Case Title: P. v. Stanistreet

Citation: 

Docket Number: S102722

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 12/5/02 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
S102722 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
Ct.App. 2/6 B143501 
 
 
) 
SHAUN STANISTREET, 
) 
Ventura County 
 
 
) 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 97C010155 
___________________________________ ) 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
 
) 
BARBARA JOYCE ATKINSON, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 97C010156 
 
 
) 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Penal Code1 section 148.6 makes it a misdemeanor to file an allegation of 
misconduct against a peace officer knowing the allegation to be false.  We must 
decide whether that section violates constitutional free speech rights.  Relying 
primarily on R.A.V. v. St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377 (R.A.V.), defendants argue, 
and the Court of Appeal found, that section 148.6 is unconstitutional because it 
proscribes knowingly false accusations of misconduct against peace officers only 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
2
and not against others.  “By protecting only peace officers,” the Court of Appeal 
said, “section 148.6 selectively prohibits expression because of its content.  It 
therefore violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.”  We 
conclude that section 148.6 is constitutional on its face. 
Section 148.6 proscribes only constitutionally unprotected speech—
knowingly false statements of fact.  Moreover, it does not apply to all accusations 
of misconduct against peace officers but only to complaints filed with a law 
enforcement agency in a way that legally obligates the agency to investigate the 
complaint.  The circumstance that it covers only those persons—peace officers—
who will be the subject of the mandatory investigation does not render it 
unconstitutional. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Court of Appeal summarized the underlying facts.  “In a written 
complaint filed with the Oxnard Police Department, defendants Shaun Stanistreet 
and Barbara Joyce Atkinson accused an Oxnard police officer of committing lewd 
conduct at a Police Activities League (PAL) gathering.  PAL is a police-sponsored 
group that works with at-risk youth.  The officer was director of PAL.  The 
charges proved to be false.” 
A jury found defendants guilty of violating section 148.5 (filing a 
knowingly false report of a criminal offense) and section 148.6, both 
misdemeanors.  The trial court had instructed the jury that an element of each 
offense was that the defendants knew the allegation was false.  Over a dissent, the 
appellate division of the superior court affirmed the judgments.  The Court of 
Appeal transferred the case for decision (Cal. Rules of Court, rule  62) and 
reversed the judgments.  It found that section 148.5 does not apply to complaints 
asserting misconduct by police officers and that section 148.6 is unconstitutional. 
 
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We granted the People’s petition for review to decide whether section 148.6 
is unconstitutional on its face. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Section 148.6 
  Section 148.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides:  “(1) Every person who files 
any allegation of misconduct against any peace officer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 
(commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2, knowing the allegation to be 
false, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”2 
The Legislature first enacted section 148.6 in 1995.  (Stats. 1995, ch. 590, 
§ 1; Assem. Bill No. 1732 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.).)  At that time, a different 
statute made (and still makes) it a misdemeanor to report a felony or misdemeanor 
knowing the report to be false.  (§ 148.5.)  However, the courts had interpreted 
section 148.5 as not applying to complaints of police misconduct from members of 
                                             
 
2  
The rest of section 148.6, subdivision (a), provides:  “(2)  Any law 
enforcement agency accepting an allegation of misconduct against a peace officer 
shall require the complainant to read and sign the following advisory, all in 
boldface type:  You have the right to make a complaint against a police officer for 
any improper police conduct.  California law requires this agency to have a 
procedure to investigate citizens’ complaints.  You have a right to a written 
description of this procedure.  This agency may find after investigation that there 
is not enough evidence to warrant action on your complaint; even if that is the 
case, you have the right to make the complaint and have it investigated if you 
believe an officer behaved improperly.  Citizen complaints and any reports or 
findings relating to complaints must be retained by this agency for at least five 
years. 
“It is against the law to make a complaint that you know to be false.  If you 
make a complaint against an officer knowing that it is false, you can be prosecuted 
on a misdemeanor charge.” 
“I have read and understood the above statement. 
“___________________ 
“Complainant 
“(3)  The advisory shall be available in multiple languages.”  (Boldface 
type deleted.) 
 
4
the public.  (Pena v. Municipal Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 77, 83; People v. 
Craig (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 3, 6; see San Diego Police Officers Assn. v. 
San Diego Police Department (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 19, 22-23.)  The Legislature 
enacted section 148.6 to fill this gap. 
The Court of Appeal recently explained the background leading to section 
148.6’s enactment.  “The Legislature noted that since the Rodney King incident in 
March 1991, law enforcement agencies throughout the state had ‘revised their 
citizen complaint procedures to promote greater accountability on the part of their 
line officers.’  (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1732 
(1995-1996 Reg. Sess.).)  However, a ‘glaringly negative side-effect which has 
resulted [was] the willingness on the part of many of our less ethical citizens to 
maliciously file false allegations of misconduct against officers in an effort to 
punish them for simply doing their jobs.’  (Ibid.)  Against this backdrop, the 
Legislature enacted section 148.6, in an attempt to curb a perceived rising tide of 
knowingly false citizens’ complaints of misconduct by officers performing their 
duties.”  (San Diego Police Officers Assn. v. San Diego Police Department, supra, 
76 Cal.App.4th at p. 23.) 
The bill’s author provided additional background:  “Yearly hundreds of 
unfounded and false complaints are filed against Peace Officers.  In the Los 
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department alone, over 500 complaints were received of 
which approximately 60 to 70 % were unfounded.  [¶]  This bill will help prevent 
frivolous complaints which can affect the individual officer’s future.  For example, 
a Deputy Sheriff on a list for promotion to Sergeant receives a false report of 
misconduct, after which his promotion is deferred until the matter is resolved.  
After which, the complaint being found ungrounded, the Deputy has no recourse 
for any financial loss due to the delay.”  (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis 
of Assem. Bill No. 1732, supra, p. 2.)  A Senate committee report explained that 
 
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section 832.5 requires complaints against peace officers be investigated and the 
records retained for at least five years.  It noted concerns with fraudulent 
complaints and the “adverse impact upon a deputy’s job mobility and promotional 
opportunity” these complaints can cause until they are resolved.  (Sen. Com. on 
Criminal Procedure, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1732 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) pp. 
2, 4.) 
Thus, section 148.6 fills the gap created when the courts interpreted section 
148.5 as not applying to complaints of police misconduct.  But it does not merely 
extend section 148.5’s protection to peace officers.  Section 148.5 applies only to 
knowingly false reports “that a felony or misdemeanor has been committed,” i.e., 
to reports of a criminal offense.  By contrast, section 148.6 applies to all “citizens’ 
complaints of police misconduct during the performance of an officer’s duties that 
may or may not rise to the level of a criminal offense.”  (San Diego Police 
Officers Assn. v. San Diego Police Department, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 23.)  
Accordingly, section 148.6 gives protection to peace officers that the Legislature 
has not given to others.  As the Court of Appeal put it in this case, “It is not a 
crime to knowingly make such an accusation against a firefighter, a paramedic, a 
teacher, an elected official, or anyone else.” 
On the other hand, as the Senate committee report noted, the Penal Code 
also requires that every department or agency that “employs peace officers shall 
establish a procedure to investigate complaints by members of the public against 
the personnel of these departments or agencies, and shall make a written 
description of the procedure available to the public,” and that “[c]omplaints and 
any reports or findings relating to these complaints shall be retained for a period of 
at least five years.”  (§  832.5, subds. (a), (b).)  These provisions similarly apply 
only to complaints against peace officers.  Section 832.5 does not require 
 
6
investigation or lengthy retention of such accusations against firefighters, 
paramedics, teachers, elected officials, or others. 
B.  General Principles 
The right to criticize the government and governmental officials is among 
the quintessential rights Americans enjoy under the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Californians enjoy under the California 
Constitution, article I, section 2.3  “[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than 
self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.  The First and Fourteenth 
Amendments embody our ‘profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it 
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials.’ ”  (Garrison v. Louisiana (1964) 379 U.S. 64, 
74-75, quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 270.)  
“Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.  However 
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the 
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”  (Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 339-340.) 
Thus, speech criticizing the government and governmental officials 
receives the highest protection.  However, this protection does not extend to all 
                                             
 
3  
Neither defendants nor the Court of Appeal rely on the California 
Constitution as a separate basis to invalidate section 148.6.  Although the 
California Constitution has independent force, and in some regards it provides 
greater protection of speech than the United States Constitution, we have said that 
California law regarding defamation is coterminous with that of the United States 
Constitution.  (Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 745-746; 
see also Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 
352, 367, fn. 12; Walker v. Kiousis (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1446.)  
Specifically, the California Constitution has never given greater protection to 
knowingly false factual statements than the United States Constitution.  
Accordingly, we do not further discuss the California Constitution. 
 
7
speech.  “But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.  Neither 
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in 
‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.  New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.  They belong to that category of utterances which ‘are 
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a 
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed 
by the social interest in order and morality.’  (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 572 (1942).”  (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 418 U.S. at p. 340.) 
Although false statements of fact, by themselves, have no constitutional 
value, constitutional protection is not withheld from all such statements.  “[W]here 
the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest 
in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the 
Constitution, in the dissemination of truth. . . .  [¶]  Moreover, even where the 
utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution which secure freedom of 
expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the 
knowing or reckless falsehood.  Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if 
the speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of 
hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute 
to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.”  (Garrison v. 
Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. at pp. 72-73, fn. omitted.) 
For these reasons, the high court announced in a landmark civil libel case a 
“rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory 
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was 
made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”  (New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at pp. 279-280.)  The court later applied the same rule to 
a criminal case.  “The reasons which led us so to hold in New York Times, 376 
 
8
U.S., at 279-280, apply with no less force merely because the remedy is criminal.  
The constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression compel application of the 
same standard to the criminal remedy.  Truth may not be the subject of either civil 
or criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned.  And since 
‘. . . erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if 
the freedoms of expression are to have the “breathing space” that they “need . . . to 
survive” . . . ,’ 376 U.S., at 271-272, only those false statements made with the 
high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New York Times 
may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions.”  (Garrison v. Louisiana, 
supra, 379 U.S. at p. 74.) 
The high court has made clear, however, that even as to public officials, 
knowingly false statements of fact are constitutionally unprotected.  “The use of 
calculated falsehood, however, would put a different cast on the constitutional 
question.  Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful 
exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and 
deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. . . .  
For the use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of 
democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or 
political change is to be effected. . . .  Hence the knowingly false statement and the 
false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy 
constitutional protection.”  (Garrison v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. at p. 75.) 
Section 148.6 governs false allegations of misconduct only if the person 
knows them to be false.  This test is even more stringent than the test of New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, because it does not sanction recklessly 
false statements but only knowingly false statements.  Thus section 148.6 
proscribes only constitutionally unprotected speech. 
 
9
This conclusion, however, does not end the inquiry.  The Court of Appeal 
invalidated section 148.6 not because it proscribed protected speech but because it 
proscribed only some—not all—of the unprotected speech in its category.  For this 
conclusion it relied on R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. 377, to which we now turn. 
C.  The R.A.V. Case 
In R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. 377, the defendant, who had allegedly burned a 
cross in an African-American family’s yard, was charged with violating a St. Paul, 
Minnesota, ordinance that prohibited the placing “ ‘on public or private property a 
symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited 
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds 
to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, 
creed, religion or gender . . . .’ ”  (Id. at p. 380.)  The Minnesota courts had 
interpreted the ordinance as proscribing only “fighting words.”  (Ibid.)  The high 
court unanimously agreed the ordinance violated the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, but it divided as to the reasons. 
As the Court of Appeal recently summarized, the R.A.V. majority 
invalidated the ordinance “as unlawfully discriminating on the basis of content.  
According to the high court, its previous statements that the Constitution does not 
protect certain categories of expression were not to be taken literally, but meant 
only that ‘these areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be 
regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, 
defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the 
Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination 
unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.’  ([R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at 
pp. 383-384], original italics.)  Thus, while certain categories of speech and 
expressive conduct may be regulated, such regulation may not discriminate within 
 
10
that category on the basis of content.  For example, ‘the government may 
proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of 
proscribing only libel critical of the government.’  ([Id., at p. 384], original italics.)  
The ordinance in R.A.V. was facially unconstitutional as content-based 
discrimination because it discriminated among fighting words based on race, 
color, creed, religion, or gender.  (Id., at p. [391].)”  (In re Steven S. (1994) 25 
Cal.App.4th 598, 610.) 
Defendants aptly summarize their argument why section 148.6 is 
unconstitutional under R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. 377:  “ . . . California may choose 
to ban all defamation proscribable under [New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 
376 U.S. 254] and [Garrison v. Louisiana (1964) 379 U.S. 64, 67], regardless of 
its subject matter or target.  Alternatively, California may choose to provide an 
absolute privilege for all citizen complaints, including speech critical of peace 
officers.  What the state may not do, without running afoul of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, is to apply one defamation rule to citizen complaints 
against peace officers, and a different rule to those made against other public 
officials.  That, however, is precisely the content- and viewpoint-based distinction 
created by Penal Code section 148.6.”  In other words, defendants argue the 
Legislature may proscribe all knowingly false allegations of misconduct or none, 
but it may not proscribe some of them.  As we explain, defendants misread R.A.V., 
supra, 505 U.S. 377.  That decision does not require such an all-or-nothing 
approach.4 
                                             
 
4  
R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. 377, involved fighting words, not knowingly false 
statements of fact.  This circumstance seemed important to the high court.  “It is 
not true that ‘fighting words’ have at most a ‘de minimis’ expressive content, 
[citation], or that their content is in all respects ‘worthless and undeserving of 
constitutional protection,’ [citation]; sometimes they are quite expressive indeed.”  
(Id. at pp. 384-385.)  Arguably, knowingly false statements of fact, unlike fighting 
words, are in all respects worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection.  
 
11
In response to criticism by the minority, the R.A.V. majority denied that it 
was requiring the proscription of either all speech or no speech.  “In our view, the 
First Amendment imposes not an ‘underinclusiveness’ limitation but a ‘content 
discrimination’ limitation upon a State’s prohibition of proscribable speech.”  
(R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 387.)  “Even the prohibition against content 
discrimination that we assert the First Amendment requires is not absolute.  It 
applies differently in the context of proscribable speech than in the area of fully 
protected speech.  The rationale of the general prohibition, after all, is that content 
discrimination ‘raises the specter that the Government may effectively drive 
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace,’ [citations].  But content 
discrimination among various instances of a class of proscribable speech often 
does not pose this threat.”  (Id. at pp. 387-388.) 
The high court identified three categories of content discrimination that do 
not threaten to drive ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace and hence are 
permissible.  (R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 388-390.)  Contrary to defendants’ 
argument and the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, we find that all three categories 
apply here. 
First, “When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the 
very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger 
of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists.”  (R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 388.)  
The Court of Appeal noted that this language “can best be understood by way of a 
concrete example provided by R.A.V.”  We agree, but the Court of Appeal 
overlooked the most pertinent example:  “[T]he Federal Government can 
                                                                                                                                      
 
However, the court cited defamation as an example of the kind of proscribable 
speech it was talking about (id. at p. 383), which suggests it at least assumed that 
its opinion covers knowingly false statements of fact.  Accordingly, we will 
assume section 148.6 is subject to that decision. 
 
12
criminalize only those threats of violence that are directed against the President, 
see 18 U.S.C. § 871—since the reasons why threats of violence are outside the 
First Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the 
disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence 
will occur) have special force when applied to the person of the President.  
[Citation.]  But the Federal Government may not criminalize only those threats 
against the President that mention his policy on aid to inner cities.”  (R.A.V., 
supra, at p. 388.) 
This example applies here.  The reason the entire class of speech at issue—
knowingly false statements of fact—is proscribable has “special force” (R.A.V., 
supra, 505 U.S. at p. 388) when applied to false accusations against peace officers.  
When a person makes a complaint against a peace officer of the type that section 
148.6 governs, the agency receiving the complaint is legally obligated to 
investigate it and to retain the complaint and resulting reports or findings for at 
least five years.  (§ 832.5.)  Thus, the potential harm of a knowingly false 
statement is greater here than in other situations.  “The State’s desire to redress 
these perceived harms provides an adequate explanation for its” criminalizing 
these particular false statements of fact “over and above mere disagreement with 
offenders’ beliefs or biases.”  (Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993) 508 U.S. 476, 488 
[rejecting a constitutional challenge under R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. 377, to law 
punishing bias-motivated crimes more severely than crimes committed for other 
reasons].)  Accordingly, just as the government may criminalize only threats of 
violence against a specific victim, the President, so too may the Legislature 
criminalize only knowingly false accusations against a class of victims, peace 
officers.  To complete the analogy, what the Legislature may not do is criminalize 
only knowingly false accusations of illegal racial profiling. 
 
13
Second, “Another valid basis for according differential treatment to even a 
content-defined subclass of proscribable speech is that the subclass happens to be 
associated with particular ‘secondary effects’ of the speech, so that the regulation 
is ‘justified without reference to the content of the . . . speech,’ [citations].”  
(R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 389.)  This basis also applies here.  Knowingly false 
accusations of misconduct against a peace officer have substantial secondary 
effects—they trigger mandatory investigation and record retention requirements.    
Complaints directed at other persons do not receive this special treatment.  This 
requirement of an investigation, and the resulting investigation itself, can have 
substantial effects.  Public resources are required to investigate these complaints, 
resources that could otherwise be used for other matters; the complaints may 
adversely affect the accused peace officer’s career, at least until the investigation 
is complete; and the complaints may be discoverable in criminal proceedings.  
(See City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 8-10; Aguilar v. 
Johnson (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 241, 249-250.)  These secondary effects justify 
the regulation on a neutral basis without reference to the content of the speech.  
(See Morascini v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Conn. 1996) 675 A.2d 1340, 
1348-1351 [cost of speech that the state must bear for reasons unrelated to its 
content is a secondary effect].) 
The third category is a catchall.  “There may be other bases as well.  
Indeed, to validate such selectivity (where totally proscribable speech is at issue) it 
may not even be necessary to identify any particular ‘neutral’ basis, so long as the 
nature of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility that 
official suppression of ideas is afoot.”  (R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 390.)  Here, 
we see no realistic possibility of official suppression of ideas.  In finding to the 
contrary, the Court of Appeal stated, “The explicit legislative intent of the law is to 
suppress a specific class of speech:  citizen complaints of police misconduct.”  
 
14
Were that statement accurate, our task would be easy indeed.  Complaining of 
police misconduct is a quintessential right in this country.  But that is not what is 
afoot here.  The Legislature is not suppressing all complaints of police 
misconduct, only knowingly false ones. 
Defendants argue that section 148.6 impermissibly targets a “disfavored 
subject[].”  (Quoting R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 391.)  On the contrary, the 
targeted subject—formally filed complaints of misconduct against a peace 
officer—is, in other respects, favored.  Those complaints are subject to mandatory 
investigation and record retention requirements.  If a person wants to file a 
complaint in a way that forces an investigation, that person may not knowingly tell 
a factual falsehood.  The Legislature may elevate the status of a category of 
complaints that are particularly sensitive—like those of misconduct against peace 
officers—and require their investigation and retention of records, and at the same 
time penalize those who invoke that status with knowingly false complaints.  No 
one has a constitutional right to make a complaint of misconduct knowing both 
that the complaint must be investigated and that it is false. 
Defendants suggest that the requirement of section 148.6, subdivision 
(a)(2), that the complainant read and sign an admonition explaining the right to 
make a complaint, the investigation and record retention requirements, and the 
criminal sanction for knowingly false complaints, shows that official suppression 
of ideas is indeed afoot.  We disagree.  That admonition merely advises 
complainants of the law and impresses on them the significance of the formal 
complaint.  Warning people of the consequences of a knowingly false complaint is 
no more impermissible than advising people they are signing a document or 
testifying under penalty of perjury.  The explanation and admonition do not 
invalidate the statute. 
 
15
Some of the arguments that the defendants and the Court of Appeal below 
employ do not match the purported reason they claim section 148.6 is invalid.  In 
its concluding remarks, the Court of Appeal stated, “In our country, we expect and 
tolerate an infinite variety of expression.”  The statement is both true and 
irrelevant.  In our country, we do not expect, and the Constitution does not require 
us to tolerate, knowingly false statements of fact. 
  Defendants argue that section 148.6 has a “chilling effect” on the exercise 
of constitutional rights.  The Court of Appeal echoes this argument:  “But section 
148.6 might well stifle the registering of legitimate complaints made by the 
remaining 30 to 40 percent of citizens.”  But they do not explain, and we do not 
see, how extending section 148.6 to all complaints of public employee misconduct 
would reduce this supposed chilling effect.  As defendants necessarily concede, 
however, so extending section 148.6 would cure any violation of the rule of 
R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. 377.  Thus, the chilling effect argument has nothing to do 
with whether section 148.6 is invalid under R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. 377. 
Rather, the chilling effect argument relates to another common 
constitutional objection to legislation regulating speech—that it is overbroad 
because it threatens protected as well as unprotected speech.  A statute is facially 
overbroad if it “may cause others not before the court to refrain from 
constitutionally protected speech or expression.”  (Broadrick v. Oklahoma (1973) 
413 U.S. 601, 612; see In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 709.)  To succeed, “a 
constitutional challenge based on asserted overbreadth . . . must demonstrate the 
statute inhibits a substantial amount of protected speech.  (New York v. Ferber 
(1982) 458 U.S. 747, 768-769.)  ‘[O]verbreadth . . . must not only be real, but 
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’  
(Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra, 413 U.S. at p. 615.)”  (In re M.S., supra, 10 
Cal.4th at p. 710.) 
 
16
Section 148.6 is not overbroad.  The high court explained in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, and Garrision v. Louisiana, supra, 379 
U.S. 64, that a statute regulating all false statements of fact would be overbroad 
because it would inhibit protected speech.  But section 148.6 proscribes only 
knowingly false statements.  As noted in another case that rejected a chilling effect 
argument regarding section 148.5, “The statute prohibits only knowing falsehoods.  
This requirement of scienter protects witnesses who honestly misperceive facts.  
Those who knowingly give false information to police officers should be 
discouraged from doing so.”  (People v. Lawson (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 60, 68.)    
Moreover, section 148.6 applies only to formally filed accusations that the agency 
must investigate, not to more casual speech.  Such formal accusations are akin to 
statements or declarations made under penalty of perjury which, if knowingly 
false, are punishable as a felony.  (§§ 118, 126.)  Accusations that section 148.6 
cover are not as formal as statements made under penalty of perjury, but the 
punishment for such accusations that are knowingly false is also not as serious.  
Section 148.6 has no more of an impermissible chilling effect than California’s 
perjury laws.5 
Defendants cite a series of state and federal district court decisions 
declaring Civil Code section 47.56 unconstitutional (Gritchen v. Collier (C.D.Cal. 
                                             
 
5  
If the statute had criminalized other, less formal accusations—in speeches 
or newspapers, for example—the potential for chilling the exercise of 
constitutionally protected speech would arguably be greater.  We are reviewing 
only the statute actually before us and express no opinion on the constitutionality 
of other possible statutes.  We also note that this case involves only a facial 
challenge to section 148.6, not an “as applied” challenge.  (See Tobe v. City of 
Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084.)  Nothing we say would preclude an as 
applied challenge should section 148.6 be improperly applied. 
6  
Civil Code section 47.5 provides, as relevant, that “a peace officer may 
bring an action for defamation against an individual who has filed a complaint 
with that officer’s employing agency alleging misconduct, criminal conduct, or 
 
17
1999) 73 F.Supp.2d 1148, revd. on jurisdictional grounds (9th Cir. 2001) 254 F.3d 
807; Haddad v. Wall (C.D.Cal. 2000) 107 F.Supp.2d 1230; Walker v. Kiousis, 
supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 1432), and a federal district court order declaring Penal 
Code section 148.6 unconstitutional (Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino 
(C.D.Cal. 2000) 107 F.Supp.2d 1239).  Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino, supra, 
107 F.Supp.2d 1239, contains almost identical analysis as Haddad v. Wall, supra, 
107 F.Supp.2d 1230, filed the same day by the same court.  All of these cases rely 
on R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. 377.  We find them either inapposite or unpersuasive.  
The first, Gritchen v. Collier, supra, 73 F.Supp.2d 1148, was reversed on appeal 
when the Ninth Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the 
question.  (Gritchen v. Collier, supra, 254 F.3d 807.)  Although, as defendants 
note, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision because the district court should not 
have decided the constitutional question rather than because it decided it 
incorrectly, the reversal certainly weakens its precedential value.  To the extent the 
later decisions rely on the reversed decision (see Haddad v. Wall, supra, 107 
F.Supp.2d at pp. 1233-1234, 1237-1238; Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino, 
supra, 107 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1243-1244, 1246-1247; Walker v. Kiousis, supra, 93 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1437), they are accordingly also weakened. 
But we need not consider in detail the extent to which the reversal of 
Gritchen v. Collier, supra, 73 F.Supp.2d 1148, undermines these cases.  We 
express no opinion on the validity of Civil Code section 47.5 because the issue is 
not before us.  For the reasons stated, we respectfully disagree that Penal Code 
section 148.6 is invalid.  Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino, supra, 107 
F.Supp.2d 1239, overlooks the circumstance that complaints subject to the 
criminal sanction of Penal Code section 148.6 have, in some ways, a favored 
                                                                                                                                      
 
incompetence, if that complaint is false, the complaint was made with knowledge 
that it was false and that it was made with spite, hatred, or ill will.” 
 
18
status that justifies the regulation without reference to the content of the speech, 
and the other reasons we have identified why the statute is valid. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeal erred in finding section 148.6 unconstitutional.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the 
matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
BROWN, J. 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
I agree with the majority that Penal Code section 148.6 (section 148.6) is 
constitutional because it criminalizes only knowingly false complaints against 
peace officers, and any content discrimination it embodies by not covering 
complaints against other public officials is, in light of the substantial secondary 
effects of a complaint against a peace officer, justifiable under R. A. V. v. St. Paul 
(1992) 505 U.S. 377 (R.A.V.) “ ‘without reference to the content of the . . . 
speech’ ” (id. at p. 389).  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 12-13 [noting cost to public 
of mandatory investigation of police misconduct complaints].)  Accordingly, I 
concur in the judgment of reversal and in this aspect of the majority’s reasoning.  I 
disagree, however, that section 148.6 also falls within R.A.V.’s “special force” 
exception for content discrimination based on “the very reason the entire class of 
speech at issue is proscribable” (R.A.V., supra, at p. 388) or its catchall exception, 
applicable where “there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas 
is afoot” (id. at p. 390).  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11-15.) 
As the majority itself points out, the reason that the class of speech at 
issue—knowingly false statements of fact—is proscribable (as defamation) is that 
it has “ ‘no constitutional value’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 6, quoting Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 340); that is, such speech may injure personal 
reputations without making any positive contribution to the democratic process.  
This reason, the majority asserts, “has ‘special force’ [citation] when applied to 
false accusations against peace officers.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.)  But section 
 
2
148.6 does not target speech that is especially worthless or especially injurious to 
reputation.  Put another way, the majority identifies nothing about false speech 
affecting peace officers that distinguishes it from false speech affecting other 
governmental officials with respect to the grounds on which defamation is 
proscribable in the first place.  Accordingly, R.A.V.’s “special force” exception 
does not apply.  (See R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 388.) 
As to the catchall exception, the majority sees here “no realistic possibility 
of official suppression of ideas” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 13), but I disagree.  Section 
148.6 “gives protection to peace officers that the Legislature has not given to 
others” who work in public service.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.)  Section 148.6 also 
is unique in its mandate that the possibility of criminal sanctions for knowingly 
false complaints be prominently held up before prospective complainants at a 
critical juncture.  In many police misconduct situations, it inevitably will come 
down to the word of the citizen against the word of the police officer or officers, in 
which case law enforcement authorities will conduct an investigation to determine 
who is telling the truth.  If authorities for any reason disbelieve the citizen, the 
citizen (whether guilty or innocent) may then under section 148.6 face both 
criminal prosecution and the burden and expense of retaining a defense attorney.  
Prospective complainants cannot help but be aware of these realities when 
deciding whether to go forward with their complaints by signing the statute’s 
required admonition.  Realistically, some complainants are likely to choose not to 
go forward—even when they have legitimate complaints. 
In light of the foregoing, and as we need not, in order to find section 148.6 
constitutional, rely on R.A.V.’s “special force” or catchall exceptions from the 
First Amendment’s general ban on content discrimination, I do not rely on them.  
Instead, I rest my concurrence on the exception for content discrimination 
 
3
justifiable “ ‘without reference to the content of the . . . speech.’ ”  (R.A.V., supra, 
505 U.S. at p. 389.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
I CONCUR: 
MORENO, J. 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Stanistreet 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 93 Cal.App.4th 469 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S102722 
Date Filed: December 5, 2002 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Ventura 
Judge: John J. Hunter* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Andrew Wolf for Defendant and Appellant Shaun Stanistreet. 
 
Steven Warner for Defendant and Appellant Barbara Joyce Atkinson. 
 
ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Daniel P. Tokaji, Mark D. Rosenbaum; ACLU Foundation of 
Northern California and Alan L. Schlosser for Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Douglas E. Mirell and Karen R. Thorland for National Association for Citizen Oversight of Law 
Enforcement and Professor Samuel Walker as Amici Curiae on behalf or Defendants and Appellants.  
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for  Respondent: 
 
Michael D. Bradbury, District Attorney, Michael D. Schwartz and Douglas H. Ridley, Deputy District 
Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Lewis, D’Amato, Brisbois & Bisgaard, Joseph Arias and Christopher D. Lockwood for City of San 
Bernardino as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Rains, Lucia & Wilkinson and Alison Berry Wilkinson for Peace Officers’ Research Association of 
California Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Jones & Mayer, Martin J. Mayer and Michael R. Capizzi for California State Sheriff’s Association, 
California Police Chief’s Association and California Peace Officer’s Association as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
*Retired judge of the former Ventura Municipal Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Daniel P. Tokaji 
ACLU Foundation of Southern California 
1616 Beverly Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA  90026 
(213) 977-9500 x276 
 
Michael D. Schwartz 
Deputy District Attorney 
800 South Victoria Avenue 
Ventura, CA  93009 
(805) 654-2719