Case Title: White v. White

Citation: 434 N.W.2d 361

Docket Number: 880140

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1989-01-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
434 N.W.2d 361 (1989) Martha Florence WHITE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Thomas Henry WHITE, Defendant and Appellee. Civ. No. 880140. Supreme Court of North Dakota. January 9, 1989. *362 Lundberg, Nodland, Schulz & Lervick, Bismarck, for plaintiff and appellant; argued by Ardell Tharaldson. Anseth & Zander, Williston, for defendant and appellee; argued by Janet Holter Zander. GIERKE, Justice. This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Martha White, from a district court judgment granting a divorce from the defendant, Thomas White, making a division of property and awarding spousal support. For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss the appeal. On October 18, 1988, Thomas filed a motion to dismiss the appeal pursuant to Rule 27 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure upon the ground that Martha unconditionally, voluntarily, and conscientiously demanded, received and accepted all of the benefits granted her under the judgment, and thereby waived her right to appeal. Accordingly, we will first consider Thomas' motion to dismiss. Martha and Thomas were married in May of 1955. Irreconcilable differences arose between the parties and a judgment of divorce was entered in Williams County District Court on March 15, 1988. At the time the divorce judgment was entered, Martha was 57 years old and Thomas was 56 years old. The divorce judgment provided in relevant part as follows: On February 24, 1988, prior to entry of the formal judgment, Martha forwarded to Thomas a quit claim deed for him to sign as to the homestead which was jointly *363 owned real property. Instead, Thomas, preferring a warranty deed, prepared and signed on March 3, 1988, a warranty deed to Martha for the homestead. In turn, Martha signed on March 17, 1988, a warranty deed to Thomas for the rental house. On March 22, 1988, Martha, through her attorney, wrote a letter to Thomas' counsel requesting a meeting for the purpose of dividing the remaining joint assets. Additionally, Martha demanded a bill of sale from Thomas for the bar and requested that Thomas sign off of the bar's liquor license. Accordingly, a meeting was held on March 31, 1988, at which time titles to the motor vehicles were signed and exchanged, the war bonds were divided, the coin collection was divided, and the US mint coin collection was divided. Also, at this meeting, Thomas relinquished rights to the bar and his name was removed from the liquor license as requested by Martha. On May 10, 1988, Martha filed a notice of appeal. Thomas contends that Martha's acceptance of all the benefits under the judgment and her present attempt to attack the judgment on appeal are inconsistent, and an election to take the benefits under the judgment was a renunciation of her right of appeal. The general rule in North Dakota is that a party to a divorce action who accepts substantial benefits pursuant to a divorce judgment thereby waives the right to appeal from the judgment. Brodersen v. Brodersen, 374 N.W.2d 76, 77 (N.D.1985); Geier v. Geier, 332 N.W.2d 261, 263 (N.D. 1983); Sanford v. Sanford, 295 N.W.2d 139, 141 (N.D.1980). We recognized in Sanford v. Sanford, supra at 141-142, that the general rule was subject to several recognized exceptions: After taking into account the affirmative actions taken by Martha to transfer *364 title to the homestead to her name, to transfer rights to the bar and liquor license, and to divide the remaining items of property of substantial value, we conclude that Martha accepted substantial benefits under the divorce judgment and therefore Martha waived her right to appeal. Accordingly, Thomas' motion to dismiss Martha's appeal is granted. The appeal is dismissed. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and VANDE WALLE and MESCHKE, JJ., concur. LEVINE, Justice, concurring specially. On appeal Martha claims error in her award of only $400.00 a month in Air Force retirement pay, in the failure of the court to award her any of Thomas' civil service pension and in her award of the Bar instead of the financially more secure pension benefits. It is obvious that were we to agree with Martha on the merits, it would be necessary to remand to the trial court for an equitable redistribution of not only the property erroneously distributed, but also the other property over which Martha has already exercised ownership. Thus, the provisions of the judgment are clearly subject to reversal on appeal and Martha's acceptance of the benefits given by those provisions unfortunately constitutes a waiver of the appeal. Boyle v. Boyle, 19 N.D. 522, 126 N.W. 229, 230 (1910). I therefore concur in what is a harsh but unavoidable result. VANDE WALLE, J., concurs.