Case Title: Commonwealth v. Liebenow

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11593

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2014-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11593 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CARL B. LIEBENOW, JR. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     September 2, 2014. - November 25, 2014. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Larceny.  Intent.  Mistake.  Practice, Criminal, Affirmative 
defense. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Pittsfield Division 
of the District Court Department on August 12, 2010. 
 
 
The case was heard by Fredric D. Rutberg, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant. 
 
John Bossé, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The defendant, who was in the business of 
collecting and selling scrap metal, was charged with larceny 
under $250, G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1), in connection with his 
removal of two lengths of steel pipe from a construction site 
located on private property in Pittsfield.  He was convicted of 
 
2 
that charge following a jury-waived trial in the District Court.  
The conviction was affirmed by the Appeals Court in a divided 
opinion, see Commonwealth v. Liebenow, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 387, 398 
(2013), and we granted the defendant's petition for further 
appellate review. 
 
The defendant claimed as an affirmative defense at trial 
that he lacked the requisite specific intent to steal because he 
honestly, albeit mistakenly, believed that the property he 
removed from the site was abandoned.  The judge, however, 
erroneously viewed the affirmative defense as requiring proof 
that the defendant's belief was objectively reasonable.  This 
misperception appears to have arisen from the conflation of two 
distinct concepts that have appeared over time in our 
jurisprudence:  the concept of good faith belief, which is 
subjective, and the concept of reasonable belief, which is 
objective.1  We take this opportunity to resolve the resulting 
confusion.  As the dissent in the Appeals Court correctly stated: 
                     
1 In Commonwealth v. Liebenow, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 387, 391-
394 (2013), the Appeals Court relied on language in Commonwealth 
v. White, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 488 (1977), and Commonwealth v. 
Anslono, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 867, 867–868 (1980), in support of the 
proposition that, as to the issue of belief, a defendant can be 
acquitted of larceny only if he honestly and reasonably believed 
that the money he took was his own.  A number of other appellate 
decisions have cited with approval the reasonable belief language 
in Commonwealth v. White, supra, and Commonwealth v. Anslono, 
supra, in discussing the defense of mistaken belief in connection 
with the specific intent crimes of larceny and robbery.  See, 
 
3 
 
"[W]ith respect to specific intent crimes such as 
larceny, . . . [t]he question for the fact finder is not 
whether the defendant has behaved reasonably but instead 
whether he actually possessed the requisite mental state. 
 
 
". . .  
 
 
"[W]here a defendant puts at issue his belief that the 
property he took had been abandoned, . . . the Commonwealth 
must prove that the defendant 'knew that he had no right to 
the property taken,' . . . not merely that a reasonable 
person in the defendant's position would have known" 
(citation omitted). 
 
Commonwealth v. Liebenow, supra at 405, 409 (Milkey, J., 
dissenting). 
 
Here, the defendant adequately raised the defense of honest 
belief that the items he took were abandoned, and it was the 
Commonwealth's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant's subjective belief was not honestly held but, instead, 
was a pretense or sham.  Therefore, the conviction must be 
vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the evidence that the judge, 
as fact finder, could have found to support the charge of 
larceny.  We then summarize the evidence introduced by the 
defendant, in the light most favorable to him, that a fact finder 
                                                                  
 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Vives, 447 Mass. 537, 540–541 (2006); 
Commonwealth v. Gelpi, 416 Mass. 729, 731 (1994); Commonwealth v. 
Larmey, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 281, 283–285 (1982).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Garrity, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 349, 358 n.7 (1997), 
cert. denied, 524 U.S. 954 (1998) (fiduciary embezzlement). 
 
4 
could have found to conclude that the defendant honestly believed 
that the property was abandoned. 
 
a.  Commonwealth's evidence.  On the morning of July 27, 
2010, the defendant was driving around Pittsfield in his sport 
utility vehicle (SUV), in search of junk metal that he could 
sell.  He drove onto Amy Court, a privately owned cul-de-sac, 
which was the site of a proposed twenty-six-unit condominium 
complex then in the process of being constructed.  Several signs 
stating "no trespassing" and "private property" had been posted, 
construction had been completed on only one unit, and the 
construction site contained company trucks, construction 
equipment, and a "job" trailer.  Construction company workers had 
stacked leftover lengths of steel pipe and steel plates, intended 
for use on other projects, in an area at the bottom of the cul-
de-sac where there was no construction.  The items had been 
placed behind a pile of top soil to keep them from view, so that 
the area would appear attractive to prospective purchasers of the 
lots, and there were no trash receptacles or discarded materials 
in sight. 
 
Kenneth Lufkin, an employee of the developer, observed the 
defendant drive down to the end of the cul-de-sac; because the 
tailgate of the defendant's SUV had been removed, Lufkin was able 
to see that the back of the SUV was empty.  The defendant drove 
 
5 
behind the pile of top soil and out of Lufkin's view, but Lufkin 
could hear what sounded like steel banging.2  Lufkin stopped the 
defendant as he was driving from the cul-de-sac toward the public 
street.  When Lufkin asked the defendant what he was doing, the 
defendant said that he was just picking up some junk steel, and 
drove away.  Lufkin turned around to see what was in the back of 
the SUV and saw several steel plates and lengths of steel pipe.  
He wrote down the defendant’s license plate number, then 
contacted his employer and the police. 
 
Officer James Parise of the Pittsfield police department was 
dispatched to Amy Court, where he spoke with Lufkin and 
determined that there had been a larceny of some property from 
that location.  The defendant's vehicle subsequently was located 
at a junkyard that purchased scrap metal.  Parise went to the 
junkyard and spoke with the defendant, who admitted that he had 
taken the items he had in his vehicle, but said that they had not 
come from Amy Court.  The defendant agreed to accompany Parise to 
Amy Court; Lufkin and the project developer, Amy Kroboth, met 
them at the construction site.  Lufkin identified the material in 
the back of the defendant's vehicle as items which had been taken 
                     
2 Kenneth Lufkin testified that, in the past, construction 
workers on the site had encountered people dumping trash on the 
vacant lots and, as a result, several signs stating "no 
trespassing" had been placed on trees at the end of the cul-de-
sac in order to prevent people from coming onto the property and 
discarding trash. 
 
6 
from the Amy Court property, and the defendant returned the 
items.  Kroboth thereafter requested that the defendant be 
charged with larceny. 
 
At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, the defendant 
moved for a directed verdict; his motion was denied. 
 
b.  Evidence viewed favorably to defendant.  The defendant 
testified that he believed the construction debris and other 
items he had collected had been abandoned and did not belong to 
anyone.  The defendant knew that people dumped trash at the end 
of Amy Court.  During the mid-morning hours of July 27, the 
defendant drove his vehicle to the end of the Amy Court cul-de-
sac in search of discarded metal items that had been left or 
dumped on a dirt trail leading into the woods which began at the 
end of the paved cul-de-sac.  This was one of several places to 
which he drove that morning in search of junk metal.3  The 
defendant was unaware of the no trespassing signs, and did not 
know that Amy Court was then a private road that, according to 
Kroboth, had not yet "been accepted by the city" as a public 
street.  The defendant made no effort to conceal what he was 
                     
3 Officer James Parise of the Pittsfield police department 
testified that, at the time he encountered the defendant at the 
junk yard, "[t]here was all kinds of junk in the back of [the 
defendant's] vehicle; not only stuff that was reported missing 
from the property, but just scrap metal in general."  It is 
unclear from the record when these items were placed in the 
defendant's sport utility vehicle (SUV), and whether they were 
collected before or after the defendant left Amy Court. 
 
7 
doing.  He had driven to that location previously to collect junk 
metal; and he conducted his search for scrap metal during 
daylight hours.  The defendant drove from the paved road onto a 
dirt trail leading into the woods, and saw two lengths of steel 
pipe, which he picked up and placed in his SUV, along with other 
items. 
 
The defendant was leaving the area when he encountered 
Lufkin, who had driven down the road to meet him.  The defendant 
stopped his vehicle, and Lufkin accused him of dumping.4  When 
the defendant replied that he was "just picking up junk steel," 
Lufkin said he did not have a problem with that, and the 
defendant drove off.  Later, when he was met by Parise at the 
junkyard, the defendant admitted taking the steel pipes, and said 
he believed they had been abandoned.  He also testified, as he 
had told Parise, that there were steel plates in his vehicle that 
did not come from Amy Court.  At Parise's request, the defendant 
voluntarily returned to Amy Court.  There, he met with Parise, 
Lufkin, and Kroboth.  The defendant returned the two lengths of 
                     
4 Lufkin testified that on at least one prior occasion he 
had seen the defendant drive down to the end of Amy Court, and 
noticed that there were tires tied to the top of his SUV.  This 
caused Lufkin to be concerned that the defendant "was going to 
try to dump the tires down below."  The defendant also testified 
that he believed Lufkin was concerned primarily with whether he 
was dumping items. 
 
8 
steel pipe Lufkin identified as belonging to the developer of Amy 
Court; he was not asked to return the steel plates.5 
 
c.  Closing arguments.  In closing, defense counsel directed 
the judge's attention to Commonwealth v. White, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 
483 (1977), and argued that the case "stands for the proposition 
that the defendant is not guilty of larceny if the defendant had 
a mistaken but honest belief the defendant was entitled to the 
property."6  Counsel maintained that, because the defendant 
"honestly thought he was entitled to have" what he believed was 
abandoned property, and returned it when it was claimed by the 
owner, the Commonwealth failed "to prove[] beyond a reasonable 
doubt that [the defendant] intended to permanently deprive [the 
owner] of the property." 
                     
5 Lufkin testified that when the defendant and Parise 
returned to Amy Court, the defendant claimed the flat pieces of 
steel were from another site; Lufkin acknowledged that the 
defendant returned the lengths of pipe.  Lufkin's employer 
testified that all of the materials identified by Lufkin as 
having been taken were returned. 
 
6 The defendant in Commonwealth v. White, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 
483 (1977), was charged with stealing fifty dollars from his 
employer at gunpoint in a bar.  Based on the defendant's 
testimony, "it was open to the jury to find" that the defendant's 
employer owed him fifty dollars in wages; seeing the employer in 
the bar, the defendant demanded his money, and the employer threw 
it down on the bar counter, whereupon the defendant, believing 
the money was his, took it and left; he did not point his gun at 
the employer.  Id. at 485.  The Appeals Court reversed the 
defendant's conviction after concluding that the jury had not 
been not properly instructed.  Id. at 488-489. 
 
9 
 
The prosecutor argued that, even if the defendant's belief 
were an honest one, that belief also had to be objectively 
reasonable.  He pointed to evidence that the construction 
materials had been hidden behind a pile of top soil, that signs 
stating the area was private property had been posted on trees in 
the vicinity of the dirt pile, and that the defendant had 
admitted to taking the items from that area as support for the 
prosecutor's claim that the defendant’s belief was not 
reasonable. 
 
d.  Verdict.  The judge rejected the defendant's argument.  
In announcing his verdict, the judge stated that "the presence of 
the no trespassing sign puts [the defendant] on notice that the 
property was not for [him] to take.  [The defendant's] honest 
belief at that point would not be relevant."7 
 
2.  Discussion.  The offense of larceny is defined in G. L. 
c. 266, § 30 (1), as follows:  
 
"Whoever steals, or with intent to defraud obtains by a 
false pretence, or whoever unlawfully, and with intent to 
steal or embezzle, converts, or secretes with intent to 
convert, the property of another as defined in this section, 
whether such property is or is not in his possession at the 
time of such conversion or secreting, shall be guilty of 
larceny . . . ." 
                     
7 Apparently believing that the holding of Commonwealth v. 
White, supra, was limited to factual circumstances involving the 
taking of money from a person, similar to the circumstances in 
that case, the judge also suggested, incorrectly, that a 
"different intent" applies to larceny offenses that do not 
involve taking money. 
 
10 
 
To convict a defendant of larceny requires that the Commonwealth 
prove that a defendant took the personal property of another 
without the right to do so, and "with the specific intent to 
deprive the other of the property permanently."  Commonwealth v. 
Murray, 401 Mass. 771, 772 (1988). 
 
a.  Honest but mistaken belief.  A defendant has 
sufficiently raised the defense of mistaken belief "if any view 
of the evidence" would support a factual finding that the 
defendant honestly believed that the items he took were 
abandoned.  Commonwealth v. Vives, 447 Mass. 537, 541 (2006). 
 
Here, in addition to the defendant's testimony that he 
believed that the property he took had been abandoned, there was 
evidence at trial, viewed favorably to the defendant, from which 
a fact finder could have inferred that, notwithstanding the 
presence of the no trespassing signs, the paved cul-de-sac named 
Amy Court, as well as the construction site surrounding it, were 
open to the public to permit inspection of the lots on which 
townhouses were to be constructed.  The evidence also permitted 
the inference that the defendant's denials to Parise of having 
taken anything from "Amy Court" reflected a misunderstanding as 
to the location the officer meant when he referred to "Amy 
Court"; there was evidence that the defendant was unaware that 
the paved cul-de-sac was private property, or that the dirt trail 
 
11 
at the end of that cul-de-sac was part of the Amy Court 
development then under construction.  The left-over lengths of 
steel pipe taken by the defendant were behind a pile of soil, in 
an area where no construction was then taking place. 
 
b.  Law on offense of larceny.  It has been long established 
that the specific intent to steal is negated by a finding that a 
defendant held an honest, albeit mistaken, belief that he was 
entitled to the property he took.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Brisbois, 281 Mass. 125, 128-129 (1932) (jury correctly 
instructed that, if defendant "honestly thought" he had legal 
right to remove wooden building, "then there was no criminal 
intent to steal"); Commonwealth v. McDuffy, 126 Mass. 467, 469, 
471 (1879) (where defendant charged with statutory forerunner of 
G. L. c. 266, § 30 [1], trial judge erred in excluding evidence 
"competent upon the issue of the defendant's belief" that money 
he took was due him); Commonwealth v. Stebbins, 8 Gray 492, 495 
(1857) (court noted as "clearly unexceptional" jury instruction 
"that the defendant was not guilty of larceny, if she took the 
money under an honest belief that she had a legal right to take 
it").  See also Commonwealth v. Weld, Thacher's Crim. Cas. 157, 
163 (Boston Mun. Ct. 1827) (judge instructed, "if [the defendant] 
honestly thought he had a right to the paper, it excludes the 
idea of a felonious taking"). 
 
12 
 
Twenty-five years before Commonwealth v. White was decided, 
the United States Supreme Court held in Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246, 271 (1952), that an honest, though 
mistaken, belief that property was abandoned is a defense to 
larceny.8  Noting that stealing government property was a crime 
of specific intent, the Court held that evidence of a defendant's 
honest belief should have been presented to the jury, and 
reversed the defendant's conviction, stating: 
 
"[I]t is not apparent how [the defendant] could have 
knowingly or intentionally converted property that he did 
not know could be converted, as would be the case if it was 
in fact abandoned or if he truly believed it to be abandoned 
and unwanted property. 
 
 
". . . 
 
 
"Whether that intent existed, the jury must determine, 
not only from the act of taking, but from that together with 
[the] defendant’s testimony [that he believed the spent 
casings to be abandoned] and all of the surrounding 
circumstances. . . . [On proper instructions, the jury] 
might have concluded that the heaps of spent casings . . . 
presented an appearance of unwanted and abandoned junk, and 
that lack of any conscious deprivation of property . . . was 
indicated by [the defendant's] good character, the openness 
of the taking, crushing and transporting of the casings, and 
the candor with which it was all admitted." 
 
                     
8 The facts in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 
(1952), are quite similar to those here:  the defendant, who 
collected and sold junk metal, found several spent bomb casings 
on an Air Force bombing range that was known to be good hunting 
grounds and was frequented by hunters.  Id. at 247.  Several 
signs stating "Danger -- Keep Out -- Bombing Range" were placed 
on the range.  The defendant loaded the casings into his truck in 
broad daylight, and testified that he believed the property was 
abandoned.  Id. at 247-248. 
 
13 
Id. at 271, 276. 
 
c.  Source of reasonable belief language.  The decision in 
Commonwealth v. White, supra, appears to have departed from this 
settled principle when, in summarizing the law, the Appeals Court 
stated that the jury must acquit a defendant of larceny if they 
find "that the defendant honestly and reasonably believed that 
the money he took from [the victim] represented a debt actually 
due from [the victim] to the defendant" (emphasis supplied).9  
Id. at 488. 
                     
9 Commonwealth v. Low, Thatcher's Crim. Cas. 477 (Boston 
Mun. Ct. 1837), which is quoted in Commonwealth v. White, supra 
at 486-487, makes use of the "reasonably believed" language, and 
may have been one source of confusion.  In Commonwealth v. Low, 
supra at 480, 485, the jury were instructed, 
 
"The question of [the defendant's] intention is for the 
jury in all cases, and it is to be inferred from all the 
circumstances of the case . . . .  If the defendant has 
satisfied you, or you believe from all the evidence in the 
case, that [the defendant] acted with good faith on his 
part, that he reasonably believed that he had a good cause 
of action . . . , and that he might lawfully use this 
trustee process in this manner, to obtain security for his 
demand, that will negative the felonious intent, and will 
authorize you to give a verdict of acquittal." 
 
In that case, the defendant, who was indebted to the victim, 
gave the victim notes as collateral security for the amount due 
plus interest.  The Commonwealth alleged that, as part of a 
fraudulent scheme, the defendant obtained a writ of trustee 
process that was to be served on his codefendant as soon as the 
codefendant was able to obtain the notes from the victim, who was 
bringing them in anticipation of payment.  The judge further 
instructed, "A felonious taking supposes not only a trespass, but 
a fraudulent and wicked mind in the trespasser, acting against 
his own conviction of right, and the plain dictates of common 
 
14 
 
The addition of a requirement of a reasonable belief is 
inconsistent with the White court's reliance on cases such as 
Commonwealth v. McDuffy, supra, and Commonwealth v. Weld, supra.  
Indeed, the White court observed that the jury should have been 
instructed as the defendant had requested,10 "because it was open 
to the jury to find on [the defendant's] testimony that he 
honestly believed that he was taking his own money from [another] 
and that if the jury had so found, they could not have found the 
requisite intent to steal and would have been obliged to acquit 
the defendant of larceny."  Commonwealth v. White, supra at 486.  
Moreover, in framing the question of honest belief, the court 
noted that the implications of the cases on which it relied "are 
confirmed by the authoritative writers in the field of criminal 
law."  Id. at 487. 
 
Among those authorities, the White court quoted R.M. 
Perkins, Criminal Law 271 (2d ed. 1969), for the proposition 
                                                                  
 
honesty," id. at 479, and that the jury could consider whether 
the defendant had a reasonable belief that he could take out the 
writ and obtain the notes in the way that he did.  If the jury 
believed that the defendant had a "fraudulent plan" to transfer 
the notes from the victim's possession to his own, and that the 
defendant was "aware at the time that he committed a wrongful 
act, [the jury would] have the right to infer . . . that the 
defendant had a preconcerted design to get the notes into his 
possession, with the intent to steal them."  Id. at 484. 
 
10 The defendant had requested an instruction that, "[i]f the 
defendant believed that the money he had acquired from [the 
victim] was actually his money, [the] defendant is not guilty of 
a charge of larceny."  Commonwealth v. White, supra at 485. 
 
15 
that, under the then-prevailing view of the law, "no larceny is 
committed if the taking is open . . . and with a bona-fide belief 
in the right to collect the debt in that manner."  Commonwealth 
v. White, supra.  That treatise also states, "[S]o long as the 
claim [of mistaken belief] is genuine and sincere there is no 
larceny, even if it is quite ill-grounded."  R.M. Perkins, 
Criminal Law, supra at 265-266.  The court in White also cited 
R.A. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 456, at 90-
91 (1957),11 and W.R. LaFave & A.W. Scott, Criminal Law § 88, at 
638, and § 94, at 693-695 (1972),12 for the same principle.  As 
they continue to do to date, these authorities explicitly 
rejected a requirement that such an honest belief also must be 
objectively reasonable.  See W.R. LaFave & A.W. Scott, Criminal 
Law, supra at § 88, at 638 (where person takes property under 
mistaken belief he owns it, it was abandoned, or he was given 
                     
11 "A defendant does not commit larceny if he takes property 
of another under the honest belief that it is his property. . . . 
The defendant is not guilty of larceny if he has acted under a 
bona fide belief that a person giving him the permission to take 
the property had authority to do so, or that one whom he assists 
in the taking has a right thereto" (footnotes omitted).  R.A. 
Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law & Procedure § 456, at 90-91 
(1957). 
 
12 "One may take the property of another honestly but 
mistakenly believing (1) that it is his own property, or (2) that 
it is no one's property, or (3) (though he knows it is another's 
property) that the owner has given him permission to take it as 
he did."  W.R. LaFave & A.W. Scott, Criminal Law § 88, at 638 
(1972).  See id. at § 94, at 693-695 (1972). 
 
16 
permission, "he lacks the intent to steal required for larceny, 
even though his mistaken but honest belief was unreasonable" 
[footnotes omitted]).13 
 
Based on the foregoing, we do not think that the Appeals 
Court in Commonwealth v. White, supra at 488, intended to depart 
from the long-established principle that an honest belief need 
not be objectively reasonable to negate the specific intent 
required for larceny, despite its use of the phrase "honestly and 
reasonably believed."  The discussion of the cases and 
authorities in Commonwealth v. White, reflects that court's 
understanding of "[t]he rather simple rule that an honest mistake 
of fact or law is a defense when it negates a required mental 
element of the crime."  W.R. LaFave & A.W. Scott, Criminal Law 
§ 47, at 357 (1972).  It is of some significance that the White 
court was not asked to focus specifically on the question whether 
reasonableness of belief was a concept separate from good faith 
belief, and reasonableness of the defendant’s belief was neither 
raised nor discussed.  As W.R. LaFave & A.W. Scott, Criminal Law, 
                     
13 Since 1977, commentators have continued to state that the 
specific intent required to be found guilty of larceny may be 
negated where a defendant holds a mistaken but honest belief that 
the property he is charged with stealing was his to take.  See 3 
W.R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 19.5(a), at 88 (2d ed. 
2003); R.M. Perkins & R.N. Boyce, Criminal Law 326 (3d ed. 1982).  
See also Model Penal Code § 223.1(3)(a)-(b) (1980) ("It is an 
affirmative defense to prosecution for theft that the actor:  
[a] was unaware that the property or service was that of another; 
or [b] acted under an honest claim of right . . . ."). 
 
17 
supra, also notes, that "simple rule" may be misapplied "because 
of uncritical acceptance of the general statement that the 
mistake must be reasonable." 
 
 Evidence of reasonableness may, however, be considered by 
the jury to assist in their determination whether to credit a 
defendant's honest belief.14  "Neither juries nor judges are 
required to divorce themselves of common sense, but rather should 
apply to facts which they find proven such reasonable inferences 
as are justified in the light of their experience as to the 
natural inclinations of human beings."  United States v. Tejeda, 
974 F.2d 210, 213 (1st Cir. 1992), quoting United States v. 
Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1991).  See W.R. 
LaFave & A.W. Scott, Criminal Law, supra at § 88, at 638 ("the 
openness of the taking, as well as the reasonableness of the 
belief, though not conclusive, will buttress [a defendant's] 
claim of good faith"); R.M. Perkins & R.N. Boyce, Criminal Law 
326 (3d ed. 1982) ("A mere pretense advanced in bad faith will 
                     
14 We note that the current version of Instruction 8.520, 
Supplemental Instruction 7, of the Criminal Model Jury 
Instructions for Use in the District Court (2009) includes the 
same incorrect language on "reasonable belief": 
 
"Claim of right.  If the defendant took another 
person's property in an honest and reasonable belief that 
(he) (she) (another person on whose behalf he [she] was 
acting) had a legal right to it, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty, even if that belief was in fact 
mistaken, because he [she] lacked the intent to steal." 
 
18 
not prevent conviction of larceny . . .").  See also Morissette 
v. United States, 342 U.S. at 276 (considering evidence of 
defendant's awareness that "casings were on government property, 
his failure to seek any permission for their removal and his 
self-interest as a witness," jury could disbelieve his profession 
of innocent intent). 
 
d.  Affirmative defense of honest belief.  A defendant may 
raise an honest, yet mistaken, belief as an affirmative defense.15  
See Commonwealth v. Vives, 447 Mass. at 540-541.  A defendant's 
honest belief that the property he took was abandoned constitutes 
an affirmative defense to larceny.  Abandoned property is 
property "to which the owner 'has relinquished all right, title, 
claim, and possession, but without vesting it in any other 
person.'"  Griffith v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 414 Mass. 
824, 828 (1993), S.C., 420 Mass. 365 (1995), quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary 3 (6th ed. 1990).  See Black's Law Dictionary, 1411 
(10th ed. 2014) (defining "abandoned property" as "[p]roperty 
that the owner voluntarily surrenders, relinquishes, or 
disclaims"). 
                     
15 Although we use the term affirmative defense, in this 
context the Commonwealth nonetheless bears the burden of proof 
because the defense addresses an element of the offense of 
larceny, the defendant's specific intent to steal.  Once a 
defendant meets the burden of production, the burden of proof 
shifts to the Commonwealth to disprove the defense.  Commonwealth 
v. Vives, 447 Mass. 537, 541 (2006). 
 
19 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment of conviction is vacated and 
set aside, and the matter is remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.