Case Title: Estate of Klink v. State.

Citation: 113 Haw. 332

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
TAW LIBRARY
‘4 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER *#*
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

= 000 ~~

 

 

THE ESTATE OF ALOYSIUS KLINK, by its Special Administratrix,
HILDEGARD T. KLINK; DANIA M. KLINK, @ minor, by HILDEGARD T.
KLINK, as Her Next Friend; HILDEGARD 'T. KLINK; DIANA KLINK-JAMES;
JULIA A. KLINK; and ALEKANDER M. KLINK, Plaintiffs-Appellants

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Defendant-Appellee

and
INC. ; GORDON SOUDER; PAUL S. OGASAWARA; JOHN

SUBARU OF AMERICA,
JANE DOES 1-10; DOE BUSINESS ENTITIES 1-10; DOE
Defendants

DOES 1-10;
CORPORATIONS 1-10; and DOE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES 1-10,

 

No. 25430

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO. 98-039)

2007

 

ans

February 20,
NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUPABIa7.

MOON, C.J, LEVINSON,
OPINION OF THE cover BY LeviNsoN, J.

‘The plaintiffs-appellants Hildegard T. Klink,

g
a
=
2
&§

individually, as special administratrix of the estate of Aloysius
Klink, a minor,

Klink (Klink), and as next of friend of Dania M.
and Alexander

Michael Klink, Diana Klink-James, Julia A. Klink,
M, Klink (hereinafter, collectively, “the Appellants”] appeal
from the October 7, 2002 amended judgment of the circuit court of

the third circuit, the Honorable Riki May Amano presiding, in
 

‘+8 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER
favor of the defendant-appellee State of Hawai"i (hereinafter,
the state] and against the Appellants.

The present matter concerns the death of Klink in an
automobile accident, which eccurred on the island of Hawai'i on
March 9, 1997. The Appellants raise sixteen points of error on
appeal, contending in substance that the circuit court: (1)
erred in concluding that the State fulfilled its duty to design,
construct, and maintain the highway and its duty to warns (2)
abused ite discretion in excluding evidence of prior and
subsequent accidents near the site of the subject accident; (3)
clearly erred in finding that a warning sign was in place on the
morning of the accident approximately $00 feet before the
accident site; and (4) abused its discretion in allowing an
expert witness for the State to testify regarding matters
allegedly beyond the scope of his expertise. Intertwined with
these points of error, the Appellants also challenge as clearly
erroneous certain findings of fact (FOFs) entered by the circuit
court on March 18, 2002.

For the reasons discussed infra in section III, we
hold, on the record before us, that the State is liable to the
Appellants as 2 matter of law. We therefore vacate the circuit
court’s October 7, 2002 amended judgment and remand for a trial

on the issue of the Appellants’ damages.

1. BACKGROUND
A. The Accident
At approximately 7:00 a.m. on March 9, 1997, on a

section of Route 130, located on the island of Hawai'i and known

 
44 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER +++
as the Péhos Bypass, a northbound Subaru being driven by Klink
crossed over the center line and into the southbound lane,
colliding with an oncoming truck driven by Gordon Souder, killing
Klink.

John Silva came upon the accident scene before the
arrival of any police and proceeded to a local store to call for
assistance. He did not recall seeing any water runoff on the
highway.

Officer Martin Ellazar of the Hawai'i County Police
Department (HCPD), trained in accident investigation and
reconstruction, was assigned to the Traffic Enforcement Unit on
‘the morning of the accident and arrived at the scene
approximately one hour and fifteen minutes after the accident had
occurred. He later testified that, throughout his approximately
hour-long investigation, it was raining intermittently, he
observed water traveling across the roadway, and he photographed
an area “where the water runoff [wa]s up against the berm and the
water [was] coming off of the northbound into the southbound
lane.” Officer Ellazar also observed runoff debris -- material
deposited both along the lower western portion of the roadway and
along the shoulder -- which he said was indicative of water
flowing across the roadway, but could not estimate when the
debris had been deposited. At the time, he did not observe any
water flowing from the eastside driveway that fronted the highway

at the location of the accident.

 

HCPO Officer Randali Aurelio, who arrived at the

at least fifteen minutes after the accident, did not observe any
see POR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HIWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER ***
water flowing from the east side of the highway and crossing the
roadway, nor did he observe any runoff debris on the northbound
lane, but he did observe some water running down the southbound
lane and the berm on the west side of the road. The water flow
did not concern hin.

8B. The Highwa
Sometime before 1991, the State approved highway

designs drafted by a private firm for construction of the Pahoa
Bypass and the accompanying shoulder areas, earthen banks, and
driveways in the area of the accident. The State constructed the
highway and opened it for traffic in 1991 and has had the legal
responsibility to maintain it since then. Howard Haymore, an
employee of the State’s Department of Transportation (DOT),
supervised its construction. The highway runs generally north
and south, but the section where the accident occurred turns to
the west on a 2000-foot radius curve with a 4.5 percent downhill
grade toward the north and an average 2.4 percent superelevation'
Gown toward the west. The highway plans included a cutbank on
the eastern shoulder and the construction of two driveways in the
area of the Klink accident. During the construction process, the
shoulder of the road was cut into in order to achieve a uniform
slope. Prior to the March 9, 1997 accident, there was no

drainage system at the site on the eastern shoulder but, in 1998,

 

the DOT installed an interceptor ditch.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 2299 (1993)
defines “superelevation” as “the vertical distance between the heighte of
{nner and outer eoges of highkay pavenent”; e.g., the banked curve of &
rocetrack would have substential superelevetion.

4
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‘The Lawsuit And Testimony

On March 3, 1998, the Appellants filed a first amended

 

complaint against the State and the other defendants,’ alleging,
inter alia: (1) that the State negligently designed,
constructed, and maintained the Pahoa Bypass, such that the
roadway was “deficient, dangerous, and inadequate”; (2) that the
State failed to warn motorists adequately of the unsafe condition
of the Bypass; and (3) that the State’s negligence was the legal
cause? of Klink’s death.
on June 12, 2001, the State filed a motion in limine to
exclude police reports describing twenty-two prior accidents and
five subsequent accidents near the site of the subject collision.
‘The Appellants’ counsel partially opposed the motion, seeking to
have seven of the reports admitted for consideration by their
accident reconstruction expert, Harry Krueper:
(Counsel): . . . T have no problen . . . with the real substance
Gf" the motion [to exclude the Feporta). te's just
that any time any expert analyzer a traffic accident
he ordinarily looks at... + incidences thet occurred
on the rosdway. 1 don’t believe... Krueper is
gonna specifically refer to the factors... involved

in other accidents but he would believe | | . sey
that he looked at the other accidents to determine

 

 

+ the other defendants included Subaru of America, Inc., Souder, and
alleged to be a source
.S5ed without prejudice by
sd with prejudice by
stipulation on July 7, 1999. All remaining claims against Souder were
Gismiased with prejudice by stipulation on vuly § and August 10, 1999,

 

  

2 “Because we prefer ‘legal cause’ over ‘proximate cause,’ we use
the former, except uhen quoting directly from = case.” Tavior-Rice
91 Hawai'l 60, €9 n.6, 979 F.2d 1086, 1085 n.6 (1999). ee alge
Lapez, 77 Mawas's 262, 287 5, 684.24 345, 350 n.5. (1994) (tPor ur
Purposes, the terns ‘legal cause’ and "proximate cause’ are synonymous,
although courts should use “iegal cause’ instead of ‘proximate cause’ when
Instructing Juries. See Knedle v. watkiki Getewsy Hotel, 69 Raw. 376, 369,

342 Buza 317, 366 (198711

   

 
   

[FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S AWAIT REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER

what other factors may have influenced his
Unvestigation. But beyond that I'don’t think that
he's going to sey that. - . Because of an accident
that occurred in 1982 ne believes that this particular
condition... . is negligent.

The court: Is he offerig’an opinion as to fegligence?

[counsel]: No, . - - not negligence, rather it's defective in
Sessgn) excuse me. But I don't believe he’s gonna
fefer. - . specifically to any other accidents. He
‘all say'.'. + that he did look at #12 other
Theidences on'this particular stretch of roadway to
See if there wae something there that clued him into
hat would be a design defect... .(O)ther than that
Son" think he'll refer to anything specifically.

the court: Hy experience with design is the facts stand on their
oun and that being its dimensions of angles.

Icounser}: That's correct. that is correct, yes. But... T
ihink any expert locking at whether the roadway is

* Gelective does consider other incicences that
Gocurred on the roadway, which he certainly did, as
Gig. - (the State's expert, Andrew) Levitt, but
fers not gonna specifically say that because of this
Recident(] or because of @ factor in another accident,
that this indicates Gesion defect].

Sot understand.” <1 really have no
objection to the motion With that caveat, Your Honor.

 

 

  

      

 

(Some capitalization altered.) The circuit court then granted
‘the motion, noting “with respect to the caveat, I am just
wondering if there would be some sort of . . . objection as to
relevancy . . . because I can’t see how [the accident reports)
would be relevant especially with respect to an expert opinion on
design.” ‘The police reports that the Appellants’ counsel sought
to offer into evidence involved seven accidents that occurred
prior to March 9, 1997 in rainy conditions at the following

locations:
 

48 FOR PUBLICATION An WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER +1

Distance from

Date of Accident Klink's Point of Impact!
August 7, 1993 302 feet north

February’ 17,1994
uly’ 25, 1954
Septenner 8, 199¢
August 25, i995
Mazch 3, 1996
May 18, 1996

 

‘The September 9, 1994 accident report and witness

m., in rainy conditions, the

 

interview states that at 6:50
driver of a northbound vehicle observed a southbound vehicle
cross the center line and enter the northbound lene of travel.
‘The northbound driver successfully avoided a collision by
maneuvering onto the shoulder of the highway but observed in her
rearview mirror that the southbound vehicle “kept coming into the
(north]bound lane,” striking the vehicle following directly
behind her. The accident occurred in the vicinity of the
“Reduced Speed 45 MPH” sign where Klink’s vehicle came to a rest
on the day of the Klink accident. Aside from a notation

indicating “rain” on the report under “Weather Conditions,”

 

‘the record provides the location of the pricr accidents in
relation to the eleven and twelve mile Barkers cn the Pahos Bypass. but,
because a review of the circuit court's ip limine ruling necessitates
consideration of the similarity between the pricr accidents and Alink' # with
Fegard to the sectien of highway implicated, the locations reported in the
accident reports have been translated to fix the eite of the Klink accident a8
the point ef reference

 

 

* The Appellants, in their menorandum in opposition to the state!s
notion in lining, referred’ to an April 9, 1994 sccicent Dut 2 careful reading
Of the pertinent accident report reveals that the handwritten police report i=
Gated septesber 9, 1994 (9/9/94) ie no report pertaining to-an April
3, 1996 accident in the record.

 

   
0 YOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER ***
however, there is no mention made of the road conditions nor of
the underlying cause of the southbound vehicle entering the
oncoming lane of traffic.

‘The August 25, 1995 accident report indicates that a
southbound vehicle hydroplaned at @ curve approximately $30 feet
to the north of the Klink accident site, crossed the center line
and collided head-on with a northbound vehicle. ‘The remainder of
the reports provide few details beyond the fact that the driver
“Lost control” or “ran off” the roadway.

‘The circuit court also considered a motion filed by the
Appellants to add Travis Henderson-Bell as a critical witness,
based on the fact that, on December 4, 1998, Henderson-Bell was
involved in a similar automobile accident approximately 920 feet
northward from the site of Klink’s accident.‘ The Appellants’
counsel offered the following justification for adding Henderson-
Bell as a witness:

[counse!:] [2]t 48 correct that the accident ie not... at the
(And) it is some time
Levant, Your Honor, is what
appened to his car. The weather was substantially
Snilar, [it] was in the early morning hours, it was
Falningy and, '. , the effect that the water had on

Ris cor {2 supotantially simiiar.
the court: Well Lane the relevance substantial { similerity of

fhe conaiesens -.. 7

{counsel;] Well the problem with thet, Your Honor, is that ncbody
Esp cestify a2 to the exact uster level, che exact

  

   

 

 

«According to police reports, Henderson-Bell's accident occurred
127 feet south of mile marker Il on the Pahoa Bypass, while Klink’s occurred
0.2 piles, or 1056 feet, south of nile sarker 11. Therefore, although the
Jopeliants maintain that the Henderson-Bell accident occurred in precisely the
Sere location, in front of the sane driveway, the evidence in the record,
Ineluding the Appellant's own memorandum in opposition to the State's mtion
in lining, incicetes that Henderson-Bell's accident actually occurred
Sfptonimately $20 fect farther northward on the highway, at a location
significentiy cotside the ares depicted on the scale chagram of the Klink
collision

 

  

 
48 YOR PUBLICATION in WEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER +++

fallen on the roadway with respect to
to sccients. it most 1 can offer to

Fly morning hours
They are located within as.
hundred yards of each other, [(Alnd the vehicles both
Feacted in the sane or nearly the sane manner.

  
   

(Some capitalization altered.) The State sought to exclude all
and

 

of Henderson-Bell’s testimony on grounds of untimelin
irrelevance. The circuit court orally denied the motion to add
Henderson-Bell as @ witness, opining that “with regard to Mr.
Henderson-Bell, it seems to me that his testimony would lack the
necessary foundation for relevance and that foundation would go
to the issue of similarity of conditions.”

A bench trial conmenced on July 23, 2001.

1. Beja} testimony of Howard Havmore
Shortly after the Pahoa Bypass was completed in 1991,

 

an accident occurred in the area, prompting Haymore to conduct a

 

“[vlery informal” investigation of the scene. He drove the
highway shortly thereafter in heavy rain, however, and observed
“water coming over the top of the cut bank” flowing westward
across the highway just south of the driveway, but could never
determine the source of that flow, because it was his belief that
the land on the eastern side of the road sloped away from the

highway. ‘The flow of water started south of the eastside

 

driveway and flowed westward across the highway, “cross{ing] both
lanes of travel.” He did not observe any water flowing from the

astside driveway itself.

 

On May 20, 2001, Henderson-Bell was depesed in & different leweuit
concerning his accident.
+ FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER *#¢

 

Haymore was troubled by what he had observed but “could

see no reasonable source” for the water, testifying that “I

 

couldn't figure out how in the world it ever got there to start
with... . [I]f I hadn’t seen it, T would say that whoever saw
it was off the deep end.” Haymore discounted the incident as an
“anomaly” which he presumed was caused by the adjacent landowner
“dumping water on the roadway” and did not observe it again.
Although Haymoze realized that a repeat occurrence “would be

problem,” he did not conduct any further investigations to

 

confirm his theory that the landowner had been dumping water and
did not at the time formally report his concerns to the DOT.

Haymore, as a DOT representative, regularly attended
meetings of a conmunity traffic organization, the Puna Traffic
Safety Council [hereinafter, “the Safety Council”), and recalled
at least two specific complaints concerning water traversing the
Pahoa Bypass ~~ one from a private citizen concerning a section
of roadway five hundred feet from the site of Klink’s accident
reporting water traversing the roadway, thereby making driving
unsafe, and one from a police officer more generally describing
flooding during heavy rainfall at the site of Klink’s accident.
Haymore asserted that none of the individuals expressing concern
about the road’s safety could “tell (him) where the water came
from” that created the observed sheet flow.

Nevertheless, as a result of citizens’ concerns,
Haymore was directed twice by his superiors to reinspect the
area. His first investigation was conducted on a day when the

Weather vas dry and clear. Haymore testified that his

10
 

498 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST’ HAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER

 

investigations were purely visual: “basically all I did was look
at the roadway. . . . I did not investigate any vehicles or
anything else.” He further testified that “trying to figure out
where the water came from was the big issue” because “[one has
to know[:] . . . if the water is coming across the entire roadway
one inch thick, then I couldn’t do anything about it. If it’s
coming across the roadway one inch thick in a localized area, I
can do something about it.” He clarified, however, that
ascertaining “[ulhere it was coming across (the roadway] was the
Stitical feature.” (Emphases added.) In addition to the
inspections described in his testimony, Haymore also indicated
that, because he was interested in responding to the community's
complaints concerning water on the highay coming from the two
driveways, he “tried on several occasions when it was raining to
run out and check it . . . [but was] unsuccessful [in] find[ing]
any water.”

Nevertheless, following a second inspection that was
prompted by ancther accident in the area, Haymore recommended
that an interceptor ditch be placed on the eastern, high side of
the superelevated curve of the highway to prevent water from
flowing across the roadway at the site where Klink later lost
control of his vehicle. In an August 1, 1996 e-mail to Bruce
McClure, his superior at the DOT, regarding the site, he
characterized the need for a drainage facility as “imperative,”
see infra.

On redirect examination, the Appellants’ counsel

questioned Haymore further regarding the source of the water and

u
 

08 POR PUBLICATION im WEST’ § HAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER

the decision to install the interceptor ditch in 1998 based on
what Haymore had uncovered in his investigations:

[counse!): You've testified that you saw water coming over the
top of the bank?

[aymore): One time, yes

[Counsel]: ; ; Andes a result of thet, you put the
Interceptor diten to stop that’ from occurring?

ieymore: Well, that and people have told me water came down the
Grivewsy, so thet 1 would put the interceptor diten in
fo tey and accumulate any water that sight encounter
the roadway from the upper side

(counsel): But the interceptor ditch does not extend across the
Griveuaye, does it?

[taymore): He should’ dip across the driveways at the ditch,

[Counsel]: If water should be coming across a cut benk in the
Aanner which you've described, Mr. Klink would hi
Checuntered thet water in the direction in which he

‘going. fe would later have encountered water

  

 

 

 

 

       

Sonilg Gown {fom the driveway that enters onto Route

$80 Just north of. . + where the cut bank would be?
(teynore): The driveway was north’ of where 1 saw the water.
[cetmae!]: 50 you're aware of two possible sources of

Sontag onto the high side of that super ele
EGrve which would then flow ail the way cr
roasway?

[waymore): f'esn day T only feel there's one source of water, and
that would be the driveway,

 

 

Finally, Haymore testified that, pursuant to applicable
safety standards, signs warning of flooded road conditions should
be placed “about five hundred feet in front of the occurrence."

2. fe f

McClure was employed as the DOT's district engineer for
Hawai'i County from April 1996 through June 1997 and had overall
responsibility for administration of the PShoa Bypass. McClure
testified that, even when road construction standards are met,
state engineer who notices a dangerous condition on the highway
should alert the department so that necessary remedial actions
could be taken and McClure would have expected Haymore to have

done so.

22
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Beginning in April or May 1996, McClure began attending
meetings of the Safety Council, where he received complaints from
citizens and police officers about water crossing the Péhoa
Bypass. In response, he ordered his staff to review accidents
that had occurred in the vicinity. After his staff informed him
that more than one wet-weather accident had occurred near the
location, he recommended that warning signs innediately be
installed @ quarter of a mile northward and southward of the site
of the water flow because water crossing the roadway would create
a dangerous and unexpected condition. McClure’s department
considered the “intermediate measure” of grooving the pavement
but, McClure testified, “the best measure is always to try to get
the water at its source and not have it cross the road, if
possible.”

At the request of the Appellants’ counsel, McClure then
read into the record part of the August 1, 1996 e-mail from

Haymore:*

 

1996 e-mail refers to # menorendum Heymore wrote,
din relevant part

 

+ the August 1
dated September 21, 1995, which re

  

 

Subject: Accident on the Pihos Bypass at the 1.1 MP
[T]he Pahca Bypass has had problens about 500 feet
forther towards Kapoho where water cones over the top
Gf the cut bank and runs across the superelevated
Foadway. The northbound truck that hyéroplaned
Shortly after the completion of this project had bald
tires that appear to be under inflated. This was
Considered to be the primary cause of this accident at
the tine although there was an unusual anount of water
fon the roudvay. . . + Unless there ig another unknown
Source of water suchas water coming down the
hhonestesd road just northwest of the accident site it
ie difficult to see how any undve enount of water
could be on the roadway or how the roadway surfa:
Gould be Gnususily slick. The cinder slope behind the
Querdreil cn the southbound lane shows considerable
Signe of erosion past the area where the water from

 

 

 

 

3
‘104 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER ++

The other two accidents were probably caused by
tthe water the greenhouse cunps over the top of the cut
Bank on the high side sf the superelevated curve.
This fa not a new phenomenon but I did not realize st
as 2 problem. About the only cure for this 1s to put,
Sdrainage Facility on the high sige of the super.
Possibly a gutter would work, but the slope on
ine iow side of the super shows evidence of heavy
Water flow which would suggest a ditch on the top of
the cut bank. My memory of the right of way in this
area suggests that we do not have edeguate room for a
Giteh gn the top of the cut bank. This leads me to
Conclude that st may be nec
the cut bank back to the righ
the area

  

 

 

 
 
  

on the memo, in response, McClure wrote the following message
“Wow about installing a ‘Road Floods During Rain’ sign now(?]
And how much would it cost to groove the road (to mitigate any
hydroplaning, if it occurs,) until [we] could build an
interceptor ditch(2]”

3. Eurther testinony of officer Ellazar

officer Ellazar testified that, before the Klink
accident, he frequently traveled the subject area and observed
the roadway under @ variety of weather conditions and, on several
eccasions, during “Light rain, medium, to heavy downpour” had
observed water coming off the cutbank on the east side of the
road in the location where the accident occurred and flowing

across the roadway, onto the northbound lane and then further

 

tthe top of the cut bank would flow down the
embankment. The scurce of this water 1s net clear

It ie alto not sbvious if the erosion is caused by
hore than the local runoff of the roadway. Unless
Bore information becones available there appears to be
ne justification fer eny change to the roadway.

[Format altered and kahaké added.)

4
44 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORPS and PACIFIC REPORTER +++
onto the southbound lane with “not much variance” in the flow
regardless of the intensity of the rainfall. He further
testified that, one evening during a heavy rain storm, he had

 

almost lost control of his own vehicle due to water sheeting

across the roadway.

4, Testimony of Lieutenant James Kelly

HCPD Officer Lt. Janes Kelly attended the Safety
Council meetings and recalled citizens expressing concerns
specifically involving water conditions on the Péhoa Bypass near
the eleven mile marker, the same area where Klink’s accident
occurred. Kelly testified that at least one Do? representative
was present at each meeting, normally Haymore or McClure. In
addition to the other complaints, at one meeting, the Safety
Council's leader directly addressed the state representative and
denanded that an investigation be undertaken of the particular
stretch of highway.

Lt. Kelly testified that he was disquieted by the
citizens’ concerns and that he twice undertook his own
investigations of the subject area. He made it a point to
inspect the highway during different levels of rainfall and
testified that “(t]he depth of the water was significant on the
heavy downpour time.” In fact, both regular rain conditions and
2 heavy downpour created a similar water pattern:

(Als che road As level and starts to curve and go down

Ecliou'the carve and fellow the doumerd pegeern of

the roscuay. It would. sheet from thot particaler

fea, natal to mauha, (east to west, northbound to

Southbound anes] inside corner, and then diagonally
Gross the road, There would be a noticeable sheet

 

 

1s
 

4ts+ FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S AWAIT REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER

during the curve in the down sweep of the water
Tunning broadly across the road to the inside.

‘The water would completely cross the roadway at that time. Lt.
Kelly discussed his observations and concerns at length with a
state representative. An employee of the DOT’s Highways Division
reported to the Safety Council that an investigation of the site
revealed no problens with water on the roadway. Lt, Kelly “got a
Little strong at that point” and asked the representative if the
State could groove the roadway, but “{algain they said it wasn’t
a problem.”

Lt. Kelly was part of the investigative team that
responded to the Klink accident. He recalled observing water
running along the gutter located on the west side of the road.
Based on the debris line at the gutter, he concluded “that water
[had been] there at a much higher level than when I got there.”
Lt. Kelly did not recall any running water or debris on the east
side of the road, nor did he recall observing any water running
off the east driveway or property.

5, Testimony of Krueper

Krueper testified for the Appellants as a traffic and
civil engineer specializing in highway and accident
reconstruction. He testified that, based on his measurements of
the Pahoa Bypass and its surrounding landscape, water runoff
would travel across the roadway any time it rained. He noted
that it was standard practice in roadway design to intercept
water entering the roadway “offside from the hill, from the dirt
shoulder” and channel it along the outside edge of the road.

Krueper believed that the interception capabilities of offside

16
40 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S WAWAI'E REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER 4+

 

water at the site of the accident were inadequate. During a
visit to the scene for his report, Krueper also observed water

t flowing across the road” while

 

coming off the driveway and “shi
it was drizzling, although later, on cross-exanination, he
confirmed that he had not observed any other runoff during that
inspection. He testified that the State should have constructed
a dip at the bottom of the driveway to prevent water from
entering the roadway. Ultimately he concluded that a film of
water on the roadway resulted in a loss of traction to Klink’ s
vehicle, causing the accident, in part based on observed water
flow and debris and in part based on the dynamics of the
accident, asserting that “there’s no way a person can turn that
sharp on dry pavement without rolling over.” He emphasized that
or a complete loss

 

he did not believe that true hydroplaning
of contact between the tires and the road surface -- caused
Klink’s vehicle to follow the trajectory that it did but, rather,
that the trajectory of the vehicle indicated that contact with
the roadway was only partially lost, “caused by a film of water

being on the roadway’s surface” and further causing the rear of

 

Klink's vehicle to swing around toward the front in a count
clockwise direction as the lighter rear end failed to brake as
effectively as the heavier, front end of the vehicle when Klink
entered the downhill-sloping superelevated curve. He also
testified that, based on his analysis of the vehicle, the
condition of Klink's tires did not play a role in the accident.
With regard to the sufficiency of the roadway’ s design,

Krueper stated that broad standards of roadway construction

v7
++ FOR PUBLICATION in WEST’ § HAWAI'I REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER ***
cannot substitute for an engineer's professional judgment based

on particular on-site conditions. He testified that a basic

 

principle of road construction is dewatering the roadway before a
Griver enters a superelevation. In his opinion, the design of
the Pahoa Bypass did not demonstrate “professional engineering
judgment” because there was no drainage for uphill water.
Accordingly, in Krueper’s opinion, the lack of a feature, such es
a ditch, to intercept the water from the land abutting the
highway before it reached the road rendered the design of the
highway defective.

Krueper opined that, if the supervising engineer had
observed water flowing onto the roadway from the shoulder shortly
after the highway had opened, he should have investigated to
ensure that the highway had been built according to design
specifications. Krueper further testified that the engineer
should then have notified a supervisor of the condition, warning
signs should have been installed, and methods to intercept the
water should have been undertaken immediately. In Krueper’s
opinion, Haymore’s failure to take action when he first observed
water coming over the cutbank in 1991 was a deviation from
professional and ethical standards.

Krueper also testified that warnings signs should be
placed “far enough in advance of the object that you are to warn
of so a driver can reasonably perceive, react, and do what the

sign intends to tell you to do before you get to that point.”

 

Specifically, pursuant to DOT guidelines, in Krueper’s opinion

the appropriate location for a sign warning of flooding would be

18
 

S44 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S KAMAI'T REFORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER +
at least 450 feet prior to the condition, $00 feet if the roadway
was downhill, which for the present matter would be approximately
50 feet south of station 0400 on Exhibit 27. Krueper believed

that the “Road Floods During Rain” sign he observed during his

site inspection, located roughly at station 300 on Exhibit 27 --
approximately 100 feet south of where Klink’s car began its spin,

and approximately 350 north from the location Krueper believed it

 

should have been located to provide adequate warning -~ was
nevertheless not present on the day of the Klink accident because
it appeared to be brand new and there was no mention of it in the

police report.
6. Testimony of Ellison Ancheta
Ellison Ancheta, as supervisor for a DOT traffic
services crew, was tasked with installing the “Road Floods During
Rain” signs. He testified that the two signs, one for each
direction of travel, were erected on August 7, 1996 and that the
sign for the northbound lane was placed at least 600 feet before
the spot where Klink’s car began its skid. However, Ancheta
yed the installation of

 

conceded that he had not personally witne:
the northbound sign, but had only received oral confirmation from
his work crew that it had completed the work, which had been
assigned to it on the same day via a written DOT work orders? the
oral confirmation and the fact that, upon the crew's return, the
posts and signs were not present, led Ancheta to conclude that

the crew had installed the signs.

+ a DOT work order assigns work to be completed on a given day,
whereas 2 daily maintenance report, sg@ nffa, reports what work has beer
Completed on a given day.

19
 

1+ FOR PUBLICATION in WES/§ KAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER +

 

Ancheta confirmed, however, that the August 7, 1996
work order had called for the sign for northbound traffic to be

¢ farther north than it was,

 

installed approximately 250 £
toward the site where the accident occurred, at a location where
‘an “intersection ahead” sign was already located. Only after the
Klink accident did he discover that the sign had, in fact, been
installed farther south, when a report on the accident was issued
and 2 state official had notified him that the sign was in the
more southern location. He questioned his crew about the
misinstallation and was informed that, because the “intersection
ahead” sign was already located at the called-for coordinates,
his crew had made @ judgment call to install the “road floods”
sign farther south, where Ancheta personally observed it during a
site visit following Klink's accident.

‘The Appellants objected to the testimony, arguing that
Ancheta had no personal knowledge of the installation or location
of the sign until after the accident and, hence, thet his
testimony, which was elicited to establish the existence and
location of the warning sign on the day of the accident,
constituted inadmissible hearsay. The circuit court allowed the
State to continue its questioning, however, in order further to
establish the foundation of Ancheta’s knowledge. The circuit
court then asked Ancheta to identify on Exhibit 27 -- the diagram
of the accident site prepared by Krueper -- (1) the location
where the work order called for the sign to be placed and (2) the
location where his crew had actually placed the sign on August 7,

1996. Ancheta then testified, referring to a March 27, 1997

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+8 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S JAWAZ'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER

 

daily maintenance report (DMR) introduced into evidence, that,
following Klink’s accident, the sign was moved to the second
location nearer the east side driveway where it was subsequently
observed by Krueper during his site inspection. The circuit
court allowed the report into evidence, over the Appellants’
counsel's objection that “it does not identify the sign that was
moved [or] where that sign was located,” arguing that “[t]here is
nothing to show that this document is related in any fashion to
the sign which is [the] subject of the inquiry.” The circuit
court thereafter made the following comments:

(qihis is what I'm hearing and 11m going to share this

Hight now with everyone on the record ~~ (Ancheta]

Fenenberc the accident maybe, not by date or tine, bot

because it caused someone to tell him eYou gots sign

in the wrong place, go cut and change it.” He went

out to look for hinself, he saw the sign in the wrong

place. He told us where he [hed] seen that sien,

Sinich ss about 250 feet... to the right of wnere

(Exnibit 27] ends. ‘New the cnly thing that we need to

Ascertain is the tonber of feet fron the intersection
‘nd my estimation ts

 

 

 

 

‘The Appellants further objected to the propriety of Ancheta
referring to a work order not in evidence in testifying where the
sign was originally installed. The circuit court responded that
much of the confusion stemmed from the failure of either party to
depose Ancheta prior to trial:
1) Well, Your Honor, 11m troubled by the fact

that’ this witness obviously relied on

Gocuments for hie testimony...

They've never been identified tn this case

yp until today.
Produced. And I think that is highly

 

(appeitente’ counss

 

 

 

 

   

irregular.

{the courts) I don’t know what you are talking about.

appellants’ counsel:) The work order that he's referring to for
example. -.. [T]hat he looked at to

Seteraine the date. That's not in court.
We've never seen it. It’s never been

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444 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER

Adontified.

(the Courts) fhe point is what? You wanted the work
Order to determine the date of the
Sceident or something else?

(Appellante’ counsel:) Well, no. I just think that they have an
obligation to bring these docunents if
Enis witness se going to cestity. =.

(the Courts) ell Sf we're going to talk about
Sbligations snd wnat we know end don't
Know then we are going to get to the 3:
of why [ancheta]'s deposition was not
fakens So l’m not going there. You do
hat jou have to do, but don't mess up the
“itness, confuse him, confuse me, mess up
the facte, Please, we're just trying to
get clarity.

 

Ancheta continued his testimony based upon the DMRs and his
recollection of pertinent work orders that he had reviewed prior
to trial.

7. Testimony of Francis Nishioka

As the DOT's head of the hyrdraulics design section,
Francis Nishioka was charged with managing water runoff on the
State's highway system, including standards compliance and
drainage construction. He testified that, after three visits to
the site and a review of all the relevant depositions and design
plans, including pre-construction topographical maps, in his
expert opinion the design of the highway met all criteria,
fe. He

 

including those pertaining te drainage, and was
contested Krueper’s expert opinion that custom and practice would
have called for a drainage feature on the upper side of 2

superelevated highway -- in the present matter, the east side of

by testifying that the topecraphical map he

 

the road

22
448 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER *#¢

 

reviewed" indicated that water could not flow toward the road,
“lalnd . . . since rainwater does not flow toward the road the
He furthered testified that,

 

cut-off ditch is not required.
based on his reading of the pre-construction topographical map,
water from the cut-bank directly fronting the highway would be
“very minimal” and that the bulk of any water falling on the
driveway would flow not onto the highway but would instead flow
parallel to it into a gulch northward of the driveway. on cross~
examination, however, Nishioka conceded that the actual
toposraphy of the site could have heen altered by the
construction process; Nishioka further conceded that, if Haymore
had observed “water coming off this cut bank flowing onto the
roadway in this area and crossing the roadway,” then there would
be a dangerous condition. Nishioka contended that if the water
originated froma private source, such as a greenhouse, then it
would not be the DOT’s responsibility to design for or address
the problems he admitted, however, that he was unaware of any
investigation to determine the ultimate source of the water
coming off of the cutbank and further testified that his
department had not received any notification that water was
crossing the highway until after Klink’s accident. He was also
unaware of any subsequent determination of the source of the
water but confirmed that his department oversaw the installation
of the interceptor ditch. He further conceded that the map upon
which he was relying did not contain measurements of the slope of

 

 

% The topographical map relied upon by Nishioka was entered into
evidence se Defendent’s Exhibit 12 but is missing fron the exhibite provided
to this court as part of the record on appeal.

23

 
 

e+ FOR PUBLICATION Sn WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER
the roadway or the driveway and that, based on the measurenents
actually conducted by Krueper, rainwater either falling on the
ériveway or running parallel don the shoulder onto the driveway

would eventually run onto the highway, at least at higher volunes

 

of water.
8. Testimony of Danielle Alejandro
According to her testimony, Danielle Alejandro" was
“tailgating” -- as close as one-half of a car length -- behind

Souder’ s vehicle when Klink’s vehicle crossed the median strip
and collided with Souder, but she was able to maintain control of
her vehicle and avoid the collision. Alejandro testified that it
waa “pouring” rain leading up to and at the time of the accident
and that Souder’s vehicle was moving so slowly that she attempted
to pass it several tines but that “it was pouring so hard that I
was afraid to.” She recalled water running on the roadway. On
exoss-examination, however, she also indicated that she did not
see any water coming from the driveway or the grassy area along
the northbound lane. In response to the confusion concerning
Alejandro's testimony regarding water flow, the Appellants
elicited the following testimony on redirect:

tinat yoo do rece}, thoughy se that it was

Tuifalgs ona"It'hed beenraining hard since the

Eine yee got onto ithe Funes Bypass)?

AAG water was running on the roedvey on both
Net" che readvey at. the acelsent scene?

Sep tlremnter TP ESSE" chnieg on totn stasis

Water was running on the rosdway?
Yee

    

 

°:

 

 

1 panielle Alejandro appears in some of the record as Danielle

Mide1, her maiden rane,

 

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9. Testimony of Souder

In contrast to Alejandro’s testimony, Souder maintained

 

that, while it had rained earlier that morning, it was not
raining at the time of the accident and he did not believe
Alejandro’s vehicle was following him particularly closely. He
Gid not recall Alejandro’s vehicle ever attempting to pass him.
He became aware of Klink’s venicle when it was “[vlery, very
close . . . [w]hen it took a sudden swerve into my lane of
traffic.” He recalled that Klink’s vehicle “took a slight jog to
the right and then an immediate hard turn to the left.” At the

 

time Klink executed that maneuver, Souder insisted that there
were no vehicles to his inmediate left; to wit, no vehicle
attempting to pass Souder; accordingly, Souder had no explanation
as to why Klink drove as he did. He remembered Alejandro’ s
vehicle passing through the accident scene innediately afterward.

10. Testimony of Andrew Levitt

Andrew Levitt, the State’s accident reconstruction
expert, testified that, based on a review of the physical
evidence and photographs of the accident, it was his expert
opinion that the accident was not caused by hydroplaning but,
rather, by Klink’s attempts to avoid an unknown vehicle entering
his lane of travel. He reasoned that, if Klink’s vehicle had
hydroplaned, denying Klink steering control, his vehicle would
have continued northward in a straight trajectory until the
roadway curved sway toward the west and out from underneath it,
sending the vehicle onto the east side shoulder. Levitt

maintained that, in order to execute the maneuver that it did --

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‘0+ POR FUBLICATION An WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORES and PACIFIC REPORTER +
a radical change in the direction of the vehicle from northward
to northwestward -- the vehicle's tires would have had to have
remained in contact with the pavement, making steering input
possible. He asserted that the turn and rotation of Klink's
vehicle, as diagraned by Krueper, was not possible solely within
the northbound lane of travel, that, in order to produce the
evidence gathered at the accident site, Klink’s vehicle would of
necessity have first been steered eastward onto the northbound
shoulder before turning westward across the highway, into the
oncoming, southbound traffic, and that that maneuver required
some degree of contact between the vehicle’s tires and the
roadway. He theorized that the vehicle driven by Alejandro had

 

attempted to pass Souder’s vehicle by entering the northbound
lane, presenting Klink with the need to steer right, onto the
shoulder, and then left, back onto the roadway, and to apply his
brakes, thereby resulting in the accident. He maintained that,
Alejandro having admitted tailgating the Souder vehicle and given
the human reaction time necessary to avoid the collision, it was
“simply not possible” for her to avoid becoming part of the
accident without either being much farther behind the Souder
vehicle than she claimed or “off in the northbound lane in
passing mode.” Levitt reviewed Krueper’s testimony and contested
Krueper‘s reconstruction, maintaining that it did not reproduce
the rotation necessary to place Klink’s vehicle where it was when
it struck Souder’s truck.

on cross-examination, Levitt conceded that neither

Souder nor Alejandro had testified that Klink's vehicle ever left

26
 

‘44 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S IAWAT'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER ©
the roadway. He also conceded that the police had not observed
any tire marks on the pavement or the paved shoulder; he
asserted, however, that it would not be uncommon, given the wet
conditions, for a vehicle in such a scenario to fail to leave
discernible marks. On the other hand, he conceded that if
Klink’s vehicle had lost traction in its rear wheels, perhaps due
to water on the roadway, the rear of his vehicle would have
drifted slightly to the right, which, in turn, could have caused
Klink to overcorrect to the left, bringing him into the oncoming
lane of traffic. Nevertheless, Levitt maintained that such a
scenario would presuppose either that Klink was “inattentive” or
that he was “grossly overreacting to a stimulus.”

11. Testimony of Dr. John Dracup

Dr. John Dracup testified for the State as an expert in
hydrology and hydraulic engineering. Relying on police
photographs taken of the area on the day of Klink’s accident, he
opined that the shoulder sloped away from the roadway on the
eastern side of the highway. The Appellants objected to this
testimony as exceeding the scope of Dr. Dracup’s expertise, but
were overruled by the circuit court. Dr. Dracup’s analysis did
not rely on any independent survey of the topography of the site.

Relying on Krueper’s measurements of the site and
meteorological data of the rainfall in the area during the
morning of the accident -- which reported 0.19 inches of rainfall.
Dr. Dracup opined that, even

 

in the hour before the accident
assuming all 0.19 inches fell in a sudden deluge, the water would
drain completely from the roadway within fifty-four to eighty-

27
 

+8 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS and VACIFIC REPORTER

five seconds. He conceded on cross-examination, however, that he
did not include the driveway area in his calculations. The
Appellants’ counsel then asked Dr. Dracup to refer to photographs
Dr. Deacup had taken in the course of his field investigation of
the accident site. Dr. Dracup confirmed the photos were taken
two hours after a light rain had fallen. He conceded that the
photos exhibited water on the highway, water continuing to drain
down the driveway, and water continuing to flow down the
interceptor ditch, constructed subsequent to the accident, along

the eastern shoulder.

D. The Circuit Court's FOFs And Conclusions Of Lay (cous)
Prior to closing arguments, the circuit court stated:

I'm very concerned snd troubled by the notice
ehat was given to the [007]. There's no question they
knew that something was wrong in that area. Ang thelr
oun officials went to these meetings, Police officers
festified that they were present at these mestings
before ehis accident sccurred by at least
conservatively a yearvand-e-nalf to two years,

So that's what bothers se. That they had this
notice that is was a dangerous condition. They had
Fotice that it wae a fatel condition, actually, in one
Situation sa 1 think investigated by Mr. Haymore, And
they cidn’t do anyening. And it was because they went
Ehere and couldn't figure out how the water had

13. But they couldn't deny that the water

All these people Were telling then that

the water was there. So it's very eroubling to me.
Ang I'thine the law is that the State bas 2 duty,

 

 

 

   

   

Following closing arguments, inter alia, the circuit court orally
issued the following FOFs and COLs:

2 algo find that the source of the water on the
roadway, however, hag not been proven. Ang that even
today there 1 no evidence of the source of that

voter. And the source ie critical to the fix. Can't
top & flow f you don't know how and where to curn it

 

‘The Court finds that the State hee a duty to
design and construct ite highway inva manner 80 a8 to
mate it ressons5ly safe for intended use. There is no

 

26
‘44 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

proof that the design or construction of this highway

‘The Court also finds thet the State hes a duty
to maintain the highway and te inform the public of
the existence of any highway defects.

"The. Court finds that the activities of the State
show the State fulfilled its duty to investigate, to
put up signs, and therefore there is no breach of that
Guty in this’ cese,

‘The circuit court instructed the State to prepare written FOFs
and COLs. On March 18, 2002, the circuit court entered, inter

 

alia, the following written FOFs and CoLs:#
Empmnss oF act

 

10. About two weeks after the Pahoa Bypass
‘opened in 1981, Mr’ Haynore noticed water flowing over
the top of the earthen cut bank on the east side of
the «+ < Bypass. The water concerned Me. Haynore

11, Also about tuo weeks after the Pahoa Bypass
opened, tir. Haymore became aware of @ truck accident
thet happened... where he save the water overflow

12," ME, Haymore was a regular attendee of the
Pune Traffic Safety Council. Ne first recalled
cormunity concern about hydroplening accidents on the
Pinca Bypass aboot three months after the Nekano-
Hutchinson accident on August 25, 1995, which
Feportedly scoured 0.1 miles south of the 31 Mile

13. at one of the nectines, tr, Havmere spoke

 

anos brmass.
TE. Haymore went to the Pahos Bypass twice

to investigate it.
18

‘ha September 21, 1295 eenorandun, te
Haynore gored thet the “fhe Byease nae had proplens

about £00 feet further towards Kepoho where water

fone: over the ton of The ut Denk end runs gerese the

fuupexelevated toadwav.” owever, Hr. fiewmore stated
Te. in April 18se, Brace WeClure, P.E., became

the district engineer for thes. = DOT. wy
Hawai'i District. He managed all State Highvays for

 

 

4 ghe Appellants challenge the FOFs snd Cole that are set forth in
bole.

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FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS and PACIFIC REFORTER ++#

tthe entire Big Teland.
17. Invapril 1996, we, Mocluce attended a

esting of the Setety Council where cotizens

‘sxbtessed concer that there vasa fatal accident on

Hie Fanos Sypass where there hed been pravicus:
‘accidents due, they believed, to excessive water on
‘the readuay,

Te, Mr, McClure investigated che accident site
nd_concluded shat several of the accicente occurred
inset weetner

79. ME. McClure concluded that water micht
contribute fo 'problens experienced BY Asteriste.
Ecaveling the eihos Beas.

C. Corrective Meseures
20. Me. Haymore
atnage the
7

Bis “OaAogust 2, 1996, wr. McClure suggested
inetalling *Roed Floods During Rain signs, ane
investigating grooving the road surface until a
interceptor ditch could be Built.

‘BE, “Pursuant to the guidelines of the Hawai (‘)4
Statewide Uniform Desion Manual, that warning sign
Should be placed approximately 300 fe. before the
Gangerous conaition of which it warns.

23, A work order vas emved, ordering
installation of the warning sign at the 11.18 mile
narker, which ss approximately 200 ft. south of the
Gangerous condition of which it wae supposed to give
warning, contrary to the guidelines of the Highway,
Statewide Uniform Design Manvel,

oe CSM ynehets wes foreman of the crew
responsible for the placement of highway signs on the
Big Teland.

‘250, Ancheta ordered three menbers of his crow
to place ‘the sign in that location. The crew later
Teported back that chey had placed the sign, but
Anehets did not perform any Inspection to determine if
or where the sign wes placed. Ancheta had no personal
Knowledge of where or when the sign was in fact
Placed, until sone months following the Klink
Beeidene

‘2b, ancheta testified that sone months after
the Klink secident, he was told orally, ey somebody
Working for the state Highway Deparenent, that. the
Sign hag net been placed where it had becn cesignated.

27. Ancheta testified that upon receiving that
notification, he want out to the sign and learned that
the ign was ‘not placed where it had been designated,
‘but was instead placed approximately 500 ft. further
down the read ana southerly direction

 

 

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MAWAL'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER +64

 

OR PUBLICATION sn WES?”

28. Ancheta adnitted that the State saintaine
an up-to-date ciary which should include the date of
installation of al highway signs, and if a sign se
placed sonevhere other than originally designated, the
Feason for placing the sign in another locetion. No
such docunent was produced by the State, nor envered
inte evidence in trial.

25, After speaking with his crew, and
personally going to the scene, Ancheta decided to move
the sign back to where it was originally designated

30. 'Mr. Ancheta further testified that he did
hot speak with anyone at the office of the state
Retorney General about the original placement of the
‘sign in the wrong location, nor the subsequent
Felocation of the sign, until shortly before tréal.

Su. There were fo documents int reduced by the
State at trial, which indicate or show that the sign
was not placed’ where originally designated, at Mile
Marker 11.18. There were no documents, such as the
State Highway sign diary, Introduced to show where the
‘sign was in fact placea, ‘nor giving the reacon way it
was placed in its’ location

32. According to State Departaent of
‘Transportation traffic crev supervisor... Ancheta,
fon August 7, 1996, the sign vael,] for slo Bound
Grivers{,] placed’more than 500 feet south of where
Me. Kroeper testified that Me. Klink would encounter
‘excess water on the Phos Pypan

 

 

Subs den! 2. 1997

33. Throughout the morning of March 9, 1987
(the “accident date"), the Fanos Bypass area wae
subjected to intermittent rain showers alternating
between light and heavy intensity,

‘34, "te surface of the Pahoa Bypass rosdvay was
wot and there was excess water in the vicinity of the
Klink accident, However, the source of the water vas
unknown.

35. At approximately 7:00 a.m. on the accident

ariving northbound on the

 

 

 

date). Klink.
Pites ypase, between jiile Markers 1! and 12 +.»

se. ue drivin 2 nour.

37. Bs Hr. Klink drove northbound and approached the
5 ‘arivin near,

fr. Klink’ venicie span in
counterciockwise direction snd siid inte the
Southbound travel lane. Ae st did so, it was struck

on the Fight reer qusrter-panel by a" pick-up
truck... driven. . + in the southbound travel Lane
By Souders =”.

 

30." Danielle tidei-Alejandro was the driver of
2 vehicle driving scutnbound inmediately behing Hr.

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FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIVIC REPORTER +

 

Souder st the tine of the accident.

40. Christopher Derasin, 2 passenger in Midel~
Atejandro's vehicle, testified that it was drizzling
at the tine of the accident.

4. “yes Souder eaid it wag not raining at the
time of the accident. Neither of them saw water
flowing on the road.

Ta,” Mos Midel-Alejandeo testified that it was
gaining “very hard” at the time of the accident. "She
Gescribed water running across the roadway at the
Scene of the accident. However, she could not say
Sihere the water was coming from.

43, “Mareen Ell [a)zar ie a Havai(']4 County
Police officer, and wae one of the investigating
Seficers that cane to the accident scene more than one
hour after the accident had occerred. He observed
Tonoff going in a vesterly direction acrose both lanes
Of travel, and collecting at the Dera on the west side
of the roadway. However, he stated that the runoff
Gia net concern hin at the time. He saw no runctf
Gebris fron the east properties{,] out Bank(,] oF
Grivewsy on the road.

“i, Le. Janee Kell {Jy is a mesber of the
Hawai (‘11 County Police Department. le arrived at the
Recident scene when the vehicles and parties were
Still present, He sawino runoff debris from the east
Properties, cut bank(,] or driveway on the road.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

iol “narry Keueper, PI.1E., plaintiffs! expert
highway design engineer and accident
Peconstructionist, rendered opinions based upon a
Fessonable degree of probability in his fields of

GE, The speed Lint for Mr. Klink at the tine
of the accident was 55 miles per hour

43. There was no form of drainage at the place
where Mr. #link Lost control of his venicle, about 120
feet south of the collision site.

50. Eunctt crested sheet flow where Mr. Mink

kes where

 

# pint read

 

ss ot a
ot we she vel

Sizerelevation slope of the readvay into the
Pt et there is banking or superelevation of

SE sand

‘The Klink vehicle went into ite

 

32
 

08 YOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S WAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER

 

sountercleckwise apin when, a2 Mr, Kink wos traveling
Dorthbound st seprexinatels #2. Miles par nour he
‘eusonably applied his brakes tomaintain his speed or

‘folaveld sone pet
55. Uc Klink amelied bis brakes as be
aporoached the southertmost driveway such that the

rear tires of Ris vehicle lost contact with the

Kouduax vhen Te cane ucon sheet flow causing it co
‘pin counterclockwise end into the path of the vehicle
scien by He Souder,

St, The-sceident was caused by water on the

z ang cause Lo Z Tite would have
been enhanced by braking and possibly steering input.

57, However, the source of the vater on the
road had not been proven. Further, the scurce of the
water is critical to any remediation.

©. 1998 Drainage Improvement Profect

£8. in 1998, the State installed an interceptor
ditch between the eastern shoulder of the Panos Bypass
ane the cut bank which sloped down £0 the
‘Shoulders [)

 

 

ONCLUSIONS OF LAK

1. The state has a duty to design and construct
ite highway ins manner so as to make St reasonably
sate for intended use, There se no proof that the
Gerign of construction of the Pahos Bypass and the
area of the subject accident was unsat

2. The State has a duty to masneain ite
highway(e], and to infora the public of the existence
of any highway defects. The activities of the state
Show that the State £uigilied ite daty to investigate,
and to install signs, and therefore, it did not breach
ite duty,

‘3. There is insufficient proof that the State's
negligence was a substantial factor in causing
Plaintise’s injuries.

 

 

 

 

 

(Emphasis and kahakS added.) On October 7, 2002, the circuit
court filed its amended judgment as to all claims in favor of the

defendants. ‘The Appellants’ timely appeal followed.

Ie should be noted that, at trial, the State did not challenge the
esity of the posteaccident installation of an interceptor diten slong
fern shovlder of the highway

     

33
 

OR PUBLICATION in WEST'S WAWAT'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER +

 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The [elreuit] court's . . . FOFS . . . are
Feviewed on appeal under’ the Soletriy”
erroneous” standard. (Jn re Jane 1Doe,

{pore on May 22, 1996), 64 Havel (alr)
46, 908 Fo2d (865,] £86 [(1986)] (citing
Behe vs ingole, #0 Nawal 423, 423 1.6,
Ho Fae 132, 196 9.6 11996))." BFF “is
Gleariy erroneous when (1) the record
Tacks gubstancial evience to support the
finding, of (2) despite substantial
evidence in support of the finding, the
Sppellate court is nonetheless Lert with
GeFinite and firm conviction that 3
Sistake hae been made.” State v, Okusure,
76 Hawai’: 303, 392, 694 F.2d 80, 89
(1988) (citation onitted). "*Substantial
evidence’... 1s credibie evidence which
fe ef sufficient quality and probative
Value to enable 2 person of reasonable
Gaution to support a conclusion.” Dos, 64
Hawaii at 46, 928 P.za at 688. (quoting
State v. Mallace, 60 Hawei"t 382, 391-82,
SID Prag e95, 70%-08 (1996)); see also
Stately. Kotle, 1 Hawai'i 319, 326, 964
F.za Te, 67 (3998)

 

  

i 201 Hawas's
B20 21, t Pe3a 167, 174 (2005)

rover v. Adams, 102 Hewai"i 399, 409-10, 77 P.3d 63, 93-94
(2003) (some brackets added and some in original).

7*A COL is not binding upon an appellate
court and is freely reviewable fer its
correctness.” AIG Hawaii Ing. Co. ve

ef Cazaang, 1 Haw. 620, G28, 65)
Peta 321, 326 (1993) (quoting

ig “Beach Coy Tt Rae
a5, fis, 839 P20 10, 78 (19921). This
court ordinertiy reviews COLs under the
Eignt/wrong stancera.. 1p re Estate of
Holt, 15 haw. 226, 232, 057 P.za 1358,
F358" (1883). Thos, “*{a] CoL thet ie
Supported by the efiat courts (Fors) and
thet reflects an spplication of the
Correct rule of low will not be
overturned.'* Estate of Caraang, 74 Haw.
ot 626-28, 881 F.2d st 326 (quoting Batacs.
nce, 76 lian. at 119, 039 p.2d at 29)
Sfowever, a COL that presents mixed

 

34
 

FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS and PACIFIC REFORTER

   

of fact and law 4
Clearly erroneous
he. court's cone!
sndent upon the facts and circumstances

eo" Ids at 629, 051
Plad'at 326 (quoting Augec. Taer, 14 haw.
at 113, £39 Poza at 29) {anternal
Guotation marks caitted)

 
      

 

cate vs Burutans, 76 Hawai'i 172, (1601,
S73 Fad st, 158) (1894)

 

Allstate Ine. cov. Ponce, 108 Hawai'i 445, 493, 99
Psd 96, 10¢ (2008) {Some brackets and internal,
citations cnitted,) (Some bracketed material
aiteres.)

Thompson v, Kvo-Ya Cou, Ltd., 112 Hawai'i 472, 474, 146 P.3d

1049, 1051 (2006) (some brackets in original).

B. Adnission Of Evidence Of Other Incidents To Prove The
Existence Of A Dangerous Condition

[D)ifferent stendarde of review aust
be applied to trial court decisions
Fegaraing the sdniseibility of evidence,
Gepending on the requirenents of the
particular rule of evidence at issue.
linen application of 8 particular
evidentiary rule can yield only one
Correct result, the proper standard for
Sppeliate review ta the right /wrong

etencara.
Keslcha v. County of await, 74 Haw. 308,
319, 844 Poa 670, 676... (1993).

Were the evidentiary roiing at issue
Concerns edmissibility based upon
Felevance, under. » + [Hawai Rules of
Evidence (JHRE{})".".”. Rules 401 and 402,
the proper standard Of" oppellate review 15
the Fight/wrong standard. See State =
ate, 17 Hawaii 340, 347, 604 P28 403
{assay

State v. Kupines, 60 Hawat't 207, 214, 909 P.2d 1122,
Ti2s{] (1986) (sone brackets in ‘original and sone
added). “Evidenttay decisions based on HRE Rule 403,
nic Lequire s "Jusgnest call’ on the part of tne
trial court, ae reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”
h S Chany EO Hawars 212, 215, 908 P20 1196,
1201," (7995) “(citing Sato v. Tawata, 79 Hawai'i 14,
15, 897 F.2d 981, See (1350). s "The trial
Court abuses its’ discretion when it clearly exceeds

 

 

38
POR PUBLICATION in WEST! § HAMAT'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER **#

 

tthe bounds of reason or disregerds rules or principles
Of law of practice to the substantial detriment of &
party 1itigant.*” State v. Ganal, @1 Hawas's 358,
595, "917 Pr2a 370, 385 (1998) (quoting .. . Furdeans,
76 thawoi's (at) 179, 873 P.2d (at) $8. =» De

Tabieros v, Clark Equip, Co,, 85 Haw. 336, 350-51, 944 P.2d
1293-94 (1997) (quoting State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai'i 1, 11, 928
P.2d 843, 853 (1996).

c. ifications Br mony Of

 

 

[ut 4s not necessary that the expert
witness have the highest possible
Goalitications to testify about 8
farticulsr manner, .- . Dut the expert
Mithess most have such skill, knowledge,
Sr experience in the field in question as
fo make it appeer that his opinion or
Snterencesdraming would probably aid the
trier of fact in arriving at the

Eruth, ss Once the basic requisite
Guslidiations ave established, the extent
Bean expert's knowledge of subject matter
goes to the weight rather than the
Saniesibility of the testimony.

 

 

   

    

‘state vs Wallace, €0 Hawai'i 362, 419.37, 910 F.26
Soe THE n-37 11096) (brackets and ellipais points in
original) (emphases omitted). *'Whether expert
Cestincny should be admitted et trial reste within the
Sound aiseretion of the trial court and will not be
Overturned unless there is a clear abuse of
Giseretion.”” Jd at 406, 310 F.2d at 729

 

  

 

 

 

Tabieros, 85 Hawai'i at 351, 944 P.2d at 1294.

11. piscussroy
‘The Appellants generally contend that, because the
circuit court found (1) that a “dangerous” and “fatal” condition
of excess water on the highway developed during a period of
rainfall and (2) that Klink's accident was caused by “excessive
water” on the roadway, and because (3) the evidence adduced at
trial denonstrated that the State had more than adequate notice

of the dangerous condition, the circuit court erred in concluding

36
 

FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER *#+
that the State was not Liable for Klink’s death. More
specifically, the Appellants contend: (1) that the circuit court
erred in finding that, on March 9, 1997, a warning eign was
posted at least 500 feet before the site of the accident; (2)
that the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding
evidence of prior and subsequent accidents; and (3) that the
circuit court erred in concluding that the State had fulfilled
its duty to design, construct, and maintain the highway for
reasonably safe use and to warn of any hazards.
A. The Circuit Court Did Not Clearly Err In Finding That

The Sian Has Posted At Least S00 Feet South Of The East

‘The Appellants contend that the circuit court clearly
erred in finding that, on the day of the accident, a “Road Floods

During Rain” sign was posted at least 500 feet southward of the

 

scene of the accident.
It is well settled that the trial judge, sitting as the
trier of fact, is “free to make all reasonable and rational
inferences under the facts in evidence, including cizcumstantial
evidence.” State v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 249, 831 P.2d 924, 931
(1992). Disregarding Ancheta’s testimony regarding any hearsay
statements made by menbers of the work crew originally charged
with installing the sign (to which the Appellants objected at
trial and which underlie their challenge of FOF Nos. 27 and 32),
the following evidence pertaining to the warning sign was adduced
at trial: (1) a DNR dated August 7, 1996, reported that
Ancheta''s crew had installed, for Hilo-bound drivers, a warning

sign along the Pahoa Bypass at the 11.18 mile marker, or

2
 

FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAL'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER +

 

approximately 50 feet south of the accident sites (2) Ancheta
testified that, based on his recollection of the work order he
reviewed shortly before trial, on August 7, 1996, his work crew
was instructed to install the sign where, in fact, an

“intersection ahead” sign was already in place; (3) Ancheta

 

testified that road maintenance crews as a practice are granted
discretion by their supervisors to adjust the location of signs
in response to conditions at the scene; (4) Ancheta testified
that, after Klink's accident, he personally observed the warning
sign for Hilo-bound drivers at a location at least 500 feet
further south of where the DOT engineers had originally directed
his crew to place it back on August 7, 1996; and (5) Ancheta
testified that he and his crew relocated the Hilo-bound sign
northward closer to the original location designated in the
August 7, 1996 DMR, pursuant to 2 March 27, 1997 DMR. Nothing in
the record controverts the foregoing evidence or raises doubts
concerning the reasonable and rational inference drawn from it by
the cireuit court that, on August 7, 1996, a “Road Floods During
Rain” sign was placed approximately 500 feet south of the site of

% ancheta testified that he personally observed the sign 200 feet
southward of the 000 marker on Exhibit 27. He farther cestified that the
Griginal work order instructed hic crew to install the warning sign at 2+00 on
Gahibit 2%, which 8 opproxinately 320 feet north from marker 0+00 and, hence,
Spproxinately S00 feet north from where he cbserved it actually located
following the accident.

   

 

 

38
+8 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

Klink’s accident and was at that location on the day of the

accident. Therefore, the circuit court did not clearly err in so

finding.

B. The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In
Excludine Evidence Of Prior And Subsequent Accidents

Evidence of other accidents may be “highly

probative on material issues of a negligence action."
41 R28 962, 9S,

ie] 1900) *Telvidence of other sinslar accidents
Of occurrences may be relevant cireumstantially to
show a defective or dangerous condition, notice
thereof or causstion.on the occasion in’ question,
Ad, at 994-85. But “the introduction of
Sther-accident evidence may carry with it the problens
associated with ingsiry into collateral matters
coer". at 985. To Minimize these protlens we
have cautsoned our trial courts that?

 

 

Iplefore evidence of previous. .
aceidents) ney be adaitted on the issue
of whether of not the condition as it
existed wee in facts dangerous one, it
mast first be shown (by the proponent of
the evidence) that the conditions under
which the elleged previous accidents
Sceurred were the sane or substantially
Similar to the one in question.

 

 

keesorts, Ines, $7 Haw. [645,] 682, $62
Prig (426-] 456 ((1577)]. Bot we recognize that’ "when
the purpose of the offered evidence ta to. show
notice,” the required similarity in circumstances is
Considerably less than that demanded when the object
{s"fo"shon 4 defective or dangerous concition or
Causation, “since ll that ia required here is that,
the previous... (accident) should be such as to
attract the defendant's attention to the dangercus
Sitcation which resulted in the litigated accident.”

ia

 

 

 

Yet “even when sufficient similarity is shown,

 

he Appellants else allege error by the circuit court in refusing
fa request to voir size Ancheta on the basis of his assertion that he knew
Sinere the sign wae installes on August 7, 1996 cnd in overruling an cbsection
Tova question posed by the State regarding whether Anchete had any doubt that,
Upon Visiting the scene after Alink’s accident, he hed sbserved the warning

sign 7300 -- 500 plus 200 to 250 fect south.” ‘Inasmuch as the basis for
Aneheta's testimony concerning the purported originel location of the sign and

his lack of personel knowledge of the subject were fully developed later, any
trror by the circuit court in the challenges ruling was ners

39

 

 

 
 

#2 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER

 

the adaission of evidence of prior similar accidents
Us" still] within the aiseretion of a trial court.”
Li"(citateone onitted). The evidence, of course,
aay be excluded 4f the danger of unfair surprise,
prejudice, confusion of the issues or the
Cotsideration of sndue consunption of time is
Sisproportionate to (its) value.” Id, at 652, $62
Pidg st 43¢ (citations omitted); see (HRB Rule) 403.

 

 

Kago v. Davis, 68 Haw. 447, 455-56, 719 P.2d 387, 393 (1986)

(some brackets added and some in original) (some internal

 

citations omitted) (concluding trial court erred in excluding
evidence of four prior accidents in vicinity of subject
accident), quoted in Tabieros, 85 Haw. at 378, 944 P.2d at 1321.
‘Therefore,

[tlhe purpose for which the evidence is offered “is

Important’ in getermining whether the proof will be

acbitted end how strictly the requirement of

Siniiority of conditions will be applied." E. Cleary,

imsConsick on Evidence) $200, at 287 (3d ed. 19801

nas [als_we have seen, “(t]he strictness of (the)

Feguirement of similarity of conditions is much

Eeloxes = < when the purpose of the offered evidence

[etoshow notice... +” Harshaw s  ., 57 Baw. at

52) 962 P-2a at 4340.)
Kaeo, 68 Haw. at 456-57, 719 P.2d at 393 (some internal quotation
signals omitted).

1. The Henderson-Bel) accident

‘The Appellants cite to Henderson-Bell’s deposition,
wherein he testified that, on December 4, 1998, while traveling
northward on the Pahoa Bypass, his vehicle encountered a “river
or standing water” on the road that threw his vehicle into a
counterclockwise spin, causing it to enter the southbound lane of
travel and strike en oncoming vehicle. Henderson-Bell opined
that “there was water on the road. . . coming from a driveway.

s+ [The water) seemed 1ike it was coming from that driveway.”

40
 

‘se4 YOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S IAMAL'S REPORTS and PACIFIC REFORTER
‘The Appellants contend that there was such similarity to Klink’ s
accident that the circuit court erred in excluding Henderson-Bell
as a witness, particularly because his testinony tended to prove
the driveway wae a source of the water.

nile the similarities between Henderson-Bell’s and
Klink's accidents may be noteworthy, the record reflects that
Henderson-Bell hydroplaned at a location on the highway at least
fe supra note 6.

Insofar as the Appellants argue for the inclusion of the

three hundred yards farther north than Klink,

 

 

Henderson-Bell testimony as tending to prove that the driveway
implicated in Klink’s accident was a source of the water at
Klink's accident site, the record does not reflect that the
driveway implicated by Henderson-8ell was, in fact, the same
driveway as in the present matter. If it was intended to prove
the source of the water at the location Klink lost control of his
vehicle, ve cannot say that the circuit court abused its
discretion in excluding Henderson-Bell’s testimony. By the same
token, inesmuch as the circuit court found that K1ink’s accident
tion 1.0,

 

was caused by excess water on the roadway, see supra
FOF Nos. 50-56, any exclusion of Henderson-Bell’s testimony that
could cause hydroplaning likewise fell within the circuit court's

intended to establish that excess water on the Pahoa Bypass

 

discretion given the undue consumption of time it would have
entailed proportionately to its value.

2. The prior accidents
‘The Appellants next argue that the circuit court

erroneously excluded police reports of seven previous wet weather

a
44% OR PUBLICATION in WEST'S WAWAI'E REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER

 

accidents that they maintain were relevant to establish notice,
defect, and existence of a dangerous condition, citing Kaeo, 68
Haw. at 457, 719 P.2d at 393. They contend that prior accidents
need not be identical to be probative, citing Taylor-Rice vw.
State, 91 Haw. 60, 76-77, 78, 979 P.2d 1086, 1102-03, 1105
(2999), and Kaeo, 68 Haw. at 455, 719 P.2d at 393. Although the
latter proposition may be true, the fact remains that the
Appellants failed at the hearing and again on appeal to
articulate specifically how any of the seven accidents were
sufficiently similar to Klink’s accident -- beyond the fact that
each occurred during wet weather near the site of the accident --
to justify a determination that the circuit court abused its
discretion in excluding them. As noted supra, the burden is on
the proponent of the evidence to demonstrate sufficient
similarity to meet the standard for the purpose for which the
evidence is sought to be admitted.
a reduction ven x "
desion sal

The Appellants’ counsel argued for admission of the
seven prior accident reports on the theory that Krueper would
want to rely on them to form his opinion of the highway’s design
and construction and would want to refer to them as a basis for
his opinion while testifying. The Appellants’ counsel emphasized
that Krueper would not be testifying specifically as to the
details of the reports themselves.

‘The reports need not have been admitted for Krueper to

rely on them because “expert opinion can be based upon matters

42
   

+ FOR PUBLICATION in WEST’ HAMAT'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER

otherwise inadmissible.” State v. Yip, 92 Hawai'i 98, 108, 987
P.2d 996, 1006 (App. 1999). See also Swink v. Cooper, 77 Hawai'i
209, 215, 881 P.2d 1277, 1283 (App. 1994) (“An expert’s opinion
may thus be based on even inadmissible evidence, including
hearsay.”); Addison M. Bowman, Hawai'i Rules of Evidence Manual

§ 703-2[1] (3d ed. 2006) ("So long as the expert's basis material
meets [HRE RJule 703/s{%] criterion of ‘reasonable reliance,’ it
need not be admissible in evidence. Indeed, the very purpose of
the reasonable reliance requirement is to set 2 standard for
validating, as an expert's basis, material that will not achieve
admissibility under [the HRE].). Furthermore, in Zabieros, this
court noted that “an expert may discuss the underlying facts and
data upon which he or she is relying on direct examination, even

though hearsay may be involved -- at least for the limited

 

purpose of disclosing the basis of his or her opinion” and held

that HRE (Roles} 703 and 708(") do not foreclose an
Gupert witness from revealing, in the course of direct
euamination, the contents of the materials upon which
he of she has reasonably relied —~ hearsay though they

 

 

“HRE Rute 703 provides

 

‘The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert beses an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or
atle known to the expert at or before the nearing. If of = type
Teasonably relies ypon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions of inferences upon the subject, the facts or date
‘sdnissible in evidence. ‘The court may, howe
Gisailow testimony in the form of an cpinicn cr inference if the
Underlying facts cr data indicate lack of trustworthines

 

   

 

RE Rute 705 provids

 

the expert nay testify in terme of opinion or inference and
give the expert's reasons therefor without disclosing the
Snderiying facts cr data if the underlying facts cr deta have been

id in discovery proceedings. The expert may in any event,
fed te disclose the underiying fects cr

 

    

a3
‘10+ FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS and PACIFIC REFORTER

 

may be -~ in order to explain the basis of his or her
opinion, provided, of course, thst (1) the expert hae
‘actually relied on the material as a basis of the
Gpinion, (2) the materials are “of 4 type reasonably,
relies upon by experte in the particuler field in
forming opinions er inferences upon the subject,” and
(3) the nateriig do not otherwise “indicate # lack of

   

 

85 Haw. at 384, 944 P.2d at 1327. Therefore, regardless of
whether the reports were admitted into evidence, Kreuper could
have relied on them to form his opinion of the design and
construction of the highway and, if the three-pronged test
articulated in Tabieros were satisfied, could have referred to
the reports expressly during direct examination.”

Moreover, the reports set forth only the barest facts
pertaining to the accidents and none are accompanied by further
formal investigations, including the September 9, 1994 and
August 25, 1995 accidents, see supra section 1.c. We conclude,
therefore, that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
considering the necessity of avoiding confusion of the issues and
any undue consumption of time and ruling to exclude them.

b. Introduction of the seven reports to

‘eatablish that the State was on notice of a
‘Sangerous condition

Insofar as the Appellants argue that the accident
reports were improperly excluded because they were relevant to

 

% of course, in addition to ensuring that the requirenents of the
three-pronged test were met, the circuit court would also have been obligated
to limit eny testimony by Krueper pertaining te the contents of the reports
through “appropriate restrictive supervision ‘soa to allow only that
necessary to explain to the [trier of fact] the manner in which che (otherwise
Tnecnissibie meterial] formed a part of the basis cf (the) “expert opinion.”
85 Hawai'i at 303, 944 Pi2a at 1526, quoted in Bowman, supra,

Br0s-2121 (0)

 

 

44
 

9+ FOR PUBLICATION in WEST’ HAWAT' REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER +
establish that the State was on notice of the dangerous condition
“caused by water at the cut slope area,” the State concedes that
it was on notice as to community concerns regarding both the
flooding on the highway and the previous accidents in the area.
It also concedes that “after the construction was completed, when
there were complaints of water creating a potentially dangerous
condition, the [S]tate then had a duty either to correct the
condition or to warn of the condition.” Therefore, bearing in
mind that the Appellants failed to argue their “notice relevancy”
theory at the pretrial hearing, any error in excluding the
reports by virtue of their relevance to proof of notice would be
harmless.
c.

The Cizcuit Court Was Wrong In Concluding That the
State Fultilled its Duty To Design, Construct, And
Maintain The Roadway In A Reasonably Safe Condition Ox
To Warn Adequately Of Any Unsafe Conditions.

‘The State had a duty to mitigate the
known _hazard_or to warn motorists
adequately of the danger.

the duty of the State 4s to design and construct its
highways in such a sanner a= to sake then reasonably
Safe for their intended uses, and thereafter to
aintain them in a reasonably safe condition...
‘The State’ s duty to maintain includes a duty to
Correct ox inform the public of the existence of
highway defects.

 

 

 

 

 

Tavlor-Rice v, State, 91 Hawai'i 60, 70, 979 P.24 1086, 1096
(1999) (quoting Laqua v. State, 65 Haw, 211, 214, 649 P.2d 1135,
1137 (1982) (quoting Breed v. Shaner, 57 Haw. 656, 665, 562 P.2d
436, 441 (1977))) (emphasis omitted). “This court has, in a
variety of contexts, repeatedly recognized a duty owed to all
persons to refrain from taking actions that might foreseeably

45
448 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S MAMA'S REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER

   

cause harm to others.” Id, at 71, 979 P.2d at 1097 (emphasis in
original) (citing, inter alia, Knodle v, Waikiki Gateway Hotel,
Inca, 69 Haw. 376, 385, 742 P.2d 377, 383 (1987) (for the
proposition that, “under the prevailing rule[,] duty. . . is
bounded by the foreseeable renge of danger”) (some brackets
omitted); Janssen v, Am, Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 69 Haw. 31, 34,
731 P.2d 163, 165 (1987) (concluding that a “defendant owes a
duty of care only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the
conduct”).

The State does not dispute that it owed Klink a duty to
maintain the highway in a reasonably safe condition, which
included the duty to mitigate and warn of known hazards; indeed,
it concedes in the present matter that, “after the construction
was completed, when there were complaints of water creating a
potentially dangerous condition, the State then had a duty to
correct the condition or to warn of the condition.”

2. The circuit court erred in concluding that the
State did not breach a duty.

‘The Appellants challenge COL Nos. 1 and 2, see supra
section I.D, which respectively concluded that the State (1)
fulfilled its duty to design and construct @ reasonably safe
highway and (2) fulfilled its duty to maintain the highway in a

reasonably safe condition and to inform motorists of any highway

© Ae this court concluded in Zevler=Rice (and the state does not
challenge) the duty fo avosd foreseeable herm to others applies equally to the
State, particularly in light of HRS § 662-2. (1993), which provides in
pertinent part: “ihe State hereby waives ite inmunity for liability for the
Korte of its exployees and shall be liable in the sane manner and to the sane
extent ae 2 private individual under like circumstances «+ +.”

 

 

 

 

46
 

s+ FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S IAMAI'T REFORES and PACIFIC REFORTER
defects. The Appellants also challenge FOF Nos. 34 and $7, see
di, supra, claiming that the circuit court clearly-erred when it
found that the source of the water on the roadway remained
“unknown” and “not proven,” arguing that Haymore had adnitted
that the driveway was a source of the water and further claiming
that it was clear error to find that the source of the water was
critical to any remediation -~ a conclusion that implicitly
discharged the State, pending further investigation, of its duty
to undertake any mitigation efforts ~~ arguing thet the
installation, in 1998, of the interceptor ditch established that
the State recognized the feasability of precautionary measures as
a Youre” for the water flow.

a. The State breached its duty to mitigate the
hazard in-a timely manner

Nishioka, charged with managing water runoff on the
state highway system and with ensuring compliance with design
standards, testified that the highway met all relevant design
criteria, He testified that, based on the topographical survey
of the site, an interceptor ditch was not required on the
superelevated curve in question. Haymore concurred that, unless
there were indications that water would flow across the highway,
an interceptor ditch was not warranted in the design. Krueper,
conversely, testified that, in his expert opinion, proper highway
design did not solely adhere to generalized criteria but
responded to conditions on-site and, because the site of the
accident lacked any drainage for uphill water, the design of the

Péhoa Bypass did not demonstrate “professional engineering

7
 

+8 POR PUBLICATION in WEST'S NAWA'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER
judgment” and was defective. Nevertheless, whether due to the
design, construction, or the maintenance of the highway, the
record is clear that, within weeks of the highway opening,
Haymore observed water sheeting on the highway followed by
community complaints of hazardous conditions. As the State
concedes, it was at that point that the State was on notice that
a hazard existed and was under a duty to address it.
i. The circuit court clearly erred in
‘oping cat tee urea of the pater was
Although Haymore testified that “I. . . feel there's
one source of water, and that would be the driveway,” he also
testified that he had never observed any water flowing from the
driveway onto the roadvay and, in fact, had only observed water
flowing across the highway once, from the cutbank, and regarded
At as an anomaly for which he could not offer an explanation. He
further testified that none of the private citizens or police
officers who complained of water sheeting on the roadway had ever
ascertained the water's source. while Lt. Kelly encountered
“significant” sheeting on the roadway during heavy rains, he
offered no opinion as to its ultimate source. As head of the
DoT’'s hydraulics design section, Nishioka testified, based on
topographical maps surveyed before the construction of the
highway, that water low from the cutbank onto the highway would
be “very minimal” and that he was unaware of any subsequent

determination of the ultimate source of the water. Dracup,

48
+4 POR PUBLICATION in WEST'S IAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER **4

relying on photographs, testified that the shoulder sloped away
from the roadway."

Officer Ellazar, however, testified that, on several
occasions, he had observed water flowing off the cutbank and onto
and over the roadway into the southbound lane. He further
testified that, on the day of the accident, he observed water
“coming off of the northbound into the southbound lane” and
runoff debris along the lower west portion of the roadway,
indicative of water flowing across the roadway. As noted, Lt.
Kelly similarly reported that, even in moderate rain, water on
the east side of the roadway would track the superelevated curve
until, by the time it reached the location where Klink’s accident
occurred, it covered both lanes of travel. In addition, at least
one private citizen present at the Safety Council meetings
reported sheet flow at the location.

Krueper, during an inspection undertaken while it was
drizzling, observed water coming off the driveway and “sheet

flowing across the roadway.” Moreover, in contrast to Nishioka’s

 

% the Appellants allege that the ciroust court abused its discretion
in allowing Sracip to testity concerning the slope of the east. shoulder,
because his testimony wes speculative,” based on “nisleading photographs,”
ane seontrary to credible, probative evidence.” Inasmuch as (1) Dr. Dracup’s
Status as an expert on the hydraulic aspects of highway drainage was
Ectablishea, (2) he had personally conducted 8 site visit, (3) the Appellants
fail to substantiate beyond mere assertion that the photographs of the site
Were “aisleading,” particularly in light of Dr. Dracup'e visit to the site,
Gnd (4) the fact thst "[o]nce the basic requisite qualifications are
Sctablishes, the extent of an expert's knowledge of subject matter goes to, the
height rather than the sdnicsibiiity of the testimony,” Zabieros, BS Hawai's
bt a1, 944 P.2d at 1294, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
Gliowifg Or. dracup to offer his opinion concerning the topography of the east
Shoulder of the highway. The cane reascning applies to the Appellants’
Siiegation thet the cifcult court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Dracup

Spine thet the cetained water on the roacay visible in sone photographs of
the site was due to tire depressions in the highway rather than runoff.

  

 

 

 

 

 

   

49
 

‘#8 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S WAWAL'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REFORTER

reliance on pre-construction topographical maps and Dracup’s
reliance on photographs of the site, Krueper conducted post~
construction surveys of the site and determined that the cutbank
along the highway sloped toward the road.

Inasmuch as (1) Nishioka's testimony was based on
outdated topographical maps that he conceded could be rendered
inaccurate by subsequent physical changes in the terrain wrought
during the construction process, (2) Nishioka conceded (a) that
he relied in his testimony on maps that did not contain
measurements of the slope of the roadway or driveway and (b)

urements of the site, heavy rainfall

 

that, based on Krueper’s me:
Would flow from the driveway onte the highway, (3) Dracup did not
conduct any measurements of the land along the highway to support
his opinion and did not include the driveway area in his
calculations of water flow across the roadway, (4) both Officer
Ellazer and Krueper observed water flowing from the east bank of
the roadway, from the driveway and the cutbank, even during light
to moderate rainfall, and sheeting across both lanes of the
roadway, (5) Haymore conceded that the driveway would be @ likely
source of the water and had personally observed water flowing off
the cutbank, and (6) Krueper, employing post-construction
measurenents of the area, demonstrated that the cutbank and the
Griveway sloped toward the roadway, we conclude that the circuit
court clearly erred in finding that the source of the water had
never been determined. In addition to Hymore’s observance of
the phenomenon, other uncontested testimony of independent

witnesses, particularly Officer Ellazar and Lt. Kelly,

50
 

set rom PORICATION in MEETS WAT REFORES and FACET REFOREER
established that rainfall, including Light to moderate rainfall,
produced a vater flow from the east bank of the road that spread
across both lanes of traffic. the circuit court's finding that
the source of the water remained unknown, therefore, i8 not
supported by substantial evidence in the record and, in sny
event, leaves this court “with a definite and fim conviction
that a mistake has been made.” rover, 102 Havat'i at 410, 77
P.3d at $4. Rather, the uncontroverted testimony denonstrates
that the origin of the vater was rainfall and the source, of
eriginal location, of the flow onto the roadvay was the east side
of the roadway, including the cutbank and drivevay.
i.
Sater fees ted Sunptonen.* farther
oth Haynore and Neclure testified that remedial

actions would be more effective the more was known concerning the
source of the water. Haynore testified that “trying to figure
ut where the water cane from was the big issue" but, during the
nore than five years during which he vas avare of the water flov,
he did not expend significant energy or tine on further
investigating the source, Following the citizen complaints, he
“determined, or at least . . . felt, we should put ina aiten.”
Despite his inability to better ascertain the source of the
water, following his second investigation of the area, Haymore
wrote to McClure thet it was “imperative” that a drainage
facility be built, Although still unsure of the ultimate source

of the water, Haymore concluded that “about the only cure” was to

51
4* FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S WAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER *+#

place a drainage facility “on the high side of the
super [elevation).”

McClure, in turn, testified that, when devising a
corrective plan, “the best measure is always to try to get the
water at its source” but did not assert, as the circuit court
found, that determining the source of the water was “critical” to
any remediation efforts. In testimony, he could not recall what
further steps, if any, were taken to determine the source but
testified that, nevertheless, his department proceeded with the
interceptor ditch. Nishioka, charged with managing water runoff
on the State’s highway systen, could not recall any studies
undertaken to further determine the ultimate source of the ater
but, nevertheless, oversaw the design of the interceptor ditch.

Despite its apparent preference for determining more
fully the ultimate source of the water, the State nevertheless
constructed an interceptor ditch at the scene, even though
neither McClure nor Nishioka could recall the details of any

further investigations being conducted concerning the source.

 

The only information deemed “critical” by state officials was
here the water was crossing the road, not the ultimate source of
the water, and, in light of the testimony of Lt. Kelly and
Haymore, particularly concerning the complaints lodged with the
Safety Council, the State was on notice as to where the water was
crossing the road. The record dees not contain substantial
evidence that a determination of the source of the water was
“critical” to any remediation and, therefore, FOF No. $7 is

clearly erroneous, see Trover, 102 Hawai'i at 409-10, 77 P.3d at.

 

52
 

40+ OR PUBLICATION Sn WEST'S HAMAT'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REFORTER
93-94. Rather, after reviewing the relevant testimony, this
court is “left with the definite and firm conviction” that the
circuit court made a mistake in finding that further
determination of the source of the water was critical to any

remediation. Id. at 410, 77 P.3d at 94.

Al. The State failed to employ reasonable,
ayallable mitigation measures ina
rine nce al he
hazardous condition.

In 1991, Haynore, driving the highway during a heavy
rain, observed water flowing over the cutbank end covering both
lanes of the highway. He assumed that the flow was caused by the
adjacent landowners dumping water but did not make any inquiries
to determine whether that was, in fact, the case. In early 1996,
he and McClure received reports, from citizens and police
officers, of water crossing the highway at the site in
“significant” depths, during both moderate and heavy rains.
Haymore deemed the creation of a drainage facility at the site
“imperative.”

The State, for its part, contends that, (1) having

 

conducted an investigation that failed to determine the source of
the sheeting water that eye-witnesses had reported and then, (2)
having erected a warning sign, it had fully discharged its legal
duty to motorists. The State asserts that its engineers
continued to consider corrective measures, but makes no
representations that any further investigations were conducted

into the ultimate source of the water.
‘+8 OR PUBLICATION in WEST'S WAA'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER *

 

‘This court has, at least obliquely, implied that the
duty to maintain highays includes the duty to repair. see
Wemple ex rel, Dano v. Dahman, 103 Hawai'i 385, 393, 83 P.3d 100,
108 (2004) (noting that “*[bjefore the municipality can be held
responsible for maintenance, repair, and liability[,] there must
be unequivocal acceptance by the municipality.’”) (quoting
Wiemple I, 102 Hawai'i 27, $1, 72 P.3d 499, 523 (App. 2002)

(quoting Maui Ranch Estates Owners Ass'n, v. County of Maul, 6

Haw. App. 414, 421, 724 P.2d 118, 123 (1986))). The case law of

 

other jurisdictions is in general agreement that “[t]he duty of
governmental bodies to ‘maintain’ streets or highways is
ordinarily held to include the duty to repair.” Ehlinger va
Lowa, 237 N.W.2d 784, 788 (Towa 1976) (citing Delarosa v.
Arizona, $16 P.2d 582, 584 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974); Clay v. City of
os Angeles, 98 Cal. Rptr. $82, $86 (Ct. App. 1972); Engman v.
City of Des Moines, 125 N.W.2d 235, 237 (Iowa 1963); Weiher v.
Phillips, 133 N.£, 67, 68 (Ohio 1921); McClung v, King County,
204 P. 1064, 1065 (Wash. 1922)). Nevertheless, once on notice of
a hazardous condition, the State must be afforded a reasonable
time to effect repairs. Id. (concluding that a state “‘must have
actual notice of the dangerous condition of a street, or the
condition must have existed for a sufficient time to enable the
[State] to discover and repair the same, in the exercise of
reasonable and ordinary care and diligence’) (quoting Abraham v.
Sioux City, 250 N.W. 461, 462 (Iowa 1933)). Inasmuch as (1)
Haymore and, through him, the State, had long-standing knowledge

of the nature and location of the hazard, (2) sufficient

54
   

OR PUBLICATION Sn WISE’ KAWAI'T REFORES and PACIFIC REPORTER
information concerning the cause of the hazardous condition to
effect repairs, as evidenced by the installation of the
Interceptor ditch, and (3) the State failed to articulate a
sonable justification for the delay in mitigating the hazard
through installation of the ditch, we hold that the circuit court

 

was wrong in concluding that the State did not breach “its duty
to design, construct and/or maintain -- which includes a duty to
‘correct’ defects in -- the highway.” Tavlor-Rice, $1 Hawai't at
74, 979 P.2d at 1100.

 

ido that the sta
its.duty to maintain, it breached its dutv to
warn adequately.

In addition to alleging that the State breached its
duty to maintain the highway in @ reasonably safe condition, the
Appellants contend that the State failed to warn adequately of
the danger, citing First Ins, Co, of Hawaii, Inc, v. State, 66
Haw, 413, 425, 665 P.2d 648, 656 (1983); Tabieros, 85 Haw. at
354, 944 P.2d at 13417 Gump v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 93 Haw. 428,
436-37, § P.3d 418, 426-27 (App. 1999).). The State, for its

 

part, concedes that, once it was on notice of the hazardous
condition on the highway, it was under a duty either to repair
the condition or to warn motorists adequately of the danger.

tion for

 

‘The adequacy of a warning is generally a qu
the trier of fact, although, in rare instances, the question of a
warning’s adequacy may be determined as a matter of law. Acoba
ws Gen, Tire, Inc., 92 Hawai'i 1, 15, 986 P.2d 288, 302 (1999)
(pertaining to the adequacy of warnings in product liability

disputes) (quoting Wagatsuma v. Patch, 10 Hew. App. 547, 574, 879

55
 

‘0+ POR PUBLICATION in WEST'S WOWAL'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REFORTER
P.2d $72, $87 (1994) (**(T]he issue of breach of duty 4s common
to both negligence and strict products liability claims and is
ordinarily one for the jury./"); see also Bidar vy, Anta, Inc.,
66 Haw. 547, $52, 669 P.24 154, 159 (1983) ("*[W)hether the
obligation to exercise reasonable care was breached is ordinarily
a question for the trier of fact to determine.) The
Appellants essentially contend, therefore, that the circuit
court, sitting as the trier of fact, clearly erred in its coL
No. 2 in implicitly determining that the State discharged its
duty to warn adequately.

our jurisprudence, however, offers no analytical tools
for divining on review whether @ highway warning was “adequate”
and, therefore, whether the circuit court clearly erred in so
concluding. When faced with a question of first impression, this
court may turn to the case law of other jurisdictions for
guidance. State v. Cornelio, 64 Hawai'i 476, 490, 935 P.2d 1021,
1035 (1997). The South Carolina Supreme Court has reasoned,
concerning the adequacy of highway signage, that

n(eyhe (State) ss not an insurer of the safety of

tavelers over the Righwaye of the Stat

‘feope the highways

Asperiormed when it
Fessonsbly safe condition for travel, and gtacts and
snable users of said highwave, exerciaina ordinary

 

 

void injury £0 themselves and
suena.”
Taylor v. S.C, State Highway Dep't, 130 8.6.20 418, 422 (S.C.
1963) (quoting Epps v. S.C, State Highway Dep't, 39 S.£.2d 198,
201 (S.C. 1946)) (emphasis added). The North Carolina Suprene

Court has noted that,

56
‘04 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S JUWAT'T REFORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER +++

 

[ijp the final analysis, the test of the sufficiency
of the warning is not whether barriers or other
Physical devices are used, but is whether the means

 

exercise of ordinary care, to
Presley v. CM. Allen £ Co., Ince, 66 S.E.2d 789, 792 (N.C, 1951)

(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
‘As stated supra in section III.A, the cireuit court did

 

not clearly err in finding that, on the day of the accident, a

t 500 feet prior

 

“Road Floods During Rain” sign was posted at le:
to the scene of the accident, a sufficient distance before the
hazard to fulfill professional guidelines for the proper
placement of the sign, even according to Krueper, the Appellants’
expert witness.

Nevertheless, the circuit court found that Klink was
traveling at thirty-five to forty miles an hour, fifteen to
twenty miles an hour below the posted speed limit, and that, when
his vehicle began its spin, he was traveling only twenty-five
miles per hour. It found that there was excess water on the road
in the vicinity, that runoff created sheet flow at the site of
the accident, and that, as Klink approached the driveway on the
eastern shoulder, he reasonably applied his brakes and thereafter
Jost control of his vehicle. rt further found that “[t]he
accident was caused by water on the roadway in sufficient
magnitude to make it very slippery and cause loss of traction.”
The State's expert did not controvert Krueper’s testimony that
the conditions of Kiink’s tires did not contribute to the

57
 

FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER *#¢
accident. In fact, the circuit court’s FOFs are devoid of any
finding of contributory negligence on Klink's part.

Based upon the foregoing, the circuit court concluded
that [t]he activities of the State show that the State fulfilled
its duty . . . to install signs and, therefore, it did not breach
its duty.” The duty to warn adequately, however, is not
fulfilled merely by installing signs if the measures taken are
Anadeguate to “enable users of [the] highway, exercising ordinary
care and prudence, to avoid injury to themselves and others.”
Baylor, 130 $.£.2d at 422, The circuit court, in concluding that
the State had fulfilled its duty to warn, clearly erred as a
matter of law when it implicitly found that the State’s warnings
were adequate. The record does not contain substantial evidence
to support the conclusion that the State put Klink on sufficient
notice of the gravity and severity of the hazard present on the
roadway “to enable him, in the exercise of ordinary care, to
avert injury.” Presley, 66 $.B.2d at 792. Accordingly, we are
“left with the definite and firm conviction” that the circuit
court made a mistake in concluding that the posted sign was
adequate to apprise Klink of the hazard. rover, 102 Hawai'i at
410, 77 P.3d at 94.

* the Appellants raise two further allegations in their statenent of
pointe of error. they assert that FOF No. 43 was clearly erroneous in stating
Phat Officer Eliazar did net observe runoff debris fron the
properties on the road and that
bt the accident scene. A review of the relevant e
Statenents attributed to Officer Ellazar in FOF No.
teributed to Officer Aurelio, who testified that he
fast properties in the northbound lane and that the water flow did not concern
hin. “To that limited degree, FOF No. <3 1s clearly erroneous. The Appellants
do not, however, articulate any argument ae to how the nistaken attribution

(continued...)

  

     

   

58
‘+4 POR PUBLICATION in MESI’S HAMAY'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER ***

D. The cil Brred In Thi a

Klink’s Death.

‘This court has long held, in the context of
negligence actions, that
[eine best definition and the most
est of proninate or Legal cause

   

Sctor's negligent conduct 19 5 tesa) cause

cf harm to another if (a) his (or her)

Conduct ie a substantial factor in

Bringing sbout the harm, and (5) there is

he rile of law relieving the actor fren

Bability becouse of the manner in which

his [or her] negligence has resulted in

the harm.” Restatement, Torts, § £317

Prosser on Torts, § €7-

ave 48" Haw. 128, 132, 363 F.2d 963,
973 (2961); ase also Age v. Hundahl, 78 Hawei's 230,
236, 691 P.2a 1022, 1028 (1995) (quoting the MischélL
fest with approval). Under the Mitchell test, ©

 

 

 

 

 

‘fhe wnole cause or the only factor in
Bringing about the hare. Zt was enouch
that nis lor her! nealicence was a
‘substantial factor in causina the
st a a

Knodle, 69. Hay

Thternal quotation mark

omitted)

at 390, TZ P.2d at 386 (citation,
‘and brackets

 

 

Taylor-Rice, 91 Hawai'i at 74, 979 P.2d at 1100 (emphases in
original) (some brackets added and some in original). “The first
arm of the test contemplates @ factual determination that the
negligence of the defendant was more likely than not a
substantial factor in bringing about the result complained of.”
Id. at 74-75, 979 P.2d 1100-01 (some emphasis added and some

omitted) (citations omitted). Appellate review of a lower

 

    

continued)
Sing on the cutcone of the lawsuit. The Appellants also contend

TY Se clearly erroneous, in that it is “incomplete” for failing
to mention it. Kelly's testimony concerning hie personal observations, prior
to the accidents of water on the rosdmay. Inasmuch as FOF No. ¢4 correctly
Stetes if. Kelly's testimony ae to hie Soservaticns the day of the accident,
Ie°'Es not ‘clearly erroneous.

 

 

   

 

59
 

48 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAMAr'T REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER
court’s determination of legal causation is, therefore, subject
to a clear error standard. Id, (citing Mitchell, 45 Haw. at 139,
363 P.2d at 977).

a.
that the State's breach of duty was not a
substantial factor in causing Kiink’s death,

t flow

 

The circuit court found that runoff created a
at the site where Klink lost control of his vehicle and that the
accident was caused by excessive water on the highway. Officer
Ellazar and Lt. Kelly testified that, during regular and heavy
rains, water would sheet across both lanes of travel in
“significant” depths, sufficient on one occasion to cause Officer
Ellazar nearly to lose control of his vehicle. the circuit court
further found that “[w)here there is banking or superelevation of
a highway, custom and practice requires placement of an
interceptor ditch at the edge of the shoulder to capture water
running off adjacent slopes and driveways.” Moreover, the State
was on sufficient notice of the source of the water to be subject
to a duty to act to renedy the hazard, see supra sections
HIL.C.2.a.d-4ii. The State installed the interceptor ditch in
1998 and Dracup, the State’s expert hydrologist, testified that
it intercepted water from the east driveway and diverted it from
the highway for at least two hours after a light rain. Finally,
as noted aupra in section I1.C.2.b, the record is devoid of any
evidence of contributory negligence on Klink’s part.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the circuit court
clearly erred when it found that the State's failure to install

the interceptor ditch, to take other remedial action, or to warn

60
+4 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAMAI'I REPORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER +4
adequately of the severity of the hazard faced by motorists on
the bypass during moderate to heavy rains was not a substantial
factor in bringing about Klink’s death, Taylor-Rice, 91 Hawai'i
at 74, 979 P.2d at 1100.

 

militate aoa: iiity on

hate.

~The second arm of the Mitchell test contemplates
inguiry whether there are policy concerns or rules of law that
would prevent imposition of liability on the negligent party
although his negligence was clearly a cause of the resultant
injury.” Taylor-Rice, 91 Hawai'i at 75, 979 P.2d at 1101
(emphasis omitted) .

The State does not allege that any contributory
negligence on Klink's part or any other superceding intervening
event interceded in the chain of causation so as to relieve the
State of liability, Rather, on the facts of this case, it was
clearly foreseeable that motorists would travel the section of
highway at issue during moderate to heavy rains, at speeds of
forty miles an hour or greater -- given the fifty-five mile an
hour speed limit -- and encounter the water hazard that Klink did
on the morning of March 9, 1997. See id. at 76, 979 P.2d at 1102
(citing McKenna v, Volkewacenverk Aktiengeselischaft, 57 Haw.
460, 466, 558 P.2d 1018, 1023 (1977), for the proposition that
only unforeseeable intervening negligent acts break the chain of
causation sufficient to relieve an actor of liability). Although
“ [t]he State is not the insurer of the personal safety of every

member of the motoring public,” its “duty . . . is to design and

a
 

‘t+ FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S JAMAI'S REFORES and PACIFIC REFORTER
construct its highways in such a manner as to make them
reasonably safe for their intended uses, and thereafter to
maintain them in a reasonably safe condition.” Pickering v.
State, $7 Haw. 405, 409, $87 P.2d 125, 128 (1976) (citing Ikene
veMaruo, 54 Haw. 548, 511 P.2d 1087 (1973); Boyce Motor Lines vs
Mas, 117 N.Y.S.2d 289 (App. Div. 1952); Overton v. Wenatchee
Beebe Orchard Co., 183 P.2d 473 (Wash. 1947)).

In the present matter, the State is not liable to the
Appellants merely because an accident occurred on the P&hoa
Bypass in the early morning of March 9, 1997. Where the State is
not on notice of a hazard and otherwise fulfills its duties to
design, construct, and maintain its highways, to conduct a
reasonably thorough investigation and undertake repairs in a
timely and reasonable manner, and to warn motorists of existing
hazards sufficiently “to enable users of said highways,
exercising ordinary care and prudence, to avoid injury to
themselves and others,” Tavlor, 130 $.£.2d at 422, the State
quite rightly will not be Liable for accidents that may occur.

Liability in the present matter exists because the
State was on notice as early as 1991, and certainty by early
1996, of the hazardous water accumulations on the subject section
of the Péhoa Bypass but failed to undertake timely and reasonable
measures to mitigate the danger or to warn adequately of the
severity of the hazard. Further investigation was not critical
to the remediation of the hazard; indeed, the record reflects
that the State installed the interceptor ditch based on Haynore’s

1991 observations and on the reports received of water emanating

6
 

04 FOR PUBLICATION in WEST'S HAMAL'T REFORTS and PACIFIC REPORTER
from the property along the eastern side of the highway, without
the need for any further determination as to its source.

the record is devoid of substantial evidence to support
the circuit court’s conclusion that there was insufficient proof
that the State's negligence in addressing the hazard was not
substantial factor in causing Klink's death, and we are unaware
of any policy concerns or rules of law that would prevent
imposition of liability on the State. Taylor-Rice, 91 Hawai'i at
74, 979 P.2d at 1100. The circuit court's COL No. 3 was
therefore wrong. Id. at 74-75, 979 P.2d at 1100-01. MWe hold as
a matter of law that the State breached its duty to maintain and

warn and further that the State’s breach was the legal cause of

 

Klink's death.

IV. CONCLUSION

In Light of the foregoing, we vacate the circuit
court's October 7, 2002 amended judgment and remand this matter
for a trial on the issue of the Appellants’ damages.
on the briefs:

Michael P. Akana, Gary A. Berticevich,
and Kevin H.S. Yuen
for the plaintiff-appeliant

Estate of Aloysius Klink Gr
Robin M. Kishi, :
Deputy Attorney General, kbc Pt} Lorinaon

for the defendant-appeliee
State of Hawai Sees C8 Talay are

Yon e. Bastyr

63