Case Title: In re Crew

Citation: 

Docket Number: s107856

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 7/11/11 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re MARK CHRISTOPHER CREW  
) 
 
) 
on Habeas Corpus. 
)          S107856 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
 
A jury convicted petitioner Mark Christopher Crew of one count of murder 
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and one count of grand theft (§§ 484, 487).  It found 
true a special circumstance allegation that the murder was for financial gain.  
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1).)  The jury fixed the penalty for the murder at death.  On 
petitioner‟s automatic appeal (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; Pen. Code, § 1239), this 
court affirmed the judgment (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822).   
 
Petitioner filed a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief 
from the judgment.  He alleged, among other things, ineffective representation by 
his trial counsel at the penalty phase of his capital trial for failing to adequately 
investigate and present mitigating evidence.  We issued an order to show cause 
limited to this claim. 
 
After the filing of the Attorney General‟s return and petitioner‟s reply to it, 
we determined that disputed questions of fact required an evidentiary hearing.  On 
September 13, 2006, we appointed as referee the Honorable Andrea Y. Bryan, a 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
 
2 
superior court judge in Santa Clara County, and directed her to take evidence and 
make findings of fact on these questions:  
 
“1.  What information did petitioner‟s trial counsel have when deciding on 
the scope of his investigation into potential mitigating evidence?  
 
“2.  What actions did petitioner‟s trial counsel take to investigate potential 
evidence that could have been presented in mitigation at the penalty phase of 
petitioner‟s trial?  What were the results of that investigation?  
 
“3.  What tactical justifications, if any, does petitioner‟s trial counsel offer 
for (a) limiting the scope of his investigation and conducting the investigation in 
the manner that he did, and (b) in limiting the presentation of penalty phase 
evidence in the manner that he did?  
 
“4.  What additional mitigating evidence could petitioner have presented at 
the penalty phase?  How credible was this evidence?  
 
“5.  What investigative steps would have led to this additional evidence?  
 
“6.  What circumstances weighed against the investigation or presentation 
of this additional evidence[?]  What evidence damaging to petitioner, but not 
presented by the prosecution at the guilt or penalty phase of trial, would likely 
have been presented in rebuttal if petitioner had introduced this evidence?  
 
“7.  Did petitioner do or say anything to hinder or prevent the investigation 
or presentation of mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, or did he ask that any 
such evidence not be presented?  If so, what did he do or say?” 
At the evidentiary hearing, which lasted four days, 12 witnesses testified.  
The referee then submitted to this court a 19-page report, which included factual 
findings.  After our review of the record and the referee‟s report, we conclude that 
petitioner has not established that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief.   
 
 
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I.  TRIAL EVIDENCE 
 
The evidence supporting the judgment of death is set forth in People v. 
Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th 822, and is summarized here. 
 
A.  Guilt Phase Evidence 
 
In 1981, petitioner met murder victim Nancy Jo Wilhelmi Andrade in a bar 
in San Jose, California.  Nancy owned a purebred horse and a Ford pickup truck.  
In January 1982, during a break in her intermittent romantic relationship with 
petitioner, Nancy bought a yellow Corvette automobile.  After Nancy and 
petitioner resumed their relationship, petitioner talked to his friend Richard 
Elander about killing Nancy. 
 
Petitioner asked Nancy to move with him to Greer, South Carolina, where 
petitioner‟s mother and stepfather lived.  When Nancy insisted on getting married 
first, petitioner married her in June 1982.  The marriage was troubled from the 
outset.  Petitioner was rarely with Nancy, spent time with other women, and in 
June 1982, the same month in which he married Nancy, asked yet another woman, 
Lisa Moody, to marry him.  (Petitioner and Moody did not get married.)   
 
In July 1982, petitioner and his friend Elander moved to Greer, South 
Carolina, while Nancy remained in California.  Also in July, Nancy and her friend 
Darlene Bryant took a trip across the country; during a stop in Greer, Nancy spent 
the night with petitioner.  After Nancy‟s visit, petitioner talked to his stepfather, 
Bergin Mosteller, about killing Nancy and discussed with Elander different ways 
of killing her. 
 
In August 1982, after returning to California from South Carolina, Nancy 
often spoke with petitioner by phone.  After deciding to move to South Carolina, 
she closed out her bank accounts, obtaining $10,500 in cash as well as a money 
order for $2,500.  On August 21, 1982, when Nancy was staying at Darlene‟s 
house, petitioner and his stepfather arrived at the house in a station wagon, which 
 
 
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was pulling a horse trailer.  The plan was to have petitioner‟s stepfather drive the 
station wagon to Texas, where he would leave Nancy‟s horse with petitioner‟s 
relatives; Nancy and petitioner were to follow in Nancy‟s Corvette and truck. 
 
On August 23, 1982, Nancy and petitioner went to Nancy‟s parents‟ house 
in Santa Cruz, California, to pick up her dog and belongings.  That same day they 
left for South Carolina; that night, petitioner registered at a motel in Fremont, 
California.  The next day, petitioner visited Lisa Moody at her home in Newark, 
California.  On August 28, petitioner and Moody left for South Carolina.  Along 
the way they stopped at the home of petitioner‟s grandmother in Texas; while 
there, petitioner received a phone call that upset him.  Petitioner and Moody then 
went to South Carolina, where petitioner opened a bank account in which he 
deposited murder victim Nancy‟s $2,500 money order; petitioner‟s friend Elander 
and stepfather Mosteller sold Nancy‟s clothing, horse trailer, and horse.   
 
On the day that petitioner and Lisa arrived in South Carolina, he described 
to Elander the details of Nancy‟s death:  After petitioner and Nancy left San Jose, 
California, in separate vehicles, they stopped and walked up a hillside into the 
woods, where petitioner shot Nancy in the back of her head and rolled her body 
down a ravine.  He then went to his friend Bruce Gant‟s house in Campbell, 
California, and the two of them drove to the murder scene to retrieve the vehicle 
that had been left there.  The next evening, petitioner and Gant got drunk and went 
back to the site of the murder.  When petitioner saw that Nancy‟s body had 
moved, he “freaked out” and told Gant.  Gant then went down the ravine, where he 
tried to strangle Nancy and break her neck.  He eventually cut her head off.  
Thereafter, Gant and petitioner put Nancy‟s body in a 55-gallon drum filled with 
cement and buried it in the backyard of Gant‟s house; they put Nancy‟s head in a 
five-gallon bucket filled with cement and threw it off the Dumbarton Bridge 
between Alameda and San Mateo Counties, California.   
 
 
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In mid-September 1982, petitioner and Lisa Moody came back to 
California.  Petitioner then sold murder victim Nancy‟s truck, forging her 
signature to the certificate of title.  On October 13, petitioner told Moody that the 
phone call he had received while in Texas was from his friend Bruce Gant, who 
had complained that the body petitioner had buried in Gant‟s backyard was 
“beginning to stink.”   
 
After petitioner‟s return to South Carolina, he sold Nancy‟s Corvette to 
Marion Mitchell.  When Mitchell repeatedly asked for title documentation to the 
car, petitioner‟s friend Elander told Mitchell that petitioner had killed his wife, cut 
off her head, put her body in a barrel filled with cement, and buried it in a 
backyard. 
 
In January 1983, petitioner moved to Connecticut.  There he stayed with 
Jeanne Meskell, with whom he had had a previous romantic relationship.  He told 
Meskell that the body of a girl he had killed was in two pieces in two drums filled 
with cement, and that one drum was in San Francisco Bay and the other was in a 
backyard.   
 
Police searches of Gant‟s house and yard did not turn up any evidence.  
Nancy‟s body was never found. 
B.  Penalty Phase Evidence 
 
The parties stipulated that petitioner had no prior felony convictions.  The 
prosecution did not present additional evidence in its case-in-chief at the penalty 
phase of petitioner‟s capital trial. 
 
Petitioner presented evidence of his childhood, his success as a soldier 
while in the Army, his positive relationships with women, and his compassionate 
acts for others.   
 
Petitioner‟s father, William Crew, testified that petitioner was born in 1954 
and that in 1957 the family moved from Fort Worth, Texas, to Novato, California, 
 
 
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and then in 1966 to Petaluma, California.  Petitioner did well in school and was 
involved in sports.  He was never physically abused.  Petitioner‟s parents divorced 
in 1969.  Petitioner and his father then moved to San Jose, California. 
 
In 1970, when petitioner was 15 years old, his father remarried.  Petitioner 
did not get along with his stepmother and one of her three children.  When he was 
17 years old, petitioner quit high school and joined the Army.   
 
In the Army, petitioner became a squad leader in charge of 12 to 14 men, 
rose to the rank of sergeant, and became the driver for the base commander, 
Colonel Donald Pearce.  The latter testified that petitioner was intelligent, 
dependable, possessed common sense, and was mature.  While in the Army, 
petitioner married his high school girlfriend, Patricia Silva, and they had a 
daughter.  The marriage ended in divorce before petitioner‟s honorable discharge 
from the Army.  After the discharge, petitioner married Debra Lunde.  When this 
marriage ended, petitioner moved to Texas.  Petitioner returned to California, 
where he worked as a truck driver and attended junior college.   
 
Emily Bates testified that she had a romantic relationship with petitioner 
and that he treated her well.  Kathy Harper testified that, when she was financially 
destitute, petitioner moved in with her and provided financial support for her and 
her son.  Petitioner‟s friend, James Gilbert, described petitioner as a caring and 
generous person.  Irene Watson, petitioner‟s grandmother, testified that petitioner 
took care of her for two to three months when she was ill.   
 
Three Santa Clara County Sheriff‟s deputies testified that petitioner, while 
in jail awaiting trial, interacted well with prisoners and staff and had at times acted 
to prevent trouble in the jail.  Jerry Enomoto, the former head of the California 
Department of Corrections (now Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation), 
stated that in his opinion petitioner would not be a high security risk in prison if 
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 
 
 
7 
 
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented testimony by a jail informant that 
petitioner had talked about needing to escape because he was going to be found 
guilty of killing a woman. 
II.  REFERENCE HEARING 
 
A.  Evidence and Referee’s Findings Regarding Trial Investigation and 
Evidence at Penalty Phase 
 
At the habeas corpus reference hearing, the following evidence was 
presented: 
 
In July 1987, petitioner retained Joseph O‟Sullivan to represent him at the 
capital trial, which was scheduled for September 19, 1988.  Shortly before that 
trial date, O‟Sullivan requested a six-month continuance to deal with problems 
related to his stress and alcohol abuse.  The trial court continued the trial to April 
17, 1989.   
 
In November 1988, Joseph Morehead became second counsel.  Morehead 
was an experienced criminal defense attorney, but he had never before been 
counsel in a death penalty case.  At petitioner‟s trial, Morehead had a dual role:  
one was to assist lead attorney O‟Sullivan at the guilt phase; the other was to 
prepare and present a defense at the penalty phase.  At the time of Morehead‟s 
appointment, lead attorney O‟Sullivan had not done any work to prepare for the 
penalty phase.  In O‟Sullivan‟s opinion the case would not proceed to the penalty 
phase.  O‟Sullivan had a number of meetings with petitioner, asked him about his 
background, constantly asked if there was anything the defense was missing, and 
described the term “mitigating evidence” by reading to petitioner the applicable 
Penal Code statutes. 
 
Before trial, second counsel Morehead talked to petitioner‟s grandmother, 
Irene Watson, as well as petitioner‟s father, with whom Morehead met on 
numerous occasions and upon whom he relied for information about petitioner‟s 
 
 
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background.  Petitioner‟s father said that petitioner had a normal childhood until 
the father‟s remarriage.  He described petitioner‟s mother as “cold and 
withdrawn,” but he never mentioned any childhood sexual abuse of petitioner by 
his mother. 
 
In preparing for the penalty phase, Attorney Morehead told petitioner about 
the type of evidence that could be presented at a penalty phase and asked 
petitioner about his childhood.  Petitioner said that he had a good life until his 
mother and father divorced.  Petitioner mentioned his drug abuse and his many 
romantic relationships with women.  Petitioner never mentioned sexual abuse by 
his mother, nor did he say anything about exposure to a sexually charged 
environment by his grandfather. 
 
Attorney Morehead decided to focus at the penalty phase on mitigating 
evidence in three categories:  (1) evidence of petitioner‟s positive background, 
with no criminal history; (2) evidence that not all of petitioner‟s relationships with 
women were manipulative and exploitative; and (3) evidence that petitioner had 
been a model prisoner while in jail awaiting trial in this case. 
 
In February 1989, Attorney Morehead hired John A. Murphy as an 
investigator to assist in preparation for both the guilt and penalty phases.  From 
February until July 1989, Murphy focused exclusively on investigation for the 
guilt phase.  In early July, Morehead and Murphy discussed developing mitigating 
evidence for the penalty phase; Morehead wanted to portray petitioner as a “good 
man,” with no previous criminal record.  Murphy met with petitioner a number of 
times, but he did not ask petitioner about his family life or background.  Petitioner 
never said anything to Murphy that was unflattering about himself or his family.  
Investigator Murphy‟s efforts were directed towards locating penalty phase 
witnesses, finding military and jail records pertaining to petitioner, and finding an 
 
 
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expert to testify that petitioner would have no problem adjusting to prison if 
sentenced to life without possibility of parole. 
 
Second counsel Morehead had only one contact with petitioner‟s mother 
and that was during the guilt phase when petitioner and his mother met in a jury 
room at the court.  At that time, petitioner was shackled to a chair and his mother 
greeted him with a hug and a kiss and then sat on petitioner‟s lap. 
 
Morehead retained psychiatrist Frederick James Phillips to evaluate 
presentation of a mental state defense for the guilt phase.  Dr. Phillips spent 
approximately 20 minutes interviewing petitioner but submitted no report.  
Attorney Morehead also consulted Dr. David E. Smith, an expert on addiction and 
clinical toxicology.  Morehead initially considered presenting Drs. Phillips and 
Smith as expert witnesses at the penalty phase but then decided against it for fear 
of enabling the prosecution in its cross-examination to put before the jury again 
the facts relating to the murder, such as the dismemberment of Nancy‟s body and 
petitioner‟s refusal to tell anyone where the body was.  Morehead did not present 
any expert testimony at either the guilt phase or the penalty phase of the trial.   
 
In early April 1989, Attorney Morehead filed a motion to strike the sole 
special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed for financial gain.  
At a hearing on April 17, the day jury selection began, the trial court questioned 
whether the special circumstance allegation was appropriate, but said that it would 
await trial testimony before ruling on the defense motion.  The trial court gave 
both the prosecution and the defense a copy of a memorandum that the court‟s law 
clerk had prepared, which recommended striking the special circumstance 
allegation.  
 
On July 17, 1989, when the prosecution rested its case, the trial court 
denied the defense motion to strike the special circumstance allegation.   
 
 
10 
 
At the habeas corpus evidentiary hearing in 2007, the referee found that 
trial counsel Morehead “was confident that he had filed a viable motion to strike 
the special circumstance allegation,” particularly in light of the trial court‟s initial 
concern — expressed before the presentation of any trial testimony — about the 
propriety of the special circumstance allegation.  It was only much later, when the 
trial court denied the defense motion — a ruling made after the prosecution had 
rested its case — that Morehead realized, in the referee‟s words, “there might be a 
penalty phase.”  The penalty phase began two weeks later, on August 1, 1989.   
 
At the penalty phase, the defense presented evidence that petitioner had a 
normal childhood until his parents divorced, had good relationships with women, 
had done well in military service, and would not be a problem in prison if 
sentenced to life without possibility of parole. 
 
The referee found that this defense evidence enabled the prosecution to 
argue at the penalty phase that petitioner had used his advantages of a “decent 
background,” his love of family, and his leadership abilities for the purposes of 
“incredible evil.” 
 
B.  Evidence Regarding Petitioner’s Background  
 
At the reference hearing, petitioner presented the testimony, as well as the 
declaration, of clinical psychologist Larry Allen Morris, a specialist in the 
treatment and evaluation of perpetrators and survivors of childhood sexual abuse.  
Relying on resources and research available at the time of the penalty phase of 
petitioner‟s capital trial in 1989, Dr. Morris assessed petitioner‟s social history to 
determine any childhood sexual abuse (a possibility first raised by petitioner‟s 
habeas corpus counsel) and the impact of such abuse, if any, on petitioner‟s 
development.  Dr. Morris reviewed documents pertaining to petitioner and his 
family, such as petitioner‟s medical, school, and military records; declarations 
 
 
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obtained by petitioner‟s habeas corpus counsel; and documents as well as 
testimony presented at petitioner‟s trial.  He also interviewed a number of 
witnesses, and he interviewed petitioner for five hours.   
 
Dr. Morris testified at the reference hearing that at the time of petitioner‟s 
penalty phase trial it was established that sexual abuse of male children could 
produce long-term effects pertaining to self-esteem, relationships, depression, 
addictions, and compulsive sexual activity. 
 
Dr. Morris stated that petitioner‟s social history indicated the prevalence of 
sexual abuse and incest.  Petitioner‟s maternal grandfather had sexually molested 
petitioner‟s mother from childhood through adolescence, and had exposed his 
grandsons to inappropriate sexual conduct.  Petitioner‟s paternal grandfather was 
romantically involved with women other than his wife. 
 
Dr. Morris also testified that petitioner‟s father was 17 years old when he 
married petitioner‟s mother, who was then 16 years old.  Petitioner‟s father was 
often away from home, and he had numerous extramarital affairs.  Petitioner‟s 
mother was depressed and withdrawn.  She would stay in bed for days at a time.  
She rarely went outside the home.  In the 1960‟s, when petitioner was an 
adolescent, he was “sexually exploited” by his maternal grandfather, Jack 
Richardson, who attempted to get petitioner and his older brother to engage in 
sexual activities with young girls for Richardson‟s amusement.  After petitioner‟s 
parents divorced in 1969, petitioner lived with his father, who remarried in 1970.  
Petitioner‟s father continued his heavy drinking and with his second wife would 
have adult “sexually charged” parties that petitioner and his friends attended when 
petitioner was in high school.  Petitioner‟s father molested his second wife‟s 
daughter for about six years during her preteen and teenage years. 
 
In a five-hour interview, Dr. Morris learned the following from petitioner:  
When petitioner was six or seven years old, his mother would get into the bathtub 
 
 
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with him and hold him sideways so that petitioner‟s hip bone was between her 
legs.  She also would sit on the toilet when petitioner was taking a bath, and after 
urinating would have petitioner wipe her with toilet paper.  From petitioner‟s 
earliest memories, and continuing for many years, his mother would bring him 
into her bed, place his wrist between her legs or drape her body over him and 
straddle one of his legs followed by her rubbing or pushing repeatedly against him.  
Petitioner was encouraged by his maternal grandfather to engage in sexual 
activities with girls when he was very young, and as a teenager he had a number of 
sexual experiences with older women.  Petitioner began drinking alcohol and 
using illegal drugs while in junior high school.  This pattern continued through 
high school and into his adult years, when he would frequently smoke marijuana 
and use drugs such as methamphetamine and cocaine.  In the years before the 
murder in this case, petitioner was extremely depressed, and his substance abuse 
increased significantly. 
 
In Dr. Morris‟s opinion, petitioner was sexually abused by his mother 
throughout his childhood, and was exposed to an oversexualized environment by 
his maternal grandfather.  According to Dr. Morris, molestation in petitioner‟s 
family and aberrant sexual behavior by the maternal grandfather should have been 
“red flags” warranting an investigation by the defense as to whether petitioner was 
a victim of child molestation.  “[A]ny reasonably competent mental health 
professional,” Dr. Morris stated, would have done so. 
 
On cross-examination by the Attorney General at the reference hearing, 
Dr. Morris acknowledged that petitioner‟s symptoms, such as substance abuse and 
multiple sexual relationships with women, were also consistent with a diagnosis of 
antisocial personality disorder, and that there was “no external extrinsic evidence 
that [petitioner] was sexually abused . . . .” 
 
 
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At the reference hearing, petitioner also presented the testimony of 
psychiatrist Frederick James Phillips.  At the time of petitioner‟s murder trial, 
Dr. Phillips had been asked by defense counsel to perform a mental status 
examination of petitioner.  Dr. Phillips did not then know that the case involved 
the death penalty; he had never before dealt with a capital defendant.  His task was 
to evaluate petitioner‟s mental state at the time of the murder and petitioner‟s 
mental state at the time of trial.  He spent 20 minutes talking to petitioner.  He also 
spoke with petitioner‟s father, but was not told about any family history of mental 
illness.  He unsuccessfully tried to contact petitioner‟s mother.  
 
On the Attorney General‟s cross-examination at the evidentiary hearing, 
Dr. Phillips stated that he had not submitted a report to petitioner‟s trial counsel 
because there was no useful information to provide.  Phillips explained that during 
the interview at the jail, he asked petitioner general questions about his childhood 
and about his family life, to which petitioner responded that he “grew up in a 
normal home under normal circumstances.”  Petitioner made no negative 
comments about his mother or his father.  Dr. Phillips stated that if at the time of 
petitioner‟s trial he had been told about sexual abuse in petitioner‟s family, and 
about petitioner‟s depression, compulsive womanizing, and drug and alcohol 
abuse, one of Phillip‟s conclusions — but not necessarily the most likely one — 
would have been that petitioner had been sexually abused. 
 
Petitioner also presented at the reference hearing the declaration of 
Dr. David E. Smith, a specialist in addiction medicine and clinical toxicology with 
experience testifying as an expert at the penalty phase of capital trials.  Although 
petitioner‟s trial counsel had consulted Dr. Smith regarding the impact of drug and 
alcohol use on petitioner‟s mental state at the time of the murder, Dr. Smith had no 
recollection of his trial involvement.  After petitioner had been sentenced to death, 
petitioner‟s habeas corpus counsel asked Dr. Smith to assess the impact of 
 
 
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petitioner‟s drug and alcohol history on petitioner‟s mental state and functioning.  
To do that, Dr. Smith reviewed Dr. Morris‟s declaration summarizing petitioner‟s 
social history, declarations provided by petitioner‟s habeas corpus counsel, and 
documents from petitioner‟s trial.  He also interviewed petitioner and individuals 
with knowledge of petitioner‟s drug and alcohol use. 
 
In the opinion of Dr. Smith, petitioner has “addictive disease, consisting of 
drug and alcohol dependence” and is “genetically predisposed to drug and alcohol 
dependence as well as to depression.”  Petitioner‟s abuse of drugs and alcohol, 
starting when petitioner was 13 years old and continuing with increasing 
frequency and severity, derailed his psychological development and adversely 
affected his judgment and reasoning.  Had Dr. Smith been provided the 
information concerning petitioner‟s drug and alcohol abuse and depression, he 
would have told petitioner‟s trial counsel that there was a strong case for 
mitigation based in part on substance abuse, and he would have advised counsel to 
develop a comprehensive medical, psychological, and social history of petitioner. 
 
Another witness for petitioner at the reference hearing was his former 
girlfriend, Cynthia Pullman.  She testified that petitioner drank alcohol “all the 
time,” used cocaine, suffered from insomnia, experienced sexual dysfunction, and 
often became very depressed. 
 
Emily Vander Pauwert, formerly Emily Bates, who had been a defense 
witness at petitioner‟s capital trial, also testified on his behalf at the reference 
hearing.  She had been romantically involved with petitioner in the late 1970‟s or 
early 1980‟s.  She testified that he regularly drank heavily, that he would drink to 
excess with his father when they were together, that he would sleep for long 
periods of time and have nightmares, and that he had bouts of depression.  She 
described petitioner‟s mother, whom she had met once, as “very distant and cold” 
 
 
15 
towards him.  Petitioner told her his mother had been abusive, but he did not say 
whether the abuse was physical or mental. 
 
Patricia Silva, petitioner‟s first wife, testified that petitioner used marijuana, 
barbiturates, and occasionally LSD when he was in high school, and that he was a 
heavy beer drinker.  His drug and alcohol abuse continued after they were married 
and moved to Georgia, where petitioner was stationed while in the Army.  
Petitioner had mood swings; he would often become very depressed and would 
sleep excessively during the day.  Petitioner never told her that his mother had 
sexually molested him. 
 
Doug Tompkins, who became petitioner‟s stepbrother after petitioner‟s 
father married Tompkins‟s mother, testified that he once saw his stepfather 
(petitioner‟s father) put his hand down the pajama top of Tompkins‟s eight-year-
old sister.  Tompkins did not see petitioner get drunk very often; he saw petitioner 
smoke marijuana “a handful of times,” but he never saw petitioner use cocaine or 
amphetamines. 
 
Admitted into evidence at the reference hearing was the deposition of Eddie 
Richardson, petitioner‟s uncle and his mother‟s brother; the deposition was taken 
while Richardson was incarcerated in Texas for statutory rape.  Richardson stated 
that his father (petitioner‟s grandfather) physically abused him and petitioner‟s 
mother, and that his father had sexual relations with young girls.  Richardson‟s 
sister (petitioner‟s mother) told him that their father had sexually molested her.  
He had no knowledge of petitioner‟s mother‟s sexual abuse of her children, 
behavior that would be “out of character” for her.  
 
Petitioner also presented the declaration of John Turner, the son of the 
second wife of Jack Richardson (petitioner‟s grandfather), stating that petitioner‟s 
grandfather had molested young girls.  Also presented was deposition testimony 
 
 
16 
by two women that Eddie Richardson, petitioner‟s uncle, molested them from 
when they were young girls until they were teenagers. 
 
Testifying for the prosecution at the reference hearing was forensic 
psychologist Daniel Martell.  He said that on the record presented, he could not 
reach a conclusion as to whether petitioner‟s mother had sexually abused 
petitioner as a child.  According to Dr. Martell, the symptoms of depression, 
substance abuse, and sexual promiscuity are not symptoms specific to sexual 
abuse because many other disorders, including antisocial personality, have the 
same symptoms.  Because childhood sexual abuse by one‟s mother is rare, 
Dr. Martell considered it “farfetched” to suggest that the symptoms indicated were 
distinctly characteristic of “sexual abuse by one‟s mother.”  He also said that it 
“was unsupportable by the literature” to suggest that any competent mental health 
professional would have looked for sexual abuse by the mother.  He further stated 
that although the record would support a conclusion of sexual abuse of women by 
petitioner‟s male family members, there was no indication that any of the males 
were sexually abused. 
 
C.  Referee’s Report 
 
As noted at the outset, this court‟s reference order asked the referee to hold 
an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact on seven questions, which we 
discuss below.   
1.  Question No. 1 
 
Our first question asked what information petitioner‟s trial attorneys had 
when they determined the scope of the investigation into potentially mitigating 
evidence to be presented at the penalty phase of petitioner‟s capital trial.  The 
referee found that trial counsel knew that petitioner (1) had no prior criminal 
history; (2) had a good, fairly normal childhood; (3) had a pattern of drug and 
 
 
17 
alcohol abuse; (4) had relationships with many women and difficulty maintaining 
long-term relationships; and (5) suffered from sleep disorders and depression. 
2.  Question No. 2 
 
Our second question asked what actions petitioner‟s trial counsel took to 
investigate potentially mitigating evidence that could have been presented at the 
penalty phase, and the results of that investigation.  The referee found that lead 
trial counsel O‟Sullivan did no investigation, but that he did ask petitioner about 
his background, that he repeatedly asked petitioner if there was anything the 
defense should know, and that he explained the essence of mitigating evidence by 
reading to petitioner the applicable Penal Code statutes.  As to second trial counsel 
Morehead, the referee found that his focus was on the positive aspects of 
petitioner‟s life.  The referee also found that petitioner‟s father had told Morehead 
that petitioner‟s childhood was relatively normal, that petitioner‟s mother was cold 
and withdrawn, and that petitioner started having problems at age 15 after his 
parents divorced.  The referee further found that defense trial investigator Murphy 
did not start investigating the existence of any potentially mitigating evidence until 
July 1989, shortly before commencement of the penalty phase, and that Murphy 
did not ask petitioner about his family life or background. 
3.  Question No. 3 
 
Our third question asked the referee to determine trial counsel‟s tactical 
justifications in limiting the scope of the investigation into, and presentation of, 
potentially mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.  The referee found that 
neither lead counsel O‟Sullivan nor second counsel Morehead had articulated any 
tactical justification.  Additionally, the referee found that Morehead had decided 
not to present at the penalty phase any testimony by mental health experts because 
of his concern that the prosecution‟s cross-examination of such witnesses would 
 
 
18 
have reminded the jury of the facts surrounding the murder of petitioner‟s wife, 
Nancy. 
4.  Question No. 4 
 
Our fourth question asked the referee what additional mitigating evidence 
the defense could have presented at the penalty phase of petitioner‟s capital trial, 
and to determine the credibility of such evidence.   
 
With regard to petitioner‟s family history, the referee found that petitioner‟s 
father had molested his eight-year-old stepdaughter, that petitioner‟s maternal 
grandfather (Jack Richardson) had sexually abused not only petitioner‟s mother 
but also his granddaughter and a neighbor girl.  The referee further found that 
petitioner‟s maternal uncle (Eddie Richardson) had molested his own daughter and 
granddaughter, and other young girls. 
 
On the issue of drug and alcohol abuse, the referee found that such abuse 
by petitioner began at an early age, continued through his life, and increased in the 
years immediately before his arrest for Nancy‟s murder.  Petitioner‟s father started 
drinking at an early age and continued to do so throughout his life.  
 
The referee found a history of mental illness in petitioner‟s family.  
Petitioner‟s maternal grandfather had mental health problems, and the 
grandfather‟s older brother (Dewey) was a psychotic who had been 
institutionalized.  Petitioner‟s paternal grandmother was unstable and suffered 
from depression and anxiety.  With respect to petitioner, he suffered from 
depression, anxiety, low self-esteem, sleep disorders, and occasional sexual 
dysfunction. 
 
As to expert testimony on sexual abuse, the referee quoted from 
Dr. Morris‟s declaration, which petitioner had presented at the reference hearing.  
The declaration expressed Dr. Morris‟s opinion that petitioner was sexually 
abused by his mother beginning at an early age and continuing through his 
 
 
19 
childhood, and that petitioner was exposed to an “extraordinary oversexualized 
environment” by his maternal grandfather, who encouraged petitioner to engage in 
sexual misbehavior for the grandfather‟s pleasure.  The psychological impact of 
this sexual abuse, Dr. Morris‟s declaration stated, was made worse when 
petitioner‟s father and brother exposed him to additional inappropriate sexual 
experiences.  According to Dr. Morris, these negative experiences adversely 
affected petitioner‟s emotional well-being, his ability to develop interpersonal 
relationships, and his sexual development.  
 
On the issue of substance abuse, the referee quoted the opinion of 
petitioner‟s expert Dr. Smith that petitioner “suffered from chronic alcohol and 
drug dependence stemming from his traumatic upbringing and family history, 
which had a long term deleterious effect on his mental health and functioning 
. . . .” 
 
As to the credibility of evidence presented at the reference hearing on the 
issue of mitigating evidence, the referee stated that she had “no reason to doubt the 
veracity of any of the evidence that was presented” and that she accepted the 
evidence as “valid.” 
5.  Question No. 5 
 
Our fifth question asked the referee what investigative steps petitioner‟s 
trial counsel could have taken to uncover additional mitigating evidence for 
presentation at the penalty phase of petitioner‟s capital trial.  The referee found 
that trial counsel could have discovered such evidence by traveling to the locations 
of witnesses, documents, and records, and by interviewing the various witnesses, 
just as habeas corpus counsel had done.  The referee also found that at the time of 
trial petitioner‟s counsel could have retained an expert, such as Dr. Morris, on 
male victims of sexual abuse. 
 
 
20 
6.  Question No. 6 
 
Our sixth question asked the referee to determine whether any 
circumstances would have hindered defense trial counsel‟s investigation into, or 
the presentation of, additional mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, and what 
evidence damaging to petitioner, but not presented by the prosecution at the guilt 
or penalty phase of trial, would likely have been offered on the prosecution‟s 
rebuttal if petitioner had presented such evidence.  The referee found that lead trial 
attorney O‟Sullivan conducted no penalty phase investigation and delegated that 
task to second counsel Morehead.  The latter‟s other assignments — assisting in 
selecting a jury, preparing pretrial motions, exploring a mental state defense for 
the guilt phase, and being the second counsel at the guilt phase — prevented him 
from doing any work on the penalty phase until after trial began.  Both defense 
attorneys expected the trial court to strike the sole special circumstance allegation 
— that the murder was for financial gain.  Such a ruling by the trial court would 
have rendered a penalty phase unnecessary.  Only much later, on July 17, 1989, 
when the prosecution rested its case-in-chief at the trial‟s guilt phase and the trial 
court denied the defense motion to strike the special circumstance allegation 
(made in April before the presentation of evidence), did it become apparent to the 
defense that a penalty phase could not be ruled out.  The referee also found that 
defense investigator Murphy did not begin a penalty phase investigation until early 
July 1989.   
 
As to our question what evidence damaging to petitioner the prosecution at 
the trial‟s penalty phase would likely have presented on rebuttal, the referee found 
(a) that defense attorney Morehead was concerned that presenting the testimony of 
mental health experts at the penalty phase would have enabled the prosecution to 
reinforce to the jury the facts of Nancy‟s murder; and (b) that prosecution 
witness Dr. Martell could have testified that petitioner‟s symptoms of depression, 
 
 
21 
substance abuse, and sexual promiscuity were shared by a substantial majority of 
the prison population and were as consistent with a diagnosis of antisocial 
personality disorder as with the defense theory that as a child petitioner was 
sexually abused by his mother. 
7.  Question No. 7 
 
Our seventh question asked the referee whether petitioner did or said 
anything that hindered or prevented the defense from investigating and presenting 
additional mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.  The referee found that it was 
undisputed petitioner did not tell his trial counsel of childhood sexual abuse.  But 
the referee also found no evidence that petitioner had hindered such an 
investigation or asked that mitigating evidence not be presented. 
8.  Referee’s summary 
 
Summarizing the mitigating evidence presented by petitioner at the 
reference hearing, the referee stated there was abundant credible evidence at the 
hearing “that petitioner‟s upbringing was anything but idyllic” and that the 
evidence “demonstrated that petitioner had a family history fraught with incest, 
abuse, dysfunction, mental illness and substance abuse.” 
III.  PETITIONER’S EXCEPTIONS TO THE REFEREE’S REPORT 
 
Petitioner challenges the referee‟s finding that second counsel Morehead 
“was concerned that the presentation of mental-health evidence on petitioner‟s 
behalf [at the trial‟s penalty phase] would have led to a reiteration of the facts of 
the crime.”  The referee made this finding in response to that part of our question 
number six asking what evidence the prosecution could have presented on rebuttal 
if petitioner had presented additional mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.  
According to petitioner, the finding is not responsive to our inquiry in question 
number six because the facts of the crime were presented at the guilt phase.  The 
 
 
22 
referee, however, made the same finding in response to reference question number 
three, which asked what tactical justifications trial counsel had for limiting the 
presentation of evidence at the penalty phase.  Because the referee‟s finding is 
responsive to question number three, petitioner‟s challenge to the finding as to our 
question number six has no effect on our review of this matter. 
 
Petitioner also takes exception to the referee‟s finding that prosecution 
witness “Dr. Martell testified that the petitioner‟s symptoms were just as 
consistent with antisocial personality disorder as they were with sexual abuse.”  
Petitioner argues it was undisputed that he could not be diagnosed with having an 
antisocial personality disorder because he did not satisfy the diagnostic criterion of 
exhibiting a conduct disorder before the age of 15 years.  In support, petitioner 
points to his witness Dr. Morris‟s testimony on redirect examination by 
petitioner‟s attorney at the reference hearing that a diagnosis of antisocial 
personality disorder requires a finding of a conduct disorder before the age of 15, 
and that he saw no evidence in the documents he had read that petitioner had a 
conduct disorder before that age.  Earlier, however, on cross-examination by the 
prosecution, Dr. Morris acknowledged that petitioner‟s symptoms were consistent 
with a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. 
 
We agree with the referee.  Prosecution witness Dr. Martell, who had 
reviewed the pertinent documentary evidence, including the declaration of 
petitioner‟s expert Dr. Morris, and who had heard Dr. Morris‟s testimony at the 
reference hearing, testified that in evaluating a defendant in light of a nonsexual 
murder and a background of depression, womanizing, and substance abuse, the 
“first thought” is that the person has an antisocial personality.  Dr. Martell also 
reviewed the information relating to petitioner‟s childhood and adult life; he was 
never asked whether petitioner had a conduct disorder before he was 15 years old.  
Given this state of the evidence, we cannot conclude, as petitioner would have us 
 
 
23 
do, that it was undisputed that he could not be diagnosed with having an antisocial 
personality disorder.   
IV.  ATTORNEY GENERAL’S EXCEPTIONS TO THE REFEREE’S REPORT 
A.  Findings of Sexual Abuse 
 
The referee stated she had no reason to doubt the veracity of the mitigating 
evidence that petitioner presented at the reference hearing, and she “accept[ed] the 
evidence as valid.”  As relevant here, that evidence included defense expert 
Dr. Morris‟s opinion that petitioner had been sexually abused by his mother.  In 
challenging the referee‟s findings, the Attorney General argues that five rulings by 
the referee were erroneous and that those rulings may have affected the referee‟s 
findings.  We discuss those rulings below. 
 
1.  Denial of Attorney General’s motion for psychodiagnostic 
evaluation 
 
The Attorney General argues that the referee erred in denying the motion to 
have an Attorney General mental health expert conduct a psychodiagnostic 
evaluation of petitioner.  We agree.  When, as here, a habeas corpus petitioner 
places in issue his mental condition at the penalty phase of his capital trial and in 
support presents the testimony of a mental health expert, the prosecution is entitled 
to have the petitioner examined by its mental health expert.  (People v. McPeters 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1190; see § 1054.3; People v. Superior Court (Pearson) 
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 572.) 
2.  Denial of Attorney General’s motion to call petitioner as a witness 
 
The Attorney General faults the referee for denying the Attorney General‟s 
request to call petitioner as a witness at the reference hearing.  We agree. 
 
A petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding involving a challenge to a 
judgment based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to investigate 
and present certain mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial has 
 
 
24 
no right not to be called as a witness.  (In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 791, 
815.)  Nor, contrary to the referee‟s explanation and petitioner‟s argument here, 
would petitioner‟s testimony have been irrelevant at the reference hearing.   
 
A habeas corpus petitioner must prove sufficient grounds for relief.  (In re 
Bolden (2009) 46 Cal.4th 216, 224.)  Here, petitioner had the burden of proving 
his allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the penalty phase.  
Questioning of petitioner by the Attorney General at the reference hearing would 
have been highly probative of petitioner‟s credibility on the key issue of whether 
as a child he was sexually abused by his mother and why, during the 17 years from 
August 5, 1985 (when petitioner was charged) to February 26, 2002 (when in 
connection with the reference hearing petitioner was interviewed by his expert 
witness, psychologist Dr. Morris), petitioner made no mention of childhood sexual 
abuse by his mother.  Questioning of petitioner by the Attorney General would 
have been helpful in determining whether such sexual abuse could have been 
discovered by trial counsel and, if so, whether the failure to present such evidence 
at the penalty phase prejudiced petitioner.   
 
3.  Limiting Attorney General’s cross-examination of petitioner’s 
witness Emily Vander Pauwert 
 
The Attorney General contends that the referee inappropriately limited the 
Attorney General‟s cross-examination of Emily Vander Pauwert.  We agree. 
 
Emily Vander Pauwert, petitioner‟s former girlfriend and a defense witness 
at petitioner‟s capital trial when she was known as Emily Bates, later testified on 
petitioner‟s behalf at the reference hearing.  On direct examination, Vander 
Pauwert testified to petitioner‟s drinking habits, his irregular sleep patterns, his 
relationships with his mother and father, his relationships with other women, and 
her own contacts with trial counsel.  On cross-examination by the Attorney 
General, Vander Pauwert said that she visited petitioner while he was in jail, and 
 
 
25 
that she wanted to find out whether he had killed Nancy, his wife.  The Attorney 
General then asked Vander Pauwert:  “And isn‟t it true that he gave you two 
different versions of how his wife died?”  When petitioner‟s counsel objected to 
this question as being beyond the scope of the reference hearing, the referee asked 
the Attorney General for a response.  The Attorney General replied that the 
question was relevant to petitioner‟s character, his moral culpability, and his 
credibility, noting that Dr. Morris‟s opinion of childhood sexual abuse by 
petitioner‟s mother was based in part on Dr. Morris‟s assessment of petitioner‟s 
veracity.  The referee sustained petitioner‟s objection and rejected the Attorney 
General‟s request to make an offer of proof. 
 
We agree with the Attorney General that the referee should have allowed 
the Attorney General to ask the question at issue, as it was relevant to petitioner‟s 
credibility and moral culpability, both of which were at issue at the reference 
hearing.   
 
4.  Referee’s refusal to allow certain questions during Attorney 
General’s direct examination of prosecution psychologist 
Dr. Martell 
 
The Attorney General contends the referee erred in denying the Attorney 
General an opportunity, during direct examination of prosecution psychologist 
Dr. Martell, to question Dr. Martell on the lack of a causal connection between 
petitioner‟s childhood sexual abuse by his mother and his commission of the 
murder.  We disagree. 
 
During the Attorney General‟s direct examination of Dr. Martell, the 
Attorney General asked:  “[W]e‟ll assume that [petitioner] was sexually assaulted 
as he alleges by his mother.  Based on the peer-reviewed and validated 
professional literature that was available to members of your profession in 1989, 
can you cite the court to any authority that a male who had been sexually abused 
 
 
26 
as petitioner alleges was at a statistically significant higher risk than someone who 
had not been so sexually assaulted to commit a premeditated and deliberate 
murder?”  Petitioner‟s counsel objected on the ground that the question asked for 
irrelevant evidence, adding:  “There has been no evidence offered by petitioner 
regarding the assertion that the abuse evidence that has been presented is 
connected to the commission of the offense.”  After briefly conferring with 
counsel for both parties, the referee sustained the objection to the Attorney 
General‟s question to Dr. Martell. 
 
The Attorney General argues the evidentiary ruling was an abuse of the 
referee‟s discretion.  The Attorney General asserts the question was proper rebuttal 
evidence to correct any misimpression created by petitioner‟s presentation at the 
reference hearing of mitigating evidence that, according to petitioner, his trial 
counsel should have presented at the penalty phase.  
 
The admission of rebuttal evidence is committed to the sound discretion of 
the trier of fact, here the referee, whose decision will not be disturbed in the 
absence of “ „palpable abuse.‟ ”  (People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 965; 
People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 912.)  At the reference hearing, petitioner 
had conceded the very point that the Attorney General sought to elicit through the 
question posed to prosecution expert Dr. Martell — that no causal relationship 
existed between petitioner‟s childhood sexual abuse by his mother and his later 
murder of Nancy, his wife.  Here, the referee‟s stated ground for sustaining the 
objection of petitioner‟s counsel reflects her full understanding of petitioner‟s 
concession.  Because the evidentiary ruling does not constitute palpable abuse, the 
referee did not abuse her discretion in sustaining the objection to the Attorney 
General‟s question at issue. 
 
 
 
27 
5.  Referee’s refusal to allow certain questions on cross-examination by 
Attorney General of petitioner’s expert witness, Dr. Morris 
 
The Attorney General argues the referee erred in sustaining petitioner‟s 
objections during the Attorney General‟s cross-examination of petitioner‟s expert 
witness, Dr. Morris, concerning petitioner‟s motivation for killing Nancy, his wife.  
We disagree. 
 
While cross-examining Dr. Morris, the Attorney General asked whether 
petitioner‟s murder of his wife was motivated by greed, and also whether the 
murder was partially motivated by “the thrill of the kill.”  The referee sustained 
petitioner‟s objections to each question.  The Attorney General asserts that the 
questions were appropriate rebuttal questions.  As noted above, an evidentiary 
ruling on rebuttal evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be 
disturbed unless the abuse is palpable.  No abuse of discretion occurred here.  
Dr. Morris‟s testimony was not directed to and did not address petitioner‟s 
motivation for the murder.  The Attorney General‟s questions at issue were 
directed at most to a peripheral aspect of Dr. Morris‟s testimony and opinion. 
 
B.  Referee’s Finding That Petitioner Did Not Hinder or Prevent Trial 
Counsel’s Penalty Phase Investigation 
 
The referee found:  “It is undisputed that petitioner did not tell his trial 
counsel that he was the victim of sexual molestation or abuse.”  The referee 
further found:  “No evidence was presented that petitioner . . . hindered the 
investigation in any manner or asked that any particular mitigating evidence not be 
presented.”  The Attorney General challenges the latter finding, arguing the 
evidence indicates that petitioner did hinder trial counsel‟s investigation by failing 
to disclose to his trial counsel the alleged childhood sexual abuse by his mother 
and by telling counsel that until the time of his parents‟ divorce, his childhood had 
been normal.  We agree with the Attorney General. 
 
 
28 
 
“The reasonableness of counsel‟s actions may be determined or 
substantially influenced by the defendant‟s own statements or actions.  Counsel‟s 
actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by 
the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant.  In particular, what 
investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information.”  
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691.)  Thus, a defendant can 
hinder counsel‟s investigation not only through affirmative statements, but also by 
remaining silent or failing to disclose pertinent information to counsel.  (In re 
Andrews (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1234, 1255.)  Whether a defendant‟s statements or 
nondisclosures have hindered trial counsel‟s investigation depends upon the 
circumstances of each case.  (See In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 729.)   
 
Here, lead trial counsel O‟Sullivan, who talked to petitioner daily, asked 
petitioner about his background, asked petitioner whether there were any problems 
that O‟Sullivan should know about, and explained to petitioner the scope of 
mitigating evidence by reading to him the applicable Penal Code statutes.  
According to O‟Sullivan, petitioner did not tell him of “anything amiss or awry.” 
 
Second counsel Morehead, who was in charge of the trial‟s penalty phase, 
explained to petitioner the purpose of the penalty phase and the types of evidence 
that could be presented.  When Morehead asked petitioner about his childhood, 
petitioner responded that he “had a good life until the time that the mother and the 
father got divorced, and from then on it spiraled downward.”  Petitioner never 
mentioned to either attorney that his mother had sexually abused him as a child, 
obviously critical information, which did not surface until petitioner‟s expert Dr. 
Morris interviewed him for the reference hearing, 17 years after petitioner was 
charged with his wife‟s murder and 15 years after his mother‟s death.   
 
Nothing in petitioner‟s statements to his trial counsel would have led a 
reasonable attorney to suspect that petitioner had been the victim of childhood 
 
 
29 
sexual abuse by his mother.  Also, in an interview with Dr. Phillips, a psychiatrist 
retained by the defense, petitioner said he “grew up in a normal home under 
normal circumstances.”  Accordingly, we agree with the Attorney General that the 
referee erred in finding that petitioner had not hindered his trial counsel‟s 
investigation. 
V.  BURDEN OF PROOF AND SCOPE OF REVIEW 
 
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on a 
presumptively final judgment; therefore, “the petitioner bears a heavy burden 
initially to plead sufficient grounds for relief, and then later to prove them” 
(People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474).  By a preponderance of the 
evidence, the petitioner must establish facts that constitute a basis for relief.  (In re 
Bolden, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 224.)  When, as here, this court has ordered an 
evidentiary hearing, we independently review the referee‟s resolution of legal 
issues and of mixed questions of law and fact.  (In re Johnson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 
447, 461.)   
 
Here, petitioner claims that he was denied the right to effective assistance 
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under 
article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.  (In re Marquez (1992) 1 
Cal.4th 584, 602.)  That right, petitioner contends, was violated because his trial 
counsel failed to provide effective assistance at the trial‟s penalty phase. 
 
To prevail on this claim, petitioner must prove “ „that counsel‟s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms, and that counsel‟s deficient performance was prejudicial, i.e., 
that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel‟s failings, the result would 
have been more favorable to the defendant.‟ ”  (In re Roberts (2003) 29 Cal.4th 
726, 744-745.)  “ „A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.‟ ”  (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333.)  If a 
 
 
30 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be determined on the ground of lack 
of prejudice, a court need not decide whether counsel‟s performance was deficient.  
(Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697; In re Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 
974, 1019-1020.)   
 
Central to petitioner‟s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel here is his 
assertion that trial counsel failed to present at the penalty phase mitigating 
evidence of childhood sexual abuse by his mother.  He now argues that defense 
counsel should have discovered such abuse and presented evidence of it to the 
jury.  We need not decide whether defense counsel‟s investigation fell below 
professional norms, because in any event petitioner has not met his burden of 
showing prejudice.  Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel could reasonably 
have discovered the alleged abuse. 
 
Petitioner had a number of pretrial meetings with defense counsel in which 
counsel explained what the penalty phase entailed, the type of evidence that could 
be presented at the penalty phase, and the scope of such evidence.  In those 
meetings, counsel asked petitioner about his social history and background.  
Petitioner never mentioned childhood sexual abuse by his mother.  Instead, 
petitioner as well as his father told defense counsel that petitioner had had a 
normal childhood.  Petitioner made a similar statement to a defense psychiatrist, 
Dr. Phillips. 
 
Petitioner first mentioned sexual abuse by his mother when his expert, 
Dr. Morris, interviewed petitioner for the reference hearing, 17 years after 
petitioner was charged with his wife‟s murder and 15 years after his mother‟s 
death.  His former wife, Patricia Silva, who testified on behalf of petitioner at the 
reference hearing, said he never told her of being sexually abused by his mother.  
Emily Vander Pauwert testified at the reference hearing that petitioner had 
mentioned to her that his mother had been abusive, but that he did not elaborate on 
 
 
31 
whether any such abuse was emotional or physical, much less say that it was 
sexual in nature.  His mother‟s brother, Eddie Richardson, stated in his deposition 
presented at the reference hearing that he had no knowledge of such sexual abuse 
by petitioner‟s mother, and that such abuse would have been “out of character” for 
her.   
 
Petitioner‟s own statements to his expert, psychologist Morris, about his 
mother‟s alleged sexual abuse of him cannot be used to establish the truth of those 
statements.  (People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 481; People v. Gardeley 
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 619.)  Therefore, Dr. Morris‟s recitations at the reference 
hearing of petitioner‟s statements to him regarding the alleged sexual abuse do not 
constitute proof that such abuse actually occurred.  Accordingly, at the reference 
hearing petitioner failed to produce direct evidence that he was the victim of 
maternal sexual abuse. 
 
Petitioner asserts that at the reference hearing he did present evidence that 
his trial counsel could have learned of the maternal sexual abuse if counsel had 
hired a reasonably competent mental health professional to evaluate petitioner.  
Petitioner did indeed present such evidence at the reference hearing.  Petitioner‟s 
expert, Dr. Morris, testified that petitioner‟s symptoms of depression, substance 
abuse, sleep disorders, and compulsive sexual behavior, when viewed with 
statements that his mother had been sexually molested, “would have constituted 
red flags warranting investigation as to whether or not [petitioner] himself had 
been the victim of sexual abuse,” and that “any reasonably competent mental 
health professional” would have inquired into whether petitioner was a victim of 
such abuse.  To a lesser degree this view was supported by psychiatrist 
Dr. Phillips, who testified on petitioner‟s behalf at the reference hearing that if he 
had known of petitioner‟s history one of his conclusions, but not necessarily the 
most likely one, would have been that petitioner had been sexually abused. 
 
 
32 
 
Dr. Martell, the prosecution‟s expert, disagreed with petitioner‟s expert, 
Dr. Morris.  Dr. Martell testified that petitioner‟s symptoms were not specific to 
sexual abuse and were consistent with a diagnosis of antisocial personality 
disorder, a diagnosis common in the prison population.  Thus, in Dr. Martell‟s 
opinion a reasonably competent mental health professional would not have been 
alerted to the need to inquire into the possibility of maternal sexual abuse.  As 
Dr. Martell explained, maternal sexual abuse is so rare that it is not a matter that 
would generally be the subject of professional inquiry, the professional literature 
on the subject is very limited, and the historical evidence of men in petitioner‟s 
family taking advantage of women would lead a mental health professional to 
conclude that petitioner too took advantage of women, but not to conclude that as 
a child petitioner had been sexually abused by his mother. 
 
The competing views of the mental health experts have persuasive force, 
but we need not decide which of those views to accept.  Even if we assume that at 
the time of petitioner‟s trial a reasonably competent mental health professional 
would have inquired into whether petitioner had been sexually abused by his 
mother, petitioner has not carried his burden of establishing that evidence of such 
abuse would have actually been discovered.  As discussed earlier, petitioner never 
told his trial counsel of being sexually abused by his mother.  Petitioner‟s first and 
only mention of such abuse occurred 17 years after his arrest for the murder of his 
wife, when his expert, Dr. Morris, interviewed him in preparation for the reference 
hearing.  Because petitioner has not shown that further investigation by defense 
counsel would have revealed evidence of maternal sexual abuse, he has not 
established prejudice from the absence of any additional investigation.   
 
We now turn to the remaining mitigating evidence that petitioner presented 
at the reference hearing and that he asserted his trial counsel should have 
presented at the penalty phase.  As previously explained, the referee found that 
 
 
33 
petitioner presented credible evidence that his “upbringing was anything but 
idyllic” and that he had “a family history fraught with incest, abuse, dysfunction, 
mental illness and substance abuse.”  Petitioner argues that his trial counsel‟s 
failure to discover and present this evidence at the penalty phase of his capital trial 
violated his constitutional right to competent counsel.  As we explain below, we 
need not decide whether reasonably competent counsel would have discovered and 
presented this evidence, because petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel‟s 
failure to do so. 
 
Petitioner presented a substantial array of evidence at the reference hearing 
concerning his family history.  But family background “is of no consequence in 
and of itself.”  (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 279.)  Rather, it “is 
material if, and to the extent that, it relates to the background of defendant 
himself.”  (Ibid.)  Here, much of the family background evidence presented at the 
reference hearing was not connected to petitioner.  For example, although 
petitioner presented evidence that his grandfather sexually abused his own 
children, including petitioner‟s mother, there is no evidence that petitioner was 
aware of this abuse until after his capital trial.  Similarly, although petitioner 
offered evidence that his father and uncle sexually molested girls in the family, 
petitioner has failed to show he was aware of such molestation at the time of his 
capital trial.  
 
True, some of the family history evidence at the reference hearing did relate 
to petitioner‟s own background.  Petitioner presented evidence that his mother was 
cold and aloof; that petitioner, his father, and his older brother had substance 
abuse problems; that petitioner, his mother, and his father suffered from 
depression; that petitioner‟s grandfather exposed him to an “oversexualized 
environment” and encouraged sexual activities; and that petitioner‟s older brother 
and friends of his brother exposed him to drinking, drugs, and sexual activities.  
 
 
34 
But no evidence was presented that petitioner suffered the deprivations of an 
impoverished upbringing or that he was ever subjected to violence or physical 
abuse. 
 
To decide whether petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel‟s failure to 
discover and present the evidence described in the preceding paragraph, we must 
determine whether that evidence, when considered in light of the aggravating and 
mitigating evidence presented at the penalty phase of petitioner‟s capital trial, is of 
such significance that it undermines our confidence in the outcome of the penalty 
phase of that trial.  (In re Lucas, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 733.)  We conclude that 
petitioner was not prejudiced. 
 
The mitigating evidence petitioner presented at the reference hearing of his 
dysfunctional family might have elicited some jury sympathy for him at the 
penalty phase of his capital trial.  But petitioner showed no causal connection 
between his family environment and his cold-blooded and calculated decision to 
brutally murder his wife, Nancy, a few months after they were married, for the 
sole purpose of obtaining her money and possessions.  Even if petitioner‟s 
upbringing was not ideal, it was not so horrible as to leave him incapable of 
functioning as a law-abiding member of society.  Penalty phase evidence 
presented by the defense showed that he had had good relationships with women, 
and that he had served in the military without incident and had been honorably 
discharged.  Petitioner was not an immature youth when he killed his wife; he was 
in his late 20‟s.  For these reasons, we find no reasonable probability that, but for 
trial counsel‟s alleged failings, the result of the penalty phase would have been 
different.  (See Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.)  
DISPOSITION 
 
Petitioner has not established that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief on 
his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating and presenting 
 
 
35 
certain mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of his capital trial.  Because our 
order to show cause and our reference order were limited to this claim, we do not 
here address any other claim set forth in the petition, which will be resolved by 
separate order.  (In re Bolden, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 230.)   
 
The order to show cause is discharged.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CHAVEZ, J.*
                                              
2  
Petitioner‟s request (presented as an argument in his brief on the merits) 
that we remand the matter to the referee with directions that the referee order 
disclosure of the communication made by another judge to Judge Brian C. Walsh, 
who recused himself after being appointed referee, is deemed to be a motion for 
such disclosure, and as such is denied. 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, 
Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Crew 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S107856 
Date Filed: July 11, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Lynne S. Coffin and Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defenders, Andrew S. Love, Assistant State Public 
Defender, and Evan Young, Deputy State Public Defender, for Petitioner Mark Christopher Crew. 
 
Bill Lockyer, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and 
Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Ronald A. Bass, Gerald A. Engler and Ronald S. 
Matthias, Assistant Attorneys General, Peggy S. Ruffra, Alice Lustre and Glenn R. Pruden, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Respondent State of California. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Andrew S. Love 
Assistant State Public Defender 
221 Main Street, Tenth Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Glenn R. Pruden 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5959