because of the large numbers of Indian children being adopted by non-Indians. The Court stated that: ". . . [I]t is clear that Congress' concern over the placement of Indian children in non-Indian homes was based in part on evidence of the detrimental impact on the children themselves of such placements outside their culture. Congress determined to subject such placements to the ICWA's jurisdictional and other provisions, even in cases where parents consented to an adoption, because of concerns going beyond the wishes of individual parents. . . ." ¶15 In 1992, this Court examined Holyfield's implications. ¶16 In 1994, within two years after our decision in S.C., supra, the Oklahoma Legislature, apparently in response to our opinions and in recognition of the Holyfield teaching, amended the Oklahoma Act. Prior to the amendment, "The purpose of the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act is the clarification of state policies and procedures regarding the implementation by the State of Oklahoma of the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act, P.L. 95-608. It shall be the policy of the state to cooperate fully with Indian tribes in Oklahoma in order to ensure that the intent and provisions of the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act are enforced." Title ". . . B. The Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act applies only to a child who is a member of an Indian tribe or who is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. . ." ¶17 Section 40.1 was amended in 1994. It provides: "The purpose of the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act is the clarification of state policies and procedures regarding the implementation by the State of Oklahoma of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act P.L. 95-608. It shall be the policy of the state to recognize that Indian tribes and nations have a valid governmental interest in Indian children regardless of whether or not said children are in the physical or legal custody of an Indian parent or Indian custodian at the time state proceedings are initiated. It shall be the policy of the state to cooperate fully with Indian tribes in Oklahoma in order to ensure that the intent and provisions of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act are enforced." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, ". . .B. Except as provided for in subsection A of this section, the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act applies to all state voluntary and involuntary child custody court proceedings involving Indian children, regardless of whether or not the children involved are in the physical or legal custody of an Indian parent or Indian custodian at the time the state proceedings are initiated. . . ." (Emphasis added.) ¶18 When ascertaining legislative intent, the Court must presume that when adopting an amendment, the Legislature had knowledge of the law as it previously existed and had in mind the judicial construction placed on the law. B. The Constitutionality of the Application of the Acts. ¶19 The mother insists that a refusal to apply the "existing Indian family exception" to the present cause could result in an unconstitutional application of the Acts. She relies primarily on the California Court of Appeals decision In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 , 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 , 529, (1996), cert. denied Cindy R. v. James R., ¶20 Bridget, supra, involved a father of Indian twins who sought to rescind his voluntary relinquishment of parental rights. After the trial court determined the relinquishment invalid, the appellate court reversed, holding that the Act would be unconstitutional and violate the Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments unless it was limited by the "existing Indian family" doctrine. ¶21 In another California Court of Appeals case, In re Santos Y, 92 Cal. App. 4th 1274 , 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 , 731 (2001), the court reached a conclusion similar to the Bridget, supra, case. Santos, supra, involved a constitutional challenge to a trial court order which required the transfer of a child to placement with a member of the Indian tribe to which the child's sole connection was one-quarter genetic contribution from the mother who was an enrolled tribal member. The Santos court held that the application of the federal Act was unconstitutional under the Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when the child's sole connection to the tribe was the genetic contribution. ¶22 The Supreme Court of North Dakota rejected the rationale and constitutional analysis used by the California Appellate Courts in In the Interest of A.B., 2003 N.D. 98, 663 N.W.2d 625 (2003), cert. denied Hoots ex rel. A.B. v. K.M., 124 S. Ct. 1875, 158 L. Ed. 2d 466 (2004). A.B. involved the transfer of jurisdiction of a parental termination proceeding from state juvenile court to tribal court. The County argued that the transfer would be unconstitutional relying on the California Court of Appeals' decisions. The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the transfer was not unconstitutional. It determined that: 1) the United States Supreme Court has consistently rejected claims that laws which treat Indians as a distinct class violate equal protection; 2) the different treatment of Indians and non-Indians under the Act is based on the political status of the parents and children and the sovereign nature of the tribe; 3) the substantive due process and equal protection challenges were subject to a rational basis analysis and the Act was rationally related to the protection of the integrity of American Indian families and tribes and is rationally related to the fulfillment of Congress's unique guardianship obligations toward Indians; and 4) Congress's plenary power to legislate Indian matters is well established and the Act is a rational exercise of that power which does not violate the Tenth Amendment. ¶23 We agree with the North Dakota Supreme Court's rationale and find it equally applicable to the present cause. We hold that the Acts are not unconstitutional as applied to this cause. II. ¶25 The father argues that the trial court erred in finding that the adoption could proceed, pursuant to 10 O.S. 2001 §7505-4.2(C), ¶26 Title 10 O.S. 2001 §7505-4.2 provides in pertinent part: ". . .C. Consent to adoption is not required from a father or putative father of a minor born out of wedlock if: 1. The minor is placed for adoption within ninety (90) days of birth, and the father or putative father fails to show he has exercised parental rights or duties towards the minor, including, but not limited to, failure to contribute to the support of the mother of the child to the extent of his financial ability during her term of pregnancy. . ." ¶27 The evidence reflects that: 1) the father acknowledged paternity and was pleased at the prospect of becoming a father; 2) the mother lived with him and his mother during a significant portion of the pregnancy; 3) the father quit school and obtained a job in preparation for one day providing for the family; 4) the father was allowed to believe for several months that the mother had miscarried the baby; 5) it was not physically evident that the mother was even pregnant until approximately after the sixth month of the pregnancy; 6) the father attempted to make contact with the baby at the hospital when the child was born, but he was prevented from doing so by the mother and the hospital staff; and 7) after the child's birth, the father sent some money to the mother's attorney for child related expenses. ¶28 The standard of review for a trial court's conclusion regarding a child's eligibility for adoption without the consent of the biological parent is whether it is supported by the clear weight of the requisite clear and convincing evidence. CONCLUSION ¶29 Legislative amendments to the Oklahoma Act, have expressly contradicted the application of the exception to Indian child custody proceedings in Oklahoma. Therefore, we determine that: 1) the "existing Indian family exception" is no longer a viable doctrine applicable in Oklahoma insofar as Indian child custody proceedings are concerned; and 2) even if it were, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that the child was eligible for adoption without the consent of the father. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED. WATT, C.J., OPALA, V.C.J., KAUGER, EDMONDSON, COLBERT JJ., concur. LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, WINCHESTER, TAYLOR, JJ., dissent. FOOT