Case Title: Dominion Resources, Inc. v. Alstom Power, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 181061

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Lemons, C.J., Mims, McClanahan, Powell, Kelsey, and McCullough, JJ., and 
Millette, S.J. 
 
DOMINION RESOURCES, INC., ET AL. 
 
 
OPINION BY  
v.  Record No. 181061 
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
April 11, 2019 
ALSTOM POWER, INC. 
 
UPON A QUESTION OF LAW CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
 
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut entered a certification 
order asking this Court to answer a determinative question of law in a proceeding pending before 
it.  Pursuant to our jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of Virginia and 
Rule 5:40, we accepted the following question: 
Does Virginia law apply the collateral source rule to a breach of 
contract action where the plaintiff has been reimbursed by an 
insurer for the full amount it seeks in damages from the defendant? 
 
I.  BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The certified question of law arises from a contract dispute between the plaintiffs, 
Dominion Resources Services, Inc., Dominion Resources, Inc., Dominion Energy, Inc., 
Dominion Generation Corp., and Dominion Technical Solutions, Inc. (collectively, “Dominion 
Resources”), and the defendant, Alstom Power, Inc. (“Alstom”).  The contract at issue (the 
“Alliance Agreement”) is governed by Virginia law and concerned services performed by 
Alstom at Dominion Resources’ power-generation facilities.  It contained mutual indemnities as 
well as requirements that Alstom obtain certain insurance policies.  Pursuant to those 
requirements, Alstom obtained an insurance policy with an aggregate limit of $5 million (the 
“Zurich policy”) and an excess policy with an $18 million limit (the “Allianz policy”), both 
naming Dominion Resources as an additional insured.  Both are “eroding” policies, in which the 
 
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costs of defending a lawsuit are considered part of the loss.  Additionally, Dominion Resources 
independently obtained an excess insurance policy from Associated Electric & Gas Insurance 
Services (“AEGIS”).  Alstom was not involved in securing the AEGIS policy, nor did it pay any 
portion of the AEGIS policy premium. 
 
A boiler accident at a Dominion Resources power-generation facility operated under the 
Alliance Agreement injured five workers, three fatally.  The workers and estates filed a lawsuit 
against Dominion Resources, Alstom, and others, which ultimately resulted in a settlement 
agreement.  Dominion Resources paid more than $5 million to settle the claims and incurred 
more than $9.9 million in defense expenses.  As a result of the litigation and settlement, 
Dominion Resources received a total of more than $5 million from the Zurich and Allianz 
policies.  It additionally received payment from the AEGIS policy for the remaining expenses it 
incurred in defending and settling the litigation.1  The parties agree that the combination of 
insurance payments from the Zurich, Allianz, and AEGIS policies have fully reimbursed 
Dominion Resources for the costs it incurred in defending and settling the litigation. 
 
Pursuant to language in the Alliance Agreement requiring each of Dominion Resources’ 
and Alstom’s “respective insurers to waive all rights of recovery against each other, whether in 
contract, tort (including negligence and strict liability) or otherwise,” AEGIS has not brought any 
claims against Alstom’s insurers for reimbursement of the amounts it paid to Dominion 
Resources.  Dominion Resources has the option to reimburse AEGIS if it recovers any damages 
from Alstom in the underlying action.  If Dominion Resources recovers and chooses to 
                                                 
1 Although the Allianz policy had a limit of $18 million, Dominion Resources accepted 
$2.52 million to settle its claims against Allianz under that policy.  The AEGIS policy was thus 
necessary to reimburse Dominion Resources for its remaining litigation expenses. 
 
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reimburse AEGIS, doing so would improve its loss history with AEGIS and reduce its premiums 
for future insurance policies. 
 
In the underlying case, Dominion Resources alleged that Alstom breached the Alliance 
Agreement in two ways:  (1) by failing to defend Dominion Resources in the boiler accident 
litigation, and (2) by obtaining eroding rather than noneroding insurance policies.  Dominion 
Resources sought as damages the sum it expended in defending and settling the boiler accident 
litigation not covered by the Zurich and Allianz Policies.  In other words, Dominion Resources 
sought to recover from Alstom the same amount it received from the AEGIS policy. 
 
Alstom moved to dismiss Dominion Resources’ action on several grounds, including that 
Dominion Resources has suffered no recoverable damages because AEGIS has already paid the 
full amount sought.  Alstom argued that Dominion Resources should be barred from obtaining a 
double recovery and that the collateral source rule does not apply in contract actions.  Dominion 
Resources agreed that AEGIS reimbursed it but contended that the collateral source rule applies 
in this case to prevent the district court from considering the AEGIS reimbursement. 
Recognizing that no controlling Virginia precedent has addressed whether the collateral 
source rule applies to breach-of-contract actions and that “whether the collateral source rule 
applies has the capacity to dispose of all of Dominion Resources’ claims in the case,” the district 
court issued a certification order requesting that this Court consider this dispositive question of 
law.2  We now consider the question. 
                                                 
2 The district court explained that “[i]f the collateral source rule does not apply to breach 
of contract actions such as this, Dominion Resources would be barred from obtaining the relief 
that it seeks, and summary judgment would be granted for Alstom on all of Dominion 
Resources’ claims.”  It acknowledged that resolution of the question in the affirmative would not 
resolve the dispute, nor would the issue be determinative of Alstom’s counterclaims.  Rule 
5:40(a) requires that the question be “determinative in any proceeding pending before the 
certifying court.”  The certified question in this case is determinative because if the collateral 
 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
The collateral source rule as previously applied in Virginia provides that “compensation 
or indemnity received by a tort victim from a source collateral to the tortfeasor may not be 
applied as a credit against the quantum of damages the tortfeasor owes.”  Schickling v. Aspinall, 
235 Va. 472, 474 (1988).  This Court first applied the rule in an 1877 wrongful death case, 
holding that evidence of a life insurance payment for the benefit of the decedent’s family could 
not be admitted into evidence.  Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Wightman, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 431, 
446 (1877), rev’d on other grounds sub nom Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Koontz, 104 U.S. 5 
(1881).  The Court observed that the “mere fact that the family of the deceased received money 
from some other source would not justly influence the measure of compensation” the defendant 
company owed for injuries attributable to it.  Id.  The fact of insurance was an inappropriate 
consideration in determining damages because “[t]he party effecting the insurance paid the full 
value for it, and there is no equity in the claim of the defendant to the benefit of a contract for 
which it gave no consideration.”  Id. 
Since then, and for similar reasons, Virginia has consistently recognized the collateral 
source rule in tort cases.  See Bullard v. Alfonso, 267 Va. 743, 749 (2004); Acuar v. Letourneau, 
260 Va. 180, 192 (2000); Schickling, 235 Va. at 475; Walthew v. Davis, 201 Va. 557, 563 
(1960); Johnson v. Kellam, 162 Va. 757, 764 (1934); see also Code § 8.01-35 (providing that 
provable damages for lost income in personal injury and death cases shall not be reduced 
because of reimbursement to the plaintiff or decedent from any collateral source, nor the fact of 
reimbursement admitted into evidence).  Although early cases limited the rule’s application to 
                                                 
source rule does not apply in the underlying breach-of-contract action, then the district court will 
enter summary judgment for Alstom and dismiss all of Dominion Resources’ claims.  See Small 
v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 286 Va. 119, 125 (2013). 
 
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insurance payments in tort claims, “[l]ater cases have applied the rule to social security benefits, 
public and private pension payments, unemployment and workers’ compensation benefits, 
vacation and sick leave allowances, and other payments made by employers to injured 
employees, both contractual and gratuitous.”  Bullard, 267 Va. at 748 (quoting Schickling, 235 
Va. at 474); see also 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 405 (2019); 4 Fowler V. Harper et al., Harper, 
James and Gray on Torts § 25.22, at 801–04 (3d ed. 2007).  This Court has nevertheless 
recognized limitations on the rule’s scope.  For instance, it does not apply to settlement proceeds 
from one of multiple joint tortfeasors because the settlement implicitly attributes part of the fault 
to that individual; as such, the settlement amount is deducted from the amount the remaining 
tortfeasors owe.  Acordia of Virginia Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Genito Glenn, L.P., 263 Va. 377, 387–
88 (2002) (citing Sweep v. Lear Jet Corp., 412 F.2d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 1969)); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A (1979). 
 
Until now, the question of whether the collateral source rule applies to breach-of-contract 
actions in Virginia has not been squarely before this Court.  In Schickling, this Court observed 
that it has never “had occasion to consider whether the collateral source rule applies to contract 
cases.”  235 Va. at 475.  It declined to do so in that case because the defendant, not the plaintiff, 
received the collateral compensation, which rendered the rule “inapposite.”  Id.  Later, in Acuar, 
this Court acknowledged that “neither the tort policy of this Commonwealth nor the collateral 
source rule was implicated” in a case involving only construction of an insurance contract, but 
applied the rule in the case then before it because it was “reviewing a tort claim, not a contractual 
one, by an injured party against a wrongdoer.”  260 Va. at 191.  Most recently, this Court stated 
that it has “never applied the rule outside the tort context” in a footnote explaining why 
consideration of the rule was unnecessary in that breach-of-contract case.  CPM Virginia, LLC v. 
 
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MJM Golf, LLC, 291 Va. 73, 80 n.1 (2015).  Specifically, the Court declined to address one 
party’s argument that the collateral source rule should remain limited to “its presently recognized 
boundaries” because it resolved the case on the narrower ground that no breach of contract 
warranties occurred.  Id.  Relying on these statements declining to reach the issue, Alstom 
contends that Virginia law does not recognize the collateral source rule in breach-of-contract 
actions.  This view reads too much into our prior cases.  A review of the justifications this Court 
has cited in applying the collateral source rule indicates it may apply in certain contract 
situations. 
 
A fundamental principle of damages is that a plaintiff may not receive a double recovery 
for a single injury.  See Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor Cars, Inc., 266 Va. 558, 561 (2003) 
(“[W]hen the claims, duties, and injuries are the same, duplicative recovery is barred.”); Joyner 
v. Graybeal, 204 Va. 543, 546 (1963) (rejecting potential double recovery as “inequitable”); 
Smith v. Hensley, 202 Va. 700, 705 (1961) (recognizing a rule against double recoveries).  This 
is because the essential purpose of both tort and contract damages is compensation.  “The 
cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for the injury 
caused to the plaintiff by the defendant’s breach of duty.”  Harper et al., supra, § 25.1, at 574.  
Accordingly, this Court has held that “[d]amages are awarded in tort actions to compensate the 
plaintiff for all losses suffered by reason of the defendant’s breach of some duty imposed by law 
to protect the broad interests of social policy.”  Kamlar Corp. v. Haley, 224 Va. 699, 706 (1983); 
see Acuar, 260 Va. at 192 (“[T]he purpose of compensatory damages . . . is to make a tort victim 
 
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whole.”).  Similarly, damages for breach of contract “are subject to the overriding principle of 
compensation.”3  Kamlar Corp., 224 Va. at 706. 
Damages in both tort and contract cases thus exist only to compensate a plaintiff for the 
injury suffered, not to leave that plaintiff better off because of the injury.  See Schickling, 235 
Va. at 474–75 (noting that it is a “principle[] of tort law” that “a plaintiff is entitled to 
compensation sufficient to make him whole, but no more”); Orebaugh v. Antonious, 190 Va. 
829, 834 (1950) (“A plaintiff is not allowed to recover for a breach of contract more than the 
actual loss sustained by him, nor is he allowed to be put in a better position than he would have 
been had the wrong not been done and the contract not been broken.”). 
 
The collateral source rule is a narrow exception to both the default rule against double 
recoveries and the principle that compensatory damages cannot leave a plaintiff better off than 
before the injury.  Whenever a plaintiff has a source of recovery collateral to the defendant, it 
will either (1) give the plaintiff a double recovery and leave him or her in a better financial 
position than before the injury, or (2) permit the defendant to escape full liability for all damages 
resulting from his wrong.  Schickling, 235 Va. at 474–75; see also Burks v. Webb, 199 Va. 296, 
304 (1957) (“[A] defendant, who by his negligence has injured another, owes to such other full 
compensation for the injuries inflicted by him, and the payment for those injuries from a 
collateral source, in no way relieves such defendant of his obligation.”).  Thus, in the tort 
context, this Court has often explained that the collateral source rule implements a public policy 
allocating the double recovery to the plaintiff: 
                                                 
3 Although punitive damages may be awarded in appropriate tort cases to punish and 
deter egregious wrongdoing, Kamlar Corp., 224 Va. at 706, they are awarded “in addition to full 
compensation, and [are] something not given as [the plaintiff’s] due, but for the protection of the 
public,” Norfolk & W. R.R. Co. v. Neely, 91 Va. 539, 540 (1895) (emphasis added). 
 
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A plaintiff who receives a double recovery for a single tort enjoys 
a windfall; a defendant who escapes, in whole or in part, liability 
for his wrong enjoys a windfall.  Because the law must sanction 
one windfall and deny the other, it favors the victim of the wrong 
rather than the wrongdoer. 
 
Acuar, 260 Va. at 193 (quoting Schickling, 235 Va. at 475). 
Unlike a tortfeasor, one who breaches a contract is liable for only those damages that 
would not have occurred but for the breach—a plaintiff’s post-breach mitigation, including 
favorable substitute transactions, will reduce the breaching party’s liability.  Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 347 cmt. e (1981).  For this reason, some commentators have suggested 
that “[t]he case for the application of the collateral source rule is less compelling in a case 
involving breach of contract than in the case of a tort.”  22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 407. 
Nevertheless, a similar rationale supports the rule’s application in at least some contract 
cases:  enforcing the parties’ expectation interests in the contracts they have entered.  See Filak v. 
George, 267 Va. 612, 618 (2004) (“[T]he major consideration underlying contract law is the 
protection of bargained for expectations.”).  We find the discussion of contract expectation 
interests with respect to the collateral source rule in John Munic Enterprises, Inc. v. Laos, 326 
P.3d 279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014), to be persuasive.  In that case, the Court of Appeals of Arizona 
considered whether a settlement between John Munic Enterprises and its attorney could serve as 
a credit to a judgment entered against the Laos family.  Id. at 281–82.  The court determined that 
the damages at issue sounded in contract.  Id. at 283.  It then went on to address whether the 
collateral source rule applied to justify upholding the trial court’s ruling.  Id.  As in the case at 
bar, one party contended that the rule is strictly a tort doctrine, while the other argued it is more 
generally applicable based on its justifications.  Id. at 284.  The court agreed with the latter party, 
 
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noting that “[a]pplying the collateral source rule has been held to advance” the goal of 
“[e]nforcing the expectation interests of the parties.”  Id. at 285.  It reasoned: 
[W]hen a party has paid valuable consideration before the breach 
to a collateral source to insure against a loss or otherwise to protect 
its interest, there is no logical reason to deny that party a benefit it 
has paid for and grant it to another party who neither negotiated for 
it, paid for it, nor absorbed the opportunity costs of securing it, but 
who has precipitated the loss.  To do so would subsume the 
expectations of the third-party contract into the breached contract, 
devaluing or eliminating the separate benefit of the third-party 
contract which was supported by separate consideration, and place 
the breaching party in a better position than if it had performed the 
contract. 
 
Id.  The court concluded that “it makes little sense, in the name of fulfilling the expectations of 
the contract, to give the breaching party the benefit of a separate contract negotiated before the 
breach by the non-breaching party with a third party.”  Id. 
 
This analysis echoes this Court’s reasoning when the collateral source rule was first 
recognized in Wightman:  “[t]he party effecting the insurance paid the full value for it, and there 
is no equity in the claim of the defendant to the benefit of a contract for which it gave no 
consideration.”  70 Va. (29 Gratt.) at 446.  This Court has consistently cited this and similar 
reasoning with approval since then.  See, e.g., Acordia of Virginia Ins. Agency, Inc., 263 Va. at 
387 (“If the plaintiff was himself responsible for the benefit, as by maintaining his own insurance 
or by making advantageous employment arrangements, the law allows him to keep it for himself.  
If the benefit was a gift to the plaintiff from a third party or established for him by law, he should 
not be deprived of the advantage that it confers.” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A 
(1979))). 
 
We additionally note that, particularly in the contract context, “the supposed ‘double 
recovery’ often will prove to be more hypothetical than actual.”  John Munic Enterprises, Inc., 
 
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326 P.3d at 286.  In many collateral source rule cases, the real issue is not whether to 
overcompensate the plaintiff—it is instead whether the breaching defendant or the collateral 
source should be primarily responsible for compensation.  3 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 
§ 12.6(4), at 158 (2d ed. 1993).  Frequently in contract cases implicating the rule, the plaintiff 
has either assigned its claims or otherwise is liable to reimburse the collateral source, or the 
collateral source has a claim of subrogation against the defendant.  There is no double recovery 
in such cases because the breaching defendant bears the full burden of the breach while the 
plaintiff receives only one award:  either the collateral source, after reimbursing the plaintiff, 
pursues the claim against the defendant; the plaintiff pursues the claim against the defendant and 
repays the collateral source; or the collateral source, after reimbursing the plaintiff, obtains 
subrogation from the defendant. 
 
Virginia’s recognition that the collateral source rule may apply in the breach-of-contract 
context does not mean that the rule would apply in every case, or even most cases.  As one 
leading treatise observes, 
Contract cases are varied and there is no essential reason that they 
should all be treated alike on the collateral source issue merely 
because they contain contract elements. . . . [D]ifferent contract 
cases may demand different answers.  The performance called for 
by the contract, the nature of the breach, the nature of the parties’ 
non-contractual relationship, and the nature of the benefits in issue, 
and the subrogation rights of the collateral source payor may all be 
relevant in determining whether to apply the collateral source rule. 
 
Dobbs, supra, § 12.6(4), at 157.  Accordingly, we recognize that “[t]he equities, practicalities 
and economics of different situations suggest that at least for the present, a case by case analysis 
is required.”  Id. 
 
 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
The same rationales supporting this Court’s long recognition of the collateral source rule 
in tort cases also support the rule’s application in certain breach-of-contract actions.  Whether the 
rule applies to a given case, however, requires a case-specific determination of whether the 
parties’ expectations, in light of those rationales, support the rule’s application.  Because 
Virginia law thus recognizes that the rule can apply to breach-of-contract cases, we answer the 
certified question in the affirmative. 
Certified question answered in the affirmative.