Case Title: Gezzi v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Gezzi v. State1990 WY 105800 P.2d 485Case Number: 89-275Decided: 10/05/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
SANDRA GEZZI, 

APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

Marvin J. 
Johnson of Edwards & Johnson, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne and Paul S. 
Rehurek, Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Sandra 
Gezzi appeals from a judgment and sentence of the district court which sentenced 
her to three years of probation. She pled guilty to two counts of uttering 
forged checks in violation of W.S. 6-3-602(a)(iii) (June 1988 Repl.). The issues 
raised in this appeal address the constitutionality of W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 
Repl.). All of the issues raised are disposed of by the court's opinion in 
Billis v. State, etc., No. 88-250, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990). Therefore, 
we affirm the district court's judgment and sentence.

[¶2]      Gezzi contends 
for these propositions:

I. Does the prosecutorial 
veto contained in § 7-13-301 (W.S. 1977) violate the constitutional mandate of 
separation of powers?

II. Was the prosecutorial 
veto provision of § 7-13-301 (W.S. 1977) unconstitutionally enacted?

III. Did the prosecutor's 
refusal to consent to first offender treatment for appellant violate her rights 
to due process?

IV. Did the prosecutor's 
arbitrary and capricious refusal to consent to sentencing pursuant to § 7-13-301 
violate article 1, § 2 and article 1, § 7 of the Wyoming 
Constitution?

[¶3]      We reject the 
first issue, violation of separation of powers, for the reasons discussed in 
Billis, at 412-427. The second issue, concerning enactment of the statute, is 
disposed of in Billis, at 427-433.

[¶4]      As to the third 
issue, Gezzi has made no individual argument, but, rather, incorporated by 
reference materials from briefs in other cases which have now been decided in 
Billis. Although we do not usually permit such matters to be incorporated by 
reference, we have made an exception here. See Cambio v. State, No. 89-169, 800 P.2d 482 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990). Since Gezzi made no individual argument, and since 
we have decided in Billis that the statute does not operate in such a manner as 
to offend the constitutional rights of defendants, we can only conclude that 
Gezzi's due process rights were not offended in any manner by W.S. 
7-13-301.

[¶5]      Finally, Gezzi 
claims that the prosecutor's decision was arbitrary and capricious. We held in 
Billis that the prosecutor's control of a prosecution is committed to his sound 
discretion and we will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless 
it is based on suspect factors such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification. Billis, at 465. This record raises no question in that 
regard.

[¶6]      The judgment and 
sentence of the district court is affirmed.

MACY, J., files a concurring 
opinion.

URBIGKIT, C.J., files a 
dissenting opinion.

MACY, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶7]      I concur simply 
because Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. Nos. 88-250, 88-304, 88-310, 88-311, 
88-312, and 89-4, October 5, 1990), is controlling. I am, however, still firmly 
convinced that the power and duty to adjudicate should be exclusively in the 
judiciary. See my dissenting opinion in Billis.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶8]      I do now and will 
continue to dissent in this case and others similarly postured as I did in 
Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. 1990) (Nos. 88-250, 304, 310, 311, 312 and 
89-4, 10/5/90), and all of its ignoble progeny. Although I judicially subscribe 
to stare decisis, its application will never permit me to disregard the Wyoming 
Constitution.1

[¶9]      Each of these 
additional cases provide a separate incorrectly adopted, ill-advised 
justification, while this court's majority continues to strive rigorously to 
defend a constitutionally and precedentially unsupportable position. This case 
extends further in announcing a most curious supposition currently found in case 
law. In addressing discretion of the State to authenticate invasion into the 
judicial function of sentencing following guilt determination, this court's 
majority now acclimatizes that exercised discretion with racial 
non-discrimination.

[¶10]   In the first place, the function is 
not prosecutorial diversion - it is embedded in the judicial sentencing 
responsibility. Without citation of authority, the majority then 
states:

We will not interfere 
with the exercise of that discretion [to apply a sentencing veto] unless it is 
based on suspect factors such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification.

This court has 
never previously categorized exercise of discretion as a racial, religious, or 
sex discrimination concept, nor has the array of cases cited by the majority in 
Billis. In those cases, discretion could be related to the present fundamental 
law of Wyoming which we defined in Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 
1986) (citation omitted), and have since frequently repeated:

Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.

[¶11]   Exercised discretion, justified or 
improvident, is not confined to civil rights as a concept. Conversely, civil 
rights violations do not involve discretion, but instead, deliberate mutilation 
of the fundamental interests of the American society and our constitutional 
provisions. About the only thing that the prosecutorial veto cases are not are 
civil rights litigation.

[¶12]   The majority has switched 
justification and logic of the administrative agency action from an arbitrary 
and capricious criteria to a civil rights discrimination analysis. The proper 
test is not color, race, or sex, but arbitrary and capricious review, State v. 
Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607, 618 (1977) (Leonardis II), (patent abuse 
of discretion), as a judicial inquiry in analysis of administrative action. In 
State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503, 432 A.2d 74, 79-80 (1981) (footnote omitted), a 
case confidently cited by the majority in Billis, that court said:

As we stated in Leonardis 
II, supra, 73 N.J. at 381, 375 A.2d 607, judicial review of a prosecutor's 
decision whether or not to suspend criminal charges infringes on both the 
Legislature's power to define crimes and the Executive's responsibility to 
enforce the laws and therefore must be performed with sensitivity. Since the 
Legislature has established a PTI [pretrial intervention] program with judicial 
review, the trial court correctly concluded that the problem of judicial 
interference with legislative authority has been eliminated. Nevertheless, our 
concern about unwarranted interference with prosecutorial prerogative persists 
as a reason for requiring that a trial court find a patent abuse of discretion 
before ordering enrollment in a PTI program without prosecutorial 
consent.

Retention of the 
Leonardis II standard does not mean, as the trial court presumed, that arbitrary 
and capricious action on the part of prosecutors not amounting to a patent and 
gross abuse of discretion will go unchecked. As discussed in the previous 
section, we stated in Bender that a trial court should remand an application to 
the prosecutor if it finds that the prosecutor's denial of the application was 
an abuse of his discretion, even if the abuse was not patent and gross. See 
[State v.] Bender, supra, 80 N.J. [84] at 94, 402 A.2d 217 [(1979)]. Because a 
remand interferes less with prosecutorial authority than does an order 
suspending prosecution, this procedure does not raise the same concerns about 
the separation of powers that necessitated a narrower standard of review in 
Leonardis II. Cf. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 575 & n. 12, 95 S. Ct. 1851, 1861 & n. 12, 44 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1975) (preferable course when trial 
court finds that decision not to bring suit was arbitrary and capricious is to 
remand, because an order to initiate suit would raise separation of powers 
problems). By remanding upon finding an abuse of discretion, courts can assure 
prosecutorial compliance with procedural guidelines and observance of the 
legislative standards for PTI and protect defendants against arbitrary and 
irrational decisionmaking without supplanting the prosecutor's primacy in 
determining whether PTI is appropriate in individual cases.

See also State 
v. Collins, 90 N.J. 449, 448 A.2d 977 (1982).

[¶13]   In a related inquiry defining 
Oregon law, the court responsibility was to "determine whether a reasonable 
basis exits [for the administrative decision]." State ex rel. Harmon v. 
Blanding, 292 Or. 752, 644 P.2d 1082, 1088 (1982). That review obviously 
addresses the normal administrative agency arbitrary and capricious criteria for 
exercised discretion. The Kansas court described the pretrial diversion 
discretion rule similarly in State v. Greenlee, 228 Kan. 712, 620 P.2d 1132, 
1139 (1980) by stating that "[t]he prosecutor, although possessing wide 
discretion is not immune from judicial review of the exercise of that discretion 
for arbitrariness." See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S. Ct. 663, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, reh'g denied 435 U.S. 918, 98 S. Ct. 1477, 55 L. Ed. 2d 511 
(1978).

[¶14]   The California court in Esteybar v. 
Municipal Court for Long Beach Judicial Dist. of Los Angeles County, 5 Cal. 3d 119, 95 Cal. Rptr. 524, 528-29, 485 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1971), 
stated:

Under our system of 
separation of powers, we cannot tolerate permitting such an advocate to possess 
the power to prevent the exercise of judicial discretion as a bargaining tool to 
obtain guilty pleas. A defendant is entitled to have an independent 
determination of whether he should be held to answer on a felony or a 
misdemeanor, and this is not possible when the exercise of judicial discretion 
depends on the "pleasure of the executive." ([People v.] Tenorio, [3 Cal. 3d 89] 
at p. 93, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993 [(1970)].)

* * * * * *

* * * Article III, 
section 1 of the California Constitution provides: "The powers of state 
government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the 
exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted 
by this Constitution."

What this case 
teaches is that uncontrolled prosecutorial meanness, in overreaching advocacy 
control of the intrinsic judicial obligation for criminal offense sentencing, is 
ignored in real terms of abuse of discretion and is disconnected from its 
violation of the separation of powers under the Wyoming 
Constitution.

[¶15]   The prosecutor, as assisted by this 
court in conviction affirmation, Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972 (Wyo. 1989), sent 
Mr. Gezzi off to the Wyoming State Penitentiary for alleged "bad touching" and 
sexual abuse of his children. Unfortunately, that rehabilitative action under 
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 15, did not leave his wife and children with sufficient 
resources for adequate supply of food under the resulting DPASS-welfare status. 
Sandra Gezzi, without those resources to supplement food stamps and welfare 
funds for the family, forged eleven checks totalling $488.412 on the 
account of her incarcerated husband to local grocery and general merchandise 
stores. The account was not favored by sufficient funds for check clearance. 
Immediately detected and arrested, Sandra Gezzi, without any prior criminal 
involvement, entered into a plea bargain for a guilty plea to felony offenses 
for two of the grocery checks with dismissal of eight others and the apparent 
disappearance of the eleventh. Probation was not opposed by the prosecutor with 
restitution to be provided. Her explanation:

     THE DEFENDANT: Both of 
them were checks that I wrote on a closed account of my husband's. My husband is 
in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. I wrote them both for food. It was getting 
towards the end of the month and my food stamps had run out.

     THE COURT: So you went 
some place and obtained food by tendering a check drawn on an account that you 
knew was closed?

     THE DEFENDANT: That's 
correct, sir.

     THE COURT: Did you 
sign your husband's name?

     THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I 
did.

[¶16]   Counsel for Sandra Gezzi argued for 
a first offender status and a W.S. 7-13-301 non-felony conviction application, 
but the representative of the district attorney's office exercised a 
prosecutorial veto. The explanation found in Sandra Gezzi's trial brief 
was:

In fact, during 
discussions with the prosecutor in this case, counsel asked what authority 
existed for the interpretation that multiple offenses precluded first offender 
status. The prosecutor stated he needed no authority; the Legislature left the 
decision up to the prosecutor, and that is how he chose to interpret the 
statute. Furthermore, the prosecutor's decision to disallow first offender 
treatment where a defendant stands upon his or her rights punishes the exercise 
of those rights and offends the Constitutions of the United States and 
Wyoming.

[¶17]   The explanation given by the 
prosecutor at the sentencing hearing, after plea had been entered and accepted, 
was:

      [PROSECUTOR]: 
Your Honor, it's the State's position that when 301 is requested and it's not 
given it doesn't necessarily need to be a part of a charge concession, that it 
not or that it be given. This is not a situation where Mrs. Gezzi has pled 
guilty to all the charges, and in this case the State dropped nine counts, and I 
would submit that should we have to come back on this because of the question of 
301 that we need to start from the very beginning again with all eleven counts 
and that's simply what I meant to indicate. Our file indicates that nine counts 
were dropped, that she would plead to two and the State would not object to 
probation and there would be no 301, and I would submit that that is a charge 
concession.

[¶18]   I ask the question about this 
welfare supported housewife who is left to support her family on public funds 
after the societal proclivity for incarceration is vented upon the wage earner: 
What discretion was exercised in any rational fashion and how can society be 
benefited in forcing upon this woman the status of a convicted felon? The result 
is particularly obnoxious to me since, here again, the prosecutorial advocate 
makes the decision without the good sense to relate demanded punishment of a 
felony status to any beneficial result to anyone, either in deterrence or 
societal benefit.

[¶19]   I totally refuse to limit 
characterization of properly exercised discretion to constitutional 
discrimination based on race, color, or creed. How about a single parent trying 
to feed her family until the incarcerated father can return to assist in 
maintenance by wage earner income?

[¶20]   Should Sandra Gezzi never want to 
have a weapon for her family's protection, never have the desire to vote, or 
never want to try to advance her own capabilities in education and employment, 
it may not matter. It does matter to me, because it is wrong to give the 
advocate a big slice of the judicial sentencing authority and discretion to be 
exercised by veto without any rational justification.

[¶21]   It matters to me because we give 
power to the prosecutor to determine indiscriminately punishment without the 
judicial responsibility to "support, obey and defend" the Constitution and to do 
justice impartially. The advocate and the judiciary share very different 
responsibilities in the justice delivery system. Here we give a significant 
share of that judicial power without assessing judicial responsibility to the 
litigative advocate. It is both philosophically and constitutionally 
wrong.

[¶22]   Consequently, I again respectfully 
dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 Compare, however, 
Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 Wn. & Lee L.Rev. 281 
(1990).

2 Sandra Gezzi was ordered 
to make full restitution in the amount of $510.41.