Case Title: Smith v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 021583

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Carrico,1 S.J. 
 
JAMES ALLEN SMITH, JR. 
 
v.  Record No. 021583     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
February 28, 2003 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, James Allen Smith, Jr., argues that his 
convictions for first-degree murder and use of a firearm in 
the commission of first-degree murder should be reversed 
because the trial court erred in admitting expert opinion 
testimony on "blood spatter analysis."2  Because we conclude 
that blood spatter analysis is a matter for expert testimony 
and that a sufficient evidentiary foundation for that opinion 
testimony was established in this case, we will affirm the 
convictions. 
 
On February 7, 2000, Officer Mark Jones went to Smith's 
residence in Henrico County in response to a call.  In a 
bedroom, Jones found Tracey L. Chandler lying on her back on 
the bed with her feet on the floor.  There were six bullet 
entry wounds in her body:  behind her right ear, in the right 
                     
1 Chief Justice Carrico presided and participated in the 
hearing and decision of this case prior to the effective date 
of his retirement on January 31, 2003. 
2 This analysis is alternately referred to as "blood stain 
pattern analysis" and "blood splatter analysis."  We use the 
phrases interchangeably in this opinion. 
side of her chest, in her mouth, in her right hand, and above 
her left and right knee caps.3  Dr. Deborah Kay, the assistant 
medical examiner, testified that Chandler bled to death, 
although the wound behind her ear was potentially lethal. 
 
Smith was subsequently indicted for the first-degree 
murder of Chandler and the use of a firearm in the commission 
of first-degree murder in violation of Code §§ 18.2-32, -53.1.  
At trial, Smith testified that he shot Chandler in self-
defense when she attacked him with a needle during an argument 
over Chandler's drug use.  Smith testified that Chandler was 
standing when he fired the first three shots and that she sat 
down and rose again before he fired again. 
 
Over Smith's objections, Norman Tiller testified as an 
expert in blood stain pattern analysis.  Tiller stated that, 
based on his analysis of the impact spatter blood stains on 
the victim's pants, Chandler was not standing when she was 
shot.  The jury convicted Smith of the crimes charged, and the 
trial court sentenced him to a total of 28 years' 
imprisonment.  The Court of Appeals refused Smith's petition 
for appeal by order.  Smith v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2402-
01-2, June 20, 2002. 
                     
3 One bullet may have passed through Chandler's hand into 
her leg. 
 
2
We awarded Smith an appeal limited to the assignments of 
error regarding the admission of the blood stain pattern 
analysis.  Smith contends that blood spatter analysis is not a 
reliable science, and that the trial court should not have 
allowed "a purported expert" to offer opinion testimony on the 
subject.  Smith also contends that, even if such analysis is 
reliable, the opinion testimony should not have been admitted 
in this case because the Commonwealth failed to establish a 
sufficient evidentiary basis or foundation for such opinion 
testimony.  We consider these arguments in order. 
I. 
As explained by Tiller, blood stain pattern analysis is 
the analysis of the "shape, size and configuration of blood 
stains at a crime scene or on a piece of physical evidence."  
Depending on the type of stain and the circumstances, a number 
of different conclusions can be reached, such as the cause of 
the stain, its point of origin, and the direction in which the 
blood droplets were going at impact.  The analysis involves 
the application of principles of physics, chemistry, biology, 
and mathematics.  Many jurisdictions have held that blood 
spatter analysis is reliable because it is "clearly a well–
recognized discipline, based upon the laws of physics, which 
undoubtedly assist[s] the jurors in understanding what 
occurred."  State v. Rodgers, 812 P.2d 1208, 1212 (Idaho 
 
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1991).  The Supreme Court of Minnesota stated that "the 
results of blood splatter analysis are generally accepted in 
the scientific as well as the judicial community" noting that 
because the techniques are based on "the well-settled sciences 
of chemistry and physics, the reliability of the technique may 
be appropriate for judicial notice."  State v. Moore, 458 
N.W.2d 90, 98 & n.6 (Minn. 1990).  See also Danny R. Veilleux, 
Annotation, Admissibility, in Criminal Prosecution, of Expert 
Opinion Evidence as to "Blood Splatter" Interpretation, 9 
A.L.R. 5th 369, §§ 1(a), 7(a)(1993). 
Smith argues that this analysis and its attendant 
conclusions should not be accepted because no reliable and 
valid method exists to test it.  The lack of validity of blood 
spatter analysis, according to Smith, rests on the fact that 
human beings cannot be used to conduct experiments testing 
theories of the "science."  Shooting bullets into blood soaked 
sponges or other substances cannot accurately replicate the 
results of blood spatter from wounds to human beings, Smith 
asserts. 
We held that blood spatter evidence was admissible expert 
testimony in Compton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 716, 727, 250 
S.E.2d 749, 756 (1979), and Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 
222, 240, 427 S.E.2d 394, 406 (1993).  In Stewart, we rejected 
the defendant's contention that blood spatter evidence was not 
 
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reliable.  Id.  To the extent that the ability to test a 
method of analysis is relevant in assessing whether expert 
opinion based on that discipline is admissible, we note that 
many of the specific physical elements of blood spatter 
analysis are capable of being tested using the laws of physics 
and chemistry, and by employing principles of gravity, 
inertia, and viscosity.  In accordance with other 
jurisdictions, we adhere to the view that this form of 
scientific analysis can form a basis for admissible proof upon 
an appropriate foundation.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
trial court did not err in concluding that blood spatter 
analysis was a reliable science based on our prior decisions 
affirming the admission of such evidence. 
II. 
Smith also asserts that, even if blood spatter analysis 
is a reliable science, Tiller's testimony in this case should 
not have been admitted because the Commonwealth failed to 
provide an adequate foundation. 
At trial, Tiller testified about the characteristics of 
the shapes and patterns of blood stains depending on the 
source of the blood and other factors.  Tiller explained that 
when a bullet enters the body and blood leaves the body 
through the entry wound, the type of blood stain is known as 
"impact spatter."  The blood under these conditions, following 
 
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"the path of least resistance," exits the entry wound in a 
conical pattern, and eventually falls to the ground.  The 
greater the force of the impact, the smaller the droplets of 
blood that are expelled from the wound.  Tiller testified that 
when these droplets strike a surface at a perpendicular angle, 
the resulting blood stain is circular.  If the resulting blood 
stain is elliptical in shape, it may be concluded that the 
blood droplet struck the surface at an angle. 
Tiller assumed that the 18 blood spots found on the leg 
of Chandlers' pants were her blood.  All but two of the blood 
spots on the pants were circular in shape, which is consistent 
with the blood striking the pants at a perpendicular angle.  
Furthermore, Tiller found almost no impact spatter blood on 
the pants below the knees, on the back of the pants, or on 
Chandler's shirt.  Based on these facts, Tiller concluded that 
Chandler was not standing at the time she was shot. 
Tiller also testified that, most commonly, the source of 
impact spatter is a head wound because of the great amount of 
blood in the head and because the head is not generally 
covered with clothing which could deflect or block the direct 
travel of the blood.  Therefore, in Tiller's opinion, the 
wound to Chandler's mouth was the most likely source of the 
spots of blood found on Chandler's pants. 
 
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Tiller testified that he could not rule out Chandler's 
hand as a source of the blood spatter on the pants, but that, 
in his opinion, her hand was not a likely source.  Chandler's 
hand showed a bullet entry wound on the back and the exit 
wound made by that bullet was on her right palm.  Exit wounds, 
according to Tiller, cause more blood spatter than entry 
wounds.  If the hand wound had been the source of the blood on 
Chandler's pants, Tiller testified that he would have also 
expected to see blood spatter below the knees of her pants and 
above the waistline on her shirt.  There was no such blood. 
 
Smith argues that no adequate foundation was laid for 
Tiller's opinion testimony because only three of the 18 blood 
spots on the pant's legs had been proven to be Chandler's 
blood, because Tiller could not rule out the wound to 
Chandler's hand as the source of the blood spots, and because 
there was no evidence that stains on the bedclothes were blood 
or how long the blood stains had been on the pants. 
Determining whether an adequate foundation has been laid 
for the admission of an expert opinion is an exercise of the 
trial court's discretion, to be made in light of all the 
testimony produced.  See Brown v. Corbin, 244 Va. 528, 531, 
423 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1992).  In this case, the trial court 
held that the evidence provided a sufficient basis for the 
expert's opinion testimony because (1) the victim's blood had 
 
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been identified by DNA testing within the same area on each of 
the two legs of the pants allowing the jury to "reasonably 
conclude that the other spots were also the victim's blood;" 
and (2) there was sufficient basis to allow the expert to 
opine on which wound most likely caused the blood spatter on 
the pants.  The trial court concluded that the objections made 
by Smith went to the weight of the evidence, not its 
admissibility.  We cannot say, based on the record in this 
case, that the trial court abused its discretion in 
determining that the Commonwealth produced an adequate factual 
foundation for the introduction of Tiller's expert opinion 
testimony. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.
 
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