Case Title: Lenz v. Warden of the Sussex I State Prison

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
UPON REHEARING 
 
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, 
and Agee, JJ. 
 
MICHAEL W. LENZ 
 
v.  Record No. 012883     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
March 5, 2004 
WARDEN OF THE SUSSEX I  
STATE PRISON 
 
UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
 
In this case we granted a rehearing to the Warden to 
consider whether trial counsel were ineffective because they 
did not object to the verdict form given to the jury in the 
sentencing phase of petitioner's capital murder trial.  The 
Warden argues that the verdict form the jury considered was 
proper under this Court's holding in Atkins v. Commonwealth, 
257 Va. 160, 178, 510 S.E.2d 445, 456 (1999), and that trial 
counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to 
anticipate this Court's subsequent decision in Powell v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 512, 545, 552 S.E.2d 344, 363 (2001), 
requiring that the jury receive a verdict form that 
specifically states that a life sentence may be imposed even 
after finding one or both aggravating circumstances.  The 
Warden is correct. 
In Atkins the jury was not given a verdict form that 
allowed it to impose a life sentence if the Commonwealth 
proved neither of the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  257 Va. at 178-79, 510 S.E.2d at 456-57.  The defense 
had offered the statutory verdict form, Code § 19.2-264.4, 
that allowed this sentencing option, but the trial court 
refused that form.  Id. at 171-72, 510 S.E.2d at 452.  We held 
that the total absence of any jury verdict form allowing 
imposition of a life sentence if neither of the aggravating 
factors was proven was reversible error.  Id. at 179, 510 
S.E.2d at 457.  We noted that, had the trial judge selected 
the statutory verdict form Atkins' counsel offered, the 
missing sentencing option would have been submitted to the 
jury.  Id. at 178, 510 S.E.2d at 456.  That issue is not 
present in this case, however, because the jury received the 
statutory verdict form absent in Atkins.1 
The issue petitioner raises here is whether the verdict 
form must specifically provide the option of imposing a 
sentence of life when the Commonwealth has established one or 
both aggravating factors.  We addressed that issue for the 
                     
1 The verdict form before the jury in the sentencing phase 
of petitioner's capital murder trial comports with the 
language contained in Code § 19.2-264.4(D): 
 
We, the Jury, on the issue joined, having 
found the defendant guilty of Capital 
Murder, as charged in the indictment, and 
having considered the evidence in 
aggravation and mitigation of the offense, 
fix his punishment at imprisonment for life. 
 
 
2
first time in Powell.  261 Va. at 542, 552 S.E.2d at 361.  
Powell was not decided until after petitioner's capital murder 
trial concluded.  Therefore, trial counsel could not have been 
ineffective for failing to anticipate this Court's subsequent 
decision in Powell, Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350, 1360 
(4th Cir. 1995), and petitioner is not entitled to a new 
sentencing hearing on that basis. 
 
In light of this holding, we must address the claims in 
petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus relating to 
the sentencing phase of his capital murder trial.2  These 
claims are allegations of improper jury contacts and 
communications in connection with his sentencing hearing, 
Claims I and II, and various allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in the sentencing proceeding, Claim VII. 
CLAIMS I AND II 
 
In Claim I, petitioner asserted that the bailiff in his 
trial provided ex parte answers to jurors' questions about the 
court's sentencing instructions and, in Claim II, that Juror 
Anita J. Durrett was improperly seated and that one or more 
jurors consulted a Bible in the jury room during sentencing 
                     
2 Petitioner raised ten claims in his petition for writ of 
habeas corpus. In our original opinion we specifically 
declined to address petitioner's claims relating to his prior 
sentencing hearing and dismissed all his claims except the 
claim involving the verdict form.  Lenz v. Warden, 265 Va. 
373, 379, 381-82, 579 S.E.2d 194, 197-99 (2003). 
 
3
deliberations.  We referred Claims I and II to the Circuit 
Court of Augusta County for an evidentiary hearing by order 
entered June 17, 2002. 
Following the evidentiary hearing on August 9, 2002, the 
circuit court issued a letter opinion stating its findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations.  The circuit 
court recommended rejecting both claims, finding that the 
petitioner did not carry his burden of proof to establish that 
the jury had asked the bailiff questions concerning their 
sentencing instructions, that there was no evidence that Juror 
Durrett was biased in favor of the death penalty, and that 
there was "no reasonable possibility that the jury verdict was 
influenced by an improper communication in the form of a 
quotation from the Bible." 
Petitioner filed a brief with this Court raising a number 
of objections to the findings and conclusions of the circuit 
court.  The Commonwealth filed a brief responding to 
petitioner's arguments and supporting the circuit court's 
conclusions.  Petitioner filed a reply brief.3 
We begin by addressing two preliminary matters:  the 
Commonwealth's assertion that Claims I and II are procedurally 
barred by the rule in Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 205 
                     
3 Petitioner also filed a supplemental brief that was 
rejected by order dated February 23, 2003. 
 
4
S.E.2d 680 (1974), and petitioner's complaint that the circuit 
court erred by limiting the evidentiary value of affidavits 
submitted in the case. 
A.  Procedural Bar 
 
The Commonwealth asserts that Slayton precludes 
consideration of petitioner's Claims I and II in this habeas 
corpus proceeding because petitioner did not raise those 
claims at trial and on direct appeal.  We disagree. 
 
Slayton holds that one may not use a habeas corpus 
proceeding as a substitute for appeal.  215 Va. at 29, 205 
S.E.2d at 682.  Slayton makes clear, however, that this 
procedural bar operates when the petitioner "has been afforded 
a fair and full opportunity to raise and have adjudicated" the 
constitutional issue at trial and on appeal.  Id.  If the 
petitioner did not have that "fair and full opportunity" 
during his criminal trial and direct appeal, the rule in 
Slayton does not apply.  See DiPaola v. Riddle, 581 F.2d 1111, 
1113-14 (4th Cir. 1978). 
 
In this case, the Commonwealth asserts that the Slayton 
bar operates because the petitioner could have procured 
information from the jurors regarding communications with the 
bailiff and the presence and use of the Bible during sentence 
deliberations "sooner − immediately after trial, in fact."     
Adopting the Commonwealth's rationale for applying the Slayton 
 
5
bar in this case would in effect impose a requirement on 
defense counsel to poll jurors and any other persons involved 
with the criminal trial immediately following the trial, often 
at the same time that counsel is involved in filing post-trial 
motions and preparing for appeal.  Failure to conduct such a 
poll or investigation in every case would then subject counsel 
to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a habeas 
corpus proceeding.  We decline to impose such a requirement.  
Absent any indication that counsel or petitioner knew or 
should have known of the complained of conduct at a time when 
the trial court could address the misconduct allegations, the 
procedural bar in Slayton does not apply. 
 
In this case there is no evidence that trial counsel or 
petitioner had any information indicating that counsel should 
have interviewed the jury members or the bailiff, and the 
Commonwealth suggests none.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
Slayton does not bar petitioner's Claims I and II. 
B.  Affidavits 
 
In its opinion letter, the circuit court stated that it 
based its findings on the testimony of the witnesses at the 
hearing and that it relied on the affidavits the petitioner 
and respondent filed only as they affected the credibility of 
the witnesses. 
 
6
 
Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in not 
considering the affidavits as substantive evidence.  He 
suggests that because Code § 8.01-660 allows the use of 
affidavits as evidence in a habeas corpus proceeding and 
because at least some of the affiants did testify, the circuit 
court should have either found that the affidavits were 
credible testimony or resolved any credibility questions he 
had through cross-examination of the testifying affiants. 
Code § 8.01-660 provides that 
In the discretion of the court or judge before whom 
the petitioner is brought, the affidavits of 
witnesses taken by either party, on reasonable 
notice to the other, may be read as evidence. 
 
This statute makes consideration of affidavits as substantive 
evidence a matter in the court's discretion.  Accordingly, we 
apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the 
circuit court's decision regarding the use of the affidavits 
in this case. 
The circuit court identified a number of reasons why it 
did not consider the affidavits as substantive evidence, 
including that they had no indicia of inherent credibility, 
were taken without benefit of a transcript, and were taken a 
significant time after the events occurred.  Based on this 
record, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its 
 
7
discretion in refusing to consider the affidavits as 
substantive evidence. 
 
We now turn to the circuit court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law regarding the claims that were the subject 
of the evidentiary hearing.  When we refer a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus involving a capital murder case to a 
circuit court for an evidentiary hearing, we give deference to 
the circuit court's factual findings and consider those 
findings binding upon this Court unless they are plainly wrong 
or without evidence to support them.  Hedrick v. Warden, 264 
Va. 486, 496, 570 S.E.2d 840, 847 (2002).  We review de novo 
any questions of law or mixed questions of fact and law that 
the circuit court addressed.  Id. 
C.  Improper Communications with the Bailiff 
 
Responding to jury inquiries regarding sentencing 
instructions without notifying defendant or his counsel 
violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  
Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1975); Remington 
v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 360, 551 S.E.2d 620, 636-37 
(2001); Palmer v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 592, 605, 130 S.E. 
398, 402 (1925).  Petitioner claimed that he was deprived of 
his Sixth Amendment right because the bailiff provided ex 
parte responses to juror questions regarding the instructions 
the jurors received in the sentencing phase of his capital 
 
8
murder trial.  Petitioner has the burden to establish that 
such improper contact occurred.  Stockton v. Virginia, 852 
F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir. 1988). 
As recited above, the circuit court found no credible 
evidence to support petitioner's allegations of improper 
contact and rejected petitioner's misconduct claim.  
Petitioner challenges these findings, asserting that the "most 
credible evidence" shows that the jurors had questions about 
the sentencing instructions during deliberations and the 
bailiff answered some of their questions.  Petitioner's attack 
on the sufficiency of the evidence relies wholly on statements 
in petitioner's affidavits; however, as we stated above, the 
circuit court did not and was not required to consider those 
affidavits as substantive evidence. 
A review of the record shows that some of the jurors and 
the bailiff could not recall whether the bailiff was asked any 
questions at all; other jurors recalled that they asked the 
bailiff some questions.  No juror testified that any of the 
questions that may have been asked related to the trial 
court's instructions.  Thus, the circuit court's factual 
findings are neither plainly wrong nor without evidence to 
support them and therefore are binding on us.  Hedrick, 264 
Va. at 496, 570 S.E.2d at 847. 
 
9
Accordingly, we find that petitioner failed to carry his 
burden to show that an improper contact occurred, and we 
reject this claim. 
D.  Extraneous Influence 
 
The second claim we referred to the circuit court for an 
evidentiary hearing was that petitioner was denied his rights 
under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution because jurors read from and relied 
upon passages in the Bible in making their sentencing 
determination.  The United States Supreme Court set out the 
following standard for evaluating a claim of extraneous jury 
contact: 
In a criminal case, any private communication, 
contact or tampering, directly or indirectly, with 
a juror during a trial about the matter pending 
before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed 
presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance 
of known rules of the court and the instructions 
and directions of the court made during the trial, 
with full knowledge of the parties.  The 
presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests 
heavily upon the Government to establish, after 
notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such 
contact with the juror was harmless to the 
defendant. 
 
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954). 
 
The circuit court found as a matter of fact that one 
juror "had at least one Bible and perhaps a 'Woman's 
Devotional' with her in the jury room during the deliberations 
in the penalty phase of the trial."  The circuit court also 
 
10
found that the Bible was open during deliberations, that one 
juror read from it, and that other jurors looked at it.  The 
circuit court assumed that those jurors who looked at the 
Bible did read from it but found that there was no evidence 
showing what Bible passage or passages were read. 
The circuit court, applying Remmer, Burch v. Corcoran, 
273 F. 3d 577 (4th Cir. 2001), and Stockton, concluded that, 
absent any probative evidence that a juror relied on the 
contents of a passage in the Bible in making the sentencing 
decision, there was "no reasonable possibility that the jury 
verdict was influenced by an improper communication in the 
form of a quotation from the Bible." 
 
Petitioner asserts that the circuit court erred in a 
number of particulars in finding that there was no indication 
that the "jury verdict was influenced by an improper 
communication in the form of a quotation from the Bible."  The 
petitioner first complains that the circuit court's factual 
findings ignore various jurors' testimony that the Bible was 
read aloud and was consulted for purposes of determining what 
punishment was appropriate for the crime of murder.  As with 
his complaints regarding the factual findings regarding 
communications with the bailiff, the petitioner bases this 
challenge on statements in the petitioner's affidavits, not on 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing.  As we have previously 
 
11
stated, the trial court was not required to credit the 
statements in the affidavits.  Our review of the record shows 
that the circuit court's factual findings are consistent with 
the hearing testimony and are not plainly wrong.  Thus, those 
factual findings are binding upon us.  Hedrick, 264 Va. at 
496, 570 S.E.2d at 847. 
The petitioner also complains that the circuit court 
improperly misallocated the burden of proof in his claim of 
extraneous jury contact.  The Remmer presumption of prejudice 
arises upon a showing of two elements:  that an extraneous 
contact with or by a member of the jury took place and that 
such contact was "about the matter pending before the jury."  
Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229.  The character of the extraneous 
contact must "reasonably draw into question the integrity of 
the verdict."  Stockton, 852 F.2d at 743.  Once the petitioner 
shows both elements, the presumption arises, the petitioner is 
relieved of proving actual prejudice, and the burden shifts to 
the government to establish that the potentially prejudicial 
contact was harmless.  Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229. 
 
In this case, the petitioner established the first 
element but did not establish the second:  the relevance of 
the contact to the pending matter.  The circuit court found 
that extraneous material, the Bible, was present in the jury 
room during deliberations, but the circuit court also found 
 
12
that there was no evidence of what Bible passages were read.  
Implicit in this finding is a determination that no evidence 
showed that jurors read Bible passages relating to the 
sentencing decision.  Thus, petitioner did not establish that 
the "contact" with the Bible was "about the matter pending 
before the jury." 
Petitioner concedes that no evidence shows which Bible 
passages were read.  Nevertheless, petitioner argued 
strenuously to this Court that "the evidence clearly 
established that several of the jurors read passages regarding 
the appropriate punishment for murder."  Our review of the 
record indicates otherwise. 
At the evidentiary hearing, petitioner read Juror Durrett 
a portion of the affidavit she gave to the petitioner in which 
she stated that she had a Bible with her during the trial and 
that while deliberating on the sentence "some jurors were able 
to point to passages in the Bible that support the death 
penalty for anyone who kills another person."  In response to 
petitioner's questions about these statements, Juror Durrett 
testified that she could not recall which jurors had asked 
about the Bible, that another juror had identified a book of 
the Bible which contained information about death, that jurors 
had referred to the location of passages in the Bible from 
memory, that she had her Bible in the room but did not think 
 
13
that she had it open during deliberations, and that no one had 
"read out loud" from the Bible.     
Juror Sallie Zirkle testified that a "female juror" did 
read from the Bible, but Juror Zirkle could not remember which 
juror did the reading, what verse was read, why it was read, 
or if the reading occurred during the jury's deliberations 
regarding guilt or sentencing.   
Juror Barbara Pack testified that, while a Bible was on 
the table in the jury room, she did not know if anyone other 
than the owner of the Bible read or looked at the Bible.  
Juror Pack "assumed" the owner of the Bible was reading it 
when she "looked" at it. 
Juror John M. Harmon testified that nothing was read 
aloud from the Bible.  He did not know what the owner of the 
Bible read, if anything, when "looking through" it.  Juror 
Joan Lafferty testified that the Bible was a Women's 
Devotional Bible and that neither the owner nor any other 
juror read from this book.  
The only reference to a matter related to the sentencing 
decision was Juror Durrett's testimony that a juror recited, 
by memory, the location of a Bible passage relating to the 
appropriate punishment for murder.  This is not evidence that 
the jury consulted, read aloud, or discussed the referenced 
passage or any other Bible passage. 
 
14
The circuit court's implicit and explicit factual 
findings – that there was no evidence establishing that the 
jurors' contact with extraneous material involved the "subject 
matter" before the jury – are supported by the record and not 
plainly wrong.  Based on these factual findings, we agree that 
the petitioner failed to carry his burden of showing an 
extraneous contact with the jury about the pending sentencing 
decision such that the integrity of the jury's verdict was 
reasonably drawn into question.  Therefore, petitioner has not 
made the threshold showing entitling him to the presumption of 
prejudice.  See Burch, 273 F.3d at 591.   
Petitioner also challenged the seating of Juror Durrett 
based on the statement in her affidavit that the "Bible says 
that the death penalty is the appropriate punishment for 
murder."  This statement, he asserts, shows that seating her 
violated the principles set forth in Morgan v. Illinois, 504 
U.S. 719, 729 (1992), because she would automatically vote for 
the death penalty in every case.  The circuit court rejected 
this claim.  After reviewing Juror Durrett's voir dire 
testimony during the capital murder trial, the circuit court 
found that she "was specifically asked whether she would 
consider both alternatives available to her, either life 
without parole or death, and that she answered she would."  
Based on this finding, the circuit court concluded that there 
 
15
was no support for the proposition that Juror Durrett was 
biased in support of the death penalty and recommended that 
this claim be denied. 
We also reject petitioner's claim that Juror Durrett was 
biased in support of the death penalty.  The record supports 
the circuit court's findings of fact.  The single statement in 
her affidavit regarding an "appropriate punishment" is 
insufficient evidence upon which to find that Juror Durrett 
herself concurred with the statement and that she would 
automatically apply this "appropriate punishment" in every 
capital murder case.  During voir dire, Juror Durrett was 
specifically asked whether she had any religious, 
philosophical, or moral beliefs that would prevent her from 
imposing the death sentence and she responded "no."  She was 
also asked if she would consider both life imprisonment 
without parole and death as alternative penalties and she 
responded that she would.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
seating Juror Durrett did not violate the requirements of 
Morgan v. Illinois. 
Accordingly, we reject Claim II.  
CLAIM VII 
In Claim VII, petitioner asserted that he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel in the sentencing phase of his 
capital murder trial because counsel failed to investigate and 
 
16
present the circumstances of the offense, evidence regarding 
petitioner's religion, and evidence regarding petitioner's 
background; failed to develop relevant evidence regarding 
petitioner's mental illness, to investigate the implications 
of petitioner's medications, and to obtain the assistance of 
an independent expert; and unreasonably failed to seek 
additional time to investigate, all of which individually and 
collectively prejudiced him.  
To prevail on these claims, petitioner bears the burden 
of showing that his counsel's performance was objectively 
deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  In 
applying the performance prong of this test, the issue is 
whether counsel's acts or omissions were unreasonable in light 
of all the circumstances.  Id. at 688.  That determination 
begins with a strong presumption that counsel's actions fall 
within the wide range of adequate professional assistance, and 
this presumption bars an inadequate assistance claim if the 
complained of conduct might have been the result of tactics or 
strategy.  Id. at 689; Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 
185-86 (1986).  
The "prejudice" prong of the Strickland test requires the 
petitioner to show that there is a "reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
 
17
the proceeding would have been different."  466 U.S. at 694.  
A "reasonable probability" is more than a "possibility" of 
prejudice; it is a "probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome."  Id.  The errors must have 
"actually had an adverse effect on the defense."  Id. at 693. 
Further, in applying this two-prong test, we need not 
determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before 
addressing the prejudice prong.  If the petitioner fails to 
show the requisite prejudice, we need not scrutinize counsel's 
performance.  Id. at 697.  
A.  Failure to Seek Additional Time to Investigate 
On April 17, 2000, counsel for petitioner requested a 
continuance based on difficulties they were experiencing in 
meeting with petitioner and contacting other potential 
witnesses.  The trial court granted a two-month continuance.  
Counsel did not seek a second continuance.  Petitioner asserts 
that his counsel should have sought a second continuance 
because of difficulties in obtaining information and testing 
regarding petitioner's background.  We reject this claim.  
Petitioner recites that "the trial court would have likely 
granted" a second continuance if counsel had sought one and 
that without the continuance counsel "were . . . unable to 
investigate and present all relevant evidence" regarding 
petitioner's background, religion, and mental health history.  
 
18
The evidence petitioner proffers in support of this claim is 
that some experts were not appointed until shortly before 
trial, and affidavits from his trial counsel and mitigation 
specialist explaining difficulties in meeting with petitioner 
and expressing the opinion that "[e]veryone . . . could have 
used" more time. 
Many of the difficulties the mitigation expert 
experienced in meeting with petitioner were the result of her 
schedule and location.  Even in light of those difficulties, 
the mitigation expert affirmed counsel's mitigation strategy.  
There is no evidence that any of petitioner's experts told his 
counsel that they needed more time.  Under these circumstances 
we cannot say that counsel's failure to seek a second 
continuance was unreasonable under the circumstances and, 
accordingly, we reject this claim.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689. 
B.  Failure to Investigate and Present Circumstances of 
the Offense 
 
Citing affidavits his fellow inmates submitted, 
petitioner asserts that his trial counsel should have 
investigated and introduced evidence regarding petitioner's 
dedication to the Asatru religion, including his belief in, 
and fear of, "life-threatening black magic," which the victim, 
Brent H. Parker, allegedly was using against petitioner.  Such 
 
19
evidence, petitioner claims, would have demonstrated to the 
jury that he did not kill Parker because of a depraved mind 
but because he feared for his life.4  
We reject this claim.  First, the petitioner presented 
this evidence to the jury through his own testimony.  
Petitioner testified about the nature of the Asatru religion 
and his dedication to it as well as his relationship with the 
victim and the threats the victim made toward him.   
Petitioner also asserts that the inmate's testimony would 
have shown that the killing was not related to petitioner's 
depravity of mind, one of the grounds for establishing the 
vileness aggravating factor.  However, this assertion does not 
address the other grounds supporting a finding of vileness – 
torture and aggravated battery.  The evidence that the victim 
was stabbed 68 times supports a finding of vileness based on 
torture or aggravated battery.  Furthermore, the jury also 
found that petitioner would be a future danger to society.  
Nothing in the alleged missing testimony would have affected 
that finding.   
Accordingly, we reject petitioner's claim because he 
failed to show that, had the additional testimony he cites 
                     
4 We do not treat petitioner's arguments as asserting a 
claim of self-defense.  At issue here is the sentencing 
proceeding, at which point the jury had already rejected such 
claim. 
 
20
been presented to the jury, there would have been a reasonable 
probability of a different result.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694. 
C.  Failure to Investigate and Present Relevant Evidence 
Regarding Petitioner's Religion 
 
Petitioner claims that presenting evidence of the Asatru 
religion and his immersion in it solely through his own 
testimony was insufficient to inform the jury of the true 
nature of the religion and its significance in his life.  
Without receiving this information from other witnesses such 
as fellow inmates or acquiring an understanding of prison 
dynamics from an expert in prison life, petitioner asserts, 
the jury was left with the "sole impression that Lenz's 
religion was nothing more than a dangerous and scary cult."  
If the jury had such information, petitioner concludes, "there 
is a reasonable probability that the jury would not have 
sentenced Lenz to death." 
We reject this claim.  Nothing in the record suggests 
that the prison life expert petitioner asserts counsel should 
have called, James E. Aiken, had any knowledge of the Asatru 
religion or of petitioner's involvement in it.  The record 
shows only that Aiken had qualified as an expert in "prison 
operations and classifications" and would have testified 
 
21
regarding the probability of petitioner's future 
dangerousness. 
The record does show that petitioner called as a witness 
the prison psychologist who had interviewed him following the 
murder.  The witness described some of the tenets of the 
Asatru religion.  The witness testified that he believed 
petitioner was sincere in his dedication to this religion.  
The record shows that petitioner's trial counsel did 
attempt to put on the dynamics of the prison atmosphere and 
religious groups through the prison psychologist.  Counsel 
ceased that line of questioning when the witness' answer 
indicated a lack of violence connected with the Asatru 
religious group and when the trial court barred further 
inquiries regarding violent acts by other religious groups in 
the prison.  Counsel's decision to end this line of 
questioning apparently was a strategic decision based on the 
court's ruling and the testimony of the prison psychologist. 
Similarly, the inmate testimony petitioner asserts that 
the jury should have heard did not involve the substance of 
the Asatru religion.  That testimony described the contrast 
between petitioner's immersion in his religion and the 
victim's aggressive, bullying, non-religious character, as 
well as the relationship between petitioner and his victim.  
Petitioner himself testified to this evidence, and as 
 
22
previously stated, other testimony related to the sincerity of 
petitioner's religious beliefs.  
This record does not support a finding that petitioner's 
counsel acted unreasonably in light of all the circumstances 
or that the failure to present testimony of other inmates and 
James Aiken raises a reasonable probability that the result of 
the sentencing proceeding would have been different.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 694. 
D.  Failure to Properly Investigate and Present Relevant 
Evidence Regarding Petitioner's Background 
 
Petitioner complains, in part, that trial counsel were 
ineffective because they failed to investigate and develop 
information about petitioner's family history of alcoholism, 
drug abuse, and mental illness.  We reject this part of the 
claim.   
Petitioner obtained an affidavit from trial counsel 
stating that efforts were made to locate petitioner's 
biological father but that they "never located [petitioner's] 
biological father, or any other members of his biological 
paternal family."  Counsel did not make a decision that finding 
these persons was unnecessary, compare Wiggins v. Smith, 
___U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (2003); rather their investigation 
of these matters was unsuccessful.  Under these circumstances, 
 
23
we cannot say that counsel's actions "fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  
Petitioner also complains that his trial counsel were 
ineffective because they did not present detailed information 
regarding his psychiatric institutionalizations, diagnoses, 
and treatments.  We reject this claim also. 
First, petitioner does not assert that counsel were 
deficient in failing to investigate his background.  
Petitioner acknowledges that counsel had obtained the records 
relevant to the evidence he now asserts should have been 
presented to the jury.  "[C]ounsel had . . . stacks of records 
regarding Lenz's treatment and diagnoses."  He also 
acknowledges that both petitioner and his mother testified 
regarding his childhood and institutionalizations.  That 
testimony provided the jury with the following information. 
Petitioner's mother met his biological father, Michael W. 
Stagenga, while Stagenga was a student at the United States 
Naval Academy, and they married upon Stagenga's graduation.  
When petitioner was born in 1964, Stagenga was stationed in 
Vietnam.  Petitioner's parents divorced in 1967, in part 
because his mother was concerned that his father had a 
drinking problem. 
Petitioner and his mother returned to Virginia.  His 
mother married Bill Lenz, a Navy helicopter pilot, in April 
 
24
1968.  Bill Lenz wanted to and eventually did adopt 
petitioner.  Mrs. Lenz testified that Bill Lenz never told 
petitioner that "he loved him" and was intense and strict with 
petitioner.  Bill Lenz told Mrs. Lenz not to "hug" petitioner 
all the time.  
The Lenz family moved a number of times as Bill Lenz's 
station assignments changed.  In first grade, Mrs. Lenz was 
told that her son was "rough on the play ground" and "fidgety 
in class."  When he was in second grade, petitioner's brother 
Lance was born.   
When petitioner was in fourth grade, his parents sent him 
to San Diego Children's Home, a day school, because he was 
having trouble controlling his anger.  The family went to 
counseling although Bill Lenz "didn't like it."  The next year 
the family returned to Virginia when Bill Lenz left the Navy 
and joined the Secret Service.  Petitioner attended public 
schools in Woodbridge and needed no special help.  He was 
involved in scouting, soccer, and church activities.  Mrs. 
Lenz testified that petitioner and Bill Lenz had no close 
father-son relationship and that Bill Lenz disciplined 
petitioner by making him go to his room for long periods of 
time.  There was no physical abuse. 
When petitioner was 14 years-of-age, his mother was 
looking after a neighbor's house and car while the neighbor 
 
25
was away.  Petitioner and a friend took the car keys and drove 
the car around.  When confronted, petitioner was "scared", 
and, according to Mrs. Lenz, held a kitchen knife and 
threatened to take his own life.  As a result of this 
incident, petitioner's parents admitted him to Potomac 
Hospital, a crisis center, in Woodbridge, Virginia.  He was 
transferred to Dominion Psychiatric Treatment Center 
(Dominion) in Falls Church, Virginia, a few weeks later 
because he was showing depression and repressing anger.  The 
family participated in counseling, although Bill Lenz was 
embarrassed "about it" and didn't like doing it.    
A few months after petitioner was released from Dominion, 
he and a boy he had met at Dominion burglarized a home and 
stole some jewelry.  Petitioner was returned to Potomac Crisis 
Center at the insistence of Bill Lenz.  At the hearing on the 
burglary charges, the juvenile court judge sent petitioner to 
Commonwealth Psychiatric Hospital (Commonwealth) in Richmond 
as an alternative to jail.  The family participated in 
counseling while petitioner was at Commonwealth. 
When released from Commonwealth, petitioner was enrolled 
in Gladden School, a school for boys with behavioral problems.  
That school closed.  Petitioner again got "into trouble" and 
this time was sent to Beaumont Learning Center.  He acquired 
his general equivalency diploma while at Beaumont.  After one 
 
26
trip home from Beaumont, petitioner did not return to Beaumont 
as required.  He went to Virginia Beach for two days. 
When petitioner was released from Beaumont, his parents 
had moved to New Jersey.  He went to New Jersey and enrolled in 
a small college.  After a "short time," petitioner was in 
"trouble" again and sentenced to jail in New Jersey.  When 
released, his mother, who had moved to Iowa, returned to New 
Jersey and helped him find a place to stay there.  Eventually 
petitioner returned to Virginia. 
Petitioner complains that this evidence is inadequate 
because it does not recite the specific diagnoses and 
treatments he underwent in the various institutions.  However, 
those records show that at age 14 petitioner tested at or above 
grade level in all tested areas but spelling, had a verbal IQ 
of 112, a performance IQ of 117 and a full scale IQ of 116.  He 
was classified in the bright to normal range.  His 
psychological evaluations showed that he had poor impulse 
control, exhibited destructive behavior, had been using "pot" 
for over a year, had used LSD, and had used cocaine for five 
months before he was placed in Dominion.  Petitioner also 
admitted he was "dealing" to finance his drug supply.  He was 
evaluated as not psychotic but "demanding, infantile, depressed 
and angry."  The evaluator recommended help in improving his 
self-esteem and controlling his anger.  Later evaluations 
 
27
reinforced the notion that petitioner was "above average" in 
intelligence but continued to abuse drugs and alcohol.  
In light of the information contained in the reports and 
evaluations from the various institutions in which petitioner 
received treatment, counsel's decision not to present more 
detail regarding those reports was not unreasonable.  The 
particulars of those reports would have represented a "two 
edged sword" that counsel often confront when constructing the 
strategy most likely to assist rather than harm a client.  
Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 980-81 (4th Cir. 1995)(cross-
purpose evidence capable of aggravation and mitigation). 
Finally, petitioner has failed to show what the jury 
could have heard that would have had a reasonable probability 
of changing the sentencing result.  The jury heard about 
petitioner's unloving and demanding step-father, his natural 
father's drinking problem, his suicidal tendencies, his low 
self-esteem and feelings of worthlessness, and his own 
extensive drug and alcohol use.  The possibility that 
description of these facts could have been presented in more 
detail does not support a finding of a reasonable probability 
that the jury would have reached a different result.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
E.  Failure to Develop Relevant Evidence Regarding 
Petitioner's Mental Illness 
 
 
28
Petitioner claims that his social and psychiatric history 
indicates that he suffers from a "cognitive dysfunction" and 
that this dysfunction leads to low self-esteem, suspiciousness, 
paranoia, and eccentric behavior – actions that were documented 
by prior evaluations of petitioner.  Such dysfunction, 
petitioner asserts, "helps explain" petitioner's loss of 
control and extreme reaction to the victim's behavior.  Thus, 
petitioner concludes, his counsel were ineffective because they 
did not sufficiently develop this information regarding his 
mental illness.  
Again we reject this claim.  We note that petitioner is 
not asserting that counsel failed to engage in any 
investigation of petitioner's mental state; rather, 
petitioner's complaint is that counsel's development and 
presentation of the evidence was inadequate. 
Petitioner's argument relies primarily on the affidavit 
of a clinical neuropsychologist who tested petitioner and 
reviewed his records years after the capital murder trial.  At 
the time of trial, petitioner had never been diagnosed with a 
mental illness of any type.  Petitioner's psychiatric 
evaluations had identified psychological problems but never 
suggested a mental illness or "cognitive dysfunction" amounting 
to a mental illness. 
 
29
Counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to 
develop a "mental illness" theory to use in mitigation when 
such a condition had not even been suggested by any expert or 
individual who had evaluated petitioner.  See Poyner v. Murray, 
964 F.2d 1404, 1418-19 (4th Cir. 1992). 
F.  Failure to Obtain Assistance of an Independent Expert 
 
At trial, petitioner sought the assistance of James  
Aiken as an expert witness on the operation and classification 
of inmates in the Virginia prison system.  The trial court 
denied petitioner's motion to appoint this expert, saying that 
the services of the expert were "expensive" and that the 
information petitioner sought was available from persons who 
were in Virginia and who could "tell you better how it's done."  
Counsel for petitioner noted his objection but made no further 
argument.  At trial, petitioner called the Virginia Department 
of Corrections Director of Operations and the Assistant Warden 
of Operations at Red Onion Prison to testify on the system of 
prisoner classification and security.  
Petitioner argues that under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 
(1985), he was entitled to an independent expert and that the 
expert petitioner sought could have assisted in "preparing a 
defense to the Commonwealth's case for future dangerousness" in 
the context of a prison environment.  Such assistance, 
petitioner argues, would not have been forthcoming from 
 
30
employees of the Commonwealth's prison system.  Counsel's 
failure to advise the trial court of the need for this 
independent expert constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel, according to petitioner. 
We reject this claim.  Trial counsel appealed the denial 
of petitioner's motion for the appointment of the expert at 
issue on direct appeal.  This Court resolved the issue, holding 
that Ake did not require the trial court to appoint the expert.  
Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 462, 544 S.E.2d 299, 305 
(2001).  
To the extent petitioner is complaining that counsel's 
ineffectiveness is based on their failure to make the argument 
that the expert would be testifying not only to prison 
classifications and operation but also opining on petitioner's 
future dangerousness in the context of a prison setting, we 
also reject the claim.  We have held that Code § 19.2-264.2 
does not limit the consideration of whether the defendant would 
pose a continuing threat to society to a "prison society" 
because a defendant would be sentenced to life imprisonment 
without parole.  Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 517, 537 
S.E.2d 866, 879 (2000).  While Lovitt was decided one month 
after petitioner's sentencing proceeding, we cannot conclude 
that counsel was ineffective for failing to advance an argument 
that we have subsequently rejected.  
 
31
G.  Failure to Investigate Implications 
 of Petitioner's Medications 
 
Petitioner asserts that he was being treated with the 
steroid prednisone and the antihistamine Benadryl at the time 
of the murder and that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to seek expert assistance to determine if these 
medications negatively affected petitioner. 
We reject this claim.  Petitioner's mitigation theory 
revolved around the sincerity of his religious beliefs and his 
feelings of low esteem and repressed anger stemming from his 
relationship with his step-father.  Petitioner never suggested 
that he was not in control of his actions when he stabbed and 
killed Parker or that the sincerity of his religious beliefs 
was the product of some adverse reaction to medication.  
Decisions regarding trial strategy often require rejection of 
other potential strategies.  The course of actions petitioner 
suggests in this habeas proceeding is inconsistent with the 
trial strategy his trial counsel elected.  We cannot conclude 
that trial counsel's actions were deficient for failing to make 
the argument petitioner suggests.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
H.  Cumulative Prejudice 
Lastly, petitioner complains that the cumulative effect 
of trial counsel's actions and omissions during the sentencing 
phase "individually and cumulatively, prejudiced Lenz."  We 
 
32
reject this claim.  Having rejected each of petitioner's 
individual claims, there is no support for the proposition that 
such actions when considered collectively have deprived 
petitioner of his constitutional right to effective assistance 
of counsel.  Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557, 586 n.22 (4th 
Cir. 1999), Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852 (4th Cir. 
1998). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we deny the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. 
Writ denied. 
 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL and JUSTICE 
KEENAN join, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent.  At its core, the issue that 
Michael W. Lenz raises in this habeas corpus case ultimately 
evolves from our recent consideration of a defendant’s rights 
in view of the awesome responsibility statutorily entrusted to 
the jury in a capital murder case to determine whether a 
defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.  
The jury’s determination is aided by two fundamental and 
pertinent principles.  A death sentence may not be imposed 
unless the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one or 
both of the so-called aggravating factors of future 
dangerousness or vileness have been proven.  However, the jury 
 
33
may fix the defendant’s punishment at life imprisonment even 
when it finds that one or both of these aggravating factors 
have been proven.  Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4.  In this 
context, our decision in Atkins v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 160, 
178, 510 S.E.2d 445, 456 (1999), was premised upon the well 
established rule that “it is materially vital to the defendant 
in a criminal case that the jury have a proper verdict form” 
reflecting all of its sentencing options.  In my view, the 
majority either ignores the rationale of Atkins or unduly 
limits that rationale to the specific facts of that case.  Our 
subsequent decision in Powell v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 512, 
552 S.E.2d 344 (2001), illustrates the point that it is 
reversible error when the jury is not given complete or 
adequate verdict forms that comport with the correct statement 
of the law given to the jury by the trial court in its 
sentencing instructions regarding the sentencing options 
available to the jury, regardless of the specific manner in 
which those forms are incomplete or inadequate.  For the 
reasons that follow, I would vacate Lenz’s death sentence and 
remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing 
hearing. 
Beyond question, the jury in Lenz’s case was not given a 
verdict form that specifically reflected the jury’s option of 
imposing a life sentence, or a life sentence and a fine of not 
 
34
more than $100,000, even if the jury found that the 
Commonwealth had proven beyond a reasonable doubt one or both 
of the aggravating factors necessary for imposing a sentence 
of death.  The trial court was required to provide the jury 
with a verdict form expressly providing this sentencing 
option, and we expressly so held in Powell, 261 Va. at 545, 
552 S.E.2d at 363. 
The Warden in this case misses the mark when arguing 
essentially that there is no “Atkins error” in the verdict 
forms given to Lenz’s jury because unlike Atkins the jury in 
Lenz’s case was given the statutory verdict form provided by 
Code § 19.2-264.4.  That statutory verdict form was also given 
to the jury in Powell and there we explained: 
The issue is not whether the jury was provided with 
the means to discharge its obligation.  If that were 
the only goal, it could be achieved by providing the 
jury with a generic verdict form and advising the 
jury to fill in the particulars of the sentence from 
the instructions.  Rather, the issue is whether the 
jury is likely to be confused where it is instructed 
that it may impose a sentence other than death if it 
finds one or both of the aggravating factors have 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but receives 
verdict forms that do not expressly state that the 
jury is allowed to fix a sentence of life 
imprisonment even though one or both aggravating 
factors are present. 
 
Id. at 545, 552 S.E.2d at 363.  We applied the rationale of 
Atkins in Powell and the specific deficiency in the verdict 
 
35
forms given to the jury in the former case was not material to 
our analysis in the latter case.  Id. 
The majority does not dispute that, in the absence of the 
procedural differences in the two cases, Powell would control 
the verdict form issue raised by Lenz in this case.  In 
Powell, the inadequacy of the jury verdict forms was an issue 
raised at trial and preserved for appeal.  Id.  In Lenz’s 
case, the very same issue was not raised at trial and 
preserved for appeal.  In Lenz’s direct appeal we raised the 
issue, sua sponte, and asked the parties to address it in view 
of our decision in Atkins.  We ultimately held, however, that 
the issue was procedurally defaulted under Rule 5:25 because 
Lenz had neither raised the issue in the trial court nor 
assigned error to the verdict forms before this Court.  Lenz 
v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 472, 544 S.E.2d 299, 311 (2001).  
The issue is now before this Court on Lenz’s claim that his 
counsel was ineffective in not preserving the issue of the 
inadequate jury verdict forms used in his capital murder 
trial. 
Adopting the position asserted by the Warden in Lenz’s 
habeas corpus case, the majority concludes that Lenz’s counsel 
was not ineffective because “trial counsel could not have been 
ineffective for failing to anticipate this Court’s subsequent 
decision in Powell.”  I agree, but counsel did not need to 
 
36
anticipate our decision in Powell.  In my view, trial counsel 
was ineffective in not recognizing after our decision in 
Atkins, which was rendered one and one half years prior to 
Lenz’s trial, that it was materially vital to Lenz that the 
jury be given a proper verdict form reflecting all of its 
sentencing options.  Specifically, any reasonably effective 
counsel would have recognized after Atkins that a jury form 
that did not specifically reflect the jury’s option of 
imposing a life sentence, or a life sentence and a fine of not 
more than $100,000, even if the jury found that the 
Commonwealth had proven beyond a reasonable doubt one or both 
of the aggravating factors necessary for imposing the death 
sentence, would not comport with the correct statement of law 
given to the jury by the trial court in its sentencing 
instructions.  In such a case, the jury would be presented 
“with a confusing situation in which the trial court’s 
instructions and the form the jury was given to use in 
discharging its obligations [would be] in conflict.”  Atkins, 
257 Va. at 179, 510 S.E.2d at 457.  Indeed, that was the 
reason we raised this issue sua sponte in Lenz’s direct 
appeal.  Our concern was the application of the rationale of 
Atkins, not the specific manner in which the verdict forms 
were inadequate in that case, and not the decision we would 
render in Powell. 
 
37
 
38
In short, in view of this Court’s decision in Atkins, 
Lenz’s counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the 
inadequate verdict form given to the jury at Lenz’s capital 
murder trial.  That failure precluded Lenz from having his 
sentence determined by a jury with verdict forms that 
reflected all of its sentencing options under the law or 
receiving relief on direct appeal.  Lenz obviously was 
prejudiced by counsel’s failure.  Accordingly, I would vacate 
Lenz’s death sentence and remand the case to the trial court 
for a new sentencing hearing.* 
 
                     
* Because I would remand the case for a new sentencing 
hearing based upon the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel with respect to the failure to object to the improper 
verdict form, I would not reach the other issues addressed by 
the majority and express no opinion thereon.