Case Title: Randall v. Riel

Citation: 123 N.H. 757

Docket Number: 82-401

State: new-hampshire

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Date: 1983-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
123 N.H. 757 (1983) GLENN RANDALL & a. v. DONALD RIEL & a. No. 82-401. Supreme Court of New Hampshire. August 31, 1983. Stephen R. Fine & Assoc., P.A., of Manchester (Charles A. Meade on the brief and orally), for the plaintiffs. Bruce F. DalPra, of Manchester, by brief and orally, for the defendants. BATCHELDER, J. This is an appeal from a decision of the Belknap County Superior Court (Dunfey, C.J.), approving the report of a Master (Bernard I. Snierson, Esq.), which strictly enforced the forfeiture clause in a contract or bond for deed. For the reasons which follow, we reverse and remand. *758 The factual situation which gives rise to the question involved in this appeal may be simply stated. The plaintiffs, Glenn and Sharon Randall, signed an agreement with the defendants on November 28, 1980, which the parties referred to as a "bond for deed." The agreement called for the plaintiffs to purchase land and buildings in Barnstead for $49,900, payment for which was to be as follows: a down payment in the amount of $14,900 and the balance of $35,000 in 240 monthly payments of $397.65 each, beginning January 1, 1981. The prescribed payments reflected accrued interest at the rate of 12.5% per annum. Pursuant to this agreement, the plaintiffs took possession of the premises on or about December 20, 1980. Under the terms of the agreement, title was to remain with the sellers until all payments had been made, but the plaintiffs retained the right to accelerate their purchase. The particular clause in the agreement which gives rise to this appeal provided: The agreement also provided that the plaintiffs pay the real estate taxes and insurance. Within a year after entering into the above-described agreement, the plaintiffs became unable to make the required monthly payments, and the defendants were forced to pay the 1981 taxes. Consequently, the defendants served the plaintiffs with a notice to quit and later obtained a writ of possession. The plaintiffs, in turn, filed a bill in equity seeking a temporary injunction to prevent eviction and to recover the $14,900 down payment, plus any accumulated equity in the property resulting from an increase in its value since the date of the agreement. Several hearings were held, and the plaintiffs voluntarily surrendered possession of the property pending final resolution of the issues regarding damages. As stated previously, the master's approved recommendation called for strict enforcement of the contract's forfeiture clause, so that all payments were to be retained by the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed that ruling. The terms "contract for deed," "bond for deed" and "installment land contract" are synonymous, and are used to describe the most commonly employed mortgage substitute. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON, & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 3.25, at 79 (1979) (hereinafter cited as OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN); see also Tromblay v. Dacres, 135 Vt. 335, 339, 376 A.2d 753, 756 (1977). These agreements usually contain the following provisions: the prospective *759 purchaser, after making a down payment, occupies the property, and pays in monthly installments the balance of the principal and interest. The vendor, however, retains legal title until the final payment is made. During the contract term, the purchaser normally assumes responsibility for paying the taxes and insurance and promises to keep the property in good repair. OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra at 79. Ordinarily, these agreements contain a liquidated damages or penalty provision. Id. at 80. [1] Our court has made a distinction as to whether or not a stipulated sum in a contract, such as the one before us, is in fact enforceable as liquidated damages or is a penalty. We have stated that: Langlois v. Maloney, 95 N.H. 408, 412-13, 64 A.2d 697, 701 (1949) (quoting Schoolneck v. Gold, 89 Conn. 110, 113, 93 A. 124, 125 (1915)). This standard for determining the enforceability of a damages provision is essentially the same as that set forth in section 339 of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1932), which provides in part that: See Langlois v. Maloney, 95 N.H. at 413, 64 A.2d at 701-02. In a situation analogous to the case at hand, we have held that a buyer in default under a purchase-and-sale agreement may recover a portion of a $10,000 down payment against a $33,000 contract obligation because the down payment exceeded the loss incurred by the seller. Newcomb v. Ray, 99 N.H. 463, 468, 114 A.2d 882, 885 (1955); see also Gaynes v. Allen, 116 N.H. 469, 471, 362 A.2d 197, 199 (1976). *760 [2] In the instant case, the master made no determination as to the reasonableness of the amount to be retained by the defendants. Instead he stated that he knew "of no law ... which would affect the valid value of the contract and the strict enforcement of its terms...." Because the master failed to consider the relevant law, that is, whether the damages retained by the defendants were reasonable, and whether there was a means to calculate the damages, we remand. At the hearing on remand, reasonable damages should be determined as the difference between the market value of the property and the contract price, plus such other special damages as may have resulted from the plaintiffs' breach of the contract for deed. Cf. Bower v. Davis & Symonds Lumber Co., 119 N.H. 605, 609, 406 A.2d 119, 122 (1979) ($10,000 liquidated damages provision was reasonable because property was sold in an arms-length transaction after breach for $90,000, which was less than $100,000 contract price). Reversed and remanded. BOIS, J., did not sit; the others concurred.