Case Title: In re Disqualification of Pontious

Citation: 2001-Ohio-4105

Docket Number: 2001AP078

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Pontious, 94 Ohio St.3d 1235, 2001-Ohio-4105.] 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF PONTIOUS. 
THE STATE OF OHIO v. MCCULLOUGH. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Pontious (2001), 94 Ohio St.3d 1235.] 
Judges — Affidavit of disqualification — Judge’s receipt and consideration of 
unsolicited letters that relate solely to defendant’s request for a 
continuance are not evidence of bias or prejudice — General Assembly 
has required that judges consider the objections of crime victims to a 
request for continuance — R.C. 2930.08. 
(No. 01-AP-078 — Decided September 14, 2001.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Fayette County Common Pleas Court 
case No. 2000-0085-CRI. 
 
MOYER, C.J.  This affidavit of disqualification filed by Jerry McHenry, 
counsel for defendant, seeks the disqualification of Judge Victor Pontious from 
further proceedings regarding the above-referenced case, State v. Matthew 
McCullough. 
 
Affiant makes three contentions in support of his claim that Judge 
Pontious should be disqualified from further proceedings in this case: 
• Judge Pontious denied the defendant’s request for a continuance of the 
September 18, 2001 trial date; 
• Judge Pontious commented that this was a “simple case” and that a 
defense psychologist recently retained by the defendant’s counsel would 
not need additional time to prepare for trial; 
• Judge Pontious received and read communications from members of the 
victim’s family in which they objected to the defendant’s request for a 
continuance and stated their views regarding the appropriate punishment 
in this case.  The fact that Judge Pontious received these communications 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
was not shared with the defendant until a pretrial conference on August 
23, 2001. 
 
Judge Pontious admits that he overruled the defendant’s request for a 
continuance of the trial date, admits having received letters from the victim’s 
family objecting to the defendant’s request for a continuance, and denies having 
commented on the merits of the underlying case.  He provides a copy of a journal 
entry, dated September 5, 2001, in which he found that his consideration of these 
letters was authorized by R.C. 2930.08.  Attached to this journal entry are copies 
of the letters sent to Judge Pontious by the victim’s family.  These letters reflect 
the family members’ objections to the continuance requested by the defendant and 
do not address the merits of the case or the potential punishment that should be 
imposed if the defendant is convicted. 
 
A judge’s decision to grant or deny a party’s request for a continuance is 
within the sound discretion of the judge and is not, by itself, evidence of bias or 
prejudice.  In re Disqualification of Spahr (1987), 36 Ohio St.3d 603, 522 N.E.2d 
457.  In a criminal case, the judge’s decision to grant or deny a continuance is 
governed, in part, by R.C. 2930.08, which reads as follows: 
 
“If a motion, request, or agreement between counsel is made in a case and 
the motion, request, or agreement might result in a substantial delay in the 
prosecution of the case, the prosecutor in the case, to the extent practicable and if 
the victim has requested notice pursuant to division (B) of section 2930.03 of the 
Revised Code, shall inform the victim that the motion, request, or agreement has 
been made and that it might result in a delay.  If the victim objects to the delay, 
the prosecutor shall inform the court of the victim’s objections, and the court shall 
consider the victim’s objections in ruling on the motion, request, or agreement.” 
 
A trial judge cannot reasonably be expected to control what 
correspondence is sent to the judge by persons interested in a pending case, 
particularly by persons who are unrepresented family members of a crime victim.  
January Term, 2002 
3 
Although the better practice in this situation would have been for the judge to 
promptly notify the parties of the receipt of the letters and immediately provide 
them with copies, I cannot conclude that the judge’s receipt and consideration of 
unsolicited letters that relate solely to the defendant’s request for a continuance 
are evidence of bias or prejudice.  This is especially true in view of the fact that 
the General Assembly has required that trial judges consider the objections of 
crime victims to a continuance request. 
 
For these reasons, the affidavit of disqualification is found not well taken 
and is denied.  The case shall proceed before Judge Pontious. 
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