Case Title: IN THE DISCIPLINARY MATTER OF BILLINGS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE DISCIPLINARY MATTER OF BILLINGS2001 WY 8130 P.3d 557Case Number: 99-218Decided: 08/31/2001

April Term, A.D. 2001

 
IN 
THE DISCIPLINARY MATTER OF

JOHN 
R. BILLINGS, d/b/a OPEN

CREEK 
OUTFITTING, LICENSED

OUTFITTER, 
LICENSE NO. BG-295

 

AND

 

JOHN 
R. BILLINGS, d/b/a OPEN

CREEK 
OUTFITTING,

 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

                                                                                    

WYOMING 
BOARD OF OUTFITTERS AND

GUIDES,

 

Appellee(Respondent).

 

W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certification 

from 
the District Court of Park County:

The 
Honorable H. Hunter Patrick, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

S. 
Joseph Darrah of Darrah & Darrah, P.C., Powell, WY and Daniel B. Frank of 
Frank Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, WY.  
Argument by Mr. Frank.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; John 
S. Burbridge, Assistant Attorney General; Angela C. Dougherty, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Burbridge.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and MACY,* GOLDEN, and HILL,  JJ.

 *Retired 
June 2, 2000.

  

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice.

 [¶1]      Based on 
complaints from dissatisfied clients of outfitter John R. Billings (Billings), 
the Wyoming State Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides (Board), after 
four days of hearings, revoked Billings' outfitter's license.  We reverse and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Billings presents 
this statement of the issues:

 

A.  Did the Wyoming Board of Outfitters and 
Professional Guides (Board) make adequate findings of fact in its order revoking 
the Appellant's outfitting license to show that it weighed conflicting evidence 
and made a reasoned decision sufficient to permit judicial review of the Board's 
reasoning?

 

B.  Upon judicial review of the entire 
record is there substantial evidence showing that the Board met its burden to 
prove its case with clear and convincing evidence?

 

C.  Did the Board properly promulgate 
regulations containing adequate objective standards to permit judicial review of 
the agency's conclusions of law in its order?

 

D.  Did the Board exceed its statutory 
authority when it promulgated regulations which expand the reach and effect of 
the regulations upon the Appellant beyond the clear meaning of the authorizing 
statute?

 

E.  Did the Board fail to comply with the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act when it incorporated Federal Regulations by 
reference in the absence of the procedures required by W.S. 
§16-3-103(h)?

 

F.  Did the Board violate the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act and constitutional notice requirements when it 
found Appellant violated certain regulations which it did not allege in its 
complaint?

 

G.  In the event that the Court upholds any 
of the Board's factual findings and corresponding regulations, did the Board 
adequately explain how it applied its findings of fact to the law so as to 
permit judicial review of the Board's ultimate legal 
conclusions?

 

H.  Is Appellant entitled to judgment 
declaring that certain provisions in the outfitters act and the Board's 
commensurate regulations are constitutionally void for vagueness and over 
breadth in accordance with the Declaratory Judgments Act?

 

I.  Is Appellant entitled to judgment 
declaring that the Board has not been properly been [sic] delegated authority to 
adjudicate matters properly devoted to the jurisdiction of the Courts or other 
agencies?

 

As 
appellee, the Board articulates this statement of the 
issues:

 

I.  Whether 
the decision of the Wyoming State Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides 
revoking Appellant's license was proper under Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-114.

 

II.  Whether 
Appellant improperly used the "statement of facts" portion of his brief for 
legal argument in violation of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.

 

III.  Whether 
the Appellant's complaint for declaratory judgment was improperly joined with 
Appellant's petition for relief.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Appellant 
Billings is an outfitter licensed by the Board.  Billings has provided commercial 
outfitting services in the Bridger-Teton National Forest since the early 
1980s.  His business consists of 
outfitting hunters, through the use of horses and mules, into an area near the 
southeast corner of Yellowstone Park, in the Thorofare River Drainage.  There, Billings maintains two hunting 
camps.  His lower hunting camp is 
approximately 37-39 miles from the Ishawooa Creek Trailhead while his upper 
hunting camp is located 30-32 miles from that trailhead.  Billings also maintains a "layover" camp 
along the Ishawooa Creek Trail, where clients stop overnight en route to the 
hunting camps.  The hunting camps 
may also be reached by way of a trail known as the Deer Creek Trail. 

 

[¶4]      On July 20, 1998, 
the Board filed a complaint against Billings seeking censure, suspension, or 
revocation of Billings' outfitter's license.  The Board's complaint was based on 
written complaints from hunters who hired Billings' during the 1996 and 1997 
hunting seasons.  The Board's 
complaint first alleged that Billings acted unethically and dishonorably in the 
treatment of, and correspondence with, his clients.  The complaint next alleged that Billings 
had willfully endangered his clients.  
One endangerment allegation asserted the abandonment of clients on Deer 
Creek Trail as the clients packed out of camp.  The other willful endangerment 
allegation asserted Billings had permitted a client to lead a troublesome mule, 
Mel, along the trail and that the client was eventually kicked in the chest by 
the mule. (The evidence produced at the hearing indicated that the client, Dan 
Nutsch, was actually kicked by the mule he had been riding, Bo, when he 
dismounted Bo in order to gather up troublesome Mel.)

 

[¶5]      The complaint also 
alleged that Billings had violated significant federal regulations pertaining to 
wildlife, game, and fish by (1) improperly disposing of a mule carcass, in 
violation of 36 C.F.R. 261.58(s); and (2) caching items in the wilderness 
without permission from the United States Forest Service in violation of 36 
C.F.R. 261.57(f).  
The complaint further alleged that Billings had failed to maintain neat 
and sanitary camps and that Billings had substantially breached his contract 
with his clients by, inter alia, utilizing hunting guides who were not properly 
trained and by failing to maintain a sufficient number of employees in 
camp.  The 
complaint finally alleged that Billings had treated his livestock in an inhumane 
fashion.  

 

[¶6]      After four days of 
hearings, held December 11, 1998, and February 2-4, 1999, the Board issued its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on April 22, 1999, revoking Billings' 
outfitters license.  
The Board's Findings of Fact included:

 

3.  On or about October 10, 1997, John R. 
Billings did act unethically and dishonorably by calling his clients names such 
as "son of a bitch"; by challenging clients to a fight when disagreements arose; 
and by assaulting a client at the trailhead.

 

4.  On or about October 10, 1997, John R. 
Billings did willfully endanger the health and safety of clients, in that he 
abandoned one of his clients, Sandra Ditzler, on the Deer Creek Trail.

5.  On or about September 8, 1997, John R. 
Billings did willfully endanger the health and safety of clients in that he 
permitted Dan Nutsch to be injured while caring for livestock which belonged to 
John R. Billings, and which should have been properly cared for by employees of 
John R. Billings, while traveling into camp.

 

6.  On or about August 25, 1997, John R. Billings 
did violate significant federal regulations pertaining to Wildlife, game and 
fish in that he did fail to properly dispose of the carcass of a dead mule as 
required by 36 C.F.R. 261.58(s), Special Order, relating to Grizzly Bears, 
properly issued by the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest 
Service.

 

7.  During the Fall of 1997, John R. Billings 
failed to maintain a sanitary camp in that he permitted livestock to remain in 
and near the camp water supply utilized for human consumption; and leave 
excrement near the water supply in violation of the rules and regulations of the 
Board.

 

8.   John R. Billings breached his contracts with 
clients by failing to be responsible for the actions of his employees and 
professional guides in that he failed to properly provide supervision for his 
employees in handling of livestock while transporting hunters to camp; failed to 
provide adequate training for his employees in the handling of livestock; and by 
his lack of attendance at camp, failed to supervise or adequately provide for 
the supervision of the activities of his employees while they were in camp; 
failed to provide adequate professional outfitting and guide services at his 
camps, and while on the trail to and from his camp; failed to provide adequate 
employees and guides to properly run his camps; and causing clients to lose 
hunting time they had contracted for because of his lack of adequate employees 
and guides. 

 

[¶7]      The Board's order 
also includes conclusions of law that are virtually identical to these findings 
of fact.  Those 
conclusions provided:  

 

4.  John R. Billings did act unethically and 
dishonorably by calling his clients names such as "son of a bitch"; by 
challenging clients to a fight when disagreements arose; and by assaulting a 
client at the trailhead in violation of § 23-2-416(a)(v) and (x) W.S. 1998 and 
Chapter 3, Section 1(o) and (t), Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming State 
Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides.

 

5.  John R. Billings did willfully endanger the 
health and safety of clients, in that he abandoned one of his clients, Sandra 
Ditzler, on the Deer Creek Trail in violation of § 23-2-416(a)(ix) and (x) W.S. 
1998 and Chapter 3, Section 1(k), (o) and (t), Rules and Regulations of the 
Wyoming State Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides.

6.  John R. Billings did willfully endanger the 
health and safety of clients in that he permitted a hunter, Dan Nutsch, to be 
injured while caring for livestock which belonged to John R. Billings, and which 
should have been properly cared for by employees of John R. Billings, while 
traveling into camp in violation of § 23-2-416(a)(ix) and (x) W.S. 1998 and 
Chapter 3, Section 1(k), (o) and (t), Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming State 
Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides.

 

7.  John R. Billings did violate significant 
federal regulations pertaining to wildlife, game and fish in that he did fail to 
properly dispose of the carcass of a dead mule as required by regulations 
relating to Grizzly Bears, 36 C.F.R. 261.58(s), Special Order, properly issued 
by the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service in violation of § 
23-2-416(a)(iv) and (x) W.S. 1998 and Chapter 3, Section 1(e) and (t), Rules and 
Regulations of the Wyoming State Board of Outfitters and Professional 
Guides.

 

8.  John R. Billings failed to maintain a 
sanitary camp in that he permitted livestock to remain in and near the camp 
water supply utilized for human consumption; and leave excrement near the water 
supply in violation of § 23-2-416(a)(ix) and (x) W.S. 1998 and Chapter 3, 
Section 1(n), (o) and (t), Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming State Board of 
Outfitters and Professional Guides.

 

9.   John R. Billings breached his contracts with 
clients by failing to be responsible for the actions of his employees and 
professional guides in that he failed to properly provide supervision for his 
employees in handling of livestock while transporting hunters to camp; failed to 
provide adequate training for his employees in the handling of livestock; and by 
his lack of attendance at camp, failed to supervise or adequately provide for 
the supervision of the activities of his employees while they were in camp; 
failed to provide adequate professional outfitting and guide services at his 
camps, and while on the trail to and from his camp; failed to provide adequate 
employees and guides to properly run his camps; and causing clients to lose 
hunting time they had contracted for because of this lack of adequate employees 
and guides in violation of § 23-2-412(d), 23-2-416(a)(vi) and (x) W.S. 1998 and 
Chapter 3, Section 1(k), (p) and (t), Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming State 
Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides. 

 

[¶8]      The Board also 
specifically found and concluded that Billings did not engage in the inhumane 
treatment of his livestock.  The Board did not make any findings regarding 
the allegation that Billings had illegally cached items in the wilderness. 

 

[¶9]      Billings filed a 
combined petition for review and complaint for declaratory judgment with the 
district court, which certified the case pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09.  After hearing oral 
argument in this matter, this court granted Billings' motion to stay the 
enforcement of the Board's revocation order.  W.R.A.P. 12.05.  

 

 

 

[¶10]   The standards for judicial review of 
agency action are set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 
2001):

 

(c)        To the 
extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  
In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of 
the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court shall:

 

(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed; and

 

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings 
and conclusions found to be:

 

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law;

 

(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

 

(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or 
limitations or lacking statutory right; 

 

(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; or

 

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed 
on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute. 

 

[¶11]   A disciplinary proceeding before a 
licensing board is an adversary proceeding where the burden is on the 
complaining party to present its case in a proper manner and to state with 
precision the charges against the licensee.  Dorr v. Wyoming Board of Certified Public 
Accountants, 2001 WY 37 ¶8, 21 P.3d 735 ¶8 (Wyo. 2001); Devous v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 416 (Wyo. 1993).  Those charges must 
be established by clear and convincing evidence.  Id.; Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 939-40 (Wyo. 2000). 

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶12]   In addressing Billings' numerous 
contentions, we will first address those issues related to the petition for 
review of agency action.  We will then address the declaratory judgment 
action.  

Adequacy of the Board's findings of fact

 

[¶13]   Billings contends the Board's findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are insufficient to permit appellate review.  We agree.  Wyoming law requires that suspension and revocation 
proceedings before the Board be conducted in accordance with the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(c) (LexisNexis 
2001).  WAPA, in turn, 
requires that a final decision in a contested case include findings of fact and 
conclusions of law:

 

A 
final decision or order adverse to a party in a contested case shall be in 
writing or dictated into the record.  The final decision shall include findings of 
fact and conclusions of law separately stated.  Findings of fact if set forth in statutory 
language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the 
underlying facts supporting the findings. 

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 
(LexisNexis 2001).  
The purpose of § 16-3-110 is "to require the articulation of basic facts 
from which ultimate findings of fact are determined in order to facilitate 
judicial review."   Harris v. 
Wyoming State Tax Comm'n, 718 P.2d 49, 51 (Wyo. 1986).  Expounding on that 
theme, this court has ruled that, "[i]t is insufficient for an administrative 
agency to state only an ultimate fact or conclusion, but each ultimate fact or 
conclusion must be thoroughly explained in order for a court to determine upon 
what basis each ultimate fact or conclusion was reached.  The court must know 
the why."  Geraud v. Schrader, 531 P.2d 872, 879 (Wyo.), cert. 
denied 423 U.S. 904, 96 S. Ct. 205, 46 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1975); Billings v. Wyoming State Bd. of Outfitters & 
Professional Guides, 837 P.2d 84, 86 (Wyo. 1992).

 

[¶14]   Turning to the Board's findings, we 
focus first on finding of fact four, where the Board found Billings had 
endangered the health and safety of Sandra Ditzler by abandoning her on the Deer 
Creek Trail.  
Initially, it is problematic that this finding does not explain how 
Ditzler's health and safety were endangered by Billings' actions.  Moreover, even if 
this court presumes that abandoning a client on a trail is tantamount to 
endangering the health and safety of the client, the Board's findings regarding 
abandonment are inadequate.  The Board does not provide any underlying 
facts to support its finding of ultimate factthat Ditzler was abandoned.  On this issue, we 
find guidance in previous cases:

 

In 
construing the statutory requirements this court has had occasion to distinguish 
basic facts from ultimate facts.  In First National 
Bank of Worland v. Financial Institutions Board, supra, 616 P.2d [787] at 
795 [Wyo. 1980], we identified the size of a town, the nature of business 
activity, and a projected increase in sales tax as basic facts.  On the other hand, 
findings that the evidence did not demonstrate waste and that the evidence did 
not establish cause are ultimate facts.  Pan American 
Petroleum Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, [446 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1968)].  In Powell v. Board of 
Trustees of Crook County School District No. 1, Crook County, supra, 550 
P.2d [2221] at 1119-1120 [(Wyo. 1976)], we addressed a finding that "the 
contestant has been unable to control the conduct of his students," and we said, 
"This is a conclusion and not a finding!"

 

Westates Const. Co. v. Sheridan 
County Sch. Dist. No. 2, Bd. of Trustees, 719 P.2d 1366, 1371 (Wyo. 1986).  Here, we view the 
finding that Ditzler was abandoned on the trail as a finding of ultimate 
fact.  
Billings' defense to the charge was that he did not abandon Ditzler 
because he planned to check on Ditzler's progress after he delivered his 
livestock to the trailhead and that Ditzler had been left in good hands, with 
her husband and with a client who was known to possess wilderness survival 
skills.  In 
addition, there was a dispute in the evidence regarding Ditzler's distance from 
the trailhead when Billings proceeded ahead without her.  Nevertheless, the 
Board articulates no basic facts to support its ultimate finding that Billings' 
actions amounted to abandonment.  Finding four fails to comply with Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-3-110.

 

[¶15]   Finding number six is likewise 
inadequate.  
Although the Board there concludes that Billings violated a significant 
federal regulation by failing to properly dispose of a mule carcass, it does not 
identify how Billings failed to properly dispose of the carcass.  The quoted federal 
regulation prohibits a person from possessing or leaving unattended any animal 
carcass unless the carcass is (1) at least one half mile from any sleeping area, 
trail, or recreation site; or (2) at least 100 yards from any sleeping area, 
trail or recreation site and acceptably stored; or (3) being eaten, being 
prepared for eating or being transported.  However, the Board's findings do not reveal 
how or why Billings' disposal of the carcass failed to comply with this 
requirement.  
Finding of fact six is a legal conclusion, unsupported by underlying 
facts.1  

 

[¶16]   In finding eight, the Board found that 
Billings "breached his contracts with clients" through various failings.  However, the 
finding does not articulate which clients were affected, the terms of the 
contracts, or even which contracts were breached.  Finding three is similarly inadequate.  The finding does 
not tell us whom Billings assaulted, whom he called a son of a bitch, whom he 
challenged to a fight, or under what circumstances all these actions 
occurred.  

 

[¶17]   Finding number five suffers from other 
problems.  
There, the Board found that Billings had willfully endangered the health 
and safety of Dan Nutsch by permitting him to be injured while caring for 
livestock "which should have been properly cared for by employees of John R. 
Billings."  In 
addition to challenging the sufficiency of this finding, Billings also argues it 
lacks record support.  
In Billings' view, this finding amounts to a conclusion that his conduct 
fell below the standard of care for those in his industry.  He contends that, 
because no expert testimony on the issue was presented to the Board, the record 
does not support the finding.  Obviously, clients on an outfitted hunting 
trip must participate in the adventure.  The extent of such participation, however, is 
not something this court has within its knowledge.  

 

[¶18]   Perhaps the Board, which consists2 of a number of persons who would undoubtedly 
qualify as experts in the field of outfitting, used its expertise to determine 
that Billings' actions failed to meet his duty of care as an outfitter.  However, our 
decision in Devous v. State Board of Medical 
Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 418 (Wyo. 1993), does not permit the Board to do 
that:

 

Turning then to the appeal of 
the Board with respect to the decision of the district court to set aside 
certain statutory grounds for failure of substantial evidence, we affirm the 
district court in that regard.  The crux of the issue is whether the record 
must include expert testimony with respect to those statutory grounds, or 
whether we must acknowledge and accept the expertise of the Board members in 
establishing standards that demonstrate infringement of the statute.  There was no expert 
testimony offered at the hearing to establish standards with respect to these 
statutory grounds.  
If judicial review has any purpose, it must be exercised by objectively 
evaluating evidence in the record.  There is no way that a judicial review could 
reach the subjective determination of standards by individual members of the 
Board.  
Consequently, in order to maintain the integrity of judicial review, we 
conclude it is necessary that, with respect to the violations that were asserted 
under Wyo. Stat. § 33-26-402(a)(xv), (xviii), and (xxvi), expert testimony in 
the record was required and, lacking such testimony, there is no substantial 
evidence to sustain those allegations.  

 

In this case, if the Board intends to rely on a finding 
that Billings' conduct regarding the mule kick incident fell below the standard 
of care for those in his industry, the Board should rely on expert testimony in 
making such a finding.  In this case, it would not have been 
difficult for the Board to obtain such expert testimony, as many of the 
witnesses would probably have qualified as experts in this field due to their 
"knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education."  W.R.E. 702.  Regardless, absent 
any indication in its findings that the Board is relying on expert testimony, we 
conclude that the finding is insufficient to permit review.  

 

[¶19]   In defending its decision, the Board's 
brief to this court provides numerous citations to the record pointing to 
evidence that it claims supports its findings.  However, appellate briefing is not the place 
to articulate sufficient findings of fact.  It is not the duty of this court to analyze 
and assess evidence presented to an administrative body to determine the weight 
to be given evidence or the credibility to be afforded witnesses.  State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div. v. Roggenbuck, 
938 P.2d 851, 854 (Wyo. 1997); Carrillo v. State ex rel. 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 987 P.2d 690, 693 (Wyo. 1999).  Instead, it is 
simply our task to determine whether the evidence supports the administrative 
decision.  We 
have previously accepted findings of fact that were "sparse."  Whiteman v. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., Dep't of 
Employment, 984 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Wyo. 1999).  Here, however, the record includes over 1200 
pages of transcript and over 60 exhibits.  The court is repeatedly left with the 
question "Why" when reviewing the Board's findings.  We thus conclude 
those findings are inadequate to permit appellate review.  We are not 
requiring perfection from the Board.  However, some explication of the basic facts 
is required before this or any court can review an agency decision. 

 

[¶20]   Billings also complains that the 
Board's decision to revoke his license is not supported by clear and convincing 
evidence, the burden of proof in license revocation cases.  Dorr v. Wyoming Board of Certified Public Accountants, 
2001 WY 37 ¶8, 21 P.3d 735 ¶8 (Wyo. 2001); Painter v. 
Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 939-40 (Wyo. 2000); Devous v. 
State Board of Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 416 (Wyo. 1993).  Here, however, we 
decline to perform such a review without adequate findings of fact. 

 

The Board's Rules

 

[¶21]   Billings lodges a litany of complaints 
against the rules promulgated by the Board.  To address these issues, we will first set 
out the statutes and rules the Board utilized to revoke Billings' license.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
23-2-416 (LexisNexis 2001), provides in pertinent part:

 

(a)       The board may * 
* * suspend or revoke a license issued under this act for any of the following 
causes:

 

* * *

 

(iv) Violation of any significant federal or state law or 
related regulations pertaining to wildlife, game and fish;

 

(v) Unethical or dishonorable conduct;

 

(vi) A substantial breach of contract with any person using 
outfitting or professional guiding services of the licensee;

 

* * *

 

(ix) Willfully endangering the health and safety of any 
person;

 

(x) Violation of this act or any rule or regulation of the 
board.

 

[¶22]   Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
23-2-410(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999),3 the Board has promulgated rules regarding 
revocation.  
Those rules provide in pertinent part: 

 

CHAPTER 3   REGULATORY PROVISIONS 

 

Section 1.  Rules of Professional Conduct.  The following 
includes, but is not limited to, rules of professional conduct, a violation of 
which may be considered unethical or dishonorable conduct; 

 

* * * 

 

(e) A licensee shall comply with all local, state and 
federal laws and regulations pertaining to wildlife, game and fish. 

 

* * * 

 

(k) A licensee shall not breach a contract with any person 
using outfitting or professional guide services of the licensee. 

 

* * * 

 

(n) A licensee shall maintain neat, orderly and sanitary 
camps at all times and shall provide clean, fresh drinking water, protect all 
food from contamination and dispose of all garbage, debris and human waste.  Livestock 
facilities shall be separate from camp facilities.  Streams shall be 
protected from contamination. 

 

(o) A licensee shall not willfully endanger the health and 
safety of the public. 

 

(p) A licensee shall provide a licensed professional guide 
for every two (2) hunters in wilderness areas and for up to six (6) hunters in 
all other areas of the State. 

 

* * * 

 

(t) A licensee shall not violate any provision of the Act. 

 

Section 2. Denial, Suspension and Revocation. Failure to 
comply with any provision of these Rules shall be grounds for denial of an 
outfitter or professional guide license or any other discipline to include, but 
not limited to, suspension for a period not to exceed three (3) years or 
revocation of any outfitter or professional guide license issued by the 
Board. * * *   

 

[¶23]   Billings claims the Board has 
promulgated and applied rules that exceed the statutory authority granted to the 
Board by the legislature.  After a comparison of the statute and the 
Board's rules, we agree with Billings that subsections (e) and (k) of Chapter 3, 
Section 1, operate to exceed the Board's statutory authority.  

 

[¶24]   It is well established that:

 

An administrative agency is limited in authority to powers 
legislatively delegated.  "Administrative agencies are creatures of 
statute and their power is dependent upon statutes, so that they must find 
within the statute warrant for the exercise of any authority which they 
claim."

 

Amoco Production Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 
12 P.3d 668, 673 (Wyo. 2000) (citations omitted).  "An agency is wholly without power to modify, 
dilute or change in any way the statutory provisions from which it derives its 
authority."  Platte Development Co. v. State, Environmental Quality 
Council, 966 P.2d 972, 975 (Wyo. 1998).  Thus, administrative agencies are bound to 
comply with their enabling statutes.  Sears v. Romer, 
928 P.2d 745, 751 (Colo.App. 1996).  An administrative rule or regulation which is 
not expressly or impliedly authorized by statute is without force or effect if 
it adds to, changes, modifies, or conflicts with an existing statute.  Id.  Conversely, a rule or regulation which is 
expressly or impliedly authorized by the enabling statute will be given force 
and effect.  Id.; Public Service Comm'n v. 
Formal Complaint of WWZ Co., 641 P.2d 183, 186 (Wyo. 1982) (An agency's 
"implied powers are only those derived by necessary implication from express 
statutory authority granted to the agency."); Painter v. 
Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 938 (Wyo. 2000) ("Administrative rules and regulations 
have the force and effect of law.").  Indeed, the Wyoming legislature has 
implicitly recognized these limitations on rulemaking authority.  The statute that 
permits the Insurance Commissioner to promulgate rules, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
26-2-110(a), provides:  "No rule or regulation shall extend, modify 
or conflict with any law of this state or the reasonable implications 
thereof."  
Cited in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Wyoming Ins. Dep't, 793 P.2d 1008, 1012 (Wyo. 1990).

 

[¶25]   With the combination of § 1(e) and § 2, 
the Board has established that a license may be revoked for a failure to comply 
with any local, state, 
or federal law or regulation pertaining to wildlife, game or fish.  The authority 
provided by statute is more limited:  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(iv) provides 
that a license may be revoked only for violation of "any significant federal or 
state law or related regulations pertaining to wildlife."  (Emphasis 
supplied.)  
Because § 1(e) has the effect of changing the statutory terms "any 
significant" to "all," that regulation has expanded the power of the Board by 
permitting it to revoke a license for violation of any law or regulation rather 
than violation of only the significant ones.  The possibility exists that the Board, as 
evidenced by its regulation, considers all "state and federal law[s] and 
regulations pertaining to wildlife" to be significant.  However, such an 
analysis would effectively delete the term "significant" from the statute and 
would be contrary to the legislative will.  Section 1(e) is beyond the power granted to 
the Board.    

 

[¶26]   Section 1(k) similarly expands the Board's 
power.  The 
statutory provision, § 23-2-416(a)(vi) permits revocation of a license for a 
"substantial" breach of contract.  Section 1(k), on the other hand, increases 
the power of the Board by permitting it to revoke a license for any breach of 
contract, not just a substantial breach.  Section 1(k) is, therefore, beyond the power 
of the Board.  

 

[¶27]   Although we have determined that §§ 
1(e) and 1(k) are invalid, this does not mean the Board is precluded from 
utilizing the comparable statutory provisions (§§ 23-2-416 (a)(iv) & 
(vi)).  See Wyoming Mining Ass'n v. 
State, 748 P.2d 718, 724 (Wyo. 1988) ("A clear statutory direction is 
enforceable by an agency in accordance with its plain meaning without 
promulgation of a rule.")  Despite Billings' complaints that the Board 
has provided no definition of which regulations will be considered significant, 
that is not a concern in this case.  The federal regulation/order in question 
relates to the disposal of carcasses and was enacted to prevent those carcasses 
from attracting grizzly bears.  Indeed, the regulation/order was implemented 
"with a primary goal of minimizing grizzly/human encounters."  Common sense and 
human experience tell us that human interaction with grizzly bears is a 
dangerous and potentially deadly proposition.  Peterson v. Game and 
Fish Com'n, 989 P.2d 113, 116 (Wyo. 1999).  We have no trouble concluding that a 
regulation/order developed to minimize such interactions is "significant."  As for whether any 
breaches of contract by Billings were "substantial," we are confident that the 
Board, in any future order applying this provision (§ 23-2-416(a)(vi)) will 
explain why a breach of contract is "substantial." 

 

[¶28]   Billings also contends the Board's 
rules do not contain adequate objective standards.  Initially, we agree 
with Billings that the terms "unethical or dishonorable" conduct contained in § 
23-2-416(a)(v) are too amorphous to permit the Board to invoke them without 
providing further guidance as to what it considers unethical or 
dishonorable.  
Otherwise, any action by the Board would be arbitrary and 
capricious.  In 
so concluding, we rely on Matter of Bessemer Mt., 
856 P.2d 450, 453 (Wyo. 1993), where this court held that 

 

the 
EQC cannot classify lands within the state as "very rare or uncommon" without 
first establishing by regulation the criteria and factors which will set the 
standard for that classification.  We are satisfied that, in the absence of such 
a regulatory standard, the phrase "very rare or uncommon" is too amorphous to 
permit judicial review of the action of the EQC.  Consequently, any such classification 
inherently is arbitrary and capricious.

 

We 
find this reasoning equally applicable in this case.  

 

[¶29]   At the same time, we conclude that the 
legislature, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-410(a)(ii), intended to provide 
the Board with the discretion to promulgate rules pertaining to unethical and 
dishonorable conduct.  
We again rely on Matter of Bessemer Mt., 856 P.2d  at 454, where it was written:

 

We 
are satisfied the intent of the legislature was to invoke the expertise of the 
EQC to establish by regulation the factors and criteria that will serve as a 
standard for making the classification of "very rare or uncommon."   When the 
legislative mandate is broad, as in this case, the administrative agency must 
invoke expertise to create standards, which will furnish notice to the public of 
how the decision may be reached.  The creation of such standards serves to 
eliminate any need to develop standards on a case by case basis, which is 
time-consuming; may lead to inconsistent results; and severely inhibits judicial 
review.

 

[¶30]   Taking its cue from the legislature, 
the Board has created rules of professional conduct in chapter 3 of its 
regulations.  A 
breach of those rules amounts to "unethical or dishonorable conduct."  To the extent the 
Board has taken the subjects laid out in the statute and incorporated those into 
the definition of unethical or dishonorable conduct, we see no problem.  Although this form 
of rule making may be duplicative of the power the Board has been granted by the 
legislature, we find nothing inherently improper with it.  

 

[¶31]   Regardless, there are two matters 
involving alleged unethical or dishonorable conduct we must consider 
further.  We 
first examine § 1(n), which permits the Board to take action based on a 
licensee's failure to maintain a neat, orderly, and sanitary camp.  Billings is correct 
that this regulation lacks a clear statutory basis.  However, that does 
not necessarily mean the Board was without power to promulgate the regulation 
that designates this conduct as unethical or dishonorable.  As we have 
previously stated, the Board has been given the power to promulgate rules.  The question, then, 
is whether § 1(n) is impliedly authorized by the enabling statute.  Billings makes no 
attempt to establish why § 1(n) is beyond the power of the Board.  He does not provide 
any cogent argument why the Board cannot conclude that the failure to maintain a 
neat and sanitary camp is "unethical or dishonorable."  He has thus not 
persuaded this court that the Board lacked the power to promulgate this 
rule.  Under 
these circumstances, the rule will be given effect. 

 

[¶32]   Next, we examine finding of fact three 
and conclusion of law four, where the Board found that Billings (1) acted 
unethically and dishonorably and (2) willfully endangered his clients by calling 
a client a "son of a bitch"; challenging a client to a fight; and assaulting a 
client.  The 
first problem is that neither the finding nor the conclusion specifies which 
conduct amounts to willful endangering and which conduct it considers unethical 
or dishonorable.  
It is clear that, in finding that Billings called someone a "son of a 
bitch," the Board was relying on a letter written by Billings addressed to a 
client who was dissatisfied with Billings' services.  In the letter, 
Billings suggests this manner of settling their differences:  "Preferably we can 
accomplish this, one son of a bitch to another, with our fists."  We agree that 
Billings' conduct is unfortunate.  However, we do not agree that the reference 
to "son of a bitch" in a letter endangered the client when he received the 
letter at his home in Tulsa, Oklahoma.  Thus, the question is whether this conduct 
can be penalized in reliance on only the statutory terms "unethical or 
dishonorable conduct."  As we have previously stated, to simply tag 
the conduct unethical or dishonorable is not sufficient under Bessemer Mt.  Therefore, we cannot find a statute or 
regulation that clearly permits the Board to punish Billings for such 
conduct.  

 

[¶33]   As for the assault and the challenge to 
a fight, perhaps assaulting clients and challenging them to fights could be 
considered willful endangerment.  However, at this point, we cannot tell if 
this is what the Board intended by its finding and conclusion.  The Board will have 
the opportunity to clarify this point in further proceedings.

 

[¶34]   Billings also complains that certain 
statutory provisions require definition.  He complains that the Board must define 
"willfully endangering" found in § 23-2-416(a)(ix).  We are of the 
opinion that those terms are not so technical that further definition is 
required.  In 
Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 658 (Wyo. 2000), in 
the context of the child endangerment statute, this court agreed with a number 
of decisions that "concluded that some form of the term endanger' has an easily 
and commonly understood meaning and is not vague."  As for the term 
willful, we have previously stated, in a license revocation case, that when 
looking at the willfulness of a licensee's conduct, this court's duty was "to 
determine if the evidence establishes intentional, or knowing, or voluntary acts 
as distinguished from accidental."  Kirbens v. State Bd. 
of Medicine, 992 P.2d 1056, 1064 (Wyo. 1999).  We conclude the Board was not required to 
define "willfully endangering."

 

[¶35]   Billings also complains that the Board 
must define the term "violation" found in § 23-2-416(a)(iv).  However, we agree 
with the State that this term needs no further definition.  Violation in this 
context simply means non-compliance with the law or regulation in question.  

 

[¶36]   Billings next complains the Board 
improperly relied on grizzly bear regulation in its decision.  He argues that, 
before the Board may rely on federal regulations, those regulations must be 
incorporated into the Board rules in accord with WAPA.  We disagree.

 

[¶37]   The statute 
Billings relies on, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-103(h) (Lexis 1999), provides:  

 

(h)  An agency may incorporate, by reference in 
its rules and without publishing the incorporated matter in full, all or any 
part of a code, standard, rule or regulation that has been adopted by an agency 
of the United States or of this state, another state or by a nationally 
recognized organization or association, provided:

 

(i)  Incorporation of the full text in agency 
rules would be unduly cumbersome or expensive;

 

(ii)  The reference in the rules of the 
incorporating agency fully identifies the incorporated matter by location, date 
and otherwise, and states that the rule does not include any later amendments or 
editions of the incorporated matter;

 

(iii)  The agency, organization or association 
originally issuing the incorporated matter makes copies of it readily available 
to the public and the rules of the incorporating agency state where such copies 
are available;

 

(iv)  The incorporating agency maintains and makes 
available for public inspection a copy of the incorporated matter and the rules 
of the incorporating agency state where copies of the incorporated matter are 
available at cost from the incorporating agency; and

 

(v)  The incorporating agency otherwise complies 
with all procedural requirements under this act and the rules of the registrar 
of state agency rules governing the promulgation and filing of agency rules.

 

Billings' reliance on Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-3-103(h) under his circumstances is misplaced.  First, nothing in 
this provision (or the outfitter statutes) requires that federal regulations be 
incorporated into the Board's rules before the Board can rely on a violation of 
the same to suspend or revoke a license.  Indeed, the "may" language found in (h) 
clearly indicates permissive authority.  Rawson v. State, 
900 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Wyo. 1995).  More importantly, we need not reach the issue 
presented by Billings because it is clear that Billings was aware of, and 
subject to, the federal regulation.  During examination by the Board, Billings 
admitted the grizzly bear regulation was given to him as part of his Special Use 
Permit issued by the United States Forest Service.  Under these 
circumstances, we reject Billings' argument. 

  

 

[¶38]   Billings next contends that he was not 
afforded proper notice of the allegations against him, as required by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-3-113.  
Specifically, he complains of insufficient notice of (1) the willful 
endangerment allegation concerning the mule kick incident and (2) the allegation 
that he breached his contracts with clients by failing to maintain a proper 
hunter-to-guide ratio.  Regarding the mule kick incident, the Board's 
complaint alleges the mule Mel kicked a client.  Although the complaint neither specifies that 
Nutsch was the client who was kicked nor that it was actually the mule Bo that 
did the kicking, it is clear that Billings had notice of the mule kick 
incident.  
First and foremost, the Board's answers to interrogatories identify 
Nutsch as the person injured as a result of interaction with Mel.  In addition, 
Billings' own testimony clearly establishes that he had notice of the 
incident.  Not 
only did Billings visit Nutsch in the hospital the day of the incident, he 
performed his own investigation.  In so doing, he requested his employees 
provide detailed written statements about the mule kick incident.  Moreover, Nutsch 
has filed suit against Billings to recover for personal injuries suffered as a 
result of being kicked.  We conclude Billings was provided sufficient 
notice of this allegation. 

 

[¶39]   As for Billings' complaint that he was 
not provided sufficient notice of the hunter-to- guide ratio problems, we again 
disagree.  Not 
only does the complaint against Billings generally allege that he failed to 
provide adequate professional guiding services, it specifically alleges that 
clients were unable to hunt because of lack of guides.  This clearly raises 
the issue of the proper number of guides, a requirement set out in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 23-2-401(a).  
Billings' argument is rejected.

 

 

 

[¶40]   Along with his petition for review of 
agency action, Billings filed a declaratory judgment action pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.12 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-101 et seq. (Lexis 
1999).  In the 
declaratory judgment action, Billings seeks a declaration that various 
provisions of the outfitter statutes and the Board's rules are 
unconstitutional.  
The Board argues that the declaratory judgment action has been improperly 
joined with the petition for review and that the declaratory judgment action 
must be brought separately.  However, the Board has not appealed from the 
district court's certifying case to the supreme court certification order.  In that order, the 
district court concluded that the declaratory judgment action was properly filed 
and certified the declaratory judgment action along with the petition for 
review.  
Because the Board did not appeal, we cannot address its contentions.  We will, however, 
address whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain a declaratory judgment 
action that has been certified by the district court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b).

 

[¶41]   In the published order of In re Conflicting Lease Application for Wyoming 
Agricultural Lease No. 1-7027, 972 P.2d 586, 587 (Wyo. 1999), this court 
addressed the method by which a party may assail the constitutionality of a 
statute that grants agency authority.  There, we (1) reiterated that an 
administrative agency has no authority to determine the constitutionality of a 
statute and (2) indicated that the district court and this court have no 
"authority on review of an agency decision to hold a statute unconstitutional vel non."  Id.  Based on these 
principles, we concluded that the "appropriate course for an aggrieved party to 
pursue when a statute that affords authority to an agency is deemed to be 
unconstitutional is found in and preserved by the provisions of W.R.A.P. 
12.12."  Id.  That rule indicates that the remedy to be 
sought is an independent declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that 
the statute is unconstitutional.  See In re Worker's Compenation Claim of Shryack, 3 P.3d 850, 856-57 (Wyo. 2000); Dorr v. Wyoming Board of 
Certified Public Accountants, 2001 WY 37 ¶13, 21 P.3d 735 ¶13 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

[¶42]   Despite Billings' attempt to follow our 
mandate, we find no authority in W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) or elsewhere in the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure for the district court to certify the declaratory judgment 
action.  
W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) indicates that a certification order is limited to the 
issues found in the petition for review of an agency action.  In re Conflicting Lease Application, 972 P.2d  at 
587.  Perhaps 
more importantly, the district court's certification order has the effect of 
giving this court original jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment 
action.  Such 
original jurisdiction is not contemplated by the declaratory judgment statute or 
the Wyoming Constitution.  We conclude the district court was without 
authority to certify the declaratory judgment action; and we, therefore, cannot 
address the issues presented by Billings' declaratory judgment action.  Despite this, we 
are comfortable in concluding that Billings' claims have been substantially 
resolved by this opinion.

 

 

 

[¶43]   For the reasons stated, we remand this 
case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment vacating the 
order of the Board and remanding the proceedings to the Board for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

FOOTNOTES

1This court is 
aware that Billings, under examination from the Board, agreed that disposal of 
the mule carcass was not in accordance with the federal regulation.  However, we make 
our conclusion for the edification of the Board and because there are other 
significant inadequacies in the Board's order.

2Pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-408 (Lexis 1999), the Board is comprised of four members 
representing outfitters, one member of the Wyoming game and fish commission, and 
two members from the public at large.

3That subsection 
provides:

 

(a)        The board 
shall:

 

            
* * * 

            
(ii) Carry out the provisions of this act and in accordance with the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, adopt necessary rules and regulations for 
carrying out this act including requirements for training, experience and 
knowledge of relevant law and rules and regulations as may be imposed upon 
outfitters and professional guides, the content and requirements for examination 
of license applicants and other necessary and reasonable rules[.]