Case Title: State v. Dangler

Citation: 2020-Ohio-2765

Docket Number: 2017-1703

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Dangler, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-2765.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-2765 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. DANGLER, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Dangler, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-2765.] 
Criminal law—Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)—A trial court must explain to a defendant the 
“maximum penalty involved” when accepting a plea of guilty or no 
contest—When a trial court explained to a defendant sex offender who 
entered a plea of guilty or no contest that he is subject to the sex-offender-
registration scheme of R.C. Chapter 2950 as part of his penalty, the 
defendant is entitled to have his conviction vacated for lack of a more 
complete explanation only if he demonstrates prejudice. 
(No. 2017-1703—Submitted February 20, 2019—Decided May 5, 2020.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Williams County, No. WM-16-010,  
2017-Ohio-7981. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} Brad Dangler pleaded no contest to sexual battery and then sought to 
vacate his plea on appeal.  He contends that his plea was invalid because the trial 
court failed to comply fully with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)’s requirement that the court 
explain the “maximum penalty” for the offense at the time it accepted the plea.  
Specifically, he maintains that even though the trial court told him that he would 
have to register as a Tier III sex offender for the rest of his life, it erred by not 
explaining more fully the obligations and restrictions that went with his status as a 
sex offender.  He says this purported failure gives him an automatic right to 
withdraw his plea, without any need to demonstrate that he was prejudiced. 
{¶ 2} We disagree.  When a trial court has told a defendant that he is subject 
to the sex-offender-registration scheme, that defendant is entitled to have his 
conviction vacated for lack of a more complete explanation only if he demonstrates 
prejudice—that is, that he would not have entered the plea but for the incomplete 
explanation.  Because Dangler has not demonstrated prejudice, he is not entitled to 
withdraw his plea. 
A Plea and an Appeal 
{¶ 3} Dangler was indicted on one count of rape of a substantially impaired 
person in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), a felony of the first degree.  He 
ultimately reached an agreement with the state to resolve the case with a plea and 
an agreed sentence.  The state amended the count to sexual battery in violation of 
R.C. 2907.03(A)(2), a felony of the third degree, and Dangler entered a plea of no 
contest “with a consent to a finding of guilt.”  The parties jointly recommended a 
sentence of three years in prison, with the state indicating that it would not object 
to judicial release after Dangler had served two years and four months. 
{¶ 4} Before accepting the plea, the trial court engaged Dangler in a plea 
colloquy. The court instructed Dangler at the outset, “If I ask you a question that 
you do not understand, please stop me and I will rephrase it.”  The court told 
January Term, 2020 
 
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Dangler the maximum possible prison term and fine that could be imposed and 
further advised him, “You would also be obligated to register as a Tier III sex 
offender which means you would have an obligation to register for your lifetime.”  
Dangler replied that he understood.  After explaining the constitutional rights 
Dangler was waiving by entering a plea, the trial court accepted Dangler’s plea and 
entered a finding of guilty. 
{¶ 5} The trial court proceeded with sentencing a month later.  At the 
hearing, the court designated Dangler a Tier III sex offender, detailed his 
obligations with respect to registration and in-person verification, and informed 
him of the possibility of criminal prosecution for noncompliance.  Dangler clarified 
the date of his initial registration and indicated that he had no other questions about 
the terms of his sex-offender status.  The court then imposed the agreed-upon 36-
month prison term and a mandatory five-year period of postrelease control. 
{¶ 6} Dangler appealed, raising two assignments of error.  First, he sought 
to have his plea vacated on the grounds that the trial court had not complied with 
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)’s requirement that the court inform him of the maximum 
penalty for his crime.  That provision requires the court to determine “that the 
defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the 
charges and of the maximum penalty involved.”  Id.  Dangler asserted that in order 
to adequately inform him of the maximum penalty, the trial court was required to 
explain to him (1) the registration requirements that went with his classification 
(verifying his address in-person every 90 days for the rest of his life with the sheriff 
of any county in which he resides, works, or attends school), (2) the residency 
restrictions applicable to his classification, and (3) the community-notification 
process by which members of the public would be made aware of his status as a sex 
offender.  He contended that because the court did not provide that information, his 
plea was not knowing and voluntary.  Dangler also challenged the trial court’s order 
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requiring him to pay appointed-counsel fees without a determination of his ability 
to pay. 
{¶ 7} The state defended the plea, arguing that the trial court had 
substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) by informing Dangler that he 
would be classified as a Tier III sex offender and would be required to register for 
the rest of his life.  The state further asserted that Dangler had not shown that he 
was prejudiced by any lack of notification by the trial court about other aspects of 
the sex-offender-classification scheme. 
{¶ 8} Relying on this court’s decision in State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 
344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, the Sixth District Court of Appeals 
concluded that the registration and in-person verification requirements, 
community-notification provisions, and residency restrictions are punitive 
sanctions.  Under the Sixth District’s view, each of these requirements constitutes 
a separate penalty and therefore a trial court must go over each requirement in order 
to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(A)’s maximum-penalty advisement.  Because the 
trial court did not review the community-notification provisions and the residency 
restrictions, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court had completely failed 
to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and vacated Dangler’s conviction and sentence 
without requiring him to show prejudice.  The court determined that its resolution 
of the plea issue rendered the appointed-counsel-fee question moot. 
{¶ 9} The Sixth District certified that its decision was in conflict with 
decisions from the Second District Court of Appeals in State v. Young, 2d Dist. 
Greene No. 2013-CA-22, 2014-Ohio-2213, and the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals in State v. Creed, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97317, 2012-Ohio-2627.  We 
determined that a conflict exists and ordered briefing on the following question: 
 
During a plea hearing, does the failure of the sentencing court to 
inform a defendant of all of the penalties associated with a sex 
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5
offender classification imposed by R.C. Chapter 2950 constitute a 
complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11 and render the plea void 
without the need to show prejudice resulted? 
 
152 Ohio St.3d 1404, 2018-Ohio-723, 92 N.E.3d 876. 
Compliance with Crim.R. 11 
{¶ 10} Because a no-contest or guilty plea involves a waiver of 
constitutional rights, a defendant’s decision to enter a plea must be knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 
L.Ed.2d 391 (1992); State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 
N.E.2d 462, ¶ 25; see State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 
(1996).  If the plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, 
enforcement of that plea is unconstitutional.  Id. 
{¶ 11} Ohio’s Crim.R. 11 outlines the procedures that trial courts are to 
follow when accepting pleas.  We have explained that the rule “ensures an adequate 
record on review by requiring the trial court to personally inform the defendant of 
his rights and the consequences of his plea and determine if the plea is 
understandingly and voluntarily made.”  State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168, 
331 N.E.2d 411 (1975); see also State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 107, 564 N.E.2d 
474 (1990). 
{¶ 12} Ever since the rule’s adoption in 1973, we have been grappling with 
how best to review a trial court’s colloquy to ensure that a defendant’s plea is 
knowing and voluntary.  See State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480, 423 
N.E.2d 115 (1981).  In keeping with that objective, our focus in reviewing pleas 
has not been on whether the trial judge has “[incanted] the precise verbiage” of the 
rule, State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977), but on whether 
the dialogue between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant 
understood the consequences of his plea, State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-
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Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 15-16; Clark at ¶ 26; State v. Miller, ___ Ohio St.3d 
___, 2020-Ohio-1420, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 13} When a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on 
appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish that an error occurred in the 
trial-court proceedings and that he was prejudiced by that error.  See State v. Perry, 
101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 14-15; Stewart at 93; 
Crim.R. 52. 
{¶ 14} We have made a limited exception to the prejudice component of 
that rule in the criminal-plea context.  When a trial court fails to explain the 
constitutional rights that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, we 
presume that the plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and no showing 
of prejudice is required.  Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 
462, at ¶ 31; Veney at syllabus.  We have identified these constitutional rights as 
those set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c): the right to a jury trial, the right to confront 
one’s accusers, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to compulsory 
process to obtain witnesses, and the right to require the state to prove guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  Id. at ¶ 19.  But when a trial court fails to fully cover other 
“nonconstitutional” aspects of the plea colloquy, a defendant must affirmatively 
show prejudice to invalidate a plea.  Id. at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 15} We have created one additional exception to the prejudice 
requirement: a trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 
11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudice.  State v. Sarkozy, 117 
Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22.  In Sarkozy, we held that 
the trial court had completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)’s 
requirement that it explain the maximum penalty when the court made no mention 
of postrelease control in the plea colloquy, despite the fact the defendant was 
subject to a mandatory five years of postrelease control.  Id. 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
{¶ 16} Aside from these two exceptions, the traditional rule continues to 
apply: a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he demonstrates 
he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions of 
Crim.R. 11(C).  Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d at 108, 564 N.E.2d 474.  The test for prejudice 
is “whether the plea would have otherwise been made.”  Id. 
{¶ 17} Unfortunately, our caselaw has muddled that analysis by suggesting 
different tiers of compliance with the rule.  The court has, in some instances, said 
that “partial” compliance is sufficient absent a showing of prejudice from the failure 
to “substantially” comply, see, e.g., Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 
893 N.E.2d 462, at ¶ 32.  Elsewhere, the court has indicated that when a trial court 
has “substantially” complied, the defendant must show prejudice from the failure 
to “strictly” or “literally” adhere to the rule, see, e.g., Nero at 107-108; see also 
Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d at 93, 364 N.E.2d 1163.  But those formulations have served 
only to unduly complicate what should be a fairly straightforward inquiry.  Properly 
understood, the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has the trial court complied 
with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with 
the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden 
of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the 
defendant met that burden? 
The “Maximum Penalty” 
{¶ 18} At issue here is compliance with Crim R. 11(C)(2)(a), which 
requires that the trial court determine that the defendant is “making the plea 
voluntarily, with understanding of * * * the maximum penalty involved.”  Thus, a 
threshold question is whether the classification of an offender as a sex offender and 
the various obligations that come with that classification are part of the “penalty” 
that is imposed on a defendant for his crime. 
{¶ 19} In concluding that the sex-offender-registration scheme constitutes 
a penalty for the purposes of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), the Sixth District relied upon our 
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decision in Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108.  The 
question in Williams was whether Ohio’s current sex-offender-registration scheme, 
R.C. Chapter 2950, could be applied retroactively without violating the prohibition 
on retroactive laws contained in Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution.  
That question turned, at least in part, on whether the statutory scheme should be 
considered remedial or punitive.  The General Assembly has indicated that current 
R.C. Chapter 2950 is remedial, specifying the Chapter’s purpose “to protect the 
safety and general welfare of the people of this state,” R.C. 2950.02(B), by 
preventing sex offenders from “engaging in further sexually abusive behavior,” 
R.C. 2950.02(A)(2).  But notwithstanding the General Assembly’s stated intent, 
this court concluded in Williams that changes made by 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 
(“S.B. 10”), Ohio’s version of the federal Adam Walsh Act, rendered the statutory 
scheme “so punitive that its retroactive application is unconstitutional.”  Id. at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 20} Williams did not address whether the sex-offender-registration 
scheme constitutes a penalty for purposes of Crim.R. 11.  It did, however, hold that 
when the various parts of the scheme were considered together, there was enough 
of a punitive aspect that the scheme could not be applied retroactively.  The state 
urges us to revisit Williams.  But to do so would be beyond the scope of the certified 
question and is unnecessary for purposes of deciding this case.  Instead, based on 
the rationale of Williams, we proceed with the assumption that the scheme as a 
whole constitutes a penalty for purposes of Crim.R. 11. 
{¶ 21} The Sixth District held that it was not enough for the trial court to 
inform Dangler that he was subject to the sex-offender-registration scheme; the trial 
court was also required to separately go over the registration and in-person-
verification requirements, community-notification provisions, and residency 
restrictions imposed by R.C. Chapter 2950.  It concluded that because the trial court 
failed to do so, this case fell under the complete-noncompliance exception and that 
Dangler was therefore excused from establishing prejudice.  This result is premised 
January Term, 2020 
 
9
on the Sixth District’s understanding of each aspect of the sex-offender-
classification scheme as a discrete criminal penalty. 
{¶ 22} We disagree.  Contrary to the view of the Sixth District, the Williams 
court did not decide that any specific element of the statutory scheme constitutes a 
criminal penalty.  Rather, we explicitly stated that “[n]o one change compels our 
conclusion that S.B. 10 is punitive.”  Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-
3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, at ¶ 21.  It was the changes to the statutes “in aggregate” 
that rendered the retroactive application of the statutory requirements punitive.  Id.  
Thus, although R.C. Chapter 2950 contains a mixture of remedial and punitive 
elements, id. at ¶ 20, it was the statutory scheme as a whole that the court deemed 
to be punitive, id. at ¶ 16, 21.  Because the trial court in this case advised Dangler 
that he would be subject to the registration requirements of that statutory scheme, 
the trial court did not completely fail to comply with Crim R. 11(C)(2)(a)’s 
maximum-penalty-advisement requirement. 
Dangler Cannot Demonstrate Prejudice 
{¶ 23} The next question—must Dangler demonstrate prejudice?—is easily 
answered.  The trial court did not completely fail to comply with Crim.R. 
11(C)(2)(a)’s requirement that it explain the maximum penalty.  And the 
maximum-penalty advisement is not a constitutional requirement.  Consequently, 
neither of this court’s exceptions to the prejudice requirement apply, and Dangler 
can prevail only by establishing that he would not have pleaded no contest but for 
the trial court’s failure to explain the sex-offender-classification scheme more 
thoroughly. 
{¶ 24} Both parties have addressed the prejudice issue in their briefs to this 
court, and we have the full record before us, so we may resolve that issue now.  
Prejudice must be established “ ‘on the face of the record.’ ”  Hayward v. Summa 
Health Sys./Akron City Hosp., 139 Ohio St.3d 238, 2014-Ohio-1913, 11 N.E.3d 
243, ¶ 26, quoting Wagner v. Roche Laboratories, 85 Ohio St.3d 457, 462, 709 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
N.E.2d 162 (1999).  There is nothing in the record indicating that Dangler would 
not have entered his plea had he been more thoroughly informed of the details of 
the sex-offender-classification scheme.  This is presumably why Dangler asks us to 
conclude that solely by virtue of challenging a plea on appeal, a defendant is 
“explicitly demonstrating” that his plea would not have otherwise been made.  But 
that would be tantamount to eliminating the prejudice requirement altogether.  
Because Dangler has not established prejudice, he is not entitled to have his no-
contest plea vacated for a failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 25} The trial court could have gone further than it did and reviewed with 
Dangler the entirety of his obligations and burdens under the sex-offender-
classification scheme.  And we encourage trial courts to be thorough in reviewing 
consequences of a defendant’s decision to enter a plea, including those stemming 
from classification as a sex offender: the duty to register and provide in-person 
verification, the community-notification provisions, and the residency restrictions. 
{¶ 26} But the trial court did not completely fail to comply with Crim.R. 
11(C)(2)(a), and there is nothing in the record to support a conclusion that Dangler 
would not have entered his plea had the trial court been more detailed in its 
explanation.  We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals on the 
certified-conflict issue, reinstate the trial court’s acceptance of his plea, and remand 
this cause to the court of appeals to consider the assignment of error it found moot. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
DONNELLY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined 
by STEWART, J. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2020 
 
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DONNELLY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 27} At the time that appellee, Brad J. Dangler, filed the notice of his 
appeal to the Sixth District Court of Appeals, the consistent law of the Sixth District 
was to conclusively presume prejudice in the circumstances of cases like Dangler’s.  
See, e.g., State v. McMahon, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-14-036, 2015-Ohio-3300, 
¶ 19.  Dangler was not on notice of a need to assert that he was in fact prejudiced 
by the trial court’s failure to inform him of the community-notification 
requirements, 
periodic 
in-person-verification 
requirements, 
or 
residency 
restrictions contained in the statutory scheme governing sex offenders, R.C. 
Chapter 2950.  The only issue briefed in this court was the certified-conflict issue—
whether prejudice must be presumed as a matter of law in all cases of this type.  
Now that we are resolving that issue in the negative and reversing the judgment 
below, we should be remanding this cause to the appellate court with instructions 
to allow the parties to brief the issue of prejudice in fact as to Dangler rather than 
sua sponte deciding the merits of the issue ourselves without giving the parties 
notice or an opportunity to respond. 
{¶ 28} That being said, I agree as a general matter that reversal is 
appropriate in this case and that the certified-conflict question should be answered 
in the negative.  A trial court’s failure to explain any one detail among the specific 
registration requirements, community-notification provisions, address-verification 
requirements, 
and 
residential 
restrictions 
associated 
with 
sex-offender 
classification does not constitute a “complete failure” to comply with Crim.R. 
11(C)(2)(a) as contemplated in State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-
509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22.  That line is an obvious one to draw.  Beyond that basic 
notion, it is also important for both trial and appellate courts to bear in mind that 
sex-offender classification is unique among criminal penalties and is a relatively 
new addition as a category of criminal penalty. 
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{¶ 29} When a trial court imposes a prison term, the commonplace 
understanding of imprisonment obviates the court’s need to explain its meaning in 
detail.  But merely reciting the word “prison” does not technically explain the 
nature of the penalty or describe the aspects that a defendant might find to be 
particularly burdensome or punitive.  The trial court need not explain that prison 
involves the basic loss of liberty through physical confinement in a facility, as well 
as the loss of privacy and personal physical integrity on a number of levels.  See, 
e.g., R.C. 5120.66 (an inmate’s information is displayed on a publicly accessible 
internet database); R.C. 2301.57(E) (involuntary medical testing); Ohio Adm.Code 
5120-9-17(B)(1) (incoming mail is opened and reviewed); Ohio Adm.Code 5120-
9-25(I) (haircuts by physical force). 
{¶ 30} Each way in which prison might curtail a defendant’s liberty 
interests does not need to be explained in order to adequately notify a criminal 
defendant of the “maximum penalty involved” pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).  
Instead, the penalty is prison, and the “maximum penalty” is the longest duration 
of time that the defendant might have to endure the penalty of prison.  If the penalty 
aspects of sex-offender classification were as commonly understood as prison, then 
a trial court would simply need to identify the longest duration that a defendant 
would be subjected to the requirements of R.C. Chapter 2950.  In other words, a 
defendant would need to be notified whether he or she would be subject to the 
statutory scheme for 15 years as a Tier I offender, 25 years as a Tier II offender, or 
for life as a Tier III offender.  See R.C. 2950.07(B). 
{¶ 31} But, of course, sex-offender classification is not as commonly 
understood as prison.  By contrast, it is a relatively new concept.  See Smith v. Doe, 
538 U.S. 84, 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003).  Over time, we can expect 
that the requirements and consequences involved in sex-offender classification will 
eventually become common knowledge.  Currently, though, identifying the 
duration of sex-offender classification alone would satisfy only the minimum that 
January Term, 2020 
 
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would be needed to avoid a finding of complete noncompliance with Crim.R. 
11(C)(2)(a).  A more detailed explanation of certain aspects of sex-offender 
classification might be necessary in order for a defendant to truly understand the 
penalty involved.  And any claim of prejudice on appeal deserves particularly 
careful and comprehensive consideration. 
{¶ 32} The Sixth District has been correct in repeatedly emphasizing in its 
opinions that a trial court should be thorough in explaining the import of the new 
and still-evolving consequences of sex-offender classification.  The best practices 
of a trial court would be to explain the registration requirements, community-
notification requirements, address-verification details, and residential restrictions 
as described by the Sixth District in its opinion in this case and its opinions in other 
cases.  In light of Crim.R. 11’s purpose of ensuring an adequate record to review 
the voluntariness of a plea, State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 107, 564 N.E.2d 474 
(1990), an ideal colloquy on sex-offender classification would also be accompanied 
by a written sex-offender-registry notification form, signed by the defendant, with 
an integrated attestation of counsel that the defendant has been apprised of and 
understands the form’s contents. 
{¶ 33} Ohio’s trial courts need guidance on best practices regarding sex 
offenders’ pleas more than they need a re-explanation of basic concepts already 
established in Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224.  I do 
not see why this court continues to review cases contesting the validity of guilty 
and no-contest pleas when this court ends up merely repeating already-existing 
standards in narrower and narrower terms.  We could keep on accepting these cases, 
or we could do something useful; we could use our power to promulgate rules of 
procedure that incorporate standardized guilty and no-contest plea forms for sex 
offenses. 
{¶ 34} The advantage of using a standard sex-offense plea form is that the 
defendant would receive notice of all significant aspects of sex-offender 
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classification before the plea hearing even takes place, rather than receiving notice 
of registration requirements as an afterthought at the sentencing stage pursuant to 
R.C. 2950.03.  Such a form would prompt a defendant to consider a wide range of 
variables and factors, and it would provide the opportunity for the defendant to pose 
informed questions to defense counsel and the trial court.  Requiring an attestation 
of counsel on the plea form would ensure that defense counsel sits down with the 
defendant and reviews everything before the plea hearing.  Using plea forms would 
also allow the plea hearing itself to be more efficient and focused.  It would be 
possible to strive for uniformity even with the understanding that different trial 
judges in different courthouses throughout the state of Ohio have vastly different 
amounts of time that they can spend on these plea hearings. 
{¶ 35} Standard plea forms for sex offenses—and for that matter, all 
categories of criminal offenses—would enhance the efficiency of the judicial 
process and, more importantly, would bring us closer to achieving the goal of 
protecting all criminal defendants’ due-process rights.  We should keep in mind 
that the defendants’ due-process rights are paramount in the plea process.  Rather 
than putting our energy into ensuring the narrowness of appellate review for 
criminal defendants, our goal should be to help Ohio’s trial courts ensure that guilty 
and no-contest pleas are knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
David T. Harold and Thomas A. Matuszak, Assistant Wood County 
Prosecuting Attorneys, as special prosecuting attorneys, for appellant. 
Karin L. Coble, for appellee. 
_________________