Case Title: Doe, SORB No. 339940 v. Sex Offender Registry Board

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12908

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12908 
 
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 339940  vs. 
  SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 4, 2021. - July 20, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Kidnapping.  Constitutional Law, Sex 
offender.  Due Process of Law, Sex offender.  Evidence, Sex 
offender, Hearsay, Expert opinion.  Practice, Civil, Sex 
offender, Hearsay.  Administrative Law, Substantial 
evidence.  Witness, Expert. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 2, 2017. 
 
The case was heard by Robert L. Ullmann, J., on a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Elizabeth Doherty for the plaintiff. 
Nicole M. Nixon for the defendant. 
 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  The plaintiff, John Doe, appeals from the 
judgment of the Superior Court affirming the decision of the Sex 
 
2 
Offender Registry Board (board) to classify him as a level three 
sex offender.  The plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of 
provisions in the sex offender registration law, G. L. c. 6, 
§§ 178C-178Q, that require a person convicted of kidnapping a 
child to register as a sex offender, as applied in the 
circumstances of his case.  The plaintiff also contests the 
admission of hearsay evidence at his classification hearing; the 
denial of his motion for funds to engage an expert; and the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support his level three 
classification.  We conclude that the sex offender registration 
law is not unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff.  
Further, we conclude that there was no error in the hearing 
officer's reliance on hearsay evidence and denial of the 
plaintiff's motion for expert funds, and that the board's 
decision to classify the plaintiff as a level three sex offender 
was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion.  We therefore affirm the 
judgment. 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts from the 
administrative record, reserving some details for later 
discussion.  At the time of the primary incident at issue in 
this case, the plaintiff was in a relationship with a woman who 
lived in the same apartment complex as a ten year old girl 
(victim).  On April 27, 2010, the plaintiff left his 
 
3 
girlfriend's apartment after a disagreement.  As the plaintiff 
walked through the apartment complex, he encountered the victim 
in a stairwell while she was walking to her grandmother's 
apartment.  The two had never spoken, but the victim recognized 
the plaintiff.  The plaintiff suddenly blocked the victim from 
the exit door she was trying to use and punched her in the face, 
knocking her backward and causing severe bleeding from her nose 
and mouth.  The plaintiff continued to punch the victim in the 
back of her head while she was on her knees.  He covered her 
mouth to prevent her from screaming and said, "If you don't shut 
up, I will break your neck."  The plaintiff then dragged the 
victim down the stairwell.  At some point, the plaintiff removed 
his shirt to wipe the victim's blood off her face.  As the 
plaintiff continued to drag the victim down the steps, they 
approached the lobby of the apartment complex, at which time the 
victim was able to break free and reach a security guard. 
The plaintiff subsequently was arrested, and he later 
pleaded guilty to kidnapping a child, G. L. c. 265, § 26; 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. 
c. 265, § 15A (b); and other crimes.1  During his plea hearing, 
 
1 The plaintiff also pleaded guilty to assault and battery 
on a child with injury, G. L. c. 265, § 13J (b); unarmed 
robbery, G. L. c. 265, § 19 (b); threatening to commit a crime, 
G. L. c. 275, § 2; and witness intimidation, G. L. c. 268, 
§ 13B. 
 
4 
the plaintiff acknowledged that his guilty plea to the charge of 
kidnapping of a child would require him to register as a sex 
offender with the board.  He was sentenced to from six to eight 
years in prison on the charge of kidnapping of a child with a 
subsequent five-year probationary period on the charge of 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.2 
2.  Statutory and regulatory framework.  The sex offender 
registration law, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q, imposes registration 
requirements on persons convicted of certain enumerated 
offenses, including kidnapping of a child under G. L. c. 265, 
§ 26.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178C (defining "sex offender," "sex 
offense," and "sex offense involving a child"); Noe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 5340 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 480 
Mass. 195, 196 (2018) (Noe No. 5340).  After the offender has 
been convicted, the agency that has custody of or supervision 
over the offender "shall transmit to the board said sex 
offender's registration data."  G. L. c. 6, § 178E (a)-(b).  The 
board is then tasked with deciding whether the offender should 
have a duty to register and, if so, determining the offender's 
classification level, taking into account certain statutory 
factors, the board's guidelines, and any materials submitted by 
the offender.  See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178K (1)-(3), 178L (1) (a); 
 
2 The plaintiff received concurrent sentences on the other 
counts to which he pleaded guilty. 
 
5 
803 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.04-1.07, 1.33 (2016); Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 23656 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
483 Mass. 131, 133-134 (2019) (Doe No. 23656); Commonwealth v. 
Hammond, 477 Mass. 499, 509-510 (2017). 
The board may find that the offender has no duty to 
register, where it determines that the circumstances of the 
offense in conjunction with the offender's criminal history do 
not indicate a risk of reoffense or a danger to the public.  See 
G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (d); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.29 (2016).  
Significantly, however, such relief is not available to certain 
classes of offenders, including those who already have not been 
registered for at least ten years and have been convicted of a 
sex offense involving a child.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (d); 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.29 (4); Hammond, 477 Mass. at 510. 
Sex offenders who are determined to have a duty to register 
are classified into three "levels of notification" to government 
authorities and the public depending on their risk of reoffense, 
the degree of dangerousness they pose to the public, and whether 
a public safety interest is served by public access to 
information pertaining to the offender.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.03 (2016); Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 3177 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 486 
Mass. 749, 754 (2021) (Doe No. 3177). 
 
6 
Upon notification of the board's recommended classification 
level, sex offenders may accept it, in which case the 
recommended classification level becomes final, or they may 
reject it and request a de novo evidentiary hearing before a 
hearing examiner to challenge their duty to register and 
classification level.3  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1); 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. §§ 1.04, 1.08, 1.17 (2016); Noe No. 5340, 480 Mass. 
at 197.  The hearing examiner's decision is subject to review 
and modification by the board, and offenders may then seek 
judicial review of that final decision in the Superior Court.  
See G. L. c. 6, § 178M; G. L. c. 30A, § 14; 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 1.21, 1.24 (2016); Doe No. 23656, 483 Mass. at 134. 
 
3.  Board proceedings.  On March 3, 2014, the board 
notified the plaintiff of his duty to register as a level three 
sex offender, the highest classification level.  The plaintiff 
challenged the board's recommendation, and on May 9, 2017, a 
hearing examiner held an evidentiary classification hearing.  
Prior to the hearing, the plaintiff moved for expert funds in 
order to retain an expert witness to testify to the effect of 
the plaintiff's mental condition on his current level of 
dangerousness and risk of reoffense.  The hearing examiner 
 
3 As discussed in greater detail infra, the board bears the 
burden at the hearing of proving the offender's classification 
level and duty to register by clear and convincing evidence.  
See Doe No. 3177, 486 Mass. at 756-757. 
 
7 
denied the motion, citing the plaintiff's failure to produce 
enough evidence to show a connection between his alleged 
generalized anxiety disorder and its impact on his continued 
dangerousness or risk. 
 
The plaintiff also moved to exclude evidence of a past 
charge of aggravated rape of a child and other related offenses, 
for which he was ultimately found not guilty after a jury trial.  
This evidence included a police report, which stated that the 
eight year old daughter (rape complainant) of the plaintiff's 
then girlfriend had told police and victim advocates that the 
plaintiff sexually assaulted her.  The rape complainant claimed 
that, on four consecutive nights, the plaintiff came into her 
room and licked her vagina and buttocks, which the plaintiff 
told her would help her stop wetting the bed.  The hearing 
examiner denied the plaintiff's motion to exclude this evidence, 
and upon finding the rape complainant's statement to be detailed 
and reliable, the hearing examiner considered it in assessing 
the plaintiff's level of dangerousness and risk of reoffense. 
At the close of the plaintiff's hearing, the hearing 
examiner determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 
plaintiff was dangerous and posed a high risk of reoffense.  The 
board subsequently required the plaintiff to register as a level 
three sex offender. 
 
8 
The plaintiff then filed a complaint requesting judicial 
review of the board's decision pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178M, 
and G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  A Superior Court judge affirmed the 
board's decision, finding it to be supported both by the law and 
by the evidence.  The plaintiff timely appealed, and we granted 
his application for direct appellate review. 
Discussion.  1.  Constitutionality of G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C 
et seq., as applied.  The plaintiff first argues that by 
requiring him to register as a sex offender, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 6, §§ 178C and 178K, the board violated his due process 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, because his index offense had no sexual component and 
allegedly did not involve any sexual conduct or purpose. 
As a threshold matter, we reject the board's contention 
that the plaintiff did not use the proper procedural avenue to 
present this constitutional challenge and thus that the issue is 
not properly before this court.  The board cites Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
459 Mass. 603 (2011) (Doe. No. 10800), where we held that the 
board lacked the authority to consider an offender's facial 
challenge to the constitutionality of the board's classification 
regulations, and consequently concluded that the constitutional 
issue in the offender's appeal from the board's decision 
 
9 
pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, was not properly before this 
court.  See id. at 628-631.  We said that the offender should 
have commenced a separate declaratory judgment action in the 
Superior Court properly to raise the constitutional challenge in 
a judicial forum.  See id. at 630-631. 
In the present case, however, it was proper for the 
plaintiff to challenge the constitutionality of the registration 
requirement as applied to him in the proceedings before the 
board and in his subsequent appeal.  Where, as here, a 
constitutional issue is closely intertwined with the facts of a 
specific case subject to agency adjudication, it is appropriate 
for a party to raise the constitutional question in the agency 
proceeding and for the agency to assume jurisdiction.  Although 
the agency lacks the power to decide the constitutionality of 
its enabling statutes and regulations, it can and should make 
the factual findings necessary to address the constitutional 
question and apply its expertise to the construction and 
application of any related statutes or regulations in light of 
the constitutional question.  This process compiles an 
appropriate record for the Superior Court to consider on appeal 
in determining whether the agency's determinations were made in 
compliance with or in violation of constitutional provisions, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (a).  See Branch v. 
Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 481 Mass. 810, 815 n.11 
 
10 
(2019), cert. denied sub nom. Branch v. Massachusetts Dep't of 
Labor Relations, 140 S. Ct. 858 (2020), and cases cited; 
Hammond, 477 Mass. at 513.  We thus turn to the merits of the 
plaintiff's constitutional claim. 
Challenges to the constitutionality of a statute are 
questions of law that we consider de novo.  See Commonwealth v. 
Feliz, 481 Mass. 689, 696 (2019), S.C., 486 Mass. 510 (2020).  
Because the plaintiff does not assert that a fundamental right 
is at issue (nor is any fundamental right apparent),4 we employ 
the rational basis standard of review to evaluate whether the 
application of the sex offender registration law to him comports 
with due process.  "Under the Federal Constitution, the rational 
basis test under principles of due process is 'whether the 
statute bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative 
objective . . . and, under the . . . State Constitution[, is] 
whether the statute bears real and substantial relation to 
public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the 
general welfare'" (quotations omitted).  Chief of Police of 
Worcester v. Holden, 470 Mass. 845 (2015), quoting English v. 
 
4 We previously have concluded that the sex offender 
registration statute does implicate liberty and privacy 
interests, but that such interests are not fundamental.  See, 
e.g., Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 311 (2015); Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 1211 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 
750, 759 (2006). 
 
11 
New England Med. Ctr., Inc., 405 Mass. 423, 430 (1989), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).  "In any evaluation of 
reasonableness, . . . we will recognize every rational 
presumption in favor of the legislation," Chelsea Collaborative, 
Inc. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 27, 45 (2018), 
quoting Carleton v. Framingham, 418 Mass. 623, 631 (1994), and 
the party challenging the law bears the "burden of proving the 
absence of any conceivable grounds which would support the 
statute," Zeller v. Cantu, 395 Mass. 76, 84 (1985), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Franklin Fruit Co., 388 Mass. 228, 235 (1983). 
The primary objective of the sex offender registration law 
is "to protect 'the vulnerable members of our communities from 
sexual offenders.'"  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780, 789 (2008) (Doe No. 
8725), quoting St. 1999, c. 74, emergency preamble.  As stated 
in the preamble to the revised 1999 law, 
"the Legislature found 'the danger of recidivism posed by 
sex offenders, especially sexually violent offenders who 
commit predatory acts characterized by repetitive and 
compulsive behavior, to be grave and that the protection of 
the public from these sex offenders is of paramount 
interest.'  It also found that . . . the registration of 
sex offenders is a proper exercise of police powers 
'regulating present and ongoing conduct, which will provide 
law enforcement with additional information critical to 
preventing sexual victimization.'" 
 
Doe No. 8725, supra at 789-790, quoting St. 1999, c. 74, 
emergency preamble.  The plaintiff does not contest that this is 
 
12 
a permissible legislative objective that involves public safety, 
but he argues that requiring him to register as a sex offender 
even though his index offense had no sexual component is not 
reasonably related to this objective.  Based on our review of 
the legislative history behind the sex offender registration 
law, and the circumstances of the plaintiff's case, we disagree. 
 
The sex offender registration law was first enacted in 
1996, see St. 1996 c. 239, § 1, in response to the Federal Jacob 
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Registration Act (Wetterling Act), Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title 
XVII, § 170101, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994), codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14071 (repealed and replaced by 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901 et seq.), 
which reduced Federal funding for State law enforcement programs 
by ten percent if States failed to establish registration 
schemes in compliance with Federal standards promulgated under 
the act, see 42 U.S.C. § 14071(f)(2)(A).  See also Nichols v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113, 1116 (2016); Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 34186 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 
554, 558 n.7 (2015) (Doe No. 34186).  The Wetterling Act was 
named for an eleven year old boy who had been abducted at 
gunpoint in 1989, see Nichols, supra, and as its full title 
indicates, it obligated States to adopt registration 
requirements not only for persons convicted of sexually violent 
offenses, but also for persons convicted of certain criminal 
 
13 
offenses against a victim who is a minor, including kidnapping 
of a minor except by a parent, see 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(1)(A), 
(3)(A)(i).5 
Commentary in support of the Wetterling Act indicates that 
Congress had two related reasons for requiring registration by 
persons previously convicted of certain crimes involving minors, 
such as kidnapping, even when those crimes did not directly 
involve a sexual component.  First, as a general matter, 
Congress was concerned about recidivism not only among sex 
offenders, but also among persons previously convicted of crimes 
against children, including crimes other than sex offenses, and 
it concluded that a registry of such persons would facilitate 
locating them quickly for purposes of investigation when a child 
is abducted or otherwise victimized: 
"The reason this bill is so important is because of the 
high rate of recidivism in persons who have committed 
crimes against children, and it is not just sex crimes 
against children but all crimes against children.  The 
recidivism rate is probably higher in this area of our 
criminal justice system . . . . 
 
 
5 The Wetterling Act was amended in 1996 by Megan's Law, 
which further mandated public release of "relevant information 
that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific 
person required to register under this section."  See Pub. L. 
No. 104-145, § 2, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996), codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14071(d).  In 2006, Congress repealed the Wetterling Act, 
replacing it with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act, 120 Stat. 590, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901 et seq. (subsequently 
transferred to 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901 et seq.).  See Nichols, 136 
S. Ct. at 1116; Doe No. 34186, 470 Mass. at 558 n.7. 
 
14 
"So the first place that law enforcement looks when a child 
has been abducted or has been the victim of a crime which 
does not involve abduction is with the list of offenders 
that are within that community or within that area, and 
very often when a child is abducted, the person who has 
perpetrated this crime takes the child a far way away where 
law enforcement really do not know who is involved, so time 
is of the essence in law enforcement being able to track 
down known child offenders to see if they were involved in 
an abduction or another crime against a child."  (Emphases 
added.) 
 
139 Cong. Rec. 31250 (Nov. 20, 1993) (remarks of Rep. F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr.).  Second, Congress cited statistics showing 
that a high percentage of child abductions also involve sexual 
assaults, indicating a correlation between the two crimes.  See 
H.R. Rep. No. 103-392, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 4 (1993) 
(Committee on the Judiciary), citing Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention, United States Department of Justice, 
"Missing, Abducted, Runaway and Thrownaway Children in America" 
142 (May 1990) ("Two-thirds of the cases of non-family child 
abduction reported to police involve sexual assault").  See also 
139 Cong. Rec. 12057 (May 28, 1993) (remarks of Sen. David F. 
Durenberger); 139 Cong. Rec. 31251 (Nov. 20, 1993) (remarks of 
Rep. James M. Ramstad); 139 Cong. Rec. 31252 (Nov. 20, 1993) 
(remarks of Rep. Hamilton Fish, Jr.).6  In light of these 
 
6 The board cites subsequent studies showing that the 
perpetrator sexually had assaulted the child victim in forty-six 
percent of the nonfamily abductions studied, see D. Finkelhor, 
H. Hammer, & A.J. Sedlak, United States Department of Justice, 
Nonfamily Abducted Children:  National Estimates and 
Characteristics, National Incidence Studies of Missing, 
 
15 
concerns about recidivism among persons previously convicted of 
a crime against a child and the correlation between child 
abductions and sexual assault, Congress rationally could have 
concluded that a person previously convicted of kidnapping a 
child should be required to register both because that person 
poses a risk of repeating the offense and, more particularly, 
because a person previously convicted of kidnapping a child may 
have intended to assault the child sexually as well, even if 
that purpose was thwarted, and poses a risk of repeating the 
offense for the same purpose in the future. 
Given that the sex offender registration law was enacted to 
comply with the Wetterling Act's requirements, the Legislature 
was presumably acting in accord with the same rationale when it 
included kidnapping of a child under the age of sixteen in 
 
Abducted, Runaway, and Thrownaway Children, at 10 (Oct. 2002), 
and that sixty-three percent of child victims were assaulted 
sexually when kidnapped, see J. Wolak, D. Finkelhor, & A.J. 
Sedlak, United States Department of Justice, Child Victims of 
Stereotypical Kidnappings Known to Law Enforcement in 2011, 
Juvenile Justice Bulletin, at 10 (June 2016).  Conversely, the 
plaintiff cites a law review article criticizing the 
methodologies of both the 1990 and the 2002 Department of 
Justice studies cited supra.  See Raban, Be They Fish or Not 
Fish:  The Fishy Registration of Nonsexual Offenders, 16 Wm. & 
Mary Bill Rts. J. 497, 519-523 (2007).  For purposes of rational 
basis review, however, "it is not the province of the court to 
sit and weigh conflicting evidence supporting or opposing a 
legislative enactment."  Shell Oil Co. v. Revere, 383 Mass. 682, 
687 (1981), quoting Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 594 
(1939).  We only need determine whether there is some 
conceivable, rational ground that would support the law that is 
being challenged. 
 
16 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 26, as one of the offenses 
triggering registration requirements under the Massachusetts 
law.  See St. 1996, c. 239, § 1; G. L. c. 6, § 178C.7  See 
generally Swift v. AutoZone, Inc., 441 Mass. 443, 447 (2004) 
(where Massachusetts law was intended essentially to be 
identical to Federal law, legislative history of cognate Federal 
statute is relevant to understanding intent of Legislature in 
enacting Massachusetts statute). 
Although the sex offender registration law's objective of 
protecting the public against the danger of recidivism by sex 
offenders, as stated in the 1999 preamble, is arguably narrower 
than that of the Wetterling Act, the inclusion of child 
kidnapping among the offenses requiring registration is still 
reasonably related to such an objective, given the correlation 
between child abductions and sexual assault undergirding the 
Federal law on which G. L. c. 6, § 178C, was based.  As courts 
 
7 In 1999, the Legislature substantially revised the sex 
offender registration law in response to various rulings by this 
court.  See Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 422-423 (2001).  
The revised law listed kidnapping of a child under G. L. c. 265, 
§ 26, as a sex offense, and kidnapping of a child under the age 
of sixteen under G. L. c. 265, § 26, as a sex offense involving 
a child.  See St. 1999, c. 74, § 2.  See also St. 1999, c. 74, 
§ 12 (amending G. L. c. 265, § 26, to establish kidnapping of 
child under age of sixteen by person other than child's parent 
as distinct offense).  The revised law also prohibited the 
sentencing court and the board from relieving persons convicted 
of sex offenses involving a child from the law's registration 
requirements.  See St. 1999, c. 74, § 2; G. L. c. 6, §§ 178E 
(e), (f), 178K (2) (d); Hammond, 477 Mass. at 513. 
 
17 
in other States have observed in rejecting similar as-applied 
due process challenges to their sex offender registration laws, 
requiring sex offender registration for persons convicted of 
child kidnapping is reasonable because "kidnapping can be a 
precursor to sex offenses against children."  People v. Johnson, 
225 Ill. 2d 573, 591 (2007). 
Although the kidnapping itself may not involve any sexual 
component, "in many cases, the offender intends a sexual assault 
that is prevented only by the offender's arrest or the escape of 
the victim," People v. Knox, 12 N.Y.3d 60, 68, cert. denied, 558 
U.S. 1011 (2009), and absent an overt act "an offender's sexual 
motive or intent may be difficult to prove," State v. Smith, 
2010 WI 16, ¶ 13, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 865 (2010) (considering 
grounds for requiring registration by person convicted of false 
imprisonment of minor).  Furthermore, "a child cut off [by 
kidnapping] from the safety of everyday surroundings is 
vulnerable to sexual abuse even if the offender's sexual desires 
are not the motive of the crime."  Knox, supra.  Among other 
risks, a "kidnapper may plan to prostitute a child, or may seize 
an unplanned-for opportunity to do so."  Id. 
 
We recognize that there are some cases where courts have 
reached a contrary conclusion, holding that sex offender 
registration requirements violated due process as applied to 
persons convicted of kidnapping a child.  But typically, these 
 
18 
cases have involved situations where the State conceded, or the 
facts conclusively demonstrated, that there was no sexual 
component or motivation in the kidnapping.  For example, the 
Florida Supreme Court determined that the State's sex offender 
registration requirement was not reasonably related to the 
legislative purpose of protecting children from sexual predators 
as applied to a defendant who was convicted of kidnapping after 
he stole a car that had a baby in the back seat, where "the 
State concede[d] that the crime contained no sexual element and 
the circumstances of the crime conclusively belie[d] any sexual 
motive."  State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1217 (Fla. 2004).  
In that case, it was undisputed that the defendant had stolen 
the car because he had run out of gasoline while driving another 
vehicle, and that the kidnapping had been committed solely to 
facilitate the carjacking.  Moreover, the defendant had 
voluntarily left the child, still sitting in her car seat, in 
front of a doctor's office.  See id. at 1207-1208, 1214-1215.8 
 
8 See also, e.g., Yunus vs. Lewis-Robinson, U.S. Dist. Ct., 
No. 17-cv-5839 (AJN) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2019) (granting 
preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of sex offender 
registration requirements in favor of plaintiff who had been 
convicted of kidnapping of minor, where kidnapping had been 
carried out to ransom victim in exchange for money and drugs, 
and nonsexual nature of offense was conceded and conclusive);  
State v. Small, 2005-Ohio-3813, ¶ 30 (Ct. App.) (subjecting 
defendant to sex offender registration requirements violated due 
process where defendant had kidnapped one year old boy to 
facilitate robbery and there was no evidence of any sexual 
motivation); State v. Reine, 2003-Ohio-50, ¶ 28 (Ct. App.) 
 
19 
The circumstances in the present case are very different 
from those in Robinson, as the plaintiff's kidnapping of the 
victim was not merely collateral to another crime.  The 
plaintiff intentionally and violently assaulted the victim, a 
ten year old girl, before threatening to break her neck if she 
did not keep quiet and dragging her down several flights of 
stairs.  Had the victim not broken free and escaped, the 
kidnapping likely would have continued, putting the victim at 
potential risk of sexual assault.9 
On these facts, and considering that we must recognize 
every rational presumption in favor of the sex offender 
registration law's validity, we conclude that the law's 
registration requirements for persons convicted of kidnapping a 
child, as applied to the plaintiff, bear a reasonable, real, and 
substantial relation to the legislative objective of protecting 
vulnerable members of our communities, such as children, against 
recidivism by sex offenders. 
 
2.  Hearing examiner's consideration of hearsay evidence.  
The plaintiff next argues that it was unreasonable for the 
hearing examiner to credit and admit hearsay statements in the 
 
(classifying defendant as sex offender violated due process 
where parties stipulated that defendant's kidnapping offenses 
were committed without any sexual motivation or purpose). 
 
9 See discussion of Congress's findings concerning the high 
correlation between child abductions and sexual assault supra. 
 
20 
police report concerning his alleged sexual abuse of the rape 
complainant, because such statements do not qualify as 
"substantial evidence" under G. L. c. 30A, § 1.  We disagree. 
 
As a general matter, apart from the heightened standards of 
proof that we have required for specific types of decisions, the 
board's adjudicatory decisions must be supported by "substantial 
evidence," which is defined as "such evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."  G. L. 
c. 30A, §§ 1 (6), 14 (7) (e).  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry 
Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 109 
(2014).  The range of evidence that may be considered by hearing 
examiners is not limited by the same rules of evidence that 
apply in court proceedings; hearing examiners may exercise their 
discretion to admit and give probative value to evidence "if it 
is the kind of evidence on which reasonable persons are 
accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs."  G. L. 
c. 30A, § 11 (2).  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.18(1) (2016).  
See also Doe No. 10800, 459 Mass. at 638.  In this context, we 
have held that "hearsay evidence bearing indicia of reliability 
constitutes admissible and substantial evidence."  Id.  Such 
indicia include "the general plausibility and consistency of the 
victim's or witness's story, the circumstances under which it is 
related, the degree of detail, the motives of the narrator, the 
presence or absence of corroboration and the like."  Doe, Sex 
 
21 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 10304 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 70 
Mass. App. Ct. 309, 313 (2007). 
In the present case, the hearing examiner highlighted the 
detailed nature of the rape complainant's statement in 
concluding that it was reliable.  She noted that the rape 
complainant specifically described how the plaintiff sexually 
assaulted her (the rape complainant stated that the plaintiff 
licked her private parts and indicated the vagina and buttocks 
area on an anatomically correct gingerbread drawing); where the 
assault occurred (in the bedroom she shared with her younger 
brother); and what the plaintiff told her prior to or during the 
assaults (that what he was doing would help her to stop wetting 
the bed).  Although the rape complainant could not provide 
specific dates and times for the assaults, she also stated that 
they had occurred on four consecutive nights. 
The hearing examiner also considered the circumstances 
under which the rape complainant's statement was taken, 
observing that the disclosures were made during a 
multidisciplinary investigation team interview at the child 
advocacy center.  And she cited the plausibility of the rape 
complainant's statement, noting that the fact that the plaintiff 
subsequently also beat, threatened, and kidnapped another young 
girl (the victim) added credibility to the rape complainant's 
account. 
 
22 
In contesting the hearing officer's reliance on the rape 
complainant's statements in the police report, the plaintiff 
focuses on the lack of corroboration for these hearsay 
statements.  But as the hearing officer noted, there was 
indirect corroboration by the plaintiff's admission to an attack 
on another young girl, the victim, and in any event 
corroboration is only one of several indicia of reliability to 
be considered.  Here, the hearing examiner primarily cited the 
detail in the statement by the rape complainant.10 
On this record, we are satisfied that the hearing examiner 
did not abuse her discretion in admitting and giving probative 
 
 
10 The plaintiff argues that mere detail in a hearsay 
statement does not confer reliability, but the case that he 
cites in support of this proposition, Edward E. v. Department of 
Social Servs., 42 Mass. App. Ct. 478, 486 (1997), actually 
involved a paucity of detail, where the reporting child was not 
able to talk about specifics and the only detail she provided 
concerned where the alleged sexual assaults took place.  See id.  
By comparison, the statement by the rape complainant in the 
present case provided much more detail about the context and 
nature of the assaults than was provided by the victim in Edward 
E. 
 
23 
effect to the hearsay statements contained in the police 
report.11,12 
3.  Motion for expert funds.  The plaintiff argues next 
that the hearing examiner abused her discretion by denying the 
plaintiff's motion for funds for an expert witness to examine 
and testify to his current mental condition and its effect on 
his current level of risk of reoffense and level of 
dangerousness.  We disagree. 
 
11 As we discuss in more detail infra, the hearing examiner 
was permitted to consider the rape complainant's statement in 
the police report as part of the classification process 
notwithstanding the plaintiff's acquittal of the charges brought 
against him as a result of that statement.  As we recently 
reaffirmed, where "a sex offense is unproven at a criminal 
trial, a hearing examiner may consider the facts underlying the 
charges 'where such facts are proven by a preponderance of 
evidence,' the standard used for subsidiary facts."  Doe No. 
3177, 486 Mass. at 754-755, quoting Soe, Sex Offender Registry 
Bd. No. 252997 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 381, 396 
(2013).  See id. at 757.  See also Doe, Sex Offender Registry 
Bd. No. 523391 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 
85, 90 (2019) ("The lack of criminal conviction does not render 
information contained within a police report inadmissible in an 
administrative proceeding").  In light of the hearing examiner's 
findings discussed supra, she could have also properly found 
that the facts alleged in the rape complainant's statement were 
adequately established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
12 The plaintiff urges us to adopt a heightened standard for 
determining the reliability of hearsay statements when they 
provide the sole basis for determining that a convicted sex 
offender poses a danger, suggesting that we should require 
corroboration by independently admitted sources or an offender's 
admissions.  Having recently rejected a related argument for 
increasing the standard of proof for subsidiary facts in 
classification proceedings, see Doe No. 3177, 486 Mass. at 754-
757, and note 11, supra, we decline to do so here. 
 
24 
The board has discretion to grant funds to indigent 
offenders for an expert witness or report to be presented at the 
classification hearing, "whether or not the board itself intends 
to rely on this type of expert evidence."  Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 89230 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 452 Mass. 
764, 770, 774 (2008) (Doe No. 89230) (avoiding constitutional 
question by construing sex offender registration law as 
permitting board discretion to grant expert witness funds to 
indigent offenders regardless of whether board intends to 
present expert evidence). 
The board's discretionary decision to grant or deny an 
offender's motion for expert funds is "based on the facts 
presented in an individual case."  Id. at 775.  The offender's 
motion for expert funds must 
"1. identify a condition or circumstance special to the sex 
offender and explain how that condition is connected to his 
or her risk of reoffense or level of dangerousness; 2. 
identify the particular type of Expert Witness who would 
provide testimony to assist the Hearing Examiner in his or 
her understanding and analysis; and 3. include supporting 
documentation or affidavits verifying the specific 
condition or circumstance that the offender suffers from." 
 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.16(4)(a) (2016).  A motion that fails 
to meet these criteria may be denied prior to the hearing.  Id. 
 
In particular, the offender bears the burden of 
"identify[ing] and articulat[ing] the reason or reasons, 
connected to a condition or a circumstance special to him, that 
 
25 
he needs to retain a particular type of expert."  Doe No. 89230, 
452 Mass. at 775.  "A general motion for funds to retain an 
expert to provide an opinion on the sex offender's risk of 
reoffense, without more, would appear to be insufficient."  Id. 
Here, the plaintiff's motion was supported by an affidavit 
from his counsel averring that the plaintiff suffered from an 
anxiety disorder, that he had a past history of psychiatric 
hospitalizations, and that an expert was needed to determine the 
effect of his mental illness on his level of dangerousness and 
risk of reoffense.  The motion also attached documentation 
showing that the plaintiff had received treatment for symptoms 
of generalized anxiety disorder during his incarceration.  The 
plaintiff did not, however, provide documentation showing that 
he had in fact been diagnosed with that disorder, nor did his 
motion "explain how that condition is connected to his . . . 
risk of reoffense or level of dangerousness."13  803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.16(4)(a)(1).  The plaintiff also failed to provide or 
cite significant research or evidence to support such a 
connection of the kind that has been provided in other cases 
 
13 In addition, the hearing examiner noted that the 
plaintiff had stated at his plea hearing first that he had been 
drinking in addition to taking medication at the time of the 
assault on the victim, and then that he had been off the 
medication at that time.  These statements raised questions 
about whether treatment would be effective in mitigating the 
risk of future offenses, even assuming that the kidnapping was 
causally related to his mental condition. 
 
26 
where the denial of expert funds was held to be an abuse of 
discretion.  See, e.g., Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 
205614 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 610 (2013) 
(hearing examiner abused discretion in denying motion for expert 
funds supported by significant evidence that research 
undergirding board guidelines limited almost exclusively to male 
sexual recidivism, and evidence indicating that females have 
lower over-all rates of sexual recidivism); Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 58574 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 98 Mass. 
App. Ct. 307, 311 (2020) (Doe's motion for expert funds 
improperly denied where it "was tailored to the specifics of 
Doe's chronic hepatitis C" and included physician's report 
supporting his condition and "setting forth some of Doe's 
symptoms and his treatment with interferon," as well as "two 
scientific articles show[ing] a correlation between Doe's 
particular condition . . . and lower libido and sexual 
dysfunction"); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 vs. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 9-11 (2014) (expert 
testimony needed to provide "assistance and guidance for the 
proper interpretation and understanding" of "technical and 
complex" studies regarding correlation between age and 
recidivism).  We conclude that the hearing examiner did not 
abuse her discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for funds 
to engage an expert. 
 
27 
4.  Classification of plaintiff as a level three sex 
offender.  Finally, we reject the plaintiff's contention that 
his classification as a level three sex offender was not 
supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
"A reviewing court may set aside or modify the board's 
classification decision where it determines that the decision is 
in excess of the board's statutory authority or jurisdiction, is 
based on an error of law, is not supported by substantial 
evidence, or is an arbitrary and capricious abuse of 
discretion," provided that "[t]he reviewing court 'shall give 
due weight to the experience, technical competence, and 
specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the 
discretionary authority conferred upon it.'"  Doe No. 3177, 486 
Mass. at 754, quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). 
A level three classification is appropriate "[w]here the 
board determines that the risk of reoffense is high and the 
degree of dangerousness posed to the public is such that a 
substantial public safety interest is served by active 
dissemination" of information about the offender to the public.  
Doe No. 3177, supra, quoting G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (c).  This 
determination comprises "three elements that must each be 
established by clear and convincing evidence:  (1) the 
offender's risk of reoffense, (2) the offender's dangerousness 
as a function of the severity and extent of harm the offender 
 
28 
would present to the public in the event of reoffense, and (3) 
the public safety interest served by public access to the 
offender's information."  Doe No. 3177, supra.  Importantly, 
"[i]n determining whether these elements have been established 
by clear and convincing evidence," however, "a hearing examiner 
may consider subsidiary facts that have been proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence."  Id. at 756-757, quoting Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 656 (2019). 
The plaintiff's argument contesting his level three 
classification essentially recapitulates the issues already 
discussed, albeit in a different context.  He contends that the 
evidence was insufficient to support his level three 
classification because his kidnapping and assault of the victim 
did not involve a sexual purpose or motive and was occasioned by 
a mental health issue, and because the rape complainant's 
statement was hearsay.  In particular, he challenges the hearing 
examiner's application of two factors in the board's guidelines:  
factor 2 (repetitive and compulsive behavior involving two or 
more separate episodes of sexual misconduct) and factor 3 (adult 
offender with a child victim as an indicator of a heightened 
risk to public safety and, for adults targeting prepubescent 
children, deviant sexual interest and an even higher risk of 
reoffense and degree of dangerousness).  See 803 Code Mass. 
 
29 
Regs. § 1.33(2), (3).  With regard to factor 2, the hearing 
examiner found that the plaintiff had engaged in sexual 
misconduct with two victims on separate occasions, and with 
regard to factor 3, she found that the plaintiff had sexually 
assaulted two prepubescent child victims. 
Based on the indicia of reliability discussed supra, the 
hearing examiner could properly admit the rape complainant's 
statement in the police report and find by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the plaintiff had sexually assaulted the rape 
complainant.  And given that kidnapping of a child is defined as 
a sex offense by the sex offender registration law, that there 
is evidence of a statistical correlation between kidnapping and 
sex offenses, and that the plaintiff's rape of the rape 
complainant provided other evidence of the plaintiff's 
involvement in a child sex offense, the hearing examiner 
properly could find that the kidnapping of the victim was also 
an act of sexual misconduct. 
The hearing examiner also considered numerous other risk-
elevating factors from the board's guidelines in classifying the 
plaintiff as a level three sex offender.14  These included his 
 
14 General Laws c. 6, §§ 178K (2) and 178L (1), delineate 
"criteria to be considered by the [b]oard in determining risk of 
reoffense and degree of dangerousness and authorize the [b]oard 
to identify and utilize additional risk factors and criteria not 
specifically listed in the statute."  803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.04.  Relying on this statutory authority, the board 
 
30 
physical attack on a stranger (the victim);15 the physical 
contact involved in his rape of the rape complainant;16 his 
assault on two different types of victims;17 evidence of his 
alcohol and substance use;18 and his poor disciplinary record 
 
promulgated 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33, "which describes and 
defines the factors that the [b]oard shall consider in making 
all registration and classification decisions."  803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.04. 
 
 
15 Factor 7 -- relationship between the offender and victim 
(giving full weight based on a finding that the victim of the 
plaintiff's index offense was a stranger, which demonstrates a 
higher risk of reoffense than offenders who target victims known 
to them); factor 8 -- weapons, violence, or infliction of bodily 
injury (finding that the plaintiff beat and threatened, thereby 
causing injury to, the victim of the plaintiff's index offense -
- an aggravating factor that may be indicative of sexual arousal 
to violence or an antisocial orientation).  See 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.33(7), (8). 
 
16 Factor 19 -- level of physical contact (giving moderate 
weight based on a finding that the plaintiff engaged in oral, 
vaginal penetration of the rape complainant, which has been 
shown to cause increased psychological harm to the victim). See 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(19). 
 
17 Factor 21 -- diverse victim type (finding that the 
plaintiff sexually assaulted both a stranger and a victim known 
to him); and factor 22 -- number of victims (finding that the 
plaintiff committed acts of sexual misconduct against two 
victims).  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(21), (22). 
 
18 Based on statements from the plaintiff regarding his 
drinking and statements from the plaintiff's girlfriend 
regarding his cocaine addiction, the examiner gave full weight 
to factor 9 -- alcohol and substance abuse, which may increase 
an offender's risk of reoffense.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.33(9). 
 
 
31 
during his incarceration.19  The hearing examiner also considered 
three risk-mitigating factors relating to the plaintiff's 
probation supervision, treatment, and home situation and support 
systems.20  But she gave the plaintiff's participation in 
treatment very little weight upon finding that it was short 
lived and rooted in his desire to receive parole, and gave no 
weight to his home situation, upon finding that the plaintiff 
lacked supportive relationships in Massachusetts.  Finding that 
these limited mitigation factors were far outweighed by the risk 
indicated by the many aggravating factors, the hearing examiner 
concluded that the plaintiff presented a high risk of reoffense 
and high degree of dangerousness, thereby warranting 
registration as a level three sex offender. 
We conclude that the hearing examiner demonstrated the 
appropriateness of the plaintiff's level three classification by 
clear and convincing evidence.  As the plaintiff has failed to 
show that the examiner's determination was arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, not supported by substantial 
 
19 Factor 12 -- behavior while incarcerated or civilly 
committed.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(12).  The plaintiff 
had seventeen disciplinary reports while in prison.  The hearing 
examiner gave this factor minimal weight, however, due to the 
relatively minor nature of the offenses. 
 
 
20 Factor 28 -- supervision by probation or parole; factor 
32 -- sex offender treatment; and factor 33 -- home situation 
and support systems.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(28), (32), 
(33). 
 
32 
evidence, or otherwise unlawful, we defer to the board's 
classification decision.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 
380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 300 (2015) 
("appellant bears the burden of showing that one of these 
conditions has been met"). 
Conclusion.  The judgment affirming the board's decision to 
classify the plaintiff as a level three sex offender is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.