Case Title: Commonwealth v. Hebb

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12158

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12158 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WILLIAM J. HEBB. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 7, 2017. - June 30, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence.  Constitutional 
Law, Double jeopardy.  Practice, Criminal, Double jeopardy, 
Verdict. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on July 19, 2016. 
 
 
The case was reported by Spina, J. 
 
 
 
Christopher DeMayo for the defendant. 
 
Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Timothy St. Lawrence, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In this case, we decide whether double jeopardy 
principles preclude the Commonwealth from retrying the defendant 
on a complaint charging a violation of G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1), on the theory of operation of a motor vehicle 
with a percentage of alcohol in his blood of .08 or greater (per 
 
 
2 
se violation), after a jury acquitted him on the theory of 
operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor (impaired ability violation).  The 
Commonwealth prosecuted the one-count complaint on both 
theories, and after the jury returned a verdict on the impaired 
ability violation only, the judge declared a mistrial on the per 
se violation.  A new complaint issued charging only a per se 
violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).  Claiming that 
retrial violated his double jeopardy rights where the complaint 
issued after an acquittal on the impaired ability violation, the 
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.  The judge 
denied the motion. 
 
The defendant sought relief in the county court pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The case is before us on a reservation and 
report from a single justice of this court.  We conclude that 
double jeopardy principles do not preclude retrial where the 
Commonwealth prosecuted the case on both theories and the jury 
reached a verdict on only one of those theories. 
 
Background.  We set forth the facts the jury could have 
found.  On May 16, 2013, the defendant was struck by a vehicle 
while he was operating his motorcycle on a public way.1  At the 
scene of the collision, the defendant admitted to having had 
                     
 
1 The parties stipulated that the defendant was operating 
his motorcycle on a public way. 
 
 
3 
several alcoholic beverages and was uncooperative with the 
paramedics.  After the defendant complained of pain, he was 
transported to the Milford Hospital emergency department. 
 
The treating physician observed that the defendant's skin 
appeared "flushed" and that his speech was slurred, and detected 
"an odor of alcohol on [his] breath."  Based on these 
observations, the physician determined that the defendant was 
"intoxicated[,] probably with alcohol."  With the defendant's 
consent, medical personnel drew blood samples for alcohol levels 
to be determined.  Subsequent testing of the blood samples by a 
blood analyst in the State police crime laboratory showed a 
blood alcohol level of .133.  On cross-examination, the blood 
analyst acknowledged that the tubes holding the defendant's 
blood samples also contained an anticoagulant to prevent blood 
clotting and that if the anticoagulant is not properly 
activated, the blood sample could clot, and yield an 
artificially high blood alcohol test result. 
 
During closing arguments, defense counsel urged a finding 
that the defendant had not been impaired while operating his 
motorcycle, and that the blood alcohol test results were 
unreliable because the Commonwealth failed to present evidence 
that the anticoagulant was properly activated prior to testing.  
The prosecutor argued that (1) the defendant's behavior and 
appearance at the scene of the collision and at the hospital 
 
 
4 
proved the impaired ability violation; and (2) the defendant's 
blood alcohol level of .133 proved the per se violation. 
 
The verdict slip conformed to the complaint, charging both 
the impaired ability violation and the per se violation, and 
provided the jury the following options:  (I) "Operating a Motor 
Vehicle Under the Influence of Liquor:  1.  Not Guilty; 2.  
Guilty"; and (II) "Operating a Motor Vehicle with a Blood 
Alcohol Level of .08% or greater:  1.  Not Guilty; 2.  Guilty."  
During the deliberations, the jury reported in writing the 
following:  "Made decision on first count; however, saw evidence 
that was supposed to be redacted, swaying our decision [on the 
second count].  What is our next step?"  In response, the judge 
summoned the jury to the court room and conducted a voir dire.  
During the colloquy, the judge learned that although the 
information indicating that the defendant was being prosecuted 
for a fourth offense had been redacted from the exhibits, the 
jury were able to discern the word "fourth" next to OUI.  This 
information swayed the jury's decision as to option II, the per 
se violation, but not as to option I, on which the jury returned 
a not guilty verdict.  The jury left the verdict slip blank for 
option II, marking neither "not guilty" nor "guilty."  
Accordingly, the judge accepted the verdict on option I and 
declared a mistrial on option II. 
 
In December, 2015, a second criminal complaint issued 
 
 
5 
against the defendant, charging one count of operating with a 
blood alcohol level percentage of .08 or greater, fourth 
violation, under G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).  The defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that retrial violated his 
double jeopardy rights.  A second judge denied the motion, and 
the defendant filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
seeking review of that judge's order.  A single justice of this 
court reserved and reported the case to the full court on August 
12, 2016. 
 
Discussion.  Generally, "[t]he denial of a motion to 
dismiss in a criminal case is not appealable until after trial, 
and we have indicated many times that G. L. c. 211, § 3, may not 
be used to circumvent that rule."  Jackson v. Commonwealth, 437 
Mass. 1008, 1009 (2002).  However, we have recognized a limited 
exception "where a defendant's motion to dismiss raises a double 
jeopardy claim of substantial merit."  Azubuko v. Commonwealth, 
464 Mass. 1002, 1003 (2012).  Because the double jeopardy issue 
raises a question of law, our review of the judge's decision is 
de novo.  See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 476 Mass. 367, 369 
(2017); Commonwealth v. Carlino, 449 Mass. 71, 72 n.7 (2007). 
 
In its broadest sweep, "[t]he double jeopardy principle 
'protects against three specific evils -- "a second prosecution 
for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for 
the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for 
 
 
6 
the same offense"'" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Brown, 
470 Mass. 595, 603 (2015).  The "evil" to be prevented by the 
double jeopardy principle in the circumstances presented by this 
case is a second prosecution after an acquittal.  Thus, the 
issue to be decided here is whether an acquittal of only one of 
the charged violations is, in effect, an acquittal of both 
violations.  We conclude that it is not. 
 
First, the statute as written provides that a defendant may 
be convicted on one or both violations.  In 2003, the 
Legislature amended G. L. c. 90, § 24 (OUI statute), "to 
strengthen the protections afforded the public from drivers who 
might be impaired by the consumption of alcohol."  Commonwealth 
v. Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 813 (2007).  With this amendment, 
"the Legislature added language to the OUI statute, making it a 
violation to operate a motor vehicle not only under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor [(impaired ability violation)], 
but also with a blood alcohol level of .08 or more [(per se 
violation)]."  Id. at 811.  Thus, the statutory framework 
created by the 2003 amendment established alternative theories 
under which a violation of the OUI statute could be charged and 
proved, each containing a factual element not necessary to prove 
the other.  See Commonwealth v. Filoma, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 16, 20 
(2011).  In other words, to prove a per se violation of the OUI 
statute, the Commonwealth need not establish that the defendant 
 
 
7 
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.  See G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).  See also Filoma, supra.  Likewise, to 
prove an impaired ability violation of the statute, the 
Commonwealth need not show that the defendant's blood alcohol 
level was .08 per cent or more.  See id. at 20-21. 
 
Here, the complaint charged the defendant with an impaired 
ability violation and, in the alternative, a per se violation.  
Thus, the charging decision was consistent with the legislative 
purpose to minimize the risk to public safety from drivers who 
are either actually impaired or presumed to be impaired based on 
their blood alcohol level.  Consistent with its charging 
decision, the Commonwealth affirmatively pursued both 
alternatives at trial, and the verdict slip permitted the jury 
to choose either or both alternatives. 
 
Second, "the protection of the [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause 
by its terms applies only if there had been some event, such as 
an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy."  
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 426 Mass. 617, 625 (1998), quoting 
Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984).  And, as 
we have said, "where a verdict does not specifically resolve all 
the elements of the offense charged, it is defective and cannot 
operate as either an acquittal or a conviction," Brown, 470 
Mass. at 603-604, and thus does not trigger double jeopardy 
protections.  Therefore, double jeopardy protections were not 
 
 
8 
triggered here, because the jury's not guilty verdict on the 
impaired ability charge did not resolve the factual element 
necessary to establish a per se violation -- that the defendant 
operated a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level of .08 per 
cent or greater.  The jury's resolution of that factual element, 
a live issue in the prosecution, was foreclosed by the mistrial 
declaration.  In sum, the double jeopardy bar does not prohibit 
the Commonwealth from seeking to retry a defendant "where other 
theories (supported by evidence at a first trial) would support 
a defendant's conviction in the second."  Marshall v. 
Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 529, 538 (2012). 
 
Our conclusion that double jeopardy principles do not bar 
retrial on the per se violation where the defendant was 
acquitted on the impaired ability violation is consistent with 
this court's application of double jeopardy principles in cases 
involving trials for murder under multiple theories.  For 
example, in Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 459-461 
(2009), we held that the Commonwealth could retry a defendant 
for murder on a theory on which the jury had not reached a 
verdict at the first trial.  Likewise, in Brown, 470 Mass. at 
605-606, we held that where the jury in the first trial failed 
to reach a verdict on the "facts and merits" of the charge of 
murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation, double jeopardy principles did not prohibit the 
 
 
9 
Commonwealth from retrying the defendant on that theory at a 
second trial.  "The 'interest in giving the prosecution one 
complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its 
laws' justifies treating the jury's inability to reach a verdict 
as a nonevent that does not bar retrial."  Yeager v. United 
States, 557 U.S. 110, 118 (2009), quoting Arizona v. Washington, 
434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978). 
 
The defendant contends that the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 
(1978), forecloses retrial on the per se violation because the 
jury acquitted him on the impaired ability violation.  We 
disagree.  In Sanabria, the trial judge entered an acquittal on 
the entire count charging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1955, 
"without specifying that [the judge] did so only with respect to 
one theory of liability."  Id. at 67.  Because Sanabria is 
distinguishable from this case, it does not advance the 
defendant's argument. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons explained above, we remand the 
matter to the county court for entry of an order denying the 
defendant's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.