Case Title: Paulson v. Andicoechea

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95-300

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Paulson v. Andicoechea1996 WY 150926 P.2d 955Case Number: 95-300Decided: 11/15/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Judith L. PAULSON,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Jose ANDICOECHEA, 
Individually, Jose Andicoechea, d/b/a Cody Motel, and Cody Motel, Inc., 
Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court of Sweetwater County, Jere Ryckman, J.

Robert W. Horn 
(argued), and Vonde M. Smith of Robert W. Horn, P.C., Jackson Hole, for 
appellant.

Daniel T. Massey 
of Harrison & Massey, LLC, Rawlins, for appellees.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

LEHMAN, Justice.

[¶1]      The issue 
presented in this case is whether appellee owes appellant a duty to clear snow 
and ice from a parking lot. Finding that the natural accumulation rule bars 
imposition of such a duty under the specific facts of this case, we affirm the 
district court's grant of summary judgment.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant 
presents the following issue:

I.          
May the natural accumulation rule serve as a foundation for summary 
judgment in the face of specific common law and statutory duties which mandate 
the removal of snow and ice from the property where a citizen was 
hurt?

[¶3]      Appellee states 
the issues:

I.          
Is summary judgment appropriate in a slip and fall case when the summary 
judgment is based on undisputed facts, well-settled Wyoming case law concerning 
the natural accumulation rule, and the obvious danger rule?

II.          
If a landowner in Wyoming cleans a parking area following a snowfall, is 
there a common law duty created requiring landowner to clean the parking area 
each subsequent snowfall thereafter?

III.         Does 
Rock Springs' city ordinance requiring snow removal from sidewalks create a duty 
to remove snow from parking areas not located on sidewalks?

FACTS

[¶4]      On December 10, 
1991, Appellant Judith Paulson (Paulson) arrived at the Appellee Cody Motel 
(Cody Motel) in Rock Springs, Wyoming to perform her janitorial cleaning 
service. It had snowed, and Cody Motel had not cleared away the snow and ice 
which had accumulated in the parking lot. When Paulson arrived at the Cody 
Motel, she drove into the parking lot, got out of the truck, and entered the 
main office. She then returned to her truck and drove to the laundry room, 
whereupon she supervised the cleaning of the rooms. As Paulson drove around and 
walked on the parking lot, she recognized that it was packed and slick with snow 
and ice.

[¶5]      When Paulson's 
duties were finished, she drove her vehicle back to the main office to clock 
out. Paulson parked her vehicle in the parking lot; and, upon stepping out of 
her truck, she slipped and fell on some snow and ice injuring herself. 
Subsequently, Paulson filed an action in district court against Cody Motel and 
its owner, Jose Andiocoechea, based upon negligence. Cody Motel submitted a 
motion for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to Paulson and, thus, 
a negligence action could not survive. The district court agreed with Cody Motel 
and granted summary judgment. Paulson timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. 
Standard of review

[¶6]      Summary judgment 
is proper, even in negligence cases, when there is no genuine issue of material 
fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Pullman v. Outzen, 924 P.2d 416, 418 (Wyo. 1996); Downen v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 
887 P.2d 515, 518 (Wyo. 1994); Eiselein v. KMart, Inc., 868 P.2d 893, 894-95 
(Wyo. 1994). When we review a motion for summary judgment, we view the record on 
appeal in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and accept 
all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the record in favor of that 
party. Pullman, at 418; Downen, at 518; Eiselein, at 894.

II. 
Natural accumulation and obvious danger rules

[¶7]      In Wyoming, this 
court has made a distinction between natural and unnatural accumulations of snow 
and ice regarding slip and fall cases. The owner or occupier of the premises is 
not liable for injuries resulting from a slip and fall on a natural accumulation 
of snow and ice. Pullman, 924 P.2d  at 418; Eiselein, 868 P.2d  at 897. We have 
further held that there is no liability when the dangers surrounding such 
natural accumulation are obvious or are as well known to the plaintiff as the 
defendant. Pullman, at 418; Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 789 (Wyo. 
1982). In Eiselein we defined and clarified the reasoning underlying these 
rules:

[A] proprietor is not 
considered negligent for allowing the natural accumulation of ice due to weather 
conditions where he has not created the condition. The conditions created by the 
elements, such as the forming of ice and falling of snow, are universally known 
and there is no liability where the danger is obvious or is as well known to the 
plaintiff as the property owner.

Bluejacket [v. 
Carney, 550 P.2d 494], at 497 [(Wyo. 1976)]. The rationale underlying this rule 
is that

in a climate where there 
are frequent snowstorms and sudden changes of temperature, these dangerous 
conditions appear with a frequency and suddenness which defy prevention and, 
usually, correction; consequently, the danger from ice and snow in such 
locations is an obvious one, and the occupier of the premises may expect that an 
invitee on his premises will discover and realize the danger and protect himself 
against it.

62A Am.Jur.2d 
Premises Liability § 699 (1990).

Eiselein, 868 P.2d  at 897; see also Johnson v. Hawkins, 622 P.2d 941, 942-43 (Wyo. 1981). It 
is significant to point out that one of the underlying principles of the natural 
accumulation rule is that the dangers of natural accumulations of snow and ice 
are obvious; thus, the obvious danger rule is contained within and is part and 
parcel of the natural accumulation rule.

[¶8]      Liability will 
only attach if the owner or occupier creates an unnatural accumulation that is 
substantially different in volume or course than would naturally occur. Pullman, 
924 P.2d  at 418; Eiselein, 868 P.2d  at 898. To establish that an accumulation of 
snow and ice is unnatural, a plaintiff must show that the defendant created or 
aggravated the hazard, that the defendant knew or should have known of the 
hazard, and that the hazardous condition was substantially more dangerous than 
it would have been in its natural state. Pullman, at 418. Furthermore, no duty 
exists which requires either the removal of an obvious danger or a warning of 
its existence. Eiselein, at 895. In Sherman v. Platte County, we 
stated

there is the rule that no 
duty exists which requires either the removal of an obvious danger or a warning 
of its existence. Second is the rule that no duty exists to remove the natural 
accumulation of snow and ice. The latter rule broadens the protection accorded 
possessors of land under the former rule. It covers that class of cases where 
the ice and snow naturally accumulate in a fashion where there is a lurking 
danger, i.e., the ice is covered by the snow.

642 P.2d  at 789. 
We have also stated that even the most ably constructed and carefully maintained 
parking lot will probably contain minor indentations in which naturally 
occurring water can accumulate and freeze; naturally occurring water which 
naturally concentrates in such a lot is still considered a natural accumulation. 
Eiselein, 868 P.2d  at 898.

[¶9]      In Pullman, we 
concluded that pedestrian packed snow and ice is not substantially more 
dangerous than snow and ice in its natural state. 924 P.2d  at 418. We went on to 
hold that pedestrian packed snow and ice is a natural accumulation and that an 
owner or occupier of the premises at which such an accumulation occurs is not 
liable for injuries incurred as a result of a slip and fall accident on that 
natural accumulation, and we affirmed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment. Id.

[¶10]   At issue in this case is whether 
packed and frozen snow and ice in a parking lot is a natural accumulation under 
the specific facts. Paulson did not sustain her burden of proving that Cody 
Motel did anything to create or aggravate the hazard of the snow and ice, and 
she did not prove that the snow and ice was in a substantially more dangerous 
state than in its natural state. Paulson failed to present evidence that Cody 
Motel created an unnatural accumulation that is substantially different in 
volume or course than would naturally occur. The record establishes that it had 
snowed on the parking lot, that ice had built up, and that Cody Motel did not 
undertake to remove the snow and ice. Thus, Cody Motel did not change the 
condition of the snow and ice, nor did they create any unnatural accumulation. 
Nor did Paulson present evidence that in the exact area where she fell, the 
parking lot was so defective as to cause snow and ice to unnaturally accumulate 
in a substantially more dangerous state. To the contrary, the record shows that 
the area upon which Paulson fell was in no different state than the rest of the 
parking lot. To comport with Eiselein, naturally occurring water, and therefore 
snow and ice, which naturally concentrates in a parking lot is still considered 
a natural accumulation.

[¶11]   We also find that Paulson was 
aware, or should have been aware, of the open and obvious danger the snow and 
ice posed in the parking lot. Paulson testified in a deposition that she saw 
that the entire parking lot contained snow and ice. She testified that when she 
got out of her truck in the morning in front of the main office, she noticed 
that the parking lot was snow-packed and frozen with ice covering the snow. She 
testified that she walked carefully to and from her truck to the motel, and 
walked carefully from each side of the motel to the other because it was slick. 
Therefore, under the obvious danger rule inherent in the natural accumulation 
rule, Paulson should have been aware of the dangers the snow and ice presented. 
Cody Motel had no duty to remove or warn her of such obvious dangers. See 
Eiselein, 868 P.2d  at 895; Sherman, 642 P.2d  at 789. The district court 
correctly applied the natural accumulation rule in granting summary judgment 
against Paulson.

III. 
Impact of municipal ordinances

[¶12]   Although Wyoming statutory and 
common law impose no duty upon Cody Motel to remove natural accumulations of 
snow and ice, Paulson contends that Rock Springs municipal ordinances do impose 
such a duty. The first municipal ordinance that Paulson entreats requires an 
owner or occupier of premises within the city limits to keep front sidewalks 
free of accumulation of snow and ice. Paulson, however, did not injure herself 
on the sidewalk in front of the Cody Motel; as such, this argument is 
irrelevant.

[¶13]   The second municipal ordinance 
relied upon by Paulson involves the prohibition against causing or permitting a 
pool of water to form, stand or flow upon any street, sidewalk, alley or other 
public ground. This argument also fails. There is no evidence in the record that 
Cody Motel caused or permitted a pool of water to form, stand or flow upon any 
street, sidewalk, alley or other public ground, and no evidence that such was 
the proximate cause of Paulson's injury.

IV. Impact 
of Cody Motel's previous removal of snow and ice

[¶14]   Paulson argues that Cody Motel had 
a duty to remove the snow and ice from the parking lot on the day she was 
injured because Cody Motel had removed the snow and ice from the parking lot on 
previous days when it had snowed. Paulson mischaracterizes the law of negligence 
regarding gratuitous undertakings. In order for a negligence action to survive 
regarding a gratuitous rendering of services to another, the party being sued 
has to actually undertake the rendering of the services which caused harm to the 
plaintiff. See Kelly v. Roussalis, 776 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Wyo. 1989); Beard v. 
Brown, 616 P.2d 726, 733-34 (Wyo. 1980); Ellsworth Bros., Inc. v. Crook, 406 P.2d 520, 523-24 (Wyo. 1965); Restatement, Second, Torts § 323 (1965); 57A 
Am.Jur.2d Negligence §§ 112, 113 (1989) (§ 113: "essential to a finding of 
liability is a particular undertaking in fact, not merely the expectation of one 
or the legal right to pursue one, for without the actual assumption of the 
undertaking there can be no correlative legal duty to perform that undertaking 
carefully"). Cody Motel did not undertake to remove the snow and ice after the 
last snow before Paulson was injured. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that 
previous gratuitous removals of ice and snow resulted in an unnatural 
accumulation.

CONCLUSION

[¶15]   Paulson failed to satisfy her 
burden that Cody Motel created an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice in its 
parking lot that was substantially different in volume or course than would 
naturally occur. Cody Motel undertook no action to remove the snow and ice, and 
Paulson was well aware of the snow and ice in the parking lot and should have 
been well aware of the open and obvious dangers the snow and ice posed. The 
compacted snow and ice in Cody Motel's parking lot was a natural accumulation; 
and, accordingly, Cody Motel is not liable for slip and fall injuries resulting 
therefrom. The decision of the district court is

[¶16]   Affirmed.