Case Title: Tapscott v. State

Citation: 343 Md. 650

Docket Number: 135/95

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 135
September Term, 1995
_____________________________________
ROBERT ALLAN TAPSCOTT
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
____________________________________
   * Murphy, C.J. 
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker,
JJ.
____________________________________
OPINION BY MURPHY, C.J.
  ___________________________________
       Filed:  November 4, 1996
* Murphy, C.J., participated in the 
  hearing of the case, in the       
  conference in regard to its       
  decision and in the adoption of the
  opinion, but he had retired from  
  the Court prior to the filing of  
  the opinion.
In this case, we address whether half-blood relationships are
included within Maryland's prohibition against incest, codified as
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 335, which
provides:
Every person who shall knowingly have carnal
knowledge of another person, being within the degrees of
consanguinity within which marriages are prohibited by
law in this State, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .
. . .
I
A
 Maryland Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol.) § 2-202 of the Family
Law Article lists the specific relationships within which marriage
is prohibited.  Section 202(c)(1)(xii) bars a man from marrying his
sister's daughter, and § 202(c)(2)(iv) declares that a woman may
not marry her mother's brother.  Thus, Article 27, § 335 prohibits
carnal relations between a man and his niece.  Section 2-202 does
not state whether it applies to both whole-blood and half-blood
relationships.
B
On May 13, 1994, Robert Allan Tapscott was convicted of two
counts of incest following a jury trial before the Circuit Court
for Prince George's County (Clark, J.).  During the trial, the
State introduced evidence to show that Tapscott engaged in
intercourse with "K.C." on two occasions.  The State also
introduced evidence demonstrating that Tapscott and K.C.'s mother
had the same father and were therefore half-blood siblings.  Thus,
2
according to the State's evidence, K.C. was Tapscott's half-blood
niece.
Following his conviction, Tapscott appealed to the Court of
Special Appeals, raising various arguments.  After the Court of
Special Appeals affirmed the incest convictions — Tapscott v.
State, 106 Md.App. 109, 664 A.2d 42 (1995) — Tapscott petitioned
this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.
C
Tapscott argues that § 2-202 of the Family Law Article does
not prohibit marriage between half-blood relatives.  He asserts
that because § 2-202 does not specifically mention half-blood
relatives, this Court cannot extend § 2-202's definition to include
such relationships.  Tapscott contends that to do so would violate
the principle of strict construction of penal statutes.  Finally,
Tapscott claims that the legislature's specific reference to half-
blood relations in Maryland Code (1974, 1991 Repl. Vol.) § 1-204 of
the Estates and Trusts Article demonstrates that the legislature
has been aware of half-blood relationships and would have expressly
listed them in Family Law § 2-202 if it had intended to include
them.  The State, on the other hand, contends that § 2-202 of the
Family Law Article prohibits marriage between half-blood relations
to the same extent as whole-blood relations.
II
A
As Tapscott correctly notes, criminal statutes must be
3
strictly construed in favor of the defendant, Jones v. State, 304
Md. 216, 220, 498 A.2d 622 (1985), and "courts will not extend the
punishment to cases not plainly within the language used."  State
v. Archer, 73 Md. 44, 20 A. 172 (1890), quoted in State v. Fabritz,
276 Md. 416, 422, 348 A.2d 275 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942
(1976).  This rule of construction has been referred to as the
"rule of lenity."  See State v. Purcell, 342 Md. 214, 229, 674 A.2d
936 (1996).
Relying on the rule of lenity, Tapscott argues that because
half-blood relationships have not been specifically included within
the list of prohibited relationships in § 2-202, we must construe
§ 2-202 to exclude such relationships.  To support his contention,
Tapscott cites State v. Craig, 254 Kan. 575, 867 P.2d 1013 (1994),
People v. Baker, 69 Cal. 2d 44, 69 Cal. Rptr. 595, 442 P.2d 675,
676 (1968), and State v. Bartley, 304 Mo. 58, 263 S.W. 95, 95
(1924).  In each of these cases, courts held that a strict
construction of the relevant incest statutes required the exclusion
of half-blood relationships from the statutes' prohibitions.  In
reaching this conclusion, however, the courts expressly relied on
the fact that the relevant statutes explicitly prohibited relations
between half-blood brothers and sisters but made no reference to
any other half-blood relationships.  See Craig, supra, 867 P.2d at
1015 (statute forbad marriage or sexual relations between a person
and his "child, grandchild of any degree, brother, sister, half-
brother, half-sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece"); Baker,
     At one time, it appears that statutes such as those in Craig,
1
Baker, and Bartley were also generally interpreted to include half-
blood uncles and aunts within the incest definition.  See State v.
Reedy, 44 Kan. 190, 24 P. 66 (1890), overruled, Craig, supra, 867
4
supra, 442 P.2d at 676 (statute forbad marriage between "parents
and children, ancestors and descendants of every degree, and
between brothers and sisters of the half as well as the whole
blood, and between uncles and nieces or aunts and nephews");
Bartley, supra, 263 S.W. at 95 (statute  defined incest as sexual
relations between "grandparents and grandchildren of every degree,
brother and sisters of the half, as well as of the whole, blood,
uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews").  In each case, the courts
inferred 
that 
the 
specific 
inclusion 
of 
some 
half-blood
relationships 
was 
intended 
to 
exclude 
those 
half-blood
relationships not mentioned.  See Craig, supra, 867 P.2d at 1016;
Baker, supra, 442 P.2d at 676 (concluding that "the Legislature by
expressly including relationships between brothers and sisters of
the half blood and not so specifying as to more distant relatives
has evinced the intention to exclude such persons from the
prohibitions of the statute"); Bartley, supra, 263 S.W. at 96
(adopting the view that "[w]hen the Legislature mentioned brothers
and sisters of the half blood, it necessarily excluded all other
relationships of the half blood").
In contrast, courts interpreting statutes with no specific
mention 
of 
half-blood 
relationships 
have 
included 
such
relationships within the incest prohibition.   See Singh v. Singh,
1
P.2d at 1016; State v. Guiton, 51 La. Ann. 155, 24 So. 784, 784
(1898) (applying French civil law to include half-uncles and half-
nieces in a statute prohibiting marriage between "brother and
sister, whether of the whole or of the half blood, . . . and also
between the uncle and the niece, the aunt and the nephew"); State
v. Harris, 149 N.C. 513, 62 S.E. 1090, 1090-91 (1908) (holding that
even though the statute specifically referred to half-blood
siblings, and made no mention of half-blood uncles or nieces,
"[t]he relation of uncle and niece must of necessity be of the half
blood . . .  We think the defendant and his niece, the daughter of
his half-sister, clearly within the statute."); People v. Womack,
167 Cal. App. 2d 130, 334 P.2d 309, 311 72 A.L.R.2d 703 (1959) ("It
has been held generally that [prohibitions against incestuous
relationships apply to designated near relatives, whether by the
half blood or the whole blood."), overruled, Baker, supra, 442 P.2d
at 679.  See also W.R. Habeeb, Annotation, Sexual Intercourse
Between Persons Related By Half Blood As Incest, 72 A.L.R.2d 706,
707 (1959).
5
213 Conn. 637, 569 A.2d 1112, 1121 (1990) (according common meaning
to terms "uncle" and "niece" and determining that half-blood
relationships fall within incest statute); State v. Sharon H., 429
A.2d 1321, 1326-28 (Del. Super. 1981) (interpreting statute that
prohibited marriage between a person and "his or her ancestor,
descendant, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, niece, nephew or first
cousin" to include half-blood relatives); State v. Skinner, 132
Conn. 163, 43 A.2d 76, 77 (1945), overruled on other grounds, State
v. Tillman, 152 Conn. 15, 202 A.2d 494 (1964) (holding that "the
word sister, as used in the [incest] statute, applies to and
includes a half sister"); State v. Lamb, 209 Iowa 132, 227 N.W.
830, 831-32 (1929) (finding that "sister" includes both whole-blood
and half-blood relations within the meaning of the incest statute);
Commonwealth v. Ashey, 248 Mass. 259, 142 N.E. 788 (1924)
(convicting a half-blood uncle and niece of violating statutes
6
providing that "no man shall marry his . . . sister's daughter" and
"no woman shall marry her . . . mother's brother"); State v. Smith,
101 S.C. 293, 85 S.E. 958, 959 (1915) (noting that "the fact that
the relationship in this case is only of the half blood . . . is of
no consequence; for . . . the words used in the statute must be
taken in their ordinary meaning, and therefore include relations of
the half blood"); Burdue v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 428, 138 S.W.
296, 297 (1911) (including a half-blood sister within the
prohibitions of a statute making it a crime for a person to
"carnally know his . . . sister," and noting that no distinction is
made between full blood and half blood sisters for purposes of
inheritance); Shelley v. State, 95 Tenn. 152, 31 S.W. 492 (1895)
(including half-blood brothers and sisters within the prohibitions
of an incest statute making no specific provisions for half-blood
relationships); State v. Wyman, 59 Vt. 527, 8 A. 900 (1887)
(applying incest statute equally to those of whole and half blood);
see also State v. Allen, 304 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa 1981); A.W.
Collins, Jr., Annotation, Sexual Intercourse Between Persons
Related by Half Blood as Incest, 34 A.L.R.5th 723 §§ 2, 4 (1995);
W.R. Habeeb, Annotation, Sexual Intercourse Between Persons Related
By Half Blood As Incest, 72 A.L.R.2d 706, 707 (1959).  In each of
these cases, a statute specifying prohibited relationships, with no
mention of "half blood" or "whole blood," was interpreted as
applying to half-blood relationships as well as whole-blood ones.
B
7
While the rule of lenity requires that penal statutes be
strictly construed, "[a] rule should not, however, be invoked to
subvert the purposes of the statute."  State v. Kennedy, 320 Md.
749, 754, 580 A.2d 193 (1990), quoted in Purcell, supra, 342 Md. at
229.  Because the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to
ascertain and carry out the intent of the legislature, Montgomery
County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523, 636 A.2d 448 (1994), "[t]he
intention of the legislature in drafting a statute should control
a court's construction of that statute."  Kennedy, supra, 320 Md.
at 755.   Our examination of the language and history of § 2-202
leads us to conclude that it applies to the relationships therein
enumerated regardless of whether half-blood or whole-blood
relatives are involved.
The proper starting point in the interpretation of any statute
is the plain language of the statute itself.  Thanos v. State, 332
Md. 511, 522, 632 A.2d 768 (1993).  Absent evidence to the
contrary, the words in a statute should be given their generally
understood meaning, Comptroller of Treasury v. Jameson, 332 Md.
723, 732-33, 633 A.2d 93 (1993), or their "ordinary and natural
import."  Revis v. Automobile Ins. Fund, 322 Md. 683, 686, 589 A.2d
483 (1991).  The question before us, then, is whether the terms
"mother's brother" and "sister's daughter," as used in § 2-202, are
commonly understood to include relations of half-blood sisters and
brothers as well as those of whole-blood siblings.
Several courts have addressed this issue and concluded that
8
the terms "brother" and "sister" are commonly understood to include
half-blood siblings.  See Sharon H., supra, 429 A.2d at 1328
(finding half-blood brothers and sisters to be within the natural
meaning of "brother" and "sister"); People v. Elliff, 74 Colo. 81,
219 P. 224, 225 (1923) (citing various dictionaries and concluding
that "'brother and sister' when used without any qualification,
include 'half-brothers and half-sisters'"); Lamb, supra, 227 N.W.
at 832; Skinner, supra, 43 A.2d at 76; Wyman, supra, 8 A. at 900;
see also Black's Law Dictionary 194, 1387 (6th ed. 1990) (including
both whole-blood and half-blood siblings in definitions of
"brother" and "sister");.  We agree that "brother" and "sister" as
used in § 2-202 of the Family Law Article include half-blood
siblings as well as full blood siblings, and that "mother's
brother" and "sister's daughter" therefore include half-blood
uncles and nieces.
The history of Maryland's marriage prohibitions supports our
conclusion that § 2-202 prohibits marriages between half-blood
relations to the same degree as full-blood relations.  In England,
"[a]lthough incest was punished by the ecclesiastical courts . . .,
it was not an indictable offense at common law and punishment was
left entirely to the ecclesiastical courts."  Singh, supra, 569
A.2d at 1115.  Originally, "[t]he ecclesiastical courts followed
the interdiction of Levitical law which prohibited marriages
between persons more closely related than fourth cousins . . .; no
distinction was made between persons related by affinity or
9
consanguinity."  Baker, supra, 442 P.2d at 678.  In 1540, following
Henry VIII's break with the Catholic Church, a statute was passed
limiting the prohibitions against marriage to relatives closer than
first cousins.  Singh, supra, 569 A.2d at 1115; Baker, supra, 442
P.2d at 678.  The English courts and authorities consistently
interpreted these marriage prohibitions to include half-blood
relations as well as those of the full-blood.  See Singh, supra,
569 A.2d at 1117 (citing English sources); Ashey, supra, 142 N.E.
at 788 (same).
The American jurisdictions departed from English law by
declaring incest to be a crime, in addition to prohibiting marriage
between specified individuals.  The majority of states extended
these criminal prohibitions to first cousins and beyond, and
"generally define[d] incest as marriage or sexual intercourse
between persons too closely related in consanguinity or affinity to
be entitled to marry legally."  Singh, supra, 569 A.2d at 1115; see
also Baker, supra, 442 P.2d at 678; Collins, supra, §§ 2, 4[a]
("Courts have generally held or recognized that sexual intercourse
between persons related by half blood constitutes incest[] in cases
involving . . . uncles and nieces of the half blood").  Maryland's
statutes fit this pattern, with Art. 27, § 335 defining incest as
carnal relations between individuals who are prohibited from
marrying under § 2-202.
In Ashey, supra, 142 N.E. at 788, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court traced the predecessor of its incest statute back to
10
1695 and concluded that the original statute had been modeled upon
English ecclesiastical law.  The court held that "[w]hen our
original law was enacted in 1695-96, it seems reasonable to assume
that the interpretation of the ecclesiastical law as it then
existed in England was adopted, treating the half blood relation
like the whole blood."  Id.  As a result, the court concluded that
half-blood relations were likewise included in the Massachusetts
statute.  Id.
The Connecticut Supreme Court took a similar approach in
Singh, supra, 569 A.2d at 1115.  There, the court found that incest
had been a crime since 1702 with very little substantive change in
the language of the statute since that time.  Id. at 1115-16.
Citing Ashey, the court concluded that "[i]t is fair to assume
that, when the incest statute was enacted in 1702, the framers were
aware of and adopted the interpretation of the ecclesiastical law
as it then existed in England, thus treating the relation of the
half blood like that of the whole blood."  Id. at 1117.
As with the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes, § 2-202's
predecessors can be traced to at least the eighteenth century.  In
ch. 12, § 1 of the Acts of 1777, the Maryland legislature enacted
a "Table of the degrees of kindred and affinity within which no
persons related shall marry together."  In ch. 12, § 2, the
legislature imposed a penalty of "five hundred pounds current
money" or banishment forever from the state upon anyone marrying
"within the three degrees of lineal direct consanguinity, or within
11
the first degree of lateral consanguinity."  This enactment mirrors
the structure of § 2-202, with § 2-202(b) prohibiting any marriage
within three degrees of direct lineal consanguinity or within the
first degree of collateral consanguinity, and with § 2-202(c)
providing an enumerated list of "[c]ertain [prohibited] marriages
within other degrees of affinity or consanguinity."  With the
exception of some deletions from the list of prohibited
relationships in § 2-202(c) of the Family Law Article, the modern
statute is largely the same as the one passed more than 200 years
ago.  No changes have been made to the statute that would indicate
a change in the legislature's intent with respect to whether half-
blood relationships should be included within § 2-202's marriage
prohibitions.
We agree with the Massachusetts and Connecticut Supreme Courts
and conclude that, given the history of marriage and incest
prohibitions in English and American law, and the historic role of
English law in forming the law of this State, it is appropriate to
assume that the framers in 1777 "were aware of and adopted the
interpretation of ecclesiastical law as it then existed in
England."  Singh, supra, 569 A.2d at 1117.  As a result, we
conclude that § 2-202 prohibits marriages between half-blood
relations to the same extent that it prohibits marriages between
full blood relations.
Because half-blood uncles and nieces are encompassed within
the terms "mother's brother" and "sister's daughter," there was no
12
need for the legislature to refer specifically to half-blood
relations in the statute, and the absence of such a reference does
not indicate that half-blood relations are excluded.  As the
Delaware Superior Court stated in Sharon H., supra, 429 A.2d at
1328, "[t]o engraft such exceptions on the plain language of [the
incest statute], because it does not expressly include such
relations, requires an unreasonable interpretation of the statute
which the doctrine of strict construction does not mandate."
C
Tapscott is similarly in error in his contention that the
legislature's mention of half-blood relations in § 1-204 of the
Estates and Trusts Article implies that the legislature intended to
exclude such relationships from the prohibitions of § 2-202 of the
Family Law Article.  Section 1-204 of the Estates and Trusts
Article provides that "[a] relative of the half blood has the same
status as a relative of the whole blood."  Because the rules
relating to intestate succession have a different context and
origin from incest prohibitions, however, Tapscott's comparison is
inapposite.
In Wyman, supra, 8 A. at 900, the Vermont Supreme Court
rejected a similar attempt to use laws relating to intestate
succession 
to 
interpret 
statutes 
regulating 
marriage 
and
prohibiting incest.  There, the court addressed the contention that
half-blood relations were excluded from the incest statute because
they were also excluded from the common-law rules relating to
13
intestate succession.  Id.  In rejecting this argument, the court
stated:
It is true that by the common law a brother of the half-
blood could not inherit, but this was a rule for the
regulation of the descent of property, and had no broader
scope.  It did not undertake to affect the relations of
brethren of the half-blood any further than to prescribe,
for certain reasons having their origin in the ancient
system of feudal tenures, that, in the descent of the
inheritance, a brother of the half-blood should be left
out.  The common-law rule, therefore, would have no force
in a case of this kind . . . .
Id.
Tapscott's contention fails for a similar reason.  Our modern
statutes relating to incest and intestate succession have evolved
from different systems with different underlying rules.  As noted
in Wyman, supra, English common law courts specifically forbade
half-blood relations from inheriting.  Thus, it should not be
surprising that the legislature specifically mentioned half-blood
relations in § 1-204, a statute designed to reverse the pre-
existing common law rule.  As we have already discussed, the
English ecclesiastical courts and the majority of American courts
interpreting incest laws, in contrast, have treated half-blood and
full-blood relatives equivalently, and it should be similarly clear
that the legislature felt no need to distinguish between half-blood
and full-blood relationships when it enacted Maryland's prohibition
on incest.
For these reasons, we conclude that § 2-202 of the Family Law
Article prohibits half-blood relations from marrying to the same
     Tapscott also argues that if we interpret § 2-202 of the
2
Family Law Article as encompassing half-blood relations, then
Maryland's incest law is unconstitutionally vague.  We do not
address this point in detail because it has not been raised
previously, and therefore has not been preserved for our review.
Maryland Rule 8-131.  Given that our interpretation of § 2-202 is
wholly consistent with the interpretations given to similar
statutes by the other courts addressing this issue, and in light of
our conclusion that Maryland's statute relied on pre-existing
English law and uses terms within their commonly accepted meaning,
such a challenge is unlikely to succeed in any event.  See Williams
v. State, 329 Md. 1, 10-11, 616 A.2d 1275 (1992).
14
degree that it prohibits whole-blood relations from doing so.  As
a result, Tapscott's sexual liaisons with his half-blood niece were
similarly prohibited by Article 27, § 335.2
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.