Case Title: Matter of a Member of the Bar: Amberly

Citation: 

Docket Number: 138690

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
In the Matter of a Member
of the Bar of the Supreme Court
of the State of Delaware,

VINCENT M. AMBERLY,

§
§
§
§ No. 232, 2010
§
Respondent. §

Board Case No. 2009-0390-B
Submitted: May 24, 2010
Decided: June 1, 2010
Corrected: June 2, 2010
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices.
ORDER

This 2" day of June 2010, the Court having reviewed the Report of the
Board on Professional Responsibility, the Objections of the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel and Respondent's response to objections of the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that the Board's findings (copy attached) are hereby
adopted with the exception of the recommendation for a 30-day suspension
identical to the District of Columbia, The misconduct involving false statements to
fa tribunal and misleading statements to counsel for the Virginia State Bar
Disciplinary Board warrant substantially different discipline in Delaware.
Respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law in Delaware for a period
of six months and shall pay the costs of these proceedings.

BY THE COURT:

(s/ Henry duPont Ridgely
Justice
EFiled: Apr 73 2010 10386465

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‘April 22, 2010 ae
BY HAND
Stephen D. Taylor, Court Administrator
Supreme Court of Delaware

Ebert N, Carvel State Office Building
820 N. French Street

P.O, Box 1997

Wilmington, DE 19899-1997

Re: Inthe Matter of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware:

‘Vincent A. Amberiy, Respondent; Board Case No, 2009-0390-B
Dear Me. Taylor

Enclosed is the original of our Panel recommendation in the above-captioned matter,
Pease call me ifthe Court should require anything further.

‘Very truly yours,

  

ROBERT K. BESTE, JR.

RKB/ns}

Enclosure

ccc: Michael S. McGinnis, Esquire (w/ encL) (by First-Class Mail and Electronic Mail)
Vincent M. Amberly, Esquire (w/ enc.) (by First-Class Mail and Electonic Mail)
‘Wayne J. Carey, Esquire (w/ enc.) (by Electronic Mai
Edward Bassett, Esquire (w/ encl) (by Electronic Mai)

 

 

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BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Oupwl

OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAW:

In the Matter of

>
Member of the Bar of the ) CONFIDENTIAL
Supreme Court of Delaware: )

)
VINCENT M. AMBERLY, ) Board Case No. 2009-0390-B

)

Respondent.

Before Wayne Carey, Esquire, Edward J. Bassett,
‘and Robert K. Beste, Jr, Esquire (Chair)

Michael S. McGinnis, Esquire for Petitioner, OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL

Vincent M. Amberly, Esquire, Pro Se

Dated: April 22, 2010
 

BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

{In the Matter of a >
Member of the Bar of the ) CONFIDENTIAL
‘Supreme Court of Delaware: )
)
VINCENT M. AMBERLY, ) Board Case No. 2009-0390-B
Respondent. )

‘This isa disciplinary proceeding filed by the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel (;ODC
‘«*Pattoner) against Vincent M. Amberly, Esquire (“Ambery/” or “Respondent”. The ODC
filed it Peution for discipline "the Petition”) on October 5, 2009, Respondent is an attomey
tiensed to practice law inthe Commonwealth of Virginia, the State of Delaware, ad the
District of Columbia, as well as before the United States Patent and Trademark Offic.

The Petition arises out of Respondent's representation of a client in two lawsuits agunst

the client, inthe Fairfax County, Virginia, General District Court, Martin B, Katz, the plaintiff in

 

that Virginia tigation against Respondents lien, ied complaints agaist Respondent sa
result of the alleged actions of Respondent inthe Virginia coun, in September and October of
200s,

A hearing was bed before Virginia Stat Bar Disciplinary Board ("VA Board"), 00
November 16,2007. The Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board made the following “Findings of

Fact”

 

Fact

1. Atal times relevant tothe matters st forth herein, Vincent Mark
‘Amberly (hereinafter “Respondent"), was an attorney licensed to practice law in
the Commonwealth of Virginia.

2. Mr. Martin B. Katz (hereinafter “Complainant”) instituted two
lawsuits against the Respondent's cliens in the Fairfax County, Virginia, General
District Court. The Complainant and Respondent appeared in that Court on
September 19, 2005, a retum date on one of the cases.

3. In open Court on September 19, 2005, the Respondent handed the
‘Complainant a copy of s Motion to Consolidate, and presented argument thereon
tothe Court. The Respondent stated tothe presiding judge thatthe Respondent
‘would be filing a Counterclaim, but he didnot farish a copy of the Counterclaim
to the Court orto the Complainant on the eccasion of the court appearance.
Following their court appearance, the Respondent filed the Motion to Consolidate
and a Counterclaim, with the Clerk ofthe Court. The Counterclaim contained no
certificate of service,

4, Later that same day, September 19, 2005, the Complainant
requested a copy ofthe Counterclaim during a telephone call with the
Respondent. On September 20, 2005, the Respondent sent the Complainant an &-
‘mail, stating, among other things, that “I wll forward to you a hard copy of the
‘Cousterelaim that we filed with the Court yesterday,” an “I will be in touch with
‘you shortly regarding the forther stats ofthe case.”

5. On September 26, 2005, the Complainant sent the Respondent an
-mull stating, among other things, that he had not received the Counterclaim
from the Respondent.

6. On September 30, 2005, the Respondent sent the Complainant an
‘email, stating as follows:

‘Attached please find the Counterclaim that we filed on.
behalf ofthe Trent Group, ln. The details inthis document
‘are sufficient to constitute a Bill of Particulars, and put you
‘on notice of your clients [sic.] claim against you,

7. On September 30, 2005, the Respondent mailed to the
‘Complainant a copy of the Counterclaim containing the following certificate of
service, signed by the Respondent

1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19" day of September, 2005,
true and correct copy of the foregoing Counterclaim, was
attempted delivery by hand to Martin B. Kavz a the Courtbouse,
‘but he refused delivery, on the 30" of September, 2005, a tre and
‘correct copy of the foregoing Counterclaim, was delivered to
Martin B. Katz, 9822 Hill Steet, Kensington, MD 20895, and via,
electronic trans-Mission or e-mail to the Plaintiff Martin B. Katz.

 

8. The Respondent made representation as contained in the foregoing.
certificate of service in open court on October 6, 2005, ia response to the
Complainant's motion to dismiss the Counterclaim,
9. The Respondent's stalements in the certificate of service that he
attempted hand delivery ofthe Counterclaim to the Complainant, and that the
Complainant refused such delivery, were false, and were made by the Respondent
with knowledge of thei falsity

10. Despite the fact that Respondent did not furnish the Complainant
With a copy ofthe Counterclaim before September 30,2005, despite the contents
‘of the telephone conversations and e-mails between the Complainant and the
Respondent wherein Complainant sought acopy of the Counterclaim and the
Respondent promised to provide it, and notwithstanding the representation in the
certificate of service set forth above, the Respondent made the following
representation in a letter to Bar Counsel dated December 19, 2005:

‘On September 30, 2005, the day after the deadline the Court had.
set

for service of my client's Bill of Paniculars forthe Counterclaim,
Mr. Katz and I discussed whether or not I would be filing a Bill of
Particulars and would instead rely upon the fact inthe
Counterclaim that {had given to him on the return day September
19% At that time, Mr. Katz advised me that he had never received
‘copy of the Counterclaim. T told him that we bad discussed the
Counterciaim on numerous occasions and that I had handed it to
him atthe September 19° hearing, but he claimed that he never
recived it. immediately sent him a copy of the Counterclaim via
‘email, as well as copy via first-class mail. ***

1, Respondent's representations to Bar Counsel, set forth above, were
‘misleading in that they were calculated to induce Bar Counsel to conclude a) that
‘Respondent had infact furnished the Counterclaim witha copy of the
Counterclaim on September 19, 2005, and b) that Respondent first leamed from
‘the Complainant on September 30, 2005, that Complainant did not have a copy of
the Counterclaim,

12. Atall times relevant hereto, Vincent Mark Amberly’s address of
record wit the Virginia State Bar has been Vincent Mark Amber!y, c/o Litman
Law, 3717 Columbia Pike, Arlington, Virginia 22204, The respondent received
‘proper notice ofthis proceeding as required by Part Six, Section IV, paragraph

13(E) and (D(a) ofthe Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court.
‘See Opinion dated January 23, 2008, atached hereto as Exhibit “1.”
‘The Virginia Board found, in its Opinion dated January 3, 2008, that Respondent violated

the Rules of Professional Conduct in several respects:
(2) Respondent violated Rule 33, by knowingly making false statement of
fact raw toa tribunal

(6) Respondent violated Rule 4.1, by making a fle statement of fact oI
toother,

(© Respondent violated Rule 8.1, for knowingly making a fale statement of
material fact in a ertifeaton filed by Respondent as a condition of maintaining or renewing »
license to practic law in Virgina; and

(4 Respondent voled Rule 84, by engaging in dishonesty, feu, deceltcr
risreresemation, whic reflect adversely on the lawyer's fines o practice lw

After deliberation, the Virgin Board imposed a sanction of “Admoniton with Tenn,”
sd equred Respondent to complet thee hours of continuing legal education on Virginia Court
Procedres, an fr whch no legal education credit was o be sought. Further, Respondent vas
‘0 complete three hours of continuing education on Ethic, fr which ne continuing legal
stucstion credits were to be sought The costs were also assessed against Respondent.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PROCEEDINGS

Respondent has also been admited to practice law in he District of Columbia since
1982, The findings of the Virginia Board were subsequently presented to the District of
Columbia Board on Professional Resposibity (hesinater “DC Board"). The mater before the
DC Board was heat as a eiprocal disciplinary proceeding. The DC Bar Counsel and
Respondent provided submissions othe DC Board. Evidently, no actual bearing was eld before
the DC Board.

D.C. Bar R. XI §11 is simile to Rue 18 ofthe Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure (bereimater “Procedural Rules), The DC Boar found no evidence tat Respondent
was denied due process, or tat there was any infirmity of proof inthe Virginia proceeding. DC
Bar Counsel tok the positon that, had the matter been an orignal proceeding in the Distict of
Columbia, Respondent's misconduct would have warranted substantially different discipline than
that provided by the Virginia Boar; the DC Board would have asked for more significant
sanctions. Respondent, though counsel, asked tha the DC Board impose sanctions the same as
the Virginia Board. The DC Board reviewed numerous precedents in its jrsdiction, showing
‘hat intentional, false, and misleading statements made to court aod to disciplinary authorities
‘normaly reals in suspension. There are several DC Bead cates, a cited in the Opinion ofthe
DC Board, which show that, if there sno significant prior record thirty-day suspension is
sporopriate, For the reasons more fully set forth in ts Opinion dated June 13,2008, the DC
Board concluded that identical reciprocal discipline was “not appropiate," and recommended the
‘Court impose substantially different reciprocal discipline of a thirty-day suspension. (Exhibit
2,

‘The Distt of Columbia Court of Appeals then considered the recommendation ofthe
DC Board; and, by Opinion dated June 25, 2009, suspended Respondent from tbe practice of lew
in the District of Columbia, for thirty days. (Exhibit “3").

DELAWARE PROCEEDINGS

Pursuant to Rule 18 ofthe Procedural Rules, on October 5, 2009, the Delaware Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (*ODC") presented its petition tothe Delaware Supreme Cour, together
withthe Amended Order of Admoniton with Terms that was entered bythe VA Board, and also
the Opinion and Order entered bythe istrict of Columbia Court of Appeals dated June 25,
2009, ODC request thatthe Board on Professional Responsibility ofthe Supreme Cour ofthe

‘State of Delaware ("Delaware Board") recommend the Delaware Supreme Court conclude,
similar tothe DC proceedings, that Respondent's misconduct established in Virginia warrants
“substantially different discipline” under Procedural Rule 18(4). ODC seeks a suspension of no
Jess than six months,

By letter dated December 31, 2009, ODC advised the Delaware Supreme Court that this
‘matter was 2 reciprocal discipline case, and suggested that the only issue before the Delaware
Board was whether it was to make a recommendation fo the Delaware Supreme Court, that ODC
‘had met its burden under Procedural Rule 18(4)(4), demonstrating Respondent's professional
‘misconduct inthis matter, as conclusively established by the VA Board, imposing the public
sanction of an “admonition with tems” warrants “substantially different discipline” in Delaware.
‘ODC further suggested the Panel Chair schedule a telephone conference to discuss and consider
the furure course of proceeding before the Delaware Board.

Following such request, a telepbone conference was conducted on January 14, 2010,
Participating were the Panel Chairman and one other member of the Delaware Board Panel, Mr.
Basset’; Respondent; and Mr. Michael McGinnis on bebalf of ODC. During the telephone
conference, ODC took the positon, consistent with is letter of December 31, 2009, that the
‘Delaware Board and the proceedings were bound by the factual findings of the VA Board, and
the sole issue before the Delaware Board was whether ODC met its burden of showing under
Rule 18(4)(4), that the facts, as determined by the VA Board, warrant “substantially different
discipline” in Delaware. If that burden was met, ODC sought a six-month suspension. ODC
believed hearing was not required or necessary, bt that ODC had no objection to oral
argument, ifthe Board believed it would be helpful. Respondent agreed on the legal issue that be
was bound by the facts, as determined by the VA Board; but argued

 

‘substantially different

discipline” was not warranted; and requested a hearing to present testimony and/or argument, 38

 

 

‘Mr. Cary was ou oftown ca January 14, and vable opacity teleonferece

6
to wbether there should be “substantially different discipline.” and to adress a recommendation
foe appropriate sanctions, The Board members ruled, as both ODC and Respondent agreed, that
the Delaware Board would be bound by the Virgins findings of fact. The Delaware Board
belived, however, that hearing should beheld, at which time atonal agumeat andlor

evidence could be presented on the issue of whether a"

 

bstasialy differen discipline” was
vvaranted; and, is, what sanctions shouldbe impose.

‘Aearing was held before the Delaware Board on January 27,2010. ODC
‘gin ook the position it had me its Rule 18(4\(4) burden, to warrant “substantially
Aitferent discipline” in Delaware, nd sought six-month suspension

Respondent again concurred that he was bound bythe factual findings ofthe VA Board.
Respondent argued, although he is bound by hose factual findings, the VA Board had an
opportunity to review all ofthe facts [which the Delaware Board cannot do under Rule 18(4)(4);
ad, with ll such its, it ruled a reprimand with conditions was appropriate. Respondent
argued, ial facts were considered bythe Delaware Boar, it would concude thatthe VA
‘Board's sanction was appropriate, and not impose a substantially different sanction than tat of
the VA Board, i. a reprimand. Respondent points out that this is not a case of misappropriation
offs, or multiple complaints, (Tr 20). Respondent indicated that although he currently does
‘ot actively practice in Delaware, be was proud of his Delaware reptaton and ad worked with
«wellAmown Delaware firm, and ater withthe Delaware Attorey General's Office, and
believes these proceedings have damaged his epuation in Delaware and elsewhere. Tr. 21)
Respondent candidly admits tat, nly, he may ot have ken this mater.seriusy,.but,
{assure you I do now, take it very seriously” (Te, 22), Respondent argues further thatthe

‘Complsint did not have a substantive impact upon anyone, and there was no client involved. (Te.
22). Respondent asserts that the counterclaim he filed on behalf of his client was ultimately
dropped, and therefore the Complainant was not materially affected. (Tr. 22). Respondent argues
further the errors be made were a result of inexperience. This was hs first experience ina small
claims cour, and he did not understand the rules. (Tr. 22-23). Respondent now practices only in
areas of law that he knows, and these types of mistakes are not apt to reoccur. (Tr. 24).
Respondent notes he has been required to take six bours of CLE, without getting any credit (Te.
26); he was laid off in March, 2009, which he at least indirectly and to some extent, blamed on
bis problems withthe disciplinary proceedings (Tv. 26); and he further notes tat, a the time of
these proceedings, he was been involved in a divorce, and opposing counsel used claims about
‘Respondents ethical deficiencies which he believes affected the outcome of his divorce, (Tr.

28), Finally, Respondent notes that, although he isnot curently represented by counsel in
Delaware, he has incurred $15,000.00 in attorney's fees throughout these disciplinary
proceedings. (Tr. 32). In other words, Respondent argues he has suffered substantially and
enough.

‘ODC counters thatthe Delaware Supreme Court has never recognized as a mitigating
factor, ina reciprocity matter, the impact of prior disciplinary sanctions upon the attorney. ODC
acknowledges that, while such may be a mitigating factor under the ABA Standards, there is no
case in Delaware that applies that standard to a Delaware proceeding. ODC further point to In
Be Katz, 981 A.2d 1133 (Del. 2008), where the Board on Professional Responsibility rejected
the attomey’s argument that his lack of experience in the practice of real estate law constituted &
‘mitigating factor. See Opinion at p. 1146. ODC further points out that Respondent didnot self:
‘report to the Delaware Disciplinary authorities under Rule 18, regarding the existence of the

reprimand in Virginia. Respondent counters he understood and expected the Virginia Bar would
send the decision o Delaware, because he had made it claro them that he was a member of
both the DC and Delaware Bars. He noes the DC Bar andthe Trademark and Patent Offices
contacted him, and he assumed their contact was a result of being contacted bythe VA Bar,
‘hich he expected would also contact the Delaware Bar. (Tr: 39), ODC counters hat assertion
is unreasonable, due tthe length of ime that Respondent did not report the mater to Delaware,
and also notes itis the atomey's responsibility to notify Delaware and that Respondent is

required to know the Rules. See Procedural Rules 18(a).

DING! YARD,

Rule 18. of Procedural Rules
Rule 18 ofthe Procedural Rules, requires tis Board 10 recommend to the Court that it

‘shall impose discipline that is identical to that discipline imposed in another jurisdiction, unless it
clearly appears om the face ofthe record on which discipline is predicated, that:

(() the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to
‘constitute a deprivation of due process;

{Q) there was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to
the clear conviction that the Court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as
final the conclusion on that subject;

Q) the imposition ofthe same discipline by the Court would result in grave
injustice; or

(4) the misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline or no
<iscipline in this State; o¢

(5) the reason forthe original transfer to disability inactive status no longer exists.

Ifthe Court determines that any of those elements exist, the Court shall enter such
‘other order as it deems appropriate

[Neither party argues that Items (1) - (3) and (5) are applicable, and the Board finds those
factors are not present. However, this Board feels compelled to find that, upon the face of the
‘ecord on which this Disciplinary Proceeding is predicated, it clearly appears that *..the
‘misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline...in this State”

‘The Delaware Board is bound by the findings ofthe VA Board findings, that Respondent
‘knowingly made false statements to the Virginia Cour, and that Respondent made misleading
statements to counsel forthe VA Board, in that Board's investigation. The Delaware Supreme
CCourt and this Board is guided by the precedents ofthe Delaware Supreme Court, and the ABA
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. In Re: Agostini, 632 A.2d 80 (Del. 1993).

Rulle 6.12 of such Procedural Rules provides:

 

‘Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false statements

or documents are being submitted tothe court or that material information is

{improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action, and causes injury or

Potential injury to a party tothe egal proceeding, or causes an adverse or

potentially adverse effect onthe legal proceeding.
‘Suspension therefore seems appropriate when a lawyer: (1) knows that false statements or
documents; (2) are being submitted tothe court; (3) and takes no remedial action; (4) and causes
injury or potential injury to a party tothe legal proceeding or causes an adverse or potentially
adverse effect on the legal proceeding. Clearly, since this Board is bound by the findings ofthe
‘VA Board, the requirements of Rule 6.12 are met; and suspension is “generally appropriate.”
‘The Board found Respondent's action to have been a knowing submission ofa false statement to
‘the Court; no remedial action was taken; and there was injury, and certainly potential injury to a
party; and there was certainly an impact on the proceedings, since merely needing the court's
involvement impact the proceedings. Respondent argues there was no adverse impact to his
client; but that isnot the issue. Respondent also argues there was no real impact on the

complainant, since the counterclaim was withdrawn; but, the complainant was sill impacted.

10
Rule 6.13 ofthe Procedural Rules seems tobe the next ower category of violation, and
provides:

Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in
determining whether statements ot documents are fase or in taking remedial
‘ction when material information is being withheld, and causes injury or potential
injury toa pary to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially
adverse effect onthe legal proceeding.

 

‘This Board finds Rule 6.13 not to be applicable, and reprimand is not “generally appropriate”
‘because it requires a negligent standard, which cannot be applied to the present facts because of a
finding that Respondent “knowingly” made false representations to the Court. While the finding
‘of “misleading” statements to counsel forthe VA Board is not clear, and could be considered
‘negligent, this Board nonetheless must consider Respondent's representation tothe Court to be a
knowing violation ofthe Rules, and Rule 6.13 does not apply.

The following factors should be considered by the Court and the Board, in determining,
an appropriate sanction, or whether a sanction should be substantially different. Those
‘considerations are: 1) the nature ofthe duty violated; (2) the attorney's mental state; (3) the
‘sctual or potential injury caused by the misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating or
‘mitigating circumstances. ln Re: Figliola, 652 A.24 1071 (Del. 1995),

ature of Duty Vi

‘The Board believes itis clear that Respondeat's conduct violates Rule 33(aXl) ofthe
Delaware Lawyer's Rules of Professional Conduct (“DLRPC"), by knowingly making a false
Statement of fat toa tribunal. Comment 2 to Rule 3.3(aX1) provides, the rule is to avoid conduct
that undermines the integrity ofthe adjudicative process, The Board also finds that Respondent's
Conduct violates DLRPC 4.1, when, in the representation ofa client, the lawyer knowingly
‘makes 8 false or material facto a third party. In addition, Respondent's conduct violates DLRPC

n
Rule 8-4(c), by engaging in conduct involving deceit or misrepresentation. Candor to any
tribunal must be the hallmark of lawyer conduct,
Attomey's Mental State

‘As previously indicated, the VA Board determined, and this Board therefore determines,
that Respondent's conduct was a “knowing” violation,

‘Actual. or Potential Injury Caused

Here, the Board must also consider Respondent's argument that his client's counterclaios

 

before the Virginia Court was ultimately dismissed, and that therefore the opposing party did not
really suffer any damage in the Virginia proceedings. That position is wrong. Not only did
Respondent cause injury, annoyance and aggravation tothe opposing party, but the potential for
hhacm in misrepresentations tothe cout is enormous, and would favor mote significant penalty.
‘Existence of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

‘The Board believes it most appropriate to consider aggravating and mitigating
Circumstances below inthis report and while discussing the topic ofthe extent ofa “substantially
<iflerent discipline,” rather than repeated findings here. Suffice i to say, the Board believes the
sggravating and mitigating factors in summary, weigh in favor of «suspension.

‘Under the ABA Standards 6.12 and 7.2, and the other factors above itis cleara
suspension is appropriate, which i a “substantially different disciphine” than the reprimand given
bythe VA Board, Respondent argues the VA Board really saw ll ofthe facts and fel a
‘reprimand was appropriate; and ifthe Delaware Board could know all ofthe fhcts before the VA
‘Board, the Delaware Board would conclude, like the VA Board, that a reprimand is appropriate.
However, this Board is bound by the findings ofthe VA Board, that there was a knowing

2
misstaement tothe Court whic alone warans suspension. The ral question i, “What period
‘of suspension i appropriate?”
‘What Length of Suspension is Warranted?

‘OC seeks suspension of atleast six-months, ODC cites In Re: Katz, 981 A.24 1131
(Del, 2008), which involved a Delaware attorney, and involved multiple violations of DLRPC
1.1, 1400), 1.7, 1.16(a, and 1.16 Interpretive Guidelines re: Residential RealEstate
‘Transactions, and said Delaware atomey received a suspension of one year It appears a total of
six realestate transactions were involved, The Board believes the circumstances inthe Katz
<ecision are substantially more severe than the circumstances presented here.

(ODE further points the Board to In Re: Becker, 869 A 24 327 (Del. 2008) The atomney
Jnvolved received a three-year suspension, based upon multiple violations of DLRPC 1.1, 12(8),
1.4(@), 14(b),115(9), 1.15(6, 8.1, 8.100), 8-46), and 8.(@), nd alo that the attorney
‘knowingly made false statements of material fact in the course of the ODC investigation. The
case involved mishandling of cient funds on multiple oceasions

(ODE further points the Board to In Re: Chasanov, 869, A24 327 (Del. 2005). The
attomey received suspension of six months. That cate involved two separate matters, involving
knowingly false statements made to the Family Cour.

‘The Board concldes tht all ofthese cases present substatisll more severe
circumstances than present inthis mater and that Respondent's suspension should ot be as
severe o lengthy asin those matters.

This Board is mindfl of the decision in In Re: Fillo, 652 A.2d 1071 (Del. 1995), and
[ADA Standard 2.3. Tat decision and Standard indicate that something such asa thiny-day

suspension is impractical to institute and monitor; and a lawyer who is suspended needs adequate
time to notify clients, make arrangements for cases, resolve financial dealings, and remove

 

‘oneself totally from the practice of aw; and it isnot practical to do tis within a thiny-day time
period. Those factors and arguments donot appear to hold much sway here, because Respondent
is not practicing in Delaware, and a suspension from practice in Delaware would not require bim
to do anything

‘Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

‘With those factors in mind, the Board now tens to the aggravating and mitigating factors
found in ABA Standars 9.22 and 9.32. The Board will only review those aggravating and
‘mitigating actors that have application, or that Respondent of ODC has argued shouldbe
anplied.

‘Assravating Factors

©) dishonest or selfish motive.

Respondent contends his mistakes were relly a result of inexperience, and
‘misunderstanding of the rules inthe Virginia Cour where the violations. To the contrary,
however, Respondent finds himself in this dilemma, asa result of his own conduct (an pethaps
selfish motive, in an improper cerificaton tothe Cour. tis not necessarily the mistake inthe
local rules for which Respondent i tobe sanctioned, it is moreso what he di when he realized
he ad not followed the rules. To some extent therefore, Respondents conduct is selfish, ithe
‘Perhaps tried to cover up his mistakes,

(6) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally filing to

 
‘This Board finds tha these two factors have no application to the Delaware proceedings.
However, the VA Board found that Respondent's representations to VA Bar Counsel were
misleading and calculated to induce VA Bar Counsel to conclude facts that were not accurate
‘See Item 10-11 ofthe Findings of the VA Board (Exhibit “I” hereto). I appears the contention
‘there is that Respondent essentially told VA Bar Counsel the same thing he told the VA Court,
Respondent puts forward that this shows his consistency as to what really happened, and ODC
argues itis further wrongful conduct. This Board is frankly not fully satisfied with either
‘contention, but does consider it as an aggravating factor since Respondent's version was found t0
be false.

(@) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct.

‘While this may have been the case inthe initial proceedings, itis not the case now. This
Board was impressed that Respondent flt he had “leared his lesson,” is now repentant, and
now takes “..it very seriously.” (Tr, 22).

‘Mitigating Factors

Again, the Board only lists those factors it considers to have application,

(@) absence of prior disciplinary record:

‘This factor mitigates in Respondent's favor, since there are no known prior disciplinary
proceedings before any court, even though Respondent has been practicing in various courts
since 1980,

(4) absence of dishonest or selfish motive:

‘The Board believes Respondent made a mistake in following the rules, and then got into
trouble as a result of not knowing how to resolve the problem once he had created it. The Board
{does not believe Respondent was motivated by dishonest (although perhaps selfish) motive, but
primarily by inexperience in that particular cout, in dealing with the type of problem he was
sealing with

(©) fulland fre disclosure to disciplinary hoard or cooperative attitude toward

‘While the Board understands the issues above, regarding disclosure or misrepresentations
to VA Bar Counsel, the Board concludes that Respondent has made full and free disclosure to
this Board, and has been cooperative throughout the proceedings. The Board notes that
Respondent has not contested many issues, did his best to walk the fine line between arguing,
‘What he wanted to argue, and the Board's finding that he was bound by the findings of the VA.
Board.

(inexperience in the practice of laws

While Respondent had been practicing law for twenty-five years when the offenses
‘occurred, he was indeed inexperienced in this small claims court matter. That does not however
‘excuse a false certification. The Board does believe the experience of these matters over the past
five years has made a significant impression on Respondent and his inexperience will not cause
this problem again.

(@) character and reputation:

Respondent indicates, and there is no evidence tothe contrary, that his character and
reputation is unsold, The Board was impressed by his conduct at the hearing,

(&) imposition of other penalties or sanctions:

Respondent has expended $15,000 in attorney's fees, has been reprimanded by the VA
‘Cour; has been suspended for thirty days by the DC Cour; has possibly been impacted in regard
to both his employment and marital and divorce situation; and has suffered distress and.
 

‘embarrassment a these proceedings ina third cour; and, perhaps most importantly, will most
likely be the subject of further proceedings in the United States Patent and Trademark Offices,
‘where Respondent has his principal practice, and where ke will perhaps suffer the most dam
as a result of his actions. This Board feels that perhaps Respondent has suffered enough: that
Respondent takes this matter very seriously, that Respondent will conduct himself an
‘appropriate and ethical fashion inthe future; and Respondent has gained significant experience
from these proceedings. Finally the Board feels a more serious sanction will not really benefit the
Coun, society, oF the Delaware Bar.

©) remorse:

‘Once again, the Board was impressed by Respondent's remorse and cooperation,

CONCLUSION

‘This Board is admittedly roubled by the conduct of Respondent in Virginia, but
Respondent has no prior record, and has suffered significant, andthe Board is let with the
‘conclusion the thiy-day suspension imposed by the District of Columbia Cour of Appeals has
taught Respondent the lesson he need to lear; the system has served its purpose; and anything
more than athirty-<day suspension will not effectively serve a purpose. This Board is also
‘concerned that a longer suspension may be tantamount to penalty fr being admit in
Delaware, Further, a thity-day suspension has the value of consistency in following the sanction
imposed by the respected District of Columbia Court of Appeals

‘This Board recommends that Respondent be suspended from the practice of aw in
Delaware fora period of thirty days, and that be pay the costs these proceedings in Delaware.

‘The Board finds it unfortunate that there are no Delaware decisions that are of similar facts, but

”
‘notes the decisions reviewed by the DC Bowed seem closer in fact and substance than the
Delaware decisions cited by ODC and imposing greater sanctions. See In Re: Rasen, 481 A.2d

451 (D.C. 1984) (Awomey with prior discipline who provided less than truthful statements in

 

suppor of two separate mations for contcuances, nd ina thi paper opposing a motion, was
‘Suspended for thirty days); In Re: Qwens, 806 A.2d 1230 (D.C. 2002) (Attomey gave false
‘Statements to an Administrative Judge in order to cover fact that she attempted to eavesdrop on
testimony, violating the Court's sequestration order, was suspended for thirty days); In Re:
Ushendu, 812 A.2d 93 (D.C. 2002) (Atomey with no prior disciplinary recon! signed and
notarized papers for clients, without showing his initials, and was suspended for thirty | days).
This Board i also mindful, and believes ito be significant, thatthe real impact to Respondent
Will be in the expected proceedings to take place in the United Patent and Trademark Offices.
Respectfully submited,

a)

OA Ea

Robert K Beste 3, Enq. (LD, No. 158), Chair

Wayge 1 Garey, ECD. No. at)

 

   

 

Biiward Bassett

scamia
‘notes the decisions reviewed by the DC Boaid sou cluset in fact and substance than the
Delaware decisions cited by ODC and imposing grcater sanctions. See In Ke: Rosen, 481 A.2d
451 (D.C. 1984) (Attomey with prior discipline who provided less than truthful statements in
‘suppoc of two separate motions for continuances, and ina third paper opposing a motion, was
suspended for thiny days); In Re: Owens, $06 A.24 1230 (D.C. 2002) (Attorney gave false
‘statements to an Administrative Judge in order to cover fact that she attempted to eavesdrop on
‘testimony, violating the Cour’s sequestration order, was suspended for thiay days): In Re:
Uchendy, 812 A.2d 933 (D.C. 2002) (Artomey with no prior disciplinary record signed and
notarized papers for clients, without showing his initials, and was suspended for thiny days)
‘This Board is also mindful, and believes it to be significant, that the real impact to Respondent
will be in the expected proceedings to take piace inthe United Patent and Trademark Offices,

Respectfully submitted,

 

Robert K, Beste, Je, Faq. (No, 134), Chair
Wayne J. Carey, Esq, (1D, No. 2041)

Faward Bassett