Case Title: Commonwealth v. Sanchez

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12778

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12778 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DAGOBERTO SANCHEZ. 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 5, 2019. - August 25, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Jury and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, Challenge 
to jurors, New trial, Verdict, Sentence, Collateral 
estoppel, Double jeopardy.  Estoppel.  Collateral Estoppel.  
Constitutional Law, Double jeopardy. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 5 and 16, 2005. 
 
 
Following review by the Appeals Court, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 
189 (2011), a motion for a new trial, filed on January 10, 2018, 
was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (Mark T. 
Lee, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
Ruth Greenberg for the defendant. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  Throughout the thirteen years of his 
incarceration, the defendant pressed the same claim at every 
 
 
 
2 
 
stage of appeal or motion for postconviction relief -- that the 
trial judge did not properly inquire as to whether the 
prosecutor unconstitutionally struck young African-American men 
from the jury.  The Appeals Court affirmed the trial judge's 
decision not to probe deeper into the prosecutor's reasons, 
while the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 
on review of the defendant's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, concluded that the trial judge unreasonably applied 
Federal law. 
 
In this appeal, we must determine what effects these 
divergent holdings have for a judge considering a subsequent 
motion for postconviction relief.  We also must decide whether 
the motion judge1 erred in reducing the verdict under Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995), and 
whether principles of double jeopardy bar a new trial. 
Lastly, we recognize and address apparent differences 
between Massachusetts and Federal procedures and remedies for 
impermissible peremptory challenges.  In so doing, we adopt the 
language of the Federal standard for the first step of a 
challenge pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 
(1986).  We retire the language of "pattern" and "likelihood," 
which has long governed the first-step inquiry under 
                                                 
 
1 The motion judge was not the trial judge, who had retired. 
 
 
 
3 
 
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486, 489-490, cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), because we conclude that this 
language has resulted in persistent confusion for judges and 
litigants alike. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we determine that the judge's 
decision to reduce the verdict in this case under rule 
25 (b) (2) was improper, and that principles of double jeopardy 
do not preclude resentencing or retrying the defendant.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judge's alternative disposition, and 
remand the matter to the Superior Court for retrial. 
 
Background.  1.  Batson and Soares challenges.  "The 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibit a 
party from exercising a peremptory challenge on the basis of 
race" or other protected classes.  Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 
Mass. 307, 319 (2017), citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 95, and 
Soares, 377 Mass. at 486.  Under the Federal Constitution, a 
racially motivated peremptory challenge violates both the rights 
of the defendant, Batson, supra at 85, citing Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), and the rights of the 
impermissibly struck juror, Batson, supra at 87.  While the 
inquiry under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights focuses on 
a "defendant's right to be tried by a fairly drawn jury of his 
or her peers," we have long concluded that "[r]egardless of the 
 
 
 
4 
 
perspective from which the problem is viewed, the result appears 
to be the same."  Jones, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Benoit, 
452 Mass. 212, 218 n.6 (2008).  Both constitutions "forbid[] 
striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory 
purpose."  Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2244 (2019).  
See Commonwealth v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 393 (2018).  See 
also Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 284-288, 300 (1st Cir. 
2014) (Sanchez V) ("Batson's core rationale [is] that [a] 
person's race simply is unrelated to his [or her] fitness as a 
juror" [quotations and citation omitted]). 
 
Both Federal and Massachusetts courts employ a three-step 
burden-shifting analysis to examine whether a peremptory strike 
is being used impermissibly.  See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2244; 
Robertson, 480 Mass. 393.  First, the party challenging the 
strike must rebut a presumption that the peremptory challenge is 
proper.  In Massachusetts, the presumption of propriety is 
"rebutted on a showing that (1) there is a pattern of excluding 
members of a discrete grouping and (2) it is likely that 
individuals are being excluded solely on the basis of their 
membership in that group."  Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 
539, 545 (2017).  If a party makes such a showing, "the burden 
shifts to the party exercising the challenge to provide a 
'group-neutral' explanation for it" (citation omitted).  Id.  
 
 
 
5 
 
Finally, the "judge must then determine whether the explanation 
is both 'adequate' and 'genuine'" (citation omitted).  Id. 
 
2.  Voir dire.  In the course of the circuitous appellate 
odyssey of this case, the underlying facts of the voir dire have 
been discussed repeatedly and at length.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 189, 190–191 (2011) 
(Sanchez I); Sanchez V, 753 F.3d at 284-288.  We briefly address 
only those underlying facts that are relevant to this appeal. 
 
The original dispute centered on the prosecutor's twelfth 
peremptory challenge, in which he struck a nineteen year old 
African-American college student from the jury.  Sanchez V, 753 
F.3d at 286.  Because two other young, African-American men also 
had been struck, defense counsel objected on Batson-Soares 
grounds.  Id. at 286-287.  Instead of seeking a reason from the 
Commonwealth or determining that the prima facie showing had 
been made, the judge responded, "I think his youth and the fact 
that he's a full-time college student could be a problem."  Id.  
Upon further argument from defense counsel, the judge sought to 
"shortcut" the process by asking the prosecutor if he would 
proffer a race-neutral reason for the strike.  Id. at 287.  The 
prosecutor argued that age is not a protected characteristic and 
insisted that the judge formally find that a threshold showing 
of impropriety had been made before proceeding to the second 
step of the inquiry.  Id. at 287-288.  Noting that five African-
 
 
 
6 
 
American jurors had been seated, the judge declared that the 
prima facie showing had not been made, and then allowed the 
prosecutor to use the peremptory challenge without requiring him 
to give a race-neutral reason.  Id. at 288.  Defense counsel 
renewed her objection, and the case proceeded to trial, where 
the defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and 
possession of a firearm without a license.  Id. 
 
3.  Appellate history.  a.  Direct review.  On appeal, the 
defendant argued error in the trial judge's decision not to 
continue past the first step of the Batson-Soares inquiry.  The 
Appeals Court determined that there was no error in the judge's 
decision.  See Sanchez I, 79 Mass. App. Ct. at 191-193.  The 
court reasoned that "the fact that other members -- here, five -
- of an allegedly targeted group were seated is an appropriate 
factor to consider in determining whether the presumption of 
propriety had been rebutted."  Id. at 192.  The Appeals Court 
also determined that the judge was correct in deciding that 
neither age nor "persons of color" are protected classes under 
Batson and Soares.  Id. at 193.  This court denied further 
appellate review, and the United States Supreme Court denied the 
defendant's petition for certiorari.  See Sanchez v. 
Massachusetts, 565 U.S. 948 (2011); Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 460 
Mass. 1106 (2011). 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
b.  Federal habeas proceedings.  In considering the 
defendant's Federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
noted an apparent conflict between Federal law under Batson and 
Massachusetts law under Soares with respect to the showing 
required at the first step of the inquiry.  See Sanchez vs. 
Roden, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 12-10931-FDS (D. Mass. Feb. 14, 2013) 
(Sanchez IV), vacated by Sanchez V, 753 F.3d 279.  The District 
Court judge's view that "[t]he Massachusetts 'likely' standard 
is thus more stringent than the [F]ederal standard" led the 
court to conduct a de novo review of the defendant's Federal 
Batson claims, in accordance with Federal habeas jurisprudence.2  
Id. 
 
The District Court judge concluded that, while specific 
racial or ethnic groups are constitutionally protected, the 
broader appellation of people "of color" did not represent a 
"cognizable group" for purposes of Batson.  Sanchez IV, supra, 
citing Gray v. Brady, 592 F.3d 296, 302 (1st Cir. 2010).3  
                                                 
 
2 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
noted the appearance of the contradiction and did not reach the 
question whether Massachusetts law actually requires a higher 
burden at the first stage of a Batson inquiry.  See Sanchez v. 
Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 300 n.15 (1st Cir. 2014) (Sanchez V). 
 
3 In reaching this determination, the United States District 
Court employed a three-part test for defining a cognizable group 
under Batson, according to which the party challenging the 
strike must show that "(1) the group is identifiable and limited 
 
 
 
8 
 
Similarly, he noted that age is not a cognizable group under 
Batson.  Sanchez IV, supra.  He also decided that 
intersectionality brought the defendant no further, and 
explicitly declined to recognize "young African-American men" or 
"young men 'of color'" as cognizable groups for Batson purposes.  
Id.  Accordingly, the judge denied relief; he reasoned that even 
if the Appeals Court had applied the proper first-step burden, 
the defendant's claim would fail because it was not based on a 
specifically protected cognizable group.  Id. 
 
The First Circuit reviewed the defendant's habeas claim de 
novo.  See Sanchez V, 753 F.3d at 293.  It concluded that the 
Appeals Court, and by implication this court (in denying further 
appellate review), unreasonably applied clearly established 
Federal law.  Id. at 299-300 (defining unreasonable application 
of Federal law as exceeding even clear error). 
 
Specifically, the First Circuit pointed to Snyder v. 
Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008), a case in which the United 
                                                 
by some clearly identifiable factor, (2) a common thread of 
attitudes, ideas, or experiences runs through the group, and 
(3) a community of interests exists among the group's members, 
such that the group's interest cannot be adequately represented 
if the group is excluded from the jury."  Sanchez vs. Roden, 
U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 12-10931 (D. Mass. Feb. 14, 2013), vacated, 
753 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 2014), citing Gray v. Brady, 592 F.3d 
296, 305-306 (1st Cir. 2010).  It concluded that "[a]lthough 
African–Americans and Hispanics are each a distinct cognizable 
group, when combined they lack the necessary characteristics, 
definable qualities, common thread of attitudes, or interests to 
be considered a cognizable 'group.'" Id. 
 
 
 
9 
 
States Supreme Court "made it clear that in considering a Batson 
objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, 
all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial 
animosity must be consulted."  Sanchez V, 753 F.3d at 299, 
quoting Snyder, supra at 478.  Accordingly, the First Circuit 
determined that the Appeals Court "wholly failed to consider all 
of the circumstances bearing on potential racial 
discrimination."  Sanchez V, supra.  In particular, the First 
Circuit expressed concern that when the Appeals Court pointed 
primarily to the number of African-Americans who already had 
been seated, it "sent the unmistakable message that a prosecutor 
can get away with discriminating against some African Americans 
(and by extension, individuals from any other ethnic background) 
on the venire:  so long as a prosecutor does not discriminate 
against all such individuals, not only will his strikes be 
permitted, but he will not even be required to explain them."  
Id. at 299-300. 
The First Circuit went on to conduct a thorough first-step 
inquiry by considering all of the relevant facts and 
circumstances bearing on potential racial discrimination.  Id. 
at 301-307.  The court then concluded that the defendant 
"satisfied his initial burden under Batson, and the prosecutor 
should have been required to articulate a race-neutral reason 
for his peremptory strike."  Id. at 307.  As a remedy, it 
 
 
 
10 
 
remanded the matter to the District Court for an evidentiary 
hearing "to allow a factual, on-the-merits determination with 
respect to the second and third prongs" of the Batson inquiry.  
Id. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing -- some eight years after the 
voir dire at the defendant's trial -- the United States District 
Court judge attempted to ascertain whether the prosecutor in 
fact had exercised his peremptory challenge on the basis of 
race.  See Sanchez vs. Roden, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 12-10931-FDS 
(D. Mass. Feb. 4, 2015), aff'd, 808 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(Sanchez VII), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1685 (2016).  When asked 
directly, the prosecutor testified that he struck the juror in 
question because of the juror's age, not his race.  Id.  Based 
on a combination of his testimony and his demeanor, including 
testimony about why he did not strike a twenty-one year old, 
white, Russian immigrant who also was a student, the judge found 
that the prosecutor's "race-neutral explanation, under the 
circumstances presented here, is reasonable and credible."  Id.  
Therefore, the defendant's challenge failed at the third step of 
Batson, and habeas relief was denied.  Id.  Reviewing this 
determination under the deferential standard of clear error, the 
First Circuit affirmed the Federal District Court judge's 
determination.  See Sanchez VII, supra at 90, 93. 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
c.  Motion for a new trial.  The defendant then filed a 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), or, in the alternative, for 
a reduced sentence pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2).  
The motion judge looked to the First Circuit's holding in 
Sanchez V.  He then noted that this court has 
"recognized and restated the legal rules applied by the 
First Circuit in the Sanchez case.  These principles had 
always been the law during the pendency of this case, 
including the trial in 2006.  Thus, under clear, 
preexisting law, [the defendant] should have prevailed on 
his initial appeal -- to the Massachusetts Appeals Court." 
 
The motion judge concluded that, although the defendant received 
a remedy for his Federal rights under Batson, "[n]o court has 
adjudicated [the defendant's] remedial rights under the [S]tate 
[C]onstitution."  Because this court has determined that the 
erroneous termination of a Batson-Soares inquiry at the first 
step is structural error, see Robertson, 480 Mass. at 397, the 
judge exercised the discretion afforded him under rule 30 (b) to 
grant a new trial. 
 
In recognition of the prejudice to the Commonwealth 
inherent in retrying a murder case after so many years, the 
judge gave the Commonwealth a choice of alternative 
dispositions:  either accept a reduction in the verdict to 
manslaughter under Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2) or proceed with 
the order for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b).  By 
 
 
 
12 
 
the terms of the order, should the Commonwealth decline to 
choose, the sentence automatically would be reduced to one for 
manslaughter.  Rather than making an affirmative choice, the 
Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal. 
 
At a subsequent hearing, the judge resentenced the 
defendant on the manslaughter conviction to a term of from 
fifteen years to fifteen years and one day of incarceration.  
Taking into account the defendant's good time credits, this 
essentially amounted to a sentence of time served.  The 
Commonwealth filed a second notice of appeal.  The Commonwealth, 
did not, however, seek to have the defendant's new sentence 
stayed pending appeal. 
 
Discussion.  On a written motion, a judge "may grant a new 
trial at any time if it appears that justice may not have been 
done."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b).  A motion for a new trial is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the judge.  Commonwealth v. 
DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. 657, 663-664 (2011).  "[A]n appellate 
court will examine the motion judge's conclusion only to 
determine whether there has been a significant error of law or 
other abuse of discretion."  Id. at 664, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Wolinski, 431 Mass. 228, 235 (2000). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the motion judge abused his 
discretion in granting relief, because his order violates 
principles of both direct and collateral estoppel. 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
1.  Direct estoppel.  A judge's authority to grant a new 
trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), while broad, is 
limited by principles of direct estoppel.  See Commonwealth v. 
Ellis, 475 Mass. 459, 475 (2016).  For direct estoppel to bar 
relief, "the Commonwealth must show that the issues raised in 
the defendant's rule 30 (b) motion were actually litigated and 
determined . . . , that such determination was essential to the 
defendant's conviction, and that the defendant had an 
opportunity to obtain review of the determination."  
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 443 Mass. 707, 710 (2005).  When 
these three criteria are met, i.e., where the "facts and the law 
are literally the same [as in the direct appeal]," direct 
estoppel prevents a judge from granting relief under rule 30 (b) 
solely "based on [the] assertion that [the] direct appeal was 
decided wrongly."  Id. at 710-711.  See Ellis, supra; 
Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 364 Mass. 211, 229 (1973), and cases 
cited ("a motion for a new trial may not be used as a vehicle to 
compel a trial judge to review and reconsider questions of law 
which were actually raised at the trial and already reviewed by 
an appellate court"). 
 
In Rodriguez, 443 Mass. at 711, however, we left open the 
possibility that, where this court, in a separate and later 
case, has indicated or implied that a specific appellate 
decision was wrongly decided, there might be grounds for a 
 
 
 
14 
 
motion for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) for the 
particular individual whose appellate case had been cast into 
doubt.4  Here, we have not pointed directly to the defendant's 
case as decided wrongly, but the First Circuit has stated as 
much on Federal habeas review.5  Indeed, that court did not mince 
words in critiquing the Appeals Court's decision, and, by 
implication, this court's decision to deny further appellate 
review.  "The [Appeals Court]'s treatment of Sanchez's Batson 
claim was more than clearly erroneous:  it was objectively 
                                                 
 
4 In a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), the defendant in Rodriguez 
sought a new trial because this court had called into doubt one 
of the grounds for a critical decision on a motion to suppress 
in Commonwealth v. Jimenez, 438 Mass. 213, 220 n.5 (2002), a 
case decided after her trial.  See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 
443 Mass. 707, 707-708 (2005).  This court ultimately decided 
that direct estoppel applied, because the footnote in Jimenez 
invalidated only one of the two possible grounds for the no-
knock warrant, and therefore the motion to suppress was not 
wrongly decided.  See Rodriguez, supra at 711. 
 
 
5 The Commonwealth is correct in arguing that the assessment 
of Sanchez I by the First Circuit is not strictly binding on 
either this court or the Appeals Court.  "[A]lthough we give 
respectful consideration to such lower Federal court decisions 
as seem persuasive, we are not bound by decisions of Federal 
courts except the decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
on questions of Federal law" (quotations and citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 308 (2014).  See 
Commonwealth v. Pearson, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 299, 304 n.9 (2019), 
("We are not bound by the analysis of constitutional principles 
applied by the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit"), S.C., 484 Mass. 1104 (2020) (granting further 
appellate review on another ground).  To the extent that the 
motion judge's order implies that the decision of the First 
Circuit was binding authority as to the correctness of the 
Appeals Court's decision, that implication is not correct. 
 
 
 
15 
 
unreasonable in light of clearly established [F]ederal law."  
Sanchez V, 753 F.3d at 300.  The question we must decide is 
whether the conclusion by the First Circuit that Massachusetts 
appellate courts unreasonably applied Federal law unsettles the 
preclusive effect of the direct appellate process.  We conclude 
that it does. 
 
Direct estoppel, a form of issue preclusion, is a 
judicially created doctrine with roots in the common law.  See 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 431 Mass. 71, 74 (2000).  Even where 
the formal requirements are met, the doctrine is not absolute. 
See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (1982) (exception to 
issue preclusion exists when "a new determination is warranted 
in order to take account of an intervening change in the 
applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable 
administration of the laws").  Cf. United States v. Bell, 988 
F.2d 247, 251 (1st Cir. 1993) (detailing exceptions to closely 
related "law of the case" doctrine, including specific exception 
"in the interests of justice"). 
 
Like other stability-promoting judicial doctrines, direct 
estoppel serves "stability in the decision[-]making process, 
predictability of results, proper working relationships between 
trial and appellate courts, and judicial economy."  Bell, 988 
F.2d at 250 (referring to law of the case doctrine).  See 
Commonwealth v. Stephens, 451 Mass. 370, 375 (2008) ("collateral 
 
 
 
16 
 
estoppel is designed to relieve parties of the cost and vexation 
of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by 
preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on 
adjudication" [quotation and citation omitted]).  These 
interests, while important, exist in some inherent tension with 
the underlying purpose of Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, which grants 
broad authority to judges, in order that they may "ensure that 
the result in every criminal case is consonant with justice."  
Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 666 (1998).  In 
determining not to apply direct estoppel here, we conclude that 
the interests of finality and judicial economy must yield to a 
direct indication from a higher or coordinate court that a 
specific appeal was wrongly decided; a judge, exercising his or 
her discretion, may grant a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 30 on such grounds. 
 
This conclusion draws further support here given our 
frequent, extensive, and approving reliance on Sanchez V in 
explaining the standard for evaluating the first phase of a 
Batson-Soares inquiry.  See, e.g., Jones, 477 Mass. at 321-325 
(citing Sanchez V, supra, ten times while explaining proper 
application of Batson).  See also Commonwealth v. Ortega, 480 
Mass. 603, 607 (2018); Robertson, 480 Mass. at 393; Commonwealth 
v. Lopes, 478 Mass. 593, 599 (2018).  It would not be 
unreasonable for a trial judge to conclude from this history, as 
 
 
 
17 
 
the motion judge did here, that we have agreed with and adopted 
the reasoning of the First Circuit, and that its reading of how 
Federal law should have been applied, specifically with respect 
to the defendant's case. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that where a Federal Circuit Court 
of Appeals on habeas review has determined that a Massachusetts 
appellate court has unreasonably applied Federal law, regardless 
of the ultimate disposition of the petition, direct estoppel 
does not bar a judge, in his or her discretion, from granting a 
new trial on the ground that justice might not have been done. 
 
2.  Collateral estoppel.  The Commonwealth argues further 
that, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the ultimate 
result of the defendant's habeas litigation -- denial because 
the prosecutor's race-neutral reason for exercising the 
peremptory challenge was found credible -- should be given 
preclusive effect against the defendant's rule 30 (b) motion.  
In other words, because the Federal courts ultimately have 
determined that there was no Batson violation, the defendant 
cannot be granted a new trial on the ground of a Batson-Soares 
violation. 
 
For collateral estoppel to apply, five criteria must be 
met: 
"(1) the issues in the two proceedings must be identical; 
(2) the party estopped must have had sufficient incentive 
to litigate the issue fully and vigorously; (3) the party 
 
 
 
18 
 
estopped must have been a party to the previous litigation; 
(4) the applicable law must be identical in both 
proceedings; and (5) the first proceeding must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits such that the 
defendant had sufficient incentive and an opportunity to 
appeal" (footnote omitted). 
 
Commonwealth v. Cabrera, 449 Mass. 825, 829 (2007), citing 
Commonwealth v. Ringuette, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 351, 357, S.C., 443 
Mass. 1003 (2004).  We agree with the Commonwealth that all five 
conditions are satisfied with respect to the defendant's rights 
under the Federal Constitution and Batson.6  We also agree with 
the Commonwealth that the evil meant to be prevented by the 
whole Batson-Soares schema is the discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges. 
 
We agree with the motion judge, however, that collateral 
estoppel does not bar a remedy under the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights and the holding of Soares, because, in 
order for collateral estoppel to apply to a specific claim, "the 
applicable law must be identical in both proceedings."  See 
Cabrera, 449 Mass. at 829.  For a first-stage Batson-Soares 
                                                 
 
6 Specifically, (1) the Batson issue is identical; (2) the 
defendant had every incentive to litigate vigorously at his 
criminal trial on a charge of murder; (3) the defendant was a 
party to the habeas litigation; (4) to the extent that the 
defendant was litigating under the Federal Constitution, the law 
was the same; and (5) the determination by the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts ultimately was 
affirmed by the First Circuit.  See Sanchez v. Roden, 808 F.3d 
85, 90 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 
 
 
19 
 
error, our law differs from Federal law in that it provides for 
a greater and more certain remedy. 
 
Under Federal law, even one peremptory challenge determined 
to have been exercised on the basis of race is structural error 
for which prejudice is conclusively presumed.  See Scarpa v. 
Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 
1129 (1995), citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 100.  Error at the first 
step of a Batson challenge, however, i.e., erroneously failing 
to require a reason from the party attempting to strike the 
juror, generally is treated by remand for the belated completion 
of the burden-shifting analysis.  See Sanchez V, 753 F.3d at 
307-308, citing Batson, supra, and Johnson v. California, 545 
U.S. 162, 173 (2005).  See also People v. Johnson, 38 Cal. 4th 
1096, 1099 (2006) (addressing question of proper procedure after 
first-step Batson error is recognized on appeal, and noting that 
"[t]he [F]ederal courts generally remand"); 6 W.R. LaFave, J.H. 
Israel, N.J. King, & O.S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 22.3(d) 
(4th ed. 2019 update) ("limited remand for a new Batson hearing 
is the remedy applied by appellate courts throughout this 
country when a trial court fails to conduct a proper Batson 
analysis, unless it is impossible to reconstruct the 
circumstances surrounding the peremptory challenges, due perhaps 
to the passage of time or the unavailability of the trial judge" 
[quotations and citations omitted]). 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
In Massachusetts, by contrast, we essentially have rejected 
remand as a remedy when a judge erroneously fails to find a 
prima facie showing at the first stage of the Batson-Soares 
inquiry.  See Ortega, 480 Mass. at 607–608 ("Because the judge 
failed to recognize that the defendant had made out a prima 
facie showing of discrimination . . . , the defendant's 
convictions must be reversed"); Robertson, 480 Mass. at 397 
("Because such an error [(failing to move past the first step)] 
is structural, carrying the presumption of prejudice, we vacate 
the convictions and remand the case for a new trial"); Jones, 
477 Mass. at 325-326; Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 11 n.14 
(2013) ("where a judge abuses his or her discretion by failing 
to find a prima facie case, the error is unlikely to be 
harmless"); Commonwealth v. Long, 419 Mass. 798, 807 (1995). 
 
Indeed, since well before Batson was decided, we have 
expressed skepticism concerning the contention that the real 
motives of a party seeking to strike a juror can be discerned 
accurately years later on remand.  See Soares, 377 Mass. at 492 
n.37 ("we have considered carefully, and rejected, the 
alternative disposition of remanding the matter solely to 
determine the basis of the prosecutor's exercise of the 
peremptory challenges in issue.  We do not consider this to be a 
realistic alternative. . . .  [T]he conditions of the 
empanelment in issue cannot be easily recreated").  As the 
 
 
 
21 
 
motion judge in this case was careful to point out, this concern 
is warranted even where the striking party's good faith and 
candor are fully credited. 
 
In response to this apparent conflict between Federal and 
Massachusetts law, the Commonwealth points to a series of 
footnotes in which we have left open the possibility that 
circumstances exist where a remand for an evidentiary hearing 
would be permissible under the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  See Ortega, 480 Mass. at 608 n.10, quoting Jones, 477 
Mass. at 326 n.31.  Despite this possibility, however, neither 
party has identified a single instance where an appellate court 
in Massachusetts actually has remanded a case for an evidentiary 
hearing after a first-stage Batson-Soares error in the more than 
forty years since Soares was decided.7  Nor has this court. 
 
If ever there were circumstances in which a remand was 
appropriate, this case -- where the remand occurred nearly eight 
years after the original voir dire -- does not present such 
circumstances.  The entirely hypothetical (and now foreclosed) 
                                                 
 
7 The possibility of a remand also conflicts with those 
cases where we have determined that prematurely terminating a 
Batson-Soares inquiry is structural error, the defining feature 
of which is a conclusive presumption of prejudice.  See 
Robertson, 480 Mass. at 397 ("Because [the first-step] error is 
structural, carrying the presumption of prejudice, we vacate the 
convictions and remand the case for a new trial").  If the error 
is structural, the only proper remedy, as our long-standing 
practice indicates, is a new trial. 
 
 
 
22 
 
option of remand does not alter our assessment that 
Massachusetts and Federal law differ significantly on the 
question of an appropriate remedy for a first-stage Batson-
Soares error.  Because the operative law is not identical, 
collateral estoppel does not apply.  As the motion judge 
determined, the defendant thus is entitled to the presumptive 
remedy of a new trial.  See Soares, 377 Mass. at 486.  Because 
neither direct nor collateral estoppel bar that result, we 
discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision to grant 
a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b). 
 
3.  Trial judge's authority under rule 25 (b) (2).  
Rule 25 (b) (2) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure 
gives trial judges the authority "on motion [to] set aside the 
verdict and order a new trial, or order the entry of a finding 
of not guilty, or order the entry of a finding of guilty of any 
offense included in the offense charged in the indictment or 
complaint."  This authority "overlap[s] in significant respects" 
with that granted under rule 30 (b) to order "a new trial at any 
time if it appears that justice may not have been done."  See 
Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 447 Mass. 161, 166 (2006); Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 30 (b).  A trial judge's authority under 
rule 25 (b) (2) is "comparable to the power vested in this court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and . . . 'should be guided by 
the same considerations.'"  Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 
 
 
 
23 
 
808, 820 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 
555 (1981).  Both provisions embody a legislative delegation of 
"judicial responsibility to ensure that the result in every 
criminal case is consonant with justice."  See Woodward, 427 
Mass. at 666, citing Gaulden, supra at 553–554 & n.7.  We review 
a sentencing reduction under rule 25 (b) (2) only to determine 
whether "the judge abused his [or her] discretion or committed 
an error of law."  Rolon, supra at 821, citing Woodward, supra 
at 668. 
 
It is well established that a trial judge has broad 
authority to reduce a jury's verdict, "even where the evidence 
supports the verdict returned by the jury."  Gilbert, 447 Mass. 
at 168 n.9.  See Rolon, 438 Mass. at 820, citing Woodward, 427 
Mass. at 666–667.  This authority is exercised properly "where 
the weight of the evidence in the case, although technically 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict, points to a lesser 
crime."  Rolon, supra at 821. 
 
We also have sanctioned reductions in verdicts as remedies 
for certain trial errors.  See, e.g., Woodward, 427 Mass. at 667 
(reduction in verdict may be used to "ameliorate injustice 
caused by the Commonwealth, defense counsel, the jury, the 
judge's own error, or, as may have occurred in this case, the 
interaction of several causes"); Commonwealth v. Millyan, 399 
 
 
 
24 
 
Mass. 171, 188–189 (1987).  In Gilbert, 447 Mass. at 169, we 
reasoned: 
"If a trial judge has the discretionary authority to reduce 
a verdict when there are no errors in the trial 
proceedings, but nevertheless concludes that a different 
verdict would rectify a 'disproportionate' verdict, 
[Gaulden, 383 Mass.] at 556, or would be more 'consonant 
with justice,' Commonwealth v. Seit, 373 Mass. 83, 94 
(1977), we see no reasoned basis under our rules or 
otherwise to preclude a similar reduction where an error 
does not affect the lesser included offense that is 
supported by the evidence" (emphasis added). 
 
This authority to reduce verdicts because of errors, although 
granted by rule, is consistent with long-standing judicial power 
under the common law.  "Trial judges have long held the 
authority at common law to modify a judgment where a jury's 
verdict on a greater offense cannot stand, but their finding on 
a lesser included offense is 'amply supported by the evidence' 
and 'unaffected' by the error."  Gilbert, supra at 168, citing 
Commonwealth v. Clifford, 254 Mass. 390, 394 (1926). 
 
As these formulations imply, the power to reduce verdicts 
is not without constraint.  By rule, the reduction must be to a 
lesser included offense of the offense charged.  Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 25 (b) (2).  See Commonwealth v. Walker, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 
194, 197 (2007).  In addition, the lesser included offense must 
be unaffected by the error warranting the reduction.  Gilbert, 
447 Mass. at 176.  We consistently have explained that "[a] 
judge should use this power sparingly, and not sit as a second 
 
 
 
25 
 
jury" (quotations and citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Almeida, 452 Mass. 601, 613 (2008).  See Commonwealth v. Chhim, 
447 Mass. 370, 381 (2006).  A reduction to a lesser verdict is 
not justified when it "would be inconsistent with the weight of 
the evidence" or is "based solely on factors irrelevant to the 
level of offense proved."  Rolon, 438 Mass. at 822. 
 
Here, the trial judge reduced the defendant's conviction of 
murder in the second degree to manslaughter on the basis of a 
first-step error in the Batson-Soares inquiry.  The judge wrote 
that the error "places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in 
doubt and effectively deprives [the defendant] of his 
constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury, in 
violation of [art.] 12." 
 
After reaching this conclusion, the judge's decision to 
reduce the sentence because of the Batson-Soares error was an 
error of law.  If the defendant was deprived of his 
constitutional right to an impartial jury, such that the jury 
could not have convicted him of murder in the second degree, 
that jury likewise could not have convicted him of any crime.  
Because the error here affects all of the lesser included 
offenses to the same extent as the greater -- indeed, it goes to 
the power of the jury to render any verdict at all -- it was 
"irrelevant to the level of offense proved."  Rolon, 438 Mass. 
at 822.  Under these circumstances, the only proper remedy was 
 
 
 
26 
 
to grant a new trial.8  Contrast Millyan, 399 Mass. at 188–189 
(reduction from murder in first degree to murder in second 
degree was affirmed where error alleged at trial pertained to 
premeditation). 
 
Accordingly, the order reducing the verdict must be vacated 
and set aside.  Before affirming the judge's alternative 
disposition of a new trial, however, we consider whether that 
result is barred by the defendant's double jeopardy claim. 
 
4.  Double jeopardy.  "At its core, the prohibition against 
double jeopardy, which flows from the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, as well as the statutory and common 
law of Massachusetts, provides that 'a person cannot twice be 
put in jeopardy for the same offence.'"  Marshall v. 
Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 529, 534 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Burke, 342 Mass. 144, 145 (1961).  This guarantee against double 
jeopardy consists of three independent protections.  "It 
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal.  It protects against a second prosecution for the 
                                                 
 
8 Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 447 Mass. 161 (2006), is not to 
the contrary.  On appeal, both the Commonwealth and the 
defendant in that case agreed that the judge's instructions on 
premeditation and malice were erroneous such that they created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  Id. at 169-170.  
This court upheld a reduction of the verdict from murder in the 
first degree to murder in the second degree because the malice 
(required for both degrees of murder) could be "ineluctably 
inferred" from the evidence, while premeditation could not 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 176. 
 
 
 
27 
 
same offense after conviction.  And it protects against multiple 
punishments for the same offense."  Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 
Mass. 502, 509 (2014), quoting Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth, 386 
Mass. 260, 271–272 (1982), S.C., 390 Mass. 438 (1983).  See 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). 
 
These prohibitions "'represent[] a constitutional policy of 
finality for the defendant's benefit' in criminal proceedings."  
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 19 (2010), quoting 
Aldoupolis, 386 Mass. at 274.  See United States v. Jorn, 400 
U.S. 470, 479 (1971).  This principle of finality "animates our 
common-law protections against double jeopardy and prevents the 
Commonwealth from 'shatter[ing] the defendant's repose and 
threaten[ing] him with grievous harm.'"  Selavka, 469 Mass. 
at 513, quoting Double Jeopardy, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 101, 102 
(1977). 
 
Here, the defendant argues that principles of double 
jeopardy preclude any further punishment, in the event he were 
to be retried and convicted again.  For after the judge reduced 
the verdict to manslaughter, he sentenced the defendant on the 
reduced verdict and that sentence has been fully executed and 
served.  The defendant asserts a constitutionally significant 
finality interest in this completed sentence, such that any 
further punishment would amount to being impermissibly punished 
multiple times for the same crime.  Because the reduced verdict 
 
 
 
28 
 
underlying that sentence was timely appealed by the 
Commonwealth, we conclude that the defendant remained in 
continuing jeopardy, notwithstanding the completion of this 
invalid sentence. 
 
When a defendant successfully moves to vacate a conviction 
on either direct or collateral review, an appellate court's 
subsequent order for a new trial does not generally offend the 
protections against double jeopardy.9  See Hicks v. Commonwealth, 
345 Mass. 89, 91 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 839 (1963), and 
cases cited.  See also United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 
(1896), and cases cited.  Two traditional justifications are 
given for this deeply rooted rule.  First, the defendant has 
knowingly unsettled the finality of his or her conviction and 
sentence by appealing.  "[T]he double jeopardy proscription 
protects the defendant against governmental oppression, it does 
                                                 
 
9 There are two exceptions.  Retrial is prohibited where the 
appellate court's reversal is based on the sufficiency of the 
evidence.  See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 186, 191 
(1957); Commonwealth v. Beal, 474 Mass. 341, 354 (2016), quoting 
Marshall v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 529, 538 (2012) ("The 
State . . . generally cannot retry a defendant when an appellate 
court overturns a conviction because of insufficient evidence" 
[quotation omitted]).  Second, where conviction of a lesser 
included offense implies an acquittal of the greater offense, 
the defendant may not be retried on the greater charge.  See 
Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 451 n.20 (2006) (verdict 
of murder in second degree acted as acquittal of charge of 
murder in first degree, barring retrial on greater offense); 
Commonwealth v. Berry, 431 Mass. 326, 336 n.13 (2000) 
(manslaughter verdict acted as acquittal of charge of murder in 
second degree, barring retrial on murder charge). 
 
 
 
29 
 
not 'relieve a defendant from the consequences of his voluntary 
choice' to invalidate his original punishment."  Commonwealth v. 
Cumming, 466 Mass. 467, 471 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Leggett, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 730, 737 (2012).  See United States 
v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978).  Second, double jeopardy is 
not offended because the defendant is understood to remain in 
continuing jeopardy from the first prosecution throughout the 
appellate process.  See Commonwealth v. Resende, 476 Mass. 141, 
146 (2017) ("Continuing jeopardy, on the other hand, exists 
where a verdict is vacated, either through a direct appeal or by 
the allowance of a motion for a new trial, and the defendant is 
retried on that charge"). 
 
The second of these rationales, continuing jeopardy, also 
supports our long-standing determination that double jeopardy 
does not prevent the Commonwealth from appealing from an order 
or decision granting a defendant postconviction relief.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529, 532 (1981) (no 
problem with double jeopardy where Commonwealth appealed from 
postconviction order granting required finding of not guilty 
pursuant to rule 25 [b] [1]); Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 550 (same 
for order to reduce verdict under rule 25 [b] [2]).  See also 
Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005), citing United 
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975) ("When a jury returns 
a verdict of guilty and a trial judge [or an appellate court] 
 
 
 
30 
 
sets aside that verdict and enters a judgment of acquittal, the 
Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude a prosecution appeal to 
reinstate the jury verdict of guilty"). 
 
Here, the Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal from 
the judge's initial order granting postconviction relief.  After 
the defendant was resentenced on the reduced charge, the 
Commonwealth filed a second notice of appeal objecting to the 
reduction in the verdict and the new sentence.  The ongoing 
litigation of these appeals put the defendant on notice that any 
postconviction relief granted to him was not final.  "The 
defendant, of course, is charged with knowledge of the [relevant 
law allowing a governmental appeal], and has no expectation of 
finality in his sentence until the appeal is concluded or the 
time to appeal has expired."  United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 
U.S. 117, 136 (1980).  This is true even in situations where the 
relief being appealed has resulted in the defendant's discharge 
from custody.  See Wilson, 420 U.S. at 345 ("it is well settled 
that an appellate court's order reversing a conviction is 
subject to further review even when the appellate court has 
ordered the indictment dismissed and the defendant discharged"). 
 
The defendant directs us to Selavka, 469 Mass. at 514, but 
that decision is not to the contrary.  There, we determined that 
even an illegal sentence cannot be revised after the expiration 
of a sixty-day deadline within which the Commonwealth can, by 
 
 
 
31 
 
rule, seek to correct sentencing errors.  Id.  See Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 29, as appearing in 474 Mass. 1503 (2016).  In Selavka, 
supra at 513, however, it was precisely the lengthy period of 
inaction by the Commonwealth that meant that the "defendant's 
expectation of finality in his initial sentence [had] 
'crystallized'" such that double jeopardy prevented increased 
punishment (citation omitted).  Here, by contrast, the 
Commonwealth's actions to contest the judge's order were timely.  
Thus, the defendant did not have "every reason to believe that 
his sentence would remain fixed."  Id. at 514.  Rather, he has 
known since well before he was resentenced10 that the order 
granting a new trial or reducing the verdict was under appeal, 
and that his first conviction legally could be reinstated.  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Sallop, 472 Mass. 568, 570-572 (2015); 
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 19-20 (2010), and cases 
                                                 
 
10 This timing distinguishes those cases where we have 
determined that the protections against double jeopardy 
prevented a defendant from being resentenced on a completed 
sentence.  For example, in Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 477 Mass. 
206, 216 (2017), the "defendant had completed both his term of 
probation and his term of incarceration well before the 
Commonwealth's . . . motion to 'clarify' the defendant's 
sentence."  We explained that "because all parts of the 
defendant's sentence had been completed at the time of the 
[Commonwealth's] motion [to clarify], at that point the sentence 
could not have been modified in any way."  Id.  In other words, 
a defendant's expectation of finality in a sentence is different 
when it is challenged prior to its imposition, as opposed to 
sometime after it has been fully served. 
 
 
 
32 
 
cited; Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 552, 560-561 
(2019) (Singh, J., dissenting). 
 
Accordingly, in the unusual procedural posture of this 
case, we ascertain no violation of the protections against 
double jeopardy in resentencing the defendant should he be 
reconvicted at a new trial.11 
 
5.  Apparent conflict in Batson-Soares standards.  As 
described supra, the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts noted an apparent conflict between 
Massachusetts law under Soares and Federal law under Batson.  
See Sanchez IV, supra.  Under the frequently cited language of 
Soares, 377 Mass. at 489-490, the presumption that a peremptory 
challenge is properly made is rebutted by a "showing that (1) a 
pattern of conduct has developed whereby several prospective 
jurors who have been challenged peremptorily are members of a 
discrete group, and (2) there is a likelihood they are being 
                                                 
 
11 Of course, double jeopardy protections require that any 
time that the defendant has served, including "good time 
credits," be fully subtracted from any new sentence he might 
receive.  See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-719 
(1969) ("the constitutional guarantee against multiple 
punishments for the same offense absolutely requires that 
punishment already exacted must be fully 'credited' in imposing 
sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense" [footnote 
omitted]).  Here, this includes ensuring that any new sentence 
would not extend the amount of committed time served prior to 
the defendant becoming eligible for parole. 
 
 
 
33 
 
excluded from the jury solely by reason of their group 
membership." 
 
At the same time, "under Batson, a defendant must merely 
raise an inference that the prosecutor struck a juror because of 
race or other protected status."  See Sanchez IV, supra, citing 
Johnson, 545 U.S. at 169 (holding unconstitutional California's 
first-step requirement that discrimination be "more likely than 
not").  This is not the first time that Federal courts have 
indicated that the language in Soares might be more stringent 
than that standard necessary to establish the first step in 
Batson, and therefore impermissible.  See Aspen v. Bissonnette, 
480 F.3d 571, 575-576 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Aspen v. 
Roden, 552 U.S. 934 (2007) (equating "an 'inference' of 
discrimination with a showing that gender was the 'likely' 
reason that the prosecutor exercised her peremptory challenges" 
was contrary to clearly established Federal law).12  See also 
Gray v. Brady, 588 F. Supp. 2d 140, 142 (D. Mass. 2008), aff'd, 
592 F.3d 296 (1st Cir. 2010). 
                                                 
 
12 The First Circuit declined to determine whether 
Massachusetts case law generally was at odds with Batson; it 
noted that this court has required a group-neutral explanation 
in situations where, in its view, racially motivated 
discrimination was not actually "likely."  See Aspen v. 
Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 575 n.4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub 
nom. Aspen v. Roden, 552 U.S. 934 (2007). 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
We do not agree that the requirements of Soares, 377 Mass. 
at 489-490, as we consistently have interpreted them, are at 
odds with the requirements of Batson.  We have emphasized 
repeatedly that the first-step burden under Soares is minimal.  
See Robertson, 480 Mass. at 390 n.6 ("Our three-step process 
mirrors the procedure in Batson . . ."); Jones, 477 Mass. at 321 
("rebutting the presumption of propriety is not an onerous 
task"); Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460, 463 n.4 (2003) 
("In order to ensure that the important protections set forth 
in . . . Soares, supra at 491, are fully adhered to, the burden 
of making this showing ought not be a terribly weighty one").  
Indeed, Soares itself articulated the distinct two-part inquiry 
of "likelihood" and "pattern" as a framework for determining 
whether an inference of discrimination reasonably could be 
drawn.  See Soares, supra at 490 ("Presented with evidence as to 
these two elements, the trial judge must determine whether to 
draw the reasonable inference that peremptory challenges have 
been exercised so as to exclude individuals on account of their 
group affiliation"). 
 
Nonetheless, it is easy to see how the language of Soares 
continues to sow confusion.  On its face, a reader readily could 
conclude that showing a peremptory challenge was "likel[y]" 
discriminatory requires a higher standard of proof than the 
"inference" required by Batson.  See Aspen, 480 F.3d at 575 n.3 
 
 
 
35 
 
(citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1310 [1993] 
for proposition that "[s]omething is 'likely' to occur 'if it 
has a better chance of occurring than not,'" and noting 
similarities between this and standard repudiated by Johnson, 
545 U.S. at 164, that "the  objector must show that it is more 
likely than not that the other party's peremptory challenges, if 
unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias"). 
 
Similarly, Soares, 377 Mass. at 489-490, asks judges to 
discern whether there has been a pattern of discrimination.  
Yet, in certain circumstances, we have determined that a single 
peremptory challenge may establish such a pattern.  See 
Commonwealth v. Prunty, 462 Mass. 295, 306 n.15 (2012) 
(collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Harris, 409 Mass. 461, 465 
(1991).  We also have held that, in some circumstances, a judge 
has broad discretion to move past the first step of the inquiry 
"without having to make the determination that a pattern of 
improper exclusion exists."  See Lopes, 478 Mass. at 598, 
quoting Issa, 466 Mass. at 11 n.14. 
 
Surveying our jurisprudence on the issue, we note that we 
essentially have made the two-part first-step inquiry of Soares, 
which predated Batson, conform to Federal usage through 
interpretations that exist in tension with the plain meaning of 
the words "likely" and "pattern."  Unsurprisingly, this has 
resulted in continuing confusion amongst judges and litigants.  
 
 
 
36 
 
Indeed, the instant case is yet another example in which we have 
determined that a new trial is required because a trial judge 
erred by not moving past the first step of the inquiry.  See 
Ortega, 480 Mass. at 607–608; Robertson, 480 Mass. at 397; 
Jones, 477 Mass. at 325-326. 
 
For these reasons, we take this opportunity to clarify our 
common law by retiring the specific language of Soares that 
requires, at the first step, a "showing that (1) a pattern of 
conduct has developed whereby several prospective jurors who 
have been challenged peremptorily are members of a discrete 
group, and (2) there is a likelihood they are being excluded 
from the jury solely by reason of their group membership."  
Soares, 377 Mass. at 490.  After the release of the rescript in 
this case, we will adopt the Federal language:  the presumption 
of propriety is rebutted when "the totality of the relevant 
facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose."  
See Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168, quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94. 
In determining whether an inference of discriminatory 
purpose is properly drawn at the first step, the United States 
Supreme Court has instructed that "all of the circumstances that 
bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted."  
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008).  See Johnson, 545 
U.S. at 169, quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 ("a prima facie case 
of discrimination can be made out by offering a wide variety of 
 
 
 
37 
 
evidence, so long as the sum of the proffered facts gives 'rise 
to an inference of discriminatory purpose'" [footnote omitted]).  
As the Court has emphasized, "[t]he Constitution forbids 
striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory 
purpose."  Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2244. 
In the course of determining whether an inference of 
discriminatory purpose is warranted with respect to a challenged 
juror, judges should consider, among any other relevant factors, 
(1) the number and percentage of group members who have 
been excluded from jury service due to the exercise of a 
peremptory challenge;13 
 
(2) any evidence of disparate questioning or investigation 
of prospective jurors;14 
 
(3) any similarities and differences between excluded 
jurors and those, not members of the protected group, who 
have not been challenged (for example, age, educational 
level, occupation, or previous interactions with the 
criminal justice system);15 
                                                 
13 This ordinarily is the beginning of the inquiry.  
Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 322 (2017).  While not 
required to raise the inference, a distinct pattern of disparate 
strikes is clearly sufficient to move past the first step of the 
inquiry.  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986). 
 
14 See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2246-2248 
(2019); Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 ("the prosecutor's questions and 
statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his 
challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory 
purpose"). 
 
15 See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005) 
("More powerful than these bare statistics, however, are side-
by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were 
struck and white panelists allowed to serve").  Indeed, in this 
case, the First Circuit relied heavily on the fact that the 
prosecutor did not challenge a white, twenty-one year old 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
(4) whether the defendant or the victim are members of the 
same protected group; and 
 
(5) the composition of the seated jury.16 
 
                                                 
college student, but did strike an African-American, nineteen 
year old college student.  See Sanchez V, 753 F.3d at 304-305 
("The only objective difference between the two young men 
appearing in this record is their race. . . .  Such differential 
treatment, while by no means dispositive as to the ultimate 
question of racial discrimination, suffices at Batson's first 
step to raise an inference of possible racial discrimination"). 
 
 
16 Caution should be exercised in the use of this factor.  
The bare fact that some members of a protected group were seated 
on a jury does not immunize future peremptory challenges from 
constitutional scrutiny.  Otherwise, as the First Circuit 
warned, the challenging party "can get away with discriminating 
against some [group members] on the venire:  so long as [an 
attorney] does not discriminate against all such individuals, 
not only will his strikes be permitted, but he will not even be 
required to explain them."  Sanchez V, 753 F.3d at 299-300. 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
"This list of factors[17] is neither mandatory[18] nor exhaustive; 
a trial judge and a reviewing court must consider 'all relevant 
circumstances' for each challenged strike."  Jones, 477 Mass. 
at 322 n.24, citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. 
While we do not join those States that have eliminated 
entirely the first step of Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94,19 in 
                                                 
17 In discussing this step in Jones, 477 Mass. at 332, we 
enumerated "the possibility of an objective, group-neutral 
explanation for the strike" as another factor in the initial 
stage of the analysis.  We recognized, as well, that this factor 
"overlaps" with the second and third stages.  See id. at 332 
n.25.  Because this factor properly applies only to the later 
stages, we do not include it here as applicable to the first 
stage.  When considering this factor in later stages, a judge 
should be careful not to conflate the second and third steps by 
volunteering a possible group-neutral reason on behalf of the 
party attempting to exercise the strike (as the judge did here 
by pointing out the juror's age).  If there is a readily 
apparent, group-neutral reason that already has been raised by 
the striking party in a for-cause challenge, such as, here, a 
college student, that might cut against an inference of 
discriminatory intent. 
 
18 While a judge must consider all relevant factors, the 
judge need not consider each of these enumerated factors in 
every individual case; some enumerated factors might not be 
relevant in particular circumstances, and other factors, not 
noted here, also might be applicable. 
 
 
19 See, e.g., State v. Morales, 71 Conn. App. 790, 800 n.16 
(2002); State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993); 
State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 938 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 
U.S. 1014 (1992).  Contrary to the suggestion in Justice Lowy's 
concurrence, such a significant departure should be made in a 
case where the issue is raised directly and fully briefed, and 
where this court has the opportunity to receive input from the 
bar. 
 
 
This aside, we are unconvinced that removing the first step 
entirely is quite as simple or salutary as the concurrence 
 
 
 
40 
 
accordance with our long-standing jurisprudence and the Federal 
standard, rebutting the presumption of propriety continues to be 
"not an onerous task."  Jones, 477 Mass. at 321.  See Johnson, 
545 U.S. at 170 ("We did not intend the first step to be so 
onerous that a defendant would have to persuade the judge -- on 
                                                 
suggests.  Because every potential juror is a member of some 
discrete race or gender, every peremptory strike then would be 
subject to challenge and explanation.  This leads to two 
possibilities. 
 
 
On the one hand, the court could require or imply (in 
accordance with the rules of professional conduct) that there is 
some good faith requirement for the exercise of challenges to 
peremptory strikes.  Such a requirement, however, merely would 
reinstate the first step of the Batson inquiry in a different 
guise, for a good faith challenge to a peremptory strike could 
be predicated only on some reason to believe or to infer that 
the attempt to strike was exercised for an impermissible 
purpose -- the very question examined in Batson's first step. 
 
On the other hand, if there were no good faith requirement 
for challenging a peremptory strike, litigants would have a 
strong incentive to challenge every peremptory strike.  Such a 
challenge, at best, would prevent the removal of a juror whom 
opposing counsel did not want on the jury and, at a minimum, 
could reveal something of the opposing trial strategy.  Even if 
there is a cognizable difference between requiring some 
explanation for every strike and requiring an explanation that 
meets the standard of a "for cause" challenge, such a regime 
would alter the nature of a peremptory challenge so 
fundamentally that it would raise the question whether 
peremptory challenges simply should be abolished.  There may 
well be good arguments for doing so, see, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. 
at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that only eliminating 
peremptory challenges will end racial discrimination in jury 
selection); Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460, 468 (2003) 
(Marshall, C.J., concurring) (calling for abolishment of or 
substantial restriction on peremptory challenges), but a 
determination to do so unquestionably is a decision we cannot 
reach here, without full briefing and input from the bar. 
 
 
 
41 
 
the basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible for the 
defendant to know with certainty -- that the challenge was more 
likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination").  
And, having determined that erroneously terminating a Batson-
Soares inquiry at the first step is structural error, we 
reiterate our exhortation that judges "think long and hard 
before they decide to require no explanation from the prosecutor 
for the challenge and make no findings of fact."  Issa, 
466 Mass. at 11 n.14.20  As the United States Supreme Court has 
explained, "[t]he inherent uncertainty present in inquiries of 
discriminatory purpose counsels against engaging in needless and 
imperfect speculation when a direct answer can be obtained by 
asking a simple question."  Johnson, supra at 172. 
 
As is evident in this case, it is essential for trial 
judges to examine carefully all of the relevant facts and 
circumstances at the first stage of a Batson-Soares inquiry.  
See Sanchez V, 753 F.3d at 301-307.  We anticipate that adopting 
the Federal formulation of the test will emphasize the 
multifaceted nature of the necessary inquiry, so that judges may 
better ferret out improper peremptory challenges. 
                                                 
 
20 This guidance was issued well after the trial in this 
case, and therefore was unavailable to the trial judge. 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
Conclusion.  The order reducing the verdict under Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 25 (b) (2) is vacated and set aside.  So much of the 
judge's order as grants a new trial is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J. (concurring).  I agree with the court that the 
judge's decision to reduce the defendant's verdict under Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995), was 
improper, and that the judge's order granting a new trial should 
be affirmed.  I write separately because I believe that upon 
timely objection to a peremptory challenge made on the basis of 
race or another protected class, we should conclude that that 
party has met the first prong of the Batson-Soares test (Batson 
test).  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-94 (1986); 
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489-490, cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 881 (1979).  See also State v. King, 249 Conn. 645, 658 
n.18 (1999), quoting State v. Hodge, 248 Conn. 207, 219 n.18, 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 969 (1999) ("the party objecting to the 
exercise of the peremptory challenge satisfies step one of the 
tripartite process simply by raising the objection"); Melbourne 
v. State, 679 So. 2d 759, 764 (Fla. 1996) (first prong met upon 
timely objection, upon showing that struck "venireperson is a 
member of a distinct" group, and upon request that court ask 
challenging party for reason for challenge); State v. Meeks, 495 
S.W.3d 168, 173 (Mo. 2016) (en banc), quoting State v. Parker, 
836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 
(1992) (first prong satisfied where defendant raises Batson 
objection and identifies "the cognizable racial group to which 
the venireperson or persons belong"); State v. Edwards, 384 S.C. 
 
 
 
2 
 
504, 508 (2009) ("When one party strikes a member of a 
cognizable racial group or gender, the trial court must hold a 
Batson hearing if the opposing party requests one"); Provost, 
Excavating from the Inside:  Race, Gender, and Peremptory 
Challenges, 45 Val. U.L. Rev. 307, 353 (2010) (proposing model 
State statute moving to second Batson prong upon showing of 
peremptory challenge based on membership in cognizable group).  
Doing so, in my view, will result in a fairer process for the 
parties, attorneys, prospective jurors, and the court, and will 
result in fewer avoidable reversals of convictions. 
We have persistently urged, if not beseeched, judges to 
reach the second prong and elicit a group-neutral explanation 
regardless of whether they find that the objecting party has 
satisfied the first prong.  See Commonwealth v. Ortega, 480 
Mass. 603, 607 n.9 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 
Mass. 1, 11 n.14 (2013) ("We therefore again 'urge judges to 
think long and hard before they decide to require no explanation 
from the prosecutor for [a Batson] challenge and make no 
findings of fact' . . ."); Commonwealth v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 
383, 396 n.10 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 Mass. 
593, 598 (2018) (judges have broad discretion to move to second 
prong without having to decide that defendant met first prong); 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 325-326 (2017) ("Had the 
judge allowed the inquiry to go forward, the prosecutor might 
 
 
 
3 
 
well have proffered an adequate and genuine race-neutral reason 
for her strike . . ."); Issa, supra ("the judge created a 
significant and needless risk of reversal by failing to require 
the prosecutor to explain her reasons for challenging [the] 
juror").  See also Commonwealth v. Fritz, 472 Mass. 341, 348 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 450 Mass. 395, 406, cert. 
denied, 555 U.S. 893 (2008) ("[a] judge may, of course, raise 
the issue of a Soares violation sua sponte"); Commonwealth v. 
Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 220-221 (2008) (concluding that judge's 
request for prosecutor explanation constitutes implicit finding 
that first prong was satisfied).  This is especially so given 
the considerable deference we give to a judge's determination as 
to the second and third prongs of the Batson inquiry, see 
Commonwealth v. Prunty, 462 Mass. 295, 304 (2012), and the 
judge's obligation to determine that the objected-to peremptory 
challenge is both adequate and genuine, see id. at 309, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460, 464 (2003) ("The 
determination whether an explanation is 'bona fide' entails a 
critical evaluation of both the soundness of the proffered 
explanation and whether the explanation [no matter how 'sound' 
it might appear] is the actual motivating force behind the 
challenging party's decision"). 
And while the court here "reiterate[s]" that same 
"exhortation" to judges here, ante at    , it still opts to 
 
 
 
4 
 
align the first prong's standard with that articulated under 
Federal law.  I agree that the Federal standard is more 
straightforward than the Soares standard utilized by our courts 
for the last forty years, but my suggestion will avoid confusion 
about the first prong and impose a process that recognizes not 
just the perniciousness of racial discrimination, but implicit 
bias as well.1  Compare Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 
(2005), quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94 (under Federal law, 
first prong met where "the totality of the relevant facts gives 
rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose"), with Soares, 
377 Mass. at 489-490 (first prong met where challenging party 
demonstrates both "a pattern of conduct" that peremptorily 
struck jurors "are members of a discrete group" and "a 
likelihood" of exclusion based solely on their "group 
membership"). 
I agree with the court that meeting the first prong is "not 
an onerous task," Jones, 477 Mass. at 321; indeed, that reality 
undergirds my suggestion that the first prong is satisfied when 
counsel objects to a peremptory challenge on the basis of race 
or another protected class.  However, I fear that the court's 
                                                 
1 "Multiple studies confirm the existence of implicit bias, 
and that implicit bias predicts real-world behavior. . . .  That 
is, even people who do not believe themselves to harbor implicit 
bias may in fact act in ways that disfavor people of color."  
Commonwealth v. Buckley, 478 Mass. 861, 878 n.4 (2018). 
 
 
 
5 
 
new, nonexhaustive multifactorial test merely replaces one 
complicated, uncertain, and possibly inconsistent standard with 
another.  See State v. Whitby, 975 So. 2d 1124, 1127 (Fla. 2008) 
(Pariente, J., concurring) (describing "the confusion that 
Florida law avoids by requiring race-neutral explanations more 
often than federal law"). 
"The inherent uncertainty present in inquiries of 
discriminatory purpose counsels against engaging in needless and 
imperfect speculation when a direct answer can be obtained by 
asking a simple question."  Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172.  Our case 
law demonstrates that the first prong is unnecessary and 
inefficient.  Indeed, we have reversed at least three cases of 
murder in the first degree since 2017 because judges have 
declined to request a group-neutral reason when faced with a 
Batson challenge.  See Ortega, 480 Mass. at 607-608; Robertson, 
480 Mass. at 397 (erroneous termination of Batson inquiry at 
first prong constitutes structural error); Jones, 477 Mass. at 
325-326; Commonwealth v. Long, 419 Mass. 798, 807 (1995).  Thus, 
while the first prong is unnecessary, it is not harmless. 
Further, I see no reason to retain a presumption of 
peremptory propriety in this context.  As the presumption 
inherently suggests, attorneys are officers of the court, and 
thus, there is every good reason to believe that most challenges 
are -- or at the very least, are intended to be -- appropriate.  
 
 
 
6 
 
As such, a judge's finding that the objecting party satisfied 
the first prong, and thus demonstrated "an inference of 
discriminatory purpose," is, by its nature, a finding that the 
challenging attorney may have engaged in discriminatory conduct.  
Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168, quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94.  
This often requires the judge to make a finding of 
discriminatory intent concerning an attorney whose ability and 
integrity the judge respects based on years of the judge's 
experience.  One can understand a judge's reticence to do so, 
and perhaps even a fellow attorney's as well, in the face of 
what appears to be minimal evidence of discriminatory purpose. 
Perhaps our focus is in the wrong place.  Considering the 
reality of implicit bias, it seems best course for all trial 
participants, including prospective jurors who have a 
constitutional right to serve, to require a group-neutral 
explanation upon a proper Batson objection.  See Batson, 476 
U.S. at 87 ("by denying a person participation in jury service 
on account of his race, the State unconstitutionally 
discriminated against the excluded juror").  Such a procedure 
avoids automatically impugning counsel and helps thwart not only 
the insidious danger of discriminatory animus, but also the 
arguably more prevalent peril of implicit bias. 
So long as a challenging party can provide the court with a 
group-neutral reason, the Batson inquiry will continue.  See 
 
 
 
7 
 
Jones, 477 Mass. at 319.  And if the challenging party cannot, 
then the second prong will have accomplished exactly what the 
courts intended the Batson inquiry to accomplish -- discovering 
and eradicating discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, 
whether implicit or purposeful.  See id., citing Batson, 476 
U.S. at 95, and Soares, 377 Mass. at 486. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring).  I agree with Justice Lowy that 
there are sound reasons to consider abandoning the first prong 
of the Batson-Soares test, which, under the court's decision, 
now provides that "the presumption of propriety is rebutted when 
the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of 
discriminatory purpose" (quotation and citation omitted).  Ante 
at    .  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986); 
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489-490, cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 881 (1979).  I defer from joining his concurrence only 
because I agree with the court that if we were to announce such 
a departure from our current jurisprudence, we should do so in a 
case where the question is squarely presented and where we have 
the benefit of briefing by the parties and amici. 
 
The court's opinion and Justice Lowy's concurrence describe 
three alternatives:  (1) keeping the first prong, and applying 
the standard that the court articulates in its opinion; (2) 
eliminating the first prong entirely; or (3) keeping the first 
prong, but modifying it by adopting a good faith standard.  A 
good faith standard would not require a judge to make a finding 
of an inference of discriminatory purpose but would avoid the 
risk that some attorneys might challenge every exercise of a 
peremptory strike by a prosecutor or defense counsel.  With the 
benefit of such briefing, we will be able to carefully consider 
 
2 
which of these three alternatives, or a variation thereof, to 
adopt.