Case Title: Roberts v. SAIF

Citation: 

Docket Number: S52078

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: June 15, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Compensation of
Clifton R. Roberts, Claimant,
CLIFTON R. ROBERTS,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
SAIF CORPORATION
and BUTLER FORD, INC.,
Respondents on Review.
(Agency No. 02-07221; CA A122465; SC S52078)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted June 22, 2005.
Robert F. Webber, of Black, Chapman, Webber, Stevens &
Peterson, Medford, argued the cause and filed the petition for
petitioner on review. 
David L. Runner, Appellate Counsel, SAIF Corporation, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents on review. 
Before Carson, Chief Justice,** and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,*** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of the
Workers' Compensation Board are affirmed.
Durham, J., concurred and filed an opinion in which Riggs,
J., joined.
*Judicial Review from the Workers' Compensation Board. 196 Or App 414, 102 P3d 752 (2004).
** Chief Justice when case was argued.
*** Chief Justice when decision was rendered.
KISTLER, J.
A coworker backed a company pickup into claimant while
claimant was riding a motorcycle at work.  Claimant filed a
workers' compensation claim.  Employer resisted the claim on the
ground that a statutory exclusion for injuries incurred "while
engaging in or performing * * * any recreational or social
activit[y] primarily for the worker's personal pleasure" applied. 
See ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B) (stating exclusion). (1)  The Workers'
Compensation Board held that the exclusion applied, and the Court
of Appeals affirmed.  Roberts v. SAIF, 196 Or App 414, 102 P3d
752 (2004).  We allowed claimant's petition for review and now
affirm the Court of Appeals decision.
Claimant worked as a sales person for an automobile
dealership.  One day, a coworker brought his motorcycle to work. 
The general manager took a ride on the motorcycle before work. 
Later that day, another employee rode the motorcycle.  During the
day, while the sales people were waiting for customers, claimant
rode the motorcycle on the sales lot.  As claimant was bringing
the motorcycle back to park it in one of the service bays,
another employee backed a company pickup into claimant, severely
injuring him.
Claimant filed a workers' compensation claim, which his
employer denied.  Claimant asked for a hearing.  Before the
hearing, the parties stipulated that riding motorcycles was not a
function of claimant's job.  They also stipulated that riding the
motorcycle "served no business purpose, and the employer gained
no benefit from [claimant's] riding of the motorcycle."
After considering the evidence, the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) ruled that claimant's injury arose out of and in the
course of his work.  See ORS 656.005(7)(a) (stating requirement
for injury to be compensable).  The ALJ reasoned that the injury
"arose out of" the work because the risk of being hit by a moving
vehicle was inherent in claimant's job.  He also concluded that
the injury occurred "in the course of" claimant's work because
employer required its sales people to remain on the premises even
when customers were not present.
The ALJ determined that ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B), which
sets out an exclusion relating to certain recreational and social
activities, did not preclude claimant's injury from being
compensable.  The ALJ reasoned that ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B) applies
only when a worker's injury results from a recreational or social
activity.  The ALJ found that claimant's injury had not resulted
from riding the motorcycle; rather, it had resulted from his
coworker's failure to watch where he was going while driving the
company pickup.  Because ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B) did not render the
injury noncompensable, the ALJ directed employer to accept
claimant's workers' compensation claim.
The board reversed, relying on ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B). 
The board reasoned that, under the plain wording of that statute,
the exclusion is not limited to injuries that occur "as the
result of" engaging in recreational and social activities; it
also applies to injuries that an employee incurs "while engaging
in or performing" recreational or social activities.  The board
found that, in this case, claimant had been injured while he was
engaged in a recreational activity -- riding the motorcycle.
The board then turned to the question whether claimant
had engaged in that activity "primarily for [his] personal
pleasure."  On that point, the board noted that claimant had
"testified * * * that he enjoyed riding motorcycles and that
there was no work-related reason for him to be riding the
motorcycle at the time of the accident."  The board found that,
based on that evidence, claimant had been riding the motorcycle
primarily for his own personal pleasure rather than for work-related reasons.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the board's order
for essentially the same reasons.  See Roberts, 196 Or App at
417-19 (following board's reasoning).
On review, claimant argues that his "primary job (when
not actively engaged in selling to a customer) was to be on the
premises, available for customers."  He notes that, even though
he rode the motorcycle for his own pleasure, "doing so did not
take [him] away from his primary work function of being available
for a customer [coming onto the lot]."  (Emphasis omitted.) 
Claimant contends that both the board and the Court of Appeals
failed to consider the nature of his work in deciding whether
riding the motorcycle was only an incidental departure from his
primary work activity.
ORS 656.005(7)(a) provides, as a general rule, that an
injury will be compensable only if it "aris[es] out of and in the
course of employment."  ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B) states an additional
limitation on compensable injuries.  See Andrews v. Tektronix,
Inc., 323 Or 154, 161 n 1, 915 P2d 972 (1996) (explaining
relationship between ORS 656.005(7)(a) and ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B)). 
It provides that a "'[c]ompensable injury' does not include * * *
[an] [i]njury incurred while engaging in or performing, or as the
result of engaging in or performing, any recreational or social
activities primarily for the worker's personal pleasure."  ORS
656.005(7)(b)(B). 
Textually, ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B) raises three questions. 
The first is whether the worker was engaged in or performing a
"recreational or social activit[y]."  The second is whether the
worker incurred the injury "while engaging in or performing, or
as the result of engaging in or performing," that activity.  The
final question is whether the worker engaged in or performed the
activity "primarily for the worker's personal pleasure."  If the
answer to all those questions is "yes," then the worker cannot
recover.
Regarding those issues, there is little dispute that,
in the context of this case, riding the motorcycle was a
"recreational activity." (2)  Similarly, even though claimant's
injury did not occur "as the result of" engaging in a
recreational activity, it did occur, as the board found, "while
engaging in * * * [that] recreational activity."  The latter
statutory phrase requires a temporal rather than a causal
connection -- a conclusion that follows both from the plain text
of that phrase and from our obligation to give, if possible, each
part of the statute meaning.  See Vsetecka v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 337 Or 502, 510, 98 P3d 1116 (2004) (stating interpretative
principle).  The remaining question is whether claimant was
engaged in that activity "primarily for [his] personal pleasure."
In analyzing that question, we begin with the text of
that phrase and its context.  As used in this context, the word
"primarily" means "first of all: fundamentally, principally
* * *."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1800 (unabridged ed
2002).  As the legislature's use of the word "primarily" implies,
a worker may engage in a recreational or social activity for
reasons other than personal pleasure, and the board's task is to
determine whether the worker's personal pleasure was the
principal or fundamental reason for engaging in the activity.  As
the text also implies, in carrying out that task, the board
should consider whether the worker was engaged in the activity
primarily for the worker's personal pleasure or for work-related
reasons.
A review of the legislative history confirms that
that was the legislature's intent.  In 1986, an interim House
Task Force proposed, among other changes to the workers'
compensation law, a provision that would reverse a Court of
Appeals decision, Beneficiaries of McBroom v. Chamber of
Commerce, 77 Or App 700, 713 P2d 1095, rev den'd, 301 Or 240
(1986).  See, e.g., Testimony, House Task Force on Occupational
Disease, October 8, 1986, Ex G (statement of Ken Johnson)
(stating that reason for provision).  In McBroom, a salesperson
attending a work-related conference in Los Angeles died, while
intoxicated, in a hot tub.  77 Or App at 702.  In deciding
whether his widow had a compensable workers' compensation claim,
the Court of Appeals began from the proposition that "traveling
employees are considered to be within the scope of employment
while away from home" and that injuries suffered during the
course of those travels ordinarily will be compensable.  Id. at
703 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  The court
recognized, however, that the injury would not be compensable if
the worker injured himself while engaged in "a distinct departure
on a personal errand."  Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).  Because the Court of Appeals concluded that
that exception did not apply, it held that the death was
compensable.  Id. at 704.
In seeking to reverse that ruling, the task force
drafted a bill that would have added the following provision to
the workers' compensation statutes:  An injury will not be
compensable if the worker "incurred [it] while engaging in or
performing, or as the result of engaging in or performing, any
recreational or social activities for the worker's personal
pleasure."  House Task Force on Occupational Disease, October 8,
1986, Ex A (Sept 9, 1986 draft bill).
Some members of the task force expressed concern over
the breadth of the proposed exclusion.  Representative Hooley
observed that the exclusion could mean that "taking a
recreational walk would disqualify certain work related claims
automatically."  Minutes, House Task Force on Occupational
Disease, Oct 8, 1986, 30.  Representative Kotulski stated that he
shared Representative Hooley's concern and suggested adding the
phrase "and not in any way connected with employment activities"
after the word "pleasure."  Id.  Alternatively, Representative
Kotulski suggested limiting the scope of the exclusion to
recreational or social activities that the employer had not
encouraged, while another representative proposed limiting the
exclusion to recreational or social activities that lacked a
"demonstrable relationship" with the employer's interests.  Id.
Ultimately, the task force could not agree on a
solution to the problem and submitted, during the next
legislative session, a draft bill that contained the same wording
that had caused its members concerns.  Id.; see House Committee
on Labor, HB 2271, Bill File (Nov 11, 1986 draft bill) (retaining
same wording).  At a hearing on that bill, a staff person for the
House Labor Committee noted the task force's concern over the
breadth of the proposed wording.  Minutes, House Committee on
Labor, HB 2271, March 25, 1987, 4.  One committee member
explained that the committee was not trying to prevent injuries
from being compensable if the employer had benefitted from the
recreational or social activity.  Tape Recording, House Committee
on Labor, HB 2271, March 25, 1987, Tape 69, Side B.  A witness
suggested adding the phrase "and of no benefit to the employer"
after the word "pleasure" to make that intent clear.  Id.
(statement of Jim Edmunson).  However, Representative Kotulski
objected that, "[i]f we added that, I think that we'd be opening
up the whole hot tub case again."  Id.  After discussing the
question, the committee decided not to amend that section of the
bill, but the chair explained that the committee intended that
the exclusion would apply to only those recreational and social
activities "that clearly do not benefit the employer."  Id.
(statement of Representative Shiprack) (emphasis added).
The issue arose again when the bill reached the Senate
Labor Committee.  Senator Hill, the chair of the committee,
proposed resolving it by adding the word "solely" before the
phrase "for the worker's personal pleasure."  Senator Hill
explained his reasons for proposing the amendment:
"My feeling on offering this amendment is to
indicate that we're not talking about something that
the worker may be engaged in which is actually a part
or within the scope of employment.  For instance, a
working lunch in which the worker is eating and may
find pleasure in the experience of eating salmon, or
something, and may choke on a salmon bone and therefore
incur a compensable injury.  * * *  What we're trying
to get at are those recreational or social activities
that are not part, that are not part of the work, that
are performed solely for the worker's personal
pleasure.  And that would help clarify that."
Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Labor, HB 2271, June 8, 1987,
Tape 201, Side A (statement of Senator Hill).  The committee
approved the amendment, and the legislature enacted the bill as
amended.
In 1990, the legislature returned to the issue and
substituted the word "primarily" for "solely" in ORS
656.005(7)(b)(B) (1987), amended by Or Laws 1990, ch 2, § 3.  A
proponent of that amendment testified that it
"basically just cleans up something in the '87
legislature that you may recall, the hot tub case.  It
really just kind of cleans up the language, making that
provision that was already enacted a little more
meaningful."
Tape Recording, Special Committee on Workers' Compensation, SB
1197, May 3, 1990, Tape 7, Side B (statement of Constance Wold). 
Although another witness opposed the amendment, the committee
adopted it without further discussion, and the legislature
enacted the bill.
As the legislative history confirms, the legislature
intended that the board should determine both the degree to which
a recreational or social activity serves the employer's work-related interests and the degree to which the worker engaged in
the activity for the worker's personal pleasure.  Only if the
worker's personal pleasure was the fundamental or principal
reason, in relation to work-related reasons, for engaging in the
activity will the resulting injury be noncompensable.
With that standard in mind, we turn to the board's
resolution of this case.  As noted, claimant argues that his act
of riding the motorcycle advanced a work-related interest (being
available on the sales lot) as well as his own personal pleasure. 
In his view, the board erred in two respects:  First, in not
recognizing that his recreational activity served a work-related
purpose and, second, in not finding that the work-related purpose
was primary. (3)
Although there is evidence from which the board could
have found that claimant's presence on the sales lot (even while
riding the motorcycle) served a work-related purpose, there is
also evidence from which the board could have drawn a different
inference.  For instance, claimant stipulated that "the riding of
the motorcycle by [claimant] * * * served no business purpose,
and the employer gained no benefit [from that activity]."  Given
that stipulation, we cannot say that substantial evidence does
not support the board's finding that "there was no work-related
reason for [claimant] to be riding the motorcycle at the time of
the accident."  See Garcia v. Boise Cascade Corp., 309 Or 292,
295, 787 P2d 884 (1990) (explaining substantial evidence
standard).  Substantial evidence also supports the board's
finding that claimant rode the motorcycle for his personal
pleasure.  Having made those findings, the board did not err in
concluding that claimant engaged in the recreational activity
primarily for his personal pleasure -- that is, that the
fundamental or principal reason that he rode the motorcycle was
for his personal pleasure.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of
the Workers' Compensation Board are affirmed.
DURHAM, J., concurring.
I join the majority's conclusion that the Workers'
Compensation Board did not err in deciding that, in enacting ORS
656.005(7)(b)(B), the legislature has excluded claimant's injury
from the scope of those injuries that are compensable under
Oregon's Workers' Compensation Law, ORS 656.001 to 656.990.
Today's decision is the first from this court to
interpret ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B) since the legislature adopted that
provision in 1987.  I write separately to discuss an additional,
and perhaps unforeseen, consequence of ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B). 
Understandably, the majority opinion does not delve into that
topic, because it is beyond the scope of this judicial review. 
However, if ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B), as presently drafted,
potentially will produce an outcome that the legislature never
anticipated and may not have desired, the legislature will
benefit from prompt notice of that fact so that it might revisit
the issue in the future.
In overview, Oregon's Workers' Compensation Law
obligates every employer to qualify as either a carrier-insured
employer or a self-insured employer and, thus, to maintain
assurance that subject workers of the employer "will receive
compensation for compensable injuries as provided by this chapter
* * *."  ORS 656.017(1).  If an employer satisfies that
obligation, then ORS 656.018 confines the employer's liability
exclusively to the terms of the Workers' Compensation Law.  ORS
656.018 provides, in part:
"(1)(a) The liability of every employer who satisfies
the duty required by ORS 656.017(1)is exclusive and in
place of all other liability arising out of injuries,
diseases, symptom complexes or similar conditions
arising out of and in the course of employment that are
sustained by subject workers, the workers'
beneficiaries and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages from the employer on account of such conditions
or claims resulting therefrom, specifically including
claims for contribution or indemnity asserted by third
persons from whom damages are sought on account of such
conditions, except as specifically provided otherwise
in this chapter.
"* * * * *
"(2) The rights given to a subject worker and the
beneficiaries of the subject worker under this chapter
for injuries, diseases, symptom complexes or similar
conditions arising out of and in the course of
employment are in lieu of any remedies they might
otherwise have for such injuries, diseases, symptom
complexes or similar conditions against the worker's
employer under ORS 654.305 to 654.336 or other laws,
common law or statute, except to the extent the worker
is expressly given the right under this chapter to
bring suit against the employer of the worker for an
injury, disease, symptom complex or similar condition."
"* * * * *
"(7) The exclusive remedy provisions and
limitation on liability provisions of this chapter
apply to all injuries and to diseases, symptom
complexes or similar conditions of subject workers
arising out of and in the course of employment whether
or not they are determined to be compensable under this
chapter."
(Emphasis added.)
The provisions emphasized above make it clear that the
injured worker's statutory right to compensation turns on whether
the worker has suffered a "compensable injury."  However, those
statutes also create an employer immunity from worker claims
(other than those grounded in or authorized by the Workers'
Compensation Law) that is not linked to the compensability of the
underlying injury.  ORS 656.018(2) declares that the claimant's
statutory right to benefits is "in lieu of" other remedies for
injuries or diseases that arise out of and in the course of
employment.  ORS 656.018(7) provides that the statutory
compensation remedy is the injured worker's exclusive remedy for
all injuries arising out of and in the course of employment
regardless of the compensability of the injury.
ORS 656.005(7)(a) defines "compensable injury" as "an
accidental injury, or accidental injury to prosthetic appliances,
arising out of and in the course of employment requiring medical
services or resulting in disability or death * * *[,]" subject to
certain limitations for consequential and combined
conditions. (4)  However, ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B) declares that
certain injuries from "recreational or social activities" are not
"compensable" injuries.  That subsection, which is the
interpretive focal point of this case, provides:
"(b) 'Compensable injury' does not include:
"* * * * *
"(B) Injury incurred while engaging in or
performing, or as the result of engaging in or
performing, any recreational or social activities
primarily for the worker's personal pleasure * * *."
As the majority correctly points out, the legislature
incorporated into that statutory provision alternative bases for
excluding recreational or social activity injuries.  First, that
provision excludes injuries that are the result of engaging in or
performing any recreational or social activities primarily for
the worker's personal pleasure.  The term "result," in context,
incorporates the familiar concept of legal causation as a
requirement for exclusion.  Thus, that prong of the provision
excludes an injury from compensability only if the recreational
or social activity caused the injury.
In addition, ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B) excludes from
compensability any injury incurred while engaging in or
performing any recreational or social activities primarily for
the worker's personal pleasure.  The majority correctly infers
from the text of that prong of the statutory provision that the
legislature did not intend that text to incorporate a requirement
of legal causation.  Reading in another causation requirement 
would create a needless redundancy:  The first prong of the
provision, discussed above, excludes from compensability any
injury that a recreational or social activity causes.  To accord
interpretive significance to the legislature's use of the term
"while," the majority correctly reads that term to exclude an
injury from compensability if there is a temporal coincidence
between the injury and a recreational or social activity.  Thus,
the statutory provision excludes from compensability any injury
that occurs at the same time that the employee engages in or
performs a recreational or social activity, even if the injury
arises out of and in the course of employment and the sole source
of the risk of injury is the workplace.
The legislature's exclusion based on a temporal
coincidence between the injury and the employee's recreational or
social activity renders claimant's injury noncompensable.  Here,
the immediate cause of claimant's injury was the errant driving
behavior of a co-worker -- a classic work-related risk -- not
carelessness by claimant in operating a motorcycle.  Nonetheless,
ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B) renders the injury noncompensable because it
occurred while claimant was engaged in the recreational activity
of attempting to park a motorcycle.  The facts that claimant
simultaneously was carrying out his work assignment, i.e.,
waiting on the employer's lot for customers to arrive, and was
paid for his time, are immaterial.  The principal relevant fact
is the temporal coincidence between claimant's injury and the
recreational or social activity in which he was engaged.
ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B) will pose interpretive problems
for the board and the courts in the future.  The scope of the
phrase "recreational or social activities" is one potential
source of difficulty.  Do the terms "recreational" and "social,"
as modifiers of "activities," refer to a set of organized
activities, behaviors or events, or do they instead describe the
employee's motive in engaging in a broad range of actions at
work, whether alone or with others, that are not purely work
assignments?
The phrase "primarily for the worker's personal
pleasure" necessarily invites litigation over the employee's
state of mind in engaging in or performing recreational or social
activities.  That will be true even if the activity is one that
the employer has assigned to the worker as part of the job.  Does
the statute render an injury noncompensable if the worker
incurred it while engaged in an employer-mandated recreational
activity that the worker was only too happy to perform (e.g.,
testing an employer's camping products while backpacking in a
scenic wilderness)?
The most significant consequence of the enactment of
ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B) will not be the sorts of interpretive
difficulties to which I have alluded and which the board and the
courts will address in due time.  Rather, it is in respect to the
tort law ramifications of (1) the legislature's categorical
exclusion of a class of work-related injuries from the scope of
"compensable" injuries under the Workers' Compensation Law; and
(2) the restriction of the worker's remedy for a work-related
injury to that set out in the Workers' Compensation Law whether
or not the injury is compensable.
In Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 23
P3d 333 (2001), this court held that Article I, section 10, of
the Oregon Constitution limits the authority of the Oregon
legislature to restrict a worker's right to seek a remedy by due
course of law for injuries resulting from another person's
negligence in the workplace. (5)  In that case, the claimant
had developed an occupational disease in his lungs due to the use
of harsh chemicals in the workplace.  The employer denied his
claim for compensation, and an administrative law judge upheld
the denial, because the claimant had failed to prove that the
workplace was the major contributing cause of the disease, as the
Occupational Disease Law, ORS 656.802 to 656.807, required.  Id.
at 87.
The worker brought an action in court against the
employer for negligence.  The employer argued that, even if the
worker had suffered a work-related injury but could not receive
compensation, the statutes sheltered the employer from tort
litigation by restricting the worker to the remedies provided in
the workers' compensation system whether or not the injury was
compensable.
On appeal, this court determined that the employer had
interpreted the statutes correctly.  However, this court
concluded that the statutes had left the worker with no remedy
for his work-related illness.  Because the worker's illness was
an injury respecting the "person," in the constitutional sense,
for which the common law had afforded a remedy, this court held
that Article I, section 10, deprived the legislature of the
authority to deny a remedy to the worker.  Id. at 135-36.  This
court stated that:
"[t]he exclusive remedy provisions of ORS 656.018
(1995) are unconstitutional under the remedy clause,
because they leave the worker with no process through
which to seek redress for an injury for which a cause
of action existed at common law."
Id. at 135.  The court remanded the worker's negligence claim to
the trial court for further proceedings.
The legislature's policy choice with respect to a
worker's injury incurred during recreational or social activities
is analogous to the policy choice addressed in Smothers regarding
injuries or diseases for which the workplace is less than the
major contributing cause.  The legislature has declared that
injuries incurred as the result of, or while, performing
recreational or social activities are not compensable.  Yet the
legislature also has declared that the remedies in the Workers'
Compensation Law are claimant's exclusive remedy for injuries and
diseases arising out of and in the course of employment whether
or not those injuries and diseases are compensable.  Like the
occupational disease in Smothers, claimant's injury arose out of
and in the course of employment.  In net terms, the legislature
has attempted to exclude claimant's injury from compensability
and to preclude claimant from recovering any remedy in any other
forum.
There is little doubt that claimant suffered an injury
to his "person," in the constitutional sense, when the co-worker
drove into him.  It is also clear that, at common law, the
employer was exposed to liability if he failed to provide a
reasonably safe place in which to work, such as by hiring
incompetent workers who exposed other workers to dangerous
conditions in the workplace. (6)
The foregoing discussion compels the conclusion that,
under the logic of Smothers, the legislature cannot exclude
claimant's injury from compensability under the Workers'
Compensation Law and, at the same time, preclude claimant from
resorting to another forum, such as Oregon's courts, to obtain a
remedy for his workplace injury.  The remedy clause in Article I,
section 10,
"mandates that a remedy be available to all persons --
including workers -- for injuries to 'absolute' common-law rights for which a cause of action existed when the
drafters wrote the Oregon Constitution in 1857."
Smothers, 332 Or at 136.
Therefore, the combined effect of ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B)
and ORS 656.018(1)(a), (2), and (7) now leaves employers exposed
to liability in tort to workers for injuries that result from or
occur during recreational or social activities and that arise out
of and in the course of employment.  Whether the legislature
intended that consequence is beside the point; it is nonetheless
the predicable outcome of an examination of the legislature's
statutory policy choices in light of the legal principle that
Article I, section 10, embodies.  The question whether to alter
the policy choice reflected in any of the statutes discussed
above is for the legislature to decide. (7)
I concur.  
Riggs, J., joins in this concurring opinion.
1. ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B) provides that a "'[c]ompensable
injury' does not include * * * [an] [i]njury incurred while
engaging in or performing, or as the result of engaging in or
performing, any recreational or social activities primarily for
the worker's personal pleasure."
2. To qualify as "recreational or social activities," an
employee's action must be "recreational" or "social" and also an
"activity."  As the board found and the Court of Appeals
explained, in the context of this case, riding a motorcycle was
both "recreational" and an "activity."  See Roberts, 196 Or App
at 417-18 (discussing that issue).
3. Claimant also argues that any injury incurred during a
recreational or social activity should be compensable if the
activity involved only an incidental departure from work.  In his
view, only if the activity was a significant departure from work
should an injury be noncompensable.  Claimant does not identify a
textual basis in ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B) for his proposed rule, and
it appears to reinstate the exception to compensability that the
Court of Appeals recognized in McBroom and that the legislature
sought to narrow.
4. Oregon law defines "occupational disease" in part as
"any disease or infection arising out of and in the course of
employment * * *[,]" ORS 656.802(1)(a), and considers an
occupational disease "an injury for employees of employers who
have come under this chapter * * * [']" subject to certain
requirements that pertain to occupational disease claims, ORS
656.804.  Consequently, the rules that govern whether a worker's
compensation remedy for an injury is an exclusive remedy apply
with equal force to an occupational disease.
5. Oregon Constitution, Article I, section 10, provides:
"No court shall be secret, but justice shall
be administered, openly and without purchase,
completely and without delay, and every man
shall have remedy by due course of law for
injury done him in his person, property, or
reputation."
6. In Smothers, this court analyzed Anderson v. Bennett,
16 Or 515, 19 P 765 (1888), in which the plaintiff suffered
blindness when his supervisor negligently ordered the plaintiff
to drill a hole in some rock, causing an explosion.  The court
held that the employer was exposed to liability for failure to
make reasonable provision for the plaintiff's safety in the
workplace.  Smothers noted that that rule was a part of the
common law in Oregon at the time of the adoption of the state
constitution in 1857.  Smothers, 332 Or at 131.
7. Since this court decided Smothers in 2001, the
legislature has made no change to the exclusive remedy policy
stated in ORS 656.018(7).