Case Title: In Re: Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-1490 
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IN RE:  AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
1.510. 
 
December 31, 2020 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
The Court, on its own motion, amends Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 
(Summary Judgment).1  Effective May 1, 2021, the amended rule adopts the 
summary judgment standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242 (1986); and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574 (1986) (together, the “federal summary judgment standard”).  
Through this amendment, we align Florida’s summary judgment standard with that 
of the federal courts and of the supermajority of states that have already adopted 
the federal summary judgment standard.  See Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural 
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. Jud. Admin 
2.140(d). 
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Retrenchment and the States, 106 Calif. L. Rev. 411, 432 (2018) (identifying 
thirty-seven states as having adopted the federal standard in whole or in part; since 
then a thirty-eighth state (Utah) has embraced the federal standard).   
 
The Florida and federal rules of civil procedure share the same overarching 
purpose: “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action.”  Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.010; cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.  Moreover, as a purely textual 
matter, the critical sentences in Florida’s summary judgment rule and in the federal 
summary judgment rule are materially indistinguishable.  Specifically, Florida’s 
rule 1.510(c) requires summary judgment where the record shows “that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), in turn, 
requires summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
 
Despite this consistency of purpose and text, Florida and federal courts have 
not been aligned in their summary judgment jurisprudence.  Three particularly 
consequential differences stand out.  (The following explains these key differences; 
the discussion is not intended to limit the scope of the rule amendment that we 
adopt today.) 
 
First, “Florida courts [have] repeatedly declined to recognize the 
fundamental similarity between a motion for directed verdict and a motion for 
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summary judgment.”  Thomas Logue & Javier Alberto Soto, Florida Should Adopt 
the Celotex Standard for Summary Judgment, 76 Fla. Bar J. Feb. 2002, at 20, 22.  
By contrast, the Supreme Court has held that the federal summary judgment 
standard “mirrors” the standard for a directed verdict.  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.  
Although it recognized that there are procedural differences in the two motions 
(one is made before trial and the other during trial), the Supreme Court concluded 
that “the inquiry under each is the same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient 
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one 
party must prevail as a matter of law.”  Id. at 251-52. 
 
Second, since this Court’s decision in Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 
1966), Florida courts have required the moving party conclusively “to disprove the 
nonmovant’s theory of the case in order to eliminate any issue of fact.”  Logue & 
Soto, supra, at 24.  By contrast, the Supreme Court has held that there is “no 
express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion 
with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.”  Celotex, 
477 U.S. at 323.  Rather, the Supreme Court explained that “the burden on the 
moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district 
court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s 
case.”  Id. at 325.  Upon motion and provided there has been an “adequate time for 
discovery,” the Supreme Court has held that summary judgment should be entered 
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“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 
an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial.”  Id. at 322.  In other words, under the federal summary 
judgment standard, “the extent of the moving party’s burden varies depending on 
who bears the burden of persuasion at trial.”  Salo v. Tyler, 417 P. 3d 581, 587 
(Utah 2018). 
 
Third, Florida courts have adopted an expansive understanding of what 
constitutes a genuine (i.e., triable) issue of material fact.  While the caselaw is not 
entirely uniform, a leading treatise characterizes the Florida standard this way: 
“[T]he existence of any competent evidence creating an issue of fact, however 
credible or incredible, substantial or trivial, stops the inquiry and precludes 
summary judgment, so long as the ‘slightest doubt’ is raised.”  Bruce J. Berman & 
Peter D. Webster, Berman’s Florida Civil Procedure §1.510:5 (2020 ed.).  By 
contrast, the Supreme Court has described the federal test as whether “the evidence 
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.  “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not 
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.”  Id. at 249-50 
(citations omitted).  A party opposing summary judgment “must do more than 
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”  
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586.  More recently, the Supreme Court explained that 
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“[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly 
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court 
should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment.”  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). 
 
In Wilsonart, LLC v. Lopez, No. SC19-1336, 2019 WL 5188546, at *1 (Fla. 
Oct. 15, 2019), we invited the parties to brief the question whether Florida should 
adopt the federal summary judgment standard.  In addition to the Wilsonart parties’ 
submissions, we heard from numerous amici, who as a group articulated a range of 
perspectives from Florida’s legal and business communities.  What we learned in 
Wilsonart supplemented our own views and experience dealing with this issue, 
which has long been the subject of thoughtful commentary.  See, e.g., Logue & 
Soto, supra (advocating that Florida adopt the federal summary judgment 
standard); Leonard D. Pertnoy, Summary Judgment in Florida: The Road Less 
Traveled, 20 St. Thomas L. Rev. 69 (2007) (same); see also Debra M. Salisbury, 
Trawick’s Florida Practice & Procedure § 25:5 (2020 ed.) (“Florida courts have 
followed a more restrictive course than federal courts so that summary judgment 
has lost some of its utility in Florida practice.”).   
We are persuaded that the federal summary judgment standard better 
comports with the text and purpose of rule 1.510 and that adopting that standard is 
in the best interest of our state.  As we said at the outset, our rules of civil 
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procedure are meant “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action.”  Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.010.  Yet Florida courts’ interpretation of our 
summary judgment rule has unnecessarily failed to contribute to that objective.  
Overall and especially as to each of the key areas described above, the federal 
summary judgment standard is more rational, more fair, and more consistent with 
the structure and purpose of our rules of civil procedure. 
We agree with the Supreme Court that “[s]ummary judgment procedure is 
properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral 
part of [our rules] as a whole.”  Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.  The Supreme Court’s 
reasoning underlying the federal summary judgment standard is compelling:  “One 
of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of 
factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a 
way that allows it to accomplish this purpose.”  Id. at 323-24. 
In adopting this amendment, we reaffirm the bedrock principle that summary 
judgment is not a substitute for the trial of disputed fact issues.  As the Supreme 
Court itself has emphasized, the summary judgment rule must be implemented 
“with due regard … for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are 
adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury.”  Id. at 
327.  Our goals are simply to improve the fairness and efficiency of Florida’s civil 
justice system, to relieve parties from the expense and burdens of meritless 
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litigation, and to save the work of juries for cases where there are real factual 
disputes that need resolution. 
 
To allow an opportunity for public comments, this amendment will not take 
effect until May 1, 2021.  We invite comments not just on this amendment, but 
also on whether the effective implementation of the amendment requires any 
additional, ancillary amendments to rule 1.510.  We also invite comments on 
whether there are specific textual provisions of federal rule 56 that should be added 
to rule 1.510, and indeed whether rule 1.510 should be replaced in its entirety with 
the text of rule 56.  Interested persons shall have sixty days from the date of this 
opinion to file comments with the Court.2  We specifically invite comments from 
The Florida Bar’s Civil Procedure Rules Committee. 
 
2.  All comments must be filed with the Court on or before March 2, 2021, 
with a separate request for oral argument if the person filing the comment wishes 
to participate in oral argument, which may be scheduled in this case.  If filed by an 
attorney in good standing with The Florida Bar, the comment must be 
electronically filed via the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal (Portal) in accordance 
with In re Electronic Filing in the Supreme Court of Florida via the Florida 
Courts E-Filing Portal, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC13-7 (Feb. 18, 2013).  If 
filed by a nonlawyer or a lawyer not licensed to practice in Florida, the comment 
may be, but is not required to be, filed via the Portal.  Comments filed via the 
Portal must be submitted in Microsoft Word 97 or higher.  See In re Electronic 
Filing in the Florida Supreme Court, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC17-27 (May 9, 
2017).  Any person unable to submit a comment electronically must mail or hand-
deliver the originally signed comment to the Florida Supreme Court, Office of the 
Clerk, 500 South Duval Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1927; no additional 
copies are required or will be accepted. 
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Accordingly, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are amended as reflected 
in the appendix to this opinion.  New language is indicated by underscoring; 
deletions are indicated by struck-through type.  The amendments shall become 
effective May 1, 2021 at 12:01 a.m. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THESE AMENDMENTS. 
 
LABARGA, J., dissenting. 
 
Citing Florida’s interest in “secur[ing] the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action,” majority op. at 2, 5, the majority’s decision 
discards long-settled law—interpreting the standard for summary judgment in 
Florida’s state courts—in favor of the less restrictive federal interpretation.  Under 
the federal interpretation, summary judgment is appropriate if the trial court 
concludes that no reasonable jury could render a verdict in favor of the nonmoving 
party.  Fully recognizing the imperative that Florida’s state courts operate 
efficiently, I nonetheless dissent to today’s decision, which infringes upon the role 
of the jury in deciding disputes in civil cases. 
 
Because of its preclusive effect, a grant of summary judgment warrants great 
caution.  Indeed, “[c]aution and discernment should go hand in hand where the 
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power to enter summary judgment or decree is exercised, for such a power wields a 
dangerous potential which could have the effect of trespass against fundamental 
and traditional processes for determining the rights of litigants.”  Humphrys v. 
Jarrell, 104 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958).  Vital to carrying out these 
fundamental and traditional processes is the jury which, in its role as finder of fact, 
hears evidence presented at trial and decides questions of fact raised by a litigant’s 
claim. 
 
The moving party’s intent in filing a motion for summary judgment is to 
dispose of a litigant’s claim on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists.  For decades, Florida courts have been judicious in granting summary 
judgment because, as observed by one of our district courts, “a motion for 
summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits.”  Hervey v. Alfonso, 
650 So. 2d 644, 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).  However, when the more relaxed 
federal interpretation is applied to a motion for summary judgment, the trial court’s 
analysis goes far beyond evaluating whether an issue of material fact is in dispute.  
Instead, the trial court assumes a role traditionally reserved for a jury and engages 
in weighing evidence. 
 
I emphasize that it is not the dispute of any fact that precludes summary 
judgment, but the dispute of a genuine issue of material fact.  Thus, the issue of 
fact must be of such import that it is dispositive of the litigant’s claim.  Far from 
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being an innocuous requirement, this language sets a much higher bar than what 
the majority describes as “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”  
Majority op. at 4 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).  
 
For more than two hundred years, this country has preserved the right to trial 
by jury in civil cases.  George Mason, one of this country’s founding fathers, said: 
“That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the 
ancient trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred.”  
Because I believe that today’s decision infringes upon the jury’s sacred role, I 
respectfully dissent. 
Original Proceeding – Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 
 
 
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APPENDIX 
RULE 1.510. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
  
(a) – (b) 
[No Change] 
 
 
  
(c)  
Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion must state with 
particularity the grounds upon which it is based and the substantial matters of law 
to be argued and must specifically identify any affidavits, answers to 
interrogatories, admissions, depositions, and other materials as would be 
admissible in evidence (“summary judgment evidence”) on which the movant 
relies. The movant must serve the motion at least 20 days before the time fixed for 
the hearing, and must also serve at that time a copy of any summary judgment 
evidence on which the movant relies that has not already been filed with the court. 
The adverse party must identify, by notice served pursuant to Florida Rule of 
Judicial Administration 2.516 at least 5 days prior to the day of the hearing if 
service by mail is authorized, or delivered, electronically filed, or sent by e-mail no 
later than 5:00 p.m. 2 business days prior to the day of the hearing, any summary 
judgment evidence on which the adverse party relies. To the extent that summary 
judgment evidence has not already been filed with the court, the adverse party 
must serve a copy on the movant pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial 
Administration 2.516 at least 5 days prior to the day of the hearing if service by 
mail is authorized, or by delivery, electronic filing, or sending by e-mail no later 
than 5:00 p.m. 2 business days prior to the day of hearing. The judgment sought 
must be rendered immediately if the pleadings and summary judgment evidence on 
file show that there is no genuine issuedispute as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. The summary judgment 
standard provided for in this rule shall be construed and applied in accordance with 
the federal summary judgment standard articulated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); and 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).   
 
 
(d) – (g) 
[No Change]  
 
 
Committee Notes 
 
[No Change]