Case Title: Jortner v. Secretary of State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2023 ME 25

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2023-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2023 ME 25 
Docket: 
Cum-23-83 
Argued: 
March 30, 2023 
Decided: 
 April 10, 2023 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ. 
Majority: 
 MEAD, HORTON, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ. 
Dissent: 
 STANFILL, C.J. 
 
 
WAYNE R. JORTNER et al. 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 
HORTON, J. 
[¶1]  The Secretary of State appeals from a judgment entered by the 
Superior Court (Cumberland County, MG Kennedy, J.) in favor of 
Wayne R. Jortner, Richard Bennett, John Clark, and Nicole Grohoski 
(collectively, Jortner) on Jortner’s petition to the Superior Court for review of 
the Secretary of State’s decision determining the wording of a ballot question 
for citizen-initiated legislation.  Contending that the Superior Court erred in 
vacating her decision, the Secretary of State maintains that her wording of the 
question meets the statutory requirements that it be “understandable to a 
reasonable voter reading the question for the first time” and that it “will not 
mislead a reasonable voter who understands the proposed legislation into 
 
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voting contrary to that voter’s wishes.”  21-A M.R.S. § 905(2) (2023).  Reviewing 
the Secretary of State’s decision independently, we reach the same conclusion 
as the Superior Court: the decision must be vacated and the matter remanded 
to the Secretary of State for reformulation of the question. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  Jortner and others applied to the Secretary of State for authorization 
to circulate a petition for a citizens’ initiative proposing legislation entitled “An 
Act To Create the Pine Tree Power Company, a Nonprofit, Customer-owned 
Utility.”  See 21-A M.R.S. § 901 (2023).  The petition, including its proposed 
legislation, was approved for circulation, and in November 2022, the Secretary 
of State certified that the initiators of the legislation had obtained sufficient 
valid 
signatures. 
 
See 
Pine 
Tree 
Power 
Petition, 
available 
at 
https://perma.cc/864H-CFHB; 21-A M.R.S. §§ 901, 902, 903-A, 905(1) (2023); 
Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18, cls. 1, 2. 
[¶3]  On December 21, 2022, the Secretary of State released a proposed 
ballot question for public comment.  See 21-A M.R.S. §§ 901(4), 905-A, 906 
(2023).  On January 30, 2023, after the public comment period had closed, the 
Secretary of State decided on the final wording for the ballot question: 
 
3 
Do you want to create a new quasi-governmental power 
company governed by an elected board to acquire and operate 
existing for-profit electricity transmission and distribution 
facilities in Maine? 
 
Although some commenters had urged that the proposed Pine Tree Power 
Company (the Company) should be described as “consumer-owned” rather 
than “quasi-governmental,” the Secretary of State decided to use the term 
“quasi-governmental” for the following reasons: 
• The Act would create the Company as a “body corporate and politic,” a 
term used in the Maine Revised Statutes to describe other 
quasi-governmental entities. 
• The Company would be classified as a “general government” entity for 
purposes of board member compensation under 5 M.R.S. § 12004-G 
(2023). 
• The Company would be permitted to borrow under statutes applicable to 
quasi-municipal entities. 
• A majority of the board of directors would be elected in elections 
governed by Title 21-A of the Maine Revised Statutes. 
• Candidates for election to the board would be eligible to seek Maine Clean 
Election Act funds. 
• The Company would be subject to the Maine Freedom of Access Act. 
• The Company would be authorized under the Maine Administrative 
Procedure Act to adopt regulations having legal force. 
• Although the Act would classify the Company as “consumer-owned,” the 
term is misleading because it could, in the Secretary of State’s words, 
inaccurately “suggest to voters that that consumers would be acquiring 
shares or some other formal ownership stake in the new entity.” 
 
4 
 
[¶4]  On February 9, 2023, Jortner filed in the Superior Court a timely 
petition for judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision.  See 21-A M.R.S. 
§§ 901(7), 905(2); M.R. Civ. P. 80C.  Jortner argued that the term 
“quasi-governmental power company” is incomprehensible and misleading 
because there is no statutory definition of the term, and that the term would 
confuse and mislead reasonable voters, whereas voters would understand the 
term “consumer-owned transmission and distribution utility.”  He argued that 
voters might improperly believe that the Company would be privately 
managed, that it would be a taxpayer-funded organ of government, or that it 
would be run by the government.  In contrast, he argued, the term 
“consumer-owned” appears in other statutes, was used in the petitions 
themselves and in other related documents, and is the most accurate descriptor 
of the Company.  The relief sought in his petition included a request that the 
court “[m]odify the [Secretary of State’s] Decision by substituting the term 
‘consumer-owned 
transmission 
and 
distribution 
utility’ 
for 
‘quasi-governmental power company’ in the Ballot Question.” 
 
[¶5]  The court considered these arguments and those of the Secretary of 
State and issued a decision on March 9, 2023, vacating the Secretary of State’s 
decision.  The court reasoned that the term “quasi-governmental” is not 
 
5 
understandable to a reasonable voter, especially because it is not a term 
defined in Maine’s statutes, and that the term is misleading because it suggests 
that the Company would be funded by taxpayers rather than consumers, 
whereas the core feature of the proposed legislation is consumer funding and 
ownership.  The court declined Jortner’s request that it modify the question to 
use the term “consumer-owned” and instead remanded the matter to the 
Secretary of State to revise the wording of the question.  See Me. Const. art. IV, 
pt. 3, § 20 (allocating the task of drafting the ballot question to the Secretary of 
State). 
 
[¶6]  The Secretary of State timely appealed.  See 21-A M.R.S. § 905(3); 
M.R. App. P. 1A.  We issued an expedited briefing schedule, established the 
order of proceedings for oral argument, and accepted briefs from the parties 
and amici curiae Maine Affordable Energy Ballot Question Committee, Maine 
Energy Progress Political Action Committee, and The Sierra Club.  In their 
briefs, both the Secretary of State and Jortner focus on the term 
“quasi-governmental.”  Jortner does not maintain on appeal his argument that 
the ballot question should incorporate the term “consumer-owned” instead of 
the term “quasi-governmental,” and we deem that argument withdrawn. 
 
6 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  Our discussion will begin with a summary of our standard of review 
and existing statutory language and interpretations, and will then proceed to 
an analysis of the issue presented here. 
A. 
Standard of Review and Pertinent Law 
 
[¶8]  Because, by statute, our “standard of review must be the same as for 
the Superior Court,” 21-A M.R.S. § 905(3), we engage in a direct review of the 
ballot question as drafted by the Secretary of State, without reference to the 
Superior Court’s judgment, to “determine whether the description of the 
subject matter is understandable to a reasonable voter reading the question for 
the first time and will not mislead a reasonable voter who understands the 
proposed legislation into voting contrary to that voter’s wishes,” id. § 905(2); 
see Olson v. Sec’y of State, 1997 ME 30, ¶ 4, 689 A.2d 605.  This standard of 
review subsumes our review of whether the Secretary of State met her 
constitutional obligation to “prepare the ballots in such form as to present the 
question or questions concisely and intelligibly,” Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 20, 
and her statutory obligation to “write the question in a clear, concise and direct 
manner that describes the subject matter of the . . . direct initiative as simply as 
 
7 
is possible,” 21-A M.R.S. § 906(6)(B).1  See Olson, 1997 ME 30, ¶ 6, 689 A.2d 605; 
cf. Allen v. Quinn, 459 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Me. 1983) (indicating that when 
interpreting the citizen-initiative provisions of the Maine Constitution, “we 
seek the meaning which the words would convey to an intelligent, careful 
voter” (quotation marks omitted)); Payne v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 110, ¶ 18, 
237 A.3d 870 (same).  The burden of persuasion is on the party challenging the 
Secretary of State’s action.  See Olson, 1997 ME 30, ¶ 7, 689 A.2d 605; see also 
21-A M.R.S. § 905(2) (providing for an appeal to be brought in accordance with 
M.R. Civ. P. 80C); Maquoit Bay, LLC v. Dep’t of Marine Res., 2022 ME 19, ¶ 5, 
271 A.3d 1183 (“The party challenging the agency decision bears the burden of 
persuasion on appeal.”). 
 
[¶9]  We have considered on two occasions whether ballot questions met 
the standard set forth in section 905(2).  See Olson, 1997 ME 30, ¶¶ 7-11, 
689 A.2d 605; Wagner v. Sec’y of State, 663 A.2d 564, 568 (Me. 1995).  In 
Wagner, the drafted question was as follows: 
Do you favor the changes in Maine law limiting protected 
classifications, in future state and local laws to race, color, sex, 
physical or mental disability, religion, age, ancestry, national origin, 
 
1  Title 21-A M.R.S. § 906(6)(B) was amended after we decided Olson v. Secretary of State, 1997 ME 
30, 689 A.2d 605.  See P.L. 2019, ch. 414, § 1 (effective June 20, 2019) (codified at 21-A M.R.S. 
§ 906(6)(B) (2023)).  We consider the standard of review laid out for us in 21-A M.R.S. § 905(2) 
(2023) to continue to subsume our review of the Secretary of State’s statutory obligations described 
in section 906(6)(B) as that statute has been amended.  See Olson, 1997 ME 30, ¶ 6, 689 A.2d 605. 
 
8 
familial status, and marital status, and repealing existing laws 
which expand these classifications as proposed by citizen petition? 
 
Wagner, 663 A.2d at 566 n.3 (quotation marks omitted).  We concluded that 
even if the question incorrectly implied that the proposed legislation would 
bind future lawmakers, the question would not mislead voters into voting 
contrary to their intent.  Id. at 568. 
 
[¶10]  More recently, we considered a ballot question that the Secretary 
of State drafted to read as follows: 
Should spraying pesticides from the air or putting pesticides in 
Maine’s waters be a Class A crime? 
 
Olson, 1997 ME 30, ¶ 3, 689 A.2d 605 (quotation marks omitted).  We concluded 
that the use of the term “putting” was not misleading to a voter who understood 
the proposed legislation because, although the parties challenging the question 
suggested that the term carried an element of intent, the term’s meaning was 
close to that conveyed in the proposed act, which criminalized “caus[ing], by 
any means, the introduction of” pesticides in Maine waters.  Id. ¶¶ 7-9.  We 
noted in support of our conclusion that the drafted question contained no 
express statement about an intent requirement and that a reasonable voter 
who understood the initiative would not be misled.  Id. ¶ 9. 
 
9 
 
[¶11]  We further concluded that the use of the term “Class A crime” was 
understandable to a reasonable voter because, viewed with existing statutes, it 
adequately informed the voter of the choice presented.  Id. ¶¶ 10-11.  We 
assumed that “voters [would have] discharged their civic duty to educate 
themselves about the initiative,” including about the statutory definition of a 
Class A crime.  Id. ¶ 11. 
 
[¶12]  The ballot question drafting process, as we stated, “is designed to 
ensure that voters, who may be reading the question for the first time in the 
voting booth, will understand the subject matter and the choice presented.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  Nonetheless, “[v]oters are not to rely on the ballot question 
alone in order to understand the proposal.”  Id.  In essence, the ballot question 
must ask a clear question about whether the voter wishes to approve proposed 
legislation of which the voter is presumed to be already aware.  See id.  We 
explicitly rejected “the notion that section 905 requires that the description be 
understandable to a voter who is reading both the question and the legislation 
for the first time.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 
[¶13]  These opinions inform us that the question need not provide 
complete, comprehensive information about the legislation or its effect.  See id. 
¶ 7 (“Merely demonstrating that the question creates a misleading impression 
 
10 
about the legislation is not enough.”); Wagner, 663 A.2d at 568 (“Although the 
question may inaccurately suggest the legislation will limit the actions of future 
state legislatures, it is not misleading within the meaning of section 905(2).” 
(footnote omitted)).  The statute is concerned with whether “a reasonable voter 
who understands the proposed legislation” but is reading the question for the 
first time would not be able to understand the question or would be misled 
“into voting contrary to that voter’s wishes,” 21-A M.R.S. § 905(2) (emphasis 
added)—not whether a voter who does not understand the proposed 
legislation would be able to fully understand it based on the question alone. 
 
[¶14]  The question must also represent the proposed legislation 
“concisely and intelligibly,” Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 20, “in a clear, concise and 
direct manner that describes the subject matter of the . . . direct initiative as 
simply as is possible,” 21-A M.R.S. § 906(6)(B).  Thus, we consider whether the 
ballot question is clear and understandable and whether the ballot question 
will mislead a reasonable, informed voter into voting contrary to the voter’s 
intent.  Id. § 905(2); Olson, 1997 ME 30, ¶¶ 4-11, 689 A.2d 605; Wagner, 
663 A.2d at 568. 
B. 
Review of the Drafted Ballot Question 
 
[¶15]  The Secretary of State’s ballot question used the term at issue in 
 
11 
this appeal—“quasi-governmental”—to describe the Company.  Jortner 
contends that the term “quasi-governmental” is both “incomprehensible” and 
“misleading” and therefore fails both the “understandable” and the “not 
mislead[ing]” requirements of section 905(2).  The Secretary of State asserts 
that the term “quasi-governmental” meets both requirements and suggests that 
Jortner’s preferred term, “consumer-owned,” might “misguide” voters into 
believing that the Company would give consumers “some sort of formal 
ownership stake” in the Company. 
 
[¶16]  Because responsibility for formulating the question rests with the 
Secretary of State, our review focuses on whether the Secretary of State’s term 
“quasi-governmental power company” (1) is “understandable to a reasonable 
voter reading the question for the first time” and (2) “will not mislead a 
reasonable voter who understands the proposed legislation into voting 
contrary to that voter’s wishes.”  21-A M.R.S. § 905(2).  Jortner bears the burden 
to show that the Secretary of State’s inclusion of the term causes the question 
to violate one or both of the two section 905(2) criteria.  See Olson, 1997 ME 30, 
¶ 7, 689 A.2d 605; see also 21-A M.R.S. § 905(2); Maquoit Bay, LLC, 2022 ME 19, 
¶ 5, 271 A.3d 1183. 
 
12 
1. 
The New Company as Classified and Described in the Proposed 
Legislation 
 
 
[¶17]  “The electric power industry is generally made up of three types 
of electric utilities: investor-owned utilities, publicly owned utilities (including 
federal, state and municipal governmental entities) and electric cooperatives.”  
16 Business Organizations with Tax Planning § 240E.01 (Matthew Bender Lexis 
2023).  According to the Maine Public Utilities Commission’s summary of 
residential electric rates, Maine’s electric utilities consist of all three types—
although they are currently classified in statute as either “consumer-owned” or 
“investor-owned.”  See Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Residential Electric Rates, 
available at https://perma.cc/6QYF-XGQ9; 35-A M.R.S. §§ 3104(1)(A), 
3201(6), 3501(1) (2023). 
 
[¶18]  The proposed legislation would classify the Company as a 
“consumer-owned transmission and distribution utility” for purposes of the 
Maine statutes governing public utilities.  See Pine Tree Power Petition, §§ 9, 12 
(proposed 35-A M.R.S. §§ 3501(1)(F), 4003(1), (12)(A)).  An existing statute 
defines “consumer-owned transmission and distribution utility” to mean “any 
transmission and distribution utility that is wholly owned by its consumers, 
 
13 
including its consumers served in the State.”2  35-A M.R.S. § 3501(1).  The 
current statutory “consumer-owned transmission and distribution utility” 
category explicitly includes five identified types of entities: a “rural 
electrification cooperative,” an “electrification cooperative organized on a 
cooperative plan under the laws of the State,” a “municipal or quasi-municipal 
transmission and distribution utility located in the State,” “[t]he portion of any 
municipal or quasi-municipal entity located in the State providing transmission 
and distribution services,” and a “transmission and distribution utility wholly 
owned by a municipality located in the State.”3  35-A M.R.S. § 3501(1)(A)-(E). 
 
[¶19]  That the statutory “consumer-owned” category already includes 
five different types of electric utilities raises an immediate question as to how 
the ballot question should describe the Company.  The proposed legislation 
does not answer the question because it would simply include the Company by 
 
2  Notably, an “investor-owned transmission and distribution utility” is defined in the negative, for 
purposes of the statute governing scheduled meter readings, as “a transmission and distribution 
utility other than a consumer-owned transmission and distribution utility as defined in [35-A M.R.S. 
§ 3201 (2023)].”  35-A M.R.S. § 3104(1)(A) (2023).  Section 3201(6) provides the same definition of 
a “consumer-owned transmission and distribution utility” as 35-A M.R.S. § 3501(1) (2023). 
 
3  The Maine statute is not alone in classifying publicly owned utilities with member-owned 
cooperatives under the “consumer-owned” rubric.  See, e.g., Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply 
Sys., 744 P.2d 1032, 1072 (Wash. 1987) (“[T]he rural electric cooperatives, like the respondent 
[public utility districts] and municipal utilities, are nonprofit, consumer-owned utilities serving those 
who reside within their service areas . . . .”).  Other authorities distinguish between publicly owned 
and consumer-owned utilities.  See Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 19-20 (1st Cir. 
1990) (“Investor-owned utilities of the type we have described supply approximately 75% of the 
nation’s electricity.  The remainder is supplied by government- and consumer-owned systems.”). 
 
14 
name as a sixth type of utility within the statutory “consumer-owned” category 
without stating what type it is or how it resembles or differs from the five utility 
types already included in the statute.  See Pine Tree Power Petition, § 9 
(proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 3501(1)(F)). 
 
[¶20]  The Company would not be a cooperative because the proposed 
legislation does not contain any provision conferring any ownership or 
property interest or right on the Company’s customers that would be 
comparable to the property rights of members of a cooperative.4  Indeed, the 
proposed legislation defines a “customer-owner” only as “a person to whom the 
company provides electricity.”  Id. § 12 (proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 4001(5)).  
Consistent with the Company’s designation in the title of the proposed Act as a 
“nonprofit” utility, the proposed legislation provides that “[t]he rates and all 
other charges of the company must be sufficient to pay in full the cost of service, 
including the cost of debt and property taxation,” id. § 12 (proposed 35-A M.R.S. 
 
4  For example, by statute, the users of a rural electric cooperative’s transmission and distribution 
services are “members” of the cooperative, 35-A M.R.S. § 3734 (2023), and are granted specific 
statutory rights to receive portions of the cooperative’s revenue and value, 35-A M.R.S. §§ 3705, 
3755(5) (2023).  A rural electrification cooperative must, in specified circumstances, distribute 
revenues in the form of prorated “patronage refunds” to its members (who must be users of the 
cooperative’s transmission and distribution services), id. §§ 3705, 3734, and must similarly 
distribute funds to members proportionally and through a prescribed method if it dissolves and 
winds up its business, id. § 3755(5).  There are no comparable provisions in the proposed legislation 
here. 
 
15 
§ 4004), with no provision for refunds, rebates, dividends, or similar 
distributions to customers. 
 
[¶21]  Many aspects of the Company would be governmental in nature.  
Initially, the fact that the Company would be a creature of statute is itself a 
governmental attribute.  The following additional features lend support to the 
characterization of the Company as being at least partly or in a sense 
governmental: 
• Several of the purposes of the Company further statewide policy 
objectives.  Those purposes include to “provide an open, supportive and 
competitive platform to develop and deploy renewable generation, 
storage, efficiency and beneficial electrification technologies”; to “assist 
the State in rapidly meeting or exceeding the climate action plan goals 
established in Title 38, chapter 3-A”; to “improve the State’s Internet 
connectivity through more affordable access to utility poles and other 
infrastructure in unserved or underserved areas of the State, as defined 
in section 9202, subsection 5”; to “advance economic, environmental and 
social justice and to benefit [C]ompany workers and all communities in 
the State”; and to “support, secure and sustain economic growth and 
benefits for the State.”  Id. § 12 (proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 4002(1)(C)-(F), 
(H)). 
• Some members of the board of the Company would be elected by popular 
vote—not by customers only.  Id. (proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 4002(2)(A)). 
• Candidates for those elected board positions would be “eligible for 
funding through the Maine Clean Election Act, in amounts and under 
terms commensurate with those for candidates for the State Senate.”  Id. 
(proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 4002(2)(C)). 
• “The nomination of candidates for elected members of the board [would 
be] governed by Title 21-A, chapter 5, subchapter 2, and the 
 
16 
determination of the election [would be] governed by Title 21-A, section 
723-A.”  Id. (proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 4002(2)(E)). 
• The Secretary of State would be authorized to “adopt rules governing the 
election of members of the board” in consultation with the Public Utilities 
Commission.  Id. (proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 4002(2)(E)). 
• A vacancy of an elected board member would be filled by a special 
election “held within 180 days of notification of the vacancy and declared 
in the manner prescribed by Title 21-A, section 366.”  Id. (proposed 35-A 
M.R.S. § 4002(3)). 
• The board would have the obligation to make reports to the joint standing 
committee of the Legislature having jurisdiction over energy and utilities 
matters, with annual reports being required to address state climate 
action plan goals, job creation, and gross state product.  Id. (proposed 
35-A M.R.S. §§ 4002(7), 4011). 
• The Company would be authorized to “adopt rules pursuant to Title 5, 
chapter 375, subchapter 2-A for establishing and administering the 
[C]ompany and carrying out its duties,” and those rules would be “major 
substantive rules as defined in Title 5, chapter 375, subchapter 2-A.”  
See id. (proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 4003(10)). 
• Assistance and counsel could be provided to the Company’s board “by the 
Office of the Treasurer of State, the Office of the Attorney General, the 
Maine Municipal Bond Bank, the Finance Authority of Maine, the [Public 
Utilities C]ommission, the Office of the Public Advocate and any other 
state entity.”  Id. (proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 4003(13)). 
• The Act would refer to the Company as “a quasi-municipal corporation” 
for purposes of municipal debt liability, and the Company would pay 
municipal property taxes, but “[a]ll bonds, notes and other evidences of 
indebtedness issued by the [C]ompany [would be] . . . exempt from state 
income tax.”  Id. (proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 4008(1), (2)). 
• The Act would provide that “[t]he [C]ompany serves a public purpose.”  
Id. (proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 4006). 
 
17 
• The proceedings and records of the company would, with some 
exceptions, be “subject to the freedom of access laws, Title 1, chapter 13.”  
Id. (proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 4010). 
• The Company would have to produce a “5-year plan” that would 
“[e]stablish lower rates for low-income residential customers,” create 
“rapid charging infrastructure for electric vehicles” across the state, 
“[r]educe make-ready and pole attachment costs for open-access 
fiber-optic cable in unserved and underserved areas of the State,” and 
rapidly invest “in the distribution network to upgrade reliability and to 
improve capacity for interconnections of new renewable generation and 
storage facilities.”  Id. (proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 4012). 
 
[¶22]  In addition, the proposed legislation provides that “[d]ebt or 
liability of the [C]ompany is not a general obligation or moral obligation of the 
State or any agency or instrumentality of the State other than the [C]ompany,” 
which suggests that the Company would be an “agency or instrumentality of the 
State.”  Id. (proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 4005) (emphasis added).  The board of the 
Company would also be included among the “[g]eneral government” boards 
that are authorized, for their specific purposes, to “hold hearings, adopt rules 
and establish policies and procedures,” and to “enter into contracts, establish 
just charges, conduct investigations, acquire property or enforce state laws.”  
5 M.R.S. § 12004-G; see Pine Tree Power Petition, § 1 (proposed 5 M.R.S. 
§ 12004-G(36)).  Although the Company’s employees would be private 
employees of a nongovernmental “operator” responsible for the employees’ 
benefits, the “operator” would be selected through “competitive public 
 
18 
solicitation.”  Pine Tree Power Petition, § 12 (proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 4003(3), 
(5)). 
 
[¶23]  Due to the Company’s substantial governmental attributes and the 
absence of any provision in its enabling legislation defining or conferring 
ownership rights in either investors or members, the Company conforms most 
closely to the publicly owned model of a utility.5  Because the term 
“consumer-owned,” as used in the Maine utilities statutes, includes some 
entities that are directly and literally owned by consumers and some that are 
not, the Secretary of State determined that the term “consumer-owned” would 
not be clear and understandable in context and might mislead voters who are 
familiar with the proposed legislation. 
 
2. 
“Quasi-Governmental” 
 
[¶24]  Instead of  the term “consumer-owned,” the Secretary of State used 
the term “quasi-governmental” to describe the Company because she regarded 
it as being similar to other “quasi-governmental” entities that have been 
established pursuant to Maine statutes.  This rationale assumes, however, that 
the informed voter is familiar not only with the proposed legislation but with 
 
5  Our characterization of the Company as being most like a publicly owned utility finds support 
in the parties’ oral arguments.  Counsel for the Secretary of State referred to the proposed Company 
as a “quasi-municipal entity,” and counsel for Jortner likened it to a municipal power company. 
 
19 
an assortment of other statutes using the term “quasi-governmental”—a term 
not used in the proposed legislation.  Although the term “quasi-governmental” 
appears in several Maine statutes, it is not defined in any of them.  See, e.g., 21-A 
M.R.S. § 196-A(1)(E) (2023) (authorizing the Secretary of State or a registrar to 
make available, to a “quasi-governmental entity, certain voter information for 
that entity’s authorized use only”).  Some statutes give examples of 
quasi-governmental entities, including “a government-sponsored enterprise,” 
24-A M.R.S. § 1151-A(31) (2023) (defining “person” for purposes of statutes 
governing certain domestic life and health insurers), and “a conservation 
commission, a regional planning commission or a water or sewer district,” 
33 M.R.S. § 1581(1)(A) (2023) (defining “holder” for purposes of Maine’s trail 
easement statutes). 
 
[¶25]  More generally, the term “quasi-governmental” itself is not a 
common term; it does not appear even in some unabridged dictionaries.  
See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 
Unabridged (2002); Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1993).  
Moreover, even in legal contexts, the prefix “quasi-” “is not a very definite 
word.”  Quasi, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (quotation marks 
omitted).  In common usage, it has multiple meanings: 
 
20 
• “[t]o some degree; in some manner,” Quasi-, American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2016); 
 
• “being partly or almost,” or “apparently but not really” having a quality, 
Quasi-, New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010); 
 
• “as if; in a sense or manner; . . . in part,” or “seemingly” but not actually 
being something, Quasi, Webster’s New World College Dictionary 
(5th ed. 2016); or 
 
• “resembling, having some, but not all of the features of,” Quasi-, Random 
House Unabridged Dictionary (quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
[¶26]  The Secretary of State’s purpose in describing the Company is 
entirely justified, but her use of a descriptive term that does not appear in the 
proposed legislation and does not have a clear dictionary definition persuades 
us that the question as drafted is not “understandable to a reasonable voter 
reading the question for the first time.”  21-A M.R.S. § 905(2).  In marked 
contrast to the term at issue in Olson, the potentially confusing term used in 
the ballot question here does not appear in the proposed legislation.  See Olson, 
1997 ME 30, ¶¶ 2, 10-11, 689 A.2d 605 (considering whether “Class A crime,” 
a term used in the proposed legislation, was understandable to a reasonable 
voter seeing the question for the first time).  A voter who was aware of the 
proposed legislation would not necessarily have encountered the term 
“quasi-governmental” before reading the question.  It is not reasonable to 
assume that a voter would have researched statutes or other sources to 
 
21 
determine the meaning of a term that the voter has not seen in the proposed 
legislation before proceeding to vote in an election. 
 
[¶27]  Even if the voter had previously encountered the term, the term is 
not used in the proposed legislation to describe the Company, the prefix 
“quasi-” has multiple meanings, and even in Maine statutes, there is no existing 
statutory definition of the term.  For these reasons, a voter could well be 
uncertain about the meaning of the term in the context of the question: Is the 
Company in fact partly governmental or does it merely resemble a 
governmental entity?  Or is the Company seemingly, but not actually, like a 
governmental entity?  Although “[i]t is inevitable that ballot questions will 
reflect the ambiguities, complexities, and omissions in the legislation they 
describe,” id. ¶ 11, a question that could generate additional ambiguity or 
confusion is not “understandable to a reasonable voter reading the question 
for the first time,” 21-A M.R.S. § 905(2); see also Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 20; 
21-A M.R.S. § 906(6)(B). 
 
[¶28]  We hold that the term “quasi-governmental” is not a term that a 
reasonable voter reading the question for the first time would be expected to 
understand in context as an adjectival descriptor of the Company.  The 
Secretary of State’s inclusion of the term in the ballot question therefore means 
 
22 
that the question does not meet the “understandable” standard of section 
905(2).  On the other hand, because of the Company’s numerous governmental 
qualities and features, it would not be misleading for the question to 
incorporate a more understandable description of the governmental aspects of 
the Company,6 but it is for the Secretary of State, not for us, to formulate the 
question.  See Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 20; 21-A M.R.S. § 906(6)(B).  Our 
application of section 905(2) in this manner furthers the legislative goal of 
presenting questions to the public “in a clear, concise and direct manner that 
describes the subject matter of the . . . direct initiative as simply as is possible.”  
21-A  M.R.S. § 906(6)(B). 
 
6  Jortner argues that the Secretary of State’s use of the term “quasi-governmental” is misleading 
because the voters will assume that “an organization designated as ‘governmental,’ regardless of 
qualifier, is supported by tax revenues.”  Existing publicly owned utilities in Maine are funded by 
users who pay rates, not by taxpayers, and a voter familiar with the proposed legislation would have 
no reason to believe that taxes would pay for the Company’s delivery of electricity.  See 35-A M.R.S. 
§ 3912 (2023) (requiring municipal electric districts to set rates to cover “the current expenses for 
operating and maintaining the electric system” and to cover debt obligations); 35-A M.R.S. § 6105(2) 
(2023) (requiring a municipal or quasi-municipal water utility to “establish rates, tolls or charges 
that are just and reasonable and that provide revenue as may be required to perform its public utility 
service and to attract necessary capital on just and reasonable terms”); Pine Tree Power Petition, 
§ 12 (proposed 35-A M.R.S. § 4004) (providing that “[t]he rates and all other charges of the company 
must be sufficient to pay in full the cost of service, including the cost of debt and property taxation”).  
Jortner also argues that, if the question refers to the Company as in any sense governmental, it might 
“trigger” an “emotional impact” among voters.  The potential effect upon voters of a descriptor is not, 
however, within the scope of our review of a drafted question—our only task is to determine whether 
the question is “understandable to a reasonable voter reading the question for the first time and will 
not mislead a reasonable voter who understands the proposed legislation into voting contrary to that 
voter’s wishes.”  21-A M.R.S. § 905(2). 
 
23 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
[¶29]  Ultimately, our task is not to compose the wording of a ballot 
question de novo but to determine whether the Secretary of State’s chosen 
wording is “understandable to a reasonable voter reading the question for the 
first time” and whether it will “mislead a reasonable voter who understands the 
proposed legislation into voting contrary to that voter’s wishes.”  21-A M.R.S. 
§ 905(2).  Fully recognizing the considerable challenge that the Secretary of 
State faces in drafting a ballot question summarizing complex legislation in 
simple, clear, and understandable terms, we conclude that Jortner has met his 
burden to demonstrate that the question as drafted is not “understandable to a 
reasonable voter reading the question for the first time.”  Id.  Even though some 
features of the new entity would be governmental in nature, the use of the term 
“quasi-governmental” in the ballot question does not meet this standard. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment vacating the Secretary of State’s 
decision affirmed.  Remanded for the Superior 
Court to remand to the Secretary of State to 
revise the ballot question consistent with the 
analysis in this opinion.  Mandate to issue 
immediately. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
STANFILL, C.J., dissenting. 
[¶30]  I appreciate the Court’s thorough discussion of the standards and 
issues involved in this case, which recognizes that the responsibility for 
drafting the ballot question lies with the Secretary of State.  Court’s Opinion 
¶¶ 3, 16; 21-A M.R.S. § 901(4) (2023).  I respectfully dissent, however, because 
I believe that the Secretary’s use of the term “quasi-governmental” to describe 
the Pine Tree Power Company complies with her constitutional and statutory 
responsibilities to ensure that “the description of the subject matter is 
understandable to a reasonable voter reading the question for the first time and 
will not mislead a reasonable voter who understands the proposed legislation 
into voting contrary to that voter’s wishes,” 21-A M.R.S. § 905(2) (2023); to 
“write the question in a clear, concise and direct manner that describes the 
subject matter of the . . . direct initiative as simply as is possible,” 21-A M.R.S. 
§ 906(6)(B) (2023); and to “prepare the ballots in such form as to present the 
question or questions concisely and intelligibly,” Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 20. 
[¶31]  The 
proposed 
legislation 
does 
not 
use 
the 
term 
“quasi-governmental”; rather, it classifies the Company as “consumer-owned.”  
See Pine Tree Power Petition, §§ 9, 12 (proposed 35-A M.R.S. §§ 3501(1)(F), 
4003(1), (12)(A)).  In drafting the question, the Secretary chose to use the term 
 
25 
“quasi-governmental” to describe the proposed Company because she 
regarded it as being similar to other “quasi-governmental” entities established 
in Maine statutes.  Court’s Opinion ¶ 24.  Although an informed voter may not 
be familiar with the term’s usage in other statutes, there is no requirement that 
a term be defined in a statute to be understandable.  And, particularly because 
it may be encapsulating a complex piece of legislation into one simple question, 
“the question need not provide complete, comprehensive information about 
the legislation or its effect.”  Court’s Opinion ¶ 13. 
[¶32]  The Court critiques the term “quasi-governmental” as ill-defined.  
But it is a compound word, composed of a word and a prefix that are both 
readily understood.  “Governmental” is simply the adjectival form of 
“government,” and “quasi” is a commonly used prefix.  As the Court explains, 
“quasi” can mean to some degree, in some manner, partly, apparently but not 
really, resembling, or seemingly but not actually.  Court’s Opinion ¶ 25.  As both 
the Secretary and the Court note, many aspects of the Company are, indeed, 
governmental in nature.  Court’s Opinion ¶¶ 21-22.  The Company to some 
degree, in some manner, almost, or partly resembles a governmental entity. 
[¶33]  “It is inevitable” that the phrasing of the question “reflect[s] the 
ambiguities, complexities, and omissions in the legislation [it] describe[s].”  
 
26 
Olson v. Sec’y of State, 1997 ME 30, ¶ 11, 689 A.2d 605.  It is not our task to 
determine whether the Secretary’s chosen phrasing is optimal; indeed, it may 
not be.  Because I believe the question is understandable and will not mislead a 
reasonable voter (as previously defined), however, I would vacate the decision 
of the Superior Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, Paul E. Suitter, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), and 
Jonathan R. Bolton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for 
appellant Secretary of State 
 
Sean R. Turley, Esq., and Peter L. Murray, Esq. (orally), Murray, Plumb & 
Murray, Portland, for appellees Wayne R. Jortner, Richard Bennett, John Clark, 
and Nicole Grohoski 
 
Nolan L. Reichl, Esq. (orally), Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, for amicus curiae 
Maine Affordable Energy Ballot Question Committee 
 
Paul McDonald, Esq. (orally), and Rosalie Wennberg, Esq., Bernstein Shur, 
Portland, for amicus curiae Maine Energy Progress Political Action Committee 
 
Benjamin Gaines, Esq. (orally), Gaines Law LLC, Portland, for amicus curiae The 
Sierra Club 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number AP-2023-7 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY