Case Title: Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Wood

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1111486

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2013-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 02/22/2013 
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t h e 
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Southern Reporter. 
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Decisions, 
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0 6 4 9 ) , o f 
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t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n 
o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may be 
made b e f o r e 
t h e o p i n i o n i s 
p r i n t e d i n 
Southern Reporter. 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 
1111486 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company 
v. 
Barbara Walker Wood, as administratrix of the estate 
of 
D.V.G., a minor, deceased, and K.C.T., a minor, by 
and 
through Earnest T., h i s 
father and next f r i e n d 
C e r t i f i e d Question from the 
United States D i s t r i c t Court 
f o r 
the Northern D i s t r i c t of 
Alabama, Southern D i v i s i o n 
(Case no. 2:11-CV-03967-JHH) 
STUART, J u s t i c e . 
1111486 
N a t i o n w i d e M u t u a l F i r e I n s u r a n c e Company ("Nationwide") 
and 
S t a t e Farm M u t u a l A u t o m o b i l e I n s u r a n c e Company 
("State 
Farm") 
f i l e d 
a d e c l a r a t o r y - j u d g m e n t 
a c t i o n i n t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r 
t h e N o r t h e r n 
D i s t r i c t o f Alabama, 
Southern 
D i v i s i o n , 
s e e k i n g , 
among 
o t h e r 
t h i n g s , 
a 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f 
t h e s t a t u s o f 
a s e t t l e m e n t agreement t h e y had 
r e a c h e d 
w i t h D.V.G., a minor, 
r e s o l v i n g h e r c l a i m s f o r 
coverage stemming f r o m i n j u r i e s she r e c e i v e d i n 
an a u t o m o b i l e 
a c c i d e n t , 
f o l l o w i n g h e r d e a t h i n a subsequent 
u n r e l a t e d 
a u t o m o b i l e 
a c c i d e n t 
b e f o r e 
t h e 
J e f f e r s o n 
C i r c u i t 
C o u r t 
a p p r o v e d t h a t 
s e t t l e m e n t 
agreement. 
The f e d e r a l 
d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t u l t i m a t e l y c o n c l u d e d 
t h a t t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d 
i n v o l v e d 
a 
q u e s t i o n 
o f Alabama law f o r w h i c h 
t h e r e was no c l e a r 
c o n t r o l l i n g 
p r e c e d e n t , 
and i t t h e r e f o r e 
c e r t i f i e d 
t h e 
f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n t o t h i s C o u r t p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 18, A l a . R. 
App. 
P.: 
"Under Alabama law, 
i s 
an i n s u r a n c e company bound t o 
a s e t t l e m e n t agreement n e g o t i a t e d on b e h a l f o f an 
i n j u r e d 
minor, 
i f t h a t 
minor 
d i e s 
b e f o r e 
t h e 
s c h e d u l i n g o f a p r o ami h e a r i n g w h i c h was 
i n t e n d e d 
by b o t h s i d e s t o o b t a i n a p p r o v a l o f t h e s e t t l e m e n t ? " 
We c o n s e n t e d t o answer t h e q u e s t i o n , and we now answer i t i n 
the a f f i r m a t i v e . 
2 
1111486 
I . 
The 
f e d e r a l 
d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t 
p r o v i d e d 
t h e f o l l o w i n g 
s t a t e m e n t o f f a c t s , w h i c h was s t i p u l a t e d 
t o 
by 
t h e 
p a r t i e s , 
i n 
the 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n o r d e r 
f i l e d w i t h t h i s C o u r t on August 17, 
2012: 
"On o r about March 16, 2011, 
D.V.G. was an 
occupant o f a v e h i c l e d r i v e n by K.C.T. t h a t was 
i n v o l v e d i n 
a s i n g l e - v e h i c l e 
motor v e h i c l e a c c i d e n t 
i n 
Hoover, Alabama. 
A t t h e time o f t h e s u b j e c t 
a c c i d e n t , t h e 
v e h i c l e o c c u p i e d by 
D.V.G. and d r i v e n 
by K.C.T. was i n s u r e d under a p o l i c y o f i n s u r a n c e 
i s s u e d by [ N a t i o n w i d e ] . 
T h i s 
N a t i o n w i d e 
p o l i c y 
p r o v i d e d f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y l i a b i l i t y coverage. A t 
the 
time o f t h e s u b j e c t 
a c c i d e n t , D.V.G. 
a l s o 
p o s s e s s e d u n i n s u r e d / u n d e r i n s u r e d 
m o t o r i s t 
coverage 
under a p o l i c y o f i n s u r a n c e i s s u e d by [ S t a t e Farm]. 
"Stan B r o b s t o n , 
a c t i n g as a t t o r n e y f o r D.V.G., 
who was a minor 
a t t h e time 
o f t h e s u b j e c t 
c o l l i s i o n , made i n s u r a n c e c l a i m s f o r p e r s o n a l 
i n j u r y 
a g a i n s t K.C.T., who s u b m i t t e d t h e c l a i m under t h e 
N a t i o n w i d e 
l i a b i l i t y 
p o l i c y 
and f o r u n i n s u r e d / 
u n d e r i n s u r e d 
m o t o r i s t coverage under t h e 
S t a t e Farm 
p o l i c y , b u t 
d i d 
n o t f i l e 
s u i t . 
On o r about August 
5, 2011, 
a l e t t e r was w r i t t e n t o R a l p h D. 
G a i n e s , 
I I I [ a t t o r n e y f o r N a t i o n w i d e ] , and 
f o r w a r d e d t o Stan 
B r o b s t o n , 
as c o u n s e l f o r 
D.V.G., c o n f i r m i n g 
t h a t 
N a t i o n w i d e was t e n d e r i n g i t s b o d i l y i n j u r y 
l i a b i l i t y 
l i m i t s 
o f $50,000.00 t o D.V.G. 
On o r about 
September 
7, 
2011, S t a t e 
Farm 
i n f o r m e d 
Stan 
B r o b s t o n , 
as 
c o u n s e l 
f o r D.V.G., 
t h a t 
i t 
was 
t e n d e r i n g 
i t s a v a i l a b l e 
u n i n s u r e d / u n d e r i n s u r e d 
m o t o r i s t l i m i t s o f 
$50,000.00 t o 
D.V.G. The o f f e r s 
made by N a t i o n w i d e and S t a t e Farm, w h i c h t o t a l e d 
$100,000, were 
a c c e p t e d by Stan 
B r o b s t o n 
as 
t h e 
a t t o r n e y f o r D.V.G. I t 
was t h e 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a l l 
p a r t i e s t h a t t h e s e t t l e m e n t needed t o 
be 
s u b m i t t e d 
3 
1111486 
t o 
t h e C i r c u i t 
C o u r t 
o f J e f f e r s o n 
County f o r 
a p p r o v a l . 
"On o r about September 15, 2011, D.V.G. p a s s e d 
away as t h e r e s u l t o f i n j u r i e s 
s u s t a i n e d i n 
an 
u n r e l a t e d motor v e h i c l e a c c i d e n t 
t h a t o c c u r r e d on 
t h a t d a t e . 
The p a r t i e s agree t h a t D.V.G.'s d e a t h 
was n o t 
r e l a t e d t o 
t h e 
a l l e g e d i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d 
i n 
the s u b j e c t a c c i d e n t on March 16, 2011. As o f t h e 
date o f 
h e r 
d e a t h , t h e r e had 
been no c o m p l a i n t 
f i l e d 
by o r on b e h a l f o f D.V.G., a s s e r t i n g c l a i m s f o r 
p e r s o n a l 
i n j u r y o f UM/UIM b e n e f i t s a g a i n s t K.C.T. 
and/or 
S t a t e Farm i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e a u t o m o b i l e 
a c c i d e n t o c c u r r i n g on March 16, 2011. No p r o 
ami 
h e a r i n g was ever h e l d , and a c o u r t never approved 
the 
s e t t l e m e n t . "
1 
I I . 
The r e l e v a n t f a c t s i n t h i s case are u n d i s p u t e d . 
"Because 
the i s s u e s b e f o r e us i n v o l v e o n l y t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f law t o 
u n d i s p u t e d 
f a c t s , our r e v i e w i s 
de novo." 
S t a t e Farm Mut. 
 
Auto. I n s . Co. v. M o t l e y , 909 So. 2d 806, 810 ( A l a . 2005) 
( c i t i n g A l f a Mut. 
I n s . Co. 
v. S m a l l , 829 
So. 
2d 743, 745 ( A l a . 
2002); and A l l s t a t e I n s . Co. 
v. S k e l t o n , 675 So. 
2d 377, 379 
( A l a . 
1 9 9 6 ) ) . 
^There was 
a p p a r e n t l y 
some 
argument i n t h e f e d e r a l 
d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t 
as t o whether t h e o f f e r 
and a c c e p t a n c e 
communicated between a t t o r n e y s was s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h 
a 
s e t t l e m e n t 
agreement. 
However, t h e q u e s t i o n as 
c e r t i f i e d 
assumes t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a s e t t l e m e n t 
agreement, and, f o r 
purposes o f t h i s o p i n i o n , we do l i k e w i s e . 
4 
1111486 
I I I . 
"Under t h e 
Alabama s u r v i v a l s t a t u t e , § 6-5-462, 
A l a . 
Code 1975, an u n f i l e d c l a i m s o u n d i n g i n t o r t 
w i l l not s u r v i v e t h e d e a t h o f t h e p e r s o n w i t h t h e 
c l a i m , Malcolm v. K i n g , 686 So. 2d 231 ( A l a . 1996); 
G e o r g i a Cas. & Sur. Co. v. White, 582 So. 2d 487 
( A l a . 
1991) . 
A c l a i m on a c o n t r a c t , on t h e o t h e r 
hand, 
s u r v i v e s i n f a v o r o f a decedent's 
p e r s o n a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , 
r e g a r d l e s s o f whether t h e decedent 
had 
f i l e d an a c t i o n b e f o r e h i s d e a t h , M c C u l l e y v.  
S o u t h T r u s t Bank o f B a l d w i n County, 575 So. 2d 1106 
( A l a . 
1991); B e n e f i e l d v. A q u a s l i d e 
'N' Dive Corp., 
406 So. 2d 873 ( A l a . 1981)." 
Brooks v. H i l l , 717 So. 2d 759, 763 ( A l a . 1998) . Thus, i t 
i s 
u n d i s p u t e d t h a t any p o t e n t i a l 
t o r t 
c l a i m s D.V.G. h e l d were 
e x t i n g u i s h e d when she d i e d ; t h e 
i s s u e b e f o r e us i s whether she 
h e l d 
any c o n t r a c t u a l 
c l a i m s 
a t h e r d e a t h 
t h a t 
a r e now 
e n f o r c e a b l e by t h e a d m i n i s t r a t r i x o f h e r e s t a t e , h e r mother 
B a r b a r a Walker Wood. Wood argues t h a t t h e s e t t l e m e n t 
a g r e e d 
t o by D.V.G.'s a t t o r n e y Stan B r o b s t o n and 
N a t i o n w i d e and S t a t e 
Farm 
i s a 
v a l i d 
c o n t r a c t 
t h a t 
Wood 
can now 
e n f o r c e . 
N a t i o n w i d e and S t a t e Farm argue t h a t t h e s e t t l e m e n t 
agreement 
was 
an e x e c u t o r y 
c o n t r a c t 
t h a t would n o t be complete and 
b i n d i n g 
u n t i l i t was approved by t h e J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t C o u r t 
f o l l o w i n g a p r o 
ami h e a r i n g . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , t h e y argue t h a t , 
even i f t h e 
s e t t l e m e n t agreement was a b i n d i n g and e n f o r c e a b l e 
c o n t r a c t , t h e 
p r o 
ami h e a r i n g was a c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t t o t h e 
5 
1111486 
performance o f the c o n t r a c t and 
t h a t h e a r i n g i s now i m p o s s i b l e 
as a r e s u l t o f 
t h e 
d e a t h o f 
D.V.G.; c o n s e q u e n t l y , 
t h e y argue, 
t h e i r d u t y t o p e r f o r m under t h e c o n t r a c t i s d i s c h a r g e d . 
Based on t h e s t i p u l a t e d f a c t s , i t 
i s a p p a r e n t t h a t a 
c o n t r a c t d i d e x i s t a t 
t h e 
time o f 
D.V.G.'s d e a t h . 
N a t i o n w i d e 
and 
S t a t e Farm have argued t h a t a minor l a c k s c a p a c i t y t o 
c o n t r a c t and cannot e n t e r i n t o a b i n d i n g s e t t l e m e n t o f h i s o r 
her p o t e n t i a l c l a i m s ; however, t h i s argument i s i n c o m p l e t e . 
As 
t h i s 
C o u r t has s t a t e d , 
" ' [ i ] t i s w e l l 
s e t t l e d by t h e 
a u t h o r i t i e s 
t h a t 
i n f a n t s a r e n o t l i a b l e on any o f 
t h e i r 
c o n t r a c t s , e x c e p t f o r n e c e s s a r i e s . 
With t h e e x c e p t i o n , a l l 
o t h e r c o n t r a c t s o f i n f a n t s , whether e x e c u t o r y o r 
e x e c u t e d , may 
be a v o i d e d o r r a t i f i e d a t 
t h e 
e l e c t i o n o f t h e i n f a n t . ' " H&S  
Homes, L.L.C. v. McDonald, 823 So. 2d 627, 630 ( A l a . 2001) 
( q u o t i n g H a r r i s v. Raughton, 37 A l a . App. 
648, 
649, 
73 So. 
2d 
921, 922 (1954) (emphasis a d d e d ) ) . See a l s o D a v i s v. T u r n e r , 
337 
So. 2d 355, 361 ( A l a . C i v . 
App. 1976) ( s t a t i n g 
t h a t 
c o n t r a c t s e n t e r e d 
i n t o by minors a r e "not v o i d , b u t v o i d a b l e 
o n l y " and 
"not t o t a l l y i n e f f e c t u a l , [but] m e r e l y 
u n e n f o r c e a b l e 
i f 
l a t e r r e p u d i a t e d " ) . 
Thus, a t 
t h e 
time t h e s e t t l e m e n t was 
a g r e e d t o , a c o n t r a c t was formed 
t h a t was b i n d i n g 
upon 
6 
1111486 
N a t i o n w i d e and S t a t e Farm b u t v o i d a b l e a t D.V.G.'s e l e c t i o n .
2 
See a l s o White v. A l l i e d Mut. I n s . Co., 29 Kan. 
App. 2d 
797, 
802, 31 P.3d 328, 332 (2001) 
(minor n o t bound by s e t t l e m e n t 
agreement u n t i l c o u r t a p p r o v a l was o b t a i n e d , b u t o t h e r p a r t y 
was 
"bound n o t t o revoke o r attempt t o w i t h d r a w i t s o f f e r " 
p r i o r t o t h e c o u r t h e a r i n g ) ; Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 
1075, 
1080 ( 9 t h C i r . 1978) 
( s e t t l e m e n t was v o i d a b l e a t 
e l e c t i o n o f minor u n t i l approved by t h e c o u r t ) ; and Danes v.  
A u t o m o b i l e U n d e r w r i t e r s , I n c . , 
159 I n d . 
App. 505, 511, 307 
N.E.2d 902, 906 (1974) ( s e t t l e m e n t o f minor's c l a i m n o t v o i d 
ab 
i n i t i o b u t v o i d a b l e u n t i l c o u r t a p p r o v a l i s o b t a i n e d ) . 
^Nationwide 
and S t a t e Farm c i t e Tennessee C o a l , I r o n &  
R.R. v. Hayes, 97 A l a . 201, 210, 12 So. 98, 103 (1892), f o r 
the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a s e t t l e m e n t agreement e n t e r e d 
i n t o on 
b e h a l f o f 
a minor i s 
i n v a l i d u n t i l i t r e c e i v e s c o u r t a p p r o v a l . 
("[The n e x t f r i e n d ' s ] mere consent i s 
n u g a t o r y . 
I t 
i s 
as i f 
i t were n o t and had never b e e n . " ) . 
However, i t i s a p p a r e n t 
t h a t t h e C o u r t was s p e a k i n g o n l y o f t h e n e x t f r i e n d ' s a b i l i t y 
t o b i n d t h e 
minor, n o t 
t h e o t h e r p a r t y . 
See 97 A l a . a t 
209, 
12 So. a t 
103 ("[The next f r i e n d ] can 
n o t r e l e a s e t h e 
cause o f 
a c t i o n , nor 
compromise i t , nor 
submit i t 
t o 
an a r b i t r a t i o n t h e 
 
r e s u l t o f w h i c h w i l l b i n d t h e i n f a n t . " (emphasis 
a d d e d ) ) . 
Moreover, we note t h a t i n 
t h i s case i t i s 
u n c l e a r whether 
Wood was i n v o l v e d i n 
n e g o t i a t i n g o r a p p r o v i n g t h e s e t t l e m e n t . 
No a c t i o n had 
been i n i t i a t e d by Wood on D.V.G.'s b e h a l f a t t h e 
time o f t h e s e t t l e m e n t , and t h e s t i p u l a t e d 
f a c t s b e f o r e us 
i n d i c a t e o n l y t h a t B r o b s t o n n e g o t i a t e d t h e s e t t l e m e n t " a c t i n g 
as a t t o r n e y f o r D.V.G." 
7 
1111486 
N a t i o n w i d e 
and 
S t a t e Farm n e v e r t h e l e s s argue t h a t 
the 
f a c t t h a t no h e a r i n g was h e l d t o a l l o w a c o u r t t o approve the 
s e t t l e m e n t — 
a h e a r i n g t h a t a l l 
p a r t i e s agree was r e q u i r e d t o 
t a k e 
p l a c e 
— 
n u l l i f i e s 
the 
agreed-upon 
s e t t l e m e n t 
and 
r e l e a s e s them from t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s under t h a t 
s e t t l e m e n t 
e i t h e r because the c o n t r a c t was m u t u a l l y e x e c u t o r y or because 
the c o n t e m p l a t e d 
h e a r i n g was 
a c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t t o 
t h e i r 
p e r f o r m a n c e . 
E i t h e r argument i s p r e m i s e d on the t h e o r y t h a t 
the h e a r i n g and c o u r t a p p r o v a l i s now 
i m p o s s i b l e because of 
D.V.G.'s d e a t h — 
i f D.V.G. cannot execute her o b l i g a t i o n t o 
o b t a i n c o u r t a p p r o v a l of the s e t t l e m e n t , N a t i o n w i d e 
and S t a t e 
Farm argue, then 
t h e y are l i k e w i s e e x c u s e d from 
f u l f i l l i n g 
t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s of p a y i n g her the sums a g r e e d upon i n the 
s e t t l e m e n t , and, i f o b t a i n i n g c o u r t a p p r o v a l was 
a c o n d i t i o n 
p r e c e d e n t , 
t h e i r 
d u t y 
t o 
p e r f o r m 
under 
the 
s e t t l e m e n t 
agreement does not a r i s e u n t i l t h a t a c t i s a c c o m p l i s h e d . 
See 
Lemoine Co. of Alabama, L.L.C. v. HLJ C o n s t r u c t o r s , I n c . , 
62 
So. 3d 1020, 
1025 
n. 5 ( A l a . 2010) 
( n o t i n g t h a t " B l a c k ' s 
Law 
 
D i c t i o n a r y 
d e f i n e s 
' c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t ' 
as 
' [ a ] n 
a c t 
or 
e v e n t , 
o t h e r t h a n a l a p s e of t i m e , t h a t must e x i s t or 
o c c u r 
8 
1111486 
b e f o r e a d u t y t o p e r f o r m something p r o m i s e d a r i s e s . ' 
B l a c k ' s 
Law 
D i c t i o n a r y 312 
(8th ed. 
2 0 0 4 ) . " ) . 
However, a l t h o u g h N a t i o n w i d e ' s 
and S t a t e Farm's arguments 
are 
based 
on 
sound 
p r i n c i p l e s 
of 
c o n t r a c t 
law, 
t h e y 
n e v e r t h e l e s s u l t i m a t e l y f a i l because t h e y 
are based on 
the 
u n s u p p o r t e d p r e m i s e t h a t D.V.G.'s death makes i t i m p o s s i b l e 
f o r the s e t t l e m e n t agreement t o be s u b m i t t e d t o the J e f f e r s o n 
C i r c u i t C o u r t f o r a p p r o v a l . 
As Wood argues i n her 
b r i e f : 
" [ N a t i o n w i d e 
and 
S t a t e 
Farm] 
here 
t a k e 
the 
p o s i t i o n t h a t [D.V.G.'s] death 
p r i o r t o a p r o 
ami 
h e a r i n g makes, f o r t u i t o u s l y f o r them, such a h e a r i n g 
i m p o s s i b l e . 
However, no c i t a t i o n i s g i v e n f o r such 
a p r o p o s i t i o n . A l l of the e v i d e n c e 
n e c e s s a r y 
f o r a 
t r i a l c o u r t t o make a p r o ami d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
a b i d e s . 
A h e a r i n g t o approve the agreement c o u l d y e t be h e l d 
but f o r the r e f u s a l on the p a r t of 
[Nationwide 
and 
S t a t e Farm] i n the i n s t a n t c a s e . " 
Wood's b r i e f , pp. 6-7. 
In t h e i r b r i e f s , N a t i o n w i d e 
and S t a t e 
Farm c o u n t e r t h a t t h e y have c i t e d Mayo v. A n d r e s s , 373 So. 
2d 
620, 625 
( A l a . 1979), f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t D.V.G.'s d e a t h 
makes a p r o 
ami 
h e a r i n g i m p o s s i b l e ; however, t h a t 
c i t a t i o n 
s u p p o r t s o n l y the g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t "the p r o m i s o r must 
p e r f o r m u n l e s s the performance i s r e n d e r e d 
i m p o s s i b l e by a c t 
of God, 
by the law, or by the o t h e r p a r t y . " 
( T o r b e r t , 
C.J., 
c o n c u r r i n g s p e c i a l l y ) . Mayo i n no way i n d i c a t e s t h a t i t would 
9 
1111486 
be i m p o s s i b l e f o r a t r i a l c o u r t t o r u l e on whether a c o n t r a c t 
a g r e e i n g t o s e t t l e a m i n o r ' s c l a i m s was i n 
t h e minor's b e s t 
i n t e r e s t , though t h e minor i s now deceased. 
F o r a l l t h a t 
appears, t h e 
e v i d e n c e r e q u i r e d f o r such a h e a r i n g i n 
t h i s case 
i s 
s t i l l 
a v a i l a b l e , even though t h e now deceased minor i s 
n o t .
3 
I t 
i s 
e s t a b l i s h e d law 
t h a t a decedent's c o n t r a c t c l a i m s 
s u r v i v e h i s 
o r h e r d e a t h , and, because we have h e l d t h a t t h e 
s e t t l e m e n t 
agreement was a c o n t r a c t v o i d a b l e a t D.V.G.'s 
e l e c t i o n , we can t h i n k o f no reason why a t r i a l c o u r t c o u l d 
3 I n d e e d , Wood has a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e 
o n l y reason a h e a r i n g 
has n o t 
been h e l d i s 
because N a t i o n w i d e and S t a t e Farm r e f u s e 
to 
t a k e 
p a r t . 
As t h e Kansas C o u r t o f A p p e a l s h e l d i n a 
s i m i l a r case, such a r e f u s a l i s improper: 
"The 
' f r i e n d l y ' h e a r i n g i n t e n d e d t o 
o b t a i n c o u r t 
a p p r o v a l o f t h e s e t t l e m e n t agreement q u a l i f i e d as a 
c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t f o r 
t h e s e t t l e m e n t 
agreement. 
[The i n s u r e r ] u n d e r t o o k t o arrange t h e h e a r i n g and 
then r e f u s e d t o go f o r w a r d w i t h 
i t . 
T h i s i t 
c o u l d 
not do. 
"'"The r u l e i s 
c l e a r and w e l l s e t t l e d , 
and 
founded i n a b s o l u t e 
j u s t i c e , 
t h a t a 
p a r t y 
t o 
a 
c o n t r a c t 
cannot 
p r e v e n t 
performance by 
another 
and d e r i v e any 
b e n e f i t , o r escape any l i a b i l i t y , from h i s 
own 
f a i l u r e 
t o 
p e r f o r m 
a 
n e c e s s a r y 
c o n d i t i o n . 
[ C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ] 
And t h i s 
i s 
t h e 
u n i v e r s a l 
r u l e . 
[ C i t a t i o n s 
o m i t t e d . ] " ' 
[ W a l l e r i u s v. Hare,] 194 
Kan. 
[408,] 412, 399 P.2d 543 [ ( 1 9 6 5 ) ] . " 
White, 29 Kan. 
App. 2d a t 803, 31 P.3d a t 
332. 
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1111486 
not make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e f a i r n e s s o f t h a t c o n t r a c t even 
a f t e r t h e minor's d e a t h . 
F o r t h e s e 
r e a s o n s , we answer t h e 
c e r t i f i e d q u e s t i o n i n 
t h e a f f i r m a t i v e . 
IV. 
Under Alabama law, an i n s u r a n c e company i s bound t o a 
s e t t l e m e n t agreement n e g o t i a t e d on b e h a l f o f 
an i n j u r e d minor, 
even i f t h a t minor d i e s b e f o r e t h e s c h e d u l i n g o f t h e c o u r t 
h e a r i n g 
t h a t 
a l l p a r t i e s 
a g r e e d was 
n e c e s s a r y 
t o o b t a i n 
a p p r o v a l o f t h e s e t t l e m e n t agreement. 
I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e 
p a r t i e s ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g , 
such a h e a r i n g i s s t i l l r e q u i r e d , and 
the minor's d e a t h does not r e n d e r t h a t h e a r i n g i m p o s s i b l e . 
We 
thus answer i n 
t h e a f f i r m a t i v e t h e q u e s t i o n c e r t i f i e d t o t h i s 
C o u r t . 
QUESTION ANSWERED. 
Moore, C.J., 
and B o l i n , P a r k e r , Murdock, Main, Wise, and 
B r y a n , 
J J . , concur. 
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