Case Title: MERCHANTS AND PLANTERS BANK & TRUST CO. v. Ensley

Citation: 502 So. 2d 686

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1986-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
502 So. 2d 686 (1986)
MERCHANTS AND PLANTERS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF ARKADELPHIA, ARKANSAS
v.
Thomas G. ENSLEY and Esther E. Ensley
85-168.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 5, 1986.
Rehearing Denied February 6, 1987.
*687 W.W. Dinning of Lloyd, Dinning, Boggs & Dinning, Demopolis, for appellant.
Amy L. Inglis and William S. Poole, Jr., Demopolis, for appellees.
SHORES, Justice.
This case was begun by Thomas E. Ensley against his wife, Esther, in the Circuit Court of Marengo County, seeking a divorce and division of personal and real property, including a pickup truck and a lime crusher located in Marengo County. The real property was located in Arkansas.
After the divorce proceedings were begun, the real property in Arkansas was sold under a foreclosure decree rendered by the Chancery Court of Hot Springs County, Arkansas.
Several third parties intervened, claiming an interest in the personal property. Perry, Inc., the John Deere dealer in Marengo County, filed a lien against the lime crusher and the pickup truck for work and labor performed on each. Likewise, Merchants and Planters Bank and Trust Company of Arkadelphia, Arkansas (hereinafter the "bank"), intervened and also sought to have a lien imposed on the lime crusher. The basis of the bank's claim was apparently a note executed by the Ensleys evidencing a loan made to them by the bank. Wilkinson & Jenkins, Inc., a Florida contractor, also claimed an interest in the lime crusher.
The trial court tried the case on March 29, 1985, without a jury. The decree from which the bank appeals was entered on September 23, 1985, and is in its entirety as follows:
In its issues on appeal, the bank lists several abstract statements, most of which are correct statements of law, for example: (1) that the payer of a note made the basis of a lawsuit must plead payment as a defense; (2) that estoppel must be specially pleaded; and (3) that where a judgment shows that the trial court did not consider the whole record and a material part of the record was not brought to the attention of the trial court, the judgment is not sufficient and must be reversed.
We are not directed to any ruling of the trial court on any of the issues urged for reversal. Thus, we are asked to reverse the judgment of a trial court which heard a case tried ore tenus, decided the facts, and entered a final judgment, without any showing of error. This we cannot do. The burden is on an appellant to show error adverse to his cause. It may be true, as the bank argued, that the trial court inadvertently overlooked an item of evidence, but the appellant did not call it to the court's attention by motion to reconsider or otherwise. This leaves this Court with nothing to review. Rule 46, A.R.Civ.P.; Conley v. Beaver, 437 So. 2d 1267 (Ala. 1983); Bill Steber Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Morgan, 429 So. 2d 1013 (Ala.1983); Holt v. Davidson, 388 So. 2d 548 (Ala.1980); Durden v. Furniture Fair of Dothan, Inc., 348 So. 2d 1375 (Ala.1977); Basin Coal Co. v. Gulledge, 470 So. 2d 1258 (Ala. Civ.App.1985). See Ala.Digest, Appeal & Error, Key No. 181.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.