Case Title: Williams v. Aona. ICA mem.op., filed 12/10/2008 [pdf], 119 Haw. 334. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/27/2009. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 05/06/2009 [pdf].

Citation: 121 Haw. 1

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

---000---

 

CEDRIC C. WILLIAMS, Respondent /Petitioner-Appellee

ROBERT AONA, Petitioner/Respondent-Appellant

 
      
  
 

No. 28691 2
jf 2 rc
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS 2 &
(CIVIL CASE NO, 18S07-1-353) 5 = oc
a
JUNE 19, 2009
MOON, C.J.) NAKAYANA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, Jd.» AND
CIRCUIT JUGGE CHANG, ASSIGNED BY REASON’ OF VACANCY
QPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.
Petitioner/Respondent-Appellant Robert Rona (Aona)
(application)

filed a timely Application for Writ of Certiorari
urging this court to review the December 30, 2008 judgment of the

Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) based on its Memorandum

Opinion in Williams v. Aona, No, 28691, 2008 WL 5182933 (App.

Dec. 10, 2008). The ICA’s Memorandum Opinion affirmed the

district court of the first circuit's! (district court) July 17,

2007 Order Granting Petition for Injunction Against Harassment

(injunction order).

* the Honorable Gerald #. Kibe presided.
 

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In his Application, Aona argues that the ICA gravely

 

erred in affirming the injunction order because:

(1) “The ICA incorrectly held that the district court had
jurisdiction over Williama’s Petition [for a temporary
restraining order and injunction against harasement].”

(2) “The ICA incorrectly affirmed the district court's
injunction imposing a distance restriction on Aona while in
the workplace.”

(3) “The ICA incorrectly affirmed the district court's refusal

to admit and consider evidence of Willian’

 

prior criminal
conviction.”

(4) “the ICA incorrectly affirmed the district court’s refusal
to admit and consider evidence of the (Department of
Environmental Services} workplace rules.”

We accepted the Application for the Limited purpose of
correcting an error by the ICA when it affirmed the district
court's jurisdiction on the basis of the doctrine of preemption.
We agree with the ICA’s Memorandum Opinion in all other respects.

‘BACKGROUND

 

Aona and Cedric Willians (Williams) aze both employees
of the City and County of Honolulu (city and County) Department
of Environmental Services (DES), Honolulu Yard. Aona works for
DES as a “refuse collection supervisor.” Aona’s duties include

“conducting periodic” post-checks on refuse vehicles, “like snap
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inspections.” A post-check is an examination of the refuse truck
that occurs at the end of a shift. During a post-check, the
driver is responsible for examining certain parts of the truck

including the lights, tires, rims, and frame. Conducting

 

periodic post-checks is “not a set duty.” Instead, it is rotated

among various supervisors.
Williams works for DES as a “crew leader.” A crew
leader is responsible for driving the refuse vehicle. After his
shift, Williams is responsible for conducting a post-check on his
refuse vehicle.
A, Retition for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
on July 3, 2007, Williams filed a petition for Ex Parte
‘Temporary Restraining Order and for Injunction Against Harassment
(petition) against Aona. The petition was based on “[rJecent or

past act(s) of harassment.” Williams explained that:

Saturday June 30, 2007 at approximately 11:55 A.M. Robert
Rona pained me on ay left sided chest area causing an
imediate sharp pain that required anergency medical
treatment at Straub clinic and hospital. 1 was diagnose
with a bruised chest. Assault occurred at Honolulu Refuse
Collection Yard located at 26 Migdle Street, Honolulu, HT
56815, Police Report was filed and superintendent and
refuse collection auninistrater was notified. shen T
questioned Robert Aona as to why he did this to me he
Fesponded that T am a foolish boy.” I feel that this may be
J racial term and he may dislike ne due to ny race of being
Ateican Aserican. “I have notified refuse collection
Soninistrator that Aobert Aona is causing se psychological
Serene due to the fact that he is s larger nan than amy, be
may not Like my race snd I fear he may attack me and cause
hRe much more severe bodily and psychological harm than Ae
Siready has. I feel severely threatened by Robert Aona due
to his excessive size. He causes me anxiety when I see him.

 

 

 

 
 

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B. District Court Proceedings
on July 17, 2007, a hearing was held in district court,

 

Willians’s testimony
Williams testified that on June 30, 2007, after he

the

 

brought his refuse truck back to the refuse yard, Aona w
supervisor in charge who supervised Williams's post-check of his
truck. According to Williams, Aona first helped him check the
Lights on the truck and then

T parked the truck, got out and then (Aona) stepped back
(and) ‘said Start trom wherever you want. So'l started from
the front tires, check the lugs; check che rim, going downy
Check the frame, going down. I'was dréving the Bulky truck
that day. That‘e two back tires, so there's four on one
Side, so I"m checking those tires, the rims, check the last
ize!

 

 

 

‘As I was going around the truck, he stopped me, (“start
fagsin, sow oxplain to me what you doing, {"] and then I said,
(wnaer(")” And then 1 (Jyou know what, you Juse
gotta write me up because I’m not gonna doa pest-check with
yout.)

 

Williams testified that he did not think that it was unusual that
Aona was conducting a post-check; rather “{jJust the way he
wanted me to do it, to start all over and explain to him what 1’m
doing. That’s not right.”

After Williams disobeyed Aona’s instructions, he stated
that,

X went walk to the truck to get my bag, he pushed the door
shut. So, T tried to open (it) again, then right there, he
palnéd me’on the chest snd aaid [“lyou nothing but a £00113
oy, {*] and I tole(sic) ‘em, ("Jwhat's up with that, you hit
mme and you calling me names” (”]

   

 
 

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Williams testified that after Ana palned him, he felt “a sharp
pain” in his chest and noticed “a mark” on his chest. williams
called his union steward and then called the police. Williams
completed a police report and informed the police that he wanted
to press charges against Aona, The police asked if Willians
wanted them to call an anbulance, but Williams told them that he
would go to the hospital on his own.’ Williams had his girlfriend
drop him off sat the hospital. He was diagnosed with a bruise on
his chest and prescribed pain pills.
2. Aona’s testimony

On June 30, 2007, Aona testified that he was the
supervisor on duty who supervised Williams's post-check of his
refuse vehicle. Aona stated that he was dissatisfied with
Williams's post-check because Williams had skipped several steps.
Rona eventually told Williams “you missed a whole lot. . . [slo
let's go back and start where we left off and work our way back
hore,” but Willians “totally ignored” Aona. then, Aona said, “I
think I'm gonna have to ask you to tell me what you doing because
that way, I‘11 know you're doing it.” According to Aona,

[Williams] starts saying, (%)1 doing my post-check, I doing
my pore-check(*) ‘ahd all he’s doing 48 playing with
The lug nuts on the bick th

 

Sot said, (*){Willians), you're forcing me to do
this. “I’m giving you's direct order, let's go back to the
Front, start over and do the post=check properly like you
were taught, ("] and then he stands up and ne goes ("]you
Cannot teil me what to do, ("] Teecause) Tam not hie
supervisor.
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After that, Aona testified that he

said (“lyes, (*) T can and will require you to do this. T
Malked right hero and (Wilitans) was standing there Looking
at me kind of belligerently like, "("]yea cannot. [")

 

“Jwell, 1711 just wait, you know. So, T waited,
Tdon't know, lees then a minute, you know, seconds, and Ne
hadn't moved, so.1 told him... ["Jlet’s stare here, [*)
and he still’ doesn’t move, so I said ["can we do the post
Gheck now?(*)

At this point, he rushed up to me and he was, he had a
glowering look on his face, ne had his dark shades and he’s
Puffing Rinself up and trying to be intimidating

hen he came. . , too close for my personal space, I put ay
hand on his shoulder and went ("Jetop, stop,” =. (we're
Sn'that position for five seconds, and I'm thinking £0
myself, okay, great, situation resolved, we're gonna start
the post=check:

 

hon he starts, he takes a step back and goes (*}you
wen touch me, you wen touch me, ("] and his voice 1s getting
Iouder, literally shouting and he starts hopping around in
that afea. .- (2)o, 1 backed up to the front of the truck
sped out his cell
phnd and I thought that was a good ides, 20 1 whipped out
hny coll phone and Z called the Base yard office. sss I'm
Corned away from hin and I’m shaking my head, ch, this ie a
foolish move.

 

 

He stops his dancing and cones up to me again and goes
(vIwhat you wen call ne(") screaming, but he's not really,
he stili maintain {sic} safe enough space from se, but he's
‘Screaming at me, ["Iwhat you wen call me, what you wen call
Be.("] 1 told "on, (]{Willians}, 1 didn’t cali you
Snything.("]. This is when be brings his face so close to my
ace Ym taller than him, but he's trying, you koe,
do the face, body push and he's’ pushing me, and then I told
Yen, {"]back pr {") you know, and he didn’t back up.

 

   

[njnis is when I put my hand on (his) . . . and I told ‘em,
[Tback opr") he didn’t back up.

Soy he finally backed up just a Little bit, but it was
fgnough for me that 1 disengaged and I walked far’ away, maybe
fon fect in front of the vehicle, and at this tine too, "he
haa kine’a (sic) backed up to halfway in the body of the
truck and ‘ny phone had gotten flipped off at this

 

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time, so Z called again (sic] innediately acting
supervisor(<]

After Aona called the supervisor and asked hin to cone

to the yard, Aona claims that he “turn{ed) around and receive

 

[sic] three forearm smashes into [his] sternum. . . from
[Williams's] right forearm and it stunned [him], it rocked [his]
head back.”? Aona stated that two superintendents were “in
sight” and Willians “innediately backed off." However, according
to Aona, neither superintendent witnessed Willians’s alleged
attack on Aona.

Soon after, the police arrived. Aona clains that he
voluntarily gave a statement to police detailing Williams's
alleged attack on him.

Aona also testified that, at the end of the day, he
Grove to the Kaiser urgent care clinic where he “was seen and
treated for soft tissue damage.” He stated that “I was
prescribed ice, ice regime, pain killer, and it was suggested
that I have follow-up on gentle massage and was suggested that 1
have follow-up visits and perhaps even counseling for any post-
stress that I might have suffered from being attacked.”

Aona denied “striking Willians with an open palm or

otherwise in his chest area(.]”

® non questioned by the district court, Aona testified that Willians
hit him with bis left forearm, because he still had his phone in his right
hand!

 
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The District Court's Discussion with Deputy Corporation
Counsel About Workplace Management

Also present at the hearing was Deputy Corporation
Counsel Gary Takeuchi (Takeuchi) representing the employer, the
City and County. Takeuchi stated that “we do have an agreement
of the parties that in the injunction that might issue in this
case, we would not include the place of employment, that the
parties are confident that the employer can work out
arrangements.” Takeuchi also stated that “the supervisory people
that I spoke to strongly believe that they can manage the
worksite so there won't be issues . . . whatever geographical
standard might be imposed would be difficult to maintain at the
work location.”

C. The District Court’s Order Granting Williams's Petition for
Indunction

‘The district court granted Willians’s petition and
filed the Order Granting Petition for Injunction Against
Harassment against Aona. The district court found that Williams
was more credible than Aona:

ME COURT: I have considered the evidence that has
been presented during the course of this hearing. have
considered all factual issues by the clear and convincing
Standard, and I hava made eterninations on igeves of
eredibility and, indeed, this case turns on questions of
Credibility between Mr. Williams ang Hr. Rona because there
are no other percipient witnesses to what happened Between
{the tho gentlemen on June 30, 2007, at just before noon at
the Honolulu Refuse Division Facility on Middle street

 

 

 

 

   

 

iow, I have had during the course of this long hearing
fan opportunity to watch both sides while they were making
Their statenents. “I've thus been able cbserve their
Geneanor, behavior, Listened to what they have said, how

 
 

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they have said it, facial expressions, body language, those
Kinds of thinga, and those ail contribute to ny ability te
render a determination on the issue of credibility.

 

ow, one thing I do note a2 reflected by my question
to Mr. Rota is that during the course of his testizony, he
Gis reference touching Mr- WLillans not once, but two times
in his initial testinony. How, he endeavored to correct
that in response to ay questions by indicating that it was
Guring the first tine chat there was any hint of any trouble
that Hr, Aona said that Wr. Nilliams approached Mr. Rona
that Mr: Aona put out Mis hand to aaintain sone distance
\eith Mr, Williams and thus kept his hand, right hand on Mr.
Willians’s Lee shoulder for sone time

But then, and Le was during this morning's sesaicn,
Me. Willians iidicatea that, excuse ne, Mr- Aona said that
there was a farther tine when Mr, Miliians cane. forward, got
close again to his, We. Aona ssid that he put nig hand on
Mg. Williams’ (s} shoulder just Like wae demonstrated
earlier, and tome, that's an inconsistency in terme of what
Mr. Aana Says happened. It's, it was something that I took
Rote of at that point and questioned Me. Aona about it, but
Pidon’t feel confortable in the way that Hr. Rona responded.

 

 

And further, in the way in which Mr. Aona again
proceeded with nis testimony in comparison to the very clear
Gnd firm testinony, very straightforward testinony of ME
Willians, 11 of this leads me to conclude that Mr.

Williams! (s] version of events is sore credible than that of
Be. Aone.

As a result, the court found that Williams had
established by clear and convincing evidence that Acna had
harassed him according to the definition in Hawai'i Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 604-10.5(a) (1) (1993 & Supp. 2008) and that a

temporary restraining order was warranted.’

 

> Rs § 604-10.5 grants the district court the power to enjoin and
temporarily restrain harassment. it states, in relevant part

 

“Harasonent” means

 

(2) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the thr:
imminent physical harm, bodily injury, oF assault (+)

 

of

(b) The district courts shall have power to enjoin oF
prohibit or temporarily restrain harassnent.
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The order required Aona to not intentionally be within
fifteen feet away of Williams at any time for three years. There
was no separate distance requirenent for the work site.
D.  IcA’s Memorandum Opinion

The ICA affirmed the district court’s Order Granting
Petition for Injunction Against Harassment. Williams, 2008 WL

5182933, at *10.

(c) Any person who has been subjected to harassment may
petition the district court of the disteset in which the
Petitioner resides for a tenporary restraining order and an
Tnjuncelon from further harassment.

 

 

(a) A petition for relief from harassment shali be in
writing and shall allege that a past act or acts of
harasssent may have occurred, or that threats of harasenent
ake it probable that acts of harassment may be immineney
{and shall be accompanied by an sffiaavit mage under oath or
‘Statement made under penalty of perjury stating the specific
facts snd circumstances fron whieh gellef 1s seughe.

 

 

w

(The parties naned in the petition may file or give
oral responses explaining, excusing, Justifying, or denying
the alleged act or acts of harassment. The court shall
Fecelve all evidence that io relevant at the hearing, and
nay make independent inquiry.

 

 

 

LUTE the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that harasenent as defined in paragraph (1) of that

      

definition exists, it nay enjoin for no sore than three
yes

further harassment of the petitioner, or that
janent as defined in paragraph (2) of that definition
yxists, it shall enjoin fer no more than three years further
harasshent of the petitioner) provided that thi® paragraph
Shall not prohibit! the court from issuing other injunctions
Against the naned parties even if the tine co which the
Injunction applies exceeds total of three yeare,

  

 

HRS $ 604-10.5(a) (1), (b)=(d), (4).
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TI, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. durisdiction
Whether the district court had jurisdiction over
Williams's petition “presents a question of law, reviewable de
novo.” See Hawaii Med, Ass'n v. Hawaii Med, Serv, Ass'n, Inc.,
Hawai'i 77, 90, 148 P.3d 1179, 1192 (2006).
The Issuance of a TRO
With respect to the issuance of a TRO, a relief in equity,
the relief granted by a court in equity ie discretionary” nd
wilt not be overturned on review unless the court abused its
Giscretion, . A court abuses its discretion whenever it
exceeds the bounds of reason of disregarde roles cx
Principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment,

bea party.

In re Guardianship of Carlsmith, 113 Hawai'i 211, 223, 151 2.34

 

 

 

692, 104 (2006) (internal quotation marks, citations, brackets,
and ellipses in original omitted).
TI. DISCUSSION

The central issue in this Application is whether the
district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Williams's
petition or whether Williams was first required to exhaust his
contractual renedies under the collective bargaining agreement
(CBR) between the City and County and United Public Workers
AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO. Aona correctly clains that the ICA
erred when it affirmed the district court’s jurisdiction on the
basis of the doctrine of preemption. However, we hold that the
@istrict court properly exercised jurisdiction over Williams's

petition for the reasons discussed below,

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The District Court Properly Exercised Jurisdiction over
Williams's Petition for an Ex Parte Temporary Restraining
Order and For Injunction Against Harassment,

In addition to filing the petition for a TRO, williams
filed a grievance against Aona with the City and County in the
form of a “workplace violence incident report.” At the hearing,
the district court asked Aona if he wanted to make a motion to

postpone the hearing until after any “personnel action” was

 

taken. Aona chose to proceed with the hearing.

On appeal to the ICA, Aona argued that the district
court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Williams's
petition because the conduct Williams complained of was an
employment matter. According to Aona, employment matters were
governed by the CBA and Williams had not exhausted his
adninistrative remedies under the CBA. Aona claimed that:

In his petition for a TRO and injunction, Willsans
essentisily makes the complaint nis employer, 08S, violated
ction 46.02a of the CBA, which requires DES to provide a
violence-free workplace by providing the means snd methods

to prevent the risk of violence to employees, such (as)
Witllans. Under the CBA, however, Killiams was required to

‘Ive that ‘complaint pursuant to the grievance procedure
t forth in section 15 of tne CBA.

 

 

 

 

In other words, Aona argued that Williams should have waited for
the results of the workplace investigation into the grievance he
filed against Aona before filing his petition with the district
court.

‘The ICA concluded that the district court had subject

matter jurisdiction over the hearing. The ICA stated that

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“preemption of state court jurisdiction [by a contract grievance
provision in a collective bargaining agreement] is not unlimited
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) or Hawai'i policy.”
Williams, 2008 WL 5182933, at *4. Specifically, the ICA
concluded that Williams's interest in protection from “outrageous
conduct, threats, intimidation, and words” was “not diminished or
preempted because it is related to matters contained in a CBA
grievance process.” Id, The ICA further concluded that “Acna
failed to demonstrate that a written remedy was available under
the CBA grievance procedure that could protect Williams from
future harassment, Because Aona did not demonstrate that the CBA

provides a reasonable alternative to an injunction order, the

 

presumed goal of such a policy is not applicable.” Id. (footnote
omitted).

In his Application, Aona argues that the ICA erred when
Ae concluded that the district court had jurisdiction over
Williams's petition because “the ICA erroneously confused the
doctrines of preemption and exhaustion, failed to conduct any
analysis of the exhaustion issue, and erroneously concluded that
the CBA provides no remedy to Williams.”

Although Aona is correct in his assertion that the ICA
exred in its reliance on the doctrine of preemption, the district
court had jurisdiction over Williams’s petition based upon the

following analysis.

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Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Aona failed to raise the exhaustion of remedies issue
in the district court. “As 2 general rule, if a party does not
raise an argument at trial, that argument will be deemed to have
been waived on appeal; this rule applies in both criminal and
civil cases.” State v, Moses, 102 Hawai'i 449, 456, 77 P.3d 940,
947 (2003).

However, Aona argues that Williams’s failure to exhaust
his administrative remedies deprived the district court of
subject-matter jurisdiction. As we have stated,

[At is wolt-established . . . that Lack of aubject matter
Jurisdiction can never be waived by any party at any tin

in re Application of Rice, €@ fw, 324, 913 F.2d 426 (1996).
Th setting forth the absolute necessity that a court possess
subject matter jurisdiction, this court rule

 

“the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
cannot be waived by the parties." If the parties do
not raise the issue, "a court iy for
unless jurisdiction’ of the court over the subject
batter exists, any Judgnent rendered 13 invalid,”
(Citing Mever'vs Texritary, 36 Naw. 75, 78 (1942))

Idk 68 Haw. at 335, 713 P.2d at 427. Moreover, “[sluch a

Guestion is in order at any stage of the case, and though a

Yower court 1s found to have lacked Juriadiction, we have

Jurisdiction here on appeal, not of the merits, bur for the

Purpose of correcting an erfor in Jurtadietion.” Zak,

Chun v, Emplovees’ Ret. Sys., 73 Haw. 9, 13, 828 P.2d 260, 263

(2992); see also, e.g., 488 Am Jur 2d Labor and Labor Relations
§ 2428 (2005) ("A claim that the defendants should have raised

 

 

 

plaintiffs’ alleged failure to exhaust contractual remedies in
their answer and waived it by failing to do so was rejected,

since the failure to exhaust goes to the court's subject-matter

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jurisdiction and can be raised at any time by any party or by the
court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (3).") (citation omitted).
Thus, if the district court did not have jurisdiction over
Williams's petition, then its order mst be vacated despite
Aona’s previous failure to raise the issue. See Lingle v, Hawaii
Gov't Employees Ass’n, AFSCME, Local 152, AFL-CIO, 107 Hawai'i
178, 182, 111 P.3d 587, 591 (2005) ("A judgment rendered by a
circuit court without subject matter jurisdiction is void.”
(citation omitted) ).

a. exhaustion of renedies in general

Aona argues that the district court did not have
jurisdiction over Willian’s petition because he did not exhaust
his remedies under the CBA, Exhaustion of renedies is defined as
“(Ihe doctrine that, if an administrative renedy is provided by
statute, a claimant must seek relief first from the
administrative body before judicial relief is available.”
Black's Law Dictionary 613 (8th ed. 2004). In general, the
doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is a policy of judicial
economy. See generally 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 474
(The exhaustion rule serves a legitimate state interest in
requiring parties to exhaust administrative remedies before
proceeding to court, thereby preventing an overworked court from

considering issues and remedies that were available through

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administrative channels.”). As such, the doctrine of exhaustion
of remedies temporarily divests a court of jurisdiction.

>. exhaustion of remedies under a CBA

Aona is correct that when parties are bound by the
terms of a CBA, we have repeatedly identified a policy interest

in requiring employees to exhaust their contractual remedies

 

before bringing judicial claims against an employer:
It is well-settled that an employee must exhaust any
grievance or arbitration procedures provided under 2
Collective bargaining agreement before bringing a court
action puksuanE to the aurecnent. strong policy
Considerations support this rule. The exhaustion
Fequirenent, first, preserves the integrity and autonomy of
the collective bargaining process, allowing the parties to
develop their own uniform mechanism of dispute resolution,
Te sis pronotes judicial efficiency by encouraging the
orderly and less time-consuming settlement of disputes
through alternative means.

Hokama v, University of Hawai‘, 92 Hawai‘ 268, 272, 990 P.2d
2150, 1154 (2999) (footnote omitted) (internal citations omitted)

 

 

  

(emphasis added). Indeed, “where the terms of public employment
are covered by 2 collective bargaining agreement pursuant to HRS
Chapter 89 and the agreement includes a grievance procedure to
dispose of employee grievances against the public employer, an
aggrieved employee is bound by the terms of the agreement.”
Winslow v. State, 2 Haw. App. 50, 55, 625 P.2d 1046, 1050 (2981).
Applying the exhaustion doctrine to the terns of a CBA “is in
keeping with prevailing National Labor Relations policy and
Hawaii policy favoring arbitration as a dispute settlement

mechanism.” Santos v, State, Dept, of Transp., Kauai Div., 64

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Haw. 648, 655, 646 P.24 962, 967 (1982) (per curium). However,
“[glrievance procedure is not to be resorted to with respect to
matters not included within its scope in the collective
bargaining agreement.” SIA C.J.S. Grievances § 340 (2003)
(citations omitted).

2. The ICA Erroneously Analyzed the Issue of the District
Court’s Jurisdiction Because the Doctrine of Preemption
Is Inapplicable.

The ICA concluded that the district court had
jurisdiction over Willians’s petition based on the doctrine of
Preemption. Williams, 2008 WL 5182933, at ¥3-4.

‘The ICA first discussed our decision in Santos
requiring an exhaustion of contractual remedies under a CBA.
However, the ICA then stated that

of state court jurisdiction is not unlinites
‘nder the National Labor Relations Act (NL#A) or Hawas't
policy, In Radclit{e v, Rainbow Constr, Co, 254 Fuad 772
(Sth Cir, 2001), the Unites state(s) Court of Appesi(s) tor
the Winth Circuit held that certain actions under the KURA
wore not prsemsted fron state court Jurisdiction. these
actions included “torts of threatened violence,
traditionally held not to be prasmuted, or intentional
infliction of enctional distress, and defamation, both of
which the Supreme Court has held to be exceptes tron
Garnon’s'® precenption rule aven though they involve. conduct
arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA.” Ragcli¢te,
25t F.3d St 785. (cieateons omiteed!))

    

 

 

Id. at +4.

 

“The ICA explained that “Gammon” refers to ae
Souncil v. Garmon, 359 0.5. 236, 79°8-Ce. 133 (1989) {Gaenen preemption rule
Fefers to Preemption of state law by the MURA). Radcliffe, 25¢ Fed at 780'n.
6." williams, 2008 WL 5162933, at “neds

 

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‘The ICA then cited our decision in Briggs v, Hotel
Corp. of Pac., 73 Haw. 276, 831 P.2d 1335 (1992) for the
proposition that “‘outrageous conduct, threats, intimidation, and
words’ which cause the plaintiff to suffer ‘grievous mental and
emotional distress as well as great physical damage’ may also
fall within an exception to the federal interest in the national
labor policy and therefore permit state law recovery.” Hilliams,
2008 WL 5182933, at *4 (quoting Bricas, 73 Haw. at 284, 831 P.2d
at 1341). Finally, the ICA stated that “[t]he State has a
substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the kind of
abuse of which Williams complained. That interest is not
diminished or preempted because it is related to matters
contained in a CBA grievance process.” Id, (emphasis added).
Preemption is commonly defined as “[t]he principle,
(derived from the Supremacy Clause [of the United States
Constitution}) that a federal law can supersede or supplant any
inconsistent state law or regulation.” Black's at 1217; see also
id. at 303 (defining the term “conplete-preemption doctrine” as
“[t]he rule that a federal statute’s force may be so
extraordinary and all encompassing that it converts an ordinary
state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for
Purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule”). In contrast to
the doctrine of exhaustion’s temporary divestment of
jurisdiction, when a federal statute preempts a state law claim,

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preemption fully divests the state-law court of all subject-
matter jurisdiction over a particular issue, As we have stated
in the context of employment law:

ven it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the
activities which 2 State purports to regulate are protected
By $7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute. an
unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal
enactnent requires that state jurisdiction must yield, To
leave the States free to regulate conduct 20 plainly within
the central aim of federal regulation involves too great &
Ganger of confilet between power asserted ay Congress and
Fequirenents imposed by state law.”

Briggs, 73 Haw. at 283, 831 P.2d at 1340 (quoting San Diego Bldg.

 

 

Trades Council v. Gammon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)). Thus, the
preemption doctrine is triggered when a court is presented with
conflicting state and federal statutes.

Here, the district court was not presented with
conflicting state and federal statutes because the NLRA does not
apply to the City and County. The NLRA only applies to

“employers,” as defined by the NURA. See generally 29 U.S.C.

* conflicting state statutes can also trigger the preanption
doctrine, Indeed, HRS chapter 69 preempts conflicting state statutes:

   

‘This chapter shall take precedence over all conflicting
statutes concerning this subject matter and shall preempt
all contrary local ordinances, executive orders,
Tegisiation, or rules adopted by the State, a county, of any
department or agency thereat, inclusing the departments of
hnuman resources development Or of personnel services oF the
Civil service commisason:

 

RS § 89-19 (2993 ¢ Supp. 2008). However, HRS $ 89-19 does not apply here
because Acra challenges the CBA and not the provisions of ARS chapter 83. Sea
Mawal's Org. of Police Officers v.-Gos'y of rot, Journalists Univ, of tua
Chapter, £3 await 376, 403, 927 P.24 906, 412 (1996) ("By its own langues
MRS" § 89-19 accords preenptive effect to the provisions of HRS chapter £9 and
not to the agreements entered into between parties pursuant to the authority,
Procedures, and rules established in ARS chapter #9.” (emphasis added) )~

   

 

 

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$ 182(1) (2000). Under the NLRA, the term “employer” “shall not
include . . . any State or political subdivision thereof{.)” 29
U.S.C. § 152(2) (2000) (emphasis added). Aona and Williams's
employer is the City and County of Honolulu, @ political
subdivision of the state of Hawai'i. See Haw. Const. art. VIII,
$1, Therefore, the NLRA does not apply and the ICA’s discussion
of preemption was irrelevant.

In sum, Aona is correct that the doctrine of preemption
is inapplicable to the facts of this case. As a result, we hold
that the ICA’s application of preemption principles to conclude
that Williams was not required to exhaust his contractual
remedies was erroneous.

3. Despite the ICA's Error, It Correctly Concluded That
the District Court Properly Exercised Jurisdiction Over
Williams’s Petition.

Although the ICA used an erroneous framework to
determine that the district court had jurisdiction over
Williams’s petition, the ICA correctly concluded that the

district court had jurisdiction becai

 

(1) Williams's petition
involves conduct outside the scope of the CBA? (2) even if CBA
remedies did apply, tort claims are excepted from the general
rule that employees must exhaust their remedies under the CBA
before seeking judicial relief; (3) the CBA did not provide

Williams with an adequate remedy; and (4) public policy does not

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support limiting injunctions against harassment for employees
subject to CBAs.

a. exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine

The doctrine of exhaustion is not absolute.

“[B]xceptions to this doctrine exist, such as when pursuing the

contractual renedy would be futile.” Poe v. Hawaii Labor
Relations ad., 97 Hawai'i 528, 536, 40 P.34 930, 938 (2002)

Likewise, “[a]n aggrieved party rieed not exhaust administrative
remedies where no effective renedies exist.” Hokana, 92 Hawai‘t
at 273, 990 P.2d at 1185. Furthermore, “[a]s a general
proposition . . . the contractual grievance procedure does not
apply to tort actions.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Finally, policy interests underlying the exhaustion doctrine may
be outweighed by other interests. See Vaughn v, Pac, tw, Bel]
Tals Cou, 611 P.2d 281, 290 (Or. 1980) (“We conclude that a
worker claiming any type of unlawful employment. discrimination
. . is entitled to bring suit for injunctive relief pursuant to
that statute, notwithstanding the availability of a remedy under
the collective bargaining agreement. We reject defendant’ s
argument that workers who have a remedy under a collective
bargaining agreement are limited to that exclusive remedy. We
hold that the state policy favoring exclusivity of collective
bargaining agreement remedies does not foreclose the plaintiff's

right to seek injunctive relief in this case.”

 

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as sired

Liams sou was oursi of

he CBA.

In Hokama, we stated that “(flor purposes of the
exhaustion requirement, we must determine whether [the
employee's] claims arise from the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement.” Hokama, 92 Hawai'i at 273, 990 P.2d at
1155. In order to determine whether Williama’s clain arose from
the terms of the CBA, we must look to the relevant CBA

provisions.* According to section 15.02 of the CBA, “[t]he term

 

‘The CBA was not submitted into evidence at the district court.

Pursuant to HRS § 64

  

elvery appeal shail be taken on the record, and no new
evidence shall be introduced in the supreme court. Ihe
Sppeliate court may correct any error appearing oh the
Fecord, but need not consider « point that was not presented
in the crisi court in an appropriate manner. No jusgnest,
order, or decree shall be Feversed, amended, oF modified for
any error or defect, unless the court is of the opinion thee
it’nas injuriously Sffected the substantial rights of the
appellant

 

 

 

ARS § 641-2 (1993 6 2008 Supp.). Thus, as a generat rule, we would not
consider the ters of the CEA.

However, Rona states that “Aona attached as Appendix B to his
opening brief a copy of the relevant portions of the written CBA and requested
the ICA to take judicial notice of chat document.” It ia not clear if the Ic
took judicial notice of the CBA, but for the following reasons, we take
Judicial notice of the attached portions of the CBA.

Hawai'i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 201 (1993), provides that
judicial notice may be taken of facts “capable of accurate ‘and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned” and that [a] court may take Judicial notice, whether fequested or
not," HE Rule 201(c) “at any stage of the proceeding,” HRE Rule 201(f1-
Indeed, “(tihe trial court may take judicial notice of « fact if it ss. conmon
knowledge or easily verifisble.” State v. lord, 63 Haw. 270, 272, 625 P.2a
1038, 1039 (1981) (citation omitted); Additionally,

 

an appellate court is not precluded from exercising its
iseretion to take judicial notice of certain facts where

22
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grievance shall mean a complaint filed by a bargaining unit
Employee, or by the Union, alleging a violation,
misinterpretation, or misapplication of a specific section of
this Agreement occurring after its effective date.” Section
15.01 of the CBA requires that “{a] grievance that arises out of
alleged Employer violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication
of this Agreement, its attachment, and appendices shall be
resolved as provided in Section 15.” Section 15 of the CBA
the trial court elected not to do so, See Application of
53. Haw. 496, 497 P.24 $49 {1970)- As we se
of the Judicial notice rule, and it would
‘wholescne one, is to eliminate the necessity
time of the court and Jury to make formal

proof of @ fact which cannot be dispated. van Selcen
Rangey'2, Inc, 199 Kan, 417, 420 Pc2d 298 (1987)

 

  

State vs Mave, 1 Haw. App. 644, 646, 623 P.2d #98, 299 (1981) (per curiam).

Rona argues that it is appropriate for che ICA and this court to
take judicial notice of the CBA because the CEA ia a “natter of public
record." See HRS § 82-3 (1593). (""Goverasent record’ ‘means information
maintained by an agency in written, auaitory, visual, electronic, or other
Physical form."); MRS § 9ZF-i1(a) 1993) ("Ail government records are open to
public inspection unless access ie restricted or closed by taw."l«, Jo
Kaho'chanohane v, State, 214 Hawai'i 302, 328, 162°P.3d 696, 722 (2007), we
took Judicial notice of “[Employees’ Retirement System of the State of” Baw
(ERS)] reports for the fiscal years 2002, 2003, 2604, and 2005" becaus
were “a matter of public record, and appropriate for judicial notice,
their significance bears directly on the instant matter.”

528, 162 P.3d at 722. We also noted that “[t]his case ia a proper case’ for
judicial notice of subsequent events inasmuch as the iasue of standing 1s coly
Falsed on appeal, and the parties were unable to develop the record regarding
the ERS” standing.” ig. at 329'n.13, 162 2.34 at 723 m.19

    

 

   

 

  

We have the discretion to take judicial netice of the CEA because
it 1s a matter of public record and easily verifiable, Also like the
Standing issue in Kabo'chanchano, the issue of exhaustion was raised for the
first tine on appeal and the Tecord below was sot adequately developed.
Therefore, we take judicial notice of the CBA provisions appended to Aona’s|
opening brief.

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outlines the steps that must be taken to file a grievance.
Section 46.02a of the CBA provides that:

‘The Employer shall conply with all applicable Federal,
State, or Local safety Lave, rules and regulations. (6.C.
Chapter 12-208, Havall Administrative Rules, pertaining ¢o
protective clothing, shoes and accessories), inclucing the
Hawaii Workers Compensation Law. Tha Employer shail provide
a workplace free from violence by providing safety and
health training that includes cecogsition ef conditions and
Denavior that say lead to or increase the risk of violence
and the means and the methods to prevent or reduce thar risk
fo -Employees and supervisors during work hours

    

 

 

 

 

Upon review of the facts alleged and issues raised in
Williams's petition, it is clear that they do not arise from the
terms of the CBA. See Blair v, ing, 96 Hawai'i 327, 332, 31 P.3d
1e4, 189 (2001) (in order to determine if an action vas in tort
or in the nature of assumpsit “this court has locked to the
essential character of the underlying action in the trial court.

+ + The character of the action should be determined from the
facts and issues raised in the complaint, the nature of the
entire grievance, and the relief sought.” (internal citations
omitted)). Williams’s petition states that:

Robert Acna is causing me psychological stress due to the
fact that he is a larger man than i am, he say not like ay
‘ace and I fear he say attack ne and couse ne much nore

re bodily and psychological haze than he already has. 1
severely threatened by Robert Aona due to his excessive
size. He causes me anxiety when I see him.

   

 

 

 

Williams’s petition does not constitute a CBA grievance because
it does not “alleg[e] 2 violation, misinterpretation, or

misapplication of a specific section of [the CBA) occurring after

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its effective date.” Instead, it is clear that Willians is
seeking @ TRO and injunction as an individual against Aona solely
sn his individval capacity; the fact that Willians and Aona are
also employee and supervisor 1s not relevant to the relief
sought, In sum, Williams's petition is beyond the scope of the
can.

eM e nis

Sitdiass Soapiained of naean intentional tore

Additionally, even if the CBA applied, because the
conduct Millians sought to enjoin was an intentional tort, he was
not required to exhaust Ais remedies under the CBA. See Hokama,
92 Hawai'i at 273, 990 P.2d at 1155. In his petition, willians
alleged that Aona “palmed [him] on [his] left sided chest area
causing an innediate sharp pain that required energency medical
teeatnent [.]” There ss no indication that Williams assented to
this bodily contact. Therefore, Aona’s conduct clearly fits the
common law intentional tort of battery, as “a defendant causes
battery when he or she ‘intentionally causes bodily contact to
the plaintif£ in a way not justified by the plaintiff's apparent
wishes or by a privilege, and the contact sa in fact hamful or
against the plaintiff's will.’* Doe Parente No, iv, state,
Dept. of Educ, 100 Hawai'i 34, 68, 58 8.34 545, 599 (2002)
(acoba, J., dissenting) (quoting Dobbs, The Lay of Tarts, § 28 at
52-53 (2000) (citations omitted) ).

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Additionally, Williams claims that Aona 1s causing hin
“psychological stress." The infliction of emotional distress is
also a cognizable tort claim recognized by this court. See, e.9,
Kaho'chanchano v. State, 117 Hawai'i 262, 306, 178 P.3d 538, 582
(2008) (explaining that “a plaintiff may recover for [the
negligent infliction of emotional distress], absent any physical
manifestation of his or her psychological injury or actual
physical presence within 2 zone of danger, where a reasonable
person, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope
with the mental stress engendered by the circunstances of the
case”) (citation omitted)); Hac v. Univ. of Hawai'i, 102 Hawai'i
92, 106, 73 P.3d 46, 60 (2003) (“Intentional infliction of

emotional distress is an injury recognized by the Restatement as

 

independently giving rise to liability.”). Therefore, the
conduct complained of in Williams’s petition constitutes an
exception to the general rule that Williams was required to
exhaust his contractual remedies before seeking judicial relief.
The cases Acna relies upon do not change the analysis.
Aona incorrectly implies that in Santos we held that the
employee-plaintiff was required to exhaust his administrative
renedies before seeking a judicial renedy for tort claims related
to the intentional infliction of emotional distress, However, we
did not hold that the employee was required to exhaust
contractual remedies under the CBA before seeking a judicial

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remedy for tort claims. Instead, we held that a previous circuit
court judgment that the employee “could not bring an action
against the State (his employer] without first having exhausted
his contractual remedies became final when (the employee] did not
appeal the same and the time provided for such appeal expired.
Thus, [the employee] is barred from relitigating that issue.”
Santos, 64 Haw. at 656, 646 P.2d at 967. As such, Santos does
not conflict with a holding that the exhaustion of contractual
remedies does not apply to tort claims.

Aona also clains that the ICA’s decision in Winslow is
controlling. In Winslow, an employee was denied paid
administrative leave. Subsequently

[the employes] filed a grievance . . . in accordance with
the grievance procedures set out [4h the CBA) alleging that
the failure to grant her request for paid acminiserative
eave and transfer violates the terna of the collective
bargaining agreement, specifically, Sections 11
(Disciptine) 12) (Layotf), 49 (sanirary Conditions), 50
(Staffing and Workload), nd 46. (Working Condition:
Safety)’ in ner grievance, appellant slso sage allegations
of sex discrimination and inopecified Occupational Satety
and'Health Act (OSHA) ‘lolations

 

  

 

Winslow, 2 Haw. App. at 53, 625 P.2d at 1049-50. Before
completing the grievance process “appellant filed suit in circuit
court against the state and the Union alleging essentially the
same claims that were initially raised in the grievance.” Id. at
53-84, 625 P.2d at 1050. The complaint included “allegations of
negligence” and “infliction of emotional distress.” Id, at 54

n.3, 625 P.2d at 1050 n.3. The ICA held that “where the terms of

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public employment are covered by a collective bargaining
agreement pursuant to HRS Chapter 89 and the agreement includes a
grievance procedure to dispose of employee grievances against the
public employer, an aggrieved employee is bound by the terms of
the agreement.” Id. at 55, 625 P.2d at 1050.

Although Winslow required the employee to exhaust her
contractual remedies for claims that included claims in tort, the
facts and circumstances in Winslow are distinguishable from those
in the instant Application. It is true that the employee in
Winslow included the tort claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress in her complaint; however, the tort claim
arose out of her primary claim that she was denied paid
administrative leave in violation of the terms of the CBA. Here,
Williams’s tort claims of battery and “psychological stress” form
the bases for his entire petition. Unlike the employee in
Winslow, Williams does not allege any violation of the CBA. Nor
does he name the City and County as a party to his petition.

Additionally, to read the ICA’s decision in Winslow
broadly as: requiring the exhaustion of contractual claims for all
tort claims would be inconsistent with our later decision in
Hokama, where we stated that “(aJs a general proposition, we
agree that the contractual grievance procedure does not apply to

tort actions.” Hokama, 92 Hawai'i at 273, 999 P.2d at 872

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(anteinal citations omitted). As such, the district court's
exercise of jurisdiction was not inconsistent with Minslov.

4. Williams was not remixed to exhaust his

The TCA concluded that “ona failed to desonstrate that
a written remedy was available under the CBA grievance procedure
that could protect Willians fron future harassment, Because Aona
did not denonstrate that the CBA provides a reasonable
alternative to an injunction ofder, the presumed goal of such a
policy 4s not applicable.” Williams, 2008 WL 5182933, at +4
(footnote omitted) .

Rona argues that the TCA erred because (1) the CBA
denonstrates the City and County's concern over workplace
violence and contractual abligation “te provide a workplace free
from violence by providing . . . the method and means to prevent
or reduce the risk £0 Employees and supervisors," and (2)
testimony before the district court from Deputy Corporation
counsel for the City and County expressed the city and County's
position that “DES wished to manage the worksite itself, without
court interference, and that DES can manage the situation in
various ways, such (#ic] arranging no direct dealings between
wsiaiaae and ona, reassignnents, or having a third party present
during those tines that Williams and Acna might have to be
kogether.”

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‘*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

The ICA correctly concluded that the CBA did not
provide an effective remedy for Williems. See Hokama, 92 Hawai'i
at 273; Fruit and ve Wazehousens 260 v.
Morley, 378 F.2d 738, 745 (9th Cir. 1967) (stating that “the
exhaustion of intraunion remedies doctrine cannot apply unless
there is available from the union a remedy which is neither
uncertain nor futile. Inherent in this proposition is the idea
that to invoke the exhaustion principle the union must show that
there was a procedure available to the menbers within the union
structure reasonably calculated to redress the particular
grievance complained of.”).

‘The CBA provision Aona claims is controlling is titled
workplace safety. Willians’s petition was not limited to the
workplace. Instead, Williams sought a TRO and injunction to
enjoin Ana from “contacting, threatening, or physically
harassing” Williams or anyone residing at his residence; calling
Williams on the phone; and “entering or visiting” Willians’s
“residence, including yard and garage” and “place of employnent.”
In other words, Williams asked the district court to regulate
conduct not only in the workplace but beyond the workplace ~~

places where the CBA hi

 

no effect. Therefor

 

as the relief
Williams sought was not limited to the workplace, the CBA could

not provide an adequate remedy,

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Additionally, the CBA did not present specific steps
that would be taken in the event of a physical altercation
between an employee and a supervisor. The CBA’s broad mandate to
provide unspecified “means to prevent or reduce the risk (of
violence] to Employees and supervisors” is not specific enough to
provide an adequate alternative to the specific tezms of a TRO
and injunction against harassment.

Furthermore, Aona’s argument that the ICA should have
considered the testimony of the Deputy Corporation Counsel
regarding the steps that the City and County would take to manage
the work site is also unavailing, The CBA is a contract between
the City and County and United Public Workers AFSCME, Local 646,
AFL-CIO. When interpreting a contract, it is well-settled that

courts should not draw inferences from a contract zeqarding
the parties’ intent when the contract se definite and
Unambiguous. in fact, contractual cerss should be
interpreted according to their plain, ordinary meaning and
accepted uge in common speech. The court should look no
farther than the four corners of the docunent to determine
whether an ambiguity exists

United Pub, Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO v. Dawson Int'l,
Incs, 113 Hawai'i 127, 140, 149 P.3d 495, 508 (2006) (quoting
State Farm Fire 4 Cas. Co. v, Pac, Rent-All, Inc., 90 Hawai'i
315, 324, 978 P.2d 753, 762 (1999) (citations omitted)). As

 

such, the ICA was not required to consider the Deputy Corporation
Counsel's testimony regarding interpretation of the CBA

contractual terns.

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e. public policy

We agree with the ICA’s conclusion that “(t]he state
has a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the
kind of abuse of which Williams complained.” Williams, 2008 WL
51862933, at *4. The broad availability of a TRO and injunction
serves the public interest by preventing physical and
psychological violence.

Allowing an injunction against harassment in cases like
this does not conflict with the policy favoring the exhaustion of
contractual remedies. Williams did not attempt to circunvent the
contractual grievance process. Instead, he filed his petition in
conjunction with a grievance. According to Williams, he only
wanted the injunction to last until the workplace violence
investigation was concluded. A TRO and injunction provide timely
intervention and hopefully prevent future harassment. As
Williams explained in his answering brief -- filed more than nine
months after the district court hearing -- “I did file a
grievance. To date there has not been a response. This was an
assault that needed an immediate response. It takes a long time
for [sic] any action is taken on a grievance.” Depriving
employees of the opportunity to seek a TRO and injunction against

harassment merely because they we:

 

parties to a CBA would

 

leprive employees of an immediate remedy against violence.

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Iv. concwsron
Accordingly, while the ICA erred when it affizmed the
district court's jurisdiction on the basis of the doctrine of
preemption, we hold that the district court had jurisdiction on
the alternative bases discussed in detail in this opinion.
Consequently, in accordance with Rule 36(d) (2) of the Hawai'i
Rules of Appellate Procedure, we (1) vacate the judgment entered
by the ICA on Decenber 30, 2008; (2) vacate the part of the ICA's
Memorandum Opinion concerning preemption; and (3) affirm the
district court's July 17, 2007 Order Granting Petition for

Injunction Against Harassment.

Frederick W. Rohlfing
and Michael G. Kozak
(of Case Lombardi s Pettit)

for petitioner/respondent=
appellant Cacti LI

Cedric C. Williams
respondent/petitioner- DP >

appellee, pro se
Conca €, Duly by +

Co tb ny

3