Case Title: P. v. Johnson

Citation: 

Docket Number: S097857

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 6/17/02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
)
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
)
)
S097857
v.
)
)
Ct.App. 2/7 B139943
LONNIE JOHNSON,
)
)
Los Angeles County
Defendant and Appellant.
)
Super. Ct. No. TA052640
__________________________________ )
Penal Code section 288.5 defines the crime of continuous sexual abuse of a
child.  Any person who either resides in the same home with a minor child or has
recurring access to the child, who over a period of time, not less than three months
in duration, engages in three or more acts of substantial sexual conduct with the
child or three or more acts of lewd or lascivious conduct, is guilty of the offense of
continuous sexual abuse.  (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a); see id., §§ 1203.066,
subd. (b) [defining substantial sexual conduct], 288, subd. (a) [defining lewd or
lascivious conduct]; further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise specified.)  Enacted in 1989, section 288.5 was aimed at solving a
recurrent problem in the prosecution of so-called resident child molesters:
Because of the age of the victim and the repeated and continual nature of the
offenses, trial testimony often failed to identify with specificity the date or place of
particular charged acts, and the defense’s ability to respond to specific charges
arguably was impaired.  A line of Court of Appeal decisions beginning with
2
People v. Van Hoek (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 811 (Van Hoek) reversed convictions
obtained through the use of such “generic” testimony, concluding that the inability
to effectively defend against such charges deprived defendants of due process and
that such proceedings improperly compromised the constitutional guarantee of
jury unanimity.  (E.g., People v. Vargas (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 831, 845-847;
People v. Luna (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 726, 738-749; People v. Atkins (1988) 203
Cal.App.3d 15, 19-23; Van Hoek, supra, at pp. 814-818.)1
The Legislature responded to the Van Hoek line of cases by enacting
section 288.5.  (Stats. 1989, ch. 1402, § 1, p. 6138.)  In a prosecution under the
statute, the trier of fact need unanimously agree only that the requisite number of
specified sexual acts occurred, not which acts constituted the requisite number.
(§ 288.5, subd. (b).)  The statute, however, imposes certain limits on the
prosecution’s power to charge both continuous sexual abuse and specific sexual
offenses in the same proceeding.  A defendant may be charged with only one
count of continuous sexual abuse unless multiple victims are involved, in which
case a separate count may be charged for each victim.  (§ 288.5, subd. (c).)  And,
central to this case, “[n]o other felony sex offense involving the same victim may
be charged in the same proceeding with a charge under this section unless the
other charged offense occurred outside the time period charged under this section
or the other offense is charged in the alternative.”  (Ibid.)
Defendant was charged with continuous sexual abuse of a child under age
14 between September 19, 1995, and February 28, 1998, in violation of section
                                                
1 
In People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 322, this court disapproved the
Van Hoek line of cases, concluding that presentation of generic testimony of this
sort does not deprive a defendant of due process, the right to defend, or a
unanimous jury verdict.
3
288.5, subdivision (a) (count 1); forcible lewd act on a child between September
19, 1995, and September 18, 1996 (count 2); forcible lewd act on a child between
September 19, 1996, and September 18, 1997 (count 3); sodomy of a person under
age 14 by a person 10 or more years older between September 19, 1996, and
September 18, 1997, in violation of section 286, subdivision (c) (count 4); forcible
lewd act on a child between September 19, 1997, and September 28, 1998 (count
5); and forcible lewd act on a child between September 19, 1997, and February 28,
1998 (count 6).  Counts 2, 3, 5 and 6 alleged violations of section 288, subdivision
(b).  Despite the requirement of section 288.5, subdivision (c), the section 288 and
section 286 charges were not alleged in the alternative to the section 288.5 charge.
Defendant was convicted on all counts.2  The trial court sentenced him to
the high term of 16 years’ imprisonment on the section 288.5 count and, pursuant
to section 654, stayed sentences on the remaining counts.  The Court of Appeal
reversed defendant’s convictions on counts 2 through 6, finding that the plain
language of section 288.5, subdivision (c) precluded convictions on both the
continuous sexual abuse charge and the individual sexual offenses.  In so holding,
the Court of Appeal disagreed with an earlier decision, People v. Valdez (1994) 23
Cal.App.4th 46 (Valdez), which held that the charge-in-the-alternative language of
section 288.5, subdivision (c) precluded multiple punishment, but not multiple
convictions in this context.
                                                
2 
Defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
convictions, and we therefore need not discuss it in any detail.  In brief, between
1995 and 1998 defendant molested a friend’s young son, for whom he babysat on
a number of occasions; defendant denied any molestation but testified to one
incident of “accidental” contact between his penis and the victim’s anus, as well as
one incident in which the victim, assertedly unbidden, orally copulated defendant.
The prosecution presented evidence of various uncharged similar incidents in
which defendant had molested another boy in the same age range as the victim.
4
We granted review to resolve the conflict between the present case and
Valdez.  Because we find the Valdez court’s reading of section 288.5, subdivision
(c) unpersuasive, we affirm the appellate court’s decision in this case and
disapprove Valdez.
DISCUSSION
Our task in this case is to interpret section 288.5, subdivision (c)’s
requirement that “[n]o other felony sex offense involving the same victim may be
charged in the same proceeding with a charge under this section unless the other
charged offense . . . is charged in the alternative,” as it affects the validity of
multiple convictions under the present circumstances.  Our role in construing a
statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature in order to effectuate the purpose
of the law.  (People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94.)  Because the statutory
language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the
words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning and construing
them in context.  (People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 230-231.)  If the
plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends, and we
need not embark on judicial construction.  (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21
Cal.4th 563, 572; People v. Walker (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 969, 973.)  If the
statutory language contains no ambiguity, the Legislature is presumed to have
meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs.  (People v.
Lawrence, supra, at pp. 230-231; People v. Dyer (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 448, 453.)
The Court of Appeal found the language of section 288.5, subdivision (c)
“clear and unambiguous.  On its face, [the statute] prohibits the prosecution from
charging the defendant with a violation of section 288.5 and any other sexual
felony occurring during the same time period, unless the offenses are charged in
the alternative.  In other words, the defendant cannot be convicted of both
continuous sexual abuse and the individual underlying acts of that abuse.”  The
5
premise of the Court of Appeal’s decision is that if a defendant may be charged
with two different offenses only in the alternative, then he or she may not properly
be convicted of those offenses in the conjunctive.  By the Court of Appeal’s
reasoning, if an accusatory pleading is improper (i.e., a count alleging violation of
section 288.5 is joined, and not—as subdivision (c) requires—charged
alternatively, with one or more counts alleging specific sexual offenses), then the
multiple convictions predicated thereon cannot stand, and either the continuous
abuse conviction or the convictions on the specific offenses must be vacated.
The Valdez court took a different approach to the statute.  In finding
multiple convictions proper, it reasoned as follows:  Section 288.5 explicitly
permits alternative charging of continuous sexual abuse and specific sexual
offenses; the specific offenses, having different elements than section 288.5, are
not necessarily included therein; nor are the specific offenses and section 288.5
“alternative” in the sense that commission of one necessarily constitutes an
acquittal of the other.  (Valdez, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 48-49.)  Because the
prosecution cannot know in advance on which offenses the trier of fact will
convict, which convictions will be sustained on appeal, and which statutes will
never be retrospectively declared invalid, the Valdez court opined, multiple
convictions should be permitted, with the sentences imposed on the lesser of the
“alternative” crimes stayed pursuant to section 654.3  (Valdez, supra, at p. 49.)
                                                
3 
The Valdez court relied on the proposition that the permanent staying of the
specific sexual offenses pursuant to section 654 ensured that the defendant would
suffer no additional penal consequences therefrom in the future.  (Valdez, supra,
23 Cal.App.4th at p. 49.)  Since Valdez was decided, however, this court has held
to the contrary.  (People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 36 [a conviction stayed
pursuant to section 654 may constitute a “strike” under the “Three Strikes” law].)
6
Adopting in large part the reasoning of the Valdez court, the People here
argue that section 288.5, subdivision (c) does not mean a defendant may not be
convicted of committing a violation of both section 288.5 and another felony sex
offense within the same time period.  This, they argue, is because section 9544
permits prosecutors to charge multiple related offenses and because it is possible
to commit a violation of both section 288.5 and another sexual felony.  The instant
situation is not, the People contend, that of greater and lesser included offenses,
where multiple convictions are precluded under the rule of People v. Pearson
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 355.
We agree with the People that section 954, in general, permits the charging
of multiple related offenses, and that continuous sexual abuse and other sexual
offenses, lacking certain common elements, do not stand in the relation of greater
and lesser included offenses.  But to grant these premises does not necessitate the
conclusion that a defendant may validly be convicted of both continuous sexual
abuse and other sexual offenses involving the same victim occurring during the
same period of time.  In explicitly requiring that continuous sexual abuse and
specific sexual offenses be charged in the alternative, section 288.5 essentially
carves out an exception to section 954’s general rule permitting joinder of related
charges.  In these circumstances, “ ‘ “the general rule [is] that where the general
statute standing alone would include the same matter as the special act, and thus
                                                
4 
In relevant part, section 954 provides:  “An accusatory pleading may charge
two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, or different
statements of the same offense or two or more different offenses of the same class
of crimes or offenses, under separate counts . . . .  The prosecution is not required
to elect between the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory
pleading, but the defendant may be convicted of any number of the offenses
charged, and each offense of which the defendant is convicted must be stated in
the verdict or the finding of the court . . . .”
7
conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general
statute whether it was passed before or after such general enactment.” ’ ”  (People
v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 501, quoting In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d
651, 654.)
The People suggest that the distinction between specific and general
statutes, discussed in such cases as People v. Jenkins, supra, 28 Cal.3d 494, and
People v. Butler (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1224, pertains only to the question
whether a prosecutor may seek a conviction for a crime defined by a general
statute when the offense falls within the purview of a more specific one.  We
disagree.  Nothing inherent in the logic of the specific/general distinction supports
the suggested limitation; as the Butler court reasoned, the inference that a specific
statute constitutes an exception to a more general one is merely one tool by which
a court may ascertain and effectuate legislative intent (id. at p. 1243) and thus may
apply as well to procedural statutes as to those defining offenses.  Nor does the
narrowness of the People’s suggestion comport with Williamson’s broad statement
of the general rule.  (See In re Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 654.)  Thus,
section 288.5, subdivision (c)’s explicit alternative pleading requirement
differentiates section 288.5 from other offenses as far as the operation of section
954 is concerned.5
                                                
5 
Nothing in this conclusion is inconsistent with People v. Hord (1993) 15
Cal.App.4th 711, 720, where the Court of Appeal concluded that the Legislature’s
purpose in passing section 288.5 was not to enact a specific statute in order to
preclude prosecution for other generally applicable sexual offenses.  In this case,
we hold only that the alternative pleading requirement of section 288.5,
subdivision (c) is a specific statute as against section 954’s general authorization
for pleading multiple offenses.  Notably, People v. Hord, supra, at pages 720-721,
emphasized that section 288.5, subdivision (c) precludes a prosecutor from
charging continuous sexual abuse in addition to other sex offenses, except in the
alternative, unless the crimes charged involve different time periods.
8
In addition, the People’s interpretation of section 288.5 runs afoul of one of
the guiding principles of statutory construction, that significance be accorded
every word of an act.  (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798-799.)
If section 954 permits multiple charges and convictions in the present
circumstances, then the alternative charging language of subdivision (c) of section
288.5 is essentially rendered meaningless.  We will avoid an interpretation that
makes surplusage of a portion of a statute.  (Delaney, supra, at p. 799.)
The People also argue the Court of Appeal’s reading of section 288.5,
subdivision (c) fails to give due weight to the legislative intent and public policy
animating the statute.  As the People observe, in enacting section 288.5, the
Legislature declared:  “It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this act to
provide additional protection for children subjected to continuing sexual abuse and
certain punishment for persons referred to as ‘resident child molesters’ by
establishing a new crime of continuing sexual abuse of a child under
circumstances where there have been repeated acts of molestation over a period of
time, and the perpetrator either resides with or has recurring access to the
child. . . .”  (Stats. 1989, ch. 1402, § 1(b), p. 6138.)  As noted above (see ante, at
pp. 1-2), the Van Hoek line of cases had invalidated convictions of such molesters,
when predicated on “generic” testimony unspecific as to date or place, and the aim
of section 288.5 was to fortify such convictions against constitutional challenge.
In our view, the Legislature apparently was not seeking to multiply potential
convictions or punishments for such offenders, but rather to subject them to
“certain” punishment by lowering the unanimity hurdle against which many
molestation prosecutions evidently had stumbled.  Our reading of the statute is
consistent with this aim.
Defendant points us to a portion of the legislative history, a memorandum
prepared in the Office of the Attorney General, who was the source of the
9
legislation, to support his reading of section 288.5.  Resort to the legislative
history is unnecessary when, as here, the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous.  Even were we inclined to grant defendant’s request for judicial
notice of such history, the cited memorandum is irrelevant to our interpretation of
section 288.5.  “In construing a statute we do not consider the objective of an
authoring legislator when there is no reliable indication that the Legislature as a
whole was aware of that objective and believed the language of the proposal
would accomplish it.”  (Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery (1998) 19 Cal.4th 714,
726-727.)
CONCLUSION
Prosecutors in sexual abuse cases possess a variety of means to seek
convictions and severe punishments in cases involving sexual offenses against
vulnerable young victims.  They may, for example, plead and prove discrete
sexual offenses and seek consecutive sentencing when permitted; they may bring a
charge of continuous sexual abuse, with its relatively severe range of punishments
(§ 288.5, subd. (a)); they may charge continuous sexual abuse and discrete sexual
offenses outside the period of the alleged continuous abuse (People v. Cortes
(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80); in appropriate circumstances, they may plead and
prove the allegations required by section 667.61, the “One Strike” law; or they
may charge discrete sexual offenses and continuous sexual abuse in the
alternative.  Because, however, section 288.5, subdivision (c) clearly mandates the
charging of continuous sexual abuse and specific sexual offenses, pertaining to the
same victim over the same period of time, only in the alternative, they may not
obtain multiple convictions in the latter circumstance.  The information in this
case failed to comply with section 288.5, subdivision (c).  The multiple
convictions predicated on this pleading thus are inconsistent with the statute, and
10
the Court of Appeal correctly reversed the convictions on counts 2 through 6.  The
judgment of the Court of Appeal is therefore affirmed.6
WERDEGAR, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
                                                
6 
People v. Valdez, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 46, is disapproved to the extent it
is inconsistent with this opinion.
11
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Johnson
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 88 Cal.App.4th 539
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S097857
Date Filed: June 17, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Thomas R. Simpson
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Katharine Eileen Greenebaum, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys
General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Mark E. Turchin and Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorneys General,
Scott A. Taryle, Sanjay T. Kumar, David C. Cook and Thien Huong Tran, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
12
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Katherine Eileen Greenebaum
12304 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 300
Los Angeles, CA  90025
(310) 447-6155
Thien Huong Tran
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA  90013
(213) 576-1341