Case Title: Martin Acquadro, M.D. v. Janet Bergeron

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC01-896

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
1.  Prior to the disposition of this case, we quashed the Fifth District's
decision in Horowitz and disapproved of the court's decisions in Intercontinental
Corp. and McLean to the extent that those decisions were inconsistent with our
Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC01-896
____________
MARTIN ACQUADRO, M.D., et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
JANET BERGERON, et al.,
Respondents.
[July 10, 2003]
QUINCE, J.
We have for review Acquadro v. Bergeron, 778 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA
2001), a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which expressly and
directly conflicts with the decisions of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in
Horowitz v. Laske, 751 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), quashed sub nom. Wendt
v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2002);1 Thompson v. Doe, 596 So. 2d 1178
decisions in Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2002), and Execu-Tech
Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New OJI Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2000).  See Wendt,
822 So. 2d at 1260.  Since we have quashed the Fifth District’s decision in
Horowitz, that decision cannot serve as a basis for conflict jurisdiction.  
2.  Bergeron contends in her complaint that she and Eddie lived together for
eight years and that they "lived together as if they were husband and wife, and held
themselves out to be husband and wife."  Dr. Acquadro states in his affidavit
contesting personal jurisdiction that Bergeron and Eddie lived together for "several
-2-
(Fla. 5th DCA 1992), approved, 620 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1993); Intercontinental
Corp. v. Orlando Regional Medical Center, Inc., 586 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 5th DCA
1991); McLean Financial Corp. v. Winslow Loudermilk Corp., 509 So. 2d 1373
(Fla. 5th DCA 1987), and the Second District Court of Appeal in Koch v. Kimball,
710 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Phillips v. Orange Co., 522 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1998); and Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corp. v. Ward, 696 So. 2d 930
(Fla. 2d DCA 1997).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
  On September 17, 1997, respondent Janet Bergeron (Bergeron) was
arrested for battery on Edward Acquadro (Eddie), the uncle of petitioner Dr. Martin
Acquadro and the brother-in-law of petitioner Rose Acquadro.  Both Dr. Acquadro
and Rose Acquadro are residents of Massachusetts.  At the time of Bergeron's
arrest, Eddie was 72 years old and Bergeron was 38 years old.  Before the arrest,
Eddie and Bergeron resided together in the same house in Boca Raton, Florida.2
years" and that Eddie "allowed Bergeron to reside in his house."
3.  Bonnie Towing and several of its employees were defendants below. 
However, the only defendants before this Court are Dr. Martin Acquadro and Rose
Acquadro.
-3-
 Bergeron and Eddie went to Bonnie Towing & Recovery, Inc. (Bonnie
Towing)3 to recover their car, which had been towed.  When a Bonnie Towing
employee informed Bergeron that the tow bill was $100, Bergeron became hostile. 
She began to yell at Eddie, and forcibly picked him up and carried him out of the
office through the front door.  Eddie hit his head on the door on the way out.  After
Bergeron carried Eddie outside, she hit Eddie in the arm with a car battery. 
Bergeron was taken into custody after Bonnie Towing employees called the police
to the scene. 
The police found probable cause to arrest Bergeron for battery of a person
65 years of age or older.  However, the State ultimately entered a nolle prosse
because the mental evaluations of Bergeron concluded that the "criteria of legal
insanity" were present; therefore, the State could not meet its burden of proving
Bergeron's intent beyond a reasonable doubt.     
Dr. Acquadro and his parents, Rose Acquadro and the since-deceased
4.  The parties dispute the time at which the Acquadros learned of
Bergeron's arrest.  Bergeron contends that the Acquadros conspired with Bonnie
Towing in order to have Bergeron arrested, and this contention forms the basis for
her false imprisonment, false arrest, and malicious prosecution claims.  By contrast,
the Acquadros' affidavits contend that they did not learn of Bergeron's arrest until
after it occurred.
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Andrew Acquadro, learned of Bergeron's arrest on the day she was arrested.4 
Andrew and Rose Acquadro arranged for Eddie to fly to Massachusetts to obtain
medical care and treatment.  After recuperating, Eddie moved to an assisted nursing
center.  Eddie eventually died on August 27, 1998.
Bergeron spent thirteen days in jail and was then released.  Bergeron claims
that while she was in jail, the residence was ransacked and her belongings were
stolen.  Moreover, Bergeron contends that upon returning to the residence, she
discovered that an employee of Bonnie Towing, James R. Bonnie (Bonnie), had
been given a "power of attorney" to dispose of all of the property in the residence. 
Bonnie allegedly explained that the Acquadros had paid him for "liquidating all of
Janet's possessions, Janet and Eddie's possession[s]."  Additionally, Bergeron
contends that Rose Acquadro personally supervised Bonnie as he disposed of the
property in the residence shared by Bergeron and Eddie, and that Rose Acquadro
presided over the discarding or selling of the property from the house in Palm
Beach County.  
5.  The parties dispute whether this action was brought in Dr. Acquadro's
personal capacity, or whether he brought this action based upon a power-of-
attorney from Eddie.
6.  On December 24, 1998, Bergeron filed a claim against Eddie's estate,
seeking a constructive or resulting trust over "all assets formerly on deposit in
[Eddie] and [Bergeron's] account with IBM Southeast Employees Federal Credit
Union."  On March 11, 1999, the trial court struck the claim on the basis that
Bergeron was not an interested party in the proceedings. 
-5-
On September 18, 1997, a circuit judge entered an order of no contact
against Bergeron.  The order provided that Bergeron was to have no contact, direct
or indirect, in or out of custody, with Eddie.  On October 17, 1997, at Bergeron's
arraignment, the circuit court entered an order directing Bergeron to obtain a new
residence.  Despite these orders, on October 18, 1997, the police advised Dr.
Acquadro that Bergeron's father, Robert Bergeron, was at Eddie's house, and that
Robert Bergeron told the police that Janet Bergeron was still coming to the house
during the day.     
On October 24, 1997, Dr. Acquadro commenced a civil action against
Bergeron and her father, alleging causes of action for unlawful entry and detention,
trespass, and declaratory relief.5   Because the counts for unlawful entry and
detention and declaratory judgment were rendered moot when Eddie regained
possession of the house, these claims were dismissed on January 6, 1998.  Dr.
Acquadro dismissed the case in its entirety on August 25, 1998.6
7.  Although the record is not completely clear on this point, it appears that
this call was a conference call, in which Bonnie called Rose Acquadro in
Massachusetts, and Rose Acquadro and Bonnie proceeded to call Bergeron in
Palm Beach County. 
-6-
On February 23, 1999, Bergeron filed a six-count complaint against Dr.
Acquadro, Rose Acquadro, Bonnie Towing, and several Bonnie employees,
including James Bonnie.  The complaint raised claims of false arrest, false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
against all of the defendants.  Bergeron also brought a defamation claim against
Rose Acquadro based upon a telephone call from Massachusetts to Bergeron, her
sister Jacqueline Branz, and James Bonnie in Florida in which Acquadro stated that
Bergeron "had AIDS."7  Finally, Bergeron brought a civil theft claim against James
Bonnie and the Acquadros for allegedly disposing of her property located in the
house she shared with Eddie.
The Acquadros filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for
failure to state a cause of action, and filed affidavits in support of the motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  In the affidavits, Rose Acquadro denied making a
defamatory statement, but did not deny that she made the statement during a
telephone conversation with individuals in Florida that Bergeron "had AIDS." 
Bergeron did not file any affidavits in opposition to the Acquadros' motion to
8.  Bergeron testified that she did not speak to Rose Acquadro, but she
overheard the entire conversation.  
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dismiss, but instead presented the live testimony of both herself and her sister at a
hearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction.  At the hearing, both Bergeron and her
sister, Jacqueline Branz, testified that Rose Acquadro and James Bonnie called
Eddie’s residence the day that Bergeron was released from jail.  Branz testified that
Rose told her that she wanted them out of her house.  Branz also testified that Rose
told her that Bergeron "had AIDS."8  Additionally, the trial court allowed the parties
to argue both personal jurisdiction and whether Bergeron's complaint stated
cognizable causes of action.  The trial court ultimately denied the Acquadro's
motion to dismiss.
On appeal to the Fourth District, the Acquadros contended that Bergeron's
failure to refute their affidavits denying the tortious conduct required the trial court
to grant their motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  See Acquadro v.
Bergeron, 778 So. 2d 1034, 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).  The Fourth District
rejected this argument, explaining that 
[t]he purpose of affidavits in these circumstances is "to contest the
allegations of the complaint concerning jurisdiction or to raise a
contention of minimum contacts."  Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais,
9.  In Doe v. Thompson,  620 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Fla. 1993), this Court
explained the two-pronged Venetian Salami test for contesting personal jurisdiction
as follows:
     This Court, in Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499,
502 (Fla.1989), explained the two-step inquiry for determining
long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. A court first must
determine whether the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts
to bring the action within the ambit of our long-arm statute.  Id. at 502.
A court then must determine whether sufficient minimum contacts
exist between our forum state and the defendant to satisfy the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements--in short, whether
a nonresident defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court" in Florida.
-8-
554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989).[9]  Where the affidavits are in conflict,
the trial court holds a "limited evidentiary hearing in order to determine
the jurisdiction issue."  Id. at 503.
In the present case the trial court did hold an evidentiary
hearing, but the purpose was not, as the court correctly recognized, to
resolve whether the defendants had committed the torts.  That would
have required a full-blown trial, not the limited evidentiary hearing
contemplated by Venetian Salami.
Because the defendants' affidavits did not deny that the
telephone communication, which was the basis of personal
jurisdiction, had occurred, the trial court correctly denied the motion
to dismiss.  Carida v. Holy Cross Hosp., Inc., 424 So. 2d 849 (Fla.
4th DCA 1982) (committing defamation by telephone call into Florida
constituted the commission of a tort in Florida and subjected
defendant to personal jurisdiction); Silver v. Levinson, 648 So. 2d 240
(Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (same).
Id.   Therefore, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's denial of the
Acquadros' motion to dismiss.  This appeal followed.  
10.  Section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), provides:
     (1)   Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in
this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a
natural person, his or her personal representative to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing
of any of the following acts:
     . . . .
     (b)    Committing a tortious act within this state.
-9-
ANALYSIS
I.
The conflict issue in this case is whether the Fourth District erred in
concluding that personal jurisdiction was proper over two out-of-state residents
based on section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1999).10  Recently, in Wendt, we
addressed a substantially similar issue, and concluded: 
[I]n order to "commit a tortious act" in Florida, a defendant's physical
presence is not required.  Second, "committing a tortious act" in
Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through the nonresident
defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into
Florida.  However, the cause of action must arise from the
communications.  This predicate finding is necessary because of the
connexity requirement contained in section 48.193(1).  See § 48.193(1)
(stating that "[a]ny person . . . who personally or through an agent
does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits
himself or herself . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for
any cause of action arising from the doing of the following acts").
-10-
 822 So. 2d at 1260 (footnote omitted).  Therefore, on the basis of Wendt, we
approve the Fourth District's decision to the extent it concluded that allegedly
defamatory phone calls made into Florida by a nonresident could be sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction.  Accordingly, we find that Rose Acquadro's
telephone conversation in which she stated that Bergeron "has AIDS" is sufficient
to establish personal jurisdiction.
However, petitioners also contend that even if the Court concludes that
jurisdiction is proper with regard to Rose Acquadro, the Court should still reverse
the Fourth District's decision with regard to Dr. Martin Acquadro.  Petitioners
explain that the defamation claim was brought only against Rose Acquadro. 
Therefore, petitioners allege that the Fourth District's decision may be read as
holding that statements made via telephone into Florida resulting in claims for false
arrest or malicious prosecution are sufficient for jurisdiction under section
48.193(1)(b), and that this holding conflicts with this Court’s decision in
Thompson, the Fifth District's decisions in McLean Financial, Texas Guaranteed,
and Intercontinental Group and the Second District's decisions in Phillips and
Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corp.
Our decision in Wendt expressly disapproves of McLean Financial and
Intercontinental Group to the extent that those cases require physical presence in
11.  Similarly, the Second District in Koch considered whether a tape-
recorded telephone call between a nonresident defendant and a Florida resident
plaintiff could serve as the basis for personal jurisdiction under section 48.193
(1)(b).  See 710 So. 2d at 6.  The Second District held that the tortious act
occurred in Florida because the interception occurred where the communication
was uttered, and thus the nonresident defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction
under section 48.193(1)(b).  See id.  Thus, we approve the Second District's
decision in Koch because like Wendt, the decision held that a telephonic
communication into Florida can constitute a tortious act under section 48.193
(1)(b).  Yet, in Texas Guaranteed Student Loan, the Second District held that
sending debt collection letters and making telephone calls from out of state to a
Florida resident is insufficient to establish jurisdiction under section 48.193 (1)(b). 
See 696 So. 2d at 932.  However the Second District did not consider whether the
plaintiff's cause of action arose from the defendant's sending debt letters and
making collection calls.  Cf. Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1260.  Therefore, we disapprove
the Second District's decision in Texas Guaranteed Student Loan to the extent that
the decision holds that telephonic or electronic communications may not serve as
the basis for personal jurisdiction.
-11-
Florida in order to establish personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b).  See
Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1260.  Moreover, as explained above, the Wendt opinion
expressly holds that "telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida
may form the basis for personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) if the
alleged cause of action arises from the communications."  Id.11  In the instant case,
Dr. Acquadro never denied the telephone communications which Bergeron alleged
occurred.  Dr. Acquadro, in his affidavit contesting jurisdiction, denied speaking to
representatives from Bonnie Towing.  Although Dr. Acquadro denied lying to the
police and the prosecutor, he never denied his involvement in the telephone
-12-
communications with individuals in Florida which form the basis of the tort claims. 
Section 48.193 does not, as petitioners argue, distinguish among the universe of
possible torts.  Instead, the statute provides that any person who commits a
tortious act in this state submits himself or herself to the personal jurisdiction of the
courts of this state.  See § 48.193(1), Fla. Stat. (1999).  Since this Court has held
that a tortious act can arise from an individual’s telephonic communications, see
Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1260, we find that the telephonic communications made by
Dr. Acquadro are sufficient to form the basis for personal jurisdiction in this case.  
II.
Additionally, petitioners contend that the trial court erred in refusing to shift
to Bergeron the burden of proving that jurisdiction was proper after they filed
affidavits in this case.  In Venetian Salami, this Court explained the procedure for
contesting personal jurisdiction as follows:
Initially, the plaintiff may seek to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant by pleading the basis for service in the language of the
statute without pleading the supporting facts.  By itself, the filing of a
motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the person
does nothing more than raise the legal sufficiency of the pleadings.  A
defendant wishing to contest the allegations of the complaint
concerning jurisdiction or to raise a contention of minimum contacts
must file affidavits in support of his position.  The burden is then
placed upon the plaintiff to prove by affidavit the basis upon which
jurisdiction may be obtained. 
-13-
554 So. 2d at 502 (citations omitted).  Thus, petitioners contend that after they filed
affidavits contesting personal jurisdiction, the burden should have shifted to
Bergeron to demonstrate why jurisdiction was proper in this case.  However, as
Bergeron points out, petitioners' contention only has merit assuming that the
affidavits were legally sufficient to shift the burden.  
Because this case involves two separate defendants, a separate jurisdictional
analysis will be conducted for each.  With regard to Rose Acquadro, in addition to
claims of false and malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and civil theft, Bergeron's amended complaint raised a
defamation claim, alleging:
On or about October 2, 1997, ROSE ACQUADRO made a
statement that Ms. Bergeron "has AIDS."
ROSE ACQUADRO published the statement that Ms. Bergeron
"has AIDS" to third parties, Jacqueline Branz and JAMES R.
BONNIE.
ROSE ACQUADRO's statement that Ms. Bergeron "has
AIDS" was false.
Said statement was defamatory.
Said statement was of and concerning Ms. Bergeron.
ROSE ACQUADRO uttered the statement with common law
malice, spite, hatred, ill-will, and an evil intention to injure and defame. 
Standing alone, “the filing of a motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction over the person does nothing more than raise the legal sufficiency of the
12.  In fact, the overwhelming majority of Rose Acquadro's affidavit
contains legal conclusions rather than refutation of the facts in Bergeron's
complaint:
I never lied to the police to convince them to arrest and
prosecute Bergeron.  I did not make false statements regarding
Bergeron's abuse toward Eddie.  I did not make false statements
regarding Bergeron's neglect of Eddie.  I did not provide false or
-14-
pleadings."  Venetian, 554 So. 2d at 502.  In order to prevail on a motion to
dismiss, a defendant must file an affidavit containing allegations, which if taken as
true, show that the defendant’s conduct does not make him or her amenable to
service.  See, e.g., Waye v. Eddings, 638 So. 2d 582, 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994);
Atlas Aircraft Corp. v. Buckingham, 302 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). 
Additionally, the affidavits submitted must contain something “more than the
assertion of legal conclusions.”  Rever v. Lapidus, 151 So. 2d 61, 62 (Fla. 3d DCA
1963).  In response to the allegations in the complaint, Rose Acquadro filed an
affidavit in conjunction with her motion to dismiss, which stated in pertinent part: "I
did not make defamatory statements about Bergeron."  Therefore, rather than claim
that she did not make the statement that Bergeron "has AIDS," all Rose Acquadro's
affidavit provides is a legal conclusion that the content of her statement was not
defamatory.  This is insufficient to shift the burden to Bergeron to demonstrate that
jurisdiction was proper in this case.12  Therefore, with regard to Rose Acquadro,
malicious information to the police and prosecutors.
I did not make defamatory statements about Bergeron.  I did
not steal, convert, or commit theft of Bergeron's property, and I did
not conspire to steal, convert, or commit theft of Bergeron's property.
I did not unlawfully restrain Bergeron or deprive her of her
liberty against her will.  I did not cause Bergeron to be falsely
imprisoned or deprived of her liberty.  I did not conduct myself
toward Bergeron in an extreme or outrageous manner.
I have committed no tortious acts against Bergeron in the State
of Florida or elsewhere.  My conduct has not been such that I should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Florida.  Maintenance of
this suit would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.
-15-
the Court finds that the burden remained on her to contest the propriety of personal
jurisdiction in this case. 
With regard to Dr. Martin Acquadro, the analysis becomes slightly more
complicated.  In connection with Bergeron's false arrest and prosecution and false
imprisonment claims, Bergeron alleged the following facts:  
MARTIN ACQUADRO and ROSE ACQUADRO spoke by
telephone from Massachusetts with the BONNIE TOWING
representatives before, during, and after Ms. Bergeron's arrest.  The
Acquadros offered them money or other benefits to procure Ms.
Bergeron's arrest.
. . . .
MARTIN ACQUADRO and ROSE ACQUADRO took
extraordinary steps to aggressively push for Ms. Bergeron to be
prosecuted.  They provided false, malicious and incriminating
information to the police and prosecutors to encourage Ms.
Bergeron's prosecution.  They hired private investigators to follow her
around and take pictures of her, and provided information to the
authorities to support a claim that she was continuing to seek out
-16-
Edward W. Acquadro, as if she were a threat to him.
Specifically, Bergeron alleged in her malicious prosecution claim that:
An original criminal judicial proceeding was commenced against
Ms. Bergeron on charges of elderly abuse or neglect and battery of an
elderly person.
The defendants legally caused said criminal judicial proceedings
to be commenced against Ms. Bergeron.
The defendants legally caused said criminal judicial proceedings
to be continued against Ms. Bergeron.
There was a bona fide termination of the criminal prosecution
on the merits in favor of Ms. Bergeron.
There was a lack of probable cause for the prosecution of Ms.
Bergeron.
The defendants caused Ms. Bergeron's prosecution with
malicious intent.
In Dr. Martin Acquadro's affidavit contesting jurisdiction, he stated:
Bergeron's amended complaint in this action contains several
false allegations.  I did not speak with and was not even acquainted
with representatives of defendant, Bonnie Towing & Recovery
("Bonnie Towing") prior to Bergeron's arrest.  I did not offer money
or other benefits to procure Bergeron's arrest.  In fact, I knew nothing
of Bergeron's arrest until after it had occurred.
I never lied to the police to convince them to arrest and
prosecute Bergeron.  I did not make false statements regarding
Bergeron's abuse toward my uncle.  I did not make false statements
regarding Bergeron's neglect of my uncle.  I did not provide false or
malicious information to the police and prosecutors.
My attorneys did not provide the criminal court with false
information to support the Order of No Contact and Order Directing
New Residence.  In fact, these orders had already been entered by the
time that legal counsel was retained to represent my uncle's interests in
Acquadro I.
. . . . 
I did not unlawfully restrain Bergeron or deprive her of her
-17-
liberty interest against her will.  I did not cause Bergeron to be falsely
imprisoned or deprived of her liberty.  I did not conduct myself
toward Bergeron in an extreme or outrageous manner.
(Emphasis supplied.)  This underlined portion of the affidavit constitutes factual
contentions refuting the basis for personal jurisdiction concerning the false arrest
and imprisonment claims.  In other words, because Dr. Acquadro contends that he
did not speak to the Bonnie Towing employees before Bergeron's arrest, he claims
that he could not be involved in Bergeron's alleged false arrest or false
imprisonment.  Dr. Acquadro's factual refutation of Bergeron's false arrest and
false imprisonment claims shifts the burden to Bergeron to demonstrate the basis
for jurisdiction as to these claims.
However, Dr. Acquadro's statements in his affidavit with regard to the
malicious prosecution claim appear to be legal conclusions rather than assertions of
fact.  For example, although he contends that he never lied to the police, Dr.
Acquadro does not refute the fact that he gave information to the police.  It is a
matter for the jury to decide at trial whether Dr. Acquadro in fact lied.  Therefore,
we conclude that Dr. Acquadro did not meet his burden in refuting the allegations in
the complaint, at least insofar as the malicious prosecution claim goes.  Thus, the
burden remained with both of the Acquadros to demonstrate that personal
jurisdiction was improper in this case.
-18-
CONCLUSION   
Accordingly, we approve the Fourth District's determination that personal
jurisdiction of Rose Acquadro and Dr. Martin Acquadro was proper.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and LEWIS, J., and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.
PARIENTE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s decision to approve the Fourth District’s
decision that the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss.  The decisions
of the trial court, district court, and the majority of this Court do not follow the
procedures or reasoning of or the two-step procedure outlined in Venetian Salami
Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989), and reaffirmed in Wendt v.
Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2002), and Doe v. Thompson, 620 So. 2d 1004
(Fla. 1993), in order to determine whether sufficient “minimum contacts” are
demonstrated to satisfy due process requirements.  In respect to both defendants,
the case should be remanded with directions that the trial court enter an order based
upon the evidentiary hearing as to whether there were minimum contacts
-19-
demonstrated in accord with the procedures and reasoning of Venetian Salami Co.
Venetian Salami Co. was grounded upon the recognition that a state’s long
arm jurisdiction implicates due process requirements of the United States
Constitution:
[I]n cases involving jurisdiction over nonresidents, there
are constitutional issues which we must also consider.  A
court may acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
only if the nonresident has “minimum contacts with [the
forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’”  International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945).  Thus, under a given factual situation,
even though a nonresident may appear to fall within the
wording of a long arm statute, a plaintiff may not
constitutionally apply the statute to obtain jurisdiction in
the absence of the requisite minimum contacts with the
forum state.  Harlo Products Corp. v. Case Co., 360 So.
2d 1328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Jack Pickard Dodge, Inc.
v. Yarborough, 352 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
[Osborn v. University Society, Inc., 378 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1979).]
We approve of the foregoing analyses in [Scordilis v.
Drobnicki, 443 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)], [Unger v.
Publisher Entry Service, Inc., 513 So. 2d 674, 675 (Fla. 5th DCA
1987)], and Osborn.  The mere proof of any one of the several
circumstances enumerated in section 48.193 as the basis for obtaining
jurisdiction of nonresidents does not automatically satisfy the due
process requirement of minimum contacts.  We do recognize,
however, that implicit within several of the enumerated circumstances
are sufficient facts which if proven, without more, would suffice to
meet the requirements of International Shoe Co.
-20-
Venetian Salami Co., 554 So. 2d at 502.
The procedure to be followed is that set forth in Venetian Salami Co..
Initially, the plaintiff may seek to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant by pleading the basis for service in the language of the
statute without pleading the supporting facts.  Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.079(i);
Jones v. Jack Maxton Chevrolet, Inc., 484 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA
1986).  By itself, the filing of a motion to dismiss on grounds of lack
of jurisdiction over the person does nothing more than raise the legal
sufficiency of the pleadings.  Elmex Corp. v. Atlantic Fed. Savings &
Loan Ass’n, 325 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).  A defendant
wishing to contest the allegations of the complaint concerning
jurisdiction or to raise a contention of minimum contacts must file
affidavits in support of his position.  The burden is then placed upon
the plaintiff to prove by affidavit the basis upon which jurisdiction may
be obtained.  Elmex Corp.  In most cases, the affidavits can be
harmonized, and the court will be in a position to make a decision
based upon facts which are essentially undisputed.  However, the
question remains with respect to what should be done if the relevant
facts set forth in the respective affidavits are in direct conflict.  There
is no Florida decision on this question, and the instant case highlights
the dilemma.
. . . .
. . . Therefore, we hold that in cases such as this, the trial court
will have to hold a limited evidentiary hearing in order to determine the
jurisdiction issue.
Venetian Salami Co., 554 So. 2d at 502-03 (emphasis added).
We have recognized this as a two-step inquiry.  In Doe, 620 So. 2d at 1005,
this Court said:
This Court, in Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d
499, 502 (Fla. 1989), explained the two-step inquiry for determining
long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.  A court first must
13.  I do not agree with the majority opinion that the defendant’s affidavit
was insufficient to require the plaintiff to move forward with contradicting proof on
the issue of jurisdiction.  To rest a decision in this case on a 1963 district court
opinion which in actuality found jurisdiction was lacking is contrary to Venetian
Salami Co. and the plain trend of Florida law since 1963, which is to have issues in
civil cases decided on their merits, not on technical pleading issues.  Moreover, the
defendant’s affidavit was essentially the same as the affidavit referred to in Doe v.
Thompson, with which this Court stated no problem.  Nevertheless, the sufficiency
of the affidavit in this case is irrelevant since the trial court held the evidentiary
hearing, which, pursuant to Venetian Salami Co., is triggered by the filing of the
affidavit.
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determine whether the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts
to bring the action within the ambit of our long-arm statute.  Id. at 502. 
A court then must determine whether sufficient minimum contacts
exist between our forum state and the defendant to satisfy the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirements—in short,
whether a nonresident defendant “should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court” in Florida.  Id. at 500 (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
See also Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d at 1257.  This procedure was basically
followed in this case in the trial court, in that following the filing of the defendant’s
affidavits, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing.13  However, the trial judge did
not enter an order following the evidentiary hearing setting out the trial judge’s
required and essential determination from the evidence in respect to minimum
contacts.
The district court’s decision states:
In the present case the trial court did hold an evidentiary
hearing, but the purpose was not, as the court correctly recognized, to
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resolve whether the defendant had committed the torts.  That would
have required a full-blown trial, not the limited evidentiary hearing
contemplated by Venetian Salami.
Because the defendants’ affidavits did not deny that the
telephone communication, which was the basis of personal
jurisdiction, had occurred, the trial court correctly denied the motion
to dismiss.
Acquadro v. Bergeron, 778 So. 2d 1034, 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).  It is the sum
of these conclusions which do not follow Venetia Salami Co. or the reasoning upon
which Venetian Salami Co. was based.  Likewise, this does not follow this Court’s
decision in Wendt.
In Wendt, this Court made the specific point that the fact that a
communication was made into Florida was not sufficient to determine the issue of
minimum contacts.  This Court remanded Wendt with directions that there be
further proceedings to make that determination.
While I agree that there is no requirement for a full-blown trial on the tort
claim, the district court erred and the majority now errs in holding that the
defendant’s not denying the telephone call alone was sufficient to establish the
“minimum contacts.”  Moreover, without any basis, the majority simply rejects Dr.
Acquadro’s affidavit statement that he did not have the telephone conversation in
which the alleged tortious conduct occurred.  This leads to the inevitable
conclusion that in the view of the majority, any telephone conversation, consisting
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of tortious conduct or not, is sufficient.  That cannot meet constitutional muster. 
Such a holding would logically mean that every communication, regardless of its
substance, by an out-of-state person would subject the caller to being haled into
Florida’s courts.  Furthermore, it must be recognized that this long-arm jurisdiction
has a statutory base as well as a constitutional limitation.  In this instance, the
statutory requirement is the commission of a tort in Florida.  Therefore, there has to
be in the evidentiary hearing some evidence that a tort has been committed in
Florida.  Though no case has stated what kind of showing is necessary, I believe
the standard should be similar to a probable cause showing in a criminal setting. 
But in this case, there was no indication by the trial judge of what evidence he
found to support minimum contacts.  At the very least, in respect to Dr. Acquadro,
I cannot find in the record factual evidence to support minimum contacts that he
committed a tort in Florida.
Additionally, I believe Justice Pariente, sitting then as a judge on the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, in Silver v. Levinson, 648 So. 2d 240, 242-243 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1994), set out what also should have been determined by the trial judge
following the evidentiary hearing:
In defendant’s second prong of attack, he asserts that
subjecting him to jurisdiction in Florida violates his due process rights. 
We must analyze whether subjecting defendant to suit in Florida
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violates his due process rights even if jurisdiction is proper under
Florida’ s long arm statute.  Venetian Salami; Estate of Vernon, 609
So. 2d at 128.
The single most important factor to consider is whether “the
defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. . . .”  World-
Wide Volkeswagen Corp v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980). 
This factor must be viewed from the perspective of the defendant, not
that of the plaintiff.  See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977). 
Due process requires that the nonresident have sufficient minimum
contacts with the state of Florida such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”  International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945).
The United States Supreme Court has rejected any “talismanic
jurisdictional formula” to determine the requisite minimum contact. 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485-86 (1985). 
Subjecting a defendant to in personam jurisdiction based on a single,
isolated transaction by the nonresident defendant does not necessarily
offend due process.  Lacy v. Force V Corporation, 403 So. 2d 1050,
1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); see also Godfrey v. Neumann, 373 So. 2d
920 (Fla. 1979).  Doe does not hold otherwise.  The analysis must
focus on the nature of the act.  When dealing with isolated acts of a
defendant, rather than centering on continuous economic activity
within the state, a key focus is the quality and nature of the interstate
transaction.  The court must inquire into whether the conduct is so
random, fortuitous or attenuated that it cannot fairly be said that the
potential defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
in another jurisdiction.  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 486.
(Emphasis added.)  I add to this the express recognition in Venetian Salami of the
United States Supreme Court requirement set out in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), that “[a] court may acquire personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident only if the nonresident has ‘minimum contacts with
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[the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”’”  554 So. 2d at 502 (quoting Osborn
v. University Society, Inc., 378 So. 2d at 874).
This case presents a bizarre and unusual factual situation.  From a reading of
the transcript of the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, it is even unclear
what occurred in respect to the isolated telephone call that is the subject of the
defamation claim against defendant Rose Acquadro.  Petitioner’s brief, appendix
item 7 at 44.  It does not appear that the defendant initiated the call into Florida.  I
know of no authority for a telephone call not made by an out-of-state person into
the state being sufficient “minimum contacts” for which the out-of-state person has
been held to reasonably contemplate being haled into court in the state from which
the call was initiated.  This question has a factual basis component including an
assessment of credibility, in which it is necessary that the trial court make a specific
determination.  See Venetian Salami Co., 554 So. 2d at 503 n. 1.  Here, the trial
court did not make that determination.
Therefore, the decision of the district court should be quashed with
directions to remand to the trial court.  I would include in the directions that the trial
judge should allow the parties to put on any additional evidence which is relevant to
the issue of minimum contracts pursuant to the standards for this determination and
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then for the trial judge to make specific factual and legal determinations in respect
to minimum contacts.
Finally, it is my view that because this is a bizarre factual situation, it is not a
case in which this Court needs to or even should write an opinion if the majority is
going to approve the district court.  Though I do not agree with approving the
district court, it appears to me that it would be far better to simply discharge
jurisdiction.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict
Fourth District - Case No. 4D00-2011
(Palm Beach County)
Donna M. Greenspan of Edwards & Angell, LLP, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Petitioners
Robert Rivas of the Rivas Law Firm, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondents