Case Title: Ebzery v. City of Sheridan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ebzery v. City of Sheridan1999 WY 90982 P.2d 1251Case Number: 98-318Decided: 06/25/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
PATRICIA K. EBZERY, GEORGE EWAN, JAMES F. JACKSON, THERESA M. 
JACKSON, IRIS MADIA, KENNETH MADIA, ARLAND M. WIBERG, and RUTH A. WIBERG, 
Appellants (Petitioners),

v.

CITY OF SHERIDAN, WYOMING 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, BRUCE R. ELWORTHY and ANN MARSHALL, Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

Appeal from the W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certification from the District Court of Sheridan County Honorable John 
C. Brackley, Judge.

Brian N. 
Beisher, Hart & Beisher, Sheridan, WY. Representing 
Appellants.

Stephen K. 
Gregersen, Sheridan City Attorney; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution 
Assistance Program; and Carl S. McGuire III, Student Intern, Prosecution 
Assistance Program, Sheridan, WY. Representing Appellee City of Sheridan, 
Wyoming Board of Adjustment.

Bruce R. 
Elworthy, Elworthy & Marshall, Sheridan, WY. Representing Appellees Bruce 
R. Elworthy and Anne B. Marshall.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellee Sheridan 
Board of Adjustment (the Board) granted a variance to Appellees, Bruce Elworthy 
and Anne Marshall (Owners), allowing the construction of a six-foot fence on two 
sides of Owners' property. Residents of Sheridan opposing the variance bring 
this appeal, claiming the Board's determination is not supported by substantial 
evidence. Finding no factual basis for the Board's conclusion that the variance 
granted is the minimum adjustment necessary to accomplish its purpose, we 
reverse and remand.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellants 
present the following issues for review:

A. Whether the 
City of Sheridan Board of Adjustment's decision to grant the variance was 
supported by substantial evidence.

B. Whether the 
factual findings of the City of Sheridan Board of Adjustment permit a court to 
follow the agency's reasoning from the evidentiary facts to its eventual legal 
conclusion.

C. Whether the 
City of Sheridan Board of Adjustment complied with Wyoming Statute § 15-1-608 
(b) (ii) in granting the variance to Bruce Elworthy and Anne 
Marshall.

Appellee City of 
Sheridan phrases the issues as follows:

A. Did the Board 
of adjustment sufficiently set forth its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
when the Board of Adjustment issued an Order granting a variance to Appellees 
Bruce R. Elworthy and Anne B. Marshall?

B. Was the Board 
of Adjustment's decision to grant a variance to Appellees Bruce R. Elworthy and 
Anne B. Marshall based on substantial evidence when the Board of Adjustment 
received and reviewed relevant evidence and made their decision based on such 
evidence?

C. Was the 
variance granted by the Board of Adjustment the minimum adjustment necessary to 
accomplish the variance's purpose when the variance granted by the Board of 
Adjustment allowed Appellees Bruce R. Elworthy and Anne B. Marshall to construct 
a six-foot high fence on two sides of their property where Sheridan, Wyo., Code 
of Laws app. A. § 10(17) (1994) allowed a four-foot fence to be 
built?

Appellees 
Elworthy and Marshall present these issues:

1. Does the lack 
of an application and/or Order staying construction of the permitted improvement 
(the fence) render this matter moot?

2. Do the 
Applicants have a vested right to the fence irrespective of the legitimacy 
and/or propriety of the Board's actions?

FACTS

[¶3]      Owners' property 
consists of a residence and yard comprising one full city block in Sheridan, 
Wyoming. At the time of purchase, the property was surrounded by a hedge over 
six feet tall and contained an in-ground swimming pool which had not been in use 
for quite some time. The property had fallen into a state of disrepair; the 
hedge had died in many spots, and the remainder had accumulated dead wood and 
trash. After beginning repairs, Owners learned that the hedge, as it then 
existed, would not meet their liability insurance policy requirements to screen 
in the pool.

[¶4]      The Sheridan Code 
allows a resident to place six-foot fencing along the back of a property and 
also along the sides of properties not adjacent to a street. All other 
residential fences may not exceed four feet in height. A six-foot fence is 
allowed on the property if it meets the setback requirement of 25 feet from the 
curb. Owners wished to construct a six-foot fence around the entire perimeter of 
their property approximately 15 feet from the curb and, therefore, filed a 
request for a variance with the Sheridan Board of Adjustment. The basis for this 
request was two-fold: Owners claimed that the pool had to be fenced for public 
safety purposes, and that the fence had to be six feet tall to comply with their 
liability insurance policy requirements that the pool be screened 
in.

[¶5]      Owners' request 
was first considered at the July 9, 1998, Board meeting. After some discussion 
and the presentation of several letters from neighbors in opposition to the 
variance, the Board's vote resulted in a two-two tie because one member of the 
Board was absent from the meeting. Failing to pass by a majority vote, the 
variance was denied.

[¶6]      The Board 
reconsidered its decision at a special meeting on July 30, 1998. Between the 
first and second meetings, Owners submitted a detailed letter to the Board 
explaining why they believed the variance was appropriate. The letter was 
accompanied by exhibits, which included the relevant portion of Owners' 
insurance policy, several affidavits regarding the condition of the hedge, 
articles about safety issues relating to in-ground pools, and a diagram of the 
proposed fence. Neighbors opposing the variance again appeared in person and by 
letter. After limited discussion, it was determined that Owners did not need a 
variance for the back fence. When Owners agreed that the front fence need not be 
more than the allowed four-foot height, the request was modified to provide a 
variance for a six-foot fence on the two sides of the property adjacent to 
streets. In a three-two vote, the variance was granted and was recorded on 
August 4, 1998, in the Sheridan County Courthouse.

[¶7]      Appellants filed 
a petition for review in the district court on August 28, 1998. The Board then 
issued a written Order dated September 10, 1998, with findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. On November 4, 1998, the district court certified the case 
to this Court pursuant to Rule 12 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶8]      As we recently 
stated in Scott v. McTiernan, 974 P.2d 966, 969 (Wyo. 
1999):

When we review 
cases which have been certified to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 12.09(b), we apply the appellate standards which are applicable to the 
court of first instance. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (Michie 1997) governs 
judicial review of administrative actions.

In reviewing an 
agency's findings of fact, we determine whether substantial evidence supports 
the findings. "Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind 
might accept in support of the agency's conclusions." We affirm an agency's 
conclusions of law when they are in accordance with law. When an agency has not 
invoked and properly applied the correct rule of law, we correct the agency's 
errors.

An 
administrative agency is charged with the duty of supporting its action with 
adequate findings of fact. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 (Michie 1997). Section 
16-3-110 states in pertinent part:

A final decision 
or order adverse to a party in a contested case shall be in writing or dictated 
into the record. The final decision shall include findings of fact and 
conclusions of law separately stated. Findings of fact[,] if set forth in 
statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of 
the underlying facts supporting the findings.

In discharging 
its duty under § 16-3-110, the agency must "make findings of basic facts upon 
all of the material issues in the proceeding and upon which its ultimate 
findings of fact or conclusions are based." This Court needs to know "why" an 
agency decided the way it did. When an agency does not make adequate findings of 
basic fact, we do not have a rational basis upon which to review its ultimate 
findings and conclusions. In cases where the findings do not adequately explain 
the rationale for the agency's decision, we remand the matter to the agency so 
that it can make additional findings.

(Citations 
omitted.)

DISCUSSION

Final 
Order

[¶9]      As an initial 
matter, we address whether the Board's final order was contained in the Minutes 
of the July 30 meeting, as contended by Owners, or whether the final order is 
the written order issued over six weeks later. This determination is important 
not only because our review is initially focused on the final order, but also 
because the timely filing of an appeal from agency action is a jurisdictional 
matter. Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, 589 P.2d 1295, 1301 (Wyo. 
1979). If confusion exists as to whether a final order has been issued, it may 
result in costly litigation regarding the timeliness of an appeal or the 
foreclosure of judicial review. See Rosenberger v. City of Casper Bd. of 
Adjustment, 765 P.2d 367, 369 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶10]   "A final administrative order is 
one ending the proceedings, leaving nothing further to be accomplished." MGTC, 
Inc. v. Public Service Com'n of Wyoming, 735 P.2d 103, 106 (Wyo. 1989). Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 provides that the agency will render separately stated 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in writing, or dictate these findings 
and conclusions into the record. In this case, the minutes of the July 30 
meeting indicate the Board unequivocally granted the variance, and at the close 
of the meeting adopted findings which had been dictated into the record. The 
Board did not inform the contestants that a written order would be issued at a 
later date or that the matter was subject to further consideration. In fact, the 
variance was recorded at the Sheridan County Courthouse on August 4, 1998. Thus, 
there was nothing further to accomplish after the July 30 meeting, and, 
consequently, the Board's determination on July 30 was a final appealable 
order.

Substantial 
Evidence

[¶11]   The Board's decision to grant a 
variance is circumscribed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-608(ii)(B) (Michie 1997), 
which states:

(ii) . . . No 
adjustment in the strict application of any provision of an ordinance may be 
granted unless:

(B) For reasons 
fully set forth in the board's findings, the circumstances or conditions are 
such that the strict application of the provisions of the ordinance would 
deprive the applicant of the reasonable use of the land or building, the 
granting of the adjustment is necessary for the reasonable use thereof and the 
adjustment as granted is the minimum adjustment that will accomplish [that] 
purpose[.]

(Emphasis 
added.) 

[¶12]   Appellants maintain the record is 
devoid of evidence showing that a six-foot fence running the length of two sides 
of a city block is the minimum variance required in this situation. We, 
therefore, look to the factual findings on which the Board determined this 
issue. These facts must be based exclusively on the evidence in the record. Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107(r) (Michie 1997).

[¶13]   When the Board voted to grant the 
variance, it "adopted the findings set forth in the motion." The motion to grant 
the variance stated as follows:

There are 
special circumstances or conditions peculiar to this piece of land in that this 
property is located on an entire city block so that all four sides face city 
streets, and this condition has not resulted from any act of Mr. Elworthy and/or 
Ms. Marshall;

That these 
circumstance (of the property covering an entire city block) are such that the 
strict application of the fence ordinance would deprive Mr. Elworthy and Ms. 
Marshall of the reasonable use of their land because without the fence they 
could not obtain liability insurance, and that Mr. Elworthy has a right to 
reasonably fence his property;

That granting 
the requested variance would be in harmony with the general purpose and intent 
of the ordinance and would not be injurious to the 
neighbors.

[¶14]   While the Board found the 
reasonable use of Owners' land includes the ability to procure liability 
insurance, there is no finding in the July 30 minutes that the variance granted 
was the minimal alteration necessary to accomplish this purpose. Although the 
absence of this finding would normally require a remand for further findings, 
all parties to this appeal addressed the written Order of the Board. Therefore, 
we will consider that Order as further explanation of the Board's 
actions.

[¶15]   In its Order, the Board recites six 
findings of fact:

1. The property 
at 1001 Pioneer is located on an entire City block so that all four (4) sides of 
the property face the streets and this condition does not apply to other 
properties in the neighborhood.

2. The 
circumstance or condition described above does not result from any act of the 
owners of the property, subsequent to the adoption of Section 10, # 17, of 
Appendix A of the Sheridan Code.

3. The owners of 
the property can not obtain homeowner's liability insurance for their property 
because their homeowner liability insurance carrier will not insure their 
property without a minimum 6 foot fence around their swimming 
pool.

4. It is to the 
benefit of the public that a swimming pool be fenced for the safety of children 
or others who might wander into the pool area.

5. The pool is 
within 25 feet of the street. Placing a fence only around the perimeter of the 
pool would divide the owner's [sic] lot in such a way as to deprive them 
reasonable use of their property.

6. A 6 foot 
fence would not be necessary along Pioneer Street because the swimming pool is 
not visible from Pioneer Street.

Based on these 
findings, the Order's final conclusion of law states, "Granting a variance to 
allow a 72 inch high fence along Florence and Greystone Streets is necessary to 
allow the owners reasonable use of their property and is the minimum adjustment 
that would accomplish this purpose."

[¶16]   Appellants maintain that these 
findings of fact do nothing to provide a reasonable basis for the Board's 
conclusion that the variance granted to Owners is the minimal adjustment which 
would allow Owners to purchase liability insurance. We 
agree.

[I]t is 
essential to surviving judicial review that the record of a contested agency 
action contain such factual findings as would permit a court to follow the 
agency's reasoning from the evidentiary facts on record to its eventual legal 
conclusions. Similarly, we have held that a contested case hearing must provide, 
and the record of that proceeding must document, information sufficient to the 
making of a reasonable decision. Absent such information, the agency decision 
must be set aside as arbitrary.

Heiss v. City of 
Casper Planning and Zoning Commission, 941 P.2d 27, 30, (Wyo. 1997) (citing 
Jackson v. State e rel. Workers' Compensation Division, 786 P.2d 874, 877 (Wyo. 
1990)); see also Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' School, 813 P.2d 185, 201 (Wyo. 
1991).

[¶17]   Appellants contend that the minimum 
variance would allow Owners to fence the pool rather than the entire property. 
This suggestion was raised to the Board several times. The minutes of the July 9 
meeting reflect the following discussion:

Fred Nelson 
asked if Mr. Elworthy has considered the option of just fencing off the pool 
area?

Mr. Elworthy 
said that doesn't solve the problem of the dying hedge. They have already had 
trouble with people driving and hitting the hedge.

Again, on July 
30, another homeowner suggested that only the pool be fenced. This suggestion 
was addressed by the Board solely with the finding:

5. The pool is 
within 25 feet of the street. Placing a fence only around the perimeter of the 
pool would divide the owner's [sic] lot in such a way as to deprive them 
reasonable use of their property.

In its brief, 
the Board explains this finding as follows:

This option [of 
fencing only the pool] was untenable because under the Sheridan ordinances, 
since the property line is approximately ten feet from the curb, the setback 
requirement mandates that the fence would have to be at least thirty-five feet 
from the curb. The six-foot fence that Owners would build around the pool to 
qualify for homeowner liability insurance would have passed through the pool 
itself leaving the deepest end of the pool outside the six-foot 
fence."

This 
explanation, however, assumes that the only option available was to fence the 
entire perimeter of the property. It fails to account for a variance which would 
have allowed Owners to place a six-foot fence along the length of the pool near 
the street, thus, effectively avoiding the problem of the fence running through 
the pool. Instead, the variance granted by the Board allows a maximum 
adjustment, including the entire length of the block on the street adjacent to 
the pool, as well as the length of another block. The Board offered no 
alternative reasons to support the finding that fencing the perimeter of the 
pool would unreasonably divide the Owners' lot.

[¶18]   Appellees point to the letter 
submitted by Owners stating that if a fence were located anywhere other than the 
site of the hedge, it would result in the replacement of the entire sprinkler 
system. Again, this statement was made with the assumption that the only 
alternative to the requested variance was to place a six-foot fence meeting the 
25-foot setback requirements around the perimeter of the property, not the pool. 
We also note that there is nothing in the Board's findings of fact or in the 
minutes of the meetings on July 9 and 30 which references this factor as a basis 
for the Board's decision.

[¶19]   The language in the statute 
requires Owners to prove a hardship exists, and the variance requested is the 
minimum variance which is sufficient to relieve the hardship proven by the 
applicant. See 83 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning and Planning § 957 (1993); 3 Kenneth H. 
Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning, § 20.86 at 685-86 (4th ed. 1996); see 
also 39 Joy St. Condominium Association. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 688 N.E.2d 1363, 1366 (Mass. 1998) Clark County Board Of Commissioners v. Taggart 
Construction Company, 615 P.2d 965, 967 (Nev. 1980). The hardship recognized by 
the Board was the inability to buy liability insurance without a fence screening 
the pool. Because the record lacks documentation supporting a reasonable 
conclusion that the variance granted was the minimum adjustment necessary to 
achieve this purpose, we must conclude that the decision of the Board is 
arbitrary.

Vested Rights 
Doctrine

[¶20]   Owners argue that the fence has 
been built in reliance on the variance, and, therefore, they have a vested right 
in the fence which renders this action moot. In support of their argument, 
Owners rely on our holding in Snake River Venture v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 616 P.2d 744 (Wyo. 1980). In Snake River, a developer requested a 
permit to construct a subdivision and commercial development in Teton County. 
Id. at 746. After initial approval of the project, the county board of 
commissioners amended the relevant zoning regulations to limit the permitted 
density. Thereafter, the commissioners gave final approval to the developer's 
project, even though the proposed density exceeded the amount allowed in the 
amended regulations. Subsequently, a trial court held that the final approval 
was unlawful. Id. at 747-49.

[¶21]   Upholding the finding of the trial 
court on appeal, we quoted with approval Boise City v. Blaser, 572 P.2d 892, 894 
(1977):

[W]hile a 
landowner who merely obtains a building permit is not protected against a future 
zoning change, he will be protected if, in reliance on the permit or on the 
existing zoning, he has made substantial expenditures or otherwise committed 
himself, to his substantial disadvantage, before the zoning is 
changed.

 (Citation 
omitted.) "The fact that appellant-developer had not begun any actual 
construction on the project at the time of the trial court's decision [was] 
highly significant to our disposition of this appeal." Snake River Venture, 616 P.2d  at 745. Owners contend that because they expended substantial amounts in 
reliance on the variance, this holding grants them a vested right to keep the 
six-foot fence.

[¶22]   We disagree. Generally, a permit 
issued under a mistake of fact confers no vested right or privilege and may be 
revoked at any time. Bruno v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 664 A.2d 1077, 1080 
(Pa. 1995). The concept of vested rights "is a judicial construct designed to 
provide individual relief in zoning cases involving egregious statutory or 
bureaucratic inequities." Id. (quoting Highland Park Community Club v. Zoning 
Board of Adjustment, 506 A.2d 887, 891 (Pa. 1986)). Our decision in Snake River 
did not specifically address the precise conditions under which expenditures or 
commitments create a vested right. It has been recognized, however, that a 
property owner must act in good faith to acquire vested rights in a variance, 
and the reliance on the variance must be reasonable. See Bruno, 664 A.2d  at 
1080. Actions taken in reliance on a variance or permit while the time for 
appeal is pending are inherently unreasonable. Columbus Board of Zoning Appeals 
v. Wetherald, 605 N.E.2d 208, 210 (Ind. App. 1992); Appeal of Gambone, 598 A.2d 620, 626 (Pa. 1991) (and cases cited therein); Bowman v. City of York, 482 N.W.2d 537, 546 (Neb. 1992). Rather than protected activity, the commitment and 
expenditures under these circumstances are considered to be a calculated risk. 
Wetherald, supra; Bowman, supra; Hussey v. Town of Barrington, 604 A.2d 82, 85 
(N.H. 1992).

[¶23]   Here, Owners knew that the Board's 
decision was hotly contested and subject to appeal for 30 days after the time 
the Board rendered its final decision. Nonetheless, Owners state that before the 
time for appeal had passed, they executed a contract and paid a non-refundable 
deposit for materials, tore down substantial portions of the hedge, and paved a 
driveway, providing for the placement of fence posts. Owners further submit that 
they continued to substantially complete the construction after the appeal was 
filed despite the fact the petitioners had concurrently filed a motion for stay 
of the administrative order.

[¶24]   Snake River does not stand for the 
proposition that one who knows a variance is subject to appeal may render that 
appeal moot if only they act quickly. Owners' affirmative statements demonstrate 
that they were well aware of the risks associated with proceeding with the fence 
during the time allowed for appeal. The theory of vested rights does not apply 
here.

CONCLUSION

[¶25]   The record fails to demonstrate 
substantial evidence on which to base a reasonable determination that the 
variance granted to Owners was the minimal adjustment necessary for the purpose 
of the variance. In addition, Owners' expenditures and commitments made during 
the time allowed for appeal of this matter did not constitute the reasonable and 
good faith reliance necessary to create a vested right in the fence as 
constructed. We, therefore, reverse and remand the Order of the 
Board.