Case Title: People v. Lofton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87382, 87434

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket Nos. 87382, 87434 cons.-Agenda 10-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
ANTHONY W. LOFTON, Appellee.-THE PEOPLE OF THE 
STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RICHARD STEWART,
Appellee.
Opinion filed November 22, 2000.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the
court:
	In both of these cases, consolidated here, the defendant was
convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. In one,
cause No. 87382, we consider the right of confrontation granted by
the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution (U.S.
Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8). In the other, cause
No. 87434, we consider the right of due process granted by the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, §1). We
address each cause separately.
	In cause No. 87382, the defendant, Anthony W. Lofton, was
charged by indictment in Kane County with two counts of
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS
5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 1996)), arising out of an incident that
occurred early in September 1996. The defendant, a friend of the
mother of the child, was alleged to have placed his finger in and
on the vagina of M.H., five years old at the time. On the morning
of defendant's trial by jury in February 1997, the State was heard
on its motion that M.H. be permitted to testify by way of closed-circuit television, which motion the defendant resisted. Section
106B-5 (725 ILCS 5/106B-5 (West 1996)), concerning testimony
by a child victim and commonly known as the Child Shield Act
(People v. Van Brocklin, 293 Ill. App. 3d 156, 166 (1997)),
provides in part,
			    
"(a) In a proceeding in the prosecution of an offense of
*** predatory criminal sexual assault of a child ***, a
court may order that the testimony of a child victim under
the age of 18 years be taken outside the courtroom and
shown in the courtroom by means of a closed circuit
television if:
				    
(1) the testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
				    
(2) the judge determines that testimony by the child
victim in the courtroom will result in the child suffering
serious emotional distress such that the child cannot
reasonably communicate or that the child will suffer
severe emotional distress that is likely to cause the child
to suffer severe adverse effects.
			    
(b) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the
	 defendant, and the judge may question the child.
			    
***
			    
(d) Only the following persons may be in the room with
the child when the child testifies by closed circuit
television:
				    
(1) the prosecuting attorney;
				    
(2) the attorney for the defendant;
				    
(3) the judge;
				    
(4) the operators of the closed circuit television
equipment; and
				    
(5) any person or persons whose presence, in the
opinion of the court, contributes to the well-being of the
child, including a person who has dealt with the child
in a therapeutic setting concerning the abuse, a parent
or guardian of the child, and court security personnel.
			    
(e) During the child's testimony by closed circuit
television, the defendant shall be in the courtroom and
shall not communicate with the jury if the cause is being
heard before a jury.
			    
(f) The defendant shall be allowed to communicate with
the persons in the room where the child is testifying by
any appropriate electronic method.
			    
(g) The provisions of this Section do not apply if the
defendant represents himself pro se.
			    
(h) This Section may not be interpreted to preclude, for 	purposes of identification of a defendant, the presence
of both the victim and the defendant in the courtroom
at the same time.
			    
(i) This Section applies to prosecutions pending on or
commenced on or after the effective date of this
amendatory Act of 1994." 725 ILCS 5/106B-5 (West
1996).
	At the hearing on this motion, the child's mother testified on
direct examination that M.H. said of her feelings about seeing
Anthony Lofton again "that [M.H.] was afraid and she doesn't
want to have to look at him [defendant]." Her mother compared
the child's altered behavior immediately after the incident with her
much improved behavior at the time of trial. Immediately after the
incident, the child's mother stated,
		"[M.H.] wouldn't eat. She wasn't sleeping. If someone
would knock on the door, she was real jumpy. When she
would go in the bathroom to do normal body functions
she took her feces and spread it all over the walls. She
colored all over the walls with crayons. Withdrawn. She
is usually friendly and talkative. She wouldn't open her
mouth to anyone."
M.H.'s mother said that after Christmas of 1996 the child was her
"normal self." However, after her mother informed her two days
before trial began that she would have to testify about this matter,
her mother said, M.H. had "been having nightmares again. Not
eating really. Not sleeping, and she said she didn't want to come.
She didn't want to see him [defendant]." The child's mother
answered in the affirmative the question posed to her by the State
as to whether she felt that her daughter "would suffer some trauma
if she were forced to come into the courtroom and testify about
what Mr. Lofton did to her in his presence." Responding to a
question on cross-examination, she stated, "I think she will have
some trauma if she has to testify and look at your client, yes." Ray
Bramel, a sexual assault coordinator at the Community Crisis
Center in Elgin, testified likewise about the child's extreme
withdrawal shortly after the incident occurred and her dramatic
improvement since that time. This witness testified that on the
morning of the hearing M.H.'s "words were to please keep us safe
from Anthony" but that in all other respects she was "assertive,
full of affect, lively."
	In ruling on this motion, the trial court stated,
			    
"Now, in order for this closed circuit television
testimony to occur the Court must make a finding either
that the child's testimony in the courtroom will result in
the suffering of serious emotional distress such that the
child cannot reasonably communicate or that the child
will suffer severe emotional distress that is likely to cause
the child to suffer severe adverse effects. Thus far, the
testimony that I have heard is all focused on the child's
fear of the defendant and the effect that seeing the
defendant will have. I have heard nothing thus far that
would suggest that testifying in the presence of a jury
would have such an adverse effect. That was the opinion
in the case cited by the State, People v. Scott, [284 Ill.
App. 3d 336 (1996)], where the child's mother opined
that the child could not testify in the courtroom in front of
the jurors because she was shy and embarrassed. The
setup of this courtroom is such that we can-some
accommodation I believe is called for here. We can
position the child in front of the jury with her back to the
defendant. We can move these podiums behind her, and
we can bring her into the room before the jury comes in
and before the defendant comes in. I am willing to allow
an individual, whether it be Miss Bramel or the child's
mother, to sit in close proximity to the child during her
testimony so long as they do not communicate with the
child or in any way impede the questioning of the child.
In this way the child will not see the defendant yet she
will be testifying in front of the jury so that they can
observe her. She may be questioned and cross-examined
in front of the jury and never have to see the defendant.
This would require, Mr. McCulloch [defense counsel],
that you position yourself away from the counsel table
during your questioning. I would, of course, permit you to
make frequent trips back to your client to confer with him
during the course of the testimony.
			    
Now, if it proves that the child cannot communicate in
front of the jury and if that showing is made in-by her
inability to communicate then, of course, I would consider
and that would give me a basis upon which to make a
necessary finding, but I would like to try this in this
modified courtroom setup before we move to the closed
circuit television. That's how I will rule.
			    
Let's take a moment then to position a chair and to
position the podiums. We will take a recess, and we'll
have the child brought in before the defendant comes
back."
	After M.H. was seated as a witness, the trial court stated
outside the presence of the jury, "We are in open court. The
defendant is present with his attorney, Mr. McCulloch. Both
prosecutors are present. And the alleged victim is seated in a chair
directly in front of the jury box. Behind her are two podiums that
are placed together, and seated next to her is our court reporter,
Miss Hogan." Thereupon the following colloquy ensued between
defense counsel and the trial court:
			    
"MR. McCULLOCH: So the record is accurate, I don't
want my silent assent to appear as an agreement to this
procedure because I think that this is very peculiar. From
where we sit we cannot see the witness. I'm not
suggesting that the Chinese wall approach is what we
sought nor do we think it's appropriate. Everything-
			    
THE COURT: Mr. McCulloch, you are free to
reposition yourself by all means so that you can see the
witness. And I will not obstruct you in any way in doing
that. I stated the purpose for this arrangement, and I think
it is the least obtrusive way of accomplishing a needed
result and based on the testimony I heard. If you want to
move your chair you are free to do so.
			    
MR. McCULLOCH: You would agree that it is peculiar
in that it isolates the witness, and the jury gets the sense
of being isolated, us being isolated from her, and anything
I do to reposition it just sort of reinforces that problem.
			    
THE COURT: I will give you an option here. Do you
prefer the closed circuit television?
			    
MR. McCULLOCH: I prefer open court as it's
customarily known.
			    
THE COURT: Between this arrangement and closed
circuit do you prefer the closed circuit?
			    
MR. McCULLOCH: I don't want it to look like I
picked it.
			    
THE COURT: It's clear that you are not picking it. I am
giving you the choice of two alternatives.
			    
MR. McCULLOCH: Given my earlier request, I guess
no choice but to do this, but just it looks peculiar. I'm not
for it."
	At the conclusion of the child's direct testimony, the
prosecutor told her, "I'm going to ask you to get up out of your
chair for a minute, okay?" and asked her, "Can you come over
here by me for one minute?" M.H. then left her chair to stand next
to the prosecutor, who told her further, "I need you to look around
at all the people in the courtroom, okay?" and asked, "See
everybody that's in the courtroom?" In response the child nodded
her head up and down. Then the prosecutor asked M.H., "Do you
see the man that you knew named Anthony?" The child responded
by shaking her head from side to side. Asked further by the
prosecutor, "Do you see him anywhere in the courtroom?" the
child answered, "No." Asked again by the prosecutor, "Do you see
the man that you knew that you just talked about named Anthony,
do you see him anywhere in this courtroom?" the child again
answered, "No." The prosecutor reiterated the word, "No," and
asked the child, "You are sure?" The child responded by nodding
her head up and down.
	At the conclusion of M.H.'s testimony and out of the presence
and hearing of the jury, the trial court stated,
			    
"I want to make a few remarks about this morning's
proceedings for purposes of the record. Based upon the
testimony of [M.H.'s mother] and Rae Bramel I made the
specific findings that if the child were required to testify
within the view of the defendant that the child would
likely, based upon this testimony, experience severe
emotional distress and would likely suffer severe adverse
effects such as loss of appetite, nightmares, fear of other
people and abberant [sic] behavior such as the testimony
of her spreading feces on the wall and on another occasion
coloring on the wall. Thus, the witness was allowed to
testify from a chair that was positioned directly in front of
the jury box. Two podiums I would estimate
approximately say four feet tall, is that a fair estimate?
			    
MS. SIMPSON [assistant State's Attorney]: That would
be close, your Honor.
			    
THE COURT: Were placed side by side behind the
witness' chair. The court reporter was positioned in a
chair on the floor next to the child so that she could hear.
The child was very soft spoken. And no one else was
seated near the child. The child did have in her lap a doll
***.
* * *
			    
THE COURT: The defendant remained at counsel
table. From his vantage point he was not able to see the
alleged victim as she testified. The-his attorney, Mr.
McCulloch, was allowed and frequently did leave counsel
table and stand at a point where he could observe the
witness, and he did make frequent trips back to counsel
table to confer with his client. Now, hindsight is always
perfect. As it turns out the State nevertheless in spite of all
the evidence asked the child to stand and see if she could
identify the defendant. Thus, the confrontation that I
thought we were trying to avoid was nevertheless called
for. Had I known that, I doubt that I would have made
these arrangements, but what's done is done, and the
record beyond that will speak for itself."
When Assistant State's Attorney Simpson indicated that the
"[o]nly way that you are going [to] get the child to identify the
person they are testifying about-" the trial court responded, "I
don't want to argue with you, but had I known that that was the
intent I might have done things differently."
	M.H. was the first of several witnesses for the State. The
defendant chose not to testify. The jury found defendant guilty of
both counts of the indictment. Post trial, defendant moved for the
entry of an order granting his motion, made during trial, for a
directed finding or, in the alternative, for a new trial, contending,
inter alia, that the State failed to prove him guilty of the charges
beyond a reasonable doubt and that
		"the Court erred in permitting the State to physically
rearrange the Courtroom setting, resulting in a tableau
type arrangement for the Complainant to testify and not
allow the Defendant to then see the witness. The net result
was to draw undue attention toward, and sympathy for,
the Complainant and, at the same time, deny the
Defendant his constitutional right to see and confront his
accuser."
The trial court denied defendant's post-trial motion and imposed
consecutive sentences of 18 years in the Department of
Corrections with respect to count I and 12 years in the Department
of Corrections with respect to count II. In denying defendant's
post-trial motion the trial court stated,
			    
"Based upon the evidence presented to me at the time,
I concluded that given the child's age, her level of
maturity and her condition, that some accommodation
was necessary.
			    
I fashioned what I believed was the minimal change
necessary to allow the child to testify. I did that not
expecting that the State would ask the child to actually
view the defendant. Since I believed based upon the
information presented that that would have been
extremely traumatic. The child failed to identify the
defendant in court. There was a face-to-face
confrontation, however, at that point.
			    
The child's voice was extremely low. It is most
doubtful that she would have been able to communicate
from the witness stand in any event. The microphone is
stationary, it is situated approximately a foot from the
witness chair. And I believe that even had that been
attempted, that I would have needed to allow her to sit
close to the jury so that they could at least hear her.
			    
I did order that the two podiums be placed behind her
as she sat in front of the jury box. Each is approximately
four feet high and each is approximately two feet wide.
			    
The defendant was present at all times. He was within
approximately 15 or 17 feet. And as I mentioned, there
was ultimately the face-to-face confrontation at the end of
the testimony.
			    
This I believe is a matter for the Court's discretion. I
exercised that discretion, given the evidence available to
me at the time."
	Defendant appealed, contending, inter alia, that he had not
been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of predatory
criminal sexual assault and that his rights to due process, to a fair
trial, and to confront witnesses against him had been violated by
the method the trial court used to present the testimony of M.H.
After a review of the evidence, the appellate court expressly would
not reverse defendant's convictions on the basis of his challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence. However, it reversed his
convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial because the
procedure the trial court employed with regard to the testimony of
M.H. violated defendant's right to confront witnesses against him.
Lofton, 303 Ill. App. 3d 501, 505. The appellate court determined
that the Child Shield Act
		"in no way provides for a courtroom setup designed to
keep a witness from seeing the defendant because the
witness may be afraid of the defendant.
			    
In this case, the court made no findings that would
bring the testimony of M.D.H. under the Act and,
therefore, did not use the statutory closed-circuit
television for her testimony. However, the setup that the
court did order had no basis in law and was violative of
defendant's right to confrontation. The legislature has
provided a specific remedy for use in cases where specific
findings regarding the welfare of the child witness are
made. The procedures of the Act have been found to pass
constitutional muster [in People v. Van Brocklin, 293 Ill.
App. 3d 156 (1997)]. However, this does not mean that
any other procedures fashioned by a court for reasons
other than those stated in the Act are appropriate." Lofton,
303 Ill. App. 3d at 506.
The appellate court also found it "difficult to conceive how a child
who does not recognize a person can be traumatized by seeing that
person" (Lofton, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 507); determined that "[t]he
detriment to defendant's right to confront witnesses and to not be
placed in a bad light as a disturbing or intimidating party was not
properly balanced by the isolation of the minor witness from a
person she did not recognize" (Lofton, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 507);
and concluded that the actions of the trial court "had no
constitutional or statutory basis" (Lofton, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 507).
While the appellate court concluded that a further contention of
defendant that one of his convictions must be vacated because he
was convicted of more than one offense arising out of the same
physical act was now moot because the appellate court had
reversed both convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial,
the appellate court pointed out to the court and the State, in the
interests of judicial economy, that count II, as currently
constituted, fails to allege facts sufficient for a charge of predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child. We allowed the State's petition
for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill.
2d R. 315).
	Contending that the defendant, Anthony Lofton, was not
denied his right to confront a witness when the trial court allowed
the child witness to testify before the jury with podiums placed
between her and the defendant, the State relies heavily upon
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990). The defendant, relying in great part upon Craig as
well as the earlier case of Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 101 L. Ed. 2d 857, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988), maintains that his rights to
confront witnesses and to be afforded due process were violated
when the child witness testified in front of the jury with physical
barriers placed behind her in such a way that the defendant and the
witness were unable to view each other during the testimony of the
witness. No challenge is mounted against the constitutionality of
the Child Shield Act, and we do not consider that question. As the
defendant asserts, the issue in this case is not whether one-way
closed-circuit television used to convey trial testimony violates a
defendant's rights but whether the defendant's right to a face-to-face confrontation was violated when the trial court implemented
a scheme unauthorized by statute that not only prevented M.H.
from seeing the defendant while she testified, as would occur
when a child's testimony is taken by means of one-way closed-circuit television outside the courtroom pursuant to section
106B-5, but also prevented the defendant from seeing M.H. while
she testified, as would not occur when a child's testimony is so
taken.
	The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, made
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right *** to be confronted with the witnesses against him ***"
(U.S. Const., amend. VI). Craig, 497 U.S.  at 844, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at
677, 110 S. Ct.  at 3162. The confrontation clause of the Illinois
Constitution was amended on November 8, 1994, to remove the
"face-to-face" language of article I, section 8, and conform this
state's confrontation clause to that of the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution, so that it now provides, "In criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right *** to be confronted
with the witnesses against him or her ***" (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §8 (amended November 8, 1994)). People v. Dean, 175 Ill. 2d 244, 254 (1997); People v. Weninger, 292 Ill. App. 3d 340, 342
(1997). No argument is made that the defendant is entitled to
greater protection under the Illinois Constitution, and we will
apply the same analysis to both. See People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 131 n.1 (2000).
	Both Coy and Craig required the Court to consider the
constitutionality of courtroom procedures designed to prevent a
child witness from having to face across an open courtroom a
defendant charged with sexually assaulting the child. White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357, 116 L. Ed. 2d 848, 860, 112 S. Ct. 736, 743 (1992). In Coy the Court vacated a conviction resulting
from a trial in which child accusers testified from behind a large
screen and in which there had been no particularized showing that
such a procedure was necessary to avert a risk of harm to the
children. After certain lighting adjustments in the courtroom, the
screen enabled the defendant in Coy dimly to perceive the child
witnesses but permitted them to see the defendant not at all. Coy,
487 U.S.  at 1014-15, 101 L. Ed. 2d  at 863, 108 S. Ct.  at 2800. In
Craig the majority upheld a conviction resulting from a trial in
which children testified against the defendant by means of one-way closed-circuit television after individualized showings of
necessity.
	In Craig the Court was required to decide whether the
confrontation clause of the sixth amendment categorically
prohibits a child witness in a child abuse case from testifying
against a defendant at trial, outside the defendant's physical
presence, by one-way closed-circuit television. Before the case
went to trial, the State sought to invoke a Maryland statutory
procedure, similar to that of section 106B-5, permitting a judge to
receive, by one-way closed-circuit television, the testimony of a
child witness alleged to be a victim of child abuse. To invoke the
procedure, the trial court must first " 'determin[e] that testimony
by the child victim in the courtroom will result in the child
suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot
reasonably communicate.' Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann.
§9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989)." Craig, 497 U.S.  at 841, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at
675-76, 110 S. Ct.  at 3161. Once the procedure has been invoked,
the child witness, prosecutor, and defense counsel withdraw to a
separate room, and the judge, jury, and defendant remain in the
courtroom. The child witness is then examined and cross-examined in the separate room, while a video monitor records and
displays the witness' testimony to those in the courtroom. During
this time the witness cannot see the defendant, who remains in
electronic communication with defense counsel. Objections may
be made and ruled upon as if the witness were testifying in the
courtroom. In support of its motion in Craig invoking the one-way
closed-circuit television procedure, the State presented expert
testimony that the named victim, as well as a number of other
children alleged to have been sexually abused by the defendant,
would suffer " 'serious emotional distress such that [they could
not] reasonably communicate' " (Craig, 497 U.S.  at 842, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 676, 110 S. Ct. at 3161) if they were required to testify
in the courtroom. The defendant objected to the use of the
procedure on confrontation clause grounds.
	In Craig the Court remarked upon its observation "in Coy v.
Iowa that 'the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a
face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of
fact.' [Citations.] This interpretation derives not only from the
literal text of the Clause, but also from our understanding of its
historical roots. [Citations.] " Craig, 497 U.S.  at 844, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 677, 110 S. Ct.  at 3162. The Court continued by saying that
it had never, however, held that the confrontation clause
guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face
meeting with witnesses against them at trial, adding,
		"Indeed, in Coy v. Iowa, we expressly 'le[ft] for another
day . . . the question whether any exceptions exist' to the
'irreducible literal meaning of the Clause: "a right to meet
face to face all those who appear and give evidence at
trial." ' [Citation.] The procedure challenged in Coy
involved the placement of a screen that prevented two
child witnesses in a child abuse case from seeing the
defendant as they testified against him at trial. [Citation.]
In holding that the use of this procedure violated the
defendant's right to confront witnesses against him, we
suggested that any exception to the right 'would surely be
allowed only when necessary to further an important
public policy'-i.e., only upon a showing of something
more than the generalized, 'legislatively imposed
presumption of trauma' underlying the statute at issue in
that case. [Citations.] We concluded that '[s]ince there
ha[d] been no individualized findings that these particular
witnesses needed special protection, the judgment [in the
case before us] could not be sustained by any conceivable
exception.' [Citation.]" (Emphasis in original.) Craig, 497 U.S.  at 844-45, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 677-78, 110 S. Ct.  at
3163.
Because the trial court in Craig made individualized findings that
each of the child witnesses needed special protection, Craig
required the Court to decide the question reserved in Coy. Craig,
497 U.S.  at 845, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 678, 110 S. Ct.  at 3163.
	The central concern of the confrontation clause is to ensure
the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by
subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary
proceeding before the trier of fact. Craig, 497 U.S.  at 845, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 678, 110 S. Ct.  at 3163. In Craig the Court observed that
			    
"[a]lthough face-to-face confrontation forms 'the core
of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause,'
[citation] we have nevertheless recognized that it is not
the sine qua non of the confrontation right. See Delaware
v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985) (per curiam) ('[T]he
Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the
defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and
expose [testimonial] infirmities [such as forgetfulness,
confusion, or evasion] through cross-examination, thereby
calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for
giving scant weight to the witness' testimony')
[citations]." Craig, 497 U.S.  at 847, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 679-80, 110 S. Ct.  at 3164.
"In sum," the Court concluded, "our precedents establish that 'the
Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face
confrontation at trial,' Roberts, [448 U.S.] at 63 (emphasis added;
footnote omitted), a preference that 'must occasionally give way
to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case,'
Mattox, [156 U.S.] at 243." Craig, 497 U.S.  at 849, 111 L. Ed. 2d 
at 681, 110 S. Ct.  at 3165.
	As a consequence, the Court stated, it has interpreted the
confrontation clause in a manner sensitive to its purposes and
sensitive to the necessities of trial and to the adversary process.
Craig, 497 U.S.  at 849, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 681, 110 S. Ct.  at 3165.
Accordingly, although the Court reaffirmed the importance of
face-to-face confrontation with witnesses appearing at trial, it
could not say that such confrontation is an indispensable element
of the sixth amendment's guarantee of the right to confront one's
accusers. Craig, 497 U.S.  at 849-50, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 681, 110 S. Ct.  at 3165-66. However, the Court emphasized,
			    
"That the face-to-face confrontation requirement is not
absolute does not, of course, mean that it may easily be
dispensed with. As we suggested in Coy, our precedents
confirm that a defendant's right to confront accusatory
witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face
confrontation at trial only where denial of such
confrontation is necessary to further an important public
policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is
otherwise assured." Craig, 497 U.S.  at 850, 111 L. Ed. 2d 
at 681-82, 110 S. Ct.  at 3166.
	While the Court acknowledged that Maryland's statutory
procedure, when invoked, prevents a child witness from seeing the
defendant as he or she testifies against him at trial, the Court found
		"it significant, however, that Maryland's procedure
preserves all of the other elements of the confrontation
right: The child witness must be competent to testify and
must testify under oath; the defendant retains full
opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination; and
the judge, jury, and defendant are able to view (albeit by
video monitor) the demeanor (and body) of the witness as
he or she testifies. Although we are mindful of the many
subtle effects face-to-face confrontation may have on an
adversary criminal proceeding, the presence of these other
elements of confrontation-oath, cross-examination, and
observation of the witness' demeanor-adequately ensures
that the testimony is both reliable and subject to rigorous
adversarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to
that accorded live, in-person testimony." (Emphasis
added.) Craig, 497 U.S.  at 851, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 682, 110 S. Ct.  at 3166.
Confident that use of the one-way closed-circuit television
procedure, where necessary to further an important state interest,
does not impinge upon the truth-seeking or symbolic purposes of
the confrontation clause, the Court determined that the critical
inquiry in Craig was, therefore, whether use of the procedure was
necessary to further an important state interest and concluded that
a state's interest in the physical and psychological well-being of
child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, "at
least in some cases," a defendant's right to face his or her accusers
in court. Craig, 497 U.S.  at 852-53, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 682-83, 110 S. Ct.  at 3167.
	Refusing to second-guess the considered judgment of the
Maryland legislature regarding the importance of its interest in
protecting child abuse victims from the emotional trauma of
testifying, the Court held that, if the State makes an adequate
showing of necessity, the state interest in protecting child
witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is
sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that
permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a
defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the
defendant. Craig, 497 U.S.  at 855, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 685, 110 S. Ct. 
at 3169. The Court determined that the requisite finding of
necessity must be case-specific, that is, the trial court must hear
evidence and determine whether use of the one-way closed-circuit
television procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the
particular child witness who seeks to testify and must find that the
child witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom
generally, but by the presence of the defendant. If the state interest
were merely the interest in protecting child witnesses from
courtroom trauma generally, denial of face-to-face confrontation
would be unnecessary because the child could be permitted to
testify in less intimidating surroundings in the physical presence
of the defendant. Craig, 497 U.S.  at 855-56, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 685,
110 S. Ct.  at 3169. 	Satisfied that the use of Maryland's special
procedure, where necessary to further the important state interest
in preventing trauma to child witnesses in child abuse cases,
adequately ensures the accuracy of the testimony and preserves the
adversary nature of the trial, the Court concluded that
			"where necessary to protect a child witness from trauma
that would be caused by testifying in the physical
presence of the defendant, at least where such trauma
would impair the child's ability to communicate, the
Confrontation Clause does not prohibit use of a procedure
that, despite the absence of face-to-face confrontation,
ensures the reliability of the evidence by subjecting it to
rigorous adversarial testing and thereby preserves the
essence of effective confrontation. Because there is no
dispute that the child witnesses in this case testified under
oath, were subject to full cross-examination, and were
able to be observed by the judge, jury, and defendant as
they testified, we conclude that, to the extent that a proper
finding of necessity has been made, the admission of such
testimony would be consonant with the Confrontation
Clause." (Emphasis added.) Craig, 497 U.S.  at 857, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 686, 110 S. Ct.  at 3170.
	Thus, although the confrontation clause generally requires
face-to-face confrontation, the requirement is not absolute, the
Supreme Court having carved out a narrow exception when denial
of face-to-face confrontation is necessary to further an important
public policy and the necessities of the case require. United States
v. Hamilton, 107 F.3d 499, 503-04 (7th Cir. 1997). In the instant
case the trial court's innovation falls far outside the narrow and
limited exception created by Craig. When a child witness testifies
pursuant to section 106B-5, which, as we have said, is similar to
the statutory scheme allowed in Craig, the child testifies under
oath, is subject to contemporaneous cross-examination, and "must
testify under the watchful eyes of the parties and the fact finder."
Van Brocklin, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 169. The right to confront
witnesses includes the right to hear and to view them as they
testify. People v. Broyld, 146 Ill. App. 3d 693, 698 (1986). When
a defendant appears pro se, the right to confront witnesses includes
the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses; when a defendant
appears by counsel, the right to confront witnesses includes the
ability to be of aid in counsel's cross-examination. Broyld, 146 Ill.
App. 3d at 698. Here the defendant's inability to observe the
manner of the witness while testifying could have prejudiced him
by limiting his ability to suggest lines of examination to his
attorney that might have been indispensable to effective cross-examination (see People v. Nastasio, 19 Ill. 2d 524, 530 (1960)).
Unlike the use of one-way closed-circuit television provided for by
the legislature in section 106B-5 and found permissible in Craig,
the barricade the trial court erected behind M.H. completely
precluded the defendant from seeing her while she testified. Under
the provisions of section 106B-5 and the method deemed
acceptable in Craig, the defendant is able to see the victim testify,
although by video monitor. The measure the trial court devised
here, however, permitted defendant no view of the testifying
victim whatsoever. Moreover, while we recognize that the trial
court was not relying on section 106B-5 for the accommodation
it made, we note that prior to erecting this physical barrier between
the child witness and the defendant the trial court appears to have
made no findings that would have satisfied either of the bases set
forth in section 106B-5(a)(2) for the use of one-way closed-circuit
television. In sum, the trial court's adoption of this ad hoc
procedure improperly expanded the narrow exception to the right
to face-to-face confrontation created by the Court in Craig for the
taking of testimony of a child witness in a child abuse case by the
use of one-way closed-circuit television.
	 The unauthorized alternative the trial court fastened upon of
permitting the child witness to testify against the defendant
barricaded by podiums limited the defendant's ability to aid in the
cross-examination of the witness and thereby impinged upon the
truth-seeking purpose of the confrontation clause (see Craig, 497 U.S.  at 852, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 682, 110 S. Ct. at 3167). The novel
arrangement devised by the trial court, authorized neither by
statute nor by common law, failed to ensure the reliability of the
evidence by subjecting it to rigorous adversarial testing and, thus,
failed to preserve the essence of effective confrontation. While we
acknowledge the trial court's concern with regard to striking a
balance between the right of the defendant to confront the
witnesses against him and the need to protect the child witness
from trauma, this concern led to the creation of an apparently
heretofore unknown arrangement of a courtroom that
impermissibly abridged defendant's sixth amendment right to
confront the child witness testifying against him. The admission
of her testimony, given under such circumstances, was
incompatible with the confrontation clause.
	Although confrontation errors are constitutional violations,
they do not automatically warrant reversal, and a defendant's
conviction can be affirmed if the court is able to conclude the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Johnson, 116 Ill. 2d 13, 28 (1987). However, such error cannot be considered
harmless unless the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error did not contribute to the finding of guilt.
McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d  at 139; People v. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335, 355 (1997). The State has confined its argument to the theory
that the trial court's innovative arrangement of the courtroom did
not infringe upon defendant's right of confrontation. However, the
State does not argue that any such error was harmless. Thus, the
State has failed to satisfy its burden of showing beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the guilty
verdict.
	As we indicated supra, the appellate court addressed
defendant's contention that he had not been proved guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt of predatory criminal sexual assault but
expressly would not reverse his convictions on the basis of his
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Inasmuch as he does
not here dispute the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not
consider that question, already determined adversely to his
position by the appellate court. Hence, defendant cannot
subsequently claim that retrial is barred by evidentiary
insufficiency. See Johnson, 116 Ill. 2d  at 29; People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 309 (1979).
	For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court's use of
podiums that prevented the child witness and the defendant from
seeing one another as she testified abrogated defendant's right to
confrontation guaranteed by the United States and Illinois
Constitutions. In light of this holding, we do not reach defendant's
further claim that the use of the podiums in this manner violated
his constitutional right to due process, nor do we consider any of
the other issues addressed by the appellate court in its opinion but
not presented to this court for review. Therefore, we affirm the
judgment of the appellate court in cause No. 87382, holding that
the procedure adopted by the trial court for use during the
testimony of M.H. violated defendant's right to confrontation,
reversing his convictions, and remanding the cause for a new trial.
	In cause No. 87434, the defendant, Richard Stewart, was
charged in Champaign County with two counts of predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1)
(West 1996)), arising out of incidents occurring between January
1 and March 10 of 1997. The defendant, who is the uncle of the
child, T.N., was alleged to have placed his mouth on the sex organ
of T.N. and to have placed his finger in her sex organ. T.N. was
12 years old at the time of these incidents; defendant was 43. At
the time the offenses were alleged to have been committed
defendant was living with his sister and her children, including T.
N., and had lived with them for about a year and a half prior
thereto. Before the selection of the jury, at the outset of the
hearing conducted on the State's motion to consider the
admissibility of hearsay evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule pursuant to section 115-10(b)(1) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 1996)), the trial
court stated, "Ms. Dobson is here on behalf of the People. Mr.
Barnes is here on behalf of the defendant." The trial court then
asked, "Do we anticipate the Defendant's presence, counsel?"
Defense counsel responded, "No, your Honor. I didn't ask him to
be brought over." The hearing was conducted, at which T.N., her
mother, and a police investigator testified. At the conclusion of
the hearing the trial court concluded that the time, content, and
circumstances surrounding T.N.'s hearsay statements made them
reliable. At trial these three witnesses, as well as a pediatrician
who had examined T.N., testified in behalf of the State. Defendant
testified, denying having abused T.N. In his behalf he called other
witnesses, including his 24-year-old son. The jury found
defendant guilty of both counts. The trial court denied defendant's
motion for a new trial and sentenced him to two concurrent 18-year terms. The question before us is whether the hearing on the
motion brought pursuant to section 115-10 prior to the
commencement of trial involves such a substantial right of the
accused that his absence from the hearing vitiates any action taken
with respect to it (see People v. Woods, 27 Ill. 2d 393, 395
(1963)).
	Section 115-10 provides in part:
			    
"(a) In a prosecution for a physical or sexual act
perpetrated upon or against a child under the age of 13
***, including but not limited to prosecutions for
violations of sections 12-13 through 12-16 of the
Criminal Code of 1961 [720 ILCS 5/12-13 through
12-16 (West 1996)] ***, the following evidence shall be
admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:
				    
(1) testimony by such child *** of an out of court
statement made by such child *** that he or she
complained of such act to another; and
				    
(2) testimony of an out of court statement made by
such child *** describing any complaint of such act or
matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an
element of an offense which is the subject of a
prosecution for a sexual or physical act perpetrated
upon or against a child ***.
			(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:
				    
(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside
the presence of the jury that the time, content, and
circumstances of the statement provide sufficient
safeguards of reliability; and
				    
(2) The child *** :
					    
(A) testifies at the proceeding; or
					    
(B) is unavailable as a witness and there is
corroborative evidence of the act which is the
subject of the statement.
			    
(c) If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section,
the court shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to
determine the weight and credibility to be given the
statement and that, in making the determination, it shall
consider the age and maturity of the child ***, the nature
of the statement, the circumstances under which the
statement was made, and any other relevant factor." 725
ILCS 5/115-10(a), (b), (c) (West 1996).
	Upon defendant's appeal, he contended, inter alia, that the
admission of hearsay evidence violated his rights of confrontation
and of due process. With respect to the latter contention, he
claimed that his absence from the hearing conducted pursuant to
section 115-10 violated his due process right because that hearing
bore a substantial relationship to his opportunity to defend himself
and that, as a result, his absence from this critical stage affected
the fairness of the trial.
	The appellate court concluded that defendant's right of
confrontation had not been violated. Stewart, 303 Ill. App. 3d 844,
850. However, because of the importance of hearings conducted
pursuant to section 115-10, the appellate court determined that
defendants have a due process right to be present at these hearings
and that defendant's absence violated his right to due process, a
violation amounting to plain error. While the appellate court
"acknowledge[d] defendant's presence during this hearing may
have had no effect on the outcome of the case," it concluded that
"the significance of the hearing warranted his presence, unless he
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived this right."
Stewart, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 851. The appellate court found no
such waiver. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the
judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for a new trial.
The appellate court concluded further that the evidence was
sufficient to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, so
that defendant faces no risk of double jeopardy upon retrial.
Because the appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial
court on the basis of a violation of defendant's right to due
process, it found no need to address his argument that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. We allowed the State's petition
for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).
	In this court the State contends that defendant, Richard
Stewart, was not denied his right of due process as a consequence
of his absence from the hearing conducted pursuant to section
115-10. Defendant makes several contentions: that he was denied
his right to be present at all critical stages where the trial court
conducted this hearing outside of his presence; that he did not
waive this issue by failing to raise it in the trial court; that the
appellate court erroneously concluded that his right to confront
witnesses was not violated when the section 115-10 hearing was
conducted outside his presence; that the appellate court
erroneously concluded that his presence at that hearing would
have no impact on the integrity of the truth-seeking process; and
that the appellate court correctly concluded that the section
155-10 hearing is so important to the administration of justice that
the defendant has an absolute right to be present during
substantive testimony given by adults. Defendant also seeks cross-relief, contending that trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to cross-examine the complaining witness'
mother properly at the hearing conducted pursuant to section
115-10 to determine the reliability of the complaining witness'
statement used to convict him.
	Under the United States Constitution a criminal defendant has
a general right to be present at every stage of his trial. People v.
Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 80, 82 (1990). When the accused is not
present in person, the error is not cured by the presence of his
counsel, as his attorney has no power to waive his right to be
present. People v. Smith, 6 Ill. 2d 414, 416 (1955). The nearly
unanimous rule in this country is that the defendant's
constitutional right to be present at the trial does not embrace a
right also to be present at the argument of motions prior to trial or
subsequent to verdict. Woods, 27 Ill. 2d  at 395. However, the
Court has assumed that even in situations where the defendant is
not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him, he has
a due process right " 'to be present in his own person whenever
his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness
of his opportunity to defend against the charge.' " Kentucky v.
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631, 647, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (1987), quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105-06, 78 L. Ed. 674, 678, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332 (1934). Although
the Court has emphasized that this privilege of presence is not
guaranteed "when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a
shadow" (Snyder, 291 U.S.  at 106-07, 78 L. Ed.  at 678, 54 S. Ct.
at 332), due process clearly requires that a defendant be allowed
to be present "to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be
thwarted by his absence" (Snyder, 291 U.S.  at 108, 78 L. Ed.  at
679, 54 S. Ct. at 333). Stincer, 482 U.S.  at 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d  at
647, 107 S. Ct.  at 2667. Therefore, a defendant is guaranteed the
right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is
critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the
fairness of the procedure. Stincer, 482 U.S.  at 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d 
at 647, 107 S. Ct.  at 2667.
	Under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
a criminal defendant's right of presence is violated only when his
absence results in the denial of a fair and just trial. People v. Bull,
185 Ill. 2d 179, 201 (1998); Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 83. The question
is not whether "but for" the outcome of the proceeding the
defendant would have avoided conviction but whether the
defendant's presence at the proceeding would have contributed to
his opportunity to defend himself against the charges. Stincer, 482 U.S.  at 744 n.17, 96 L. Ed. 2d  at 647 n.17, 107 S. Ct.  at 2667 n.17.
The justice or injustice of the exclusion of the defendant must be
determined in the light of the whole record. Snyder, 291 U.S.  at
115, 78 L. Ed.  at 683, 54 S. Ct.  at 336.
	In Snyder although the majority and dissent disagreed as to
whether due process required the presence of the defendant at a
view of the scene by the jury during trial, the majority concluding
that it did not, both agreed that defendants have the right to be
personally present at every stage of the trial where their substantial
rights may be affected by the proceedings and where their
presence relates to the fullness of their opportunity to defend
against the charge. In Stincer the respondent, who was the
defendant in a criminal action in which he had been found guilty
of first degree sodomy, contended that his due process rights had
been violated by his exclusion from the hearing conducted to
determine the competency to testify of the two young girls against
whom he was accused of having committed sodomy. The
respondent in Stincer gave no indication that his presence at the
competency hearing would have been useful in ensuring a more
reliable determination as to whether the witnesses were competent
to testify. The majority in Stincer concluded that the due process
rights of the respondent had not been violated by his exclusion
from the hearing on the competency of the two witnesses to
testify, emphasizing "the particular nature of the competency
hearing" (Stincer, 482 U.S.  at 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d  at 647, 107 S. Ct.
at 2667), at which "[n]o question regarding the substantive
testimony that the two girls would have given during trial was
asked" (Stincer, 482 U.S.  at 745-46, 96 L. Ed. 2d  at 647, 107 S.
Ct. at 2667) and at which:
		"[a]ll the questions, instead, were directed solely to each
child's ability to recollect and narrate facts, to her ability
to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and to her
sense of moral obligation to tell the truth. Thus, although
a competency hearing in which a witness is asked to
discuss upcoming substantive testimony might bear a
substantial relationship to a defendant's opportunity
better to defend himself at trial, that kind of inquiry is not
before us in this case." Stincer, 482 U.S.  at 746, 96 L. Ed. 2d  at 647-48, 107 S. Ct.  at 2667-68.
As this court observed in People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 13
(1995), the Court's analysis in Stincer turned on the nature of the
hearing from which the defendant had been excluded.
	Here, much like the situation the Court envisioned but did not
encounter in Stincer, the questioning of the alleged child victim,
her mother, and the police investigator at the section 115-10
hearing did touch upon the upcoming substantive trial testimony
of the witnesses to a very great extent. T.N. described defendant's
molestation of her, and her mother and the police investigator
described T.N.'s statements concerning the matter to each of
them. The substantive points elicited during the section 115-10
hearing unquestionably bore a "substantial relationship" to
defendant's opportunity better to defend himself at trial. See
Stincer, 482 U.S.  at 746, 96 L. Ed. 2d  at 647-48, 107 S. Ct. at
2667-68; Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 14.
	The defendant contends that not until trial, at which he was
present, did his counsel elicit testimony from T.N.'s mother that
T.N. had a motive to lie about the defendant's molestation of
her-testimony that could have been obtained the day before trial
during the section 115-10 hearing had defendant been present
then, testimony that would have undermined a finding that the
circumstances of T.N.'s statements provided sufficient safeguards
of reliability, as required by section 115-10(b)(1). Specifically,
defendant points to the testimony of T.N.'s mother on cross-examination during trial regarding the circumstances under which
T.N. accused defendant of sexually assaulting her.
	During the section 115-10 hearing, conducted the day before
the jury was chosen and the trial began, T.N.'s mother testified on
direct examination by the State that T.N. had informed her after
an argument between T.N. and her older brother that defendant
was molesting her. Following that argument the witness took T.N.
aside to speak with her about, among other things, sexual conduct.
At the section 115-10 hearing, T.N.'s mother testified on cross-examination that teasing between T.N. and her brother had
"started it all," teasing that the witness had not heard but had been
"reported" to her.
	However, at trial during cross-examination of this witness
defense counsel elicited numerous facts concerning the
circumstances that led to T.N.'s statements about defendant's
sexual assaults upon her. On cross-examination at trial, T.N.'s
mother testified that a friend of the family had been present during
the "tiff" between T.N. and her sibling and that thereafter T.N.'s
mother asked T.N. if "she was sexually involved or if she was
playing around with another little boy in the neighborhood [named
Mike]." She asked T.N. "[i]f she was playing around with
somebody or if she had let somebody play around with her" and
told her that she "thought that this little boy Mikey and her had
done something." Following "[a]t least five or six" denials by
T.N. that this was so in response to her mother's claim that she
"knew there was something going on," T.N.'s mother told T.N.
that she was "going to take her to a doctor because the doctor
could tell if she had any sexual-whether they [sic] can or
not-[she] had told [T.N.] that [she] was going to take her to the
doctor and have her checked." According to her mother, T.N.
responded by saying, "Oh, so a doctor can tell if you have done
anything like that." Her mother said, "[Y]es." Then T.N. asked her
older brother, who was present, to leave the room, burst into tears,
and told her mother, "[M]om, it's Rick, Uncle Rick is the only
one that's been messing with me." T.N.'s mother testified that in
response she "jumped up" and asked, "[T.N.], are you telling me
the truth and she said, yes mom, and I said oh, I'm so sorry baby
and I grabbed her and I hugged her and I kissed her and I told her
I loved her. And I asked her to go into my-her bedroom and wait
for me until I came and got her, because I needed to get my shit
together and figure out what I was going to do."
	Defendant argues that by describing defendant as having
molested her, T.N. went from being a child in trouble with her
mother for having engaged in sexual activity with a 13-year-old
boy in the neighborhood to being a victim, consoled and
comforted by her. Defendant asserts that had T.N.'s motive to lie
been exposed at the section 115-10 hearing, the trial court would
not have found her statements sufficiently reliable to be allowed
into evidence and that, as a consequence, there is a reasonable
probability he would not have been convicted. The State argues,
among other things, that defense counsel was present at the
section 115-10 hearing and that defendant had no direct
knowledge of the hearsay statements found admissible because he
was not present when any of the statements were made, so that his
presence at the hearing bore no substantial relationship to his
ability to present his defense and, thus, was not required. The
State maintains further that T.N.'s testimony that defendant had
told her not to tell anyone anything about these incidents because
he would "go back to prison for a long time" supports the
inference that T.N. was trying to protect him by remaining silent
until she was falsely accused of having had sexual relations with
a boy in her neighborhood.
	In light of the entire record, we cannot say that there is
nothing defendant could have done had he been present at the
section 115-10 hearing and nothing he could have gained (see
Snyder, 291 U.S.  at 108, 78 L. Ed.  at 679, 54 S. Ct. at 333).
Numerous details, possibly disadvantageous to the State's
position, about precisely how T.N. came to accuse the defendant
were elicited at trial at which defendant was present, whereas
virtually none were elicited at the section 115-10 hearing the day
before from which he had been absent. Even if, as the State
maintains, defendant did lack direct knowledge of the hearsay
statements in question or how they came to be made, we are
mindful that this is an intrafamilial incident, information about
which defendant might well have obtained through one or more
members of his family. The record suggests that defendant's
presence at the section 115-10 hearing would have contributed to
his ability to defend himself against the charges, so that his
"privilege of presence" would not have been "useless, or the
benefit but a shadow" (Snyder, 291 U.S.  at 106-07, 78 L. Ed.  at
678, 54 S. Ct. at 332).
	On the basis of the record we think that defendant's presence
at the section 115-10 hearing would have been useful in ensuring
a more reliable determination as to the admissibility of T.N.'s
statements (see Stincer, 482 U.S.  at 747, 96 L. Ed. 2d  at 648, 107
S. Ct. at 2668) and would have contributed to his opportunity to
defend himself against the charges lodged against him. We agree
entirely with the appellate court's astute observation that "[i]n
some child sex abuse cases, hearsay testimony may be the only
evidence supporting the victim's allegations. The outcome of the
section 115-10 hearing is potentially the most important
determination during the case and bears a substantial relationship
to defendant's ability to establish a defense" (Stewart, 303 Ill.
App. 3d at 851). This defendant should have had the opportunity
to present to the trial court the details of T.N.'s provocation to
accuse him of molesting her for the court's consideration in
determining whether "the time, content, and circumstances of the
statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability," required by
section 115-10(b)(1). Certainly the record indicates that
defendant's presence at the section 115-10 hearing would have
borne a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his
opportunity to defend against the charges. By the time trial began
and defendant was present to defend against the charges, it was
too late for him to protest the admissibility of T.N.'s hearsay
statements, damaging in the extreme to his defense. Because the
record indicates that defendant's presence at the section 115-10
hearing would have contributed to the fairness of the criminal
proceeding against him and that a fair and just hearing was
thwarted by his absence, we conclude that the section 115-10
hearing was a stage critical to the outcome of the criminal
proceeding at which defendant had a right to be present. Hence,
we are brought to the conclusion that defendant's absence resulted
in his being denied a fair and just trial, thereby violating his due
process right of presence (see Bean, 137 Ill. 2d at 83).
	Where the right to be present exists, the defendant must
waive that right knowingly and voluntarily. See Taylor v. United
States, 414 U.S. 17, 18-20, 38 L. Ed. 2d 174, 176-78, 94 S. Ct. 194, 195-96 (1973). Nothing in this record suggests that the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be
present at the section 115-10 hearing.
	Because defendant claimed for the first time on review in the
appellate court that he was denied his right to be present at all
critical stages of the proceedings when the trial court conducted
the 115-10 hearing outside of his presence, the State contends that
he has waived the issue for review. However, as defendant asserts
and the appellate court determined, this issue must be treated as
plain error, which is a narrow and limited exception to the general
rule concerning waiver and which may be invoked only where the
evidence is closely balanced or the alleged error so substantial that
it deprived the defendant of a fair trial (Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 200).
Here, where the defendant's absence resulted in a denial of his
constitutional right to due process pursuant to the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution, plain error
occurred. 	As we indicated supra, the appellate court concluded
that the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, so that defendant faces no risk of double
jeopardy upon retrial. Defendant does not renew that contention
in this court, and we do not review it. The question having already
been determined adversely to defendant's position by the appellate
court, defendant cannot hereafter claim that retrial is barred by
evidentiary insufficiency. See Johnson, 116 Ill. 2d  at 29; Taylor,
76 Ill. 2d  at 309.
	Because of our determination with respect to the deprivation
of defendant's right to due process afforded him by the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution, we need not
consider his cross-claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the
section 115-10 hearing, based upon trial counsel's failure to
cross-examine T.N.'s mother properly at this hearing. Nor do we
consider any of the other issues addressed by the appellate court
in its opinion but not presented to this court for review.
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court in cause No. 87434, reversing the judgment of the
trial court and remanding the cause for a new trial. However,
because defendant was deprived of due process as a result of
being absent from a critical stage of the criminal proceeding
against him, namely, the hearing conducted pursuant to section
115-10, we remand the cause to the circuit court not merely for a
new trial but also for a new section 115-10 hearing at which
defendant is present, unless he validly waives his right of
presence.
No. 87382-Appellate court
judgment affirmed.
No. 87434-Appellate court judgment
affirmed as modified;
 cause remanded with directions.