Case Title: FULGENCIO ERES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0251

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
FULGENCIO ERES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 42Case Number: S-08-0251Decided: 04/08/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
FULGENCIO 
ERES,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, 
Senior Assistant Public Defender, Wyoming Public Defender Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Alden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric Johnson, 
Faculty Director, Eric K. Thompson, Student Director, and Ryan W. Podlesnik, 
Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Podlesnik.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant 
Fulgencio Eres appeals his felony conviction for receiving stolen property, 
asserting claims of instructional error and evidentiary insufficiency.  We will affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Eres presents 
these issues for our review:

 
 
I.          
Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on the appropriate point 
in time for valuation of the stolen property?

 
 
II.         
Did the State present sufficient evidence to support a felony level value 
of stolen property?

 
 

BACKGROUND 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The basic facts 
in this case are straightforward.  
On November 23, 2007, Darren Gonzales discovered his home had been broken 
into and several items had been stolen.  
Among the items taken were home theater components, various televisions, 
DVD players, VCRs, headphones, and a Sony PlayStation 2.  Gonzales reported the break-in and theft 
to the Cheyenne Police Department.  
A few days later, Gonzales received information relating to the stolen 
items and conveyed it to the investigating officers.  

 
 
[¶4]      Based on the 
information received, Detective Thomas Hood and Detective James Eddy contacted 
Eres at his residence on November 29.  
While there, they discovered several items reportedly stolen from the 
Gonzales residence.  Eres admitted 
to the detectives that he knew the property in question had been stolen.  Eres further stated he bought the stolen 
property for about $200.00 and planned on selling it for a profit.  The detectives seized the stolen 
property and transported it to the Cheyenne Police Department.    

 
 
[¶5]      The State 
subsequently charged Eres with one count of receiving stolen property valued in 
excess of $1,000.00 as proscribed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-403(a)(i) (LexisNexis 
2009),1 a felony.  At trial, the only contested issue 
concerned the fair market value of the stolen property and, thus, the level of 
Eres' criminal culpability.  The 
district court instructed the jury on the elements of both the charged felony 
offense and the lesser included misdemeanor offense of receiving stolen property 
with a value of less than $1,000.00.  
The jury found the value of the property exceeded $1,000.00 and convicted 
Eres on the felony offense.  The 
district court sentenced Eres to a term of imprisonment of six to eight 
years.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Jury 
Instruction

 
 
[¶6]      At the 
instruction conference, Eres objected to the district court's proposed 
instruction concerning the time period to be used for determining the value of 
the stolen property under § 6-3-403(a).  
Eres contended that the appropriate point of valuation should be the date 
the criminal act of receiving occurred, and he offered an instruction to that 
effect.  The district court rejected 
Eres' proposed instruction and instructed the jury that "[t]he value of the 
property alleged to have been stolen and unlawfully received is the market value 
of the property taken, at the time and place the property was stolen."  

 
 
[¶7]      On appeal, Eres 
and the State dispute whether the district court erred in instructing the jury 
to determine the value of the stolen property at the time of its original 
theft.  Sections 6-3-403(a)(i) and 
(iii) are ambiguous in the sense that they refer merely to "the value of the 
property" and do not identify the specific point in time that the value of 
property should be determined.  
Thus, as noted by the parties, the statute is susceptible to more than 
one meaning.  This Court has not 
previously determined the meaning of "the value of the property" in the context 
of one charged with receiving stolen property.  However, there is no need to decide 
this case of first impression on the 
matter because the timing of valuation  that is, the property's value on the 
date of receipt as compared to the date of theft  was not an issue at 
trial.

 
 
[¶8]      The record 
discloses that both the State and Eres proceeded at trial on the theory that no 
distinction existed in the property's value as between the date the property was 
stolen and the date Eres received it.  
No contention was made that the property's value varied between the date 
of theft and the date of receipt.  
Nor was there any attempt, through the introduction of evidence or 
otherwise, to differentiate the property's value among the criminal events.  The parties basically presented two 
competing property valuations that did not distinguish, in any manner, the 
property's worth as between the time of the theft and the time of the 
receipt.  Simply put, the parties 
did not provide any basis upon which the jury could rationally assess the 
property's value at the time Eres received it as compared to when it was 
stolen.  Thus, the timing of the 
valuation of the stolen property is not an issue under the facts of this 
case.  Eres' counsel even admitted 
as much at the instruction conference:  
"We're not really saying that the value was diminished in the time that 
someone else had it to the time Mr. Eres [received] it." 

 
 
[¶9]      In any event, 
even assuming the district court misstated the law governing the valuation 
element, we are unable to conclude that the error mandates reversal of Eres' 
conviction.  In Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, ¶ 18, 193 P.3d 266, 271-72 (Wyo. 2008), we recognized that a trial court's failure to 
properly instruct on an element of a crime is not a fundamental error requiring 
automatic reversal but, rather, is a trial-type error.  If a proper objection is made at trial, 
as in this case, an instructional error is evaluated in accordance with the 
harmless constitutional error standard described in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
23-24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827-28, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967).  Granzer, ¶ 16, 193 P.3d  at 271.  Under that standard, an error will not 
result in reversal if we are convinced the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id.  Because of the lack of evidence of 
competing valuations, we are convinced there is no possibility that the jury 
verdict would have been different under the instruction requested by Eres.

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶10]   Eres challenges the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting his conviction.  
The benchmark for reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim is 
whether the evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from it, when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the State, are adequate to permit a reasonable trier 
of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Granzer, ¶ 23, 193 P.3d  at 273; Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 22, ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 641, 645 (Wyo. 2001).  We have 
consistently held that it is the jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in 
the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw reasonable inferences from the 
facts.  Sotolongo-Garcia v. State, 2002 WY 185, 
¶ 11, 60 P.3d 687, 689 (Wyo. 2002).  
We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury but will only 
determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even 
could, have found the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Conine v. State, 2008 WY 146, ¶ 5, 197 P.3d 156, 159 (Wyo. 2008); Grissom v. 
State, 2005 WY 132, ¶ 24, 121 P.3d 127, 136 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 
[¶11]   Eres was charged with felony 
receipt of stolen property under § 6-3-403(a)(i).  Under that statute as set forth in the 
jury instructions, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Eres received stolen property with a value in excess of $1,000.00.  The district court instructed the jury, 
as noted above, that "value" meant "the market value of the property . . . at 
the time and the place the property was stolen."  The district court further defined 
"market value" as "the price a willing buyer would pay, and which a willing 
seller would accept."  In attacking 
his conviction, Eres claims the trial evidence was insufficient to establish the 
stolen property in question had a market value in excess of $1,000.00.  We disagree.  

 
 
[¶12]   Initially, we note that Eres' 
insufficiency claim is premised, in part, on his contention that the State was 
required to establish the property's value at the time he received it.  As already discussed, the value of the 
stolen property as between the date of theft and the date of receipt was not an 
issue at trial.  Consequently, we 
need only determine whether the trial evidence was sufficient to support the 
jury's conclusion that the stolen property, as instructed by the district court, 
was worth $1,000.00 or more during the time in question.

 
 
[¶13]   At trial, Gonzales, the owner of 
the property, gave specific opinions, accompanied by photographs, regarding the 
market value of many of the stolen items.  
For example, Gonzales testified that the Sony stereo receiver depicted in 
Exhibit 1, which he had purchased seven months before the burglary for 
$1,450.00, was worth "half the purchase price," i.e., $725.00.  He also testified about the market value 
of the Sony PlayStation, a graphic equalizer, stereo speakers, various DVD 
players, and a television, whose combined market value was $665.00.  The values Gonzales expressed on these 
items were based on his knowledge of the amount he had paid for them, as well as 
his knowledge of the market.  
Altogether, Gonzales' testimony established a combined market value of 
$1,390.00 for certain stolen items, well in excess of the $1,000.00 threshold 
for the charged felony offense. 

 
 
[¶14]   Eres does not contend that 
Gonzales' testimony was not competent evidence of the property's market 
value.  As the owner of the 
property, Gonzales is presumed to have special knowledge of the property's value 
and is qualified to express an opinion about it.  Weathers v. State, 652 P.2d 970, 973 
(Wyo. 1982).  The weight to be given 
his testimony was for the jury to decide.  
Id.

 
 
[¶15]   In addition, Gonzales provided 
specific testimony about the purchase price of several stolen items and the 
dates he had purchased them.  The 
district court instructed the jury that it could consider the purchase price in 
assessing the market value of the property.  The district court also instructed the 
jury to consider the evidence "in the light of your experience and knowledge of 
human affairs."  In accord with the 
district court's instructions and using its experience and knowledge of human 
affairs, the jury could have drawn reasonable inferences from each item's 
purchase date and price in deciding the market value of the stolen 
property.  See 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 140 (2006); see also Hebron v. United States, 837 A.2d 910, 914 (D.C. 2003) (holding that a jury may draw reasonable inferences 
from an item's purchase date and price when determining whether the government 
has met its burden of proving value under the theft statute); State v. Holmes, 830 S.W.2d 460, 462 
(Mo.App. E.D. 1992) (jury may consider purchase price and age in determining 
value).  

 
 
[¶16]   Viewing the evidence as a whole, 
and affording the State all favorable inferences which may be fairly and 
reasonably drawn from it, we have no trouble concluding the evidence was 
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
value of the stolen property exceeded $1,000.00.  Although Eres presented contrary 
evidence indicating a lesser market value for the property, it was the jury's 
responsibility to evaluate that evidence and assign it the weight it deemed 
appropriate in determining Eres' guilt or innocence on the charged crime.  The jury apparently found the State's 
evidence more compelling.  We will 
not second guess the jury's determination.  
In sum, we find ample evidence to sustain Eres' conviction.  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1§ 6-3-403(a) provides:

(a)  A person who buys, 
receives, conceals or disposes of property which he knows, believes or has 
reasonable cause to believe was obtained in violation of law is guilty 
of:

(i)  A felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is one 
thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or more; or

*  *  * *

(iii)  A misdemeanor 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more 
than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both, if the value of the 
property is less than one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00).