Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF CHARLES LEROY CRAGO AND OLIVE K. CRAGO, CO-TRUSTEES OF THE CRAGO RANCH TRUST u/t/a DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 1992, FOR A PRIVATE ROAD: ELK HORN RANCH, INC. V. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CROOK COUNTY, WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0007

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF CHARLES LEROY CRAGO AND OLIVE K. CRAGO, CO-TRUSTEES OF THE CRAGO RANCH TRUST u/t/a DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 1992, FOR A PRIVATE ROAD: ELK HORN RANCH, INC. V. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CROOK COUNTY, WYOMING2007 WY 158168 P.3d 845Case Number: S-07-0007Decided: 10/08/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF CHARLES LEROY CRAGO AND OLIVE 
K. CRAGO, CO-TRUSTEES OF THE CRAGO RANCH TRUST u/t/a DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 1992, 
FOR A PRIVATE ROAD:ELK HORN RANCH, 
INC.,Appellant(Petitioner),v.THE BOARD OFCOUNTYCOMMISSIONERS OF CROOK 
COUNTY, WYOMING,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCrookCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Max Main 
and Wade Nyberg of Bennett, Main & Gubbrud, PC, Belle Fourche, SD

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
M. Baron, CrookCounty and Prosecuting Attorney, Sundance, WY

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The Appellant in this 
case is the Elk Horn Ranch, Inc.  The owners of the Elk Horn Ranch are Werner 
and Dorothy Fortak.  
We will refer to the Appellant as the Fortaks in this opinion.  Charles and Olive 
Crago, and their son Jerry Crago, operate an adjoining ranch, although its owner 
is the Crago Ranch Trust.  We will refer to that entity as the 
Cragos.  The 
Cragos asserted that they had no enforceable means of access to their ranch 
because, in 2003, the Fortaks began denying the Cragos the use of a road that 
they had used for at least the preceding 50 years.  The Fortaks 
acquired the Elk Horn Ranch in 1987.  For this reason the Cragos sought a private 
road under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (LexisNexis 2007).  The need for a 
private road is not in dispute in this case.  The issues relate to the selection of which 
of two existing routes across the Fortaks' ranch was the most appropriate under 
the terms of the governing statute, and by what method the damages caused to the 
Fortaks, by the loss of their exclusive use of the route that was ultimately 
designated, is to be measured.

 
 
[¶2]      The Appellee in this 
case is the Crook County Board of CountyCommissioners (the Board).

 
 
[¶3]      We will affirm in 
part, reverse in part, and remand this matter to the district court with 
directions that the district court further remand it to the Board for additional 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶4]      The Fortaks raise 
these issues:

 
 
            
1.  The findings of fact and conclusion of law made by the 
Board are not supported by substantial evidence.

 
 
            
2.  The Board erred in selecting the route preferred by the 
Cragos as the route that does the least possible damage.

 
 
            
3.  The Board erred in selecting the route preferred by the 
Cragos as the route that is the most reasonable and convenient.

 
 
The Board essentially conformed its statement of the issues 
to that of the Fortaks, but adds that the Board did not act arbitrarily, 
capriciously, or abuse its discretion in resolving this matter.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
The Statute

 
 
[¶5]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
24-9-101 (LexisNexis 2007) provides the sole, and complete, remedy for 
landlocked owners to obtain access to their property.  Pine Bar Ranch, LLC v. 
Luther, 2007 WY 35, ¶ 9, 152 P.3d 1062, 1065 (Wyo. 
2007); Snell v. 
Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1046 
(Wyo. 1975).1  The statute that 
governs in the matter of private roads was dramatically changed in 2000, and, as 
a consequence, many of our cases that predate those amendments are not reliable 
sources of authority with respect to cases initiated after March 14, 2000.  2000 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 88, 
§§ 1-3.  
We set out the entirety of the current statute here:2

 
 
§ 24-9-101. Petition; initial hearing; appointment of 
viewers and appraisers; bond; rules.

 
 
            
(a)  Any person whose land has no outlet to, nor connection 
with a public road, may file an application in writing with the board of county 
commissioners in the county where his land is located for a private road leading 
from his land to some convenient public road.  The application shall contain the following 
information:

            
(i)  The legal description of the land owned by the applicant 
to which access is sought and a statement that the land is located within the 
county;

            
(ii)  A specific statement as to why the land has no legally 
enforceable access, other than a waterway, and whether the land is surrounded on 
all sides by land owned by another person or persons or a natural or man-made 
barrier making access unreasonably costly;

            
(iii)  A description of the applicant's efforts to purchase a 
legally enforceable access to a public road;

            
(iv)  A description sufficient to identify the general location 
of any access routes proposed by the applicant;

                        
(v)  The legal description and the names and addresses of the 
affected parties of all land over which any proposed access routes would 
cross.  
Affected parties includes the owners of record, owners of recorded 
easements and rights of way and any lessee, mortgagee or occupant of the land 
over which any proposed road would cross and may include the state of 
Wyoming;  
and

                        
(vi)  A statement as to whether any actions of the applicant or 
any person with the consent and knowledge of the applicant, caused the 
applicant's land to lose or to not have any legally enforceable access.

            
(b)  Within ten (10) days after filing an application with the 
board, the applicant shall give notice in writing by certified mail, with return 
receipt, to the affected parties of all lands over which any private road is 
applied for, of his pending application for a private road.  The notice shall 
include a complete copy of the original application and any amendments 
thereto.

            
(c)  The board shall review the application within thirty (30) 
days of its receipt and if the board finds the application contains the 
information required by subsection (a) of this section and notice has been 
provided in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, it shall schedule a 
hearing to determine whether the applicant has no legally enforceable access to 
his land.  The 
hearing shall be scheduled at a date that allows the applicant time to give all 
notice required under this section.

            
(d)  If the applicant has had access to his land and that 
access is being denied or restricted, the board of county commissioners may 
grant temporary access to the applicant over a route identified by the board 
until the application has been processed and finalized.

            
(e)  After the board has scheduled a hearing date under 
subsection (c) of this section, the applicant shall give written notice of the 
date, time and place of the hearing on the application, by certified mail with 
return receipt, to all affected parties named in the original application and 
any other landowners the board believes may be affected by the application or 
any alternative route which may be considered by the board or the viewers and 
appraisers.  
The written notice shall include a copy of the original application and 
any amendments thereto and shall be provided at least sixty (60) days prior to 
the pending hearing.  
If any affected party is a nonresident, and there is no resident agent 
upon which personal service can be had, then the notice may be published once a 
week for three (3) weeks in a newspaper published in the county.  The first 
publication shall be at least sixty (60) days prior to the hearing.

            
(f)  The board may assess to the applicant costs for acting on 
the application under this section and W.S. 24-9-103 and require the applicant 
to file a bond to pay for those costs.

            
(g)  All affected parties having an interest in the lands 
through which the proposed road or any alternative road may pass may appear at 
the hearing and be heard by the board as to the necessity of the road and all 
matters pertaining thereto.

            
(h)  If at the completion of the hearing the board finds that 
the applicant has satisfied the requirements of this section and access is 
necessary because the applicant has no legally enforceable access, the board 
shall appoint three (3) disinterested freeholders and electors of the county, as 
viewers and appraisers. Before entering upon their duties the viewers shall take 
and subscribe to an oath that they will faithfully and impartially perform their 
duties under their appointment as viewers and appraisers.  The board shall 
cause an order to be issued directing them to meet on a day named in the order 
on the proposed road, and view and appraise any damages and make a 
recommendation to the board.  Prior to meeting on-site to view the proposed 
road, the viewers shall give notice in writing to the applicant and affected 
parties of the lands through which the proposed road or any alternative road may 
pass, of the time and place where the viewers will meet, at least ten (10) days 
before viewing the road, at which time and place all persons interested may 
appear and be heard by the viewers.  The viewers and appraisers shall then proceed 
to locate and mark out a private road and alternative routes as they deem 
appropriate, provided the location of the road shall not be marked out to cross 
the lands of any affected party who was not given notice under subsection (e) of 
this section.  
The viewers 
and appraisers shall recommend the most reasonable and convenient route, 
provided that access shall be along section and boundary lines whenever 
practical.  The 
viewers and appraisers may recommend specific conditions that the board place on 
the road as the board deems necessary, including provisions for maintenance and 
limitations on the amount and type of use.  The proposed road shall not exceed thirty (30) feet in 
width from a certain point on the land of the applicant to some certain point on 
the public road, and shall be located so as to do the least possible damage to 
the lands through which the private road is located.  The viewers and 
appraisers shall also appraise any damages sustained by the owner over which the 
road is to be established and make full and true returns, with a plat of the 
road to the board of county commissioners.  The viewers and appraisers shall also 
determine whether or not any gates or cattleguards shall be placed at proper 
points on the road, and appraise any damages in accordance with that 
determination.

            
(j)  In determining any damages to be suffered by the owner or 
owners of the lands through which the access shall be provided, the viewers and 
appraisers shall appraise the value of the property before and after the road is 
in place.  
Damages also may include reasonable compensation for any improvements on 
the lands over which any private road is to be granted which were not paid for 
and will be used by the applicant.

            
(k)  All hearings under this section and W.S. 24-9-103 shall be 
held in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, as it applies 
to a contested case.  
The board shall enforce the provisions of this article in accordance with 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.  [Emphases added.]

 
 
[¶6]      We have concluded 
that once a landowner has proved that he has no "legally enforceable means by 
which he can gain access" to a public road, then he has demonstrated the 
"necessity" for a private road.  Pine Bar Ranch, at ¶ 9, 152 P.3d  at 1066.  In this case, the 
necessity for the private road is not disputed.

 
 
[¶7]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
24-9-103 (LexisNexis 20007) also pertains, so we set it out verbatim too:

 
 
§ 24-9-103. Report of viewers and appraisers; second 
hearing; order by commissioners; appeal.

 
 
            
(a)  The viewers and appraisers so appointed, or a majority of 
them, shall make a report of their recommendations to the board of county 
commissioners at the next regular session, and also the amount of damages, if 
any, appraised by them, and the person or persons entitled to such damages. Upon 
receiving the report of the viewers and appraisers, the board shall hold a 
hearing after twenty (20) days prior written notice to all affected parties 
having an interest in the lands through which the proposed road or any 
alternative road may pass, at which time the affected parties may address the 
report.  The 
board may either accept, reject or modify the report and recommendations.  The board shall select 
the most reasonable and convenient route for the access, provided that 
access shall be along section and boundary lines whenever practical.  In compliance with 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, the board shall issue an order 
specifying the route selected by the board, any conditions imposed by the board 
and any damages and costs to be paid by the applicant.

            
(b)  The applicant and any other person aggrieved by the action 
of the board including the amount of any damages awarded, may appeal to the 
district court at any time within thirty (30) days from the date of the 
order.

            
(c)  After the board of county commissioners has received proof 
of payment by the applicant of any damages and costs ordered to be paid, the 
board shall cause a certified copy of the order to be filed with the register of 
deeds declaring the road to be a private road, and citing in the order any 
conditions imposed by the board.

            
(d)  In addition to paying any damages to be suffered by the 
affected parties having an interest in the land through which the access shall 
be provided, the applicant shall be responsible for obtaining and for paying for 
any engineering and construction costs incurred concerning the location and 
construction of the road.

            
(e)  If the proposed private road is located in two (2) or more 
counties, or if all parties and the board of county commissioners so stipulate, 
the applicant may bring a private road action in district court in the county 
where any of the affected lands are located.  [Emphases added.]

 
 
The Parties to This Judicial Review

 
 
[¶8]      The Fortaks sought 
review of the Board's action in the district court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12, and 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2007).  Only the Board took part in the proceedings 
in the district court as a party opponent to the Fortaks.  In Miller v. Bradley, 
4 P.3d 882, 889 (Wyo. 
2000) we said:

 
 
Bradley claims that the Board of County Commissioners is 
precluded from appealing the district court order to this court by its failure 
to file an appeal with the district court.  The Board of County Commissioners is not a 
"person" as defined by the relevant statutes.  See Brandt v. TCI Cablevision of Wyoming, 873 P.2d 595 (Wyo.1994); 
Basin Electric Power 
Co-op., Inc. v. Dep't of Rev., 970 P.2d 841 (Wyo.1998); W.R.A.P. 12.01.  Therefore, that board could not appeal to the 
district court and cannot be scored for its failure to do so.  Additionally, as a 
practical matter, the Board of County Commissioners has no reason to appeal to 
the district court from its own decision--we assume it is not "aggrieved or 
adversely affected" by it own decision.  See W.R.A.P. 12.01.   However, an 
"aggrieved party may obtain review of any final judgment of the district court 
by appeal to the supreme court."   W.R.A.P. 12.11; Safety Medical 
Servs., Inc. v. 
Employment Security Comm'n, 724 P.2d 468, 471 (Wyo.1986); W.R.A.P. 
12.11.   
Because the Board of County Commissioners was a proper party (FN1) below, 
it is not precluded from appealing the district court order to this court.

 
 
(FN1.) The Board of County Commissioners is a proper party 
in the action before the district court because it acts as a "regulatory" body, 
not as an "adjudicative" body, under the private road statute.  See Antelope Valley 
Improvement Dist. v. Board of Equalization [Clarification], 4 P.3d 876 (Wyo.2000).

 
 
[¶9]      We question the 
soundness of our holding in Miller, and we will backtrack a bit from it.  Under the 
circumstances of the instant case, we hold that the Board acted principally as 
an adjudicatory body and probably should not have filled the role it has thus 
far played in these proceedings in the district court and in this Court.  The County and the 
Board may have an interest in the sensible laying out of roads throughout the 
County and that may appropriately be deemed as an exercise of its regulatory 
powers.  
However, the Board did not act in the defense of its regulatory powers in 
these appeals.  
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101 and 
18-3-504(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2007).

 
 
[¶10]   The Fortaks did not challenge the 
Board's acting as the principal respondent in the district court proceedings, 
and they do not challenge its role as Appellee in this appeal.  We do not consider 
this a circumstance that deprives this Court of its jurisdiction to resolve this 
appeal and so we proceed to respond to the issues raised by the Fortaks, 
cautioning that both the district court and similarly situated parties need to 
be more attentive to the concerns we expressed above.

 
 
The Standard of Review

 
 
[¶11]               
In Hoff v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2002 WY 129, 53 P.3d 107 (Wyo.2002), we 
reiterated the administrative agency action standard of review clarified in Newman v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2002 WY 91, 49 P.3d 163 (Wyo.2002). 

 
 
Judicial review of an agency action is directed by Wyo. 
Stat.  Ann. § 
16-3-114.

 
 
      In appeals where both 
parties submit evidence at the administrative hearing, Newman mandates that 
appellate review be limited to application of the substantial evidence 
test.  This is 
true regardless of which party appeals from the agency decision.  In addition, this 
court is required to review the entire record in making its ultimate 
determination on appeal.

 
 
      The substantial 
evidence test to be applied is as follows:  "In reviewing findings of fact, we examine 
the entire record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support 
an agency's findings.  
If the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot 
properly substitute our judgment for that of the agency and must uphold the 
findings on appeal.  
Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might 
accept in support of the agency's conclusions.  It is more than a scintilla of 
evidence."  Newman, at 
¶ 12.

 
 
      Even when the factual 
findings are found to be sufficient under the substantial evidence test, ... 
this court may be required to apply the arbitrary-and-capricious standard as a 
"safety net" to catch other agency action which prejudiced a party's substantial 
right to the administrative proceeding or which might be contrary to the other 
WAPA review standards.  [Newman provides a] purely demonstrative 
listing ... of situations which could warrant the consideration of the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard in addition to the substantial evidence 
test.  However, 
this appeal presents no such unique circumstances.

 
 

Hoff, 2002 WY 129, ¶¶ 5-8, 53 P.3d 107 (footnotes and 
some citations omitted).  This private road appeal presents no unique 
circumstances; therefore, we apply only the substantial evidence analysis.

 
 

Elk Horn Ranch v. Board of CountyCom'rs, 2002 WY 167 ¶ 7, 57 P.3d 1218, 1222 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
The Road not Taken

 
 
[¶12]   The principal source of controversy in 
this case is that there were two roads/routes already in existence and available 
for the Cragos to use.  Indeed, the record suggests that they used 
both roads from time to time.  The westerly route (also called Route #1) ran 
very near to the Fortaks' home, yard, building site for their retirement home, 
corrals, and calving area.  The reason the Fortaks denied the Cragos the 
use of the road was because that use also brought with it an ever-increasing 
proliferation of traffic (especially hunters), car lights (in the early and late 
hours of the day), dust, and noise to their farmstead.  The Fortaks felt 
justified in denying use of their road to the Cragos (and their visitors) 
because there was another road only a very short distance away to the east that 
ameliorated those problems, but still allowed them access to their home and 
ranch (the easterly route or Route #2).  However, it had several shortcomings in the 
eyes of the Cragos, the viewers and appraisers, and the Board.  Those shortcomings 
were that it was not as safe and was somewhat more circuitous and lengthy than 
Route #1.  In 
addition, it was only 16 feet wide as it crossed a reservoir along its way.  Route #2 was 
established under the private road statute in 2000.  That action was 
filed before the 2000 amendments to § 24-9-101 became effective, and the parties 
stipulated that the former statute would govern in that case, when it was tried 
after the effective date of the revised statute.  Elk Horn Ranch v. Croell Redi-Mix, Inc., 2002 WY 167, ¶ 3, 57 P.3d 1218, 1221 (Wyo. 
2002).3

 
 
[¶13]   Against this background, the Fortaks 
assert that the statute requires the viewers and appraisers to recommend "the 
most reasonable and convenient route," as well as to locate the road so as to do 
the "least possible damage to the lands through which the private road 
passes."  The 
Fortaks contend that the Board focused on the reasonableness and convenience of 
the road vis- -vis the Cragos, without really considering its reasonableness and 
convenience as to the Fortaks.  They also contend that the Board focused on 
possible expenses that the Cragos would incur if Route #2 were designated as the 
private road available to them, rather than the damage to the Fortaks' property 
if Route #1 was used.  
The Fortaks believed that their property would be seriously damaged by 
the Cragos' use of the road past their home, whereas they waived any damages at 
all if the Cragos accepted Route #2.  It is also apparent that the Board appeared 
to interpret the governing statute to require a 30-foot wide 
easement, rather than to recognize that it prohibited the easement from being more than 30 feet wide.  One of the central 
reasons the Board gave for rejecting Route #2 was that it would cost $60,000.00 
to widen it as it crossed the reservoir, as well as to make a few other 
changes.  On 
Route #1, the costs of changes and improvements deemed necessary by the viewers 
and appraisers were projected to be only $16,800.00.4  The Board made 
detailed findings, and we set out below the ones pertinent to this appeal:

 
 
            
d)  The most convenient road to the [Cragos] is Route #1, as 
stated by the [Cragos] and the viewers and appraisers report and testimony.

            
e)  There is no difference in distance to [the boundary of 
Cragos] real property from the State 
Highway.

            
f)  It is approximately (7) tenths of a mile across [the 
Fortaks], on either Route #1 or Route #2.

            
g)  It is 1.4 miles longer for the [Cragos] to get to their 
homesite by using Route #2 rather than Route #1 [the 1.4 mile difference is 
transversed solely on the Cragos property].  This is due to the hills, ridge and canyon on 
the [Cragos'] property.

            
h)  The least expensive route to the [Cragos], in view of 
construction and maintenance of the road from their home, is Route #1.  [The Fortaks] did 
not deny this fact.  
The [Cragos] would have to spend upwards of $60,000.00 to improve Route 
#2 across the [Cragos], [the Fortaks] and the State land to make the route 
usable year round since Route #2 needs to be graded, drained and aligned across 
the dam.

            
i)  Route #2  across the [Cragos], [Fortaks] and the State 
land is a haul road used by large trucks to haul sand from the Croell Redi-Mix 
sand pit.

            
j)  Route #1 is currently not a haul road.  It has been used as 
a haul road in the past but is no longer used as a haul road.

            
k)  Route #1 was the [Cragos'] traditional access to their 
property and was used by them for about 50 years.

            
l)  Route #1 has not substantially changed in location in the 
past 50 years except to move away from the buildings that are now occupied by 
the Fortaks on the Elk Horn Ranch, Inc., property.

            
m)  Route #1 has been improved into an all weather graveled 
road over the last 50 years by the [Cragos] and their family, by the Fortaks, by 
the previous owners of the Elk Horn Ranches, Inc., by the previous users of the 
Croell Redi-Mix sand pit, Riley Sand & Gravel and by Croell Redi-Mix until 
they obtained a private road over Route #2 which Croell Redi-Mix currently uses 
as a haul road.

            
n)  Route #2 has been somewhat improved by Croell Redi-Mix over 
the last 2 years since its establishment as a Private Road No. 231.

            
o)  Route #1 is safer than Route #2.  Route #2 is used 
for heavy trucks (commercial) and seasonal (summer) traffic.  Route #2 does not 
appear to be as safe as Route #1 especially for use by the [Cragos] and their 
families.  From 
the [video] tape it would appear that Route #2 has very little engineering 
(grade, culverts, drainage) when it was built.  The reservoir that Route #2 crossed did not 
show it had any design for high water other than to run across the road.  It appears to have 
been built as a dam and not a road.  The dam could be lowered to make the road 
wider, and thus safer for vehicular traffic but it may damage the dam.

            
p)  Route #2 appears from the [video] tapes, the hearing and 
the viewers and appraisers report to be more likely than Route #1 to have 
problems with snow and ice in winter limiting the [Cragos'] practical access to 
their property.

            
q)  Route #2 currently benefits the Croell Redi-Mix sand 
pit.  Route #1 
does not benefit the Croell Redi-Mix sand pit nor any other sand pit or mining 
operation.  
Route #1 cannot be used for access to the Croell Redi-Mix sand pit.

            
r)  [The Fortaks] did not quantify the diminished value of 
their property.

            
s)  [The Fortaks] did not make any claims for damages if Route 
#2 was awarded.

            
t)  Route #1 is the route that the Fortaks use to get to the 
Elk Horn Ranch, Inc., headquarters and buildings.

            
u)  [The Fortaks] claim that it would be more convenient for 
them if the [Cragos] used Route #2 since Route #1 goes through their calving and 
feeding area near their home.  They also stated the dust, noise and 
headlights cause problems for them and their livestock.

            
v)  The Viewers and Appraisers Report and their testimony 
discussed and analyzed the steepness, condition, safety, and problems with 
construction of both routes.  They found that Route #2 ran over a narrow 
earthen dam that would require work, and a cut through the ridge requiring heavy 
equipment and perhaps blasting.  They found that it would be safer, cheaper 
and more reasonable and convenient for the [Cragos] to use Route #1 rather than 
Route #2.

            
w)  The Viewers and Appraisers Report and testimony stated that 
Route #1 would be the better route to use by the [Cragos].  Where the road 
actually passes through the Elk Horn valley the noise and dust would still be 
about the same since the routes are not that far apart.

            
x)  There is approximately $2,550.00 in damages to [The Cragos] 
property by making Route #1 the Crago Private Road No. 242 based upon the 
viewers and Appraisers Report.  We adopt this amount as the claims for 
damages since no other comparable evidence was presented.  No damage amount 
was calculated for Route #2 because they were waived by [The Fortaks] if the 
[Cragos] chose Route #2 or if Route #2 was selected.

 
 
[¶14]   The viewers and appraisers had 
recommended damages in the amount of $2,550.00, a point that we will discuss 
more fully below.  
They also recommended some modifications to the road, but the Board 
rejected those.  
The Board also rejected recommendations that additional cattle guards be 
installed, that the County mandate additional graveling and other improvements, 
and that the Cragos be limited in the use of the road.

 
 
[¶15]   After careful consideration of the 
evidence presented before the Board, we conclude that there is substantial 
evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the Cragos should be granted a 
private road over Route #1.  A specific concern expressed by the Fortaks 
is that there is not substantial evidence that Route #1 was "safer" than Route 
#2.  Safety is 
not an item specifically enumerated by the statute.  However, "safety" 
is certainly not excluded, and we conclude that it does fit within the 
descriptive terms "reasonable" and "convenient," i.e., a safe road is more 
reasonable and convenient than one that is unsafe.  The testimony of 
the viewers and appraisers, the video tapes, and the findings detailed in their 
report constitute substantial evidence that Route #1 was safer.  

 
 
Damages

 
 
[¶16]   The viewers and appraisers found that 
the fair market value of the Fortaks' land was $2,000.00 per acre.  They claim that 
there is not substantial evidence to support this finding.  However, our review 
of the testimony reveals that there is substantial evidence on that point. 

 
 
[¶17]   The Fortaks also contend that the 
viewers and appraisers did not select the route that was most reasonable and 
convenient, and their findings to that effect are not supported by substantial 
evidence.  Our 
reading of the record is that the focus of the viewers and appraisers was to 
select the most reasonable and convenient route.  Much of the transcript, the video tapes, and 
many of the specific findings demonstrate that was a central concern of the 
process, and we conclude that substantial evidence supports the selection of 
Route #1.  In 
Reidy v. Stratton 
Sheep Co., 2006 WY 69, ¶¶ 28-32, 
135 P.3d 598, 608-10 (Wyo. 
2006) we held:

 
 
            
Consideration of convenience is demonstrated most clearly in Wagstaff.  The facts in Wagstaff were 
somewhat complicated, but they were key to our decision and bear repeating 
here:

 
 
      Grindstone Cattle 
Company ("GCC") owns a piece of real property which is commonly known as 
"Scott's Place" and another parcel of real estate which is north and west of 
Scott's Place and is separated from Scott's Place by a strip of land owned by 
the State of Wyoming and the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM").  Wagstaffs own real 
property that adjoins Scott's Place to the south.  A title search established there are no 
easements or rights of way of record evidencing any legally enforceable access 
to Scott's Place.  
While State Route 354 runs through Wagstaffs' property, it does not run 
through Scott's Place.  For over fifty years, GCC and its predecessors 
have had permissive use of a mile long roadway traversing 

Wagstaffs' land to access their property from State Route 
354.

 
 

Wagstaff, ¶ 3, 53 P.3d  at 80.  

 
 
The Board received evidence of other possible routes to the 
Scott's Place property.  County Road 150, the "Pape 
Road," to the east of Scott's place, was deemed not 
to be a viable option because the Green River lies between Scott's Place and the 
Pape Road, and there is no 
existing access without bridging across the river.  The only other 
possible means of access would be from the west and north, which would require 
traveling an extra 35 miles on State Route 354, County Road 112, and County Road 
115, and then traversing an additional 15 miles over dirt tracks across state 
and BLM property.

  

Id., ¶ 8, 53 P.3d  at 81.   On appeal, Wagstaff claimed the 
circuitous route through GCC's other piece of property provided the statutory 
outlet to or connection with a public road.  Id.  In response to 
Wagstaff's argument, we stated:

 
 
      Moreover, even if we 
were to hold that the unimproved dirt tracks on the State and BLM land 
constituted public roads, such a determination is not definitive in the analysis 
that must be made.  
As stated previously, the legislature in its enactment of § 24-9-101 
intended that the term "outlet" be such that it affords the landowner access via 
a convenient public road and that convenience and reason prevail in the 
establishment of roads.  While Wagstaffs argue that GCC should be 
required to use the route over the State and BLM unimproved dirt tracks because 
GCC could file a petition to require the needed maintenance on County Road 115 
and the unimproved dirt tracks across the State and BLM property and spend 
additional monies to improve the State and BLM unimproved dirt tracks so they 
would be generally passable on a year round basis, requiring GCC to take such 
acts simply does not fall within the legislature's expressed intention.

 
 

Id., ¶ 18, 53 P.3d  at 84.  Affirming the board, this Court agreed GCC 
should not be required to travel an extended route amounting to an additional 
fifty miles over roadways which were impassable for part of the year in lieu of 
establishing a mile long private road over Wagstaff's land.  Id., ¶ 3, 8, 20, 53 P.3d  
at 80-81, 84.

 
 
Although the legislature has amended other aspects of the 
statute, it has not done so to change our interpretation that convenience of the 
public road is a factor to be considered.  If this Court had incorrectly interpreted the 
legislature's intent, "legislative action to clarify the statutes and correct 
the court's decision would seem a likely result."  Albertson's, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 2001 WY 98 ¶ 21, 33 P.3d 161 
(Wyo.2001).

 
 
            
The convenience factor must, however, be applied judiciously.  Wyo. Const. Art. I, § 32 mandates 
that in order to constitutionally justify a private condemnation of property, 
there must be necessity.  Consequently, the inconvenience which would 
justify a private taking must be substantial.  In fact, it must be so substantial it is 
functionally equivalent to necessity.  Our case law bears this out.  We have never 
approved a private road simply on the basis that it would be more convenient to 
the applicant than another already existing means of access.  Rather, only when 
the record contains evidence showing the alternative access is obviously 
impractical and unreasonable has this Court approved the creation of a private 
road under the statutes.

 
 
            
Interpreting the statute to allow a finding of necessity when an 
applicant is seriously inconvenienced by an alternative route serves the 
purposes of the private road statute.  The statutory private road procedure replaced 
the common law way of necessity as the means for a landlocked property owner to 
gain access to his property.  Ferguson, 811 P.2d  at 290.  The legislature 
enacted the private road statutes to ensure a landowner can use his property for 
"productive purposes" while providing compensation to the burdened 
landowners.  
Id. at 289, citing 2 Thompson 
on Real Property §§ 362-368 (1980 Repl).  Stated another way, a private road granted 
pursuant to § 24-9-101, et. seq., allows the use and enjoyment of specific 
property by providing access.  Reaves, 782 P.2d  at 1137.  Thus, there is a 
"public good" consideration in granting a private road.  We explained in Hulse v. First Am. 
Title Co., 2001 WY 95, ¶¶ 30-33, 
33 P.3d 122, 132-33 (Wyo.2001) (some citations omitted):

 
 
[T]here is a public interest in giving access by 
individuals to the road and highway network of the state as a part and an 
extension thereof for economic reasons and the development of land as a resource 
for the common good, whether residential or otherwise.

 
 
* * *

 
 
Moreover, this court has held the right to condemn a way of 
necessity under constitutional and statutory provisions is an expression of 
public policy against landlocking property and rendering it useless.  As a consequence, 
the statute provides that any grant of a private road under its provisions 
requires a finding by the board that the property owner seeking its creation has 
no legally enforceable access to a public road and that the private road is 
"necessary" before it may enter its order declaring the creation of the private 
road.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
24-9-101-103.

 
 
            
If the purposes of the statute are to be served, we must take into 
account instances of substantial inconvenience.  We have recognized this concept in choosing 
between alternative routes when we have refused to require a landlocked property 
owner to choose a "wholly illogical, uneconomic, and unproductive road."  Ferguson, 811 P.2d  at 290.   See also, Martens v. Johnson 
County Bd. of Comm'rs, 954 P.2d 375, 380 (Wyo.1998).  Furthermore, we have refused to require 
private road applicants to overcome all obstacles before petitioning for a 
private road, Walton 
v. Dana, 609 P.2d 461, 463 
(Wyo.1980), or to consider routes in other counties, Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 463 
(Wyo.1995).  
These cases indicate that the statute must be interpreted practically and 
support our holding that a showing of substantial inconvenience may satisfy the 
necessity requirement of the private road statute.  See also, Peery v. Hill, 275 
Ky. 105, 120 S.W.2d 762, 764 (1938) (holding under the Kentucky private road 
statute, an applicant had proven necessity when he showed practical 
necessity):  
See M. DiSabatino, Way of Necessity Over Another's Land, Where a Means of 
Access Does Exist, But is Claimed to be Inadequate, Inconvenient, Difficult, or 
Costly, 10 A.L.R.4th 447 (1981), and cases cited therein.

 
 
[¶18]   It is evident from the record on appeal 
that the Board (and the viewers and appraisers) had to make a difficult decision 
between two roads.  
One eminently viable and the other just barely viable.  We will not second 
guess their ultimate decision, and we conclude that their decision is supported 
by substantial evidence.

 
 
[¶19]   However, the damage determination made 
by the Board (and the viewers and appraisers) has some significant flaws that we 
cannot ignore.  
The figure $2,550.00 was arrived at by this method of reasoning:  They applied the 
"before and after" method of appraisal by accepting that the value of the ranch 
was $2,000.00 per acre to ascertain the "before" value ($2,000.00 x 3,526 acres 
= $7,052,000.00).  
To obtain the "after" valuation, they determined that some modifications 
were needed to improve the road, and that those modifications would use up 2.55 
acres of ground.  
They then did this calculation:  2.55 acres x $2,000.00 = $5,100.00.  Because the Fortaks 
and Cragos would share the road, they divided that number in two to get the 
damages of $2,550.00.5  No damages were awarded for the length of the 
route because it was already "bought and paid for."  Thus, the "after" 
value was simply the "before" minus $2,550.00.

 
 
[¶20]   This is, of course, not a "before and 
after" appraisal by any stretch of the meaning of that phrase.  Relevant authority 
indicates that "before and after" appraisal is a phrase of art in the appraisal 
business.  See 
4 Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, § 13.0117 (Appraisal Techniques for Partial Takings) (2003); and 32 
Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 405, Inverse Condemnation by Physical Invasion, § 17 
(Elements of damages; checklist [e.g., Value of land together with fixtures; 
Relative worthlessness of remainder; Annoyance and inconvenience from invasion, 
such as noise, vibrations, dirt or dust, smoke, or odors; Lessened value as site 
for purposes of which land was being used]) (1995).  An example of a 
"before and after" appraisal is found in the record.  However, that 
appraisal was done for the Croell Redi-Mix 
Road and does not pertain directly to the instant 
case.  It could 
have served as a template for someone else doing a similar appraisal, but it was 
not.  That 
appraisal determined that the "before and after" damage appraisal revealed a 
value of $316,000.00 in damages.  That perhaps stands at the other end of the 
spectrum of values pertinent to this issue, but the viewers and appraisers were 
not instructed how to do a "before and after appraisal," they apparently made no 
effort to discern a proper methodology, and the one that was actually employed 
told the Board nothing about the "before and after" values of the Fortaks' 
property.  To 
complicate this somewhat further, the Board adopted the findings of the viewers 
and appraisers that the damages were $2,550.00, even though they rejected the 
recommendation of the viewers and appraisers that the road be modified, which 
was the source of the $2,550.00 figure.  Thus, in the end, the damages awarded did not 
relate in any rational way to the sort of damages contemplated by the governing 
statute.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   Although this appeal and the 
proceedings in the district court had an improper party included (the Board), 
and the proper party did not participate (the Cragos), we nonetheless conclude 
that we should respond to the issues raised, at least in part.

 
 
[¶22]   The Fortaks are correct that the award 
of damages is not a "before and after" award of damages as contemplated by the 
governing statute or as contemplated by our previous cases that have dealt with 
this subject.  
Indeed, the award of damages has no apparent basis in the facts and 
circumstances of this case.  For this reason, the order of the district 
court affirming the Board's award of damages is reversed.  As did the district 
court, we also affirm the decision of the Board establishing the private road 
over Route #1.  
The matter is remanded to the district court with directions that it be 
further remanded to the Board of County Commissioners to once again begin the 
process of having the viewers and appraisers make a "before and after" 
determination of the Fortaks' damages, consistent with this opinion, the 
governing statute, and the generally accepted appraisal techniques.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The original statute 
governing private roads was enacted in 1895, and the 2000 amendments were a 
significant step in modernizing the procedures to be used in laying out private 
roads.  A more 
enduring problem appears to be that the actual practice in many counties has not 
changed in light of the amendments.  We also take note that these statutory 
provisions emanate from the Wyoming Constitution.  Wyo. Const. art 1, § 32 provides:  "Private property 
shall not be taken for private use unless by consent of the owner, except for 
private ways of necessity, and for reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or 
across the lands of others for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic or 
sanitary purposes, nor in any case without due compensation."  Wyo. Const. art 1, 
§ 33 provides:  
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use 
without just compensation."

 
 

2Editor's notes:  There is no 
subsection (i) in this section as it appears in the printed acts.

3The Board of County 
Commissioners is included as an Appellee in the caption of that case 
(erroneously), but did not participate in the appeal.

 
 

4As we also note later, 
ultimately the Board rejected any improvements to either road.

 
 

5In any event, the 
Commissioners may not divide the assessed damages by two, merely because the 
Fortaks get a one-half share of use in the road.  Before the Commissioners' action, the Fortaks 
were at liberty to use that land for any purpose they desired, and now it is 
dedicated for use as a road.