Case Title: Lenz v. Warden

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
MICHAEL W. LENZ 
            OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 012883        April 17, 2003 
 
WARDEN OF THE SUSSEX I 
STATE PRISON 
 
UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
I. 
 
 
Petitioner, Michael William Lenz, was convicted of the 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a person by a 
prisoner confined in a state or local correctional facility in 
violation of Code § 18.2-31(3).  The jury fixed his punishment 
at death, and the circuit court sentenced petitioner in 
accordance with the jury verdict.  We affirmed the judgment of 
the circuit court in Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 544 
S.E.2d 299, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1003 (2001).  In view of 
our resolution of this proceeding, it is not necessary that we 
discuss the underlying facts related to petitioner's 
convictions. 
II. 
 
As permitted by Code § 8.01-654, Lenz filed a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court against Page True, 
Warden, Sussex I State Prison, alleging, among other things, 
that his trial counsel were ineffective.  The Warden filed a 
motion to dismiss, and this Court entered an order directing 
that the Circuit Court of Augusta County conduct an 
evidentiary hearing limited to certain issues.  This Court 
took petitioner's remaining claims under advisement. 
 
The circuit court conducted the evidentiary hearing 
required by this Court pursuant to Code § 8.01-654(C) and 
submitted its written report to this Court, which entered 
orders establishing a schedule for the submission of briefs.  
Petitioner filed an opening brief that only addressed the 
issues that were the subject of the circuit court's 
evidentiary hearing.  Petitioner, in his opening brief, did 
not discuss the issues that this Court had taken under 
advisement, including petitioner's claim that trial counsel 
were ineffective because they failed to challenge the verdict 
form during petitioner's capital murder trial. 
 
The Warden, relying upon our decision in Hedrick v. 
Warden, 264 Va. 486, 570 S.E.2d 840 (2002), argues that this 
Court must dismiss all petitioner's claims that were not 
discussed in his opening brief, including his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims that were asserted in the 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  We disagree with the 
Warden. 
 
It is true, as the Warden asserts, that in Hedrick, we 
held that a petitioner's claims were procedurally defaulted 
because the petitioner, who had asserted those claims in his 
 
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petition for a writ of habeas corpus, failed to discuss those 
claims in his opening brief.  264 Va. at 522, 570 S.E.2d at 
862.  However, in this case, unlike the petitioner in Hedrick, 
Lenz specifically incorporated by reference in his opening 
brief the arguments that he advanced in his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  We think that this is a material 
difference, and we hold that petitioner's claims that he 
specifically incorporated by reference as a part of his 
opening brief are not procedurally barred. 
 
We recognize that we have repeatedly held that a litigant 
cannot incorporate by reference arguments that were made in 
another court or in another case.  See Schmitt v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 138, 547 S.E.2d 186, 194 (2001), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1094 (2002); Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 
Va. 307, 319, 541 S.E.2d 872, 881, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1043 
(2001); Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 328, 336, 513 S.E.2d 
634, 638-39, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952 (1999); Pulliam v. 
Coastal Emergency Servs., Inc., 257 Va. 1, 20 n.12, 509 S.E.2d 
307, 318 n.12 (1999); Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 
537, 450 S.E.2d 365, 372 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 
(1995); Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395, 401 n.4, 442 
S.E.2d 678, 683 n.4, vacated and remanded on other grounds by 
513 U.S. 922 (1994); Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 
460-61, 423 S.E.2d 360, 370 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 
 
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1036 (1993); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 99-100, 393 
S.E.2d 609, 622, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990).  And, we 
adhere to these prior rulings.  However, in this case, 
petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed 
with the Clerk of this Court.  Unlike the situation that may 
exist when a litigant seeks to incorporate by reference 
arguments filed in another court or in another case, this 
Court has no difficulty ascertaining the exact arguments that 
petitioner has incorporated by reference from other pleadings 
filed in this Court. 
III. 
A. 
 
Petitioner argues, among other things, that his trial 
counsel were ineffective because they failed to object to the 
verdict form during the sentencing phase of his capital murder 
trial.  Petitioner, relying principally upon our decision in 
Atkins v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 160, 510 S.E.2d 445 (1999), 
argues that trial counsel were ineffective because they failed 
to object to the verdict form that was incomplete and 
inaccurate.  This verdict form failed to inform the jury that 
it could sentence petitioner to life imprisonment even if the 
jury found petitioner guilty of both aggravating factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Continuing, petitioner states that 
his trial counsel did not challenge the verdict form either in 
 
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the circuit court or in petitioner's initial brief filed on 
appeal. 
 
We agree with petitioner.  In Atkins, we considered 
whether a jury, at the conclusion of the sentencing phase of a 
capital murder trial, was properly instructed when "the 
verdict form failed to provide the jury with the option of 
sentencing [the defendant] to life imprisonment upon a finding 
that neither of the aggravating factors of future 
dangerousness or vileness was proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  257 Va. at 177-78, 510 S.E.2d at 456.  We observed 
that "it is materially vital to the defendant in a criminal 
case that the jury have a proper verdict form."  Id. at 178, 
510 S.E.2d at 456. 
 
We reversed the circuit court's judgment in Atkins that 
imposed the sentence of death upon the defendant because the 
jury verdict form was not accurate.  The form that was 
submitted to the jury "contained no alternative finding 
permitting the jury to impose only a life sentence if neither 
future dangerousness nor vileness had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Id.
 
When we considered Lenz' direct appeal to this Court, we 
raised, sua sponte, the issue whether the verdict form was 
proper in light of our decision in Atkins.  We directed 
counsel to address this issue.  Petitioner's trial counsel 
 
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responded to our directive and stated that the jury verdict 
form they drafted was defective because the form did "not 
include the alternatives that, having found the defendant 
guilty of capital murder, the jury could find either or both 
of the aggravating factors and still impose a life sentence."  
This Court did not consider petitioner's arguments on direct 
appeal because they were neither raised in the circuit court 
nor were they the subject of an assignment of error before 
this Court during the appeal.  Lenz, 261 Va. at 472, 544 
S.E.2d at 311. 
 
The jury in the sentencing phase of Lenz' capital murder 
trial was given the following form which is almost identical 
to the language contained in Code § 19.2-264.4(D): 
"We, the Jury, on the issue joined, having found the 
defendant guilty of Capital Murder, as charged in 
the indictment, and having considered the evidence 
in aggravation and mitigation of the offense, fix 
his punishment at imprisonment for life." 
 
This form, however, did not satisfy our holding in Atkins 
because the form failed to inform the jury that it could 
impose a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence of life 
imprisonment and a fine if the jury found that neither of the 
aggravating factors had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Therefore, we are compelled to conclude that the above-
referenced form, which is almost identical to the language 
 
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contained in Code § 19.2-264.4(D), is not sufficient to 
satisfy our holding in Atkins. 
 
We disagree with the Warden's contention that 
petitioner's trial counsel could not "have been ineffective 
for failing to object to a verdict form mandated by statute 
and which repeatedly had been held by this Court to be 
proper."  Our decision in Atkins, holding that it is 
materially vital to a defendant in a criminal case that the 
jury be given a proper verdict form reflecting its sentencing 
options, was rendered in February 1999, one and one-half years 
before petitioner's jury was instructed.  Atkins, 257 Va. at 
178, 510 S.E.2d at 456. 
 
We note that in June 2001, we decided Powell v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 512, 552 S.E.2d 344 (2001).  In Powell, 
we held that a verdict form identical to the one used in the 
present case was improper because the form failed to state 
that the jury could impose a sentence of life imprisonment, 
even after finding the defendant guilty of one or both 
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  261 Va. at 
545, 552 S.E.2d at 363.  Thus, here, as in Powell, the absence 
of this sentencing alternative from the verdict form 
constituted error in the sentencing phase of the capital 
murder proceeding.  Id.
 
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We disagree with the Warden that petitioner has not 
suffered any prejudice.  Our above-stated holding in Atkins 
requires a finding of prejudice because had counsel assigned 
error to the verdict form during the direct appeal of the 
judgment, petitioner would have received a new sentencing 
proceeding.  See Atkins, 257 Va. at 179, 510 S.E.2d at 457.  
See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 394-95 (2000); 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); Hedrick v. 
Warden, 264 Va. at 496-97, 570 S.E.2d at 847; Powell, 261 Va. 
at 545, 552 S.E.2d at 363. 
B. 
 
In view of our ruling that will require petitioner to 
receive a new sentencing hearing, we need not consider his 
habeas corpus claims that relate to his prior sentencing 
hearing. 
C. 
 
Petitioner argues that he "was denied his right to 
counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings due to the 
trial court's refusal to order that Lenz be transported to a 
location where he could have reasonable access to his 
attorneys until a week before his capital trial commenced, and 
due to the conditions under which the Commonwealth forced 
trial counsel to consult with Lenz during the months prior to 
his trial."  This claim is procedurally defaulted because it 
 
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could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal.  Slayton 
v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 30, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975). 
 
We recognize that in his brief on direct appeal, 
petitioner argued that he was "denied effective assistance of 
[c]ounsel in that the Department of Corrections housed [him] 
hours away from the site of the trial and of the offices of 
his appointed attorneys.  Because of these great distances the 
defendant could only meet with his attorneys for a short 
period of time.  The time the defendant spent with his 
attorneys was much less than the travel time to and from the 
location."  Lenz, 261 Va. at 460, 544 S.E.2d at 304.  We 
refused to consider this claim on direct appeal because in 
this Commonwealth, "[c]laims raising ineffective assistance of 
counsel must be asserted in a habeas corpus proceeding and are 
not cognizable on direct appeal."  Id.  However, in 
petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he does not 
allege that his counsel were ineffective for this reason.  
Rather, he asserts that he was denied his right to counsel at 
a critical stage of the proceedings, which is different from a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
Petitioner argues that "[t]he death penalty in Virginia 
is unconstitutional."  This argument was raised on direct 
appeal and petitioner may not assert this argument again in 
 
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this habeas corpus proceeding.  Slayton, 215 Va. at 30, 205 
S.E.2d at 682. 
D. 
 
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel were ineffective 
because they "fail[ed] to object to the Department of 
Corrections' unilateral decision to place a stun belt on 
[petitioner] throughout his trial, without any showing of 
need, denied [petitioner] his rights to be tried without 
restraint, to effective assistance of counsel, and to a fair 
trial."  We disagree. 
 
During a pretrial hearing, petitioner's trial counsel 
asked the circuit court for permission to purchase civilian 
clothes for the petitioner, even though he was an inmate.  
Trial counsel did not want petitioner to appear before a jury 
wearing a prison-issued jumpsuit and shackles.  The circuit 
court inquired whether petitioner could wear a stun belt 
because "if he were to escape, that would be a danger to the 
public."  Apparently, petitioner was required to wear a stun 
belt during his trial. 
 
In view of petitioner's criminal history, which included 
multiple convictions for escape from custody, we hold that 
trial counsel were not ineffective because they did not object 
to the circuit court's decision to require this inmate to wear 
a stun belt.  Even habeas counsel do not dispute that 
 
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petitioner was a risk to the public if he were able to escape.  
There is nothing in this record that indicates the jury 
observed a stun belt on petitioner during his trial.  
Petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice because he cannot 
show that there is a "reasonable probability" that, but for 
counsel's [allegedly] unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  "A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; 
accord Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002); Roe v. Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 482 (2000); Hedrick v. Warden, 264 Va. 
at 497, 570 S.E.2d at 847.  Accordingly, we hold that 
petitioner fails to satisfy the performance or prejudice 
standards established in Strickland v. Washington. 
E. 
 
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel "were 
ineffective for failing to object to jury instructions that 
incorrectly permitted the jury to convict [petitioner] of 
capital murder even if [the jury] did not find that the 
[Commonwealth] had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that 
[petitioner] was . . . the actual perpetrator of the victim's 
death."  Petitioner's contention is without merit. 
 
The evidence at trial established that Lenz and another 
inmate stabbed the victim with knives numerous times.  The 
 
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victim incurred a total of 68 stab wounds and all the wounds 
contributed to the victim's death.  During the guilt phase of 
petitioner's capital murder trial, the circuit court 
instructed the jury that it may convict petitioner of capital 
murder if the Commonwealth proved "beyond a reasonable doubt 
that [petitioner] was an active and immediate participant in 
the act or acts that caused the victim's death." 
 
In view of the facts, the instruction that the circuit 
court gave the jury was a correct statement of law, and we 
approved that instruction in Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 
Va. 482, 493-95, 404 S.E.2d 227, 234-35, cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 944 (1991).  Contrary to petitioner's arguments, he was 
not entitled to a jury instruction that he could only be 
convicted of capital murder in the event the jury found beyond 
a reasonable doubt that he was the "triggerman."  As we have 
held, "a defendant who 'jointly participated in [a] fatal 
beating' was subject to conviction and punishment for capital 
murder, [when] the other requisite elements were present.  We 
adhere to the view that [when] two or more persons take a 
direct part in inflicting fatal injuries, each joint 
participant is an 'immediate perpetrator' for the purposes of 
the capital murder statutes."  Id. at 495, 404 S.E.2d at 235.  
Thus, we hold that trial counsel were not ineffective because 
they had no basis upon which to object to the challenged jury 
 
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instruction, which was appropriate in view of the facts 
presented to the jury during the guilt phase of petitioner's 
capital murder trial. 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, we will dismiss all petitioner's claims 
except his claim that asserted he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to object 
to the improper verdict form.  We will grant that portion of 
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the use 
of the improper verdict form, and petitioner shall be granted 
a new sentencing hearing. 
  Petition dismissed in part, 
     granted in part, and case 
remanded to the circuit court 
for a new sentencing hearing. 
 
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