Case Title: Pinther v. Hiett

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-10-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Pinther v. Hiett1994 WY 107884 P.2d 631Case Number: 93-276Decided: 10/12/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Ronald 
E. PINTHER,

Appellant 
(Respondent),

v.

Craig 
E. HIETT,

Appellee 
(Petitioner).

 

Appeal 
from District Court of Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Donald 
E. Miller, Cheyenne.

Representing 
Appellee:

Peter 
G. Arnold of Riske & Arnold, P.C., Cheyenne.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Advancing several 
theories, appellant challenges the district court's entry of a judgment by 
consent.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant frames 
the following issues:

I. 
Did the district court have the authority, or in the alternative, did the 
district court abuse its discretion, when it granted a permanent injunction 
restraining appellant from:

A. 
Displaying certain described behaviors in the presence of appellant's 
stepchildren;

B. 
Possessing firearms in the presence of appellant's 
step-children.

II. 
Did Petitioner lack standing to bring a petition which sought to protect the 
interest of individuals not parties to the action?

[¶4]      Appellee 
identifies these issues:

1. 
May this Consent Decree be appealed?

2. 
Did the Appellee have standing to petition the District Court for a restraining 
order intended to protect the welfare of his minor 
children?

3. 
Did the District Court have the authority to restrain the Appellant 
from:

a. 
engaging in violence either toward the Hiett children or toward third persons 
while in the presence of the Hiett children;

b. 
threatening violence against the Hiett children or against third persons in the 
Hiett children's presence;

c. 
handling firearms or threatening to handle firearms while in the presence of the 
Hiett children; 

d. 
using profanity or threatening language in the presence of the Hiett children or 
toward third persons while in the Hiett children's 
presence?

4. 
Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it permanently restrained 
Appellant from:

a. 
engaging in violence either toward the Hiett children or toward third persons 
while in the presence of the Hiett children;

b. 
threatening violence against the Hiett children or against third persons in the 
Hiett children's presence;

c. 
handling firearms or threatening to handle firearms while in the presence of the 
Hiett children;

d. 
using profanity or threatening language in the presence of the Hiett children or 
toward third persons while in the Hiett children's 
presence?

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      On July 23, 1993, 
Craig E. Hiett (Hiett) petitioned the district court for a permanent restraining 
order to protect his two children from the allegedly irrational and dangerous 
behavior of the children's stepfather, Ronald E. Pinther (Pinther). At the time, 
Pinther was married to Hiett's former wife, Carol Wolfe-Pinther (Wolfe). Hiett 
alleged that Pinther was an "emotionally unstable" individual whose past conduct 
had demonstrated the "inability to control his emotions" which resulted in "harm 
to those around him." Hiett requested the district court enter a broadly phrased 
order restraining Pinther and Wolfe from having "face to face contact with each 
[other] whenever [Wolfe] has custody of [Hiett's] 
children."

[¶6]      The district 
court conducted a hearing on the petition which resulted in the entry of a 
judgment by consent styled as "Consent Decree and Permanent Restraining Order" 
(hereinafter Judgment by Consent). The form of the Judgment by Consent which the 
district court filed included four general findings of 
fact:

BASED 
UPON THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES FREELY GIVEN IN OPEN COURT, THE COURT FINDS Mr. 
Pinther should be restrained from engaging in violence either toward the Hiett 
children or toward third persons while in the Hiett [children's] 
presence.

THE 
COURT FURTHER FINDS Mr. Pinther should be restrained from threatening violence 
against the Hiett children or against third persons in the Hiett [children's] 
presence.

THE 
COURT FURTHER FINDS Mr. Pinther should be restrained from handling firearms or 
threatening to handle firearms while in the Hiett [children's] 
presence.

THE 
COURT FURTHER FINDS Mr. Pinther should be restrained from using profanity or 
threatening language toward or in the presence of the Hiett 
children.

[¶7]      The Judgment by 
Consent restrains Pinther from certain actions:

1. 
Ronald E. Pinther, is hereby permanently restrained from engaging in violence 
either toward the Hiett children or toward third persons while in the Hiett 
[children's] presence.

2. 
Mr. Pinther is hereby permanently restrained from threatening violence against 
the Hiett children or against third persons in the Hiett [children's] 
presence.

3. 
Mr. Pinther is hereby permanently restrained from handling firearms or 
threatening to handle firearms while in the Hiett [children's] 
presence.

4. 
Mr. Pinther is hereby permanently restrained from using profanity or threatening 
language in the presence of the Hiett children or toward third persons while in 
the Hiett [children's] presence.

[¶8]      Pinther filed a 
written objection to the form of the Judgment by Consent. W.R.C.P. 58(a). 
Pinther argued that "[m]aking specific findings * * * infers that Mr. Pinther 
had behaved aberrantly and not in accordance with behavior expected in every-day 
society." Pinther admitted that the parties had stipulated to the entry of the 
Judgment by Consent. Pinther reiterated that he consented to the entry of the 
Judgment by Consent because the "behavior required does not depart from ordinary 
behavior and the fact that he made no admission of any departure from behaving 
within the bounds of the order." The district court overruled Pinther's 
objection and entered the Judgment by Consent.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶9]      The novel 
question before this court is whether a judgment by consent may be appealed. Our 
review discloses that a judgment by consent may be appealed. However, the scope 
of appellate review is limited.

[¶10]   Various theories have been advanced 
by courts considering whether a judgment by consent may be appealed. See 
E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Right to Appellate Review of Consent Judgment, 
69 A.L.R.2d 755 (1960) (collecting cases). Some courts have held that a party 
who consented to the entry of a judgment lacked standing to appeal. See e.g., 
Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1517 (11th Cir. 1984). Other courts have 
adopted the view that an appeal from a judgment by consent should simply be 
dismissed. See e.g., Cohen v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 788 F.2d 247, 
249-50 (4th Cir. 1986).

[¶11]   We agree with the considered 
position expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Pacific R.R. 
v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 295, 25 L. Ed. 932, 935 (1879). The United States 
Supreme Court held that the entry of a judgment by consent waives certain claims 
of error.

If, 
when the case gets here, it appears that the decree appealed from was assented 
to by the appellant, we cannot consider any errors that may be assigned which 
were in law waived by the consent, but we must still receive and decide the 
case. If all the errors complained of come within the waiver, the decree below 
will be affirmed, but only after hearing.

Id. 
A party to a judgment by consent is deemed to have waived any objections to 
matters within the scope of the judgment. Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores 
Co., 971 F.2d 522, 526 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Coughlin v. Regan, 
768 F.2d 468, 469-70 (1st Cir. 1985)). Therefore, the waiver theory for a 
judgment by consent may be analogous to the limited review permitted for appeals 
of guilty pleas. See e.g., Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1106 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶12]   Authoritative commentators also 
support the adoption of the waiver theory. "The true principle at work, however, 
is one of waiver or consent; the appropriate disposition, if the appeal 
represents no more than a retroactive attempt to undo consent properly given, is 
affirmance rather than dismissal." 15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller 
& Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 
3902 at 92 (1992).

[¶13]   Under the standard we adopt today, 
a judgment by consent may be appealed to claim: a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction; a lack of actual consent; fraud in the procurement of the order; 
or, mistake. N.L.R.B. v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U.S. 318, 323, 82 S. Ct. 344, 348, 7 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1961); Coughlin, 768 F.2d  at 470; 
Pacific Nat. Bank of Washington v. Mount, 97 Idaho 887, 556 P.2d 70, 71 
(1976). "A judgment by consent or stipulation is generally construed as an 
agreement between the parties under which the terms of the judgment are not 
subject to review on appeal." Matter of Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d 165, 
168 (Utah 1983).

[¶14]   Pinther broadly characterizes his 
appeal as one challenging the district court's "authority" to enter the Judgment 
by Consent. Pinther maintains that Hiett did not have standing to file the 
petition. Furthermore, Pinther specifically argues the district court abused its 
discretion when it entered the Judgment by Consent. The only cognizable 
challenge to a judgment by consent which Pinther presents is Hiett's standing to 
sue. N.L.R.B., 368 U.S.  at 323, 7 L. Ed. 2d 312; Coughlin, 768 F.2d  
at 470; Pacific Nat. Bank of Washington, 556 P.2d  at 
71.

[¶15]   A challenge to the standing of a 
party is jurisdictional in nature. Spratt v. Security Bank of Buffalo, 
Wyo., 654 P.2d 130, 134 (Wyo. 1982). The standing to sue doctrine requires 
that a party have "a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to 
obtain judicial resolution of that controversy." Matter of Various Water 
Rights in Lake DeSmet Reservoir, Bd. of Control, Docket No. II-77-2-1, 623 P.2d 764, 767 (Wyo. 1981). 

At 
its most elementary level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making 
body should refrain from considering issues in which the litigants have little 
or no interest in vigorously advocating. Washakie Co. Sch. Dist. No. One v. 
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 317 (Wyo. []), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 
101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 [(1980)]. Accordingly, the doctrine of standing 
focuses upon whether a litigant is properly situated to assert an issue for 
judicial or quasi-judicial determination. Laramie Rivers Co. v. Wheatland 
Irr. Dist., 708 P.2d 20, 27 (Wyo. 1985). A litigant is said to have standing 
when he has a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy." This personal 
stake requirement has been described in Wyoming as a "tangible interest" at 
stake. The tangible interest requirement guarantees that a litigant is 
sufficiently interested in a case to present a justiciable controversy. 
Laramie Rivers, 708 P.2d  at 27 (quoting Int'l Ass'n Fire Fighters v. 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 702 P.2d 1294, 1297-98 (Wyo. 
1985)).

Schulthess 
v. Carollo, 
832 P.2d 552, 556-57 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶16]   Pinther asserts Hiett did not have 
standing to sue to protect the Hiett children. Pinther maintains that the 
failure to bring the petition on behalf of the Hiett children resulted in an 
improper exercise of authority by the district court. Additionally, Pinther 
contends that Hiett had no personal stake in the 
controversy.

[¶17]   Hiett responds that the petition 
stated a sufficient factual basis to disclose that a tangible interest was at 
stake. As the natural father of the two minor children, Hiett alleged that his 
children were occasionally in the presence of Pinther. Hiett alleged that he had 
been informed by Wolfe, the children, the children's counselor, and the Cheyenne 
Police Department that Pinther had exhibited a "propensity toward violence" and 
had acted "irrationally and in a dangerous fashion * * *" in the presence of the 
Hiett children. Hiett argues "[i]t is impossible to conceive of a more personal 
stake or interest than the interest a parent has for the welfare and safety of 
his children." We agree.

[¶18]   In Washakie County School Dist. 
No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316-17 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980), this court considered whether 
various parties had standing to sue the state to challenge the system of 
financing public education. Among the parties were school board members who 
participated in the suit as parents of children attending schools. We held the 
parents had standing. Id. at 317. "Parents are keenly concerned and 
suffer tangible injury if their children do not receive a proper education." 
Id.

[¶19]   Certainly, a parent suffers a 
similar, if not greater, tangible injury if his or her children are threatened 
with, or have suffered from, physical or emotional harm. See State in 
Interest of J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 714-15 (Utah 1990) (noting that, in 
custody matters, determination of standing should not be mechanical). Therefore, 
we hold that Hiett had standing to seek a restraining order against Pinther. 
See Stuckey v. Stuckey, 768 P.2d 694, 695 (Colo. 1989) (holding court, 
based on mother's petition, could issue a permanent injunction to restrain a 
father who had exhibited threatening behavior from having any contact with his 
minor child). The controversy presented for the district court's resolution was 
not artificial or academic. Washakie County School Dist. No. One, 606 P.2d  at 317. Hiett sought a remedy for a palpable injury. The district court did 
not exceed its subject matter jurisdiction when it entered the Judgment by 
Consent.

[¶20]   In his remaining challenges to the 
district court's "authority," Pinther specifically contends the district court 
abused its discretion. Pinther argues the Judgment by Consent is overbroad and 
seeks to protect persons not parties to the court proceedings. Pinther declares 
that the relief granted by the Judgment by Consent unnecessarily restricts his 
activities, including fundamental rights. Pinther also maintains the Judgment by 
Consent granted an equitable remedy where other relief was available at 
law.

[¶21]   Pinther failed to raise an 
appealable issue with these arguments. As a party to the Judgment by Consent, 
Pinther waived any objections to matters within the scope of the judgment. 
Pacific R.R., 101 U.S.  at 295, 25 L. Ed. 932; Mock, 971 F.2d  at 
526. The objections Pinther raised at district court were limited to the form of 
the Judgment by Consent. Pinther could have specifically reserved a right to 
appeal the challenged terms of the Judgment by Consent. See e.g., In Re U.S. 
Oil & Gas Litigation, 967 F.2d 489, 494-95 (11th Cir. 1992). He did not. 
Without an unequivocal reservation of a right to appeal, the terms of the 
judgment by consent are not subject to review. Coughlin, 768 F.2d  at 470; 
Matter of Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d  at 168.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶22]   The parties made an agreement to 
resolve their dispute. As a result, a Judgment by Consent was properly entered 
by the district court. The parties must now abide by the terms of their 
agreement.

[¶23]   We affirm.