Case Title: Drummer Boy Homes Ass’n v. Britton

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11969

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-03-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11969 
 
DRUMMER BOY HOMES ASSOCIATION, INC.  vs.  CAROLYN P. BRITTON & 
another.1 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     January 7, 2016. - March 29, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Condominiums, Common expenses.  Real Property, Condominium.  
Lien.  Mortgage, Priority.  Practice, Civil, Standing, 
Attorney's fees. 
 
 
 
 
Civil actions commenced in the Concord Division of the 
District Court Department on August 8, 2007; February 6, 2008; 
and October 6, 2008. 
 
 
After consolidation, the case was heard by Peter J. 
Kilmartin, J., on a motion for summary judgment, and a motion to 
alter and amend the judgment was also heard by him. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.  
 
 
 
Thomas O. Moriarty (Jennifer L. Barnett with him) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Michael A.F. Johnson, of the District of Columbia (Rhiannon 
A. Campbell with him), for Federal Housing Finance Agency & 
others, amici curiae. 
 
Randy A. Britton, pro se. 
                     
 
1 Randy A. Britton. 
2 
 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Alan E. Lipkind & Elizabeth Brady Murillo for Avidia Bank & 
others. 
 
Henry A. Goodman, Ellen A. Shapiro, Charles A. Perkins, 
Jr., Scott J. Eriksen, & David R. Chenelle for Community 
Associations Institute. 
 
Clive D. Martin & Diane R. Rubin for Real Estate Bar 
Association for Massachusetts, Inc. 
 
Stephen C. Reilly & Jennifer E. Greaney for Bank of 
America, N.A. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  At issue in this case is whether G. L. c. 183A, 
§ 6, permits an organization of unit owners to establish 
multiple contemporaneous priority liens on a condominium unit by 
filing successive legal actions to collect unpaid monthly common 
expense assessments (common expenses).2  We conclude that the 
statute allows for such liens.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the Appellate Division of the District Court,3 which 
reached a contrary conclusion.4 
                     
 
2 Common expenses are defined in G. L. c. 183A, § 1, as "the 
expenses of administration, maintenance, repair or replacement 
of the common areas and facilities, and expenses declared common 
expenses by this chapter." 
 
 
3 The Appellate Division of the District Court is 
encompassed within the definition of a "lower court" from whose 
decision an appeal may be taken to an appellate court.  See 
Mass. R. A. P. 1 (c), as amended, 454 Mass. 1601 (2009). 
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of 
Drummer Boy Homes Association, Inc. (association), by Avidia 
Bank, Brookline Bank, Mutual of Omaha Bank, North Shore Bank, 
and Rockland Trust Company; Community Associations Institute; 
and the Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc.  We 
also acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of the 
decision of the Appellate Division of the District Court by Bank 
of America, N.A.; and the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the 
3 
 
 
1.  Background.  Over the last ten years, the parties in 
this case have been involved in protracted and contentious 
litigation concerning parking rights at a condominium complex.  
Our recitation of the factual background and procedural history 
encompasses only those matters that relate to the specific 
issues now before this court.  Drummer Boy Condominium II, which 
consists of twelve individual units, is one of nine condominiums 
comprising Drummer Boy Green in Lexington.  In the aggregate, 
the nine condominiums have approximately 150 units.  The 
defendant, Carolyn P. Britton, purchased a unit in Drummer Boy 
Condominium II in May, 2001.  In April, 2008, she transferred 
title to the unit by quitclaim deed to herself and her husband, 
defendant Randy A. Britton, as tenants by the entirety.5 
 
Around 2004, the Brittons began to withhold payment of 
their monthly common expenses because of a dispute concerning 
parking rules and related fines.  On August 8, 2007, the Drummer 
Boy Homes Association, Inc. (association),6 commenced an action 
                                                                  
Federal National Mortgage Association, and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation. 
 
 
5 Because they share the same last name, we refer to the 
Brittons individually by their first names. 
 
 
6 The association originally filed suit as the "Board of 
Directors of the Drummer Boy Homes Association, Inc."  As will 
be discussed infra, the Appellate Division of the District Court 
corrected the name of the plaintiff to its present form. 
4 
 
in the District Court against the Brittons.7  It sought to 
recover unpaid common expenses and to enforce a priority lien 
pursuant to G. L. c. 183A, § 6 (c), and G. L. c. 254, §§ 5, 5A, 
that would be superior to the first mortgage to the extent of 
the common expenses due during the six months immediately 
preceding the commencement of the action.8  The Brittons 
continued to withhold payment of their monthly common expenses.  
On February 6, 2008, the association commenced a second action 
to recover the unpaid common expenses that had accrued since the 
filing of its first action, and to enforce a second six-month 
priority lien.  When the Brittons still did not pay their 
monthly common expenses, the association commenced a third 
action on October 6, 2008, to recover the unpaid common expenses 
that had accrued since the filing of its second action, and to 
                     
 
7 The complaint named Carolyn as a defendant because she 
held title to the unit at the time the suit was brought.  Randy 
was also named as a defendant and party in interest because he 
was the holder of a second mortgage on the condominium unit.  
After the association asserted that Randy, who has a juris 
doctor degree but is not admitted to the bar, had engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law by filing a motion to dismiss the 
complaint, Carolyn transferred ownership of the unit to herself 
and Randy.  The Brittons then proceeded together as pro se 
defendants.  Coldwell Banker Mortgage, the holder of the first 
mortgage on the Brittons' unit, and Massachusetts Educational 
Financing Authority, the holder of another mortgage on the unit, 
were also named as defendants and parties in interest in the 
complaint.  Although each entered an appearance, neither has 
participated in the litigation or filed an appeal. 
 
 
8 The association voluntarily dismissed two earlier actions 
against Carolyn for the nonpayment of common expenses after she 
paid the amounts due. 
5 
 
enforce a third six-month priority lien.  The association 
subsequently filed a motion to consolidate the three actions, 
which was allowed. 
 
On March 9, 2009, the association filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  Following a hearing, a judge allowed the 
motion and entered judgment in favor of the association in the 
amount of $22,742.08.9  The judge first determined that the 
association was the proper entity to seek recovery of unpaid 
common expenses pursuant to G. L. c. 183A, § 6.  He then 
concluded that there were no disputed issues of material fact 
regarding the association's ability to recover unpaid common 
expenses and related fines, as well as reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs associated with the collection of such expenses.  
The judge pointed out that, notwithstanding the Brittons' 
arguments about the purported illegality of the parking policies 
at Drummer Boy Green, they never initiated an action to resolve 
their parking dispute, and they could not remedy the matter 
simply by ignoring the fines and refusing to pay their common 
                     
 
9 The judge pointed out that, apart from the issues raised 
in the association's original causes of action, the court 
already had resolved all other matters presented in this 
litigation, including the Brittons' request for injunctive 
relief and their various motions, counterclaims, and third-party 
actions.  The judgment in favor of the association was comprised 
of $9,887.22 in unpaid common expenses for the three six-month 
periods that were the subject of the consolidated actions (which 
included common expenses, fines, late fees, and costs), $12,314 
in reasonable attorney's fees, and $540.86 in costs of 
collection. 
6 
 
expenses.10  The judge also concluded, however, that the filing 
of successive actions was not consistent with G. L. c. 183A, § 6 
(c), and that the association's lien priority over the first 
mortgagee for common expenses, plus reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs, was limited to the one six-month period preceding the 
commencement of the first of the consolidated actions.  That 
being the case, the judge established a priority lien under § 6 
(c) in the amount of $15,054.86.11  The judge denied the 
association's subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment 
to reflect three successive six-month periods of lien priority. 
 
Both parties appealed to the Appellate Division of the 
District Court.  By decision dated July 20, 2011, a panel of the 
Appellate Division affirmed the judgment in all respects.  After 
reviewing the parties' extensive briefing, the panel determined 
that only two issues had been properly raised:  standing and 
                     
 
10 A unit owner may not challenge common expenses by 
refusing to pay them, but, instead, should pay under protest and 
then seek a judicial determination of the legality of the 
assessment, as well as suitable reimbursement.  See Trustees of 
the Prince Condominium Trust v. Prosser, 412 Mass. 723, 726 
(1992) ("A system that would tolerate a unit owner's refusal to 
pay an assessment because the unit owner asserts a grievance, 
even a seemingly meritorious one, would threaten the financial 
integrity of the entire condominium operation"); Blood v. 
Edgar's, Inc., 36 Mass. App. Ct. 402, 404-406 (1994). 
 
 
11 The judge determined the amount of the priority lien by 
adding together the unpaid common expenses for only the six 
months immediately preceding the association's first action 
against the Brittons ($2,200), plus reasonable attorney's fees 
($12,314), and the costs of collection ($540.86). 
7 
 
statutory interpretation.  First, the panel considered the 
Brittons' argument that the plaintiff was not a legal entity 
entitled to sue and, therefore, the judgment was void.  The 
association conceded that it should have brought suit in the 
name of "Drummer Boy Homes Association, Inc.," rather than 
"Board of Directors of the Drummer Boy Homes Association, Inc."  
The panel corrected the misnomer, concluding that the litigation 
was brought by an existing legal entity with authority to sue, 
and that the Brittons suffered no prejudice as a result of the 
amendment. 
 
Next, the panel considered the association's argument that, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 183A, § 6 (c), it was entitled to lien 
priority for three successive six-month periods.  After 
reviewing the language of the statute, together with its 
underlying policy of balancing a condominium association's need 
to enforce the collection of unpaid common expenses and a first 
mortgagee's desire to protect the priority of its security 
interest, the panel concluded that the association was entitled 
to only one six-month period of lien priority.  In the panel's 
view, extending a condominium association's lien priority beyond 
one six-month period of time would undermine the purpose of the 
statutory scheme.  The panel also stated that the association 
was entitled to recover reasonable appellate attorney's fees and 
costs. 
8 
 
 
Both parties appealed to the Appeals Court, which affirmed 
the judgment of the Appellate Division.  Drummer Boy Homes 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Britton, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 624 (2014).  We then 
granted the association's application for further appellate 
review. 
 
2.  Standing.  As an initial matter, the Brittons contend 
that because the association is not the "organization of unit 
owners" for Drummer Boy Condominium II, it does not have 
standing to bring a cause of action pursuant to G. L. c. 183A 
for the recovery of unpaid common expenses.  As a consequence, 
the Brittons continue, this court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider the association's claims under the 
statute, and, therefore, summary judgment should enter in their 
favor.  We disagree.12 
 
A condominium is a creature of statute.  See G. L. c. 183A; 
Kaplan v. Boudreaux, 410 Mass. 435, 442 (1991).  General Laws 
c. 183A, § 6 (a) (i), states that "[t]he organization of unit 
                     
 
12 The Brittons properly raised only one issue before the 
Appellate Division -- whether the judgment of the District Court 
was void due to the misnomer of the plaintiff.  To the extent 
that the Brittons have raised other issues in the present 
appeal, they are waived.  We consider the matter of the proper 
plaintiff because the issue of standing is one of subject matter 
jurisdiction and can be raised at any time up until the final 
judgment on appeal.  See generally Indeck Maine Energy, LLC v. 
Commissioner of Energy Resources, 454 Mass. 511, 516 (2009).  
See also Reporters' Notes to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (h) (3), Mass. 
Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Civil Procedure, at 194 
(LexisNexis 2015-2016). 
9 
 
owners shall have a lien on a unit for any common expense 
assessment levied against that unit from the time the assessment 
becomes due."  Pursuant to G. L. c. 183A, § 1, the "organization 
of unit owners" is "the corporation, trust or association owned 
by the unit owners and used by them to manage and regulate the 
condominium." 
 
On June 7, 1976, the trustees of Drummer Boy Trust 
(trustees), together with their successors and assigns, executed 
a Declaration of Covenants, Easements, and Restrictions 
(declaration) to create Drummer Boy Green.  In turn, the 
declaration provided for the creation of the association as the 
entity to which the trustees would delegate and assign "the 
powers of maintaining and administering . . . common areas and 
facilities and administering and enforcing the covenants and 
restrictions and collecting and disbursing the assessments and 
charges hereinafter created."  The association was incorporated 
under the laws of Massachusetts for the purpose of exercising 
these functions.13  The declaration further states that "[e]very 
                     
 
13 The declaration states that its covenants, easements, and 
restrictions "shall run with and bind the land and shall inure 
to the benefit of and be enforceable by the [association] for a 
term of 30 years . . . , after which time said covenants and 
restrictions shall be automatically extended for successive 
periods of ten (10) years unless an instrument signed by the 
then Owners of two-thirds of the Living Units has been recorded, 
agreeing to terminate or change said covenants and restrictions 
in whole or in part."  On November 9, 2005, fifty per cent or 
more of the unit owners of Drummer Boy Green extended the 
10 
 
person who or entity which is a record owner of a fee or 
undivided fee interest in any Living Unit shall be a member of 
the [association]."  As set forth in the covenant for 
maintenance assessments, if an assessment is not paid in a 
timely manner, the association "may bring an action at law 
against the [unit owner] personally obligated to pay the same or 
to foreclose the lien against the Living Unit." 
 
On September 30, 1976, the trustees executed a master deed, 
submitting specified land, together with the buildings and 
improvements erected thereon, and all easements, rights, and 
appurtenances belonging thereto, to the provisions of G. L. 
c. 183A, thereby creating Drummer Boy Condominium II.  It was 
subject to the terms of the declaration, and the covenants, 
easements, and restrictions set forth therein were incorporated 
by reference into the master deed.  Section 8 of the master deed 
states that "Drummer Boy Condominium II Association" is the 
unincorporated association of unit owners that will manage and 
regulate Drummer Boy Condominium II.  Article I, Section 2, of 
the bylaws adopted by Drummer Boy Condominium II Association 
(bylaws) provides that such entity is the "organization of 
[u]nit [o]wners" as defined in G. L. c. 183A.  At the same time, 
Article I, Section 3, of the bylaws provides that the 
                                                                  
restrictions set forth in the declaration for a period of twenty 
years, until June 7, 2026. 
11 
 
association (that is, Drummer Boy Homes Association, Inc.) has 
been organized under Massachusetts law for the purpose of 
administering and enforcing the declaration, and that the 
declaration vests in the association "certain responsibilities 
for the maintenance of the Common Elements described in the 
Master Deed."  Moreover, Article VI, Section 1, of the bylaws 
states that "[f]or the duration of the Declaration, the Common 
Expenses shall be determined, assessed and collected by the 
[association] as provided in the Declaration and its By-Laws, on 
behalf of [Drummer Boy Condominium II] and all other Drummer Boy 
Condominiums . . . ." 
 
In essence, pursuant to the master deed and the bylaws, 
Drummer Boy Condominium II Association delegated the exclusive 
authority to assess and collect common expenses to the 
association.  That being the case, the association functions as 
the "organization of unit owners" to recover unpaid common 
expenses and to enforce a priority lien in accordance with G. L. 
c. 183A, § 6.  We conclude that the association had standing to 
bring the present action. 
 
3.  Successive priority liens.  The association contends 
that because a unit owner's responsibility to pay monthly common 
expenses is a recurring obligation, an organization of unit 
owners can file successive legal actions under G. L. c. 183A, 
§ 6, to establish and enforce multiple contemporaneous liens on 
12 
 
a condominium unit, each with a six-month period of priority 
over the first mortgage, for the recoupment of successive 
periods of unpaid common expenses.  We agree. 
 
Our analysis of G. L. c. 183A, § 6, is guided by the 
familiar principle that "a statute must be interpreted according 
to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words 
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated."  Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).  
See Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001), and cases 
cited.  "Courts must ascertain the intent of a statute from all 
its parts and from the subject matter to which it relates, and 
must interpret the statute so as to render the legislation 
effective, consonant with sound reason and common sense."  
Twomey v. Middleborough, 468 Mass. 260, 268 (2014).  "When 
amending a statute or enacting a new one, the Legislature is 
presumed to be aware of prior statutory language."  Ropes & Gray 
LLP v. Jalbert, 454 Mass. 407, 412-413 (2009). 
 
An organization of unit owners is entitled to have a lien 
on a condominium unit for unpaid common expenses from the time 
such expenses become due.  See G. L. c. 183A, § 6 (a) (i).  
General Laws c. 183A, § 6 (c), first par., states, in relevant 
13 
 
part, that "[w]hen any portion of the unit owner's share of the 
common expenses has been delinquent for at least sixty days 
. . . , the organization of unit owners shall send a notice 
stating the amount of the delinquency to the unit owner . . . 
[and] to the first mortgagee."  Then, "thirty days prior to the 
filing of an action by the organization of unit owners to 
enforce its lien for delinquent common expenses, the 
organization of unit owners shall send a notice stating its 
intention to file said action to the first mortgagee."14  Id.  
The evident purposes of such notices are to give the unit owner 
an opportunity to remedy the delinquency so as to avoid an 
enforcement action that may result in foreclosure, and to 
apprise the first mortgagee of the status of the property so it 
can take appropriate action, as necessary, to protect its 
security interest. 
 
Prior to 1992, a lien on a condominium unit for unpaid 
common expenses was subordinate to the first mortgage of record.  
See St. 1991, c. 554, § 1.  As a consequence, the first 
mortgagee had little incentive to initiate a foreclosure action 
against the unit owner because its security interest was not in 
                     
 
14 A lien established under G. L. c. 183A, § 6, "shall be 
enforced in the manner provided in [G. L. c. 254, §§ 5, 5A]."  
G. L. c. 183A, § 6 (c), second par.  In turn, G. L. c. 254, § 5, 
states that such a lien "shall be enforced by a civil action 
brought . . . in the district court in the judicial district 
where [the] land lies." 
14 
 
jeopardy.  At the same time, during periods of falling real 
estate values, when the mortgage on a condominium unit might 
equal or exceed the fair market value of the unit, a foreclosure 
action by the first mortgagee could result in insufficient funds 
to satisfy a condominium association's lien.  In 1992, the 
Legislature recognized that "a serious public emergency" had 
developed with respect to housing created pursuant to G. L. 
c. 183A.  St. 1992, c. 400, § 1.  "This emergency ha[d] been 
created by a policy of disinvestment by unit owners who [were] 
no longer paying their lawfully assessed share of the common 
expenses.  Without the payment of these common expenses, 
condominium buildings [were] falling into physical and financial 
disrepair, causing neighborhood blight, and jeopardizing the 
public health, safety, and welfare."  Id.  The Legislature's 
response was to "take action to aid condominium associations" by 
enacting numerous amendments to G. L. c. 183A.  Id. 
 
Significantly, the Legislature inserted the second 
paragraph of G. L. c. 183A, § 6 (c), to establish the priority 
of diverse liens that could be placed on a condominium unit.  
See St. 1992, c. 400, § 9.  It states, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
 
"[A] lien [under G. L. c. 183A, § 6, for unpaid common 
expenses] is prior to all other liens and encumbrances on a 
unit except (i) liens and encumbrances recorded before the 
recordation of the master deed, (ii) a first mortgage on 
the unit recorded before the date on which the assessment 
15 
 
sought to be enforced became delinquent, and (iii) liens 
for real estate taxes and other municipal assessments or 
charges against the unit.  This lien is also prior to the 
mortgages described in clause (ii) above to the extent of 
the common expense assessments based on the budget adopted 
pursuant to [G. L. c. 183A, § 6 (a),] which would have 
become due in the absence of acceleration during the six 
months immediately preceding institution of an action to 
enforce the lien and to the extent of any costs and 
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in the action to 
enforce the lien . . ." (emphasis added). 
 
G. L. c. 183A, § 6 (c), second par.  The statute further 
provides that "payment of the assessments with respect to such 
six month period, and to the extent of any costs or reasonable 
attorneys' fees incurred in said action, shall serve to 
discharge such lien to the extent that such lien is prior to 
such mortgages described in clause (ii) above."  Id.  Moreover, 
"[t]he priority amount shall not include any amounts 
attributable to special assessments, late charges, fines, 
penalties, and interest assessed by the organization of unit 
owners."  Id.  In essence, when a condominium association 
initiates a lien enforcement action, it can obtain so-called 
"super-priority" status over a first mortgagee for six months' 
worth of common expenses.  See id. 
 
General Laws c. 183A, § 6 (c), second par., is silent with 
respect to whether, in the face of ongoing nonpayment of common 
expenses, an organization of unit owners can initiate subsequent 
actions to establish priority liens beyond one six-month period.  
Nonetheless, the insertion of the fourth and fifth paragraphs of 
16 
 
G. L. c. 183A, § 6 (c), as discussed infra, suggests that the 
Legislature anticipated that condominium associations might 
initiate multiple lien actions.  See St. 1998, c. 242, § 6.  
Indeed, given the Legislature's recognition of the "serious 
public emergency" caused by unit owners who fail to pay their 
common expenses, it is reasonable to think that the Legislature 
would view such payment delinquencies as an ongoing problem 
necessitating more than the heretofore limited remedy of one 
lien for six months' worth of common expenses.  See Blood v. 
Edgar's, Inc., 36 Mass. App. Ct. 402, 405 n.2 (1994) 
(Legislature consistently has amended G. L. c. 183A "to 
strengthen common expense collection").  The financial stability 
of the condominium form of home ownership depends, in 
significant part, on the timely receipt of common expenses by 
the organization of unit owners.  See Trustees of the Prince 
Condominium Trust v. Prosser, 412 Mass. 723, 726 n.3 (1992) 
("the collection of all common area charges is important to the 
viability of any condominium enterprise"). 
 
In 1998, the Legislature inserted the fourth and fifth 
paragraphs of G. L. c. 183A, § 6 (c), to establish the procedure 
by which a first mortgagee could maintain its lien priority 
notwithstanding the initiation of an enforcement action by an 
organization of unit owners to recoup unpaid common expenses.  
17 
 
See St. 1998, c. 242, § 6.  General Laws c. 183A, § 6 (c), 
fourth par., states, in relevant part, as follows: 
 
"The organization of unit owners shall take no further 
action to enforce its priority liens against a particular 
unit for common expenses if the first mortgagee agrees in 
writing that a priority lien exists without the requirement 
of instituting an action, as to such enforcement and pays, 
within [sixty] days of said writing, the following 
prescribed amounts:  (1) so much of any delinquent 
assessments on that unit for regularly recurring budgeted 
common expenses over a period for six months immediately 
preceding the notice of delinquency that would constitute a 
priority amount if an action had been commenced on the date 
the organization gives its delinquency notice to the 
mortgagee; (2) costs and reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred by the organization at the time of said writing by 
the first mortgagee to collect outstanding common expenses 
. . . ; [and] (3) all future common expenses, and special 
assessments other than special assessments for improvements 
made pursuant to [G. L. c. 183A, § 18,] assessed against 
that unit from the date of said notice until such time as 
the mortgagee's mortgage is foreclosed or otherwise no 
longer encumbers the unit.  The amount which the first 
mortgagee, if it so elects, would be required to pay to 
cause the organization not to proceed to enforce its 
priority liens shall not include any amounts attributable 
to late charges, fines, penalties, and interest assessed by 
the organization of unit owners . . ." (emphasis added).15 
 
In addition, G. L. c. 183A, § 6 (c), fifth par., provides that, 
when requested by the first mortgagee, "the organization of unit 
owners shall provide a written statement in reasonable detail of 
the actual dollar amounts the first mortgagee would be required 
                     
 
15 Based on the language of G. L. c. 183A, § 6 (c), fourth 
par., the organization of unit owners will be unable to recover 
all monies due and owing from a unit owner because a first 
mortgagee who elects to pay prescribed amounts in order to 
prevent a lien enforcement action is not required to pay certain 
enumerated fees that have been imposed on the unit owner as a 
consequence of the nonpayment of common expenses. 
18 
 
to pay, if it so elected, to cause the organization of unit 
owners not to take further action to enforce its priority liens 
against the unit" (emphasis added).  The fifth paragraph also 
sets forth a timetable by which the first mortgagee and the 
organization of unit owners shall enter into the written 
agreement described in the fourth paragraph.  See id. 
 
By enabling a first mortgagee to assume responsibility for 
a unit owner's unpaid common expenses, the Legislature has 
balanced the interests of a condominium association with those 
of a first mortgagee.  On the one hand, the condominium 
association is assured that it will receive six months' worth of 
delinquent common expenses plus all future common expenses, 
thereby allowing it to meet its ongoing financial obligations 
without imposing an additional burden on unit owners who have 
paid their common expenses in a timely manner.16  On the other 
hand, the first mortgagee is assured that it will maintain its 
lien priority, and that the condominium association will refrain 
                     
 
16 The amici on behalf of financial institutions that lend 
money to condominium associations point out that these loans, 
which are used to maintain and repair the common elements of a 
condominium, are secured by a pledge of the condominium 
association's income stream, namely, the common expenses paid by 
the unit owners.  According to these amici, the availability of 
multiple contemporaneous priority liens for successive six-month 
periods of time reduces the risk associated with such loans and 
increases the willingness of financial institutions to make 
them.  The amici state that they currently have approximately 
$229 million in outstanding loans to about 721 condominium 
associations in Massachusetts. 
19 
 
from taking further enforcement action.  The first mortgagee 
also can avoid the costs and reasonable attorney's fees that 
otherwise would be incurred in the lien enforcement action, and 
can preserve the value of its collateral through the continuous 
payment of common expenses.17 
 
Construing G. L. c. 183A, § 6 (c), as permitting an 
organization of unit owners to establish a single priority lien 
on a condominium unit for the recovery of only six months' worth 
of unpaid common expenses would render the mechanism established 
by the Legislature in the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the 
statute inconsequential.  It also would ignore the Legislature's 
                     
 
17 In concluding that successive lien enforcement actions 
would undermine the equitable balance between the interests of a 
condominium association and those of a first mortgagee, the 
Appellate Division relied, in part, on § 3-116 of the Uniform 
Condominium Act (UCA), 7 (Part II) U.L.A. 625 (Master ed. 2009).  
The UCA was enacted for three primary purposes:  "(1) to make 
terminology and details of condominium statutes uniform so that 
national lenders could more easily assess the appropriateness of 
condominium documents and financing, (2) to make unit holders' 
'bundle of rights' more uniform so that 'the increasingly mobile 
consumer' could become more educated 'in this very complex 
area,' and (3) to solve problems concerning 'termination of 
condominiums, eminent domain, insurance, and the rights and 
obligations of lenders upon foreclosure of a condominium 
project,' which were 'not satisfactorily addressed by any 
existing statute.'"  Plano Parkway Office Condominiums v. Bever 
Props., LLC, 246 S.W.3d 188, 193-194 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007), 
quoting Prefatory Note to UCA, supra at 487.  Massachusetts has 
not adopted either the UCA or its successor, the Uniform Common 
Interest Ownership Act, 7 (Part II) U.L.A. 1 (Master ed. 2009).  
Moreover, neither includes any provisions akin to those set 
forth in G. L. c. 183A, § 6 (c), fourth par., establishing a 
mechanism for the balancing of interests beyond what was 
afforded by the 1992 amendments to G. L. c. 183A, § 6. 
20 
 
references to "priority liens" in both the fourth and fifth 
paragraphs of § 6 (c) (emphasis added).  There would be little 
reason for a first mortgagee to assume responsibility for the 
payment of a unit owner's future common expenses if the 
condominium association were limited to one six-month period of 
lien priority.  In such circumstances, future common expenses 
would always be subordinate to the first mortgage.  The 
procedure articulated in the fourth and fifth paragraphs of 
G. L. c. 183A, § 6 (c), reflects an awareness by the Legislature 
that the statute permits an organization of unit owners to 
establish and enforce multiple contemporaneous priority liens on 
a condominium unit.  Our interpretation of G. L. c. 183A, § 6, 
is consistent with the Legislature's long-standing interest in 
improving the governance of condominiums and strengthening the 
ability of organizations of unit owners to collect common 
expenses, thereby avoiding a reemergence of the serious public 
emergency that developed in the early 1990s.  We are cognizant 
of the concern that by allowing a condominium association to 
establish multiple priority liens over an extended period of 
time, those liens eventually could have priority over much of 
the first mortgage.  However, it is well within the control of a 
first mortgagee to avert the establishment of such liens in the 
first instance by paying statutorily prescribed amounts to the 
21 
 
organization of unit owners in conformity with G. L. c. 183A, 
§ 6 (c), fourth par. 
 
4.  Appellate attorney's fees.  In its brief, the 
association has requested appellate attorney's fees and costs 
incurred as a consequence of its efforts to recover the common 
expenses due and owing from the Brittons.  General Laws c. 183A, 
§ 6 (b), states that "[t]he unit owner shall be personally 
liable for all sums assessed for his share of the common 
expenses including late charges, fines, penalties, and interest 
assessed by the organization of unit owners and all costs of 
collection including attorneys' fees, costs, and charges."  The 
Appellate Division of the District Court awarded the association 
$8,500 in appellate attorney's fees and costs, which was added 
to the total judgment entered in its favor. 
 
We now conclude that the association is statutorily 
entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
associated with the proceedings before this court and the 
Appeals Court.18  See Yorke Mgt. v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 19 
(1989).  The association is directed to file with the clerk of 
this court materials detailing and supporting its request for 
                     
 
18 With respect to a request for attorney's fees and costs 
that the association may have incurred as a consequence of 
filing its own appeal in the Appeals Court and opposing the 
Brittons' cross appeal, the association may apply to that court 
for such fees and costs.  See Costa v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 
453 Mass. 614, 633 n.28 (2009); T & D Video, Inc. v. Revere, 450 
Mass. 107, 117 (2007). 
22 
 
such fees and costs within fourteen days of the issuance of the 
rescript in this case.  See Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10 
(2004).  The Brittons will be afforded fourteen days to respond, 
and the court will then enter an appropriate order.  See id. at 
10-11. 
 
5.  Conclusion.  The association may file successive legal 
actions against the Brittons under G. L. c. 183A, § 6, to 
establish and enforce multiple contemporaneous liens on their 
condominium unit, each with a six-month period of priority over 
the first mortgage, for the recoupment of successive periods of 
unpaid common expenses.  Accordingly, the judgment of the 
Appellate Division of the District Court is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.