Case Title: State ex rel. Commt. for the Referendum of Ordinance No. 3543-00 v. White

Citation: 2000-Ohio-64

Docket Number: 20001457

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Commt. for the Referendum of Ordinance No. 3543-00 v. 
White, 90 Ohio St.3d 212, 2000-Ohio-64.] 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. COMMITTEE FOR THE REFERENDUM OF ORDINANCE NO. 3543-
00 ET AL. v. WHITE, CLERK, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Commt. for the Referendum of Ordinance No. 3543-00 v. 
White (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 212.] 
Ordinances — Same procedural requirements that must be followed to enact an 
ordinance must be followed to repeal an ordinance — Mandamus sought 
to compel city of North Ridgeville et al. to submit Ordinance No. 3543-
99 to the electorate by placing it on the November 7, 2000 election ballot 
— Laches — Relators acted with reasonable diligence, when — Writ 
granted, when. 
The same procedural requirements that must be followed to enact an ordinance 
must be followed to repeal an ordinance. 
(No. 00-1457 — Submitted September 8, 2000 — Decided September 29, 2000.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
 
On March 6, 2000, respondent, City Council for the City of North 
Ridgeville, Ohio, enacted Ordinance No. 3543-99,1 which would rezone 
approximately two hundred acres bordering the city of Avon from R-1 (residence 
district) to PCD (planned community development).  On that same date, city 
council adopted Resolution No. 894-2000, which granted preliminary approval 
for a proposed planned community development on the property to be known as 
Kingston Place. 
 
On April 3, relators Committee for the Referendum of Ordinance No. 
3543-99 and its members filed a referendum petition with respondent Jim White, 
Clerk of Council for the City of North Ridgeville, requesting the submission of 
Ordinance No. 3543-99 to North Ridgeville electors for their approval or rejection 
 
 
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at the November 7, 2000 general election.  On April 17, during a city council 
meeting, White certified that the referendum petition was legally sufficient. 
 
Following White’s certification of relators’ referendum petition at the 
April 17 city council meeting, members of city council voted by a six-to-one 
margin to approve a motion to “rescind” Ordinance No. 3543-99.  After the vote, 
a dispute arose concerning whether relators had sought a referendum on the 
correct ordinance because certain North Ridgeville officials indicated their belief 
that Resolution No. 894-2000 had automatically rezoned the property from 
residential to planned community development by city council’s approval of the 
preliminary plan. 
 
On July 3, relators, the committee, its members, and other taxpaying 
residents of North Ridgeville, demanded, via letter, that the city law director bring 
a legal action to compel respondents White and city council to submit Ordinance 
No. 3543-99 to the Lorain County Board of Elections for placement on the 
November 7, 2000 election ballot.  Relators contended in the July 3 demand letter 
that city council’s April 17 vote to rescind Ordinance No. 3543-99 by passing a 
motion was ineffective because a new ordinance was required to repeal the 
ordinance. 
 
On July 6, the law director rejected relators’ demand.  The law director 
indicated that city council had properly repealed the ordinance on April 17 when 
it voted to grant the motion to rescind.  In addition, the city law director noted 
that, based on new information, relators’ referendum petition had contained an 
insufficient number of valid signatures to warrant submission of the ordinance to 
the electorate.2 
 
On August 11, 2000, relators filed this action for a writ of mandamus to 
compel respondents, North Ridgeville, its city council, and White, to submit 
Ordinance No. 3543-99 to the electorate by placing it on the November 7, 2000 
 
 
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election ballot.  Respondents filed an answer, and the parties filed evidence and 
briefs pursuant to our expedited election schedule under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9). 
__________________ 
 
Phillips & Co., L.P.A., and Gerald W. Phillips, for relators. 
 
Eric H. Zagrans, North Ridgeville Law Director, for respondents. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  Relators claim that they are entitled to a writ of mandamus 
to compel respondents to submit Ordinance No. 3543-99 to the electors for their 
consideration on the November 7 general election ballot.  We agree, and for the 
reasons that follow we grant the writ requested by relators. 
 
Initially we must address respondents’ contention that relators’ cause of 
action is barred by the doctrine of laches.  Respondents contend that relators 
failed to act with the diligence and promptness required in election cases and, 
further, that relators lack any justifiable excuse for failing to file this action sooner 
to contest the action taken by city council on April 17.  We do not agree with 
respondents. 
 
It is well established that in election-related matters, extreme diligence and 
promptness are required.  State ex rel. Schwartz v. Brown (1964), 176 Ohio St. 91, 
26 O.O.2d 438, 197 N.E.2d 801.  See, also, State ex rel. White v. Franklin Cty. 
Bd. of Elections (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 45, 49, 600 N.E.2d 656, 659.  When the 
required promptness has not been exhibited, we have routinely denied 
extraordinary relief in election-related cases based on laches.  See, generally, 
White, 65 Ohio St.3d at 48, 600 N.E.2d at 659, and cases cited therein.  Relators 
bear the burden of establishing that they acted with the requisite diligence in 
extraordinary writ cases involving elections.  State ex rel. Manos v. Delaware Cty. 
Bd. of Elections (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 562, 564, 701 N.E.2d 371, 373. 
 
In most instances, relators’ delay of nearly four months in filing this action 
from the time city council voted to rescind Ordinance No. 3543-99, would, 
 
 
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without justifiable excuse, warrant dismissal of relators’ claims based on laches.  
However, we cannot ignore respondents’ part in causing this delay.  Therefore, 
after a thorough review of the evidence before the court, we find, for the reasons 
that follow, that relators did act with the requisite diligence in filing this 
mandamus action. 
 
On March 6, 2000, two actions were taken by the North Ridgeville City 
Council relating to the rezoning at issue.  Ordinance No. 3543-99 rezoned the 
affected area from R-1 residential district to the zoning classification of Planned 
Community Development.3  Resolution No. 894-2000 purported to grant 
preliminary approval for the proposed planned community development.  In 
addition, however, other events surrounding the enactment of Ordinance No. 
3543-99 and adoption of Resolution No. 894-2000 and the subsequent attempted 
repeal by city council of Ordinance No. 3543-99 are relevant to our consideration 
of this issue. 
 
Prior to city council’s votes on proposed Ordinance No. 3543-99 and 
proposed Resolution No. 894-2000, the law director for North Ridgeville advised 
the council members on February 24, 2000, of the need to consider the proposed 
ordinance and proposed resolution “in the proper sequence,” “in the way that our 
ordinances require them to do.”  (Emphasis added.)  According to the law 
director, under the city’s recently adopted planned community development 
ordinance,4 city council must grant preliminary approval of a proposed 
community development plan “as a prerequisite to Council approving the 
changing in the zoning.”  (Emphasis added.)  The law director further clarified 
that his intent was to ensure that “Council votes on [proposed Resolution No. 894-
2000] which is the legal prerequisite before it considers and votes on [proposed 
Ordinance No. 3543-99].”  He further advised council that “[t]he approval of the 
Resolution granting the preliminary approval to the PCD plan must be considered 
by Council first.  Then if council approves it, then Council can consider the 
 
 
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request to rezone.”  (Emphasis added.)  Finally, on March 6, 2000, the date of the 
third and final reading of proposed Ordinance 3543-99, and the same date as the 
enactment of Ordinance No. 3543-99 and passage of Resolution No. 894-2000, 
the law director referred to proposed Ordinance No. 3543-99 as the “proposal to 
re-zone” and further stated in relation to the proposed ordinance that “should 
Council vote to approve the change in zoning as requested from [residential to 
planned community development] [t]he developer would have one year within 
which to complete and file a final plan for development of the PCD District.” 
 
At city council meetings subsequent to the enactment of Ordinance No. 
3543-99 and the passage of Resolution No. 894-2000, on May 1, May 15, and 
June 5, the law director advised council that its adoption of Resolution No. 894-
2000, which granted preliminary approval of the proposed planned community 
development, also automatically rezoned the area at issue.  In other words, he was 
now informing council that, in effect, its vote enacting Ordinance No. 3543-99 
had been unnecessary, since its previous vote passing Resolution No. 894-2000 
accomplished what Ordinance No. 3543-99 purported to do, i.e., rezone the land 
from residential to a planned community development district. 
 
According to the law director, he informed council several times, prior to 
the votes enacting Ordinance No. 3543-99 and adopting Resolution No. 894-
2000, that Resolution No. 894-2000 would automatically rezone the property in 
question.  Contrary to these assertions of the law director, there is nothing in the 
record before this court that supports that contention.  Even assuming, arguendo, 
that the law director did, in fact, convey that information to council, construing 
the evidence as a whole, we believe it is unlikely that members of city council 
understood the rezoning issue in the light that the director suggests. 
 
The need for the city law director to explain to city council the effect of its 
votes on Ordinance No. 3543-99 and Resolution No. 894-2000 after the passage 
of those items of legislation is testament to the confusion that existed among 
 
 
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council members concerning this rezoning issue.  We need not assess 
responsibility for the creation of the confusion.  Suffice it to say that, 
undoubtedly, confusion also existed among those parties interested in voicing an 
opinion on the rezoning issue.  This confusion, we believe, contributed at least in 
part to the relators’ delay in filing this action. 
 
In addition to the foregoing, in response to relators’ demand to compel 
respondents to submit Ordinance No. 3543-99 to the Lorain County Board of 
Elections for placement on the November 7 ballot, the law director raised an 
entirely new argument challenging the sufficiency of relators’ referendum 
petition.  This contention, questioning the number of valid signatures, was raised 
more than two months after the clerk of city council certified that the referendum 
petition was legally sufficient.  In addition, there was an attempt to introduce two 
new ordinances seeking to repeal approval of the preliminary plan for the 
proposed planned community development and subsequent alleged rezoning.  
Granted, introduction of these ordinances was untimely according to the North 
Ridgeville Charter.  This, however, could be attributed, at least in part, to the 
changing legal positions of the city’s law director.  Relators’ persistent attempts to 
undo the actions of city council should not be strictly construed against them 
when city council itself was not fully aware of the ramifications concerning its 
approval of Ordinance No. 3543-99 and adoption of Resolution No. 894-2000. 
 
The cumulative effect of the respondents’ actions clearly contributed to 
relators’ delay in filing this action.  Although laches is not an affirmative defense 
in an election matter, i.e., respondents are not required to raise the defense, laches 
is still an equitable doctrine.  Respondents cannot be afforded the benefit of the 
doctrine when they come to the court having substantially contributed to the delay 
in question.  Christman v. Christman (1960), 171 Ohio St. 152, 154, 12 O.O.2d 
172, 173, 168 N.E.2d 153, 155.  Respondents’ claims of delay and alleged 
 
 
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prejudice cannot stand the light of day in view of the record before us.  
Accordingly, laches does not bar relators’ claims. 
 
The primary issue for our consideration is whether Section 13.2 of the 
North Ridgeville City Charter authorized city council to repeal Ordinance No. 
3543-99 based only upon an oral motion without any underlying written 
document, to wit, an “ordinance.”  After considering all of the relevant charter 
provisions, we conclude that the North Ridgeville City Charter required city 
council to enact a new ordinance to repeal Ordinance No. 3543-99. 
 
Section 3.12 (three point twelve) of the North Ridgeville City Charter 
provides that “[a]ll legislative action shall be by ordinance or resolution except 
when otherwise required by the Constitution or the laws of the state of Ohio.”  
Section 13.2 (thirteen point two) of the charter sets forth city council’s authority 
after the clerk of city council determines that a referendum petition is sufficient.  
Section 13.2 provides: 
 
“Within thirty (30) days after the enactment by Council, of any ordinance 
or resolution which may be subject to a referendum under the laws of the State of 
Ohio, a petition signed by no less than ten percent (10%) of the total electors 
voting at the last preceding November election, may be filed with Council * * * 
by personally handing said petition to the Clerk of Council, requesting the 
ordinance or resolution be repealed or submitted to the vote of the electors.  When 
said petition is filed, the Clerk of Council, shall within fourteen (14) days 
ascertain the sufficiency of the petition, and if found sufficient, the Council shall, 
within thirty (30) days after sufficiency has been established, reconsider such 
ordinance or resolution.  If Council fails to repeal said ordinance or resolution 
within such thirty (30) day period, the Council shall submit it to a vote of the 
electors at the next regular election occurring more than seventy-five (75) days 
after the filing of such petition.  If such petition is signed by at least twenty 
percent (20%) of such electors, the date of the election may be fixed therein, 
 
 
8 
which may be a special election to be held at any time more than seventy-five 
(75) days after the filing of such petition.” 
 
Relators assert that under Section 3.12 of the charter, which prescribes 
general procedure for municipal legislation, city council, if it desired to repeal 
Ordinance No. 3543-99, had to enact a new ordinance to repeal Ordinance No. 
3543-99 and that that action had to be taken by city council within thirty days of 
the clerk’s determination of sufficiency.  Since no new ordinance was enacted, 
relators contend that city council’s April 17 vote to rescind Ordinance No. 3543-
99 was ineffective.  As a consequence, the referendum on the ordinance must, 
relators contend, be voted on at the November 7 general election.  We agree. 
 
Relators correctly observe that a new ordinance is generally required to 
expressly repeal an existing ordinance.  Reiff v. Hamilton City Council (1972), 32 
Ohio App.2d 224, 225, 61 O.O.2d 248, 249, 289 N.E.2d 358, 359; see, also, 
Bittinger v. Bolivar (1990), 183 W.Va. 310, 314, 395 S.E.2d 554, 558; St. Paul 
Citizens for Human Rights v. St. Paul City Council (Minn.1979), 289 N.W.2d 
402, 405.  The general rule is supported by the rationale that “[t]he repeal of 
legislation has similar widespread effect upon the community and, consistent with 
sound legislative operation, must be subject to the same procedural requirements 
as positive enactments.”  (Emphasis added.)  Reiff, 32 Ohio App.2d at 226, 61 
O.O.2d at 249-250, 289 N.E.2d at 360. 
 
Nevertheless, respondents urge this court to find that city council was not 
required to enact a new ordinance to repeal Ordinance No. 3543-99, but instead 
was authorized, pursuant to Section 13.2, to repeal the ordinance simply by 
passing a motion to rescind.  However, the language of Section 13.2 simply does 
not support respondents’ position.  Nowhere in Section 13.2 is city council 
authorized to repeal an ordinance without enacting a new ordinance.  Section 13.2 
simply provides the mechanism for challenging a legislative enactment of city 
council by referendum.  Contrary to the respondents’ assertions, Section 13.2 does 
 
 
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not authorize, in contravention of Section 3.12, repeal of an ordinance or 
resolution simply by passing a motion to rescind. 
 
Further, we reject respondents’ contention that it would be impractical and 
render Section 13.2 nugatory if Section 3.12 and other general charter provisions 
required that city council enact a new ordinance in order to repeal an existing 
zoning ordinance.  Respondents ignore the clear language of Sections 3.12 and 
13.2 and misconstrue the purpose of other charter provisions. 
 
Respondents’ assertion that Section 3.12 must yield to the special thirty-
day-repeal provision of Section 13.2 in order to avoid going through the entire 
legislative process a second time is misguided.  In proposing an ordinance to 
repeal a newly enacted zoning ordinance, there would be no need, as respondents 
suggest, to hold another public hearing (Section 9.1), submit a proposed zoning 
ordinance to the planning commission (Section 8.8), or comply with the three-
reading rule (Section 3.12), when those processes have been completed prior to 
the passage of the zoning ordinance.  As we indicated in In re Election Contest of 
Democratic Primary Election Held May 4, 1999 for Nomination to the Office of 
Clerk, Youngstown Mun. Court (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 258, 266, 725 N.E.2d 271, 
278, it is our duty to construe legislation to avoid unreasonable or absurd results.  
Respondents’ arguments, if accepted, would turn Section 13.2 on its head. 
 
The North Ridgeville City Charter speaks to the question before the court, 
and, consequently, it is a closed issue.  The charter is the preeminent authority in 
this matter, and it is clear and unequivocal.  Moreover, upon reflection, would 
anyone seriously contend that municipal governmental bodies should be able to 
repeal sections of their city code simply by using the vehicle of a motion and 
voice vote of the city council?  The mischief that that could entail should be 
obvious even to a casual observer.  Such a procedure is frightening to contemplate 
and would be questionable at best and dangerous at its worst.  Therefore, we find 
that city council’s April 17 action attempting to repeal Ordinance No. 3543-99 
 
 
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was not authorized and that, pursuant to Sections 3.12 and 13.2 of the North 
Ridgeville Charter, city council was required to enact a new ordinance to repeal 
the ordinance. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the same procedural requirements that must be 
followed to enact an ordinance must be followed to repeal an ordinance.  We 
therefore grant relators’ requested writ of mandamus and order respondents to 
submit Ordinance No. 3543-99 to the electors of the city of North Ridgeville at 
the November 7, 2000 general election. 
Writ granted. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MoYER, C.J., PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
Although the parties refer to the ordinance in question as 
Ordinance No. 3543-00 rather than Ordinance No. 3543-99, the ordinance was 
enacted as No. 3543-99, and the referendum petition refers to it as No. 3543-99.  
Therefore, we will refer to the ordinance as No. 3543-99 rather than No. 3543-00. 
 
2. 
Respondents do not contend in this proceeding that the referendum 
petition should now be disqualified as failing to have the minimum number of 
signatures required by the city charter. 
 
3. 
On September 20, 1999, Council of the City of North Ridgeville 
adopted Ordinance No. 3491-99.  That ordinance is entitled “An Ordinance 
Adding Planned Community Development District As a New Zoning 
Classification.”  (Emphasis added.)  The first paragraph provides that “the City 
Council has determined that Planned Community Development (P.C.D.) District 
needs to be added to the City of North Ridgeville Ordinances as a new zoning 
classification,” and the third paragraph of the ordinance, designated as “Section 
1,” ordains that “P.C.D. District be added to the Ordinances of the City as [a] new 
zoning classification.”  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, there can be no question that 
 
 
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where a party seeks to create and construct a PCD, a zoning classification of PCD 
must exist or existing zoning must be changed to that classification by action of 
the city council. 
 
4. 
See footnote 3. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. Relators have not established a clear legal right to 
have the ordinance submitted to the electorate or a corresponding clear legal duty 
on the part of respondents to do so. 
 
Section 13.2 of the North Ridgeville Charter specifies city council’s 
authority after its clerk determines that a referendum petition is sufficient: 
 
“Within thirty (30) days after the enactment by Council, of any ordinance 
or resolution which may be subject to a referendum under the laws of the State of 
Ohio, a petition signed by no less than ten percent (10%) of the total electors 
voting at the last preceding November election, may be filed with Council * * * 
by personally handing said petition to the Clerk of Council, requesting the 
ordinance or resolution be repealed or submitted to the vote of the electors.  When 
said petition is filed, the Clerk of Council, shall within fourteen (14) days 
ascertain the sufficiency of the petition, and if found sufficient, the Council shall, 
within thirty (30) days after sufficiency has been established, reconsider such 
ordinance or resolution.  If Council fails to repeal said ordinance or resolution 
within such thirty (30) day period, the Council shall submit it to a vote of the 
electors at the next regular election occurring more than seventy-five (75) days 
after the filing of such petition.  If such petition is signed by at least twenty 
percent (20%) of such electors, the date of the election may be fixed therein, 
which may be a special election to be held at any time more than seventy-five 
(75) days after the filing of such petition.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Under Section 13.2 of the charter, once White determined on April 17 that 
the referendum petition was legally sufficient, the city council had thirty days to 
 
 
12 
reconsider Ordinance No. 3543-99.  If, during that period, council failed to repeal 
the ordinance, it had a duty to submit it to the electors at the November 7 election.  
On the same date that its clerk concluded that the petition was sufficient, the city 
council voted to rescind the ordinance. 
 
Section 3.12 of the charter, which prescribes general procedure for 
municipal legislation, states, “All legislative action shall be by ordinance or 
resolution except when otherwise required by the Constitution or the laws of the 
State of Ohio.”  Relators claim that council had to enact a new ordinance to repeal 
Ordinance No. 3543-99 within thirty days of White’s determination of sufficiency 
and that council’s April 17 vote on a mere motion to rescind Ordinance No. 3543-
99 was thus ineffective, thereby entitling them to vote on the ordinance at the 
November 7 election. 
 
The general rule that, absent legislation to the contrary, a new ordinance is 
required to expressly repeal an existing ordinance is inapplicable here.  Without 
any provision of the Ohio Constitution regarding the interpretation of the North 
Ridgeville Charter, the court may apply general interpretative rules concerning 
statutory construction.  See State ex rel. Mirlisena v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 597, 600, 622 N.E.2d 329, 331; see, also, State ex 
rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 589, 592, 651 
N.E.2d 1001, 1003, reconsideration granted on other grounds (1995), 75 Ohio 
St.3d 381, 662 N.E.2d 339.  Under one such general rule, codified at R.C. 1.51, 
except where a general provision is adopted after a conflicting special provision 
and there is a manifest intent that the general provision prevail, the special 
provision prevails.  State ex rel. Dublin Securities, Inc. v. Ohio Div. of Securities 
(1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 426, 429-430, 627 N.E.2d 993, 996-997. 
 
Section 13.2 is a special provision that specifies city council’s authority 
following a determination by its clerk that a referendum petition is sufficient, and 
the charter does not evidence any manifest intention that Section 3.12 prevail over 
 
 
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Section 13.2 when council repeals an ordinance within the thirty-day period 
following its clerk’s determination of sufficiency. 
 
In addition, the special thirty-day repeal provision of Section 13.2 would 
be rendered nugatory if Section 3.12 and other general charter provisions required 
that city council enact a new ordinance in order to repeal the ordinance that is the 
subject of a sufficient referendum petition.  See State ex rel. Fattlar v. Boyle 
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 123, 127, 698 N.E.2d 987, 990 (“Municipal charters must 
be construed to give effect to all separate provisions”).  (Emphasis added.)  See, 
also, State ex rel. Fite v. Aeh (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 684 N.E.2d 285, 287.  
That is because application of these general provisions would make it impossible 
for city council to repeal zoning ordinances that are the subject of valid 
referendum petitions within the thirty days specified by Section 13.2 of the 
charter.  See Section 3.12 (in addition to requiring legislative action by ordinance 
or resolution, includes three-reading rule that cannot be dispensed with if 
ordinance pertains to zoning); Section 3.13 (nonemergency ordinances are not 
effective until thirty days after final passage by council, and any change in zoning 
ordinances cannot be declared an emergency measure that would be immediately 
effective); Section 8.8 (ordinances referring to zoning cannot be adopted until 
they have been first submitted to the planning commission for report and 
recommendation, and the commission has sixty days to submit a report and 
recommendation); and Section 9.1 (notice and hearing requirement for passage 
and amendment of any zoning ordinance). 
 
As relators themselves argue, “[t]o construe or allow the general [charter] 
provisions to prevail over these special provisions [of Section 13.2 of the charter] 
would completely frustrate the crucial timing interests of these provision[s].”  In 
addition, relators further specifically assert that “Charter Provision 13.2, a special 
provision, governing the enactment of an ordinance repealing a referendum 
ordinance, shall be an exception to the general provisions of the Charter 8.8, 3.12, 
 
 
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3.13, [and] 9.1 * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  Like the three-reading requirement of 
Section 3.12 and the remaining requirements of Sections 3.13, 8.8, and 9.1 of the 
charter, the requirement of Section 3.12 that legislative action be by ordinance is 
also a general provision that must yield to the special thirty-day repeal provision 
of Section 13.2.  This gives effect to Section 13.2 and avoids a construction of the 
charter that would lead to unreasonable or absurd results.  See In re Election 
Contest of Democratic Primary Election Held May 4, 1999 for Nomination to the 
Office of Clerk, Youngstown Mun. Court (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 258, 266, 725 
N.E.2d 271, 278 (court’s duty to construe statutes to avoid unreasonable or absurd 
results). 
 
Therefore, under Section 13.2 of the charter, the city council was 
authorized to repeal Ordinance No. 3543-99 by vote on a motion, and council did 
so in a timely manner on April 17.  Because council repealed the ordinance that 
relators sought to be placed on the November 7 ballot, respondents have no duty 
to submit the ordinance to North Ridgeville electors at the November 7 election.  
Section 13.2, North Ridgeville Charter. 
 
In addition, relators received precisely what they requested in their letter 
attached to their referendum petition, i.e., either the repeal of the ordinance or its 
submission to the electors.  In fact, relators’ counsel initially agreed that the city 
council’s April 17 action repealed the ordinance, and one of relators agreed that 
when city council repealed the ordinance, relators got what they desired.  A writ 
of mandamus will not issue to compel an act that has already been performed.  
State ex rel. Lee v. Montgomery (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 233, 237, 724 N.E.2d 
1148, 1151. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
 
15 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  Because I find that the doctrine of laches should 
bar relators’ claims, I would not reach the merits of the instant case.  Accordingly, 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
As the majority correctly notes, when relators have failed to exhibit the 
required diligence and promptness in election-related cases, this court has applied 
laches and denied extraordinary relief.  See, generally, State ex rel. White v. 
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 45, 48, 600 N.E.2d 656, 659.  
For the following reasons, I conclude that application of laches is warranted under 
the facts of this case. 
 
First, relators bear the burden of establishing that they acted with the 
requisite diligence in filing their claim.  State ex rel. Manos v. Delaware Cty. Bd. 
of Elections (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 562, 564, 701 N.E.2d 371, 373.  They have 
failed to meet this burden.  We have held that a delay as brief as nine days can 
preclude our consideration of the merits of an expedited election case.  Paschal v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 141, 656 N.E.2d 1276.  
Here, relators failed to file this action until nearly four months after the April 17, 
2000 rescission of the ordinance, even though they knew or should have known of 
the basis of their present claim. This is not a case in which prejudice to 
respondents’ ability to prepare and defend against relators’ claims would have 
occurred “even ‘under the best of circumstances.’ ” State ex rel. Ascani v. Stark 
Cty. Bd. of Elections (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 490, 494, 700 N.E.2d 1234, 1237, 
quoting State ex rel. Squire v. Taft (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 365, 369, 632 N.E.2d 
883, 886.  Rather, this is a case in which prejudice arose as a result of unjustified 
tardiness.  Because relators delayed filing this action, they “made this case an 
expedited election matter under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9), thereby restricting 
respondents’ time to prepare and defend against [relators’] claims.”  State ex rel. 
SuperAmerica Group v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 182, 
186, 685 N.E.2d 507, 510. 
 
 
16 
 
Relators lack any justifiable excuse for the majority of this delay; some of 
the relators themselves testified that they knew of no reason for their counsel’s 
delay in filing this mandamus action.  If relators cannot adequately explain their 
lack of diligence in filing, then this court should not endeavor to supply an excuse 
for them. 
 
Second, by not applying laches, the majority opinion undermines the 
purpose of S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9), which is to “ ‘incorporate an expedited election 
schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefs in election cases filed in that 
time period to assist the court in resolving such cases promptly.’ ”  State ex rel. 
Landis v. Morrow Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 187, 189, 724 
N.E.2d 775, 777, quoting SuperAmerica, 80 Ohio St.3d at 187, 685 N.E.2d at 
511.  The purpose of the rule is not to provide a party with a strategic advantage; 
relators should not be able to delay filing an election case merely to restrict 
respondents’ time to gather evidence and file a merit brief.  Indeed, after relators 
filed this case, they filed a motion for a protective order, complaining that 
respondents had given relators too little notice to depose them, although 
respondents had little time to obtain discovery in order to file evidence under the 
expedited schedule of S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9).  Similar maneuvering has been labeled 
gamesmanship.  See State ex rel. Ryant Commt. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 107, 113, 712 N.E.2d 696, 701; State ex rel. Grendell v. 
Davidson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 636, 716 N.E.2d 704, 711. 
 
Third, the majority makes much of respondents’ conduct in asserting that a 
significant portion of relators’ delay was essentially caused by respondents.  I 
disagree.  Any minimal delay that might have been caused by the law director’s 
inclusion of an additional ground of insufficiency of the referendum petition in his 
July 6 rejection of relators’ July 3 demand did not excuse relators’ failure to file 
this action between April 17 and July 6.  Ryant Commt., 86 Ohio St.3d at 114, 
712 N.E.2d at 702; Manos, 83 Ohio St.3d at 563, 701 N.E.2d at 372.  In fact, 
 
 
17 
relators’ July 13 letter shows that relators had already rebutted this new argument 
by that date, thereby making any further “extensive analysis” of the petition from 
July 13 to August 11 unnecessary.  Further, the statement by certain city officials 
that Resolution No. 894-2000 had already rezoned the property did not justify 
relators’ lengthy delay in asserting their claimed rights in relation to Ordinance 
No. 3543-99, a different enactment.  If anything, the confusion on the part of both 
parties that the majority recounts suggests the need to seek judicial resolution as 
soon as the thirty-day reconsideration period had expired.  This matter could have, 
and should have, been filed earlier. 
 
Relators erroneously cite nonelection cases to support their contention that 
the “equitable affirmative defense” of laches is  inapplicable.  But laches is not an 
affirmative defense in election cases; instead, as noted, the burden rests upon 
relators in election cases to establish that they instituted their action with the 
required diligence and promptness.  Ascani, 83 Ohio St.3d at 494, 700 N.E.2d at 
1237; Manos, 83 Ohio St.3d at 564, 701 N.E.2d at 373. 
 
I would therefore deny the writ. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.