Case Title: Hickey v. Pathways Ass’n, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11603

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-09-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-11603 
 
BRIAN S. HICKEY & others1  vs.  PATHWAYS ASSOCIATION, INC., & 
others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 7, 2014. - September 22, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, 
JJ. 
 
 
Beach.  Way, Private.  Real Property, Registered land:  
Easement, Beach, Easement.  Easement. 
 
                                                 
1 Mary P. Hickey, Lorraine M. Paglia, and Robert L. Paglia. 
 
2 Kathleen D. Homa, Theodore M. Homa, Evelyn A. Jenkins, 
Jane W. Loiselle, John R. Loiselle, James T. Moshier, Mary E. 
Moshier, Joseph J. Rahal, Mary G. Rahal, Irving A. Wilson, 
Martha K. Young, Roland W. Young, Norman Allentoff, Patricia M. 
Becker, Robert Becker, Rebecca S. Blair, Wesley K. Blair, III, 
Carole R. Bohn, Geraldine Burstein, Joseph Burstein, Frank 
Carrick, Jean Carrick, Marie C. Creonte, William T. Creonte, 
Craig P. Eddy, Julia H. Eddy, Robert A. Furman, Elaine Giberti, 
Richard Giberti, Susan M. Hennessey, Pamela A. Maher, Paul J. 
Maher, Barbara Jessel, Martin Jessel, Karen LaFauci, James 
Maguire, Mary Maguire, Geoffrey L. Mahon, Mary Ellen Manock, 
Arthur Maressa, Gary McWilliams, Rosalind Neuman, Sanford 
Neuman, Marcia O'Shea, Richard O'Shea, Julie A. Piantedosi, 
Lewis R. Piantedosi, Paul W. Pietro, Susan E. Pietro, Joseph 
Russo, Suzanne Russo, Ronald S. Saks, Sharalyn Saks, Ann 
Christine Tobey, William Banks Tobey, Joseph Tosh, Christine M. 
Tosti, Christopher P. Tosti, Dorothy L. Tosti, Andrew Tvirbutas, 
Catherine Tvirbutas, Elizabeth Walker, John J. Walker, Kristin 
M. Walker, Michelle T. Walker, Susan L. Walker, Dudley Woodward, 
Karen Woodward, and Bayview Limited Partnership. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
April 15, 2009. 
 
 
The case was heard by Karyn F. Scheier, J., on a case 
stated. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jennifer S.D. Roberts for Lorraine M. Paglia & another. 
 
Brian M. Hurley for Brian S. Hickey & another. 
 
Kevin T. Smith for Elizabeth J. Walker & others. 
 
David L. Delaney for Pamela A. Maher & others. 
 
Roland W. Young, pro se. 
 
Peter L. Freeman, for William J. Creonte & others, was 
present but did not argue. 
 
 
LENK, J.  This case involves a dispute among landowners in 
the same subdivision over access rights over a private way to 
the beach.  The plaintiffs own two beachfront lots in the town 
of Dennis (town), fronting on Shore Drive.  Shore Drive runs 
along the waterfront parallel to Cape Cod Bay.  The plaintiffs' 
lots are separated by a twenty-foot way that extends south from 
Cape Cod Bay, along the length of the lots, to Shore Drive.  The 
defendants3 own lots located to the south and west of the 
                                                 
3 A number of the defendants in the Land Court did not 
pursue an appeal.  Another seven defendants, who own waterfront 
lots that appear on the subdivision plans showing the 
plaintiffs' lots (James J. Lepore, Douglas and Patricia Suliman, 
N. Richard and Karen Greenfield, and Jack and Claire Chaflin), 
filed a joint stipulation of dismissal in December, 2010, 
several years before the Land Court judge issued her decision.  
For simplicity, we refer to the set of defendants who pursued an 
appeal as "the defendants." 
3 
 
plaintiffs' lots, starting from the inland side of Shore Drive.  
All of the land involved is registered land; it had formed part 
of a 217.24 acre tract of land originally owned by Frank B. 
Tobey and registered in the Land Court in 1903.  In 1917, Tobey 
conveyed the parcel to two sisters who thereafter subdivided the 
parcel repeatedly through 1977.  Over that sixty-year period, 
they subdivided the parcel a small section of residential lots 
at a time.  The way appears on the subdivision plans creating 
the plaintiffs' lots, and on some of the plans creating the 
defendants' lots. 
The defendants maintain that, according to provisions in 
their deeds and certificates of title, all of which reference 
easements over ways in subdivision plans, they hold rights of 
access over the way.  The plaintiffs contend that they hold all 
ownership rights in the way, and the defendants have no right to 
use it for any purpose.  The plaintiffs claim that, once the 
sisters sold the second of their two lots to the plaintiffs' 
predecessors in interest, the way as it appears on the 
subdivision plans ceased to exist, with each of their 
predecessors in interest acquiring title to one-half of the way, 
and no one else retaining any rights of access.  In support of 
this contention, the plaintiffs offer a series of arguments, 
some of which are contradictory to others. 
If the land at issue here were recorded land, it is 
4 
 
unlikely that this case would be before us.  Under long-standing 
common-law rules of interpretation of deeds containing 
references to plans, the defendants' understanding likely would 
prevail.  However, this is registered land.  And the land 
registration act provides that "[e]very plaintiff receiving a 
certificate of title in pursuance of a judgment of registration, 
and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a 
certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the 
same free from all encumbrances except those noted" on 
the certificate.  G. L. c. 185, § 46.  While the plaintiffs' 
deeds contain provisions granting easement rights over the way 
from the original developers to the plaintiffs' predecessors in 
interest, it is undisputed that the plaintiffs' certificates of 
title do not contain a specific encumbrance showing an easement 
right held by any one of the named defendants.  Therefore, we 
confront the question whether easements claimed over registered 
land to provide waterfront access from the defendants' inland 
lots are binding against the plaintiffs, where easements 
benefiting the defendants do not appear on the plaintiffs' 
certificates of title, but are noted in various forms on the 
defendant lot owners' certificates of title and in plans 
referenced in those certificates. 
The plaintiffs filed an action in the Land Court to quiet 
title and for declaratory relief against twenty named defendants 
5 
 
and persons "unascertained or unknown claiming as successors of 
Frank B. Tobey."  Ultimately, the case proceeded with almost 
seventy named lot holder defendants holding thirty-eight 
certificates of title.  Relying on a common-law presumption, the 
judge determined that the plaintiffs hold the fee in the way, 
each abutter owning the land from the lot line to the center 
line of the way. 
In evaluating the defendants' claims to easements over the 
way, the judge divided the defendants into three main groups.  
The division was based on differences in the language in the 
defendants' certificates of title concerning access over ways 
shown on different subdivision plans.  The first group of 
defendants holds certificates granting them access over the ways 
shown in "all other plans in Land Court Case No. 647," the 
original Land Court case under which the 217 acre parcel was 
registered in 1903.  The second group of defendants holds 
certificates of title granting them access over all ways shown 
on Land Court Plan 647-G (G Plan); that plan, which also shows 
the earlier subdivision plans establishing the plaintiffs' lots 
and the way, created thirty-two lots, moving several blocks 
inland from the plaintiffs' lots.  The third group of defendants 
holds certificates of title referencing ways appearing on 
subdivision plans, other than the G Plan, that show their 
particular lots.  Many of those defendants' certificates 
6 
 
reference Land Court Plan 647-M (M Plan), which created 
approximately eighty lots south and southwest of the lots on the 
G Plan.  Other of those defendants' certificates reference later 
plans showing small sections of lots created by reconfiguring a 
series of lots on a given street shown on the G or M Plans, 
without changing any of the public or private ways shown on the 
G or M Plans.  The judge concluded that the lot owners in the 
first and second groups hold rights of access over the way, and 
the owners in the third group do not. 
The plaintiffs appealed, and a number of the defendants 
filed cross appeals.  Thereafter, we allowed the plaintiffs' 
application for direct appellate review.  Because the defendants 
successfully rebutted the common-law presumption, we determine 
that the plaintiffs do not hold the fee in the way.  We conclude 
also that, as to the first two groups of defendants, the judge 
was correct in determining that the defendants hold easements 
over the way.  We conclude further that, as to the third group 
of defendants, and all but two of the unclassified defendants,4 
                                                 
4 Certain defendants were not classified into any of the 
three groups.  For varying reasons, the judge concluded that 
certain of those unclassified defendants hold access rights over 
the way, and eleven do not.  We conclude that the judge was 
correct in deciding that two of those defendants, Rosalind and 
Stanford Neuman, whose names do not appear on any certificate of 
title submitted to the Land Court, do not hold easements over 
the way.  As to the other defendants, who hold Certificates No. 
190691 (Walker), 110223 (Maressa), 164891 (Tosti), and 179868 
(Tobey), we conclude that they hold easement rights over the way 
7 
 
they, too, hold easements for access to the waterfront over the 
way. 
1.  Background.  The Land Court judge reached her 
determination on a "case stated" basis, relying upon facts 
stipulated by all of the parties and 285 exhibits, largely 
copies of documents filed in the Barnstable Registry District of 
the Land Court.  After she issued her initial decision in April, 
2013, the judge allowed the parties to submit proposed 
corrections of stipulated facts and other requested 
modifications.  In July, 2013, the judge issued an amended final 
decision, allowed a motion for entry of judgment, and modified a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting access to the way, entered at 
the request of the plaintiffs in June, 2010, such that the 
successful defendants were permitted to use the way.  We 
summarize the undisputed facts, reserving certain facts for 
later discussion of the issues. 
a.  Development of the registered parcel.  The plaintiffs, 
Brian S. Hickey, Mary P. Hickey, Robert L. Paglia, and Lorraine 
M. Paglia, own two beachfront lots in the town, Lots X and J 
respectively.  The lots, fronting on Shore Drive, are separated 
by a twenty-foot way that extends south from Cape Cod Bay, along 
the approximately 280 foot length of the plaintiffs' lots, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
for reasons similar to those for the owners in the second and 
third groups.  See discussion, infra. 
8 
 
ends at Shore Drive.  The defendant lot owners hold thirty-eight 
certificates of title to lots inland of the plaintiffs' lots, on 
the inland side of Shore Drive, south of the plaintiffs' lots.  
All of the lots involved initially formed part of a 217.24 acre 
tract of land owned by Frank B. Tobey.  In 1903, Tobey brought a 
proceeding in the Land Court, Registration Case No. 647, to 
register the parcel pursuant to G. L. c. 185.  He was issued 
certificate of title No. 16, under plan 647-A. 
The registered parcel was first subdivided in June, 1917, 
when it was conveyed to the original developers, sisters Lunette 
Luscombe and Ruth T. Morley, under Plan 647-B (B Plan).  The 
B Plan subdivided the easternmost part of the 217 acre parcel, 
bounded on the north by Cape Cod Bay and on the west by a "road" 
now known as Nobscussett Road, into 155 lots.5  In 1925, Luscombe 
and Morley conveyed the land to the Nobscussett Realty Trust 
(their family trust) and, in 1928, conveyed another subdivision 
                                                 
5 The B Plan is divided into two sheets.  The first sheet 
creates a series of waterfront lots along a street paralleling 
Cape Cod Bay, with four ten-foot ways extending between every 
three waterfront lots, from the road to the beach.  A strip of 
beach, approximately 150 feet wide, runs along the waterfront 
the entire length of the plan, and is itself labeled as a lot.  
South of the waterfront road, the plan creates two more parallel 
streets running east-west, with several connecting streets 
running north-south from the waterfront road.  The second sheet 
creates an additional eight blocks of residential lots, further 
inland from the lots on the first sheet, with north-south 
streets connecting to the streets shown on the first sheet, and 
extending inland to the boundary of the developers' land. 
9 
 
of the 217 acre parcel, the C Plan.6 
In June, 1935, the entire 217 acre parcel was reconveyed to 
Luscombe and Morley, who were issued Certificate of Title No. 
3710 (Certificate No. 3710).  After they reacquired the 
registered parcel, Luscombe and Morley began developing 
residential lots to the west of Nobscussett Road, in a similar 
fashion to the earlier subdivision on the B Plan.  Luscombe and 
Morley proceeded first to develop lots along the shore line from 
east to west, and then from the south side of Shore Drive 
inland. 
The plaintiffs' lots were created on subdivision plans 647-
D (D Plan) and 647-F (F Plan), in 1936 and 1938.  These plans 
show five and thirteen residential lots, respectively, along 
Cape Cod Bay to the north of a road now known as Shore Drive.  
The twenty-foot way at issue first appeared on the D Plan.  It 
is shown on the western side of the D Plan, and abuts the 
western boundary of the lot that is now the Paglias'.  Shore 
Drive (labeled "Road") is shown extending open-ended on the 
western edge of the D Plan.7  The eastern boundary of the 
                                                 
6 The C Plan is essentially a square running south from Cape 
Cod Bay, immediately to the west of Nobscussett Road, 
encompassing much of the land at issue here, including the land 
on the D, F, and G Plans. 
 
7 On the eastern side of the D Plan, a perpendicular road, 
also now known as Shore Drive, extends north to the shoreline, 
along the eastern edge of the easternmost lot, and extends south 
10 
 
easternmost lot on the F Plan, now the Hickeys' lot, abuts the 
way to the west of the Paglias' lot.8  The defendants' lots, 
south of Shore Drive, were created on subdivision plans 647-G, 
647-M, 647-S, 647-2, 647-8, 647-11, and 647-15, from 1940 
through 1977.9 
When the plaintiffs acquired their lots in 1994 and 1999, a 
large wooden staircase standing at the waterfront end of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
to a road owned by the town of Dennis (town).  At that time, 
Luscombe and Morley also owned all of the land between Shore 
Drive and the town road. 
 
8 In 1937, between the filing of the D and F plans, Luscombe 
and Morley filed the E Plan, which subdivided the westernmost 
part of their 217 acre parcel, a portion that jutted west along 
the waterfront; unlike the land south of the D and F Plans, 
Luscombe and Morley did not own the land south of the land on 
the E Plan.  The E Plan created one large waterfront lot, Lot K, 
two smaller inland lots, Lots L and M, immediately south of Lot 
K, and a road now known as BayView Road leading southeast from 
Lot K, between lots L and M, and thence along the western edge 
of the developers' parcel.  In May, 1937, the town took Bayview 
Road by an exercise of eminent domain.  Approximately one month 
later, Luscombe and Morley conveyed Lot K to the town; it became 
a public beach, with public parking added later on Lots L and M.  
In 1945, the town took the Common Landing parcel, a waterfront 
parcel at the northern terminus of Shore Drive, and took an 
easement in Shore Drive from that point west to Bayview Road.  
All of these takings, which provided public access to the 
waterfront at the westernmost and midway points of the original 
parcel, occurred before Luscombe and Morley conveyed any lots to 
the defendants' predecessors in interest. 
 
9 For convenience, an overlay combining the individual Land 
Court plans into a single document is attached in the Appendix.  
It is similar to a map prepared by some of the parties during 
proceedings in the Land Court, and submitted in the record 
appendices in their briefs, that was not an exhibit in the 
summary judgment record. 
 
11 
 
area of the way led from the dunes and rocks down to the beach.  
For some years, the plaintiffs saw the way being used, but took 
no action; the Hickeys maintained in argument before us that 
they allowed this use as permissive.  Several years before 
commencing litigation in the Land Court, however, the plaintiffs 
decided that they no longer wanted this use to continue; 
eventually, contending that the staircase was dangerous because 
of damage to some of the supporting posts, the Paglias obtained 
permission from the town to remove it.  The Land Court judge's 
order explicitly permitted those defendants whom she concluded 
had access rights over the way to repair or rebuild the 
staircase and to make use of the way.10 
b.  Judge's classification of defendant lot holders.  As 
stated, the judge divided most of the defendants into three 
groups, based on language in their certificates of title.  The 
first group of owners (fourteen certificates of title) hold 
certificates of title and deeds that state, either directly or 
by incorporating a reference to an earlier certificate or deed, 
that the owners "have, as appurtenant to said parcel, a right to 
use all ways shown on all other plans filed in Land Court Case 
No. 647, for all purposes in common with others entitled 
                                                 
10 An easement on registered land cannot be extinguished 
through nonuse or prescription.  See G. L. c. 185, § 53; Cater 
v. Bednarek, 462 Mass. 523, 528-529 & n.15 (2012); Lasell 
College v. Leonard, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 390 (1992). 
12 
 
thereto."  The second group of owners (seven certificates of 
title) have certificates of title and deeds explicitly granting 
access to all ways shown on the G Plan.11 
The third group of owners hold eleven certificates of title 
to lots shown on derivatives of the G Plan, and to lots shown on 
the M Plan and plans reconfiguring specific lots on that plan.  
Their certificates of title reference rights to ways appearing 
on subdivision plans showing their particular lots; the 
certificates do not explicitly reference the G Plan or 
explicitly grant rights to use all of the plans in Case No. 647.  
The certificates state, either directly or by incorporating a 
reference to an earlier certificate or deed, that "there is 
appurtenant to [the lot] a right to use the ways shown on [the 
plan showing the lot] for all purposes common with others 
entitled thereto." 
2.  Discussion.  The plaintiffs maintain that the judge 
erred in concluding that any party other than the plaintiffs 
themselves has rights to use the way.  They argue that the judge 
determined correctly that, under common-law principles 
                                                 
11 The G Plan, which creates lots south and east of the 
plaintiffs' lots, including those immediately across the street, 
on the inland side of Shore Drive, also shows the way, the lots 
on the D Plan, and the eastern half of the lots on the F Plan, 
including the Hickeys' lot, as well as another way to the water 
between two other waterfront lots on the F Plan.  The G Plan 
also indicates the outlines of the B Plan, the subdivision to 
the east of Nobscussett Road. 
13 
 
applicable to land conveyed as abutting a way, the plaintiffs 
own the fee from their respective lot lines to the center of the 
way.  Based on this, the plaintiffs contend that, after deeding 
the parcels containing what are now the Hickey and Paglia lots 
to the plaintiffs' predecessors in interest, Donald B. Aldrich 
and Eugene J. and Harriet J. Waldron, respectively, the 
developers Luscombe and Morley retained no rights to grant 
easements to subsequent purchasers of any other lot.  The 
plaintiffs argue also that, even if Luscombe and Morley retained 
some interest in the way, the judge improperly determined that 
the defendants are entitled to easements by estoppel, which the 
plaintiffs contend are prohibited under Jackson v. Knott, 418 
Mass. 704, 711 (1994) (Jackson).12  The plaintiffs maintain 
further that Lane v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Falmouth, 65 Mass. 
App. Ct. 434 (2006) (Lane), and Duddy v. Mankewich, 75 Mass. 
App. Ct. 62 (2009) (Duddy), upon which the judge relied, were 
wrongly decided, and are contrary to Jackson, supra at 714 n.7, 
and to G. L. c. 185.  Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the 
facts here differ significantly from those in Lane and Duddy, 
and that, applying their holdings, which the plaintiffs maintain 
are that easements by estoppel may arise on registered land, no 
                                                 
12 In addition, the Paglias argue explicitly, and the 
Hickeys suggest, that the exceptions noted in Jackson v. Knott, 
418 Mass. 704, 711 (1994) (Jackson), are improper, and that 
easements on registered land should be construed strictly to 
include only those entries on the certificate of title. 
14 
 
easements exist over the way for the benefit of any of the 
defendants. 
Because the judge issued her decision on a case stated 
basis, we review it de novo, drawing our own inferences of fact 
and reaching our own conclusions of law.  See Richardson v. Lee 
Realty Corp., 364 Mass. 632, 634 (1974); Ware v. Hardwick, 67 
Mass. App. Ct. 325, 326 (2006). 
Having considered the defendants' arguments in rebuttal of 
the common-law presumption, we conclude that the defendants have 
established the original developers' intent to retain the fee in 
the way, and that the plaintiffs hold only easements over the 
way.  We conclude also, following Jackson, Lane, and Duddy, that 
documents on file in the land registration office show Luscombe 
and Morley's clear intent to grant easements over the way to the 
defendants in both the first and second groups, and, based on 
similar reasoning, to the defendants in the third group. 
a.  Fee in the way.  We consider first a question that the 
plaintiffs argue is outcome determinative:  the ownership of the 
fee interest in the way.  The plaintiffs maintain that once 
Luscombe and Morley conveyed their lots out of the registered 
parcel to Aldrich and the Waldrons, Luscombe and Morley had no 
rights left in the way to convey to future purchasers of any 
other lots, see Darman v. Dunderdale, 362 Mass. 633, 639 (1972), 
and thus that any language purporting to grant easements in any 
15 
 
of the defendants' certificates of title could not have conveyed 
such an interest.  The defendants joining one of the briefs 
argue that the plaintiffs hold fee in the way, but that Luscombe 
and Morley retained an easement interest which they were able to 
convey.  A majority of the defendants maintain, however, that 
the plaintiffs hold only easement rights in the way, in which 
Luscombe and Morley retained the fee interest.  See Suburban 
Land Co. v. Billerica, 314 Mass. 184, 189-190 (1943). 
The judge determined that the Hickeys and the Paglias each 
own a fee in one-half of the way based on the common-law 
presumption13 that a grantor conveying land described as "on" or 
"by" a way, who owns title to the way, as here, is presumed to 
have conveyed the way to its center line.14  See Rowley v. 
Massachusetts Elec. Co., 438 Mass. 798, 803 (2003); Murphy v. 
Mart Realty of Brockton, Inc., 348 Mass. 675, 679-681 (1965) 
(Murphy). 
                                                 
13 Common-law principles apply here because the derelict fee 
statute, G. L. c. 185, § 58, enacted in 1971 and amended in 
1990, does not apply retroactively to registered land.  G. L. 
c. 185, § 2.  See generally Hanson v. Cadwell Crossing, LLC, 66 
Mass. App. Ct. 497, 499-502 (2006); Adams v. Planning Bd. of 
Westwood, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 387-391 (2005). 
 
14 While the judge's decision states that the plaintiffs' 
ownership of the fee is a stipulated fact, most of the 
defendants did not stipulate to such ownership.  Indeed, after 
the initial decision was issued, a number of the defendants 
challenged that assertion.  In her order granting final 
judgment, the judge clarified that she relied on the common-law 
presumption, but did not further explain her reasoning. 
16 
 
Although the plaintiffs present it as a "rule of law" and 
state that fee ownership was conveyed to Aldrich and the 
Waldrons by "operation of law," the common-law presumption that 
a grantor of property abutting a way also conveys the fee to the 
center of the way is "not an absolute rule of law irrespective 
of manifest intention, but is merely a principle of 
interpretation adopted for the purpose of finding out the true 
meaning of the words used."  Crocker v. Cotting, 166 Mass. 183, 
185 (1896).  "[A]fter reviewing the cases concerning this rule 
of presumed intent, the court [explained] that 'the underlying 
principle on which they all rest is that the intent of the 
parties in each instance was ascertained from the words used in 
the written instrument interpreted in the light of all the 
attendant facts.  That is the general principle governing the 
interpretation of deeds.'  Simonds v. Simonds, 199 Mass. 552, 
554 (1908)."  Suburban Land Co. v. Billerica, 314 Mass. at 189, 
quoting Erickson v. Ames, 264 Mass. 436, 444 (1928).  See 
Patterson v. Paul, 448 Mass. 658, 665 (2007).  If there is 
ambiguity in the deed concerning whether and to what extent an 
easement was intended, rather than a grant of the fee, a court 
may consider the circumstances existing at the time the deed was 
executed to assist in determining the grantor's intent.  Queler 
v. Skowron, 438 Mass. 304, 311 (2002); Dunham v. Dodge, 235 
Mass. 367, 371-373 (1920). 
17 
 
To determine whether the defendants have rebutted the 
presumption in this case requires a review of the progression of 
the development of the registered parcel and the creation of the 
plaintiffs' lots. 
i.  Paglias' lot.  As stated, the Paglias' lot, Lot J, was 
created by a subdivision shown on the D Plan, filed in 
September, 1936, that created five beachfront lots.  Lot J is 
bordered by Lot I to the east and by the way to the west.  On 
September 4, 1936, Luscombe and Morley conveyed Lot J, and the 
other four lots shown on the D Plan, to Aldrich, the Paglias' 
predecessor in interest.  The Aldrich deed described Lot J as 
being bounded by Cape Cod Bay to the north, "[w]esterly by a 20-
foot right of way, there measuring two hundred eighty feet (280) 
feet . . . ; [s]outherly by a 40-foot road [Shore Drive] . . . 
and [e]asterly by 40-foot road [also known as Shore Drive]."  
Lot J was conveyed "together with rights of way for all purposes 
over said roads and rights of way."  Aldrich's certificate of 
title states that the land "is subject to and has the benefit of 
the easements, restrictions and rights set forth in Document No. 
8841 [the Aldrich deed] and Certificate No. 3710 [the Luscombe 
and Morley certificate] so far as the same are in force and 
applicable."  The Paglias acquired Lot J by deed dated August 
30, 1999.  The Paglias' certificate describes the land as "Lot J 
Land Court Plan 647-D." 
18 
 
ii.  Hickeys' lot.  The Hickeys' lot, Lot X, was created in 
July, 1938, by a subdivision shown on the F Plan.  The F Plan 
created thirteen beachfront lots.  Lot X is bordered on the east 
by the way and on the west by Lot Y.  The Paglias' lot, Lot J, 
also appears on the F Plan, to the east of Lot X; Lots X and J 
are shown on the F Plan as separated from each other by the way.  
Two other ways to the water, virtually identical to the way at 
issue, also appear on the F Plan, between lots N and O and 
between Lots Q and R.  In 1944, Luscombe and Morley conveyed 
lots X and Y to the Waldrons, the Hickeys' predecessors in 
interest.  The Waldron deed describes the parcel as bounded 
northwesterly by Cape Cod Bay, on the northeast by "a way 20 
feet wide [and] 275 feet . . . ," southeasterly by another way 
[Shore Drive], and southwesterly by Lot Z.  The Waldrons' 
certificate of title provides that both Lots X and Y have an 
appurtenant "[r]ight of [w]ay over the adjacent ways as shown on 
plan 647-F" and that the land "is subject to and has the benefit 
of the rights and provisions in Certificate of Title No. 3710, 
so far as the same are in force and applicable."  The Hickeys 
acquired lot X by deed dated May 14, 1994.  The Hickeys' 
certificate of title describes their land as Lot X in Plan 647-F 
and provides: 
"Said land is subject to and has the benefit of the 
rights and provisions in Certificate of Title No. 3710, so 
far as in force and applicable. 
19 
 
 
"There is appurtenant to said land a right of way over 
the adjacent ways as shown on said plan 647-F." 
iii.  Defendants' lots.  Lots held by sixteen of the 
defendants15 were created on the G Plan, filed in May, 1940.  The 
majority of the lots of the defendants in the first and second 
groups appear on that plan.  Another nine of the defendants' 
lots were created on the M Plan, filed in June, 1947.16  Many of 
the lot of the owners in the third group appear on that plan.  
The remaining lots held by the defendants were created by plans 
that reconfigured specific lots along individual streets on the 
G and M Plans.17 
                                                 
15 Roland W. and Martha K. Young (Lot 236), Lewis R. and 
Julie A. Piantedosi (Lot 237), Craig P. and Julia H. Eddy (Lot 
238), Dudley and Karen Woodward (Lot 242), William T. and Marie 
C. Creonte (Lot 244), Frank and Jean Carrick (Lots 245 and 246), 
James and Mary Maguire (Lots 257 and 258), and Jane and John 
Loiselle (Lot 259). 
 
16 Theodore M. and Kathleen D. Homa (Lot 323), Ronald S. and 
Sharalyn Saks (Lot 324), Joseph and Dorothy L. Tosti (Lot 337), 
Robert and Patricia M. Becker (Lot 368), and Karen LaFauci (Lot 
387). 
 
17 Plan 647-S (October, 1955), created Lot 522, owned by 
defendants Paul W. and Susan E. Pietro. 
 
Plan 647-2 (August, 1964) reconfigured certain lots on the 
M plan.  It shows lots owned by Wesley K. and Rebecca S. Blair 
(Lot 465), Ann Christine Tobey, William Banks Tobey, and Mary 
Ellen Manock (all having a one-third interest in Lots 466 and 
467), Joseph and Geraldine Burnstein (as having a partnership 
interest in partnership holding Lot 471), James T. and Mary E. 
Moshier (Lot 476), Norman Allentoff (Lot 478), Joseph and 
Suzanne Russo (Lot 479), Richard and Elaine Giberti (Lot 488), 
20 
 
iv.  Interest in the way reserved by grantors Luscombe and 
Morley.  The reason for the rule of presumed intent has been 
said to be that it is not to be presumed that a grantor, having 
conveyed lots bounding on a street "under which the land 
presumably would be of little value to a private owner, would 
not be expected to care much to retain the title after parting 
with all of his property on the side of the street."  Gray v. 
Kelley, 194 Mass. 533, 537 (1907).  See Erickson v. Ames, 264 
Mass. 436, 443 (1928). 
In Suburban Land Co. v. Billerica, 314 Mass. at 189, we 
examined certain deeds in a subdivision to determine whether the 
developer had intended to convey the fee in particular ways to 
lot holders whose lots abutted the ways, where the deeds were 
silent on the question of fee ownership.  The town argued that 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Joseph J. and Mary G. Rahal (Lot 491). 
 
Plan 647-8 (July, 1969) reconfigured other lots shown on 
the M plan and created lots owned by defendants Christopher P. 
and Christine M. Tosti (Lot 515), Richard and Marcia O'Shea (Lot 
518), Martin and Barbara Jessel (Lot 523), Robert A. Furman and 
Carole R. Bohn (Lot 525), and Gary McWilliams (Lot 527). 
 
Plan 647-11 (May, 1973) reconfigured certain lots shown on 
the G Plan and created lots owned by Paul J. and Pamela A. Maher 
(Lots 533 and 534), Susan M. Hennessey (Lot 535), Andrew and 
Catherine Tvirbutas (Lot 538), and Geoffrey L. Mahon (Lots 539 
and 540). 
 
Plan 647-15 (August, 1977) reconfigured another group of 
lots shown on the G Plan, creating lots owned by defendants John 
J., Elizabeth, Kristin M., Susan L., and Michelle T. Walker (Lot 
569), and Arthur Maressa (Lot 571). 
21 
 
the developer had had no interest to convey at the time it 
purported to convey an easement to a water company to install 
and maintain a water system, which the successor in interest to 
the water company later obtained via a foreclosure deed.  Id. at 
188.  We determined that the presumption that the developer 
conveyed the fee to the abutting landowners had been rebutted 
because the developer had installed and operated a system of 
water pipes beneath the ways at the time of the conveyances of 
the lots.  Id. at 190.  We concluded that the developer would 
not have conveyed the ways to the abutting lot holders because 
the developer "could not have intended to hamper itself and its 
rights by parting with the fee in any part of these streets."  
Id.  We therefore reversed a decision by the Superior Court that 
a successor in interest of the developer had no easement in the 
ways.  Id. at 194. 
Here, likewise, there is clear indication in documents on 
file with the land registration office that Luscombe and Morley 
did not intend to convey the fee in the way.  Rather, they 
reserved it for themselves to further their plan of development 
of the subdivision.  This intent is evident in the language of 
the deeds, in the ways laid out on the plans and the plain 
interrelationship among the plans, in other documents in the 
land registration system indicating the conduct of Luscombe and 
Morley and their grantees throughout the forty-year period of 
22 
 
development of the 217 acre parcel,18 as well as in Luscombe and 
Morley's winding up of ownership interests in the ways after the 
subdivision of the parcel was completed. 
When the way was created and the first deeds out were 
conveyed to Aldrich and the Waldrons, the way is described as 
adjacent to or "appurtenant to" their lots, separate and 
distinct from the lots themselves.  In both deeds, Luscombe and 
Morley explicitly granted Aldrich and the Waldrons easement 
rights in the way.  Clearly treating the way as separate 
property, Aldrich's deed and certificate of title provide that 
Lot J is conveyed "together with the rights of way for all 
purposes over said roads and rights of way [on the D Plan]."19  
The Waldron certificate of title provides, "There is appurtenant 
to said lots a [r]ight of [w]ay over the adjacent ways as shown 
                                                 
18 The entirety of the 217 acre parcel, shown on plans A, B, 
and C, is included in Luscombe and Morley's certificate of 
title, Certificate No. 3710.  The certificate provides, in part: 
 
"Said land is subject to and has the benefit of all 
outstanding rights of way, if any such there be, and so far 
as the same are now in force and applicable." 
 
19 In addition to the way, the D plan shows a road that is 
now Shore Drive, running east-west parallel to the coast; 
another road also now called Shore Drive, running north-south 
along the eastern boundary of Lot F, the easternmost lot, and 
intersecting with the waterfront road; and, finally, a town road 
parallel to the water, further inland, separated from the rest 
of the plan by a large section of undeveloped land then owned by 
Luscombe and Morley.  On the D Plan's eastern boundary, a 
reference states, "See Plan No. 646-G, Cert. of Title No. 1689." 
 
23 
 
on said plan 647-F."20  Had Aldrich and the Waldrons held the fee 
in the way, such easement rights over the way would have been of 
no use.  Indeed, the conveyance of such an easement would have 
been of no effect; the holder of a fee cannot hold an easement 
for access over the fee.  Thus, upon conveyance of Lot X and the 
ten feet on the western half of the way to the Waldrons, the 
easement would have been extinguished.  See Goldstein v. Beal, 
317 Mass. 750, 754 (1945) (Goldstein), and cases cited.  See 
also Adams v. Planning Bd. of Westwood, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 
390 n.15 (2005); Cheever v. Graves, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 606 
(1992).  The developers' intent to grant easements, not fees, is 
thus even more evident than for the developers in Suburban Land 
Co. v. Billerica, 314 Mass. at 190, where the deeds were silent 
as to fee or easement rights in the way. 
An examination of the plans in Case No. 647 shows that the 
parcel is a long, narrow strip along the waterfront, extending 
approximately five blocks inland from the shoreline.  On all of 
the plans, to the east and west of Nobscusset Road, the land is 
divided into small residential lots, along ways roughly 
paralleling the water.  Ways running between waterfront lots, 
                                                 
20 In addition to the way at issue, the F Plan shows two 
other ways leading between waterfront lots to the beach, and 
shows what is now Shore Drive abutting the southern boundary of 
all of the waterfront lots.  Shore Drive and Lot J are both 
depicted as open-ended; Shore Drive leads off the eastern edge 
of the F Plan into what is noted as the D Plan, "filed with 
Cert. of Title No. 4063." 
24 
 
from the water to a road along the shore, are shown every three 
to four house lots west of Nobscussett Road, on the D, F, 
G Plans, and to the east of Nobscussett Road, on the B Plan.  
See note 5, supra.  The way to the waterfront would have been of 
no use to Aldrich, the owner of five waterfront lots, or to the 
Waldrons, owners of two waterfront lots; all of their lots are 
entirely on the waterfront, with lot lines continuing down to 
the mean high water mark.  The way also would serve no purpose 
for any of the other waterfront lots shown on the D and F Plans, 
whose lot lines also continue to the mean high water mark.  The 
way thus created, along with the two other ways between 
waterfront lots shown on the F Plan, are, on the face of the 
plans, part of an integral scheme of ways in a neighborhood, 
providing access to the waterfront, every three or four lots.21  
The purpose to provide waterfront access to inland lots is 
obvious on the face of the plans, and would have been to those 
purchasing the Paglia lot in 1936 and the Hickey lot in 1944. 
Retaining the fee in the way provided Luscombe and Morley, 
who held property inland of the waterfront lots shown on the D 
and F Plans, rights to the waterfront which they could convey to 
                                                 
21 The plans show this continuing pattern of development 
notwithstanding the public access available to the beach after 
the takings of Bayview Road to the west, Shore Drive, and Common 
Landing to the east, and after Luscombe and Morley had deeded 
beachfront Lot K, adjacent to Bayview Road, to the town as a 
public beach.  See note 8, supra. 
25 
 
subsequently developed inland lots.  See Duddy, supra at 63, 64 
(in conveying lots abutting way on first plan, developer was 
"careful to retain the fee" in that way, and thereafter conveyed 
easement rights over extension of way shown on subsequent plan 
to additional lots created on that plan).  That Luscombe and 
Morley contemplated such further development is clearly 
indicated in the reference to the as-then-yet-to-be-filed G Plan 
at the eastern side of the D Plan, and in the large section of 
undeveloped land they owned south of Shore Drive, that appears 
on the D Plan, bounded by a town road.  The landowners to whom 
Luscombe and Morley later conveyed lots were explicitly granted 
easements to use all ways shown on their plans, together with 
others, or all ways in the registered land case.  Clearly, for 
Luscombe and Morley, maximizing the value of the registered 
parcel rested in developing inland lots with convenient access 
to the water.  They would not have hampered themselves in this 
pursuit by conveying the entirety of the fee over the way to the 
first two purchasers.  See Suburban Land Co. v. Billerica, 314 
Mass. at 190.  Like the developer in that case, the presumption 
of intent to convey a fee because the way would have had no 
remaining value to Luscombe and Morley after the lots abutting 
it were conveyed "is not applicable here, for the fee in the 
streets was a valuable adjunct to" Luscombe and Morley's other 
land.  Id. 
26 
 
In addition to the plain language of the Aldrich and 
Waldron deeds, and the clear purpose of the way, other documents 
in the registry system indicate an intention to convey easements 
and to reserve the fee.  In 1939, after the conveyance to 
Aldrich, and before the conveyance to the Waldrons, Luscombe and 
Morley conveyed two other waterfront lots, Lots 233 and 234, the 
first lots out on the G Plan, to Joseph Pare, Jr.  In 1939, 
again before the conveyance to the Waldrons, Luscombe and Morley 
conveyed two additional lots on the G Plan, lots 231 
(waterfront, abutting the way on the eastern edge of the F Plan) 
and 232 (inland) to Joseph Pare, Jr., by a deed stating that the 
lots "are subject to and have the benefit of all outstanding 
[rights-of way], if any, in-so-far as the same are now of legal 
force and effect." 
Throughout the course of development, Luscombe and Morley 
continued to grant explicit rights in all ways shown on a plan 
or to all ways in Case No. 647, indicating a belief that they 
had rights to do so; those rights were included on the lot 
owners' certificates of title.  In similar circumstances of 
intended future development by owners of a large parcel, we 
noted that a potential purchaser 
"reasonably should have been aware that the [developers] 
would have to retain title to the proposed way in order to 
proceed with the development of the large area of land 
beyond their lot.  The [developers] were both the owners 
and developers of the land and it would be contrary to 
27 
 
common sense for [a plaintiff,] one of the original 
purchasers of lots north of the developed area, to believe 
that no other property was to be developed that would 
require the use of the 'proposed street' for access.  The 
right-of-way granted [to another lot holder], which was 
recorded before the date of the deed from the [developer] 
to [the plaintiffs], makes it clear that the ownership of 
the land within the 'proposed street' and extending beyond 
into the undeveloped part of the property was to remain 
with the [developers]." 
 
Beattie v. Swanson, 360 Mass. 50, 53 (1971).  See Emery v. 
Crowley, 371 Mass. 489, 492-493, 494 (1976), quoting Murphy, 
supra at 680 (language of deed and plans showed that grantor did 
not intend to convey fee in way that crossed another parcel, but 
only easement of access to adjoining lot; "rules of construction 
are designed to elucidate the intent of parties to written 
instruments, . . . and thus look to the instruments themselves 
and extrinsic facts, if necessary, to decide if the deeds 
involved here pass title to real estate 'abutting' a 'way'"); 
McGovern v. McGovern, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 688, 700 (2010) ("the 
conduct of the parties after the conveyance was consistent with 
retention of the fee").  See also Frost v. Jacobs, 204 Mass 1, 5 
(1910) (concluding grantors did not intend to convey fee in 
passageway where deed conveyed "privilege to the owner of said 
lot to use the private way in common with other abutting 
owners," retention of fee permitted grantor to grant access to 
way and staircase in subsequent sale, and grantee thereafter 
conveyed property using same language in subsequent deed). 
28 
 
Furthermore, the town acted as though Luscombe and Morley 
had retained the fees in the ways.  When the town took Bayview 
Road in 1937, and the Common Landing at the end of Shore Drive 
in 1945,22 and took an easement in Shore Drive itself,23 also in 
1945, the town listed in the instruments of taking the lot 
                                                 
22 The Common Landing occupies the northernmost portion of 
Shore Drive, terminating in the water, between Lot J on the D 
Plan (then owned by Aldrich) and Lot 234 on the G Plan (then 
owned by Schweinler).  Schweinler and Aldrich are listed in the 
instrument of taking as the abutting lot holders; the land in 
the way taken is described as "'Common Landing' at the northerly 
end of Shore Drive," "by the land of" Aldrich and "by the land 
of" Schweinler.  Luscombe and Morley are listed as the owners of 
the land taken and are awarded damages. 
 
23 The length of Shore Drive from Bayview Road to 
Nobscussett Road is approximately 3,600 feet.  At the time of 
the taking, there were thirteen lot owners, some of whom held 
multiple lots abutting Shore Drive, including Aldrich, the 
Waldrons, Pare, and Schweinler, and also Luscombe and Morley.  
All are noted in the document of taking.  The document states 
that it takes "land within the side lines of the town way called 
Shore Drive."  The land taken is detailed, for each lot owner, 
as abutting, inter alia, the "northerly," "easterly," 
"southerly," and "westerly" "side line" of the lot along Shore 
Drive. 
 
The document of taking states that the town awards damages 
to Luscombe and Morley "as damages to the owners of the land for 
the taking of this easement."  The land taken for which damages 
are paid is designated as 144,350 square feet of land, described 
in Certificate No. 3170.  Dividing approximately 144,350 by the 
40-foot width of Shore Drive, Luscombe and Morley were 
compensated for the entire approximately 3,600 length of Shore 
Drive west of Nobscussett Road, and the abutting lot owners were 
not compensated.  Pare, the owner of Lot 231, was compensated 
for 300 square feet of land that would become an extension of 
Shore Drive.  At the time of the taking, Shore Drive ended on 
the west side of Pare's land; the extension ran across his lot.  
Lot 231 was later subdivided into eighteen lots, some of which 
are held by defendants in this case. 
 
29 
 
owners abutting those ways, and then compensated Luscombe and 
Morley, stated to be the owners of the land in the ways that 
were taken, for those takings. 
Additionally, in 1982, when winding up after all of the 
land had been subdivided and conveyed, Luscombe and Morley 
deeded the ways in the subdivision first to the Nobscussett 
Realty Trust, a family trust, which then deeded the ways to 
James R. Julian and Donald D. Cattanch before the trust was 
terminated.24  The deed conveyed to the trust the fee in numerous 
named ways, and also conveyed the entire fee in all remaining 
unnamed ways in Case No. 647, with the specific exception of the 
six ways leading between waterfront lots to the beach shown on 
Plans B, D, and F.25  Even after the subdivision was complete and 
the other ways had been conveyed expressly to their family 
trust, Luscombe and Morley thus reserved for themselves, and 
presumably their heirs, the fee interest in the ways to the 
beach. 
Starting in the 1970s, the deeds to later-conveyed lots 
contain an exclusive reservation of rights in the ways; they 
grant rights of access over the ways shown on a specific plan or 
                                                 
24 The certificate of title to Julian and Cattanch lists 
encumbrances for the takings in Bayview Road, Shore Drive, and 
Common Landing, discussed supra. 
 
25 See Guideline 19 of the Land Court Guidelines on 
Registered Land, Easements, Restrictions, Covenants and Other 
Rights Granted or Reserved in Deed (2009). 
30 
 
all plans in the subdivision, and explicitly exclude a fee 
interest.  The plaintiffs argue that this is an indication that 
the developers did not intend to retain rights in fees in the 
ways in their conveyances of earlier lots, because they knew how 
to do so and would have done so.  This more precise language 
including the reservation of the fees in the documents beginning 
in the 1970s is better explained as reflecting a response to the 
derelict fee statute, which was first enacted in 1971.  See 
G. L. c. 185, § 58.  Although that statute does not apply to 
land registered prior to its enactment, and thus is not 
applicable to any of the lots at issue here, it does apply 
prospectively to registered land. 
We are not persuaded by the plaintiffs' suggestion that the 
way simply ceased to exist after the conveyance of the fee to 
Aldrich and the Waldrons.  That argument would make a nullity of 
a carefully-drafted set of ways on a plan of residential lots, 
leading to the waterfront, with undeveloped land clearly 
indicated across the street from those lots.  Under this view, 
the way would exist only during the period when a single lot had 
been conveyed.  The second conveyance, on the other side of the 
way, would extinguish the easement in the way explicitly 
conveyed by Luscombe and Morley to Aldrich and the Waldrons. 
Based on information available in documents on file with 
the land registration office in Case No. 647, the defendants 
31 
 
have rebutted the common-law presumption that Luscombe and 
Morley intended to convey title to the center line of the way; 
we conclude that the developers intended to convey, as set forth 
in the deeds and certificates of title, rights of access over 
the way to Aldrich and the Waldrons, shared with others.  The 
documents show that Luscombe and Morley intended to retain the 
fee in that way and the other ways on the plans filed in Case 
No. 647, and acted consistently with that intent for over forty 
years. 
b.  Easement rights in the way.  Even without a fee in the 
way, the plaintiffs, as easement holders, have an interest in 
preventing use of the way by those without rights of access.  In 
addition, all of the defendants seek determinations that they 
are entitled to use of the way.  We turn to consideration of 
what rights over the way, if any, are held by the defendants.26 
                                                 
26 We note that the Land Court judge determined that certain 
defendants did not hold access rights over the way even where 
their lots appear on the G Plan, and notwithstanding her 
conclusion that Luscombe and Morley intended to convey access 
over the way to all owners of lots on the G Plan, because the 
defendants' certificates of title do not mention easement rights 
over any ways, or because the certificates describe their source 
of title with reference to a certificate for another lot 
appearing on the G Plan, without express mention of the G Plan.  
However, even on registered land, there is no requirement that 
easements appurtenant, benefiting a lot, must be listed on the 
certificate of title.  See Duddy v. Mankewich, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 
62, 64 n.6 (2009) (Duddy), quoting Dubinsky v. Cama, 261 Mass. 
47, 56-57 (1927) ("'However desirable it may be that the . . . 
certificate of title should disclose the whole state of the 
title, including all easements appurtenant,' G. L. c. 185 
32 
 
One claiming the benefit of an easement bears the burden of 
proving the existence of that easement on the servient estate.  
Reagan v. Brissey, 446 Mass. 452, 458 (2006); Boudreau v. 
Coleman, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 621, 629 (1990).  Where recorded land 
is at issue, it is well established that easements to ways shown 
on a plan may be recognized based on references to that plan in 
a deed.  A plan referred to in a deed becomes a part of the 
contract so far as may be necessary to aid in the identification 
of the lots and to determine the rights intended to be conveyed.  
Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston, 127 Mass. 374, 376 (1879).  
"'In determining the intent, the entire situation at the time 
the deeds were given must be considered."  Goldstein, supra at 
755, quoting Prentiss v. Gloucester, 236 Mass. 36, 52 (1920).  
For land abutting a way, where the deed describes the way as a 
boundary and references a plan showing the way, the grantor's 
intent to convey an easement over the way is assumed.  "[A] 
                                                                                                                                                             
requires only easements to which the registered land is subject 
be set out in the certificate of title.  Easements [benefiting] 
the property need not be noted").  Accordingly, the absence of 
any notice on the certificates of certain defendants benefiting 
their land is without consequence to the analysis here.  A 
reasonable purchaser would have discerned the developers' intent 
with regard to all lots on the G Plan.  See Duddy, supra at 64, 
67, 68, 69-70 (concluding all of plaintiffs' lots had right of 
access over way, and were burdened by others' rights of access, 
where some plaintiffs' deeds and certificates were silent 
concerning easement rights, some plaintiffs' deeds contained 
grants of access to individual lot owner, and other plaintiffs' 
certificates noted easement rights only for benefit of that 
plaintiff's lot). 
33 
 
right of way shown on a plan becomes 'appurtenant to the 
premises conveyed as clearly as if mentioned in the deed.'"  
Duddy, supra at 67, quoting Lagorio v. Lewenberg, 226 Mass. 464, 
466 (1917).  Easements to which a registered parcel is subject, 
however, are another matter entirely, and the fundamental issue 
in this case. 
i.  Land registration act.  The purpose of the land 
registration act is to ensure that holders of land registered 
under the act enjoy certainty of title to their property.  See 
Commonwealth Elec. Co. v. MacCardell, 450 Mass. 48, 50 (2007); 
Doyle v. Commonwealth, 444 Mass. 686, 690 (2005); G. L. c. 185, 
§ 57.  Every judgment of registration "shall set forth the 
estate of the owner and . . . all particular estates, mortgages, 
easements, liens, attachments and other encumbrances . . . to 
which the land or the owner's estate is subject."  G. L. c. 185, 
§ 47.  "[E]very plaintiff receiving a certificate of title in 
pursuance of a judgment of registration, and every subsequent 
purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for 
value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all 
encumbrances except those noted on the certificate, and any of 
the [statutorily enumerated] encumbrances which may be 
existing . . . ."  G. L. c. 185, § 46. 
Thus, for registered land to be burdened by an easement, 
generally the easement must be shown on the certificate of 
34 
 
title.  Commonwealth Electric Co. v. MacCardell, 450 Mass. at 
50-51.  See Jackson, supra at 711; Tetrault v. Bruscoe, 398 
Mass. 454, 461 (1986); Goldstein, supra at 757; Dubinsky v. 
Cama, 261 Mass. 47, 56-57 (1927).  In addition, "[n]o title to 
registered land, or easement or other right therein, in 
derogation of the title of the registered owner, shall be 
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.  Nor shall a 
right of way by necessity be implied under a conveyance of 
registered land."  G. L. c. 185, § 53. 
Nonetheless, with certain limited but important 
distinctions, such as those just noted, registered land is to be 
treated in the same manner, and according to the same legal 
doctrines, that apply to recorded land.  See G. L. c. 185, § 77 
(land registration act shall not "change or affect in any way 
any other rights or liabilities created by law and applicable to 
unregistered land, except as expressly provided in this 
chapter").  See, e.g., Goldstein, supra at 755 ("the same 
principles that govern the effect to be given a plan in the case 
of unregistered land apply where the land is registered"); 
Williams Bros. Inc. of Marshfield v. Peck, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 
682, 686 (2012) (registration act only changes common law if 
intent to do so is clearly expressed). 
35 
 
ii.  First Jackson exception.  In Jackson,27 as here, the 
issue concerned access rights to a beach over a way between two 
waterfront properties in a subdivision comprised of registered 
land.  Jackson, 418 Mass. at 705.  The certificates of title to 
the waterfront lots did not expressly mention an easement over 
the way in question for the benefit of the inland lot owners.  
Id. at 706.  After conducting an examination of other documents 
in the land registration office to determine "whether an express 
easement exists as a result of the references on the [waterfront 
lot owners'] certificates of title to the [w]ay and to plans 
showing the [w]ay," id. at 709, we determined that the plans 
were referenced in the certificates "principally to provide a 
description of the boundaries of the properties," and the way at 
issue was "only generally referenced as marking a boundary."  
Id. at 710.  Accordingly, we concluded that no express easement 
existed.  Id. at 714. 
We recognized, however, that there are two exceptions to 
the general rule that an easement burdening registered land must 
be set forth explicitly on the certificate of title.  Under the 
first Jackson exception, "an owner, in limited situations, might 
take his property subject to an easement at the time of 
                                                 
27 The plaintiffs contend that Jackson itself is wrongly 
decided, and urge that we adopt a stringent interpretation of 
G. L. c. 185, §§ 46 and 47, that would eliminate both of the 
Jackson exceptions.  We decline this invitation. 
36 
 
purchase:  (1) if there were facts described on his certificate 
of title which would prompt a reasonable purchaser to 
investigate further other certificates of title, documents, or 
plans in the registration system."28  Id. at 711.  We therefore 
proceeded to determine whether, even though the easement for the 
benefit of the inland lot owners was not expressly described on 
the certificate of title, "there were facts described on [the 
waterfront lot owners'] certificate[s] of title which would 
prompt a reasonable purchaser to investigate further other 
certificates of title, documents, or plans in the registration 
system."  Id. 
We explained that a reasonable purchaser of registered land 
whose certificate of title references a plan "would be expected 
to review that plan."  Id.  We stated further that where a 
parcel of registered land involves a lot bounded by a way, and 
the deed or certificate of title refers to a plan, a potential 
purchaser is on notice that the property is bounded by a way and 
that others may have easements in the way.  Id. at 712.  The 
purchaser would "be expected to examine the certificates of 
other lot owners in the subdivision to determine whether others 
might have an interest in the [w]ay."  Id.  Because such an 
                                                 
28 The second Jackson exception applies where an owner takes 
possession of registered land with actual knowledge that an 
encumbrance exists.  Jackson, supra at 711.  None of the parties 
suggests that it has any application here. 
37 
 
examination is limited to documents on file in the land 
registration office, it is consistent with the purposes of the 
land registration act. 
After examining additional documents in the land 
registration office, including approximately sixty deeds, and 
associated certificates and subdivision plans, we concluded that 
no easement existed because none of the documents referenced an 
easement or a right to use the way in question.  Id. at 708, 
710.  We observed that 
"[a] review of the [inland lot owners'] certificates of 
title would disclose to [the waterfront lot owners] no 
right to use the [w]ay on any certificate.  Appurtenant to 
each of the [inland lot owners'] lots is a precisely 
described right to use only those private ways necessary 
for access to that specific lot.  Further, as the facts 
disclose, the record is devoid of any indication in other 
certificates of title, and in deeds, of any rights in the 
[w]ay.  On the contrary, all the documents consistently 
express rights only in private ways considered essential 
for access to the lot being conveyed." 
 
Id. at 712.  We accordingly concluded that the grantors 
specifically intended to convey only limited easement rights 
over the particular listed ways necessary for the inland lot 
purchasers to reach their lots, and that the requirement of the 
first Jackson exception had not been satisfied.  Id. at 713. 
iii.  Application of first Jackson exception to Luscombe 
and Morley's conveyances.  The plaintiffs maintain that, even if 
38 
 
Jackson and its progeny29 were decided correctly, a reasonable 
                                                 
29 More than twenty years after this court's decision in 
Jackson, and relying on the first Jackson exception, the Appeals 
Court held that a defendant lot owner had easement rights in a 
private way abutting the plaintiffs' registered lots, where the 
plaintiffs' certificates of title contained no explicit 
reference to an easement for the benefit of the defendant.  Lane 
v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Falmouth, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 434, 
437-438 (2006) (Lane).  In that case, the plaintiffs' lots 
fronted along the private way, and one side of the defendant's 
lot abutted the terminus of the way.  Id. at 435.  The way 
extended approximately thirty feet inside the defendant's lot, 
then terminated.  Id. at 436.  One of the plaintiff's 
certificates stated that there was "appurtenant to said land a 
right of way . . . , said right to be exercised in common with 
all others now or hereafter lawfully entitled thereto."  Id. at 
438.  The other plaintiffs' deed referenced the private way as a 
boundary, and both their deed and their certificate of title 
referred to a subdivision plan filed in the registration office 
of the Land Court.  Id. The Appeals Court determined that this 
put the plaintiffs on notice that their property was bounded by 
a way over which others might enjoy a right of access.  Id. 
 
Three years later, again relying on the first Jackson 
exception, the Appeals Court determined that the plaintiffs' 
lots on registered land, all of which abutted a private road, 
were burdened by easements for access by the defendant lot 
owner, even though none of the certificates of title in the 
plaintiffs' chains of title showed an easement for the benefit 
of the defendant's lot.  See Duddy, supra at 66-68, 70 n.13.  
Each of the plaintiffs' deeds described their land as being 
bounded by a private road, and referenced a subdivision plan 
showing that road.  Id. at 68.  Some of the plaintiffs' deeds 
included a right to access the road for their own use, and some 
plaintiffs' certificates of title included an easement for 
access by the lot owner; for other plaintiffs, neither their 
deeds nor their certificates mentioned easement rights.  Id. at 
64.  None of the express easements for the plaintiffs' use of 
the road mentioned rights for anyone other than the lot owner.  
Id. at 64-65.  The defendant's lot was created on a later plan, 
and abutted the terminus of the same private road, which was 
extended on the later plan into other land that had been owned 
by the developer.  Id. at 63, 65.  The court concluded that the 
defendant's lot was benefited by a right of access over the 
private road, because the road on the plan creating the 
39 
 
purchaser in the plaintiffs' positions would not have had reason 
to review any documents indicating potential rights of access 
over the way by any of the defendants.  The plaintiffs contend 
that the D and F Plans do not include, reference, or incorporate 
the defendants' lots.  The plaintiffs maintain that, based on 
their certificates, no reasonable purchaser would have been led 
to review any plans other than the D and F Plans, or any 
certificates of title after the Aldrich and Waldron 
certificates, and thus would not have become aware of any 
documents indicating the existence of rights over the way other 
than to the few waterfront lots shown on the D and F Plans.  
Because, they contend, no reasonable purchaser would have had 
notice of any possible encumbrance over the way, the Land Court 
judge must have relied improperly on a theory of easement by 
estoppel30 in reaching her conclusion that any of the defendants 
                                                                                                                                                             
plaintiffs' lots was shown "as proceeding, open-ended, a 
measurable distance into [the developer's] remaining land" which 
would have required further inquiry.  Id. at 67-68. 
 
30 Because the Appeals Court indicated, in both Lane and 
Duddy, that, in those circumstances, the court also would have 
concluded that easement rights existed based on a theory of 
estoppel, we touch briefly on the theory of estoppel in those 
cases.  See Duddy, supra at 70, n.13; Lane, supra at 438-439.  
With regard to recorded land, "'when a grantor conveys land 
bounded on a street or way, he and those claiming under him are 
estopped to deny the existence of such street or way, and the 
right thus acquired by the grantee (an easement of way) is not 
only coextensive with the land conveyed, but embraces the entire 
length of the way, as it is then laid out or clearly indicated 
and prescribed.'  Casella v. Sneierson, 325 Mass. 85, 89 
40 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
[(1949)], and cases cited.  This rule is applicable even if the 
way is not yet in existence, so long as it is contemplated and 
sufficiently designated."  Murphy v. Mart Realty of Brockton, 
Inc., 348 Mass. 675, 677-678 (1965) (Murphy).  In Lane, supra at 
437, the Appeals Court observed that "undisputed facts" -- the 
plaintiffs' and defendants' deeds and plans, on file in the land 
registration office -- themselves "established" that the 
defendant lot holder had an easement for access over a way 
abutting the plaintiffs' lots.  The court noted that its 
conclusion was "not affected by the fact that the plaintiffs' 
titles . . .  are registered."  Id. at 437.  "[T]he estoppel 
giving rise to such an easement occurs by virtue of the language 
in a deed of conveyance, which language refers to the way as a 
boundary."  Id. at 439, citing Adams v. Planning Bd. of 
Westwood, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 392 (2005). 
 
It is true that in Jackson, supra at 714 n.7, when 
discussing Goldstein v. Beal, 317 Mass. 750, 755-756 (1945) 
(Goldstein), we noted that "Goldstein explicitly disclaims an 
estoppel theory."  This, however, is a description of the 
holding in Goldstein, which focused on the intent of the 
parties.  It is not a statement that no easement by estoppel on 
registered land could ever arise.  Indeed, in Goldstein, we 
observed that, "in other circumstances a reference to a plan in 
a deed on which a passageway is designated may be sufficient to 
create rights in it."  Id. at 756, and cases cited. 
 
That being said, we discern no reason why, in principle, in 
such limited circumstances as in Lane and Duddy, application of 
an estoppel theory to subsequent purchasers would impede the 
purposes of the land registration scheme.  In each instance, a 
seller conveyed registered land abutting a way, the conveyance 
described the ways as a boundary, and the deed referenced a 
subdivision plan on file in the land registration office showing 
the way.  See Duddy, supra at 63-64; Lane, supra at 435, 438.  
In such circumstances, the deeds and plan necessary to establish 
an easement by estoppel are all documents within the land 
registration system and also make the showing necessary to 
establish the first Jackson exception.  We note also that the 
Land Court's own guidelines on registered land, setting forth 
rules of construction of deeds, state, "Reference to another 
instrument or plan incorporates that document into the 
description in its entirety."  Guideline 2.1.4.2.2(c) of the 
Land Court Guidelines on Registered Land (2009).  We make no 
statement, however, concerning other, broader uses of the term 
"estoppel" to include ways other than those abutting the land at 
41 
 
hold access rights over the way. 
We do not agree that a reasonable purchaser would have so 
limited the examination.  Purchasers are expected to review the 
plan showing the lot in question, and to investigate further 
other certificates of title, documents, and plans contained 
within the registration system, at the time of their purchase, 
to determine both their own rights and whether others have 
rights.  See Jackson, supra at 711-712; Duddy, supra at 62. 
The judge stated that, under the first Jackson exception, a 
purchaser of registered land is required to investigate other 
documents within the land registration system; at the time of 
the plaintiffs' purchases, in 1994 and 1999, the plaintiffs 
would have been bound to investigate the F and D plans 
referenced explicitly on their certificates; a review of those 
plans would have demonstrated the "progression of the 
development" and would have required them to review the deeds 
and certificates underlying the lots contained on the plans 
showing the way; and a review of the defendants' certificates 
that reference plans showing the way would have informed the 
plaintiffs that the grantors intended to convey easement rights 
to those lot owners, even though the easements are not noted on 
                                                                                                                                                             
issue, conveyed by a deed referencing a plan showing those ways.  
See Rahilly v. Addison, 350 Mass. 660, 662 (1966); Casella v. 
Sneierson, 325 Mass. 85, 89 (1949).  See also Jackson, supra at 
711, quoting Pearson v. Allen, 151 Mass. 79, 81 (1890). 
 
42 
 
the plaintiffs' certificates.  We agree.  This is precisely the 
analysis undertaken in Jackson, and an examination of the 
documents in the land registration office supports the judge's 
conclusion. 
The Hickey certificate describes their lot as "Lot X on 
Plan 647-F," and the Paglia certificate describes their lot as 
Lot J on Plan 647-D.  Both the Aldrich and Waldron deeds grant 
access to all "ways" on their respective plans, and, in the 
Waldron deed, specifically to ways adjacent to lot X.  Both 
deeds state that they are bounded by ways on two sides (one 
being the way at issue).  Upon a review of the D and F Plans, a 
reasonable purchaser of the plaintiffs' lots would have been 
informed of the existence of the way, connecting to another, 
open-ended, "road," now known as Shore Drive.  On the D Plan, 
Shore Drive extends into adjacent land referenced as appearing 
on the G Plan.  On the F Plan, Shore Drive extends into land 
referenced as appearing on the D Plan. 
A review of the F plan would disclose two other ways to the 
water, between two other sets of lots, virtually identical to 
the way between lots J and X.  Viewed together, the three ways 
show a pattern of evenly spaced ways to the water every three or 
four lots, on this small strip of beachfront lots.  The D and F 
plans also show the undeveloped land on the inland side of Shore 
Drive across from Lots J and X, also owned by developers 
43 
 
Luscombe and Morley.  In addition, there is a road abutting Lot 
F on the eastern side of the D Plan, and then running south from 
Shore Drive, along Luscombe and Morley's undeveloped land, to a 
"town road" parallel to Shore Drive, on the southern edge of the 
D Plan.  The north-south road is too long to show in full on the 
D Plan, so a break in the road is indicated, in order to display 
the "town road" on the same page.  The "town road" is then shown 
leading, open-ended, west into the middle of Luscombe and 
Morley's undeveloped land.  This clearly indicates the intent to 
develop all of Luscombe and Morley's undeveloped land inland 
from Shore Drive to the town road.  Thus, even from an 
examination of these two small plans, the network of 
interconnecting ways, and the planned development of other 
inland lots that would make use of the ways, would have been 
immediately apparent. 
In addition to the layout of the ways, notations on the 
plans would suggest to a reasonable purchaser that other 
documents in the land registration system might show that others 
had easement rights over the way.  The D and F Plans are both 
titled "Subdivision of Part of Land shown on Plan 647A, Filed 
with Cert. of Title No. 16."  A notation on each plan states 
that it is a "copy of part of plan" filed in the land 
registration office.  On its eastern edge, the D Plan 
specifically references the G Plan.  The G Plan includes open-
44 
 
ended ways leading into other land of Luscombe and Morley, 
designated as being part of Certificate No. 3710, that is now 
the M Plan.  These references, in addition to the references to 
the developers' Certificate No. 3710, which is included in the 
Aldrich and Waldron certificates31 (and in the Paglia and Hickey 
certificates), would have informed a potential purchaser of the 
extent of the developers' land, and of the set of potentially 
benefited lots.32 
A reasonable purchaser, even at the time of the Aldrich 
conveyance, thus would have been aware of the progression of 
development along the waterfront, and the later progression 
inland.  This should have alerted a purchaser that there might 
have been others who could have rights, similar to his own 
rights, over the way adjacent to his lot.  We conclude that 
these are "facts described on [the] certificate of title which 
would prompt a reasonable purchaser to investigate further other 
                                                 
31 Even at the time of the Aldrich conveyance, when the D 
Plan was created, the B Plan, referenced in Certificate No. 
3710, showed a similar scheme.  See note 5, supra. 
 
32 As noted, supra, the Aldrich and Waldron certificates 
both state that the land "is subject to and has the benefit of 
the rights and provisions in [Certificate No. 3710], so far as 
the same are in force and applicable."  Among other things, 
Certificate No. 3710 states that its land is "subject to and has 
the benefit of all outstanding rights of way, if any such there 
be . . ."  Certificate No. 3710 contains a list of other lots, 
beyond those few waterfront lots shown on the bay side of Shore 
Drive on the D and F Plans; it lists all first deeds out from 
Luscombe and Morley for the entire 217 acre parcel. 
 
45 
 
certificates of title, documents, or plans in the registration 
system," Jackson, supra at 711, including the G and M Plans that 
contain lots inland from Shore Drive and reference each other.33 
Based on the above, we conclude that the judge was correct 
in holding that Luscombe and Morley intended to grant access 
over the way to all of the lots on the G Plan, and that the 
defendants in the first and second groups hold access rights 
over the way.  See Adams v. Planning Bd. of Westwood, 64 Mass. 
App. Ct. 383, 389 (2005); Boudreau v. Coleman, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 
621, 629, (1990).  See, e.g., Reagan v. Brissey, 446 Mass. 452, 
461 (2006) (implied easement rights in parks benefitting lot 
owners in a subdivision); Leahy v. Graveline, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 
144, 148-149 (2012) (beach rights in back lot owners based on 
deeds, plans, and contemporaneous advertisements). 
The judge concluded that the remaining lot owners, largely 
the owners in the third group whose certificates contain 
references to the M Plan or derivative portions of that plan, do 
not have easement rights in the way because the plans referenced 
                                                 
33 The plaintiffs argue that a reasonable purchaser should 
look no further than the first deed out from the common 
developer to his predecessor in interest; if that certificate 
shows no reservation of an easement, no other documents need be 
examined.  But that is not the case.  When conducting an 
investigation of the registration system, "we ask whether there 
were facts . . . available [to the plaintiffs] at the time of 
their purchases, that would lead them to discover that their 
propert[ies] were subject to an encumbrance, even if that 
encumbrance was not listed on their certificates of title" 
(emphasis added).  Jackson, supra at 711. 
46 
 
on their certificates do not show the way and they were not 
granted rights over all ways in Case No. 647.  Based on the 
clear intent of the original developers, as indicated in the 
interrelationship of the subdivision plans, the pattern of 
conveyance, the deeds and certificates of title expressly 
granting access to all ways in the Land Court case or to all 
ways on a plan, we conclude that the owners in the third group, 
and most of the unclassified owners, see notes 4 and 26, supra, 
also hold easement rights over the way. 
We note first that the judge had before her three "sheets," 
labeled 674M sheets 1, 2, and 3, each showing portions of the 
new lots created on the M Plan.  These sheets were stipulated to 
by the parties as being copies of documents filed in the 
Barnstable Registry District.  Although the sheets explicitly 
reference the G Plan, they do not show the way itself.  An 
examination of the M Plan on file in the land registration 
office,34 however, shows portions of the D, F, and G Plans in the 
                                                 
34 The M Plan on file with the land registration office is 
the plan approved by the Land Court in allowing the subdivision, 
see G. L. c. 185, §§ 1, 10, 26-31, 33, 51, 117, of which this 
court may take judicial notice.  See Land Court Manual of 
Instructions for the Survey of Lands and Preparation of Plans 
§ 4.1 (2006).  See, e.g., id. at §§ 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 2.1.2.1, 
2.1.2.2.  See also Guideline 5 of the Land Court Guidelines on 
Registered Land, Approval by the Engineering Department (2009). 
 
In Duddy, supra at 69 n.12, the Appeals Court suggested, 
but did not decide, that for purposes of the documents a 
reasonable purchaser should examine, the original grantees would 
47 
 
northeastern quadrant of the M Plan.  The M Plan includes an 
open-ended portion of the way, as well as an open-ended portion 
of the neighboring way to the water between waterfront lots N 
and O.  The M Plan also contains an outline of the area of the 
G Plan, to the north of the new lots shown on sheets 1, 2, and 
3.  The southernmost set of lots created on the G Plan are 
indicated on the M Plan as open-sided to the north, just as the 
lots on the D and F Plans are indicated as open-sided lots on 
the G Plan.  Thus, the M Plan, filed by Luscombe and Morley in 
the land registration office in June, 1947, seven years after 
the filing of the G Plan, clearly establishes their intent to 
treat the M Plan and the G Plan as an interrelated whole, with 
ways leading into Shore Drive and into the ways to the 
waterfront.35 
                                                                                                                                                             
be chargeable with notice of documents filed in the Land Court 
registration office in Boston, not just those in the Barnstable 
Registry District.  The court noted that the "registration 
system," as defined in the registration act, encompasses 
documents on file in the Land Court, and imputing such notice 
would not impose an undue burden on purchasers of registered 
land.  Id. 
 
35 In Rahilly v. Addison, 350 Mass. 660, 662-663 (1966), a 
case involving a petition for registration of a waterfront lot, 
we determined that the defendant inland lot owners held an 
easement for access to a beach over a private way abutting the 
plaintiffs' waterfront lot, where neither the plaintiffs' nor 
the defendants' deeds from a common grantor mentioned an 
easement over the way.  Both the plaintiffs' and the defendants' 
deeds, however, contained easement rights to a road paralleling 
the water, which intersected with the private way, as well as 
another road, perpendicular to the shore road, that crossed the 
48 
 
Moreover, simply applying the same rationale as the judge 
used in concluding that defendants with certificates referencing 
all ways on the G Plan have access rights over the way (which 
appeared on the G Plan), all of the defendants whose 
certificates reference access rights over the ways on the M 
Plan, where the way also appears, have access rights over the 
way. 
This intent also can be ascertained by examining only the 
three M Plan sheets provided to the judge, which, while showing 
the new lots, do not include as much of the context showing the 
interrelated plans.  Nonetheless, each sheet does show ties to 
                                                                                                                                                             
shore road and ended at a different section of the beach.  Id. 
at 661-662.  We determined the common grantor intended the 
inland lot owners to have access to and use of the beach area, 
and affirmed registration of the plaintiffs' land with the 
encumbrance noted for the inland lot owners' access over the 
private way.  Id. at 662-664.  The plaintiffs argued, as do the 
plaintiffs here, that their deed was conveyed out from the 
common grantor to their predecessor in title several years 
before the defendants' deeds were conveyed to the defendants' 
predecessors in title, and therefore that the grantor could not 
have intended an easement to benefit any of the defendants.  Id. 
at 663.  We concluded that the judge was warranted in finding a 
common scheme to benefit all of the lots in the subdivision with 
beach access and use of the beach.  Id. at 662-663.  "The 
existence of . . . a building scheme . . . [may] show an 
intention that the restrictions imposed upon the several lots 
shall be appurtenant to every other lot in the tract included in 
the scheme."  Id., quoting Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 481 
(1935). 
 
This is not contrary to our observation in Jackson, supra 
at 711-712, that a reference to a plan laying out a large tract 
would not itself provide each purchaser of a lot on that plan 
with a right of way over every road and way laid down.  As noted 
there, intent is paramount. 
49 
 
some portion of the D, F, and G Plans, and ways connecting those 
plans.  The facts here, and the relationship of the ways on the 
G Plan and the M Plan, are similar, in certain pertinent 
respects, to the circumstances in Duddy, supra at 62-65.  There, 
the plaintiffs owned registered lots created on one plan, 
fronting on a private road that provided access to a public way.  
Id. at 63-64.  The defendant owned a lot on a later-created plan 
which abutted a later-created portion of that way.  Id. at 63, 
65.  On the plan creating the plaintiffs' lots, the way was 
shown as open-ended and extending into other land owned by the 
developer of the subdivision.  Id. at 68.  Some of the 
plaintiffs' certificates of title, and some of their deeds, 
included an express easement granting the plaintiff lot owner a 
right of access over the private road leading to the public way, 
and some did not; others were silent as to any easement over the 
private road.  Id. at 64.  None of the easements in any of the 
plaintiffs' deeds or certificates mentioned rights over the road 
for the benefit of anyone other than the plaintiff lot holder. 
Id. at 64-65.  Nor did any of the certificates or deeds indicate 
that the developer reserved rights in the private road at the 
time he conveyed the lots on the first plan, that he might later 
use to convey easements to as-yet-undeveloped lots on some 
future plan.  Id. at 65.  In addition, at the time of the 
litigation, the private road existed on the ground only as far 
50 
 
as indicated on the first plan, which did not show the 
defendant's lot.  Id. 
In concluding nonetheless that the defendant had access 
rights over the private road abutting the plaintiffs' lots, the 
Appeals Court stated that a review of the first plan "would also 
have put these plaintiffs on notice that [the road] continued 
onto [the developer's] remaining land," id. at 68, which he 
later subdivided in the second plan.  Id. at 68-70 & n.13.  
Here, similarly, Luscombe and Morley clearly intended that the 
lot holders on the M Plan, like the other lot holders on the 
G Plan, have access rights over the way. 
In addition to determining that there were no easements 
over the way for the benefit of the lots created on the M Plan, 
the judge concluded also that most of the defendants who own 
lots created on the later derivative plans do not hold access 
rights over the way.  We do not agree.  These derivative plans 
show small sections of lots on streets that already existed on 
the G or M Plans.  The plans simply reconfigure certain lots 
along an existing way.  Each plan shows open-ended ways leading 
off the edges (into the continuation of that road on the G or M 
Plan), and some also show open-ended partial lots, established 
on the G or M Plans, on their boundaries.  Plans 647-2, 647-8, 
647-11, 647-13, 647-15, 647-S, and 647-W, in particular, show 
open-ended portions of Shore Drive.  Moreover, the titles of 
51 
 
these plans include references stating that they reconfigure 
specific noted lots on earlier plans.  Under the reasoning 
applicable to the defendants holding lots on the G and M Plans, 
we conclude that the owners of lots on these plans hold 
easements for access over the way. 
3.  Conclusion.  So much of the judgment of the Land Court 
declaring that the defendants in the first and second groups 
have a right of access over the twenty foot way that runs 
between the plaintiffs' lots from Shore Drive to Cape Cod Bay is 
affirmed.  As to the defendants in the third group, and several 
of those who were not classified into any group, the decision 
that they do not hold easements for use of the way is erroneous.  
The case is remanded for entry of an amended judgment declaring 
that the holders of certificates of title nos. 95145, 408557, 
144428, 70287, 77871, 178757, 190559, 190691, 110223, 164891, 
and 179868 also have the benefit of right of access over the 
way. 
The remaining portions of the judgment are affirmed. 
So ordered. 
Appendix.