Case Title: Phyllis M. Landis v. Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc.

Citation: 2001 WI 86

Docket Number: 2000AP000330

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 86 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
00-0330 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Phyllis M. Landis, individually, and as personal 
representative for the estate of Edward E. 
Landis,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., 
Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., Mayo Health System, 
Luther Hospital and Wisconsin Patients 
Compensation Fund,  
 
Defendants-Appellants, 
M. Terry McEnany, M.D.,  
 
Defendant.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 164 
Reported at:  238 Wis. 2d 190, 616 N.W.2d 910 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 3, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 30, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
Benjamin D. Proctor 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins concurrence. 
 
Dissented: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH and WILCOX, J.J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by J. Drew Ryberg, Michael J. Happe and Kelly & 
Ryberg, S.C., Eau Claire, and oral argument by Michael J. Happe. 
 
2 
 
 
For the defendants-appellants there was a brief 
by Joy L. O’Grosky, Timothy J. Cesar and Axley Brynelson, LLP, 
Madison, and oral argument by Joy L. O’Grosky. 
 
2001 WI 86 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 00-0330  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Phyllis M. Landis, individually, and as  
personal representative for the estate of  
Edward E. Landis,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Physicians Insurance Company of  
Wisconsin, Inc., Midelfort Clinic, Ltd.,  
Mayo Health System, Luther Hospital and  
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
M. Terry McEnany, M.D.,  
 
          Defendant. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, Landis v. Physicians Insurance 
Co. of Wisconsin, Inc., 2000 WI App 164, 238 Wis. 2d 190, 616 
N.W.2d 910, reversing an order of the circuit court for Eau 
Claire County, Benjamin D. Proctor, Judge.  The plaintiffs in 
this action are Phyllis M. Landis, individually, and as personal 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 00-0330 
 
2 
representative for the estate of her late husband Edward E. 
Landis.  The defendants are Physicians Insurance Company of 
Wisconsin, Inc.; Midelfort Clinic; Mayo Health System; Luther 
Hospital; the Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund; and a heart 
surgeon, M. Terry McEnany, M.D.  Mrs. Landis is suing for 
alleged medical malpractice attributable to the defendants that 
resulted in the death of Edward Landis.  One of the defendants, 
Dr. McEnany, performed heart surgery on Mr. Landis. 
¶2 
The circuit court denied the defendants' motion to 
dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice complaint.  The 
defendants' motion relied on Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b)(1999-
2000)1 in asserting that the five-year time limit in this statute 
for filing a medical malpractice action expired before the 
commencement of the action.  The circuit court disagreed, 
concluding that the mediation process mandated by Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.44, in particular the tolling provision in subsection (4), 
tolled the five-year limitation for filing actions. 
¶3 
The court of appeals granted the defendants leave to 
appeal the circuit court's nonfinal order.  It then reversed, 
determining that the § 655.44 mediation process did not toll the 
five-year limitation.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
five-year limitation in § 893.55(1)(b), which operates as a 
statute of repose, was not tolled because § 655.44(4) tolls 
"[a]ny applicable statute of limitations" but does not toll any 
                     
1 All statutory references are to the 1999-2000 version of 
the Wisconsin Statutes, unless otherwise noted.  
No. 00-0330 
 
3 
applicable statute of repose.  Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4) (emphasis 
added).  The court of appeals noted the difference between a 
statute of limitations and a statute of repose, basing its 
decision on: (1) statements made in cases and Black's Law 
Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) about the difference between statutes 
of limitations and statutes of repose; and (2) the interplay 
among Wis. Stat. §§ 655.44, 655.445, and 893.55. 
¶4 
The issue before this court is whether the five-year 
deadline 
for 
filing 
actions 
contained 
within 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b) is tolled when a party requests mediation of a 
medical malpractice dispute pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 655.44.  
¶5 
We conclude that the § 655.44 mediation process tolls 
the five-year deadline for filing a medical malpractice action 
under § 893.55(1)(b).  When the legislature wrote the language 
in 
§ 655.44(4) 
tolling 
"[a]ny 
applicable 
statute 
of 
limitations," it intended to include any applicable statute of 
repose.  In this subsection, the legislature made no distinction 
between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose.  In 
numerous other statutes, the legislature has not differentiated 
with a precise statutory label whether a time limitation for 
commencing an action is a statute of limitations or a statute of 
repose.  The term "statute of repose" is largely a judicial  
label 
for 
a 
particular 
type 
of 
limitation 
on 
actions.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
I 
 
No. 00-0330 
 
4 
¶6 
On March 17, 1994, Mr. Landis underwent heart surgery. 
Dr. McEnany performed the surgery, a septuple (7) coronary 
bypass.  About two weeks later, on April 1, 1994, Mr. Landis 
died.  Mrs. Landis alleges that Mr. Landis died "through the 
negligence of defendants in their failure to elicit informed 
consent and to provide reasonable care for Mr. Landis." 
¶7 
In the late winter and early spring of 1999, Dr. 
McEnany received significant media attention in the Eau Claire 
area.  For example, according to newspaper articles in the 
record, the Eau Claire Leader-Telegram reported that there was a 
high patient death rate in connection with Dr. McEnany's 
surgeries.  This was almost five years after Mr. Landis died.  
According to Mrs. Landis, she learned from media reports that 
her husband's death might have been caused by Dr. McEnany's 
negligence.2  Mrs. Landis claims she discovered this alleged 
negligence in February 1999, about one month short of five years 
after the surgery. 
                     
2 In the fall of 1999, in a motion to the circuit court for 
change of venue, the defendants claimed the local media's 
coverage of Dr. McEnany's alleged negligence had so tainted the 
local populace that the defendants could not receive a fair 
trial in Eau Claire County.  In that motion, the defendants 
noted that as of the fall of 1999 there were six cases pending 
in the county's circuit court arising out of Dr. McEnany's 
treatment of patients and there were an additional twelve cases 
involving patients pursuing claims through mediation.  In 
addition, the defendants presented the circuit court with a poll 
conducted in the county showing a high number of county 
residents had developed negative opinions about Dr. McEnany and 
his treatment of patients.  The circuit court denied the 
defendants' motion for change of venue. 
No. 00-0330 
 
5 
¶8 
During the following month, on March 8, 1999, Mrs. 
Landis filed a request for mediation pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.44.  This was about one week short of the five-year 
limitation for commencing an action concerning the alleged act 
of negligence in the Landis surgery (namely, March 17, 1999).3   
¶9 
Wisconsin Stat. § 655.43 requires that a claimant and 
all respondents in a medical malpractice dispute participate in 
"mediation" 
to 
assist 
in 
the 
"informal, 
inexpensive 
and 
expedient" resolution of disputes.4  Wis. Stat. § 655.42(1).  
Section 655.44 allows a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice 
to request mediation before filing an action in circuit court.5  
                     
3 For purposes of this analysis, we use March 17, 1994——the 
date of the Landis surgery——as the triggering  "date of the act 
or omission."  The "date of the act or omission" is the language 
used in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b).  There is no dispute that 
Mrs. Landis filed a request for mediation within the five-year 
limitation. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 655.43 provides: "The claimant and all 
respondents named in a request for mediation filed under s. 
655.44 or 655.445 shall participate in mediation under this 
subchapter." 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 655.44 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) REQUEST AND FEE.  Beginning September 1, 
1986, any person listed in s. 655.007 having a claim 
or a derivative claim under this chapter for bodily 
injury or death because of a tort or breach of 
contract based on professional services rendered or 
that should have been rendered by a health care 
provider may file a request for mediation and shall 
pay the fee under s. 655.54. 
 
. . . . 
(4) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.  Any applicable 
statute of limitations is tolled on the date the 
No. 00-0330 
 
6 
A parallel provision, Wis. Stat. § 655.445, allows a plaintiff 
to file a request for mediation after filing an action in 
circuit court.6  Mrs. Landis chose to request mediation before 
filing an action in circuit court.  Thus, she proceeded under 
§ 655.44.  Under either § 655.44 or § 655.445, when a plaintiff 
                                                                  
director of state courts receives the request for 
mediation if delivered in person or on the date of 
mailing if sent by registered mail.  The statute 
remains tolled until 30 days after the last day of the 
mediation period under s. 655.465 (7). 
 
(5) NO COURT ACTION COMMENCED BEFORE MEDIATION.  
Except as provided in s. 655.445, no court action may 
be commenced unless a request for mediation has been 
filed under this section and until the expiration of 
the mediation period under s. 655.465 (7). 
 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 655.445 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) 
COMMENCING 
ACTION. 
REQUEST 
AND 
FEE.  
Beginning September 1, 1986, any person listed in s. 
655.007 having a claim or a derivative claim under 
this chapter for bodily injury or death because of a 
tort or breach of contract based on professional 
services rendered or that should have been rendered by 
a health care provider shall, within 15 days after the 
date of filing an action in court, file a request for 
mediation. 
 
The 
request 
shall 
be 
prepared 
and 
delivered in person or sent by registered mail to the 
director of state courts, in the form and manner 
required under s. 655.44 (2) and (3), together with a 
notice that a court action has been commenced and the 
fee under s. 655.54 shall be paid. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
(3) NO COURT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE MEDIATION.  For 
actions filed under sub. (1), no discovery may be made 
and 
no trial, pretrial 
conference 
or 
scheduling 
conference may be held until the expiration of the 
mediation period under s. 655.465 (7). 
  
No. 00-0330 
 
7 
files a request for mediation, the filing triggers a mandatory 
90-day mediation period.7 
¶10 During the 90-day mediation period in this case, the 
parties did not reach a settlement.  During this period, Mrs. 
Landis was prohibited by Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5) from filing an 
action in circuit court, even though the five-year deadline from 
Mr. Landis's surgery passed. 
¶11 The plaintiffs believe that the tolling provision in 
Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4) tolled the five-year time limitation in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b).  The defendants disagree, reasoning 
that the five-year time limitation in § 893.55(1)(b) was not 
tolled 
because 
§ 655.44(4) 
applies 
only 
to 
statutes 
of 
limitations, not statutes of repose.  After Mrs. Landis filed a 
complaint in circuit court, the defendants moved to dismiss the 
complaint.  The circuit court denied the motion, but the court 
of appeals reversed, adopting the defendants' reading of 
§ 655.44(4). 
 
II 
                     
7 Under Wis. Stat. § 655.465(7), the mediation period under 
Wis. Stat. § 655.44 or 655.445 lasts 90 days if the request is 
personally delivered to the director of state courts.  Wis. 
Stat. § 655.465(7).  If the request is mailed to the director of 
state courts, the mediation period lasts 93 days from the date 
of mailing the request.  Id.  Nevertheless, under either 
§ 655.44 or 655.445, if all parties to a dispute can agree in 
writing to a longer period of mediation, § 655.465(7) allows a 
longer 
period 
for 
the 
purposes 
of 
applying 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 655.44(4) and (5) and 
655.445(3). 
 For 
the sake of 
simplicity, we refer to this period as a 90-day mediation 
period. 
No. 00-0330 
 
8 
 
¶12 This case involves the application of a statute to 
undisputed facts.  This is a question of law that we review de 
novo.  Nelson v. McLaughlin, 211 Wis. 2d 487, 495, 565 N.W.2d 
123 (1997).  In addition, this disagreement requires us to 
engage in statutory interpretation. 
¶13 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law 
that this court reviews de novo, Reyes v. Greatway Insurance 
Co., 227 Wis. 2d 357, 364-65, 597 N.W.2d 687 (1999), benefiting 
from the analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals. 
 Meyer v. Sch. Dist. of Colby, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 599 N.W.2d 
339 (1999). 
¶14 The purpose of statutory interpretation is to discern 
the intent of the legislature.  McEvoy v. Group Health Coop., 
213 Wis. 2d 507, 528, 570 N.W.2d 397 (1997).  To determine this 
intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute.  Id. 
 If the language of the statute clearly and unambiguously sets 
forth the legislative intent, it is our duty to apply that 
intent to the case at hand and not look beyond the statutory 
language to ascertain its meaning.  Reyes, 227 Wis. 2d at 365. 
¶15 If the language of the statute is ambiguous and does 
not clearly set forth the legislative intent, the court will 
resort to judicial construction.  Kelley Co. v. Marquardt, 172 
Wis. 2d 234, 247-48, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992).  We ascertain 
legislative intent through judicial construction in relation to 
a number of extrinsic factors, including the legislative object 
intended to be accomplished, id. at 248, and the statute's 
No. 00-0330 
 
9 
scope, history, context, and subject matter.  Beard v. Lee 
Enters., Inc., 225 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 591 N.W.2d 156 (1999).  A 
statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by a 
reasonably well-informed person in either of two senses.  Reyes, 
227 Wis. 2d at 365.  Depending on the facts of a case, the same 
statute may be ambiguous in one setting and unambiguous in 
another.  Id. 
¶16 In addition, although "it is true that statutory 
interpretation begins with the language of the statute, it is 
also well established that courts must not look at a single, 
isolated sentence or portion of a sentence, but at the role of 
the relevant language in the entire statute."  Alberte v. Anew 
Health Care Serv., 2000 WI 7, ¶10, 232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 
515.  Moreover, in interpreting a statute, courts must attempt 
to give effect to every word of a statute, so as not to render 
any portion of the statute superfluous.  County of Jefferson v. 
Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 305, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999). 
 
III 
 
 
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55 places various restrictions 
on medical malpractice actions, including time limitations for 
commencing an action.  Section 893.55(1) allows a plaintiff to 
commence a medical malpractice action within the later of the 
following two options: 
 
(a) Three years from the date of injury, or 
 
No. 00-0330 
 
10
(b) One year from the date the injury was discovered, 
or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have been discovered, except that an action may not be 
commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years from 
the date of the act or omission. 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(a)-(b).  Subsection (1)(a) uses the term 
"injury."  Because more than three years had passed from the 
time of Mr. Landis's surgery and death, Mrs. Landis did not meet 
the deadline under subsection (1)(a).  Mrs. Landis claims to 
have discovered the defendants' negligence in February 1999.  
Thus, subsection (1)(b) applies to this case because it is the 
later deadline.  Under the "repose" clause in paragraph (b), the 
maximum time limit for filing suit is "5 years from the date of 
the act or omission." 
¶18 To pursue a medical malpractice claim, a claimant must 
request mediation.  Section 655.44 allows a claimant to request 
mediation before filing an action in circuit court, while 
§ 655.445 permits a claimant to file for mediation after 
initiating an action in circuit court.8 
¶19 Under either statutory path, the claimant and all 
respondents named in a request for mediation must participate in 
mediation.  Wis. Stat. § 655.43.  The interplay between 
§§ 655.44 and 655.445 demonstrates that claimants have a choice 
on how to proceed when attempting to resolve a dispute.  Under 
either option, a 90-day mediation period ensues. 
                     
8 A claimant proceeding under Wis. Stat. § 655.445 (allowing 
commencement of action before filing request for mediation) must 
file a request for mediation within 15 days of commencing an 
action in circuit court. 
No. 00-0330 
 
11
¶20 In this case, Mrs. Landis filed a mediation request on 
March 8, 1999, before she filed an action in circuit court.  A 
90-day mediation period followed.  During this mediation period, 
Mrs. Landis was prohibited from filing a lawsuit.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.44(5).  However, during this mediation period, the five-
year deadline for filing suit under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) 
passed. 
¶21 Thus, the dispute in this case is whether the tolling 
provision in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4) tolls the five-year time 
limitation for filing actions in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 655.44(4) provides: 
 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. Any applicable statute of 
limitations is tolled on the date the director of 
state courts receives the request for mediation if 
delivered in person or on the date of mailing if sent 
by registered mail.  The statute remains tolled until 
30 days after the last day of the mediation period 
under s. 655.465 (7). 
Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4) (emphasis added). 
¶22 Had Mrs. Landis chosen to proceed under Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.445 and filed an action in circuit court on March 8, 1999, 
instead of filing a request for mediation as she did, there is 
no dispute that this action would have been commenced within the 
five-year time limitation.  Under that scenario, mediation would 
have ensued and if no agreement were reached, Mrs. Landis could 
have proceeded with the action already filed in circuit court.  
¶23 Mrs. Landis chose to go the other route, first filing 
for mediation.  The defendants contend that the five-year 
limitation in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) was not tolled during 
No. 00-0330 
 
12
the 
mediation 
period 
because 
the 
tolling 
provision 
in 
§ 655.44(4) 
tolls 
only 
"[a]ny 
applicable 
statute 
of 
limitations," not any applicable statute of repose.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.44(4) (emphasis added).  The plaintiffs counter that when 
the legislature decided that a mediation request would toll 
"[a]ny applicable statute of limitations," it intended that all 
time limitations be tolled, including any applicable statute of 
repose. 
¶24 The 
defendants 
rely 
in 
great 
part 
upon 
the 
availability of an option for a claimant to file an action in 
circuit court before filing a request for mediation.  They argue 
that a claimant in Mrs. Landis's shoes should file an action in 
circuit court before filing a request for mediation, to avoid 
the 
time 
limitation 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b). 
 
The 
defendants contend that this was the legislature's purpose in 
creating § 655.445. 
 
IV 
 
A. 
Ambiguity 
 
¶25 Our focus in this case is on Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4).  
Our goal is to discern the legislature's intent when it enacted 
this provision.  Reyes, 227 Wis. 2d at 365.   
¶26 Did the legislature intend in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4) 
to include a statute of repose within the phrase "[a]ny 
applicable statute of limitations," or did it intend to exclude 
No. 00-0330 
 
13
a statute of repose by distinguishing it from a statute of 
limitations?  The answer is not clear from the language of the 
statute.  The term "statute of limitations" is ambiguous because 
it can be understood in two different senses by reasonably well-
informed persons, and there are persuasive reasons for each 
interpretation. 
¶27 Like the court of appeals, we have examined Black's 
Law Dictionary to decipher the difference between a statute of 
limitations and a statute of repose.  Landis, 238 Wis. 2d 190, 
¶5 n.4.  This examination demonstrates the ambiguity of the 
phrase "[a]ny applicable statute of limitations" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.44(4).  We have studied three editions of Black's Law 
Dictionary.  The evolving definitions in these volumes——the 
oldest of which was current at the time § 655.44 was passed——
show the ambiguity of the words. 
¶28 The seventh edition of Black's Law Dictionary defines 
 a statute of limitations in pertinent part as follows: 
 
A statute establishing a time limit for suing in a 
civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued 
(as when the injury occurred or was discovered).  The 
purpose of such a statute is to require diligent 
prosecution 
of 
known 
claims, 
thereby 
providing 
finality and predictability in legal affairs and 
ensuring that claims will be resolved while evidence 
is reasonably available and fresh. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1422 (7th ed. 1999).  Meanwhile, the same 
edition defines "statute of repose": 
 
A statute that bars a suit a fixed number of years 
after the defendant acts in some way (as by designing 
or manufacturing a product), even if this period ends 
No. 00-0330 
 
14
before the plaintiff has suffered any injury.  Cf. 
Statute of Limitations. 
 
"A statute of repose . . . limits the time within 
which an action may be brought and is not related to 
the accrual of any cause of action; the injury need 
not have occurred, much less have been discovered. 
Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations which begins 
running 
upon 
accrual 
of 
the 
claim, 
the 
period 
contained in a statute of repose begins when a 
specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause 
of action has accrued or whether any injury has 
resulted." 
Id. at 1423 (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 4, at 
20-21 (1987)), quoted in Landis, 238 Wis. 2d at ¶5 n.4.   
¶29 In 
the 
seventh 
edition 
of 
Black's, 
the 
legal 
distinction between a statute of limitations and a statute of 
repose is that a statute of limitations begins to run when a 
cause of action accrues, as opposed to a statute of repose, 
which begins to run when the "defendant acts in some way (as by 
designing or manufacturing a product)."9  Id.  This edition 
presents a relatively clear distinction between a statute of 
limitations and a statute of repose. 
¶30 Going backward, the sixth edition of Black's Law 
Dictionary defines a statute of limitations in pertinent part as 
follows: 
 
Statutes of the federal government and various states 
setting maximum time periods during which certain 
actions can be brought or rights enforced.  After the 
                     
9 This court has acknowledged that this is the distinction 
between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose.  
Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶26, 237 Wis. 2d 
99, 613 N.W.2d 849; Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 252, 578 
N.W.2d 166 (1998).  
No. 00-0330 
 
15
time period set out in the applicable statute of 
limitations has run, no legal action can be brought 
regardless of whether any cause of action ever 
existed. 
Black's Law Dictionary 927 (6th ed. 1990).  Within the 
definitional section for a statute of limitations, the sixth 
edition compares statutes of limitations to statutes of repose: 
 
Statute of repose compared.  While statutes of 
limitation are sometimes called "statutes of repose," 
the former bars right of action unless it is filed 
within a specified period of time after injury occurs, 
while "statute of repose" terminates any right of 
action after a specific time has elapsed, regardless 
of whether there has as yet been an injury. 
Id. (citation omitted).  The sixth edition of Black's Law 
Dictionary also has a distinct definition for a statute of 
repose: 
 
"Statutes of limitations" extinguish, after period of 
time, right to prosecute accrued cause of action; 
"statute of repose," by contrast, limits potential 
liability by limiting time during which cause of 
action can arise.  It is distinguishable from statute 
of limitations, in that statute of repose cuts off 
right of action after specified time measured from 
delivery of product or completion of work, regardless 
of time of accrual of cause of action or of notice of 
invasion of legal rights. 
Id. at 1411 (citations omitted). 
¶31 The sixth edition of Black's Law Dictionary is not as 
clear as the seventh edition.  In particular, we note the sixth 
edition indicates that "statutes of limitation are sometimes 
called 
'statutes 
of 
repose'"——although 
it 
does 
so 
while 
explaining the distinction between the two concepts.  Id. at 
927. 
No. 00-0330 
 
16
 
¶32 The ambiguity in the term "statute of limitations" is 
most evident in the fifth edition of Black's Law Dictionary.  
The distinction between a statute of limitations and a statute 
of repose is not well drawn in the fifth edition.  A statute of 
limitations is defined in relevant part as follows: 
 
A statute prescribing limitations to the right of 
action on certain described causes of action or 
criminal prosecutions; that is, declaring that no suit 
shall be maintained on such causes of action, nor any 
criminal charge be made, unless brought within a 
specified period of time after the right accrued.  
Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose, and are 
such legislative enactments as prescribe the periods 
within which actions may be brought upon certain 
claims or within which certain rights may be enforced. 
Black's Law Dictionary 835 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).  The 
fifth edition does not contain a definition of statute of repose 
or compare a statute of repose to a statute of limitations.  See 
id. at 835, 1169, 1264-66 (failing to define repose and statute 
of repose or to discuss the difference between a statute of 
limitations and a statute of repose). 
¶33 The fifth edition of Black's was published in 1979.  
It was the most recent edition of Black's when the statute at 
issue was passed.  We find it significant, for the purposes of 
analyzing 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 655.44(4) 
that, 
at 
the 
time 
the 
legislation at issue passed, the most authoritative American 
legal dictionary contained a definition that "[s]tatutes of 
limitation are statutes of repose."  Id. at 835 (emphasis 
added).  See also Black's Law Dictionary 927 (6th ed. 1990) 
(indicating that "statutes of limitation are sometimes called 
No. 00-0330 
 
17
statutes of repose"); Black's Law Dictionary 1423 (7th ed. 1999) 
(implying that statutes of repose are a type of statute of 
limitations 
by 
stating: 
"Unlike 
an 
ordinary 
statute 
of 
limitations which begins running upon accrual of the claim, the 
period contained in a statute of repose begins when a specific 
event occurs") (emphasis added). 
¶34 The court of appeals relied on the seventh edition of 
Black's when it decided Landis last year.  Landis, 238 Wis. 2d 
190, ¶5 n.4.  In 1995, the court of appeals decided a case about 
punitive damages in medical malpractice cases and said: 
 
In the wake of its findings, the legislature enacted a 
medical malpractice statutory scheme to combat the 
increasing liability insurance costs.  A statutory cap 
was placed on noneconomic damages, § 893.55(4)(d), 
STATS., 
a 
special 
statute 
of 
limitations 
was 
introduced to prohibit the commencement of an action 
more than five years after the act or omission giving 
rise to the claim, § 893.55(1)(b)[,] and a mediation 
system was established to provide an alternative means 
of resolving medical malpractice disputes.  Section 
655.42, STATS. 
Lund v. Kokemoor, 195 Wis. 2d 727, 735, 537 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 
1995) (emphasis added). 
 
¶35 The 
phrase 
"a 
special 
statute 
of 
limitations," 
referring to Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b), is consistent with the 
definition of "statute of limitations" in the then-current sixth 
edition of Black's.   
¶36 We think it is appropriate to pay attention to the 
dictionary 
definition 
of 
a 
statutory 
term 
that 
was 
contemporaneous with the enactment of the term.  In this case, 
however, resort to the dictionary does not completely resolve 
No. 00-0330 
 
18
the issue.  Therefore, we conclude that the phrase "[a]ny 
applicable statute of limitations" is ambiguous and that the 
court is warranted in examining the language in relation to its 
context, subject matter, scope, history, and objective.  Kelley 
Co., 172 Wis. 2d at 248. 
 
B. 
Legislative Intent in Extrinsic Factors 
 
1. 
Context 
 
¶37 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) contains a statute of 
repose that "limits the time period within which an action may 
be brought based on the date of the act or omission."  Aicher v. 
Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶26, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 
N.W.2d 849.  Because a statute of repose bears no relation to 
the accrual of a cause of action and may take effect before an 
injury is discovered or even before an injury has occurred, a 
statute of repose can be quite arbitrary. 
¶38 Against this background, the legislature created two 
clear statutory exceptions to the time limits in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b).   
¶39 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(2) provides that if a health 
care provider conceals from a patient a prior act or omission of 
the provider which has resulted in injury to the patient, an 
action shall be commenced within one year of discovery of the 
concealment, or within one year of when the concealment should 
have been discovered, "or within the time limitation provided by 
No. 00-0330 
 
19
sub. (1), whichever is later" (emphasis added).  Subsection (2) 
is highly relevant to our inquiry.  First, it creates an 
exception to the five-year limitation in subsection (1)(b).  
Second, it refers to subsection (1) as a statute with a "time 
limitation." 
¶40 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(3) provides that when a 
foreign object which has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or 
effect has been left in a patient's body, an action shall be 
commenced within one year after the patient becomes aware or 
should have become aware of the object "or within the time 
limitation provided by sub. (1), whichever is later" (emphasis 
added).  Subsection (3) is also highly relevant.  Like 
subsection (2), it creates an exception to the five-year 
limitation in subsection (1)(b).  It also refers to subsection 
(1)(b) as a statute with a "time limitation." 
¶41 The legislature's willingness to provide exceptions to 
the 
five-year 
limitation 
in 
§ 893.55(1)(b) 
informs 
our 
interpretation when we turn to Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4).  Inasmuch 
as two statutes override the applicable statute of repose in 
particular circumstances, there is no reason why a third statute 
should not effect the same objective. 
¶42 We discern a second major clue to legislative intent 
in statutory context.  Wisconsin Stat. § 655.44(4) uses the word 
"any" before the phrase "applicable statute of limitations."  
The word "any" is normally construed to mean "every."  Falk v. 
Tax Comm'n, 218 Wis. 130, 134, 259 N.W. 624 (1935); Juneau v. 
Wis. Tax Comm'n, 184 Wis. 485, 488, 199 N.W. 63 (1924); Coutts 
No. 00-0330 
 
20
v. Wis. Ret. Bd., 201 Wis. 2d 178, 190, 547 N.W.2d 821 (Ct. App. 
1996).  Thus, Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4) may be interpreted to read: 
Every applicable statute of limitations is tolled on the date 
the director receives the request for mediation.  The word "any" 
is not consistent with the narrow construction urged by the 
defendants. 
¶43 Looking back to Wis. Stat. § 893.55, we see its 
present title: "Medical malpractice; limitation of actions" 
(emphasis added).  When § 655.44(4) was approved, the title of 
§ 893.55 
was 
"Limitation 
of 
actions; 
medical 
malpractice" 
(emphasis added).  Wis. Stat. § 893.55 (1983-84).  In addition, 
we see the references in subsections (2) and (3) to the "time 
limitation" in subsection (1).  We also see that the statute of 
repose in § 893.55(1)(b) is merely a clause within a paragraph 
and that the paragraph begins as a statute of limitations.  It 
is 
"well 
established 
that 
courts 
must 
not 
look 
at 
a . . . portion of a sentence, but at the role of the relevant 
language in the entire statute."  Alberte, 232 Wis. 2d 587, ¶10. 
¶44 The statutory context provides persuasive evidence 
that the legislature was comfortable creating exceptions to the 
statute of repose in § 893.55(1)(b), and that it intended to 
toll every part of the statute under § 655.44(4) because 
§ 893.55(1) is an "applicable statute of limitations." 
 
2. 
History 
 
No. 00-0330 
 
21
 
¶45 Chapter 655 of the statutes is entitled "Health Care 
Liability and Patients Compensation."  This chapter was created 
by the legislature in 1975.  Chapter 37, Laws of 1975.  The 
original legislation created "formal panels" and "informal 
panels" to help resolve claims for bodily injury or death 
against health care providers.  From the beginning, resort to 
the panels was mandatory.  Wis. Stat. § 655.04(1)(b) (1975-76). 
 
¶46 The original legislation provided that "[n]o action 
may be commenced in court unless the controversy has first been 
heard and findings and an order have been made by the panel."  
Wis. Stat. § 655.04(1)(b) (1975-76).  Concurrently, subsection 
(6) of § 655.04 provided: "The filing of the submission of 
controversy shall toll any applicable statute of limitations, 
and such statute of limitations shall remain tolled until 30 
days after the hearing panel issues its written decision, or the 
jurisdiction of the panel is otherwise terminated." 
 
¶47 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55 did not exist in 1975.10  It 
was created in 1980 by Chapter 323, Laws of 1979.  Chapter 323 
was a general revision of the statutes of limitations.  Aicher, 
237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶23.  1979 Assembly Bill 326, which led to 
Chapter 323, described itself as "An Act . . . relating to claim 
procedures 
against 
government 
entities 
and 
employes, 
and 
statutes of limitations" (emphasis added). 
                     
10 The applicable statute of limitations was a three-year 
statute of limitations without a statute of repose.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.205 (1975-76).  
No. 00-0330 
 
22
 
¶48 This history is important.  First, the legislation 
creating § 893.55 described itself as an act relating to 
"statutes of limitations."  Second, from the time Chapter 323 
took effect in 1980 until the subsequent revision of the law on 
patient compensation panels in 1986, a claimant who went to one 
of the voluntary panels must have assumed that he or she was 
tolling all of § 893.55(1) by going to the panel, because the 
claimant had no option to file suit first.   
¶49 Wisconsin Stat. § 655.19 (1975-76) also provided that 
"unless the parties have stipulated in writing under § 655.07 to 
be bound by the panel determination, any party to a panel 
hearing may, within 120 days after the date of an order made by 
a panel, commence an action for a trial in the circuit or county 
court."  By using the term "any party," the statute contemplated 
court action by both claimants and respondents.  Why would the 
legislature give a respondent the right to go to court to 
challenge something a panel did but deny a claimant the right to 
go to court (after the five-year deadline in the statute of 
repose) to confirm something the panel did? 
 
¶50 Defendants argue that a right to file a suit before 
going to mediation was created in 1986 to "save those plaintiffs 
confronted with a statute of repose."  The problem with this 
argument is that there was a tolling provision in the original 
1975 statute with the same words found in present law.  The 
phrase "[t]he filing of the submission of controversy shall toll 
any applicable statute of limitations," from the 1975 statute, 
is equivalent to the phrase, "[a]ny applicable statute of 
No. 00-0330 
 
23
limitations is tolled," in the current statute.  The words were 
carried over in 1986.  We see no evidence that the 1975 words, 
carried over to present law, have ever failed to save plaintiffs 
from the statute of repose——until this case. 
 
3. Purpose 
 
¶51 Statutes of limitation and statutes of repose share at 
least one common objective.  They require timely notice to 
defendants that they will be required to defend a suit.  When a 
claimant files for mediation under Wis. Stat. § 655.44, the same 
objective is served.  Notice is given and defendants are put on 
alert. 
¶52 In Aicher, this court discussed the purposes behind 
statutes of limitation and statutes of repose: 
 
Statutes of limitation, which "are found and approved 
in 
all 
systems 
of 
enlightened 
jurisprudence," 
articulate the principle that it is more just to put 
the adversary on notice to defend a claim within a 
specified period of time than to permit unlimited 
prosecution of stale claims.  Statutes of limitation 
promote 
fair 
and 
prompt 
litigation 
and 
protect 
defendants from stale or fraudulent claims "brought 
after memories have faded or evidence has been 
lost." . . . Statutes of repose operate similarly to 
protect both plaintiffs and defendants from litigating 
claims in which the truth may be obfuscated by death 
or disappearance of key witnesses, loss of evidence, 
and faded memories. 
Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶27 (citations omitted).  Tolling "[a]ny 
applicable statute of limitations," including a statute of 
No. 00-0330 
 
24
repose, for mediation, does not undermine the basic purpose of 
these statutes. 
¶53 Little would be gained by requiring the commencement 
of an action in court.  Whether a claimant proceeds under Wis. 
Stat. § 655.44 or § 655.445, defendants are put on timely notice 
and they may begin preserving evidence, locating witnesses, and 
developing theories of defense, even though the formal process 
of discovery cannot begin. 
¶54 Something would be lost, however, if the process were 
to begin with a lawsuit.  The legislature intends the mediation 
system to provide claimants and defendants "with an informal, 
inexpensive and expedient means for resolving disputes without 
litigation."  Wis. Stat. § 655.42(1).   
¶55 The defendants' argument runs counter to the basic 
goals of the mediation system because it would force some 
persons to file an action in circuit court before engaging in 
mediation. 
 
This 
could 
have 
some 
effect 
on 
litigation, 
encouraging claimants who might otherwise not proceed with an 
action in court to go forward because they had already filed a 
complaint.  Our holding today ensures that all claimants, 
whether or not faced with the impending passage of the five-year 
time limitation for commencing an action, can pursue resolution 
through Chapter 655 mediation. 
¶56 The defendants argue that the legislature created Wis. 
Stat. § 655.445 (allowing filing of medical malpractice action 
in circuit court before requesting mediation) for the purpose of 
preventing the situation that occurred here.  They insist that 
No. 00-0330 
 
25
any reading of § 655.44 to toll the five-year statute of repose 
would render § 655.445 superfluous.  We disagree. 
¶57 First, the defendants argue that § 655.445 was created 
so that a claimant could file a complaint and avoid the passing 
of the five-year limitation in situations in which the five-year 
limitation is close to running.  However, this is not the only 
purpose for § 655.445.  Section 655.445 allows a claimant to 
commence an action in circuit court at any time before the 
expiration of the appropriate time limitation in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1).  Thus, a claimant can take advantage of the chance 
to commence a circuit court action whether or not a time 
limitation is about to expire. 
¶58 It is apparent that the legislature wanted claimants 
to have a choice: (1) to demonstrate a willingness to cooperate 
with a defendant in resolving a matter through mediation by 
first filing a mediation request under Wis. Stat. § 655.44; or 
(2) to demonstrate the gravity of a matter by first commencing 
an action in circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 655.445.  Whatever 
the reason, the legislature has decided claimants should have a 
choice on how to proceed at any time within the applicable time 
limitation, not just near the statutory deadline.  Thus, 
§ 655.445 is not rendered superfluous as a result of our 
interpretation of § 655.44(4). 
¶59 We have reviewed the legislative history of Wis. Stat. 
Ch. 655 Subch. VI, see 1985 Wis. Act 340, § 69r (creating Wis. 
Stat. Ch. 655 Subch. VI, the current mediation scheme), as well 
as the prior statutory mediation plan.  Wis. Stat. Ch. 655 
No. 00-0330 
 
26
Subch. 
II 
(1983-84). 
 
The 
prior 
mediation 
scheme 
was 
substantially modified by 1985 Wis. Act 340.11  We have found 
nothing in the Legislative Reference Bureau's (LRB) drafting 
file to support the defendants' argument concerning the tolling 
of the five-year limitation in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b).  
Rather, the analysis of 1985 Wis. Act 340 by the LRB 
demonstrates that the legislature simply wanted claimants to 
have an option in how to resolve a dispute with a health care 
provider.  Legislative Reference Bureau Bill Drafting File for 
1985 Wis. Act 340 (failing to indicate that Wis. Stat. § 655.445 
was intended to accommodate cases in which the five-year 
                     
11 Prior to 1985 Wis. Act 340, a person who pursued a 
medical malpractice claim was required to engage in mediation 
before commencing an action in circuit court.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.04(1)(b) (1983-84).  There was not an option in which a 
claimant could commence an action in circuit court before 
mediation, id., as there is currently.  Wis. Stat. § 655.445. 
The phrase "[a]ny applicable statute of limitations" from 
Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4) originated with language from the tolling 
provision in the prior statutory mediation system.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.04(6) 
(1983-84) 
("The 
filing 
of 
the 
submission 
of 
controversy [tantamount to a mediation request] shall toll any 
applicable 
statute 
of 
limitations, 
and 
such 
statute 
of 
limitations shall remain tolled until 60 days after the 
[mediation] panel issues its written decision and order, or the 
jurisdiction of the panel is otherwise terminated.") (emphasis 
added).  This phrase was carried over to the current scheme.  
Compare Wis. Stat. § 655.04(6) (1983-84) with Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.44(4).  There is no evidence in the legislative history of 
1985 Wis. Act 340, however, that the legislature created Wis. 
Stat. § 655.445——the option to commence an action before 
requesting 
mediation——because 
the 
phrase 
"[a]ny 
applicable 
statute of limitations" would not operate to toll the five-year 
limitation in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) when a claimant proceeds 
under § 655.44. 
No. 00-0330 
 
27
limitation in § 893.55(1)(b) was close to expiration, stating 
directly: "Claimants may file a request for mediation before 
filing in court or simultaneously with a court filing.") 
(analysis by the LRB attached to the second draft of 1986 A.B. 4 
(Special Session)). 
¶60 The defendants also contend that "[a]ny argument which 
ignores that the medical malpractice statute of repose is 
distinct from the statute of limitation, contravenes this 
court's prior rulings."  We acknowledge that our opinions have 
long regarded statutes of limitations as different from statutes 
of repose,12 but we note that these opinions have wrestled with 
how a statute of limitations or statute of repose operates, or 
whether a limitations statute bears on some constitutional 
right.  
We have 
not previously 
focused 
on 
whether the 
                     
12 See Pulchinski v. Strnad, 88 Wis. 2d 423, 428, 276 N.W.2d 
781 (1979) (citing Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 115, 211 
N.W.2d 834 (1973); Haase v. Sawicki, 20 Wis. 2d 308, 311, 121 
N.W.2d 876 (1963); Md. Cas. Co. v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 390, 393, 
14 N.W.2d 177 (1944)) ("In Wisconsin law, statutes of limitation 
are not treated as statutes of repose.").  However, the 
statement made in Pulchinski addressed an entirely different 
issue than this case.  In Pulchinski, and the cases it cites, 
this court considered issues relating to the difference between 
enlarging the time to commence an action when a statute of 
limitations has expired, versus when a statute of repose has 
expired.  Id. (citing cases above).  The court of appeals cited 
Pulchinski for the proposition that "'[i]n Wisconsin law, 
statutes of limitation are not treated as statutes of repose.'" 
 Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2000 WI App 164, 
¶5 n.4, 238 Wis. 2d 190, 616 N.W.2d 910 (quoting Pulchinski, 88 
Wis. 2d at 428).  The analysis of this issue and the statements 
made in those cases as to the different treatment of statutes of 
limitation 
and 
statutes 
of 
repose 
are 
inapplicable 
in 
considering the legal issue in this case. 
No. 00-0330 
 
28
legislature's use of the words "[a]ny applicable statute of 
limitations" in a tolling provision includes an applicable 
statute of repose.  See Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99; Estate of Makos 
v. Wis. Masons Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 564 N.W.2d 662 
(1997), overruled by Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶6.  The issue in 
this case is fundamentally different.13 
¶61 A review of Wis. Stat. Ch. 893——a chapter that 
substantially regulates time limitations on commencing a variety 
of actions——shows the legislature does not employ the phrase 
                     
13 The dissent argues that our opinion "ostensibly withdraws 
from Aicher" and similarly that we conclude "statutes of repose 
are one and the same as statutes of limitations."  Dissent at 
¶¶83, 89.  The dissent is not correct in these statements. 
First, there is no retreat from our holding in Aicher.  Our 
holding 
as 
to 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56 is unaffected by this decision.  
Moreover, our statements in Aicher concerning the difference 
between a statute of repose and a statute of limitations remain 
sound. 
Second, 
unlike 
Aicher, 
this 
case 
is 
not 
about 
the 
constitutionality of a statute of repose.  This case is about 
what the legislature meant when it said that "[a]ny applicable 
statute of limitations" is tolled when a claimant files a 
request for mediation under Wis. Stat. § 655.44.  This case is 
about how the legislature labels or names things, and it is 
apparent that the legislature does not use the label "statute of 
repose."  The dissent points to the 72 total case references in 
state history to statutes of repose, but it has not pointed to a 
single statute in force that even contains the word "repose"——
despite the argument that the term "statute of repose" has been 
part of the "legal lexicon" for more than 100 years.  In 
addition, no one has offered evidence that the legislature has 
ever used the words "statute of repose."  While the concept of a 
statute of repose may have been part of the "legal lexicon" for 
more than a century, it has never been part of the legislative 
lingo in this state. 
No. 00-0330 
 
29
"statute of repose."14  The legislature does, however, use many 
other phrases to describe temporal limitations on actions.15  
Moreover, computer database searches of the statutes show the 
legislature has not used the words "repose," "statute of 
repose," or "statutes of repose" in the text of any statute in 
force.  It is apparent that the phrase "statute of repose" is 
judicial terminology and is not featured in legislative lingo.16 
                     
14 Even statutes that plainly operate as statutes of repose 
are not called such by the legislature.  Wis. Stat. § 893.66 
(six-year limitations on actions against accountants); Wis. 
Stat. § 893.71 (three-year limitation on action to contest the 
validity of a change of any county seat); Wis. Stat. § 893.91 
(two-year limitation on "action by a state or town . . . to 
recover expenses incurred in the suppression of a forest fire"). 
 The legislature neither labels these provisions as statutes of 
repose nor refers to them in that manner. 
As a further illustration, we have examined two bills that 
were unquestionably intended to create statutes of repose.  
Neither of the bills mentions the phrase "statute of repose" in 
the relating clause, the analysis by the LRB, or the text of the 
bill.  1993 Assembly Bill 531; 1991 Senate Bill 408. 
15 For example, the legislature has employed "period of 
limitation," Wis. Stat. § 893.04, "time limitation," Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(2) and (3), "statutes of limitation," Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.13 
(title), 
"statute 
of 
limitations," 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 893.135 
and 
893.137, 
and 
"law 
limiting 
the 
time 
for 
commencement of an action," Wis. Stat. §§ 893.14 and 893.15. 
16 The dissent alleges that we have failed to consider that 
the legislature is presumed to be aware of court decisions.  
Dissent at ¶81.  Thus, according to the dissent, "[h]ad the 
legislature intended that § 655.44(4) applied to statutes of 
repose, as well as statutes of limitations, the legislature 
would have so stated."  Id. 
No. 00-0330 
 
30
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
¶62 The phrase "[a]ny applicable statute of limitations" 
in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4)——the provision that tolls time 
limitations when a party requests mediation of a medical 
malpractice dispute——is ambiguous when considering whether it 
tolls an applicable statute of repose.  Judicial construction 
indicates the legislature intended that the five-year limitation 
in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) be tolled when a party requests 
mediation pursuant to § 655.44. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
                                                                  
The problem with this analysis is that the terms "statute 
of repose" and "statute of limitations" have long been two of 
the most confusing and interchangeably used terms in the law.  
See 
Francis 
E. 
McGovern, 
The 
Variety, 
Policy 
and 
Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 
Am. 
U. 
L. 
Rev. 
579, 
582-87, 
621 
(1981) 
(reviewing 
interchangeable use of the phrases "statute of repose" and 
"statute of limitations" and confusion over the meaning of a 
statute of repose).  As we said above, the legislature has not 
yet chosen to use the words "statute of repose." 
No. 00-0330 
 
31
 
 
 
 
No. 00-0330.awb 
 
1 
¶63 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring). I join the 
majority opinion in its entirety.  I write separately to address 
the dissenting opinion. 
¶64 In a spirited writing, the dissent continues in its 
attempt to ride the Makos17 train.  The dissent is either unable, 
or unwilling, to acknowledge that Makos has no precedential 
value.  Indeed, the Makos train never left the station.   
¶65 What the dissent fails to acknowledge is what this 
court readily admitted only seven days after the Makos opinion 
was released: Makos has no precedential value.  In Doe v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 334 n.11, 565 N.W.2d 
94 (1997), this court explained:  "[T]he only 'majority' holding 
in [Makos] is the mandate.  Of the four 'majority' justices, 
three separate opinions give three distinct reasons for the 
result.  Therefore, none of the opinions in that case has any 
precedential value."  (Emphasis added).   
¶66 The dissent continued to try to ride the Makos train 
last term in Aicher.  See Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. 
Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶¶86-92, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849 
(Crooks, J., dissenting).  Now, in the present case the dissent 
again attempts to stoke the Makos fires.  In footnote 13 the 
dissent laments that Aicher overruled Makos "just three years 
after that decision."  It erroneously suggests that Makos was 
precedent to overrule in the first instance.  Again, in footnote 
                     
17 Estate of Makos v. Wisconsin Health Care Fund, 211 
Wis. 2d 41, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997). 
No. 00-0330.awb 
 
2 
16, the dissent refuses to acknowledge that there was no 
majority opinion of precedential value in Makos.  See Aicher, 
2000 WI 98, ¶¶35-40 (explaining split decision in Makos and 
indicating that Makos "carries no precedential weight"); see 
also Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 280, 578 N.W.2d 166 
(1998) (Geske, J., concurring).   
¶67 The dissent's unwillingness to acknowledge the fate of 
Makos is symptomatic of its flawed approach in this case.  The 
dissent is unwilling to acknowledge that the term "statute of 
repose" is not part of the legislature's lexicon, but rather is 
a judicially created label used to describe a particular type of 
limitation on actions.  Instead, the dissent derides the 
majority, while all the time ignoring this critical distinction. 
¶68 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
1 
¶69 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (dissenting). The twists and 
turns the majority opinion engages in to allow Landis to 
continue her action are many.  The statutes governing mediation 
and the commencement of medical malpractice actions are plain on 
their faces.  Had Landis complied with them, her action would 
have been timely filed.  But she did not comply.  Consequently, 
the majority opinion retreats from the position that was 
strenuously championed just a year ago——that "[s]tatutes of 
repose 
are 
different 
from 
statutes 
of 
limitations," 
and 
"represent legislative policy decisions that dictate when the 
courthouse doors close for particular litigants."  Aicher v. 
Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶¶26-27, 237 Wis. 2d 
99, 613 N.W.2d 849 (emphasis added).18  Today, per the majority 
opinion, a "'statute of repose' is largely a judicial label."  
Majority op. at ¶5.  Last year, it was a legislative absolute.  
See Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶54.  The sad irony of today's decision 
is that it appears from the result that the majority is more 
concerned with keeping the door to the courthouse open for an 
adult who failed to follow the law, than slamming the courthouse 
                     
18 The majority opinion attempts to distinguish Aicher v. 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2000 WI 98, 237 Wis. 2d 
99, 613 N.W.2d 849, on the basis that Aicher pertained solely to 
the constitutionality of a statute of repose, where this case is 
about legislative intent.  See majority op. at ¶60 n.13.  
However, the constitutionality of the statute of repose in 
Aicher was wholly dependent upon legislative intent.  See, e.g., 
Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶¶46, 50, 53, 54.  If there is any 
distinction between the source for the majority's conclusions 
both here and in Aicher——namely, the legislature——it is a 
distinction without a difference.    
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
2 
door closed for a child with no other recourse.19  See id. at 
¶¶86-92 (Crooks, J., dissenting, joined by Bablitch, J.).  I 
respectfully dissent from such a course of action. 
¶70 Whether, as Landis argues, Wis. Stat. § 655.44 tolls 
the statute of repose in § 893.55(1)(b) is, as the majority 
acknowledges, a question of statutory interpretation. However, 
contrary to the majority's characterization of § 655.44(4), it 
is clear and unambiguous.  A request for mediation tolls the 
statute of limitations, not the statute of repose.  As the 
majority 
repeatedly 
indicated 
in 
Aicher, 
a 
statute 
of 
limitations is distinct from a statute of repose.  See 2000 WI 
98, ¶¶10, 26, 27, 28, 32, 46, 50, 53, 54, 60, 76, 77, 78, 83, 
85.  A statute of limitations "establishes the time frame within 
which a claim must be initiated after a cause of action actually 
accrues."  Id. at ¶26.  This time frame, also called "period of 
limitation" and "time limitation," is set by legislative 
statutes of limitations.  Statutes of limitations dictate the 
time "within which an action may be commenced . . . computed 
                     
19 In Aicher, Ame Aicher was blinded in one eye as a result 
of an eye condition that was found, but not treated, during her 
newborn examination. Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 
2000 WI 98, ¶8, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849.  The injury 
occurred within six months of the alleged negligent act.  Id. at 
¶7.  However, the injury was not discovered until Ame was 13 
years old.  By that time, according to the majority of the 
court, the applicable statutes of repose operated as a complete 
bar to any action, even though the doors to the courthouse had 
closed even before Ame realized that she had been injured.  The 
majority repeatedly invoked the idea that it was solely within 
the purview of the legislature to enact statutes of repose, 
which, as the legislature knew according to the majority, were 
significantly different than statutes of limitations. 
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
3 
from the time that the cause of action accrues until the action 
is commenced."20  Wis. Stat. § 893.04; see also majority op. at 
¶61 
n.15. 
 
The 
applicable 
time 
frame 
here, 
set 
by 
§ 893.55(1)(b), is one year from accrual, that is, one year from 
the date the injury was discovered, or should have been 
discovered.  Landis alleges that she discovered the alleged 
negligence that gave rise to her claim in February, 1999.  Her 
claim thus accrued then, and, to comply with the applicable 
statute of limitations, she would have had to file her action 
within a year.  She did.  Her action was filed on July 2, 1999. 
¶71 However, 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b) 
sets forth a 
statute of repose, that "an action may not be commenced under 
this paragraph more than 5 years from the date of the act or 
omission."  This was firmly, and repeatedly, established in 
Aicher.  See, e.g., 2000 WI 98, ¶¶10, 11, 26, 85.  The five-year 
repose provision has nothing to do with when a medical 
malpractice claim accrues.21  It is not a statute of limitations; 
it is a statute of repose.  "A statute of repose . . . limits 
the time period within which an action may be brought based on 
the date of the act or omission.  Statutes of repose thus bear 
no relation to the accrual of a cause of action and can toll 
                     
20 An action is commenced once it is filed with the court.  
Wis. Stat. § 893.02. 
21  Under Wis. Stat. § 893.55, a claim accrues when there 
has been an injury (sub. (1)(a)), the discovery of an injury 
(sub. (1)(b)), the discovery of a concealed act or omission 
(sub. (2)), or the discovery of a foreign object left in the 
body (sub. (3)). 
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
4 
before an injury is discovered or even before an injury has 
occurred." 
 Id. at ¶26 
(footnote 
omitted).  
In 
short, 
"[s]tatutes 
of 
repose 
are 
different 
from 
statutes 
of 
limitations."  Id.  Not only are statutes of repose different 
than statutes of limitations, they are legislative enactments, 
reflecting "policy considerations better left to the legislative 
branch of government."  Id. at ¶54; see also ¶27 ("statutes of 
repose represent legislative policy decisions that dictate when 
the courthouse doors close for particular litigants."); ¶46 
("The question of what the . . . statute of repose for a 
particular action should be is a fundamental question of public 
policy."); ¶50 ("This court has concluded many times that the 
legislature may sever a person's claim by  . . . a statute of 
repose . . . .").  Just last year, a statute of repose was not a 
"judicial label," or a form of "judicial terminology," as the 
majority states it is today.  See majority op. at ¶¶5, 61.  This 
should hold true here.  
¶72 Taking what the majority of the court said in Aicher at 
face value——that statutes of limitations are different from 
statutes of repose——a request for mediation under Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.44(4) tolls only the one-year-after-discovery limitation 
period, but not the five-years-after-act-or-omission period, in 
§ 893.55(1)(b).  Let us examine what alleged wrong would result 
from applying these precepts here.  
¶73 Landis was coming up against the five-year bar when 
she discovered the alleged negligence in February, 1999.  Her 
husband's surgery was on March 17, 1994 and he died on April 1, 
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
5 
1994.  The last possible date that would be five years after an 
act or omission pertaining to Landis' husband was April 1, 1999, 
and thus, that would be the last possible date to file an action 
not barred by the statute of repose.     
¶74 However, the majority does acknowledge that mediation 
is required before a medical malpractice claim proceeds.  
"Except as provided in s. 655.445, no court action may be 
commenced unless a request for mediation has been filed under 
this 
section 
and 
until 
the 
expiration 
of 
the 
mediation 
period. . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 655.44(5).  By the time Landis 
discovered the alleged negligence in February of 1999, Landis 
could not have waited until the 90-day mediation period expired 
to file her complaint.  May, 1999, would be too late. 
¶75 Yet, as the majority points out, Wis. Stat. § 655.44 
was not her only option; § 655.445, as a parallel provision, 
provided a choice.  See majority op. at ¶¶9, 19.  The 
legislature provided an exception to the requirement that 
mediation must be completed before an action is commenced in 
§ 655.445, and according to that choice, Landis could have filed 
her action first, and then completed mediation.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.445(1), (3).22 
                     
22 Contrary to the majority's conclusion, this option does 
not mean that mediation is foreclosed, nor does it favor 
litigation over mediation.  See majority op. at ¶53, 54.  
Rather, mediation still precedes active litigation.  "[N]o 
discovery may be made and no trial, pretrial conference or 
scheduling conference may be held until the expiration of the 
mediation period . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 655.445(3).    
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
6 
¶76 Landis needed only to have followed the law.  No 
grievous result would have occurred in this case, had the 
majority held to the position that was espoused in Aicher.  
Unlike the situation in Aicher, Landis was left with a right, 
but no remedy.  See 2000 WI 98, ¶¶86-92 (Crooks, J., dissenting, 
joined by Bablitch, J.). 
¶77 The fact that the legislature specifically provided an 
exception to mediation-before-litigation indicates that the 
legislature contemplated that some plaintiffs may be nearing the 
five-year repose bar, when they contemplate filing a medical 
malpractice claim.  By permitting such plaintiffs to commence 
their action in conjunction with a request for mediation 
(pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 655.445), rather than after the 
mediation period (pursuant to § 655.44), the legislature kept 
intact the impact of the statute of repose in § 893.55(1)(b).  
If the legislature intended § 655.44(4) to toll the statute of 
repose, there would have been no need to provide a statutory 
exception for plaintiffs approaching the expiration of time to 
commence their medical malpractice actions.  The majority ought 
not to disregard the language and corresponding self-evident 
legislative purpose of § 655.44 and § 655.445, in preference to 
an alternative purpose constructed on sheer speculation.  "Such 
reasoning is tantamount to declaring that all legislative 
decisions regarding time limitation periods are void unless the 
legislature 
agrees 
with 
this 
court's 
assessment 
of 
what 
constitutes good public policy."  Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 
245, 260, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998).   
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
7 
¶78 The alternative purpose offered by the majority is 
that the legislature intended to provide medical malpractice 
claimants with what appears to be a strategic tactic, that is, 
claimants could either "first fil[e] a mediation request" to 
"demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with a defendant," or 
"first commenc[e] an action" "to demonstrate the gravity of a 
matter."  See majority op. at ¶58.  In enacting legislation, I 
would not impute to the legislature a motive or purpose of 
considering alternative approaches which reflect the claimant's 
attitude toward the defendant or toward his or her claim.  
Instead, I would assume that the legislature considers foremost 
sound public policy, e.g., "prompt litigation ensures fairness 
to the parties."23  Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶53.  Moreover, the 
majority's strategy-based purpose runs counter to the point of 
mediation, which is "an informal, nontechnical, inexpensive and 
expedient . . . process to assist in resolving disputes without 
litigation."  See 1985 Wis. Act 340 (which enacted Wis. Stat. 
§§ 655.44 and 655.445), Drafting File, Report on Patients 
Compensation Panels; Mediation, VII.A.  Nonetheless, the alleged 
purpose of the legislature that the majority offers does not 
correspond 
to 
the 
language 
of 
the 
statutes. 
 
Section    
655.445(3) 
also 
requires 
mediation 
before 
the 
litigation 
proceeds, even though an action has been filed.  The majority's 
tendered purpose also does not explain the exception in 
                     
23 I would also impute to the legislature a motive or 
purpose that, by its statutory enactments, it demonstrates "the 
gravity" that it attaches to every medical malpractice claim.  
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
8 
§ 655.44(5), which allows a claimant to file an action before 
mediation. 
¶79 The majority claims that "[l]ittle would be gained" by 
applying the distinction between the statute of repose and the 
statute of limitations in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b), which was 
made plain by this court in Aicher.  Majority op. at ¶53.  If 
applied, however, § 893.55(1)(b)'s repose provision would remain 
in full force, undiluted.  That is, no action would be commenced 
more than five years after the underlying act or omission.  
Apparently, 
this 
is 
just 
what 
the 
legislature 
intended, 
according to the Judicial Council Committee's Note accompanying 
the enactment of § 893.55(1):  "Subsection (1) further provides 
that in no event may a malpractice action be commenced later 
than 6 [5] years from the time of the alleged act or omission."24 
 Ch. 323, Laws of 1979.  
¶80 Wisconsin Stat. § 655.44 also would remain intact, and 
in full force.  It would be applied to toll the three-year-
after-discovery and the one-year-after-discovery-of-injury or 
concealment 
or 
foreign 
object 
limitations 
periods 
in 
§ 893.55(1), (2), and (3).  Similarly, § 655.445 would fulfill 
one of its self-evident purposes, which is to permit the timely 
commencement of medical malpractice claims that accrued under 
the discovery rule in § 893.55(1)(b), and simultaneously promote 
the laudable goal of mediating those claims before active 
                     
24 An amendment to the original bill changed the repose 
period from six to five years.  
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
9 
litigation ensues.  The maxims of statutory construction which 
this court normally adheres to would be complied with, not 
ignored.  A "fundamental rule of statutory construction requires 
that effect be given, if possible, to every word, clause, and 
sentence in a statute, and that a construction resulting in any 
portion of a statute being superfluous should be avoided 
whenever possible."  Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 2000 WI 
41, ¶30, 234 Wis. 2d 587, 601, 610 N.W.2d 467.  Similarly, 
statutes are examined in pari materia, not in isolation.25  
Moreover, the holding in Aicher that statutes of repose are 
different than statutes of limitations would remain intact. 
¶81 At the time the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. 
§§ 655.44 and 655.445 in 1986,26 the term "statute of repose" had 
been part of the legal lexicon for over 100 years.  See 
                     
25 "In construing a statute, the entire section and related 
sections 
are 
to 
be 
considered 
in 
its 
construction 
or 
interpretation.  . . .  Sections of statutes relating to the 
same subject matter must be construed in pari materia."  State 
v. Clausen, 105 Wis. 2d 231, 244, 313 N.W.2d 819 (1982) 
(internal citations omitted).    
26 See 1985 Wis. Act 340, from May, 1986 Special Session.  
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
10
Pritchard v. Howell, 1 Wis. 131, 138 (1853).27  The court has, 
during this time, indicated that what distinguishes a statute of 
repose from a statute of limitations is that the former "limits 
the time period in which an action can be brought based on the 
date of an act or omission."  Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶26; see also 
McMillan v. Wehle, 55 Wis. 685, 694, 13 N.W. 694 (1882); Tomczak 
v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 252, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998).  Had the 
legislature intended that § 655.44(4) applied to statutes of 
repose, as well as statutes of limitations, the legislature 
would have so stated.  Indeed, the majority ignores the fact 
that the legislature is presumed to enact laws with full 
                     
27 In the first volume of Wisconsin Reports, this court 
first examined a statute of repose and stated that "[i]ts 
enactment is held by all to be within the constitutional power 
of the legislature."  Pritchard v. Howell, 1 Wis. 131, 138 
(1853).  Since then, according to my research, this court has 
referred to statutes of repose in 45 decisions from Pritchard in 
1853 up through the present.  See, e.g., McMillan v. Wehle, 55 
Wis. 685, 687, 694, 13 N.W. 694 (1882); Bekkedal v. Viroqua, 183 
Wis. 176, 185, 196 N.W. 879 (1924); Gamma Tau Educational 
Foundation v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 41 Wis. 2d 675, 684, 165 
N.W.2d 135 (1969); Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, ¶49, 242 Wis. 2d 
507, 625 N.W.2d 860.  My research has also found that the court 
of appeals has referred to statutes of repose in 26 decisions, 
some unpublished.  A sampling of the published cases are:  
Kohnke v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 2d 80, 85, 
410 N.W.2d 585 (1987); Miller v. Kretz, 191 Wis. 2d 573, 583, 
531 N.W.2d 93 (1995); and Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 
2001 WI App 21, ¶18, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776 (following 
Aicher). 
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
11
knowledge of decisions of this court.28  See Glinski v. Sheldon, 
88 Wis. 2d 509, 519-20, 276 N.W.2d 815 (1979).  The majority 
should have acknowledged that the legislature meant what it said 
when it limited the tolling provision in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4) 
to statutes of limitations.29 
¶82 The majority seems to think that extending the repose 
period 90 days or so——the length of the mediation period——is no 
big deal for the medical malpractice defendant.  See majority 
op. at ¶53.  But Wis. Stat. §§ 655.44, 655.445 and 893.55 all 
reflect the legislature's "goal of limiting the 'long tail' of 
liability 
of 
those 
who 
actually 
provide 
health 
care 
to 
patients."  Estate of Makos v. Wisconsin Health Care Fund, 211 
Wis. 2d 
41, 
76, 
564 
N.W.2d 
662 
(1997) 
(Bradley, 
J., 
                     
28 The majority opinion counters this long-held assumption 
with the argument that there is no evidence that "legislative 
lingo" has included the term "statute of repose."  See majority 
op. at ¶61.  Apparently, that fact, if true, was immaterial to 
the 
majority 
in 
Aicher——much 
to 
Ame 
Aicher's 
detriment.  
Nonetheless, the majority opinion refers to two bills "that were 
unquestionably intended to create statutes of repose," but did 
not include that phrase.  Majority op. at ¶61 n.14.  However, 
neither of these bills, 1993 Assembly Bill 531 and 1991 Senate 
Bill 408, were enacted into law, so we have no way of knowing, 
clearly and unquestionably, what the legislature intended.  
29 Notably, Aicher is seen as one of the most important 
decisions 
from this court's 
2000 
term.  
See 
Daniel W. 
Hildebrand, 2000 Significant Court Decisions, Wisconsin Lawyer 
18, 20 (June 2001).  However, what seemed clear to the majority 
in Aicher——the difference between statutes of repose and 
statutes of limitations——is not so clear after the majority's 
opinion here today.  This leaves the bench and bar, and 
legislature, at sea as to the distinction between statutes of 
repose and statutes of limitations.   
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
12
dissenting).30  Aicher emphatically reiterated throughout the 
opinion that 
the 
legislature provided 
medical 
malpractice 
claimants a right to pursue their claim only up to five years 
after the act or omission as evidenced by the statute of repose 
in § 893.55(1)(b).  See, e.g., 2000 WI 98, ¶50, 53, 54.  Ame 
Aicher had no right to pursue her claim because "[n]o right to 
remedy resides here because the legislature expressly chose not 
to recognize a right based on a claim discovered more than five 
years after the allegedly negligent act or omission . . . ."  
Id. at ¶54.  As the majority in Aicher aptly observed, "[w]ere 
we to extend a right to remedy outside the limits of these 
recognized rights, we effectively would eviscerate the ability 
of the legislature to enact any statute of repose."  2000 WI 98, 
¶54.  Yet, this may be exactly the result of what the majority 
has done here today.  
¶83 The majority's conclusion that statutes of repose are 
one and the same as statutes of limitations not only contradicts 
                     
30 Aicher "adopt[ed] much of Justice Bradley's dissent in 
Makos" to overrule Estate of Makos v. Wisconsin Health Care 
Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997) just three years 
after that decision.  See Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶40.  Regardless 
of what the concurrence may think that Aicher did to Makos (see 
concurring op. at ¶66), at least the majority in Aicher agreed 
that "our decision . . . expressly overrules Makos.”  Id. at 
¶68.  Indeed, the concurring opinion here presents the classic 
red herring.  This case, and this dissent, are not Makos 
revisited.  Rather, they are about a majority saying that 
statutes of repose and statutes of limitations are different one 
year, and then saying the next year, no, they are not.  A 
metaphor, even a mixed one, cannot make a dissenting opinion 
something it is not.  The debate in regard to Article I, Section 
9 of the Wisconsin Constitution is left for another day. 
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
13
Aicher, but its conclusion becomes only a matter of  "judicial 
label[ling], " so that a difference that existed just last year 
ceases to exist today.  First, the majority regales us with 
various definitions of "statute of limitations" and "statute of 
repose" to establish that the term "statute of limitations" in 
Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4) is ambiguous.31  Plainly, these terms were 
not ambiguous to the majority in Aicher.  See 2000 WI 98, ¶¶26-
28, 46, 50, 54.  Aicher recognized that the legislature was 
scrupulous in its construction of the medical malpractice 
statutory scheme.  Id. at ¶21.  Here, however, the majority 
usurps the legislature's authority by creating a judicially-
manufactured exception, permitting Landis to pursue her claim 
after the repose period had expired, even though she had an 
adequate opportunity to commence her action timely. 
¶84 The majority's opinion also does not interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55(2) and (3) correctly.  These subdivisions are not 
                     
31 The 
majority 
claims 
that 
it 
examines 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary because the court of appeals relied upon it.  
Majority op. at ¶27.  However, the court of appeals refers to 
Black's in an introductory footnote.  See Landis v. Physicians 
Ins. Co. of Wis., 2000 WI App 164, ¶5 n.4, 238 N.W.2d 190, 616 
N.W.2d 910.  It does not rely upon Black's for its analysis.  
Nonetheless, the distinction that the court of appeals makes 
between statutes of repose and statutes of limitations, is the 
same as the distinction this court made in Aicher.  See Landis, 
2000 WI App 164, ¶¶5, 6.  Perhaps, if Aicher had been decided 
prior to the court of appeals decision below, the court of 
appeals would have relied upon it. It is also noteworthy that 
here, as well as before the court of appeals, the parties did 
not assert that the term "statute of limitations" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.44(4) was ambiguous.  Landis, 2000 WI App 164, ¶8.  Only 
the majority, using subtle differences in various editions of 
Black's, finds the term ambiguous. 
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
14
exceptions which override the five-year repose provision in sub. 
(1)(b).  See majority op. at ¶¶38-41.  Rather, subdivisions (2) 
and (3) provide exemptions to the injury or discovery of injury 
accrual statutes of limitations in sub. (1).  See Aicher, 2000 
WI 98, ¶10 n.4.  Instead, the five-year repose provision does 
not apply to actions arising under sub. (2) and (3), so there is 
no limit to override.  The five-year repose provision appears to 
apply only to the discovery rule of accrual in sub. (b), even 
though, arguably, it also applies to the injury rule of accrual 
in sub. (a).  See Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, ¶49, 242 Wis. 2d 
507, 625 N.W.2d 860. 
¶85 The majority opinion also claims that there is nothing 
in the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 655.44 and § 655.445 
which supports the conclusion that I find self-evident; namely, 
that § 655.44(4) tolls only the statute of limitations, and not 
the statute of repose, in § 893.55.  However, the same law that 
enacted §§ 655.44 and 655.445, also amended § 893.55.  See 1985 
Wis. Act 340, §§ 72, 72b (created subs. (4) and (5) of 
§ 893.55).  It is reasonable to infer that the legislature 
created §§ 655.44(5) and § 655.445, in part, to accommodate the 
statute of repose in § 893.55(1)(b) that was also before the 
legislature at the same time. 
¶86 It is also important to consider information from the 
Legislative Reference Bureau's drafting file for the 1985 Wis. 
Act 340, which established the mediation scheme now in force.  
The legislature enacted a number of nonstatutory provisions to 
ensure "an orderly and equitable transfer of pending patients 
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
15
compensation panel controversies to courts."  1985 Wis. Act 340, 
§ 73.  One of these provisions required that any pending claim 
before the panel had to be filed with a court within 60 days, 
"[i]f the claimant wishes to proceed with the malpractice 
claim."  Id. at § 73(2)(c)a.  The tolling provision then in 
effect would extend only through that 60-day period:  "Any 
applicable 
statute 
of 
limitations 
tolled 
under 
section 
655.04(6), 1983 stats., shall remain tolled until the expiration 
of the 60-day period."  Id.  Evidently, whatever effect the 
tolling provision in § 655.04(6) had, if any, upon the statute 
of repose in § 893.55(1)(b),32 that effect was to end shortly 
after the mediation scheme became effective.  1985 Wis. Act 340 
wiped the slate clean.  Pending claims, which may have run afoul 
of the five-year statute of repose, had to be filed before 
mediation was requested.  1985 Wis. Act 340, § 73(2)(c)b.  
"Beginning September 1, 1986," new claims had to follow the 
                     
32 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) was enacted in 1979, 
effective July 1, 1980.  Ch. 323, Laws of 1979.  Section 655.04 
was enacted earlier, in 1975.  Ch. 37, Laws of 1975 (see 
majority op. at ¶47.)  The statute of limitations that § 655.04 
would have tolled was § 893.205.  (The same law that enacted 
§ 893.55(1)(b) amended and renumbered § 893.205 as § 893.54.  
Ch. 323, Laws of 1979.)  Section 893.205 provided that "[a]n 
action to recover damages for injuries to the person for such 
injuries sustained on and after July 1, 1955 . . . ." must be 
brought within three years after the cause of action accrued.  
Rod v. Farrell, 96 Wis. 2d 349, 350-51, 291 N.W.2d 568 (1980) 
(overruled in part by Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 
550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983)).  This statute of limitations was 
tied to the accrual of the cause of action (see id. at 351, 
n.3), 
and 
did 
not 
include 
a 
statute 
of 
repose, 
like 
§ 893.55(1)(b) does.    
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
16
procedure provided in §§ 655.44 and 655.445.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 655.44(1), § 655.445(1).  In other words, new claims had to 
comply with the statute of repose in § 893.55(1)(b).  Regardless 
of how Wis. Stat. § 655.04 may have operated on the statute of 
repose in § 893.55(1)(b)——and we do not know since we were never 
confronted with that issue——§ 655.04 is not before us today.  
Instead, before us are §§ 655.44 and 655.445, wherein the 
legislature provided the means to require claimants to engage in 
mediation and comply with statutes of repose simultaneously.   
¶87 Ironically, Landis did not need the majority to engage 
in the twists and turns it does here to preserve her claim. She 
just had to follow the law.  There are a number of statutory 
schemes that require litigants to navigate various time periods, 
one of which is chapter 655.  See Tamminen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 109 Wis. 2d 536, 546, 327 N.W.2d 55 (1982).  Here, "each 
statute may be complied with without violating the other."  Id. 
 Aicher warned practitioners to "take cautious note of the 
potential impact of [statutes of repose] for their clients."  
2000 WI 98, ¶31 n.9.  Had Landis' counsel carefully reviewed and 
interpreted the interplay among the applicable statutes, Landis 
may have timely commenced her action, in accord with legislative 
dictates. 
¶88 It is especially difficult for me to accept the 
majority's device of characterizing a statute of repose as only 
a "judicial label" now, when the statute of repose was 
championed as a legislative mandate just last year to foreclose 
a child's opportunity for redress.  See Aicher, 2000 WI 98.  
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
17
Extinguishing a plaintiff's claim where the plaintiff had no 
opportunity to discover her injury prior to the running of the 
five-year statute of repose is problematic.  More problematic is 
saving a plaintiff who discovers her injury before the end of 
the five-year period and yet chooses to postpone commencing her 
action.  By circumventing the law as legislated and devising a 
way for Landis' claim to proceed, this court adds to the 
injustice it allowed to occur in Aicher.   
¶89 Even though the majority opinion ostensibly withdraws 
from Aicher, it fails to acknowledge that, last year, the 
constitutionality of the statute of repose in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b) depended upon the fact that that statute was 
enacted 
by 
the 
legislature, 
not 
that 
§ 895.55(1)(b) 
was 
determined to be a statute of repose by means of "judicial 
terminology."  See Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶¶41-84; see also 
majority op. at ¶63.  Granted, the constitutionality of the 
statute of repose in § 893.55(1)(b) is not at issue here, 
because Landis discovered the alleged injury before the statute 
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
18
of repose had foreclosed her remedy.33  Nonetheless, the only 
principled way for the majority to reach the result it does 
today is to confront, not ignore, the underlying basis for the 
constitutionality of § 893.55(1)(b)'s statute of repose.  For 
the reasons herein, I respectfully dissent. 
                     
33 The author of this dissent has previously called into 
question the constitutionality of the statute of repose in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) where the statute foreclosed a remedy for 
an injury before that injury had even been discovered.  See, 
e.g., Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶¶86-92 (Crooks, J., dissenting, 
joined by Bablitch, J.); see also Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 59-68  
(the application of the statute of repose in § 893.55(1)(b) 
violates Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
insofar as it deprives one of the right to a remedy) (Crooks, 
J., concurring with the lead opinion by J. Steinmetz as to 
Article I, Section 9).  Justice Bablitch, joined by Justice 
Wilcox, concurred with the majority in Makos based upon the 
language in Wis. Stat. § 893.55.  211 Wis. 2d at 55-59.  Justice 
Wilcox also joined the majority in Aicher.  However, Justice 
Wilcox joins this dissent because the real error here is the 
misapplication of Aicher, not the foreclosure of a remedy before 
the injury is discovered. 
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
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¶90 I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this opinion. 
 
 
No. 00-0330.npc 
 
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