Case Title: Nefredo v. Montgomery County

Citation: 414 Md. 585

Docket Number: 84/09

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
HEADNOTE:
FIRST AMENDMENT – FREEDOM OF SPEECH – STANDING – COMMERCIAL
SPEECH – FORTUNETELLING – A Montgomery County ordinance imposes a penalty for
the demand or receipt of remuneration or gratuity for fortunetelling.  This ordinance violates
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because it impermissibly burdens
protected speech based on the content of that speech.
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 84
September Term, 2009
NICK NEFEDRO
v.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND,
et al.
  
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia 
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
Harrell, J., Dissents
Filed:   June 10, 2010
The petitioner in this case, Nick Nefedro, wishes to open a fortunetelling business in
Montgomery County.  Montgomery County, however, has an ordinance (“the Fortunetelling
Ordinance”) that prohibits the acceptance of remuneration for fortunetelling.  Nefedro has
asked us to determine whether the Fortunetelling Ordinance violates his right to freedom of
speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 40 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.  Montgomery County argues that the Ordinance does not
implicate those constitutional provisions or, in the alternative, that it is consistent with the
federal and state constitutions.  After reviewing the facts of the case and the relevant sources
of law, we shall agree with Nefedro.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arose in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.  On May 28, 2008,
Nefedro filed suit against the County and Isiah Leggett, the County Executive for
Montgomery County (collectively, “the County”).  In his complaint, Nefedro challenged the
Fortunetelling Ordinance on the grounds that it violates the First Amendment and Article 40
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, as well as oppositions and replies to those motions.  On December 11, 2008, the
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the
Fortunetelling Ordinance is constitutional.  Nefedro noted a timely appeal to the Court of
Special Appeals.  Before the intermediate appellate court had an opportunity to hear
arguments in the case, we issued a writ of certiorari on our own motion.  Nefedro v.
Montgomery County, 410 Md. 165, 978 A.2d 245 (2009).
1 In his answers to interrogatories, Nefedro states that he sought a business license
from a supervisor in the Montgomery County Licensing Department, at the address,
“Montgomery County Circuit Court, 50 Maryland Avenue, Rockville, MD 20850.”  The
County argues that this statement shows that Nefedro applied for a license from the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County, not Montgomery County itself.  Nefedro responds by
asserting that the Licensing Department is located at the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County.  As we explain in this opinion, this factual dispute is immaterial to our resolution
(continued...)
2
FACTS
The following facts are not in dispute.  Nefedro is engaged in the fortunetelling
business in several locations across the country.  In this business, he charges customers a fee
in exchange for fortunetelling, palm reading, and other related services.  Nefedro has stated
that he intends to open a location for his fortunetelling business in Montgomery County.
There is some dispute about what Nefedro has done in furtherance of his expressed
intent to open a business in Montgomery County.  Nefedro claims that he leased property
in Montgomery County, paid rent on the property, purchased furnishings for the property,
placed a sign in the storefront announcing that the fortunetelling business would soon open,
and attempted to acquire a business license from the Montgomery County Licensing
Department.  Nefedro says that the supervisor of the Licensing Department denied his
request for a license, citing the Fortunetelling Ordinance.  The County argues that these
claims are unsupported by the record, and, indeed, there is nothing in the record to support
Nefedro’s claims other than his own assertions.  In addition, the County argues that, if
anything, Nefedro’s assertions suggest that he requested a license from the Montgomery
County Circuit Court, not the County itself.1
1(...continued)
of the case.
2 Nefedro later amended his complaint to also allege a claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2006), that Leggett, individually, had deprived Nefedro of his First Amendment
rights.  He also requested attorneys fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  These matters are
not before this Court. 
3
There is no dispute that the Fortunetelling Ordinance prohibits the acceptance of
remuneration for the performance of fortunetelling.  The Ordinance states:
Fortunetelling.
Every person who shall demand or accept any
remuneration or gratuity for forecasting or foretelling or for
pretending to forecast or foretell the future by cards, palm
reading or any other scheme, practice or device shall be subject
to punishment for a class B violation as set forth in section 1-19
of chapter 1 of the County Code; and in any warrant for a
violation of the above provisions, it shall be sufficient to allege
that the defendant forecast or foretold or pretended to forecast
or foretell the future by a certain scheme, practice or device
without setting forth the particular scheme, practice or device
employed; provided, that this section shall not apply to any
benefit performance or part thereof conducted pursuant to
section 30-4 of this Code.
Montgomery County Code, § 32-7 (1999).
Nefedro filed suit against the County.  In his suit, Nefedro asked the court for a
declaratory judgment, pursuant to Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 3-406 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, stating that the Fortunetelling Ordinance violates
his First Amendment right to freedom of speech and Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights.2  The parties subsequently filed various motions, including cross-motions for
4
summary judgment, and the trial court held a hearing on the summary judgment motions.
At the hearing, the court concluded that the Fortunetelling Ordinance was constitutional,
denied Nefedro’s motion for summary judgment, and granted the County’s motion for
summary judgment.  The court stated:
All right.  Well, I think this is essentially a police power
being exercised by Montgomery County.  And, certainly, under
its police power it has the right to regulate this type of activity.
It’s a commercial transaction and even the intermediary [sic]
test of this ordinance meets the standard.
So, it certainly has a substantial interest.  It’s been
demonstrated that the regulation directly and materially
advances the substantial interests and it is narrowly drawn.  It is
not prohibiting the speech.  It is simply regulating it.
In its written order granting the County’s motion for summary judgment, the trial
court stated:
[T]he County fortunetelling law . . . is constitutional.  The
County law regulates speech, not conduct.  And, insofar as the
County law does regulate speech, it is narrowly drawn to serve
the County’s compelling governmental interest in protecting its
citizenry from fraud.
Nefedro appealed the trial court’s ruling.  While the case was before the Court of
Special Appeals, we granted certiorari on our motion to answer the following question:
Did the trial court err in finding that Montgomery County Code
§ 32-7, criminalizing the demand or receipt of payment for
fortunetelling, does not violate the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Article 40 of the Declaration of Rights of the
Maryland Constitution?
After receiving briefs and hearing arguments from both parties, we answer this question in
3 Nefedro argues that he has standing pursuant to the three-prong test described by the
United States Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112
S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 364 (1992).  That test sets forth the prudential
requirements for standing in federal court, but it is not applicable to state courts.
5
the affirmative and reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standing
As an initial matter, the County argues that Nefedro lacks standing to challenge the
Fortunetelling Ordinance.  In “a multitude of cases,” this Court has “recognize[d] the
availability of actions for declaratory judgments or injunctions challenging the validity of
statutes or regulations which may, in the future, be applied to or adversely affect the
plaintiffs.”  Jackson v. Millstone, 369 Md. 575, 588-90, 801 A.2d 1034, 1042-43 (2002)
(citing many cases).3  Our decision in State v. Lundquist, 262 Md. 534, 278 A.2d 263 (1971),
demonstrates this principle in regard to a freedom of speech challenge.  In Lundquist, we
concluded that there was standing to challenge a statute requiring participation in a flag
salute based entirely on one plaintiff’s statement that he and his son objected to and would
not participate in the ceremony.  262 Md. at 539-40, 278 A.2d at 266-67.  In reaching that
conclusion, we noted “the obvious chilling effect on [the plaintiffs’] First Amendment
rights” and that the Attorney General had stated, in its answer to the plaintiffs’ amended
complaint, that “a program of enforcement [was] in preparation and await[ed] only the
outcome of this case.”  Lundquist, 262 Md. at 540, 278 A.2d at 267.
4  As discussed supra, the parties disagree about when, how, and if Nefedro applied
for a business license.  As our discussion above demonstrates, this factual dispute is of no
consequence.
5 As we have noted, Nefedro also alleges that the Fortunetelling Ordinance violates
his right to freedom of speech as guaranteed by Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.  We need not consider Article 40 and the First Amendment separately as Article 40
(continued...)
6
 The record shows that, at the very least, the Fortunetelling Ordinance will adversely
affect Nefedro.4  The County does not dispute that Nefedro operates fortunetelling
businesses, and Nefedro has expressed an intent to open a fortunetelling business in
Montgomery County if he is allowed to do so.  The parties also agree that the Fortunetelling
Ordinance would prohibit Nefedro from receiving remuneration for fortunetelling.  Indeed,
the County’s argument is founded on its assertion that Nefedro should not be allowed to
receive remuneration for fortunetelling because it is, and should be, illegal in Montgomery
County.  The undisputed facts therefore demonstrate that Nefedro intends to open a
fortunetelling business in Montgomery County but that he would be subject to penalties
under the Fortunetelling Ordinance if he did so.  These facts are sufficient to establish
standing.
II.
First Amendment
We now address Nefedro’s First Amendment challenge to the Fortunetelling
Ordinance.  Nefedro argues that the Ordinance violates his right to freedom of speech as
guaranteed by the First Amendment.5  For the foregoing reasons, we agree.
5(...continued)
is read generally in pari materia with the First Amendment.  WBAL-TV Div., Hearst Corp.
v. State, 300 Md. 233, 243 n.4, 477 A.2d 776, 781 n.4 (1984)  
6 Nefedro argues that fortunetelling is speech under the First Amendment, citing many
courts that have reached that conclusion.  See, e.g., Argello v. City of Lincoln, 143 F.3d 1152,
1152 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The [fortunetelling] ordinance is a content-based regulation of
speech.”); Trimble v. City of New Iberia, 73 F. Supp. 2d 659, 666-67 (W.D. La. 1999) (“The
Court finds that the Ordinance does indeed prohibit speech based on its content, namely
speech that involves fortunetelling, palmistry, reading futures and the like.”); Spiritual
Psychic Sci. Church v. City of Azusa, 703 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Cal. 1985) (“[A]ny prohibition
or regulation of fortune-telling must be given full scrutiny under the Constitution.”).  The
County has not refuted Nefedro’s argument that fortunetelling is speech.  Accordingly, we
assume that to be true for purposes of our decision.
7
The Fortunetelling Ordinance Regulates Speech
There seems to be no dispute between the parties in this case that fortunetelling is
speech.6  Instead, the issues before us are whether the Fortunetelling Ordinance regulates
speech and, if so, whether that regulation violates the First Amendment.  Nefedro argues that
the Ordinance regulates speech and that, accordingly, the law must pass First Amendment
scrutiny.  The County responds that because the Ordinance regulates only the payment of
money for fortunetelling services, it regulates only conduct.  As a result, the County asserts,
the Ordinance does not implicate the First Amendment.  In our view, the Fortunetelling
Ordinance does regulate speech.
The First Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibits the states from passing laws “abridging the freedom of speech.”  U.S. Const.
amend. I.  The United States Supreme Court has explained:
This provision embodies “[o]ur profound national commitment
7 The Supreme Court concluded that in regard to the parties before the Court, an
honoraria ban on federal employees violated the First Amendment even though “Congress
may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public employees that would be plainly
unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.”  United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees
Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1012, 130 L. Ed. 2d 964, 978-79 (1995).
8
to the free exchange of ideas.”  Harte-Hanks Communications,
Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686, 105 L. Ed. 2d 562, 109
S. Ct. 2678 (1989).  “[A]s a general matter, ‘the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content.’”  Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 65, 77 L. Ed. 2d 469, 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983) (quoting
Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 33 L. Ed.
2d 212, 92 S. Ct. 2286 (1972)).  However, this principle, like
other First Amendment principles, is not absolute.  Cf. Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41, 108
S. Ct. 876 (1988).
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 1707, 152 L. Ed. 2d 771, 780 (2002)
(Ashcroft I).
Assuming, as we do, that fortunetelling is speech, the question before us is whether
the Fortunetelling Ordinance violates the First Amendment by improperly restricting that
speech.  The County argues that the Ordinance does not implicate the First Amendment at
all because it prohibits not fortunetelling itself, but the receipt of remuneration for
fortunetelling.  This is not a meaningful distinction.  The Supreme Court has held that a
restriction on compensation for speech implicates the First Amendment.  In United States
v. National Treasury Employees Union, the Court found unconstitutional the application of
a federal law that banned honoraria for federal employees.7  513 U.S. 454, 115 S. Ct. 1003,
130 L. Ed. 2d 964 (1995).  The Court explained that such an outright ban on remuneration
8 Explaining the importance of remuneration in promoting speech, the Court noted
the “self-evident” fact that, for example, “[p]ublishers compensate authors because
compensation provides a significant incentive toward more expression.”  Nat’l Treasury, 513
U.S. at 469, 115 S. Ct. at 1014, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 981.  The Court also quoted Samuel
Johnson, who reportedly said, “No man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money.”
Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 469 n.14, 115 S. Ct. at 1014 n.14, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 981 n.14
(quoting J. Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson LL. D. 302 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952)).
9 A restriction on speech implicates the First Amendment not only because it restricts
the speaker’s right to speak, but also because it restricts the recipient’s right to hear the
speech.  The Supreme Court has explained that “where a speaker exists, . . . the protection
afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”  Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1823, 48
L. Ed. 2d 346, 355 (1976).
10 A “Son of Sam” law typically restricts the ability of an individual to receive
remuneration for speech that is related to his or her criminal activity, with the proceeds
instead going to the victims of the crimes.  Garrett Epps, Wising Up:  “Son of Sam” Laws
and the Speech and Press Clauses, 70 N.C.L. Rev. 493, 500-05 (1992).  The term “Son of
(continued...)
9
for speech implicates the First Amendment even though it “neither prohibits any speech nor
discriminates among speakers based on the content or viewpoint of their messages.”  Nat’l
Treasury, 513 U.S. at 468, 115 S. Ct. at 1014, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 981.  Such a restriction
implicates the First Amendment because “its prohibition on compensation unquestionably
imposes a significant burden on expressive activity.”8  Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 468, 115
S. Ct. at 1014, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 981.  As a result, the Court concluded that “[b]y denying
respondents that [financial] incentive, the honoraria ban induces them to curtail their
expression . . . .”  Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 469, 115 S. Ct. at 1014, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 981.9
Cases involving “Son of Sam” laws further illustrate the principle that restrictions on
the receipt of remuneration for speech implicate the First Amendment.10  In Simon &
10(...continued)
Sam” comes from the popularly recognized name of a serial killer, David Berkowitz, who
terrorized New York in 1977 and subsequently stood to profit from the rights to his story.
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 108,
112 S. Ct. 501, 504, 116 L. Ed. 2d 476, 482 (1991).
10
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, the Supreme Court
addressed such a law, which required any entity contracting with an accused or convicted
person for the depiction of a crime to turn over to the state any income from that contract.
502 U.S. 105, 109, 112 S. Ct. 501, 504-05, 116 L. Ed. 2d 476, 482-83 (1991).  If a victim
of the crime recovered a money judgment against the accused or convicted person within
five years, the victim would be paid from the fund; otherwise, the money would be returned
to the entity.  Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 109, 112 S. Ct. at 505, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 483.
The Court explained that “[a] statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment
if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech.”  Simon
& Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115, 112 S. Ct. at 508, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 486-87.  The Court then
determined that this law, in particular, implicated the First Amendment because it “singled
out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden that it place[d] on no other speech
and no other income.”  Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 123, 112 S. Ct. at 512, 116 L. Ed. 2d
at 491-92.  For this reason, the Court concluded that the statute did not pass First
Amendment scrutiny.  Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 123, 112 S. Ct. at 512, 116 L. Ed. 2d
at 492.
Other jurisdictions, including this one, have explicitly followed Simon & Schuster in
11
concluding that restrictions on remuneration for speech implicate the First Amendment.  In
Curran v. Price, 334 Md. 149, 638 A.2d 93 (1994), we concluded that the Maryland “Son
of Sam” statute implicates the First Amendment.  The statute, Maryland Code (1957, 1992
Repl. Vol., 1993 Cum. Supp.) Art. 27, § 764, had been modeled after the invalidated New
York statute.  Curran, 334 Md. at 159-60, 638 A.2d at 98.  It required parties to submit to
the State certain crimes-related speech contracts and compensation arising from those
contracts.  Curran, 334 Md. at 154-56, 638 A.2d at 96-97.  Although the Legislature had
amended the statute to address some of the concerns raised in Simon & Schuster, we
concluded that the statute still placed a burden on speech.  Curran, 334 Md. at 161, 638 A.2d
at 99.  As we explained, “to deny compensation for certain speech will chill such speech.”
Curran, 334 Md. at 162, 638 A.2d at 99.  The state supreme courts in Arizona, California,
Massachusetts, Nevada, and Rhode Island have each reached the same conclusion.  See State
ex rel. Napolitano v. Gravano, 60 P.3d 246, 250-52 (Ariz. 2002) (concluding that the First
Amendment applied to a law that called for the forfeiture of royalties from books based on
racketeering activities); Keenan v. Superior Court, 40 P.3d 718, 722 (Cal. 2002) (concluding
that “California’s analogous provision [to the statute at issue in Simon & Schuster] similarly
imposes a content-based financial penalty on protected speech”); Opinion of the Justices to
the Senate, 764 N.E.2d 343, 347 (Mass. 2002) (“Consistent with other courts, we conclude
that [a pending bill proposing a ‘Son of Sam’ law] is a content-based regulation of speech.”);
Seres v. Lerner, 102 P.3d 91, 97 (Nev. 2004) (“Because [the ‘Son of Sam’ law] is a
11 Nefedro has cited a number of other cases for the proposition that spending
restrictions can violate the First Amendment.  See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22,
108 S. Ct. 1886, 1892, 100 L. Ed. 2d 425, 435 (1988) (concluding that a restriction on paid
petition circulators implicated the First Amendment because “the circulation of a petition
involves . . . ‘core political speech’”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 96 S. Ct. 612, 634-
35, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659, 687-88 (1976) (“A restriction on the amount of money a person or
group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression . . . .”); State v. Brookins, 380 Md. 345, 368, 844 A.2d 1162, 1176
(2004) (“[T]he spending of money by a political candidate directly affects the ability of that
candidate to disseminate his or her political message effectively.”).
The problem with Nefedro’s reliance on these cases is that they concern the
applicability of the First Amendment when the government places restrictions on the
expenditure of money by a speaker in furtherance of his or her own speech.  For example,
an individual must often spend money to have someone circulate a petition, so a restriction
on paid petition circulators restricts the individual’s ability to circulate the petition.  Meyer,
486 U.S. at 422-23, 108 S. Ct. at 1892, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 435-36; see also Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 19, 96 S. Ct. at 635, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 688 (“[V]irtually every means of communicating ideas
in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money.”)  The present case, on the other
hand, concerns a restriction not on the expenditure of money in furtherance of one’s own
speech, but on the receipt of money in exchange for speech.  This is a related, but
analytically distinct, issue.
12
content-based restriction on speech, the statute must pass a strict scrutiny level of review, in
line with relevant case authority.”); Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 676 (R.I. 1997)
(“[W]e are persuaded that the criminal royalties act is a content-based statute.”).  Like the
Fortunetelling Ordinance, “Son of Sam” laws restrict the ability of an individual to receive
remuneration for his or her speech.11
As these cases demonstrate, a restriction on remuneration for protected speech is a
restriction on the speaker’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech.  The Fortunetelling
Ordinance is such a restriction.  By punishing protected speech when that speech is made in
exchange for payment, the County is imposing a burden on that speech.  Like the
12 While addressing whether a religious group could be taxed for selling religious
books and pamphlets, the Supreme Court noted that “[i]t should be remembered that the
pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not distributed free of charge. . . . Freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can
pay their own way.”  Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111, 63 S. Ct. 870, 874, 87
L. Ed. 1292, 1297 (1943).
13
government employees in National Treasury, or the authors and publishers in the cases
involving “Son of Sam” statutes, an individual who wishes to engage in protected speech for
a profit will be discouraged from doing so because there is no promise of a financial
benefit.12  This type of burden on speech is something the First Amendment generally
forbids, especially when, as in this case, the burden is directed at speech specifically because
of the content of that speech.
The above notwithstanding, the County repeatedly asserts, and the dissent agrees, that
fortunetelling is “inherently fraudulent” and, as a result, should not receive any First
Amendment protection.  Indeed, the First Amendment does not protect fraudulent
statements.  Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 612, 123 S. Ct.
1829, 1836, 155 L. Ed. 2d 793, 804 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment does not shield
fraud.”).  We are not, however, persuaded that all fortunetelling is fraudulent.  While we
recognize that some fortunetellers may make fraudulent statements, just as some lawyers or
journalists may, we see nothing in the record to suggest that fortunetelling always involves
fraudulent statements.  Indeed, fortunetellers, like magicians or horoscope writers, are able
to provide entertainment to their customers or some other benefit that does not deceive those
who receive their speech.  Just as many other courts have concluded, we view this non-
14
fraudulent speech as receiving protection under the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Argello v.
City of Lincoln, 143 F.3d 1152, 1153 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the argument that a
fortunetelling ordinance could “be upheld as a prohibition against fraud” because it did “not
require that fortunetellers know that they are conveying false information, or that they have
no power of seeing into the future”); Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 959 F. Supp. 1040,
1044 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (explaining that an ordinance that banned fortunetelling was invalid
because “[e]ven if the City is trying to prevent fraud, the Ordinance encompasses much more
than fraud”); Spiritual Psychic Sci. Church v. City of Azusa, 703 P.2d 1119, 1126 (Cal.
1985) (explaining that when people who “believe they possess the power to predict what has
not yet come to pass . . . impart their beliefs to others, they are not acting fraudulently; they
are communicating opinions which, however dubious, are unquestionably protected by the
Constitution”).
In response, the County and the dissent have cited a number of cases in which courts
have referred to fortunetelling as fraudulent.  We are unpersuaded by these cases.  In most
of them, the courts were not asked to consider whether fortunetelling was protected speech.
See Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 133 So. 13 (Ala. 1931) (addressing the authority of a
municipality to pass an ordinance inconsistent with state law); Bridewell v. City of Bessemer,
46 So. 2d 568 (Ala. Ct. App. 1950) (addressing the authority of a municipality to levy a
prohibitory licensing fee outside its city limits); White v. Adams, 343 S.W.2d 793 (Ark.
1961) (addressing whether the vocation of fortunetelling is a common right or a privilege
15
upon which the state may impose a prohibitory tax); Fay v. Lambourne, 108 N.Y.S. 874
(N.Y. App. Div. 1908) (addressing a suit by fortunetellers asking for an injunction
prohibiting other fortunetellers from using a particular trade name).  In another case, there
was no freedom of speech argument before the court and the fortunetelling remuneration ban
at issue included an explicit exemption for fortunetelling performed “for the purpose of
entertainment or amusement.”  Ballard v. Walker, 772 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)
(addressing N.Y. Penal Law § 165.35 (McKinney 1988)).  Yet another case, In re Bartha,
134 Cal. Rptr. 39 (Ct. App. 1976), has been explicitly disavowed by that state’s supreme
court.  Spiritual Psychic, 703 P.2d at 1122 (“We are unable to subscribe to Bartha’s broad
characterization of fortunetelling as an exclusively commercial activity, and to the theory
that it therefore can be indiscriminately regulated, or, in this instance, wholly prohibited.”).
These cases do not affect our conclusion that some fortunetelling is simply not fraudulent.
The only two cases that the County and the dissent have cited that might have any
persuasive effect are a 1928 decision from the Supreme Court of Ohio, Davis v. State, 160
N.E. 473 (Ohio 1928), and an unreported opinion from the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland, Mitchell v. Hartford County, No. L-01-3998 (D. Md. Sept. 5,
2002).  In regard to Davis, we agree with the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, which rejected Davis when striking down a fortunetelling ban, stating:
In the case at bar, . . . this Court . . . concludes that Davis v.
State does not stand today as a controlling authority that fortune
telling is inherently a fraudulent occupation. . . . The unspoken
premise of the Rule in the case at bar, that fortune telling,
16
phrenology, horoscope and the other practices prohibited by the
Rule are inherently fraudulent, is not supported by any factual
record or factual statement . . . .
Angeline v. Mahoning County Agric. Soc’y, 993 F. Supp. 627, 633 (N.D. Ohio 1998)
(citations and quotations omitted).  As for Mitchell, we decline to do as that court did and
“defer to the legislative finding . . . that fortunetelling is inherently deceptive and, therefore,
is unprotected speech.”  Mitchell, No. L-01-3998 at 3.  Such deference would allow
legislatures to ban any manner of protected speech by simply declaring it “inherently
deceptive.”  Accordingly, we conclude that the Fortunetelling Ordinance regulates speech
that the First Amendment protects.
Fortunetelling Is Not Commercial Speech
The County argues that if we conclude that the Fortunetelling Ordinance regulates
speech, as we have, then it is still constitutional because, according to the County, the law
regulates only commercial speech.  While we acknowledge that laws restricting commercial
speech receive less scrutiny than laws restricting noncommercial speech, we disagree that
the Fortunetelling Ordinance regulates commercial speech.
The Supreme Court has explained that laws regulating commercial speech do not
receive the same level of heightened scrutiny as laws regulating other types of speech.  In
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, the Court explained
that although the First Amendment “protects commercial speech from unwarranted
governmental regulation,” there is a “‘commonsense’ distinction between speech proposing
17
a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government
regulation, and other varieties of speech.”  447 U.S. 557, 561-62, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2349, 65
L. Ed. 2d 341, 348 (1980) (quoting Ohralik  v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 455-56,
98 S. Ct. 1912, 1918, 56 L. Ed. 2d 444, 453 (1978)).  Accordingly, “[t]he Constitution . . .
accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression.”  Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63, 100 S. Ct. at 2350, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 348-49.
In this regard, our initial determination is whether fortunetelling is commercial
speech.  The general rule is that commercial speech is speech that “propose[s] a commercial
transaction.”  Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74, 109 S. Ct.
3028, 3031, 106 L. Ed. 2d 388, 399 (1989) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1826, 48 L. Ed. 2d 346,
358 (1976)); see also Lubin v. Agora, 389 Md. 1, 23, 882 A.2d 833, 846 (2005) (explaining
that commercial speech is “speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction”
(quoting Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 340, 106 S. Ct.
2968, 2976, 92 L. Ed. 2d 266, 279 (1986))); Jakanna v. Montgomery County, 344 Md. 584,
595, 689 A.2d 65, 70 (1997) (“Commercial speech is ‘expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.’” (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at
561, 100 S. Ct. at 2349, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 348)).  The line between commercial and non-
commercial speech can sometimes be difficult to discern, see Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2274,
13 In its brief, the County cites a number of cases involving the regulation of
advertising and solicitation to support its argument that “[l]aws analogous to the County’s
Fortunetelling [Ordinance] have been sanctioned . . . .”  See, e.g., Fl. Bar v. Went for It, Inc.,
515 U.S. 618, 620, 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2373, 132 L. Ed. 2d 541, 547 (1995) (concerning
“targeted direct-mail solicitations” by attorneys); United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,
509 U.S. 418, 421, 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2700, 125 L. Ed. 2d 345, 351 (1993) (concerning
“federal statutes that prohibit the broadcast of lottery advertising”).  These laws are hardly
analogous to the Fortunetelling Ordinance.  Advertising and solicitation, unlike
fortunetelling, often fall within the definition of commercial speech.
18
85 L. Ed. 2d 652, 663 (1985) (“More subject to doubt, perhaps, are the precise bounds of the
category of expression that may be termed commercial speech . . . .”), but the Court has
foreclosed the idea that speech is commercial simply because it is made for an economic
benefit, see Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67, 103 S. Ct. at 2880, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 477 (explaining
that speech is not commercial just because it is an advertisement, refers to a specific product,
or has an “economic motivation”); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66,
84 S. Ct. 710, 718, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 698 (1964) (explaining that the fact that the speech was
a paid advertisement was as “immaterial” to the question of whether it was commercial
speech “as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold”).13
Fortunetelling is not commercial speech.  The purpose of fortunetelling is not to
propose a commercial transaction, nor is it solely related to the economic interests of the
speaker.  Fox, 492 U.S. at 473-74, 109 S. Ct. at 3031, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 399; Jakanna, 344
Md. at 595, 689 A.2d at 70.  The purpose of fortunetelling is instead to provide some other
benefit to the individuals involved, whether entertainment or information that sheds light on
future events.  This is true even though the fortuneteller may receive money in exchange for
14 The County argues that fortunetelling might be commercial speech because it
“could involve commercial speech or a mix of commercial and non-commercial speech.”
This argument is a nonstarter.  Practically any speech could include commercial speech,
including speech that the First Amendment clearly protects.  Under the County’s reasoning,
statutes regulating newspapers generally would be subject to a lower standard of scrutiny
because newspapers sometimes include commercial speech.  Instead, we look at whether the
“principle type of expression at issue” is one that “propose[s] a commercial transaction.”
Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3031, 106
L. Ed. 2d 388, 399 (1989).
19
his or her services; the fact that there is an economic motivation for speech does not
transform non-commercial speech into commercial speech.  Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67, 103
S. Ct. at 2880, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 477; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 265-66, 84 S. Ct. at 718,
11 L. Ed. 2d at 698.  The fact that some aspect of fortunetelling may involve commerce also
does not transform it into commercial speech.14  See Fox, 492 U.S. at 473-75, 109 S. Ct. at
3031-32, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 399-400 (identifying commercial speech by looking at “the
principle type of expression at issue”).  Accordingly, we conclude that the Fortunetelling
Ordinance regulates speech that receives full protection under the First Amendment.
The Fortunetelling Ordinance Is Not Narrowly Tailored
Having determined that the Fortunetelling Ordinance regulates fully protected speech
based on its content, we now determine whether the Ordinance nonetheless passes muster
under the First Amendment.  A statute that regulates speech based on its content is
“‘presumptively invalid,’ . . . and the government bears the burden to rebut that
presumption.”  United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 817, 120 S. Ct. 1878,
1888, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865, 882 (2000) (quoting R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382,
15 We disagree with the County and the dissent that we should consider the
Fortunetelling Ordinance an incidental restriction on speech, subject to the four-factor test
from United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1968).  What
is ultimately being restricted here is pure speech – i.e., the telling of fortunes – not conduct
involving “speech” and “nonspeech elements,” like the burning of draft cards that was at
issue in O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77, 88 S. Ct. at 1678-79, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 679-80.  The
cases we discuss above support that conclusion.  See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. 454, 115
S. Ct. 1003, 130 L. Ed. 2d 964 (considering a restriction on honoraria for speech to be a
restriction on speech, not expressive conduct); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. 105, 112 S. Ct.
501, 116 L. Ed. 2d 476 (considering a restriction on payment for speech to be a restriction
on speech, not expressive conduct).
16 In addition to arguing that the Fortunetelling Ordinance is not narrowly tailored,
Nefedro argues that it is overbroad and unconstitutional when applied to him.  We need not
address these arguments because we conclude that the Ordinance is not narrowly tailored.
17  As we discuss in this opinion, the County asserts that the Fortunetelling Ordinance
is intended to combat fraud.  The parties do not dispute that combating fraud is a compelling
government interest, so we assume that it is for purposes of this opinion.
20
112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305, 317 (1992)).  Not every statute of this sort,
however, is unconstitutional.  The Supreme Court has explained that a statute that regulates
speech based on its content may still comply with the First Amendment if it is “narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.”  Playboy Entm’t, 529 U.S. at 813,
120 S. Ct. at 1886, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 879.15  Nefedro argues that the Ordinance is not
narrowly tailored,16 while the County argues that it is.  In our view, the Fortunetelling Statute
is not narrowly tailored and, accordingly, is unconstitutional.17
A statute is not “narrowly tailored” if “a less restrictive alternative would serve the
Government’s purpose.”  Playboy Entm’t, 529 U.S. at 813, 120 S. Ct. at 1886, 146 L. Ed.
2d at 879.  This requirement “ensure[s] that speech is restricted no further than necessary to
21
achieve the [intended] goal, for it is important to ensure that legitimate speech is not chilled
or punished.”  Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2791, 159 L. Ed. 2d
690, 701 (2004) (Ashcroft II).  To that end, a court’s question in determining whether a
statute is narrowly tailored is “whether the challenged regulation is the least restrictive means
among available, effective alternatives.”  Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at 666, 124 S. Ct. at 2791,
159 L. Ed. 2d at 701.
Cases involving freedom of speech demonstrate the narrow-tailoring requirement.
In Ashcroft II, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a federal statute that
was intended to protect minors from sexually explicit materials on the Internet.  542 U.S. at
659-60, 124 S. Ct. at 2788, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 697.  To achieve that goal, the statute imposed
a fine and prison time for the knowing posting on the Internet of content that was “harmful
to minors,” as defined by the statute, unless the defendant could prove that he or she took
reasonable measures to make the harmful content accessible only by adults.  Ashcroft II, 542
U.S. at 661-62, 124 S. Ct. at 2789, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 698-99.  The Court concluded that the
statute was not narrowly tailored because the plaintiffs had suggested a less restrictive
alternative that would be at least as effective, if not more so, than what the statute required:
blocking and filtering software employed by the Internet user, as opposed to the content
creator.  Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at 666-70, 124 S. Ct. at 2791-94, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 701-04.
Similarly, in Playboy Entertainment, the Court considered a statute that required cable
television operators to fully block sexually-oriented channels during hours when children
18 The Ordinance specifically prohibits only the receipt of remuneration or gratuity
for fortunetelling by “cards, palm reading or any other scheme, practice or device.”  The
County asserts that the words “scheme” and “device” refer only to deceptive practices, and,
accordingly, the Ordinance is narrowly tailored.  We disagree.  Regardless of whether the
County has correctly interpreted these two words, the County has ignored the word
“practice.”  The common meaning of “practice” is certainly not limited to deceptive
practices.  See Webster’s II New College Dictionary 887-88 (3rd Ed. 2005) (defining
“practice,” in relevant part, as “the act or process of doing something: PERFORMANCE” or
“[e]xercise of an occupation or profession ”).
19 The County argues that its deceptive trade practices ordinance may not be effective
(continued...)
22
might be viewing.  529 U.S. at 806, 120 S. Ct. at 1882, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 875.  The Court
concluded that the statute was unconstitutional because an effective, less restrictive
alternative was available:  an already-existing statute that required cable operators to block
certain channels at a cable subscriber’s request.  Playboy Entm’t, 529 U.S. at 816-27, 120
S. Ct. at 1887-93, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 881-88.
The Fortunetelling Ordinance is not narrowly tailored.  According to the County, the
purpose of the Fortunetelling Statute is to combat the fraud that apparently ensues from
fortunetelling.  There is at least one less restrictive, effective means for combating fraud:
laws making fraud illegal without respect to protected speech.18  In fact, Montgomery
County already has such an ordinance.  See Montgomery County Code, § 11-4 (2009)
(prohibiting fraud in regard to deceptive trade practices, including “any deception, fraud,
false pretense, false premise, misrepresentation, or concealment, suppression, or omission
of any material fact with the intent that consumers rely on the concealment, suppression, or
omission, in connection with any consumer goods or services”).19  The State of Maryland
19(...continued)
for combating the fortunetelling-related fraud it seeks to prevent.  That does not save the
Fortunetelling Ordinance.  If the County is correct that more is needed to address fraud, it
may certainly pass an appropriate ordinance that does not infringe on protected speech.
20 The County argues that the Fortunetelling Ordinance is necessary because
“[a]ttempting to address the consequence of . . . fraud, after the fact, is hardly as effective
as the prophylactic measure that the County has enacted” and because it is “more efficient
to simply ban the fraudulent practice.”  This is a grave misunderstanding of the First
Amendment, which forbids this sort of unfettered infringement on speech in the pursuit of
governmental goals, even legitimate ones.  See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535
U.S. 234, 245, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1399, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403, 417 (2002) (“The prospect of crime
. . . by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech.”).
23
also has fraud laws that do not restrict protected speech.  See generally Md. Code (2002,
2009 Supp.), Title 8 of the Criminal Law Article (“Fraud and Related Crimes”); Md. Code
(1975, 2005 Repl. Vol., 2009 Supp.), Title 13 of the Commercial Law Article (“Consumer
Protection Act”).  Indeed, fraud laws without respect to protected speech date back at least
as far as the Code of Hammurabi.  See The Avalon Project: Code of Hammurabi (L.W. King
trans., 1910) (2008), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/hamframe.asp (last accessed June 8,
2010) (“264.  If a herdsman, to whose care cattle or sheep have been entrusted, be guilty of
fraud and make false returns of the natural increase, or sell them for money, then shall he be
convicted and pay the owner ten times the loss.”).  For its part, the County has advanced
absolutely no legitimate reason why an ordinance directed at speech is necessary to combat
fraud when there are speech-neutral fraud laws that are already in effect and an uninterrupted
history of such laws dating back to the beginning of recorded law.20  Accordingly, we agree
with Nefedro that the Fortunetelling Ordinance is not narrowly tailored and conclude that
21 The County notes two cases in which Maryland courts addressed fortunetelling
laws.  Town of Forest Heights v. Frank, 291 Md. 331, 435 A.2d 425 (1981); Montgomery
County v. Eli, 20 Md. App. 269, 315 A.2d 136 (1974).  The County argues that in neither
case did we nor the Court of Special Appeals “address, sua sponte, the constitutionality of
fortunetelling laws.”  This argument has no weight because, of course, neither we nor the
intermediate appellate court must address issues that are not before us.  Similarly irrelevant
are other statutes, including those from other counties in Maryland, that prohibit
fortunetelling businesses.
24
the Fortunetelling Ordinance violates the First Amendment.21
CONCLUSION
Fortunetelling may be pure entertainment, it may give individuals some insight into
the future, or it may be hokum.  People who purchase fortunetelling services may or may not
believe in its value.  Fortunetellers may sometimes deceive their customers.  We need not,
however, pass judgment on the validity or value of the speech that fortunetelling entails.  If
Montgomery County is concerned that fortunetellers will engage in fraudulent conduct, the
County can enforce fraud laws in the event that fraud occurs.  The County need not, and
must not, enforce a law that unduly burdens protected speech to accomplish its goal.  Such
a law will curtail and have a chilling effect on constitutionally protected speech.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
MONTGOMERY
COUNTY REVERSED.  CASE
REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
ENTRY 
OF 
A
DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE
COUNTY. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 84
September Term, 2009
                                                                             
NICK NEFEDRO
v.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND,
et al.
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Dissenting Opinion by Harrell, J.
                                                                             
Filed:  June 10, 2010
1Montgomery County Code, § 32-7, entitled “Fortunetelling,” provides:
Every person who shall demand or accept any remuneration or
gratuity for forecasting or foretelling or for pretending to
forecast or foretell the future by cards, palm reading or any other
scheme, practice or device shall be subject to punishment for a
class B violation as set forth in section 1-19 of chapter 1 of the
County Code; and in any warrant for a violation of the above
provisions, it shall be sufficient to allege that the defendant
forecast or foretold or pretended to forecast or foretell the future
by a certain scheme, practice or device without setting forth the
particular scheme, practice or device employed; provided, that
this section shall not apply to any benefit performance or part
thereof conducted pursuant to section 30-4 of this Code.
Montgomery County Code, § 32-7 (2004).
I dissent from the reasoning and conclusion reached in the Majority Opinion, namely,
that Montgomery County Code § 32-71 (the “Fortunetelling Ordinance”), which prohibits
generally persons from demanding or accepting any remuneration or gratuity for forecasting
or foretelling, or pretending to forecast or foretell, the future by cards, palm reading, or any
other scheme, practice, or device, represents an unconstitutional restriction upon the
Appellant’s, Nick Nefedro’s, right to freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  The
Majority Opinion observes that
the County repeatedly asserts . . . that fortunetelling is
“inherently fraudulent” and, as a result, should not receive any
First Amendment protection.  Indeed, the First Amendment does
not protect fraudulent statements.  Illinois ex rel. Madigan v.
Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 612, 123 S. Ct. 1829,
1836, 155 L. Ed. 2d 793, 804 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment
does not shield fraud.”).  We are not, however, persuaded  that
all fortunetelling is fraudulent.  While we recognize that some
fortunetellers may make fraudulent statements, just as some
-2-
lawyers or journalists may, we see nothing in the record to
suggest that fortunetelling always involves fraudulent
statements.  Indeed, fortunetellers, like magicians or horoscope
writers, are able to provide entertainment to their customers or
some benefit that does not deceive those who receive their
speech.
Maj. Op. at 13-14.  The Majority Opinion, in the face of a tide of judicial decisions from
other jurisdictions expressing the view that the business of commercial fortunetelling is
“inherently fraudulent” and, as such, is not entitled to protection against government
restriction, offers a handful of contrary opinions (Maj. slip op at 14), endeavors to distinguish
the greater body of cases on point (Maj. slip op at 14-16), and hazards an inapt analogy to
lawyers and journalists (Maj. slip op at 13-14), the latter of which fails to recognize that,
although some lawyers or journalists may make fraudulent statements, the practice of such
professions without fraud is attainable.  I would affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County and hold that Montgomery County’s election to protect its citizens (and
their money and other assets) from for-profit fortunetellers, palmists, card readers, and the
like, does not violate Appellant’s constitutional right to free speech.
Long-standing Supreme Court precedent establishes that the guarantees of the First
Amendment do not provide insulation from government restriction of speech that is
fraudulent.  See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612,
123 S. Ct. 1829, 1836, 155 L. Ed. 2d 793, 804 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment does not
shield fraud.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1830, 48 L. Ed. 2d 346, 364 (1976) (“Untruthful speech,
-3-
commercial or otherwise, has never been protected [by the First Amendment] for its own
sake.”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L. Ed. 2d
789, 805 (1974) (“[T]he intentional lie . . . belong[s] to that category of utterances which ‘are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.’” (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572,
62 S. Ct. 766, 769, 86 L. Ed. 1031, 1035 (1942))).  See also United States Sec. and Exch.
Comm’n v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Punishing fraud,
whether it be common law fraud or securities fraud, simply does not violate the First
Amendment.”); Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 233
F.3d 981, 992 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Laws directly punishing fraudulent speech survive
constitutional scrutiny even where applied to pure, fully protected speech.”).
Many jurisdictions deem the business of commercial fortunetelling to be an inherently
fraudulent activity.  Ballard v. Walker, 772 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The
fortune telling statute, in particular, was designed to protect against ‘a prevailing species of
fraud whereby its practitioners, professing occult powers of prognostication, annually bilk
a gullible public of many millions of dollars.’” (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 165.35
(McKinney 1988) (practice commentary at p. 254))); Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 133
So. 13, 14 (Ala. 1931) (“So associated with cheats, frauds, imposition upon the credulous and
superstition is [the business of fortunetelling] that its absolute prohibition is generally
declared to be within the police power of the state, and municipalities to which such power
-4-
is delegated.”); Bridewell v. City of Bessemer, 46 So. 2d 568, 570-71 (Ala. Ct. App. 1950)
(“[T]he business of fortune telling is denominated as a useless calling, and subject to police
regulation.  This being so, the City . . . had the right to so combine its police power and
taxing power as to levy a license tax which would discourage, and to all practical purposes
prohibit, persons from engaging in the hocus pocus of fortune telling within the limits of its
police jurisdiction.”); White v. Adams, 343 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Ark. 1961) (“The lawmakers
are entitled to believe that no human being has the power of foretelling future events and that
therefore fortune telling may be a fraudulent means of preying upon the ignorant, the
superstitious, and the gullible.  Consequently it has been uniformly held that the state, in the
exercise of its police power, may constitutionally prohibit fortune telling altogether.”); In re
Bartha, 134 Cal. Rptr. 39, 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (“It is within the police power of the
municipality and province of the legislative body to determine that the business of
fortunetelling is inherently deceptive and that its regulation or prohibition is required in order
to protect the gullible, superstitious, and unwary.”); Fay v. Lambourne, 108 N.Y.S. 874, 876
(N.Y. App. Div. 1908) (“The pretense of occult powers and the ability to answer confidential
questions from spiritual aid is as bad as fortune telling and a species of it and is a fraud upon
the public.”); Davis v. State of Ohio, 160 N.E. 473, 475 (Ohio 1928) (“[F]ortune-telling and
similar crafts are fraudulent practices, and therefore not within the protection afforded to a
lawful business.”).
Recognizing the foregoing analyses, Judge Legg of the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, in an unpublished memorandum opinion in Mitchell v. Harford
2Lest anyone presume hypocrisy (in light of Maryland Rule 1-104(b) regarding the
prohibition of general citation of unreported opinions) on my part for relying here on an
unreported opinion of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, I hasten to note
that Rule 1-104(b) applies solely to the citation of unreported opinions of the Court of
Appeals and Court of Special Appeals and then only to parties offering same to either
Maryland appellate courts.
-5-
County, No. L-01-3998 (D. Md. Sept. 5, 2002), upheld, on summary judgment, the
constitutionality of anti-fortunetelling statutes passed by the City of Aberdeen and Harford
County that are nearly identical to § 32-7 of the Montgomery County Code.2  In Mitchell, the
plaintiff, claiming that she was “a psychic capable of divining the future through the use of
Tarot readings, palm readings, and dream analysis,” sought to open a fortunetelling business
in Aberdeen.  Slip op. at 2.  Both the City and the County, however, had ordinances
prohibiting persons from engaging in fortunetelling for consideration.  Id. at 1-2.
Specifically, the City’s statute, which was adopted in 1979, read:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the Incorporated Town of
Aberdeen to ask, demand, charge or accept any remuneration,
gratuity or anything of value for forecasting, foretelling or
pretending to forecast or foretell the future of another by cards,
palm reading or any other scheme, practice or device.
Id. at 1.  Similarly, the Harford County Code provided:
Any person in the county who shall ask, demand, charge or
accept any remuneration, gratuity or anything of value for
forecasting or foretelling or for pretending to forecast or foretell
the future of another, by cards, palmreading or any other
scheme, practice of [sic] device, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor . . . 
Id. at 1-2.  The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the respective statutes, arguing,
3In a footnote, Judge Legg observed that “[t]he statutes ban fortunetelling for
consideration, not fortunetelling itself, nor the advertising of fortunetelling services.  The
speech at issue here is, therefore, ‘speech for profit,’ as opposed to ‘commercial speech.’”
Id. at 4 n.3 (citing Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482, 109 S.
Ct. 3028, 3036, 106 L. Ed. 2d 388, 405 (1989) (“While these examples consist of speech for
a profit, they do not consist of speech that proposes a commercial transaction, which is what
(continued...)
-6-
inter alia, that they “violate[d] the guarantees of free speech contained in the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights.”  Id. at 2.
In rejecting the plaintiff’s contentions and granting summary judgment in favor of the
governmental defendants, Judge Legg stated:
As a general rule, the government may not abridge the
public’s right to free speech.  The Supreme Court has held,
however, that “[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise” is
not protected.  Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizen’s Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).  In
keeping with this principle, courts have deferred to the
determinations of municipalities and legislatures that “the
business of fortunetelling is inherently deceptive . . . .”  In re
Bartha, 63 Cal. App. 3d 584, 591 (1976).  This Court will defer
to the legislative finding of the City and Harford County that
fortunetelling is inherently deceptive and, therefore, is
unprotected speech.  Accordingly, Mitchell’s First Amendment
claim must fail.
Id. at 3.  The District Court observed further that, “[e]ven if fortunetelling were protected
speech, the statutes would withstand constitutional scrutiny,” opining:
The statutes do not target the speech itself, but instead the
noncommunicative act of selling the speech.  Thus, United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), provides the applicable
legal test for determining the constitutionality of the statutes.[3]
3(...continued)
defines commercial speech . . . .”).
-7-
O’Brien establishes a four part test for evaluating the
constitutionality of regulations that target noncommunicative
acts, but have the incidental effect of suppressing speech.  Id. at
377.  Specifically a statute must:
(i) be within the constitutional power of the
government;
(ii) be unrelated to the suppression of free
expression;
(iii) 
further 
an 
important 
or 
substantial
government interest; and
(iv) restrict speech no greater than is necessary to
achieve the government interest at stake.
Id.
The statutes clearly satisfy the first three requirements.
First, it is within the constitutional power of the government to
regulate fortunetelling.  Second, the purpose of the statutes is to
prevent fraud, not to suppress fortunetelling altogether.
Preventing fraud is an important government interest.  See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940).  Thus, the
crucial question is whether the statutes restrict more speech than
is necessary to prevent fraud.
Anti-fortunetelling statutes are designed to prevent “‘a
prevailing species of fraud whereby its practitioners, professing
occult powers of prognostication, annually bilk a gullible public
of many millions of dollars.’” Ballard v. Walker, 772 F. Supp.
1335, 1341 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting N.Y. Penal Law §§
165.35 (McKinney 1988) (practice commentary at p. 254)).
Courts have held that it is within the police power of the state to
enact such regulations, and court should defer to legislative
determinations that the “regulation or prohibition [of fortune-
telling] is required in order to protect the gullible, superstitious,
and unwary.”  In re Bartha, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 591.
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[The plaintiff] argues that the statutes could be amended
to prohibit fraudulent fortunetelling for consideration, as
opposed to prohibiting all fortunetelling for consideration.
Presumably such a statute would make it illegal for any
fortuneteller to represent an ability to see the future if they did
not genuinely believe that they did, indeed, possess such an
ability.  [The plaintiff] has submitted an affidavit attesting to the
sincerity of her belief in her ability to divine the future.
The sincerity of [the plaintiff’s] beliefs is immaterial.
Neither she nor anyone else can foretell the future.  The law
does not permit the sale of a bogus cancer remedy, for example,
simply because the seller wholeheartedly believes in the efficacy
of the product.  The sincerity of the seller’s belief does not turn
a worthless product or service into a valuable one.  The state is
empowered to protect the public, especially the most gullible
and unsophisticated members of the public, by banning the sale
of valueless products and services.
It must be remembered that the statutes do not ban
fortunetellers from telling fortunes.  The practitioner may claim
to have occult powers so long as she does not charge for her
services.  Moreover, the fortuneteller may charge a fee so long
as she does not claim to have occult powers she lacks.
Fortunetelling as entertainment is entirely legal and not banned
by the statutes.  Accordingly, the statutes do not violate the First
Amendment.
Id. at 3-5.
Although the District Court’s decision in Mitchell is not binding upon this Court for
at least a couple of reasons, it is, in my view, sufficiently persuasive as to move me to
conclude that affirmance of the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County is the
correct outcome in the present case.  The Fortunetelling Ordinance contained in the
Montgomery County Code is, in essence, identical to the provisions upheld against First
Amendment challenge by the District Court in its decision in Mitchell.  By limiting its
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application to what many jurisdictions have concluded to be the inherently fraudulent
business of fortunetelling for remuneration, rather than preventing all fortunetelling, the
ordinance restricts no more speech than is necessary to further the County’s expressed and
significant interest in preventing fraud from being perpetrated upon its citizens.  The
Majority opinion, deeming itself more insightful about the nature of commercial
fortunetelling than the largely factual assessment of the Montgomery County government,
substitutes its judgment for that of the legislative body.  I, on the other hand, would hold that
§ 32-7 of the Montgomery County Code does not restrict impermissibly Appellant’s First
Amendment rights.