Case Title: Commonwealth v. Diggs

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12009

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12008 
SJC-12009 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARCEL A. DIGGS. 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DAMIANE K. SOTO. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 7, 2016. - July 29, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
 
Bail.  Arrest.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil actions commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on November 9 and 17, 2015.  
 
 
The cases were reported by Spina, J.  
 
 
 
Edward Crane for the defendants. 
 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Timothy J. Cruz, District Attorney, & Robert C. Thompson, 
Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The defendants, Marcel A. Diggs and Damiane K. 
                                                 
 
1 Justice Duffly participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored this opinion prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
Soto, challenge orders for pretrial detention imposed by 
District Court judges after hearings at which the judges 
concluded that each defendant was dangerous within the meaning 
of G. L. c. 276, § 58A (dangerousness statute).  Under that 
statute, a person "held under arrest" on charges of one of an 
enumerated list of offenses may be subject to "a hearing to 
determine whether conditions of release will reasonably assure 
the safety of any other person or the community."  G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A (4).  The defendants argue that neither of them was "held 
under arrest" within the meaning of G. L. c. 276, § 58A (4), 
when they appeared in court to be arraigned, and therefore that 
they could not lawfully be subjected to a pretrial detention 
hearing.  The defendants each filed petitions for extraordinary 
relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court.  The 
single justice ordered the matters joined and reserved and 
reported them to the full court. 
We conclude that where a criminal defendant has been 
arrested or is subject to an outstanding arrest warrant for an 
enumerated offense, the defendant may be subject to pretrial 
detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58A (4), even if the defendant 
is not held in custody following the arrest, so long as the 
dangerousness hearing takes place "immediately upon the person's 
3 
 
first appearance before the court."2  Id.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the orders of pretrial detention. 
Background.  1.  Damiane Soto.  Soto was arrested on 
charges of assaulting and threatening his pregnant girl friend, 
in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13A, and G. L. c. 275, § 2.3  
After he was booked at the Marlborough police station, Soto 
posted bail, which had been set at $1,000.  Two days later, a 
criminal complaint issued charging Soto with the offenses 
alleged.  That same day, when Soto appeared in court as 
required, the Commonwealth moved for an order of pretrial 
detention under the dangerousness statute.  Soto argued that he 
could not be detained because he had been released on bail 
following his arrest, and therefore he was not "held under 
arrest" when he appeared for arraignment.  The judge rejected 
                                                 
2 As we observed in Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 
780 (1996), the Commonwealth bears a "heavy burden" to satisfy  
G. L. c. 276, § 58A, and therefore to subject an individual to 
pretrial detention.  The Commonwealth must establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that "no conditions of release will 
reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the 
community."  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3). 
 
3 General Laws c. 276, § 58A (1), provides, in relevant 
part, that "[t]he [C]ommonwealth may move, based on 
dangerousness, for an order of pretrial detention . . . [for] a 
violation of an order pursuant to . . . [G. L. c. 209A, 
§§ 3, 4, 5,] . . . or arrested and charged with a misdemeanor or 
felony involving abuse as defined in [G. L. c. 209A, § 1]."  The 
Commonwealth sought pretrial detention on the theory that the 
offenses for which Soto was charged are enumerated offenses 
because they are misdemeanors involving "abuse" of a "family or 
household member" as defined in G. L. c. 209A, § 1.  Soto does 
not dispute this contention. 
4 
 
Soto's challenge to the legality of the proceedings, conducted a 
dangerousness hearing, and ordered Soto held without bail 
pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A (4). 
2.  Marcel Diggs.  Diggs allegedly threatened to burn down 
a house belonging to the mother of his former girl friend, while 
the family was inside.  Following the threat, the former girl 
friend filed a report with the Watertown police department and 
sought a restraining order against Diggs.  A summons was issued 
based on these events, and on the following day, a criminal 
complaint issued charging Diggs with threatening to commit a 
crime, G. L. c. 275, § 2.4  Shortly thereafter, following a 
review of Diggs's criminal history, a Watertown police officer 
obtained an arrest warrant for Diggs.  Diggs, however, had no 
fixed address at that point, and police were unable to locate 
him to execute the arrest warrant. 
Several months later, Diggs was held on a probation 
detainer in Plymouth County for violating the terms of his 
probation in an unrelated matter.  When authorities from the 
Plymouth County house of correction transported Diggs to the 
District Court to appear for arraignment on those charges, the 
Commonwealth moved for pretrial detention based on 
dangerousness.  Diggs argued that he was not subject to pretrial 
                                                 
4 Diggs does not dispute the Commonwealth's assertion that a 
violation of G. L. c. 275, § 2, is an enumerated offense under 
the dangerousness statute. 
5 
 
detention because, although he was in the custody of Plymouth 
County on charges of a probation violation, he had not been 
arrested by the Watertown police in connection with the 
complaint charging him with threatening to commit a crime, and 
thus was not "held under arrest" for an enumerated offense at 
the time of his arraignment.  The judge rejected Diggs's 
challenge to the legality of the proceedings, conducted a 
dangerousness hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A, and 
ordered Diggs held in pretrial detention without bail. 
Discussion.  Whether the defendants were "held under 
arrest," such that the Commonwealth lawfully could seek 
dangerousness hearings under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, at the time of 
their arraignments, is a question of statutory interpretation.  
We review questions of law, such as statutory interpretation, de 
novo.  Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Boston, 435 Mass. 718, 
719 (2002).  "Our task is to interpret the statute 'according to 
the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words 
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated.'"  O'Brien v. Director of the Div. of Employment 
Sec., 393 Mass. 482, 487-488 (1984), quoting Industrial Fin. 
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360, 364 (1975).  To the 
6 
 
extent that the Legislature's intent is clear, "the statute, if 
reasonably possible, must be construed to carry out that 
intent."  Automobile Insurers Bur. of Mass. v. Commissioner of 
Ins., 425 Mass. 262, 267 (1997), quoting Industrial Fin. Corp. 
v. State Tax Comm'n, supra.  Because we assume generally that 
the Legislature intends to act reasonably, "[w]e will not adopt 
a literal construction of a statute if the consequences of such 
a construction are absurd or unreasonable."  Champigny v. 
Commonwealth, 422 Mass. 249, 251 (1996), quoting Attorney Gen. 
v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326, 336 (1982). 
General Laws c. 276, § 58A (4), provides in relevant part: 
"When a person is held under arrest for an offense 
listed in subsection (1) and upon a motion by the 
[C]ommonwealth, the judge shall hold a hearing to determine 
whether conditions of releases will reasonably assure the 
safety of any other person or the community." 
 
The statute does not define the meaning of "held under arrest" 
for purposes of this subsection.  Relying on dictionary 
definitions of the word "arrest," the defendants argue that a 
defendant is held under arrest when he or she is arrested and 
held in physical custody by a legal authority.  The defendants 
also point to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in United States v. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 
1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011), in which the court interpreted the 
word "arrest," as used in the United States sentencing 
guidelines, to mean the process by which the police inform a 
7 
 
suspect that she or he is under arrest, transport the suspect to 
the police station, and book the suspect into jail.  The 
defendants argue that they were not subject to pretrial 
detention hearings because neither of them was arrested and in 
the custody of the arresting authorities at the time of 
arraignment. 
The Commonwealth contends that such a construction of the 
statute would contravene the intent of the Legislature.  It 
proffers the following hypothetical.  Three suspects, all with 
identical criminal records demonstrating a history of violent 
offenses, jointly commit an armed robbery.  One suspect is 
arrested immediately and brought before the court for 
arraignment.  The second suspect is arrested after the District 
Court has closed for the day, and subsequently released on bail 
with instructions to report to court the next day.  The third 
suspect evades arrest, and an arrest warrant issues.  That 
suspect is later arrested in another jurisdiction for an 
unrelated offense, and eventually is brought before the court to 
remove the warrant for the armed robbery.  Under the defendants' 
proposed construction of the phrase "held under arrest," only 
the first suspect would be subject to a dangerousness hearing, 
even though all three suspects have the same criminal histories 
and are charged with the commission of the same enumerated 
offense.  The Commonwealth maintains that the Legislature could 
8 
 
not have intended this outcome. 
We agree that construing the phrase "held under arrest" in 
a strictly literal sense would thwart the dangerousness 
statute's intended purpose to protect the public from dangerous 
individuals who are awaiting trial for a specified set of 
offenses that include, as here, offenses involving the abuse of 
family members.  See Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 709 
(2009), quoting Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 780 
(1996) ("The pretrial detention regime in [G. L. c. 276], 
§ 58A[,] 'is explicitly predictive and seek[s] systematically to 
identify those who may present a danger to society and to 
incapacitate them before that danger may be realized'"); G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A (1) (listing enumerated offenses). 
The Legislature enacted G. L. c. 276, § 58A, in the wake of 
this court's decision in Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 
682 (1993), which struck down the prior regime of pretrial 
detention in part because it did not afford sufficient 
procedural protections to individuals before they were subject 
to pretrial detention.5  See 1994 House Doc. No. 4305.  The 
                                                 
5 In Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 682 (1993), we 
struck down G. L. c. 276, § 58, as amended through St. 1992, 
c. 201, § 3, the predecessor to G. L. c. 276, § 58A, because we 
concluded that the statute as written violated the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  The predecessor statute applied to all persons 
arrested or subject to arrest, regardless of the seriousness of 
the offense charged; it did not require the Commonwealth to 
9 
 
Governor proposed the new form of the dangerousness statute, 
originally entitled, "An Act to reduce crime committed by 
defendants awaiting trial," to the Legislature.6  In his letter 
to the House of Representatives and the Senate accompanying the 
proposed bill, the Governor explained that the bill would cure 
the procedural defects of the prior statute, and commented, 
"Government has no more important obligation than 
protecting the safety of its citizens, and yet dangerous 
arrestees who clearly pose an ongoing danger to our 
community too often are released out on bail or personal 
recognizance.  Innocent lives, particularly the lives of 
women victimized by domestic violence continue to be put at 
risk.  This legislation is critical to our ability to 
reduce, if not eliminate, that risk." 
 
Id.  The Legislature approved House Bill No. 4305 on July 14, 
1994.7  See St. 1994, c. 68. 
The phrase at issue here, "held under arrest," was included 
                                                                                                                                                             
prove dangerousness by any specific standard of proof; and it 
did not provide the individual with the right to be heard, to 
cross-examine witnesses, or to counsel.  In Mendonza v. 
Commonwealth, 423 Mass. at 780-788, we concluded that the 
amended version of the dangerousness statute, at issue here, 
provided adequate procedural protections by limiting its 
application to situations where there was probable cause to 
believe that an individual had committed certain enumerated 
offenses, requiring the Commonwealth to prove dangerousness by 
clear and convincing evidence, and affording a right to a 
hearing and the right to counsel. 
 
6 The title subsequently was changed to "An Act relative to 
the release on bail of certain persons."  See St. 1994, c. 68. 
 
7 Enactment of G. L. c. 276, § 58A, followed public debate 
on a widely publicized killing of a woman by her husband, who 
had been released on bail following an earlier attack against 
her.  See Killing of Malden Woman Ignites Fight on Bail Reform, 
Boston Globe, May 9, 1994. 
10 
 
in the Governor's proposed bill, and the Legislature adopted 
that provision virtually verbatim.  See 1994 House Doc. 
No. 4305; St. 1994, c. 68, § 6.  Based on this, we conclude that 
the Legislature enacted G. L. c. 276, § 58A, with the intent of 
protecting the public from the potential harm posed by persons 
who have been arrested or are subject to arrest, who have been 
found to be dangerous.  See Mendonza v. Commonwealth, supra at 
781 (fact that "a surprising percentage of crimes are committed 
by persons awaiting trial" provided support for Commonwealth's 
need to detain "persons who pose a particular danger to the 
public"). 
Given this explicitly articulated purpose to protect the 
public, it is unlikely that the Legislature intended to draw 
arbitrary distinctions between individuals who have been 
released on bail by a magistrate, those who are arrested and in 
physical custody, and those for whom an arrest warrant has 
issued, but has not been executed.  See Reade v. Secretary of 
the Commonwealth, 472 Mass. 573, 578 (2015), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 1729 (2016), quoting Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health 
& Retardation Ass'n, 421 Mass. 106, 113 (1995) ("[I]t is a well-
established cannon of statutory construction that a strictly 
literal reading of a statute should not be adopted if the result 
will be to thwart or hamper the accomplishment of the statute's 
obvious purpose, and if another construction which would avoid 
11 
 
this undesirable result is possible"). 
We are not persuaded by the defendants' assertion that the 
Legislature intended to draw such a distinction in order to 
encourage defendants who have been released on bail, or who have 
not yet been arrested, to appear in court, rather than to 
default.  Nothing in the language, structure, or history of the 
dangerousness statute suggests that the use of the phrase "held 
under arrest" indicates a legislative intent to provide an 
incentive to persons who have been arrested or are subject to 
arrest, but who are not in custody, to appear in court.  
Moreover, the Legislature has criminalized the failure to appear 
in court after release on bail, thereby providing an explicit 
disincentive for an individual to default.  See G. L. c. 276, 
§ 82A.  Adopting the defendants' proposed construction would 
thwart the legislative purpose to permit a judge to determine 
whether someone charged with a crime is sufficiently dangerous 
so as to warrant detention while awaiting trial, or whether 
additional safeguards are required in order to allow the 
individual to be admitted to bail while protecting the public.  
See Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 Mass. 355, 358 (2013), quoting 
Opinion of the Justices, 313 Mass. 779, 782 (1943) ("the 
construction of a word or phrase may vary from its plain meaning 
when such a meaning would 'involve a construction inconsistent 
with the manifest intent of the law-making body or repugnant to 
12 
 
the context of the same statute"). 
In sum, the phrase "held under arrest," within the meaning 
of G. L. c. 276, § 58A (4), refers to any person who has been 
arrested or for whom an arrest warrant has issued in connection 
with one of the enumerated offenses in G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1).  
Under this construction, both defendants were "held under 
arrest," and therefore properly were subject to a dangerousness 
hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A (4), where each hearing 
was held "immediately upon the person's first appearance before 
the court." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Orders for pretrial  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  detention affirmed.