Case Title: HORSE CREEK CONSERVATION DISTRICT, a Wyoming Irrigation District; and PHASE 23, LLC, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., the WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0200

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
HORSE CREEK CONSERVATION DISTRICT, a Wyoming Irrigation District; and PHASE 23, LLC, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., the WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL2009 WY 143221 P.3d 306Case Number: S-08-0200Decided: 11/23/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
HORSE 
CREEK CONSERVATION DISTRICT, a Wyoming Irrigation District; and PHASE 23, LLC, a 
Wyoming Limited Liability Company,

 
 
Appellants

(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel., the WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Goshen County

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Curtis 
B. Buchhammer, Buchhammer & Kehl, PC, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Ryan 
T. Schelhaas, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Brandi Lee Monger, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Schelhaas.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice.     

[¶1]      The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the State of Wyoming ruling that, 
pursuant to an agreement between Horse Creek Conservation District (HCCD) and 
the State, the public has a perpetual right of recreational use access to HCCD 
property adjacent to the Hawk Springs Reservoir.  On appeal, appellants claim that the 
district court committed a host of legal errors in arriving at its 
decision.  We will affirm the 
district court's decision, though on a slightly different basis.  We conclude that Wyoming statutes 
expressly required HCCD to grant public access to its property adjacent to the 
reservoir as part of the legislation appropriating funds for rehabilitation of 
the dam and water conveyance systems.  
When the project agreement is interpreted in accordance with the 
statutes, it provides for public access to HCCD property.  Nevertheless, we remand for reformation 
of the agreement so that it will conform fully to the statutory language.  

            
 

ISSUES

            

[¶2]      HCCD and Phase 23 
present a multi-faceted issue challenging the district court's summary judgment 
ruling:

 
 

I.              
In 
granting summary judgment to appellee, did the trial court err 
by:

 
 

A.           
 Incorrectly interpreting and construing 
the project agreements entered into by the parties as creating a "perpetual, 
public recreational use access" to the Hawk Springs Reservoir and adjacent 
lands?

 
 

B.           
Incorrectly 
interpreting and construing W.S. §§ 41-2-216 through 41-2-218 as memorializing 
or creating a "perpetual, public recreational use access" to the Hawk Springs 
Reservoir and adjacent lands?

 
 

C.           
Incorrectly 
determining that Phase 23, LLC, was not a bona fide 
purchaser?

 
 

D.           
Incorrectly 
determining that petitions filed with the Eighth Judicial District Court 
requesting approval of the project agreements acknowledged a grant of public 
access and contained sufficient legal descriptions of the property subject to 
public access?

 
 

E.           
Incorrectly 
determining that Horse Creek Conservation District is barred by contract law, 
laches, estoppel and applicable statutes of limitations from challenging 
appellee's prior improvements at the Hawk Springs Recreation 
Area?

 
 

F.            
Failing 
to find that the statutory provisions of W.S. § 41-2-218(b)(ii)(G) purportedly 
creating a perpetual right of public access over Horse Creek Conservation 
District property are in violation of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities?

 
 
The 
State phrases the issues differently:

 
 

1.            
Did 
Horse Creek Conservation District, in exchange for more than $8,500,000 of 
taxpayers' money, grant perpetual public access to Hawk Springs Reservoir and 
all adjacent lands owned by it or the State of Wyoming for the purposes of 
hunting, fishing and general recreation?  

 
 

2.            
Does 
the right of perpetual public access run with HCCD's land adjacent to the Hawk 
Springs Reservoir?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Hawk Springs Reservoir was originally 
constructed in the early 1900's and is located on Sections 9, 10, 15, 16, 21, 
and 22 of Township 20 North, Range 61 West, 6th P.M. in Goshen County, Wyoming.  HCCD is an irrigation district organized 
under Wyoming law and owns much of the land covered by and surrounding the 
reservoir.  In 1911, the State Board 
of School Land Commissioners granted an easement to HCCD's predecessor to allow 
the reservoir to inundate part of Section 16.1  Later, HCCD received an additional grant 
from the State increasing the reservoir easement to encumber the entire east 
half of Section 16. 

 
 
[¶4]      In the late 1970s 
or early 1980s, Hawk Springs Reservoir was determined to be hydrologically 
inadequate.2  In 1983, the Wyoming Legislature passed 
legislation to provide funding to rehabilitate the dam and water conveyance 
systems.  Wyo. Stat. Ann.  §§ 41-2-216 through 41-2-218 (LexisNexis 
2007).3  Because the language of this act is 
critical to our decision, we will restate most of it verbatim in the discussion 
below.  For now, we note the 
statute's requirement that, before funds could be released to HCCD for 
the reservoir construction project, a 
project agreement had to be made with the Department of Economic Planning and 
Development (DEPAD), with a provision guaranteeing perpetual public 
access to the reservoir and adjacent lands.

 
 
[¶5]      The parties 
executed the first project agreement on November 7, 1983.  The agreement recitals referred to the 
enabling legislation and indicated that State funding was provided to accomplish 
a number of goals, including repairing the dam and water delivery systems and 
constructing "facilities for public benefit."  The agreement iterated the legal 
description of the reservoir and recited the funding apparatus, which included 
grants and loans from the State to HCCD.  
The agreement also provided that HCCD could not deny the public access to 
the reservoir and "adjacent public lands designated for recreational use." 

 
 
[¶6]      An additional 
appropriation of funds was needed to complete the project.  Consequently, the parties entered into a 
second project agreement on April 1, 1985.  
The second project agreement expressly superseded the first project 
agreement.  Given that the relevant 
provisions of the project agreements are virtually identical, however, we will 
not distinguish between the two except where specificity is required.  

 
 
[¶7]      HCCD petitioned 
the district court for approval prior to entry into each project agreement.  Pursuant to the petition process, the 
members of HCCD were given notice and the opportunity to object to the 
agreements.  No HCCD member objected 
to the project agreements, and the district court entered orders approving 
them.  HCCD and DEPAD also executed 
mortgages and promissory notes to secure the loans from the State. 

 
 
[¶8]      Using State funds 
totaling more than $8,500,000, HCCD made the repairs to the dam and water 
conveyance system.  In addition, the 
State constructed various improvements next to the reservoir, including camping 
facilities, restrooms, and a boat ramp.  
Most of the improvements were located on HCCD lands in Section 9.  The rest of the public facilities were 
located immediately to the south on State land in Section 16.      

 
 
[¶9]      On September 11, 
2006, HCCD entered into a contract for deed to sell forty acres in Section 9 to 
Phase 23, LLC.  The forty acres 
included many of the public improvements constructed by the State.  The only members of Phase 23 were Ronald 
and Dorothy Buchhammer.  The 
Buchhammers were members of HCCD when the project agreements were submitted to 
the district court for approval, and they offered no objections to the 
agreements.  In addition, at the 
time Phase 23 entered into the contract for deed, Mr. Buchhammer was employed by 
HCCD as its superintendent.  After 
the contract for deed was executed and notice was given to the State that the 
property had been sold, Mr. Buchhammer put up a gate and no trespassing signs, 
thereby terminating public access to the recreation area.  

 
 
[¶10]   The State filed this action seeking 
a judgment declaring that the public had the right to perpetual access to HCCD 
lands adjacent to the reservoir.  It 
also filed a motion for injunctive relief to require HCCD and Phase 23 to 
restore public access to the area.  
HCCD and Phase 23 responded and counterclaimed for declaratory relief and 
monetary damages for the State's use of HCCD property.  The district court granted the State's 
motion for injunctive relief, and dismissed all of HCCD's claims except for the 
declaratory judgment claim, concluding that the dismissed claims were barred by 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-101 et seq. and Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7.4  

 
 
[¶11]   The State then filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  After considering 
the parties' voluminous filings, the district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the State.  It ruled that 
the project agreement granted the State perpetual public recreational use access 
to Hawk Springs Reservoir and HCCD's land adjacent to the reservoir.  The district court stated that HCCD's 
attempts to challenge the State's improvements on HCCD lands were barred by 
contract law, laches, estoppel and the applicable statutes of limitations.  The district court also ruled that Phase 
23 was not a bona fide purchaser and could not, therefore, challenge the State's 
public access interest.  HCCD and 
Phase 23 filed a timely notice of appeal.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶12]   Our standard for reviewing summary 
judgment orders is well known:

 
 

Summary 
judgment is appropriate when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c); Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming 
Beverages, Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo.2002). "A genuine 
issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would 
establish or refute an essential element of a cause of action or a defense that 
the parties have asserted." Id. Because summary judgment involves a 
purely legal determination, we undertake de novo review of a trial 
court's summary judgment decision. Glenn v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2008 
WY 16, ¶ 6, 176 P.3d 640, 642 (Wyo.2008).

 
 

Jacobs 
Ranch Coal Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., LLC, 
2008 WY 101, ¶ 8, 191 P.3d 125, 128-29 (Wyo.2008). We view the facts from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and give that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record. Brumbaugh v. Mikelson Land Co., 2008 WY 66, ¶ 11, 185 P.3d 695, 
701 (Wyo.2008).

 
 

Riverview 
Heights Homeowners' Association v. Rislov, 2009 
WY 55, ¶ 7, 205 P.3d 1035, 1038 (Wyo. 2009).  We are not bound by the district court's 
legal reasoning and "may affirm the summary judgment on any legal grounds 
appearing in the record."  Voss v. Goodman, 2009 WY 40, ¶ 9, 203 P.3d 415, 419 (Wyo. 2009), quoting Wyoming Cmty. College Comm'n v. Casper 
Cmty. College Dist., 2001 WY 86, ¶ 11, 31 P.3d 1242, 1247 (Wyo. 2001).  

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 

1.            
Statutory 
Provisions Pertaining to Public Access

 
 
[¶13]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-2-216 through 
-218 provided State funding for the reconstruction of Hawk Springs 
Reservoir.  It included a provision 
expressly pertaining to public access to the reservoir and adjacent lands for 
recreational purposes.  We must 
interpret the statute to determine whether public access to HCCD land adjacent 
to the reservoir is required.  

 
 
[¶14]   Our statutory interpretation rules 
are well-known.  Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law.  
Krenning v. Heart Mountain 
Irrigation Dist., 2009 WY 11, ¶ 9, 200 P.3d 774, 778 (Wyo. 2009).  Our paramount consideration is the 
legislature's intent as reflected in the plain and ordinary meaning of the words 
used in the statute.  Initially, we 
determine whether the statute is clear or ambiguous.  

 
 
A 
statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons 
are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability. 
Conversely, a statute is 
ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. If we determine that 
a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the 
statute.

 
 

Id., 
quoting RK v. State ex rel. Natrona County Child 
Support Enforcement Dep't, 2008 WY 1, ¶ 10, 174 P.3d 166, 169 (Wyo. 
2008).  In interpreting a statute, 
we will not ignore other statutory provisions pertaining to the same subject but 
will, instead, consider all such provisions in pari materia.  Qwest Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of 
Wyoming, 2007 WY 97, ¶ 22, 161 P.3d 495, 501 (Wyo. 2007).  

            

[¶15]   The language and context of the 
relevant statutes are critical to our decision.  Consequently, despite its length, we 
quote the majority of the act here.  
Section 41-2-216 stated: 

 
 
(a) As used in this act:

 
 

(i) 
"Commission" means the Wyoming water development 
commission;

 
 

(ii) 
"Department" means the department of economic planning and development [economic 
development and stabilization board];

 
 

(iii) 
"District" means the Horse Creek conservation district;

 
 

(iv) 
"Project" means the Hawk Springs project under W.S. 41-2-217;

 
 

(v) 
"This act" means W.S. 41-2-216 through 41-2-218.

 
 
Section 
41-2-217 stated:

 
 
(a) The Hawk Springs project consists of the 
following components:

 
 
(i) 
Necessary repairs to Dam No. 1 on Hawk Springs Reservoir, Goshen 
County;

 
 
(ii) 
Renovation of the existing delivery system of the 
district;

 
 
(iii) 
A public recreation area;

 
 
(iv) 
A geological and hydrological review of the project by the 
department;

 
 
(v) 
Replacement of the existing Horse Creek siphon;

 
 

(vi) 
Lining of the existing canal and, where economically feasible, replacing the 
canal with buried pipe;

 
 

(vii) 
Installation of necessary public facilities.

 
 
Section 
41-2-218 stated:

 
 
(a) Subject to the conditions in subsection (b) of 
this section, the construction of the project shall be financed as 
follows:

 
 
(i)      A grant to the 
district through the department not to exceed four million five hundred fifteen 
thousand dollars ($4,515,000.00), of which two million three hundred thirty 
thousand dollars ($2,330,000.00) shall be expended only for dam repair and 
outlet works and two million one hundred eighty-five thousand dollars 
($2,185,000.00) for canal repairs.  
The department shall release grant funds as it deems 
necessary;

 
 
(ii)     A loan to the district 
through the department as authorized in W.S. 9-2-206 [repealed] in an amount not to exceed one 
million nine hundred seventy-five thousand dollars ($1,975,000.00) to construct 
the project for a term of fifty (50) years to commence as provided in 
subparagraph (D) of this paragraph at an annual interest rate of four percent 
(4%)[.]

 
 
* 
* *

 
 
(iii)    Authorization to the game and 
fish commission to expend not more than one hundred seventy thousand dollars 
($170,000.00) for necessary public facilities for the public recreation area in 
consultation with the department and the recreation commission [parks and 
cultural resources commission];

 
 
(iv)    Authorization to the 
department to expend not more than sixty thousand dollars ($60,000.00) for a geological and 
hydrological review of the project under W.S. 41-2-217(a)(iv).

 
 

(b) The department shall not release any funds to 
the district authorized under paragraphs (a)(i) and (ii) of this section 
until:

 
 

(i)      An independent 
geological and hydrological review under W.S. 41-2-217(a)(iv) has been 
completed;

 
 

(ii)     The department and the 
district have entered into a project agreement providing the district shall 
undertake construction of all project components concurrently containing the 
following provisions and terms:

 
 

(A)    The department shall review 
and approve all design and construction plans prior to 
construction;

 
 

(B)    The district shall supervise 
design and construction and submit all requests for payment to the 
department;

 
 

(C)    The department shall directly 
make necessary payments in response to requests for 
payment;

 
 

(D)    The district shall provide 
security to the department as deemed sufficient by the attorney general to 
include a mortgage on the dam and canals and an assignment of water 
rights;

 
 

(E)    The district shall grant to 
the department for the state, ownership of the storage in Hawk Springs Reservoir 
from elevation 4,446.9 feet to elevation 4,461.9 feet according to the 1982 
United States soil conservation service survey, approximately one thousand seven 
hundred seventy-nine (1,779) acre-feet of water;

 
 

(F)    The district shall operate 
the reservoir to provide a pool depth of twenty (20) feet by January 1 in those 
years when sufficient water is available;

 
 

(G)    The district shall grant 
public access in perpetuity to the Hawk Springs Reservoir proper and to all 
adjacent lands owned by the district or the state for the purposes of hunting, 
fishing and general recreation including the construction of such facilities as 
deemed necessary by the game and fish commission to maximize the public 
enjoyment;

 
 

(H)    The district shall pay all 
the costs including manpower for all operation, maintenance and repairs to the 
dam and water delivery system after the project is 
completed;

 
 

(J)     The department shall 
determine an amount to be assessed annually by the district against district 
members and the district shall place the funds so collected into a separate 
account as a sinking fund adequate to meet future maintenance costs for the 
project;

 
 

(K)    The department may contract 
with the district for maintenance of public facilities constructed under this 
project.

 
 
(There 
is no subparagraph (b)(ii)(I) in this section as it appeared in the printed 
acts.)

 
 

[¶16]   Section 41-2-218(b)(ii)(G) pertains 
to public access.  HCCD and Phase 23 
argue that the public access provision is ambiguous.  They claim that, by describing the areas 
where HCCD was required to allow public access with the disjunctive "or" (i.e., 
public access to lands owned "by the district or the state") the legislature 
gave HCCD and DEPAD the power to negotiate perpetual public access to either 
district or State lands adjacent to the reservoir, but not necessarily to 
both.  The appellants claim that, in 
making that election while drafting the project agreement, DEPAD and HCCD 
decided that the public would have access to the State land in Section 16 
adjacent to the reservoir but not to HCCD's land adjacent to the reservoir.5  

 
 
[¶17]   On its face, the clear language of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-2-218(b)(ii)(G) requires HCCD to grant public access to all 
adjacent lands, whether owned by the district or the State.  The term "or" follows the phrase "all 
adjacent lands."  Consequently, it 
seems that the "or" was used to distinguish between the two different types of 
lands the public would be entitled to access, not to give DEPAD and HCCD the 
authority to choose one or the other.

 
 

[¶18]   The appellants correctly point out 
that this interpretation runs counter to one of the traditional statutory 
interpretation rules.  That rule 
provides that the term "or" is typically used in the disjunctive sense and 
provides a choice between alternatives.  
See, e.g., Olsten Staffing Services, Inc. v. D.A. 
Stinger Services, Inc., 921 P.2d 596, 600 (Wyo. 1996).  See also 
Amoco 
Production Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Carbon County, 876 P.2d 989, 993 (Wyo. 1994) (interpreting "or" as disjunctive in the context of a 
statute requiring refund of "erroneous or illegal" tax payments).  There is also authority, however, 
stating that "or" 
may be interpreted differently if necessary to harmonize the statutory 
provisions and give effect to the clear legislative intent.  

 
 
[¶19]   In Beitel v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div., 991 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (Wyo. 1999), we interpreted a statute stating that 
an employee's late filing of an injury report in a worker's compensation case 
raised a presumption that his claim should be denied.  The statute provided that the 
presumption could be rebutted "if the employee establishe[d] by clear and 
convincing evidence a lack of prejudice to the employer or division in investigating the 
accident and in monitoring medical treatment."  Id. at 1245, quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(c) 
(Michie 1991) (emphasis added).  
This Court held that when both the division and the employer objected to 
the employee's claim for benefits, the "or" must be interpreted as a 
conjunction, obligating the employee to prove that both the division and the 
employer were not prejudiced in order to overcome the presumption.  That interpretation gave effect to the 
clear legislative intent that a worker should not receive benefits if his 
dilatory notice of injury prejudiced the ability of any eligible objector to 
investigate the accident or monitor medical treatment.  Id. at 1247.  

 
 
[¶20]   State Department of Family Services v. 
PAJ, 934 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Wyo. 1997) is another case interpreting the word 
"or" differently from its typical disjunctive meaning.  The statute at issue in that case stated 
that "[t]he consent of the mother shall include an affidavit stating that she 
was not married at the time of conception or at the time of birth of the 
child."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-102(c) (Cum. Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).  The State claimed that the mother's 
consent satisfied the statute if she averred to just one of the 
alternatives:  she was unmarried at 
the time of conception, or she was unmarried at the time of birth.  We ruled that, even though the term "or" 
was used in the statute, the legislature clearly intended a consent to be valid 
only if the mother could aver that she was not married at both the time of 
conception and the time of the child's birth.  PAJ, 934 P.2d  at 1262.      

 
 
[¶21]   Considering the entire act 
pertaining to the Hawk Springs Reservoir in pari materia, it is obvious that the 
legislature appropriated a large sum of money and, in order to get full public 
benefit in exchange for the funding, required public access for recreational 
purposes.  Wyo.  Stat. Ann. § 41-2-217 provides for a 
"public recreation area" and the "[i]nstallation of necessary public 
facilities."  Section 
41-2-218(a)(iii) appropriated $170,000 to the Wyoming Game and Fish for 
construction of public facilities.  
By focusing on the public recreation potential for Hawk Springs Reservoir 
and expressly identifying "hunting, fishing and general recreation" as the 
purposes of the public access, the legislature clearly intended for HCCD to 
grant broad, as opposed to narrow or limited, public access to the area.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
41-2-218(b)(ii)(G).  Interpreting 
the statutes as requiring access either only to State land or only to district 
land would result in an inappropriately narrow interpretation of the public 
access provision.  Accordingly, as 
in Beitel and PAJ, reading the "or" in its typical 
disjunctive sense would not fulfill the obvious legislative intent of broad 
public access expressed throughout the act.

 
 
[¶22]   Further, as the State argues, there 
is a grammatical reason for using "or" rather than "and" in the phrase.  If the legislature had used the 
conjunctive "and" in place of the "or," the public arguably would have had 
access only to lands jointly owned by HCCD "and" the State.  That interpretation would render the 
statute nonsensical, because no such jointly owned lands exist.  

 
 
[¶23]   In order to accomplish its purpose 
of providing for greater public recreational opportunities, the legislature 
clearly meant to require HCCD, as a condition of receiving funding for the Hawk 
Springs Reservoir rehabilitation project, to grant public access to all lands 
adjacent to the reservoir, whether held by the State or owned by the 
district.  We therefore conclude 
that the clear and unambiguous language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-2-218(b)(ii)(G), 
when read in pari materia with the 
rest of the act, required HCCD to grant public access to all of its lands 
adjacent to the reservoir.  

 
 

2.            
Contractual 
Provisions Pertaining to Public Access

 
 
[¶24]   The legislature prohibited the 
release of any funds to HCCD for the reservoir project until it entered into a 
project agreement with DEPAD, incorporating certain specific provisions.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-2-218(b)(ii).  One of the provisions the parties were 
required to incorporate into the project agreement was the right of public 
access to HCCD land, discussed above.  
The project agreement included the following paragraph pertaining to 
public access:

 
 
12.       It is 
further agreed that THE DISTRICT will not deny right of access to the general 
public, for recreational purposes, to Hawk Springs Reservoir and adjacent public 
lands designated for recreational use, after completion and acceptance of the 
reservoir and appurtenant works.  

 
 
[¶25]   Our oft-stated procedure for 
interpreting contracts was reiterated in Fox v. Wheeler Electric, Inc., 2007 WY 
171, ¶ 10, 169 P.3d 875, 878 (Wyo. 2007):

 
 
The 
primary focus is on determining the intent of the parties to the contract. The 
initial question is whether the language of the contract is clear and 
unambiguous. If it is, then the trial court determines the parties' intent from 
the contract language alone. It does not consider extrinsic evidence, although 
it may consider the context in which the contract was written, including the 
subject matter, the purpose of the contract, and the circumstances surrounding 
its making, all to help ascertain what the parties intended when they made the 
contract. The trial court then enforces the contract in accordance with the 
plain meaning its language would be given by a reasonable person. All of these 
issues-deciding whether a contract is unambiguous, determining the parties' 
intent from the unambiguous language, and enforcing the contract in accordance 
with its plain meaning-involve questions of law for the trial court. When we 
undertake de novo review of the trial court's conclusions of law, we 
follow the same familiar path. See Double Eagle Petroleum & Mining Corp. 
v. Questar Exploration & Production Co., 2003 WY 139, ¶¶ 7-8, 78 P.3d 679, 681-82 (Wyo. 2003), and cases cited therein.

    

See 
also 
Ecosystem Resources, L.C. v. Broadbent 
Land & Resources, L.L.C., 2007 WY 87, ¶¶ 9-11, 158 P.3d 685, 688 (Wyo. 
2007). 

 
 
[¶26]   The appellants argue that Paragraph 
12 of the project agreement does not allow public access to HCCD lands adjacent 
to the reservoir because those lands are not "public lands."  The State recognizes the problem created 
by the use of the term "public lands" in the agreement, stating that it is 
"unfortunate" that the project agreement language failed to mirror the statutory 
language.  

 
 
[¶27]   Our case law is clear that, in 
interpreting contracts, we must take into account relevant statutes.  In Bjork v. Chrysler Corp., 702 P.2d 146 
(Wyo. 1985), we considered the effect of a release negotiated between one of 
several tortfeasors and the injured party. This Court ruled that the release 
language had to be interpreted in the context of Wyoming's Right to Contribution 
Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-1-110 through -113 
(1977).  Id. at 151.  See also Bentley v. Director of the Office of State 
Lands and Investments, 2007 WY 94, ¶¶ 18-22, 160 P.3d 1109, 1115-16 (Wyo. 
2007) (interpreting installment contract for sale of State land in accordance 
with relevant statutes).

 
 
[¶28]   In Bjork, we considered the relevant 
statutes in interpreting the release even though there was no indication that 
the release specifically referred to the statute.  See also Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Lower & Co., 
770 P.2d 692, 696 (Wyo. 1989) ("statutory provisions become a part of the 
bargain contemplated by the parties in Wyoming as though the statute[s] actually 
were included in the terms").  Here, 
the project agreement expressly referred to the statutes providing funding for 
the rehabilitation of the Hawk Springs Reservoir, making the rationale for 
interpreting this agreement in the context of the statutes even stronger.  The project agreement recitals 
specifically recognized that the statutory enactment was the impetus for the 
rehabilitation project and the execution of the agreement.  Employing phraseology from our typical 
rules of contract interpretation, the statutes pertaining to the Hawk Springs 
Reservoir rehabilitation form part, if not most, of the circumstances 
surrounding the agreement's creation.  

 
 
[¶29]   We must, therefore, interpret the 
project agreement in light of the statutes.  The project agreement provided that HCCD 
would "not deny right of access to the general public, for recreational 
purposes, to Hawk Springs Reservoir and adjacent public lands designated for 
recreational use."  The agreement 
does not define "public lands designated for recreational use" and HCCD 
maintains that its lands, including the disputed Section 9, are not public 
lands.  As we stated above, however, 
Section 41-2-218(b)(ii)(G) required HCCD, as a condition of receiving funding 
for the project, to provide public access to all of its lands adjacent to the 
reservoir.  The statute had the 
practical effect of making HCCD lands adjacent to the reservoir "public lands," 
at least for recreation purposes.  
Thus, the clear language of the agreement, when interpreted in accordance 
with the relevant statutes, provided that HCCD was required to grant public 
access to its lands adjacent to the reservoir.    

 
 
[¶30]   Our interpretation of the plain 
language of the project agreement is buttressed by the fact that DEPAD did not 
have the legal authority to enter into a contract that did not incorporate the 
statutorily required provisions.  
State agencies can exercise only those powers authorized by statute.  Natrona County School Dist. No. 1 v. Ryan, 
764 P.2d 1019, 1035 (Wyo. 1988).  
See also K N Energy, Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d 207, 210-11 (Wyo. 1988).  A 
corollary of the rule is that, when a statute provides a particular manner in 
which a power may be executed, the agency may not exercise its power in a 
different way.  Town of Worland v. Odell & Johnson, 
79 Wyo. 1, 16-17, 329 P.2d 797, 802-03 (1958).  Any action taken by an agency without 
authority is ultra vires and 
void.  Id. at 803.  Accordingly, when interpreting contracts 
involving State agencies, we must, if possible, interpret them in a manner to 
comply with the law.  Tri-County Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. City of 
Gillette, 584 P.2d 995, 1005-06 (Wyo. 1978).

 
 
[¶31]   If we were to interpret the project 
agreement as advocated by appellants, the agreement would violate the statutes 
which expressly required HCCD to grant public access to its lands adjacent to 
the reservoir.  Interpreting the 
project agreement to comply with DEPAD's statutory authority, it is clear that 
Section 41-2-218 required DEPAD and HCCD to enter into a contract guaranteeing 
public access to district lands.  
The contractual language "public lands designated for recreational use" 
must, therefore, be interpreted to include the adjacent HCCD property.  

 
 
[¶32]   With that said, however, we 
recognize the potential for future problems resulting from the project 
agreement's failure to mirror the statutory language.  This case, therefore, presents a classic 
scenario where we should use our equitable power of reformation to correct the 
project agreement's failure to express fully the obvious intent of the 
legislature and the parties.  Reformation emanates from the maxim 
that "equity treats that as done which ought to have been done."  Hutchins v. Payless Auto Sales, 
Inc., 2002 WY 8, ¶ 19, 38 P.3d 1057, 1063 (Wyo. 2002).  The remedy is appropriate when a written 
instrument does not accurately memorialize the agreement of the parties.  Id.  

 
 
[A] 
court acting in equity may reform a written instrument upon clear and convincing 
evidence of the following elements: (1) a meeting of the minds-a mutual 
understanding between the parties-prior to the time a writing is entered into, 
(2) a written contract, or agreement, or deed (3) which does not conform to the 
understanding, by reason of mutual mistake. 

 
 

Id.  See also W.N. McMurry Construction Co. v. 
Community First Insurance, Inc. Wyoming, 2007 WY 96, ¶ 18, 160 P.3d 71, 77 
(Wyo. 2007). 

 
 
[¶33]   Sections 41-2-216 through -218 
clearly establish that the parties had a mutual understanding prior to execution 
of the project agreement.  The 
release of State funds to HCCD and the completion of the rehabilitation of the 
reservoir and associated systems in accordance with the statutes provide 
additional support that the statutes reflected the parties' mutual 
understanding.  The project 
agreement was in writing and, although it is properly interpreted to be 
consistent with the statute, the contractual language does not fully conform to 
the parties' mutual understanding, as reflected in the statutes.  Thus, we remand to the district court 
for reformation of the project agreement language to conform more closely to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-2-218(b)(ii)(G) (now renumbered as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
99-99-218(b)(ii)(G)).  

 
 

3.            
Legal 
Description

 
 
[¶34]   Next, we consider HCCD's argument 
that the public access provision is void because the area encumbered is not 
delineated by a specific legal description.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-141 was originally 
adopted in 1981, and was in effect when the Hawk Springs Reservoir legislation 
was passed and the project agreement was executed.  It states in relevant 
part:

 
 
 (a)      Except as 
provided in subsection (c) of this section, easements across land executed and 
recorded after the effective date of this act which do not specifically describe 
the location of the easement are null and void and of no force and 
effect.

 
 
(b)       Except as 
provided in subsection (c) of this section, agreements entered into after the 
effective date of this act which grant the right to locate an easement at a 
later date and which do not specifically describe the location of the easement 
are null and void.

 
 
(c)        For 
purposes of this act [section] an easement or agreement which does not 
specifically describe the location of the easement or which grants a right to 
locate an easement at a later date shall be valid for a period of one (1) year 
from the date of execution of the easement or agreement. If the specific 
description is not recorded within one (1) year then the easement or agreement 
shall be of no further force and effect.

 
 
(d)       For 
purposes of this act [section] the specific description required in an easement 
shall be sufficient to locate the easement and is not limited to a 
survey.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34-1-141 (LexisNexis 2005).

 
 
[¶35]   Section 41-2-218(b)(ii)(G) provided 
for public access to the reservoir proper and "all adjacent lands owned by the 
district."  The project agreement 
contained a legal description of the reservoir location6 but it did not include a 
specific legal description of the adjacent lands subject to public 
access.

 
 
[¶36]   Section 34-1-141(d) states that a 
legal description from a survey is not required so long as the description is 
sufficient to locate the easement.  
The question for our determination, then, is whether the description of 
the lands "adjacent" to the reservoir is sufficient to locate property 
encumbered by the public access interest.  
As statutory and contract interpretation principles make clear, the plain 
and ordinary meaning of the words governs.  
"Adjacent" is defined as "nearby" or "having a common endpoint or 
border."  Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary 56 (1991).  See also Board of County Commissioners of the County 
of Laramie v. City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 16, ¶¶ 20-31, 85 P.3d 999, 1005-09 
(Wyo. 2004) (interpreting the terms "adjacent" and "contiguous" in annexation 
statutes).  We conclude that the 
plain meaning of the term "adjacent" is sufficiently definite to allow the 
encumbered property to be located.

 
 
[¶37]   Markstein v. Countryside I, L.L.C., 2003 
WY 122, ¶¶ 44-45, 77 P.3d 389, 402 (Wyo. 2003) presented a problem similar to 
the one here.  In Markstein, the owners of the servient 
estate argued that an agreement for a fishing rights easement was void because 
it did not contain a specific legal description of the area encompassed by the 
easement in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-141.  We ruled that the agreement was not void 
because it provided "that the rights involved are to be used within a particular 
region of the servient estate" and there was "a specific legal description of 
this land attached as an exhibit to the agreement."  The agreement also incorporated sketch 
maps to denote the area of land involved.  
Id., ¶ 45, 77 P.3d  at 
402.  

 
 
[¶38]   Markstein indicates that the type of 
description necessary to satisfy the statute will depend on the nature of the 
encumbrance.  Obviously, a fishing 
easement is different from a road easement because more varied lands will be 
used to fulfill the dominant owner's right.  In the context of a fishing easement, a 
more general description of the areas encumbered will be sufficient.  Considering that the project agreement 
included a legal description of the reservoir, and that the nature of the 
public's recreation interest is such that it will be used over a broad area 
adjacent to the reservoir, the rationale employed in Markstein reinforces our conclusion that 
the description of all lands "adjacent" to the reservoir is sufficient to locate 
the encumbrance.  

 
 
[¶39]   An additional reason exists to 
reject the appellants' position.  It 
is a basic tenet of statutory construction that a specific statute will control 
over a general statute covering the same subject.  See, e.g., Coffinberry v. Board of County Commissioners 
of the County of Hot Springs, 2008 WY 110, ¶ 7, 192 P.3d 978, 980 (Wyo. 
2008).  Here, the specific statute 
required public access to HCCD lands adjacent to the Hawk Springs Reservoir 
(Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-2-218), while a general statute required that a specific 
description be included in any agreement to grant an easement (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34-1-141).  If we were to rule that 
the public does not have a right to access because the parties did not 
specifically describe the lands burdened by the right in accordance with Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34-1-141, we would be undermining the legislature's clear intent 
that, by appropriating substantial funds for the rehabilitation of the Hawk 
Springs Reservoir, it required perpetual public access to all HCCD land adjacent 
to the reservoir.  That result is 
not supported by the language of the statute or the contract, or by our 
precedent.  We find no error in the 
district court's resolution of this issue. 

 
 

4.            
Rule 
Against Perpetuities

 
 
[¶40]   The appellants also argue that the 
right to public access is void because it violates the rule against 
perpetuities.  Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
30 states:  "Perpetuities and 
monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state, and shall not be 
allowed."  The rule against 
perpetuities was codified by the legislature at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-139, 
which provides in relevant part:   
           

 
 
(a) No interest in real or personal property shall 
be good unless it must vest not later than twenty-one (21) years after some life 
in being at the creation of the interest and any period of gestation involved in 
the situation to which the limitation applies.

 
 
The 
policy behind the rule against perpetuities is to encourage alienability of 
property.  See McGinnis v. McGinnis, 391 P.2d 927, 
932-33 (Wyo. 1964).  The rule 
forbids the protracted suspension of the right to alienate property by voiding 
interests that will not vest within the statutory term.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-139.     

 
 
[¶41]   The rule against perpetuities does 
not apply when the interest has already vested.  Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620, 633 
(Wyo. 1983).  See also Hartnett v. Jones, 629 P.2d 1357, 
1361-62 (Wyo. 1981).  Here, the 
public access interest vested upon adoption of the statutes and project 
agreement.  There are no 
contingencies or other provisions limiting the public's right in the 
future.  Moreover, the alienability 
of the property is not compromised by the public access provision.  The fact that Phase 23 and HCCD entered 
into a contract for deed for 40 acres of the property encumbered by the public 
access interest is proof of the alienability of the property.  We conclude, therefore, that the rule 
against perpetuities does not operate to void the public access provision.  

 
 

5.            
Bona 
Fide Purchaser

 
 
[¶42]   Phase 23 claims that it should not 
be bound by the public access interest because the interest is not a matter of 
public record and it was a bona fide purchaser.  It relies upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34-1-120 in support of its position:

 
 
Every 
conveyance of real estate within this state, hereafter made, which shall not be 
recorded as required by law, shall be void, as against any subsequent purchaser 
or purchasers in good faith and for a valuable consideration of the same real 
estate or any portion thereof, whose conveyance shall be first duly 
recorded.

   

[¶43]   We ruled in Bentley, ¶¶ 42-43, 160 P.3d  at 1120-21, 
that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-120 does not apply to executory contracts because 
they do not fall within the applicable definition of a "conveyance" in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34-1-102.7  Under its contract for deed, Phase 23 
simply has an equity interest in the property and will not receive a conveyance 
of the property from HCCD until the contract is fully performed.  Because the contract is executory, there 
has been no conveyance of the property and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-120 provides 
no remedy to Phase 23.   

 
 
[¶44]   The district court articulated an 
additional basis for rejecting Phase 23's claim under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34-1-120.  It concluded that Phase 
23 was not a "bona fide purchaser," or, in the language of the statute a 
purchaser "in good faith."  To 
prevail under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-120, Phase 23 was required to establish 
that it was a bona fide purchaser, defined as: "(1) a purchaser in good faith; 
(2) for a valuable consideration, not by gift; (3) with no actual, constructive 
or inquiry notice of any alleged or real infirmities in the title; and (4) who 
would be prejudiced by the cancellation or reformation."  Bentley, ¶ 40, 160 P.3d  at 1120, quoting 
Grose v. Sauvageau, 942 P.2d 398, 402 (Wyo. 1997).  

 
 
[¶45]   Phase 23 argues that, under our 
ruling in Grose, it was a bona fide 
purchaser.  The Groses received a 
quitclaim deed from the record property owner, but it contained numerous 
technical defects and was not recorded in the public record.  Grose, 942 P.2d  at 400.  After receiving the deed, the Groses 
constructed improvements on the property.  
Ms. Sauvageau, who owned the neighboring property, searched the property 
records which, of course, did not include the Groses' deed.  She then contacted the record owner and 
obtained a quitclaim deed.  After 
recording her deed, she demanded that the Groses vacate the property.  They refused on the basis of their 
quitclaim deed.  Ms. Sauvageau then 
filed an action to quiet title to the property and eject the Groses.  Id. at 400-01.  Ms. Sauvageau claimed that, under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-120, the Groses' quitclaim deed was void as against her 
because it was not recorded and she was a bona fide subsequent purchaser.  The Groses argued that their occupation 
of the property should have put Ms. Sauvageau on inquiry notice that they owned 
the property.  We ruled, under the 
circumstances presented there, that Ms. Sauvageau's investigation of the 
property ownership in the public record was sufficient and the Groses' quitclaim 
deed was void as to her.  Id. at 402-03. 

 
 
[¶46]   The situation presented here is 
readily distinguishable from Grose 
because the Buchhammers, who were the only members of Phase 23, had actual 
knowledge of the public's claim of access.  
They were members of HCCD when the project agreements were executed and 
did not object to HCCD's petitions for district court approval of the project 
agreements.  In addition, Mr. 
Buchhammer, as an employee of HCCD, was intimately involved in the dispute over 
public access prior to the limited liability company's entry into the contract 
for deed.  Under these 
circumstances, Phase 23 was not a bona fide purchaser under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34-1-120.  We note, however, that 
after the project agreement is reformed to conform to the statutory provision 
for public access, it would be prudent for the State to record an instrument as 
a way of avoiding future notice issues.

 
 
[¶47]   We need not consider the remainder 
of the appellants' issues because our rulings contained herein are 
dispositive.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶48]   The statutes providing for 
rehabilitation of the Hawk Springs Reservoir, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-2-216 
through -218, specifically required HCCD to grant public access to its lands 
adjacent to the reservoir.  When the 
project agreement is interpreted in the context of the statutes, as it must be, 
it unambiguously provides for public access.  However, because the contractual 
language does not mirror the statutory language, we remand for application of 
the equitable power of reformation to conform the contractual language to the 
statutes.  We further conclude that, 
as a matter of law, the rule against perpetuities does not apply to the public 
access interest because it is fully vested.

 
 
[¶49]   Phase 23 is also bound by the 
public access interest even though it was not recorded in the public 
record.  Phase 23 is not entitled to 
relief under the recording statute because it has not received a conveyance of 
property from HCCD and it had actual notice of the public's access interest, 
precluding it from being a bona fide purchaser.               
 

 
 
[¶50]   Affirmed and remanded for 
reformation of the project agreement consistent with this decision.       

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Upon admission to the United States, Sections 16 and 36 of each township 
were reserved to the State of Wyoming for the benefit of common schools.  Wyo. Const. Organic Act, 15 Stat. 178, 
ch. 235, § 14 (1868); Wyo. Act of Admission, 26 Stat. 222, ch. 664, § 4 
(1890).   

 
 

2Apparently, HCCD now questions the accuracy of the information that led 
to the determination that rehabilitation of the reservoir was necessary.  Given that the rehabilitation took 
place, the validity of that initial determination is irrelevant to our 
analysis.

  

3Effective July 1, 2009, these statutes were renumbered as Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 99-99-216 through 99-99-218.  
2009 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 168, § 401.

 
 

4The appellants do not contest the district court's dismissal order on 
appeal.  

 
 

5HCCD arguably needed to grant public access to State lands because it had 
a reservoir easement on the east one-half of the State land located in Section 
16.

 
 

6The legal description of the reservoir in the project agreement 
apparently included some property that was not covered by water.  We know this because the legal 
description of the reservoir location included the east half of Section 9, but 
the southeast quarter of Section 9, which was included in the contract for deed 
between HCCD and Phase 23, contains most of the State 
improvements.

 
 

7Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-102 states:

 
 
The 
term "conveyance", as used in this act, shall be construed to embrace every 
instrument in writing by which any estate or interest in real estate is created, 
alienated, mortgaged or assigned, or by which the title to any real estate may 
be affected in law or in equity, except wills, leases for a term not exceeding 
three (3) years, executory contracts for the sale or purchase of lands, and 
certificates which show that the purchaser has paid the consideration and is 
entitled to a deed for the lands, and contain a promise or agreement to furnish 
said deed at some future time.