Case Title: Tarr v. SUPERIOR COURT IN & FOR PIMA COUNTY

Citation: 142 Ariz. 349, 690 P.2d 68

Docket Number: 17652-PR

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1984-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
142 Ariz. 349 (1984) 690 P.2d 68 Betty A. TARR, a widow, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF PIMA, and The Honorable William N. Sherrill, Judge thereof, Respondents, and J.R. "Jona" JENSEN and Jensen & Jensen General Contractors, Real Parties in Interest. No. 17652-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. October 31, 1984. *350 Scott & Renneckar by Kirk S. Cookson, Tucson, for petitioner. Gerard Anderson, Tucson, for real parties in interest. CAMERON, Justice. Plaintiff, Betty Ann Tarr, brought this petition for review of an opinion and decision of Division Two of the Court of Appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. Art. 6, § 5(3) and Rule 23, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, 17A A.R.S. We must decide the following issue: The facts necessary for a disposition of the issue follow. On 7 November 1983 plaintiff filed an action for breach of contract and misrepresentation in Pima County Superior Court against J.R. Jensen and Jensen & Jensen General Contractors, the defendants. Defendants failed to answer within the twenty days required by Rule 12(a) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., and on 29 November a default was entered against them. On 2 December, defendants filed an answer and counterclaim. A default judgment was entered against defendants on 5 December. Defendants moved, on 1 March 1984, to set aside the default and to vacate the default judgment. The trial court vacated the default judgment but refused to set aside the entry of default. Plaintiff then filed a petition for special action in Division Two of the Court of Appeals. The court accepted jurisdiction and affirmed the trial court action. Tarr v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 371, 690 P.2d 90 (App. 1984). In so doing, Division Two held contrary to a decision of the Court of Appeals, Division *351 One, Anderson v. White, (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (Meyerson, J., dissenting). We took jurisdiction to resolve the conflicting positions of the two Divisions of the Court of Appeals. Rule 55 states: Rule 55 is a severe remedy. When a default is entered, a defaulted party loses all rights to litigate the merits of the cause of action. A default does not, however, prevent one who has been defaulted from appearing in the action. As our Court of Appeals has noted: Cook v. Steiner, 22 Ariz. App. 505, 505, 528 P.2d 1264, 1264 (1975). Rule 55(b)(2) states: The notice requirement of subsection (b)(2) furnishes some protection to those litigants who have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court by making an appearance to contest the entry of default or, in an unliquidated case, introduce evidence concerning the extent of their liability. See Neis v. Heinsohn/Phoenix, Inc., 129 Ariz. 96, 101, 628 P.2d 979, 984 (App. 1981). Because of the desirability of deciding cases on the merits rather than on the pleadings, courts have construed the term "appearance" liberally. Our Court of Appeals has stated that "any action on the part of defendant, except to object to the jurisdiction over his person which recognizes the case as in court, will constitute a general appearance * * *." Austin v. State ex rel. Herman, 10 Ariz. App. 474, 477, 459 P.2d 753, 756 (1969). Furthermore, we have found that a defendant "appeared" even though formal procedures were not followed. For instance, we have held that a letter written by the employer-garnishee denying indebtedness was an appearance. We stated that McClintock v. Serv-Us Bakers, 103 Ariz. 72, 74, 436 P.2d 891, 893 (1968). The Court of Appeals, Division One, in Anderson v. Wilson, supra, has stated, however, that a late answer does not constitute an appearance. Citing Long-Cleveland-Hayhurst & Co. v. Peterson, 91 Ariz. 47, 369 P.2d 666 (1962) and Martin v. Sears, 45 Ariz. 414, 44 P.2d 526 (1935), the court stated that this late answer did not constitute an appearance because: "[w]hen a party is defaulted he has no right to participate in any further proceedings in the case, except to file a motion to set aside the default and petition for leave to appear and answer." We disagree with the majority opinion in Anderson, supra, and agree with the dissent, which reads as follows: We believe that a late filing of an answer may constitute an appearance under Rule 55(b)(2), supra. See Annot., 27 A.L.R.Fed. 620 (1976). We hold, therefore, that in the instant case the defendants submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and their actions constituted an appearance sufficient to entitle them to notice pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2). Anything to the contrary in Anderson v. Wilson, 140 Ariz. 64, 680 P.2d 200 (App. 1984) is disapproved. The Court of Appeals, Division Two, decision in this matter is approved, and the decision of the trial court is affirmed. HOLOHAN, C.J., GORDON, V.C.J., and HAYS and FELDMAN, JJ., concur.