Case Title: Serico v. Rothberg

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-69-16

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2018-07-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.)

              Lucia Serico v. Robert M. Rothberg, M.D. (A-69-16) (079041)

Argued April 9, 2018 -- Decided July 19, 2018

FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for the Court.

         This appeal arises from plaintiff Lucia Serico’s motion for attorney’s fees and other
litigation expenses pursuant to Rule 4:58 after a jury trial on medical malpractice claims
against Robert M. Rothberg, M.D. At issue is whether Serico may collect attorney’s fees
from Rothberg despite entering into a “high-low agreement” that limited the amount she
could recover at trial to $1,000,000.

        Before trial, Serico served Rothberg with an offer of judgment for $750,000
“inclusive of costs and prejudgment interest.” The offer letter contained a warning that
Serico would seek “all reasonable litigation expenses including costs, interest, and attorney’s
fees in accordance with Rule 4:58,” the rule governing offers of judgment. Rothberg
declined the offer.

        During trial, the parties entered into a high-low agreement on the record. The “low”
was $300,000 and the “high” was $1,000,000. Neither party mentioned Rule 4:58, nor did
they explicitly waive or preserve rights pursuant to the Rule. Rothberg’s counsel stated “that
if there is a no cause, [Serico] gets $300,000.00. If there is a verdict in favor of [Serico] in
excess of $1,000,000, [Serico] gets $1,000,000. If there is a verdict in favor of [Serico] . . .
for an amount of money of any point between $300,000.00 and $1,000,000, [Serico] gets that
amount of money without interest.” Upon further questioning by the trial judge, both parties
agreed the “medical expenses are subsumed within the amount” of the agreement. Counsel
confirmed that Rothberg did not have insurance coverage in excess of $1,000,000.

      The jury awarded Serico a total amount of $6,000,000. The court entered judgment in
the amount of $1,000,000 as specified in the agreement. Serico moved for litigation
expenses, including attorney’s fees, pursuant to Rule 4:58-2. The trial court denied the
motion, applying a custom and usage analysis. Serico appealed.

        An Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s decision. 
448 N.J. Super. 604
(App. Div. 2017). Because high-low agreements are contracts, the panel determined, the
terms are to be enforced as written, if clear. Id. at 614. In the interest of encouraging
settlement, a plaintiff cannot recover more than the “high” of the agreement unless she
explicitly preserves the right to seek more. Id. at 615-16.

                                               1
       Serico petitioned for certification, which the Court granted. 
230 N.J. 416 (2017).

HELD: The high-low agreement is a settlement subject to the rules of contract
interpretation. Based on the expressed intent of the parties and the context of the agreement,
the agreement set $1,000,000 as the maximum recovery. Therefore, Serico may not seek
additional litigation expenses allowed by Rule 4:58. The judgment of the Appellate Division
is accordingly affirmed.

1. Rule 4:58 prescribes the process and consequences of making a pre-trial offer of judgment.
The fundamental purpose of the rule is to induce settlement. Rule 4:58-1 provides, in relevant
part, that “any party may, at any time more than [twenty] days before the actual trial date, serve
on any adverse party . . . an offer to take a monetary judgment in the offeror’s favor, or as the
case may be, to allow judgment to be taken against the offeror, for a sum stated therein
(including costs).” R. 4:58-1(a). The Rule continues: “The making of a further offer shall
constitute a withdrawal of all previous offers made by that party. An offer shall not, however,
be deemed withdrawn upon the making of a counter-offer by an adverse party but shall remain
open until accepted or withdrawn as is herein provided.” R. 4:58-1(b). Finally, the Rule
describes the consequences of a party’s failure to accept the offer and proceeding to trial. R.
4:58-2(a); -3(a). In essence, the rule imposes financial consequences on a party who rejects a
settlement offer that turns out to be more favorable than the ultimate judgment. It is designed
so that a party who has rejected a settlement may not escape mandatory payment for any
portion of the costs incurred as a result of his decision. All costs that result from the rejection
of an offer of judgment, including those incurred in Appellate Division and Supreme Court
proceedings, fall within the scope of Rule 4:58-2. (pp. 7-10)

2. A high-low agreement, like the one at issue in this case, is “[a] settlement in which a
defendant agrees to pay the plaintiff a minimum recovery in return for the plaintiff’s agreement
to accept a maximum amount regardless of the outcome at trial.” Black’s Law Dictionary 797
(9th ed. 2009). “Any outcome between the agreed limits is to be accepted by the parties.” Benz
v. Pires, 
269 N.J. Super. 574, 578-79 (App. Div. 1994). The agreement is a settlement contract
and subject to the rules of contract interpretation. Malick v. Seaview Lincoln Mercury, 
398 N.J. Super. 182, 186, 190 (App. Div. 2008). In Benz, the Appellate Division determined that
prejudgment interest could not be collected on a pretrial settlement unless specified in the
agreement, and applied the rule to the high-low agreement. 
269 N.J. Super. at 580. In Malick,
the Appellate Division considered whether a plaintiff could recover interest pursuant to Rule
4:58 after entering into a high-low agreement of $175,000 to $1,000,000. 
398 N.J. Super. at 184-85. In negotiating the agreement, the plaintiff waived prejudgment interest but expressly
reserved the right to pursue “legal fees and litigation costs” pursuant to Rule 4:58, if applicable.
Id. at 185. The panel concluded that the agreement was ambiguous and remanded. Id. at 189.
(pp. 10-11)

3. In this case, the parties entered into a high-low agreement during jury deliberations. The
agreement was not intended to avoid litigation expenses or save time; it was entered to mitigate
the inherent risk to the parties of a jury verdict and to limit subsequent appeals. The plain
language of the agreement is silent on the issue of Rule 4:58 expenses. In putting the
                                                  2
agreement on the record, both parties had a chance to explain their position and discuss terms
before the trial judge. The resulting agreement set a hard limit of $1,000,000, and expressly
stated no interest or medical expenses would be added to that amount. The settlement through
high-low agreement superseded and extinguished the offer of judgment. Although the high-low
agreement is a settlement, it is not the sort of settlement contemplated by Rule 4:58; rather, it
serves a different purpose and provides distinct benefits. (pp. 12-14)

4. Here, the agreement on the record reveals a meeting of the minds on both the floor and
ceiling of Serico’s recovery, including fees and expenses. Because the contract superseded the
qualifying offer of judgment, if Serico desired Rule 4:58 expenses, she would have been
required to explicitly preserve the right to pursue them when entering into the high-low
agreement in this case. A crucial aspect of any high-low agreement is finality; both parties
benefit from the strict and explicit limitation of financial exposure that such agreements
provide. The Appellate Division and trial court correctly denied Serico’s motion for Rule
4:58-2 expenses. (p. 14)

       AFFIRMED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON,
SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion.

                                              3
                                     SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       A-
69 September Term 2016
                                                079041

LUCIA SERICO, Executrix of
the Estate of BENJAMIN
SERICO, deceased, and LUCIA
SERICO, Individually,

    Plaintiffs-Appellants,

         v.

ROBERT M. ROTHBERG, M.D.,

    Defendant-Respondent,

         and

MOUNTAINSIDE HOSPITAL and
RICHARD ROE, M.D.,

    Defendants.

         Argued April 9, 2018 – Decided July 19, 2018

         On certification to the Superior Court,
         Appellate Division, whose opinion is
         reported at 
448 N.J. Super. 604 (App. Div.
         2017).

         Bruce H. Nagel argued the cause for
         appellants (Nagel Rice, attorneys; Bruce H.
         Nagel and Robert H. Solomon, on the briefs).

         James B. Sharp argued the cause for
         respondent (Schenck Price Smith & King,
         attorneys; James B. Sharp, of counsel and on
         the brief, and Benjamin Hooper, on the
         brief).

    JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court.

                               1
     This appeal arises from plaintiff Lucia Serico’s1 motion for

attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses pursuant to Rule

4:58 after a jury trial on medical malpractice claims against

Robert M. Rothberg, M.D.   At issue is whether Serico may collect

attorney’s fees from Rothberg despite entering into a “high-low

agreement”2 that limited the amount she could recover at trial to

$1,000,000.   We determine that the high-low agreement is a

settlement subject to the rules of contract interpretation.

Accordingly, based on the expressed intent of the parties and

the context of the agreement, we find that the agreement set

$1,000,000 as the maximum recovery.   Therefore, Serico may not

seek additional litigation expenses allowed by Rule 4:58.     The

judgment of the Appellate Division is accordingly affirmed.

                                I.

                                A.

     This claim arose from Rothberg’s negligent failure to

diagnose Benjamin Serico -- who unfortunately passed away before

trial -- with colon cancer.   Before trial, in April 2014, Serico

1  Lucia Serico sued individually and as executrix of the estate
of her husband, Benjamin Serico. They are collectively referred
to as “Serico.” Serico brought claims against other defendants,
but this appeal concerns only her claims against Robert M.
Rothberg, M.D.

2  In this case, as discussed later, Serico and Rothberg agreed
to a high-low of $300,000 to $1,000,000, meaning she would
recover at least $300,000 and at most $1,000,000, no matter the
verdict.
                                 2
served Rothberg with an offer of judgment for $750,000

“inclusive of costs and prejudgment interest.”    The offer letter

contained a warning that Serico would seek “all reasonable

litigation expenses including costs, interest, and attorney’s

fees in accordance with Rule 4:58,” the rule governing offers of

judgment.    Rothberg declined the offer.

     During trial, in October 2015, the parties entered into a

high-low agreement on the record.     The “low” was $300,000 and

the “high” was $1,000,000.    Neither party mentioned Rule 4:58,

nor did they explicitly waive or preserve rights pursuant to the

Rule.   While the parties did not address the issue of attorney’s

fees and other litigation expenses, the trial transcript reveals

the scope of the agreement.    Rothberg’s counsel stated:

            We’ve offered a high low settlement agreement
            to the plaintiff, which the plaintiff has at
            this time accepted. The terms are $1,000,000
            for the high, and $300,000.00 for the low.

            And with specificity, that means that if there
            is a no cause, [Serico] gets $300,000.00. If
            there is a verdict in favor of [Serico] in
            excess    of   $1,000,000,    [Serico]    gets
            $1,000,000.

            If there is a verdict in favor of [Serico]
            . . . for an amount of money of any point
            between $300,000.00 and $1,000,000, [Serico]
            gets that amount of money without interest.
            So if the verdict is for $600,000.00,
            [Serico] gets $600,000.00, period. Okay?

            There will be no appeal. In the event of a
            hung jury, [Serico’s counsel] has the option
            of either accepting the low figure of

                                  3
         $300,000.00, or opting for a new trial at his
         option at that time. He does not have to make
         that decision now.   He can make it at that
         time.

    Upon further questioning by the trial judge, both parties

agreed the “medical expenses are subsumed within the amount” of

the agreement.   Serico’s counsel asked for clarification that

Rothberg did not have insurance coverage in excess of

$1,000,000:

         Also, Judge, I do have my client in court today
         just to confirm that what she and the boys
         have agreed to a [$300,000] low, [$1,000,000]
         high.

         And also I’d like Mr. Sharp to represent that
         there is no excess coverage other than
         [$1,000,000], that that’s the policy.

Counsel confirmed the policy limit with an insurance

representative in the courtroom.

    The jury awarded Serico a total amount of $6,000,000.      The

court entered judgment in the amount of $1,000,000 as specified

in the agreement.   Serico moved for litigation expenses,

including attorney’s fees, pursuant to Rule 4:58-2.     The trial

court denied the motion, applying a custom and usage analysis.

The trial court relied on his forty-two years of experience as

an attorney and judge, and conferred with judicial colleagues.

The judge determined that he had never encountered a litigant

who sought costs and fees pursuant to the offer of judgment rule

after entering into a high-low agreement.   Serico appealed.

                                   4
                                    B.

    An Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s

decision in a published opinion, but applied different

reasoning.    Serico v. Rothberg, 
448 N.J. Super. 604 (App. Div.

2017).     The panel determined that Serico “could not recover any

amount beyond the 'high’ . . . because the [high-low] agreement

limit[ed] the total amount of [Rothberg’s] obligation to that

amount.”    Id. at 613.    Because such agreements are contracts,

the panel continued, the terms are to be enforced as written, if

clear.    Id. at 614.     In the interest of encouraging settlement,

a plaintiff cannot recover more than the “high” of the agreement

unless she explicitly preserves the right to seek more.       Id. at

615-16.

    Serico petitioned this Court for certification, which we

granted.     
230 N.J. 416 (2017).

                                    II.

                                    A.

    Serico argues that Rule 4:58, by its plain language,

compels the ordering of litigation expenses, including

attorney’s fees, to be paid by Rothberg.       Moreover, she asserts,

because the high-low agreement is a contract, and the parties

did not discuss the offer of judgment rule in relation to the

agreement, there was no meeting of the minds creating an

enforceable contract on that issue.

                                     5
    Serico contends that the intent of the parties must govern

in interpreting the agreement, but cautions the Court against

finding a “secret, unexpressed intent.”   She emphasizes that a

high-low agreement cannot automatically waive the right to seek

litigation expenses.   Any waiver of her right to expenses

pursuant to Rule 4:58 would have to be explicit or implied,

according to Serico.

                                B.

    Rothberg agrees that high-low agreements are contracts and

should be subject to traditional rules of contract

interpretation by the courts.   He urges the Court to enforce the

agreement in accordance with its plain meaning and not the

secret or unexpressed intent of the parties.   Rothberg contends

that a basic assumption of high-low agreements is that “a

plaintiff cannot recover more than the amount agreed to as the

'high’ limit.”   Because Serico did not express her intention to

pursue Rule 4:58 expenses during negotiations, and the intention

was not placed on the record with the rest of the agreement,

Rothberg stresses her recovery is limited to the high-low

agreement’s clear terms.

    Rothberg argues that a 2008 Appellate Division case, Malick

v. Seaview Lincoln Mercury, which considered the relationship

among high-low agreements, Rule 4:58 expenses, and prejudgment

interest, is in agreement with the panel’s decision in this

                                 6
case.   
398 N.J. Super. 182 (App. Div. 2008).    There, Rothberg

continues, the plaintiff specifically reserved his right to the

offer of judgment remedy despite the high-low agreement.     Here,

Rothberg reasons that because Serico did not express her intent

to pursue Rule 4:58 expenses, she is limited to the agreement.

                                 III.

    There are no disputed facts in this case and we review only

the application of law to established facts.     Thus, our review

is de novo.   Manalapan Realty v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 
140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (“A trial court’s interpretation of the law

and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are

not entitled to any special deference.”).

                                 IV.

    We begin our analysis with a brief discussion of Rule 4:58

and its purposes.   We then apply the rule to the high-low

agreement that is the subject of this dispute.

                                 A.

    Rule 4:58 prescribes the process and consequences of making

a pre-trial offer of judgment.    The “fundamental purpose of the

rule” is to induce settlement.    Pressler & Verneiro, Current

N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 4:58 (2018).     It is “designed

particularly as a mechanism to encourage, promote, and stimulate

early out-of-court settlement of . . . claims that in justice

                                  7
and reason ought to be settled without trial.”   Crudup v.

Marrero, 
57 N.J. 353, 357 (1971).

    Rule 4:58-1 provides, in relevant part, that

         any party may, at any time more than [twenty]
         days before the actual trial date, serve on
         any adverse party, without prejudice, and file
         with the court, an offer to take a monetary
         judgment in the offeror’s favor, or as the
         case may be, to allow judgment to be taken
         against the offeror, for a sum stated therein
         (including costs).    The offer shall not be
         effective unless, at the time the offer is
         extended, the relief sought by the parties in
         the case is exclusively monetary in nature.

         [R. 4:58-1(a).]

The Rule continues:

         [i]f at any time on or prior to the 10th day
         before the actual trial date the offer is
         accepted, the offeree shall serve on the
         offeror and file a notice of acceptance with
         the court. The making of a further offer shall
         constitute a withdrawal of all previous offers
         made by that party.      An offer shall not,
         however, be deemed withdrawn upon the making
         of a counter-offer by an adverse party but
         shall remain open until accepted or withdrawn
         as is herein provided.

         [R. 4:58-1(b).]

Finally, the Rule describes the consequences of a party’s

failure to accept the offer and, proceeding to trial:

         if the offer of a claimant is not accepted and
         the claimant obtains a money judgment, in an
         amount that is 120% of the offer or more,
         excluding allowable prejudgment interest and
         counsel fees, the claimant shall be allowed,
         in addition to costs of suit:         (1) all
         reasonable   litigation    expenses   incurred

                                8
         following non-acceptance; (2) prejudgment
         interest of eight percent on the amount of any
         money recovery from the date of the offer or
         the date of completion of discovery, whichever
         is later, but only to the extent that such
         prejudgment interest exceeds the interest
         prescribed by R. 4:42-11(b), which also shall
         be allowable; and (3) a reasonable attorney’s
         fee for such subsequent services as are
         compelled by the non-acceptance.

         [R. 4:58-2(a) (emphases added).]

Similarly, when the offeror is not the claimant (i.e., the

offeror is the defendant):

         [i]f the offer of a party other than the
         claimant is not accepted, and the claimant
         obtains a monetary judgment . . . that is
         favorable to the offeror as defined by this
         rule, the offeror shall be allowed, in
         addition to costs of suit, the allowances as
         prescribed   by  R.   4:58-2,  which   shall
         constitute a prior charge on the judgment or
         verdict in uninsured/underinsured motorist
         actions.

         [R. 4:58-3(a).]

A favorable determination “is a money judgment . . . that is 80%

of the offer or less.”   R. 4:58-3(b).

    “In essence, the rule 'imposes financial consequences on a

party who rejects a settlement offer that turns out to be more

favorable than the ultimate judgment.’”   Wiese v. Dedhia, 
188 N.J. 587, 593 (2006) (quoting Schettino v. Roizman Dev., 
158 N.J. 476, 482 (1999)).   It is designed so that “a party who has

rejected a settlement” may not “escape mandatory payment for any

portion of the costs incurred as a result of his decision.”

                                 9
Ibid.    That is, “[t]he rule was intended to penalize a party who

rejects a settlement offer that turns out to be more favorable

than the ultimate judgment.”    Ibid. (quoting Gonzalez v. Safe &

Sound Sec. Corp., 
185 N.J. 100, 125 (2005)).   “[A]ll costs

[that] result [from] the rejection of an offer of judgment,

including those incurred in Appellate Division and Supreme Court

proceedings, fall within the scope of Rule 4:58-2.”    Id. at 593-

94.

                                 B.

      A high-low agreement, like the one at issue in this case,

is “[a] settlement in which a defendant agrees to pay the

plaintiff a minimum recovery in return for the plaintiff’s

agreement to accept a maximum amount regardless of the outcome

at trial.”   Black’s Law Dictionary 797 (9th ed. 2009).   “Any

outcome between the agreed limits is to be accepted by the

parties.”    Benz v. Pires, 
269 N.J. Super. 574, 578-79 (App. Div.

1994).    The agreement is a settlement contract and subject to

the rules of contract interpretation.    Malick, 
398 N.J. Super.

at 186, 190.

      In contrast to a pre-trial offer of judgment, the parties

to a high-low agreement “agree to let the usual process of trial

and judgment operate and control the outcome.”    Benz, 
269 N.J.

Super. at 579.    In Benz, the plaintiff applied for prejudgment

interest pursuant to Rule 4:42-11(b) after the jury returned a

                                 10
no-cause verdict, entitling him to the lower limit of the

agreement.   Id. at 577.   The Appellate Division determined that

prejudgment interest could not be collected on a pretrial

settlement unless specified in the agreement, and applied the

rule to the high-low agreement.     Id. at 580.

    In Malick, the Appellate Division considered whether a

plaintiff could recover interest pursuant to Rule 4:58 after

entering into a high-low agreement.     
398 N.J. Super. at 184.

Before trial, the plaintiff offered to settle for $650,000 and

the defendant rejected the offer.      Id. at 184.   During trial,

the parties negotiated a high-low of $175,000 to $1,000,000.

Id. at 184-85.   In negotiating the agreement, the plaintiff

waived prejudgment interest but expressly reserved the right to

pursue “legal fees and litigation costs” pursuant to Rule 4:58,

if applicable.   Id. at 185.   The panel concluded that the

agreement was ambiguous and remanded for determination of

whether prejudgment interest included both Rule 4:42-11 and Rule

4:58 interest, without comment on the other Rule 4:58 costs and

fees.   Id. at 189.

                                  C.

    We analyze the agreement at issue in this case under the

familiar rules of contract interpretation.     “It is well-settled

that '[c]ourts enforce contracts “based on the intent of the

parties, the express terms of the contract, surrounding

                                  11
circumstances and the underlying purpose of the contract.”’”        In

re County of Atlantic, 
230 N.J. 237, 254 (2017) (alteration in

original) (quoting Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill, 
217 N.J.
 99, 118 (2014)).

         A reviewing court must consider contractual
         language in the context of the circumstances
         at the time of drafting and . . . apply a
         rational meaning in keeping with the expressed
         general purpose. [I]f the contract into which
         the parties have entered is clear, then it
         must be enforced as written.         Where an
         agreement is ambiguous, courts will consider
         the parties’ practical construction of the
         contract as evidence of their intention and as
         controlling weight in determining a contract’s
         interpretation.

         [Id. at 254-55 (alterations in original)
         (citations and quotation marks omitted).]

In the absence of a factual dispute, we review the

interpretation of a contract de novo.     Id. at 255 (citing

Kieffer v. Best Buy, 
205 N.J. 213, 222-23 (2011)).

                                  V.

    In this case, the parties entered into a high-low agreement

during jury deliberations.     The agreement was not intended to

avoid litigation expenses or save time; it was entered to

mitigate the inherent risk to the parties of a jury verdict and

to limit subsequent appeals.     The plain language of the

agreement is silent on the issue of Rule 4:58 expenses.        We must

therefore look to the expressed intent of the parties and the

context of the agreement.

                                  12
    In putting the agreement on the record, both parties had a

chance to explain their position and discuss terms before the

trial judge.   The resulting agreement set a hard limit of

$1,000,000, and expressly stated no interest or medical expenses

would be added to that amount (“So if the verdict is for

$600,000.00, [Serico] gets $600,000.00, period.   Okay?”).

    Exploring the context of the agreement, Serico’s request

that Rothberg’s counsel represent on the record that the

insurance policy limit was $1,000,000 is most revealing.     With a

representative from the insurance company present, and the terms

of the agreement on the record, Serico was satisfied that there

was no secondary policy from which to recover -- $1,000,000

would be the ceiling.

    The original, qualifying offer of judgment of $750,000

expired, thus bringing into place the penalties provided for in

the rule.   However, the settlement through high-low agreement

superseded and extinguished the offer of judgment.   An offer of

judgment pursuant to Rule 4:58 is designed to encourage parties

to settle claims that ought to be settled, saving time, expense,

and averting risk, while the specter of the continued

prosecution of the lawsuit remains.   A high-low agreement, in

contrast, only mitigates the risk faced by the litigants -- it

saves no time or expense related to litigation and requires the

full panoply of judicial process, up to and including a jury

                                13
verdict.   Although the high-low agreement is a settlement, it is

not the sort of settlement contemplated by Rule 4:58; rather, it

serves a different purpose and provides distinct benefits.

    We conclude that the parties intended $1,000,000 to be the

maximum recovery, including all expenses and fees, and that they

anticipated that it would replace any prior agreements.    Serico

may not now seek Rule 4:58 expenses based on her previous offer

of judgment.   The agreement on the record reveals a meeting of

the minds on both the floor and ceiling of Serico’s recovery,

including fees and expenses.   Because the contract superseded

the qualifying offer of judgment, if Serico desired Rule 4:58

expenses, she would have been required to explicitly preserve

the right to pursue them when entering into the high-low

agreement in this case.   A crucial aspect of any high-low

agreement is finality; both parties benefit from the strict and

explicit limitation of financial exposure that such agreements

provide.

                                VI.

    We conclude that the Appellate Division and trial court

correctly denied Serico’s motion for Rule 4:58-2 expenses.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.

     CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN,
PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s
opinion.

                                14