Case Title: Nathan Smith and Dale D. Smith v. H. Buford Cowart; Debbie Cowart d/b/a DBM Enterprises; and Herman Cowart

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1090048

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2011-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 02/25/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
____________________
1090048
____________________
Nathan Smith and Dale D. Smith
v.
H. Buford Cowart; Debbie Cowart d/b/a DBM Enterprises; and
Herman Cowart
Appeal from Macon Circuit Court
(CV-99-107)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Nathan Smith and Dale D. Smith appeal from a judgment
entered by the Macon Circuit Court in their action against
H. Buford Cowart, Debbie Cowart d/b/a DBM Enterprises, and
1090048
2
Herman Cowart (collectively "the Cowarts").  We affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
In 1994, the Smiths and Buford Cowart formed Heartland
Products, 
Inc. 
("Heartland"); 
Heartland 
engaged 
in 
a
landscaping business based in Macon County.  The Smiths owned
49 percent of the corporation; Buford Cowart owned 51 percent
of the corporation.  The Smiths alleged that Heartland owned
13.7 acres of real property and various pieces of equipment --
including two forklifts, a loader, a bark screener, and a tub
grinder ("the equipment") -- used in the operation of its
business.  The Cowarts counter that they, not Heartland, owned
most of the equipment.
The Smiths claim that they were passive investors in
Heartland and that Buford Cowart ran the day-to-day operations
of the business.  The parties agree that Heartland obtained
business loans from SouthTrust Bank in exchange for which
SouthTrust obtained a security interest in property owned by
Heartland.  The parties disagree as to whether the property in
which SouthTrust obtained a security interest included the
equipment.  The Smiths claim that they were the guarantors on
1090048
A copy of the SouthTrust assignment to the Smiths states
1
that the assignment concerns a security interest in "those
certain 
equipment, 
furniture, 
fixtures, 
accessories, 
parts 
and
inventory of Heartland Products, Inc., more specifically
described [in] attached Exhibit 'A.'"  "Exhibit A" contains a
description of the real property.  
3
the loans, while the Cowarts claim that Buford Cowart also was
a guarantor on the loans.  
The Smiths claim that Buford Cowart caused Heartland to
default on its business loans with SouthTrust, which forced
the Smiths to make payments on those loans.  The Smiths
eventually paid off the loans, and SouthTrust assigned its
rights and interests in Heartland's property resulting from
the loans to the Smiths.  The Smiths claim that the assignment
by SouthTrust gave them ownership rights in the equipment; the
Cowarts dispute this claim.  The Cowarts assert that the loans
had no connection to the equipment because, according to them,
Heartland did not own the equipment.1
On May 6, 1999, the Smiths filed a complaint in the Macon
Circuit Court against the Cowarts.  The gravamen of the
complaint was that Buford Cowart had depleted the resources of
Heartland without the Smiths' knowledge for the benefit of
businesses owned by Buford Cowart's wife Debbie Cowart and by
Buford Cowart's father Herman Cowart.  The complaint included
1090048
At some point in the course of the litigation USF&G was
2
acquired by Travelers Bond & Financial Products, which became
the successor in interest on the bond.  For the sake of
simplicity, we refer to the surety as USF&G throughout this
opinion.  
4
claims 
of 
breach 
of 
fiduciary 
duty, 
conversion, 
and
dissolution of the corporation.  Pertinent to this appeal, the
Smiths alleged that Buford Cowart fraudulently transferred
some of the equipment to his wife, to be used in DBM
Enterprises, a competing landscaping business operated by his
wife, and that he diverted some of the equipment to his
father, to be used in Heartland Trucking, a business operated
by his father.  
On June 21, 1999, the Smiths filed a motion for a writ of
seizure of the equipment pursuant to Rule 64, Ala. R. Civ. P.,
as well as for a preliminary injunction to prevent the Cowarts
from using the equipment.  Nathan Smith filed an affidavit
with the motion in which he listed the items of equipment at
issue and stated that it was his "belief" that Heartland owned
the equipment.  Smith also averred that the equipment had a
value of $113,800.  The Smiths filed a $250,000 bond with the
motion; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company ("USF&G")
was named in the bond as a surety.  
2
1090048
Rule 64(b)(2)(B), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
3
"If the court upon preliminary examination finds
that the risk of concealment, transfer or other
disposition of or damage to the property by
permitting it to remain in the possession of the
defendant between the filing of the action and the
time of a hearing is real, then the court shall
forthwith enter an order authorizing the issuance of
a writ of seizure but the court shall provide in
said order that the defendant is entitled, as a
matter of right, to a pre-judgment hearing on the
issue of dissolution of the writ if a written
request for hearing is served on counsel for the
plaintiff within five (5) days from the date of
seizure of the property by the sheriff or other duly
constituted officer.  If such a request is made, the
writ shall expire upon the fifteenth day from said
date of seizure unless the court, after hearing,
continues the order in effect.  The expiration of
5
On June 24, 1999, the trial court issued a writ of
seizure in which it ordered the sheriff of Lee County to
attach all the equipment found at a particular address in
Opelika.  The order also required the Cowarts to return to
Heartland all the equipment that was not seized by the
sheriff.  Consistent with Rule 64(b)(2)(B), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
the order stated that the Cowarts were entitled to a
prejudgment hearing on the issue of dissolution of the writ of
seizure if a written request for such a hearing was served on
the Smiths' counsel within five days of the attachment of the
property.   The record does not reflect, and the Cowarts do
3
1090048
the writ shall not prejudice the right of the
plaintiff to a reinstatement thereof but any such
reinstatement shall not be made without notice and
hearing.  If no request for a hearing is made within
the five- (5-) day period, the writ shall remain in
effect pending further order of the court but, the
court, in its discretion, may hear a request for
dissolution of the writ although said request is
served more than five (5) days from the date of
seizure."
6
not contend, that the Cowarts made a written request for
dissolution of the writ of seizure.  
The Smiths state that they received only one item of
equipment, a forklift, as a result of the writ of seizure.
The Cowarts do not dispute this assertion, though they contend
that because of the injunction they could not and did not use
any of the equipment until the writ of seizure eventually was
dissolved.  
On August 13, 1999, Herman Cowart answered the Smiths'
complaint.  He also stated a counterclaim of conversion
against the Smiths, alleging that they had deprived him of one
flashlight, one tarp, and several thousand "yards" of mulch.
On December 17, 1999, Buford Cowart and Debbie Cowart jointly
answered the Smiths' complaint.  They also filed counterclaims
against the Smiths.  Debbie Cowart alleged that she had loaned
Heartland $17,000, for which she had not been repaid.  Buford
1090048
7
Cowart alleged that the Smiths had promised to assist him in
running Heartland but that the Smiths repeatedly refused to
provide the help they had promised.  He also alleged that he
had performed work for Heartland between 1994 and 1998 for
which he had not been paid, labor he valued at $97,000.
The record reflects that, in April 2000, the Smiths
propounded to the Cowarts interrogatories and requests for the
production of documents.  When the Cowarts apparently did not
reply to those discovery requests, the Smiths filed a motion
to compel discovery.  The record does not reflect that the
trial court ruled upon the Smiths' motion.  In their brief,
the Cowarts' counsel states that "the Cowarts provided the
Smiths with all company documents in their possession, which
numbered in the thousands."
For their part, the Cowarts contend in their brief to
this Court that, between May 2001 and December 2003, their
counsel sent notices scheduling the depositions of the Smiths
on four different occasions but that the Smiths failed to
appear on each such occasion.  The Smiths do not directly deny
this assertion; instead, they observe that the record does not
contain any notices of deposition.  
1090048
8
On January 4, 2001, the Smiths filed a motion to set the
case for trial, and the trial court entered an order
scheduling the trial for February 22, 2001.  The parties
subsequently filed a joint motion to continue, which the trial
court granted.  On April 4, 2002, the Smiths' counsel informed
the trial court that his address had changed.  On November 12,
2002, the Cowarts filed a motion to set the case for trial;
the trial court scheduled the trial for February 25, 2003.
The case was not tried on that date.  On April 7, 2003, the
Smiths' counsel informed the trial court that his address
again had changed.  The trial court next scheduled the case to
be tried on May 1, 2003.  The case was not tried on that date.
The trial court scheduled the case for trial on August 5,
2003.  The case was not tried on that date.  The trial court
scheduled the case for trial on November 20, 2003.  The
Cowarts' counsel subsequently requested that the case be
continued.  On August 9, 2005, the Cowarts filed another
motion to set the case for trial.  The Cowarts served the
motion on the Smiths' counsel at an address different from the
last address the Smiths' counsel had registered with the trial
1090048
9
court.  The trial court scheduled the trial for November 3,
2005.  The trial was not held on that date.  
On February 15, 2008, the Cowarts filed another motion to
set the case for trial.  The Cowarts served the motion on the
Smiths' counsel at the address the Smiths' counsel had
registered with the trial court the first time he notified the
court of his change of address.  The trial court set the case
for trial on May 12, 2008, and ordered that a copy of the
order be sent to counsel for both parties.  A notation in the
case-action summary states that the case had been set for
trial for May 12, 2008.  
On May 12, 2008, the Cowarts and their counsel appeared
for trial, but the Smiths and their counsel did not.  On that
date, the trial court entered an order that stated, in
pertinent part:
"On May 6, 1999, the [Smiths] filed this action
against Defendants H. Buford Cowart, Debbie Cowart,
d/b/a DBM Enterprises, and Herman B. Cowart.  On
May 12, 2008, the Court set this matter for Trial.
The [Smiths] failed to appear.  The Court further
finds that the [Smiths] have failed to prosecute
their claims.  Therefore, it is hereby:
"ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that
all of the [Smiths'] claims against Defendants H.
Buford Cowart, Debbie Cowart, d/b/a DBM Enterprises,
1090048
10
and Herman B. Cowart are hereby dismissed with
prejudice."  
The Cowarts' counterclaims against the Smiths were not
adjudicated by the trial court's order and remained pending
before the trial court.
In their brief to this Court, the Cowarts state that also
on May 12, 2008, they made an oral motion for forfeiture of
the surety bond the Smiths had posted in conjunction with
their motion for a writ of seizure filed on June 21, 1999.  On
June 19, 2008, the Cowarts filed a written motion to the same
effect.  In this motion, the Cowarts asserted that most of the
items of equipment listed in the motion for a writ of seizure
actually were owned by the Cowarts personally and were not
owned by Heartland.  Thus, the Cowarts contended, the seizure
of the equipment had been wrongful and they had been
wrongfully enjoined from using the equipment; they requested
a forfeiture of the bond as a result.  In support of the
motion, Buford Cowart filed an affidavit in which he stated
that most of the items of equipment were owned by the Cowarts.
The Cowarts did not serve the written motion on the Smiths or
on USF&G.
1090048
The case-action summary does contain a notation dated
4
June 19, 2008, indicating that the Cowarts had filed their
forfeiture motion with the trial court.
11
The trial court set the motion for a hearing on June 23,
2008.  The case-action summary, however, does not contain a
notation to this effect.   
4
On June 23, 2008, the Cowarts and their counsel appeared
for the hearing and presented evidence and argument to the
trial court; the Smiths and their counsel did not appear.
Based on the evidence presented by the Cowarts, the trial
court issued an order in which it found, among other things,
that the seizure and injunction obtained by the Smiths had
been wrongful:
"On May 6, 1999, the [Smiths] filed this action
against Defendants H. Buford Cowart, Debbie Cowart,
d/b/a DBM Enterprises, and Herman B. Cowart.  On
July 21, 1999, the [Smiths] filed a Motion for a
Writ 
of 
Seizure 
regarding 
numerous 
items 
of
equipment that the [Smiths] claimed were being
improperly held by the [Cowarts].  Furthermore, [the
Smiths] posted a bond in the amount of $250,000.00
through USF&G.
"On June 23, 2008, the Court heard evidence in
this matter wherein most of the items of equipment
belonged to the [Cowarts] and the Motion for Writ of
Seizure, filed by the [Smiths] was not well taken.
The Court finds that the [Cowarts] were deprived of
the use of this equipment wrongfully.  The Court
further finds that the [Smiths] were on notice that
said equipment should not have been the basis for
1090048
We note that the bond posted by the Smiths and ordered
5
forfeited by the trial court provides, among other things,
that "Nathan Smith IV and Dale D. Smith ('Plaintiffs') and the
undersigned sureties are held and firmly bound unto [the
Cowarts] in the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand and no/100
($250,000.00) Dollars" based on the conditions subsequently
described in the bond.
12
their Motion for Writ of Seizure.  The Court further
finds that the [Cowarts] were damaged in excess of
the $250,000.00 bond posted by the [Smiths].  It is
therefore:
"ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that
the 
bond 
posted 
by 
the 
[Smiths] 
is 
hereby
forfeited.[ ]  The surety on said bond is Ordered to
5
forthwith pay the sum of $250,000.00 to the Circuit
Clerk of Macon County; the Clerk is Ordered to hold
said proceeds pending further Orders from the Court.
"This Court's Order of June 24, 1999, Ordering
the Writ of Seizure and Injunction is hereby
vacated."
(Emphasis added.)
On August 4, 2008, the Smiths' counsel filed a motion
purportedly pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., which he
styled as a "Motion to Set Aside," that requested that the
trial court set aside its order of June 23, 2008.  In the
motion, the Smiths' counsel claimed that he "has never been
served by the [Cowarts] of any Motions, specifically Motions
pertaining 
to 
the 
Surety 
Bond 
posted 
in 
this 
case.
Furthermore, the below-signed counsel received no notice of a
1090048
13
hearing regarding same."  The Smiths' counsel averred that he
learned about the trial court's June 23, 2008, order through
"an inquiry from [USF&G]."  He contended that the June 23,
2008, order should be set aside because, among other things,
the Smiths had not been notified of the hearing on the
Cowarts' forfeiture motion.
On April 8, 2009, the trial court held a hearing on the
Smiths' motion to set aside the June 23, 2008, order.  On
April 22, 2009, the trial court entered an order denying the
Smiths' motion.  In pertinent part, the trial court's order
provided:
"Based on the Court's review of the record, the
[Cowarts] moved that this case be set for trial on
February 15, 2008, indicating that this matter had
been pending for nine years, and the [Smiths] had
failed to prosecute their claims.  The Court set
this matter for trial for May 12, 2008.  The clerk's
record indicates that all parties received notice of
the trial setting, pursuant to the Court's order.
On May 12, 2008, the case was called for trial, and
the [Cowarts] were present and ready for trial,
while neither the [Smiths] nor their counsel were
present.  The Court dismissed the [Smiths'] claims
and re-set the matter of the forfeiture of the bond
for June 23, 2008.  On June 23, 2008, the case was
again called, [and] the [Cowarts] and their counsel
were present, while neither the [Smiths] nor their
counsel were present.  The Court, after reviewing
the affidavits submitted by the [Cowarts], entered
its order of forfeiture of the bond on June 23,
2008.
1090048
14
"Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that
the [Smiths] had notice of the trial setting of this
matter and failed to appear.  The Court finds
further that the [Smiths] had notice of this Court's
order dismissing their claims on May 12, 2008, and
took no action.  The Court finds further that the
[Smiths] are not entitled to the relief they are now
seeking under Rule 60(b) of the Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure. ..."
In May 2009, the Smiths' original counsel filed with the
trial court a notice of withdrawal from his representation of
the Smiths.  Subsequently, new counsel for the Smiths filed a
notice of appearance in the trial court.  On June 1, 2009, the
Smiths' new counsel filed what was styled a "Motion to Alter,
Vacate or Amend Pursuant to Rule 59, Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure, or In the Alternative, for Relief from Judgment or
Order Pursuant to Rule 60, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure."
In the motion, the Smiths requested that the trial court
vacate its orders of May 12, 2008, June 23, 2008, and
April 22, 2009.  Among other things, the Smiths asserted
through their new counsel that their previous counsel did not
receive notice of either the May 12, 2008, trial of the
Smiths' claims or the June 23, 2008, hearing on the Cowarts'
motion for forfeiture of the surety bond and, therefore, that
the orders of the trial court should be vacated.  The Smiths
1090048
15
contended, among other things, that the trial court's May 12,
2008, order dismissing the Smiths' claims for lack of
prosecution "resulted from the mistake, inadvertence or
excusable neglect of the Smiths' then-counsel."  The motion
further stated that failure to set aside the orders of the
trial court would violate the Smiths' right to due process.
On June 7, 2009, the Smiths filed a notice of appeal
(case no. 1081095) of the trial court's April 22, 2009, order
denying the Smiths' motion to vacate the trial court's
June 23, 2008, order requiring forfeiture of the surety bond.
On June 29, 2009, this Court, by order, remanded the action to
the trial court because it appeared that all claims -- in
particular the Cowarts' counterclaims -- had not been
adjudicated and that, therefore, the Smiths had appealed from
a nonfinal judgment.  The June 29, 2009, order stated that if
the trial court did not adjudicate the remaining claims or
certify the April 22, 2009, order as a final judgment pursuant
to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., this Court would dismiss the
appeal.  On July 17, 2009, this Court dismissed the Smiths'
appeal because the trial court had not entered a final
judgment on the matter.  
1090048
16
On August 3, 2009, the trial court held a hearing.  On
August 26, 2009, the trial court entered an order in which it
dismissed the Cowarts' counterclaims with prejudice upon oral
motion of the Cowarts. The trial court's order explicitly
stated that "[t]his order will be a final judgment of all
claims in this matter, as all parties' claims have now been
adjudicated."  The court simultaneously denied the Smiths'
June 1, 2009, motion.   
On October 1, 2009, the Smiths filed the present appeal
from the trial court's August 26, 2009, order.
II.  Standard of Review
The parties disagree concerning the standard of review to
be applied in this appeal.  The disagreement stems from the
Cowarts' contention that the Smiths are appealing from the
denial of the Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., aspect of the
Smiths' June 1, 2009, motion for relief from judgment.
As indicated by its title, the Smiths' June 1, 2009,
motion purported to seek relief from the trial court under
both Rule 59 and Rule 60, Ala. R. Civ. P.  We also note that
the motion was filed before the entry of a final judgment by
the trial court on August 26, 2009.  Despite having thus been
1090048
17
filed prematurely, i.e., before the entry of a final judgment,
the motion ripened for consideration by the trial court
simultaneously with that court's entry of a final judgment on
August 26.  See Dubose v. Dubose, 964 So. 2d 42, 45 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2007) (holding that a prematurely filed motion under
Rule 60(b) ripened for the trial court's consideration upon
the trial court's entry of a final judgment); Ex parte Lang,
500 So. 2d 3, 5 (Ala. 1986) (to same effect); and Melvin v.
Loats  23 So. 3d 666, 667 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (holding that
a prematurely filed motion for a new trial under Rule 59
ripened for the trial court's consideration upon the trial
court's entry of a final judgment).
The fact that the Smiths' June 1, 2009, motion ripened
for the trial court's consideration, however, does not mean
that the trial court had before it a proper request for relief
under the Rule 60(b) aspect of that motion.  This Court
recently explained in Ex parte Haynes, [Ms.  1081257,
Sept. 30, 2010] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2010):
"'The Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure do
not contemplate the filing of a Rule 60(b)
motion during the pendency of a Rule 55(c)
motion.  But while the Rules do not
contemplate it, they do not preclude it,
either. Under Rule 59.1, the Rule 55(c)
1090048
18
motion was denied as a matter of law on
November 26, 1985 (90 days after August 28,
1985); upon that denial, the default
judgment of August 12 became "final" within
the contemplation of Rule 60(b) –- "[o]n
motion ... the court may relieve a party
... from a final judgment"   -- and the
court was free to consider the Rule 60(b)
motion, 
which 
had 
been 
theretofore
premature. We consider that the Rule 60(b)
motion was quickened and became a pending
motion as of November 27, 1985, without the
necessity of a refiling.  Thus, the court
had jurisdiction of that motion at the time
of its order granting the motion on
December 3, 1985.'
"[Ex parte Lang, 500 So. 2d 3, 4-5 (Ala. 1986).]
"Lang involved successive Rule 55(c) and Rule
60(b) motions, but as the defendants observe, this
Court subsequently allowed an alternative Rule 55(c)
and Rule 60(b) motion in Ex parte Vaughan, 539
So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Ala. 1989).  As the Court of
Civil Appeals has succinctly explained:
"'[W]hile it frowns upon the practice,
Alabama law allows a party to join a
request for relief from judgment under Rule
60(b) with a request for a post-judgment
remedy affected by Rule 59.1's 90-day
"automatic denial."  See Ex parte Vaughan,
539 So. 2d 1060 (Ala. 1989).  In Vaughan,
our Supreme Court considered the propriety
of a motion seeking an order pursuant to
Rule 55(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., setting aside
a 
default 
judgment 
and 
alternatively
seeking relief from the judgment pursuant
to Rule 60(b).  Relying upon its earlier
opinion in Ex parte Lang, 500 So. 2d 3, 5
(Ala. 1986), the Vaughan court concluded
that such a motion seeking alternative
1090048
19
relief was not precluded by the Rules of
Civil Procedure, although "the better
practice is to file a Rule 60(b) motion
only when there is a final judgment in the
case" 539 So. 2d at 1061.'
"Ex parte Gamble, 709 So. 2d 67, 70 (Ala. Civ. App.
1998).
"The problem with the defendants' argument is
that in the motion filed here, no distinction is
made between the grounds for relief under Rule 55(c)
and those for relief under Rule 60(b).  The
defendants' motion makes no mention of Rule 60(b),
but, more importantly, in order plausibly to be
considered a viable Rule 60(b) motion it must ask
for relief on grounds that amount to more than a
request for a mere reconsideration of the denial of
the defendants' original Rule 55 motion.  Here, the
sole ground for relief stated in the motion was the
defendants' attorney's 
'inadvertence' 
and 
'excusable
neglect.'  Because there existed nothing in the
motion to distinguish the Rule 55(c) motion from the
purported Rule 60(b) motion, any Rule 60(b) aspect
to the motion would simply constitute a motion to
'reconsider' the Rule 55(c) motion.
"In McIntyre v. Satch Realty, Inc., 961 So. 2d
135, 138-39 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006), the Court of
Civil Appeals stated:
"'Although McIntyre and 4M's Rule 60(b)
motion provided more factual detail than
their previously denied Rule 55(c) motion
had and although their Rule 60(b) motion
actually 
explained 
the 
allegedly
meritorious defenses to which they had
merely alluded in their previous motion,
"the relief sought reveals that [McIntyre
and 4M were] simply attempting to have a
second review of the [default] judgment and
to have the trial court reconsider its
1090048
20
previous denial of [their] post-judgment
motion."  Foster v. Foster, 636 So. 2d 467,
468 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994).  Rule 60(b),
however, cannot serve as a basis for a
motion 
that, 
in 
effect, 
seeks 
a
reconsideration 
of 
matters 
already
considered by the trial court in a previous
postjudgment motion when the facts alleged
in the Rule 60(b) motion "were known by the
moving party at the time of his original
[postjudgment] motion."  Ex parte Dowling,
477 So. 2d 400, 403 (Ala. 1985).  Such a
Rule 60(b) motion, and a subsequent appeal
of the denial of such a motion, cannot be
used as a substitute for an appeal of the
trial court's original judgment.  See,
e.g., Landers v. Landers, 812 So. 2d 1212,
1216 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) ("Alabama
precedent is clear that a Rule 60(b) motion
may not be used to seek reconsideration of
a trial court's denial of a postjudgment
motion, 
nor 
are 
Rule 
60(b) 
motions
substitutes for appeal."); and Pace v.
Jordan, 348 So. 2d 1061 (Ala. Civ. App.
1977) (having failed to obtain review by
appeal following denial of his postjudgment
motion for a new trial, the plaintiff may
not obtain review pursuant to the filing of
a Rule 60(b) motion, because that rule does
not provide a substitute for an appeal).'
"(Emphasis added.)  See also Ex parte Dowling, 477
So. 2d 400, 403 (Ala. 1985) (stating that '[w]here
the facts alleged in the motion to reconsider were
known by the moving party at the time of his
original motion, Rule 60(b) does not authorize a
motion to reconsider'); Brown v. Martin, 394 So. 2d
375, 377 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (declining to treat
appellant's motion to reconsider an order denying
his motion to set aside a default judgment as a
motion for relief under either Rule 60(b)(1) or
60(b)(6) because the 'motion was nothing more than
1090048
21
a motion for the trial court to reconsider its
previous order.  Practically nothing different was
presented by the motion to reconsider than was
presented by the motion to set aside the default
judgment.')."
___ So. 3d at ___ (footnotes omitted)
As in Haynes, the motion filed by the Smiths on June 1,
2009, contains no grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) that are
distinguishable from the grounds contained in that motion for
relief under Rule 59, and, thus, "any Rule 60(b) aspect to the
motion would simply constitute a motion to 'reconsider' the
Rule [59] motion."  ___ So. 3d at ___.  The trial court's
August 26, 2009, order is properly considered as one that
constitutes 
a 
final 
judgment 
in 
this 
case 
and 
that
simultaneously denies relief from that judgment under Rule 59.
Consistent with Haynes, the appeal before us is properly
considered as being from that final judgment.
Insofar as the trial court's August 26, 2009, final
judgment dismissed the Smith's claims for lack of prosecution,
we note that "'[t]he dismissal of a civil action for want of
prosecution because of the plaintiff's failure to appear at
trial falls within the judicial discretion of a trial court
and will not be reversed upon an appeal except for an abusive
1090048
22
use of that discretionary power.'"  Hollander v. Nance, 888
So. 2d 1275, 1277-78 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (quoting Thompson
v. McQuagge, 464 So. 2d 105, 106 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)).
Insofar as the trial court's final judgment finding the
seizure of equipment and the enjoining of the Cowarts to have
been wrongful, and accordingly ordering the forfeiture of the
bond posted by the Smiths, the issue presented is whether the
Smiths were deprived of due process in relation to the entry
of the judgment because they did not receive notice and an
opportunity to be heard.  As presented in this case, the
question turns on the proper application of legal principles
to undisputed facts and is reviewed by this court de novo.
See, e.g., Ex parte Soleyn, 33 So. 3d 584, 587 (Ala. 2009)
(stating that "it is well established that where the issues
involve only the application of law to undisputed facts
appellate review is de novo").
III.  Analysis
A. Dismissal of the Smiths' Claims
Rule 41(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
"For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to
comply with these rules or any order of court, a
defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of
any claim against the defendant.  Unless the court
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23
in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal
not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper
venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits."
The Smiths argue that, although a trial court has the
power to dismiss a plaintiff's action for failure to
prosecute, such a sanction is a severe one and should not be
employed merely for a prolonged period of inactivity by the
plaintiff.  Indeed, this Court has stated that, "since
dismissal with prejudice is a drastic sanction, it is to be
applied only in extreme situations" and that, as a result,
"appellate courts will carefully scrutinize such orders and
occasionally will find it necessary to set them aside."  Smith
v. Wilcox County Bd. of Educ., 365 So. 2d 659, 661 (Ala.
1978).  
This Court also has stated, however: 
"Although dismissal with prejudice is a harsh
sanction that should be used only in extreme
circumstances, there nevertheless comes a point in
every action when the interest of the trial court in
controlling its calendar and its interest in
avoiding risk to the defendant outweigh the interest
in disposing of litigation on the merits."
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24
Henderson v. G & G Corp., 582 So. 2d 529, 531 (Ala. 1991).
This Court also has observed that dismissal of a plaintiff's
action under Rule 41(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., 
"is warranted where there is a 'clear record of
delay, willful default or contumacious conduct by
the plaintiff.'  Selby v. Money, 403 So. 2d 218, 220
(Ala. 1981).  Because the trial judge is in the best
position to assess the conduct of the plaintiff and
the degree of noncompliance, his decision to grant
a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute will be
accorded considerable weight by a reviewing court."
Jones v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 604
So. 2d 332, 341 (Ala. 1991).
The Smiths contend that there is no evidence of
intentional delay or contumacious conduct in this case.  The
only evidence is that the Smiths and their counsel failed to
appear for the trial setting of May 12, 2008, and that their
failure was simply due to the fact that the Smiths' counsel
did not receive notice of either the Cowarts' motion to set
the case for trial or the trial court's order setting the case
for trial on that date.  The Smiths argue that, at most, this
constitutes excusable neglect by their previous counsel that
did not warrant the "harsh sanction" of dismissal of their
claims.  
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In their brief to this Court, the Cowarts state that on
no less than four of the six occasions on which this case was
rescheduled for trial before the final setting of May 12,
2008, the Cowarts and their counsel appeared in court, but the
Smiths and their counsel failed to appear.  As noted in the
rendition of the facts, the Cowarts also charge that the
Smiths failed to appear for scheduled depositions four
separate times.  The Smiths do not directly deny either of
these charges.  Instead, they state that the record fails to
support these claims.  
As to the Cowarts' assertions regarding the Smiths'
failure to appear for trial settings on four occasions before
the May 12, 2008, hearing, the Cowarts initially made this
claim in the trial court in their response in opposition to
the Smiths' June 1, 2009, motion to set aside the trial
court's previous orders.  The Smiths did not dispute this
claim before the trial court, and, as indicated, they do not
directly deny it before this Court.  The trial court expressly
found in its May 12, 2008, order that the Smiths had "failed
to prosecute their claims."   
1090048
26
With respect to the May 12, 2008, hearing, in particular,
the trial court explicitly concluded in its April 22, 2009,
order denying the August 4, 2008, motion filed by the Smiths'
previous counsel that "[t]he clerk's record indicates that all
parties received notice of the trial setting, pursuant to this
Court's order."  We find no evidence to the contrary in the
record before us.  
In addition, our review of the record reveals that the
case-action summary contains an entry for February 15, 2008,
that makes note of the filing of the Cowarts' motion to set
the case for trial.  The case-action summary also contains an
entry dated March 14, 2008, stating that the trial court had
ordered that the case be set for trial on May 12, 2008.  
"It is the prevailing rule in Alabama 'that a
litigant ... has responsibility for keeping track of
his case and knowing its status.'  D. & J. Mineral
& Mining, Inc. v. Wilson, 456 So. 2d 1099, 1100
(Ala. Civ. App. 1984).  Therefore, a trial court
'owes no duty to notify a party of the setting of a
case or to continue a case because of the absence of
a party ....'  D. & J. Mineral, 456 So. 2d at
1100-01."
Burleson v. Burleson, 19 So. 3d 233, 239 (Ala. Civ. App.
2009).
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27
The Smiths' action had been pending in the trial court
for nine years before that court entered its order of
dismissal.  The case-action summary indicates that the action
languished in the trial court for up to eight years without
any activity by the Smiths.  Henderson, 582 So. 2d at 531.
Under the totality of the particular circumstances presented
in this case, we cannot say that the trial court exceeded its
discretion in dismissing the Smiths' claims and denying the
Smiths' motion to alter or vacate that dismissal.
B. The Trial Court's June 23, 2008, Order
The Smiths contend that the trial court violated their
basic right of due process in entering its June 23, 2008,
judgment finding that the seizure of equipment and the
enjoining of the Cowarts had been wrongful and ordering the
forfeiture of the surety bond.  The Smiths contend that they
were provided no notice of the motion or of any hearing at
which it would be considered and that this falls short of the
minimum requirements for due process.  They note that their
previous counsel denied receiving any notice of the Cowarts'
motion that led to the hearing or any notice of a setting of
a hearing on the Cowarts' motion.  (They also observe that the
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28
Cowarts did not serve a copy of their written motion on
USF&G.)  The Smiths argue that the entry of the June 23, 2008,
judgment without providing notice and an opportunity to be
heard when for nine years the Cowarts had given no indication
that they needed relief from the writ of seizure constitutes
an error of due process that requires the reversal of the
trial court's final judgment.
Among other things, the Smiths cite Humane Society of
Marshall County v. Adams, 439 So. 2d 150, 152 (Ala. 1983), for
the proposition that "the fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner."  In Adams, this Court observed:
"'The doctrine of the authorities is
that whenever it is sought to deprive a
person of his property, or to create a
charge against it, preliminary to, or which
may be made the basis of, taking it, the
owner must have notice of the proceeding,
and be afforded an opportunity to be heard
as to the correctness of the assessment or
charge.  It matters not what the character
of the proceeding may be, by virtue of
which his property is to be taken, whether
administrative, 
judicial, 
summary, 
or
otherwise.'" 
439 So. 2d at 152 (quoting Jenks v. Stump, 41 Colo. 281, 286,
93 P. 17, 19 (1907)). 
1090048
29
In the present case, the trial court set a date for a
hearing on the Cowarts' motion.  On June 23, 2008, the Cowarts
and their counsel appeared for the hearing, but the Smiths and
their counsel did not appear.  The trial court heard evidence
from the Cowarts.  Based on the evidence presented to it in
that hearing, the trial court made factual findings and
entered a judgment on the merits to the effect that the
Cowarts "were deprived of the use of this equipment
wrongfully" and that they "were damaged in excess of the
$250,000 bond posted by the [Smiths]." 
As noted, the Smiths' contention is that they received no
notice of the June 23, 2008, hearing, nor any opportunity to
be heard regarding the issues adjudicated in it.  The record
supports their contention.  When the Cowarts filed their
written motion on June 19, 2008, just four days before the
hearing, they sent a copy of the motion to an address of the
Smiths' previous counsel that, in April 2003, the Smiths'
counsel had informed the trial court was no longer his correct
address.  In the Smiths' August 4, 2008, motion to set aside
the trial court's judgment, the Smiths' previous counsel
1090048
30
represented that he never received a copy of the Cowarts'
motion, and the Cowarts do not dispute this claim.  
Furthermore, when the trial court set a date for the
hearing on the Cowarts' motion, it did not do so by order or
even by entry in the case-action summary.  The Smiths'
previous counsel stated that he never received notice that
there would be a hearing on the motion; nothing in the final
judgment or other orders entered by the trial court
contradicts this assertion.  The trial court repeatedly stated
in its April 22, 2009, order denying the Smiths' first motion
to set aside the judgment that the Smiths' counsel received
notice of the May 12, 2008, trial setting for the Smiths'
claims, but it never stated that the record indicated that the
Smiths' counsel received notice of the June 23, 2008, hearing.
If the Smiths' counsel did not receive any notice -- even
through the case-action summary -- of a hearing on the
Cowarts' motion, it would not be surprising that the Smiths
and their counsel failed to appear for that hearing.
The Cowarts argue that the trial court orally set the
date for the hearing on their motion during the May 12, 2008,
hearing.  Accordingly, the Cowarts argue, if the Smiths had
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31
appeared for the May 12, 2008, hearing in which the trial
court dismissed the Smiths' claims against the Cowarts, the
Smiths would have had notice of the June 23, 2008, hearing on
the Cowarts' motion against the Smiths.  Even assuming this to
be true, the fact remains that the Smiths and their counsel
were not present at the May 12, 2008, hearing.  An appropriate
effort therefore was necessary in order to provide notice to
the Smiths and their counsel of the subsequent hearing on the
Cowarts' motion.
In sum, it is undisputed that neither the Smiths nor
their counsel received advance notice of the June 23, 2008,
hearing.  Consequently, we reverse the trial court's final
judgment insofar as it reaffirmed the June 23, 2008, order
finding that the seizure of equipment and the enjoining of the
Cowarts had been wrongful and accordingly ordering a
forfeiture of the bond that had been posted by the Smiths.  
IV.  Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment insofar as it
dismissed the Smiths' claims against the Cowarts for failure
to prosecute those claims.  We reverse the trial court's
judgment insofar as it reaffirmed the trial court's June 23,
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32
2008, order as described above, and we remand the cause for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Bolin, and Main, JJ., concur.