Case Title: People v. Hanna

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94780, 94900

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket Nos. 94780, 94900 cons.-Agenda 6-May 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CRAIG
A. HANNA et al., Appellees-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DAVID D. VAUGHN et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed October 17, 2003.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	At issue in this case is whether certain devices for measuring
breath alcohol were properly tested by the Illinois Department of
Public Health before being approved for use as evidential breath
analysis instruments in Illinois. In two decisions, the appellate court
concluded that they were not. 332 Ill. App. 3d 527; Nos. 5-01-0912,
5-01-0914 cons. (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
We consolidated these decisions for review and now reverse the
judgments of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	The defendants in this case were each arrested for driving under
the influence of alcohol in unrelated incidents which occurred in either
1999 or 2000. Each defendant submitted to breath testing and each
defendant recorded a breath-alcohol level above the legal limit.
Following their arrests, four of the defendants, Craig A. Hanna,
Kathryn R. Price, Keith Ryan O'Loughin and Gordon R. Pruett, were
prosecuted in the circuit court of Williamson County for driving under
the influence of alcohol. The remaining two defendants, David D.
Vaughn and Kevin L. Johnson, were prosecuted in the circuit court of
Johnson County for the same offense.

Williamson County Defendants
	Prior to their trials, the four Williamson County defendants, who
were all represented by the same attorney, filed separate but similar
motions in which they sought to suppress the results of their breath
tests. In these motions, defendants alleged that the particular makes
and models of the breath testing devices which the police had used to
measure their breath-alcohol levels were not properly tested by the
Illinois Department of Public Health (Department) before being placed
on the Department's list of approved evidentiary breath analysis
instruments. From this, defendants argued that the breath testing
devices used in their cases should not have been in use in Illinois, and
that the results of their breath tests should therefore be suppressed.
Defendants did not allege in their motions that the results of their
breath tests were, in fact, invalid or unreliable.
	The suppression argument made by the Williamson County
defendants was premised on the regulatory scheme for breath testing
devices found in section 11-501.2 of the Illinois Vehicle Code
(Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-501.2 (West 1998)) and section
510.40 of title 77 of the Illinois Administrative Code (title 77) (77 Ill.
Adm. Code §510.40 (1996)). Section 11-501.2 of the Vehicle Code
governs the admissibility of breath test results in prosecutions for
driving under the influence of alcohol. See People v. Keith, 148 Ill. 2d 32, 41 (1992). At the time defendants were given their breath tests,
section 11-501.2(a)(1) authorized the Department to certify the
accuracy of breath testing equipment used for evidentiary purposes
and to prescribe regulations necessary for the certification process.
Section 11-501.2(a)(1) also provided that, to be "considered valid"
at trial, breath-alcohol testing had to be performed according to the
standards promulgated by the Department. 625 ILCS
5/11-501.2(a)(1) (West 1998).(1)
	Before 2001, the Department had in place a set of administrative
regulations which governed the certification process for evidential
breath analysis instruments. These regulations, set forth in section
510.40 of title 77 (77 Ill. Adm. Code §510.40 (1996)), contained a
number of requirements that had to be met before a particular make
and model of breath testing equipment could be listed by the
Department as certified or approved for evidentiary purposes. See 77
Ill. Adm. Code §510 app. B (2000) (listing approved devices). One of
these requirements, found in subsection (c) of section 510.40, stated
that evidential breath analysis instruments "will be tested and
approved by the Department in accordance with but not limited to the
Standards for Devices to Measure Breath Alcohol promulgated by the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration" and found in certain
federal regulations published in 1984 and 1993. 77 Ill. Adm. Code
§510.40(c) (1996).(2)
	Before the circuit court, defendants alleged that, under the
standards adopted by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), a breath testing device had to be subjected
to, among other things, an input power test, an ambient temperature
test and a vibrational stability test before the device could be approved
for use as an evidential breath measurement device by the NHTSA.
See 49 Fed Reg. 48859-60 (1984); 58 Fed. Reg. 48708 (1993).
Defendants further alleged that these three tests were not performed
by the Department on the devices which had been used to conduct
their breath tests. Defendants therefore argued that the devices had
not been tested "in accordance with" the NHTSA standards as
required by section 510.40(c) of title 77 and that the results of their
breath tests could not be "considered valid" under section
11-501.2(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code.
	The circuit court of Williamson County consolidated defendants'
cases to consider their motions to suppress. On April 17, 2001, a
hearing was held on the motions. At that hearing, defendants
introduced the testimony of one witness, Larry D. Eztkorn.
	Etzkorn testified that he was the division chief for the alcohol and
substance testing program at the Department of Public Health from
1992 until 2001, at which time the responsibility for approving breath
testing devices was transferred to the Illinois Department of State
Police. Eztkorn stated that he was currently the technical director or
supervisor of the breath-alcohol program for the State Police. Eztkorn
also stated that while he was employed by the Department of Public
Health, he was in charge of the program which approved evidential
breath testing devices for use in Illinois.
	Eztkorn was questioned about the standards adopted by both the
Department and the NHTSA for approving evidential breath testing
equipment. Eztkorn acknowledged that a breath testing device could
not be approved by the NHTSA for evidentiary use unless the device
was first subjected to an input power test, an ambient temperature test
and a vibrational stability test. Etzkorn also acknowledged that these
tests were not performed on three models of breath testing devices
which defense counsel cited as being on the Department's list of
approved evidential breath analysis instruments: the "Intoxilyzer
3000,"(3) the Intoxilyzer 5000 and the Intox EC/IR. However, Eztkorn
testified that, in his view, the Department was not required to perform
the tests on those devices. Eztkorn gave two general reasons as to
why he believed this was so.
	First, according to Eztkorn, the language of section 510.40(c) of
title 77 did not impose a testing requirement. Eztkorn noted that,
although section 510.40(c) referred to the NHTSA standards and
regulations, the federal regulations themselves did not require the
states to perform any testing. Instead, with respect to the states, the
NHTSA regulations were only nonbinding recommendations or
guidelines. Further, the NHTSA regulations contemplated that some
states would adopt their own, individualized testing requirements. The
Department had adopted its own testing program, Eztkorn explained,
and had performed some tests, such as testing for interference from
radio waves, that were not done at the federal level. Moreover,
Eztkorn stated that he had drafted portions of the current, revised
version of section 510.40(c) and, in particular, had added the phrase
"not limited to" which appears in the regulation. Eztkorn testified that
it "was never [his] intent" when drafting the changes to section
510.40(c) to adopt all the federal testing standards. Rather, according
to Eztkorn, the federal standards were meant to be used for guidance
only and the Department had the discretion, under section 510.40(c),
to select its own testing requirements.
	Eztkorn's second answer as to why the Department was not
required to perform the tests on the breath analysis devices was that
the tests simply were not relevant to the way in which the devices
were used in Illinois. Eztkorn explained that the input power test, the
ambient temperature test and the vibrational stability test were needed
if the breath testing device was not kept in a stable or controlled
environment. Thus, for example, a device would need to be tested for
accuracy under various power inputs if it was drawing power from a
generator, as might be the case if it was being used in a remote area
of the country such as rural Montana. Eztkorn explained, however,
that in Illinois, the breath testing devices at issue were all placed in
police stations and that the stations themselves were on a power grid.
The devices thus drew a stable supply of electricity and, as such, did
not need to be subjected to a power input test. The ambient
temperature test was also not relevant, Eztkorn stated, because the
devices were kept "in a controlled environment in a room in a police
station, normally heated." Similarly, since the devices were kept in
police stations, the Department "didn't test for [vibrational stability]
because it didn't make sense for the state of Illinois to test for that."
According to Eztkorn, because the breath testing devices at issue were
kept in stable environments, the three tests required by the NHTSA
were "not necessary in the state of Illinois," it would not "make any
sense to do that testing," and it would be "a waste of resources" to
perform the testing. Eztkorn also explained that the Department did
not have the necessary equipment to perform the tests. Finally,
according to Eztkorn, the three tests had already been performed by
the NHSTA on the models at issue in this case. The devices had all
passed the tests and the Department was aware of those results.
	Following the hearing, the circuit court granted defendants'
motions to suppress. The circuit court initially found that the NHTSA
standards required an input power test, an ambient temperature test
and a vibrational stability test; that the models of breath analysis
instruments at issue in this case had been fully tested and approved by
the NHTSA; and that the Department had received information from
the NHTSA to that effect. The court also found that the three tests
had not been performed by the Department itself on the breath
analysis instruments. In passing, the circuit court noted that Eztkorn
had testified at the hearing on defendants' motion to suppress but the
court did not otherwise discuss his testimony.
	After making its findings, the circuit court concluded that the
Department's failure to repeat the NHSTA tests meant that the
defendants' breath test results had to be suppressed. The court stated:
		"[Section 510.40(c)] uses simple, clear and concise language.
This section has no ambiguity. This section requires the
Department to test and approve all machines '... in
accordance with but not limited to the Standards for Devices
to Measure Breath Alcohol promulgated by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration... .' The Department
did not conduct the required testing before placing the
[Intoximeter 3000] and the Intoxilyzer 5000 on the list of
approved models for use in Illinois as Approved Breath
Testing Instruments."
The circuit court further concluded that the "NHTSA testing and
approval is irrelevant" since "[f]or whatever reason, the Department
chose to require its own testing to be conducted." Thus, because the
Department had not itself performed the three tests, the circuit court
determined that the "machines were not properly approved for use in
Illinois pursuant to the regulations" and that the results of defendants'
breath tests had to be suppressed.
	The State filed a certificate of substantial impairment and
appealed. 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). The appellate court affirmed. 332
Ill. App. 3d 527. Stating that it "could not agree more" with the
circuit court, the appellate court held that the plain language of section
510.40(c) of title 77 required the Department to perform the same
tests on the breath analysis instruments that were performed by the
NHTSA under its standards. And, since the Department did not
perform those tests, the appellate court concluded that the circuit
court properly suppressed the results of the defendants' breath tests.
	We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal and docketed
the appeal in this court as cause No. 94780.

Johnson County Defendants
	Prior to their trials, the two Johnson County defendants filed
motions in limine which sought to bar the State from using the results
of their breath tests at trial. The motions contained arguments
identical to those in the Williamson County defendants' motions to
suppress. The Johnson County defendants also submitted to the circuit
court a transcript of the evidentiary hearing which was conducted in
Williamson County.
	After concluding that the Department had not properly tested the
breath analysis instruments at issue before approving them for use, the
circuit court granted the defendants' motions in limine. The State
appealed. See Keith, 148 Ill. 2d  at 38-39 (appeal properly brought by
the State from a motion in limine which had the effect of suppressing
evidence).
	Relying on its previous decision in the appeal taken from the
Williamson County cases, the appellate court summarily affirmed.
Nos. 5-01-0912, 5-01-0914 cons. (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal.
We docketed the appeal in this court as cause No. 94900 and
consolidated the case with cause No. 94780 for review.

ANALYSIS
	Section 510.40(c) of title 77 states that breath analysis
instruments "will be tested and approved by the Department in
accordance with but not limited to the Standards for Devices to
Measure Breath Alcohol promulgated by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration." 77 Ill. Adm. Code §510.40(c) (1996).
Before this court, defendants contend that, under the plain language
of section 510.40(c), the Department was required to perform the
same tests on the breath analysis instruments at issue in this case that
were conducted by the NHTSA. Because three of the NHTSA
tests-the power input test, the ambient temperature test and the
vibrational stability test-were not done by the Department, defendants
contend that the Department's testing was not "in accordance with"
the NHTSA standards and, therefore, that the results of their breath
tests should be suppressed.
	In response, the State disputes defendants' reading of section
510.40(c). The State acknowledges that, under section 510.40(c), the
Department must test the breath analysis instruments "in accordance
with" the standards adopted by the NHTSA. The State observes,
however, that the federal guidelines are guidelines only; they do not
impose a mandate upon the states to perform the three tests at issue
here. The State further notes that the federal guidelines expressly
permit a state to rely upon the testing done by the NHTSA (see 49
Fed. Reg. 48855 (1984)). Therefore, the State argues, the Department
tested "in accordance with" the federal standards even if they did not
repeat every test conducted by the NHTSA.
	The State also argues that the appellate court's construction of
section 510.40(c) must be rejected because it leads to absurd results.
Citing to Eztkorn's testimony, the State argues that the three NHTSA
tests have no relevance to how the breath analysis instruments at issue
in this case are used in Illinois. The State also notes that, according to
Eztkorn, the Department did not have the equipment necessary to
perform the tests. The State maintains, therefore, that adopting the
appellate court's construction of section 510.40(c) would mean
accepting the proposition that the Department intended to force itself
to spend time and money to duplicate irrelevant tests which it did not
have the equipment to perform. According to the State, "[v]ery few
results could be more absurd than this."
	We agree with the State that the appellate court's interpretation
of section 510.40(c) of title 77 cannot be correct in light of the absurd
consequences that stem from that interpretation. The principles that
lead to this conclusion are well established. Administrative regulations
have the force and effect of law and are construed according to the
same standards that govern the construction of statutes. Union
Electric Co. v. Department of Revenue, 136 Ill. 2d 385, 391 (1990).
The cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are
subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent.
In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 307 (2002). The most
reliable indicator of legislative intent is found in the language of the
statue itself (Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000)) and that language should be given its plain,
ordinary and popularly understood meaning (Carver v. Sheriff of
La Salle County, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 507 (2003)).
	However, where a plain or literal reading of a statue produces
absurd results, the literal reading should yield: "It is a familiar rule,
that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers. *** If a literal construction of the words of a statute be
absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity."
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459-60, 36 L. Ed. 226, 228, 12 S. Ct. 511, 512 (1892). See also, e.g., Public
Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453-55,
105 L. Ed. 2d 377, 391-92, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2566-67 (1989); Watt v.
Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266, 68 L. Ed. 2d 80, 88, 101 S. Ct. 1673,
1677-78 (1981); Croissant v. Joliet Park District, 141 Ill. 2d 449, 455
(1990) ("Statutes are to be construed in a manner that avoids absurd
or unjust results"); People ex rel. Cason v. Ring, 41 Ill. 2d 305, 312-13 (1968) (when the literal construction of a statute would lead to
consequences which the legislature could not have contemplated, the
courts are not bound to that construction); V. Dougherty, Absurdity
and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in
Statutory Interpretation, 44 Am. U.L. Rev. 127, 127-28 (1994) ("The
absurd result principle in statutory interpretation provides an
exception to the rule that a statute should be interpreted according to
its plain meaning").
	The principle that statutory language should not be construed to
produce an absurd result is a deeply rooted one. Over 130 years ago,
the United States Supreme Court interpreted a statute which, under
its plain terms, made it illegal in all instances to obstruct the passage
of mail or a mail carrier. The Court held that the statute did not apply
to a sheriff who executed an arrest warrant against a mail carrier while
he was delivering mail. In so holding, the Court cited two instances,
both centuries old, where the plain language of a law was not followed
because doing so produced an absurd result:
			"The common sense of man approves the judgment
mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which
enacted, 'that whoever drew blood in the streets should be
punished with the utmost severity,' did not extend to the
surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in
the street in a fit. The same common sense accepts the ruling,
cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II, which
enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of
felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when
the prison is on fire-'for he is not to be hanged because he
would not stay to be burnt.'" United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487, 19 L. Ed. 278, 280 (1869).
	More recently, Judge Posner has explained the rule that absurd
results are to be avoided, even in the face of plain language:
			"Usually when a statutory provision is clear on its face the
court stops there, in order to preserve language as an
effective medium of communication from legislatures to
courts. If judges won't defer to clear statutory language,
legislators will have difficulty imparting a stable meaning to
the statutes they enact. But if the clear language, when read
in the context of the statute as a whole or of the commercial
or other real-world (as opposed to law-world or word-world)
activity that the statute is regulating, points to an
unreasonable result, courts do not consider themselves bound
by 'plain meaning,' but have recourse to other interpretive
tools in an effort to make sense of the statute. E.g., Public
Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453-55, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 105 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1989); Green v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527, 109 S. Ct. 1981,
104 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); AM Int'l,
Inc. v. Graphic Management Associates, Inc., 44 F.3d 572,
577 (7th Cir. 1995); Veronica M. Dougherty, 'Absurdity and
the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle
in Statutory Interpretation,' 44 Am. U.L. Rev. 127 (1994).
They do not want to insult the legislature by attributing
absurdities to it." Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 879-80 (7th Cir. 2002).
	In the case at bar, Eztkorn testified that the breath testing devices
at issue were all kept in the stable environment of a police station and,
thus, were not exposed to power fluctuations, vibrations, or
temperature extremes. Because the devices were not exposed to these
conditions, Eztkorn explained, it would not "make any sense" and was
"not necessary in the state of Illinois" to perform a power input test,
an ambient temperature test or a vibrational stability test on the breath
analysis instruments. Further, according to Eztkorn, the Department
did not have the equipment to conduct the tests.
	During the suppression hearing, defense counsel did not challenge
any of Eztkorn's assertions regarding the use of breath testing devices
in Illinois. Eztkorn was the individual in charge of the Department's
program which approved evidential breath testing devices for use in
Illinois and was unquestionably qualified to speak to the issue of how
breath testing devices are used in this state. No other witness testified
at the hearing. Eztkorn's sworn testimony was unimpeached and
uncontradicted and, further, has not been called into question on
appeal. We are not free to ignore undisputed evidence of record.
Accordingly, we take it as true, for purposes of this appeal, that the
input power test, the ambient temperature test and the vibrational
stability test have no relevance to the way the breath devices at issue
in this case are used in Illinois.
	When viewed within the real-world activity that section 510.40(c)
of title 77 was intended to regulate, the interpretation of section
510.40(c) adopted by the appellate court below produces decidedly
absurd results. If we were to conclude, as the appellate court did, that
section 510.40(c) required the Department to conduct the three tests
at issue, then we would have to assume that the Department drafted
a regulation which required it to perform irrelevant and unnecessary
testing, for which it had no equipment and which, as a consequence,
would prevent it from approving any breath testing device for use in
Illinois. We decline to attribute such nonsensical intentions to the
Department. Cf. Public Citizen, 491 U.S.  at 453 & n.9, 105 L. Ed. 2d 
at 391 & n.9, 109 S. Ct.  at 2566 & n.9 (rejecting the "straightforward
reading" of a statute because that reading would ascribe an
"outlandish" intent to Congress). Accordingly, even if the appellate
court was correct, and a plain or literal reading of section 510.40(c)
would indicate that the tests at issue had to be performed, we reject
that interpretation of section 510.40(c) here.
	The courts below did not discuss Eztkorn's testimony regarding
the use of breath testing equipment in Illinois or consider the impact
of his testimony upon the proper interpretation of section 510.40(c)
of title 77. In cause No. 94780, the appellate court acknowledged the
existence of Eztkorn's testimony but then mentioned only that part of
the testimony in which Eztkorn explained his intentions as a drafter of
section 510.40(c). According to the appellate court, "Eztkorn had
testified that, in drafting the regulation, he never intended to require
testing for input voltage stability, ambient temperature stability and
vibrational stability." 332 Ill. App. 3d at 531. Having described
Eztkorn's testimony solely in these terms, the appellate court declined
to consider it. The appellate court reasoned that, because it had
determined that the meaning of section 510.40(c) was clear and
unambiguous, it could not give any consideration to Eztkorn's
testimony about drafting the regulation. 332 Ill. App. 3d at 530-31.
	As we have noted, however, Eztkorn's testimony was not limited
to an explanation of his intent when he drafted the revisions to section
510.40(c). Eztkorn also testified as to the factual or historical question
of how breath testing devices are used in Illinois. Neither the circuit
courts nor the appellate court in this case made any mention of
Eztkorn's testimony on this issue. This was error. The process of
statutory interpretation should not be divorced from a consideration
of the "real-world activity" (Krzalic, 314 F.3d at 880) that the statute
is intended to regulate. Indeed, this court has long held that, in seeking
legislative intent, "the court will always have regard to existing
circumstances, contemporaneous conditions, the object sought to be
attained by the statute and the necessity or want of necessity for its
adoption." (Emphasis added.) Smith v. County of Logan, 284 Ill. 163,
165 (1918). See also, e.g., Collins v. Board of Trustees of the
Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 112 (1993)
("Existing circumstances at the time the statute was enacted,
contemporaneous conditions, and the object sought to be achieved all
may be considered"); Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 155, 168 (1991). Further, in determining the intent of the legislature,
a court "may properly consider not only the language of the statute,
but also the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be
remedied, and the purpose to be achieved." (Emphasis added.)
Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d  at 308, citing People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36,
42 (2000); Stern v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 179 Ill. 2d 160, 164
(1997); People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 345 (1992). See generally
2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §48:03 (6th ed.
2000).
	We previously cited the centuries-old Bolognian law which stated
"that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the
utmost severity," and the United States Supreme Court's agreement
that it would be absurd to apply that law to a "surgeon who opened
the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit." Kirby, 74 U.S.  at 487, 19 L. Ed.  at 280. In the case at bar, to hold that
Eztkorn's testimony regarding the use of breath testing devices may
not be considered would be the equivalent of saying that a court
charged with construing the Bolognian law could not consider the
testimony of the surgeon explaining that he only drew blood in an
effort to help the person who had fallen in a fit. No rule of
construction requires a court of law to turn a blind eye to reality in
this way. See, e.g., 44 Am. U.L. Rev. at 150-52 (noting that, under
the absurd result principle, a court is not limited to considering only
the internal, formal logic of a statute). Accordingly, even if the
appellate court was correct to ignore the legislative history of section
510.40(c), i.e., Eztkorn's testimony regarding the drafting of the
regulation, it was not correct to ignore the reality of how breath
testing devices are used in this state.
	The courts below failed to acknowledge or consider the real-world activity-the use of breath testing devices in Illinois-that section
510.40(c) was designed to regulate. When that real-world context is
taken into account, the appellate court's construction of section
510.40(c) is clearly untenable and must be rejected. Having rejected
the appellate court's interpretation of section 510.40(c) of title 77, the
remaining possible interpretation of the regulation, and the one which
we now adopt, is that the Department was not required to perform the
input power test, the ambient temperature test and the vibrational
stability test on the breath analysis instruments at issue. Because the
tests were not required, the circuit courts of Williamson and Johnson
Counties erred in granting defendants' motions to suppress and
motions in limine.

CONCLUSION
	For the forgoing reasons, the judgments of the appellate and
circuit courts in cause No. 94780 and cause No. 94900 are reversed.
Cause No. 94780 is remanded to the circuit court of Williamson
County and cause No. 94900 is remanded to the circuit court of
Johnson County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
No. 94780-Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.
No. 94900-Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.
1.   Section 11501.2(a)(1) has been amended since the time of defendants' arrests. Since
	January 2001, the authority to certify the accuracy of breath testing equipment has resided with the Illinois Department of State
	Police. See 625 ILCS 5/11501.2(a)(1) (West 2002).
2.   Under current regulations
	promulgated by the Illinois Department of State Police, only breath testing devices which have been approved for use by the NHTSA may be
	approved for use in Illinois. Testing at the state level is no longer required. See 20 Ill. Adm. Code §1286.210 (2002).
3.
	  In the proceedings below, and in this court, the parties have referred to the "Intoxilyzer 3000" as
	one of the models included on the Department's list of approved evidential breath analysis instruments. However, there is no such
	model on the Department's list. The device the parties presumably meant to reference is the Intoximeter 3000, which does appear on the
	list. See 77 Ill. Adm. Code §510 app. B (2000). See also G. Sapir, M. Giangrande & A. Peters, Breath Alcohol Machines: Evidence
	Foundation Requirements in Illinois, 22 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1, 9 n.40 (1988) (noting that the "Intoxilyzer 3000" does not
	exist, although the name is sometimes mistakenly used). The parties' error does not affect our analysis in this case.