Case Title: Snell v. Office of the Chief Medical Examiner

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11530

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11530 
 
EMORY G. SNELL, JR.  vs.  OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MEDICAL EXAMINER. 
 
 
April 22, 2019. 
 
 
Practice, Civil, Action in nature of mandamus.  Office of Chief 
Medical Examiner.  Public Records. 
 
 
 
Emory G. Snell, Jr., appeals from a judgment of the county 
court denying his complaint for relief in the nature of 
mandamus.  Snell was convicted of murder in the first degree, 
based in part on the testimony of a medical examiner who 
performed an autopsy on the body of the victim, Snell's wife.  
Commonwealth v. Snell, 428 Mass. 766, 769, cert. denied, 527 
U.S. 1010 (1999).  In 2012, pursuant to the public records law, 
G. L. c. 66, § 10 (a), Snell requested from the Office of the 
Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) twenty-seven categories of 
documents concerning that medical examiner.1  The OCME denied the 
request, asserting that the information requested, to the extent 
that it existed, was exempt from disclosure under G. L. c. 4, 
§ 7, Twenty-sixth (c), because it was in the medical examiner's 
personnel file.  Snell appealed to the supervisor of records 
                     
 
1 It appears that, separately from these proceedings, Snell 
has moved for a new trial in his criminal case and has sought 
similar postconviction discovery in connection with that motion.  
These efforts have met with some success, as a judge in the 
Superior Court ordered the OCME to produce the medical 
examiner's personnel file, along with other documents, for in 
camera review.  After oral argument in this matter, the OCME 
informed us that it produced the personnel file and that after 
in camera review, the judge found that it contained no documents 
relevant to Snell's motion for a new trial.  We express no view 
whether that ruling was correct, and we need not determine 
whether these developments render this appeal moot. 
2 
 
 
(supervisor).  At the request of the public records division, 
the OCME provided a specific response to each of the twenty-
seven categories, claiming as to most of the categories either 
that the documents were exempt from disclosure or that the OCME 
had no responsive documents.  By letter dated March 8, 2013, the 
supervisor, noting that a document is not exempt from disclosure 
merely because it is contained in a personnel file, instructed 
the OCME to review its records; redact them where necessary; 
provide them to Snell; and, to the extent that the OCME claimed 
the records were exempt from disclosure, provide a comprehensive 
response to support the exemption claim.  When the OCME did not 
do so in a timely manner, Snell filed his complaint, which 
sought an order directing the OCME to comply with the 
supervisor's March 8, 2013, letter.  
 
 
The single justice properly denied relief.  "When a single 
justice denies relief in the nature of mandamus, '[her] 
determination will rarely be overturned.'"  Watson v. McClerkin, 
455 Mass. 1002, 1003 (2009), quoting Mack v. Clerk of the 
Appeals Court, 427 Mass. 1011, 1012 (1998).  "A complaint in the 
nature of mandamus is 'a call to a government official to 
perform a clear cut duty,' and the remedy is limited to 
requiring action on the part of the government official."  Ardon 
v. Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 464 Mass. 1001, 1001 
(2012), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 872 (2013), quoting Simmons v. 
Clerk-Magistrate of the Boston Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 
448 Mass. 57, 59-60 (2006).  As the single justice stated, Snell 
made no showing that the OCME had a clear cut duty to produce 
any of the documents he was requesting or that the OCME was 
refusing to produce any record that was not exempt from 
disclosure under the public records law.  Nor is there any 
indication in the record that the OCME was refusing to comply 
with the supervisor's instructions.  In these circumstances, 
Snell has not shown that he was entitled to relief in the nature 
of mandamus. 
 
 
Moreover, "[i]t would be hard to find any principle more 
fully established in our practice than the principle that 
neither mandamus nor certiorari is to be used as a substitute 
for ordinary appellate procedure or used at any time when there 
is another adequate remedy."  Myrick v. Superior Court Dep't, 
479 Mass. 1012, 1012 (2018), quoting Rines v. Justices of the 
Superior Court, 330 Mass. 368, 371 (1953).  A person requesting 
public records may commence a civil action in the Superior Court 
to enforce the public records law.  G. L. c. 66, § 10A (c).  
Snell offers no reason why this would not have been an adequate 
3 
 
 
remedy in these circumstances.  The single justice neither erred 
nor abused her considerable discretion by denying relief.2   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
Emory G. Snell, Jr., pro se. 
 
David R. Marks, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
 
                     
 
2 The OCME has moved to dismiss this appeal as moot, arguing 
that, after the single justice's decision, it supplemented its 
initial response to Snell's public records request and that 
therefore Snell has received all the relief he requested in his 
mandamus complaint.  We need not determine whether the OCME's 
supplemental response in fact fully disposed of Snell's 
requests.