Case Title: Johnson v. Masters

Citation: 2013 WI 43

Docket Number: 2011AP001240

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 43 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1240 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
In re the marriage of: 
 
Patricia A. Johnson, p/k/a Patricia Masters, 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
Michael R. Masters, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 17, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 7, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Kathryn W. Foster 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concur. (Opinion 
filed.) ZIEGLER, ROGGENSACK, GABLEMAN concur. 
(Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant, there was a brief (in court 
of appeals) by Joseph F. Owens and Law Offices of Joseph F. 
Owens, New Berlin, and Debra K. Riedel and Law Offices of Debra 
K. Riedel, New Berlin, and a reply brief to the Supreme Court by 
Joseph Owens and Debra K. Riedel. Oral argument by Joseph F. 
Owens. 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief by Erik I. 
Colque and Colque Law, LLC, Waukesha, and oral argument by Erik 
I. Colque.  
 
 
2013 WI 43
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2011AP1240   
(L.C. No. 
1988FA73) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Patricia A. Johnson, 
 
 
Petitioner–Appellant  
 
 
v. 
 
Michael R. Masters,   
 
 
Respondent–Respondent  
FILED 
 
MAY 17, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Kathryn W. Foster, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.    This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 809.61 (2009-10).  It concerns a dispute over the 
enforceability of a pension award in a divorce judgment.  The 
specific question we address is whether the circuit court erred 
when it denied Patricia Johnson's motion for the entry of a 
qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) on the grounds that 
the motion was barred by Wis. Stat. § 893.40, a statute of 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
2 
 
repose,1 
which 
states 
that 
"action 
upon 
a 
judgment 
or 
decree . . . shall be commenced within 20 years after the 
judgment or decree is entered or be barred."  Johnson had filed 
a motion on September 13, 2010, seeking to compel Michael 
Masters to provide pension information so that the necessary 
QDRO could be prepared and his Wisconsin Retirement System (WRS) 
pension could be divided in accordance with the judgment of 
divorce. The judgment in the divorce had been filed more than 20 
years before, on July 20, 1989.  With regard to the pension 
benefits, the judgment had awarded Johnson half of the value 
accrued during the span of the marriage and stated that a QDRO 
"shall be submitted to secure these rights."   
¶2 
This court has upheld the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40 in a family law context.2  We see no evidence for the 
argument that the legislature intended for family law judgments 
to be categorically exempted from its application though we 
recognize the realities of family court judgments and see some 
                                                 
1 We address the question as presented in the certification 
by the court of appeals and as briefed by the parties.  We do 
not attempt to answer questions not raised by the certification.     
2 That case involved an action by the State to enforce 
payment of child support that had been ordered in a divorce 
judgment.  We held that Wis. Stat. § 893.40 governed the case. 
We said, "[U]nder the statute, an action brought to enforce a 
child support judgment must be commenced within 20 years of the 
date when the judgment is entered. The period of limitation 
begins to run upon entry of judgment, irrespective of whether 
any payment under that judgment has been missed."  Hamilton v. 
Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, ¶4, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832. 
 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
3 
 
evidence that this court has made certain accommodations for the 
ongoing obligations that are common in that area.  There is a 
twist in this case, however, that we consider dispositive of the 
question, and that is the fact that even though the 1989 
judgment required the filing of a QDRO, the WRS was not 
authorized under statute to accept a QDRO related to this 
divorce until May 2, 1998. 
¶3 
In order to interpret the relevant statutes to avoid 
"absurd or unreasonable results,"3 and in order to "constru[e] 
each in a manner that serves its purpose"4 as we are bound to do, 
we hold that Johnson's motion is not barred by the operation of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.40.  The judgment contained a provision that 
required the filing of a QDRO with the WRS, and it was not until 
1998 that legislation authorized WRS to accept such orders for 
marriages such as this one that were terminated in 1989.  It 
would be absurd and unreasonable to construe the statute of 
repose in such a way that it would begin to run at the time of a 
judgment with regard to a provision that assigned Masters' 
interest contrary to existing law, which was and continued for 
the next nine years to be that WRS pension interests were not 
assignable.5  Construing the statute as starting to run as to the 
                                                 
3 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 
WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
4 State v. Szulczewski, 216 Wis. 2d 495, 503, 574 N.W.2d 660 
(1998). 
5 Wis. Stat. § 40.08(1)(1987-88), in effect at the time of 
the 1989 divorce judgment, stated: 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
4 
 
pension provision at the point when the provision was no longer 
contrary to law is a way to retain the statute's limiting 
function "in a manner that serves its purpose."  Under the 
circumstances present in this case6 where a statute precludes a 
provision in a judgment, the statute of repose cannot begin to 
run as to that provision until the legislature changes the law 
such that the provision can be carried out.  In this case, that 
change went into effect on May 2, 1998, and the statute of 
repose will bar actions on such a provision only after May 1, 
2018.  We therefore reverse the order of the circuit court and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The circuit court's order that we review denied 
Johnson's motion for the entry of a QDRO and granted Masters' 
motion to dismiss based on Wis. Stat. § 893.40.  The QDRO that 
Johnson sought from the Waukesha County Circuit Court, the 
Honorable Kathryn W. Foster presiding, is an order that would 
authorize the administrator of Masters' pension plan, the 
Wisconsin Retirement System, to assign Johnson a portion of his 
                                                                                                                                                             
The benefits payable to, or other rights and interests 
of, any member, beneficiary or distributee of any 
estate under any of the benefit plans administered by 
the department . . . shall not be assignable, either 
in law or equity, or be subject to execution, levy, 
attachment, garnishment or other legal process except 
as specifically provided in this section. 
6 We address the question as presented in the certification 
by the court of appeals and as briefed by the parties.  We do 
not attempt to answer questions not raised by the certification.     
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
5 
 
pension benefits, in accordance with the divorce judgment.  It 
is important to provide a brief explanation of what a QDRO is 
and why there was no authority for the WRS to accept one when 
Johnson and Masters divorced in 1989.    
¶5 
QDROs are defined by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), the federal law that governs private 
sector pension plans.  "The primary objective of ERISA is to 
protect employees from the mismanagement of funds set aside to 
finance employee benefits and pensions by establishing a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme that required employers to 
fulfill certain reporting, disclosure and fiduciary duties."  
Aurora Med. Group v. DWD, 2000 WI 70, ¶16, 236 Wis. 2d 1, 612 
N.W.2d 646 (citations omitted).  Federal law generally prohibits 
assigning pension benefits; however, it provides a mechanism in 
QDROs to assign pension benefits under certain circumstances:  
 
[T]he anti-alienation provision in [the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act] precludes assignment of the pension 
benefits [without] a valid QDRO. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) 
("[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided 
under the plan may not be assigned or alienated").  ERISA's 
prohibition on the assignment or alienation of pension 
benefits has been strictly enforced.  A QDRO is an express 
exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision.  See ERISA 
§ 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I). . . . 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i) 
defines a “qualified domestic relations order” as a 
domestic relations order 
 
(I) 
which creates or recognizes the existence of an 
alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an 
alternate payee the right to, receive all or a 
portion of the benefits payable with respect to 
a participant under a plan, and 
 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
6 
 
(II)  
with respect to which the requirements of 
subparagraphs (C) and (D) are met.... 
In re Gendreau, 191 B.R. 798, 801-02 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) 
aff'd, 122 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).  "A 
qualified domestic relations order permits payment of benefits 
of qualified private retirement plans to one other than the 
employee spouse. Such a recipient is denominated an 'alternate 
payee,' which includes a nonemployee spouse."  Schinner v. 
Schinner, 143 Wis. 2d 81, 86 n.1, 420 N.W.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(citations omitted).   
¶6 
ERISA does not apply to government retirement plans 
such as the WRS, see 29 U.S.C.A. § 1003(b)(1), and the Wisconsin 
statutes that governed those plans initially made no provision 
for QDROs.  In Lindsey v. Lindsey, the court of appeals 
described an early unsuccessful attempt to pass legislation 
authorizing the Wisconsin Retirement System to accept QDROs: 
  
1985 Assembly Bill 689 was a proposal to create a procedure 
whereby a participant's accumulated rights and benefits 
under the Wisconsin Retirement System could be made the 
subject of a "qualified domestic relations order." See 
Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau to 1985 
Assembly Bill 689. The fiscal note to this proposed 
legislation observed that "[t]he statutes governing the 
Wisconsin 
Retirement 
System 
(WRS) 
do 
not 
provide 
a 
mechanism for dividing rights and benefits under the system 
to comply with a court order." "The purpose of this bill is 
to provide a mechanism for the division of WRS benefits 
pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order issued by 
a court in a manner similar to that established by Federal 
law for private sector pension plans." Report of Joint 
Survey Committee on Retirement Systems for 1985 Assembly 
Bill 689 (emphasis added). This proposed legislation failed 
to pass the Assembly. 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
7 
 
Lindsey v. Lindsey, 140 Wis. 2d 684, 694 n.8, 412 N.W.2d 132 
(Ct. App. 1987).  The state of the law in Wisconsin in 1989 was 
that benefits, rights and interests of any WRS member "shall not 
be assignable, either in law or equity, or be subject to 
execution, levy, attachment, garnishment or other legal process 
except as specifically provided in this section[,]" and no 
provisions were included for QDROs.  Wis. Stat. § 40.08(1) 
(1987-88).  That remained the law until the passage of 1989 Wis. 
Act 218, which authorized WRS to accept QDROs beginning April 
28, 1990, but did not apply retroactively to divorces occurring 
prior to the new statute's effective date, which was April 28, 
1990.  It was not until May 2, 1998, that WRS was authorized by 
1997 Wis. Act 125 to accept QDROs related to divorces that 
became effective between January 1, 1982, and April 28, 1990.  
In part, 1997 Wis. Act 125 stated, 
  
40.08(1m)(k) of the statutes is created to read: . . . [A] 
court may revise or modify a judgment or order specified 
under subd. 1. for participants whose marriages were 
terminated by a court on or after January 1, 1982, and 
before April 28, 1990, but only with respect to providing 
for payment in accordance with a qualified domestic 
relations order of benefits under the Wisconsin retirement 
system that are already divided under the judgment or 
order.  
1997 Wis. Act 125, § 5.  That authorization closed a gap that 
had been created by the earlier legislation authorizing WRS to 
accept QDROs but failing to state clearly that it applied 
retroactively to divorces that became final after January 1, 
1982 and before April 28, 1990.   
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
8 
 
¶7 
The final judgment in Johnson and Masters' divorce was 
entered on July 20, 1989, so it fell into the category of 
divorces that were covered by the change in the law that took 
effect in 1998 with regard to QDROs.  The judgment stated that 
the Marital Agreement between the parties was appended to the 
judgment and was "approved as reasonable" and was incorporated 
into the judgment of the circuit court.  The Marital Agreement 
included the following provisions: 
V. Property Division – Pension 
The Petitioner shall be awarded [half] of the value of 
the Respondent's Wisconsin Retirement System benefits 
accrued from date of marriage thr[ough] the date of 
divorce.  A QDRO shall be submitted to secure these 
rights. 
 . . .  
X. Execution of documents 
Now or in the future, upon demand, the parties agree 
to execute and deliver any and all documents which may 
be necessary to carry out the terms and conditions of 
this marital agreement. 
 . . .  
XII. Divesting of property rights 
Except as otherwise provided for in this marital 
agreement, each party shall be divested of and each 
party waives, renounces and gives up pursuant to Wis. 
Stats. § 861.07, all right, title and interest in and 
to the property awarded to the other. All property and 
money received and retained by the parties shall be 
the separate property of the respective parties, free 
and clear of any right, title, interest or claim of 
the other party, and each party shall have the right 
to deal with and dispose of his or her separate 
property as fully and effectively as if the parties 
had never been married. 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
9 
 
XIII. Mutual releases 
Neither party may, at any time hereafter, sue the 
other, or his or her heirs, personal representatives 
or assigns, for the purpose of enforcing any or all of 
the rights relinquished and/or waived under this 
marital agreement. Both parties also agree that in the 
event any suit shall be commenced, this release, when 
pleaded, shall be and constitute a complete defense to 
any such claim or suit so instituted by either party. 
 . . .  
XX. Survival of marital agreement after judgment 
Both parties agree that certain paragraphs of this 
marital 
agreement 
shall 
survive 
the 
subsequent 
judgment of divorce and shall have independent legal 
significance. This marital agreement is a l[e]gally 
binding contract, entered into for good and valuable 
consideration. In the future, either party may enforce 
this specific marital agreement in this or any other 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
¶8 
In April 2009, nearly 20 years after the divorce was 
final, Masters retired from his job as a school janitor.  It is 
undisputed that Masters did not notify Johnson that he was 
retiring.  According to an undisputed affidavit in the record, 
Johnson learned in March 2010 that Masters had retired.  On 
March 3, 2010, Johnson filed a form QDRO that was signed by the 
circuit court on March 5, 2010, and vacated by stipulation of 
the parties 24 days later when it was discovered that it 
contained an error.  Johnson then retained new counsel and took 
steps to obtain a valuation of the pension and draft a QDRO to 
obtain her portion of the pension.   
¶9 
When WRS notified Johnson that Masters' authorization 
was required in order to disclose the pension value information, 
she sought his authorization.  On September 7, 2010, Johnson 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
10 
 
received notification that Masters would not provide the 
necessary authorization.  Johnson then filed a motion on 
September 12, 2010, for orders to require Masters to release his 
pension information.  At a hearing before a court commissioner, 
Masters was ordered to sign the authorization.  He then moved 
for a hearing de novo in the circuit court.   
¶10 In the circuit court, Masters moved to dismiss the 
motion on the grounds that Johnson's motion was barred by Wis. 
Stat. § 893.40 because it states that action must be commenced 
within 20 years after "the judgment or decree is entered," and 
it includes no exemptions for family law judgments.  In the 
alternative, he argued that the doctrine of laches barred 
Johnson's claim because her delay in seeking the QDRO was 
unreasonable and prejudiced him.  Johnson argued that the 
statute of repose could not operate as a bar to her motion in 
light of Wis. Stat. § 767.01, in Ch. 767, Actions Affecting the 
Family, which states that "circuit courts . . . have authority 
to do all acts and things necessary and proper in those actions 
and to carry their orders and judgments into execution as 
prescribed in this chapter." Alternatively, Johnson argued that 
the doctrines of unclean hands and equitable estoppel precluded 
Masters' statute of repose defense.7  The circuit court held two 
hearings on the matter, and the parties briefed the issues 
extensively.  
                                                 
7 The parties' briefs to the circuit court contained other 
arguments that are not recited here because they were not 
pursued on appeal. 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
11 
 
¶11 The circuit court granted Masters' motion to dismiss 
based on Wis. Stat. § 893.40, and it denied his motion to 
dismiss based on the doctrine of laches.  It denied Johnson's 
motion for the entry of a QDRO.  In ruling from the bench, the 
circuit court stated: 
The, quote, cause of action, the ability to obtain a 
QDRO, was not directly triggered by the actual 
retirement of Mr. Masters.  It was, in fact, a result 
of a 1989 divorce decree and after the passage of the 
Wisconsin Act of 125 in 1997 was subject to be 
executed from that time going forward, not contingent 
on the retirement date of Mr. Masters.8  
¶12 Johnson appealed the denial of her motion.9  The court 
of appeals certified the case to this court, and we accepted 
certification. 
DISCUSSION 
¶13 The question presented by this case is how the statute 
that requires "action upon a judgment or decree" to be 
"commenced within 20 years" applies to a judgment containing a 
provision that cannot be performed under existing law at the 
time of judgment.  It is a question of statutory interpretation, 
a question of law that this court reviews de novo.  Teschendorf 
                                                 
8 The circuit court also stated that the doctrine of laches 
would favor the petitioner's position except that it "runs full 
face into the stone wall in the form of the statute of repose."  
The circuit court expressed its belief that the result was 
inequitable: "I frankly hope I am wrong [if the case is 
appealed] because I do believe my decision is a harsh result."  
9 Masters cross-appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss 
based on the doctrine of laches; he filed a notice of voluntary 
dismissal of his cross-appeal on October 6, 2011.  
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
12 
 
v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶9, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 
N.W.2d 258.  We begin with established principles of statutory 
interpretation: 
Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-
defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning.  Context is important to 
meaning. So, too, is the structure of the statute in 
which 
the 
operative 
language 
appears. 
Therefore, 
statutory language is interpreted in the context in 
which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid 
absurd or unreasonable results.   
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 
58, ¶¶45-46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citations 
omitted).  "Under the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation 
statutes should be reasonably construed to avoid conflict.  When 
two 
statutes 
conflict, 
a 
court 
is 
to 
harmonize 
them, 
scrutinizing both statutes and construing each in a manner that 
serves its purpose."  State v. Szulczewski, 216 Wis. 2d 495, 
503, 574 N.W.2d 660 (1998).   
¶14 We considered a related question concerning the 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.40 in Hamilton v. Hamilton, 
2003 WI 50, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832, which involved an 
action by the State to collect child support arrearages "almost 
30 years after the original judgment, more than 20 years after 
the amended judgment, and more than 15 years after [the] 
youngest child reached the age of majority." Id. at ¶2.  
We hold that Wis. Stat. § 893.40, which became 
effective on July 1, 1980, governs the time within 
which a party may bring an independent action to 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
13 
 
collect child support arrearages that accumulated 
after the statute's effective date.  In addition, we 
conclude that, under the statute, an action brought to 
enforce a child support judgment must be commenced 
within 20 years of the date when the judgment is 
entered. The period of limitation begins to run upon 
entry of judgment, irrespective of whether any payment 
under that judgment has been missed. 
Id., ¶4.   
¶15 The 
parties' arguments with regard to statutory 
interpretation focus on the question of whether the legislature 
intended to subject family law judgments to Wis. Stat. § 893.40 
or to exempt them from it. The statute states: 
Action on judgment or decree; court of record. Except 
as provided in s. 846.04(2) and (3) and 893.415, 
action upon a judgment or decree of a court of record 
of any state or of the United States shall be 
commenced within 20 years after the judgment or decree 
is entered or be barred. 
Johnson argues that her motion is not "action upon a judgment or 
decree" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.40.  She points to Wis. 
Stat. § 801.02 as providing guidance for defining the terms 
"action" and "commence."  The statute states: 
[A] civil action in which a personal judgment is 
sought is commenced as to any defendant when a summons 
and a complaint naming the person as defendant are 
filed 
with 
the 
court, 
provided 
service 
of 
an 
authenticated copy of the summons and of the complaint 
is made upon the defendant under this chapter within 
90 days after filing. 
Because her motion did not commence with a summons and 
complaint, she argues, it does not constitute "action" within 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 893.40.  She also points to language 
from a footnote in this court's decision in Hamilton: 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
14 
 
The court of appeals noted that both Walter and the 
State agree that the State's motion is an "independent 
action" upon the judgment.  Apparently, neither party 
argues that the State could not bring a motion within 
the context of the original action. We do not address 
this issue because it has no bearing on our present 
decision. 
Hamilton, 261 Wis. 2d 458, ¶9 n.4 (citations omitted).  She 
argues that language means that the applicability of the statute 
of repose depends on a distinction between an "independent 
action" and "a motion within the context of the original 
action."  She contends that the Hamilton footnote signaled that 
the court wished to limit the application of the statute of 
repose in the family law context to independent actions brought 
by third parties.10   
¶16 Masters argues that the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40 is unambiguous and makes no exceptions that would 
                                                 
10 Johnson's other argument is that her interest in the 
pension plan was created at the time the judgment was entered 
and that she is therefore "entitled to seek enforcement of the 
terms of the divorce judgment at any time . . . ." App. Br. at 
12.  For that proposition, she cites Dewey v. Dewey, 188 Wis. 2d 
271, 279, 525 N.W.2d 85 (Ct. App 1994) (holding that the former 
wife's "interest in one-half of [the former husband's] pension 
was not a part of his bankruptcy estate nor was it a 
dischargeable debt. It was [the former wife's] separate property 
upon which the timing of the execution of the QDRO had no 
effect.")  We note that the "timing of the execution of the 
QDRO" in that case refers to the significance of the timing 
before or after a bankruptcy action; the language cannot be 
fairly characterized as standing for the proposition that timing 
is of no consequence whatsoever.  In that case, there was no 
discussion of a statute of repose; the former wife's action to 
enforce the judgment was commenced two years after the judgment 
was entered.  In any case, we decide this case on other grounds 
and need not address this argument further.    
 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
15 
 
exempt Johnson's motion from being barred 20 years after the 
date of the judgment.  He argues that this court's holding in 
Hamilton is that Wis. Stat. § 893.40 applied to bar an action in 
a child support case, and it should be dispositive of this case.  
He argues that it would contravene the statute's language and 
would nullify the statute if the court were to carve out an 
exception for family law judgments or make a distinction between 
actions begun by motion and those begun by summons and 
complaint.  He argues that the legislature made it clear that it 
had no intention of exempting post-judgment actions in family 
law cases from the requirements of the statute of repose because 
it did actually enact a specific exemption in 2003 in response 
to Hamilton and limited that exemption to actions for child 
support.11   
¶17 We first address why Hamilton does not answer the 
question presented in this case.  First, we note that the 
                                                 
11 Following 
this 
court's 
decision 
in 
Hamilton, 
the 
legislature accepted the court's invitation to clarify its 
intention with regard to limitations on actions to collect child 
support owed under a judgment.  It passed 2003 Wis. Act 287, 
which created Wis. Stat. § 893.415. The statute states in 
relevant part: 
(2) An action to collect child or family support owed 
under a judgment or order entered under ch. 767, or to 
collect child support owed under a judgment or 
order . . . shall be commenced within 20 years after 
the youngest child for whom the support was ordered 
under the judgment or order reaches the age of 18 or, 
if the child is enrolled full-time in high school or 
its equivalent, reaches the age of 19. 
Wis. Stat. § 893.415. 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
16 
 
footnote on which Johnson relies at most implies only that a 
legally meaningful distinction may exist between an "independent 
action" on a judgment and "a motion within the context of the 
original action."  It does not necessarily stand for the 
proposition that Hamilton "has no application to post-judgment 
motions brought between the original divorcing parties pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 767.281 within the action itself." App. Br. at 
7.  That far overstates a footnote that stated only, "We do not 
address this issue because it has no bearing on our present 
decision." Hamilton, 261 Wis. 2d 458, ¶9 n.4.  Further, the 
holding of the case is stated elsewhere in the decision as 
"under the statute, an action brought to enforce a child support 
judgment must be commenced within 20 years of the date when the 
judgment is entered." Id. at ¶4 (emphasis added).  That language 
would appear to include an action "between the original 
divorcing parties."   
¶18 Masters considers Hamilton's holding dispositive of 
this case because he would apply the statute here in the same 
way as the court did in Hamilton to bar the action.  But we have 
already stated that we consider a crucial fact in this case to 
be that a QDRO could not be assignable until permitted by the 
legislature.  That fact makes this case distinguishable from 
Hamilton.  The provision the State sought to enforce in that 
case was a provision ordering child support payments, and there 
was no statute existing at the time of the judgment that 
prevented the filing of the proper documents to carry out that 
judgment.  Therefore, though it addresses similar issues and 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
17 
 
contains helpful language with regard to the application of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.40, Hamilton does not govern the analysis here.  
¶19 This case raises thorny questions.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 893.40 cannot be said to be ambiguous as to the time 
limitation.  While it does not define "action on a judgment," it 
does state clearly that the time period during which action on a 
judgment or decree must be commenced is "within 20 years after 
the judgment or decree is entered."  And yet, we find that the 
facts of the case before us compel a more careful look.  As we 
have explained, the 1989 divorce judgment required a filing of a 
QDRO.  The statute that authorized WRS to accept such a filing 
in this divorce did not come into existence until nine years 
later when the legislature passed 1997 Wis. Act 125.  We cannot 
apply this statute of repose without recognizing the fact that, 
at the time of the judgment, a statute actually foreclosed for 
nine 
years 
the 
single 
action, 
crucial 
to 
the 
pension's 
assignability, that had to occur to secure the pension award.  
That is the crux of this case. 
¶20 This court, in a previous case, considered the 
application of a statute that appeared to be unambiguous yet had 
troubling implications appearing to lead to a disturbing outcome 
if applied literally.12  In Teschendorf, this court unanimously 
                                                 
12  It is the court's role, in the context of statutory 
interpretation, to give effect to legislation unless we find 
that the legislature could not have intended the absurd or 
unreasonable results a statute appears to require. As we have 
stated: 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
18 
 
agreed to affirm a court of appeals ruling refusing to apply a 
reducing clause in an uninsured motorist provision in an auto 
insurance policy.  The question there involved construing Wis. 
Stat. §  632.32(5)(i), which authorizes such reducing clauses, 
and determining whether it applied where worker's compensation 
payments were made to the State of Wisconsin Work Injury 
Supplemental Benefit Fund.  Although the court was unanimous in 
affirming, the justices were evenly divided on whether the 
statute in question was ambiguous.13  The position of three 
justices was that  
                                                                                                                                                             
The purpose in this situation is to verify that the 
legislature did not intend these unreasonable or 
unthinkable results.  See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. 
Co., 
490 
U.S. 
504, 
527 
(1989) 
(Scalia, 
J., 
concurring); Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶52 n.9, 681 
N.W.2d 110; see also Public Citizen v. United States 
Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465 (1989) (invoking 
the Supreme Court's absurdity exception to the plain 
language of the statute); Robbins v. Chronister, 402 
F.3d 1047, 1050 (10th Cir. 2005) (collecting federal 
circuit court and Supreme Court cases applying the 
absurdity exception). Because our purpose in these 
situations is grounded in open disbelief of what a 
statute appears to require, we are bound to limit our 
off-statute investigations to obvious aberrations. 
Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶15, 293 Wis. 
2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258. 
13 Chief 
Justice 
Shirley 
Abrahamson 
took 
a 
different 
position on the statutory construction approach and concurred in 
the holding. Teschendorf, 293 Wis. 2d 123, ¶70 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring) 
(writing 
that 
"[a] 
better 
approach 
to 
statutory 
construction 
would 
be 
to 
drop 
the 
ambiguous/unambiguous/literal/plain meaning pretense and instead 
take a comprehensive view of statutory interpretation"). 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
19 
 
[a]lthough the meaning of the statute appears to be 
plain, a literal application of the language would be 
absurd. As a general rule, courts apply the ordinary 
and accepted meaning of statutory language, unless it 
produces an absurd result. Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 
¶32, 
612 
N.W.2d 
659. 
Because 
a 
literal 
application . . . would 
produce 
an 
absurd 
and 
unreasonable result in certain situations, Justices 
Wilcox, Crooks, and Butler construe the statute to 
avoid that result.   
Teschendorf, 293 Wis. 2d 123, ¶32.  After setting forth examples 
of how the statute if applied as unambiguously written would 
create untenable results in certain circumstances, the opinion 
adds, "Because this literal interpretation produces absurd 
results and defies both common sense and the fundamental purpose 
of [the statutes governing worker's compensation and uninsured 
motorist coverage], Justices Wilcox, Crooks, and Butler reject 
it unless extrinsic sources reveal the legislature intended 
these consequences." Id., ¶43 (citing to Green v. Bock Laundry 
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
("We are confronted here with a statute which, if interpreted 
literally, produces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, 
result. Our task is to give some alternative meaning to the word 
'defendant' in Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) that avoids 
this consequence . . . .")). 
¶21 The 
reasoning 
followed 
by 
three 
justices 
in 
Teschendorf, as well as that followed by the court in Wenke v. 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
20 
 
Gehl Co.,14 is apropos in this case.  As with the statutes 
involved in Teschendorf, the application of Wis. Stat. § 893.40 
in certain circumstances may produce results that "def[y] both 
common sense and the fundamental purpose" of the statute.  The 
judgment here has the flaw, as to the pension award provision, 
that under the statute then in effect the pension was not 
assignable.  Where the statute clearly states that WRS pension 
interests "shall not be assignable, either in law or in equity," 
and a court entered a judgment with a provision assigning such 
an interest, that fact must be taken into account.15        
¶22 In the case under review, the dispositive fact in our 
view is that the statute operated to prohibit pension interests 
from being assigned at the time the judgment was entered.  We do 
                                                 
14 For another instance when this court has confronted 
apparently dispositive clear language in a source of law that 
was ultimately held not to be dispositive of the issue, see 
Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶49, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 
405 (noting that "[t]he language of these [Judicial Council] 
Committee Notes [setting forth the legislative intent] does 
appear, on its face, to speak exactly to Wenke's construction of 
both §§ 893.05 and 893.07" but nonetheless adopting a contrary 
interpretation of the legislative intent in light of "a largely 
unperceived shift in the meaning attached to the phrase 'statute 
of repose.'") 
15 The record does not disclose whether the original counsel 
perhaps believed that the legislature would authorize QDROs and 
that it would eventually be possible to file one in accordance 
with the judgment of divorce, but as we noted above, attempts 
were being made to pass such legislation as early as 1985.   
Bills authorizing QDROs were introduced on February 21 and March 
15, 1989, and were pending at the time the divorce judgment was 
entered in July.  The following year 1989 Wis. Act 218 became 
law, but as explained above, its provisions did not cover 
divorces granted between January 1, 1982 and April 28, 1990. 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
21 
 
note that there might be other grounds as well for reaching the 
result we reach, founded on the unique characteristics of family 
law judgments.  In family law matters especially, courts often 
encounter 
provisions 
in 
orders 
that 
create 
continuing 
obligations that may very well extend beyond 20 years, such as 
support, maintenance, property transfers, agreements for the 
sale of property, and educational expenses payments.  We have 
recognized the unique nature of family law judgments in another 
context, which lends support to our holding.  Rules promulgated 
by 
this 
court, which of course are procedural and not 
substantive, do treat family law orders differently from others 
in one telling respect.  They set the required minimum time 
periods for courts to retain "the original paper records" for 
various types of cases.  See SCR 72.01, Retention of original 
record.  As might be expected, the minimum time periods set for 
courts to retain records for various types of cases corresponds 
to the relevant statute limiting enforcement of the judgment.  
For example, civil case files and records of money judgments are 
to be retained for 20 years, consistent with Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40's 20-year limitation on enforcing such judgments.  See 
SCR 72.01(1) and (5).  The retention requirements for delinquent 
income or franchise tax warrants or liens are tied directly to 
relevant statutes regarding their enforcement, and the rule 
notes that for warrants or liens that are renewed, "a new 20-
year retention period begins from the date on which the renewal 
is filed with the clerk of circuit court." See SCR 72.01(7m).   
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
22 
 
¶23 With regard to family case files, family court 
records, family court minute records and maintenance and support 
payment records, the rule departs from the practice of tying the 
retention period to a recognized limitation on enforcing 
judgments and instead sets the required minimum for retaining 
such records as follows: 
[Thirty] years after entry of judgment of divorce, 
legal separation, annulment, or paternity, or entry of 
a final order, except that after 30 years, for any 
case file for which related support or maintenance 
payments are continuing to be made, 7 years after 
final 
payment 
or 
after 
an 
order 
terminating 
maintenance is filed.  
See SCR 72.01(11), (12), (13), and (14).  We suggest only that 
these procedural rules reflect a recognition on the part of this 
court that in some respects ongoing obligations are a common 
feature of family law judgments, and whether observing the 
obligation to construe statutes to avoid absurd results or 
exercising their equitable powers, circuit courts, under Wis. 
Stat. § 767.01, in Ch. 767, Actions Affecting the Family, "have 
authority to do all acts and things necessary and proper in 
those actions and to carry their orders and judgments into 
execution as prescribed in this chapter."   
¶24 For example, in Bliwas v. Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d 635, 178 
N.W.2d 35 (1970), we considered a stipulation in which the 
divorcing couple had agreed that the father would "pay the cost 
of tuition, books, supplies, rent, food allowance and certain 
miscellaneous expenses" for his son's college and graduate 
professional expenses in a Wisconsin school even beyond his 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
23 
 
twenty-first 
birthday; 
the 
court-ordered 
support 
payments, 
however, would be lowered and would then terminate on the son's 
twenty-first birthday. Id. at 637.  While the question presented 
in that case had to do with the proper procedural method for 
bringing the father, who was not complying with the stipulation, 
into court, we addressed at some length the basis for enforcing 
the stipulation: 
However, we hold that the enforcement of a family 
court order, which would not be enforceable without a 
prior stipulation of the parties that it be made part 
of the decree, rests not so much in the enforcement of 
a 
contractual 
obligation 
or 
even 
extension 
of 
jurisdiction of the court, as it does in recognizing 
that a person who agrees that something be included in 
a family court order, especially where he receives a 
benefit for so agreeing, is in a poor position to 
subsequently object to the court's doing what he 
requested the court to do.  One leading text puts the 
proposition 
involved 
in 
the 
following 
language: 
"[W]here the court disposes of the property of the 
parties by stipulation . . . the general rule applies 
that a party who procures or consents to the entry of 
the decree is estopped to question its validity, 
especially where he has obtained a benefit from it." 
Id. at 639-40.  The decision went on to quote from another 
jurisdiction in support of such a rule: 
In a case where a wife had received certain advantages 
under the award of the divorce court, made pursuant to 
a stipulation of the parties, the Supreme Court of the 
State of Washington held it to be well established law 
that, " . . . even though a decree is void as beyond 
the power of the court to pronounce, a party who 
procures or gives consent to it is estopped to 
question its validity where he has obtained a benefit 
therefrom." 
Id. at 640 (citing Svatonsky v. Svatonsky,  389 P.2d 663, ___ 
(Wash. 1964)). 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
24 
 
¶25 Though we do not decide this case on grounds of 
equitable estoppel, it appears to support our decision and to  
provide independent grounds for our holding.  We have addressed 
the doctrine in similar cases, and in Rintelman v. Rintelman, 
118 Wis. 2d 587, 596, 348 N.W.2d 498 (1984), we held:  
In situations such as this one, all that need be shown 
to constitute an estoppel is that both parties entered 
into the stipulation freely and knowingly, that the 
overall settlement is fair and equitable and not 
illegal or against public policy, and that one party 
subsequently seeks to be released from the terms of 
the court order on the grounds that the court could 
not have entered the order it did without the parties' 
agreement. 
We recently addressed a related issue where a stipulation and 
order established a 33–month unmodifiable floor for child 
support payments, and a party was seeking modification of the 
order.  In May v. May, we emphasized courts' deference to 
parties' stipulations: "[W]e are sensitive to the importance and 
prevalence of stipulations in helping families going through 
difficult and litigious divorces and curbing disagreements 
[between] the parties. The ability to contract is fundamental to 
our legal system and may aid parties in settling their divorces 
more amicably." May v. May, 2012 WI 35, ¶18, 339 Wis. 2d 626, 
813 N.W.2d 179.  The court went on to add: 
[W]here the parties to a child support order have 
entered into a stipulation in regard to child support 
for a limited period of time that the court has 
adopted, courts will attempt to give effect to the 
parties' intentions where the stipulation was entered 
into freely and knowingly, was fair and equitable when 
entered into, and is not illegal or violative of 
public policy. In this context, a court's review 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
25 
 
typically will consider the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel, by which a party may be precluded from 
challenging an agreement when the elements of estoppel 
set forth in Rintelman are satisfied.  
Id., ¶36 (citation omitted).  We recognize the elements of 
estoppel in several key provisions in the stipulation here that 
was incorporated into the judgment: 
X. Execution of documents 
Now or in the future, upon demand, the parties agree 
to execute and deliver any and all documents which may 
be necessary to carry out the terms and conditions of 
this marital agreement. 
 . . .  
XII. Divesting of property rights 
Except as otherwise provided for in this marital 
agreement, each party shall be divested of and each 
party waives, renounces and gives up pursuant to Wis. 
Stats. § 861.07, all right, title and interest in and 
to the property awarded to the other. All property and 
money received and retained by the parties shall be 
the separate property of the respective parties, free 
and clear of any right, title, interest or claim of 
the other party, and each party shall have the right 
to deal with and dispose of his or her separate 
property as fully and effectively as if the parties 
had never been married. 
XIII. Mutual releases 
Neither party may, at any time hereafter, sue the 
other, or his or her heirs, personal representatives 
or assigns, for the purpose of enforcing any or all of 
the rights relinquished and/or waived under this 
marital agreement. Both parties also agree that in the 
event any suit shall be commenced, this release, when 
pleaded, shall be and constitute a complete defense to 
any such claim or suit so instituted by either party. 
In light of these provisions as agreed upon by the parties, the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel supports our holding where 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
26 
 
Masters had promised in 1989 "in the future, upon demand, 
. . . to execute and deliver any and all documents which may be 
necessary to carry out the terms and conditions of this marital 
agreement."    
CONCLUSION 
¶26 In order to interpret the relevant statutes to avoid 
"absurd or unreasonable results," and in order to "constru[e] 
each in a manner that serves its purpose" as we are bound to do, 
we hold that Johnson's motion is not barred by the operation of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.40.  The judgment required the filing of a QDRO 
with the WRS, and it was not until 1998 that legislation 
authorized WRS to accept such orders for marriages such as this 
one that were terminated in 1989.  It would be absurd and 
unreasonable to construe the statute of repose in such a way 
that it would begin to run at the time of a judgment with regard 
to a provision that assigned Masters' interest contrary to 
existing law, which was and continued for the next nine years to 
be that WRS pension interests were not assignable.  Construing 
the statute as starting to run as to that provision at the point 
when the provision was no longer contrary to law is a way to 
retain its limiting function "in a manner that serves its 
purpose."  Under the circumstances present in this case where a 
statute precludes a provision in a judgment, the statute of 
repose cannot begin to run as to that provision until the 
legislature changes the law such that the provision can be 
carried out.  In this case, that occurred on May 2, 1998, and 
the statute of repose will bar actions on that provision after 
No. 
2011AP1240   
 
27 
 
May 1, 2018.  We therefore reverse the order of the circuit 
court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
By the Court.—Reversed and remanded. 
 
 
No.  2011AP1240.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶27 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion authored by Justice Crooks and the 
concurrence authored by Justice Bradley.  I write separately to 
address the characterization of a circuit court's exercise of 
equitable powers in Justice Ziegler's concurrence as "based 
solely on the subjective determination of each judge who reviews 
such a question" and "an arbitrary determination of any one 
judge on any given day."  Justice Ziegler's concurrence, ¶41.  
¶28 If 
a 
circuit 
court 
exercises 
its 
discretionary 
equitable powers in a subjective, arbitrary fashion instead of 
setting forth logical, rational reasoning based on the facts of 
record and a correct statement of the law, the circuit court has 
erred and its ruling will be reversed on appeal.  
¶29 The comment in Justice Ziegler's concurrence equating 
discretion with judicial subjectivity and arbitrariness does a 
disservice to judicial decision making and to the circuit courts 
of the state.  The comment cannot stand unchallenged.  
 
No.  2011AP1240.awb 
 
1 
 
¶30 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion in its entirety, concluding that Johnson's 
motion for the entry of a qualified domestic relations order is 
not barred by the operation of Wis. Stat. § 893.40.  I agree 
with the majority opinion when it states that it would be 
"absurd and unreasonable" to construe the statute of repose in a 
way that it would begin to run at the time the judgment in this 
case was entered.  Majority op., ¶3.   
¶31 Likewise, I agree with the majority when it states 
that there has been "a recognition on the part of this court" 
that: 
. . . in some respects ongoing obligations are a 
common feature of family law judgments, and whether 
observing the obligation to construe statutes to avoid 
absurd results or exercising their equitable powers, 
circuit courts, under Wis. Stat. § 767.01, in Ch. 767, 
Actions Affecting the Family, "have authority to do 
all acts and things necessary and proper in those 
actions and to carry their orders and judgments into 
execution as prescribed in this chapter." 
Id., ¶23.1   
¶32 However, I write separately to address the unnecessary 
uncertainty that Justice Ziegler's concurrence introduces into 
the law.  By raising questions concerning the continued vitality 
of judgments that require the payment of maintenance or the 
continuation of life insurance with designated beneficiaries, 
                                                 
1 Justice Ziegler asserts that this concurrence "incorrectly 
characterizes the conclusions reached in the majority opinion."  
Justice Ziegler's Concurrence, ¶1 n.1.  Ultimately, it will be 
left to the reader to determine whether such an assertion is 
correct.  This concurrence does not attempt to "characterize" 
the majority opinion but rather quotes directly from it. 
No.  2011AP1240.awb 
 
2 
 
Justice Ziegler's concurrence creates uncertainty in areas of 
family law not presented in this case.   
¶33 In the concurring opinion, Justice Ziegler questions 
"whether or how Wis. Stat. § 893.40 may affect the enforcement 
of 
obligations 
which 
may 
necessarily 
extend 
beyond 
20 
years. . . ."  Justice Ziegler's Concurrence, ¶2.  She further 
appears to question whether judgments requiring "maintenance" or 
the payment of "life insurance proceeds" that may continue 
beyond or may first become due after 20 years post-judgment will 
remain enforceable after 20 years has passed.  Id., ¶1 n.2.   
¶34 Both the majority and the dissent provide a response 
to 
Justice 
Ziegler's 
concerns. 
 
The 
majority 
correctly 
recognizes that "[i]n family law matters especially, courts 
often encounter provisions in orders that create continuing 
obligations that may very well extend beyond 20 years."  
Majority op., ¶22.   
¶35 The 
dissent 
responds 
by 
explaining 
that 
"[t]he 
suggestion that a party could simply stop paying alimony or 
maintenance after 20 years, as a result of Wis. Stat. § 893.40, 
is not reasonable or realistic because of the continuing nature 
of the obligation to pay."  Dissent, ¶112 (emphasis in 
original); Ashby v. Ashby, 174 Wis. 549, 554, 183 N.W. 965 
(1921) (determining that an order for alimony payments was a 
"continuing judgment, always subject to modification by the 
court during the life of the parties," and therefore a statute 
of limitations did not apply).  I agree with the dissent's 
conclusion that a judgment that orders indefinite maintenance 
No.  2011AP1240.awb 
 
3 
 
payments is a continuing judgment that is not barred by the 
operation of Wis. Stat. § 893.40.   
¶36 In response to the concern regarding the change of 
life insurance beneficiaries, the dissent explains that "the 
insured may not change the beneficiary more than 20 years after 
the entry of the judgment and expect that he or she has not 
created a new cause of action for the original beneficiary."  
Dissent, ¶111.  Likewise I agree with the dissent's conclusion 
that the obligation to designate a specific beneficiary may be 
enforced beyond the 20-year period.  
¶37 Accordingly, although I join the majority opinion in 
its entirety, I respectfully concur. 
¶38 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence. 
No.  2011AP1240.akz 
 
1 
 
¶39 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion because it does not conclude that a court 
has the equitable power to ignore a statute of repose and 
because it concludes that under the facts of this case Wis. 
Stat. § 893.40 does not apply because a qualified domestic 
relations order (QDRO) was not possible when this judgment was 
entered.1  I concur to urge the legislature to consider whether 
legislative change could provide greater certainty to courts, 
litigants, and parties who may depend on the enforceability of 
certain family court matters beyond 20 years.2   
¶40 The legislature has set a 20-year statute of repose in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.40, and in the case at issue, the circuit court 
concluded, as Justice Prosser would, that § 893.40 barred 
enforcement.  The majority opinion reverses the circuit court 
but has cabined its analysis to "the circumstances present in 
this case" and the "dispositive fact" that the QDRO statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 40.08, "operated to prohibit pension interests from 
                                                 
1 Justices Roggensack and Gableman join this concurrence 
because they also conclude that the majority opinion does not 
answer whether Wis. Stat. § 893.40 bars certain family court 
judgments that extend beyond 20 years, and it does not conclude 
that the circuit court has the equitable power to ignore a 
statute of repose.  If, as Justice Bradley suggests, the 
majority opinion were to answer those questions, it would not 
have sufficient votes to constitute a majority opinion and would 
then be only a lead opinion.  Therefore, Justice Bradley's 
concurrence incorrectly characterizes the conclusions reached in 
the majority opinion.   
2 The payment of retirement benefits, maintenance, or life 
insurance proceeds may be court ordered and thus necessarily 
extend beyond 20 years.  While the majority somewhat addresses 
equitable estoppel, it does not state that equitable estoppel 
provides an enforcement mechanism.  See majority op., ¶25. 
No.  2011AP1240.akz 
 
2 
 
being assigned at the time the judgment was entered."  Majority 
op., ¶¶3, 19-23, 26.  I join that holding.  I write to clarify 
the fact that the majority opinion leaves unanswered the 
question of whether or how Wis. Stat. § 893.40 may affect the 
enforcement of obligations which may necessarily extend beyond 
20 years.3  See majority op., ¶¶3, 19-23, 26.  Further proof that 
legislative action may provide greater clarity is evident by the 
thoughtful yet differing viewpoints and analyses of the circuit 
                                                 
3 Justice Bradley's opinion incorrectly suggests that the 
majority has decided this issue.  Instead, the majority's 
analysis is entirely dependent on the fact that a QDRO could not 
have transferred these assets at the time of the divorce 
judgment.  The majority's conclusion does not hinge on the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 893.40.  The majority holds that 
"[u]nder the circumstances present in this case where a statute 
precludes a provision in a judgment, the statute of repose 
cannot begin to run as to that provision until the legislature 
changes the law such that the provision can be carried out."  
See majority op., ¶¶3, 26.  Absent the unique facts of this 
particular case, the majority would be required to determine 
whether § 893.40 otherwise bars enforcement.  In fact, that 
issue was presented by the parties, addressed by the circuit 
court, and is again presented in the concurrences and the 
dissent. 
No.  2011AP1240.akz 
 
3 
 
court decision in this case, the arguments of counsel, and our 
own majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.4 
¶41 Unlike Justice Bradley, I would not go beyond the 
majority opinion to conclude that a court may simply invoke its 
equitable powers to override the language in a statute of 
repose.  If the equitable power of the circuit courts can so 
supersede the limits of a statute of repose, such as Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40, based solely on the subjective determination of each 
judge who reviews such a question, then whether a court order is 
enforceable under the statute could be subject to an arbitrary 
                                                 
4 Justice Bradley asserts that Justice Prosser's dissent 
supports her position, yet he concludes that the 20-year statute 
of repose is an absolute bar to this enforcement proceeding.  
Moreover, if Ashby v. Ashby, 174 Wis. 549, 183 N.W. 965 (1921), 
somehow unequivocally answers the question, then the majority 
decision would not need to undertake its extensive analysis.  
Instead, it could rely on that precedent and the equitable power 
of the circuit court.  Ashby was decided well before Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40 was enacted, and arguably, Dewey v. Dewey, 188 
Wis. 2d 271, 525 N.W.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1994), may call into 
question whether this is a continuing judgment.  The dissent 
cites several cases in support of the proposition that circuit 
courts can equitably enforce certain family law judgments that 
may continue past 20 years.  See dissent, ¶¶110-11.  However, 
none of the plaintiffs in the cases cited by the dissent 
attempted to enforce a judgment more than 20 years after the 
entry of judgment, nor do any of the cases cite to or discuss 
the application of § 893.40.   
No.  2011AP1240.akz 
 
4 
 
determination of any one judge on any given day.5  I cannot 
conclude that the rule of law supports such subjectivity.  
Apparently, the issue of when § 893.40 bars enforcement is 
subject to some debate.6    
¶42 Courts, practitioners, and parties deserve greater 
certainty when it comes to important family law issues.  It is 
the role of the legislature, not the courts, to enact statutes.  
                                                 
5 Judicial decisions made without definable standards are 
arbitrary decisions that are disfavored under the law.  See 
Donaldson v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist., 2004 
WI 67, ¶¶91-102, 272 Wis. 2d 146, 680 N.W.2d 762.  I am at a 
loss as to why Chief Justice Abrahamson's concurrence disparages 
my concern over avoiding arbitrary decision-making, which should 
not be confused with a court's duty to engage in discretionary 
decision-making, as somehow being disrespectful of circuit court 
judges.  C.J. Abrahamson's concurrence, ¶29.  To the contrary, 
having been a trial lawyer and a circuit court judge, I 
understand that courts, lawyers, and litigants would typically 
prefer greater certainty when analyzing jugular issues, such as 
when a statute of repose acts as a bar to enforcement.  
Unfortunately, this opinion is limited to its facts and does not 
answer that issue. 
6 Legislative response to a court decision is not unusual.  
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 
832, is instructive as to the interplay between court decisions 
and subsequent legislative response.  After Hamilton, the 
legislature initiated statutory changes to address the child 
support issues raised therein.  It is not uncommon for this 
court to ask the legislature to consider legislative action.  
See, e.g., State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶54 n.16, 345 
Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369; id., ¶¶98-99 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting); State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, ¶¶79, 84, 328 
Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317 (Ziegler, J., concurring) (asking 
legislature to set parameters and standards of use for the 
installation and monitoring of GPS tracking devices); id., ¶77 
(Crooks, 
J., 
concurring); 
id., 
¶126 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting); State v. McClaren, 2009 WI 69, ¶¶77-79, 318 
Wis. 2d 739, 767 N.W.2d 550 (Bradley, J., dissenting); State ex 
rel. J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc., v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
Cnty., 2000 WI 30, ¶24 n.14, 233 Wis. 2d 428, 608 N.W.2d 679. 
No.  2011AP1240.akz 
 
5 
 
Perhaps legislative change is not needed, but perhaps it is.  I 
merely 
request 
that 
the 
legislature 
evaluate 
the 
issue 
presented.   
¶43 For the foregoing reasons I concur.  
¶44 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶45 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Michael R. 
Masters and Patricia A. Johnson were married on October 18, 
1986.  They were divorced on July 20, 1989.  Their divorce 
judgment, signed by Waukesha County Circuit Judge Robert 
Mawdsley, made the couple's written marital property agreement 
part of the judgment.  The marital property agreement read in 
part: "V. Property Division——Pension.  The Petitioner shall be 
awarded 
1/2 
of 
the 
value 
of 
the 
Respondent's 
Wisconsin 
Retirement System [WRS] benefits accrued from date of marriage 
thru the date of divorce.  A QDRO [qualified domestic relations 
order] shall be submitted to secure these rights." 
¶46 For more than 20 years, Patricia Johnson did not 
submit a QDRO to the WRS or to the court "to secure [her] 
rights" to a portion of her former husband's pension.  Thus, 
when she attempted to file a QDRO in 2010, her effort was 
opposed by Masters and ultimately denied by the Waukesha County 
Circuit Court.1 
¶47 The basis for the circuit court's denial was Wis. 
Stat. § 893.40, which provides: 
 
Action on judgment or decree; court of record.  
Except as provided in ss. 846.04(2) and (3) and 
893.415, action upon a judgment or decree of a court 
of record of any state or of the United States shall 
be commenced within 20 years after the judgment or 
decree is entered or be barred. 
¶48 The issue presented in this case is whether there is 
any reasonable basis for Johnson to avoid the apparent effect of 
this statute.  I conclude that there is not. 
                                                 
1 Kathryn W. Foster, Judge. 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
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¶49 The majority takes the opposite view.  It asserts that 
it would be an absurdity to apply the statute under the 
circumstances of this case.  Justice Ziegler's concurrence 
raises the stakes even more and pleads with the legislature to 
change the law.  Inasmuch as I believe the circuit court's 
decision was correct, the majority's analysis is flawed, and 
Justice Ziegler's concurrence is mistaken because the statute is 
reasonable, I respectfully dissent.   
I 
¶50 The facts and circumstances heavily influence the 
outcome of this case. 
¶51 Congress 
approved 
the 
Employee 
Retirement 
Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to protect the interests of 
participants in the growing number of employee benefit plans in 
the private sector throughout the United States.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1001.  Ten years later, Congress amended ERISA by enactment of 
the Retirement Equity Act of 1984.  See Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 
Stat. 1426 (1984).  The purpose of the Retirement Equity Act, 
which created the "qualified domestic relations order" in 29 
U.S.C. § 1056(d), was to facilitate the orderly assignment or 
alienation of all or a portion of a person's employee benefit 
plan to an "alternate payee" as the result of a court order or 
judgment relating to child support, alimony, or marital property 
rights stemming from divorce.  See S. Rep. No. 98-575, at 3, 18-
21 (1984) reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2549, 2564-2567. 
¶52 As the majority opinion notes, however, "ERISA does 
not apply to government retirement plans."  Majority op., ¶6 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
3 
 
(citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 1003(b)(1)); see also Lindsey v. Lindsey, 
140 
Wis. 2d 684, 
690, 
412 
N.W.2d 132 
(Ct. 
App. 
1987).  
Consequently, a court's authority to assign or divide a 
government pension in Wisconsin was and is subject to Wisconsin 
statute. 
¶53 On July 20, 1989——the date of the Johnson/Masters 
divorce——Wis. Stat. § 40.08 read in part: 
 
Benefit 
assignments 
and 
corrections. 
(1) 
Exemptions.  The benefits payable to, or other rights 
and 
interests 
of 
any 
member, 
beneficiary 
or 
distributee of any estate under any of the benefit 
plans administered by the [Department of Employee 
Trust Funds (the department)], including insurance 
payments, shall be exempt from any tax levied by the 
state or any subdivision of the state and shall not be 
assignable, either in law or equity, or be subject to 
execution, levy, attachment, garnishment or other 
legal process except as specifically provided in this 
section.  The exemption from taxation under this 
section shall not apply with respect to any tax on 
income. 
Wis. Stat. § 40.08(1) (1987-88) (emphasis added).  Compare id. 
with Wis. Stat. § 66.81 (1987-88) (prohibiting the taxation, 
execution, and assignment of pension benefits in the retirement 
system of first class cities). 
 
¶54 However, the statute continued: 
 
(3) Waivers.  Any participant, beneficiary or 
distributee of any estate may waive, absolutely and 
without right of reconsideration or recovery, the 
right to or the payment of all or any portion of any 
benefit payable or to become payable under this 
chapter.  The waiver shall be effective on the first 
day of the 2nd month commencing after it is received 
by the department or on the date specified in the 
waiver if later. 
Wis. Stat. § 40.08(3) (1987–88) (emphasis added). 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
4 
 
¶55 The gist of these statutory provisions was clear.  In 
July 1989 the benefits payable to a member of the WRS were not 
assignable in a divorce proceeding except as specifically 
provided in Wis. Stat. § 40.08.  Section 40.08 did not authorize 
any "qualified domestic relations order."  It did, however, 
permit a member to waive payment of a portion of his or her 
pension by filing an appropriate waiver with the department. 
¶56 The legislature changed the law approximately nine 
months later.  See 1989 Wis. Act 218.  Newly created Wis. Stat. 
§ 40.08(1m) provided that a participant's accumulated rights and 
benefits in the WRS shall be divided by "a qualified domestic 
relations order" but "only if the order provides for a division 
as specified in this subsection."  Wis. Stat. § 40.08(1m) (1989–
90) (emphasis added).  The specifications in § 40.08(1m), plus 
the new definition of "qualified domestic relations order" in 
Wis. Stat. § 40.02(48m), take up more than a full page of the 
1989-90 statutes.  Wisconsin Stat. § 40.08(1m)(j) pointedly 
stated: "This subsection applies to qualified domestic relations 
orders issued on or after April 28, 1990, that provide for 
divisions of the accumulated rights and benefits of participants 
whose marriages have been terminated by a court on or after 
April 28, 1990." 
¶57 In short, the 1990 changes in the statutes did not 
apply to the Johnson/Masters divorce. 
¶58 In 1998 the legislature amended the statutes again2 to 
recognize qualified domestic relations orders issued on or after 
                                                 
2 See 1997 Wis. Act 125. 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
5 
 
January 1, 1982, Wis. Stat. § 40.08(1m)(j) (1997–98), and to 
permit the revision or modification of judgments entered on or 
after January 1, 1982, to provide for payments under a qualified 
domestic relations order.  Wis. Stat. § 40.08(1m)(k)2. (1997–
98).  These changes permitted Johnson to take the step outlined 
in the marital property agreement to secure her rights. 
¶59 The plain truth is that the property division-pension 
section of the Johnson/Masters marital property agreement was 
not valid on the date of the 1989 divorce because the law did 
not then permit a court to divide Michael Masters' WRS pension.  
If the law had not changed in 1998, the 1989 property division-
pension section of the marital property agreement might never 
have been eligible to become valid, although it was always 
possible for Patricia Johnson to secure Masters' written waiver 
under Wis. Stat. § 40.08(3). 
¶60 If the 1998 law had been in place on July 20, 1989, 
Johnson would still have been required by the marital property 
agreement, the judgment incorporating that agreement, and the 
applicable statutes to submit a QDRO to the department to secure 
her rights. 
¶61 Johnson had 20 years to obtain a QDRO and submit it to 
the department or at least file it with the court.  She did not 
do so, even though such a QDRO was specifically authorized by 
law in her situation from May 2, 1998, through July 20, 2009——
that is, for more than 11 years——and even though she signed a 
draft QDRO after the divorce.  There is no evidence that Johnson 
sought a court order or contempt to force Masters to comply with 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
6 
 
the marital property agreement by signing the draft QDRO or a 
revised QDRO. 
¶62 Johnson also had 20 years to obtain a written waiver 
from Masters, either voluntarily or through court action.  She 
did not do so, even though the Waukesha County Circuit Court 
held post-divorce hearings in the Johnson/Masters case in 1995 
and 1996 and issued orders in the case in 1995, 1996, and 2004. 
¶63 In addition, Johnson had almost nine years to seek to 
amend the judgment to obtain the cash equivalent of her pension 
share in lieu of a QDRO, during the period when a QDRO was not 
authorized by statute in her case.  After that time, she could 
have pursued multiple options, including an effort to secure the 
cash equivalent. 
¶64 Johnson's interest in a portion of Masters' pension 
was always contingent upon her taking steps to secure and 
enforce her rights.  She did not do so until more than 20 years 
after the divorce judgment. 
¶65 In pointing the finger at Johnson for failing to take 
the required action to protect her rights, one is actually 
pointing at her divorce counsel.3  There is no allegation by 
Johnson that Masters' divorce counsel failed to do something 
that he committed to do.  This case, then, reveals more than 20 
years of unexplained inaction and neglect.  It is hardly an 
"absurdity" for a court to take that inaction into account. 
                                                 
3 See Scott L. Dennison, Valuing Retirement Benefits in 
Divorce, Wis. Lawyer, June 2012, at 10–11 ("Lawyers who work on 
divorces that involve QDROs have been magnets for malpractice 
suits, because a poorly designed QDRO can be a real disaster."). 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
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II 
¶66 Johnson's 
inaction 
over 
a 
20-year 
period 
is 
significant because of Wis. Stat. § 893.40, the 20-year statute 
of repose.  The statute provides, in part, that "action upon a 
judgment or decree of a court of record of any state or of the 
United States shall be commenced within 20 years after the 
judgment or decree is entered or be barred."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40 (emphasis added). 
¶67 The history and purpose of Wis. Stat. § 893.40 deserve 
discussion.  The court also should discuss Johnson's attempt to 
get around the statute by arguing that her effort to secure a 
QDRO was not "an action upon a judgment."  
¶68 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.40 became law in 1980.  See 1979 
Wis. Act 323.  It combined and modified the provisions of two 
repealed statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 893.16(1) and 893.18(1).  The 
former statute had provided a 20-year statute of limitations: 
"Within 20 years.  Within 20 years: (1) An action upon a 
judgment or decree of any court of record of this state or of 
the United States sitting within this state."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.16(1) (1977-78). 
¶69 The latter statute had only a 10-year statute of 
limitations: "Within 10 years.  Within 10 years: (1) An action 
upon a judgment or decree of any court of record of any other 
state or territory of the United States or of any court of the 
United 
States 
sitting 
without 
this 
state." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.18(1) (1977-78). 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
8 
 
 
¶70 The new Wis. Stat. § 893.40 established a uniform 20-
year time limit for an "action upon a judgment or decree" and 
specified that the 20 years began to run when the "judgment or 
decree is entered."  It added that a failure to timely commence 
action would "bar[]" future action upon a judgment.  These 
changes transformed two statutes of limitation into a single 
statute of repose. 
¶71 "A statute of repose . . . limits the time period 
within which an action may be brought based on the date of an 
act or omission."  Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, ¶29, 261 
Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832.  The "act" that triggers the 
statute of repose in Wis. Stat. § 893.40 is the entry of a 
judgment.  See generally, Daniel J. La Fave, Remedying the 
Confusion Between Statutes of Limitation and Statutes of Repose 
in Wisconsin——A Conceptual Guide, 88 Marq. L. Rev. 927 (2005). 
¶72 Limitation periods in statutes of limitation and 
statutes of repose are "legislative pronouncements of policy 
barring actions for various policy reasons regardless of the 
merit of the action."  Hamilton, 261 Wis. 2d 458, ¶42 (citations 
omitted).  These statutes are meant to "ensure prompt litigation 
of claims and to protect defendants from fraudulent or stale 
claims brought after memories have faded or evidence has been 
lost."  Korkow v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 117 Wis. 2d 187, 198, 
344 N.W.2d 108 (1984).  As this court explained in Aicher: 
Statutes 
of 
limitation 
and 
statutes 
of 
repose 
represent legislative policy decisions that dictate 
when 
the 
courthouse 
doors 
close 
for 
particular 
litigants. . . .  [These statutes] "are found and 
approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence," 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
9 
 
[and] articulate the principle that it is more just to 
put the adversary on notice to defend a claim within a 
specified period of time than to permit unlimited 
prosecution of stale claims. 
Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶27, 237 
Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849 (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 
444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979)). 
¶73 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.40 has no exception for family 
law cases except for actions to collect child support payments.  
See Wis. Stat. § 893.415.  This specific exception was created 
following the court's decision in Hamilton, which discussed 
§ 893.40 extensively.4   
¶74 The court in Hamilton said Wis. Stat. § 893.40 was 
"plain and unambiguous" as to the act that begins the 20-year 
period.  Hamilton, 261 Wis. 2d 458, ¶30.  This means that the 
statute is not triggered by the subsequent "accrual" of a right, 
as 
the 
majority 
mistakenly 
suggests. 
 
Thus, 
Hamilton's 
interpretation of § 893.40 should decide this case unless 
Johnson's effort to secure a QDRO in 2010 was not an "action 
upon a judgment." 
¶75 This possibility is raised in the certification from 
the court of appeals and argued by Johnson in this review. 
¶76 The argument is grounded in the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.02: 
 
Except as provided in s. 893.415(3), an action is 
commenced, within the meaning of any provision of law 
which limits the time for the commencement of an 
action, as to each defendant, when the summons naming 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.415(1) defines "action" as "any 
proceeding brought before a court" to collect child or family 
support. 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
10 
 
the defendant and the complaint are filed with the 
court, but no action shall be deemed commenced as to 
any defendant upon whom service of authenticated 
copies of the summons and complaint has not been made 
within 90 days after filing. 
Wis. Stat. § 893.02 (emphasis added). 
¶77 The certification states that an "argument could be 
made that an 'action' is a proceeding which is begun by a 
summons and complaint and that an action upon a judgment or 
decree of a court of record therefore means any judgment that 
was commenced by a summons and complaint."  The certification 
added that this was part of the rationale used in Lueck v. 
Lueck, No. 2011AP1195, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 
12, 2011), review denied (Mar. 2, 2012), where the court of 
appeals said Wis. Stat. § 893.40 did not pertain to actions 
begun by a motion and order to show cause because motions and 
orders to show cause "are not a summons and complaint."  Id., 
¶9. 
¶78 The argument that Johnson's effort to secure a QDRO in 
2010 was not an action upon a judgment must be addressed. 
¶79 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 893.02 and 893.40 both have their 
origins in early Wisconsin law.  Revised Wisconsin Stat. Chapter 
138, § 15 (1858), provided: "Within twenty years:——1. An action 
upon a judgment or decree of any court of record of this state." 
¶80 Section 27 of the same chapter then provided, in part, 
that "[a]n action shall be deemed commenced as to each 
defendant, when the summons is served on him, or on a co-
defendant, who is a joint contractor or otherwise united in 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
11 
 
interest with him."  Wis. Stat. ch. 138, § 27 (1858) (emphasis 
added). 
¶81 These two statutes were accompanied by two other 
provisions of note.  Section 2 of Chapter 122 of the 1858 
Revised Statutes provided that, "[a]n action is an ordinary 
proceeding in a court of justice, by which a party prosecutes 
another party for the enforcement or protection of a right, the 
redress or prevention of a wrong, or the prevention of a public 
offense."  Wis. Stat. ch. 122, § 2 (1858). 
¶82 Section 10 of Chapter 122 provided: 
 
No action shall be brought upon a judgment 
rendered in any court of this state, except a court of 
the justice of the peace, between the same parties, 
without leave of the court, for a good cause shown, on 
notice to the adverse party; and no action on a 
judgment rendered by a justice of the peace shall be 
brought in the same county within two years after its 
rendition, except in cases of his death, resignation, 
incapacity to act, or removal from the county, or that 
the 
process 
was 
not 
personally 
served 
on 
the 
defendant, or on all the defendants, or in case of the 
death of some of the parties, or when the docket or 
record of such judgment is or shall have been lost or 
destroyed. 
Wis. Stat. ch. 122, § 10 (1858) (emphasis added). 
 
¶83 These statutes suggest that "action" was an "ordinary 
proceeding," as opposed to a special proceeding, and that 
sometimes this "action" required a "summons" and sometimes it 
required "notice to the adverse party." 
¶84 The essence of Wis. Stat. § 893.40 appears again in 
chapter 177, section 4220 of the 1878 Revised Statutes: "Within 
twenty years: 1. An action upon a judgment or decree of any 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
12 
 
court of record of this state, or of the United States, sitting 
within this state." 
¶85 The 
forerunner 
of 
present 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.02 
(regarding summons and complaint) was found in Chapter 177, 
Section 4239 of the 1878 Revised Statutes: 
An action shall be deemed commenced, within the 
meaning of any provision of law which limits the time 
for the commencement of an action, as to each 
defendant, when the summons is served on him, or on a 
codefendant who is a joint contractor or otherwise 
united in interest with him. 
Wis. Stat. ch. 177, § 4239 (1878) (emphasis added). 
¶86 The 
1878 
Revised 
Statutes 
also 
maintained 
the 
definition of "action" in the new Section 2595 of Chapter 118 
but eliminated the second reference to "action upon a judgment" 
that had appeared in Chapter 122, Section 10 of the 1858 Revised 
Statutes. 
¶87 By 1925 the language in Section 4220 of the 1878 
Revised 
Statutes 
appeared 
without 
change 
(except 
for 
punctuation) in Wis. Stat. § 330.16 (1925).5  The language of 
Section 4239 of the 1878 Revised Statutes appeared in Wis. Stat. 
§ 330.39 (1925).  The definition of "action" from 1878 continued 
in Wis. Stat. § 260.03 (1925). 
¶88 Sections 
330.16 
and 
330.18 
were 
renumbered 
as 
§§ 893.16 and 893.18 in § 2, ch. 66, Laws of 1965.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 330.39 was renumbered § 893.39 in the same chapter. 
                                                 
5 The 10-year statute of limitations for "action upon a 
judgment . . . of any court of record of any other state" 
appeared in Wis. Stat. § 330.18(1) (1925). 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
13 
 
¶89 In 1975 the supreme court adopted the Wisconsin Rules 
of Civil Procedure, effective January 1, 1976.  See 67 
Wis. 2d 585, 585-784 (1975).  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.39 was 
amended "to conform to the proposed mode of commencement of 
action under s. 801.02(1)."  Id. at 770–71.  It read: 
 
Action, when commenced.  An action shall be 
deemed commenced, within the meaning of any provision 
of law which limits the time for the commencement of 
an action, as to each defendant, when the summons 
naming him as defendant and the complaint are filed 
with the court, but no action shall be deemed 
commenced as to any defendant upon whom service of 
authenticated copies of the summons and complaint has 
not been made within 60 days after filing. 
Id. at 770-71 (emphasis added). 
 
¶90 This amended section was repealed and recreated as 
Wis. Stat. § 893.02 by Section 28, Chapter 323, Laws of 1979, 
the chapter that repealed and recreated all of Wis. Stat. 
Chapter 893.  Chapter 323 is the same chapter that created Wis. 
Stat. § 893.40, the statute of repose at issue in this case. 
¶91 In sum, Johnson's argument depends in large part on 
whether the supreme court redefined "action upon a judgment" 
when it added "complaint" to Wis. Stat. § 893.39 in 1975. 
¶92 There are several cases prior to the 1975 change that 
suggest "action upon a judgment" was broadly construed to 
include "actions" beyond the filing of a new lawsuit.   
¶93 In Coon v. Seymour, 71 Wis. 340, 345-46, 37 N.W. 243 
(1888), the court explained "action upon a judgment."  The court 
said:  
We do not understand this [case] to be an action upon 
a judgment which may be brought within twenty years 
after the cause of action accrued, within the meaning 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
14 
 
of sec. 4220, R.S.  Such an action is to confirm and 
enforce a judgment.  This, on the contrary, is an 
action to avoid and set aside a judgment for alleged 
causes existing outside of the record. 
Id. (emphasis added).  An action to "confirm and enforce a 
judgment" is not a new lawsuit.   
 
¶94 In Brown v. Hopkins, 101 Wis. 498, 77 N.W. 899 (1899), 
the court discussed a judgment of foreclosure entered on 
December 10, 1877, and an execution issued upon that judgment on 
December 3, 1897, and a subsequent levy on real estate, both 
within the 20-year statute of limitations.  The court said: 
 
The question is whether an execution which is 
duly issued and partially executed by levying upon 
property within twenty years from the entry of a 
judgment expires at the end of the twenty-year period, 
or whether it remains valid and effective, so that the 
property so levied upon may be thereafter sold and 
applied to satisfy the command of the writ.  Our 
statute provides (R.S. 1878, sec. 4220) that a 
judgment of a court of record outlaws at the end of 
twenty years from the date of its rendition; and, 
further (R.S. 1878, sec. 2968), that "in no case shall 
an execution be issued, or any proceedings had on any 
judgment, after twenty years from the time of the 
rendition thereof."  It is very evident from this 
latter section that a valid execution may be issued at 
any time up to the last day of the twenty years; and 
the question is whether, when so issued, it is 
rendered void by the limitation upon the judgment.  
Our statute requires no order of confirmation of the 
sheriff's sale, nor any other proceeding by the court, 
to 
perfect 
the 
purchaser's 
title. 
 
No 
further 
proceedings upon the judgment are contemplated or 
required by the statute.  The sale of the property by 
the sheriff, and the payment or application of the 
proceeds, are simply the carrying out of the commands 
of his writ, which, when issued, was perfectly valid. 
Brown, 101 Wis. at 499-500. 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
15 
 
 
¶95 The Brown case shows that "execution" upon a judgment 
was required within the 20-year period.  "Execution" was not a 
new lawsuit. 
 
¶96 In Zellmer v. Sharlein, 1 Wis. 2d 46, 82 N.W.2d 891 
(1957), a daughter filed a claim against her late father's 
estate.  When the daughter's mother and father were divorced, 
the divorce judgment had incorporated a stipulation that 
required the father to pay the premiums on an insurance policy 
on his life for the benefit of the daughter.  Id. at 47.  The 
father failed to pay the premiums.  Id. at 48.  As a result, 
when the father died and left nothing for the daughter (on 
grounds that he had provided for her by the life insurance 
policy), she filed and litigated a claim against his estate.  
Id.  The court rejected a defense that the claim was barred by a 
six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract.  Id. at 
52.  It concluded that the claim was within the 20-year statute 
of limitations for a claim upon a judgment, namely, the divorce 
judgment.  Id.  The claim did not constitute a new lawsuit. 
 
¶97 In Schafer v. Wegner, 78 Wis. 2d 127, 254 N.W.2d 193 
(1977), the plaintiff commenced an action to recover personal 
property awarded to her in a divorce judgment in 1957.  The suit 
was commenced in 1973, within the 20 years set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.16(1) (1971-72).  Id. at 130–31.  The court observed that, 
"[t]he household furniture was awarded to the appellant in the 
divorce decree and the statute of limitations concerning actions 
based on that award is twenty years."  Id. at 132.  Although the 
plaintiff's suit was timely filed under the statute, this court 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
16 
 
dismissed it on grounds of laches.  Id.  There is no evidence in 
the opinion that the court would have viewed a "motion" 
different from a new suit under the statute of limitations.  
Rather, the court cut off the plaintiff after a shorter time 
period. 
¶98 Coon, Brown, Zellmer, and Schafer suggest that courts 
have viewed "action upon a judgment" broadly, not restricting an 
"action" to a proceeding that required a summons and complaint.  
The question here is whether that view changed in 1975 when the 
court modified the language in Wis. Stat. § 893.39 (1973-74). 
¶99 There are at least four reasons why this court should 
not adopt any theory that Wis. Stat. § 893.40's time limitation 
applies 
to 
only 
proceedings 
commenced 
by 
a 
summons 
and 
complaint. 
¶100 First, this theory depends upon a conclusion that this 
court contravened its rulemaking authority when it amended Wis. 
Stat. § 893.39 in 1975. 
¶101 In 1975 Wis. Stat. § 251.18, the predecessor to 
present Wis. Stat. § 751.12, contained the same critical 
language found in present law, namely, with respect to court-
made rules of pleading, practice, and procedure, "Such rules 
shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of 
any litigant."  If the court's 1975 amendment to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.39 (1973-74) narrowed the statute of limitations so that 
it applied to only proceedings initiated by summons and 
complaint——thereby removing the limitation on motions, orders to 
show cause, claims, executions, and the like——the court would 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
17 
 
have violated § 251.18 because it clearly would have abridged, 
enlarged, or modified the substantive rights of persons affected 
by judgments. 
¶102 "In Wisconsin, unlike many states, the running of the 
statute of limitations extinguishes the right as well as the 
remedy; if the statute has run, the cause of action no longer 
exists."  Schafer, 78 Wis. 2d at 134.  "The limitation of 
actions is a right as well as a remedy, extinguishing the right 
on one side and creating a right on the other, which is as of 
high dignity as regards judicial remedies as any other right and 
it is a right which enjoys constitutional protection."  Maryland 
Cas. Co. v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 390, 393, 14 N.W.2d 177 (1944) 
(citations omitted). 
¶103 Second, an interpretation that Wis. Stat. § 893.40 is 
inapplicable to motions, orders to show cause, and other 
proceedings not requiring a "complaint" would mean, in effect, 
that there would be no time period for a party to bring certain 
kinds of actions upon a judgment.  This would effectively remove 
the limitation, creating tremendous uncertainty, because it 
would be replaced with the far-less-certain doctrine of laches.  
See Schafer, 78 Wis. 2d at 132. 
¶104 It is hard to imagine that this court would purposely 
gut a longstanding statute of limitations at the very time it 
was speaking of the constitutional significance of such statutes 
in court decisions. 
¶105 Third, an interpretation that Wis. Stat. § 893.40 is 
inapplicable to motions, orders to show cause, and other 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
18 
 
proceedings not requiring a complaint could have serious adverse 
consequences outside family law.  Masters argues that the 
principle stated in the Lueck decision would leave many post-
judgment collection actions without any time limitation to 
commencement.  He points to earnings garnishments and executions 
as examples.  In the absence of a specific statute limiting a 
particular enforcement mechanism upon a judgment, this concern 
is well founded. 
¶106 Fourth, the legislature concluded that Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40 applied to a broad array of "proceedings" when it 
created Wis. Stat. § 893.415 after the Hamilton decision.  
Subsection (1) defines "action" in the section to mean "any 
proceeding brought before a court, whether commenced by a 
petition, motion, order to show cause, or other pleading."  This 
broad 
definition 
would 
be 
superfluous 
if 
§ 893.40 
were 
inapplicable to anything other than a proceeding commenced with 
a summons and complaint. 
¶107 There are various ways to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§§ 893.40 and 893.02.  The latter section provides a surefire 
way of acting "upon a judgment" before a statute of limitations 
or a statute of repose has run.  See Lak v. Richardson-Merrell, 
Inc., 100 Wis. 2d 641, 649, 302 N.W.2d 483 (1981).  Whether the 
wording of § 893.02 was expected or intended to curtail what an 
"action" was is much more speculative.  The enactment of 
§ 893.40, on the other hand, signified a clear objective: a 
statute of repose eliminated issues about accrual because the 
statute begins to run at a definite time, based on an event, not 
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an indefinite time based upon the accrual of a right.  The 
majority 
opinion 
has 
the 
effect 
of 
disregarding 
the 
legislature's clearly stated objective. 
III 
 
¶108 Justice Ziegler's concurrence presents a different 
problem.  Justice Ziegler writes that some family court 
judgments and orders may necessitate jurisdiction for longer 
than 20 years, such as the payment of retirement benefits, 
maintenance issues, or life insurance proceeds.  In my view, 
courts will employ reason and common sense in dealing with 
questions about the enforcement of judgments.   
 
¶109 For instance, some judgments, like the Johnson/Masters 
divorce judgment, require some additional step or steps to 
secure a right.  Filing a QDRO protects the rights of the 
"alternate payee" with respect to both public and private 
retirement benefits.  Enforcing a properly filed QDRO is not 
barred by Wis. Stat. § 893.40. 
 
¶110 Other judgments are not only final but also complete, 
in the sense that no additional steps are required by a party 
seeking to enforce a right.  These in essence are continuing 
judgments.   
 
¶111 For instance, a judgment that requires an insured to 
pay premiums and designate a specific beneficiary needs no 
additional action by the beneficiary.  The beneficiary has a 
property right and may enforce that right against the insured or 
the insured's estate when the insured violates that right.  See 
Richards v. Richards, 58 Wis. 2d 290, 298–99, 206 N.W.2d 134 
No.  2011AP1240.dtp 
 
20 
 
(1973).  In other words, the insured may not change the 
beneficiary more than 20 years after the entry of the judgment 
and expect that he or she has not created a new cause of action 
for the original beneficiary.  Glassner v. DOR, 115 Wis. 2d 168, 
181, 340 N.W.2d 223 (Ct. App. 1983).   
 
¶112 As another example, in Ashby v. Ashby, 174 Wis. 549, 
183 N.W. 965 (1921), this court said that alimony was a 
"continuing judgment, always subject to modification by the 
court during the life of the parties," and thus a statute of 
limitations did not apply.  Ashby, 174 Wis. at 554.6  The 
suggestion that a party could simply stop paying alimony or 
maintenance after 20 years, as a result of Wis. Stat. § 893.40, 
is not reasonable or realistic because of the continuing nature 
of the obligation to pay.  Cf. Rintelman v. Rintelman, 118 
Wis. 2d 587, 348 N.W.2d 498 (1984); Estate of Barnes, 170 
Wis. 2d 1, 12–13, 486 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1992).   
 
¶113 A party can protect its interests in a judgment by 
timely action and by careful wording of the judgment.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 893.40 is designed to discourage people from sleeping on 
their rights.  The statute is not likely to be used against 
people who are wide awake and conscious of the need to assert 
their interests. 
¶114 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
6 However, because Mrs. Ashby waited so long to seek back 
payments for alimony, she could not get everything that her ex-
husband owed her.  Ashby v. Ashby, 174 Wis. 549, 555–56, 183 
N.W. 965 (1921).  Fully enforcing the judgment after 44 years 
was not fair to the ex-husband, since he no longer had any way 
to earn money.  Id. 
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