Case Title: McFarlin v. State

Citation: 409 Md. 391

Docket Number: 119/08

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Robert Lee McFarlin v. State of Maryland, No. 119, September Term 2008.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW–FOURTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
An inmate at a maximum security penal institution does not have an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in an outgoing letter placed in an unsealed envelope.  Moreover, under
Maryland precedent, a correctional institution’s seizure of inmate correspondence does not
violate the Fourth Amendment when the institution acts pursuant to legitimate concerns for
safety and security.  The exclusionary rule does not apply in this case because the Fourth
Amendment was not violated.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 119
September Term, 2008
ROBERT LEE McFARLIN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Barbera
Adkins,
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
Filed: July 17, 2009
1The Maryland House of Corrections Annex has since been renamed the Jessup
Correctional Institution.
2The Maryland Division of Correction 2007 Inmate Handbook is available online at
http://dpscs.maryland.gov/rehabservs/doc/pdfs/2007_Inmate_Handbook.pdf (last visited Jun.
22, 2009).
3A “mail cover” is a screening device requested by a law enforcement agency and
implemented by the prison.
In this case we must determine whether a letter that Petitioner, Robert Lee McFarlin,
wrote to his father from prison was wrongfully admitted into evidence at McFarlin’s trial for
murder.  To reach this determination, we must address whether the Maryland Correctional
Adjustment Center (“MCAC”) seized the letter in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.  We shall hold that McFarlin’s constitutional rights were not
violated and that his letter was properly admitted into evidence.
I. 
On February 3, 2004, McFarlin  was serving a prison sentence at the Maryland House
of Correction Annex (“MHCA”),1 for convictions unrelated to this appeal.  On that date,
McFarlin stabbed and killed fellow MHCA inmate, Damon Bowie.  Because McFarlin killed
Bowie, he was transferred from MHCA to MCAC, a “maximum level II” facility in
Baltimore.  According to the Maryland Institute of Correction’s 2007 Handbook,2 a
“maximum level II facility,” is a facility of “the highest security level for problem males who
have shown a pattern of violence or institutional misconduct, or are very high escape risks.”
Shortly after Bowie’s death, investigators sought and received a “mail cover”3 for
McFarlin, which directed mail room clerks at MCAC to photocopy McFarlin’s outgoing
4We provide further explanation of the MCAC rule regarding outgoing mail infra.
The record indicates that the place designated for outgoing mail was a lockbox.
5The testimony appears as presented by the Court of Special Appeals in its unreported
opinion in this case, McFarlin v. State, No. 2129, September Term 2006.  Internal footnotes
have been admitted.
2
mail.  The mail cover request was marked with an expiration date of March 4, 2004.  On
April 13, 2004, McFarlin wrote a letter to his father that stated: “I done put myself in a deep
hole, Pop.  I killed someone in prison.  I can’t explain it.”  McFarlin placed his letter in an
unsealed envelope pursuant to a MCAC rule and dropped the letter in the area designated
for outgoing mail.4   MCAC officials intercepted the letter, photocopied it, and provided a
copy to State prosecutors.  The State sought to introduce the letter into evidence at
McFarlin’s trial for murder.  McFarlin moved to suppress the letter and a suppression
hearing took place on February 3, 2005.  
At the suppression hearing, various State employees testified about MCAC’s policies
and regulations relating to inmate correspondence.  The record reflects the following:5
James Peguese (“Warden Peguese”), warden of the Annex and a former
correctional officer at MCAC, was the first to testify.  He stated that as of
March 2000, all new inmates at MCAC received an inmate orientation manual
and listened to an audio tape advising them of MCAC’s policies regarding
incoming and outgoing mail.  Warden Peguese also stated that there was a
Division of Corrections Directive in place at MCAC, which “advises MCAC
would not handle the mail as all of the other institutions do.”  He described
MCAC’s regulations regarding outgoing mail as follows:
[Warden Peguese]: All correspondence being sent out of the
institution by inmates was to be left unsealed for inspection
prior to being sent out of the facility.
3
[State]: And when you say “for inspection,” what does that
mean?
[Warden Peguese]: Well, we check for a variety of things.  We
check for contraband leaving the institution.  We also check for
content . . . keeping in mind that these were the people that had
been moved from other populations that were disruptive or
created some disturbances or were violent in another
population–we wanted to check to see whether or not there was
correspondence going back and forth to one of the other
institutions that might indicate that something was about to
happen, or them giving directions to someone that something
was about to happen.
We checked for, as I mentioned, contraband, because in many
instances they tried to make–they sent various items to political
figures [sic] to the President.  We also checked to make sure
that no one was trying to make contact with a victim, because
we found that happened in several cases.  So it was a variety of
things there.  
With regard to [McFarlin], Warden Peguese stated his specific concerns as
follows:
[Warden Peguese]: Well, yes.  I wanted to determine whether or
not there could be a possible retaliation; determine whether
[Bowie’s death] was gang-affiliated or whether there was going
to be other players involved . . . 
[State]: And would monitoring [McFarlin’s] outgoing mail
provide information that would satisfy any of those concerns?
[Warden Peguese]: It definitely could.
In addition, Warden Peguese stated that, “because of the type of inmate that
was received at MCAC, [there] was reasonable cause to inspect all mail.” 
The next person to testify at the suppression hearing was Sergeant
Donald Lane (“Sgt. Lane”) of the Department of Public Safety, Internal
Investigative Unit.  He stated that on February 4, 2004, his unit requested a
“mail cover” on [McFarlin].  Sgt. Lane described the procedure as follows:
4
[Sgt. Lane]: A mail cover is what we use as an investigative
tool.  Once we identify a suspect–or in a crime; [sic] not just
homicides, but big assaults and other crimes–we place what we
call a mail cover.  What we do is we have a form and we fill it
out and we present that to the Commissioner of Corrections.  He
has to approve it or disapprove it.  And then the mail cover
request, what we do is we–just a brief narrative of what the
situation is, what the crime is, and why we want the mail cover.
We forward that to the Commissioner of Corrections.  He
approves it or disapproves it.  When he approves it, we forward
it to the institution that the inmate is being housed at.  And then
what they do is they collect the mail, incoming and outgoing,
photocopy it, and then pass it forward on to us, and we review
it to see if there is any evidence or any mention of the crimes or
[sic] the list, not only the suspect, but other possible people that
may be involved as well.
[State]: Okay.  And when you say they forward it on to you,
“they” being the personnel in the Mail Department?
[Sgt. Lane]: The personnel in the Mail Department, and there is
usually an investigator at each institution, especially the larger
institutions with maximum security inmates and medium
security inmates.  They have their own institutional
investigators, which are actually correctional officers.  And
that’s who we use, we pretty much deal with.
And then the mailroom personnel are actually the ones that do
the mail covers.  They’re the ones that open the mail, copy it,
and they put it into a file, and then either they fax it down to us,
or we go and pick it up, or the investigative officer at the
institution will contact us.
In this case, the “investigative officer” in MCAC was Lieutenant Kim Wilson
(“Lt. Wilson”).  Sgt. Lane further stated that “pursuant to . . . internal policy,”
he forwarded the mail cover request to the Commissioner of Corrections and
it was subsequently approved.  He stated:
[Sgt. Lane]: When I do a mail cover on cases I’m working on,
I don’t put an end date, I put a start date.  And then what I’ll do
5
is I’ll contact the institution where the inmate is residing when
I am finished, or when I have what I needed from the mail
cover, and just verbally, you know, tell him to stop it, or ask
him to stop the mail cover at that time.
[State]: Okay.  So when you personally institute a request for
[sic] mail cover, it is your practice to not put an end date on it.
You notify the institution when you want it to stop.
[Sgt. Lane]: That’s correct.
[State]: Is that standard practice in your office?
[Sgt. Lane]: Yes.
Sgt. Lane also stated that, although he did not request an end date for
the mail cover placed on [McFarlin], the Commissioner of Corrections gave
an end date of March 4, 2004.  Sgt. Lane stated, however, that he was not
aware of the end date until he saw the document on April 21, 2004, after Lt.
Wilson informed him about [McFarlin’s] letter.  At that time, Sgt. Lane
requested another mail cover, without an end date, “and forwarded that to the
Commissioner of Corrections.”  This second mail cover was approved on
April 28, 2004.
Karen Gardner (“Gardner”), a mailroom clerk at MCAC, was the last
person to testify.  She stated that she has enforced over 50 mail covers and that
“[m]ost of the time [a mail cover] does not have an expiration date.”  With
regard to the mail cover on [McFarlin], Gardner stated, “I thought it was
indefinite.  Because I have some that’s [sic] indefinite.”  To explain the
procedure for mail covers, she stated:
[Gardner]: [The envelope is] already open.  So I just take the
letter out.
[Gardner]: Take it to the copier; copy it, with the envelope; put
it back in its original form; seal it, stamp it, and send it to its
destination, and give the copy to [Lt. Wilson].
Gardner further stated that, beginning on February 4, she “started
copying all incoming and outgoing correspondence that had [McFarlin’s]
name on it” and that she processed the letter in question on April 13, 2004.
Gardner also testified as follows:
6COMAR 12.02.20.04 provides:
(continued...)
6
[State]: And from the time that you began the mail cover on
[McFarlin] back in February, was there ever a time prior to you
seeing this letter that anybody advised you to stop the mail
cover?
[Gardner]: No sir.
* * * 
[State]: So you continue until somebody tells you to stop, is that
fair to say?
[Gardner]: Yes.
[State]: Nobody told you to stop on April 13th?
[Gardner]: No, sir.
The Circuit Court denied McFarlin’s motion to suppress and admitted the letter into
evidence.  In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals upheld the Circuit Court’s
decision, holding that the Fourth Amendment right to privacy did not protect McFarlin’s
letter from inspection.  The intermediate appellate court reasoned that “an inmate in a
maximum security correctional facility could expect an unsealed letter to be read, inspected,
seized, or used as evidence in trial, even if he is not told that such actions would take place.”
The intermediate appellate court also noted that due to the State’s legitimate security needs,
MCAC officers were entitled to intercept McFarlin’s mail.
In addition, the Court of Special Appeals rejected McFarlin’s contention that
COMAR 12.02.20.04E6 is unconstitutionally vague because the regulation does not explain
(...continued)
Outgoing Mail
A.  The warden shall ensure that all outgoing mail is date stamped on the date
the mail is received by staff who are assigned to forward mail to the United
States Postal Service or courier.
B.  Outgoing mail may not be held for more than 24 hours excluding
weekends and holidays, except as provided in §E(1) and (2).
C.  The inmate shall include the inmate’s name, commitment number, and the
return address of the institution on outgoing mail.
D.  If the inmate desires to mail money from the inmate’s account with a letter,
the inmate shall forward the letter and unsealed envelope, together with the
proper withdrawal slips, to the person or department designated by internal
detectives.
E.  Outgoing mail may not be opened unless clear evidence exists to warrant
inspection.  The warden or designee shall:
(1) Make the decision to open and inspect outgoing mail and shall
ensure that the reasons for and results of the inspection are
documented;
(2) Withhold outgoing mail only when it is:
(a) Found to contain contraband,
(b) Evidence of a violation of a rule or regulation, or
(c) A basis for requesting an investigation by the Department’s
investigative unit or a law enforcement agency.
(emphasis added).
7
or identify what kind of  “clear evidence” is required to warrant the inspection of an inmate’s
outgoing mail.  Analyzing the regulation under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the
intermediate appellate court concluded that the regulation passed the fair notice and
enforcement criteria.  First, the Court of Special Appeals stated that it is  “fairly ascertainable
that ‘clear evidence’ relates to security and safety matters, as MCAC is a high security penal
institution.”  Then, the court determined that because COMAR 12.02.20.04 specifically
applies only to inmates’ outgoing mail, the regulation is not so broad that it is likely be
interpreted irrationally.  
8
McFarlin petitioned this Court for certiorari and we granted his petition to consider
the following question: “Was it error to admit into evidence a letter sent from prison by
Petitioner McFarlin to his father?”  McFarlin v. State, 406 Md. 579, 961 A.2d 553 (2008).
II.
The State urges the Court to affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Citing Thomas v. State, 285 Md. 458, 404 A.2d 257 (1979), the State avers that this Court
has already ruled that there is no Fourth Amendment Right to privacy in inmate mail.
Moreover, the State argues that the principle recognized in Thomas, “that inmates do not
have a Fourth Amendment right regarding their mail –or at least no right which trumps the
security and penalogical needs of the institution–” is widely recognized.   
In addition, the State posits that to the extent the issue is preserved, COMAR
12.02.20.04E was not violated in this case.  The State points out that 12.02.20.04 expressly
grants a warden the power to make decisions to open and inspect outgoing mail and that,
because of the nature of MCAC and the inmates transferred to it, Warden Peguese justifiedly
determined there was reasonable cause to inspect McFarlin’s mail.  Moreover, the State
asserts that even if there was a violation of COMAR 12.02.20.04, a violation of a State
regulation does not trigger the exclusionary rule.  The State contends that the exclusionary
rule is “applied exclusively to violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and not to COMAR violations” and as such, the relief that McFarlin seeks is
“simply not available in the instant case.”  Finally, the State avers that COMAR 12.02.20.04
is not vague and even it were, this is “fundamentally irrelevant” because a regulation “which
9
is so vague as to be invalid cannot form the cornerstone of a Fourth Amendment expectation
of privacy.”
McFarlin argues that the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals should be
reversed.  He contends that it was error for the trial court to admit his letter into evidence.
McFarlin posits that a prisoner’s right to correspond is a fundamental right protected by the
First Amendment and not merely a privilege.  Moreover, McFarlin asserts that he had a
Fourth Amendment right to privacy in the letter that he sent to his father and that MCAC’s
seizure of the letter was unreasonable.   McFarlin contends that he had an expectation of
privacy in the letter that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable because he relied on
MCAC’s policies  pertaining to correspondence when sending the  letter.  Specifically,
McFarlin maintains that although MCAC’s inmate manual instructed inmates not to seal any
outgoing correspondence, the manual did not indicate that outgoing correspondence was
subject to being read or inspected for content.  McFarlin avers:
It was not “reasonable” for the State prison system to . . . give notice to
inmates of policies restricting the State’s use of the content of mail, thereby,
inducing inmates to rely upon a reasonable and limited expectation of privacy
created by those policies, and then search letters for incriminating statements
as to past crimes, at least, in the absence of a valid Order from the
Commissioner, based on a showing of good cause.
McFarlin also renews his argument that COMAR 12.02.20.04E did not justify the
State’s action of unconstitutionally seizing his letter to his father.  McFarlin asserts that the
regulation is void-for-vagueness because it does not specify what type of clear evidence, or
clear evidence of what kind of activity, is required to inspect an inmate’s mail.
10
III. 
 A.  Standard of Review
In reviewing a circuit court’s grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence,
we ordinarily consider only the evidence contained in the record of the
suppression hearing.  The factual findings of the suppression court and its
conclusions regarding the credibility of testimony are accepted unless clearly
erroneous.  We review the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably
drawn in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.  We undertake our
own constitutional appraisal of the record by reviewing the law and applying
it to the facts of the present case. 
Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 82, 939 A.2d 689, 697 (2008) (citations omitted).
B.  Fourth Amendment Analysis 
We hold that McFarlin’s constitutional rights were not violated when MCAC
inspected McFarlin’s letter to his father and provided a copy of the letter to State officials.
Accordingly, we hold that the suppression court did not err in denying the suppression
motion.  Initially, we conclude that McFarlin did not have an expectation of privacy in his
letter to his father that was objectively reasonable.  Alternately, we conclude that under our
holding in Thomas, even if we were to assume that McFarlin had an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in his letter to his father, MCAC’s seizure of the letter did not violate
McFarlin’s Fourth Amendment rights because the seizure was justified by MCAC’s
legitimate concern for security.   
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
11
States Constitution makes the protections of the Fourth Amendment applicable to the States.
Paulino v. State, 399 Md. 341, 349, 924 A.2d 308, 313 (2007).  To invoke the protections
of the Fourth Amendment, an individual bears the burden of demonstrating that he or she
had “a justifiable, a reasonable, or a legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded
by government action.”  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L.
Ed. 2d 220, 226 (1979).  In Laney v. State, 379 Md. 522, 545, 842 A.2d 773, 786-87 (2004),
we  explained that this burden consists of two inquiries: “(1) whether the individual has a
subjective expectation that his or her property or possessions will not be searched, and (2)
whether the expectation is objectively reasonable under the circumstances.”  Accord Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 588 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that there is a “twofold requirement” to invoke the protection
of the Fourth Amendment: “first . . . a person [must] have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable”).
A defendant demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy by showing that he or
she sought “to preserve something as private.” Whiting v. State, 389 Md. 334, 349, 885 A.2d
785, 793 (2005) (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 740, 99 S. Ct. at 2850, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 579).  To
establish that the subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable, a defendant
must demonstrate that the law is prepared to recognize the expectation as “legitimate.”
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148, 99 S. Ct. 421, 433, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 404 (1978) (noting
that an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy is “more than a subjective expectation
12
of not being discovered”).  Whether the law recognizes an expectation of privacy as
legitimate varies by context and can “depend on an individual’s relationship with the State.”
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391, 132 L. Ed. 564,
575 (1995).  As a consequence of their relationship with the State, inmates have lower
expectations of privacy than non-incarcerated individuals.  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
524, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3199, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393, 401 (1984) (holding that while “persons
imprisoned for a crime enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that
imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights”); see also
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1877, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 473 (1979) (“The
fact of confinement as well as the legitimate goals and policies of the penal institution limits
[a prisoner’s] retained constitutional rights.”). 
 As recited above, McFarlin asserts that despite his incarceration, he had a “limited
and reasonable” expectation of privacy in his letter to his father.  McFarlin also argues that
in light of the mail policies contained in MCAC’s “Inmate Orientation Manual,” his
expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable.   The record indicates that all MCAC
inmates receive a copy of the Inmate Orientation Manual upon arrival at MCAC.  In
pertinent part, this Manual provides:
Inmate Mail and Reading Material
VI. Procedure:
A.  Inmates at MCAC will not seal any outgoing correspondence.  The
managing officer shall designate the appropriate staff to be responsible for
ensuring that the correspondence is sealed before it leaves the facility.
B. Inmates at all facilities except MCAC may seal their own
correspondence . . . .
13
C.  Incoming mail must bear the name and number of the inmate and will be
opened before delivery to the inmate and inspected only for money orders,
cash, stamps, checks, or contraband. . . .
D.  Legal mail will be opened and inspected only in the presence of the
inmate.  Where there is reason to believe the mail is not bonafide legal mail,
the mail shall be opened and inspected only in the presence of the inmate.
E.  Outgoing mail will not be opened, unless there exists clear and convincing
evidence to warrant inspection.  In this event, the reasons and inspection will
be documented.  The Managing Officer or designees shall make the decision
to open and inspect outgoing mail and shall ensure that the reasons for and
results of the inspection are documented.  The Managing Officer or designees
shall withhold outgoing mail only when it is found to contain contraband, is
evidence of violation of a rule and/or regulation, or is the basis for requesting
an investigation by the Division of Correction Internal Investigation Unit or
any law enforcement agency.
(emphasis added).  
In our view, the Inmate Orientation Manual does not support McFarlin’s contention
that he had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his mail.   In fact, section VI.
A. of the Manual makes clear that inmates at MCAC do not have the same mail privileges
as inmates at other institutions.   Because inmates at MCAC may not seal or close their
outgoing correspondence, as inmates at all other institutions in Maryland may, the provisions
of VI. E, which dictate when outgoing correspondence may be opened, do not apply to
MCAC inmates.  The outgoing mail of MCAC inmates remains open until institutional
officials inspect it and seal it for delivery.  Warden Peguese provided testimony at the
suppression hearing that explained that all outgoing mail at MCAC is inspected for
contraband and content due to the fact that the inmates detained at MCAC are individuals
that have been moved from other prison populations because they were disruptive, had
created disturbances, or had engaged in violence while in prison.  Thus, even if we are to
14
assume  that McFarlin had a subjective expectation of privacy in his letter, we hold that
under the circumstances of this case, it was not objectively reasonable for McFarlin, an
inmate at the highest security penal institution in the State, to believe that the outgoing letter
that he placed in an unsealed envelope would not be inspected.   Accord  State v. McCoy, 527
P.2d 725, 728 (Or. 1974) (holding that a defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment
were not violated when a sheriff read and copied outgoing mail that the defendant gave to
the sheriff for delivery in an unsealed envelope);  State v. Wiley, 565 S.E. 2d 22, 32 (N.C.
2002) (concluding that even if an incarcerated defendant had a subjective expectation of
privacy in a letter placed in an unsealed envelope and given to jail personnel for delivery,
the expectation was not objectively reasonable).
Alternatively, we hold that under this Court’s decision in Thomas, MCAC’s seizure
of  McFarlin’s letter to his father was justified by MCAC’s legitimate concern for security
and thus, did not violate the Fourth Amendment regardless of any expectation of privacy that
McFarlin might have had in the letter.  In Thomas, an inmate  handed a correctional officer
a letter in a sealed envelope for delivery to another inmate.  Thomas, 285 Md. at 459, 404
A.2d at 258.  The officer opened the letter and after discovering that it contained an
inculpatory statement, turned it over to officials at the State’s Attorney’s office.  Id.  Thomas
was unaware of any institutional regulation that governed correspondence between inmates.
Thomas, 285 Md. at 462, 404 A.2d at 259.  
After reviewing the case, the Thomas Court held that even if an inmate has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her correspondence, this expectation can be
15
outweighed by the security interests of a correctional institution, “thereby rendering [a
search] ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Thomas, 285 Md. at
468, 404 A.2d at 263.  The Court reasoned:
Assuming that the defendant had some reasonable expectation of privacy with
regard to the envelope because of the absence of notice informing him that the
contents would be inspected . . . no “probable” cause or “reasonable
suspicion” that the envelope contained contraband, escape plans, etc., need be
shown.  Rather, the question is whether this type of search is justified by the
institution’s legitimate concern for security.  There can be little doubt that it
is so justified.  A detention center or correctional institution clearly has a
reasonable security interest in knowing what one inmate is communicating or
sending to another.  
* * * 
Although we believe it would be preferable for jails, detention centers and
correctional institutions in this State to inform inmates, by regulation, posted
notice or otherwise, concerning inspection of inmate to inmate
correspondence, nevertheless whatever privacy expectations the defendant
Thomas may have had regarding the sealed envelope were outweighed by the
legitimate security needs of the detention center.  
Thomas, 285 Md. at 468-69, 404 A.2d at 263.
McFarlin attempts to distinguish Thomas by arguing that its holding does not apply
to the facts of this case.  McFarlin points out that Thomas involved a letter from one inmate
to another rather than a letter from an inmate to a family member.  He also relies on the
Inmate Orientation Manual, referenced supra, to argue that here, unlike in Thomas, “there
was no absence of a regulation” pertaining to the correspondence at issue.  Although we
agree that there are some factual distinctions between McFarlin’s case and the facts
presented in Thomas, we conclude that the principles articulated in Thomas are equally
applicable to McFarlin’s case.
7We do not find this holding inconsistent with Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S 396,
94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1974), rev’d on other grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401, 198 S. Ct. 1874, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1989).  In Procunier, the Court considered
when censorship of inmate correspondence violates the First Amendment, not whether a
correctional institution’s act of reading inmate mail violates the Fourth Amendment.
Procunier, 416 U.S. at 405-06, 94 S. Ct. at 1808, 104 L. Ed. at 236. Procunier is relevant,
however, because there, the Court recognized that legitimate government interests can justify
the restraint on inmate correspondence.  Specifically, the Court stated:
One of the primary functions of government is the preservation of societal
order through enforcement of the criminal law, and the maintenance of penal
institutions is an essential part of that task. The identifiable governmental
interests at stake in this task are the preservation of internal order and
discipline, the maintenance of institutional security against escape or
unauthorized entry, and the rehabilitation of the prisoners. While the weight
(continued...)
16
Thomas directed that when analyzing whether a search of inmate correspondence
violates the Fourth Amendment, the key inquiry is whether the search was “justified by the
institution’s legitimate concern for security.” Id.  As noted above, MCAC is a maximum
level II prison facility that houses males who have demonstrated a high propensity for
violence or institutional misconduct.  At the suppression hearing,  Warden Peguese testified
that due to MCAC’s serious safety concerns, all mail at the institution is routinely inspected
“with or without” a mail cover.  Warden Peguese also testified that MCAC had a specific
interest in inspecting McFarlin’s mail because officials needed to determine if the death of
Damon Bowie was retaliatory and related to gang conflict.  Upon reviewing the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that
the admission of McFarlin’s letter to his father as evidence at McFarlin’s trial was not in
violation of McFarlin’s constitutional rights.7  Like the defendant in Thomas, any privacy
(...continued)
of professional opinion seems to be that inmate freedom to correspond with
outsiders advances rather than retards the goal of rehabilitation, the legitimate
governmental interest in the order and security of penal institutions justifies
the imposition of certain restraints on inmate correspondence.  Perhaps the
most obvious example of justifiable censorship of prison mail would be
refusal to send or deliver letters concerning escape plans or containing other
information concerning proposed criminal activity, whether  within or without
the prison.   
Procunier, 416 U.S. at 412-13, 94 S. Ct. at 1811, 104 L. Ed. at 239-40; accord Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (4th ed. 2004) (“[C]ourts
have . . . [held] that Procunier v. United States . . . recognized the maintenance of jail
security as a legitimate government interest and that ‘since censorship was held to be
justifiable under certain circumstances, then, by implication, it appears that the mere reading
of prisoners’ mail is permissible.”) (quoting State v. Matthews, 538 P.2d 637, 642 (KS
1975)).  
17
expectations that McFarlin might have had regarding his letter to his father were outweighed
by MCAC’s legitimate security needs.   See Sparkman v. State, 184 Md. App. 716, 968 A.2d
162 (2009) (holding under Thomas, a prison official’s act of reading an inmate letter
contained in an envelope marked “return to sender” did not offend the inmate’s rights under
the Fourth Amendment); cf.  Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 21-22,  40 S.Ct. 50, 53,
64 L. Ed. 103, 111 (1919) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when prison
officials seize inmate correspondence pursuant to rules and regulations designed to promote
safety and other goals of the penal institution); United States v. Whalen, 940 F.2d 1027, 1035
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 951, 112 S. Ct. 403, 116 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1991)
(“Because of their reasonable concern for prison security and inmates’ diminished
expectation of privacy, prison officials do not violate the Constitution when they read
18
inmates’ outgoing letters.”) (quoting United States v. Brown, 878 F.2d 222, 225 (8th Cir.
1989)).  
C.  Void-For-Vagueness Analysis
As an initial matter, we note our agreement with the State’s contention that “even if
there was a violation of COMAR 12.02.20.04, a violation of a State regulation does not
trigger the exclusionary rule.”  The exclusionary rule generally applies only to violations of
the Fourth Amendment.  MVA v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 368, 739 A.2d 58, 65 (1999)
(explaining that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is . . . a “judicially created means
of deterring illegal searches and seizures.”); cf.  Parker v. State, 402 Md. 372, 406, 936 A.2d
862, 882 (2007) (noting that under some circumstances evidence is inadmissible if it is
obtained in violation of Maryland’s common law “knock and announce” principle). 
Because we have held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated in this case, McFarlin’s
argument in relation to COMAR 12.02.20.04E is not relevant.
 
Despite the above determination, we also note that we agree with the Court of Special
Appeals’ conclusion that COMAR 12.02.20.04E is not unconstitutionally vague.  In
Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 781 A.2d 851 (2001),  this Court provided an extensive
examination of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.  There, we explained that a statute must be
“sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties,” otherwise, the enactment is void-for-vagueness.
Galloway, 365 Md. at 614, 781 A.2d at 860 (quoting Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1, 8, 616
A.2d 1275, 1278 (1992)).  We then summarized the requisite void-for-vagueness analysis
19
as follows:
A well grounded principle in federal constitutional law is that, when
considering the void-for-vagueness doctrine, courts consistently consider two
criteria or rationales.  The first rationale is the fair notice principle that persons
of ordinary intelligence and experience be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited, so that they may govern their behavior
accordingly.   The standard for determining whether a statute provides fair
notice is whether persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
the statute’s meaning.  A statute is not vague under the fair notice principle if
the meaning of the words in controversy can be fairly ascertained by reference
to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises or even the
words themselves if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.
The second criterion of the vagueness doctrine regards enforcement of
the statute.  This rationale exists to ensure that criminal statutes provide legally
fixed standards and adequate guidelines for police, judicial officers, triers of
fact and others whose obligation it is to enforce, apply and administer the
penal laws.  To survive analysis, a statute must eschew arbitrary enforcement
in addition to being intelligible to the reasonable person.
 
Galloway, 365 Md. at 615-16, 781 A.2d at 860-61 (citations omitted).  
McFarlin argues that COMAR 12.02.20.04 is unconstitutionally vague because
subsection E of the regulation provides that “[o]utgoing mail may not be opened unless clear
evidence exists to warrant inspection,” yet, does not inform what constitutes “clear
evidence.”  In other words, McFarlin asserts that the statute is unconstitutionally vague
because it begs the question, “clear evidence of what?”  We do not find COMAR
12.02.20.04 void-for-vagueness.  As the Court of Special Appeals noted in its opinion in this
case, McFarlin had fair notice that “clear evidence” under COMAR 12.02.20.04E “relates
to security and safety matters, as McFarlin is incarcerated in a high security penal
institution.”  We also agree with the Court of Special Appeals’s conclusion that “because
COMAR 12.02.20.04 specifically applies only to inmates’ outgoing mail, it is not so broad
20
that it would likely  be interpreted irrationally.” See Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 122, 389
A.2d. 341, 346 (1978) (A criminal statute is not void “merely because it allows for the
exercise of some discretion on the part of law enforcement and judicial officials.  It is only
where a statute is so broad as to be susceptible to irrational and selective patterns of
enforcement that it will be held unconstitutional. . . . ”).   
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED.
PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS.