Case Title: Commonwealth v. Kostka

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12381

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12381 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  TIMOTHY KOSTKA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 8, 2021.  -  March 31, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Home Invasion.  Evidence, Disclosure of evidence.  
Cellular Telephone.  Practice, Criminal, Disclosure of 
evidence, Discovery, Argument by prosecutor, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 26, 2012. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Mitchell H. Kaplan, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on November 9, 2018, was heard by 
him. 
 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant. 
 
Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney (Ursula A. Knight, 
Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  This case arises from the April 16, 2012 
stabbing death of sixty-seven year old Barbara Coyne in the 
bedroom of her first-floor apartment in a three-family house in 
the South Boston section of Boston.  On October 9, 2015, a jury 
2 
convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree and home 
invasion in connection with Coyne's death. 
 
In this consolidated appeal from his conviction and the 
denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant argues that 
a new trial is required because of a number of erroneous 
evidentiary rulings, as well as the Commonwealth's asserted 
failure to comply with its discovery obligations.  In addition, 
the defendant asks that we order a new trial or reduce the 
degree of guilt using our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
because, even if there was sufficient evidence to sustain the 
conviction, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 
 
After a careful review of the record, we affirm the 
convictions and discern no reason to exercise our authority to 
grant relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have 
found, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
reserving certain details for later discussion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Tavares, 484 Mass. 650, 651 (2020). 
 
a.  Commonwealth's case.  i.  Day of the stabbing.  Barbara 
Coyne lived with her granddaughter, Sinead Coyne,1 in the first-
floor apartment of a three-family home in South Boston.  
Barbara's adult son, Richard Coyne, lived with a roommate in the 
 
 
1 Because they share a last name, we refer to Barbara, 
Sinead, and Richard Coyne by their first names. 
3 
third-floor apartment, and a niece and her family occupied the 
second-floor apartment.  Richard was an avid runner, and had 
planned to run the Boston Marathon on Monday, April 16, 2012.  
On Sunday evening, however, he decided not to run due to the 
forecast of extreme heat the following day.  Instead, he decided 
to spend the day working on his boat. 
 
After having coffee with his mother at around 6:30 A.M, as 
was his routine, Richard ran an errand, returned home at around 
8 A.M., and left again to go for a short run.  According to 
Richard, the front door to the three-family house was almost 
always unlocked, and his mother tended to unlock the door to her 
own apartment every morning so that Richard could come in for 
coffee.  At about 9:30 A.M., after returning from his run, 
Richard went to the basement of the building to look for a power 
saw.  When he was unable to find the saw, he walked through his 
mother's kitchen to return to his apartment on the third floor.  
He spoke to his mother at that time, which he estimated to be 
around 9:47 or 9:48 A.M.  He ultimately found the saw in a 
closet in his apartment, spent ten to fifteen minutes cleaning 
the closet, and headed back downstairs to put the saw in his 
truck.  While walking downstairs, he noticed that the door to 
his mother's apartment was ajar, which he thought was odd. 
 
Richard went into the apartment and found his mother lying 
on the floor of her bedroom.  She was on her stomach, with a 
4 
pool of blood underneath her head.  She was bleeding profusely 
from a wound that ran across her neck in a zig-zag pattern.2  
Richard woke up Sinead, who had been sleeping, and called 911.  
While Barbara was struggling to breathe, she managed to tell 
Richard that she had been stabbed by someone wearing a white 
shirt and a hat.  She went into cardiac arrest and passed away 
while being transported to a hospital in an ambulance. 
 
The defendant lived with his family near the Coyne 
residence.  As of the date of trial, the defendant and Richard 
had known each other for about twenty years.  Richard's close 
friend married the defendant's cousin, and the two would see 
each other at family gatherings and social events at local yacht 
clubs.  When the defendant was younger, Richard, who is about 
thirteen years older than the defendant, took the defendant and 
his brother fishing on Richard's boat.  Occasionally, the 
defendant would help Richard clean the boat after fishing trips, 
and in 2006, Richard sold his boat to the defendant. 
 
Several witnesses testified that the defendant suffered 
from a heroin addiction and had relapsed shortly before the day 
of the stabbing.  These witnesses, some of whom had consumed 
drugs with the defendant, explained that the defendant told them 
 
 
2 The autopsy also disclosed that the victim had cuts on her 
hands that might have been defensive wounds, and abrasions on 
her shins. 
5 
he regularly committed crimes of breaking and entering, as he 
was unemployed.  The defendant told one witness that if anyone 
caught the defendant breaking into a house, he would "slice 
their throat."  The defendant then showed the witness a kitchen 
knife that he had hidden in the sleeve of his sweatshirt. 
 
On the date of the stabbing, at around 9:30 A.M., the 
defendant called several individuals to ask if they knew where 
or how he could sell high-end fishing equipment.  The 
defendant's telephone records revealed that around that time, he 
placed a call to a pawn shop.  At 10:04 A.M. -- minutes after 
Richard discovered his mother with her neck cut -- the 
defendant's image was captured on surveillance video footage at 
a convenience store located two blocks from the Coyne residence.  
The defendant appeared to be in front of a lottery machine.  
Surveillance video footage from that same store, taken at 
11:49 A.M., showed the defendant again at the store, wearing a 
white tank top with a second white shirt wrapped around his 
hand.  At 12:21 P.M., video footage from the store showed the 
defendant standing in the area of the beer cooler. 
 
Shortly after 1 P.M., the defendant was picked up by a 
friend who drove him to the Mission Hill section of Boston, 
where they jointly purchased heroin, then returned to South 
Boston to consume it.  Two carpenters who had worked at the 
defendant's family home that day, between the hours of 8 A.M. 
6 
and 4 P.M., testified that they had not seen the defendant at 
any point. 
 
ii.  Investigation.  Police found the victim's bedroom in a 
state of disarray.  Sinead testified that the room usually was 
tidy, but several items were out of place, including two jewelry 
boxes on which fingerprints matching the defendant's were found.  
Police also found a bloody fingerprint on an envelope in the 
living room that later was "individualized" to the defendant's 
right thumb print.  Water appeared to have been sprayed around 
the kitchen sink, and there was what looked like blood mixed 
with water in the sink; no evidence was introduced with respect 
to any testing of this blood.  Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) from 
underneath the victim's fingernails was a mixture of DNA 
profiles.  The victim's DNA profile was "fully included" in the 
mixture, and the defendant's DNA profile was partially included.  
One in 40,000 Caucasians also would be included. 
 
Police found lottery tickets in the living room, the 
kitchen, and inside the victim's vehicle ; the tickets in the 
living room were stained with what appeared to be blood.  Sinead 
testified that her grandmother frequently played scratch lottery 
tickets and tended to keep ten to fifteen in the apartment at 
any one time, on a footstool in her living room. 
 
iii.  Lottery evidence.  Records from the Lottery 
Commission revealed that one hundred dollars' worth of winning 
7 
tickets that were cashed at the convenience store at 10:02 to 
10:03 A.M. and at 11:52 A.M. -- times when surveillance video 
footage showed the defendant at the store -- bore ticket numbers 
that were in sequence with the ticket numbers on losing tickets 
found in the victim's home. 
 
Kevin Carroll, a security investigator for the Lottery 
Commission, testified to the practices and procedures of the 
Lottery Commission.  He also answered specific questions 
concerning the tickets cashed at the two particular times on 
April 16, 2012, and the tickets found in the victim's home.  
According to Carroll, the Lottery Commission does not 
manufacture the tickets for the lottery games; it designs the 
games and contracts with a private company to print and ship the 
tickets.  The Lottery Commission distributes the books of 
tickets it receives from the manufacturer to individual "agents"3 
upon their request.  A book may contain fifty, one hundred, 150, 
or 300 tickets, depending on the game. 
 
 
3 The stores, restaurants, bars, and other businesses that 
contract with the lottery to sell lottery tickets are known as 
"agents."  Individual agents contact the Lottery Commission when 
they are ready for a new shipment of tickets, and may choose to 
be provided a "cash drawer" as a means of having sufficient cash 
available on hand to pay out winners.  If an agent does not have 
sufficient cash in its own registers to pay a particular winner, 
the agent may cancel the transaction and direct the winner to a 
different store to redeem a winning ticket. 
8 
 
The tickets in each book are numbered sequentially, 
beginning with 000 and ending in 049, 099, 149, or 299, 
respectively.  Each ticket has a unique number that consists of 
a two-digit number corresponding to the specific game, a six-
digit number, also known as the serial number, identifying the 
particular book of tickets, and the three-digit ticket number.  
The game number and book number are the same for every ticket in 
a book.  Each ticket also has a unique, randomly assigned "void 
if removed number"(VIRN). 
 
At the time of manufacture, all of the tickets in a book 
are physically attached, with perforations between each ticket.  
The tickets are shipped to the agents shrink wrapped together 
with a separate bar code that the agent must scan in order to 
activate the book.  No ticket can be sold until the book is 
activated by the proper agent.  When an individual ticket is 
sold to a customer, it is torn off at the perforations from the 
rest of the tickets in the book.  The Lottery Commission does 
not track individual ticket sales. 
 
To redeem a winning ticket, a customer presents the ticket, 
and the agent scans its bar code at a lottery terminal; if the 
customer presents multiple tickets, generally they all are 
scanned, and then the cashier presses a button to calculate the 
total winnings due the customer.  When a bar code is scanned, 
the Lottery Commission records the date, time, and location of 
9 
the transaction; the game number, book number, and individual 
ticket number; the VIRN; and the amount of the winnings.  This 
information is stored in the Lottery Commission's electronic 
database, which the Lottery Commission can access at any time.  
Agents are instructed to tear up or mark the winning tickets 
that have been redeemed and to discard them. 
 
b.  Defendant's case.  The defendant called his own 
fingerprint expert to challenge his identification as the person 
who left the bloody fingerprint found on an envelope in the 
victim's living room.  The expert testified that the bloody 
fingerprint was too distorted to conclude that it matched the 
defendant's known exemplar.  As to the fingerprints on the 
jewelry boxes in the victim's bedroom, the defendant's brother 
testified that the defendant had been inside the Coyne residence 
in 2007 to pick up a part for the boat Richard sold him. 
 
The defendant's mother testified that she believed the 
defendant was at home on April 16, 2012, at least until 12 or 
12:30 P.M.  The defendant's brother testified that he and the 
defendant had purchased a substantial amount of high-end fishing 
equipment in 2007 and 2008, which they still owned.  The 
defendant's mother, brother, and cousin all testified to the 
friendly relationship between the Coyne family and the 
defendant's family, both of whom had lived in the area for many 
years. 
10 
 
c.  Prior proceedings.  On June 26, 2012, a grand jury 
returned indictments charging the defendant with murder in the 
first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1, and home invasion, G. L. 
c. 265, § 18C.  On October 9, 2015, a jury found the defendant 
guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, and of home 
invasion.  The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
On November 9, 2018, while his appeal was pending in this 
court, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial in this 
court, which we remanded to the Superior Court for resolution.  
The defendant also filed a motion in the Superior Court for 
posttrial discovery.  Following a nonevidentiary hearing, the 
trial judge denied both motions.  The defendant appealed from 
the denial of his motion for a new trial, and we subsequently 
consolidated that appeal with the defendant's direct appeal of 
his convictions. 
 
2.  Discussion.  In his motion for a new trial, the 
defendant argued that he was prejudiced because his trial "was 
substantially affected by numerous and substantial discovery 
errors, by multiple Brady violations, and by demonstratively 
unwarranted representations to the court in legal argument and 
to the jury in closing argument."  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963).  In particular, the defendant maintained that 
the discovery provided in the multiple Lottery Commission 
11 
reports was "incomplete and fabricated," and that the 
Commonwealth had not disclosed anything about data on the 
reports being encrypted.  The defendant also challenged the 
introduction of a Lottery Commission report that was not 
disclosed to him until four days into trial, and a Lottery 
Commission investigator's testimony about that report.  The 
defendant pointed out that data in the report differed from 
lottery records that had been produced by the Commonwealth 
during pretrial discovery, and argued that testimony by the 
investigator that some of the reports contained encrypted data 
was speculative hearsay.  In addition, the defendant argued that 
the Commonwealth violated its discovery obligations in not 
providing him with cell service location information (CSLI) 
evidence concerning the location of his cellular telephone at or 
near the time the victim was attacked.  The defendant also 
argued that, in her closing, the prosecutor inappropriately 
asserted that, by challenging the lottery records, defense 
counsel had engaged in "gamesmanship," and improperly relied 
substantively on hearsay testimony by Carroll that certain data 
on the reports was encrypted. 
 
The judge did not directly address the issues of fabricated 
or incomplete testimony about the Lottery Commission reports, or 
make any rulings on them.  Nor did he address the issue of 
encryption.  Instead, he summarized the defendant's arguments in 
12 
his motion for a new trial as consisting of two broad 
categories, (1) "the admission of evidence concerning winning 
lottery tickets that the defendant cashed at a convenience store 
near [the victim's] apartment a few hours after the murder," and 
(2) "the failure to provide certain cell location evidence 
concerning the location of the defendant's cell phone at or near 
the time of the murder."  Without stating explicitly that he 
found Carroll's testimony credible, by adopting that testimony, 
including the hearsay, as established fact, the judge did so 
implicitly in his summary of the facts and in his discussion. 
 
The judge addressed the defendant's argument concerning the 
Lottery Commission reports and the investigator's testimony in 
one sentence:  "[t]he defendant's argument is based upon his 
misunderstanding of the VIRN numbers that appear on each 
ticket."  Even accepting that all of Carroll's testimony about 
the VIRNs was credible, however, does not resolve the issues the 
defendant raised.  First, regardless of whether the Lottery 
Commission's systems could generate a new report from the 2012 
ticket information that contained all of the disputed or missing 
ticket numbers along with the VIRNs, that would have no bearing 
on the sources for the ticket numbers in the obviously different 
font and color on the printed daily business report from 2012.  
Second, accepting that Carroll honestly believed everything his 
"computer people" told him about the purportedly encrypted 
13 
VIRNs, he had no basis on which to confirm that the actual 
reasons for the differences in the VIRNs was a result of 
encryption.  Accordingly, we consider those claims directly, 
along with the other arguments in the defendant's direct appeal. 
 
In his direct appeal, the defendant pursues the arguments 
about the midtrial disclosure of a Lottery Commission report and 
Carroll's testimony concerning that report, as well as improper 
statements in the prosecutor's closing argument.  He also seeks 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We consider each issue in 
turn. 
 
a.  Lottery records and midtrial disclosure.  In 2012, the 
defendant filed a motion for discovery of all exhibits the 
Commonwealth intended to introduce at trial, all documents 
related to the case or that referred to evidence to be 
introduced at trial, and numerous categories of exculpatory 
evidence.  The motion was allowed in its entirety.  In response, 
the Commonwealth produced two sets of records concerning the 
lottery tickets:  a printed list of the lottery transactions 
that took place at the convenience store on the day the victim 
was stabbed (daily business report) and ticket reconstruction 
reports from the manufacturer who produced the lottery tickets.  
Although the Lottery Commission is a third party and not part of 
the prosecution team, the prosecution had obtained certain 
documents from the Lottery Commission by subpoena, and the 
14 
documents thus were in the prosecutor's case file.  The 
defendant then filed a motion in limine to exclude these 
documents at trial on the ground that they did not qualify as 
business records.  The trial judge ruled that the documents 
would be subject to a voir dire hearing before they could be 
introduced at trial. 
 
On the fourth day of trial, before the planned voir dire, 
the Commonwealth provided the defendant with a new set of 
lottery records, the so-called JFI report.  While the JFI report 
contains much of the same information as the daily business 
report, it differs in notable ways.  Among other things, both 
reports indicate, for each winning ticket redeemed on a given 
date, the game number, the book number, and the VIRN.  The JFI 
report also contains the individual ticket number for each 
winning ticket, which, as Carroll described, represents the 
ticket's numerical location within the sequence of tickets that 
form one book, and were physically attached to each other prior 
to sale. 
 
The daily business report for April 16, 2012, contains 
individual ticket numbers for winning tickets cashed at 
11:52 A.M. -- the second of three times that day when the 
defendant appeared on surveillance video footage at the 
convenience store -- but does not include individual ticket 
numbers for the tickets that were cashed between 10:02 and 
15 
10:03 A.M., the first time that day when the defendant appeared 
on the video surveillance footage.  The daily business report 
and the JFI report also contain different VIRNs for the same 
ticket.  At the voir dire hearing, Carroll testified that the 
JFI report was a version of the daily business report that was 
rarely used by the Lottery Commission, but could be created on 
request. 
 
The ticket reconstruction reports from the ticket 
manufacturer pertain only to the transactions at 11:52 A.M.  
These reports indicate the game number, book number, ticket 
number, and VIRN for each ticket that was redeemed at that time.  
Notably, however, the VIRNs listed on the ticket reconstruction 
reports for a given ticket differ both from the VIRNs printed on 
the daily business report and the VIRNs on the JFI report. 
 
Following the voir dire hearing, the judge allowed the 
daily business report and the JFI report to be introduced as 
business records,4 and allowed the defendant also to introduce 
 
 
4 The judge ruled that the JFI report was admissible as a 
business record, as was the daily business report produced 
during pretrial discovery, because both were produced by the 
Lottery Commission and could be "rerun" at will, but the 
reconstruction reports produced by the ticket manufacturer could 
not.  On appeal, the defendant does not challenge these rulings, 
but rather argues that, regardless of whether the documents were 
business records, they should not have been admitted because 
they were not produced prior to trial.  Nonetheless, in its 
brief, the Commonwealth argues at some length that the judge's 
ruling as to the JFI report was correct. 
 
16 
the ticket reconstruction reports.  The defendant was allowed a 
standing objection to Carroll's testimony regarding the JFI 
report. 
 
i.  Fabricated disclosures.  In his motion for a new trial, 
the defendant argued that the Commonwealth violated its 
discovery obligations by disclosing "incomplete and fabricated 
documentary evidence."  The records the defendant challenged as 
misleading and fabricated were the daily business report and the 
ticket reconstruction reports.  The defendant pointed out that, 
on the daily business report, the column for individual ticket 
numbers for transactions during the period from 10:02 to 
10:03 A.M. on April 16, 2012, was blank for each ticket cashed, 
while the individual ticket numbers were listed for transactions 
that occurred at 11:52 A.M.  Those individual ticket numbers, 
however, appeared in a font and color that was different from 
 
 
Hearsay contained in a business record is admissible where 
the record was (1) made in good faith, (2) in the regular course 
of business, (3) before the beginning of the criminal proceeding 
in which it is offered, and (4) it was the regular course of 
business to make such a record at the time or within a 
reasonable time of the recorded event.  Commonwealth v. 
Zeininger, 459 Mass. 775, 782, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 967 
(2011), citing G. L. c. 233, § 78.  Although the daily business 
report the Commonwealth sought to introduce had been produced in 
September 2015, the judge found, based on Carroll's testimony, 
that it was printed from data created in 2012 that had been 
available in the Lottery Commission's database since then.  See 
Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 410-411 (2020) (electronic 
records were created when data was captured, not day that 
printout of data was generated). 
17 
the font and color used elsewhere in the document.  In addition, 
the VIRNs listed on the daily business report differed from the 
VIRNs listed on the ticket reconstruction report for the same 
ticket. 
 
Ultimately, the Commonwealth did not introduce either set 
of records at trial, because it chose to rely on the JFI report 
that it obtained midtrial, which contained individual ticket 
numbers and VIRNs for each transaction.  The defendant, however, 
introduced both sets of documents during cross-examination of 
Carroll.5  He argued essentially that all of the lottery records 
were unreliable, because of the differences in the VIRNs for any 
given transaction on all three documents; he did not at that 
point argue that any of the reports were fraudulent or false.  
In his motion for a new trial, however, the defendant maintained 
that the Commonwealth's decision to disclose the three sets of 
records in itself constituted a discovery violation, where the 
VIRNs on all three sets of documents did not match, and the 
daily business report contained missing and manually appended 
individual ticket numbers.  While the evidence concerning the 
 
 
5 At the voir dire hearing, the judge ruled that, unless it 
called one of the ticket manufacturer's employees to testify, 
the Commonwealth could not introduce the reconstruction reports 
as business records; the defendant, however, could introduce 
them on cross-examination, and the jury could consider them for 
all purposes ("Whatever purposes [defense counsel] uses it for 
is up to him, and the jury can decide what value to assign to 
the document"). 
18 
ticket numbers might not have been clearly presented, nothing in 
the record suggests that the JFI report that the Commonwealth 
produced, or any of the other reports, were fraudulent.  Carroll 
testified that, in 2012, the daily business reports the Lottery 
Commission generated did not include individual ticket numbers.  
The Lottery Commission had the ability at that time to generate 
JFI reports, which included individual ticket numbers, but those 
reports were rarely used.  In 2012, when the Lottery Commission 
generated a daily business report, it would request the 
individual ticket numbers from the ticket manufacturer, using 
the VIRNs listed on the report.  Here, when asked about ticket 
numbers for two time periods, the manufacturer responded only 
with the individual ticket numbers for the 11:52 A.M. 
transactions, and provided that information in the form of the 
ticket reconstruction reports.  Those numbers were then manually 
entered onto a copy of the daily business report, and appear in 
a different font and color than the rest of the document. 
 
We address the inconsistencies in the VIRNs in the next 
section. 
ii.  Encryption testimony.  During cross-examination, after 
having introduced the two sets of lottery reports produced 
during pretrial discovery, the defendant asked Carroll to 
explain why the VIRN on any given transaction was listed as a 
different number in each of those reports and why both of those 
19 
numbers differed from the VIRN in the JFI report.  Carroll 
responded: 
"[F]rom what my computer people have told me that generate 
these reports . . . for security purposes some numbers are 
deleted on the [Lottery Commission's records] than what is 
actually the VIRN number on the ticket. . . . I believe 
[these numbers] from what was explained to me [are] 
encrypted by the computer somehow, and that's how they 
figure it out." 
 
 
In his motion for a new trial, the defendant argued that 
the Commonwealth violated its discovery obligations by failing 
to disclose any evidence of encryption pretrial.  As stated, in 
his decision the motion judge did not rule on this claim.  
Because the defendant was allowed a standing objection to 
Carroll's testimony regarding the JFI report and the VIRNs, we 
treat his objection to the introduction of the encryption 
testimony as preserved. 
Rule 14 (a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, 
444 Mass. 1501 (2005), mandates the provision to a defendant of 
certain items6 in the Commonwealth's possession or control, 
 
 
6 Items which must be provided under Rule 14 (a) (1) include 
(i) written or recorded statements and the substance of oral 
statements; (ii) grand jury minutes and testimony before a grand 
jury; "(iii) [a]ny facts of an exculpatory nature"; "(iv) [t]he 
names, addresses, and dates of birth of the Commonwealth's 
prospective witnesses other than law enforcement witnesses 
. . . "; "(v) [t]he names and business addresses of prospective 
law enforcement witnesses"; (vi) [i]ntended expert opinion 
evidence . . ."; "(vii) [m]aterial and relevant police reports, 
photographs, tangible objects, all intended exhibits, reports of 
physical examinations of any person or of scientific tests or 
experiments, and statements of persons the party intends to call 
20 
without a defendant having to request them.  Rule 14 was adopted 
to facilitate automatic provision of the discovery mandated by 
the constitutional principles set forth in Brady, 373 U.S. at 
87, "without the need for motions or argument."  Commonwealth v. 
Taylor, 469 Mass. 516, 521 (2014), quoting Reporter's Notes 
(Revised, 2004) to Rule 14, Massachusetts Rules of Court, Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, at 179 (Thomson Reuters 2014).  The rule 
"promote[s] judicial efficiency and encourage[s] full pretrial 
disclosure" (quotation and citation omitted).  Taylor, supra. 
Rule 14 (a) (1) requires mandatory production of discovery 
to a defendant, however, only where the items are "in the 
possession, custody, or control of the prosecutor, persons under 
the prosecutor's direction and control, or persons who have 
participated in investigating or evaluating the case and either 
regularly report to the prosecutor's office or have done so in 
this case."  Both the Commonwealth and the defendant also may 
"move for an order to any individual, agency or other entity in 
possession, custody or control of items pertaining to the case" 
to preserve that item for a set period of time, so that it may 
be available for subpoena.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (E).  A 
 
as witnesses"; "(viii) [a] summary of identification procedures, 
and all statements made in the presence of or by an identifying 
witness that are relevant to the issue of identity or to the 
fairness or accuracy of the identification procedures"; and 
"(ix) [d]isclosure of all promises, rewards or inducements made 
to witnesses the party intends to present at trial." 
21 
defendant also may move, as the defendant did here, "for 
discovery of other material and relevant evidence not required 
by subdivision (a) (1)."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (2). 
In this case, both the defendant and the Commonwealth had 
the daily business report and the reconstruction reports in 
their possession for more than two years before trial,7 each of 
which themselves showed differing VIRNs for the same 
transaction.  Indeed, at the voir dire hearing on the JFI 
report, the judge commented that he "wish[ed]" the matter had 
been addressed "weeks ago" (prior to trial), rather than at a 
voir dire midtrial.  Nonetheless, there is no indication that 
the Commonwealth was aware, prior to Carroll's testimony, that 
the Lottery Commission or its manufacturer used encryption.  
Carroll testified that the reason for the encrypted VIRN was to 
prevent Lottery Commission employees from searching for uncashed 
winning tickets, not to track sales or winners. 
 
Regardless of whether the Commonwealth violated its 
discovery obligations by failing to disclose evidence of 
encryption pretrial, we are convinced "that the error did not 
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect" (citation 
omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Peno, 485 Mass. 378, 399 (2020) 
 
 
7 More than two years prior to trial, the Commonwealth 
apparently obtained from the Lottery Commission, and then 
disclosed to the defendant, the daily business report and the 
reconstruction reports. 
22 
(where objection is preserved and issue is not constitutional, 
review is for prejudicial error).  As the judge noted in his 
order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, "the VIRN 
numbers are only a 'red herring' as they may relate to the 
evidence presented in this case."  The relevant information 
contained in the JFI report is not the VIRNs on the redeemed 
tickets, but the game, book, and individual ticket numbers.  
That data, not the randomly generated VIRNs, demonstrated a 
physical relationship between the winning tickets cashed (which 
had been destroyed, per protocol) and tickets found in the 
victim's home.  Whether the VIRNs on some Lottery Commission 
records were, in fact, encrypted thus was of little relevance to 
the Commonwealth's case.  Cf. Peno, supra at 399-400 (to decide 
whether errors at trial amounted to prejudicial error, we 
consider whether "the errors . . . went to the heart of the 
issues at trial or concerned collateral matters" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
The defendant also argued, in his motion for a new trial, 
that Carroll's testimony about the VIRNs being encrypted 
constituted impermissible hearsay and speculation.  See part 
2.c, infra. 
iii.  Midtrial disclosures.  The defendant contends that 
the JFI report and Carroll's testimony about it should not have 
been introduced, due to the Commonwealth's failure to produce 
23 
the report until after trial had begun, in violation of its 
discovery obligations.  Although the Commonwealth specifically 
sought out the JFI report, it did not obtain the report itself 
until midtrial, and disclosed the report shortly thereafter. 
 
Except in extraordinary circumstances, see Commonwealth v. 
Cotto, 471 Mass. 97, 115 (2015), the Commonwealth's discovery 
obligations extend only to documents or information that is 
within the prosecutor's "possession, custody or control."  
Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 139 & n.20 (2006).  See 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a).  This limitation applies both to the 
Commonwealth's mandatory discovery obligations under 
rule 14 (a) (1), and to its obligations to disclose evidence 
requested by the defendant in a motion pursuant to 
rule 14 (a) (2).  See Dwyer, supra at 140 n.22.  As discussed, 
records that are only in the possession of third parties need 
not be disclosed by the Commonwealth pursuant to 
rule 14 (a) (2).  Once a third-party record is obtained by the 
Commonwealth, however, it becomes part of the prosecutor's case 
file, triggering discovery obligations. 
The JFI report is a third-party record, created by the 
Lottery Commission, that the Commonwealth did not possess until 
midtrial.  The report was generated by the Lottery Commission on 
September 23, 2015 -- two days into trial -- and disclosed to 
the defendant two days later.  As such, the Commonwealth's 
24 
production of the JFI report did not constitute an improper late 
disclosure.  Notwithstanding that the Commonwealth could have 
obtained the report by a subpoena prior to trial, see 
rule 14 (a) (1) (E), the Commonwealth had no obligation to turn 
over the report until receiving it.  While earlier access to the 
JFI report by both parties would have been preferable, the 
Commonwealth did not violate its discovery obligations in this 
case. 
 
In addition, defense counsel could have requested a 
continuance to investigate the discrepancies between the JFI 
report and the lottery records received during discovery.  Such 
information might have allowed the defense to mount a more 
effective cross-examination of Carroll.8  See Commonwealth v. 
Baldwin, 385 Mass. 165, 177 (1982), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Cundriff, 382 Mass. 137, 150 (1980) ("defense counsel should, 
when faced with delayed disclosure situations, seek 'additional 
time for investigative purposes'").  Ultimately, however, it is 
unlikely that this information would have undermined the 
validity of the JFI report, a duly adjudged business record, and 
therefore it is unlikely that such information would have 
affected the outcome of the case. 
 
 
8 Although the judge suggested it at voir dire, neither side 
called an employee of the ticket manufacturer to testify. 
25 
 
b.  CSLI data.  In his motion for a new trial, the 
defendant challenged as a discovery violation the Commonwealth's 
purported failure to provide "complete cell phone technical 
data" (e.g., a CSLI report or a map of the CSLI data showing the 
probable locations of the defendant's cellular telephone on the 
morning of April 16, 2012, and reports of the results of a 
detective's investigation of the raw CLSI data).  The 
Commonwealth did provide the defendant with the lists of raw 
data showing the cellular tower numbers (not locations) that the 
defendant's telephone had connected to within the relevant 
times, which police investigators had obtained from the 
defendant's cellular service provider, but did not provide any 
of the analysis it typically would have obtained from an expert, 
such as a technical expert employed by a cellular service 
provider.  In addition, the tower number for the time period 
from 9:44 A.M., the closest to the critical period between 9:48 
to 10:02 A.M., was listed as all zeros. 
 
At trial, in response to the prosecutor's question whether 
he had done anything further with the CSLI data after receiving 
it from the provider, the detective who had conducted the CSLI 
investigation responded, "No."  On cross-examination, when asked 
if he had included the results of his review in a police report, 
the detective again answered "No."  When asked why he had not 
done so, the detective explained that, after talking to a 
26 
representative of the cellular service provider, he was of the 
opinion that the data was "unreliable" and had no "investigative 
value."  On further questioning, the detective explained that 
"the information on the cell towers, they jumped around 
from minute to minute, one minute he's . . . in one part of 
the city, the next minute he's . . . in another part of the 
city.  Two minutes later he's . . . back in another -- into 
a completely different part of the city." 
 
As the detective described, a subscriber will be connected 
through a cell tower that is not necessarily the closest to the 
location of the telephone.  The raw data showed that between 9 
and 10:02 A.M. on April 16, 2012, the defendant's telephone 
connected to towers in Quincy and the South Boston, Dorchester, 
and Charlestown sections of Boston as well as at Logan Airport.  
Between 9:50 and 10:02 A.M., it was connected to a tower in 
Quincy. 
 
On redirect examination, the detective testified that, in 
the course of his investigation, he had contacted the 
defendant's cellular service provider and had been told that 
cell towers near the ocean, such as in South Boston, can connect 
with other cell towers that are near an ocean, even at some 
distance away.  In other words, the device could be connecting 
to a tower nowhere close to its location.  Because the detective 
was not an expert in how the provider's equipment operated, the 
judge instructed the jury, immediately after the detective's 
testimony, that if they believed the detective's testimony, they 
27 
could use it only as evidence concerning why the information 
"might have caused the police to do something or not do to 
something with respect to their investigation." 
 
The motion judge (who was also the trial judge) concluded 
that there was no discovery violation because the results of the 
detective's investigation were not exculpatory; the connection 
of the defendant's telephone to towers in multiple areas of 
Boston and a neighboring city, within minutes, tended to call 
into question the reliability of the CSLI data, whereas, 
evidently, if the data only showed that the defendant had been 
in Quincy, that would have been highly exculpatory.  Given the 
detective's testimony, there was no error in the judge's 
conclusion that the CSLI data was not exculpatory, and thus that 
there was no Brady violation in the decision not to disclose the 
results of the detective's investigation. 
As the defendant points out, however, in his motion for 
pretrial discovery, he specifically requested "[t]he results, 
including notes, reports, and summaries of . . . all scientific, 
forensic, or field tests regardless of whether the Commonwealth 
intends to introduce such evidence at trial," and his motion was 
allowed in full.9  While the Commonwealth was not obliged to 
 
 
9 Because the detective concluded that the information was 
unreliable and not exculpatory, the Commonwealth also was under 
no obligation to provide the defendant with information about 
the existence of the service provider's statement, and the 
28 
create a report or a map from the raw data, the results of the 
detective's investigation appear to fall within the ambit of the 
allowed motion for nonmandatory discovery of the results of 
investigations and scientific tests, and thus should have been 
provided.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (2) ("The defendant may 
move, and following its filing of the Certificate of Compliance 
the Commonwealth may move, for discovery of other material and 
relevant evidence not required by subdivision (a) (1)"). 
 
Nonetheless, had the information been produced, it would 
have made no difference.  The defendant's repeated insistence 
that the CSLI data showed his telephone in Quincy during the 
crucial minutes disregards the evident impossibility of being in 
the numerous locations included in the CSLI data within minutes 
of each other, and thus the lack of relevance of the locations 
of the cell towers to establishing the defendant's location at 
the time of the stabbing.  Moreover, having been provided the 
raw data, including the cell tower numbers, the defendant could 
have sought information from the cellular service provider, or 
an independent technical expert, about the location of the 
towers and the meaning of the many different tower numbers in a 
short time period.  Given that video surveillance footage showed 
the defendant apparently at a convenience store in South Boston 
 
identity of the individual who made the statement.  See Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (E). 
29 
at 10:02 A.M., however, the argument that his cellular telephone 
was in Quincy at that time likely would have had little if any 
impact on the jury's thinking.  See Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472 
Mass. 587, 601 (2015). 
 
c.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  In both his motion for 
a new trial and on direct appeal, the defendant challenged 
certain statements in the prosecutor's closing argument.  In her 
closing, the prosecutor argued: 
"And as regards to the lottery ticket records, ask 
yourselves, ladies and gentlemen, whether you can rely on 
the records of the Massachusetts State Lottery Commission, 
a billion dollar business, and as you recall from the 
testimony, ask yourselves whether truly the numbers don't 
match or whether there was some gamesmanship in the numbers 
playing by the defense, because what you know through the 
testimony of Mr. Carroll is that the reasons those VIRNs 
don't match up is because they are encrypted." 
 
The defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly 
disparaged defense counsel by suggesting that his efforts to 
attack the validity of the lottery records constituted 
"gamesmanship," and that the prosecutor misstated the evidence 
by relying upon Carroll's speculative testimony, based on 
hearsay, that the VIRNs printed on the lottery records contained 
encrypted data.  The defendant explicitly objected to the use of 
the word "gamesmanship."  While the defendant did not object 
directly to Carroll's testimony about encryption, the judge 
allowed the defendant, at the voir dire of Carroll and at 
several sidebar hearings thereafter, a continuing objection to 
30 
Carroll's testimony on the subject of the VIRNs; at one sidebar, 
the judge cautioned defense counsel that his objection had been 
preserved and that there was no need to continue to object.  
Accordingly, we review the challenged statements for prejudicial 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Morales, 461 Mass. 765, 784 (2012). 
In his closing argument, the defendant argued that the jury 
should not accept the Commonwealth's attempt "to prove . . . 
that somehow, someway, that the lottery tickets that [the 
defendant] transacted[,] like thousands of other people that 
day, . . . that somehow those were Barbara Coyne's."  The 
prosecutor properly could contest this characterization of the 
Commonwealth's evidence and argue that the ticket numbers of the 
redeemed lottery tickets were in sequence with those found in 
the victim's home.  See Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 436 Mass. 
671, 674 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Awad, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 
139, 141 (1999) ("Within reason, prosecutors may be critical of 
the tactics utilized by trial counsel in defending a case").  
While it is improper for a prosecutor to argue that the "whole 
defense" is a "sham," Commonwealth v. McCravy, 430 Mass. 758, 
764 (2000), a prosecutor may characterize a particular point in 
defense counsel's closing argument as such, Commonwealth v. 
Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 130 (2013).  In so doing, however, a 
prosecutor may not "disparage[] defense counsel personally."  
Fernandes, supra. 
31 
In some circumstances, we have determined that a brief 
reference to defense counsel's argument as a "smoke screen" or 
"smoking mirrors" did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice, and that any prejudicial effect was 
cured by the judge's instruction that closing arguments are not 
evidence.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 429 Mass. 502, 
508-509 & n.4 (1999); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 428 Mass. 455, 
463 (1998), S.C., 468 Mass. 1009 (2014).  In Commonwealth v. 
Raposa, 440 Mass. 684, 697 (2004), we concluded similarly as to 
a prosecutor's statement that defense counsel could "spin gold 
from straw."  By contrast, in Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437 Mass. 
569, 581 (2002), we held that the prosecutor improperly 
disparaged the defense by characterizing a defense strategy as 
"despicable."  We concluded that such a characterization "goes 
beyond labeling [a defense tactic] as unworthy of belief or 
lacking in merit and smacks more of an ad hominem attack."  Id. 
 
Here, the core of the defense was that the defendant had 
not been at the scene and was mistakenly being tied to it by 
incomplete or unreliable lottery records, where the 
Commonwealth's own reports contained multiple disparities.  Most 
significantly, the different reports showed three different 
VIRNs for the same transaction, while Carroll testified that 
that number was unique for each ticket.  In addition, one report 
had no ticket numbers for a series of transactions, while 
32 
another contained manually added information that the Lottery 
Commission investigator explained had been obtained from the 
ticket manufacturer.  Defense counsel's challenge to the 
differences in the reports, and the investigator's explanation 
about what his "computer people" informed him had created the 
differences on the printed reports, accurately pointed out the 
acknowledged differences and suggested that they were a reason 
the jury should not credit the reports. 
The prosecutor's use of the word "gamesmanship," however, 
could have emphasized to the jury that these apparently valid 
challenges to the numbers were what the judge described as a 
"red herring"; while unique to each ticket, the VIRNs were 
randomly generated, and the VIRNs of the winning tickets were 
unknown.  The game, book, and ticket numbers, which were 
sequential and which, in combination, were also unique, were the 
key that tied the redeemed winning tickets to the tickets found 
in the victim's home, with matching game and book numbers, and 
ticket numbers close in sequence to the redeemed tickets.  Thus, 
this remark about gamesmanship itself was not improper. 
 
The prosecutor's statement about the encrypted VIRNs, 
however, was based on inadmissible hearsay and speculation about 
what the Lottery Commission investigator had been told by 
unidentified others.  The defendant argues that the prosecutor 
misstated the evidence by asserting as a fact, based on 
33 
Carroll's hearsay testimony, that "the reason those VIRNs don't 
match up is because they are encrypted."  "Although prosecutors 
are entitled to argue 'based on evidence and on inferences that 
may reasonably be drawn from the evidence,' they may not 
'misstate the evidence or refer to facts not in evidence.'"  
Commonwealth v. Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 585 (2018), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516 (1987). 
When the testimony about encryption was introduced, the 
defendant did not move to strike it and did not request a 
limiting instruction.  Accordingly, the testimony was admitted 
for all purposes, and the prosecutor therefore did not err in 
referring to it as substantive evidence.  See Commonwealth v. 
Roberts, 433 Mass. 45, 48 (2000) (evidence was admitted for all 
purposes where no request for limiting instruction was made).  
See also Commonwealth v. Jones, 439 Mass. 249, 261 (2003) 
("Hearsay, once admitted, may be weighed with the other 
evidence, and given any evidentiary value which it may possess" 
[citation omitted]).  Nonetheless, the judge's error in allowing 
the admission of the encryption testimony without limitation did 
not give rise to a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
The winning lottery tickets were far from the only evidence 
implicating the defendant.  The Commonwealth's case included 
fingerprint evidence tying the defendant to jewelry boxes in the 
victim's bedroom and a bloody envelope in her living room.  He 
34 
also was a possible contributor to DNA found under the victim's 
fingernails.  The Commonwealth introduced evidence that the 
defendant likely had committed other break-ins to obtain money 
to support his heroin addiction; the defendant had told one of 
his friends that he routinely committed "B&Es" and would slice 
the throat of anyone who caught him in the act, and then he had 
displayed a knife in his sleeve.  Video surveillance images 
showed the defendant at the convenience store, near a lottery 
terminal, within minutes of the victim's neck being cut.  In 
addition, early in the afternoon of the stabbing, a witness who 
used heroin with the defendant testified that they had driven 
together to their source in Mission Hill, purchased heroin, and 
returned to South Boston to consume it. 
 
Considering the evidence as a whole, the lottery records 
were a key part of the Commonwealth's case.  While the forensic 
evidence was critical, it alone could not have supported a 
conviction.  The prosecutor herself acknowledged the 
significance of the lottery tickets, stating during her closing, 
"That is what connects the defendant to Barbara Coyne and her 
murder."  Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the improper 
admission of the encryption testimony altered the jury's 
perception of the lottery records in a meaningful way.  See 
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 494-495 (1997).  As 
stated, while the randomly generated VIRNs of the winning 
35 
lottery tickets were not known and not well explained or 
documented, and the tickets had been destroyed, the unique 
combination of book number, game number, and sequential ticket 
number were described clearly at trial, and the winning ticket 
numbers at issue were very close in numbered sequence to tickets 
from the same game and book found in the victim's home.  As 
such, the error did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
d.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant also 
argues that, although barely sufficient under the Latimore 
standard, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 
(1979), the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and 
therefore he should be granted relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  
The defendant argues that "the verdict rested on a questionable 
foundation" because "the Commonwealth's evidence for the time of 
[the victim's] death left only a brief window between 9:48 and 
10 A.M. -- a mere [twelve] minutes -- for the perpetrator to 
commit a bloody murder" and then "travel several blocks to the 
convenience store . . . with no visible trace of blood on his 
clothing."  The defendant also points out that none of the video 
surveillance along the route from the Coyne residence to the 
convenience store captured any images of him during that time. 
 
"[O]ur duty pursuant to [G. L. c. 278,] § 33E, is to 
determine whether the verdict returned is consonant with 
36 
justice."  Commonwealth v. Berry, 466 Mass. 763, 770 (2014), 
citing Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 680 (1980).  In 
this case, notwithstanding the brief window of time the 
defendant points out, we conclude that there is no reason to 
reduce the defendant's sentence or order a new trial.  The 
defendant allegedly redeemed lottery tickets for the first time 
that day at 10:02 A.M., and he was not captured on video 
surveillance footage until 10:04 A.M.10  That leaves, at a 
minimum, fourteen minutes (9:48 to 10:02 A.M.) for the defendant 
to slice the victim's neck, steal lottery tickets, rinse off in 
the victim's kitchen sink, and travel the short distance to the 
convenience store. 
 
Although certainly the timeline is tight, it was not 
impossible for the defendant to have accomplished all of these 
action in the span of twelve to fourteen minutes.  His own house 
was close to the Coyne residence, and he kept his boat at a 
yacht club a block from the convenience store and the victim's 
house.  He was familiar with the neighborhood, where he had 
lived from childhood, and would have been able to navigate it 
quickly.  With respect to the fact that the defendant was not 
captured on any surveillance cameras along the route from the 
 
 
10 The surveillance video inside the convenience store did 
not capture the winning lottery tickets actually being redeemed.  
Nor did the system capture the defendant entering the store. 
37 
Coyne residence to the convenience store, the Commonwealth 
presented evidence that a number of these cameras either were 
turned off or were inoperable during the relevant period. 
 
Additionally, it is the function of the jury to determine 
the persuasiveness of the Commonwealth's evidence.  On the 
fourth day of trial, the jury took a view of the Coyne and 
Kostka residences, the corner store, and the two nearby yacht 
clubs.  In particular, the jury walked the few blocks from the 
Coyne residence to the convenience store.  They thus were well 
positioned to evaluate the Commonwealth's version of events.  We 
defer to their decision.  Moreover, the nature of the killing, 
the possible defensive wounds on the victim, and the signs of a 
search of the house for valuables suggest no reason to reduce 
the conviction of murder to a lesser degree of guilt. 
Judgments affirmed. 
Order denying motion for a 
new trial affirmed.