Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Amaddio and Wargo

Citation: 2020-Ohio-141

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Amaddio and Wargo, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-141.] 
  
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-141 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. AMADDIO AND WARGO. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Amaddio and Wargo,  
Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-141.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—One-
year suspension. 
(No. 2019-0809—Submitted August 6, 2019—Decided January 22, 2020.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the  
Supreme Court, No. 2018-068. 
______________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent Mark Douglas Amaddio, of Beachwood, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0041276, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1989.  
Respondent John Joseph Wargo Jr., of Berea, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 
0023299, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1975.  Although Amaddio 
and Wargo are not members of the same firm, they sometimes work together on 
medical-malpractice and personal-injury cases. 
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{¶ 2} In complaints filed with the Board of Professional Conduct on 
November 29, 2018, relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged that Amaddio and Wargo 
attempted to collect a clearly excessive fee in a wrongful-death case in the absence 
of a signed contingent-fee agreement.  The complaints also alleged that they 
engaged in conduct that adversely reflected on their fitness to practice law by 
circulating a frivolous draft petition to remove their client, the decedent’s father, as 
the administrator of the estate in an effort to pressure the client to pay the excessive 
fee. 
{¶ 3} The parties entered into stipulations of fact, misconduct, and 
mitigating factors and recommended that Amaddio and Wargo be publicly 
reprimanded for their misconduct.  Based on those stipulations, the parties’ joint 
exhibits, and the testimony adduced at a hearing before a panel of the board, the 
board found that Amaddio and Wargo engaged in the charged misconduct but 
recommends that they be suspended from the practice of law for six months, fully 
stayed on the condition that they engage in no further misconduct. 
{¶ 4} We accept the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, but for the 
reasons stated below, we find that the appropriate sanction for Amaddio’s and 
Wargo’s misconduct is a one-year suspension from the practice of law in Ohio. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 5} In April 2016, 16-year-old O.B. was in the care of a hospital that was 
treating her for mental-health disorders.  On April 13, she died as the result of an 
apparent suicide.  A staff member and administrator of the hospital immediately 
acknowledged responsibility for O.B.’s death and expressed condolences to her 
parents. 
{¶ 6} O.B.’s parents (“the father” and “the mother”)1 decided to personally 
handle negotiations with the hospital, in an effort to strip away organizational 
                                                          
 
1. Because the terms of the settlement agreement between the hospital and the decedent’s family are 
confidential, we do not use the names of the decedent and her parents.   
January Term, 2020 
3 
 
bureaucracy and engage in a “compassionate collaboration” with the doctors and 
hospital administrators.  O.B.’s parents set three goals: (1) to ensure that the 
surviving members of their family, including O.B.’s two younger sisters, received 
the treatment necessary to deal with their loss, (2) to establish school-based mental-
health initiatives, including a partnership between the hospital and local city 
schools to provide holistic transitional care for students who return to school after 
receiving mental-health treatment, and (3) to reach a financial settlement with the 
hospital that honored and respected O.B.’s life. 
{¶ 7} Although O.B.’s parents planned to negotiate with the hospital 
themselves, they also sought to identify an attorney who would represent their 
interests if the negotiations ever broke down.  To that end, the father interviewed 
multiple attorneys in the weeks following O.B.’s death. 
{¶ 8} The father first spoke with Amaddio by telephone and was impressed 
with his empathy.  O.B.’s parents later met with Amaddio at their home.  At that 
meeting, Amaddio proposed a reduced contingent fee of 20 percent—because it 
was apparent that the family wanted to avoid litigation—but no fee agreement was 
signed.  The father made it clear to Amaddio (and all the other attorneys he 
interviewed) that he did not want to hire an attorney unless and until negotiations 
with the hospital broke down. 
{¶ 9} In the ensuing months, the father met multiple times with the 
hospital’s president, administrators, medical staff, and in-house counsel and 
established a compassionate collaboration that achieved all of the family’s goals.  
The mother frequently accompanied the father to those meetings—but Amaddio 
never did.  The father kept Amaddio apprised of the progress of the negotiations to 
ensure a seamless transition in the event that the negotiations broke down. 
{¶ 10} As the father entered into the final stages of the negotiations, 
Amaddio explained that it would be necessary to open an estate and obtain the 
probate court’s approval for any monetary settlement.  In early November 2016, 
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Wargo prepared and filed the documents necessary to open O.B.’s estate and have 
the father appointed as the administrator. 
{¶ 11} Later that month, O.B.’s parents reached a confidential settlement 
with the hospital that accomplished all their goals—including a seven-figure 
financial settlement.  The father maintained that they would not have been able to 
achieve that result if attorneys had been involved.  The father advised the hospital’s 
counsel that Amaddio and Wargo would obtain the court’s approval of the 
settlement.  All told, Amaddio spent approximately 15 hours on the matter in the 
seven months between O.B.’s death and the signing of the settlement agreement 
between her parents and the hospital. 
{¶ 12} In a series of texts after the settlement, Amaddio mentioned to the 
father that he could not speak with the hospital’s counsel until he had a signed 
engagement contract and that O.B. would have been proud of the father’s hard 
work.  The father responded: 
 
Thank you.  I took care of my daughter which I needed to 
do! 
Thanks for your honesty, compassion, empathy and support.  
I could not have moved with confidence without your words.  You 
are a good man!!!!!!! 
I am open tomorrow to talk and sign contract with you. 
 
{¶ 13} When the father and Amaddio met the following day, the father 
expected to sign a contract for Amaddio to handle the probate matter for a fee of a 
few thousand dollars.  Instead, Amaddio presented him with the same 20 percent 
contingent-fee agreement he had presented at their first meeting, and the father 
refused to sign it.  Amaddio advised the father to contact Wargo about the probate 
proceedings and shook his hand. 
January Term, 2020 
5 
 
{¶ 14} The father first met with Wargo in early December 2016, with the 
expectation that they would discuss the pending probate matter.  However, a major 
focus of the conversation was Amaddio’s fee.  Wargo suggested that Amaddio 
would agree to significantly reduce the fee and that the hospital might agree to pay 
a portion of it.  With the father’s consent, Wargo called the hospital’s attorney to 
discuss that possibility and left a message requesting a return call.  But the father 
withdrew his consent to those discussions later that day and formally terminated 
Wargo’s representation on December 19, 2016. 
{¶ 15} Thereafter, the father obtained new counsel, who informed Wargo 
that the family did not believe that they owed him and Amaddio any fee relating to 
the negotiation and settlement with the hospital.  Wargo and Amaddio then enlisted 
the aid of Wargo’s partner, Tom Wilson, to pursue a claim for attorney fees.  Wilson 
proposed filing an application to remove the father as the administrator of O.B.’s 
estate to pressure her parents into paying a fee.  Wargo did not question the 
proposed tactic and thought, “Okay, you know, play some hardball.” 
{¶ 16} Wilson caused a draft petition for the father’s removal as 
administrator to be hand-delivered to the father—and later e-mailed it to the father’s 
new attorney and the hospital’s in-house counsel with a cover e-mail stating that it 
would be filed on January 17, 2017, “absent a successful resolution of the attorney 
fee issue.”  As drafted, the petition included a brief summary of O.B.’s mental-
health conditions, the events that led to her hospitalization, and the circumstances 
of her death.  It also accused the father of fraudulently representing that he would 
pay a 20 percent contingent fee to induce Amaddio to help him negotiate the 
settlement, and it disclosed the amount and structured payout of the confidential 
settlement between O.B.’s parents and the hospital.  The draft petition concluded 
by identifying Amaddio and Wargo as creditors of the estate and requesting that 
the father be removed as the administrator. 
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{¶ 17} Amaddio and Wargo were aware of the content of the draft petition 
and acknowledged that it was intended to pressure the father to pay them a fee.  The 
board found that the timing of its delivery to O.B.’s parents—just days before their 
first Christmas without O.B.—was extremely hurtful to the grieving family. 
{¶ 18} Soon thereafter, the attorney whom O.B.’s parents had recently hired 
and outside counsel that had been hired by the hospital separately advised Wilson 
that Amaddio and Wargo should abandon their fee claim.  Amaddio and Wargo did 
not file the petition to remove the father, but they did file an application for attorney 
fees in which they alleged that the father had orally agreed to a 20 percent 
contingent fee.  One day before the scheduled hearing on their fee application, 
Amaddio and Wargo withdrew it. 
{¶ 19} All issues between Amaddio, Wargo, and O.B.’s parents were 
resolved after O.B.’s parents initiated sanction proceedings against Amaddio and 
Wargo.  Amaddio and Wargo agreed to donate $30,000 to the mental-health 
organization that the family had established in O.B.’s honor and issue “separate, 
heartfelt and sincere” letters of apology to the father and the mother.  Amaddio and 
Wargo had paid one-half the donation amount before their April 24, 2019 
disciplinary hearing and are scheduled to pay the remaining balance by December 
31, 2020.  Pursuant to the terms of Amaddio and Wargo’s settlement with O.B.’s 
parents, no further restitution is owed. 
{¶ 20} The parties stipulated that Amaddio and Wargo’s attempt to collect 
a seven-figure fee for the services they provided to O.B.’s parents violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from making an agreement for, charging, 
or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee) and that by circulating the draft 
petition accusing the father of being a fraud and a liar, they engaged in conduct that, 
although not specifically prohibited by rule, nonetheless adversely reflects on their 
fitness to practice law, in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice 
January Term, 2020 
7 
 
law).  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013-Ohio-3998, 
997 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 21.  The board found that Amaddio and Wargo committed the 
charged misconduct and noted that even if they were entitled to a fee on the basis 
of quantum meruit, the seven-figure remuneration that they had sought was clearly 
excessive for Amaddio’s 15 hours of communication with the father and Wargo’s 
preparation of the initial probate documents. 
Sanction 
{¶ 21} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 22} The board rejected the parties’ stipulation that no aggravating factors 
are present in this case.  Instead, it found that Amaddio and Wargo acted with a 
selfish motive and caused harm to O.B.’s vulnerable family by threatening to 
publicly accuse the father of fraud.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2) and (8). 
{¶ 23} As mitigating factors, the board found that neither Amaddio nor 
Wargo had a prior disciplinary record and that they both had made a timely good-
faith effort to rectify the consequences of their misconduct, made full and free 
disclosure to the board and exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary 
proceedings, and submitted evidence of their good character and reputation.  See 
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (3), (4), and (5). 
{¶ 24} The parties stipulated that the appropriate sanction for Amaddio and 
Wargo’s misconduct is a public reprimand.  In support of that sanction, the parties 
relied on cases publicly reprimanding attorneys who charged or collected clearly 
excessive fees in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) or engaged in conduct that 
adversely reflected on their fitness to practice law in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 
8.4(h).  See, e.g., Columbus Bar Assn. v. Adusei, 136 Ohio St.3d 155, 2013-Ohio-
3125, 991 N.E.2d 1142 (publicly reprimanding an attorney who had no written fee 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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agreement but retained nearly $8,000 as his fee for collecting nearly $24,000 in 
life-insurance proceeds); Geauga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Martorana, 137 Ohio St.3d 19, 
2013-Ohio-1686, 997 N.E.2d 486 (publicly reprimanding an attorney who charged 
five clients excessive and nonrefundable fees ranging from $1,695 to $2,300 for 
services she did not complete); see also Disciplinary Counsel v. Rosen, 144 Ohio 
St.3d 113, 2015-Ohio-3420, 41 N.E.3d 383 (publicly reprimanding an attorney who 
improperly accessed information on a restricted government database); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mecklenborg, 139 Ohio St.3d 411, 2014-Ohio-1908, 12 
N.E.3d 1166 (publicly reprimanding an attorney who failed to disclose on his 
driver’s-license application that he had recently been charged with operating a 
vehicle while intoxicated).  But the board distinguished those cases on the grounds 
that they did not involve violations of both rules and that the attorneys in the cases 
involving violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) did not cause specific harm to an 
identified and vulnerable victim as Amaddio and Wargo did. 
{¶ 25} The board also considered two cases in which we sanctioned 
attorneys for threatening to pursue criminal charges to gain advantage in fee 
disputes with former clients.  In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Cohen, 86 Ohio St.3d 100, 
712 N.E.2d 118 (1999), we publicly reprimanded an attorney for threatening to file 
criminal charges against a former client who had issued him two checks, totaling 
$250, that were returned for insufficient funds.  After the client filed a grievance 
against him, Cohen wrote to the client acknowledging his improper conduct and 
asserting that he had never intended to file criminal charges.  We found that 
Cohen’s conduct violated former DR 7-105 (prohibiting a lawyer from threatening 
to pursue criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter).  But 
recognizing that his threats represented an isolated incident of bad judgment for 
which he had apologized, we publicly reprimanded Cohen for his misconduct. 
{¶ 26} And in Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Hartke, 132 Ohio St.3d 116, 2012-
Ohio-2443, 969 N.E.2d 1189, the attorney went to a former client’s home after she 
January Term, 2020 
9 
 
failed to pay his fee of approximately $5,000 for handling her divorce and engaged 
in a heated discussion with the client in the presence of her six-year-old daughter.  
When it became clear that the client would not pay, Hartke threatened to file 
criminal charges and told her that she could go to jail and lose her children.  He 
then accompanied her to the bank to withdraw the amount that she owed him, but 
she was so distraught that bank personnel called the police, who suggested that she 
pay Hartke what she owed.  Hartke accepted $3,000 to satisfy the debt.  We found 
that Hartke “threaten[ed] to present criminal charges * * * solely to obtain an 
advantage in a civil matter” in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(e) and that his conduct 
adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).  
Recognizing that he had previously been suspended from the practice of law, had 
acted with a selfish motive, had caused emotional harm to a vulnerable client, and 
had failed to fully acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, we suspended 
him from the practice of law for six months with no stay. 
{¶ 27} The board determined that Amaddio’s and Wargo’s misconduct 
warrants a sanction more severe than a public reprimand because they violated both 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).  But the board also credited them for 
abandoning their threat to file the petition to remove the father as the administrator 
of O.B.’s estate, acknowledging their wrongdoing, and apologizing to O.B.’s 
parents.  Citing the absence of prior discipline over their many years of practice, 
their sincere regret, and their good-faith efforts to rectify the consequences of their 
misconduct, the board found that they were not likely to repeat their misconduct 
and concluded that an actual suspension was not necessary to protect the public or 
promote public confidence in the legal profession.  Therefore, the board 
recommends that we suspend Amaddio and Wargo from the practice of law for six 
months but stay the entire suspension on the condition that they engage in no further 
misconduct. 
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{¶ 28} Having reviewed the record and our precedent, we find that a fully 
stayed six-month suspension is entirely inadequate to sanction Amaddio and Wargo 
for the misconduct at issue in this case.  Here, in contrast to the cases cited by the 
parties and the board, Amaddio and Wargo charged and attempted to collect a 
seven-figure contingent fee—no less than $1,000,000—for approximately 15 hours 
of consultation about a wrongful-death claim and the preparation of basic probate 
documents to open the decedent’s estate.  They also attempted to coerce the father’s 
compliance with their unreasonable demands by threatening to publicly file a 
document that (1) sought to remove the father from his position as the administrator 
of his recently deceased 16-year-old daughter’s estate, (2) contained personal and 
confidential information about his daughter, the circumstances of her death, and her 
parents’ confidential settlement with the hospital where her death occurred, (3) 
accused the father of fraudulently inducing Amaddio and Wargo to help him 
negotiate the settlement by promising to pay them 20 percent of any settlement 
obtained, and (4) accused the father of self-dealing for allocating a greater portion 
of the settlement to himself and the mother, at the expense of their surviving 
children. 
{¶ 29} The fee that Amaddio and Wargo claimed was grossly 
disproportionate to the amount and difficulty of the work that they had performed.  
In addition, the alleged fee agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law because 
it was never reduced to a writing signed by the client and the attorneys as required 
by R.C. 4705.15(B) (requiring a contingent-fee agreement in connection with a 
claim that is or may become the basis of a tort action to be reduced to a writing 
signed by both the client and the lawyer).  See also Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(1) 
(requiring a lawyer to set forth a contingent-fee agreement in a writing signed by 
both the client and the lawyer).  Although the board credited Amaddio and Wargo 
for abandoning their threat to publicly file the inflammatory petition, the pair 
nevertheless maintained their seven-figure demand in their April 2017 application 
January Term, 2020 
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for attorney fees.  O.B.’s parents successfully negotiated a seven-figure settlement 
with the hospital just over seven months after their daughter’s tragic death, but they 
spent the next year of their lives and incurred $42,000 in attorney fees opposing 
Amaddio and Wargo’s unreasonable claim.  On these facts, we conclude that a 
sanction more severe than those recommended by the parties and the board is 
warranted. 
{¶ 30} Accordingly, Mark Douglas Amaddio and John Joseph Wargo Jr. 
are  suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one year.  Costs are taxed to 
Amaddio and Wargo in equal shares. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DEWINE, J. 
__________________ 
 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 31} I dissent from the majority’s determination that the misconduct of 
respondents, Mark Douglas Amaddio and John Joseph Wargo Jr., warrants the 
imposition of an actual one-year suspension from the practice of law.  In my view, 
a one-year suspension, fully stayed on the condition of no further misconduct, is 
consistent with our precedent and is the appropriate sanction in this case. 
{¶ 32} The primary purpose of our discipline process is not to punish the 
offending attorney but to protect the public, Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian, 112 
Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-6510, 858 N.E.2d 368, ¶ 10, and “[i]n determining the 
appropriate sanction for professional misconduct, we consider the duties violated, 
the actual or potential injury caused, the lawyer’s mental state, the existence of 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and the sanctions imposed in similar 
cases,” Columbus Bar Assn. v. Linnen, 111 Ohio St.3d 507, 2006-Ohio-5480, 857 
N.E.2d 539, ¶ 25. 
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{¶ 33} The majority states that “[h]aving reviewed the record and our 
precedent, we find that a fully stayed six-month suspension is entirely inadequate 
to sanction Amaddio and Wargo for the misconduct at issue in this case.”  Majority 
opinion at ¶ 28.  The majority, however, cites no precedent supporting its assertion 
that an actual one-year suspension is the appropriate sanction.  While no one 
existing case may share the specific facts of Amaddio’s and Wargo’s misconduct, 
we should nonetheless be guided by precedent and reconcile current cases with that 
precedent to provide meaningful guidance to the lawyers subject to our system of 
discipline. 
{¶ 34} I agree with the Board of Professional Conduct that none of the cases 
cited by respondents support the imposition of a public reprimand as a sufficient 
sanction to protect the public under the circumstances of this case.  I also agree that 
our decision in Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Hartke, 132 Ohio St.3d 116, 2012-Ohio-
2443, 969 N.E.2d 1189, is instructive and militates in favor of a fully stayed 
suspension from the practice of law. 
{¶ 35} In Hartke, the disciplined attorney, James R. Hartke, had represented 
Jacqueline Usher in her divorce and earned fees totaling $5,000.  Hartke and Usher 
had agreed that the fees would be paid out of a distribution Usher was entitled to 
from her ex-husband’s 401(k) plan.  But after she received that distribution, she 
failed to pay Hartke’s fee and refused to answer or return his calls inquiring about 
it.  Hartke went to her home, angrily confronted Usher in front of her six-year-old 
child, demanded payment of his fee, and threatened criminal action against her if 
she did not comply.  He then insisted that they go to the bank together and withdraw 
the funds, and at the bank, Usher was so visibly upset that a teller called the police.  
After the police arrived and suggested that Usher pay Hartke what she owed him, 
Hartke agreed to accept $3,000 to satisfy the obligation. 
{¶ 36} We found that Hartke violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(e) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from threatening criminal charges solely to gain advantage in a civil matter) 
January Term, 2020 
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and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects 
on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  The aggravating factors were a previous 
suspension from the practice of law, a selfish motive, emotional harm to a 
vulnerable client, and Hartke’s failure to fully acknowledge the wrongfulness of his 
conduct.  In mitigation, Hartke had made full disclosure to the panel, the 
misconduct was a one-time incident, and it was contrary to his “general character.”  
Id. at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 37} We concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the 
mitigation, rejected the recommended sanction of a fully stayed six-month 
suspension, and imposed an actual six-month suspension from the practice of law.  
Id., 132 Ohio St.3d 116, 2012-Ohio-2443, 969 N.E.2d 1189, at ¶ 12, 20. 
{¶ 38} Hartke is not directly on point.  Unlike this case, Hartke did not 
involve a clearly excessive fee.  Nonetheless, to the extent it is comparable to 
respondents’ misconduct, Hartke’s misconduct was more serious.  Although both 
respondents and Hartke used improper threats to pressure a client to pay their fees, 
respondents did not threaten criminal charges against a vulnerable client, go to the 
client’s home, or engage in a heated argument with the client in front of a child of 
tender years.  Nor did they force the client to go to a bank and withdraw funds or 
receive a negotiated payment upon the arrival of law enforcement.  Also, unlike 
Hartke, respondents have fully acknowledged the wrongfulness of their conduct.  I 
do not condone respondents’ actions, but I must nevertheless recognize that they 
lack prior disciplinary records, they made a timely, good-faith effort to rectify their 
misconduct, and they presented evidence of their good character and reputation.  
Moreover, they received no fee for the 15 hours of legal services performed and 
agreed to make a $30,000 donation to a mental-health organization established in 
the name of their clients’ daughter.  At the time of the panel hearing, $15,000 had 
already been donated, and respondents have until the end of 2020 to pay the 
remainder. 
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{¶ 39} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, including the following finding: 
 
 
Based upon their demeanor and testimony at the hearing, the 
panel finds that Respondents are sincere in regretting their actions 
and they have made good faith efforts to rectify the consequences of 
their admitted misconduct.  More importantly, the panel does not 
believe this conduct is likely to be repeated, given Respondents’ 
many years in practice without any disciplinary problems and the 
evidence of their good character.  Accordingly, we do not find that 
an actual suspension is required to protect the public or safeguard 
the public’s confidence in the legal profession. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 40} The primary purpose of our discipline process is not to punish the 
attorney who engaged in the misconduct but to protect the public.  Agopian, 112 
Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-6510, 858 N.E.2d 368, at ¶ 10.  In selecting a sanction, 
we consider the relevant factors, Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 
424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16, and weigh the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 
2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  But today, the majority’s imposition of an 
actual term of suspension despite the significant differences between Hartke and 
this case seems more like punishment than an attempt to protect the public. 
{¶ 41} Based on the striking differences between this case and Hartke—the 
lack of any direct coercion of a client, the fact that no portion of the fee was paid, 
and the length to which respondents have gone to mitigate the harm they caused—
I do not believe that actual time out from the practice of law is needed to protect 
the public.  However, because this case involves additional misconduct in the form 
January Term, 2020 
15 
 
of an attempt to collect a clearly excessive fee, the length of the stayed suspension 
should be longer than that recommended by the board.  Accordingly, I agree with 
the majority that a one-year suspension from the practice of law is the appropriate 
sanction for respondents’ misconduct, but I would fully stay the suspension on the 
condition that they engage in no further misconduct.  For this reason, I dissent. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________________ 
Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Gallagher Sharp, L.L.P., Monica A. Sansalone, and Timothy T. Brick, for 
respondent Amaddio. 
Coakley Lammert Co., L.P.A., George S. Coakley, and Richard T. Lobas, 
for respondent Wargo. 
_____________________________