Case Title: State v. Lazzaro

Citation: 1996-Ohio-397

Docket Number: 19950647

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, V. LAZZARO, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Lazzaro (1996), ___ Ohio St.3d __.] 
Criminal law -- Falsification -- Obstructing official business -- Making 
unsworn false oral statement to public official with purpose to 
mislead, hamper, or impede investigation of a crime is punishible 
conduct within meaning of R.C. 2921.13(A)(3) and 2921.31(A). 
The making of an unsworn false oral statement to a public 
official with the purpose to mislead, hamper or 
impede the investigation of a crime is punishable 
conduct within the meaning of R.C. 2921.13(A)(3) 
and 2921.31(A).  (Columbus v. Fisher [1978], 53 
Ohio St.2d 25, 7 O.O.3d 78, 372 N.E.2d 583, and 
Dayton v. Rogers [1979], 60 Ohio St.2d 162, 14 
O.O.3d 403, 398 N.E.2d 781, overruled.) 
 
 
(No. 95-647 -- Submitted March 20, 1996 -- Decided August 
7,1996.) 
 
2
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 
94CA005885. 
 
On October 7, 1993, Noel Neece and Julie Swindell, who are 
employed as nurse’s aides by the Good Samaritan Nursing Home, were 
assisting a resident, Carl Newman, at the toilet when an argument 
erupted between Neece and Newman, resulting in Neece punching and 
breaking Newman’s nose.  Charlotte Lazzaro, then administrator of the 
nursing home, was notified of the incident and immediately conducted 
an initial investigation by separately questioning the two nurse’s aides.   
 
Lazzaro began by talking with Swindell, who told Lazzaro that 
Neece had intentionally struck Newman.  Swindell also gave Lazzaro a 
written statement describing the assault.  Lazzaro then permitted 
Swindell to leave for the day.  
 
Next, Lazzaro questioned Neece.  Neece’s depiction of the events 
differed markedly.  According to Neece, he had struck Newman 
accidentally while putting his arm up to defend himself.  Lazzaro then 
 
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wrote down Neece’s description of the event, and he signed the 
statement.  Although Neece’s shift had ended, Lazzaro detained him so 
the police could question him. 
 
Lazzaro contacted the Avon Police Department and requested 
that an officer be sent to investigate the incident.  According to Officer 
Michael Kish, when he arrived at the nursing home, he spoke first with 
Lazzaro, who told him that she had an employee who had struck a 
resident, but that the employee had described it as an accident.  When 
Kish asked Lazzaro if anyone witnessed the incident, she responded 
that no one had.  Lazzaro, however, denies that she ever had this initial 
conversation with Kish.  
 
Kish then questioned Neece regarding the injury to Newman.  
Neece maintained his story that the assault had been an accident. 
Although Lazzaro was present during Neece’s entire explanation and 
demonstration of the incident, at no time did Lazzaro tell Kish about the 
existence of a contradictory witness, nor did she provide him with 
 
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Swindell’s written statement describing the incident as an intentional 
assault.  After investigating the incident for approximately one-half hour, 
Kish informed Lazzaro that there appeared to be no criminal act and left 
the nursing home. 
 
Four days later, Lazzaro again called the Avon police.  By this 
time, she had learned that Kish had filed his report concluding that 
Neece had struck Newman accidentally.  She had also learned that the 
full extent of Newman’s injuries consisted of a broken nose and visible 
facial bruising.  In her call to the police, Lazzaro indicated that new 
evidence had come to light suggesting that Neece had intentionally 
struck Newman.  When Kish returned the call two days later, Lazzaro, 
for the first time, also suggested that the police talk to Swindell. 
 
Aided by the new information, the Avon police reopened the 
investigation and, ultimately, arrested Neece.  Neece admitted that he 
had intentionally struck Newman, and eventually pled guilty to felonious 
assault. 
 
5
 
Subsequently, Lazzaro was charged with obstructing official 
business, falsification, and obstructing justice.  After a trial to a jury,  she 
was found guilty of obstructing official business and falsification.  
Following this court’s decision in State v. Bailey (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 
443, 644 N.E.2d 314, the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the 
convictions and sentence. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
------------------------ 
 
Gregory A. White, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Jonathan Rosenbaum, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Gold, Rotatori & Schwartz Co., L.P.A., Gerald S. Gold and John S. 
Pyle, for appellant. 
------------------------ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  This case presents the court with the question of 
whether the making of an unsworn false oral statement to a public 
 
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official with the purpose to mislead, hamper or impede the investigation 
of a crime is punishable conduct within the meaning of R.C. 
2921.13(A)(3) and 2921.31(A).  For the following reasons, we answer 
that question in the affirmative. 
 
At trial, Lazzaro was found guilty of violating R.C. 2921.13, Ohio’s 
falsification statute, which provides: 
 
“(A)  No person shall knowingly make a false statement, or 
knowingly swear or affirm the truth of a false statement previously 
made, when any of the following applies: 
 
“*** 
 
“(3)  The statement is made with purpose to mislead a public 
official in performing the public official’s official functions.” 
 
Lazzaro was also convicted of obstructing official business under 
R.C. 2921.31(A), which provides: 
 
“(A)  No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to 
prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any 
 
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authorized act within his official capacity, shall do any act which 
hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of his lawful 
duties.” 
 
Lazzaro relies on our holdings in Columbus v. Fisher (1978), 53 
Ohio St.2d 25, 7 O.O.3d 78, 372 N.E.2d 583, and Dayton v. Rogers 
(1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 162, 14 O.O.3d 403, 398 N.E.2d 781, where we 
held that the making of unsworn false oral statements to a police officer 
was not punishable conduct with the meanings of R.C. 2921.13(A)(3) or 
2921.31(A), respectively. 
 
In Fisher, the defendant was convicted of violating a municipal 
ordinance virtually identical to R.C. 2921.13(A)(3) for giving a false 
name to a police officer.  The Fisher court reviewed the history of the 
statute, and adopted the reasoning that for a false statement to be 
punishable it must be in writing and must also derive from an intent to 
mislead. 
 
8
 
In Rogers, the defendant was convicted of violating a Dayton 
municipal ordinance identical to R.C. 2921.31(A) for lying to a police 
officer by falsely confirming the identity of her companion.  Relying on 
the reasoning in Fisher, the Rogers court concluded that because 
“conduct such as appellant’s is not punishable under R.C. 
2921.13(A)(3), which specifically addresses the making of false 
statements to public officials, we are reasonably led to the determination 
here not to extend the meaning of R.C. 2921.31 beyond that intended 
by the General Assembly.”  Rogers, supra, 60 Ohio St.2d at 164, 14 
O.O.3d at 404-405, 398 N.E.2d at 783. 
 
The holdings in Fisher and Rogers were expressly limited to their 
facts by this court’s recent decision in State v. Bailey (1994), 71 Ohio 
St.3d 443, 644 N.E.2d 314.  In Bailey, the defendant was convicted 
under R.C. 2921.32(A)(5) for obstructing justice when she continually 
refused to move from the doorway of the house, thereby blocking the 
police from entering the house to arrest her brother, and repeatedly 
 
9
declared that her brother was not home.  In Bailey we observed that 
both state and federal case law have “firmly established that unsworn 
false oral statements made for the purpose of impeding an officer’s 
investigation are punishable ***.”  (Citations omitted.)  Id. at 446, 644 
N.E.2d at 316.  We held at the syllabus that “[t]he making of unsworn 
false oral statements to a law enforcement officer with the purpose to 
hinder the officer’s investigation of a crime is punishable conduct within 
the meaning of R.C. 2921.32(A)(5).” 
 
In view of our recent decision in Bailey, we conclude that 
Lazzaro’s reliance on Fisher and Rogers is misplaced.  Although Bailey 
did not overrule those cases, it did limit them to their facts, as the 
specific statutes involved in each were not directly before this court at 
that time.  However, both R.C. 2921.13(A)(3) and 2921.31(A) are the 
subject of review in the instant case, and we conclude that the sound 
reasoning expressed in Bailey applies equally to both statutes. 
 
10
 
Lazzaro argues that it would be an improper retroactive 
application of our decision in Bailey to the facts at bar because Bailey 
was not announced until after Lazzaro’s convictions, but before review 
of the case by the court of appeals.  We disagree.  “The general rule is 
that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former 
decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the 
former was bad law, but that it never was the law.”  Peerless Elec. Co. 
v. Bowers (1955), 164 Ohio St. 209, 210, 57 O.O 411, 129 N.E.2d 467, 
468. 
 
Lazzaro also argues that the doctrine that mere exculpatory 
denials cannot be punished should apply to her responses to Kish.  See 
Columbus v. New (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 221, 1 OBR 244, 438 N.E.2d 
1155.  But, see, United States v. Steele (C.A.6, 1991), 933 F.2d 1313, 
1320.  However, this doctrine does not extend to the facts in the present 
case because the questions asked by Kish of Lazzaro did not implicate 
her Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination.  
 
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Accordingly, we make no decision regarding its applicability to the 
statutes reviewed. 
 
The record indicates that Lazzaro embarked upon a course of 
conduct aimed at limiting the police investigation in such a way that the 
assault on Newman would be ruled accidental.  One way was by 
allowing the only witness to the assault, Julie Swindell, to leave work 
without speaking to Kish.  Neece testified that when he talked with 
Lazzaro soon after the assault, she told him that she had already taken 
Swindell’s statement, and that Swindell would not be talking to the 
police.  This suggests that Lazzaro did not merely passively fail to assist 
Kish’s investigation, but actively chose which witnesses Kish would 
encounter.  Lazzaro furthered the concealment of this key witness by 
denying her existence.  Specifically, when Kish testified at trial, he 
stated: 
 
“A 
I asked [Lazzaro] if there was [sic] any witnesses, and she 
said no. 
 
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“Q 
Are you sure of that? 
 
“A 
I’m positive. 
 
“Q 
And her response was what? 
 
“A 
That there wasn’t any.” 
   
 
Kish also testified that Lazzaro was present during Neece’s entire 
explanation of the assault: 
 
“Q 
And Mrs. Lazzaro was present during this entire 
presentation? 
 
“A 
That is correct. 
 
“Q 
And demonstration? 
 
“A 
That’s right.  He demonstrated it next. 
 
“Q 
Did she ever tell you she had conflicting information to that 
report? 
 
“A 
No, she did not. 
 
“* * * 
 
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“Q 
Did you make efforts again to ascertain if there were any 
possible witnesses? 
 
“A 
Yes, I did.  Before I released Mr. Neece I asked Mr. Neece 
also if there were any witnesses, and he said no. 
 
“Q 
In Mrs. Lazzaro’s presence? 
 
“A 
In Mrs. Lazzaro’s presence.  *** 
 
“* * * 
 
“Q 
At any time did anyone say there’s another witness to see, 
maybe your decision [of no criminal act] is a little hasty? 
 
“A 
No, they did not.” 
 
There can be no doubt that the statements and actions of Lazzaro 
conveyed false information regarding the existence of another witness 
and the possibility of a criminal act.  A trier of fact could reasonably 
conclude from the evidence that Lazzaro intended to mislead and 
impede the investigation conducted by Kish.   
 
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The General Assembly has adopted legislation intended to 
discourage individuals from purposely giving false information that 
hinders public officials in the performance of their duties.  Complete and 
honest cooperation with the law enforcement process by all citizens is 
essential to the effective operation of the justice system.  Columbus v. 
New (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 221, 227, 1 OBR 244, 249, 438 N.E.2d 1155, 
1160. Therefore, we hold that the making of an unsworn false oral 
statement to a public official with the purpose to mislead, hamper or 
impede the investigation of a crime is punishable conduct within the 
meaning of R.C. 2921.13(A)(3) and 2921.31(A).  Our decisions in 
Columbus v. Fisher and Dayton v. Rogers are hereby overruled. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
RESNICK, COOK and STRATTON, JJ., CONCUR. 
 
COOK and STRATTON, JJ., concur separately. 
 
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F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., not participating. 
 
STRATTON, J., concurring.  I concur in the majority opinion.  There does 
not seem to be any dispute over the law, but rather how the law applies to these 
facts.  Was Lazzaro merely confused about her conflicting duties, as the dissent 
alleges, or was she trying to hide patient abuse to protect her nursing home, as 
the jury found?  Did she call the police again because she realized a 
discrepancy, or because she knew the facts were about to come out?  The jury 
was in the best position to weigh credibility (both hers and Officer Kish’s), to 
judge motive, and to decide whether the evidence supported the charge beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Lazzaro intended to impede the investigation.  
Therefore, since the weighing of the evidence is the real issue here, and the 
evidence can clearly be read as the jury found, I would affirm the court of 
appeals and the jury’s conclusions. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
 
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FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J., dissenting.   I respectfully dissent.  I disagree with the 
majority’s decision to affirm the appellant’s convictions for obstructing official business 
(R.C. 2921.31[A]) and falsification (R.C. 2921.13[A][3]).  I believe the General Assembly 
never intended to criminalize the situation which occurred here.  Therefore, I would reverse 
the court of appeals’ decision, which affirms the appellant’s convictions. 
 
In reaching my decision, I carefully considered the evidence presented at trial.  
According to this evidence, it was appellant who summoned the police to the nursing home 
on October 7, 1993.  The police dispatch tape recorded her telephone conversation, where she 
stated:  “I have an employee that -- well, I have a resident that has a bloody nose and an 
employee I suspect of punching him in the nose.”  (Emphasis added.)  In response to 
appellant’s call, Patrolman Michael Kish reported to the nursing home to investigate.  This 
investigation lasted a total of thirty-two minutes, when Kish left his cruiser to when he re-
entered it to leave the scene.  Only ten minutes of his investigation was spent talking to the 
suspect, Noel Neece, Jr., and appellant. 
 
When interviewed by Kish, Neece stuck to his original story that it was an accident.  
Appellant knew that another nurse’s aide, Julie Swindell, had given conflicting statements; 
however, appellant did not know at the time what had really occurred.  Appellant had just 
received the report of this incident about one hour beforehand, and she was in the process of 
collecting information so she could reach her own determination of what had occurred.  
 
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Appellant also stated that she was overwhelmed and had “tunnel vision” because she did not 
know what her responsibilities were to the patient, the nursing home, the witness, and the 
suspect.  Therefore, appellant did not volunteer Swindell’s name.  In addition, she testified 
that Kish never asked her if there were any witnesses.  Instead, the officer only asked whether 
the patient had a roommate, to which she replied “yes.”  Of course, Patrolman Kish’s 
testimony differs from appellant’s.  Kish testified that he asked appellant if there were other 
witnesses, and she said “no.”  Kish also testified that he asked if the patient had a roommate. 
 
Before leaving the nursing home, Kish told appellant he did not think a criminal act 
had occurred.  However, he told appellant to call him if it was later determined that the 
patient’s nose was broken. 
 
The next day, Friday, October 8, 1993, appellant began preparing her report 
concerning the incident for the State Department of Health.  In her seven years as the 
administrator, this was the first time she had dealt with a case of physical patient abuse.  In 
connection with preparing her report, appellant learned the extent of the patient’s injury and 
obtained a copy of Kish’s police report.  After considering all the information, appellant 
concluded that Neece had intentionally struck the patient.  Her report to the state, which she 
sent on October 11, 1993, reflects her conclusion that patient abuse had occurred. 
 
After reaching this conclusion, appellant realized that the police report and her report 
to the state were conflicting.  She did not want to make the police officer look ridiculous, and 
 
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she realized that Kish had reached his conclusions because he did not know that the patient’s 
nose was broken or that Swindell had offered a different version from the suspect’s version.  
After speaking with the head of night security at the nursing home (an off-duty sergeant for 
the Avon police) on October 11, 1993, appellant called the police station to give Kish this 
new information.  As a result of appellant’s disclosure, the case was reopened and Neece was 
arrested for assaulting the patient and ultimately pled guilty to that charge. 
 
Based upon these facts, appellant was convicted of obstructing official business (R.C. 
2921.31[A]) and falsification (R.C. 2921.13[A][3]).  In order to sustain a conviction for 
obstructing official business, the state was required to prove, inter alia, that appellant (1) 
performed any act which hampered or impeded a public official in the performance of his 
lawful duties, and (2) with a purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay performance by a public 
official of any authorized act within his official capacity.  (Emphasis added.)  To prove 
falsification, the state was required to show that appellant (1) knowingly made a false 
statement, (2) with purpose to mislead public official in performing his official function.  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
At oral argument, the prosecutor admitted that the state had to prove appellant’s intent 
in committing these crimes.  Further, the prosecutor conceded, despite all the legal rhetoric in 
his appellee brief to the contrary, that the only evidence he had to prove this intent was 
Patrolman Kish’s testimony that appellant stated in response to his inquiry that there were no 
 
19
witnesses.  The prosecutor then argued that if Kish’s testimony was true, then intent could be 
inferred from appellant’s oral statement.  This was the sum and substance of the evidence the 
state produced to prove appellant guilty of these charges. In my mind, this evidence, which 
was disputed, is wholly inadequate to prove these crimes. 
 
Instead, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was confused and did not know 
what her responsibilities were when confronted with the police investigation.  This confusion 
is understandable.  As the administrator of the nursing home, she was faced with the task of 
knowing, understanding and juggling her responsibilities to the patient, nursing home, 
employees of the nursing home, and governmental authorities.  Nevertheless, appellant 
discharged her duties under the law.  She immediately reported the incident to the police, 
suspended the suspected wrongdoer, and proceeded to prepare her report to the Department 
of Health.  
 
After she digested all the information, she arrived at her conclusion that Neece had 
intentionally struck the patient.  This conclusion was recorded in her state report.   Because of 
her concern that her report and the police report did not match, she initiated contact with 
Patrolman Kish to provide him with all the information she had.  She had no legal 
responsibility to do so.  It was not her job to do the investigation for the police.  Her only 
legal obligation was to report a suspected crime, which she did on October 7.    However, 
 
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solely based upon her voluntary actions, Neece was arrested for his crime and charged 
accordingly.  Justice prevailed when Neece entered his guilty plea.   
 
I am at a loss to understand why the majority wants to punish appellant’s actions.  By 
upholding criminal convictions under these facts,  I am afraid that today’s decision today will 
have a far-reaching impact on every conversation between a law enforcement officer and a 
private citizen.  Faced with the very real threat of criminal prosecution if an oral statement is 
later corrected, a citizen may very well be discouraged from providing any information to the 
police.  In other words, the police, who already have a difficult job in ferreting out crime, 
have just been dealt a blow to their ability to combat crime.  Instead, I believe the goal of 
obtaining accurate information about criminal misconduct can best be served by shielding 
from prosecution witnesses who voluntarily come forward to correct a police officer’s 
misunderstanding about the case.  Accordingly, I would reverse appellant’s convictions. 
 
PFEIFER, J., wholeheartedly concurs in the foregoing dissenitng opinion.