Case Title: State v. Jones

Citation: 2019-Ohio-5159

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-5159.] 
  
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-5159 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. JONES, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-5159.] 
Criminal law—Dogs—R.C. 955.22—Sufficiency of the evidence—Prior dangerous-
dog designation not required before person may be prosecuted for failing 
to control or confine a dangerous dog—Prosecution may prove dog’s 
dangerousness at trial—State failed to present sufficient evidence that dog 
was dangerous—Court of appeals’ judgment vacating conviction affirmed. 
(No. 2018-0601—Submitted May 8, 2019—Decided December 17, 2019.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 
No. C-160908, 2018-Ohio-565. 
_________________ 
STEWART, J. 
{¶ 1} In this certified-conflict case, we decide whether the “dangerous dog” 
element of R.C. 955.22’s dangerous-dog laws requires that the dog in question have 
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been previously designated as “dangerous,” as defined by R.C. 955.11(A)(1)(a), 
pursuant to the procedures set forth in R.C. 955.222 before the state may prosecute 
a person for violating R.C. 955.22(D).  Here, the First District Court of Appeals 
concluded that a prior designation as a dangerous dog is a prerequisite to its owner 
being prosecuted for failing to confine a dangerous dog in violation of R.C. 
955.22(D).  2018-Ohio-565, 95 N.E.3d 440.  In contrast, the Fifth District Court of 
Appeals has determined that the state may establish the dangerous-dog element by 
proving that the dog is “dangerous” without offering proof of any previous 
designation.  State v. Crocker, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 2012 CA 0021, 2013-Ohio-
3100.  The Fifth District held that the state may prove “dangerousness” as an 
element of the offense at trial, without the dog in question having been previously 
designated as dangerous through some other process.  Further, it held that the acts 
of the dog qualifying it as “dangerous” pursuant to R.C. 955.11(A)(1)(a) may have 
occurred simultaneously with the events giving rise to the R.C. 955.22 dangerous-
dog prosecution.  See id. at ¶ 14, 31-32. 
{¶ 2} We recognized that a conflict exists and accepted the state’s appeal 
on the following question of law: “Must a dog have been previously designated as 
a ‘dangerous dog’ under Chapter 955 of the Ohio Revised Code before its owner 
may be prosecuted for a violation of R.C. 955.22?”  153 Ohio St.3d 1428, 2018-
Ohio-2418, 100 N.E.3d 445.  We hold that a prior designation of dangerousness 
pursuant to R.C. 955.222 or otherwise is not a prerequisite to prosecution for failing 
to abide by R.C. 955.22’s dangerous-dog laws.  Instead, where the state has 
probable cause to believe the dog in question is dangerous, based on prior actions 
of the dog that meet the definition contained in R.C. 955.11(A)(1)(a), the state may 
initiate prosecution and prove the dog’s dangerousness at trial along with the other 
elements of the offense. 
{¶ 3} In the present case, however, we find that the state failed to present 
sufficient evidence that the dog in question was in fact “dangerous.”  Accordingly, 
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we answer the certified-conflict question in the negative but affirm the judgment of 
the First District Court of Appeals for reasons that are different from those 
announced in its opinion. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 4} Appellee, Joseph Jones, was walking his dog near his Cincinnati 
apartment when he unleashed the dog to allow it to protect him from an approaching 
stray dog.  Jones’s dog and the stray interacted without incident.  As Jones was 
walking back to his apartment, the two dogs proceeded toward a woman, Alyssa 
Rushing, who had just exited the building with her dog.  According to Jones, he 
then re-leashed his dog and the stray attacked Rushing’s dog.  Rushing, however, 
claimed that Jones’s dog bit her on the wrist and hand, pulling her to the ground, 
while the stray dog attacked her dog.  Jones assisted in separating his dog from 
Rushing and also in freeing her dog from the stray.  Both Rushing and her dog 
sustained bite wounds. 
{¶ 5} The state charged Jones with failing to confine a dangerous dog, in 
violation of R.C. 955.22(D), a fourth-degree misdemeanor, which, among other 
things, prohibits an owner of a dangerous dog from removing the dog’s leash while 
in public.  The case was heard in the Hamilton County Municipal Court, where 
Jones was eventually tried and convicted.  The court sentenced him to a 30-day jail 
term, suspended on the condition that he successfully complete six months of 
nonreporting probation and pay a $100 fine and court costs. 
{¶ 6} On direct appeal, Jones argued that the state failed to present sufficient 
evidence to sustain a conviction for failure to confine a dangerous dog because his 
dog had never been designated as a dangerous dog prior to the state charging him 
with the offense.  According to Jones, the dangerous-dog element of the offense is 
established only through proof of a separate prior legal action that results in a dog 
being designated a “dangerous dog” by the government.  He explained that the 
government can secure a prior formal designation by following the procedures 
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outlined in R.C. 955.222—a related statute that provides a civil notice and hearing 
process for designating dogs as dangerous when there is reason to believe that the 
dog meets the definition of “dangerous dog” contained in R.C. 955.11(A)(1)(a).  
Jones argued that R.C. 955.22’s dangerous-dog laws do not apply to a person unless 
that person’s dog has previously been designated “dangerous” by the government 
in accordance with the process set forth in R.C. 955.222 or alternatively, by a judge 
at an earlier proceeding for failure to confine that dog. 
{¶ 7} The state countered that the dangerous-dog element of the offense 
does not require a dog to have been previously designated as dangerous pursuant to 
R.C. 955.222 or any other judicial proceeding.  The state maintained that the 
element can be proven at trial by introducing evidence that the dog’s conduct 
satisfies the “dangerous dog” definition contained in R.C. 955.11(A)(1)(a), with no 
need for a prior formal designation under R.C. 955.222.  In support of its position, 
the state cited Crocker, 2013-Ohio-3100, the conflict case on appeal.  In Crocker, 
the Fifth District upheld a conviction under one of R.C. 955.22’s dangerous-dog 
provisions without requiring proof of a prior dangerous-dog designation.  Instead, 
the court held that the state was permitted to present evidence at trial to prove that 
the dog was dangerous as defined by R.C. 955.11(A)(1)(a).  Id. at ¶ 31. 
{¶ 8} The First District agreed with Jones.  In reversing his conviction, the 
court held that a previous dangerous-dog designation “is a prerequisite to finding a 
violation of the R.C. 955.22(D).”  2018-Ohio-565, 95 N.E.3d 440, at ¶ 10.  The 
court held that such a designation “is an element of the offense” and, as such, could 
not be satisfied by presenting evidence at trial that the dog was dangerous.  Id.  The 
appellate court’s rationale was premised largely on due-process concerns pertaining 
to fairness and notice.  In particular, the First District wrote that a prior designation 
is required because it serves to provide the owner with notice that he must confine 
his dangerous dog as required by R.C. 955.22(D).  Id.  In arriving at its conclusion, 
the First District relied on our decision in State v. Cowan, 103 Ohio St.3d 144, 
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2004-Ohio-4777, 814 N.E.2d 846, and the legislature’s subsequent enactment of 
R.C. 955.222 and its notice and hearing requirements.  Id. 
{¶ 9} The state filed a motion to certify a conflict between districts, arguing 
that the underlying decision in this case conflicts with the Fifth District Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Crocker.  The First District granted the state’s motion to 
certify a conflict.  We recognized that a conflict exists and accepted the appeal, 153 
Ohio St.3d 1428, 2018-Ohio-2418, 100 N.E.3d 445. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A.  Statutory framework 
{¶ 10} Notwithstanding the strong emotional bonds that often form between 
people and their dogs, dogs are considered personal property in Ohio and, as such, 
are subject to regulation pursuant to the state’s police power.  Cowan at ¶ 9.  R.C. 
Chapter 955, aptly titled “Dogs,” contains numerous laws on the ownership and 
treatment of dogs, which range from the details of licensing, selling, and 
impounding them to broader physical-control requirements.  Additionally, the 
chapter defines specific legal terms, such as “nuisance dog,” “dangerous dog,” and 
“vicious dog,” see R.C. 955.11, and outlines penalties for noncompliance with its 
laws, see R.C. 955.99. 
{¶ 11} One of the sections at issue here, R.C. 955.22, dictates how an 
owner, keeper, or harborer of a dog must confine that dog if it is a dangerous dog, 
see division (D), and requires the owner, keeper, or harborer of a dangerous dog to 
obtain liability insurance if ordered by a court, see division (E).  Additionally, R.C. 
955.99(G) enhances the penalty for failing to confine or control one’s dog if it is a 
dangerous dog. See R.C. 955.22(C) (establishing general requirements for 
confining and controlling “any dog,” irrespective of whether that dog falls under 
one of the specific designations set forth in R.C. 955.11).  R.C. 955.22 uses the 
same definition of “dangerous dog” as that contained in 955.11(A)(1)(a), which 
defines a “dangerous dog” as one that, without provocation, has done any of the 
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following: (1) caused a non-serious1 injury to a person, (2) killed another dog, or 
(3) has been the subject of a third or subsequent violation of R.C. 955.22(C).2 
{¶ 12} A separate section of R.C. Chapter 955, R.C. 955.222, provides a 
means by which a dog warden or other authorized official may designate a dog as 
“dangerous” when there is reasonable cause to believe that the dog meets the R.C. 
955.11(A)(1)(a) definition.  See R.C. 955.222(B) and (F).  If a dog warden chooses 
to exercise his or her authority to designate a dog as dangerous, then the warden 
must notify the dog’s owner, keeper, or harborer of both the designation and the 
option to request a judicial hearing to contest it.  R.C. 955.222(A) and (B).  At the 
hearing, the warden has the burden of proving the designation by clear and 
convincing evidence.  R.C. 955.222(C). 
{¶ 13} Here, the First District concluded that the dangerous-dog element of 
R.C. 955.22’s dangerous-dog laws requires that the dog in question have been 
previously designated a dangerous dog.  The Fifth District, on the other hand, 
allowed the state to introduce evidence other than a prior designation to prove 
dangerousness—in that case, witness testimony establishing that the dog in 
question killed another dog.  Crocker, 2013-Ohio-3100, at ¶ 31-32.  We conclude 
that a prior designation of dangerousness is not a requirement for proving the 
dangerous-dog element. 
                                                          
 
1. A dog that, without provocation, “has killed or caused serious injury to any person” is a “vicious” 
dog.  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 955.11(A)(6)(a).  See also R.C. 955.11(A)(5) (defining “serious 
injury”). 
 
2. R.C. 955.22(C) provides: “Except when a dog is lawfully engaged in hunting and accompanied 
by the owner, keeper, harborer, or handler of the dog, no owner, keeper, or harborer of any dog shall 
fail at any time to do either of the following: 
 
(1) Keep the dog physically confined or restrained upon the premises of the owner, keeper, 
or harborer by a leash, tether, adequate fence, supervision, or secure enclosure to prevent 
escape; 
 
(2) Keep the dog under the reasonable control of some person.” 
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B.  Our decision in Cowan 
{¶ 14} The legislature’s enactment of R.C. 955.222, see 2012 Sub.H.B. No. 
14, followed this court’s decision in Cowan, 103 Ohio St.3d 144, 2004-Ohio-4777, 
814 N.E.2d 846, in which we determined that the version of R.C. 955.22 then in 
effect, see Sub.H.B. No. 350, Section 1, 148 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3597, 3597-3599, 
violated procedural-due-process requirements because it allowed a dog warden to 
label dogs as dangerous or vicious without providing a mechanism for the dog 
owner to challenge the designation.  In Cowan, Cowan’s neighbor informed the dog 
warden that Cowan’s dogs had attacked his (the neighbor’s) wife.  Id. at ¶ 1.  The 
deputy warden conducted a brief investigation and determined that Cowan’s dogs 
were vicious based on the neighbor’s account of the attack.3  Id.  The deputy warden 
notified Cowan of the determination and also informed her that she must comply 
with R.C. 955.22’s vicious-dog-confinement requirements.  Id.  After the deputy 
warden was summoned to Cowan’s residence on two subsequent occasions in 
response to complaints that her dogs were not confined as required by R.C. 955.22’s 
vicious-dog provisions, the warden filed charges against Cowan for two counts of 
failing to confine a vicious dog, at the time a violation of R.C. 955.22(D)(1), one 
count of failing to obtain the required liability insurance for a vicious dog, at the 
time a violation of R.C. 955.22(E), and one count of failing to restrain a dangerous 
dog, a violation of R.C. 955.22(D)(2)(b).  Id. at ¶ 2-3.  After she was convicted on 
all counts, Cowan appealed.  Id. at ¶ 4-5.  The Eleventh District Court of Appeals 
reversed Cowan’s convictions, finding that R.C. 955.22 “unconstitutionally 
deprived [Cowan] of her due process rights” because she had no opportunity to 
contest the vicious-dog designations “prior to her property rights being 
                                                          
 
3. When we decided Cowan in 2004, the version of R.C. 955.22 in effect at that time contained 
several provisions that applied to vicious dogs in addition to dangerous dogs.  Since then, R.C. 
955.22 has been amended to remove any reference to “vicious dogs.”  2012 Sub.H.B. No. 14.  
However, R.C. 955.222(E) states that vicious dogs are subject to the same control and confinement 
requirements as dangerous dogs under R.C. 955.22. 
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substantially and adversely affected.”  Id. at ¶ 5; see also State v. Cowan, 11th Dist. 
Portage Nos. 2002-P-0029, 2002-P-0030, 2002-P-0031, 2003-Ohio-3547, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 15} In upholding the Eleventh District’s decision in Cowan, we 
determined that the unilateral designation by a state actor, without any right to 
contest or appeal the designation, violated due process because it did not provide 
Cowan with “a right to be heard in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner 
on the issue of whether her dogs were vicious or dangerous.”  Id. at ¶ 12-13.  In 
doing so, we rejected the state’s assertion that R.C. 955.22 afforded Cowan the right 
to challenge her dog’s classification at her subsequent criminal trial and was thus 
constitutional.  Id. at ¶ 12.  Our determination on this point was due in large part to 
the fact that the state presented the deputy warden’s unilateral designation as 
conclusive, essentially irrebuttable, proof to the jury that Cowan’s dogs were in fact 
vicious.  Id. at ¶ 14.4  Cowan had no meaningful opportunity to contest the 
underlying designation at trial, and therein lay the constitutional problem.  Id. at  
¶ 14-15. 
{¶ 16} In this case, the First District relied on our decision in Cowan, as 
well as the legislature’s subsequent enactment of R.C. 955.222, to support its 
conclusion that Jones’s dog must have been formally designated “dangerous” 
pursuant to R.C. 955.222 before Jones could be prosecuted.  2018-Ohio-565, 95 
N.E.3d 440, at ¶ 10-11.  Specifically, the court stated: 
                                                          
 
4. Additionally, this court raised concerns about how a delay in Cowan’s ability to challenge the 
warden’s unilateral designation of her dogs as vicious or dangerous might affect her due-process 
rights. Specifically, the court stated, “We find it inherently unfair that a dog owner must defy the 
statutory regulations and become a criminal defendant, thereby risking going to jail and losing her 
property, in order to challenge a dog warden’s unilateral decision to classify her property.  The 
statute does not provide appellee a right to be heard in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner 
on the issue of whether her dogs were vicious or dangerous.”  Cowan at ¶ 13.  We no longer have 
this concern.  With the advent of R.C. 955.222, a dog warden may no longer make a unilateral 
determination that a dog is dangerous without first providing the owner, keeper, or harborer of the 
dog with notice of the designation and notice of that person’s statutory right to contest the 
designation at a timely civil hearing.   
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If the designation were not [a] prerequisite, Jones would not have 
been put on notice as to the statutory requirements for confining his 
dog, or had the opportunity to challenge the designation and 
consequent restriction on his property rights. Any other 
interpretation of R.C. 955.22(D) would render R.C. 955.11 
superfluous and deprive dog owners of their statutory and 
constitutional rights to due process. The Ohio Supreme Court 
already said as much in [Cowan], when it struck down a former 
version of the “dangerous dog statute” for infringing upon the due 
process rights of dog owners for the same reason, leading to the 
enactment of R.C. 955.222. 
 
Id. at ¶ 10.  We find the First District’s concerns about notice, and its reliance on 
Cowan and R.C. 955.222, to be misplaced. 
C.  Due process does not require a prior designation 
{¶ 17} To begin, we have acknowledged on many occasions that due 
process requires notice and fair warning of the conduct proscribed by a penal 
statute.  See generally Akron v. Rowland, 67 Ohio St.3d 374, 381, 618 N.E.2d 138 
(1993) (“Due process requires that the terms of a criminal statute be reasonably 
clear and definite * * * ”).  But we do not agree with the First District’s statement 
that R.C. 955.22 requires a prior dangerous-dog designation for Jones to have been 
put on notice of the statutory requirements for confining his dog and his attendant 
criminal liability for failing to do so.  R.C. 955.11(A)(1)(a) explicitly defines the 
term “dangerous dog” as one that “has done any of the following: (i) [c]aused 
injury, other than killing or serious injury, to any person; (ii)  [k]illed another dog; 
[or] (iii) been the subject of a third or subsequent violation division (C) of section 
955.22 * * * .”   We determine that R.C. 955.11(A)(1)(a)’s use of the past tense,  
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“has done,” when referring to the dog’s conduct, means that only the dog’s prior 
conduct can be used to define it as a dangerous dog.  Accordingly, before a person 
has any legal obligation to confine or control his dog as described by R.C. 955.22’s 
dangerous-dog laws, the dog in question must have first done something that 
qualifies it as a dangerous dog. 
{¶ 18} The statutory language makes clear that the element of 
dangerousness contained in R.C. 955.22’s dangerous-dog provisions cannot be met 
where the sole evidence of a dog’s dangerousness is an act that took place 
contemporaneously with the failure-to-control-or-confine violation that is the 
subject of the prosecution.  Because the dangerous-dog designation turns on the 
dog’s past behavior, the statute provides fair warning to a dog owner that he or she 
may be subject to the dangerous-dog provisions of R.C. 955.22. 
{¶ 19} Further, our decision in Cowan turned on whether a state agent could 
make a unilateral legal determination, accompanied by relatively burdensome 
obligations for the owner of the dog, without any procedural oversight.  We held 
that this violated due process, but never concluded, as the appellate court suggests, 
that the government must have formally designated a dog as “dangerous” before 
alleging that a person has violated the pertinent parts of R.C. 955.22.  See 2018-
Ohio-565, 95 N.E.3d 440, at ¶ 13.  It appears that R.C. 955.222 was adopted by the 
legislature in the years after Cowan as a means of providing a constitutionally sound 
way for a dog warden or other authorized official to designate dogs as dangerous 
prior to, and independent of, the criminal process.  But neither our decision in 
Cowan nor the legislature’s subsequent enactment of R.C. 955.222, which 
establishes a procedure for designating a dog as dangerous, requires that the 
government have previously designated a dog as dangerous before initiating a 
prosecution for a violation of R.C. 955.22’s dangerous-dog laws.  Rather, the state 
may, without a prior designation pursuant to R.C. 955.222 or otherwise, prosecute 
and prove the element of dangerousness at a trial for a violation of R.C. 955.22.  If 
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the government can offer facts showing that a dog’s conduct before the events 
giving rise to the charged offense meets the definition of “dangerous” that is 
contained in R.C. 955.11, then the element of dangerousness is satisfied; and of 
course, the owner, keeper, or harborer in such a situation can challenge the state’s 
proof in the ordinary course of litigation. 
D.  Statutory language does not require a prior designation 
{¶ 20} Contrary to Jones’s contention, nothing in R.C. Chapter 955 
suggests that a dog must be formally designated as a dangerous dog before an 
owner, keeper, or harborer can be prosecuted for noncompliance with R.C. 955.22’s 
dangerous-dog provisions.  Had the legislature intended a prior designation to be a 
prerequisite to prosecution, it could have inserted this language into R.C. 955.222 
or R.C. 955.11(A)(1)(a) or elsewhere.  It did not.  This is important because R.C. 
955.11 and R.C. 955.22 were amended in 2012 in the same legislative act that 
enacted R.C. 955.222’s notice and hearing process.  See 2012 Sub.H.B. No. 14.  
The legislature was therefore able to insert a prior-designation requirement into the 
statutory scheme had it desired to do so. 
E.  Sufficiency of the evidence 
{¶ 21} Having determined that a prior dangerous-dog designation is not 
required in order to proceed with a prosecution under R.C. 955.22, and having 
determined that the prosecution may prove the dog’s dangerousness at trial, we now 
consider whether the state met its burden of proof in this case. 
{¶ 22} In order to prove that Jones’s dog was a “dangerous dog” within the 
meaning of R.C. 955.22, the state had to present evidence that the dog, without 
provocation, had done any of the following: (1) caused a non-serious injury to 
another person, (2) killed another dog, or (3) been the subject of a third or 
subsequent violation of R.C. 955.22(C).  See R.C. 955.11(A)(1)(a). 
{¶ 23} At trial, the state introduced evidence of a Facebook post, allegedly 
written and posted by Jones, that contained pictures of his dog and several 
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comments underneath.  One commenter stated, “I love how he walks thru crowds 
like no ones outside lol good temperament.”  Jones replied, “Yeah I had to train em 
to do that.  He use to try n smell or bite everybody.”  Further, Jones testified that at 
the time of the incident his dog was in “protection training” classes, in which the 
dog learned, essentially, how to protect Jones from danger.  According to Jones’s 
testimony, the protection-training courses were intended to teach his dog how to 
attack and bite on command and “never let go.” 
{¶ 24} We conclude that the state failed to meet its burden of offering 
sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for failure to control a dangerous dog.  
The facts related above do not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that, prior to 
biting Ms. Rushing, Jones’s dog ever caused injury to a person, killed another dog, 
or was the subject of three or more violations under R.C. 955.22(C).  See State v. 
Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 25} We answer the certified question by holding that a prior dangerous-
dog designation is not required before a person may be prosecuted for failing to 
control or confine a dangerous dog.  Here, however, the state failed to present 
sufficient evidence of prior acts of Jones’s dog that would render him dangerous 
under R.C. 955.11(A)(1)(a).  Accordingly, we maintain the First District’s reversal 
of Jones’s conviction, but for the reasons stated in this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and WAITE, DEWINE, and DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by FRENCH, 
J. 
CHERYL L. WAITE, J., of the Seventh District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
FISCHER, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment only. 
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{¶ 26} When interpreting a statute, we give plain and ordinary meaning to 
all the words and phrases in the statute, State v. Singer, 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 108, 362 
N.E.2d 1216 (1977), and give effect to all parts of the statutory scheme, United Tel. 
Co. of Ohio v. Limbach, 71 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 643 N.E.2d 1129 (1994).  Because 
the majority’s holding that a “prior dangerous-dog designation is not required 
before a person may be prosecuted for failing to control or confine a dangerous 
dog,” majority opinion at ¶ 25, fails to give effect to the plain and unambiguous 
meaning of all the words chosen by the legislature and fails to give effect to all 
parts of the statutory scheme found in R.C. Chapter 955, I disagree with its 
reasoning.  Contrary to the majority, I would answer the certified question in the 
affirmative: a “dangerous-dog” designation, pursuant to R.C. 955.222, is a 
prerequisite to prosecuting an individual for failing to confine or control the dog.  I 
nevertheless concur in the court’s judgment, as I would affirm the judgment of the 
First District Court of Appeals.  Therefore, I concur in judgment only. 
Statutory Interpretation 
{¶ 27} This case presents a narrow certified-conflict question whether a dog 
must have been previously designated a “dangerous dog” under R.C. Chapter 955 
before its owner may be prosecuted for a crime pursuant to R.C. 955.22 for failing 
to confine or control the dog.  The facts of the case are undisputed.  See majority 
opinion at ¶ 17.  To resolve the question presented, we begin at a familiar place, 
statutory construction. 
{¶ 28} Our duty when construing a statute is to determine and give effect to 
the intent of the General Assembly as expressed in the language it enacted. Griffith 
v. Aultman Hosp., 146 Ohio St.3d 196, 2016-Ohio-1138, 54 N.E.3d 1196, ¶ 18; 
Fisher v. Hasenjager, 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 2007-Ohio-5589, 876 N.E.2d 546, ¶ 20. 
“When the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and 
definite meaning, we must rely on what the General Assembly has said.”  Jones v. 
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14 
Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-1099, 784 N.E.2d 
1172, ¶ 12, citing Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 
721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000). 
{¶ 29} “Where a statute defines terms used therein, such definition controls 
in the application of the statute * * *.”  Good Samaritan Hosp. of Dayton v. 
Porterfield, 29 Ohio St.2d 25, 30, 278 N.E.2d 26 (1972), citing Terteling Bros., Inc. 
v. Glander, 151 Ohio St. 236, 85 N.E.2d 379 (1949), and Woman’s Internatl. 
Bowling Congress, Inc. v. Porterfield, 25 Ohio St.2d 271, 267 N.E.2d 781 (1971).  
Terms that are undefined in a statute are accorded their common, everyday 
meaning.  See R.C. 1.42. 
{¶ 30} The crime that appellee, Joseph Jones, was convicted of—failing to 
confine a dangerous dog, in violation of R.C. 955.22(D)—is part of the broad 
statutory scheme in R.C. Chapter 955, covering, among other subjects, dog 
registration, kennel registration, the appointment of dog wardens, confinement and 
control of dogs, and assistance dogs.  Therefore, our interpretation of the intent of 
the General Assembly in enacting R.C. 955.22(D) must consider, and cannot render 
meaningless, other parts of the statutory scheme.  Limbach, 71 Ohio St.3d at 372, 
643 N.E.2d 1129.  We must, when construing this provision, give effect to the entire 
statutory scheme. 
{¶ 31} R.C. 955.22(D)’s confinement and restraint requirements apply only 
to owners of dangerous dogs.  The legislature defined “dangerous dog” in R.C. 
955.11(A)(1) as 
 
(a) * * * a dog that, without provocation * * * has done any 
of the following:   
(i) Caused injury, other than killing or serious injury, to any 
person;  
January Term, 2019 
 
15 
(ii) Killed another dog;  
(iii) Been the subject of a third or subsequent violation of 
division (C) of section 955.22 of the Revised Code. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 32} The verb “has done” is present-perfect tense and indicates that the 
behavior by the dog must have previously occurred at some unspecified time.  See 
Robinson v. Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 81AP-517, 1982 WL 4144, 
*2 (Apr. 29, 2019).  Therefore, it is only after the dog has first engaged in one of 
the behaviors set forth in R.C. 955.22(A)(1)(a)(i) through (iii) that the definition of 
“dangerous dog” can apply to that dog.  See State v. Smith, 104 Ohio St.3d 106, 
2004-Ohio-6238, 818 N.E.2d 283, ¶ 18 (the use of “has been convicted of or 
pleaded to” in the sexually-violent-predator specification “indicate[s] that at time 
of indictment, the person has already engaged in a sexually violent offense”). 
{¶ 33} But here, the majority holds that the dangerous-dog determination 
can occur simultaneously with the prosecution for failing to confine a dangerous 
dog in violation of R.C. 955.22(D) as long as the “government can offer facts 
showing that [the] dog’s conduct before the events giving rise to the charged 
offense meets the definition of ‘dangerous.’ ” Majority opinion at ¶ 19.  If that is 
true, then why did the General Assembly provide a civil legal process in R.C. 
955.222 by which a court may ultimately determine whether a dog is dangerous 
and that also affords the owner of that dog a right of appeal?   
{¶ 34} The procedure by which a dog is designated a dangerous dog 
provides that if the dog warden or authorized official “has reasonable cause to 
believe a dog * * * is a * * * dangerous dog,” the owner shall be notified of the fact 
that the warden or authorized person “has designated the dog a * * * dangerous 
dog.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 955.222(B)(1).  If the owner disagrees with the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
designation, he or she may then timely request a hearing, R.C. 955.222(B)(2), 
which shall be conducted by the municipal or county court with territorial 
jurisdiction over the owner, R.C. 955.222(A).  At the hearing, the dog warden or 
authorized person “has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that the dog is a * * * dangerous dog.”  R.C. 955.222(C).  Thereafter, if a dog is 
designated a “dangerous dog,” the owner has a right to appeal the court’s 
determination.  Id. 
{¶ 35} The General Assembly did not define “designate” for purposes of 
R.C. 955.222.  “Designate” has varying definitions. The most relevant are (1) “to 
distinguish as to class: denominate, identify, label” or (2) “to declare to be:  
characterize.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 612 (1986).  
Therefore, by its plain and unambiguous terms, R.C. 955.222 provides that a dog 
cannot be a dangerous dog until the process has been completed, either by the 
owner’s failure to timely seek a hearing or by final judicial determination.  It is only 
after a dog is designated a “dangerous dog” that the owner of the dog is put on 
notice that he or she is subject to the more stringent ownership and harboring 
requirements of R.C. 955.22(D) and that a violation of those requirements may 
subject the owner to criminal prosecution. 
{¶ 36} The majority states that “nothing in R.C. Chapter 955 suggests that 
a dog must be formally designated as a dangerous dog” before its owner may be 
prosecuted for violating R.C. 955.22.  Majority opinion at ¶ 20.  However, this 
reading of the statute fails to give effect to the term “designate” as used in R.C. 
955.222.  As stated above, the common meaning of the word “designate” in this 
context is to declare that something meets a specific class—here, placing certain 
dogs into the class of “dangerous dogs.”  Our role is to evaluate a statute “as a whole 
and giv[e] such interpretation as will give effect to every word and clause in it.  No 
part should be treated as superfluous unless that is manifestly required, and the 
January Term, 2019 
 
17 
court should avoid that construction which renders a provision meaningless or 
inoperative.”  State ex rel. Myers v. Spencer Twp. Rural School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 
95 Ohio St. 367, 373, 116 N.E. 516  (1917).  Statutes “ ‘may not be restricted, 
constricted, qualified, narrowed, enlarged or abridged; significance and effect 
should, if possible, be accorded to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act.’ 
” Weaver v. Edwin Shaw Hosp., 104 Ohio St.3d 390, 2004-Ohio-6549, 819 N.E.2d 
1079, ¶ 13, quoting Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231, 78 N.E.2d 370 (1948), 
paragraph five of the syllabus.  Here, however, the majority’s determination does 
not give effect to every word and clause in the statutory scheme. 
{¶ 37} Moreover, it appears that the majority has not thoroughly analyzed 
R.C. 955.222 and, therefore, has failed to consider the impact of its holding on that 
provision.  If, as the majority contends, it is the dog’s past behavior that puts an 
owner on notice of being subject to R.C. 955.22, majority opinion at ¶ 18, why 
would the General Assembly have enacted R.C. 955.222(D), which  requires that a 
dog be confined or restrained pursuant to R.C. 955.22(D) until a court makes a final 
dangerous-dog determination and during the appellate process.  However, in this 
case, under the majority’s holding, R.C. 955.222(D) is meaningless, as it would be 
unnecessary to notify an owner of the duty to comply with R.C. 955.22(D) during 
the R.C. 955.222 process since he should have started complying immediately after 
the dog engaged in the behavior. 
{¶ 38} The effect of the majority’s holding also results in an inconsistent 
application of other dangerous-dog requirements.  Specifically, the owner of a 
dangerous dog is required to obtain a registration certificate and place a tag on the 
dog’s collar that identifies the dog as a dangerous dog, R.C. 955.22(E)(2); notify 
the dog warden if the dog is loose or unconfined, bites a person, or attacks another 
animal while off the owner’s property, R.C. 955.22(E)(3)(a) through (c); and notify 
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18 
the county auditor within ten days if the dog is sold, given to another person, or 
dies, R.C. 955.22(E)(4). 
{¶ 39} However, another part of R.C. 955.222(D) provides that an owner 
“shall not be required to comply with any other requirements established in the 
Revised Code that concern a * * * dangerous dog * * * until the court makes a final 
determination and during the pendency of any appeal.”  Nevertheless, the 
consequence of the majority’s holding is that an owner whose dog has engaged in 
the behavior set forth in R.C. 955.11(A), but has not been subject to the R.C. 
955.222 designation process, must comply with the “other requirements” 
notwithstanding the General Assembly’s express intent that compliance with those 
requirements shall not be required until there is a final judicial determination. 
{¶ 40} Because I find that giving effect to every word and phrase requires a 
prior designation that a dog is a dangerous dog before an owner can be charged 
with a crime for failing to control or confine a dangerous dog, I would answer the 
certified conflict question in the affirmative and thus I disagree with the majority’s 
reasoning.  Nevertheless, because the majority affirms the appellate court on other 
grounds, I concur in judgment only. 
FRENCH, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Paula Boggs-Muething, Cincinnati City Solicitor, Natalia S. Harris, 
Cincinnati City Prosecutor, and Christopher Liu, Senior Assistant Prosecutor, for 
appellant. 
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and David 
Hoffmann Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. 
_________________