Case Title: McNally v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 183, 2008

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-09-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
*Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. Art. IV § 12. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
TROY McNALLY, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 183, 2008 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. No. IK07-01-0935 thru 0950 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and IK07-02-0429 thru 0435 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  May 21, 2009 
Decided:  August 18, 2009 
Amended:  September 28, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, Justices and 
NICHOLAS, Judge* constituting the court en banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Kevin M. Howard, Young, Malmberg & Howard, P.A., Dover, Delaware for 
appellant. 
 
 
John Williams, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Troy McNally appeals his conviction in the Superior Court of Reckless 
Endangering First degree (4 counts), Possession of a Firearm During the 
Commission of a Felony (4 counts), and Criminal Mischief (1 count).  McNally 
challenges the trial judge’s jury instruction on reasonable doubt; the trial judge’s 
decision to permit the State’s ballistic expert to testify alleging that so doing 
violated McNally’s right to confrontation and D.R.E. 702; and the trial judge’s 
exercise of discretion by admitting gunshot residue (GSR) evidence when a chain 
of custody witness did not testify.  Because the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion or commit plain error, we AFFIRM. 
FACTS 
 
On the night of January 6, 2007, someone shot four .45 caliber bullets in the 
direction of 82 Strawberry Drive, Magnolia, Delaware.  Stacey Smith was visiting 
her mother at 102 Strawberry Drive, the house next door.  Smith and McNally 
dated in the past, and they have two children together.  One bullet struck Smith’s 
car.  The other three bullets struck the house at 82 Strawberry Drive.  Four people 
were inside 82 Strawberry Drive that night.  From 102 Strawberry Drive, Smith 
and her mother heard a loud noise.  They went outside and found a bullet hole in 
the left front fender of Smith’s car.  In a 911 telephone call, Smith identified 
McNally as the shooter and claimed that he tried to run her off the road earlier that 
 
3 
day.1  No one at the scene saw the shooter or the shooter’s vehicle, although many 
people heard loud noises that sounded like firecrackers or gunshots.  McNally 
denied being in the area of the shooting, or possessing or firing a gun.  The police 
did not recover a firearm. 
The police identified McNally as a suspect based on his relationship with 
Smith and the alleged driving encounter earlier on the evening of the shooting.  
Police found four .45 caliber shell casings on the street in front of 82 Strawberry 
Drive.  They also found three .45 caliber shell casings in McNally’s aunt’s SUV, 
which McNally drove the night of the shooting.2  Police found GSR residue in that 
SUV and on McNally’s hands.  The State’s ballistics expert, Carl Rone, 
determined that the shell casings found in the SUV and the street came from the 
same gun.  Another expert, Elana Foster, testified that the evidence found on 
McNally’s hands and in his aunt’s SUV was gunshot residue.  Foster testified that 
GSR on McNally’s hands indicates that he either fired a gun, was near a gun when 
it was fired, or came into contact with a person or object that had GSR on it. 
                                                 
1  
While they were both driving, McNally allegedly motioned for Smith to pull over.  She 
kept driving. 
 
2  
His aunt gave the police permission to search her vehicle. 
 
 
4 
 
ANALYSIS 
I. 
The Trial Judge Properly Instructed the Jury on the Issue of 
Reasonable Doubt. 
 
 
McNally contends that the trial judge erred in his reasonable doubt jury 
instruction.  He argues that the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury that it 
must be firmly convinced of McNally’s innocence before acquitting him.  Because 
McNally did not object timely to the jury instructions, we review the trial judge’s 
instruction for plain error.3  An error is plain when it affects the defendant’s 
substantial rights, and thus, affected the outcome of the trial.4  Though the 
instruction included superfluous language, the trial judge did not commit plain 
error by instructing the jury as he did. 
 
Jury instructions are not grounds for reversal if they are “reasonably 
informative and not misleading.”5  Some inaccuracies in jury instructions are 
permissible.6  A jury instruction is grounds for reversal only where the “deficiency 
                                                 
3  
Del. Sup. Ct. R. 8; Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 
4  
Brown, 897 A.2d at 753 (internal citation omitted). 
 
5  
Floray v. State, 720 A.2d 1132, 1137 (Del. 1998) (internal citation omitted). 
 
6  
Id. at 1138. 
 
 
5 
undermined the ability of the jury ‘to intelligently perform its duty in returning a 
verdict.’”7  All jury instructions are reviewed as a whole.8 
 
In this case, the trial judge instructed the jury in part: 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly 
convinced of the defendant’s guilt.  Therefore, if, based upon your 
conscientious consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced 
that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you should find the 
defendant guilty. 
 
If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility or, in 
other words, a reasonable doubt that the defendant is not guilty, you 
must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt by finding the 
defendant not guilty. 
 
 
McNally believes that the second paragraph of this instruction erroneously 
instructs the jury that he can only be acquitted if the jury has a reasonable doubt 
that he is not guilty, i.e. if the jury is firmly convinced that he is not guilty.  While 
McNally is correct that a jury need not be firmly convinced that defendants are not 
guilty before acquitting them;9 the jury instruction does not explicitly require 
McNally’s interpretation. 
                                                 
7  
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 
8  
Id. 
 
9  
Mills v. State, 732 A.2d 845, 849-50 (Del. 1999) (the State must prove each element of 
the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 
 
6 
 
In Mills v. State, we upheld the exact instructions at issue here.10  McNally 
concedes that the phrase “reasonable doubt that the defendant is not guilty” is 
permissible because of our holding in Mills v. State.11  He contends, however, that 
the instruction can be fairly read to require the jury to be “firmly convinced” that 
McNally did not commit the acts charged in order to acquit him.  He claims that 
the instruction creates a higher threshold for acquittal than is constitutionally 
permissible.12 
 
McNally misreads the instruction.  The instruction requires a jury to be 
firmly convinced of proof beyond a reasonable doubt before convicting him, not be 
firmly convinced of innocence before acquitting him.  Thus, in order to convict 
McNally the jury must be firmly convinced of each element of the crimes as 
charged.  Although we do not find plain error in the jury instruction, we urge the 
Superior Court to reconsider using the expression “ . . ., you think there is a real 
possibility or, in other words, a reasonable doubt that the defendant is not guilty” 
from their pattern instructions, to prevent any potential confusion.  The resulting 
                                                 
10  
Id. at 852 (the sole difference in Mills is that the instruction is in one paragraph as 
opposed to the two paragraphs of this instruction). 
 
11  
Id. at 853 (the jury instruction read as a whole did not violate the defendant’s Due 
Process rights). 
 
12  
Id. at 852 (the definition of reasonable doubt may not impose a higher degree of doubt 
than the Due Process clause requires for acquittal). 
 
 
7 
language could be simply phrased “ . . . if you have a reasonable doubt about the 
defendant’s guilt, . . . .” 
II. 
The Trial Judge Properly Admitted the State’s Expert Testimony. 
 
McNally argues that the State’s ballistics expert did not provide a proper 
foundation for his testimony or explain how he derived his expert opinion.  By 
admitting this expert’s testimony, McNally contends the trial judge violated D.R.E. 
702 and McNally’s constitutional right to confront witnesses against him.  Because 
McNally did not object to the expert’s trial testimony, we review the trial judge’s 
admission of the expert testimony for plain error.13 
 
A trial judge exercises discretion when deciding to admit expert 
testimony.14  The trial judge is the gatekeeper for expert testimony and must assess 
whether the evidence is reliable and relevant.15  “A witness may testify as an expert 
when qualified as an expert and the trial judge determines that the witness has 
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge that will assist the finder of fact 
in understanding evidence or in determining a fact at issue.”16  “Even though an 
                                                 
13  
Del. Sup. Ct. R. 8; Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006); Martin v. State, 1998 
WL 985994, at *1 (Del.) (alleged constitutional violations are reviewed for plain error when not 
objected to at trial). 
 
14  
M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 522 (Del. 1999). 
 
15  
Goodridge v. Hyster Co., 845 A.2d 498, 503 (Del. 2004); Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 
74 (Del. 1993). 
 
16  
Goodridge, 845 A.2d at 503. 
 
8 
expert may be qualified to opine within a recognized ‘field,’ that fact alone does 
not automatically guarantee reliable, and therefore admissible, testimony.”17  “It is 
critical that a trial judge be satisfied that any generalized conclusions are 
applicable to the particular facts of the case.”18  Although preferable, a testifying 
expert does not need to recall each detail of how he applied his generalized 
conclusions to the particular facts of the case.19 
 
The State introduced Delaware State Police forensic firearms examiner, 
Carl Rone, to testify that all seven casings were shot from the same .45 caliber gun.  
The State proffered Rone as an expert based on his training and 20 years of 
experience in the ballistics field.  Rone testified that he worked in the Delaware 
State Police Forensic Firearms Services Unit and personally examined the seven 
shell casings.  Rone also testified about his relevant associations and publications.  
The trial judge permitted Rone to testify as a ballistics expert.  The trial judge did 
not make an express finding on, and McNally did not object to, Rone’s 
qualifications to testify. 
 
McNally takes issue with Rone’s comment that the casings had “similar 
markings” without explaining how he came to that conclusion or what that 
                                                 
17  
Id. 
 
18  
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 
19  
Delaware v. Fenesterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1985), rev’ing Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 
959 (Del. 1985). 
 
 
9 
conclusion means to this case.  Rone’s opinion was crucial because it linked the 
shell casings at the scene of the crime with the shell casings in McNally’s aunt’s 
SUV.  Rone explained that, during testing, he looked at the casings 
microscopically at various points on the casings to compare the markings.  He 
testified that he was 100% certain that the casings came from the same weapon.  
On cross examination, he could not remember which markings on the casings were 
compared in this case or how those markings were unique to the particular gun. 
 
The State claims that any lack of recall goes to the expert’s testimony’s 
weight and not its admissibility.  The State argues that McNally could have 
explored the foundation of Rone’s opinion through cross examination.  McNally 
did ask Rone questions about the locations of the markings and the types of 
markings on cross examination.  Rone answered those questions in terms of how 
he typically handles ballistics, because he could not remember the specifics of this 
case.  McNally’s cross examination exposed credibility issues with Rone’s 
opinion. 
 
A. 
D.R.E. 702 
 
McNally does not contest Rone’s qualifications.  Instead he argues that 
Rone neither divulged the facts upon which he relied nor applied his principles 
reliably to the facts of the case.  To admit an expert’s testimony, the trial judge 
must comply with D.R.E. 702, which states: 
 
10 
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, 
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, 
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to 
the facts of the case.20 
 
D.R.E. 702 requires the proffered testimony to provide relevant and reliable 
principles and methodology.21  This rule does not require that the conclusions 
derived from those principles and methods be scientifically valid.22  When the 
expert’s application of his principles and methodology to the facts is challenged, 
the trial judge must determine that the expert “has a reliable basis in the knowledge 
and experience of [the relevant] discipline.”23   
 
Rone explained the principles and methods that he uses when testing 
casings for identifiable markings.  He explained that when he tested the casings in 
this case he found “similar markings” that led him to conclude that the casings 
came from the same gun.  Obviously it would have been more persuasive if Rone 
could recall how he arrived at his conclusion that the markings were similar, but 
                                                 
20  
D.R.E. 702. 
 
21  
Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 74 (Del. 1993). 
 
22  
Id. at n.6 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 
(1993)). 
 
23  
M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 523 (Del. 1999) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 
 
11 
we require the principles and methods—not the conclusions to be scientifically 
valid.24  Thus, we cannot find plain error because Rone did explain his principles 
and methodology and applied those principles and methods to the facts.  McNally 
was able to cross examine Rone on those principles and his methodology.  
McNally was also able to expose Rone’s lack of recollection about the application 
of the methodology to the facts here. 
 
B. 
Right to Confrontation 
 
McNally is entitled to an opportunity to effectively confront witnesses 
against him.  He is not entitled to helpful or effective confrontation.25  Satisfying 
his right to confrontation, McNally had a “full and fair opportunity to probe and 
expose [the testimony’s] infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to 
the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’ 
testimony.”26  Rone’s inability to recall the basis of his opinion went to the weight, 
not the admissibility, of his testimony.27  It was for the jury to assess Rone’s 
credibility.28 
                                                 
24  
Nelson, 628 A.2d at 74 n.6 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593). 
 
25  
Delaware v. Fenesterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985), rev’ing Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 959 
(Del. 1985). 
 
26  
Id. at 22. 
 
27  
Id. 
 
28  
Id. at 19. 
 
12 
 
Because McNally had the opportunity to cross examine Rone we must find 
that the trial judge did not commit plain error by admitting Rone’s testimony. 
III. 
The Trial Judge Properly Admitted the GSR Evidence Because the 
State Established the Chain of Custody. 
 
 
We review a trial judge’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.29  We 
review whether there is a reasonable probability that the evidence offered is what 
its proponent claims it to be.30  Thus, if there is no issue of adulteration or 
tampering, we review the trial judge’s ruling for abuse of discretion.31  Absent an 
abuse of discretion, breaks in the chain of custody go to the weight rather than the 
admissibility of the evidence.32  McNally objected to the GSR evidence because he 
contends that the State did not create a proper chain of custody. 
 
Detective Donald Christie, Jr. took GSR samples from McNally’s hands at 
1:45 AM on January 7, 2007 and took GSR samples from McNally’s aunt’s SUV 
on January 8, 2007.  The police mailed the samples to R.J. Lee Group, a private 
Pennsylvania laboratory, for analysis.  At R.J. Lee Group, employee Michelle 
Barry removed the eight vials of samples from the storage locker and placed them 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
29  
Manna v. State, 945 A.2d 1149, 1153 (Del. 2008). 
 
30  
Word v. State, 2001 WL 762854, at *3 (Del.). 
 
31  
Id. 
 
32  
Id. 
 
 
13 
on the Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) stage for overnight analysis.  Elana 
Foster, the manager of the Forensic Science Department at R.J. Lee Group, had 
previously trained Barry to place the testing items in numerical order on the SEM 
for microscopic analysis.  The SEM process is automatic once it is turned on.  
Once testing begins, any tampering with the SEM can be detected. 
 
At the end of the SEM process, the machine prints out microimages of the 
particles found.  To verify the machine’s conclusion, Foster and Dave Freehling 
each analyzed the evidence separately to verify the existence of gunshot particles 
such as lead and barium. 
 
At trial, Foster testified about the SEM process, including Barry’s part, in 
which Barry placed the vials on the machine and turned the machine on.  She 
testified that she trained Barry.  Finally, Foster testified that there was no reason to 
believe that standard operating procedure was not followed. 
 
McNally objected to Foster’s assumption that Barry properly placed the 
samples on the machine.  McNally notified the trial judge of a pretrial letter he sent 
to the State, demanding the presence at trial of all forensic toxicologists and 
chemists in this case pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 4332.  This demand included Barry, 
because she physically touched and handled the evidence.33  The trial judge 
concluded that the State established a sufficient chain of custody, because there 
                                                 
33  
10 Del. C. §§ 4331-32. 
 
 
14 
was no evidence of a reasonable probability that Barry’s handling of the evidence 
suggested a breach of protocol that could lead to misidentifying or adulterizing the 
GSR evidence.  The trial judge then admitted the GSR test results, and the State 
had Foster testify that McNally’s hands and his aunt’s SUV had GSR.  Foster 
testified that GSR on McNally’s hands meant that either McNally had fired a gun, 
was near someone who fired a gun, or touched someone or something with GSR. 
 
In chain of custody issues, the party attempting to admit the evidence must 
eliminate possibilities of misidentification and adulteration, “not absolutely, but as 
a matter of reasonable probability.”34  Alleged breaks in the chain of custody are 
irrelevant.35  The evidence does not suggest that Barry misidentified or adulterated 
the samples when she put them into the machine.  That said, we find perplexing the 
State’s assumption that it can unilaterally decide the importance of Barry’s 
involvement in the chain of custody.  McNally specifically subpoenaed Barry for 
trial.  As with a Superior Court Criminal Rule 16 discovery demand, the State did 
not have the discretion to ignore subpoenas.  The State should strictly comply or 
seek relief from compliance from the Court in the future.  Although we do not 
condone the State’s assumption that Barry’s presence would have been superfluous 
and its failure to respond to McNally’s pretrial demand for the witness’ 
                                                 
34  
Trioche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 153 (Del. 1987); accord Demby v. State, 2008 
WL 534273, at *2 (Del.). 
 
35  
See Guinn v. State, 841 A.2d 1239, 1241 (Del. 2004). 
 
 
15 
appearance, we do not conclude that Barry’s described limited involvement in the 
chain of custody suggests a reasonable probability of adulteration or tampering.  
Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting the GSR 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Superior 
Court.