Case Title: Martin v. State

Citation: 175 Vt. 80, 2003 VT 14, 819 A.2d 742

Docket Number: 2001-214

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Martin v. State (2003-214); 175 Vt. 80; 819 A.2d 742

2003 VT 14

[Filed 07-Feb-2003]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2003 VT 14
  	
                                No. 2001-214

  Carol Ann Martin	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Washington Superior Court

  State of Vermont, Agency of Transportation
  Department of Motor Vehicles	                 March Term, 2002

  Matthew I. Katz, J.

  John H. Bloomer, Jr. of McClallen & Bloomer, P.C., Rutland, for
    Plaintiff-Appellant.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, William E. Griffin, Chief Assistant
    Attorney General, and Bridget C. Asay, Assistant Attorney General, 
    Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       ¶  1.  AMESTOY, C.J.   Plaintiff Carol Ann Martin appeals the
  superior court's decision upholding the Department of Motor Vehicle's (DMV)
  refusal to issue her a special motor vehicle license plate displaying the
  letters "IRISH."  We conclude that the administrative regulation upon which
  DMV based its ruling is inconsistent with, and thus unauthorized by, the
  governing statute.  Accordingly, we reverse the superior court's decision.

       ¶  2.  This case is an example of what can happen when law and common
  sense depart.  The governing statute provides that the Commissioner of DMV
  "may refuse to honor any [vanity plate] request that might be offensive or
  confusing to the general public."  23 V.S.A. § 304(d).  Neither DMV in
  refusing to grant the "IRISH" plate, nor the State in its argument before
  this Court, have asserted that "IRISH" is a word that might be offensive to
  the public - undoubtedly because the general public would find the
  assertion more offensive than the word. (FN1)   Rather, DMV's decision, the
  superior court's opinion upholding that decision, and the State's defense
  of both rely upon an administrative regulation that seeks to insulate the
  vanity plate program from constitutional attack by removing the
  Commissioner's statutory obligation to determine a requested plate's
  potential to offend the general public. (FN2)   That the Legislature could
  relieve the Commissioner of such an obligation we have no doubt.  But until
  that body has chosen to do so by amending the statute currently granting
  the Commissioner the authority to refuse only those requests that "might be
  offensive or confusing to the general public," we cannot find a legal basis
  to uphold a regulation that assumes powers greater than those set forth in
  the statute purportedly authorizing the regulation.
        
       ¶  3.  The instant case arose when Martin submitted a special plate
  application to DMV listing two choices, "IRISH" and "IRISH1."  Martin
  received a letter from DMV stating that her application could not be
  processed because the Commissioner may deny any special plate request that
  might be offensive or confusing to the general public. (FN3)   Martin
  requested an administrative hearing, which was held before a DMV hearing
  officer.  At the hearing, DMV did not offer any specific evidence
  indicating that the requested plate might be offensive to the general
  pubic, but rather relied exclusively upon the new regulation's categorical
  exclusion of references to ethnic heritage.  In her written decision
  upholding the denial of Martin's request, the hearing officer concluded
  that the Commissioner has the authority to deny a request for special
  plates referring to ethnic heritage, irrespective of whether the reference
  is a positive or negative connotation.

       ¶  4.  Martin appealed that ruling to the superior court pursuant to
  V.R.C.P. 74 (appeals from decisions of governmental agencies).  The court
  held a hearing at which both Martin and the State presented oral argument. 
  In its written decision following the hearing, the court rejected Martin's
  request for declaratory relief based on the following rationale:

    Given the statutory authority to ban the offensive, and the
    constitutional mandate to avoid viewpoint discrimination, the
    Commissioner's regulation to place ethnic references off the table
    for license plates is reasonable, statutorily authorized and
    constitutionally necessary if the state is to preserve its vanity
    license plate program and also avoid the issuance of patently
    offensive license plates.
          
       ¶  5.  On appeal to this Court, Martin argues that the amended
  regulation is invalid because it is contrary to the intent of the
  Legislature, overbroad, and arbitrary.  Martin also argues that both the
  regulation and its governing statute, 23 V.S.A. § 304(d), violate the First
  Amendment of the United States Constitution because they give DMV
  unfettered discretion to discriminate based on the viewpoint of the
  applicant.  The State responds that the regulation is consistent with §
  304(d), and is necessary both to insulate the statute from constitutional
  challenges and to alleviate DMV's administrative burden.  The State also
  contends that Martin's constitutional arguments were waived  and, in any
  event, are without merit.
   
                                     I.

       ¶  6.  This case is unusual in that it is the anticipation of a
  constitutional challenge that formed the basis of not only the superior
  court's decision and the State's defense of the case, but also of the
  challenged regulation itself.  Through regulation, the State sought to
  resolve a legal dilemma - how does one constitutionally implement a statute
  when the Commissioner's discretion to issue vanity plates must be grounded
  in a determination of what might offend the public, given the
  susceptibility of such a statute to constitutional attack for allowing
  viewpoint discrimination in a designated or nonpublic forum?  It is the
  attempt of the State's lawyers to address this legal dilemma that frames
  this case.

       ¶  7.  To be sure, the State's sensitivity to the potential
  constitutional complications of a vanity plate program is well founded. 
  While a special plate program limiting requests to names and places would
  negate all but the most frivolous challenges, the decision of state
  legislatures to authorize more expansive (and lucrative) vanity plate
  programs has implicated more significant First Amendment concerns. 
  Although courts and commentators have differed on the extent to which the
  establishment of a vanity plate regime implicates free speech rights, there
  is little doubt that there are some constitutional limitations on the
  government's authority in this area. (FN4)  See generally M. Herald,
  Licensed to Speak: The Case of Vanity Plates, 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 595
  (2001); L. Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1357
  (2001).

       ¶  8.  But though the State's preemptive strike is understandable,
  neither its lawyers nor this Court is free to ignore the plain meaning of a
  legislative enactment in contemplation of its perceived legal infirmities. 
  Indeed, the State has cited no case law, and we have found none, suggesting
  that an administrative agency can promulgate regulations inconsistent with
  an unambiguous statute to save the statute from a potential constitutional
  attack.  Rather, the State cites In re G.T., 170 Vt. 507, 517,