Case Title: Beggerly v. Walker

Citation: 194 Kan. 61, 397 P.2d 395

Docket Number: 43,826

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1964-12-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
194 Kan. 61 (1964)
397 P.2d 395
WALTER E. BEGGERLY, Appellant,
v.
CECIL WALKER, BILL DAVIS, EARL WEST, PARSONS AERIE No. 411, Parsons Kansas, Subordinate Lodge of the Fraternal Order of the Eagles, and HARRY A. ABNEY, RALPH CAMPBELL and GUY MULLEN, Trustees of PARSONS AERIE No. 411, Parsons, Kansas, Subordinate Lodge of the Fraternal Order of the Eagles, Appellees.
No. 43,826

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 12, 1964.
Charles F. Forsyth, of Erie, argued the cause, and Clark M. Fleming, of Erie, was with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Glenn Jones and A.L. Foster, both of Parsons, argued the cause, and were on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FONTRON, J.:
This is an action brought by the plaintiff to recover for damages sustained as a result of an alleged assault and battery. *62 So for as material to the questions raised on this appeal, the amended petition reads as follows:
For purposes of this opinion, the amended petition will be referred to as the petition, the three individual defendants as Walker, Davis and West, respectively, and Parsons Aerie No. 411 Fraternal Order of the Eagles, located at Parsons, Kansas, and the trustees thereof, as Eagles.
The defendants filed individual demurrers to the petition, all of which, except Walker's, were sustained by the court. The plaintiff has perfected this appeal from the orders sustaining the demurrers of Davis, West and Eagles. No appeal has been taken by Walker from the overruling of his separate demurrer.
So far as the record shows, the trial court filed no memorandum setting forth its reasons for sustaining the demurrers, nor are the grounds for its judgment contained in the journal entry. Thus, we are not advised as to the basis on which the trial court sustained the demurrers. However, Eagles, in its brief, maintains that the lower court's judgment should be sustained for the following reasons: (1) Misjoinder of causes of action; and (2) failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against it in that (a) it alleges facts showing plaintiff to be in pari delicto, (b) it fails to charge Eagles with proximate cause, and (c) it does not allege a cause of action on a single definite theory. The defendants, Davis and West, have adopted Eagles' brief except as to misjoinder and have also filed a short brief of their own covering proximate cause *64 and in pari delicto. We will first discuss Eagles' contentions in reverse order.
Although complaint is made that the plaintiff's petition is not drawn on a single definite theory, but on a confusion of theories, our rule is to the effect that a pleading which sets forth any cause of action is sufficient to withstand a demurrer directed against it. (Liberty Glass Co., v. Bath, 187 Kan. 54, 353 P.2d 786; Shirk v. Shirk, 186 Kan. 32, 35, 348 P.2d 840.)
The most casual glance at the petition will reveal a cause of action stated against Walker for assault and battery. Furthermore, when the petition is considered in its entirety, we believe it shows that plaintiff has framed his case against Eagles on the theory of respondeat superior.
We recognize the general rule, followed in Kansas as well as in other jurisdictions, that a master is not liable for a tortious act committed by his servant, including an assault and battery upon a third person, unless the act be done by authority of the master, either express or implied, or unless the act be done by the servant in the course or within the scope of his employment. (Hudson v. M.K. & T. Rly. Co., 16 Kan. [2d ed.] 470; Hamilton v. Neff, 189 Kan. 637, 371 P.2d 157.) Notwithstanding this rule, we believe that the facts set out in plaintiff's petition bring the case within an exception thereto, which, in brief, may be stated thus: That where an employee's duties involve the preservation of peace and order on the master's premises, or the protection of the master's property from loss or vandalism, an inference arises that the servant is expected to use reasonable force in the performance of his duties and, consequently, the use of force falls within the scope of the servant's employment. The statement of the rule embodying the exception is well and more fully expressed in 6 Am.Jur.2d, Assault and Battery, § 140, in the following words:
The foregoing rule was recognized by this court in Lehnen v. Hines & Co., 88 Kan. 58, 127 P. 612, where an action was brought by a hotel guest for damages suffered from an assault upon her by the room clerk, among whose duties was the preservation of order. In this case, it was held:
In the course of its opinion, the court said:
A comprehensive annotation on the subject is found in 34 A.L.R. 2nd, 412 et seq., where cases from numerous jurisdictions are collected in which recovery has been allowed against the operators of places of public accommodation, such as hotels, restaurants, bars and saloons, for injuries which their employees had inflected on patrons of such establishments. From the allegations of the instant petition, the drinking and gambling club rooms open to the public or to guests which were maintained by the Eagles would clearly appear to be comparable to the businesses noted above.
Although the petition now before us alleges that the assault was made by Walker after the plaintiff's quarrel with West was concluded, it may reasonably be inferred from the circumstances that it was perpetrated in the course of Walker's employment to maintain order, even though unjustifiable force may have been used. The language of the petition is susceptible to the interpretation *66 that Walker entered the room with Davis, who had primary charge of the club rooms, to assist Davis in putting an end to an argument between plaintiff and West which Davis had promised the plaintiff's wife he would stop; and that the blow was struck, either to end an argument which Walker and Davis did not realize was terminated, or to prevent further trouble from a quarrelsome guest. The petition, under our rules, is to be liberally construed as against a demurrer, and plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences which logically can be drawn from the facts pleaded. (Merchant v. Foreman, 182 Kan. 550, 322 P.2d 740.)
Although it is not specifically so stated, it may also reasonably be deduced from the pleaded facts that Davis, after promising to end the disturbance, had enlisted Walker's help for that purpose and that the two men, both of whom were charged with preserving decorum in the club rooms, together approached plaintiff with such a purpose in view. Accordingly, it is our judgment that a cause of action is alleged against Davis, as well as against the Eagles. A different situation obtains as to West, whose only culpable conduct appears to have been his operation of a gaming table. No fact is alleged which infers that he had any responsibility to quell disorders or that he assumed to act in the capacity of a bouncer. We are constrained to conclude that his demurrer was correctly sustained.
What we have heretofore said disposes of the contention that no act on the part of Eagles or Davis is alleged to have been a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. If Eagles, on the principle of respondeat superior, and Davis, as an associate of or a participant with Walker in the actual assault, are liable for the injuries proximately resulting from the assault, then proximate cause, in the eyes of the law, will be attributed to both of them, in joint measure with Walker.
The claim advanced by Davis and Eagles that recovery by plaintiff is shown to be barred under the doctrine of in pari delicto is without merit. Before a wrongdoer is deprived of the law's protection, his illegal act must have a causal connection with his injury and if at the time of injury he was engaged in a breach of the law which did not proximately contribute to his damage, such circumstance will not preclude his recovery. (52 Am. Jur., Torts, § 92, pp. 436, 437.) In Norris v. York, 105 Kan. 448, 185 Pac. 43, this court has held:
Certain cases are cited by defendants in support of the doctrine which involve the element of consent, as in mutual combat. Such cases are not in point. Despite the plaintiff's questionable taste in choosing his recreational activities for the Sabbath, there is nothing in the circumstances depicted in the petition to indicate any assent on plaintiff's part to a disabling blow to the jaw.
Counsel for Eagles has expended considerable effort in arguing misjoinder of causes of action. Notwithstanding the ardent advocacy on the point, we discern nothing which is fatal to the petition on such score and shall not prolong this opinion by extensive comment on the authorities cited. The cases cited are either distinguishable on their facts or else their import has been either misconstrued or misunderstood by counsel.
Our rule concerning joinder of causes of action is set out by statute, G.S. 1949, 60-601, which provides:
This court, in Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317, has held that an action sounding in tort may be joined with one in implied warranty. In the recent case of Baker, Administrator v. Brial, 185 Kan. 322, 341 P.2d 987, in an action wherein separate causes of action were alleged against different defendants, we have said:
As we have already held, the instant petition alleges a cause of action for assault and battery against both Walker and Davis, as joint participants, and against Eagles on the basis of respondeat superior. It is apparent that all three defendants are affected by the cause of action which is alleged. Under these circumstances, the defense of misjoinder has no standing.
The judgment of the court below is sustained as to the defendant Earl West. The judgment is reversed as to defendants Bill Davis and Parsons Aerie No. 411, Subordinate Lodge of the Fraternal Order of the Eagles, with instructions that their demurrers be overruled.
It is so ordered.