Case Title: STATE v LINK

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80-374

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-374 I N THE SUPREJE COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1981 STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, LONNIE LINK, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l District, I n and f o r t h e County of Cascade. Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Chris Tweeten argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana C a r r o l l Blend argued, Deputy County Attorney, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Michael Smartt argued, Public Defender, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: June 8, 1981 Decided : 3UN 2 3 1981 Filed: JJFI 2 3 1981 M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The S t a t e appeals from an o r d e r entered i n District Court, Cascade County, g r a n t i n g defendant's motion f o r a change of venue. W e r e v e r s e . Defendant was a r r e s t e d February 25, 1980, i n G r e a t F a l l s , Montana, and was charged with felony t h e f t . H e pleaded not g u i l t y and was released on h i s own recognizance. T r i a l was set f o r June 30, but was vacated and r e s e t f o r August 25, 1980. O n August 11, 1980, defendant was a r r e s t e d f o r robbery. Both crimes were reported i n t h e Great F a l l s Tribune. One a r t i c l e , published 12 days before t r i a l , p i c t u r e d defendant i n handcuffs, and i n an a r t i c l e appearing a week before t r i a l , s e v e r a l community bus i- nessmen were reported a s being c r i t i c a l of t h e presiding d i s t r i c t judge f o r having released defendant on h i s m n recognizance. The remaining a r t i c l e s were r o u t i n e news r e l e a s e s concerning t h e crimes a l l e g e d l y committed by defendant. O n August 25, t h e day of t r i a l , defendant f i l e d a motion and a f f i d a v i t with t h e D i s t r i c t Court requesting e i t h e r a change of venue, o r t h e postponement of t h e t r i a l t o allow t i m e f o r t h e p u b l i c i t y t o d i e down. Following hearing, t h e d i s t r i c t judge granted defendant's motion f o r a change of venue. The S t a t e a p p e a l s . The p a r t i e s r a i s e d s e v e r a l i s s u e s which we frame a s follows: 1) Did t h e d i s t r i c t judge abuse h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n granting t h e change of venue? 2 ) Should t h i s Court reconsider t h e standard used t o determine whether a change of venue should be granted? The S t a t e contends t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t judge abused h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n g r a n t i n g t h e change of venue, because t h e r e was not a showing of e x i s t i n g p r e j u d i c e i n t h e community. A mere showing of p u b l i c a t i o n does not prove t h a t p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t s , which w i l l b i a s t h e t r i a l . Defendant argues t h a t t h e S t a t e has a heavy bur- "The c a s e s i n Montana have e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t b e f o r e a d i s t r i c t judge can e x e r c i s e h i s d i s c r e - t i o n i n g r a n t i n g a change of venue t h e r e must be more t h a n (1) a f f i a n t w s unsupported o p i n i o n , ( 2 ) t h e f a c t t h a t t h e a c c o u n t of a crime h a s been p u b l i s h e d , t h a t s a i d p u b l i s h e d a c c o u n t s of t h e crime are n o t p r e j u d i c i a l u n l e s s t h e y are p a s s i o n a t e enough to e x c i t e undue p r e j u d i c e , t o t h e e x t e n t o f r e n d e r i n g it i m p o s s i b l e f o r the- - -- accused --- t o h a v e a j u r y f r e e from p r e j u d i c e . " -- S t a t e ex rel. Hanrahan v. District Court, ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 1 4 5 Mont. 501, 508, 401 P.2d 770, 774. See also S t a t e v. Corliss ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 150 Mont. 40, 430 P.2d 632; S t a t e v. Sandstrom ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont. , 580 P.2d 106, 3 5 St.Rep. 744. What is r e q u i r e d by Montana case l a w , t h e n , is more t h a n a n a l l e g a t i o n of p u b l i c i t y ; t h e c o u r t must d e t e r m i n e t h a t t h e p u b l i c i t y h a s s o a f f e c t e d t h e community and h a s so aroused p r e j u - d i c e i n t h e community t h a t a f a i r t r i a l cannot be had. Here, t h e r e was no a t t e m p t to assess t h e e f f e c t of t h e p u b l i c i t y . Although t h e j u r y was r e a d y f o r t r i a l , t h e change of venue was g r a n t e d w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n i n g t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s as t o t h e i r knowledge of t h e case, whether t h e y had s e e n t h e p u b l i c i t y , or as t o t h e e f f e c t on them of t h e p u b l i c i t y . The d e c i s i o n to change venue r e s u l t e d from a f i n d i n g of p r e j u d i c e p e r se a r i s i n g o n l y from p u b l i c a t i o n . T h i s is n o t t h e l a w i n Montana. With no f i n d i n g of e x i s t i n g p r e j u d i c e , t h e d i s t r i c t judge abused h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n o r d e r i n g t h e change. T h e r e f o r e we r e v e r s e t h e o r d e r and remand t h e cause f o r t r i a l i n Cascade County. The d e f e n d a n t i n t h i s case admitted t h a t t h e r e was no showing of e x i s t i n g p r e j u d i c e . H e acknowledged t h a t no one article w a s p a s s i o n a t e enough t o a r o u s e t h e p r e j u d i c e of t h e community, b u t he urged t h e c o u r t to view t h e cumulative e f f e c t o f a l l of t h e articles p u b l i s h e d . H e argued t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d used i n Montana f o r g r a n t i n g a change of venue is too r i g i d to be workable, and u r g e s t h i s Court t o adopt t h e ABA s t a n d a r d on change of venue o r c o n t i n u a n c e . Montana l a w now r e q u i r e s a den t o show abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e judge. He c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e articles p u b l i s h e d and t h e i n f o r m a t i o n which the. judge was aware of were s u f f i c i e n t to a l l o w him to make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t could n o t g e t a f a i r t r i a l . The s t a t u t e a u t h o r i z i n g a change of venue r e q u i r e s a showing o f e x i s t i n g p r e j u d i c e : "Change of p l a c e o f t r i a l . (1) The d e f e n d a n t or t h e p r o s e c u t i o n m a y move f o r a change of p l a c e of t r i a l on t h e ground t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s -- i n t h e c o u n t y i n which t h e c h a r g e is pending -- such pre- i u d i c e that a f a i r t r i a l cannot b e had i n such a --- -- c o u n t y . The motion must be made a t least 1 5 d a y s p r i o r to t r i a l e x c e p t t h a t , i f good cause is shown, it may be made t h e r e a f t e r . " ( 2 ) The motion must be i n w r i t i n g and sup- p o r t e d by an a f f i d a v i t which must s t a t e f a c t s showing t h e n a t u r e of t h e p r e j u d i c e a l l e g e d . The d e f e n d a n t or t h e state may f i l e counter- a f f i d a v i t s . The c o u r t s h a l l conduct a h e a r i n g and d e t e r m i n e t h e merits of t h e motion. " ( 3 ) I f t h e c o u r t d e t e r m i n e s t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s i n t h e c o u n t y i n which t h e p r o s e c u t i o n is -- pending such p r e j u d i c e t h a t a f a i r t r i a l cannot b e had, it s h a l l t r a n s f e r t h e cause to any o t h e r c o u r t of competent j u r i s d i c t i o n i n any county i n which a f a i r t r i a l may be had." (Emphasis added.) S e c t i o n 46-13-203, MCA. The f i n d i n g s of t h e d i s t r i c t judge do n o t i n d i c a t e t h a t he found e x i s t i n g p r e j u d i c e . R a t h e r , he found t h a t " t h e p u b l i c i t y i n c i d e n t to t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r cases, w i t h o u t more, is s u f f i c i e n t t o w a r r a n t a change of venue." Noting t h a t t w o c h a r g e s were pending a g i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t i n Cascade County a t t h i s t i m e , t h e d i s t r i c t judge determined t h a t j u d i c i a l t i m e and economy would be b e s t served by o r d e r i n g a change of venue. T h i s Court h a s i n d i c a t e d t h a t where t h e e v i d e n c e is i n c o n c l u s i v e on t h e i s s u e of p r e j u d i c e , t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s d i s c r e t i o n should be r e l i e d on. H i s r u l i n g should n o t be d i s t u r b e d u n l e s s an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n is shown. S t a t e v. Bashor ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 614 P.2d 470, 476, 37 St.Rep. 1098, 1100. Under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e we f i n d an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . T h i s Court h a s d i s c u s s e d t h e showing t h a t must be made b e f o r e a change of venue is g r a n t e d : showing of e x i s t i n g p r e j u d i c e s u b s t a n t i a l enough t o make a f a i r t r i a l impossible, while the ABA standard r e q u i r e s only a showing of a "reasonable l i k e l i h o o d " t h a t a f a i r t r i a l cannot be had, and it does not r e q u i r e any showing of a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e . W e agree t h a t t h e "impossible t o have a f a i r t r i a l " stan- dard is an unworkable one. It is u n l i k e l y t h a t except i n t h e most extreme circumstances t h a t t h e defendant could show t h a t it is impossible t o o b t a i n a j u r y f r e e from p r e j u d i c e . But, r a t h e r t h a n adopting the ABA s t a n d a r d , a s w e a r e urged t o do by defendant, w e w i l l h e r e a f t e r apply t h e r u l e a s s e t out by t h e I l l i n o i s Supreme Court, i n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e I l l i n o i s venue s t a t u t e , on which our s t a t u t e is patterned: 'I [TI he r u l e is t h a t an accused is e n t i t l e d t o a change of venue when it appears t h e r e a r e reaso- n a b l e grounds to b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p r e j u d i c e a l l e g e d a c t u a l l y e x i s t s and t h a t by reason of t h e p r e j u d i c e t h e r e is a reasonable apprehension t h a t t h e accused cannot r e c e i v e a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l . People v. Berry (1967), 37 I11.2d 329, 226 N.E.2d 591, 592-593. See a l s o , People v. Campbell (1975), 28 Ill.App.3d 480, 328 By adopting t h e I l l i n o i s standard, we a r e not suggesting t h a t a showing of e x i s t i n g p r e j u d i c e need no longer be made. Before a d i s t r i c t judge can find "reasonable grounds t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p r e j u d i c e a l l e g e d a c t u a l l y e x i s t s " , something beyond b a r e a l l e g a t i o n is required t o prove t h a t t h e community is a c t u a l l y i n f e c t e d with p r e j u d i c e . However, by holding t h a t t h e defendant no longer has t o show t h a t it is "impossible" t o find an unprejudiced jury i n t h e community, we a r e allowing a d i s t r i c t judge t o e x e r c i s e h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n determining t h a t t h e a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e is s u f f i c i e n t l y pervasive to warrant a change of venue. Although we a r e adopting t h i s r u l e p r o s p e c t i v e l y , it is u n l i k e l y t h a t defendant would have prevailed under t h e new s t a n d a r d . A s w e noted above, no a c t u a l e x i s t i n g p r e j u d i c e was a l l e g e d o r proved which is f a t a l under e i t h e r standard. The order of t h e d i s t r i c t judge is reversed, and w e remand the cause to Cascade County for t r i a l on the merits. Chief Justice W e con : --