Case Title: Helfman v. Northeastern University

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12787

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12787 
 
MORGAN HELFMAN  vs.  NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 9, 2019. - July 27, 2020. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Negligence, College, Duty to prevent harm, Intoxicated person, 
Foreseeability of harm, Vicarious liability, Emotional 
distress.  Intoxication.  Emotional Distress.  Contract, 
Private college, Performance and breach, School handbook.  
Equal Rights Act.  Anti-Discrimination Law, Sex, Unfair 
educational practice.  Education, Private colleges and 
universities, Disciplinary matter. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 31, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Robert B. Gordon, J., on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Mark F. Itzkowitz (Kenneth I. Kolpan also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
Daryl J. Lapp (Katherine A. Guarino Baker also present) for 
the defendants. 
                                                     
 
 
1 Katherine Antonucci, Robert Jose, Briana R. Sevigny, Mary 
Wegmann, and Madeleine Estabrook. 
2 
 
Lisa A. Parlagreco & Jeffrey S. Beeler, for Heinlein Beeler 
Mingace & Heineman, P.C., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
Rebecca J. Roe, of Washington, & Erin K. Olson, for 
National Center for Victims of Crime & another, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  This case arises out of an allegedly 
nonconsensual sexual encounter between two first-year students 
at Northeastern University(Northeastern)2 in October 2013.  The 
plaintiff claims that Northeastern3 is liable for failing to 
prevent the sexual assault, as well as for its allegedly 
inadequate response, including exonerating her alleged attacker 
after a disciplinary hearing.4  Following discovery, a Superior 
Court judge granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment 
on all claims.  The plaintiff appealed, and we subsequently 
allowed her application for direct appellate review. 
                                                     
 
 
2 Northeastern is a private, nonprofit educational 
institution offering undergraduate and graduate degrees. 
 
 
3 The five named defendants were Northeastern executives 
during the relevant period.  Jose was the associate dean of 
cultural, residential, and spiritual life, and the director of 
residential life.  He supervised Antonucci, who was an area 
coordinator, and who trained and oversaw the work of the student 
resident advisors (RAs).  Estabrook was the associate vice-
president for student affairs and oversaw the office of student 
conduct and conflict resolution (OSCCR).  Wegmann was the 
director of OSCCR and was responsible for enforcing the code of 
student conduct and hiring and training members of the student 
conduct board (SCB) and the appeals board.  Sevigny was the 
assistant director of OSCCR, and trained residential life staff 
members, as well as members of the student conduct board. 
 
 
4 Northeastern police also determined not to pursue any 
criminal charges against that student. 
3 
 
In light of the multifaceted relationship between a 
university and its students, we long have recognized that 
universities have a duty to protect students from the 
foreseeable criminal acts of third parties.  Such a duty exists 
even when those criminal acts are made possible by the 
intoxication of the student victim.  Nonetheless, we conclude 
that there was no duty to protect here, where the Northeastern 
defendants had at best minimal knowledge of the conditions that 
gave rise to the particular harm, rendering this assault 
unforeseeable.  Further, although we now also recognize that a 
college or university will sometimes owe a duty to protect its 
students from the harms associated with alcohol-related 
emergencies, we conclude that this duty was met here.  
Accordingly, we affirm the order granting summary judgment to 
the defendants on the plaintiff's negligence-related claims.  
Because there was no error in the motion judge's conclusions 
regarding the plaintiff's statutory or contract claims, we 
affirm the allowance of summary judgment on those claims as 
well. 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts from the summary 
judgment record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, reserving certain details for later discussion. 
In the fall of 2013, the plaintiff was a first-year student 
at Northeastern.  As required of all first-year students, she 
4 
 
lived in a university residence hall.  A.G.,5 the alleged 
assailant, also was a first-year Northeastern student who lived 
in the same dormitory. 
Northeastern residence halls were supervised by resident 
assistants (RAs), who were students hired6 to foster community 
within the dormitories and provide assistance to resident 
students.  The RAs in turn were supervised by the residence hall 
director, a permanent staff person assigned to the same 
building, and more generally by the area coordinator.  RAs were 
required to sign a "Resident Assistant Agreement," which set 
forth the terms of their position as well as some of their 
duties. 
RAs were expected to serve as role models for the younger 
students, to be familiar with the provisions of Northeastern's 
code of student conduct (code), and to intervene if they 
encountered students violating "community norms."  RAs were to 
hold office hours to meet with students in their assigned 
residence halls, and to coordinate programs and events in 
accordance with Northeastern's educational goals.  The goals for 
first-year students included "understand[ing] the effects of 
                                                     
 
 
5 As do the parties, we refer to the student by the 
pseudonym "A.G." 
 
 
6 In exchange for their services, RAs received a dormitory 
room at no charge, meals in the residence halls, and a small 
amount of money monthly on a meal card. 
5 
 
drugs and alcohol," "identif[ying] moments of peer pressure," 
and "attend[ing] at least two on or off campus events that are 
alcohol free."  RAs performed rounds of their assigned buildings 
during assigned shifts and were expected to report any code 
violations to their supervisors.  In addition, RAs served as 
proctors at the entrances to some residence halls, where they 
regulated access to the hall.7 
On October 31, 2013, the plaintiff and A.G. were invited to 
a Halloween party hosted by Sarah Smith,8 a sophomore at 
Northeastern and an RA in a different dormitory9 from the one in 
which the plaintiff and A.G. lived.  Before leaving to attend 
the party, the plaintiff and A.G. drank alcohol in the 
plaintiff's dormitory room.  They brought more alcohol with them 
to the party, carried in a plastic soda bottle to conceal its 
existence from any campus police they might encounter during the 
walk across campus. 
                                                     
 
 
7 As apparently was common, the RAs in this case were both 
sophomore students at Northeastern, and themselves under the 
legal age for consumption of alcohol. 
 
 
8 Because neither RA is a named defendant, and both were 
underage students at the time of the alleged assault, we refer 
to them by pseudonyms. 
 
 
9 RA Smith held office hours in a different dormitory from 
the one in which she lived.  As part of her assigned rounds, 
however, she also patrolled her own dormitory. 
6 
 
While at the party, the plaintiff played drinking games 
with some of the partygoers, consuming alcohol provided by 
certain of them.  A.G. also gave her whiskey that he had 
obtained from another guest.  Between her rounds at multiple 
dormitories, Smith drank alcohol and participated in the 
drinking games.  Another RA, Paul Jones,10 who had socialized 
previously with the plaintiff, A.G., and Smith, also attended 
the party.  Both RAs (who themselves were underage) observed 
other underage students drinking alcohol, but neither RA 
provided any of the alcohol that the plaintiff consumed, nor did 
they provide any alcohol to any other guest. 
Not long after arriving at the party, the plaintiff became 
intoxicated and vomited repeatedly in Smith's bathroom; two 
student acquaintances who were attending the party stayed with 
her in the bathroom and gave her water and crackers to try to 
control the nausea.  The students also had the plaintiff wait in 
Smith's room and drink water, as they were somewhat concerned 
that the proctor at the plaintiff's residence hall might stop 
the plaintiff at the entrance because she was too visibly 
intoxicated.  They offered to walk the plaintiff home, but she 
declined because she knew that they were planning to attend 
another party, and she did not want them to walk across campus 
                                                     
 
 
10 A pseudonym.  See note 8, supra. 
7 
 
to her residence and then have to walk back to the location of 
the second party. 
As he was returning anyway in order to attend a sports 
practice early the following morning, A.G. then volunteered to 
escort the plaintiff to the dormitory where they both lived.  On 
the way back to her residence hall, the plaintiff sent a text 
message to her roommate stating, "Okay I'm coming home I'm 
really sick."  During the walk, A.G. and the plaintiff kissed 
multiple times.  At one point, the plaintiff stumbled and fell; 
A.G., who himself was intoxicated, was dragged down to the 
ground.  A.G. also took the plaintiff's telephone and 
identification card from her while en route.  When they reached 
their residence hall, the plaintiff leaned on the counter for 
support as the proctor checked their identification.  She then 
walked unsteadily from the proctor's desk to the elevator. 
The two students went to A.G.'s room, where A.G. initiated 
sex with the plaintiff.  The plaintiff later told Northeastern 
police that, "although she was very uncomfortable with what was 
going on, she didn't want to hurt his feelings by saying 
anything to him or telling him to stop."  She "wasn't scared," 
but had not felt as if she could leave if she wanted to.  She 
also said that she did not know whether A.G. believed she had 
consented to the things he was doing.  At one point when A.G. 
went to the bathroom, the plaintiff sent text messages to her 
8 
 
roommate, saying, "I'm ok," and, "Kind of."  At another point, 
the plaintiff threw up in A.G.'s bathroom. 
When the plaintiff returned to her own room the following 
morning, she told her roommate about the incident with A.G.  In 
response to one of the roommate's questions, the plaintiff said 
that, if she had been sober, she would have said something to 
stop the encounter.  The roommate, with the plaintiff's 
permission, then informed an RA of the incident.  The following 
day, the plaintiff and her mother were escorted by Northeastern 
police from her dormitory to a local hospital, where the 
plaintiff was examined and an evidence collection kit was 
completed. 
Northeastern police undertook an investigation; they 
interviewed the plaintiff, her roommate, and A.G.; reviewed the 
video recordings from the entrance to the plaintiff's residence 
hall; compiled a list of partygoers, which included the RAs 
Smith and Jones; and received screenshots of the various text 
messages sent by the plaintiff.  The police created a report of 
their investigation and provided it to the office of student 
conduct and conflict resolution (OSCCR) director Mary Wegmann; 
Wegmann then shared it with Briana R. Sevigny, the assistant 
director of OSCCR, and Madeleine Estabrook, the vice-president 
of student affairs.  Following their investigation, Northeastern 
9 
 
police decided not to file any criminal charges against A.G. and 
did not report the incident to Boston police. 
 
Based on the Northeastern police report, OSCCR charged A.G. 
with a code violation of "sexual assault with penetration."11  At 
a student conduct board (SCB) hearing on November 21, 2013, both 
the plaintiff and A.G. were appointed advisors to assist them.  
Each student asked questions of the other through the SCB chair. 
On the day after the hearing, the plaintiff and A.G. both 
were sent letters explaining that the disciplinary panel had 
found that A.G. had not committed the alleged offense.12  
Consistent with the procedures in the code at that time, only 
the letter to A.G. explained the SCB's reasoning.13  The SCB 
noted that it had spent a great deal of time reviewing the 
record, including the surveillance video recordings, due to the 
serious nature of the charges.  The letter explained that the SCB 
had considered A.G.'s statements about those words and actions 
                                                     
 
 
11 The code defined this offense as "the oral, anal, or 
vaginal penetration by an inanimate object, penis, or other 
bodily part without consent."  Consent was defined as a 
"voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity proposed by 
another and requires mutually understandable and communicated 
words and/or actions demonstrating agreement by both parties to 
participate in all sexual activities." 
 
 
12 Consistent with Northeastern's policy, the SCB employed a 
standard of a preponderance of the evidence, i.e., "more likely 
than not." 
 
 
13 Prior to the hearing, the plaintiff explicitly consented 
to this procedure. 
10 
 
he had seen as the plaintiff's consent, the plaintiff's 
statements about what she had said and done, and what a 
reasonable person would have understood about the plaintiff's 
consent or lack thereof. 
The plaintiff submitted an appeal on the ground of asserted 
issues of fact, without setting forth any requisite procedural 
error.  Unable to determine the nature of the asserted error, 
the appeals board remanded the matter for a new hearing.  In 
preparing for the de novo hearing, Estabrook concluded that 
there had been a procedural error in the allowance of the 
appeal:  the plaintiff had not stated the asserted procedural 
error, and had not sent a copy of her request for an appeal to 
A.G., nor had she provided him with notice so that he would be 
able to respond. 
Estabrook overturned the appeals board's order, but allowed 
the plaintiff time to amend her appeal to indicate the specific 
error she was challenging and to allow A.G. to receive notice of 
the appeal and an opportunity to respond.  The plaintiff 
submitted an amended appeal, on the grounds of procedural error 
and newly discovered evidence -- the evidence collection kit. 
On February 7, 2014, the appeal on the ground of procedural 
error was denied, while the appeal on the ground of new evidence 
was allowed.  The matter was remanded to the original SCB so 
that it could consider the evidence collection kit.  The SCB 
11 
 
reconvened and affirmed its original holding that A.G. had not 
committed a sexual assault.  The SCB stated that the evidence 
collection kit might have confirmed the fact of intercourse, but 
that fact had not been in dispute; the disputed issue had been 
as to the question of consent. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  We review a 
decision allowing a motion for summary judgment de novo, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
in this case the plaintiff.  See LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Joint 
Venture, 463 Mass. 316, 318 (2012).  "Summary judgment is 
appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law."  Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 Mass. 113, 118-119 
(2010).  If a plaintiff has failed to establish "an essential 
element" of her case, all other facts are rendered immaterial.  
Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 
(1991). 
The plaintiff claims that Northeastern14 not only 
negligently failed to prevent the sexual assault, but indeed 
contributed to its occurrence.  She also asserts a number of 
additional tort, contract, and statutory claims on the ground 
that Northeastern failed to respond adequately to the incident. 
                                                     
 
 
14 The five named defendants were Northeastern executives 
during the relevant period.  See note 3, supra. 
12 
 
 
b.  Negligence claims.  The plaintiff claims that 
Northeastern was negligent in several respects:  it failed to 
protect her from A.G.'s sexual assault, is responsible for the 
unreasonable acts and omissions of its RAs, and failed to 
exercise due care in training and supervising both its permanent 
staff and its "paraprofessional" RA and SCB staff.15 
 
To sustain a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must 
establish that (1) the defendant owed a legal duty to the 
plaintiff, (2) the defendant committed a breach of that duty, 
(3) there was a causal connection between the defendant's 
negligence and the plaintiff's injury or damage, and (4) the 
plaintiff sustained damages.  See Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, 
Inc., 455 Mass. 215, 221–222 (2009).  "[T]he existence of a duty 
is a question of law, and is thus an appropriate subject of 
summary judgment."  Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 146 (2006). 
 
i.  Whether Northeastern owed a duty.  "Under our case law, 
[one does] not owe others a duty to take action to rescue or 
protect them from conditions [one has] not created" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Dzung Duy Nguyen v. Massachusetts Inst. 
of Tech., 479 Mass. 436, 448 (2018).  See Restatement (Third) of 
Torts:  Phys. & Emot. Harm § 37 (2012) ("An actor whose conduct 
                                                     
 
 
15 Student members of the SCB were volunteers who attended 
particularized training, but received no compensation of any 
kind for their ad hoc work as board members. 
13 
 
has not created a risk of physical or emotional harm to another 
has no duty of care to the other . . .").  Generally, this no-
duty rule extends to the criminal acts of third parties.  See 
Jupin, 447 Mass. at 148.  It is, however, subject to certain 
exceptions, two of which the plaintiff asserts are applicable 
here.  She argues that Northeastern owed her a duty to protect 
her by virtue of the special relationship between a university 
and its students.  Additionally, she maintains that RAs Smith 
and Jones exposed her to the foreseeable criminal acts of a 
third party, and that Northeastern had a duty to protect her 
from the resulting harm. 
We agree that, here, a special student-university 
relationship between the plaintiff and Northeastern did exist.  
See Dzung Duy Nguyen, 479 Mass. at 450 (describing special 
relationship).  We nonetheless conclude that Northeastern had no 
duty to take steps to prevent the alleged sexual assault, 
because it was not reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff 
would suffer a criminal act by a third party or other imminent 
physical harm due to her intoxication at the time of the 
incident. 
 
A.  Special relationship between university and student.  
In Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 54 (1983), we 
first recognized that colleges and universities have a special 
relationship with their students which imposes a "duty . . . to 
14 
 
protect their resident students against the criminal acts of 
third parties."  Although this duty was related to the 
university's control over its campus, the relationship we 
recognized was not limited to a university's role as a landlord 
or property owner.  Rather, it arose out of the "distinctive 
relationship between colleges and their students."  Id. at 56.  
It was grounded both on the "reasonable expectation, fostered in 
part by colleges themselves, that reasonable care will be 
exercised to protect resident students from foreseeable harm," 
id. at 52, and the observation that universities "generally 
undertake voluntarily to provide their students with protection 
from the criminal acts of third parties," id. at 53. 
The defendants nonetheless maintain that whatever special 
relationship exists between a university and its student does 
not impose a duty to protect a student while he or she is 
voluntarily intoxicated.  They argue, therefore, that the 
Mullins duty does not apply, and that Northeastern had no other 
duty to protect the plaintiff from any potentially harmful 
consequences of her choice to drink alcohol.  In both respects, 
we disagree. 
 
I.  Voluntarily intoxicated students.  As many courts have 
noted, requiring colleges and universities to police all on-
15 
 
campus use of alcohol would be inappropriate and unrealistic.16  
Although "[t]here was a time when college administrators and 
faculties assumed a role in loco parentis" and "[s]tudents were 
committed to their charge because the students were considered 
minors," "[c]ollege administrators no longer control the broad 
arena of general morals."  Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 
139–140 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Borough of 
Doylestown v. Bradshaw, 446 U.S. 909 (1980).  College-aged 
students, while sometimes underage for the purposes of the 
purchase and consumption of alcohol, otherwise are adults 
expected to manage their own social activities.  See Furek v. 
University of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 516–517 (Del. 1991) ("students 
are now regarded as adults in almost every phase of community 
life" [quotation and citation omitted]).  Illicit consumption of 
alcohol is an activity that falls well outside the educational 
mission of the modern university, and the additional intrusion 
                                                     
 
 
16 See Doe v. Emerson College, 153 F. Supp. 3d 506, 514 (D. 
Mass. 2015) (imposing duty to prevent on-campus alcohol abuse 
"would be impractical and unrealistic").  See, e.g., Guest v. 
Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 21-22 (2d Cir. 2010) (no duty to prevent 
harms from drinking, even when university was aware of conduct); 
Booker v. Lehigh Univ., 800 F. Supp. 234, 240-241 (E.D. Pa. 
1992), aff'd, 995 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1993) (no duty to student 
who was injured after becoming inebriated at on-campus 
fraternity party).  See also Restatement (Third) of Torts:  
Phys. & Emot. Harm § 40 & comment l (2012) (courts reject duty 
to protect students from excessive alcohol use); Bendlin, 
Cocktails on Campus:  Are Libations A Liability?, 48 Suffolk U. 
L. Rev. 67, 73 (2015) (noting duty has been rejected in 
"majority" of cases). 
16 
 
into the private lives of students that would be necessary to 
control alcohol use on campus would be both impractical for 
universities and intolerable to students.17 
 
It does not follow, however, that a student relinquishes 
any reasonable expectation of protection from his or her college 
or university if the student becomes intoxicated.  Unlike some 
courts, we have not endorsed the view that the end of the era of 
in loco parentis justified an effective "judicial grant of 
collegiate immunity for the repercussions of student alcohol 
consumption."18  See Dall, Determining Duty in Collegiate Tort 
Litigation:  Shifting Paradigms of the College-Student 
Relationship, 29 J.C. & U.L. 485, 496 (2003).  In Mullins, we 
rejected that position, and observed that "the fact that a 
                                                     
 
 
17 Moreover, part of the collegiate experience is the 
freedom to make choices, even bad ones, as a student transitions 
into adulthood.  Imposing a duty on colleges and universities to 
police alcohol use on campus "would inevitably lead to 
repressive regulations and a loss of student freedoms, thus 
contravening a goal of higher education:  'the maturation of the 
students.'"  See Smith v. Day, 148 Vt. 595, 599 (1987), quoting 
Baldwin v. Zoradi, 123 Cal. App. 3d 275, 291 (1981). 
 
 
18 See Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 419 (Utah 
1986) ("It would be unrealistic to impose upon an institution of 
higher education the additional role of custodian over its adult 
students and to charge it with responsibility for preventing 
students from illegally consuming alcohol and, should they do 
so, with responsibility for assuring their safety and the safety 
of others").  See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 
140-141, 143 (3d Cir. 1979).  These decisions reflected an 
understanding that, as students were adults capable of choosing 
for themselves, universities owed them no more duty than they 
would any other bystanders. 
17 
 
college need not police the morals of its resident 
students . . . does not entitle it to abandon any effort to 
ensure their physical safety."  Mullins, 389 Mass. at 52.  More 
recently, in the private carrier context, we rejected the 
outdated view that the voluntary consumption of alcohol by a 
plaintiff "is the sole consideration in the assessment of a 
duty."  Commerce Ins. Co. v. Ultimate Livery Serv., Inc., 452 
Mass. 639, 650 (2008) ("A private carrier . . . which transports 
intoxicated persons can reasonably foresee that passengers . . . 
may not be fully capable of making rational decisions about 
their ability to drive")  We are not persuaded by the 
defendants' argument that no duty exists, and that the duties 
arising from the university-student relationship ought not to be 
treated similarly in the context here.19 
 
Moreover, like the era of in loco parentis, the "bystander" 
era from which those "no duty" decisions emerged also appears to 
be drawing to a close.  As we stated in Dzung Duy Nguyen, 
"[u]niversities are clearly not bystanders or strangers in 
regards to their students."  Dzung Duy Nguyen, 479 Mass. at 450.  
                                                     
 
19 See Furek v. University of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 522 (Del. 
1991) ("[a university] has a duty to regulate and supervise 
foreseeable dangerous activities occurring on its property," 
including hazing); Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 
Idaho 388, 400 (1999) (recognizing existence of duty where 
"university employees knew or should have known that [student] 
was intoxicated and should have acted at the time they saw her 
prior to her injury"). 
18 
 
Rather, "university involvement extends widely into other 
aspects of student life."  Id.  In addition to education, many 
universities provide access to basic necessities such as housing 
and food, along with the "social, athletic, and cultural 
opportunities" that form the foundation of a collegiate 
"community."  See id. at 451, quoting Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 5th 607, 625 
(2018); R.D. Bickel & P.F. Lake, The Rights and Responsibilities 
of the Modern University 85 (1999) ("Universities . . . plan, 
regulate and administer most aspects of student life"). 
 
While universities and colleges nonetheless are "not 
responsible for monitoring and controlling all aspects of their 
students' lives," the contemporary paradigm of the university-
student relationship recognizes that students' "right to privacy 
and their desire for independence may conflict with their 
immaturity and need for protection."  See Dzung Duy Nguyen, 479 
Mass. at 451-452.  Accordingly, we reject the defendants' 
blanket contention that, necessarily, universities have no 
special relationship with voluntarily intoxicated students. 
 
II.  Contours of special relationship between university 
and its intoxicated students.  Given that voluntary 
intoxication, in and of itself, does not preclude the existence 
of a special relationship between a student and a college or 
university, we turn to the scope of a university's or college's 
19 
 
duty to its intoxicated students.  In doing so, we "take into 
account a complex mix of competing considerations," Dzung Duy 
Nguyen, 479 Mass. at 452, including students' interests in both 
safety and autonomy, as well as the burden of such a duty on the 
educational institutions.  To help guide this analysis, we look 
to "a number of factors used to delineate duties in tort law."  
Id.  "Foremost among these is whether a defendant reasonably 
could foresee that he [or she] would be expected to take 
affirmative action to protect the plaintiff and could anticipate 
harm to the plaintiff from the failure to do so."20  Irwin v. 
Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 756 (1984). 
 
As noted, dangerous drinking-related activities are a 
foreseeable hazard on college and university campuses.21  Because 
                                                     
 
 
20 Other factors that may be relevant include the "degree of 
certainty of harm to the plaintiff; burden upon the defendant to 
take reasonable steps to prevent the injury; some kind of mutual 
dependence of plaintiff and defendant upon each other, 
frequently . . . involving financial benefit to the defendant 
arising from the relationship; moral blameworthiness of 
defendant's conduct in failing to act; and social policy 
considerations involved in placing the economic burden of the 
loss on the defendant."  Dzung Duy Nguyen v. Massachusetts Inst. 
of Tech., 479 Mass. 436, 452 (2018). 
 
 
21 See National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 
High-Risk Drinking in College:  What We Know and What We Need To 
Learn, at v, 10-11 (Apr. 2002), https://www.collegedrinking 
prevention.gov/media/finalpanel1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CVU-
8D4K] (estimating that fifty percent of male students, and 
twenty-nine to forty percent of female students, engage in 
"binge drinking," defined as consuming five or more drinks in a 
row for males, and four or more drinks in a row for females); 
Wechsler, Lee, Nelson, & Kuo, Underage College Students' 
20 
 
of their youth and lack of experience with the consumption of 
alcohol outside their family circle, many college students are 
particularly susceptible to risky drinking behaviors.  Massie, 
Suicide on Campus:  The Appropriate Legal Responsibility of 
College Personnel, 91 Marq. L. Rev. 625, 661 (2008) ("the 
brain's maturation process . . . continues into young adulthood, 
at least through the early twenties").22  "Colleges and 
universities, where young people in their late teens and early 
twenties live close together in a 'pressure cooker' environment, 
arguably might exacerbate a tendency towards impulsive behavior 
                                                     
 
Drinking Behavior, Access to Alcohol, and the Influence of 
Deterrence Policies, 50 J. Am. College Health 223, 223 (2002) 
(suggesting that forty percent of all college students engage in 
binge-drinking).  Each year, according to at least one 
government report, there is a strong correlation between 
students' consumption of alcohol and sexual assaults, physical 
assaults, and student deaths.  See National Institute on Alcohol 
Abuse and Alcoholism, Fall Semester -- A Time for Parents To 
Discuss the Risks of College Drinking, https:// 
www.niaaa.nih.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIAAA_ 
BacktoCollege_Fact_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YFY-ZE9A]. 
 
 
22 One researcher has postulated that the "late development 
of the frontal lobe, responsible for the 'executive functions,' 
may help to account for teenagers' willingness to indulge in 
risky behaviors, including experimentation with alcohol and 
drugs."  Massie, Suicide on Campus:  The Appropriate Legal 
Responsibility of College Personnel, 91 Marq. L. Rev. 625, 662 
(2008).  While not all college-age students are in their teens, 
at the time of the incident at issue here, both the plaintiff 
and A.G. were teenagers, as were Paul Jones and Sarah Smith. 
 
21 
 
that a 'sober second thought' would perhaps quell."23  Id. 
at 662. 
 
Colleges and universities recognize these foreseeable risks 
and have taken reasonable measures to protect students in the 
event of an alcohol-related emergency.  See Mullins, 389 Mass. 
at 55 (recognizing duty where risk of harm to student "was not 
only foreseeable but was actually foreseen").  Northeastern, for 
example, directs students to contact Northeastern police 
officers24 for assistance when faced with crises that occur on 
university grounds, including those caused by alcohol.  See 
Northeastern University police department, Emergency Medical 
Services, https://nupd.northeastern.edu/our-services/emergency-
medical-services [https://perma.cc/DC8J-996X].25  Northeastern 
                                                     
 
 
23 According to the National Center for Education 
Statistics, in 2019, there were 19.9 million college students in 
the United States.  National Center for Education Statistics, 
Fast Facts, https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372 
[https://perma.cc/VFZ5-NXSM]. 
 
 
24 These police officers are Northeastern employees, 
appointed under statutory authority, who have jurisdiction over 
Northeastern's buildings and grounds.  See G. L. c. 22C, § 63. 
 
25 A survey of local universities demonstrates the 
widespread adoption of university policies directing students to 
contact university police when there is a medical emergency on 
campus.  Some universities also have required students to 
contact university police when they believe a student is 
imperiled due to alcohol intoxication.  See Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Mind and Hand Book 2019-2020 
§ II(2)(C):  Requirement to Obtain Medical Assistance for 
Emergencies Involving Alcohol and Prohibited Substances, 
https://handbook.mit.edu/aodemergency [https://perma.cc/QVK7-
22 
 
also offers "medical amnesty" for students who contact it in a 
medical emergency involving underage consumption of alcohol, and 
offers amnesty from punishment for students and organizations 
who reach out for help in such an emergency. 
 
Given these efforts, it is foreseeable that a student will 
reasonably rely on his or her college or university for aid in 
the event of an alcohol-related emergency.  See Dzung Duy 
Nguyen, 479 Mass. at 455 ("Reliance of the student on the 
university for assistance, at least for students living in 
dormitories or away from their parents or guardians, is . . . 
foreseeable"); Irwin, 392 Mass. at 756 ("reasonable reliance by 
the plaintiff [on the defendant university], impeding other 
persons who might seek to render aid" from offering help, is 
factor in duty analysis).  Reliance is particularly foreseeable 
for first-year students like the plaintiff, whom Northeastern 
required to live on campus in its dormitories.  When such a 
student confronts an on-campus alcohol-related emergency, 
"[u]niversities are in the best, if not the only, position to 
assist."  See Dzung Duy Nguyen, supra. 
After weighing these considerations, we conclude that a 
university has a special relationship with its students, and a 
                                                     
 
HQW9]; Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 
Student Handbook 2018-2019, at 29, https://sites.tufts.edu 
/fletcherconnect/files/2018/07/Student-Handbook-2018-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FG75-NL3F]. 
23 
 
corresponding duty to take reasonable measures to protect 
students from harms associated with alcohol-related emergencies, 
in the following, narrow circumstances.  When a college or 
university has actual knowledge of conditions that would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that a student on campus is in 
imminent danger of serious physical harm due to alcohol 
intoxication, and so intoxicated that the student is incapable 
of seeking help for him- or herself, the college or university 
has a duty to take reasonable measures to protect that student 
from harm.  See Dzung Duy Nguyen, 479 Mass. at 453 (recognizing 
limited duty to take reasonable measures to protect students 
from suicide).26 
 
This duty is limited in several important respects.  It 
applies only when a university is already aware that a student 
is at imminent risk of harm.  Analyzing the degree of harm does 
not require the knowledge or precision of a medical doctor; it 
merely requires the recognition that a young person is 
dangerously intoxicated.27  Equipped with such knowledge, a 
                                                     
 
 
26 This conclusion also does not absolve a student of 
personal responsibility for his or her drinking.  A jury of 
course may consider intoxication when weighing whether the "duty 
was violated, and in determining causation."  Commerce Ins. Co. 
v. Ultimate Livery Serv., Inc., 452 Mass. 639, 650 (2008). 
27 In addition to considering the degree of intoxication, a 
university or college also should consider the context of the 
drinking, and a continuum of harms, such as whether a student is 
unconscious outside, continuing to consume at a party, or inside 
24 
 
college or university merely must act reasonably under the 
circumstances.  In some cases, to strike the appropriate balance 
between respecting a student's autonomy and the need to protect 
his or her physical well-being, a reasonable response will 
include doing little or nothing at all, while in others, calling 
for medical or other forms of assistance might be warranted. 
B.  The foreseeability of the harm.  Notwithstanding the 
special university-student relationship that existed between 
Northeastern and the plaintiff, we conclude that Northeastern 
owed no duty to protect her in this instance.  A university's 
duty to protect its students extends only to those harms which, 
based on "an examination of all the circumstances", Mullins, 389 
Mass. at 56, were reasonably foreseeable at the time.  See, 
e.g., Dzung Duy Nguyen, 479 Mass. at 455 (duty "hinges on 
foreseeability").  On this record, we conclude that Northeastern 
could not reasonably have foreseen that, absent some 
intervention on its part, the plaintiff would be subjected to a 
criminal act or other harm. 
 
I.  Foreseeability of criminal act by third party.  At the 
time of the alleged assault, Northeastern had no indication that 
                                                     
 
an assigned dormitory room.  Similarly, students with a history 
of drinking to the point of alcohol poisoning may pose an 
enhanced risk to themselves of future physical harm. 
25 
 
A.G. posed any risk to the plaintiff.28  While "[p]rior criminal 
acts are simply one factor" in the foreseeability analysis, see 
Mullins, 389 Mass. at 56, we note that nothing in the record 
indicates that A.G. had a history of sexual assaults, of which 
Northeastern was aware (or otherwise).  Cf. Schaefer v. Yongjie 
Fu, 272 F. Supp. 3d 285, 288 (D. Mass. 2017) (duty arose where 
university had knowledge that made specific criminal acts 
foreseeable).  Northeastern police conducted a search of their 
records and found no other reported incidents involving A.G. as 
an assailant.  Nor did the plaintiff identify any concerns that 
she or anyone else possessed regarding A.G. before this 
incident.  To the contrary, she indicated that she had had none. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff does not argue, nor is there any 
evidence to suggest, that residence life officers, area 
directors, or other full-time staff were aware of the events 
leading up to the alleged assault.  At most, therefore, 
Northeastern's awareness of the circumstances surrounding this 
incident was limited to the observations of Jones, an off-duty 
RA, Smith, an on-duty RA, and an unknown proctor at the 
plaintiff's dormitory. 
                                                     
 
 
28 There is no indication in the record that Northeastern's 
lack of information about the circumstances was the product of 
negligence or willful blindness on the part of Northeastern. 
26 
 
While the issue is a close one on whether the RAs or 
proctor were agents in these circumstances, we need not reach 
that issue.29  Even if we were to assume that all of their 
knowledge could be imputed to Northeastern, they lacked 
sufficient information that would have led a reasonable person 
to conclude that the plaintiff was at risk of being assaulted. 
There is no indication in the record that A.G. or any other 
attendee acted inappropriately towards the plaintiff at the 
party.  Before, during, and after the party, she was capable of 
communicating with other students, both in person and via text 
message, and was managing her intoxication.  Toward the end of 
the party, Smith was told that two female students would escort 
the plaintiff back to her dormitory.  Based on these 
observations, it would not have been foreseeable that A.G. would 
assault the plaintiff later that evening. 
Arguably, the proctor who was working at the plaintiff's 
residence hall when she returned with A.G. perhaps had the best 
                                                     
 
 
29 RAs, as students who receive some form of in-kind 
compensation (room and partial board) for their work for 
Northeastern, occupy a hybrid role that may not cleanly fit 
within the definition of "employee" for the purposes of tort 
law.  See Helms, Pierson, & Streeter, The Risks of Litigation:  
A Case Study of Resident Assistants, 180 Ed. Law Rep. 25, 26 
(2003) ("As both students and employees, RAs' employment status 
is inextricably intertwined with their academic status").  It is 
also apparent from the student code of conduct that, at least 
while on duty, RAs were empowered and expected to enforce 
university policies on behalf of Northeastern. 
27 
 
opportunity to observe the situation and intervene if 
necessary.30  There is no direct evidence in the record, however, 
of what that proctor observed, or, for that matter, the identity 
of that individual.  At most, other evidence31 supports the 
inference that the proctor saw an intoxicated male and female 
return to the residence hall where they both resided and check 
in at the front desk.  The proctor likely observed the plaintiff 
lean on the desk for support while signing in, before unsteadily 
making her way to the elevator.  There is no indication that 
A.G. was acting aggressively or sexually towards the plaintiff, 
or that the plaintiff appeared to be dangerously intoxicated at 
that point.  The mere presence of an intoxicated young woman in 
the company of an intoxicated young man as they returned to 
                                                     
 
 
30 The plaintiff asserts that the proctor failed in his or 
her duty by not calling the Northeastern police and having them 
assess whether she safely could have been allowed into the 
residence hall given her visibly intoxicated state.  There is 
evidence in the record that other students at the party 
considered that the proctor might take actions in response to 
intoxication.  The plaintiff testified as well, however, that if 
she had been approached by Northeastern police, she would have 
said that she was "fine," and "with a friend," and would have 
declined any help. 
 
 
31 A police report indicates that the plaintiff and A.G. 
were captured on video surveillance footage returning to the 
residence hall and checking in with the proctor.  This recording 
was not included in the record on summary judgment, but was 
examined by Northeastern police, who testified as to its 
contents. 
28 
 
their shared residence hall does not, without more, suggest that 
a crime or physical harm is imminent. 
 
The plaintiff maintains that Northeastern should have 
foreseen that she would be sexually assaulted because of the 
generally recognized connection between alcohol and sexual 
assault on college campuses.  As we have noted, studies do 
reflect that sexual assaults on college campuses are "a major 
public health problem," and that "[o]ver half of all college 
sexual assaults involve alcohol and alcohol is the number one 
drug used to facilitate sexual assault."  The plaintiff argues, 
based on a report by a Department of Health and Human Services 
task force, that approximately 70,000 college students "are 
victims of alcohol-related sexual assault annually" in the 
United States. 
 
This recognized relationship between alcohol and sexual 
assault on campus, however, standing alone, is not sufficient to 
impose a duty on Northeastern.  See Lake, Private Law Continues 
to Come to Campus:  Rights and Responsibilities Revisited, 31 
J.C. & U.L. 621, 649 (2005) ("notifying [an RA] that someone is 
drunk does not alert the [RA] that a rape is likely"); Hernandez 
v. Baylor Univ., 274 F. Supp. 3d 602, 619 (W.D. Tex. 2017) 
("Courts across the country have determined . . . that the 
general foreseeability of sexual assault on campus is 
insufficient to warrant negligence liability").  This is 
29 
 
precisely the overreaching type of duty that we have never 
imposed on universities, and which we again expressly reject 
today. 
II.  Foreseeability of imminent alcohol-related harm.  
Similarly, based on the RAs' and the proctor's observations of 
the plaintiff, it would not have been apparent to a reasonable 
person that she was at imminent risk of physical harm due to 
alcohol intoxication.  While the plaintiff was obviously 
intoxicated at least part of the time that she was in Smith's 
room, it did not appear that she was experiencing an emergency.  
The plaintiff did not lose consciousness during the evening or 
exhibit other indications that she was dangerously intoxicated.  
She was talking with other students, sending text messages, and 
later eating crackers and drinking water in response to her 
nausea.  No one encouraged her to seek medical attention; the 
students who were in the bathroom with her did not think that 
help was necessary, and the plaintiff herself believed that she 
did not need any.  At most, some other students believed that 
the plaintiff should be escorted home by peers and, accordingly, 
offered to walk her home. 
Moreover, in the absence of an ongoing emergency, it was 
reasonable for Jones and Smith to respond to the plaintiff's 
intoxication as they did.  Jones, an off-duty RA, informed 
Smith, an on-duty RA, that a fellow student appeared ill due to 
30 
 
drinking alcohol.  Rather than continue with her rounds, Smith 
stopped to check on the plaintiff.  She spoke with the two 
female students who were taking care of the plaintiff at the 
time and saw that these students were feeding and hydrating her.  
After listening for any indication that the plaintiff was still 
vomiting, and hearing none, Smith then permitted or acquiesced 
in the plan that those two students escort the plaintiff back to 
her own dormitory. 
At that point, it was not negligent for the RAs to allow 
those two students to walk the plaintiff home.  Indeed, 
Northeastern's policy stated that an RA need not seek further 
help or arrange transportation if the RA believed that an 
intoxicated student was being assisted by another person.  The 
fact that, unbeknownst to Smith and Jones, the plaintiff later 
turned down this offer of help and opted instead to walk back to 
her dormitory with A.G. does not make their decisions 
unreasonable.32 
 
Considering all of the information that Northeastern had at 
its disposal, it was not reasonably foreseeable that the 
plaintiff was in peril at the time of the alleged assault.  
                                                     
 
32 Nor, for that matter, would it have been negligent for 
the RAs to allow A.G. to escort the plaintiff home in the first 
instance.  A.G. was a friend of the plaintiff, they came to the 
party together, and they would be returning to their shared 
residence hall. 
31 
 
Because Northeastern was not on notice that it would be required 
to step in and protect the plaintiff, the existence of a special 
relationship alone did not impose an obligation on Northeastern 
to act.  We therefore conclude that, on the particular facts 
here, Northeastern did not owe a legal duty to the plaintiff on 
the basis of a special relationship.  In the absence of such a 
duty, summary judgment properly was granted on this portion of 
the plaintiff's negligence claim. 
 
ii.  Vicarious liability.  The plaintiff further asserts 
that by holding the Halloween party, RAs Smith and Jones created 
an unreasonable risk that she would be sexually assaulted.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B (1965).  Thus, she claims 
that Northeastern owed a duty to protect her from the resulting 
harms of that party.  See Elias v. Unisys Corp., 410 Mass. 479, 
481 (1991) ("The [vicarious] liability of the principal arises 
simply by the operation of law and is only derivative of the 
wrongful act of the agent") 
To be sure, by throwing, or tacitly permitting, this 
underage drinking party, the RAs hardly covered themselves with 
glory.  The plaintiff's argument nonetheless fails, however, 
because, as noted supra, the subsequent steps that the RAs took 
to protect the plaintiff were appropriate under these 
circumstances.  Whatever duty the RAs may have owed to protect 
the plaintiff in these circumstances was clearly met. 
32 
 
 
As the plaintiff cannot establish any breach of a duty on 
the part of the RAs, her derivative claims against the 
university fail as a matter of law. 
 
iii.  Negligent supervision and training.  The plaintiff 
argues that individual defendants Sevigny, Wegmann, and 
Estabrook, as well as Northeastern itself, should be liable for 
the negligent training and supervision of the RAs and the SCB 
members. 
The plaintiff's claim against Northeastern and the 
individual defendants fails because there is no evidence that 
any of the defendants was negligent in training or supervising 
its student resident advisors.  "Employers are responsible for 
exercising reasonable care to ensure that their employees do not 
cause foreseeable harm to a foreseeable class of plaintiffs."  
Roe No. 1 v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 469 Mass. 710, 714–715 
(2014).  To establish an employer's liability for negligently 
training and retaining an employee, a plaintiff must show that 
the "employer [became] aware or should have become aware of 
problems with an employee that indicated his unfitness, and the 
employer fails to take further action such as investigating, 
discharge or reassignment."  Foster v. The Loft, Inc., 26 Mass. 
App. Ct. 289, 291 (1988). 
 
Northeastern's RAs went through a two and one-half week 
initial training program, followed by additional workshops.  
33 
 
They also met with university staff on a weekly basis.  As part 
of the training, one student explained, RAs were directed to 
report underage drinking and respond according to the severity 
of the student's intoxication.33  This training included 
recognizing warning signs of the excessive consumption of 
alcohol. 
 
Arguably, by failing to report the underage drinking that 
they observed, and by engaging in underage drinking themselves, 
the RAs apparently did not follow their training on the night in 
question.  Nonetheless, and notwithstanding Northeastern staff's 
ongoing supervision, it does not appear on this record that 
Northeastern or any of the individual defendants were aware of 
any issues with these two RAs prior to the Halloween incident.  
Because the defendants did not know, or have reason to know, 
that the RAs would not conduct themselves according to 
Northeastern's policies and training, the defendants were not 
negligent. 
 
Similarly, the SCB members (who were uncompensated) 
underwent both a general training on disciplinary proceedings, 
and an additional training specific to sexual assault cases.  In 
addition, the SCB members were required to observe a full SCB 
                                                     
 
 
33 Northeastern's written policy, however, set out in the 
student handbook, allowed a "medical amnesty" for intoxicated 
students in which, among other actions short of reporting, RAs 
could arrange for an escort home. 
34 
 
proceeding before participating in one.  There is no evidence 
that the SCB members failed to follow the provisions of 
Northeastern's code of conduct, or any policies from their 
training, when considering the events at issue here.  Nor is 
there any indication that Northeastern staff became aware of, or 
should have become aware of, any problems with the SCB members' 
knowledge of the Northeastern code.  See Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 
177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 614 (D. Mass. 2016) (Brandeis Univ.).  To 
the contrary, the SCB letter explained clearly the factors the 
SCB considered in evaluating the issue of consent and its 
understanding of the definition of consent under the code.  
Accordingly, the defendant cannot sustain her claim of negligent 
supervision and training. 
c.  Negligent infliction of emotional distress.  There also 
was no error in the judge's decision to deny the plaintiff's 
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  "[I]n 
order to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress," 
a plaintiff must prove the following:  "(1) negligence; 
(2) emotional distress; (3) causation; (4) physical harm 
manifested by objective symptomatology; and (5) that a 
reasonable person would have suffered emotional distress under 
the circumstances of the case."  Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 
Mass. 540, 557 (1982). 
35 
 
For all the reasons discussed in part 2.b, supra, the 
plaintiff cannot sustain her negligence claims.  Accordingly, 
the motion judge properly concluded that, absent the necessary 
element of negligence, the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment had to be allowed on those counts. 
d.  Breach of contract.  In addition to her negligence 
claims, the plaintiff contends that Northeastern committed a 
breach of a contract with her in which it promised to conduct 
its disciplinary proceedings in accordance with its stated 
procedures and the code of conduct in the student handbook.  
Although the plaintiff had such a contract with Northeastern, 
there was no breach. 
Claims that a university did not exercise proper care or 
follow its established procedures in student disciplinary 
proceedings have been treated as claims for breach of contract, 
based on the university's student handbook or other documents, 
such as the student code of conduct at issue here.  See, e.g., 
Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 Mass. 474, 478 (2000); Walker v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard College, 82 F. Supp. 3d 524, 528-
529 (D. Mass. 2014), aff'd, 840 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2016).  
"Contracts between students and universities are interpreted 'in 
accordance with the parties' reasonable expectations, giving 
those terms the meaning that the university reasonably should 
expect the student to take from them.'"  Walker, supra at 528, 
36 
 
quoting Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25, 34 (1st 
Cir. 2007).  Interpretation of a contract, including "any 
ambiguities . . . in the disputed contract terms," is a question 
of law decided de novo by the reviewing court.  See Walker, 
supra at 529, citing Driscoll v. Trustees of Milton Academy, 70 
Mass. App. Ct. 285, 293 (2007). 
To decide whether there was a breach of contract as a 
result of a disciplinary proceeding, we examine the conduct of 
the disciplinary hearing to determine whether Northeastern 
failed to meet the student-plaintiff's "reasonable 
expectations," and whether the hearing was conducted with "basic 
fairness" (citations omitted).  See Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 
3d at 594.  The plaintiff identifies two ways in which she 
asserts that Northeastern committed a breach of its contract 
while conducting the disciplinary hearing.  She points to 
Estabrook's denial of her appeal after the appeals board had 
allowed it, and a lack of "basic fairness" at the subsequent 
second hearing, in part due to the destruction of the recording 
of the original hearing.  See id. 
Neither of these asserted missteps represents a breach of 
Northeastern's contract with the plaintiff.  Estabrook, as the 
vice-president of student affairs, was responsible "for the 
overall administration of the Code of Student Conduct as well as 
the Student Conduct Process."  On the record before the court, 
37 
 
it is apparent that Estabrook's position afforded her the 
implied authority to rectify serious errors in the SCB process, 
including the authority to overturn otherwise final decisions of 
the appeals board.  When she vacated the appeals board's 
decision allowing a new hearing on the ground of procedural 
error, Estabrook merely exercised that authority.  It would be 
an absurd result to decide that the plaintiff reasonably could 
have expected to proceed with an appeal on the ground of 
procedural error, where she did not point to any procedural 
error in the initial proceeding. 
 
Likewise, the plaintiff's claim that she was harmed by the 
destruction of the transcript of the original hearing cannot 
succeed.  Prior to filing her appeal, the plaintiff explicitly 
declined Northeastern's offer that she listen to an audio 
recording of the hearing.  Following the allowance of her appeal 
(which did not rely on the recording), the tapes were destroyed, 
as specifically provided for under the then-existing terms of 
the code (in an effort to protect students' privacy and 
confidentiality).  The plaintiff thus could not have had a 
reasonable expectation that the tapes would be retained, nor did 
she make any request for an exception such that the tapes would 
not be destroyed when she initially declined to listen to them. 
 
The plaintiff also points to a number of purported flaws in 
the then-existing written code, including the provision 
38 
 
prescribing destruction of recordings after the conclusion of an 
appeal, which was intended to protect the privacy of the 
parties.  These issues with the code itself, however, do not 
indicate that Northeastern committed a breach of the terms of 
the code.  Whatever flaws it arguably contained were not so 
egregious that they could have violated the plaintiff's 
reasonable expectations, or resulted in fundamental unfairness.  
In any event, it is the terms of the code, and not the changes 
the plaintiff would like to have seen made, that were at issue 
on appeal.  In the absence of a breach, the plaintiff's contract 
claim could not survive the motion for summary judgment. 
e.  MERA claim.  For similar reasons, summary judgment 
properly was granted for the defendants on the plaintiff's claim 
under the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act (MERA).  MERA provides, 
in relevant part, that "[a]ll persons within the commonwealth, 
regardless of sex . . . , shall have . . . the same rights 
enjoyed by white male citizens, to make and enforce 
contracts . . . and to the full and equal benefit of all laws."  
G. L. c. 93, § 102 (a). 
The parties agree that the plaintiff's MERA claim is based 
entirely on Northeastern's asserted breach of its contract with 
her.  Accordingly, because the breach of contract claim cannot 
succeed, for the reasons discussed supra, the judge properly 
39 
 
determined that the plaintiff also could not prevail on her MERA 
claim. 
f.  Title IX claim.  The plaintiff also raises a Federal 
claim under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Title IX).  Title IX provides that "[n]o 
person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance."  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).  See Wills 
v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20, 35 (1st Cir. 1999) (Lipez, J., 
dissenting).  The protections of Title IX are "enforceable 
through an implied private right of action against an 
educational institution . . . [that] can include a demand for 
monetary damages."  Id. at 36. 
"[T]he provisions of Title IX indicate that a funding 
recipient should be liable only for its own actions, and not for 
the independent actions of an employee or a student. . . .  
[T]he administrative-enforcement scheme for Title IX permitted 
the imposition of financial penalties only after funding 
recipients received actual notice of discrimination within their 
programs and were given an opportunity to institute corrective 
measures; they would be subject to sanctions only for their 
failure to respond rather than for an employee's independent 
acts."  Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder, 500 F.3d 
40 
 
1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 2007), citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287–289 (1998). 
The plaintiff argues that Northeastern violated Title IX by 
responding with deliberate indifference to the sex 
discrimination she suffered.  She asserts that Northeastern 
failed properly to train the students who oversaw the 
disciplinary proceedings, resulting in an inadequate process 
that left her vulnerable to future harassment by A.G.  See 
Wills, 184 F.3d at 25-26 (discussing Title IX standard).  See 
also Doe I v. University of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d 788, 812 
(M.D. Tenn. 2016) (describing ongoing injury from improper Title 
IX proceedings).  The plaintiff maintains further that the 
conduct of the SCB inquiry, and the intervention by Estabrook, 
cast doubt on the accuracy of the disciplinary process and 
support an inference that gender bias was a motivating factor.  
See Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(Columbia Univ.).  For the reasons discussed infra, this Federal 
law claim fares no better than the plaintiff's other claims. 
i.  Deliberate indifference.  To sustain a cause of action 
that is not based on an "official policy" of a university, a 
plaintiff must show that "an official who at a minimum [had] 
authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute 
corrective measures on the recipient's behalf [had] actual 
knowledge of discrimination" and responded with "deliberate 
41 
 
indifference."  Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.  See Doe v. Trustees of 
Boston College, 892 F.3d 67, 93 (1st Cir. 2018) (Trustees of 
Boston College).  The underlying "discriminatory act must be so 
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said 
to deprive the victims of access to the educational 
opportunities or benefits provided by the school."  Id., citing 
Porto v. Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 2007).  In turn, a 
university's response must be "clearly unreasonable in light of 
the known circumstances."  Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 
526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999).  See Farmer v. Kansas State Univ., 918 
F.3d 1094, 1099 (10th Cir. 2019), quoting Davis, supra at 648-
649 ("Title IX does not require a funding recipient to acquiesce 
in the particular remedial action a victim seeks. . . .  '[T]he 
recipient must merely respond to known peer harassment in a 
manner that is not clearly unreasonable'"). 
When Northeastern first learned of the asserted assault, it 
"acted expeditiously and reasonably, and exhibited no 
indifference at all to [the plaintiff's] allegations."  Hayut v. 
State Univ. of New York, 352 F.3d 733, 752 (2d Cir. 2003).  Upon 
learning of the allegations, Northeastern initiated an 
investigation that culminated in the SCB proceedings.  It also 
issued a no-contact order against A.G.; the order remained in 
place throughout the plaintiff's time at Northeastern.  The 
plaintiff was offered, and received, ongoing counselling from 
42 
 
Northeastern.  Northeastern also extended other accommodations 
to her, including offering to move her and her roommate to a 
"safe room," or transferring her out of classes she shared with 
A.G., but ultimately she decided not to accept these additional 
measures.34 
On the whole, "the record not only fails to support [the 
plaintiff's] contention, it proves otherwise."  Doherty vs. 
Emerson College, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 1:14-CV-13281-LTS (D. Mass. 
Sept. 29, 2017) (initiating investigation, issuing stay away 
order, and offering counselling was reasonable initial 
response).  As the record reflects, the SCB's hearing procedures 
were not deficient.  Prior to the first SCB hearing, the 
plaintiff was appointed an advisor to assist her and to be 
present at the hearing, as was A.G.  At her request, the 
plaintiff was allowed to ask questions of A.G. through the SCB 
chair, who heard the question as stated by the plaintiff, and 
then posed it to A.G.; A.G. similarly was allowed to ask 
questions of the plaintiff.  The SCB ultimately decided the case 
based on a complainant-friendly preponderance of the evidence 
standard.  Examining the totality of the proceedings, we 
conclude that they do not reflect deliberate indifference. 
                                                     
 
 
34 While these otherwise appropriate accommodations are not 
unreasonable in these circumstances, we note that it was the 
plaintiff, rather than A.G., who would have been required to 
adjust her living and studying arrangements. 
43 
 
Similarly, the plaintiff's assertions that the students who 
took part in the proceedings were insufficiently trained is not 
supported by the record.  To sustain her claim, the plaintiff 
would have to demonstrate that Northeastern had a "policy of 
deliberate indifference to providing adequate training or 
guidance that is obviously necessary for implementation of [the 
SCB] program."  Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1178.  Here, the students 
received specific Title IX training that included explanations 
of the key concepts in this case, among them incapacitation and 
consent; the students were instructed that someone who is 
incapacitated can never give consent.  This definition, and the 
explanation, also were set out plainly in the code that was 
provided to all students.  That the students could not precisely 
define certain terms at their depositions, five years after the 
incident, does not raise an issue of material fact that must be 
decided by a jury. 
Additionally, the plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim 
cannot succeed as a matter of law because the record does not 
establish that she was excluded from any educational 
opportunity.  Although the plaintiff reported that she 
experienced ongoing emotional and psychological harm, she does 
not identify a particular effect that this had on her education.  
Rather, the record reflects that she graduated on time, magna 
cum laude.  Cf. Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, 
44 
 
Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 823 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that there was no concrete, negative effect on education where 
plaintiff was "diagnosed with some psychological problems" 
following harassment).  Absent "necessary evidence of a 
potential link between her education and [A.G.'s] misconduct," 
the plaintiff's claim cannot survive summary judgment.  See 
Davis, 526 U.S. at 652. 
ii.  Erroneous outcome.  The entry of summary judgment for 
the defendants also was warranted as to the plaintiff's claim of 
erroneous outcome.  "[T]he applicable standard for [a] Title IX 
claim challenging [a university's] disciplinary procedures on 
erroneous outcome grounds requires that a plaintiff offer 
evidence 'cast[ing] some articulable doubt on the accuracy of 
the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding,' and indicating that 
'gender bias was a motivating factor.'"  Trustees of Boston 
College, 892 F.3d at 90, quoting Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 
F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).  Viewing the facts in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, neither necessary element could 
be established on this record. 
Estabrook's intervention, whatever its propriety, 
ultimately had little if any effect on the accuracy of the SCB's 
final decision.  Hypothetically, by reversing the appeals 
board's decision to allow an appeal, Estabrook could have 
limited the issues that the SCB could have considered on appeal 
45 
 
to purely procedural matters.  Subsequently, however, Estabrook 
allowed the plaintiff to file an amended appeal, and the matter 
was remanded for a new hearing before the SCB based on new 
evidence.  Although the appeals board had denied the plaintiff's 
amended appeal on the ground of procedural error, after 
concluding that there had been none, on remand the SCB 
nonetheless considered the procedures employed at its first 
hearing, and stated in its decision that it found that no 
procedural errors had occurred at the initial hearing.  Thus, it 
would appear that the plaintiff ultimately had the benefit of 
the full appeal of the procedures that she initially had sought. 
In addition, even if there were any doubt about the 
accuracy of the proceeding, there was no evidence that any error 
was the product of gender bias.  Although the plaintiff is 
correct that bias may be inferred when "the evidence 
substantially favors one party's version of a disputed matter, 
but an evaluator forms a conclusion in favor of the other side 
(without an apparent reason based in the evidence)," Columbia 
Univ., 831 F.3d at 57, no such inference is appropriate here.  
Estabrook's intervention does not lack an apparent reason based 
in the evidence; she indicated that she overturned the appeals 
board's decision due to her perception of procedural 
inadequacies (allowing an appeal where no ground for appeal had 
been stated) and unfairness due to lack of notice. 
46 
 
Further, any possible inference of bias would "not 
necessarily relate to bias on account of sex" (emphasis added).  
Id.  Other than the plaintiff's unsupported assertion that 
"reporting sexual assault victims are overwhelmingly female," 
she does not identify any evidence to support the additional 
conclusion that Estabrook's decision was spurred by gender bias.  
Without evidence of "a causal connection between the outcome of 
[the] disciplinary proceedings and gender bias," Trustees of 
Boston College, 892 F.3d at 91, the plaintiff's claim asserting 
an erroneous outcome must fail. 
Judgment affirmed.