Case Title: Snyder v. State

Citation: 361 Md. 580

Docket Number: 139/98

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Circuit Court of Baltimore County
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
 
 No.  139
 
 September Term, 1998
WILLIAM L. SNYDER, SR.
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                              
  Bell, C.J.
  Eldridge
 *Rodowsky
         * *Chasanow
  Raker  
  Wilner,
  Cathell        J.J.           
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
Cathell, J., concurs in result only.
Filed:
  
  
*Rodowsky, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active member of
this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated
in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
 **Chasanow, J.,  now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an  active member of
this Court, but did not participate in the decision and
adoption of this opinion.
 The issues in that appeal were unrelated to the issues in the case sub judice.
1
The petitioner, William L. Snyder, was tried and convicted of the first degree premeditated murder
of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment.  He appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of
Special Appeals, which reversed.  See Snyder v. State, 104 Md. App. 533, 657 A.2d 342 (1995).1
Following a second trial, the petitioner was again convicted of first degree murder and again sentenced to
life imprisonment.  In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment.  On
certiorari to this Court, the petitioner raises two issues: first, whether the trial court erred when it held that
facts establishing that the petitioner did not inquire about the progress of the police investigation into his
wife’s murder were admissible as evidence of his consciousness of guilt and, second, whether the trial court
erred by permitting the State to introduce testimony, that seven months prior to the murder, the petitioner
and the victim had a physical dispute, and that, at some unspecified date during the marriage, the petitioner
hit the victim.  Answering the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative, we
shall reverse.
I.
 
Mrs. Kay Snyder, the wife of the petitioner, was murdered and, on February 14, 1986, her body
was found lying on the side of the road across the street from their home.  Seven years later, the petitioner
was charged with, and tried for, her murder. 
At the petitioner’s first trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the State maintained that the
petitioner killed his wife because their marriage was breaking apart and the petitioner wished to retain full
ownership of their house and collect as the beneficiary on his wife’s life insurance policy.  Without forensic
evidence or eyewitness testimony  linking the petitioner to the murder, the State based its case solely on
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circumstantial evidence.  During both opening and closing statements, the State stressed this circumstantial
evidence, contending that it established that the petitioner was the killer.  That evidence included the
petitioner’s behavior the day of the killing, evidence that the killer took pains to delay discovery of the
crime, evidence that the murder did not occur during a robbery or sexual assault, evidence of the
petitioner’s “stormy” relationship with his wife leading up to the murder, evidence that the petitioner and
his wife  had a “big fight” the evening before the murder, as well as evidence establishing that the petitioner
had a financial motive for the murder.  
The petitioner denied the charges.  He argued instead that he was married to the victim for almost
25 years, that his relationship with his wife was “great and getting better,” and that “everything ha[d] been
great for [the] last three or four months” before the murder.
A jury found the petitioner guilty of first degree murder and the court sentenced him to life
imprisonment.  On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for a new
trial, having concluded that the trial court erred by admitting an investigating officer’s unfairly prejudicial and
speculative statements.  Snyder, supra, 104 Md. App. at 553-54, 657 A.2d at 352-53. 
The petitioner was retried.  Similar to the first trial, and over the petitioner’s objection, the State
presented testimony regarding the petitioner’s and the victim’s relationship leading up to the murder.  A
friend of the victim testified that she had a telephone conversation with the victim the night before the
murder and that the victim stated in that conversation that she “just had a fight” with the petitioner, during
which the petitioner “told her that she was a dead woman.”  The friend also stated that, at the time of this
conversation, the victim “was crying and real excited.”  “She was upset.”  “She was scared.”  The State
elicited additional testimony, also over the petitioner’s objection, from the daughters of the petitioner
 “Elimination prints” are fingerprints taken from a low probability suspect, which are then
2
measured against fingerprints lifted from the crime scene, in order to eliminate the possible suspect from
a list of suspects.
3
regarding a physical dispute between the victim and the petitioner that occurred on July 30, 1985.  The trial
court stated its reasons for admitting the evidence of the July 30, 1985 dispute:
“I think this is a circumstantial case, and the latest analogy used to always say the links of
a chain.  Now, the writer is saying strands in a cable makes it even thinner than links of a
chain.  I think he is entitled to show a continuing atmosphere as being the motive.  I agree
he has to start somewhere.
“So your objection is noted for the record.  I’m going to overrule it and allow it.  I think
it is circumstantial part of motive.”
 
Once again, over the petitioner’s objection, the State was permitted to offer testimony from the
investigating authorities regarding the petitioner’s conduct during the months and years following the murder.
An investigating officer for the State testified that, since February 20, 1986, the day the petitioner
voluntarily went to the police station to give “elimination prints,”  the petitioner made no inquiry regarding
2
the status of the police investigation.  In closing argument, the prosecutor was thus able to urge the jury to
find this lack of inquiry evidence of a guilty conscience.  More particularly, he argued:
“If he didn’t do it and he was, as he said, a loving spouse that cared about his wife, the
relationship, that things were getting better, if that were true, wouldn’t he have called the
police to inquire at the very least.”    
The petitioner was again convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.  He appealed the conviction
to the Court of Special Appeals, where he argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred by admitting the
evidence concerning the July 30, 1985 physical dispute and evidence regarding his failure to inquire about
the status of the police investigation.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction, reasoning that
 Prior to the petitioner’s arrest the victim’s brother, Mr. Johnson, posted a $10,000 reward for
3
information leading to the murderer.  The State elicited testimony from Mr. Johnson that, upon learning
of the reward, the petitioner stated, “the murder will never be solved.”  The State also offered testimony
from another witness that the petitioner told him not to cooperate with the police because “they were
not going to find out who did it.”  The State argued to the jury that these facts also exhibited a
consciousness of guilt.
4
“[i]n combination with evidence of [the petitioner’s] efforts to hinder the investigation,  [the petitioner’s]
3
failure or refusal to maintain contact with the investigating officers was admissible circumstantial evidence
of guilt.”  With regard to the petitioner’s relationship with his wife, that court reasoned that evidence of the
petitioner’s “stormy” relationship with her was properly admitted because, the evidence was:
“not offered to establish a propensity for violent conduct.  The State was entitled to
establish that appellant had both a personal motive and an economic motive to murder the
victim.”
The petitioner filed a timely petition for certiorari, which we granted in order to consider the
important evidentiary issues raised. 
II.
A.
First, the petitioner argues that the evidence offered to establish that he did not inquire about the
progress of the police investigation into his wife’s murder was inadmissible to prove a consciousness of
guilt.  He contends that culpability for murdering his wife cannot logically be inferred from the failure to
inquire.  Citing Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 667-68, 506 A.2d 111, 115 (1989), and Pettie v. State,
316 Md. 509, 519-20, 560 A.2d 577, 581-82 (1989), the petitioner argues that, because, as it is in this
case, the failure to inquire is so ambiguous and is subject to so many interpretations, evidence of the lack
of inquiry cannot be probative of consciousness of guilt and, therefore, simply is irrelevant.  
 In the case sub judice, the State admitted that the lack of interest showed by the petitioner in
4
the police search for his wife’s murderer was ambiguous because it “may be subject to more than one
interpretation . . . .”  
5
The State disagrees.  It argues that the petitioner misreads the threshold requirement for evidence
to be considered relevant, and contends that the trial court properly admitted the evidence.  Citing
McCormick on Evidence § 185, at 887 (4  ed. 1992), the State maintains that most evidence offered at
th
trial has some probative value and that, indeed, virtually all human conduct is subject to more than one
interpretation or explanation.   In this case, it argues, the petitioner’s failure to inquire into the police
4
investigation was probative on a “hotly contested issue — the nature of [the petitioner’s] relationship with
his wife.”  Therefore, the state contends, the ambiguity and competing inferences about which the petitioner
complains do not affect admissibility, but rather go to the weight that the trier of fact determines to give the
evidence.  In sum, the State argues that, 
“[t]he jury in this case, looking to the circumstances as whole, could reasonably infer that,
if [the petitioner] was a loving spouse, as his counsel insisted he was, he would have called
police sometime in [the] months and years following his wife’s murder to ask about the
progress of their investigation.”  
B. 
The rules governing the admissibility of evidence are contained in Chapter 400 of the Maryland
Rules of Evidence.  The first rule in that chapter, Md. Rule 5-401, defines “relevant evidence.”  It provides:
“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.”  
(Emphasis added).  This Court has applied and discussed this definition.  See, e.g., Conyers v. State, 354
Md. 132, 176, 729 A.2d 910, 933 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. ___ 120 S. Ct. 258, 145 L. Ed. 2d
216 (1999); Hopkins v. State, 352 Md. 146, 721 A.2d 231 (1998); Smallwood v. Bradford, 352 Md.
6
8, 26-27, 720 A.2d 586, 595-96 (1998); Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 697 A.2d 432 (1997).
While often noting the important distinction between weight and admissibility and favoring a policy of broad
admissibility, we have consistently held that a party seeking to establish the relevancy of proffered evidence
does not have to demonstrate that the evidence is weighty enough to carry that party’s burden of
persuasion.  See Md. Rule 5-401.  See also Conyers v. State, 354 Md. at 176, 729 A.2d at 933;
Hopkins, 352 Md. at 159, 721 A.2d at 237; Smallwood, 352 Md. at 26-27, 720 A.2d at 595-96;
Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. at 404-405, 697 A.2d at 439.  In fact, Rule 5-401 articulates the threshold
that must be reached; that threshold expressly requiring only that the evidence have “any tendency” to
prove a fact of consequence to the cause of action. 
Relevance is a relational concept.  Accordingly, an item of evidence can be relevant only when,
through proper analysis and reasoning, it is related logically to a matter at issue in the case, i.e., one that
is properly provable in the case.  See Md. Rule 5-401.  See also Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 736,
679 A.2d 1106, 1112 (1996).  In order to find that such a relationship exists, the trial court must be
satisfied that the proffered item of evidence is, on its face or otherwise, what the proponent claims that item
to be, and, if so, that its admission increases or decreases the probability of the existence of a material fact.
See, e.g., Pettie, 316 Md. at 519-20, 560 A.2d at 582 (declining to reach issue of whether proffered
evidence was admissible because facts did not support conclusion that evidence was what proponent
claimed it to be).  See also Pappaconstantinou v. State, 352 Md. 167, 181, 721 A.2d 241, 248 (1998)
(observing that “[o]bviously, evidence that the trial judge deems unreliable or untrustworthy is not probative
to any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the case, and hence, is not relevant evidence”).
Moreover, the relevancy determination is not made in isolation.  Instead, the test of relevance is whether,
 Md. Rule 5-403 took effect July 1, 1994.  The Rules Order dated December 15, 1993,
5
however, provided that “any trial or hearing commenced prior to July 1, 1994 shall continue to be
governed by the law and Rules in effect on June 30, 1994, and . . . no evidence shall be admitted
against a defendant in a criminal action in proof of a crime committed prior to July 1, 1994, unless that
evidence would have been admissible under the law and Rules in effect on June 30, 1994.”  Because
the charged crime occurred in 1986, we note that Md. Rule 5-403 itself does not apply in the case sub
judice.  The principle embodied in that rule constitute part of the common law of evidence, however,
and therefore, in that context, is applicable. 
7
in conjunction with all other relevant evidence, the evidence tends to make the proposition asserted more
or less probable.  Spector v. State, 289 Md. 407, 434, 425 A.2d 197, 211 (1981).
Md. Rules 5-402 and 5-403 provide additional guidance with respect to the admissibility of
relevant  evidence.  Rule 5-402 provides:
“Except as otherwise provided by constitutions, statutes, or these rules, or by decisional
law not inconsistent with these rules, all relevant evidence is admissible.  Evidence that is
not relevant is not admissible.”  
(Emphasis added).  Rule 5-403 makes clear, by prescribing a balancing test, that relevancy is not the only
test for admissibility of evidence.  That rule provides:
“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.”
(Emphasis added).   Therefore, evidence which meets the definition of “relevant evidence” under Rule 5-
5
401, and which, therefore, would be admissible under Rule 5-402 as having logical relevance, may
nonetheless be excluded under Rule 5-403.  See, e.g., Merzbacher, 346 Md. at 404, 697 A.2d at 439;
Williams, 342 Md. at 737, 679 A.2d at 1113; Md. Rule 5-403.
If relevant, circumstantial evidence regarding a defendant’s conduct may be admissible under Md.
Rule 5-403, not as conclusive evidence of guilt, but as a circumstance tending to show a consciousness of
guilt.  Hunt v. State, 312 Md. 494, 503-04, 540 A.2d 1125, 1129-30 (1988); Wright v. State, 312 Md.
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436; 86 S. Ct. 1602; 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) (allowing
6
defendant the right to be warned of several rights).  Suspects usually hear the following from
8
648, 654-655, 541 A.2d 988, 991 (1988); Davis v. State, 237 Md. 97, 105-106, 205 A.2d 254, 259
(1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 945, 86 S. Ct. 402, 15 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1965); Westcoat v. State, 231 Md.
364, 368, 190 A.2d 544, 546 (1963).  Thus, this Court has held that, through a series of inferences,
evidence of a defendant’s behavior after the commission of a crime may be admissible.  See, e.g.,
Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 59-62, 665 A.2d 223, 238 (1995) (holding that other crimes evidence,
consisting of testimony about the defendant's admission of other crimes, properly admitted under special
circumstances indicating defendant's consciousness of guilt); Hunt v. State, supra, 312 Md. at 503-504,
540 A.2d at 1129-30 (determining evidence that defendant escaped or attempted to escape from custody
admissible as inference to prove a consciousness of guilt); Wright v. State, supra, 312 Md. at 654-655,
541 A.2d at 991-92 (admitting evidence that defendant concealed his identity as supporting inference of
the defendant’s consciousness of guilt).  But cf., Bedford v. State, supra, 317 Md. 667-68, 566 A.2d at
115 (determining evidence of defendant’s possession of wire after arrest inadmissible as evidence of plan
to escape and therefore inadmissible as evidence of a consciousness of guilt because, under the facts of the
case, “[t]he possession of the wire [was] so equivocal” that its admission into evidence was more
prejudicial than probative and did not make the proposition asserted more probable).
Consciousness of guilt can be inferred either from some “pre-arrest silence,” Greir v. State, 351
Md. 241, 252, 718 A.2d 211, 217 (1998) (holding pre-arrest silence may be admissible as substantive
evidence of guilt, on a case-by-case basis, when it amounts to a tacit admission); cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, L. Ed. 2d (1976) (determining, in a post-arrest context, that Miranda  warnings
6
government authorities:
“1. You have the right to remain silent,
“2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law,
“3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while being
questioned,
“4. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer one will be appointed to represent you before any
questioning,
“5. You may also waive the right to counsel and your right to remain silent and you may
answer any question or make any statement you wish. If you decide to answer questions
you may stop answering questions at any time, to consult with an attorney,
“6. Do you understand what I have told you?”
9
contain an implicit assurance that silence will carry no penalty), or from the “failure to inquire.”  See State
v. Marshall, 586 A.2d 85, 143-46 (N.J. 1991) (inquiring too little led to an inference of a consciousness
of guilt).  The standard of proof for pre-arrest silence is more stringent than the standard of proof for failure
to inquire.  See id. at 146 (noting that pre-arrest silence, that of refusing to answer questions, enjoys
constitutional protection).  As such, if consciousness of guilt cannot be inferred from pre-arrest silence, then
it would appear that, clearly, it may not be inferred from a failure to inquire.
When viewed in the context of the petitioners right to remain silent, the admission of the petitioner’s
silence as evidence of his consciousness of guilt in the case sub judice has an element of unfairness, and is
not very probative of that fact.  See, e.g., Greir v. State, 351 Md. 241, 252, 718 A.2d 211, 217 (opining
that “[e]vidence of a person’s silence is generally inadmissible because ‘[i]n most circumstances silence is
so ambiguous that it is of little probative force’”) (internal citation omitted).  Indeed, when the suspect has
10
a right to remain silent, evidence that a suspect refused to speak with the police is not ordinarily admissible
to prove his or her consciousness of guilt.  Id. at 252-53.  In the case sub judice, the petitioner was
considered a suspect in his wife’s murder.  Although the petitioner declined to speak about his wife’s
murder, he voluntarily cooperated with authorities, giving exemplars of his fingerprints, hair and blood as
requested.  Under these circumstances, the petitioner’s silence is too equivocal to be probative.
Simply because the authorities were not required to advise the petitioner of his right to remain silent
until they subjected him to a custodial interrogation does not mean that the petitioner’s silence prior to that
occurrence should receive less protection or that the petitioner may be penalized on that account.  Many
of our sister states that have considered this issue have expressed their distrust of evidence of pre-arrest
silence as probative of a consciousness of guilt, noting its inherently low probative value and its high
potential for unfair prejudice.  See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 431 Mass. 108, 116, 725 N.E.2d 556,
565 (2000) (determining defendant’s pre-arrest silence, blank stares and failure to inquire about his wife’s
murder properly excluded as evidence of consciousness of guilt); Silvernail v. State, 777 P.2d 1169, 1175
(Alas. App. 1989) (noting a “distrust of silence as probative evidence of guilt”); Commonwealth v.
Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54, 62, 434 N.E.2d 992, 995 (1982) (noting “impeachment of a defendant with
the fact of his pre-arrest silence should be approached with caution”); Commonwealth v. Harris, 371 Mass.
462, 477, 358 N.E.2d 982, 991 (1976) (holding defendant's hanging his head and biting his lips not
admissible as nontestimonial admission demonstrating consciousness of guilt).  See also People v. Quintana,
665 P.2d 605, 610 (Colo.1983); People v. Conyers, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 458-59, 438 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743,
420 N.E.2d 933, 936 (1981).
In the case sub judice, the State does not attempt to infer consciousness of guilt from the petitioners
11
pre-arrest silence, its focus being on the petitioner’s subsequent failure to inquire about the progress of the
police investigation into his wife’s murder.  The relevance of the petitioner’s failure to inquire depends upon
whether that evidence supports four inferences: from the failure to inquire, satisfaction of the case not being
solved or actively pursued; from the satisfaction of the case not being solved or actively pursued, a
consciousness of guilt; from a consciousness of guilt, a consciousness of guilt of murder; and from a
consciousness of guilt of murder, actual guilt of murder.  We believe that, under the circumstances of this
case, evidence that the defendant failed to call the police to inquire about the status of the investigation,
even for seven years, is too ambiguous and equivocal to support such inferences.
At best, the admission of the evidence invites the jury to speculate.  The jury is asked to presume
that the petitioner’s failure to inquire is probative of the absence of a loving relationship between the
petitioner and  his wife and then to speculate as to the connection between the petitioner’s relationship with
his wife and his wife’s murder, assuming in the process, that the petitioner’s failure to inquire is indicative
of a guilty conscience.  These assumptions and speculations lack probative value where, as in this case, the
State has presented no testimony or evidence, from the investigating authorities or any other source, either
as to the general response of family members during a murder investigation or of any specific responses or
types of inquires made by members of the Snyder family in this particular case.  Moreover, the State
presented no evidence that the petitioner was requested by the authorities to inquire regularly and certainly,
it produced no evidence that the petitioner voluntarily stated that he would regularly inquire.  Thus, there
is no evidentiary basis for the conclusion that the jury drew.
This Court’s holding in Pettie v. State, 316 Md. 509, 560 A.2d 577 (1989), is instructive.  There,
the petitioner, while an inmate at the Maryland Correctional Training Center, was charged with committing
12
various sexual acts, including sodomy, upon another inmate.  Id. at 512, 560 A.2d at 578.  The State was
permitted to introduce, at trial, evidence that, after being charged and placed on administrative segregation,
a guard had been called to defendant’s cell by another inmate who had found an apparent suicide note,
where the defendant was discovered, “non responsive but conscious,” with a single cut to his wrist, id. at
512, 560 A.2d at 578, that, in other words, the defendant  had attempted suicide.  The State’s  theory was
that evidence of the defendant’s attempted suicide tended to prove the defendant’s consciousness of guilt.
Pettie, supra, at 509, 560 A.2d at 577.  The Court of Special Appeals having affirmed the trial court’s
judgment, Pettie v. State, 70 Md. App 602, 522 A.2d 394 (1987), we then granted certiorari to consider,
inter alia, the defendant’s challenge to the admission of that evidence.  We held that the evidence offered
by the State of the attempted suicide was not probative and, therefore, irrelevant.  Judge Cole, writing for
the Court, explained:
“As a general matter, evidence of conduct of the accused subsequent to the charged
criminal offense is admissible if probative of culpability.  See 29 Am. Jur.2d, Evidence §
278.  Evidence has been admitted which tends to show the accused resisted arrest, Bird
v. United States, 187 U.S. 118,  23 S. Ct. 42, 47 L. Ed. 100 (1902); took to flight or
concealment prior to arrest, Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L.
Ed. 528 (1896); suppressed or destroyed evidence, Hickory v. United States, 160 U.S.
408, 16 S. Ct. 327, 40 L. Ed. 474 (1896); escaped or attempted to escape from custody,
Hunt v. State, 312 Md. 494, 540 A.2d 1125 (1988); concealed his identity, Wright v.
State, 312 Md. 648, 541 A.2d 988 (1988); attempted suicide, State v. Campbell, 146
Mont. 251, 405 P.2d 978 (1965); possessed weapons, People v. Northcott, 209 Cal.
639, 289 P. 634 (1930); possessed stolen property, State v. Barnes, 47 Or. 592, 85 P.
998 (1906); or engaged in similar conduct.  See Wigmore, Evidence, § 276 (3d ed.
1940).
“Under Maryland law, evidence of a defendant’s flight is admissible, not as conclusive of
guilt, but as a circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt.  Wright v. State,
supra, 312 Md. 648, 541 A.2d 988; Hunt v. State, supra, 312 Md. 494, 540 A.2d 1125;
Davis v. State, 237 Md. 97, 205 A.2d 254 (1964), cert. denied, Davis v. Maryland, 382
U.S. 945, 86 S. Ct. 402, 15 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1965); Westcoat v. State, 231 Md. 364, 190
A.2d 544 (1963).
  
13
“As we see it, however, attempted suicide cannot easily be circumscribed, as that act is
subject to innumerable interpretations.  Even if we were to agree that evidence of
attempted suicide is admissible as analogous to flight and implies a consciousness of guilt
(and we do not decide that issue), the facts here simply do not support the conclusion that
Pettie tried to kill himself at all, much less that he did so as a reaction to any attack on or
sodomy of [the victim].”
Id. at 519-20, 560 A.2d 581-82. 
To be sure, the Pettie Court recognized that, in other jurisdictions, attempted suicide has been
considered probative of a  consciousness of guilt.  This Court did not reach the issue, however, because
the ambiguity and equivocal nature of the facts surrounding the alleged act did not satisfy the Court that the
act was what the State purported it to be.  As relevance only has meaning in the context of the relationship
between the proffered item and the matter properly provable in the case, we concluded that the proffered
evidence had no logical relevance and, therefore, the proffered evidence could not reasonably affect an
assessment of the fact to be inferred, i.e., that the defendant attempted suicide, leading to a conclusion that
he did so as result of a consciousness of guilt.  Id. at 520, 560 A.2d at 582.
If, as a general proposition,
evidence of a defendant’s failure to inquire about the progress of a police investigation were probative of
a consciousness of guilt, any reaction or failure to react to the death of a loved one by a family member or
friend could be construed to be probative of guilt.  Therefore, the fact that a defendant failed to inquire
about the police investigation, as in this case, see State v. Marshall, 586 A.2d 85, 143-46 (N.J. 1991)
(inquiring too little led to conviction), or inquired too often, see Smithart v. State, 946 P.2d 1264, 1275
(Alas. App. 1997) (inquiring too much equaled suspicion, which led to conviction), would suffice to support
a jury verdict.  So too, would evidence that the defendant inquired or grieved in a way that the State
deemed out of the norm, irrespective of the significant ambiguity of the conduct.  This would place a
14
potential defendant in the perennial unenviable position of being caught between a rock and a hard place.
The State’s reliance upon State v. Marshall is misplaced.  In Marshall, the defendant offered a
$10,000 dollar reward to anyone with information helpful in locating his wife’s killer and a letter was sent
to the prosecutor’s office stating that he was willing to cooperate and divulge any required information, 586
A.2d at 144, but during the resulting investigation, he failed to inquire about the progress of finding his
wife’s murderer.  Rejecting the defendant’s contention that the prosecutor’s cross examination regarding
his failure to inquire infringed on his privilege against self-incrimination, id. at 144, the court, noting the
defendant’s actions in offering the reward and communicating with the police, opined, “[t]he prosecutor’s
inquiry did not address defendant’s refusal to admit or reveal his own guilt, but rather questioned an aspect
of his conduct that appeared to conflict with his avowed interest in tracing down his wife’s murderer.”  Id.
at 146.  Thus, in the case sub judice, because the petitioner never indicated an avowed interest in tracking
down his wife’s murderer, Marshall is not at all analogous and its holding is inapplicable.
Even if, as the State urges, the failure to inquire about the police investigation has some probative
value, we are nevertheless convinced that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence in
this case.  As we have seen, there is a strong policy in favor of the admission of logically relevant evidence
so long as the proffered evidence satisfies the requirements of Md. Rule 5-403, i.e., its probative value is
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  Once evidence is determined to be relevant,
the question is what inferences, together with all of the other relevant evidence, can the jury draw from the
evidence.  Any probative value evidence of failure to inquire has is slight compared to the substantial danger
that it will result in unfair prejudice.  See Bedford v. State, supra, 317 Md. 659, 566 A.2d 111.  See also
10 Moore’s Federal Practice § 403.02 [3] (2d ed. 1979) (pointing out, “[i]f the relevance of the proffered
15
evidence is suspect or slight but would be prejudicial then any justification of its admission is slight or
non-existent”).
We concluded, in Bedford, that ambiguous and equivocal evidence similar to that at issue in this
case is inadmissible as proof of a consciousness of guilt.  There, the defendant, who was convicted of first
degree murder, challenged on appeal the trial court’s admission, as proof of his plan to escape and,
therefore, his consciousness of guilt, evidence that, during a strip search, prison guards discovered a four
inch wire, commonly used to unlock handcuffs, hidden on his person.  317 Md. at 664, 566 A.2d at 113.
This Court held that the introduction of the wire was reversible error, reasoning:
“The authorities are uniform that evidence of a consciousness of guilt is generally
circumstantial and should be more probative on the issue of ultimate guilt than prejudicial
to the defendant.  McCormick, Evidence § 271; see Fed. R. Evid. 403.  If the judge finds
that the proposed material is likely to lead a reasonable jury to infer the defendant’s guilt
without causing him substantial prejudice, then the judge may allow the jury to consider the
evidence in reaching a verdict as to the charged offense.  If, however, the inference as to
ultimate guilt is weak and the circumstantial evidence merely tends to create in the minds
of jurors the impression that the defendant is of questionable character and has a
propensity for bad acts and probably acted accordingly on the charged occasion, then the
evidence should be excluded.  
“We are not convinced that possession of a wire under the circumstances in this case is a
‘substantial step’ toward making an escape.  There are too many other possible reasons
why Bedford could have been in possession of that wire.  While we doubt that the wire
would be a tool for intra-prison work activity, we do accept that its presence could lead
the jury to other inferences about Bedford.  The jury could consider it as a weapon and
view Bedford as being violent, or could see defendant's possession of the wire as a
breaking of rules.  Consequently, it could view Bedford as a ‘bad man’ for breaking such
a rule. 
“Because the possession of the wire is so equivocal, we hold that its admission into
evidence was more prejudicial to Bedford than probative of an intent to escape and should
have been excluded.  It was reversible error to admit this evidence.” 
Id. at 667-68, 566 A.2d at 115.  (emphasis added).
16
The same rationale applies with equal, if not greater force, to the petitioner’s failure to inquire.  In
this case, the petitioner’s silence or failure to inquire has, at best, only slight probative value, but its
prejudicial effect is significant and unfair.  The jurors may have been inflamed by the evidence that the
petitioner did not show an interest in the police investigation and, therefore, ignored the nonexisting, or
weak, link between the failure to inquire and a consciousness of guilt.
III.
In light of our holding regarding the petitioner’s consciousness of guilt, we need not address the
remaining issue.  As indicated, however, we will exercise our discretion and address the issue for the
guidance of the trial court on remand. 
The petitioner complains that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of the “stormy”
relationship between the petitioner and the victim to prove his motive to commit the murder.  He argues
that, because there was no direct evidence of criminal agency, the trial court improperly permitted the State
to introduce testimony that on July 30, 1985, seven months prior to the murder, the petitioner and the victim
had a physical dispute and, even more inappropriately, permitted the State to elicit testimony that at some
unspecified date the petitioner hit the victim. 
The State argues that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting this evidence,
contending that it is probative of the nature of their marital relationship.  Citing Burch v. State, 346 Md.
253, 270-71, 696 A.2d 443, 452, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1001, 118 S. Ct. 571, 139 L. Ed. 2d 410
(1997), and cases from other jurisdictions, it denies that evidence that the petitioner responded to a physical
attack by his wife or engaged in a mutual physical dispute with her constitutes prior “bad acts evidence.”
It argues, however, that, even if tantamount to prior bad acts evidence, the trial court exercised appropriate
17
discretion in admitting the evidence on a question by question basis, to show motive, identity and agency
and to rebut the petitioner’s claim that his relationship with his wife was great.  
A.
In addition to the rules discussed supra, which define relevant evidence and the general rules which
govern the admissibility of relevant evidence, Maryland Rule 5-404(b)  limits the admissibility of evidence
offered to prove criminal propensity.  That rule provides: 
“(b)  Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.- Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident.”
As a preliminary matter,  the evidence at issue in this case falls comfortably within the definition of
“other wrongs” or “bad acts.”  See Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 735 A.2d 1061 (1999), noting,
after reviewing cases from this, and other, jurisdictions:
“[T]he general theme running through [the case law] is that a bad act is an activity or
conduct, not necessarily criminal, that tends to impugn or reflect adversely upon one’s
character, taking into consideration the facts of the underlying lawsuit.”
Id. at 549.  Thus, evidence is inadmissible if offered for the purpose of proving criminal propensity.  See
Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 406, 697 A.2d 432, 440 (1997) (noting the, “rationale for the rule
is to prevent jury from punishing defendant for having “criminal propensity”); Ayers v. State, 335 Md. 602,
630, 645 A.2d 22, 35 (1994) (reaffirming principle that “evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal acts may
not be introduced to prove guilt of the offense for which the defendant is on trial”); Harris v. State, 324 Md.
490, 496, 597 A.2d 956, 960 (1991) (holding that “[e]vidence of other bad acts may, however, be
admissible if it is relevant to the offense charged on some basis other than mere propensity to commit
crime”) (emphasis added); Jones v. State, 182 Md. 653, 656, 35 A.2d 916, 917 (1944) (opining that
“evidence of unconnected and unrelated crimes which does not show knowledge, motive, intent, a common
18
scheme or identification is inadmissible against a defendant in a criminal case as tending to show that he
committed the crime whereof he stands indicted in such case”).
To be admissible, evidence otherwise excludable as other crimes or propensity evidence, must be
substantially relevant to some contested issue in the case and be offered for a purpose other than to prove
the criminal character of the defendant, subject, of course, to the balancing requirement of Maryland Rule
5-403.  See Streater v. State, 352 Md. 800, 806-07, 724 A.2d 111, 114 (1999); Wynn v. State, 351
Md. 307, 339-40, 718 A.2d 588, 604 (1998); State v. Taylor, 347 Md. 363, 368, 701 A.2d 389, 392
(1997); Terry v. State, 332 Md. 329, 334, 631 A.2d 424, 427 (1993).  In State v. Faulkner, 314 Md.
630, 634-35, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989), this Court established a three-step test for evaluating the
admissibility of other crimes evidence:
“When a trial court is faced with the need to decide whether to admit evidence of another
crime -- that is, evidence that relates to an offense separate from that for which the
defendant is presently on trial -- it first determines whether the evidence fits within one or
more of the Ross [v. State 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976)] exceptions.  That is a
legal determination and does not involve any exercise of discretion.  See Cross [v. State],
282 Md.[468] at 474, 386 A.2d [757] at 761[(1978 )]; Moore v. State, 73 Md.App. 36,
44, 533 A.2d 1, 5 (1987), cert. denied, 311 Md. 719, 537 A.2d 273 (1988).
“If one or more of the exceptions applies, the next step is to decide whether the accused’s
involvement in the other crimes is established by clear and convincing evidence.  Lodowski
v. State, 302 Md. 691, 728, 490 A.2d 1228, 1247 (1985), defendant’s petition for cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1086, 106 S. Ct. 1469, 89 L. Ed. 2d 725, vacated, 475 U.S. 1078,
106 S. Ct. 1452, 89 L. Ed. 2d 711, rev’d on other grounds, 307 Md. 233, 513 A.2d 299
(1986); Cross, 282 Md. at 478, 386 A.2d at 764.  We will review this decision to
determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial judge’s finding.
  
“If this requirement is met, the trial court proceeds to the final step.  The necessity for and
probative value of the ‘other crimes’ evidence is to be carefully weighed against any undue
prejudice likely to result from its admission.  Cross, 282 Md. at 474, 386 A.2d at 761
(internal citations omitted).  This segment of the analysis implicates the exercise of the trial
court's discretion.  Id.; Moore, 73 Md.App. at 44-45, 533 A.2d at 5.”
19
One of the purposes for which other crimes evidence may be admitted under Rule 5-404(b) is to
prove motive.  Motive is the catalyst that provides the reason for a person to engage in criminal activity.
See Brown v. State, 359 Md. 180, 184, 753 A.2d 84, 86 (2000) (finding that purpose of murdering
pregnant mistress was not wanting wife to discover infidelity); Watkins v. State, 357 Md. 258, 261-62,
744 A.2d 1, 2-3 (2000) (determining that purpose of robbery was greed).  “Like intent, motive is a mental
state, the proof of which necessarily requires inferences to be drawn from conduct or extrinsic acts.”  See
Johnson v. State, 332 Md. 456, 471, 632 A.2d 152, 159 (1993).
Motive is not an element of the crime of murder, but, in addition to supporting the introduction of
other crimes evidence, it also may be relevant to the proof of two of the other exceptions to Rule 5-404,
intent or identity.  See Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 586, 115 A.2d 502, 511 (1955) (allowing evidence
of convictions to be admitted because it showed appellant’s behavior toward girl whom he killed only a
month later, thus tending to show motive and intent); see also Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 501, 597 A.2d
956, 962 (1991) (noting to establish motive or intent, evidence of other bad acts may have substantial
relevance); Faulkner, supra, 314 Md. at 634, 552 A.2d at 898 (figuring other crimes evidence “may be
admitted if it tends to establish motive, intent, absence of mistake, a common scheme or plan, identity,
opportunity, preparation, knowledge, absence of mistake or accident”) (emphasis added); Ross v. State,
276 Md. 664, 669-70, 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976) (holding that when “several offenses are so connected
in point of time or circumstances that one cannot be fully shown without proving the other,” then evidence
of other bad acts is admissible to show motive).  To be admissible as evidence of motive, however, the
prior conduct must be “‘committed within such time, or show such relationship to the main charge, as to
make connection obvious,’ . . . that is to say they are ‘so linked in point of time or circumstances as to
20
show intent or motive.’”  Johnson v. State, supra, 332 Md. at 470, 632 A.2d at 158-159, quoting Bryant
v. State, 207 Md. at 586, 115 A.2d at 511 and Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 155, 345 A.2d 830, 849
(1975).
Evidence of previous quarrels and difficulties between a victim and a defendant is generally
admissible to show motive.  See, e.g., Jones v. State, 182 Md. 653, 35 A.2d 916 (1944).  In that case,
the defendant was convicted of murdering his wife.  On appeal, he argued that it was improper for the trial
court to have admitted evidence of certain violent acts he directed toward his wife during the course of their
marriage.  Concluding that the evidence was admissible for reasons other than propensity, this Court
pointed out:
“In the case now before this court, the evidence presented, the subject of these two
exceptions, shows a long course of ill treatment of the deceased by the accused; that they
frequently quarreled and, although they renewed relationships at various times, there was
almost a continuous state off hostility between them.  These other crimes of the accused,
having been committed on the same person, are so closely connected to the offense
charged as to be evidence as to the intent and motive of the accused in this case.  We
therefore believe that the trial court was correct in admitting this evidence, the weight of
it to be determined by the jury.”
Id. at 657, 35 A.2d 918.
The petitioner argues that the present case is distinguishable from Jones.  He maintains that the
Jones analysis does not apply, pointing out that, in this case, the prior physical dispute was instigated by
the victim, who physically attacked the petitioner, after the dispute, the petitioner immediately sought, and
obtained, an ex parte order from the court to avoid further physical disputes, and the couple had reconciled
for approximately four months prior to the murder.  We disagree. 
The factors which the petitioner notes, while tending to prove that the petitioner was not  the
aggressor and to negate the probability that he is the murderer, do not affect the  admissibility of the
21
evidence to prove motive.  Instead, those matters more properly affect the weight to be given the evidence.
So it is also with respect to the reconciliation of the parties.  As noted in Jones, reconciliation does not
change the fact that the incident occurred and its impact, or not, should  more properly be left to the
determination of the trier of fact.  Other courts that have had opportunity to address the admissibility
of evidence of disharmony in the household as probative of the nature of a marital relationship have reached
similar results.  In Commonwealth v. Chandler, 554 Pa. 401, 721 A.2d 1040 (1998), the defendant was
convicted of possessing an instrument of crime, as well as, two counts of first-degree murder for killing his
wife and sister-in-law.  The defendant contended, on appeal, that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting evidence of his prior abuse of his wife.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed, opining that:
“[e]vidence concerning the previous relations between a defendant and a victim is relevant
and admissible for the purpose of proving ill-will, motive or malice. . . .  This principle
applies when the decedent was the spouse of the accused.  Thus, evidence concerning the
nature of the marital relationship is admissible for the purpose of proving ill-will, motive or
malice.  This includes, in particular, evidence that the accused physically abused his or her
spouse. . . .  Evidence of prior abuse is also admissible if it is ‘part of a chain or sequence
of events which formed the history of the case and was part of its natural development.’
. . . .
“Those statements were admissible under the ‘state of mind’ exception to the hearsay rule
because decedents opinion of defendant and her marriage to him went to the presence of
ill-will, malice, or motive for the killing.”
Id. at 409-11, 721 A.2d at 1044-45 (internal citations omitted).
In Commonwealth v. Cormier, 427 Mass. 446, 693 N.E.2d 1015 (1998), the defendant was
convicted of the first degree murder of his estranged wife.  He contended, on appeal, that the evidence of
prior bad acts- several incidents in which the defendant physically attacked the victim, threatened her, or
expressed to a third party his desire to kill her- was improperly admitted.  The Supreme Judicial Court of
22
Massachusetts saw it differently, noting that:
“‘It is well settled that the prosecution may not introduce evidence that a defendant has
previously misbehaved, indictably or not, for the purposes of showing his bad character
or propensity to commit the crime charged, but such evidence may be admissible if relevant
for some other purpose.’  ‘Evidence of a hostile relationship between a defendant and his
spouse may be admitted as relevant to the defendant’s motive to kill the victim spouse.’
A defendant’s oral threats and repeated acts of violence may indicate ‘settled ill-will
towards his wife, and therefore bear directly on the question whether there was any motive
for him to commit the crime.’”
Id. at 450, 693 N.E.2d at 1018 (internal citations omitted). 
The court further opined, id., that “[t]he evidence regarding the incidents introduced in this case was
directly relevant in establishing the defendant’s possible motive and intent in killing his wife.  Such evidence
was especially important in view of the defendant’s claim that he killed her in self-defense.”  Moreover, the
court believed  that, “[t]he judge’s limiting instructions reduced the possible prejudicial effect of this
evidence [when the judge] instructed the jury more than once that such evidence may be used only to show
motive or intent.”  Id.
Also to the same effect is State v. Alford, 257 Kan. 830, 896 P.2d 1059 (1995).  In  that case,
the defendant was convicted of the first degree murder of his wife, aggravated kidnaping, and unlawful
possession of a firearm.  Rejecting his argument that admitting his written statement regarding an earlier
aggravated battery was error because it was inadmissible hearsay, id. at 840, 896 P.2d at 1067, the
Kansas Supreme Court explained that the State:
“sought to introduce evidence of prior aggravated battery to show discord rather than to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.  Evidence of a discordant marital relationship and
a wife’s fear of the husband’s temper is competent as bearing on the defendant’s motive
and intent. . . .  In the defendant’s case, the evidence was admissible to show . . . a bearing
on his intent to kill [his wife].”
Id.
 The trial court, moreover, limited the prejudicial effect of the evidence during its 
7
final charge to the jury:
“Often times when asked about motive with respect to criminal cases motive is not an
element of a crime.  It need not be shown.  However, you may consider the motive or lack
of motive as a circumstance in the case.  Presence of motive may be evidence of guilt.
Absence of motive may suggest innocence.  You should give the presence or the absence
of motive, as the case may be, the weight that you believe it deserves.”
  
Thus, we conclude that the judge also properly minimized any possible prejudicial effect of the
evidence. 
23
In the case sub judice, as we have seen, the  evidence consisted of the July 30, 1985 physical
dispute between the petitioner and the victim, testimony that  the petitioner and the victim had a “stormy”
relationship, and testimony from a friend of the victim concerning a fight the night before the murder in which
the petitioner allegedly stated that the victim was “a dead woman.”  Thus, the jury heard testimony
indicating that there was disharmony in the household.  That evidence  was probative of a continuing
hostility and animosity, on the part of the petitioner, toward the victim and, therefore,  of a motive to
murder, not simply the propensity to commit murder.7
The petitioner also claims that it was error for the trial court to admit evidence from his daughter
regarding incidents in which she observed the petitioner hit the victim.  Citing several out of state cases,
Barnes v. Commonwealth, 794 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1990); Fields v. State, 362 So.2d 1319, 1320 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1978); Roberson v. State, 339 So. 2d 104 (Ala. 1976), for the proposition that a trial judge
is “without discretion to admit a statement that is so remote as to time or circumstance that its relevance
or materiality must rest in conjecture and speculation,” see Roberson, 339 So. 2d at 104, the petitioner
argues that the testimony was irrelevant because “[t]here was no time frame provided as to when or under
what circumstances [the petitioner] hit his wife.”  We disagree.
24
Although this Court has not spoken directly on this issue, several of our sister jurisdictions have had
the opportunity to do so.  In Simmons v. State, 266 Ga. 223, 466 S.E.2d 205 (1996), the defendant was
convicted of the murder of his ex-wife.  Responding to the defendant’s argument that evidence of prior
difficulties between himself and his ex-wife was improperly admitted because they were remote and
dissimilar to the murder for which he had been convicted, the Georgia Supreme Court, applying a standard
of review similar to the three-pronged test articulated in Faulkner, supra, concluded that a “lapse of eleven
years between a prior difficulty and the crime charged does not necessarily render the evidence inadmissible
as a matter of law.”  Id. at 225, 466 S.E.2d at 209.  The lapse of time went to the weight and credibility
of the testimony- not its admissibility, and was, thus, “relevant to the issues of intent, motive, scheme, and
bent of mind . . . .”  Id.
State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 428 S.E.2d 118 (1993) addressed the same issue, reaching the
same result.  The defendant in that case was found guilty of the first-degree murder of his wife.  He argued
on appeal that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence showing that he had a history of physically
abusing his wife and children and that such “evidence of specific instances of misconduct toward his wife
and children [was offered] to prove [his] character, to show that he acted in conformity therewith, or
alternatively, that the incidents were too remote in time, some more than two years prior to the killing . .
. to be admissible.”  Id. at 376, 428 S.E.2d at 131.  The North Carolina Supreme Court held that evidence
of prior bad acts, in the form of testimony by the defendant’s children about “defendant’s frequent
arguments with, violent acts toward, separations from, reconciliations with, and threats to his wife were
admissible under [North Carolina] Rule [of Evidence] 404(b) to prove . . . lack of accident, intent, malice,
premeditation and deliberation-- notwithstanding that some of the incidents dated back to the beginning of
25
the marriage.”  Id. at 378, 428 S.E.2d at 132.  The court found support in its past decisions, in which it had
held that “when a husband is charged with murdering his wife, the State may introduce evidence covering
the entire period of his married life to show malice, intent and ill will towards the victim.  Specifically,
evidence of frequent quarrels, separations, reconciliations and ill-treatment is admissible as bearing on
intent, malice, motive, premeditation and deliberation.”  Id. at 377, 428 S.E.2d at 132. 
In the case sub judice, evidence that the petitioner hit his wife was not too remote to lack a logical
relationship to motive.  The victim’s child at the time of her mother’s death was thirteen years old.
Therefore, the jury heard evidence that, at least during the last thirteen years, events occurred which may
have led to a motive to murder his wife.  In our view, the incidents are logically related to motive “to show
that the accused made declarations reflecting on his wife, the deceased, to show a long course of ill
treatment; to show that they quarreled, [and] that he maltreated her.”  Jones v. State, supra, 182 Md. at
656-57, 35 A.2d at 918, quoting 1 Warton’s Criminal Evidence § 287 at 376 (11  ed. 1935).  While we
th
agree that a trial court is without discretion to admit a statement that is so remote as to time that its
relevance or materiality must rest in conjecture and speculation, under the circumstances of this case, we
do not believe the trial court abused its discretion.  
Yet, even if we agreed with the petitioner that such acts are not admissible to prove motive,
evidence that the petitioner hit his wife, as well as evidence of more specific physical disputes, are
admissible as rebuttal evidence.  In this case, the petitioner’s attorney during opening statement reiterated
the petitioner’s sworn statement to the police that the petitioner’s relationship with his wife was “great and
getting better,” suggesting that it was improbable that the petitioner murdered his wife.  The State was
entitled to rebut that evidence.
26
Judge Cathell concurs in the result only.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AND
REMAND THE CASE TO THAT COURT
FOR A NEW TRIAL.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY BALTIMORE
COUNTY.