Case Title: H1 Lincoln, Inc. v. South Washington Street, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13088

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-13088 
 
H1 LINCOLN, INC.1  vs.  SOUTH WASHINGTON STREET, LLC, & others.2 
 
 
 
Hampden.     October 4, 2021. - January 24, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Consumer Protection Act, Landlord and tenant, Lease, Exemption 
from liability, Unfair or deceptive act, Damages.  
Contract, Lease of real estate, Release from liability, 
Misrepresentation, Damages.  Landlord and Tenant, Consumer 
protection, Termination of lease, Multiple damages.  
Damages, Consumer protection case.  Fraud.  Extortion. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 27, 2017. 
 
 
The case was tried before Mark D. Mason, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Robert J. Cordy (Annabel Rodriguez also present) for the 
defendants. 
 
 
1 Doing business as Majestic Honda. 
 
2 849 South Washington Street, LLC; 849 South Washington 
Street Realty Trust; 855 South Washington Street Realty Trust; 
865 South Washington Street Realty Trust; and Cooper Avenue 
Realty Trust. 
2 
 
 
John J. Egan (Michael G. McDonough also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Daniel A. Ford for Retailers Association of Massachusetts, 
Inc. 
 
Michael C. Gilleran for National Retail Tenants 
Association. 
 
David J. Hatem & Patricia B. Gary for American Council of 
Engineering Companies of Massachusetts & another. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The primary issue presented in this case is the 
enforceability of contractual provisions limiting liability for 
violations of G. L. c. 93A, § 11, which makes "unfair or 
deceptive act[s] or practice[s]" between businesses unlawful.  
We conclude that limitation of liability provisions will not be 
enforced to protect defendants who willfully or knowingly engage 
in the unfair or deceptive conduct prohibited by the statute. 
 
The case concerns a bitter and protracted dispute over a 
commercial lease.  The plaintiff, H1 Lincoln, Inc., doing 
business as Majestic Honda (Majestic), is a car dealership whose 
principal is James Balise.  The defendants are various entities 
connected with Alfredo Dos Anjos -- specifically, two LLCs of 
which he is the principal, South Washington Street, LLC, and 849 
South Washington Street, LLC (collectively, Dos Anjos LLCs or 
LLCs); and four realty trusts of which he is the trustee, 849 
South Washington Street Realty Trust, 855 South Washington 
Street Realty Trust, 865 South Washington Street Realty Trust, 
and Cooper Avenue Realty Trust (collectively, Dos Anjos realty 
3 
 
trusts).  Majestic agreed to rent the property at issue from the 
Dos Anjos LLCs, with plans to develop and operate an automobile 
dealership facility there. 
When the Dos Anjos LLCs sought to terminate the lease, 
Majestic commenced this action against them in the Superior 
Court, alleging unfair and deceptive conduct in violation of 
G. L. c. 93A, § 11, among other claims.  Following a jury-waived 
trial, the judge found for Majestic on its c. 93A, § 11, claim 
and granted specific performance coupled with delay damages.  
Because the judge also found that the Dos Anjos LLCs' violations 
of the statute were "willful or knowing," he doubled the 
damages.  After Majestic encountered further obstructive 
behavior from the defendants in its efforts to enforce the lease 
agreement, it moved for additional damages, alleging renewed 
violations of G. L. c. 93A, § 11.  The judge reopened the trial, 
where Majestic again prevailed and was awarded additional delay 
damages, which the trial judge again doubled for "willful or 
knowing" violations. 
The defendants make two central contentions on appeal.  
First, they argue that in both the initial trial and the 
reopened trial, the trial judge erred in finding for Majestic on 
its c. 93A, § 11, claims, because at no time was the conduct of 
the defendant entities sufficient, as a matter of law, to 
violate the statute.  Second, the defendants maintain that even 
4 
 
if their conduct was unlawful under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, Majestic 
is barred from recovering delay damages because, under a 
limitation of liability provision in the lease, it waived its 
claims to be compensated "for any speculative or consequential 
damages." 
We conclude that the defendants' conduct -- which included 
fraudulent misrepresentations and pretextual contractual 
objections designed to string along the plaintiffs and coerce 
additional concessions to which the defendants were not entitled 
under the lease -- meets the standard for unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices under G. L. c. 93A, § 11.  Furthermore, the 
unfair or deceptive conduct was done willfully, warranting the 
double damages awarded by the trial judge.  Finally, we conclude 
that a limitation of liability provision provides no protection 
in a c. 93A, § 11, action where, as here, the violation of the 
statute was done willfully or knowingly.3 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs filed by the National 
Retail Tenants Association; the Retailers Association of 
Massachusetts, Inc.; and the American Council of Engineering 
Companies of Massachusetts and the Massachusetts Chapter of the 
American Institute of Architects. 
 
 
As required by Mass. R. A. P. 17 (c) (5) (B), as appearing 
in 481 Mass. 1635 (2019), counsel for the National Retail 
Tenants Association disclosed that the plaintiff made a monetary 
contribution to fund the preparation and submission of the 
amicus's brief.  Counsel for the Retailers Association of 
Massachusetts, Inc., similarly disclosed under rule 17 (c) (5) 
(C) that its brief had been funded in part by Balise Management, 
 
5 
 
 
Background.  1.  The lease agreement.  On October 28, 2016, 
Majestic and the Dos Anjos LLCs executed a written lease by 
which Majestic agreed to rent two adjacent parcels at 849 and 
865 South Washington Street, North Attleborough (leased 
premises), for an initial twenty-three year term.  Near the 
leased premises sits another parcel owned by Dos Anjos that he 
leases to CarMax, a used car dealership.  South Washington 
Street is a desirable location to situate a car dealership; 
indeed, it is dubbed "Auto Road" in reference to the numerous 
car dealerships located in the vicinity.  The leased premises 
 
LLC, an entity affiliated with the plaintiff.  Based on these 
disclosures, the defendants moved to strike the briefs from the 
record.  In response, the amici pointed out not only that they 
had made the disclosures in compliance with the requirements of 
rule 17 (c) (5), but also that no counsel for a party had 
authored their briefs in whole or part, which they claimed was 
enough to satisfy the admonition of this court that "[b]riefs of 
amicus curiae are intended to represent the views of nonparties; 
they are not intended as vehicles for parties or their counsel 
to make additional arguments beyond those that fit within the 
page constraints of their briefs."  Aspinall v. Philip Morris 
Cos., 442 Mass. 381, 385 n.8 (2004). 
 
 
While Mass. R. A. P. 17 (c) (5) (B) & (C) require an amicus 
curiae to disclose an external monetary contribution that it has 
received in support of the preparation or submission of its 
brief -- whether from a party, party's counsel, or otherwise -- 
we have not yet ruled on the question of the consequences, if 
any, that attach to such funding.  We need not do so here, as we 
did not rely on the challenged amicus briefs in this case to 
reach our decision.  We do, however, refer the question to our 
standing advisory committee on the Rules of Appellate Procedure 
for further consideration. 
6 
 
are zoned for the development and operation of new and used 
automobile dealerships. 
 
In addition to naming the Dos Anjos LLCs as the landlords, 
the lease also represented that the LLCs had a "fee simple 
interest" in the leased premises and specifically covenanted and 
warranted that "no third party," other than governmental 
authorities, had legal rights to control the use and development 
of the leased premises.  The lease further provided that if the 
LLCs' representations, covenants, and warranties were untrue or 
incorrect, Majestic was entitled to remedies "at law, in equity, 
or under the terms of [the] Lease." 
 
Majestic's plan for the leased premises, as expressly 
recognized in the lease, was to demolish the two buildings on 
the premises and replace them with a Honda dealership facility.  
The lease also provided that during an initial feasibility 
period, Majestic was to give the Dos Anjos LLCs notice of any 
planned demolition and new construction, including preliminary 
site plans of the proposed development.  The LLCs then had the 
right, within fifteen days after receiving such notice, to 
terminate the lease if they "reasonably" objected to the planned 
development.  However, if the LLCs did not send a written 
termination notice within this fifteen-day period, then their 
right to terminate the lease would be deemed waived. 
7 
 
With respect to the permitting process for Majestic's 
planned development, the lease provided that the Dos Anjos LLCs 
was obliged to "cooperate" with Majestic in obtaining any 
governmental permits and authorizations required to modify the 
leased premises for its planned uses, although any applications 
for zoning changes or special use permits required the LLCs' 
consent.  The lease further provided, however, that this consent 
"shall not be unreasonably withheld." 
The lease included terms specifying the scope of Majestic's 
remedies upon default by the Dos Anjos LLCs.  If the LLCs 
"fail[ed] to perform any nonmonetary obligation," Majestic could 
pursue "any and all other remedies which it may have at law 
and/or in equity," including "su[ing] for damages."  Crucially, 
however, the lease also contained a limitation of liability 
provision that immunized the LLCs from "any speculative or 
consequential damages caused by the Landlord's failure to 
perform its obligations under [the] Lease." 
2.  Balise's purchase of an adjacent parcel from the Cash 
family.  Abutting the leased premises is a parcel that was owned 
by the Cash family (Cash land) at the time that the lease was 
executed.  Dos Anjos had been trying to buy the Cash land for 
fifteen years.  In late 2016 and early 2017, both Dos Anjos and 
Balise negotiated with the Cash family to buy the Cash land, 
each separately making $800,000 offers.  The Cash family 
8 
 
accepted Balise's offer in January 2017, thus upsetting Dos 
Anjos's long-held design to acquire the Cash land. 
3.  Majestic's initial discovery of the ownership 
discrepancy.  After the lease was executed, Majestic began the 
permit application process.  As part of this process, it was 
discovered in 2016 or 2017, through a title search, that there 
was a discrepancy between the entities listed as landlords in 
the lease and the record title holders of the leased premises; 
while the Dos Anjos LLCs were represented in the lease as the 
landlords and fee simple owners of the leased premises, record 
title was with the Dos Anjos realty trusts.  Based on Balise's 
experience in car dealership development, he viewed this 
discrepancy at the time as an issue that could be subsequently 
worked out as a matter of legal "clean up." 
4.  Majestic's site plan and Dos Anjos's decision to 
terminate the lease.  In May 2017, Majestic submitted a concept 
site plan to the Dos Anjos LLCs, which indicated its intentions 
to demolish one of the existing buildings on the leased premises 
and replace it with a new building, and to renovate the other 
existing building.  The site plan also showed an intended use of 
the Cash land as a facility where inventory and display vehicles 
would be parked.  The trial judge determined that, upon 
9 
 
reviewing this site plan, Dos Anjos became aware that Balise had 
acquired the Cash land.4 
After receiving notice of Majestic's plans for demolition 
and construction, the Dos Anjos LLCs did not express any 
objection or intent to terminate the lease within fifteen days.  
The LLCs therefore waived their right to terminate the lease 
based on objections to proposed demolition or construction on 
the leased premises.  Indeed, Dos Anjos was unresponsive to the 
many attempts by Balise to contact him to discuss the May 2017 
site plan. 
On July 25, 2017, Majestic resubmitted the site plan, 
accompanied by a suggestion that Dos Anjos and Balise meet to 
conduct a site walk and to discuss the resubmitted site plan.  
Dos Anjos did not respond, despite repeated suggestions by his 
lawyer, David Manoogian, that a site walk would be beneficial. 
On July 28, 2017, Dos Anjos began to express misgivings to 
Manoogian about Majestic's site plan, citing as his reason 
concerns about having two buildings on the leased premises.  
Manoogian advised that this objection would not be a sufficient 
reason to reject the site plan, because the lease expressly 
recognized Majestic's intention to demolish and replace the two 
existing buildings. 
 
4 The trial judge did not credit Dos Anjos's testimony that 
he did not recognize the Cash land on the site plan. 
10 
 
On August 4, 2017, Dos Anjos finally responded to 
Majestic's proposal of a site walk, indicating that a site visit 
would be unnecessary if Majestic would agree to amend the lease 
to limit its use of the leased premises to a Honda dealership 
only.  This Honda exclusivity limitation was not required under 
the original lease terms.  Seeking to secure approval for its 
site plan, Majestic agreed to this concession. 
Nevertheless, Dos Anjos continued to express unhappiness 
about Majestic's intention to operate two buildings on the 
leased premises, telling Manoogian that he wished to terminate 
the lease unless Majestic changed its plan.  Manoogian again 
advised Dos Anjos that this "two buildings" objection would not 
provide a sufficient basis under the lease for rejecting the 
site plan and terminating the lease.  Accordingly, Manoogian 
prepared a termination letter stating three other objections 
that he believed would better comport with the lease terms:  
first, that the site plan covered land -- the Cash land -- not 
owned or controlled by the Dos Anjos LLCs that would likely be 
part of a special permit application; second, that the plan 
contemplated merging the parcels that comprised the leased 
premises; third, that the plan would require the LLCs to grant 
easements to allow common use between the parcels of any planned 
access drives and utility systems. 
11 
 
The termination letter was mailed to Majestic on August 9, 
2017.  Having received the termination letter, Balise sent an e-
mail message to Dos Anjos on August 11, 2017, seeking a personal 
meeting to resolve any issues underlying the latter's decision 
to terminate the lease.  In response to Balise's message, Dos 
Anjos offered to reinstate the lease if, in addition to 
maintaining the Honda exclusivity limitation, Balise would agree 
to the immediate sale of the Cash land to one of the Dos Anjos 
LLCs for one dollar, in exchange for which the leased premises 
would be expanded to include the Cash land for no extra rent.  
There was nothing in the lease requiring transfer of the Cash 
land, especially transfer of a property purchased for $800,000 
for one dollar.  Dos Anjos subsequently testified that at this 
point and thereafter, he was "fishing for a deal." 
On September 7, 2017, Majestic indicated by e-mail that it 
would accept Dos Anjos's terms for reinstating the lease.  
Manoogian accordingly sent Majestic a lease reinstatement 
agreement for approval.  He nevertheless cautioned that Dos 
Anjos had "not yet decided to sign the lease reinstatement 
agreement" and was "still considering the matter." 
Over two months later, on November 22, 2017, the Dos Anjos 
LLCs sent Majestic a letter confirming their earlier decision to 
Majestic commenced this action against them the next day. 
12 
 
5.  The jury trial and first c. 93A bench trial.  Majestic 
alleged common-law claims for breach of contract and breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as well as 
violations of G. L. c. 93A, § 11.  In a jury trial on Majestic's 
common-law claims, the jury found that the Dos Anjos LLCs had 
committed a breach of the lease and of the implied covenant.  
Majestic's c. 93A, § 11, claim was reserved for a jury-waived 
trial conducted on October 26, 2018. 
In the bench trial, the judge concluded that the Dos Anjos 
LLCs were liable for several violations of G. L. c. 93A, § 11.  
First, the judge found that the LLCs knowingly disregarded their 
contractual obligations by terminating the lease.  Specifically, 
the judge determined that the reasons given for terminating the 
lease were unreasonable and invalid under the lease.  Indeed, he 
found that the LLCs' stated reasons were mere pretexts 
concealing what really motivated the termination, which was Dos 
Anjos's bitterness over Balise's purchase of the Cash land.5 
 
5 While the trial judge was unpersuaded by Dos Anjos's 
testimony that he did not notice the Cash land on the concept 
site plan that Majestic submitted for approval in May 2017, he 
placed great weight on Dos Anjos's subsequent remark that, had 
he discovered that the Cash land was part of Majestic's site 
plan in May, he "would have cancelled the deal right then and 
there."  The judge took this to reveal that the lease 
termination was ultimately motivated by Dos Anjos's bitterness 
that Balise had thwarted his hopes of acquiring the Cash land. 
13 
 
Second, the trial judge found that the Dos Anjos LLCs used 
the threat of withholding approval for the site plan and of 
terminating the lease to coerce Majestic into granting them 
benefits they were not entitled to under the lease, in 
particular the Honda exclusivity limitation and the option to 
purchase the Cash land for one dollar.  The judge also 
interpreted the LLCs' conduct surrounding the lease termination 
as a tactic to string Majestic along to extort unwarranted 
benefits. 
Accordingly, the judge ruled that Majestic was entitled to 
"actual damages" under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, awarding $4,462,500 
in delay damages should Majestic elect specific performance, or 
$5,150,000 for the value of the foregone car dealership should 
it choose to walk away from the lease.6  The sum of delay damages 
was calculated by determining that each month of delay in 
operating its planned dealership cost Majestic losses of 
$175,000, then multiplying that amount by 25.5 to reflect the 
21.5 months of delay the LLCs' unlawful conduct had caused 
 
6 Although the jury had awarded Majestic damages on its 
common-law claims, the judge limited recovery to the c. 93A 
damages to prevent duplicative damages.  "Where injury is 
incurred because of conduct which comprises the elements of any 
common law . . . cause of action, and which is also a violation 
of [G. L. c. 93A], recovery of cumulative damages under multiple 
counts may not be allowed."  Calimlim v. Foreign Car Ctr., Inc., 
392 Mass. 228, 235 (1984).  Rather, "one recovery is precluded, 
with preference given to retaining the c. 93A award."  Costa v. 
Brait Bldrs. Corp., 463 Mass. 65, 73 (2012). 
14 
 
Majestic by the time of the jury trial, plus four months of 
delay from the date of the jury verdict to the judge's ruling in 
the bench trial. 
The trial judge doubled these actual damages under the 
multiple damages provision of G. L. c. 93A, § 11, which 
authorizes double or treble damages if the defendant's unlawful 
conduct was "willful or knowing."  The judge supported his award 
of double damages by multiple findings that the Dos Anjos LLCs 
had engaged in unfair and deceptive conduct willfully or 
knowingly.  Specifically, he found that the LLCs knowingly gave 
pretextual reasons to terminate the lease and used the lease 
termination as leverage to coerce concessions from Majestic.  
Further, he found that the LLCs willfully and knowingly strung 
Majestic along, again as a means to extract undeserved benefits. 
The trial judge's award of double damages brought 
Majestic's total recovery to $10,300,000 if it chose not to 
enforce the lease, or $8,925,000 if it elected specific 
performance.  The judge also ruled that the limitation of 
liability provision in the lease was unenforceable as to the Dos 
Anjos LLCs' c. 93A, § 11, violations, because these violations 
"sound[ed] in tort" rather than in breach of contract. 
In his order of January 28, 2019, entering judgment for 
Majestic on its c. 93A claim, the judge ruled that should 
Majestic elect specific performance, the Dos Anjos LLCs were to 
15 
 
"cooperate" with Majestic in connection with the permitting 
process. 
6.  Majestic's enforcement of the lease.  On February 12, 
2019, Majestic elected specific performance.  The following day, 
Majestic sent the Dos Anjos LLCs a letter asking for immediate 
access to the leased premises.  The LLCs failed to respond to 
Majestic's letter.  Only after being repeatedly pressed for an 
answer did the LLCs eventually confirm that the land delivery 
date -- the date by which, under the lease, the site would have 
to be vacated -- would be scheduled for April 1, 2019. 
Majestic also restarted the permit application process.  
While drafting applications for permits that required listing 
the actual owner -- as distinct from the record title holder7 -- 
of the leased premises, Majestic's permitting attorneys and 
consultant became confused about which entities to list as the 
owners of the leased premises.  Majestic was aware from the 
title search conducted during its initial permit application 
process that the Dos Anjos realty trusts were the record title 
holders.  However, the permitting attorneys were unsure whether 
the trusts were also the actual owners, or whether title had 
been transferred by an unrecorded deed to the Dos Anjos LLCs 
 
7 The record title holder can diverge from the actual owner 
because the record title holder may have subsequently 
transferred the property but failed to record the deed. 
16 
 
such that the LLCs were now the owners of the leased premises, 
as represented and warranted in the lease and as Dos Anjos and 
his agents had represented in pleadings, affidavits, sworn 
testimony, and judicial admissions during the prior litigation 
with Majestic and in subsequent motions -- representations on 
which, the trial judge found, Majestic reasonably relied.  In 
fact, the Dos Anjos realty trusts held both record and actual 
title to the leased premises. 
During this period, the defendants did nothing to correct 
their misrepresentations as to the ownership of the leased 
premises.  For example, when Majestic sent draft permit 
applications to Dos Anjos for signature listing the LLCs as the 
owners of the leased premises, the defendants returned the 
signed applications without notifying Majestic that the leased 
premises were in fact owned by the realty trusts.  As the trial 
judge found, because Majestic reasonably but mistakenly believed 
that the Dos Anjos LLCs were the actual owners of the leased 
premises and therefore listed them as such on its permit 
applications, Majestic's applications at this time were invalid, 
causing months of delay in the permitting process.  For example, 
Majestic was unable to obtain a building permit until September 
16, 2019. 
In late May 2019, Majestic discovered through a new title 
search that record title to the leased premises was still with 
17 
 
the Dos Anjos realty trusts, even after the April 1 land 
delivery date by which, under the lease, the landlord's 
warranties and covenants had to be made true and accurate.  On 
May 31, 2019, Majestic notified Dos Anjos's lawyers by e-mail 
that record title to the leased premises was at odds with what 
Dos Anjos and his agents had repeatedly represented and what was 
guaranteed in the lease.  Majestic proposed that, to resolve the 
discrepancy, title to the leased premises be transferred from 
the trusts to the LLCs. 
On June 13, 2019, Dos Anjos's counsel sent an e-mail 
message to Majestic proposing, as an alternative to transferring 
ownership of the leased premises to the LLCs, an attornment or 
subordination agreement under which two of the Dos Anjos realty 
trusts would recognize the lease and Majestic's rights under it.  
Majestic rejected this offer of attornment, insisting that fee 
simple title to the leased premises must be placed in the Dos 
Anjos LLCs as guaranteed in the lease.  The defendants, however, 
refused to transfer title. 
The failure of negotiations on the ownership issue led 
Majestic to move for additional delay damages under Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 60, 365 Mass. 828 (1974), alleging further c. 93A, § 11, 
violations.  At an August 15, 2019 hearing on the rule 60 
motion, the Dos Anjos LLCs admitted that they did not own the 
leased premises and that both record title and true ownership 
18 
 
were in the Dos Anjos realty trusts.  By stipulation among the 
parties, the trusts were then added nunc pro tunc as defendants 
to Majestic's original complaint.  Following the hearing, the 
motion judge issued orders reopening the c. 93A trial and 
requiring the Dos Anjos realty trusts to be added as landlords 
under the lease. 
Even after the rule 60 hearing, however, the defendants 
persisted in their obstruction, this time by refusing to 
cooperate with Majestic in its permit applications, prompting 
the judge to issue a further order on September 10, 2019, 
commanding the defendants to cooperate with Majestic in 
completing outstanding permit applications.  Despite this 
admonition, the defendants only returned the final permit 
application that Majestic needed on November 16, 2019. 
7.  The reopened c. 93A trial.  Majestic's additional 
c. 93A claim was tried to a judge over two days in October and 
December 2019.  The trial judge ruled that the defendants had 
engaged in further misconduct violative of G. L. c. 93A, § 11. 
First, the judge found, the defendants knowingly 
disregarded their obligations under the lease by providing a 
false warranty of title and failing to make that warranty true 
and accurate as of the land delivery date, and by multiple 
failures to cooperate with Majestic in the permitting process.  
Second, the defendants deceived Majestic as to the ownership of 
19 
 
the leased premises by repeated misrepresentations in the lease, 
court filings, and judicial admissions.  Third, by refusing to 
transfer title to the leased premises to bring the property's 
ownership into conformity with the lease's warranty of title 
after deceiving Majestic about the leased premises' ownership 
for months, the defendants were leveraging the ownership issue 
and stringing Majestic along in an attempt to coerce Majestic 
into agreeing to an attornment.  An attornment would have been a 
benefit outside the lease, the judge found, because an 
attornment would shield the property interest in the leased 
premises from judgment liens should the LLCs default.8 
The trial judge also concluded that the defendants had 
engaged in these c. 93A, § 11, violations willfully and 
knowingly.  He reached this conclusion based on his findings 
that the defendants had willfully and knowingly used the 
ownership discrepancy as leverage to extract concessions from 
Majestic and had willfully and knowingly strung Majestic along.  
He also relied on his finding that the defendants had defied his 
January 28, 2019 order.  The judge's conclusion was bolstered by 
adverse inferences he drew from the fact that all three 
witnesses associated with the defendants -- Dos Anjos, 
Manoogian, and Dos Anjos's daughter and agent, Lisa Pariseault 
 
8 Under the lease, judgments against the landlord constitute 
liens against the landlord's interest in the leased premises. 
20 
 
-- declined to respond to any questions beyond identifying 
themselves by invoking constitutional privileges against self-
incrimination based on the judge's indication during the rule 60 
motion hearing that he would consider referring Dos Anjos, 
Pariseault, and their lawyers to appropriate law enforcement 
agencies for potential perjury charges.  Among the adverse 
inferences the judge drew was that although the defendants knew 
all along that the leased premises were owned by the Dos Anjos 
realty trusts, not the Dos Anjos LLCs, they "intentionally 
deceived" Majestic about the true ownership of the leased 
premises, thereby delaying and sabotaging Majestic's municipal 
permitting, as a way to gain leverage over Majestic in hopes of 
obtaining unwarranted concessions from it. 
The defendants' c. 93A, § 11, violations, the trial judge 
determined, caused delays in Majestic's municipal permitting 
process stretching from February 2019, when it elected specific 
performance, to November 16, 2019, when the defendants returned 
the final signed permit application that Majestic needed.  
Adopting the rate of $175,000 per month of delay established in 
the initial c. 93A trial, the judge calculated that Majestic was 
entitled to a total of $1,592,250 in additional delay damages 
for over nine months of added delays.  Because the defendants' 
unfair and deceptive conduct was willful and knowing, the judge 
doubled these actual damages, for a total additional award of 
21 
 
$3,184,500.  The judge also ruled, based on the same distinction 
he drew in the initial trial between c. 93A, § 11, claims 
sounding mostly in tort versus those sounding in breach of 
contract, that the limitation of liability provision in the 
lease did not preclude recovery for Majestic. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  Where a judge makes 
findings of fact in a bench trial, we review them for clear 
error.  Commissioner of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 
302 (2009), citing Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), as amended, 423 
Mass. 1402 (1996).  A trial judge's finding is clearly erroneous 
only when, "although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."  
Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424 Mass. 501, 509 
(1997), S.C., 428 Mass. 543 (1998), and S.C., 432 Mass. 43 
(2000), quoting Building Inspector of Lancaster v. Sanderson, 
372 Mass. 157, 160 (1977).  The trial judge's legal conclusions, 
by contrast, we review de novo.  T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet 
Nat'l Bank, 456 Mass. 562, 569 (2010). 
In an action alleging violations of G. L. c. 93A, "whether 
a particular set of acts, in their factual setting, is unfair or 
deceptive is a question of fact."  Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise 
Line Ltd., 460 Mass. 500, 503 (2011), quoting Schwanbeck v. 
Federal–Mogul Corp., 31 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 414 (1991), S.C., 
22 
 
412 Mass. 703 (1992).  But whether conduct found to be unfair or 
deceptive "rises to the level of a chapter 93A violation is a 
question of law" (citation omitted).  Baker v. Goldman, Sachs & 
Co., 771 F.3d 37, 49 (1st Cir. 2014).  Accord Casavant, supra 
("A ruling that conduct violates G. L. c. 93A is a legal, not a 
factual, determination" [citation omitted]). 
2.  Chapter 93A, § 11, liability for the defendants' 
conduct surrounding the lease termination.  We first consider 
whether the trial judge properly concluded that the Dos Anjos 
LLCs' actions surrounding the termination of their lease with 
Majestic amounted to unfair and deceptive conduct prohibited 
under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, and whether any such unlawful conduct 
was "willful or knowing." 
General Laws c. 93A, § 2, makes unlawful "unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices" in the conduct of "any trade or 
commerce," while § 11 applies these prohibitions to dealings 
between those "engaged in trade or commerce," giving a private 
right of action to businesses harmed by another business's 
unlawful conduct under § 2.  Chapter 93A also provides for the 
doubling or tripling of "actual" damages if the court finds that 
the defendant's unfair or deceptive conduct was a "willful or 
knowing" violation of the statute.  G. L. c. 93A, § 11, fifth 
par. 
23 
 
a.  The defendants' liability for unfair conduct.  To 
determine what conduct rises to the level of an "unfair" act or 
practice actionable under G. L. c. 93A, we have consistently 
looked to the factors articulated in PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe 
Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 596 (1975):  (1) whether the 
conduct is within "at least the penumbra of some common-law, 
statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) 
whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; 
[and] (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers" or 
other businesses (citation omitted). 
Focusing on the first PMP Assocs., Inc. factor, we conclude 
that the Dos Anjos LLCs' conduct surrounding the lease 
termination was squarely within an established category of 
unfair conduct under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, namely, "commercial 
extortion."  Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 
451, 474 (1991).9  This is the use of "coercive or extortionate 
tactics" by one business to "extract undeserved concessions from 
other business entities."  Renovator's Supply, Inc. v. Sovereign 
 
9 Our application of the PMP Assocs., Inc. factors is 
sensitive to the business-to-business context of G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 11, which requires a higher degree of misconduct for a 
violation than in the consumer protection context of G. L. 
c. 93A, § 9.  See Giuffrida v. High Country Investor, Inc., 73 
Mass. App. Ct. 225, 238 (2008) ("[B]usinesses seeking relief 
under Section 11 are held to a stricter standard than consumers 
in terms of what constitutes unfair or deceptive conduct" 
[citation omitted]). 
24 
 
Bank, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 419, 430 (2008).  See Pepsi-Cola Metro. 
Bottling Co. v. Checkers, Inc., 754 F.2d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 1985) 
(describing as unfair practice under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, "form 
of extortion" in which one business uses "wedge" to force 
another business into doing "what otherwise it could not be 
legally required to do"). 
One form that commercial extortion takes is the use of 
breaches of contract, or threatened breaches, as leverage to 
extract additional benefits not covered by the contract.  See 
Massachusetts Employers Ins. Exch. v. Propac-Mass, Inc., 420 
Mass. 39, 43 (1995) (Propac-Mass) (breach of contract 
"undertaken as leverage" to "destroy" contractual rights of 
another party has "coercive quality" that makes it unfair under 
G. L. c. 93A, § 11); Atkinson v. Rosenthal, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 
219, 226 (1992) ("extortionate quality" of using breach of 
contract as "lever to obtain advantage" for breaching party 
makes such conduct unfair under G. L. c. 93A). 
We affirm the trial judge's determination that the Dos 
Anjos LLCs attempted this type of unlawful commercial extortion.  
Indeed, the LLCs' actions, as found by the trial judge, closely 
resemble misconduct we found in Anthony's Pier Four, Inc., 411 
Mass. at 474-476, to be commercial extortion violative of G. L. 
c. 93A, § 11.  There, the defendant landowner abused its right 
to approve changes in the plaintiff's development plan, in 
25 
 
breach of contract, to coerce the plaintiff into making 
financial concessions not required under the contract.  Id. at 
472-473.  Here, the Dos Anjos LLCs abused their right to reject 
Majestic's site plan -- which the LLCs had in any case waived by 
failing to timely object -- by providing pretextual and 
unreasonable grounds for terminating the lease.  The LLCs then 
offered to reinstate the lease on the condition that Majestic 
agree to concessions outside the lease.  These tactics gave the 
LLCs powerful leverage against Majestic, which was eager to 
realize its plan to develop a dealership facility on the "Auto 
Road."  The LLCs used this leverage to extort two benefits they 
had not bargained for under the lease:  the Honda exclusivity 
limitation and the opportunity to buy the Cash land, which had 
cost Majestic $800,000, for a mere one dollar.10  In other words, 
the Dos Anjos LLCs entered into a lease with Majestic on 
specific terms and then, once Majestic was committed to its 
 
10 Because the Dos Anjos LLCs ultimately decided against 
reinstating the lease, they did not get to enjoy the concessions 
they coercively extracted from the plaintiff.  This does not, 
however, prevent us from concluding that the LLCs engaged in 
commercial extortion, since the unfairness of commercial 
extortion consists in one business's use of threatened or actual 
breaches of contract as leverage to pressure another business to 
grant unwarranted concessions, not merely the subsequent 
enjoyment of the concessions.  Cf. Renovator's Supply, Inc., 72 
Mass. App. Ct. at 430 (explaining that c. 93A liability for 
commercial extortion does not require defendant's coercive 
effort to succeed in actually extracting benefits from targeted 
party). 
26 
 
decision to develop and operate its car dealership on the "Auto 
Road" because of the lease, the LLCs opportunistically used 
their leverage over Majestic to coercively extract from Majestic 
additional concessions.  This conduct meets the standard for 
unfair commercial extortion in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 11. 
Another recognized form of commercial extortion is the 
"stringing along" of a business counterparty.  See Full Spectrum 
Software, Inc. v. Forte Automation Sys., Inc., 858 F.3d 666, 674 
(1st Cir. 2017) ("one business's stringing along of another to 
the other's detriment can satisfy" standard for unfair conduct 
under G. L. c. 93A, § 11).  Stringing along tactics involve the 
use of a protracted "pattern of conduct . . . calculated to 
misrepresent the true situation" to the target business and 
thereby induce detrimental reliance on the target's part.  
Greenstein v. Flatley, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 351, 356 (1985).  With 
the target's bargaining position weakened by its prolonged 
reliance on the perpetrator's misrepresentations, the target 
becomes vulnerable to the coercive pressures which are then 
applied.  See Full Spectrum Software, Inc., supra (describing 
how defendant had "strung [plaintiff] along" so as to "take 
advantage of [the plaintiff's] financial exposure" to impose new 
and adverse contract terms); Peabody Essex Museum, Inc. v. 
United States Fire Ins. Co., 802 F.3d 39, 54 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(describing c. 93A misconduct in insurance context as "shifting, 
27 
 
specious defenses" to "string[] out the process" in order to 
"force" insured into accepting unfavorable settlement); Arthur 
D. Little, Inc. v. Dooyang Corp., 147 F.3d 47, 55-56 (1st Cir. 
1998) (characterizing defendant's misrepresentation of its 
intentions in order to "extract a favorable settlement" from 
plaintiff as "stringing out the process"). 
Here, during the months-long period between Majestic's 
initial submission of its site plan and the Dos Anjos LLCs' 
final confirmation of their decision to terminate the lease, the 
LLCs continually raised pretextual objections to Majestic's 
plan, when in fact they had no intention of abiding by the lease 
because of Dos Anjos's resentment towards Balise for purchasing 
the Cash land.  Even after Majestic accepted the LLCs' 
extortionate offer to buy the Cash land for one dollar, they 
still refused to agree definitively to abide by the lease, 
keeping Majestic guessing at what concessions might finally 
elicit that agreement.  The LLCs used these tactics in aid of a 
scheme of commercial extortion; in Dos Anjos's own words, he was 
"fishing for a deal."  Given that the Dos Anjos LLCs' conduct 
comfortably fit the "stringing along" paradigm of commercial 
extortion, we affirm the trial judge's determination that the 
LLCs acted unfairly under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, by stringing 
28 
 
Majestic along to obtain benefits not bargained for under the 
lease.11 
b.  The defendants' liability for multiple damages.  Having 
concluded that the Dos Anjos LLCs' actions surrounding the lease 
termination constituted unfair conduct in violation of G. L. 
c. 93A, § 11, we affirm the trial judge's award of actual 
damages.  Because there is sufficient evidence to establish that 
the LLCs engaged in this unlawful conduct willfully for purposes 
of the multiple damages provision in G. L. c. 93A, § 11, we also 
affirm his decision to award double damages. 
Specifically, the trial judge made an express finding that 
the Dos Anjos LLCs "willfully and knowingly strung along 
Majestic" as a way to extract undeserved concessions.  Indeed, 
his determination that the LLCs carried out a scheme of 
commercial extortion is also legally sufficient to establish 
willful or knowing violations for purposes of the multiple 
damages provision in G. L. c. 93A, § 11.  See Anthony's Pier 
 
11 We note that "a breach of contract alone does not amount 
to an unfair act or practice under G. L. c. 93A, § 2."  Propac-
Mass, 420 Mass. at 43, citing Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. 
Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 100-101 (1979).  Even an intentional or 
knowing breach of contract, standing alone, is insufficient for 
a c. 93A, § 11, violation.  See Atkinson, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 
225-226 ("additional factor" beyond even "cheerful[]" breach of 
contract is required for c. 93A violation).  To the extent that 
the trial judge's decision suggests that an intentional breach 
alone was enough to constitute an unfair act or practice under 
G. L. c. 93A, § 11, it was incorrect. 
29 
 
Four, Inc., 411 Mass. at 475 (holding that one business's 
"knowing use of a pretext" to coerce another business into 
making extra payments "establishes wilfulness as a matter of 
law"); Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 754 F.2d at 18 (evidence 
that defendant engaged in scheme of commercial extortion was 
sufficient to support determination that defendant was "guilty 
of a willful violation of [G. L. c. 93A, § 11]"). 
3.  Chapter 93A, § 11, liability for the defendants' 
conduct after Majestic elected specific performance.  We next 
consider whether the trial judge properly awarded additional 
delay damages for renewed unfair or deceptive conduct by the 
defendants, in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 11, after Majestic 
chose specific performance of the lease.  We also inquire into 
whether there is sufficient evidence to support the judge's 
decision to double these actual damages upon a determination 
that the defendants' unlawful conduct was willful or knowing for 
purposes of the multiple damages provision in G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 11.  As we conclude that the defendants' conduct after 
Majestic chose specific performance was unfair and deceptive for 
purposes of G. L. c. 93A, § 11, and this unlawful conduct was 
done willfully, we affirm the trial judge's decision in this 
regard as well. 
a.  The defendants' liability for willfully engaging in 
deceptive conduct.  The case law interpreting G. L. c. 93A 
30 
 
"offer[s] no static definition of the term 'deceptive.'"  
Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 442 Mass. 381, 394 (2004).  
Nevertheless, courts have repeatedly affirmed that fraudulent 
misrepresentation is sufficient to establish deception under 
G. L. c. 93A, § 11.  See McEvoy Travel Bur., Inc. v. Norton Co., 
408 Mass. 704, 714 (1990) ("Common law fraud can be the basis 
for a claim of . . . deceptive practices under [G. L. c. 93A]"); 
Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 498, 504 
(1979) ("A misrepresentation in the common law sense would . . . 
be the basis for a c. 93A claim"). 
Under Massachusetts law, a common-law action for fraudulent 
misrepresentation requires showing that (1) the defendant made a 
"false representation of a material fact with knowledge of its 
falsity for the purpose of inducing [the plaintiff] to act 
thereon"; (2) the plaintiff "relied upon the representation as 
true and acted upon it to his [or her] detriment"; and (3) such 
"reliance was reasonable under the circumstances."  Rodi v. 
Southern New England Sch. of Law, 532 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1175 (2009), citing Masingill v. 
EMC Corp., 449 Mass. 532, 540 (2007). 
Here, there is sufficient evidence in the record to find 
that the defendants committed fraudulent misrepresentation.  
From the time the lease was executed in October 2016, through 
the period when Majestic began enforcing the lease after the 
31 
 
initial c. 93A trial, the defendants repeatedly stated that the 
Dos Anjos LLCs owned the leased premises, when in fact the 
property was owned by the Dos Anjos realty trusts.  The trial 
judge found, based on adverse inferences he drew from the 
witnesses' silence, that the defendants made these false 
statements about the ownership of the leased premises while 
knowing of their falsity, and that the defendants thereby 
"intentionally deceived" Majestic.  He also found that Majestic 
reasonably relied on the defendants' false representations, 
which were made in the lease as well as in pleadings, 
affidavits, testimony, and judicial admissions.  Due to 
Majestic's reasonable reliance on the defendants' knowingly 
false and intentionally deceitful representations, the judge 
further determined, Majestic suffered damage in the form of 
months of delay in the permitting process.  Because these 
findings are sufficient to establish fraudulent 
misrepresentation by the defendants, the trial judge could 
properly have determined, on the same facts, that the defendants 
are liable under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, for ongoing deceptive 
conduct warranting the award of additional delay damages. 
Indeed, on these facts, the judge could have concluded that 
the defendants' deceptive conduct was willful for purposes of 
the multiple damages provision in G. L. c. 93A, § 11.  "Actions 
involving fraudulent representations in knowing disregard of the 
32 
 
truth" not only constitute c. 93A, § 11, violations, but also 
amount to "'willful' behavior under the statute."  Datacomm 
Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld Inc., 396 Mass. 760, 780 
(1986).  See McEvoy Travel Bur., Inc., 408 Mass. at 714 ("an 
intentional fraud can constitute a basis for the multiplication 
of damages").  The defendants' intentional deceit regarding the 
ownership of the leased premises thus suffices to justify the 
trial judge's award of double damages. 
b.  The defendants' liability for willfully engaging in 
unfair conduct.  As we already explained, the use of breaches of 
contract and "stringing along" as tactics of commercial 
extortion is actionable as unfair conduct under G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 11.  Renovator's Supply, Inc., 72 Mass. App. Ct. at 430.  Full 
Spectrum Software, Inc., 858 F.3d at 674.  As the trial judge 
found, the defendants exploited their false warranty of title 
and resisted resolving the ownership discrepancy to gain 
leverage over Majestic, which needed the ownership issue settled 
to proceed with its municipal permitting.  The defendants also 
engaged in "stringing along" tactics by misleading Majestic for 
months about the actual ownership of the leased premises.  The 
aim of these tactics, the judge found, was to extort from 
Majestic an adverse modification to the lease terms:  an 
attornment arrangement rather than the LLCs' fee simple 
ownership of the leased premises, which would allow the 
33 
 
defendants to avoid judgment liens arising from their defaults 
on the lease.  On this record, there is sufficient evidence to 
support a determination that the defendants, in violation of 
G. L. c. 93A, § 11, engaged in the unfair practice of commercial 
extortion.12 
This evidence also warrants a determination that the 
defendants' unfair conduct was willful, justifying double 
damages.  As we recognized above, where there is sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that a business engaged in commercial 
extortion violative of G. L. c. 93A, § 11, that evidence also 
suffices to establish willfulness for purposes of the statute's 
multiple damages provision.  Anthony's Pier Four, Inc., 411 
Mass. at 475. 
c.  Causation of damages.  The defendants contend that any 
renewed c. 93A, § 11, violations began no earlier than May 31, 
2019, when Majestic notified the defendants about the title 
discrepancy.  As such, they argue that the trial judge erred by 
including the period before that date in his calculation of 
additional delay damages.  We disagree. 
 
12 We again note that a breach of contract, even if 
intentional, does not in itself amount to an unfair act or 
practice under G. L. c. 93A, § 11.  See note 11, supra.  The 
trial judge's ruling that the defendants' intentional breaches 
of the lease alone were enough to constitute unfair conduct for 
purposes of G. L. c. 93A, § 11, was therefore incorrect. 
34 
 
In a c. 93A, § 11, action to recover damages, a plaintiff 
business must establish not only that the defendant violated the 
statute by engaging in an unfair or deceptive act or practice, 
but also that the plaintiff suffered "a loss of money or 
property . . . as a result," and that there is "a causal 
connection between the loss suffered and the defendant's unfair 
or deceptive method, act, or practice."  Auto Flat Car Crushers, 
Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 469 Mass. 813, 820 (2014).  See 
DiMarzo v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 389 Mass. 85, 101 (1983) 
("Under c. 93A, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for all 
losses which were the foreseeable consequences of the 
defendant's unfair or deceptive act or practice"). 
If the defendants' renewed unfair and deceptive conduct 
dated only from May 31, 2019, then Majestic would not be able to 
establish the requisite causal connection between the 
defendants' c. 93A, § 11, violations and the losses that 
Majestic suffered from February to May 2019 due to the delay on 
its project.  However, the defendants are incorrect in claiming 
that their additional violations traced back no earlier than May 
31, 2019.  The trial judge found that they intentionally 
deceived Majestic about the ownership of the leased premises by 
making a series of false representations; these 
misrepresentations date back to the lease itself, as well as 
pleadings, affidavits, testimony, and judicial admissions 
35 
 
connected with the initial c. 93A trial, which took place in 
2018. 
4.  The limitation of liability provision.  The final issue 
we address is whether, as the defendants contend, Majestic may 
not recover even if the defendants are otherwise liable for the 
delay damages the trial judge assessed because it is barred from 
recovery by the limitation of liability provision in the lease.  
We agree with the trial judge's conclusion that this provision 
does not preclude recovery by Majestic.  However, we reach this 
conclusion for somewhat different reasons from those articulated 
by the trial judge, who relied on a distinction developed by the 
Appeals Court between c. 93A, § 11, violations that are 
predominantly tort-like and those that resemble simple contract 
breaches.  Because G. L. c. 93A establishes causes of action 
that blur the distinction between tort and contract claims, 
incorporating elements of both, we do not adopt this 
formulation.  We focus instead on the particular language of the 
limitation of liability provision and the different liability 
standards set out in G. L. c. 93A, § 11, itself. 
a.  Speculative and consequential damages.  The limitation 
of liability provision in the instant case provided for the 
waiver of "any speculative or consequential damages caused by 
[the] Landlord's failure to perform its obligations under [the] 
Lease."  As a threshold matter, we address the meaning of 
36 
 
speculative and consequential damages and their applicability in 
c. 93A actions.  For speculative damages, this is 
straightforward.  The waiver of liability for speculative 
damages is irrelevant and redundant because speculative damages 
cannot be recovered in any action, including in a c. 93A action.  
Kitner v. CTW Transp., Inc., 53 Mass. App. Ct. 741, 748 (2002) 
(in c. 93A claim, "damages cannot be recovered when they are 
remote, speculative, hypothetical, and not within the realm of 
reasonable certainty" [citation omitted]). 
Consequential damages can, however, be recovered under 
G. L. c. 93A.  In the context of a c. 93A action, consequential 
damages encompass "all losses which were the foreseeable 
consequences of the defendant's unfair or deceptive act or 
practice."  DiMarzo, 389 Mass. at 101.  See Auto Flat Car 
Crushers, Inc., 469 Mass. at 823, quoting Brown v. LeClair, 20 
Mass. App. Ct. 976, 979 (1985) ("the 'actual damages' to which a 
prevailing plaintiff [in a c. 93A, § 11, action] is entitled 
. . . comprise 'all foreseeable and consequential damages 
arising out of conduct which violates the statute'")13  The delay 
 
 
13 This definition of consequential damages aligns with how 
consequential damages have been understood in the context of 
actions for breach of contract, namely as "[i]tems of loss other 
than loss in value of the other party's performance," 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 comment c (1981), 
provided that these losses "arise naturally from the breach" or 
were "reasonably contemplated by the parties" as consequences of 
 
37 
 
damages awarded by the trial judge, which were to compensate 
Majestic for lost profits that were a foreseeable consequence of 
delays in getting its dealership operational and resulted from 
the defendants' unfair and deceptive conduct, are thus properly 
understood to be consequential damages.  Cf. Pierce v. Clark, 66 
Mass. App. Ct. 912, 914 (2006) (holding that damages to 
compensate real property purchasers for delay in sale are 
consequential damages).  Accord 24 R. A. Lord, Williston on 
Contracts § 64:26 (4th ed. 2018) ("Delay damages are 
consequential damages"). 
The question then becomes whether the consequential damages 
Majestic sought to recover were covered by the limitation of 
liability provision at issue, and if so, whether such a 
provision was enforceable as a matter of law.  We conclude that 
even if the provision encompassed the conduct at issue, it was 
unenforceable as a matter of law. 
The specific language of the limitation of liability 
provision restricted Majestic's waiver only to consequential 
damages "caused by [the] Landlord's failure to perform its 
obligations under [the] Lease."  By its plain terms, the 
limitation of liability provision did not apply to all 
consequential damages, but rather covered only consequential 
 
the breach.  Delano Growers' Coop. Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., 
393 Mass. 666, 680 (1985). 
38 
 
damages caused by the defendants' failure to perform lease 
obligations.  In this case, the defendants' breaches of the 
lease included, among others, their termination of the lease 
based on untimely and unauthorized objections to Majestic's 
planned development.  By its express terms, the limitation of 
liability provision would preclude consequential damages for 
such breaches.  By contrast, the defendants' c. 93A, § 11, 
violations stemmed from their fraudulent misrepresentations 
regarding the ownership status of the leased premises and their 
extortionate use of pretextual reasons to terminate the lease 
and of stringing along tactics to obtain additional concessions 
from Majestic without granting any additional consideration for 
these concessions.  By its terms, the limitation of liability 
provision did not preclude consequential damages arising from 
these instances of unfair or deceptive behavior. 
That said, we recognize that separating the consequential 
damages resulting from the defendants' unfair and deceptive 
conduct from those caused by their "failure to perform . . .  
obligations under [the] Lease" is difficult because the actions 
constituting the defendants' breaches of the lease and their 
violations of G. L. c. 93A, § 11, are intertwined, and the delay 
damages resulted from both sets of actions. 
Nonetheless, as further explained below, to determine 
whether Majestic may recover, we need not unravel the 
39 
 
interconnected causes of the delay damages it sustained, because 
we conclude that a limitation of liability provision provides no 
protection for defendants who willfully or knowingly engage in 
unfair or deceptive conduct in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 11. 
b.  The enforceability of the provision.  The primary case 
in which we have previously addressed the validity of agreements 
to waive c. 93A, § 11, damages is Canal Elec. Co. v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 406 Mass. 369 (1990) (Canal).  In that 
case, we answered certified questions on whether, in an action 
by a purchaser of electric generator components for breach of 
warranty and violation of c. 93A, § 11, the plaintiff was barred 
from recovery by two limitation of liability clauses in the sale 
contracts.14  Id. at 371.  We held that the limitation of 
liability clauses were enforceable in the narrow circumstances 
presented by the undisputed facts in that case.  Id. at 375-376. 
In holding specifically that the limitation of liability 
clauses were effective to bar recovery on the c. 93A, § 11, 
 
14 The limitation of liability clauses in Canal were much 
broader in their language than the limitation of liability 
provision in the lease here.  In that case, the limitation of 
liability clauses in the sales contracts at issue "specifically 
excluded indirect, special, incidental, and consequential 
damages."  Canal, 406 Mass. at 371.  They also expressly 
provided that the remedies provided in the contracts were 
"exclusive" and that neither the seller nor its suppliers would 
"under any circumstances be liable under any theory of recovery, 
whether based on contract; on negligence of any kind, strict 
liability or tort . . . or otherwise. . . ."  Id. at 371, 377 
n.8. 
40 
 
claim, we explained that "[a] statutory right or remedy may be 
waived when the waiver would not frustrate the public policies 
of the statute."  Id. at 377.  We further explained that the 
consensual allocation of risk among "commercially sophisticated" 
parties does not generally raise public policy concerns.  Id. at 
374.  We then observed that in some circumstances, "a c. 93A 
claim may be merely duplicative of a traditional contract 
claim," id. at 378, taking as an example our determination in 
Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 387 (1979), that a 
breach of warranty also establishes a c. 93A, § 11, violation.  
Canal, supra at 378-379.  Where a c. 93A, § 11, claim simply 
duplicates a claim for breach of contract, we concluded, there 
is no public policy obstacle to enforcing a waiver of c. 93A 
liability in the business-to-business context of § 11.  Id. at 
379. 
Drawing on Canal, the Appeals Court developed a test for 
the enforceability of waivers of liability in c. 93A, § 11, 
actions.  It drew a distinction between c. 93A, § 11, claims 
that are "founded on a contract theory" and those that are 
"analogous to a tort-based recovery."  Standard Register Co. v. 
Bolton-Emerson, Inc., 38 Mass. App. Ct. 545, 549 (1995).  It 
concluded that liability disclaimers are enforceable, as Canal 
instructed, as to c. 93A, § 11, claims that are founded on 
simple breach of contract.  But, as to c. 93A, § 11, claims that 
41 
 
are analogous to tort claims, waivers are unenforceable.  Id. at 
549-550.  Accord Exhibit Source, Inc. v. Wells Ave. Business 
Ctr., LLC, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 497, 502 (2018). 
This court has not, however, adopted the tort versus 
contract distinction employed by the Appeals Court to determine 
the enforceability of limitation of liability provisions in 
c. 93A, § 11, actions.  Our cases have also pointed out that a 
c. 93A claim is difficult to pigeonhole into discrete tort or 
contract categories, as c. 93A violations tend to involve 
elements of both tort and breach of contract, blurring the lines 
between the two.  As we explained in Kattar v. Demoulas, 433 
Mass. 1, 12 (2000), quoting Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 
Mass. 688, 693 (1975), "[t]he relief available under c. 93A is 
'sui generis,'" being "neither wholly tortious nor wholly 
contractual in nature."  Hence, a "cause of action under c. 93A 
is 'not dependent on traditional tort or contract law concepts 
for its definition.'"  Kattar, supra at 13, quoting Heller v. 
Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 376 Mass. 621, 626 (1978). 
Our subsequent decisions have also qualified our analysis 
in Canal of c. 93A, § 11, claims grounded in contract breaches.  
We have specifically rejected the suggestion, which we first 
made in Linthicum and then repeated in Canal, that a breach of 
warranty alone suffices to establish an unfair or deceptive act 
under G. L. c. 93A in the business-to-business context of § 11.  
42 
 
Knapp Shoes, Inc. v. Sylvania Shoe Mfg. Corp., 418 Mass. 737, 
743, 745 n.7 (1994).  More broadly, we have reiterated that "a 
breach of contract alone does not amount to an unfair act or 
practice" for c. 93A, § 11, purposes.  Propac-Mass, 420 Mass. at 
43.  In light of these more recent decisions, the enforceability 
of waivers of c. 93A, § 11, liability for conduct that involves 
nothing more than traditional breach of contract is no longer a 
live question, given that such conduct does not even give rise 
to a claim under G. L. c. 93A, § 11. 
For all these reasons, we conclude that the enforcement of 
limitation of liability provisions in the context of G. L. 
c. 93A, § 11, should be refocused on the policies underlying the 
statute and the distinctions drawn within the statutory scheme, 
not on the difference between tort and contract.  This refocus 
reflects the fundamental principle that a waiver of statutory 
rights should not be given effect "where enforcement of the 
particular waiver would do violence to the public policy 
underlying the legislative enactment."  Spence v. Reeder, 382 
Mass. 398, 413 (1981). 
We have previously recognized that the Legislature intended 
to deter and severely punish -- not to condone -- defendants who 
willfully or knowingly engaged in unfair or deceptive acts.  
"[T]he multiple damages authorized by G. L. c. 93A 'are 
essentially punitive in nature.'"  Kraft Power Corp. v. Merrill, 
43 
 
464 Mass. 145, 157 (2013), quoting Darviris v. Petros, 442 Mass. 
274, 283–284 (2004).  See International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 
387 Mass 841, 856 (1983) (Wilson) ("The multiple damage 
provisions of c. 93A are designed to impose a penalty").  In 
providing for multiple damages when defendants willfully or 
knowingly engage in unfair or deceptive conduct, the Legislature 
was registering its "displeasure with the proscribed conduct and 
its desire to deter such conduct" by "encourag[ing] vindicative 
lawsuits."  Id. at 857, quoting McGrath v. Mishara, 386 Mass. 
74, 85 (1982).  See Haddad v. Gonzalez, 410 Mass. 855, 869 
(1991) ("It is established that deterrence is an important goal 
of the multiple damages provisions of c. 93A"). 
Because multiple damages under c. 93A "serve the twin 
'goals of punishment and deterrence,'" Kraft Power Corp., 464 
Mass. at 158, quoting Wilson, 387 Mass at 858, enforcement of a 
limitation of liability provision that would allow a defendant 
in a c. 93A, § 11, action to immunize itself in advance from 
liability for unfair or deceptive conduct that is done willfully 
or knowingly would do violence to the public policy protected by 
the statute, see Spence, 382 Mass. at 413.  Such willful and 
44 
 
knowing misconduct is not entitled to contractual protection 
from c. 93A, § 11, liability.15 
We recognize that G. L. c. 93A, § 11, involves commercial 
transactions between businesses.  In this context, courts 
recognize that "the market is a rough and tumble place," Buster 
v. George W. Moore, Inc., 438 Mass. 635, 650 (2003), and 
generally respect the right of contractual risk allocation among 
sophisticated commercial parties, even if "we ordinarily would 
not effectuate a consumer's waiver of rights under [G. L. 
c. 93A, § 9]."  Canal, 406 Mass. at 378.  Nevertheless, the 
Legislature has concluded that, even in the fiercely competitive 
business-to-business marketplace, there are standards of conduct 
to be enforced:  willful or knowing engagement in unfair or 
deceptive acts, exemplified by the defendants' extortionate 
conduct at issue in this case, must be deterred and punished.  
That legislative determination controls and may not be 
overridden by private contractual arrangements.16 
 
15 We have affirmed a similar policy against enforcing 
exculpatory contractual clauses for intentional and reckless 
misconduct in the context of tort liability.  A contract term 
"exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused 
intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of 
public policy."  Sharon v. Newton, 437 Mass. 99, 110 n.12 
(2002), quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195(1) 
(1981). 
16 Our focus on willful or knowing violations also 
recognizes that G. L. c. 93A "ties liability for multiple 
damages to the degree of the defendant's culpability by creating 
 
45 
 
Applying this standard in the case before us, we conclude 
that the limitation of liability provision at issue is 
unenforceable as contrary to public policy.  As we discussed 
above, the record reveals abundant evidence that the defendants' 
violations of G. L. c. 93A, § 11, were engaged in willfully for 
purposes of the statute's multiple damages provision.  That same 
evidence amply suffices, under the standard we have defined, to 
render the lease's limitation of liability provision ineffective 
to bar Majestic from recovery.  The delays in getting Majestic's 
dealership operational and the lost profits that thereby 
resulted were the products of the defendants' fraudulent 
misrepresentations and intentional schemes to string along and 
take advantage of Majestic.  Such "callous and intentional 
violations" of G. L. c. 93A, § 11, involve a level of 
culpability that does not only merit multiple damages, Heller, 
376 Mass. at 627, but also makes the enforcement of contractual 
waivers of liability contrary to public policy. 
 
two classes of defendants."  Wilson, 387 Mass. at 853.  Those 
defendants who have committed "relatively innocent violations" 
of the statute are not liable for multiple damages, while a 
second class of defendants who have committed "willful or 
knowing" violations are.  Id.  Enforcement of limitation of 
liability provisions for so-called relatively innocent 
violations of the statute does not raise the same public policy 
concerns as would enforcement of liability waivers for willful 
or knowing violations. 
46 
 
Conclusion.  The defendants' conduct surrounding their 
threatened and actual decision to terminate the lease, as well 
as their conduct after Majestic began to enforce the lease, 
involved numerous acts prohibited as unfair or deceptive by 
G. L. c. 93A, § 11.  Because these unlawful acts delayed the 
development and operation of Majestic's planned dealership, the 
trial judge properly awarded damages to compensate for the 
resulting lost profits.  The defendants' unfair and deceptive 
conduct was, moreover, engaged in willfully, warranting the 
award of double damages under the statute's multiple damages 
provision.  Considering the willful character of the defendants' 
c. 93A, § 11, violations, the limitation of liability provision 
in the lease is ineffective to preclude Majestic from recovering 
damages for those violations.  For the foregoing reasons, the 
judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
17 Majestic has requested an award of appellate attorney's 
fees and costs in its brief.  As the prevailing party on appeal 
in a c. 93A, § 11, action, Majestic is entitled recover 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs.  See Twin Fires Inv., LLC 
v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 445 Mass. 411, 433 (2005); 
Bonofiglio v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 412 Mass. 612, 613 
(1992).  Majestic may file an appropriate application for 
appellate fees and costs in this court, pursuant to the 
procedure established by Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10-11 
(2004).