Case Title: In re A.N.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S242494

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re A.N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
A.N., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S242494 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Six 
B275914 
 
Ventura County Superior Court 
2015040294 
 
 
May 4, 2020 
 
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice 
Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Cuéllar, Kruger, and Groban 
concurred. 
1 
In re A.N. 
S242494 
 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
The Legislature has established a detailed statutory 
scheme to govern juvenile truancy.  (See e.g., Ed. Code, 
§§ 48260–48265; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601.)  We granted review 
to determine whether this scheme requires (1) the use of a school 
attendance review board (SARB) or a similar truancy mediation 
program, or (2) the issuance of a fourth truancy report, before 
the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a minor on the 
basis of truancy.  We hold that the juvenile court may exercise 
jurisdiction in a formal wardship proceeding on the basis of the 
minor having “four or more truancies within one school year” 
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 601, subdivision (b) 
if a fourth truancy report has been issued to the attendance 
supervisor or the superintendent of the school district, even if 
the minor has not been previously referred to a SARB or a 
similar truancy mediation program.1  Because A.N.’s school had 
sent at least four truancy reports to the superintendent of the 
school district before the wardship petition was filed against 
A.N., we affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment that the juvenile 
court possessed jurisdiction over A.N. 
                                        
1  
Our holding is limited to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction 
in a formal wardship proceeding initiated by the filing of a 
petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 650.  We 
do not consider the informal juvenile and traffic court’s 
jurisdiction in a hearing conducted in accordance with Welfare 
and Institutions Code sections 255 through 258. 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
2 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
By the time A.N. entered high school, she was struggling 
with difficult circumstances at home and in her personal life.  
Beginning in eighth grade, she developed school attendance 
problems that continued throughout her ninth grade year. 
 
On October 6, 2015, the principal of A.N.’s school mailed a 
truancy notice to her parents.  In the letter, the principal 
explained that A.N. had accumulated four unexcused absences 
or tardies, and he invited her parents to contact the school’s 
attendance supervisor to “discuss solutions that will improve 
[A.N.’s] attendance.”  A week later, on October 13, the principal 
sent a second truancy notice listing another five unexcused 
absences or tardies.  In this letter, the principal warned A.N.’s 
parents that their daughter was “at risk of being classified as a 
habitual truant,” and he urged them to contact the attendance 
supervisor “as soon as possible.”  On December 15, the principal 
sent a third truancy notice documenting another 10 unexcused 
absences or tardies. In it, he stated that A.N. was a habitual 
truant, and he again requested that her parents contact the 
attendance supervisor “as soon as possible.”2 
 
Three days earlier, on December 12, a police officer had 
issued A.N. a citation for habitual truancy under Education 
Code section 48262.3  Under that section, a pupil is classified as 
a “habitual truant” if he or she “has been reported as a truant 
three or more times per school year” and a school official has 
                                        
2  
A.N.’s principal mailed both English and Spanish copies of 
each of his letters to A.N.’s parents. 
3  
Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to 
the Education Code. 
 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
3 
made “a conscientious effort to hold at least one conference with 
a parent or guardian of the pupil and the pupil himself.”4 
 
On December 31, the District Attorney filed a wardship 
petition against A.N. in the juvenile court.  (See Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 650.)  The petition alleged that A.N. was a habitual 
truant under section 48262 and that she was within the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 601. 
 
Almost two weeks later, on January 12, 2016, A.N. and her 
mother attended a SARB meeting.  They signed a contract 
stating that A.N. would attend school regularly and that her 
mother would provide information about any future absences. 
 
During late April and early May, the juvenile court held a 
trial on the wardship petition.  At trial, the school attendance 
supervisor testified that a computerized system automatically 
sends a report to the school district whenever a teacher records 
a student as absent from or tardy to class. He explained that the 
system also generates student attendance profiles that provide 
attendance supervisors with a list of each student’s recorded 
absences and tardies.  Additionally, he testified that he had 
spoken with A.N. on multiple occasions and provided her with 
information about available services.  A.N.’s attendance profile 
and the letters sent from the principal to A.N.’s parents were 
admitted into evidence. 
                                        
4  
Section 48262 also explains:  “[A] conscientious effort 
means attempting to communicate with the parents of the pupil 
at least once using the most cost-effective method possible, 
which may include electronic mail or a telephone call.”  Although 
the record does not indicate whether A.N.’s parents received the 
principal’s letters, it does indicate that a school official spoke 
with A.N.’s father over the phone. 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
4 
 
On May 10, the juvenile court sustained the wardship 
petition.  At A.N.’s request, the court ordered A.N. to pay a $50 
fine rather than to complete 20 hours of community service.  
(See § 48264.5, subd. (d)(1), (2).) 
 
On appeal, A.N. claimed that the juvenile court lacked 
jurisdiction because, at the time the petition was filed, (1) she 
had not yet appeared before a SARB and (2) a fourth truancy 
report had not been sent to her and her parents.  (In re A.N. 
(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 403 (A.N.).)  The Court of Appeal affirmed 
the juvenile court’s judgment, holding that neither of these steps 
were prerequisites to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over a 
minor on the basis of the minor having “four or more truancies 
within one school year” under Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 601, subdivision (b) (Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 601(b)).  We granted A.N.’s petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
Before turning to the issues before us, we review our 
familiar principles of statutory construction.  “We start with the 
statute’s words, which are the most reliable indicator of 
legislative intent.”  (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 627.)  “ ‘We 
interpret relevant terms in light of their ordinary meaning, 
while also taking account of any related provisions and the 
overall structure of the statutory scheme to determine what 
interpretation best advances the Legislature’s underlying 
purpose.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors 
v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 293.)  “If we find the 
statutory language ambiguous or subject to more than one 
interpretation, we may look to extrinsic aids, including 
legislative history or purpose to inform our views.”  (John v. 
Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 96.) 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
5 
A.  Background 
 
As is relevant here, Welfare and Institutions Code section 
601(b) provides:  “If a minor between 12 years of age and 17 
years of age, inclusive, has four or more truancies within one 
school year as defined in Section 48260 of the Education Code or 
a school attendance review board or probation officer determines 
that the available public and private services are insufficient or 
inappropriate to correct the habitual truancy of the minor, or to 
correct the minor’s persistent or habitual refusal to obey the 
reasonable and proper orders or directions of school authorities, 
or if the minor fails to respond to directives of a school 
attendance review board or a probation officer or to services 
provided, the minor is then within the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court which may adjudge the minor to be a ward of the 
court.”  In brief, this subdivision lists three bases of juvenile 
court jurisdiction:  (1) “four or more truancies within one school 
year”; (2) a determination by a SARB or a probation officer that 
available services are insufficient or inappropriate to correct the 
minor’s truancy; or (3) a minor’s failure to respond to the 
directives of a SARB or a probation officer or to services 
provided. 
 
In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the juvenile 
court possessed jurisdiction in the formal wardship proceeding 
against A.N. on the basis of her “four or more truancies within 
one school year” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 
601(b).  (A.N., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 406.)  Consequently, 
we limit our consideration to whether (1) the use of a SARB or a 
similar truancy mediation program, or (2) the issuance of a 
fourth truancy report to the pupil and his or her parents or 
guardians, is a prerequisite to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction in 
a formal wardship proceeding upon this basis. 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
6 
 
At the outset, we agree with A.N. that Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 601(b) “cannot be read in isolation but 
must be harmonized” with the Education Code sections 
governing truancy.  (See Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & 
Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 [“[S]tatutes or 
statutory sections relating to the same subject must be 
harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent 
possible.”].)  So, we briefly review the other sections of the 
statutory scheme that are most relevant to our analysis. 
 
First, if a pupil “is absent from school without a valid 
excuse three full days in one school year or tardy or absent for 
more than a 30-minute period during the schoolday without a 
valid excuse on three occasions in one school year, or any 
combination thereof,” section 48260, subdivision (a) provides 
that the pupil “shall be classified as a truant and shall be 
reported to the attendance supervisor or to the superintendent 
of the school district.”  If the pupil is “again absent from school 
without valid excuse one or more days, or tardy on one or more 
days,” section 48261 provides that the pupil “shall again be 
reported as a truant to the attendance supervisor or the 
superintendent of the district.”  If the pupil is “reported as a 
truant three or more times per school year” and “an appropriate 
district officer or employee has made a conscientious effort to 
hold at least one conference with a parent or guardian of the 
pupil and the pupil himself, after the filing of either of the 
reports required by Section 48260 or Section 48261,” section 
48262 provides that the pupil “shall be deemed an habitual 
truant.” 
 
Meanwhile, section 48264.5 provides increasingly serious 
consequences that may result from a pupil’s continued truancy 
or his or her failure to complete assigned programs.  Subdivision 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
7 
(a) states that “[t]he first time a truancy report is issued,” the 
pupil and the pupil’s parent or guardian may be requested to 
attend a meeting.  Subdivision (b) provides that “[t]he second 
time a truancy report is issued,” the pupil may be assigned to an 
afterschool or weekend study program, and that a pupil who 
fails to complete such a program “shall be subject to subdivision 
(c).”  Subdivision (c) states that “[t]he third time a truancy report 
is issued,” the pupil may be required to attend a SARB meeting 
or a similar truancy mediation program, and that a pupil who 
fails to complete such a program “shall be subject to subdivision 
(d).”  Finally, subdivision (d) provides that “[t]he fourth time a 
truancy is issued,” the pupil “may be within the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court that may adjudge the pupil to be a ward of the 
court pursuant to Section 601 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code.” 
B.  Use of a SARB or a Similar Truancy Mediation 
Program 
 
First, we consider A.N.’s claim that the statutory scheme 
and In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283 (Michael G.) require 
the use of a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program 
before a pupil comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
 
In Michael G., supra, 44 Cal.3d 283, we considered 
whether the juvenile court may exercise its contempt power to 
detain a minor during nonschool hours.  Our opinion recognized 
that the Legislature had previously amended the statutory 
scheme “to require referral of truants to [SARBs] before juvenile 
court intervention,” and we described referral to a SARB as a 
“condition precedent to the juvenile court’s intervention.”  (Id. 
at p. 290.)  As we explain below, this dictum was abrogated by 
subsequent amendments to the statutory scheme. 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
8 
 
When we decided Michael G., supra, 44 Cal.3d 283, in 
1988, the statutory scheme required habitual truants to be 
referred to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program 
before they are referred to the juvenile court.  Former section 
601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code stated:  “Any person 
under the age of 18 years who . . . is a habitual truant from 
school within the meaning of any law of this state, shall, prior 
to any referral to the juvenile court of the county, be referred to a 
school attendance review board pursuant to Section 48263 of the 
Education Code, or to a truancy mediation program pursuant to 
Section 601.3 of this code, or to both a school attendance review 
board and a truancy mediation program if both have been 
established in the county.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 601.1, 
as amended by Stats. 1985, ch. 667, § 1, p. 2256, italics added.)  
Additionally, section 601(b) formerly read:  “If a school 
attendance review board determines that the available public 
and private services are insufficient or inappropriate to correct 
the habitual truancy of the minor, or to correct the minor’s 
persistent or habitual refusal to obey the reasonable and proper 
orders or directions of school authorities, or if the minor fails to 
respond to directives of a school attendance review board or to 
services provided, the minor is then within the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court . . . .”  (Welf. & Inst., former § 601(b), as amended 
by Stats. 1976, ch. 1071, § 11, p. 4818, italics added.) 
 
So, as our dictum in Michael G., supra, 44 Cal.3d 283, 
recognized, former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code mandated initial referral to a SARB or a similar truancy 
mediation program, and section 601(b) formerly provided only 
two bases of juvenile court jurisdiction—both of which 
contemplated the prior use of a SARB or a similar truancy 
mediation program.  In 1994, however, Senate Bill No. 1728 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
9 
(1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1728) repealed former 
section 601.1—thereby removing the express requirement that 
a minor be initially referred to a SARB or a similar truancy 
mediation program—and amended section 601(b) to include a 
third basis of jurisdiction—a minor’s “four or more truancies 
within one school year.”  (Stats. 1994, ch. 1023, §§ 6, 7, p. 6217.) 
 
Without discussing the fact that Senate Bill 1728 repealed 
former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, A.N. 
asks us to read Education Code section 48264.5—a section 
added by Senate Bill 1728—to require initial referral to a SARB 
or a similar truancy mediation program.  (Stats. 1994, ch. 1023, 
§ 4, pp. 6215–2616.)  As mentioned above, section 48264.5’s 
subdivisions provide graduated consequences that may result 
from a pupil’s continued truancy or the pupil’s failure to 
complete assigned programs.  Specifically, A.N. argues that a 
pupil must be referred to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation 
program, as described in section 48264.5, subdivision (c), before 
she comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, as 
described in subdivision (d).  Although A.N. acknowledges that 
subdivision (c) provides that a habitual truant “may” be referred 
to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program, she contends 
that this discretionary language merely “reflect[s] the reality 
that not every county has established a SARB.”  In other words, 
she claims that initial referral to a SARB is still required in any 
county that has established one. 
 
For support, A.N. looks to Senate Bill 1728’s legislative 
history.  Specifically, she points to a bill analysis prepared by 
the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, which commented:  
“Upon the failure of the earlier steps to alleviate the truancy 
problem, the juvenile court may exert jurisdiction over the 
minor pupil. . . .  Court intervention is reserved until after other 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
10 
steps have failed, so as not to overburden already heavy court 
calendars until necessary.”  (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. 
on Sen. Bill No. 1728 (1993–1994 Reg Sess.) as amended June 
30, 1994, p. 3, italics added.)  Likewise, she cites the Legislative 
Counsel’s summary digest, which stated:  “This bill would 
provide that if a pupil who has attended certain programs 
including a school attendance review board program, has a 4th 
truancy in the same school year, the pupil shall be classified as 
an habitual truant, within the jurisdiction of the of the court.”  
(Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1728 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) 
5 Stats. 1994, Summary Dig., p. 417, italics added.)  According 
to A.N., this legislative history “makes clear” that the 
Legislature intended to keep the requirement that a minor be 
referred to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program 
before the juvenile court. 
 
First, we observe that nothing in the current statutory 
scheme expressly requires initial referral to a SARB or a similar 
truancy mediation program.  Section 48264.5’s subdivisions 
refer to actions that “may” be taken in response to a pupil’s 
continued truancy or failure to complete assigned programs.  
Specifically, section 48264.5, subdivision (c) states that a 
habitual truant “may be referred to, and required to attend, an 
attendance review board . . . .”  (Italics added).  We are not 
persuaded by A.N.’s argument that this discretionary language 
merely “reflect[s] the reality that not every county has 
established a SARB,” because the subdivision also provides that 
a habitual truant “may” be  referred to and required to attend “a 
truancy mediation program pursuant to Section 48263 or 
pursuant to Section 601.3 of the Welfare and Institutions Code” 
or, in a school district that does not have such a program, “a 
comparable program deemed acceptable by the school district’s 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
11 
attendance supervisor.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  Similarly, section 
48263, subdivision (a) states that a school district attendance 
supervisor or another designated school official “may” refer a 
habitual truant “to a school attendance review board, or to the 
probation department for services if the probation department 
has elected to receive these referrals.”  (Italics added.)  Because 
Senate Bill 1728 repealed former section 601.1 of the Welfare 
and Institutions Code, which provided that a habitual truant 
“shall” be referred to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation 
program before the juvenile court, and because current 
Education Code sections 48263 and 48264.5 consistently use 
“may” to describe referrals to such programs, we understand the 
discretionary language of the statutory scheme to authorize, but 
not require, school officials to initially refer habitual truants to 
SARBs or similar truancy mediation programs.  (See In re 
Richard E. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 349, 354 [“The ordinary import of 
‘may’ is a grant of discretion.”]) 
 
Second, we note that multiple analyses of Senate Bill 1728 
informed legislators that the bill would repeal the requirement 
that a minor be referred to a SARB or a similar truancy 
mediation program before the juvenile court.  (See, e.g., Assem. 
Com. on Education, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1728 (1993–1994 
Reg. Sess.) as amended June 30, 1994, pp. 1, 2; Sen. 3d reading 
analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1728 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended Aug. 19, 1994, pp. 1, 2; Sen. 3d reading analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 1728 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 26, 1994, 
pp. 1, 2.)  To this end, the Legislative Counsel’s summary digest 
cited by A.N. also stated:  “Under existing law, a juvenile who is 
an habitual truant is required to be referred to a school 
attendance review board or truancy mediation program, before 
referral to the juvenile court. . . . [¶]  This bill would repeal the 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
12 
section on referral to the school attendance review board or 
truancy mediation program . . . .”  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. 
Bill No. 1728 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) 5 Stats. 1994, Summary 
Dig., p. 417.) 
 
Any contradictory statements in Senate Bill 1728’s 
legislative history may be explained by the Legislature’s joint 
passage of Senate Bill 1728 and Assembly Bill No. 2658 (1993–
1994 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 2658).  (Stats. 1994, ch. 1024, 
p. 6218.)  As is relevant here, Senate Bill 1728 contained a single 
provision to repeal former section 601.1 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code (Stats. 1994, ch. 1023, § 7, p. 6217), but 
Assembly Bill 2658 contained alternate provisions:  one that 
would amend former section 601.1, and another that would 
repeal former section 601.1 (Stats. 1994, ch. 1024, §§ 5, 5.5, 
pp. 6222–6223).  Assembly Bill 2658 clarified that if Senate Bill 
1728 was enacted first and Assembly Bill 2658 was enacted 
second, its provision repealing former section 601.1 would take 
effect, and its provision amending former section 601.1 would 
not.5  (Stats. 1994, ch. 1024, § 8, p. 6225.)  Because the 
Legislature passed both bills on the same day, it effectively 
delegated the decision whether to amend or repeal former 
                                        
5  
The Legislature likely included this “double-jointing” 
provision to prevent Assembly Bill 2658’s provision amending 
former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code from 
“chaptering-out” Senate Bill 1728’s provision repealing that 
section in the event that Senate Bill 1728 was enacted first and 
Assembly Bill 2658 was enacted second.  (See In re Thierry 
S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 727, 739–740 (Thierry S.) [explaining the 
Legislature’s “double-jointing” procedure].) 
 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
13 
section 601.1 to the Governor.6  And, by signing Senate Bill 1728 
before Assembly Bill 2658, the Governor elected to repeal 
section 601.1, thereby removing the express requirement that a 
minor be referred to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation 
program before the minor is referred to the juvenile court.7 
 
A.N. and amicus curiae California Rural Legal Assistance 
(CRLA) also contend that referring truants directly to the 
juvenile court undermines the purposes of SARBs and similar 
truancy mediation programs: to address the underlying sources 
of attendance problems primarily through the provision of 
community services and to make juvenile court intervention a 
matter of last resort. 
 
This argument is supported by several sections of the 
current statutory scheme.  In the article of the Education Code 
governing SARBs, the Legislature has declared its intent that 
“intensive guidance and coordinated community services may be 
provided to meet the special needs of pupils with school 
                                        
6  
Handwritten annotations on the Governor’s chaptered bill 
files suggest that the Governor was informed accordingly.  
(Legis. Counsel, letter to Governor Pete Wilson (1993–1994 Reg. 
Sess.) Sept. 21, 1994, Governor’s chaptered bill files, ch. 1023; 
Legis. Counsel, letter to Governor Pete Wilson (1993–1994 Reg. 
Sess.) Sept. 19, 1994, Governor’s chaptered bill files, ch. 1024.) 
7  
Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume the Governor 
signed Senate Bill 1728 before Assembly Bill 2658, because the 
former is chapter 1023, and the latter is chapter 1024 of the 
Statutes of 1994.  (See Gov. Code, § 9510; Thierry S., supra, 19 
Cal.3d at p. 739 & fns. 10, 11 [explaining the rebuttable 
presumption that chapter numbers indicate the order in which 
the Governor signs bills into law].) 
 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
14 
attendance problems or school behavior problems.”8  (§ 48320, 
subd. (a).) To fulfill this intent, the Legislature has established 
a step-by-step process for counties with a SARB or a probation 
department that has elected to receive habitual truant referrals.  
First, section 482639 authorizes school district attendance 
supervisors and other designated school officials to refer 
habitual truants to the SARB or to the probation department.  
(§ 48263, subd. (a); see § 48264.5, subd. (c).)  When issuing such 
referrals, these school officials have a responsibility to provide 
“documentation of the interventions undertaken at the school” 
and “the reason for the referral.”  (§ 48263, subd. (a).)  Then, the 
SARB or the probation officer must determine whether 
available community services can resolve the pupil’s attendance 
problems.  (Id. subd. (b)(1), (b)(2).)  If so, the SARB or the 
probation officer is required to direct the pupil, the pupil’s 
parents or guardians, or both to those services.  (Id. subd. (b)(1).)  
If not, section 48320 authorizes the SARB to:  “(1) Propose and 
promote the use of alternatives to the juvenile court system.  [¶]  
(2) Provide, in any proposed alternative, for maximum 
utilization of community and regional resources appropriately 
employed in behalf of minors prior to any involvement with the 
judicial system.  [¶]  (3) Encourage an understanding that any 
alternative based on the utilization of community resources 
                                        
8  
The bill that originally added this language also added 
former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which 
originally required initial referral to a SARB.  (Stats. 1974, 
ch. 1215, §§ 1, 9, pp. 2624–2625, 2629.) 
9  
The bill that added Education Code section 48263 also 
amended former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code to require initial referral to a SARB, or to a truancy 
mediation program, or to both.  (Stats. 1984, ch. 754, §§ 2, 4, 5, 
pp. 2722–2725.) 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
15 
carries an inherent agency and citizen commitment directed 
toward the continuing improvement of such resources and the 
creation of resources where none exist.”  (§ 48320, subd. (b), 
italics added.)  In either case, if the pupil is ultimately referred 
to the juvenile court, the SARB or the probation officer must 
submit “documentation of efforts to secure attendance as well as 
its recommendations on what action the juvenile court should 
take in order to bring about a proper disposition of the case.”  
(§ 48263, subd. (b)(2).) 
 
Even in counties without a SARB or a probation 
department that receives habitual truant referrals, section 
48264.5, subdivision (c) authorizes school officials to refer 
habitual truants to comparable truancy mediation programs.  
The graduated structure of this section’s subdivisions seems to 
contemplate, at least as a general matter, that habitual truants 
will be brought to the juvenile court only after the truancy 
mediation process has failed.  (See § 48264.5, subds. (c), (d).)  
Collectively, these sections suggest that the Legislature 
intended that habitual truants typically be referred to a SARB 
or a similar truancy mediation program before the juvenile 
court.  (See conc. opn., post, at pp. 2–3.) 
 
As explained above, however, after Senate Bill 1728’s 
repeal of former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code, no section expressly requires initial referral to a SARB or 
a similar truancy mediation program.10  Because Senate Bill 
                                        
10  
Both parties and amicus curiae CRLA also direct our 
attention to Welfare and Institutions Code section 258, 
subdivision (b), which provides:  “If the minor is before the court 
on the basis of truancy . . . [¶]  (1)  The judge, referee, or juvenile 
hearing officer shall not proceed with a hearing unless both of 
 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
16 
1728 also amended section 601(b) of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code to grant the juvenile court jurisdiction over 
minors with “four or more truancies,” the bill may have been 
intended to afford local officials the flexibility to go directly to 
the juvenile court in such cases.  Additionally, because the bill 
granted the juvenile court the authority to direct a habitual 
truant to attend a “court-approved truancy prevention 
program,” the Legislature apparently contemplated that some 
minors would be referred to a truancy mediation program after 
the juvenile court.11  (§ 48264.5, subd. (d)(3).)  In such cases, 
                                        
the following have been provided to the court:  [¶]  (A)  Evidence 
that the minor’s school has undertaken the actions specified in 
subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of Section 48264.5 of the Education 
Code . . . . [¶ ]  (B)  The available record of previous attempts to 
address the minor’s truancy.”  Both parties and CRLA assume 
that this subdivision applies to formal wardship proceedings 
(see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 650) in addition to hearings by the 
informal juvenile and traffic court (see Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§§ 255–258).  Specifically, they believe that this subdivision 
requires a minor to have been referred to a SARB or a similar 
truancy mediation program—and, in A.N.’s view, to have failed 
to successfully complete such a program—before the juvenile 
court may hold a hearing in a formal wardship proceeding on 
the basis of truancy.  As mentioned above, A.N. and her mother 
attended a SARB meeting before the juvenile court held the trial 
in the formal wardship proceeding against A.N.  (See ante, p. 3.)  
Because A.N. does not argue that this subdivision was violated 
in her case, we do not address it here.  (See also ante, p. 1, fn. 1.) 
11  
If the juvenile court adjudges a minor to be a ward of the 
court solely on the basis of habitual truancy, the juvenile court 
may order: 20 to 40 hours of community service, a fine of $50 or 
less, attendance at a truancy prevention program, or suspension 
or revocation of driving privileges (if the minor has previously 
attended a SARB or a truancy mediation program).  (Ed. Code, 
§ 48264.5, subd. (d); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601, subd. (b) 
 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
17 
initial referral to the juvenile court may ultimately result in the 
provision of services to address the underlying sources of the 
pupils’ attendance problems. 
 
For this reason, we hold that the use of a SARB or a 
similar truancy mediation program is not a prerequisite to the 
juvenile court’s jurisdiction in a formal wardship proceeding on 
the basis of a minor having “four or more truancies within one 
school year” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(b).  
We recognize that this conclusion may be in tension with several 
sections of the statutory scheme, and we appreciate A.N. and 
CRLA’s contention that referring habitual truants directly to 
the juvenile court is counterproductive to the goal of improving 
attendance.  (See generally, conc. opn., post, at pp. 3–7.)  But it 
is up to the Legislature to resolve any such tension and to act 
upon such policy arguments, if it deems such action 
appropriate.12 
C.  Jurisdiction on the Basis of “Four or More 
Truancies” 
 
We next turn to A.N.’s claim that Education Code section 
48264.5, subdivision (d) (section 48264.5(d)) requires (1) a fourth 
truancy report to be issued, and (2) that the report be issued to 
the pupil and the pupil’s parents or guardians, before the 
                                        
[minor who is adjudged a ward of the juvenile court solely on the 
basis of habitual truancy shall not be held in a secure facility or 
removed from the custody of his or her parents or guardians 
except for the purposes of school attendance].) 
12  
We are aware that pending legislation would eliminate the 
juvenile court’s jurisdiction over minors on the basis of truancy 
by repealing and replacing Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 601.  (Assem. Bill No. 901 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) §§ 19, 
20, as amended by Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Sept. 6, 2019.) 
 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
18 
juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a minor on the 
basis of the minor having “four or more truancies within one 
school year” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(b). 
 
Again, Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(b) 
provides in relevant part:  “If a minor . . . has four or more 
truancies within one school year as defined in Section 48260 of 
the Education Code . . . , the minor is then within the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge the minor 
to be a ward of the court.”  (Italics added.)  And, as stated above, 
Education Code section 48264.5(d) provides:  “The fourth time a 
truancy is issued within the same school year, the pupil may be 
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court that may adjudge 
the pupil to be a ward of the court pursuant to Section 601 of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code.”  (Italics added.) 
 
Because these subdivisions are in pari materia, we 
construe them together “so that all parts of the statutory scheme 
are given effect.”  (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 
1050, 1090–1091.)  In particular, we note that the same bill 
(Senate Bill 1728) that amended Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 601(b) to provide that a minor with “four or more 
truancies” is “within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court” also 
added Education Code section 48264.5(d), which originally 
provided that “[u]pon the fourth truancy within the same school 
year,” a pupil is “within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”  
(Stats. 1994, ch. 1023, § 4, pp. 6215–2616.)  For this reason, and 
because one section expressly references the other, we believe 
the Legislature intended “four . . . truancies” in Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 601(b) and “fourth truancy” in 
Education Code section 48264.5(d) to refer to the same set of 
circumstances, upon which the minor comes within the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
19 
1.  Four “Truancies” and the “Issuance of a Fourth 
Truancy” 
 
As 
already 
discussed, 
section 
48264.5 
provides 
increasingly serious consequences for a pupil’s continued 
truancy or failure to complete assigned programs.  As is relevant 
here, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of section 48264.5 begin, “The 
[first/second/third] time a truancy report is issued . . . .”  (Italics 
added.)  But the term “report” is missing from section 
48264.5(d), which begins:  “The fourth time a truancy is 
issued . . . .”  (Italics added.) 
 
The Court of Appeal determined that the Legislature 
intentionally omitted “report” from section 48264.5(d), and it 
concluded that a pupil comes within the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court if she is “truant a fourth time (i.e., accrues six or 
more unexcused absences [or tardies]),” even if a fourth truancy 
report has not been issued.  (A.N., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 406.)  Under its reasoning, a “truancy” is the minimum 
number of unexcused absences or tardies needed to require the 
issuance of a truancy report.  Because three unexcused absences 
or tardies are needed to require a first report (§ 48240), and a 
subsequent unexcused absence or tardy is needed to require an 
additional report (§ 48261), six unexcused absences or tardies 
are needed to require a fourth report.  We reach a different 
interpretation. 
 
To begin, we find the phrase “[t]he fourth time a truancy 
is issued” in section 48264.5(d) to be ambiguous.  As used in each 
of section 48264.5’s subdivisions, “issued” is a transitive verb—
one that requires a direct object.  In the first three subdivisions, 
“report” follows naturally as an object of “issued” because it is a 
concrete noun.  In the fourth subdivision, “truancy” follows 
awkwardly because it is an abstract noun, generally defined as 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
20 
“an act or instance of playing truant” or “the state of being 
truant.”  (Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 1993) p. 1267.) 
 
The Court of Appeal may have implicitly read “[t]he fourth 
time a truancy is issued” in section 48264.5(d) to mean “the 
fourth time a truancy report is required to be issued.”  Although 
this construction would solve the subdivision’s grammatical 
problems, it would also mean that the consequences of 
subdivision (d) would be triggered by an unexcused absence or 
tardy, whereas the consequences of subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) 
would be triggered by the issuance of a truancy report.  This 
could lead to the odd result that a pupil could be subject to the 
most serious consequences of the statutory scheme in 
subdivision (d) without being subject to the least serious 
consequences in subdivision (a), in the event that she accrues a 
sixth unexcused absence or tardy before being reported as 
truant. 
 
We believe a better interpretation of section 48264.5(d) is 
“the fourth time a truancy report is issued.”  Specifically, the 
parallel structure of section 48264.5’s subdivisions indicates 
that the Legislature intended subsequent occurrences of the 
same event—the issuance of a truancy report—to trigger the 
increasingly serious consequences of the section.  More 
generally, when section 48264.5 is read in context, it seems that 
the Legislature did not intend unexcused absences or tardies to 
trigger increasingly serious consequences unless they are 
reported in accordance with the statutory scheme.  For example, 
a third unexcused absence or tardy does not lead to any 
consequences unless the pupil is “reported to the attendance 
supervisor or to the superintendent of the school district” as 
required by section 48260.  (See § 48264.5, subd. (a).)  A fourth 
unexcused absence or tardy does not lead to more serious 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
21 
consequences unless the pupil “has once been reported as a 
truant” and is “again . . . reported as a truant” as required by 
section 48261.  (See § 48264.5, subd. (b).)  Likewise, a fifth 
unexcused absence or tardy does not lead to classification as a 
habitual truant and to more serious consequences unless the 
pupil is “again . . . reported as a truant” as required by section 
48261.  (See §§ 48262, 48264.5, subd. (c).)  This suggests that a 
sixth unexcused absence or tardy should not lead to the most 
serious consequences of the statutory scheme unless the pupil is 
“again . . . reported as a truant” as required by section 48261.  
(See § 48264.5, subd. (d).) 
 
Even if the Legislature intentionally omitted the term 
“report” from subdivision (d), we do not believe it intended the 
omission to have substantive significance.  When the 
Legislature added section 48264.5 in 1994, the section’s 
subdivisions began:  “Upon the [first/second/third/fourth] 
truancy . . . .”  (Stats. 1994, ch. 1023, § 4, p. 6215).  Thus, the 
subdivisions originally shared identical language and meaning; 
successive “truanc[ies]” triggered the increasingly serious 
consequences of each subdivision.  In 2001, the Legislature 
amended the section such that subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) 
began, “The [first/second/third] time a truancy report is 
required . . . ,” and subdivision (d) began, “The fourth time a 
truancy is required to be reported . . . .”  (Stats. 2001, ch. 734, 
§ 29, pp. 5786–5787.)  At this time, the introductory language of 
subdivision (d) was slightly different from that of the other 
subdivisions, but its meaning was the same; successive 
truancies continued to trigger the increasingly serious 
consequences of each subdivision because successive truancies 
required successive reports under section 48261.  In 2012, the 
Legislature again amended the section such that subdivisions 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
22 
(a), (b), and (c) now begin, “The [first/second/third] time a 
truancy report is issued . . . ,” and subdivision (d) now begins, 
“The fourth time a truancy is issued . . . .”  (Stats. 2012, ch. 432, 
§ 2.)  With the 2012 amendment, the Legislature substituted 
“issued” for “required” in subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) and for 
“required to be reported” in subdivision (d).  The apparent 
purpose of this amendment was to clarify that successive 
truancies must be reported in order to trigger the increasingly 
serious consequences of each subdivision.  Nothing in the 
legislative history suggests that the Legislature intended the 
language in subdivision (d) to have different meaning than the 
language of the other subdivisions. 
 
For these reasons, we interpret “[t]he fourth time a 
truancy is issued” in section 48264.5(d) to mean “the fourth time 
a truancy report is issued.”  Accordingly, we read “four or more 
truancies” in Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(b) to 
refer to four or more acts of being truant that have been reported 
in accordance with the statutory scheme. 
2.  Recipient of Truancy Reports 
 
Next, we must determine the appropriate recipient of the 
truancy reports referenced in section 48264.5.  A.N. contends 
that each of the section’s subdivisions requires a report be sent 
to the pupil’s parents or guardians before the juvenile court may 
exercise jurisdiction.  In response, the Attorney General argues 
that the subdivisions reference the internal reports that must 
be sent to the attendance supervisor or the superintendent of 
the school district under sections 48260 and 48261.  He observes, 
“[A.N.]’s argument may rest on a misapprehension that the 
‘truancy reports’ in section 48264.5 are parental notifications 
[required by section 48260.5].” 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
23 
 
As referenced above, section 48260, subdivision (a) 
requires a pupil to “be reported to the attendance supervisor or 
to the superintendent of the school district” upon his or her third 
unexcused absence or tardy.  (Italics added.)  Likewise, section 
48261 requires a pupil previously “reported as a truant” to 
“again be reported as a truant to the attendance supervisor or 
the superintendent of the district” if he or she is again absent or 
tardy without excuse.  (Italics added.)  Moreover, section 48262 
provides that a pupil who “has been reported as a truant three 
or more times per school year” is a habitual truant, provided 
that a school official has made “a conscientious effort to hold at 
least one conference with a parent or guardian of the pupil and 
the pupil himself, after the filing of either of the reports required 
by Section 48260 or Section 48261.”  (Italics added.)  Meanwhile, 
section 48260.5, requires the school district to “notify the pupil’s 
parent or guardian” upon the pupil’s “initial classification as a 
truant.”  (Italics added.) 
 
The Attorney General has the better interpretation.  
Section 48264.5’s references to “truancy report[s]” must be 
interpreted in light of the entire statutory scheme.  “[W]hen the 
same word appears in different places within a statutory 
scheme, courts generally presume the Legislature intended the 
word to have the same meaning each time it is used.”  (People v. 
Gray (2014) 58 Cal.4th 901, 906.)  Accordingly, we presume the 
Legislature used “report” in section 48264.5 as a cross reference 
to “reports” in section 48262 and “reported” in sections 48260 
and 48261, not to “notify” in section 48260.5.  Additionally, we 
note that section 48260.5 requires a parental notification only 
upon the pupil’s initial classification as a truant, whereas 
sections 48260 and 48261 require reports to be issued to the 
attendance supervisor or the superintendent upon the pupil’s 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
24 
initial classification as a truant and upon every subsequent 
unexcused absence or tardy.  Therefore, the “first time,” “second 
time,” and “third time” a “truancy report is issued” in 
subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of section 48264.5 more likely refer 
to the reports required by sections 48260 and 48261.  This 
interpretation ensures that school officials are informed of a 
pupil’s continued truancy and thus can take appropriate steps 
to address the situation, such as requesting the pupil and the 
pupil’s parent or guardian attend a meeting (§ 48264.5, 
subd. (a)), assigning the pupil to an afterschool or weekend 
study program (id., subd. (b)), requiring the pupil to attend a 
SARB meeting or a similar truancy mediation program (id., 
subd. (c); see §§ 48260.6, subd. (a); 48263, subd. (a)), or issuing 
a notice to appear in juvenile court (§ 48264,5, subd. (d); see 
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601, subd. (d)). 
 
A.N. and CRLA argue that this construction would violate 
the due process rights of pupils and their parents and guardians.  
Assuming A.N. did not forfeit this argument by failing to raise 
it in her opening brief, we reject it on the merits.  Although 
section 48264.5 does not require external reports be sent to the 
pupil’s home, government officials must comply with basic due 
process requirements, including the statutory provisions meant 
to ensure the pupil and his or her parents or guardians receive 
adequate notice of the pupil’s truancy and the potential 
consequences.  For example, section 51101, subdivision (a)(4) 
requires the pupil’s parent or guardian “[t]o be notified on a 
timely basis if their child is absent from school without 
permission.”  As previously explained, section 48260.5 requires 
the school district to notify the pupil’s parent or guardian upon 
the pupil’s “initial classification as a truant.”  Additionally, 
section 48262 provides that “no pupil shall be deemed an 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
25 
habitual truant unless an appropriate district officer or 
employee has made a conscientious effort to hold at least one 
conference with a parent or guardian of the pupil and the pupil 
himself, after the filing of either of the reports required by 
Section 48260 or Section 48261.”13 
 
Therefore, we hold that a fourth truancy report must be 
issued to the attendance supervisor or the superintendent of the 
school district before the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction 
over a minor on the basis of the minor’s “four or more truancies 
within one school year” under Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 601(b). 
D.  The District Attorney’s Petition Against A.N. 
 
Finally, we consider whether the juvenile court had 
jurisdiction over A.N. 
 
The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court had 
jurisdiction on the basis of A.N.’s “four or more truancies within 
one school year” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 
601(b), but the court did not consider whether a fourth truancy 
report had been issued to the attendance supervisor or the 
superintendent of the school district.  (A.N., supra, 11 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 406–407.)  Before this court, the Attorney 
General argues that a fourth truancy report had been issued.  
                                        
13  
As 
referenced 
above, 
section 
48262 
defines 
a 
“conscientious effort” as “attempting to communicate with the 
parents of the pupil at least once using the most cost-effective 
method possible, which may include electronic mail or a 
telephone call.”  (See ante, p. 3, fn. 4.)  We do not address 
whether the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a 
minor when a school official has made a conscientious effort to 
communicate with the minor’s parents or guardians but has 
been unable to actually communicate with them.  (See ibid.) 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
26 
A.N. does not argue otherwise, and the record supports the 
Attorney General’s argument.  Specifically, A.N.’s attendance 
supervisor testified that a computerized system automatically 
sends a report to the school district whenever a teacher records 
a student as absent from or tardy to class and that the same 
system generates student attendance profiles that provide 
attendance supervisors with a list of each student’s recorded 
unexcused absences and tardies.  A.N.’s student attendance 
profile lists dozens of recorded unexcused absences or tardies 
prior to the filing of the wardship petition.  Consequently, the 
juvenile court had jurisdiction over A.N. on the basis of A.N.’s 
four or more acts of being truant that were reported in 
accordance with the statutory scheme. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeal declared that A.N. “refused to go to 
school” and “demonstrated [an] unwavering commitment to 
avoiding an education.”  (A.N., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 405.)  
But the record suggests that A.N.’s attendance problems arose 
out of difficult circumstances at home and in her personal life.  
Both parties and amicus curiae CRLA agree that students often 
fall into truancy for reasons beyond their control.  (See conc. 
opn., post, at p. 4.)  The Court of Appeal also opined that school 
officials “did everything they could and should do to educate—
not abandon—A.N.”  (A.N., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 406.)  
But a SARB meeting was not held until A.N. had accumulated 
dozens of unexcused absences or tardies, and there is no 
evidence that any services were provided to her or her parents.  
When a habitual truant is adjudged a ward of the juvenile court 
but is never offered any services to address the underlying 
causes of his or her attendance problems, we question whether 
the statutory scheme functions as the Legislature expected. 
In re A.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
 
27 
That being said, we agree that the juvenile court possessed 
jurisdiction over A.N.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal.  
CHIN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
1 
In Re A.N.  
S242494 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
I agree with today’s opinion that Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 601, subdivision (b) (section 601(b)) authorizes 
juvenile court jurisdiction upon a minor’s fourth truancy, even 
if the minor has not received services through a school 
attendance review board (SARB) or similar truancy mediation 
program.  I write separately to highlight the tension between 
section 601(b)’s grant of jurisdiction and the rehabilitative and 
diversionary purpose of the Education Code’s SARB provisions.  
(See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13–17.)  Those provisions signal the 
Legislature’s recognition that school attendance problems are 
often traceable to family instability, poverty, homelessness, 
transportation issues, safety concerns, trauma, mental health 
challenges, or learning disabilities, and that appropriate 
guidance and assistance to students and their families can 
ameliorate such problems.  By contrast, as studies have shown, 
a wardship petition in juvenile court may put students on a 
different path — one that significantly increases their likelihood 
of dropping out of school and entering the criminal justice 
system.  Given its potentially profound consequences, it is 
widely believed that juvenile court involvement should be “a 
matter of last resort.”  (Id. at p. 13.)  The jurisdictional statute 
at issue in this case is a funnel into what many call the school-
to-prison pipeline.  In light of today’s decision, the Legislature 
In re A.N. 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
 
2 
may wish to revisit what services or interventions are required 
before a student can be put onto this unpromising path. 
Education Code section 48320, subdivision (a) provides 
that in establishing SARBs and defining their broad authority, 
“it is the intent of the Legislature that intensive guidance and 
coordinated community services may be provided to meet the 
special needs of pupils with school attendance problems or 
school behavior problems.”  “Composed of representatives from 
various youth-serving agencies, SARBs help truant or 
recalcitrant students and their parents or guardians solve 
school attendance and behavior problems through the use of 
available school and community resources.”  (SARB Handbook: 
A Road Map for Improved School Attendance and Behavior 
(2018) p. 11 (SARB Handbook); see Ed. Code, § 48321, subds. 
(a)(2) & (b)(1).)  According to the State SARB, “the Legislature 
enacted . . . [s]ection 48320 to enhance the enforcement of 
compulsory education laws and to divert students with school 
attendance or behavior problems from the juvenile justice 
system until all available resources have been exhausted.”  
(SARB Handbook, p. 10; see Ed. Code, § 48325.) 
Other provisions of the Education Code also evince the 
Legislature’s intent that “minors typically be referred to a SARB 
or a similar truancy mediation program before the juvenile 
court.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.)  Education Code section 
48264.5 establishes a step-by-step process for addressing “the 
root causes” of school attendance problems (Ed. Code, § 48264.5, 
subd. (a)) and for utilizing SARBs or a similar truancy 
mediation program to improve attendance (id., subd. (c)) in a 
manner consistent with the due process rights of students and 
their parents.  To initiate the SARB process, the “school district 
supervisor of attendance” or another designated school official 
In re A.N. 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
 
3 
must first refer the minor to the SARB.  (Id., § 48263, subd. (a).)  
Upon referral, the SARB then “determines [whether] available 
community services can resolve the problem of the truant or 
insubordinate pupil.”  (Id., subd. (b)(1).)  Education Code section 
48320, subdivision (b) directs SARBs to:  “(1) Propose and 
promote the use of alternatives to the juvenile court system.  
[¶] (2) Provide, in any proposed alternative, for maximum 
utilization of community and regional resources appropriately 
employed in behalf of minors prior to any involvement with the 
judicial system.  [¶] (3) Encourage an understanding that any 
alternative based on the utilization of community resources 
carries an inherent agency and citizen commitment directed 
toward the continuing improvement of such resources and the 
creation of resources where none exist.”  (See also id., § 32261, 
subd. (b) [“the establishment of an interagency coordination 
system is the most efficient and long-lasting means of resolving 
school and community problems of truancy and crime”].)  If the 
SARB concludes that “available community services cannot 
resolve the problem” or if “the pupil or the parents or guardians 
of the pupil, or both, have failed to respond to [SARB] 
directives,” the SARB may refer the minor to juvenile court.  
(Id., § 48263, subd. (b)(2).)  These statutes envision 
individualized 
guidance 
and 
community-based 
services 
coordinated through SARBs or a similar mechanism as 
preferred alternatives to juvenile court intervention. 
The desirability of such alternatives is supported by 
empirical studies.  (See, e.g., Petrosino et al., Formal System 
Processing of Juveniles: Effects on Delinquency: A Systematic 
Review (2010) Campbell Systematic Reviews, at p. 36 [reviewing 
29 controlled trials and finding that juvenile court intervention 
increases the severity and frequency of subsequent delinquency, 
In re A.N. 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
 
4 
especially compared to diversionary alternatives]; Petitclerc et 
al., Effects of Juvenile Court Exposure on Crime in Young 
Adulthood (2013) 54 J. Child Psych. & Psychiatry 291, 294 
[identifying increased criminality into early adulthood among 
minors exposed to the juvenile court system, after controlling for 
covariates].)  It is also supported by the experiences of juvenile 
court judges and other judicial branch officers.  (See Coalition 
for Juvenile Justice, Positive Power: Exercising Judicial 
Leadership to Prevent Court Involvement and Incarceration of 
Non-Delinquent Youth (2012) pp. 6–7 [reporting judicial 
perspective that “bringing youth petitioned as truants before 
[the] court failed to improve their academic performance or 
attendance” and that “school-based and family-based responses 
to high-need youth” resulted in better outcomes]; id. at pp. 5–14 
[collecting similar perspectives from juvenile court judges].) 
A 2012 Judicial Council of California report noted that 
“[t]ruant children and children with school behavior problems 
tend to come from poor minority families that may be 
experiencing 
unemployment, 
hunger, 
housing 
issues, 
transportation issues, family dissolution or dysfunction, 
domestic violence, or community safety issues.  Children may 
also have learning disabilities or other issues that impact their 
ability to attend school. . . .  As such, truancy and school behavior 
interventions should involve addressing child and family issues 
holistically . . . .  Interventions should be supportive and involve 
the least punitive responses available, while at the same time 
reinforcing student and parent accountability . . . .  They should 
also focus on re-engaging the student in school, including 
attention to both attendance and academic problems.”  (Judicial 
Council of Cal., Truancy and School Discipline: An Overview of 
the Literature and Statistics (2012) p. 11, citations omitted.) 
In re A.N. 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
 
5 
Since 2014, the Judicial Council’s Keeping Kids in School 
and Out of Court (KKIS) Initiative has worked to “change[] 
attitudes regarding school discipline in California” by promoting 
diversionary alternatives to the justice system.  (Judicial 
Council of California, Summit Caps Five-Year Effort to Keep 
Kids in School and Out of Court (2020)  [as of May 4, 2020]; all 
Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket 
number, 
and 
case 
name 
at 
.)  The KKIS Initiative has collected research 
suggesting the greater efficacy of community-based services 
than juvenile court intervention in addressing the causes of 
truancy and in improving school attendance and outcomes.  
(Judicial Council of Cal., Keeping Kids in School and Out of 
Court Initiative (2020)  
[as of May 4, 2020].)  The initiative has also promoted a range 
of alternatives, including informal youth courts, community 
collaborations, and SARBs, that are designed to prevent 
students from entering the school-to-prison pipeline.  (Ibid.) 
Before 1994, “former section 601.1 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code mandated initial referral to a SARB or a 
similar truancy mediation program, and section 601(b) formerly 
provided only two bases of juvenile court jurisdiction—both of 
which contemplated the prior use of a SARB or a similar truancy 
mediation program.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)  In that context, 
we explained that “[t]he Education Code establishes a 
comprehensive mechanism for dealing with truants ranging 
from resort to various community programs, to special 
mediation programs.  [Citations.]  Truants are not, except in 
aggravated circumstances involving ‘habitual’ offenders, subject 
to the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts.”  (In re James D. (1987) 
In re A.N. 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
 
6 
43 Cal.3d 903, 910.)  Six unexcused absences, comprising four 
truancies, did not constitute “aggravated circumstances” at that 
time.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 8–9.)  We observed that “[t]he 
Legislature’s move towards utilizing the school attendance 
review boards as a condition precedent to the juvenile court’s 
intervention is understandable and in keeping with legal 
commentary calling for greater participation of school and social 
welfare professionals, even to the exclusion of the juvenile 
court’s jurisdiction.”  (In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 
290.) 
As today’s opinion explains, the Legislature in 1994 
repealed former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code and amended section 601(b) to authorize juvenile court 
jurisdiction after six unexcused absences.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 8–9.)  Even so, the 1994 legislation encouraged SARB 
intervention before juvenile court jurisdiction.  According to its 
summary digest, the bill “provide[d] that if a pupil who has 
attended certain programs including a school attendance review 
board program, has a 4th truancy in the same school year, the 
pupil shall be classified as an habitual truant, within the 
jurisdiction of the court, and may be adjudged a ward of the 
court.”  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1728 (1993-1994 
Reg. Sess.) 5 Stats. 1994, Summary Dig., p. 417, italics added.) 
In cases like A.N.’s, the diversionary purpose of SARBs 
appears compromised by section 601(b)’s grant of jurisdiction to 
the juvenile court before the student has had an opportunity to 
benefit from SARB services.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 26 [“we 
question whether the statutory scheme functions as the 
Legislature expected”].)  The record here indicates that at least 
some of A.N.’s school attendance difficulties arose from 
challenging circumstances beyond her control.  Less than a year 
In re A.N. 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
 
7 
before her multiple ninth grade absences, a school counselor 
reported that A.N. was “feeling very troubled” because her 
nephew Daniel, whom she cared for regularly, was taken away 
from her family by Child Protective Services.  This event, the 
counselor wrote, led A.N. to “engag[e] in self-mutilation.”  Yet 
before the school district referred A.N. to a SARB that could 
offer her services to identify and ameliorate these difficulties, 
the District Attorney filed a wardship petition against her.   
The broad prosecutorial discretion arising under section 
601(b) extends to an enormous number of students.  In the 
2018–2019 school year, at least 650,000 students in California 
public schools — nearly one-eighth of our schoolchildren — were 
chronically absent, meaning they were absent at least 10 
percent of the school year, which is three times the number of 
absences necessary to be classified as an habitual truant.  
(Keeping Kids in School and Out of Court Initiative, About 
Chronic 
Absenteeism 
and 
School 
Discipline 
(2019) 
 [as of May 4, 2020].)  
The highest rates of chronic absenteeism were observed among 
African American, American Indian, and Latino students.  
(Ibid.) 
Not all counties have pursued truancy prosecutions as 
aggressively as Ventura County, where the petition against A.N. 
was filed.  According to Ventura County’s 2015–2016 annual 
SARB report, the District Attorney cited 869 students and 482 
parents for truancy that school year.  (Ventura County Off. of 
Education, Ventura County School Attendance Review Board 
Data Summary 2015-2016 (2016).)  Amicus curiae California 
Rural Legal Assistance notes that Ventura County children and 
their parents were criminally charged at “much higher rates 
than students and parents in other counties.”  (See Pen. Code, 
In re A.N. 
Liu, J., concurring 
 
 
8 
§ 270.1 [authorizing criminal prosecution of parents and 
guardians for their child’s truancy]; Ed. Code, § 48293 
[authorizing civil penalties ranging from $100 to $1000].)  By 
contrast, Los Angeles County, which serves 10 times as many 
students, reported only 43 referrals to juvenile court during that 
same period.  (Los Angeles County Off. of Education, Annual 
School Attendance Review Board (SARB) Report 2015-2016: 
Final Report (2016).)  In light of such stark disparities, the 
Legislature may wish to reconsider the breadth of jurisdiction 
conferred by section 601(b).  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 17, fn. 12 
[citing pending legislation that would eliminate juvenile court 
jurisdiction on the basis of four or more truancies].) 
In sum, although the language of section 601(b) compels 
today’s holding, the statute is in substantial tension with the 
Legislature’s evident purpose in the Education Code to 
encourage 
diversionary 
alternatives 
to 
juvenile 
court 
intervention.  This tension warrants renewed legislative 
consideration. 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re A.N. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 11 Cal.App.5th 403 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S242494 
Date Filed:  May 4, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Ventura 
Judge:  William R. Redmond 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Stephen P. Lipson and Todd W. Howeth, Public Defenders, Michael C. McMahon, Chief Deputy Public 
Defender, and William Quest, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Franchesca S. Verdin, Monica De La Hoya and Cynthia L. Rice for California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., 
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Janill L. Richards, Deputy State Solicitor General, 
Christina Bull Arndt, Scott A. Taryle and Tannaz Kouhpainezhad, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
William Quest 
Senior Deputy Public Defender 
800 S. Victoria Ave., 2nd Floor 
Ventura, CA 93009 
(850) 654-3032 
 
Christina Bull Arndt 
Supervising Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring St., Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6383