Case Title: Va. Dep't of Health v. Kepa, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 140100

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2015-01-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, McClanahan, 
and Powell, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 140100 
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
January 8, 2015 
KEPA, INC., d/b/a SHE-SHA CAFÉ AND 
HOOKAH LOUNGE 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in construing the Virginia Indoor Clean Air Act to exempt 
a retailer of tobacco and tobacco products from regulation, 
despite the fact that it also serves food. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
A. 
Background 
 
Kepa, Inc. has owned and operated She-Sha Café and Hookah 
Lounge ("She-Sha") in Blacksburg since 2003.  She-Sha sells 
tobacco and tobacco products to its customers.  Customers may 
purchase tobacco to smoke on-site through "hookahs," which are 
available for rent at the café, or to smoke off-site.1  It also 
sells food for on-site consumption in the same area where 
tobacco is smoked. 
 
She-Sha is licensed as a "Food Establishment," 
specifically a "Full Service Restaurant," by the Virginia 
                     
1 A "hookah" is a "pipe for smoking that has a long flexible 
tube whereby the smoke is cooled by passing through water."  
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1088 (1993). 
 
2 
Department of Health ("Department").  It is also licensed as an 
"Other Tobacco Product Retailer" by the Virginia Department of 
Taxation.  On its business license application to the Town of 
Blacksburg, She-Sha lists the nature of its business as 
"Restaurant and Retail Tobacco Store." 
 
On January 22, 2010, the Montgomery County Health 
Department received a complaint indicating that She-Sha was 
allowing customers to smoke in its restaurant in violation of 
the Virginia Indoor Clean Air Act, Code § 15.2-2820 et seq. 
("VICAA"), which went into effect on December 1, 2009.  VICAA 
makes smoking in restaurants generally unlawful, subject to six 
narrow exceptions.  Code § 15.2-2825(A)(1) through (A)(6).  On 
January 27, 2010, the Department conducted an investigation and 
subsequently charged She-Sha with two violations.2 
B. 
Relevant Statutory Provisions and Material Proceedings 
Below 
 
 
At issue in this appeal is the proper interpretation of 
two statutory provisions from VICAA that appear to conflict 
when applied to She-Sha.  First, Code § 15.2-2821, which states 
VICAA's general applicability, provides: 
                     
2 The Department charged She-Sha with violating Code § 15.2-
2825(D), which requires restaurants to post "No Smoking" signs 
in non-smoking areas, and Code § 15.2-2825(F), which prohibits 
smoking in any non-smoking area of a restaurant.  She-Sha 
agrees that it had not posted any "No Smoking" signs and that 
it had not divided its establishment into smoking and non-
smoking areas. 
 
3 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed 
to: 
 
1. Permit smoking where it is otherwise 
prohibited or restricted by other applicable 
provisions of law; or 
 
2. 
Regulate 
smoking 
in 
retail 
tobacco 
stores, 
tobacco 
warehouses, 
or 
tobacco 
manufacturing facilities. 
 
Next, Code § 15.2-2825, which prohibits smoking in restaurants, 
provides in relevant part: 
A. Effective December 1, 2009, smoking shall 
be prohibited and no person shall smoke in 
any restaurant in the Commonwealth or in any 
restroom within such restaurant, except that 
smoking may be permitted in: 
 
. . . . 
 
3. Any restaurants located on the premises 
of any manufacturer of tobacco products; 
 
. . . . 
 
5. Any portion of a restaurant that is 
constructed in such a manner that the area 
where 
smoking 
may 
be 
permitted 
is 
(i) 
structurally separated from the portion of 
the 
restaurant 
in 
which 
smoking 
is 
prohibited and to which ingress and egress 
is through a door and (ii) separately vented 
to prevent the recirculation of air from 
such area to the area of the restaurant 
where smoking is prohibited. 
 
It is also relevant to note that, for the purposes of VICAA, a 
"Restaurant" is "any place where food is prepared for service 
to the public on or off the premises, or any place where food 
 
4 
is served."  Code § 15.2-2820.  However, the term "retail 
tobacco store" is undefined in the Act. 
 
She-Sha requested an informal hearing to contest the 
charges.  On July 8, 2010, the Department upheld the 
violations, stating that She-Sha was "properly labeled as a 
restaurant" and that none of the exceptions in VICAA applied to 
the establishment. 
 
After the informal hearing, She-Sha requested a formal 
hearing pursuant to the Virginia Administrative Process Act, 
Code § 2.2-4000 et seq.  At the hearing, She-Sha claimed it was 
a "retail tobacco store," and thus, exempt from regulation 
under VICAA as provided in Code § 15.2-2821(2).  She-Sha 
presented evidence, which the Department did not contest, that 
it derived approximately two-thirds of its revenue from 
tobacco-related sales. 
 
In his findings of fact and conclusions of law, the 
hearing officer noted that the Department's official 
interpretation of Code § 15.2-2825 treats all establishments 
meeting the definition of a "restaurant" in Code § 15.2-2820 as 
 
5 
subject to regulation under VICAA.3  The hearing officer also 
found that the General Assembly had "specifically exempted 
stand alone retail tobacco stores and restaurants operation 
[sic] on the premises of tobacco manufacturing facilities."  He 
reasoned that, by not specifically exempting "restaurants 
operating within retail tobacco stores," the General Assembly 
had signaled its intent to regulate establishments such as She-
Sha.  The State Health Commissioner concurred with the 
recommendations contained in the letter and upheld the charged 
violations. 
 
She-Sha appealed the Department's decision to the Circuit 
Court of Montgomery County.  After considering the record 
compiled during the administrative proceedings and the oral 
arguments of both parties, the circuit court ruled that VICAA 
did not provide an exemption for She-Sha's establishment.  
Thus, the circuit court found that the Department did not make 
an error of law when it interpreted VICAA to regulate hookah 
bars that serve food in areas where smoking occurs. 
 
Next, She-Sha pursued its case to the Court of Appeals.  A 
three-judge panel affirmed the circuit court by a 2-1 vote in a 
                     
3 Department Program Implementation Manual 09-02 states that 
"[h]ookah bars are subject to the [smoking] ban if they prepare 
and serve food." Virginia Department of Health, Program 
Implementation Manual #09-02, at 6 (Sept. 17, 2009).  It also 
notes that a hookah bar may continue to serve food if it erects 
"a structural separation between the non-smoking area and the 
smoking areas."  Id. 
 
6 
published opinion.  Kepa, Inc. v. Virginia Dept. of Health, 61 
Va. App. 696, 740 S.E.2d 26 (2013) (Kepa I).  The majority 
found that to adopt She-Sha's reading of Code § 15.2-2821, and 
exempt She-Sha from regulation as a "retail tobacco store," 
would force a conflict with Code § 15.2-2825.  Id. at 707, 740 
S.E.2d at 32.  Noting that a court interpreting "multiple, 
related statutory provisions must give full effect to each 
provision while remaining true to the purpose and intent behind 
them," the majority concluded that the General Assembly did not 
intend to provide an exemption to "retail tobacco stores not 
operating exclusively as such."  Id. 
 
The majority began with the premise that, "[a]s a 
restaurant, She-Sha must comply with the restaurant smoking 
ban, unless it falls within one of the six expressly stated 
exemptions."  Id. at 704, 740 S.E.2d at 30.  It then turned to 
the exemptions listed under Code § 15.2-2825(A)(1)-(6), 
focusing in particular on Code § 15.2-2825(A)(3), which 
specifically exempts "[a]ny restaurants located on the premises 
of any manufacturer of tobacco products."  Drawing on the maxim 
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius," the majority reasoned 
that the express exemption of tobacco manufacturers, and 
corresponding omission of tobacco retailers, signaled an intent 
to regulate restaurants on the premises of tobacco retailers.  
Id. at 706, 740 S.E.2d at 31.  To conclude otherwise, the 
 
7 
majority continued, would allow She-Sha to "circumvent the 
statutory obligations associated with being a restaurant."  Id. 
at 707, 740 S.E.2d at 32. 
 
Then, She-Sha petitioned the full Court of Appeals for a 
rehearing en banc.  In a 6-3 decision, the Court of Appeals 
overruled the panel, holding that She-Sha, as a restaurant, was 
exempt from VICAA because it is also a retail tobacco store.  
Kepa, Inc. v. Virginia Dept. of Health, 62 Va. App. 614, 617, 
751 S.E.2d 671, 672 (2013) (Kepa II). 
 
Again, the majority found that Code §§ 15.2-2821 and -2825 
were "inconsistent or ambiguous when read together" and sought 
to harmonize the provisions.  Id. at 623, 751 S.E.2d at 675.  
This time, the majority declined to infer that the General 
Assembly signaled its intent to regulate restaurants located on 
the premises of a retail tobacco store by not providing a 
specific exemption under Code § 15.2-2825.  Id. at 625, 751 
S.E.2d at 676.  Rather, the majority found that the plain 
language of Code § 15.2-2821 clearly indicated that VICAA did 
not apply to retail tobacco stores.  Id. 
 
The majority further concluded that Code § 15.2-2821 
trumped Code § 15.2-2825, because "[h]ad the General Assembly 
intended to permit the Department to regulate smoking in any 
facility that prepares and sells food, it would have included 
such authority in Chapter 2 of Title 35.1," which generally 
 
8 
authorizes the Department to regulate restaurants.  Id. at 626, 
751 S.E.2d at 677.  In a footnote, the majority also noted that 
"She-Sha's primary business is the retail sale of tobacco," 
suggesting that the percentage of revenue attributable to such 
sales should guide the inquiry into whether Code § 15.2-2821 
exempts an establishment from regulation.  Id. at 621 n.8, 751 
S.E.2d at 674 n.8. 
 
The dissent argued that the interpretation adopted by the 
majority "ascribes a broad meaning to the term 'retail tobacco 
store' that is not contextually supported."  Id. at 627, 751 
S.E.2d at 677 (Chafin, J., dissenting).  As a result, the 
dissent contended, the majority opinion elevated Code § 15.2-
2821(2) at the expense of Code §§ 15.2-2821(1) and -2825, 
thereby permitting smoking where it is "otherwise prohibited" 
and frustrating the public policy behind VICAA.  Id. at 629-30, 
751 S.E.2d at 678 (noting that VICAA is "undoubtedly a public 
health initiative").  Moreover, the dissent took issue with the 
majority's failure to define "retail tobacco store," and 
asserted that the opinion would permit any restaurant to avoid 
VICAA by merely selling packs of cigarettes.  Id. at 630-31, 
751 S.E.2d at 679. 
 
The Department's appeal to this Court followed. 
 
 
 
9 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
"[W]e give deference to the decisions of administrative 
agencies when those decisions 'fall within an area of the 
agency's specialized competence.'"  Virginia Marine Res. Comm'n 
v. Chincoteague Inn, 287 Va. 371, 380, 757 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2014) 
(quoting Virginia Dep't of Health v. NRV Real Estate, LLC, 278 
Va. 181, 185, 677 S.E.2d 276, 278 (2009)).  "'However, when an 
issue involves a pure question of statutory interpretation, 
that issue does not invoke the agency's specialized competence 
but is a question of law to be decided by the courts.'"  Id. 
(quoting Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Commonwealth Dep't 
of Envtl. Quality, 270 Va. 423, 442, 621 S.E.2d 78, 88 (2005)).  
This appeal presents a pure question of statutory construction 
which we review de novo.  Id. 
B. 
The Parties' Arguments 
 
On appeal, the parties presented the same arguments that 
they advanced at each stage below.  The parties do not dispute 
that, by definition, She-Sha operates a restaurant and a retail 
tobacco store on its premises.  The only dispute between the 
parties is how to read and apply Code §§ 15.2-2821 and -2825 
given She-Sha's dual business identities. 
 
The Department argues that She-Sha is not exclusively a 
retail tobacco store, so Code § 15.2-2821 does not apply.  
 
10 
Rather, it contends that She-Sha is a restaurant as defined by 
VICAA, and therefore, it is subject to regulation under Code § 
15.2-2825.  In support, the Department points to Code § 15.2-
2821(1), which it reads to disallow the exemption in subsection 
(2) if an establishment is otherwise subject to regulation 
under VICAA.  The Department also invokes the maxim "expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius" to construe the two provisions 
together.  It argues that by expressly providing an exemption 
for "tobacco manufacturing facilities" in Code § 15.2-2825, but 
not for "retail tobacco stores" or "tobacco warehouses," the 
General Assembly signaled its intent to regulate restaurants 
operating on the premises of such stores or warehouses.  
Finally, the Department argues that She-Sha's interpretation 
will ultimately require courts to graft a "primary purpose 
test" onto VICAA, whereby courts must determine which aspect of 
the business predominates. 
 
She-Sha argues that the plain language of Code § 15.2-2821 
exempts a retail tobacco store from all smoking regulations 
even if the store is also a "restaurant" as defined by VICAA.  
First, it contends that Code § 15.2-2821(1) means that nothing 
in VICAA should operate by negative inference to permit smoking 
where it is otherwise prohibited by other applicable provisions 
of law "outside the chapter."  Thus, She-Sha posits that 
subsection (1) does not invite conflict with Code § 15.2-2825, 
 
11 
because it provides a rule for applying VICAA to other, 
external smoking prohibitions, while subsection (2) provides a 
rule for applying the smoking regulations contained within 
VICAA.  Consequently, She-Sha asserts that subsection (2) 
forbids the application of any VICAA regulation to an entity 
that could "fairly be described as a retail tobacco store."  
Thus, although Code § 15.2-2825 prohibits smoking in 
restaurants, Code § 15.2-2821 preemptively exempts retail 
tobacco stores from regulation under VICAA.  Finally, She-Sha 
argues that the Department misapplied the maxim "expressio 
unius est exlusio alterius" to Code § 15.2-2825(A), because the 
Department failed to account for the difference in language 
between Code § 15.2-2821(2) ("manufacturing facilities") and 
Code § 15.2-2825(A)(3) ("premises of any manufacturer"). 
C. 
Whether Code § 15.2-2821 Exempts She-Sha from Regulation 
Under Code § 15.2-2825 
 
 
"The primary objective in statutory construction is to 
determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature as 
expressed in the language of the statute."  Appalachian Power 
Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 284 Va. 695, 706, 733 S.E.2d 250, 
256 (2012) (citing Halifax Corp. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 262 
Va. 91, 99-100, 546 S.E.2d 696, 702 (2001)).  "If a statute is 
subject to more than one interpretation, we must apply the 
interpretation that will carry out the legislative intent 
 
12 
behind the statute."  Conyers v. Martial Arts World of 
Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007) 
(collecting cases).  Moreover, "where, as here, a regulatory 
statute is designed to promote the public welfare and the scope 
of the coverage intended is drawn in doubt by a regulated 
[business] claiming exemption, courts must determine what was 
intended."  Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Board of Cnty. 
Supervisors, 226 Va. 382, 387-88, 309 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1983). 
 
With these principles in mind, and for the four reasons 
stated below, we agree with the Department that Code § 15.2-
2825 applies to She-Sha. 
1. 
Code § 15.2-2821 Recognizes a Three-Tier Industry and Code 
§ 15.2-2825 Exempts Only One Tier from Regulation 
 
 
She-Sha, and the Court of Appeals in Kepa II, appears to 
begin with the premise that Code § 15.2-2821(2) applies to its 
business model.  That premise is not supported by the statutory 
framework.  Nothing in subsection (2) references a "retail 
tobacco store and restaurant."  Even so, She-Sha suggests that 
subsection (2) precludes regulation of its restaurant because 
the restaurant is "in" the retail store.  On brief, She-Sha 
identifies Code § 15.2-2824(A)(i), which prohibits smoking in 
elevators, and it notes that Code § 15.2-2821(2) overrides that 
prohibition if the elevator is in a retail tobacco store.  
Thus, She-Sha suggests that we should treat the restaurant the 
 
13 
same way that we would treat an elevator within a retail 
tobacco store and exempt it from regulation under Code § 15.2-
2825.  Of course, this analogy ignores fundamental differences 
between an elevator and a restaurant.  Moreover, the analogy 
relies on the premise that Code § 15.2-2821(2) applies to its 
business model in the first place.  The analogy is not 
sustainable because She-Sha's business identity as a restaurant 
is not separate from its business identity as a retail tobacco 
store: the restaurant and the retail tobacco store are one and 
the same.  Therefore, we cannot, and do not, begin with the 
premise that Code § 15.2-2821(2) applies to exclude regulation 
within She-Sha's establishment. 
 
Rather, we begin by noting that Code § 15.2-2821 defines 
VICAA's general applicability.  The statute, in full, provides 
that: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed 
to: 
 
1. 
Permit smoking where it is otherwise 
prohibited 
or 
restricted 
by 
other 
applicable provisions of law; or 
 
2. 
Regulate 
smoking 
in 
retail 
tobacco 
stores, tobacco warehouses, or tobacco 
manufacturing facilities. 
 
Thus, the General Assembly clearly recognized three tiers 
within the tobacco industry: manufacturing, shipping and 
storage, and retail, and it exempted such businesses from 
 
14 
regulation under VICAA.  Yet, the General Assembly only 
addressed manufacturers in Code § 15.2-2825(A).  The section 
does not address restaurants located on the premises of tobacco 
warehouses or tobacco stores.  In relevant part, the statute 
provides that: 
[S]moking shall be prohibited and no person 
shall 
smoke 
in 
any restaurant 
in 
the 
Commonwealth or in any restroom within such 
restaurant, except that smoking may be 
permitted in: 
 
. . . . 
 
3. 
Any restaurants located on the premises 
of any manufacturer of tobacco products . 
. . . 
 
Code § 15.2-2825(A)(3) (emphasis added).  By its plain 
language, Code § 15.2-2825(A) applies to "any restaurant" 
without exception other than those specifically enumerated in 
subsections (A)(1) through (A)(6).  By contrast, Code § 15.2-
2821(2) deals generally with certain exempt businesses within 
the tobacco industry.  In our view, subsection (A)(3) shows 
that the General Assembly considered the distinct possibility 
that a restaurant could be located in or on the premises of an 
exempted store, warehouse, or manufacturing facility, and 
elected to exempt only one of the three.4  "[W]hen one statute 
                     
4 She-Sha's argument that the term "premises" must necessarily 
mean something other than a "manufacturing facility" assumes a 
"gap" left by Code § 15.2-2821 that would need to be construed 
away.  See Kepa I, 61 Va. App. at 713, 740 S.E.2d at 35 (Petty, 
 
15 
speaks to a subject in a general way and another deals with a 
part of the same subject in a more specific manner, the two 
should be harmonized, if possible, and where they conflict, the 
latter prevails."  Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336, 
340, 257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979) (citations omitted). 
 
Section 15.2-2825(A) specifically prohibits smoking in 
"any restaurant," which in turn is "any place where food is 
served," regardless of its location or the nature of business 
it is combined with.  See Code § 15.2-2820 (defining 
"Restaurant").  The term "retail tobacco store" does not 
connote the degree of inclusivity that the General Assembly 
specifically attributed to a "restaurant."  The General 
Assembly could have specifically exempted "retail tobacco 
stores" and "tobacco warehouses" in the same manner that it 
exempted manufacturers in Code § 15.2-2825(A)(3).  It did not.  
By omitting stores and warehouses from the exemptions in Code § 
15.2-2825(A), the General Assembly signaled its intent to treat 
such establishments differently under VICAA. 
                                                                 
J., dissenting) (construing "premises" to "presumably" fill a 
gap in Code § 15.2-2821).  However, the General Assembly made 
no effort to fill the supposed gap in the case of tobacco 
retail stores or warehouses.   Thus, She-Sha's interpretation 
is redundant to the extent that the "premises" include the 
"manufacturing facility."  To the extent "premises" include 
property in addition to the "manufacturing facility," it 
introduces ambiguity that would require even more 
harmonization. 
 
16 
2. 
Code § 15.2-2825(A)(5) Reflects a Balanced Approach to 
Regulating Smoking in Restaurants 
 
 
Next, we note that Code § 15.2-2825(A)(5) clearly 
accommodates businesses that would like to operate a restaurant 
and allow smoking therein, such as She-Sha.  After the 
introductory clause prohibiting smoking in "any restaurant," 
subsection (A)(5) goes on to permit smoking in: 
Any 
portion 
of 
a 
restaurant 
that 
is 
constructed in such a manner that the area 
. . . is (i) structurally separated from 
the portion of the restaurant in which 
smoking is prohibited and to which ingress 
and egress is through a door and (ii) 
separately 
vented 
to 
prevent 
the 
recirculation of air from such area to the 
area of the restaurant where smoking is 
prohibited. 
 
This provision balances VICAA's public health initiatives with 
the interests of businesses that cater to the smoking public.  
Subsection (A)(5) allows She-Sha to accommodate its patrons who 
wish to smoke and eat at the same time, as long as it provides 
a separate nonsmoking area.  Thus, the General Assembly created 
viable options for businesses that sell both tobacco and food 
for on-site consumption. 
 
The Court of Appeals in Kepa II never considered 
subsection (A)(5), and thus, failed to construe the statute as 
a whole.  See City of Lynchburg v. English Constr. Co., 277 Va. 
574, 584, 675 S.E.2d 197, 202 (2009).  Indeed, the majority in 
Kepa II stated that "[t]he only Code § 15.2-2825(A) exemption 
 
17 
at issue in this case is an exemption for 'restaurants located 
on the premises of any manufacturer of tobacco products.'"  62 
Va. App. at 624 n.10, 751 S.E.2d at 675 n.10.  By neglecting 
the applicability of subsection (A)(5), the Court of Appeals 
failed "to give force and effect" to each provision.  City of 
Lynchburg, 277 Va. at 584, 675 S.E.2d at 202. Had it done so, 
it would have recognized that the General Assembly did create 
an exception that allows hybrid restaurant and retail tobacco 
establishments to conduct both aspects of their business 
simultaneously, thereby obviating the need to draw a bright 
line between retail tobacco store and restaurant.5 
3. 
VICAA Does Not Contain a Primary Business Purpose Test and 
Courts May Not Graft Such a Test onto the Act 
 
 
As we have already noted, She-Sha's restaurant and She-
Sha's retail store are one and the same.  Yet, She-Sha and the 
Court of Appeals would fashion an exemption for restaurants in 
retail tobacco stores, or more accurately, an exemption for 
combination restaurant/retail tobacco stores, provided that the 
                     
5 The majority below suggests that if the General Assembly had 
wanted to authorize "the Department to regulate smoking in any 
facility that prepares and serves food, [then] it would have 
included that authority in Chapter 2 of Title 35.1."  Kepa II, 
62 Va. App. at 626, 751 S.E.2d at 677.  This disregards the 
definition of a "restaurant" in VICAA, which is broad enough to 
authorize the Department to regulate smoking in any such 
facility through Code § 15.2-2825(A).  See Code § 15.2-2820 
(defining restaurant to mean "any place where food is prepared 
for service to the public . . . or any place where food is 
served"). 
 
18 
"primary business is the retail sale of tobacco."  Kepa II, 62 
Va. App. at 621 n.8, 751 S.E.2d at 674 n.8. 
 
The term "retail tobacco store" is not defined anywhere in 
VICAA.  Moreover, construing "retail tobacco store" broadly 
would invite any restaurant to avoid VICAA by selling tobacco 
at retail or re-branding itself as a retail tobacco store that 
happens to prepare and sell food.  She-Sha protests that courts 
could look through a business' self-representation to ensure 
that the "core business model is based upon its sale of tobacco 
to the consuming public." 
 
In Kepa II, the majority adopted this argument.  It 
decided that resolving the practical issue raised by its 
interpretation was "unnecessary" because "She-Sha's primary 
business is the retail sale of tobacco," and thus the opinion 
could be limited to similar scenarios.  62 Va. at 621 n.8, 751 
S.E.2d at 674 n.8.  However, the "primary business" test does 
not appear anywhere in VICAA.  When construing a statute, "we 
are not free to add to language, nor to ignore language, 
contained in statutes."  BBF, Inc. v. Alstom Power, Inc., 274 
Va. 326, 331, 645 S.E.2d 467, 469 (2007) (internal quotation 
marks, alteration, and citation omitted).  There is no 
statutory support for defining what is, or what is not, a 
"retail tobacco store" based on an establishment's "primary 
business."  Consequently, there is no statutory support for 
 
19 
construing Code § 15.2-2821(2) to exempt businesses that are 
not exclusively retail tobacco stores. 
4. 
The Purpose of VICAA is to Promote Public Health 
 
 
"The purpose for which a statute is enacted is of primary 
importance in its interpretation or construction."  Virginia 
Electric & Power Co., 226 Va. at 388, 309 S.E.2d at 311 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  As the 
dissent below recognized, VICAA "is undoubtedly a public health 
initiative."  Kepa II, 62 Va. App. at 630, 751 S.E.2d at 678 
(Chafin, J., dissenting).  The plain language of VICAA clearly 
shows that the General Assembly intended VICAA to promote the 
health of the Commonwealth by reducing exposure to second hand 
smoke in public places.  The enforcement framework buttresses 
that conclusion.6 
 
VICAA promotes clean indoor air in public places, and it 
promotes clean indoor air for the customers and employees of 
such places.  Not all employees have the luxury of working in 
their preferred work environment, yet they must work, and the 
General Assembly has determined that they should be able to 
                     
6 Under Article 2 of VICAA ("Statewide Regulation of Smoking"), 
all fines collected pursuant to its provisions are paid into 
the Virginia Health Care Fund, which is "used solely for the 
provision of health care services."  Code § 32.1-367.  And 
under Article 3 ("Local Regulation of Smoking"), all fines 
collected pursuant to local ordinances are paid into local 
treasury and "shall be expended solely for public health 
purposes."  Code § 15.2-2833(D). 
 
20 
work in an environment that limits their exposure to second 
hand smoke if that concerns them.  Construing Code § 15.2-
2821(2) broadly to include "retail tobacco stores and 
restaurants" would frustrate the purpose of VICAA and roll back 
its protections for restaurant customers and employees 
throughout Virginia, and not just in a single hookah bar in 
Blacksburg. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated, we hold that Code § 15.2-2821 does 
not exempt She-Sha from regulation under Code § 15.2-2825, 
because it is not exclusively a retail tobacco store.7  The 
General Assembly authorized the Department to regulate smoking 
in "any restaurant," defined broadly as "any place where food 
is served," except as permitted by Code § 15.2-2825(A)(1)-(6).  
We will not lightly create a judicial exception to such broad 
language so as to frustrate the General Assembly's public 
health purpose.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and enter final judgment. 
 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
                     
7 Because we find that Code § 15.2-2821(2) is inapplicable to 
She-Sha, we do not decide whether Code § 15.2-2821(1) would 
require Code § 15.2-2825 to preempt Code § 15.2-2821(2). 
 
21 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, dissenting. 
 
I dissent for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals' 
majority in the decision below, Kepa, Inc. v. Virginia Dep't of 
Health, 62 Va. App. 614, 751 S.E.2d 671 (2013)(en banc).