Case Title: MICHAEL DALE ISELI V. STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-181

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
MICHAEL DALE ISELI V. STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 102160 P.3d 1133Case Number: 06-181Decided: 06/26/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
MICHAEL 
DALE ISELI,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

D. 
Terry 
Rogers, InterimState Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, 
Appellate Counsel; and David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate 
Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Causey.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the appellant's convictions for interference with a peace officer and 
causing bodily injury to a peace officer, in which the appellant raises several 
issues concerning jury instructions.  
We conclude that the instructions as given adequately informed the jury 
as to the law and the appellant's theory of defense, and we, therefore, 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.     Did the district court 
err in instructing the jury as to the elements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) 
(LexisNexis 2005)?

 
 
2.     Did the district court 
err in refusing to give an adequate theory-of-defense 
instruction?

 
 
3.     Did the district court 
err in refusing to give the appellant's proferred self-defense 
instructions?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Investigator 
Davis of the 
Natrona County Sheriff's Office (NCSO) was aware that several felony warrants 
existed authorizing arrest of the appellant.  Davis was 
also aware that the appellant might be en route from New Mexico to Wyoming to see his wife.  At approximately 11:30 a.m., on August 
28, 2005, while off duty, Investigator Davis was informed by NCSO Corporal 
Frimml that the appellant's wife had told authorities that the appellant was 
supposed to meet her at EdnessKimballWilkinsPark 
in NatronaCounty between noon and 
1:00 p.m. on that date.  Given the 
short time to prepare an arrest plan, Davis drove to the park in an unmarked car, and 
in civilian clothes, but with a badge on a chain around his neck, outside his 
shirt.  Uniformed officers in marked 
patrol vehicles also approached the park:  
Corporal Frimml and Deputy Arnold in one, Deputy Walters in another, and 
Deputy Means in yet another.

 
 
[¶4]      Shortly after 
arriving at the park, Davis observed the appellant's wife get out of 
her car and tie her dog to a fence post.  Davis had planned to intercept the appellant 
before he reached his wife, but the appellant arrived, parked his vehicle, and 
walked over to his wife, lying down on the ground next to her.  Davis parked behind the appellant's 
vehicle to prevent escape, radioed the other officers that the appellant was 
already there, and began walking toward the couple with his service revolver 
drawn but down by his side.

 
 
[¶5]      As he walked 
toward the appellant, Davis verbally identified himself as a deputy 
sheriff and stated that he had a warrant for the appellant's arrest.  Davis 
ordered the appellant to remain on the ground, but the appellant jumped to his 
feet, looked at Davis, and then yelled at his wife, "I can't 
believe you turned me in."  While 
continuing to yell at his wife, the appellant began to walk toward the vehicles. 
 When Davis followed, the appellant turned and walked 
back toward his wife, threw a beer bottle at her, and then turned and ran toward 
a restroom and the park's main road.  Davis gave chase, repeating that the appellant 
was under arrest.  Just after the 
appellant crossed the road, Davis caught up with and tackled him.  As they hit the ground and began to 
struggle, the appellant struck Davis in the sides and legs.  The chain holding Davis's badge was broken 
and the appellant's glasses were knocked from his face.  The appellant grabbed Davis's hands and arms, and then began pinching Davis's leg.  When Davis did not let go of him, the appellant grabbed 
Davis's throat 
with his left hand.

 
 
[¶6]      When Davis felt that the 
appellant was trying hard to choke him, Davis began to fear for his life, so he 
struck the appellant on the side of his head with the rubber butt of his 
pistol.  That had no effect, so he 
struck the appellant again, this time with the pistol's metal barrel.  The appellant then released his hold on 
Davis, rolled 
away, and began again to run away.

 
 
[¶7]      Corporal Frimml, 
and Deputies Arnold and Means, had by that time arrived on the scene.  They identified themselves as peace 
officers, Deputy Means doing so by way of the public address system in his 
patrol vehicle.  The appellant 
looked back at the deputies, but continued to run.  The appellant slowed down when Corporal 
Frimml pumped a shell into his shotgun, allowing Deputy Arnold to catch up with 
and tackle the appellant.  The 
appellant even then continued to resist, refusing to place his hands behind his 
back to be handcuffed.  He did so 
only after Corporal Frimml placed his foot on the appellant's back to keep him 
on the ground.  He was then 
handcuffed, placed in a patrol vehicle, and transported to 
jail.

 
 
[¶8]      The appellant was 
charged with interference with a peace officer, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-5-204(a) (LexisNexis 2005) and causing bodily injury to a peace officer, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) (LexisNexis 2005).  Those sections read as 
follows:

 
 
(a)    A person commits a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of 
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both, if he knowingly 
obstructs, impedes or interferes with or resists arrest by a peace officer while 
engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties.

 
 
(b)    A person who intentionally 
and knowingly causes or attempts to cause bodily injury to a peace officer 
engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties is guilty of a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) 
years.

 
 
The 
misdemeanor count alleged that the appellant interfered with Corporal Frimml and 
Deputy Arnold.  The felony count 
alleged that the appellant caused bodily harm to Investigator 
Davis.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      We reiterated our 
standard for the review of jury instructions in Adams v. State, 2003 WY 152, ¶ 4, 79 P.3d 526, 529-30 (Wyo. 2003):

 
 
            
It is also well established that a trial court has a duty to instruct a 
jury on the general principles of law applicable to the case at issue.  A trial court is given wide latitude in 
instructing the jury and, as long as the instructions correctly state the law 
and the entire charge covers the relevant issue, reversible error will not be 
found.  Instructions must be 
considered as a whole, and individual instructions, or parts of them, should not 
be singled out and considered in isolation.  Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, [274] (Wyo. 2001); Coburn v. 
State, 2001 WY 30, ¶ 9, 20 P.3d 518, [520] (Wyo. 2001); Merchant v. State, 4 P.3d 184, 190 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 
            
Jury instructions shall not be ruled defective absent a showing that the 
instructions confused or misled the jury as to the proper principles of law and 
prejudiced the defendant.  Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1061 (Wyo. 
2000).  Prejudicial error must be 
demonstrated, and prejudice will not be demonstrated unless the instruction 
confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of law.  Wilson v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 916 (Wyo. 
2000).  Further, a failure to 
instruct properly on an element of a crime does not constitute plain error where 
evidence of the defendant's guilt is overwhelming.  Id.

 
 
[¶10]   Specifically with regard to what 
has come to be known as the "theory of defense" instruction, we said the 
following in Holloman v. State, 2002 
WY 117, ¶¶ 15-16, 51 P.3d 214, 219 (Wyo. 2002) (footnote 
omitted):

 
 
            
Due process requires the trial court to give a correct instruction to the 
jury that details the defendant's theory of the case. Blakely v. State, 474 P.2d 127, 129 
(Wyo. 
1970).  The instruction must 
sufficiently inform the court of the defendant's theory and must be supported by 
competent evidence.  Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 490 
(Wyo. 
1992).  A theory of the case is more 
than a comment on the evidence that tells the jury how to consider the 
evidence.  Ellifritz v. State, 704 P.2d 1300 
(Wyo. 
1985).  Fundamentally, the 
instruction must in the first instance be a proper theory of the case, or theory 
of defense, instruction.  That is, 
the offered instruction must present a defense recognized by statute or case law 
in this jurisdiction.  Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d  at 
490.

 
 
            
As Bouwkamp explained, 
"[t]heory of defense instructions are to be derived from and address criminal 
defenses provided for by statute or acknowledged by this court."  Id.  It further noted "common-law defenses 
are retained unless otherwise provided by this act."  Id. (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-102(b)).  Additionally, this 
Court has discussed acceptable defenses, notably in Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 269 
(Wyo. 
1985).  See also 1 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 21, at 70 n. 1 
(1984); 1 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's 
Criminal law § 39 (15th ed. 1993).

 
 
            
Any competent evidence is sufficient to establish a defense theory even 
if it consists only of testimony of the defendant.  Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 745 
(Wyo. 
1987).  We view the evidence in a 
light favorable to the accused and the accused's testimony must be taken as 
entirely true to determine if the evidence is competent.  Duckett v. State, 966 P.2d 941, 944 
(Wyo. 
1998).  Even if the court deems the 
evidence to be weak, or unworthy of belief, the instruction must be given if a 
jury could reasonably conclude the evidence supports the defendant's 
position.  Id.  The refusal to allow an instruction 
requested by the defendant when due process requires the defendant's instruction 
be given is reversible error per se.  
Id.

 
 

See also 
Burkhardt v. State, 2005 
WY 96, ¶ 12, 117 P.3d 1219, 1223-24 (Wyo. 2005); Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, ¶ 146, 67 P.3d 536, 590 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
However, 
we have also noted that "[n]ot every instruction must be given simply because 
there is a claim that it incorporates a theory of the case."  Wilkening v. State, 922 P.2d 1381, 1383 
(Wyo. 
1996).  A trial court may properly 
refuse to give a proposed instruction if it is erroneous, confusing, 
argumentative, or if the instruction unduly emphasizes one aspect of the case, 
the law, or the defendant's version of the events.  Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1346 
(Wyo. 1996); Jansen v. State, 892 P.2d 1131, 1140 
(Wyo. 1995); Virgilio v. State, 834 P.2d 1125, 1128 
(Wyo. 
1992).  Additionally, "instructions 
not based on the evidence can be properly refused."  Chavez-Becerra v. State, 924 P.2d 63, 67 
(Wyo. 
1996).

 
 

Farmer 
v. State, 2005 
WY 162, ¶ 23, 124 P.3d 699, 707 (Wyo. 2005).  As with other instructions, the district 
court must exercise discretion in determining what, if any, theory-of-the-case 
instructions are to be given:

 
 
            
We first dispose of Coburn's contention that it was within his "exclusive 
province" to decide which instructions relating to his self-defense theory 
should be given to the jury.  He 
fails to cite any authority to support this proposition because the law is 
contrary.  "It is within the court's 
discretion to present its own instruction or instructions covering the 
defendant's theory of the case."  Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 757 
(Wyo. 1995) (quoting Sanchez v. State, 694 P.2d 726, 729 
(Wyo. 
1985)).  Indeed, the trial court is 
charged with the duty to present instructions on the law that apply to the 
issues that were raised by the evidence.  
Id. at 
756.

 
 

Coburn 
v. State, 2001 
WY 30, ¶ 11, 20 P.3d 518, 520-21 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did the 
district court err in instructingthe jury as to the elements 
ofWyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) (LexisNexis 2005)?

 
 
[¶11]   The appellant's theory of defense 
was that he did not know Investigator Davis was a peace officer at the time of 
the incident, and that, therefore, he could not be guilty of knowingly causing 
bodily injury to a peace officer.  
The evidence presented in support of that theory was the appellant's own 
testimony.  Specifically, he 
testified that Davis did not look like a peace 
officer, that he did not hear Davis identify 
himself as a peace officer because his wife's doga Rottweilerwas barking so 
loudly as Davis approached, and that he panicked 
when he saw that Davis had a gun.

 
 
[¶12]   The appellant proferred two 
instructions directed to the "knowingly "element of the charges.  The first, proposed instruction "A," 
explained his theory of defense:

 
 
DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. A

 
 
            
The Defendant's position is that he did not know Investigator Davis was a 
peace officer at the time of the attempted arrest in this case and did not learn 
that Investigator Davis was a peace officer until after the events that gave 
rise to the assault on a peace officer were concluded.

 
 
            
Under the law, a person is not guilty of the charge of assault on a peace 
officer, resisting arrest or interference with a peace officer unless the State 
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant knew that the other person 
was a peace officer, along with all the other elements of the 
charge.

 
 
The 
second, proposed instruction "F," was a revised elements 
instruction:

 
 
DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. F

 
 
The 
elements of the crime of Assault on a Peace Officer, as charged in Count 1 of 
this case, are:

 
 
1.   On or about the 28th day of August, 
2005

 
 
2.   In Natrona 
County, Wyoming

 
 
3.   The Defendant, Michael Dale 
Iseli

 
 
4.   Intentionally and knowingly caused 
bodily injury to a peace officer

 
 
5.   Knowing the person he was injuring was a 
peace officer

 
 
6.   While that peace officer was 
engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶13]   The district court refused both of 
these instructions, giving somewhat different versions instead.  The elements instruction read as 
follows:

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 11

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Assault on a Peace Officer, as charged in 
Count 1 of this case, are:

 
 
            
1.   On or about the 28th 
day of August, 2005

 
 
            
2.   In Natrona County, Wyoming

 
 
            
3.   The Defendant, 
Michael Dale Iseli

 
 
            
4.   Intentionally and 
knowingly caused bodily injury to a peace officer

 
 
            
5.   While that peace 
officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his official 
duties.

 
 
            
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of 
these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find 
the defendant guilty.

 
 
            
If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the 
evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

 
 
[¶14]   The theory-of-defense instruction 
given by the district court read as follows:

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 13

 
 
Defendant 
contends that he did not know Investigator Davis was a peace officer at the time 
of the attempted arrest in this case and did not learn that Investigator Davis 
was a peace officer until after he was arrested by Deputy Arnold and 
Frimml.

 
 
Therefore, 
Defendant contends he did not intentionally and knowingly cause bodily injury to 
a peace officer.

 
 
[¶15]   In rejecting the appellant's 
proposed instruction "F," the district court relied upon Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 12, 36 P.3d 1151, 1157 (Wyo. 2001), in which this Court approved usage of an 
instruction identical to Instruction No. 11 in a case with facts similar to 
those sub judice.  We do not find this to have been an 
abuse of discretion, especially because the district court also gave Instruction 
No. 13, which basically duplicated the appellant's proposed instruction 
"A."  Citing Farmer, ¶ 24, 124 P.3d  at 708, the district court 
also noted that the statement in the appellant's proposed instruction "A" that 
the State was required to prove the knowingly element beyond a reasonable doubt 
was redundant and, therefore, unnecessary because Instruction No. 11 already 
informed the jury that the State had to prove every element of the crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 

 
 
[¶16]   We conclude that the instructions 
as given accurately informed the jury as to the elements of the crime and the 
State's burden of proof, and provided the legal basis from which the appellant 
could argue that he was not guilty because he did not know that Investigator 
Davis was a peace officer.

 
 
Did the 
district court err in refusing to give an adequate theory-of-defense 
instruction?

 
 
[¶17]   In addition to proposed instruction 
"A" discussed above, the appellant also offered proposed instruction "B," which 
reads as follows:

 
 
DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. B

 
 
            
It is lawful for a person being assaulted to defend himself from attack 
if he has reasonable grounds for believing and does believe that bodily injury 
is about to be inflicted upon him.  
In doing so he may use all force, which would appear to a reasonable 
person, in the same or similar circumstances, to be necessary to prevent the 
injury which appears to be imminent.

 
 
[¶18]   The appellant contends that by 
refusing to give his proposed instructions "A" and "B," the district court 
effectively denied him a theory-of-the-case instruction.  His premise is that, not knowing 
Davis was a 
peace officer, he had the right to defend himself.  We agree with the district court even 
though, at first blush, a self-defense instruction might appear logical under 
the circumstances of this case.  In 
refusing to give these instructions, however, the district court correctly 
discerned that a self-defense instruction was improper under any version of the 
facts.  Consider the 
possibilities:  If the appellant 
knew Davis was a 
peace officer, he had no right to defend himself against arrest, so no 
self-defense instruction was warranted.  
If the appellant did not know Davis was a peace officer, he cannot be guilty 
of the charged crime, so no self-defense instruction was warranted.  If Davis had used excessive force in making the 
arrest, the appellant would have been entitled to defend himself, but there was 
no evidence suggesting the excessive use of force, so no self-defense 
instruction was warranted.  See Ortega v. State, 966 P.2d 961, 966 
(Wyo. 
1998).

 
 
Did the 
district court err in refusing to give the appellant's proferred self-defense 
instructions?

 
 
[¶19]   It is difficult to distinguish this 
issue from the issue just discussed, except that it is directed at the district 
court's refusal to give the appellant's proposed instructions "C," "D," and "E," 
all of which are also self-defense instructions.  These proposed instructions read as 
follows:

 
 
DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. C

 
 
            
You are instructed that there may be situations that police activities 
are so provocative and resistance so understandable that it can only be 
concluded that the police were not engaged in the lawful performance of their 
official duties and that such conduct by the officer may give rise to [the] 
right of self-defense.

 
 
DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. D

 
 

            
Before a 
defendant may be convicted of any crime, the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in 
self-defense.

 
 
DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. E

 
 
            
You are instructed that Defendant's self-defense claim is not precluded 
merely by the fact that Investigator Davis is a peace 
officer.

 
 
            
In fact Investigator Davis's status as a peace officer is irrelevant to 
your consideration of the reasonableness of the Defendant's self-defense claim 
if the Defendant was unaware of Investigator Davis's employment 
status.

 
 
[¶20]   As with proposed instructions "A," 
"B," and "F," it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse 
to give these instructions.  There 
was no evidence to support proposed instruction "C."  Proposed instruction "D" is a 
misstatement of the law because self-defense is not available to an arrestee 
where the peace officer has not used excessive force; ergo, the State need not 
disprove the defense in that situation.  
Proposed instruction "E" was refused by the district court for the same 
reasons as the others, as set forth above.  
While we agree with that conclusion, we will also add that "E" is not 
supported by any cited authority, and it is sufficiently confusing that it 
likely would have confused the jury.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   
The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the 
appellant's proposed jury instructions.  
Affirmed.